Title: Mann v. Northgate Investors, LLC

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mann v. Northgate Investors, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-455.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-455 
MANN, APPELLEE, v. NORTHGATE INVESTORS, L.L.C., D.B.A. NORTHGATE 
APARTMENTS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Mann v. Northgate Investors, L.L.C.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-455.] 
Landlord and tenant—A landlord owes guests of a tenant the same duties under 
R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) that the landlord owes to the tenant—Lighting in 
common areas. 
(No. 2012-1600—Submitted April 24, 2013—Decided February 12, 2014.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 11AP-684, 2012-Ohio-2871. 
____________________________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether a landlord owes the statutory duty 
under R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) to “[k]eep all common areas of the premises in a safe 
and sanitary condition” to a tenant’s guest properly on the premises.  We hold 
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today that a landlord does owe to a tenant’s guest the statutory duties under R.C. 
5321.04(A)(3) and that a breach of that duty constitutes negligence per se. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} On June 15, 2007, plaintiff-appellee, Lauren Mann, then 16 years 
old, visited a friend, Michelina Markiewicz, who was a tenant at an apartment 
building owned by defendant-appellant, Northgate Investors, L.L.C.  Mann had 
entered the building at around noon that day, and left her friend’s second-floor 
apartment in the evening at around 11:00 P.M.  Mann had to walk down two sets 
of stairs (with a landing between them) to exit the building.  She testified that the 
hallway and stairway were dark because it was night and there was no lighting—
the existing lighting fixtures were inoperable.  Despite the darkness, she decided 
to proceed down the stairs.  She successfully descended the two flights of stairs, 
but after stepping off the last step—and thinking there might be another step—she 
stumbled forward through a glass panel adjacent to the glass exit door, suffering 
injuries. 
{¶ 3} Mann filed suit against Northgate on October 5, 2010, alleging in 
her complaint that Northgate had “negligently failed to maintain adequate lighting 
for safe ingress and egress to said premises during nocturnal hours, thereby 
creating a danger to residents and guests.”  Northgate filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that it had breached a duty of care 
to Mann.  It asserted that it owed Mann the duty it would owe an invitee, a duty of 
ordinary care in maintaining its property.  Northgate further argued that darkness 
is an open and obvious danger and that there is no duty of a premises owner to 
warn an invitee of open and obvious dangers, since those dangers are so obvious 
that business owners may reasonably expect their invitees to discover the hazard 
and take appropriate actions to protect themselves against it. 
{¶ 4} Mann countered that Ohio’s Landlord-Tenant Act, in particular, 
R.C. 5321.04, imposes a duty on landlords to make all necessary repairs and to do 
January Term, 2014 
 
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whatever is necessary to keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, to 
keep common areas of the premises safe, and to maintain electrical systems and 
lighting fixtures. 
{¶ 5} The trial court granted summary judgment to Northgate, holding 
that R.C. 5321.04 “was intended to establish the duties between landlords and 
tenants” and that since Mann was not a tenant but a business invitee, Northgate 
“only owed [her] a duty of ordinary care.” (Emphasis sic.)  The court further held 
that the darkness on the stairs was open and obvious and that the duty of ordinary 
care “is negated when the hazard posed to the invitee is one that is open and 
obvious.”  Finally, the court held that in addition to her failure to demonstrate that 
Northgate owed her a duty, Mann also had failed to show evidence of causation. 
{¶ 6} Mann appealed, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court. 2012-Ohio-2871, 973 N.E.2d 772 (10th Dist.).  The appellate court 
held that tenants’ guests are entitled to the protections of R.C. 5321.04, that a 
landlord’s violation of R.C. 5321.04 constitutes negligence per se, and that the 
open-and-obvious doctrine does not apply when the landlord is negligent per se. 
Id. at ¶ 14, 19, and  21.  The court further held that Mann had offered evidence of 
causation sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Id. at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 7} The appellate court certified a conflict to this court recognizing 
that its opinion conflicted with that of the Ninth District Court of Appeals in 
Shumaker v. Park Lane Manor of Akron, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 25212, 2011-
Ohio-1052, regarding the applicability of R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) to a tenant’s guest.  
This court agreed that a conflict exists and ordered briefing on the following 
issue:  
 
Whether landlord owes the statutory duties of R.C. 
5321.04(A)(3) to a tenant’s guest properly on the premises but on 
the common area stairs at the time of injury? 
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133 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2012-Ohio-5149, 977 N.E.2d 692. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 8} In 1974, the General Assembly enacted the Ohio Landlord-Tenant 
Act, R.C. Chapter 5321.  “The Act codifies the law of this state regarding rental 
agreements for residential premises, and governs the rights and duties of both 
landlords and tenants.” Vardeman v. Llewellyn, 17 Ohio St.3d 24, 26, 476 N.E.2d 
1038 (1985). 
{¶ 9} R.C. 5321.04(A) sets forth the obligations of a landlord who is a 
party to a rental agreement.  Among other duties, a landlord must “[m]ake all 
repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the remises in a 
fit and habitable condition,” R.C. 5321.04(A)(2), and “[k]eep all common areas of 
the premises in a safe and sanitary condition,” R.C. 5321.04(A)(3). 
{¶ 10} The Landlord-Tenant Act “changed the previous common law 
relationship of landlords and tenants under residential rental agreements.” 
Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St.2d 20, 21-22, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).  
Shroades explained that “in light of the previous common law immunity of 
landlords, and in recognition of the changed rental conditions and the definite 
trend to provide tenants with greater rights,” the General Assembly enacted the 
law in “an attempt to balance the competing interests of landlords and tenants.” 
Id. at 24-25. 
{¶ 11} Shroades was the first case to recognize that a landlord could be 
liable in tort for injuries resulting from the landlord’s failure to meet the 
obligations imposed by R.C. 5321.04: 
 
In light of the public policy and drastic changes made by 
the statutory scheme of R.C. Chapter 5321, we hold that a landlord 
is liable for injuries, sustained on the demised residential premises, 
January Term, 2014 
 
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which are proximately caused by the landlord’s failure to fulfill the 
duties imposed by R.C. 5321.04. We conclude that the General 
Assembly intended both to provide tenants with greater rights and 
to negate the previous tort immunities for landlords. 
 
Id.at 25. 
{¶ 12} In Shroades, this court held that the landlord had failed to meet the 
statutory requirement of keeping the premises in a fit and habitable condition.  
Reasoning that “[a] violation of a statute which sets forth specific duties 
constitutes negligence per se,” the court held that the landlord’s failure to abide 
by R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) constituted negligence per se.  The court made clear that a 
finding of negligence per se does not necessarily result in liability: “proximate 
cause for the injuries sustained must be established.” Id. at 25.  Further, a plaintiff 
tenant would also have to show that “the landlord received notice of the defective 
condition of the rental premises, that the landlord knew of the defect, or that the 
tenant had made reasonable, but unsuccessful, attempts to notify the landlord.” Id. 
at 26. 
{¶ 13} In Shump v. First Continental-Robinwood Assocs., 71 Ohio St.3d 
414, 644 N.E.2d 291 (1994), syllabus, this court held that a landlord’s common-
law and statutory obligations extend to guests of a tenant: “A landlord owes the 
same duties to persons lawfully upon the leased premises as the landlord owes to 
the tenant.” 
{¶ 14} In Shump, Sandra Burnside, a guest of a tenant, died from smoke 
inhalation and/or carbon monoxide poisoning from a fire in her friend’s 
apartment.  The fire had started on the first floor of the apartment, and the 
evidence suggested that Burnside became aware of the fire only when the smoke 
detector on the second floor of the two-story apartment was activated.  Burnside’s 
estate filed a wrongful-death claim against the landlord, alleging that the landlord 
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had failed to install a smoke detector on the first floor of the apartment, contrary 
to a city ordinance.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the landlord, 
holding that Burnside was a licensee and that the landlord owed to Burnside only 
a duty to refrain from willful and wanton conduct, which the estate had failed to 
prove.  The appellate court affirmed that part of the trial court’s holding. 
{¶ 15} This court reversed, rejecting the appellate court’s holding that a 
landlord’s duty to a tenant’s guest should be governed by the common-law 
classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee.  The court held that those 
classifications “determine the legal duty that a tenant owes others who enter upon 
rental property that is in the exclusive control of the tenant” and “do not affect the 
legal duty that a landlord owes a tenant or others lawfully upon the leased 
premises.” (Emphasis sic.) Shump, 71 Ohio St.3d at 417, 644 N.E.2d 291. 
{¶ 16} Shump cited longstanding common law that courts should not 
distinguish between the duties that a landlord owes a tenant and the duties a 
landlord owes to other people lawfully upon the leased premises. 
 
“ ‘It is the well settled general rule that the duties and liabilities of 
a landlord to persons on the leased premises by the license of the 
tenant are the same as those owed to the tenant himself.  For this 
purpose they stand in his shoes. * * * The guest, servant, etc., of 
the tenant is usually held to be so identified with the tenant that 
this right of recovery for injury as against the landlord is the same 
as that of the tenant would be had he suffered the injury.’ ” 
[Caldwell v. Eger, 8 Ohio Law Abs. 47 (8th Dist.1929)], quoting 
16 Ruling Case Law (1917) 1067, Section 588. 
 
Id. at 419. 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 17} This court held that R.C. Chapter 5321 does not alter the “well-
settled common-law principle” of a landlord’s duty to a tenant’s guest, because 
statutes are presumed to embrace the common law extant at their enactment. 
 
“Statutes are to be read and construed in the light of and with 
reference to the rules and principles of the common law in force at 
the time of their enactment, and in giving construction to a statute 
the legislature will not be presumed or held, to have intended a 
repeal of the settled rules of the common law unless the language 
employed by it clearly expresses or imports such intention.” 
(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan (1909), 81 Ohio 
St. 79, 90 N.E. 146, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 18} Thus, the court concluded that as common-law protections 
extended to a tenant’s guests, the Landlord-Tenant Act’s protections would 
extend to guests. 
 
Thus, the obligations imposed upon a landlord under R.C. 5321.04 
would appear to extend to tenants and to other persons lawfully 
upon the leased premises. R.C. 5321.12 states: “In any action 
under Chapter 5321. of the Revised Code, any party may recover 
damages for the breach of contract or the breach of any duty that is 
imposed by law.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
(Emphasis sic.) Shump, 71 Ohio St.3d at 420, 644 N.E.2d 291. 
{¶ 19} Since a landlord owes a tenant’s guest the same duty that the 
landlord owes the tenant, it only follows that the duty a landlord owes a tenant 
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under R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) is also owed to the tenant’s guest.  But not every court 
addressing the issue has come to that conclusion.  The case below was certified to 
this court as being in conflict with Shumaker v. Park Lane Manor of Akron, 9th 
Dist. Summit No. 25212, 2011-Ohio-1052.  That court found that “ ‘a social 
guest, injured in an area not in the exclusive control of the tenant, is owed a duty 
of care by the landlord no higher than that owed to a licensee,’ ” citing Rios v. 
Shauck, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 97CA006753, 1998 WL 289692 at *1 (June 3, 
1998). Schumaker at ¶ 12.  Schumaker held that his court’s extension of a 
landlord’s responsibilities to a tenant’s guest did not apply because “Shump is 
limited to injuries occurring ‘upon the leased premises.’ ” Id. 
{¶ 20} Shump does state, as Schumaker points out, that “the obligations 
imposed upon a landlord under R.C. 5321.04 would appear to extend to tenants 
and to other persons lawfully upon the leased premises.”  (Emphasis sic.) Shump, 
71 Ohio St.3d at 420, 644 N.E.2d 291.  But “lawfully upon the leased premises” is 
not limiting language—the decedent in Shump happened to be in the tenant’s 
apartment, not in a common area, when she died.  Notably, Shump cited 
Stackhouse v. Close, 83 Ohio St. 339, 94 N.E. 746 (1911), a case involving 
injuries to a tenant’s guest suffered due to the malfunctioning of a common-area 
elevator, for the proposition that “a landlord may be held liable to a tenant’s guest 
for the breach of a statutory duty imposed upon the landlord.”  Shump, 71 Ohio 
St.3d at 420, 644 N.E.2d 291. The court concluded regarding Stackhouse, “We 
reiterate that holding today.” Id. 
{¶ 21} Further, Shump adopted the Restatement of Torts section stating 
that in common areas, the landlord owes the same duty to the tenant’s guest as it 
owes to the tenant.  In the syllabus of Shump, this court approved and adopted 2 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Sections 355 to 362 [1965].  Section 360 
addresses the liability of landlords in common areas: 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
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A possessor of land who leases a part thereof and retains in 
his own control any other part which the lessee is entitled to use as 
appurtenant to the part leased to him, is subject to liability to his 
lessee and others lawfully upon the land with the consent of the 
lessee or a sublessee for physical harm caused by a dangerous 
condition upon that part of the land retained in the lessor’s control, 
if the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have 
discovered the condition and the unreasonable risk involved 
therein and could have made the condition safe. 
 
