Title: Commonwealth v. Concepcion

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12382 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RAYMOND CONCEPCION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 4, 2020. - March 16, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, Grand jury, 
Retroactivity of judicial holding.  Retroactivity of 
Judicial Holding.  Jurisdiction, Superior Court, Juvenile 
Court.  Superior Court, Jurisdiction.  Juvenile Court, 
Jurisdiction.  Malice.  Intent.  Duress.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Retroactivity of judicial holding, 
Grand jury proceedings, Transcript of testimony before 
grand jury, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 4, 2012. 
 
A motion for transcription of instructions to the grand 
jury was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and the cases were tried 
before him. 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Billowitz for the defendant. 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Katherine E. Burdick for Juvenile Law Center, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
J. Leon Smith, Jr., for Citizens for Juvenile Justice & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  On March 16, 2016, a jury convicted the 
defendant, Raymond Concepcion, of murder in the first degree, 
G. L. c. 265, § 1, for killing the victim, Nicholas Martinez.1  
At the time of the offense, the defendant was fifteen years old 
and had a history of trauma, mental health issues, and impaired 
cognitive abilities.  The judge sentenced the defendant to life 
with the possibility of parole after twenty years.2,3  The 
defendant appealed. 
 
On appeal, the defendant does not contest that he killed 
the victim.  Instead, he argues that his youth and mental 
impairments were unlawfully ignored during his indictment, 
trial, and sentencing.  Specifically, the defendant argues (1) 
that our decision in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 810 
(2012), which requires prosecutors to instruct the grand jury on 
mitigating circumstances and defenses when seeking an indictment 
of a juvenile, applies retroactively to his case; (2) that both 
his sentence and G. L. c. 119, § 74 -- the statute mandating 
that juveniles charged with murder in the first or second degree 
 
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of unlawful firearm 
possession under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
 
 
2 The judge also sentenced the defendant to from four to 
five years in State prison on the firearm conviction, to be 
served concurrently with the murder sentence. 
 
 
3 The legal basis of the defendant's sentence is discussed 
infra. 
3 
 
committed when they were between fourteen and eighteen years old 
be tried in the Superior Court, not the Juvenile Court -- are 
unconstitutional; and (3) that several of the jury instructions 
were erroneous.  Additionally, the defendant asks us to exercise 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the murder 
verdict.  Although we reject the defendant's other arguments, in 
the circumstances of this case we do exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and reduce the verdict to murder in 
the second degree.4 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain details for discussion.  
 
Although the defendant did not know the victim, both had 
been members of the Mission Hill gang in Boston at different 
points in time.  In September 2011, the victim left 
Massachusetts -- and apparently the gang -- returning to Boston 
in June 2012.5  Sometime around May 2012, the defendant joined 
the gang.  The defendant was approximately fifteen years old at 
the time.  He claims that, despite just recently having joined, 
he already wanted to leave the gang by the fall of 2012. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Juvenile 
Law Center and by Citizen for Juvenile Justice and the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
5 Further evidence was not before the jury, but it appears 
that the victim left Massachusetts after he implicated a fellow 
member of the gang and returned in order to testify in grand 
jury proceedings. 
4 
 
 
On October 17, 2012, fellow Mission Hill gang member 
Derrick Hunt told the defendant to retrieve a gun the defendant 
had purchased two months earlier.6  Hunt then told the defendant 
to get into a Nissan Maxima with two other members of the gang, 
Jaquan Hill and Shakeem Johnson.  Other members told the 
defendant that shooting the victim was the only way that the 
defendant could leave the gang.  The defendant believed that if 
he tried to leave the gang on his own accord, both he and his 
family would be harmed or killed. 
 
Hill and Johnson proceeded to drive the defendant around 
Boston.  They found the victim -- who was driving in his car -- 
and followed him for about twenty minutes.  Although the 
defendant knew Johnson, he had not previously known Hill.  Hill 
was five feet, eight inches tall and weighed 245 pounds, while 
Johnson was over six feet tall and weighed 300 pounds.7  The 
defendant was approximately five feet, seven inches tall and 
weighed 130 pounds.  Hill and Johnson told the defendant that he 
had no choice but to follow their orders.  Those orders issued 
while the three were stopped near a traffic light on Southampton 
 
 
6 The defendant was only able to recall that the person who 
told him to retrieve the gun was called either "R" or "Fish."  
Hunt was later identified as Fish.  What happened to Hunt is 
unclear from the record. 
 
 
7 Additionally, Hill was nineteen years old and Johnson 
twenty-one years old at the time. 
5 
 
Street.  Hill told the defendant to get out of the car.  Hill 
then pointed to the victim's car, which was stopped at the 
traffic light, and told the defendant to "get him." 
 
The defendant got out of the Maxima and, gun in hand, 
approached the victim's car.  From behind the driver's side of 
the victim's car, the defendant fired two rounds through the 
driver's side rear window at the victim.  The defendant then 
readjusted his position and fired two to three more shots, this 
time straight through the driver's side window.  The victim's 
car then accelerated and crashed into another vehicle.  Three 
bullets in all struck the victim, who was later pronounced dead. 
 
After shooting the victim, the defendant returned to the 
Maxima.  Hill, Johnson, and the defendant fled the scene in the 
vehicle.  A nearby police detective heard the gunshots.  The 
detective saw the defendant reenter the Maxima and promptly 
followed the vehicle, activating his cruiser's lights and siren.  
A brief pursuit ensued, in which other officers joined and which 
ended when heavy traffic stopped the Maxima.  Police arrested 
Hill, Johnson, and the defendant.  Initially denying 
involvement, the defendant soon confessed to having shot the 
victim. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  On December 4, 2012, a Suffolk 
County grand jury indicted the defendant on charges of murder, 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1, and carrying a firearm 
6 
 
without a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Hill 
and Johnson were also indicted as joint venturers.  Soon after, 
the defendant filed a motion for transcription of the 
instructions to the grand jury, which was denied.  The 
defendant's case was later severed from Hill and Johnson's 
cases. 
 
At trial, the defendant did not contest that he shot the 
victim.  Rather, he argued that his age, previous trauma, and 
multiple mental impairments precluded him from forming the 
requisite intent.  To this end, a clinician who worked with the 
defendant while he was in a Department of Youth Services (DYS) 
detention center awaiting trial testified that the defendant 
acted at times like someone who was eight or nine years old, 
rather than someone who was fifteen years old.  Specifically, 
the clinician noted that the defendant would go through cycles 
where he threw "temper tantrums" and then started to cry 
uncontrollably before staff would have to soothe him.  The 
clinician further testified that the defendant was a "follower" 
and that "other kids would tell him to do certain things and he 
would do them." 
 
The defendant's mother testified that the defendant had 
previously witnessed a series of traumatic incidents.  When the 
defendant was around eight years old, he watched his father get 
shot five times in one incident and survive.  The defendant 
7 
 
later witnessed a violent robbery of a store while playing 
outside.  Further, the defendant saw his uncle accidently shoot 
himself in the leg while cleaning a pistol.  Finally, the 
defendant witnessed a police officer shoot his brother, who also 
survived the episode. 
 
As an expert witness for the defense, a psychologist who 
had examined the defendant over the course of ten hours and 
performed several psychological tests testified that the 
defendant functioned at the level of someone who was nine or ten 
years old and that he lacked age-level adaptive skills.  
According to the psychologist, the defendant had an intelligence 
quotient of sixty-six, a limited capacity for abstraction or 
problem-solving, and a limited capacity to form intent.  The 
psychologist further testified that the defendant had global 
developmental delay of moderate severity and submitted a report 
detailing how the defendant suffered from posttraumatic stress 
disorder and a persistent depressive disorder.  Boston 
Children's Hospital and DYS records also referenced a history of 
traumatic brain injury and documented concerns about the 
defendant's cognitive delay.8  As a consequence of these 
conditions combined with the defendant previously having 
 
 
8 The defendant appears to have suffered brain trauma when 
as a child he fell off a roof and lay unconscious for between 
fifteen minutes and one hour. 
8 
 
witnessed multiple people being shot, the psychologist testified 
that the defendant lacked the ability to understand the full 
meaning of killing someone. 
 
The psychologist's testimony was disputed by the 
Commonwealth's expert, a psychiatrist who had examined the 
defendant for little more than one hour sometime before the 
trial.  The psychiatrist testified that the defendant's 
cognitive ability was "in the average range" and that he had 
"adequate day to day street savvy to go about his 
circumstances."  As a result, the psychiatrist believed that the 
defendant had no psychological, cognitive, or emotion conditions 
that would have impaired his ability to form intent.9 
 
On March 16, 2016, the jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or cruelty 
and guilty of unlawful firearm possession.  The judge sentenced 
the defendant to life with the possibility of parole after 
twenty years on the murder conviction and from four to five 
years in State prison on the firearm conviction, to be served 
concurrently with the murder sentence.  The defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Grand jury proceeding.  Days after the 
defendant was indicted, we decided Walczak, holding that when 
 
 
9 The Commonwealth concedes on appeal that the defendant 
"had documented intellectual limitations." 
9 
 
the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile for murder and 
presents to the grand jury "substantial evidence of mitigating 
circumstances or defenses (other than lack of criminal 
responsibility)," the prosecutor must "instruct the grand jury 
on the elements of murder and on the significance of the 
mitigating circumstances and defenses."  Walczak, 463 Mass. at 
810.  Soon after his indictment, the defendant filed a motion 
for transcription of the grand jury instructions, arguing that 
Walczak's rule applied retroactively to his case and that the 
grand jury instructions were necessary for him to put forward 
that argument.  The judge denied the motion.  The defendant now 
argues that Walczak should apply retroactively to his case. 
 
Despite the defendant's argument otherwise, the issue of 
retroactivity does not fully arise here.10  The evidence of 
 
 
10 We have repeatedly noted, albeit in passing, that Walczak 
applies only prospectively.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 483 
Mass. 1, 40 (2019) (Gants, C.J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. 
Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 219 (2017); Walczak, 463 Mass. at 810.  
Nevertheless, whether Walczak applies retroactively may be more 
complicated than it first appears. 
 
 
As a baseline, the "Federal Constitution requires Federal 
and State courts to retroactively apply new Federal 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure to direct appeals 
from convictions."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 645 
(2020), citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).  
Equally clear is that States court may exercise discretion when 
deciding whether to apply new rules premised on the common law, 
State statutes, or their supervisory authority retroactively to 
direct appeals.  See Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 
n.10 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005); Commonwealth v. 
 
10 
 
mitigating circumstances that Walczak requires be introduced to 
the grand jury must "support indictments other than murder."  
Id. at 835 (Lenk, J., concurring) (citing reasonable provocation 
and sudden combat as examples).  For the application of Walczak 
to have made a difference, then, an instruction to the grand 
jury on a manslaughter offense would have had to have been 
proper.  See id. 822 (Lenk, J., concurring) (noting that 
 
D'Agostino, 421 Mass. 281, 284 n.3 (1995); Commonwealth v. 
Waters, 400 Mass. 1006, 1007 (1987).  We have exercised this 
discretion numerous times.  See, e.g., Martin, supra (declining 
to retroactively apply new felony-murder rule); Commonwealth v. 
Muller, 477 Mass. 415, 431 (2017) (retroactively disavowing 
inference-of-sanity instruction). 
 
 
When new rules are premised solely on the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, however, our case law is less clear.  
Although we have noted that "this court has consistently 
referenced with implicit approval the principle that a new 
criminal rule [based on the Declaration of Rights] applies to 
'those cases still pending on direct review'" (citation 
omitted), Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 257 n.41 
(2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015), this statement is merely 
descriptive.  We have not explicitly held that the Declaration 
of Rights mandates retroactive application of such rules.  Cf. 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
655, 664 (2013) (Diatchenko I), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 436 (2013), S.C., 473 
Mass. 832 (2016); Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 413 Mass. 193, 201-
202 (1992). 
 
 
Walczak is not an ideal vehicle for resolving this issue.  
Whether Justice Lenk's concurrence -- which provided the crucial 
vote for the holding -- was premised on the Declaration of 
Rights is unclear.  See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 824-825, 830-831 
(Lenk, J., concurring).  Regardless, because we do not reach the 
issue of retroactivity here, we need not dissect either the 
opinion or our cases further. 
11 
 
voluntary manslaughter charges may proceed in Juvenile Court 
whereas murder charges must proceed in Superior Court). 
 
As discussed infra, an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter was not warranted at trial.  What was unwarranted 
as an instruction for the petit jury here was likewise 
unwarranted for the grand jury.  See Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 
Mass. 487, 499, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959) ("If any thing 
improper shall be given in evidence before the grand jury, the 
error may be corrected subsequently upon the trial before the 
petit jury" [citation omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 483 Mass. 1, 22 (2019) (Cypher, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("This court has held consistently 
that any perceived error at the grand jury stage can be cured by 
the petit jury at trial").  Cf. Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 
Mass. 727, 733, cert. denied sub nom. Aiello v. Massachusetts, 
474 U.S. 919 (1985) (unprejudiced petit jury cure grand jury 
bias).  Thus, even if Walczak applied retroactively, its rule 
would not have altered the proceedings. 
 
2.  Constitutionality of G. L. c. 119, § 74.  General Laws 
c. 119, § 74, directs that "[t]he juvenile court shall not have 
jurisdiction over a person who had at the time of the offense 
attained the age of fourteen but not yet attained the age of 
[eighteen] who is charged with committing murder in the first or 
second degree."  Because G. L. c. 119, § 74, mandates that 
12 
 
juveniles indicted for murder must be tried in the Superior 
Court -- where, if convicted, they must be sentenced to life in 
prison, albeit with the possibility of parole -- the defendant 
argues that the statute violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution as well as due process.  We disagree. 
 
General Laws c. 119, § 74, is a jurisdictional statute; it 
proscribes no punishments, requiring only that a juvenile 
charged with murder must be tried in the Superior Court.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Soto, 476 Mass. 436, 438-440 (2017) 
(discussing G. L. c. 119, § 74).  As the United States Supreme 
Court has noted when examining the proportionality of a 
juvenile's sentence under the Eighth Amendment, focusing on 
whether judicial discretion was available at the transfer stage 
overlooks the real issue:  whether the underlying punishment 
that could be imposed once the juvenile is transferred to adult 
court survives constitutional scrutiny.  See Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 487-489 (2012).  A juvenile convicted of murder in 
the first degree does face a mandatory sentence of life with the 
possibility of parole.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2 (b).  Yet as 
explained infra, that sentence does not violate either art. 26 
or the Eighth Amendment; only sentences of life without the 
possibility of parole have been held to be unconstitutional for 
juveniles.  See, e.g., Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
13 
 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013) (Diatchenko I), S.C., 
471 Mass. 12 (2015) (discretionary life without parole for 
juveniles unconstitutional under art. 26).  Cf. Miller, supra at 
479 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth 
Amendment).  Consequently, if there is no disproportionality 
violation in the underlying punishment, then there is no 
violation in G. L. c. 119, § 74. 
 
The defendant also claims that we should subject G. L. 
c. 119, § 74, to strict scrutiny because it implicates a 
fundamental right.  The defendant defines this right as the 
right to have a judge consider a defendant's status as a 
juvenile before he or she is tried in the Superior Court.  To 
this end, the defendant emphasizes that he is not claiming that 
juveniles have a fundamental right to access to the Juvenile 
Court.  Yet in instances where a juvenile is charged with murder 
in the first or second degree, that is exactly what this 
argument implies.  If a defendant charged with murder did not 
have the right to be tried in the Juvenile Court, why would the 
same defendant have the right to ask a judge to consider trying 
him or her there?  Thus, absent a claim of right to access the 
14 
 
Juvenile Court, automatic jurisdiction alone cannot be the basis 
for arguing that G. L. c. 119, § 74, is unconstitutional.11 
 
We have previously rejected an analogous claim in an equal 
protection challenge to G. L. c. 119, § 74.  See Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 506-507 (2015).  The defendants there 
argued that access to the Juvenile Court implicated "important" 
rights, although not fundamental ones.  Id. at 506.  Although we 
noted that "[t]he differences between being tried in the 
Superior Court and in the Juvenile Court are considerable," id., 
quoting Walczak, 463 Mass. at 827 (Lenk, J., concurring), we 
reaffirmed our long-standing position not to apply "strict 
scrutiny to statutes that implicate such interests."  Freeman, 
supra.  See Commonwealth v. Wayne W., 414 Mass. 218, 223 (1993) 
("Had it wanted, the Legislature could have lawfully chosen to 
 
 
11 Because jurisdiction under G. L. c. 119, § 74, is 
mandatory, the heavy reliance by one of the amici, the Juvenile 
Law Center, on Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and 
the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), line of cases is 
misplaced.  The statute in Kent provided the juvenile court with 
discretion to waive jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis, which 
the Supreme Court allowed so long as the court provided a 
pretransfer hearing.  Kent, supra at 561.  In short, Kent 
involved a statutory right to access the juvenile court, the 
denial of which required individual adjudication subject to the 
requirements of procedural due process that the Court later 
further explicated in the Mathews decision.  See Kent, supra at 
557 ("The net, therefore, is that petitioner -- then a boy of 
[sixteen] -- was by statute entitled to certain procedures and 
benefits as a consequence of his statutory right to the 
'exclusive' jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court").  General Laws 
c. 119, § 74, however, provides no such right and thus does not 
implicate procedural due process. 
15 
 
abolish Juvenile Court jurisdiction over certain violent crimes 
without infringing on a juvenile's constitutional rights").  
Nothing presented by the defendant causes us to rethink this 
position. 
 
Without a fundamental right being implicated, G. L. c. 119, 
§ 74, need only survive rational basis review.  See Freeman, 472 
Mass. at 508.  In Freeman, we held that concerns about 
"unavoidable complexities and attendant need for staff and 
services implicated in implementing the act" provided a rational 
basis for not applying the protections afforded to seventeen 
year old juveniles under G. L. c. 119, § 74, retroactively to 
defendants convicted before the law's passage (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 509.  Analogous considerations provide a 
rational basis for the statute's assignment of jurisdiction.  
Murder trials are resource intensive.  Consolidating 
jurisdiction in the Superior Court maximizes judicial economy by 
avoiding duplicative costs that would occur if murder trials 
were also held in other courts.  Cf. Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 
396 Mass. 740, 744 (1986) (this court's familiarity with capital 
cases provided rational basis for restricting review of denial 
16 
 
of postconviction motions of capital defendants to it).  
Consequently, we uphold G. L. c. 119, § 74.12 
 
3.  Constitutionality of sentence.  The defendant maintains 
that the combination of his youth and intellectual disability 
renders his sentence of life with the possibility of parole 
after twenty years disproportional to his conviction, violating 
both art. 26 and the Eighth Amendment.  Specifically, the 
defendant contends that the mandatory nature of the life 
sentence renders the punishment unconstitutional.  We again 
disagree. 
 
Because art. 26 affords defendants greater protections than 
the Eighth Amendment does, we begin our analysis there.  See 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 668-669.  "The touchstone of art. 
26's proscription against cruel or unusual punishment . . . [is] 
proportionality."  Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 683 
(2017).  "The essence of proportionality is that 'punishment for 
 
 
12 The Juvenile Law Center claims that G. L. c. 119, § 74, 
creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption that a 
juvenile is as morally culpable as an adult charged with the 
same offense.  The differences in punishments for murder in the 
first degree for juveniles compared to adults belie this claim.  
A life sentence without the possibility of parole is imposed on 
an adult convicted of murder in the first degree, but the 
possibility of parole must be available for a juvenile convicted 
of the crime because we have recognized that the latter has 
"diminished culpability."  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 670, 
quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. 
17 
 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender 
and the offense.'"  Id., quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 469. 
 
"To reach the level of cruel [or] unusual, the punishment 
must be so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the 
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 482 
Mass. 399, 403 (2019).  To determine whether a sentence is 
disproportionate requires (1) an "inquiry into the nature of the 
offense and the offender in light of the degree of harm to 
society," (2) "a comparison between the sentence imposed here 
and punishments prescribed for the commission of more serious 
crimes in the Commonwealth," and (3) "a comparison of the 
challenged penalty with the penalties prescribed for the same 
offense in other jurisdictions" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497-498 
(1981).  "The burden is on a defendant to prove such 
disproportion . . . ."  Id. at 497. 
 
Life sentences for juveniles have been the subject of 
considerable analysis in our cases since Diatchenko I.  There, 
we held that imposing a sentence of life without the possibility 
of parole on a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree 
violated art. 26.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 658.  We have 
since left open the question whether mandatory life sentences 
with the possibility of parole for juveniles may someday violate 
18 
 
art. 26, committing to revisit the issue only once the law and 
science in the area have settled.  See Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 
Mass. 742, 754 (2020) (discussing cases where issue was left 
open).  In the meantime, we repeatedly have held that mandatory 
life sentences with the possibility of parole after a term of 
years are proportional for juveniles convicted of murder in 
either the first or second degree.  See id. (upholding mandatory 
life sentence with possibility of parole after fifteen years for 
juvenile convicted of murder in first degree); Commonwealth v. 
Lugo, 482 Mass. 94, 100 (2019) (upholding mandatory life 
sentence with possibility of parole after fifteen years for 
juvenile convicted of murder in second degree); Commonwealth v. 
Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 62 (2015) (same).13 
 
The defendant's sentence -- life with the possibility of 
parole after twenty years -- is itself a product of post-
Diatchenko I developments in our case law.  After we invalidated 
the sentencing scheme at issue in Diatchenko I, we limited the 
maximum sentence allowable for juveniles convicted of homicide 
crimes committed after August 2, 2012, to the sentence imposed 
for murder in the second degree:  a mandatory life sentence with 
 
 
13 These decisions are consistent with Miller, 567 U.S. at 
470, which only struck down mandatory life sentences imposed on 
juveniles without the possibility of parole. 
19 
 
parole eligibility set between fifteen and twenty-five years.14  
See Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 689-690 (2013), S.C., 
474 Mass. 576 (2016).  Having shot the victim on October 17, 
2012, the defendant was sentenced under Brown's framework.15 
 
Nothing in Brown suggested that sentencing a juvenile 
convicted of murder in the first degree to a mandatory life 
sentence with the possibility of parole at twenty years would 
violate art. 26.  Cf. Brown, 466 Mass. at 686 ("neither Miller 
nor [Diatchenko I] precludes mandatory sentencing for juveniles 
in all circumstances").  Nor does the parole eligibility period 
stray from what other jurisdictions impose on juveniles 
convicted of the crime.  See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. 
§ 5-10-102(c)(2) (juvenile convicted of murder in first degree 
and sentenced to life "is eligible for parole after serving a 
minimum of twenty-five [25] years' imprisonment"); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. § 13–751(A)(2) (juvenile convicted of murder in first 
degree and sentenced to life "shall not be released on any basis 
until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar 
years if the murdered person was fifteen or more years of age 
 
 
14 August 2, 2012, was the effective date of the parole 
statute, G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as amended through St. 2012, 
c. 192, §§ 37–39. 
 
 
15 Since Diatchenko I and Brown, the Legislature has amended 
the sentencing statute.  See G. L. c. 279, § 24, as amended 
through St. 2014, c. 189, § 6. 
20 
 
and thirty-five years if the murdered person was under fifteen 
years of age or was an unborn child").16  The question thus 
becomes whether a period of twenty years of incarceration before 
parole eligibility is proportioned "to both the offender and the 
offense" in this case.  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669, quoting 
Miller, 567 U.S. at 469.  We hold that it is. 
 
Although the defendant's age and mental impairments are 
factors that weigh in his favor, they do not alone tip the 
scales toward disproportionality.  See Okoro, 471 Mass. at 53, 
62 (upholding life sentence with parole after fifteen years for 
"borderline deficient" defendant who was fifteen years old).  We 
must also consider the gravity of the offense.  Cepulonis, 384 
Mass. at 497.  Even juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses 
may be sentenced to terms with parole eligibility exceeding 
fifteen years in "extraordinary circumstances."  Perez, 477 
Mass. at 685-686.  Murder in the first degree based on extreme 
atrocity or cruelty is among the most serious crimes punishable 
in the Commonwealth.  For this reason, we have observed that 
art. 26 allows for "some period in excess of fifteen years 
before parole eligibility for a juvenile offender convicted of 
 
 
16 As another of the amici, Citizens for Juvenile Justice, 
observes, many other States have reformed their sentencing laws 
to provide judges with discretion when sentencing juveniles 
convicted of murder in the first degree.  Unless the law or 
science changes, however, providing this discretion is a task we 
leave to the Legislature. 
21 
 
murder in the first degree."17  LaPlante, 482 Mass. at 405.  See 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 672 ("It plainly is within the 
purview of the Legislature to treat juveniles who commit murder 
in the first degree more harshly than juveniles who commit other 
types of crimes, including murder in the second degree"). 
 
Twenty years does not fall outside this period.  The 
sentence imposed on the defendant would not in itself prevent 
him from having a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."18  Diatchenko 
I, 466 Mass. at 674, quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 
(2010).  The period is not "so lengthy that it could be seen as 
the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole."  
Brown, 466 Mass. at 691 n.11.  Compare LaPlante, 482 Mass. at 
405-406 (upholding aggregate term of forty-five years as 
proportional punishment for juvenile defendant convicted of 
 
 
17 The sentencing judge echoed this sentiment, remarking 
that parole eligibility after fifteen years would be the same 
sentence the defendant would have received if he had been 
convicted of murder in the second degree. 
 
 
18 Both the Commonwealth and the defendant acknowledge the 
difficulties that the defendant may face with the parole board.  
It bears stressing that the board should "evaluate the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, including 
the age of the offender, together with all relevant information 
pertaining to the offender's character and actions during the 
intervening years since conviction."  Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 
674.  "Circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime" 
here include the defendant's cognitive abilities, history of 
trauma, and mental health issues. 
22 
 
three counts of murder in first degree), with Brown, supra 
(noting that "sentence of life with parole eligibility only 
after sixty years" and "mandatory seventy-five-year sentence 
resulting from aggregation of two mandatory sentences that 
permitted parole eligibility only after fifty-two and one-half 
years for juvenile" were unconstitutional).  We therefore 
conclude that the defendant's sentence is constitutional.19 
 
4.  Jury instructions.  "When reviewing jury instructions, 
we evaluate the instruction as a whole, looking for the 
interpretation a reasonable juror would place on the judge's 
words" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 46 (2019).  "We do not consider words from 
the instructions in bits and pieces or in isolation from one 
another" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
The defendant points to four alleged errors in the jury 
instructions:  (1) that the jury were improperly instructed that 
they could infer malice from the use of a weapon, (2) that the 
jury should have been instructed that a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty requires specific intent, (3) that the jury 
 
 
19 The defendant also argues that he was entitled to an 
individualized, youth-specific hearing under Miller prior to 
sentencing.  Such a hearing is mandated only where the 
defendant's sentence is presumptively disproportional.  Cf. 
Perez, 477 Mass. at 686.  Because we find the defendant's 
sentence to be proportional, it follows that he was not entitled 
to a Miller hearing.  See Watt, 484 Mass. at 753-754. 
23 
 
should have been instructed on involuntary manslaughter, (4) 
that the jury should have been instructed on duress as a defense 
to murder.  Because the defendant preserved the first three of 
these issues, we review each in turn for prejudicial error.  Id.  
The defendant did not, however, preserve the fourth issue, 
concerning duress.20  We therefore consider, for that issue, 
whether there was error and, if so, whether it created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002). 
 
a.  Malice.  In the context of murder in the first degree 
on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, malice is defined 
as "an intent to cause death, to cause grievous bodily harm, or 
to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the defendant, 
a reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow."  Commonwealth v. Castillo, 
485 Mass. 852, 858 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 
Mass. 37, 45 (2012). 
 
The judge instructed the jury here: 
"As a general rule, you are permitted but not required to 
infer that a person who intentionally uses a dangerous 
weapon on another person intends to kill that person, or 
cause him or her grievous bodily injury, or intends to do 
an act which in the circumstances known to him a reasonable 
person would know creates a plain and strong likelihood 
that death would result." 
 
 
 
20 At trial, the defendant explicitly advised the court that 
he did not intend to pursue a duress defense. 
24 
 
The defendant argues that this instruction allowed the jury to 
infer guilt from the use of a weapon and thus undermined his 
defense, which was premised on his juvenile and disabled status 
rendering him unable to form the requisite mens rea.21 
 
Generally, juries may "infer malice from the use of a 
dangerous weapon."  Odgren, 483 Mass. at 47, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 250 (2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018).  The inference, however, "must be 
presented as permissive."  Odgren, supra.  These principles have 
been "frequently cited with approval in our cases, including 
those where there is evidence of intoxication or mental 
impairment on the part of the defendant."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 457 Mass. 69, 74 (2010).  We have also 
extended application of these principles to juveniles.  Odgren, 
supra at 48-49. 
 
The trial judge's description of the law in his instruction 
was accurate, and the inference was permissive.  A similar case 
to this one, Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, controls.  In Odgren, a 
juvenile with several mental health diagnoses was convicted of 
murder in the first degree.  Id. at 42, 44.  The defendant 
argued that the jury could not infer malice or intent from his 
actions because doing so presupposed his sanity and ascribed to 
 
 
21 The defendant does not dispute that a firearm is a 
dangerous weapon. 
25 
 
him an adult's ability to reason.  Id. at 47.  We rejected this 
argument, declining to exempt juveniles and those with mental 
impairments from the application of our normal jury 
instructions.  See id. at 47-49.  We see no reason to revisit 
that conclusion, particularly in such an analogous case.  The 
judge's instructions on malice were not erroneous. 
 
b.  Specific intent.  Although the defendant acknowledges 
that the instructions reflected current law, he argues that the 
jury should have been instructed that a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty requires specific intent.  We reject this 
argument. 
 
"To convict a defendant of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth must 
prove that the defendant committed an unlawful killing with 
malice aforethought and with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  
Szlachta, 463 Mass. at 45, citing G. L. c. 265, § 1, and G. L. 
c. 277, § 39.  The "proof of malice aforethought is the only 
requisite mental intent for a conviction of murder in the first 
degree based on murder committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty."  Castillo, 485 Mass. at 865, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  We have repeatedly (and 
recently) declined to require the jury to find that the 
defendant had the specific intent to commit an extremely 
atrocious or cruel murder.  See, e.g., Castillo, supra; 
26 
 
Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 442 (1995); Commonwealth 
v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 879 (1987). 
 
Against this case law, the defendant contends that the 
unique circumstances of his case required a specific intent 
instruction in order to ensure fairness of the verdict.  The law 
already addresses this concern.  Specifically, we have held that 
where a defendant presents evidence of a mental impairment, a 
jury may consider this fact when assessing extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  Szlachta, 463 Mass. at 48-49, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 848-849 (2006) ("while reduced mental 
capacity is relevant to the jury's exercise of their broad 
discretion as a reflection of the community's conscience, there 
is no greater mens rea required for murder by extreme atrocity 
or cruelty than there is for murder in the second degree, and 
the crime does not require that the defendant be aware that his 
acts were extremely cruel or atrocious").  The judge accordingly 
instructed the jurors here, informing them that they could 
"consider any credible evidence again about the existence of a 
mental, intellectual or emotional impairment in determining 
whether the defendant acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty."  
We discern no error. 
 
c.  Involuntary manslaughter.  Next, the defendant argues 
that the judge erred in declining to instruct the jury on 
involuntary manslaughter.  In considering this issue, we view 
27 
 
the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant.  
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 437 (2015).  "[W]here a 
defendant is charged with murder, an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter is appropriate if any reasonable view of the 
evidence would [permit] the jury to find 'wanton and reckless' 
conduct rather than actions from which a 'plain and strong 
likelihood' of death would follow" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id. at 438.  Despite the defendant stressing that the 
combination of his disability, youth, and history of trauma 
impaired his ability to appreciate the risks associated with 
shooting someone multiple times at close range with a firearm, 
these factors alone do not demand an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter. 
 
"Malice is what distinguishes murder from manslaughter."  
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 471 Mass. 537, 546, cert. denied, 577 
U.S. 1013 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 
392, 396 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 360 (2000) and 447 Mass. 1017 
(2006).  "The distinction means that a verdict of manslaughter 
is possible only in the absence of malice."  Pagan, supra.  Yet 
the absence of malice does not necessitate the presence of an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction.  For instance, "[e]ven if 
a mental impairment negates malice . . . a defendant would not 
be entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter" 
(emphasis in original).  Id. at 548.  This is so because mental 
28 
 
impairment, otherwise "often characterized as diminished 
capacity," Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 747, 752 (2018), 
"goes to the question of criminal responsibility and not to the 
issue of involuntary manslaughter."  Pagan, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Garabedian, 399 Mass. 304, 316 (1987). 
 
Therefore, "[b]efore an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter may be given, the defendant would be required to 
adduce evidence of the 'traditional elements' of involuntary 
manslaughter that the jury might believe."  Pagan, 471 Mass. at 
548, quoting Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 302-303 
(1992).  "A judge need not provide an involuntary manslaughter 
charge if it is clear that the risk to the victim was nothing 
less than a 'plain and strong likelihood that death would 
follow.'"  Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 831 (2000), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 Mass. 478, 493 (1998).  See 
Pagan, supra at 548 n.20 ("Cases of involuntary manslaughter 
require proof of intentional wanton or reckless conduct, 
resulting in an unintentional killing, and not proof of 
intentional conduct bearing on a specific intent to kill or a 
specific intent to injure"). 
 
The evidence here does not support an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant shot a firearm at the 
victim multiple times, firing an initial pair of rounds before 
changing his position and continuing to shoot.  Such actions are 
29 
 
"simply not compatible with the 'high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another person' associated with 
wanton and reckless conduct."  Pagan, 471 Mass. at 547.  See 
Watt, 484 Mass. at 752 ("Firing a [firearm] multiple times, 
directed toward specific individuals, provides a sufficient 
basis to conclude that the defendant understood the likely 
deadly consequences of his actions"). 
 
Even if the defendant did not fully apprehend that death 
would result, nothing in the evidence suggests he did not 
understand that grievously serious injuries would result from 
shooting the victim multiple times.22  Cf. Sires, 413 Mass. at 
303 (despite intoxication, "the defendant knew facts that a 
reasonably prudent person would have known, according to common 
experience, created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would follow the act of shooting").  Denial of the defendant's 
request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction was proper.23 
 
 
22 On this point, even the defense's psychologist testified 
that while the defendant's mental impairments and prior trauma 
gave him a "very different way of thinking about what it means 
to hurt someone," his ability to understand the consequences of 
shooting someone was "[n]ot nil." 
 
 
23 The jury also declined to convict the defendant of murder 
in the second degree, "the malice element of which comes closest 
to involuntary manslaughter."  Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 
634, 650 (2009).  Indeed, in finding the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree, the jury found, as the judge 
properly instructed, "that the defendant either intended to kill 
[the victim], or intended to cause him grievous bodily harm, or 
 
30 
 
 
d.  Duress.  Finally, the defendant maintains that the 
judge erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of 
duress.  In particular, the defendant contends that he believed 
gang members would kill him and his family if he did not shoot 
the victim.  Acknowledging that duress is not a defense to 
murder in Massachusetts, the defendant nevertheless maintains 
that because he was unable to resist coercive pressure due to 
his disability and past trauma, the defense should be available 
in his case. 
 
The defendant is correct:  duress is not a defense to 
murder.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 835 (2012).  
The defendant is incorrect, however, in contending that this 
prohibition "rests on the premise that the defendant is making a 
reasoned choice between courses of action."  Although we have 
noted that allowing the defense for murders could incentivize 
gangs to press members to carry out killings under the threat of 
harm, this was of secondary importance in why we barred juries 
from considering the defense.  See id. at 833-834.  Primary 
among our concerns was one long embodied in the common law:  
that "[w]hen the defendant commits murder under duress, the 
resulting harm -- i.e., the death of an innocent person -- is at 
 
intended to do an act which in the circumstances known to the 
defendant a reasonable person would have known created a plain 
and strong likelihood that death would result."  "These findings 
negate the possibility of involuntary manslaughter."  Id. 
31 
 
least as great as the threatened harm -- i.e., the death of the 
defendant" (citation omitted).  Id. at 833.  The moral math of 
trading the defendant's life for the victim's does not add up to 
a valid defense that the jury may consider.24  We decline the 
defendant's invitation to revisit the issue. 
 
5.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  "Our power 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, directs us to consider a defendant's 
entire case, taking into account a broad range of factors, when 
determining whether a conviction of murder in the first degree 
was a miscarriage of justice that warrants a reduction in the 
degree of guilt."  Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 770 
(2014).  "Our duty is not to sit as a second jury but, rather, 
to consider whether the verdict returned is consonant with 
justice" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Dowds, 483 Mass. 498, 512 (2019).  "After such consideration, we 
'may, if satisfied that the verdict was against the law or the 
weight of the evidence, or because of newly discovered evidence, 
or for any other reason that justice may require (a) order a new 
 
 
24 Whether the defendant is able to resist coercive pressure 
does not alter this equation when it comes to presenting duress 
as a defense to the jury.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 
Mass. 262, 267 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1158 (2016) 
(juveniles charged with intentional murder cannot assert duress 
defense).  However, these factors are relevant to our 
considerations under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Vasquez, 462 
Mass. at 835. 
32 
 
trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of 
guilt.'"  Id., quoting G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Here, the jury concluded that the defendant was criminally 
responsible for murdering the victim.  We do not alter that 
conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 773 
(2007) ("our task is not to determine whether the verdicts are 
those we would have returned, but whether they are consonant 
with justice").  Given the facts of the crime, "there is no 
question of reducing the verdict below murder; the question that 
presents itself is the less drastic one whether there is ground 
for reducing from first to second degree murder."  Berry, 466 
Mass. at 772, quoting Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 
316 (1978).  We determine that there is. 
 
A confluence of factors lead us to this conclusion.  
Although the defendant was fifteen years old when he shot the 
victim, expert testimony presented at trial suggested that he 
functioned at the level of someone who was nine or ten years 
old.  He suffered from depression and posttraumatic stress 
disorder, the latter of which likely stemmed from a history of 
witnessing family members being shot.  Testimony indicated that 
he was easy to manipulate.  In short, if ever there was someone 
who could be pressured into doing others' bidding, the defendant 
was that person. 
33 
 
 
Mental illness alone is generally insufficient to support a 
verdict reduction under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 421 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Zagrodny, 443 Mass. 93, 108 (2004).  If the 
defendant had decided to shoot the victim free from external 
influence, the analysis here would be different.  But the 
defendant was not free from such influence.  Members of the gang 
threatened both the defendant and his family.  With this as 
background, they offered him a way out of the gang, one that led 
him on October 17, 2012, to get out of the car driven by Hill 
and Johnson and shoot the victim.  "The crime was abhorrent.  
But it is in just such cases that we must be on guard against 
too passiona[te] a reaction, which in the long run will not 
promote due enforcement of the criminal law."  Cadwell, 374 
Mass. at 319.  Punishing the defendant for murder in the first 
degree overlooks both his unique vulnerabilities and the 
precarious situation in which he found himself. 
 
Furthermore, although we cannot say that the defendant's 
actions were "driven by [his] mental condition" alone, 
Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 434 (2008), we do note 
the incongruous fate of those who physically and figuratively 
drove him to the crime.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 481 Mass. 
794, 796-797 (2019) ("a judge may consider a disparate sentence 
of a coventurer, tried separately and subsequently, who was 
34 
 
convicted of the same crime where, at the time of sentencing, it 
is reasonably apparent that the defendant was less culpable than 
or equally culpable to his or her yet untried coventurer").  The 
adult gang members Hill and Johnson, along with other members of 
the gang, exerted pressure on the defendant that he was 
particularly ill suited to resist due to the combination of his 
age, cognitive impairments, and mental illnesses.  Hill and 
Johnson, however, received sentences of from twelve to fourteen 
years for being coventurers, while the defendant faces life in 
prison. 
 
Although not a defense that the jury may consider, "in 
exceptional and rare circumstances of duress, justice may 
warrant reduction of a defendant's guilt in our review under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 835.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 824 (2017), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 54 (2018) ("The authority granted us under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, includes the discretion to reduce a conviction of 
felony-murder in the first degree in circumstances where the 
jury do not have that option").  The case before us is such an 
exceptional and rare one.  In light of the circumstances, then, 
a verdict of murder in the second degree is more consonant with 
justice than is a verdict of murder in the first degree.  See 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
35 
 
 
Conclusion.  The verdict of murder in the first degree and 
the sentence imposed are vacated and set aside.  The matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court, where a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the second degree is to be entered and the defendant 
is to be sentenced accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.