Title: Medrano v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Medrano v. State1996 WY 47914 P.2d 804Case Number: 95-31Decided: 03/26/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

DARREAL J. MEDRANO,  

Appellant (Defendant), 

v. 

STATE OF WYOMING,  

Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid Program; John McClanahan, Student Intern; 
Stephanie Sprecher, Student Intern; and Jay Bachlet, Student Intern 
(argued). 

Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; Larry M. Donovan, Senior Assistant Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi T. Sansonetti, 
Special Assistant Attorney General, Pro Hac Vice (argued).

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Defendant Darreal 
Medrano appeals his conviction for possession with the intent to deliver a 
controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (1977) 
and W.S. 35-7-1014(d)(xxi) (1977).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Defendant, though 
failing to include a separate statement of the issues in his appellate brief as 
required by W.R.A.P. 7.01(d), presents the following for our 
consideration:

Argument I

The 
court below erred in admitting into evidence items seized during Mr. Medrano's 
arrest because (1) the arrest was unlawful as the arresting officer lacked 
reasonable articulable suspicion required to stop Mr. Medrano (2) officer 
McDonald's subsequent actions were not reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place and (3) Mr. 
Medrano did not give voluntary consent to search his 
vehicle.

Argument II

The 
trial court violated Mr. Medrano's right to legal counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when it admitted at 
trial incriminating statements deliberately elicited from Mr. Medrano by an 
undisclosed agent of the State of Wyoming and where such statements were the 
only direct evidence indicating Mr. Medrano's knowing possession of a controlled 
substance.

Argument III 

The 
trial court erred by allowing as substantive evidence against Mr. Medrano the 
unconstitutionally obtained hearsay statement of Ms. Clara Calderon, by failing 
to sua sponte give a limiting instruction, and by allowing the prosecutor to use 
substantively, inadmissible evidence under the guise of impeaching its own 
witness.

Argument IV

The 
trial court erred by allowing Officer Bruce Dexter to testify substantively 
regarding Ms. Calderon's hearsay statement and committed plain error by failing 
to sua sponte give a limiting instruction.

The State gives a more 
concise statement of the issues:

I.          
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the contraband to be admitted 
into evidence.

II.          
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Clara Calderon 
to be admitted into evidence.

III.         
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Officer Bruce 
Dexter to be admitted into evidence.

FACTS

[¶4]      On May 19, 1994, 
Officer Carl McDonald of the Wyoming Highway Patrol heard a broadcast over his 
radio that a robbery had occurred in Fort Collins, Colorado at about 12:35 p.m. 
The robber was described as a white male in his thirties with brown hair, a 
partial beard, and wearing blue jeans and a blue shirt. The getaway vehicle was 
described as a white Mercury Topaz bearing license plates with a white 
background and dark blue or black lettering, possibly a Wyoming plate. A later 
broadcast stated that the car may have been a Honda 
Prelude.

[¶5]      Officer McDonald 
headed south on interstate highway I-25 towards the Colorado border in an effort 
to assist other officers who were keeping vigil in the event the suspect entered 
Wyoming. At about 2:00 p.m., Officer McDonald observed defendant's white 
two-door Chevrolet coupe with two occupants traveling north on I-25. The car had 
license plates with a white background and dark blue lettering from Nebraska. 
Following the vehicle, Officer McDonald concluded that the driver resembled the 
description of the robbery suspect, and the car was then pulled 
over.

[¶6]      Officer McDonald 
and another officer separately interviewed the defendant and his passenger. 
During the interview with Officer McDonald, defendant appeared nervous; he was 
perspiring and licking his lips, avoided eye contact with the patrolman and his 
hands trembled. Defendant stated that he had borrowed the car and that the car 
was owned by a man named Reyes. However, when the registration was produced, the 
owner was listed as Garsaro.

