Title: In re Goodwin.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No.  110,200 
 
In the Matter of JEFFREY M. GOODWIN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed January 24, 2014. Eighteen-month suspension. 
 
Kate F. Baird, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary 
Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
Jeffrey M. Goodwin, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Jeffrey M. Goodwin, of Kansas City, 
Kansas, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1997. 
 
 
On April 25, 2013, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent untimely filed an answer on May 29, 2013. A hearing 
was held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys 
on June 12, 2013.  
 
 
The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. 
R. Annot. 464) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 484) (communication); 
1.16(d) (2013 Kan. Ct.  R. Annot. 569) (termination of representation); Kansas Supreme 
Court Rule 207(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 336) (failure to cooperate in disciplinary 
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investigation); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 208 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 349) 
(registration of attorneys). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
. . . . 
 
"8. 
On April 25, 1997, the Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to 
the practice of law in the State of Kansas. Additionally, in October, 2001, the Missouri 
Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the State of Missouri. 
 
 
"9. 
On September 14, 2012, the Kansas Supreme Court suspended the 
respondent's license to practice law for failing to comply with the annual requirements to 
maintain his law license. On November 1, 2012, the Kansas Supreme Court reinstated the 
respondent's license to practice law. 
 
 
"10. 
In 2012, the respondent served on the juvenile appointment list for 
Wyandotte County, Kansas. By serving in that capacity, the respondent agreed to be 
available in the juvenile division on designated dates to assist juveniles facing 
prosecution. 
 
 
"11. 
On September 2, 2012, D.T. accompanied his 11-year-old son to an 
arraignment hearing in the juvenile division of the Wyandotte County District Court, on a 
charge of felony theft. D.T. and his son were not financially eligible for court-appointed 
counsel. The court continued the case to September 17, 2012, to allow D.T. time to retain 
counsel for his son. D.T. was encouraged to hire an attorney who was 'in the system.' 
 
 
"12. 
The respondent was in court that day on September 2, 2012, assisting 
indigent clients. D.T. and his son talked with the respondent at that time and requested 
that the respondent represent D.T.'s son. The respondent agreed to represent D.T.'s son 
for a fee of $500. D.T. paid the respondent $500. 
 
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"13. 
The respondent failed to enter his appearance on behalf of D.T.'s son. 
 
 
"14. 
On September 17, 2012, D.T. and his son appeared in court for 
arraignment. The respondent failed to appear. Because the respondent did not appear, the 
court continued the case to October 17, 2012. 
 
 
"15. 
By this time, however, the Kansas Supreme Court had suspended the 
respondent's license to practice law. The respondent had taken no steps to notify the 
court, opposing counsel, or his clients that his Kansas license to practice law had been 
suspended. 
 
 
"16. 
On October 17, 2012, D.T. and his son again appeared in court. Again, 
the respondent failed to appear. In preparation for participation in the diversion program, 
court personnel directed D.T.'s son to view a video. Following the video, the respondent 
still had not arrived. D.T. and his son waited approximately one hour for the respondent. 
The respondent did not arrive during that hour. Court personnel called the respondent by 
telephone. The respondent instructed the court personnel that he could not appear that day 
but that he would appear at the next setting. Court personnel then informed D.T. and his 
son that the matter could not proceed without the presence of counsel and the case was 
set over to October 31, 2012. At the time the respon[dent] spoke with court personnel, the 
respondent was not licensed to practice law. 
 
 
"17. 
On October 31, 2012, D.T. and his son appeared in court again. Again, 
the respondent failed to appear in court. Deb Erickson, an attorney, was present and 
offered to assist D.T.'s son. Ms. Erickson assisted D.T.'s son and he began participating in 
the diversion program. 
 
 
"18. 
D.T. placed several telephone calls to the respondent throughout the 
period of representation. The respondent failed to return D.T.'s telephone calls. 
 
 
"19. 
Following the October 17, 2012, court appearance, D.T. contacted the 
respondent and requested that the respondent refund the $500 fee. The respondent never 
contacted D.T. nor did he refund the $500 fee. 
 
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"20. 
On November 7, 2012, D.T. filed a complaint against the respondent 
with the disciplinary administrator. The disciplinary administrator and the attorney 
appointed to investigate the complaint directed the respondent to provide a written 
response to the complaint filed by D.T. The respondent never provided a written response 
to the complaint filed by D.T. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"21. 
It is appropriate to consider violations not specifically included in the 
Formal Complaint under certain circumstances. The law in this regard was thoroughly 
examined in State v. Caenen, 235 Kan. 451, 681 P.2d 639 (1984), as follows: 
 
 
'Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (232 Kan. clxvi), requires the 
formal complaint in a disciplinary proceeding to be sufficiently clear and 
specific to inform the respondent of the alleged misconduct. 
 