{¶ 22} Finally, Shump recognized that R.C. Chapter 5321 does not 
limit to tenants the ability to bring a claim based upon a statutory 
violation: 
 
R.C. 5321.12 states: “In any action under Chapter 5321. of the 
Revised Code, any party may recover damages for the breach of 
contract or the breach of any duty that is imposed by law.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Shump, 71 Ohio St.3d at 420, 644 N.E.2d 291. 
{¶ 23} We thus conclude that Shump should in no way be interpreted so as 
to prevent a tenant’s guest from benefiting from the protections of R.C. 
5321.04(A) simply because he or she is in a common area of the leased premises.  
A landlord owes to a tenant’s guest the same duty that it owes a tenant in regard 
to R.C. 5321.04(A)(3): to keep the common area in a safe and sanitary condition. 
{¶ 24} The question remains as to what the legal significance is of a 
failure of a landlord to meet the obligations of R.C. 5321.04(A)(3).  If a violation 
of R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) constitutes negligence per se, a landlord may not rely upon 
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the open-and-obvious doctrine to escape liability.  In Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio 
St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195, this court held that a landlord’s 
failure to meet the statutory duty under R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) negates the open-and-
obvious doctrine. 
{¶ 25} After Shroades, this court revisited negligence per se in relation to 
R.C. 5321.04 in Sikora v. Wetzel, 88 Ohio St.3d 493, 727 N.E.2d 1277 (2000).  
The plaintiff, Aaron Sikora, was a guest of a tenant who leased a condominium 
owned by the defendant, Tom Wetzel; an outdoor deck attached to the 
condominium collapsed, injuring Sikora.  Sikora sued Wetzel, alleging that he 
was negligent per se for a violation of R.C. 5321.04(A)(1), which requires 
landlords to “[c]omply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing, 
health, and safety codes that materially affect health and safety.”  Wetzel, the 
second owner of the condominium, had no knowledge of the deck’s design defect, 
which the previous owner had known about.  Still, the court of appeals found that 
Wetzel was strictly liable for a violation of R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) and that the 
Shroades notice requirement was inapplicable. 
{¶ 26} This court set forth the three different ways that courts view 
statutory violations of public-safety laws in negligence cases: 
 
Courts view the evidentiary value of the violation of statutes 
imposed for public safety in three ways: as creating strict liability, 
as giving rise to negligence per se, or as simply evidence of 
negligence. See, generally, Browder, The Taming of a Duty—The 
Tort Liability of Landlords (1982), 81 Mich.L.Rev. 99. These are 
three separate principles with unique effects upon a plaintiff’s 
burden of proof and to which the concept of notice may or may not 
be relevant. 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
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Sikora at 495. 
{¶ 27} This court rejected the idea that R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) is a strict-
liability statute, that is, that a defendant would be liable per se for a statutory 
violation regardless of any defenses or excuses, including lack of notice. 
 
