Title: Commonwealth v. Edwards

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13242 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTIAN EDWARDS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 7, 2022. - December 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Abuse Prevention.  Protective Order.  Practice, Criminal, 
Discovery, Disclosure of evidence, Dismissal, Mistrial, 
Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Springfield Division 
of the District Court Department on March 26, 2019. 
 
 
An order of dismissal was entered by Patrick S. Sabbs, J., 
and a motion for reconsideration was heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Andrea Harrington, District Attorney, & Patrick Sadlon, 
Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the 
Berkshire district. 
 
Anne Rousseve, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Chauncey B. Wood, Jessica J. Lewis, William C. Newman, & Matthew 
R. Segal for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others. 
 
Deborah J. Manus for Boston Bar Association. 
2 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  During his trial for violation of an abuse 
prevention order, see G. L. c. 209A, § 7, the defendant objected 
when the Commonwealth attempted to introduce in evidence a 
certificate of service of the order that had not been disclosed 
in discovery.  The Commonwealth previously had disclosed a 
different certificate of service, for a modification of the 
order; service of that modification was after the date of the 
alleged violation.  After a sidebar hearing to discuss the 
defendant's objection, the judge determined that it would be 
"fundamentally unfair" to the defendant to continue with the 
trial, or to allow the Commonwealth to retry the defendant, and 
sua sponte dismissed the case with prejudice.  The defendant did 
not object to the judge's ruling.  The Commonwealth's motion for 
reconsideration was denied.  The Commonwealth then appealed from 
the dismissal and from the denial of its motion for 
reconsideration to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion. 
 
We conclude that the dismissal with prejudice was an abuse 
of discretion because there was no egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct, and the judge could have remedied the discovery 
violation in some other way, such as by issuing a continuance or 
excluding introduction of the certificate.  As the dismissal was 
issued for procedural reasons, and not as a finding on the 
3 
 
ultimate question of the defendant's guilt, it was functionally 
equivalent to a declaration of mistrial.  We therefore analyze 
whether double jeopardy principles bar a retrial of the 
defendant under our jurisprudence on mistrials. 
 
We further conclude that the defendant did not consent to a 
mistrial because, first, the lack of objection to the dismissal 
did not constitute implied consent, and second, prior to the 
judge's ruling, counsel expressed a preference for the case to 
be resolved by the empanelled jury.  Because there was no 
manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, the Commonwealth is 
barred from retrying the defendant.1 
 
1.  Background.  On June 11, 2018, an abuse prevention 
order issued against the defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, 
§ 7 (209A order).  The order prohibited the defendant from 
contacting his former girlfriend, and it required him to stay at 
least fifty yards away from her and to leave and stay away from 
her residence.  According to a police report, on February 22, 
2019, at about 7:40 P.M., as the former girlfriend was getting 
out of her vehicle to enter her house, her brother, who lived 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the district 
attorney for the Berkshire district; the amicus brief submitted 
by the Committee for Public Counsel Services, American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., and Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of the 
defendant; and the amicus letter submitted by the Boston Bar 
Association. 
4 
 
with her, told her that he had just seen the defendant's 
mother's Black Nissan sedan pass by the house.  The former 
girlfriend then drove to a friend's house for safety, at which 
point her brother called her and told her that the defendant's 
car kept circling the house. 
 
The police report indicated that the defendant had been 
served with a 209A order on August 8, 2018, and that the order 
had an expiration date of July 12, 2019.  In March 2019, a 
complaint issued against the defendant charging him with one 
count of violating an abuse prevention order.  See G. L. 
c. 209A, § 7.  A certificate of service indicates that the 
defendant was served with a modification of the order on April 
22, 2019. 
 
On January 8, 2020, at a pretrial conference on the 
complaint, a different assistant district attorney stood in for 
the attorney who later represented the Commonwealth at trial.  
The trial judge asked the prosecutor, "[F]or your exhibits, it's 
the restraining order?"  She responded, "Yes, your honor."  The 
judge then asked defense counsel whether he had been provided 
the order, to which defense counsel responded, "Yes."  When the 
judge inquired whether there were "any problems with service," 
defense counsel responded that he had "been provided discovery." 
 
On the first day of trial, the prosecutor informed the 
judge that she would not be calling any police officers as 
5 
 
witnesses.  On the second day of trial, the victim, the 
defendant's former girlfriend, began to testify.  When the 
prosecutor attempted to show her a copy of the certificate of 
service for the 209A order, the defendant objected.  At sidebar, 
defense counsel said that he had never seen the document the 
Commonwealth was attempting to introduce.  He explained that the 
order provided to the defendant during discovery indicated a 
date of service of April 22, 2019, after the date of the alleged 
violation, February 22, 2019, while the order that the 
prosecutor was attempting to introduce indicated a date of 
service of August 8, 2018, prior to the date of the alleged 
violation.  Counsel argued that it would be a violation of the 
rules of discovery for the Commonwealth to introduce the earlier 
209A order.  He noted that, at the pretrial conference, the 
prosecutor had asked him whether she had given him the 
Commonwealth's discovery, and counsel had shown the prosecutor 
what he had received so that she could compare it to her own 
files.  The prosecutor had confirmed that counsel had received 
what she believed to be the proper documents. 
 
After hearing this explanation, the judge pointed out that, 
if counsel had believed that service had been made after the 
alleged violation, then he could have filed a motion to dismiss.  
Counsel responded, "And then they could have re-complained it 
and my client would be back in the position he finds himself in 
6 
 
today.  That's why I wanted to [e]mpanel the jury, so that he 
could be found not guilty of this offense."  The judge replied, 
"I'm not sure about [re-complaining].  If that were the actual 
date of service, then they would not have been able to [re-
complain] it."  Counsel noted that the police report indicated a 
date of service prior to the alleged violation, and added, "I 
could not have filed a [DiBennadetto] motion to dismiss because 
the application for complaint said that he was served prior to 
the incident."2 
 
The prosecutor argued that the Commonwealth should not be 
precluded from introducing the certificate of service, because 
defense counsel was on notice of the August 8, 2018 service from 
the date indicated in the police report, he had had the 
opportunity to raise the issue of service at the trial-readiness 
conference, and he could have obtained a copy of the 209A order 
from the clerk's office.  Counsel responded, 
"the position of the [prosecutor] and the court cannot be 
that it is my job to help the government prove the case 
against [the defendant].  The government gave me the 
evidence that they intended to use at trial, and I set it 
up for the trial based on the evidence that they gave me 
and my assessment of the strengths of the case. . . .  I 
can't be expected to, and I won't, help the government 
prove their case against [the defendant], [or] point out 
fatal flaws in their cases for them so that they can prove 
their cases." 
 
2 See Commonwealth v. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass. 310, 313 
(2002) ("a motion to dismiss . . . is the appropriate and only 
way to challenge a finding of probable cause" in District 
Court). 
7 
 
 
 
The judge asked the prosecutor whether she had a copy of 
what had been provided to the defendant during discovery.  The 
prosecutor responded that she "was not the original [assistant 
district attorney (ADA)] that gave that copy. . . .  The copy 
was given back on June 18th of 2019 by another ADA, not myself." 
 
Following the sidebar discussion, the judge called a 
recess; immediately after the recess, the judge ruled on the 
defendant's objection.  The judge stated that he would not 
"fault the defense attorney for not trying to seek a certified 
copy" of the 209A order mentioned in the police report prior to 
trial.  In addition, the judge observed that, "there were 
multiple prosecutors in the life of this case.  However, this 
assistant district attorney in front of me is the one who is, at 
this point, on the hook for this." 
 
The judge said that he had considered all of the options, 
including declaring a mistrial.  The judge declined to declare a 
mistrial because it "would allow the Commonwealth to . . . get a 
new trial date."  At the subsequent trial, the Commonwealth 
would be able to introduce the previously undisclosed 
certificate of service, after having certified prior to this 
trial that discovery was complete.  The judge explained, 
"The Commonwealth is really bound by their trial readiness 
and [their certification] that all the discovery was 
complete.  It was, now, apparently incomplete, and 
incomplete as to a fundamental theory of proof for the 
8 
 
Commonwealth. . . .  [A]ll I can say is that the other 
prosecutors need to communicate with each other." 
 
 
The judge also decided that, even if the earlier 
certificate of service were to be excluded at a subsequent 
trial, "it would be unfair to the defendant to go forward" with 
the trial, because the Commonwealth might then have a police 
officer testify as to the earlier date of service, which would 
be "fundamentally unfair" to the defendant.  Accordingly, the 
judge concluded that "the sanction [is] that the matter will be 
dismissed with prejudice." 
 
The prosecutor moved to reconsider.  In her motion, she 
stated that she was unable to confirm that the Commonwealth had 
provided the defendant with the correct certificate of service 
during pretrial discovery.  At a hearing on the motion, the 
prosecutor reiterated that defense counsel willfully had 
concealed from the judge his belief that the Commonwealth had 
disclosed an order that had been served after the date of the 
alleged violation.  The prosecutor argued that "the defendant 
was not surprised by the evidence because he knew he had not 
received it." 
 
