Title: Vermont v. de Macedo Soares

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 56













State v. de Macedo Soares (2010-241)
 
2011 VT 56
 
[Filed 17-May-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 56
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-241
 
MARCH TERM, 2011
 
State of Vermont
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APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
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District Court of Vermont
 
}
Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit
 
}
 
Theodore de Macedo Soares
}
DOCKET NO. 4-9-09
  Cata
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: M. Kathleen Manley
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
This is a discretionary appeal of the district court's decision
upholding the judicial bureau's judgment against defendant for speeding on an
interstate highway.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
On the afternoon of June 5, 2009, defendant was stopped on Interstate 91
and issued a citation for speeding.  The citation stated that defendant
was traveling eighty miles per hour in a sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed
zone.  The citation further stated that the accused could either pay the
specified waiver amount or challenge the ticket, in which case, if the
prosecution proved its case, any fine within the specified penalty range could
be imposed.  The citation noted that the waiver amount plus $50 for court
costs is commonly assessed following a hearing.  The citation indicated a
waiver amount of $140 and a penalty range from $36 to $1186.
¶ 3.            
Defendant elected to contest the ticket at a judicial bureau
hearing.  At the hearing, he did not testify but cross-examined the only
witness for the Statethe state trooper who had cited him for speeding. 
At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer upheld the citation and fined
defendant $140 plus $50 for court costs, noting that defendant had been stopped
for speeding nine times.  Defendant appealed to the district court, which
upheld the judicial bureau's judgment.  This Court then granted
defendant's request for permission to appeal.
¶ 4.            
Defendant first argues that the traffic citation is unconstitutional
because: (1) the penalty range applies only when a defendant chooses to
maintain a constitutionally protected right to challenge the citation; (2) the
$50 in court costs is assessed only if a defendant is found guilty following a
hearing; (3) the waiver amount is an improper incentive to settle that chills a
defendant's right to challenge a citation; (4) the solicitation of a guilty
plea violates the principle of a presumption of innocence; and (5) the process
for issuing a citation does not assure a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional
rights.
¶ 5.            
We find no constitutional violation and no merit to these
arguments.  Defendant was cited for a civil traffic violation, not a
criminal offense; therefore, the principal cases he relies on to support his
constitutional argumentsUnited States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)
and Veilleux v. Springer, 131 Vt. 33, 300 A.2d 620 (1973)are
inapposite.  In Jackson, the Supreme Court struck down the death
penalty clause of the Federal Kidnapping Act, which allowed the death penalty
to be imposed only on those defendants who were found guilty after pleading not
guilty and requesting a jury trial.  390 U.S.  at 585. 
The Court concluded that applying the death penalty only to defendants who assert
their right to contest their guilt before a jury unconstitutionally chilled
defendants' right to plead not guilty and to demand a jury trial.  Id. at 581.  In Veilleux, we applied the Jackson
rationale to strike down a statute that provided for a six-month driver's
license suspension only for defendants who pled not guilty after being charged
with driving while intoxicated.  131 Vt. at 38-39, 300 A.2d  at 624.  We emphasized that the provision could not pass
constitutional muster because the license suspension "falls only upon those who
exercise the fundamental right to plead not guilty to a criminal charge upon
which the constitutional rights guaranteed to a defendant in criminal
proceeding are contingent."  Id. at 40, 300 A.2d 
at 625.
¶ 6.            
The instant case, in stark contrast to those relied upon by defendant,
involves a civil traffic fine that can be either paid in a specified amount
without recourse to a hearing or challenged and adjudicated in a civil
proceeding before the judicial bureau.  Unless a fundamental right is at
stake, which is not the case here, being a civil defendant is "fundamentally
different" from being a criminal defendant.  Lewis v.
Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2002).  Thus, the
constitutional rights implicated in the cases cited by defendant are not
implicated here.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Vt. Dist. Court, 152 Vt. 1, 6,
563 A.2d 636, 639-40 (1989) (holding that defendant had no constitutional right
to jury trial in civil proceeding unknown at common law).  Defendant may
have a statutory right to a jury trial with respect to this traffic violation,
but he waived that right and has alleged a statutory violation.
¶ 7.            
The citation advised defendant that he could either pay a specified
amount set by a legislatively established panel or challenge the fine in a
civil administrative proceeding before the judicial bureau.  The citation
also indicated the full range of fines allowed under the statute allegedly
violated in the event defendant wished to challenge the violation.
  If defendant were correct that providing the option of paying a
waiver amount violates the constitutional rights of those cited for traffic
violations, all persons cited would be required to participate in
administrative proceedings regarding minor traffic violations.  Nor could
participation in administrative proceedings be avoided if defendant were
correct that any payment waiver had to be knowing and intelligent.  That
would require those cited to engage in colloquies before a hearing officer or
judge to assure that a requested waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
Fortunately for citizens who are ticketed, such criminal law safeguards are
neither legislatively nor constitutionally required with respect to civil
traffic violations.
¶ 8.            
Next, defendant contends that the judicial bureau erred in admitting
evidence from the LIDAR laser device used to detect his speed, arguing: (1) the
prosecution failed to show that evidentiary hearings had been conducted on the
