Title: State v. Bragdon

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 87 
Docket: 
Ken-14-346 
Argued: 
June 16, 2015 
 
Decided: 
July 16, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN W. BRAGDON 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  Steven W. Bragdon appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by 
the trial court (Murphy, J.) following his conditional guilty plea to a charge of 
possession of sexually explicit materials (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C) 
(2014).  Bragdon contends that the court (Billings, J.) erred in denying his motion 
to suppress evidence derived from internet service provider (ISP) records that the 
State obtained with a grand jury subpoena.  He asserts that the State was required 
to use the procedure set forth in 5 M.R.S. § 200-B (2014) to obtain the records, and 
that its failure to do so violated his right to due process.  The State contends that 
section 200-B creates an alternative, not exclusive, method for it to use in seeking 
ISP records, and that even in the event of a violation of the statute, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply.  Because we agree with the State’s first 
contention, we affirm the judgment without reaching the second. 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The facts were stipulated at the hearing on Bragdon’s motion to 
suppress or are otherwise not disputed.  In April 2013, the Maine State Police 
Computer Crimes Unit (CCU), which routinely investigates activity involving the 
distribution of child pornography, began an investigation into suspicious activity 
involving a particular internet protocol (IP) address; FairPoint Communications 
was the ISP for that address. 
 
[¶3]  In May 2013, the Attorney General’s Office, pursuant to M.R. 
Crim. P. 17(c),1 issued a grand jury subpoena to FairPoint concerning the 
suspected IP address, commanding FairPoint to appear before the Kennebec 
County Grand Jury and produce information about the subscriber as of the time 
that the suspicious activity was observed.  The State did not seek prior judicial 
authorization before issuing the subpoena.  In response to the subpoena, FairPoint 
produced records identifying the IP address as one assigned to Bragdon at his 
home address in Waterville. 
 
[¶4]  Detectives from the CCU met with Bragdon at his home and obtained 
his consent to seize and search computer-related items.  After receiving notice 
from Bragdon’s attorney that Bragdon was revoking his consent to search the 
                                         
1  The Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure have since been superseded by the Maine Rules of Unified 
Criminal Procedure.  2014 Me. Rules 16 (effective in Kennebec County on April 1, 2015); 
see M.R.U. Crim. P. 17. 
 
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items, officers obtained a warrant and completed the search, during which they 
discovered evidence that led the grand jury to indict Bragdon on March 27, 2014. 
 
[¶5]  Bragdon moved to suppress the evidence found during the search on 
the ground that the State had not followed the procedure set out in 5 M.R.S. 
§ 200-B(2), which provides: 
The Attorney General, a deputy attorney general or a district attorney 
may demand, in writing, all the records or information in the 
possession of the public utility or Internet service provider relating to 
the furnishing of public utility services or Internet services to a person 
or a location if the attorney has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
services furnished to a person or to a location by a public utility or 
Internet service provider are being or may be used for, or to further, 
an unlawful purpose. 
 
Records of utility services, as applied to Internet service providers, are 
limited to the following information and records in the possession of 
the Internet service provider: the subscriber’s or customer’s name, 
address, local and long-distance telephone billing records, telephone 
number or other subscriber number or identity and length of time the 
services have been provided to the subscriber or customer. 
 
Upon a showing of cause to any Justice of the Superior Court or Judge 
of the District Court, the justice or judge shall approve the demand. 
Showing of cause must be by the affidavit of any law enforcement 
officer. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
 
[¶6]  The Superior Court (Billings, J.) held a hearing and denied the motion.  
Bragdon entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2),2 
                                         
2  See also M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). 
 
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preserving his right to appeal from the denial of the motion to suppress.  The court 
(Murphy, J.) entered judgment and imposed a sentence of three years’ 
imprisonment, with all but sixty days suspended, and two years of probation.  This 
appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Bragdon contends that (1) the Superior Court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress because section 200-B provides the exclusive method by which 
the State can seek ISP records, and (2) it was therefore a violation of his due 
process rights for the State to obtain the records through the use of a grand jury 
subpoena.  The court found that there was no violation of section 200-B because 
the statute’s unambiguous use of the permissive “may” means that it provides an 
alternative way to seek ISP records, not the exclusive method for doing so. 
 
[¶8]  The court’s finding that the statute is unambiguous is well-supported.  
See Beckford v. Town of Clifton, 2014 ME 156, ¶ 9, 107 A.3d 1124 (stating that a 
statute is to be construed de novo, with an examination beyond its plain meaning 
“only if it is ambiguous” (quotation marks omitted)).  Section 200-B(2), like the 
rule of criminal procedure allowing a grand jury to issue a subpoena to obtain 
documentary evidence from a nonparty, uses the permissive “may.”  5 M.R.S. 
§ 200-B(2); M.R.U. Crim. P. 17A(a).  That common word means “[t]o be allowed 
or permitted to,” in contrast to another common word, “must,” which means “[t]o 
 
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be required or obliged by law.”  Webster’s II New College Dictionary 677, 722 
(2001); see State v. Brown, 2014 ME 79, ¶ 13 n.5, 95 A.3d 82 (“Unless the statute 
itself discloses a contrary intent, words in a statute must be given their plain, 
common, and ordinary meaning, such as people of common intelligence would 
usually ascribe to them.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
[¶9]  Had it wished, the Legislature could have made the section 200-B 
procedure mandatory by saying that if the State seeks to obtain records from an 
ISP, then it must comply with the statute.  Nothing in the language that the 
Legislature chose says that, however.  See State v. Adams, 2014 ME 143, ¶ 8, 
106 A.3d 413 (“Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in which our primary 
purpose is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. . . . If the statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, we construe the statute in accordance with its 
plain meaning . . . .” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).  When the 
Legislature intends to limit law enforcement’s access to information to particular 
methods, it knows how to do so.  See, e.g., 16 M.R.S. § 642(1) (2014) 
(“A government entity may obtain portable electronic device content information 
directly from a provider of electronic communication service only in accordance 
with a valid warrant issued by a duly authorized justice, judge or justice of the 
peace . . . .”). 
 
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[¶10]  Bragdon makes too great a leap in asking us to construe the ordinary 
meaning of “may” to mean that the State must use the statutory method and is 
therefore barred from using a grand jury subpoena.  We conclude that had the 
Legislature intended to curtail such a well-established and commonly-used 
practice, it would have said so.  The trial court was therefore justified in finding 
that in this case “may” means “may.”  Because the statute is unambiguous, and the 
court correctly applied its plain meaning, it did not err in denying the motion to 
suppress. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Darrick X. Banda, Esq., Law Offices of Ronald W. Bourget, 
Augusta, for appellant Steven W. Bragdon 
 
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, Prosecutorial District IV, 
Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CR-2013-676 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY