Title: AMOCO PROD. CO. v. EM NOMINEE PSHP. CO.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

AMOCO PROD. CO. v. EM NOMINEE PSHP. CO.2000 WY 912 P.3d 534Case Number: 96-321, 96-327Decided: 04/14/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, 
Appellant (Plaintiff), v.EM NOMINEE PARTNERSHIP COMPANY, a/k/a ENERGY 
METHODS NOMINEE PARTNERSHIP COMPANY, a Colorado Partnership, HALLWOOD G.P.,INC., 
and E.D.P. OPERATING, LTD., Appellees (Defendants). EM NOMINEE PARTNERSHIP 
COMPANY, a/k/a ENERGY METHODS NOMINEE PARTNERSHIP COMPANY, a Colorado 
Partnership; HALLWOOD G.P., INC.; and E.D.P. OPERATING, LTD., Appellants 
(Defendants), v.AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeals from the District 
Court of Sweetwater County: The Honorable Jere Ryckman, 
Judge.

Representing 
Amoco Production Company: Peter A. Bjork of Bjork, 
Lindley & Danielson, P.C., Denver, Colorado. 

Representing 
Em Nominee Partnership Company, et al:  
Thomas J. Kimmell of 
Zarlengo & Kimmell, LLC, Denver, Colorado; and J. Kent Rutledge and Lou 
Piccioni of Lathrop & Rutledge, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The 
question that we must address here is whether expert testimony articulating the 
custom and practice in the industry can substitute for the sound of silence to 
fill a hole in a Unit Agreement and create an obligation to refund overriding 
royalties. Collateral issues are argued with respect to several theories for 
recovery of the royalties; a counterclaim for conversion; the effect of the 
statute of limitations; and the computation of interest. The trial court found 
that the Unit Agreement was not ambiguous, and it ruled that EM Nominee 
Partnership Company, a/k/a Energy Methods Nominee Partnership Company, a 
Colorado Partnership, Hallwood G.P., Inc., and E.D.P. Operating, Ltd. (EM 
Nominee) had no obligation to repay the royalties to Amoco Production Company 
(Amoco). Summary Judgment was entered in favor of EM Nominee on all claims 
asserted by Amoco and also on the claim of EM Nominee to recover royalties from 
other properties withheld by Amoco in an effort to collect the amount it claimed 
was due to it. We accept the careful and reasoned analysis by the trial court, 
and the Order on Motion to Amend Complaint and Motions for Summary Judgment and 
Judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed in all 
respects.

[¶2] In the 
Brief of Appellant, Amoco Production Company, in Case 

[¶3] No. 96-321 
the issues are identified as:

A. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellees (collectively "EM 
Nominee") on Appellant's ("Amoco") claim for breach of 
contract?

B. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to EM Nominee on Amoco's claim for 
unjust enrichment?

C. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to EM Nominee on Amoco's claim for 
conversion, the error including finding that Amoco's claim for conversion was 
barred by the statute of limitations?

D. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting EM Nominee summary judgment on its counterclaim for 
conversion against Amoco?

E. Whether the District 
Court erred in ruling that the damages recoverable on EM Nominee's counterclaim 
for conversion were not limited by application of the statute of 
limitations?

F. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting EM Nominee a judgment which included pre-judgment 
interest, when insufficient evidence supporting EM Nominee's interest 
calculations was submitted to the Court?

[¶4] These same 
issues are adopted by reiteration in the Response Brief of Appellees, EM Nominee 
Partnership Company a/k/a Energy Methods Nominee Partnership Company, a Colorado 
Partnership, Hallwood G.P., Inc., and E.D.P. Operating, Ltd., in Opposition to 
Amoco's Appeal. In the Reply Brief of Appellant, Amoco Production Company, these 
additional statements of issues appear:

A. Summary of 
Argument.

B. Viewing the provisions 
of the Unit Agreement and Letter-In-Lieu of Transfer Order in the light most 
favorable to Amoco, material issues of fact exist which make the District 
Court's entry of summary judgment improper.