 
'The seminal decision regarding the applicability of the due 
process clause to lawyer disciplinary proceedings is found in In re 
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, reh. denied 391 
U.S. 961, 88 S. Ct. 1833, 20 L. Ed.2d 874 (1968). There the United 
States Supreme Court held that a lawyer charged with misconduct in 
lawyer disciplinary proceedings is entitled to procedural due process, and 
that due process includes fair notice of the charges sufficient to inform 
and provide a meaningful opportunity for explanation and defense. 
 
 
'Decisions subsequent to Ruffalo have refined the concept of due 
process as it applies to lawyer disciplinary hearings, and suggest that the 
notice to be provided be more in the nature of that provided in civil 
cases. The weight of authority appears to be that, unlike due process 
provided in criminal actions, there are no stringent or technical 
requirements in setting forth allegations or descriptions of alleged 
offenses. . . . Due process requires only that the charges must be 
sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the misconduct 
charged, but the state is not required to plead specific rules, since it is the 
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factual allegations against which the attorney must defend. . . . However, 
if specific rules are pled, the state is thereafter limited to such specific 
offenses. . . . 
 
 
'Subsequent to the Ruffalo decision, the due process 
requirements in lawyer disciplinary proceedings have been given 
exhaustive treatment by this court. In State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 
P.2d 966 (1975), 87 A.L.R.3d 337, the court summarized prior Kansas 
and federal precedent on the question, including Ruffalo, and held in 
accordance with established precedent that the state need not set forth in 
its complaint the specific disciplinary rules allegedly violated . . . , nor is 
it required to plead specific allegations of misconduct. . . . What is 
required was simply stated therein: 
 
"We must conclude that where the facts in connection 
with the charge are clearly set out in the complaint a 
respondent is put on notice as to what ethical violations 
may arise therefrom. . . . 
. . . . 
"It is not incumbent on the board to notify the 
respondent of charges of specific acts of misconduct as 
long as proper notice is given of the basic factual 
situation out of which the charges might result."' 
 
235 Kan. at 458-59 (citations omitted). Thus, only when the formal complaint alleges 
facts that would support findings of violations of additional rules, will considering 
additional violations be allowed. In this case, the disciplinary administrator alleged that 
the respondent did not earn the $500 fee and that the respondent failed to return the 
unearned fee. Thus, the disciplinary administrator included sufficient facts in the formal 
complaint to warrant consideration of a violation of KRPC 1.16 and the hearing panel 
concludes that it is proper to consider a violation of KRPC 1.16. 
 
 
"22. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.16, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 
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207, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208, as detailed below. [Footnote: In addition, Ms. Baird 
alleged that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 1.5 (unreasonable 
fee), KRPC 3.2 (expediting litigation), KRPC 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law), KRPC 
8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211 
(answer). The hearing panel does not find clear and convincing evidence that the 
respondent violated these rules. Specifically, with regard to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent's answer was filed two weeks late. While the 
respondent did not comply with the rule, the hearing panel finds that the untimely filing 
of the respondent's answer did not impact the proceedings in a negative fashion, and a 
conclusion that the respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b) is not warranted.] 
 
"KRPC 1.3 
 
 
"23. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The Respondent failed to diligently and 
promptly represent D.T.'s 11-year-old son. The Respondent failed to appear in court with 
the young boy. Finally, the Respondent's lack of diligence caused D.T. and his 11-year-
old son to repeatedly make unnecessary trips to court. Because the Respondent failed to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, the hearing panel 
concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.3. 
 
"KRPC 1.4 
 
 
"24. 
KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.' In this case, the Respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) when he failed to return 
D.T.'s telephone calls. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the Respondent 
violated KRPC 1.4(a). 
 
"KRPC 1.16 
 
 
"25. 
KRPC 1.16 requires lawyers to take certain steps to protect clients after 
the representation has been terminated. Specifically, KRPC 1.16(d) provides the 
requirement in this regard: 
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'Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to 
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as 
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of 
other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is 
entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been 
earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent 
permitted by other law.' 
 
The Respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d) when he failed to return the unearned fees. The 
hearing panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d). 
 
"Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b) 
 
 
"26. 
Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 
207(b) provides the requirement in this regard. 
 
'It shall be the duty of each member of the bar of this state to aid the 
Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Board, and the Disciplinary 
Administrator in investigations concerning complaints of misconduct, 
and to communicate to the Disciplinary Administrator any information 
he or she may have affecting such matters.' 
 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b). The Respondent knew that he was required to forward a written 
response to the initial complaint—he had been instructed to do so in writing by the 
disciplinary administrator and the attorney investigator. Because the Respondent 
knowingly failed to provide a written response to the initial complaint filed by D.T., the 
hearing panel concludes that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b). 
 
"Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208 
 
 
"27. 
Attorneys are required to notify the clerk of the appellate courts of any 
change of address within thirty days. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). In this case, the 
respondent's address changed and he did not provide the clerk of the appellate courts with 
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the change of address information. As of the date of the hearing, the respondent still had 
not provided the clerk of the appellate courts with his current address. Accordingly, the 
hearing panel concludes that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"28. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"29. 
Duty Violated.  The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide 
competent and diligent representation and adequate communication. The respondent 
violated his duty to the legal profession and the legal system to comply with the annual 
registration requirements to maintain his law license. The respondent violated his duty to 
the legal profession to cooperate in disciplinary investigations. 
 
 
"30. 
Mental State.  The respondent knowingly violated his duties. 
 
 
"31. 
Injury.  As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to his client, his client's father, the legal system, and the legal profession. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"32. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
 
"33. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses.  In 2007, the respondent participated in the 
attorney diversion program for having violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
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"34. 
A Pattern of Misconduct.  The respondent has engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct by repeatedly failing to return D.T.'s telephone calls and by repeatedly failing 
to appear in court. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent engaged in a 
pattern of misconduct. 
 
 
"35. 
Multiple Offenses.  The respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, 
KRPC 1.16, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208. Thus, the respondent 
violated multiple rules. 
 
 
"36. 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceedings by Intentionally 
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process.  The respondent 
failed to provide a written response to the initial complaint and the respondent failed to 
timely file his answer to the formal complaint. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent engaged in a bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding. 
 
 
"37. 
Vulnerability of Victim.  D.T. and his son were vulnerable to the 
respondent's misconduct. 
 
 
"38. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1997. At the time 
of the misconduct, the respondent had been practicing law for approximately 15 years. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent had substantial experience in the 
practice of law. 
 
 
"39. 
Indifference to Making Restitution.  To date, the respondent has taken no 
steps to return the unearned fees to D.T. 
 
 
"40. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
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"41. 
Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive.  The respondent's misconduct 
does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness. 
 
 
"42. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by the Attorney's 
Cooperation During the Hearing and the Attorney's Full and Free Acknowledgment of 
the Transgressions.  During the formal hearing, the respondent fully and freely 
acknowledged the misconduct. 
 
 
"43. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"44. 
At the hearing on the formal complaint, Ms. Baird recommended that the 
respondent be indefinitely suspended or disbarred. The respondent requested that the 
hearing panel recommend that he be indefinitely suspended. 
 
 
"45. 
While the respondent's misconduct is serious, it does not warrant an 
indefinite suspension or disbarment from the practice of law. It is important to note that 
the respondent appears to have a certain level of distaste for the practice of law. In the 
opinion of the hearing panel, the level of discipline to recommend is not based on the 
respondent's attitude, but rather, the level of discipline to recommend is based on the 
seriousness of the misconduct. 
 
 
"46. 
Regardless of the respondent's bad attitude, the respondent must, 
however, make D.T. whole for his loss. Accordingly, the hearing panel directs the 
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respondent to provide certified funds in the amount of $500 made payable to D.T., to Ms. 
Baird within 30 days of this report. The certified funds should be made payable to D.T. in 
the amount of $500. 
 
 
"47. 
Finally, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the 
ABA Standards, and being mindful of the recommendation of Ms. Baird and the 
respondent, the hearing panel recommends that the respondent be suspended for a period 
of 18 months. Additionally, the hearing panel recommends the Kansas Supreme Court 
require that the respondent undergo a reinstatement hearing, pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 
219. 
 
 
"48. 
At least at this time, the respondent has no intention of returning to the 
practice of law. If at some point in the future, the respondent desires to return to the 
practice of law, the hearing panel would recommend that the respondent undergo an 
attitude adjustment prior to appearing before the reinstatement hearing. 
 
 
"49. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, the discipline to be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 
375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 356). Clear and 
convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of 
the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he 
untimely filed an answer; he filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing 
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report. With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are deemed admitted. 
Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 375). Furthermore, the 
evidence before the hearing panel establishes the charged misconduct in violation of 
KRPC 1.3 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 464) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
484) (communication); 1.16(d) (2013 Kan. Ct.  R. Annot. 569) (termination of 
representation); Kansas Supreme Court Rule 207(b) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 336) 
(failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 208 
(2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 349) (registration of attorneys) by clear and convincing 
evidence and supports the panel's conclusions of law. We therefore adopt the panel's 
findings and conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. Before this court, where the respondent tardily appeared, the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the respondent be indefinitely suspended 
or disbarred and that he be required to appear at a reinstatement hearing pursuant to 
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 219 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 407). The respondent 
requested indefinite suspension. The hearing panel recommended that respondent be 
suspended for a period of 18 months and that respondent undergo a reinstatement 
hearing, pursuant to Rule 219. We hold that respondent should be suspended from the 
practice of law for 18 months effective as of the date of this opinion and that he be 
subject to a Rule 219 reinstatement hearing before his suspension may be lifted. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jeffrey M. Goodwin be suspended from the 
practice of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 18 months as of the date of this 
opinion, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
300). 
 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 406) and Rule 219. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.