Title: Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
MANNY VILLANUEVA et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S252035 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H041870 and H042504 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
1-10-CV173356 
 
 
March 18, 2021 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.  
 
 
1 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
S252035 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
The Insurance Code requires title insurers and title 
companies to file most rates with the Insurance Commissioner 
before charging those rates to consumers.  (Ins. Code, 
§§ 12401.1, 12401.7, 12414.27.)  The issue in this case is 
whether, if a title insurer charges rates without filing them, a 
consumer can challenge the charges as unlawful in court.  The 
insurer in this case argues the answer is no for two reasons.  
First, it asserts entitlement to immunity under a provision 
barring suits under noninsurance laws for any “act done, action 
taken, or agreement made pursuant to the authority conferred” 
by the rate-filing statutes.  (Id., § 12414.26.)  Second, it argues 
that under other provisions of the Insurance Code, unfiled-rate 
claims are committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Insurance Commissioner. 
We reject both arguments.  The statutory immunity for 
“act[s] done . . . pursuant to the authority conferred” (Ins. Code, 
§ 12414.26) by the rate-filing statutes does not shield title 
insurers from suit for charging unauthorized rates, and the 
Insurance Commissioner does not have exclusive jurisdiction 
over such claims.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, which reached the opposite conclusion on both 
questions, and remand for further proceedings. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
2 
I. 
When plaintiff Manny Villanueva (Villanueva) and his 
wife Sonia refinanced the mortgage on their home, defendant 
Fidelity National Title Company (Fidelity) handled the escrow 
and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company supplied title 
insurance.  For its services, Fidelity charged the Villanuevas an 
escrow fee, overnight delivery fee, courier fee, and draw deed fee 
(i.e., a fee for preparing a new deed). 
Villanueva later sued Fidelity, asserting that the delivery, 
courier, and draw deed fees added to the Villanuevas’ escrow 
statement were illegal because they had never been filed with 
the Insurance Commissioner (Commissioner).  (See Ins. Code, 
§§ 12401.7 [“No title insurer . . . shall use any rate in the 
business of title insurance . . . prior to the filing” and public 
display of the rate], 12414.27.)  The original complaint alleged a 
range of common law claims and a statutory claim under the 
unfair competition law.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. 
(UCL).)1  Subsequent motions eliminated the common law 
claims, leaving only the UCL claim.  Villanueva sought to certify 
a class of similarly situated consumers, and the court granted 
the motion. 
Following a bench trial, the court determined that Fidelity 
was required to file its rates with the Commissioner, that 
document delivery was a service for which a rate filing was 
 
1  
“The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair 
competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice.’  [Citation.]  Its purpose ‘is 
to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair 
competition in commercial markets for goods and services.’ ”  
(Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320.) 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
3 
required, and that Fidelity had not filed its delivery service rate.  
The court further determined that, for the first two years of the 
class period, Fidelity had no rate on file for drawing deeds or 
document preparation, and thus during that period, the fee for 
drawing up a deed was also illegal. 
The trial court rejected Fidelity’s argument that it should 
be held immune from Villanueva’s suit under Insurance Code 
section 12414.26 (section 12414.26).  The court reasoned that 
the section insulates from suit only those actions that are 
authorized by relevant provisions of the Insurance Code.  
Because those provisions do not authorize charging unfiled 
rates, section 12414.26 immunity did not apply.   
Based on its findings, the trial court granted the class 
injunctive relief.  But it denied restitution on the ground that 
the rates charged were disclosed to and approved by Villanueva 
and other class members, who received the benefit of their 
bargain, the services for which they paid.2 
Both sides appealed.  The Court of Appeal reversed in part 
and ordered the trial court to enter judgment dismissing the 
suit.  (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2018) 26 
Cal.App.5th 1092, 1136.)  It concluded the class claims were 
barred for two independent reasons.  First, reversing the trial 
court, the Court of Appeal held that Fidelity was in fact immune 
from Villanueva’s suit under section 12414.26.  Invoking 
language from Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 26 (Quelimane), the Court of Appeal reasoned 
that immunity under the statute extends to all “ ‘ratemaking-
 
2  
The trial court’s ruling denying restitution is not before 
us, and we express no views concerning its correctness. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
4 
related activities,’ ” a category that includes the charging of 
unfiled rates.  (Villanueva, at p. 1124, quoting Quelimane, at 
p. 46.)  Second, the court held that the statutory scheme affords 
consumers charged unfiled rates only one avenue of redress:  an 
administrative complaint submitted to the Commissioner 
pursuant to article 6.7 (Ins. Code, §§ 12414.13–12414.19) of the 
title insurance chapter.  The Court of Appeal concluded the trial 
court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of 
Villanueva’s suit.  (Villanueva, at pp. 1126–1128.) 
We granted review to consider both components of the 
Court of Appeal’s ruling. 
II. 
Title insurance “is a customary incident of practically 
every California real estate transaction,” including a sale or 
refinancing.  (Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial 
Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 314; see 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real 
Estate (4th ed. 2020) § 7:1, pp. 7-13 to 7-14.)  Title insurers 
insure “the record title of real property for persons with some 
interest in the estate, including owners, occupiers, and lenders.”  
(FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1992) 504 U.S. 621, 625.)  A title 
insurance policy is not a guarantee as to the state of the 
property’s title.  (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 41; Siegel v. 
Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1191.)  It 
instead offers indemnification to the insured against many 
losses arising from title defects not disclosed in the title policy 
or report, as well as errors by the entity performing the title 
search.  (Ins. Code, §§ 104, 12340.1, 12340.2; see Ticor Title, at 
pp. 625–626.) 
Title insurance differs in some respects from other forms 
of insurance.  While most other forms of insurance provide 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
5 
protection against future loss, title insurance instead relates to 
the past; it protects against undisclosed encumbrances and 
defects in title that exist at the time the policy is issued.  
(Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 41; King v. Stanley (1948) 
32 Cal.2d 584, 590.)  Thus, rather than requiring periodic, 
ongoing premiums to obtain continuing future coverage, title 
insurance requires a one-time payment (Wolschlager v. Fidelity 
National Title Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 784, 789) 
compensating for the risk assumed and the services rendered in 
connection with researching and preparing the policy (see Ins. 
Code, § 12340.7).  Notwithstanding these differences, title 
insurance and title insurance rates are subject to regulation by 
the Insurance Commissioner, just like more classical forms of 
insurance and insurance premiums.  (See Ins. Code, §§ 12340–
12418.4.) 
The work involved in supplying a title insurance policy is 
often divided between the title insurer and other entities.  
Fidelity is what is known as an “underwritten title company,” 
meaning a company that conducts the title search and prepares 
a preliminary title report and may also collect fees and issue the 
policy on behalf of the title insurer.  (See Ins. Code, §§ 12340.4, 
12340.5; Title Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 715, 720.)  For the regulatory purposes at issue here, 
title insurers and underwritten title companies are treated 
alike.  (See, e.g., Ins. Code, §§ 12401.1, 12401.2, 12401.7, 
12401.71.)  For convenience, therefore, we will refer to both as 
simply “title insurers.” 
The Insurance Code requires all title insurers to file a 
schedule of their rates with the Commissioner.  (Ins. Code, 
§ 12401.1.)  The filing requirement extends to any rate imposed 
as part of “the business of title insurance” (id., § 12401.7), which 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
6 
includes “any service in conjunction with the issuance . . . of a 
title policy including but not limited to the handling of any 
escrow, settlement or closing in connection therewith” (id., 
§ 12340.3, subd. (c)).3  Once rates are filed, regulated entities are 
required to wait 30 days before using them.  (Ins. Code, 
§§ 12401.1, 12401.7.)  This regulatory approach — commonly 
known as “file and use” — allows entities to implement their 
filed rates without the need for formal prior approval.  (See 
McCray v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. (D.Del. 2009) 636 
F.Supp.2d 322, 325 [in a “ ‘file and use’ state . . . the insurers file 
their rates with the [Department of Insurance] and begin to 
charge them after the effective date stated in their filings, 
unless the Commissioner disapproves the rates”]; Quiner, Title 
Insurance and the Title Insurance Industry (1973) 22 Drake 
L.Rev. 711, 724.) 
The Legislature first established this system of title 
insurance rate regulation in 1973.  Although voters would later 
require the Commissioner to affirmatively approve most other 
insurance rates before they could take effect (Prop. 103, as 
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988); see Amwest Surety 
Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1259), they expressly 
exempted title insurance from this prior-approval approach 
(Ins. Code, §§ 1851, subd. (d), 1861.13).  The system in place 
today is thus the same file-and-use system the Legislature 
originally chose in 1973. 
The issue in this case concerns the remedies available to a 
consumer when a title insurer uses rates that it has not filed.  
Fidelity argues, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that the 
 
3  
There is an exception for “miscellaneous charges.”  (Ins. 
Code, § 12340.7.)  This exception is not at issue here. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
7 
relevant statutory provisions leave no room for a consumer to 
sue based on unfiled-rate charges — both because section 
12414.26 immunizes their ratemaking from civil suit under 
noninsurance laws and because administrative complaints to 
the Commissioner constitute the exclusive avenue for consumer 
relief.  We consider each argument in turn. 
III. 
A. 
To determine the scope of the immunity afforded by 
section 12414.26, we begin, as always, with the text, which 
affords the best guide to the Legislature’s intent.  (See, e.g., 
McLean v. State of California (2016) 1 Cal.5th 615, 622; Tonya 
M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 844.)  The statute 
provides in full:  “No act done, action taken, or agreement made 
pursuant to the authority conferred by Article 5.5 (commencing 
with Section 12401) or Article 5.7 (commencing with Section 
12402) of this chapter shall constitute a violation of or grounds 
for prosecution or civil proceedings under any other law of this 
state heretofore or hereafter enacted which does not specifically 
refer to insurance.”  (§ 12414.26.)  Villanueva argues that this 
provision extends immunity only to conduct authorized by the 
relevant articles and that the unfiled rates challenged here are 
not authorized.  Fidelity counters that the conduct here is 
authorized by the referenced articles.  But it also contends that 
the provision in any event extends immunity beyond conduct 
authorized by the relevant articles to conduct regulated by the 
relevant articles. 
To evaluate Fidelity’s argument that Villanueva’s suit 
targets conduct authorized by articles 5.5 and 5.7, we begin by 
examining what it is, precisely, that these articles authorize.  
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
8 
Article 5.5 (Ins. Code, §§ 12401–12401.10) is the article directly 
relevant here.  It governs title insurance rate filing and 
regulation.  Among other things, article 5.5 requires title 
insurers to “establish basic classifications of coverages and 
services” as a basis for their rates (Ins. Code, § 12401.2; see id., 
§ 12401.3, subd. (d)) and to then file those rates with the 
Commissioner (id., § 12401.1).  The article forbids rates that are 
excessive, inadequate, or discriminatory.  (Id., § 12401.3, subd. 
(a).)  It generally prohibits title insurers from charging unfiled 
rates or rates before their effective date, 30 days after filing.  
(Id., §§ 12401.1, 12401.7; see id., §§ 12401.71, 12401.8 
[specifying exceptions].)  In addition, article 5.5 permits insurers 
to consult with each other and with industry organizations and 
share information and loss experience data (id., § 12401.4), data 
that is central to the insurers’ ability to set rates (see State 
Comp. Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 930, 939 
(State Fund) [“ ‘As a practical matter the business of insurance 
cannot be conducted and maintained upon a sound basis unless 
insurance carriers discuss and pool their experience for rate 
making purposes,’ ” quoting Joint Interim Legis. Com., Rep. on 
Ins. Reg., 1 Sen. J. Appen. (1947 Reg. Sess.) p. 5]).  Finally, the 
article permits entities under the same management to act in 
concert.  (Ins. Code, § 12401.6.) 
Article 5.7 (Ins. Code, §§ 12402–12402.2) regulates 
insurance advisory organizations, a term defined to include 
entities that “collect[] and furnish[] to [their] members or 
insurance supervisory officials loss and expense statistics or 
other statistical information and data relating to the business of 
title insurance.”  (Id., § 12340.8.)  Through such organizations, 
insurers may obtain a much deeper pool of loss experience data 
than they would otherwise have at their disposal.   
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
9 
Fidelity argues that because article 5.5 regulates rates for 
the business of title insurance, the act of charging rates — 
including unfiled rates — is an act “done . . . pursuant to the 
authority conferred by Article 5.5.”  (§ 12414.26.)  But article 5.5 
is more narrowly drawn.  It contemplates that title insurers 
may:  (1) charge a filed rate after its effective date (Ins. Code, 
§§ 12401.1, 12401.7); (2) charge a filed rate before its effective 
date if the new rate results in a rate reduction (id., § 12401.71, 
subd. (a)); and (3) for unusual risks or services, impose 
surcharges in excess of those set forth in the rate filing, provided 
the surcharges are reasonable and approved in writing in 
advance (id., § 12401.8).  Setting aside “miscellaneous charges” 
(id., § 12340.7), the imposition of any charge that does not fit 
within these categories would not be authorized by article 5.5.  
The rates charged here, which were never filed with the 
Commissioner, do not fall into any of these categories.  Far from 
being authorized, they are expressly prohibited.  (See Ins. Code, 
§§ 12401.1, 12401.7, 12414.27.) 
Fidelity’s alternative contention — that immunity extends 
not just to conduct authorized by article 5.5 but also to any 
matter regulated by the article — is plainly contradicted by the 
language of the statute.  Section 12414.26 extends immunity 
only to acts done, actions taken, or agreements made “pursuant 
to the authority conferred by Article 5.5 . . . or Article 5.7.”  
(Italics added.)  If the Legislature had wished to adopt Fidelity’s 
desired approach, it could have simply written, “No matter 
regulated under Article 5.5 or Article 5.7” shall be a basis for suit 
under a law not specifically referencing insurance.  The 
Legislature instead chose to include language explicitly limiting 
immunity to acts authorized by, rather than merely regulated 
under, the relevant articles, and we must give effect to that 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
10 
choice.  (E.g., Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. 
Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1038 [when possible, 
“courts should give meaning to every word of a statute”].)4 
Prior cases reinforce our understanding of section 
12414.26 immunity.  Section 12414.26 is not the only provision 
of its kind; it is one of four nearly identical immunity provisions 
scattered through the Insurance Code that supplement limited 
state regulation with partial immunity for specific categories of 
insurance.  (See Ins. Code, §§ 795.7, 1860.1, 11758, 12414.26.)  
These statutes address the same class of subjects and share a 
common purpose, and so their parallel language should be 
construed in like fashion.  (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
1152, 1161; accord, e.g., People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 
1167–1168.)  Those courts that have addressed the issue have 
consistently understood the language of these provisions to 
immunize acts affirmatively authorized by the relevant 
provisions of the Insurance Code, as opposed to acts that are 
merely regulated under those provisions. 
In State Fund, supra, 24 Cal.4th 930, for example, we 
emphasized that by the express terms of Insurance Code section 
11758, immunity extends only to acts taken and agreements 
made “ ‘pursuant to the authority conferred by this article’ ” 
(State Fund, at p. 936, quoting Ins. Code, § 11758, italics added 
by State Fund), not to any act taken or agreement made 
 
4  
Limiting the immunity conveyed by section 12414.26 to 
the scope expressly granted by its terms also conforms to the 
“general rule of statutory construction . . . that a legislative 
grant of privilege or immunity is strictly construed against the 
grantee.”  (Katsaris v. Cook (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 256, 265, 
citing 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1974) 
§ 63.02, p. 81.) 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
11 
“ ‘pursuant to this article’ ” (State Fund, at p. 936).  We 
identified what the relevant article authorized — namely, 
specific forms of cooperation between insurers — and concluded 
that immunity applied only if the challenged wrongdoing, the 
miscalculation and misreporting of loss information, was 
“related to such authorized cooperation.”  (Ibid.)  Because the 
alleged wrongdoing was not related to any such authorized 
cooperation, the insurer was not entitled to immunity.5 
To similar effect is Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2008) 160 
Cal.App.4th 1403, in which insurance exchanges sought 
immunity under a different parallel statute, Insurance Code 
section 1860.1 (section 1860.1), for their collection of certain 
fees.  Pointing to the plain statutory text, the Court of Appeal 
explained that the collection of fees would be immune from suit 
only if it was “an act done or action taken under the authority 
conferred by” the relevant chapter.  (Fogel, at p. 1416.)  Because 
the defendants could “not identify any specific provision [of the 
chapter] that authorize[d] them to collect” the fees, no immunity 
applied.  (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 1416–1417; accord, MacKay v. 
Superior Court (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1443 [§ 1860.1 
“does not exempt all acts done ‘pursuant to’ the chapter — which 
is to say, all ratemaking acts — but instead exempts acts done 
 
5  
Fidelity tries to distinguish State Fund on the ground that 
the article prescribing the scope of immunity for Insurance Code 
section 11758 differs from the underlying articles determining 
the scope of immunity under section 12414.26.  While that may 
be, the relevance of State Fund does not depend on any 
substantive similarity in what it is those underlying articles 
authorize, but rather on the point that each statute extends 
immunity only to what is authorized — whatever that may be 
— and not to acts that are related to, but unauthorized by, the 
underlying article. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
12 
‘pursuant to the authority conferred by this chapter’ ”]; MacKay, 
at p. 1449 [immunity “does not extend to insurer conduct not 
taken pursuant to that authority”].) 
Much as in these prior cases, we see nothing in the plain 
language of section 12414.26 that supports Fidelity’s expansive 
view of its immunity from suit.  The provision confers immunity 
for acts, actions, or agreements authorized by articles 5.5 and 
5.7.  This statutory immunity does not extend to the charging of 
unfiled rates because those articles confer no such authority; on 
the contrary, the referenced articles expressly prohibit the 
charging of unfiled rates. 
We consider the text clear on this point.  But to the extent 
any uncertainty remains, we may also look to the provision’s 
history.  (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Davis (2015) 61 Cal.4th 846, 
853–862; ABC Internat. Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric 
Corp. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1247, 1258–1262.)  That history 
reinforces the conclusion that section 12414.26 was not designed 
to immunize title insurers for any and all activities related to 
rate-setting — including, as Fidelity would have it, charging 
unfiled rates. 
Section 12414.26 and the related immunity provisions (see 
Ins. Code, §§ 795.7, 1860.1, 11758) were a byproduct of legal 
changes in the regime governing the application of antitrust law 
to the insurance field.  To understand these provisions in 
historical context thus requires a brief excursion into the 
development of that body of law. 
In its infancy, antitrust law was generally assumed not to 
apply to the insurance industry.  In 1869, the United States 
Supreme Court had held that insurance contracts were neither 
interstate nor commercial transactions for purposes of the 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
13 
federal commerce clause.  (Paul v. Virginia (1869) 75 U.S. 168, 
182–185.)  Though Paul did not expressly address the question, 
the implications for federal insurance regulation seemed clear:  
If an insurance contract was not interstate commerce, then 
insurers could not be subject to federal regulation under the 
commerce clause.  Thus, when Congress later invoked its 
commerce clause power to enact the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890 and other antitrust legislation, the insurance industry 
generally proceeded on the assumption that the industry lay 
beyond the reach of the laws’ restrictions.  (Carlson, The 
Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws (1979) 57 Tex. 
L.Rev. 1127, 1130.)  The same assumption applied to this state’s 
antitrust laws, which similarly trained their sights on 
combinations operating to restrain “commerce.”  (Stats. 1907, 
ch. 530, § 1, p. 984; see Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters 
(1946) 29 Cal.2d 34, 43 (Speegle).)  This assumption led insurers 
to engage in the common industry practice of sharing claims 
history information to assist in setting premiums, free from 
worries about potential liability for engaging in concerted 
action.  (Cf. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co. 
(1979) 440 U.S. 205, 221 [noting “the widespread view that it is 
very difficult to underwrite risks in an informed and responsible 
way without intra-industry cooperation”]; Speegle, at p. 45; 
State Deputy Ins. Comr. J. R. Maloney, letter to Governor Earl 
Warren re Sen. Bill No. 1572 (1947 Reg. Sess.) June 10, 1947, 
p. 1.) 
The assumption was proved false in 1944, however, when 
the United States Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Underwriters 
Assn. (1944) 322 U.S. 533.  In that case, the court revisited and 
overruled Paul, concluding that insurance qualified as 
interstate commerce after all and that nothing in the Sherman 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
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14 
Act exempted insurers from its reach.  (Underwriters Assn., at 
pp. 553, 560–561.)  This court shortly followed suit, concluding 
that state antitrust law likewise contained no exemption for 
insurers and so they could be found liable under the state’s 
principal antitrust law, the Cartwright Act.  (Speegle, supra, 29 
Cal.2d at pp. 43–46; see Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16700–16758.)   
These developments significantly altered the insurance 
landscape.  Newly faced with significant antitrust exposure, 
insurers quickly sought both federal and state legislative relief.  
Their efforts were successful.  In 1945, Congress enacted the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provided that states would 
continue to play the primary role in regulating the insurance 
industry.  (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015; see Group Life & Health Ins. 
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., supra, 440 U.S. at pp. 217–220.)  The 
federal statute further declared a temporary moratorium on 
applying federal antitrust law to the insurance industry (15 
U.S.C. § 1013), with application of federal law to resume only to 
the extent the insurance industry was not regulated in a given 
state by the end of the moratorium period (id., § 1012(b).)  In 
response, the California Legislature passed the McBride-
Grunsky Insurance Regulatory Act of 1947.  (Stats. 1947, ch. 
805, pp. 1896–1908 (McBride-Grunsky Act); State Fund, supra, 
24 Cal.4th at p. 938.)  By supplying rudimentary regulation of 
certain lines of insurance, the McBride-Grunsky Act ensured 
that insurers would remain exempt from federal antitrust 
regulation.  (See State Fund, at p. 939; Donabedian v. Mercury 
Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 980; State Deputy Ins. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
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15 
Comr. J. R. Maloney, letter to Governor Earl Warren re Sen. Bill 
No. 1572, supra, June 10, 1947, pp. 1–2.)6 
The immunity language now found in section 12414.26 
traces its origins to this early legislative effort at state insurance 
regulation.  One of the stated purposes of the McBride-Grunsky 
Act was to authorize and define the permissible extent of 
“cooperation between insurers in rate making and other related 
matters.”  (Ins. Code, former § 1850, added by Stats. 1947, 
ch. 805, § 1, p. 1896 and repealed by Prop. 103, § 7, as approved 
by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988).)  Former section 1853, for 
example, permitted insurers to share information and act in 
concert when setting rates, while former section 1853.6 largely 
prohibited agreements to adhere to the same rates.  (Ins. Code, 
former § 1853, added by Stats. 1947, ch. 805, § 1, p. 1898 and 
repealed by Prop. 103, § 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 8, 1988); Ins. Code, former § 1853.6, added by Stats. 1947, 
ch. 805, § 1, p. 1899 and repealed by Prop. 103, § 7, as approved 
by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988).)  In tandem with these 
 
6  
The McBride-Grunsky Act was designed only to “enact[] 
the minimal regulation required to exempt California insurance 
from federal antitrust law.”  (King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
1217, 1240 (conc. opn. of Broussard, J.).)  The law made 
California “a so-called ‘open rate’ state,” with rates “set by 
insurers without prior or subsequent approval by the . . . 
Commissioner.”  (Id. at p. 1221 (maj. opn).)  Indeed, the act 
prohibited the Commissioner from fixing rates, relying instead 
on the open market to dictate rates.  (See Ins. Code, former 
§ 1850, added by Stats. 1947, ch. 805, § 1, p. 1896 and repealed 
by Prop. 103, § 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 
1988); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 
287, fn. 15, 300.)  Under this regime, “ ‘California ha[d] less 
regulation of insurance than any other state . . . .’ ”  (Garamendi, 
at p. 240.) 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
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16 
provisions, the Legislature conferred immunity on insurers who 
engaged in such authorized activities.  Section 1860.1 provides:  
“No act done, action taken or agreement made pursuant to the 
authority conferred by this chapter[7] shall constitute a violation 
of or grounds for prosecution or civil proceedings under any 
other law of this State heretofore or hereafter enacted which 
does not specifically refer to insurance.” 
In later years, the Legislature would enact several 
additional pieces of similar legislation regulating additional 
lines of insurance that had been excluded from the McBride-
Grunsky Act.  Each time it included a similar immunity 
provision.  First, in 1951, acting to address concerns that 
workers’ compensation insurers working in concert might be 
subject to federal antitrust prohibitions, the Legislature enacted 
workers’ compensation insurance legislation paralleling the 
McBride-Grunsky Act.  (Ins. Code, §§ 11750–11759.2; State 
Fund, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 939–940.)  The legislation 
included new Insurance Code section 11758, modeled on section 
1860.1:  “No act done, action taken or agreement made pursuant 
to the authority conferred by this article shall constitute a 
violation of or grounds for prosecution or civil proceedings under 
any other law of this State heretofore or hereafter enacted which 
does not specifically refer to insurance.”  (Ins. Code, § 11758.)  
And in 1963, as part of a new article in the Insurance Code 
(§§ 795–795.7) aimed at improving insurance options for the 
elderly, the Legislature enacted Insurance Code section 795.7:  
“No act done, action taken or agreement made pursuant to the 
 
7  
Division 1, part 2, chapter 9 of the Insurance Code (former 
§§ 1850–1860.3), i.e., the chapter added by the McBride-
Grunsky Act. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
17 
authority conferred by this article shall constitute a violation of 
or grounds for prosecution or civil proceedings under any other 
law of this State heretofore or hereafter enacted which does not 
specifically refer to insurance.” 
Finally, in 1973, the Legislature turned to title insurance.  
Because the McBride-Grunsky Act expressly exempted this 
category (Ins. Code, § 1851, subd. (d)), title insurance rates were 
to that point unregulated.8  With title insurers facing suits 
alleging state antitrust violations, the industry sponsored a 
measure that would extend McBride-Grunsky-Act-style rate 
regulation to title insurance, while supplying, as the McBride-
Grunsky Act had, future immunity from antitrust liability for 
certain concerted actions.9  To that end, the Legislature largely 
copied the same immunity language it had used in the McBride-
Grunsky Act and subsequent legislation.10 
 
8  
See Department of Finance, Enrolled Bill Report on 
Senate Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) prepared for 
Governor Reagan (Sept. 25, 1973) page 1; Legislative Analyst, 
analysis of Senate Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended August 27, 1973, page 1. 
9  
See Assembly Finance & Insurance Committee, analysis 
of Senate Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
August 27, 1973; Senator George N. Zenovich, author of Senate 
Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) letter to Governor Ronald 
Reagan, September 18, 1973, page 1; Assistant Legislative 
Counsel Sean E. McCarthy, California Land Title Association, 
letter to Governor Ronald Reagan re Senate Bill No. 1293 (1973-
1974 Reg. Sess.) September 17, 1973, pages 1, 3, 5. 
10  
As originally introduced, the legislation extended 
immunity to acts authorized under the title insurance chapter.  
(Sen. Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 27, 
1973, § 15.)  Shortly before final passage, the provision was 
 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
18 
As this history reveals, and as numerous courts have 
observed over time, the language of these statutes was originally 
drafted to ensure that insurers would not be subject to antitrust 
liability for consulting with each other before establishing their 
rates.  (See State Deputy Ins. Comr. J. R. Maloney, letter to 
Governor Earl Warren re Sen. Bill No. 1572, supra, June 10, 
1947, 
pp. 1–2; 
Deputy 
Atty. 
Gen. 
Harold 
B. 
Haas, 
interdepartmental communication to Governor Earl Warren re 
Sen. Bill No. 1572 (1947 Reg. Sess.) June 11, 1947, pp. 3, 13; 
State Fund, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 938–940; Fogel v. Farmers 
Group, Inc., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410; Donabedian v. 
Mercury Ins. Co., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 990.)  The 
available committee reports concerning section 12414.26 
 
amended to narrow immunity to only those acts authorized by 
specific articles:  “No act done, action taken, or agreement made 
pursuant to the authority conferred by Article 5.5 (commencing 
with Section 12401) or Article 5.7 (commencing with Section 
12402) of this chapter shall constitute a violation of or grounds 
for prosecution or civil proceedings under any other law of this 
state heretofore or hereafter enacted which does not specifically 
refer to insurance.”  (Sen. Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended Sept. 10, 1973, § 15.) 
 
As noted above (ante, p. 6), in 1988, voters passed 
Proposition 103, an initiative that discarded much of the 
original McBride-Grunsky Act and replaced it with a drastically 
revised insurance rate regulation scheme.  (See generally 20th 
Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 239–246; 
Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 812–813; 
MacKay v. Superior Court, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1445–
1446.)  But the McBride-Grunsky Act’s exemption for title 
insurance was left in place (see Ins. Code, §§ 1851, subd. (d), 
1861.13; Calfarm Ins. Co., at p. 812, fn. 1), and so these reforms 
did not alter the framework for title insurance rate regulation, 
which remains subject to the McBride-Grunsky-Act-style rules 
specific to title insurance adopted in 1973. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
19 
express a parallel purpose — to extend the same McBride-
Grunsky-Act-style rate regulation to title insurance while 
permitting the use of industry rating organizations and the 
exchange of loss experience data.  (Sen. Ins. & Financial Insts. 
Com., analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 12, 1973, pp. 2–3; Assem. Financial & Ins. Com., 
analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1293, supra, as amended Aug. 27, 1973; 
Dept. of Insurance, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 27, 1973; Sen. George N. Zenovich, 
author of Sen. Bill No. 1293, letter to Governor Ronald Reagan, 
supra, Sept. 18, 1973, p. 1.) 
Read against the backdrop of this history, section 
12414.26 is best understood as an effort to reconcile the tension 
between what is explicitly allowed by articles 5.5 (Ins. Code, 
§ 12401 et seq.) and 5.7 (Ins. Code, §12402 et seq.) and what is 
potentially disallowed by other noninsurance statutes, most 
prominently the Cartwright Act and other antitrust acts.  It 
creates a safe harbor for actions authorized by articles 5.5 and 
5.7 and harmonizes title insurance law with background state 
laws governing business competition and other matters.  The 
history offers no hint that either section 12414.26 or its 
predecessor immunity provisions were ever thought to 
categorically immunize all ratemaking activity — even 
unauthorized activity — from suit.   
Finally, we may consider the views of the Insurance 
Commissioner himself.  (See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State 
Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 (Yamaha) [“an 
agency’s interpretation [of a statute] is one among several tools 
available to the court”].)  The Commissioner is charged by 
statute with enforcing compliance with the title insurance 
ratemaking scheme.  (See Ins. Code, §§ 12414.13–12414.31.)  
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
20 
For decades, the Commissioner has consistently maintained the 
view that section 12414.26 and its parallel statutes do not 
immunize against civil suit the charging of unauthorized rates, 
but rather are aimed at concerted activities that would 
otherwise be susceptible to challenge under the antitrust laws.  
(See, e.g., State Fund, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 940 [relating and 
giving weight to this position in the context of Ins. Code, § 11758 
immunity]; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co., supra, 116 
Cal.App.4th at p. 990 [same, in the context of § 1860.1 
immunity]; Gen. Counsel Adam Cole, Dept. of Ins., letter to 
Chief Justice Ronald M. George, Nov. 19, 2010, pp. 2–3 
[presenting Commissioner’s position that statutes do not 
immunize against civil suits challenging individual insurer’s 
rates]; id. at pp. 3–4 [recounting repeated instances of previous 
Commissioners taking the same view as far back as 1991].)  
Acting as an amicus curiae in this case, the current 
Commissioner maintains the same position, urging that section 
12414.26 was intended only to afford “immunity for certain 
types of concerted ratemaking activity that would otherwise be 
subject to the Cartwright Act or other antitrust laws” and 
should not be read to immunize the charging of unfiled rates. 
These views do not bind us; questions of statutory 
interpretation are ultimately for this court to decide.  (E.g, 
Association of California Ins. Companies v. Jones (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 376, 389–390.)  But the Commissioner’s interpretation 
of section 12414.26 is, like interpretive rules generally, due 
weight and respect insofar as contextual factors suggest that the 
interpretation rests on institutional expertise giving the 
Commissioner  a “ ‘comparative interpretive advantage’ ” and 
that the interpretation is “ ‘probably correct.’ ”  (Yamaha, supra, 
19 Cal.4th at p. 12.)  Here, the Commissioner’s view is 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
21 
consistent and long-standing, having been maintained by five 
different Commissioners across a period stretching back nearly 
30 years.  It has roots in an even longer period of experience 
overseeing the mechanisms for enforcing insurers’ ratemaking 
and rate-filing obligations.  Such a history justifies treating the 
Commissioner’s position with considerable respect.  (See Ste. 
Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park & Open-Space Dist. 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 282, 292–293; Yamaha, at pp. 13, 14.)  The 
Commissioner’s views, moreover, draw on the best evidence 
available from the statutory text and legislative history and 
align with the conclusions logically inferable from those sources 
(see Yamaha, at p. 14 [the soundness of an agency’s reasoning 
adds to its power to persuade]).  The Commissioner’s views thus 
reinforce our conclusion that section 12414.26 does not 
immunize title insurers from suits based on the charging of 
unfiled rates. 
Villanueva, the Commissioner, and other amici curiae 
urge us to hold more broadly that section 12414.26 immunizes 
insurers only against antitrust liability for concerted actions.  
Their argument raises interpretive questions unnecessary to the 
resolution of this case, and we do not decide them here.  (See 
Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 
[declining to decide whether immunity extended only to 
concerted action because even under a broader reading the 
challenged action was manifestly not within the statutory 
immunity].)11  Even if the immunity granted by section 12414.26 
 
11  
 Concerning the parallel language in a sister statute, the 
Court of Appeal has observed:  “[W]hile the initial motivation 
behind Insurance Code section 1860.1 may have been exemption 
 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
22 
extends beyond antitrust laws, nothing in the text, surrounding 
scheme, or legislative history supports extending the provision 
to immunize what article 5.5 itself expressly prohibits. 
B. 
Fidelity offers several additional arguments in favor of its 
expansive reading of section 12414.26, but none is persuasive. 
First, like the Court of Appeal, Fidelity relies on language 
in Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th 26.  In Quelimane, this court 
reversed a determination that section 12414.26 barred an action 
based on conspiracy to refuse to issue title insurance policies for 
certain categories of properties.  We explained that the scope of 
section 12414.26 immunity is limited to actions taken under 
articles 5.5 and 5.7 and, generally speaking, “Article 5.5 applies 
only to rate regulation, article 5.7 only to advisory organizations 
which supply data related to ratemaking.”  (Quelimane, at 
pp. 44–45.)  Because the “Court of Appeal did not consider the 
restriction to ratemaking-related activities in Insurance Code 
section[] 12414.26,” it erroneously extended the statutory 
immunity to an agreement (a conspiracy not to issue policies at 
all) entirely unrelated to ratemaking.  (Quelimane, at p. 46.) 
Fidelity argues that our description of section 12414.26 as 
restricted to ratemaking-related activities should control the 
outcome here.  After all, Fidelity contends, charging unfiled 
 
from antitrust laws in particular, it was recognized [at the time 
of enactment] that the language of the exemption was, in fact, 
broader.”  (MacKay v. Superior Court, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1445.)  Neither Villanueva nor the Commissioner addresses 
whether the language of section 12414.26 sweeps more broadly 
than concerted action, and we do not attempt to resolve the issue 
here. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
23 
rates is an activity related to ratemaking, even if it is not an “act 
done . . . pursuant to the authority conferred by” the ratemaking 
provisions of article 5.5 or 5.7.  (§ 12414.26.)  Fidelity’s argument 
overreads Quelimane by a fair stretch.  Quelimane did not 
purport to cast aside the actual terms of the statute.  It merely 
identified a necessary condition for immunity — that the 
challenged act, action, or agreement relate to ratemaking, as do 
articles 5.5 and 5.7 — without offering a comprehensive 
overview of section 12414.26 immunity.  Quelimane’s truncated 
description was more than adequate for purposes of that case, 
because even when discussed in that fashion, it was apparent 
that the scope of these articles (loosely speaking, ratemaking) 
and the allegations of the Quelimane complaint (a conspiracy 
not to issue policies) did not overlap.  There was no need to 
describe the conduct immunized by section 12414.26 with any 
greater precision.   
Even so, Fidelity would read Quelimane as establishing 
not just a necessary condition for immunity, but a sufficient one:  
so long as the alleged conduct relates to ratemaking in some 
way, it automatically is immunized by section 12414.26.  It is 
simply a logical fallacy to infer from Quelimane’s holding — if 
conduct does not relate to ratemaking, it cannot be immunized 
by section 12414.26 — that if conduct does relate to ratemaking, 
it necessarily is immunized by section 12414.26.  Quelimane 
said no such thing, and overreading it in this fashion would lead 
to results Quelimane surely did not intend. 
Consider, for example, the case of an insurer that deviates 
from its filed rates to impose higher rates for African-Americans 
seeking title insurance for home purchases in particular 
neighborhoods.  Such a policy would surely relate to ratemaking:  
The insurer effectively has two rate schedules, one for African-
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
24 
Americans and another for those of other races.  Such a policy 
would also be clearly illegal — not only under general 
antidiscrimination laws like the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the 
Fair Employment and Housing Act, but also under article 5.5 
itself.  (Civ. Code, § 51 [prohibiting racial discrimination in the 
provision of services by businesses]; Gov. Code, § 12955, 
subds. (d), (i) [prohibiting racial discrimination by businesses 
engaged in real estate transactions]; Ins. Code, § 12401.3, subd. 
(a) [“Rates shall not be . . . unfairly discriminatory”].)  Under 
Fidelity’s view of section 12414.26 immunity, the illegality 
would make no difference; a consumer aggrieved by the 
discriminatory rate could not sue.  Quelimane is not fairly read 
to establish such a rule, particularly in the face of clear textual 
and historical indications that section 12414.26 immunity was 
intended to have a much more limited reach. 
Fidelity, like the Court of Appeal, also invokes Walker v. 
Allstate Indemnity Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 750 and MacKay 
v. Superior Court, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 1427 in support of its 
proposed reading of section 12414.26.  (See Villanueva v. 
Fidelity National Title Co., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1120–
1124.)  Those cases, however, involved challenges to certain 
insurance rates that were actually filed with and approved by 
the Commissioner.  Specifically, after Proposition 103, insurers 
were required to file automobile insurance rate applications 
with the Commissioner and await approval before imposing 
them.  (Ins. Code, § 1861.05; see Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 
supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 813.)  In Walker and MacKay, the insurers 
had done so, but were nevertheless being sued for charging these 
filed and approved rates.  The Courts of Appeal concluded the 
governing immunity statute, section 1860.1, “must bar claims 
based upon an insurer’s charging a rate that has been approved 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
25 
by the commissioner.”  (Walker, at p. 756; see MacKay, at 
p. 1449 [finding “no tort liability for charging a rate that has 
been approved by the commissioner”].) 
Unlike the automobile insurance rates at issue in Walker 
and MacKay, title insurance rates need not receive formal 
approval from the Commissioner, but need only be filed in order 
to become, after a waiting period, effective.  (See Ins. Code, 
§§ 12401.1, 12401.2, 12401.7.)  But as the trial court and Court 
of Appeal concluded, Fidelity did not fulfill even these lesser 
responsibilities:  It did not establish or file certain rates, identify 
the services covered by others, or hold off charging rates until 
after they became effective, and so “failed to comply with 
sections 12401.1, 12401.2, and 12401.7.”  (Villanueva v. Fidelity 
National Title Co., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126.)  For this 
reason, neither Walker nor MacKay can help Fidelity’s case.  
(See MacKay v. Superior Court, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1449 [distinguishing “cases [in which] the underlying conduct 
was not the charging of an approved rate”]; Donabedian v. 
Mercury 
Ins. 
Co., 
supra, 
116 
Cal.App.4th 
at 
p. 992 
[distinguishing Walker as involving “a challenge to approved 
rates”].) 
Finally, Fidelity raises a practical argument.  It notes that 
section 12414.26 supplies not just immunity from liability but 
immunity from suit.  (See § 12414.26 [acts that are the subject 
of immunity shall not “constitute . . . grounds for prosecution or 
civil proceedings”].)  Fidelity argues that for any such immunity 
to be meaningful, it must always be demonstrable at the earliest 
possible opportunity, i.e., on demurrer.  From this premise, 
Fidelity argues that the substantive standard for when 
immunity applies must be defined in such a way that its 
application can be determined at a glance from the pleadings — 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
26 
an imperative that argues in favor of extending immunity to all 
acts connected with ratemaking. 
The argument rests on a flawed premise.  That the 
Legislature granted insurers immunity from suit for certain acts 
does not excuse insurers, as the parties claiming entitlement to 
that protection, from having to demonstrate, with evidence if 
necessary, that the preconditions for its invocation have been 
met.  Qualified immunity, for example, likewise supplies “an 
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.”  
(Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985) 472 U.S. 511, 526.)  But the immunity 
attaches only once its basis is apparent; allegations that would 
defeat qualified immunity will allow suit to proceed, and 
dismissal may in some cases not occur until a motion for 
summary judgment (see ibid.) or later (see, e.g., Johnson v. 
Jones (1995) 515 U.S. 304, 317–320 [denying interlocutory 
review of summary judgment denial that required defendants 
asserting qualified immunity to go to trial]; Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
(1982) 457 U.S. 800, 819–820 [remanding for lower court to 
determine whether, in face of claimed qualified immunity, case 
could go to trial]).  That section 12414.26 includes language 
establishing a broad procedural protection offers no basis to 
disregard other language in the statute, limiting immunity to 
any “act done, action taken, or agreement made” pursuant to 
specific statutory sources of authority (§ 12414.26), that more 
narrowly defines the universe of conduct to which it applies.  
Even so construed, section 12414.26 still provides a basis for 
bringing a lawsuit to a prompt end, once the statutory 
prerequisites have been shown. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
27 
IV. 
We turn to Fidelity’s alternative argument that 
Villanueva’s lawsuit is barred because a proceeding before the 
Commissioner is a consumer’s exclusive remedy for the charging 
of an unfiled rate.  Notably, Fidelity disavows any argument 
that this statutory administrative proceeding must be 
exhausted before filing a suit in superior court or that a superior 
court should refer such a suit to the Commissioner under the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.12  Fidelity’s argument about the 
role of administrative proceedings is considerably broader.  
Focusing our attention on this broad alternative argument for 
affirmance, we agree with Villanueva and the Commissioner 
that administrative proceedings are not a ratepayer’s exclusive 
remedy for the charging of an unfiled rate. 
Article 6.7 (Ins. Code, §§ 12414.13–12414.19) of the 
chapter covering title insurance provides for administrative 
 
12  
When primary jurisdiction applies, an initial suit in court 
is permitted, although the trial court may thereafter choose to 
stay the action and solicit an agency’s views.  (Jonathan Neil & 
Assoc., Inc. v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 917, 931–933; Farmers 
Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 390–392.)  
When 
exhaustion 
applies, 
a 
party 
must 
pursue 
an 
administrative remedy initially, but may thereafter file suit in 
court.  (Jonathan Neil, at pp. 930–931; Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
at p. 390.)  When a statutory regime vests exclusive jurisdiction 
in an agency, in contrast, a party may only proceed 
administratively and thereafter may only challenge the results 
of 
any 
administrative 
outcome 
through 
administrative 
mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) or such other means as 
the statutory scheme may specify (see, e.g., Lab. Code, 
§ 1700.44, subd. (a) [exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Labor 
Commissioner, with review by way of trial de novo in superior 
court]). 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
28 
proceedings before the Commissioner in the event of disputes 
over charged rates or rating plans or systems.  First, a “person 
aggrieved by any rate charged . . . by a title insurer . . . may 
request such person or entity to review the manner in which the 
rate, plan, system, or rule has been applied with respect to 
insurance or services afforded him.  Such request . . . shall be 
written.”  (Id., § 12414.13.)  If unable to obtain satisfaction from 
the insurer, the aggrieved consumer may then turn to the 
Commissioner:  “Any person aggrieved by the action of any such 
person or entity in refusing the review requested, or in failing or 
refusing to grant all or part of the relief requested, may file a 
written 
complaint 
and 
request 
for 
hearing 
with 
the 
commissioner, specifying the grounds relied upon.”  (Ibid.)  
Under this provision, a written complaint to the regulated entity 
is a necessary prerequisite to a written complaint to the 
Commissioner; it is only if the written complaint fails that a 
person is “aggrieved” and entitled to seek a hearing with the 
Commissioner.  (Ibid.)  But nothing in either Insurance Code 
section 12414.13 or the remainder of article 6.7 suggests that a 
complaint to the Commissioner is exclusive of any other remedy 
that might be available to the consumer, including remedies 
otherwise available in judicial proceedings.13 
 
13 
Fidelity further notes that other parts of the statutory 
scheme give the Commissioner additional responsibilities for 
interpreting and enforcing the rate-filing requirements of the 
title insurance chapter.  For example, Insurance Code section 
12340.7 gives the Commissioner the authority to promulgate 
regulations identifying certain “miscellaneous charges” that are 
not subject to regulation as rates.  But nothing about this grant 
of rulemaking authority implies exclusive jurisdiction over 
consumer claims based on failure to comply with the relevant 
provisions of the title insurance law. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
29 
The language in Insurance Code section 12414.13 
contrasts with that of other schemes where the Legislature has 
made 
manifest 
its 
intent 
to 
establish 
an 
exclusive 
administrative remedy.  For example, the Talent Agencies Act 
(Lab. Code, §§ 1700–1700.47) regulates relations between 
artists in Hollywood and those who represent them (see 
Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi (2008) 42 Cal.4th 974, 
984–985).  A provision of the act requires that disputes under it 
be submitted in the first instance to the Labor Commissioner:  
“In cases of controversy arising under this chapter, the parties 
involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor 
Commissioner, who shall hear and determine the same, subject 
to an appeal within 10 days after determination, to the superior 
court where the same shall be heard de novo.”  (Lab. Code, 
§1700.44, subd. (a), italics added.)  This language, using the 
mandatory “shall,” grants “original and exclusive jurisdiction 
over issues arising under the Act” to the Labor Commissioner.  
(Marathon Entertainment, Inc., at p. 981, fn. 2; see Styne v. 
Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 54–56.) 
The state’s workers’ compensation scheme is to similar 
effect.  The Legislature has set out an administrative procedure 
for injured workers to file for and obtain compensation for 
workplace injuries.  (Lab. Code, §§ 3200–6149; see Cal. Const., 
art. XIV, § 4 [authorizing the Legislature to establish and vest 
an  administrative body with jurisdiction “to determine any 
dispute” arising under the workers’ compensation law].)  The 
statutory scheme expressly makes that compensation, in the 
cases where it is available, “the exclusive remedy” for such 
injuries.  (Lab. Code, § 3601, subd. (a); see id., § 3602, subd. (a) 
[“sole and exclusive remedy”].)  The scheme also explicitly 
provides that “[a]ll the following proceedings shall be instituted 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
30 
before the [Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board] and not 
elsewhere,” including claims seeking compensation, to enforce 
liability for compensation, and so on.  (Id., § 5300; see King v. 
CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1056–1057.)  Through 
the use of such express language, the Legislature has ousted 
superior courts of jurisdiction and granted the Workers’ 
Compensation 
Appeals 
Board 
“exclusive 
jurisdiction 
to 
determine the extent of recovery for an injury” covered by the 
workers’ compensation scheme.  (Unruh v. Truck Insurance 
Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 624.)   
The language of these statutes shows that the Legislature 
knows how to prescribe exclusivity when it so intends.  The 
Legislature used no comparable language here.  In describing a 
consumer’s right to file a complaint with the Commissioner, the 
Legislature used the permissive “may” rather than the 
mandatory 
“shall.” 
 
(See 
Ins. 
Code, 
§ 16 
[governing 
interpretation of the two terms].)  And the Legislature included 
no other language expressly making proceedings before the 
Commissioner the exclusive avenue of recourse.  In the absence 
of such language, we infer the Legislature did not intend such a 
result. 
In evaluating whether a remedial scheme was intended to 
be exclusive, we may also consider the scope of the recourse it 
affords.  We have said that exhaustion of a remedy prior to 
pursuing a civil suit — never mind, as Fidelity urges here, 
exclusivity — may not be required if the relief available is 
materially incomplete.  (See Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 
4 Cal.3d 685, 691 [“ ‘The rule that a party must exhaust his 
administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in the courts “has 
no application in a situation where an administrative remedy is 
unavailable or inadequate” ’ ”].)  Of course, we do not doubt the 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
31 
Legislature has the power to limit aggrieved parties to an 
administrative forum, even if that forum is incapable of 
supplying a make-whole remedy.  But an incomplete remedial 
scheme offers some indication as to whether the Legislature 
intended the administrative forum to serve as an exclusive path 
to relief. 
Here, Villanueva seeks restitution on a classwide basis, 
but as Villanueva notes (and the Commissioner agrees), the 
statutory scheme grants the Commissioner no power to issue 
restitution to aggrieved individual consumers, never mind a 
class of them.  The only relief the Commissioner can provide is 
an order prohibiting the unlawful rate or suspending or 
revoking the insurer’s license.  (See Ins. Code, §§ 12414.16, 
12414.17; State Fund, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 938 [noting the 
Ins. Code contains no provision authorizing the Commissioner 
to order refunds to insureds of improper charges].)  To interpret 
article 6.7 as supplying consumers’ sole avenue of recourse 
would leave them unable to obtain restitution of, or have the 
insurer disgorge, illegal overcharges.  It would, as the 
Commissioner argues, undermine the stated overarching goal of 
ensuring that insurers do not impose excessive or unfairly 
discriminatory rates.  (Ins. Code, § 12401.)  In some cases where 
a violation is too minor to warrant a license suspension, 
exclusivity would eliminate any effective deterrent, and in other 
cases where a suspension is imposed, the absence of restitution 
would render any remedy incomplete.  For this reason, the 
Commissioner in his briefing urges that “private enforcement is 
an important complement to the Department[ of Insurance]’s 
jurisdiction and consumer protection mission.” 
Fidelity 
disputes 
the 
premise, 
arguing 
that 
the 
Commissioner does in fact have authority to order restitution in 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
32 
proceedings under Insurance Code section 12414.13 et seq.  
Fidelity’s argument rests on Insurance Code section 12414.18, 
which sets out the procedures to be followed when denying, 
suspending, or revoking an insurer’s license, incorporating by 
reference the rules set out in Government Code sections 11500 
to 11529.  The statute also provides that the “commissioner shall 
have all the powers granted to him” in that chapter of the 
Government Code.  (Ins. Code, § 12414.18.)  Among these are 
the power to file an accusation (Gov. Code, §§ 11503, subd. (a), 
11507), to obtain discovery (id., § 11507.6), to hear a case (id., 
§ 11512), to issue a decision (id., § 11517), and to certify official 
acts (id., § 11528). 
Fidelity argues that one statute in the cross-referenced 
chapter, Government Code section 11519.1, grants the 
Commissioner the power to order restitution.  Fidelity’s 
argument is unsound.  While nearly every other statute in the 
chapter grants powers generically to any “agency,” defined as 
every “state board[], commission[], and officer[] to which this 
chapter is made applicable by law” (Gov. Code, § 11500, 
subd. (a)), Government Code section 11519.1 is far more 
circumscribed:  It authorizes “an order of restitution” only in a 
very narrow subset of proceedings, those involving a “decision 
rendered against a licensee under Article 1 (commencing with 
Section 11700) of Chapter 4 of Division 5 of the Vehicle Code”14 
(Gov. Code, § 11519.1, subd. (a)).  It does not authorize any other 
agencies in any other proceedings to issue restitution.  Had the 
Legislature intended the procedural rules of the chapter to 
include a broad grant of authority to agencies to issue 
 
14  
That article pertains generally to the licensing of car 
dealers by the Department of Motor Vehicles. 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
33 
restitution, it presumably would have used the same unlimited, 
generic language consistently employed elsewhere in the 
chapter.  The Government Code and the Insurance Code 
provision incorporating its procedures by reference do not grant 
the Commissioner any power to order restitution to insureds.  
Fidelity offers no reason why the Legislature would have 
intended to consign consumers to an exclusive set of 
administrative remedies incapable of offering restitution for 
their losses; this failure to make any provision for restitutionary 
relief offers an additional indication that the Legislature did not 
intend to make administrative proceedings exclusive of all other 
remedies. 
Turning 
from 
the 
specific 
provisions 
governing 
administrative rate proceedings before the Commissioner, 
Fidelity also invokes Insurance Code section 12414.29 (section 
12414.29) as support for its view that these proceedings are 
exclusive of other remedies.  Section 12414.29 provides in full:  
“The 
administration 
and 
enforcement 
of 
Article 
5.5 
(commencing with Section 12401) and Article 5.7 (commencing 
with Section 12402) of this chapter shall be governed solely by 
the provisions of this chapter.  Except as provided in this 
chapter, no other law relating to insurance and no other 
provisions in this code heretofore or hereafter enacted shall 
apply to or be construed as supplementing or modifying the 
provisions of such articles unless such other law or other 
provision expressly so provides and specifically refers to the 
sections of such articles which it intends to supplement or 
modify.  The provisions of this chapter and regulations adopted 
pursuant thereto shall constitute the exclusive regulation of the 
conduct of escrow and title transactions by entities engaged in 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
34 
the business of title insurance as defined in Section 12340.3, 
notwithstanding any local regulation or ordinance.” 
Fidelity’s argument rests solely on the first two sentences 
of the provision; we have previously explained that the third 
sentence, which was added to the statute some years after it was 
enacted, serves “to preempt local regulation, not to exempt title 
insurers from other state laws governing unfair business 
practices” (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 45), and so it has 
no bearing on the viability of Villanueva’s UCL claim.  According 
to Fidelity, the requirements that the “enforcement of Article 5.5 
. . . shall be governed solely by the provisions of this chapter,” 
and “no other law relating to insurance” shall apply absent 
express 
provision 
(§ 12414.29), 
permit 
administrative 
proceedings before the Commissioner (Ins. Code, §§ 12414.13–
12414.19), but preclude enforcement of article 5.5 through any 
other means, including the UCL suit at issue here. 
Read 
in 
isolation, 
the 
first 
sentence 
— 
“The 
administration and enforcement of Article 5.5 (commencing 
with Section 12401) and Article 5.7 (commencing with Section 
12402) of this chapter shall be governed solely by the provisions 
of this chapter” — might seem to support Fidelity’s view.  
(§ 12414.29.)  But this sentence and the following sentence were 
enacted together and are better read and understood together.  
The first sentence limits administration and enforcement of 
articles 5.5 and 5.7 to the provisions of “this chapter,” i.e., 
Insurance Code sections 12340 to 12418.4, the chapter 
specifically governing title insurance.  The second sentence 
explains what provisions are being excluded from application:  
“Except as provided in this chapter, no other law relating to 
insurance and no other provisions in this code . . . shall apply to 
or be construed as supplementing or modifying the provisions of 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
35 
such articles unless such other law or other provision expressly 
so provides and specifically refers to the sections of such articles 
which it intends to supplement or modify.”  (§ 12414.29, italics 
added.)  In other words, the statute governs the relationship 
between article 5.5 and other parts of the Insurance Code and 
resolves any conflict or overlap by specifying that those 
provisions specific to title insurance, rather than insurance 
generally, should govern unless another provision of the 
Insurance Code explicitly specifies otherwise.  Section 12414.29 
does not govern the relationship between the provisions of 
article 5.5 and other noninsurance laws, such as the UCL.15 
This reading of the text is supported by considering the 
historical background and surrounding statutory scheme.  
Section 12414.29 was modeled on a parallel provision in the 
McBride-Grunsky Act, Insurance Code section 1860.2, which 
provides in nearly identical terms:  “The administration and 
enforcement of this chapter shall be governed solely by the 
provisions of this chapter.  Except as provided in this chapter, 
no other law relating to insurance and no other provisions in 
this code heretofore or hereafter enacted shall apply to or be 
construed as supplementing or modifying the provisions of this 
 
