Title: Dworning v. Euclid

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Dworning v. Euclid, 119 Ohio St.3d 83, 2008-Ohio-3318.] 
 
 
 
DWORNING, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF EUCLID ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Dworning v. Euclid, 119 Ohio St.3d 83, 2008-Ohio-3318.] 
Employment discrimination — R.C. 4112.99 — A public employee alleging 
employment discrimination in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 need not 
exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to a civil service commission 
before pursuing the civil action allowed in R.C. 4112.99. 
(No. 2007-0307 – Submitted January 22, 2008 – Decided July 8, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 87757, 2006-Ohio-6772. 
–––––––––––––––––– 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A public employee alleging employment discrimination in violation of R.C. 
Chapter 4112 need not exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to a 
civil service commission before pursuing the civil action allowed in R.C. 
4112.99. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we are asked to determine whether a 
public employee who alleges discriminatory practices must first exhaust the 
public employer’s administrative remedies before pursuing the civil action 
allowed by R.C. Chapter 4112.  We hold that the employee need not do so. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} Appellee Michael Dworning was employed by appellant city of 
Euclid for almost 30 years as a firefighter and was serving as fire chief at the time 
of his separation from employment.  Under Section 7, Article V, Charter of the 
City of Euclid, the fire chief is a member of the classified service.  On March 4, 
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2004, the mayor of Euclid sent a letter to the Euclid Civil Service Commission, 
stating that Dworning was terminated from his position effective February 20, 
2004.  A few days later, the mayor sent another letter to the commission, 
indicating that Dworning had submitted a retirement notice on March 8, 2004, 
effective as of February 20, 2004. 
{¶ 3} Dworning did not file an appeal with the commission to contest his 
employment termination.  Instead, he instituted this action on October 26, 2004, 
against appellants, the city of Euclid, Thomas Cosgriff, Jim Slivers, and two John 
Does.  The complaint alleged claims of discrimination based on disability, aiding 
unlawful discriminatory practices, invasion of privacy through disclosure of 
privileged medical information, defamation, breach of employment contract, and 
civil conspiracy. 
{¶ 4} Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
Dworning’s complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because he failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not appeal his alleged 
constructive discharge to the commission.  The trial court granted appellants’ 
motion for summary judgment on this ground. 
{¶ 5} The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed.  The appellate court 
concluded:  
{¶ 6} “In the end, we are left with choosing between a judge-made rule 
of convenience over a clearly defined statutory right.  We continue to adhere to 
the fundamental principles supporting the exhaustion doctrine.  In the main, they 
have the salutary effect of promoting judicial economy and efficiency.  We cannot 
however, apply a doctrine of ‘judicial convenience’ when the General Assembly 
has so very clearly provided for a right of private action with the intent that it has 
priority over other laws.  The remedial purposes of the discrimination laws are not 
served by requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.  We therefore hold 
that a separated civil service employee who has administrative remedies available 
January Term, 2008 
3 
to him by way of a civil service appeal is not required to exhaust those remedies 
as a predicate to filing a private disability discrimination action under R.C. * * * 
4112.99.”  Dworning v. Euclid, 8th Dist. No. 87757, 2006-Ohio-6772, ¶ 65. 
{¶ 7} We accepted this case as a discretionary appeal.  Appellants 
contend that to sustain the utility of civil service procedures to redress alleged 
employment wrongs in the public employment setting, this court should require 
public employees to exhaust internal administrative remedies before launching 
premature, expansive, and potentially unnecessary employment lawsuits against 
public employers.  Dworning responds that because the statutory language of R.C. 
Chapter 4112 is clear and unambiguous, we should not allow a municipality to 
defeat the chapter’s purpose by requiring a public employee to exhaust internal 
administrative remedies before filing a civil action against the employer.  We 
agree with Dworning. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 8} As the Eighth District correctly noted, this case involves the 
interaction between two public policies: the policy requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and the policy against discrimination in an employment 
setting, which is codified in R.C. Chapter 4112.  Each policy will be analyzed 
before we determine their relationship to each other. 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
{¶ 9} It is a well-established principle of Ohio law that a party seeking 
relief from an administrative decision must pursue available administrative 
remedies before pursuing action in a court.  Noernberg v. Brook Park (1980), 63 
Ohio St.2d 26, 29, 17 O.O.3d 16, 406 N.E.2d 1095, citing State ex rel. Lieux v. 
Westlake (1951), 154 Ohio St. 412, 43 O.O. 343, 96 N.E.2d 414.  We have stated, 
“ ‘Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature 
interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently 
and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the 
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parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a 
record which is adequate for judicial review.’  Weinberger v. Salfi (1975), 422 
U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522.  The purpose of the doctrine 
‘* * * is to permit an administrative agency to apply its special expertise * * * in 
developing a factual record without premature judicial intervention.’  Southern 
Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan (C.A.6, 1985), 774 F.2d 693, 702.  The judicial 
deference afforded administrative agencies is to ‘* * * “prepare the way, if the 
litigation should take its ultimate course, for a more informed and precise 
determination by the Court * * *.” ’  Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(1973), 409 U.S. 289, 306, 93 S.Ct. 573, 582, 34 L.Ed.2d 525.”  Nemazee v. Mt. 
Sinai Med. Ctr. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 109, 111-112, 564 N.E.2d 477. 
{¶ 10} The exhaustion doctrine is not without exception.  For instance, 
when there is a judicial remedy that is intended to be separate from the 
administrative remedy, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
does not apply.  Basic Distrib. Corp. v. Ohio Dept. of Taxation (2002), 94 Ohio 
St.3d 287, 290, 762 N.E.2d 979. 
{¶ 11} The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a 
jurisdictional defect but is rather an affirmative defense, if timely asserted and 
maintained.  Jones v. Chagrin Falls (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 456, 674 N.E.2d 1388, 
syllabus.  In this case, appellants asserted the defense of failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies in their answer and then sought summary judgment based 
on the defense. 
{¶ 12} Pursuant to the home rule powers granted to municipalities by 
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the city of Euclid has adopted a 
charter that gives the mayor the power to remove any officer or employee of the 
city.  Section 2(D), Article IV, Euclid Charter.  That power is subject to the 
commission’s duty under Section 7, Article V, Euclid Charter, to hear appeals 
from a decision by the mayor to remove an employee. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 124.40, the commission has the authority to 
promulgate rules not inconsistent with R.C. Chapter 124.  The Local Rules of the 
Civil Service Commission provide: 
{¶ 14} “8.2  DISCHARGE OR REDUCTION IN RANK OR 
COMPENSATION.  No person in the classified service shall be discharged or 
reduced in rank or compensation without being notified, in writing, by the 
Appointing Authority or officer of the reasons of such discharge or reduction. 
{¶ 15} “8.3 
REQUEST 
FOR 
HEARING 
UPON 
SUSPENSION, 
DISCHARGE OR REDUCTION.  Any employee, officer or holder of a position 
in the classified service may request a hearing before the Appointing Authority to 
appeal the notice of suspension, discharge or reduction in rank or compensation. 
{¶ 16} “(A) Time Requirement for Defense of Charge.  Any employee, 
officer, or holder of a position in the classified service requesting a hearing before 
the Appointing Authority on discharge or reduction in rank or compensation of 
such employee, officer, or holder must make such request within ten days of 
receiving notice from the appointing officer of discharge or reduction. 
{¶ 17} “(B) Time Schedule for Hearing before Appointing Authority.  The 
appointing officer shall, within ten days of receiving a request by an employee for 
a hearing on the discharge or reduction, set the date for such hearing. 
{¶ 18} “8.4  APPEAL TO COMMISSION.  In the event of an adverse 
decision made or affirmed against an employee in the appeal to the Appointing 
Authority or officer, said employee may file an appeal with the commission.  
Such appeal for the Commission must be filed in writing within ten days after the 
date of the adverse decision. 
{¶ 19} “(A) Time Schedule for Hearing Before the Commission.  Upon 
receipt of notice of appeal, the Commission shall forthwith notify the Appointing 
Authority or officer and shall have a hearing on the issue no later than thirty days 
from the filing of the appeal with the Commission. 
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{¶ 20} “(B) Decision of Commission.  The Commission, upon hearing 
testimony, may affirm, disaffirm or modify the decision or judgment of the 
Appointing Authority. 
{¶ 21} “(C) Appeal of Commission Decision.  An employee, upon 
receiving an adverse decision from the Commission, may appeal such decision to 
the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, pursuant to the Ohio Revised 
Code.” 
{¶ 22} Appellants argue that Dworning was required to appeal to the 
commission before he could file a civil lawsuit.  Dworning asserts that the plain 
language of R.C. Chapter 4112 and the purposes behind its adoption do not 
require him to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
R.C. Chapter 4112 
{¶ 23} In Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio 
St.3d 131, 133, 543 N.E.2d 1212, we explained that “R.C. Chapter 4112 is 
comprehensive legislation designed to provide a wide variety of remedies for 
employment discrimination in its various forms.”  R.C. 4112.02 provides: 
{¶ 24} “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: 
{¶ 25} “(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, 
military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to 
discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against 
that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.” 
{¶ 26} It is also an unlawful discriminatory practice for “any person to 
aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any act declared by this section to 
be an unlawful discriminatory practice, to obstruct or prevent any person from 
complying with this chapter or any order issued under it, or to attempt directly or 
indirectly to commit any act declared by this section to be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice.”  R.C. 4112.02(J). 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 27} R.C. Chapter 4112 is remedial legislation designed to prevent and 
eliminate discrimination.  R.C. 4112.08 states: “This chapter shall be construed 
liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes, and any law inconsistent with 
any provision of this chapter shall not apply.”  See also Helmick, 45 Ohio St.3d 
131, 133, 543 N.E.2d 1212. 
{¶ 28} When enacted in 1959, R.C. Chapter 4112 established an 
administrative scheme in which complaints of discrimination were presented to 
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”).  Am.S.B. No. 10, 128 Ohio Laws 
12, 16-17.  Access to the courts was limited; a party aggrieved by a final order of 
the OCRC could seek judicial review of that order.  Id. at 18-19.  The first private 
cause of action for discrimination was created in 1969 when the General 
Assembly allowed victims of housing discrimination to file civil actions.  
Am.H.B. No. 432, 133 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2170, 2181-2182.  Shortly thereafter, 
private causes of action were granted for victims of credit discrimination, 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 151, 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1589, 1595-1596, and for victims 
of age discrimination, Am.H.B. No. 230, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2268, 2275. 
{¶ 29} In 1987, the General Assembly amended R.C. 4112.99 to provide: 
“Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive 
relief, or any other appropriate relief.”  Am.H.B. No. 5, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
1761, 1778.  In Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 135, 136, 
573 N.E.2d 1056, we declared that “[a] plain reading of this section yields the 
unmistakable conclusion that a civil action is available to remedy any form of 
discrimination identified in R.C. Chapter 4112.” 
{¶ 30} After the 1987 amendment, one who claims that discrimination has 
occurred has two avenues of recovery under R.C. Chapter 4112: administrative 
relief through the OCRC or a civil suit filed in a court of common pleas.  In Elek, 
we allowed an individual to file a civil action to remedy discrimination without 
having invoked the administrative remedies available through the OCRC.  60 
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Ohio St.3d at 138, 573 N.E.2d 1056.  We have also held that the filing of a charge 
of discrimination with the OCRC does not preclude a person from filing a civil 
action under R.C. 4112.99. Smith v. Friendship Village of Dublin, Ohio, Inc. 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 503, 506, 751 N.E.2d 1010. 
Which Public Policy Controls? 
{¶ 31} The Eighth District expressed concern that applying the exhaustion 
doctrine to discrimination claims would limit, and in some circumstances 
supersede, the private right of action under R.C. 4112.99.  The court of appeals 
also noted that a claim for disability discrimination could not be considered by the 
city’s civil service commission and that the civil service commission could not 
provide the same relief, such as money damages or injunctive relief, that would be 
available in a civil action.  Relying on this court’s holding in Elek and Friendship 
Village that R.C. 4112.99 is to be liberally construed and that R.C. 4112.08 
precludes any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of R.C. Chapter 4112, 
the Eighth District concluded that the remedial nature of R.C. 4112.99 prevails 
over the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. 
{¶ 32} Appellants attempt to distinguish Elek and Friendship Village by 
pointing out that those decisions addressed the administrative remedies offered by 
R.C. Chapter 4112 rather than the “internal administrative remedies” that public 
employers are required to provide to classified civil servants.  Appellants contend 
that this court’s decision in Nemazee, which required an employee to exhaust all 
internal administrative remedies provided in his employment contract prior to 
suing in a court of common pleas, is controlling. 
{¶ 33} We conclude that Nemazee is readily distinguishable.  First, the 
employee there did not claim discrimination.  Nemazee, 56 Ohio St.3d at 110, 564 
N.E.2d 477.  Second, that employee had a contract that gave him the right to a 
hearing following any adverse disciplinary action.  Id.  Finally, the holding in 
Nemazee was based upon this court’s opinions and case law from other 
January Term, 2008 
9 
jurisdictions that courts should defer to the judgment of hospital administrators in 
matters relating to staffing decisions.  Id at 113, 114, 564 N.E.2d 477. 
{¶ 34} Appellants argue that requiring public employees to exhaust their 
administrative remedies is consistent with the mandate of R.C. Chapter 4112.  
They view the administrative exhaustion requirement as simply a precondition, 
rather than an obstacle, to filing suit.  But certain discrimination claims, such as 
age discrimination under R.C. 4112.02(N), must be filed within 180 days.1  
Furthermore, discrimination may not be immediately evident.  An employee 
might not become aware of the public employer’s discriminatory act (such as 
hiring a younger worker or reinstating a male but not a female employee) within 
the ten-day period allowed for an appeal to the city’s civil service commission.  
The employee would then be prohibited from pursuing a discrimination claim 
under R.C. 4112.99 unless he or she had already filed an administrative appeal.  
We will not permit a rule of judicial convenience to frustrate R.C. Chapter 4112’s 
goals of eliminating discrimination and providing redress to its victims.  R.C. 
4112.08 forbids such a result. 
{¶ 35} The purposes of the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies also would not be furthered if applied in this situation.  Appellants 
extensively argue that an appeal to the civil service commission is designed to 
afford due process to classified civil servants and to protect their property rights 
in continued employment while allowing a public employer to correct its own 
mistakes.  We do not dispute this point.  But permitting a public employee to file 
a discrimination claim without first appealing to the civil service commission 
does not stop a public employer from correcting its own mistakes.  The discovery 
                                                 
1.  Appellants argue that Dworning’s ability to file a civil lawsuit would not be hampered by 
requiring him to appeal to the civil service commission, because his claim is for disability, not for 
age discrimination. 
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process of a lawsuit brings facts to light.  A public employer is always free to 
enter into a settlement agreement if it realizes that an error has been made. 
{¶ 36} We do not agree with appellants’ contention that a discrimination 
claim arising from a public employee’s discharge is encompassed within the 
broader determination of whether the discharge was for “just cause.”  We have 
previously recognized that “the issues involved in a civil service appeal before 
either the State Personnel Board of Review or a municipal civil service 
commission and an unlawful discriminatory practice charge before OCRC are 
different.”  Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1995), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 120, 122, 656 N.E.2d 684.  Two courts of appeals have also determined that 
a civil service commission’s review of an employment action does not necessarily 
resolve the issue of discrimination against a public employee. Cincinnati v. Dixon 
(1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 164, 604 N.E.2d 193; Jackson v. Franklin Cty. Animal 
Control Dept. (Oct. 6, 1987), 10th Dist. No. 86AP-930, 1987 WL 18210. 