Defense counsel argued that it was not his "burden to 
assume the Commonwealth's theory of the case. . . .  The 
Commonwealth gave me discovery.  It's not the defendant's 
obligation . . . to alert . . . the Commonwealth . . . to 
9 
 
misconduct or errors or oversights on the part of the 
Commonwealth that are to the defendant's advantage."  The judge 
expressed reservations about characterizing the Commonwealth's 
actions as "misconduct."  Defense counsel asserted that while 
the judge might not be comfortable labeling what had happened 
"misconduct," the defendant had "no obligation to help the 
Commonwealth prove the case or to make sure that the 
Commonwealth provides discovery sufficient to convict the 
defendant. . . .  [G]iven the discovery that I received, . . . I 
exploited [the missing order] to the best of my ability.  Now 
the Commonwealth is essentially arguing that, you know, they 
should get a do-over because of that." 
 
The judge noted that the defendant might have been "on 
notice for what a police officer might have testified to because 
it's in a police report," but that "the Commonwealth decided not 
to call the [police as] witnesses prior to any of this 
happening."  The judge pointed to "the Commonwealth's obligation 
at the trial readiness to make sure that, however many 
prosecutors had their hands on the file, that all of the 
discovery that they intend to use has been provided to the 
defendant."  The judge also said that he would not fault the 
defendant for "waiting in the weeds" to object to the 
introduction of the 209A order at trial.  Finally, the judge 
emphasized that the dismissal was his decision, and not a 
10 
 
request by the defendant, and reaffirmed the dismissal with 
prejudice. 
 
The Commonwealth appealed to the Appeals Court from the 
dismissal and from the denial of its motion for reconsideration, 
and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that the dismissal 
with prejudice was an abuse of the judge's discretion to 
sanction discovery violations.  The defendant maintains that the 
dismissal with prejudice was justified because the Commonwealth 
committed an avoidable discovery violation that effectively 
deprived him of a viable defense. 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that it is not barred from 
retrying the defendant because, by not objecting to the judge's 
order of dismissal, he consented to a mistrial, and that the 
defendant "exploit[ed] the [Commonwealth's] discovery failure to 
obtain a dismissal or a not guilty verdict."  The defendant 
contends that a retrial is barred because he did not consent to 
the termination of the trial and there were sufficient grounds 
for prohibiting a retrial. 
 
a.  Discovery violation.  As stated, the judge dismissed 
the case with prejudice as a sanction for the Commonwealth's 
attempt to introduce a certificate of service for a 209A order 
that had not been disclosed in discovery.  The Commonwealth 
argues that this constituted an abuse of discretion in part 
11 
 
because the defendant was not prejudiced by the Commonwealth's 
discovery violation.  "We review the judge's sanctions order for 
abuse of discretion or other error of law."  Commonwealth v. 
Sanford, 460 Mass. 441, 445 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Carney, 458 Mass. 418, 425 (2010). 
 
As part of its mandatory discovery obligations, the 
Commonwealth must disclose all intended exhibits to the 
defendant at or before the pretrial conference.  See 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 469 Mass. 516, 521-522 (2014); Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14 (a) (1), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005).  This is 
intended to ensure that a defendant can "make effective use of 
the evidence in preparing and presenting his case."  
Commonwealth v. Stote, 433 Mass. 19, 23 (2000), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 381 Mass. 90, 114 (1980). 
 
When a party violates its discovery obligations, the trial 
judge may issue a sanction.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004).  Sanctions for discovery 
violations are "a mechanism for protecting a defendant's right 
to a fair trial" by ensuring that the Commonwealth complies with 
its discovery obligations.  See Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 
434, 439 (2010).  "Sanctions for noncompliance with discovery 
are within the judge's discretion" (citation omitted).  Id. at 
440.  In sanctioning a discovery violation, "the court may make 
a further order for discovery, grant a continuance, or enter 
12 
 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances."  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c) (1).  The court also may "in its 
discretion exclude evidence for noncompliance with a discovery 
order issued or imposed pursuant to [rule 14]."  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (c) (2). 
 
