Title: People v. Hall

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86168-Agenda 4-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								ANTHONY HALL, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 1, 2000.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court:
	Following a 1984 bench trial in the circuit court of McLean
County, defendant, Anthony Hall, was convicted of murder. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a). At a separate sentencing
hearing, the court, sitting without a jury, found defendant eligible
for the death penalty and further determined that there were no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of that
sentence. Pursuant to defendant's subsequent petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ordered that defendant receive a new sentencing hearing.
Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1997).
	The circuit court of McLean County held a new sentencing
hearing. A jury determined that there were no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
penalty. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to death. The
death sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
	The record contains the following pertinent facts. On February
8, 1983, the body of the victim, Frieda King, was found in a closet
next to a walk-in freezer at the Pontiac Correctional Center. She
had been stabbed to death. At the time of the murder, the victim
had been the civilian supervisor of the inmate kitchen, where
defendant had been working as a clerk. After an investigation,
defendant was charged in the circuit court of Livingston County
with the murder.
	Following a change of venue to McLean County, the circuit
court convicted defendant of murder and imposed the death
penalty. On direct review, this court upheld defendant's conviction
and sentence. People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376 (1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 951, 94 L. Ed. 2d 802, 107 S. Ct. 1618 (1987). Defendant
subsequently petitioned the circuit court for relief pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
122-1 et seq.). Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court
denied defendant's petition and this court affirmed. People v. Hall,
157 Ill. 2d 324 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 999, 130 L. Ed. 2d 415, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994).
	The United States District Court for the Central District of
Illinois denied in full defendant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Hall v. Washington, 916 F. Supp. 1411 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed in part, holding that defendant "received
ineffective assistance of counsel at his capital sentencing hearing
and that he must be granted a new sentencing hearing." Hall v.
Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 1997).
	The circuit court of McLean County held a new sentencing
hearing. Prior to the first stage thereof, defendant moved to
stipulate that: he had attained the age of 18 years at the time of the
murder of which he was convicted, and that the murder victim was
a Department of Corrections employee who was killed in the
course of performing her official duties. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983,
ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(2). The trial court granted defendant's motion
and, based thereon, found that he was eligible for the death
penalty.
	At the second stage of the capital sentencing hearing, a jury
heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation. We recount the
aggravation evidence that the State presented in the order that the
events occurred.
	One morning in September 1975, defendant, age 16,
approached Kathy Ford Washington as she was on her way to
work. He asked her for the time. When she looked up from her
watch, he was displaying a handgun. He demanded her money and
became upset upon discovering that she did not have much. He
forced her to walk into a vacant building, where he raped her at
gunpoint. He eventually pled guilty to armed robbery and was
sentenced to a prison term of four years.
	In October 1975, defendant entered the bedroom of Denise
Smith and her sister Hermie. He raped and robbed each at
gunpoint. He eventually pled guilty to rape and was sentenced to
a four-year prison term.
	Defendant was incarcerated in a juvenile detention facility
until he was 18, at which time he was transferred to Menard
Correctional Center. There, in February 1978, a large fight began
during a lunch period, which grew to as many as 30 inmates.
Defendant held an inmate while two others beat, kicked, and twice
stabbed the inmate. As discipline, defendant lost one year of good-time credit on his sentence. Defendant was imprisoned for
approximately three years.
	One afternoon in November 1980, Alfreda McIntosh was
walking down a street. Defendant called out to her, asking if he
knew her. McIntosh replied in the negative and walked faster.
Defendant ran to her, put his arm around her, and held a knife to
her. Upon his demand, McIntosh gave defendant her money.
	Defendant directed McIntosh at knifepoint to a building; she
refused to enter. Defendant then took her around the side of the
building and forced her to sit on some stairs. Defendant then
ordered McIntosh to pull down her pants. As she stood to do so,
she grabbed defendant's knife. A struggle ensued, in which
McIntosh was cut. Defendant overpowered her, retrieved his knife,
returned her to the stairs, and repeated his demand. When she
complied and ceased struggling, defendant lost his erection and
could not penetrate her.
	The State elicited from McIntosh that the attack had long-term
effects on her. She found it difficult to be around men, especially
in trains, buses, and elevators.
	Defendant was eventually indicted on several charges relating
to the McIntosh attack, tried, and convicted of armed robbery and
armed violence. He was sentenced to a prison term of 40 years.
	Defendant was serving this sentence when, on February 8,
1983, he murdered the victim in this case. Through witnesses and
exhibits, the State recounted its case against defendant at the guilt
phase of his trial. See Hall, 114 Ill. 2d  at 392-98.
	In July 1983, a female correctional officer delivered books
and magazines to defendant in his cell. Defendant made a lewd
comment and exposed himself to her. A few days later, defendant
asked the officer to deny the incident and retract her report. He
feared that the incident would be used against him at his murder
trial.
	Attorney Steven Skelton testified to an incident that occurred
at defendant's trial. On February 24, 1984, immediately prior to
opening statements, defendant requested to proceed pro se and
asked for a continuance to prepare his defense. The trial judge
brought defendant; his two defense counsel, Skelton and David
Ahlemeyer; and a court reporter into a conference room adjoining
the courtroom. They were discussing defendant's representation
when defendant struck Skelton on the head with a chair, threw the
chair at Ahlemeyer, and then punched the trial judge on the head.
See Hall, 114 Ill. 2d  at 389-90.
	Later that day, defendant was taken from the courthouse to the
Logan Correctional Center. He was the lone inmate in the prison's
segregation unit. After about an hour, defendant questioned why
he was the only inmate there, grew afraid that he would be beaten,
and became very agitated. He wrenched a nine-foot piece of steel
from his cell wall and wrecked his cell, screaming that he had to
leave. After about an hour he calmed down.
