Title: Matter of Fray

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Fray1986 WY 138721 P.2d 1054Case Number: 86-33Decided: 06/20/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Determination of Heirship of Claude FRAY, a/k/a Claude J. Fray, a/k/a Claudie 
Fray, Deceased. Myrtle FRAY, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

Richard L. FRAY, Trustee 
of the W.O. Fray Trust, Appellee (Petitioner), O.P. Omley, et al., Appellees 
(Respondents).

Appeal from District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Keith P. Tyler, 
Casper, for appellant.

W. Thomas 
Sullins, II, of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellee Richard L. Fray, Trustee 
of the W.O. Fray Trust.

Thomas E. 
Lubnau, II, Gillette, for appellees 
(respondents) O.P. Omley, George E. Omley, Elizabeth Crook and Sue 
Chappell.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This action was 
commenced by appellee Richard L. Fray, as trustee of the W.O. Fray Trust, to 
determine the heirs of Claude Fray, deceased. Claude Fray and his heirs are 
beneficiaries under the W.O. Fray Trust. Both Myrtle Fray and Thelma Omley Fray 
claimed to be the legal wife of Claude Fray. The trial court upheld the validity 
of Claude Fray's marriage to Thelma Omley Fray and held that her heirs 
(appellees O.P. Omley, George E. Omley, Elizabeth Crook and Sue Chappell) were 
the proper heirs of Claude Fray.

[¶2.]     Appellant Myrtle Fray 
brings this appeal and raises a single issue:

"Did the probate court 
err in determining that Thelma O. Fray and not Myrtle M. Fray was the legal wife 
of the deceased, Claude J. Fray, and entitled to inherit one-half of his 
estate?"

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Claude Fray toiled all 
the days of his life, for heirs he knew not whom.

[¶5.]     Claude and Myrtle Fray 
were married in Ellensburg, 
Washington, on June 23, 1923. On 
April 30, 1927, Cleo Jean Fray was born of the marriage. The marriage fell on 
bad times and Claude quit the marital bed, and strayed north of the border. 
While in Canada he knew one 
Florence Evelyn Brown, and the issue of this meretricious relationship was LeRoy 
Claude Fray, who was born February 1, 1928, in Edmonton, Alberta, 
Canada. Claude 
and Florence 
never married, but Claude later acknowledged his paternity of LeRoy. LeRoy was 
later adopted by his grandparents, Harry and Ethyl Decker.

[¶6.]     Claude and Myrtle Fray 
separated sometime in 1934. On September 11, 1939, some five years later, Claude 
Fray filed for divorce in Washington against Myrtle. Myrtle filed an 
"Answer and Cross-Complaint," also seeking a divorce. Claude's petition was 
dismissed, but Myrtle was granted an interlocutory decree of divorce on June 24, 
1940. No application was ever made by Myrtle to finalize the divorce decree. 
Therefore, on March 30, 1942, Claude Fray filed for a divorce from Myrtle in 
Nevada, and a 
final decree was entered on June 1, 1942.

[¶7.]     Claude Fray married 
Thelma Omley Fray in Arizona in 1947. Claude and Thelma resided in 
California 
until Claude's death in 1965. Thelma died in 1973. Thelma's heirs seek 
inheritance from Claude Fray, who died intestate. The following chronology of 
significant dates is set forth in the record:

"6/23/23 Claude Fray and 
Myrtle Mildred Fray married in Ellensburg, Washington

"9/1/26 Claude Fray and 
Myrtle Mildred Fray separated

"4/30/27 Cleo Jean Fray 
(Ives) born to Claude Fray and Myrtle Mildred Fray at Ellensburg, Washington

"2/1/28 LeRoy Claude Fray 
(Decker) born to Claude Fray and Florence Evelyn Brown at Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

"12/17/37 LeRoy Claude 
Fray (Decker) adopted by Harry C. Decker and Ethyl Decker in Benton County, Washington

"6/24/40 Findings of 
Fact, Conclusion of Law and Interlocutory Order entered in Claude J. Fray vs. 
Myrtle M. Fray, Superior Court of 
Kittitas County, Washington

"6/1/42 Findings and 
Decree granting divorce entered in Claude Fray vs. Myrtle Mildred Fray, Second 
Judicial District court, Washoe 
County, Nevada

