Title: Commonwealth v. Jackson

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-10398 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL JACKSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2015. - April 16, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Duffly, JJ. 
 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, 
Instructions to jury, Empanelment of jury, Public trial, 
Failure to object, Waiver, Capital case.  Jury and Jurors.  
Duress.  Constitutional Law, Jury, Public trial, Waiver of 
constitutional rights.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 27, 2002.  
 
 
The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 18, 2010, was heard by 
him.  
 
 
 
Emanuel Howard for the defendant. 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Afton M. Templin, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  After a jury trial, the defendant, Michael 
Jackson, was convicted of murdering Jose Lane, the unlawful 
2 
 
possession of a firearm, and the unlawful possession of 
ammunition.  At trial, the defendant had requested that the 
judge instruct the jury that duress was an available defense to 
intentional murder, which the judge declined to do.  Prior to 
sentencing, the defendant orally moved for a new trial and for a 
mistrial when it was learned that one of the jurors was not a 
United States citizen.  Both motions were denied.  On March 16, 
2006, the judge imposed a mandatory sentence of life in State 
prison on the defendant's conviction of murder in the first 
degree, a concurrent sentence of four and one-half years in 
State prison for the unlawful possession of a firearm, and a 
concurrent sentence of one year in a house of correction for the 
unlawful possession of ammunition. 
 
On March 22, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001), on three grounds, the first two of which were rejected 
without a hearing on December 2, 2010,1 and the third denied on 
May 3, 2011, after an evidentiary hearing.2  The denial of this 
motion was consolidated with the defendant's direct appeal. 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant claimed error in the inclusion of a 
noncitizen on the jury and challenged the constitutionality of a 
sentence of life imprisonment for a person under the age of 
eighteen. 
 
 
2 The defendant claimed violation of his right to a public 
trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution because three family members and supporters were 
3 
 
 
In his appeal, the defendant contends that the judge erred 
in denying his request to instruct the jury on duress, that the 
inclusion of a noncitizen juror on the jury constituted 
structural error requiring a new trial, and that his right to a 
public trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was violated when his fiancée, sister, and 
step-grandmother were asked to leave the court room during a 
portion of the empanelment process.  For the reasons stated 
below, we find no reversible error, and discern no basis to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or 
set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree.  Therefore, 
we affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, while reserving certain details 
for discussion in conjunction with the issues raised. 
 
a.  The killing.  At approximately 10:30 P.M. on January 
24, 2002, Samuel Dew was standing on the sidewalk near the steps 
leading up to the front porch of the home of the victim's sister 
in the Dorchester section of Boston.3  The victim was standing on 
the first landing leading to the porch, sharing a cigar with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
apparently asked by a court officer to leave the court room when 
the jury venire (consisting of seventy-nine jurors) were brought 
in for empanelment. 
 
 
3 The victim stayed at his sister's home four or five days 
each week. 
4 
 
Dew, who noticed a person walking on the street toward them.  
When the person was about an arm's length away, Dew recognized 
him as the defendant, Michael Jackson,4 someone he had met a 
dozen or so times in the course of Dew's work at the Dorchester 
Reporting Center, a Department of Youth Services facility.  The 
three exchanged pleasantries, and afterward, the defendant 
turned as if to walk away.  The defendant then reached behind 
his back, brought out what Dew described as a shiny metal 
object, and pointed it at the victim.  When Dew realized the 
object was a gun, he turned and ran away from the house.  He 
last saw the victim turning and running up the stairs toward the 
porch.  He heard gunshots go off behind him.  Boston police and 
emergency medical technicians soon arrived and took the victim 
to the Boston Medical Center, where he died five minutes after 
arrival. 
 
The next day, Dew learned that the police wanted to speak 
to him.  He called and arranged to meet with them at police 
headquarters.  On arrival, investigators asked him to look at a 
series of eight photographs, including a photograph of Michael 
Jackson.  Dew picked out the defendant's photograph and said he 
was "a hundred percent" that the person depicted was the shooter 
whom he knew by the name of "Mike D." 
                                                          
 
 
4 Dew knew the defendant by his nickname, "Mike D." 
5 
 
 
That same day, Boston police Sergeant Greg Long, based on 
information the police had received, set up surveillance in 
front of another address in Dorchester.  At approximately 
6:15 P.M., Sergeant Long and fellow officers began following a 
black GMC Yukon sport utility vehicle that left that location.  
They stopped the vehicle and removed the defendant from the back 
seat, arrested and handcuffed him, and brought him to the 
homicide unit at the Boston police headquarters.  The defendant 
was seventeen years of age. 
 
Officer Paul McLaughlin, who conducted the defendant's 
interrogation, read the defendant the Miranda warnings and 
obtained a signed Miranda waiver before speaking to him for an 
unrecorded period of time.  One hour and forty minutes later, 
the defendant agreed to give a recorded statement.5  During the 
statement, the defendant admitted to shooting the victim and 
related events that had occurred the day before the shooting 
                                                          
 
 
5 This statement was the subject of a pretrial motion to 
suppress.  After an evidentiary hearing, that motion was denied 
by a judge other than the trial judge.  The voluntariness of the 
statement was an issue subsequently raised and extensively 
litigated at the trial.  Dr. Paul Zeizel, a clinical 
psychologist, was called by the defendant and testified about 
his examination of the defendant and his opinion with regard to 
the defendant's susceptibility to being influenced by persons in 
authority like the police.  A humane practice instruction was 
given to the jury by the trial judge.  Although not raised as an 
issue on appeal, we have reviewed the denial of the motion to 
suppress and the manner in which the voluntariness issue was 
handled at trial, and we find no error. 
 
6 
 
when he and a friend, Riccardo Green, were at a cemetery.  Green 
informed the defendant that there were people who thought the 
defendant was "ratting"6 to the police, and the only way to avoid 
"catch[ing] consequences" associated with being a rat was for 
the defendant to kill the victim, who Green claimed had killed 
another individual, Rasheed Fountain, several years before.7 
 
b.  Public trial.  On the day of jury empanelment, the 
defendant's fiancée, sister, and step-grandmother were in the 
court room.  Before the venire were brought in, a court officer 
asked the three individuals to leave the court room.  They 
followed the officer's orders and were not present in the court 
room during the empanelment process.  There was no objection. 
 
An evidentiary hearing was held on the claim in the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial of an alleged 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the judge issued a written 
memorandum of decision finding that the number of jurors in the 
venire exceeded the seating capacity of the court room.  He 
concluded that the brief closure of the court room was de 
minimis so as to not equate to a closure in the constitutional 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant had testified during a grand jury proceeding 
implicating a gang member in an unrelated murder. 
 
 
7 The defendant described Rasheed Fountain as a father 
figure to him.  Seven years prior to the facts that give rise to 
this case, the defendant witnessed Rasheed Fountain's murder, 
allegedly at the hands of the victim in the present case. 
7 
 
sense and that, even if it had not been de minimis, the facts 
concerning the empanelment satisfied the criteria of Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
 
c.  Makeup of the jury.  On March 7, 2006, the day 
following the jury's verdicts but before sentencing, the judge 
informed counsel that he believed one of the jurors was not a 
United States citizen.8  The judge conducted a hearing on March 
14, 2006, during which the juror told the court that he was not 
a United States citizen.  Defense counsel orally moved for a 
mistrial and for a new trial; both motions were denied. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "When this court reviews a defendant's 
appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial in 
conjunction with his direct appeal from an underlying conviction 
of murder . . . , we review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  
Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 59, cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 796 (2012). 
 
a.  The defense of duress.  The defendant argues that the 
judge erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of 
duress.  The defendant claims that juveniles (age seventeen or 
younger) should be allowed to invoke duress as a defense to 
intentional murder, notwithstanding the fact that the defense is 
barred from use by adults.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
8 When the judge went to thank the jury for their service, 
one juror asked the judge if he might be able to recommend to 
the juror an attorney for assistance on an immigration matter. 
8 
 
827, 835 (2012).  Because this issue was properly raised below, 
we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Graham, 62 
Mass. App. Ct. 642, 651 (2004). 
Discussion about the defendant's request for a duress 
instruction began during the Commonwealth's case.  When the 
judge indicated that he did not believe that duress was a 
defense to intentional murder,9 defense counsel made what 
amounted to an offer of proof as to the witnesses he might call 
if duress were a defense, and declared that they would testify 
as to the difficulties of the defendant's upbringing and 
circumstances.  These witnesses were not called by the 
defendant, and, at the close of evidence, the judge definitively 
denied defense counsel's request for a duress instruction.  
 
In Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 835, we concluded that duress was 
not an available defense to intentional murder.10  Nonetheless, 
the defendant claims that it was error to foreclose the defense 
to a juvenile offender because of the fundamental differences 
between adults and juveniles.  In Vasquez, we had no need to 
specify our holding as foreclosing duress as a defense to 
                                                          
 
 
9 The judge was also the trial judge in Commonwealth v. 
Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827 (2012). 
 
 
10 In coming to this conclusion, we noted that duress is not 
an available defense to intentional murder under the common law 
of any State and "[e]very State appellate court, except one," 
that has addressed this application of duress has determined 
that it does not justify intentional murder.  Vasquez, 462 Mass. 
at 834 & n.5. 
9 
 
intentional murder for both adult and juvenile offenders.  We 
take this opportunity to clarify that our holding does foreclose 
such a defense for both classes of offender. 
 
