Title: Gibbs v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
  
OTTO GIBBS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 46, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. No. IN96-05-0521R1 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 26, 2002 
  Decided:   August 28, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of August 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Otto Gibbs, filed an appeal from the 
January 7, 2002 order of the Superior Court denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no 
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.  
(2) 
In his appeal, Gibbs claims that the Superior Court committed legal 
error and abused its discretion by: a) summarily dismissing as procedurally 
 
 
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defaulted his claim that he was denied access to an exculpatory DNA report at 
trial; and b) summarily dismissing his claim that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate his case and failing to 
properly cross-examine the complaining witness. 
(3) 
In September 1997, a Superior Court jury convicted Gibbs of 
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree.  He was sentenced to 20 
years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 15 years for 5 years at 
decreasing levels of probation.   
(4) 
There is no merit to Gibbs’ claim that it was improper for the 
Superior Court to summarily dismiss his claim that he was denied access to an 
exculpatory DNA report.  The Superior Court correctly determined that the 
claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been asserted in Gibbs’ 
direct appeal.1  The Superior Court also correctly determined that there was no 
basis in the record for excusing the procedural default,2 since the report not only 
was given to Gibbs’ counsel prior to trial, but was inculpatory.  Finally, it was 
within the discretion of the Superior Court to determine whether a hearing on 
                                                 
1Gibbs v. State, Del. Supr., No. 480, 1997, Veasey, C.J. (Nov. 19, 1998);  SUPER. CT. 
CRIM. R. 61(i) (3). 
2SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B); SUPER. CT. CRIM. R 61(i) (5). 
 
 
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Gibbs’ postconviction motion was warranted.3  There is no evidence that the 
Superior Court abused its discretion in determining that Gibbs’ claim should be 
dismissed without a hearing. 
(5) 
Gibbs’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is likewise 
unavailing.  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Gibbs must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different.4  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.”5  Gibbs has failed to demonstrate that any action 
taken by his counsel resulted in prejudice to him.  There was, therefore, no abuse 
                                                 
3SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(h). 
4Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
5Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
 
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of discretion in the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
Chief Justice