Title: State v. Yolanda M. Spears

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0536-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Yolanda M. Spears,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 720, 585 N.W.2d 161 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley & Prosser, J.J., join 
 
 
Prosser, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Pamela Magee, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Richard D. Martin, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0536-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Yolanda M. Spears,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   We are presented with a 
single issue for our review:  Whether the circuit court in 
sentencing the defendant erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it ruled the victim's criminal record irrelevant to its 
sentencing determination. 
¶2 
The State seeks review of a published decision of the 
court of appeals, State v. Spears, 220 Wis. 2d 720, 585 N.W.2d 
161 (Ct. App. 1998), which affirmed a judgment and reversed an 
order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the Honorable 
John A. Franke.  The circuit court denied the defendant's 
postconviction motion for resentencing.  In her motion for 
postconviction relief, the defendant argued that the circuit 
court erred by refusing to consider evidence of the victim's 
criminal record when determining her sentence. 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
2 
¶3 
We hold that evidence of the victim's criminal record 
is relevant to the defendant's sentence because it supports the 
defendant's view of the crime for which she has been convicted.1 
¶4 
The events leading to the crime for which Yolanda M. 
Spears (Spears) was convicted are disputed and lie at the heart 
of the defendant's appeal.  In Spears' version of the events, 
she and her friends were celebrating her sister's birthday in 
the early morning hours of July 15, 1995, when Phillip Young 
(Young) robbed her and a friend.  According to two witness 
accounts, Young hit Spears twice in the face in his successful 
effort to take her purse.  The witnesses also told police that 
Young stole the purse of another woman who was with Spears.  
Immediately following the robbery, an unknown bystander chased 
Young, beat him, and successfully retrieved both purses. 
¶5 
Members of Young's family cast doubts upon Spears' 
version of the events, questioning whether Young stole her 
purse, much less violently assaulted her.  Of the events of July 
15, 1995, whether Young physically assaulted Spears is the only 
disputed question for the purposes of this appeal. 
¶6 
After her purse was returned to her, Spears took the 
keys to a friend's car and with it chased Young, who was on 
                     
1 Because we hold that a defendant has the right to present 
evidence supporting her view of the crime, we decline to address 
the defendant's additional arguments that the victim's criminal 
record was relevant to rebut "good" character evidence with 
evidence of the victim's "bad" character and that the record was 
relevant to the three sentencing factors that a circuit court 
must consider when making its sentencing determination.  See 
Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938). 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
3 
foot.  A witness to the ensuing crime told police that he 
observed Spears driving in excess of 40 miles per hour and 
witnessed her drive onto a sidewalk where Young was walking.  
Missing Young on her first pass, she turned her car around and 
drove back toward Young, who had remained on the sidewalk.  As 
Young fled down the sidewalk, he was hit by Spears and was 
propelled into a street.  Spears drove off.   
¶7 
Moments later, having driven a couple of blocks away 
from Young, Spears made a U-turn and returned to the scene.  
According to the witness, Spears accelerated to what the witness 
believed to be about 50 miles per hour and ran directly over 
Young where he lay in the street.  Young died shortly thereafter 
from the injuries he sustained from twice being hit by Spears. 
¶8 
On September 13, 1995, pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Spears entered an Alford plea2 to second degree intentional 
homicide.3  Prior to the sentencing hearing which was held on 
November 14, 1995, the circuit court received numerous letters 
from Young's family, Spears' family, and members of the 
community, each one offering personal sentiments regarding the 
                     
2  Spears entered a plea of guilty pursuant to Alford.  
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); State v. Garcia, 
192 Wis. 2d 845, 856, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  With an Alford 
plea a defendant accepts conviction but either maintains his or 
her innocence or declines to admit having committed the crime.  
See Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 856.  In this case, defense counsel 
indicated that Spears accepted conviction but had premised her 
plea more upon her inability to remember her crime than upon her 
affirmative denial that she committed the crime. 
3  Wis. Stat. § 940.05(1)(b)(1993-94). 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
4 
high-profile crime and many suggesting to the court what the 
writers believed to be an appropriate sentence for Spears. 
¶9 
In anticipation of the sentencing hearing, defense 
counsel prepared a sentencing memorandum to which he attached a 
copy of the victim's criminal record.  At the hearing, the 
prosecutor objected on grounds that the victim's criminal record 
was not relevant to the court's determination of Spears' 
sentence.  The circuit court declined to formally strike the 
victim's criminal record, but agreed with the prosecutor that 
"the specific prior record of the victim [was] not relevant at 
all to these proceedings." 
¶10 The 
circuit court 
then 
received 
statements 
from 
members of Young's family who generally expressed grief over his 
death and portrayed Young as a good-hearted person whose death 
at the hands of Spears required that she be given a harsh 
sentence. In addition, two members of Young's family questioned 
whether Young had violently assaulted Spears. 
¶11 Rosie Young, one of Young's sisters, told the court 
that she could not "see [her] brother as doing the things that 
they all claim that he had donethe victim's [sic] claim that he 
had done. . . .  I don't know, but I cannot perceive my brother 
as being that type of person [who would partake in the crime of 
physically assaulting a woman and snatching her purse]." 
¶12 Jennifer Young, the victim's first counsin, said, "he 
was a mana good man . . . .  [He] had a good heart, and I guess 
it took a woman to take him away from us because he would never 
hurt a woman.  He would never hurt a woman." 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
5 
¶13 Following the statements, the prosecutor acknowledged 
that there was no dispute that Young had initiated the 
confrontation.  However, she believed that the known facts left 
uncertain whether that confrontation involved physical force.  
The circuit court sought clarification on that point: 
 
The Court: 
I agree that any prior record the 
victim might have had is irrelevant 
here, but I would like to achieve as 
best an understanding as I can of what 
caused this to happen. 
 
 
Other than the people that were with this Yolanda 
Spears, is there any witness reporting 
a physical assault by the victim on 
Ms. Spears beyond the purse snatching? 
 
Ms. Heard: 
No.  Other than the people that are 
with her? 
 
The Court: 
Yes. 
 
Ms. Heard: 
No, there was no one else. 
 
The Court: 
Any objective evidence of that?  When 
she was arrested in Nebraska, was 
there a black guy [sic]?  Was there a 
broken nose? 
 
Ms. Heard: 
No broken nose, no. 
¶14 Defense counsel provided the court with the following 
comments from Spears' friends, the witnesses who told police 
they had seen Young's crime: 
 
Mr. Ksicinski: Ms. Austin stated to the police that 
she 
looked 
up 
and 
observed 
Young 
punching Yolanda in the face, break 
the strap, and take Yolanda's purse.  
She 
states 
Young 
came 
after 
her, 
carrying Yolanda's purse.  Then Ms. 
Winters states that Necole putmeaning 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
6 
Ms. Wintersput the key in the door.  
The black male who had taken her seat 
in the tavern ran up to her and 
Yolanda and stated, quote, this is a 
stick up, unquote.  Necole states that 
this 
black 
male 
grabbed 
Yolanda's 
purse and Yolanda pulled it back.  
Necole states that the black male then 
hit Yolanda in the face twice with his 
fist, and the strap broke, and he got 
Yolanda's purse.  Necole states that 
the black male suspect then came at 
her to take her purse and she hit him 
with it. . . . 
¶15 The court, after setting forth those facts it believed 
relevant to Spears' sentence, made the following comments, which 
reveal that the statements made by Young's family created for 
the court a factual uncertainty with respect to Young's alleged 
assault on Spears: 
 
I didn't realize until just a few days ago that there 
were some potential considerable factual disputes 
here.  It was clear from the very beginning of this 
case, it was clear at the plea hearing that this was 
going to be a difficult case, that there was a 
considerable amount of information which would come to 
bare on all of those factors, the nature of this 
particular crime, the character of this particular 
defendant, and the particular interests that the 
community has in thisin this sentence.  But I've 
received letters claiming that you didn't do this, 
that you're taking the fall for somebody else.  I've 
received letters and heard from the victim's family 
indicating that they challenge at least some of the 
provocation that was more or less assumed at theat 
the plea hearing in this case. 
 
I am comfortableeven though we have not had an 
evidentiary hearing, we have not had a trial in this 
matter, I'm comfortable with a reasonable view of the 
facts here, what I believe is what happened.  I don't 
think there's any question that you did this.  If 
there's any evidence that you didn't do it, then that 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
7 
should beshould have been or should be presented to 
the Court.  But I'm satisfied that you did it, and 
there's been no claim from you specifically that you 
didn't do it. 
 
There appears to be some question about the degree of 
provocation, but I'm satisfied that the victim in this 
case engaged in an assaultive offense against you and 
your friends.  I'm satisfied that he set about, with 
whatever intent or particular motives he may have had, 
to snatch your purse, snatch more than one purse, and 
that this was done with some violence or at least some 
threat of violence. 
 
There is some unresolved issue here about whether 
there was an actual physical assault on you.  There's 
some witnesses who claim that there was.  There's a 
family of the victim here that doesn't believe that 
there was. 
 . . .  
 
[I]n sentencing you, I do have to try to understand 
what it was you did and why you did it, and whether or 
not a physical blow was struck.  It's quite clear that 
you were subject to some assault, either by violence 
or 
the 
threat 
of 
violence, 
and 
it's 
on 
that 
basisthose bases that I am proceeding to decide upon 
a sentence that is hopefully fair to you, and fair to 
the victim's family in this case, and fair to the 
community. 
After further discussion of the factors upon which it was 
relying for its decision, the circuit court sentenced Spears to 
20 years in prison. 
¶16 Subsequently, Spears filed a motion for postconviction 
relief, asserting first that given the facts of the case, the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in sentencing 
her to 20 years, five more than the prosecutor's recommendation. 
 Second, Spears asserted that the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law when it refused to consider the victim's prior 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
8 
criminal record as her rebuttal to the "good" character evidence 
his relatives provided the court in their statements at her 
sentencing hearing. 
¶17 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Spears' 
postconviction 
motion, concluding that while the criminal record 
 
would have been relevant on the issue of whether the 
victim was a model citizen, it was not specifically 
offered for that purpose nor was there any material 
issue in that regard.  Similarly, [] if there had been 
a dispute as to whether the victim had in fact 
attempted to snatch the defendant's purse, his prior 
record would have had some relevance.  Here, however 
there was no such dispute.  I accepted that the victim 
provoked the incident by committing an assaultive 
offense against the defendant and her friend.  While 
the victim's bad conduct and character on the night of 
his death was an important mitigating factor in this 
sentencing, the victim's general character was not a 
sentencing factor, and there was simply no reason to 
give his prior record any weight. 
¶18 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing, holding that a victim's criminal record was 
relevant to sentencing when members of the victim's family 
recommended sentences that were in part based upon the victim's 
virtuous nature.  Spears, 220 Wis. 2d at 728. The court of 
appeals also believed that Young's criminal record was relevant 
because it supported the defendant's view of the circumstances 
surrounding her crime.  Id. at 728 n.6.  We affirm on the narrow 
grounds that Young's criminal record should have been admitted 
as evidence because it tends to support the defendant's view of 
the circumstances surrounding her crime, the gravity of which 
was a sentencing factor considered by the sentencing court. 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
9 
¶19 Sentencing decisions are left to the sound discretion 
of the circuit court and our review of a sentencing decision is 
limited to determining whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 
622, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984).  "A discretionary determination, to 
be sustained, must demonstrably be made and based upon the facts 
appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and 
applicable law."  State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 579-80, 469 
N.W.2d 163 (1991)(quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 
66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981)).  We recognize a "strong public policy 
against interference with the sentencing discretion of the trial 
court and sentences are afforded the presumption that the trial 
court acted reasonably."  Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 622.  We are 
reluctant to interfere with the sentence the circuit court has 
imposed, for the circuit court is in the best position to 
consider the relevant factors and the demeanor of the defendant. 
 State v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 682, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993) 
(citing Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 622). 
¶20 We have explained that a sentencing court, when 
fashioning 
a 
sentence, 
should 
consider 
all 
relevant 
and 
available information. State v. Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 142, 156, 
560 N.W.2d 256 (1997).  At the very least, the sentencing court 
must consider the following three primary factors: (1) the 
gravity and nature of the offense, including the effect on the 
victim, (2) the character and rehabilitative needs of the 
offender, and (3) the need to protect the public. Id.; Echols, 
175 Wis. 2d 653 at 682. 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
10
¶21 In addition, we have identified a number of factors 
related to the primary factors which a circuit court might use 
in considering the appropriate sentence: 
 
