Title: Johnson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM T. JOHNSON, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 444, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 9711014716 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 2, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
April 21, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.   
 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 21st day of April 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm as supplemented, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, William T. Johnson, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for correction of sentence and motion for 
postconviction relief.  The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Johnson’s 
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
2
 
(2) 
Johnson and a co-defendant were tried in 1998 for having committed 
three armed robberies.  The State sought to prove that Johnson was the driver of 
the getaway car.  The jury convicted Johnson of one count of robbery and related 
offenses.  The Superior Court granted the State’s motion to declare Johnson a 
habitual offender and sentenced him under title 11, section 4214(a) of the 
Delaware Code.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and 
sentence.2  In 2002, the Court affirmed the denial of Johnson’s first motion for 
postconviction relief.3 
 
(3) 
In February 2009, Johnson filed a motion for correction of sentence 
alleging that the State’s habitual offender motion was deficient.  In April 2009, 
Johnson filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging that he is entitled to a new 
trial on the basis of this Court’s 2009 opinion in Allen v. State.4  By order dated 
July 27, 2009, the Superior Court denied Johnson’s motions as without merit.5  
This appeal followed. 
 
(4) 
The Court has determined that the denial of Johnson’s motions should 
be affirmed.  We agree with the Superior Court that Johnson’s “habitual status was 
sufficiently established and [he] was appropriately sentenced,” and that the 
                                          
 
2 Johnson v. State, 1999 WL 1098173 (Del. Supr.). 
3 Johnson v. State, 2002 WL 1836684 (Del. Supr.). 
4 See Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203 (Del. 2009) (holding that when a charged offense is divided 
into degrees, a defendant convicted of the offense on the basis of accomplice liability is entitled 
to an instruction requiring that the jury make an individualized determination of the degree of the 
defendant’s culpability).   
5 State v. Johnson, 2009 WL 2385153 (Del. Super.). 
 
3
accomplice liability jury instruction given in Johnson’s case “sufficiently complies 
with Allen.”6  The Court has further determined that both of Johnson’s motions 
were subject to procedural bars without exception.7  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm as 
supplemented is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice 
                                          
 
6 The record reflects that the jury was instructed in relevant part: 
 
If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a principal-
accomplice relationship between [Johnson] and one or more other persons with 
respect to the robbery charges, you must also unanimously decide what degree of 
robbery is compatible with [Johnson’s] responsibility for any aggravating fact or 
circumstance, in this case the threat of force or display of a deadly weapon, 
irrespective of the responsibility for that aggravating fact or circumstance of any 
principal or any other accomplice.  In other words, even though you may find that 
[Johnson] was an accomplice to the liability, you need not find that each 
participant is guilty of the same degree of robbery.  As such, you will be required 
to determine whether [Johnson’s] accountability establishes a violation of robbery 
in the first degree, robbery in the second degree or theft. 
 
 Trial Tr. at 181-82 (Oct. 1, 1998). 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a), (b) (barring motion to correct sentence imposed in illegal 
manner filed more than ninety days after sentencing); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring 
motion for postconviction relief filed more than three years after judgment of conviction is final) 
(amended 2005 to reduce limitations period to one year for conviction final after July 1, 2005)).  
Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (providing that this 
Court may affirm a trial court judgment on grounds different from those articulated by the trial 
court).