"9/8/47 Claude Fray and 
Thelma Omley Fray married in Yuma 
County, Arizona

"9/30/65 Claude Fray died 
in West Los Angeles, Los Angeles 
County, California"

[¶8.]     At issue in this case 
is a property interest held by Claude Fray under the W.O. Fray Trust. The 
property is situate in Campbell 
County, Wyoming. The 
trial court found:

"NOW, THEREFORE, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Claude Fray, * * * deceased, died more than 
two years prior to the institution of this proceeding, his date of death being 
September 30, 1965; that upon the date of death of Claude Fray, * * * deceased, 
his heirs at law, and the proportion of his estate to which each such heir is 
entitled, were and are as follows:

"One-Half (1/2) Thelma O. 
Fray, now deceased

"One-Fourth (1/4) Cleo 
Jean Ives, 3525 Hartsock Lane, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado 80907 

"One-Fourth (1/4) LeRoy 
Decker, 
East 12 Salmon 
Street, Spokane, Washington99218
;

"and that the 
above-stated heirs of Claude Fray, * * * deceased, by descent, receive, in the 
proportions above-stated, all right, title and interest of Claude Fray, * * * in 
and to the mineral interest and estate in the real property described as 
follows:

"Campbell County, Wyoming

Township 41 North, Range 
73 West, 6th P.M.

Section 7: SE 
1/4

Section 8: NW 1/4 SW 1/4 
S 1/2 SW 1/4

Section 17: NW 1/4 NW 
1/4

"and any and all 
revenues therefrom, and any and all real property interests of Claude Fray, * * 
* deceased, in the State of Wyoming discovered 
hereafter."

[¶9.]     Appellant Myrtle Fray 
contends the trial court erred in determining that Thelma Omley Fray was the 
legal wife of Claude Fray for purposes of inheritance, and not Myrtle 
Fray.

[¶10.]  We begin by stating our applicable 
standards of review. In Pancratz Company, Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Construction/Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906 (Wyo., 1986), we said:

"When reviewing cases on 
appeal we accept the evidence of the prevailing party as true, leaving out 
entirely the evidence presented in conflict therewith, giving every favorable 
inference which may fairly and reasonably be drawn from the prevailing party's 
evidence. Shanor v. Engineering, Inc. of Wyoming, Wyo., 705 P.2d 858 (1985). The trial court's 
findings are presumed correct, and such findings will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous or contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence. M & M Welding, Inc. v. Pavlicek, Wyo., 713 P.2d 236 
(1986)."

[¶11.]  The rule in this state is that the law of 
the situs where land is situate determines its devolution upon the death of an 
owner. In re Ray, 74 Wyo. 389, 287 P.2d 629 
(1955); and In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940). Therefore, 
distribution was properly made under Wyoming law, specifically, § 2-4-101(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977 (1985 Cum.Supp.), which reads in relevant part:

"If the intestate leaves 
husband or wife and children, or the descendants of any children surviving, 
one-half (1/2) of the estate shall descend to the surviving husband or wife, and 
the residue thereof to the surviving children and descendants of children, as 
hereinafter limited."

[¶12.]  There is no dispute that the court 
correctly applied the law regarding Claude Fray's surviving children Cleo Jean 
Fray (Ives) and LeRoy Decker. The only dispute concerns whether the trial court 
correctly determined that Thelma Omley Fray was the legal wife of Claude Fray, 
therefore entitling her heirs to one-half interest in the property at 
issue.

[¶13.]  Appellant Myrtle Fray contends that she 
should be deemed the lawful wife of Claude Fray since she contends the 
Washington interlocutory divorce decree was 
never finalized and the Nevada divorce decree was void for lack of 
personal service. In further support of her contentions she cites International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 
(1945), for the proposition that the Nevada 
court lacked jurisdiction over her since she had no contacts in the state of 
Nevada. The 
contentions are wrong for several reasons.

[¶14.]  First of all, the International Shoe case 
was decided in 1945, several years after the Nevada court entered its divorce decree in 
1942. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877), the United States Supreme Court espoused the general rule that 
substituted service by publication only gives a court jurisdiction over property 
within its jurisdiction. However, the court made two important exceptions: 1) 
cases which affect the personal status of the plaintiff, and 2) cases where 
service of process is agreed to in advance. The court stated: 

"To prevent any 
misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe 
that we do not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that a State may not 
authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a 
non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without 
service of process or personal notice to the non-resident. The jurisdiction 
which every State possesses, to determine the civil status and capacities of all 
its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which 
proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on within its territory. 
The State, for example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon 
which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the 
causes for which it may be dissolved. * * *" 95 U.S. 735-736, 24 L. Ed. 573.

