Title: Trump v. Biden

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 91 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2038 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Donald J. Trump, Michael R. Pence and Donald J. 
Trump for President, Inc., 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Joseph R. Biden, Kamala D. Harris, Milwaukee 
County Clerk c/o George L. Christenson, 
Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers c/o Tim 
Posnanski, Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann 
S. Jacobs, Dane County Clerk c/o Scott McDonell 
and Dane County Board of Canvassers c/o Alan  
Arnsten, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON PETITION TO BYPASS COURT OF APPEALS, REVIEW 
OF DECISION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 14, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 12, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen A. Simanek   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., filed a concurring opinion.  HAGEDORN, 
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
joined.  ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and 
ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, a brief was filed by James R. 
Troupis and Troupis Law Office, Cross Plains, and R. George Burnett 
and Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry S.C., Green Bay.  Oral argument 
presented by James R. Troupis. 
 
For the defendants-respondents Joseph R. Biden and Kamala D. 
Harris, a brief was filed by Matthew W. O’Neill and Fox, O’Neill 
& Shannon, S.C., Milwaukee, Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Michelle M. 
Umberger, Will M. Conley and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, and John 
M. Devaney (pro hac vice) and Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, D.C.  
Oral argument was presented by John M. Devaney. 
 
For the defendants-respondents Wisconsin Elections Commission 
and Ann S. Jacobs, oral argument was presented by assistant 
attorney general Colin T. Roth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 91 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP2038 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV2514 & 2020CV7092) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Donald J. Trump, Michael R. Pence and Donald J. 
Trump for President, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph R. Biden, Kamala D. Harris, Milwaukee 
County Clerk c/o George L. Christenson, 
Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers c/o Tim 
Posnanski, Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann 
S. Jacobs, Dane County Clerk c/o Scott McDonell 
and Dane County Board of Canvassers c/o Alan 
Arnsten, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 14, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  DALLET and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., filed a concurring opinion.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER and 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and ZIEGLER, J., 
joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Stephen A. Simanek, Reserve Judge.  Affirmed.   
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   In the 2020 presidential election, 
the initial Wisconsin county canvasses showed that Wisconsin 
voters selected Joseph R. Biden and Kamala D. Harris as the 
recipients 
of 
Wisconsin's 
electoral 
college 
votes. 
 
The 
petitioners1 (collectively, the "Campaign") bring an action under 
Wis. Stat. § 9.01 (2017-18)2 seeking to invalidate a sufficient 
number of Wisconsin ballots to change Wisconsin's certified 
election results.  Specifically, the Campaign seeks to invalidate 
the ballots——either directly or through a drawdown——of more than 
220,000 Wisconsin voters in Dane and Milwaukee Counties.   
¶2 
The Campaign focuses its objections on four different 
categories of ballots——each applying only to voters in Dane County 
and Milwaukee County.  First, it seeks to strike all ballots cast 
by voters who claimed indefinitely confined status since March 25, 
2020.  Second, it argues that a form used for in-person absentee 
voting is not a "written application" and therefore all in-person 
absentee ballots should be struck.  Third, it maintains that 
municipal officials improperly added witness information on 
absentee ballot certifications, and that these ballots are 
therefore invalid.  Finally, the Campaign asserts that all ballots 
collected at "Democracy in the Park," two City of Madison events 
in late September and early October, were illegally cast.   
                                                 
1 The petitioners are Donald J. Trump, Michael R. Pence, and 
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
3 
 
¶3 
We conclude the Campaign is not entitled to the relief 
it seeks.  The challenge to the indefinitely confined voter ballots 
is meritless on its face, and the other three categories of ballots 
challenged fail under the doctrine of laches. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
After all votes were counted and canvassing was 
completed for the 2020 presidential election contest, the results 
showed that Vice President Biden and Senator Harris won Wisconsin 
by 20,427 votes.  The Campaign sought a recount in two of 
Wisconsin's 72 counties——Milwaukee and Dane.  The Milwaukee County 
Elections Commission and the Dane County Board of Canvassers 
conducted the recount and certified the results.  The recount 
increased the margin of victory for Vice President Biden and 
Senator Harris to 20,682 votes. 
¶5 
The Campaign appealed those decisions in a consolidated 
appeal to the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 9.01(6)(a), naming 
Vice President Biden, Senator Harris, the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission (WEC), and several election officials as respondents.3  
The circuit court4 affirmed the determinations of the Dane County 
Board of Canvassers and the Milwaukee County Elections Commission 
                                                 
3 Also named were Milwaukee County Clerk c/o George L. 
Christenson, Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers c/o Tim 
Posnanski, Ann S. Jacobs, Dane County Clerk c/o Scott McDonell, 
and Dane County Board of Canvassers c/o Alan Arnsten. 
4 The consolidated appeals were assigned to Reserve Judge 
Stephen A. Simanek. 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
4 
 
in full.  The Campaign appealed and filed a petition for bypass, 
which we granted.   
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶6 
The 
Campaign 
asks 
this 
court 
to 
reverse 
the 
determinations of the Dane County Board of Canvassers and the 
Milwaukee County Elections Commission with respect to four 
categories of ballots it argues were unlawfully cast.5  The 
respondents argue that all ballots were cast in compliance with 
the law, or at least that the Campaign has not shown otherwise.  
They further maintain that a multitude of legal doctrines——
including laches, equitable estoppel, unclean hands, due process, 
and equal protection——bar the Campaign from receiving its 
requested relief.  We agree that the challenge to the indefinitely 
confined voter ballots is without merit, and that laches bars the 
relief the Campaign seeks on the three remaining categories of 
challenged ballots. 
 
A.  Indefinitely Confined Voters 
¶7 
Wisconsin 
allows 
voters 
to 
declare 
themselves 
indefinitely 
confined, 
provided 
they 
meet 
the 
statutory 
requirements.  See Wis. Stat. § 6.86(2)(a).6  These individuals 
                                                 
5 We may set aside or modify the determination if "a provision 
of law" is "erroneously interpreted" and "a correct interpretation 
compels a particular action."  Wis. Stat. § 9.01(8).  We accept 
the findings of fact unless a factual finding "is not supported by 
substantial evidence."  Id. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.86(2)(a) provides:   
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
5 
 
are not required to provide photo identification to obtain an 
absentee ballot.  Id.  On March 25, 2020, the Dane and Milwaukee 
County Clerks issued guidance on Facebook suggesting all voters 
could declare themselves indefinitely confined because of the 
pandemic and the governor's then-existing Safer-at-Home Order.  
This court unanimously deemed that advice incorrect on March 31, 
2020, and we noted that "the WEC guidance . . . provides the 
clarification on the purpose and proper use of the indefinitely 
confined status that is required at this time."  The county clerks 
immediately updated their advice in accordance with our decision. 
¶8 
The Campaign does not challenge the ballots of 
individual voters.  Rather, the Campaign argues that all voters 
claiming indefinitely confined status since the date of the 
erroneous Facebook advice should have their votes invalidated, 
whether they are actually indefinitely confined or not.  Although 
the number of individuals claiming indefinitely confined status 
has increased throughout the state, the Campaign asks us to apply 
this blanket invalidation of indefinitely confined voters only to 
ballots cast in Dane and Milwaukee Counties, a total exceeding 
                                                 
An elector who is indefinitely confined because of age, 
physical illness or infirmity or is disabled for an 
indefinite period may by signing a statement to that 
effect require that an absentee ballot be sent to the 
elector 
automatically 
for 
every 
election. 
 
The 
application form and instructions shall be prescribed by 
the commission, and furnished upon request to any 
elector by each municipality.  The envelope containing 
the absentee ballot shall be clearly marked as not 
forwardable.  If any elector is no longer indefinitely 
confined, the elector shall so notify the municipal 
clerk. 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
6 
 
28,000 votes.  The Campaign's request to strike indefinitely 
confined voters in Dane and Milwaukee Counties as a class without 
regard to whether any individual voter was in fact indefinitely 
confined has no basis in reason or law; it is wholly without merit. 
 
B.  Laches  
¶9 
Three additional categories of ballots are challenged by 
the Campaign.  In Milwaukee and Dane Counties, the Campaign asserts 
all in-person absentee votes were cast unlawfully without an 
application, and that all absentee ballots with certifications 
containing witness address information added by the municipal 
clerks were improperly counted.  Additionally, the Campaign 
challenges all ballots returned at the City of Madison's "Democracy 
in the Park" events. 
¶10 All 
three 
of 
these 
challenges 
fail 
under 
the 
longstanding and well-settled doctrine of laches.  "Laches is 
founded on the notion that equity aids the vigilant, and not those 
who sleep on their rights to the detriment of the opposing party."  
State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2019 WI 110, ¶14, 389 
Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587.  Application of laches is within the 
court's discretion upon a showing by the party raising the claim 
of unreasonable delay, lack of knowledge the claim would be raised, 
and prejudice.  Id., ¶15. 
¶11 For obvious reasons, laches has particular import in the 
election context.  As one noted treatise explains: 
Extreme diligence and promptness are required in 
election-related matters, particularly where actionable 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
7 
 
election practices are discovered prior to the election.  
Therefore, laches is available in election challenges.  
In fact, in election contests, a court especially 
considers the application of laches.  Such doctrine is 
applied because the efficient use of public resources 
demands that a court not allow persons to gamble on the 
outcome of an election contest and then challenge it 
when dissatisfied with the results, especially when the 
same challenge could have been made before the public is 
put through the time and expense of the entire election 
process.  Thus if a party seeking extraordinary relief 
in an election-related matter fails to exercise the 
requisite diligence, laches will bar the action. 
29 C.J.S. Elections § 459 (2020) (footnotes omitted). 
¶12 Although it disagrees the elements were satisfied here, 
the Campaign does not dispute the proposition that laches may bar 
an untimely election challenge.  This principle appears to be 
recognized and applied universally.  See, e.g., Jones v. 
Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, 842 F.3d 1053, 1060–61 (7th Cir. 2016) 
("The obligation to seek injunctive relief in a timely manner in 
the election context is hardly a new concept.").7  This case may 
                                                 
7 See also Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206 (1991) ("The candidate's and 
party's claims to be respectively a serious candidate and a serious 
party with a serious injury become less credible by their having 
slept on their rights."); Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign 
Comm., 849 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Although adequate 
explanation for failure to seek preelection relief has been held 
to exist where, for example, the party challenging the election 
had no opportunity to seek such relief, if aggrieved parties, 
without adequate explanation, do not come forward before the 
election, they will be barred from the equitable relief of 
overturning the results of the election." (citation omitted)); 
Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 710 F.2d 177, 182 
(4th Cir. 1983) ("[F]ailure to require pre-election adjudication 
would 'permit, if not encourage, parties who could raise a claim 
to lay by and gamble upon receiving a favorable decision of the 
electorate and then, upon losing, seek to undo the ballot results 
in a court action.'"); Perry v. Judd, 471 Fed. App'x 219, 220 (4th 
Cir. 2012) ("Movant had every opportunity to challenge the various 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
8 
 
                                                 
Virginia ballot requirements at a time when the challenge would 
not have created the disruption that this last-minute lawsuit 
has."); McClung v. Bennett, 235 P.3d 1037, 1040 (Ariz. 2010) 
("McClung's belated prosecution of this appeal . . . would warrant 
dismissal on the grounds of laches, because his dilatory conduct 
left Sweeney with only one day to file his response brief, 
jeopardized election officials' timely compliance with statutory 
deadlines, and required the Court to decide this matter on an 
unnecessarily accelerated basis." (citations omitted)); Smith v. 
Scioto Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 918 N.E.2d 131, 133-34 (Ohio 2009) 
("Appellees could have raised their claims in a timely pre-election 
protest to the petition.  'Election contests may not be used as a 
vehicle for asserting an untimely protest.'" (citations omitted)); 
Clark v. Pawlenty, 755 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2008) (applying 
laches to bar election challenge where "[t]he processes about which 
petitioners complain are not new"); State ex rel. SuperAmerica 
Grp. v. Licking Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 685 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ohio 
1997) ("In election-related matters, extreme diligence and 
promptness are required.  Extraordinary relief has been routinely 
denied in election-related cases based on laches."); Tully v. 
State, 574 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ill. 1991) (applying laches to bar 
challenge to an automatic retirement statute where a retired judge 
"was at least constructively aware of the fact that his seat was 
declared vacant" and an election had already taken place to replace 
him); Lewis v. Cayetano, 823 P.2d 738, 741 (Haw. 1991) ("We apply 
the doctrine of laches . . . because efficient use of public 
resources demand that we not allow persons to gamble on the outcome 
of the election contest then challenge it when dissatisfied with 
the results, especially when the same challenge could have been 
made before the public is put through the time and expense of the 
entire election process."); Evans v. State Election Bd. of State 
of Okla., 804 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. 1990) ("It is well settled 
that one who seeks to challenge or correct an error of the State 
Election Board will be barred by laches if he does not act with 
diligence."); Thirty Voters of Kauai Cnty. v. Doi, 599 P.2d 286, 
288 (Haw. 1979) ("The general rule is that if there has been 
opportunity to correct any irregularities in the election process 
or in the ballot prior to the election itself, plaintiffs will 
not, in the absence of fraud or major misconduct, be heard to 
complain of them afterward."); Harding v. State Election Board, 
170 P.2d 208, 209 (Okla. 1946) (per curiam) ("[I]t is manifest 
that time is of the essence and that it was the duty of the 
petitioner to proceed with utmost diligence in asserting in a 
proper forum his claimed rights.  The law favors the diligent 
rather than the slothful."); Mehling v. Moorehead, 14 N.E.2d 15, 
20 (Ohio 1938) ("So in this case, the election, having been held, 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
9 
 
be a paradigmatic example of why.  The relevant election officials, 
as well as Vice President Biden and Senator Harris, had no 
knowledge a claim to these broad categories of challenges would 
occur.  The Campaign's delay in raising these issues was 
unreasonable in the extreme, and the resulting prejudice to the 
election officials, other candidates, voters of the affected 
counties, and to voters statewide, is obvious and immense.  Laches 
is more than appropriate here; the Campaign is not entitled to the 
relief it seeks. 
 
