Title: REYNA v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

REYNA v. STATE2001 WY 10533 P.3d 1129Case Number: 00-193Decided: 11/06/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

JOSEPH 
REYNA, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Lynn Boak, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Devon O'Connell 
Coleman, Interim Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Ryan Patrick 
Healy, Student Intern.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 [¶1]      At a change of 
plea hearing, the appellant, Joseph Reyna, pled guilty to one count of forgery, 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001), and one 
count of conspiracy to commit forgery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-1-303(a) and 6-3-602(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), both felonies.  He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 
five to ten years on each charge.  
After sentencing, the district court denied the appellant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.  This 
appeal is from the judgment and sentence and from the denial of the motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      There are four 
issues presented for review:

 

            
1.         
Did the district court violate W.R.Cr.P. 11 in its advisement of the 
elements of a conspiracy?

 

            
2.         
Did the district court violate W.R.Cr.P. 11 in allowing the appellant to 
waive a presentence investigation report (PSI)?

 

            
3.         
Was the appellant denied effective assistance of counsel in entering his 
guilty pleas?

 

            
4.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?

 

PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND

 

[¶4]      The probable 
cause affidavit attached to the Information filed in this case alleges that in 
December of 1999, the appellant and Juan Martinez forged seven checks totaling 
more than $10,000.00 on the account of Lowell Luebke.  Upon his arrest, the appellant filed an 
affidavit of indigency and a public defender was appointed to represent 
him.  It is disputed in the record 
whether a preliminary hearing was held or waived.1  At any rate, the appellant was bound 
over for trial in the district court on both charges.

 

[¶5]      At his district 
court arraignment, the appellant entered pleas of not guilty and moved under 
W.R.Cr.P. 21.1(a) for peremptory disqualification of the district judge.  The case was then assigned to a 
different district judge.  At a 
change of plea hearing on May 17, 2000, the appellant entered pleas of guilty to 
both charges and was sentenced as set forth above.  The pleas were the result of a limited 
plea agreement in which the State's only concessions were an agreement not to 
file additional charges against the appellant and to proceed without a 
presentence investigation.

 

[¶6]      The appellant's 
trial counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on June 9, 2000.  During the pendency of the appeal, the 
appellant filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea in the district court.  This Court entered an Order Granting 
Motion to Stay Appeal, remanding the case to the district court for resolution 
of that motion.  The district court 
heard the motion on November 13, 2000, and denied it on November 30, 2000.  That denial, in addition to the original 
judgment and sentence, is the basis for this appeal.

 

Did 
the District Court Violate W.R.Cr.P. 11 in its

advisement 
of the elements of a conspiracy?

 

[¶7]      W.R.Cr.P. 11 sets 
forth the procedures that must be followed for acceptance of a plea by a 
criminal defendant.  The rule is lengthy and complex.  Pertinent to the present discussion are 
section (b), which describes the advisements that must be given to the 
defendant, section (d), which requires the court to determine the voluntariness 
of the plea, section (e)(7), which prohibits waiver of a presentence 
investigation by plea agreement, section (f), which requires the court to 
determine the accuracy of the plea by inquiring into the factual basis, and 
section (h), which allows harmless errors to be disregarded.

 

[¶8]      The appellant's first 
contention is that the district court's colloquy with the appellant was 
insufficient to establish that the pleas were voluntary or that there was a 
factual basis for the pleas.  He relies on McCarthy 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969) 
(quoting F.R.Cr.P. 11, Notes on Advisory Committee 
on Criminal Rules), for the proposition that the judge must determine "that 
the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the 
indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the defendant 
has pleaded guilty.'"  
Specifically, the appellant argues that, conspiracy being a specific 
intent crime, it was improper for the district court to infer that element from 
the following exchange between the district court and the appellant:

 

            
THE COURT:  
Mr. Reyna, how do you plead to Counts I and II of the Information that's 
on file in this matter?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Guilty.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Were you in Laramie County on or about December 2 of 1999?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
And did you have a plan with one or more people to commit forgery?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Was that person Juan Martinez?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Were you also in Natrona [sic] County on December 17 of 1999?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Did you issue checks on an account that did not belong to you?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Did you write checks on an account?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Was that Mr. Luebke's account?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Did you have his permission to do that?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
No.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Does the State accept those factual recitations?

 

            
[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]:  Yes, Your Honor.  And I believe you 
did get in the fact that it was in Laramie County, Wyoming.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Do you agree with that, Mr. Reyna?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
On both counts?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

[¶9]      We have adopted the 
following standard of review for cases involving the acceptance of a guilty 
plea:

 

            
The procedure utilized to accept a guilty plea is reviewed by this court 
as a whole.  Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 187 (Wyo.1994).  "Our inquiry 
determines if the district court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, 
including the possible penalties; informed the defendant of the right to 
representation; informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; 
and obtained a factual basis for the plea."  Mehring [v. 
State], 860 P.2d [1101] at 1106 [(Wyo.1993)] (emphasis added).  These procedural 
requirements are intended to assure that the individual facing the criminal 
charges is not misled into an unintentional waiver of substantial rights.  Id.

 

McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 (Wyo. 1994).  We look to the totality of the circumstances 
to determine the voluntariness of a plea.  Mehring v. State, 
860 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶10]   At the change of plea hearing in the 
instant case, the district court reviewed with the appellant all of the 
following:

 

            
1.         The 
terms of the plea agreement.

 

            
2.         The 
appellant was not under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, drug, or 
medication, he did not suffer from a mental disability or learning disorder, and 
he had no physical problems or distractions.

 

            
3.         The 
appellant had reviewed the Information.

 

            
4.         The 
nature of the charges.2

 

            
5.         The 
potential penalties.

 

            
6.         The 
rights waived by a guilty plea.3

 

            
7.         The 
plea agreement did not restrict sentencing, and the appellant could be sentenced 
to the maximum penalty allowed by law.

 

            
8.         The 
pleas were made of the appellant's own free will.

 

            
9.         The 
appellant had discussed the matter "fully and completely" with his attorney and 
he was satisfied with that attorney's representation.

 

            
10.       The appellant 
had no questions he wished to ask his attorney before pleading.

 

            
11.       If the 
appellant pled guilty, he would be required to answer questions concerning the 
crimes.

 

            
12.       The amount of 
restitution.

 

            
13.       There was a 
factual basis for the pleas.

 

[¶11]   This list reveals the immediate 
circumstances under which the district court accepted the factual basis for the 
conspiracy plea.  
The appellant's contention that there was insufficient discussion of the 
specific intent element of conspiracy could implicate either his understanding 
of the nature of the charge (#4) or the factual basis for the charge (#13).  The appellant's 
appellate brief commingles these arguments.

 

[¶12]   These immediate circumstances do not, 
however, tell the whole story.  The change of plea hearing did not take place 
in a vacuum.  
The appellant is an experienced criminal, with three previous 
penitentiary sentences for felony convictions, two for forgery and one for 
theft.  See Kaldwell v. State, 908 P.2d 987, 992-93 (Wyo. 
1995).  He was 
represented by an experienced public defender who reviewed the evidence and plea 
options with him.  
See McCarty, 883 P.2d  at 374.  There was a 
preliminary hearing.  
The appellant, himself, raised the idea of waiving the presentence 
investigation report because he feared the judge would learn that he "may be 
wanted" in Nebraska "for the same thing not as much money."  These circumstances 
indicate that the appellant made a voluntary plea with a full understanding of 
the nature of the charges.

 

[¶13]   The appellant does not contest that a 
forgery or forgeries occurred or that there was a sufficient factual basis 
presented for that crime.  His contention is that the factual basis for 
conspiracy was inadequate because his specific intent  the agreement that a 
crime be committed  has to be inferred from other statements.4  We disagree.  The appellant 
replied, "Yes," when asked, "And did you have a plan with one or more people to commit 
forgery."  
(Emphasis added.)  Certainly it does not require much of an 
inference to conclude that "a plan with one or more people to commit forgery" is 
substantively the same as "agrees with one (1) or more persons that they . . . 
will commit [forgery]."5  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(a).

