Title: State v. Seaton

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Nancy J. Pinno, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
--------------------------------------------- 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Travis J. Seaton, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Muss  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
CROOKS, BRADLEY, JJ., dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For defendant-appellant Nancy J. Pinno, there were briefs 
by Len Kachinsky and Sisson and Kachinsky Law Offices, Appleton, 
and oral arugment by Len Kachinsky.  
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2 
For defendant-appellant Travis J. Seaton, there were briefs 
by Amelia L. Bizzaro and Bizzaro Law LLC, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Amelia L. Bizzaro. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, 
attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert J. Dreps, Aaron 
A. Seligman, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin 
Freedom 
of 
Information 
Council, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Broadcasters 
Association, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Newspaper 
Association.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918   
(L.C. No. 
2009CF189 & 2006CF446) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Nancy J. Pinno, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Travis J. Seaton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Fond du Lac County, Richard J. Nuss, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   These cases are before the 
court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
2 
 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2011-12).1  The court of appeals certified 
both State v. Pinno and State v. Seaton because these unrelated 
cases present the question whether the closure2 of a public 
criminal trial without objection from the defendant is subject 
to a waiver analysis or a forfeiture analysis on review.3 
¶2 
Fond du Lac County Circuit Judge Richard J. Nuss 
(Judge Nuss) presided over jury trials in Pinno and Seaton, 
including the voir dire proceedings.  In both voir dire 
proceedings, the judge said he wanted the public to leave the 
courtroom to make room for large jury panels.  Neither defendant 
objected, and both defendants were later found guilty by juries 
in trials that were completely open after the juries were 
selected. 
¶3 
The defendants, Travis J. Seaton (Seaton) and Nancy J. 
Pinno (Pinno), pursued postconviction relief, and in both cases 
Judge Nuss found that the courtroom had never actually been 
closed to all members of the public not part of the jury panel.  
In Seaton's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, filed almost four years 
after the guilty verdict, Seaton alleged that a second, unknown 
closure took place in his case when someone stood in front of 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-
12 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 References to a closed courtroom in this opinion refer to 
the exclusion of at least some members of the public from the 
courtroom.  The opinion does not use "closure" to suggest that 
no one, other than the parties and their attorneys, is or was 
permitted to be present in the courtroom. 
3 State 
v. 
Pinno, 
Nos. 
2011AP2424-CR 
& 
2012AP918, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2012). 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
3 
 
the courtroom doors to prevent the public from reentering the 
courtroom.  Judge Nuss denied all postconviction motions, and 
these appeals followed. 
¶4 
Seaton and Pinno argue that a violation of the public 
trial right is structural error, and the right is not forfeited 
by their failure to make timely objections.  Both defendants 
argue 
in 
the 
alternative 
that 
they 
received 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel because their attorneys failed to timely 
object to the exclusion of the public from voir dire.  In 
addition, Seaton argues that he was denied his right to an 
impartial judge when Judge Nuss failed to grant Seaton's recusal 
motion. 
¶5 
We reach the following conclusions. 
¶6 
First, the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
extends to voir dire.  Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 
(2010).  A judge's decision to "close" or limit public access to 
a courtroom in a criminal case requires the court to go through 
an analysis on the record in which the court considers 
overriding interests and reasonable alternatives as set out in 
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 48 (1984).  The court must 
make specific findings on the record to support the exclusion of 
the public and must narrowly tailor the closure.  Id. 
¶7 
Second, the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
may be asserted by the defendant at any time during a trial.  A 
defendant who fails to object to a judicial decision to close 
the courtroom forfeits the right to a public trial, so long as 
the defendant is aware that the judge has excluded the public 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
4 
 
from the courtroom.  Although the Supreme Court has categorized 
a violation of the right to a public trial as a structural 
error, that categorization does not mandate a waiver analysis, 
and a defendant need not affirmatively relinquish his right to a 
public trial in order to lose it.  It would be inimical to an 
efficient judicial system if a defendant could sit on his hands 
and try his luck in a closed courtroom only to argue after his 
conviction that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had 
been violated.   
¶8 
Third, the records in these cases are clear that 
neither Seaton nor Pinno objected to the alleged courtroom 
closure.  In Seaton's case, the allegation that courtroom 
personnel prevented the public from reentering the courtroom 
does not alter the analysis because Seaton was aware of the 
initial exclusion.  If courtroom personnel did prevent the 
public from coming back into the courtroom, that prevention was 
part of the initial exclusion.  Therefore, Seaton and Pinno both 
forfeited their rights to a public trial.   
¶9 
Fourth, defendants must demonstrate prejudice to prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object 
to the closure of the courtroom.  The categorization of the 
denial of the public trial right as structural error does not 
create a presumption of prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Seaton and Pinno have not proven that they were 
prejudiced by their attorneys' failure to object to the 
exclusion of the public from the courtroom.  Therefore, both 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
5 
 
defendants 
have 
failed 
to 
prove 
that 
their 
counsel 
was 
ineffective. 
¶10 Finally, Seaton was not denied his right to an 
impartial judge.  Judge Nuss's communications show that he was 
cognizant of his responsibilities under the Judicial Code of 
Conduct, and he did not appear to be biased.  We presume that 
judges are impartial, and Seaton has not offered sufficient 
evidence to rebut that presumption.  Therefore, Judge Nuss 
properly denied the recusal motion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. State v. Seaton 
¶11 Travis 
J. 
Seaton 
was 
charged 
with 
first-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
as 
a 
repeater 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.02(1) and 939.62(1)(c), on November 17, 2006.  The 
charges stemmed from an incident that occurred in the early 
morning hours of November 15 in the City of Fond du Lac.  Seaton 
was involved in an altercation with Keith Rockweit (Rockweit) 
outside a bar.  Seaton threw a single punch that caused Rockweit 
to fall down and hit his head on the concrete pavement.  Seaton 
was arrested a few minutes later about two blocks from the bar.  
Rockweit was taken to a hospital and treated for cerebral 
hemorrhaging and a broken jaw, but he died later that day. 
¶12 Seaton engaged Attorneys Gerald P. Boyle and K. 
Richard Wells to represent him at trial, which was scheduled for 
March 24, 2008.  Attorney Wells handled voir dire for the 
defendant. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
6 
 
¶13 Before voir dire began, Judge Nuss attempted to make 
room for the large incoming jury panel, indicating that he might 
clear the courtroom: 
THE COURT: All right.  Couple housekeeping matters 
that the Court will then address.  First of all, just 
for those others that are in attendance, . . . there's 
a hundred jurors coming in.  Obviously we're short on 
space.  And their comfort and availability will not be 
compromised by anyone else in the courtroom if it 
becomes necessary, I'm just going to excuse everybody 
in the courtroom, that's the way it's going to be.  
We'll have to be certainly sensitive to that, I'm 
certainly sensitive to the victim, I'm certainly 
sensitive to the Defendant, but jurors come first.  
And so the Court will address that. 
 
Let me just invite [the clerk's opinion].  With 
the space that we have, do you think the jurors will 
be able to be seated in here? 
THE CLERK: I believe so.  Twenty-four in the jury box.  
We'll probably have to clear the courtroom first. 
THE COURT: All right.  And so we probably will do that 
just to be on the safe side. 
¶14 No one objected. 
¶15 The jury panel entered the courtroom at 9:40 a.m.  
Before 
the 
jury 
entered, 
the 
court 
disposed 
of 
several 
evidentiary 
issues 
and 
made 
the 
following 
concluding 
observation: 
[T]he 
Court 
wants 
to 
address 
those 
others 
in 
attendance.  If there is one hint of one word of any 
juror at all for any reason, all are going out.  Okay?  
I'm not going to pick and choose or identify any 
particular individual.  Mum is the word while the 
Court is engaged in its voir dire . . . .  I don't 
expect 
any 
comments 
made, 
I 
don't 
expect 
any 
snickering, I don't expect any outbursts, I don't 
expect anything.   And if one person says one thing or 
makes one comment that I can hear up here, the whole 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
7 
 
courtroom is going to be cleared of those individuals.  
All right?   
(Jury enters the courtroom at 9:40 a.m.) 
¶16 The record shows that the court actually seated 91 
potential jurors, 14 of whom were ultimately selected for the 
jury.  After the jurors were selected the court asked: "Does 
either attorney have any motions to make regarding the jury 
selection process?"  Both the prosecutor, Assistant Attorney 
General Thomas L. Storm, and defense counsel, Richard Wells, 
specifically answered, "No, Your Honor."  Then the jury was 
sworn and excused for lunch.  Again the court asked counsel: 
"Counsel 
have 
anything 
for 
the 
Court?" 
 
Attorney 
Wells 
responded, "No." 
¶17 On March 28, 2008, the jury found Seaton guilty of 
first-degree reckless homicide as a repeater, and on August 6, 
2008, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison and 15 years of 
extended supervision.  Seaton moved for an order granting a 
mistrial,4 which the circuit court denied in a written order on 
December 23, 2008. 
¶18 On February 16, 2009, Seaton filed a postconviction 
motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30.  In that motion, Seaton 
                                                 
4 In the motion, Seaton alleged that one of the jurors 
encountered Seaton's aunt at a gas station before the trial and 
told her that he had read a news article about Seaton and was 
convinced that Seaton was guilty.  The juror did not reveal that 
conversation during voir dire.  At a hearing on the motion for a 
mistrial on October 31, the allegedly biased juror testified 
that he did not get the paper and did not read anything about 
the trial before it began.  He said he did not talk to anyone 
about the trial before it began and did not know what the 
charges against Seaton were before trial. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
8 
 
argued that his sentence was too harsh, reasserted his argument 
that one of the jurors was biased, and argued that "other acts 
evidence" was used improperly.  The circuit court held a hearing 
on the motion on April 2, 2009 and denied Seaton's motion in its 
entirety on April 13, 2009.  On April 28, 2009, Seaton filed a 
notice of appeal.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court on July 14, 2010.  Seaton did not raise his present Sixth 
Amendment and ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the 
court of appeals.5  On August 13, 2010, this court received 
Seaton's petition for review, which we subsequently denied. 
¶19 On January 4, 2012, Seaton filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.066 
motion and requested an evidentiary hearing.  In the memorandum 
                                                 
5 Up to this point, Seaton was represented by Boyle, Boyle & 
Boyle, S.C.  Seaton subsequently retained Bizzaro Law LLC to 
petition this court for review after the first appeal and to 
pursue other postconviction relief. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(1) states: 
(1) After the time for appeal or postconviction 
remedy provided in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner 
in custody under sentence of a court or a person 
convicted and placed with a volunteers in probation 
program under s. 973.11 claiming the right to be 
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
U.S. 
constitution 
or 
the 
constitution or laws of this state, that the court was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that 
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 
by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, 
may move the court which imposed the sentence to 
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
 . . . . 
(4) All grounds for relief available to a person 
under this section must be raised in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
9 
 
supporting his postconviction motion, Seaton argued for the 
first time that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was 
violated.  In the alternative, Seaton argued that his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the closure of the 
courtroom.  Seaton attached an affidavit of Kevin Kirkpatrick 
(Kirkpatrick) to support his motion.  Kirkpatrick said that 
Seaton's attorney had hired him to investigate whether the 
courtroom was closed to the public during voir dire.  The 
affidavit alleged that someone stood outside the courtroom and 
prevented the public from reentering.  Kirkpatrick said he 
attempted to get the names of the bailiffs who allegedly 
prevented the public from coming back into the courtroom, but 
Judge Nuss denied that request.  In the affidavit, Kirkpatrick 
describes interviews conducted in November and December 2011 
                                                                                                                                                             
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental or amended 
motion. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
10 
 
with several people who were present during voir dire.7  
Kirkpatrick filed an open records request on November 29, 2011, 
asking for the names of the bailiffs who prevented the public 
from reentering the voir dire proceedings and for the names of 
the deputies that were assigned to the courtroom on that day.  
Judge Nuss denied that request in a handwritten letter.8 
¶20 Kirkpatrick wrote Judge Nuss to request an interview, 
but Judge Nuss declined that request in a letter dated December 
                                                 
7 On November 13, 2011, juror Lisa Krusick told Kirkpatrick 
that the jury box and courtroom seats were filled with 
prospective jurors, and she could not recall anyone in the 
courtroom other than the attorneys and court officials.  Juror 
Ruth Molloy told Kirkpatrick on November 15, 2011, that she did 
not remember anyone other than the judge being in the courtroom 
while Judge Nuss was questioning the potential jurors.  Also on 
November 15, 2011, Roy Seaton said that he and his family were 
made to leave the courtroom, and he saw the victim's family 
leaving as well.  He said that someone guarded the doors to 
prevent his family from reentering the courtroom.  Seaton's 
mother, his wife, and his sister-in-law confirmed Roy Seaton's 
account.  Deputy Michael Hardengrove told Kirkpatrick on 
November 29, 2011, that he did not remember whether he was 
working during the voir dire in Seaton's case, but he said that 
the public had been excluded from the courtroom in the past to 
make room for jurors when the jury pool was large.  On December 
7, 2011, David Lorenz, who was a potential juror but was not 
selected, told Kirkpatrick that only the attorneys and courtroom 
personnel were in the courtroom during voir dire.  Courtroom 
clerk Cathy Mikle told Kirkpatrick on December 28, 2011, that 
she "vaguely remembered the courtroom being cleared." 
8 The note said, "Request denied given absence of proper 
basis, lack of justification warranting the same and in the 
public interest."  In a post scriptum, Judge Nuss said, "This 
case was affirmed on appeal & petition for review before the 
Supreme Court denied.  Given the same the Court considers this 
case closed." 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
11 
 
29, 2011.9  In his letter, Judge Nuss said, "Be advised that as 
presiding Judge and in order to insure that the integrity of the 
official court file and record are preserved, your request to 
interview me is being respectfully denied."  Judge Nuss assured 
Kirkpatrick that he never denied any party the right to a public 
trial and cautioned Kirkpatrick that his interview request could 
"be considered as an 'ex parte communication' . . . .  The Code 
of 
Judicial 
Ethics 
and 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
specifically 
prohibit[] a Judge from considering the same." 
¶21 Also on December 28, Seaton's new attorney, Amelia 
Bizzaro (Attorney Bizzaro), filed an open records request with 
the Fond du Lac County Corporation Counsel for the names and 
contact information of the bailiffs assigned to Judge Nuss's 
courtroom on March 24, 2008.  The Fond du Lac County Clerk of 
Courts granted the request in part on December 29, 2011, and 
supplied the names of the bailiffs but did not provide their 
contact information. 
¶22 On January 4, 2012, the same day he filed the § 974.06 
motion, Seaton also filed a motion requesting that Judge Nuss 
recuse himself.  The circuit court held a hearing, on April 13, 
2012, for argument on the § 974.06 and recusal motions.  The 
hearing was limited to argument; it was not an evidentiary 
hearing. 
                                                 
9 In the letter, Judge Nuss said that information about the 
bailiffs was not available when Kirkpatrick requested it earlier 
because the record was still at the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but 
he said the Clerk of Courts would provide the information now 
that the record had been returned. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
12 
 
¶23 At the hearing, Judge Nuss explained:  
What happened quite simply is that we had 91 jurors to 
come in and the Court in anticipation of that jury 
panel 
being 
brought 
in . . . noted 
that 
some 
individuals were seated in areas where quite frankly 
the jury panel was going to have to sit.  I had to sit 
67 people behind the rail someplace. 
He said that he "wanted to be very respectful of the seating 
space 
limitation, 
preventing 
unnecessary 
nonjurors 
from 
intermingling with and compromising the jury panel, protection 
of the jurors to maintain that impartiality and really most 
importantly to ensure and promote the protection of the 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury."  Judge Nuss 
also explained: 
But what happened was this Court did nothing more than 
excuse those that in fact were in the courtroom to 
step out until that jury was brought in . . . .  And 
the Court was very careful never to lock it, never to 
close it . . . .  It was for the sole and exclusive 
purpose of facilitating the sitting of the jury.  Once 
that jury was seated those individuals were welcome 
back in.  We tried to bring the jury up as close as we 
could.  We did that.  There was space.  There were 
others there. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶24 At the hearing, Judge Nuss denied the request for an 
evidentiary hearing as well as the motions for recusal and 
postconviction relief, and he issued a written order denying the 
same on April 16, 2012.  Seaton appealed the denial of the 
§ 974.06 and recusal motions on April 23, 2012. 
B. State v. Pinno 
¶25 Judge Nuss presided at a second, unrelated jury trial 
approximately 21 months after the Seaton verdict.  The case 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
13 
 
involved Nancy J. Pinno who was accused of assisting her 
biological son, Brandon Mueller (Mueller), in disposing of the 
body of his girlfriend, whom Mueller had killed a few weeks 
earlier.  Pinno purportedly transported the woman's body in her 
car to the house of a friend.  There, Mueller and Pinno's friend 
burned the body before they dumped the woman's ashes into a hole 
they drilled in the ice on Lake Winnebago. 
¶26 Unsurprisingly, the case drew wide attention as it 
preceded 
Mueller's 
homicide 
and 
corpse 
mutilation 
trial.  
Pinno's attorney filed a motion on November 10, 2009, to change 
the venue or to bring in jurors from another venue because of 
the high level of publicity that the case had received.10  Pinno 
went to trial on December 14, 2009, on charges of mutilating a 
corpse as a party to the crime contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.11(1) and 939.05 and resisting or obstructing an officer 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). 
¶27 Pinno was represented by Attorney Catherine Block 
(Attorney Block).  In the first hour of the trial, before voir 
dire, Judge Nuss made several comments about excusing non-jurors 
during voir dire. 
MS. BLOCK: The two gentlemen who just walked in are 
friends of Nancy Pinno.  They are not witnesses. 
THE COURT: They will be excused during the voir dire. 
MS. BLOCK: Understand. 
                                                 
10 The court denied the motion at a hearing on November 16, 
2009. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
14 
 
THE COURT: So as soon as we get done with the current 
issues . . . we'll then, as far as those non jurors 
are concerned, they're all going to be excused.  And 
there are no victim's family issues here. . . .  
[T]here's victim family, but there's nobody here in 
that regard, correct? 
MS. WERNER: Not yet.  There will be. 
THE COURT: Later, okay.  I just want to give 
deference——a victim certainly is entitled to be in the 
courtroom during voir dire, and I just want to respect 
that.  So if they are here, I want to give deference 
to that.  If they are not here, it's a nonissue. 
MS. WERNER: They will be here this morning. 
THE COURT: Okay.  But once we start voir dire there 
won't be anybody coming in and out of here until after 
the jury is selected. 
¶28 Before the jury came in, Judge Nuss said:  
Others that are in the courtroom, . . . when we come 
back we're going to take a brief recess when we come 
back.  Other than the jury, nobody will be in the 
courtroom.  Okay.  So just have the jury panel in 
here.  I want no one else in here during the entire 
voir dire process until the jury is selected.  Any 
press in here?  (No response)  I want no press in here 
either. 
 
 . . . . 
Any other housekeeping?  (No response.)  Excellent.  
Let's recess . . . . 
No one objected to the order closing voir dire.  After the 
recess and before the jury came in, Judge Nuss gave counsel an 
opportunity to raise any concerns when he asked, "Any other 
matters that require judicial intervention before we have the 
jury brought in?"  District Attorney Daniel Kaminsky replied, 
"Nothing from the State."  Attorney Block responded, "I don't 
believe so, Your Honor." 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
15 
 
¶29 After the jury was selected, Judge Nuss asked counsel: 
"Does either attorney have any motions to make regarding the 
jury selection process?"  Both District Attorney Kaminsky and 
Attorney Block replied: "No, Your Honor." 
¶30 On December 18, 2009, the jury found Pinno guilty of 
mutilating a corpse as a party to the crime and of obstructing 
an officer.  She was sentenced to seven and a half years of 
confinement and five years of extended supervision for the 
mutilating a corpse count, and nine months of confinement to be 
served consecutively for obstructing an officer.11  On August 3, 
2011, Pinno filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02, arguing that she was denied her right to a public 
trial when the judge removed the public from the courtroom 
during voir dire.  In the alternative, she argued that her 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the clearing of 
the courtroom. 
¶31 At the evidentiary hearing for the postconviction 
motion, Judge Nuss explained: 
I believe we had a jury panel of 85, there might have 
been 83 or something that actually showed up . . . .   
 
 . . . . 
And so the Court given due respect to the public trial 
aspect of this matter recognized that during voir 
dire . . . the Court had no choice other than to limit 
admission of the public to the courtroom in the 
                                                 
11 Pinno was represented by Attorney Catherine Block until 
the postconviction stage of the proceedings, at which point 
Attorney Leonard Kachinsky was appointed to represent her. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
16 
 
interest of justice and for other reasons that I'll 
comment on.  But it was a numbers issue at that point. 
Judge Nuss put his clerk, who was sitting in the courtroom 
during voir dire, on the stand, and she stated that the 
courtroom "was never locked."  The clerk also said that "there 
[were] people that were in the courtroom and that were allowed 
to come in and out of the courtroom" during the voir dire 
process, but she could not remember who came in and could not 
describe them. 
¶32 Attorney Block also took the stand during the motion 
hearing.  Attorney Block testified that she did not object to 
the court's exclusion of the public because "[t]he motion or the 
order of the Court or the statement of the Court was never 
readdressed [after they took a break] and therefore I never 
brought it up again or objected to it as I didn't believe it had 
taken place."  Attorney Block said that because the court did 
not try to close the courtroom after the break, she felt no need 
to address it.  In addition, Attorney Block thought that the 
presence of the public could potentially negatively affect voir 
dire and noted "that the media coverage up to the trial was 
relatively inflammatory in nature."  Pinno's postconviction 
counsel said, "I would have to agree to some extent with [the 
District Attorney] that you can't fault Ms. Block too much for 
not interrupting the Court in the middle of the Court's 
Statement. . . .  That's not clearly the strongest prong of our 
motion in this case." 
¶33 After hearing all the evidence, Judge Nuss denied 
Pinno's motion orally and explained his reasoning:  
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
17 
 
With regard to the issue of closure, I just want to 
make it eminently clear here, I never closed the 
courtroom.  The courtroom was never closed.  It was 
never secured.  It was never locked.  The word was 
never mentioned.  There seems to be an aura of 
emphasis that this was in fact a closed hearing.  It 
was not. 
The court made it clear that it wanted to ensure that the jury 
pool was not tainted in any way and noted that "what is of 
importance 
also 
is 
the 
publicity 
that 
this 
case 
had 
gotten . . . ." 
¶34 The circuit court issued a written order denying 
Pinno's postconviction motion on October 3, 2011.  Pinno filed a 
notice of appeal on October 14, 2011. 
¶35 As 
noted, 
these 
cases 
came 
to 
this 
court 
on 
certification, which we accepted on February 25, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶36 This 
court 
applies 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
historical facts to determine whether a criminal defendant was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  State v. 
Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶45, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  We 
uphold the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  "The appellate court 
determines the application of constitutional principles to those 
evidentiary or historical facts independently of the circuit 
court and court of appeals but benefiting from those courts' 
analyses."  Id. (footnote omitted). 
¶37 Both cases raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.  "Whether counsel was ineffective is a mixed question of 
fact and law."  State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶19, 336 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
18 
 
Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 (citation omitted).  We will uphold 
the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, but ultimately, whether counsel provided ineffective 
assistance is a question of law subject to de novo review.  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
¶38 Seaton argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing based on his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion.  Whether a 
postconviction motion is sufficient to require an evidentiary 
hearing is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de 
novo.  Id., ¶18.  If the motion sets forth facts that, if true, 
would entitle the defendant to relief, normally the circuit 
court must hold an evidentiary hearing.  Id.  "However, if the 
motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to 
relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to 
grant or deny a hearing."  State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 (citations omitted). 
¶39 Finally, Seaton argues that Judge Nuss should have 
recused himself.  Whether a judge is required to recuse himself 
is a question of law subject to de novo review.  State v. 
Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 104-05, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982); State v. 
Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶7, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
19 
 
¶40 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides an accused the right to a public trial:12 
                                                 
12 Persons other than the defendant may invoke the right to 
a public trial under the First Amendment.  See Presley v. 
Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 212 (2010) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. 
v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501 
(1984)).  However, our analysis is limited to the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial.  See Presley, 558 U.S. at 213 
("The extent to which the First and Sixth Amendment public trial 
rights are coextensive is an open question, and it is not 
necessary here to speculate whether or in what circumstances the 
reach or protections of one might be greater than the other.").   
In addition to the First and Sixth Amendments, Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.14 also provides a basis for the public trial right.  That 
statute says: 
The sittings of every court shall be public and 
every citizen may freely attend the same, except if 
otherwise expressly provided by law on the examination 
of persons charged with crime; provided, that when in 
any court a cause of scandalous or obscene nature is 
on trial the presiding judge or justice may exclude 
from the room where the court is sitting all minors 
not necessarily present as parties or witnesses. 
Wis. Stat. § 757.14; see State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. 
Circuit Court for La Crosse Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 233, 340 
N.W.2d 460 (1983) (applying Wis. Stat. § 757.14 to voir dire 
proceeding).  The defendants do not mention this statute in 
their briefs as it would likely not provide the remedy they 
seek.  In La Crosse Tribune, the court ordered that the 
transcript be given to the plaintiff newspaper as a remedy for 
the judge's improper decisions to hold voir dire in his chambers 
and to exclude the reporter.  Id. at 224-30, 241 (noting also 
that "no meaningful order affecting the [defendant's] trial 
could be issued by this court" because voir dire had been 
completed and the trial was over).   
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
20 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Supreme Court has determined that 
the public trial right is applicable to the states based on its 
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Presley, 558 
U.S. at 211-12 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). 
¶41 The 
right 
to 
a 
public 
trial 
"has 
always 
been 
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our 
courts as instruments of persecution."  In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
at 270.  An open courtroom "is an effective restraint on 
possible abuse of judicial power" and a deterrent to arbitrary 
decision-making.  Id. (footnote omitted).  
¶42 This court indicated in Ndina that the Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial advances four core values: "(1) to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thus, the remedies available under Wis. Stat. § 757.14, 
namely, the production of the transcript of the private 
proceeding, would be insufficient to grant the desired relief to 
the defendants here.  We need not decide today whether someone 
other than the defendant can seek additional remedies under that 
statute. 
 
Moreover, 
Supreme 
Court 
"cases 
have 
uniformly 
recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the 
benefit of the defendant."  Presley, 558 U.S. at 213 (quoting 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)).  Although 
the public generally has an independent right to attend public 
trials, it would seem odd to allow a reversal of a judgment 
based on the demand of a member of the public.  Therefore, while 
the judge's orders in these cases likely violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.14, that issue is not before us, and the defendants' 
claims and requested remedies stem from the Sixth Amendment. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
21 
 
ensure a fair trial; (2) to remind the prosecutor and judge of 
their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their 
functions; (3) to encourage witnesses to come forward; and (4) 
to discourage perjury."  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶49 (quoting 
Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-47)).  However, the Ndina court noted 
that "[t]hese four values do not necessarily represent an 
exhaustive list of the values served by the Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial."  Id., ¶49 n.25 (citing Peterson, 85 
F.3d at 43 n.5). 
¶43 The right to a public trial includes suppression 
hearings, Waller, 467 U.S. 39, and voir dire, Presley, 558 U.S. 
209; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) 
(The Court in Press-Enterprise relied on the First Amendment, 
not the Sixth Amendment, to support the public trial right for 
the press.). 
¶44 Acknowledging the potential breadth of the right to a 
public trial, the fact remains that the right is not absolute.  
Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶44.  The Supreme Court "has made clear 
that the right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to 
other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a 
fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure 
of sensitive information."  Waller, 467 U.S. at 45.  "There are 
no doubt circumstances where a judge could conclude that threats 
of improper communications with jurors or safety concerns are 
concrete enough to warrant closing voir dire."  Presley, 558 
U.S. at 215.  "[T]he public-trial guarantee is not violated if 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
22 
 
an individual member of the public cannot gain admittance to a 
courtroom because there are no available seats.  The guarantee 
will already have been met, for the 'public' will be present in 
the form of those persons who did gain admission."  Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588-89 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
¶45 To close a courtroom proceeding to the public in a 
criminal case without violating a defendant's public trial 
right, the circuit court must ensure that the following four 
requirements are satisfied: (1) the party advocating for closure 
"must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be 
prejudiced"; (2) the closure must be narrowly tailored to 
protect the overriding interest; (3) the judge must consider 
reasonable alternatives to excluding the public; and (4) the 
judge must make specific findings to support the exclusion of 
the public so that a reviewing court may assess whether the 
courtroom was properly closed.  Waller, 467 U.S. at 45, 48. 
¶46 In addition to qualifying the denial of the public 
trial right as described, the Waller Court also determined that 
"the remedy should be appropriate to the violation" to prevent 
defendants from taking advantage of the error.  See id. at 50.  
In Waller, the trial court violated the defendant's right to a 
public trial when it excluded the public from a suppression 
hearing over a period of seven days.  Id. at 41-43.  The Court 
ordered a new suppression hearing rather than a new trial 
because if a second suppression hearing ended in the same result 
as the first, "a new trial presumably would be a windfall for 
the defendant, and not in the public interest."  Id. at 50 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
23 
 
(citations omitted).  Thus, even in the event of an improper 
courtroom closure, courts must carefully fashion a remedy to 
avoid granting a "windfall" to an opportunistic defendant.   
¶47 Because the right to a public trial is not absolute, 
excluding the public from the courtroom will not always be 
error.  When deprivation of the public trial right is an error, 
however, the Supreme Court has said that the error is 
structural——that it defies harmless error analysis.  Thus, it is 
important to consider how excluding the public from voir dire 
fits within the framework of structural error. 
A. Structural Error 
¶48 Both Pinno and Seaton contend that because violation 
of an accused's public trial right constitutes "structural 
error," the right cannot be forfeited——it must be waived.  
Consequently, they argue, any violation of the public trial 
right must be reviewed under a knowing, voluntary waiver 
standard. 
¶49 Although "most constitutional errors can be harmless," 
there are a very limited number of structural errors that 
require automatic reversal.  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
8 (1999) (citation omitted).  Structural errors are different 
from regular trial errors because they "are structural defects 
in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis 
by 'harmless-error' standards."  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279, 309 (1991).  Structural defects affect "[t]he entire 
conduct of the trial from beginning to end."  Id.  An error also 
may be structural because of the difficulty of determining how 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
24 
 
the error affected the trial.  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).   
¶50 The limited class of structural errors include: 
complete denial of the right to counsel,13 a biased judge,14 
excluding members of the defendant's race from a grand jury,15 
denial of the right to self-representation,16 denial of the right 
to 
a 
public 
trial,17 
and 
a 
defective 
reasonable 
doubt 
instruction.18  Neder, 527 U.S. at 8; see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 
U.S. 
at 
148-49, 
152 
(determining 
that 
violating 
a 
defendant's right to counsel of his choice is structural error).  
Because denial of the right to a public trial has been labeled a 
structural error, defendants generally do not have to show 
prejudice when they bring a properly preserved claim of 
violation.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50 & n.9; see also Neder, 
527 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted).   
¶51 Although the Supreme Court has cited Waller in saying 
that the denial of the public trial right is structural error,19 
Waller itself did not use that term.  The Court did not cite 
                                                 
13 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
14 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
15 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
16 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
17 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
18 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
19 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 
148-49 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
25 
 
Waller or refer to denial of the right to a public trial to 
illustrate structural defect until 1991.  Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
at 310.  Just two years later, the Court failed to mention 
Waller in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), a Sixth 
Amendment case in which the Court stated that denying a criminal 
defendant's right to a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt was 
structural error.  Id. at 281-82.  Even more quizzical, the 
Supreme Court did not use the term "structural error" at all in 
Presley, a 2010 decision involving a deprivation of the public 
trial right during voir dire.  See Presley, 558 U.S. 209.  The 
Presley Court relied heavily on Waller but did not refer to the 
error as structural, perhaps realizing that such a label is 
somewhat dubious in comparison to the other errors that share 
the structural error designation. 
¶52 The fact that Waller says the public trial right is 
not absolute and cautions that courts should impose a remedy 
that is appropriate to the violation undermines the "structural" 
nature of the error.  Thus, we are left with a questionable 
proposition: 
excluding 
the 
public 
from 
the 
courtroom 
is 
structural error unless it is not error at all.  We recognize 
the importance of maintaining and enforcing constitutional 
rights, but we have difficulty with a label——structural error——
that equates the right to a completely open criminal trial with 
the right to an attorney or the right to an unbiased judge. 
¶53 In any event, if the exclusions of the public during 
the voir dire proceedings in Pinno and Seaton were structural 
errors, that does not end the analysis.  The Supreme Court's 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
26 
 
decision regarding the closure of voir dire in Presley provides 
a helpful factual comparison.  In Presley, the judge told the 
defendant's uncle, who was the lone courtroom observer, that he 
had to leave the courtroom for the duration of voir dire.  Id. 
at 210.  The defendant's attorney objected to the judge's 
exclusion of the defendant's uncle, but the judge explained that 
the uncle could not "intermingle" with the jurors and that he 
could come back after voir dire.  Id.  The defendant moved for a 
new trial and offered evidence to show that the entire jury 
panel could fit in the jury box and on one side of the 
courtroom, leaving the other side open for the public.  Id. at 
210-11.  The exclusion of the public in Presley was perhaps 
exacerbated by the fact that "[n]othing in the record show[ed] 
that the trial court could not have accommodated the public at 
Presley's trial."  Id. at 215. 
¶54 While there are similarities among Presley and the two 
cases before us, there is one crucial difference.  In Presley, 
the defendant immediately objected to the closure.  Id. at 210.  
Even granting that the violation of the right to a public trial 
is structural error, the Supreme Court has never said that the 
structural nature of that error exempts the defendant from an 
obligation to object to a violation.  See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 
U.S. 868, 893 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing 
concern that the Court failed to determine whether a structural 
right may be forfeited by failure to object and opining that 
"structural constitutional claims[] have no special entitlement 
to review.").  Freytag involved a different kind of structural 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
27 
 
defect——an alleged violation of the Appointments Clause and 
separation 
of 
powers——but 
Justice 
Scalia's 
analysis 
is 
persuasive as it pertains to the type of error in Pinno and 
Seaton.  Justice Scalia commented: 
Personal rights that happen to bear upon governmental 
structure are no more laden with public interest (and 
hence inherently nonwaivable by the individual) than 
many 
other 
personal 
rights 
one 
can 
conceive 
of . . . for example, . . . the Sixth Amendment right 
to a trial that is "public," provide[s] benefits to 
the entire society more important than many structural 
guarantees; but if the litigant does not assert [the 
right] in a timely fashion, he is foreclosed.   
Id. at 895-96.  (citations omitted). 
¶55 To decide this case, we must turn now to whether the 
right to a public trial may be forfeited by the defendant's 
failure to object to a courtroom closure. 
B. Waiver and Forfeiture 
¶56 We have recognized two distinct ways in which a 
defendant may give up his rights: waiver and forfeiture.  
"Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion 
of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right."  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶29 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).  The 
forfeiture rule facilitates fair and orderly administration of 
justice and encourages parties to be vigilant lest they lose a 
right by failing to object to its denial.  Id., ¶30.  
Contemporaneous objections give judges the opportunity to remedy 
an error so that it does not fester beneath the proceedings and 
infect the judgment of the court.  Forfeiture "prevents 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
28 
 
attorneys from 'sandbagging' opposing counsel by failing to 
object to an error for strategic reasons and later claiming that 
the error is grounds for reversal."  Id. (footnote omitted). 
¶57 In contrast, the waiver rule applies to rights that 
"are so important to a fair trial that courts have stated that 
the 
right 
is 
not 
lost 
unless 
the 
defendant 
knowingly 
relinquishes the right."  Id., ¶31.  To decide whether a 
forfeiture or waiver analysis is appropriate, "we look to the 
constitutional or statutory importance of the right, balanced 
against the procedural efficiency in requiring immediate final 
determination of the right."  State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶38, 
343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848.  Rights that must be waived if 
they are to be lost include the right to assistance of counsel, 
the right to refrain from self-incrimination, the right to trial 
by jury, and the right of the defendant to be in the same 
courtroom as the presiding judge.  Id., ¶¶37, 40; see State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶14, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  This 
court has not yet determined whether the right to a public trial 
is subject to a waiver or forfeiture analysis; courts are 
divided on this issue.  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶35.  We 
conclude that a criminal defendant may forfeit his right to a 
public trial when he knows of a court's order to exclude the 
public from the courtroom but fails to object. 
¶58 We can think of at least four reasons to support this 
conclusion. 
¶59 First, although the public trial right is very 
important, the absence of the public for part or even all of a 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
29 
 
criminal trial does not necessarily mean that the trial was 
unfair——that it did not serve its function as a reliable vehicle 
for the determination of guilt or innocence or that the 
punishment 
resulting 
from 
the 
trial 
was 
not 
legitimate.  
Juvenile proceedings are generally closed to the public, Wis. 
Stat. § 48.299, and many criminal hearings or even trials have 
no spectators to observe the proceedings.  The presence of the 
public at a trial serves as a deterrent against misconduct or 
unfairness in the trial, but the absence of the public does not 
automatically lead to misconduct or unfairness or any other 
circumstance prejudicial to the defendant. 
¶60 Second, a requirement that a defendant must waive his 
public trial right in order to lose it would effectively 
supersede the circuit court's acknowledged authority to close 
the courtroom for compelling reasons by applying and satisfying 
the four Waller factors.  The public trial right is not 
absolute.  If a right is so important to a fair trial that the 
right cannot be lost unless the defendant intentionally waives 
it, then the right cannot be taken away by the court solely to 
advance another party's interests. 
¶61 Third, 
the 
procedural 
efficiency 
in 
requiring 
objections to the denial of the public trial right favors a 
forfeiture analysis.  See Soto, 343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶¶36-38.  If 
waiver were required, a defendant could tax judicial resources 
by demanding a new trial if the judge excluded the public, even 
if the exclusion did not affect the proceedings.  For his 
inaction, the defendant could receive a fair trial as well as an 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
30 
 
automatic reversal if he did not like the outcome.  In such a 
scenario, waiver encourages gamesmanship.  The new trial would 
be a "windfall" for the defendant, a result that the Waller 
Court explicitly tried to prevent.  Balancing the importance of 
the public trial right and the efficiency of a contemporaneous 
determination of the right, it is evident that forfeiture is the 
proper analytical framework. 
¶62 Fourth, using a forfeiture analysis in this context is 
supported by language in both Waller and Presley.  The Waller 
Court concluded, "In sum, we hold that under the Sixth Amendment 
any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the 
accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its 
predecessors."  Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted).  Similarly, Presley said that "the accused 
does have a right to insist that the voir dire of the jurors be 
public . . . ."  Presley, 558 U.S. at 213 (first emphasis 
added).  Both cases use phrases suggesting that the onus is on 
the defendant to assert his right.  Thus, even though the denial 
of the public trial right has been deemed structural error, 
these cases use language that arguably promotes a forfeiture 
analysis. 
¶63 Contrary to the contentions of Pinno and Seaton, the 
structural nature of the error in denying the right to a public 
trial does not command a waiver analysis.  The Supreme Court has 
implied in dicta that a defendant may forfeit his right to a 
public trial.  See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 
(1991) (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
31 
 
(1960)), for the proposition that a defendant "waives" his right 
to a public trial by failing to object to courtroom closure).  
In Levine, the Court analyzed under the Due Process Clause the 
closure of the courtroom during a grand jury proceeding.  
Levine, 362 U.S. at 616.  The Court said:  
Due regard generally for the public nature of the 
judicial process does not require disregard of the 
solid demands of the fair administration of justice in 
favor of a party who, at the appropriate time and 
acting under advice of counsel, saw no disregard of a 
right, but raises an abstract claim only as an 
afterthought on appeal. 
Id. at 619-20.  Although Levine was not decided on Sixth 
Amendment grounds, we find its reasoning persuasive here and 
decline to allow defendants who failed to object to the closure 
of a courtroom to raise that issue for the first time after the 
trial is over.20  We conclude, therefore, that the Sixth 
                                                 
20 We are not alone in determining that a defendant forfeits 
the right to a public trial by failing to object.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138, 142-43 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that the defendant abandoned the right to a public 
trial by failing to object); United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 
146, 155 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1360 (2007) 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) ("[R]egardless of whether 
the Waller prerequisites are met, defendants can waive their 
right to a public trial. . . .   Where a defendant, with 
knowledge of the closure of the courtroom, fails to object, that 
defendant waives his right to a public trial."); People v. 
Vaughn, 821 N.W.2d 288, 308 (Mich. 2012) ("While a criminal 
defendant has the constitutional right to a public trial, that 
right is forfeited when no objection is made at the time of the 
courtroom's closure to members of the public."); State v. 
Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1989) ("We hold that the 
failure of a defendant and his or her counsel to object to a 
closure order constitutes waiver of the defendant's right to a 
public trial . . . .").  Although some of these cases use the 
term, "waiver," the context demonstrates that they are actually 
referring to what this court has deemed "forfeiture." 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
32 
 
Amendment right to a public trial may be forfeited when a 
defendant knows that the judge has ordered the public to leave 
the courtroom but does not object. 
1. Seaton's Voir Dire 
¶64 Chronologically, Seaton's case was tried first, but 
Seaton's claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
was violated did not come until nearly four years after the jury 
found him guilty.21  It came via a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion,22 
which alleged that after the judge ordered the public out of the 
courtroom, courtroom personnel stood outside and prevented the 
public from reentering.  Seaton argues that Judge Nuss's order 
and the courtroom personnel guarding the doors constituted two 
separate violations of his right to a public trial.  Judge Nuss 
did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Seaton's postconviction 
motion, so there was a lack of hard evidence to support his 
finding that the courtroom was never closed.  However, the 
                                                 
21 Pinno, by contrast, argued in her Wis. Stat. § 974.02 
motion on August 3, 2011, that the closing of voir dire violated 
her public trial right.  Thus, Seaton's § 974.06 motion, filed 
on January 4, 2012, came after Pinno's motion. 
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(4) requires that the defendant 
provide a sufficient reason for raising an issue for the first 
time in a § 974.06 motion when that issue "could have been 
raised on direct appeal or in a sec. 974.02 motion."  State v. 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).  
It is unclear why Seaton believes the denial of the public trial 
right could not have been raised in prior motions or on appeal.  
However, because the result that we reach has the same effect as 
determining 
his 
motion 
was 
procedurally 
barred, 
we 
will 
disregard the potential procedural defect for the purpose of our 
analysis. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
33 
 
record is clear that Seaton did not object to any closure that 
may have occurred.   
¶65 Seaton's argument that Judge Nuss's order and the 
bailiffs' blocking of the courtroom doors were two separate 
violations of his public trial right is unpersuasive.  Seaton 
had an opportunity to object to the closure of the courtroom 
when Judge Nuss ordered the public to leave, and he did not take 
that opportunity.  The bailiffs' actions were part of that same 
closure.  This would be a different case if Judge Nuss had made 
no order closing the courtroom, and bailiffs, acting on their 
own and without notifying anyone in the courtroom, had prevented 
the public from entering.  A defendant must have an opportunity 
to object to the closure if he is to forfeit his right to a 
public trial.  See Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶135 (Prosser, J., 
concurring) (stating that a defendant must "enter a timely 
objection to a violation of the right [to a public trial] unless 
the defendant is not in a position to do so").  In this case, 
Seaton and his three attorneys were aware that the judge made an 
order excluding the public, and no one objected.  Courtroom 
personnel did not create a separate closure if they acted to 
effect the court's order. 
¶66 An evidentiary hearing is normally required if the 
§ 974.06 motion alleges "sufficient facts that, if true, show 
that the defendant is entitled to relief."  Balliette, 336 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶18 (citation omitted).  Nothing in Seaton's 
§ 974.06 motion suggests that he objected to the courtroom 
closure.  Therefore, Seaton forfeited his right to a public voir 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
34 
 
dire, and the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in denying the § 974.06 motion without a hearing. 
2. Pinno's Voir Dire 
¶67 In Pinno's trial, Judge Nuss said, "[O]nce we start 
voir dire there won't be anybody coming in and out of here until 
after the jury is selected."  No one objected to Judge Nuss's 
statement.  Twenty-five pages later in the transcript, Judge 
Nuss reiterated that the courtroom would be closed: "Other than 
the jury, nobody will be in the courtroom."23  He made the second 
announcement before the court and parties took a short break, 
and no one objected.  On more than one occasion, Judge Nuss 
asked counsel if they had any motions, but the attorneys 
consistently responded that they did not.  
¶68 Pinno argued in a Wis. Stat. § 974.02 motion after 
trial that her right to a public trial was denied, and Judge 
Nuss held an evidentiary hearing.  At that hearing, Judge Nuss's 
clerk at the time said that the courtroom was not locked and 
that people came in and out during voir dire.  Pinno's trial 
                                                 
