Title: State v. Pedersen

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

309 N.W.2d 490 (1981) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Clarence D. PEDERSEN, Appellant. No. 64625. Supreme Court of Iowa. August 26, 1981. Rehearing Denied September 17, 1981. *491 Troyce A. Wheeler, Gary K. Anderson, and Richard H. Gross, Council Bluffs, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Julie F. Pottorff, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David E. Richter, Pottawattamie County Atty., for appellee. Considered by LeGRAND, P. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK, and LARSON, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. The question in this appeal from a first-degree murder conviction is whether defendant Clarence D. Pedersen was mentally competent to stand trial. Defendant has a history which includes residences in mental institutions, use of controlled substances, mutilation of livestock, and a nomad existence. The State's psychiatrist, Paul L. Loeffelholz, M. D., diagnosed defendant as having a schizoid personality disorder. The diagnosis of defendant's psychiatrist, George A. Young III, M. D., is schizophrenia, simple or chronic undifferentiated type. Mr. and Mrs. Clarence Pedersen, Sr. are substantial farmers in southwest Iowa. Defendant, their son, had been working as a farm hand for them. They had a daughter, Mrs. Kent M. Nelson, who was terminally ill with cancer. Defendant liked to hunt, and did so on the day of December 30, 1978. That evening Kent Nelson visited his hospitalized wife, and then came to the Pedersen home. The jury could find that Mrs. Pedersen arose from bed and that she and defendant briefly conversed with Nelson. Mrs. Pedersen returned to bed and Nelson apparently retired to a sleeping bag before the fireplace in the living room. Sometime after Mrs. Pedersen fell asleep, a loud explosion aroused the household. Mr. and Mrs. Pedersen left their bed, and as they moved down the hall toward the explosion they met defendant emerging from his bedroom. He was clothed, but his habit was to remove only his boots on retiring. On reaching the living room, Mrs. Pedersen heard a gurgling sound, felt a cold draft, noticed that the front door was ajar, and closed it. Mr. Pedersen and defendant found Nelson bleeding from a wound to the head. The authorities were called, and Mr. Pedersen and defendant went to the highway to direct the ambulance to the house. Mr. Pedersen told the officers he found a shotgun shell by Nelson when he first observed him, picked it up, and then put it down where he thought he had found it. At some point he also noted that several guns in defendant's room were not in their cases; he smelled one but it did not appear to have been recently fired. An officer testified at the subsequent trial that when he initially checked defendant's room, all guns but one were in their places. He found that one gun in a case and testified it smelled as if it had recently been fired. Later that morning officers conducted nitrate tests on the hands of Nelson, defendant, *492 Mr. Pedersen, and another son, Dan, who apparently was not at home at the time of the incident. Only defendant had significant elements of gunpowder on his hands. Evidence was introduced at trial that the shell Mr. Pedersen testified he found was consistent with having been fired in the gun the officer testified he found in defendant's room. Defendant consistently denied throughout the investigation that he shot Nelson. He did not, however, present any evidence at trial of his version of the occurrence or of anything else. Defendant was charged with murder. The public defender was appointed to represent him. The defender moved for a psychiatric examination of defendant. The district court appointed Dr. Loeffelholz of the Iowa Security Medical Facility, and defendant was examined there. Dr. Loeffelholz was of the opinion that defendant was not insane at the time of the alleged murder and that he was competent to stand trial. The defender requested further psychiatric examination, and the court appointed Dr. Young to make it. Dr. Young did so, and concluded that defendant was not insane at the time of the alleged murder but that at the time of examination defendant was not competent to stand trial. In his opinion defendant appreciated the murder charge and understood the proceedings, but defendant could not assist effectively in his defense as a result of a mental disorder. In Dr. Young's view, defendant had pronounced negativism and also a delusion that his case had to be dismissed if not tried within thirty dayswhich had passedand this combination prevented defendant from assisting or indeed from accepting counsel. Dr. Young thought that defendant should receive a period of treatment to see if he could be brought to a condition of accepting and assisting counsel. The defender moved the court to suspend trial on the charge and to determine defendant's competency. The district court, Martin, J., held a hearing and took pains to see that the parties had the opportunity to bring out the evidence on competency. Psychiatric and psychological reports were introduced, and both psychiatrists testified. The court found defendant competent to assist counsel effectively, and set the case for trial. Since the court found defendant competent and since defendant, insisting that the trial had to occur within thirty days, refused counsel, the public defender could represent him no longer. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 581-82 (1975). The trial court nonetheless had the defender sit in the courtroom, in the event defendant would at some point accept help. The court endeavored at length to persuade defendant to accept counsel, and pointed out the dangers of trial without counsel. But defendant adamantly refused, repeating that the thirty-day time limit had expired. Trial went forward. Defendant, being of low normal intelligence and without legal training or counsel, made no defense. He did not participate in questioning witnesses, objecting, presenting evidence, requesting jury instructions or objecting to instructions, or arguing to the jury. At the end of the State's evidence defendant made the statement, "I don't think they found who done it yet," which the court took as a motion for directed verdict, and overruled. The court treated defendant with patience and consideration, offering him counsel and also the opportunity to participate personally. Defendant steadfastly maintained that the trial had to occur within thirty days. The trial thus consisted substantially of the State's evidence and arguments. The following excerpts are illustrative of the record. Defendant responded to a question at one point: And this: Defendant: Yeah. Defendant: Yeah. Again: Defendant: My fairness time passed. At one point in the trial defendant made this outburst in connection with his father and mother: Mr. Pedersen: I didn't. Mr. Rodenburg [prosecutor]: Maybe the Court would ask the Defendant in the *494 presence of everybody here if he wishes to speak to his parents? Mrs. Pedersen: I didn't. Defendant: You what? What? You, oh, damn liars. Defendant: Aid in my defense? The Court: Or help you Defendant: Them are direct enemies if you ask me. (Laughter.) The Court: Who? Defendant: Those queers. (Laughter.) Mrs. Pedersen: I didn't. After this outburst the public defender sought permission from defendant to move for a mistrial based on defendant's incompetency to assist in his defense. Defendant refused: The Court: All right. After the jury returned the guilty verdict, defendant made these statements among others: Also: Bailiff: Quiet down. And this: After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defendant accepted the public defender as counsel. Following sentence to life imprisonment, defendant appealed. In this appeal defendant raises several issues but we find one of them to be determinative: whether defendant was competent to assist counsel effectively in defense to the charge. I. A criminal trial of a person who is incompetent to undergo trial deprives him of due process of law. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S. Ct. 896, 904, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 113 (1975). This means that we must evaluate the totality of the circumstances on the competency question. State v. Lyon, 293 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Iowa 1980); State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa 1979). If we considered only the pretrial proceedings and closed our eyes to the trial evidence, we would ignore realities. Cf. Kempf, at 710 ("We would have to wear blinders to review the transfer decision only on the basis of the information disclosed in the transfer hearing. It would be unrealistic to do so."). The situation is different from State v. Jackson, 305 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Iowa 1981) (court found the defendant competent; the defendant subsequently moved to reconsider; "there was no additional evidence and no claim her condition had changed in the intervening thirty-four days"). Here abnormal incidents and *496 delusions occurred after the initial competency hearing and order, and the defender attempted to make a mistrial motion and did make a new-trial motion which was overruled. We must thus examine the competency question anew. The governing statute on this subject now provides in sections 812.3 to 812.5, The Code 1979: Under the prior statute, the burden of proving incompetency to stand trial, by a preponderance of the evidence, was on the defendant. § 783.2, The Code 1977. We think the rule is the same under the present statute notwithstanding absence of an express statutory provision. A defendant is initially presumed to be competent, and the burden to establish the contrary should be on him; if the evidence is in equipose the presumption should prevail. See on this subject, 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 70 (1965); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 940(5)(c), at 749-50 (1961); H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 434-35 (1954); Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity To Stand Trial, 21 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 593, 603 (1960). For this issue counsel will be appointed to represent an unrepresented defendant whether the defendant desires counsel or not, as was properly done here. II. In considering the totality of the circumstances in our de novo review, we turn to the two main parts of the record bearing on defendant's competency to stand trial: the views of the two psychiatrists, and defendant's utterances and conduct before, during, and after trial. A. That the psychiatrists hold opposite views on defendant's competency is understandable in view of their diametrically opposing approaches to the problem and, to a certain extent, to psychiatry itself. Basically, Dr. Loeffelholz appears to believe that defendant could have counsel and cooperate with counsel if he wills to do so, while Dr. Young appears to believe that defendant has an illness which causes negativism and a delusion that prevent him from accepting and cooperating with counsel. The two psychiatrists gave lengthy testimony at the pretrial hearing on defendant's competency. We can set out only a small *497 fraction of it. The following is illustrative of Dr. Loeffelholz's approach and conclusion: Dr. Loeffelholz testified at one point he has an opinion on whether defendant has a pronounced medical disorder. Then this occurred: Also: On the other side, the following from Dr. Young's testimony is illustrative. After describing defendant as "an extremely dangerous, volatile, dangerous individual," Dr. Young testified: Q. And now go back to the question before that which is, do you think he has some serious mental impairment? As I understand your testimony the impairment extends to his ability to assist counsel. *499 Is that a serious impairment in your mind? A. I feel he has a schizophrenic condition and he is not always psychotic. He phases in and out of psychosis, and so that in spite of a long term, chronic serious mental disorder this is not at all times so severe to say that he is always psychotic, no. Also: In Dr. Young's report to the court, which he supported in lengthy testimony, we find the following: Also: My impression is that Clarence Dean Pedersen is a disturbed and dangerous individual of low normal intelligence who also presents with marked antisocial tendencies. He exhibits paranoid thinking and outbursts of sadistic hostile impulses, as well as a tendency toward marked denial of unpleasant reality. Although organicity from past drug usage cannot be completely discounted and an electroencephalogram in 1976 showed Rt. Occipital spike activity, current psychological testing does not support a diagnostic impression of organicity. Diagnostically *500 Dean presents with Schizophrenia, Simple or Chronic Undifferentiated type. And this: B. We have previously quoted the record regarding defendant's utterances and conduct before, during, and following trial. They are illustrative, and we see no necessity to quote the record further. The psychiatrists did not have the benefit of some of this subsequent information. What effect, if any, it might have on their views we do not know. III. Where then does our de novo review of all these attendant facts and circumstances lead us? Defendant did not defend at all at the murder trial; the verdict was a foregone conclusion. The defender contends this was because defendant, from a delusion and negativism induced by mental illness, believed he had to be released under a thirty-day time limit. The prosecutor claims defendant could have had counsel and a defense if he had wanted them. Was defendant's refusal to accept counsel and a defense the result of mental illness, or was it cupidity or some other rational choice by him? This issue is essentially factual, but in arriving at our finding we have in mind the opening remarks of the United States Supreme Court in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896, 903-04, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 112-13 (1975): Upon our de novo review of the entire record, pretrial, during trial, and posttrial, we find that from mental illness, defendant was unable to assist effectively in his defense. His conviction cannot stand, consistently with due process of law. IV. The parties have argued several other issues, but we find no necessity to consider those questions in view of our disposition of the appeal on the central issue of defendant's competency at the time of trial. V. We return the case to district court for further proceedings. The fact may be that defendant is now competent to assist effectively in his defense or that he may with treatment become competent; or that proceedings may be necessary under sections 812.4 and 812.5 of the Code; or that still other proceedings may be indicated. In any event the further proceedings are to comport, of course, with due process and sections 812.3 to 812.5 of the Code. The clerk is directed to tax printing costs for defendant's brief at four dollars per page. Iowa R.App.P. 16(c). REVERSED AND REMANDED.