Title: Ex Parte Thompson

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

474 So. 2d 1091 (1985)
Ex parte Charles A. THOMPSON.
(In re Amos C. Thompson v. Charles A. Thompson).
84-782.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 26, 1985.
*1092 Steven F. Casey of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, for petitioner.
David F. Ovson of Smith, White & Hynds, Birmingham, for respondent.
BEATTY, Justice.
Petitioner (defendant) seeks a writ of mandamus to the trial court directing it to allow an evidentiary hearing in order to permit defendant to present evidence and cross-examine appraisers appointed by the court pursuant to Code of 1975, § 35-6-101, in an action for a sale of property for division. The writ is denied.
The relevant facts are as follows:
Pursuant to Code of 1975, § 35-6-100, respondent (plaintiff) filed a petition for a sale for division as to property jointly held with the defendant. Section 35-6-100 provides as follows:
In accordance with the last sentence of the statute, the defendant filed a timely notice of his desire to purchase plaintiff's interest in the jointly held property and further requested the court to appoint an appraiser pursuant to § 35-6-101 to determine the value of the property. Section 35-6-101 provides:
Accordingly, the court appointed Charles Pritchett, a Member Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraiser, who submitted a written appraisal report valuing the property at $26,000. The defendant filed written objections to Pritchett's appraisal report, which were overruled by the trial court. In its order, however, the trial court provided that the "Defendant may, within the 30 day period, file additional objections or a motion to reconsider this Order, but such objections or motion shall be supported by an appraisal from a duly qualified MAI appraiser." The defendant did this: Along with his motion to alter, amend, or vacate the prior order and an amendment to his written objections, the defendant filed the written appraisal report of Mr. T.E. Young, an MAI appraiser who valued the subject property at $13,000.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order granting defendant's motion to vacate its prior order and appointing a third appraiser, Mr. L.T. Reeves, Jr., an MAI appraiser, to appraise the subject property. Reeves submitted an appraisal valuing the property at $27,100. In due course, the trial court entered an order, which stated in part:
Following this order, the defendant filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, the denial of which is the basis of this petition for writ of mandamus.
The defendant contends that the opportunity to submit written objections to the appraisal reports is not sufficient to allow him to exercise his due process rights to contradict the evidence presented in writing, and that he should be allowed an evidentiary hearing for that purpose. The defendant further contends that, even though the statutory scheme allows for this procedure, the trial court's determinations are invalid because they are based solely on the written reports of the appraisers, which are hearsay.
The constitutionality of these statutory provisions has been addressed previously by this Court. In Madison v. Lambert,[1] 399 So. 2d 840, 843 (Ala.1981), we stated the due process issues as presented in that case as follows:
This Court went on to hold:
Similarly, in Gibbons v. Allen, 402 So. 2d 914, 916 (Ala.1981), this Court reiterated:
In the present case, when the defendant objected to the report of the first court-appointed appraiser, the trial court overruled those objections but permitted the defendant to "file additional objections or a motion to reconsider" if "supported by an appraisal by a duly qualified MAI appraiser." When the report of the defendant's appraiser conflicted greatly with that submitted by the first appraiser, the court granted defendant's motion and appointed a third appraiser. Only after the court had confirmed that the two court ordered appraisals were substantially the same did it fix the value of the property. It appears to this Court that, in taking these steps, the trial court not only properly exercised its discretion, but it also fulfilled the demands of "the ends of justice." Madison, supra.
It is axiomatic that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only when there is a clear showing that the court below abused its descretion and exercised it in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Ex parte Baker, 459 So. 2d 873, 876 (Ala.1984); Ross v. Luton, 456 So. 2d 249, 254 (Ala.1984); Ex parte Hartford Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 933 (Ala.1981). Furthermore, the petitioner must show that he has a clear right to the remedy sought. Tuscaloosa City Board of Education v. Roberts, 440 So. 2d 1058 (Ala.1983). Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion or that he has a clear right to the relief sought.
We further find no merit in the defendant's claim that the trial court's order is invalid because it is based on hearsay. First, the reports to which defendant objects are mandated under § 35-6-101, which provides that "[t]he appraisers or commissioners appointed under this section shall make their report in writing to the court within 30 days after their appointment." See also, Jolly v. Knopf, 463 So. 2d 150 (Ala.1985), where this Court reaffirmed the holdings in Madison and Gibbons, supra. Second, this objection is not properly reviewable by way of mandamus because a review by appeal would provide an adequate remedy. See Echols v. Housing Authority of Auburn, 377 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1979), and Guaranty Funding Corp. v. Bolling, 288 Ala. 319, 260 So. 2d 589 (1972).
For the above stated reasons, the writ is denied.
WRIT DENIED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.
[1]  In his reply, the defendant makes a futile attempt to distinguish the present case from Madison on the ground that he is not seeking the sale for division, whereas the appellant in Madison was. We think the quoted language of Madison (Viz., "[n]othing prevents any objection by any party") to be sufficient to cover the objections made here.