Title: Craney v. Attorney General

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13572 
 
PAUL D. CRANEY & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 6, 2024. - June 27, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, 
& Wolohojian, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition.  Attorney 
General.  Network Companies.  Labor, Collective bargaining. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 14, 2024. 
 
The case was reported by Georges, J. 
 
 
Kevin M. McGinty (Daniel J. Goodrich also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
M. Patrick Moore, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Attorney General & another. 
Thomas O. Bean, for the interveners, was present but did 
not argue. 
Stacey M. Leyton, of California, & Nicole M. Rothgeb, for 
Kate Andrias & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
 
1 Kristen Arute and Michael Hruby. 
 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth; Marcelo Cordoba, Juan 
Garcia, Martin Pitney, and Roxana Lorena Rivera, interveners.  
 
2 
 
WOLOHOJIAN, J.  At issue is whether the Attorney General 
properly certified Initiative Petition 23-35, "An Act Giving 
Transportation Network Drivers the Option to Form a Union and 
Bargain Collectively" (petition), as satisfying the requirements 
of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  
The plaintiffs argue that the petition should not have been so 
certified because it does not meet art. 48's requirement that it 
contain only related subjects.  More specifically, they contend 
that the petition's provisions allowing transportation network 
drivers (drivers) to organize and collectively bargain with 
transportation network companies (companies) are unrelated to 
its provisions subjecting the results of any collective 
bargaining to supervision, review, and approval by the 
Commonwealth's Secretary of Labor.  We conclude that the 
petition seeks to establish a multistep collective bargaining 
scheme in which the Secretary of Labor's role is an integrated 
component and, therefore, that the subjects of the petition are 
related for purposes of art. 48.  We accordingly affirm the 
Attorney General's certification of the petition.3 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by twenty-two 
law professors, the Center for American Progress, and the 
Chinese Progressive Association.  
 
3 
 
Background.4  The petition proposes to add a new chapter to 
the General Laws, c. 150F, which would "create[] the opportunity 
for workers in the digital transportation industry to form 
[driver] organizations and to negotiate on an industry-wide 
basis with companies in this industry on recommendations to the 
commonwealth that raise standards for the terms and conditions 
of work in this industry."5  The proposed law would expressly 
provide drivers the right  
"of self-organization, to form, join, or assist [driver] 
organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection free from 
interference, restraint, or coercion by [the companies], 
and . . . to refrain from any of these activities." 
 
 
4 This matter is before us on the single justice's 
reservation and report of the plaintiffs' amended complaint, 
which was filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 
and sought a declaration that the petition does not satisfy the 
related subjects requirement of art. 48, and an order enjoining 
the Secretary of the Commonwealth from placing the petition on 
the Statewide election ballot. 
 
 
5 Although workers defined as "employees" under the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) already have the right to bargain 
collectively with their employers, it has not been resolved 
whether drivers are employees under the NLRA.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 157; Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Am. v. 
Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 795 (9th Cir. 2018) (Seattle).  The 
proposed law would define drivers as exclusive of individuals 
"who, with respect to the provision of services through a 
[company's] online enabled-application or platform, [are 
employees] within the meaning of [the NLRA]."  Thus, if the 
proposed law is enacted, it would create a scheme whereby 
drivers could collectively bargain under the NLRA if they are 
deemed employees for purposes of that statute or, if they are 
not so deemed, could collectively bargain under the proposed 
law.  
4 
 
 
The proposed law would protect these rights by preventing the 
companies from engaging in conduct that would interfere with 
drivers' unionization and collective bargaining efforts.   
The proposed law contains detailed procedures to be 
utilized by drivers wishing to organize and to bargain 
collectively.  For example, it contains procedures by which to 
designate a bargaining representative.  It also includes 
procedures for conducting negotiations, and those to be followed 
should negotiations reach an impasse.  If such an impasse 
occurs, the proposed law details a resolution process consisting 
of mediation followed by arbitration.  It also identifies 
specific factors the arbitrator must consider in reaching a 
decision.  Finally, of particular significance for purposes of 
this case, the proposed law provides that -- whether reached by 
agreement or by an arbitrator -- the outcome of the collective 
bargaining process must be reviewed and approved by the 
Secretary of Labor.  The Secretary of Labor is required to take 
into consideration the same factors as the arbitrator in 
reaching a decision. 
Discussion.  As we have already noted, the Attorney General 
certified that the petition was in proper form for submission to 
Massachusetts voters, and, among other things, "that it contains 
only subjects that are related or are mutually dependent."  Art. 
5 
 
48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  The 
plaintiffs challenge the certification on the ground that the 
petition's provisions pertaining to the Secretary of Labor's 
supervisory role are not related to the remainder of the 
petition.  We review the Attorney General's certification de 
novo.  Anderson v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 780, 785 (2018).  In 
conducting this review, we are guided by the "firmly established 
principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the 
people's prerogative to initiate and adopt laws" (citation 
omitted), Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 487 (2014), 
while keeping in mind that we are "obligated to safeguard the 
integrity of the initiative petition process by requiring that 
those seeking to change the law strictly comply with art. 48," 
Anderson, 479 Mass. at 785-786.   
To determine whether an initiative petition contains only 
related subjects, we ask whether "one can identify a common 
purpose to which each subject of an initiative petition can 
reasonably be said to be germane."  Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n 
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 219-220 (1981).  
"At some high level of abstraction, any two laws may be said to 
share a 'common purpose,'" Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 
218, 226 (2006), S.C., 451 Mass. 803 (2008), but "the related 
subjects requirement is not satisfied by a conceptual or 
abstract bond," Gray v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 638, 648 
6 
 
(2016).  "There is no bright-line rule to follow in making such 
a determination.  Rather, the question is a matter of degree."  
Colpack v. Attorney Gen., 489 Mass. 810, 814 (2022). 
"[I]n addition to considering whether the subjects of an 
initiative petition share a common purpose, we have examined two 
more specific questions."  Colpack, 489 Mass. at 815.  First, we 
consider whether  
"'the similarities of an initiative's provisions dominate 
what each segment provides separately so that the petition 
is sufficiently coherent to be voted on "yes" or "no" by 
the voters,' [and s]econd, we consider whether the proposed 
initiative 'express[es] an operational relatedness among 
its substantive parts that would permit a reasonable voter 
to affirm or reject the entire petition as a unified 
statement of public policy'" (citation omitted). 
  
Id., quoting Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 658 
(2016).  "[I]nitiative petitions containing multiple provisions 
involving a variety of different regulatory issues . . . may 
meet the related subjects requirement of art. 48, so long as the 
provisions are part of an 'integrated scheme' of regulation."  
Colpack, 489 Mass. at 816.   
The petition at issue here would establish an integrated 
scheme by which drivers may organize and collectively bargain 
with companies.  The scheme extends from selection of an 
exclusive bargaining representative for the drivers, through the 
timeline and process of negotiations with the companies, to 
approval by the Secretary of Labor of either a negotiated 
7 
 
agreement (if one is reached) or (in the case of an impasse) an 
arbitrator's determination.  
We are unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that the 
Secretary of Labor's role in the collective bargaining process 
is not part of this integrated scheme.  The last step in the 
collective bargaining process (approval by the Secretary of 
Labor) is no less connected to the scheme than any preceding 
step.  Indeed, there is an explicit relationship between the 
Secretary of Labor's approval and the arbitrator's determination 
because the Secretary of Labor must review the arbitrator's 
determination using the same factors employed by the arbitrator.  
In the circumstances, approval by the Secretary of Labor is 
merely one requirement of many that "determine[s] how 
[collective bargaining] will be implemented."  See Oberlies v. 
Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 823, 832 (2018).   
Our conclusion that the Secretary of Labor's supervisory 
role is part of the petition's integrated scheme is buttressed 
by the fact that it is designed to "anticipate[] and address[] a 
potential consequence" of the collective bargaining process the 
petition seeks to create.  Oberlies, 479 Mass. at 832 
(operational relatedness where workforce reduction provision 
addressed potential response by hospitals to nurse-patient ratio 
requirement).  Specifically, the proponents of the petition 
foresee a legal challenge that the collective bargaining process 
8 
 
would be preempted by Federal antitrust law.6  See 15 U.S.C. § 1.  
By giving the Secretary of Labor a supervisory role over that 
process, the proponents of the petition hope to place it outside 
the reach of Federal antitrust regulation.  States are permitted 
to displace competition due to "the sovereign capacity of the 
States to regulate their economies."  Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224 (2013), 
citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350, 352 (1943).  Non-
State actors engaging in anticompetitive conduct may also obtain 
State action immunity where "the challenged restraint [is] one 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as [S]tate 
policy" and "the policy [is] actively supervised by the State."  
Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. at 224-225, quoting 
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).  The petition seeks to meet these two 
requirements by clearly articulating and affirmatively 
expressing that the Commonwealth's policy is to allow drivers to 
organize and collectively bargain, and by providing active 
supervision of those activities by the Secretary of Labor.7   
 
 
6 An antitrust challenge has been brought against a similar 
law and has survived a motion to dismiss.  See Seattle, 890 F.3d 
at 775-776. 
 
