Title: Walker v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Goodwyn, C.J., Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, Chafin, and Mann, JJ., and Koontz, 
S.J. 
 
JACQUES LAMAR WALKER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 220378 
JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH 
 
 
 
June 1, 2023 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal presents two primary issues.  First, we consider whether the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution requires a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification 
testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for 
the first time in open court.  We also examine whether the jury was properly instructed that the 
defendant was subject to the second or subsequent offense provisions of Code § 18.2-53.1 for 
using a firearm in the commission of robbery.  With regard to the first issue, in accord with the 
majority of courts that have considered this question, we conclude that the Due Process Clause 
does not require a court to pre-screen an eyewitness identification made for the first time in 
court.  Second, we hold that the jury was properly instructed on the second or subsequent offense 
provisions of Code § 18.2-53.1. 
BACKGROUND 
 
I. 
A WELLS FARGO BANK IS ROBBED AT GUNPOINT BY A MASKED INDIVIDUAL. 
 
 
On the afternoon of May 23, 2016, a man wearing a mask, a hooded sweatshirt, and a 
distinctive yellow work vest “barge[d]” into the lobby of a Wells Fargo bank branch.  Edlin 
Cottrell, one of the tellers, heard a scream, which another teller described as a “blood curdling 
scream.”  Cottrell saw the masked man and ducked behind her desk. 
 
2 
 
The robber struck a customer and knocked him down.  The robber then went behind the 
teller line to where the bank employees were.  He pointed a gun at the tellers and told them in a 
“demanding,” and “rushed” voice to put money in a bag.  His demeanor was “forceful.”  The 
bag, a black bag with handles, appeared to be the kind of plastic bag used at liquor stores.  The 
teller complied, as did other bank employees.  A third teller mostly hid under her desk.  Once the 
money was placed in the bag, the robber then ran out the front door.  All told, the robber ran off 
with over $15,000. 
 
The mask covered the robber’s nose and mouth.  His eyes and skin tone were visible.  
Based on skin tone, he was described as black.  A teller described the robber as medium build 
and maybe 5’8” or 5’9”. 
 
A person in the parking lot observed the robber exiting the bank and getting into the 
passenger side of a white Acura automobile.  Another person was driving. 
 
II. 
THE INVESTIGATION AND WALKER’S ARREST. 
 
The Wells Fargo bank branch that was robbed is located at Tackett’s Mill Shopping 
Center in Prince William County.  Approximately four hours before the robbery of the Wells 
Fargo bank, an employee of a different bank, a branch of BB&T, located a few miles from the 
Wells Fargo bank that was robbed, heard a report of suspicious activity.  Acting on this report, 
she followed a suspicious vehicle with two men in it.  The vehicle was a late model white Acura.  
She wrote down the license plate and reported it to the police.  She also was able to observe the 
two men when they stepped out of the car.  One of the men was “shorter and . . . stockier” and 
the other was “taller and thinner.”  The thinner, taller man was in the passenger seat.  The 
thinner of the two was wearing a “yellow shirt.”  She saw their faces.  She identified Walker at 
 
3 
trial as one of the men in the white Acura.  Police later learned that an Acura with the reported 
license plate was registered to a Jacques Walker. 
 
Some of the money the Wells Fargo tellers placed in the bag was “strapped money,” 
meaning a stack of bills wrapped with a band.  The straps have a Wells Fargo Bank stamp on 
them, which has a date and a number for a particular branch.  These straps also bear the initials 
of a service manager and a particular teller.  These straps help ensure the money is accounted for 
and help the tellers identify certain bundled amounts, such as $500 or $5,000. 
 
A police officer who responded to the 9-1-1 call from the bank robbery observed a 
yellow vest on the ground, by the road.  Police collected the vest, as well as additional items of 
clothing, including a black ski mask and a pair of jeans, further down the road from the Wells 
Fargo bank that was robbed. 
   