[¶15.]  In Williams v. State of North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942), the court held that North 
Carolina was obligated to give full faith and credit to a Nevada divorce decree. 
This was so even though the cause of action could not be entertained in the 
state of the forum either because it was barred by local statute or contrary to 
local policy, and the judgment obtained in a sister state was entitled to full 
faith and credit. The court further stated:

"* * * Within the limits 
of her political power North Carolina may, of course, enforce her own policy 
regarding the marriage relation - an institution more basic in our civilization 
than any other. But society also has an interest in the avoidance of polygamous 
marriages (Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223, 54 S. Ct. 684, 686, 78 
L.Ed. 1219) and in the protection of innocent offspring of marriages deemed 
legitimate in other jurisdictions. And other states have an equally legitimate 
concern in the status of persons domiciled there as respects the institution of 
marriage. So when a court of one state acting in accord with the requirements of 
procedural due process alters the marital status of one domiciled in that state 
by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree 
should be excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because its 
enforcement or recognition in another state would conflict with the policy of 
the latter. * * *" 317 U.S. 303, 63 S. Ct. 215, 87 L. Ed. 288-289.

[¶16.]  One contesting the validity of a divorce 
granted in another state may still question whether domicile was properly 
obtained in the foreign court. Williams v. State of North 
Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577 (1945). See also, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 92 L. Ed. 1429, 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1948).

[¶17.]  Appellant has failed in her burden to 
affirmatively show that the Nevada proceedings were jurisdictionally 
defective. The record shows that Claude Fray, as a resident of the state of 
Nevada, filed 
for divorce on March 30, 1942. Concurrently with the filing, Claude Fray also 
filed an "Affidavit for Order for Publication of Summons" stating he did not 
know where Myrtle Fray was residing and that service should be accomplished 
through publication. The order was granted and service was made by publication 
as well as mailing service to Myrtle Fray's last known address. The divorce 
decree was then granted on June 1, 1942.

[¶18.]  In the absence of a showing of a 
jurisdictional defect, we must give full faith and credit to judicial 
proceedings of another state:

"Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe 
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the 
Effect thereof." Art. IV, § 1, U.S. 
Constitution.

[¶19.]  A decree of divorce granted by another 
state having jurisdiction to do so is entitled to full faith and credit in every 
other state. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 71 S. Ct. 474, 95 L. Ed. 552 
(1951). One authority has stated: 

"* * * The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the 
United States finally determines the conditions under which the decrees of 
courts in one state are to be recognized in other states. In these days of a 
mobile population it is highly desirable, if not essential, for a divorce decree 
to be unchallengable in all states. For this reason the limitation found in the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, though it purports only to affect recognition in 
other states, is in practice nearly as effective in defining the boundaries of 
divorce court jurisdiction as the state statutes which actually set those 
boundaries." Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 
11.2, p. 287 (1968).

[¶20.]  As early as 1934 in the case of In re St. 
Clair's Estate, 46 Wyo. 446, 28 P.2d 894 (1934), this court stated that second 
marriages are presumed to be valid, and such presumption can be overcome only by 
clear and convincing evidence. The court quoted with approval 18 R.C.L. 419, 
420, §§ 43, 44, as follows:

"`* * * The presumption, 
which increases in strength with the lapse of time, can only be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and the evidence to overcome it 
must be especially strong after the lapse of a great many years. To overcome the 
prima facie case established by the showing of a subsequent marriage, proof of a 
former marriage is required, and also evidence from which it may be concluded 
that it has not been dissolved by death or divorce. Mere proof of a prior 
marriage and that one party had not obtained a divorce is not sufficient, for 
the other might have obtained such divorce and left him or her free to contract 
the second marriage.'" Id., at 897.

[¶21.]  In Travis v. Travis Estate, Wyo., 334 P.2d 508 (1959), we held that in the absence of a showing that a divorce decree 
entered in a district court was void on the face of the record, such decree was 
not subject to collateral attack in probate after the death of the divorced 
husband. In that case, the decedent was married three separate times and 
fathered a son each time. The decedent died intestate. After his death, his 
third wife attacked the validity of his last divorce. The probate court set 
aside the last divorce, thus adjudging decedent's third wife to be an heir. On 
appeal this court reversed, and stated the divorce was not subject to collateral 
attack since decedent's third wife had failed to show the divorce was 
void.

[¶22.]  We think the same can be said here. 
Myrtle Fray has failed to show that the Nevada divorce decree is invalid and that the 
same should be voided. She claims she was never divorced from Claude Fray 
inasmuch as the interlocutory decree entered by the Washington court was 
never finalized. But that is because she never moved to have the order 
finalized. Be it remembered that after Claude Fray filed a petition seeking a 
divorce in Washington, Myrtle Fray filed an "Answer and 
Cross-Complaint" also seeking a divorce. In its interlocutory order the 
Washington 
court dismissed Claude Fray's complaint and granted Myrtle Fray's 
"cross-complaint," stating:

"The defendant upon her 
cross-complaint is entitled to a divorce from plaintiff, and that in due course 
defendant be awarded a divorce from plaintiff."

[¶23.]  One year after the interlocutory order 
was entered, Myrtle Fray filed a "Petition to Modify Interlocutory Order" 
seeking: 1) an order to show cause why Claude Fray should not be held in 
contempt for failure to pay alimony and child support, and 2) a modification of 
the interlocutory order to have money held in a bank turned over to the clerk of 
court for security to pay child support. The order was granted. As noted 
earlier, Myrtle Fray never moved to finalize the divorce 
decree.

[¶24.]  Now, some forty-five years after the 
interlocutory order was granted by the Washington court, some forty-three years after the divorce 
decree was entered in Nevada, and some twenty years after Claude 
Fray's death, Myrtle Fray claims she should be adjudged the legal wife of Claude 
Fray for the purposes of inheritance.

"`It is elementary that 
unreasonable delay in the assertion of rights without excuse and coupled with 
the death of material witnesses and the loss of material evidence which works to 
the disadvantage of adverse parties will warrant the denial of equitable relief. 
[Citations.] Rowe v. Big Sandy Coal Corporation, 197 Va. 136, 144, 87 S.E.2d 763, 768 (1955).'

* * * * * 
*

"It is plainly apparent 
that appellee had no interest in Bartsch or the decree he obtained in Nevada, except as to the 
alimony paid by him. Their marriage had been terminated by his death, and it is 
apparent that appellee asserted her relation as the widow of Bartsch, and the 
invalidity of his decree of divorce, solely for the purpose of obtaining a 
portion of his property.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Here, Signe 
Bartsch, appellee, did nothing to preserve her marriage. The marital relations 
between her and Bartsch had ceased thirty years before his death, and she had 
acquiesced in his remarriage for more than twenty years. Moreover, she presented 
no reasonable excuse or justification for her delay in seeking an annulment of 
the Nevada 
decree." Bartsch v. Bartsch, 204 Va. 462, 132 S.E.2d 416, 420-422 
(1963).

[¶25.]  One authority has 
stated:

"A party seeking to 
vacate or annul a divorce decree must be actuated by good motives and not by 
expectation of personal advantage, especially where a third party has, in good 
faith, married the divorced spouse; and a desire for personal advantage will be 
presumed from long acquiescence by a defendant in a fraudulent decree which he 
seeks to set aside. * * *" 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 171, p. 688 
(1959).

[¶26.]  We think the trial court was correct in 
adjudging Thelma Omley Fray the legal wife of Claude Fray. Myrtle Fray has 
failed to meet her burden of showing that the Nevada decree was invalid. Furthermore, we 
think equity demands that the trial court's judgment be upheld. Having found no 
reversible error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed in all 
respects.

[¶27.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶28.]  I concur.

[¶29.]  However, by concurrence it is not 
intended to presume the validity of the Nevada divorce as the dispositive issue on 
appeal. Appellant had the burden of the attack on the validity of the Nevada judgment, which 
was not met by evidence or argument. The record affords, at most, modest 
conviction that with proper attack the divorce decree would have survived that 
jurisdictional attack based upon the affidavit upon which it was premised. 
Jurists' suspicions, however, are not a substitute for facts demonstrated by 
appellate record, including an adequate proof of the law of 
venue.