Title: Wright v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Rodney Wade Wright v. State of Maryland
No. 73, Sept. Term, 1997
It is ordinarily inappropriate for the State to withhold a confession that is admissible as
substantial evidence in its case-in-chief, ask the defendant on cross-examination whether
he/she made such a confession, and then admit the confession as impeachment evidence on
rebuttal if the defendant denies having made the confession.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 73
September Term, 1997
______________________________________
RODNEY WADE WRIGHT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Karwacki  (retired, 
  specially assigned),
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
Rodowsky, Chasanow,  and Karwacki,  JJ, concur
and dissent.
______________________________________
Filed:  April 17, 1998
 In a conditional cross-petition, the State asked us to consider whether, by failing to make
1
a proper objection, Wright failed to preserve his challenge to the rebuttal evidence.  We denied the
conditional cross-petition, so that issue is not before us.  Implicit in our ruling on the cross-petition,
of course, is our belief that there was a sufficient objection.
  
Rodney Wright was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Charles County of
second degree rape, second and third degree sexual offense, and child abuse, for which he
was given varying terms of imprisonment.  The judgments were affirmed by the Court of
Special Appeals.  We granted certiorari to consider two questions:  (1) whether the trial
court erred in allowing, as rebuttal evidence, an inculpatory statement that Wright made to
Louis Hurt, a one-time cell-mate at the county detention center; and (2) whether, for
purposes of the child abuse conviction, Wright qualified as a “household member,” within
the meaning of Maryland Code, Article 27, § 35C (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.).   We shall
1
answer both questions in the affirmative and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals and remand the case for retrial.
UNDERLYING FACTS
In June, 1995, Wright was living in Bel Alton with Shirley Thompson and Shirley’s
two children, Latara, age 4, and Rhonda, age 2.  The victim in the case was Shirley’s younger
sister, Queen Champion, who was then 12 years old.  Queen lived with her mother (Juanita
Thompson), her stepfather, and her two younger sisters about 15 miles away, in Indian Head.
Following the end of the school term and with her mother’s consent, she went to stay with
Shirley for part of the summer.  There is some dispute as to when she actually arrived.
Juanita Thompson said that Shirley came to get her around June 10 or June 13, which
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conforms with Queen’s recollection, and, for purposes of this appeal, we shall assume that
to be the case.  Initially, the stay was to be for two weeks, but it was extended to July 10.
At some point near the end of June, a friend of Queen’s, Tomika Dorsey, came to stay for
about a week.  Queen and Tomika occasionally played outside but also helped care for
Shirley’s children.
On June 28, Shirley left the home at about 8:30 a.m. to keep an appointment at the
health department.  In the home at the time were Wright, Queen, Tomika, Latara, and
Rhonda.  Queen testified that, while Rhonda was sleeping and Tomika and Latara were
taking a bath, she was  watching television.  When the TV began “acting up,” Queen asked
Wright, who was in his bedroom, if he could fix it.  According to Queen, as she was leaving
Wright’s room, he called her back, pushed her on to the bed, and locked the door.  He  held
her down on the bed, removed her shorts and underwear, performed cunnilingus, and then
had sexual intercourse with her.  She said that she was squirming, kicking, screaming, and
attempting to get away, to no avail.  At some point, one of the other children began knocking
on the door, asking to come in, but Wright continued.  Not until he heard Shirley returning
did he relent, jump up, and put on his clothes.  Queen ran into the bathroom and noticed
blood “and some slimy stuff” coming from her vagina.  Wright, she said, warned her not to
tell anyone what happened, or he would “slam [her] head into the wall.”
Although Queen said that she called for Shirley to come into the bathroom, Shirley
responded instead to Wright.  Thereafter, Queen said nothing.  Her mother came to get her
on July 10, after somehow learning from one of her other daughters that Wright had “fooled
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with” Queen, but it was not until Queen was home that she informed her mother what had
happened.  Ms. Thompson took her daughter to the hospital, where she was examined.  The
doctor found one tear of the hymen which, the doctor later testified, indicated a single
incident of intercourse.
DISCUSSION
The Statement To Louis Hurt
After his arrest, Wright was incarcerated in the county detention center.  His cell-mate
for part of that time was one Louis Hurt, who was facing carjacking and robbery charges.
According to Hurt, although Wright was initially reluctant to discuss the charges against him,
he eventually told Hurt a story that was largely consistent with Queen’s version of what had
occurred.  It was, in every respect, a full confession.  Although Hurt was listed as a witness
by the State, he did not testify, and was not even mentioned, in the State’s case-in-chief.  The
State’s case consisted of the testimony of Queen, her mother, and the doctor who examined
Queen at the hospital.  Queen’s account was thus corroborated principally by the testimony
of the doctor that she was not a virgin and that the tear to her hymen indicated only one
penetration.  In cross-examination, the suggestion was planted that Queen may have had
intercourse with a boyfriend which, if true, could also explain her vaginal condition.
That defense was pursued in Wright’s case, in large part through the testimony of one
of Queen’s girlfriends, Crystal Hill, who said that, in June, 1995, Queen had told her that
 Both Queen and the boyfriend, Damien, denied that they had engaged in sexual intercourse.
2
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Queen and her boyfriend, Damian, had had intercourse on one occasion.   Queen also told
2
her that she (Queen) and Wright had “had sex,” although Queen said nothing about being
raped.  Wright was the last defense witness.  On direct examination, he denied having had
sexual intercourse with Queen; he denied pushing her on the bed and removing her clothing;
he denied having oral sex with her; and he denied removing his own clothes in Queen’s
presence.  He was not asked about Louis Hurt or whether he had made any statements to
Hurt.  He acknowledged having spoken with a police detective when he was arrested on July
10, identified the written statement given to the detective, and was questioned about some
aspects of it, although the statement itself was never offered into evidence.  On cross-
examination, he was asked, for the first time, whether he knew Hurt, and he acknowledged
that he did.  He also acknowledged having talked to Hurt about this case, although not about
what his testimony would be.  When asked whether he trusted Hurt sufficiently to tell him
“about what happened,” Wright objected, and, at the bench, the prosecutor made a proffer:
“First, he told him, I am in on these charges, they charged me
with this.  Then he talked to him later and the defendant said, it
is her mother, the mother is behind this.  He talked to him a
month later and he said, I will tell you what happened, and he
told him the entire thing that happened, him and Shirley were
having problems, she was out of the house that day.  He wanted
to get a nut so he had sex with Queen.”
The court overruled the objection, declaring that the State could ask “about any
admissions he may have made.”  Upon further questioning, Wright again admitted having
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talked to Hurt about the charges and even about Queen’s mother, but he denied telling him
“that what happened was that you and Shirley were having some problems, and you just
wanted to get a nut so Queen was there and you had sex with Queen.”  On redirect
examination, he said that he knew Hurt and did not trust him.  He said that Hurt was aware
of the charges against him — Wright had a copy of the charges with him in jail and Hurt had
seen them — but that, when Hurt questioned him about the charges, he “just told him to
mind his business.”
Immediately upon the conclusion of Wright’s testimony, which ended the defense
case, the State called Hurt as a rebuttal witness.  Over objection, Hurt was permitted to
testify essentially as the prosecutor had proffered.  Omitting intervening questions, he said:
“[Wright] told me that him and his girlfriend were having
problems between each other.  She left . . . to go to the health
department, took one of the children with her.  He was left in
the house with him and his other daughter and . . . Shirley’s
sister. . . Shirley was gone.  She left.  He was in the living room
playing with his daughter and Shirley’s sister asked him could
he fix the antenna in the bedroom.  He went to fix the antenna
and he started to think to himself the girl looks pretty good.  He
went behind her and said he pushed her on the bed and started
to have oral sex with her and she started screaming, saying stop.
He said he just want to get a nut.”
Hurt continued that, in addition to having oral sex, Wright admitted having vaginal
intercourse with Queen and stopped only when Shirley’s car pulled up.  Wright also said that
he threatened Queen if she said anything. 
There are a number of nuances and distinctions that need to be considered in this case,
but the ultimate question is whether it is permissible for the State to withhold from its case-
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in-chief an inculpatory statement by the defendant bearing directly and substantively on the
defendant’s guilt, set the stage for using the statement in rebuttal by asking the defendant on
cross-examination whether the  defendant ever made such a statement, and then using the
statement in rebuttal if the defendant denies having made it.  The answer depends on the
nature of the statement,  what it is intended to rebut, whether it is being offered as
substantive or impeachment evidence, and whether it really could have been used in the
State’s case-in-chief.
The general rule, of long standing in Maryland, is that “the plaintiff [which in a
criminal case is the State] must put in the whole of his evidence upon every point or issue
which he opens, before the defendant proceeds with the evidence on his part.”  Maurice v.
Worden, 54 Md. 233, 251 (1880).  It may not “go into half of its case and reserve the
remainder, but is obliged to develop the whole.”  Cumb. & Penn. R.R. Co. v. Slack, 45 Md.
161, 176 (1876) (quoting from 1 Greenl. Ev. § 74).  More recently, we noted, with particular
reference to criminal cases, that “[o]rdinarily, an orderly conducted criminal trial anticipates
the State adducing all of its evidence in chief and resting its case.  The defense follows by
producing its evidence tending to establish the accused’s non-culpability . . . .”  Mayson v.
State, 238 Md. 283, 288, 208 A.2d 599, 602 (1965).  A contrary practice, this Court has
observed, “would not only greatly prolong trials, but would frequently lead to surprise and
injustice.”  Bannon v. Warfield, 42 Md. 22, 39 (1875); Cumb. & Penn. R.R. Co, supra, 45
Md. at 176; State v. Booze, 334 Md. 64, 67, 637 A.2d 1214, 1216 (1994).  See also 6 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1873 (Chadbourn ed. 1976). 
-7-
There are two caveats to the general rule, both described in some detail in State v.
Hepple, 279 Md. 265, 368 A.2d 445 (1977).  The first arises from the discretion that a trial
court has to permit a party to reopen its case-in-chief, even after the opposing party has
concluded.  In State v. Booze, supra, 334 Md. 64, 637 A.2d 1214, we synthesized holdings
and pronouncements from earlier cases, including State v. Hepple and Dyson v. State, 328
Md. 490, 615 A.2d 1182 (1992), and, quoting from some of those Opinions, confirmed
(1) that the trial court has discretion “to permit the moving party to reopen its case to
introduce evidence adducible in chief,” but (2) that, in exercising that discretion, the judge
must consider a number of factors, including “whether the State deliberately withheld the
evidence proffered in order to have it presented at such time as to obtain an unfair advantage
by its impact on the trier of facts,” and “[w]hether good cause is shown; whether the new
evidence is significant; whether the jury would be likely to give undue emphasis, prejudicing
the party against whom it is offered; whether the evidence is controversial in nature; and
whether the reopening is at the request of the jury or a party.”  334 Md. at 69, 637 A.2d at
1217.  The judge must consider “whether the proposed evidence is merely cumulative to, or
corroborative of, that already offered in chief or whether it is important or essential to a
conviction.”  Id. at 69, 637 A.2d at 1216-17.  The discretion, in other words, though broad,
is not unbounded; it cannot be used to permit the plaintiff/State unfairly to prejudice the
defendant.  We made clear in both Hepple, 279 Md. at 270, 368 A.2d at 449, and Booze, 334
Md. at 69, 637 A.2d at 1216, that the court’s allowance of such a reopening will not
constitute an abuse of discretion “so long as [it] does not impair the ability of the defendant
 This seems to be the general rule, although some  States have taken a different, more flexible
3
approach and have allowed the prosecution to withhold important evidence, including a confession,
and use it to rebut even denials of guilt.  See, for example, Walker v. State, 510 P.2d 1365 (Nev.
1973); Wallace v. State, 447 P.2d 30 (Nev. 1968); Crawford v. State, 688 P.2d 357 (Okla. Crim.
1984); Commonwealth v. Adams, 102 A.2d 202 (Pa. 1954).  Those cases rest on the view that a trial
court has virtually unbounded discretion in allowing the State to present its evidence as it pleases and,
to some extent, seem to confuse the court’s discretion to allow the State to reopen its case-in-chief,
which they find broader in scope than we do, with the discretion to determine what constitutes proper
rebuttal evidence.
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to answer and otherwise receive a fair trial.”3
The second caveat deals with rebuttal evidence.  In Mayson v. State, supra, 238 Md.
at 289, 208 A.2d at 602, and State v. Hepple, supra, 279 Md. at 270, 368 A.2d at 449, we
defined rebuttal evidence as any competent evidence which explains, or is a direct reply to,
or a contradiction of “any new matter that has been brought into the case by the defense.”
(Emphasis added.)  See also Lane v. State, 226 Md. 81, 90, 172 A.2d 400, 404 (1961), where
we defined it as competent evidence which explains, or is a direct reply to, or a contradiction
of, “material evidence introduced by the accused . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  The articulation
that we used in Lane was repeated in Booze, supra, 334 Md. at 70, 637 A.2d at 1217.
There is an important distinction between rebuttal evidence and evidence sought to
be admitted pursuant to a  reopening of the case-in-chief.  In the latter situation, the evidence
ordinarily would have been admissible during that party’s case-in-chief; its proponent merely
seeks to have the evidence admitted out of order.  A party bearing the burden of proof on an
issue ordinarily has no right to have evidence admitted out of order after the party has closed
its case.  Varying the order of proof is, however, clearly within the court’s discretion, which
is why a decision to permit a party to reopen its case-in-chief for that purpose also is
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discretionary.  Because  rebuttal evidence, in contrast, is designed solely to address new
matters or facts introduced by the defendant during the defendant’s case, that evidence
ordinarily would have been inadmissible, as irrelevant, in the plaintiff/State’s case-in-chief,
for, at that stage, there would have been nothing to rebut.  Thus, although there is discretion
in the trial court to determine whether evidence offered in rebuttal actually qualifies, under
the test we have established, as proper rebuttal evidence, Hepple, supra, 279 Md. at 270, 368
A.2d at 449, if the evidence does qualify as rebuttal, the party ordinarily has a right to have
it admitted.  Wigmore explains the distinction:
“For matters properly not evidential until the rebuttal, the
proponent has a right to put them in at that time, and they are
therefore not subject to the discretionary exclusion of the trial
court.  Matters that should have been put in at first may by that
discretion be refused later, because this is but the denial of a
second opportunity.  But matters of true rebuttal could not have
been put in before, and to exclude them now would be to deny
them their sole opportunity for admission.  Hence, while the
trial court’s determination of what is properly rebutting evidence
should be respected, yet, if its nature as such is clear,  the
proponent does not need the trial court’s express consent to
admit it as involving a departure from the customary rule.
This will always be the case for evidence offered to
impeach the opponent’s witnesses by way of moral character,
bias, self-contradiction, or the like.”
6 WIGMORE, supra, § 1873 at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
Hurt’s testimony was offered solely as rebuttal evidence.  The State did not seek to
reopen its case-in-chief in order to allow Hurt to testify, and the testimony was not allowed
as part of the case-in-chief.  The issue, then, is whether the court abused its discretion in
 While Wright and Hurt were together in the detention center, they were initially being
4
represented by the same attorney from the Public Defender’s Office.  At some point, Hurt informed
the attorney of his intention to testify against Wright, whereupon the attorney withdrew from Hurt’s
case and another lawyer was assigned to represent him. In response to Wright’s request for discovery,
seeking a copy of “all statements made by the Defendant to a State agent” and “the substance of each
oral statement and a copy of all reports of each oral statement,” the State advised: “The Defendant
has . . . furnished a statement.  A copy of any written statement or summary of any oral statement is
attached hereto.  The attached report discloses the circumstances under which the statement was
obtained.” 
The only attachment actually indicated in the response was a 5-page police report that was
given directly to defense counsel.  No attachment appears in the court file, and we therefore cannot
tell what was included in that police report.  The record reveals that Wright had made both an oral
and a written statement to a police detective, who clearly would have been a State agent.  Without
objection, the written statement made to the detective was marked for identification and discussed
in the testimony, but it was never offered into evidence.  In an omnibus motion, Wright moved to
suppress any unlawfully obtained confessions, statements, or admissions, but no particular confession,
statement, or admission was ever identified.  A pretrial hearing was held on one aspect of the omnibus
motion, dealing with a medical report, but counsel never raised the issue of any statement Wright
made to Hurt and at the end of that hearing expressly abandoned her motion.  Although a general
objection was made when Hurt was asked about his conversation with Wright, there was no
suggestion, much less a claim, that Hurt’s testimony would be inadmissible because of any violation
of Miranda.  
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determining that the testimony was proper rebuttal evidence. 
As we have indicated, Hurt’s testimony constituted nothing more or less than a full
confession of guilt by Wright — a classic party admission.  On this record, there is no reason
to suppose that Hurt’s testimony would not have been admissible, as substantive evidence,
in the State’s case-in-chief.  There is nothing to indicate that Wright’s alleged admissions
were not voluntary; nor is there anything in the record to indicate that Hurt was, in any way,
a State agent, thereby implicating the procedural protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  Wright, indeed, makes no claim to the
contrary.4
 The State’s concession on that point is entirely justified.  In State v. Hepple, supra, 279 Md.
5
at 273, 368 A.2d at 450, we made clear that “it [is] essential that the State, in chief, make a prima
facie case against the defendant” and that “[t]he mere denial by a defendant of the State’s accusation
together with an assertion that he was engaged in different activities than those sought to be proved
by the prosecution does not  necessarily constitute ‘new matter’ entitling the State to present
additional evidence on the same subject it originally sought to prove.”  See also State v. Booze, supra,
334 Md. 64, at 75 n.4, 637 A.2d at 1219:  “The denial of guilt is not, in any event, new matter
presented by the defendant.  But even if it were, testimony that more properly is adducible in the
State’s case-in-chief does not explain, reply to, or contradict it.”  Judge Chasanow overlooks that
principle in his dissent, notwithstanding its proper concession by the State.
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It is clear from the State’s proffer during its cross-examination of Wright that it
intended to offer Hurt’s testimony of Wright’s confession as rebuttal evidence.  But what
was it intended to rebut?  In its brief (State’s Brief at 6-7), the State tells us its theory:
“Hurt’s testimony can be classified as a contradiction of a new
matter brought into the case by the defense.  Although the denial
of guilt does not constitute new matter presented by the
defendant, see State v. Booze, 334 Md. at 75 n.4; State v.
Hepple, 279 Md. at 273, Wright’s testimony here was not
merely a denial of guilt; he was stating additionally that he
never admitted his guilt to his cellmate.  Thus, Wright’s
testimony clearly injected a new matter into the case.  And
Hurt’s testimony was clearly a contradiction of Wright’s denial
that he admitted to Hurt that he had sex with Queen.”
(Emphasis added.)
In laying out its position, the State acknowledges a number of things:  (1) that Hurt’s
testimony was inadmissible to rebut Wright’s testimony on direct examination that he did not
engage in the alleged conduct;  (2) that the sole function of Hurt’s testimony was, instead,
5
to rebut Wright’s denial that he confessed to Hurt; (3) that, under our holding in Bruce v.
State, 318 Md. 706, 569 A.2d 1254 (1990), Hurt’s rebuttal testimony was not admissible as
substantive evidence but only to impeach Wright’s denial that he made the admission; and
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(4) that the denial sought to be impeached was elicited by the State on cross-examination and
was not, therefore, injected affirmatively into the case by Wright. 
When viewed in this manner, which is the manner presented to us by the State, the
problem emerges:  the State has a confession that is admissible in its case-in-chief as
substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt; instead of offering it at that stage, the State
waits to see if the defendant testifies; if the defendant testifies and denies guilt, the State asks
on cross-examination whether the defendant ever made the confession; if the defendant
answers affirmatively, the State continues its cross-examination and brings out the entire
confession as a prior inconsistent statement; if the defendant denies the confession, the State
springs it, in full blossom, in rebuttal, supposedly for the limited purpose of contradicting the
defendant’s denial that he or she ever made the confession.  The State gambles that, upon
request, the court may instruct the jury (or instruct itself, in a bench trial) that the confession
may be used only to impeach the defendant’s statement that he never made the confession
and not as substantive evidence of guilt, but with or without such an instruction, the trier of
fact hears the substance of the confession at or near the end of the case — after the defense
is concluded.
In State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 375 A.2d 1105 (1977), and State v. Franklin, 281 Md.
51, 375 A.2d 1116 (1977), we addressed the circumstances under which the State could
properly use, in rebuttal, a confession rendered inadmissible in its case-in-chief because of
Miranda violations.  Following a line of cases from other jurisdictions, we construed Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971) and  Oregon v. Hass, 420
 In Harris, the Court noted:
6
“Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here
did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the
adversary process.  Had inconsistent statements been made by the
accused to some third person, it could hardly be contended that the
conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination
and impeachment.”
Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 225-26, 91 S. Ct. at 645-46, 28 Ld. Ed. 2d at 4-5.  In Walder, the Court
held:
“Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him.  He must be free to
deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving
leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief.”
Walder, supra, 347 U.S. at 65, 74 S. Ct. at 356, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 507.
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U.S. 714, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1975) “as requiring that the issues sought to be
impeached by the challenged extrajudicial statement of the accused be initiated by the
accused on direct examination” and held that “[t]he prosecution is not permitted to use
tainted evidence to impeach an issue which it first solicited on cross-examination.”  Kidd,
supra, 281 Md. at 49, 375 A.2d at 1114.  We did not directly address in Kidd or Franklin
whether such a confession could be used to rebut a mere denial of guilt asserted by a
defendant on direct examination, for that situation was not presented in those cases.  There
is language in Harris  suggesting that a tainted confession might be usable for that purpose,
although language in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503
(1954), relied upon in Harris, suggests the contrary.   See also People v. Taylor, 501 P.2d
6
-14-
918 (Cal. 1972) and United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1974), cited favorably by
us in State v. Kidd, following the view suggested in Walder.
The Harris/Kidd line of cases is mentioned principally for the sake of contrast, for
they present a quite different situation.  The stark contrast, of course, is that, in those
situations, the State has a confession that it cannot use in its case-in-chief.  The concern
expressed in Harris was that Miranda not “be perverted into a license to use perjury by way
of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”  Harris
v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. at 226, 91 S. Ct. at 645, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 5.  The Court reached
a pragmatic balance between two competing public policies — the exclusionary rule
precluding the use of confessions obtained in violation of Miranda, on the one hand, and not
giving defendants a free ride to commit perjury, on the other — and concluded that the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule was sufficiently achieved by making the confession
unusable in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
The competing interests here are quite different and nowhere near as equivalent.
Precisely because the confession was admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, there was no
prospect of the defendant getting a free ride to commit perjury.  Had Hurt testified in the
State’s case-in-chief, Wright could have been confronted and vigorously cross-examined
with respect to that testimony.  The State would have had the advantage of Hurt’s testimony
as both substantive evidence and a prior inconsistent statement by Wright, but Wright would
have had the advantage, in presenting his own case, of contradicting and denying Hurt’s
account.  The  advantage to the State in withholding the admissible confession for rebuttal
 Judge Chasanow states in his dissent that “[i]t was only after Wright’s attorney brought out
7
on redirect examination of Wright that Wright did not and would not have made any incriminating
statements to Hurt, that the prosecutor had to call Hurt in rebuttal.”  (Emphasis added.)  That is
simply not so.  The prosecutor made clear what he intended to do during his cross-examination of
Wright.  The decision to hold back Hurt — who was listed as a State’s witness — until the end was
a deliberate one made prior to the close of the State’s case-in-chief.
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was purely a tactical one designed for maximum prejudicial effect:  either (1) to discourage
the defendant from testifying, even to deny the guilt that the State is obliged to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt, or (2), if, as occurred here, the defendant chose to testify, to have the
confession dramatically admitted afterward — just prior to jury deliberation.7
Unlike the Harris/Kidd situation, that constitutes an offensive, not a defensive use of
the confession, but it is an offensive use that is fundamentally unfair and rests, for its
purported validity, on a transparent fiction.  It simply defies logic to suggest that, when it
really has a choice, the State would prefer to use a confession to impeach a defendant’s
credibility on what is essentially a collateral point — whether he or she, in fact, made such
a statement —  than to use it as substantive evidence of guilt.  The State’s true goal in this
case was not to suggest to the jury that Wright was not telling the truth when he denied
making the confession to Hurt, but rather to sandwich its case around that of the defense and
put its most damaging piece of evidence after the defense has concluded its presentation.
That kind of offensive use is wholly inconsistent with the long-standing rule in
Maryland that the State put on its case first.  It is also inconsistent with our long-standing
definition of rebuttal evidence.  It is unnecessary, and it is unfair.  Although some courts,
without much analysis, have allowed the practice, many have not, for the very reasons we
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find persuasive.  In People v. Bennet, 224 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. 1975), the defendant was
charged with murder.  His defense was alibi, and he took the stand and denied the shooting.
On cross-examination, he was asked whether he had ever told a fellow inmate at the
detention center that when he got out, “there was going to be some more murders,” and he
denied having made such a statement.  After the defense rested, the prosecutor called the
other inmate who, over objection, testified that the defendant had made the statement.
Reversing, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the State’s ploy “misconceives the
office of rebuttal,” that “[r]ebuttal is limited to the refutation of relevant and material
evidence — hence evidence bearing on an issue properly raised in a case,” that “where the
prosecutor did not offer this evidence in his case in chief, which he would have had to do if
this were to be regarded as an admission or part of a scheme, it did not bear on an issue
raised by the People,” and that “[t]he device of eliciting a denial of some statement not
properly in the case at the time of denial will not serve to inject an issue.”  (Emphasis
added.)  Id. at 842.  See also People v. McGee, 243 N.W.2d 663 (Mich. App. 1976); People
v. Bean, 280 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. App. 1979).
The Arkansas Supreme Court took the same position in Birchett v. State, 708 S.W.2d
625 (Ark. 1986).  The defendant was charged with robbery, and the State’s case consisted
essentially of eye-witness identifications by the two victims.  The defendant testified in his
defense and, on cross-examination, was asked whether he had discussed the robbery with his
girlfriend and had shown her some jewelry taken in the robbery.  He denied having done so.
Over objection, the State then produced the girlfriend in rebuttal to testify that the defendant
-17-
had discussed the robbery with her and had shown her some of the jewelry.  The issue on
appeal was whether the girlfriend was a proper rebuttal witness, as her name had not been
disclosed in discovery.  Reversing, the Arkansas court held, at 626-27:
“It is evident [that the girlfriend] was not a true rebuttal witness.
Her testimony was not merely in response to evidence presented
by the defense. . . .  Rather, this appears to be an instance of a
witness who could have been presented in the state’s case in
chief being withheld until rebuttal.  Her testimony impeached
responses drawn from the appellant during his cross-
examination.  The questions asked of appellant during cross
seem clearly designed to manufacture a rebuttal situation for a
presentation of the state’s evidence that belonged in its case in
chief — evidence that was not genuinely in response to anything
presented by appellant in his defense.  Under these
circumstances, the witness should not have been granted rebuttal
status.”
A similar result was reached in Lucas v. Commonwealth, 195 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1946).
The defendant, charged with murder, denied having robbed and killed the victim.  On cross-
examination, he was asked whether he had made certain inculpatory statements, amounting
to a confession, to two people while confined in the county jail, and he denied making those
statements.  The State then called the two people in rebuttal to testify as to the statements.
Reversing, the court held that the introduction of the confession in rebuttal was “prejudicially
erroneous.”  Id. at 92.  The confession, it held, “was not introduced for the purpose of
[a]ffecting appellant’s credibility as a witness, but was substantive evidence and should have
been introduced in chief.”  Id.  Noting the discretion generally allowed a trial court to permit
rebuttal evidence, the court nonetheless concluded that “the Commonwealth should not be
permitted to take undue advantage of the defendant and withhold important evidence until
-18-
near the close of trial, and then introduce it in the guise of rebuttal evidence.”  Id. (emphasis
added).  The Lucas court further noted:
 “In the case before us, it is obvious that the Commonwealth
deliberately held the witness back in order to get an advantage.
The evidence introduced in rebuttal was purely substantive in
nature, and should have been introduced in chief.  It was the
most damaging evidence offered by the Commonwealth, and its
introduction during the final stages of the trial was, under the
circumstances, prejudicial to appellant’s rights.”
Id. at 93 (emphasis added).  See also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147 (Ky.
1970).
For other expositions of this approach, see Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 791
(Miss. 1988) (“Manifestly, no party should be permitted as a deliberate trial tactic to decide
in advance of trial to withhold a part of his case in chief, but instead attempt to suggest such
evidence in cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing side, and then offer the
evidence in rebuttal”); State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280, 288 (N.M. 1979) (declaring that “[t]his
type of gamesmanship in the conduct of a criminal trial is not to be commended”); State v.
Turner, 337 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976); State v. Smith, 45 So. 415 (La. 1908).  In People v.
Rodriguez, 136 P.2d 626 (Cal. App. 1943), the court, though reversing a judgment on other
grounds, commented as to this issue, at 628-29: 
“The People have no right to withhold a material part of their
evidence which could as well be used in their case in chief, for
the sole purpose of using it in rebuttal. . . . The alleged
confession was offered to establish facts constituting guilt; the
impeachment feature was incidental and comparatively
unimportant.  It was no more proper for the District Attorney to
offer the evidence as rebuttal after defendant’s denial of the
-19-
alleged statements, under the pretense that it was offered to
impeach the defendant, than it would have been to offer it in
rebuttal if the defendant had not been questioned about it at all.
It makes no difference here that the testimony as to the
confession, aside from being evidence of the fact of guilt, also
tended to impeach the defendant.”
Compare Wallace v. State, 447 P.2d 30 (Nev. 1968); Walker v. State, 510 P.2d 1365 (Nev.
1973); Cowart v. State, 579 So. 2d 1 (Ala. App. 1990); and Mitchem v. State, 503 N.E.2d
889 (Ind. 1987).
The State contends that we reached a different conclusion in Bruce v. State, supra,
318 Md. 706, 569 A.2d 1254.  The defendant there was charged with five counts of murder,
arising from a massacre that occurred at an apartment in Landover.  The State produced
evidence that Bruce did, indeed, participate in the shootings, that, after the shootings, Bruce,
two other men who also allegedly participated, and Bruce’s girlfriend, Michelle Nelson,
drove to Virginia together, that a week later they went to Florida where they split up, and that
Bruce eventually went to New York, where he was arrested.  Bruce testified in his own
defense.  He acknowledged being in the apartment but stated that he was not involved in the
shootings and left the apartment as soon as the shooting began.  He admitted that he and Ms.
Nelson drove to Virginia and then flew to Florida but claimed that the trip to Florida had
been pre-planned.  He said that, after spending four days in Florida, he went to New York.
On cross-examination, Bruce admitted knowing one Kenneth Clee from New York,
but he denied telling Clee that he was “on the run from the F.B.I.” because of some killings
in Maryland.  After the defense rested, the State was allowed to call Clee as a rebuttal
-20-
witness to testify that Bruce had, indeed, made the statement denied by Bruce.  In addressing
that issue, this Court stated:
“Appellant’s admissions to Clee that he was fleeing from the
F.B.I. and had killed a couple of people in Maryland could have
been introduced as substantive evidence in the State’s case in
chief.  They constitute admissions of flight and admissions of
criminal agency.  Instead of offering these statements as part of
its case, the State waited, and when Appellant took the witness
stand and denied participation in any killings and testified that
the trip to Florida was pre-planned, the State attempted to
impeach this testimony through the prior inconsistent statements
made to Clee.  When Appellant denied making the statements to
Clee, the State quite properly, in rebuttal, offered the prior
inconsistent statement through Clee.  We note that Appellant’s
statement when offered in rebuttal was not admissible at that
stage as an admission, but was admissible at that stage as a prior
inconsistent statement.”  
The situation before us in Bruce was much more focused than what is before us here.
Bruce testified on direct examination that his trip to Florida was pre-planned, thereby
implying that it did not constitute a consciousness of guilt through flight.  He was asked on
cross-examination whether he had made a statement inconsistent with that assertion and,
when he denied doing so, rebuttal evidence on that limited point was legitimately allowed,
to establish the prior inconsistent statement and to suggest to the jury that he was not telling
the truth when he asserted that the trip was pre-planned.  Admission of Clee’s testimony as
rebuttal in that setting did not raise the same kinds of issues that are presented when, as here,
the State deliberately holds back a full and detailed confession to rebut not the defendant’s
substantive testimony on direct examination but a statement elicited by the State on cross-
examination.  To stretch the holding in Bruce beyond what was before us there is
 Judge Chasanow takes us to task for “totally ignor[ing]” Maryland Rule 5-613, which he
8
regards as “directly on point.”  We have not ignored the Rule; it simply has no bearing on this case.
With some modifications, the Rule essentially codifies the common law principle allowing a witness
to be examined about and impeached with a prior statement made by the witness that is inconsistent
with the witness’s trial testimony and, if the conditions of the Rule are satisfied and the statement
concerns a non-collateral matter, to offer evidence of the prior inconsistent statement.  Rule 5-613
is a rule of evidence, not a rule of trial procedure.  It is not a license for a plaintiff or the State to
withhold critical substantive evidence that should be offered in its case-in-chief and present it,
improperly, as rebuttal evidence, to rebut a matter that it has introduced into the case.  Neither the
Rule as codified nor its common law antecedent precluded the other courts whose opinions we have
cited from reaching the same conclusion we reach here. 
-21-
unnecessary and inappropriate.  Had we intended a broader scope, we would at least have
cited some authority and discussed the concerns that are addressed here.
In conformance with the long-standing Maryland practice of requiring the
plaintiff/State to put on its case first, and for the reasons enunciated in the out-of-State cases
cited above, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Hurt’s
testimony as rebuttal evidence.  It was predominantly substantive evidence of guilt that
should have been presented by the State during its case-in-chief, and its admission as
rebuttal, purportedly to impeach Wright’s statement, elicited on cross-examination, that he
never made the statement was manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.8
Household Member
Count 3 of the indictment charged Wright with having violated Maryland Code,
Article 27, § 35C which, in relevant part, makes it a felony for “[a] parent or other person
who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a
child or a household or family member” to cause abuse to the child.  A “household member”
-22-
is defined as “a person who lives with or is a regular presence in a home of a child at the time
of the alleged abuse.”
As worded, the statute subjects to liability for child abuse (1) the child’s parent, (2) an
“other person” who has permanent or temporary care or custody of the child, (3) an “other
person” who has responsibility for the supervision of the child, (4) a household member, and
(5) a family member.  The State’s position was that, under the circumstances, Wright was
either a person having responsibility for Queen’s care, custody, or supervision, or that he was
a household member.  At the conclusion of the State’s case, the court, responding to a motion
for judgment, found insufficient evidence of the former but, viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the State, concluded that it sufficed to permit the jury to determine that
Wright was a household member in Queen’s temporary home.  Wright acknowledges that
he was a household member of Shirley’s home but presses the point that Shirley’s home was
not Queen’s home — that Queen lived with her mother in Indian Head and was only a
temporary occupant in Shirley’s abode.  The statute, he urges, requires that the defendant be
a household member in the child’s home.
