Title: Regina A. Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Company, Inc.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

On June 29, 1998, plaintiff Regina Viscik started working for Fowler Equipment Company, Inc., (Fowler) as its billing clerk. Viscik had been overweight her entire life due to a metabolic disorder that prevented her body from breaking down fats. At age twenty, Viscik had a car accident in which she suffered burns to her legs that would not heal due to her obesity. As a result of the weight problem and the accident, Viscik suffered from degenerative arthritis in her hip and knee joints, restricted lung capacity, and depression. Her inability to take in enough oxygen prevented her from performing any lifting or heavy work. At the time she was hired by Fowler, Viscik stood five feet, nine inches tall, weighed approximately four hundred pounds, and occasionally used a cane. Prior to Viscik s hiring, Fowler had hired a consultant, Joyce Killmer, to analyze its operations and identify ways to improve them. Killmer recommended that the billing clerk s office be moved out of the customer services office. As a result, the clerk s office was relocated some distance from the customer services office, though in that office sat the fax machine and two-way radios frequently used by the billing clerk. On the second day of work, Viscik first informed Killmer of her condition and that she could not move around as quickly as others. On that day, the first complaints about Viscik s work ethic were made. Although there was some testimony that the complaints were based on Viscik s productivity and her use of the phone for personal calls, Killmer recalled that they had to do more with her inability to stand by the copier and fax machine. On Viscik s third day of work, Killmer observed Viscik experiencing some difficulty as she stood waiting for a dispatcher to train her to retrieve faxes. When Killmer advised Fowler of this, Fowler instructed her to fire Viscik. Killmer testified that Fowler made no mention of Viscik s work ethic or personal calls. Viscik was discharged on her fourth day of work. Killmer advised Viscik that Fowler needed someone who could move around the office better then she could. Seven weeks later, Viscik secured another position and proceeded to sue Fowler. At trial, Dr. Shen, Viscik s treating physician since 1991, testified that Viscik s condition had been diagnosed as morbid obesity, and that it was genetic. Morbid obesity, testified Dr. Shen, refers to a disease or diseases that occur as a result of obesity and prevent normal activity, such as Viscik s arthritis, restrictive lung disease, and depression. Dr. Shen further testified that Viscik s obesity constituted a handicap. The jury returned a verdict in Viscik s favor, awarding her $50,000 in damages and counsel fees. New trial motions filed by both parties were denied. Both parties appealed, raising, in part, the three issues before this Court: that Viscik failed to prove that she was handicapped and that the trial court erred in two aspects of the jury charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court s judgment in all respects, holding that Viscik was handicapped, that although the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the reasonable, objective employer standard, the error was harmless and did not mislead the jury; and, that the facts supported a reasonable accommodation instruction. The Supreme Court granted Fowler s petition for certification. HELD: The Court is satisfied, as was the Appellate Division, that the evidence supported the jury s finding with regard to plaintiff s handicap. However, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on reasonable accommodation and that charge was prejudicial to defendant. A new trial is warranted. 1. The LAD was enacted in 1945 with the express purpose of ensuring that the civil rights guaranteed by the State Constitution are extended to all its citizens and its provisions are to be liberally construed. Under LAD, a person must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that he or she (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) applied for or held a position for which he or she was objectively qualified; (3) was not hired or was terminated from that position; and that (4) the employer sought to, or did fill the position with a similarly-qualified person. The establishment of a prima facie case gives rise to a presumption of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The burden would then shift back to the employee to show that the employer s proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. The threshold inquiry in a handicapped discrimination case is whether the plaintiff in question fits the statutory definition of handicapped, which could be either physical or non-physical. The term handicapped in LAD is not restricted to severe or immutable disabilities and has been interpreted as significantly broader then the analogous provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Pp. 13-20) 2. Viscik s testimony, medical history, and her expert s opinion fully support the finding that she was physically handicapped within the meaning of LAD. Viscik suffered from disease or pathology as a result of her obesity, resulting in limited mobility as well as other infirmities. (Pp. 20-22) 3. A jury charge must correctly state the applicable law. An incorrect jury charge constitutes reversible error only if the jury could have come to a different result had it been correctly instructed. In this case, the reasonable accommodation charge, objected to below, was prejudicial to Fowler. The charge directed the jury to consider a claim not at issue in the case and mixed two theories, pretext and reasonable accommodation, completely and purposefully distinct theories. Moreover, the charge held Fowler to a standard on which no proofs had been offered. A new trial is warranted. (Pp. 23-26) 4. Both parties and the Appellate Division agree that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to assess Fowler s reasons for terminating Viscik under an objective employer standard. The fact-finder is required to consider the employee s performance or other qualities in light of the employer s subjective standards, including work ethic. The focus on subjectivity at the most critical stage of proof is consistent with LAD. Instructing the jury regarding the proper standard was critical to the outcome. On remand, the charge should be framed properly. (Pp. 26-29) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with the Court s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA, join in JUSTICE LONG s opinion. JUSTICE ZAZZALI did not participate. REGINA A. VISCIK, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. FOWLER EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., and HELENE LANIE FOWLER, Defendants-Appellants. Argued February 11, 2002 Decided March 28, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. John A. Ridley argued the cause for appellants (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Mr. Ridley and Karen L. O Keeffe, on the briefs). Christopher P. Kelly argued the cause for respondent (Reppert, Kelly, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. Four days after she was hired, plaintiff Regina Viscik (Viscik) was discharged from her position as a billing clerk with defendant Fowler Equipment Company, Inc. (Fowler). Thereafter, Viscik filed a complaint against Fowler alleging that her obesity was a handicap and that she had been discharged on the basis of that handicap in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. She recovered a judgment that was affirmed by the Appellate Division. We granted Fowler s petition for certification and here revisit the standards applicable to a handicap case under LAD. We granted Fowler s petition for certification, limited to the three issues outlined above. Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., Inc., 170 N.J. 386 (2001). II. On appeal, Fowler argues that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that Viscik established a handicap within the meaning of LAD; that Viscik met neither of the two standards in the statute for establishing a handicap; that the Appellate Division improperly mixed and matched the elements of two different handicap standards; and that the facts do not support the Appellate Division s conclusion. Fowler also claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding reasonable accommodation; that that concept was never pled; that Viscik never sought an accommodation; that an accommodation charge is not warranted where all parties agree that a plaintiff is capable of performing the job; and that the pervasiveness of the reasonable accommodation concept in the charge poisoned it. Lastly, Fowler contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the standard to be applied in assessing an employer s justification for termination is that of a reasonable, objective employer. Viscik counters that the proofs adduced at trial clearly support the conclusion that she is handicapped under LAD; that a reasonable accommodation instruction was necessary for completeness and that the objective employer standard constituted harmless error. III. The New Jersey LAD was enacted in 1945 with the express purpose of ensuring that the civil rights guaranteed by the State Constitution are extended to all its citizens. L. 1945, c. 169; N.J.S.A. 10:5-2. That goal has particular resonance in the area of employment discrimination, where LAD declares that the opportunity to gain employment without fear of discrimination is a civil right and that discriminatory action "menaces the foundation of a free democratic state. Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 491 (1982) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 & N.J.S.A. 10:5-4). In furtherance of its goals, LAD has evolved to encompass various forms of discrimination. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 68 (1978). The statute was amended in 1972 to prohibit employment discrimination against the physically handicapped (L. 1972, c. 114.) and again in 1978 to include disabilities other than physical ones. L. 1978, c. 137, 3. Consistent with that approach, we have held that the overarching goal of LAD to eliminate the cancer of discrimination is to be achieved through a liberal construction of its provisions. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562 (1999), rev d, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000). In expanding the scope of LAD s protections, the Legislature also recognized that certain handicapped persons could be legitimately precluded from performing certain tasks due to their conditions. Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 496. As a result, although the statute prohibits any unlawful employment practice against a handicapped person, its provisions do not apply if "the nature and extent of the handicap reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment." N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1. Moreover, LAD does not prevent the termination or change of the employment of any person who in the opinion of the employer, reasonably arrived at, is unable to perform adequately the duties of employment, nor to preclude discrimination among individuals on the basis of competence, performance, conduct or any other reasonable standards. Once the prima facie case has been established, the McDonnell Douglas analysis is followed in all other respects. Handicapped means suffering from physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or from any mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. Handicapped shall also mean suffering from AIDS or HIV infection. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q), there are two specific categories of handicap: physical and non-physical. The physical and non-physical clauses of the statute are distinct from each other and provide separate ways of proving handicap. Rosemary Alito, New Jersey Employment Law, 4-14:1, 170 (2d ed. 1999); Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 594 (stating that an alcoholic might suffer from either a physical disability or infirmity ... which is caused by illness or from a mental or psychological ... disability ... or both ). To meet the physical standard, a plaintiff must prove that he or she is (1) suffering from physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement (2) which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy. N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q). By way of example, but not limitation, the following are included within the notion of physical handicap: Any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device. IV. We turn first to Fowler s claim that Viscik failed to prove she was handicapped within the meaning of LAD. We agree with Fowler that, at least at one point, there was a miscue when the Appellate Division linked elements from the two distinct LAD standards. It did so by relating Viscik s physical disability to the physiological condition language that appears in the non-physical disability clause of the statute. We note, however, that the trial court did not make that error in charging the jury; the trial court specifically advised the jury of the distinct ways in which a handicap could be established. The question presented, therefore, is whether the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the evidence supported the jury verdict that Viscik is handicapped. We think it did. Viscik s testimony, medical history, and her expert s opinion fully support the finding that she established a physical handicap within the meaning of LAD. According to her expert, she is morbidly obese, that is, suffering from disease or pathology as a result of her obesity , and that her obesity-based arthritis, heart condition and obstructive lung disease are clearly physical infirmities under the first prong of the physical handicap test. The second prong of that test requires the infirmity to be caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness. On that point, Dr. Shen testified that Viscik s metabolic condition is genetic, that she suffered from it since birth, and that it is a direct cause of the obesity-based infirmities. Additionally, Viscik testified about the limits that her morbid obesity imposes in relation to her knee. She verified her inability to move around quickly and need for a cane. She also explained the effects of her asthma and shortness of breath. Dr. Shen, moreover, attested to each of those limitations. We are satisfied, therefore, as was the Appellate Division, that the evidence supported the jury s finding with regard to Viscik s handicap. A. The trial court instructed the jury that Fowler had a duty to reasonably accommodate Viscik s handicap and the jury charge is rife with references to that premise. Prior to charging the jury regarding the requirements for a prima facie case, for example, the court informed it that the reasonable accommodation concept could be used to determine whether Fowler s proffered reason for Viscik s dismissal was pretextual: One of the things you can take into account in that regard is whether there was a reasonable accommodation that was offered or considered ... in considering ... whether the plaintiff has shown ... the assertions of the employer are mere pretext. And the final thing she must show is that the challenged employment decision ... took place under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, either because either because it was filled by someone else ... or because it might well have been that a reasonable accommodation might well have been afforded ... and such reasonable accommodation was not offered. Finally, the court gave an extensive charge on reasonable accommodation in connection with the verdict sheet: And by reasonable accommodation I mean whether there was some course of action short of firing that would not impose an undue hardship upon the company to that could have been done in order to permit her to perform the tasks that were a legitimate part of the job. On the other hand, if no accommodation could be made without undue hardship upon the company, or even if some accommodation or some steps that may have been taken, but wouldn t have been adequate to permit her to perform the essential functions of the job, then you would find that there would be no reasonable accommodation that could be afforded. The reasonable accommodation is simply one of the considerations that you can determine in evaluating the mind set or the state of mind of the company. On this record, we find that those allusions to reasonable accommodation were erroneous. Reasonable accommodation is only an issue in a handicap discrimination case in two instances. The first is the case in which a plaintiff affirmatively pleads failure to reasonably accommodate as a separate cause of action. See, e.g., Seiden v. Marina Associates, 315 N.J. Super. 451, 462 (Law Div. 1998) (quoting Wooten v. Acme Steel Co., 986 F. Supp. 524, 526-27 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting there are two distinct categories of disability discrimination claims: (1) a claim alleging discrimination ... including a failure to reasonably accommodate an employee s known disability and (2) a claim for disparate treatment discrimination, i.e., treating a disabled employee differently ... because of his disability ) (citations omitted)). The second is the case in which an employer, rather than defending on the grounds that the employee was terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, proffers the employee s inability to perform the job as a defense. See, e.g., Svarnas v. AT&T Communications, 326 N.J. Super. 59, 74-75 (App. Div. 1999) ( An exception to accommodation exists where an employer reasonably determines that an employee because of a handicap cannot presently perform the job even with an accommodation. ) Neither case was presented here. This was a pretext case, not a reasonable accommodation case and the law clearly distinguishes between those theories. Viscik neither pled reasonable accommodation nor requested any such accommodation from Fowler, as the law requires. Moreover, Fowler never argued that a reasonable accommodation was impossible. Rather, Fowler chose to stand or fall on the assertion that Viscik s work ethic was poor. If that contention was true, Fowler had no duty to reasonably accommodate her. If it was not true, and the jury determined that Viscik was terminated because of her handicap, Fowler would be liable, having abandoned the defense that Viscik could not be accommodated. In our view, the reasonable accommodation charge, objected to below (Rule 2:10-2), was prejudicial to Fowler. The charge essentially focused the jury s attention on a claim not at issue in the case and mixed two theories, pretext and reasonable accommodation, that are completely and purposefully distinct from one another. More importantly, it held Fowler to a standard on which no proofs had been offered. Under those circumstances, a new trial is warranted. B. Both parties and the Appellate Division agree that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to assess Fowler s reasons for terminating Viscik under an objective employer standard. Fowler s sticking point is a narrow one: that that error, which was not objected to, was capable of producing an unjust result. In light of our ruling regarding a new trial, it is unnecessary for us to address the issue. We choose, however, to comment on it because it will likely re-emerge at the new trial. The McDonnell Douglas framework utilizes both subjective and objective employer standards at different stages of its analysis. Critically, those standards are distinct and not interchangeable. Each has a specific place in the framework. Thus, in addressing the second prong of McDonnell Douglas, as modified by Clowes, the standard is an objective one: was the employee meeting the employer s legitimate or reasonable expectations. See, e.g., Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 600. However, in answering the overarching question of whether the employer s proffered non-discriminatory reason for discharge was pretextual, the fact-finder is required to consider the employee s performance or other qualities in light of the employer s subjective standards, including work ethic. Ibid. In that respect, the employer s subjective decision-making may be sustained even if unfair. See Gorham v. AT&T Co., 762 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding plaintiff s contention that she was not treated fairly because she was never informed of her unsatisfactory performance was irrelevant). The focus on subjectivity at the most critical stage of proof is consistent with LAD. N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1; Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 561 (1990) (holding that an "employee can be fired for a false cause or no cause at all. That firing may be unfair, but it is not illegal"); Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 496 (1982) ( There should be no second-guessing the employer ). Here, the trial court charged the jury twice with respect to the standard by which it should analyze Fowler s decision to fire Viscik. The first charge that imported an objective standard was proper within the context of the second prong of the prima facie case: In addition to showing by a preponderance of the evidence that she is handicapped, the plaintiff is required to establish to your satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence that she was performing the job at a level that met a reasonable expectation of the employer. Clearly, there is a significant difference between reviewing an employment action from the perspective of a theoretical, reasonable employer and that of a subjective, individual employer. Actions that could not pass muster under the former might well be sustained under the latter. In short, instructing the jury regarding the proper standard was critical to the outcome. On remand, the charge should be framed properly. v. FOWLER EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., and HELENE LANIE FOWLER, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED March 28, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY