Title: State v. Thompson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: February 4, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, 

	Respondent,

	v.

MATTHEW DWIGHT THOMPSON,

	Appellant.

(CC9411-37406; SC S43235)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death entered by the Circuit Court for Multnomah
County.

	William J. Keys, Judge.

	Argued and submitted September 10, 1998.

	David E. Groom, Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for
appellant.  With him on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public
Defender.

	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.*

	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

	The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death are
affirmed.

	*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

		VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

		This is an automatic and direct review of a judgment of
conviction and a sentence of death.  ORS 163.150(1)(g); ORAP
12.10(1).  Defendant seeks reversal of his convictions for
aggravated murder, ORS 163.095, felony murder, ORS 163.115, and
first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225.  Alternatively, defendant
asks this court to vacate his death sentence.  We affirm the
judgment of conviction and the sentence of death.

I.  FACTS

		The jury found defendant guilty.  We therefore view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Rose, 311 Or 274, 276, 810 P2d 839 (1991).

		About 10:30 p.m. on November 18, 1994, Andrew McDonald
and his wife, Debra Oyamada, were at the Driftwood Tavern in
Portland.  Defendant and his companion, Paul Whitcher, entered
the tavern and ordered a pitcher of beer.  Oyamada was sitting at
a video poker machine and McDonald was sitting at the bar. 
Defendant was wearing a plaid shirt.  Defendant and Whitcher
approached Oyamada.  Defendant asked Oyamada if she was from "the
'samurai family'" or "from samurai blood."  She responded, "As a
matter of fact, yes, I am."  Defendant continued, but Oyamada
said she did not want to talk.  Oyamada turned her back to
defendant because she thought those were "weird questions" and
that defendant was "overbearing."  Defendant persisted, saying,
"I need to know about it.  I'm a warrior and I want to know about
this."  Oyamada replied that she did not want to talk about it. 
Defendant then sat next to Oyamada.  She said, "You're sitting in
someone else's seat."  After that, defendant got up from the seat
and started to walk toward the door.  As they walked, McDonald
approached defendant and Whitcher and said, "Please leave her
alone, she doesn't want to talk about it."  Pat Disciascio, the
bartender, became concerned, and he directed defendant and
Whitcher to leave the tavern.  When defendant and Whitcher did
not leave immediately, Disciascio said "Good night, you guys,"
and pointed toward the door.  As defendant and Whitcher left the
tavern, one of the two men said, "I feel like killing somebody
tonight."  Defendant and Whitcher then stood outside, where
defendant said to Whitcher, "I'm going to go back in there and
kick that guy's ass."  Defendant stated to Whitcher, "If we do
this, you know, we're going to jail."

		Between five and ten minutes after leaving, defendant
ran into the tavern alone, grabbed McDonald from behind, began
striking him, and dragged him outside.  Oyamada tried to pry
defendant off of McDonald.  Defendant then turned on Oyamada,
hitting her in the head, throwing her to the ground, and stabbing
her in the head and neck.  Bill Jones, another tavern patron,
grabbed defendant.  Defendant stabbed Jones six times.  Defendant
then ran away.  Ambulances took McDonald, Oyamada, and Jones to
the hospital.  McDonald died as a result of his wounds.

		Defendant and Whitcher went to defendant's
grandmother's home, where defendant lived.  Defendant introduced
Whitcher to his grandmother, then she went to her room to sleep.
About 1:30 a.m. that night, defendant's grandmother awoke and
went downstairs because she heard a lot of noise.  She saw
Whitcher cleaning up broken glass and defendant cleaning grape
juice off the rug.  She asked Whitcher to leave.  Defendant said
that he was going to see that Whitcher got home safely, and the
two men left the house.  When defendant returned shortly, his
grandmother was still cleaning grape juice.  Defendant said he
would clean the grape juice and told his grandmother to go to
bed, which she did.  Before she fell asleep, she heard the
washing machine running.

		About 1:30 a.m. that night, Sally Woolley called "911"
to report that she heard loud, angry, male voices outside her
home.  Woolley reported that a man was lying face down in the
street.  Another man, wearing a plaid shirt, was kneeling over
him and rolled him partially onto his side.  The man in the plaid
shirt rummaged through the other man's pockets, then ran away. 

		The police arrived.  The man on the street was
identified as Whitcher.  He had been stabbed sixteen to twenty
times and was dead.  One pocket had been turned inside out.

		About 2:00 a.m. that night, the police found defendant
walking nearby.  He smelled of alcohol and was nervous and
evasive.  His shoes were untied and, although it was a cold
night, he was sockless.  One eye was swollen.  The police thought
that defendant might have witnessed Whitcher's stabbing and
questioned him.  After denying that the had been in an
altercation, defendant stated that he lived nearby with his
grandmother, but gave the police his mother's address.  He denied
ever having been arrested or being on probation.  After a record
check indicated that he had been arrested and that currently he
was on probation, defendant was taken into custody.

		The police first contacted defendant's mother, who
stated that defendant did not live with her.  She gave the police
defendant's grandmother's address.  The police contacted
defendant's grandmother at her home.  She invited the officers
into her home and gave them permission to look around. 
Defendant's grandmother then led them to the washing machine in
the basement and opened the lid.  Blood was smeared on the
outside of the machine.  The washed clothing in the machine had
stains consistent with blood.  The grandmother told police that
the clothing in the machine was defendant's.  The state's
criminologist concluded that the DNA recovered from the top of
the washing machine, and from jeans, a shoelace, and a sock found
in the washing machine, was consistent with Whitcher's.  

		At 12:30 p.m. on November 19, 1994, detectives returned
to defendant's grandmother's home with a search warrant.  After
finding no weapons, the police left.  The returned around 5:00
p.m. that day.  With defendant's grandmother's consent, the
detectives searched her basement.  A detective found a bloody
knife on a cross-beam and a blood-smeared wallet inside a wood
stove.  The knife was consistent with defendant's grandmother's
description of a knife defendant owned.  The state's criminalist
concluded that the blood on the knife and wallet matched
Whitcher's blood type.

II.  TRIAL

		Defendant was charged in a 22-count indictment with the
murders of Andrew McDonald and Paul Whitcher and with related
crimes.  The first 14 counts charged crimes that occurred at the
Driftwood Tavern in the late hours of November 18, 1994.  The
remaining counts charged crimes that occurred in the early
morning hours of November 19, 1994.  Defendant pled not guilty to
all charges.(1)  After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of
aggravated murder (4 counts), murder (2 counts), felony murder (2
counts), first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary (2 counts),
and first-degree assault (2 counts).  After a penalty phase
proceeding, he was sentenced to death.(2)

		Defendant assigns nine claims of error relating to the
guilt phase and five claims relating to the penalty phase of his
trial.  He also contends that Oregon's death penalty statute
violates the Oregon and United States constitutions.

III. GUILT-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

A.  Pretrial motions

		1.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his pro se motion for substitution of counsel.

		Before trial, defendant informed the trial court that
his counsel was "not working out."  Specifically, he complained
that:  he had not yet received all police reports, his counsel
took two to three weeks to return some phone calls, his counsel
should have attempted to "lower" the indictment, and that he had
filed an action against his counsel under 42 USC § 1983 (federal
civil action for deprivation of rights).  After permitting
defendant to explain his reasons for moving to substitute
counsel, the trial court denied his motion.  The court explained
that defendant was being well represented by qualified attorneys
and that he had not given the court sufficient grounds to change
his counsel. 

		Later, defendant filed a pro se motion for substitution
of counsel.  Again, the trial court asked him to explain his
complaints.  He asserted that there was "no harmony" between him
and his attorneys.  The court then stated:

		"As you might recall, you and I have discussed
this question on several occasions and on a couple of
occasions I've gone over your complaints item by item
and found them not to be a legal basis to grant your
request.

		"Since I see nothing new, my ruling that I made in
the past will stand and that is your motion for change
of counsel is denied."

		This court reviews a trial court's denial of a criminal
defendant's motion for substitution of counsel for an abuse of
discretion.  State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 258, 839 P2d 692
(1992), opin adhered to 318 Or 28, 861 P2d 1012 (1993).(3)

		A trial court, presented with a defendant's request for
substitution of court-appointed counsel, must assess the facts
and determine whether the defendant's complaints are
"legitimate."  Langley, 314 Or at 257; see also State v.
Davidson, 252 Or 617, 620, 451 P2d 481 (1969) ("a defendant has
no right to have another court-appointed lawyer in the absence of
a legitimate complaint concerning the one already appointed for
him.").  

		"A 'legitimate complaint' about a court-appointed
lawyer is one that is based on an abridgement of a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel. 
The right to counsel requires adequate performance of
an appointed lawyer's professional assistance." 
Langley, 314 Or at 258 (footnote omitted).

See also Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 872 n 3, 627 P2d 458
(1981) (explaining that court-appointed counsel "cannot always be
'effective,' but they must always be 'adequate' to the task").

		Defendant does not claim that the trial court failed to
make a factual assessment of the legitimacy of his complaints
against his counsel.  The issue is whether his complaints were
"legitimate."  The record shows that defendant did not assert
facts that would have required the trial court to allow his
motion for substitution of counsel.  Rather, defendant's
complaints indicate his general frustration with the pretrial
process.  For example, when pressed for specificity regarding his
motion, defendant claimed that he "saw the bail hearing as just a
chance for the district attorney to trump up charges to give
witnesses practice testimony," and that he "was ignorant of these
legal proceedings."  Our review of the record does not reveal any
other substantive basis for defendant's complaint about his
counsel.  We hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for substitution of
counsel.

		2.  Defendant next contends that the trial court erred
by denying his motion to sever the counts related to the separate
homicides in the indictment.  

		Before trial, defendant moved to sever the first 14
counts of the indictment, arguing that the state had not met the
statutory requirements for joinder of the charges.  He further
argued that, even if those requirements had been met, he would
suffer substantial prejudice if the counts were not severed.  

		The trial court reasoned:

	"[ORS] 132.560[(4)] provides that two or more offenses
may be charged in the same accusatory instrument if
they are alleged to have been committed by the same
person and are either of the same or similar character
or are based on the same act or transaction.  The
allegations here meet both tests.  All of these cases
are either connected violent crimes of the same or
similar character.  They also are all part of the same
act or transaction.  The evidence in one under any
standard would be admissible in trial in the other.  In
fact, it would be very difficult to understand the
evidence in one of these crimes without hearing all of
the evidence in the other crime.  So the motion to
sever is denied."

		On review, defendant notes that the two homicides
occurred on "separate calendar days," and argues that it "was
unnecessary to refer to both homicides to tell the story of
either homicide separately."(5)  He argues that substantial
prejudice resulted from the joinder, because "the presentation of
both [homicides] would irrevocably influence the jurors as to
their decision about each separate homicide."  

		Joinder of charges is governed by statute.  ORS
132.560.  A trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed
for legal error.  Community Bank v. U.S. Bank, 276 Or 471, 478,
555 P2d 435 (1976).  Therefore, we review a trial court's
determination that the state met the statutory requirements for
joinder of charges for legal error.  We also review a trial
court's determination whether the facts stated in a defendant's
motion to sever show the existence of prejudice for legal error. 
State v. Miller, 327 Or 622, 629, ___ P2d ___ (1998).

		In Miller, this court interpreted ORS 132.560(3) to
determine what the legislature meant by the term "prejudice." 
This court stated:

		"The 'prejudice' standard in ORS 132.560(3)
demonstrates that the legislature intended to authorize
the court to safeguard the parties from potential
injury or harm to their interests in a fair trial. 327
Or at 627 (emphasis in original).

		This court assesses "fairness" in this context by
"evaluating the specific interests of the parties at stake in
light of our legal traditions and the applicable rules of trial
procedure[.]"  Id.  The "actual or likely impairment" of a
party's interest in "a trial conducted efficiently and in
accordance with all applicable laws, including the constitutions,
statutes, and rules of procedure and evidence, and in a decision
based on a dispassionate consideration of the evidence rather
than bias, emotion, or other improper criteria * * * constitutes
* * * prejudice within the meaning of ORS 132.560(3)."  Id. at
627-28.

		Defendant does not support his claim of error with
arguments based on the facts in this case.  Rather, he merely
states that "where the offenses are distinct in time, place and
evidence, defendant runs the risk that any adverse effect from
one case will influence the jury's consideration of the other
case."  Defendant essentially argues that the jury's decision was
not based on dispassionate consideration of the evidence relating
to the McDonald and Whitcher murders.  We agree with the trial
court that the offenses are sufficiently similar to have been
joined, and defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced, within the meaning of ORS 132.560(3), by the trial
court's denial of his motion to sever.  We hold that the trial
court did not err by denying defendant's motion to sever the
counts in the indictment.

B.  Trial motions

		1.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to evidence that when he first was
contacted by the police he denied that he previously had been
arrested or was on probation.  

		The defense theory of the case was that defendant was
too intoxicated to act voluntarily or to form the intent
necessary to commit the acts with which he was charged.  During
trial, the prosecutor informed the court that the state intended
to introduce evidence that when defendant first was contacted by
the police he denied ever having been arrested or that he had
been on probation.  The prosecutor explained that the evidence
was relevant to show that the defendant had not been so
intoxicated that he could not form criminal intent to commit
murder.  The prosecutor stated that:

	"[I]t is the State's position that it shows that the
defendant was able to process the information that he
was able to in fact lie about it to try and protect
himself and to get out of the clutches of the police,
and it is therefore relevant."

Defense counsel objected to the evidence on the ground that it
would be "unduly prejudicial" citing Oregon Evidence Code (OEC)
403.(6)  The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the
state to introduce evidence of defendant's denials, but the court
ruled that no details about the arrests or probation would be
admitted.

		On review, defendant argues that the evidence was
"overwhelmingly prejudicial."  We review a trial court's decision
to admit evidence challenged under OEC 403 for an abuse of
discretion.  State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 407-08, 927 P2d 1073
(1996).

		The trial court considered the use for which the
evidence was offered and limited its scope to the denials
themselves.  The trial court restricted the state from eliciting
the details of arrest, conviction, or probation and the state
properly restricted its questions to the denials.  There is
little reason to believe that evidence's probative value was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  We conclude that
that evidence had persuasive power to establish a fact of
consequence, i.e., whether defendant was able to form criminal
intent near the time of the homicides.  See State v. Lyons, 324
Or 256, 280, 924 P2d 802 (1996) ("'Unfair prejudice' describes a
situation in which the preferences of the trier of fact are
affected by reasons essentially unrelated to the persuasive power
of the evidence to establish a fact of consequence.").  We hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
defendant's objection to evidence that when he first was
contacted by the police he had denied that he previously had been
arrested or probation.(7) 

		2.  Defendant next contends that the trial court erred
in denying his motions for judgments of acquittal on Counts 1, 5,
10, and 11 of the indictment.  

		Count 1 charged defendant with aggravated felony murder
on the theory that he intentionally murdered McDonald in the
course and furtherance of attempting to commit and committing
first-degree burglary at the Driftwood Tavern.  Count 5 charged
felony murder, again with first-degree burglary at the tavern as
the underlying felony.  Count 10 charged first degree burglary on
the theory that defendant entered the tavern with intent to
assault McDonald.  Finally, Count 11 alleged that defendant
committed first-degree burglary by unlawfully and knowingly
entering and remaining in the tavern with a dangerous weapon with
intent to assault McDonald.  All four counts were premised on the
state's theory that the bartender had excluded defendant from the
tavern before defendant reentered and attacked McDonald.

		Following the state's case-in-chief, defense counsel
moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.  As to the four
counts involving burglary, defense counsel argued that the state
had presented insufficient evidence from which the jury could
find that the bartender had excluded defendant from the tavern
and, therefore, that no burglary had been committed as a matter
of law.  The trial court ruled:

	"[W]hat I'm going to rule is that it's a fact question
as far as whether there was an exclusion or simply a
salutation.  I paid very close attention to what
everybody said about voice inflection, and particularly
the bartender, and he clearly said that it was his
attention [sic] to exclude them but that he didn't use
those words.  He thought that they knew that they
couldn't come back.  Because I originally had some real
question when I heard the words used and heard Ms.
Oyamada's recitation of that.  But I'm going to submit
that fact question.  So I deny your special motion on
that basis."

		On review, defendant argues that the state presented
insufficient evidence from which the jury could find that
defendant had been excluded from the Driftwood Tavern and,
therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motions for
judgments of acquittal on Counts 1, 5, 10, and 11.  

		"We review challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence solely to determine whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Our decision is not whether we believe defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the
evidence is sufficient for the jury to so find."  State
v. Rose, 311 Or 274, 281, 810 P2d 839 (1991).

ORS 164.225(1) provides:

		"A person commits the crime of burglary in the
first degree if the person violates ORS 164.215 and the
building is a dwelling, or if in effecting entry or
while in a building or in immediate flight therefrom
the person:

		"(a) Is armed with a burglar's tool as defined in
ORS 164.235 or a deadly weapon; or 

		"(b) Causes or attempts to cause physical injury
to any person; or 

		"(c) Uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon."

ORS 164.215(1) provides:

		"Except as otherwise provided in ORS 164.255, a
person commits the crime of burglary in the second
degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a
building with intent to commit a crime therein." 
(Emphasis added).

ORS 164.205 provides in part:

		"As used in ORS 164.205 to 164.270, except as the
context requires otherwise:

		"* * * * *

		"(3) 'Enter or remain unlawfully' means:

		"(a) To enter or remain in or upon premises when
the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining,
are not open to the public or when the entrant is not
otherwise licensed or privileged to do so[.]" (Emphasis
added.)(8)

		Several witnesses testified about the circumstances
surrounding the bartender's exclusion of defendant from the
tavern.  Debra Oyamada testified that as defendant and Whitcher
were heading toward the door, the bartender said:  "Good night,
you guys, and he was pointing at the door.  Good night, you
guys."  Defendant and Whitcher then exited the Driftwood. 
Oyamada testified that "between five and ten minutes" after the
time defendant and Whitcher walked out the door, defendant ran
back inside the tavern and attacked McDonald.

		 Williams Jones, a tavern patron, testified:

		"A:  I looked up just as [defendant and Whitcher]
were going out because I heard Pat [Disciascio, the
bartender] yelling, you know, good night, you know, get
out.

		"Q:  Did you see him pointing to the door?

		"A:  Yes."

		John Earp, another tavern patron, testified:

		"Q:  All right. When -- as a result of that
exchange [between McDonald and defendant], did you hear
Pat Disciascio say something to the young man?

		"A:  Absolutely.  He pointed at the door and said,
Good night fellas.  And it was pretty clear to me that
he was --

		"* * * * *

		"Q:  When you heard Mr. Disciascio say that, and
you indicated that he pointed with one of his arms,
were you able to see where his arm was pointed?

		"A:  He was pointing at the door.

		"Q: Is there any doubt in your mind what the
intent was that Mr. Disciascio had in your mind what he
was telling them?

		"A:  To leave."

On cross-examination, Earp testified:

		"Q:  Okay.  Now, you testified on direct
examination that you were able to hear the bartender
say good night, boys, and point toward the door, is
that right, sir?

		"A: Correct.

		"* * * * *

		"Q: Anything else but good night, boys?

		"A: I think he just said good night and pointed at
the door --

		"Q: Good night.

		"A:  -- in a very affirmative way."  (Emphasis
added.)

		Pat Disciascio, the bartender, testified:

		"Q:  Did you hear -- were you watching this as it
happened?

		"A:  Well, I became concerned because I heard --
the talking was louder --

		"* * * * *

		"Q:  Did you direct these men to leave?

				"A:  I did.

		"Q:  How did you do that?

		"A:  I asked them -- they were -- I just said keep
it going, I'd like you to leave.

		"Q:  All right.  Do you remember precisely the
words you used in directing them out the door?

		"A:  Something like it's time to leave, let's keep
it going, it's time to leave.

		"Q:  And did they respond to you?

		"A.  Yes."

On cross-examination, Disciascio testified:

		"Q:  * * * Okay.  When you went to say good night
boys they were already headed out the door, is that
right, sir?

		"A:  Well, no, they'd stopped.

		"Q:  Okay.  Where did they stop at?

		"A:  To talk to Debbie Oyamada.

		"Q:  Okay.  After their contact with Ms. Oyamada,
isn't it true that they were in the process of leaving
-- going toward the door when you assisted them out by -

		"A:  Yes.

		"Q:  -- saying keep going, boys?

		"A:  Yes.

		"Q:  Now sir, you never told them they couldn't
come back in, did you, sir?

		"A:  No, I didn't.

		"Q:  Okay.

		"A:  I just assumed they wouldn't."

		Although the witnesses provided slightly different
versions of the bartender's words and conduct, their testimony is
consistent about his directions to defendant and Whitcher to
leave the tavern.  Although defendant claims that "there was no
fixed time that he was not supposed to re-enter" the tavern that
night, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that the
bartender intended to and did exclude defendant and Whitcher from
the tavern at least for the remainder of that evening.  Further,
we find that the Jones and Earp testimony provided evidence from
which a rational juror could find that a reasonable person would
understand the bartender's words and conduct as an exclusion.

