Title: MVA v. Lytle

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, No. 68, September Term, 2002.
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION – TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE – SECTION
16-205.1 – SUSPENSION OF LICENSE FOR EXCEEDING PERMISSIBLE
STATUTORY BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT – ADMINISTRATIVE PER SE
STANDARD – MARGIN OF ERROR – DUE PROCESS.
Maryland Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), Transportation Article, § 16-
205.1 is an administrative per se statute that mandated sanctions be imposed on the basis of
a certified and unrebutted 0.10 test result from a chemical breath test for alcohol.  The
certified test result alone was prima facie evidence of the tested person’s blood alcohol
concentration at the time of testing.  The absence of a requirement that the plus or minus
0.01 margin of error inherent in breath test instruments be applied in favor of the tested
person does not violate the tested person’s due process rights.
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Case # C-2001-73775
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 68
September Term, 2002
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
V.
MICHAEL PATRICK LYTLE
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
   (retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   April 8, 2003
I.
Respondent in this case, Michael Patrick Lytle, was arrested for Driving While
Intoxicated (DWI) and administered a breathalyzer test.  The relevant statutory provisions
establish a rebuttable presumption that the test results generated by certain breath test
instruments administered by trained test technicians are accurate.  That presumption may be
rebutted at an administrative evidentiary hearing by a showing that the specific instrument
used to measure the subject’s breath was malfunctioning at the time of testing or that human
error caused the test to generate an inaccurate result.  Respondent offered no evidence or
arguments on either score before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Maryland
Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”).  Instead, he claimed generally that the type of
machine used, the Intox EC/IR, had a plus or minus 0.01 range of accuracy and that that
margin of error must be applied to his case, yielding a blood alcohol content (“BAC”)
measurement below the then prevailing 0.10 benchmark for DWI.  The specific issue before
us is whether a general “margin of error” of the “accepted scientific range of accuracy” of
the type of test instrument used must be applied to certified test results produced by a
specific Intox EC/IR machine in a prima facie case of violating Maryland Code, Title 16,
§ 16-205.1(f)(8)(i)(4)(B).
A.
1 All references to the Maryland Code are to the 1999 Replacement Volume of the
Transportation Article and the 2000 Supplement unless otherwise indicated.  The statute at
issue was amended in 2001 to substitute “0.08" for “0.10.”  Chapters 4 and 5, Acts 2001,
effective 30 September 2001.  Otherwise, the statute remains substantively the same.
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The Transportation Article of the Maryland Code, Title 16 (Vehicle Laws – Driver’s
Licenses), Subtitle 2 (Cancellation, Refusal, Suspension, or Revocation), §§ 16-201 - 213
(1977, 1999 Repl. Vol. and 2000 Supp.),1 § 16-205.1(b)(2) provides that 
. . . if a police officer stops or detains any person who the police
officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving
or attempting to drive under the influence of alcohol . . . the
police officer shall: (i) Detain the person; (ii) Request that the
person permit a test to be taken; and (iii) Advise the person of
the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to
take the test, . . . .    
The type of testing authorized under § 16-205.1 is a test of breath or, under limited
exceptions, a blood test to determine alcohol concentration.  § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iv).  When the
test is administered, the toxicologist’s reporting protocol is to reduce the readings of the test
instrument to a reported result.  The “test result” is generated when the operator takes the
lowest of two or three readings and records the lowest result after it is rounded down to the
second decimal place.  Regulations of the State Toxicologist, Amendment 1, Section C(5)
(1999).  When a test results in a BAC of 0.10 or more at the time of testing, the police
officer administering the test “shall . . . personally serve an order of suspension on the
person.”  § 16-205.1(b)(3)(ii).  The police officer then must send a sworn statement to the
Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) within seventy-two hours stating that the person
2 Regulations of the Toxicologist, Post Mortem Examiners Commission, State of
Maryland, Regarding Tests of Breath and Blood for Alcohol adopted October 1, 1995, as
amended October 1, 1999.  The Regulations were issued in 1983 and were reissued in 1990,
1995, and 2001 with amendments.  The Regulations are appended to the Maryland DWI
manual prepared by the Maryland State Police.  We have appended the regulations to our
opinion.
The Toxicologist’s Regulations are significant by virtue of § 16-205.1(a)(2) which
provides “[a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway . . . is
(continued...)
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submitted to the test and that the test indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at
the time of testing.  § 16-205.1(b)(3)(vii)(2).  Under the statute, the sworn statement of the
test technician or analyst is prima facie evidence of a test result of 0.10 or more.  § 16-
205.1(f)(7)(ii).  The Intox EC/IR test machine is a “reliable indicator of the alcohol
concentration of a person,” pursuant to the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”)
11.11.03.08B(6).
The Transportation Article authorizes tests “subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302
through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.”  § 16-
205.1(f)(8)(i)(4)(B).  Sections 10-304(a)(3) and (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article of the Maryland Code require tests to be administered with “equipment approved by
the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission” and by a “qualified person”
who “has received training in the use of the equipment in a training program approved by
the toxicologist.”  The protocols for testing procedures and the equipment approved by the
toxicologist are contained in the Regulations of the Toxicologist (“Toxicologist’s
Regulations”).2  The accuracy of the breath test instruments is monitored both through
2(...continued)
deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309 inclusive,
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained
on suspicion of driving . . . while intoxicated.”  Sections 10-304(a)(3) and (b) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article require tests to be administered with “equipment approved
by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission,” and by a “qualified
person” who “has received training in the use of the equipment in a training program
approved by the toxicologist.”
3 A temporary license is issued allowing the person to continue driving for forty-five
days after the order of suspension is issued.  If a hearing is requested at the time the order
is issued or within ten days of issuance then a hearing is scheduled within forty-five days.
The person is allowed to request a hearing within thirty days of issuance of the order but in
that instance the forty-five day temporary license will not be renewed or extended to account
for the pending hearing.  See § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v)(1) and (2).
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diagnostic maintenance performed at least monthly on the Intox EC/IR test machine and
through an internal standard test that is run before and after the administration of each test.
Toxicologist’s Regulations, Sections IIE, IIIC(3), Amendment 1, Section C(3).  The monthly
diagnostic test is conducted using a test solution that is 0.10% alcohol content.  The results
of the test must be between 0.095% and 0.105% or the test instruments must be removed
from use until they are repaired to meet the required tolerance.   Toxicologist’s Regulations,
Section IIA(7).  The test instrument itself runs an internal standard test, generating an “STD”
reading, at the beginning and end of each test.  A valid test yields an STD reading between
0.090 and 0.110 pursuant to the regulations.  Toxicologist’s Regulations, Amendment 1,
Section C(3).  
The person subject to detention may request an administrative hearing at the time his
license is suspended or within a specified period thereafter.  § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v).3  If the
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person does not request an administrative hearing, then a sanction is imposed on the forty-
sixth day after issuance of the order of suspension.  A test result indicating an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing requires imposition of a forty-five or
ninety day suspension of the driver’s license, depending on the number of prior offenses.