                                                 
should not be disturbed when there was full opportunity to correct 
any irregularities before the vote was cast."); Kewaygoshkum v. 
Grand Traverse Band Election Bd., 2008-1199-CV-CV, 2008-1200-CV-
CV, 2008 WL 6196207, at *7 (Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians Tribal Judiciary 2008) (en banc) ("In the instant 
case, nearly all of the allegations by both Plaintiffs against the 
Election Board relate to actions taken (or not taken) by the 
Election Board prior to the general election . . . .  [T]hey are 
not timely raised at this point and should be barred under the 
doctrine of laches."); Moore v. City of Pacific, 534 S.W.2d 486, 
498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("Where actionable election practices are 
discovered prior to the election, injured persons must be diligent 
in seeking relief."); Kelly v. Commonwealth, No. 68 MAP 2020, 2020 
WL 7018314, at *1 (Penn. Nov. 28, 2020) (applying laches to bar a 
challenge to a mail-in voting law where challengers could have 
brought their claim anytime after the law's enactment more than a 
year prior but instead waited until after the 2020 General 
Election); Bowyer v. Ducey, CV-20-02321-PHX-DJH, 2020 WL 7238261, 
at *10 (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2020) (applying laches to bar claims where 
"affidavits or declarations upon which Plaintiffs rely clearly 
shows that the basis for each of these claims was either known 
well before Election Day or soon thereafter"); King v. Witmer, 
Civ. No. 20-13134, 2020 WL 7134198, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2020) 
("If Plaintiffs had legitimate claims regarding whether the 
treatment of election challengers complied with state law, they 
could have brought their claims well in advance of or on Election 
Day——but they did not."). 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
10 
 
1.  Unreasonable Delay 
¶13 First, the respondents must prove that the Campaign 
unreasonably delayed in bringing the challenge.  What constitutes 
an unreasonable delay varies and "depends on the facts of a 
particular case."  Wis. Small Bus. United, Inc. v. Brennan, 2020 
WI 69, ¶14, 393 Wis. 2d 308, 946 N.W.2d 101.  As we have explained: 
[U]nreasonable delay in laches is based not on what 
litigants know, but what they might have known with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.  This underlying 
constructive knowledge requirement arises from the 
general rule that ignorance of one's legal rights is not 
a reasonable excuse in a laches case.  Where the question 
of laches is in issue, the plaintiff is chargeable with 
such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry, 
provided the facts already known by him were such as to 
put a man of ordinary prudence upon inquiry.  To be sure, 
what we expect will vary from case to case and litigant 
to litigant. But the expectation of reasonable diligence 
is firm nonetheless. 
Wren, 389 Wis. 2d 516, ¶20 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  Here, the Campaign unreasonably delayed with respect to 
all three categories of challenged ballots. 
¶14 Regarding the Campaign's first challenge, Wisconsin law 
provides that a "written application" is required before a voter 
can receive an absentee ballot, and that any absentee ballot issued 
without an application cannot be counted.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.86(1)(ar); Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2).  The Campaign argues all in-
person absentee votes in Dane and Milwaukee Counties were cast 
without the required application.   
¶15 But both counties did use an application form created, 
approved, and disseminated by the chief Wisconsin elections 
agency.  This form, now known as EL-122, is entitled "Official 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
11 
 
Absentee Ballot Application/Certification."  It was created in 
2010 in an effort to streamline paperwork following the 2008 
election, and has been available and in use ever since.   
¶16 The Campaign does not challenge that any individual 
voters' ballots lacked an application——an otherwise appropriate 
and timely issue.  Rather, the Campaign argues this "application" 
is not an application, or that municipal clerks do not give this 
form to voters before distributing the ballot, in contravention of 
the statutes.8  Regardless of the practice used, the Campaign would 
like to apply its challenge to the sufficiency of EL-122 to strike 
170,140 votes in just two counties——despite the form's use in 
municipalities throughout the state.9  Waiting until after an 
election to challenge the sufficiency of a form application in use 
statewide for at least a decade is plainly unreasonable.   
¶17 The second category of ballots challenged are those with 
certificates containing witness address information added by a 
municipal clerk.  Absentee ballots must be witnessed, and the 
witness must provide their name, signature, and address on the 
certification (printed on the back side of the envelope in which 
the absentee ballot is ultimately sealed).  Wis. Stat. § 6.87(2), 
(4)(b)1., (6d).  While a witness address must be provided on the 
                                                 
8 According to the findings of fact, the practice in Dane and 
Milwaukee Counties is that the application portion of the envelope 
is completed and shown to an official before the voter receives a 
ballot. 
9 In its findings of fact, the circuit court concluded that 
651,422 voters throughout the state used Form EL-122 in the 2020 
presidential election. 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
12 
 
certification for the corresponding ballot to be counted, the 
statute is silent as to what portion of an address the witness 
must provide.  § 6.87(6d).  
¶18 The process of handling missing witness information is 
not new; election officials followed guidance that WEC created, 
approved, and disseminated to counties in October 2016.  It has 
been relied on in 11 statewide elections since, including in the 
2016 presidential election when President Trump was victorious in 
Wisconsin.  The Campaign nonetheless now seeks to strike ballots 
counted in accordance with that guidance in Milwaukee and Dane 
Counties, but not those counted in other counties that followed 
the same guidance.  The Campaign offers no reason for waiting years 
to challenge this approach, much less after this election.  None 
exists.   
¶19 Finally, the City of Madison held events on September 
27, 2020, and October 3, 2020, dubbed "Democracy in the Park."  At 
these events, sworn city election inspectors collected completed 
absentee ballots.  The city election inspectors also served as 
witnesses if an elector brought an unsealed, blank ballot.  No 
absentee ballots were distributed, and no absentee ballot 
applications were accepted or distributed at these events.   
¶20 The Campaign characterizes these events as illegal early 
in-person absentee voting.  When the events were announced, an 
attorney for the Wisconsin Legislature sent a warning letter to 
the City of Madison suggesting the events were illegal.  The City 
of Madison responded that the events were legally compliant, 
offering reasons why.  Although these events and the legislature's 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
13 
 
concerns were widely publicized, the Campaign never challenged 
these events, nor did any other tribunal determine they were 
unlawful.   
¶21 The Campaign now asks us to determine that all 17,271 
absentee ballots collected during the "Democracy in the Park" 
events were illegally cast.  Once again, when the events were 
announced, the Campaign could have challenged its legality.  It 
did not.  Instead, the Campaign waited until after the election——
after municipal officials, the other candidates, and thousands of 
voters relied on the representations of their election officials 
that these events complied with the law.  The Campaign offers no 
justification for this delay; it is patently unreasonable.   
¶22 The time to challenge election policies such as these is 
not after all ballots have been cast and the votes tallied.  
Election officials in Dane and Milwaukee Counties reasonably 
relied on the advice of Wisconsin's statewide elections agency and 
acted upon it.  Voters reasonably conformed their conduct to the 
voting policies communicated by their election officials.  Rather 
than raise its challenges in the weeks, months, or even years 
prior, the Campaign waited until after the votes were cast.  Such 
delay in light of these specific challenges is unreasonable.   
 
2.  Lack of Knowledge 
¶23 The second element of laches requires that the 
respondents lacked knowledge that the Campaign would bring these 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
14 
 
claims.10  The respondents all assert they were unaware that the 
Campaign would challenge various election procedures after the 
election, and nothing in the record suggests otherwise.  On the 
record before us, this is sufficient to satisfy this element.  See 
Brennan, 393 Wis. 2d 308, ¶18. 
 
3.  Prejudice 
¶24  Finally, the respondents must also prove that prejudice 
results from the Campaign's unreasonable delay.  "What amounts to 
prejudice . . . depends upon the facts and circumstances of each 
case, but it is generally held to be anything that places the party 
in a less favorable position."  Wren, 389 Wis. 2d 516, ¶32. 
¶25 With respect to in-person absentee ballot applications, 
local election officials used form EL-122 in reliance on 
longstanding guidance from WEC.  Penalizing the voters election 
officials serve and the other candidates who relied on this 
longstanding guidance is beyond unfair.  The Campaign sat on its 
hands, waiting until after the election, despite the fact that 
this "application" form was in place for over a decade.  To strike 
                                                 
10 While our cases have identified this element as a general 
requirement for laches, it does not always appear to be applicable.  
To some extent, this requirement focuses on the ability of the 
asserting party to mitigate any resulting prejudice when notice is 
provided.  But this may not be possible in all types of claims.  
Most jurisdictions do not identify lack of knowledge as a separate, 
required element in every laches defense.  See, e.g., Hart v. King, 
470 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Haw. 1979) (holding that laches barred 
relief in federal court notwithstanding plaintiffs' unsuccessful 
pre-election suit in state court).  In any event, we have no 
difficulty finding this element satisfied here. 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
15 
 
ballots cast in reliance on the guidance now, and to do so only in 
two counties, would violate every notion of equity that undergirds 
our electoral system.   
¶26 As for the ballots to which witness address information 
was added, the election officials relied on this statewide advice 
and had no reason to question it.  Waiting until after the election 
to raise the issue is highly prejudicial.  Applying any new 
processes to two counties, and not statewide, is also unfair to 
nearly everyone involved in the election process, especially the 
voters of Dane and Milwaukee Counties.   
¶27 Finally, the respondents, and indeed all voters, are 
prejudiced if the ballots collected at the "Democracy in the Park" 
events are invalidated.  Voters were encouraged to utilize the 
events, and 17,000 voters did so in reliance on representations 
that the process they were using complied with the law.  Striking 
these ballots would disenfranchise voters who did nothing wrong 
when they dropped off their ballot where their local election 
officials told them they could.  
¶28 In short, if the relief the Campaign sought was granted, 
it would invalidate nearly a quarter of a million ballots cast in 
reliance on interpretations of Wisconsin's election laws that were 
well-known before election day.  It would apply new interpretive 
guidelines retroactively to only two counties.  Prejudice to the 
respondents is abundantly clear.  Brennan, 393 Wis. 2d 308, ¶25. 
 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
16 
 
4.  Discretion 
¶29 Whether to apply laches remains "within our equitable 
discretion."  Id., ¶26.  Doing so here is more than equitable; it 
is the only just resolution of these claims. 
¶30 To the extent we have not made this clear in the past, 
we do so now.  Parties bringing election-related claims have a 
special duty to bring their claims in a timely manner.  
Unreasonable delay in the election context poses a particular 
danger——not just to municipalities, candidates, and voters, but to 
the entire administration of justice.  The issues raised in this 
case, had they been pressed earlier, could have been resolved long 
before the election.  Failure to do so affects everyone, causing 
needless litigation and undermining confidence in the election 
results.  It also puts courts in a difficult spot.  Interpreting 
complicated election statutes in days is not consistent with best 
judicial practices.  These issues could have been brought weeks, 
months, or even years earlier.  The resulting emergency we are 
asked to unravel is one of the Campaign's own making.11   
¶31 The claims here are not of improper electoral activity.  
Rather, they are technical issues that arise in the administration 
of every election.  In each category of ballots challenged, voters 
                                                 
11 Our decision that the Campaign is not entitled to the relief 
it seeks does not mean the legal issues presented are foreclosed 
from further judicial scrutiny.  Wisconsin law provides sufficient 
mechanisms for challenging unlawful WEC guidance or unlawful 
municipal election practices.  Nothing in our decision denying 
relief to the Campaign would affect the right of another party to 
raise substantive challenges.   
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
17 
 
followed every procedure and policy communicated to them, and 
election officials in Dane and Milwaukee Counties followed the 
advice of WEC where given.  Striking these votes now——after the 
election, and in only two of Wisconsin's 72 counties when the 
disputed practices were followed by hundreds of thousands of 
absentee voters statewide——would be an extraordinary step for this 
court to take.12  We will not do so. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶32 Our laws allow the challenge flag to be thrown regarding 
various aspects of election administration.  The challenges raised 
by the Campaign in this case, however, come long after the last 
play or even the last game; the Campaign is challenging the 
rulebook adopted before the season began.  Election claims of this 
type must be brought expeditiously.  The Campaign waited until 
after the election to raise selective challenges that could have 
been raised long before the election.  We conclude the challenge 
to indefinitely confined voter ballots is without merit, and that 
laches bars relief on the remaining three categories of challenged 
ballots.  The Campaign is not entitled to relief, and therefore 
                                                 
12 Granting the relief requested by the Campaign may even by 
unconstitutional.  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (per 
curiam) ("The right to vote is protected in more than the initial 
allocation of the franchise.  Equal protection applies as well to 
the manner of its exercise.  Having once granted the right to vote 
on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate 
treatment, value one person's vote over that of another."). 
No. 
2020AP2038 
 
2 
 
does not succeed in its effort to strike votes and alter the 
certified winner of the 2020 presidential election.   
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No.  2020AP2038.rfd&jjk 
1 
 
¶33 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET 
and 
JILL 
J. 
KAROFSKY, JJ.   (concurring).  As acknowledged by the President's 
counsel at oral argument, the President would have the people of 
this country believe that fraud took place in Wisconsin during the 
November 3, 2020 election.  Nothing could be further from the 
truth.  The President failed to point to even one vote cast in 
this election by an ineligible voter; yet he asks this court to 
disenfranchise over 220,000 voters.  The circuit court, whose 
decision we affirm, found no evidence of any fraud.  
¶34 The evidence does show that, despite a global pandemic, 
more than 3.2 million Wisconsinites performed their civic duty.  
More importantly as it relates to this lawsuit, these voters 
followed the rules that were in place at the time.  To borrow 
Justice Hagedorn's metaphor, Wisconsin voters complied with the 
election rulebook.  No penalties were committed and the final score 
was the result of a free and fair election. 
¶35 For the foregoing reasons, we concur. 
 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
1 
 
¶36 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  I agree, of course, 
with the majority opinion I authored holding that the petitioners1 
(collectively, the "Campaign") are not entitled to the relief they 
seek.  But I understand the desire for at least some clarity 
regarding the underlying election administration issues.  A 
comprehensive analysis is not possible or appropriate in light of 
the abbreviated nature of this review and the limited factual 
record in an action under Wis. Stat. § 9.01 (2017-18).2  However, 
I do think we can be of some assistance, and will endeavor to 
address in some measure the categories of ballots the majority 
opinion properly applies laches to.  
¶37 Beyond its challenge to indefinitely confined voters, an 
issue the court's opinion quickly and appropriately dispenses 
with, the Campaign raises challenges to three categories of 
ballots:  (1) all in-person absentee ballots in Dane and Milwaukee 
Counties for want of an absentee ballot application; (2) all 
absentee ballots in Dane and Milwaukee Counties where municipal 
officials added witness address information on the certification; 
and (3) all ballots collected at two City of Madison "Democracy in 
the Park" events occurring in late September and early October.  I 
begin with some background, and address each while remaining 
mindful of the limited nature of this review. 
 