Duress has been defined as "a present, immediate and 
impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-founded 
fear of death or of serious bodily injury if the criminal act is 
not done," with no reasonable and available chance at escape, 
and where no person of reasonable firmness could have acted 
otherwise in the circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
382 Mass. 189, 199 (1981).  The defendant argues that it was 
error to subject juveniles to the same strictures of 
reasonableness as an adult.  In support of this contention, the 
defendant cites several recent United States Supreme Court cases 
that have acknowledged some inherent differences between adults 
and juveniles, and have altered the treatment of juveniles in 
certain aspects of the criminal justice system.  See Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (life sentences for juveniles 
without possibility of parole); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. 
Ct. 2394 (2011) (custodial interrogation); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole for nonhomicide offense); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (death penalty for juveniles). 
 
Even were we to agree that the standard of reasonableness 
we would apply to an adult confronted with the fear of death or 
10 
 
serious bodily injury might be somewhat different and more 
forgiving for a person seventeen years of age or younger, this 
would not justify a duress defense for intentional murder.  As 
we discussed in Vasquez, the rationale of such a defense is not 
that a defendant faced with a threat of harm loses his or her 
mental capacity to commit the crime, or that the defendant has 
not engaged in a voluntary act.  "Rather, it is that, even 
though he has done the act the crime requires and has the mental 
state which the crime requires, his conduct which violates the 
literal language of the law is justified because he has thereby 
avoided a harm of greater magnitude" (citation omitted).  
Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 833.  We reject the "choice of evils" 
rationale to justify intentional murder even where the murderer 
is a juvenile, because in an intentional killing, the threat of 
harm to the juvenile claiming duress, even the threat of death, 
is no greater than the harm to the victim being killed. 
 
Aside from our rejection of the defense of duress generally 
in cases of intentional murder, the elements of the defense were 
not made out in this case.  There was no evidence that the 
threat against the defendant was "immediate" or that he could 
not escape or avoid the harm that he alleges was threatened.  
Nor does this case present such extraordinary and rare 
circumstances that might justify a reduction in the defendant's 
guilt under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Id. at 835.  Although the 
11 
 
defendant experienced a difficult childhood, was acquainted with 
individuals with gang affiliations, and alleged that he had been 
told he would face personal consequences if he did not execute 
the victim, these are not the type of rare circumstances that 
would warrant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
The defendant's actions are directly contrary to the 
purpose of and policy behind the duress defense.  His choice of 
evils justifying the killing of a third party to spare harm to 
himself is no different from that of the defendant in Vasquez.  
The Supreme Court cases relied on by the defendant are not to 
the contrary.  Because the judge properly applied the law, there 
was no error. 
b.  Public trial.  The defendant seeks a new trial on a 
second theory, that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
was violated because the court room was closed for a period of 
sixty to ninety minutes during jury empanelment.  It is well 
settled that violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial is considered structural error.  See United States v. 
Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010); Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 
456 Mass. 94, 105 (2010).  However, it is possible that some 
closures are so limited in scope or duration that they are 
deemed de minimis, and thus do not implicate the Sixth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 44 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 878 (1996).  We have held that 
12 
 
"the closure of a court room for the entire empanelment process 
[was] not de minimis," notwithstanding that it lasted only 
seventy-nine minutes, Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 
97, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 356 (2014), and that partial 
closures are not per se de minimis.  Cf. Cohen (No. 1), 456 
Mass. at 110-111 (concluding partial closure not de minimis 
where voir dire was closed on three of five days and six friends 
and supporters of defendant were excluded). 
 
Where a defendant timely raises and preserves a meritorious 
claim of structural error, this court "will presume prejudice 
and reversal is automatic."  Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 
854, 857 (2014).  However, the right to a public trial, like any 
structural right, can be waived.  See Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 
at 105-106; Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 33 & n.3 
(2000) (deficient reasonable doubt instruction is structural 
error subject to waiver); Commonwealth v. Edward, 75 Mass. App. 
Ct. 162, 173 (2009). 
 
The defendant did not raise an objection when the court 
room was closed, arguably because neither he nor his counsel was 
aware of the closure.  The issue also was not raised in his 
first motion for a new trial that preceded sentencing.  The 
defendant contends that his claim cannot be procedurally waived 
when neither counsel nor the defendant knew of the occasion for 
objection.  This argument is at odds with our recent decision in 
13 
 
Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652 (2014).  In that case, the 
defendant's uncle was prevented from entering the court room 
during jury empanelment.  Id. at 672.  Defense counsel did not 
know of the court room closure and therefore did not object.  
Id. at 672 n.24.  Nonetheless, we concluded that the "right to a 
public trial may be procedurally waived whenever a litigant 
fails to make a timely objection."  Id. at 672.  Cf. LaChance, 
469 Mass. at 858-859 (when Sixth Amendment violation is 
unpreserved due to ineffective assistance of counsel and 
attacked on collateral grounds, defendant must show prejudice 
notwithstanding structural nature of claim).  As such, we 
conclude that the defendant procedurally waived his Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial during the empanelment 
process. 
 
Despite the fact that the claim is procedurally waived, we 
still analyze the claim pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
determine whether a closure would subject him to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The defendant has 
failed to advance any argument or articulate any facts that 
would support such a finding.11 
                                                          
 
 
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 737 
(2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (declining to order 
new trial where "defendant point[ed] to no factors suggesting . 
. . that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
occurred"); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 
(2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002) 
14 
 
 
c.  Noncitizen on the jury.  The requirement that jurors 
must be United States citizens is established statutorily by 
G. L. c. 234A, § 4.  However, the same chapter of the General 
Laws contains an explicit savings clause which states: 
"[T]he fact that a juror shall be found to be not qualified 
under [G. L. c. 234A, § 4] . . . shall not be sufficient to 
cause a mistrial or to set aside a verdict unless objection 
to such irregularity or defect has been made as soon as 
possible after its discovery or after it should have been 
discovered and unless the objecting party has been 
specially injured or prejudiced thereby." 
 
G. L. c. 234A, § 74. 
 
 
While the defendant objected on being informed by the judge 
that a noncitizen had been on the jury, thus satisfying the 
first prong of the exception to the savings clause, the 
defendant has not shown any prejudice.  Rather, he urges this 
court to consider a violation of G. L. c. 234A, § 4, to be 
structural error and thus as requiring no showing of prejudice.  
The defendant relies on Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) 
(Hillery), to support this contention.  In Hillery, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the holding of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit that the respondent had been denied equal 
protection because the grand jury that indicted him were 
composed entirely of white jurors, despite the fact that there 
were qualified African-Americans available.  Id. at 256-257.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(finding no "serious doubt whether the result of the trial 
might have been different had the error not been made"); 
Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832-833 (2001). 
15 
 
so holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that "discrimination in 
the grand jury undermines the structural integrity of 
the criminal tribunal itself, and is not amenable to harmless-
error review."  Id. at 263-264.  Hillery is inapposite.  It does 
not contemplate the facts that are at issue in this case.  The 
structural error analysis involved racial discrimination in 
excluding minority members from the grand jury.  The holding 
makes no reference to the inclusion of jurors deemed unqualified 
for jury service by State law in a petit jury.  Even the cases 
cited by Hillery as examples of structural error do not 
encompass, let alone mention, the improper qualification of a 
juror included on a petit jury.12  The defendant points us to no 
Massachusetts authority that would require us to consider this 
error structural, and such a position runs directly counter to 
the statutory language of § 74 and this court's precedent.13 
                                                          
 
 
12 See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (death 
sentence cannot be carried out where prospective juror excluded 
from jury for cause for merely expressing scruples against death 
penalty, rather than being irrevocably committed to vote against 
it); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (reversing 
denial of habeas relief when trial judge failed to protect 
defendant from inherently prejudicial publicity); Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (reversal required when judge has 
financial interest in conviction, despite lack of indication 
that bias influenced decisions). 
 
 
13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541, 545-546 
(1976) (defendant not entitled to new trial where one juror 
discovered to be distantly related to victim and defendant, 
because defendant failed to show prejudice); Commonwealth v. 
Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 618-619 (1949), quoting 
16 
 
 
The present case bears striking resemblance to the case of 
Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895), in which the Supreme 
Court determined that the inclusion of a juror who was not a 
citizen of the United States was a defect, but was not "an 
infraction of the Constitution of the United States."  Id. at 
300.  The Supreme Court surmised that if the defendant were to 
show prejudice then he may be entitled to a new trial, but the 
mere inclusion of the noncitizen juror did not "den[y] due 
process of law."  Id. at 303.  We glean no language in the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights that would require a 
conclusion different from that reached under the Federal 
Constitution. 
 
The defendant does not address how he was prejudiced by a 
noncitizen juror deciding his case, and in the absence of 
prejudice, the ordering of a new trial is unwarranted under 
G. L. c. 234A, § 74. 
 
d.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the record in 
accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 186 Mass. 231, 237-238 (1904) ("If 
. . . it is discovered after a verdict that a disqualified 
person has joined in the decision, the interests of justice 
require that the irregularity or accident shall be treated like 
other irregularities. . . .  If in the opinion of the presiding 
judge, the disqualification of a juror has operated injuriously, 
and has tended to the return of an erroneous verdict, or has 
otherwise worked injustice, a new trial should be granted"); 
Wong Chung, supra (defendant not entitled to new trial where 
discovered that one juror may have been stripped of citizenship 
rights). 
17 
 
basis exists to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the 
first degree or to order a new trial.  In that review we 
discerned nothing in the defendant's conviction that suggests 
such would be appropriate.  Accordingly, we decline to exercise 
our authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.