{¶ 37} Civil service commissions are creatures of statute. See R.C. 
124.40.  Their authority is limited to those areas provided by statute.  A civil 
service commission is not authorized to handle discrimination claims by either 
R.C. 124.40 or 124.34 or the commission’s local rules.  See Dixon, 78 Ohio 
App.3d at 169, 604 N.E.2d 193 (a municipal civil service commission is not the 
appropriate body to resolve a public employee’s allegation of religious 
discrimination).  Thus, the experience or expertise of the city’s civil service 
commission would not be of any benefit to the parties or the courts during the 
judicial review of a claim of discrimination, and an appeal to the commission 
would not necessarily create a record that would be adequate for such a review. 
{¶ 38} The General Assembly has demonstrated that it is aware that 
employees may have other remedies available to them for particular types of 
employment violations.  R.C. 4112.14 provides in part:  
January Term, 2008 
11 
{¶ 39} “(B) Any person aged forty or older who is discriminated against 
in any job opening or discharged without just cause by an employer * * * may 
institute a civil action against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction. * 
* * 
{¶ 40} “(C) The cause of action described in division (B) of this section 
and any remedies available pursuant to sections 4112.01 to 4112.11 of the 
Revised Code shall not be available in the case of discharges where the employee 
has available to the employee the opportunity to arbitrate the discharge or where a 
discharge has been arbitrated and has been found to be for just cause.” 
{¶ 41} Thus, for certain age discrimination claims, the General Assembly 
has expressed its intent to prefer arbitration over other remedies when arbitration 
is available.  The General Assembly, however, has not manifested a similar intent 
for claims of other forms of discrimination.  We agree with the Eighth District 
that “unless and until the General Assembly expressly incorporates an exhaustion 
requirement into R.C. Chapter 4112, we have no basis for requiring it as a matter 
of course to those workers who have available civil service remedies.”  Dworning, 
2006-Ohio-6772, at ¶ 58. 
{¶ 42} Finally, appellants also misconstrue the Eighth District’s statement 
that its “holding does not apply to employment relationships defined by contract, 
whether private or by way of a collective bargaining agreement, which set forth 
agreed upon disciplinary procedures, regardless of whether the right to invoke 
those procedures is couched in discretionary language.”  Id. at ¶ 58.  An employee 
or employee’s agent who bargains with an employer relinquishes certain rights to 
obtain other benefits.  Therefore, an employee who has entered into an 
employment contract may give up the right to immediately file a civil action for 
discrimination in a court and instead agree to appeal to a civil service commission 
or other administrative agency. 
Conclusion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 43} The protection of an individual’s right to pursue private remedies 
is too central an aspect of Ohio’s commitment to nondiscrimination to be limited 
to, or delayed by, an administrative process.  We hold that a public employee 
alleging employment discrimination in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 need not 
exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to a civil service commission before 
pursing the civil action allowed in R.C. 4112.99. The judgment of the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Thorman & Hardin-Levine Co., L.P.A., Christopher P. Thorman, Peter 
Hardin-Levine, and Jon L. Lindberg, for appellee. 
 
Chris Frey; Millisor & Nobil Co., L.P.A., Richard A. Millisor, and 
William E. Blackie, for appellant city of Euclid. 
 
Elfvin & Besser, L.P.A., and Barbara Kaye Besser, for appellants James 
Slivers and Thomas Cosgriff. 
 
Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Municipal League. 
 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, William P. Marshall, Solicitor 
General, Christopher R. Geidner and Robert J. Krummen, Deputy Solicitors, and 
Duffy Jamieson, Assistant Attorney General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
state of Ohio. 
 
Fortney & Klingshirn and Neil E. Klingshirn; Gittes & Schulte, Frederick 
M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio 
Employment Lawyers’ Association, Ohio NOW Legal Education Defense Fund, 
Committee Against Sexual Harassment, Ohio State Legal Services Association, 
and Columbus Branch of the Ohio NAACP.