admissibility of this novel technology; (2) there was no proof that the device
had been tested according to the manufacturer's specifications, that the
operator had been trained in its operation, or that the officer had the
training and capability to visually estimate speeds to any degree of accuracy;
(3) the prosecution failed to submit a certification of accuracy for the
device; and (4) the device was improperly tested.
¶ 9.            
As with the constitutional arguments, we reject these evidentiary claims
of error.  Proceedings before the judicial bureau and on appeal to the
district court are governed by Rule 80.6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
V.R.C.P. 80.6(a), and "are intended to be expedited and summary."  Shlansky
v. City of Burlington, 2010 VT 90, ¶ 19, ___ Vt. ___, 13 A.3d 1075.  In proceedings of this nature, the Rules of Evidence do not apply,
but rather evidence "is admissible if it is of a type commonly relied upon by
reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs."  V.R.S.C.P. 6(b).  In this case, the officer who stopped
defendant testified that he visually estimated defendant's speed at eighty
miles per hour, that the reading from his LIDAR laser device confirmed his
estimate, that he had been trained and certified in the use of the device, that
he had successfully performed the manufacturer's recommended tests on the
device before and after using it the day he stopped defendant, and that no
"certificate" of accuracy existed.  This testimony was more than
sufficient for the hearing officer and the district court to determine that
defendant had been speeding fifteen miles per hour above the posted speed
limit.
¶ 10.         Before
the traffic bureau, defendant moved to dismiss all evidence concerning use of
laser technology for "lack of foundation" because "there is no judicial notice
of laser."  In making this argument, defendant cited an Illinois appellate
court case rejecting a trial court's judicial notice of an evidentiary hearing
held in an unrelated trial court case in which the court found the use of a
laser device to be generally accepted.  See People v. Canulli, 792 N.E.2d 438, 444-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  On
appeal, in a one-sentence argument, defendant asserts that the court erred in
admitting the LIDAR results because radar and LIDAR are not the same, no
Vermont authorities confirm the reliability or admissibility of LIDAR
technology, and the district court did not give "judicial notice" of the
reliability of the technology.  We find no merit to this argument. 
Defendant has not identified any evidence suggesting that the LIDAR device
incorporates a novel technology or is significantly different from or less
accurate than other speed-detection devices.  Indeed, several
jurisdictions, including Illinois, have held that the reliability of this
technology has been sufficiently demonstrated to allow its introduction into
evidence without first holding an underlying evidentiary hearing on its
reliability.  See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 166 P.3d 387, 389-90
(Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (citing other jurisdictions that have accepted general
reliability of laser device in support of holding "that laser speed detection
devices are generally reliable and their results may be admitted into evidence
in Idaho courts" without either taking specific judicial notice or requiring
scientific evidence of laser's reliability); People v. Mann, 922 N.E.2d 533, 537-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (concluding that decisions from other
jurisdictions "are ample authority that the use of LIDAR to measure the speed
of moving vehicles is based on generally accepted scientific
principles").  Defendant's reliance upon Canulli is unavailing
insofar as the appellate court in that case reversed the trial court because it
had relied upon an inadequately litigated, nonbinding decision in another trial
court case involving a different type of laser technology from the technology
being challenged in Canulli.  See Mann, 922
N.E.2d at 535-36; Canulli, 792 N.E.2d  at 444-45.
 Accordingly, the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in
admitting results from the use of the LIDAR laser device without first holding
an evidentiary hearing on the device's reliability.
¶ 11.         Finally,
according to defendant, the requirement that he pay court costs, including
filing fees, to the judicial bureau, the district court, and this Court, as
well as the necessity that he pay for a transcript of the judicial bureau
hearing, offends Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution, which, in
relevant part, provides that "every person ought to obtain right and justice,
freely, and without being obliged to purchase it."  Defendant urges us to
adopt a literal reading of Article 4, which, in his view, would mean that
requiring him to incur costs for filing fees and a transcript is essentially
requiring him to "purchase" justice.  Again, we find no merit to this
argument.  "Filing fees for civil suits have been challenged on
constitutional grounds before, without success."  Lewis, 279 F.3d 
at 528-29 (citing cases).  "The Supreme Court has never held that access
to courts must be free; it has concluded, rather, that reasonably adequate
opportunities for access suffice."  Id. at 528 (citing Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)).  Indeed, the First Congress of the United
States provided for filing fees by all plaintiffs, Lewis, 279 F.3d  at
528, and this Court upheld filing fees even in criminal cases as early as 1888,
In re Marron, 60 Vt. 199, 203-04, 12 A. 523, 526 (1888).
¶ 12.         Nor
is there a constitutional bar to requiring only losing parties to pay court-related
fees.  Cf. Fleury v. Kessel/Duff Constr. Co., 149 Vt. 360, 364, 543 A.2d 703, 705 (1988) (needing "little analysis" to reject claim that statute
making attorney's fees recoverable against employer when employee prevails in
workers' compensation cases violates Article 4's prohibition against requiring
litigants to purchase justice).  While there is a fundamental right to
access the courts, there is no constitutional guarantee that a litigant will be
able to do so without expense.  Defendant's citation to the Magna Charta
and other historic legal texts does not aid his cause.  In relevant part,
the Magna Charta was aimed at curtailing the selling of writs.  J.
Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of
State Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279, 1286 (1995).  No such
laudable goal is at issue here.
           
Affirmed.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice