Title: State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip 
Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-625.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-625 
THE STATE EX REL. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, INC. v. 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-625.] 
Public records — Open meetings — Duty of private entities — Definitions of 
“public body,” R.C. 121.22, and “pubic office,” R.C. 149.011 — 
Functional equivalence — Quasi-agency — Prior request for public 
records. 
(No. 2010-0728 — Submitted January 4, 2011 — Decided February 16, 2011.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, 
the Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners and the individual commissioners, 
the Cuyahoga County Transition Advisory Group (“TAG”) and its members, and 
the Transition Executive Committee (“TEC”) and its members, to provide access 
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to the records and meeting minutes of TEC and its workgroups pursuant to Ohio’s 
Sunshine Laws, R.C. 121.22 and 149.43.  Because relator, American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. (“ACLU”), has not established its entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief, we deny the writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In November 2009, Cuyahoga County voters adopted a county 
charter that  replaces the county’s three-member board of commissioners with an 
elected county executive and council, changes several county offices from elected 
to appointed positions, and reorganizes or eliminates certain departments.  The 
charter became effective in January 2010, with the new county government 
effective in January 2011. 
{¶ 3} Under Section 13.07 of the Cuyahoga County Charter, the board of 
county commissioners created TAG, which had a duty to develop 
recommendations for the transition to the new county government: 
{¶ 4} “The Board of County Commissioners, not later than March 2010, 
shall designate three senior administrative officials of the County to act as a 
Transition Advisory Group, which shall develop recommendations for the orderly 
and efficient transition to the operation of the County government under the 
provisions of this Charter and shall work with the newly elected County officials.  
The Board of County Commissioners shall provide necessary facilities and 
support for the Transition Advisory Group and shall make provision in the budget 
of the County for the salaries of the elected officers who are to take office in 
January 2011 and for such other matters as shall be necessary and practicable to 
provide for the transition.  All County officials and employees shall cooperate 
with the Transition Advisory Group by providing such information and 
documents as the Transition Advisory Group shall request in connection with the 
performance of its duties under this section and shall use their best efforts to assist 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
the newly elected County officials and their designees and representatives in 
implementing the transition.” 
{¶ 5} Pursuant to this section of the charter, on November 19, 2009, the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners designated James McCafferty, the 
county administrator, Gary Holland, the director of the county Department of 
Justice Affairs, and Joseph Nanni, the county director of human resources, to act 
as the TAG. 
{¶ 6} At a Gund Foundation dinner in early December 2009, both 
McCafferty and Martin Zanotti, the chairperson of New Cuyahoga Now (“NCN”), 
a private entity that had drafted the new charter and guided the campaign for its 
passage, spoke about county-transition issues.  Following discussion between 
McCafferty and Zanotti, TAG invited NCN and the Greater Cleveland 
Partnership1 (“GCP”) to form a comprehensive civic coalition that would 
represent and work with all sectors of the community during the transition period 
and beyond. 
{¶ 7} NCN and GCP accepted the invitation and created a steering 
committee, the TEC, to oversee the creation of workgroups as part of the 
committee. TEC has eight members, including its cochairpersons, McCafferty and 
Zanotti.  The workgroups comprise community leaders, county employees, and 
private citizens who volunteered to participate in the transition based on their 
expertise and interest in the specific subject-matter areas of the workgroups.  
Thirteen workgroups were ultimately created:  Public Engagement Committee, 
County Government Collaboration Committee, Code of Ethics Workgroup, 
Finance & Administration Workgroup, Justice Services Workgroup, Human 
Services Workgroup, Human Resources Workgroup, Human Capital/Quality 
                                                 
1 The Greater Cleveland Partnership “is a membership association of Northeast Ohio companies 
and organizations and one of the largest metropolitan chambers of commerce in the nation.”  
http://www.gcpartnership.com/About-GCP.aspx.   
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Places Workgroup, Information Technology Workgroup, Procurement & Public 
Works Workgroup, Economic Development Workgroup, County Council 
Planning Workgroup, and Boards & Commissions Workgroup. 
{¶ 8} Under the general transition structure, TEC was to review and 
approve recommendations offered by the workgroups and forward approved 
recommendations to TAG for review, approval, and submission to the newly 
elected county executive and council by November 2010.  But TAG is free to 
disregard any recommendations made by TEC or the workgroups, and TEC and 
the workgroups retain their independent right to present recommendations directly 
to the county executive and council notwithstanding TAG’s disapproval. 
{¶ 9} Neither the Commissioners nor TAG created TEC or the 
workgroups, and TAG did not delegate any of its charter-mandated duties to TEC 
or the workgroups.  TEC receives no guidance or direction from TAG, and 
although county employees serve on TEC and various workgroups, they have no 
official authority to direct or make decisions on behalf of TEC or any workgroup. 
{¶ 10} TAG has received $7,000,000 in funding from the county, but 
none of that money has been allocated to TEC or the workgroups.  The only 
operational assistance provided by the board of commissioners and TAG to TEC 
and the workgroups was posting information about TAG, TEC, and the 
workgroups on the county website for the transition and providing meeting space 
for some of the workgroups.  NCN has received money entirely from private 
sources to support its efforts.  In essence, TEC and the workgroups are 
independent of any government entity or process. 
{¶ 11} On February 11, 2010, shortly after media reports that McCafferty 
and Zanotti had stated that transition workgroups should be able to conduct 
business in private, TAG issued a press release entitled “Transition Advisory 
Group Committed to Open Meetings,” in which it “reaffirmed the importance of 
transparency and openness to the formation of a new county government by 
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opening all work group meetings to the public.”  As announced in the release, 
“[m]inutes of the Transition Work Groups and scheduled meeting dates, times and 
locations will also be posted on the Cuyahoga County Website.” 
{¶ 12} Consistent with the press release, information about meetings of 
TAG, TEC, and any committees, subcommittees, or workgroups assembled under 
TEC, including the dates, times, locations, and minutes of the meetings, has been 
made available to the public through regular postings on the county’s transition 
website, http://charter.cuyahogacounty.us/en-US/home.aspx.  For example, the 
meeting dates, locations, agendas, and minutes for all of TEC’s meetings have 
been posted on the website, and the meetings have been open to the public. 
{¶ 13} By letter dated February 17, 2010, relator, American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. (“ACLU”), submitted a request addressed to the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners and County Administrator 
McCafferty pursuant to R.C. 149.43 and Section 12.06 of the Cuyahoga County 
Charter for certain records relating to the transition to the new county 
government, including (1) “[r]ecords of whether any members of the Transition 
Advisory Group (‘TAG’), its committees, subcommittees, or workgroups have 
completed the public records training that is required for elected officials and their 
designees pursuant to Revised Code Section 109.43,” (2) “policies or procedures 
(official or unofficial) used in the formation of any committees, subcommittees, 
or workgroups established by or under the TAG,” (3) a “list of the names of each 
individual/volunteer who is serving or has served on a committee, subcommittee, 
or workgroup under the TAG,” (4) “[f]ull copies of minutes to all TAG or 
subcommittee meetings that have already been held,” and (5) “[f]ull copies of any 
documents or reports created by TAG or any of its subcommittees.” 
{¶ 14} A couple of weeks later, the county prosecutor’s office submitted a 
response to the ACLU’s records request on behalf of the board and McCafferty.  
In the response, the county specified that for the second, fourth, and fifth 
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categories of requested records, it would provide access to records of TAG, which 
it conceded was a public body for purposes of the Sunshine Laws, but it could not 
provide access to the records of TEC and the various transition workgroups 
because, inter alia, TAG did not create the workgroups and the workgroups were 
“private, unincorporated associations” rather than “public bodies.”  The county 
stated, “[N]either the [board of county commissioners] nor Mr. McCafferty can 
respond * * * to those portions of your letter that are not directed to TAG, but are 
instead directed to those various voluntary associations formed by interested 
members of the public to provide community input to the TAG.” 
{¶ 15} Further, the county noted that it had no records for the first 
category 
of 
requested 
records─public-records 
training 
for 
TAG 
members─because they were not elected officials or their designees subject to 
R.C. 109.43.  As to the third category of requested records─lists of persons 
serving on transition committees, subcommittees, or workgroups─the county 
stated that although it did not believe they were public records, it would 
nevertheless submit the lists to the ACLU.  The county provided access to copies 
of about 7,000 pages of responsive documents to the ACLU.  The county’s 
response included all known nonprivileged, responsive public records of the 
board and TAG but did not include any records of TEC or its workgroups, which 
the board and TAG did not have.  On March 8, the ACLU retrieved the records 
provided by the county. 
{¶ 16} About a month and a half later, on April 27, the ACLU filed this 
action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, the board of commissioners 
and its members, TAG and its members, and TEC and its members, to provide it 
with access to the “public records and meeting minutes of the various county 
government transition committees and workgroups established by the County to 
fulfill its responsibilities under Section 13.07 of the new Cuyahoga County 
Charter.”  The ACLU requested “a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the 
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Respondents to make the requested records available for inspection and copying 
without further delay” and “a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the 
Respondents to prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate minutes and to 
conduct all meetings in public.”  The board, TAG, and their members filed a 
motion to dismiss, and TEC and its members filed an answer and a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The ACLU filed a motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint and a motion to strike the affidavit in the answer.  The 
ACLU’s amended complaint requested the same relief as its initial complaint. 
{¶ 17} On August 25, 2010, we granted the ACLU’s motion for leave to 
file an amended complaint, denied the motions for judgment on the pleadings, to 
dismiss, and to strike, and granted an alternative writ.  126 Ohio St.3d 1541, 
2010-Ohio-3855, 932 N.E.2d 337.  The parties have submitted evidence and 
briefs. 
{¶ 18} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits.  In addition, the ACLU has filed a motion for leave to exceed the page 
limit for its reply brief, and respondents TEC and its members have filed a motion 
to strike certain newspaper articles relied upon by the ACLU in its merit brief. 
Legal Analysis 
Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit 
{¶ 19} S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.4(C) provides, “Except in death penalty appeals of 
right, the reply brief shall not exceed twenty numbered pages, exclusive of the 
table of contents, the table of authorities cited, the certificate of service, and any 
appendix.”  Excluding the table of contents, table of authorities, and the certificate 
of service, the ACLU’s reply brief exceeds the 20-page limit by six pages. 
{¶ 20} We have previously granted motions to extend the page limits for 
briefs.  E.g., Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 1402, 684 N.E.2d 
335. 
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{¶ 21} We exercise our discretion here and grant the ACLU’s motion.  As 
the ACLU notes, it is responding to two sets of respondents’ briefs, which were 
35 and 36 pages long, and one of those briefs included a constitutional argument.  
Under these circumstances, allowing the ACLU to exceed the 20-page limit by a 
few pages is warranted. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 22} The ACLU requests a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to 
prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate minutes of meetings of TEC and its 
transition workgroups, conduct all of these meetings in public, and provide access 
to their public records and meeting minutes.  To be entitled to the writ, the ACLU 
must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear 
legal duty on the part of respondents, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Brown v. Lemmerman, 124 Ohio St.3d 
296, 2010-Ohio-137, 921 N.E.2d 1049, ¶ 9. 
Lack of Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law 
{¶ 23} Mandamus will not issue if the relator has an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law.  R.C. 2731.05. 
{¶ 24} The ACLU bases its entitlement to the requested extraordinary 
relief on R.C. 121.22 and 149.43.  “Ohio’s ‘Sunshine Laws’ govern public 
records and open meetings.”  Dream Fields, L.L.C. v. Bogart, 175 Ohio App.3d 
165, 2008-Ohio-152, 885 N.E.2d 978, ¶ 3.  For the ACLU’s public-records 
mandamus claim, “[m]andamus is the appropriate legal remedy to compel 
compliance with R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. 
Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 
108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6.  Relators in public-
records mandamus cases need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 
33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 41. 
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9 
 
{¶ 25} For the ACLU’s open-meetings mandamus claim, notwithstanding 
the county respondents’ contentions to the contrary, the claim is not an ill-
disguised claim for a declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, and neither 
a declaratory judgment nor a prohibitory injunction would constitute an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.  A declaratory judgment would not be an 
adequate remedy without a mandatory injunction ordering respondents to prepare, 
file, and maintain full and accurate meeting minutes of past closed meetings of 
TEC and its workgroups and to compel them to conduct all TEC and workgroup 
meetings in public.  A mandatory injunction, however, is an extraordinary remedy 
that does not preclude a writ of mandamus.  See State ex rel. Ohio Liberty 
Council v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 28.  
Similarly, R.C. 121.22(I), which affords mandatory injunctive relief by way of a 
common pleas court action to enforce the provisions of the Open Meetings Act, 
does not prevent a mandamus action.  See State ex rel. Fairfield Leader v. 
Ricketts (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 97, 102, 564 N.E.2d 486.  And a prohibitory 
injunction would not provide the ACLU with the relief it requests:  an order to 
compel respondents to comply with R.C. 121.22 by preparing, filing, and 
maintaining full and accurate meeting minutes and to hold all of the TEC and 
workgroup meetings in public.  Ohio Liberty Council, at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 26} Therefore, the ACLU’s amended complaint properly invokes our 
original jurisdiction, and a common pleas court action for a declaratory judgment 
and either a mandatory or a prohibitory injunction would not provide an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law so as to preclude its mandamus claims. 
Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty: Prospective Mandamus Relief 
{¶ 27} In its amended complaint, the ACLU has requested “a peremptory 
writ of mandamus directing the Respondents to prepare, file, and maintain full 
and accurate minutes and to conduct all meetings in public.”  Insofar as the 
ACLU’s request for relief could be construed as requesting a writ of mandamus to 
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compel compliance with R.C. 121.22 by respondents in the future, they are not 
entitled to this relief.  A “writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the general 
observance of laws in the future.”  State ex rel. Kirk v. Burcham (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 407, 409, 696 N.E.2d 582. 
{¶ 28} Moreover, the evidence establishes that TEC and the transition 
workgroups are complying with R.C. 121.22 by conducting open meetings and 
preparing and providing minutes of the meetings.  “Mandamus will not compel 
the performance of an act that has already been performed.”  State ex rel. Dehler 
v. Kelly, 123 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-5259, 915 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 1. 
{¶ 29} For the ACLU’s claim for copies of minutes of past TEC and 
workgroup meetings that were closed to the public, the Open Meetings Act, “R.C. 
121.22, requires the preparation, filing, and maintenance of a public body’s 
minutes.  * * * Once these minutes are prepared, Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 
149.43, requires the public body to permit public access to the minutes upon 
request.”  State ex rel. Citizens for Open, Responsive & Accountable Govt. v. 
Register, 116 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-5542, 876 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 30} Nevertheless, the ACLU’s evidence that TEC and the workgroups 
held private meetings in the past is based on a solitary February 10, 2010 
Cleveland Scene newspaper article in which it was reported that McCafferty said 
that “committees have already started working behind closed doors.”  By contrast, 
respondents’ evidence is supported by affidavits establishing that TEC meetings 
have been open to the public and that information, including meeting minutes, for 
TEC and the workgroups, has been made available to the public through regular 
postings on the county’s website.  The single newspaper article does not satisfy 
the ACLU’s burden to establish its entitlement to the preparation and provision of 
the requested minutes.  See State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 
2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 59 (court need not consider two newspaper 
articles as evidence in mandamus case); State ex rel. Miller v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
of Elections, 103 Ohio St.3d 477, 2004-Ohio-5532, 817 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 15, quoting 
State ex rel. Flagner v. Arko (Feb. 5, 1998), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 72779 and 
87263, 1998 WL 45342, *3, quoting Heyman v. Bellevue (1951), 91 Ohio App. 
321, 326, 48 O.O. 404, 108 N.E.2d 161 (“newspaper article ‘cannot be accepted 
as [summary-judgment] evidence; it is “hearsay of the remotest character” ’ ”); 
State ex rel. Boccuzzi v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 112 Ohio St.3d 438, 
2007-Ohio-323, 860 N.E.2d 749, ¶ 20 (newspaper article rejected as evidence in 
mandamus case).  This conclusion renders moot respondents TEC and its 
members’ motion to strike this and another newspaper article from the ACLU’s 
evidence. 
{¶ 31} Therefore, the ACLU has established neither a clear legal right to a 
writ of mandamus directing respondents to prepare, file, and maintain full and 
accurate minutes and to conduct all meetings in public nor a corresponding clear 
legal duty on the part of respondents to do so. 
Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty: Public-Records Claim 
{¶ 32} The ACLU also claims entitlement to a writ of mandamus to 
compel respondents to provide access to the public records of TEC and the 
transition workgroups. 
Prior Request for Records 
{¶ 33} The respondents initially assert that the ACLU is not entitled to the 
requested records because “R.C. 149.43(C) requires a prior request as a 
prerequisite to a mandamus action.”  State ex rel. Taxpayers Coalition v. 
Lakewood (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 390, 715 N.E.2d 179. 
{¶ 34} Notwithstanding respondents’ assertion to the contrary, if─as the 
ACLU alleges─TEC and its subordinate workgroups are merely committees or 
subcommittees of TAG and the board of commissioners, serving the records 
request on the board of commissioners and County Administrator McCafferty, 
who is also a member of TAG and a cochairperson of TEC, would constitute a 
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sufficient records request.  Notably, the county’s response to the ACLU’s request 
reasoned that the request was proper to the extent that it sought TAG records 
because McCafferty is a member of TAG, even though he was not named as a 
TAG member in the records request.  Similarly, although McCafferty was not 
named as a TEC cochairperson and member in the ACLU’s request, the county’s 
rationale would also support the sufficiency of the request for records of TEC and 
its workgroups.  This result is consistent with our duties to “construe the Public 
Records Act liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of 
disclosure of public records.”  State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s 
Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6.  Therefore, the 
ACLU’s public-records mandamus claim does not lack merit due to an improper 
records request. 
Public Body Under R.C. 121.22 
{¶ 35} The ACLU next asserts that it is entitled to the requested writ of 
mandamus because R.C. 121.22 and 149.43 relate to the same subject matter and 
must be construed in pari materia so that if TEC and the transition workgroups 
meet the definition of “public body” and are subject to the Open Meetings Act, 
each necessarily satisfies the definition of “public office” and is subject to the 
Public Records Act as well. 
{¶ 36} As noted previously, the court has recognized that R.C. 121.22 and 
149.43 are construed in pari materia for purposes of maintaining a record of the 
proceedings of public bodies and making minutes of those proceedings available 
to the public.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council (2001), 
92 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 748 N.E.2d 58 (“Construing R.C. 121.22, 149.43, and 
733.27 in pari materia, respondents, * * * [including] the village clerk * * *, have 
a duty to prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate minutes for council 
meetings, and to make them available for public inspection”); White v. Clinton 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 416, 667 N.E.2d 1223, paragraph one 
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of the syllabus (“R.C. 121.22, 149.43, and 305.10, when read together, impose a 
duty on all boards of county commissioners to maintain a full and accurate record 
of their proceedings”). 
{¶ 37} R.C. 121.22 and 149.43 are also arguably incorporated by 
reference in the applicable provisions of the Cuyahoga County Charter regarding 
open meetings and public records.  See Cuyahoga County Charter, Sections 12.05 
(“All meetings of the Council and any committee, board, commission, agency or 
authority of the County, as well as any similar body created by this Charter or by 
the Council, shall be open to the public as provided by general law”) and 12.06 
(“Records of the County shall be open to the public as provided by general law”). 
{¶ 38} Nevertheless, we have never expressly held that once an entity 
qualifies as a public body for purposes of R.C. 121.22, it is also a public office for 
purposes of R.C. 149.011(A) and 149.43 so as to make all of its nonexempt 
records subject to disclosure.  In fact, R.C. 121.22 suggests otherwise because it 
contains separate definitions for “public body,” R.C. 121.22(B)(1), and “public 
office,” R.C. 121.22(B)(4), which provides that “ ‘[p]ublic office’ has the same 
meaning as in section 149.011 of the Revised Code.”  Had the General Assembly 
intended that a “public body” for purposes of R.C. 121.22 be considered a “public 
office” for purposes of R.C. 149.011(A) and 149.43, it would have so provided. 
{¶ 39} R.C. 121.22(B)(1) defines a “public body” subject to the Open 
Meetings Act to include the following: 
{¶ 40} “(a) Any board, commission, committee, council, or similar 
decision-making body of a state agency, institution, or authority, and any 
legislative authority or board, commission, committee, council, agency, authority, 
or similar decision-making body of any county, township, municipal corporation, 
school district, or other political subdivision or local public institution. 
{¶ 41} “(b) Any committee or subcommittee of a body described in 
division (B)(1)(a) of this section.” 