	In January 1985, a correctional officer heard defendant state
that he wanted to decapitate the warden of his prison, even if it
meant receiving another death sentence. Defendant explained to
the correctional officer that the warden had told lies about
defendant. The incident was reported, but defendant was not
disciplined.
	On three occasions, in June 1987, May 1989, and February
1990, defendant had sexual contact with female visitors in prison
visiting rooms. In August 1994, defendant masturbated in front of
a female correctional officer and ejaculated on one of her shoes.
	Also, a sister of the victim presented victim impact testimony.
The victim came from a family with originally 13 siblings. One
sibling died as an infant and the victim was only the second sibling
to die. The victim was very close to her siblings; she was more
like a mother to them.
	The victim had seven children, all living at the time of her
death. She also had six grandchildren, three of whom were born
after she was killed and whom she would never meet. She was a
loving mother and grandmother. The victim's youngest son and
one of her brothers lived with the victim in her house. She cared
for them and made a home for them.
	The victim was very proud of and active in the Veterans of
Foreign Wars. She carried the flag in every parade. She bought a
rabbit suit with her own money to entertain children at various
functions.
	The victim was not afraid of working in a prison. She
believed that the inmates would never hurt her. In fact, many of
the inmates referred to the victim as "Mom."
	Defendant presented mitigation evidence from family and
acquaintances, prison employees, and clergy and counselors. This
evidence was presented through live testimony, affidavits, and
transcripts of testimony from prior proceedings.
	Defendant's mother, Annie Rogers, testified via videotape due
to physical impairments. Rogers testified as follows. She was
raped when she was 12 years old, resulting in defendant's birth.
Because she did not know how to care for a child, Rogers' mother
raised defendant. She was not married and had to work during the
day. Rogers' aunt and a neighbor helped look after defendant. He
completed elementary school, but did not complete high school.
	Rogers married when she was 16; the marriage produced two
children. Defendant never lived with Rogers during her marriage
or was part of her household. Rogers' husband eventually
abandoned her and she had to return to her mother's home. She
had to quit her job because one of the children from her marriage
began to fight at school.
	Rogers credited defendant with sustaining her. She had visited
defendant in prison, but now was unable to travel. She enjoyed
writing to defendant and receiving cards and letters from him.
Rogers acknowledged that she did not "pay any attention" to
defendant when he was a child. However, she loved him and
wanted to be a mother to him if it was not too late.
	The defense sought to introduce a 1990 affidavit by Patricia
Rolfe Hunt, which defendant presented in his post-conviction
proceeding. The defense had been unable to obtain her presence at
the sentencing hearing. Hunt's affidavit stated essentially as
follows. She was 41 years old, married with six children, and an
active church member. She is not related to defendant, whom she
had known since the early 1970s, when he was between 12 and 14
years old. Defendant baby-sat for Hunt during this time, and she
would see him almost daily. Hunt found defendant to be an honest,
dependable, and mild-mannered young man, who did not appear
to be violent. She trusted him to such an extent that she would
leave money around her home; defendant never took anything
from her.
	Hunt recalled an incident where defendant saved the life of
one of her children. The child began choking on a bone. Hunt was
frightened and unable to respond, but defendant responded and
saved the child's life.
	After losing contact with defendant for several years, Hunt
eventually learned that he was in prison. Since she liked,
respected, and had fond memories of him, Hunt contacted
defendant and visited him in 1988 or 1989. She had spoken with
defendant in 1990 when she executed her affidavit.
	In response to the State's objection, the trial court excised the
reference to defendant's saving the life of one of Hunt's children.
Defendant's trial counsel read the redacted affidavit to the jury.
	Leta Mills testified as follows. When Mills was 14 years old,
she participated in a summer camp swimming tournament. During
a race, she passed out in the deep end of a pool. Defendant rescued
her and administered first aid. They became friends. In the early
1980s Mills began to visit defendant in prison. She was married
between 1981 and 1984. In 1985, Mills resumed visiting
defendant. It was Mills who had sexual contact with defendant in
May 1989 and February 1990. During that time they were engaged
to be married; the engagement ended sometime in 1990. They
correspond with each other and will always be friends.
	Scott Wineberg testified to several telephone conversations he
had with defendant. During that time, Wineberg was a student at
Chicago-Kent College of Law. He worked, under the supervision
of defendant's trial counsel, in the school's clinical program.
Wineberg's first assignment was defendant's case.
	During the summer of 1990, defendant telephoned Wineberg
regarding his case quite often, generating telephone bills of about
$300 per month. In these conversations, defendant expressed
concern and compassion for others, namely his trial counsel and
Wineberg's family and classmates. Through these conversations,
Wineberg came to know defendant as a person. Defendant
additionally sent letters and holiday cards to Wineberg.
	Yvonne Del Vecchio testified as follows. She was the mother
of George Del Vecchio, a former Menard inmate who had been
executed. George was last imprisoned at Menard for about 18
years. Several years prior to his execution, George spoke of
defendant to Del Vecchio. Defendant and George were friends;
they spoke of church and religion. Del Vecchio actually met
defendant after George was executed. They have corresponded
with each other since 1997. In his letters, defendant showed care
and concern for her and for others, and never acted improperly in
any way. Also, Del Vecchio visited others in prison. She would
occasionally see defendant and they would greet each other.
	Defendant also presented mitigation evidence from prison
employees. From 1979 until her retirement in 1991, Gwendolyn
Teske was a food supervisor at Pontiac. She had worked with the
victim, and had supervised defendant. During this time, Teske did
not observe defendant act violently toward herself or anyone else.
He always fulfilled his duties and was very cooperative.
	At approximately the beginning of 1983, Thomas O'Connor
began working as a clerk in Pontiac's food service department.
