Title: Lund v. MacArthur

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

462 P.2d 482 (1969) Audrey LUND, also known as Mrs. Richard Lund v. Arthur C. MacARTHUR, Nadine K. MacArthur and Freda M. MacArthur. No. 4863. Supreme Court of Hawaii. December 11, 1969. Tobias C. Tolzmann, Honolulu, for appellants. Edward Berman, Honolulu, for respondent. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., MARUMOTO, ABE and KOBAYASHI, JJ., and Circuit Judge WONG in place of LEVINSON, J., disqualified. KOBAYASHI, Justice. Mrs. Audrey Lund (plaintiff-appellee) was the landlord of an unfurnished house leased to the MacArthurs (defendants-appellants) on December 13, 1965, for a period of one year. Tenants inspected the premises before leasing. On May 14, 1966, tenants informed landlord of their intention to vacate the premises for reasons of health. Landlord refused to allow tenants to cancel their obligations under the lease. Tenants then requested an inspection by the Building Department of the City and County of Honolulu. On May 25, 1966, the Building Department gave to Mrs. Lund a "Notice to Correct" itemizing deficiencies in the electrical wiring of the house: Tenants vacated on June 18, 1966, paying rent through July 15, 1966. Landlord corrected the deficiencies after tenants vacated. Landlord sold the house to a third party on August 15. At trial landlord sought damages including the amount of rent ($225) from July 15 to August 15, 1966, during which time the house was vacant and unrented. Tenants argued below that the violation of the Building Code constituted a breach of an implied warranty of habitability. The trial court made no findings of fact as to the nature of the wiring defects in the house, holding: Tenants argue: In Lemle v. Breeden, Supreme Court of Hawaii, November 26, 1969, 462 P.2d 470, we decided that there was an implied warranty of habitability in a lease of a dwelling. Today we hold that an implied warranty of habitability exists in unfurnished as well as furnished dwellings. The common law distinction on this ground is not in accord with the current realities of life in Hawaii. See Lemle, p. 474. There fore we reverse and remand for reconsideration in light of Lemle. On remand the trial court will have to determine whether or not the electrical deficiencies which apparently were in violation of the Building Code constituted a breach of an implied warranty of habitability. If the court finds that there has been a breach, then it will also have to determine whether the breach was material. See *484 Lemle Part B "Choice of Remedies", pp. 475. The seriousness of the defects and the length of time during which they persist are both relevant factors to be considered in determining materiality. In the present case wiring defects were brought to landlords' attention on May 25 and had not been repaired when tenants vacated on June 18, a period of at least 24 days. An inquiry into the nature of the defects would seem essential in determining materiality. For example, a wiring defect may pose an immediate fire hazard such that a tenant cannot reasonably be expected to sleep on the premises. On the other hand, a wiring defect may be in a single non-essential circuit which can be turned off at a circuit box until repaired at some later time. On remand the trial court will of course reconsider the award of costs and attorney's fees in light of its redetermination of the merits as outlined above. In this posture of the case, it would be inappropriate to review paragraph 9 of the trial court's conclusions of law. LEVINSON, J., not participating.