Title: RICKY EUGENE EWING V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICKY EUGENE EWING V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 78157 P.3d 943Case Number: 06-19Decided: 05/11/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RICKY EUGENEEWING,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Cathleen D. Parker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Parker.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Ricky 
Ewing, was charged with and convicted of interference with a peace officer under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2003), and aggravated assault and 
battery with a drawn deadly weapon under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  Appellant 
asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give a 
jury instruction on the meaning of the word "drawn" as it applied to the 
aggravated assault charge, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support 
his conviction for that offense.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court err in 
refusing to give an instruction on the meaning of the word 
"drawn"?

 
 
2.   Was there sufficient evidence 
presented at trial on the charge of aggravated assault to support the jury's 
guilty verdict?

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]      At about 2:00 
a.m., on January 31, 2004, Appellant 
returned to the home he shared with Nancy Houston after a two-week absence.  Ms. Houston informed Appellant that the 
police had been at the house earlier that evening with a warrant for his 
arrest.  At some point, Ms. Houston 
became upset with Appellant, and called the police to have him removed from the 
home.  Appellant left the house and 
went to a shed on the property where he kept his tools, and where he often went 
to work or relax.

            

[¶4]      Several sheriff's 
deputies responded to Ms. Houston's call.  
They arrived with the dual purpose of responding to the call and of 
arresting Appellant on the basis of outstanding warrants.  Dispatchers had already warned them that 
Ms. Houston believed there was a gun in the shed with Appellant.  At the scene, the officers approached 
the shed and ordered Appellant to come out.  Appellant, who had seen the officers 
approach on the closed circuit television system he had installed in the shed 
because of problems with burglaries, refused to answer.  The officers then tried to open the 
doors to the shed.  Finding the 
doors locked, they attempted to pry them open.  While they were working to open the 
doors, the officers heard someone inside the shed yell, "Any [m . . . . .f . . . 
. .] that comes in that door is going to get shot, then I'll shoot myself in the 
head."1  At that point, the officers withdrew 
and, implementing procedures for facing a "barricaded gunman," isolated and 
surrounded the shed, and called in Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
personnel.  SWAT officers arrived on 
the scene and a standoff ensued, lasting until 6:30 in the morning.  The confrontation ended when officers 
fired a round of pepper spray into the shed, forcing Appellant out.  The responding officers arrested him and 
searched the shed.  They found a 
rifle on a shelf in the shed next to the closed circuit television that 
Appellant had been using to monitor activity outside the shed, along with the 
cell phone he had been using, and a note he had written during the 
standoff.  Nancy Houston testified 
that she had last seen the rifle on the floor of the shed two days before 
"behind a bunch of things."

 
 

[¶5]      At trial, a jury 
found Appellant guilty of interference 
with a peace officer under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) and aggravated assault 
and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii).  Appellant was sentenced to one year for 
interference with a peace officer to run concurrently with a four-and-a-half to 
six-year sentence for aggravated assault.  
This appeal followed.

 
 
JURY 
INSTRUCTION

 
 
[¶6]      Appellant first 
contends that the judge erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction 
defining the word "drawn" as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502, which statute 
reads in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of aggravated assault 
and battery if he:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
(iii)  Threatens to use a 
drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his 
person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to 
another[.]

 
 
Appellant 
requested that the jury be instructed that "[t]o draw a firearm or deadly weapon 
is to point it intentionally or to aim it at a person."2  

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶7]      Appellant 
incorrectly characterizes this issue as involving a failure to give a theory of 
defense instruction.  Failure to 
give an instruction on the law related to a theory of defense is a due process 
issue, which this Court would review de 
novo.  See Wilkie v. State, 2002 WY 164, ¶ 4, 56 P.3d 1023, 1024 (Wyo. 2002) (constitutional issues are questions of law and are 
reviewed de novo).  However, an instruction that simply 
defines a term in the charging statute and does not state a recognized legal 
defense is not a "theory of defense" instruction.  See Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 
(Wyo. 1992) (a 
theory of defense instruction presents a defense recognized by statute or case 
law).  We will, therefore, review 
the requested instruction using our general standard of review for jury 
instructions.

 
 
[¶8]      We afford the 
trial court wide latitude in its decisions with respect to jury 
instructions.  Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 915 (Wyo. 
2000).  We will not find reversible 
error in a trial court's instructions to the jury unless the instructions do not 
correctly state the law, or the instructions, taken as a whole, do not 
sufficiently cover the issues presented at trial.  Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 9, 152 P.3d 401, 404 (Wyo. 2007).  A trial 
court has wide latitude, within those parameters, to choose jury instructions 
tailored to the facts and legal theories of the case.  Id.

 
 

Discussion

 
 
[¶9]      Appellant 
requested a jury instruction on the meaning of the word "drawn" as used in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii).  
However, a trial court is under no obligation to define a statutory term 
unless the term carries a technical connotation different from its everyday 
meaning.  Durham v. State, 422 P.2d 691, 692 (Wyo. 1967).  A term must only be defined if the 
correct legal definition is such a departure from ordinary meaning that the jury 
would misunderstand its application to the circumstances before it.  Wilson, 14 P.3d  
at 916.  

 
 
[¶10]   We find that the term "drawn," as 
used in this statute, does not have a technical meaning outside of its ordinary 
connotation.  The term is not 
defined in the statute, suggesting there was no legislative intent for a 
specialized meaning, and none of our case law suggests that it has any technical 
legal meaning.3  While Appellant believes the word needs 
further definition, he has not shown that to be the case.  Therefore, it was within the jury's 
province, relying on its common experience, to apply its own understanding of 
the word, without the necessity of further instruction from the trial 
court.  

 
 
SUFFICIENCY 
OF THE EVIDENCE

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶11]   When a conviction is challenged on 
the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of 
review:

 
 
[W]e 
must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  When considering a claim of the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence with the assumption that 
the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence favoring 
the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every 
favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the evidence.  We will not reweigh the evidence nor will 
we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.  

 
 

Mendoza v. 
State, 2007 
WY 26, ¶ 3, 151 P.3d 1112, 1113 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Discussion

 

[¶12]   Appellant's sole contention here is 
that there was insufficient evidence to show that he threatened to use a drawn 
deadly weapon.  Several officers 
testified that Appellant verbally threatened to shoot them if they continued 
their attempts to remove him from the shed.  The jury, therefore, could have 
concluded that Appellant threatened the officers.  As to a deadly weapon, we have long held 
that an unloaded gun qualifies as a deadly weapon for the purposes of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii).  Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1019 
(Wyo. 
1999).  That leaves only the issue 
of whether a reasonable jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the rifle was "drawn."

 
 
[¶13]   As discussed above, it was the 
jury's task to apply the common meaning of the word "drawn" to the situation at 
hand.  Webster's International Dictionary 
defines "draw" as follows:4 "[verb]1 . . . f: to remove (a 
weapon) from a sheath ."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 686 (1993).  A more 
recent abridged version of Webster's 
dictionary defines "draw" as "vt. . . 
. 5a. To take or pull out for use, as 
a weapon . . . vi. . . . 4. To pull 
out a weapon for use."  Webster's II New College Dictionary 
350-51 (3d ed. 2005).  Similarly, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
352 (10th ed. 1995) defines "draw" in this context as "to bring out a weapon 
(drew, aimed, and fired)."  We are satisfied from reviewing these 
sources that the common meaning of "drawn" does not contain the element of 
aiming or pointing, and the district court did not err in declining to instruct 
the jury that the word had such a meaning.

 
 
[¶14]   We have previously found that 
sufficient evidence existed to uphold a conviction for aggravated assault where 
a defendant did not point the gun at his victim.  In Hart v. State, 2003 WY 12, ¶ 6, 62 P.3d 566, 569 (Wyo. 2003), the defendant "pulled the gun out of the back of his pants 
and showed it to [the victim] by holding it straight up in the air, pointing 
toward the sky, directly in front of a window."  We held that a jury could have found 
that this constituted a threat to use a drawn deadly weapon, regardless of the 
fact that the weapon was never pointed or aimed at the victim in that case.  Id., ¶10, at 
569-570.

 
 
[¶15]   Here, Appellant contends that the 
jury could not reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had drawn 
the rifle, since no one saw him with it in his hand.  The jury was presented with evidence, 
however, in the form of officer testimony, that Appellant verbally threatened to 
shoot the officers.  It was also 
presented with testimony from Nancy Houston, the other resident of the home 
where the standoff took place, that the rifle in question had been on the floor 
in the shed, behind other objects, two days before Appellant's return.  The officers on the scene testified that 
when they entered the shed where Appellant was barricaded, they found the rifle 
in the open, in close proximity to the cell phone Appellant had been using, the 
note he had written, and the closed circuit television monitor Appellant had 
been watching throughout the standoff.  
Those facts, combined with Appellant's statement that he was going to 
shoot the officers, allowed for the reasonable inference that Appellant had 
removed the rifle from its previous location and had placed it in a position for 
use when he made the threat.  Those 
facts are sufficient to show that the rifle was "drawn."

            

[¶16]   Appellant's argument that he cannot 
be convicted because no one saw him with the rifle must fail.  The law simply does not require such 
direct proof.  No one could have 
seen the rifle during the standoff because Appellant was in a windowless shed 
during the entire confrontation.  The jury could reasonably have inferred, 
from the circumstantial evidence presented, that the deadly weapon found with 
Appellant's possessions at the end of the standoff had been "drawn" while the 
police were under threat.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The district court properly refused 
Appellant's instruction defining the word "drawn" in the aggravated assault 
statute, and there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii).  
The district court's judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Three of 
the deputies testified about their recollections of this statement.  While all differ slightly in wording, 
the descriptions are substantially similar.  This particular version is the 
recollection of one of the primary responding officers as noted in the report of 
his trainee, who was also on the scene.  
Mr. Ewing, on the other hand, testified that he yelled, "You [m . . . . 
.f . . . . . .].  First one through 
the door I will let shoot me in the head."

 
 

2Appellant 
claims that the definition is from Black's Law Dictionary, but provides no 
citation.  The sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary contains a 
definition similar to that provided by Appellant, but omits the words "or to aim 
it at a person".  Black's Law Dictionary 494 (6th ed. 
1990).  It is notable, however, that 
in the last two editions of Black's, 
the editors have omitted the word "drawn" and no longer attempt to provide a 
definition.

  

3For the 
same reason, we have declined to require trial courts to define the word 
"threaten" in the same statute.  Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 
925-26 (Wyo. 1999); Cardenas v. State, 811 P.2d 989, 996 (Wyo. 
1991).

 
 

4Webster's 
International Dictionary 
dedicates approximately two full columns of text to the various definitions of 
the word "draw."  We have included 
only the meaning the jury could reasonably have applied 
here.