Title: McIntyre v. Hooks

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
McIntyre v. Hooks, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3529.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3529 
MCINTYRE v. HOOKS, WARDEN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as McIntyre v. Hooks, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3529.] 
Habeas corpus—Sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and are not cognizable in 
habeas corpus—Writ denied. 
(No. 2019-0042—Submitted March 10, 2020—Decided July 2, 2020.) 
IN HABEAS CORPUS. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Petitioner, Lewis Leroy McIntyre Jr., an inmate at the Ross 
Correctional Institution (“RCI”), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
ordered respondent, Mark Hooks, the warden at RCI, to file a return of writ.  155 
Ohio St.3d 1403, 2019-Ohio-943, 119 N.E.3d 432.  In response, Hooks filed a 
motion to dismiss.  For the reasons that follow, we deny the motion to dismiss and 
also deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the merits. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
The facts in the record 
{¶ 2} In August 1991, McIntyre was convicted of aggravated burglary in 
violation of former R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) and (A)(3), an aggravated felony of the first 
degree, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136 (“S.B. 2”), and felonious 
assault in violation of former R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), an aggravated felony of the 
second degree, S.B. 2.  He was also convicted of a firearm specification on each 
count.  He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 22 to 46 years.  State v. 
McIntyre, Summit C.P. No. CR 91 01 0135 (Sept. 9, 1991).1 
{¶ 3} In December 2007, McIntyre was granted parole and released.  In July 
2009, however, his parole was revoked after he was convicted of tampering with 
evidence, petty theft, tampering with records, and obstructing justice.  He was 
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of four years.  State v. McIntyre, Summit 
C.P. No. CR 09 03 0647 (July 22, 2009).  The Ninth District Court of Appeals 
remanded that case so that the trial court could conduct an allied-offense analysis, 
and the trial court merged the tampering-with-records conviction with the 
tampering-with-evidence conviction.  McIntyre was resentenced to an aggregate 
prison term of three years.  The record does not indicate whether that sentence was 
ordered to be served consecutively or concurrently with his other prison term. 
{¶ 4} In 2015, this court granted McIntyre a writ of mandamus because his 
1991 sentencing order did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C) and the “one-document” 
rule that this court established in State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-
3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 17 (only one document may constitute a final, appealable 
order), and was therefore not a final, appealable order.  State ex rel. McIntyre v. 
Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 144 Ohio St.3d 589, 2015-Ohio-5343, 45 
N.E.3d 1003, ¶ 10 (plurality opinion).  On February 3, 2016, the trial court issued 
                                                 
1.  In 1992, McIntyre was convicted of aggravated assault under the same case number and 
sentenced to a prison term of 18 months.  But because he was ordered to serve that sentence 
concurrently with the 1991 sentences, the 1992 conviction is not relevant to the present analysis. 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
a new sentencing entry for the 1991 and 1992 convictions (“the 2016 entry”), again 
imposing an aggregate 22-to-46-year prison sentence. 
The issue presented 
{¶ 5} In 1991, when McIntyre was convicted and sentenced for aggravated 
burglary and felonious assault, the maximum prison term for an aggravated felony 
of the first degree was 25 years and the maximum prison term for an aggravated 
felony of the second degree was 15 years.  See former R.C.2929.11(B)(1) and (2), 
143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1433; S.B. 2.  McIntyre received the maximum prison term 
on both counts.  However, when the trial court issued the 2016 entry, 2011 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”) had been enacted, and it established different 
maximum penalties for these offenses.  Specifically, the maximum penalty for a 
first-degree felony was 11 years, former R.C. 2929.14(A)(1), and the maximum 
penalty for a second-degree felony was 8 years, former R.C. 2929.14(A)(2). 