 

[C]omplete descriptions of the elements are not mandatory 
in accepting a plea under [Rule 11].  See W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b).  The 
courts of our land do not function with scripts requiring each participant to 
perform his or her specific part in the same manner on each occasion.  We should never 
mistake the presence of the printed or spoken word for comprehension.  A ritualistic 
expression of verbiage, complete with legal terminology and excess, may provide 
a comfortable layer of support for technically demanding members of the bar, but 
would provide little real assurance that the accused actually understands what 
is about to be accomplished.

 

Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1108-09.  See also United 
States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1011 (8th 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1067 
(1995).

 

[¶14]   W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) does not require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually 
guilty.  United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971); McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1966).  The rule's standard is much lower than 
that:

 

Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the 
court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as 
shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 11(f).  In applying this rule, the judge need not 
rely solely on the statements of the defendant, but may draw inferences from all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime.  Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 17-19 (Wyo. 
1993).  We cannot say that, in the instant case, 
there were insufficient facts and circumstances from which the district court 
could satisfy itself of a factual basis for the conspiracy plea.

 

[¶15]   Since we conclude that the district 
court complied with the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 11 in the matters set forth above, 
we need not consider a harmless error analysis under section (h) of the 
rule.

 

Did the district court violate W.R.Cr.P. 11 in allowing 
the

appellant to waive a presentence investigation report 
(psi)?

 

[¶16]   W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(7) provides that a 
"presentence investigation may not be waived by plea agreement for any 
felony."  
Despite the use of the word "may," this clearly is a mandatory 
provision.  See Board of County Com'rs of Fremont County v. State ex 
rel. Miller, 369 P.2d 537, 542 (Wyo. 1962) and Mayor v. Board of 
Land Com'rs, 64 Wyo. 409, 192 P.2d 403, 411 (1948).  The appellant does little but raise this 
issue in his appellate brief, citing no authority for the appropriate remedy for 
a breach, and even admitting that it was the appellant, himself, who wanted to 
waive the PSI.  
He does suggest three purposes for the rule:  (1) to keep 
criminal defendants from hiding their lengthy records; (2) to make sure 
defendants are familiar with their prior record; and (3) to give judges 
information upon which to base appropriate sentences.

 

[¶17]   Even if we accept these purposes, 
however, they are of little assistance to the appellant.  Available to the 
district court at sentencing, and to counsel before sentencing, was a 1992 
PSI.  The 
appellant testified that he was incarcerated, apparently for the crime that 
generated that PSI, until 1997.  Further, he did not want a new PSI, for fear 
the district judge would learn of a similar crime in Nebraska.  The State was aware 
of the appellant's "activities" since the date of the 1992 PSI.

 

[¶18]   Undoubtedly, the intent of W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(7) is that a new PSI be done whenever a felon is sentenced after a plea 
agreement.6  While the "letter of the law" may have been 
violated in the instant case, the district court and counsel did abide by its 
spirit.  It 
might even be said, since the 1992 PSI was used, that there was no violation of 
the rule at all, especially given the information available as to the 
appellant's activities since that date.  At most, this was a slight "variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which [did] not affect substantial rights" of 
the appellant, and we may disregard it.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(h).  There was no 
miscarriage of justice.  See Bird v. 
State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1128-30 (Wyo. 1995), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 907 (2000).  We conclude that the district court did not 
violate W.R.Cr.P. 11 in any substantial manner in proceeding to sentencing with 
the 1992 PSI and other available information.

 

Was the appellant denied effective assistance of 
counsel

in entering his guilty pleas?

 

[¶19]   Wyoming has a well-established and 
oft-repeated standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel:

 

            
"When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial 
counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.  
Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo.1995); 
Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo.1995); 
Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo.1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986).  The reviewing court 
should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance 
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 
1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. 
State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo.1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo.1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney' and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of [the] case.'  Lower v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1990).  The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.'  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064."

