Title: ROBERT R ANDERSON V PINE KNOB SKI RESORT INC

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 16, 2003  
ROBERT R. ANDERSON and CHRISTINE M.  
ANDERSON, individually and as next 
friends of ROBERT C. ANDERSON, a 
minor,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 121587  
PINE KNOB SKI RESORT, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
This 
case 
concerns Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act (SASA),  
MCL 408.321 et seq., and whether a skier’s collision with a  
timing shack is a danger that inheres in the sport, precluding  
recovery for injuries that result.  We conclude that it is  
such a danger and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a  
matter of law under the SASA.  
I. FACTS AND LOWER-COURT ACTIONS  
Robert C. Anderson was a member of his high school’s  
varsity ski team. On January 5, 1999, he participated in an  
interscholastic giant-slalom competition, scheduled at Pine  
Knob Ski Resort, Inc. (Pine Knob).  While his first run was  
uneventful, on his second run, after passing the last gate on  
the way to the finish line on the slalom racecourse, he  
“caught an edge” as he neared the finish line and lost his  
balance.  Before he could recover, he collided with the shack  
housing the race timing equipment.  He suffered lacerations to  
his face, arm, and leg and broke several bones and teeth.  
Anderson, through his parents as his next friends,  
sued, alleging negligence by the resort.  Pine Knob  
responded by seeking summary disposition on the basis  
that it, as a ski-area operator, was immune from  
premises-liability claims by recreational skiers, of the  
sort here presented, because of the SASA.  Pine Knob also  
argued that summary disposition was warranted, should it  
fall outside the protections of the SASA, under the  
common-law doctrine that bars recovery for plaintiffs who  
are injured by open and obvious hazards.  The trial court  
denied defendant’s motion, ruling that these claims fell  
2  
 
outside the immunity granted by the SASA and that  
questions 
of 
fact 
existed, 
foreclosing 
summary  
disposition on the common-law premises-liability issue.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an  
unpublished opinion per curiam, agreeing that this  
circumstance fell outside the SASA. 
With regard to  
defendant’s assertion that the danger was open and  
obvious to plaintiff and, thus, the claim was barred on  
that common-law basis, the Court of Appeals agreed it was  
open and obvious, but held that the bar did not apply  
here because the risk of harm was unreasonable.  
We granted defendant’s application for leave to  
appeal. 467 Mich 897 (2002).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This case concerns a trial court’s decision on a  
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), as  
well as a matter of statutory construction.  We are asked  
to determine whether a set of circumstances falls within  
the scope of MCL 408.342(2).  To do this, if the language  
of the statute is clear, we simply apply the terms of the  
statute to the circumstances of the case.  Veenstra v  
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159-160; 645 NW2d  
3  
 
643 (2002).  Because this is a matter of law and concerns  
a summary-disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we  
review de novo.  Chandler v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315,  
319; 652 NW2d 224 (2002).  
III. ANALYSIS  
The Legislature, in 1962, enacted the SASA in an  
effort to provide some immunity for ski-area operators  
from personal-injury suits by injured skiers.
 The  
statute states:  
(1) While in a ski area, each skier shall 
do all of the following:  
(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or 
her speed and course at all times.  
(b) Stay clear of snow-grooming vehicles 
and equipment in the ski area.  
(c) Heed all posted signs and warnings.  
(d) Ski only in ski areas which are marked 
as open for skiing on the trail board described 
in [MCL 408.326a(3)].  
(2) Each person who participates in the 
sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere 
in that sport insofar as the dangers are 
obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, 
but are not limited to, injuries which can 
result from variations in terrain; surface or 
subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; 
rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth 
or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and 
their components, with other skiers, or with 
properly marked or plainly visible snow-making  
4  
  
 
or snow-grooming equipment. [MCL 408.342.]  
As can be seen, this act specified that skiers have the  
responsibility to ski under control, as well as to heed  
signs and warnings and avoid snow-grooming vehicles and  
equipment.  Moreover, the act continued that, by skiing,  
skiers are held to have accepted certain types of risks  
from dangers that inhere in the sport as long as those  
dangers are “obvious and necessary.” Id.  
In determining if the potential of collision with a  
timing shack is a danger inherent in the sport and, if it  
is, whether it was a danger that was obvious and  
necessary, we must study the structure of the statute and  
the 
language 
employed 
by 
the 
legislators 
in 
MCL  
408.342(2).  
This subsection identifies two types of dangers  
inherent in the sport.  The first can usefully be  
described as natural hazards and the second as unnatural  
hazards.  The natural hazards to which the act refers  
without limit are “variations in terrain; surface or  
subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks,  
trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris  
. . . .”  MCL 408.342(2).  The unnatural hazards include  
5  
 
“collisions with ski lift towers and their components,  
with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly  
visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.”  MCL  
408.342(2).  For both types of hazards, the examples are  
clearly 
only 
examples 
because 
the 
Legislature  
specifically has indicated that the covered dangers are  
not limited to those expressly described.  The examples  
are employed to give the reader guidance about what other  
risks are held to be assumed by the skier.  We undertake  
this analysis by determining what is common to the  
examples.  This exercise is what legal scholars describe  
as discerning meaning by use of the doctrine of ejusdem  
generis,1 and leads us to conclude that the commonality  
in the hazards is that they all inhere in the sport of  
skiing and, as long as they are obvious and necessary to  
the sport, there is immunity from suit.  
With that understood about the statute and its  
proper construction, we turn to whether the timing shack  
was within the dangers assumed by plaintiff as he engaged  
1“Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, general 
terms are interpreted to include only items that are ‘of 
the same kind, class, character, or nature as those 
specifically enumerated.”  LeRoux v Secretary of State, 
465 Mich 594, 624; 640 NW2d 849 (2002)(citation omitted).  
6  
 
 
in ski racing at Pine Knob.  
There is no disputed issue of fact in this matter  
that in ski racing, timing, as it determines who is the  
winner, is necessary.  Moreover, there is no dispute that  
for the timing equipment to function, it is necessary  
that it be protected from the elements.  This protection  
was afforded by the shack that all also agree was obvious  
in its placement at the end of the run.  We have then a  
hazard of the same sort as the ski towers and snow-making  
and grooming machines to which the statute refers us.  As  
with the towers and equipment, this hazard inheres in the  
sport of skiing.  The placement of the timing shack is  
thus a danger that skiers such as Anderson are held to  
have accepted as a matter of law.  
In adopting this approach, we reject the argument of  
the plaintiff, which was adopted by the Court of Appeals,  
that, while some sort of protection of the timing  
equipment may have been required, the shack was larger  
and more unforgiving than other imaginable, alternative  
timing-equipment protection might have been.  We find  
nothing in the language of the statute that allows us to  
consider factors of this sort.  Once hazards fall within  
7  
 
 
the covered category, only if they are unnecessary or not  
obvious is the ski operator liable.  
To adopt the standard plaintiff urges would deprive  
the statute of the certainty the Legislature wished to  
create concerning liability risks.  Under plaintiff’s  
standard, after any accident, rather than immunity should  
suit be brought, the ski-area operator would be engaged  
in the same inquiry that would have been undertaken if  
there had been no statute ever enacted.  This would mean  
that, 
in 
a 
given 
case, 
decisions 
regarding 
the  
reasonableness of the placement of lift towers or snow  
groomers, for example, would be placed before a jury or  
judicial fact-finder.  Yet it is just this process that  
the grant of immunity was designed to obviate.  In short,  
the Legislature has indicated that matters of this sort  
are to be removed from the common-law arena, and it  
simply falls to us to enforce the statute as written.  
This we have done.  
Finally, as this matter is fully resolved by  
reference to the SASA, we need not consider whether  
defendant retains a duty under common-law premises  
8  
 
 
liability.2  In accord with this, the remaining portions  
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that addressed  
this issue are vacated.  
IV. RESPONSE TO DISSENTS  
The dissents would go even further in this matter  
than plaintiff has urged, advancing the remarkable  
proposition that this statute should be read to create a  
test 
for 
tort 
liability, 
which 
can 
be 
properly  
characterized as: Could this accident have been avoided  
if the shack were in a different place than it was?  If  
so, defendant loses.  
We believe that this new proposed standard is a most  
ill-advised direction for the law to take in this case,  
or in virtually any other case that does not concern  
strict liability.  The reason is that it can be predicted  
with one hundred percent certainty that the answer to the  
dissents’ question in this case, and any other case where  
such a standard would be applied, is: Of course, if the  
2Justice Weaver, in her dissent, has discussed 
common-law premises-liability doctrines, in particular 
the “open and obvious” doctrine, and feels this case 
turns on the application of them to these facts.  This  
whole approach is off-target because the common law no 
longer controls once the Legislature enacts statutes that 
preempt it.  Const 1963, art 3, § 7. That has happened 
here.  
9  
 
shack were somewhere else, plaintiff would not have hit  
it.  The problem this standard creates is that it fails  
to recognize that no accident, be it a skiing accident,  
a car accident, or an airplane crash, is unavoidable.  
After all, if the defendant had not opened the ski area  
that day, or, to deal with our examples, the driver had  
not driven his car or the pilot had not taken off, then  
there would have been no accident. 
Alas, however,  
defendant, having opened the ski area, or ventured to  
drive or fly, is liable.  Let us be clear, what the  
dissent proposes is nothing less than an abandonment of  
common-law liability rules and the imposition of strict  
liability on any occasion there is an accident.  
When one reflects on the roots of tort law in this  
country, it is clear that our legal forebears spurned  
such 
a 
“hindsight” 
test 
and, 
instead, 
adopted 
a  
foreseeability test for determining tort liability. See  
the venerable Palsgraf v Long Island R Co, 248 NY 339;  
162 NE 99 (1928), a case that every law student since  
1928 has studied, and countless hornbooks and cases too  
numerous to require citation, where this is made clear.  
Said plainly, the common-law test for tort liability is  
10  
 
not a “could-it-have-been-avoided” test, rather, it is a  
“was-this-foreseeable-to-a-reasonable-person-in-this­
defendant’s-position” standard.  Before today, none would  
have contested that there were no assertions to the  
contrary in our case law.  No longer can that be said.  
That the dissents would propose to abandon the  
foreseeability test and adopt the hindsight test is  
startling enough, but it is even more strange to do so  
here where we have a statute that was designed not only  
to preclude strict liability for ski operators, but also  
to preclude some doctrines of traditional, common-law  
liability in these areas.  Nevertheless, were the dissent  
the majority, that is not what would take place.  To be  
understood then is that the dissents invite us to join  
them in transmogrifying our law and this statute by  
converting both into vehicles imposing strict liability  
on defendants. We decline most adamantly to do so.  
To deal with the beneficiaries of this statute  
briefly, one can only imagine their dismay, were the  
dissents the law, when all along they no doubt thought  
they were being protected by this legislation to then  
learn not only that they were not being protected, but  
11  
 
also that they would be in the unenviable position of not  
even having the defense that the accident for which they  
are being sued was not foreseeable.  Their dismay would  
be justified.  
In sum, the dissents are wrong as a general matter  
with regard to how liability is determined, and they are  
particularly wrong with regard to ski-area operators who  
are protected by the statute here under consideration  
that the Legislature enacted with the clear goal of  
advantaging, not disadvantaging, ski-area operators in  
tort litigation with skiers.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Plaintiff’s claims should have been barred as a  
matter of law.  The risk of this collision was accepted  
by plaintiff and thus his claim is barred under the SASA.  
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  This  
case is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings  
consistent with this decision.  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
12  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
  
