Title: Attorney Grievance v. Siskind

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. William L. Siskind, Misc. Docket AG
No. 22, Sept. Term 2006.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE - CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH FORMER CLIENT -
COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE - AN ATTORNEY’S FIDUCIARY
DUTY TO PROTECT A FORMER CLIENT’S CONFIDENCES IS A BROADER
OBLIGATION IN AN ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY MATTER THAN THE
EVIDENTIARY RULE GOVERNING ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE - MISCONDUCT - AN ATTORNEY VIOLATES MRPC 8.4(C)
BY MAKING AN INTENTIONALLY FALSE STATEMENT, OR ONE HE OR SHE
KNOWS TO BE FALSE, RATHER THAN ONE THAT MERELY IS THE RESULT OF
A MISTAKE OR MISUNDERSTANDING
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case # 24-C-06-006167
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 22
September Term, 2006
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND
v.
WILLIAM L. SISKIND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.
Raker
         *Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially
assigned),
JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Harrell, J.
______________________________________
Filed: August 24, 2007
*Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed
1The pre-1 July 2005 version of Rule 1.4, which was in effect at the time of its alleged
violation by Respondent, stated:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
2The pre-1 July 2005 version of Rule 1.7 stated:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(c) The consultation required by paragraphs (a) and (b) shall include
(continued...)
2
with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the “Petition”) against
William L. Siskind (“Respondent”), alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) in connection with his transactions involving a business
associate named Frank Zokaites.  Respondent is charged with violations of MRPC 1.4
(Communication),1 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule),2 1.8 (Conflict of Interest:
(...continued)
explanation of the implications of the common representation and any
limitations resulting from the lawyer’s responsibilities to another, or from the
lawyer’s own interests, as well as the advantages and risks involved.
3The pre-1 July 2005 version of Rule 1.8, in pertinent part, stated:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business, financial or property transaction
with a client unless:
(1) the transaction is fair and equitable to the client; and
(2) the client is advised to seek the advice of independent legal
counsel in the transaction and is given a reasonable opportunity
to do so.
4The pre-1 July 2005 version of Rule 1.9, in pertinent part, stated:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as these Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
5The pre-1 July 2005 version of Rule 1.15, in pertinent part, stated:
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting
(continued...)
3
Prohibited Transactions),3 1.9 (Conflict of Interest: Former Client),4 1.15 (Safekeeping of
Property),5 8.1 (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters),6 and 8.4(c) (Misconduct).7  The
(...continued)
regarding such property.
6The pre-1 July 2005 version of Rule 8.1, in pertinent part, stated:
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact.
7The pre-1 July 2005 version of Rule 8.4(c) provided:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
*                                      *                                     *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
4
case was referred to the Honorable Barry G. Williams of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact and recommended conclusions
of law.
At the hearing before Judge Williams on 23 January 2007, Petitioner abandoned all
of the violation allegations contained in the Petition save those of MRPC 1.9 and 8.4(c).  On
8 March 2007, Judge Williams, in his written findings and conclusions, concluded that
Respondent violated MRPC 1.9 and 8.4(c).
I. The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judge Williams rendered the following facts and conclusions of law, purporting to be
based on clear and convincing evidence.
A. Respondent’s Former Representation of 101 Charles, LLC (MRPC 1.9)
8At the time 101 Charles was formed, Zokaites obtained an indirect ownership interest
in the Jefferson Building by virtue of his 50% stake in 101 Charles, which held the deed to
the building.  In 2004, TCL sold its 50% stake in 101 Charles to Zokaites, making him the
sole owner of the entity controlling the building.
5
On 15 February 2004, Respondent filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City “individually and as attorney for Transamerican Commercial, Ltd.,” (“TCL”), against
101 Charles, LLC (“101 Charles”) and Zokaites, seeking to enforce the terms of a contract
executed on 15 September 2004 which conveyed ownership of 101 Charles from TCL to
Zokaites.  The entity, 101 Charles, was formed in July 2002 for the purpose of renovating
and marketing an office building in downtown Baltimore known as the Jefferson Building.8
Despite his protestations to the contrary, Respondent formerly represented 101
Charles as its attorney from the entity’s inception in July 2002 until 15 September 2004.  In
addition to serving as 101 Charles’s general counsel, Respondent performed significant legal
work on behalf of 101 Charles.  In July 2002, Respondent entered into a Purchase Agreement
and Addendum with Zokaites to transfer the Jefferson Building from Respondent to the
newly formed 101 Charles.  That Purchase Agreement indicated that “[Respondent] will
provide an attorney’s letter of title to Zokaites and [101 Charles]. [Respondent] will not
charge Zokaites or [101 Charles] any fees for legal work performed in connection with the
Property and this Agreement.”  (emphasis added).  Further, Respondent prepared a deed
conveying the Jefferson Building from TCL to 101 Charles.
Because Respondent formerly represented 101 Charles, the hearing judge determined
that Respondent violated MRPC 1.9 when he initiated the contract suit on 15 February 2005
6
against his former client.  The lawsuit he filed on behalf of TCL and himself involved the
same or a substantially related matter to the 15 September 2004 transference of TCL’s
member shares in 101 Charles to Zokaites because the suit sought to enforce the terms of the
contract effectuating the transfer.  According to the hearing judge, because Respondent
indirectly owned and controlled 50% of 101 Charles through his ownership of TCL, he
“necessarily had confidential information regarding 101 Charles.”  Further, there existed a
substantial risk that Respondent disclosed and used confidential information in filing suit
against his former client, 101 Charles.  Finally, TCL’s and Respondent’s pecuniary interests
were materially adverse to those of 101 Charles because, if the Respondent’s lawsuit was
successful, his former client could have been required to pay over $300,000 in damages to
Respondent and TCL.
B. Zokaites’s Loan to TCL (MRPC 8.4(c))
In March 2002, Zokaites loaned $151,550.00 to Respondent to enable Respondent to
satisfy an architect’s lien on a New Mexico investment property known as La Mesa Race
Track, which is owned partially by Respondent.  The Collateral Agreement for the March
2002 loan stated, “Zokaites has agreed to lend the total sum of $151,550.00 to [Respondent]
in accordance with the terms of a Note entered into by [Respondent].”  (emphasis added).
