Title: MCGUINN v STATE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13744 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 THOLMAS P. McGUINN, Defendant and Appellant, THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Leonard J. Haxby argued, Butte, Montana Daniel R. Sweeney argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Denny Moreen argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Craig G. Phillips argued, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana Submitted: March 7, 1978 Decided: ?U# ' 1378 i ,:g 1 L .' % d l Filed: dub' M r . Justice John C. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court: This is an appeal by defendant Thomas P. McGuinn from the f i n a l judgment entered on a jury verdict of guilty of de- liberate homicide i n the District Court, Silver B o w County. The body of Mrs. LaRae Alley was found on M a y 30, 1976, a t approximately 2:00 p.m. i n an area located approximately 10 miles south of Butte, Montana. The cause of death was four bullet wounds i n the head. Time of death was estimated to be between 5 a.m. of the morning of M a y 30 and 1 p.m. that after- noon. Defendant was f i r s t questioned concerning the murder on or about M a y 30, 1976. N o charges resulted from t h i s questioning. Later, on June 2, 1976, defendant was arrested and placed i n custody by the Silver B o w County sheriff's office on another charge. A t that time the clothing of the defendant was taken from him and sent t o the FBI laboratory i n Washington, D.C. for analysis i n connection with the murder of LaRae Alley. O n August 5, 1976, defendant was charged by Information with the crime of deliberate homicide. T r i a l commenced on February 15, 1977. During the t r i a l the s t a t e offered direct and circum- s t a n t i a l evidence tending t o prove defendant committed the crime. Contrarily, defendant maintained h i s innocence throughout the t r i a l , testifying on h i s own behalf and insisting he was not i n the area a t the time the crime was committed. On February 23, 1977, defendant was found guilty of the crime of deliberate homicide by a jury verdict. From t h i s verdict and subsequent judgment, defendant appeals. Defendant presents numerous issues for review by t h i s Court. The determinative issue is whether there is sufficient substantial, credible evidence t o support the jury verdict? The balance of the claimed errors is alleged to be cumulative and taken together amounts t o reversible error. The standard used by t h i s Court when reviewing the verdict of a jury is s e t forth i n State v. Merseal, (1975), 167 Mont. 412, "This Court remains evermindful of one fundamental rule -- that questions of fact must be determined solely by the jury, and that given a certain legal minimum of evidence, t h i s Court on review w i l l not substitute i t s judgment for that of the jury. * * * "On appeal w e examine the evidence t o de- termine whether the verdict i s supported by sub- s t a n t i a l evidence. In so doing, w e view the evidence i n the l i g h t most favorable t o the State. * * *" 167 Mont. 415. The s t a t e offered evidence t o show defendant had the opportunity to-murder M r s . Alley. The time element connecting defendant with the crime is: O n M a y 30, M r s . Alley l e f t her home a t approximately 8:25 t o 8:30 a.m. t o deliver gasoline t o her husband on Continental Drive. O n that same morning, de- fendant l e f t the D & M Bar, located i n Butte, a t approximately 7:30 a.m. H i s vehicle was seen on the road leading t o the scene of the crime a t approximately 8:00 a.m. Defendant's vehicle was again seen on that road driving toward Butte from the scene of the crime a t a high r a t e of speed between 8:45 and 8:50 a.m. A detective investigating the crime t e s t i f i e d t o making several t r i p s between the victim's house and the murder scene. H e found it took from 10-12 minutes t o cover the route, i f one traveled within the speed l i m i t s . In addition t o the time element, a pair of sunglasses found a t the crime scene, a f t e r the i n i t i a l discovery of the body, was circumstantiZilly linked t o defendant. Testimony was also given that a man matching defendant's description purchased a new pair of sunglasses on the evening of M a y 30. Next, the s t a t e produced evidence t o demonstrate defendant had the means t o murder Mrs. Alley. Defendant consented t o a search of h i s home which produced an unusual .38 short S & W box of bullets and a suspected .38 Smith & Wesson weapon. Three Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory experts gave testimony: I r a Holland, a special agent for the FBI, t e s t i f i e d con- cerning the neutron activation analysis performed on the bullets removed