                                                 
1 The petitioners are Donald J. Trump, Michael R. Pence, and 
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
2 
 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
¶38 Elections in Wisconsin are governed by Chapters five 
through 12 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  In applying these laws, we 
have a long history of construing them to give effect to the 
ascertainable will of the voter, notwithstanding technical 
noncompliance with the statutes.  Roth v. Lafarge Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Canvassers, 2004 WI 6, ¶19, 268 Wis. 2d 335, 677 N.W.2d 599.3  
This longstanding practice is confirmed in statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 5.01(1) says, "Except as otherwise provided, chs. 5 to 12 
shall be construed to give effect to the will of the electors, if 
that can be ascertained from the proceedings, notwithstanding 
informality or failure to fully comply with some of their 
provisions."  So generally, when ballots are challenged, they are 
counted if the will of the voter can be ascertained. 
¶39 Wisconsin looks quite a bit more skeptically, however, 
at absentee ballots.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.84(2) provides: 
Notwithstanding [Wis. Stat. §] 5.01(1), with respect to 
matters relating to the absentee ballot process, [Wis. 
Stat. §§] 6.86, 6.87(3) to (7) and 9.01(1)(b)2. and 4. 
shall be construed as mandatory.  Ballots cast in 
                                                 
3 See also State ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71, 89 (1875) 
("It would be a fraud on the constitution to hold them 
disfranchised without notice or fault.  They went to the election 
clothed with a constitutional right of which no statute could strip 
them, without some voluntary failure on their own part to furnish 
statutory proof of right.  And it would be monstrous in us to give 
such an effect to the registry law, against its own spirit and in 
violation of the letter and spirit of the constitution."); State 
ex rel. Blodgett v. Eagan, 115 Wis. 2d 417, 421, 91 N.W. 984 (1902) 
("when the intention of the voter is clear, and there is no 
provision of statute declaring that such votes shall not be 
counted, such intention shall prevail"); Roth v. Lafarge Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Canvassers, 2004 WI 6, ¶¶19-25, 268 Wis. 2d 335, 677 
N.W.2d 599 (collecting cases). 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
3 
 
contravention of the procedures specified in those 
provisions may not be counted.  Ballots counted in 
contravention of the procedures specified in those 
provisions may not be included in the certified result 
of any election. 
This tells us that, to the extent an absentee ballot does not 
comply with certain statutory requirements, it may not be counted.4   
¶40 Our review in this case is of the determinations of the 
board of canvassers and elections commission.  The determination 
shall be "set aside or modif[ied]" if the board of canvassers or 
elections commission "has erroneously interpreted a provision of 
law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action."  
§ 9.01(8)(d).  We "may not substitute [our] judgment for that of 
the board of canvassers . . . as to the weight of the evidence on 
any disputed findings of fact."  Id.  However, findings of fact 
"not supported by substantial evidence" shall be set aside.  Id.  
Legal conclusions made by the board of canvassers or elections 
commission are reviewed independently.  Roth, 268 Wis. 2d 335, 
¶15. 
¶41 With this framework in mind, I turn to the three specific 
categories of ballots challenged here.  
 
II.  IN-PERSON ABSENTEE BALLOT APPLICATIONS 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.86(1)(ar) says that "the municipal 
clerk shall not issue an absentee ballot unless the clerk receives 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin courts have had few opportunities to opine on this 
statute.  The court appeals noted in a 2001 case:  "Section 
6.84(2)'s strict construction requirement, applicable to statutes 
relating to the absentee ballot process, is consistent with the 
guarded attitude with which the legislature views that process."  
Lee v. Paulson, 2001 WI App 19, ¶7, 241 Wis. 2d 38, 623 N.W.2d 577. 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
4 
 
a written application therefor from a qualified elector of the 
municipality."  The mandatory requirement is that each ballot be 
matched with an application.   
¶43 The Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) has designed, 
approved, and distributed forms for statewide use by local election 
officials.  Among the forms are a separate absentee ballot 
application (form EL-121) and a combined application and 
certification (form EL-122).  Milwaukee and Dane Counties, like 
many other communities around the state, use form EL-122 for in-
person absentee voters.  The Campaign argues that form EL-122 is 
not an application, and that all 170,140 in-person absentee ballots 
cast in Dane and Milwaukee Counties therefore lacked the required 
"written application."  This argument is incorrect. 
¶44 "Written application" is not specially defined in the 
election statutes, nor is any particular content prescribed.  EL-
122 
is 
entitled 
"Official 
Absentee 
Ballot 
Application/Certification." (Emphasis added).  Beyond containing 
basic voter information also present on EL-121, Form EL-122 
requires the elector to sign, stating: "I further certify that I 
requested this ballot."  This would appear to satisfy the ordinary 
meaning of a written ballot application.  See Quick Charge Kiosk 
LLC v. Kaul, 2020 WI 54, ¶18, 392 Wis. 2d 35, 944 N.W.2d 598 ("When 
statutory language is not specially defined or technical, it is 
given its 'common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.'" (quoting 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110)).   
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
5 
 
¶45 The record further bears out its function as an 
application.  In both Milwaukee and Dane Counties, voters completed 
the application portion of EL-122 and showed it to an election 
official before receiving a ballot.5  Then, after completing the 
ballot, the voter signed the certification portion of the form, 
which the clerk witnessed.  Section 6.86(1)(ar) contains no 
requirement that the application and certification appear on 
separate documents, and the facts demonstrate that the application 
was completed before voters received a ballot.  As best I can 
discern from this record, EL-122 is a "written application" within 
the meaning of § 6.86(1)(ar).  That it also serves as a ballot 
certification form does not change its status as an application.6   
¶46 Therefore, on the merits and the record before us, in-
person absentee voters using form EL-122 in Dane and Milwaukee 
Counties did so in compliance with Wisconsin law.7   
 
                                                 
5 The Campaign appears to suggest a different sequence of 
events, but that is not what the record before us reflects. 
6 It 
is 
not 
unusual 
or 
inherently 
problematic 
for 
administrative forms to have multiple functions.  The MV1, for 
example, serves as both an application for registration under Wis. 
Stat. § 341.08 and an application for a certificate of title under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 342.06. 
 
See 
https://wisconsindot.gov/ 
Documents/formdocs/mv1.pdf. 
7 It is presently unclear whether the statutes would be better 
or more clearly effectuated by separating the application and 
certification, or whether certain retention practices may be 
problematic.  The expedited nature of our review of this case does 
not permit a full examination of this question.  But the mandatory 
procedure insofar as the voter is concerned——that he or she fill 
out a written application——is surely satisfied. 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
6 
 
III.  WITNESS ADDRESSES 
¶47 The Campaign also challenges several thousand absentee 
ballots cast in Milwaukee and Dane Counties where election 
officials added missing witness address information to the 
certification.  This challenge is oddly postured and seems to miss 
the statutory requirements. 
¶48 Absentee ballots cast in Wisconsin must be witnessed.  
Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.  In order to comply with this 
requirement, voters place absentee ballots in an unsealed 
envelope, the back of which includes a certificate.  § 6.87(2).  
The certificate must include a statement for the witness to 
certify, along with space for the witness's signature, printed 
name, and "[a]ddress."  Id.  The law states that the "witness shall 
execute" the relevant witness information——including, one would 
presume, the required address.  Id.  "If a certificate is missing 
the address of a witness, the ballot may not be counted."  
§ 6.87(6d). 
¶49 Although Wis. Stat. § 6.87(6d) requires an address, 
§ 6.87(2) and (6d) are silent on precisely what makes an address 
sufficient.  This is in stark contrast to other provisions of the 
election statutes that are more specific.  For example, Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.34(3)(b)2. requires an identifying document to contain "[a] 
current and complete residential address, including a numbered 
street address, if any, and the name of the municipality" for the 
document to be considered proof of residence.  Similarly, Wis. 
Stat. § 6.18 requires former residents to swear or affirm their 
Wisconsin address as follows:  "formerly residing at . . . in 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
7 
 
the . . . ward . . . aldermanic district (city, town, village) 
of . . . County of . . . ."8  While the world has surely faced more 
pressing questions, the contours of what makes an address an 
address has real impact.  Would a street address be enough, but no 
municipality?  Is the state necessary?  Zip code too?  Does it 
matter if the witness uses their mailing address and not the 
residential address (which can be different)? 
¶50 Based on the record before the court, it is not clear 
what information election officials added to what number of 
certifications.  Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(6d) would clearly prohibit 
counting a ballot if the entire address is absent from the 
certification.  However, if the witness provided only part of the 
address——for example, a street address and municipality, but no 
state name or zip code——it is at least arguable that this would 
satisfy § 6.87(6d)'s address requirement.  And, to the extent 
clerks completed addresses that were already sufficient under the 
                                                 
8 "And 'absent textual or structural clues to the contrary' a 
particular word or phrase used more than once in the same act is 
understood 'to carry the same meaning each time.'"  Town of 
Delafield v. Central Transport Kriewaldt, 2020 WI 61, ¶15 n.6, 392 
Wis. 2d 427, 944 N.W.2d 819 (quoting State ex rel. DNR v. Wis. 
Court of Appeals, Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶30, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 
N.W.2d 114).   
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
8 
 
statute, I am not aware of any authority that would allow such 
votes to be struck.9   
¶51 The parties did not present comprehensive arguments 
regarding which components of an address are necessary under the 
statute.  It would not be wise to fully address that question now.  
But I do not believe the Campaign has established that all ballots 
where clerks added witness address information were necessarily 
insufficient and invalid; the addresses provided directly by the 
witnesses may very well have satisfied the statutory directive.  
The circuit court's findings of fact reflect that many of these 
ballots contained additions of the state name and/or zip code.  I 
conclude the Campaign failed to provide sufficient information to 
show all the witness certifications in the group identified were 
improper, or moreover, that any particular number of ballots were 
improper.   
¶52 Although I do not believe the Campaign has offered 
sufficient proof on this record to strike ballots, this broader 
issue appears to be a valid election administration concern.  WEC, 
other election officials, the legislature, and others may wish to 
                                                 
9 The statute seems to suggest only the witness should fill 
in the information necessary to comply with the statute.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 6.87(2) ("the witness shall execute . . . ").  If a zip 
code is not required under the statute, for example, I'm not sure 
clerks would be prohibited from adding the zip code.  Then again, 
I'm not sure why they would want to add anything to an already 
sufficient ballot, or what their authority would be to do so.  It's 
possible WEC guidance to add witness information is aimed at 
complying with related WEC guidance that all aspects of a mailing 
address——including city, state, and zip code——should be included 
in the witness certification (arguably, information the statute 
does not always require).  Regardless, this case is not well-
postured to answer these questions. 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
9 
 
examine the requirements of the statute and measure them against 
the guidance and practice currently in place to avoid future 
problems.   
 