 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT R. ANDERSON and CHRISTINE M.  
ANDERSON, individually and as next 
friends of ROBERT C. ANDERSON, a 
minor,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 121587  
PINE KNOB SKI RESORT, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion  
that plaintiff Robert C. Anderson’s collision with a timing  
shack is a danger that inheres in the sport and recovery is  
precluded under Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act, MCL 408.321 et  
seq.  I believe a question of fact remains whether the danger  
of plaintiff’s collision with the timing shack was obvious and  
necessary, thus making summary disposition inappropriate.  
Because I would affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals  
and the trial court denying defendant summary disposition, I  
must dissent.  
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review de novo decisions on motions for summary  
  
  
 
 
 
 
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331,  
337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).  Likewise, we review de novo matters  
of statutory interpretation.  Cardinal Mooney High School v  
Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d  
21 (1991).  
II. ANALYSIS  
A. Ski Area Safety Act  
This case concerns Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act (SASA),  
MCL 408.321 et seq., particularly MCL 408.342(2), which  
provides:  
Each person who participates in the sport of 
skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport 
insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. 
Those dangers include, but are not limited to, 
injuries which can result from variations in  
terrain; 
surface 
or 
subsurface 
snow 
or 
ice  
conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other 
forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with 
ski lift towers and their components, with other 
skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible 
snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.  
The majority properly characterizes the two types of  
dangers inherent in the sport, as provided by the statute, as  
natural hazards and unnatural hazards.  MCL 408.342(2) gives  
as examples the following unnatural hazards: “collisions with  
ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or  
with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow­
grooming equipment.”   However, such hazards must be “obvious  
and necessary” before a ski operator may be protected by the  
2  
 
statute.  
In this case, we must determine whether the timing  
equipment, including the shack in which the equipment was  
housed, is a danger inherent in the sport, and whether the  
danger is obvious and necessary.  As the statute expressly  
states, it is the danger that must inhere in the sport.  
Timing the race itself is not the danger to be considered; the  
timing equipment is the danger; thus, the equipment must be  
the inherent danger before we can continue the inquiry posed  
by the statute.  
It is not disputed that timing and equipment are  
necessary in ski racing.  Nor is it disputed that timing  
equipment must be protected from the elements.  However, it  
does not follow that a timing shack is necessary, or that the  
placement of the timing shack in this case, near the finish  
line of the race course at the bottom of the hill, was  
“obvious and necessary,” as required by MCL 408.342(2).  
Therefore, I disagree with the majority that the placement of  
the timing shack is a danger skiers are held to accept as a  
matter of law.  
Further, the unnatural hazards in the statute are not  
described as particular items, but collisions with the  
particular items.  (E.g., “collisions with ski lift towers and  
their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked  
3  
 
or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment”).  
Therefore, we must focus on the collision with the timing  
shack, not just the timing shack itself.  “Location, location,  
location!”  Contrary to the majority’s analysis, location must  
be a factor because it relates to whether the danger of  
collision is necessary.  
MCL 408.342(2) does not simply read that dangers that  
inhere in the sport are ones for which skiers assume the risk.  
The dangers must also be obvious and necessary.  If the timing  
equipment can be located in a way that poses no danger of  
collision, such as at the top of the hill as it is now, then  
the danger posed by the timing shack is not “necessary” as  
required by MCL 408.342(2).  
The inquiry is whether plaintiff assumed the risk and  
accepted the danger of colliding with this particular timing  
shack.  We must examine the necessity of the shack itself, as  
well as the necessity of the location.  
The majority accuses me of misconstruing the SASA and  
creating a strict-liability test for ski-area operators.  
Quite the contrary, it is the majority that overzealously  
misconstrues the SASA in favor of ski-area operators by  
skimming over the “obvious and necessary” requirement imposed  
by the Legislature.  I cannot agree with the majority that  
simply because timing equipment is necessary, as is protection  
4  
for such equipment, that plaintiff’s collision with the timing  
shack was “necessary.” 
That the timing shack is a hazard  
that inheres in the sport and is of the same type as ski  
towers and snow-making machines does not mandate the  
conclusion that plaintiff accepted the risk of colliding with  
the timing shack as a matter of law.  
I 
respectfully 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority’s  
recharacterization of the question I pose in this case, ante  
at 9.  I would ask, as the statute requires, whether the  
collision with the timing shack was necessary.  Because there  
was testimony from which a jury could find that plaintiff’s  
collision with the timing shack was not necessary, summary  
disposition is inappropriate.  
Ultimately, in its response to my dissent, the majority  
misses the point with its discussion of foreseeability.1  My  
focus is on the language of MCL 408.342(2).  Because the  
statute requires the danger to be inherent as well as obvious  
and necessary, and because there remains a question of fact  
with respect to the necessity of this timing shack and its  
1With regard to the majority’s recitation of Palsgraf  
v Long Island R Co, 248 NY 339; 162 NE 99 (1928), I 
assure my colleagues that I am familiar with Palsgraf and  
do not wish to engage in any type of hindsight analysis. 
Instead of debating the doctrines of tort law, I simply 
attempt to apply the statute at issue.  
5  
  
  
 
location, summary disposition for defendant is inappropriate  
at this time.  The trial court properly denied defendant’s  
motion, and this Court should not disturb that ruling.  
B. Motion for summary disposition  
In reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought  
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court considers affidavits,  
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence  
filed in the action or submitted by the parties.  MCR  
2.116(G)(5). Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362;  
547 NW2d 314 (1996).  Such evidence is viewed in a light most  
favorable to the party opposing the motion—in this case,  
plaintiffs. Id.  A trial court may grant a motion for summary  
disposition only when the affidavits or other documentary  
evidence show that there is no genuine issue regarding any  
material fact. Id.  
In this case, there remains a genuine issue of material  
fact—whether the location of the timing shack, or even the  
timing shack itself, was necessary.  I would not decide this  
issue as a matter of law as the majority does; rather, I would  
put it in the hands of the trier of fact.  
There is deposition testimony in this case that it was  
unnecessary to place the timing shack at the bottom of the  
hill near the finish line.  In fact, there is testimony that  
a shack was not necessary to house the timing equipment.  
6  
 
Robert Shick, Pine Knob’s general manager, admitted it  
was unnecessary to place the timing shack so close to the  
finish line for ski races.  He testified that he had seen race  
courses at several other ski resorts and had seen the timing  
shack placed at the top of the ski hill.  Mr. Shick further  
admitted that a timing shack could be placed anywhere, it does  
not have to be near the finish line.  Additionally, Mr. Shick  
testified that “reflecting upon this accident,” Pine Knob  
reshaped the racing area and moved the timing shack further  
away from the finish line.  
Further, three coaches who were present on the day of the  
accident testified that the timing shack could have been  
anywhere.  Daniel Costigan, a ski coach for Detroit Country  
Day, testified that during the season after plaintiff’s  
injury, the timing shack was on the top of the hill, off the  
skiing surface.  Coach Costigan also testified that there was  
no need for a timing shack at the bottom of the hill.  Coach  
Joseph Kosik testified at his deposition that there was  
flexibility in regards to the location of the timing shack.  
Finally, Coach Earl Rosengren testified at his deposition that  
the timing shack was moved after plaintiff’s accident, even  
though it houses the same timing equipment it did at the time  
of the accident. Coach Rosengren also stated that there does  
not need to be an actual shack in which to house timing  
7  
  
equipment.  
The testimony of these four individuals clearly presents  
a genuine issue of material fact—whether the timing shack at  
the bottom of the hill, or even the shack itself, was  
necessary, as required by MCL 408.342(2) before declaring that  
plaintiff assumed this danger.  Thus, summary disposition is  
inappropriate.  
III. CONCLUSION  
I would hold that plaintiff is not precluded from  
recovery as a matter of law.  Rather, a genuine issue of  
material fact remains whether the danger of plaintiff’s  
collision with the timing shack was obvious and necessary.  
Because there is evidence that the location of the timing  
shack, and even the shack itself, was not necessary, plaintiff  
should not be precluded from recovery under the SASA.  I would  
affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial  
court.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
8  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT R. ANDERSON and CHRISTINE M.  
ANDERSON, individually and as next 
friends of ROBERT C. ANDERSON, a minor,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 121587  
PINE KNOB SKI RESORT, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff’s  
collision with a timing shack at the end of ski racecourse is  
a danger that inheres in the sport of skiing, thus precluding  
recovery for plaintiff’s resulting injuries under Michigan's  
Ski Area Safety Act (SASA), MCL 408.321 et seq. 
I would  
affirm the Court of Appeals decision that the SASA does not  
operate to bar plaintiff’s negligence claim.  
Further, I would conclude under Lugo v Ameritech Corp,  
Inc, 464 Mich 512; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), that there is a  
question of fact regarding whether the location of the shack  
created an unreasonable risk of severe harm despite the  
danger’s open and obvious nature.  Therefore, I would also  
 
 
affirm the Court of Appeals decision that the circuit court  
properly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition  
pursuant to the common-law open-and-obvious-dangers doctrine.  
MCL 408.342(2) provides:  
Each person who participates in the sport of 
skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport 
insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. 
Those dangers include, but are not limited to, 
injuries which can result from variations in  
terrain; 
surface 
or 
subsurface 
snow 
or 
ice  
conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other 
forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with 
ski lift towers and their components, with other 
skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible 
snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.  
It is undisputed that the timing shack was obvious.  Plaintiff  
testified that he knew it was there. The question under the  
statute is whether the timing shack was a necessary danger.1  
1The circuit court concluded that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether the placement of 
the shack was necessary under MCL 408.342(2) stating:  
However, you have, really, two things, both 
the placement of the shack and the necessity of 
the shack.
 And the parties are disputing 
whether the shack was necessary. 
Defendant  
says it was because the plaintiffs’ minor was 
participating in a race.  Plaintiffs argue that 
a timing shack is not one of the dangers set 
forth in the Act.  Also, the shack could have 
been placed anywhere.  
So, as I say, it’s placement and, you know, 
necessity.  You might need a timing shack for a 
trial, to time the runs. But where are you 
going to put it?  
2  
 
 
The location of the shack is relevant to the question of  
the necessity of the danger posed because the statute reads  
that the dangers inherent in the sport of skiing include, not  
just the hazards themselves, but the danger of "injuries which  
can result from . . . collisions with" such hazards. 
MCL  
408.342(2).  This language makes the placement of the shack  
relevant when considering the necessity of dangers that are  
not expressly enumerated in the statute.  
The deposition testimony, including that of plaintiff's  
coach and defendant's general manager, reveals that the  
placement of the shack approximately eight to twenty feet from  
the finish line was not necessary.  Testimony revealed that  
the shack was portable and that it could be located at other  
places on the hill, including at the top of the course.  
Nevertheless, the majority concludes as a matter of law  
that the placement of the shack is a danger that inheres in  
the sport of skiing, because the timing equipment required  
protection from the elements.  While I agree that timing  
equipment is necessary to ski racing, I do not agree as the  
majority implies that the danger of collision posed by the  
placement of a portable timing shack is analogous to the  
danger of collision posed by ski lift towers and snow-making  
and grooming equipment.  
Ski lift towers are required to carry skiers up the hill  
3  
 
 
 
and snow-making and grooming equipment must be placed where  
snow and snow grooming is needed.2  The placement of equipment  
related to these functions is a matter of necessity.  By  
contrast, it was undisputed that the timing shack could be  
located anywhere on the hill.  Therefore, I dissent from the  
majority’s conclusion that the timing shack in this case  
constitutes a necessary hazard under the SASA and would hold  
that the plaintiff’s negligence claim is not barred as a  
matter of law by this statute.  
For this reason, it is necessary to address whether  
plaintiff’s negligence claim is barred by the common-law,  
premises-liability doctrine of open and obvious dangers.  Any  
assertion that the common law of premises liability has no  
application following the enactment of the SASA is unfounded.  
The common law of premises liability remains “in force” at ski  
areas under Const 1963, art 3, § 7 because the SASA is not a  
strict-liability statute and because the SASA does not  
insulate ski areas from all potential liability.3  The statute  
states that a skier assumes the risk of collision with dangers  
that inhere in the sport of skiing “insofar as the dangers are  
obvious and necessary.”  MCL 408.342(2). Where, as here, a  
2The statute requires that snow-making and snow­
grooming equipment be “properly marked.”  
3In other words, the SASA limits liability, but it 
does not eliminate liability.  
4  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
danger does not inhere in the sport of skiing because it is  
not necessary under MCL 408.342(2), the next inquiry is  
whether there is a duty at common law.4  
In Lugo, supra at 517, a majority of this Court addressed  
when a possessor of a premises is required to protect invitees  
from open and obvious dangers concluding that  
with regard to open and obvious dangers, the 
critical question is whether there is evidence that 
creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether there are truly “special aspects” of the 
open and obvious condition that differentiate the 
risk from typical open and obvious risks so as to 
create an unreasonable risk of harm, i.e., whether 
the “special aspect” of a condition should prevail 
in imposing liability upon the defendant or the 
openness and obviousness of the condition should 
prevail in barring liability.  
The Lugo majority explained further that “only those special  
aspects that give rise to a uniquely high likelihood of harm  
or severity of harm if the risk is not avoided will serve to  
4Certainly, a majority of this Court is at liberty to 
change the common law regarding open and obvious dangers 
should it be moved to do so.  Gruskin v Fisher, 405 Mich 
51, 66; 273 NW2d 893 (1979).  The Legislature, on the  
other hand,  is at liberty to enact a statute of more 
limited liability.  See, e.g., Colo Rev Stat 33-44­
107(8)(c) (“Under Colorado law, a skier assumes the risk 
of any injury to person or property resulting from any of 
the inherent dangers and risks of skiing and may not 
recover from any ski area operator for any injury 
resulting from any of the inherent dangers and risks of 
skiing, including: Changing weather conditions; existing 
and changing snow conditions; bare spots; rocks; stumps; 
trees; collisions with natural objects, man-made objects, 
or other skiers; variations in terrain; and the failure 
of skiers to ski within their own abilities.”)  
5  
 
 
 
remove that condition from the open and obvious danger  
doctrine.” Lugo, supra at 519.5  
The defendant's general manager testified that he had  
considered the potential of injury from a collision with the  
timing shack and that the padding protecting the front of the  
shack was intended to prevent injury.  Other parts of the  
shack, including the corners, however, were not padded.  There  
was also evidence that the plaintiff "caught an edge" and that  
"catching an edge" can happen at any time, even to experienced  
skiers, requiring adequate distance to regain control.  
Under Lugo’s articulation of the open-and-obvious  
doctrine, it must be determined whether the timing shack  
created a uniquely high likelihood of harm or of severe harm  
to a ski racer.  In my view, the placement of the timing shack  
in close proximity to the finish line of a giant slalom  
racecourse, at the point when a racer’s momentum and  
exhaustion peak, raises a question of fact regarding whether  
the location of the timing shack created a uniquely high  
likelihood of severe harm.  Ski racing demands speed.  Speed  
5I concurred only in the result in Lugo and wrote  
separately because I believed, as I continue to believe, 
that the Lugo majority introduced a new consideration in 
the determination whether a defect is unreasonably 
dangerous despite its obviousness, that being whether a 
defect created the “unreasonable risk of severe harm.”  
Lugo, supra at 544 (opinion by WEAVER, J.).  
6  
carries with it increased risks, including the increased risk  
of collision.  Under Lugo, the location of the timing shack is  
the “special aspect” that creates a question of fact regarding  
whether risk of severe harm was unreasonable despite the  
obviousness of the timing shack.  
For these reasons, I would affirm the Court of Appeals  
decision that defendant’s motion for summary disposition was  
properly denied by the circuit court.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
7