§ 16-205.1(b)(1)(i) and (ii).  If there is an administrative hearing, the issues to be adjudicated
are circumscribed by § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i):
1.  Whether the police officer who stops or detains a
person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was
driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the
influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any
drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle
safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous
substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation
of § 16-813 of this title;
2.  Whether there was evidence of the use by the person
of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination
of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous
substance;
3.  Whether the police officer requested a test after the
person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that
shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses
to take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspension or
issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(1) and (2)
of this section;
4.  Whether the person refused to take the test;
5.  Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a
motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more at the time of testing; or 
6.  If the hearing involves disqualification of a
commercial driver’s license, whether the person was operating
a commercial motor vehicle.
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(Emphasis added.)  The sworn statement of the test technician is prima facie evidence of a
test result of 0.10 BAC or more.  The person contesting the test instrument reading may
submit evidence that the test instrument used to measure his or her breath was
“malfunctioning at the time of testing, or that human error caused the test to be inaccurate.”
COMAR 11.11.03.08B(7).  The Code of Maryland Regulations, 11.11.03.08B(5)-
(7)(Hearings, Evidence), promulgated pursuant to § 12-104(b), provided in relevant part:
(5) For the purpose of determining the accuracy of the
test result indicating the alcohol concentration of the licensee,
the following breath testing instruments shall be deemed
reliable indicators of the alcohol concentration of a person:
(a) Breathalyzer Model 900;
(b) Breathalyzer Model 900A;
(c) Intoximeter 3000; and
(d) Intox EC/IR.
(6) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the test
result of a test of blood or breath indicating the alcohol
concentration of the licensee is accurate.
(7) The reliability of breath testing instruments approved
in § B(5) of this regulation and the presumption established in
§ B(6) of this regulation may not preclude a licensee from
demonstrating that the specific breath testing instrument used to
test the alcohol concentration of the licensee was
malfunctioning at the time of testing, or that human error caused
the test result to be inaccurate.
B.
Lytle was stopped by Officer Dickey of the Anne Arundel County Police Department
at approximately 10:50 p.m. on 11 March 2001 after the officer paced him traveling 70
m.p.h. in a posted 55 m.p.h. zone and watched him cross the shoulder lane marker five times
and the center line four times.  After stopping Lytle’s vehicle, Officer Dickey noticed the
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smell of alcohol emanating from Lytle’s breath.  The officer administered the Horizontal
Gaze Nystagmus test to Lytle who displayed six clues of intoxication.  Officer Dickey then
administered two additional field sobriety tests to Lytle who displayed four signs of
intoxication on the walk and turn test and three signs of intoxication on the one leg stand
test.  A preliminary breath test was administered and Lytle was arrested for driving while
intoxicated and driving under the influence of alcohol.
After arresting Lytle, Officer Dickey requested another breathalyzer test which
resulted in a reading of 0.101 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.  A second test
administered by the officer yielded a 0.105 reading.  Consequently, Officer Dickey issued
a Certification and Order of Suspension to Lytle.  
On 14 March 2001, Lytle requested a hearing before the OAH.  The hearing was held
before an ALJ on 12 June 2001.  The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) appeared at
the hearing through its paper record of the certified test results.  At the hearing, Lytle made
a Motion for No Action and argued that the test result of 0.10 should be reduced below 0.10
because of the permissible variance of such test results arguably recognized in the
Toxicologist’s Regulations.  The ALJ took the matter sub curia and granted Lytle ten days
in which to file a Memorandum of Law supporting his position.  
Lytle postulated in his memorandum that the test results of 0.10 are insufficient to
show that he was subject to the sanctions of § 16-205.1(b)(1).  Section 16-205.1(b)(1)
provides in relevant part:
4 The Toxicologist’s Regulations state in this regard that: “No scientific measurement
is unequivocally precise.  All such measurements have an accepted scientific range of
accuracy.  For the breath and blood tests for alcohol content, the accepted scientific range
of accuracy is plus or minus 0.01of the reported result.”
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(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person
may not be compelled to take a test.  However, the detaining
officer shall advise the person that, on receipt of a sworn
statement from the officer that the person was so charged and
refused to take the test, or was tested and the result indicated an
alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the Administration shall:
(i) In the case of a person licensed under this title:
1.  For a test result indicating an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of
testing:
A.  For a first offense, suspend the driver’s
license for 45 days; . . . 
Lytle argued that the “accepted scientific range of accuracy” for breath test results as stated
in the Toxicologist’s Regulations is plus or minus 0.01.4  Lytle contended therefore that his
test results must be reduced by 0.01 to yield a result of 0.09, thus rendering the sanctions of
§ 16-205.1(b)(1) inapplicable.  
Relying on cases from other states, Lytle observed that some require particular test
results as a basis for sanction and others require a specific alcohol content before sanctions
may be imposed.  Lytle contended that Maryland law required that sanctions be imposed
based on a specific alcohol content and not a particular test result, and therefore he was
entitled to the benefit of the margin of error.    
On 20 June 2001, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding, as a matter of law, that the
MVA failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Lytle had an alcohol
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concentration of 0.10 or greater at the time of testing.  The ALJ’s reasoning began with the
premise that the statute was written using the “alcohol content” standard.  Noting that the
language of § 16-205.1(b)(1), “or was tested and the result indicated an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more,” contained references both to the “test result” and “alcohol
content” standards, the ALJ relied on § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(5) to reason that the Legislature
intended the statute to employ the “alcohol content” standard.  Relying on § 16-
205.1(f)(7)(i), enumerating the issues that could be raised at an administrative hearing, and
specifically § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(5), the ALJ emphasized that the test was: “[w]hether the
person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration
of 0.10 or more at the time of testing.” (Emphasis added.)  The administrative adjudicator
rationalized that the exclusion of test result language from the statement of issues that could
be raised at an administrative hearing indicated the Legislature’s intent to use alcohol
content as the applicable standard.  On this foundation, the ALJ concluded that it would “be
patently unfair as well as a violation of due process not to consider and apply the margin of
error, i.e. the accepted scientific range of accuracy, in [Lytle’s] case.”  Furthermore, he
concluded, again as a matter of law, that “[t]he MVA has not shown by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the margin of error or the accepted scientific range of accuracy was
factored into the calculation of the alcohol content of Mr. Lytle’s breath,” and therefore the
MVA failed to prove that Lytle “drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle ‘while having
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an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater at the time of testing’” as required by § 16-
205.1(f)(7)(i)(5).  The ALJ ordered that “no action” be taken against Lytle.  
On 9 August 2001, the MVA filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2000 Repl. Vol.), State
Government Article, § 10-222 (“the State Administrative Procedure Act”).  The Circuit
Court was asked to consider whether the ALJ erred when he took into account the margin
of error in establishing the accurate level of Lytle’s BAC breath result.  Lytle reiterated in
the Circuit Court the arguments he presented in the administrative proceeding.  The MVA,
now represented by counsel, argued that it was authorized to suspend a driver’s license
based on a certified test result and was not required to litigate proof of an actual breath
alcohol content level.  The court affirmed the decision of the ALJ.  
The Circuit Court, like the ALJ, was unable to find any Maryland case law providing
guidance on the issue.  The court relied upon an Alaska case urged by Lytle.  In Haynes v.
Alaska, 865 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1993), the Alaska Supreme Court held that the failure to apply
the margin of error inherent in the type of testing device in favor of the person subject to
license revocation was a violation of the due process rights afforded by both the federal and
Alaska constitutions.  The Circuit Court, agreeing with the analysis of the Alaska court,
concluded that the margin of error “must be applied when determining the somewhat strict
statutory standard of license revocation.”
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The MVA petitioned this Court to grant a writ of certiorari.  We granted the petition
to consider whether a certified and unrebutted 0.10 test result from a chemical breath test for
alcohol was sufficient evidence of an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more mandating a
driver’s license suspension under the administrative per se provisions of § 16-205.1.  371
Md. 261, 808 A.2d 806 (2002).
C.
The MVA argues here that the language of § 16-205.1, and its related legislative
history as well as that of the statutory scheme of which it is a part, authorize the MVA to
impose license suspensions based solely on certified test results.  The MVA further
contends, as a matter of law, that it proved Lytle’s blood alcohol concentration inasmuch as
he failed to submit any competent evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the
certified 0.10 test result in his case was accurate.
The MVA maintains that a reading of the plain language of the statute and
consideration of the overall statutory scheme reveal that § 16-205.1 is a “test result” statute.
The MVA reminds us that, to interpret Maryland’s motor vehicle laws, we must “ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the legislature” in a reasonable statutory construction that is
consistent with the “purpose, aim or policy of the legislature reflected in the statute.”  MVA
v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 346-47, 643 A.2d 442, 444 (1994).  The ALJ’s interpretation of §
16-205.1 was incorrect therefore because his interpretation failed to construe subsection
(f)(7)(i)(5) as part of a statutory scheme.  Subsection (f)(7)(i), permitting challenge of
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“[w]hether the person  drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing” at an administrative hearing, must be
read together with subsection (f)(7)(ii), establishing that “[t]he sworn statement of the police
officer . . . shall be prima facie evidence of a test refusal or a test resulting in an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing,” to discern more accurately the
legislative intent.  When the two subsections are considered in tandem, the MVA suggests,
it becomes clear that the Legislature intended a certified test result to be presumptive proof
of a 0.10 BAC.
The MVA continues that the design of the § 16-205.1 administrative process reflects
the Legislature’s intent to sanction drunk drivers based on test results.  The purpose of the
administrative per se provisions were to create an administrative system that would take
“swift and certain action against drunk drivers.”  Based upon recommendations of the Task
Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving (“Task Force”), the Legislature rewrote § 16-205.1
in 1989 to create a new administrative system governing suspension of drivers licenses.  See
House Bill 556, 1989 Md. Laws ch. 284, § 1.  One of the Task Force’s recommendations
was to create an “administrative per se law” providing for the prompt suspension of a
driver’s license belonging to a drunk driving suspect who “[s]ubmitted to the BAC test, and
the results exceeded a statutorily defined limit.”  MVA v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 460, 597
A.2d 939, 941-42 (1991).  One of the purposes of the new statute, as declared in an
amendment to the preamble of House Bill 556, was “establishing certain sanctions for
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certain test results.”  (Emphasis added.)  The statute was amended to create mandatory
sanctions imposed “when the driver takes a test to determine alcohol concentration and fails
the test.”  Embrey v. MVA, 339 Md. 691, 698, 664 A.2d 911, 914 (1995).  
The MVA also finds significant the Legislature’s failure to incorporate proposed
amendments that would have allowed drunk driving suspects to conduct a mini-trial at their
administrative hearings.  The Legislature refused to adopt amendments which would have
allowed a driver to compel attendance of the police officer or test technician at the hearings
and, instead, retained the nature of an administrative per se hearing as one where “a sworn
statement is prima facie evidence of a violation of § 16-205.1.”  The MVA asserts that the
Legislature, in the formulation of the regulatory scheme, must have accounted for the
accepted scientific range of accuracy of the approved breath testing instruments as the
Legislature “is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and
information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the
prior law.”  City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283-84, 477 A.2d 1174, 1177
(1984).  The MVA also suggests that the Task Force heard testimony on the accuracy of
breath testing machines such that it naturally follows that the Legislature was “well versed”
in the accuracy of breath test machines when it nonetheless created the administrative per
se law.
As noted supra, Lytle did not submit any evidence before the OAH to controvert the
MVA’s certified test results, choosing instead to challenge the statutory procedure for
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calculating a certified test result.  By relying on the Toxicologist’s Regulations, so the
MVA’s argument goes, both Lytle and the ALJ acted improperly because there is no “statute
that authorizes the toxicologist to establish evidentiary presumptions or to allocate the
burdens of production and persuasion at an MVA suspension hearing.”  Borbon v. MVA, 345
Md. 267, 275, 691 A.2d 1328, 1332 (1996).  
Not only was it improper to rely on the Toxicologist’s Regulations as a source of
authority, the ALJ misapplied those regulations.  The MVA contends that the regulations do
not support reducing Lytle’s test result by 0.10.  The toxicologist already had taken into
account the general scientific accuracy of the test in his reporting protocol by, first, taking
the lowest of two or three readings as the “test result;” and, second, reporting the lowest test
result only after it is rounded down to the second decimal place.  Thus, the standards
contained in the Toxicologist’s Regulations support the accuracy of the Intox EC/IR test
instrument and therefore do not provide a basis for impeaching Lytle’s test results.  The
MVA concludes, therefore, that the ALJ misinterpreted the accepted scientific standards to
reach his result and acted outside the scope of his authority by disregarding the statutory
prima facie case.
Lytle, in addition to maintaining his earlier arguments, contends that the MVA’s
appellate arguments were waived and are not properly before this Court because they were
not raised at the administrative hearing.  Lytle argues that because the MVA appeared at the
administrative hearing only through its paper test results and did not present any arguments,
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the arguments the MVA now makes before this Court are waived based on our decision in
Brodie v. MVA, 367 Md. 1, 785 A.2d 747 (2001) (stating that “in an action for judicial
review of an agency’s decision, ordinarily, a reviewing court may not pass upon issues
presented to it for the first time on judicial review and that are not encompassed in the final
decision of the administrative agency”).
If the merits need to be reached, the decision of the ALJ, as Lytle sees it, is
presumptively valid and must be reviewed in a light favorable to him.  See Mehrling v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 371 Md. 40, 65, 806 A.2d 662, 677 (2002); Young v. Anne Arundel
County, 146 Md. App. 526, 658-69, 807 A.2d 651 (2002).  As to the language of the statute,
he contends that it focuses on alcohol content and not test results.  Lytle suggests that if §
16-205.1 permits him to challenge the “alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of
testing,” acceptance of the MVA’s contention that the Legislature intended reliance solely
on the “certified test results” would “ameliorate” this right.  Such an interpretation of the
competing clauses would render one of them “superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.”  In
order to “harmonize” the relevant provisions of the statute, he urges that it must be
interpreted as favoring alcohol concentration and not test results.  Referring to portions of
the Floor Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, House Bill 556 (1989), stating
that the proposed administrative per se law requires imposition of sanctions when “the
person takes the test and has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater,” Lytle
interprets that to mean that the Legislature intended the statute to be an “alcohol content”
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statute.  Further supporting his interpretation, Lytle points to a statement from the preamble
of Senate Bill 108 and House Bill 3 of the 2001 Session of the Maryland General Assembly
(2001 Md. Laws ch. 4 & 5) which lowered the alcohol concentration threshold to 0.08: “For
the purpose of . . . reducing the level of alcohol concentration for a certain administrative
offense that results in the suspension of a driver’s license under certain circumstances.”  On
the basis of this, Lytle concludes that the amended statute is an alcohol content statute and
states that “it strains the imagination to believe that in 1989 the legislature intended for ‘test
results’ to be the standard, and then in 2001, without discussion, it changed its mind and
made ‘alcohol concentration’ the standard.”
Lytle claims case law support from other jurisdictions.  In addition to the Alaska case
discussed supra, he finds succor from Nebraska, Nebraska v. Bjornson, 271 N.W.2d 839
(Neb. 1978); Washington, Washington v. Keller, 672 P.2d 412 (Wash. App. 1983); Ohio,
Ohio v. Prestier, 455 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio Misc. 1982); and Hawaii, Hawaii v. Boehmer, 613
P.2d 916 (Haw. 1980).  These cases, he contends, require the application of the scientific
margin of error to test results produced by breathalyzer instruments, absent statutory
direction to the contrary.
 Finally, Lytle observes that he has a property right in his driving privilege that may
not be suspended without the protections of due process.  He argues that the second of three
factors applicable to administrative procedural due process analysis under Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976), “the risk of
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erroneous deprivation of such [property] interest through the procedure used,” is violated,
and consequently he is deprived of his property right, when the results of the Intox EC/IR
test are used without taking into account the 0.01 margin of error.
In its Reply Brief, the MVA argued that Lytle is incorrect to assert that failure to
apply the margin of error test is a violation of his due process rights.  Procedural due process
requires “only that a licensee be informed of the evidence on which the agency is relying and
be given a chance to rebut such evidence.”  Plumer v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir.
1990).  The use of a certified test result does not deny Lytle a meaningful hearing in the
constitutional sense because he had the opportunity to testify and otherwise attempt to rebut
the test result at his administrative hearing.  The MVA asserts that this Court, in Moon v.
State, 300 Md. 354, 478 A.2d 695 (1984), condoned the Legislature’s declaration that breath
test results are reliable evidence and therefore the suspension of driver’s licenses based upon
certified test results satisfies the constitutional requirement that the statutory scheme be free
from unwarranted risk of an erroneous outcome.
In reply to Lytle’s waiver argument, the MVA asserts that its right to judicial review
is preserved because it is a party aggrieved by the ALJ’s decision.  The errors of law urged
by the MVA for appellate review are “expressly ‘encompassed in the final decision’ of the
ALJ.”  Brodie, 367 Md. at 4, 785 A.2d at 749.  It was appropriate for the MVA to appear
at the hearing on its paper submission because hearings under § 16-205.1 were intended by
the Legislature to be “informal and summary in nature,” MVA v. Richards, 356 Md. 356,
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377, 739 A.2d 58, 70 (1999), and “permit the MVA’s case to be made in most instances
from a documentary record.”  Borbon, 345 Md. at 283, 691 A.2d at 1336.  The MVA
submitted a prima facie case to the ALJ when it submitted the certifications of the police
officer and the test operator. 
II.
A.
Lytle is incorrect in his assertion that the MVA is not entitled to have this Court
consider its arguments.  The State APA, § 10-222(a)(1), provides that “a party who is
aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the
decision.”  Section 10-222(f)(1) provides that “judicial review of disputed issues of fact
shall be confined to the record.”  The dispute in this case is purely one of law.  The MVA
asks us to determine whether a certified, unrebutted 0.10 test result from a chemical breath
test for alcohol is sufficient evidence of an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more mandating
a driver’s license suspension under the administrative per se provisions of § 16-205.1.  Our
conclusion will be reached by determining the legislative intent and interpreting the relevant
statutory provisions.  The grounds relied on by the agency are identical to the issues the
MVA raises here.  The ALJ determined that the statute required consideration of the margin
of error because the statute is a “alcohol content” statute and the MVA argues before us that
the statute does not require consideration of the margin of error because it is a “test result”
statute.  The MVA’s arguments are properly before this Court.
5 The MVA has delegated to the OAH in cases such as the present one the
responsibility to conduct the evidentiary hearing and render the final administrative decision
of the agency.  COMAR 11.11.02.07 and .08(A).  The MVA, however, may obtain judicial
review of its own decision, thus made, if it is aggrieved by the decision rendered in its name
by the OAH and was a party to the administrative proceeding.  State APA, § 10-222(a)(2).
- 19 -
B.
A court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency5 generally is limited to
determining whether there was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the
agency’s findings of fact and whether the agency’s conclusions of law were correct.  MVA
v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 490-91, 796 A.2d 75, 81-82 (2001).  To determine whether an
agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence the reviewing court must exercise
deference towards an agency’s fact-finding and determine only “whether a reasoning mind
reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.”  Bd. of Physician
Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68, 729 A.2d 376, 380 (1999) (quoting Bulluck
v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978)).  We further noted
that “[e]ven with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded
the position of the administrative agency,” and “an administrative agency’s interpretation
and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given
considerable weight by reviewing courts.”  Banks, 354 Md. at 69, 729 A.2d at 381.  The
issue in the present matter, the interpretation of § 16-205.1, presents a pure question of law.
See Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), State Gov’t Article, § 10-222(h)(3).
- 20 -
C.
The result in this case turns on the intent of the Legislature.  Our analysis begins with
the language of the statute as the primary source of legislative intent.  When the language
is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of the statute and the result is not absurd, we
have held that no further inquiry into legislative intent is required.  See Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 301, 783 A.2d 667, 670 (2001); Degren v.
State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999).  Beyond plain meaning, the purpose of
the statute may be ascertained by examining the Legislature’s statement of a statute’s
purposes, and courts may consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence”
indicating the  legislative intent.  State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 262, 666 A.2d 128, 141
(1995); Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 312, 619 A.2d 531, 534 (1993).  The language of
a statute cannot be divorced from its context.  Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 212, 627 A.2d
1019, 1025 (1993).  As we stated in Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987), even where the language of the statute is
plain, its meaning is controlled by its context.  In short, the statutory language must be
construed in light of and governed by its context within the overall statutory scheme.  In re
Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 542, 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992).  An appellate court may consider
evidence such as a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it
passed through the Legislature, and its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation to
- 21 -
ascertain the Legislature’s goal in enacting the statute.  Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146,
626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993).  
Lytle argues that the language of § 16-205.1 is ambiguous and that recourse to the
legislative history reveals that the statute was intended to be an “alcohol content” statute,
rather than a “test result” statute.  He supports his argument primarily on the basis that if the
statute were construed that “test results” triggered sanctions under § 16-205.1, it would
render the language of § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(5) “superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.”  Lytle
also uses portions of the Floor Report regarding H.B. 556 of 1989 to support his argument,
in particular a passage stating:  
[t]his bill adopts an ‘administrative per se’ law requiring the
suspension of an individual’s driver’s license if the person is
detained by police for driving or attempting to drive while
intoxicated . . . and the person: (1) refuses to take the test . . . ;
or (2) the person takes the test and has a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or greater.
Lytle’s reliance on the Floor Report is misplaced.  The excerpt he relies on does not
state that a person’s license will be suspended based on his alcohol content; rather it
provides that suspension will occur on the basis of a test result indicating a certain level of
BAC.  The emphasis is on the BAC, but only as measured by the test instrument.  Lytle’s
fixation on the language contained in § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(5), “[w]hether the person drove or
attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more
at the time of testing,” focuses on a discrete portion while ignoring its overall context.  The
phrase “at the time of testing” would be surplusage if alcohol content was determinative.
- 22 -
If alcohol content was determinative, the statute would use the words “alcohol content,”
instead of “alcohol concentration.”  Blood alcohol concentration is a specific term of
measurement and use of that term refers to test results rather than the alcohol content of the
person’s blood stream.
Our examination of the pertinent statutory language, its place in the statutory scheme,
and even the relevant legislative history reveals a result opposite that reached by Lytle.
Lytle’s argument is based on snippets of language shorn from their contextual roots.  It is
clear that the Legislature intended to create an administrative per se law imposing “certain
sanctions for certain test results.”  The stated purpose of the statute and the deliberate
crafting of the regulatory scheme indicate that the statute was intended to create expedient
procedures that swiftly would impose penalties for drunk driving irrespective of any parallel
potential criminal processes or penalties.  To this end, Petitioner correctly observes that the
Legislature created an administrative system that focused on test results as a basis for
sanctions.
The administrative procedures promulgated by the MVA pursuant to § 12-104(b)
emphasize the purposes of the overall statutory scheme that includes § 16-205.1.  The Code
of Maryland Regulations establishes extensive procedures for checking the accuracy of the
test instruments employed to implement § 16-205.1.  The administrative procedures and
instrument maintenance guidelines further demonstrate the intent that the swift and certain
- 23 -
action taken be predicated on test results.  Sections 16-205.1(f)(7)(i) and (ii) are self-evident
of this:
(7)(i) At a hearing under this section, the person has the rights
described in § 12-206 of this article, but at the hearing the only
issues shall be:
1.  Whether the police officer who stops or detains a
person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was
driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the
influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any
drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle
safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous
substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation
of § 16-813 of this title;
2.  Whether there was evidence of the use by the person
of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination
of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous
substance;
3.  Whether the police officer requested a test after the
person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that
shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses
to take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspension or
issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(1) and (2)
of this section;
4.  Whether the person refused to take the test;
5.  Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a
motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more at the time of testing; or 
6.  If the hearing involves disqualification of a
commercial driver’s license, whether the person was operating
a commercial motor vehicle.
(ii)  The sworn statement of the police officer and of the test
technician or analyst shall be prima facie evidence of a test
refusal or a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more at the time of testing.  
- 24 -
The statute further permits a sworn statement of the police officer attesting to the BAC level,
as measured by an approved test instrument, to stand as prima facie evidence of the indicated
BAC.  § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii).  The MVA imposes sanctions for test results indicating an
alcohol concentration of 0.10 or higher and for persons refusing to take the test.  See
COMAR 11.11.03.01 (stating that the administrative procedures established in that chapter
govern sanctions imposed on drivers “who have refused a properly requested test or who
have submitted to a test which showed a 0.10 or more alcohol concentration”).  Actual blood
alcohol content cannot be the basis for sanctions when an unwillingness to take the test
triggers sanctions.  Section 16-205.1(b)(i)(2) provides that for a first offense test refusal the
MVA will suspend the driver’s license for 120 days, and the MVA will impose a sanction
of suspension for one year for a second offense test refusal.  The administrative penalties for
refusing to take the test are more severe than those imposed for test results indicating a BAC
that exceeds the legal limit.
The language throughout the statutory scheme consistently frames the measurement
of alcohol content in terms of the certified test result.  The repetition of the phrase “while
having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing,” when describing the
offense, suggests that the result as determined by the test is the determinative element of the
offense.  No importance is given any other means of calculating alcohol content outside the
final test instrument measurements of alcohol concentration.  The Legislature chose a means
for rendering an accurate reading of alcohol content and then drafted a statute creating
- 25 -
procedures for taking the readings and imposing penalties based upon those readings.  The
provisions in the COMAR establishing the reliability of test results produced by the
enumerated breathalyzer instruments further support the view that the test results are
intended for administrative adjudication purposes to be an accurate measure of blood alcohol
content, unless evidence is adduced that the specific machine employed in the specific
driver’s test was malfunctioning or the testing officer failed to follow the prescribed testing
procedures in some meaningful way.  Further, the procedures outlined in the Toxicologist’s
Regulations were designed to ensure the reliability of the test instruments and, subsequently,
the reliability of the test results. Actual alcohol content is not at issue in an administrative
hearing pursuant to § 16-205.1 because precautions have been taken by the Legislature to
ensure that the testing process is fair to the tested person and to ensure that the most accurate
result possible is rendered by the testing process. 
The ALJ incorrectly determined that the language of § 16-205.1(b)(1), “or was tested
and the result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more,” and the language of § 16-
205.1(f)(7)(i)(5), “[w]hether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while
having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing,” indicated that the
Legislature intended to create an “alcohol content” statute.  The ALJ’s conclusions would
be more justified if the statute omitted all language referring to testing and “the time of
testing,” and instead expressed the offense and the issue to be adjudicated at the hearing
exclusively in terms of blood alcohol content.  It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
- 26 -
that the words of the statute are to be read so as not to create surplusage.  The ALJ’s
interpretation of the statute, however, creates surplusage.  To read the statutory language as
basing sanctions on alcohol content rather than test results creates conflict between the intent
of the statute and the provisions limiting the issues to be heard at the administrative hearing.
If the intent of the statute is to impose sanctions based on actual alcohol content then the
issues to be heard at the administrative hearings would include evidence of alcohol content
other than the test results.  The statutory scheme does not require the MVA to produce any
evidence of intoxication other than the certified test results in order to make a prima facie
case.  It is, therefore, logical to conclude this is so because the statute intended sanctions be
imposed based on test results.  
Although the statute is plain and unambiguous when viewed as part of its overall
statutory scheme, the legislative history also validates that it is a “test result” driven statute.
The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee explained in its Floor Report regarding House
Bill 556 of 1989 that the administrative per se law was written to provide, in cases of drunk
driving, “a swift penalty which is separate from any criminal penalties that may be imposed
for the driving offenses.”  Floor Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, House Bill
556, at 2 (1989). 
That the statute would be a “test result” statute is logical given the additional time and
fiscal resources that would be required if an individual was permitted to challenge not only
the alcohol concentration as evidenced by the test results, but otherwise could litigate the
- 27 -
“actual” alcohol content of the person’s blood stream at the time of the driving offense.  A
statement from the Governor’s Legislative Office regarding proposed House Bill 556 stated
that the bill would have the effect of “eliminating long delays through the criminal court
process due to continuances, jury prayers, plea bargaining, and diversion programs before
the offender encounters any appropriate sanctioning of his behavior.  Individuals receiving
a PBJ would not escape Administrative review of their fitness to continue to operate on the
highways.”  The statement further asserted that “[t]his bill would ensure immediate and
certain sanctions by the Administration,” and “speedy Administrative sanctions would help
the offender to recognize the cause and effect relationship between the offense and the
sanction which would otherwise be weakened by lengthy delays in the court processes.”
Governor’s Legislative Office, “Positive Aspects of Administrative Per Se,” House Bill 556
(1989).
A letter from the Lieutenant Governor to the Chairman of the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee and the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee expressed the
following concerns about proposed House Bill 556:
In Amendment No. 13 of House Bill 556, the sworn
statement submitted by an arresting officer and test technician
would not be admissible if the officers were summoned to
appear at the administrative hearing.  The Administration is
concerned that the wording of this Amendment would
encourage every licensee to summon a police officer and
technician as a tactical maneuver to bar the sworn statement
from being admitted into evidence.
This could result in the required appearance of virtually
every arresting officer and test technician in more than 26,800
- 28 -
hearings (based on 1988 arrest statistics).  The cost to police
agencies would be overwhelming.  An estimated 174,000 man
hours would be required for police officers at administrative
hearings and the cost in overtime hours would exceed $4
million.
The provisions of House Bill 556, as amended, would
cause serious problems in the scheduling of police officers to
provide at least a minimum level of police protection to the
public.  In those areas of the State where police staffing is
already at critically low levels, the wholesale summonsing of
the officers could practically eliminate police protection.  The
cost in overtime to overcome the loss of manpower would also
create an unreasonable burden for all of Maryland’s police
agencies.  The projected degree of fiscal impact would
overwhelm the already high overtime expenditures that police
are forced to utilize.
Under the current amendments, Maryland’s law
enforcement community would have neither the funds nor the
personnel to adequately enforce the provisions of this bill.
These projections, if they occur, might negate completely any
possible benefit to highway safety that this bill was intended to
make.
I understand that discussions have occurred with
Chairman Horne and Administration officials and that there has
been agreement that the language from page 11, line 36 to page
12, line 5 of House Bill 556 be amended to read as follows:
(II) 1.  UNLESS THE PERSON HAS
REQUESTED, AS REQUIRED UNDER THIS
SECTION, A SUBPOENA TO BE ISSUED
FOR THE POLICE OFFICER OR THE TEST
TECHNICIAN 
OR 
ANALYST 
WHO
PERFORMED THE TEST TO BE PRESENT
AT THE HEARING, OR OTHERWISE
COMPLY WITH THE SUBPOENA THE
SWORN STATEMENT OF THE POLICE
OFFICER SHALL AND OF THE TEST
TECHNICIAN OR ANALYST SHALL BE
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF A TEST
REFUSAL OR A TEST RESULTING IN AN
- 29 -
ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION OF 0.10 OR
MORE AT THE TIME OF TESTING.
2.  UNLESS THE PERSON HAS
REQUESTED, AS REQUIRED UNDER THIS
SECTION, A SUBPOENA TO BE ISSUED
FOR THE POLICE OFFICER OR THE TEST
TECHNICIAN 
OR 
ANALYST 
WHO
PERFORMED THE TEST TO BE PRESENT
AT THE HEARING, OR OTHERWISE
COMPLY WITH THE SUBPOENA THE
SWORN 
STATEMENT 
SHALL 
BE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AND THE
POLICE OFFICER AND TEST TECHNICIAN
NEED NOT BE PRESENT OR GIVE
TESTIMONY.
Letter from Hon. Melvin A. Steinberg, Lieutenant Governor, to Senator Walter M. Baker,
Chairman, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, and Delegate William S. Horne,
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, at 2-3 (30 March 1989).  These extracts from the bill
file for House Bill 556 attest to the Legislature’s intent to create procedures that would be
an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.  They explicitly
indicate an intent to limit the issues considered at resultant administrative hearings.
A key component of the “swift and effective” procedures created by the bill was the
prima facie status given the test results indicating blood alcohol concentration.  The test
results were intended to be the basis for sanctions, assailable only on the basis of specific
test instrument defects or meaningful test-giver error at the time of testing.  The preamble
to House Bill 556 enumerates the purposes of the Bill:
- 30 -
For the purpose of altering the administrative sanctions for
driving or attempting to drive under certain conditions
involving alcohol; altering provisions relating to the implied
consent to take certain tests; altering the penalties for refusing
to take a test for alcohol and establishing certain sanctions for
certain test results. 
(Emphasis added.)  The Department of Fiscal Services’ Summary of Legislation described
the legislation as “[a]lter[ing] the length of time a driver’s license is suspended for a test
result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing,” and
“[e]stablish[ing] a new procedure for a police officer to follow in the event a person refuses
to take the test for alcohol or takes a test for alcohol which results in an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more.”  Department of Fiscal Services, Revised Fiscal Note to
House Bill 556, at 1 (1989) (emphasis added).  The purpose was to establish the test results
as the basis for sanctions, hence the administrative hearings, when requested, were to be as
brief and expedient as due process permits.
Lytle places great weight on the Haynes case decided by the Supreme Court of
Alaska.  The court decided in Haynes, in the absence of legislative history, that, a statute
providing that “a person commits the crime of driving while intoxicated (DWI) if a breath
analysis reveals that the person’s breath sample contains 0.10 grams or more of alcohol per
210 liters of the person’s breath,” required the 0.01 margin of error to be applied to the test
result in favor of the person taking the test.  865 P.2d at 754.  The Supreme Court of Alaska
reasoned that because the Alaska Legislature delegated authority to the Department of Public
Safety to approve satisfactory techniques and methods of performing breath analysis of
- 31 -
suspected drunk drivers, instead of taking it upon itself to select and approve the use of the
Intoximeter 3000, the test instrument used to measure Haynes’ BAC, there was no indication
that the Legislature considered the 0.01 margin of error in crafting the statute.  865 P.2d at
755-56.  The Alaska Supreme Court interpreted the statute to be an “alcohol content” statute
and held that, “[a]bsent express legislative intent to the contrary, we hold that failure to
apply the inherent margin of error of a particular testing device in favor of the person subject
to license revocation violates due process of law as guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution.”
865 P.2d at 756.
Two of the five members of the Alaska Supreme Court that decided Haynes
dissented.  The dissent rested on the basis that the statute was not ambiguous and should
have been interpreted on its face by the majority: “I do not believe that it is right to say that
a statute does not mean what it appears to mean because there is no legislative history
indicating that the apparent plain meaning of the statute is the actual meaning.  That is what
today’s opinion does.”  865 P.2d at 757 (Matthews, J., dissenting).  The dissent found it
significant that the “discount approach” to test results adopted by the majority was not used
by any other jurisdiction at that time.  Id.  The statute challenged in Haynes limited the issues
to be considered at the hearing: “[t]he hearing under this section shall be limited to the issues
of whether the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was
driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated and whether (2) the chemical test . . . produced a
result described in AS 28.35.030(a)(2).”  The dissent queried “one must ask why a
- 32 -
legislature would enact a statutory scheme in which actual levels of alcohol are critical and
then preclude the state from employing non-test evidence which tends to prove that such
levels exceeded legal limits in particular cases?”  865 P.2d at 759.  In response to its own
hypothetical question, the dissent stated that the majority’s analysis was flawed because “the
legislature probably intended that the critical element for license revocation was merely a
failing test result.”  865 P.2d at 760.  The dissent further found fault with the majority’s due
process argument, stating “[g]iven my conclusion that a failing test result alone is the critical
element in license revocation cases and that a driver’s actual alcohol level is irrelevant,” the
conclusion that “it is a violation of due process not to consider a testing device’s inherent
margin for error is plainly wrong.”  865 P.2d at 760.  
Shortly after the Supreme Court of Alaska decided Haynes, the Alaska Legislature
amended the statute to read as follows:
Except for an offense under AS 28.35.280, if an offense
described under this title requires that a chemical test of a
person’s breath produce a particular result, and the chemical test
is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by
the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute
is not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.
