Title: Link v. FirstEnergy Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Link v. FirstEnergy Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5083.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5083 
LINK ET AL., APPELLEES, v. FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION; CLEVELAND 
ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Link v. FirstEnergy Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5083.] 
Public utilities—Use of township right-of-way—No provision of Ohio law 
required public utilities to obtain permission from township and county 
engineer to leave utility pole in existing location following road-widening 
project—Evidence at trial was not legally sufficient to establish that pole 
interfered with usual and ordinary course of travel—Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirming jury award in favor of motorcyclist reversed. 
(No. 2015-0132—Submitted February 23, 2016—Decided July 26, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 101286,  
2014-Ohio-5432. 
_____________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address whether defendants-appellants, the 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (“CEI”) and FirstEnergy Service 
Company (“FirstEnergy”), may be held liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff-
appellee Douglas V. Link resulting from a motorcycle accident involving a CEI 
utility pole.  For the reasons below, we reverse the judgment of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals, which affirmed a jury award in favor of Douglas Link and his 
wife, plaintiff-appellee Diane Link, and we remand the matter to the trial court to 
enter judgment for defendants-appellants. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Savage Road project 
{¶ 2} On May 8, 2006, the Bainbridge Township Board of Trustees passed 
a resolution to improve and widen Savage Road in Bainbridge Township, Geauga 
County, Ohio.  In accordance with R.C. 5573.01, the resolution authorized the 
Geauga County Engineer’s Office to prepare engineering plans as well as any 
required surveys, estimates, and specifications.  By statute, the county engineer 
supervises the construction, reconstruction, and improvement of public roads 
undertaken by boards of township trustees under R.C. 5573.01.  R.C. 5543.09(A).  
On June 23, 2008, the board passed another resolution, adopting the county 
engineer’s plans and authorizing the township to begin the contractor-bidding 
process.  Work on the Savage Road project began sometime in the fall of 2008. 
{¶ 3} In September 2008, the county engineer transmitted the Savage 
Road construction plans to CEI.  Later that month, CEI confirmed receipt of the 
construction plans and acknowledged the presence of utility poles along Savage 
Road that required relocation.  In October 2008, CEI submitted to the county 
engineer its plan to relocate approximately 37 utility poles.  The county engineer 
did not send any formal approval of CEI’s October 2008 plan but presumed that 
CEI would proceed with pole relocation in accordance with the plan. 
January Term, 2016 
 
3
{¶ 4} On March 2, 2009, the county engineer received a revised plan from 
CEI.  CEI’s revised plan reduced the number of pole relocations and divided the 
work into two phases.  The first phase prioritized the removal of 15 poles.  The 
second phase called for the later removal of 9 poles on the west side of Savage 
Road.  By June 2009, however, CEI had decided not to move 8 of the 9 poles 
designated for the second phase. 
{¶ 5} In a letter dated March 26, 2009, the county engineer wrote to 
FirstEnergy’s external affairs division, which served as the liaison between CEI 
and governmental entities.  In his letter, the county engineer expressed concerns 
that CEI’s revised plan “[did] not address the clear zone of the roadway,” exposed 
some poles in the ditch line, and left other poles “in front of the ditch * * * only 
four to six feet off the edge of the pavement.”  The letter further stated:  
 
I would think this is a liability FirstEnergy does not want to absorb 
and I know this is a liability the township will not allow to exist on 
a public road. 
As Project Manager for the township road reconstruction 
project, I am requesting your review of this project with the hope 
you will agree that it is in the best interest of everyone that First 
Energy completes the October 2008 plan in a timely fashion and 
provide[s] a safe, clear zone for the roadway. 
 
FirstEnergy did not respond to the letter. 
{¶ 6} By June 2009, the roadwork contractor had completed its work on 
the Savage Road project and submitted final invoices to the township.  After 
consulting with the offices of the county prosecutor and the county engineer, the 
Bainbridge Township Board of Trustees decided on June 22, 2009, to reopen 
Savage Road, even though the disputed poles had not been moved. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 7} One year later, the chairman of the Bainbridge Township Board of 
Trustees sent a letter dated June 24, 2010, to FirstEnergy, again requesting 
relocation of the eight disputed poles.  In September 2010, FirstEnergy’s director 
of external affairs responded with a letter explaining that CEI had decided not to 
relocate the remaining eight poles after determining that “there was no potential 
conflict with drainage ditches or other governmental functions.”  FirstEnergy’s 
letter also stated that CEI “does not relocate poles for clear zone, except at the 
customer’s expense.”  The township did not respond to the letter or initiate any 
formal proceedings requiring CEI to remove the poles. 
The Link accident and lawsuit against CEI and FirstEnergy 
{¶ 8} On the night of October 8, 2010, Douglas Link (“Link”) was driving 
his motorcycle on Savage Road when a deer struck Link on his left side.  Diane 
Link, who was driving behind her husband in her car, saw the deer leap up from 
the left side of the road but did not see the moment of impact.  When she no 
longer saw the headlights of Link’s motorcycle in front of her, she pulled over, 
found Link lying on the side of the road, and called 9-1-1.  Link sustained 
extensive, long-term injuries to his right leg and pelvis. 
{¶ 9} The Links sued CEI, FirstEnergy, and their parent company, 
FirstEnergy Corporation (collectively, “defendants”), alleging that Link struck 
one of the eight utility poles that defendants had failed to relocate and that Link’s 
impact with the pole was the direct and proximate cause of his injuries.  The 
Links asserted claims for negligence, negligence per se, absolute and/or qualified 
nuisance, loss of consortium, and punitive damages. 
{¶ 10} Defendants filed two motions for summary judgment, arguing that 
under Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-2010, 887 
N.E.2d 1158, a utility company cannot be held liable when a vehicle collides with 
one of its poles located off the improved roadway if the utility company had 
obtained the required permission to install the pole and the pole does not interfere 
January Term, 2016 
 
5
with the usual and ordinary course of travel.  The CEI pole involved in Link’s 
accident was originally erected in 1952 and replaced in 1975.  CEI argued that no 
further permission was necessary when the pole had been in the same position for 
decades.  The court denied both motions, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. 
{¶ 11} The parties do not dispute that Link’s motorcycle hit a CEI utility 
pole at some point after the deer struck Link.  The parties offered conflicting 
evidence, however, as to whether Link was still riding his motorcycle when it hit 
the pole.  An accident reconstructionist who testified for the Links opined that 
Link was still riding his motorcycle and attempting to return to the road when he 
collided with the pole.  The Links argued that if CEI had moved the pole in 
accordance with its original plan, Link would have been able to avoid the pole.  
Defendants’ accident reconstructionist opined that Link more likely fell off his 
motorcycle before it struck the pole and that the pole therefore did not cause 
Link’s injuries. 
{¶ 12} CEI’s original, October 2008 plan called for relocation of the pole 
43 feet to the south and 9 feet to the west, providing a 17-foot clear zone.  A 
“clear zone” is an unobstructed area of the right-of-way1 beyond the pavement 
edge where an errant vehicle leaving the paved road can come to a stop or return 
safely to the pavement.  For an uncurbed township or county road like Savage 
Road with a speed limit of 45 m.p.h. and average daily traffic of 2,200 vehicles, 
the Ohio Department of Transportation’s (“ODOT”) Location and Design Manual 
recommends a clear zone of 17 feet.  CEI’s design-and-construction manual 
incorporates ODOT’s clear-zone standards.  After completion of the road-
improvement project, the pole was 6 feet, 3.6 inches from the pavement edge, 8 
                                                 
1  “Right-of-way” is defined as a “general term denoting land, property, or the interest therein 
* * * acquired for or devoted to transportation purposes” and “includes the roadway, shoulders or 
berm, ditch, and slopes extending to the right-of-way limits under the control of the state or local 
authority.”  R.C. 4511.01(UU)(2).   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
feet, 2.4 inches from the outside edge of the white line, and 8 feet, 7.2 inches from 
the inside edge of the white line. 
{¶ 13} CEI acknowledged that the pole did not meet the recommended 17-
foot clear-zone standard.  However, CEI’s original plan left four poles in the clear 
zone, and the county engineer did not object to that plan.  The county engineer’s 
office did not require the removal of other obstructions, such as mailboxes and 
driveway drainage pipes, located four to six feet from the pavement.  It requires 
utilities to obtain a permit only for pipelines and other underground structures but 
does not require a permit for utility-pole installation or relocation. 
{¶ 14} Defendants presented evidence that the relevant manuals setting 
out clear-zone standards leave room for engineering discretion.  ODOT states that 
its Location and Design Manual “should be used as a guide for establishing clear 
zones for various types of highways and operating conditions” and that “full 
consideration[ ] shall be given to sound engineering principles and economic 
factors.”  The Geauga County Commissioners Highway Use Manual states that its 
“guidelines for accommodation of power and communication lines on highway 
rights-of-way will vary with the site conditions” and that they should be 
“considered a flexible policy which may be modified where special conditions 
exist.” 
{¶ 15} Defendants also presented testimony explaining that CEI 
designates a pole for mandatory relocation on road-widening projects if the pole 
will end up in the improved drainage ditch or in the improved pavement or if 
earth removal results in grade cuts that compromise the pole’s stability in the 
ground.  The eight poles that CEI decided not to move, including the one involved 
in Link’s accident, did not meet any of these conditions. 
{¶ 16} At the close of their case, the Links dismissed their negligence-per-
se claim.  The trial court directed a verdict for FirstEnergy Corporation as to all 
claims based on insufficient evidence of its involvement.  The court also directed 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
a verdict for defendants on the absolute-nuisance claim.  At the close of 
defendants’ case, the court granted defendants’ renewed motion for directed 
verdict on the claim for punitive damages. 
{¶ 17} With respect to the three remaining claims against CEI and 
FirstEnergy, the jury returned a verdict for the Links on their qualified-nuisance 
and loss-of-consortium claims but returned a verdict for CEI and FirstEnergy on 
the negligence claim.  The jury awarded $237,200 for Douglas Link’s past 
economic loss, $180,982 for his future economic loss, and $234,100 for his future 
noneconomic loss.  But the jury did not award past noneconomic damages.  The 
jury awarded $146,250 for Diane Link’s loss-of-consortium claim.  In response to 
interrogatories, the jury apportioned the parties’ shares of liability as follows: CEI 
27 percent, the county engineer’s office 22 percent, FirstEnergy 19 percent, 
Douglas Link 17 percent, and Bainbridge Township 15 percent.  The trial court 
reduced the amount of damages awarded to the Links accordingly. 
{¶ 18} On February 21, 2013, CEI and FirstEnergy filed a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), renewing the argument made in 
their motions for summary judgment that Turner, 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-
2010, 887 N.E.2d 1158, provided an absolute bar to liability.  The trial court 
denied the motion. 
The appeal 
{¶ 19} CEI and FirstEnergy appealed to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals and collectively asserted five assignments of error.  The Links also filed 
a cross-appeal asserting four cross-assignments of error.  CEI’s first assignment of 
error is the only one relevant to the appeal before us. 
{¶ 20} CEI argued that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment, 
a directed verdict, or JNOV on the qualified-nuisance claim, because Turner 
insulated them from liability.  The Eighth District disagreed and held that “CEI 
cannot rely on Turner as a shield from liability.”  2014-Ohio-5432, 25 N.E.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
1095, ¶ 24.  The court concluded that “CEI did not have the requisite permission 
to keep the Pole in its original location after completion of the Savage Road 
widening project.”  Id.  The court also held that the trial court erred in granting 
defendants’ motion for directed verdict on the punitive-damages claim and 
remanded the cause to the trial court to conduct a new trial solely on the issue of 
punitive damages with CEI and FirstEnergy as the only defendants.  Id. at ¶ 47, 
54. 
Question presented 
{¶ 21} We accepted CEI and FirstEnergy’s appeal on their first 
proposition of law:  “The statutory permission granted to utilities by R.C. 4931.03 
to maintain poles in the unincorporated area of an Ohio township satisfies the 
‘any necessary permission’ requirement of Turner absent legislative action by a 
governing public authority to revoke or cancel the statutory permission.”  See 143 
Ohio St.3d 1440, 2015-Ohio-3427, 36 N.E.3d 188.  We rejected CEI and 
FirstEnergy’s second proposition of law, in which they asserted error by the 
appeals court in granting a new hearing for punitive damages.  Id.  We also 
declined to accept the Links’ cross-appeal arguing plain error by the jury in 
failing to award damages for past noneconomic loss.  Id. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of review 
{¶ 22} The trial court’s denial of JNOV raises a question of law requiring 
de novo review as to whether the evidence, construed most strongly in favor of 
appellees, is legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.  Environmental 
Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 119 Ohio St.3d 209, 2008-Ohio-
3833, 893 N.E.2d 173, ¶ 23.  While the trial court also denied appellants’ two 
motions for summary judgment that were based on Turner, the subsequent jury 
verdict in the Links’ favor rendered the denial of summary judgment moot.  See 
Continental Ins. Co. v. Whittington, 71 Ohio St.3d 150, 642 N.E.2d 615 (1994), 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
syllabus (“Any error by a trial court in denying a motion for summary judgment is 
rendered moot or harmless if a subsequent trial on the same issues raised in the 
motion demonstrates that there were genuine issues of material fact supporting a 
judgment in favor of the party against whom the motion was made”).  We 
therefore limit our review here to whether the trial court erred in denying 
appellants’ motion for JNOV. 
Legal framework for utility use of public rights-of-way 
{¶ 23} Since 1847, public utility companies in Ohio have enjoyed a 
qualified right to place utility poles within the right-of-way of public roads.  
Turner, 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-2010, 887 N.E.2d 1158, at ¶ 7, citing 45 
Ohio Laws 34.  But “utility companies do not enjoy unfettered discretion in the 
placement of their poles within the right-of-way” and “are required to obtain 
approval from the owner of the right-of-way.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  R.C. 4931.03 governs 
utilities’ use of the public right-of-way in the unincorporated area of a township. 
{¶ 24} In Turner, we held that “[w]hen a vehicle collides with a utility 
pole located off the improved portion of the roadway but within the right-of-way, 
a public utility is not liable, as a matter of law, if the utility has obtained any 
necessary permission to install the pole and the pole does not interfere with the 
usual and ordinary course of travel.”  Id. at syllabus.  “Placement that complies 
with the requirements of the public authority that owns the right of way is 
indicative that the object is not an obstacle to the traveling public.”  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 25} Applying the framework set out in Turner, we conclude that no 
provision of Ohio law required CEI and FirstEnergy to obtain permission from the 
appropriate public authorities—here, the township and county engineer—to leave 
the pole involved in Link’s accident in its existing location.  We also conclude 
that the evidence at trial, even when construed most strongly in the Links’ favor, 
was not legally sufficient to establish that the pole interfered with the usual and 
ordinary course of travel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Permission to maintain utility poles in township right-of-way 
{¶ 26} With respect to a public right-of-way located in an unincorporated 
area of a township, R.C. 4931.03 states that a utility company2 may “[c]onstruct 
telecommunications lines or facilities upon and along any of the public roads and 
highways and across any waters within that area by the erection of the necessary 
fixtures, including posts, piers, or abutments for sustaining the cords or wires of 
those lines or facilities.”  R.C. 4931.03(A)(1). 
{¶ 27} R.C. 4931.03 imposes two applicable limitations on a utility 
company’s use of a township right-of-way.  “Th[e] lines and facilities shall be 
constructed so as not to incommode the public in the use of the roads or highways 
* * *.”  R.C. 4931.03(A)(1).  And “[c]onstruction under this section is subject to 
section 5571.16[3] of the Revised Code, as applicable, and any other applicable 
law, including, but not limited to, any law requiring approval of the legislative 
authority, the county engineer, or the director of transportation.”  R.C. 
4931.03(B)(2). 
{¶ 28} We conclude based on the record before us that CEI and 
FirstEnergy complied with all “applicable law” governing the placement of the 
utility pole involved in Link’s accident and that they were not required to obtain a 
permit or approval from the township board of trustees or county engineer to 
leave the pole in its existing location.  Absent a resolution or affirmative legal 
action from the Bainbridge Township Board of Trustees seeking to revoke 
permission, no “applicable law” required CEI and FirstEnergy to move the pole 
from its current location. 
{¶ 29} While the county engineer has supervisory authority over road-
improvement projects undertaken by the boards of township trustees, there is no 
                                                 
2  R.C. 4931.03 applies to telecommunications and electric companies. See R.C. 4933.14(A).   
3  R.C. 5571.16 pertains to the installation of new utility poles in a township right-of-way and is 
therefore not relevant to this appeal.   
January Term, 2016 
 
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provision of Ohio law “requiring approval of * * * the county engineer” with 
respect to the placement of utility poles on township roads.  R.C. 4931.03(B)(2).  
R.C. 5543.09(A) states that “the county engineer shall supervise * * * the 
construction, reconstruction, resurfacing, and improvement of public roads by 
boards of township trustees.”  However, the Links cannot point to a statute 
requiring utility companies to obtain a permit or approval from the county 
engineer before installing or relocating utility poles on township roads.  In 
contrast, the statutes governing the use of a public right-of-way belonging to the 
state or a municipality require the issuance of a permit by the appropriate 
authority.  See R.C. 5515.01 (upon formal application, director of transportation 
may grant a permit “with respect to the location of poles” on state highways 
subject to the conditions set forth in divisions (A) through (H)); R.C. 
4939.03(C)(1) (“No person shall occupy or use a public way without first 
obtaining any requisite consent of the municipal corporation owning or 
controlling the public way”). 
{¶ 30} The Eighth District relied on the county engineer’s March 26, 2009 
letter to conclude that CEI did not have permission to keep the pole involved in 
Link’s accident in its existing location.  2014-Ohio-5432, 25 N.E.3d 1095, at  
¶ 21-24.  The letter expressed disapproval of CEI’s revised plan and requested 
“review of this project with the hope * * * that First Energy completes the 
October 2008 plan in a timely fashion and provide[s] a safe, clear zone for the 
roadway.”  However, a letter expressing disapproval does not carry the force of 
law requiring CEI to move its utility poles.  Indeed, the county engineer 
acknowledged that he did not have authority to order the relocation of utility 
poles.  While the Geauga County Commissioners Highway Use Manual requires 
utilities to obtain a permit for underground installations and pipelines, it does not 
require a permit for utility-pole installation or relocation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 31} The Links also cannot point to any “other applicable law” requiring 
CEI and FirstEnergy to obtain approval from the township’s legislative authority, 
here the Bainbridge Township Board of Trustees, to leave the pole in its existing 
location.  While the board’s chairman sent a letter to FirstEnergy dated June 24, 
2010, requesting relocation of the eight disputed poles, a letter, without more, 
does not have the force of law. 
{¶ 32} The Links would have a better argument if the board had taken 
affirmative steps to order the removal or relocation of the utility pole.  R.C. 
5571.14 authorizes a board of township trustees or township highway 
superintendent to declare as a public nuisance an object bounding a township road 
that “obstructs or endangers the public travel” and to order its removal within 30 
days.  R.C. 5571.14(A).  Upon refusal to comply, the board or superintendent can 
order the object’s removal and certify the expense to the county auditor to be 
collected in the same manner as a tax.  Id.  See also Toledo Edison Co. v. Bd. of 
Defiance Cty. Commrs., 2013-Ohio-5374, 4 N.E.3d 458 (3d Dist.) (board of 
county commissioners may order removal of utility poles along county right-of-
way pursuant to resolution under R.C. 5547.03). 
{¶ 33} Instead of initiating legal proceedings requiring CEI and 
FirstEnergy to move their utility poles, however, the board decided to reopen 
Savage Road after consulting with the county prosecutor and county engineer.  
The board evaluated the risk to public safety and decided as the owner of the 
right-of-way that the existing placement of CEI’s utility poles would not 
incommode the public use of Savage Road.  Accordingly, the jury found that the 
tortious conduct of both the county engineer’s office and the board contributed to 
Link’s injuries.  Absent a resolution or other affirmative legal action from the 
board, no provision of Ohio law required CEI and FirstEnergy to move the 
involved pole or to obtain a permit to leave the pole involved in Link’s accident in 
January Term, 2016 
 
13 
its existing location.  We therefore conclude that CEI and FirstEnergy satisfied 
the first prong of Turner. 
Evidence that the pole did not “interfere with the usual and ordinary  
course of travel” 
{¶ 34} Turning to the second prong of the Turner test, we also conclude 
that the evidence at trial was not legally sufficient to establish that the CEI utility 
pole involved in Link’s accident interfered with the usual and ordinary course of 
travel on Savage Road.  A utility company can be held liable when its placement 
of an object “that is not on the improved portion of the road but within the right-
of-way is a condition that makes the roadway unsafe for the usual and ordinary 
course of travel.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Turner, 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-2010, 
887 N.E.2d 1158, at ¶ 22, citing Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. 
Rd. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 318, 322, 587 N.E.2d 819 (1992).  In Turner, a 
motorist veered off a state highway due to darkness and fog and collided with a 
utility pole located in a grassy area two feet, five inches from the berm and three 
feet, nine inches from the white line at the edge of the road.  Id. at ¶ 1.  We held 
that the pole did not interfere with the ordinarily and usually traversed portion of 
the road and that a motorist properly using the improved portion of the highway 
would not have come into contact with the utility pole.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 35} Even when construing the evidence most strongly in the Links’ 
favor, as we must, and assuming that Link struck the utility pole while still on his 
motorcycle, there was no evidence that the pole’s placement created an unsafe 
condition for normal travel.  Had Link stayed within the marked lanes or even on 
the improved portion of the roadway, his motorcycle would not have come in 
contact with the pole. 
{¶ 36} After completion of the road-improvement project, the pole 
measured 6 feet, 3.6 inches from the pavement edge, 8 feet, 2.4 inches from the 
outside edge of the white line, and 8 feet, 7.2 inches from the inside edge of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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white line.  The county engineer did not object to mailboxes and driveway 
drainage pipes located closer to Savage Road, four to six feet from the pavement.  
And the pole in Turner was even closer to the pavement, at three feet, nine inches 
from the white line. 
{¶ 37} ODOT’s clear-zone standards leave room for engineering 
discretion and do not impose a duty to remove all obstructions within the clear 
zone unless they interfere with normal roadway travel.  ODOT states that its 
Location and Design Manual “should be used as a guide for establishing clear 
zones for various types of highways and operating conditions” and that “full 
consideration[ ] shall be given to sound engineering principles and economic 
factors.”  See also Steele v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 162 Ohio App.3d 30, 2005-
Ohio-3276, 832 N.E.2d 764, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.) (ODOT clear-zone guidelines did 
not impose duty to remove object “unless it interfere[s] with safe travel on the 
regularly traveled portion” of roadway); Floering v. Roller, 6th Dist. Wood No. 
WD-02-076, 2003-Ohio-5679, ¶ 22 (ODOT manual did not give rise to duty to 
remove all trees in clear zone).  Noncompliance with the manual’s guidelines, 
without more, does not establish an unsafe condition. 
{¶ 38} To be clear, our holding here does not limit a finding of liability 
only for obstructions located in the improved roadway.  As we noted in Turner, 
there may be cases where off-the-road placement of a pole interferes with the 
usual and ordinary course of travel.  For example, in Swaisgood v. Puder, 6th 
Dist. Erie No. E-06-033, 2007-Ohio-307, a telephone pole located three feet, nine 
inches from the paved road did not allow sufficient clearance for a tractor-trailer 
to make a proper right-hand turn.  See Turner, 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-
2010, 887 N.E.2d 1158, at ¶ 25, citing Swaisgood. 
{¶ 39} The evidence here, however, does not present a case in which the 
placement of a utility pole interfered with normal travel on a roadway.  The Links 
did not provide any evidence that a motorist driving on the improved portion of 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
Savage Road would have come in contact with the pole, which was located 6 feet, 
3.6 inches from the pavement edge and 8 feet, 2.4 inches from the outside edge of 
the white line.  Absent evidence of interference with the usual and ordinary course 
of travel on the roadway, CEI and FirstEnergy did not have a duty to remove off-
road objects within the public right-of-way that might come in contact with 
wayward vehicles. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 40} We conclude that CEI and FirstEnergy were not required by any 
applicable law pursuant to R.C. 4931.03 to move the pole involved in Link’s 
accident or to obtain a permit to leave the pole in its existing position.  We also 
conclude that the pole did not incommode or interfere with the usual and ordinary 
course of travel on Savage Road.  As a matter of law, CEI and FirstEnergy cannot 
be held liable, under any theory of liability asserted by the Links. 
{¶ 41} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals and remand the matter to the trial court to enter judgment for appellants. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents in an opinion that PFEIFER, J., joins. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 42} Respectfully, I must dissent. 
{¶ 43} The ultimate question in this matter is whether the defendant utility 
companies retained permission to leave eight utility poles in locations that had 
become dangerous due to the widening of a road.  A duly empaneled jury found 
that one of the poles was involved in an accident that resulted in serious injuries. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 44} Defendants-appellants, 
the 
Cleveland 
Electric 
Illuminating 
Company (“CEI”) and FirstEnergy Service Company (“FirstEnergy”), argue that 
they are not liable as a matter of law because they had permission to place the 
pole in its existing location in 1952.  They are correct, assuming that the 
permission was not rescinded. 
{¶ 45} If the “necessary permission” to place the pole was granted and 
never rescinded, the majority explains, then defendants have established the first 
prong of the standard set forth in Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 
215, 2008-Ohio-2010, 887 N.E.2d 1158.  I can readily agree with that reasoning. 
{¶ 46} But the record shows that the Bainbridge Township Board of 
Trustees had demanded that defendants move the eight poles in question.  
Defendants argue that affirmance of the court of appeals’ judgment in this case 
would require utility companies to survey “poles and other items that are in the 
areas surrounding the tens of thousands of miles of roadways in hundreds of 
Ohio’s unincorporated townships.”  But this roadway had been widened—at the 
time of the accident, the poles were significantly closer to the edge of Savage 
Road than they had been when installed back in 1952.  The existing locations of 
the eight poles created the hazard only in light of changed circumstances.  And 
the board sent defendants a letter rescinding permission to leave the poles in their 
existing locations after the widening of the road. 
{¶ 47} Defendants were drawn into the Savage Road matter when in 2008, 
the Geauga County engineer sent CEI his Savage Road improvement plans with 
utility poles “in the construction area” highlighted.  CEI responded with a form 
letter that had a box filled in, indicating that there were poles that would have to 
be moved.  Shortly thereafter, CEI sent the county engineer a detailed schematic 
indicating that it would move approximately 37 poles along Savage Road.  
According to this plan, the pole involved in the accident at issue was to be moved 
nine feet further away from the road.  In 2009, however, motivated by budgetary 
January Term, 2016 
 
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constraints, CEI ultimately determined that safety concerns did not, in fact, 
require relocation of 8 of the 37 poles, including the pole at issue in this case, and 
decided not to move them. 
{¶ 48} Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the Bainbridge Township 
Board of Trustees did not fail to act thereafter.  In May 2010, a car swerved to 
avoid a deer and hit one of the eight dangerously placed poles that CEI had 
decided not to relocate in 2009.  Bidar v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 97490, 2012-Ohio-3686.  The next month, according to the 
minutes of its June 14, 2010 meeting, the board reached a “general agreement” 
that a letter asking CEI to move the eight poles should be drafted.  Ten days later, 
on June 24, the chairman of the board sent CEI a letter stating, “We are concerned 
about the location” of the utility poles that CEI had chosen not to relocate.  The 
letter requested that CEI submit a schedule for moving the eight poles on account 
of their dangerous placement.  The letter further observed, “[I]t is apparent that 
safety dictates the relocation of these poles to an adequate distance from the 
roadway and in line with the other poles on Savage Road.”  Upon receipt of that 
letter, CEI was on notice that its permission to leave the eight poles in place had 
been unequivocally rescinded.  See Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82, 97, 30 
N.E. 274 (1892) (“whatever grant may have been made by the town * * * could 
have no greater operation than as a temporary license, subject to be revoked at the 
will of the town or city, as its necessities in the future uses of the street might 
require”). 