 

Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, 1168-69 (Wyo. 
2001) (quoting Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000)).  This test has been specialized for cases 
where entry of a guilty plea is challenged on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel:

 

When an attorney has allegedly misadvised his client with 
respect to the entry of a guilty plea, a determination must be made of whether 
the decision to plead and forego the defense of his case resulted in prejudice 
to the client.  
That determination involves two interrelated questions:  whether, in the 
absence of counsel's error, the recommendation of a reasonably competent 
attorney concerning the plea would differ from that given; and whether, absent 
the error, the outcome of a trial would have been more advantageous to the 
client than the result of his plea.  Hill [v. 
Lockhart], 474 U.S. [52] at 59-60, 106 S.Ct. [366] at 370-71 [88 L. Ed. 2d 203 
(1985)].  The 
defendant may also establish the necessary prejudice by proof of circumstances 
indicating that, in deciding whether or not to plead guilty, he placed special 
emphasis on the challenged aspect of his attorney's advice.  He must suggest to 
the reviewing court a plausible reason why, had his representation been as he 
claims it should have been, he would have chosen to forsake the benefits of his 
plea agreement for the risks of trial.  Id.; see also Worthen [v. Meachum], 842 F.2d [1179] at 1184 
[(10th Cir.1988)].

 

Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990); see also Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo. 1999).  The burden of proving that counsel was 
ineffective rests on the appellant.  Sorensen v. 
State, 6 P.3d 657, 660 (Wyo. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 818 (2001) (quoting Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986)).

 

[¶20]   The appellant's brief contains the 
following paragraph generally damning trial counsel's performance:

 

            
The right to assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6, and by Art. 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  
Both contemplate something more than a perfunctory defense or the 
appearance at counsel table of a warm body and nothing more.  Effective 
assistance of counsel also requires that counsel act in the Defendant's best 
interests, and that counsel not become an advocate for the prosecution.  Where a Defendant 
is threatened, coerced and intimidated into pleading guilty, and when his 
attorney will not explain and reveal evidence to which the Defendant is 
entitled, his attorney clearly is acting as an advocate for the prosecution 
rather than for the Defendant.

 

At the hearing on his motion to withdraw guilty pleas, the 
appellant testified under oath as to the following specific allegations of 
ineffectiveness of counsel:

 

            
1.         The 
appellant decided to plead guilty, then changed his mind, then pled guilty 
anyway because he "felt intimidated by" his court-appointed counsel.

 

            
2.         
Counsel did not review with him what would occur in the change of plea 
hearing and the questions that would be asked.

 

            
3.         The 
appellant did not tell the district court of the intimidation by his attorney 
because he was tired of arguing with her.

 

            
4.         
Counsel did not "do her job correctly" in trying to get the appellant a 
deal with the district attorney's office.

 

            
5.         
Counsel either failed to find out what evidence the State had against the 
appellant or she refused to divulge it to him.

 

            
6.         
Counsel threatened to have the appellant sent to the State Hospital if he 
did not plead guilty.

 

            
7.         The 
appellant told the district court he was satisfied with his attorney's 
representation because he was intimidated by the attorney.

 

            
8.         
Counsel did not explore the appellant's defenses to the conspiracy 
charge, specifically his alcohol and drug problems.

 

            
9.         
Counsel either failed to find out what other charges the State planned to 
bring against the appellant or refused to divulge that information to him.

 

            
10.       Counsel never 
explained to the appellant what a conspiracy is.

 

[¶21]   The State's response to these 
allegations consists of three documents:  an affidavit from the appellant's trial 
counsel, a letter from trial counsel to the appellant dated May 4, 2000, and a 
letter from the appellant to trial counsel on the same date.  Pertinent 
information from those documents includes the following:

 

            
1.         
Trial counsel has over five years experience as a public defender.

 

            
2.         
Trial counsel met with the appellant very soon after being appointed.

 

            
3.         At 
their first meeting, the appellant expressed a desire to plead guilty, but he 
wanted to have a preliminary hearing to see if Juan Martinez was going to be 
charged.

 

            
4.         The 
appellant asked trial counsel to try to work out a plea bargain for a stipulated 
three to five year sentence, but the district attorney refused due to the 
appellant's lengthy criminal record.

 

            
5.         
Trial counsel attempted numerous times to work out a deal for a specified 
term of years, to no avail, and this information was relayed to the 
appellant.

 

            
6.         The 
appellant still wished to plead guilty, even without a plea agreement.

 

            
7.         
Trial counsel learned of the following evidence against the appellant, 
and informed the appellant of its existence:

 

a.         The 
appellant worked for the victim.

 

b.         
Juan Martinez confessed to the police that he had cashed several checks 
for the appellant.

 

            
c.         One 
of the checks was actually made payable to the appellant.