23 For the purpose of our analysis for both cases, we will 
assume that if the voir dire proceedings were closed, the 
closures were not trivial.  In both cases, the State argues that 
the Sixth Amendment was not implicated because of the trivial 
nature of the closure.  We have determined that a closure may be 
trivial "if the closure 'does not implicate the values served by 
the Sixth Amendment.'"  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶49, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (quoting United States v. Perry, 479 
F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  In Ndina we noted that it 
would be rare that exclusion of the defendant's friends and 
family would be trivial.  Id., ¶¶51-52.  Since the allegations 
are that Judge Nuss closed voir dire for the duration of that 
proceeding, we will assume that these cases do not present the 
rare circumstances in which the closure is trivial. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
35 
 
counsel said that because the judge did not address the issue 
again when they all came back from break, she did not feel the 
need to address it.  After hearing the evidence, Judge Nuss 
determined that the courtroom was never closed and denied the 
postconviction motion.  Based on the evidence at the hearing, 
Judge Nuss's finding that the courtroom was never closed is not 
clearly erroneous.  Even if the finding were erroneous, Pinno 
failed to object to any closure that took place.  Therefore, 
even if the courtroom was closed, Pinno forfeited her Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial. 
3. The Obligations of Circuit Courts 
¶69 Despite our conclusion that Seaton and Pinno forfeited 
their rights to a public trial by failing to object to the 
exclusion of some members of the public, we pause to reflect on 
the circuit court's handling of voir dire.  We do not doubt that 
the court had good intentions, but the court's good intentions 
cannot hide its seriously mistaken approach in the two cases. 
¶70 The Sixth Amendment affords an accused criminal 
defendant the right to a public trial.  This right has deep 
historical roots.  The news media and the public have an 
overlapping right that is guaranteed by the First Amendment.  
These rights are buttressed by the Wisconsin Constitution and 
state statutes.  They may not be diminished without very careful 
consideration that is detailed on the record. 
¶71 In these jury cases, the court was faced with large 
jury panels that would take up most of the seating space in the 
courtroom.  It was not unreasonable for the court to try to 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
36 
 
accommodate the seating and comfort of the jury panel.  It was 
not unreasonable to try to avoid any undue influence on the 
panel or disruption of the jury selection process.  It was not 
unreasonable to think about a defendant's interests in a case 
with sensational pretrial publicity.  What is troublesome here 
is the court's failure to appreciate that it could not act alone 
in addressing these concerns. 
¶72 When a party moves to close a courtroom in whole or in 
part, the court is accustomed to requiring the moving party to 
explain and justify the "overriding interest" that warrants this 
"rare" action by the court.  The movant has the burden of 
showing why its identified interest will be prejudiced by a 
public trial.  The closure must be tailored to protect that 
interest, alternatives to closure must be considered, and 
judicial findings sufficient to support the closure must be 
made. 
¶73 These requirements are not dispensed with when the 
court itself initiates the closure.  The court must consult with 
the parties, one of whom has a constitutional right to a public 
trial and one of whom has the dual responsibility of promoting 
the public interest in openness and protecting the record to 
avoid reversible error. 
¶74 Here the court did not protect the record.  The 
transcript suggests that the court made up its mind to close the 
courtroom without explaining the situation fully or soliciting 
the input of affected interests.  This flawed approach precluded 
a "tailored" solution or an alternative to closure or negotiated 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
37 
 
accommodations.  This approach discouraged collaboration.  This 
approach did not result in satisfactory findings for the record.  
The court's approach may have created disgruntlement on the part 
of people visiting the court, and it certainly fostered these 
appeals. 
¶75 When a court intends to close the courtroom to the 
public for any reason, it should go through the four Waller 
factors.  Possible alternatives to closure include "reserving 
one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel 
to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective 
jurors not to engage or interact with audience members."  See 
Presley, 558 U.S. at 215. 
¶76 Judges should also be cognizant of Wis. Stat. § 757.14 
and should follow this court's guidance: 
The trial judge should recite on the record the 
factors that impel him to close the courtroom and why 
such factors override the presumptive value of a 
public trial.  The findings of fact must be made with 
specificity.  The process must be a rational one, and 
the rationality of it must be demonstrated on the 
record, showing that the conclusion was reached on 
facts of record or which are reasonably derived by 
inference from the record.  Upon review an appellate 
court should be able to determine from the record 
whether discretion was in fact exercised and whether a 
reasonable judicial mind could have reached the 
conclusion it did.  A trial court is required to hold 
a hearing and publicly reach a conclusion based on the 
exercise of discretion prior to ordering a closing. 
The parties, and members of the public present in 
court, may appear at such hearing. 
State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La Crosse 
Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 236-37, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983).  "We 
agree with Professor LaFave that '[g]enerally, the best course 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
38 
 
of action is for the trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing 
on the issue of closure' when an order of the trial court 
implicates the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial."  Ndina, 
315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶63 (brackets in original) (quoting 6 Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.1(b), at 304 (3d ed. 
2007)). 
¶77 Whenever a judge wants to close the courtroom, the 
judge should engage in a discussion with defense counsel and 
should consider the concerns and preferences of the defendant.  
The judge should ask if the defendant has any family or friends 
in attendance.  If there is a victim, the same question should 
be asked of the state regarding the victim and the victim's 
family.  The judge should make an effort to seat the victim and 
the victim's family away from the defendant's family.  The judge 
should make an effort to seat members of the public away from 
the jury panel and should instruct the public and the potential 
jurors that they are not to communicate with each other during 
voir dire.  The judge should determine the presence of any 
members of the press and try to accommodate their interests even 
if they are late. 
¶78 Fairness is essential to our system of justice.  This 
fairness should be a pride of every court.  It is hard to 
demonstrate this fairness if the courtroom is closed——if 
citizens who have done nothing wrong are shooed away.  A judge 
should respect the importance of the duty to facilitate justice 
at every stage of the proceeding and should exercise great care 
that no rights are violated. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
39 
 
¶79 "Both the prosecutor and defense counsel should bring 
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial to the circuit 
court's attention and should assist the circuit court in 
crafting a closure order consistent with the Sixth Amendment's 
'basic tenet of our judicial system.'"  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
¶85 (quoting State v. Vanness, 2007 WI App 195, ¶8, 304 
Wis. 2d 692, 738 N.W.2d 154).   
¶80 Adopting the forfeiture rule here does not give judges 
carte blanche to order courtroom closures when defendants are 
inattentive.  Rights that can be forfeited are still rights, and 
judges and attorneys should strive to conduct trials in the 
fairest manner possible.  We hope that this opinion clarifies 
the proper procedure for closing a trial proceeding so that 
judges may act to protect the rights of defendants and the 
public and to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. 
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶81 Having determined that Pinno and Seaton forfeited 
their rights to a public trial, we turn now to the claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  To raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must show both 
(1) that his counsel's representation was deficient and (2) that 
this deficiency prejudiced him so that there is a 'probability 
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome' of the 
case."  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 
(1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984); State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 
(1990)). 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
40 
 
¶82 To demonstrate deficient performance, a defendant must 
show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness."  State v. Franklin, 2001 WI 104, 
¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 582, 629 N.W.2d 289 (quoting  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688).  To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show 
that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  
Id., ¶14 (quoting  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  Thus, "[t]he 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  Id. (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694) (brackets in original).  In conducting this 
analysis, courts should presume that the attorney has "rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 690. 
¶83 Pinno and Seaton both argue that because the right to 
a public trial is structural, prejudice must be presumed when 
counsel 
fails 
to 
object 
to 
a 
closure. 
 
However, 
the 
circumstances in which prejudice is presumed are rare.  We 
presume prejudice: (1) "when the effective assistance of counsel 
has 
been 
eviscerated 
by 
forces 
unrelated 
to 
the 
actual 
performance of the defendant's attorney," such as when counsel 
is 
denied 
entirely 
during 
critical 
stages 
in 
judicial 
proceedings; (2) when the circumstances are such that even a 
competent attorney could not provide effective assistance, such 
as when the state or the court interferes with counsel's 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
41 
 
representation; and (3) when the attorney engages in egregious 
conduct far outside the bounds of effective assistance such as 
providing representation under a conflict of interest or failing 
to 
present 
known 
evidence 
that 
calls 
into 
question 
the 
defendant's competency to stand trial.  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 
769-71 (citations omitted); see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-
98 (2002); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-93; United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984). 
¶84 This court also has presumed prejudice when defense 
counsel failed to object when the prosecutor materially breached 
a plea agreement with respect to sentencing by recommending 
prison time instead of remaining silent as agreed.  State v. 
Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 280-81, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997).  In 
deciding to presume prejudice, we noted that "[p]art of the 
rationale behind presuming prejudice is the difficulty in 
measuring the harm caused by the error or the ineffective 
assistance."  Id. at 280 (citations omitted).  However, Smith 
was different from the present case because when a prosecutor 
agrees not to make a sentence recommendation and breaches that 
agreement, the breach "is a 'manifest injustice' and always 
results in prejudice to the defendant."  Id. at 281 (footnote 
omitted) (citation omitted).  We cannot say the same for a 
denial of the public trial right during voir dire, which does 
not necessarily implicate manifest injustice concerns that exist 
in the plea context. 
¶85 We declined to extend the presumption of prejudice in 
Smith to a failure to object to a six-person jury in a 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
42 
 
misdemeanor case.  See Franklin, 245 Wis. 2d 582, ¶10.  Even 
though it is difficult to assess the harm from a six-person jury 
as opposed to a twelve-person jury, we determined that "six-
person juries do not invoke interests of justice factors which 
require 
an 
automatic 
finding 
of 
prejudice." 
 
Id., 
¶23.  
Moreover, when the case does not fall into one of the three 
categories in which prejudice is presumed, there is prejudice 
only when counsel's errors deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial.  Id., ¶24.  Because the denial of a twelve-person jury 
does not fit within the three categories in which we presume 
prejudice, no prejudice was presumed.  Id., ¶¶25-26.  We reach 
the same conclusion regarding the denial of the right to a 
public voir dire. 
¶86 Given that prejudice is rarely presumed, an error does 
not automatically receive a presumption of prejudice merely 
because it is deemed structural.24  Indeed, a rule that prejudice 
must be presumed when counsel fails to object to the exclusion 
of the public would effectively nullify the forfeiture rule.  It 
would not matter that the defendant failed to object because he 
                                                 
24 See Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 743 (11th Cir. 2006).  
In Purvis, the court said: 
For the same reasons that prejudice cannot be presumed 
in order to satisfy the prejudice requirement when an 
objection to structural error was not made at trial, 
it cannot be presumed to satisfy the prejudice 
component of an ineffective assistance claim arising 
from the same failure to preserve the structural 
error. 
Id. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
43 
 
could 
demand 
a 
reversal 
on 
appeal 
based 
on 
ineffective 
assistance if he could prove his counsel was deficient.  As 
discussed above, the denial of the right to a public trial does 
not always lead to unfairness or prejudice.  "Thus, only when 
surrounding 
circumstances 
justify 
a 
presumption 
of 
ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient 
without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial."  
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662 (footnote omitted).  Structural errors, 
generally, do not fall under one of those circumstances.25 
1. Seaton's Ineffective Assistance Claim 
¶87 Seaton 
argues 
in 
his 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06 
postconviction motion that his trial counsel was ineffective.  
However, Seaton's motion does not allege sufficient facts to 
entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.  Seaton makes the 
conclusory argument that "[a]ny failure to object was likely 
based on oversight or inattention, rather than any reasoned 
defense strategy and thus constitutes deficient performance."  
That argument hardly overcomes the presumption of adequate 
representation.  Moreover, as the State points out, counsel had 
a number of reasons for not objecting.  Seaton's attorneys might 
have concluded that it would be better not to have the public 
                                                 
25 Contrary to the assertions of both defendants, declining 
to presume prejudice when an attorney fails to object to the 
violation of the right to a public trial does not necessarily 
leave defendants without a remedy.  Defendants could potentially 
seek relief under the discretionary reversal statutes if the 
error involved a miscarriage of justice.  Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 
and 752.35.  
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
44 
 
sitting with jurors during voir dire for a homicide trial.26  
Seaton's attorneys may have determined that it was better not to 
delay matters27 and expend resources on a hearing to determine 
whether closure was warranted.  Thus, Seaton has failed to 
demonstrate that his counsel's failure to object to the 
exclusion of the public was objectively unreasonable. 
¶88 Even if Seaton's counsel had been deficient for 
failing to object, Seaton has not demonstrated that he was 
prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiency.  In his § 974.06 
motion, Seaton merely alleged that his counsel's failure to 
                                                 
26 Although it is clear that the danger of improper 
discussions between the public and jurors is not a proper basis 
for a judge to close voir dire, Presley, 558 U.S. at 215, that 
does not necessarily mean that it is unreasonable for counsel 
and even the defendant to prefer a private proceeding.  It is 
important not to conflate the analysis of public trial violation 
claims and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating 
to the same.  See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 82-83 
(1st Cir. 2004) (noting that there are strategic advantages to a 
private voir dire even though a defendant has the right to 
insist on a public proceeding, and defense counsel's decision to 
agree to closed voir dire was objectively reasonable); Vaughn, 
821 N.W.2d at 306 (suggesting that it may be reasonable for 
counsel to determine that a closed voir dire will facilitate 
honest answers from prospective jurors). 
27 See State v. Small, 2013 WI App 117, ¶10, 351 Wis. 2d 46, 
839 N.W.2d 160.  In Small, the defendant's attorney initially 
objected 
to 
the 
exclusion 
of 
an 
observer 
who 
allegedly 
threatened a witness.  Id.  The court then prudently offered, 
"I'll 
interrupt 
this 
trial 
at 
1:30 
and 
we'll 
take 
testimony . . . ."  Id.  The lawyer responded, "We don't want a 
delay in the trial."  Id.  The court determined that the 
defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
conduct 
without 
discussing 
whether 
the 
performance 
was 
deficient, id., ¶12, but it seems unlikely that the defendant 
would have been able to show that his attorney was deficient for 
deciding not to interrupt the trial. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
45 
 
object deprived him of his right to a public trial and that the 
denial of the right to a public trial is not subject to a 
harmless error analysis.  However, it is not enough to say that 
counsel failed to object to the denial of a right that would 
lead to structural error.  The defendant must either demonstrate 
that the error falls within the rare circumstances in which we 
presume prejudice or he must prove that there was actual 
prejudice.  Seaton has done neither.  Thus, Seaton has failed to 
allege sufficient facts in his § 974.06 motion that, if true, 
would entitle him to relief, and the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in denying the motion 
without a hearing. 
2. Pinno's Ineffective Assistance Claim 
¶89 Pinno argues that because the judge's exclusion of the 
public deprived her of her Sixth Amendment right, her counsel's 
failure to object was unreasonable and therefore constituted 
deficient performance.  She asserts that the failure to object 
was likely due to oversight or inattention.  However, these 
arguments find little support. 
¶90 At the postconviction motion hearing, Attorney Block 
said that she did not object to the exclusion of the public for 
several reasons.  She said that the court made that order before 
the court took a break, and there was no indication that the 
courtroom was closed when they came back, so there was no need 
to object.  Attorney Block also said that public voir dire could 
have potentially had a negative effect on the jury, probably 
because of the inflammatory nature of the publicity surrounding 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
46 
 
the trial.  The District Attorney said that he would not "fault 
Ms. Block too much for not interrupting the Court."  Attorney 
Block's decision not to object to Judge Nuss's order closing the 
courtroom was not objectively unreasonable.  Therefore, Pinno 
has failed to prove that her counsel was deficient. 
¶91 Even 
assuming 
Attorney 
Block's 
performance 
was 
deficient, Pinno has not proven any prejudice.  Pinno merely 
argues that her attorney's failure to object should not be 
subject to a harmless error analysis and argues that prejudice 
should be presumed.  However, harmless error and prejudice are 
different inquiries.  A presumption of harm from an error to 
which counsel objected does not compel a presumption of 
prejudice when counsel fails to object.28  The Supreme Court did 
not 
include 
structural 
errors 
in 
the 
limited 
set 
of 
circumstances in which ineffective assistance is presumed to 
prejudice the defendant, and neither has this court.  Therefore, 
since Pinno has made no showing of prejudice, we conclude that 
she did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. 
D. Seaton's Recusal Motion 
¶92 "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process."  State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, 
                                                 
28 The presumption of harm granted to a structural error to 
which counsel objects gives the defendant and counsel incentive 
to timely assert a right by objecting to its denial.  However, 
when a defendant benefits from forfeiting a right, such as when 
voir dire is private in a highly publicized and controversial 
case, it would be unreasonable, absent some proof, to afford the 
defendant a presumption that his attorney's failure to object 
resulted in prejudice. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
47 
 
¶59, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31 (quoting In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).  When considering a claim of judicial 
bias, the reviewing court presumes that the judge was unbiased.  
State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶20, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 
N.W.2d 114.  However, that presumption of impartiality is 
rebuttable.  Id..  It is important to note that judges often 
consider postconviction motions relating to proceedings over 
which they presided.  Cf., State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶3, 328 
Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350; State v. Boyden, 2012 WI App 38, 
¶10, 340 Wis. 2d 155, 814 N.W.2d 505; State v. Prescott, 2012 WI 
App 136, ¶7 n.1, 345 Wis. 2d 313, 825 N.W.2d 515.  The fact that 
a judge presided over a trial does not mean that the judge may 
not preside over subsequent postconviction proceedings. 
¶93 The 
relevant 
recusal 
standard 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes is a subjective one.  A judge must recuse himself if he 
"determines that, for any reason, he . . . cannot, or it appears 
he . . . cannot, act in an impartial manner."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(g).  This statute "is clearly drafted so as to place 
the determination of partiality solely upon the judge."  State 
v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 664, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996) (citing 
State v. Am. TV and Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 
182-83, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989)); see State v. Rochelt, 165 
Wis. 2d 373, 379, 477 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The trial 
judge's declaration that he was not biased satisfies the 
subjective test.").  A reviewing court decides objectively 
whether the judge actually made the subjective determination.  
Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d at 664.  In this case, Judge Nuss said, "I 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
48 
 
take great pride in my impartiality . . . .  I don't think at 
any time in the Seaton case [have] my standards with regard to 
that ever wandered."  Later on, Judge Nuss explicitly considered 
the subjective bias test: 
The subjective test is one that I just do internally, 
whether or not there has been something presented that 
has polarized me to a point where either the State or 
the defendant's rights in further proceedings are in 
any way compromised because of preconceived opinions 
that this Court may have with regard to subsequent 
decisions.  Well, I can assure both sides that that 
never presented itself in this case, to this day it 
doesn't.  I maintain I'm extremely fair and impartial. 
(Emphasis added.)  Judge Nuss determined that he was not biased; 
therefore, he complied with Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g). 
¶94 In addition to the requirement that a judge must reach 
a subjective determination that he is not biased under Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), the Due Process Clause requires an 
objective inquiry.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 
868, 884, 886-87 (2009) (contribution of roughly $3 million to 
judge's campaign from a person with a personal stake in the case 
created "serious risk of actual bias" that rose to an 
unconstitutional level).  However, "The Due Process Clause 
demarks 
only 
the 
outer 
boundaries 
of 
judicial 
disqualifications."  Id. at 889 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)).  "[M]ost matters relating to 
judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional 
level."  Id. at 876 (brackets in original) (quoting FTC v. 
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948)).  "Because the codes of 
judicial conduct provide more protection than due process 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
49 
 
requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved 
without resort to the Constitution."  Id. at 890.  Judge Nuss's 
conduct does not approach the extreme circumstances that violate 
due process.  Thus, we turn to the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 
(SCR) to analyze Seaton's recusal claim. 
¶95 Seaton quotes SCR 60.04(4)(a) to support the argument 
that Judge Nuss was biased.  That rule says that a judge must 
recuse himself if, "[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party or a party's lawyer or personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." SCR 
60.04(4)(a).  Notably, the comment for SCR 60.04(4)(a) says that 
"bias or prejudice requiring recusal most often arises from a 
prior personal relationship but may arise from strong personal 
feelings about the alleged conduct of a party."  The comment 
suggests that bias under SCR 60.04(4)(a) generally comes from an 
extrajudicial source.  However, there is no indication that 
Judge Nuss had a personal bias or prejudice for or against 
anyone in Seaton's case.  There is no evidence to suggest that 
Judge Nuss had a personal relationship with any party or that he 
had strong personal feelings about anyone's conduct.  Therefore, 
recusal was not required under SCR 60.04(4)(a). 
¶96 More generally, SCR 60.04(4) says: 
[A] judge shall recuse himself or herself in a 
proceeding when the facts and circumstances the judge 
knows or reasonably should know establish one of the 
following or when reasonable, well-informed persons 
knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the 
justice 
system 
and 
aware 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
50 
 
know would reasonably question the judge's ability to 
be impartial[.] 
SCR 60.04(4).  None of SCR 60.04(4)'s enumerated circumstances 
fits the facts of this case.  The comment to SCR 60.04(4) gives 
an example of a judge who is seeking employment from a law firm; 
such a judge must recuse himself from cases in which that law 
firm would appear.  The comment also references Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19 as setting forth circumstances when the judge must 
disqualify himself.  The comment demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court Rules, like Wis. Stat. § 757.19, require recusal in fairly 
obvious scenarios in which a judge is clearly in an ethical 
quagmire.  Seaton is not such a case. 
¶97 In Seaton's case, Judge Nuss was careful to foster the 
appearance of impartiality.  In response to Kirkpatrick's 
letters to him, Judge Nuss denied an interview request "in order 
to insure that the integrity of the official court file and 
record are preserved" and noted that the Code of Judicial Ethics 
and Supreme Court Rules prohibited him from granting the 
interview request.  Judge Nuss's response shows that he took 
care to avoid appearing partial.  Although Judge Nuss did state 
that "at no time was either[] party's right to a public trial 
compromised during either the jury selection process or at any 
other time," that comment did not rise to the level of an 
appearance of bias, nor was that comment enough to overcome the 
presumption of impartiality.  Therefore, Judge Nuss properly 
denied Seaton's recusal motion. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
¶98 We reach the following conclusions. 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
51 
 
¶99 First, the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
extends to voir dire.  Presley, 558 U.S. at 213.  A judge's 
decision to "close" or limit public access to a courtroom in a 
criminal case requires the court to go through an analysis on 
the record in which the court considers overriding interests and 
reasonable alternatives as set out in Waller, 467 U.S. at 45, 
48.  The court must make specific findings on the record to 
support the exclusion of the public and must narrowly tailor the 
closure.  Id. 
¶100 Second, the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
may be asserted by the defendant at any time during a trial.  A 
defendant who fails to object to a judicial decision to close 
the courtroom forfeits the right to a public trial, so long as 
the defendant is aware that the judge has excluded the public 
from the courtroom.  Although the Supreme Court has categorized 
a violation of the right to a public trial as a structural 
error, that categorization does not mandate a waiver analysis, 
and a defendant need not affirmatively relinquish his right to a 
public trial in order to lose it.  It would be inimical to an 
efficient judicial system if a defendant could sit on his hands 
and try his luck in a closed courtroom only to argue after his 
conviction that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had 
been violated.   
¶101 Third, the records in these cases are clear that 
neither Seaton nor Pinno objected to the alleged courtroom 
closure.  In Seaton's case, the allegation that courtroom 
personnel prevented the public from reentering the courtroom 
Nos.   2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918 
52 
 
does not alter the analysis because Seaton was aware of the 
initial exclusion.  If courtroom personnel did prevent the 
public from coming back into the courtroom, that prevention was 
part of the initial exclusion.  Therefore, Seaton and Pinno both 
forfeited their rights to a public trial. 
¶102 Fourth, defendants must demonstrate prejudice to prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object 
to the closure of the courtroom.  The categorization of the 
denial of the public trial right as structural error does not 
create a presumption of prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Seaton and Pinno have not proven that they were 
prejudiced by their attorneys' failure to object to the 
exclusion of the public from the courtroom.  Therefore, both 
defendants 
have 
failed 
to 
prove 
that 
their 
counsel 
was 
ineffective. 
¶103 Finally, Seaton was not denied his right to an 
impartial judge.  Judge Nuss's communications show that he was 
cognizant of his responsibilities under the Judicial Code of 
Conduct, and he did not appear to be biased.  We presume that 
judges are impartial, and Seaton has not offered sufficient 
evidence to rebut that presumption.  Therefore, Judge Nuss 
properly denied the recusal motion. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶104 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I join 
the reasoning set forth in Justice N. Patrick Crooks' dissent, 
which focuses on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial.   
¶105 I write separately to focus on the violations in the 
instant cases of the public's right to open court proceedings, a 
right with deep historical roots in the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, in Wisconsin statutes dating back to 
1849, and in the common law.  Even if the defendant voluntarily 
and knowingly agrees to a closure, the public retains a right to 
open judicial proceedings.  The public's right cannot be waived 
by the defendant.  Rather, the public's right is an obligation 
that the court must enforce sua sponte. 
¶106 The news media and the public have rights to open 
court 
proceedings, 
"guaranteed 
by 
the 
First 
Amendment . . . [and] buttressed by the Wisconsin Constitution 
and state statutes.  They may not be diminished without a 
court's very careful consideration that is detailed on the 
record."1   
¶107 The majority opinion is filled with soaring rhetoric 
deploring closed court proceedings and with solemn, sober 
admonitions to circuit courts about the procedures to be 
followed before closing a proceeding to the public.  The 
majority opinion fittingly declares that in the present cases, 
the circuit court's "good intentions cannot hide its seriously 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶70. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
2 
 
mistaken approach in the two cases" and goes on to chastise the 
circuit court as follows:  
What is troublesome here is the court's failure to 
appreciate that it could not act alone in addressing 
these concerns. 
. . . . 
The closure must be tailored  . . . , alternatives to 
closure must be considered, and judicial findings 
sufficient to support the closure must be made.  
 
. . . . 
The transcript suggests that the court made up its 
mind to close the courtroom without explaining the 
situation fully or soliciting the input of affected 
interests.2    
 
¶108 The majority opinion concedes that the closures in the 
instant cases were improper.  It accepts that closures have been 
characterized as structural error,3 i.e., an error subject to 
automatic reversal, an error that "infect[s] the entire trial 
process and necessarily render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair."4   
¶109 Yet the majority opinion renders the lofty legal 
tenets meaningless as it empowers circuit courts to close 
courtrooms to the public without any compelling reason and 
offers no remedy for the circuit court's violations of the 
public's right to open court proceedings.   
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶¶69, 71, 72, 74. 
3 Majority op., ¶¶49-50 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 
39 (1984); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49 
(2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991)). 
4 State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶42, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 
N.W.2d 61 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 8). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶110 The judiciary must enforce the fundamental right of 
the public to open court proceedings.  
¶111 Rather than enforce the public's right, the majority 
simply throws up its collective hands and sends a jarring 
message:  This court will not honor the legal commandments of 
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, the statutes, and 
the common law. 
¶112 The majority opinion asserts that "it would seem odd 
to allow a reversal of a judgment based on the demand of a 
member of the public."  Majority op., ¶40 n.12.  But the 
majority opinion does not explain what is "odd" about this 
court's enforcement of constitutional, statutory, and common-law 
mandates that court proceedings be open.   
¶113 Unlike the majority opinion, I do not view enforcement 
of public rights to open court proceedings as "inimical to an 
efficient judicial system."  Majority op., ¶7.  I view 
enforcement of the public right to open judicial proceedings as 
essential to an accountable judiciary deserving of the public's 
trust and confidence in the fair administration of justice.  "It 
is hard to demonstrate . . . fairness if the court is closed."5   
¶114 The issue is what is the remedy in the present case 
for the violation.  Different facts and circumstances dictate 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶78. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
4 
 
different remedies.6  The record demonstrates that closing 
courtrooms in Fond du Lac County during voir dire without a 
compelling justification is a repeated practice.7  Consequently, 
                                                 
6 Although in some cases of erroneous court closures a 
remedy of disclosure of the transcript may be appropriate, see 
State ex rel. 
La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 
Wis. 2d 220, 242, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983), in other cases, a 
different remedy may be appropriate.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 50 
(determining that "the remedy should be appropriate to the 
violation"). 
This court has recognized that the appropriate remedy is 
one that conforms to the particular facts and circumstances of 
the case.  Cf. State v. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, ¶25, 274 
Wis. 2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945 (summarizing our case law as basing 
the appropriate remedy for material and substantial breach of a 
plea agreement on the totality of the circumstances); Summers v. 
Touchpoint 
Health 
Plan, 
Inc., 
2008 
WI 
45, 
¶¶44-47, 
309 
Wis. 2d 78, 749 N.W.2d 182 (selecting appropriate remedy in 
wrongful termination case to "return to the status quo prior to 
the arbitrary and capricious termination actions"); State v. 
Beyer, 2006 WI 2, ¶¶48-62, 287 Wis. 2d 1, 707 N.W.2d 509 
(considering the appropriate remedy in a due process violation 
during civil commitment proceedings based on the purposes of the 
statute, the nature of the error, and the ability of the remedy 
to correct the error). 
7 A deputy at the courthouse, Michael Hardengrove, asserted 
that closure of the courtroom was a repeated event for voir 
dire: 
Q:  Based on your experience working as courthouse 
security, do you recall times when a courtroom may 
have been cleared to make room for potential jurors? 
A:  Yes.  That has been done in the past when the jury 
pool is large and the courtroom is not big enough to 
hold everyone. 
Q:  What happens in those cases in which the jury pool 
is large? 
A:  The jury pool gets priority over other people.  I 
have known of situations in which the jury pool was so 
large that the questioning began in the basement of 
the courthouse before moving to the courtroom. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
5 
 
in the instant cases, the remedy for the repeated violations of 
the constitutions, Wis. Stat. § 757.14, and the common law 
public trial right must be to reverse the judgments of the 
circuit court and remand the causes to the circuit court for new 
trials.  The recurring illegal practice of closing voir dire in 
Fond du Lac County must end.  It is the responsibility of the 
trial and appellate courts of the State to keep judicial 
proceedings public and open: 
[T]he great virtue in our Anglo-American court system 
is that it is open to the public so that all will know 
that the courts, as instruments of government, are 
defending the rights of the people and are not 
suppressing them.  Thus it will be rare indeed when a 
trial judge can appropriately and in the exercise of 
discretion conclude that the quest for justice will be 
better served by secrecy than by public disclosure.8   
¶115 The two cases before the court are not rare cases 
justifying closed courtrooms.  It is this court's task to 
protect 
the 
public's 
right 
to 
open 
court 
proceedings.  
Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶116 Our forebears thought the public right to open court 
proceedings so important that they firmly embedded and protected 
the right in three vital legal sources:  The United States and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q:  So at the time of Mr. Seaton's trial, it wasn't 
unusual for the courtroom to be emptied to make sure 
there was enough room for the jury panel? 
A:  No, it wasn't unusual. 
See majority op., ¶19 n.7; J. Crooks' dissent, ¶147 & n.1. 
8 La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 242. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
6 
 
Wisconsin Constitutions, the Wisconsin statutes dating back to 
1849, and the common law. 
¶117 The 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantee the right of the public to attend trials.  
The right of the public to attend trials under the First 
Amendment has been recognized as protecting distinctly public 
rights, notwithstanding the interests of criminal defendants 
under the Sixth Amendment.9   
¶118 The right to attend public trials "is implicit in the 
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend 
such 
trials, 
which 
people 
have 
exercised 
for 
centuries, 
important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press would be 
eviscerated."10   
¶119 The public's constitutional right to public access to 
a trial plays a particularly significant role in the proper 
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a 
                                                 
9 Notably, for example, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 504 (1984), the 
defendant favored closure, arguing that failure to seal certain 
records 
would 
"violate 
the 
jurors' 
right 
to 
privacy."  
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
public right to open trials required enforcement. 
10 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 
(1980) (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.) 
(internal quotation marks & citation omitted); see also Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment, joined by Marshall, J.) ("[O]pen trials are bulwarks 
of our free and democratic government: public access to court 
proceedings is one of the numerous 'checks and balances' of our 
system, because contemporaneous review in the forum of public 
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial 
power.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
7 
 
whole.11 Public scrutiny serves as "an effective restraint on 
possible abuse of judicial power."12   
¶120 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that any deprivation of the public right to open court 
proceedings requires the highest level of judicial scrutiny, 
declaring that a court closing a courtroom must show "that the 
denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."13  A court must 
consider alternative means before engaging in a closure of the 
courtroom:  "Absent consideration of alternatives to closure, 
the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir 
dire."14   
 
¶121 The Wisconsin statutes echo the strong constitutional 
protection of the public right to open court proceedings.  The 
public right to open court proceedings has been entrenched in 
Wisconsin statutory law since the legislature declared in 1849:  
"The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, 
and every citizen may freely attend the same."15  
                                                 
11 In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 
606 (1982), the Court held, inter alia, that to justify 
exclusion of the press and public from criminal trials, the 
state must show that closure is necessitated by a compelling 
government interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest. 
12 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). 
13 Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07. 
14 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511. 
15 1849 Rev. Stat. ch. 87, § 17. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
8 
 
 
¶122 The 1849 legislature's "clear and express legislative 
policy that courts are to be open to all the people"16 has, over 
the last 165 years, remained in the statutes in the same 
language, with an "extremely limited" limitation on "the scope 
of this legislative mandate . . . that a court sitting shall be 
public"——a limitation not applicable to the present cases.17  
Wisconsin Stat. § 757.14 now provides as follows:  
The sittings of every court shall be public and every 
citizen 
may 
freely 
attend 
the 
same, 
except 
if 
otherwise expressly provided by law on the examination 
of persons charged with crime; provided, that when in 
any court a cause of scandalous or obscene nature is 
on trial the presiding judge or justice may exclude 
from the room where the court is sitting all minors 
not necessarily present as parties or witnesses 
(emphasis added). 
 
¶123 In interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 757.14, the 
court has declared: 
• Voir dire is presumptively to be open to the public.18 
• In the proper exercise of discretion a circuit court 
may close a sitting of a court.19 
• Exclusion of the public from voir dire may constitute 
an erroneous exercise of discretion on the part of the 
trial court.20 
                                                 
16 La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 232. 
17 Id. at 231. 
18 Id. at 233. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 238. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
9 
 
• The circumstances to close a courtroom must be 
compelling.21 
• To close a courtroom, the circuit court must make 
findings of fact with specificity; the process must be 
a rational one and must be demonstrated on the 
record.22  
• The tenor and general position of Anglo-American law 
is presumptively that a fair trial cannot be had 
unless the trial is open and subject to public 
scrutiny.23  
¶124 The majority opinion concedes that the circuit court 
orders in the instant cases "likely violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.14."24  
¶125 In addition to the constitutional and statutory 
mandates, the public right to open court proceedings is rooted 
in our Anglo-American common-law heritage.25  The United States 
                                                 
21 Id. at 223, 238, 240. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 236. 
24 Majority op., ¶40 n.12. 
25 The Wisconsin Constitution adopted the common law unless 
otherwise altered or suspended by the legislature or modified by 
the 
courts. 
 
Article 
14, 
Section 
13 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution provides as follows: 
Section 13.  Such parts of the common law as are now 
in 
force 
in 
the 
territory 
of 
Wisconsin, 
not 
inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and 
continue part of the law of this state until altered 
or suspended by the legislature. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
10 
 
Supreme Court has detailed the common-law history of the public 
trial right, recognizing that it arose in response to the secret 
or closed trial, which "had become an instrument for the 
suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless 
disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial."26  The 
public right to attend trial at common law extended not only to 
trial proceedings, but also to other essential court proceedings 
attached to trial, including jury selection and voir dire 
proceedings.27   
¶126 The public right to open court proceedings "is a 
reflection of the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that 
justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."28  The value 
that anyone is free to attend court proceedings "gives assurance 
that 
established 
procedures 
are 
being 
followed 
and 
that 
deviations will become known."29  Our constitutional, statutory, 
                                                                                                                                                             
For a more extensive history of the common-law public right to 
trial, see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 563-75 (Burger, 
C.J., plurality op., joined by White, J. and Stevens, J.), which 
discusses at length the common-law roots of the public trial 
right, and notes that "[f]rom this unbroken, uncontradicted 
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries 
past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness 
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system 
of justice." 
26 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269 (1948). 
27 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 506-08 (describing the 
openness of jury selection processes at English common law and 
that "public jury selection thus was the common practice in 
America when the Constitution was adopted"). 
28 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) 
(internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 
29 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508 (internal quotation 
marks & citations omitted). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
11 
 
and common-law sources of law require that courts hold their 
doors open to guarantee the integrity of their judicial 
proceedings. 
II 
¶127 Thus, 
three 
sources 
of 
law 
separately 
and 
in 
combination mandate that court proceedings be open.  To whom are 
these mandates addressed?  The courts! 
¶128 The public right to attend court proceedings is not, 
as the majority opinion would have you believe, a right that 
requires a party to the litigation or a member of the public to 
act in order to enforce it.  The responsibility to keep court 
proceedings open lies with each court.   
¶129 Contrary to the majority opinion's protestations,30 the 
issue of the circuit court's compliance with the right of the 
public to attend open court is now before this court.  The 
constitutions, Wis. Stat. § 757.14, and the common law are 
mandates on the courts——mandates which the courts are required 
to observe regardless of the parties' or public's position.   
¶130 As this court has noted in another context, a 
statutory mandate serves as a requirement on the courts 
themselves.  The courts are obligated to obey those mandates, 
sua sponte, regardless of the parties' positions: 
The harmless error rule . . . is an injunction on the 
courts, which, if applicable, the courts are required 
to address regardless of whether the parties do. See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) (specifying that no judgment 
shall be reversed unless the court determines, after 
                                                 
30 Majority op., ¶40 n.12. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
12 
 
examining the entire record, that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of a party). 
State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶47 n.12, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189 (emphasis added).   
¶131 Like the harmless error rule, the public right to open 
court proceedings is a mandate on the courts, which the courts, 
including this court, must address.  Even an issue not raised by 
any party is properly before the court when our law places that 
responsibility on the court.  The statute in the instant case 
explicitly directs that judicial proceedings "shall be public 
and every citizen may freely attend the same."31   
¶132 The duty to ensure that this mandate is carried out 
falls on the judges of the state, including the justices of this 
court, who must maintain the integrity of the court system by 
following the law:  "A judge shall respect and comply with the 
law . . . ."32  The law requires that court proceedings be open, 
and "[t]he judge alone controls the courtroom . . . ."33 
¶133 If court proceedings are to be closed, the court must 
articulate clear reasons on the record for contravening the 
                                                 
31 Wis. Stat. § 757.14 (emphasis added).  Compare Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(2) ("No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted . . . unless in the opinion of the court to which 
the application is made . . . it shall appear that the error 
complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a new 
trial.") (emphasis added). 
32 SCR 60.03(1). 
33 State v. Champlain, 2008 WI App 5, ¶34, 307 Wis. 2d 232, 
744 N.W.2d 889 (declaring that only a judge, not a jail 
administrator, can make a decision regarding restraints for a 
prisoner in the courtroom). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
13 
 
explicit mandate of the Constitutions, statutes, and common law 
to keep court proceedings open:   
[T]he closure of a courtroom should ensue only when 
not to do so would defeat the very purpose of the 
court proceedings or would otherwise substantially 
impinge upon widely held public values which have been 
declared 
by 
the 
legislature 
in 
particular 
circumstances to supersede the general public policy 
of the open courtroom. 
. . . . 
[A]lthough a courtroom can be closed in the exercise 
of discretion, the circumstances necessary to trigger 
the discretion to close a courtroom must be compelling 
indeed.34 
A court's power to close a proceeding may be exercised only if 
the court follows a procedure that balances a compelling 
                                                 
34 La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 235.   
Sister states with similar statutory language have, like 
Wisconsin, required the courts to enforce the mandate for public 
court proceedings and have placed a heavy burden on courts to 
demonstrate a compelling reason for closure.   
In interpreting a substantially similar statute providing 
for public access to open court, the California Supreme Court 
declared: 
The need to comply with the requirements of the First 
Amendment right of access may impose some burdens on 
trial courts.  But courts can and should minimize such 
inconveniences by proposing to close proceedings only 
in the rarest of circumstances, as explained above.  
Accordingly, the burden imposed by requiring trial 
courts to give notice of a closure hearing and make 
the 
constitutionally 
required 
findings, 
and 
the 
ensuing burden imposed by permitting review of closure 
orders by extraordinary writ, will not unduly encumber 
our trial or appellate courts. 
NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 
371 (Cal. 1999). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
14 
 
interest in closing the courtroom against the public's interest 
in freely attending court proceedings: 
The trial judge should recite on the record the 
factors that impel him to close the courtroom and why 
such factors override the presumptive value of a 
public trial.  The findings of fact must be made with 
specificity.  The process must be a rational one, and 
the rationality of it must be demonstrated on the 
record, showing that the conclusion was reached on 
facts of record or which are reasonably derived by 
inference from the record.  Upon review an appellate 
court should be able to determine from the record 
whether discretion was in fact exercised and whether a 
reasonable judicial mind could have reached the 
conclusion it did.  A trial court is required to hold 
a hearing and publicly reach a conclusion based on the 
exercise of discretion prior to ordering a closing.  
The parties, and members of the public present in 
court, may appear at such hearing.35   
¶134 It is thus the obligation of each court to make the 
public right to open judicial proceedings a reality. 
III 
¶135 In the instant cases, the circuit court did not meet 
the necessary burden to justify closure of the courtroom, either 
under the constitutions, Wis. Stat. § 757.14, or the common law.  
In each of the instant cases, the circuit court did not 
articulate that it was exercising its discretion to close a 
courtroom "to assure justice would not be thwarted"36; it failed 
to provide a compelling reason for closure; and it did not seek 
alternatives to closure.  The circuit court thus improperly 
                                                 
35 La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 236-37 (cited by 
majority op., ¶76). 
36 La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 238. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
15 
 
barred the public from the proceeding, as the majority opinion 
acknowledges.37 
¶136 In Seaton, the circuit court gave the following 
justifications for its closing of the courtroom.  First, the 
circuit court noted the comfort of seating the jurors: 
Obviously we're short on space.  And [the jurors'] 
comfort and availability will not be compromised by 
anyone else in the courtroom if it becomes necessary, 
I'm just going to excuse everybody in the courtroom, 
that's the way it's going to be. 
Later, the circuit court noted that it wanted to prevent 
disruptions in the courtroom or conversations with potential 
jurors: 
If there is one hint of one word of any juror at all 
for any reason, all are going out.  Okay?  I'm not 
going to pick and choose or identify any particular 
individual.  Mum is the word while the Court is 
engaged in its voir dire . . . . And if one person 
says one thing or makes one comment that I can hear up 
here, the whole courtroom is going to be cleared of 
those individuals.  All right? 
¶137 Regarding 
the 
circuit 
court's 
first 
concern——the 
comfort of and availability of seating for the jurors——nothing 
in the record or in the case law suggests that this rationale 
rises to the level of a compelling government interest or that 
this interest could not have been met by alternative means.   
¶138 Regarding 
the 
circuit 
court's 
second 
concern——
disruptions created by members of the public——nothing in the 
record evidences any disruption by members of the public.  The 
                                                 
37 Majority op., ¶69. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
16 
 
circuit court issued its warning, but made no finding of any 
disruption.   
¶139 In Pinno, the circuit court stated its reasoning for 
closure at the postconviction evidentiary proceeding as a 
generalized "interest of justice," "for other reasons," and as a 
"numbers issue":  
[T]he Court had no choice other than to limit 
admission of the public to the courtroom in the 
interest of justice and for other reasons that I'll 
comment on.  But it was a numbers issue at that point. 
 
