Title: Bogue v. R & M GROCERY

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

553 So. 2d 545 (1989)
Effie BOGUE
v.
R & M GROCERY.
87-1575.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 15, 1989.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing November 9, 1989.
Stan Brobston, Bessemer, for appellant.
W.J. McDaniel and Robert S.W. Given of McDaniel, Hall, Conerly & Lusk, Birmingham, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, R & M Grocery. The plaintiff, Effie Bogue, was injured in a slip and fall accident upon the defendant's premises.
On February 3, 1986, Effie Bogue entered the R & M Grocery to purchase a pack of cigarettes and to cash her husband's retirement check. After being told by the clerk that she must produce identification before she could cash her husband's check, she proceeded out the door through which she had entered the grocery store, and fell, causing injury to herself.
Bogue sued R & M Grocery, alleging that it had negligently failed to maintain its premises in a safe condition for the use of the grocery's invitees. Specifically, Bogue asserted that her fall was caused by a significant drop in elevation from the doorway to the parking lot.
*546 In its answer, R & M Grocery denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged that Bogue's own negligence caused or contributed to her fall. R & M Grocery later moved for summary judgment based on the pleadings and on Bogue's deposition.
In opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Bogue presented the affidavit of Dr. James V. Walters, a civil engineer. Walters's affidavit stated, in part, as follows:
The trial court entered a summary judgment for R & M Grocery and made it final under Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. Bogue appeals, and we reverse.
This action was commenced before June 11, 1987; therefore, the applicable standard of review is the "scintilla rule." See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975.
Tribble v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 534 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Ala.1988).
*547 Bogue was a business invitee upon the grocery store's premises at the time of her accident, and as such, was owed a duty by the grocery to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition. This Court has written:
"It should be noted, however, that
"`the owner of the premises in such cases is not the insurer of the safety of his invitees and res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. Neither is there any presumption of negligence arising out of the mere fact of injury to the invitee.'
Massey v. Allied Products Co., 523 So. 2d 397, 398 (Ala.1988).
"`This court is firmly committed to the proposition that the occupant of premises is bound to use reasonable care and diligence to keep the premises in a safe condition for the access of persons who come thereon by his invitation, expressed or implied, for the transaction of business, or for any other purpose beneficial to him; or, if his premises are in any respect dangerous, he must give such visitors sufficient warning of the danger to enable them, by the use of ordinary care, to avoid it. Geis v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 143 Ala. 299, 39 So. 301 [ (1905) ].'
"`This rule ... includes (a) the duty to warn an invitee of danger, of which he knows, or ought to know, and of which the invitee is ignorant; and (b) the duty to use reasonable care to have the premises to which he is invited in a reasonably safe condition for such contemplated uses, and within the contemplated invitation.'
"`In 45 C.J. § 244, p. 837, the rule is thus stated: "The duty to keep premises safe for invitees applies only to defects or conditions which are in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like, in that they are not known to the invitee, and would not be observed by him in the exercise of ordinary care. The invitee assumes all normal or ordinary risks attendant upon the use of the premises, and the owner or occupant is under no duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to obviate known and obvious dangers, nor is he liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care."'
Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985, 989 (Ala.1980). See also Perry v. Hancock Fabrics, Inc., 541 So. 2d 521 (Ala.1989).
The plaintiff has established evidence from which a jury could find that a defect existed in the ramp or slanting structure at the door of the grocery store. The defendant contests the assertion that the configuration of the step or ramp constitutes a hazard, and also argues that if a defect existed the plaintiff's awareness of the defect eliminates any liability on the part of the defendant, as a matter of law. We cannot agree. Once it has been determined that the duty owed to an invitee has been breached, questions of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and whether the plaintiff should have been aware of the defect, are normally questions for the jury. This is such a case. There are any number *548 of factual issues for a jury in this case, as there usually are in negligence cases. As the Court noted in Foodtown Stores, Inc. v. Patterson, 282 Ala. 477, 213 So. 2d 211 (1968):
282 Ala. at 482, 213 So. 2d  at 215-16.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with the majority that Bogue presented evidence that there was a defect in the ramp; however, the majority overlooks the fact that the movant has shown that there is no evidence that the alleged defect in the ramp caused Bogue to fall.
It is readily apparent from a reading of Bogue's deposition that she had knowledge of the sloping entrance, which she now claims caused her to fall. Bogue made absolutely no assertion as to how or why she fell. She stated that there was no foreign substance on the floor that caused her to slip and fall. Nor did she claim that she was distracted by automobiles at the gasoline pumps or by anything else on the defendant's premises.
Bogue's deposition testimony, in pertinent part, was:
"* * * *
"* * * *
"* * * *
In light of the fact that Bogue fully appreciated the alleged defect or hazard that she states might have caused her to fall, and based upon her statement that she did not know what caused her to fall, I would hold that there was no evidence from which a jury could find that there was a defect in the premises that proximately caused her to fall and sustain injury and that the trial court's entry of summary judgment was appropriate.
If Bogue cannot state that the alleged defect was the cause of her fall, how can a jury make that finding?
PER CURIAM.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION MODIFIED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.