The issue is one of statutory construction, and we are thus required to ascertain and
effectuate the legislative intent.  As noted, the relevant statutory provision — § 35C(a)(5) —
defines “household member” as a person who lives with or is a regular presence in “a home
of a child at the time of the alleged abuse.”  (Emphasis added.)  Use of the indefinite article
“a,” as opposed to the definite article “the,” itself indicates a legislative recognition that, for
purposes of the child abuse statute, a child may have more than one home.  Given the
-23-
context, that is not an unreasonable recognition.
Words like “home,” “resident,” and “household” are not capable of singular, absolute,
generic definition in the law, because they are used in so many different ways and for so
many different purposes.  They may mean one thing to the census taker, another to an
automobile insurer, one thing for voting purposes or for establishing venue in litigation,
another for determining where to mail a letter.  When the law uses such a word as a
substitute for domicile, it may encompass only one, permanent, fixed abode, without regard
to where the individual may be actually residing at a given moment.  In other contexts, it may
instead mean where the person is staying at the moment.  The flexibility in these terms is
especially important with respect to children, who are more frequently part of several homes
and households.  If their parents are separated or divorced, they likely will spend time and
have clothes and belongings in the homes of both parents; they may visit grandparents or
other relatives for varying periods of time; they may be off to camp during the summer.
Where their “home” is at any given time may well depend on what is at stake in ascertaining
where their home is.
The term “household member,” and with it the term “home,” was added to § 35C in
1991.  The clear purpose of the addition was to extend the reach of the statute for the greater
protection of children, to declare as criminal violations acts of abuse committed against
children by a class of persons not then subject to the law.  The Legislature obviously
recognized that there were people other than parents, custodians, and persons directly
charged with the care and supervision of a child who were in a position to commit abuse
-24-
within the child’s home setting, where, because of the status of both the abuser and the child
in that setting, the child might be helpless against the predation.  We cannot subscribe to
Wright’s view that the Legislature intended to restrict that protection to only one residential
setting, and thus to ignore the reality actually faced by children.
Queen’s “permanent” home — her domicile — was with her mother.  Through
consensual arrangements among Queen, Shirley, and their mother, however, Queen was
living with Shirley when the criminal activity occurred.  Given that Queen, according to her
testimony and that of her mother, had been at Shirley’s house for about two weeks and was
intending to stay another two weeks, it is a fair inference that at least some part of her clothes
and other personal belongings were also at Shirley’s house; that is where she slept, bathed,
and ate; that is where her friend, Tomika, was staying with her.  That was the place where,
at the time, she formed part of Shirley’s household, a household of which Wright was a
member.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE JUDGMENT
OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY AND
REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY CHARLES COUNTY.
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
I concur with the portion of the majority opinion titled Household Member and the
determination that the defendant, Rodney Wright, was a “household member” within the
meaning of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 35C.   I dissent from the
reversal of Wright’s conviction because the trial judge admitted Wright’s prior inconsistent
statement to his one-time cellmate Louis Hurt.  In reversing Wright’s rape and child abuse
convictions, the majority reaches three illogical and unsupported conclusions.  First, the rules
for impeaching witnesses and parties by extrinsic evidence of their prior inconsistent
statements do not apply to defendants.  Second, impeaching evidence of a defendant’s partial
admission is admissible in rebuttal, but impeaching evidence of a defendant’s full and
complete confession is not.  Third, a defendant’s illegally obtained confession is admissible
to impeach the defendant on rebuttal, but a defendant’s valid confession is not.
EVEN ASSUMING ERROR THERE IS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR
Before going into my reasons for believing there was no error in admitting Wright’s
confession as proper rebuttal, I should explain why, even if there was a timing error by the
prosecutor in offering the confession on rebuttal, there was no prejudice that would require
a new trial.  Wright’s confession was admissible even if it was admitted at the wrong stage
of trial.  A judge has wide latitude in permitting variations in the order of proof, and what
admissible evidence may be used in rebuttal is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.  Recently in State v. Booze, 334 Md. 64, 637 A.2d 1214 (1994), we reiterated the test
-1-
for reversible error:
“In the usual case, what constitutes rebuttal testimony rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling may
be reversed only when it constitutes an abuse of discretion, i.e.,
it has been shown to be both ‘manifestly and substantially
injurious.’” (Citations omitted).
334 Md. at 68, 637 A.2d at 1216 (quoting Mayson v. State, 238 Md. 283, 289, 208 A.2d 599,
602 (1965)).  Since the defendant’s confession is concededly admissible, any timing error
in admitting it in rebuttal rather than in the case-in-chief was not “manifestly and
substantially injurious.”  Id.; see also Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 74, 16 S.Ct.
216, 218, 40 L.Ed. 343, 345 (1895)(“It was obviously rebuttal testimony.  However, if it
should have been more properly introduced in the opening, it was purely within the sound
judicial discretion of the trial court to allow it, which discretion, in the absence of gross
abuse, is not reviewable....”).
The majority acknowledges there was no evidence improperly admitted in the instant
case, but opines that, because the jury heard Hurt’s testimony in the rebuttal phase of trial,
the jury gave it special and undue impact.  According to the majority, “[t]he State’s true goal
in this case was not to suggest to the jury that Wright was not telling the truth when he
denied making the confession to Hurt, but rather to sandwich its case around that of the
defense and put its most damaging piece of evidence after the defense has concluded its
presentation.” ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1998)(Majority Op. at 16).  This is
unwarranted and inaccurate speculation.  Hurt was not the last rebuttal witness and to say
that the uncorroborated testimony of a jailhouse snitch who seeks sentencing concessions for
-2-
testifying against a cellmate is more damaging than the corroborated testimony of the child
rape victim borders on the absurd.  Further, there is nothing in the facts that indicates the
timing of the admission of the confession was manifestly and substantially injurious.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
Medical evidence was presented in the State’s case-in-chief that the victim had a tear
to her hymen indicating only one penetration.  Wright’s evidence implied that the victim had
intercourse with her boyfriend.  By late afternoon of the first day of trial, both the State and
the defense had concluded their cases, and the judge proposed recessing for the day.  The
State, however, implored the judge to allow Hurt to testify before recessing for the day.  The
judge complied and permitted Hurt to testify.  The next morning the last rebuttal witness was
called.  He was the victim’s boyfriend, and he testified that he and the victim had never had
intercourse.  The State obviously did not want Hurt as its last witness — the State did not
even want Hurt’s testimony on the last day of trial.  In fact, there is some indication that the
State did not want to call Hurt at all.  In redirect examination of the defendant, the defense
attorney may have been trying to goad the prosecutor into calling Hurt by repeatedly having
Wright testify he would not have made any incriminating statements to Hurt.  Redirect
examination of Wright included the following:
“[Defense Counsel:] Now, Mr. Hurt — I am sorry, Mr. Wright,
while you were being held at the detention center, you spoke
with Mr. Hurt. Correct?
[Defendant:] Correct.
-3-
[Defense Counsel:] And was Mr. Hurt your [cellmate]?
[Defendant:] Yes, he was.
[Defense Counsel:] And what was your relationship with Mr.
Hurt while you were in the detention center?
[Defendant:] Enemy.
[Defense Counsel:] You and he did not get along?
[Defendant:] From the beginning.
[Defense Counsel:] Would you consider him a confidant,
someone you tell stuff to?
[Defendant:] Not at all.
[Defense Counsel:] Did you know Mr. Hurt before you were in
the detention center?
[Defendant:] Of him.
[Defense Counsel:] Did you know him, personally?
[Defendant:] I knew of him.  Like, I know him, I seen him, but
I didn’t go near him, didn’t fool with him or talk to him.
[Defense Counsel:] Mr. Wright, you are going to have to listen
to my question.  Did you know Mr. Hurt, personally, before you
went to the detention center?
[Defendant:] Not really, not personally.
[Defense Counsel:] Had you met him before?
[Defendant:] I had.
[Defense Counsel:] Had you talked to him before?
[Defendant:] No.
-4-
[Defense Counsel:] How did you meet him?
[Defendant:] I saw him somewhere, I saw him at a store.  That
is the only way I knew him.
[Defense Counsel:] Did you know him by name?
[Defendant:] Yes.
[Defense Counsel:] Had you ever been introduced to him?
[Defendant:] No.
[Defense Counsel:] Now, you indicated when Mr. Jones asked
you about the conversations with Mr. Hurt, that you told him the
girl’s mother didn’t like you.
[Defendant:] Yes, I did.
[Defense Counsel:] Did you ever tell him what your side of
what occurred was?
[Defendant:] No, I just told him to mind his business.”
The defense attorney could have simply left the matter with Wright’s statement on
cross-examination that he made no incriminating admissions to Hurt.  Instead, she dwelled
on the issue in re-direct examination of Wright.  This may have been done to goad the
prosecutor into calling Hurt because in balance his testimony may have been more helpful
to the defense than to the State.  Hurt’s credibility was at least suspect because he was
incarcerated for carjacking and armed robberies and may have been hoping for a
reconsideration of the eighteen-year sentence he received for those crimes.  What made
Hurt’s testimony helpful to the defense was that on cross-examination by defense counsel
Hurt acknowledged that he was a good friend of the victim’s sister Shirley Thompson.  Hurt
-5-
had Ms. Thompson’s phone number and spoke to her fairly frequently during the period she
lived with the defendant.  Ms. Thompson told Hurt that she was afraid of Wright.  Thus, Hurt
supplied a motive for Ms. Thompson to convince her young sister and Hurt to falsely
incriminate Wright.  This may also have been a reason why the prosecutor might have been
reluctant to call Hurt unless goaded into doing so by the defense. 
Offering Hurt’s testimony in rebuttal, rather than in the State’s case-in-chief, was
clearly not manifestly and substantially injurious.  The majority acknowledges that Hurt’s
testimony was admissible and that the only error was that the jury heard it as rebuttal in the
afternoon rather than during the State’s case-in-chief in the morning of the first day of a two-
day trial.  I do not see any justification for requiring the victim to again undergo the trauma
of disclosing her rape and sexual ordeal to a courtroom of strangers in order to force the State
to present the exact same witnesses and the exact same evidence, but in a slightly different
order.
THERE IS AN EVIDENTIARY DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CONFESSIONS AS ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS AS 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The majority includes a very relevant quotation from WIGMORE:
“For matters properly not evidential until the rebuttal, the
proponent has a right to put them in [at] that time, and they are
therefore not subject to the discretionary exclusion of the trial
court.  Matters that should have been put in at first may by that
discretion be refused later, because this is but the denial of a
second opportunity.  But matters of true rebuttal could not have
been put in before, and to exclude them now would be to deny
-6-
them their sole opportunity for admission.  Hence, while the
trial court’s determination of what is properly rebutting evidence
should be respected, yet, if its nature as such is clear,  the
proponent does not need the trial court’s express consent to
admit it as involving a departure from the customary rule.
This will always be the case for evidence offered to
impeach the opponent’s witnesses by way of moral character,
bias, self-contradiction, or the like.”  (Emphasis in
original)(footnotes omitted).
6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1873, at 678-79 (Chadbourn ed.
