Title: STATE v BEACHMAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 80-.45 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t - i f f and Respondent, -vs-- WILLIAM L. B E A C H M A N I Defendant acd Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l District:, I n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln, t h e Honorable Robert C. Holter, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record : For Appellant: Donald L. S h a f f e r , Libby, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely , Attorney General, Helena, Monta.na Wi1liar.i Douglas, County Attorney, Libby, Montanc? Submitted on ~riefs: J u l y 10, 1980 oecided: 1 , . - 1%~' F i l e d : 3 - Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his appeal a r i s e s from a conviction of defendant of o b s t r u c t i o n of j u s t i c e , a felony, under s e c t i o n 45-7-303, MCA, i n t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Lincoln County, t h e Honorable Robert M. Holter presiding. O n o r about June 23, 1975, a t the Pack Rat mining claim near Libby, Montana, David Iocca was s h o t twice i n t h e back of t h e head, k i l l e d and buried. P r i o r t o t h a t d a t e Iocca, Randall Craig Baugh, and defendant had l i v e d together a t t h e Pack Rat cabin. S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e decedent was s h o t , Baugh and defendant f l e d t h e state. Baugh surrendered himself t o a u t h o r i t i e s i n late 1975. He was subsequently convicted of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and sentenced t o seventy-five years i n prison. Defendant w a s apprehended i n Arizona i n A p r i l 1979. H e w a s charged under an amended information with d e l i b e r a t e homicide, o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , o b s t r u c t i n g j u s t i c e by a s s i s t i n g Baugh i n t h e b u r i a l of Iocca. The jury a c q u i t t e d defendant of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and convicted him of ob- s t r u c t i n g j u s t i c e . P r i o r t o defendant's t r i a l , Baugh confessed t o i n v e s t i - g a t o r s t h a t he alone had murdered and buried Iocca. ~ a u g h then submitted t o a polygraph examination, t h e r e s u l t s of which tended t o support h i s statement t h a t he alone had k i l l e d Iocca b u t showed i n d i c a t i o n s of deception a s t o Baugh's statement t h a t defendant was n o t involved i n t h e b u r i a l . The prosecution f i l e d a p r e t r i a l motion i n limine seeking exclusion of t h e polygraph and i t s r e s u l t s . The t r i a l c o u r t ruled t h e evidence inadmissible. Baugh then t e s t i f i e d during t h e S t a t e ' s case-in-chief r e l a t i n g h i s version of t h e events surrounding I o c c a l s death. H i s testi- mony was s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same a s h i s p r i o r confession except it i n d i c a t e d t h a t defendant helped i n t h e b u r i a l of Iocca. The S t a t e a l s o f i l e d a motion i n limine t o p r o h i b i t t h e defense from making any reference t o t h e Lincoln County Attorney having o f f e r e d marijuana t o defendant on t h e n i g h t before t h e murder. The t r i a l c o u r t excluded a l l such evi- dence, r u l i n g it i r r e l e v a n t . A f t e r t r i a l defendant w a s sentenced t o t e n years i n prison, designated a dangerous offender and declared i n e l i - g i b l e f o r p a r o l e under s e c t i o n 46-18-202, MCA. O n appeal defendant f i r s t r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by granting t h e S t a t e ' s motion i n limine t o exclude evidence of Baugh's polygraph examination. The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t t h e r e s u l t s of polygraph examinations a r e n o t admissible a s evidence i n a criminal t r i a l . S t a t e v. Hollywood (1960), 138 Mont. 561, 358 P.2d 437; S t a t e v. Cor (1964), 1 4 4 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86; S t a t e v. Campbell (1978), 176 Mont. 323, 579 P.2d 1231, 35 St.Rep. 1080; S t a t e v. Bashor (1980), Mont. - 1 - P. 2d , 37 St.Rep. 1098. Defendant, r e l y i n g on S t a t e v. Dorsey (1975), 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, argues t h a t polygraph testimony, which i s exculpatory, i s admissible notwithstanding a staters r u l e s p r o h i b i t i n g i t s admission. Without r u l i n g on whether t h e polygraph testimony i n t h i s i n s t a n c e i s exculpatory, t h i s Court merely needs t o note we have declined t o f o l l o w ~ ~ o r s e y and t h e r a t i o n a l e expressed by t h e New Mexico c o u r t i n t h a t case. See Bashor, 37 St.Rep. a t 1108. ~ e f e n d a n t a l s o argues t h a t t h e polygraph testimony should be admissible under a standard generally applied t o e x p e r t testimony. Relying on t h e r a t i o n a l e expressed i n Bashor and united S t a t e s v. Alexander (8th C i r . 1975), 526 F.2d 161, we disagree. Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid., allows e x p e r t opinion t o be introduced a t t r i a l i f s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge w i l l a s s i s t t h e t r i e r of f a c t t o understand t h e evidence o r determine a f a c t i n i s s u e . The only thing t h e polygraph r e s u l t can accomplish i n t h i s i n s t a n c e i s t o support t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of Baugh a s t o h i s testimony. Baugh's c r e d i b i l i t y is n o t a f a c t i n i s s u e i n t h i s a c t i o n ; thus, t h e opinion of t h e polygraph o p e r a t o r a s t o t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s of t h e statements made, does n o t f a l l within t h e scope of Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid. It i s d i s t i n c t l y t h e j u r y ' s province t o determine whether a witness i s being t r u t h f u l . Baugh t e s t i f i e d f u l l y a t t r i a l t o every i t e m t h a t he t e s t i f i e d t o during t h e polygraph examination. The jury w a s a b l e t o determine whether t h i s testimony was c r e d i b l e . The polygraph e x p e r t i n t h i s c a s e would be d i r e c t l y invading t h e province of t h e jury i f he had been allowed t o o f f e r h i s opinion a s t o whether Baugh had been t e l l i n g t h e t r u t h . See Bashor, 37 St.Rep. a t 1109. For t h e reasons s t a t e d , we f i n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n excluding t h e evidence of t h e polygraph examination. The second i s s u e r a i s e d by defendant on t h i s appeal i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n granting t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o exclude defendant's testimony t h a t he had smoked mari- juana with t h e prosecutor t h e n i g h t before t h e offense. he t r i a l c o u r t i n excluding t h e o f f e r e d evidence reasoned t h a t it was n o t r e l e v a n t , o r i f r e l e v a n t , t h a t i t s probative value was outweighed by i t s p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t . Rule 401, Mont.R.Evid., d e f i n e s r e l e v a n t evidence a s "evidence having any tendency t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e of a f a c t t h a t i s of consequence t o t h e determination of t h e a c t i o n more probable than it would be without t h e evidence." (Emphasis supplied.) The b a s i s of t h e S t a t e ' s charge of o b s t r u c t i o n of j u s t i c e a g a i n s t defendant a s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e amended i n f o r - mation w a s t h a t he a s s i s t e d Baugh i n t h e b u r i a l of Iocca, thereby aiding i n t h e suppression and concealment of t h e homicide committed by Baugh. The evidence sought t o be admitted was o f f e r e d t o show defendant w a s n o t encouraged by t h e law o f f i c e r s i n Lincoln County a t t h e t i m e Iocca w a s k i l l e d and thus had reason t o f e a r he would n o t g e t a j u s t , f a i r t r i a l ; consequently, i n s t e a d of going t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s he f l e d t h e state. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t defendant e n t e r t a i n e d t h e b e l i e f he could n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l i n Lincoln County. Thus, t h e testimony a s t o h i s encounter with t h e prosecutor t h e n i g h t before t h e murder was r e l e v a n t as t o show defendant's i n t e n t f o r leaving the area. However, t h e f a c t t h a t defendant f l e d t h e a r e a i s not of major consequence t o t h e determination of t h i s a c t i o n . The gravamen of t h e o b s t r u c t i o n of j u s t i c e charge i s defendant's s t a t e of mind a t t h e time he was a s s i s t i n g Baugh i n t h e b u r i a l of I o c c a ' s body. The evidence sought t o be admitted had l i t t l e , i f any, probative value a s t o t h i s question. Rule 403, Mont.R.Evid., allows t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , t o balance t h e probative value of evidence as a g a i n s t i t s tendency t o prejudice o r confuse and mislead t h e jury. S t a t e v. R o l l i n s (1967), 149 Mont. 481, 428 P.2d 462; S t a t e v. B r e i t e n s t e i n (1979), Mont. , 591 P.2d 233, 36 St.Rep. 403; S t a t e v. Azure (1979), Mont. I 591 P.2d 1125, 36 St.Rep. 514. The evidence i n t h i s i n s t a n c e i s p r e j u d i c i a l i n t h a t it tends t o c a s t t h e prosecutor i n a less than favorable l i g h t and would r e s u l t i n a t r i a l within a t r i a l a s t o h i s a l l e g e d behavior. More important, s i n c e t h e evidence i s n o t proba- t i v e t o defendant's state of mind a s he was a s s i s t i n g i n t h e b u r i a l , t h e testimony would only have d i r e c t e d t h e j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n from t h e p r i n c i p a l i s s u e and thereby c r e a t e a confused and misled jury a s t o defendant's g u i l t o r innocence. Defendant argues t h a t t h e probative value of t h e evi- dence outweighs any u n f a i r prejudice o r confusion of t h e i s s u e s . W e disagree. The evidence sought t o be admitted i s c o l l a t e r a l , focusing only on defendant's i n t e n t o r motive i n f a i l i n g t o go t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n Lincoln County and n o t on defendant's i n t e n t o r motive i n a s s i s t i n g Baugh. The evidence having l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e main f a c t i n i s s u e , it cannot be s a i d t h e probative value c l e a r l y over- r i d e s t h e evidence's p r e j u d i c i a l and confusing nature. Consequently, w e cannot f i n d the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n i t s exclusion. The f i n a l i s s u e r a i s e d on appeal i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n sentencing defendant under a s t a t u t e n o t i n e f f e c t when t h e offense w a s committed. The offense i n t h i s case occurred i n l a t e June 1975. Defendant was apprehended, t r i e d and convicted i n 1979. I n sentencing defendant, t h e t r i a l c o u r t declared him a danger- ous offender under s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, and declared him i n e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e under s e c t i o n 46-18-202, MCA. Both s t a t u t e s w e r e enacted i n t h e 1977 l e g i s l a t i v e session and became e f f e c t i v e on J u l y 1 of t h a t year. Application of a law which e l i m i n a t e s o r delays a defendant's p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y a f t e r t h e criminal offense has been committed i s ex p o s t f a c t o a s applied t o t h a t - defendant and, therefore, unconstitutional. S t a t e v. Gone (1978) I - Mont. , 587 P.2d 1291, 35 St.Rep. 1540; S t a t e v. Azure (1978), - Mont. , 587 P.2d 1297, 35 St.Rep. 1559. W e order such r e s t r i c t i o n s t r i c k e n from t h e judgment and sentence. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed a s modified. k l";' , d - Z / L J u s t i c e W e concur: ?h+d! Chief j u s t i c e