 

            
d.         The 
appellant had prior convictions for forgery and had been imprisoned in Nebraska 
for "forgery and fraud type offenses."

 

            
e.         
There was some evidence that the word "hundred" was misspelled on these 
checks and on other checks for which the appellant had been convicted.

 

            
8.         
Because the appellant wished to plead guilty, trial counsel advised him 
first to plead not guilty, so a different sentencing judge could be obtained, 
the present judge being the same judge who had sentenced him on his most recent 
prior conviction.

 

            
9.         
When the appellant voiced some concerns about pleading guilty, trial 
counsel advised him that he should plead guilty because, by taking 
responsibility, he would receive a lesser sentence.

 

            
10.       Trial counsel 
believed the evidence against the appellant to be overwhelming.

 

            
11.       The State 
agreed to waive the PSI at the appellant's request, and also agreed not to file 
additional forgery charges on new checks it had received.

 

            
12.       The appellant 
could not understand why trial counsel would not take herself off his case 
because he had lots of attorneys take themselves off his cases.

 

            
13.       In his letter, 
the appellant states, "I will have to admit that you are a good attorney and I 
would like you to finish this case for me as I said."

 

[¶22]   In addition to considering the above 
information, the district court also reviewed the transcript of the change of 
plea hearing, which contained the following dialogue:

 

            
THE COURT:  
Apart from that plea agreement, has anybody promised you anything or 
threatened you with anything in order to get you to plead guilty?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
No.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Are you entering this plea of your own free will?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Have you discussed this matter fully and completely with [your 
court-appointed counsel]?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Are you satisfied with her representation of you in this matter?

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Before I go any further, do you have any questions that you would like to 
ask her?  I can 
arrange it so you can ask those separately or confidentially, if necessary.

 

            
THE DEFENDANT:  
No, Your Honor.

 

[¶23]   Based on everything in the record and 
everything presented at the hearing, the district court concluded that there was 
"little or no doubt" of the adequacy of trial counsel's representation of the 
appellant.  We 
agree.  The 
appellant has failed to meet his heavy burden of overcoming the strong 
presumption of effectiveness.  To a large extent, this is simply a 
credibility issue, and we are not inclined to second-guess the district court in 
that regard.

 

[¶24]   Neither of the two prongs of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) test has been met.  While trial counsel 
could have been more patient, it is clear from the record that she was dealing 
with a client who was more than ordinarily demanding.  What appears to 
have been a personality conflict did not rise to deficient representation.  Further, the 
appellant has not proven what prejudice he suffered as a result of trial 
counsel's representation.  Given his record, it certainly is not 
surprising that the district attorney would not agree to a light sentence, and 
it is not surprising that the district judge gave him substantial consecutive 
sentences.

 

[¶25]   One particular issue deserves 
additional mention.  
The appellant claims that trial counsel failed to investigate or present 
two possible defenses:  lack of specific intent and 
intoxication.  
However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that either of these 
defenses was available to the appellant.  A hearing was held in the district court on 
the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  The appellant 
presented no evidence at that hearing that he had no specific intent either to 
agree that a forgery would be committed or that the forgery was done with the 
intent to defraud.  
As to the defense of intoxication, the only evidence in the record is 
that the appellant answered "yes" to his attorney's question, "Did you have any 
alcohol or drug problems at the time that you were charged with these 
crimes?"  There 
is nothing to show the extent of the appellant's alcohol or drug problems, if 
they existed, or that they contributed in any way to the commission of the 
crimes.  
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a defense for which there 
is no evidentiary support.  Barron v. State, 
819 P.2d 412, 416 (Wyo. 1991); Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 624 (Wyo. 1985).

 

[¶26]   The idea that the appellant should 
plead guilty did not come from trial counsel, but from the appellant.  He was not tricked 
or threatened into making that decision.  The fact that trial counsel concurred with 
the appellant's assessment of the case does not mean she was ineffective.  The appellant has 
not shown that a different attorney would have advised him any differently.

 

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying 
the

appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?