¶140 The circuit court does not elaborate on any "interest 
of justice" or "other reasons" for closing the courtroom.  As in 
Seaton, the circuit court justified closure on the number of 
jurors in the courtroom.  As in Seaton, there was no evidence 
that the jury and the public could not, in some manner, have 
been accommodated in the courtroom safely.   
¶141 Our case law requires that if court proceedings are to 
be closed, "[a] trial court is required to hold a hearing and 
publicly reach a conclusion based on the exercise of discretion 
prior to ordering a closing."38  The circuit court held no such 
hearing prior to closure in the instant cases.   
¶142 The circuit court did not demonstrate a compelling 
interest for excluding the public.  The circuit court abdicated 
its constitutional, statutory, and common-law responsibilities.  
This court should not do the same. 
                                                 
38 La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis. 2d at 237.  See also majority 
op., ¶76. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶143 I would reverse the judgments of the circuit courts 
and remand the causes to the circuit courts for a new trial. 
¶144 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶145 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶146 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I join the 
reasoning set forth in Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson's 
dissent concerning the public trial right guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.  I write separately to focus on a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and to address remedy in 
this context.   
¶147 Courtroom 
closures, 
by 
their 
very 
nature, 
are 
extremely troubling.  The circumstances under which a courtroom 
can be closed without violating a bedrock principle of our 
justice system——the right to a public trial——are rare.  Travis 
Seaton and Nancy Pinno, the defendants in these consolidated 
cases, each asserts that voir dire proceedings during their 
criminal trials in Fond du Lac County were closed to the public 
apparently to make room for large jury venires.  While these 
allegations alone are disconcerting, the record in Seaton's case 
demonstrates that these types of closures are apparently common 
practice in Fond du Lac County.1  If there is to be a courtroom 
closure, there must be consideration and application of the 
Waller2 factors because a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶19, n.7.   
2 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), adopted a four-part 
test first articulated in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 
(Press Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984), under which a trial court 
may close courtroom proceedings under very limited circumstances 
despite a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  
In Waller, the United States Supreme Court stated,  
Under Press–Enterprise, the party seeking to close the 
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
2 
 
public trial is absolutely rooted in the essential underpinning 
of our judicial system: fairness.   
¶148 Considering that the public trial right is such a 
fundamental concept to our criminal justice system, I cannot 
agree with the majority's conclusion that a criminal defendant's 
failure to make a contemporaneous objection results in his or 
her forfeiture of that right.  Contrary to the majority opinion, 
I assert that a defendant's public trial right, guaranteed by 
both the Sixth Amendment3 and the Wisconsin Constitution,4 can be 
                                                                                                                                                             
likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no 
broader than necessary to protect that interest, the 
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to 
closing the proceeding, and it must make findings 
adequate to support the closure.   
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.  See also majority op., ¶45 (discussing 
Waller).  
3 The Sixth Amendment, in part, provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Sixth 
Amendment public trial right is applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 
(1948) ("In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret 
proceedings, 
their 
inherent 
dangers 
to 
freedom, 
and 
the 
universal requirement of our federal and state governments that 
criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee 
that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process 
of law means at least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced 
to prison.").  
4 Wisconsin Const. art. I, § 7 provides: 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
3 
 
given 
up 
only 
if 
the 
defendant 
affirmatively 
voices 
a 
willingness to do so.  I would therefore consider the right 
subject to waiver analysis.  This conclusion results from 
consideration of the importance of the public trial right, the 
unique position of a violation of the right as a structural 
constitutional error, its concern with fairness, and persuasive 
authority from the United States Supreme Court and from other 
jurisdictions——all considerations that are minimized by the 
majority opinion. 
¶149 In 
addition, 
I 
write 
separately 
to 
express 
my 
disagreement 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion 
that 
prejudice should not be presumed when a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is based on an alleged violation of the 
public trial right.5  I recognize that under my use of waiver 
                                                                                                                                                             
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
Although the defendants' arguments are based on the Sixth 
Amendment rather than the Wisconsin Constitution, I note that 
the public trial right under art. I, § 7 does not appear to be 
any different than the right under the Sixth Amendment. 
I also note that Wis. Stat. § 757.14 requires that 
courtrooms remain open.  Although this statute has potential 
applicability to this case, my focus is on a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial. 
5 Majority op., ¶9. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
4 
 
analysis, there would be no need to reach the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims presented by these defendants.  
However, I am not persuaded by the majority opinion's discussion 
of the presumption of prejudice.  At the outset, I agree with 
the majority that the presumption of prejudice is warranted 
under circumstances in which the harm of the error in question 
is difficult to measure.  In contrast to the majority's 
position, however, I conclude that a public trial violation that 
occurs during voir dire is exactly the type of harm that may 
permeate an entire trial in incalculable ways.  Therefore, 
contrary to the majority approach, I would presume prejudice in 
this context. 
¶150 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
A CHALLENGE TO A PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT VIOLATION, A 
STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR, CANNOT BE FORFEITED. 
 
¶151 The majority opinion carefully and thoroughly sets 
forth many of the principles underlying the Sixth Amendment 
public trial right.  For example, there is no dispute that the 
Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant with the right to 
a public trial and that this public trial right extends to voir 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
5 
 
dire.6  There is also no dispute that the Sixth Amendment public 
trial right, which serves four primary purposes, is not 
absolute.7  Additionally, I agree with the majority that under 
Waller, the remedy for a violation of the Sixth Amendment public 
trial right must be appropriate considering the nature of the 
specific violation at issue.8  Finally, I agree with the majority 
that some violations of the Sixth Amendment public trial right 
may be so trivial as not to warrant a remedy,9 and I emphasize 
that the alleged closures at issue in these cases are not 
trivial. 
¶152 The majority opinion provides a limited discussion of 
the importance of the Sixth Amendment public trial right10 but 
does appear to recognize that the United States Supreme Court 
                                                 
6 Id., ¶¶40, 43.  In Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 
(2010), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment public trial right applies to voir dire.  It is of no 
importance that the Supreme Court decided Presley after the voir 
dire proceedings took place in both the Pinno and Seaton trials.  
This is because Presley explicitly asserts that the issue of 
whether the Sixth Amendment public trial right applies to voir 
dire was already a well-settled principle under Press-Enterprise 
I and Waller, which addressed the right under the First 
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment, respectively.  Id. at 213. 
7 Majority op., ¶42 (discussing the four core values as 
outlined by State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 
N.W.2d 612); majority op., ¶¶44-45 (discussing Waller, 467 U.S. 
at 45, 48).   
8 Majority op., ¶46. 
9 Id., ¶67, n.23. 
10 Id., ¶41.  
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
6 
 
has included a violation of the right amongst a short list of 
structural constitutional errors, which are not subject to 
harmless error analysis.11  The importance of the Sixth Amendment 
public trial right and the status of a violation of the right as 
a structural constitutional error are the reasons I take issue 
with the majority opinion. 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT TO THE FAIRNESS OF 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 
 
¶153 The Sixth Amendment public trial right results from 
the long-held belief that secret proceedings will not produce 
just results.12  Thus the public trial right has long been 
recognized by our federal government as well as by the 
overwhelming 
majority 
of 
state 
governments, 
including 
Wisconsin.13  Underlying this long-standing recognition of the 
public trial right is the concept that publicity ensures that 
criminal defendants receive fair trials.14  "Without publicity, 
                                                 
11 See id., ¶50. 
12 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 412 (1979); In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268-69 ("The traditional Anglo-American 
distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the 
notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to 
the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the 
French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet.") (internal 
footnotes omitted).  
13 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-68. 
14 Id. at 270 ("[T]he guarantee has always been recognized 
as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as 
instruments of persecution."). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
7 
 
all other checks are insufficient; in comparison of publicity, 
all other checks are of small account."15 
¶154 Although the majority opinion sets forth four of the 
core values of the Sixth Amendment public trial right, it is 
worthwhile to set them forth again.   
The [United States] Supreme Court has described four 
values furthered by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a 
public trial: "(1) to ensure a fair trial; (2) to 
remind 
the 
prosecutor 
and 
judge 
of 
their 
responsibility to the accused and the importance of 
their functions; (3) to encourage witnesses to come 
forward; and (4) to discourage perjury."16 
 
Although 
stated 
as 
four 
distinct 
values, 
each 
of 
these 
principles underlying the public trial right works to guarantee 
one 
fundamental 
concept 
of 
our 
criminal 
justice 
system: 
fairness.  The United States Supreme Court's classification of a 
violation 
of 
the 
public 
trial 
right 
as 
a 
structural 
constitutional error further supports the contention that the 
public trial right is undoubtedly concerned with the fairness of 
criminal trials.  
¶155 The United States Supreme Court divides constitutional 
errors into two categories.17  Most constitutional errors are 
                                                 
15 Id. at 271 (quoting 1 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of 
Judicial Evidence 524 (1827)).   
16 Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶49 (quoting Peterson v. 
Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Waller, 467 U.S. 
at 46-47 (1984)). 
17 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) 
(citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
8 
 
categorized as trial errors.18  The effect of these types of 
errors on criminal trials can be determined by considering the 
error in light of all of the evidence presented to the jury; 
therefore, this category of constitutional errors is subject to 
harmless error analysis.19 
¶156 In a smaller category of constitutional errors are 
those that are not subject to harmless error analysis, and these 
are referred to as structural errors or defects.20  In contrast 
to the effect of trial errors, the effect of structural errors 
on a trial cannot be determined because structural errors have 
the potential to taint the entire framework of a trial.21  The 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a 
violation of the public trial right is a defect that is 
structural in nature.22  In other words, while the specific 
effect of the error on the trial itself cannot be determined, 
the effects of a violation of the public trial right always have 
the potential to permeate the entirety of a criminal trial. 
                                                 
18 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-08. 
19 Id. at 307-08. 
20 See id. at 309-10. 
21 Id. 
22  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148-49; Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. In 
each of these cases the United States Supreme Court cited 
Waller, 467 U.S. 39. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
9 
 
¶157 My emphasis on a violation of the public trial right 
as a structural constitutional error does not directly answer 
the important question of whether a forfeiture or a waiver 
analysis applies.  However, this categorization, as I will 
explain, does inform my position on both the issue of whether 
waiver or forfeiture applies and the issue of whether prejudice 
should be presumed in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  The designation of a public trial violation as 
structural error absolutely heightens the seriousness of this 
type of error when compared to constitutional violations 
categorized as trial errors.  This is because, as noted above, 
the effect of a violation of the public trial right cannot be 
measured and always poses a threat to the fairness of the entire 
trial process. 
¶158  It is these concepts——that the effect of a violation 
of the public trial right cannot be measured, and the public 
trial right's concern with fairness——that the majority fails to 
fully recognize.  Instead of adhering to the two categories of 
constitutional errors established by the United States Supreme 
Court, namely trial errors and structural errors, the majority 
attempts to minimize the seriousness of a public trial right 
violation.  It does so in two primary ways.   
¶159 First, the majority opinion attempts to separate a 
violation of the public trial right from other structural errors 
and cast it into a category all its own.  However, the 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
10 
 
majority's attempt to place the public trial right into a lesser 
category of structural constitutional rights is not supported by 
United States Supreme Court precedent.   
¶160 It is of no importance that Waller, decided in 1984, 
did not use the phrase "structural error"23 because the 
categories of structural error and trial error were not defined 
or utilized until the Court's 1991 decision in Arizona v. 
Fulminante.24  While the Court had previously identified a very 
limited number of constitutional errors that were not subject to 
harmless error analysis, the Fulminante decision was the Supreme 
Court's first specific application of the dual categories (trial 
errors and structural errors) to its prior decisions.25  In 
Fulminante, the Supreme Court clearly relied on its prior 
decision in Waller when it included a public trial right 
violation as falling within the structural error category.26     
¶161 I am also not persuaded that the United States Supreme 
Court's failure to use the phrase "structural error" in every 
case that addresses a violation of a structural constitutional 
right or the public trial right has any significance.  In 
                                                 
23 See majority op., ¶51. 
24 Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279. 
25 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error 
and the Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2037-38 (2008) (discussing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18 (1967), and Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279). 
26 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.  
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
11 
 
Presley, the Court applied Press Enterprise I and Waller to hold 
that the public trial right extends to voir dire.27  The fact 
that the Court did not engage in a discussion of structural 
constitutional errors in Presley cannot be read as an indication 
that the Court has, in any way, backtracked from its prior 
holdings, which squarely placed a public trial right violation 
in the category of a structural constitutional error.28   
¶162 Second, the majority opinion repeatedly relies on its 
conclusion that a public trial right violation does not 
automatically 
result 
in 
unfairness 
or 
prejudice 
to 
the 
defendant.29  For example, the majority opinion states, "[T]he 
absence of the public does not automatically lead to misconduct 
or unfairness or any other circumstance prejudicial to the 
defendant."30 However, this statement completely disregards the 
fact that the effect of a public trial right violation cannot be 
determined.  This is the very reason the United States Supreme 
Court has labeled this type of error a structural error. 
¶163 Classification of a violation of the public trial 
right as a structural constitutional error does not answer the 
question of whether a waiver or forfeiture analysis applies.  
                                                 
27 Presley, 558 U.S. at 212-13. 
28 See supra ¶10. 
29 Majority op., ¶¶59, 84, 86.   
30 Id., ¶59. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
12 
 
However, a discussion of the violation of the public trial right 
as a structural constitutional error highlights the importance 
of the public trial right and its concern with the fairness of 
criminal trials.  Therefore, the discussion of a public trial 
right violation as a structural constitutional error informs my 
conclusion that waiver analysis is the applicable standard.       
 
