Title: DAVID D. FREUDENTHAL, Governor of the State of Wyoming, and DR. BRENT SHERARD, Director of the Department of Health, in their capacity as custodian of records V. CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming corporation; CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. DAVID D. FREUDENTHAL, Governor of the State of Wyoming, and DR. BRENT SHERARD, Director of the Department of Health, in their capacity as custodian of records

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVID D. FREUDENTHAL, Governor of the State of Wyoming, and DR. BRENT SHERARD, Director of the Department of Health, in their capacity as custodian of records V. CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming corporation; CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. DAVID D. FREUDENTHAL, Governor of the State of Wyoming, and DR. BRENT SHERARD, Director of the Department of Health, in their capacity as custodian of records2010 WY 80Case Number: S-09-0183, S-09-0184Decided: 06/22/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

DAVID 
D. FREUDENTHAL, Governor of the State of Wyoming, and DR. BRENT SHERARD, 
Director of the Department of Health, in their capacity as custodian of 
records,Appellants(Defendants),v.CHEYENNE 
NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming 
corporation,Appellee(Plaintiff).CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC., a 
Wyoming corporation,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.DAVID D. 
FREUDENTHAL, Governor of the State of Wyoming, and DR. BRENT SHERARD, Director 
of the Department of Health, in their capacity as custodian of 
records,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge, Retired*

 
 
Representing 
Appellants in Case No. S-09-0183:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee in Case No. S-09-0183:

Bruce 
T. Moats of Law Office of Bruce T. Moats, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Amicus Curiae Wyoming Education Association, Equality State Policy Center and 
Wyoming Trial Lawyers Association in Case No. 
S-09-0184:

Patrick 
E. Hacker and Erin M. Kendall of Hacker, Hacker & Kendall, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Judge 
Grant retired effective August 5, 2009.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Declining mineral revenue required the 
Governor of the State of Wyoming, David D. Freudenthal (the Governor), to 
request budget reduction plans from all state agencies.  Claiming the budget reduction plans were 
public records under Wyoming's Public Records Act (WPRA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
16-4-201 through 16-4-205 (LexisNexis 2009), Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. (the 
Newspaper) requested copies of the plans the Department of Family Services (DFS) 
and the Department of Health submitted to the Governor.  The Governor denied the request asserting 
the plans fell within a deliberative process privilege incorporated in the 
WPRA.

 
 
[¶2]  The Newspaper petitioned the district 
court for access to the budget reduction plans. After an in camera review of the 
plans, the district court held they were not the sort of documents to which the 
privilege would apply.  As to 
whether the WPRA incorporated the privilege, the district court opined that the 
better policy would be to recognize the privilege where the facts warranted 
it.  

 
 
[¶3]  The Governor and the director of the 
Department of Health, Dr. Brent Sherard, (collectively the State) appealed the 
district court's ruling that the privilege did not apply and the plans must be 
disclosed.  The Newspaper cross 
appealed, asserting Wyoming has not and should not recognize the deliberative 
process privilege within the WPRA.  We affirm the district court's ruling 
that the documents requested must be disclosed.  As to the district court's comments that 
the privilege should be recognized, we conclude this case does not present the 
appropriate occasion to decide whether or not the deliberative process privilege 
is incorporated into the WPRA.   

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]  The State presents the following issue 
in its appeal:

 
 
            
Whether the documents sought to be inspected by the Newspaper fall within 
the deliberative process privilege incorporated in Wyo. Stat. Ann.  § 16-4-203(b)(v). 

The 
Newspaper restates the issue as follows:

 
 
            
Whether the budget reduction plan of the Department of Health submitted 
to the Governor would fall within the deliberative process privilege if the 
privilege is adopted in Wyoming. 

In 
its cross appeal, the Newspaper states the following 
issue:

 
 
            
Whether Wyoming courts should recognize the evidentiary privilege against 
discovery of information regarding the deliberative process of government 
decision-makers, and, if so, in what form. 

The 
State rephrases the issue as follows:

 
 

            
Whether 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(b)(v), which exempts "[i]nteragency or intraagency 
memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a private party in 
litigation with the agency" from required disclosure under the Wyoming Public 
Records Act, incorporates the "deliberative process privilege." 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]  The 2008 Consensus Revenue Estimating 
Group (CREG) reports projected falling prices for Wyoming produced minerals 
indicating a likely decline in state mineral revenue.  On November 25, 2008, the Governor 
advised all executive agency heads and the 2009 Wyoming Legislature of the 
predicted revenue shortfalls.  He 
requested all agency heads to prepare a contingent budget reduction plan.  

 
 
[¶6]  On February 12, 2009, the Governor 
renewed his request, and directed all agencies to submit budget reduction plans 
by May 5, 2009, incorporating both a five and ten percent reduction in general 
fund appropriations.  On May 5, 
2009, the Newspaper verbally requested DFS's budget reduction plan pursuant to 
the following WPRA provision:

 
 
§ 
16-4-202.  Right of inspection; . . 
. .

 
 
            
(a)  All public records shall 
be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times, except as provided in 
this act or as otherwise provided by law . . . .

[¶7]  The Governor's office denied the request 
stating the documents were in draft form.  
 The Newspaper then made 
verbal requests to DFS as well as the Department of Health to inspect their 
budget reduction plans.  Again, the 
Governor's office denied the requests.  The Newspaper requested a written 
statement explaining the grounds for the denial.  The Governor issued a written explanation 
for the denial citing the following WPRA provision:

 
 
 
 
§ 
16-4-203.  Right of inspection; 
grounds for denial; . . . .

. 
. . .

            
(b)  The custodian may deny 
the right of inspection of the following records, unless otherwise provided by 
law, on the ground that disclosure to the applicant would be contrary to the 
public interest;

. 
. . .

            
(v) Interagency or intraagency memoranda or letters which would not be 
available by law to a private party in litigation with the 
agency[.]

[¶8] 
On May 22, 2009, the Newspaper petitioned the district court for access to the 
records previously requested.  The 
Newspaper also sought an order to show cause naming the Governor, Dr. Sherard 
and DFS director Tony Lewis as defendants.1  On June 18, 2009, the district court 
issued an Order to Show Cause directing the State to submit the disputed 
documents to the court, under seal, for in camera review.  

 
 
[¶9]  After reviewing the documents, the 
district court issued its decision letter in which it stated:  

 
 
It 
is the opinion of this Court that it would be better policy to recognize the 
privilege where the facts warrant it.  
The more immediate question is whether the documents at issue in this 
case create facts that warrant application of the 
privilege.

 
 
The 
district court concluded the documents did not fall within the privilege because 
they were essentially spread sheets showing the various programs, current 
allocations, recommended reductions and the impact of those reductions.  Concluding that the information 
contained in the plans was purely factual and contained no personal opinion or 
advice about policy-making, the district court ordered the State to produce the 
documents.  In the final paragraph 
of its decision letter, the district court stated:

 
 
Because 
the executive should have the most frank, unrestrained exchange of opinions with 
close advisors before making critical decisions, Wyoming law should recognize 
the deliberative process exception to the right to inspect documents.  Because it would be an exception to 
strong and important public policy, it must be narrowly applied and sparingly 
invoked.  Given these limitations, 
the materials in question cannot qualify for the 
privilege.

 
 
The 
district court entered an order consistent with its decision letter.  The parties timely appealed.2 

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶10]  The district court's conclusions that 
the deliberative process privilege should be recognized in Wyoming and that the 
documents at issue did not fall within the deliberative process privilege are 
conclusions of law, are not binding on this Court and are reviewed de novo.  Pagel v. Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1226, 1229 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.    
 The Deliberative Process Privilege, 
Generally

[¶11]  As with the perhaps better known 
presidential privilege,3 the deliberative process privilege 
is intended to promote the flow of information within the executive branch of 
government.  Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore A Treatise 
on Evidence, 1312 (2d ed. 2010).  
While the presidential privilege is a narrow conditional privilege for 
communications involving the President, his advisors, and their White House 
staff, the deliberative process privilege applies more broadly to 
intergovernmental communications by executive officials in general.  Id. at 1336.

 
 
[¶12]  The deliberative process privilege was 
first recognized in Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).  After the government sold three aluminum 
production plants to Reynolds Metals, Kaiser sued claiming the government 
breached the most favored purchaser clause of the parties' contract.  Id. at 941.  Kaiser sought production in discovery of 
a document which the government refused to produce on the grounds it contained 
opinions rendered to the agency head by a member of his staff that did not 
reflect the position of the agency, and its disclosure would discourage agency 
staff from giving candid advice and impede effective agency administration.  Id. at 943.  In deciding whether the government 
properly withheld the document, the court of claims began by noting that the 
question of "whether or not, or to what extent, there is a privilege' against 
the discovery of information in the possession of the Government is an unsettled 
question."  Id. at 945.  Referencing a "public policy" of "open, 
frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning administrative 
action," the court of claims concluded that "confidential intra-agency advisory 
opinions . . . belong to that class of governmental documents that are 
privileged from inspection as against public interest."  Id. at 946. 

 
 

[¶13]  The privilege first recognized in Kaiser came to be known as the 
deliberative process privilege.  
Courts have characterized it as a common law doctrine established by a 
long line of cases.  Sprague Electric Co. v. U.S., 462 F. Supp. 966, 971 (Cust. Ct. 1978); Colorado 
Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Colo. 1998).4  After 
Congress enacted the 
1966 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the federal courts generally 
construed it as incorporating the deliberative process privilege by way of § 
552(b)(5), which provides in language nearly identical to § 16-4-203(a)(v), that 
a government is not required to disclose "inter-agency or intra-agency 
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than 
an agency in litigation with the agency."  
Environmental Protection Agency v. 
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87, 93 S. Ct. 827, 836, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 
(1973).

 
 
[¶14] 
 Despite the cases interpreting 
FOIA, the original draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not include a 
provision incorporating the deliberative process privilege.  Imwinkelried, supra, at 1337.  In fact, Congress rejected a later 
revision to the FRE recognizing the privilege.  Id.  Thus, the FRE approved by Congress in 
1975 did not include any codification of the deliberative process privilege and 
the privilege remains a creature of case law.  

 
 
[¶15] 
In Mink, one of the leading FOIA 
cases recognizing the privilege, a Congresswoman sought production of 
recommendations a departmental under-secretary made to the President concerning 
the advisability of a scheduled underground nuclear test.  The President denied the request in part 
on the basis of FOIA Exemption 5.  
Citing Kaiser, 157 F. Supp.  at 
946, the Court stated:

 
 
[T]he 
legislative history of Exemption 5 demonstrates that Congress intended to 
incorporate generally the recognized rule that "confidential intra-agency 
advisory opinions. . . are privileged from inspection."

 
 

Mink, 
410 U.S.  at 86, 93 S. Ct.  at 836.  
The Court quoted Congressional reports reflecting that in discussing 
Exemption 5, legislators were concerned "that it would be impossible to have any 
frank discussion of legal or policy matters in writing if all such writings were 
to be subjected to public scrutiny" and "efficiency of Government would be 
greatly hampered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all Government 
agencies were prematurely forced to operate in a fishbowl.'"  Id. at 87, 836.  Concluding that Congress intended 
Exemption 5 to incorporate the deliberative process privilege, the Court 
remanded the case for determination of whether the documents fell within the 
privilege.       

 
 
[¶16]  Since Mink, the question of whether particular 
records are exempt from public inspection on the basis of the deliberative 
process privilege incorporated within FOIA has been addressed by numerous 
federal circuit and district courts.  
See, for example, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of 
Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Grand Central P'ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 1999); K.L. v. 
Edgar, 964 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Ill 1997).  Among the reasons given for recognizing 
the privilege in the context of FOIA's Exemption 5 are that the privilege 
protects the flow of ideas within government agencies, allows candid discussion 
and free exploration of ideas and improves governmental decision-making by 
taking official deliberations out of a fishbowl.  Id.; Sun-Sentinel Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland 
Sec., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1258 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2006).  The United States Supreme Court 
reiterated the rationale for the privilege within the context of FOIA's 
Exemption 5 most recently in Dep't of the 
Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-9, 121 S. Ct. 1060, 1066, 149 L. Ed. 2d 87 (2001):

 
 
The 
deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials 
will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential 
item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance "the quality 
of agency decisions" by protecting open and frank discussion among those who 
make them within the Government.  

 
 
[¶17]  In recent years, some state courts have 
adopted the rationale of FOIA cases to support incorporating the deliberative 
process privilege within their state's public records laws.  See, e.g., Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. 
Univ. of Maryland, 854 A.2d 1220, 1227 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 
22 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. 2000); City of 
Colorado Springs,, 967 P.2d  at 1051; Capital Info. Group v. Office of the 
Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 33-34 (Alaska 1996); Gould v. New York City Police Dep't, 675 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 248-49 (Cal. 1991).  Other 
state courts have declined to recognize a deliberative process privilege within 
their state statutes.  State of Illinois ex rel. Birket v. City of 
Chicago, 705 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Ill. 1998), concluding that "in light of the 
range of competing policies underlying the deliberative process privilege, its 
adoption should be left to the General Assembly," and Sands v. Whitnall School Dist., 754 N.W.2d 439, 458 (Wis. 2008), declining to recognize the privilege because state 
statute requires common law privileges not originating in the constitution to be 
adopted by statute or court rule and state laws reflect a strong policy of 
transparency and access.

 
 
[¶18]  This Court has not addressed the issue 
of whether the deliberative process privilege is incorporated within the 
WPRA.  However, we have addressed 
the WPRA, and the policy behind it, in a number of cases.  In Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, 567 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 1977), this Court noted the similarities between 
FOIA and § 16-4-203(b)(v) and held that the policy behind the WPRA, like that 
behind FOIA, is one of disclosure, not secrecy, meaning the exemptions are to be 
narrowly construed.  Id. at 733.  The Court said:  "The legislature of this state has 
stressed the importance of making available to the public" agency records.  Id.  The Court stated further:  "With some necessary exceptions, 
recognized by Wyoming's records and meetings acts, state agencies must act in a 
fishbowl." Id. at 734.  See also, Allsop v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 
2002 WY 22, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d 1092, 1095-96 (Wyo. 2002), reiterating that the WPRA 
speaks to the philosophy of disclosure and, with some necessary exceptions, 
requires state agencies to act in a fishbowl.  

 
 
[¶19]  In Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of 
Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785 (Wyo. 1983), this Court emphasized that "the public's 
business" should be open to the public whenever possible and "[t]he courts, 
legislature, administrative agencies, and the state, county and municipal 
governments should be ever mindful that theirs is public business and the public 
has a right to know how its servants are conducting its business."  Id. at 791.  We cautioned that newspaper, television 
and radio are "the eyes and ears of the people" and the citizenry must have 
access to what public officers and employees are doing unless disclosure would 
cause legally recognized harm.  Id.  We cited the WPRA and the open meetings 
statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-11-101 to 9-11-107 (1977) renumbered as Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-401 through 16-4-408 (LexisNexis 2009), as examples of 
legislative intent to maintain an open and accountable government.  Sheridan Newspapers, 660 P.2d  at 
792.  We said statutes relating to 
public access to public records should be liberally construed and that any doubt 
should be resolved in favor of disclosure.  
Id. at 793.  Unless withholding public records is 
authorized by statute, we said:  

 
 
The 
language of the [WPRA] imposes a legislative presumption which says that, where 
public records are involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the public 
policy, the public interest and the competing interests of those involved.  

 
 

Id. 
at 796.

 
 
[¶20]  In Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050 
(Wyo. 1994), we reiterated our prior statements that the WPRA is intended to 
promote disclosure, not secrecy.  
Quoting Norman J. Singer, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
60.01 (5th ed. 1992), we concluded legislation requiring disclosure 
of information is considered remedial, and

 
 
[r]emedial 
statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the 
remedy.  The policy that a remedial 
statute should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the remedial 
purpose for which it was enacted is firmly established.

 
 

Id. 
at 1052.  We 
said:

 
 
[A]n 
open and accountable government is particularly important with respect to the 
expenditure of public funds.  
Members of the public have a legitimate interest in the operation of the 
county hospital and in the amount the community is spending to attract health 
care providers.  

 
 

Id. 
at 1056.  And: 

 
 
Given 
the overriding public interest in the full disclosure of information of 
expenditure of public finds, any legislative restriction on the disclosure of 
such public information must be expressly textual.

Id.

 
 
[¶21]  Citing these cases, the Newspaper 
asserts recognition of the deliberative process privilege within the WPRA would 
be contrary to Wyoming's longstanding policy in favor of open and accessible 
government.  The Newspaper contends 
there is no language in the WPRA incorporating the privilege and for this Court 
to conclude otherwise would require reading words into the Act.  The Newspaper further contends the 
deliberative process privilege is largely a creation of federal case law 
interpreting FOIA, which although persuasive in some instances, is not binding 
on this Court when considering Wyoming law.  While conceding that language in the 
federal law is nearly identical to language contained in the WPRA, the Newspaper 
asserts there are two important differences weighing heavily against recognition 
of the privilege in the WPRA context.    First, § 16-4-203(b) 
requires the custodian of the public record to weigh the public interest in 
withholding the record against the state's policy of open government while FOIA 
contains no similar requirement.  
Second, while FOIA's legislative history indicates Congress expressly 
anticipated that some sort of governmental privilege would apply through 
Exemption 5, there is no indication the Wyoming Legislature considered the 
deliberative process privilege when it adopted the WPRA.  In fact, the Newspaper points out, when 
the legislature enacted the WPRA in 1969, Mink had not yet been decided and Kaiser, a pre-FOIA decision, was one of 
only a few cases recognizing a privilege applicable to governmental decision 
making.  The Newspaper also urges 
this Court to consider the reasoning of other states which have refused to adopt 
the "deliberative process" privilege because it is "detrimental to the search 
for truth central to our adversary process."  Sands, 754 N.W.2d  at 458.  In the event we recognize the privilege, 
the Newspaper insists this Court narrowly tailor it to the specific purposes of 
§ 16-4-203(b)(v).  

 
 
[¶22]  The State contends the district court 
correctly concluded the WPRA encompasses the deliberative process privilege, 
thereby allowing government officials to withhold documents that would not be 
available to a private party in litigation with the agency.  The State directs our attention to 
federal and other state court decisions interpreting virtually identical 
statutory language that have recognized the privilege.  The State correctly points out that 
federal and state case law is saturated with explanations of how the 
deliberative process privilege encourages frank and honest communication.  The State asserts the same compelling 
state interests leading to recognition of the deliberative process privilege in 
other states are present in Wyoming rendering the district court's holding 
appropriate and correct.  The State 
notes this Court has stated that parallel language between a Wyoming statute and 
federal statute makes it appropriate to examine persuasive authority, 
particularly federal cases.  Sublette County Rural Health Care Dist. v. 
Miley, 942 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Wyo. 1997). 

 
 
[¶23]  The issue the parties ask this Court to 
decide is an important and complex one.  
Reflecting the importance of public access to information, we have quoted 
the writings of two of this Country's founders, Thomas Jefferson: 

 
 
The 
people are the only censors of their governors; . . . give [the people] full 
information of their affairs through the channel of the public papers, and to 
contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people; [W]ere 
it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, 
or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the 
latter. 

 
 
And 
James Madison:

 

A 
Popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it is 
but a Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both.  Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 
and the people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the 
power which knowledge gives.    

 
 

Houghton, 
870 P.2d  at 1057.  Other writers 
have addressed the importance of evidentiary privileges.  In his two-volume, 2000 plus page 
treatise, Imwinkelried begins by stating: 

 
 
[P]rivilege 
law is arguably the most important doctrinal area in the law of evidence. . . . 
[It] concerns "extrinsic social policy."  
From society's perspective, "the rules governing privileges" can be 
"justifiably viewed as the most important" evidentiary doctrines.  

 
 
Imwinkelried, 
supra, at 3.    

 
 
[¶24]  The complexities involved in determining 
whether the WPRA incorporates the deliberative process privilege are apparent 
from the foregoing discussion of its development.  From the plain language of the WPRA, it 
is clear the legislature intended public records to be open for inspection by 
any person unless exempted from public inspection by the WPRA or other law.  There is no language in the WPRA 
expressly stating that documents may be withheld from the public on the basis of 
the deliberative process privilege.  
We are not aware of, and the State does not cite, any other Wyoming 
statute or court rule incorporating the privilege.  

 
 
[¶25]  Like the federal courts' interpretation 
of FOIA Exemption 5, the State argues the basis for the privilege is found in § 
16-4-203(b)(v), which exempts from disclosure if contrary to the public interest 
"interagency or intraagency memoranda or letters which would not be available by 
law to a private party in litigation with the agency."  The WPRA contains no provision 
explaining what the legislature meant by documents "which would not be available 
by law to a private party in litigation with the agency."  Pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure, however: 

 
 
            
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is 
relevant to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim 
or defense of any party.    

(Emphasis 
added).  If § 16-4-203(b)(v) is read 
in conjunction with W.R.C.P. 26(b), it would appear that privileged inter- and intra-agency 
memoranda are exempt from disclosure under the WPRA.  By statute, Wyoming recognizes six 
privileges, including attorney-client, physician-patient, priest- or 
clergyman-confessor and husband and wife.5  There is no reference in the statute to 
a deliberative process privilege applicable to inter-agency or intra-agency 
communications.  

 
 
[¶26]  The State contends the deliberative 
process privilege is incorporated into § 16-4-203(b)(v) by virtue of the English 
common law which the legislature adopted in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 
(LexisNexis 2009).6  The Wyoming judiciary likewise has 
adopted the common law with respect to privileges by way of WRE 501.7  The State further asserts this Court has 
the authority to determine "what the common law is."  See Briefing.com v. Jones, 2006 WY 16, 
¶¶ 12-14, 126 P.3d 928, 935-36 (Wyo. 2006); Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 
416, 182 P.2d 801, 806 (1947).    

 
 
[¶27]  In a line of cases spanning sixty years 
this Court has stressed that it will recognize the common law as modified by 
judicial decisions, accepting the interpretation that best fits the time and 
this jurisidiction.  Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint 
Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Wyo. 1990), citing In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677, 681 (1940).  We have 
expressed a reluctance to recognize, or continue recognition 
of, a common law rule that had its genesis in a social, 
economic and political climate entirely foreign to Wyoming in current times. 
 Id.  Thus, when deciding whether to accept a 
particular common law rule, we evaluate whether developments in the law are 
consistent with our policies and precedent.  Id. at 1173.

 
 
[¶28]  The State asserts the deliberative 
process privilege existed in 1607 English common law as a derivative of the 
"crown privilege;" therefore, the legislature necessarily adopted the 
deliberative process privilege when it adopted the common law. We disagree.  Any "crown privilege" had its genesis in 
a social, economic and political climate entirely foreign to Wyoming in 
2010.  Moreover, as the State 
concedes, there was no statute or common law principle in 1607 granting a right 
to inspect the king's records.  