{¶ 49} At trial, the chairman of the board testified that the board intended 
this letter to “make [relocation of the poles] happen.”  On September 10, 2010, 
CEI responded, offering in a letter to “draw up costs for [the township]” if it was 
interested in relocating the poles.  Just a few weeks later, a deer ran plaintiff-
appellee Douglas Link’s motorcycle off the road and into one of the eight poles 
that CEI had decided not to relocate. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 50} My disagreement with the majority opinion is based on the 
standard of review it employs and its determination that the board failed to act 
after CEI decided not to move the poles.  The jury has already entered a verdict in 
favor of the Links.  Our role on appeal is limited by our standard for reviewing a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Although we are to conduct a de novo 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the majority points out that we are also 
required to construe the evidence at trial most strongly in favor of the Links.  
Majority opinion at ¶ 22, citing Environmental Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss 
Miller, L.L.P., 119 Ohio St.3d 209, 2008-Ohio-3833, 893 N.E.2d 173, ¶ 23.  I 
dissent because I believe that the majority has taken the liberty of reevaluating the 
evidence contrary to the correct legal standard of review.  We are not jurors, and 
the jurors apparently found that defendants had been placed on notice that (1) the 
poles were a hazard and (2) the board of trustees had rescinded permission for 
CEI to leave the eight poles in their hazardous locations. 
{¶ 51} As explained above, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to 
reach these conclusions.  The board chairman’s letter alone, properly construed in 
the light most favorable to the Links, allows a reasonable inference that the 
chairman requested a schedule for moving the eight dangerously placed poles in 
his official capacity on behalf of the board.  The majority ignores the fact that the 
evidence flatly contradicts any assertion that defendants had ongoing permission 
to leave the poles where they were.  They did not. 
{¶ 52} The majority states that if the board of trustees had initiated more 
“formal” legal proceedings or taken official legal action to rescind whatever 
presumed lawful permission was granted in the 1950s, then defendants might not 
have established the first prong of Turner.  Majority opinion at ¶ 7.  The majority 
suggests that the board should have declared the eight poles a public nuisance and 
ordered their removal under R.C. 5571.14.  Majority opinion at ¶ 32.  I disagree.  
The chairman of the board explained at trial that the trustees serve part-time and 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
do not always know what to do without direction from the county prosecutor or 
county engineer.  The fact that the board of trustees did not follow the procedure 
outlined in R.C. 5571.14 suggests more strongly that it was not aware that that 
statute existed than that it consciously decided to allow CEI to leave the eight 
poles where they were. 
{¶ 53} That the board of trustees applied a softer touch when working with 
a private entity cannot override the jury verdict against defendants.  A declaration 
of public nuisance under R.C. 5571.14 is an undiplomatic final act of an 
aggrieved township.  It is certainly not the only act sufficient to rescind 
permission to use the township’s roadway easement for placement of a utility 
pole.  Instead, the board of trustees was empowered with “control of the township 
roads of [the] township.”  R.C. 5571.02.  “Control” must entail at least the 
discretion as to how to demand that a utility company move its pole to a safer 
location within a township’s easement. 
{¶ 54} Even assuming that the evidence that permission was rescinded is 
weak or conflicts with other facts in the record—a proposition I disagree with—
that evidence is sufficient when construed most strongly in favor of the Links.  
For that reason, the jury’s verdict should stand.  Properly understood, the majority 
opinion holds that the township could have more clearly rescinded permission by 
an official declaration of public nuisance instead of a letter sent pursuant to the 
“general agreement” of the board reflected in the minutes of its meeting.  This 
court does not and should not throw out jury verdicts based on our own 
determination of what evidence would have been better proof.  It is simply 
irrelevant whether a majority of this court would come to the same conclusion as 
the jury did.  That is a question of the weight of the evidence, and answering that 
question was the role of the jury below. 
{¶ 55} Respectfully, I dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_________________ 
DeMarco & Triscaro, Ltd., and Joseph J. Triscaro, for appellees. 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., Thomas I. Michals, John J. Eklund, 
William E. Coughlin, and Eric S. Zell, for appellants. 
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., Frank J. Reed Jr., and Alexander L. Ewing, 
urging affirmance for amici curiae the County Commissioners Association of 
Ohio and the Ohio Township Association. 
Melissa R. Lipchak, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association 
for Justice. 
Edward L. Bettendorf, urging reversal for amicus curiae the Ohio Bell 
Telephone Company. 
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