Title: Pierce v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

401 So. 2d 730 (1981) Mike PIERCE v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 52550. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 29, 1981. George T. Kelly, Jr., Cleveland, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen., by Mark A. Chinn, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before ROBERTSON, P.J., and WALKER and LEE, JJ. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Mike Pierce was convicted in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County, Honorable Elzy J. Smith presiding, for delivery and sale of cocaine and was sentenced to serve fifteen (15) years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections and to pay a fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000). Pierce has appealed to this Court and he assigns two (2) errors in the trial below. According to the State's evidence, on May 22, 1979, confidential informant David Hammontree met with narcotics agents Ron Pitts and Mike Tyson near Alligator, Mississippi. Hammontree and Pitts drove to appellant's rural home followed in a separate automobile by Tyson. Upon arrival there, Hammontree went inside and shortly thereafter returned with appellant to the Pitts automobile. Pitts asked appellant whether he had any cocaine for sale. Appellant answered in the affirmative and offered to sell him two (2) grams for $200.00. Pitts purchased the cocaine from appellant and later, he and Hammontree met Tyson at a nearby roadside park where they examined the packages containing a white powder, which appeared to be cocaine. Subsequently a test of the substance at the crime laboratory verified that it was cocaine. After his arrest, and upon the trial, appellant denied that he had met with the officers and Hammontree and that he sold cocaine on the occasion mentioned. He testified *731 that his first knowledge of the matter was on May 13, 1980, when was arrested at his father's home. Appellant's defense was an alibi, corroborated by his father and wife. (1) Did the lower court err in refusing to permit an independent analysis of the contraband prior to trial? Appellant was indicted for the sale of cocaine on May 12, 1980; counsel was appointed for him on May 13; arraignment was conducted May 19; and the trial was set for May 26, 1980. On May 20, the court entered an order setting 4:00 p.m. on May 22, as the deadline for filing pretrial motions. At 5:00 p.m. on May 22, counsel for appellant, the prosecutor and the trial judge met in chambers, at which time counsel for appellant requested an extension of the motion deadline. The judge extended the deadline until noon on May 23, with the understanding that no late motion would cause a delay in the trial. On the next day, appellant's attorney filed a motion for continuance setting out a need for additional time in order to obtain an independent laboratory analysis of the contraband. The motion was denied as untimely, since it would delay trial. However, the trial judge did grant appellant access to the contraband and the right to have an analysis made, if and when he desired to do so. After the trial, appellant had the contraband examined by an analyst of his choice and that examination revealed the substance to be cocaine which corroborated the analysis made by the State Crime Laboratory. Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to grant a continuance in order that he might have the benefit of an independent analysis prior to trial. In Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1970), this Court reversed a drug conviction where the defendant's motion for an independent analysis of the substance had been overruled by the lower court. The opinion stated: In Ladnier v. State, 273 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1973), appellant made an untimely motion for an extension after the jury had been empaneled. The Court affirmed the conviction with the following comment: We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in declining to grant a continuance for time in which to obtain an independent analysis for the reason that the motion was not filed timely. If the examination subsequent to trial had indicated that the contraband substance was not cocaine, that evidence probably would have warranted a new trial even though the motions were not timely filed. However, there has been no showing of prejudice absent the independent analysis at trial. One of two things would have occurred, if that information had been available prior to trial: (1) appellant would not have used his expert to verify the state's analysis, or (2) if he had used the expert, the State's case would have been strengthened against appellant. (2) Did the lower court err in permitting a tape to be played before the jury which contained evidence of a different drug sale made by appellant on May 21, the day before the subject sale? Appellant testified in his own behalf at the trial. On direct examination, he was asked and responded to the following question: On cross-examination, the following transpired: The appellant denied that the voice on the tape was his. He contends that introduction of the tape was prejudicial and that it related to a separate and distinct crime from the one with which he was charged and tried. The tape was admitted into evidence *733 and was played before the jury on the ground that it was for impeachment of appellant's testimony as to previous drug sales made by him. In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1953), Walder was indicted and tried for narcotics possession. He had been previously indicted in 1950 for a similar offense but the indictment was dismissed due to an unlawful search and seizure. At his trial in 1952, Walder testified on direct examination that he had never sold any narcotics to anyone in his life. He repeated the denial during cross-examination, whereupon the prosecution offered evidence of the 1950 drug sale. The trial court permitted the impeachment and, upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and said: Also, see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is under a duty to testify truthfully and in order to test the veracity of his statement, the prosecution may utilize traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. We hold that, under the facts of the case sub judice, the lower court properly admitted the tape for the purpose of impeaching appellant's testimony. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.