The Collateral Agreement made two other references to Respondent as a party to, and
recipient of, the loan.  Respondent understood fully the Collateral Agreement.  Contradicting
the Collateral Agreement, however, was a Promissory Note dated 20 March 2002 indicating
that the borrower of the $151,550.00 was TCL.  The Promissory Note was drafted and signed
7
by Respondent on behalf of TCL.  Further, a mortgage, dated 4 April 2002, refers to the
$151,550.00 loan, stating that TCL is the mortgagor.  The mortgage was drafted and signed
by Respondent on behalf of TCL.
Respondent, when drafting and signing legal documents, generally uses his name and
TCL interchangeably.  Thus, it was not a mistake or oversight when Respondent used his
own name as the borrower in the Collateral Agreement.  Another example of this
synonymous use was found in the Purchase Agreement, dated 9 July 2002, of the Jefferson
Building in Baltimore.  In the Purchase Agreement, Respondent described himself as the
owner of the Jefferson Building, but the deed later conveying the building to 101 Charles
listed TCL as the owner.  The deed was signed by Respondent on behalf of TCL.  At other
times, however, Respondent was more precise in using his name or that of TCL.  For
example, Respondent, in drafting the Addendum to the Purchase Agreement, appeared to
appreciate the legal ramifications of using his name at certain points and that of TCL at
others.
Furthermore, Respondent made inconsistent statements about the identity of the loan
recipient regarding the New Mexico property.  In a 20 May 2005 letter to Bar Counsel,
Respondent stated, “I negotiated with Zokaites” and “I secured the loan by a promissory note
signed by me, individually.  As a bonus for lending me the money I promised Zokaites a 2%
interest in my 50% interest either in the sale of La Mesa Track, or the same interest in the net
income produced by the track if my partner of 50% and I developed it.”  (emphasis added).
In a letter to Bar Counsel several months later, however, Respondent characterized the same
8
transaction as a loan to La Mesa, LLC.  In that same letter, Respondent indicated that
$126,500.00 of the loan was deposited into a bank account controlled by Respondent at
Carrollton Bank and, further, that some $13,668.51 not used to pay off the lien on the race
track and satisfy legal fees, “per agreement of Mr. Zokaites, was to be used as [Respondent]
saw fit.”  (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Respondent personally borrowed money from Zokaites.  In a 5 April
2004 deposition of him taken in the course of his personal bankruptcy case, however,
Respondent stated, “I have not personally borrowed any money from Mr. Zokaites.”  In
responses to discovery in the present disciplinary matter, Respondent indicated that his sworn
answers at the deposition in the bankruptcy matter were not accurate or true.  Contrary to his
assertions that he was mistaken at the deposition, Respondent knowingly testified falsely
under oath when he stated that he never personally borrowed money from Zokaites.  This
knowingly false testimony violates MRPC 8.4(c) according to Attorney Grievance
Commission v. White, 354 Md. 346, 367, 731 A.2d 447, 459 (1999).
C. Respondent’s Assertion that Zokaites was his Client (MRPC 8.4(c))
At the 5 April 2004 deposition in his personal bankruptcy case, Respondent answered
a question seeking the identification of Zokaites by replying, “He is a client of mine and my
son’s, and I have some business with him.”  Respondent thereafter in the deposition invoked
attorney-client privilege as the basis for refusing to answer inquiries whether Zokaites loaned
him money.
Although Respondent was aware that his deposition testimony was under oath, he now
9
asserts that his testimony was incorrect and the result of confusion related to his advanced
age.  This explanation was found unsatisfactory and incredible by Judge Williams in light
of the fact that, during the hearing on the Petition, Respondent was otherwise able to provide
detailed and thorough descriptions of the complex business transactions he structured with
Zokaites and others.  Respondent’s excuse is also undermined by the complicated legal and
business documents drafted and/or signed by him.  Therefore, Respondent failed to prove his
defense of mistake by a preponderance of the evidence.  It is undisputed that Respondent
never served as Zokaites’s attorney.  Thus, Respondent knowingly testified falsely under oath
in violation of MRPC 8.4(c) when he indicated that he was Zokaites’s attorney.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review for attorney disciplinary matters is succinctly summarized in
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Zdravkovich, 375 Md. 110, 825 A.2d 418 (2003):
This Court exercises “‘original and complete jurisdiction for
attorney disciplinary proceedings in Maryland,’ and conducts
‘an independent review of the record.’”  “In conducting that
review, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as prima
facie correct unless shown to be ‘clearly erroneous,’ and we give
due regard to the hearing judge’s opportunity to assess the
credibility of witnesses.”  “As to the hearing judge’s conclusions
of law,” however, “‘our consideration is essentially de novo.’”
 375 Md. at 126, 825 A.2d at 427 (citations omitted).
In reaching the findings of fact to which we bestow a good measure of deference in
our review, the hearing judge must “apply the clear and convincing standard of proof when
weighing the evidence.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 16, 904 A.2d
10
477, 486 (2006) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 389, 784 A.2d
516, 523-24 (2001)); Maryland Rule 16-757(b).  “The clear and convincing standard of proof
lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard, which is generally applied
to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is applied to most crimes.”
Ward, 394 Md. at 16, 904 A.2d at 486 (citing Harris, 366 Md. at 389, 784 A.2d at 523).  The
attorney subject to the disciplinary hearing may assert “an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or attenuation[, but] has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a
preponderance of the evidence.”  Maryland Rule 16-757(b); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50-51, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).
III. Respondent’s Exceptions
After receiving three extensions of the filing deadline from us, Respondent filed
exceptions to Judge Williams’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on 14 May 2007.
Stated generally, Respondent advanced the following exceptions: (1) the hearing judge found
erroneously that Respondent knowingly made a false statement at the bankruptcy deposition
by asserting that he was Zokaites’s attorney; (2) Respondent’s assertion of attorney-client
privilege at his bankruptcy deposition did not violate MRPC 8.4(c) because the assertion did
not prevent the deposing attorney from acquiring the information he sought; (3) the hearing
judge found erroneously that Respondent made a false statement at the deposition when he
testified that he had not borrowed personally any funds from Zokaites; (4) the hearing judge
wrongfully did not require Bar Counsel to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent intended to testify falsely at the deposition; (5) the hearing judge, once
11
convinced that the Respondent made a false statement, incorrectly placed the burden on
Respondent to prove that his misstatement was an innocent one; (6) the hearing judge failed
to find explicitly that Respondent intended to make false statements;(7) the hearing judge
concluded erroneously that there was a “substantial relationship” between Respondent’s
former representation of 101 Charles and the 2004 transaction which served as the basis for
Respondent’s contract action against 101 Charles, (8) the hearing judge neglected to find that
101 Charles waived the conflict of interest presented by Respondent’s representation of TCL
by failing to object to Respondent’s appearance; and (9) the hearing judge erred by not
recognizing that former business partners who are having a falling out and sue each other
have no right of confidentiality as to their previous communications with each other or their
lawyer.
A. Respondent’s Former Representation of 101 Charles, LLC (MRPC 1.9)
1. No Substantial Relationship
Respondent first argues that his representation of 101 Charles was limited only to
creating the deed, articles of incorporation, and an opinion letter related to the transfer of a
50% interest in 101 Charles to Zokaites.  Further, Respondent asserts that Jeffrey Siskind (his
son, who is an attorney in Florida) and Zokaites prepared and signed the later Purchase
Agreement, executed on 15 September 2004, which transferred TCL’s member shares in 101
Charles to Zokaites.  Respondent also disputes the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent
drafted both the 20 March 2002 Promissory Note for the La Mesa loan made by Zokaites and
the Addendum to the 2004 Purchase Agreement.  This limited involvement in the affairs of
12
101 Charles, in the opinion of Respondent, is not substantially related to the litigation for
which Respondent represents TCL against 101 Charles.
In support of this position, Respondent argues that the hearing judge misapplied this
Court’s standard, articulated in Gatewood v. State, 388 Md. 526, 880 A.2d 322 (2005), for
determining whether two legal matters are substantially related for the purposes of conflict
of interest analysis.  In particular, Respondent contends that Bar Counsel failed to prove that
there was a substantial risk that information confidential to 101 Charles was utilized by
Respondent in his later suit against 101 Charles.  As an illustration, Respondent relies upon
Gatewood for the proposition that it was error to conclude that there was a substantial
relationship, because neither Bar Counsel nor the hearing judge undertook a close
examination of the facts relating to Respondent’s previous representation of 101 Charles to
determine if Respondent was using confidential information.  In Gatewood, the trial judge,
once alerted to a possible conflict in a criminal case, quizzed the allegedly conflicted
prosecuting attorney to satisfy himself that the attorney could not recall confidential
information gained from prior representation of the then-defendant while serving as his
public defender in an earlier, unrelated matter.  388 Md. at 532-36, 880 A.2d at 325-28.
We do not accept, similar to the hearing judge’s view, Respondent’s bald assertion
that he did not compose the 2004 Purchase Agreement.  The hearing judge made a finding
of fact, based on his evaluation of the evidence and observation of Respondent as a witness,
that Respondent performed legal work for 101 Charles, including the drafting and execution
of the Purchase Agreement.  The hearing judge’s findings are supported by the requisite
13
quantum of proof.
The pertinent consideration here is whether Respondent’s previous representation of
101 Charles is “substantially related” to the contract action Respondent filed against 101
Charles on behalf of TCL.  As we said in Gatewood, “‘substantially related’ embraces
consideration of circumstances where the same issue is litigated, albeit for a different client,
if there is a substantial risk that confidential communications between the attorney and his
or her former client may be disclosed or utilized in a material manner prejudicial to the
former client.”  388 Md. at 544, 880 A.2d at 332-33.
By operation of law, Respondent is assumed to possess confidential information
pertaining to 101 Charles because he served as the entity’s attorney.  Buckley v. Airshield
Corp., 908 F. Supp. 299, 306 (D. Md. 1995) (quoting Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists,
Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724, 731 (E.D. Va. 1990)) (“It is well settled that once an attorney-client
relationship has been established, an irrebuttable presumption arises that confidential
information was conveyed to the attorney in the prior matter.”).  This presumption arises in
the present case because of the level of Respondent’s involvement with 101 Charles’s affairs.
Respondent’s intimate involvement in the preparation of various legal and business
documents relating to 101 Charles, from the moment of its inception until the transaction
which made Zokaites its sole owner, demonstrates that Respondent possessed significant
knowledge of its affairs, arguably more than anyone.  His guiding hand was involved in
every legal transaction affecting 101 Charles.  He recounted detailed information regarding
the entity for purposes of this and other litigation.  It is beyond reasonable contention that
14
Respondent was equipped with confidential information bearing on the contract action he
initiated against his former client.  Further, Respondent’s recall, for purposes of his defense
at the hearing on this disciplinary action, of details relating to the transactions affecting 101
Charles supports the notion that such information still resided within Respondent’s memory
at the time he filed suit against his former client.
Accordingly, we are unmoved by Respondent’s argument that the hearing judge failed
to make express findings as to what specific confidential information regarding 101 Charles
Respondent possessed and used.  Respondent appears to fault the hearing judge for not
querying Respondent in the same probing manner as the trial judge did for the Public
Defender, turned State’s Attorney, who previously defended, in another case, the same
defendant he was now prosecuting.  Gatewood, 388 Md. at 532-36, 880 A.2d at 325-28.
Interrogation is not required in every case.  Gatewood does not stand for the proposition that
judges themselves must conduct an exhaustive inquisition of potentially conflicted attorneys.
The facts in Gatewood, rather, were unique.  There the trial judge was moved to pose
questions to the potentially conflicted attorney as the result of two oral motions to disqualify
the attorney.  In other contexts, all that may be required is that a judge, in the course of his
or her deliberations, “examine the nature and scope of the prior and present representation
and determine whether confidences might have been disclosed in the course of the prior
representation which could be relevant to the present action.”  Buckley, 908 F. Supp. at 304-
05.  It is clear to us that Judge Williams observed the relevant considerations on the record
before him and we find no error infecting his conclusion.
15
2. Any Confidentiality Was Destroyed by the Contract Suit
Respondent stakes out an alternative position where he argues that any confidential
information he may have attained by virtue of formerly representing both 101 Charles and
TCL may be wielded against 101 Charles in a subsequent suit against it by TCL as
represented by Respondent.  This position purportedly is supported by a principle of law
known variably as the “common interest doctrine” or the “joint representation doctrine.”  As
this doctrine goes, confidential information divulged by co-clients to a shared attorney loses
its confidential nature when litigation arises between the former co-clients as the result of a
breakdown in their common interest.  See In re Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F.
Supp. 381, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Hillerich & Bradsby v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d
124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998); Opus Corp. v. IBM Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (D. Minn.
1996); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 47, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Respondent reasons that, because the information he attained in the process of representing
both TCL and 101 Charles underwent the above-mentioned transmogrification from
confidential to non-confidential when TCL initiated a suit against 101 Charles, the matters
are no longer substantially related.  Accordingly, without a substantial relationship between
the previous concurrent representation and the contract claim, any utilization by him of
information gained from the concurrent representation would not present a conflict of
interest.  The argument is clever, but incorrect.
We have agreed already with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent
possessed confidential information relating to 101 Charles, obtained from his previous
16
representation of the entity.  Respondent’s alternative argument, however, gainsays the
confidential nature of that information because the attorney-client privilege that existed
between each of 101 Charles and TCL and their attorney, Respondent, was destroyed as a
result of the subsequent contract litigation.  This argument, however, fails because, for
purposes of an attorney discipline proceeding involving a conflict with a former client’s
interests, the existence of an attorney-client privilege does not matter.  Respondent overlooks
a lawyer’s broader ethical duty to avoid representing conflicting interests, which supercedes
the more narrow evidentiary concern of attorney-client privilege.  See In re Criminal
Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. 1, 5, 602 A.2d 1220, 1222 (1992) (“[T]he rule of
confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege.”).  Other jurisdictions
encountering Respondent’s species of argument have expressed the same reason for rejecting
it.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with an argument
similar to Respondent’s in an attorney disqualification case, Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s
Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (1979).  Brennan’s Inc. involved a dispute between two
camps of a federated chain of family-run restaurants spread across various Southern states.
590 F.2d at 170.  Prior to the dispute, all of the family members were stockholders and
directors in the plaintiff corporation, which controlled the New Orleans branch of the
restaurant chain, and some were stockholders and directors for the defendant corporations
controlling other chain locations in Texas, Georgia, and other parts of Louisiana.  Id.  For a
period of approximately two years, an attorney named Wegmann served as general counsel
17
for the family businesses.  Id.  In that time, he prosecuted the applications for federal
registration of several service marks.  Id.  A later rift in the family caused the division of the
restaurants into two camps and Wegmann decided to continue his representation of the
defendants and severed his connections to the plaintiff.  Id.  Subsequent to the division of the
several family restaurants among the feuding family members, a legal dispute arose over the
use of the service marks registered in the plaintiff’s name.  Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 170-
71.  Wegmann represented the defendant corporations in the suit filed by his former client
as plaintiff and submitted a counterclaim.  Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 171.  The plaintiff
moved to disqualify Wegmann based on a conflict of interest, which motion the trial court
granted.  Id.  The corporate defendants appealed that ruling, arguing that the joint
representation prevented the formation of any confidences between the parties and
Wegmann, thus obviating for Wegmann any ethical duty not to represent the defendants
against his former client.  Id.
The Brennan, Inc. court rejected the defendants’ argument.  The court began by
reciting the familiar prohibition against representing any interest materially adverse to that
of a former client when the matters are substantially related, a rule premised on the
presumption that the former representation involved the disclosure of the client’s
confidences.  Id.  Contrary to the defendants’ assertion that such a presumption does not arise
in joint representation scenarios, the court noted that “[t]he fundamental flaw in defendants’
position is a confusion of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege with the ethical duty to
preserve a client’s confidences.”  Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 172.  “[T]he ethical duty is
18
broader than the evidentiary privilege,” encompassing the protection not only of confidential
information, but “all knowledge acquired from client.”  Id.  The court stressed the fiduciary
duty that is formed when a client places his or her trust in an attorney and the obligation not
to betray that trust.  “A client would feel wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with
the aid of an attorney who formerly represented the client in the same matter.”  Id.  Finally,
the court opined that “[t]he need to safeguard the attorney-client relationship is not
diminished by the fact that the prior representation was joint with the attorney’s present
client.”  Id.
Several jurisdictions have acknowledged the wisdom of the reasoning in Brennan, Inc.
See, e.g., Exterior Sys., Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071-72 (N.D.
Ind. 2002); Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 861 (W. Va. 1995); X
Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1307-08 (E.D. Va. 1992);  Prisco v. Westgate Entm’t, Inc.,
799 F. Supp. 266, 270 (D. Conn. 1992); Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1525, 1535
(D. Kan. 1992); Anchor Packing Co. v. Pro-Seal, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1215, 1217-18 (E.D.
Mich. 1988); St. Albans Fin. Co. v. Blair, 559 F. Supp. 523, 526, aff’d, 725 F.2d 670 (3d Cir.
1983).
Even courts not relying on Brennan’s, Inc. arrive at the same conclusion.  In Knight
v. Ferguson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), two parties, who eventually became
associates in a restaurant venture, had been represented concurrently by an attorney named
Wideman.  One of the soon-to-be partners, Knight, consulted with Wideman, who was
already the Fergusons’ attorney, regarding the formation of a corporation to run a restaurant.
19
Knight, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 826.  Wideman was also retained to handle a dispute Knight had
with a party sought originally as her associate in the venture, but who backed out.  Id.