 '(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of 
undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of 
presentence 
investigation; 
(5) 
vicious 
or 
aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the 
defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 
trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention.' 
Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 623-24; see also Echols, 175 Wis. 2d at 
682.  A circuit court need not specifically address on the 
record each of these "secondary" factors; we leave to the 
circuit court the determination of which factors are relevant to 
its sentencing decision in the particular case.  Echols, 175 
Wis. 2d at 683.  Imposition of a sentence may be based on one or 
more of the three primary factors after all relevant factors 
have been considered.  Anderson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 361, 366-
67, 251 N.W.2d 768 (1977). 
¶22 The question on appeal is quite narrow in scope.  The 
defendant does not challenge the reasoning process the circuit 
court used in determining her sentence.  Her single point of 
error alleges that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in refusing to consider the victim's criminal record. 
¶23 We agree.  In considering the gravity of Spears' 
offense, the circuit court made quite clear that it believed 
that the circumstances leading to her crime were relevant to its 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
11
sentencing decision.  Information that would have tended to 
clarify the events leading to that crime should have been 
considered relevant by the court.  See State v. Richardson, 210 
Wis. 2d 694, 705, 563 N.W.2d 899 (1997) ("Relevant evidence is 
evidence that has any tendency to make the existence of a fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
or less probable.").  The victim's criminal record is such 
evidence. 
¶24 "It is well-settled that a criminal defendant has a 
due process right to be sentenced only upon materially accurate 
information."  State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 419, 576 
N.W.2d 912 (1998)(citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 
(1972); Bruneau v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 166, 174-75, 252 N.W.2d 347 
(1977)). As part of the guarantee that he or she be sentenced on 
reliable information, a defendant has the right to rebut 
evidence that is admitted by a sentencing court.  See Handel v. 
State, 74 Wis. 2d 699, 704, 247 N.W.2d 711 (1976)(circuit court 
does not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant when 
facts contained in a presentence report are not challenged or 
disputed by the defendant); State v. Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d 169, 
196, 567 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1997)(at a sentencing hearing, a 
defendant need not be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses who present evidence of the defendant's prior criminal 
offenses "as long as the defendant has an opportunity to rebut 
the evidence."); United States v. Lawrence, 934 F.2d 868, 874 
(7th Cir. 1991)(a sentencing court may consider uncorroborated 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
12
hearsay so long as the defendant has had an opportunity to rebut 
it). 
¶25 The transcript from the sentencing hearing reveals 
that there was quite clearly a dispute as to whether Young 
physically assaulted Spears, as the sentencing judge repeated on 
a number of occasions that he recognized that such a dispute 
existed.  This factual dispute was brought to the court's 
attention by Young's sister and cousin in statements that the 
court did not exclude as irrelevant to its decision.  The 
court's consideration of Young's criminal record may have helped 
it resolve this dispute for the purposes of sentencing Spears.  
Certainly the criminal record was relevant as evidence for the 
purpose of rebutting the statements made by Young's family that 
Young would not have hurt a woman or have partaken in a crime 
that involved physically assaulting a woman. 
¶26 Our review of Young's criminal record reveals that he 
was arrested between 1984 and 1993 on 18 separate occasions.  
Among the misdemeanor and felony offenses for which he was 
arrested are robbery, burglary, party to battery, resisting 
arrest and obstructing an officer, theft, attempted theft, 
retail theft, bail jumping, and attempted first-degree homicide. 
 He was not prosecuted in the case involving attempted first-
degree homicide.  For many of the other crimes for which he was 
arrested, it is not entirely clear which cases were and which 
were not prosecuted.  However, it is evident that he was 
convicted of burglary on at least three occasions, and was once 
convicted of robbery.  He received a sentence of five years 
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
13
prison for the latter conviction.  This criminal record reveals 
a history of violent crimes. 
¶27  In finding Young's criminal record irrelevant, the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Because the 
court admitted statements which cast doubts on the question of 
whether Young physically assaulted Spears, Spears should have 
had an opportunity to present evidence of the criminal record to 
rebut those statements. 
¶28 Further, a resolution of the disputed question may 
have had an effect on the sentence Spears received.  The circuit 
court purposefully left unresolved the issue of whether there 
was an actual physical assault on Spears.  However, as the 
circuit court explicitly acknowledged, the events precipitating 
Spears' crime was relevant to its determination of the gravity 
of her crime.  The court explained that it did "have to try to 
understand what it was [Spears] did and why [she] did it, and 
whether or not a physical blow was struck."  It then sentenced 
Spears without as full an understanding as it might have had 
following consideration of Young's record.  The circuit court's 
failure to consider the criminal record for the purposes of 
determining the series of events culminating in Young's death 
was error given that the court considered "the victim's bad 
conduct and character on the night of his death [] an important 
mitigating factor in this sentencing."  
¶29 On this record, we cannot know whether the circuit 
court would have considered a robbery involving physical assault 
a greater mitigating factor than a robbery involving a non-
No. 
97-0536-CR 
 
14
physical assault.  But it may have.  And the circuit court did 
not explain that its determination of whether a physical assault 
had in fact occurred was irrelevant to its decision.  In fact, 
it explicitly stated that the circumstances of the crime were 
relevant.  Therefore, Young's criminal record should have been 
considered in assessing whether Young's assault on Spears was 
likely to have been physical or non-physical, for that would 
reflect upon his conduct and character on the night of Spears' 
crime, and, perhaps, may then have had some effect on the 
sentence Spears received. 
¶30 In conclusion, we hold that where a victim's criminal 
record supports a defendant's version of a crime, the gravity of 
which crime is a sentencing factor, it should be admitted as 
evidence at the defendant's sentencing hearing.  Of course, once 
such evidence is admitted, the weight to be given any of the 
factors the circuit court considers in sentencing is fully 
within its discretion.  See Cunningham v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 277, 
282, 251 N.W.2d 65, 67-68 (1977).  
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
97-0536-CR.wab 
 
1 
¶31 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring).    As a general 
principle, the law should not allow the victim, in seeking 
punishment for the defendant, to lie about a material fact 
without fear of contradiction.  Because I perceive the holding 
in this case to be very narrow, and very much in line with this 
general principle, I concur. 
¶32 The majority does not hold, as the dissent by Justice 
Prosser says, that a victim’s entire criminal record is 
admissible when it arguably supports the defendant’s view of the 
crime.  See Prosser, J., dissenting at 6.   
¶33 I read the majority as holding that when the victim or 
his or her supporters disputes the provocative circumstances 
leading up to the crime by misstating a material fact about the 
victim, the defendant does not have to stand helplessly by in 
the face of the lie. 
¶34 Here, the victim’s witnesses disputed the provocative 
nature of the victim’s initial attack on the defendant.  In 
doing so, one of the victim’s supporters lied about a material 
fact.  She said that “he had a good heart, and I guess it took a 
woman to take him away from us because he would never hurt a 
woman.  He would never hurt a woman.”  Majority op. at 5.   
¶35 That is a lie.  On March 6, 1993, according to a 
criminal complaint in the record, the victim seriously injured a 
woman during the theft of her purse. 
¶36 A victim’s lie about a material fact should not be 
allowed to stand uncorrected.  The defendant “must be given an 
opportunity to rebut or explain misinformation upon which the 
97-0536-CR.wab 
 
2 
trial relies or to which it is exposed in its sentencing 
decision.”  State v. Behrnes, 706 So. 2d 179, 182 (La. Ct. App. 
1997) (citing State v. Cox, 369 So.2d 118 (La. 1979)).  See also 
 U.S. v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1990); U.S. 
v. Saintil, 753 F.2d 984, 990 (11th Cir. 1985).  
¶37 The principle that a defendant has a right to correct 
a victim’s lie about a material fact does no damage to the 
advancement of victims’ rights.  There may be occasion to find 
an exception to that general principle, but not this case.  
Here, the victim’s prior record puts the lie to his supporter’s 
statement.  It should be admitted.  I concur.    
 
 
No. 97-0536-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶38 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
For too many years victims have been the forgotten people in the 
criminal justice system.  Victims frequently have viewed 
themselves as twice victimizedfirst by the criminal and then by 
the legal system.  The victim rights movement has been a potent 
force for reforms that enable victims to be informed about their 
cases as they move through the criminal justice system and to 
influence the system's handing of their cases.  The case before 
us is about one such reformthe victim's impact statement at 
sentencing. 
¶39 The court of appeals concluded that because the 
victim's relatives described the impact of the crime on their 
lives to influence the circuit court to impose a lengthy prison 
sentence, the circuit court erred in not considering the 
victim's criminal record to show that the victim's relatives may 
have overstated their loss or may have misconceived the 
character of their loved one. The court of appeals wrote: "Faced 
with recommendations that [the defendant] serve a lengthy prison 
sentence, in part, because of the virtue of her victim, [the 
defendant], in fairness, should have had the opportunity to 
recommend a lesser sentence, in part, because [the victim's] 
No. 97-0536-CR.ssa 
 
2 
record compromised claims about his virtue."  State v. Spears, 
220 Wis. 2d 720,727-28, 585 N.W.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶40 The majority opinion significantly narrows the court 
of appeals decision and the purposes for which a victim's 
criminal record is admissible at sentencing.  The majority 
opinion holds that the victim's criminal record is admissible in 
this 
case 
at 
the 
defendant's 
sentencing 
because 
the 
circumstances of the crime may be considered in sentencing, the 
victim's criminal record is probative of the victim's assaultive 
character 
and 
the 
victim's 
criminal 
record 
supports 
the 
defendant's view of the circumstances of the crime. Majority op. 
at 2.  The majority writes that "whether [the victim] physically 
assaulted the [defendant] is the only disputed question for the 
purpose of this appeal."  Majority op. at 3.  
¶41 Assuming 
for 
purposes 
of 
this 
dissent, 
without 
deciding the issue, that the majority opinion is correct about 
the admissibility of a victim's criminal record for these 
limited purposes, I conclude that the majority has decided a 
hypothetical case, not the one presently before this court.   
¶42 In this case the circuit court admitted the criminal 
record; it gave it no weight.  Without using the victim's 
criminal record, the circuit court found that the victim had 
snatched the defendant's purse and had physically assaulted the 
defendant. The circuit court stated that "while the victim's bad 
No. 97-0536-CR.ssa 
 
3 
conduct and character of the night of his death was an important 
mitigating factor in this sentencing, the victim's general 
character was not a sentencing factor, and there was simply no 
reason to give his prior record any weight." 
¶43 The circuit court explained that it accepted the 
defendant's 
view 
of 
the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
crime 
and 
considered the circumstances of the crime in sentencing the 
defendant: 
". . . I'm satisfied that [the victim] in this case 
engaged 
in 
an 
assaultive 
offense 
against 
[the 
defendant]. . . . I'm satisfied that [the victim] set 
about . . . to 
snatch 
[the 
defendant's] 
purse . . . and that this was done with some violence 
or at least the threat of violence. There is some 
unresolved issue here about whether there was an 
actual physical assault. . . . [I]n sentencing you 
[the defendant], I do have to try to understand what 
it was you [the defendant] did and why you did it, and 
whether or not a physical blow was struck.  It's quite 
clear that you [the defendant] were subject to some 
assault, either by violence or the threat of violence, 
and it's on that basisthose bases that I am 
proceeding to decide upon a sentence that is hopefully 
fair to you [the defendant], and fair to the victim's 
family in this case, and fair to the community."   
 