To convict a defendant of violating a 209A order, the 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant was aware of the 
terms of the order before the time of the alleged violation.  
Commonwealth v. Shea, 467 Mass. 788, 794 (2014).  Here, the 
judge found that the Commonwealth did not provide in discovery a 
certificate of service indicating that the defendant had been 
served with a 209A order before the date of the alleged 
violation.  Accordingly, introduction at trial of the 
undisclosed certificate would have undermined the defendant's 
planned defense that the Commonwealth had failed to establish 
all the elements of the offense.  See Commonwealth v. Lowery, 
487 Mass. 851, 869-870 (2021); Cruz v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 
664, 671-672 (2012). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant was not 
prejudiced by the discovery violation because "defense counsel 
was aware of the discovery problem and the actual date of 
service," and thus the defendant did not face any "unfair 
surprise" when the prosecutor attempted to introduce the 
previously undisclosed certificate of service at trial.  The 
13 
 
modern rules of discovery, however, "were created to permit 
defense counsel to learn, through discovery of the government's 
evidence, what the defendant faces in standing trial, and to 
assist in preventing trial by ambush."  Commonwealth v. Eneh, 76 
Mass. App. Ct. 672, 677 (2010).  The Commonwealth certified, 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (3), that it had disclosed 
all of its intended exhibits prior to trial, and it was proper 
for defense counsel to rely on the Commonwealth's certification.  
See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 377 Mass. 887, 895 (1979) (question 
is whether "the defense [was] materially hurt in its preparation 
by having to meet unexpected [evidence]").  It thus was not an 
abuse of discretion for the judge to sanction the Commonwealth 
for its discovery violation. 
 
Having concluded that imposition of a sanction against the 
Commonwealth was appropriate, we turn to the nature of the 
sanction imposed. 
 
b.  Dismissal with prejudice.  Two principles govern a 
judge's imposition of sanctions for a discovery violation.  
"First, sanctions are remedial in nature.  Second, sanctions 
should be tailored appropriately to cure any prejudice resulting 
from a party's noncompliance and to ensure a fair trial."  
Sanford, 460 Mass. at 445-446, quoting Carney, 458 Mass. at 427. 
 
Under these principles, dismissal with prejudice can be a 
permissible response to a discovery violation by the 
14 
 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Washington W., 462 Mass. 204, 
215 (2012); Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c) (1).  Nonetheless, 
dismissal with prejudice is a "remedy of last resort because it 
precludes a public trial and terminates criminal proceedings."  
Washington W., supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 453 Mass. 
873, 877 (2009).  A dismissal with prejudice is warranted "where 
there is egregious prosecutorial or police misconduct and 
prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial, and where 
the dismissal is necessary to cure the prejudice."  Washington 
W., supra.  "Such relief should be reserved" only for "the most 
intolerable government conduct."  Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 
Mass. 266, 291 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 
Mass. 484, 485 n.1 (1998).  In determining whether to dismiss 
with prejudice, a judge should consider the prejudice the 
defendant would endure in the "subsequent trial and the 
interference with procedural rights therein."  Mason, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Viverito, 422 Mass. 228, 231 (1996). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the decision to dismiss with 
prejudice here was an abuse of discretion.  We agree.  While the 
Commonwealth was at the very least negligent in failing to 
provide, during the more than one year of discovery, the sole 
exhibit it planned to rely upon at trial, its actions did not 
reach the high threshold of egregious misconduct.  See Brangan 
v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 361, 366 (2017) ("The standard for 
15 
 
prosecutorial misconduct mandating the dismissal of an 
indictment is high").  Nothing in the judge's findings, or in 
the record, suggests that the Commonwealth's error was 
intentional.  See id. at 367 (dismissal of indictment was 
inappropriate in part because prosecutor did not knowingly make 
false statement to jury); Cruz, 461 Mass. at 673-674 ("Dismissal 
was considered and rejected because the prosecutor's violation 
of the discovery order was found to be unintentional").  Rather, 
the judge expressed reservation in characterizing the 
Commonwealth's actions as "misconduct," and suggested instead 
that the error could be attributed to a failure of the various 
assistant district attorneys who had prosecuted the case to 
communicate with each other.  See Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 
Mass. 325, 333 (1986) (reversing dismissal with prejudice in 
part because there was no prosecutorial misconduct). 
 
Moreover, the judge had available alternative remedies to 
cure the discovery violation.  See Mason, 453 Mass. at 877 
(dismissal of criminal case "is a remedy of last resort" 
[citation omitted]).  A continuance, for instance, could have 
provided the defendant with additional time to prepare a 
response to the newly disclosed certificate of service.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c) (1) ("For failure to comply with any 
discovery order . . . the court may . . . grant a continuance").  
See also Commonwealth v. Kostka, 489 Mass. 399, 412 (2022), 
16 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 177 (1982) 
("defense counsel should, when faced with delayed disclosure 
situations, seek additional time for investigative purposes").  
The judge also could have ordered the certificate of service 
excluded from introduction at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Cole, 
473 Mass. 317, 331 (2015), overruled on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454 (2019) ("When a party 
fails to comply with its discovery obligations, Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (c) (2) . . . confers on a judge the discretion to exclude 
evidence based on the party's noncompliance . . ."). 
 