1976).  Unfortunately, after this quotation, the majority seems to lose sight of the meaning
of the quotation and confuse two separate concepts: 1) rebuttal evidence offered in
contradiction to evidence offered by the defense; and 2) rebuttal evidence offered to impeach
defense witnesses.  See majority opinion, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at
11-13 and n.5).  Rebuttal evidence offered to contradict the defense’s evidence is restricted
to new issues raised by the defense, and the State cannot contradict the defense’s evidence
or testimony to the effect that the defendant is innocent by offering in rebuttal additional
evidence that the defendant is guilty and that could have been admitted in the State’s case-in-
chief.  Rebuttal by contradiction is limited to new matters brought out in the defense’s case-
in-chief.  But there is a separate and distinct rule pointed out by the WIGMORE quotation and
that rule is that rebuttal evidence is always proper “to impeach the opponent’s witnesses
[including the defendant] by way of moral character, [which would include prior convictions
for crimes affecting credibility, etc.], bias, self-contradiction, [which includes prior
inconsistent statements], or the like.”  6 J. WIGMORE, supra, at 678-79.
-7-
I am in full agreement with the majority that, as a general rule, the State must put all
of its substantive evidence in its case-in-chief and may not hold back substantive evidence
for use as rebuttal.  That general rule, however, was not violated in the instant case.  What
the majority fails to recognize is that a defendant’s oral confession may be used in one of two
ways.  First, a confession is an admission by a party opponent which can be used by the State
as substantive evidence in its case-in-chief.  Second, if the defendant testifies in a manner
inconsistent with the oral confession, the confession may be used as a prior inconsistent
statement to impeach the defendant.  If used in this manner, the oral confession is only
admitted for impeachment and not as substantive evidence.  
When a defendant is cross-examined about a confession and admits making the
statement, the defendant may explain the inconsistencies.  If, however, the defendant denies
making the oral inconsistent statement or cannot remember the statement and if the statement
is not collateral, then the State is permitted to put in extrinsic evidence of the confession, not
as substantive evidence, but as impeachment of the defendant’s testimony.  See Bruce v.
State,  318 Md. 706, 729, 569 A.2d 1254, 1266 (1990).  The purpose of the rebuttal
testimony is, as MCCORMICK states:
“The theory of attack by prior inconsistent statements is
not based on the assumption that the present testimony is false
and the former statement true but rather upon the notion that
talking one way on the stand and another way previously is
blowing hot and cold, and raises a doubt as to the truthfulness
of both statements.”  (Footnote omitted).
1 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 34, at 114 (4  ed. 1992).
th
-8-
THE APPLICABILITY OF MARYLAND RULE 5-613
We have a court rule of evidence that is directly on point and specifically designed
to be applicable to statements by parties but which the majority claims has no bearing on the
instant case.  Maryland Rule 5-613 is headed “Prior statements of witnesses” and provides:
“(a)  Examining witness concerning prior statement.  A party
examining a witness about a prior written or oral statement
made by the witness need not show it to the witness or disclose
its contents at that time, provided that before the end of the
examination (1) the statement, if written, is disclosed to the
witness and the parties, or if the statement is oral, the contents
of the statement and the circumstances under which it was
made, including the persons to whom it was made, are disclosed
to the witness and (2) the witness is given an opportunity to
explain or deny it.
(b)  Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of
witness.  Unless the interests of justice otherwise require,
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness
is not admissible under this Rule (1) until the requirements of
section (a) have been met and the witness has failed to admit
having made the statement and (2) unless the statement concerns
a non-collateral matter.”
The Maryland rule differs from its federal counterpart Federal Rule of Evidence 613
as follows:
“COMPARISON TO FEDERAL RULE
EXPLANATION:  [Brackets] indicate matter deleted from the
Federal Rule and Underlining indicates matter added to the
Federal Rule.
Rule 5-613.  PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
  (a)  Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement
-9-
  [In examining a witness concerning a prior statement
made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement need
not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that
time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to
opposing counsel.]  A party examining a witness about a prior
written or oral statement made by the witness need not show it
to the witness or disclose its contents at that time, provided that
before the end of the examination (1) the statement, if written,
is disclosed to the witness and the parties, or if the statement is
oral, the contents of the statement and the circumstances under
which it was made, including the persons to whom it was made,
are disclosed to the witness and (2) the witness is given an
opportunity to explain or deny it.
  (b)  Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of
Witness
  Unless the interests of justice otherwise require,
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness
is not admissible under this Rule (1) until the requirements of
section (a) have been met and the witness has failed to admit
having made the statement and (2) unless the statement concerns
a non-collateral matter. [unless the witness is afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party
is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or
the interests of justice otherwise require.  This provision does
not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule
801(d)(2).]”
MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE at 5-613-4 & 5 (Howard S. Chasanow ed. 1994).
Both the Maryland rule and the federal rule deal with impeaching a witness’s
testimony by a prior inconsistent written or oral statement of the witness.  Both rules apply
to prior inconsistent statements of all witnesses, including parties, and both apply in civil as
well as criminal cases.  Both rules permit extrinsic evidence of the witness’s prior statement
to be introduced in evidence to impeach the witness’s testimony if certain conditions are met.
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Maryland Rule 5-613(b) expressly permits extrinsic evidence of a party’s prior inconsistent
statements, as well as a witness’s prior inconsistent statements.  In fact, Maryland modified
the federal rule counterpart to give more protections to parties impeached by their prior
inconsistent statements.
One of the primary differences between the two rules deals with the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence of a party’s prior inconsistent statement.   Under the federal rule, after a
party testifies, extrinsic evidence of the party’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible and
the party need not be afforded the opportunity to explain or deny the statement; under the
Maryland rule a party must be afforded an opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent
statement before extrinsic evidence of the statement is admissible.  In the instant case, the
requirements of the Maryland rule were met.  Professor Lynn McLain, who assisted in
drafting the Maryland Rules of Evidence, explains the difference between the Maryland and
the federal rules of evidence in the use of a party’s prior inconsistent statements.
“Section (b) of the Maryland Rule omits the federal rule’s
provision that the requirements of (1) giving the witness an
opportunity to explain or deny his or her statement and (2)
giving the opposing party an opportunity to question the witness
about it, do not apply to admissions of a party opponent as
defined in Fed. R. Evid.  801(d)(2) [Md.  Rule 5-803(a)].  If the
opposing party’s statement is offered as substantive evidence,
Rule 5-803(a), not Rule 5-613, is clearly the applicable rule.
Rule 5-613(b) addresses only evidence offered ‘under this
Rule.’  If an opposing party is impeached under Rule 5-613, the
same rules apply as to any other witness.”  (Emphasis in
original).
LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND PRACTICE, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 2.613.3, at 169
-11-
(1994 ed.).
The majority states it is not ignoring Md. Rule 5-613, but that the rule “simply has no
bearing on this case.” ___ Md. at ___ n.8, ___ A.2d at ___n.8 (Majority Op. at 22 n.8).  The
reason given is “Rule 5-613 is a rule of evidence, not a rule of trial procedure.”  Id.
(emphasis in original).  If on cross-examination a defendant is asked about and denies
making a prior inconsistent statement, then Rule 5-613(b) expressly allows the prosecutor
or plaintiff to prove the prior inconsistent statement to impeach the defendant’s trial
testimony.  The prosecution or plaintiff cannot interrupt the defendant’s case to offer
extrinsic evidence of the defendant’s prior inconsistent statement, but must wait for rebuttal
to do so.  No prior decision of this Court has ever even remotely suggested that introducing
a prior inconsistent statement violates any rule of trial procedure, let alone the vague
unidentified rule of trial procedure that supercedes our codified rules of evidence.
According to the majority, if a plaintiff or the State does not introduce all of a
defendant’s statements in the case-in-chief it forfeits the right to impeach a defendant by the
self-contradiction of those prior inconsistent statements.  The rebuttal evidence of Wright’s
confession met all of the requirements of Md. Rule 5-613(b) and was unquestionably
admissible under that rule.  Nothing in the “rules of trial procedure” justifies ignoring the
rules of evidence and giving defendants immunity from impeachment under Rule 5-613(b).
The rules of evidence are included in, not superceded by, the rules of trial procedure.  
BRUCE v. STATE IS CONTROLLING AND MADE NO DISTINCTION
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BETWEEN FULL CONFESSIONS AND PARTIAL CONFESSIONS
Bruce v. State, supra, is a fairly recent case directly on point.  In Bruce, the defendant
Kirk Bruce was convicted of five counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  One
of the issues in Bruce’s appeal was the admissibility in the State’s rebuttal of a confession
Bruce made to Kenneth Clee.  A unanimous Court affirmed Bruce’s conviction.  In
describing the facts and our holding we said:
“After the defense rested its case, the prosecutor asked to call a
rebuttal witness, Kenneth Clee.  Over objection, Clee was
permitted to testify that in March or April of 1988, he had a
conversation with Appellant in New York, and during that
conversation Appellant admitted that ‘he had killed a couple of
people in Maryland, and that he was wanted by the F.B.I.’ 
Appellant claims that the trial judge erred in admitting
Clee's testimony as rebuttal evidence.  Appellant's admissions
to Clee that he was fleeing from the F.B.I. and had killed a
couple of people in Maryland could have been introduced as
substantive evidence in the State's case in chief.  They constitute
admissions of flight and admissions of criminal agency.  Instead
of offering these statements as part of its case, the State waited,
and when Appellant took the witness stand and denied
participation in any killings and testified that the trip to Florida
was pre-planned, the State attempted to impeach this testimony
through the prior inconsistent statements made to Clee.  When
Appellant denied making the statements to Clee, the State quite
properly, in rebuttal, offered the prior inconsistent statement
through Clee.  We note that Appellant's statement when offered
in rebuttal was not admissible at that stage as an admission, but
was admissible at that stage as a prior inconsistent statement to
impeach Appellant's testimony.  Appellant could have requested
a limiting instruction that the prior inconsistent statement was
admissible only to impeach Appellant's testimony, and not as
substantive evidence, but he did not do so, and the trial judge
ordinarily is not required to give a limiting instruction in the
absence of a request.  See Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158
-13-
A.2d 80 (1960).  See also Tinnen v. State, 67 Md. App. 93,
100-01, 506 A.2d 656, 659-60 (1986).”  (Emphasis
added)(footnote omitted).
Bruce, 318 Md. at 728-29, 569 A.2d at 1265-66.
Bruce is indistinguishable from the instant case and should be controlling.  Yet,
instead of following Bruce, the majority attempts to draw distinctions that do not exist.  As
any evidence text will explain, the purpose of a prior inconsistent statement is to impeach
the witness’s trial testimony by showing that, on one or more previous occasions, the witness
made statements that contradict the trial testimony and, therefore, the testimony is less
worthy of belief.  MCCORMICK states that impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement “is
an attack by proof that the witness on a previous occasion has made statements inconsistent
with his present testimony.”  1 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33, at 112
(1992).  The majority seems to suggest the purpose of a prior inconsistent statement is to
impeach the witness by showing he or she told a lie when the witness denied making the
statement.  Somehow the majority totally misconstrues the purpose of the prior inconsistent
statements when it attempts to distinguish Bruce and the instant case by saying:
“Admission of Clee’s testimony as rebuttal in that setting did
not raise the same kinds of issues that are presented when, as
here, the State deliberately holds back a full and detailed
confession to rebut not the defendant’s substantive testimony on
direct examination but a statement elicited by the State on cross-
examination.”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 21).  The majority goes on to state the
purpose of Hurt’s rebuttal testimony was “to impeach Wright’s statement, elicited on cross-
-14-
examination, that he never made the statement.” ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority
Op. at 22).  That was not the purpose for which the trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent
statement in the instant case, not the purpose for which the inconsistent statement was
admitted in Bruce, and is never the purpose for admitting a prior inconsistent statement.
Hurt’s testimony was not admitted to show Wright committed perjury when he denied
making a statement to Hurt; it was admitted to show Wright’s trial testimony was subject to
doubt because it was inconsistent with prior statements made by him.