 
 
[¶29]  The State contends, irrespective of 
English common law, the deliberative process privilege is part of this Country's 
common law by virtue of Kaiser and 
its progeny.  Because the 
legislature and this Court have adopted the common law, the State asserts, we 
must construe § 16-4-203(b)(v) together with the common law as recognized in Kaiser, meaning agency records are 
exempt if they are pre-decisional and deliberative and would not be available by 
law to a private party in litigation.  
The State cites to other federal and state court decisions that have 
taken this approach.

 
 
[¶30]  The Newspaper argues the rationale other 
courts have given for recognizing the deliberative process privilege in the 
context of public records has been rejected by this Court as contrary to 
Wyoming's policy of open government.  
In addition to this Court's interpretations of the WPRA, the Newspaper 
cites the legislature's amendment to the Public Meetings Act.  The Newspaper argues the legislature 
affirmed its position that open government is better government when it amended 
the definition of "meeting" in § 16-4-402(a)(iii), to include "discussion, deliberation [and] presentation of 
information."  1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
207-08 (emphasis added).  With the 
amendment, meetings previously closed to the public because they were 
deliberative and did not involve final action such as a vote, came within the 
definition of meetings that must be open to the public.  The Newspaper cites this Court's recent 
statement that this legislative change clearly indicates the intent to ensure 
agency deliberations occur during a public meeting.  Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bldg. Code Bd. 
of Appeals, 2010 WY 2, ¶ 16, 222 P.3d 158, 164 (Wyo. 2010). 

 
 
[¶31]  As the foregoing discussion reflects, 
deciding whether or not the WPRA incorporates the deliberative process privilege 
requires consideration of Wyoming statutory law and legislative intent, this 
Court's previous pronouncements concerning the WPRA, the common law, federal law 
interpreting FOIA and the degree to which the latter sources should influence 
our interpretation of state law.  
Given our conclusion, discussed in the next section, that the documents 
at issue in this case would not fall within the privilege in any event, we 
decline to decide whether the WPRA incorporates the privilege.  A decision by this Court today that the 
WPRA would, in the appropriate case, incorporate the deliberative process 
privilege would have no effect on these litigants in this case and would be 
merely advisory.  See, e.g., Voss v. Goodman, 2009 WY 40, 
¶ 5-7, 203 P.3d 415, 418 (Wyo. 2009) (stating courts cannot issue advisory 
opinions or adjudicate hypothetical questions).  Moreover, it is axiomatic that in 
applying any evidentiary privilege, a court must consider the nature of the 
particular documents in the context of the litigation and assure the protection 
provided is as limited as it can be.  This is especially true with regard to 
this privilege in light of the potential for its abuse by agencies and the clear 
legislative preference for making governmental records public.  A case in which the documents at issue 
are not the kind of confidential intra-agency opinions protected by the 
privilege and, therefore, must be released for public inspection does not 
provide the appropriate circumstance for this Court to establish the parameters 
of the privilege in the event we were inclined to recognize it under Wyoming 
law.  

 
 
[¶32]  To quote Imwinkelried, supra, at 3-4:

 
 
            
It is no secret that in selecting cases to decide, the [United States] 
Supreme Court tends to choose cases that potentially have a significant social 
impact.  Since World War II, 
privilege cases have had a prominent place on the Court's docket.  For example, privilege rulings have 
figured in many of the major constitutional confrontations between branches of 
government, including Watergate during the Nixon Administration, Iran-Contra 
during the G.H.W. Bush Administration, the battle between President Clinton and 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, and the efforts to obtain the records of Vice 
President Cheney's National Energy Policy Development Group during the G.W. Bush 
Administration.  It should come as 
no surprise then that since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
1975, the Supreme Court has handed down more decisions relating to privilege law 
than concerning any other part of the Federal Rules. 

 
 
Given 
the importance of privilege law, and this State's clear legislative policy 
favoring open and accessible government, we will wait to decide whether the WPRA 
incorporates the deliberative process privilege when we are presented with a 
case in which it is shown that the records sought to be disclosed would fall 
within the privilege.  In the 
meantime, if the legislature wishes to expressly incorporate the deliberative 
process privilege in the WPRA, we presume it will act to do 
so.

 
 

2.    
 Scope of the Deliberative Process 
Privilege

[¶33]  Among jurisdictions that recognize the 
deliberative process privilege, its scope is limited generally to communications 
between executive officials that are both pre-decisional and deliberative.  Mapother v. Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  It 
extends to any executive branch employee participating in a particular policy 
decision; the communication must be intra-governmental, but can be either 
inter-agency or intra-agency; and the official may be elected or appointed.  Imwinkelried, supra, at 1345.  The privilege protects only 
pre-decisional materials, not final decisions.  Id.  at 1346.  