 

[¶27]   We have recently reiterated the 
standard by which a district court determines whether to grant a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing and the standard by which we review a 
denial of such a motion:

 

            
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that if a motion to withdraw a plea is made 
after sentencing, a plea "may be set aside only to correct manifest 
injustice."  
"Manifest injustice" contemplates a "situation that is unmistakable or 
indisputable, was not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a 
party."  McCarthy v. State, 945 P.2d 775, 776 (Wyo.1997).  It is, in part, 
intended to address ""a fundamental defect which inherently results in a 
complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary 
demands of fair procedure."'"  United States v. 
Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir.1997) 
(quoting United States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 
1028 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 508 U.S. 943, 113 S. Ct. 2424, 124 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1993) and F.R.Cr.P. 
32(d)).  The 
party seeking to withdraw his pleas bears the burden of demonstrating manifest 
injustice.  State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 139 (Wyo.1998).  Justification for 
this heightened standard for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing is based in 
the 

 

"practical considerations important to the proper 
administration of justice.  Before sentencing, the inconvenience to court 
and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared 
with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to trial by 
jury.  But if a 
plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to 
plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea 
if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.  The result would be to undermine respect for 
the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the 
sentencing process."

 

Id. at 138 (quoting Hicklin v. 
State, 535 P.2d 743, 749 (Wyo.1975) and Kadwell v. 
United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963)) (emphasis 
in original).

 

            
A district court has discretion in determining whether a party has proved 
manifest injustice.  
Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the district 
court's determination.  McDermott, 962 P.2d  at 138.  A 
district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea "will not be 
reversed for an abuse of discretion so long as the district court reasonably 
could conclude as it did."  Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 869 (Wyo.2000).

 

Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶¶ 27-28, 32 P.3d 1061, 1069-70 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶28]   In the instant case, the appellant's 
motion to withdraw pleas is premised upon the three arguments previously 
discussed herein.  
Since we have already concluded that W.R.Cr.P. 11 was not violated by the 
district court's advisements or by its proceeding to sentencing on the basis of 
the 1992 PSI, and that the appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective, the 
appellant has failed to show such manifest injustice as would require the 
district court to have allowed him to withdraw his pleas.

 

[¶29]   The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The record contains a Waiver of Preliminary Hearing 
dated March 8, 2000, signed by the appellant and his attorney.  However, there is a 
docket entry in the County Court (now established as Circuit Court) file for a 
preliminary hearing held on the same date.  The State's appellate brief says that the 
preliminary hearing was waived.  The appellant's brief and an affidavit of his 
trial counsel both assert that a preliminary hearing was held, and counsel 
refers to conversations that occurred at or after the hearing.  We conclude that 
the preliminary hearing did take place.

  2Referring to the Information, the district court said:

 

This document contains two counts.  Count I alleges 
that on December 2 of 1999 you conspired with one or more people to commit a 
crime, specifically forgery.  Count II is alleged to have occurred on 
December 17 of 1999.  
This allegation is that you committed a specific crime of forgery by 
uttering  by issuing a check on the account of one Lyle Luebke without that 
person's permission.

 

  3Specifically, the district court detailed the right to 
persist in a not guilty plea, the right to a speedy trial, the right to a jury 
trial, the right to a unanimous verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to 
be represented by counsel, the right to confront witnesses, the right to present 
and subpoena witnesses, the right to testify or to remain silent, the right to 
the presumption of innocence, and the right to appeal.

  4Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(a) provides as follows:

 

A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime 
if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them 
will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the 
objective of the agreement.

 

  5Wyoming 
has adopted the unilateral theory of conspiracy under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-303(a), which means that the State need prove the "guilty mind" only of the 
defendant, not the co-conspirator.  Miller v. State, 
955 P.2d 892, 896-98 (Wyo. 1998).  The word "agrees" in the statute is not used 
in its contract sense.  But see Palato v. 
State, 988 P.2d 512, 513-16 (Wyo. 1999), where the bilateral theory of 
conspiracy is adopted under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2001).  The latter statute 
is in the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act rather than the criminal code.

  6It 
seems odd to make this restriction applicable only to cases where the PSI is 
waived as part of a plea agreement.  The purposes of a PSI are the same in any 
case.  
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) provides that a PSI shall be conducted in every felony case, and that this requirement may 
not be waived, although, with the parties' consent, the court may allow the 
report to be filed after sentencing.