Alaska Stat. § 28.40.060 (1996).  See Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 P.2d
427 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).  The purpose and effect of AS 28.40.060 was to indicate that
Legislature’s unequivocal decision that “a .01 percent working tolerance was ‘tolerably
inaccurate,’ and therefore, irrelevant to the driver’s guilt under [the statute], and not in
- 33 -
violation of state or federal due process rights.”  Alaska Stat. § 28.40.060 note (1996).  See
Bushnell v. Alaska, 5 P.3d 889 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).  
Lytle also cites to cases from Nebraska, Ohio, Hawaii, and Washington that applied
the margin of error to breathalyzer test results.  See Nebraska v. Bjornson, 271 N.W.2d 839
(Neb. 1978); Washington v. Keller, 672 P.2d 412 (Wash. App. 1983); Ohio v. Prestier, 455
N.E.2d 24 (Ohio Misc. 1982); Hawaii v. Boehmer, 613 P.2d 916 (Haw. 1980).  None of
these decisions, however, actually fuel Lytle’s jurisprudential engine.  The Nebraska
decision relied on by Lytle was overruled by Nebraska v. Babcock, 419 N.W.2d 527 (Neb.
1988).  Lytle mischaracterizes the position of the Hawaii courts.  Lytle employs the Boehmer
case to suggest that Hawaii law mandates giving the benefit of the margin of error to the
defendant in a drunk driving case.  In truth, the Supreme Court of Hawaii found that the
error of margin is a relevant factor that may be considered at an administrative hearing, but
it is only one factor to be weighed in determining whether it is “more probable than not” that
the driver’s BAC level was above the legal threshold.  Lara v. Tanaka, 924 P.2d 192, 195
(Haw. 1996).  The Supreme Court of Hawaii held in Lara that, when the margin of error as
applied to a BAC reading yielded a test result between the range of 0.097 and 0.117, the
“hearing officer could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence in this case, including
the margin of error, that it was more probable than not that Respondent ‘had a blood alcohol
content of .10% or more.’” Id.  
- 34 -
A decision rendered by the Ohio Court of Appeals subsequent to the case cited and
relied upon by Lytle, Ohio v. Prestier, 455 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio Misc. 1982), held that the
margin of error alone does not determine the accuracy of a driver’s breath test.  Ohio v.
Graham, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4669.  The Washington case Lytle cited, Washington v.
Keller, 672 P.2d 412, 414 (Wash. App. 1983), also does not support directly Lytle’s
proposition.  In that case, the Court of Appeals of Washington held that the reputed margin
of error in the breathalyzer was only one factor for the trier of fact to consider when
determining whether the State met its burden of proving that the BAC indicated by the
breathalyzer test was correct, and the test result alone is not conclusive proof of actual blood
alcohol content.  672 P.2d at 413-14.  Lytle is misguided to rely on the foregoing cases from
other jurisdictions to support the proposition that the margin of error must be considered to
calculate an accurate BAC level and to further support the argument that Maryland’s statute
should be read as an “alcohol content” statute instead of a “test result” statute.  The cases he
lauds as favoring his reading of the statute at best support including the margin of error as
but one factor for the administrative trier of fact to consider when making a determination
of a person’s BAC.  They do not hold that the margin of error must be applied in all cases
in favor of the person tested.
C.
Lytle argues that a person has a property interest in his or her driver’s license, Dep’t
of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 474 A.2d 191 (1984), and therefore due process
- 35 -
requirements apply to administrative proceedings affecting that property interest.  Lytle
reasons that the second of three factors set out by the United States Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976), “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such [property] interest through the procedure used,”
when applied to his case, makes “clear that simply using the result of the Intox EC/IR breath
test would create the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [his] property interest.”  If applied,
the margin of error would have resulted in an actual blood alcohol concentration as low as
0.09, and Lytle would not have been “per se intoxicated” by law.  Therefore, as his theory
goes, any adverse action taken by the MVA to deprive him of his driver’s license property
right was violative of due process.
Lytle’s argument has no merit.  The due process clause functions to “protect interests
in life, liberty and property from deprivation or infringement by government without
appropriate procedural safeguards.”  Coleman v. Anne Arundel Police, 369 Md. 108, 141-
42, 797 A.2d 770, 790-91 (2002) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332, 96 S.Ct. at 901, 47
L.Ed.2d at 18).  To establish a violation of due process, the aggrieved party must show that
state action resulted in a deprivation of a property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  If a property interest is established then the court must
determine what procedures are required constitutionally before an individual may be so
deprived.  The procedures required are determined by balancing the individual and
- 36 -
governmental interests affected by the property deprivation.  Armacost, 299 Md. at 416, 474
A.2d at 203.
We have recognized that a driver’s license is a property interest protected by both the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.  299 Md. at 418, 474 A.2d at 204.  We also have stated that interpretations of
federal procedural due process provisions by the Supreme Court are persuasive in our
interpretation of Article 24.  299 Md. at 416, 474 A.2d at 203.  The elements a court should
take into consideration in balancing the private interest against the governmental interest
were outlined by the Mathews court:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. at 903, 47 L.Ed.2d at 33.  In a case challenging the
procedures provided by Maryland’s Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program for appealing
an adverse inspection result, or a revocation or non-renewal of registration, we reasoned:
The second Mathews consideration is addressed to the risk of an
erroneous determination under the procedures provided and the
benefits to be gained from the substitution of alternative
procedures.  Where, as here, suspension decisions are largely
automatic as based upon scientifically accepted objective
criteria, and prompt post-suspension judicial review is available,
the likelihood of erroneous administrative determinations is
- 37 -
minimal.  See Love, supra, 431 U.S. at 113-14, 97 S.Ct. at
1727-1728.  Consequently, little is to be gained from provision
of additional procedures.
Armacost, 299 Md. at 419, 474 A.2d at 204-05.  
Lytle insists that due process is offended unless the 0.01 margin of error is factored
into the calculation of a tested person’s BAC before the person’s driver’s license is
suspended.  Essential to Lytle’s argument is that the existing procedures for measuring blood
alcohol content are inadequate and likely to result in the erroneous suspension of a person’s
driver’s license.  Interpreting the statute as an “alcohol content” statute requiring the margin
of error to be factored into the final BAC reading would impose significant additional
administrative and fiscal burdens upon the State.  Actual alcohol content would be subject
to determination at the administrative hearing and the State would be required to expend
more time and resources proving the subject’s BAC.  Additionally, the statute would lose
its per se quality and sacrifice its intended swift and expedient nature.  The requirements that
the test instruments be maintained and tested regularly and that the test administrator take
the lowest of two or three readings rounded down to the second decimal place to arrive at
the official “test result” as promulgated in the COMAR are intended to ensure the scientific
accuracy of the certified test result used as evidence at the administrative hearing.
Our statement in Armacost is equally true when applied to the present matter.  The
statutory scheme makes suspension decisions relatively automatic, predicated upon
“scientifically accepted objective criteria,” and prompt post-suspension review is guaranteed
- 38 -
by the provision of an administrative hearing.  The suggested additional procedure would
result in a burden on the State disproportionate to the benefits to the individual.  The
government has a significant interest in deterring drunk driving and in removing drunk
drivers from the roads.  Summary suspension of driver’s licenses based on reliable test
results exceeding the designated acceptable limit as measured by approved breath test
instruments acts as a deterrent and promptly removes the drunk driver from the roads.
