Title: Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Briggs Engineering, Inc.

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 49176 
 
BRUNOBUILT, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
BRIGGS ENGINEERING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; DEAN W. BRIGGS, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
MATERIALS TESTING & INSPECTION, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
KEVIN L. SCHROEDER, CHARLES E. 
KAISER, ELIZABETH BROWN, DAVID O. 
CRAM, ERSTAD ARCHITECTS, PA, an 
Idaho 
professional 
service 
corporation; 
ANDREW C. ERSTAD, CHERYL PEARSE, 
TREASURE VALLEY ENGINEERS, INC., 
an 
Idaho 
corporation; 
MATRIX 
ENGINEERING, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
DOUGLAS L. UNGER, KLEINFELDER, 
INC., a California corporation; and G. 
ALEXANDER RUSH, 
 
     Defendants. 
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Boise, January 2023 Term 
 
Opinion filed: March 7, 2023 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Ada County. Steven J. Hippler, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
McConnell Wagner Sykes & Stacey, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant. Richard Lee 
Stacey, Jr. argued. 
 
Cummings Law Offices, Boise, for Respondents. Richard Cummings argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
MOELLER, Justice.  
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This appeal stems from a professional malpractice lawsuit following a landslide in the 
Boise foothills. BrunoBuilt, Inc., was constructing a custom home on a vacant lot in 2016 when a 
landslide occurred beneath the Terra Nativa subdivision. Following damage to the lot, BrunoBuilt 
filed a professional negligence suit against numerous engineers and engineering firms involved in 
the construction of the subdivision, arguing that they failed to identify preexisting landslide 
conditions and other geological circumstances that made residential development unsafe at this 
site. 
Over two years later, in the fall of 2018, BrunoBuilt discovered additional damage to the 
finished custom home itself. It then brought suit against additional defendants, including Briggs 
Engineering, Inc., and Erstad Architects.1 Briggs Engineering filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the district court granted. The court concluded that BrunoBuilt’s action was time 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). BrunoBuilt 
appealed this decision. It argued that the malpractice claim did not begin to accrue until there was 
damage to the custom home, rather than just the land. We disagree with BrunoBuilt’s analysis and 
affirm the district court that BrunoBuilt’s claim is time barred.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case concerns damage to a residential construction project in the Terra Nativa 
subdivision caused by a landslide in the foothills northeast of Boise, Idaho. Work on this 
subdivision began back in 1998, with multiple engineering firms employed over the years to 
complete the various phases of development amidst market fluctuations and delays. One 
engineering firm, Strata, Inc., completed a geotechnical engineering report of the area in 2003. 
This report was independently reviewed by Kleinfelder, Inc., an engineering firm hired by the City 
of Boise, to evaluate Strata’s compliance with the City of Boise Hillside Development Manual and 
its engineering requirements to ensure safe residential development. Boise approved the plats and, 
in 2004, the Terra Nativa property was annexed into the City of Boise.  
In 2014, Amy and William Dempsey purchased a vacant property lot (“Lot 16”) in Terra 
Nativa. At the time the Dempseys acquired the property, it was bare land with no structures on it. 
The Dempseys first hired Erstad Architects, PA,2 to design their home. As part of the property’s 
                                                 
1 BrunoBuilt’s lawsuit against the Erstad Architects is the subject of a companion appeal.  
2 At all relevant times to this appeal, Erstad Architects was organized as Erstad Architects, PA. However, Erstad 
Architects, PA, filed a statement of conversion and converted to a general business corporation (Erstad Architects, 
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development, Erstad entered into a contract with Dean Briggs, of Briggs Engineering, Inc., 
(collectively “Briggs Engineering”) to perform civil engineering services, including the 
preparation of a site grading and drainage plan as well as an erosion control plan for Lot 16. “The 
scope of work involved surface soils and water,” but it did not involve geotechnical services. In 
July 2015, the Dempseys separately contracted with BrunoBuilt, Inc., to build a custom home 
designed by Erstad. Pursuant to a construction agreement, the Dempseys transferred ownership of 
Lot 16 to BrunoBuilt, via a quitclaim deed, as security for their construction contract with the 
agreement to pay for the home upon its completion. Construction on the home commenced in 2015 
and continued into 2016.  
