Title: STATE v DeGEORGE KENNEDY HOLMA

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13562 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1976 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondent, ED DeGEORGE, WILLIAM KENNEDY and E. J. HOLMAN, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Second Judicial D i s t r i c t , Hon. James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Mark P. Sullivan argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent : John G. Winston argued, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Jack Parker argued, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Luxan and Murfitt, Helena, Montana Terence B e Cosgrove argued, Helena, Montana Submitted : October 20, 1976 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding wherein defendants- appellants petitioned f o r a s t a y of execution of a judgment of conviction and f o r f e i t u r e of public o f f i c e . Counsel was heard ex p a r t e and t h e matter taken under advisement. There- a f t e r t h e Court ordered an adversary hearing and stayed execution of t h e judgment u n t i l t h e f u r t h e r order of t h e Court. The adversary hearing was held, b r i e f s f i l e d , o r a l argu- ment had and t h e cause submitted. It appears t h a t defendants were charged with o f f i c i a l misconduct, a misdemeanor, i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of S i l v e r Bow County. A jury t r i a l r e s u l t e d i n a unanimous v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and a judgment of conviction was entered. The g i s t of t h e charge w a s t h a t defendants, who w e r e t h e members of t h e board of county commissioners, had entered i n t o two c o n t r a c t s f o r county road construction, one f o r $2,898 and t h e o t h e r f o r $9,901, without f i r s t advertising f o r bids. The judgment d i d not contain any order of f o r f e i t u r e of o f f i c e a s specified i n s e c t i o n 94-7-401(4), R.C.M. 1947, a s amended, but the presiding d i s t r i c t judge advised defendants a t t h e time t h e judgment was entered t h a t they would no longer be a b l e t o perform any o f f i c i a l d u t i e s a s county commissioners be- cause of t h e application of such section. Defendants applied t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r an order staying execution which was denied. The a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s Court followed. Defendants have appealed t h e i r convictions. It i s agreed t h a t t h e only questions now before t h i s Court a r e whether o r not t h e appeal stayed t h e f o r f e i t u r e of o f f i c e , and, i f not, can such f o r f e i t u r e be stayed by t h i s Court i n view of t h e provisions of t h e s t a t u t o r y law? Section 94-7-401 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, a s amended, insofar a s herein p e r t i n e n t , provides: " ( 4 ) A public servant who has been charged as provided i n subsection (3) may be suspended from h i s o f f i c e without pay pending f i n a l judgment. Upon f i n a l judgment of conviction he s h a l l perma- nently f o r f e i t h i s o f f i c e . Upon a c q u i t t a l he s h a l l be r e i n s t a t e d i n h i s o f f i c e and s h a l l re- c e i v e a l l back pay." This paragraph i s n o t a p o r t i o n of t h e penalty s e c t i o n , which is s e c t i o n 94-7-401(2), R.C.M. 1947, and reads: " ( 2 ) A public servant convicted of t h e o f f e n s e of o f f i c i a l misconduct s h a l l be fined not t o exceed f i v e hundred d o l l a r s ($500) o r be im- prisoned i n t h e county j a i l f o r a t e r m not t o exceed s i x (6) months, o r both." Counsel admit t h a t a review of t h e c a s e s involving l i k e s i t u a t i o n s show a s p l i t of a u t h o r i t y . W e are impressed with t h e reasoning of t h e Arizona Supreme Court i n S t a t e vs. S u l l i v a n , 66 A r i z . 348, 188 P.2d 592,599, from which we quote: " * * * It is our opinion t h a t a vacancy is c r e a t e d t h e moment a judgment of conviction is entered a g a i n s t a public o f f i c e r . N o appeal o r c e r t i f i - c a t e of probable cause can avoid t h e vacancy o r t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r appointment. W e cite with approval t h e c a s e of McKannay v. Horton, 151 C a l . 711, 91 P. 598, 601, 13 L.R.A., N.S., 661, 121 Arn.St.Rep. 146, i n which t h e c o u r t s a i d : " ' * * * The only e f f e c t of an appeal and c e r t i f i - c a t e of probable cause is t o s t a y t h e execution of t h e judgment. Removal from o f f i c e i s n o t p a r t of t h e judgment of conviction i n c a s e s of felony, though a consequence which flows from it, and t h e s t a t u t e i n express t e r m s d e f i n e s and thereby l i m i t s t h e e f f e c t of t h e appeal and c e r t i f i c a t e of probable cause. * * * ' "To l i k e e f f e c t see S t a t e v. Chapmen, 187 Wash. 327, 60 P.2d 245, 106 A.L.R. 640; I n re Obergfell, 239 N.Y. 48, 145 N.E. 323. "The o b j e c t of t h e removal of a p u b l i c o f f i c e r f o r o f f i c i a l misconduct is not t o punish t h e o f f i c e r , b u t t o improve t h e public s e r v i c e . The public i n t e r e s t demands t h a t public a f f a i r s be administered by o f f i c e r s upon whom rests no stigma of conviction of a felony, o r of any offense in- volving a v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . " The Annotation i n 71 ALR2d 593, 600, d i s c u s s e s many c a s e s and t h e annotator s t a t e s : "A majority of t h e c a s e s , where t h e r e w e r e provisions declaring, i n substance, t h a t a public o f f i c e s h a l l become vacant upon t h e incumbent's conviction of a felony o r c e r t a i n o t h e r crimes, have held t h a t , notwithstanding an appeal, t h e r e was a conviction within t h e meaning of t h e pro- v i s i o n s and t h a t such conviction caused an immed- i a t e vacancy, d e s p i t e t h e appeal, t h e c o u r t s i n most instances reasoning, t o one degree o r another, along t h e following l i n e s : t h a t t h e vacancy i n , o r removal from, o f f i c e r e s u l t i n g from t h e con- v i c t i o n was not a punishment and d i d not consti- t u t e p a r t of t h e judgment of conviction, but w a s a consequence imposed i n t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e public and of sound government, and t h a t it would be a g a i n s t t h i s public i n t e r e s t t o r e t a i n i n o f f i c e , pending an appeal, one who, upon a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y o r judgment and sentence by t h e c o u r t , was no longer presumed t o be innocent, but who t h e r e a f t e r , during t h e pendency of t h e appeal, w a s presumed t o be g u i l t y , even though he might ultimately succeed i n e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s innocence. Thus, an appeal, o r c e r t i f i c a t e of reasonable doubt o r probable cause, has been held t o have no e f f e c t on, and not t o avoid t h e vacancy i n o f f i c e of-- * * *". See, a l s o , People v. McGuane, 13 I11.2d 520, 150 N.E.2d I n S t a t e ex r e l . Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 456, 457, 8 P.2d 791, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " * * * It may be s a i d i n passing t h a t t h e proceed- ings before t h e p o l i c e commission, under t h e circum- stances, were i d l e and useless. * * * The a c t i o n of t h e mayor i n permanently discharging r e l a t o r was a l s o unnecessary t o h i s e f f e c t i v e removal. B y force of t h e s t a t u t e , h i s o f f i c e became vacant upon h i s conviction of t h e felony. * * *" This case w a s l a t e r overruled i n p a r t i n Melton v. Oleson, 165 Mont. 4 2 4 , 530 P.2d 466, as t o t h e holding t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i - c a t i o n of t h e offense as t o felony o r misdemeanor was t o be i n t e r - preted by t h e law of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n where t h e conviction w a s had was controlling, not t h e law of Montana. The Court i n t h e l a t t e r case held t h a t it was t h e law of Montana which c o n t r o l s and not t h e law of t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n where t h e conviction was had. This portion of t h e Anderson opinion i s not involved i n t h i s cause. It i s our holding t h a t t h e appeal does not s t a y t h e f o r f e i t u r e of t h e o f f i c e . Turning now t o t h e matter of whether o r not t h i s Court can s t a y such f o r f e i t u r e . Defendants a s s e r t t h a t they a r e e n t i t l e d t o a s t a y of t h e f o r f e i t u r e of o f f i c e by v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 95-2406, R.C.M. 1947. While t h i s s e c t i o n provides t h a t a s t a y may be granted pending an appeal i n c a s e s of d e a t h sentence, imprisonment, f i n e and probation, it c o n t a i n s no such provision with r e s p e c t t o f o r f e i t u r e of o f f i c e . Defendants contend t h a t w e should adopt a strict con- s t r u c t i o n of t h e words " f i n a l judgment" contained i n s e c t i o n 94-7-401(4), a s amended, and t h a t a public o f f i c e r should not be compelled t o vacate h i s o f f i c e u n t i l t h e " f i n a l judgment" on h i s appeal. W e do not accept such contention. Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., provides i n p a r t : "A p a r t y aggrieved may appeal from a judgment o r o r d e r , except when expressly made f i n a l by law, i n t h e following cases: " ( a ) From a f i n a l judgment entered i n an a c t i o n o r s p e c i a l proceeding commenced i n a d i s t r i c t c o u r t , o r brought i n t o a d i s t r i c t c o u r t from another c o u r t o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e body." (Emphasis supplied.) Rule 7, M.R.App.Civ.P., i n p a r t provides: " ( c ) N o s t a y of proceedings s h a l l be allowed upon a judgment o r order which adjudges t h e defendant g u i l t y of usurping, o r intruding i n t o , o r unlawfully holding public o f f i c e , c i v i l o r m i l i t a r y , within t h i s s t a t e ; o r which g r a n t s a w r i t of mandamus, o r of p r o h i b i t i o n , a g a i n s t a t r i b u n a l , corporation, public o f f i c e r , o r board, commanding c e r t a i n a c t s t o be done which ought t o be done by such t r i b u n a l , corporation, public o f f i c e r , o r board, and not involving t h e payment o r allowance of money o r its equivalent." Section 95-2404, R.C.M. 1947, i n p a r t provides: " ( a ) A n appeal may be taken by t h e defendant only from a f i n a l judgment of conviction, and o r d e r s a f t e r judgment which a f f e c t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e defendant." (Emphasis supplied.) These s e c t i o n s of our s t a t u t o r y law s p e l l o u t t h e public policy of t h e s t a t e and only i n extraordinary circumstances should t h i s Court invoke t h e a u t h o r i t y granted by Rule 6 2 ( g ) , M.R.Civ.P. Such circumstances do n o t e x i s t i n t h i s matter. Nor should w e suspend t h e r u l e s a s provided i n s e c t i o n 95-2402, R.C.M. 1947. I n view of what has been h e r e t o f o r e s t a t e d it i s our considered opinion t h a t t h e f o r f e i t u r e i s automatic upon con- v i c t i o n and i n t h i s cause it should n o t be stayed. The r e l i e f sought by t h e defendants i s t h e r e f o r e denied. L e t r e m i t t i t u r i s s u e f o r t h w i t rn -------------- ' / Chief J u s t i c e i i / J h W e concur: , ,Bone Jack Green, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s .