Majority op. at 7.  
¶44 Given the circuit court's acceptance of the assaultive 
nature of the victim and the defendant's version of the 
circumstances of the crime, including the victim's initiating 
the encounter by purse snatching and by violence or threat of 
violence, further evidence in the form of the victim's criminal 
record was not necessary.  Indeed the criminal record was 
No. 97-0536-CR.ssa 
 
4 
irrelevant.  The circuit court had already accepted as true 
those facts to which, according to the majority opinion, the 
criminal record may be relevant.  
¶45 Sentencing is a discretionary decision.  An appellate 
court starts out with the presumption that the circuit court 
acted reasonably.  State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 418-19, 
576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).  The circuit court has wide latitude in 
determining 
the 
information 
pertinent 
to 
the 
sentencing 
decision.  State v. Marshal, 172 Wis. 2d 491, 500 n.7, 493 
N.W.2d 758 (t. App. 1992).  The circuit court exercised its 
discretion in this case.  Nothing in the record points to an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  I would therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and affirm the order of the 
circuit court. 
¶46 As to the broader implications of the issue presented 
in this case, I share the concerns of the circuit court that 
considering the victim's criminal record would lead to an 
improper balancing of the "comparative worth" of the defendant 
and the victim. The circuit court eloquently expressed these 
concerns as follows: 
 
For the most part, the victim's individual worth 
is not itself a proper factor at sentencing. . . . The 
court should . . .not attempt to measure the relative 
value of the victim's life.  While the defendant may 
benefit when no one appears to mourn the deceased, 
there is no corresponding right to argue that "since 
No. 97-0536-CR.ssa 
 
5 
nobody else cares, why should we" or to otherwise seek 
to diminish the value of the victim's life. 
 
Even though there might be circumstances in which 
the court could weigh the positive contributions and 
worth of the victim in assessing the harm caused by 
the crime, it does not follow that there is a right to 
have the court consider that a victim was a terrible 
burden on society.  Such an inquiry opens a door which 
should remain closed.  If the victim's prior criminal 
record is admissible, does the defendant also have the 
right to present evidence that the victim cheated on 
his taxes, was emotionally abusive to his children, 
suffered from chronic alcoholism, or couldn't hold a 
job?  Such an inquiry would demean the victim families 
in 
such 
cases, 
without 
serving 
any 
legitimate 
sentencing purpose.  In addition, even should a 
sentencing court be entitled to consider the murder of 
a career criminal as less serious, certainly the court 
has the discretion not to do so.  In this case, I 
chose not to treat the victim's criminal record as a 
mitigating factor. 
 
. . . . Even the most vile member of the 
community has the right to be free from unlawful, 
violent death, and once his life has been taken we 
will never know what positive contributions he might 
yet have made. 
 
¶47 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶48 I am authorized to state that JUSTICES ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY AND DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶49 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  (Dissenting).    This is the way 
I see this case:   
¶50 Yolanda Spears wanted vengeance.  Other people would 
have been satisfied with the beating that she and her sister and 
a stranger had administered to the man who had assaulted her and 
taken her purse.  When the stranger came out of the night to 
pursue and tackle her assailant, she and her sister were able to 
catch up with the man and kick him and punch him with the same 
ferocity as he had punched her.4  She had retrieved her purse and 
taken her licks.  But that wasn't enough to salve the hurt and 
indignity she felt she had suffered, and it wasn't enough to 
contain her rage.  She had been wronged, a mighty unprovoked 
wrong, and she wanted vengeance.  "That m----- f----- don't play 
like that with me," she said.5 
¶51 Other people would have turned to the police and 
demanded that the State seek justice from the offender.  But the 
                     
4 In the circuit court's decision denying defendant's 
postconviction motion for a new sentencing hearing, Judge John 
A. Franke wrote:  "A person unrelated to the defendant's group 
gave chase and tackled Mr. Young, at which point Young was 
beaten and kicked, and the two purses were retrieved.  Latoya 
Austin, another of the defendant's friends, indicated that she 
and the defendant participated in kicking [the victim] about 15 
times before he left the area."  Decision and Order at 2 (Jan. 
28, 1997).  Latoya Austin was a half-sister to the defendant, 
according to the Sentencing Memorandum, prepared for the circuit 
court by Mark D. Natwick, a client services specialist for the 
State Public Defender.   
5 The defendant's statement was quoted by a named witness 
and reported on page 3 of the criminal complaint.  
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
2 
law was too slow for Yolanda Spears.  She could pass judgment 
herself; she could execute sentence herself.  Why should she 
surrender to the State the righteous power she had to impose 
justice personally? 
¶52 She grabbed the keys to a friend's car and sped off 
looking for the fleeing robber.  She saw him on the sidewalk a 
few blocks away.  He hadn't flashed any weapon when he hit her, 
but maybe he had a weapon after all.  The automobile was her 
equalizer - in fact, the automobile put her in charge, gave her 
power, made her the boss.  She drove the car onto the sidewalk 
and attempted to hit the man but he jumped away.  She drove back 
onto the street, then up on the sidewalk again and chased him 
down the sidewalk, in hot pursuit, hitting him and knocking him 
into the street. 
¶53 She drove off leaving the nameless man sprawled out in 
the intersection.  But as she drove away, something made her 
stop, turn around, and go back.  There was no way this punk 
deserved to live.  She drove back several blocks to the 
intersection and aimed her car at the punk still laying helpless 
in the street.  She accelerated the car and drove over his body, 
leaving tire tracks of vengeance on the man's back.6 
¶54 Within a few days, Yolanda Spears was charged with 
first degree intentional homicide.  The crime shocked her 
                     
6 Two 
Milwaukee 
police 
officers, 
David 
Chavez 
and 
Christopher Kraft, are cited in the criminal complaint as 
observing a "tire track" or a "tire mark" across the victim's 
back.  Kraft also testified to this at the August 1, 1995, 
preliminary examination.  
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
3 
friends.  She was a vigilante who took the law into her own 
hands and exacted a punishment grossly disproportionate to her 
victim's crime. 
¶55 The nameless person she had killed was Phillip Young. 
 He turned out to be a mother's son, a brother, a family member, 
the father of a small child.  She had no justification in law 
for running him down and leaving him as road kill on a Milwaukee 
street.   
¶56 The enormity of her troubles soon became clear.  The 
legal system that was too slow to deal with Phillip Young 
started to crank up against her.  The police located her almost 
immediately out in Omaha.  Fortunately, she was given an 
excellent public defender who skillfully initiated the process 
of trying to rehabilitate her image.7  Fortuitously, she had a 
victim with a criminal record.  If her attorney and her friends 
could just divert attention from the conduct and the crime of 
                     
7 The State Public Defender Office submitted to the circuit 
court an impressive 7 page Sentencing Memorandum to supplement 
the State's presentence investigation report.  The memorandum 
includes 
Spears' 
educational 
and 
employment 
history 
and 
supportive statements from teachers, friends, and family.  It 
also attached Phillip Young's criminal record. 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
4 
Yolanda Spears to the life and crimes of Phillip Young, perhaps 
she could escape serious punishment.8   
¶57 A preliminary hearing was held on August 1.  Sometime 
between the August 7 arraignment and the September 6 pretrial, 
Spears received an offer from the State.  On September 13 she 
accepted 
it, 
entering 
an 
Alford 
plea 
to 
second 
degree 
intentional homicide.  As part of the plea bargain, the State 
conceded that it could not prove that she did not have "adequate 
provocation" for the offense of first degree intentional 
homicide and promised to recommend only 15 years.  All things 
considered, it was a good deal. 
¶58 But Young's family would not cooperate.  They weren't 
tolerant enough to understand her actions.  They couldn't 
understand her view of the incident or why the State had reduced 
the charge.  They worked themselves into an outrage over the 
demise of this no account career criminal.9  What right did they 
have to spout off this way?  They shouldn't be permitted to 
mislead the judge about the type of person Phillip Young was.  
                     
8 The supplemental Sentencing Memorandum recommended that 
Yolanda Spears be "sentenced to a 5 to 8 year term of 
incarceration in the Wisconsin State Prison System."  Sentencing 
Memorandum at p. 6.  An attorney friend wrote asking "the Court 
to give Ms. Yolanda Spears probation with time at the House of 
Correction.  If the Court is of the opinion that prison is 
justified, then I would request . . . that she receive the same 
5 year prison sentence or less, as Mr. Young received for his 
ruthless robberies on March 6, 1993."  Letter of Attorney Thomas 
L. Frenn, filed November 9, 1995. 
9 Young is described as a "career criminal" in the motion 
for resentencing filed by the State Public Defender.  
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
5 
They shouldn't confuse the judge about how Young had assaulted 
her and provoked her.  She was the victim.  She had given up her 
right to trial.10  Still, Young's family was out for blood.  They 
wanted to put her away for a long time.  These people were 
unforgiving, vengeful.  Maybe if the judge saw this guy's whole 
criminal record - why, there's even an unprosecuted attempted 
murder arrest in there - the judge would realize there's no real 
loss in Young's death.  Maybe the judge would realize that she 
actually did the community a favor. 
¶59 This, in substance, is my interpretation of this case. 
 A young woman committed a crime of such wanton depravity that 
it cannot be minimized through public relations and cannot be 
excused.  Her crime was mitigated when the charge was reduced.  
The circuit court was thus entirely correct in its determination 
that the victim's criminal record was not relevant to anything 
at the sentencing hearing.   
¶60 The majority tries to cut and paste random comments 
into a thesis that there was a real issue about Phillip Young's 
assault on the defendant.  This revisionist history does not 
hold up.  In addition, this case casts an ominous shadow over 
future sentencing hearings.  The precedent set here could live 
on to harm future victims of crime, victims far more sympathetic 
                     
10 In the Alford Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of Rights 
Form dated September 13, 1995, Yolanda Spears signed a document 
which read in part:  "I understand that by pleading under Alford 
plea I will be giving up any possible defenses, including but 
not limited to self-defense, intoxication, insanity, lack of 
intent . . ."  
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
6 
and vulnerable than Phillip Young.  With this decision, this 
court has seriously damaged the victim's rights movement in 
Wisconsin and undermined a constitutional amendment.  Because I 
believe profound issues have been wrongly decided, I dissent. 
I. 
¶61  The holding in this case is that a computer printout 
of a victim's entire criminal record, including multiple arrests 
with unknown dispositions, is relevant to the defendant's 
sentence when it arguably supports the defendant's view of the 
crime.11  The circuit court is directed to consider the victim's 
criminal record when it sentences the defendant, even though the 
record may be given no weight.  This holding is indefensible on 
the facts of this case. 
¶62 Yolanda 
Spears 
was 
charged 
with 
first 
degree 
intentional homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.01.  The 
charge was filed on July 18, 1995.  In the criminal complaint, 
Necole M. Winters is reported as saying that she observed 
Phillip Young hit Yolanda Spears in the face twice with his 
fist. 
                     
