Title: Attorney Grievance v. Cassidy

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case # CAE00 - 10841
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 7
September Term, 2000
                                                                                
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF
MARYLAND 
v.
JOHN WALSH CASSIDY
                                                                              
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (retired,
specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                              
Opinion by Raker, J.
                                                                              
Filed: February 8, 2001
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition with this Court
for disciplinary action against John Walsh Cassidy, Respondent, alleging violations of the Maryland Rules
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Rule 1.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:
1
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
Rule 1.3 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:
2
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
Rule 1.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
3
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.  
of Professional Conduct.  The Commission charged Respondent with violating Rules 1.1 (Competence),1
1.3 (Diligence),  and 1.4 (Communication).   We referred the matter, pursuant to Maryland Rule
2
3
16-709(b), to Judge Ronald D. Schiff of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to make findings
of fact and proposed conclusions of law.  Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Schiff concluded that
Respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4., but that Respondent did not violate Rule 1.1.  Respondent filed
an exception to Judge Schiff’s conclusion that Respondent violated Rule 1.4.  Bar Counsel took no
exceptions to the findings or conclusions of the hearing judge. 
I.
Judge Schiff held an evidentiary hearing and filed a report setting out his findings and conclusions.
We set forth his report.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“This case comes to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County, Maryland by Order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland dated
May 2, 2000.  The Court of Appeals instructed this Court to make
appropriate findings as to whether Respondent, John Walsh Cassidy,
violated the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
“Petitioner, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland
(“Commission”), filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action against
Respondent on May 1, 2000.  The Commission alleges that Respondent
violated Rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct.  The Commission filed a Request for Admission of Facts and
Genuineness of Documents.  The enumerated facts, documents and
attachments thereto were admitted without objection at the hearing on this
matter.
STANDARDS OF PROOF 
“For disciplinary action to ensue, the burden of proof is on the
Commission to establish Rules violations by clear and convincing
evidence.  See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kemp, 335 Md. 1, 9, 641
A.2d 510, 514 (1994).  Furthermore, an attorney in a disciplinary
proceeding need only establish factual matters supporting the attorney’s
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Attorney Griev.
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Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 288, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992).
After a hearing held on July 13, 2000, this Court makes Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as set forth below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
“1.  Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland on June 27, 1968.  Respondent has carried on a law practice
specializing in real estate matters.
“2.  On or about April 29, 1998, Denise Glenn orally retained Respondent
for the purpose of drafting and recording a new deed to her condominium.
The new deed was to include a change in Mrs. Glenn’s name of record
from Denise Wilson to Denise Glenn.  Respondent was also instructed to
add Mrs. Glenn’s husband, Walter Glenn, as a co-owner.
“3.  Respondent quoted a fee of $100.00.  The fee represented $75.00
to prepare the deed and $25.00 to record it.
“4. Respondent stated that the deed would be ready in approximately
three weeks.
“5.  Thereafter, Respondent marked up the deed and gave it to his
secretary, Jeanette Rogers, to process according to his usual practice with
respect to deeds.
“6.  In or about July 1998, Mrs. Glenn telephoned Respondent’s office
inquiring as to the status of her deed.  This was the first contact since the
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original meeting between Respondent and Mrs. Glenn on April 29, 1998.
The individual with whom Mrs. Glenn spoke indicated that Mrs. Glenn
must provide an additional $25.00 for a notary fee.  Mrs. Glenn indicated
that an additional fee was not discussed during the original meeting.  Mrs.
Glenn then asked that Respondent call her.
“7.  Between June 1998 and December 1998 Mrs. Glenn placed several
calls to Respondent’s office but was never able to speak to him.  
“8.  In October 1998, Jeanette Rogers quit her job.  Respondent was
financially unable to immediately replace her.
“9.  On November 4, 1998, Respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for 18 months on an unrelated matter.
“10.  On December 4, 1998, Mrs. Glenn, accompanied by her husband,
Walter Glenn, visited Respondent’s office inquiring about the status of the
deed.  Respondent explained to Mr. and Mrs. Glenn that he was unable
to locate the deed.  Respondent searched for the deed while Mr. and
Mrs. Glenn were in the office but was unable to find it.  He indicated that
he would continue to search for the deed and would contact the Glenns
in a short period of time.  During this visit Respondent never disclosed his
suspension from the practice of law.
“11.  On January 4, 1999, Mrs. Glenn telephoned Respondent’s office
once again, inquiring about the status of the deed.  The person with whom
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she spoke (not Respondent) hung up on her without giving any
information.  On January 8, 1999, Mrs. Glenn filed a complaint with the
Attorney Grievance Commission.
“12.  In February 1999, Mr. Glenn visited Respondent’s office.
Respondent indicated that he had not found the deed, and issued a
$100.00 refund to Mr. Glenn.  On April 3, 1999, Respondent forwarded
an additional $200.00 to Mrs. Glenn.
“13.  Following Respondent’s April 3, 1999 reply to the Attorney
Grievance complaint, Respondent found the marked-up deed tacked to
a bulletin board, which was near Jeanette Rogers’ desk, under a number
of other papers.
“14.  At no time during the representation did Respondent inform Mr. or
Mrs. Glenn that he was suspended from the practice of law.
“15.  With respect to other pertinent matters this Court also finds the
following:
“(a) Respondent relied almost exclusively on his secretary
to draft deeds and he did not employ any type of
meaningful tickler system that would alert him to overdue
matters.
“(b) With respect to the preparation of deeds Respondent
turned over marked-up deeds to his secretary who would
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place them in a miscellaneous “ABC” file.  This file was
maintained alphabetically by case name, and was kept as
an open file on or near the secretary’s desk.  The file
included various types of matters, such as deeds and
settlement papers.  Respondent performed minimal
monitoring of this file but remained available should the
secretary have questions about the cases.  
“(c) Respondent admits that he would not have known
about the Glenns’ lost deed had the Glenns not brought
the matter to his attention.
“(d) Jeanette Rogers worked for the Crossroads Title
Company who shared office space with Respondent.
Jeanette Rogers, however, performed secretarial duties
for Respondent.  Ms. Rogers performed secretarial duties
for Respondent for approximately three years.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“I.  Rule 1.1 - Competence
     Rule 1.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides the
following:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client.  Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
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reasonably necessary for the representation.
“Petitioner relies on Attorney Grievance v. Ober, 350 Md.
616, 714 A.2d 856 (1998), as support for its assertion that Respondent
violated Rule 1.1 in connection with the loss of Mrs. Glenn’s deed.  In
Ober, the Court of Appeals found that respondent violated Rule 1.1 by
losing a client’s file and failing to reconstruct it in a timely manner.  See
id., 350 Md. at 630, 714 A.2d at 863.  The Court reasoned that “the
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for competent
representation includes the proper management of case files.”  Id.
Furthermore, “[t]he loss of a file may substantially affect an attorney’s
ability to adequately prepare the client’s case.”  Id.
“Undoubtedly, the ability for an attorney to manage case files and
implement procedures for reconstructing lost or incomplete files reflects
upon the competence of the attorney.  In Ober, however, the Court was
clear that the basis for the Rule 1.1 violation was not “solely on
[r]espondent’s loss of the file.”  Id.  Thus, it was the loss of the file
coupled with respondent’s failure to promptly reconstruct it that gave rise
to a finding of lack of competence.  Indeed, in Ober the respondent lost
his client’s file sometime after leaving his private practice in July 1994.
After several requests from his former client and her new attorney,
respondent finally reconstructed the file and handed it to his former client
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on November 18, 1996.  See id., 350 Md. at 623-24, 714 A.2d at 860.
The implication is that inherent in the notion of competence is the ability to
timely address and remedy prior mistakes.  
“In the instant matter, Respondent, a specialist in real estate
matters, clearly lost Mrs. Glenn’s deed.  Furthermore, complete
delegation of an administrative matter to his secretary is no excuse for such
loss.  The nature of the item lost, however, and the impossibility of
reconstructing the document distinguishes the instant matter from the
circumstances in Ober.  Accordingly, this Court finds that the loss of Mrs.
Glenn’s deed, while irresponsible in itself, does not rise to the level of
incompetence contemplated by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
“II.  Rule 1.3 — Diligence
       Rule 1.3 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides the
following:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.
“Respondent was retained to complete a relatively simple legal
task.  He was asked to merely prepare a deed by changing an existing
owner’s name and adding another name as co-owner.  Respondent
represented that he would complete the task in three weeks.  Respondent
never completed the task.  In fact, Respondent admitted that he would not
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have known that the task was incomplete had the Glenns not brought the
matter to his attention.  As such, Respondent clearly has an obligation to
maintain a tickler system for all open files including those relatively minor
matters, such as preparing a deed, which are the most likely to be
forgotten or misplaced.  This is especially true for a real estate practice
where the volume of paper is substantial.
“Furthermore, Respondent was retained in late April 1998 and
had approximately six months up until the time of his suspension in
November 1998 to complete this simple legal task.  Thus, the fact that
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law is of no significance
as to his ability to complete and execute the deed.  In light of the
aforementioned facts, this Court finds that Respondent violated Rule 1.3
in his representation of Mr. and Mrs. Glenn.
“III.  Rule 1.4 — Communication
         Rule 1.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides
the following:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.
“From the findings of fact listed above, this Court finds that
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Respondent did not demonstrate the communication required of attorneys
in two respects.  First, Respondent completely failed to contact and
otherwise respond to Mrs. Glenn’s repeated inquiries as to the status of
the deed.  Mrs. Glenn handed over the deed in April 1998 upon
Respondent’s representation that the deed would be completed in three
weeks.  Having not heard from Respondent, Mrs. Glenn telephoned in
July 1998 inquiring about the status of her deed.  She was unable to speak
to Respondent and was told by someone in Respondent’s office that she
owed more money.  Mrs. Glenn asked that Respondent call her to discuss
the additional money and to otherwise discuss the status of the deed.
Mrs. Glenn did not receive a return call.  Moreover, Mrs. Glenn did not
receive a return call from the numerous calls placed between July and
December 1998.  Respondent’s complete disregard of his client’s
inquiries constitutes a violation of Rule 1.4(a).
“Second, Respondent never disclosed his suspension from the
practice of law in November 1998.  More specifically, Mr. and Mrs.
Glenn visited Respondent’s office in December 1998 after many
unsuccessful attempts to contact him by telephone.  During that visit,
Respondent never disclosed that he had been suspended for 18 months.
This was a vital piece of information because no deed can be recorded
unless an attorney certifies it.  See Md. Code Ann., Real Property § 3-
-11-
104(f)(1).  Had Respondent disclosed his suspension, Mr. and Mrs.
Glenn could have made the informed choice to seek another attorney.
Thus, Respondent’s failure to disclose his suspension constitutes a
violation of rule 1.4(b).”
II.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent’s failure to disclose his
suspension from the practice of law constitutes a violation of Rule 1.4.  He argues that he did not know
whether the deed had been prepared in February 1999; he could not locate the file and, thus, could not
advise the Glenns of the status of their deed and whether they should retain another attorney.  Had
Respondent found the file, the Glenns had the option, under Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000
Supp.) Real Property Article, § 3-104(f)(1), of preparing their own deed and certifying themselves that the
deed was prepared by one of the parties named in the instrument.  He concludes that, under these
circumstances, the deed could have been recorded without an attorney certification.
We overrule Respondent’s exception.  Rule 1.4(b) requires an attorney to explain matters to a
client to permit the client to make reasonably informed decisions regarding the representation.  Without the
knowledge that Respondent had been suspended from the practice of law, the clients were unable to make
informed decisions about the objectives and means of the representation.
III.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction.  We reiterate the purpose of sanctions---to protect the
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public, to protect the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  See Attorney Grievance v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254, 760
A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000); Attorney Griev. Comm. v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 516, 704 A.2d 1225,
1240 (1998); Attorney Griev. Comm. v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 483, 671 A.2d 463, 480 (1996).  The
purpose is not to punish the errant attorney.  See Fezell, 361 Md. at 254, 760 A.2d at 1119.
Bar Counsel recommends that Respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.  Bar
Counsel recites Respondent’s disciplinary history as justification for the sanction.  Respondent suggests that
a reprimand would be in order.
On October 29, 1996, Respondent was issued a private reprimand for violation of Rules 1.3 and
8.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  He failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client, he failed to obtain the requisite signatures on a deed, and he failed to
promptly record deeds.  He also failed to respond to Bar Counsel in a timely manner in connection with
Bar Counsel’s investigation.  