		Additionally, there is evidence in the record from
which a rational juror could find that defendant understood that
the bartender intended to and did exclude them from the tavern
for at least five to ten minutes.  Brian Callicott was walking
past the tavern on the evening of November 18, 1994.  He
testified that he saw two men, one in a leather jacket and the
other in a plaid shirt, outside the tavern's door.  He testified:

		"A:  Well, the one in the leather jacket kind of
stood back as the other one with the plaid shirt went
into the door and opened it, and then he turned around,
you know, so I was standing there at this point, I
mean, was kind of moving.  But he opened the front
door, and then he noticed that his friend was standing
back, he didn't go with him.

		"Q:  So what happened?

		"A:  Well, he closed the door.  He let the door
close, and came back.  He was saying something to his
friend.  I'm not sure exactly what he said at first and
then, I mean, and then he said, if we do this --
something to this effect, if we do this, you know,
we're going to go to jail.  And that was --

		"* * * * *

		"Q:  I'm sorry.  Who was it who said it?

		"A:  The guy in the plaid shirt.

		"Q:  All right.  And he was saying -- who was this
directed to?

		"A:  To his friend with the leather jacket on.

		"* * * * *

		"Q:  And you said you heard him speak.  You heard
him say the words about if we do this we're going to
jail?

		"A:  Yeah, it was clear."  (Emphasis added.)

		We conclude that a rational jury accepting reasonable
inferences could have found that, when the bartender said, "Good
night, fellows," (or words to that effect) and pointed to the
door, a reasonable person would have understood that he was not
"licensed or privileged" to return to the tavern at the time that
he did so.  Thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury
to find defendant guilty of first degree burglary beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Defendant does not explain why, as a matter of
law, a reasonable person could not have understood the
bartender's words and conduct to be an exclusion from the tavern
for at least five to ten minutes, if not for the entire evening. 
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motions for judgments of acquittal on Counts 1, 5, 10, and 11 of
the indictment.(9)  

		3.  Defendant next contends that the trial court erred
by instructing the jury during its deliberations as to the
definitions of "entering and remaining unlawfully," and about who
had authority to exercise lawful control of the tavern premises. 

		At trial, the state requested Uniform Criminal Jury
Instructions that define the phrases "enter or remain unlawfully"
as used in ORS 164.205(3) and "person in charge" as used in ORS
164.205(5).  However, the trial court inadvertently neglected to
instruct the jury on those definitions.  After retiring to
deliberate, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking:

		"What constitutes being asked to leave a bar and
what authority does the bartender have?  What does he
have to 'do or say -- legally' to kick someone out."

Over defendant's objection, the court provided written copies of
Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions on the phrases "enter or
remain unlawfully" and "person in charge" to the jury.  

		On review, defendant does not argue that the additional
instructions were incorrect.(10)  
He complains only about when they
were given.  Defendant contends that "to read these instruction
at that time gave undue weight to these instructions, as opposed
to the previous ones."  Defendant further contends that, by
giving the additional instructions, the trial court gave undue
attention to the state's theory of guilt, thus buttressing the
state's case at a critical time for the jury.  The state responds
that the court did not abuse its discretion in providing the
definitions, that it would have been error not to have given the
definitions,(11) and that the trial court properly instructed the
jury to consider all of the instructions as a whole when it
instructed the jury on the definitions.

		We review a trial court's ruling regarding jury
reinstructions for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Flett, 234
Or 124, 129, 380 P2d 634 (1963).  For an instruction to
constitute reversible error, it must have prejudiced the
aggrieved party when the instructions are considered as a whole. 
Martini v. Beaverton Ins. Agency, Inc., 314 Or 200, 211, 838 P2d
1061 (1992).  This court has held that "cases should not be
reversed upon instructions, despite technical imperfections,
unless the appellate court can fairly say that the instruction
probably created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds
of the jurymen which affected the outcome of the case."  Waterway
Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370, 474 P2d 309 (1970).  

		When the court initially instructed the jury, it told
the jury not "to give any instruction undue emphasis."  It also
instructed the jury that it was "to consider all of the
instructions as a whole."  The court repeated that admonition
when it gave the additional instructions about which defendant
complains in this assignment.  Defendant has not demonstrated
that the timing of the additional instructions prejudiced him
when the instructions are considered as a whole.  Nor has
defendant shown that the additional instructions probably created
an erroneous impression of the law.  We hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in its timing of the jury
instructions.(12)

		4.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred by
accepting verdicts on Counts 15 and 22.  

		Count 15 of the indictment alleges that defendant

	"did unlawfully and intentionally commit and attempt to
commit the crime of Robbery in the First Degree and in
the course of and in the furtherance of said crime
which the said defendant was committing and attempting
to commit, the said defendant personally and
intentionally did cause the death of * * * PAUL R
WHITCHER * * * by stabbing him[.]"

Count 22 alleges that defendant

	"did unlawfully and knowingly use physical force upon
Paul R Whitcher, and did use a dangerous weapon, to-wit:  
a knife, while in the course of committing and
attempting to commit, theft of property, to-wit: a
wallet, with the intent of preventing and overcoming
resistance to the said defendant's taking of the said
property[.]"

The jury returned verdicts of guilty on Counts 15 and 22.  On
being polled orally by the trial court, the jurors indicated that
all 12 had voted "guilty" on Count 15 (aggravated felony murder),
but one juror indicated that she had voted "not guilty" on Count
22 (robbery).  

		Defendant argues that those verdicts are "logically
inconsistent," because defendant "simply could not have been 
guilty of felony murder based on a robbery verdict, if he was not
guilty of robbery."  The state responds that the fact that the
juror voted not guilty on the completed charge of first-degree
robbery is not inconsistent with a vote of guilty on the
aggravated murder charge, which may be committed in the course of
committing or attempting to commit first-degree robbery.  

		Whether verdicts are consistent is a question of law,
thus the trial court's acceptance of the verdicts is reviewed for
an error of law.  See State v. Mendez, 308 Or 9, 12-14, 774 P2d
1082 (1989) (implicitly applying that standard).(13)  If verdicts
can be harmonized, they are not necessarily inconsistent.  Id. at
14.

		The fact that a juror voted "not guilty" on the first-
degree robbery count and "guilty" on the aggravated felony murder
count based on that robbery count does not necessarily make those
verdicts inconsistent.  First-degree robbery requires the jury to
find that the defendant committed the completed robbery.  In
contrast, aggravated felony murder (based on first-degree robbery
in this case) does not require the jury to find that the
defendant completed the robbery.  A conviction for aggravated
felony murder may be based on a jury's finding that the murder
was committed in the course of or in furtherance of attempting to
commit a listed felony (first-degree robbery in this case).  ORS
163.115(1)(b).  We conclude that the verdicts are not "logically
inconsistent."  We hold that the trial court did not err in
accepting verdicts on Counts 15 and 22.(14)

IV.  PENALTY-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

		1.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence from his juvenile court record during the
penalty-phase trial.  

		Before trial, the court sealed a file containing
defendant's juvenile court records and social history.  After
defendant's convictions, the state sought to have those materials
released to the parties for use during the penalty-phase
proceedings.  Defendant objected, contending the materials were
not subject to disclosure for that purpose.  Defendant relied on
ORS 419 A. 255, a statute that makes such records privileged.  The
trial court ruled:

		"And I'm going to release, having reviewed the
entire juvenile [file] and finding that everything in
it could arguably be relevant or to lead [to] relevant
information and admissible information in this case,
I'm going to release it to both sides.

		"* * * * *

		"So far as any documents might be received into
evidence, we'll make a document by document decision as
to whether those should be sealed at the conclusion of
the trial."  (Emphasis added.)

		On review, defendant argues that the admission of
evidence from his juvenile court record violated his due process
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and, therefore, reversal is required.  

		At trial, defendant did not object to the admission of
any evidence that may have been derived from defendant's juvenile
court records.(15)  Thus, he has not preserved the error he claims
on review and, accordingly, this court will not address it.  See
State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 356, 927 P2d 64 (1996) (citing State
v. Isom, 313 Or 391, 406, 837 P2d 491 (1992) (an objection on one
ground is not sufficient to preserve some other objection)).  We
hold that the trial court did not err in the manner argued by
defendant.

		2.  Defendant next contends that the trial court erred
in the penalty-phase proceeding by admitting state's Exhibit 85,
a letter written by defendant.  The letter describes defendant's
plan to "hit [a guard] in the gut a few times * * * 'til he went
out or stopped moving" and then to "break window [sic]" and
escape from jail.  Defendant objected, arguing that under OEC
403, the prejudicial effect of the letter outweighed its
probative value.  The trial court overruled defendant's
objection, stating: 

	"I have to feel that on this issue of the death
sentence it certainly is much more probative than
prejudicial.  It goes to the issue of future
dangerousness which is one -- directly, which is the one
of the questions that will be put to the jury, and I
have to deny the objection."

		On review, defendant argues that the letter "suggest[s]
to the jury that defendant is a person of bad character" and that
the letter "suggests bad actions or bad character evidence which
* * * [does] not suggest future dangerousness."  A trial court's
ruling to admit evidence challenged under OEC 403 is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.  Moore, 324 Or at 408.

		We conclude that the letter, which detailed a plan to
attack a guard and escape from jail, was probative of defendant's
future dangerousness, a penalty-phase issue.  ORS
163.150(1)(b)(B).(16)  We hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting state's Exhibit 85.(17)

		3.  Defendant next contends that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for a mistrial, based on a witness's
apparently inadvertent reference to an alleged sex abuse charge
against defendant.

		During the penalty-phase, an intake worker from the
State Office for Services to Children and Families stated that in
1985 her office had difficulty providing residential placement
services for defendant because of "an allegation of a sex abuse
issue."  Defendant moved for a mistrial.  The trial court denied
the motion and instructed the jury that it should "disregard the
statement completely," because there was "nothing to sustain any
allegation of sex abuse against" defendant and that the witness's
reference to sex abuse was "unfortunate."  During the next
recess, defendant renewed his motion for a mistrial.  The trial
court again denied the motion on the ground that, although the
reference was an error, the court's jury instructions allayed any
prejudice.  

		Defendant argues that the rulings violated his right to
a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.  We review a denial of a motion for a
mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  See State v. Wright, 323 Or
8, 12, 913 P2d 321 (1996) (deferring to the trial judge's
discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial).

		The record shows that the prosecutor had instructed the
witness not to mention the sex abuse allegation against defendant
and that the witness's statement is inadvertent.  Further, the
trial court immediately gave a curative instruction.  Jurors are
presumed to follow a trial court's instructions.  State v.
Walton, 311 Or 223, 250, 809 P2d 81 (1991) (citing State v.
Smith, 310 Or 1, 26, 791 P2d 836 (1990)).  Defendant has not
shown that the jurors who served in this case failed to follow
the court's instructions.  We find no prejudice to defendant.  We
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a mistrial.

		3.  Defendant next contends that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to strike a portion of the prosecutor's
penalty-phase rebuttal argument.  

		During the penalty trial, defendant testified to the
following:

		"Let me start by -- when I was first arrested, I
talked to [defense counsel] and I told her that I just
wanted to plead guilty. * * * I did not want a trial. 
That man wanted the trial.

		"* * * * *

		"A lot of things in this case were manipulated and
promoted and pumped up.  The families, they were told a
lot of lies by that man for political gain or personal,
I don't know.  If there would have been some kind of
reasonable charges or reasonable plea, something I
could legally plead guilty to and get this all over
with, I would have * * *."

		In his closing rebuttal argument, the prosecutor
stated:

		"As to his personal attacks against me, I want you
to think about this, I want you to consider them, I
want you to use your opportunity to consider them in
assessing the probability for his committing violent
acts in the future."

Defense counsel moved to strike that statement on ground that it
was "improper."  The trial court denied the motion.

		On review, defendant argues that, "Clearly, the
prosecutor misconstrued defendant's statement, and apparently his
accompanying gestures, for his own benefit."  He further argues
that the prosecutor's statements prevented defendant from having
"a fair consideration by the jury."  The state responds that the
prosecutor's statement was relevant to the jury's consideration
of defendant's future dangerousness.  ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). 
Further, the state argues that defendant's telling the jury that
the prosecutor had lied to the victims' families and had pursued
the trial for political or personal gain did constitute a
"personal attack."  We review a trial court's ruling not to
strike a portion of the prosecutor's argument for an abuse of
discretion.  Smith, 310 Or at 24.  A trial judge may abuse his or
her discretion if the denial violated a defendant's right to a
fair trial.  Id.

		In Smith, this court stated:

	"Even if we find the prosecutor's remarks to be
improper, tasteless, or inappropriate, we will not find
an abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of
the motion for a mistrial unless the effect of the
prosecutor's remarks is to deny a defendant a fair
trial.  These same principles apply to the
determination of whether a defendant in a capital case
is entitled to a new penalty phase."  Id. (citation
omitted).

		In Wright, 323 Or at 12, this court considered whether
the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial after a
witness "glared" at the defendant.  The trial judge stated that,
in his observation of the incident, "it wasn't of sufficient
magnitude to cause a mistrial or incite the jury[.]"  Id.  On
review, this court reasoned that the case "presents a classic
example of why this court defers to a trial court's assessment of
the need for a mistrial in most circumstances:  The trial judge
is in the best position to assess the impact of the * * *
incident and to select the means (if any) necessary to correct
any problem resulting from it."  Id. (citations omitted).  

		The reasoning in Wright applies to a motion to strike
as well.  A trial transcript does not capture body language,
voice inflection, or other subtle nonverbal cues that are part of
direct communication.  Although in this case, unlike in Wright,
the trial judge did not explain on the record why he denied
defendant's motion, we infer that the judge found that the
prosecutor's remarks were not "improper."  Our review of the
record provides no clue as to whether defendant's tone of voice,
facial expression, or gestures, if any, accompanying his
statements, created an implicit threat that would be relevant to
his future dangerousness.  That is why this court defers to the
trial judge's discretion.  Here, we find no abuse of discretion
by the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion to strike.  At
a minimum, defendant's allocution, read in context, indicates
that defendant felt that the prosecutor had lied and had forced
him to trial against his will.  Defendant communicated those
assertions to the jury in a manner that demonstrated some anger
that a rational trier of fact could view to be a "threat" or a
"personal attack."  We conclude that the prosecutor's statements
did not deny defendant his right to a fair trial, and we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to strike.(18)

		5.  Finally, defendant contends that the trial court
erred in overruling his demurrer attacking the constitutionality
of Oregon's death-penalty scheme.  Defendant recognizes that his
challenges to Oregon's death penalty have been rejected by this
court in previous death penalty appeals.  See, e.g., State v.
Guzek, 310 Or 299, 797 P2d 1031 (1990); State v. Montez, 309 Or
564, 789 P2d 1352 (1990); State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93
(1990).  We decline to reconsider these issues.  See State v.
Barone, 328 Or 68, 98, 963 P2d 667  (1998) (declining to revisit
issues previously decided); State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 414,
963 P2d 667 (1998) (same).  We hold that the trial court did not
err in overruling defendant's demurrer.

		We have considered each of defendant's assignments of 
error and every argument made in support thereof.  Any assignment
of error or argument not discussed in this opinion either has
been considered by this court previously and resolved against
defendant or is not well taken.  We find no error.

		The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death
are affirmed.

1. 	In her opening statement, defense counsel told the jury
that the evidence would show that defendant killed McDonald and
Whitcher but that he did not do so intentionally.  Defense
counsel asserted that the evidence at trial would show that
defendant's conduct was the result of "heavy intoxication" and
"probably an initial aggressive act and an attempt at self-defense on [defendant's] part."

		"When you hear of the length of time it took for
these acts to be committed, when you hear about the
obvious intoxication of [defendant], when you hear
about the lack of any discussion, the lack of any
intentional actions on [defendant's] part regarding
both Mr. McDonald and Mr. Whitcher, you can only arrive
at a verdict less than aggravated murder and less than
murder.

		"* * * * * 

		"We feel, ladies and gentlemen, at the close of
all the evidence you will hold [defendant] responsible
for the death of these men, but not to the level, not
to the degree that the District Attorney has indicted
him for. * * *"

2. 	Defendant was sentenced to death for aggravated murder
on Count 1 (McDonald) of the indictment.  Defendant also was
sentenced to death for aggravated murder on Count 15 (Whitcher),
said sentence to run consecutively to the death sentence imposed
on Count 1.  On Count 18, aggravated murder (Whitcher), and Count
19, aggravated murder (McDonald), defendant was sentenced to
death, with each sentence to run concurrently with the death
sentence imposed on Count 1.

3. 	Defendant also argues that the trial court's ruling
violated his right to counsel under Article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as well as his right to due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
However, defendant made no state or federal constitutional
arguments at trial.  See State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 407, 927 P2d
1073 (1996) (refusing to address defendant's due process claim
not raised at trial); State v. Casterton, 317 Or 202, 209, 856
P2d 616 (1993) (same).  Moreover, on review, defendant has failed
to present any thorough and focused constitutional analysis.  See
State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 604, 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (refusing
to address defendant's constitutional claim, because "a thorough
and focused analysis" was not presented on review).  Accordingly,
we decline to address those claims.

4. 	ORS 132.560 provides in part:

		"(1) A charging instrument must charge but one
offense, and in one form only, except that:

		"* * * * *

		"(b) Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same charging instrument in a separate count for each
offense if the offenses charged are alleged to have
been committed by the same person or person and are:

		"(A) Of the same or similar character;

		"(B) Based on the same act or transaction; or 

		"(C) Based on two or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan.

		"* * * * *

		"(3) If it appears, upon motion, that the state or
defendant is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses under
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the court may
order an election or separate trials of counts or
provide whatever other relief justice requires."

5. 	In his brief, defendant acknowledges that the
indictment contains a count in which an aggravating factor for
the charge of aggravated murder involves the killing of two
persons at or near the same time.

6. 	OEC 403 provides:

		"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

"Generally, evidence is unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403 if it
appeals to the preferences of the trier of fact for reasons that
are unrelated to the power of the evidence to establish a
material fact."  State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 87, 963 P2d 667
(1998); citing State v. Lyons, 324 Or 256, 280, 924 P2d 802
(1996) (same) (emphasis in original). 

7. 	Defendant also argues that the evidence was not
relevant and that it was inadmissible character evidence under
OEC 404(3).  Defendant also argues that he did not receive a fair
trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.  Those arguments were not presented at trial. 
Accordingly, we decline to address them.  Moore, 324 Or at 407.

8. 	ORS 164.205 provides in part:

		"(4) 'Open to the public' means premises which by
their physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice
or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time
would cause a reasonable person to believe that no
permission to enter or remain is required.

		"(5) 'Person in charge' means a person, a
representative or employee of the person who has lawful
control of premises by ownership, tenancy, official
position or other legal relationship. It includes, but
is not limited to the person, or holder of a position,
designated as the person or position-holder in charge
by the Governor, board, commission or governing body of
any political subdivision of this state."

9. 	Defendant also argues that he "was denied his right to
due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution."  Those constitutional arguments
were not raised at trial and we decline to address them.  Moore,
324 Or at 407.

10. 	When the parties submitted their requested instructions
to the trial court, defendant did not challenge the state's right
to have the jury instructed on the definitions.

11. 	The state relies on ORCP 59 B, which provides in part
that "In charging the jury, the court shall state to them all
matters of law necessary for their information in giving their
verdict."  ORCP 59 B is made applicable to criminal trials by ORS
136.330(1). 

12. 	Defendant also argues that the timing of the additional
instructions violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Defendant made no
constitutional argument at trial and we decline to address it. 
Moore, 324 Or at 407.

13. 	In Mendez, 308 Or at 14 n 7, this court noted that it
is not clear that inconsistent verdicts provide a basis for
reversal by an appellate court.  Because we conclude that the
verdicts here are not necessarily inconsistent, we do not address
that issue.

14. 	Defendant also argues that the trial court's ruling
violated the Oregon Constitution as well as federal due process. 
Because defendant raises his state and federal constitutional
claims for the first time on review, we decline to address them. 
Moore, 324 Or at 407.

15. 	Moreover, it is not apparent from the record that any
information derived from defendants' juvenile court records in
fact was admitted at the penalty phase.

16. 	ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) provides that, in sentencing for
aggravated murder convictions:

		"Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the
evidence, the court shall submit the following issues
to the jury:

		"* * * * *

		"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society[.]"

17. 	Defendant also raises claims of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process violations for the first time on review. 
We decline to address those claims.  Moore, 324 Or at 407.

18. 	Defendant also argues that the trial court's ruling
violated his right to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and that he did not
receive due process of law.  Those constitutional claims were not
made at trial and we decline to address them.  Moore, 324 Or at
407.  Similarly, we do not address defendant's claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, because it was raised for the first
time on review.