11 In his concurring opinion, Justice Bablitch disputes this 
statement.  The facts are as follows:  The Public Defender's 
Office submitted Phillip Young's entire criminal record on a 
computer printout.  This printout was the document objected to 
by the State.  This is also the document referred to in the 
majority opinion.  The record also includes a copy of a robbery 
complaint filed against Young in 1993, but this was a document 
sent to the court by a citizen, Attorney Thomas L. Frenn, before 
the sentencing hearing.  It is not the basis for the rule in 
this case.  
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
7 
¶63 On August 1, the State conducted a preliminary 
examination.  Officer Christopher Kraft testified he was told 
that the victim of a purse snatching had been hit.  He received 
this information from a witness before he and the witness 
discovered the purse snatcher's body. 
¶64 On 
August 
7, 
the 
State 
filed 
an 
information, 
unilaterally reducing the charge from first degree intentional 
homicide to second degree intentional homicide.  The reduction 
was justified on grounds that the State could not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was no "adequate provocation" in the 
case. 
¶65 At the plea hearing on September 13, the assistant 
district attorney was asked by the court whether the defendant 
had made any incriminating statements.  She replied that the 
defendant recalled "being struck, I believe she told the police, 
in the face and that her purse was taken." 
¶66 On 
November 
9, 
the 
defense 
filed 
a 
Sentencing 
Memorandum with the court.  This was five days before the 
November 14, 1995, sentencing hearing.  Referenced in and 
attached to the Memorandum was a 14-page computer printout of 
Phillip Young's criminal record.  The report had been obtained 
on August 11, 1995, shortly after the defendant's arraignment.  
The report showed 18 arrests.  Although the public defender's 
office had almost three months to edit, correct, and clarify the 
printout, separating the wheat from the chaff, it did not do so. 
¶67 On November 14, at the sentencing hearing, the State 
took exception to the criminal record: 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
Ms. Heard: 
I . . . I do have an objection to some 
– to one of the documents.  I have an objection to the 
sentencing memorandum that was prepared by Mark D. 
Natwick, the Client Services Specialist with the 
Public Defender's Office.  I think it's inappropriate 
to have attached to this document what purports to be, 
I think, the criminal record of the victim in this 
case, Phillip Jerome Young.  I don't believe that's 
relevant. . . .  I guess I'd ask that that portion be 
deleted or removed from the presentence.  I don't – 
I've never heard of such a thing.  I don't believe 
it's relevant.  I certainly think it's something that 
if Mr. Ksicinski wishes to address in sentencing 
statements, he can, but I don't think it's anything 
that should be of record and filed in this court file 
with regards to this case. 
 
THE COURT:  It was filed as a part of these 
proceedings.  I'm not going to strike it or delete it 
in some formal way.  I will listen to what Mr. 
Ksicinski wants to say, but I agree that the specific 
prior record of the victim is not relevant at all to 
these proceedings. 
¶68 Later in the hearing, the court reiterated that the 
victim's criminal history was not relevant, when it stated, "I 
agree that any prior record the victim might have had is 
irrelevant here, but I would like to achieve as best an 
understanding as I can of what caused this to happen." 
¶69 The majority writes that "whether Young physically 
assaulted Spears is the only disputed question for the purposes 
of this appeal."  Majority op. at 3.  The victim's criminal 
record is held to be relevant to that question. 
¶70 But there was no real dispute about that question.  
The fact that two of the victim's relatives, two people who were 
not present at the robbery and had no first hand knowledge, 
offered unsworn emotional testimonials about the victim - "I 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
9 
cannot perceive my brother being that type of person" and "He 
would never hurt a woman" - did not create a real issue of fact 
because other relatives of the victim acknowledged his problems 
with the law, witnesses at the scene said there was an assault 
on Spears, and the State so strongly believed the assault claim 
that it reduced the first degree homicide charge saying it could 
not disprove that Spears had "adequate provocation" for the 
offense. 
¶71 The circuit judge resolved the question at the 
sentencing hearing.  He said: 
 
There appears to be some question about the degree of 
provocation, but I'm satisfied that the victim in this 
case engaged in an assaultive offense against you and 
your friends.  I'm satisfied that he set about, with 
whatever intent or particular motives he may have had, 
to snatch your purse, snatch more than one purse, and 
that this was done with some violence or at least some 
threat of violence. 
 
. . .  
 
[I]n sentencing you, I do have to try to understand 
what it was you did and why you did it, and whether or 
not a physical blow was struck.  It's quite clear that 
you were subject to some assault, either by violence 
or the threat of violence, and it's on that basis - 
those bases that I am proceeding to decide upon a 
sentence that is hopefully fair to you, and fair to 
the victim's family in this case, and fair to the 
community.  (emphasis supplied) 
¶72 The judge's last comments before imposing sentence 
were these: 
 
Given that your crime resulted from a situation which 
was not of your making, in fact a situation that did 
result initially from the victim's acts of aggression, 
and given your lack of prior record, and the lack of 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
10
an indication of other violent behavior on your part, 
I am satisfied that a maximum sentence is not 
necessary or appropriate in this case.  (emphasis 
supplied) 
¶73 Forcing the circuit court to consider the victim's 
criminal record as probative of whether the victim assaulted the 
defendant 
is 
not 
useful 
here 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined that issue in the defendant's favor.  The assault 
against Spears had already served as mitigation for her crime. 
¶74 Had there been a trial of Spears for first degree 
intentional homicide, proof of assaultive offenses by the victim 
would have been relevant to the issue of whether there were 
mitigating circumstances in the case.  But in a trial for second 
degree intentional homicide, mitigating circumstances are not a 
defense.  Mitigating circumstances are irrelevant to second 
degree intentional homicide because they have already been 
factored into the charge. 
¶75 By the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant 
had entered her plea to second degree intentional homicide.  
Hence, the victim's criminal record did not make the existence 
of the assault on her "more probable."  The mitigating 
circumstance of provocation had already been conceded. 
¶76 When this court not only admits the victim's criminal 
record but also instructs the circuit court to consider it in 
sentencing the defendant, it is really declaring open season on 
the victim.  He is dead.  He cannot defend himself.  What is 
worse, the precedent set by the court cannot logically be 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
11
confined to scattershot criminal records.12  The rule in this 
case is that evidence arguably relevant to the defendant's view 
of the crime is admissible in a sentencing hearing.  The 
evidence 
need 
not 
comply 
with 
the 
rules 
of 
evidence.13  
Consequently, defendants are likely to cite this case as 
authority to admit evidence that would be suppressed under the 
rape shield statute14 in other circumstances.  Defendants are 
likely to cite this case as authority to bring in other kinds of 
evidence to discredit the victim at a sentencing hearing so long 
as it supports the defendant's view of the crime. 
II. 
¶77 In 
holding 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it ruled the victim's criminal 
record was irrelevant, this court affirms the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
¶78 The court of appeals employed its own rationale in 
reversing the circuit court.  The court said: 
                     
