Title: State v. Sheridan

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

247 N.W.2d 232 (1976) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Thomas Rowland SHERIDAN, Appellant. No. 58443. Supreme Court of Iowa. November 17, 1976. Phillip F. Miller, Des Moines, for appellant. *233 Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Jim P. Robbins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ray A. Fenton, County Atty., for appellee. Considered en banc. MOORE, Chief Justice. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, Count I (marijuana) and Count II (hashish) in violation of section 204.401(1), Code 1973, and possession of a controlled substance Count III (Lysergic Acid Dithamide), Count IV (Methaqualone) and Count V (Amobarbital) in violation of section 204.401(3), Code 1973. We affirm. Defendant-appellant's first two assigned errors assert his pretrial motion to suppress all evidence in regard to search of his Des Moines home and seizure of quantities of the above-named controlled substances should have been sustained. He attacks the validity of the search warrant issued by Magistrate Ben E. Kubby first on procedural grounds and then on grounds of insufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The evidence taken at defendant's motion to suppress hearing included testimony of police officer Larry Leitzke of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad (M.A.N.S.). Leitzke testified defendant had been under surveillance by members of M.A.N.S. prior to February 14, 1975 when he conducted and witnessed a drug purchase at defendant's home through use of an undercover informant. Late that night Leitzke went to Magistrate Kubby's home to obtain a warrant for the search of defendant's home. Prior to appearing before Magistrate Kubby, Officer Leitzke prepared a search warrant and a form for the magistrate's endorsement thereon containing an abstract of evidence to be presented to the magistrate. Leitzke orally testified before Magistrate Kubby to the facts contained in the abstract he had prepared. Thereafter Magistrate Kubby made certain requisite notations in parts of the search warrant (not here involved) and specifically found the information to justify probable cause and thereafter issued the warrant. The magistrate signed the endorsement thereon containing the prepared abstract of evidence. I. Defendant first contends the search warrant was invalid on the ground Magistrate Kubby had not performed his required statutory duty because he did not personally prepare the abstract of testimony and acted only as a "rubber stamp" when he endorsed the abstract of evidence. Of course a magistrate must never become a "rubber stamp" for the police. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1512, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 727. The requirements for issuance of a search warrant are enumerated in Code section 751.4. It includes: District Judge Anthony M. Critelli, who heard defendant's motion to suppress, in his findings and conclusions noted he was not aware of one authority which in "any manner or degree condemns the practice followed herein," He found: "The magistrate's signature at the bottom of the instrument indicates that he approves, accepts, and adopts the prepared instrument and it has the same force and effect as if he had personally prepared same." We agree. Our research has led us to only one case dealing with officer-prepared abstracts of testimony in the area of search warrant proceedings. The following footnote is found in United States v. Pike, 5 Cir., 523 F.2d 734, 737-738: II. Defendant-appellant next attacks the validity of the search warrant on the ground of insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance thereof. This court in State v. Spier, Iowa, 173 N.W.2d 854, discussed and analyzed at length the duty of a magistrate in considering and determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. The pertinent quotations from pages 858-859 of Spier are: "To the same effect is section 8, Article I, of the Iowa Constitution. More recently in State v. Boer, Iowa, 224 N.W.2d 217, 219, 220, we said: *235 See also State v. Wright, Iowa, 244 N.W.2d 319; State v. Rockhold, Iowa, 243 N.W.2d 846; State v. Nelson, Iowa, 234 N.W.2d 368; State v. Drake, Iowa, 224 N.W.2d 476. As found by Judge Critelli the record clearly shows finding of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant was based on the sworn testimony of Officer Leitzke that he conducted and witnessed a drug purchase at defendant's home a few hours before his appearance before Magistrate Kubby. See State v. Liesche, Iowa, 228 N.W.2d 44. Defendant-appellant's argument it was based on reference to an unvouched for informant is unsupported by the record. Defendant-appellant's first two assigned errors are untenable. III. Trial of this case was before District Judge Wade Clarke. The jury found defendant guilty of each of the five offenses with which he was charged. Thereafter he was sentenced within the provisions of section 204.401(1) of the 1973 Code and the Iowa Indeterminate Sentence Law. Defendant-appellant's third assigned error raises an evidentiary issue regarding proof of "intent to deliver" which is an element only of the crimes charged in Count I and Count II. After Officer Leitzke related his wide experience and knowledge of drug users and his description of the paraphernalia and drugs seized at defendant's home, including 43 pounds of marijuana, the following occurred during his trial testimony: "* * * From the adverse ruling on his multiple generalized objections defendant-appellant limits the problem presented to us by his third assigned error which states: Beginning with the polestar case of Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 344, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655, we have repeatedly held a general objection to opinion testimony that the question invades the *236 province of the jury is invalid and not available. See State v. Hicks, Iowa, 245 N.W.2d 319, 320; State v. Hines, Iowa, 223 N.W.2d 190, 192; State v. Taylor, Iowa, 201 N.W.2d 724, 727; Bengford v. Carlem Corporation, Iowa, 156 N.W.2d 855, 865, and citations. In State v. Johnson, Iowa, 224 N.W.2d 617, 622, we say: We do not pass upon any part of the objection made below, except the very specific portion thereof assigned as error by defendant-appellant. We find no ground for reversal under defendant-appellant's third assigned error. Defendant-appellant's five convictions are affirmed. AFFIRMED.