In February 2016, the lands beneath the Terra Nativa subdivision began to slide. Several 
homes within the subdivision were damaged by earth movement. At this time, the Dempseys’ 
home was practically complete. In an affidavit that Mr. Bruno later submitted in connection with 
this litigation, he stated that “[i]n anticipation of securing a certificate of occupancy, [the] final 
heating, final plumbing, final electrical, and final building inspections were conducted in and 
around February and March of 2016.” Although the Dempseys’ home had passed all final building 
inspections, cracks in the soil began appearing in the yard. By April, a landslide scarp3 became 
visible and certain utilities had to be relocated. Robert Bruno’s affidavit detailed the damages from 
the landslide:  
9. As a result of the landslide, utility, highway district, and fire department services 
were all terminated, and the City of Boise withheld their certificate of occupancy. 
Portions of the utility lines were physically damaged and/or severed by the 
landslide. 
10. BrunoBuilt immediately began working with the utility entities on solutions to 
resume services to the Dempsey Lot. The utility lines have to be rerouted to the 
Dempsey Home before the utilities can be turned back on. To restore the utilities, 
BrunoBuilt will be required to perform or pay for the majority of work for rerouting 
the utility lines and services, including buying a transformer, installing the conduit, 
installing 500 feet of water line, and 500 feet of sewer line, as well as all the 
trenching, backfilling and concrete replacement. Based on requirements from the 
Fire Department, BrunoBuilt will also be required to widen the driveway to 20 feet 
                                                 
Inc.) on November 30, 2021. Throughout this appeal, “Erstad Architects, PA” or “Erstad Architects” is used to refer 
to the general corporation that is now organized as Erstad Architects, Inc. 
3 A scarp is “a steep (nearly vertical) region of exposed soil and rock at the head of the landslide” where the movement 
of adjacent land exposes part of the subsurface. Landslide Features, Kansas Geological Survey: Public Outreach 
https://www.kgs.ku.edu/Publications/pic13/pic13_2.html (last visited February 6, 2023).  
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wide to accommodate a fire truck. The City of Boise has also required a retaining 
wall be installed in order to retain topsoil.  
11. To this date, BrunoBuilt still has not been able to secure a certificate of 
occupancy for the Dempsey Home, and has had to incur increased costs based on 
the demands of the City for the certification of occupancy. 
BrunoBuilt had to build a retaining wall, grade the land, remedy the surface cracking in the 
yard, buy a transformer, reroute utilities, install sewer and water lines, and complete “all the 
trenching, backfilling and concrete replacement” required to restore service to the Dempsey 
home.4 BrunoBuilt also hired a surveyor at this time to determine whether the finished home had 
been affected by the landslide, who confirmed that he did not detect movement of the home at that 
time. After the City of Boise withheld issuing the certificate of occupancy, the Dempseys “refused 
to pay” under the construction agreement and BrunoBuilt retained ownership of the home and lot.  
After BrunoBuilt could not obtain a certificate of occupancy from the city, litigation 
ensued. On December 19, 2016, BrunoBuilt filed a complaint of professional negligence against 
numerous engineers and engineering firms involved in the construction of the Terra Nativa 
subdivision. Neither Briggs Engineering nor Erstad were named as defendants at that time. Some 
of BrunoBuilt’s initial claims were later found by the district court to be time barred by the statute 
of limitations and of repose. The district court also determined that some of these claims were 
precluded because they were solely for economic loss.  
In July of 2018, still in the midst of litigation, BrunoBuilt became aware of structural 
damage to the custom home on Lot 16 caused by the landslide. A civil engineer, Patrick Shires, 
inspected the home and discovered “cracks in the driveway, front porch and stucco, cracks in the 
foundation and nail heads that had popped out of the drywall.” On September 21, 2018, BrunoBuilt 
filed an amended complaint, naming Briggs Engineering as a defendant, as well as Erstad 
Architects. The amended complaint averred that Briggs Engineering failed to identify preexisting 
landslide conditions and other circumstances that made construction of the Dempseys’ home 
unsafe.  
Briggs Engineering filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the malpractice 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4) because 
landslide damages to the property first occurred more than two years prior to BrunoBuilt’s 
                                                 
4 BrunoBuilt claimed potential damages for even more. In its initial notice of tort claim, BrunoBuilt estimated $50,000 
in costs to reroute the utilities and stabilize the Dempsey home through the installation of helical piers. It estimated 
another $850,000 for the lost sale of the house if a final certificate of occupancy was refused by the City of Boise.  
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amended complaint. BrunoBuilt responded by arguing that the statute of limitations was 
inapplicable because the proof of actual injury had not manifested until July 2018, when damage 
to the constructed home was observable. BrunoBuilt also filed a Rule 56(d) motion for relief 
seeking additional time to complete discovery and respond to Briggs Engineering’s motion.  
The district court held a hearing on these motions on June 19, 2019. It granted Briggs 
Engineering’s motion for summary judgment and denied BrunoBuilt’s motion for a continuance. 
The district court concluded that BrunoBuilt’s suit was time barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4) because BrunoBuilt was aware of landslide 
damages to Lot 16 more than two years prior to filing its complaint. The court explained:  
It is undisputed that BrunoBuilt was aware of actual damage to the Lot as early as 
April of 2016. However, BrunoBuilt did not assert a claim against Briggs until 
September 21, 2018, more than two years later. While, in opposing summary 
judgment, BrunoBuilt attempts to draw a line between damage to the Lot and 
damage to the home, it is an inconsequential distinction. Section 5-219(4) of the 
Idaho Code specifically states that the limitation period “shall not be extended by 
reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting” from the alleged 
malpractice. The damage to the home was a continuance of damage that already 
revealed itself in the Lot. Further, BrunoBuilt’s argument disregards the fact that, 
once built, the home and the lot were an integrated whole. Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 
108 P.3d 996, 1001. Together, they constitute BrunoBuilt’s real property. I.C. § 55-
101 (defining “real property” as that which is affixed or appurtenant to land.) 
Because BrunoBuilt failed to bring suit against Briggs within two years of being 
made aware of earth movement damage to its real property, the claim is time-
barred. 
The district court then dismissed BrunoBuilt’s action against Briggs Engineering with prejudice. 
BrunoBuilt timely appealed.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it applies 
the same standard used by the trial court originally ruling on the motion. Krinitt v. Idaho Dep’t of 
Fish & Game, 162 Idaho 425, 428, 398 P.3d 158, 161 (2017). Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a court “must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 
56(a). “In making this determination, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable 
inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion.” City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Ints., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 P.3d 915, 919 
(2000). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question of 
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law, over which this Court exercises free review.” Krinitt, 162 Idaho at 428, 398 P.3d at 161. This 
Court also exercises free review over legal issues related to statutes of limitation. McCabe v. 
Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 896, 899 (2008).    
III. ANALYSIS 
A. BrunoBuilt’s action against Briggs Engineering is barred by the statute of limitations.  
BrunoBuilt asks this Court to reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment 
to Briggs. BrunoBuilt argues that the statute of limitations “could not start to accrue until there 
was ascertainable damage recoverable in the malpractice action at bar,” and that it “did not have 
recoverable damages against the Briggs Defendants until the landslide damaged separate property 
that was not the subject of underlying transaction.” Based on this argument, the analysis of Briggs 
Engineering’s statute of limitations defense has become entangled with the economic loss rule. 
BrunoBuilt relies on a unique application of the economic loss rule to argue that the agreement to 
build a custom home concerned a “separate property” and was a separate transaction from Lot 16 
itself; thus, the 2018 damages to the house are recoverable even if the earlier 2016 damages to Lot 
16 were unrecoverable as purely economic losses. In response, Briggs Engineering argues that the 
statute of limitations clearly bars BrunoBuilt’s claims and that the subject of the transaction was 
the construction of a residence—“[t]here was never any separate agreement to provide services for 
an unimproved lot.” Briggs Engineering asserts it was contracted by Erstad “to provide specified 
engineering services that were necessary to obtain a building permit [for a home],” and “[t]here 
was never any separate agreement to provide services for an unimproved lot.”  
Importantly, the district court never fully addressed the economic loss rule as it concerns 
BrunoBuilt and Briggs Engineering. While economic loss was argued and considered with other 
defendants in the BrunoBuilt litigation (including Erstad), the district court’s decision to grant 
Briggs Engineering’s motion for summary judgment appears to be solely based on Idaho Code 
section 5-219(4)’s time bar to BrunoBuilt’s claims. The district court likewise concluded that Lot 
16 and the custom home “were an integrated whole,” and that “damage to the home was a 
continuance of damage that already revealed itself in the Lot.” We agree with the district court’s 
conclusions.  
Claims of professional negligence are subject to the two-year statute of limitations under 
Idaho Code section 5-219(4), which states:  
An action to recover damages for professional malpractice . . . shall be deemed to 
have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and 
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the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences 
or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial 
relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer.  
I.C. § 5-219(4). A cause of action under this provision must commence within “two (2) years 
following the occurrence, act or omission complained of.” Id. Thus, “[t]he plain language of Idaho 
Code section 5-219 provides that a legal malpractice claim begins to accrue at the time the 
negligent act or omission occurs.” Walsh v. Swapp L., PLLC, 166 Idaho 629, 636, 462 P.3d 607, 
614 (2020). Or, as this Court has interpreted, when “some damage” has occurred. Id.; City of 
McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009).  
The reason for the “some damage” rule is that in order to recover under a theory of 
negligence, the plaintiff must prove actual damage. Until some damage occurs, a 
cause of action for professional malpractice does not accrue. Therefore, some 
damage is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action 
is barred by the statute of limitations before that cause of action even accrues. 
Buxton, 146 Idaho at 659, 201 P.3d at 632 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 
Here, it is undisputed that damages to Lot 16 were apparent and known to BrunoBuilt by 
April 2016 when a landslide scarp and cracking in the soil became visible on the property. 
Importantly, the utilities were also “physically damaged and/or severed by the landslide.” 
BrunoBuilt commenced rerouting the lines, “as well as all the trenching, backfilling and concrete 
replacement” required for their relocation and safety concerns. The City of Boise ultimately 
refused to issue a certificate of occupancy. BrunoBuilt discovered additional damages in July 2018, 
this time to the constructed home itself. A civil engineer discovered cracks in the driveway, front 
porch, stucco, and foundation, as well as nail heads that had popped out of the drywall. Because 
the amended complaint against Briggs Engineering was filed in September 2018, the cause of 
action is only timely if we conclude that the two-year statute of limitations began to accrue when 
BrunoBuilt discovered the later damage to the constructed home, rather than when the original 
damage to the yard and utilities crossing the lot occurred. BrunoBuilt argues this distinction is key 
to the case because the damages to the house constitute separate, recoverable property damages 
under the economic loss rule. Thus, this Court’s determination on the timeliness of BrunoBuilt’s 
action will turn on whether the house was a “separate property,” not subject to the underlying 
transaction regarding the home.  
We cannot overemphasize the unique posture of this case. The economic loss rule is a long-
established principle of Idaho law, first considered and adopted in Clark v. Int’l Harvester Co., 99 
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Idaho 326, 334, 581 P.2d 784, 792 (1978). It is a doctrine of judicial construct that acts as a 
boundary between tort and contract law. Id. at 333–34, 581 P.2d at 791–92. See also Dale D. 
Goble, ALL ALONG THE WATCHTOWER: ECONOMIC LOSS IN TORT (THE IDAHO CASE LAW), 34 
Idaho L. Rev. 225, 227–28 (1998). Traditionally, the economic loss rule is a defense to tort 
recovery where damages result only in economic loss, rather than physical injury or property 
damage. See, e.g., Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299, 108 P.3d 996, 999 (2005) 
(the defendants raised the economic loss rule in defense against the plaintiffs’ negligence claim). 
BrunoBuilt has crafted a novel argument that turns the shield provided by the economic loss rule 
to prevent recovery of contract-based damages in a tort action, into a sword in the hope that it can 
circumvent the statute of limitations.  
Under our jurisprudence, the economic loss rule prohibits the “recovery of purely economic 
losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another.” Blahd, 
141 Idaho at 300, 108 P.3d at 1000. These economic losses are the “costs of repair and replacement 
of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for 
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use.” Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975) (emphasis added). Whereas 
“property damage,” which is recoverable, “encompasses damage to property other than that which 
is the subject of the transaction.” Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 26, 
244 P.3d 166, 170 (2010) (quoting Salmon Rivers, 97 Idaho at 351, 544 P.2d at 309). In interpreting 
“subject of the transaction,” this Court’s pattern of cases “has implicitly defined the ‘subject of the 
transaction’ by the subject matter of the contract.” Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 
785, 791, 215 P.3d 505, 511 (2009) (emphasis added).5 
For example, in Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., this Court analyzed the economic loss rule 
as pertaining to property and lot damages. 141 Idaho at 300, 108 P.3d at 1000. In Blahd, the 
plaintiffs discovered cracks in their new home that were caused by thirty feet of improperly 
compacted fill dirt settling. Id. at 299, 108 P.3d at 999. The Blahds filed a professional negligence 
action against the engineering firms and developer of the subdivision, but the district court 
                                                 
5 This Court had previously established in Blahd that “transaction” meant the “subject of the lawsuit.” Blahd, 141 
Idaho at 300, 108 P.3d at 1000. We abrogated this interpretation in Aardema because it was overly broad. “[I]f the 
subject of the transaction is defined as the subject of the lawsuit essentially every claim would be barred by the 
economic loss rule. Instead, we read . . . Blahd to mean that the underlying contract that is the subject of the lawsuit 
is the subject of the transaction.” Aardema, 147 Idaho at 791 n.2, 215 P.3d at 511 n.2 (emphasis added).  
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ultimately awarded summary judgment to the defendants, determining that the Blahds’ various 
claims were either barred by the economic loss rule or the statute of limitations. The Blahds 
appealed, arguing that “any damage to the house [was] property damage and that the subject of the 
transaction was the improperly filled and compacted lot, not the house that was later constructed 
on the lot.” Id. at 299–300, 108 P.3d at 999–1000. This Court disagreed. It determined that the 
Blahds’ house and lot were purchased as an “integrated whole” and, thus, “the subject of the 
transaction in [that] case [was] both the lot and the house.” Id. at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001.  
Likewise, in Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a foothill in preparation 
to build duplex residences on the property. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 38, 740 P.2d 
1022, 1023 (1987). A separate contractor was hired to build the residences, and the seller later sold 
the duplexes. The buyer soon discovered damage to the duplexes because of a defective 
foundation, which resulted in a lawsuit against both the seller and contractor for negligence. This 
Court applied the economic loss rule to bar the negligence claims because the damage to the duplex 
caused by a defective foundation was purely economic. Id. at 38–40, 740 P.2d at 1023–25. In a 
separate case, this Court also explained that “the duplex itself, rather than its construction, [was] 
the subject of the transaction.” Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999). 
BrunoBuilt argues that the separate business transactions of this case severed the lot and 
the home for purposes of the economic loss rule, making the damages to the house recoverable 
property damage because it was not “subject to the underlying transaction.” In its words, 
BrunoBuilt claims it did not “acquire [Lot 16] and the Custom Home as part of a single transaction, 
and the significance of that fact cannot be overstated. BrunoBuilt first acquired legal title to the 
View Lot and then later constructed the Custom Home on said Lot.”  
Initially, we note that the quitclaim deed here is an unusual and distinguishing fact in this 
case. Here, unlike in Blahd and Tusch, the land was purchased when vacant by third parties and 
then quitclaimed as security to a contractor prior to any residence or structure being built upon it. 
However, BrunoBuilt has disregarded the fact that Lot 16, and the custom home to be constructed, 
were the subject of a single contract and transaction—just as the land and home were both damaged 
by the same landslide and its continuing effects. The construction agreement between BrunoBuilt 
and the Dempseys transferred ownership of Lot 16 to BrunoBuilt as security for a construction 
contract to build the Dempseys a home on the vacant lot. While the home was not yet constructed 
at the moment BrunoBuilt acquired Lot 16, the purpose of the construction agreement and property 
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transfer was to build that custom home. The agreement also provided that the Dempseys would 
buy back the property from BrunoBuilt upon completion of the house, meaning they would buy 
back the entire premises—both the house and the lot. Thus, the house and lot were an integrated 
whole, both part and parcel of one contract between the parties. Similarly, Briggs Engineering’s 
involvement with the property was to complete civil engineering work in developing and preparing 
Lot 16 for the construction of the Dempseys’ residence upon it. There is no dispute that the utilities 
damaged by the landslide in 2016 were primarily intended to benefit the home, not just the lot.  
Although not fully acknowledged by BrunoBuilt in its briefing, the record shows that, at 
the time of the first landslide, the house was almost complete. Thus, the initial damages in 2016 
did not occur to a vacant lot. The land shifted beneath a nearly-finished home that was undergoing 
final inspections. Importantly, these damages were not limited to the lot and yard, as BrunoBuilt 
contends. Mr. Bruno’s own affidavit avers that the utilities connecting to the home were damaged 
and severed. Utility lines had to be rerouted, trenches dug, concrete replaced—all in addition to 
the cracked soil and landslide scarp running across the front yard. Therefore, we cannot agree with 
BrunoBuilt’s view that the home and land were separate for assessing damages through the 
economic loss rule. Instead, we find Blahd and Tusch to be controlling. Because the house and lot 
were both the subject of the underlying transaction, there were no recoverable property damages 
to a “property other than that which is the subject of the transaction.” Brian & Christie, Inc., 150 
Idaho at 26, 244 P.3d at 170.  
Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to BrunoBuilt, we conclude that Briggs 
Engineering was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The subject of the transaction 
here was both the house and the land it would be built upon, and the entire property was damaged 
in 2016 by the landslide. The district court correctly determined that this is when “some damage” 
to the property occurred, making April 2016 the accrual date for purposes of the statute of 
limitations. The timeline does not shift under BrunoBuilt’s novel economic loss argument. 
Therefore, BrunoBuilt’s compensable claims in tort should have been brought within the two-year 
statute of limitations period.  
Because the record is clear the claims in this case were filed well after the statute of 
limitations had lapsed, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that BrunoBuilt’s action against 
Briggs Engineering is barred by the statute of limitations.  
B. Briggs Engineering is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
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Briggs Engineering cites two statutory provisions as a basis for attorney fees. It first argues 
that it is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3), which provides a prevailing 
party reasonable attorney fees in civil actions where “the commercial transaction comprises the 
gravamen of the lawsuit.” Idaho Transp. Dep’t v. Ascorp, Inc., 159 Idaho 138, 141, 357 P.3d 863, 
866 (2015) (quoting Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 
349 (1990)). “There are two stages of analysis to determine whether a prevailing party could avail 
itself of I.C. § 12-120(3): (1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; 
and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought.” 
Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enterprises, Inc., 170 Idaho 649, 663, 516 P.3d 73, 
87 (2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[t]here must be a 
commercial transaction between the parties for attorney fees to be awarded.” Great Plains Equip., 
Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001).  
 
Section 12-120(3) does not apply because a commercial transaction is not the gravamen of 
BrunoBuilt’s claims. First, this is a tort action. BrunoBuilt brought a cause of action for 
professional negligence and seeks property damages. As a tort action, the construction agreement 
between BrunoBuilt and the Dempseys is not integral to the claim—it is only tangentially related. 
Second, and closely related, is that there was no commercial transaction between BrunoBuilt and 
Briggs Engineering that forms the basis for recovery in this case. Erstad Architects contracted with 
Briggs Engineering to complete civil engineering work on the property, not BrunoBuilt. 
BrunoBuilt likewise did not contract with Erstad (who designed the home). Erstad’s transactional 
relationship was only with the Dempseys, as was BrunoBuilt’s. In sum, at its heart, this case bears 
no resemblance to the type of transactions we have held to be governed by section 12-120(c). 
Briggs Engineering also seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, which 
allows a court to “award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party” when “the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” However, we have 
consistently held that a “mere citation of Idaho Code § 12–121, . . . without providing any 
argument, is insufficient for an award of attorney fees on appeal.” Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 
799, 805, 241 P.3d 972, 978 (2010). Aside from citing section 12-121, Briggs Engineering did not 
provide any arguments explaining how BrunoBuilt’s appeal was “brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation,” or how it is entitled to an award under this 
section. It is not for this Court to conduct a section 12-121 analysis on behalf of a party seeking 
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fees in the first instance. Accordingly, Briggs Engineering is not entitled to an award of fees despite 
being the prevailing party on appeal.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment to Briggs Engineering. Costs 
are awarded to Briggs Engineering pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a) as a matter of course.  
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, ZAHN and Justice Pro Tem BURDICK 
CONCUR.