Title: Commonwealth v. French

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12012 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERIC S. FRENCH. 
 
 
February 14, 2017. 
 
 
Breaking and Entering.  Larceny.  Practice, Criminal, Required 
finding.  Evidence, Fingerprints, Identification.  
Identification. 
 
 
 
Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, a 
judge found the defendant, Eric S. French, guilty of breaking 
and entering in the daytime with the intent to commit a felony, 
in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 18, and larceny of property over 
$250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1).  The defendant  
appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the convictions.1  The Appeals Court, in a divided decision, 
affirmed the judgments.  See Commonwealth v. French, 88 Mass. 
App. Ct. 477 (2015).  The case is now before this court on 
further appellate review.  Because we conclude that the evidence 
was not sufficient to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant committed the crimes charged, we reverse. 
 
 
Background.  The convictions stem from a break-in and 
robbery that occurred at a market in Springfield in August, 
2013.  At trial, one of the proprietors of the store testified 
that she closed the store at 6 P.M. on August 30.  She returned 
to the store "during the night" after being notified of a break-
in.  When she arrived she saw that "[s]omebody had broken in on 
the side window and taken the panel out and climbed in."  She 
also testified that approximately $400 to $500 worth of 
cigarettes had been stolen. 
                                                 
 
1 At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant 
filed a motion for a required finding of not guilty, which the 
trial judge denied. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Several Springfield police officers also testified.  
Officer Eugene Rooke responded to a call to go to the market on 
the morning of August 31, and arrived there with his partner at 
approximately 7:20 A.M.  When they arrived, they spoke with two 
men who lived next door to the store and who had alerted the 
police that a front window to the store was "missing."  Officer 
Rooke saw that the plexiglass window pane from the window 
located to the right of the front door had been removed and was 
set against the door.  Photographs entered as exhibits at trial 
show the plexiglass leaning against the front door, next to the 
window frame from which it had been removed. 
 
 
Officer Rooke estimated that when the plexiglass was 
intact, inside the window frame, the top of it was more than six 
feet, four inches from the ground.  Additionally, he saw a milk 
crate on the ground nearby that he thought the perpetrator may 
have stood on to gain entry to the store (through the open 
window).  Photographs show the milk crate on the ground, next to 
the plexiglass.  Inside the store, Officer Rooke observed 
numerous items that would normally be on shelves located on the 
floor instead. 
 
 
Detective Gifford Jenkins also responded to the scene after 
receiving a call to do so on the morning of August 31, at around 
7 A.M.  In the course of collecting evidence, Detective Jenkins 
recovered a latent fingerprint from the plexiglass.  He 
testified that, on the basis of how he thought the plexiglass 
would sit in the window frame, the fingerprint was recovered 
from a portion of the plexiglass that was "up high."  If the 
plexiglass were sitting in the window frame as described by 
Detective Jenkins, the location of the fingerprint would have 
been, in his estimation, five feet, eight inches to six feet 
from the ground.  When asked on cross-examination if he could 
identify which part of the plexiglass was the top half and which 
was the bottom half, he indicated that the "bottom" of the 
plexiglass, as he found it at the scene (that is, removed from 
the frame and leaning against the store's front door), had a 
crack.  When asked whether he "kn[e]w . . . for certain" which 
was the top of the plexiglass and which was the bottom, he 
responded "I'm just saying.  I'm not sure.  I mean that's what 
it looks like to me."  He also testified that he took 
photographs inside the market but did not further dust for 
fingerprints. 
 
 
Finally, Detective Juan Estrada, who is trained in 
fingerprint analysis, testified without objection that the 
3 
 
 
latent fingerprint recovered from the plexiglass matched a known 
sample from the defendant.  He also testified that a fingerprint 
cannot be dated and can remain on a surface for a long period of 
time.2 
 
 
Discussion.  Where, as here, a defendant's fingerprint at a 
crime scene constitutes the only identification evidence, "the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
fingerprint was placed there during the crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Morris, 422 Mass. 254, 257 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. 
LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 703 (1977).  "The prosecution must 
couple the fingerprint[] with evidence which reasonably excludes 
the hypothesis that the fingerprint[] w[as] impressed at a time 
other than when the crime was being committed."  Commonwealth v. 
Fazzino, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 485, 487 (1989).  See Commonwealth v. 
Baptista, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 911 (1992).  Even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we 
must, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979), the Commonwealth has not done that here. 
 