{¶ 6} The issue this case presents is which law governs McIntyre’s 
sentence—the sentencing statutes in effect in 1991 and 1992 or the sentencing 
statutes in effect in 2016.  According to McIntyre, if he is subject to a maximum 
term of 46 years, then he will not complete his maximum sentence until 2037.  On 
the other hand, if he is subject to a maximum term of 25 years, then, according to 
McIntyre, he “has served all of this time and more.” 
Procedural history and the motion to dismiss 
{¶ 7} McIntyre filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court on 
January 11, 2019.  After we ordered a return of writ, Hooks filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  When a custodian is ordered to file a 
return on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he must state in writing whether he 
has the prisoner in custody, R.C. 2725.14(A), and “the authority, and the true and 
whole cause, of such imprisonment and restraint, with a copy of the writ, warrant, 
or other process upon which the prisoner is detained,” R.C. 2725.14(B).  We may 
treat a motion to dismiss as a return of writ.  See Hammond v. Dallman, 63 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
St.3d 666, 667, 590 N.E.2d 744 (1992).  And in habeas cases in which we treat a 
motion to dismiss as a return of writ, we decide the case on the merits rather than 
on the pleadings.  Id. 
{¶ 8} For this reason, we deny the motion to dismiss and proceed to 
consider the case on the merits. 
The merits of McIntyre’s claims 
{¶ 9} To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must show that 
he is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty and that he is entitled to immediate 
release from prison or confinement.  R.C. 2725.01; State ex rel. Cannon, 155 Ohio 
St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10.  “A writ of habeas corpus is 
generally ‘available only when the petitioner’s maximum sentence has expired and 
he is being held unlawfully.’ ”  Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-
Ohio-1093, 59 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 8, quoting Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 
214, 702 N.E.2d 1198 (1998).  Habeas corpus is not available when there is an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Billiter v. Banks, 135 Ohio St.3d 
426, 2013-Ohio-1719, 988 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 10} R.C. 1.58(B) provides: “If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for 
any offense is reduced by a reenactment or amendment of a statute, the penalty, 
forfeiture, or punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed according to the 
statute as amended.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, a person who is not sentenced until 
after the effective date of H.B. 86 must be sentenced under the lesser penalties from 
the amended statute, even if the crime was committed prior to the effective date.  
State v. Thomas, 148 Ohio St.3d 248, 2016-Ohio-5567, 70 N.E.3d 496, ¶ 17; State 
v. Taylor, 138 Ohio St.3d 194, 2014-Ohio-460, 5 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 20.  Accordingly, 
a person who received a penalty or punishment prior to the effective date of H.B. 
86 is not eligible to receive an H.B. 86 lesser penalty or punishment.  See, e.g., State 
v. Clay, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2011-12-016, 2012-Ohio-5011, ¶ 16. 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
{¶ 11} McIntyre claims that no sentence was imposed upon him in 1991 or 
in 1992.  According to McIntyre: 
 
An invalid entry means an invalid sentence because a sentence 
cannot be officially imposed until the written entry, constituting the 
final appealable order disposing [of] the criminal case, is signed by 
the judge and filed with the clerk. 
 
McIntyre therefore contends that he was not sentenced for his 1991 and 1992 
convictions until the trial court issued the 2016 entry.  And he argues that in 2016, 
the trial court should have sentenced him under the statutes that were in effect on 
that date. 
{¶ 12} In short, McIntyre argues that there is a sentencing error in the 2016 
entry.  But “ ‘sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and are not cognizable in 
habeas corpus.’ ”  State ex rel. Sneed v. Anderson, 114 Ohio St.3d 11, 2007-Ohio-
2454, 866 N.E.2d 1084, ¶ 7, quoting Majoros v. Collins, 64 Ohio St.3d 442, 443, 
596 N.E.2d 1038 (1992).  In Wills v. Turner, 150 Ohio St.3d 379, 2017-Ohio-6874, 
81 N.E.3d 1252, ¶ 6, we affirmed the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition that 
claimed that the trial court had erroneously sentenced the defendant under the law 
applicable at the time of his indictment, rather than the law in effect at the time of 
his guilty plea.  As in Wills, McIntyre’s allegations do not challenge the jurisdiction 
of the trial court and are therefore not cognizable in habeas corpus. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, we deny Hooks’s motion to dismiss and 
McIntyre’s request for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Writ denied. 
FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., not participating. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 14} Petitioner, Lewis Leroy McIntyre Jr., was convicted in 1991 of 
felonious assault, a violation of former R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 
146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136 (“S.B. 2”), a felony of the second degree, and 
aggravated burglary, a violation of former R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) and (A)(3), S.B. 2, 
a felony of the first degree.  He was also convicted of a firearm specification on 
each count.  The jury was unable to reach a verdict on an additional felonious-
assault charge that had been amended before trial.  On September 9, 1991, the trial 
court filed a sentencing entry that ostensibly sentenced McIntyre to a term of 8 to 
15 years for felonious assault and 8 to 25 years for aggravated burglary, plus 3-year 
prison terms for each of the firearm specifications.  The trial court ordered the terms 
to be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison sentence of 22 to 46 years.  The 
sentencing entry did not, however, address the amended felonious-assault charge 
on which the jury failed to reach a verdict. 
{¶ 15} On May 22, 1992, McIntyre pleaded guilty to aggravated assault 
under the same case number and was sentenced to a concurrent 18-month prison 
term.  But that entry likewise failed to address the amended felonious-assault charge 
on which the jury had failed to reach a verdict. 
{¶ 16} On June 27, 2012, the prosecuting attorney filed a memorandum 
giving notice that the state was not going to retry McIntyre on the amended 
felonious-assault charge from 1991.  On June 28, 2012, the trial court dismissed the 
felonious-assault charge, although the order apparently dismissed the charge as 
indicted and not as amended. 
{¶ 17} In State ex rel. McIntyre v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
144 Ohio St.3d 589, 2015-Ohio-5343, 45 N.E.3d 1003, we issued a peremptory 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
writ of mandamus directing the trial court to issue a final, appealable order that 
properly disposed of all the charges against McIntyre.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 18} On February 3, 2016, in the apparent absence of the parties, the trial 
court issued what I assume for purposes of this discussion was a final, appealable 
order.  Based on the sentencing laws in 1991, the trial court again sentenced 
McIntyre to a term of 8 to 15 years for the felonious-assault conviction, 8 to 25 
years for the aggravated-burglary conviction, and 3-year terms for the firearms 
specifications.  McIntyre’s aggregate prison term remained 22 to 46 years.2 
{¶ 19} According to our decision in State v. Craig, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-
Ohio-455, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 21, “a conviction on one count of a multicount 
indictment is not a final, appealable order when other counts remain pending after 
a mistrial.”  The failure to resolve the hanging charge is not a mere clerical error 
but rather is a fundamental failure to fully determine the action that will generally 
prevent the defendant from appealing until that charge is resolved.  Id. at ¶ 17.3   
{¶ 20} In short, McIntyre was ostensibly ordered on September 9, 1991, to 
serve an aggregate prison sentence of 22 to 46 years and was presumably delivered 
into the custody of the designated state correctional institution at that time pursuant 
to R.C. 2949.12.  But McIntyre did not have a final, appealable order to contest his 
convictions and sentence until February 3, 2016, over 24 years later. 
{¶ 21} In my view, ordering an offender to serve over 24 years in prison 
before he obtains the legal right to appeal his conviction and sentence is not a mere 
sentencing error.  To the contrary, it would at least seem to raise very serious 
                                                 
2.  The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a two-to-one decision.  
State v. McIntyre, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28125, 2018-Ohio-2001.  This court declined to accept 
jurisdiction in McIntyre’s discretionary appeal.  State v. McIntyre, 157 Ohio St.3d 1484, 2019-Ohio-
4600, 134 N.E.3d 203. 
 
3.  In Craig, however, the trial court’s subsequent finding that Craig was incompetent to stand trial 
on the pending charge operated as a de facto severance of that count.  Id. at ¶ 2. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
questions of due process and equal protection.  See Craig at ¶ 41 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment only). 
{¶ 22} This case is not like Wills v. Turner, 150 Ohio St.3d 379, 2017-Ohio-
6874, 81 N.E.3d 1252, in which the petitioner objected to having been sentenced 
under the law in effect at the time of his 1988 indictment rather than under the law 
in effect at the time of his 2004 guilty plea.  Id. at ¶ 5.  McIntyre served over 24 
years in prison before his judgment was subject to lawful appellate review.  The 
inchoate nature of McIntyre’s criminal-case proceedings distinguishes the 
allegations in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from some mere pedestrian 
challenge to a prison sentence. 
{¶ 23} Moreover, the inordinate delay in rendering a final, appealable order 
in this case has an additional consequence.  As I have noted, the prosecuting 
attorney gave notice on June 27, 2012, that the state was not going to retry McIntyre 
on the felonious-assault charge.  The trial court signed an entry on June 28, 2012, 
dismissing that charge and a final, appealable order was not journalized until 
February 3, 2016. 
{¶ 24} By the time any of those events occurred, however, the General 
Assembly enacted substantial changes to Ohio’s felony-sentencing scheme by 
means of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”), effective September 30, 2011.  Under 
H.B. 86, the maximum sentence for a second-degree felony was 8 years.  See former 
R.C. 2929.14(A)(2).  The maximum sentence for a first-degree felony was 11 years.  
See former R.C. 2929.14(A)(1).  H.B. 86 did not affect McIntyre’s prison terms for 
the firearm specifications.  So, if McIntyre had been sentenced under H.B. 86, his 
maximum sentence would have been 25 years and he would have been released, at 
the latest, in 2018 (25 years from the time of his 1991 conviction, plus 2 years to 
reflect the time he had been out on parole). 
{¶ 25} The unresolved felonious-assault charge prevented the trial court’s 
September 9, 1991 sentencing entry from being a final, appealable judgment.  See 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
Craig, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-455, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 21.  McIntyre did not 
have a final, appealable judgment until February 3, 2016, well after the effective 
date of H.B. 86. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 1.58(B) states: “If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any 
offense is reduced by a reenactment or amendment of a statute, the penalty, 
forfeiture, or punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed according to the 
statute as amended.”  Here, because no de jure punishment had been “already 
imposed,” McIntyre qualified to be sentenced under H.B. 86.  Indeed, had the 
prosecuting attorney elected to retry McIntyre in 2012, and had the prosecuting 
attorney been successful in that prosecution, McIntyre’s sentence clearly would 
have been governed by H.B. 86, even though his offenses had been committed at a 
time when Ohio law authorized the imposition of indefinite prison sentences.  See 
State v. Thomas, 148 Ohio St.3d 248, 2016-Ohio-5567, 70 N.E.3d 496, ¶ 18 
(Thomas, who was convicted in 2014 for crimes that he had committed in 1993, 
was entitled to be sentenced under H.B. 86). 
{¶ 27} Through no fault of McIntyre, his 1991 case was not finally resolved 
until 2016.  Consequently, McIntyre should have been present on February 3, 2016, 
and sentenced in accordance with H.B. 86.  And under H.B. 86, McIntyre’s 
sentence would have expired in 2018.  Yet McIntyre still remains in state custody.  
A writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy when a petitioner’s maximum 
sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully.  See Leyman v. Bradshaw, 
146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, 59 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 28} Because I believe that McIntyre is being held in state custody beyond 
the expiration of his maximum sentence, I would deny the motion to dismiss filed 
by respondent Mark Hooks and would grant McIntyre a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  I dissent. 
_________________ 
Stephen P. Hanudel, for petitioner. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Maura O’Neill Jaite, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. 
_________________