C. Amoco's payments to EM 
Nominee were not "voluntary." Judgment for EM Nominee on Amoco's claim for 
unjust enrichment must be vacated.

D. Amoco's claim for 
conversion was filed within four years after the claim accrued and is not barred 
by the statute of limitations.

E. The District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment to EM Nominee on its counterclaim for 
conversion because Amoco had a legal right to set-off proceeds from other 
properties.

F. The amount of the 
judgment entered in favor of EM Nominee fails to take into account the bar of 
the statute of limitations.

[¶5] In Case No. 
96-327, these issues are set forth in the Brief of Appellants, EM Nominee 
Partnership Company a/k/a Energy Methods Nominee Partnership Company, a Colorado 
Partnership, Hallwood G.P., Inc., and E.D.P. Operating, Ltd., on Cross 
Appeal:

A. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting Amoco summary judgment on EM Nominee's Counterclaim for 
breach of fiduciary duty?

B. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting Plaintiff, Amoco Production Company ("Amoco"), summary 
judgment on EM Nominee's Counterclaim for breach of 
contract?

[¶6] In the 
Brief of Appellee, Amoco Production Company in Case No. 96-327, the issues are 
stated in this way:

A. The District Court 
properly entered judgment in Amoco's favor on EM Nominee's Counterclaim for 
breach of fiduciary duty, as no fiduciary relationship existed between the 
parties as a matter of law.

B. The District Court 
properly entered judgment in Amoco's favor on EM Nominee's Counterclaim for 
breach of contract.

[¶7] In the 
Reply Brief of Appellants, EM Nominee Partnership Company a/k/a Energy Methods 
Nominee Partnership Company, a Colorado Partnership, Hallwood G.P., Inc., and 
E.D.P. Operating, Ltd., on Cross Appeal in Case No. 96-327, these additional 
issues are claimed:

A. Summary of 
Argument.

B. Genuine issues of 
material fact exist that preclude entry of summary judgment as to defendant's 
counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.

C. Summary judgment as to 
defendant's counterclaim for breach of contract was improperly granted.1

[¶8] On August 
2, 1973, UV Industries, Inc. (UV Industries), a predecessor in interest of EM 
Nominee, assigned a federal oil and gas lease covering 640 acres in Sweetwater 
County to Amoco, reserving a 6.25% overriding royalty. Contemporaneously with 
that assignment, a portion of the 640 acres was unitized and made subject to the 
Brady (Deep) Unit Agreement. This portion of the assigned leasehold was 
identified as Tract 11, and it became part of the participating area established 
for the Nugget "B" Formation within the unit. In order to commit Tract 11 to the 
Brady (Deep) Unit, Amoco and UV Industries executed a Unit Agreement, which 
provided in Article 11:

It is the intent of this 
section that a participating area shall represent the area known or reasonably 
estimated to be productive in paying quantities; but, regardless of any revision 
of the participating area, nothing herein contained shall be construed as 
requiring any retroactive adjustment for production obtained prior to the 
effective date of the revision of the participating area.

[¶9] On April 
23, 1975, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approved the participating area 
for the Nugget "B" Formation within the Brady (Deep) Unit. On November 28, 1975, 
the BLM approved a First Revision to this participating area, but Amoco objected 
to the revision. During a stay of the First Revision, the operator suspended 
payment of royalties from the participating area to UV Industries until November 
of 1976 when the proceeds attributable to the suspension were released, and 
payment of the royalties was resumed.

[¶10] EM Nominee 
acquired the 6.25% overriding royalty interest in the lease owned by UV 
Industries as of March 1, 1984. On June 14, 1984, Amoco accepted a 
Letter-in-Lieu of Transfer Order which reflected the transaction between UV 
Industries and EM Nominee. The acquisition of this royalty interest by EM 
Nominee specifically was made subject to the Unit Agreement that had been 
executed between Amoco and UV Industries. Between the dates of March 1, 1985 and 
November of 1988, Amoco paid EM Nominee royalties on production from the 
participating area in the amount of $248,049.95.