Knight invited the Fergusons to substitute for the balking erstwhile associate, which
invitation was accepted.  Id.  At some point subsequent to the formation of the business (with
Wideman’s assistance), Knight sued the Fergusons for breach of contract.  Id.  Although
initially represented by other counsel, the Fergusons retained Wideman to pursue their cross-
complaint against Knight.  Id.
The California Court of Appeals held that Wideman should be disqualified from
representing the Fergusons in the contract action against Knight because of the conflict of
interest involved.  Knight, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 829.  Wideman represented jointly both parties,
now adversaries, in forming the business venture.  Knight, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 828.  When a
conflagration regarding the business venture erupted between the parties and litigation
ensued, Knight objected to Wideman’s representation of the Fergusons.  Knight, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 826.  The Fergusons, pleading essentially the same argument proffered by
Respondent here, argued that no conflict was present because the previous joint
representation destroyed any attorney-client privilege that existed, and thus any
confidentiality concerns disappeared.  Knight, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 828.  The California court
rejected that argument, declaring that,
even if the attorney-client evidentiary privilege does not apply,
the result does not change.  “[T]he pertinent issue is the
propriety of an attorney’s representation adverse to a former
client. Our courts have distinguished the rule against
representing conflicting interests from the attorney-client
20
evidentiary privilege noting that the former is broader than the
latter.”  Thus, even where the issue of disclosure of privileged
information is absent, an attorney is properly disqualified for
violating the separate and independent duty not to represent
conflicting interests.
Knight, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 829 (quoting W. Cont’l Operating Co. v. Natural Gas Corp., 261
Cal. Rptr. 100, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)).  The Knight court further elucidated that
[t]he evidentiary privilege and the ethical duty not to disclose
confidences both arise from the need to encourage clients to
disclose all possibly pertinent information to their attorneys, and
both protect only the confidential information disclosed.  The
duty not to represent conflicting interests . . . is an outgrowth of
the attorney-client relationship itself, which is confidential, or
fiduciary, in a broader sense.  Not only do clients at times
disclose confidential information to their attorneys; they also
repose confidence in them.  The privilege is bottomed only on
the first of these attributes, the conflicting-interests rule, on
both.
Knight, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 829 (quoting W. Cont’l Operating Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06).
Put another way, there is more to the attorney-client relationship than the mere words
exchanged between client and counsel.  There is a more fundamental aspect of the
relationship that is the sense of trust and confidence a client invests in his or her chosen legal
counselor and representative.  In cases involving alleged ethical violations, this fiduciary
duty is of paramount concern.
Common sense also demonstrates the impropriety of Respondent’s action.  In the
process of crafting a clever argument to prove that no conflict existed because the
confidential information lost its confidential value, Respondent loses sight of a fundamental
test by which these questions ought to be resolved.  The Comment to MRPC 1.9 reads, in
21
relevant part: “The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter
that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter
in question.”  We are of the opinion that when Respondent filed a suit sounding in contract
against a former client, an entity he created, over a business transaction he helped construct
by creating the relevant documents now central to the contract suit, he effectively changed
sides.
The fact that Respondent joined the side of his former client’s former business partner
(who he also represented in the disputed transaction) bodes worse, not better, for Respondent.
Were we to accept Respondent’s position on this question, we would be approving precisely
the type of betrayal of confidence and fiduciary duty the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct are designed to protect.  See Hughes v. McDaniel, 202 Md. 626, 633, 98 A.2d 1, 4
(1953) (“[T]he confidential and fiduciary relationship enables an attorney to exercise a very
strong influence over his client and often affords him opportunities to obtain undue
advantage by availing himself of the client’s necessities, credulity and liberality.”).  It does
not take too vivid an imagination to perceive a situation where an attorney represents two
parties who become embroiled in a controversy over a business transaction with one another.
Under Respondent’s view of what constitutes a conflict of interest, the attorney would be
permitted to choose to represent the party he or she, in his or her professional judgment,
stood the best chance of prevailing.  This type of fair-weather loyalty and former client
poaching is forbidden; an attorney may not abandon the duty not to harm a former client
when circumstances make it expedient and/or self-serving to do so.  As the Comment to
22
MRPC 1.9 says, in pertinent part: “Information acquired by the lawyer in the course of
representing a client may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the
client.”
3. Waiver of the Conflict
Respondent’s final fallback position, as to the MRPC 1.9 violation allegation, is that,
if there existed a conflict of interest, 101 Charles waived the conflict by failing to raise an
objection to Respondent’s representation of TCL in the contract suit.  As confirmation of the
validity of his argument, Respondent relies on Gross v. SES American, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
719, 723 (D. Md. 2004), a case holding that a party may waive, by inaction, the right to move
to disqualify a conflicted attorney.  Respondent’s argument, although we do not believe it to
have been preserved properly for consideration by this Court, lacks merit.
Regarding preservation, we are guided by the notion that the procedures in an attorney
grievance case generally are the same as in a civil proceeding.  Md. Rules 16-709(e)(3)
(stating that papers and pleadings are to be filed in accordance with the rules governing
procedure in Circuit Court); 16-710(d) (same for hearing procedures); 16-756 (same for
discovery procedures).
Maryland Rule 16-754(a) requires that “[d]efenses against objections to the petition
. . . shall be stated in the answer and not by preliminary motion.”  It is well-understood that
waiver is an affirmative defense asserted appropriately in an answer, see Md. Rule 2-323(g),
as required by Rule 16-754(a).  Affirmative defenses, such as waiver, are themselves waived
if not asserted in the initial answer in civil actions.  Ocean Plaza Joint Venture v. Crouse
23
Constr. Co., 62 Md. App. 435, 445, 490 A.2d 252, 257-58 (1985).  Because Respondent
failed to assert waiver in his answer as a defense to the Petition, it could be deemed waived.