B. A DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT CANNOT BE 
FORFEITED. 
 
¶164 The 
importance 
of 
the 
public 
trial 
right, 
its 
categorization when violated as a structural constitutional 
error, and its concern with fairness inform my position.  I also 
find support in both Wisconsin precedent and in case law from 
other jurisdictions, that waiver31 rather than forfeiture should 
apply to a public trial right violation.  Specifically, I find 
this court's recent decision in State v. Soto32 as well as the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's 
                                                 
31 As 
the 
majority 
sets 
forth, 
waiver, 
opposed 
to 
forfeiture, requires a defendant to affirmatively give up a 
known right.  See majority op., ¶56; see also Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 
653, ¶29.  When waiver applies, we usually require that such 
waiver be given knowingly and voluntarily.  See State v. 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for a 
discussion of knowing and intelligent waiver in the context of a 
defendant's right to counsel.  
32 State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 
848. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
13 
 
decision in Walton v. Briley33 to be strongly supportive of my 
position.   
¶165 As the majority opinion sets forth, this court uses a 
balancing test, stated in State v. Soto,34 to determine whether 
forfeiture or waiver applies.35  "Therefore, when determining 
whether a right is subject to forfeiture or waiver, we look to 
the constitutional or statutory importance of the right, 
balanced 
against 
the 
procedural 
efficiency 
in 
requiring 
immediate final determination of the right."36  While the 
majority opinion sets forth this balancing test, it considers 
procedural 
efficiency 
without 
sufficiently 
weighing 
that 
interest against the importance of the Sixth Amendment public 
trial right.   
¶166 In Soto, this court determined that waiver, rather 
than forfeiture, applied to a defendant's statutory right to be 
present in the courtroom during a plea hearing.37  Soto first 
recognized, in general, that the forfeiture rule has the benefit 
of procedural efficiency.  We stated, "Rights that are subject 
to forfeiture are typically those whose relinquishment will not 
                                                 
33 Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2004). 
34 Soto, 343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶38. 
35 Majority op., ¶57. 
36 Soto, 343 Wis. 2d 43, ¶38. 
37 Id., ¶¶34-35. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
14 
 
necessarily deprive a party of a fair trial, and whose 
protection is best left to the immediacy of the trial, such as 
when a party fails to raise an evidentiary objection."38  
However, we then explained that "waiver typically applies to 
those rights so important to the administration of a fair trial 
that mere inaction on the part of a litigant is not sufficient 
to demonstrate that the party intended to forgo the right."39  We 
further explained that a defendant's statutory right to be 
present, 
in 
person, 
during 
the 
proceeding 
at 
issue 
was 
"particularly important to the actual or perceived fairness of 
the criminal proceedings."40   
¶167 The court's emphasis in Soto on the connection between 
rights subject to waiver and those same rights' concern with 
fairness or perceived fairness of a criminal trial convinces me 
that requiring waiver, rather than permitting forfeiture, is the 
correct approach.  As discussed previously, the public trial 
right is an exceedingly important constitutional right that is 
absolutely tied to the actual or perceived fairness of a 
criminal trial.  It is of no consequence that a public trial 
right violation may not actually affect fairness because whether 
the violation permeates the trial is a question an appellate 
                                                 
38 Id., ¶36. 
39 Id., ¶37. 
40 Id., ¶40.  
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
15 
 
court simply cannot evaluate in the same way that an appellate 
court can evaluate the effect of an evidentiary error.  Like a 
defendant's 
statutory 
right 
to 
be 
present 
in 
person, 
a 
defendant's constitutional right to a public trial must be 
subject to waiver, not forfeiture. 
¶168 Furthermore, the fact that juvenile proceedings are 
often closed to the public, or that some criminal proceedings 
may be void of spectators, is of no importance.  First, most 
jurisdictions do not recognize a public trial right in the 
context of juvenile adjudications because of the overriding 
confidentiality interest as well as the noncriminal nature of 
the proceedings.41  Second, it is not the actual presence of 
spectators that ensures fairness of criminal trials, but instead 
it is the fact that the public could easily access and observe 
criminal proceedings at any moment.42                 
¶169 Although I conclude that a criminal defendant must 
voluntarily and knowingly waive his or her right to a public 
trial to give up that right, I acknowledge that there is no 
                                                 
41 Susan N. Herman, The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial 
91 (2006). 
42 See Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 508 ("The value of 
openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending 
trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being 
observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives 
assurance that established procedures are being followed and 
that deviations will become known."); see also In re Oliver, 333 
U.S. at 270 ("The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject 
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
16 
 
doubt that permitting forfeiture encourages efficiency by both 
the prosecution and defense by bringing timely objections to the 
circuit court's attention.  The benefit of efficiency, however, 
does not outweigh the necessity of safeguarding the public trial 
right.  This is especially true considering that the purpose of 
the public trial right is to ensure fairness of every aspect of 
a criminal trial. 
¶170 The decision in Walton v. Briley43 further persuades me 
that waiver is the correct approach.  In Walton, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a 
criminal defendant cannot forfeit his or her right to a public 
trial.44  The Walton decision explained that waiver has been 
required of a variety of fundamental trial rights, such as "plea 
agreements, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a 
trial, the right to a trial by jury, the right to an attorney, 
and the right to confront witnesses."45  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the abovementioned 
rights were all concerned with "the fairness of the trial" and 
then concluded that "[t]he right to a public trial also concerns 
the right to a fair trial."46  I agree, as previously noted, that 
                                                 
43 Walton, 361 F.3d 431. 
44 Id. at 434. 
45 Id. at 433-34 (citations omitted).  
46 Id. at 434 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 46). 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
17 
 
the Sixth Amendment's concern with fairness requires that a 
waiver, rather than a forfeiture, analysis applies to an alleged 
public trial right violation.     
¶171 In addition, I am persuaded that waiver analysis can 
coexist with the four Waller factors.47  An application of a 
waiver analysis does not change the fact that the public trial 
right is not absolute, and that a court may close a courtroom 
only after consideration of the four Waller factors.48  However, 
when a courtroom closure does not satisfy the Waller factors, 
under a waiver approach, a closure can occur only if a defendant 
voluntarily and knowingly agrees to the closure.49 
¶172 Finally, I am not persuaded that language in prior 
United States Supreme Court decisions supports forfeiture rather 
than waiver analysis.50  The United States Supreme Court has not 
definitively addressed whether waiver or forfeiture applies to a 
public trial violation.  The defendant in Waller did object to 
the closure in his case, and the Court's holding makes note of 
                                                 
47 See majority op., ¶60. 
48 For a discussion of the Waller factors see majority op., 
¶45. 
49 This statement addresses a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial and does not take into consideration 
situations in which members of the public, including the press, 
object to courtroom closures under the First Amendment. 
50 See majority op., ¶¶62-63.  
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
18 
 
that fact.51  However, there is no indication that the Court 
would have reached a different result in that case had the 
defendant not objected to the closure.  Additionally, although 
the majority finds Peretz v. United States52 and Levine v. United 
States53 persuasive, I find those cases clearly distinguishable 
and therefore not supportive of a forfeiture analysis.  This is 
because Levine evaluated the public trial right under the Due 
Process Clause and not the Sixth Amendment.54  Thus the Levine 
decision answered only the narrow question of whether a 
defendant's failure to object to the secrecy of a contempt 
proceeding violated the Due Process Clause.55  In addition, I am 
not persuaded that Peretz, which cites to Levine broadly and 
fails to clarify that Levine considered the Due Process Clause 
and not the public trial right under the Sixth Amendment, 
supports a forfeiture analysis.56 
¶173 The Sixth Amendment public trial right is one very 
important tool by which we guarantee the fairness of criminal 
trials.  The majority opinion has compromised this important 
                                                 
51 Waller, 467 U.S. at 42, 47. 
52 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991). 
53 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960). 
54 See id. at 616 (stating that "[p]rocedural safeguards for 
criminal contempts do not derive from the Sixth Amendment").  
55 Id. at 616-17. 
56 See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
19 
 
guarantee and has minimized the importance of the public trial 
right by allowing a defendant to forfeit a right so essential to 
the core of our judicial system.  Furthermore, the forfeiture 
analysis applied by the majority opinion does nothing to 
prohibit the practice of improper courtroom closure, which at 
least in Fond du Lac County appears to be common practice.  In 
contrast, requiring waivers upholds the important purpose of the 
public trial right and encourages courts to keep trials open to 
the public.  Of course, under Waller, overriding interests may 
necessitate closure under rare circumstances. 
C. REMEDY UNDER A WAIVER ANALYSIS 
¶174 Because I would apply waiver and neither Pinno nor 
Seaton voluntarily or knowingly waived their right to a public 
trial, I briefly address the remedy each defendant should 
receive.   
¶175 In Seaton's case, the circuit court denied his request 
for an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the courtroom was 
never closed.  However, Seaton's postconviction motion included 
sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing on whether 
the courtroom was closed.  Therefore, in Seaton's case the 
proper remedy, under a waiver analysis, would be a remand for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the courtroom was 
closed during voir dire.  That hearing should be before a 
circuit court judge other than the one who denied the original 
request for an evidentiary hearing.  If an evidentiary hearing 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
20 
 
revealed that the courtroom was closed during voir dire, then 
analysis of whether the circuit court had considered the Waller 
factors would also be necessary.  If not, then the Waller 
factors must be considered and applied, and the ultimate remedy 
would depend on whether the Waller factors were satisfied.    
¶176 In Pinno's case, under a waiver analysis, the remedy 
should be different because she already received an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of courtroom closure, which she raised in 
her postconviction motion.  During this evidentiary hearing, the 
circuit court concluded that the courtroom was never closed.  
Specifically, the circuit court stated: 
So I just want to certainly emphasize that the 
courtroom was never closed.  It was never locked.  It 
was never secured.  Rather this Court was doing 
nothing more than exercising its inherent power to 
encourage limiting the admission of public to the 
courtroom only during the voir dire process given the 
jury panel of 85 potential jurors . . . . 
However, before voir dire began in Pinno's case, and just prior 
to seating the jury venire in the courtroom, the circuit court 
remarked: 
Other than the jury, nobody will be in the courtroom.  
Okay.  So just have the jury panel in here.  I want no 
one else in here during the entire voir dire process 
until the jury is selected.  Any press in here?  (No 
response.)  I want no press in here either. 
 
¶177 Based on the statements the circuit court made on the 
record just prior to voir dire, I would hold the circuit court's 
conclusion, that the courtroom was never closed, to be clearly 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
21 
 
erroneous.57  Therefore, in Pinno's case, the proper remedy 
should be consideration and application of the Waller factors to 
the facts of record, and if a violation of Pinno's public trial 
right is determined to have occurred, then a new trial is a 
remedy.  A circuit court judge other than the one who found that 
no closure had occurred would need to be assigned to Pinno's 
case.   
II. 
A VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT SHOULD RESULT IN 
THE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE IN AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL CLAIM. 
 
¶178 I recognize that, under the waiver approach that I 
would apply, it is unnecessary to address the additional issue 
of whether prejudice should be presumed when an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is based on an alleged public trial 
right violation.  However, I write separately to briefly explain 
why, contrary to the majority opinion, prejudice should be 
presumed in this context. 
¶179 As the majority recognizes, this court has presumed 
prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
cases where the harm of the error in question could not easily 
                                                 
57 The fact that the jury clerk testified during the 
evidentiary hearing that the courtroom was never locked and that 
she thought she remembered people coming in and out of the 
courtroom does not change my conclusion.  The jury clerk could 
not specifically identify or describe any person, other than 
members of the jury venire, who observed the voir dire 
proceedings. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
22 
 
be measured.58  However, the majority opinion disregards our 
prior jurisprudence by again concluding that a public trial 
violation does not always result in a "manifest injustice."59  
This conclusion misses the mark because the focus should be the 
inability of courts to measure the effect of a public trial 
violation.  Therefore, as I have previously noted, it is 
insignificant that a manifest injustice may not result every 
time a courtroom is unlawfully closed.  Since the effect of a 
public trial right violation cannot be measured, prejudice must 
be presumed, consistent with the applicable case law discussed.   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶180 Courtroom 
closures, 
by 
their 
very 
nature, 
are 
extremely troubling.  The circumstances under which a courtroom 
can be closed without violating a bedrock principle of our 
justice system——the right to a public trial——are rare.  Travis 
Seaton and Nancy Pinno, the defendants in these consolidated 
cases, each asserts that voir dire proceedings during their 
criminal trials in Fond du Lac County were closed to the public 
apparently to make room for large jury venires.  While these 
allegations alone are disconcerting, the record in Seaton's case 
demonstrates that these types of closures are apparently common 
practice in Fond du Lac County.  If there is to be a courtroom 
closure, there must be consideration and application of the 
                                                 
58 Majority op., ¶84 (discussing State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 
258, 280-81, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997)). 
59 Id. 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
23 
 
Waller factors because a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial is absolutely rooted in the essential underpinning 
of our judicial system: fairness.   
¶181 Considering that the public trial right is such a 
fundamental concept to our criminal justice system, I cannot 
agree with the majority's conclusion that a criminal defendant's 
failure to make a contemporaneous objection results in his or 
her forfeiture of that right.  Contrary to the majority opinion, 
I assert that a defendant's public trial right, guaranteed by 
both the Sixth Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution, can be 
given 
up 
only 
if 
the 
defendant 
affirmatively 
voices 
a 
willingness to do so.  I would therefore consider the right 
subject to waiver analysis.  This conclusion results from 
consideration of the importance of the public trial right, the 
unique position of a violation of the right as a structural 
constitutional error, its concern with fairness, and persuasive 
authority from the United States Supreme Court and from other 
jurisdictions, all considerations that are minimized by the 
majority opinion. 
¶182 In 
addition, 
I 
write 
separately 
to 
express 
my 
disagreement 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion 
that 
prejudice should not be presumed when a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is based on an alleged violation of the 
public trial right.  I recognize that under my use of a waiver 
analysis, there would be no need to reach the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims presented by these defendants.  
However, I am not persuaded by the majority opinion's discussion 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
24 
 
of the presumption of prejudice.  At the outset, I agree with 
the majority that the presumption of prejudice is warranted 
under circumstances in which the harm of the error in question 
is difficult to measure.  In contrast to the majority's 
position, however, I conclude that a public trial violation that 
occurs during voir dire is exactly the type of harm that may 
infiltrate an entire trial in incalculable ways.  Therefore, 
contrary to the majority approach, I would presume prejudice in 
this context. 
¶183 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶184 
I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2011AP2424-CR & 2012AP918.npc 
 
 
 
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