[¶7]      Comparing notes, 
the officers discovered that each had received very different versions regarding 
where the two men had met, where they were going and when they had left Denver. 
Returning to the men, the officers further inquired whether they possessed any 
large quantities of cash or had in their possession weapons or drugs. Defendant 
responded that he had $170, while the passenger had $800; both denied possessing 
weapons or drugs. Consent to search the vehicle was given, with defendant even 
offering to open the trunk. The search uncovered several bricks of marijuana in 
defendant's bag in the back seat and one brick in the passenger's bag, a total 
amount of approximately twelve pounds. Defendant and the passenger were then 
placed under arrest.

[¶8]      Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress, and a hearing was held on August 25, 1994. After hearing 
testimony, the district court denied the motion finding reasonable suspicion for 
the stop of defendant's vehicle and allowed the marijuana into 
evidence.

[¶9]      At defendant's 
trial, in addition to the above, evidence was also introduced through the 
testimony of Clara Calderon, who had spoken to defendant while he was in jail 
awaiting trial, that defendant had admitted he knew the marijuana was in the car 
and that it was indeed his. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial, and now 
appeals that conviction. 

DISCUSSION

A. The 
Suppression Hearing

[¶10]   Defendant contends that the 
marijuana should have been suppressed for several reasons: (1) Officer McDonald 
lacked reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop; (2) once it became clear 
that defendant did not meet the description of the robbery suspect, the officer 
had no further reasonable suspicion to continue his investigatory stop; (3) the 
officer's actions went beyond the scope of the reason for original detention; 
and (4) defendant's consent to search the vehicle was not freely 
given.

[¶11]   Evidentiary rulings of the trial 
court are not generally disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion 
is demonstrated. Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 934 (Wyo. 1995); Wilson v. 
State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). An abuse of discretion is said to mean 
an error of law committed by the trial court under the circumstances. Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(Wyo. 1980). In the context of suppression hearings we have 
said:

Findings on factual issues made by the district court 
considering a motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 378 (Wyo. 1989); Roose v. 
State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988). See W.R.Cr.P. 12(f) (effective March 24, 
1992) (formerly W.R.Cr.P. 16). Since the district court conducts the hearing on 
the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to: assess the credibility of the 
witnesses; the weight given the evidence; and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the district court's determination. United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 
1406 (10th Cir. 1990). See Rands v. 
State, 818 P.2d 44, 46 (Wyo. 1991). The issue of law, whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights, 
is reviewed de novo. See Lopez v. 
State, 643 P.2d 682, 683-85 (Wyo. 1982); Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Wyo. 
1981); and United States v. Walker, 
941 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093, 112 S. Ct. 1168, 117 L. Ed. 2d 414 
(1992).

Wilson, 
874 P.2d  at 218.

[¶12]   In previous opinions, this court 
has noted that there are three categories or tiers of interaction between police 
and citizens. See Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
220; Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 
691-92 (Wyo. 1993). The category concerned in this case is the investigatory 
stop which represents a seizure and, consequently, invokes Fourth Amendment 
protections. Wilson, at 220. However, 
because the seizure is of a less intrusive nature than an arrest, it requires 
only "the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences 
which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be 
committing a crime." Id. A law 
enforcement officer must possess the reasonable suspicion before making the 
seizure. Wilson, at 
225.

[¶13]   Defendant contends, based on 
differences between his appearance and the description of the robbery suspect, 
that Officer McDonald lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. He also argues 
that even if the stop was justified, once it was determined that he was not the 
robber, the investigation still continued. In addition, he claims that the 
investigation by the officers went beyond the scope of the initial detention by 
asking questions relating to weapons and drugs and then seeking to search his 
vehicle.

[¶14]   Officer McDonald, at the time of 
his contact with defendant's vehicle, was confronted with the 
following:

Robbery Suspect                                       
Defendant

A White male                                                   
An Hispanic male 

Partial beard                                                  
Partial beard 

Blue shirt                                                        
White shirt 

Driving white Mercury Topaz, 
later              
Driving white Chevrolet Cavalier

changed to possibly a Honda 
Prelude                   

license plates with white 
background,         
Nebraska plates with white bakground

dark blue or black 
lettering, possibly from  and dark 
blue lettering

Wyoming 

These factors together with 
the reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom are the "specific and 
articulable facts" required for an investigatory stop. Eyewitness descriptions 
of a crime are, by their very nature, not exact. The defendant and his vehicle 
fell within the realm of possible suspects when the factors and the reasonable 
inferences drawn from such are taken into account.

[¶15]   Furthermore, defendant was 
traveling in a direction from Fort Collins approximately one and a half hours 
after the crime. Defendant attempts to claim that he was not "within the range 
of possible flight" because it is only about 45 miles to Fort Collins from 
Cheyenne and, if the robber had come that way, he would have already been long 
past. However, defendant makes the unwarranted assumption that the robber would 
have fled Fort Collins immediately after the robbery. It is not unreasonable to 
anticipate that the robber may have taken an indirect route or even stopped 
somewhere before leaving the city. Therefore, the time difference between the 
robbery and defendant's appearance on I-25 near Cheyenne is not so great as to 
remove him from "the range of possible flight."

[¶16]   While acknowledging that there are 
differences between the description and defendant, we find that they are 
sufficiently close to constitute specific and articulable facts which would give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant may have been the one who 
committed the robbery in Fort Collins.

The circumstances present in this case, along with 
reasonable inferences by an experienced police officer, furnished ample grounds 
for finding a reasonable and objective basis for an investigatory stop of the 
[defendant's vehicle].

Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 8 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶17]   After the stop, the investigation 
by the officers brought to light a plethora of other factors: (1) defendant 
acted nervous, refused to make eye contact when answering questions, and his 
hands shook despite the pleasant weather; (2) defendant and the passenger were 
carrying a large amount of cash; (3) the name defendant gave Officer McDonald as 
being the owner of the car was not the name listed on the car registration; and 
(4) defendant and his passenger gave conflicting stories concerning where they 
were going, where they had met and when they had left Denver. When viewed in 
isolation, each of the factors could have an innocent basis; however, when 
viewed as a whole, they constitute grounds for a reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot. State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 604 (Wyo. 1994). Based 
on the foregoing, we conclude there were specific and articulable facts which 
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant may have been engaging in 
criminal activity. That suspicion existed throughout the officers' investigation 
until the contraband was found and, indeed, was enhanced as the investigation 
proceeded. See Collins v. State, 854 P.2d  at 695 (a detention based on reasonable suspicion can, through the 
development of additional facts during the investigation, evolve into probable 
cause for arrest).

[¶18]   We find defendant's contention that 
Officer McDonald exceeded the scope of the initial stop by inquiring if he had 
drugs or weapons on his possession to be meritless. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with asking such questions. In this case, there was considerable evidence 
to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant and his passenger may have been 
engaging in illicit activity. Initially, that suspicion was based on the Fort 
Collins robbery, but later factors that came to light after the stop could have 
supported a reasonable suspicion that something else was afoot. The officer did 
not act illegally in asking the questions.

[¶19]   Finally, defendant claims that his 
consent to search the vehicle was not freely given. Defendant's claim is 
predicated upon his belief that his detention and questioning were illegal. See e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 
18 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1994). Having found that the stop and subsequent 
questioning of defendant were within constitutional parameters, defendant's 
claim necessarily fails. The record clearly demonstrates that his consent to 
search was freely given.

B. The 
Testimony of Clara Calderon

[¶20]   At trial Calderon testified that 
defendant, during a visit with him while he was in jail, admitted that he knew 
there was marijuana in the car and that it was his. After her visit with 
defendant, Calderon was interviewed by a police detective regarding that 
conversation, and she repeated what defendant had told her. However, during her 
testimony at trial, Calderon stated that she had talked to the detective prior 
to her visit with defendant. The State then used a transcript of the recording 
the detective had made in order to refresh her recollection of the timing of the 
events and, also, to impeach her trial testimony.

