Title: Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1735 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ash Park, LLC , A Wisconsin Limited Liability 
Company, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alexander & Bishop, Ltd. , A Wisconsin 
Corporation, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 71 
Reported at: 317 Wis. 2d 772, 767 N.W.2d 614 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Atkinson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Valerie Bailey-Rihn, Jeffrey O. Davis, Freya K. Bowen, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Jeffrey O. 
Davis. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by R. George 
Burnett, Patrick M. Blaney, and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & 
Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by R. George Burnett. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson and 
the Wisconsin REALTORS® Association, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin REALTORS® Association. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1735  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV2832) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ash Park, LLC, A Wisconsin Limited Liability 
Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., A Wisconsin 
Corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Alexander & 
Bishop, Ltd., seeks review of a published decision of the court 
of appeals affirming the orders of the circuit court.1  After 
Alexander & Bishop breached a contract to purchase a parcel of 
real estate from Ash Park, LLC, the circuit court granted 
                                                 
1 Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2009 WI App 71, 
317 Wis. 2d 772, 767 N.W.2d 614, affirming orders of the circuit 
court for Brown County, William M. Atkinson, J.  
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
2 
 
summary judgment in favor of Ash Park and ordered specific 
performance of the contract.  It also imposed interest on the 
purchase price.   
¶2 
Alexander & Bishop asserts that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion under existing law by 
ordering specific performance without requiring Ash Park to 
demonstrate that a legal remedy would be inadequate and by 
failing to inquire whether performance of the contract would be 
possible.  In the alternative, Alexander & Bishop asks us to 
change Wisconsin law in one of three ways.  First, it contends 
that a seller of real estate should be required to demonstrate 
that a legal remedy would be inadequate as a prerequisite to an 
award of specific performance.  Second, it argues that ordering 
a judicial sale of the property and a money judgment for the 
deficiency should be a mandatory procedure to effectuate an 
award of specific performance.  Third, it asks us to require 
mitigation of damages when a seller asks for legal interest in 
addition to the equitable remedy of specific performance.   
¶3 
Finally, Alexander & Bishop asserts that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by imposing interest 
on the purchase price. 
¶4 
We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it ordered specific performance of 
this contract.  The contract provides that specific performance 
is an available remedy, and neither the contract nor Wisconsin 
law requires Ash Park to demonstrate that a legal remedy would 
be inadequate as a precondition to relief.  Further, although 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
3 
 
impossibility is a defense to specific performance, Alexander & 
Bishop failed to present evidence that performance would be 
impossible in the proceedings before the circuit court.   
¶5 
Additionally, 
we 
decline 
to 
alter 
longstanding 
Wisconsin law by imposing a requirement that a seller of real 
estate demonstrate the inadequacy of legal damages as a 
prerequisite to an order for specific performance.  Although a 
judicial sale and deficiency judgment may be a means of 
effectuating an award of specific performance, we conclude that 
this procedure is not mandatory.  Rather, it depends on the 
facts and equities of the case.  Because a duty to mitigate is 
contrary to an award of specific performance and would pose 
practical difficulties for the non-breaching seller, we decline 
to require mitigation when a seller asks for interest in 
addition to specific performance.2    
¶6 
Finally, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion by ordering interest on the 
purchase price.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.   
I 
¶7 
In 2007, Ash Park was the owner of a vacant parcel of 
real estate that was subject to a mortgage.  On April 6, 
                                                 
2 In the complaint, Ash Park made a claim for consequential 
damages including its costs of holding the property.  The 
circuit court made no determination regarding the nature and 
extent of any holding costs.  The issue of mitigation of those 
costs was not addressed by the circuit court and is not 
presented here. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
4 
 
Alexander & Bishop made an offer to purchase the parcel of real 
estate with the plan of developing it into a multi-tenant retail 
shopping center.   
¶8 
Ash Park submitted a counter-offer, which incorporated 
by reference most of the terms of Alexander & Bishop's offer to 
purchase.  It set the purchase price at $6.3 million, with the 
closing date to take place on or before December 14, 2007.  The 
counter-offer was accepted by Alexander & Bishop and is the 
contract that forms the basis of this lawsuit.   
¶9 
The parties' contract included a leasing contingency 
that gave Alexander & Bishop the option to terminate the 
contract if it was unable to secure an anchor tenant: 
This Offer is contingent upon Buyer negotiating a 
lease with Buyer's principal tenant . . . with terms 
and conditions acceptable to Buyer . . . on or before 
July 20, 2007.  If Buyer is unable to negotiate such 
lease by said date, this Offer may be terminated at 
the option of Buyer and all earnest money shall be 
returned to Buyer. . . .    
Upon timely notice, Alexander & Bishop also had the right to 
extend the lease contingency period: 
[T]he Buyer shall have the right to extend the lease 
contingency period for two (2) additional periods of 
two (2) calendar months, i.e. to September 20, 2007 
and November 20, 2007, provided Buyer (1) provides 
written notice to Seller of its intent to exercise 
such extension prior to the expiration of the lease 
contingency period and (2) pays to Seller, with its 
notice 
of 
exercise, 
a 
non-refundable 
extension 
fee . . .  of $25,000 for each extension period.  The 
non-refundable extension fee shall be non-refundable 
but applicable to the purchase price at closing.   
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
5 
 
The contract specified that all contingencies would be waived if 
not invoked by July 20, 2007. 
¶10 The contract also included a default clause, which 
enumerated remedies in the event of a breach.  Among other 
remedies, 
the 
contract 
explicitly 
provided 
for 
specific 
performance as a remedy for "material failure to perform any 
obligations under this Offer": 
Seller and Buyer each have the legal duty to use good 
faith and due diligence in completing the terms and 
conditions of this Offer.  A material failure to 
perform any obligation under this Offer is a default 
which may subject the defaulting party to liability 
for damages or other legal remedies.   
If Buyer defaults, Seller may: 
(1) sue for specific performance and request the 
earnest money as partial payment of the purchase 
price; or 
(2) terminate the Offer and have the option to [pursue 
liquidated or actual damages.] 
If Seller defaults, Buyer may: 
(1) sue for specific performance; or 
(2) terminate the Offer and request the return of the 
earnest money, sue for actual damages, or both. 
In addition, the Parties may seek any other remedies 
available in law or equity.   
The Parties understand that the availability of any 
judicial remedy will depend upon the circumstances of 
the situation and the discretion of the courts. . . .   
¶11 Alexander & Bishop had not secured an anchor tenant by 
July 20, 2007, and it exercised its option to terminate the 
contract.  However, on August 1, the parties signed an 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
6 
 
"Agreement to Reinstate Vacant Land Offer to Purchase," which 
stated that "the parties desire to reinstate the Offer on its 
original terms, except as specifically set forth herein[.]"  It 
provided that upon the execution of the agreement by both 
parties "and the deposit by the Buyer [of] the Extension Fee 
with the Escrow Agent, the Offer shall be fully reinstated in 
accordance with its terms[.]"   
¶12 The 
reinstatement 
agreement 
did 
not 
alter 
the 
extension dates, the closing date, or the terms of the lease 
contingency.  Thus, until the next extension deadline, Alexander 
& Bishop retained two options: (1) extend the lease contingency 
for an additional period of two months, or (2) terminate the 
contract.  Alexander & Bishop did not exercise either one of 
these options.  As a result, the contract became binding on 
September 20.   
¶13 On October 9, however, Alexander & Bishop informed Ash 
Park that its prospective anchor tenant was not interested in 
immediately leasing the property.  The parties discussed 
amending 
their 
agreement, 
but 
their 
negotiations 
were 
unsuccessful.   
¶14 Ash Park prepared for the December 14 closing, but the 
closing did not take place.  Shortly thereafter, Ash Park filed 
a complaint for breach of contract, demanding "judgment from and 
against the Defendant for specific performance or damages at 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
7 
 
law, at the election of [Ash Park], in accordance with the terms 
of the parties' Purchase and Sale Contract."3   
¶15 In response to Ash Park's motion for summary judgment, 
Alexander & Bishop asserted that there was no breach of contract 
because the contract had not been reinstated.4  It acknowledged 
that specific performance was an available remedy that "rests in 
the discretion of the court," but it contended that specific 
performance "only comes into play when damages that could be had 
at law are an inadequate remedy."  Alexander & Bishop argued 
that Ash Park's damages "are solely economic and are measurable 
upon sale of the property after [Ash Park] mitigates its 
damages."   
¶16 Further, Alexander & Bishop contended that Ash Park 
had elected the remedy of liquidated damages consisting of 
$50,000 in earnest money and that such a remedy was adequate.  
It contended that "[i]t would be inconsistent [for Ash Park] to 
retain the earnest money and sue for specific performance."  
Alexander & Bishop did not argue that specific performance was 
impossible because it could not pay the purchase price. 
                                                 
3 Ash Park also demanded damages arising subsequent to the 
breach, including "holding costs, taxes, interest, maintenance, 
commissions, 
insurance, 
penalties 
and 
opportunity 
costs, 
together with statutory costs and disbursements of this action." 
4 Specifically, Alexander & Bishop argued that because it 
had 
failed 
to 
deposit 
the 
$25,000 
called 
for 
in 
the 
reinstatement agreement, the contract had not been reinstated.  
In addition, it asserted that Ash Park had failed to provide 
merchantable title and failed to disclose material adverse 
conditions of the property. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
8 
 
¶17 After arguments, the circuit court determined that the 
contract had been reinstated and that Alexander & Bishop had 
breached the contract.5  The court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Ash Park and ordered the parties to specifically 
perform the contract.  It reasoned that the property was unique, 
that specific performance was the preferred remedy under 
Wisconsin law, and that under the terms of the contract the 
parties had bargained for this remedy: 
This is a unique piece of property.  I think specific 
performance is actually preferred given the citations 
[to Wisconsin cases involving land transactions].  I 
agree in most cases or many cases it's not asked for 
because often the party against who it's attempted to 
be enforced doesn't have the financial ability or at 
least known ability to go through with it. . . . [B]ut 
that doesn't mean specific performance shouldn't be 
used by the courts just because it's not [used] in 
certain situations.  The parties are entitled to what 
they contracted for, and they contracted for the 
purchase of this property.   
¶18 After this oral decision, Ash Park asked the circuit 
court to include an award of interest in its order as well as a 
deadline for performance.  Alexander & Bishop objected.  On 
April 9, 2008, the court entered an order providing "that 
plaintiff shall have judgment from and against the defendant for 
specific performance of the parties' Purchase and Sale Contract 
                                                 
5 At the court of appeals, Alexander & Bishop continued to 
assert that it did not breach the contract.  The court affirmed 
the circuit court's decision.  Alexander & Bishop did not 
include this issue in its petition for review.  At oral 
argument, Alexander & Bishop's counsel confirmed: "For purposes 
of this appeal before the court, we do not contest that there 
has been a breach of this contract." 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
9 
 
dated April 20, 2007, and the parties shall take such actions as 
are necessary to complete the transaction."  The order contained 
neither an award of interest nor a deadline for performance. 
 ¶19 Shortly thereafter, Ash Park filed various motions for 
the appointment of a receiver and for contempt.  It asserted 
that "[i]t is clear from the correspondence, facts, and 
arguments made by counsel that Alexander & Bishop has no 
intention of complying with this Court's Order until they are 
forced to do so."   
¶20 Alexander & Bishop countered that Ash Park was not 
entitled to the appointment of a receiver and that it would be 
"pointless" because a receiver "would not be able to close any 
faster than [Alexander & Bishop].  A receiver would not be able 
to procure financing without an anchor tenant and, therefore, 
would not be able to carry the judgment into effect."   
¶21 Further, it argued that contempt proceedings were 
inappropriate because the order contained no deadline for 
performance and because Ash Park had not demonstrated that 
Alexander & Bishop's failure to perform was "intentional."  
Alexander & Bishop asserted that "no developer can obtain 
financing for a shopping mall development as planned here, 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
10 
 
without a signed long-term anchor tenant," and "without a 
tenant, [Alexander & Bishop] cannot close."6   
¶22 On 
May 
22, 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
moved 
for 
reconsideration of the judgment for specific performance.  In 
the alternative, it moved for relief from the judgment.7  
¶23 The court heard several motions on May 30, June 27, 
and July 21.  Counsel for Ash Park argued: "The practical 
problem is that there is no incentive for the defendant to abide 
by or adhere to this Court's order as current circumstances 
presently exist" unless the court imposed interest, appointed a 
receiver, or ordered contempt sanctions.  Counsel for Alexander 
& Bishop agreed that interest might be appropriate, but 
disagreed about the amount: "I would have to concede that under 
Estreen v. Bluhm[8] there is some authority to impose some 
incentives [for performing], but I would disagree that the 12 
                                                 
6 After we accepted the petition for review, Ash Park asked 
this court to require Alexander & Bishop to post a bond pending 
our decision on the merits of the case.  It claimed that during 
the proceedings in the circuit court, Alexander & Bishop 
deferred 23 notes receivable totaling more than $12 million.  It 
asserted that Alexander & Bishop was shuffling its assets in 
order to ensure insolvency and to avoid the order for specific 
performance.  Alexander & Bishop responded that there was no 
evidence that it attempted to avoid closing on the sale through 
any fraudulent transfers.  Instead, it asserted that it had 
reclassified the assets in response to an IRS audit. 
7 Alexander & Bishop's motions for reconsideration and 
relief from judgment were premised on their assertion that Ash 
Park had failed to reveal relevant facts.  The circuit court 
rejected these arguments, see infra, ¶25, and the issues raised 
in the motions are not before this court. 
8 79 Wis. 2d 142, 255 N.W.2d 473 (1977). 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
11 
 
percent money judgment rate applies because this is not a money 
judgment."   
¶24 The court determined that it would impose interest, 
but it was initially undecided about the rate.  It explained its 
reasoning to Alexander & Bishop: "I've got to give some 
incentive. . . . There has got to be some incentive to get this 
resolved, and if [Ash Park is] sitting with all the holding 
costs," there is no incentive for Alexander & Bishop to 
specifically perform.  "[Ash Park has] to believe that, you 
know, defendant wakes up in the morning with a desire to get 
this transaction completed and the Court order complied with."   
¶25 On July 21, the circuit court orally denied Alexander 
& Bishop's motions for reconsideration and for relief from 
judgment.  The court held the motion for receivership in 
abeyance as Alexander & Bishop negotiated with a potential 
tenant: "I'm hesitant to grant [the motion to appoint a 
receiver], as I indicated in the past, because I think we'll 
more likely get this matter resolved faster through the efforts 
of the defendants rather than having a receiver come in."9 
¶26 On July 21, the court ordered interest starting at a 
rate of 5 percent, which would jump to a rate of 7.5 percent and 
increase one-half percent each month until the date of closing.  
                                                 
9 Ultimately, Ash Park filed four separate motions for 
contempt.  The record does not reflect whether the circuit court 
ruled on these motions.  However, during oral argument in this 
court, counsel for Ash Park stated: "Contempt is not before this 
court. . . . I filed four motions for contempt, and I lost every 
one of them." 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
12 
 
The court explained: "Now, I realize that that can't go on 
forever.  And if at some point counsel wants to then get relief 
from that order, they can file a motion and explain to me that 
it's been one month or two months or three months and it's 
become an unreasonable rate." 
¶27 On August 18, however, the court entered an order 
stating that it had "reconsidered the issue of appropriate 
interest rates."  It "vacate[d] the oral decision placed upon 
the record on July 21, 2008," and instead imposed 5 percent 
prejudgment interest and 12 percent postjudgment interest on the 
purchase price.  Although the circuit court order indicated that 
Ash Park had referenced Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8) (2007-08)10 when 
arguing for the imposition of interest, the circuit court did 
not cite to any statute as authority when it ordered the 
interest.  The order specified that interest would stop accruing 
on the date of closing.   
¶28 The 
court 
further 
explained 
that 
"[Alexander 
& 
Bishop's] most compelling argument against the imposition of 
interest was that the plaintiff is still owner of the property 
and receives the benefits of ownership post-closing date and 
post-judgment date."  Yet, it concluded that there was no 
beneficial use of the property:  
                                                 
10 Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8) provides that "every execution 
upon a judgment for the recovery of money shall direct the 
collection of interest at the rate of 12% per year[.]"  All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
13 
 
It appears from all statements made by counsel 
that . . . the only benefit of holding the property 
would be appreciation.  Since the property is being 
held without further activity pending defendant's 
compliance 
with 
its 
contractual 
obligation, 
any 
appreciation of the market value would accrue to the 
defendant.  The plaintiff could rent the land and 
receive rent proceeds but the type of development in 
the 
area 
does 
not 
appear 
feasible 
without 
improvements.  It makes no sense for the plaintiff to 
improve the property pending closing.11   
¶29 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by 
ordering specific performance and interest.  Ash Park, LLC v. 
Alexander 
& Bishop, Ltd., 2009 WI App 71, ¶¶6-11, 317 
Wis. 2d 772, 767 N.W.2d 614.  Further, it rejected Alexander & 
Bishop's argument that when specific performance is ordered in 
favor of a seller, "the actual remedy is an order for judicial 
sale" and deficiency judgment.  Id., ¶12.   
¶30 In its petition for review, Alexander & Bishop 
presented a single issue: "May a seller of real estate seek both 
specific performance, as well as interest on the purchase price 
without a requirement that it mitigate damages?"  Alexander & 
                                                 
11 Alexander & Bishop appealed this order on August 25, 
2008.  On November 7, while the appeal was pending, the circuit 
court ordered Alexander & Bishop to begin paying interest 
immediately and to make quarterly payments of postjudgment 
interest.  Alexander & Bishop separately appealed the November 7 
order.  The court of appeals reversed in an unpublished per 
curiam dated June 2, 2009, concluding that the circuit court 
"did not have jurisdiction" to enter the order while the appeal 
was pending at the court of appeals.  Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander 
& Bishop, Ltd., No. 2009AP62-FT, unpublished slip op. ¶6 (Wis. 
Ct. App. June 2, 2009).  Ash Park did not petition for review of 
that decision. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
14 
 
Bishop 
acknowledged 
that 
under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
specific 
performance is an available remedy for a seller of land after 
the buyer's breach.  Yet, Alexander & Bishop asserted: "This 
case presents the Court with an opportunity to examine and 
reshape 
the 
analytical 
framework 
governing 
the 
remedies 
available to a seller of real estate where the purchaser will 
not or, as in this case, cannot perform."12   
II 
¶31 Alexander & Bishop's petition for review appeared to 
recognize that the circuit court had discretion to award 
specific performance to a seller of real estate under current 
law, but it asserted that the analytical framework of Wisconsin 
law should be "reshaped."  Nevertheless, in this court, 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
now 
contends 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by ordering specific 
performance here.  Additionally, it asserts that the court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by ordering interest at the 
statutory rate.   
¶32 The decision to grant or deny the equitable remedy of 
specific performance is within the discretion of the circuit 
court. 
 
Anderson 
v. 
Onsager, 
155 
Wis. 2d 504, 
513, 
455 
N.W.2d 885 (1990).  Likewise, in a case of equity, the allowance 
                                                 
12 When we granted the petition for review, we asked the 
parties to address the procedure that should accompany an order 
for 
specific 
performance 
by 
a 
buyer 
in 
a 
real 
estate 
transaction.  The parties' arguments and proposals are subsumed 
in our discussion below.   
 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
15 
 
of interest is a matter within the circuit court's discretion.  
Estreen v. Bluhm, 79 Wis. 2d 142, 156, 255 N.W.2d 473 (1977).  A 
reviewing court will affirm the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion 
unless 
it 
was 
erroneous. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it makes an error of law 
or neglects to base its decision upon the facts of the record.  
State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶15, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 
N.W.2d 629. 
¶33 Whether 
we 
should 
alter 
Wisconsin 
jurisprudence 
presents a question of law.  We decide questions of law 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.    
¶34 We begin by setting forth the several remedies 
available to a seller of real estate upon the buyer's breach.  
Then 
we 
determine 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion by awarding specific performance.  
Next, we discuss Alexander & Bishop's proposals for altering the 
analytical framework governing the remedies available to a 
seller of real estate.  Finally, we determine whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by ordering 
interest on the purchase price. 
III. Remedies 
¶35 When a buyer breaches a contract, several different 
remedies may be available to the seller.  2 Contract Law in 
Wisconsin §§ 13.1, 13.4 (3d ed. 2007).  The seller may seek 
actual damages, often measured as the difference between the 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
16 
 
contract price and the value of the property.13  Id., § 13.6; see 
also 25 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 
§ 66:80 at 8-9 (4th ed. 2002).  The seller may select liquidated 
damages——typically, retention of earnest money.  2 Contract Law 
in Wisconsin, supra, §§ 13.36, 13.62.  Finally, the seller may 
seek specific performance of the contract.  Id. § 13.53.  
¶36 Actual damages and liquidated damages are considered 
damages 
at 
law——a 
legal 
remedy. 
 
