Title: Castle v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Castle v. State1992 WY 155842 P.2d 1060Case Number: 91-233Decided: 11/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Richard Lee CASTLE, 
Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

 
 
Robert B. Brodie of Goody & Brodie, 
Jackson, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. 
Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary Beth 
Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Prosecution Assistance Program: Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director; Lynda A. Limon, Student Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 
 

GOLDEN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Richard Lee Castle, the appellant, pleaded guilty to an amended 
three-count information charging him with felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, 
and first degree sexual assault. The district court sentenced him to a life 
sentence on the felony murder, a life sentence on the aggravated kidnapping, and 
a term of forty-five to fifty years on the sexual assault, the sentences to be 
served consecutively. On appeal, Castle asserts that because these consecutive 
sentences prevent him from re-entering society, his reformation and 
rehabilitation cannot possibly occur. Therefore, he reasons, these sentences 
violate Article 1, Section 15 of the Wyoming Constitution, which reads: "The 
penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and 
prevention." As a proposed remedy for this alleged constitutional violation, 
Castle asks this court to modify his sentence so "that one or more of the 
sentences would run concurrently."

 
 

[¶2.]     Although we hold that 
the consecutive sentences imposed on Castle for the heinous crimes he committed 
do not violate Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 15, as he asserts, our recent decisions in 
Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1992), and Peterson v. State, 841 P.2d 1345 
(Wyo. 1992), overruling Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 
496 U.S. 940, 110 S. Ct. 3224, 110 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1990), compel this court to 
vacate the sentence of forty-five to fifty years on the sexual assault 
conviction, since that felony was the underlying felony for the purposes of the 
felony murder conviction.

 
 

[¶3.]     The district court's 
imposition of the three consecutive sentences grew out of Castle's kidnapping of 
a five-year-old child from her home in Sheridan County, Wyoming, on the night of October 5 and early 
morning of October 6, 1990. At a location about three miles north of town, near 
Goose Creek, 
Castle committed a brutal sexual assault upon the victim. During this criminal 
episode, the victim was killed. Authorities listed drowning as the cause of her 
death.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶4.]     Article 1, Section 15 
of The Wyoming Constitution reads:

 
 
     The penal code shall 
be framed on the humane principles of reformation and 
prevention.

 
 

[¶5.]     In Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 930 (Wyo. 1984), this court observed that this constitutional 
provision "speaks to the penal code, not to sentencing, and we are unable to 
detect any intent on the part of the Constitutional Convention to so limit the 
discretion of sentencing judges in criminal cases." In that case, defense 
appellate counsel had asserted that the only factors which a sentencing court 
may consider in the imposition of a sentence are prevention and rehabilitation. 
Id. Rejecting that assertion, we reaffirmed the rule that a sentence within the 
statutory limits will not be disturbed upon appeal absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Id.

 
 

[¶6.]     Castle has not provided 
us with any evidence showing an intent on the part of the framers of our state 
constitution to limit the discretion of sentencing judges in criminal cases. He 
has not referred us to any decision of this court that holds a criminal 
sentence, which does not provide for the convicted person's return to society, 
as violative of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 15 of the State Charter. He has not shown 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing judge in his imposition of 
the three sentences in question.

 
 

[¶7.]     We agree with the 
state's observation that Castle's argument, if accepted, would have an effect 
farther reaching than making one or more of his sentences run concurrently. Were 
we to hold that a criminal sentence which prevents a convicted person from ever 
re-entering society violates Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 15, then the invalidity of 
the present sentencing system authorizing a "total life sentence" would 
ineluctably follow. "In Wyoming, there is no parole from a sentence 
for life. * * * Possibilities of commutation are matters within the 
constitutional prerogative of the executive department [Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 
5], and do not concern the court." Kennedy v. State, 595 P.2d 577, 578 
(Wyo. 1979) 
(citations omitted). Castle has articulated no convincing reason that would move 
us to declare the invalidity of the present sentencing 
system.

 
 

[¶8.]     As the state points 
out, this court effectively answered the question raised here by Castle when it 
held that the death penalty provisions do not violate Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 15. 
Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 64 (Wyo. 
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246. If the death penalty, which results in the ultimate irrevocable separation 
from society, is seen "as framed on the human principles of reformation and 
prevention," then a life sentence without possibility of return to society 
passes muster as well. Id.

 
 

[¶9.]     The above and foregoing 
discussion notwithstanding, our recent decisions in Cook and Peterson, 
overruling Birr, dictate that we strike the sentence of forty-five to fifty 
years on Castle's sexual assault conviction. Since the sexual assault felony was 
the underlying felony for the felony murder conviction, Cook and Peterson 
require that only the felony murder sentence of life imprisonment be 
imposed.