12 The majority opinion stresses the fact that Young "was 
convicted of burglary on at least three occasions."  Majority 
op. at 12.  But the opinion does not reveal whether Young 
unlawfully entered garages or whether he was a notorious cat 
burglar in Shorewood.  When Young's criminal record was offered, 
the sentencing judge was encouraged to infer the worst.  The 
majority opinion admits that Young was "not prosecuted in the 
case involving attempted first degree murder."  But it does not 
explain why Young was not prosecuted or whether he was 
exonerated.  The majority cannot flesh out the details of 
Young's arrests and crimes because the details are not in the 
record.  They can only ignore the prejudice in this exercise.  
13 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 911.01(4)(c). 
14 Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2). 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
12
 
Spears argues that Young's "prior criminal record was 
relevant to rebut his family's inaccurate portrayal of 
him."  She contends that the sentencing court erred in 
ruling that Young's criminal record was irrelevant to 
the sentencing decision.  Spears's contention is 
correct. 
 
Understandably, Young's relatives spoke glowingly of 
his character and, at times, they vigorously urged 
lengthy incarceration for his killer. . . .  Young's 
relatives 
attempted 
to 
convey 
their 
sense 
that 
substantial incarceration was warranted for reasons 
including what they perceived as Young's good conduct 
and what they believed to be Young's virtues. . . . 
 
Spears was entitled to attempt to counter the weight 
of the victim impact evidence by introducing evidence 
showing that Young's relatives may have overstated 
their loss, or may have misconceived the character of 
their loved one. . . . 
 
Spears . . . should have had the opportunity to 
recommend a lesser sentence, in part, because Young's 
criminal record compromised claims about his virtue. 
State v. Spears, 220 Wis. 2d at 723, 726, 728. 
¶79 While this court has chosen a different rationale, it 
has not disavowed the rationale used by the court of appeals.  
The majority writes:  "Because we hold that a defendant has the 
right to present evidence supporting her view of the crime, we 
decline to address the defendant's additional [argument] that 
the victim's criminal record was relevant to rebut 'good' 
character 
evidence 
with 
evidence 
of 
the 
victim's 
'bad' 
character. . . ."  Majority op. at 2 n.1.  Later, in the body of 
the opinion, the majority opines that "As part of the [due 
process] guarantee that he or she be sentenced on reliable 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
13
information, a defendant has the right to rebut evidence that is 
admitted by a sentencing court."  Id. at 11. 
¶80 At oral argument, counsel for the defendant explained 
that the victim's criminal record was included in the Sentencing 
Memorandum, filed five days before the sentencing hearing, in 
order to rebut letters written to the court by the victim's 
family and to anticipate what might be said at the hearing. 
¶81 Inasmuch as this court has not disavowed the rationale 
employed by the court of appeals, we are apparently recognizing 
two distinct grounds on which to attack the character of a 
victim at a sentencing hearing.  This court has even placed the 
right to rebuttal on a due process pedestal. 
III. 
¶82 In Spears' motion for postconviction relief, her 
counsel openly raised the possibility that victims of crime 
should be treated differently, depending on their character: 
 
Clearly, homicides involving totally innocent victims 
(or even less than innocent victims whose misdeeds are 
themselves an isolated incident, rather than a way of 
life) are far more "destructive of the public safety 
and happiness" than this case, involving the death of 
a career criminal.  The point is not that Ms. Spears 
should escape all responsibility, merely that the 
blameworthiness of her act must be measured not only 
against the precipitating events, but the character of 
her assailant. 
¶83 This 
theme 
was 
repeated 
over 
and 
over 
in 
the 
defendant's brief to this court.  According to the brief, "The 
Victim's Prior Record is Relevant Because the Law Affords Some 
Victims Greater Protection than Others."  App. at 17.  "The 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
14
death of Mr. Young was less 'destructive of the public safety 
and happiness' than the death of a totally innocent person. 
. . .  At common law the use of deadly force to stop a fleeing 
felon was often considered legally justified. . . . Id. at 18. 
. . .  The death of Mr. Young provides permanent protection for 
his likely future victims."  Id. at 21. 
¶84 These views are disturbing and inconsistent with the 
rule of law in a civilized society.  They invite vigilantism; 
they rationalize intolerable behavior.  It is a source of 
embarrassment that this court has nothing to say to repudiate 
these propositions. 
IV. 
¶85 In 1993, the people of Wisconsin added a victims of 
crime amendment to the state constitution.  Article I, sec. 9m, 
reads as follows: 
 
This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by 
law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy.  This state shall ensure that crime victims 
have all of the following privileges and protections 
as provided by law:  timely disposition of the case; 
the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the 
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from 
the accused throughout the criminal justice process; 
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to 
confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a 
statement to the court at disposition; restitution; 
compensation; and information about the outcome of the 
case and the release of the accused.  The legislature 
shall provide remedies for the violation of this 
section.  Nothing in this section, or in any statute 
enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any 
right of the accused which may be provided by law.  
(Emphasis supplied). 
97-0536-CR.dtp 
 
15
¶86 The amendment imposes a duty upon the State:  "The 
state shall treat crime victims . . . with fairness, dignity and 
respect for their privacy."  It also provides, however, that 
neither the amendment nor legislation implementing it "shall 
limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law."  
The rights of victims do not trump "any right of the accused"; 
but in the absence of some right of the accused, the rights of 
victims require recognition. 
¶87 The majority opinion fails to balance the rights of 
victims against the interests of criminals.  Rather, it creates 
a blueprint for criminal defendants to attack and discredit 
victims – throughout the entire sentencing process – if the 
defendant can show the attack supports the defendant's view of 
the crime or rebuts favorable evidence about a victim.  The 
opinion cannot help but discourage victims and the families of 
victims from participating in the sentencing process.  It 
undermines the victims of crime amendment.  What a legacy for 
Yolanda Spears.15 
 
 
                     
15 Circuit Judge John A. Franke performed admirably in a 
volatile situation.  The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice 
Abrahamson 
reflects 
my 
views 
on 
how 
sensitively 
and 
intelligently he did his duty.