Title: State ex rel. Benbow v. Runyan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Benbow v. Runyan, 99 Ohio St.3d 410, 2003-Ohio-4127.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BENBOW, APPELLANT, v. RUNYAN, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Benbow v. Runyan, 99 Ohio St.3d 410, 2003-Ohio-4127.] 
Courts — Jurisdiction — Contempt — Prohibition — Writ prohibiting common 
pleas court judge from exercising any further jurisdiction in a civil case 
after judgment was entered based on jury verdict following trial — Court 
of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed, when — Court retains 
jurisdiction to consider collateral issue of criminal contempt even after 
underlying action is no longer pending. 
(No. 2003-0549 — Submitted July 22, 2003 — Decided August 20, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashland County, No. 03-COA-008. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, Brian W. Benbow, was the attorney for Allstate 
Insurance Company in a case filed in the Ashland County Court of Common 
Pleas against Hydromatic Pumps Corporation.  Appellee, Judge Jeffrey L. 
Runyan, presided over the case. 
{¶2} 
On January 28, 2003, during the first day of the jury trial, Judge 
Runyan stated that he intended to find Benbow in contempt of court for his 
misconduct in front of the jury.  According to Benbow’s complaint, on January 
31, 2003, after he appeared late for the second day of the trial, Judge Runyan 
advised him that he could purge his direct contempt by paying a fine of $500.  
Judge Runyan further advised Benbow that if he did not pay the fine, the 
contempt would not be purged and he would be assessed additional penalties. 
{¶3} 
That same day, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hydromatic 
Pumps Corporation.  Judge Runyan entered a judgment in accordance with the 
judgment and dismissed Allstate’s complaint with prejudice. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶4} 
On February 13, 2003, after Benbow failed to pay the $500 fine, 
Judge Runyan issued a citation finding him in contempt and ordering him to 
appear for a show-cause hearing on March 10. 
{¶5} 
On March 5, 2003, Benbow filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Ashland County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Runyan 
from exercising any further jurisdiction in the underlying case.  On March 14, 
2003, the court of appeals sua sponte dismissed Benbow’s prohibition complaint.  
The court of appeals determined that Benbow had an adequate remedy at law by 
way of appeal.  On March 18, 2003, Judge Runyan found Benbow in contempt of 
court for his conduct at trial and for failing to appear at the March 10 show-cause 
hearing and fined him a total of $1,500. 
{¶6} 
In his appeal as of right, Benbow claims entitlement to a writ of 
prohibition because after Judge Runyan dismissed the case, he patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed further on the contempt matter.  “It 
is certainly true that, in general, when a trial court unconditionally dismisses a 
case or a case has been voluntarily dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the trial 
court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed, and a writ of 
prohibition will issue to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. 
Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 22. 
{¶7} 
Nevertheless, even when a trial court has unconditionally 
dismissed a case, the court retains jurisdiction to consider the collateral issue of 
criminal contempt.  State ex rel Corn v. Russo (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 556, 
740 N.E.2d 265 (“a court may consider the collateral issue of criminal contempt 
even after the underlying action is no longer pending”); Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp (1990), 496 U.S. 384, 396, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (“A 
court may make an adjudication of [criminal] contempt and impose a contempt 
sanction even after the action in which the contempt arose has been terminated”). 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶8} 
Moreover, unlike State ex rel. Rice v. McGrath (1991), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 70, 577 N.E.2d 1100, the primary case cited by Benbow, this case does not 
involve any dismissal of the case before trial.  Instead, the so-called dismissal was 
ordered by Judge Runyan after he had entered judgment in favor of the defendant 
based upon a jury verdict following trial.  This case is thus not governed by 
Civ.R. 41.  Cf., e.g., Beckner v. Stover (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 36, 40, 47 O.O.2d 
156, 247 N.E.2d 300. 
{¶9} 
Therefore, Judge Runyan did not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction over the criminal contempt proceedings, and Benbow’s prohibition 
claim lacks merit.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Brian W. Benbow, pro se. 
__________________