 According to the majority, Bruce’s oral confession to Clee was properly admitted in
rebuttal to impeach Bruce’s trial testimony but Wright’s was not admissible because
Wright’s statement was a full and detailed confession while Bruce’s was not.  This is a
distinction without a difference and careful comparison of the two statements shows they are
equally inculpatory.  In Bruce, what was admitted on rebuttal was Clee’s testimony that
Bruce confessed that he killed a couple of people in Maryland.  What we said in Bruce is
what we have said in several prior cases that, if a defendant takes the witness stand and
denies committing the crime or some element of the crime, the defendant like any other
witness may be impeached by his or her prior inconsistent statements.  See, e.g., State v.
Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 46-47 n.8, 375 A.2d 1105, 1114 n.8, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S.Ct.
646, 54 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977).  It does not matter whether those statements were full
confessions or merely partially incriminating admissions that contradict the defendant’s trial
testimony.  The State does pay a penalty for admitting an oral confession only as impeaching
evidence in rebuttal, rather than admitting the confession in its case-in-chief.  The penalty
-15-
A witness’s prior inconsistent signed written or recorded confessions are admissible not just
1
to impeach but also as substantive evidence under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a).  Since, however, these
are exhibits  that can go into the jury room, I would doubt that the majority would hold that a
defendant is “manifestly and substantially” injured because a recorded conversation that goes into the
jury room was introduced into evidence at the end of, rather than at the beginning of, the trial.
is that the statement is only admissible as impeachment, not substantive evidence, and upon
request, the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction to the jury that the confession is not
substantive evidence of guilt, but is only admissible for the purpose of assessing the
defendant’s credibility.  Bruce, 318 Md. at 729, 569 A.2d at 1266.   The defendant is entitled
1
to the same type of limiting instruction if, instead of using a prior inconsistent statement, the
State uses a prior conviction or any other permissible method to impeach a defendant’s
credibility.
A careful comparison of Bruce and the instant case would indicate the two cases are
indistinguishable and that Bruce’s admissions at trial were at least as much a full and detailed
confession as are Wright’s statements in the instant case.  Wright was charged with, and
convicted of, second-degree rape and second-degree sexual offense based on age disparity
and was also convicted of child abuse.  His criminal acts were having vaginal intercourse as
well as committing a sexual act on a child member of his household, who was under fourteen
years of age when he was four or more years older than the victim.  In his statement to Hurt,
Wright never admitted that the victim was a child or that she was under fourteen, nor did he
admit his own age.  In addition, Wright was convicted of child abuse, and his statement to
Hurt did not admit the vital element that Wright was a household member.  By contrast, in
-16-
Bruce, the defendant’s statement admitted on rebuttal was that he “had killed a couple of
people in Maryland.” Bruce was on trial for multiple murders in Maryland.  The confession
by Bruce was more of a full confession than the confession in the instant case.  I understand,
however, why the majority would attempt to distinguish an indistinguishable case rather than
overrule Bruce and hold that the same kind of impeaching rebuttal evidence that a unanimous
Court recently held was admissible in a capital murder trial is inadmissible in the instant
case.
THE MAJORITY MISINTERPRETS PRIOR MARYLAND CASES
Two illustrative cases that preceded our holding in Bruce and clearly do not support
the majority’s position in the instant case are the “back to back” opinions in State v. Kidd,
supra, and State v Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 375 A.2d 1116 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018,
98 S.Ct. 739, 54 L.Ed.2d 764 (1978).  I believe the majority misreads these two cases and
the line of cases they follow when the majority states:
“The Harris/Kidd line of cases is mentioned principally for the
sake of contrast, for they present a quite different situation.  The
stark contrast, of course, is that, in those situations, the State has
a confession that it cannot use in its case-in-chief.”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 14). 
In the Kidd line of cases referred to by the majority, we said a defendant’s confessions
may be admissible in rebuttal to impeach the defendant’s testimony even if we assume the
confessions were obtained in violation of the defendant’s Miranda rights.  We certainly did
-17-
not say confessions were admissible in rebuttal because they violated Miranda as the
majority now seems to suggest.  In Kidd, the defendant was charged with, and convicted of,
the statutory offense of possessing heroin in sufficient quantity to indicate an intent to
distribute.  The State’s case-in-chief showed Kidd was standing on a street corner and fled
upon the arrival of police officers.  Two officers who pursued Kidd testified that, during
Kidd’s flight, he discarded eighteen bags of heroin.  In his defense, Kidd testified and denied
having discarded the heroin.   On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Kidd “[d]id you
ever tell Officer Winkler that you were a one bag habit man”?  In response, Kidd denied the
conversation.  In rebuttal, the State called Officer Winkler who testified, over objection, that
Kidd had admitted being a heroin user and having a one-bag-a-day habit.  We reversed
Kidd’s conviction because the issue of whether Kidd was a user was irrelevant and
prejudicial and could not be interjected by the State.  We did, however, say a number of
things involving the issue in the instant case because they were relevant to the companion
case of State v. Franklin.  In Kidd, we first noted: 
“Prior to Miranda, the opinions of this Court reflected no
distinction as to the rules regarding admissibility between
confessions or admissions of a defendant offered by the
prosecution to prove its case in chief and those offered to
impeach a defendant’s testimony at trial.”  (Emphasis added).
Kidd, 281 Md. at 39, 375 A.2d at 1110.  We further reiterated the general rules for
impeaching the testimony of any witness and, by the context of the discussion, indicated
what had always been the law of evidence that those rules were applicable to all witnesses
including criminal defendants.  We said:
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“We observe that the general rule is that the credit to be
given a witness may be impeached by showing that he has made
statements which contradict his testimony in respect to material
facts (but not in respect to facts which are collateral, irrelevant
or immaterial), provided a proper foundation has been laid.  The
foundation is laid by interrogating the witness as to when, the
place at which, and the person to whom such contradictory
statements were made.  This is but fair and just in order that the
witness may be enabled to refresh his recollection in regard to
such statements, and be afforded the opportunity of making such
explanation as he may deem necessary and proper.  If the
witness denies making the designated statement or asserts that
he does not remember whether he made it, the foundation
contemplated by the general rule for the introduction of the
statement has been satisfied.
No question was raised in the case sub judice, below or
on appeal, regarding the laying of the foundation for the
introduction of the impeaching statement.”  (Emphasis
added)(citations omitted).
Kidd, 281 Md.  at 46-47 n.8, 375 A.2d at 1114 n.8. 
In the companion case of State v. Franklin, supra, the defendant Stephen Franklin was
convicted of attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon.  The alleged victim of
the robbery was a cab driver who shot Franklin in the shoulder.  Franklin went to a hospital
emergency room for treatment of the gunshot wounds inflicted by the cab driver.  When
Officer Grimes responded to a call from the hospital emergency room, he interviewed
Franklin who was dressed in hospital garb.  At the defendant’s trial, the officer was called
as a witness in the State’s case-in-chief and started to recount the defendant’s “admissions”;
there was an objection that the defendant was not given his Miranda warnings.  Even though
the defendant was apparently not in custody during the interview in the hospital emergency
-19-
room, the prosecutor “withdrew” his attempt to introduce the defendant’s statements “to
avoid the problem.”  There was no reason to believe that the defendant’s “admissions” were
inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief.  Franklin testified in his own defense and denied
that there was any attempted robbery; he also gave his own version of what he told the
police.  In rebuttal, the State called Officer Grimes who testified to the statements made by
the defendant at the hospital.  That testimony differed from the version given by the
defendant.  
We characterized the question before the Court as follows: “The issue for decision
is the propriety of the admission of Franklin’s extrajudicial statement[s] for the purpose of
impeaching his credibility.”   281 Md. at 57, 375 A.2d at 1119.  We held that the defendant’s
statements to Officer Grimes were properly admitted on rebuttal.   The majority somehow
reads Franklin as permitting the rebuttal testimony of Officer Grimes only because the State
had a confession that it could not use in its case-in-chief due to Miranda violations.  This is
incorrect.  At the time the defendant made the admissions he was not under arrest, not taken
into custody, and was in a hospital gown being treated at a hospital.  The record reflects that
there was no custodial interrogation and, thus, no Miranda violations; certainly there was no
judicial finding that the confession was inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief.   The State
chose not to offer the confession in its case-in-chief to avoid any problem and waited to use
it on rebuttal.  What we said in Franklin was that, even if we assumed the facts in the light
most favorable to Franklin, his statements were still admissible to impeach his credibility in
rebuttal.  We held that Franklin’s admissions were admissible in rebuttal even if we assume
-20-
there were Miranda violations; we did not hold that his admissions were admissible rebuttal
because we found that there were Miranda violations.  We said:  
“For the purpose of decision here we make two
assumptions consistent with Franklin’s initial objection to the
admission of his statements.  First, we assume that Franklin’s
extrajudicial statement was obtained during a custodial
interrogation within the contemplation of Miranda.  Second, we
assume that there was no compliance with the Miranda dictates.
With these assumptions, we apply to the case before us the
Harris-Hass limitation of Miranda with respect to the
impeachment exception.  Franklin’s extrajudicial statements
were offered and received for the purpose of impeaching his
credibility specifically.  There was a direct contradiction as to
the circumstances of the shooting between his testimony at trial
and the impeaching statements.  The issue was initiated by
Franklin during his direct examination when he gave his version
of those circumstances.”  (Citations omitted)(footnotes omitted).
Franklin, 281 Md.  at 58-59, 375 A.2d at 1120.
To misread Franklin’s clear holding that a defendant’s prior inconsistent statements
are admissible to impeach even assuming there are Miranda violations as somehow meaning
a defendant’s statements are admissible in rebuttal to impeach only if there are Miranda
violations is to grossly distort that holding.  Surely the Court must recognize that something
we are willing to assume when reaching a decision is generally a factor that is irrelevant to
the decision.
What we held in Franklin is what we held in Bruce; that a defendant’s prior
inconsistent statement may be offered by the State in rebuttal, regardless of Miranda
compliance or non-compliance, to impeach the defendant’s credibility in the same manner
that any other witness may be impeached by his or her prior inconsistent statements.  We
-21-
also recognized that the State pays a price for not admitting an oral confession in its case-in-
chief because, if a defendant’s confession is only offered in rebuttal to impeach the
defendant’s credibility, the confession is not admitted as substantive evidence and, upon the
defendant’s request, the jury should be so instructed.  For over a century, this Court has
consistently held that the evidentiary rules for impeachment of a defendant by extrinsic
evidence of admissible prior inconsistent statements are the same as the rules regarding
impeachment of any other witness or party by extrinsic evidence of admissible prior
inconsistent statements.  See Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, 307, 18 A. 39, 43
(1889)(concluding that when the defendant testified “at variance with former admissions or
statements by him, such former admissions or statements were clearly admissible in rebuttal
for the purpose of contradiction and impeachment”).  The Court of Special Appeals has
reached the same conclusion.  In Reed v. State, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
defendant’s statements to police after receiving Miranda warnings were proper to impeach
an explanation subsequently offered by the defendant at trial.  Writing for the Court of
Special Appeals, Judge Karwacki  stated:
“It is well settled that the credibility of the trial testimony
of a witness, whether or not a party litigant, may always be
challenged by confronting him with prior extra judicial
statements he has made which are inconsistent with his
testimony on an issue relevant to the trial.”
Reed,  68 Md. App. 320, 327, 511 A.2d 567, 570, cert. denied, 307 Md. 598, 516 A.2d 569
(1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct. 1627, 95 L.Ed.2d 201 (1987).  Not one
Maryland case is cited by the majority that holds a defendant’s prior inconsistent statement
-22-
cannot be used to impeach, and no Maryland case has held that if the defendant denies
making a prior inconsistent statement, the prior inconsistent statement cannot be offered by
the State on rebuttal.