from the victim's head. From t h i s analysis the agent stated the bullets were similar enough i n elemental composition t o have come from the same box of cartridges as those taken in the consent search a t defendant's home. This finding was confirmed by the defense expert. The bullets recovered from the victim were identified as .38 S 6 W caliber bullets. The bullets taken a t defendant's home were also .38 S & W . Ballistics indicated the bullets were fired from a barrel with five grooves plus a right-hand t w i s t . Testimony was given that the .38 S & W bullet i s an unusual .38 short cartridge intended for use in revolvers. James B. Bollenbach, an FBI agent, t e s t i f i e d the .38 S & W short cartridge when compared t o modern ammunition i s of relatively low power. This evidence corresponded with the pathologist's testimony that the bullets removed from the victim were of a low energy type, not often seen i n modern times. The pathologist, basing h i s observation on 30 years of experience, was of the opinion that modern ammunition is sufficiently powerful that the skull i s massively fractured and i n most instances the bullet penetrates t o the opposite side of the skull or exits. In t h i s case the bullet only penetrated the brain for a distance of approximately one inch a f t e r passing through the skull. Defendant's .38 f i t the general description of the .38 S & W but it was not identified a s the murder weapon. James Hilverda, another FBI special agent, t e s t i f i e d that fibers on the clothing of the victim- microscopically similar t o fibers contained i n a sweater belonging t o defendant. Those fibers could have come from the defendant's sweater, but not to the exclusion of a l l the other garments. Finally, impeaching evidence was given by defendant while testifying i n h i s own behalf. A t t r i a l , defendant stated he went t o a M r . ~ o g e r ' s residence on Continental Drive. The s t a t e pro- duced a prior statement taken by Sheriff Hagel where defendant denied making any t r i p s on Continental Drive on M a y 30. Defendant claimed he was i n a bar a t 8:00 a.m. on the morning of M a y 30. Two witnesses t e s t i f i e d to seeing defendant traveling on Continental Drive around 8 a.m. Defendant submitted t o a swab t e s t t o determine the l a s t t i m e he fired a gun. During the t e s t , defendant gave four separate stores concerning the l a s t time he fired a gun. The f i n a l story !t was two days ago", which was the day of the homicide. John Whelan t e s t i f i e d defendant requested him t o get defendant a substitute gun while both were i n the Silver B o w County j a i l . Defendant denied t h i s testimony. Finally, defendant t e s t i f i e d he barely knew the victim and had never socialized with her. John Whelan t e s t i f i e d defendant told him he knew the victim. Carol Ann Gilmore t e s t i f i e d she saw defendant and the victim, arm-in-arm, going into a restaurant approximately a year before the shooting. She was positive of her identification of both persons. Defendant was placed near the scene of the crime. De- fendant was shown t o have the means t o commit the crime. Finally, defendant cast doubt on h i s own plea of innocence by being impeached on topics closely related t o h i s a c t i v i t i e s surrounding the crime. Defendant's remaining issues w i l l be reviewed i n accord with h i s theory of cumulative error. In urging the doctrine of cumulative error, defendant raises 16 specifications of alleged errors claiming that the aggregate of these errors, when taken as a whole, constlitntes prejudicial error and hence are reversible. This Court is not obligated t o refute a l l of these alleged errors where the errors are bald assertions, absent any specific argument or authority, o r are allegations which can be classified as nitpicking and void of definable prejudice. W e w i l l , however, briefly answer these contentions i n l i g h t of the Court's ruling on the doctrine of cumulative error i n State v. Meidinger, (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 321, 502 P.2d 58, where the Court said: " * * * W e cannot accept t h i s contention. Defendant i n interpreting t h i s doctrine points out 33 separate specifications of alleged errors and claims that the aggregate of these errors when taken a s a whole constitutes prejudicial error. This doctrine, i f it in fact exists, presumes that a l l 33 allegations are errors. I f (Emphasis supplied.) Here, defendant a t the outset contends the Information was not based on sufficient probable cause. Section 95-1301, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n pertinent part: "* * *If it appears there is probable cause t o believe that an offense has been committed by