Frankly, it is easier in the present case to confront the merits of Respondent’s
argument.  It appears to us that Respondent has not met his burden of proving this affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.  Maryland Rule 16-757(b).  Respondent stakes
his argument on Gross v. SES American, Inc., where the U.S. District Court for the District
of Maryland opined that a former client waived its right to move for disqualification of its
former counsel, now acting as counsel for its rival in litigation.  The court relied, in large
part, on the untimely nature of the motion, which came approximately two years after the
date on which the conflict arose.  Gross, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 723.  Gross is inapposite here
because no similar protracted time line has been shown by Respondent.  The bare paragraph
in which the waiver argument is asserted here merely insists that 101 Charles’s competent
counsel never sought disqualification, without reference to time or any of the other factors
courts typically consider in waiver of conflict scenarios.  Id.  We are unpersuaded by
Respondent’s contention in the face of such a paucity of argument or evidence.
B. Respondent’s Alleged False Statements (MRPC 8.4(c))
Respondent excepts, on a number of fronts, to the hearing judge’s supporting findings
and conclusion that he violated MRPC 8.4(c) .  In particular, Respondent complains that the
hearing judge lacked clear and convincing evidence from which to conclude that Respondent
violated the Rule, failed to hold Bar Counsel to his burden of demonstrating that Respondent
made false statements with the intent to mislead, and misapplied the burden of proof by
24
requiring Respondent to prove that he acted innocently.
1. No Clear and Convincing Evidence of a Personal Loan
We agree with Respondent’s contention that Bar Counsel did not prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Respondent testified falsely when he asserted at the deposition in
the bankruptcy case that he had not borrowed personally money from Zokaites.  Our
conclusion is based upon the fact that the hearing judge found incorrectly that Respondent,
in fact, had borrowed personally money from Zokaites.
In determining that Respondent received a personal loan, the hearing judge placed
great reliance on the fact that Respondent and Zokaites entered into a Collateral Agreement
that made Respondent the personal beneficiary of a $151,550.00 loan from Zokaites.  The
judge then noted that the later Promissory Note indicated that the loan actually was being
made to TCL.  Confronted by this contradiction, the judge, in reviewing several documents
that allegedly showed that Respondent interchangeably employed his name and TCL’s,
surmised that Respondent treated TCL as his alter ego.  Therefore, even if the Promissory
Note stated that TCL was the borrower, the judge was persuaded that the true borrower was
Respondent.
For want of clear and convincing evidence, we do not accept the rationale employed
and conclusion reached by the hearing judge.  On the record as we see it, it was clear error
to conclude that Respondent was the borrower of the loan proceeds from Zokaites.  While
the Collateral Agreement provides that the loan was to be made to Respondent personally,
the overwhelming other evidence indicates that this agreement was aborted and a new one
25
was created, making TCL the borrower.  Contrary to the hearing judge’s conclusion, it
matters not that TCL has close ties to Respondent and that the proceeds of the loan
eventually were channeled to Respondent.  The paper trail applicable to the loan indicates
clearly that TCL was the obligor of the ultimate loan, not Respondent.  The Promissory Note
states that TCL was the borrower.  TCL repaid its obligation in September 2004 by deducting
the loan balance from the consideration Zokaites paid for TCL’s 50% interest in 101 Charles.
As broached during oral argument by a member of the Court, based on the evidence
presented by Bar Counsel, had there been a default on the loan, Zokaites would not have
been able to secure a judgment against Respondent.  Thus, we sustain Respondent’s
exception as to this basis for violating MRPC 8.4(c).
2. Respondent’s Testimony That He Represented Zokaites
Respondent also impugns the propriety of the hearing judge’s findings and
conclusions that Respondent made a false statement during the bankruptcy deposition that
he was Zokaites’s attorney.  Respondent first argues that it was not proven clearly and
convincingly that he intended to mislead the attorney representing a creditor conducting the
deposition.  He then contends that the hearing judge applied the incorrect burden of proof,
requiring Respondent to prove that he was mistaken in making the deposition statement.  For
the reasons discussed, we reject Respondent’s arguments.
Respondent attempts to draw a distinction between select other rules of attorney
conduct which require a showing that a lawyer knowingly made a false statement and MRPC
8.4(c), which he contends is violated only when the knowingly false statement is made with
9“Opposite Day” is a fictitious holiday, usually celebrated by school-aged children,
in which statements made on that day are intentionally false, but taken to mean the opposite
by listeners aware that the holiday is being celebrated.  Wikipedia.org, Opposite Day,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposite_day; see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2141 (2002). For an illustration
of “Opposite Day” in operation, see Liz Moody, Discovering the Opposite of Nothing in
Turkey, MODESTO BEE, May 20, 2007, at I2.
26
the intent to deceive or mislead.  We perceive no such distinction.  Common sense dictates
that a person who knows that his or her statement is false (conventionally known as “lying”)
necessarily has the intent to deceive.  “Opposite Day”9 notwithstanding, we are unable to
conjure a scenario in which a speaker intended to convey the truth to a listener (i.e. not
deceive) by stating what the speaker knew to be false.  Respondent offers Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Levitt, 286 Md. 231, 406 A.2d 1296 (1979), as support for his fatuous
distinction.  Not only does Levitt not mention or discuss an intent element as Respondent
intimates, the Levitt Court rather was persuaded by the context in which the knowingly false
statement was made that the predecessor rule to MRPC 8.4(c) was not violated.  286 Md. at
239, 406 A.2d at 1299-1300.  We see no similar context here.
Respondent refers to a bevy of cases supporting the unremarkable proposition that
“[i]n Maryland, a finding of deceit and misrepresentation in a disciplinary action must be
found to be intentional.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 78, 753 A.2d
17, 29 (2000) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572 A.2d
174, 179 (1990)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 478, 773
A.2d 516, 524 (2001).  The “intent” element that Respondent imagines to be the missing
27
ingredient in Bar Counsel’s allegations and proof against him means only that, “in order to
establish its case against [an attorney], Bar Counsel is required to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that [the attorney’s] supposed false statements were made with the
knowledge that such statements were false when he made them.”  Mooney, 359 Md. at 78,
753 A.2d at 29 (emphasis added).  In other words, the misrepresentation must be made by
an attorney who knows the statement is false, rather than the product of mistake,
misunderstanding, or inadvertence.  See, e.g., Jaseb, 364 Md. at 476-77, 773 A.2d at 523-24
(finding that an attorney did not knowingly misrepresent that a bankruptcy petition had been
filed, and thus violate MRPC 8.4(d), when she was operating under the mistaken impression
that it had been filed); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 673-74, 496 A.2d
672, 676-77 (1985) (affirming a hearing judge’s conclusion that an attorney did not violate
the predecessor rule to MRPC 8.4(c) when he unwittingly misrepresented the status of a
settlement offer because of a misunderstanding between the attorney and an insurance
adjuster with whom he was negotiating the settlement).  The knowledge that a statement is
false is the intent to deceive which Respondent alleges has not been found. 
