Title: Mathis v. State

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

189 So. 2d 564 (1966)
Ben T. MATHIS
v.
STATE of Alabama.
4 Div. 211.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 14, 1966.
Rehearing Denied September 8, 1966.
*565 Joe S. Pittman, Enterprise, and G. A. Lindsey, Elba, for appellant.
Richmond M. Flowers, Atty. Gen., and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
GOODWYN, Justice.
Appellant, Ben T. Mathis, was indicted in Coffee County for the offense of murder in the first degree, found guilty and sentenced to death. His appeal here is under the provisions of the automatic appeal statute. Act No. 249, appvd. June 24, 1943, Gen. Acts 1943, p. 217; 1955 Cum. Pocket Part, Code 1940, Tit. 15, § 382(1) et seq.; Recompiled Code 1958 (unofficial), Tit. 15, § 382(1) et seq.
The indictment charges, in count 1, that appellant "unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed Joseph Edward Morgan, by stabbing him with a knife." In count 2, it is charged that the killing was "by stabbing him with a sharp instrument, a better description of which is unknown to the grand jury."
Appellant was represented at his arraignment by two members of the Coffee County Bar, appointed by the court. At that time he entered pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity." The same attorneys represented him throughout his trial and on his motion for a new trial, and also represent him on this appeal.
Being mindful of our duty in cases of this kind, we have carefully considered all of the testimony, even though no lawful objection or exception was made thereto, and find none seriously prejudicial to the rights of appellant; nor can we say, after considering all of the testimony, that the verdict is so decidedly contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to be wrong and unjust. See: Act No. 249, § 10, supra; 1955 Cum. Pocket Part, Code 1940, Tit 15, § 382(10), supra; Recompiled Code 1958 (unofficial), Tit. 15, § 382(10), supra.
Under the evidence, the issue as to appellant's guilt was clearly for the jury's determination. No evidence was offered in support of appellant's insanity plea.
The trial court, in its oral charge, fully expounded the applicable law, to which *566 no exception was taken. Neither the State nor the appellant requested the giving of written charges.
Although reversible errors are charged and argued in appellant's brief, we find no merit in any of them. Nor do we find any other ground for reversal presented by the record. See: Code 1940, Tit. 15, § 389. Accordingly, the judgment is due to be affirmed.
Defendant's motion for a change of venue was denied after the taking of considerable evidence on an oral hearing before the trial court. It is argued in appellant's brief that it was error to deny the motion because
Publicity by the press, radio and television does not necessarily constitute ground for a change of venue. See: Denton v. State, 263 Ala. 311, 314-315, 82 So. 2d 406; Campbell v. State, 257 Ala. 322, 324-325, 58 So. 2d 623; Littlefield v. State, 36 Ala.App. 507, 510, 63 So. 2d 565, cert. den. 258 Ala. 532, 63 So. 2d 573. Whether a motion for a change of venue should be granted is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See: Cobern v. State, 273 Ala. 547, 551, 142 So. 2d 869; Collins v. State, 234 Ala. 197, 199, 174 So. 296; Littlefield v. State, supra. From a consideration of the evidence taken on the hearing of the motion, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
The following from Campbell v. State, 257 Ala. 322, 324-325, 58 So. 2d 623, supra, is equally applicable here:
"* * * In Godau v. State, 179 Ala. 27, 60 So. 908, 910, it was said:
The defendant moved to quash the indictment and also interposed a plea in abatement thereto. Both of these charge that the indictment was not returned by a lawfully constituted grand jury for the following reasons: That General Act No. 59, appvd. March 2, 1939, Gen. Acts 1939, p. 86, provides for the establishment of a jury commission in each of the counties in the State; that after the enactment of Act No. 59, and while it was in full force and effect Local Act. No. 572, appvd. Sept. 9, 1953, Acts 1953, Vol. II, p. 813, was enacted by the legislature; that Act No. 572 is made applicable only to Coffee County and purports to create in Coffee County a jury board in place of the jury commission provided for by General Act No. 59; that the jury board provided for by Local Act No. 572 "has maintained a jury box in the Enterprise Division of Coffee County and the names of the grand jurors as placed therein by the members of the said jury board were drawn from said jury box and subsequently became members of the grand jury" which returned the indictment against the defendant; that Act No. 572, a local law, is in conflict with Act No. 59, a general law; that, therefore, Act No. 572 is unconstitutional and void because it is violative of § 105, Constitution 1901, which provides, in pertinent part, that "no special, private or local law, except a law fixing the time of holding courts, shall be enacted in any case which is provided for by a general law."