15  
Fidelity urges that in section 12414.29, “ ‘[n]o other law 
relating to insurance’ . . . means no other law,” and if “the 
Legislature meant to limit section 12414.29 to other provisions 
in the Insurance Code, it could easily and clearly have said so.”  
But the Legislature did clearly say so, in the very language 
Fidelity quotes:  “no other law relating to insurance” (§ 12414.29, 
italics added), i.e., no other insurance-specific law.  When the 
Legislature intended to reference laws of general application 
from outside the Insurance Code, it used quite different 
language, as in sections 1860.1 and 12414.26 (“any other law . . . 
which does not specifically refer to insurance”). 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
36 
chapter unless such other law or other provision expressly so 
provides and specifically refers to the sections of this chapter 
which it intends to supplement or modify.”  Indeed, as originally 
drafted, section 12414.29 copied Insurance Code section 1860.2 
verbatim (see Sen. Bill No. 1293 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Aug. 27, 1973, § 15), although it was later amended to 
confine its scope to the administration of specific articles rather 
than the entire title insurance chapter (Sen. Bill No. 1293 
(1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 10, 1973, § 15).   
Section 1860.2 immediately follows section 1860.1, which, 
as already discussed, served as a kind of template for the 
immunity provision in section 12414.26.  (Ante, pp. 15–17.)  
Considered side-by-side, sections 1860.1 and 1860.2 are 
naturally read to regulate distinct spheres.  Section 1860.1 
governs the interplay between the insurance chapter and other 
noninsurance laws.  (Ibid. [actions authorized under the chapter 
shall not constitute violations of any state law “which does not 
specifically refer to insurance”].)  Section 1860.2, in contrast, 
deals with the interplay between the insurance chapter and 
other insurance-specific laws.  (Ibid. [“no other law relating to 
insurance and no other provisions in this [Insurance C]ode” 
shall apply unless it expressly references the provisions of the 
chapter it is intended to supplant].)   
We conclude the same is true of sections 12414.26 and 
12414.29.  While the former deals with the interplay between 
articles 5.5 and 5.7 and noninsurance laws, the latter deals with 
the interplay between those articles and insurance-specific laws.  
This understanding attends to the textual differences in 
phrasing — one set of statutes specifically deals with laws 
“relating to insurance” (Ins. Code, §§ 1860.2, 12414.29), while 
the other set deals with laws that “do[] not specifically refer to 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
37 
insurance” (§§ 1860.1, 12414.26).  It also prevents these statutes 
from duplicating each other.  If section 12414.29 (and Ins. Code, 
§ 1860.2) were understood to forbid not only application of other 
insurance laws, but also other noninsurance laws, then section 
12414.26 (as well as § 1860.1) would be superfluous. 
To the extent section 12414.29 is ambiguous, we consider 
the Commissioner’s view that this provision does not foreclose 
suits under noninsurance laws.  An administrative agency’s 
interpretation of statutes regulating the extent of its power and 
responsibilities is entitled to a measure of respect (Ste. Marie v. 
Riverside County Regional Park & Open-Space Dist., supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 292; see Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123 
Cal.App.4th 924, 937 [“The fact that the Commissioner does not 
view the trial court as having poached into the Commissioner’s 
statutory domain is clearly significant, and we defer to his 
interpretation of his authority”]), and so we accord weight to the 
Commissioner’s view that section 12414.29 does not render his 
powers to enforce article 5.5 exclusive. 
Finally, Fidelity looks to case law in search of support for 
its exclusivity argument, but its search turns up empty.  Fidelity 
notes that in Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial 
Corp., supra, 69 Cal.2d at page 323, an antitrust case, this court 
observed in passing that “rate regulation has traditionally 
commanded administrative expertise” and held allegations an 
insurer was charging below-cost rates to harm competition were 
subject to demurrer because “a court is not the appropriate 
initial arbiter of factors involved in insurance costs.”  But we 
made these observations in a very different context, a complaint 
that alleged illegal below-cost pricing, and thus asked courts to 
weigh in on whether an insurer’s rates exceeded its costs.  As we 
explained in Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
38 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, Chicago Title stands for the proposition 
that state antitrust and unfair competition law may in some 
instances be superseded, but only to the extent “specific 
provisions of the Insurance Code . . . authorize some practices 
and as to others [give] the Insurance Commissioner authority to 
determine the propriety of the conduct.”  (Id. at p. 272.)  
Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 924 and 
Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 968 are 
likewise to no avail.  Although Fidelity cites these cases in 
passing as supporting exclusive original jurisdiction for the 
Commissioner, neither found such exclusive jurisdiction for the 
claims there at issue (challenges to an auto insurer using 
broker-agents and withholding discounts based on a lack of past 
insurance, respectively), and neither contains any reasoning or 
analysis that would support exclusive original jurisdiction here. 
The Legislature, in crafting the various provisions of the 
scheme regulating title insurance, has made the relevant 
decisions concerning the appropriate spheres for courts and the 
Commissioner.  The text of the provisions it chose to adopt does 
not extend administrative exclusivity to circumstances in which 
a rate was required to be filed with, but was never filed with, 
the Commissioner.  Nothing in the statutory scheme forecloses 
a court from considering a claim that an insurer failed to meet 
its threshold obligation to file a rate and then charged the rate 
anyway.   
V. 
The Insurance Code required Fidelity to file its rates with 
the Insurance Commissioner before charging consumers, but it 
failed to do so.  Charging an unfiled rate is not an “act done . . . 
pursuant to the authority conferred by” Insurance Code section 
VILLANUEVA v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
39 
12401 et seq. (§ 12414.26).  It is a violation of the express terms 
of the Insurance Code, for which Fidelity enjoys no statutory 
immunity from suit under section 12414.26.  Nor does any 
aspect of other provisions in the chapter regulating title 
insurance grant to the Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to 
address consumer challenges to unfiled rates.  Insurance Code 
section 12414.13 supplies an administrative remedy, but it is 
not exclusive of other remedies otherwise available in the courts.  
The superior court therefore did not err in ruling on the merits 
of Villanueva’s UCL action challenging the imposition of unfiled 
rates.  (See Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 
10 Cal.4th at p. 263 [the Legislature generally intended the 
UCL and other laws to be cumulative to the powers granted the 
Commissioner to sanction insurers]; Krumme v. Mercury Ins. 
Co., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 936 [“The Insurance Code does 
not . . . displace the UCL ‘except as to . . . activities related to 
rate setting’ ”].) 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remand 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Villaneuva v. Fidelity National Title Company   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XX 26 Cal.App.5th 1092  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S252035  
Date Filed:  March 18, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara    
Judge:  Peter H. Kirwan  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Chavez & Gertler, Nance F. Becker, Mark A. Chavez; The Kick Law Firm, Taras Kick, Thomas Segal; 
Shernoff Bidart Escheverria, Michael J. Bidart; The Bernheim Law Firm, Steven J. Bernheim, Nazo S. 
Semerjian; Friedman Rubin and Richard H. Friedman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.  
 
Olivier Schreiber & Chao, Monique Olivier; Allison M. Zieve for Public Citizen and Public Justice as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Amy Bach and Mark Dillman for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Jonathan L. Wolff, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lisa W. Chao,  
Karen W. Yiu and Heather B. Hoesterey, Deputy Attorneys General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State 
Solicitor General, for California Department of Insurance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Harvey Rosenfield and Pamela Pressley for Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Federation of America and 
Consumer Federation of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Hahn Loeser & Parks, Michael J. Gleason, Rupa G. Singh, Erica L. Calderas, Steven A. Goldfarb; 
California Appellate Law Grouop, Ben Feuer, Julia Partridge and Greg Wolff for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Dentons US, Ronald D. Kent, Joel D. Siegel, Sonia R. Martin and Susan M. Walker for  California Land 
Title Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Arthur E. Davis III for American Escrow Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant.  
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steven J. Benheim 
The Bernheim Law Firm   
11611 Dona Alicia Place 
Studio City, CA 91436 
(818) 760-7341 
 
Greg Wolff 
California Appellate Law Group LLP 
96 Jessie St. 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
(415) 649-6700