In a final effort to prop up his intent element argument, Respondent discusses, in a
footnote, the varying relevance of intent in certain violations of MRPC 8.4(c).  Respondent’s
argument is not compelling.  In this footnote, Respondent argues that Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 892 A.2d 533 (2006), stands for the proposition that
intent to deceive is important in some false statement cases, but not in others.  Not only
would such an amorphous holding, without explanation of when intent was significant and
28
when not, defy logic, but Respondent plainly mischaracterizes what we held in Reinhardt.
We said there that “specific intent is not a necessary ingredient of dishonesty or
misrepresentation.”   Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 222, 892 A.2d at 540 (emphasis added).  This
was juxtaposed with our earlier statement in Reinhardt that if the conduct involved fraud,
intent would become a relevant consideration in whether there was a violation of MRPC
8.4(c).  391 Md. at 221, 892 A.2d at 540 (“For example, assuming that Bar Counsel alleged
that an attorney engaged in fraudulent conduct, evidence as to an attorney’s specific intent
would be relevant and properly considered in assessing whether Rule 8.4(c) was violated.”)
(emphasis added).  Again, illustrating the point made in the present opinion, the Reinhardt
Court found clear error in the hearing judge’s determination that an attorney did not violate
MRPC 8.4(c) by making a knowingly false statement because there was no showing of a
specific intent to be dishonest or misrepresent the truth.  391 Md. at 221-22, 892 A.2d at 540.
It was enough to find a violation of MRPC 8.4(c) that the attorney made a knowingly false
statement to his client about working on his case, when the attorney actually lost the file and
was not working on it.  391 Md. at 222, 892 A.2d at 540 (“Respondent was dishonest and
misrepresented the truth . . . .  he unquestionably told the client a lie.”).
It appears that Respondent here simply fails to appreciate the difference we have
drawn between: (1) pure acts (as opposed to words), which generally are not inherently
fraudulent or deceitful, and (2) knowingly making a false statement, which is inherently
dishonest.  In the former case, specific intent is typically necessary to be proven to
demonstrate that the conduct in question was fraudulent in fact.  On the other hand, words
29
spoken by an attorney who knows they were untrue involves an inherent intent to deceive.
As Mooney indicated, a false statement is intentionally deceitful if it is proven that the
speaker knew the statement was false.  359 Md. at 78, 753 A.2d at 29.  Contrary to
Respondent’s position, there is no additional intent element, specific or otherwise, to prove.
Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 222, 892 A.2d at 540.  We shall now examine whether the hearing
judge was clearly erroneous in finding that Respondent knew it was false to assert at the
bankruptcy deposition that Zokaites was his client.
Respondent asserted in his exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings, and has
maintained since then, that he never served as legal counsel to Zokaites.  Respondent states
that he only asserted during the bankruptcy deposition that he had so served because the
close business relationship between the two men might have led Zokaites to believe that
Respondent was his attorney, thus obligating Respondent to respect and assert attorney-client
privilege.  Since the deposition, however, Respondent asserts that, in retrospect, he mostly
likely could not have been deemed to have represented Zokaites, thus explaining his change
of position on the matter.  The hearing judge disbelieved Respondent’s explanation.  We find
no basis to second-guess that assessment.  On this record, Respondent had no reason to
conclude that Zokaites believed Respondent to be his attorney, thus making knowingly false
his statement that Zokaites was his client.
Respondent’s responses to Bar Counsel’s interrogatories, admitted in evidence,
illustrate that Respondent was aware at the time of the transactions between Zokaites and 101
Charles, and later TCL, that  Zokaites was being represented by his own counsel:
30
11.  For the period from 2001 to present, list each position
and/or title you have held or continue to hold with
Transamerican Com[m]ercial, Ltd.
ANSWER: For the period from 2001 to present: General
Counsel.  At the 2002 settlement at which time Zokaites was
represented by Donald Graham of the Law Firm of Dillon,
McCandless, King, Coulter & Graham, LLP, I signed
documents on behalf of Transamerican Com[m]ercial, Ltd.  And
also executed the 101 Charles, LLC Operating Agreement on
behalf of Transamerican Com[m]ercial, Ltd.
Respondent also knew that, prior to the time at which the 101 Charles venture was launched,
Zokaites was represented by the same firm, in addition to local counsel in Baltimore:
13.  If you contend you advised Frank Zokaites to seek the
advice of independent counsel before investing in Einstein
Clinical Laboratories, S.A., [(around 2001)] state when you
advised him to seek independent counsel and how you
communicated such advice to him.
ANSWER: I did not advise Mr. Zokaites to seek independent
counsel, knowing that he was always represented by George
Brown as local counsel in Baltimore, and by Donald P.
Graham, [of] Dillion, McCandless, King, Coulter & Graham,
LLP in Pennsylvania.
(emphasis added).  Respondent attached as an exhibit to his answers a letter he dispatched
to Zokaites’s Pennsylvania attorney regarding the closing on the 101 Charles transaction.
His discovery responses and the letter demonstrate that, for the time during which
Respondent claimed in the bankruptcy deposition testimony he was Zokaites’s attorney,
Respondent thought and acted in a manner that showed Respondent actually believed others
to be representing Zokaites’s interests rather than himself.
