Title: Parry v. Parry

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Parry v. Parry1989 WY 5766 P.2d 1168Case Number: 88-8Decided: 01/05/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
PHILIP T. 
PARRY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
KAREN L. 
PARRY, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 
 
James W. 
Gusea of Vines, Gusea & White, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Philip P. 
Whynott, Cheyenne, for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and 
MACY, JJ, and BROWN, J., Ret.*

 
 

*Retired 
June 30, 1988. 

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a district court order denying the appellant's motion for retrospective 
modification of his divorce decree. The two issues we must consider in deciding 
this case are whether the district court could retrospectively modify the decree 
with respect to child support and whether the court erred in failing to 
eliminate or reduce alimony.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     On May 23, 1984, 
appellee Karen L. Parry filed a complaint for divorce. For some time prior to 
the filing of the complaint, appellant Phillip T. Parry was living in New York and the appellee was living in Cheyenne. Against the 
advice of his several attorneys, appellant entered into a property settlement 
agreement with appellee on October 10, 1984. The agreement mentions four 
children: William, Ronald, Richard and Shannondoah. One of the provisions of the 
agreement provides:

 
 
"That the 
Defendant [appellant] shall pay to the Clerk of District Court, First Judicial 
District, child support by cash, certified check or money order, beginning on 
the 1st day of September, 1984, the sum of $800.00 per month, with said payment 
continuing until all of the minor children leave the Plaintiff's [appellee's] 
residence. One half of said support shall be paid on the 1st and one half shall 
be paid by the 15th of each month. When all the children have left the 
Plaintiff's residence Defendant will begin paying alimony in the amount of 1/2 
his military retirement pay."

 
 

[¶4.]     A decree of divorce was 
entered on October 23, 1984. One of the provisions of this decree, which is 
similar to the provision of the property settlement agreement mentioned above, 
states:

 
 
"IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the sole care, custody and control of 
the minor offspring of the marriage, to wit: William, Ronald, Richard and 
Shannondoah, are hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, subject to the right of 
reasonable visitation of the Defendant. The Defendant is ordered to pay through 
the Clerk of this District Court, First Judicial District, the sum of two 
hundred dollars, ($200.00), per child per month. One half of said sum shall be 
paid on the first day of each month and one half shall be paid on the 15th day 
of each month, beginning on the first day of September, 1984. Said payments are 
to continue until said children reach their majority, are emancipated or leave 
the Plaintiff's residence, whichever last occurs. As each child reaches majority, is 
emancipated or leaves the residence, said support for the remaining children 
proportionally increases so that the total amount of $800.00 per month is paid 
to the Plaintiff for child support. Beginning the first month following the 
last payment of child support, the Defendant shall pay alimony to the Plaintiff 
in an amount equal to one half (1/2) of his military retirement pay." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶5.]     Three months later, on 
January 24, 1985, appellant filed a motion for relief from the decree. Appellant 
contended that he had misunderstood the support provision in the agreement, and 
that it was not until he reviewed the decree that he realized support would not 
decrease as each child was emancipated or reached legal age. A hearing on 
appellant's motion was held on April 18, 1985, and by order dated May 9, 1985, 
the motion was denied.

 
 

[¶6.]     On August 5, 1985, 
appellee filed a motion for an order to show cause why appellant should not be 
held in contempt for not complying with the child support provision of the 
divorce decree. In response, appellant filed a motion to amend the divorce 
decree seeking a nunc pro tunc order reducing the child support to two hundred 
dollars per month per child "until such child reaches legal age, marries or 
becomes otherwise emancipated." Appellant also asked for elimination of alimony 
or reduction of alimony "to a reasonable sum." At a scheduling conference held 
on February 24, 1987, the court asked the parties to research the issue of 
whether it had the authority to modify the child support provision in a manner 
which would cancel or reduce the arrearages which had accrued before the filing 
of the petition for modification. Appellant filed a memorandum letter with the 
court which concluded that the issue had not been decided in Wyoming. On August 17, 
1987, a hearing was held regarding appellant's motion to amend the decree of 
divorce and the appellee's amended motion for order to show cause. Following 
that hearing, the court entered an order in which it concluded that it lacked 
"the authority or power to modify the Decree of Divorce prior to the date of the 
filing of the Motion for such modification" and that "such modification shall 
take effect as of the date of the filing of said Motion." The court 
prospectively reduced child support and awarded judgment against the defendant 
for back child supportas of August 17, 1987, which by that time had accrued to 
$14,800. The court left intact the alimony provision of the original decree of 
divorce. It is from this order of November 18, 1987, that appellant 
appeals.

 
 

[¶7.]     The first issue we will 
discuss is whether the district court had authority to retrospectively modify a 
decree of divorce with respect to child support. We hold that it did not have 
that authority.1 Generally speaking, district courts 
have authority to modify divorce decrees, including provisions for child support 
and alimony. See §§ 20-2-113, 20-2-116, W.S. 1977. When a substantial change in 
circumstances outweighs considerations of finality, a modification is warranted. 
Mentock v. Mentock, 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981). When a 
decree incorporates a settlement agreement, as in the instant case, courts are 
more reluctant to disturb the decree, because in doing so they infringe upon the 
principle of freedom of contract as well as concerns of finality. Lewis v. 
Lewis, Wyo., 716 P.2d 347 (1986). Nevertheless, this 
court has allowed prospective modification of child support provisions reached 
by agreement of the parties, upon a proper showing of a substantial change in 
circumstances. Id.

 
 

[¶8.]     Retrospective 
modification is a different matter. If a court could retrospectively modify the 
rights of a party under a decree incorporating a settlement agreement, the 
agreement becomes virtually worthless. This development would violate 
well-established Wyoming law favoring settlement agreements. 
Mentock, 638 P.2d 156; Lewis, 716 P.2d 347. Furthermore, allowing retrospective 
modifications of divorce decrees may encourage default. A party might decide to 
stop payment and allow arrearages to accrue to a substantial amount, with the 
hope and anticipation that the court will cancel the accrued payments owed to 
the receiving party. We prefer a rule which encourages a party to seek 
modification of a divorce decree at the moment his financial situation changes. 
In the present case, appellant chose to simply stop making the required 
payments. We will not sanction this type of self-help by allowing retrospective 
modification of the decree.

 
 

[¶9.]     In support of his 
position that Wyoming has allowed retrospective modification of child support 
payments, appellant cites Wardle v. Wardle, Wyo., 464 P.2d 854 (1970). In that 
case, a property settlement agreement was reached by the parties, and the 
parties subsequently modified the agreement. We upheld the district court's 
decision to modify the decree of divorce by cancelling past, unpaid child 
support payments, but distinguished the case from one in which the parties had 
not agreed, between themselves, to modify their initial settlement 
agreement:

 
 
"[S]ince 
August 1959 both Wardle and his former wife mutually consented and impliedly 
agreed that the wife would support the children and forego the benefit of 
child-support payments from Wardle and that he would forego the right to have 
custody of his children during summer months. Thus, the implied agreement of the 
parties, subsequent to the decree, prevented vested rights from accruing to 
either party (as far as the parties only are concerned). The case takes on a different complexion 
from one where only the husband is in default by failing to make monthly alimony 
or support payments. " Id. at 856. (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
In Wardle, 
we allowed the court to cancel child support arrearages only because there was 
an agreement subsequent to the original decree. This approach was consistent 
with our policy of encouraging settlement agreements and honoring freedom of 
contract. Because there is no subsequent agreement in the instant case, 
appellant's reliance upon Wardle is misplaced.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant further suggests that the 
district court had the authority to retrospectively modify the divorce decree 
because prior to the 1987 amendment to § 20-2-113, the statute did not 
specifically prohibit retrospective modifications. We disagree. In his brief, 
appellant concedes that the majority rule is that any modification of a divorce 
decree relates only to the future, i.e., either from the time of entry of the 
decree of modification or from the date the petition for modification was filed. 
We are persuaded that this rule is most congruent with our prior case law. In 
our view, the 1987 amendment to § 20-2-113 merely codified the common law as it 
existed in Wyoming. We hold that the district court acted 
properly in refusing to retrospectively modify the divorce 
decree.

 
 

[¶11.]  The second issue we must decide is 
whether the trial court erred in refusing to eliminate or reduce appellant's 
alimony payments, which are scheduled to begin the first month following the 
final payment of child support. The trial court had discretion to modify the 
provisions of the divorce decree, and absent a grave abuse of that discretion 
its decision will be left undisturbed. Manners v. Manners, Wyo., 706 P.2d 671 
(1985). See also McMillan v. McMillan, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1279 (1985); Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28 
(1974); Tanner v. Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443 (1971). In reviewing 
whether or not there was an abuse of discretion, the standard we apply is 
whether or not the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did. 
Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 
(1980). In the instant case, the trial court considered appellant's financial 
resources, his career in the Air Force, and the extent to which appellee was 
able to care for herself. Under the terms of the divorce decree the alimony 
payments might not begin until 1991, and any modification of the alimony 
provision at the present time might be premature. It appears, however, that the 
trial court here considered the alimony provision contained in the settlement 
agreement and decided to leave it intact. The appellant has not persuaded us 
that the court's decision was unreasonable under the circumstances. There was, 
therefore, no grave abuse of the trial court's discretion, and its decision must 
be left undisturbed.

 
 

[¶12.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 This issue was 
settled by the legislature in the 1987 amendment to § 20-2-113, W.S. 1977 (June, 
1987 Replacement) which was not in effect when appellant filed his motion to 
retrospectively modify the divorce decree and therefore does not govern our 
disposition of this case. The amendment reads in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) On the petition 
of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning the care, 
custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children requires. Provisions respecting maintenance may be 
modified only as to payments or installments accruing subsequent to the petition 
for modification except upon agreement of the parties." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶13.]  I can agree with the result reached by 
the court in this case. While the majority chooses to distinguish Wardle v. 
Wardle, 464 P.2d 854 (Wyo. 1970), and that 
distinction may be justified in terms of a strict view of ratio decidendi, I am 
not persuaded that Wyoming lawyers, and perhaps our district 
judges, might not have made a different prediction based upon dictum in 
Wardle.

 
 

[¶14.]  In addition to that quoted by the 
majority, the following language from Wardle, 464 P.2d  at 855-856, seems 
pertinent:

 
 
"Section 
20-66, W.S. 1957, provides that, after a divorce decree with allowance for the 
wife or children, the court may from time to time revise and alter such decree 
respecting the amount of the allowance. Specific authorization is contained in 
the section for the court to: 

 
 
"`* * * 
make any decree respecting any of said matters which such court might have made 
in the original action.'

 
 
"Counsel 
for both parties agree there are only five other states which have a statute 
similar to our § 20-66, with statutory authorization for the trial court to make 
any decree after divorce respecting allowances for the wife or children which it 
might have made in the original action.

 
 
"The 
annotation in 6 A.L.R.2d 1277, 1293 (§ 8), sets forth that four of the five 
other states which have wording in their statutes similar to the language we 
have quoted from § 20-66 (Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin) follow the rule that a trial court 
may cancel arrearages. The remaining state (Nebraska) considers the law well settled in 
that state that installments of alimony become vested as they accrue; that 
past-due installments become final judgments; and that courts have no authority 
to cancel or reduce the amount of accrued payments. See Clark v. Clark, 139 
Neb. 446, 297 N.W. 661, 663 [1941].

 
 
"We take 
the position that since August 1959 both Wardle and his former wife mutually 
consented and impliedly agreed that the wife would support the children and 
forego the benefit of child-support payments from Wardle and that he would 
forego the right to have custody of his children during summer months. Thus, the 
implied agreement of the parties, subsequent to the decree, prevented vested 
rights from accruing to either party (as far as the parties only are concerned). 
The case takes on a different complexion from one where only the husband is in 
default by failing to make monthly alimony or support 
payments.

 
 
"Under 
equitable principles, it is within the prerogatives of a trial court to leave 
the parties where they are, as far as past payments are concerned - if the court 
considers it equitable and right to do so and if that can be done without 
jeopardizing the welfare of the children. If we were to apply appellant's theory 
of a `vested' right, the courts would be powerless to apply 
equity.

 
 
"In Urbach 
v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 960, 113 A.L.R. 889, 
[1937], Chief Justice Blume pointed out that our district courts administer all 
law - the common law, statutory law, and principles of equity. At 73 P.2d 961, 
he concluded the grant of statutory power to provide for the custody and care of 
children in connection with a divorce decree does not abrogate the equitable 
powers of the court existing independent thereof. It follows from this that the 
equitable powers of the court likewise exist in an action having to do with 
unpaid child-support installments.

 
 
"In Duffy 
v. Duffy, 19 N.J. Misc. 332, 19 A.2d 236, 237 [1941], where it was argued that 
arrearages became vested as they accrued, the court said, were this the law, the 
court would be powerless to apply equitable principles in the administration of 
its statutory jurisdiction over alimony and maintenance. It went on to say, if 
the court could not apply equitable principles, it would be obliged to act as a 
mere administrative agency, impotent to prevent is processes from being employed 
in the furtherance of inequity and injustice."

 
 

[¶15.]  It is fair to say that, in earlier years, 
given the paucity of appellate litigation in Wyoming, this court often articulated 
principles by way of dictum because the opportunity to structure the law through 
direct holdings was limited. It is also fair to note that the practice has not 
completely disappeared from the opinions of our court. Given the language quoted 
above, and the fact that the provision from § 20-66, W.S. 1957, which the court 
relied upon, still appears in § 20-2-116, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), I am 
satisfied that there well may have been instances in which support payments were 
adjusted retrospectively. If that were true, it would make necessary the 
amendment to § 20-2-113, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), which is quoted in the 
first footnote of the majority opinion in order to adjust the 
law.

 
 

[¶16.]  While I do concur in the disposition of 
this case, particularly in light of the amendment to § 20-2-113, W.S. 1977 (June 
1987 Repl.), I believe that, in order to assure that any contrary orders remain 
undisturbed, it would be far better to declare that the effects of this decision 
are prospective only, and to specifically disavow the contrary dictum in 
Wardle.