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{¶ 42} The parties agree that TAG, which was created by Section 13.07 of 
the Cuyahoga County Charter as a decision-making body of the county, is a 
public body.  At issue is whether TEC and the transition workgroups are also 
public bodies for purposes of R.C. 121.22.  If TEC and the workgroups are 
committees or subcommittees of TAG, they are public bodies pursuant to R.C. 
121.22(B)(1)(b). 
{¶ 43} In construing this statute, “our obligation is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute.”  Hudson v. 
Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 30.  
“[W]e determine the legislative intent by reading words and phrases in context 
and construing them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  
State ex rel. Shisler v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 122 Ohio St.3d 148, 
2009-Ohio-2522, 909 N.E.2d 610, ¶ 18.  A “committee” is a “subordinate group 
to which a deliberative assembly or other organization refers business for 
consideration, investigation, oversight, or action,” Black’s Law Dictionary (9 
Ed.2009) 309, or “a body of persons delegated to consider, investigate, or take 
action upon and usu. to report concerning some matter or business,” Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary (1986) 458.  See Berner v. Woods, Lorain 
App. No. 07CA009132, 2007-Ohio-6207, ¶ 14 (the court applies a comparable 
dictionary definition to “committee” to hold that a “community block grant 
committee” was a “public body” pursuant to R.C. 121.22(B)(1)). 
{¶ 44} Respondents’ evidence establishes that TEC and the transition 
workgroups do not fit within the definition of “committee” of TAG so as to be a 
public body as defined in R.C. 121.22(B)(1).  Neither the board of commissioners 
nor TAG referred or delegated business to TEC and the workgroups.  Instead, two 
private entities, NCN and GCP, created TEC to oversee the creation of 
workgroups assembled under it.  TAG did not delegate any of its charter-
mandated duties to TEC and the workgroups and does not direct them.  Although 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
the ACLU cites some language in e-mails between individual TAG members and 
on the county website that suggests some assistance in providing the structure of 
the first workgroups, there is no indication that TAG as an entity acted to delegate 
to TEC and the workgroups its primary charter duty to “develop 
recommendations for the orderly and efficient transition to the operation of 
County government” under Section 13.07 of the charter.  At best, the creation of 
TEC and the workgroups by NCN and GCP, at the invitation of the county, 
merely recognized the longstanding and important rights of private citizens to 
“petition the Government” pursuant to the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and to “alter, reform, or abolish” government “whenever they may 
deem it necessary.”  Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 45} The cases cited by the ACLU in support of its mandamus claims 
are inapposite because in those cases, the evidence was uncontroverted that the 
entity held to constitute a public body for purposes of the Open Meetings Act had 
been established or designated by some governmental entity.  Berner, 2007-Ohio-
6207 (community block grant committee created by township board); Wheeling 
Corp. v. Columbus & Ohio River RR. Co. (2001), 147 Ohio App.3d 460, 771 
N.E.2d 263 (selection committee established by Ohio Rail Development 
Commission to evaluate and score proposals to operate state-owned rail line); 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 335, 762 N.E.2d 1057 
(urban design review board created by city council); Stegall v. Joint. Twp. Dist. 
Mem. Hosp. (1985), 20 Ohio App.3d 100, 20 OBR 122, 484 N.E.2d 1381 (board 
of hospital governors established under R.C. 513.07 by townships); Toledo Blade, 
61 Ohio Misc.2d 631, 582 N.E.2d 59 (community action agency designated by 
Ohio Department of Development).  No comparable evidence is apparent here. 
Functional Equivalent of a Public Office 
{¶ 46} For purposes of the Public Records Act, a public office subject to 
the act “includes any state agency, public institution, political subdivision, or any 
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other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws 
of this state for the exercise of any function of government.”  R.C. 149.011(A).  
As a secondary matter, the ACLU argues that if the TEC and the workgroups are 
private entities, each is the functional equivalent of a public office and is subject 
to R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 47} Prior to 2006, we used different tests to determine whether a 
private entity was a public office subject to the Public Records Act.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 529 
N.E.2d 443, paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Freedom 
Communications, Inc. v. Elida Community Fire Co. (1988), 82 Ohio St.3d 578, 
579, 697 N.E.2d 210. 
{¶ 48} In State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 110 Ohio St.3d 
456, 2006-Ohio-4854, 854 N.E.2d 193, at the syllabus, however, we modified the 
test for determining a private entity’s status as a public institution under R.C. 
149.011(A) by holding: 
{¶ 49} “1.  Private entities are not subject to the Public Records Act 
absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the private entity is the 
functional equivalent of a public office. 
{¶ 50} “2.  In determining whether a private entity is a public institution 
under R.C. 149.011(A) and thus a public office for purposes of the Public Records 
Act, R.C. 149.43, a court shall apply the functional-equivalency test.  Under this 
test, the court must analyze all pertinent factors, including (1) whether the entity 
performs a governmental function, (2) the level of government funding, (3) the 
extent of government involvement or regulation, and (4) whether the entity was 
created by the government or to avoid the requirements of the Public Records 
Act.” 
{¶ 51} The ACLU has not established by the requisite clear and 
convincing evidence that TEC and its subordinate workgroups are the functional 
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17 
 
equivalent of public offices for purposes of the Public Records Act.  They are 
instead private groups comprising county leaders, county staff, and citizens; they 
are not performing TAG’s charter-mandated duties but are instead submitting 
recommendations to TAG and the county in their capacities as coalitions of 
private citizens; they do not receive any funds or significant support from the 
county; they receive no guidance or direction from TAG or any other 
governmental agency and were not created by TAG or the county or to 
circumvent the requirements of R.C. 149.43.  Therefore, the ACLU’s functional-
equivalence argument fails for lack of proof.  See Oriana House, at the syllabus; 
State ex rel. Repository v. Nova Behavioral Health, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 338, 
2006-Ohio-6713, 859 N.E.2d 936. 
Quasi-Agency Theory 
{¶ 52} The ACLU finally argues that it is entitled to the public records of 
TEC and the transition workgroups based on the court’s quasi-agency theory 
espoused in State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 550 
N.E.2d 464. 
{¶ 53} “R.C. 149.43(C) manifests an intent to afford access to public 
records, even when a private entity is responsible for the records.”  Id. at 39.  
Therefore, “where (1) a private entity prepares records in order to carry out a 
public office’s responsibilities, (2) the public office is able to monitor the private 
entity’s performance, and (3) the public office has access to the records for this 
purpose, a relator in an R.C. 149.43(C) mandamus action is entitled to relief 
regardless of whether he also shows that the private entity is acting as the public 
office’s    agent.”  Id. 
{¶ 54} The ACLU has not established that TEC and the workgroups 
carried out TAG’s duty to provide transition recommendations to the county 
executive and county council, that TAG is able to monitor TEC’s and the 
workgroups’ performance, or that TAG has access to all of TEC’s and the 
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workgroups’ records so that it could monitor them.  Instead, it appears that TAG 
would have access only to the recommendations and records that TEC and the 
workgroups, within their discretion, submitted to it at the conclusion of their 
review process.  TEC and the workgroups thus have no duty to provide TAG or 
the county with access to any or all of their records. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 55} The ACLU has not established its entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus for its open-meetings and public-records 
mandamus claims.  The ACLU has failed to meet its burden of proving a clear 
legal right to the requested relief or a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of 
the respondents to provide it.  Therefore, we deny the writ.  Based on this holding, 
we need not address the claim of TEC and its members that holding them subject 
to the Sunshine Laws would violate their First Amendment rights to freedom of 
speech and association.  See State ex rel. Miller v. Brady, 123 Ohio St.3d 255, 
2009-Ohio-4942, 915 N.E.2d 1183, ¶ 11 (court need not address constitutional 
claims if it is not “absolutely necessary” to do so). 
Writ denied. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Carrie L. Davis, Staff Counsel, James L. Hardiman, Legal Director, and 
Melvyn Durchslag, Michael T. Honohan, and Brian J. Laliberte, Cooperating 
Counsel, for relator. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and David G. 
Lambert and Charles E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondents 
Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners and the individual commissioners and 
Cuyahoga County Transition Advisory Group and its members. 
January Term, 2011 
19 
 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Steven S. Kaufman, Kip T. Bollin, Gary L. 
Walters, Lorraine Evelyn Gaulding, and Barbara A. Lum, for respondents 
Cuyahoga County Transition Executive Committee and its members. 
______________________