By 
contrast, 
specific 
performance 
is 
an 
equitable 
remedy 
that 
seeks 
to 
award 
performance of the contract as specifically agreed.  Id. 
§ 13.53.  The purpose of specific performance is to order the 
breaching party to do that which it agreed to do in the 
contract.  Id.   
¶37 Here, 
the 
parties' 
contract 
provided 
specific 
performance as one of several remedies Ash Park could seek in 
the event of Alexander & Bishop's breach.14  When a contract 
specifies remedies available for breach of contract, the 
intention 
of 
the 
parties 
generally 
governs. 
 
Moritz 
v. 
Broadfoot, 
35 
Wis. 2d 343, 347-48, 151 N.W.2d 142 (1967).  
                                                 
13 The seller may sell the property to a third-party buyer 
and seek a money judgment for the deficiency against the 
breaching buyer.  Alternatively, the seller may choose to keep 
the property and seek the difference between the contract price 
and the fair market value of the property.  When a seller seeks 
damages for breach of contract, the injured party has a duty to 
use reasonable means to mitigate damages.  2 Contract Law in 
Wisconsin § 13.30 (3d ed. 2007).  
14 The contract listed actual damages, retention of the 
earnest money, specific performance, and "any other remedies 
available in law or equity" as remedies available to the seller. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
17 
 
Additionally, under Wisconsin common law, specific performance 
is a remedy available to a seller of real estate.  See, e.g., 
Heins v. Thompson & Flieth Lumber Co., 165 Wis. 563, 571, 163 
N.W. 173 (1917); see also Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 511-12 
(reaffirming the rule of Heins).   
¶38 The availability of specific performance as a remedy 
does not mean that the court will automatically grant specific 
performance upon a seller's request.  Rather, as an equitable 
remedy, an award of specific performance is discretionary.  
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 513.  The fairness of ordering specific 
performance depends on the facts and equities of the individual 
case before the circuit court and will vary from case to case.15   
¶39 Before ordering specific performance, the court must 
be satisfied that the claim is fair, just, reasonable, and not 
the 
product 
of 
an 
unconscionable 
or 
oppressive 
bargain.  
Contract Law in Wisconsin, supra, § 13.61 (citing McKinnon v. 
Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 619, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968)); see also 
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 512.  Further, impossibility of 
performance is a defense to specific performance: "[W]here it 
would be impossible for a party to perform the contract, 
                                                 
15 To the extent that Heins implied that a circuit court 
lacks discretion to determine whether specific performance is an 
available remedy, this holding was modified by Anderson: "We do 
not interpret Heins or any of its progeny to deprive the trial 
court of discretion in determining whether or not to grant 
specific performance on a contract for the conveyance of real 
estate."  Anderson v. Onsager, 155 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 455 
N.W.2d 885 (1990).   
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
18 
 
specific performance will not be granted."16  Anderson, 155 
Wis. 2d at 512. 
IV. Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion 
¶40 Alexander & Bishop contends that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to "hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether specific performance 
was appropriate," either because the seller might be able to 
sell the property to someone else, or because the buyer could 
demonstrate that it was unable to close.  In essence, this 
argument charges the circuit court with two discrete errors.  
First, Alexander & Bishop asserts that the circuit court erred 
by not requiring Ash Park to demonstrate that it had no adequate 
remedy at law.  Second, it asserts that the circuit court erred 
by failing to determine whether performance of the contract was 
"impossible."  We address each argument in turn.   
A 
¶41 In some contexts, specific performance is unavailable 
where legal damages are adequate to remedy the breach.  See, 
e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359 (1981); 25 
Williston, supra, § 67:1 at 184 ("[T]he general rule defining 
the instances where specific performance will be granted may be 
stated as follows: where damages are an inadequate remedy and 
the nature of the contract is such that specific enforcement of 
                                                 
16 Williston explains that "equity will not decree that the 
defendant shall do what is clearly beyond its power."  25 Samuel 
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 67:12 at 223 
(4th ed. 2002).  
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
19 
 
it will not be impossible or involve too great practical 
difficulties . . . equity will grant a decree of specific 
performance."); Contract Law in Wisconsin, supra, § 13.53.; 
Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 168, 31 N.W.2d 170 
(1948).   
¶42 In the context of contracts for land, however, 
Wisconsin law does not require a seller to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of a remedy at law as a prerequisite to an award of 
specific performance.  Wisconsin statutes provide that "specific 
performance of contract or covenant" is an available remedy for 
"any person having an interest in real property . . . unless the 
use 
of 
a 
remedy 
is 
denied 
in 
a 
specific 
situation."  
Wis. Stat. § 840.03(1)(f). 
¶43 Further, 
Wisconsin courts have not restricted a 
seller's remedy of specific performance to cases in which a 
remedy at law is inadequate.  In Heins, the seller of a parcel 
of land sought specific performance, and this court determined 
that specific performance was an available remedy.  165 Wis. at 
571.  Similarly, in Taft v. Reddy, 191 Wis. 144, 150, 210 N.W. 
364 (1926), this court concluded that "the [land contract] 
vendor's right to specific performance is established beyond 
question[.]"  See also Yee v. Giuffre, 176 Wis. 2d 189, 194 n.3, 
499 N.W.2d 926 (Ct. App. 1993).  None of these cases requires 
the seller to demonstrate that a legal remedy would be 
inadequate. 
¶44 Alexander & Bishop cites Henrikson v. Henrikson, 143 
Wis. 314, 127 N.W. 962 (1910), for the proposition that specific 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
20 
 
performance is unavailable as a remedy when the buyer breaches a 
contract to purchase land and there is an adequate remedy at 
law.  Henrikson does not support Alexander & Bishop's argument.  
In that case, there was no valid and enforceable contract to 
transfer land.  Rather, the agreement at issue was an oral 
contract that did not satisfy the statute of frauds.  Id. at 
317.  Henrikson does not address the remedies available to a 
seller when the buyer breaches an enforceable contract for the 
sale of land. 
¶45 Wisconsin law is consistent with the general rule 
across 
jurisdictions. 
 
Courts 
have 
traditionally 
awarded 
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land without 
a prerequisite that the non-breaching party demonstrate that 
legal damages would be inadequate.  Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 360 cmt. e (1981) ("Contracts for the sale of land 
have traditionally been accorded a special place in the law of 
specific 
performance. . . . [T]he 
seller 
who 
has 
not 
yet 
conveyed is generally granted specific performance on breach by 
the buyer."); Edward Yorio, Contract Enforcement: Specific 
Performance and Injunctions 281 (1989) ("Traditionally, when a 
buyer reneged on a promise to purchase realty, specific 
performance was almost universally available to remedy the 
breach.").  
¶46 Although Ash Park does contend that damages at law 
would be an inadequate remedy,17 we need not decide this factual 
                                                 
17 See discussion infra, ¶¶67-69. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
21 
 
question here.  We conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
by 
ordering 
specific 
performance without requiring Ash Park to demonstrate that a 
remedy at law would be inadequate. 
B 
¶47 We turn to Alexander & Bishop's second argument that 
performance of the contract would be impossible.  Wisconsin law 
recognizes impossibility as a defense to specific performance.  
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 512-13.  "The defense of impossibility 
rests on the common-sense principle that a court of equity will 
not order an impossible act."  Yorio, supra, § 5.5 at 112.   
¶48 In its arguments to this court, Alexander & Bishop 
asserts that it is "impossible" for it to perform the contract: 
"[T]he anchor tenant never committed which made it impossible 
for Alexander & Bishop to get financing and close on the deal."   
¶49 However, 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
never 
asserted 
impossibility in the circuit court as a defense to specific 
performance——either in opposition to Ash Park's motion for 
summary judgment or in its motion for reconsideration or relief 
from judgment.18  Further, in its oral ruling granting specific 
                                                 
18 Further, Alexander & Bishop did not assert that the 
contract 
was 
unfair, 
unjust, 
or 
unreasonable, 
or 
that 
performance of the contract would be oppressive.  Rather, it 
asserted that there was no breach of contract and even if there 
was, Ash Park had elected liquidated damages as a remedy by 
retaining the earnest money.  It contended that it would be 
"inconsistent" to allow Ash Park to retain the earnest money and 
also sue for specific performance.  But see Moritz v. Broadfoot, 
35 Wis. 2d 343, 349-50, 151 N.W.2d 142 (1967). 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
22 
 
performance, the circuit court appeared to recognize that the 
financial inability of a buyer could preclude such an award.19  
Yet, Alexander & Bishop never asked the circuit court to 
determine whether it would be "impossible" for Alexander & 
Bishop to perform.   
¶50 As a result, the circuit court has not made any 
factual findings about whether performance would be impossible, 
and there is no finding of fact for this court to review.  "[W]e 
will not consider factual matters raised for the first time on 
appeal; our review is confined to the facts in the record before 
the trial court at the time it decided the motion for summary 
judgment."  Coopman v. State Farm, 179 Wis. 2d 548, 556, 508 
N.W.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Lind v. Lund, 266 Wis. 232, 
237, 63 N.W.2d 313 (1954). 
¶51 Alexander & Bishop's assertion that the circuit court 
should have held a hearing at its own initiative ignores a 
litigant's responsibility to develop its case in the circuit 
court and to raise arguments on its own behalf.  Here, Alexander 
& Bishop had the opportunity to raise defenses and to request an 
evidentiary hearing, but it failed to do so.  
¶52 It was not until months after the award of specific 
performance 
when 
faced 
with 
the 
possibility 
of 
contempt 
sanctions that Alexander & Bishop first contended that it did 
                                                 
19 The court stated: "[I]n most cases or many cases 
[specific performance is] not asked for because often the party 
against who it's attempted to be enforced doesn't have the 
financial ability or at least known ability to go through with 
it[.]" 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
23 
 
not have the financial ability to perform the contract.  
Alexander & Bishop asserted that "no developer can obtain 
financing for a shopping mall development as planned here, 
without a signed long-term anchor tenant."  Thus, it argued, 
contempt sanctions should not be imposed because "without a 
tenant, [Alexander & Bishop] cannot close."    
¶53 Even if Alexander & Bishop's assertion that it cannot 
obtain financing for a shopping mall development without an 
anchor tenant is true——a question of fact we do not decide on 
appeal——it does not necessarily follow that it is impossible for 
Alexander & Bishop to specifically perform this contract.  The 
order for specific performance does not require Alexander & 
Bishop to finance and develop a shopping mall, which could 
indeed require a large investment of capital.  Rather, the order 
requires that it purchase only this parcel of vacant land.  
¶54 Without making a viable argument identifying how the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, Alexander & 
Bishop essentially asks us to reevaluate the facts and equities 
in this case.  We decline to usurp the equitable function of the 
circuit court. 
¶55 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it awarded specific performance to 
Ash Park.  The court recognized that specific performance was a 
remedy that was expressly included in the parties' contract.  
Further, it recognized that specific performance is also an 
available remedy under the common law.  If later proven, 
Alexander & Bishop's alleged financial inability to perform may 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
24 
 
be cause for the circuit court to modify its judgment.20  
However, Alexander & Bishop's bare allegations do not provide a 
basis for this court to conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion. 
V. Proposed Changes to Wisconsin Law 
¶56 Having determined that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion under current Wisconsin law, 
we examine next Alexander & Bishop's various proposals for 
changing the law.  Alexander & Bishop has urged us to "tweak" 
current law in one of three ways.   
¶57 Alexander & Bishop's first proposal asks us to 
harmonize the law of remedies available to a seller of real 
estate with the remedies available to a seller of goods by 
declaring that specific performance may not be ordered when 
there is an adequate remedy at law.  This proposal would 
preclude a circuit court from ordering specific performance in 
the first instance unless the court determined that money 
damages were inadequate.  
¶58 Alexander & Bishop's second and third proposals would 
permit the court to order specific performance even without 
concluding that money damages were inadequate.  However, these 
proposals would alter the administration or enforcement of the 
remedy of specific performance once ordered.  Alexander & Bishop 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin statutes provide that a party make seek relief 
from a judgment or order under some circumstances, including 
when "[i]t is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 806.07(g). 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
25 
 
encourages us to adopt a rule requiring a mandatory judicial 
sale and money judgment for any deficiency once specific 
performance has been ordered and the buyer cannot or will not 
pay.  In the alternative, it asks us to hold that a seller who 
is awarded interest in addition to specific performance has a 
duty to mitigate its damages by attempting to resell the 
property.   
¶59 All three proposals would affect the viability and 
meaningfulness of specific performance as a remedy for sellers 
of real estate under Wisconsin law.  We address each proposal in 
turn. 
A 
¶60 Alexander & Bishop asserts that we should harmonize 
the remedies for a buyer's breach of a real estate contract with 
the remedies available for a buyer's breach of a contract for 
goods.21  Typically, specific performance will not be decreed as 
a seller's remedy for breach of a contract to sell personal 
property unless a remedy at law is inadequate.  Welch v. 
Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 168, 31 N.W.2d 170 (1948). 
¶61 In support, it offers the Uniform Land Transactions 
Act, which was drafted in 1975.  The uniform act does not 
recognize the remedy of specific performance for a seller of 
                                                 
21 The Uniform Commercial Code, which covers the sale of 
goods, does not permit specific performance as a seller's remedy 
when legal damages would be an adequate remedy.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 402.716; see also Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 
168, 31 N.W.2d 170 (1948). 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
26 
 
real estate and does not permit a seller to bring an action for 
the price under most circumstances.22   
¶62 In the 35 years since it was drafted, no state has 
adopted the Uniform Land Transactions Act.23  Ronald Benton 
Brown, Whatever Happened to the Uniform Land Transactions Act?, 
20 Nova L. Rev. 1017, 1018 (1996).  Furthermore, the uniform act 
was withdrawn by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws 
in 1990.  Id.  We are not persuaded that we should alter our 
longstanding practices by adopting an act that has since been 
withdrawn by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws.   
¶63 We 
conclude 
that 
granting 
or 
denying 
specific 
performance as a remedy is best left to the sound discretion of 
the circuit court on a case-by-case basis.  In exercising its 
discretion, a circuit court may consider whether a remedy at law 
would be adequate to remedy a buyer's breach.  If the court 
determines that legal damages are perfectly adequate, the court 
may in its discretion choose to award damages at law rather than 
specific performance.  Yet, because this decision is best made 
                                                 
22 The comments to the Uniform Land Transactions Act explain 
that the act "abandons the existing rule under which a seller of 
a freehold interest is automatically entitled to specific 
performance. . . . [T]his section gives the seller the right to 
the price of the real estate only where it is not resaleable at 
a reasonable price with reasonable effort.  The action for the 
price is not for specific performance and is not an action 'in 
equity.'"  Uniform Land Transactions Act § 2-506 cmt. 1 (1975).  
23 But see Kuhn v. Spatial Design, Inc., 585 A.2d 967, 971 
(N.J. Super. 1991); Lawson v. Menefee, 132 S.W.3d 890 (Ky. App. 
2004). 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
27 
 
on the facts and equities of each individual case, we decline to 
adopt the rule proposed by Alexander & Bishop.    
B 
¶64 We turn next to Alexander & Bishop's second proposal.  
It asks us to graft onto the doctrine of specific performance a 
mandatory procedure for turning an equitable order into a 
judgment for money by requiring a judicial sale and money 
judgment for any deficiency.24  Alexander & Bishop asserts that 
an order for specific performance should be nothing more than a 
judgment for the purchase price, and that the procedure outlined 
above would be more equitable for both parties. 
¶65 We decline to adopt Alexander & Bishop's proposal to 
require this procedure for three reasons.  First, the proposal 
would collapse two distinct remedies——specific performance and 
actual legal damages——into one, removing for all practical 
purposes specific performance from the list of available 
remedies to a seller.   
                                                 
24 In addition, Alexander & Bishop asserts that the court 
should require a redemption period before the judicial sale.  It 
explains that a redemption period would give the buyer the 
ability to close and obtain the property before it was sold to a 
third party.   
Alexander & Bishop's request for a redemption period is 
somewhat ironic, given the facts of this case.  Although Ash 
Park urged the circuit court to include a deadline for 
performance in its order for specific performance, Alexander & 
Bishop objected to the inclusion of any deadlines.  Further, 
Alexander & Bishop has retained the opportunity to "redeem" the 
property throughout the pendency of this appeal. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
28 
 
¶66 Alexander & Bishop explains that "a monetary judgment 
would be entered . . . , but the judgment would not be for the 
full purchase price[.]"  Rather, the buyer "would be responsible 
for the seller's damages, but not more."  Yet, if specific 
performance meant nothing other than a judicial sale and 
deficiency judgment, it would not differ from a judgment for 
actual damages.   
¶67 There may be reasons, however, that a seller might 
prefer specific performance to actual damages.  In this case, 
for example, Ash Park explained that there is a mortgage on the 
property and that Ash Park would be required to satisfy the 
mortgage before it could transfer the title to a third-party 
purchaser at a judicial sale. 
¶68 At oral argument, counsel for Ash Park asserted: "If 
my client sells the property at a judicial sale, he courts 
financial ruin[.]"  He argued that if the property was sold for 
a sum of money that was less than the existing mortgage, his 
client would have to make up the difference.   
¶69 Additionally, a mandatory judicial sale would require 
the seller to relinquish its interest in the property to a third 
party before it could pursue a deficiency judgment against the 
buyer.  If the property sold for less than its actual value, the 
seller would be deprived of both the property and its fair 
market value until it could execute its judgment for the 
deficiency against the breaching buyer.  Alexander & Bishop's 
proposal to collapse actual damages and specific performance 
into one remedy would make the particular benefits of specific 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
29 
 
performance unavailable to an innocent seller after the buyer's 
breach.25   
¶70 The second reason we decline to adopt Alexander & 
Bishop's proposal is that it would require us to rewrite the 
parties' contract.  Here, the parties' bargain included the 
remedy 
of 
specific 
performance 
under 
the 
appropriate 
circumstances.  When a contract specifies remedies available in 
the event of a breach, the intention of the parties generally 
governs.  Moritz, 35 Wis. 2d at 348.   
¶71 Yet, as discussed above, Alexander & Bishop's proposal 
would collapse the remedies of legal damages and specific 
performance, resulting in specific performance in name only.  It 
would render meaningless the parties' agreement that specific 
performance 
is 
an 
available 
remedy 
in 
the 
appropriate 
circumstances.  We decline to rewrite this contract by reducing 
the number or availability of bargained-for remedies.   
¶72 The third reason that we do not accept Alexander & 
Bishop's proposal to mandate a judicial sale is that a mandatory 
procedure is antithetical to the concept of equitable relief.  
                                                 
25 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts identifies several 
additional 
reasons 
that 
a 
seller 
might 
prefer 
specific 
performance over legal damages.  First, the value of land is to 
some extent speculative.  It may be difficult for a seller to 
prove with reasonable certainty the difference between the 
contract price and the market price of the land.  Restatement 2d 
Contracts § 360 cmt. e (1981).  Second, the land may not be 
immediately convertible into money and the seller may be 
deprived of funds with which the seller could have made other 
investments.  Id.  Third, the existence of the contract, even if 
broken by the buyer, operates as a clog on saleability so that 
it may be difficult to find a purchaser at a fair price.  Id. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
30 
 
In contrast to remedies at law, a defining characteristic of an 
equitable remedy is that it is flexible and adaptable to the 
circumstances presented in a particular case.   
¶73 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence explains that "the 
court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping 
it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the 
complex relations of all the parties."  1 John Norton Pomeroy, A 
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 109 at 141 (5th ed. 1941).  
Further, "equitable remedies also differ from the legal ones in 
the manner of their administration," which should be "natural 
and flexible."  Id. § 113 at 150.    
¶74 Wisconsin cases have recognized that once a court has 
determined that equitable relief is appropriate, it has wide 
latitude to fashion the remedy based on the equities of the 
case.  See Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 22 
Wis. 2d 525, 531-32, 126 N.W.2d 206 (1964); American Medical 
Servs. Inc. v. Mutual Fed. Savings & Loan, 52 Wis. 2d 198, 205, 
188 N.W.2d 529 (1971) ("The court of equity has always had a 
traditional power to adapt its remedies to the exigencies and 
the needs of the case; that was one of the great virtues and 
reasons for the existence of courts of equity.").  Alexander & 
Bishop's proposal would denude specific performance of the 
adaptability that allows the circuit court to fashion a remedy 
to the facts and equities of a particular case.   
¶75 Alexander & Bishop also contends that a circuit court 
should refrain from enforcing an order for specific performance 
through 
contempt 
proceedings. 
 
It 
asserts 
that 
contempt 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
31 
 
sanctions would be inequitable when the required performance 
involves the payment of money.  It argues that the public policy 
against debtors' prisons militates against contempt as a 
mechanism of enforcement. 
¶76 Contempt proceedings are a typical means of enforcing 
an equitable order for specific performance.26  See Yorio, supra, 
§ 4.5.2 at 96 ("Under American law, the ultimate force of an 
equitable decree derives from the court's ability to punish 
violations of its order by fines or imprisonment for contempt of 
court.").   
¶77 Alexander & Bishop's discussion of debtors' prisons 
glosses over a key distinction.  There is a difference between a 
buyer who is unwilling to perform and one who is unable.  Each 
is subject to different treatment by a court in equity and under 
the law of contempt.   
¶78 A party's unwillingness to obey a court order is the 
very definition of contempt.  Wisconsin Stat. § 785.01(b) 
defines "contempt of court" as intentional "[d]isobedience, 
resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of 
a court."   
                                                 
26 A leading treatise explains that equitable decrees "are 
often enforced coercively, through the contempt power.  They may 
also be enforced in other, less drastic ways, however."  3 Dan 
B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.8 at 186 (2d ed. 1993).  For 
instance, Dobbs explains that equitable orders may under 
appropriate circumstances be enforced by the appointment of a 
receiver, id. § 2.8(1) at 189-90, by execution, id. at 191, or 
by supplemental proceedings to compel a defendant to reveal 
assets, id. at 191-92.   
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
32 
 
¶79 By contrast, inability to perform precludes the 
imposition of contempt sanctions.  O'Connor v. O'Connor, 48 
Wis. 2d 535, 542, 180 N.W.2d 735 (1970); see also 3 Dobbs, Law 
of Remedies § 2.8(7) at 218-19 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the 
burden of proof).  Just as impossibility is a defense to an 
order for specific performance, inability to obey that order is 
a defense to contempt.  In O'Connor, this court explained that 
"it has long been settled in Wisconsin that a person cannot be 
held in contempt of court for the failure to pay money unless 
the refusal is willful and contemptuous and not the result of 
his inability to pay."  48 Wis. 2d at 542.  
¶80 If an equitable court concludes that a buyer subject 
to an order for specific performance is unable to perform, it 
would erroneously exercise its discretion by ordering contempt 
sanctions.  In such a case, a judicial sale and deficiency 
judgment could be an equitable and appropriate procedure.27   
                                                 
27 This is what was recognized in Heins, where we said a 
seller's specific performance is "probably, generally enforced 
by the sale of the land to satisfy the amount due for purchase 
money and costs, and a judgment for the deficiency, if any, 
enforceable by execution."  Heins v. Thompson & Flieth Lumber 
Co., 165 Wis. 563, 572, 163 N.W. 173 (1917).  When the result of 
compelling performance would be harsh, we observed that resort 
to a judicial sale and deficiency judgment "is the better 
practice . . . especially 
in 
absence 
of 
some 
special 
circumstances showing clearly that such remedies are inadequate 
to fully protect the vendor's right."  Id. 
Similarly, in the context of an installment contract that 
was partially performed, the Kallenbach court equated an order 
for specific performance with a judicial sale and deficiency 
judgment.  Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 
647, 651, 142 N.W.2d 212 (1966); see also Taft v. Reddy, 191 
Wis. 144, 210 N.W. 364 (1926). 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
33 
 
¶81 Here, we emphasize that there is no finding that 
Alexander & Bishop is unable to perform.  Alexander & Bishop 
never asked the circuit court to order a judicial sale and did 
not develop a factual record demonstrating why a judicial sale 
might be an appropriate procedure under the facts of the case.  
Rather, it asks us to declare that a judicial sale is a 
mandatory 
procedure 
to 
effectuate 
an 
award 
of 
specific 
performance.   
¶82 For the reasons stated above, we decline to graft onto 
the equitable remedy of specific performance a mandatory remedy 
of a judicial sale.  It is the circuit court, rather than this 
court on review, that should make the factual findings, weigh 
the equities, and exercise its discretion to determine the 
appropriate procedure for administering and enforcing an order 
for specific performance.   
C 
¶83 Finally, Alexander & Bishop asks us to "clarify" that 
"an important component of specific performance is that the 
seller must take adequate steps to minimize its damages."  It 
concedes that a requirement to mitigate damages is inconsistent 
with the remedy of specific performance.28  See Yorio, supra, 
                                                 
28 At 
oral 
argument, 
counsel 
for 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
explained: "Mitigation certainly comes into play if you're going 
to have other types of damages.  Mitigation is a damages 
concept, and if you're going to have other types of damages 
beyond specific performance, the seller has to seek to mitigate 
those damages."  
 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
34 
 
§ 8.2.3 at 181.  Yet, it asserts that if the seller seeks 
interest in addition to the equitable remedy of specific 
performance, the doctrine of mitigation should come into play. 
¶84 In a situation where specific performance is ordered 
due to the buyer's breach, however, a duty to mitigate would 
create 
several 
practical 
difficulties. 
 
First, 
a 
seller 
requesting specific performance must be able to demonstrate that 
it is "ready, willing, and able" to perform the contract by 
delivering the title to the buyer.  Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 
516; 2 Contract Law in Wisconsin, supra, § 13.60.  The seller 
cannot be ready, willing, and able to perform the contract after 
having committed to sell the property to another buyer. 
¶85 Second, it would be extremely difficult for a seller 
to market a property to a third-party buyer when that property 
is subject to a court order for specific performance.  Potential 
third-party buyers might correctly assume that they were walking 
into a legal minefield, wagering on whether the seller, who is 
subject to a court order to deliver the title to another buyer, 
could actually deliver the title.   
¶86 For these reasons, we decline to impose a duty to 
mitigate on a seller who requests interest in addition to 
specific performance.29   
                                                 
29 In the complaint, Ash Park made a claim for consequential 
damages.  See, supra, ¶14 n.3.   
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
35 
 
VI. Interest 
¶87 We turn next to the circuit court's award of interest.  
Alexander & Bishop asserts that the court erroneously exercised 
its discretion by ordering it to pay interest on the purchase 
price.  In Estreen v. Bluhm, this court explained that the 
allowance of interest in a case of equity is dependent upon the 
various equitable circumstances of the case.  79 Wis. 2d 142, 
156, 255 N.W.2d 473 (1977).   
¶88 When 
initially 
deciding 
that 
interest 
would 
be 
ordered, the circuit court explained that its intention was to 
give Alexander & Bishop an incentive to promptly comply with the 
court's order: "There has got to be some incentive to get this 
resolved, and if [Ash Park is] sitting with all the holding 
costs," there is little incentive for Alexander & Bishop to take 
the necessary steps to close the deal.  Motivating the parties 
to comply with the court's order is a proper consideration when 
deciding to impose interest. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Alexander & Bishop also argues that mitigation should be 
required when the seller requests damages in addition to an 
order for specific performance.  Some authorities have stated 
that damages may be appropriate in addition to specific 
performance to "adjust for the delay in performance between the 
date specified in the contract and the date on which the 
equitable decree issues[.]"  See, e.g., Edward Yorio, Contract 
Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions § 9.4 at 228 
(1989).   
Here, the circuit court has not made a determination about 
the nature and extent, if any, of Ash Park's consequential 
damages.  Accordingly, no issue of mitigation of consequential 
damages has been presented in this court. 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
36 
 
¶89 Alexander & Bishop acknowledges that Wisconsin cases 
authorize a court to award interest in conjunction with an award 
of specific performance.30  Yet, it contends that the circuit 
court's exercise of discretion was erroneous under the facts of 
this case.  It cites to Estreen for the proposition that it is 
generally "inequitable to permit either party . . . to enjoy 
both the beneficial use of the property and the use of the 
purchase money . . . ."  79 Wis. 2d at 156.  In essence, 
Alexander & Bishop contends that Ash Park is obtaining a double 
recovery because it retained the beneficial use of the property 
at the same time that interest accrued on the purchase price.   
¶90 The circuit court explicitly considered the argument 
that awarding interest would violate the court's directive in 
Estreen.  However, it concluded that Ash Park had no beneficial 
use of the property for two reasons.  First, it was not feasible 
for Ash Park to rent the property without making improvements.31  
Second, any appreciation in the property's market value would 
accrue to Alexander & Bishop, rather than to Ash Park.  
Alexander & Bishop makes no argument that these findings of fact 
                                                 
30  In Buntrock v. Hoffman, the defendant was a buyer who 
breached a contract to purchase real estate.  178 Wis. 5, 189 
N.W. 572 (1922).  This court stated that "it is fair and 
equitable to charge the defendant with interest" because the 
seller "was deprived of a proper income on the amount of the 
purchase price."  Id. at 18.   
31 During the hearing, the court explained: "If you are 
buying a $6.3 million on-going hotel, you're right, he's 
collecting the rents from the hotel.  But if he's selling you a 
piece of vacant land, he doesn't have much income off a piece of 
vacant land."   
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
37 
 
are clearly erroneous.  Based on our review of the record, we 
conclude that it is not.   
¶91 Alexander & Bishop also advances that the circuit 
court erred when it ordered interest at the statutory rate.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 815.05(8) provides that "every execution upon 
a judgment for the recovery of money shall direct the collection 
of interest at the rate of 12% per year[.]"32  Alexander & Bishop 
contends that because an order of specific performance is not a 
judgment 
for 
the 
recovery 
of 
money, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by imposing interest at the 
statutory rate.  
¶92 We agree with Alexander & Bishop that the order for 
specific performance is not "a judgment for the recovery of 
money" and therefore imposition of interest pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 815.05 is inappropriate.33  Here, however, the court 
ordered interest based upon equitable considerations rather than 
pursuant to the statute.   
¶93 The record reveals that the circuit court imposed 
interest 
to 
motivate 
Alexander 
& 
Bishop 
to 
perform, 
to 
compensate Ash Park for the costs involved in holding the 
                                                 
32 In addition to 12 percent postjudgment interest, the 
circuit court ordered 5 percent prejudgment interest. 
33 We disagree with the court of appeals that this action 
arguably falls within Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8).  Ash Park, 317 
Wis. 2d 772, ¶27.  Nevertheless, we agree that the amount owed 
to Ash Park is "determinable by a reasonably certain standard of 
measurement."  See Beacon Bowl v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 740, 776-77, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993).    
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
38 
 
property, and because Ash Park had been deprived of the use of 
the purchase price.  Although Ash Park referenced Wis. Stat. 
§ 815.05(8) when arguing for the imposition of interest, the 
circuit court did not cite to any statute when it ordered 
interest.  The circuit court recognized that "[b]ecause this was 
specific performance, I'm not required to give interest at [the 
statutory rate]." 
¶94 Further, 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it reconsidered the appropriate 
rate of interest in its order of August 18.  The court made 
clear that the award of interest was based on the equities of 
the case.  It explained, "[M]y goal is to try to get some amount 
of money which motivates [Alexander & Bishop] to perform."  
However, the court also recognized that the equities of the case 
might change as the case evolved.   
¶95 Originally, Alexander & Bishop represented to the 
court that the parties were on the verge of closing.  As time 
passed and the parties failed to close, the court was justified 
in ordering a higher rate of interest to motivate Alexander & 
Bishop to close.  Although the circuit court was not required to 
set interest at the statutory rate, it did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion by doing so.34   
                                                 
34 In Estreen, for example, this court ordered interest on 
the purchase price based upon equitable considerations.  Because 
the contract did not provide for a different rate of interest, 
the court set it at the statutory rate.  79 Wis. 2d at 158.   
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2008AP1735   
 
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VII 
¶96 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it ordered specific 
performance of this contract.  The contract provides that 
specific performance is an available remedy, and neither the 
contract nor Wisconsin law requires Ash Park to demonstrate that 
a legal remedy would be inadequate as a precondition to relief.  
Further, although impossibility is a defense to specific 
performance, Alexander & Bishop failed to present evidence that 
performance would be impossible in the proceedings before the 
circuit court.   
¶97 Additionally, 
we 
decline 
to 
alter 
longstanding 
Wisconsin law by imposing a requirement that a seller of real 
estate demonstrate the inadequacy of legal damages as a 
prerequisite to an order for specific performance.  Although a 
judicial sale and deficiency judgment may be a means of 
effectuating an award of specific performance, we conclude that 
this procedure is not mandatory.  Rather, it depends on the 
facts and equities of the case.  Because a duty to mitigate is 
contrary to an award of specific performance and would pose 
practical difficulties for the non-breaching seller, we decline 
to require mitigation when a seller asks for interest in 
addition to specific performance.   
¶98 Finally, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion by ordering interest on the 
purchase price.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.   
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2008AP1735   
 
40 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court.  
 
 
No. 
2008AP1735   
 
 
 
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