THE CASES CITED FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS ARE NOT RELEVANT
Just as I believe the Maryland cases cited by the majority do not support its holding,
I believe that the cases cited from other jurisdictions are distinguishable and  do not support
the majority’s holding.  Turning to the cases cited by the majority, I will start with the
majority’s lead case of People v. Bennett, 224 N.W.2d 840 (Mich.  1975).  In that case the
defendant was on trial for murder, and he took the stand and testified to an alibi.  On rebuttal
a fellow inmate, Matthew Williams, was called and testified that the defendant said to him
that “he had another fellow to kill when he get[s] out.”  What the court held was that this was
improper rebuttal because it was collateral, prejudicial, and not relevant to any issue in the
case.  The court stated:  
“While we hold that the testimony of Williams was not
proper rebuttal, we do not wish to be understood as holding that
such testimony would properly be admissible in the case in chief
as an admission.  We have doubts that such an equivocal
statement as ‘I have another fellow to kill when I get out’ may
be treated as an admission to the charge that he killed Jimerson.
We hold, therefore, that it was reversible error to admit
the testimony of Mathew Williams as rebuttal evidence.”
Bennett, 224 N.W.2d at 842.
Perhaps the best indication of Bennett’s inapplicability is that, twenty years after
-23-
Bennett, the Supreme Court of Michigan held Bennett was inapposite in a case more
analogous to the case before this Court.  In People v. Figgures, 547 N.W.2d 673 (Mich.
1996), the defendant was charged with the felonious breaking and entering of his ex-wife’s
residence.  At issue was the defendant’s intent and hostility toward his ex-wife.  The court
summed up the relevant facts, as well as indicated Bennett’s inapplicability, when they
stated:
“On direct examination, defendant specifically stated that he
was in the process of reconciling with complainant.
Consequently, whether he was reconciling with her or harassing
her at this time was already a part of the case before cross-
examination.  This line of questioning by the prosecutor did not
inject a new issue into the case, instead, it served as the basis for
a thorough and proper exploration regarding the veracity of
defendant’s prior testimony.  As a result, the dissent’s citation
of Losey and Bennett is inapposite.”  (Emphasis in original).
Figgures, 547 N.W.2d at 678.  The court also indicated that even if the evidence could have
been offered by the State in its case-in-chief, that would not prevent its introduction on
rebuttal.
“The question whether rebuttal is proper depends on what
proofs the defendant introduced and not on merely what the
defendant testified about on cross-examination.
Contrary to the dissent’s insinuation, the test of whether
rebuttal evidence was properly admitted is not whether the
evidence could have been offered in the prosecutor’s case in
chief, but, rather, whether the evidence is properly responsive
to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the defendant.”
Figgures, 547 N.W.2d at 677-78; see also Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789, 791 (Miss.
1988)(“[Rebuttal evidence of defendant’s admission to] physical abuse of his wife or
-24-
stepchildren was not simply procedural error, but was also manifestly incompetent at any
stage of the trial proceedings.  It was evidence of other misconduct which had no probative
value on the issue before the jury, and which was inflammatory and extremely prejudicial.”).
The holdings in Bennett and Hosford should be the same in Maryland since, under Maryland
Rule 613(b), extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements is not admissible unless the
statement concerns a non-collateral matter.  The statements in both cases were collateral and
not proper rebuttal.
 People v. Bean, 280 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), is similar to several other
cases cited by the majority and concerns the improper use not the improper admission of the
defendant’s impeaching statements introduced on rebuttal.  As I have previously indicated,
our cases have held that, if the State does not introduce an oral confession in its case-in-chief
and instead waits to use it on rebuttal, the confession can only be used to impeach the
defendant’s credibility and not as substantive evidence.  Bean and several other cases cited
by the majority actually support my dissent because they stress the importance to the State
of using a confession as substantive evidence in the State’s case-in-chief and not waiting to
use a confession in rebuttal to impeach a defendant’s trial testimony.  Bean was charged with
breaking and entering a dwelling.  At trial the prosecution’s eyewitnesses indicated they saw
Bean break into the dwelling and remove a television set.  Bean testified he did not break
into the dwelling, but did help a friend move a television set from a different apartment.  In
rebuttal, the prosecution introduced Bean’s confession to the effect that he did not break into
the dwelling, but he was an accomplice to the breaking and entering.  The case was a court
-25-
trial, and the judge convicted Bean on the basis that his own confession was sufficient to
establish that Bean was guilty by aiding and abetting the breaking and entering.  The
appellate court reversed stating:
“This statement, which interjected an issue of aiding and
abetting a breaking and entering, did not bear on an issue raised
by the prosecution in its case in chief.
* * *
[T]he prosecutor employed the exact device condemned in
Bennett, supra, to establish the basis to admit defendant’s
statement as rebuttal.  Furthermore, the trial court based its
entire finding that the defendant aided and abetted the breaking
and entering on the improperly admitted statement.
Consequently, we conclude that the error in the instant case was
prejudicial to the defendant and reverse.”
Bean, 280 N.W.2d at 616.  
Other cited cases reach similar results and reverse convictions because the “rebuttal”
impeaching evidence is actually used as substantive evidence.  Lucas v. Commonwealth, 195
S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1946)( “The only direct evidence of his guilt was the alleged
confession.  This was not introduced for the purpose of effecting appellant’s credibility as
a witness, but was substantive evidence and should have been introduced in chief.”); see also
People v. McGee, 243 N.W.2d 663 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459
S.W.2d 147 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).  I agree with the results in these cases and would note that,
in Maryland, impeaching oral confessions cannot be used as substantive evidence and, upon
request, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that statements admitted on rebuttal to
impeach may not be considered as substantive evidence of guilt.  Thus, in the cited cases, it
-26-
was the use of impeaching prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence that was the
real prejudice to the defendants.   
In People v. Rodriguez, 136 P.2d 626 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943), the defendant’s
confession was improper rebuttal because the trial judge assumed that a confession offered
on rebuttal to impeach a defendant need not be voluntary and would not permit the defendant
to prove on surrebuttal that he was beaten until he confessed.  In addition, the trial judge
used the impeaching confession as substantive evidence to convict.  Similarly, in State v.
Smith, 45 So. 415 (La. 1908), the defendant’s confession was offered in rebuttal, however,
because that state’s rules of evidence did not allow surrebuttal testimony, the defendant
could not challenge the rebuttal confession nor offer his own testimony nor the testimony of
other witnesses about falsity of the rebuttal witness’s testimony.  The court made clear the
basis for its holding when it said:
“So long as the rule shall prevail in this state that a
defendant cannot of right rebut rebuttal evidence, the
prosecution will have to be confined strictly in rebuttal to
rebuttal evidence proper.  Otherwise, by an elastic appreciation
of what is and is not rebuttal, an accused might be deprived of
his constitutional right to be heard before being condemned.”
(Citations omitted).
Smith, 45 So. at 415; see also State v. Turner, 337 So.2d 455, 458 (La. 1976)(“Since in
Louisiana ‘the defendant is without right to rebut the prosecutor’s rebuttal,’ La.R.S. 15:282,
the defendant may be prejudiced by the denial to him of an opportunity to defend against
new issues.”).  As previously noted, Maryland Rule 5-613(b) expressly gives the defendant
a right  to explain or deny any prior inconsistent statement, and we have no prohibition
-27-
against surrebuttal evidence.
In Birchett v. State, 708 S.W.2d 625 (Ark. 1986), the holding was based on the
violation of an Arkansas rule of discovery.  In Maryland, the State must, upon request,
furnish the defendant with all written statements and the substance of any oral statements
made by the defendant to a state agent, Md. Rules 4-462 and 4-463, and Hurt’s statement in
the instant case was disclosed to the defense attorney before trial.  In Arkansas, the State
must only furnish the defendant with statements made by the defendant that it intends to
offer in its case-in-chief.  In Birchett, after the defendant testified at his robbery trial the
State called a witness, who had not been disclosed on discovery, to testify about a confession
made by the defendant, as well as to testify that she saw the defendant with the watch and
ring that were taken in the robbery.  The court stated:
“If a witness is proper for the state’s case in chief, the
prosecution is required to notify the defendant of the name and
address of that witness upon timely request. [Arkansas Criminal
Rules of Procedure] 17.1(a)(i).  If a witness is a genuine rebuttal
witness there is not such requirement.
* * *
“If the witness is not a true rebuttal witness, the prosecution
must comply with Rule 17.1 by notifying the defense that such
witness will be called.”
Birchett, 708 S.W.2d at 626. 
The tactical advantage in Birchett, obtained by saving a defendant’s confession and
even more important by the testimony about his possession of the stolen property for use as
rebuttal, is the unfair advantage obtained by the State’s being able to withhold the
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defendant’s statement as well as this vital substantive evidence of guilt from the defendant’s
discovery.  The prejudice to the defendant was not any tactical advantage obtained by
offering the statement two hours or so later in rebuttal rather than in the case-in-chief.   Cf.
State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280, 289 (N.M. 1979)(holding that the defendant was not
prejudiced by testimony of rebuttal witness who was not disclosed as a witness for the State
because defense counsel was given an opportunity to depose the witness before his
testimony), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 653 P.2d 162 (N.M. 1982).  
Thus, every out-of-state case cited by the majority is distinguishable because the
prejudice to the defendant was the result of state evidentiary problems regarding rebuttal
evidence that have been remedied in Maryland.  In my opinion, none of the cited cases
justifies the need for Maryland to adopt a rule treating the impeachment of a defendant by
a prior inconsistent statement different from impeachment of any other witness or party.
None of the cited cases justifies impliedly repealing Md. Rule 5-613(b) and precluding the
prosecutor from using a defendant’s prior inconsistent statement to impeach the defendant’s
testimony.
I will not go into the many cases that have reached a result contrary to the majority
since the majority acknowledges the line of cases, but for example see United States v.
Porter, 544 F.2d 936 (8  Cir. 1976):
th
“That the statements could have been produced during
the government’s case in chief does not require a different
result.  ‘The mere fact that testimony could have been admitted
on direct does not preclude its admission on rebuttal.’  United
States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 911-912 (8  Cir. 1975), cert.
th
-29-
denied, 424 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1106, 47 L.Ed.2d 314
(1975)(footnote omitted); United States v. Plata, 361 F.2d 958,
962 (7  Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841, 87 S.Ct. 94, 17
th
L.Ed.2d 74 (1966).  The scope of rebuttal is a matter in which
the trial court has broad discretion.  United States v. Calvert,
supra, 523 F.2d at 911.  After the defendant took the stand and
denied involvement in the heroin sale, it was appropriate for the
government to rebut that claim by putting Detective Olive on the
stand to testify as to Porter’s admissions.”  (Footnote omitted).
Porter, 544 F.2d at 939; see also Wallace v. State, 447 P.2d 30, 31 (1968)(“The fact that the
oral confession was offered during rebuttal rather than during the State’s case in chief is not
cause for complaint.”).  Other similar cases are cited throughout this opinion.
HARRIS v. NEW YORK DOES NOT SUPPORT THE MAJORITY’S HOLDING
THAT INADMISSIBLE CONFESSIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE REBUTTAL
BUT ADMISSIBLE CONFESSIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE REBUTTAL
The basis for the majority’s holding is that it is “manifestly and substantially
injurious” for the State to “sandbag” a defendant by not using a defendant’s confession in
the case-in-chief and saving it for use in rebuttal.  The majority explains why it believes this
is so:
“The  advantage to the State in withholding the admissible
confession for rebuttal was purely a tactical one designed for
maximum prejudicial effect:  either (1) to discourage the
defendant from testifying, even to deny the guilt that the State
is obliged to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or (2), if, as
occurred here, the defendant chose to testify, to have the
confession dramatically admitted afterward — just prior to jury
deliberation.”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 15).  The majority does not give juries or
-30-
judges credit for much intelligence if it really believes that it must grant a new trial when
witnesses testify out of order because juries and judges are so unduly influenced by the last
witnesses to testify.  In addition, the majority believes that allowing the State to call, in
rebuttal, a witness to whom the defendant has confessed, rather than restricting those
witnesses to the case-in-chief, is such a great tactical advantage and so substantially injurious
to defendants that we must grant a new trial when prosecutors use this tactical advantage.
The majority’s belief that the prosecution gets a substantial tactical advantage that is
injurious to defendants by holding back confessions from the State’s case-in-chief for use
in rebuttal is reduced to the absurd when we contrast properly and improperly obtained
confessions.  The Court will not give the prosecutor this tactical advantage of saving a
confession for rebuttal where the police scrupulously preserved the defendant’s constitutional
rights, but the Court will give the State this prejudicial tactical advantage where the police
have taken a confession in violation of the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
If  the majority really believes that it is much more tactically advantageous for the
State, and substantially injurious to the defendant, for the prosecutor to withhold a
confession in the State’s case-in-chief and save it for use in rebuttal, then perhaps Harris v.
New York,  401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971) is wrongly decided, and we
should reward the State for securing valid confessions by permitting their use in rebuttal and
deter the State from taking invalid confessions by forcing the State to introduce them only
in the case-in-chief.
The majority does accept Harris v. New York, supra, and acknowledges that pursuant
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to Harris if a defendant takes the witness stand and on cross-examination denies making a
confession that was not admissible in the government’s case-in-chief because of Miranda
violations, the confession can be introduced in rebuttal.  Apparently, the majority believes
Harris created a new impeaching technique and new form of rebuttal evidence only available
for confessions taken in violation of Miranda.  Again, the majority misreads the case.  What
Harris held was that the traditional prosecution right to impeach a defendant’s trial testimony
by prior inconsistent statements is still available, even if the statement was taken in violation
of the defendant’s Miranda rights.  The Court said:
“Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the
prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-
testing devices of the adversary process.  Had inconsistent
statements been made by the accused to some third person, it
could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid
before the jury by way of cross-examination and impeachment.”
(Emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26, 91 S.Ct. at 645-46, 28 L.Ed.2d at 4-5.  Unfortunately what the
Supreme Court said “could hardly be contended” was not only contended by Wright, but was
also adopted by this Court.
Harris’s application to the issue in the instant case has been interpreted opposite to
the construction given Harris by the majority.   In Ameen v. State, 186 N.W.2d 206 (Wis.
1971), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed a situation similar to the instant case
where the defendant made the same contentions as were made in the instant case.  The court
summarized the contentions and the relevance of the Harris holding as follows:
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“[C]ounsel argues that the presenting as rebuttal evidence of
statements made by defendant, inconsistent with his witness-
stand testimony, gives such statements a ‘blockbuster’
dimension.  The contention appears to be that all statements
made by the defendant must be introduced as part of the case in
chief, and, if not so presented, may not be offered as rebuttal
testimony.  Quite aside from the considerable discretion given
trial courts in controlling what evidence may be admitted in
rebuttal, whatever merit there may have been in the argument
made vanished with the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Harris v. New York.
* * *
In Harris, the statements made by defendant to the police
were not and could not have been used by the state as part of the
case in chief.  Here the statements made by the defendant to the
police were not presented as part of the case in chief, but could
have been.  In both situations, as well as to the shades of grey in
between where the state may not be sure as to admissibility of
statements made, Harris controls and to use such statements in
rebuttal only is to do ‘* * * no more than utilize the traditional
truth-testing devices of the adversary process. * * *’  The
defendant here was entitled to take the stand in his own defense,
or to refuse to do so, but, when he elected to testify, he cannot
be insulated from ‘* * * the risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances. * * *’” (Footnotes omitted).
Ameen, 186 N.W.2d at 209-10.  As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin indicated, Harris
should be applicable when the prosecutor knows there are Miranda violations, when the
prosecutor is uncertain whether there are Miranda violations, when the prosecutor is doubtful
whether there are Miranda violations, and when there are no Miranda violations.
It is distressing to me that, according to the majority, the State’s failure to admit a
valid confession in its case-in-chief is a far greater evil than taking a confession in violation
of a defendant’s Miranda rights.  A confession in violation of Miranda may not “be
-33-
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances,” Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. at
226, 91 S. Ct. at 645, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 5, but if the State fails to use a defendant’s confession
in its case-in-chief, the defendant does have a license to use perjury free from the risk of
confrontation by prior utterances.  The majority also recognizes that, in Harris, the Supreme
Court “reached a pragmatic balance between two compelling public policies — the
exclusionary rule precluding the use of confessions obtained in violation of Miranda, on the
one hand, and not giving defendants a free ride to commit perjury, on the other.” ___ Md.
at ___,  ___ A.2d at ___ (1998)(Majority Op. at 14-15).   I fully agree with this analysis, but
the harm done by the State not offering the defendant’s confession in its case-in-chief does
not outweigh the harm in giving defendants “a free ride to commit perjury.”
The sole basis for the majority’s distinction between the prosecutor’s use of valid and
invalid confessions in rebuttal is its assumption that prosecutors need to be deterred from
holding back confessions for use in rebuttal that could be used in the case-in-chief.  There
is no basis for the majority’s speculations.  To the contrary, there is good reason to believe
that prosecutors as a general rule would want to  present the best case possible in their case-
in-chief.  There is good reason to believe that prosecutors would want to use oral confessions
as substantive evidence by putting them in their case-in-chief, rather than holding them for
rebuttal as mere impeaching exhibits.  This Court has never before precluded a prosecutor
from admitting a defendant’s confession in rebuttal, yet the most cursory survey of criminal
cases would show that in the overwhelming majority of criminal cases confessions are
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introduced in the State’s case-in-chief.  This is also shown by the numerous suppression
hearings where prosecutors go to great lengths to prove a confession was taken in compliance
with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), so they may use the
confession in their case-in-chief.  In fact, it is obvious from the Maryland cases discussed
that often  the reason why prosecutors withheld the “confessions” was not because they
would be such powerful rebuttal, but because they were of such dubious value that only in
the face of the defendant’s denial of the statement did the scales tip in favor of admissibility.
In both Bruce and in the instant case, the defendant’s statements were made to
someone in the criminal mileau with doubtful credibility, whom the State may have been
reluctant to call.  It was only after the defendant testified that the scales may have tipped in
favor of admissibility.  In Franklin, it is obvious the prosecutor believed that admission of
the defendant’s marginally helpful admission was not worth interrupting the trial for a
suppression hearing.  It is unrealistic to think that a prosecutor, who has a confession by a
defendant, would not want to introduce it as substantive evidence in the case-in-chief.
Prosecutors like other litigants wish to put their best foot forward and present the best case
possible.  I sincerely doubt that the prosecutor withheld this “confession” to get any tactical
advantage of calling Hurt as a witness in rebuttal, especially when by doing so the confession
is not substantive evidence.  If Wright did not testify, Hurt could not be called, and if Wright
testified and admitted the statement to Hurt but said he lied to Hurt, there could be no
-35-
rebuttal testimony.  It was only after Wright’s attorney brought out on re-direct examination
of Wright that Wright did not and would not have made any incriminating statements to Hurt,
that the prosecutor had to call Hurt in rebuttal.
ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED BY THE MAJORITY
There are many troubling issues raised by the majority’s opinion. It would seem that
the rule against using a defendant’s prior inconsistent statements in rebuttal is also applicable
in civil cases, since the majority cites several civil cases in its opinion and also states that
rebuttal prior inconsistent statements “cannot be used to permit the plaintiff/State unfairly
to prejudice the defendant.”  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 8).  This
might raise potential due process implications.  Assume a plaintiff and defendant in a civil
case have each made damaging admissions and assume each wishes to get what the majority
suggests is the tactical advantage of saving the other party’s statement for impeachment.
After the plaintiff testifies and denies making the statement, the defendant can offer the
extrinsic evidence of the plaintiff’s statement in the defense case.  However, when the
defendant testifies and denies making the prior inconsistent statement, the plaintiff is
precluded from impeaching the defendant by rebuttal evidence of the prior inconsistent
statement.  Is there a potential due process violation to the plaintiff?
One of the most difficult issues to be resolved will be how to distinguish  the full
confession that was held not to be proper rebuttal in the instant case from the less than full
confession that the majority says was properly admitted as rebuttal in Bruce.  The majority
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gives us no guidance in the analysis, and a comparison of the two cases would seem to
indicate there is no distinction.  
Also left open is whether and how a defendant can be cross-examined about a prior
inconsistent statement.  This raises almost the same problems as using a confession on
rebuttal.  If, for example, the last cross-examination question asked by the prosecutor of the
defendant is whether the defendant made a confession inconsistent with the defendant’s trial
testimony and if the defendant admits making the confession, then the testimony about the
confession will still be the last evidence the jury hears.  We are told that if the defendant
denies making the confession the prosecutor cannot prove it in rebuttal because it will be the
last thing the jury hears and, thus,  prejudice the defendant.
It is also unclear whether the rule prohibiting impeachment of a defendant’s trial
testimony by using a prior inconsistent statement applies to written prior inconsistent
statements admitted as exhibits in rebuttal that were not offered as exhibits in the case-in-
chief.  There would seem to be little basis to distinguish written and oral prior inconsistent
statements, but can the majority say that a written statement that is admitted as an exhibit and
goes into the jury room is substantially and injuriously prejudicial to the defendant merely
because it was admitted as an exhibit later rather than earlier in trial?  
Is the majority’s new rule applicable to court trials?  The language of the opinion
seems to so indicate, but can the majority really suggest a defendant will be substantially
prejudiced because a judge heard an admissible confession at the end of the trial rather than
at the beginning of the trial? 
-37-
Another problem will be for prosecutors to know when a confession is admissible in
the case-in-chief or in rebuttal without a suppression hearing in every case.  If a prosecutor
is told by police that the defendant confessed but was not given the Miranda warnings, the
prosecutor may not just save the confession for impeachment because the defendant may
testify that the Miranda warnings were given and there was a full waiver so the confession
should have been admitted in the State’s case-in-chief and cannot be used as impeachment.
The question also arises as to whether a prosecutor may make a confession admissible in
rebuttal by simply refusing to prove Miranda waivers, thus, making the statement
inadmissible in the case-in-chief.  This Court has said  “[i]n undertaking to prove a waiver
of Miranda rights, ‘a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel.’”    McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 614-15, 526 A.2d 30, 33
(1987)(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724).  
T h e
majority’s “trial procedure” rule is not based on any constitutional or statutory right enjoyed
by the defendant, and it is contrary to our Rule 5-613(b).  The rationale seems to be the
majority’s belief that the last bit of testimony has such undue impact that it overshadows all
prior testimony in the case and its view that it is unfair to admit evidence that impeaches the
defendant as the last evidence in the case.   What the majority also seems to overlook is
another rule of trial procedure; since the State has the burden of proof beyond any reasonable
doubt, the State, not the defendant, has the right to open and close.  This means the State is
entitled to be the first, as well as the last, party to attempt to persuade the jury.  Permissible
-38-
evidence that impeaches the defendant as a witness properly belongs in the State’s case as
rebuttal.  There is simply no reason to give the defendant immunity from impeachment by
prior inconsistent statements merely because those statements might also have been usable
as substantive evidence in the State’s case-in-chief.  The State, as well as the defendant,
ought to follow the same evidentiary rules and all witnesses ought to be equally subject to
impeachment.  Since the State had the right to open and close, it had the right to present, in
rebuttal, the impeaching evidence permitted by Md. Rule 5-613(b).  Merely because the State
does not introduce all of the defendant’s utterances in its case-in-chief should not permit
defendants to take the stand and lie without fear of impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements.  I respectfully dissent.
Judge Rodowsky and Judge Karwacki have authorized me to state that they join in the
views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.