Title: WILKIE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILKIE v. STATE2002 WY 16456 P.3d 1023Case Number: 01-218Decided: 10/31/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

ROY 
WILKIE,

 

Petitioner,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Respondent.

 

 

Representing 
Petitioner:

 

            
Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Respondent:

 

            
Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and 
VOIGT, JJ.

 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Petitioner, Roy 
Wilkie (Wilkie), was charged on June 22, 2000, with one count of domestic 
battery.  After a jury found Wilkie 
guilty, the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial District, Sweetwater County, 
sentenced him to six months incarceration with all but four days suspended and 
placed him on supervised probation for one year.  Wilkie appealed his conviction to the 
district court, which affirmed the circuit court.  Wilkie then filed a Petition for Writ of 
Review with this Court.  We reverse 
because Wilkie was denied his constitutional right to counsel in the circuit 
court.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      While Wilkie 
presents seven issues on appeal, the resolution of one of those issues renders 
the others moot.1  Therefore, we address only the issue of 
whether Wilkie was denied his right to counsel.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Wilkie was 
charged with domestic battery for touching a household member in a rude, 
insolent, or angry manner in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) (Lexis 
1999).  He represented himself pro 
se at his jury trial because of an unusual exchange with the circuit court at 
arraignment that left him without counsel.  
Concerning whether Wilkie would have an attorney, the following dialogue 
took place:

 

            
THE COURT:  Do you intend to 
represent yourself, hire your own attorney or ask the Court to consider the 
appointment of the Public Defender to represent you?

 

            
MR. WILKIE:  I'm going to 
have to represent myself.

 

            
THE COURT:  Before a Judge or 
a Jury?

 

            
MR. WILKIE:  
Jury.

 

            
THE COURT:  Every tried a 
Jury Trial before?

 

            
MR. WILKIE:  No, I 
haven't.

 

            
THE COURT:  Understand that 
while it's your right to do that, you're responsible to do the same things that 
lawyers do when they represent clients and the Court will hold you to the same 
standard of knowledge, expertise and skill that it holds any lawyer to?  Still wish to represent yourself before 
a jury, Mr. Wilkie?

 

            
MR. WILKIE:  Well, 
they're not going to let me get an appointed lawyer because I make too much 
money, but I really don't make that much money 
(unintelligible).

 

            
THE COURT:  Well, that's not 
my (unintelligible).  How much you 
making a month at Von's Plumbing?

 

            
MR. WILKIE:  About a thousand 
a month.

 

            
THE COURT:  You're 
right.  You will sign a 
waiver of your right to be tried by a, with assistance of Counsel; Prose 
[sic] Jury.  So 
ordered.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Wilkie proceeded to 
represent himself pro se and was subsequently found guilty by a 
jury.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶4]      Wilkie alleges 
that he was denied his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution2 and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 103 when, at his arraignment, the 
circuit court did not personally advise him of his right to counsel and its 
discussion with him concerning attorneys left him without representation.  Instead, he was given a form to read 
regarding his constitutional rights, which he initialed.  Wilkie argues that he did not knowingly 
and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, and initialing the Advisement of 
Rights form was not a valid waiver of counsel.4  Constitutional issues are questions of 
law that we review de novo.  
Taylor v. State, 7 P.3d 15, 19 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶5]      This Court has 
followed the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit with respect 
to whether a waiver of the right to counsel is voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently made.  Vargas v. 
State, 963 P.3d 984, 990 (Wyo. 1998).  First, the court determines whether a 
defendant voluntarily waived this right.  
United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904 (1999).  If it determines that the right has been 
voluntarily waived, the court then determines whether the defendant waived this 
right knowingly and intelligently.  
Id.5  In that regard, a reviewing court should 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.  Id. (quoting Baker v. 
Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 
1991)).

 

[¶6]      In the instant 
case, proper inquiries were not made to determine whether Wilkie wanted to be 
represented by appointed counsel.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106(a) (LexisNexis 2001) requires the court at a 
defendant's first court appearance to determine whether the defendant is a 
"needy person."  A needy person is 
defined under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-102(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) as "a person 
who at the time his need is determined is unable to provide for the full payment 
of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation[.]"  The only evidence in the record of the 
circuit court's examination of Wilkie's ability to pay for counsel was the 
question of how much he made at Von's Plumbing.

 

[¶7]      The brief 
question and answer session that occurred in this case cannot be construed as a 
voluntary waiver by Wilkie of his right to counsel.  The circuit court did not inform Wilkie 
that he had a right to an attorney if he could not afford one, the circuit court 
merely queried whether Wilkie intended to represent himself, hire an attorney, 
or ask the court to consider the appointment of a public defender.  Wilkie clearly had the impression from 
someone that he made too much money to have a public defender.  Indeed, Wilkie's comments"Well, they're 
not going to let me get an appointed lawyer because I make too much 
money"sounds as if he believed that the decision had already been made.  Yet the circuit court did not follow up 
on that comment to determine the source of Wilkie's information or explain to 
Wilkie that it was up to the court to make that decision.6  Further, the circuit court made no 
determination whether the $1,000.00 per month figure was gross or net, or if 
Wilkie was a needy person as defined by statute.  Instead, the circuit court simply told 
Wilkie, "[y]ou will sign a waiver."  
Wilkie was not given a choice whether or not to waive 
anything.

 

[¶8]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-6-107 (LexisNexis 2001) allows for the waiver of the right to an attorney if 
"the court finds that the person has acted with full awareness of his rights and 
of the consequences of a waiver . . .."  
To determine whether the waiver has been fully informed, "the court 
shall consider such factors as the person's age, education, 
familiarity with the English language and the complexity of the crime 
involved."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  The circuit court did not 
consider any of these factors.

 

[¶9]      Regarding the 
representation of needy persons, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(a) (LexisNexis 2001) 
(emphasis added) provides:

 

The 
public defender shall represent as counsel any needy person who is 
under arrest for or formally charged with having committed a serious crime 
if:

 

            
(i)         
The defendant requests counsel; or

 

            
(ii)        The 
court, on its own motion or otherwise, orders appointment of counsel and the 
defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject, on the record, the opportunity 
to be represented by legal counsel in the proceeding.

 

To 
determine whether a person is "needy," Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106 states, in 
part:

 

            
(a)       
The determination of whether a person covered by W.S. 7-6-104 is a needy 
person shall be deferred until his first appearance in court . . 
..  Thereafter, the court shall determine, with respect to each proceeding, 
whether he is a needy person.  . . 
.

 

            
(b)       
In determining whether a person is a needy person . . . the court 
shall 
consider the standards promulgated pursuant to W.S. 
7-6-103(c)(vii).

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-103(c)(vii) 
(LexisNexis 2001) requires that the state public defender "promulgate rules and 
regulations in cooperation with the supreme court of Wyoming establishing 
standards for determining who is a needy person . . ..  The standards shall 
require the person to file with the court a written affidavit under oath stating 
his financial assets and liabilities."  
(Emphasis added.)  Wilkie 
informed the circuit court that he made only $1,000.00 per month, and did not 
state whether this was a gross or net figure, or what his monthly expenses 
were.  An affidavit should have been 
submitted regarding his financial assets and liabilities, and the circuit court 
should have taken it into consideration in deciding whether Wilkie needed 
appointed counsel.  This was not 
done.

 

[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-105(b) 
(LexisNexis 2001) states:

 

At 
the person's initial appearance the court shall 
advise any defendant who is a needy person of his right to be represented by an 
attorney at public expense.  The 
court shall 
further explain to the needy person the possibility that he may be ordered to 
reimburse the state for the costs associated with his legal 
representation."

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  We conclude that the 
circuit court utterly failed to follow these statutory procedures, and did not 
follow any other procedures7 that would have ensured that Wilkie 
understood his right to appointment of counsel.

 

[¶12]   The State contends 
that

 

a 
review of the record shows that [Wilkie] knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel, with full awareness of his rights and the consequences of his 
waiver, and then chose to proceed to trial pro se.  The circuit court properly respected his 
decision to waive his right to counsel, as it could not have forced an attorney 
upon him in light of his decision to proceed pro se.

 

We 
are unable to find anything in the record to justify this 
contention.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]   The circuit court did not make a 
reasonable examination into Wilkie's ability to pay for an attorney.  Because we find that Wilkie did not 
voluntarily waive his right to counsel, we need not consider whether he 
knowingly and intelligently waived the right.  We reverse and remand to the district 
court for further remand to the circuit court for an appropriate determination 
of Wilkie's right to appointed counsel.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The issues raised were prosecutorial 
misconduct, the right to counsel, the admission of expert testimony, whether the 
State elicited an opinion as to Wilkie's guilt, speedy trial, the right to 
confrontation, and whether Wilkie could be sentenced both to incarceration and 
probation.

  2"In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."  
United States Const. Amend. VI.

  3"In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . and to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury[.]"  Wyo. Const. art 
1, § 10.

  4The third right described on the 
Advisement of Rights form reads:

 

You 
have the right to be represented, at all stages of any criminal proceedings, by 
a lawyer chosen and hired by you.  
If you want a lawyer to represent you, but cannot afford to hire one, 
then you have the right to have me appoint a lawyer to represent you and be paid 
for by the state.

5Of 
course, a defendant must "know" of his right to counsel before he can 
voluntarily waive that right.  
Nelson v. State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Wyo. 
1997).

6Wilkie's 
comment that he was going to "have to" represent himself also should have been a 
"red flag" that alerted the circuit court to the fact that Wilkie did not 
understand his right.

7W.R.Cr.P. 
44 specifies when the right to assignment of counsel attaches, the procedures 
for implementing the right, and provides rules establishing the standard of 
indigency.  See W.R.Cr.P. 
44(a), (b), and (d).