[¶11] Earlier in 
January of 1985, Champlin Petroleum Company (Champlin), the operator of the 
Brady (Deep) Unit, drilled and completed a well within the unit lands. The well 
was tested until October 31, 1985, when a month long test flow was concluded. On 
March 7, 1986, Champlin informed Amoco of its intent to apply for a Third 
Revision to the Brady (Deep) Unit Nugget "B" Formation participating area 
because of the poor test results on the well. Champlin also advised Amoco that 
it intended to request that the revision be made retroactive to March 1, 1985. 
The revision, if approved, would eliminate Tract 11, which included the land 
subject to EM Nominee's overriding royalty interest, from the participating 
area. Apparently, Amoco never advised EM Nominee of the Third Revision sought by 
Champlin.

[¶12] Initially, 
Amoco opposed the revision proposed by Champlin, but on December 29, 1986, Amoco 
entered into a pooling agreement with other owners of leasehold interests in the 
participating area in order to preserve its revenue interest in the Nugget "B" 
Formation participating area. On May 2, 1989, in the absence of any opposition 
to the revision, the BLM approved the Third Revision, which excluded the land 
subject to EM Nominee's royalty interest from the participating area. The 
revision was made retroactive to March 1, 1985.

[¶13] On May 30, 
1991, Amoco requested that EM Nominee refund the royalties paid to it between 
March 1, 1985 and November of 1988. EM Nominee refused to reimburse Amoco for 
the $248,049.95 that had been paid pursuant to the Unit Agreement. Between March 
of 1990 and March of 1993, Amoco withheld $17,864.36 in proceeds from other EM 
Nominee properties that were not related to the Brady (Deep) Unit, and Amoco 
purported to set off the retained proceeds against its claim that EM Nominee 
should refund the royalties attributable to Tract 11 previously paid to 
it.

[¶14] On 
September 28, 1993, Amoco filed this action against EM Nominee alleging breach 
of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. EM Nominee answered Amoco's 
Complaint on December 27, 1994, and on July 10, 1995, EM Nominee amended its 
answer and filed a counterclaim alleging conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and breach of contract on the part of Amoco. Each of the parties filed a motion 
for summary judgment, and Amoco offered affidavits of expert witnesses to 
explain the custom and practice in the industry for applying the language of 
Article 11 of the Unit Agreement. In its decision letter of September 13, 1996, 
the district court found that the Unit Agreement was not ambiguous. On November 
8, 1996, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of EM Nominee as 
to all claims asserted by Amoco on the premise that EM Nominee had no obligation 
to repay the royalties at issue. In addition, the district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of EM Nominee on its counterclaim for conversion, but the 
court ruled against EM Nominee on its claims for breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of contract. Both parties have appealed the Order on Motion to Amend 
Complaint and Motions for Summary Judgment and Judgment.

[¶15] A summary 
judgment is appropriate in litigation when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop Partnership, 946 P.2d 417, 421 (Wyo. 1997); 
Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996); Roemer Oil 
Co. v. Aztec Gas & Oil Corp., 886 P.2d 259, 262 (Wyo. 1994); see also, 
W.R.C.P. 56(c). In contract litigation, when the terms of the agreement are 
unambiguous, the interpretation is a question of law, and a summary judgment is 
appropriate because there is no genuine issue of material fact. Examination 
Management Services, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996); Union 
Pacific Resources Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 218-19 (Wyo. 1994). Whether 
a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the reviewing court. Prudential 
Preferred Properties v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993). 
We review questions of law de novo without affording deference to the decision 
of the district court. Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 
866 (Wyo. 1997); Griess v. Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of Criminal 
Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶16] According 
to our established standards for interpretation of contracts, the words used in 
the contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable person would give 
to them. Doctors' Co., v. Insurance Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 
1993). When the provisions in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court 
looks only to the "four corners" of the document in arriving at the intent of 
the parties. Union Pacific Resources Co., 882 P.2d  at 220; Prudential Preferred 
Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271. In the absence of any ambiguity, the contract will 
be enforced according to its terms because no construction is appropriate. 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996); 
Prudential Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d  at 1271.

[¶17] We 
reiterate the language of Article 11 of the Unit Agreement upon which Amoco 
relies, with appropriate emphasis:

It is the intent of this 
section that a participating area shall represent the area known or reasonably 
estimated to be productive in paying quantities; but, regardless of any revision 
of the participating area, nothing herein contained shall be construed as 
requiring any retroactive adjustment for production obtained prior to the 
effective date of the revision of the participating area.

[¶18] Amoco's 
contention, as presented to this Court, is that it is implicit from this 
provision that retroactive adjustments for production obtained after the 
effective date of the revision of the participating area are required. It is 
this position that Amoco endeavored to support by offering the testimony of 
several expert witnesses. Those witnesses apparently would be willing to testify 
that the proposition asserted by Amoco is the custom and practice with respect 
to applying such language in the oil and gas industry.

[¶19] The 
district court looked at the unambiguous language of Article 11 of the Unit 
Agreement, and concluded that this language dealt only with an obligation to 
adjust for production obtained prior to the effective date of any revision of 
the participating area. The district court concluded that the language did not 
address and, therefore, did not require the reimbursement of royalty payments 
that had been made subsequent to the effective date of a revision. We do not 
rewrite contracts under the guise of interpretation, and so long as there is no 
ambiguity, we are bound to apply contracts as they have been scrivened. McMurry 
Oil Co. v. Deucalion Research, Inc., 842 P.2d 584, 588 (Wyo. 1992) (citing 
Wyoming Machinery Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 614 P.2d 716, 
720 (Wyo. 1980)); Kidd v. Kidd, 832 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1992). In State v. 
Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1988), we said:

[¶20] Next, the 
Board invokes a common sense and good faith premise for interpreting the lease. 
They urge that common sense requires a conclusion that the Board would not enter 
into a contract which permitted the lessees to receive proceeds in relation to 
the gas and foreclosed the lessor from any right to a portion of those proceeds. 
We accept the proposition that we are to interpret the contract in the light of 
common sense and good faith. Wolff [v. Belco Development Corporation Wolff v. 
Belco Development Corporation, Wyo., 736 P.2d 730 (1987)], supra; Marathon Oil 
Company v. Kleppe, 407 F. Supp. 1301 (D.Wyo. 1975), aff'd 556 F.2d 982 (10th 
Cir. 1977). Common sense and good faith do not demand a conclusion, however, 
that the Board would never enter into a contract which, in hindsight, is not the 
best arrangement that could have been made. The Board simply is requesting that 
this court rewrite the contract to encompass provisions that it would have 
included after learning of the take-or-pay payments. No rule of law justifies 
that resolution by this court.

[¶21] To the 
same effect is Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538, 544 (Wyo. 
1982).

[¶22] Nothing in 
the language of Article 11 of the Unit Agreement addresses the repayment of 
leasehold royalties previously paid. Its plain language is concerned only with 
the potential of retroactive adjustment of royalties for production that had 
occurred prior to the effective date of the revision of the participating area. 
Amoco's endeavor to invoke the testimony of experts with respect to industry 
custom and practice in applying this language inverts our rule with respect to 
extrinsic evidence. Instead of relying upon the extrinsic evidence to resolve an 
ambiguity, Amoco seeks to invoke the extrinsic evidence to structure an 
ambiguity. This would amount to this Court writing a new contract for the 
parties, and we are foreclosed from that endeavor. Union Pacific Resources Co., 
882 P.2d  at 220; Prudential Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d  at 
1271.

[¶23] In an 
effort to bolster its position, Amoco also asserts that certain language in the 
Letter-in-Lieu of Transfer Order, that EM Nominee executed, constitutes an 
agreement by EM Nominee to indemnify and reimburse Amoco for the royalty 
payments. The language upon which Amoco relies reads:

Buyer [EM Nominee] hereby 
agrees to indemnify, save and hold you [Amoco] harmless from and against any and 
all claims, demands, actions, judgments, damages, liabilities, losses, costs, 
charges, recoveries and other expenses of every nature and character which you 
may sustain by reason of making payment of proceeds of production as requested 
and authorized hereby. Indemnity agreements that exculpate one from the 
consequences of his own acts are not looked upon with favor by the courts, and 
are to be strictly construed. Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 811 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, Inc., 662 P.2d 96, 99 (Wyo. 1983). If the indemnitee intends to make the indemnitor 
responsible for a fault in which the indemnitee shares, that goal must be 
expressed in clear and unequivocal terms beyond any peradventure of doubt. 
Northwinds of Wyoming, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 779 P.2d 753, 758 (Wyo. 
1989); Wyoming Johnson, Inc., 662 P.2d  at 99. The language upon which Amoco 
relies, as found by the district court, does not in clear and unequivocal terms, 
beyond any peradventure of doubt, require EM Nominee to reimburse Amoco for 
royalties that were paid after the effective date of the revision of the unit. 
Instead, the indemnity provision upon which Amoco relies obviously is intended 
to protect Amoco against third party claims resulting from an erroneous payment 
of royalties to those other than the persons or entities entitled to them. There 
is no third party indemnification claim before this Court, and this provision is 
inefficacious for the purpose claimed by Amoco.

[¶24] In an 
alternative theory of recovery, Amoco contends that it is entitled to 
reimbursement of the royalty payments to EM Nominee under a theory of unjust 
enrichment. Unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit, is an equitable remedy which 
implies a contract so that one party may recover damages from another. Adkins v. 
Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 131 (Wyo. 1995); Bowles v. Sunrise Home Center, Inc., 847 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Wyo. 1993). There are four elements for a claim of unjust 
enrichment:

(1) Valuable services 
were rendered, or materials furnished,

(2) to the party to be 
charged,

(3) which services or 
materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party, 
and,

(4) under such 
circumstances which reasonably notified the party to be charged that the 
plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, expected to 
be paid by the party to be charged. Without such payment, the party would be 
unjustly enriched.

[¶25] Coones v. 
F.D.I.C., 894 P.2d 613, 617 (Wyo. 1995); Landeis v. Nelson, 808 P.2d 216, 217-18 
(Wyo. 1991), Zitterkopf v. Bradbury, 783 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶26] There is 
no dispute over the fact that Amoco made royalty payments to EM Nominee nor the 
fact that those payments were accepted and used by EM Nominee. Since the Unit 
Agreement did not require the repayment of royalties after the adjusted 
effective date, however, the royalty payments were not furnished under 
circumstances that would reasonably notify EM Nominee of Amoco's expectation to 
be reimbursed. As a matter of law, Amoco has failed to offer any evidence to 
establish the fourth element so as to permit it to maintain an action for unjust 
enrichment.

[¶27] Amoco's 
final theory is that the failure of EM Nominee to repay the royalty proceeds 
constituted a conversion of Amoco's property. The elements a plaintiff must 
establish for recovery for an action in conversion are:

(1) He had legal title to 
the converted property;

(2) there is a right to 
immediate possession at the time of the conversion;

(3) the defendant 
exercised dominion over the property in a manner which denied the plaintiff his 
right to use and enjoy the property;

(4) when a defendant 
comes into possession lawfully or without fault, plaintiff must show demand and 
refusal to turn over the property; and

(5) the plaintiff has 
suffered damage by the loss of the property.

[¶28] Ferguson 
v. Coronado Oil Co., 884 P.2d 971, 975 (Wyo. 1994); Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Wyo. 1985). Amoco did not offer evidence to establish its legal 
title to the royalty proceeds, nor did it demonstrate its right to immediate 
possession at the time of the alleged conversion. This is true whether we look 
at the Unit Agreement or the Letter-in-Lieu of Transfer Order. Amoco's claim for 
conversion fails.

[¶29] In any 
event, Amoco did not file its Complaint within four years of the time the cause 
of action accrued, and the claim for conversion would be barred by the statute 
of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations, found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) (Lexis 1999), reads:

(a) Civil actions other 
than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following 
periods after the cause of action accrues:

* * 
*

(iv) Within four (4) 
years, an action for:

* * 
*

(B) The recovery of 
personal property or for taking, detaining or injuring personal 
property[.]

[¶30] Wyoming is 
a discovery state in which the statute of limitations is triggered when a 
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause of action. 
Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 944 P.2d 880 [955 P.2d 880], 883 (Wyo. 1998); 
Nowotny v. L & B Contract Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 457 (Wyo. 1997); 
see also Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 343 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 
(1979). Amoco knew or had reason to know that EM Nominee had been overpaid 
royalties by May 2, 1989, when the BLM reduced the size of the unit and made 
that revision retroactive. Amoco did not file its Complaint until September 28, 
1993, and therefore, even if it could support a claim for conversion such a 
claim would be time barred.

[¶31] Amoco also 
complains of the award of summary judgment to EM Nominee on its counterclaim for 
conversion. EM Nominee sought recovery from Amoco for proceeds from royalties 
payable on other leased property that Amoco had seized. Amoco claimed the right 
to set off these royalties against EM Nominee's alleged obligation. We 
previously have noted that conversion is defined as any distinct act by dominion 
wrongfully executed over ones property in denial of his right or inconsistent 
with it. Western Nat. Bank of Casper v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635, 640 (Wyo. 1978), 
followed by, Ferguson, 884 P.2d  at 975. Since EM Nominee had no obligation to 
reimburse Amoco for the royalty payments at issue, Amoco had no right to set off 
the proceeds that it seized from the other EM Nominee's properties that were not 
related to the Brady (Deep) Unit. The district court properly granted EM Nominee 
a summary judgment on its claim for conversion.

[¶32] Amoco 
asserted as an affirmative defense that EM Nominee had failed to bring its claim 
for conversion within the four year statute of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B). As we have noted previously, Amoco was rightfully in 
possession of these proceeds, and the claim for conversion required a demand and 
refusal. As the party asserting the statute of limitations, it was Amoco's 
responsibility to demonstrate the date of the demand and refusal in order to 
commence the period for the statute of limitations. Amoco made no such showing. 
EM Nominee alleged that it became aware that it had a claim for conversion as a 
result of discovery conducted in this case. Amoco filed its Complaint on 
September 28, 1993, and EM Nominee's knowledge of its claim for conversion had 
to be acquired after that date. EM Nominee amended its answer and filed its 
counterclaim for conversion on July 10, 1995, well within the four year period 
provided in the statute of limitations.

[¶33] Amoco's 
last concern is the amount of prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 
seven percent in the amount of $6,580.65 which the district court awarded EM 
Nominee on its judgment for conversion. We have held that the allowance of 
prejudgment interest in a conversion case is not interest per se. Instead, it is 
an additional amount of damages which the finder of fact may, in its discretion, 
award to compensate the plaintiff from the time between the origin of the cause 
of action and the trial. ANR Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 893 P.2d 698, 
704 (Wyo. 1995), see also In re Johnson's Estate and Guardianship, 78 Wyo. 173, 
320 P.2d 429, 433-34 (1958). In this case, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding EM Nominee prejudgment interest as part of its damages 
for the conversion claim.

[¶34] The Order 
on Motion to Amend Complaint and Motions for Summary Judgment and Judgment 
entered in the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

Footnotes

1 In view of 
our affirmance of the Order on Motion to Amend Complaint and Motions for Summary 
Judgment and Judgment in all respects, we do not address the issues presented in 
the cross-appeal on behalf of EM Nominee.