 
 
[¶34]  For the privilege to apply, "the 
document must be generated while the government agency is engaged in a 
legitimate deliberative process."  
Id. at 1350.  As stated in Kaiser, 157 F. Supp.  at 947, application 
of the privilege is limited to "intra-agency advisory opinions" and does not 
apply to "primary facts upon which conclusions are based."  A document is privileged if its 
disclosure would "lay bare the discussion and methods of reasoning of public 
officials" and withholding it is necessary to "protect free discussion of 
prospective operations and policy."  Id.  As summarized by Imwinkelried, supra, at 1350-54, the deliberative 
process privilege protects only material reflecting

 
 
integral 
parts of the decision-making process  suggestions, advisory opinions, 
recommendations, projections, proposals, and deliberations. The material must 
reflect "personal opinions" and "ruminations about how to exercise discretion on 
some policy matter."  To be 
protected, the material must document the interactive "give-and-take of the 
consultative process."  . . . 
.

            
. . . .

[A]s 
a general proposition, the deliberative process privilege does not protect 
"purely" factual information  [unless] the factual data is so inextricably 
intertwined with the deliberative portions of the report that the two sections 
cannot be feasibly severed.

  

[¶35] 
The task of determining whether a particular document falls within the 
deliberative process privilege because it contains advisory opinions, 
deliberations or the exercise of discretion on some policy, or is instead 
outside the scope of the privilege because it contains purely factual 
information, can be difficult.  Trentadue v. Integrity Committee, 501 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007).  Determining whether the privilege 
applies is dependent upon the particular document and its role in the 
administrative process.  Id., citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of 
Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir 1980).  In Mink, 410 U.S.  at 87-88, 93 S. Ct.  at 
836-37, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between factual information and 
deliberative materials as follows:  

 
 
[T]he 
privilege that has been held to attach to intragovernmental memoranda clearly 
has finite limits, even in civil litigation.  In each case, the question was whether 
production of the contested document would be "injurious to the consultative 
functions of government that the privilege of nondisclosure protects."  Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., supra, at 946.  Thus, in the absence of a claim that 
disclosure would jeopardize state secrets, (citation omitted) memoranda 
consisting only of compiled factual material or purely factual material 
contained in deliberative memoranda and severable from its context would 
generally be available for discovery by private parties in litigation with the 
Government.  

 
 
[¶36] 
Since Mink, courts have reached 
varying results when applying the factual/deliberative distinction.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, has 
exempted even factual materials from disclosure when they reveal the mental 
processes of decision-makers.  National Wildlife Federation v. 
U.S.F.S., 861 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 
1988).   In Trentadue, 501 F.3d  at 1228, however, 
the Tenth Circuit said:

 
 
Information 
is not protected simply because disclosure would reveal some minor or obvious 
detail of an agency's decision making process.  Were that the test, Exemption 5 would 
swallow FOIA entirely.  It is 
difficult to imagine a document that would not divulge some tidbit regarding an 
agency's deliberative process.  
Moreover, the  overly broad reading is contrary to our duty to construe 
FOIA's exemptions narrowly.

Consistent 
with our sister circuits, we hold that factual information may be protected 
under Exemption 5 under certain narrow circumstances:  when disclosure would so expose the 
deliberative process within an agency that it must be deemed 
exempted.

  

[¶37]  In the present case, the district court 
reviewed the documents and stated:

 
 
It 
is the view of the Court that the documents at issue simply are not of the sort 
to which the [privilege] applies.  
[The State's] own cited standards include a requirement that the material 
be actually related to deliberation or policy-making as opposed to factual or 
informational.  The plan or proposal 
of the Department of Health does not fit that description.  The documents amount to spreadsheets 
showing for the various programs and activities presently authorized amounts of 
money, the amounts as reduced by 5% and 10%, funding source for the various 
programs, and finally, under a column labeled "Impact" the agency's statement, 
in general terms, of what would be the result for the program or activity if the 
amount allocated were to be diminished.  
Not surprisingly, it says that certain services offered by the Department 
would be reduced.  It suggests no 
adverse consequences for others.

            
It appears that restrictions in the amount of some services if the funds 
allocated for them are reduced would be almost a foregone conclusion.  That is, there appears to be little by 
way of personal opinion or advice offered by the agency head individually.  Indeed, the materials do not identify an 
individual writer.

            
The material appears not to be predominantly opinions about policy-making 
by way of recommendations for prioritization.  While it indicates curtailments of some 
programs or services if the funding for them is reduced, it does not weigh, or 
evaluate the relative merits of reducing one service at the expense of another, 
for example.  It appears not to be 
the sort of close, personal opinion advice contemplated by cases that apply the 
privilege.   

 
 
[¶38]  Having considered the documents the 
State submitted for in camera review we agree that the plans essentially provide 
factual information rather than advisory opinions or deliberative thought 
processes.  The spread sheets show 
dollar amounts, recommended cuts and the potential impact of those cuts.  They do not contain personal opinion or 
advice nor do they reveal information about how the agency decided which program 
budgets should be cut. We conclude "disclosure would [not] so expose the 
deliberative process within an agency'" that the records must be withheld from 
public inspection.  Trentadue, 501 F.3d  at 1228.  Borrowing language from Kaiser, 157 F. Supp.  at 947, we conclude 
disclosure would not "lay bare the discussion and methods of reasoning of public 
officials" and withholding the documents is not necessary to "protect free 
discussion of prospective operations and policy."   Even under the broadest interpretation, 
the plans do not fall within the deliberative process privilege.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶39]  We affirm the district court's ruling 
that the budget reduction plans the State withheld must be released to the 
Newspaper.  The plans contain 
factual information, rather than opinions, deliberations or thought processes 
and are not, therefore, the sort of documents protected by the deliberative 
process privilege.  This case does 
not present the appropriate occasion to decide whether the deliberative process 
privilege is incorporated into § 16-4-203(b)(v) of the WPRA.  Therefore, we decline to decide that 
issue.  To the extent that the 
district court held the WPRA incorporates the privilege, we 
reverse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In addition to the Governor, Mr. Lewis and Dr. Sherard are the custodians 
of records pertaining to the budget reduction 
recommendations.

 
 

2After accepting DFS's plan in its entirety, the Governor provided it to 
the Newspaper; therefore, the parties stipulated to dismissing Mr. Lewis as a 
defendant. 

 
 

3The 
existence of a presidential privilege was suggested in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) where in dictum the Court indicated the attorney general would not be 
required to answer questions concerning confidential communications with the 
President.  However, the existence 
of the presidential 
privilege was not settled until United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974), in 
which the Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash a subpoena directing 
the President to produce tape recordings of his conversations with his 
advisors.  The Court held the 
President did not have an absolute, unqualified privilege of immunity from 
judicial process.  Rather, the 
general privilege of confidentiality must yield upon a showing of specific need 
for evidence in a pending criminal case.  

 
 

4As 
some legal authorities have noted, this characterization may not be entirely 
accurate.    See, for example, 26A Charles Alan 
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure:  Evidence § 5680 (1992), stating 
there was little authority for any privilege for communications between 
government officials forty years ago; there were only a handful of cases 
recognizing the deliberative process privilege when the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were adopted in 1975; federal courts developed the privilege only in 
the last two decades; and the privilege began spreading to states only recently. 

 
 

5§ 
1-12-101.  Privileged communications 
and acts. 

(a) 
The following persons shall not testify in certain 
respects:

(i) 
An attorney or a physician concerning a communication made to him by his client 
or patient in that relation, or his advice to his client or patient. The 
attorney or physician may 
testify 
by express 
consent 
of the client or patient, and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies the 
attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same 
subject;

(ii) 
A clergyman or priest concerning a confession made to him in his professional 
character if enjoined by the church to which he belongs;

            
(iii) Husband or wife, except as provided in W.S. 
1-12-104;

(iv) 
A person who assigns his claim or interest concerning any matter in respect to 
which he would not be permitted to testify if a party;

(v) 
A person who, if a party, would be restricted in his evidence under W.S. 
1-12-102 shall, where the property is sold or transferred by an executor, 
administrator, guardian, trustee, heir, devisee or legatee, be restricted in the 
same manner in any action or proceeding concerning the 
property;

(vi) 
A confidential intermediary, as defined in W.S. 1-22-201(a)(viii), concerning 
communications made to him or information obtained by him during the course of 
an investigation pursuant to W.S. 1-22-203, when the public interests, in the 
judgment of the court, would suffer by the disclosure.

 
 

6§ 
8-1-101.  Adoption of common 
law.

 
 
            
The common law of England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as 
the same is of a general nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or 
remedial acts or statutes made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common 
law prior to the fourth year of James the First  and which are of a general 
nature and not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not 
inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until 
repealed by legislative authority.

 
 

7Rule 
501.  General 
rule.

 
 
            
Except as otherwise required by constitution or statute or by these or 
other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the privilege of a 
witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the 
courts of the State of Wyoming in the light of reason and 
experience.