10As support for this argument, Respondent relies on a contingent stipulation reached
between him and Bar Counsel in a Proposed Reprimand disposition of this case (one
ultimately not accepted by the Court in this matter) that Zokaites reasonably believed
Respondent to be his attorney.  Bar Counsel moved to strike the inclusion of this information,
which motion we grant, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-737(d).
31
Respondent, however, argues that Zokaites may have thought otherwise.10  We do not
see how.  An attorney-client relationship is formed when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the
lawyer provide legal services for the person; and . . .
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to
do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the person reasonably relies on the
lawyer to provide the services
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 174, 821 A.2d 414, 425 (2003)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000)).
Respondent, however, presented nothing to substantiate his affirmative defense that Zokaites
reasonably believed Respondent to be his attorney.  Although Respondent claims that he
created 101 Charles at Zokaites’s behest, that does not, per se, result inescapably in the
creation of an attorney-client relationship.  Rather the facts and circumstances surrounding
the situation in this record, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 650-51, 732
A.2d 876, 883 (1999), dictate that no such relationship was formed.
Unlike the factual scenario in Brooke, Respondent previously had not represented
Zokaites.  Moreover, Respondent’s creation of 101 Charles was not the act of an attorney
dutifully carrying out the wishes of a client, but rather a self-interested business maneuver.
We are mindful that “[i]t does not follow . . . that an attorney-client relationship
32
automatically is created whenever, and merely because, an attorney may perform a service
for a person with whom he or she may have a business or other arrangement that is legal in
character.”  Shaw, 354 Md. at 651, 732 A.2d at 884.  Respondent formed 101 Charles out of
his own self-interest in carrying forward the business transaction between himself and
Zokaites rather than as a mere agent for Zokaites.  This conclusion is supported by the fact
that Respondent indicated that the creation of 101 Charles and the transfer of the Jefferson
Building to that entity was required so that Zokaites could take an indirect ownership in the
Jefferson Building, without making him a partial owner of TCL (Respondent’s family
enterprise), which previously owned the Jefferson Building.  Simply because Respondent
was an attorney did not make, by necessity, each of his actions in connection with Zokaites
the result of an attorney-client relationship.
Respondent also defends his statement during the deposition that he represented
Zokaites on the basis that it was an isolated example of Respondent having mis-spoken due
to his advanced age of 82.  This defense fails for two reasons.  First, Respondent’s theory is
contradicted by the measured position taken by Respondent’s bankruptcy counsel, Alan
Grochal, Esq., who attended the relevant deposition.  After repeated attempts by the deposing
creditor’s attorney, Richard Kremen, Esq., to extract information regarding Respondent’s
relationship with Zokaites, which efforts were rebuffed by Respondent’s continued assertion
of attorney-client privilege, Mr. Grochal reminded Mr. Kremen of the earlier letter in which
Mr. Grochal stated it was his position that information pertaining to Zokaites was protected
by attorney-client privilege.  This type of predetermined legal position, developed by Mr.
33
Grochal and asserted repeatedly by both he and Respondent, strikes us as hardly an isolated,
forgetful mis-statement by Respondent in the heat of testimonially-induced stress.  Second,
the hearing judge clearly acted within the proper range of his discretion as fact-finder to
make a demeanor-based assessment that Respondent’s assertion was not credible that his
statement during the deposition was a mistake.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 393 Md.
385, 399, 903 A.2d 360, 368 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387,
398, 842 A.2d 42, 48 (2004).  We find nothing in the record to second-guess the hearing
judge on that point.
We also do not agree with Respondent’s argument that the hearing judge applied the
incorrect burden of proof by requiring Respondent to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that Respondent merely was mistaken when he testified that he represented Zokaites.  It is
apparent to us that the hearing judge already had concluded that Respondent knew his
statement was false and was considering the mistake defense as an affirmative defense.
Respondent’s exceptions as to this MRPC 8.4(c) violation are overruled.
V. Sanction
All that remains is to determine the proper sanction for the violations of MRPC 1.9
and 8.4(c) sustained in this opinion.  Maryland Rule 16-759(c) provides that “[t]he Court of
Appeals may order (1) disbarment, (2) suspension, (3) reprimand, (4) inactive status, (5)
dismissal of the disciplinary or remedial action, or (6) a remand for further proceedings.”
Petitioner recommends that Respondent be disbarred. Respondent, on the other hand,
recommends a reprimand as the appropriate sanction.
34
“The gravity of misconduct is not measured solely by the number of rules broken but
is determined largely by the lawyer’s conduct.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Briscoe, 357
Md. 554, 568, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (2000) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Milliken,
348 Md. 486, 519, 704 A.2d 1225, 1241 (1998)).  Furthermore, “[t]he sanction for a violation
of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case, including a consideration of any mitigating factors.”  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 223,
892 A.2d at 541 (2006) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341,
375, 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005)).  Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we
conclude that disbarment is the proper sanction.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gore, 380 Md. 455, 471-72, 845 A.2d 1204,
1213 (2004), we set out the primary intendment of the attorney discipline process:
The purpose of discipline under the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect
the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.
We protect the public through sanctions against offending
attorneys in two ways: through deterrence of “the type of
conduct which will not be tolerated,” and by removing those
unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls of those
authorized to practice in this State.  The public is protected
when sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the
nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which
they were committed.
We long have held that acts of dishonesty, fraud, or misleading behavior may warrant
a sanction of disbarment.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376,
418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001), we commented generally that,
[u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like,
35
intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most
important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make
intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.
Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in any attorney’s
character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.
We also have said that “[t]actics involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, carry the risk of the
ultimate sanction by this Court.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 366,
731 A.2d 447, 458 (1999); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guberman, 392 Md. 131,
137, 896 A.2d 337, 340-41 (2006) (“[C]andor and truthfulness are two of the most important
moral character traits of a lawyer.”) (citations omitted).
The hearing judge found no mitigating circumstances.  With 59 years experience as
a member of the Maryland Bar, Respondent should have appreciated the extent of his
responsibility to act with complete honesty, but failed to comport himself properly.
Accordingly, the proper sanction is disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(C), FOR
WHICH SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
COMMISSION AGAINST WILLIAM
L. SISKIND.