[¶21]   Defendant contends that several 
errors occurred during the testimony of Calderon. He contends that she was an 
informant for the police and that by initiating a conversation with him 
regarding the charged crime, his right to counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, was violated. Further, he alleges 
that her statements, which were hearsay, were improperly admitted as substantive 
evidence. Defendant additionally argues that if the statements were admitted for 
impeachment purposes, then the trial court erred by not sua sponte giving the 
jury a limiting instruction.

[¶22]   A careful review of the record has 
convinced us that Calderon did not talk to police until after her visit with 
defendant; consequently, there was no violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2630, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986); see also State v. Teel, 
793 S.W.2d 236, 245 (Tenn. 1990) (defendant must show that agents of the state 
deliberately induced, enticed or prompted incriminating remarks to require 
suppression). The government may not intrude into the attorney-client 
relationship to the prejudice of a criminal defendant. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299, 
110 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1990); Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 916-17 
(Wyo. 1992). Absent a waiver of that right, the government may not initiate any 
interrogation about the charged crime. Suliber v. State, 866 P.2d 85, 90-91 
(Wyo. 1993). In this case the police did not initiate contact with defendant. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, the record clearly demonstrates that Calderon 
had not talked with the police detective prior to her conversation with 
defendant.

[¶23]   The record also is clear on the 
fact that Calderon's prior out-of-court statements were not substantively 
introduced into evidence. Rather, they were used for impeachment purposes and to 
refresh her recollection, uses which are permitted under our rules of evidence. 
W.R.E. 607 and 612. In the same vein, we find no error in the trial court not 
giving a limiting instruction sua sponte. It is the duty of counsel to request 
such an instruction when it is desired. W.R.E. 105; Sybert v. State, 724 P.2d 463, 467-68 
(Wyo. 1986); see also Channel v. 
State, 592 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Wyo. 1979) (error not to give limiting 
instruction on prior statements used for impeachment when requested by defense 
counsel).

There are sound reasons for requiring the opponent to 
request the trial judge to limit the scope of the evidence by instructing the 
jury. * * * [T]his manner of proceeding appropriately leaves to the opposing 
trial counsel the option of concluding that, as a matter of strategy, he is 
better off without an instruction than with one, in that an instruction would 
serve only to remind the jury of what it has heard or to re-emphasize the 
evidence in the minds of the jurors, and perhaps to suggest to the jury a use 
for the evidence which is best left unmentioned.

Sybert, 
724 P.2d  at 467; (quoting 1 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 45, at 342-343 (1977)). If we were to require the trial judge to 
sua sponte issue such instructions, we would remove from opposing counsel the 
option to choose for himself for reasons of strategy whether he desired the 
instruction or not. We decline to do so.

C. The 
Testimony of Officer Dexter

[¶24]   The last issue raised by defendant 
concerns the trial testimony of Officer Dexter, who testified immediately after 
Calderon. Officer Dexter testified: (1) he had interviewed Calderon about her 
talk with defendant; (2) he talked with her after that conversation, not before; 
(3) he repeated the substance of what Calderon told him that defendant had said; 
and (4) he told how he had Calderon return for a second interview for the 
purpose of taping it. Defendant claims it was error for this testimony to be 
admitted because it was hearsay offered for its truth and, at the least, that 
the trial court should have sua sponte issued a limiting 
instruction.

[¶25]   Reviewing the record, we conclude 
there was no error in the admission of Officer Dexter's testimony. While it was 
partially hearsay when he repeated Calderon's out-of-court statements, they were 
not offered for their truth. The officer's testimony followed that of Calderon 
wherein she contradicted her prior statements by giving a different version of 
the events than what she had given to Officer Dexter. In this context, Officer 
Dexter's testimony was to show not that Calderon's statements were true but that 
she had made them at that time. There was no error in its admission and, if 
requested, a limiting instruction would have been appropriate. Again, however, 
defendant did not request such an instruction and the trial court was under no 
obligation to instruct the jury.

CONCLUSION

[¶26]   There being no error in defendant's 
trial, his conviction and sentence are hereby 
affirmed.