This contention is not well taken. Since the local act is materially different from the general act, the local act is not violative of § 105. See: State ex rel. Jones v. Steele, 263 Ala. 16, 81 So. 2d 542, and cases there cited and discussed. One material difference in the two Acts is the number of members constituting the "jury commission" (provided for by the general act) and the "jury board" (provided for by the local act) and the manner of appointing such members.
It was not error to overrule the motion to quash; nor was it error to sustain the State's demurrer to the plea in abatement.
We see no need to recite or discuss the evidence in detail. The following should suffice for a proper disposition of the appeal:
About 12:30 A.M. on June 23, 1964, two Enterprise police officers, while on routine patrol, observed a 1964 Chevrolet automobile parked on a by-pass near Enterprise. They examined the car, got its license tag number, and noticed in it a plastic bag containing cheese, vanilla wafers and crackers, with a toy pistol on top of the bag. The ignition key was out and the car was unlocked. They then checked on the car's registration and found that the tag was issued to Mr. and Mrs. J. E. Morgan. About 1:50 A.M. a message came from Ozark asking information concerning the registration of the car. It developed that the car had been found in Ozark in the possession of a negro, who ran away after being stopped by a police officer because of improper driving. When the two Enterprise officers received the message from Ozark, they advised Ozark to hold the car, that it was stolen. Then they got in touch with a nephew of Mr. and Mrs. Morgan, who accompanied them to the Morgan home. Upon arrival, they found Mr. and Mrs. Morgan dead on the floor. Mr. Morgan had been stabbed with a sharp instrument 111 times.
On June 25 a deputy sheriff found a convict-type shirt near where the Morgans' car was observed on the by-pass early on the morning of June 23. This shirt was identified as one having been issued to Mathis, who had escaped from the Camp Enterprise Convict Road Camp on the night of June 20, or 21, and was still at large on the night of June 22-23.
The Morgan home was approximately a mile and a half from the convict camp. Mr. Morgan's son testified that he last saw *568 his father alive the Sunday afternoon before he died on Monday; that he was in his father's home over that weekend; that the coat and pants introduced in evidence as State's exhibits 3 and 4 belonged to him; and that he last saw these in his father's home on the Saturday afternoon before his father died. Mathis was wearing these two articles when he was apprehended in Ozark on July 4, 1964, at about 9:30 P.M., and then taken to the Ozark City jail. At the jail, the coat was taken off of Mathis "to identify him by the scars on his body." It was stipulated that the shoes, socks and underwear, being worn by Mathis when he was brought to the jail, were removed from him and sent to the State taxicologist for examination.
The evidence shows that no blood was found on the items of clothing; that the many wounds inflicted on Mr. Morgan's body were of the type that bleed slowly; and that due to the rain in the area during the period of about two weeks when Mathis was moving about the countryside, or due to plain wear during such period, any blood could have worn off.
At about 11:00 P.M. on July 4, the sheriff (Tillman) of Coffee County, together with a member (Sgt. Riddle) of the Highway Patrol and a State investigator (Gatlin), took Mathis from the Ozark jail for the purpose of moving him to Kilby Prison for his own safety. "There was a good many automobiles and crowd gathering at the police station." Mathis did not have on a shirt, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and he wore leg irons. Sheriff Tillman and Riddle were on the front seat and Gatlin was seated beside Mathis on the back seat. They went by Troy on the way to Kilby. While on the way to Troy, Mathis made an inculpatory statement. There was testimony that no one offered Mathis any reward, hope of reward, or threatened him in any manner to get him to make the statement.
When the sheriff was asked what the statement was, the defendant objected and requested an examination of the witness out of the presence of the jury. This examination was held, after which the defendant's objection was overruled. The sheriff testified that Mathis "said there wasn't no use in trying to involve or get anybody else in trouble, that he did it by himself." Then followed these questions and answers:
"Q. Out of the kitchen, what kitchen?
"A. Out at the road camp."
The sheriff also testified that a stop was made at the Pike County Courthouse in *569 Troy, where the circuit solicitor, Mr. Green, questioned Mathis; that Mathis made a statement at that time; and that "no one in his presence or hearing offered Mathis any reward, hope of reward or threatened him in any way to get him to make a statement on that occasion." The defendant objected to the offering of the statement in evidence. The objection was overruled. No request was made for a voir dire examination of the witness out of the presence of the jury. The sheriff testified as follows:
Then followed the following questions and answers:
"Q. He first said he was going to admit it?
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you all write down anything?
Mr. Gatlin's testimony was much the same as Sheriff Tillman's. He was examined by defendant on voir dire out of the jury's presence. After the hearing, the court overruled the defendant's objection to the witness testifying concerning the inculpatory statements made by Mathis, and allowed such testimony to go to the jury. In response to a question as to what Mathis' statement was in the car on the way to Troy, the witness testified:
In response to a question as to what Mathis' statement was in the Pike County Courthouse, Mr. Gatlin testified:
On defendant's request, the jury was excused while the following motion was made:
The motion was denied.
The defendant called as a witness a medical assistant at Kilby Prison. He testified that he examined Mathis on July 5; that Mathis said "he had been beat with a black jack by the officers that arrested him," that he asked Mathis to pull off his clothes; that he "checked him over thoroughly and the only thing he found was one little spot on the back of his head between the size of a quarter and a half-of-a-dollar which the skin was not broken and it was not bad enough to give him no medication and so I marked him up `okay'"; and that he could feel the knot.
The defendant elected to take the stand. This was done after the court fully informed him, with his counsel present and with the jury out of the room, as to his right to take or not to take the stand. He testified that he escaped from "special confinement" at Camp Enterprise on the night of June 20 or 21. He related at length what he had done between the time of his escape and his capture on July 4. For one thing, he had some "home brew," which he drank. He denied that he killed Mr. Morgan and related in the following series of questions and answers, how he got the clothes he was wearing when captured, viz.:
"A. It was still parked.
"Q. And then you saw a white automobile?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. All right, which way did this white automobile come from?
"Q. You had your head pointed away from the water tank then?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the white car came from behind in a northerly direction?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Then what did you observe or what happened if anything?
"Q. Two persons got out of the white automobile?
"A. Got out of the white automobile.
"Q. All right.
"Q. Where did he get the grip from?
"Q. That is the white car now?
"A. Yes.
"Q. All right.
"A. When I looked in this car I discovered that
"Q. And you were on the right of way?
"Q. You were right on the edge of the right of way then?
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. All right, then what did you do if you did anything?
"Q. Discovered what, speak up now so everybody can hear you.
"Q. How many handkerchiefs?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. All right, then what happened?
*572 "Q. Was another car stopped where the white car was now?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And then in your judgment that was the police there?
"A. Yes, sir. And I layed back down.
"Q. All right, then what happened?
"Q. The key was on the floorboard of that automobile?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What did you do?
"Q. Did you take those items of clothing?
"A. I pulled off the shirt and put on the coat.
"Q. All right, then what did you do?
"Q. How were you dressed when you got to Ozark?
"A. How was I dressed?
"Q. Yes.
"A. I had on those trousers.
"Q. Where did you put those on?
"A. I put those trousers on there, down almost to the bridge.
"Q. Speak up now, Ben, so everyone can hear you.
"A. On that new bridge that was put in down there on 27.
"A. I put these over them other trousers.
"Q. Over the prison trousers?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. All right, sir, then you went on to Ozark?
"A. Yes, sir."
*573 Mathis also related the facts as to his arrest and subsequent events. He testified that he was thoroughly questioned and beaten, which led to his confession on the way to Troy; that he was 44 years old and had 5 years of education; that Mr. Green informed him that he was the solicitor; that he had been convicted of the following offenses: grand larceny in 1938, 2nd degree burglary in 1946, burglary and grand larceny in 1959. The evidence also shows that he is presently serving a sentence for manslaughter. He also testified that when he left Camp Enterprise all he had "was a pair of wire pliers, spoon and safety razor"; that he was beat with a black-jack "on the head, all over the head, on my shoulder, on my back"; that only Mr. Gatlin hit him, and that the leg irons were taken off before going in the courthouse in Troy.
The following is from the solicitor's cross-examination of Mathis, viz:
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you have your leg irons on at that time?
"Q. Nobody was present but me, Gatlin, and Sheriff Tillman?
"A. That's right.
"A. That's right, I told you that.
"Q. I told you who I was, didn't I?
"A. That's right.
"Q. And you didn't make any complaint to me?
"A. No, sir.
"A. Well, these thingsfrom what I
"Q. It was true what you said, wasn't it?
"A. I will explain why.
"Q. Ben, 
The three officers in the car with Mathis denied that any of them ever hit or beat Mathis or did any physical violence whatsoever to him, nor did anyone in their presence.
*574 On redirect examination, Young Daniel Hughes, an Enterprise policeman, testified that he made an examination of the car on the night of June 23; that the dome light came on; that he noticed the ignition key was out; that there was a little plastic bag with soda crackers, vanilla wafers and cheese in it; that there was nothing on the floor board in the back and nothing hanging up in the car, neither clothing hanging in the car on a rack or coat hanger or window or anything. There is evidence that there were traces of cheese and crumbs in the kitchen of the Morgan home when Mr. Morgan's death was discovered.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that there are questions presented which should be dealt with. The principal question concerns the admission in evidence of Mathis' inculpatory statements. Incident to that question is whether it was error to deny defendant's motion to exclude "the so-called testimony given by the witness H. D. Tillman and witness B. J. Gatlin" because "no opportunity was given this defendant to seek counsel and talk to counsel."
Our conclusion is that the "confession testimony" was admitted without error and that denial of the motion to exclude such testimony was not error.
We take note of two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Miranda v. Arizona (June 13, 1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, and Johnson v. New Jersey (June 20, 1966), 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882.
The holding in Miranda does not apply to this case. In Johnson, it was held that "Miranda applies only to cases in which the trial began after the date of our decision one week ago" (June 13, 1966, 86 S.C. p. 1775). The trial of this case began in 1964.
Also in Johnson it was held that Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964) "affects only those cases in which the trial began after June 22, 1964, the date of that decision." The trial of the case before us began after June 22, 1964. Accordingly, Escobedo "affects" it.
The record shows that, before the inculpatory statements were admitted, the State introduced evidence showing that neither threats were made nor coercive action taken against Mathis; that he was not physically threatened; and that no offer of reward or inducement of any kind was made to him to get him to make the statements. The only testimony to the contrary was that given by the defendant, and an inference from the testimony of the medical assistant from Kilby Prison. The defendant's testimony is contradictory and not at all convincing. The medical assistant testified, as already shown, that the only thing he could find was one small knot on the head and that the skin was not broken.
Under the evidence, a factual issue was presented on the question of voluntariness. We think the evidence is quite sufficient to support a finding of voluntariness. The statements were properly admitted in evidence.
We see no basis for reversing under the so-called "totality of circumstances" rule *575 sometimes applied by the United States Supreme Court in holding confessions to have been improperly admitted. See: Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So. 2d 840, 864, supra, and cases there cited. No doubt, the fact that Mathis, while being transported to Kilby Prison, was handcuffed and wore leg irons seems harsh, but it must be remembered that he was an escaped convict, under sentence for manslaughter, who had been at large for nearly two weeks.
The fact that Mathis was not represented by counsel when he made the inculpatory statements did not, of itself, render the statements inadmissible. See: Lokos v. State, 278 Ala. 586, 179 So. 2d 714; Sanders v. State, 278 Ala. 453, 179 So. 2d 35.
There is nothing in the record indicating that Mathis, when he made the statements, either had a lawyer who was not permitted to be present, or requested a lawyer, or requested to see anyone.
In Lokos v. State, this court said:
In Lokos, it was held that a reversal was not called for under the Escobedo holding.
The following from Sanders v. State, supra, is also applicable here:
Also applicable here is the following from People v. Agar, 44 Misc.2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763-764 (which was quoted approvingly in Duncan v. State, supra).
One other question calling for comment is whether it was error to admit in evidence the photographs of the dead body of Mr. Morgan, showing his wounds. *576 We hold this was not error. See: Boulden v. State, 278 Ala. 437, 179 So. 2d 20; Hurst v. State, 277 Ala. 686, 174 So. 2d 325; Chappellee v. State, 267 Ala. 37, 99 So. 2d 431.
Finding no error to reverse, the judgment is due to be, and is, affirmed.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur.