Title: Seales v. State

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

581 So. 2d 1192 (1991)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(Re Theron SEALES v. STATE of Alabama).
1900355.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 19, 1991.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Rosa H. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
J. Scott Boudreaux, Birmingham, for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Theron Seales was convicted in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County of the first degree rape of his seven-year-old stepdaughter. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and rendered a judgment in Seales's favor. Seales v. State, 581 So. 2d 1188 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). The State's application for rehearing in that court was overruled. The State then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. We reverse and remand.
See the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals for a full explanation of the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.
The State maintains that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred to reversal in holding that Seales was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Specifically, the State contends that it was reasonably inferable from the evidence that Seales was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, it argues, the question of Seales's guilt or innocence was one properly reserved for the jury. We agree.
The standard for appellate review of an issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in a case such as this one was set out in Dolvin v. State, 391 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1980):
"`[W]e must keep in mind that the test to be applied is not simply whether in the opinion of the trial judge or the appellate court the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt; but rather whether the jury might so conclude. Harper v. United States, 405 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.1969); Roberts v. United States, 416 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir.1969). The procedure for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence has been aptly set out in Odom v. United States, 377 F.2d 853, 855 (5th Cir.1967):
391 So. 2d  at 137-38, quoting Cumbo v. State, 368 So. 2d 871, 874 (Ala.Crim.App. 1978), cert. denied, Ex parte Cumbo, 368 So. 2d 877 (Ala.1979). See, also, Robinette v. State, 531 So. 2d 697 (Ala.1988). (Emphasis added in Dolvin.)
The indictment in the present case charged that Seales, who was over 16 years of age, had engaged in "sexual intercourse" with his stepdaughter, who was under 12 years of age. This charge was based on Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-61(a)(3), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Sexual intercourse" is defined in Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-6-60(1) (1990 Cum.Supp.), as follows:
The sole issue presented for our review is whether the State presented sufficient evidence of penetration to support the jury's guilty verdict.
The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case correctly states the law with respect to the amount of penetration that is necessary to constitute rape:
The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals also adequately summarizes the evidence relied upon by the State in support of its argument that penetration was sufficiently proved:
581 So. 2d  at 1189-90.
To this we add only the following testimony from the minor victim:
The jury could have, and obviously did, find from the evidence that Seales had attempted *1197 to force his erect penis into the victim's vagina. Dr. Fesenmeier testified that there was "redness, erythema, around the outside of the [victim's] vagina, [the] opening of her vagina and along the labia." There was certainly sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that Seales's penis had penetrated the victim's "pudendum" or "vulva," and, consequently, that Seales had had "sexual intercourse" with the victim within the meaning of § 13A-6-61(a)(3). The terms "pudendum" or "vulva," as generally applied, include the parts of the external genital organs of the human female such as the labia majora, the labia minora, and the vaginal orifice. See C.M. Goss, Gray's Anatomy, Ch. 17, pp. 1328-29 (28th ed. 1966).
The Court of Criminal Appeals appears to have taken the view that the evidence could be reasonably explained under a theory consistent with Seales's claimed innocence (i.e., that Seales had only "touched" the victim's genitalia with his penis).[2] In so doing, the court substituted its view of the evidence for that of the jury. The jury, by finding Seales guilty of the offense charged, was obviously satisfied that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. As in Robinette v. State, supra, it was the jury's call. See, also, Tedder v. State, 547 So. 2d 601 (Ala.1989).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, STEAGALL, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
[1]  Testimony at trial indicated that Marvel Seales had had a second child and had been hospitalized for a short time a couple of weeks following the delivery.
[2]  We are at a loss to explain why the following sentence was included in the court's opinion as support for its holding:

"The testimony of Dr. Fesenmeier established, as best as we can determine from the record, that the redness and irritation was around the `outside' of the vagina, along the `opening' of the vagina, and along the `sides' of the vagina."
In the paragraph preceding this sentence the court correctly noted that penetration of the vagina did not have to be shown. It is clear that the "redness" testified to by Dr. Fesenmeier was within the victim's pudendum or vulva.