IV.  DEMOCRACY IN THE PARK 
¶53 Finally, the Campaign challenges 17,271 ballots the City 
of Madison collected at "Democracy in the Park" events on September 
27, 2020, and October 3, 2020.  According to the record, at these 
events, sworn city election inspectors collected already completed 
absentee ballots and served as witnesses for absentee voters who 
brought an unsealed, blank ballot with them.  During the events, 
no absentee ballots were distributed, and no absentee ballot 
applications were distributed or received. 
¶54 Under the law, when a voter requests an absentee ballot, 
the voter must return the absentee ballot in a sealed envelope by 
mail or "in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or 
ballots."  Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.  The phrase "municipal clerk" 
has a specific meaning in the election statutes.  It is defined as 
"the city clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the executive 
director of the city election commission and their authorized 
representatives."  Wis. Stat. § 5.02(10) (emphasis added).10  A 
sworn city election inspector sent by the clerk to collect ballots 
would seem to be an authorized representative as provided in the 
definition.  Even if "municipal clerk" were not a specially-defined 
                                                 
10 When words are "specially-defined" they are given their 
"special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
10 
 
term, the only reasonable reading of the law would allow those 
acting on a clerk's behalf to receive absentee ballots, not just 
the clerk by him or herself.  After all, many clerks manage a full 
office of staff to assist them in carrying out their duties.  
Accordingly, voters who returned ballots to city election 
inspectors at the direction of the clerk returned their absentee 
ballots "in person, to the municipal clerk" as required by 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1. 
¶55 The Campaign, however, asserts that the "Democracy in 
the Park" events were illegal in-person absentee voting sites that 
failed to meet the statutory requirements under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.  
Section 6.855(1) provides in relevant part: 
The governing body of a municipality may elect to 
designate a site other than the office of the municipal 
clerk or board of election commissioners as the location 
from which electors of the municipality may request and 
vote absentee ballots and to which voted absentee 
ballots 
shall 
be 
returned 
by 
electors 
for 
any 
election.  . . . If the governing body of a municipality 
makes an election under this section, no function 
related to voting and return of absentee ballots that is 
to be conducted at the alternate site may be conducted 
in the office of the municipal clerk or board of election 
commissioners. 
§ 6.855(1) (emphasis added).   
¶56 An alternative absentee ballot site, then, must be a 
location not only where voters may return absentee ballots, but 
also a location where voters "may request and vote absentee 
ballots."  Id.  On the facts before the court, this is not what 
occurred at "Democracy in the Park" locations.  Ballots were not 
requested or distributed.  Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 6.855 is not on 
point.  
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
11 
 
¶57 In short, based on the record before the court and the 
arguments presented, I see no basis to conclude the ballots 
collected at "Democracy in the Park" events were cast in 
contravention of Wisconsin law.  This challenge fails. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 The people of Wisconsin deserve confidence that our 
elections are free and fair and conducted in compliance with the 
law.  Our elected leaders and election officials, including those 
at WEC, should continue to earn the trust of all Wisconsinites.  
The claims made by the Campaign in this case are not of widespread 
fraud or serious election improprieties.  These are ordinary sorts 
of election administration issues——for example, challenging 
whether an "application" form in use statewide for a decade 
constitutes a sufficient application (it does).  While this does 
not diminish the importance of the election procedures the 
legislature 
has 
chosen, 
Wisconsin's 
electorate 
should 
be 
encouraged that the issues raised in this case are focused on 
rather technical issues such as whether a witness must include 
their zip code as part of their address.   
¶59 That does not mean there is nothing to improve or clarify 
or correct.  But as explained in the majority opinion, the Campaign 
waited far too long to challenge guidance and practices established 
weeks, months, or years earlier.  Laches rightly bars the relief 
the Campaign seeks.  Even on the merits, however, the Campaign is 
either incorrect on the law, or does not provide sufficient proof 
to identify particular ballots that were improperly cast.  At the 
No.  2020AP2038.bh 
 
12 
 
end of the day, nothing in this case casts any legitimate doubt 
that the people of Wisconsin lawfully chose Vice President Biden 
and Senator Harris to be the next leaders of our great country.  
While the Campaign has every right to challenge ballots cast out 
of compliance with the law, its efforts to make that showing in 
this case do not succeed. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶61 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Elections have consequences.  One candidate wins and the other 
loses, but in every case, it is critical that the public perceive 
that the election was fairly conducted.   
¶62 In the case now before us, a significant portion of the 
public does not believe that the November 3, 2020, presidential 
election was fairly conducted.  Once again, four justices on this 
court cannot be bothered with addressing what the statutes require 
to assure that absentee ballots are lawfully cast.  I respectfully 
dissent from that decision.  I write separately to address the 
merits of the claims presented.1 
¶63 The Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers and the Dane 
County Board of Canvassers based their decisions on erroneous 
advice when they concluded that changes clerks made to defective 
witness addresses were permissible.  And, the Dane County Board of 
Canvassers erred again when it approved the 200 locations for 
ballot collection that comprised Democracy in the Park.  The 
majority does not bother addressing what the boards of canvassers 
did or should have done, and instead, four members of this court 
throw the cloak of laches over numerous problems that will be 
repeated again and again, until this court has the courage to 
correct them.  The electorate expects more of us, and we are 
                                                 
1 See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. 
Ct. Hist. 33 (1994) ("Legal opinions are important, after all, for 
the reasons they give, not the results they announce; results can 
be announced in judgment orders without opinion.  An opinion that 
gets the reasons wrong gets everything wrong which is the function 
of an opinion to produce.").  
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
2 
 
capable of providing it.2  Because we do not, I respectfully 
dissent.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶64 On November 3, 2020, people across Wisconsin and across 
the country exercised their constitutional right to vote.  When 
the initial Wisconsin canvass was completed on November 17, 2020, 
Joseph R. Biden and Kamala D. Harris received 20,427 more votes 
than Donald J. Trump and Michael R. Pence.  
¶65 On November 18, 2020, President Trump, Vice President 
Pence and the Trump campaign (the Petitioners) filed recount 
petitions in Milwaukee and Dane Counties.  The recount petitions 
alleged that the following errors occurred during the election in 
both counties: 
(1) 
Municipal clerks improperly completed missing 
information on absentee ballot envelopes related to 
witness addresses; 
(2) 
In-person absentee voters did not submit written 
applications for an absentee ballot; and 
(3) 
Voters who were not indefinitely confined claimed 
"indefinitely confined" status for the purposes of 
obtaining an absentee ballot without having to show 
a photo identification.  
¶66 In addition to the above allegations raised during both 
recounts, in Dane County, the Petitioners alleged error in counting 
                                                 
2 See, e.g, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____, ____ (slip 
op., at 1) (Dec. 11, 2020) (order denying motion to file bill of 
complaint) (Alito and Thomas, J.J., statement on the denial of 
Texas's motion to file a bill of complaint) ("In my view we do not 
have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a 
case that falls within our original jurisdiction. . . . I would 
therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would 
not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other 
issue")(internal citation omitted).  
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
3 
 
all ballots received during Democracy in the Park events in Madison 
on September 26, 2020, and October 3, 2020. 
¶67 The recount lasted from November 20, 2020, to November 
29, 2020.3  During the recount process, the Petitioners objected 
to irregularities in how the voting was conducted pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 9.01(5) (2017-18).4  Many irregularities were grounded in 
Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) advice on voting process.  
The boards of canvassers overruled all of the Petitioners' 
irregularity objections.   
¶68 As they relate to each alleged irregularity, the 
counties rejected the Petitioners' arguments for the following 
reasons: 
(1)  Municipal 
clerks 
improperly 
completed 
missing 
information on absentee ballot envelopes related to witness 
addresses.  
The Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers moved to accept 
ballots from envelopes with witness addresses that had 
been completed by clerks consistent with specific 
guidance by the WEC, which the Board viewed as consistent 
with Wis. Stat. § 6.87(6d). 
The Dane County Board of Canvassers also declined to 
"exclude envelopes that had a witness address added by 
the clerk." 
(2) In-person absentee voters did not submit written 
applications for an absentee ballot.  
                                                 
3 Milwaukee County completed and certified its results on 
November 27, 2020, and Dane County completed and certified its 
recount results on November 29, 2020. 
4 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2017-18 version. 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
4 
 
The Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers determined that 
there are multiple forms of application for an absentee 
ballot that can be made by absentee in-person voters and 
that the absentee ballot envelope provided to absentee 
in-person voters – which has the word "application" 
stated on it and must be completed by the voter – is an 
application for an absentee ballot.  The Milwaukee Board 
thus rejected the Trump Campaign's challenge to ballots 
cast by in-person absentee voters.  
The Dane County Board of Canvassers voted not to exclude 
or draw down any absentee ballots on the basis that they 
"do 
not 
have 
an 
attached 
or 
identifiable 
application." . . . The Dane County Board of Canvassers 
concluded that review of absentee ballot applications is 
not a part of the statutory recount process under Wis. 
Stat. § 9.01(1)(b) and therefore the applications were 
not relevant to the recount.  
(3) Voters who were not indefinitely confined claimed 
"indefinitely confined" status for the purposes of obtaining an 
absentee ballot without having to show a photo identification. 
The Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers found that "a 
designation of an indefinitely confined status is for 
each individual voter to make based upon their current 
circumstances" and that "no evidence of any voter in 
Milwaukee County [was] offered that has abused this 
process and voted through this status . . . not even an 
allegation that there was a single voter who abused this 
process to vote without providing proof of their ID, but 
eliminating proof that anyone did so. So there's no 
allegation . . . no proof . . . no evidence."  . . . The 
Board voted to overrule any challenge to a voter with 
the status of "indefinitely confined."  
The Dane County Board of Canvassers also rejected the 
Trump Campaign's challenge that would have required 
invalidating the ballots of all electors in Dane County 
who declared indefinitely confined status. The Board 
specifically declined to separate or "draw down" the 
ballots cast by electors who declared indefinitely 
confined status. 
(4)  Ballots received during democracy in the park. 
The Dane County Board of Canvassers denied the 
challenge, ruling that the Democracy in the Park events 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
5 
 
were the equivalent of a human drop box and valid under 
the statute. 
¶69 On December 1, 2020, the Petitioners filed a petition 
for leave to file an original action with us.  We denied that 
petition on December 3, 2020.  That same day, the Petitioners filed 
two notices of appeal of the recount determinations pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 9.01(6)(a).  Those cases were consolidated in 
Milwaukee County and the Honorable Stephen Simanek was assigned to 
the appeal pursuant to § 9.01(6)(b).   
¶70 The circuit court held a hearing on December 11, 2020.  
At the conclusion of oral argument, the circuit court affirmed the 
recount determinations and, in so doing, adopted pages one through 
thirty of the Respondents' Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law.  After the circuit court entered its final 
written decision, the Petitioners filed a notice of appeal.  The 
Petitioners also filed a petition for bypass under Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.60(1).  Thereafter, we granted the petition for bypass and 
assumed jurisdiction over this appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶71 In a Wis. Stat. § 9.01 proceeding, post election 
challenges "are permissible provided that they may affect the 
election results."  Logerquist v. Board of Canvassers for Town of 
Nasewaupee, 150 Wis. 2d 907, 916, 442 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1989).  
In such a proceeding, we review the determinations of the board of 
canvassers, not those of the circuit court.  Id. at 917.  "On 
appellate review of a [] § 9.01(1) proceeding, the question is 
whether the board [of canvasser's] findings are supported by 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
6 
 
substantial evidence.5  Carlson v. Oconto Bd. of Canvassers, 2001 
WI App 20, ¶5, 240 Wis. 2d 438, 623 N.W.2d 195 (citing Logerquist, 
150 Wis. 2d at 912). 
¶72 This appeal also requires us to interpret and apply 
Wisconsin statutes.  We interpret and apply statutes independently 
as questions of law, while benefitting from the discussion of the 
circuit court.  Voces De La Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke, 2017 WI 16, 
¶12, 373 Wis. 2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803. 
B.  Alleged Irregularities 
¶73 "If WEC has been giving advice contrary to statute, those 
acts do not make the advice lawful.  WEC must follow the law.  We, 
as the law declaring court, owe it to the public to declare whether 
WEC's advice is incorrect.  However, doing so does not necessarily 
lead to striking absentee ballots that were cast by following 
incorrect WEC advice.  The remedy Petitioners seek may be out of 
reach for a number of reasons."  Trump v. Evers, No. 2020AP1917-
OA, unpublished order (Wis. Dec. 3, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., 
dissenting from the denial of the petition for leave to commence 
an original action).   
¶74 This case is guided by Wis. Stat. § 6.84 which provides: 
The legislature finds that voting is a constitutional 
right, the vigorous exercise of which should be strongly 
encouraged.  In contrast, voting by absentee ballot is 
a privilege exercised wholly outside the traditional 
safeguards of the polling place.  The legislature finds 
that the privilege of voting by absentee ballot must be 
carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud 
or abuse; to prevent overzealous solicitation of absent 
                                                 
5 In the matter before us, the material facts are not 
disputed.  Rather, it is the legal consequences that follow from 
these facts that forms the controversy.  
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
7 
 
electors who may prefer not to participate in an 
election; to prevent undue influence on an absent 
elector to vote for or against a candidate or to cast a 
particular vote in a referendum; or other similar 
abuses. 
Notwithstanding s. 5.01, with respect to matters 
relating to the absentee ballot process, ss. 6.86, 
6.87(3) to (7) and 9.01(1)(b)2. and 4. shall be construed 
as mandatory.  Ballots cast in contravention of the 
procedures specified in those provisions may not be 
counted.  Ballots counted in contravention of the 
procedures specified in those provisions may not be 
included in the certified result of any election.   
Accordingly, the provisions that relate to obtaining and voting 
absentee ballots must be carefully examined as a recount proceeds.6   
C.  Witness Addresses 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(2) provides that absentee ballots 
must be accompanied by a certificate.  The certificate may be 
printed on the envelope in which an absentee ballot is enclosed.  
Section 6.87(2) provides a model certificate, and directs that 
certificates must be in "substantially" the same form as the model.  
The model provides: 
The witness shall execute the following: 
I, the undersigned witness, subject to the 
penalties of s. 12.60 (1)(b), Wis. Stats., for false 
statements, certify that I am an adult U.S. citizen and 
that the above statements are true and the voting 
procedure was executed as there stated.  I am not a 
candidate for any office on the enclosed ballot (except 
in the case of an incumbent municipal clerk).  I did not 
solicit or advise the elector to vote for or against any 
candidate or measure. 
                                                 
6 See also Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 
2004) ("Voting fraud is a serious problem in U.S. elections 
generally . . . and it is facilitated by absentee voting.  In this 
respect absentee voting is to voting in person as a take-home exam 
is to a proctored one." (internal citations omitted)). 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
8 
 
....(Printed name) 
....(Address) 
Signed ...."[7] 
Accordingly, the plain language of § 6.87(2) requires that it is 
the witness who must affix his or her signature and write in his 
or her name and address.  Section 6.87(2) does not mention an 
election official taking any action. 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(9) explains what an election 
official may do if an absentee ballot is received with an 
improperly completed certificate or no certificate:  
[T]he clerk may return the ballot to the elector, inside 
the sealed envelope when an envelope is received, 
together with a new envelope if necessary, whenever time 
permits the elector to correct the defect and return the 
ballot within the period authorized under sub. (6).   
Section 6.87(9)'s plain language authorizes election officials to 
return the ballot to "the elector" to correct "the defect."  It 
does not authorize election officials to make corrections, i.e., 
to write anything on the certificate. 
¶77 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 6.87(6d) provides that "[i]f 
a certificate is missing the address of a witness, the ballot may 
not be counted."  This language is clear.  And furthermore, its 
legislative history confirms its plain meaning.  Westmas v. 
Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶20, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 
N.W.2d 68 (quoting State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 
Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769) (explaining that courts may consult 
legislative history to confirm a statute's plain meaning).  This 
subsection was added by 2015 Wis. Act 261.  A memorandum prepared 
                                                 