the defendant the judge shall grant leave t o f i l e the information * * *.I1 The court may rely on the presence of probabilities. "* * * a mere probability is sufficient for probable cause, a prima facie showing not being necessary. Also af f idavits of probable cause are subject t o much less rigorous standards than the admissibility of evidence." State v. Miner, (1976), 169 Mont. 260, 264, 546 P.2d 252. W e have reviewed the application for leave t o f i l e the Information. The county attorney presented a large array of facts. Probable cause t o believe that an offense was committed by the defendant appears from these facts. Defendant's second contention is that a t o t a l of 17 exhibits were improperly admitted into evidence. Defendant has apparently raised as error every exhibit to which he objected i n some manner during t r i a l . Eight of the exhibits were objected t o on the grounds of lack of proper foundation. " * * * A determination of whether a foundation has been properly l a i d i n order t o introduce exhibits into evidence r e s t s with the lower court and such a determination w i l l not be overturned unless there i s a clear abuse of discretion * * *." State v. Olsen, (1968), 152 Mont. 1, 10, 445 P.2d 926. N o abuse of discretion is present i n t h i s case. I f an exhibit has been shown t o be connected with the crime and identified a s such, it is sufficient. State v. Wilroy, (1967), 150 Mont. 255, 259, 434 P,2d 138. The i t e m s i n question were shown t o be connected with the crime. Eight other exhibits were objected t o on the grounds of relevancy. Evidence is considered relevant i f it naturally and logically tends t o establish a fact i n issue. State v. Sanders, (1971), 158 Mont, 113, 117,118, 489 P.2d 371. Exhibits con- taining bullets from the crime and photographs of the crime scene have been found t o be admissible. State v. Allison, (1948), 122 Mont. 120, 133, 199 P.2d 279; State v. McKenzie, (1976), Mont . , 557 P.2d 1023, 1037, 33 St.Rep. 1043 (Remanded by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration, see: State v. McKenzie, Mont . , P.2d , 35 St.Rep. 759). A l l of the questioned items were sufficiently connected t o the crime. Defendant raises a s error the admission into evidence of Exhibit 7A, a p i s t o l introduced for i l l u s t r a t i v e purposes only. The county attorney upon presenting t h i s p i s t o l stated: "Q. I ' m going t o show you a weapon and have it marked. (Whereupon, State' s proposed Exhibit 7A i s marked for identification. ) "Q. F i r s t of a l l , I ' m going t o t e l l you t h i s was not the weapon that did the shooting. * * *I1 Af t e r some discussion and an objection by defendant that Exhibit 7 A was not the gun that shot the victim and therefore it was t o t a l l y immaterial and irrelevant t o the case, the t r i a l court apparently admitted the exhibit into evidence without a motion from either party. On appeal defendant now alleges since no attempt was made t o introduce the exhibit, the erroneous admittance of the exhibit into evidence misled the jury into believing the defendant was the owner of the murder weapon. The county attorney clearly stated that the exhibit was t o be used for i l l u s t r a t i v e purposes only. While neither party moved t o admit t h i s exhibit into evidence, they did not object when the t r i a l court stated " ~ x h i b i t 7A may be admitted into evidence. I' I n addition t o lacking a specific objection for admitting t h i s exhibit without a motion, w e see no substantial prejudice. Both the s t a t e and defendant clearly stated the exhibit was not the murder weapon. Defendant next raises an additional series of error concerning the introduction of hearsay testimony. Many of the allegations of error deal with the introduction of statements made by defendant and admitted by the trial court as a verbal act exception to the hearsay rule. The law on admissions against interest is well estab- lished. Section 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947, dealing with facts which may be proven at trial, provides in pertinent part: "2. The act, declaration or omission of a party, as evidence against such party. 1 I An admission has been defined as any voluntary statement by an accused relating to some particular fact or circumstance which indicates a consciousness of guilt and tends to connect the accused with the crime charged. State v. Allison, (1948), 122 Mont. 120, 144, 199 P.2d 279. The state questioned the sheriff regarding statements made by the defendant's son. Defendant objected on the grounds that any statements made by the son concerning the sunglasses would be hearsay, The county attorney responded to this objection by stating: "It's the same verbal act that we're talking about now. We're not asking Mr. Hagel to tell the statement was true, but that the statement was made * * * . I 1 These statements would have been hearsay had they been offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. However, as the county attorney stated, they were not offered for that purpose but rather to show how the investigation focused on the defendant as a suspect, Going further through the transcript we note defendant's son's subsequent testimony. The son stated he had not identified the sunglasses but rather said: "Those look like my dad's sunglasses. II - 9 - Accordingly, w e find no substantial prejudicial effect on the defendant. A s stated by t h i s Court i n State v. Rornero, (1973), 161 Mont. 333, 341, 505 P.2d 1207, under section 95- 2425, R.C.M. 1947: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. * * *'I Additional error i s alleged resulting from the comments and remarks made by the prosecutor. Defendant contends the comments were inflammatory and prejudicial. The lack of significance of t h i s alleged error is particularly found i n defendant's failure t o take any corrective measure during t r i a l . State v. Caryl, (1975), 168 Mont. 414, 432, 543 P.2d 389. Defendant had the burden t o show that the remarks and comments affected h i s substantial right. I n the absence of such showing there can be no prejudice. State v. Meidinger, supra. A like contention of error i s made by defendant concerning alleged comments on the evidence made by the District Court. For similar reasons, no merit i s found i n t h i s argument. The references cited from the transcript a r e nitpicky and f a i l t o qualify as comments on either the weight or interpretation of the evidence. During t r i a l defendant did not object t o any of the statements of the court now alleged t o be prejudicial, nor did he take any other corrective action. State v. Jensen, (1969), 153 Mont. 233, 236, 455 P.2d 631. Finally, defendant contends the t r i a l court gave 7 improper jury instructions and failed t o submit 14 proper in- structions on behalf of the defendant. Briefly, 2 of the 7 specifications of error concerning improper instructions were not objected t o a t the time the instructions were settled. These instructions, Court's In- structions #7 and #16, cannot now be challenged on appeal for the f i r s t time. State v. Meidinger, supra. A third alleged improper instruction, Court's Instruction #3, was objected t o on the grounds that a shorter more concise instruction was available. Court's Instruction #3 i s recommended and found i n the Montana Jury Instruction Guide. Court's Instruction /I18 was objected t o by defendant on the grounds of being repetitious of a prior court instruction. A reading of the instructions reveals the instruc- tion objected to defined circumstantial evidence, whereas the prior court instruction differentiated direct and circumstantial evidence and explained how the jury should consider circumstantial evidence. W e find no merit i n defendant's objection. The remainder of defendant's alleged improper jury in- structions f a i l t o establish any reversible error and w e deem them not worthy of discussion. Of the 14 instructions proposed by defendant, but not given, 1 1 were rejected on the grounds of being repetitious of given instructions. A f a i r reading of a l l of the jury instructions as a whole demonstrates they are sufficient and properly in- structed the jury on the law governing t h i s case. Those jury instructions rejected as repetitious were not an abuse of discretion by the court. The remaining 3 proposed instructions also f a i l t o provide grounds for reversal. Defendant attempted t o offer an instruction concerning the defense of a l i b i . This instruction was properly rejected as defendant's case was not founded upon an a l i b i defense. N o notice of such a defense was given as required by section 95-1803(3), R.C.M. 1947. N o claim was made by defendant i n keeping with the defense of a l i b i . Defendant also proposed 2 instructions providing a legal definition for the words "could" and ''similar". The District Court refused these instructions stating: ' I * * * They [the jury] heard the testimony of the similarities and it's up to them to determine the similarities and its not within the province of this court to say what similarity is or is not. 11 We find no error on the part of the trial court in refusing these instructions. This Court has carefully reviewed the issues for review presented by the defendant. We find sufficient substantial evidence, if believed by the jury. We find no abuse of judicial discretion or reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. We Concur: $LJ&tQQ\ Chief Justice Judge, sitting with the Court.