After the robbery, one of the bank customers, the man struck by the robber, noticed a 
pistol on a mulch pile in the bed of his pickup truck.  He called the police, who retrieved the gun.  
The gun turned out to be a BB gun. 
 
Two days after the robbery, on May 25, 2016, police arrested Walker in Maryland, after a 
traffic stop.  The white Acura he was traveling in was being driven 91 miles per hour in a 55 
mile per hour zone.  The license plate matched the license plate for the white Acura that the 
BB&T bank employee had noted.  Walker was the passenger in the vehicle.  Walker had about 
$2,600 in cash in his pocket.  There was also a suitcase in the back seat.  It contained a backpack, 
and inside that backpack was a black plastic bag with $9,060 in cash.  The cash from the suitcase 
was wrapped in the distinctive bands from the Wells Fargo bank.  Walker told the police in 
Maryland that they were headed to a casino.  Police also recovered two cell phones. 
 
4 
 
When questioned by the police about the Wells Fargo robbery, Walker stated that he was 
working for an employment service called Labor Ready that day, on a moving job in Warrenton.  
He said he worked from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.  A work ticket from Labor Ready, however, 
showed that Walker had worked four hours that day.  The evidence established that four hours is 
the minimum amount of pay a worker receives; the actual hours worked could have been less. 
 
A manager for Labor Ready confirmed that Walker worked on May 23, 2016, for a 
moving job.  She identified the yellow vest worn by the robber as “the same type” of vest the 
company provides to persons who work for them.  She identified Walker as the bank robber from 
a still photo.  When asked how she could identify Walker as the robber, when the robber was 
wearing a mask, she responded: 
Well, he started working for us in the colder months so a lot of the 
workers come in very bundled up so you learn to recognize them when they’re 
coming in. 
 
So and I had worked with him for four months, he’d been coming in every 
day just about asking for work so after a while you really get to know your 
workers and so I recognized him. 
 
App. 236. 
 
 
A search of the phones recovered from the Acura in Maryland revealed that someone 
used one of the phones to pull up an article titled A Man in a Yellow Vest Robs Tackett’s Mill 
Wells Fargo.  A forensic analysis of the search history of the phone revealed a query for “do 
sweat have DNA.” 
 
DNA testing on the mask recovered by the side of the road revealed a mixture.  Walker 
could not be eliminated as the major contributor to the mixture.  No DNA was recovered from 
the yellow vest found by the road.  The pair of jeans found near the road also contained a DNA 
mixture that was a match for Walker. 
 
5 
 
Walker offered alibi evidence from a “good friend” and five-time convicted felon, who 
testified that Walker worked on the moving job all day, from around noon to about 6:00 p.m.  
Walker himself testified to that effect.  However, this evidence differed in a number of ways 
from the alibi he provided to a detective just days after the robbery.  Walker also offered 
evidence from another convicted felon that a man named “Mike” may have committed the 
robbery.  Walker testified that he had no idea there was money in the car when it was pulled over 
in Maryland.  He blamed the robbery on his brother. 
 
III. 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY AND TRIAL. 
Walker was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony, as well as one count of abduction for pecuniary benefit. 
 
Walker filed a pro se, handwritten motion in limine in which he argued, among other 
things, that the court should “exclude any in court witness identification of the defendant, unless 
the witness has already been vetted in their ability to identify the suspect in a blind 6-man photo 
line up with only [their] eyes showing, because the suspect wore a ski mask.”  He contended that 
“[t]he [r]isk is to[o] high of suggestive identification because the defendant is here in the 
courtroom.”  He also argued that such an identification would be more prejudicial than probative.  
After hearing argument on the motion by Walker, who was assisted by standby counsel, the court 
denied the motion. 
 
At a jury trial, one of the bank employees, Irene Caison, testified that she saw the robber 
come in the bank lobby and she noticed he was holding a gun.  She initially dropped down 
behind the counter.  She soon became worried that the robber would kill her if she did not get up, 
so she did.  When the robber demanded money, she complied, filling the bag he provided with 
cash from different drawers.  She testified she was “looking at him,” and “staring at his eyes, 
 
6 
because [that was] all [she] could see.”  She tried to keep the robber calm by saying “we’re going 
to give you the money.” 
 
Caison was asked, “[d]o you see anyone in the courtroom today from those events on 
May 23, 2016?”  She answered in the affirmative.  She was then asked “[w]ho do you 
recognize?” to which she answered, identifying Walker, “[i]t’s the gentleman right there.”  She 
testified that she recognized his eyes.  She said that the robber was “[v]ery close,” within arm’s 
reach, that she could have touched him.  She was not asked to review a photo lineup before trial.  
When Walker, representing himself, asked Caison if she saw any other part of the individual’s 
face, she said “just your eyes, your eyebrows, and your skin complexion.”  She said she had also 
recognized him at the preliminary hearing. 
 
In its instructions to the jury, the circuit court included an instruction on eyewitness 
testimony, based on a model jury instruction.  See Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Criminal, 
No. 2.800, Note on Eyewitness Identification (2018-19 repl. ed.).  The jury found Walker guilty 
of abduction for pecuniary benefit, four counts of robbery, and four counts of using a firearm in 
the commission of robbery.  The circuit court also instructed the jury to fix Walker’s punishment 
at five years for three of the four use of a firearm charges, as “second or subsequent offense[s]” 
under Code § 18.2-53.1.  He was sentenced to serve an active sentence of 45 years in the 
penitentiary. 
 
IV. 
POST-TRIAL MOTION AND APPEAL. 
 
Walker filed a post-trial motion, again raising the due process issue based on Caison’s 
in-court identification.  The circuit court denied the motion. 
 
7 
 
On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Walker v. Commonwealth, 
74 Va. App. 475 (2022).  We granted Walker an appeal based on the following assignments of 
error: 
I.  The Court of Appeals erred by ruling that the trial court did not err in admitting 
Ms. Caison’s in-court identification of Mr. Walker as the perpetrator or in 
refusing Mr. Walker’s request to implement protective procedures. 
 
II. A.  The Court of Appeals erred by ruling that the trial court did not err in 
instructing the jury at sentencing that the second, third, and fourth guilty findings 
were to be treated as second or subsequent convictions subject to the enhanced 
sentencing provision of Code § 18.2-53.1. 
 
     B.  If the Court of Appeals is correct that Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 
759 (1979) is controlling (and not distinguishable), Ansell should be modified, 
overturned, or reversed. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
I. 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE DOES NOT REQUIRE JUDICIAL PRE-SCREENING OF  
 
 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION BEFORE A WITNESS MAKES AN IDENTIFICATION FOR  
 
 
THE FIRST TIME IN COURT. 
 
 
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived “of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”1  The phrase “due process of law” traces its origin to “[a] series of statutes 
enacted during Edward III’s reign.”  Andrew T. Bodoh, The Road to “Due Process”: Evolving 
Constitutional Language from 1776 to 1789, 40 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 103, 113 (2018).  These 
statutes “specified and updated the interests protected and the nature of the protections afforded 
under the Magna Carta’s law of the land and denial of justice clauses.  These statutes are the 
original link between due process language and the Magna Carta.”  Id.  One of these statutes, 
 
 
1 Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution likewise provides “[t]hat no person 
shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  The parties do not 
ask us to construe that Clause. 
 
8 
from 1363, “interpreted the Magna Carta as prohibiting taking or imprisoning a man, or putting 
him out of his freehold, ‘without process of the law.’”  Id. at 113-14. 
 
Relying on a series of United States Supreme Court decisions construing the Due Process 
Clause, Walker argues that an identification that is made for the first time in court is the kind of 
suggestive, improper identification procedure that the Due Process Clause regulates.  He 
contends that an identification by an eyewitness that is made for the first time in court should be 
subject to judicial pre-screening, at least in some instances.2 
 
“[Q]uestions of constitutional interpretation . . . are questions of law subject to de novo 
review” on appeal.  Ashland, LLC v. Virginia-American Water Co., 301 Va. ___, ___, 878 
S.E.2d 378, 381 (2022). 
 
There is no denying that an in-court identification is suggestive.  The defendant is seated 
at counsel table, in the courtroom.  A witness then points, sometimes with dramatic flair, to the 
defendant as the culprit.  The question is whether this practice is improperly or unnecessarily 
suggestive within the intendment of the Due Process Clause. 
 
First, it is common ground that the United States Supreme Court has not construed the 
Due Process Clause to require pre-screening by a trial court of in-court identifications.  The 
Court’s most recent decision to address eyewitness identifications is Perry v. New Hampshire, 
565 U.S. 228 (2012).  Perry, authored by Justice Ginsburg, explained that, as a general 
proposition, “[t]he Constitution . . . protects a defendant against a conviction based on evidence 
of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by affording the 
 
 
2 The Commonwealth argues that Walker’s due process argument is procedurally 
defaulted.  Although Walker’s pro se motion could have been crafted with greater precision, we 
conclude that it was sufficient to alert the court that Walker was raising a due process challenge 
to the admissibility of eyewitness testimony.  Therefore, we proceed to resolve the issue on the 
merits. 
 
9 
defendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of 
credit.”  Id. at 237. 
 
The Court then addressed a subset of cases involving improperly suggestive, out of court 
police procedures, such as Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 
U.S. 98 (1977).  The Court held that these cases set forth “the approach appropriately used to 
determine whether the Due Process Clause requires suppression of an eyewitness identification 
tainted by police arrangement.”  565 U.S.  at 238.  The Court noted that “[a] primary aim of 
excluding identification evidence obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is 
to deter law enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the first place.”  
Id. at 241.  The Court went on to say that “the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary 
judicial inquiry into the reliability of” eyewitness identifications that are “not procured under 
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”  Id. at 248.  Neither 
Perry, nor the cases that precede it, support the argument that the Due Process Clause applies to 
in-court identifications.  Instead, they manifest a concern for out-of-court, improperly suggestive 
police procedures. 
 
In United States v. Domina, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
explained the different dynamic of an in-court identification versus an out of court identification: 
The concern with in-court identification, where there has 
been suggestive pretrial identification, is that the witness later 
identifies the person in court, not from his or her recollection of 
observations at the time of the crime charged, but from the 
suggestive pretrial identification.  Because the jurors are not 
present to observe the pretrial identification, they are not able to 
observe the witness making that initial identification.  The 
certainty or hesitation of the witness when making the 
identification, the witness’s facial expressions, voice inflection, 
body language, and the other normal observations one makes in 
everyday life when judging the reliability of a person’s statements, 
are not available to the jury during this pretrial proceeding.  There 
 
10 
is a danger that the identification in court may only be a 
confirmation of the earlier identification, with much greater 
certainty expressed in court than initially. 
 
When the initial identification is in court, there are different 
considerations.  The jury can observe the witness during the 
identification process and is able to evaluate the reliability of the 
initial identification. 
 
784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 
 
Second, the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry points to a fundamental concern of our 
Constitution: the mechanism for determining the reliability of evidence is generally the trial 
itself, not a pretrial weeding out of evidence by judges.  Perry is not an isolated case.  In Kansas 
v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009), for example, the United States Supreme Court declined 
to fashion a broad exclusionary rule for statements made by jailhouse informants on the basis 
that such statements are “inherently unreliable.”  The Court observed that “[o]ur legal system . . . 
is built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing 
witnesses.”  Id.  Additionally, addressing a separate constitutional right, the right to 
confrontation, the Supreme Court had this to say: 
Admitting statements [merely because they are] deemed reliable by 
a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.  
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.  The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about 
the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could 
be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. 
 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).  Criticizing its prior test, which called for 
courts to assess the reliability of evidence, the Supreme Court observed that judicial 
determinations of reliability improperly “replace[d] the constitutionally prescribed method of 
assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one.”  Id. at 62. 
 
11 
 
Developing rules to address conduct outside the courtroom that produces tainted evidence 
in the courtroom is one thing.  It is another thing to extend these rules, designed to address 
flawed police practices prior to trial, to the presentation of evidence in the courtroom when there 
has been no allegation of impropriety prior to trial.  Extending due process this far would 
supplant the truth-finding function of a trial.  The trial is the crucible that is designed to 
determine the reliability of this evidence.3 
 
Third, in construing the Due Process Clause, we are engaged in an interpretive exercise, 
not a policy-making one.  In ascertaining the meaning of constitutional provisions, courts have 
often examined the historical understanding of words and phrases as well as longstanding 
practices.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (applying what the Court 
characterized as “an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches” to conclude that the 
installation of a GPS tracking device was a search); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a “historically grounded right[]” (quoting 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949)); Yoder v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 823, 
827-28 (1907) (drawing from the common law to conclude that summary petty contempt does 
not require trial by jury); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 624, 628 (1873) (relying 
on the common law to expansively construe the right to avoid compelled self-incrimination).  
The practice of in-court identifications has existed continuously for centuries.  This long and 
 
 
3 It is not clear why, conceptually, a due process requirement to judicially pre-screen 
evidence would be limited to in-court identifications.  The same logic, if adopted, would lead to 
pre-trial screening of statements by jailhouse informants, undercover operatives used to purchase 
narcotics, witnesses with undeniable biases, and more.  It is also unclear whether this judicial 
pre-screening would be limited to evidence offered by the prosecution, or whether it would 
extend to evidence offered by the defense. 
 
12 
uninterrupted historical practice is a powerful indicator that the Due Process Clause does not 
require a judicial pre-screening of identifications made for the first time in court. 
 
Fourth, experts who have studied eyewitness testimony have criticized the test adopted 
by the United States Supreme Court to address the reliability of eyewitness testimony.  The five 
factors the Court articulated in Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200 and Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, “were 
drawn from earlier judicial rulings and not from scientific research.”  National Research Council, 
Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 32 (2014).  “As critics have pointed 
out, the Manson v. Brathwaite test includes factors that are not diagnostic of reliability.”  Id. at 6.  
Extending to new horizons a test that authorities on eyewitness testimony universally view as 
flawed hardly seems like the right solution. 
 
Fifth, we note that, although a minority of courts have concluded that the Due Process 
Clause regulates eyewitness identifications made for the first time in court,4 a strong majority of 
courts have rejected such an interpretation of the Clause.5 
 
 
4 United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 305-07 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Rogers, 
126 F.3d 655, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 941-43 (2d Cir. 
1984); State v. Dickson, 141 A.3d 810, 820-27 (Conn. 2016).  Two of these federal decisions 
pre-date Perry.  Additionally, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has relied on “common law 
principles of fairness,” as opposed to the Due Process Clause, to impose a “good reason” 
requirement for identifications that are made for the first time in court.  Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 169 & n.16 (Mass. 2014) (cleaned up). 
 
 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 849 F.3d 906, 910-11 (10th Cir. 2017); Lee v. 
Foster, 750 F.3d 687, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hughes, 562 F. App’x 393, 398 
(6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1214-17 (11th Cir. 2013); Domina, 784 
F.2d at 1368-69; Garner v. People, 436 P.3d 1107, 1119-20 (Colo. 2019) (en banc); Byrd v. 
State, 25 A.3d 761, 767 (Del. 2011); State v. Doolin, 942 N.W.2d 500, 511-15 (Iowa 2020); 
Fairley v. Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 792, 799-800 (Ky. 2017); State v. King, 934 A.2d 556, 
561 (N.H. 2007); State v. Ramirez, 409 P.3d 902, 912-13 (N.M. 2017); People v. Brazeau, 759 
N.Y.S.2d 268, 271 (App. Div. 2003); State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 572 (Or. 2014) (en banc), 
modified on reconsideration, 343 P.3d 634 (Or. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); State v. Lewis, 609 
S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 2005). 
 
13 
 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the Due Process Clause does not require a court 
to conduct a pre-screening of an eyewitness’s testimony before that witness is permitted to 
identify the defendant for the first time in court. 
 
In concluding that the Due Process Clause does not require the pre-screening of in-court 
identifications, we are not blind to perils associated with eyewitness testimony.  Over 50 years 
ago, the United States Supreme Court observed that “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification 
are well-known” and that “the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification.”  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).  Since then, a large body of 
research has shaped our understanding of the way human memory works and how it degrades 
over time, the heightened risks associated with identifying a person of another race, the impact of 
conducting different types of lineups, and many other facets of eyewitness testimony.6 
 
There are ways to address the problem of flawed eyewitness testimony, however, without 
tearing down our long-accepted understanding of the Due Process Clause to rebuild it on the 
 
 
6 The impact of flawed eyewitness testimony in the context of actual cases, as opposed to 
social science research, is difficult to determine.  There have been many exonerations, based on 
DNA evidence, in which erroneous eyewitness testimony played a central or a contributing role.  
The number of these DNA-based exonerations is tiny in comparison to the overall volume of 
criminal convictions.  One difficulty in determining the real-world impact of flawed eyewitness 
testimony is that the overwhelming majority of criminal cases, more than ninety percent, are 
resolved by guilty pleas.  See Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, Annual Report 25 
(2022) (92% of criminal cases in Virginia in 2022 were resolved by a guilty plea).  Most of the 
cases that do proceed to trial, as this case exemplifies, do not rely exclusively on eyewitness 
testimony.  Furthermore, of the subset of criminal cases that do proceed to trial, a small number 
are jury trials.  Id. (reflecting 1% of criminal cases were tried to a jury in 2022).  Judges often sift 
evidence differently than juries.  Finally, eyewitness testimony is generated in a wide variety of 
ways.  Some witnesses will experience protracted exposure to a defendant over a period of hours 
or even days.  Other witnesses will have only very brief encounters.  Some witnesses will have 
better eyesight, observational skills, and memory than others.  Some identifications will be made 
by persons who have known a defendant very well for a long period of time and others from 
witnesses who have never before seen the defendant.  Therefore, although the DNA exonerations 
no doubt understate the number of convictions associated with flawed eyewitness testimony, it is 
difficult to assess to what extent such testimony results in convictions of innocent persons. 
 
14 
shifting sands of social science.  Of course, a defendant can make use of the traditional 
safeguards of the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and cross-examination to expose 
mistaken eyewitness testimony.  See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
596 (1993) (concluding that “[t]he[ ] conventional devices” of “[v]igorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. . . . rather than 
[its] wholesale exclusion.”).  Additionally, law enforcement officers can be (and many have 
been) trained on using best practices when conducting lineups.  That training can be modified as 
our understanding of the issue progresses.  Judges and lawyers can also be (and many have been) 
educated on the subject.  Legislatures also have a role to play.  For example, the General 
Assembly has required law enforcement agencies in Virginia to “establish a written policy and 
procedure for conducting in-person and photographic lineups.”  Code § 19.2-390.02.  Finally, a 
jury can receive an instruction on the subject of eyewitness testimony.  Whether to grant such an 
instruction is a matter of discretion for the trial judge.  Daniels v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 460, 
466 (2008).  In this case, the circuit court did just that, using an instruction developed by the 
Model Jury Instructions Committee.  See Model Jury Instruction No. 2.800, Note on Eyewitness 
Identification. 
 
For all of these reasons, we hold that the Due Process Clause did not compel the circuit 
court to pre-screen the identification Caison made of the defendant, when that identification was 
made for the first time in court. 
 
II. 
THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT CAISON’S  
 
 
IDENTIFICATION WAS MORE PROBATIVE THAN PREJUDICIAL. 
 
 
Walker also argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that the evidence was more 
probative than prejudicial.  Caison’s identification of Walker as the robber was certainly 
 
15 
relevant.  “Relevant evidence may be excluded if . . . the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by . . . the danger of unfair prejudice.”  Va. R. Evid. 2:403(a)(i).  It is 
well-settled that “[t]he responsibility for balancing the competing considerations of probative 
value and prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.”  Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 
Va. 705, 715 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90 
(1990)).  When balancing these considerations, it is of course true that “all probative direct 
evidence generally has a prejudicial effect to the opposing party.”  Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 
251 (2015). 
 
“‘[U]nfair prejudice’ refers to the tendency of some proof to inflame the passions of the 
trier of fact, or to invite decision based upon a factor unrelated to the elements of the claims and 
defenses in the pending case.”  Id.  The term “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant 
evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt [or liability] on a ground different from proof 
specific to the [case elements].”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 
519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)).  “‘Unfair prejudice’ within its context means an undue tendency to 
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”  
Id. at 251-52 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180 (construing the federal analogue to Va. R. 
Evid. 2:403)). 
 
Given the deference we accord to trial judges in balancing probative value with undue 
prejudice, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the 
probative nature of the in-court identification versus any risk of undue prejudice.  Caison’s 
identification of Walker as the robber was certainly probative.  And Walker’s argument of 
“undue prejudice” turns on the claim that Caison’s identification was not reliable.  As noted 
above, however, the reliability of the identification is to be tested by cross-examination and by 
 
16 
assessing the identification in the context of the overall evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. 
 
III. 
WALKER WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE OF  
 
 
USE OF A FIREARM IN THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY. 
 
 
 
Code § 18.2-53.1 prohibits the use or display of a firearm in the commission of certain 
felonies, including robbery.  The statute imposes “a mandatory minimum term of five years for a 
second or subsequent conviction under the provisions of this section.”  Id.  Walker challenges the 
imposition of a heightened punishment for a second or subsequent offense, noting that, here, all 
of the offenses occurred in a single event, the robbery of the Wells Fargo bank on May 23, 2016. 
 
We review a circuit court’s interpretation of statutes de novo.  Jones v. Williams, 280 Va. 
635, 638 (2010).  A penal statute, such as the one at issue, “must be strictly construed and any 
ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to its meaning must be resolved in [the defendant’s] favor.  
This does not mean, however, that [the defendant] is entitled to a favorable result based upon an 
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute.”  Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 
761 (1979). 
 
In Ansell we construed the second or subsequent offense provisions of this statute to 
apply when a defendant entered a simultaneous guilty plea to multiple charges.  In that case, the 
defendant pled guilty to two charges of robbery, one charge of attempted robbery, and three 
charges of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  Id. at 760-61.  All of the offenses 
occurred in a period of 45 minutes.  Id. at 761.  The circuit court sentenced the defendant to a 
recidivist punishment for a second or subsequent offense on two of the firearm counts.  Id.  The 
defendant objected to the enhanced punishment.  Id.  We affirmed the circuit court judgment, 
reasoning that “[t]o give the statute the construction sought by Ansell would enable an offender 
who used a firearm in the commission of a series of serious felonies over an extended period of 
 
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time prior to his apprehension to enjoy the status of a first offender as to each violation.”  Id. at 
763.  We concluded that such a “result would negate the legislative intent and would require an 
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute.”  Id.  We also noted that the purpose of the 
statute was to deter violent criminals rather than to reform them.  Id. 
 
The United States Supreme Court examined a comparably worded statute in Deal v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993), superseded by statute, First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22 (2018), as recognized in United States v. Davis, __ 
U.S. __, __, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 n.1 (2019).  That statute provided: 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses 
or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided 
for such crime of violence . . . , be sentenced to imprisonment for 
five years . . . . In the case of his second or subsequent conviction 
under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for twenty years. 
 
Id. at 130 (omissions in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. III)).  The 
phrase “second or subsequent conviction” at issue in Deal is the same phrasing used in Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  The Supreme Court explained that although “[a] judgment of conviction includes 
both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence,” in this context, “‘conviction’ refers to the 
finding of guilt by a judge or jury that necessarily precedes the entry of a final judgment of 
conviction.”  Id. at 132.  The Court reasoned that “if ‘conviction’ in § 924(c)(1) meant ‘judgment 
of conviction,’ the provision would be incoherent, prescribing that a sentence which has already 
been imposed (the defendant’s second or subsequent ‘conviction’) shall be 5 or 20 years longer 
than it was.”  Id.  We find this reasoning persuasive. 
 
 In 2018, Congress changed the federal statutory law so that, going forward, only a 
second § 924(c) violation committed “after a prior [§ 924(c)] conviction . . . has become final” 
triggers the 25-year minimum.  First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 
 
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5194, 5221-22 (2018).  In other words, Congress responded to the Supreme Court decision in 
Deal by altering the statute.  In contrast, the General Assembly has not elected to amend the 
recidivist provisions of Code § 18.2-53.1 that we construed in Ansell. 
 
Walker seeks to analogize his case to Batts v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 1 (1999), but 
we find the comparison inapposite.  In that case, the defendant had been convicted of a firearm 
offense in one proceeding, but the sentencing had been continued.  Id. at 5-6.  In a separate trial 
for robbery and use of a firearm, the Commonwealth sought to use the conviction in the first 
proceeding to enhance the punishment for the firearm charge in the second proceeding.  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals held that the jury should not have been instructed on the enhanced punishment 
provision of Code § 18.2-53.1 because – although a jury in a separate proceeding had returned a 
verdict of conviction – no final order had been entered.  Id. at 12.  The Court observed that “[a] 
final sentencing order was a necessary predicate to this action, and [the judge] had not entered 
one on the earlier firearm offense.”  Id.  The Court concluded that “[t]he jury’s verdict in that 
case was not a final conviction without the entry of the sentencing order and, therefore, could not 
be used to establish the predicate first offense.”  Id. (citing Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
518, 520 (1994)). 
 
The Court of Appeals in Batts did not distinguish Ansell.  The two cases, however, are 
not in conflict.  As the Court of Appeals explained below in the appeal of the present case, there 
exists “a key distinction between Batts and this case — Batts involved charges contested in 
separate prosecutions while all of the findings of guilt in this case arise from a single 
prosecution.”  Walker, 74 Va. App. at 497.  When a defendant faces separate prosecutions, there 
is a risk that the first conviction, which served as a predicate for an enhanced penalty in a second 
prosecution, might be set aside.  There would then be no first conviction.  Indeed, that actually 
 
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occurred in Batts, when the judge in the first proceeding set aside the jury’s verdict on the first 
firearm conviction.  Batts then stood convicted of a second conviction even though there was no 
first conviction.  Batts, 30 Va. App. at 9.  This risk, of a second offense without a predicate first 
offense, is not present when multiple charges of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony 
are tried in a single prosecution. 
 
Finally, Walker, responding to our statement in Ansell that this statute serves a deterrent 
purpose, argues that social science research demonstrates that recidivist statutes do not, in fact, 
serve a deterrent function.  Criminal punishment serves a number of purposes, including 
incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution.  Regardless of whether a recidivist statute actually 
serves a deterrent purpose, it remains the case that a person who robs more than one person is 
more blameworthy than a person who robs a single individual.  Each person Walker robbed 
experienced the terror in that moment of being robbed at the point of a gun, as well as whatever 
sequelae may flow from that event.  Whatever purpose or purposes the legislature may have had 
when it enacted the recidivism provisions of this statute — the statute does not say — the 
language of Code § 18.2-53.1, combined with the weight of our precedent, requires affirmance.  
Accordingly, Walker was properly convicted of use of a firearm as a second or subsequent 
offense. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia will be 
affirmed.