7 Asterisks removed. 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
9 
 
by the Legislative Council provides that "Act 261 . . . requires 
an absentee ballot to have a witness address to be counted.  An 
absentee ballot voter must complete the certification and sign the 
certification in the presence of a witness, and the witness must 
sign the certificate and provide his or her name and address."  
Wis. Legis. Council Act Memo, 2015 Wis. Act 261, at 2, 
https://docs.legis.wiscinsin.gov/2015/related/lcactmemo/act261.p
df. 
¶78 The contention that ballots with defective addresses 
cannot be counted is supported by more than the plain meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 6.87(6d).  The requirement that such ballots not be 
counted is found in Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2), which provides that the 
provisions in § 6.87(6d) are "mandatory."     
¶79 Notwithstanding the plain, clear requirements of two 
statutes, WEC's guidance explicitly directs municipal clerks that 
they "must take corrective actions in an attempt to remedy a 
witness address error."  WEC guidance states, "municipal clerks 
shall do all that they can reasonably do to obtain any missing 
part of the witness address."  Then in addition, the WEC instructs 
clerks to add witness address information even though the guidance 
acknowledges that "some clerks have expressed [concern] about 
altering information on the certificate envelope, especially in 
the case of a recount." 
¶80 The WEC ignores that the legislature provided only one 
act an election official may take in regard to a defective witness 
address:  mail the defective ballot back to the elector to correct 
the error.  Wis. Stat. § 6.87(9).  That the legislature made one 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
10 
 
choice about correcting a defective witness address excludes other 
methods of correction.  "[T]he express mention of one matter 
excludes other similar matters [that are] not mentioned."  FAS, 
LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 
N.W.2d 287 (quoting Perra v. Menomonee Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 
215, ¶12, 239 Wis. 2d 26, 619 N.W.2d 123) (modifications in the 
original).  In addition, and similarly, § 6.87(2) states, "[t]he 
witness shall execute the following . . . (Address)."  It does not 
state that clerks shall execute anything.   
¶81 My conclusion that errors in the certification of 
absentee ballots require discarding those ballots is consistent 
with our precedent.  In Kaufmann v. La Crosse City Bd. of 
Canvassers, 8 Wis. 2d 182, 98 N.W.2d 422 (1959), absentee ballots 
were returned to a municipal clerk without bearing a notary's 
signature on the accompanying certificate envelope, as required by 
statute at that time.  The clerk added her signature to the 
certificates.  Id. at 183.  We explained that the electors' failure 
to ensure that the certificate complied with the statute 
invalidated the ballots.  Additionally, we stated, "[t]he fact 
that the . . . clerk further complicated the matter by signing her 
name to the . . . certificate cannot aid the voter.  The two wrongs 
cannot make a right."  Id. at 186.  The ballots were not counted.  
Id.  In the case at hand, a defective witness address cannot be 
corrected by a clerk, just as the signature of the notary could 
not be completed by the clerk in Kaufmann. 
¶82 In Gradinjan v. Boho (In re Chairman in Town of 
Worchester), 29 Wis. 2d 674, 139 N.W.2d 557 (1966), absentee 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
11 
 
ballots were issued without the municipal clerk's initials or 
signature, as required by statute at that time.  We concluded that 
the ballots "should not have been counted."  Id. at 683.  
Furthermore, we said that the statute that obligated the 
invalidation of these ballots survived constitutional attack.  Id. 
at 683–84.  We emphasized that absentee voting is subject to 
different statutory requirements than voting at a polling place, 
i.e., while a ballot cast at a polling place without initials or 
a signature may be countable, an absentee ballot subject to an 
analogous defect is not.  Id. at 684.  As we stated, "[c]learly, 
the legislature could determine that fraud and violation of the 
sanctity of the ballot could much more readily be perpetrated by 
use of an absentee ballot than under the safeguards provided at a 
regular polling place."  Id.  In the case at hand, a witness 
address is a statutory requirement, mandated by law, just as the 
initials or signature of the municipal clerk was in Gradinjan. 
¶83 The canvassing boards deferred to the WEC's guidance 
about defective signatures and it appears that the circuit court 
did so as well when interpreting Wis. Stat. § 6.87.  The circuit 
court stated: 
Adding, the requisite information by the clerk has been 
in effect since before the 2016 election.  The election 
which Trump prevailed in Wisconsin, I believe, after a 
recount.  It's longstanding, I believe it's not 
prohibited by law, and it is therefore a reasonable 
interpretation to make sure, as the as the Court 
indicated earlier, that the will of the electors, the 
voters, are brought to fruition. 
It is unfortunate that WEC has such sway, especially when its 
"guidance" is contrary to the plain meaning of two statutes.   
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶84 Furthermore, we do not defer to administrative agencies 
when interpreting statutes.  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(11); see also 
Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2019 WI 
109, ¶9, 389 Wis. 2d 486, 936 N.W.2d 573 (quoting Tetra Tech EC, 
Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶108, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21).  
Accordingly, the issue is not whether the WEC adopted "a reasonable 
interpretation," as the circuit court seems to have suggested.  We 
follow the plain meaning rule when interpreting statutes, which we 
do independently.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  
Id., ¶45 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 
211, 612 N.W.2d 659). 
¶85 And finally, guidance documents "are not law, they do 
not have the force or effect of law, and they provide no authority 
for implementing or enforcing standards or conditions."  Service 
Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶102, 393 Wis. 2d 
38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  Guidance documents "impose no obligations, set 
no standards, and bind no one."  Id.  "Functionally, and as a 
matter of law, they are entirely inert."  Id. 
¶86 Administrative agencies, including the WEC, often treat 
their guidance as if it were law, but that does not make it so.  
Id., ¶143 (Roggensack, C.J, concurring/dissenting).  
Such 
treatment is inappropriate——it confuses people by making them 
think that they have a legally cognizable reliance interest in 
WEC's guidance when they do not.   
D.  Written Applications 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
13 
 
¶87 The Petitioners assert that during the two weeks that 
permit early in-person absentee voting 170,151 electors who did 
not submit a sufficient "written application" before receiving an 
absentee ballot cast votes.  The crux of the Petitioners' argument 
is that the written application must be "separate" from the ballot 
and the certification.  
¶88 The statutes provide that in the two weeks leading up to 
an election, electors may go to the municipal clerk's office and 
apply for an absentee ballot.  Upon proof of identification, the 
elector receives a ballot, marks the ballot, the clerk witnesses 
the certification and the elector casts a vote by returning the 
absentee ballot to the municipal clerk.  Wis. Stat. § 6.86(1)(b).   
¶89 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 6.86(1)(ar), "the municipal 
clerk shall not issue an absentee ballot unless the clerk receives 
a written application therefor from a qualified elector."   Other 
statutes provide for similar requirements.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.86(1)(a)1.-6. (stating that "[a]ny elector of a municipality 
who is registered to vote . . . and who qualifies . . . as an 
absent elector may make written application to the municipal clerk 
of that municipality for an official ballot by one of the following 
methods," which are then listed); Wis. Stat. § 6.86(1)(ac) 
(stating that electors "may make written application to the 
municipal clerk for an official ballot by means of facsimile 
transmission or electronic mail").   
¶90 We begin statutory interpretation with the language of 
the statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  "Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
14 
 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.   
¶91 None of the statutes in question contain the word 
"separate."  Rather, a "written application" is required before 
the elector's identity is established with a photo identification 
and the elector receives an absentee ballot.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 6.86(1)(a), (ac), (ar), (b), 6.86(2m).  Furthermore, § 6.86(2m) 
provides that "The application form and instructions shall be 
prescribed by the commission . . . ."  Here, the statutes do not 
provide a form application; the statutes do not define what is 
required on an application, but simply that it be written.  Form 
EL 122 was employed here to apply for a ballot in-person.  
¶92 Form EL 122 requires the applicant for an absentee ballot 
to provide the applicant's name, street address, city, and zip 
code.  It also asks for the date of the election for which the 
application is being made and the county and municipality in which 
the applicant votes.  The substantive information that the 
application requests is substantially similar to form EL 121, which 
is titled "Wisconsin Application for Absentee Ballot."  Each of 
these application forms requires writing prior to being submitted 
by electors in advance of an elector receiving an absentee ballot.8 
E.  Indefinitely Confined 
                                                 
8 This order of operations was confirmed in several 
affidavits.  The affiants asserted that before they received their 
ballots the clerk's office verified their photo identification and 
voter registration.  The electors were then given an EL-122 
envelope and instructed to complete it.  Once the application was 
completed, the voters received their ballots.   
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶93 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.86(2)(a) provides a manner by which 
some electors may obtain an absentee ballot outside of the mode 
outlined above.  Those who are "indefinitely confined because of 
age, physical illness or infirmity or are disabled for an 
indefinite period" may apply for an absentee ballot on that basis.  
Id.  Those electors are then excused from the absentee ballot photo 
identification requirement.  Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.   
¶94 The Petitioners contend that all votes cast by electors 
claiming indefinitely confined status after March 25, 2020 (the 
date of McDonell's Facebook post)9 are invalid.  However, we have 
discussed the indefinitely confined status in Jefferson v. Dane 
Cnty., 2020 WI 90, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ____, which is 
released today, December 14, 2020.   
¶95 In the pending matter, we do not have sufficient 
information about the 28,395 absentee voters who claimed this 
status in Milwaukee and Dane counties to determine whether they 
lawfully asserted that they were indefinitely confined prior to 
receiving an absentee ballot.  Therefore, I go no further in 
addressing this contention. 
F.  Democracy in the Park 
¶96 On September 26, 2020 and October 3, 2020, at more than 
200 City of Madison parks,10 the City of Madison held events called, 
"Democracy in the Park."  During those events, poll workers, also 
                                                 
9 On March 25, 2020, Dane County Clerk, Scott McDonell, stated 
on Facebook that community members are encouraged to claim 
indefinitely confined status due to COVID-19 and Governor Evers' 
then-active Emergency Order #12.   
10 Affidavit of Maribeth Witzel-Behl, Madison City Clerk. 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
16 
 
referred to as "election inspectors," helped in the completion of 
ballot envelopes, acted as witnesses for voters and collected 
completed ballots.11  17,271 absentee ballots were voted and 
delivered to these poll workers.12   
¶97 The poll workers who staffed Democracy in the Park were 
volunteers.  They were not employees of the City of Madison Clerk's 
office.   
¶98 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. requires that when voting 
an absentee ballot "[t]he envelope [containing the ballot] shall 
be mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal 
clerk issuing the ballot or ballots."  In addition, the plain words 
of Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2) specifically direct that the provisions of 
§ 6.87(4)(b)1. "shall be construed as mandatory."  Notwithstanding 
the use of "shall" in § 6.87(4)(b)1. and the "mandatory" 
requirement to comply with the terms of § 6.87(4)(b)1. in 
§ 6.84(2), the 17,271 ballots that were collected in Madison parks 
did not comply with the statutes.  Stated otherwise, they were not 
"delivered in person, to the municipal clerk."  
¶99 It is conceivable that the 200 sites for Democracy in 
the Park could have become alternate absentee ballot sites.  If 
the Madison Common Council had chosen to designate a site other 
than the municipal clerk's office as the location from which voters 
could request and to which they could return absentee ballots, an 
alternate absentee ballot site could have been established.  Wis. 
Stat. § 6.855(1).  The statute also provides that the governing 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
17 
 
body of a municipality may designate more than one alternate site.  
§ 6.855(5).13   
¶100 However, if Democracy in the Park were held to be 200 
alternate absentee ballot sites, then "no function related to 
voting and return of absentee ballots. . . .  may be conducted in 
the office of the municipal clerk."  Wis. Stat. § 6.855(1).  This 
requirement does not fit the facts because the Madison clerk's 
office continued to provide and accept return of absentee ballots.  
Therefore, these 200 park events do not meet the statutory criteria 
set out in § 6.855 for alternate absentee ballot sites.  
¶101 One wonders, what were they?  It is contended that they 
were "human drop boxes."  That gives little comfort because drop 
boxes are not found anywhere in the absentee voting statutes.  Drop 
boxes are nothing more than another creation of WEC to get around 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.  The plain, 
unambiguous words of § 6.87(4)(b)1. require that voted ballots 
"shall be mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the 
municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots."  Drop boxes do not 
meet the legislature's mandatory directive.  
¶102 However, 
because 
drop 
boxes 
are 
not 
separately 
identified as a source of illegal voting in this lawsuit, I will 
not dwell on the accountability problems they create, but I do not 
doubt that challenges to drop boxes in general and in specific 
instances will be seen as problems in future elections.  Therefore, 
                                                 
13 However, 200 alternate sites does seem a bit much.   
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
18 
 
we may have the opportunity to examine them in a case arising from 
a subsequent election.14   
¶103 It is also Respondent's contention that the poll workers 
who staffed these events were agents15 of the city clerk; and 
therefore, delivery of ballots to them was personal delivery to 
the clerk within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.  This is 
an amazing contention.  Without question, delivery to voluntary 
poll workers is not "delivered in person to the municipal clerk," 
as § 6.87(4)(b)1. requires.   
¶104 The legislature prescribed the absentee voting procedure 
in Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. and commanded that those procedures 
are "mandatory" in Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2).  Gatherings in 200 city 
parks did not meet the statutory requirements for lawful absentee 
voting.  They also lack the safety and solemnity that are attached 
to personally delivering absentee ballots to the municipal clerk.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶105 The Milwaukee County Board of Canvassers and the Dane 
County Board of Canvassers based their decisions on erroneous 
advice when they concluded that changes clerks made to defective 
witness addresses were permissible.  And, the Dane County Board of 
                                                 
14 We had the opportunity to examine the use of drop boxes in 
Mueller v. Jacobs, 2020AP1958-OA, but the court refused to grant 
review, from which decision Annette Kingsland Ziegler, J., Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J. and I dissented.   
15 I would be amazed if the City of Madison agreed that all 
the volunteer poll workers who staffed Democracy in the Park were 
legally agents of the city clerk given the exposure to liability 
such a determination would bring.  Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy 
Wis., Inc., 2020 WI 25, ¶25, 390 Wis. 2d 627, 939 N.W.2d 582 (lead 
opinion). 
No.  2020AP2038.pdr 
 
19 
 
Canvassers erred again when it approved the 200 locations for 
ballot collection that comprised Democracy in the Park.  The 
majority does not bother addressing what the boards of canvassers 
did or should have done, and instead, four members of this court 
throw the cloak of laches over numerous problems that will be 
repeated again and again, until this court has the courage to 
correct them.  The electorate expects more of us, and we are 
capable of providing it.  Because we do not, I respectfully 
dissent.  
¶106 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
1 
 
¶107 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  We are 
called upon to declare what the law is.  See Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").  
Once again, in an all too familiar pattern, four members of this 
court abdicate their responsibility to do so.  They refuse to even 
consider the uniquely Wisconsin, serious legal issues presented.  
The issues presented in this case, unlike those in other cases 
around the United States, are based on Wisconsin statutory election 
law. Make no mistake, the majority opinion fails to even mention, 
let alone analyze, the pertinent Wisconsin statutes.  Passing 
reference to other states' decisionmaking is of little relevance 
given the Wisconsin legal issues at stake.  See Roggensack, C.J., 
dissent, supra; Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissent, infra.  The 
people of Wisconsin deserve an answer——if not for this election, 
then at least to protect the integrity of elections in the future. 
Instead of providing clarity, the majority opinion is, once again, 
dismissive of the pressing legal issues presented.   
¶108 The 
majority 
author's 
concurrence 
is 
even 
more 
dismissive of the need for clarity in Wisconsin election law 
stating that he "understand[s] the desire for at least some clarity 
regarding 
the 
underlying 
election 
administration 
issues . . . [but] its just not possible."  Hagedorn, J., 
concurrence, ¶36.  Indeed, we are presented with a rare opportunity 
to meaningfully engage in, among other things, a known conflict 
between guidance, given by an unelected committee, and what the 
law requires.  These are more than mere "election administration 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
2 
 
issues."  See Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissent, infra.  This 
case presents not just a "desire" for clarity in the law, our 
constitutional duty requires us to declare what the law is.  Quite 
obviously, defaulting to laches and claiming that it is "just not 
possible," is directly contradicted by the majority author's own 
undertaking.  If it is important enough to address in his 
concurrence, then it should also satisfy the discretionary 
standard which overcomes the application of laches.  Instead of 
undertaking the duty to decide novel legal issues presented, this 
court shirks its institutional responsibility to the public and 
instead falls back on a self-prescribed, previously unknown 
standard it calls laches.  
¶109 Stated differently, the majority claims the petitioners 
were too late, should have acted earlier and therefore, the court 
is neutered from being able to declare what the law is.  The 
majority basically reiterates respondents' soundbites.  In so 
doing, the majority seems to create a new bright-line rule that 
the candidates and voters are without recourse and without any 
notice should the court decide to later conjure up an artificial 
deadline concluding that it prefers that something would have been 
done earlier.  That has never been the law, and it should not be 
today.  It is a game of "gotcha."  I respectfully dissent, because 
I would decide the issues presented and declare what the law is.  
I.  ABDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY 
¶110 Unfortunately, our court's adoption of laches as a means 
to avoid judicial decisionmaking has become a pattern of conduct.  
A majority of this court decided not to address the issues in this 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
3 
 
case, when originally presented to us by way of an original action.  
Trump v. Evers, No. 2020AP1971-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Dec. 3. 
2020).  In concluding that it is again paralyzed from engaging in 
pertinent legal analysis, our court unfortunately provides no 
answer or even any analysis of the relevant statutes, in the most 
important election issues of our time.  See Hawkins v. Wisconsin 
Elections Comm'n, 2020 WI 75, 393 Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877; 
Trump v. Evers, No. 2020AP1971-OA (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting); Mueller v. Jacobs, No. 2020AP1958-OA, unpublished 
order (Wis. Dec. 3, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., Ziegler, and Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, JJ. dissenting); Wis. Voters Alliance v. Wisconsin 
Elections Comm'n, No. 2020AP1930-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Dec. 
4, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting).   
¶111 Instead, the majority relies on what only can be viewed 
as a result-oriented application of the equitable doctrine of 
laches to avoid declaring what the law is.  To be clear, I am not 
interested in a particular outcome.  I am interested in the court 
fulfilling its constitutional responsibility.  While sometimes it 
may be difficult to undertake analysis of hot-button legal  
issues——as a good number of people will be upset no matter what 
this court does——it is our constitutional duty.  We cannot hide 
from our obligation under the guise of laches.  I conclude that 
the rule of law and the equities demand that we answer these 
questions for not only this election, but for elections to come.  
I have concern over this court's pattern of indecision because 
that leaves no court declaring what Wisconsin election law is.  
See Roggensack, C.J., dissent, supra; Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
4 
 
dissent, infra.  We can and should do better for the people of 
Wisconsin and for the nation, which depends on Wisconsin following 
its election laws. 
¶112 Regarding this court's continued pattern of abdicating 
its responsibility concerning election issues, earlier this term 
in Hawkins, the same members of the court relied on laches, without 
any analysis whatsoever of that doctrine, and denied a rightful 
candidate the opportunity to be placed on the ballot as a 
presidential candidate.  Thus, the court likewise denied the voters 
the opportunity to choose that candidate's name amongst the others 
on the ballot.  See Hawkins, 393 Wis. 2d 629 (Ziegler, J., 
dissenting).1  The court in Hawkins, about two months before the 
November election, declared that it was unable to act, citing the 
doctrine of laches, and applied a newly invented and previously 
unknown, self-imposed, result-oriented, laches-based deadline as 
an excuse for inaction.  Id. 
II.  LACHES DOES NOT AND SHOULD NOT BAR THIS CASE 
¶113 Once again, the majority imposes its definition of 
laches, which is tailored to its judicial preference rather than 
based on well-established legal principles.  The majority must 
know that under this court's previous laches jurisprudence, it 
                                                 
1 In 2016, the Green Party candidates received 31,072 votes.  
See Certificate of Ascertainment for President, Vice President and 
Presidential Electors General Election – November 8, 2016, 
available 
at 
https://www.archives.gov/files/electoral-
college/2016/ascertainment-wisconsin.pdf.  In 2020, the Green 
Party candidates received only 1,089 votes.  See WEC Canvass 
Results 
for 
2020 
General 
Election, 
available 
at 
https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/Statewide%
20Results%20All%20Offices%20%28pre-Presidential%20recount 
%29.pdf. 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
5 
 
should nonetheless address the merits of the issues.  As this court 
has consistently held, "[l]aches is an affirmative, equitable 
defense designed to bar relief when a claimant's failure to 
promptly bring a claim causes prejudice to the party having to 
defend against that claim."  Wisconsin Small Bus. United, Inc. v. 
Brennan, 2020 WI 69, ¶11, 393 Wis. 2d 308, 946 N.W.2d 101.  In 
Wisconsin, a defendant must prove three elements for laches to bar 
a claim:  "(1) a party unreasonably delays in bringing a claim; 
(2) a second party lacks knowledge that the first party would raise 
that claim; and (3) the second party is prejudiced by the delay."  
Id., ¶12.  Even if respondents carry their burden of proving all 
three elements of laches, "application of laches is left to the 
sound discretion of the court asked to apply this equitable bar."  
Id.  
¶114 The petitioners raised four allegations regarding 
election administration:  Absentee ballots lacking a separate 
application; absentee envelopes that are missing or have a 
defective witness address; indefinitely confined voters/faulty 
advice from election officials; and ballots cast at Madison's 
Democracy in the Park/ballot drop boxes.  The respondents cannot 
demonstrate that laches bars a single one of these claims, and, 
even if they could, the court could still and should exercise its 
discretion to hear these issues.   
A.  No Unreasonable Delay 
¶115 The first element of a laches defense requires the 
respondents to prove the petitioners unreasonably delayed in 
making their allegations.  "What constitutes a reasonable time 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
6 
 
will vary and depends on the facts of a particular case."  
Wisconsin Small Bus. United, 393 Wis. 2d 308, ¶14.   
¶116 Convenient to its purpose, the majority frames this case 
to meet its preferred outcome.  The majority characterizes this 
suit as a challenge to general election policies rather than what 
it is:  this lawsuit is a challenge to specific ballots that were 
cast in this election, contrary to the law.  The majority states, 
"[t]he time to challenge election policies such as these is not 
after all ballots in the election have been cast and the votes 
tallied."  Majority op., ¶22.  According to the majority, "[s]uch 
delay in light of these specific challenges is unreasonable."  Id.  
The majority misses the mark.   
¶117 In 
other 
words, 
contrary 
to 
the 
majority's 
characterizations, this case is not about general election 
procedure:  it is about challenging specific ballots.  In 
Wisconsin, while voting is a right, absentee voting is a privilege, 
not a right.  Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1).  The Wisconsin Legislature has 
created a set of mandatory rules to which the voters must adhere 
for their absentee ballots to count.2  Consistent with express 
mandatory rules, the petitioners allege that certain ballots were 
cast that did not adhere to the law and, therefore, should not be 
counted.  It is a specific question:  Were the ballots cast 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2) ("Notwithstanding s. 5.01(1), with 
respect to matters relating to the absentee ballot process, ss. 
6.86, 6.87(3) to (7) and 9.01(1)(b)2. and 4. shall be construed as 
mandatory.  Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures 
specified in those provisions may not be counted.  Ballots counted 
in contravention of the procedures specified in those provisions 
may not be included in the certified result of any election."). 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
7 
 
according to the law as stated in the statutes and if not, what, 
if any, remedy, exists? 
¶118 With this proper framing of the issue, it is clear that 
the petitioners did not unreasonably delay in challenging the 
ballots.  To somehow require that challenges must be made and legal 
relief given before an election, before the ballots are cast and 
before a recount is absurd.  No recount would ever amount to relief 
if that is the lodestar. 
¶119 Thus, the petitioners did not unreasonably delay in 
filing this suit, and this element of laches has not been 
demonstrated as to any of the four allegations of election 
irregularity.   
B.  Respondents Knew Ballots Would Be Challenged. 
¶120 The second element of laches addresses the knowledge of 
the party asserting laches.  See Wis. Small Bus. United, 393 
Wis. 2d 308, ¶18.  If the party lacks knowledge of claim, the 
respondents have satisfied this element.  Id.  The majority 
summarily accepts, without any analysis, that "[t]he respondents 
all . . . were unaware that the Campaign would challenge various 
election procedures after the election . . . ."  Majority op., 
¶23. Virtually nothing is in the record to support this assertion 
other than the parties' statements.  In other words, the majority 
accepts one side's statements as fact in order to disallow the 
other side its day in court.  
¶121 As explained above, this is a challenge to the ballots 
cast in this election.  The President tweeted numerous times 
shortly after Wisconsin announced the election results that he 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
8 
 
would challenge the results and prove certain ballots were 
impermissibly cast.3  The majority chose to accept the respondents' 
assertion that they did not see this lawsuit coming despite the 
record to the contrary. 
¶122 Moreover, the majority is incorrect that "nothing in the 
record suggests" that the respondents knew what the petitioners 
would be challenging.  Majority op., ¶23.  In fact, Wisconsin law 
mandates that the petitioners expressly declare on what grounds 
they plan to challenge the ballots in a recount.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 9.01(1).  In the petitioners' recount petition, the petitioners 
specifically laid out these claims.   
¶123 Thus, the majority's conclusion with respect to this 
element is particularly lean given the record.  It is at least 
more than plausible that respondents had knowledge that the 
petitioners would challenge the ballots in a lawsuit.  
C.  Respondents Lack Prejudice. 
¶124 Even if the respondents could prove the first two 
elements, the respondents themselves are not prejudiced by this 
delay.  "What amounts to prejudice . . . depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case, but it is generally held to be 
anything that places the party in a less favorable position."  Wis. 
Small Bus. United, 393 Wis. 2d 308, ¶19.  The party seeking to 
apply laches must "prove that the unreasonable delay" prejudiced 
the party, not a third party.  State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 
2019 WI 110, ¶32, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587.  This court 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 
28, 
2020, 
2:00 
p.m.), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1332776310196883461 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
9 
 
recognizes two different types of prejudice: evidentiary and 
economic.  Id., ¶33.  Evidentiary prejudice is where "the defendant 
is impaired from successfully defending itself from suit given the 
passage of time."  Id., ¶33 n.26.  Economic prejudice occurs when 
"the costs to the defendant have significantly increased due to 
the delay."  Id.  
¶125 The majority abandons these principles of laches and 
instead focuses on the prejudice to third parties.  The majority 
states that "[t]o strike ballots cast in reliance on the guidance 
now, and to do so in only in two counties, would violate every 
notion of equity that undergirds our electoral system."  Majority 
op., ¶25.  This is a new manner in which to approach the legal 
analysis of prejudice.  The majority does not explain how this 
potential remedy prevents us from hearing the merits of this case.  
The majority does not explain how these notions are either 
evidentiary or economic prejudice, nor does it consider how it 
prejudices the actual parties in this case.  It is unusual to 
conclude that overwhelming prejudice exists such that the court is 
paralyzed from considering whether the law was followed.  In other 
words, the majority seems to be saying that they do not wish to 
grant relief and therefore they will not analyze the law.  This 
remedy-focused analysis is not typical to laches. 
¶126 Neither type of prejudice applies to the respondents in 
this case.  None of the respondents claimed that they were unable 
to successfully defend themselves.  All respondents filed briefs 
in this court addressing the merits.  The circuit court's opinion 
addresses the merits.  Accordingly, evidentiary prejudice does not 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
10 
 
apply.  Furthermore, no respondents have claimed that the costs of 
defending this claim have "significantly increased due to the 
delay."  Accordingly, economic prejudice does not apply.  
¶127 At a more fundamental level, the respondents must prove 
each of the elements.  The court cannot presume that the elements 
are met.  Similarly, the court cannot assume that a party cannot 
successfully defend itself nor that a party faces "significantly 
increased" costs.  To do so forces this court to step out of our 
role as a neutral arbiter.  See Service Emp. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 
v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d.   
¶128 Therefore, the respondents cannot prove and did not even 
allege that they are prejudiced.  Accordingly, the majority 
determination in this regard is flawed.  
D.  Equitable Discretion 
¶129 Even if the majority was correct that the elements of 
laches are met here, it still has the discretion to reach the 
merits.  See Wis. Small Bus. United, 393 Wis. 2d 308, ¶12.  The 
majority claims that the "only just resolution of these claims" is 
to use laches to not address the merits of this case.  Majority 
op., ¶29.  Not so.  Our constitutional responsibility is to analyze 
the law and determine if it was followed regardless of whether any 
remedy might be available.  In this way future elections benefit 
from our analysis.  Curiously, it is unclear whether there is an 
actual majority given the fact that the writer does exercise his 
discretion to address the issues——again, a lack of clarity. 
¶130 This court should address the merits because we should 
declare what the law is.  The public has serious concerns about 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
11 
 
the election and about our election laws.  Recent polls suggest 
that the American public, regardless of party affiliation, has 
serious questions about the integrity of the November 2020 
election.4  Our court has an opportunity to analyze the law and 
answer the public's concerns, but it unfortunately declines this 
opportunity for clarification.   
¶131 The majority should declare what the law is.  Every 
single voter in this state is harmed when a vote is cast in 
                                                 
4 See Rasmussen Reports, 61% Think Trump Should Concede to 
Biden 
(Nov. 
19, 
2020) 
https://www.rasmussenreports.com/ 
public_content/politics/elections/election_2020/61_think_trump_s
hould_concede_to_biden (finding 47% of those who polled believe 
that Democrats stole votes or destroy pro-Trump ballots in several 
states to ensure that Biden would win); Politico, National Tracking 
Poll, 
Project 
201133 
(Nov. 
6-9, 
2020), 
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000175-b306-d1da-a775-
bb6691050000 (finding 34% of those polled believed the election 
was not free and fair); Jill Darling et al., USC Dornsife Daybreak 
Poll Topline at 14 (Nov. 19, 2020), Post-Election Poll UAS318, 
https://dornsife-center-for-political-future.usc.edu/past-polls-
collection/2020-polling/ (finding that those polled are only 58% 
confident that all votes in the election were accurately counted); 
R. Michael Alvarez, et al., Voter Confidence in the 2020 
Presidential Election: Nationwide Survey Results (Nov. 19, 2020), 
The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project Monitoring the Election, 
2020 
Presidential 
Election 
Survey 
Reports 
& 
Briefs, 
https://monitoringtheelection.us/2020-survey 
(finding 
39% 
of 
those polled are not confident that votes nationally were counted 
as the voter intended); Yimeng Li, Perceptions of Election or Voter 
Fraud in the 2020 Presidential Election: Nationwide Survey Results 
(Nov. 23, 2020), The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 
Monitoring the Election, 2020 Presidential Election Survey Reports 
& Briefs, https://monitoringtheelection.us/2020-survey (finding 
between 29% and 34% of those polled believe voter fraud occurs); 
Sharp Divisions on Vote Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His 
Post-Election Conduct, Pew Research Center, U.S. Politics & Policy 
(Nov. 
20, 
2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/ 
2020/11/20/sharp-divisions-on-vote-counts-as-biden-gets-high-
marks-for-his-post-election-conduct/ (finding that 41% of hose 
polled believe the elections were run and administered not well). 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
12 
 
contravention of the statutes.  See Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1).  This 
court should conduct a rigorous analysis, and determine whether 
the law was followed.  
¶132 To counter these clear equities counseling us to reach 
the merits, the majority nonetheless seemingly declines the 
opportunity in favor of a self-divined rule which would make it 
nearly impossible to know when and how such a claim could be made.   
The majority asserts that "[f]ailure to [raise these claims 
earlier] affects everyone, causing needless litigation and 
undermining confidence in the election results.  It also puts 
courts in a difficult spot.  Interpreting complicated election 
statutes in days is not consistent with best judicial practices."  
Majority op., ¶30.  A claim post-recount is always going to be 
tight on timing. 
¶133 Under the majority's new rule, a candidate will have to 
monitor all election-related guidance, actions, and decisions of 
not only the Wisconsin Elections Commission, but of the 1,850 
municipal clerks who administer the election at the local level.  
And that is just in one state!  Instead of persuading the people 
of Wisconsin through campaigning, the candidate must expend 
precious resources monitoring, challenging, and litigating any 
potential election-related issue hoping that a court might act on 
an issue that may very well not be ripe.  Moreover, it would be 
nonsensical for a candidate, or worse, a disenfranchised voter, to 
challenge an election law.  Thus, the majority's new rule does not 
prevent "needless litigation"; it spawns it in the form of 
preventative lawsuits to address any possible infraction of our 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
13 
 
election laws.  We have the opportunity to answer important legal 
questions now and should do so.   
¶134 Similarly, the majority claims by not analyzing the law 
it is bolstering public confidence.  I disagree.  As explained, 
the American public has serious questions about the previous 
election.  See supra, ¶23 n.4.  Instead of addressing these serious 
questions, the majority balks and says some other party can bring 
a suit at a later date.  See majority op., ¶31 n.11.  Lawsuits are 
expensive and time-consuming and require that the person bringing 
one has a claim.  These issues are presented here before us today.  
If they are important enough to answer at a later date, they are 
important to answer in this pending lawsuit today.  Addressing the 
merits of this case would bolster confidence in this election and 
future elections.  Even if the court does not conclude that relief 
should be granted, this lawsuit is the opportunity to declare what 
the law is——which is our constitutional duty——and will help the 
public have confidence in the election that just occurred and 
confidence in future elections.  An opinion of this court on the 
merits would prevent any illegal or impermissible actions of 
election officials going forward.  See Roggensack, C.J., dissent, 
supra; Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissent, infra.  Accordingly, 
I fail to see how addressing the merits in this case would 
undermine confidence in the election results.  If anything, 
addressing the merits will reassure the people of Wisconsin and 
our nation that our elections comport with the law and to the 
extent that the legislature might need to act, it is clear where 
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
14 
 
the law might be that needs correction.  The court's indecision 
creates less, not more clarity.  
¶135 The majority's decision not to address the merits 
suffers from an even more insidious flaw——it places the will of 
this court and the will of the Wisconsin Elections Commission above 
the express intent of the legislature.  The majority uses the 
potential remedy, striking votes, as an equitable reason to deny 
this case.  Majority op., ¶31.  But the majority ignores that the 
legislature specifically set forth a remedy that absentee ballots 
cast in contravention of the statute not be counted.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 6.84(2).  When the law is not followed, the counting of 
illegal ballots effectively disenfranchises voters.  This past 
election, absentee voting was at an extraordinarily high level.5 
Perhaps this is why it mattered more now than ever that the law be 
followed.  Also this might explain why the process has not been 
objected to before in the form of a lawsuit like this one.  The 
majority gives virtually no consideration to this fact.   
¶136 Despite the fact that the majority relies on laches to 
not declare the law in nearly all respects of the challenges 
raised, it nonetheless segregates out the indefinitely confined 
voter claim to analyze.  Notably absent is any explanation why 
this claim is not treated like the other challenges.   
¶137 Therefore, the majority's application of laches here is 
unfortunate and doomed to create chaos, uncertainty, undermine 
confidence and spawn needless litigation.  Instead of declaring 
                                                 
5 In 2016, 830,763 electors voted using absentee ballots.  In 
2020, 1,957,514 electors voted using absentee ballots.  
No.  2020AP2038.akz 
 
15 
 
what the law is, the majority is legislating its preferred policy.  
It disenfranchises those that followed the law in favor of those 
who acted in contravention to it.  This is not the rule of law; it 
is the rule of judicial activism through inaction.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶138 As I would not apply laches in the case at issue and 
instead would analyze the statutes and available remedies as well 
as the actions of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶139 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent.   
 
 
No.  2020AP2038.rgb 
 
 
1 
 
¶140 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Once again, 
the 
majority 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
wields 
the 
discretionary doctrine of laches as a mechanism to avoid answering 
questions of law the people of Wisconsin elected us to decide.  
Although nothing in the law compels its application, this majority 
routinely hides behind laches in election law cases no matter when 
a party asserts its claims.  Whether election officials complied 
with Wisconsin law in administering the November 3, 2020 election 
is of fundamental importance to the voters, who should be able to 
rely on the advice they are given when casting their ballots.  
Rather than fulfilling its duty to say what the law is, a majority 
of this court unconstitutionally converts the Wisconsin Elections 
Commission's mere advice into governing "law," thereby supplanting 
the actual election laws enacted by the people's elected 
representatives in the legislature and defying the will of 
Wisconsin's citizens.  When the state's highest court refuses to 
uphold the law, and stands by while an unelected body of six 
commissioners rewrites it, our system of representative government 
is subverted. 
I 
¶141 In Wisconsin, we have a constitution, and it reigns 
supreme in this state.  "By section 1 of article 4 the power of 
the state to deal with elections except as limited by the 
Constitution is vested in the senate and assembly to be exercised 
under the provisions of the Constitution; therefore the power to 
prescribe the manner of conducting elections is clearly within the 
province of the Legislature."  State v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 
N.W. 895, 906 (1930) (emphasis added).  The Wisconsin Elections 
No.  2020AP2038.rgb 
 
 
2 
 
Commission (WEC) possesses no authority to prescribe the manner of 
conducting elections; rather, this legislatively-created body is 
supposed to administer and enforce Wisconsin's election laws.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 5.05(1) and (2m).  While WEC may not create any law, it 
may "[p]romulgate rules under ch. 227 . . . for the purpose of 
interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the conduct of 
elections . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1)(f) (emphasis added).  It 
is undisputed that the advice rendered by WEC was not promulgated 
by rule but took the form of guidance.  "A guidance document does 
not have the force of law."  Wis. Stat. § 227.112(3).  WEC's 
guidance documents are merely "communications about the law——they 
are not the law itself."  Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1 v. 
Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶102, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  The majority 
casts aside this black letter law, choosing to apply the majority's 
subjective concept of "equity" in order to reach the outcome it 
desires.1  In doing so, the majority commits grave error by 
according WEC guidance the force of law. 
¶142 Chapters 5 through 12 of the Wisconsin Statutes contain 
the state's enacted election laws.  Section 5.01(1) states that 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided, chs. 5 to 12 shall be construed 
to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be 
ascertained from the proceedings, notwithstanding informality or 
failure to fully comply with some of their provisions."  This 
                                                 
1 During oral arguments in this case, Justice Jill J. Karofsky 
made the following statement (among others) to the President's 
attorney:  "You want us to overturn this election so that your 
king can stay in power, and that is so un-American."  When a 
justice displays such overt political bias, the public's 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary is 
destroyed. 
No.  2020AP2038.rgb 
 
 
3 
 
substantial compliance provision does not apply to absentee 
balloting procedures, however:  "Notwithstanding s. 5.01(1), with 
respect to matters relating to the absentee ballot process, 
ss. 6.86, 6.87(3) to (7) and 9.01(1)(b)2. and 4. shall be construed 
as mandatory.  Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures 
specified in those provisions may not be counted.  Ballots counted 
in contravention of the procedures specified in those provisions 
may not be included in the certified result of any election."  Wis. 
Stat. § 6.84(2) (emphasis added).   
¶143 "Section 6.84(2)'s strict construction requirement, 
applicable to statutes relating to the absentee ballot process, is 
consistent with the guarded attitude with which the legislature 
views that process."  Lee v. Paulson, 2001 WI App 19, ¶¶7-8, 241 
Wis. 2d 38, 623 N.W.2d 577.  The legislature expressed its "guarded 
attitude" toward absentee balloting in no uncertain terms, drawing 
a sharp distinction between ballots cast in person versus those 
cast absentee:  "The legislature finds that voting is a 
constitutional right, the vigorous exercise of which should be 
strongly encouraged.  In contrast, voting by absentee ballot is a 
privilege exercised wholly outside the traditional safeguards of 
the polling place.  The legislature finds that the privilege of 
voting by absentee ballot must be carefully regulated to prevent 
the potential for fraud or abuse; to prevent overzealous 
solicitation of absent electors who may prefer not to participate 
in an election; to prevent undue influence on an absent elector to 
vote for or against a candidate or to cast a particular vote in a 
referendum; or other similar abuses."  Wis. Stat. § 6.84(1) 
(emphasis added).  While the ascertainable will of the election-
No.  2020AP2038.rgb 
 