 
7 We need not -- and do not -- decide whether the proposed 
law would, in fact, satisfy the requirements for State action 
immunity.  See Oberlies, 479 Mass. at 835, quoting Abdow, 468 
Mass. at 508 ("In circumstances like these, the proper time for 
9 
 
Three further arguments bear brief mention.  First, the 
plaintiffs argue that the petition allows the Secretary of Labor 
to "dictate" the terms and conditions of the drivers' 
relationship with the companies and that this role is not 
related to the petition's stated purpose of empowering drivers 
to bargain for themselves the terms and conditions of their 
work.  But the Secretary of Labor's role is not so expansive; 
instead, it is largely confined to reviewing and approving or 
disapproving -- while employing defined considerations -- the 
agreement reached by the drivers and the companies after 
negotiation or, in the event of an impasse, the arbitrator's 
determination.  Although the Secretary of Labor would be 
permitted to set some terms and conditions in limited 
circumstances (which we set out in the margin),8 the petition 
 
deciding definitively whether the measure has the desired legal 
effect will come if and when the measure is passed").  We only 
decide that the provision giving the Secretary of Labor a 
supervisory role over the collective bargaining process "seeks 
to address" a potential challenge to that scheme.  See Oberlies, 
479 Mass. at 833. 
 
 
8 For example, the Secretary of Labor may recommend 
modifications to the terms and conditions if she disapproves of 
the submitted version, but those modifications must be approved 
by the drivers and the companies.  Additionally, if the 
Secretary of Labor approves terms and conditions that 
incorporate her own modifications or terms and conditions 
determined by an arbitrator, she may "modify" such terms and 
conditions when "market conditions have changed."  This is an 
exception to the rule, however, and does not "obliterate" the 
10 
 
does not empower the Secretary of Labor to impose terms and 
conditions without restraint.  And, absent State oversight, the 
entire scheme for collective bargaining might face an antitrust 
challenge, thwarting the petition's purpose. 
Second, although it is true, as the plaintiffs point out, 
that the Secretary of Labor's supervisory role would mean that 
the drivers' right to bargain collectively would be constrained 
by State oversight, this does not in and of itself cause the 
petition to fail the related subjects requirement.  An 
initiative petition may simultaneously broaden and restrict an 
entitlement (in this case, the right to organize and 
collectively bargain).  See Colpack, 489 Mass. at 819 ("an 
initiative petition need not focus solely on loosening [or 
tightening] restrictions in order to meet the related subjects 
requirement of art. 48"); Weiner v. Attorney Gen., 484 Mass. 
687, 694 (2020), quoting Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 
515, 528-529 (2000) ("The provisions of an initiative petition 
need not be 'drafted with strict internal consistency'").  The 
question is not whether the subjects are congruous but whether 
they are related. 
 
drivers' ability to collectively bargain as the plaintiffs 
contend. 
11 
 
Third, the plaintiffs argue that the complexity of the 
petition's scheme, combined with the fact that the Secretary of 
Labor's role in it is "buried" on the twenty-ninth page of the 
thirty-two page petition, will lead to voter confusion.  The 
entire petition is roughly organized in chronological sequence 
of the labor and bargaining activities it seeks to establish and 
regulate.  Given that the Secretary of Labor's role comes at the 
end of that process, it is hardly surprising that it is 
described towards the end of the petition, just as it is equally 
unsurprising that the arbitrator's role is described immediately 
before that.  No confusion can arise from placing the provision 
in proper sequence with all the other steps of the collective 
bargaining process.  Moreover, the Secretary of Labor's role is 
described with sufficiently clear and straightforward language9 
that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention otherwise, the 
petition here does not present the concerns raised by the 
petition at issue in El Koussa v. Attorney Gen., 489 Mass. 823, 
838-839 (2022) (voter confusion was concern where unrelated 
subject was buried at end of proposed law in "murky language" 
 
 
9 The provision states:  "Any recommendations agreed upon 
between [the companies] and a [driver] organization acting as 
exclusive bargaining representative of [the drivers] in the 
bargaining unit and/or any determination reached by an 
arbitrator under this chapter shall be subject to review and 
approval by the Secretary of Labor." 
12 
 
such that voters "may not even be aware they are making [a] 
second, unrelated policy decision"). 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court for 
entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General's 
certification of Initiative Petition 23-35 complies with the 
requirements of art. 48. 
So ordered.