 
In prior cases where a fingerprint was the only 
identification evidence, and thus a decisive factor in 
convicting the defendant, other evidence corroborated finding 
that the fingerprint was placed during the crime.  In Baptista, 
32 Mass. App. Ct. at 911, for example, one of the defendant's 
fingerprints "was found inside a closed, locked Pepsi vending 
machine," the interior of which "was not available to members of 
the public."  On this basis, the jury "could reasonably infer 
that the defendant's fingerprints were left . . . at the time of 
the crime."  Id. at 911-912.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wei Ye, 
52 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 392-393 (2001) (fingerprint found on door 
of cabinet rarely used, located in basement, and opened by 
robbers coupled with other evidence including records of 
telephone calls connecting defendant to prior owner of home 
where robbery occurred); Fazzino, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 486-487 
(location of defendant's fingerprints on box that defendant, who 
was familiar with premises, would not have "casually" handled on 
previous visit to premises, coupled with, among other things, 
possible ill feelings of defendant toward victim). 
 
 
In Morris, 422 Mass. at 257-258, on the other hand, in 
which we reversed the defendant's conviction, we concluded that 
the defendant's fingerprint on a mask found near the scene of 
the crime was not evidence sufficient to connect the defendant 
                                                 
 
2 The defendant does not contest the analysis of the 
fingerprint or argue that it is not his fingerprint. 
4 
 
 
to the crime.  In that case, there was some evidence, from which 
a reasonable inference could have been drawn, that the defendant 
was associated with two other defendants, the White brothers 
(who had already been convicted), as well as, among other 
things, evidence that linked the White brothers to the 
defendant's residence.  This was not enough, however, to 
conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt that the thumbprint was 
placed on the mask during the commission of the crime."  Id. at 
259-260.  As in Morris, the corroborating evidence here, when 
coupled with the fingerprint, does not support a conclusion that 
the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
Officer Rooke estimated that the top of the plexiglass, 
when it was seated in the frame, would have been more than six 
feet, four inches above the ground.  Detective Jenkins estimated 
that the location of the fingerprint would be between five feet, 
eight inches and six feet from the ground.  This presumes that 
the fingerprint was located on the "top" of the plexiglass -- 
that is, the portion of the plexiglass that would be furthest 
from the ground and less readily accessible to a passerby.  The 
evidence did not adequately establish, however, which part of 
the plexiglass was the "top" and which was the "bottom" when it 
was seated in the frame.  While Detective Jenkins thought that 
the location of the fingerprint was the "top" of the plexiglass, 
he was "not sure."  There was no additional evidence on this 
point, leaving open the possibility that the fingerprint was in 
fact located on a portion of the plexiglass that was easily 
accessible to a passerby. 
 
 
Even if the fingerprint was at the top of the window, it 
was, in Detective Jenkins's estimation, no more than six feet 
from the ground.  This is not so high that it could not have 
resulted from an innocent touching.  Coupled with the fact that, 
as Detective Estrada testified, fingerprints can remain on a 
surface for a long time, this reasonably suggests that the 
fingerprint could have been left at some previous time, 
unrelated to the break-in. 
 
 
Perhaps more important, the plexiglass became accessible to 
any passerby as soon as it was removed from the window frame and 
set on the ground, leaning against the market's front door.  
There is no evidence in the record as to what time the 
proprietor was alerted to the break-in or when she went to the 
store and saw that the plexiglass had been removed.  All that we 
know for certain is that the proprietor closed the store at 
6 P.M. on August 30 and went back some time "during the night" 
5 
 
 
after learning of the break-in, and that police officers arrived 
at the scene around 7 A.M. on August 31.  The plexiglass, 
therefore, could have been readily accessible to any passerby 
for several hours or more. 
 
 
It is generally true in criminal cases that the 
Commonwealth does not have to present evidence that "exclude[s] 
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533-534 (1989).  In a 
case such as this one, however, where the fingerprint evidence 
is the only identification evidence, the Commonwealth does have 
to present evidence that reasonably excludes the hypothesis that 
the fingerprint was left at some time other than when the crime 
was committed.  Even if the "evidence and reasonable inferences 
from it tend to indicate that the [finger]print might have been 
placed" on the plexiglass during the crime, the evidence still 
must "warrant a finding beyond a reasonable doubt" that this is 
what occurred.  Morris, 422 Mass. at 257-258.  The evidence here 
does not do that, and the Commonwealth therefore has not shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant left his 
fingerprint at the time of the break-in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments reversed. 
 
 
 
Joseph Visone for the defendant. 
 
Alyson C. Yorlano, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.