 
4 
 
day voter may prevail over a "failure to fully comply" with "some 
of" the provisions governing conventional voting (§ 5.01), any 
"[b]allots cast in contravention of" the law's absentee balloting 
procedures "may not be counted."  Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2).  This court 
has long recognized that in applying Wisconsin's election laws, 
"an act done in violation of a mandatory provision is void."  
Sommerfeld v. Bd. of Canvassers of City of St. Francis, 269 Wis. 
299, 303, 69 N.W.2d 235 (1955) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
¶144 In order "to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse" 
associated with absentee voting, the legislature requires the laws 
governing the absentee balloting process to be followed.  Wis. 
Stat. § 6.84(1).  If an absentee ballot is cast "in contravention" 
of the absentee balloting procedures, it "may not be counted."  
Wis. Stat. § 6.84(2).  If an absentee ballot is counted "in 
contravention" of the absentee balloting procedures, it "may not 
be included in the certified result of any election."  Id.  Long 
ago, this court understood that "we are obliged to conclude that 
if absentee ballots are improperly delivered in contravention of 
[Wisconsin's statutes], the Board of Canvassers is under duty to 
invalidate and not include such ballots in the total count, whether 
they are challenged at the election, or not."  Olson v. Lindberg, 
2 Wis. 2d 229, 238, 85 N.W.2d 775 (1957) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, if absentee ballots were counted in contravention of 
the law, the people of Wisconsin, through their elected 
representatives, have commanded the board(s) of canvassers to 
exclude those absentee ballots from the total count, independent 
of any legal challenge an aggrieved candidate may (or may not) 
bring.   
No.  2020AP2038.rgb 
 
 
5 
 
¶145 The majority carelessly accuses the President of asking 
this court to "disenfranchise" voters.  Majority op., ¶27; Justices 
Rebecca Frank Dallet's and Jill J. Karofsky's concurrence, ¶33.  
In the election context, "disenfranchise" means to deny a voter 
the right to vote.2  Under Article III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, "[e]very United States citizen age 18 or older who 
is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified 
elector of that district."  This court possesses no authority to 
remove any qualified elector's constitutionally-protected right to 
vote.  But it is not "disenfranchisement" to uphold the law.  "It 
is true that the right of a qualified elector to cast his ballot 
for the person of his choice cannot be destroyed or substantially 
impaired.  However, the legislature has the constitutional power 
to say how, when and where his ballot shall be cast . . . ."  State 
ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 613, 37 N.W.2d 472, 
37 N.W.2d 473, 480 (1949).  And the judiciary has the 
constitutional responsibility to say whether a ballot was cast in 
accordance 
with 
the 
law 
prescribed 
by 
the 
people's 
representatives. 
¶146 Each of the President's legal claims challenge the 
counting of certain absentee ballots, which the President argues 
were cast in contravention of the Wisconsin Statutes.  The majority 
misconstrues Wisconsin law in asserting that "[t]hese issues could 
have been brought weeks, months, or even years earlier."  Majority 
op., ¶30.  Section 9.01(11) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides 
                                                 
2 Disenfranchise:  "To deprive (someone) of a right, esp. the 
right to vote; to prevent (a person or group of people) from having 
the right to vote. — Also termed disfranchise."  Disenfranchise, 
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
No.  2020AP2038.rgb 
 
 
6 
 
that "[t]his section constitutes the exclusive judicial remedy for 
testing the right to hold an elective office as the result of an 
alleged irregularity, defect or mistake committed during the 
voting or canvassing process."  Only a "candidate voted for at any 
election who is an aggrieved party" may bring an action under 
Chapter 9.  Wis. Stat. § 9.01(1)(a).  Surely the majority 
understands the absurdity of suggesting that the President should 
have filed a lawsuit in 2016 or anytime thereafter.  Why would he?  
He was not "an aggrieved party"——he won.  Obviously, the President 
could not have challenged any "irregularity, defect or mistake 
committed during the voting or canvassing process" related to the 
November 3, 2020 election until that election occurred. 
¶147 The respondents recognize that under Chapter 9, the 
"purpose of a recount . . . is to ensure that the voters, clerks 
and boards of canvassers followed the rules in place at the time 
of the election."  Misunderstanding what the governing rules 
actually are, the respondents argue that having this court declare 
the law at this point would "retroactively change the rules" after 
the election.  Justice Brian Hagedorn embraces this argument, using 
a misapplied football metaphor that betrays the majority's 
contempt for the law:  "the [President's] campaign is challenging 
the rulebook adopted before the season began."  Majority op., ¶32.  
Justices Rebecca Frank Dallet and Jill J. Karofsky endorse the 
idea that this court should genuflect before "the rules that were 
in place at the time."  Justices Dallet's and Karofsky's 
concurrence, ¶34.  How astonishing that four justices of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court must be reminded that it is THE LAW that 
constitutes "the rulebook" for any election——not WEC guidance——
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and election officials are bound to follow the law, if we are to 
be governed by the rule of law, and not of men. 
¶148 As the foundation for one of the President's claims, 
Wis. Stat. § 6.87(6d) provides that "[i]f a certificate is missing 
the address of a witness, the ballot may not be counted."  The 
only statutorily-prescribed means to correct that error is for the 
clerk to "return the ballot to the elector, inside the sealed 
envelope when an envelope is received, together with a new envelope 
if necessary, whenever time permits the elector to correct the 
defect and return the ballot within the period authorized."  Wis. 
Stat. § 6.87(9).  Contrary to Wisconsin law, WEC guidance says 
"the clerk should attempt to resolve any missing witness address 
information prior to Election Day if possible, and this can be 
done through reliable information (personal knowledge, voter 
registration information, through a phone call with the voter or 
witness)."3  WEC's "Election Administration Manual for Wisconsin 
Municipal Clerks" erroneously provides that "[c]lerks may add a 
missing witness address using whatever means are available.  Clerks 
should initial next to the added witness address."4  Nothing in 
the election law statutes permits a clerk to alter witness address 
information.  WEC's guidance in this regard does not administer or 
enforce the law; it flouts it. 
                                                 
3 Memorandum from Meagan Wolfe to Wisconsin County and 
Municipal 
Clerks 
(Oct. 
19, 
2020), 
at 
https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/2020-
10/Spoiling%20Ballot%20Memo%2010.2020.pdf. 
4 Wisconsin Elections Commission, Election Administration 
Manual 
for 
Wisconsin 
Municipal 
Clerks 
(Sept. 
2020), 
at 
https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/2020-
10/Election%20Administration%20Manual%20%282020-09%29.pdf. 
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II 
¶149 Under the Wisconsin Constitution, "all governmental 
power derives 'from the consent of the governed' and government 
officials may act only within the confines of the authority the 
people give them.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1."  Wis. Legislature v. 
Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶66, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  The confines of the authority 
statutorily 
conferred 
on 
the 
WEC 
limit 
its 
function 
to 
administering and enforcing the law, not making it.  The Founders 
designed our "republic to be a government of laws, and not of 
men . . . bound by fixed laws, which the people have a voice in 
making, and a right to defend."  John Adams, Novanglus: A History 
of the Dispute with America, from Its Origin, in 1754, to the 
Present Time, in Revolutionary Writings of John Adams (C. Bradley 
Thompson ed. 2000) (emphasis in original).  Allowing any person, 
or unelected commission of six, to be "bound by no law or 
limitation but his own will" defies the will of the people.  Id.   
¶150 The judiciary is constitutionally compelled to safeguard 
the will of the people by interpreting and applying the laws duly 
enacted by the people's representatives in the legislature.  "A 
democratic state must therefore have the power to . . . prevent 
all those practices which tend to subvert the electorate and 
substitute for a government of the people, by the people and for 
the people, a government guided in the interest of those who seek 
to pervert it."  State v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895, 905 
(1930).  The majority's abdication of its judicial duty to apply 
the election laws of this state rather than the WEC's "rulebook" 
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precludes any legislative recourse short of abolishing the WEC 
altogether. 
¶151 While some will either commend or condemn the court's 
decision in this case based upon its impact on their preferred 
candidate, the importance of this case transcends the results of 
this particular election.  "A correct solution of the questions 
presented is of far greater importance than the personal or 
political fortunes of any candidate, incumbent, group, faction or 
party.  We are dealing here with laws which operate in the 
political field——a field from which courts are inclined to hold 
aloof——a field with respect to which the power of the Legislature 
is primary and is limited only by the Constitution itself."  Id.  
The majority's decision fails to recognize the primacy of the 
legislative power to prescribe the rules governing the privilege 
of absentee voting.  Instead, the majority empowers the WEC to 
continue creating "the rulebook" for elections, in derogation of 
enacted law. 
¶152 "The purity and integrity of elections is a matter of 
such prime importance, and affects so many important interests, 
that the courts ought never to hesitate, when the opportunity is 
offered, to test them by the strictest legal standards."  State v. 
Conness, 106 Wis. 425, 82 N.W. 288, 289 (1900).  Instead of 
determining whether the November 3, 2020 election was conducted in 
accordance with the legal standards governing it, the majority 
denies the citizens of Wisconsin any judicial scrutiny of the 
election whatsoever.  "Elections are the foundation of American 
government and their integrity is of such monumental importance 
that any threat to their validity should trigger not only our 
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concern but our prompt action."  State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. 
Elec. Comm'n, 2020AP123-W (S. Ct. Order issued June 1, 2020 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)).  The majority instead 
belittles the President's claims of law violations as merely 
"technical issues that arise in the administration of every 
election."  Majority op., ¶31.  The people of Wisconsin deserve a 
court that respects the laws that govern us, rather than treating 
them with such indifference.  
¶153 "Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes 
is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy."  
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).  The majority takes a 
pass on resolving the important questions presented by the 
petitioners in this case, thereby undermining the public's 
confidence in the integrity of Wisconsin's electoral processes not 
only during this election, but in every future election.  
Alarmingly, the court's inaction also signals to the WEC that it 
may continue to administer elections in whatever manner it chooses, 
knowing that the court has repeatedly declined to scrutinize its 
conduct.  Regardless of whether WEC's actions affect election 
outcomes, the integrity of every election will be tarnished by the 
public's mistrust until the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts its 
responsibility 
to 
declare 
what 
the 
election 
laws 
say.  
"Only . . . the supreme court can provide the necessary clarity to 
guide all election officials in this state on how to conform their 
procedures to the law" going forward.  State ex rel. Zignego v. 
Wis. Elec. Comm'n, 2020AP123-W (S. Ct. Order issued January 13, 
2020 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)). 
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¶154 This case represents only the majority's latest evasion 
of a substantive decision on an election law controversy.5  While 
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "a state 
indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity 
of its election process[,]" Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 
(1992), the majority of this court repeatedly demonstrates a lack 
of any interest in doing so, offering purely discretionary excuses 
like laches, or no reasoning at all.  This year, the majority in 
Hawkins v. WEC declined to hear a claim that the WEC unlawfully 
kept the Green Party's candidates for President and Vice President 
off of the ballot, ostensibly because the majority felt the 
candidates' claims were brought "too late."6  But when litigants 
have filed cases involving voting rights well in advance of 
Wisconsin elections, the court has "take[n] a pass" on those as 
well, thereby unfailingly and "irreparably den[ying] the citizens 
of Wisconsin a timely resolution of issues that impact voter rights 
and the integrity of our elections."  State ex rel. Zignego v. 
Wis. Elec. Comm'n, 2020AP123-W (S. Ct. Order issued January 13, 
                                                 
5 Hawkins v. WEC, 2020 WI 75, ¶¶84, 86, 393 Wis. 2d 629, 948 
N.W.2d 877 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("The majority 
upholds the Wisconsin Elections Commission's violation of 
Wisconsin law, which irrefutably entitles Howie Hawkins and Angela 
Walker to appear on Wisconsin's November 2020 general election 
ballot as candidates for President and Vice President of the United 
States . . . .  In dodging its responsibility to uphold the rule 
of law, the majority ratifies a grave threat to our republic, 
suppresses the votes of Wisconsin citizens, irreparably impairs 
the integrity of Wisconsin's elections, and undermines the 
confidence of American citizens in the outcome of a presidential 
election."). 
6 Hawkins v. Wis. Elec. Comm'n, 2020 WI 75, ¶5, 393 
Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877 (denying the petition for leave to 
commence an original action). 
No.  2020AP2038.rgb 
 
 
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2020 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)).  Having neglected 
to identify any principles guiding its decisions, the majority 
leaves Wisconsin's voters and candidates guessing as to when, 
exactly, they should file their cases in order for the majority to 
deem them worthy of the court's consideration on the merits. 
¶155 The consequence of the majority operating by whim rather 
than law is to leave the interpretation of multiple election 
statutes in flux——or worse yet, in the hands of the unelected 
members of the WEC.  "To be free is to live under a government by 
law . . . .  Miserable is the condition of individuals, danger is 
the condition of the state, if there is no certain law, or, which 
is the same thing, no certain administration of the law[.]"  
Judgment in Rex v. Shipley, 21 St Tr 847 (K.B. 1784) (Lord 
Mansfield presiding) (emphasis added).  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has an institutional responsibility to interpret law——not 
for the benefit of particular litigants, but for citizens we were 
elected to serve.  Justice for the people of Wisconsin means 
ensuring the integrity of Wisconsin's elections.  A majority of 
this court disregards its duty to the people of Wisconsin, denying 
them justice. 
* * * 
¶156 "This great source of free government, popular election, 
should be perfectly pure."  Alexander Hamilton, Speech at New York 
Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788), in Debates on the Federal 
Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876).  The majority's failure to 
act leaves an indelible stain on our most recent election.  It 
will also profoundly and perhaps irreparably impact all local, 
statewide, and national elections going forward, with grave 
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consequence to the State of Wisconsin and significant harm to the 
rule of law.  Petitioners assert troubling allegations of 
noncompliance with Wisconsin's election laws by public officials 
on whom the voters rely to ensure free and fair elections.  It is 
our solemn judicial duty to say what the law is.  The majority's 
failure to discharge its duty perpetuates violations of the law by 
those entrusted to administer it.  I dissent. 
¶157 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this 
dissent. 
  
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