While the judge considered this latter remedy as a 
possibility, ultimately he rejected it as unfair because the 
Commonwealth thereafter could have substituted a police 
officer's testimony about the date that the order had been 
served.  The defendant's right to be notified of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses, however, would have been protected had 
the judge instead precluded any police testimony as to this 
point.  See Lowery, 487 Mass. at 869 (judge may "exclude 
evidence from a witness whose name was not disclosed during 
discovery"); Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 224 (2007), 
quoting Stote, 433 Mass. at 23 (in determining whether to 
suppress undisclosed testimony, "we ask whether the 
prosecution's disclosure was sufficiently timely to allow the 
defendant 'to make effective use of the evidence in preparing 
17 
 
and presenting his [or her] case'").  The suppression of such 
testimony, along with the exclusion of the earlier 209A order, 
would have protected the defendant from any unfair surprise at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. 388, 398 (1999) 
("prevention of surprise" is one factor "taken into account in 
reviewing the exclusion of an undisclosed witness"); 
Commonwealth v. Daly, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 48, 52 (2016) (in 
precluding late-disclosed evidence, judge must consider 
"prevention of unfair surprise"). 
 
In addition, the discovery violation did not present the 
sort of irremediable harm that should preclude a retrial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 314 (1984) ("Such a 
drastic remedy would be appropriate where failure to comply with 
discovery procedures results in irremediable harm to a defendant 
that prevents the possibility of a fair trial").  The defendant 
argues, to the contrary, that the dismissal with prejudice was 
justified because the introduction of the certificate of service 
disrupted his planned defense, which was to assert that there 
was no evidence that he knew an abuse prevention order was in 
effect at the time of the alleged violation.  With proper notice 
before retrial, however, the certificate of service would not 
have been unexpected, and the defendant would have been aware 
that a defense based on its absence would be unavailing.  See 
Nolin, 448 Mass. at 224, quoting Stote, 433 Mass. at 23 ("it is 
18 
 
the consequences of the delay [in disclosure] that matter, not 
the likely impact of the nondisclosed evidence"); Gilbert, 377 
Mass. at 895 (question is whether "the defense [was] materially 
hurt in its preparation by having to meet unexpected 
[evidence]"). 
 
The situation here is not unlike the circumstances in 
Commonwealth v. Blaikie, 375 Mass. 601, 606-607 (1978), where a 
trial judge granted the defendant's request for a mistrial 
because testimony by a police officer referred to incriminating 
statements by the defendant that had not been included in 
pretrial discovery.  Prior to retrial, the prosecutor provided 
the defendant with the incriminating statements that previously 
had been undisclosed.  Id.  At his new trial, the defendant was 
convicted; he argued on appeal that "because the prosecutor at 
the aborted first trial allegedly breached a pretrial discovery 
agreement to disclose all the defendant's statements, due 
process requires that the prosecution be limited at the second 
trial to only those statements disclosed prior to the first 
trial."  Id. at 607.  We concluded that "[t]he award of a new 
trial, accompanied with pretrial disclosure of all the 
defendant's statements, remedied the effect of the prejudicial 
testimony at the first trial."  Id.  Accordingly, the preclusion 
of a retrial here was unnecessary.  See Commonwealth v. Light, 
394 Mass. 112, 114 (1985) ("In some instances, charges should be 
19 
 
dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct.  In others, . . . 
a defendant is entitled only to be protected from the 
prosecutor's misconduct by having a new trial . . ."). 
 
Having determined that the dismissal with prejudice was an 
abuse of discretion, we turn to consider whether the protection 
against double jeopardy precludes retrial of the defendant.  To 
address this argument, we first must discuss in some detail the 
manner in which the trial was terminated. 
 
c.  Order of termination.  The decision to allow a retrial 
"implicates a defendant's right, under the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, as well as Massachusetts 
statutory and common-law protections, against being placed in 
jeopardy twice for the same criminal offense."  Commonwealth v. 
Bryan, 476 Mass. 351, 356 (2017).  A dismissal with prejudice, 
when issued in error, however, does not necessarily preclude 
retrial.  See Brusgulis, 398 Mass. at 333.  Rather, the "manner 
in which the proceeding ended" determines whether a retrial 
would violate the protection against double jeopardy.  See 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 486 Mass. 469, 481-482 (2020), citing 
Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977). 
 
"Under double jeopardy principles, there are two 
overarching categories of orders by which a judge can terminate 
a trial prior to a verdict by the fact finder:  acquittals and 
procedural dismissals, often referred to as mistrials."  Taylor, 
20 
 
486 Mass. at 481.  "An acquittal occurs where there is a ruling 
on the facts and merits, . . . [including any] ruling which 
relates to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence" 
(quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).  Id.  Double 
jeopardy precludes retrial when a defendant is acquitted.  Id.  
By contrast, retrial may be permissible after a mistrial if a 
defendant consented to the mistrial, id. at 483, or if there was 
a manifest necessity to declare the mistrial, Bryan, 476 Mass. 
at 356. 
 
Here, both the Commonwealth and the defendant agree that 
the judge's order dismissing the case in effect resulted in a 
mistrial, and that jeopardy attached.  The judge did not make a 
finding on the ultimate question of the defendant's guilt but, 
rather, dismissed the complaint because a retrial would be 
"fundamentally unfair."  See Taylor, 486 Mass. at 481 
("termination of the proceedings . . . on a basis unrelated to 
factual guilt or innocence of the offense" does not constitute 
acquittal [citation omitted]).  "We thus analyze whether double 
jeopardy bars the current prosecution under our jurisprudence 
concerning mistrials" (citations omitted).  Id. at 482. 
 
d.  Double jeopardy.  "We review determinations regarding 
double jeopardy de novo."  Taylor, 486 Mass. at 477.  Because 
jeopardy attached at trial, the Commonwealth is precluded from 
21 
 
retrying the defendant unless he consented to the mistrial or 
there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. 
 
i.  Whether defendant consented to mistrial.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the defendant consented to the 
mistrial, and thus may be retried.  The defendant argues that 
there was no consent because defense counsel at trial expressed 
a preference against the case being dismissed, and consent was 
not implied by counsel's lack of objection to the dismissal. 
 
A defendant may consent explicitly to a mistrial either by 
moving for one or by agreeing "to one proposed by the prosecutor 
or judge."  Taylor, 486 Mass. at 483.  Consent to a mistrial 
also may be implied "where a defendant had the opportunity to 
object [to a declaration of a mistrial] and failed to do so."  
Pellegrine v. Commonwealth, 446 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Phetsaya, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 298 (1996).  
See United States v. McIntosh, 380 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 2004) 
("Where the defendant sits silently by and does not object to 
the declaration of a mistrial even though he has a fair 
opportunity to do so, a court may presume his consent" 
[quotation and citation omitted]); United States v. Goldstein, 
479 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Consent [to a mistrial] 
need not be express, but may be implied from the totality of the 
circumstances attendant on a declaration of a mistrial."). 
22 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant consented to the 
declaration of a mistrial because he did not object when the 
judge ordered the case dismissed.  As the Commonwealth asserts, 
the defendant did not formally object to the judge's order of 
dismissal.  An objection, however, may be raised in ways other 
than an "expressly articulated opposition to a mistrial."  
Taylor, 486 Mass. at 483.  In particular, a defendant may object 
by expressing a preference against mistrial prior to the judge's 
ruling.  In Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 410 Mass. 174, 177 n.2 
(1991), for instance, a mistrial was granted over the 
defendant's objection, even though the defendant "did not 
formally object to the mistrial," because the defendant had 
"ask[ed] the judge to try to avoid a mistrial."  A defendant 
need not express his or her aversion to a mistrial immediately 
prior to the judge's declaration.  In Commonwealth v. Donovan, 8 
Mass. App. Ct. 313, 316-317 (1979), the Appeals Court affirmed 
the trial judge's finding that the defendant did not consent to 
a mistrial because, at a hearing prior to the declaration of a 
mistrial, defense counsel "requested that the trial go forward," 
and suggested ways in which a mistrial could be avoided. 
 
Here, at the sidebar discussion that preceded the judge's 
order, defense counsel explained that he had not filed a motion 
to dismiss before trial because he "wanted to [e]mpanel the 
jury, so that [the defendant] could be found not guilty of this 
23 
 
offense."  The defendant also did not seek, at any point, to 
have the case dismissed.  The defendant thus gave notice that 
his preferred course was for the case to be heard and decided by 
the empanelled jury.  See Taylor, 486 Mass. at 483, quoting 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1978) ("The 
important consideration, for purposes of the [d]ouble [j]eopardy 
[c]lause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the 
course to be followed . . ."). 
 
Turning to whether the defendant impliedly consented to a 
mistrial, the defendant argues that, where a trial judge sua 
sponte orders a dismissal with prejudice, a reviewing court 
should not infer consent from a lack of explicit objection.  He 
contends that a defendant should not be required to object in 
order to preclude a mistrial. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, where a 
defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment on procedural 
grounds is allowed, the defendant may be retried.  Scott, 437 
U.S. at 98-99.  In such circumstances, the defendant has 
"deliberately [chosen] to seek termination of the proceedings 
against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence" 
and so "suffers no injury cognizable under the [d]ouble 
[j]eopardy [c]lause" if the defendant is retried.  Id.  The 
Court in Scott, however, left open the question whether a 
defendant may be retried where the dismissal is ordered sua 
24 
 
sponte by the judge, and the defendant has not objected.  Across 
jurisdictions, there is "conflicting authority" on this 
question.  State v. Bruno, 293 Conn. 127, 142 n.13 (2009).  In 
United States v. Dahlstrum, 655 F.2d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a dismissal with 
prejudice precludes retrial where the trial judge "was the 
instigator" of the dismissal, and the defendant had "no control" 
over the course of events leading up to the dismissal.  There, a 
Federal District Court judge had dismissed an indictment for tax 
evasion after finding that the Internal Revenue Service had 
"abused its power."  Id. at 972-973.  During the testimony that 
led to the judge's decision to dismiss, the majority of the 
questioning was performed by the judge.  Id. at 973.  The judge 
did not consult with the defendant as to what course of action 
to take, and the defendant did nothing to suggest that he was 
"seeking to avoid a decision by the trier of fact."  Id. at 975.  
Similarly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has concluded 
that the protections against double jeopardy prevented a retrial 
where "the trial judge, sua sponte, instigated the dismissal" 
without input from the defendant.  State v. Vestal, 131 N.C. 
App. 756, 760 (1998). 
 
By contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that "no 
interest protected by the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause precludes 
25 
 
a retrial" where the sua sponte dismissal of an indictment is 
issued in error.  See State v. Calhoun, 18 Ohio St. 3d 373, 377, 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 983 (1985).  The court held that "[t]he 
purpose of the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause is to preserve for 
the defendant acquittals or favorable factual determinations but 
not to shield from appellate review erroneous legal conclusions 
not predicated on any factual determinations."  Id. 
 
Here, as stated, the defendant did not argue for, or 
request, that the judge dismiss the case, with or without 
prejudice.  Rather, the judge issued his ruling, without input 
from the parties, after defense counsel had urged the exclusion 
of the earlier certificate of service from introduction in 
evidence.  See Dahlstrum, 655 F.2d at 975-976.  Contrast Scott, 
437 U.S. at 98-99, and United States v. Kennings, 861 F.2d 381, 
383, 385 (3d Cir. 1988) (defendant "explicitly consented to the 
court's sua sponte motion to dismiss" because he argued for 
dismissal in open court).  We therefore must decide whether, 
when a judge "instigates" a dismissal, the defendant must object 
in order to avoid a later determination that he consented to a 
mistrial. 
 
We conclude that a defendant has no such obligation.  When 
a trial ends in a dismissal, there is no declaration of a 
mistrial to which a defendant can object.  See Taylor, 486 Mass. 
at 484 (no opportunity to object where there was no declaration 
26 
 
of mistrial).  "[W]here a defendant did not have an opportunity 
to object to [a mistrial], the defendant is not deemed to have 
consented."  Id. at 483.  If anything, by not objecting to the 
dismissal with prejudice, the defendant impliedly consented to a 
dismissal that bars retrial.  See Mason, 453 Mass. at 877 
(dismissal of criminal case precludes public trial and 
terminates criminal proceedings).  Contrast Pellegrine, 446 
Mass. at 1005.  Because a dismissal with prejudice is ordered 
with the very purpose of precluding a retrial, we cannot infer 
the defendant's consent to a retrial from his silence.  See 
United States v. You, 382 F.3d 958, 964-965 (9th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1076 (2005) ("a court may infer consent 
only where the circumstances positively indicate a defendant's 
willingness to acquiesce in the mistrial order" [quotation and 
citation omitted]). 
 