Lytle’s due process argument fails.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY 
REVERSED; CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO
REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE
M A R Y L A N D 
O F F I C E  
O F
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
AND ORDER A NEW HEARING
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.
- 39 -
This is a duplicate of the Regulations of the Toxicologist, Post Mortem Examiners
Commission, State of Maryland, Regarding Tests of Breath and Blood for Alcohol adopted
October 1, 1995, as amended October 1, 1999.  The Regulations were issued in 1983 and
were reissued in 1990, 1995, and 2001 with amendments.  The Regulations are appended
to the Maryland DWI manual prepared by the Maryland State Police. 
REGULATIONS OF THE TOXICOLOGIST
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER
POST MORTEM EXAMINERS COMMISSIONER
STATE OF MARYLAND
REGARDING TESTS OF
BREATH AND BLOOD FOR ALCOHOL
YALE H. CAPLAN, Ph.D., D-ABFT
TOXICOLOGIST
App. 1
- 40 -
STATE OF MARYLAND
DEPARTMENT OF POST MORTEM EXAMINERS
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER
111 Penn Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
The attached regulations are set forth pursuant to the responsibility charged to the
Toxicologist of the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, under the Post Mortem
Examiners Commission under Section 10-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, Annotated Code of Maryland.
These regulations are issued with regard to the training and certification of personnel
performing tests of breath and blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content in
the body of drivers suspected of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages
and the approval and certification of equipment used in conducting such tests.
These regulations supersede any previous regulations issued by this Office and are
effective April 1, 1983.
Yale H. Caplan, Ph.D., D-ABFT
Toxicologist
App. 2
- 41 -
SECTION I
ALCOHOL TESTS GENERALLY
A.
Definition of “percent by weight” in alcohol tests
Section 10-307 of the Articles of Courts and Judicial Proceedings (Chemical Tests
for Intoxication-Results of Analysis and Presumptions) states that the results of
chemical tests for intoxication be expressed as “percent by weight” of alcohol in the
subject’s blood as determined by an analysis of breath or blood.  “Percent by weight”
without any qualification is inexact.  An exact scientific term would be either
“percent, weight by volume” or “percent, weight by weight”.
In regard to chemical tests of breath or blood for alcohol in the State of Maryland,
“percent by weight” is defined as “percent, weight by volume”.  This is further
explained to be the weight of alcohol in grams contained in 100 milliliters (cubic
centimeters) or blood.  This method of reporting conforms to the Uniform Vehicle
Code adopted by the American Medical Association to serve as a model for all states.
The breath testing devices are scientific instruments which determine the
concentration of alcohol in a person’s blood expressed as “percent by weight” (grams
per 100 milliliters of blood).  It does this by analyzing a specific volume of expired
breath.  The weight of alcohol in the breath sample is determined and the quantity of
the alcohol converted to its equivalent value in blood.
B.
Radio Frequency Interference
A statistical study of the results of over 18,000 Validation Tests conducted on
approximately 100 Breathalyzer Instruments (Model 800, 900 and 900A) during
January 1, 1982 through September 30, 1982 indicates that common radio
frequencies do not interfere with tests properly conducted in accordance with these
Regulations.
C.
Precision and Accuracy of Alcohol Tests
No scientific measurement is unequivocally precise.  All such measurements have an
accepted scientific range of accuracy.  For the Breathalyzer and blood tests for
alcohol, the accepted scientific range of accuracy is plus or minus 0.01% (one
hundredth of one percent) of the reported result.
App. 3
- 42 -
SECTION II
TESTS OF BREATH FOR ALCOHOL (EVIDENTIARY)
A.
Instrumentation
All instrumentation to be used in the State for the purpose of testing of breath for
alcohol must be approved by the Toxicologist.  Manufacturers of breath testing
instruments may not offer for sale to police agencies instruments that have not been
approved, and must report the sale of all such approved instruments to the CTAU.
The CTAU will then advise the Toxicologist of such sale and purchase.
1.
The Breathalyzer
The Breathalyzer, Models 800, 900 and 900A, as manufactured by Smith &
Wesson Company/G.O.E.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania or the Smith & Wesson
Electronics Company, Eatontown, New Jersey;, or the Stephenson
Corporation, Eatontown or Red Bank, New Jersey, are approved for chemical
testing of breath for alcohol.
2.
Other Breath Testing Instrumentation
Other Instrumentation that may become available will be evaluated on an
individual basis and a list of such approved instrumentation will be made
available by the Toxicologist.
3.
Breath Alcohol Simulation Equipment
The Alcohol Breath Simulator, all models as manufactured by the companies
listed in A.1. above are approved for use in conjunction with the breath testing
instruments.  Other Alcohol Breath Simulator devices will be evaluated on an
individual basis and a list of such approved equipment will be made available
by the Toxicologist.
4.
Certification of Instruments
All approved breath testing instruments must be certified by the Toxicologist
prior to being used in the State, and all breath testing instruments will be
recertified by the Toxicologist on a regular basis.  Agencies will be notified
 App. 4
- 43 -
as to the date and time of such recertification.  New instruments or instruments
removed from the field for factory repair must be certified or recertified by the
Toxicologist prior to being placed into or returned to service.  Such
certification or recertification shall be accomplished by forwarding a request
to the CTAU, who shall notify the Toxicologist.  Instruments which are
repaired by a certified Breathalyzer Maintenance Technician may be returned
to service without being recertified by the Toxicologist.
All certified instruments must be available for inspection by the Toxicologist
or his representative at all times.
5.
Instrument Test Ampoules
Certified Test Ampoules as distributed by the Smith & Wesson Company are
approved for use in conjunction with the Breathalyzer instruments.  A list of
ampoules distributed by other manufacturers that are approved will be made
available by the Toxicologist.
6.
Instrument Calibration and Validation Standard
a.
Alcohol Simulator Stock Solution will be prepared and certified by the
Toxicologist and distributed to all participating Agencies by the
CTAU.
b.
The Alcohol Simulator Stock Solution shall be used to prepare the
field Alcohol Breath Simulator solutions (Validation Test Solution) as
follows: 10 mL of the Alcohol Simulator Stock Solution will be
measured with a Class A volumetric TD pipette into a 500 mL Class
A volumetric TC flask.  Distilled water will be added to 500 mL.  The
mixture is then transferred into the Alcohol Breath Simulator (Breath
alcohol simulated concentration is 0.100%).
7.
Instrument Maintenance Tests
A certified Breathalyzer Maintenance Technician will perform a Simulator
Test (Maintenance) on each certified instrument twice each month.  The first
test will be conducted between the first and the 15th day of each month.  The
second will be conducted between the 16th and the last day of each month. 
 App. 5
- 44 -
These tests must be conducted using a freshly prepared Validation Test
Solution (0.100%).  The results of the test must not be less than 0.095% or
greater than 0.105% using the 0.100% solution.  Instruments failing to meet
this tolerance must be removed from further use until repaired.  Instruments
which are repaired by a certified Breathalyzer Maintenance Technician to
meet the above tolerance may be returned to service by the Breathalyzer
Maintenance Technician.
B.
Personnel
Requests for the training of Breathalyzer Operators or other personnel should be
submitted in writing to the Supervisor, CTAU.
App. 5 cont.