Title: MARIE B. MAY v. ROY McCORMICK, BY AND THROUGH LAURENCE SWALLOW, GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF ROY McCORMICK, INCOMPETENT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARIE B. MAY v. ROY McCORMICK, BY AND THROUGH LAURENCE SWALLOW, GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF ROY McCORMICK, INCOMPETENT1985 WY 108704 P.2d 709Case Number: 84-289Decided: 08/13/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARIE B. MAY, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

ROY McCORMICK, BY AND 
THROUGH LAURENCE SWALLOW, GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF ROY McCORMICK, 
INCOMPETENT, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
Robert M. Seipt 
and Steven M. Avery, Riverton, for 
appellant.

D.N. Sherard, 
Stephen N. Sherard and Rex E. Johnson, of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, 
Wheatland, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was given 
physical possession of a deed from her stepfather, which she recorded. The deed 
purported to vest title in the stepfather and appellant as joint tenants. In an 
action to set aside the deed, the trial court granted summary judgment to 
appellee, holding there was no delivery of the deed. Appellant states the issues 
as:

"Whether the summary 
judgment entered in this case on October 16, 1984, is an appealable judicial 
determination?

"Whether the court erred 
in finding that there was no genuine issue of fact on the question of delivery 
and therefore voided the deed of October 26, 1982?"

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

[¶3.]     On or about October 26, 
1982, appellant Marie May, stepdaughter of appellee Roy McCormick, accompanied 
her stepfather to the office of Frank J. Jones, attorney at law, in Wheatland, Wyoming, for the purpose of making a will and 
a deed. Mr. Jones prepared a will for Roy McCormick which left all of his 
property to Marie May. Mr. Jones also prepared a deed conveying a ranch from Roy 
McCormick to himself and Marie May as joint tenants. The subject ranch was 
previously owned by Marie May's father and mother. Upon the father's death, the 
mother became owner and upon her death Roy McCormick became owner. Marie May's 
grandmother was the original homesteader, owning the property before Marie May's 
father. Marie May recorded the deed on January 6, 1983, in Platte County, Wyoming. Laurence Swallow, guardian of Roy 
McCormick, instituted a lawsuit to set aside the October 26, 1982, deed and 
quiet title.

[¶4.]     In granting a summary 
judgment in favor of appellee, the court relied on testimony of appellant and 
Frank Jones which was produced at another proceeding. In his decision letter, 
the trial judge said:

"* * * Both defendant May 
and Attorney Frank Jones, who drafted the instrument are consistent in that the 
purpose of the custody was not to affect a present transfer. Based upon said 
testimony the court finds as a matter of law there was no delivery and that 
therefore there was no transfer of interest."

[¶5.]     We will address 
appellant's second assignment of error first.

I

[¶6.]     In determining the 
propriety of granting summary judgment, we first review our applicable rules. In 
Western Surety Company v. Town of 
Evansville, Wyo., 675 P.2d 258, 261 (1984), we 
said:

"* * * On review our duty 
is the same as that of the district court in determining whether and to what 
extent summary judgment should be entered. Dubus v. Dresser Industries, Wyo., 649 P.2d 198 
(1982).

"A party seeking summary 
judgment has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. Any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the 
party carrying that burden. [Citations.]

* * * * * 
*

"In considering all of 
the materials presented, both in support of and in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment, we view the record in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment and give to that party the benefit of 
all favorable inferences that might be drawn from those materials. 
[Citations.]"

[¶7.]     In Western Surety we 
quoted with approval Continental Aircraft 
Sales v. McDermott Brothers Company, 316 F. Supp. 232, 236 (D.C.Pa. 1970), 
as follows:

"`* * * The court, upon 
considering a motion for summary judgment is compelled to closely scrutinize the 
moving party's document; whereas, the opposing parties' papers, if any, should 
be treated with some indulgence.'"

[¶8.]     In a summary judgment 
proceeding, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate clearly that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact. Lane v. Busch Development, Inc., 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 (1983). See also Dudley v. Eastridge 
Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 
(1985).

[¶9.]     Part of the testimony 
of Marie May given in another proceeding and brought to our attention by 
appellee was as follows:

"Q. (By Stephen N. 
Sherard) And what was Frank's reaction? Do you recall Frank's words or could you 
paraphrase what he said?

"A. (Marie May) He did it 
just like Roy 
wanted him to do it. He made the deed, and then he asked him on the personal 
property, `How do you want to do that, Roy'. And he said, `I want to leave it to her. 
She will have to have it to make a living on the place with.' And he said, `I 
want her to have it'."

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Are we talking about 
the property included in the will and the deed both?

"A. Yes. Now, the deed is 
a joint deed.

"Q. But it would 
automatically go to you, all of it, upon his death, but it is still your 
understanding that you were not to get any of it, or any interest in that 
property, until Roy died?

"A. Well, I don't know 
how to say that because as a joint tenant on it I don't 
know."

[¶10.]  Part of the testimony of Frank Jones 
given in a previous proceeding was:

"Q. I guess my question 
is, or the problem that I have is, that the will would have taken care of the 
property without the deed. Was there any discussions that you can recall as to 
the reason why there was a deed?

"A. Right. He said the 
real estate was the biggest asset in the estate, valuewise, and he wanted to 
avoid probate on that.

"Q. Did you discuss value 
of that estate?

"A. I don't think 
specifically. I asked him about livestock, I recall. I don't think I inquired 
into bank accounts. I don't recall because he, again, somewhat knowing the 
family background, I was pretty sure in my own mind that there was not any 
estate tax problem, so we didn't spend much time at all on estate planning as 
such.

"Q. But, I guess I 
understand you to say that the deed was for the purpose of taking care of estate 
planning or gift and estate tax purposes?

"A. Right. He said he 
wanted to get the real estate, typically, out of estate, so it wouldn't have to 
go through Court again. I don't recall his language, but he wanted to have it 
pass, probably he said, without lawyers getting their fingers in the pot. I 
don't remember if he said that or not, but he sure could 
have."

 

[¶11.]  It is clear in the testimony that Marie 
May did not realize the legal significance of a deed in joint tenancy. Testimony 
by Marie May that suggests that she was not to get the property until after the 
death of Roy McCormick, in context, was not referring to legal title but to the 
benefits of title, such as income from property and physically occupying the 
property. If the deed was to be effective only after the death of Roy McCormick, 
as appellee seems to contend, it would not have been logical to make a deed in 
joint tenancy.

[¶12.]  In Rothney v. Rothney, 41 Cal. App. 2d 566, 
107 P.2d 294, 296 (1940), it was stated:

"`* * * Delivery is a 
question of fact which is to be determined from the circumstances surrounding 
the particular transaction. The intention to pass immediate and irrevocable 
title to the property interest is the essential fact for consideration. It 
should be stated that there is a vital distinction between the use of the term 
delivery, which might simply designate the mere transfer of physical custody or 
possession of the deed, and the use of the term in legal contemplation as 
constituting the necessary delivery required for "execution" of a deed. This 
distinction must be kept in mind in considering the circumstances presented by 
this action.'"

"A strong presumption of 
delivery of a deed arises from its possession by the grantee or one claiming 
under him. In other words, possession of a deed of property by the grantee 
therein named * * * is prima facie evidence of its delivery, and of the 
grantor's intent then to vest in the grantee the title to the property therein 
described. * * *" 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 159, p. 183 (1983).

"The fact that the 
grantor reserved a life estate for himself or contemporaneously received a life 
lease from the grantee is some evidence that an immediate conveyance of title 
was contemplated, on the theory that the reservation indicates an intent that 
title should immediately vest in the grantee. Similarly, evidence of the 
grantor's intention to reserve an equitable right or equitable title, or a 
showing of an agreement that the grantee would reconvey the legal title to the 
grantor, necessarily indicates an intent that title was to pass to the grantee. 
* * *" 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 167, p. 189. (1983).

[¶13.]  In Herr v. Herr, 13 N.J. 79, 98 A.2d 55, 59 
(1953), it was stated:

"And the proofs establish 
the essential element of delivery. The conveyance was made to husband and wife; 
and the circumstance that, after recording, the deed was retained by the husband 
does not repel the inference otherwise compelling of his intention to make the 
deed immediately effective as a conveyance of the land. Indeed, plaintiff 
himself revealed in his testimony a design by the conveyance to take the 
property out of the inheritance tax category; and delivery was essential to the 
effectuation of that purpose.

"The essence of delivery 
is the intent to `perfect the instrument' and thereby make an immediate transfer 
of the title to the grantee; and the intent may be deducible from the 
circumstances or the acts or words of the grantor. [Citations.] * * 
*"

[¶14.]  When the grantor of a deed properly 
executes it and surrenders possession, he is presumed to have divested himself 
of all title and interest he owned in the property, and some clear and 
convincing proof to the contrary must be shown before the deed can be properly 
set aside. Boys v. Long, Okla., 268 P.2d 890, 893 
(1954).

[¶15.]  In considering the testimony of appellant 
and attorney Jones in a light most favorable to appellant and giving her the 
benefit of all favorable inferences from such testimony, we do not believe that 
appellee has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Western Surety Company v. Town of 
Evansville, supra. Therefore, the summary judgment was improperly granted. 
See also, Dudley v. Eastridge Development 
Company, supra. 

[¶16.]  There is evidence here that Roy McCormick 
wanted Marie May to have his ranch; that he created a joint tenancy as 
contemplated by § 34-1-140, W.S. 19771; that he desired to convey to Marie 
May a ranch in joint tenancy; that as an estate planning device, he wanted to 
transfer his ranch out of his estate to save probate costs2; that it was contemplated by Marie 
May and Roy McCormick that the latter would remain in possession and receive the 
income from the ranch during his lifetime. The evidence which we have just 
delineated, together with favorable inferences, is not inconsistent with vesting 
title to the ranch in Marie May at the time she was given possession of the 
deed. If delivery of this deed for the purpose of vesting title and recording 
during the lifetime of Roy McCormick was not intended as appellee contends, his 
stated purpose in saving costs may have been frustrated. Herr v. Herr, 
supra.

[¶17.]  Roy McCormick, remaining in possession of 
the ranch and receiving the income from it during his lifetime, does not defeat 
the vesting of title in Marie May. This is not an uncommon arrangement when the 
tenants of a joint tenancy deed are parent and child. The court improperly 
granted summary judgment.

II

[¶18.]  There is no merit to appellant's first 
issue on appeal. Appellee asserted the invalidity of the deed in question on 
four theories, namely, incompetency of grantor, invalid delivery, invalidity due 
to fraud, and to quiet title against appellant. The determination that there was 
no valid delivery of the deed on the one cause of action rendered the issues 
moot in the other three causes.

[¶19.]  The court having found for appellee on 
one of the theories and having declared the deed void, there was no purpose in 
proceeding on the other three theories to see if the court could find other 
reasons to declare the deed void. However, appellee is free in future 
proceedings to reassert any one or more of the four theories set out in his 
original complaint for setting aside the deed.

[¶20.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1 "A joint tenancy or a 
tenancy by the entirety as to any interest in real or personal property may be 
established by the owner thereof, by designating in the instrument of conveyance 
or transfer, the names of such joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, 
including his own, without the necessity of any transfer or conveyance to or 
through a third person." § 34-1-140, W.S. 1977.

2 While creating a joint 
tenancy, as was done here, is not an uncommon device to avoid probate, we 
express no opinion on whether or not this is a sound estate planning 
scheme.