There he met defendant and worked with him daily. Defendant
was in charge of completing various government regulatory forms.
He also planned master menus, often over a year in advance. He
was efficient and competent. Indeed, defendant was the only
person in the department who really knew much about its
operations. Defendant was very helpful to O'Connor and assisted
in training him. Defendant never acted inappropriately. To the
contrary, in some ways defendant was instrumental in improving
relations between department staff and inmates.
	In 1993, Colleen Rennison began working as a paralegal at
Menard. Her function was to supervise the prison law library to
make legal resources available to inmates. It was not part of her
job to learn the details of inmates' cases. Her duties included
touring the prison's condemned unit two to three times weekly,
totaling approximately eight hours.
	Rennison met defendant in the early spring of 1993.
Defendant was eager to learn new words. She would help
defendant and other inmates to read and write. Defendant was
trying to learn more about the legal system. She saw him in the
library and in his cell. Defendant kept his cell very neat, and never
had anything inappropriate on his cell walls. Defendant never
acted inappropriately toward Rennison, or anyone else to her
knowledge. Rather, defendant was very pleasant.
	Defendant presented mitigation evidence also from clergy and
counselors. Lloyd Shaddle had testified on defendant's behalf at
defendant's first sentencing hearing (see Hall, 114 Ill. 2d at 401).
Shaddle subsequently died. At the second sentencing hearing,
defense counsel read the transcript of Shaddle's testimony.
	Shaddle testified as follows. He was a minister for the
Jehovah's Witnesses. He had known defendant since 1982.
Shaddle conducted Bible studies at Pontiac. Defendant regularly
attended these Bible classes until he was charged with the victim's
murder. Thereafter, Shaddle twice visited defendant, who
expressed more concern for his family than for himself.
	Father Richard Means had testified on defendant's behalf at
the evidentiary hearing on defendant's post-conviction petition
(see Hall, 157 Ill. 2d at 337). Father Means subsequently died. At
the second sentencing hearing, defense counsel and another priest
read responsively the transcript of Father Means' testimony.
	Father Means testified as follows. From February 1983 to
August 1986, he was a Roman Catholic chaplain in the Illinois
Department of Corrections. He met defendant shortly after the
murder charge. For over a year, he spent more time with defendant
than with any other prisoner. Means found defendant to be
intelligent, very literate, and very interested in religion. Means
found defendant's interest in religious studies to be sincere. They
never spoke much about this case, but defendant at times spoke
fondly of the victim. Means never saw defendant lose his temper
or act violently. Means had never before testified at a death
sentencing hearing on behalf of an inmate. However, after great
reflection, he had decided to appear on defendant's behalf.
	Major Daniel Hudson testified as follows. He was a Salvation
Army minister, who was engaged in full-time prison work. As a
correctional services coordinator, he supervised four chaplains and
had at least 43 federal, state, and local prisons and jails in his
region. One Sunday per month for the previous six years, Daniel
and his wife, Martha, conducted religious services at Menard.
Defendant attended nearly all of those services, through which
Daniel and Martha came to know defendant. In fact, Daniel spent
more time with defendant than with other inmates. They discussed,
inter alia, religion, about which defendant seemed sincere.
Defendant showed concern for his mother and asked Daniel to
pray for her. Daniel and Martha, who testified separately on
defendant's behalf, never observed defendant act improperly
toward correctional officers or inmates. Martha felt safe and
comfortable in defendant's presence.
	Daniel also described the lack of privacy at Menard. Since
cells, and even showers, lacked conventional doors, the only
possible way for an inmate to obtain privacy is to hang a sheet or
blanket on his cell bars. Daniel regularly encountered inmate
nudity and, occasionally, even inmate self-gratification. Again,
however, Daniel never observed defendant act improperly. This
was the first time that Daniel ever testified in court. Daniel wanted
to appear on behalf of defendant, who never asked Daniel to do so.
	John Nordgaard testified as follows. A Lutheran minister, he
developed a prisoner and family program through Lutheran Social
Services of Illinois. Through small groups, this secular program
monitored death row conditions and helped death row inmates
maintain contact with families and lawyers. Nordgaard began
visiting the condemned unit at Menard in 1981 or 1982. He met
defendant in 1985 when defendant was placed in the condemned
unit. Nordgaard also described the lack of privacy at Menard. He
visited Menard on the average of five times per year, and only on
a very few of those visits did he not spend time with defendant. In
their conversations, and in letters to Nordgaard, defendant
expressed sincere concern for his and Nordgaard's families.
Defendant had never acted inappropriately towards Nordgaard or
anyone else.
	Jacquelyn Wallace testified as follows. She was a Cook
County juvenile probation officer and an ordained minister.
Around 1990, Wallace served as a director in Prison Fellowship.
She visited Menard as a member of the coalition that Reverend
Nordgaard described. She met defendant through those visits and
had visited him ever since, every other month for seven years.
Also, defendant regularly telephoned Wallace, at least once per
month. Their conversations included religious matters. Wallace
found defendant to be genuine and sincere. Defendant had never
acted improperly towards Wallace or anyone else.
	At the close of the sentencing hearing, the jury found that
there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty. The trial court accordingly
sentenced defendant to death.
	Defendant appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be
discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.
DISCUSSION
	Defendant contends he was denied a fair capital sentencing
hearing because: (1) the State introduced victim impact evidence
from the victim of a prior crime; (2) the trial court erroneously
excluded several items of mitigation evidence; (3) the State's
cross-examination of defense witnesses was improper; (4) the
State's closing argument was inflammatory; (5) the trial court's
explanation to the jury of the role of "mercy" in a capital
sentencing hearing was confusing and erroneous; and (6) the trial
court refused to allow defendant to address the jury in allocution.
Defendant also contends: (7) this case should be remanded to the
trial court for a determination of whether he was taking a
"psychotropic-type" drug at his original trial; and (8) the Illinois
death penalty statute is unconstitutional.
I. Victim Impact Evidence: Prior Crime
	Defendant first contends that he was denied a fair capital
sentencing hearing because the State elicited from Alfreda
McIntosh that defendant's attack had long-term effects on her. She
testified that she found it difficult to be around men, especially in
trains, buses, and elevators. Defendant relies on People v. Hope,
184 Ill. 2d 39, 51 (1998), in which this court held that, based on
the eighth amendment, "victim impact evidence will come only
from a survivor of the murder for which the defendant is presently
on trial, not from survivors of offenses collateral to the crime for
which defendant is being tried."
	However, the record shows that defendant neither objected to
McIntosh's testimony nor included the issue in his post-sentencing
motion. Therefore, the issue is waived. People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 555 (1989). Nevertheless, defendant characterizes
McIntosh's testimony as plain error under Supreme Court Rule
615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). The plain error rule may be invoked
if the evidence at a sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or if
the error was so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
sentencing hearing. People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 111 (1996).
	After reviewing the record, we conclude that this issue does
not satisfy either requirement of the plain error rule. Initially, we
do not consider the evidence in aggravation and mitigation to be
closely balanced. It is true that defendant presented mitigation
evidence from many witnesses, which touched upon several areas
of his life. These witnesses essentially recounted defendant's
troubled childhood and vouched for his good character.
	However, defendant's mitigation evidence must be weighed
against the aggravation evidence. In denying his federal habeas
corpus petition, the federal district court noted defendant's
"considerable criminal history" and described the aggravating
nature of this murder:
			"However, these general allegations of [defendant's]
good character and childhood deprivations hardly rebut
the laundry list of aggravating evidence stacked against
him. To begin with, [defendant] is a convicted murderer.
He carried a knife to the cold storage area of the prison
with the intent to murder [the victim] in cold blood. The
number of wounds inflicted upon her body was evidence
that she suffered a brutal death. [Defendant] committed
this murder despite his regular attendance at bible study
classes in prison. He used his assignment in the inmate
kitchen to commit the murder. He killed [the victim]
while she was working in the course of her duties at the
prison." Hall, 916 F. Supp.  at 1429.
"The brutal facts of this murder, balanced against the evidence
offered in mitigation, render a conclusion that the evidence was
not closely balanced." People v. Williams, No. 85625, slip op. at
27 (May 25, 2000).
	Additionally, the State's error was not so egregious as to
deprive defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. It is true that the
State erroneously elicited from McIntosh that defendant's attack
adversely affected her. This is admittedly impact evidence from
the victim of another crime, which "is irrelevant and therefore
inadmissible." Hope, 184 Ill. 2d  at 53. However, the typed
transcript of McIntosh's testimony was 28 double-spaced pages,
while the State's elicitation was in the form of only one question,
which McIntosh answered in seven lines. Considering the
significant aggravation evidence, and McIntosh's brief answer, we
conclude that the State's error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 468-71 (1996);
People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 553-54 (1992); People v. Crews,
122 Ill. 2d 266, 286-88 (1988). Therefore, this error does not
constitute plain error. Accordingly, defendant's procedural default
of this issue is not excused.
II. Exclusion of Mitigation Evidence
	Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in excluding
several items of written mitigation evidence. The trial court
excluded that portion of the Hunt affidavit referring to defendant's
saving the life of one of Hunt's children, and two letters from
persons who corresponded with defendant.
	To meet constitutional standards, a capital sentencing hearing
must allow for individualized consideration of the offender and the
offense. In conjunction with this requirement, the sentencer in a
capital case may not be precluded from considering, or refuse to
consider as a matter of law, any relevant mitigation evidence
offered by the defense. Allowing the sentencer to consider all
relevant mitigation evidence satisfies the requirement of
individualized sentencing in capital cases. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 454 (1993).
	Accordingly, the ordinary rules of evidence are relaxed at the
aggravation-mitigation stage of a capital sentencing hearing. This
is necessary because it is important that the sentencer possess the
fullest information possible with respect to the defendant's life,
character, criminal record, and the circumstances of the particular
offense. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 171 (1998); People v.
Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 236 (1993). As a result, the only
requirement for the admissibility of evidence at this stage of a
capital sentencing hearing is that the evidence be relevant and
reliable. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 236.
A. Standard of Review
	The parties initially disagree as to how we should apply the
above-stated principles to this case. The State contends that we
should review deferentially the trial court's exclusion of this
proffered evidence. The determination of relevant and reliable
evidence at a capital sentencing hearing rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 171; Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 450. Although a reviewing court may have ruled
differently, the trial court's evidentiary ruling may not be reversed
absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264,
281 (1990). An abuse of discretion will be found only where the
trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.
People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). Reviewing courts
generally use an abuse-of-discretion standard to review evidentiary
rulings rather than review them de novo. People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 296 (1994).
	Defendant, however, contends that we should review de novo
the trial court's exclusion of this proffered evidence. It is true that
reviewing courts sometimes review evidentiary rulings de novo.
This exception to the general rule of deference applies in cases that
involve questions of statutory interpretation (e.g., People v.
Kinsloe, 281 Ill. App. 3d 799, 806-09 (1996)), or other questions
of law (e.g., People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999);
People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1994)). Defendant
reasons that the evidentiary rulings at issue here involved no fact-finding based on the demeanor or credibility of the witnesses
because the evidence was written. Citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998), defendant argues that the trial court's
evidentiary rulings were uniquely legal rulings, which we may
review de novo.
	We reject defendant's argument and review these evidentiary
rulings with deference to the trial court. The following
observations apply here: "The decision whether to admit evidence
cannot be made in isolation. The trial judge must consider a
number of circumstances that bear on that issue, including
questions of remoteness and prejudice." Childress, 158 Ill. 2d  at
296. In this case, the trial court exercised discretion in making
these evidentiary rulings, i.e., the court based these rulings on the
specific circumstances of this case and not on a broadly applicable
rule. See generally United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1437
(7th Cir. 1996); People v. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d 743 (1999).
B. Hunt Affidavit
	Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding that
portion of the Hunt affidavit referring to defendant's saving the
life of one of Hunt's children. Hearsay evidence, such as
affidavits, may be admitted without cross-examination where
relevant and reliable. People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 246
(1997). For example, the trial court in Thomas was within its
discretion in finding that affidavit evidence to be reliable because
"the affidavits were reliable opinion evidence from trained experts
who diagnosed defendant based on their professional experience."
Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d  at 246. In contrast, the trial court in this case
determined that this information lacked sufficient detail to be
reliable.
	Defendant points to Hall from the federal court of appeals, in
which the court specifically referred to this portion of the Hunt
affidavit as an example of available mitigation evidence that
defendant's trial counsel should have investigated. Hall, 106 F.3d 
at 746. Defendant reasons, therefore, that this information "was
obviously relevant and compelling." However, the federal court of
appeals was referring to assumed live testimony of Hunt, subject
to cross-examination. Here, no guaranties of reliability were
present. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding this portion of the Hunt affidavit.


C. Letters From England


	Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding two
letters. The defense was unable to obtain the presence of two
persons from England who had corresponded with defendant for
several years. Each letter describes defendant's compassion,
religious convictions, and concern for others.
	We uphold the trial court's ruling. Although each writer had
corresponded with defendant for several years, neither writer
actually had met defendant. Indeed, one writer explained that
defendant had written to an organization in England seeking "a
pen-friend." The trial court expressly found that these letters
lacked sufficient reliability based on the circumstances under
which they were written and the relationship between defendant
and the writers. The judge also observed that the information in
the letters required cross-examination and the inability to do so
was extremely significant. We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding these letters. See, e.g., People v.
Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 454-55 (1988).
III. State's Improper Cross-Examination
	Defendant next contends that the State's cross-examination of
several defense witnesses was improper. Generally, any
permissible kind of impeaching matter may be developed on cross-examination, since one of the purposes thereof is to test the
credibility of the witnesses. The latitude to be allowed on cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; a
reviewing court should not interfere absent a clear abuse of
discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant.
Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d  at 454; People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237,
269 (1985).
	Defendant claims that the State improperly: (A) questioned
defense witnesses as to defendant's lack of remorse for murdering
the victim; and (B) asked defense witnesses if they were present
while defendant was murdering the victim. Defendant adds that
the State exacerbated the prejudice from this questioning by its
corresponding remarks during closing argument.
A. Lack of Remorse
	The State elicited from several defense witnesses that
defendant never discussed with them the victim's murder, or
sought forgiveness for murdering the victim. During closing
argument, the State correspondingly remarked:
		"And what is interesting, you heard all these clergymen
come to the witness stand and testify. Did you hear a
single one even breathe a hint to you that at any time for
one second [defendant] ever indicated one shred of
remorse for murdering [the victim] ***? Has he ever
indicated to these clergymen, if he was truly a Christian,
he is growing in the Christian faith, wouldn't you think
that one of the things about growing in the Christian faith
would be to take responsibility for what you have done
and ask for forgiveness? He had opportunity after
opportunity after opportunity after opportunity to ask for
forgiveness and he never did it. He never showed any
attempt to show remorse for [the victim].
* * *
			It is time for [defendant] to take responsibility like he
has never done for the murder of [the victim]. Today is
the day for him to take responsibility for her murder."
	Defendant claims that he "retained the constitutional right not
to make any statements to anyone about his case." Defendant
asserts that the State, through this cross-examination and
corresponding argument, impinged upon his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, i.e., his right to remain silent.
He argues that the State directed the jury's attention to his failure
to confess to these witnesses that he murdered the victim.
	However, defendant objected only to the first of the questions
of which he now complains; he did not contemporaneously object
to subsequent questions and he failed to include this issue in his
post-sentencing motion. Therefore, the issue is waived. Turner,
128 Ill. 2d  at 555.
	Defendant's invocation of the plain error rule is unavailing.
Initially, as we earlier concluded, the evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing was not closely balanced.
	Addressing the second requirement of the plain error rule, the
State's cross-examination and argument did not deprive defendant
of a fair capital sentencing hearing. The fifth amendment right to
remain silent does not apply to defendant under these
circumstances. It must be remembered:
		"[T]here is no such thing as a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. There is a privilege only
against compelled self-incrimination. The key element is
compulsion. The core purpose of the privilege is not to
protect a defendant against self-incrimination generally
nor even to guard a defendant against foolish and ill-advised self-incrimination; it is to shield a defendant
against governmental coercion." (Emphasis in original.)
Ross v. State, 78 Md. App. 275, 279, 552 A.2d 1345,
1347 (1989).
Without compulsion, " 'the gears of the Fifth Amendment
privilege are not engaged. ***.' [Citation.]" Hunter v. State, 110
Md. App. 144, 164-65, 676 A.2d 968, 978 (1996). Indeed, we note
that "[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to
secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause." Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 483, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1986).
	In this case, defendant does not-and could not-assert that any
incriminating statement he could have made to these witnesses
would have been the result of governmental coercion or
compulsion. Defendant's conversations with these witnesses were
wholly voluntary. "For that reason, if for no other, it is clear that
no right protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination was violated in this case." Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374, 383, 87 S. Ct. 408, 414-15 (1966). Accordingly, there was no plain error, and
defendant's procedural default of this issue is not excused.
B. Other Improper Questions
	Defendant contends that the State improperly cross-examined
defense witnesses by asking them other irrelevant and
inflammatory questions. For example, the State asked several
defense witnesses if they were present while defendant was
murdering the victim.
	However, defendant objected only to the first of the questions
of which he now complains and that objection was sustained. As
to all of the subsequent questions, defendant failed both to object
at the sentencing hearing and to include the issue in his post-sentencing motion. Therefore, the issue is waived. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d  at 555. After reviewing the record, we further conclude that this
issue does not warrant our consideration under the plain error
doctrine. See, e.g., People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 495 (1993).
IV. State's Improper Closing Argument
	Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair capital
sentencing hearing because the State made two improper and
prejudicial remarks during closing argument. The State referred to:
defendant's killing again if his life were spared and if he were
placed in the general prison population; and the victim's not
receiving "a trial or appeal or lawyer to represent her." The record
shows that defendant failed both to object to these remarks and to
include this issue in his post-sentencing motion. The issue is,
therefore, waived. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 518 (1996);
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 495-96.
	Defendant invokes the plain error rule. A reviewing court
would normally consider waived any error related to comments to
which no objections were made, unless the comments were so
inflammatory that defendant could not have received a fair trial or
so flagrant as to threaten deterioration of the judicial process.
People v. Sims, No. 84686, slip op. at 33-34 (June 15, 2000);
People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 104 (1984). Considered in the
context of the State's entire closing argument, these brief
references did not deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing, or
threaten deterioration of the judicial process. Consequently, we
find no plain error. See Sims, slip op. at 34.
V. Court's Explanation of "Mercy"
	During defense counsel's closing argument, the trial court
explained to the jury the role of "mercy" in a capital sentencing
hearing. Defendant contends the court's explanation was
confusing and misled the jury.
	The defense and the prosecution debated this subject
throughout the sentencing hearing. In his opening statement,
defense counsel told the jury that defendant's troubled childhood
began with the circumstances surrounding his birth. Counsel
discussed how defendant was conceived by his mother being raped
at age 12 and how defendant never had a father figure. Counsel
related the difficult life and poor medical condition of defendant's
mother. Counsel told the jury that, at the time of the sentencing
hearing, defendant's mother was so ill that she could not visit
defendant in prison; indeed, she rarely left her room. At this point
in the defense opening statement, the State objected, asking:
"What relevance does this have as to her testimony about the
Defendant's childhood *** other than sympathy?" The trial court
overruled the objection.
	Later in his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury:
"As you sit here and listen to the evidence, you can even consider
mercy; mercy is a valid reason," at which point the trial court
sustained the State's objection.
	On several occasions throughout the sentencing hearing,
outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge and both sides
discussed at length the distinction between the concepts of
"mercy" and "sympathy." For example:
			"THE COURT: I wanted to say something on the
record. I have been reviewing those cases on the issue of
mercy, and the *** courts have indicated mercy is, as they
define it, an appropriate mitigating circumstance. I just
want you to know I reviewed that and I know what the
law is, and I am not saying this be the instruction or
something, but to distill in my own mind, mercy is that
kind of sympathy or compassion which may naturally
arise from the evidence presented, particularly mitigation
evidence. It is not a characteristic that exists that they can
consider existing independently of the evidence. *** It is
not the same as mere sympathy or prejudice not based on
the evidence; it is the natural feeling one may get from
evidence, such as background, circumstances that are
raised, that kind of thing.
* * *
			*** They are allowed to feel sorry for somebody
because they grew up in terrible circumstances, but they
are not allowed to ignore the evidence and just give him
mercy out of nowhere, out of the goodness of their hearts
they decide that is what they want to do."
	During defense counsel's closing argument, this issue again
arose:
			"[Defense counsel]: A mitigating circumstance is a fact
about the offense or about the Defendant which in
fairness, even mercy-
			[Prosecutor]: Again objection, Judge. Fairness and
mercy are not interchangeable in this trial. That is the law.
I object to that.
			[Defense counsel]: Mercy is a mitigating factor.
			THE COURT: As you define it.
* * *
			[Defense counsel]: *** And now I think it has come to
the point where we are going to have to try to define
mercy.
			[Prosecutor]: I am going to object.
			THE COURT: Listen to what he says.
			[Defense counsel]: I feel that I am on a tightrope, but let
me at least say this. Mercy is, no matter what it is, it is a
relevant, mitigating factor. It is one of those any other
reasons supported by the evidence. It is an option for you,
and I know exactly-
			[Prosecutor]: I am going to object that it is an option for
them.
			THE COURT: Sustained.
			[Defense counsel]: It is something that you can take
into account-
			[Prosecutor]: Objection.
			THE COURT: Overruled.
			[Defense counsel]: -in terms of aggravation and
mitigation, and the State is going to say why show him
mercy; he didn't show any to [the victim]. Show him that
we are better than him. We as a people, we as an
institution, yes, show mercy to his mother.
			[Prosecutor]: Objection.
			THE COURT: Sustained.
			[Prosecutor]: Ask that the jury be instructed to
disregard those comments which were sustained.
			[Defense counsel]: *** [I]s not mercy to the mother
something within the mitigating factors that can be
considered?
			THE COURT: Mercy is, as defined in the case law, the
part that says you can consider it, its defined as that
natural feeling of sympathy for something that may arise
from certain evidence, like we all feel sympathetic to
someone who was raped at 12 and had a child. That is a
natural reaction. Feeling those kinds of feelings are
appropriate to consider. Showing mercy is a different
thing."
Defendant now contends that this explanation from the trial judge
was inaccurate and confused the jury.
	This issue reflects the contrary roles of "sympathy" and
"mercy" in an Illinois capital sentencing hearing. These concepts
are represented in the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, which the
jury in this case received and of which defendant does not
complain. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7C.01
(3d ed. 1992) (hereafter IPI Criminal 3d) reads in part: "You are
not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling." This court
has repeatedly upheld the admonishment against sympathy in
capital sentencing hearings. See, e.g., People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 41-43 (1988); People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 95-96 (1986).
	The jury also received IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06, which
reads in part: "Mitigating factors include: *** Any other reason
supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be
sentenced to death." IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06. This court has
repeatedly held that mercy is one such "other reason." See, e.g.,
People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 234-35 (1999); People v. Miller,
173 Ill. 2d 167, 199 (1996).
	This court has held that a reasonable juror, interpreting these
instructions as a whole, would disregard the emotion of sympathy
in general when sentencing a defendant, yet would consider the
defendant's mitigation evidence and base the sentencing decision
partly on the mitigation evidence "and any feelings of sympathy or
mercy it elicited in that juror's heart or mind." People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 129 (1990); accord People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236,
254-56 (1995). In this case, the jury was free to consider
defendant's relationship with his mother as a reason for not
sentencing him to death. The admonishment against sympathy in
no way diminished the impact of this mitigating evidence. See
People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 112-13 (1990).
	Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court's explanation
suggested to the jury that mercy differed from other mitigating
factors, it was error. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 244-45. As to the
propriety of the trial court's oral explanation generally, we repeat
the following:
			"Instructions found in IPI were drafted with the goal of
sharply reducing the number of cases in which jury
verdicts were set aside because of erroneous instructions.
Consequently, each instruction was painstakingly drafted
with the use of simple, brief and unslanted language so as
to clearly and concisely state the law. To insure the use of
such instructions, this court adopted Rule 451(a), which
requires that an instruction in IPI be given where
applicable, unless the court determines that the instruction
does not accurately state the law. It is axiomatic,
therefore, that the use of additional instructions on a
subject already covered by IPI would defeat the goal that
all instructions be simple, brief, impartial and free from
argument." People v. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 545
(1980).
In this case, however, the jury received proper written instructions.
Therefore, any possible error relating to the trial judge's prior, oral
explanation was harmless. See People v. Gacy, 103 Ill. 2d 1, 98-100 (1984); accord People v. Coulter, 230 Ill. App. 3d 209, 217
(1992); People v. Gray, 215 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1052 (1991).
VI. Allocution
	Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in not
allowing him to read a statement to the jury in allocution. There is
no statutory or constitutional right to allocution in a capital
sentencing hearing. People v. Simms, No. 86200, slip op. at 53
(August 10, 2000); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 519 (1996).
	Defendant recognizes this holding, but notes the State's
argument that he expressed no remorse for murdering the victim.
Defendant refers to his proffered allocution statement, in which he
said: "To my victims, near or far, I've only had the opportunity to
mention the following in prayer, But THANKS to Your Honor, I
can say: PLEASE FORGIVE ME." Defendant is correct that "[t]he
Due Process Clause does not allow the execution of a person 'on
the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or
explain.' [Citation.]" Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,
161, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 141, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2192-93 (1994)
(opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ.); accord Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817,
821 (Ky. 1997); State v. Borders, 255 Kan. 871, 886, 879 P.2d 620, 631 (1994) (and cases cited therein). Defendant now argues
that the State denied him due process by arguing his lack of
remorse when he was not allowed to respond.
	We cannot accept this argument. Defendant, of course, could
have testified at the capital sentencing hearing, under oath and
subject to reasonable cross-examination. However, he could not
have spoken other than as a witness. See People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 376 (1981). In a written motion to make an allocution
statement, defendant acknowledged that he would be subject to
cross-examination if he testified; therefore, according to his
motion, he sought to "present mitigation" through allocution.
However, defendant had no right to address the jury without being
under oath and subject to cross-examination. See People v. Perez,
108 Ill. 2d 70, 89 (1985).
VII. Remand for Psychotropic Medication Hearing
	Defendant next contends that this case should be remanded to
the trial court for a determination of whether he was taking a
"psychotropic-type" drug at his original trial. His original trial
counsel sought a fitness determination based on defendant's
failure to cooperate. Defendant was examined by a psychiatrist
and, in October 1983, had a fitness hearing. The trial court found
that defendant was fit to stand trial.
	However, defendant now points to an April 1984 presentence
report, which states, in pertinent part, that defendant "had 3
psychiatric contacts in 1983 *** and one resulting in medication
(Dalmane) being prescribed as reported by the casework
supervisor." Defendant notes, inter alia, that Dalmane is a
"hypnotic agent" used to treat insomnia; and that Dalmane has
caused side effects that include disorientation, confusion, and
irritability. Physician's Desk Reference 2520-21 (52d ed. 1998).
	Defendant concedes that the above-quoted sentence in the
presentence report is the only reference in the record, which
includes the psychiatric report prepared for the fitness hearing, to
any prescribed medication. However, based on the reference to
Dalmane, defendant reasons that it is unknown when, how much,
for how long-and we add, even if-Dalmane was administered to
him. Citing People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394, 414-15 (1995),
defendant requests that we order a limited remand so that the trial
court may expeditiously determine these matters.
	The State, however, contends that we are precluded from
reaching the merits of this issue due to lack of jurisdiction. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded
that defendant was "entitled to a writ of habeas corpus limited to
his sentence." (Emphasis added.) Hall, 106 F.3d  at 744. The court
of appeals remanded the cause to the federal district court "for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus requiring a new sentencing
hearing." (Emphasis added.) Hall, 106 F.3d  at 753. The State
invokes the mandate rule, i.e., "when a reviewing court issues a
mandate, it vests the trial court with jurisdiction to take only such
action as conforms to that mandate. [Citations.] Any other order
issued by the trial court is outside the scope of its authority and
void for lack of jurisdiction." People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Ill. 2d 271, 276-77 (1982). Therefore, the State now argues:
"Because the Seventh Circuit ordered a remand solely for a new
sentencing hearing, the trial court could not properly consider an
issue that is completely unrelated to sentencing. It follows that the
matter is not properly before this Court, either."
	We reject this contention. Pursuant to the mandate of the court
of appeals, the federal district court granted defendant's habeas
corpus petition to the extent set forth in the appellate opinion, and
ordered the Illinois Department of Corrections to release defendant
if he was not given a new sentencing hearing within 120 days of
its order. This "conditional release" order, in its "retry or release"
form, is the most common federal habeas corpus remedy today.
See generally 2 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice & Procedure §33.3 (3d ed. 1998). "Apart from regulating
the time during which the retrial or other proceeding is to take
place *** federal courts generally exercise little authority by
means of conditional release orders to supervise or control the
precise procedures utilized at any subsequent state court
proceedings." 2 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice & Procedure §33.3, at 1379-80 (3d ed. 1998). The
mandate of the federal district court did not preclude the trial court
from conducting the determination that defendant requests.
	However, the fact that the federal mandate does not control
the jurisdiction of Illinois courts does not mean that state law
authorizes defendant to raise this claim now. The sentencing
hearing at issue in this case clearly was not affected by the alleged
1983 ingestion of Dalmane, and defendant, of course, does not
claim that it was. Thus, any error with respect to this issue goes to
the guilt-innocence phase of the original proceedings, i.e.,
defendant's underlying convictions themselves. This appeal,
however, is not the proper vehicle in which to raise such an
argument. It is axiomatic that in an appeal from a contested
proceeding, the only errors at issue are those errors which occurred
at that proceeding. The case upon which defendant relies, People
v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394 (1995), does not support raising such
an argument in this procedural context. For these reasons, we will
not address this argument in this appeal and, accordingly, express
no opinion on whether the claim is procedurally defaulted or
meritorious.
VIII. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant lastly contends that the Illinois death penalty
statute is unconstitutional (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV; Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §§2, 11) for three reasons. He argues that the
statute is unconstitutional because: (1) innocent persons will
inevitably be executed; (2) the statute places a burden of proof on
the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of
mitigating evidence and allows the sentencer to weigh a vague
aggravating factor; and (3) the statute does not sufficiently
minimize the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death
sentences. This court has repeatedly rejected these contentions.
People v. McCallister, No. 85426, slip op. at 41 (July 6, 2000);
People v. Nieves, No. 84564, slip op. at 13 (July 6, 2000);
Williams, No. 85625, slip op. at 31-32. We decline to revisit these
holdings.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
McLean County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to
enter an order setting Tuesday, March 13, 2001, as the date on
which the sentence of death entered in the circuit court is to be
imposed. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The clerk of this court
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is now
confined.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring:
	I agree that defendant's murder conviction and death sentence
should be affirmed. Therefore, I join the majority opinion. I write
separately, however, as to issue VII, which involves defendant's
fitness for trial while under medication, in order to express the
continued adherence to People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000).
In Mitchell, we held that a defendant's claim that he was denied
due process when he did not receive a fitness hearing, although he
was taking psychotropic medication, is not cognizable on post-conviction review.
	Here, defendant cites to a 1984 presentence report that was
introduced at his original sentencing hearing 16 years ago. The
report indicates that, as the result of a 1983 "psychiatric contact[],"
defendant was prescribed Dalmane. Defendant argues that this
cause should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing to
determine whether he was being treated with Dalmane during the
time of his trial and, if so, to determine also the dosage of the drug
he received and the dates of treatment. Defendant characterizes
Dalmane as a "psychotropic-type"medication.(1)
	 Defendant did not raise the issue of his fitness for trial in his
direct appeal. See People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376 (1986).
Moreover, defendant did not raise the issue in post-conviction
proceedings (see People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324 (1993)); he did not
raise the issue in his habeas corpus petition (see Unbited States ex
rel. Hall v. Washington, 916 F. Supp. 1411 (C.D. Ill. 1996)); and
he did not raise it on review of the denial of his habeas corpus
petition (see Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1997)).
	On review of the denial of defendant's habeas corpus
petition, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted defendant
a new sentencing hearing on the basis that counsel was ineffective
at defendant's capital sentencing hearing for failing to present
mitigating evidence and for failing to make an appropriate closing
argument. Hall, 106 F.3d  at 748-49. Defendant received a second
sentencing hearing and was again sentenced to death. Now, on
direct review of his second sentencing hearing, defendant, for the
first time, raises the issue of his fitness for trial. Under Mitchell,
defendant's argument in this case would have been barred
numerous proceedings ago.
	To the extent the majority opinion, by evading the issue,
impliedly suggests that a procedural vehicle exists in which
defendant may raise his claim, I disagree. Under Mitchell,
defendant's claim is barred.
	JUSTICES MILLER, HEIPLE and RATHJE join in this
special concurrence.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	Hall's death sentence cannot be allowed to stand. For the
reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty
law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I,
section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
Hall's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the cause
should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j).
1.      1Although defendant refers to Dalmane as a "psychotropic-type" or
a "psychotropic-like" medication, defendant does not argue that
Dalmane fits within the definition of psychotropic medications adopted
by this court. See Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 323-24. Dalmane, which is
used to treat insomnia, is classified among the "Sedatives & Hypnotics,"
and not among the "Psychotherapeutic Agents." See Physician's Desk
Reference 214, 216, 2520 (52d ed. 1998).