Similarly, we previously have concluded that consent to a 
mistrial cannot be inferred from a defendant's motion for a 
required finding of not guilty.  See Taylor, 486 Mass. at 471.  
In Taylor, supra at 482, even though the defendant's motion for 
a required finding was successful, we determined that "the 
termination of the trial was procedural," and thus the ruling 
"played the functional role of a declaration of a mistrial."  We 
also concluded that the defendant did not consent to be retried, 
because his motion was for a ruling that would bar a future 
27 
 
prosecution, and we had no way to determine whether the 
defendant would have objected had the judge declared a mistrial.  
Id. at 483-484.  Here, too, we "can never know" whether the 
defendant would have objected had the judge expressly declared a 
mistrial.  See id. at 484. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the defendant evinced his 
acquiescence to a mistrial where he "exploit[ed] the 
[Commonwealth's] discovery failure to obtain a dismissal or a 
not guilty verdict."  This argument is unavailing.  "[A] 
defendant who merely sets in motion a series of events that 
leads to the termination of his or her trial is protected from 
being retried by the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause."  United 
States v. Pharis, 298 F.3d 228, 244 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
defendant was under no obligation to disclose at the pretrial 
conference that the certificate of service he received through 
discovery was insufficient to support a conviction.  If, at the 
pretrial conference, the defendant had revealed his intention to 
exploit the deficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence, his trial 
strategy would have been unveiled to the prosecution.  
Generally, "a defendant need not reveal his defense."  
Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 372 Mass. 337, 342 (1977).3 
 
3 There are a few exceptions to this general rule, none of 
which are applicable here; pursuant to  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b), 
as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), "the prosecution is 
 
28 
 
 
In sum, the defendant made a statement in favor of 
continuing with the empanelled jury and did not have an 
opportunity to object to what was effectively a declaration of a 
mistrial.  The defendant thus did not consent to be retried.  
The Commonwealth therefore may reprosecute the defendant only if 
there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial.  See Taylor, 486 
Mass. at 484. 
 
ii.  Manifest necessity.  We review a determination 
regarding manifest necessity for an abuse of discretion.  
Taylor, 486 Mass. at 484.  In determining whether to declare a 
mistrial, a judge must weigh the "defendant's valued right to 
have his or her trial completed by a particular tribunal" 
against "the interest of the public in fair trials designed to 
end in just judgments" (quotations, citations, and alteration 
omitted).  Taylor, supra.  "Two principles guide our review:  
(1) counsel must have been given full opportunity to be heard 
and (2) the trial judge must have given careful consideration to 
alternatives to a mistrial" (alterations omitted).  Id., quoting 
Ray v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 1, 4 (2012). 
 
entitled to notice, and in some cases discovery, when the 
defendant intends to defend on the basis of alibi, lack of 
criminal responsibility, or the existence of a license, claim of 
authority or ownership, or exemption."  Reporter's Notes 
(Revised, 2004) to Rule 14, Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, at 167 (Thomson Reuters 2021). 
29 
 
 
Here, there was no manifest necessity to declare a 
mistrial.  As discussed, among other things, the trial judge 
could have issued a continuance or could have excluded the 
certificate of service and barred the Commonwealth from 
recanting on its earlier statement that it would not call any 
police witnesses.  See Lowery, 487 Mass. at 869 (judge may 
"exclude evidence from a witness whose name was not disclosed 
during discovery"); Cole, 473 Mass. at 331 ("When a party fails 
to comply with its discovery obligations, Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 [c] [2] . . . confers on a judge the discretion to exclude 
evidence based on the party's noncompliance"); Nolin, 448 Mass. 
at 224 (consequences of prosecutor's failure to disclose witness 
were "mitigated [in part] by the judge's grant of delay").  
While the judge considered excluding the certificate of service, 
he apparently did not consider precluding any police witnesses 
from testifying as to the date of service of the abuse 
prevention order.  See Bryan, 476 Mass. at 358 ("the judge 
[must] fully explore[] possible alternatives before declaring a 
mistrial").  The exclusion of the certificate of service and 
police testimony regarding it would have bound the Commonwealth 
to the sole document it provided in discovery and would not have 
divested the defendant of his right to complete the trial before 
his chosen tribunal.  Contrast id. at 360 ("After weighing 
30 
 
possible alternatives to a mistrial, the judge concluded that 
nothing else would suffice"). 
 
Undoubtedly, the defendant benefited from the inadvertent 
mistakes by the prosecutor.  We nonetheless are constrained by 
the protections against double jeopardy from ordering a new 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 437 Mass. 276, 283 (2002), 
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 962 (2003) ("Double jeopardy principles 
will often foreclose any remedy for, or shield from review, a 
trial judge's errors or misconduct").  See also Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) ("an acquitted defendant 
may not be retried even though the acquittal was based upon an 
egregiously erroneous foundation" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order of dismissal affirmed.