On that same day, another private reprimand was issued to Respondent for violation of Rules
1.15(b) and 8.1(b) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  He failed to abide by the terms of an
escrow agreement, he did not promptly deliver funds to a third person entitled to them, and he failed to
respond to Bar Counsel’s complaint in a timely manner. 
In June 1989, Respondent was issued a private reprimand in connection with four matters.  He was
found to have violated DR6-101(a)(3) of the Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 1.3
of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
On November 4, 1998, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law, by consent, for a
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period of eighteen months.  His suspension was based upon four real estate settlements in which he did not
obtain proper payoff amounts and did not release liens of record of which he had knowledge.  He made
disbursements contrary to that shown on settlement sheets in derogation of the interest of a secured party.
In addition, he failed to adequately respond to Bar Counsel’s request for information concerning those
matters.  It is the November 1998 suspension that he did not reveal to the Glenns.
The severity of the sanction to be imposed in any particular case depends upon the individual facts
and circumstances, taking into account any aggravating or mitigating factors.  See Fezell, 361 Md. at 254,
760 A.2d at 1119; Glenn, 341 Md. at 484, 671 A.2d 480.
Respondent has violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4.  Respondent’s failure to perform with respect to the
Glenns’ deed is a clear violation of Rule 1.3.  As we noted in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 120, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983), “lack of communication with one’s client,
for whatever reason, is a matter of continuing concern to the public,” warranting disciplinary sanction.  See
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 547, 391 A.2d 434, 436-37 (1978); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225, 237, 369 A.2d 61, 68 (1977).
Respondent suggests a reprimand as a reasonable sanction.  Underlying the violation was a
misplaced file.  There was no deceit, misrepresentation or misappropriation by Respondent, and there is
no evidence that the clients were actually harmed.  As mitigation, Respondent maintains that he relied upon
his secretary to process the deed, and unbeknownst to him, it was not processed.  After he was suspended,
he did not act as an attorney, and, in response to the Glenns, he looked for their deed, which he did without
success, and he fully refunded the fee to them.
On the other hand, when we consider Respondent’s conduct in light of his prior disciplinary history,
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it is clear that, to protect the public, an increase in the degree of discipline beyond that of a reprimand is
necessary.  The conduct underlying the instant infractions is the same conduct for which Respondent had
been disciplined in the past.  In Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Manning, 318 Md. 697, 704-05, 569
A.2d 1250, 1254 (1990), we noted:
In recent years, however, we have noticed too many instances
when lawyers have agreed to represent clients and accepted fees, in part
or in whole, only to completely neglect these same legal problems, causing
the same clients emotional distress, financial loss, or other varying kinds
of inconvenience.  More often than not, these situations have been
exacerbated by the lack of respect and attention extended to the courts
as evidenced by the failure to file timely pleadings or to make appearances
as scheduled before the court to enable proceedings to be conducted.  It
seems to us that this kind of persistent conduct is evidence of a lawyer’s
disregard of his obligation.
In fulfilling our responsibility to protect the public, we believe we would be remiss in imposing a reprimand
and conclude that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension, effective thirty days from the filing
of this opinion.  
Should Respondent be reinstated at any time in the future, such reinstatement shall be conditioned
upon Respondent satisfying the following conditions:
1.  Respondent shall have paid all costs assessed pursuant to the mandate in this matter; and
2.  Respondent shall have registered, and prepaid the tuition, at an accredited institution of higher
learning or the Maryland Institute for the Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers for a course on
Professional Responsibility, and Respondent shall have represented and warranted to Bar Counsel, and,
thereby, to this Court, that he will diligently pursue and successfully complete that course; and
3.  Respondent shall have engaged, at his expense, a monitor, acceptable to Bar Counsel, who will
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oversee Respondent’s practice of law for a period of two years and provide reports to Bar Counsel on a
quarterly basis concerning Respondent’s practice.  The monitor shall have access, by client agreement, to
all files of Respondent.  The monitor’s consent and an indication of his or her willingness to so act must be
appended to any Petition for Reinstatement.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(C), FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND AGAINST JOHN WALSH
CASSIDY.