 
 

[¶10.]  
In concluding, we feel compelled to underscore the bottom line in this 
decision. We recognize that the legislature created the felony murder statute to 
elevate a killing that results during the commission of a felony to the 
equivalent of murder in the first degree for penalty considerations. In doing 
so, the underlying felony must be acknowledged through a finding of guilt and 
conviction of the offense. In this case, without a finding of guilt and 
conviction of the heinous sexual assault of the victim, Castle's felony murder 
conviction would not stand. We interpret this to mean that the legislature did 
not intend for the underlying felony to be swept away or ignored; much to the 
contrary, it is an essential element to the successful conviction of felony 
murder. With the state's establishment of the underlying felony and the 
subsequent murder in the course of its commission, the perpetrator is then 
eligible for the severest penalties this state may impose: a sentence of death 
or life imprisonment without parole. This is and remains the bottom line; it 
does not change as a result of the lack of sentence on the underlying felony. 
The fact remains that the appellant has but one life to give, whether in 
imprisonment or execution. The absence of a sentence on the underlying felony 
does not and will not ever change this granite-hard 
certainty.

 
 

[¶11.]  
We find that the legislature has given great significance to the crime of 
sexual assault in that it may invoke a felony murder charge. The seriousness of 
this underlying felony is understood when the penalty for felony murder is 
realized. As a result, we herewith modify Castle's punishment of two life 
sentences and a term of forty-five to fifty years, consecutive, to punishment of 
two life sentences, consecutive.

 
 

[¶12.]  
Affirmed as modified.

 
 

MACY, C.J., filed an opinion, concurring in 
part and specially concurring in part.

 
 

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

MACY, Chief Justice, concurring in part and 
specially concurring in part.

 
 

[¶13.]  
I fully concur in that portion of the opinion which holds that 
consecutive sentencing does not violate Article 1, Section 15 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 

[¶14.]  
Acknowledging that Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987), habeas 
corpus denied, 894 F.2d 1160, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 940, 110 S. Ct. 3224, 110 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1990), has been overruled by Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 
1992), I specially concur in that portion of this opinion which strikes the 
appellant's sentence for committing the underlying sexual assault felony because 
that is the present status of the law in Wyoming. I do, however, continue to 
believe that the Wyoming Legislature's intent is that criminals convicted of 
both felony murder and the underlying felony be sentenced for both crimes. See 
my dissenting opinion in Cook.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶15.]  
We have found Cassandra.1 The majority has concluded that it 
must invoke the rule in Cook v. State, Peterson v. State, 841 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 
1992), to set aside Castle's sentence for sexual assault, even though Castle did 
not seek or argue for such a result. I must dissent consistently with my 
position in Cook. There is even less justification in this case for the setting 
aside of the sentence for the predicate felony than there was in 
Cook.

 
 

[¶16.]  
Like Cook and Peterson, Castle entered his pleas of guilty pursuant to a 
plea bargain, by virtue of which he avoided the possibility of a capital 
sentence. Our rule is that a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional 
defects. Duffy v. State, 837 P.2d 1047 (Wyo. 
1992); Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 1992), and cases cited. Again, like Cook 
and Peterson, Castle fails to demonstrate any jurisdictional defect. Castle 
chose to premise his appeal upon a violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 15. Castle 
says in his Brief for Appellant at 3:

 
 
The desired result, should the 
appellant prevail, would be to have his sentence corrected such that one or more 
of the sentences would run concurrently. Appellant does not challenge the validity 
of his guilty pleas or wish to have them overturned.

 
 
The majority has rejected the claim 
asserted by Castle, but it has, of its own motion, invoked the Cook proposition 
to strike the sentence on the sexual assault conviction, without the benefit of 
briefing or argument by either side. Castle has received far more than he 
requested.

 
 

[¶17.]  
Recent newspaper headlines proclaimed the fact that the 
United 
States is the most prone to violence of all of 
the industrialized nations. A failure to punish appropriately each and every act 
of criminal conduct does little to address this serious social problem. Even 
though imposition of separate punishments is of no help to a murdered child, the 
enforcement of all the penalties, or the failure to enforce them, does manifest 
the attitude of our society toward violent criminal 
conduct.

 
 

[¶18.]  
There is no need to reiterate here all of the concerns I expressed in my 
dissenting opinion in Cook. Perhaps it suffices to note that the denigration of 
the value of a young life may be more profound. Certainly, there is little value 
attached by this decision to the right of a little girl not to be cruelly 
assaulted and have the most delicate aspects of her physical integrity carefully 
protected by our rules of law. Like the robbery in Cook, the sexual assault in 
this case served simply as a predicate for invoking the first degree murder 
statute. The sexual assault did not become a lesser included offense of first 
degree murder, and I have no question that the legislature intended to punish 
the crimes separately.

 
 

[¶19.]  
I would affirm the trial court's judgment and sentence without cavilling 
about any double punishment. Castle got a good deal in his plea bargain, and the 
law should require that he abide by it.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 See Cook v. State, 
Peterson v. State, 841 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1992) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).