Considering the general reluctance among courts to impose strict 
liability in this context, the wording of the statute fails to convince 
us that the General Assembly intended to create strict liability upon 
a violation of this statutory requirement.  Absent language 
denoting that liability exists without possibility of excuses, we are 
unpersuaded that the intent behind this statute was to eliminate 
excuses and impose strict liability. 
 
Id. at 497-498. 
{¶ 28} The more common question—and one that arises in the case before 
us—is whether a statutory violation will be considered as evidence of negligence 
or whether it will support a finding of negligence per se.  The words of the statute 
tell the tale—whether a statutory violation gives rise to negligence per se 
“depends upon the degree of specificity with which the particular duty is stated in 
the statute.”  Id. at 496. 
{¶ 29} When the statute sets forth a general, abstract description of a duty, 
a violation thereof can be considered as evidence of negligence, but a violation 
does not of itself conclusively demonstrate the breach of a duty.  If a statute sets 
forth a positive and definite standard of care, a violation of the statute constitutes 
negligence per se, and that violation conclusively proves that the defendant has 
violated a duty to the plaintiff:  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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[W]here a statute sets forth “ ‘a positive and definite standard of 
care * * * whereby a jury may determine whether there has been a 
violation thereof by finding a single issue of fact,’ ” a violation of 
that statute constitutes negligence per se. Chambers v. St. Mary’s 
School (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 565, 697 N.E.2d 198, 201, 
quoting Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, supra, 161 Ohio St. [367] 374–
375, 53 O.O. [274] 278, 119 N.E.2d [440] 444. In situations where 
a statutory violation constitutes negligence per se, the plaintiff will 
be considered to have “conclusively established that the defendant 
breached the duty that he or she owed to the plaintiff.” Chambers, 
id. In such instances, the statute “serves as a legislative declaration 
of the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person applicable in 
negligence actions.” Thus the “reasonable person standard is 
supplanted by a standard of care established by the legislature.” 
57A American Jurisprudence 2d, supra, at 672, Negligence, 
Section 748 
 
Sikora, 88 Ohio St.3d at 496, 727 N.E.2d 1277. 
{¶ 30} This court determined in Sikora that the statutory requirement set 
forth in R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) was not so general and abstract as to merely 
constitute evidence of negligence. 
 
Rather, we believe the statutory requirement is stated with 
sufficient specificity to impose negligence per se. It is “fixed and 
absolute, the same under all circumstances and is imposed upon” 
all landlords. Ornella v. Robertson (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 144, 150, 
43 O.O.2d 246, 249, 237 N.E.2d 140, 143. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the statute requires landlords to conform to a 
January Term, 2014 
 
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particular standard of care, the violation of which constitutes 
negligence per se. 
 
Sikora, 88 Ohio St.3d at 498, 727 N.E.2d 1277. 
{¶ 31} Further, the court reaffirmed that “a landlord’s violation of the 
duties imposed by * * * R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) constitutes negligence per se.” Id. 
{¶ 32} We find nothing in the degree of specificity involved in the statutes 
to distinguish the requirement in R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) to “do whatever is 
reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable 
condition” from the requirement in R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) to  “[k]eep all common 
areas of the premises in a safe and sanitary condition.”  Like the statutory 
requirements under R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) and (2), R.C. 5321.04(A)(3)’s statutory 
requirement is “ ‘fixed and absolute, the same under all circumstances and is 
imposed upon’ all landlords.” Sikora at 498, quoting Ornella v. Robertson, 14 
Ohio St.2d 144, 150, 237 N.E.2d 140 (1968).  We thus conclude that like 
violations of R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) and (A)(2), a violation of R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) 
constitutes negligence per se. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 33} We reaffirm today that a landlord owes to a tenant’s guest the same 
duty that the landlord owes a tenant.  Thus, a landlord owes a tenant, and 
therefore the tenant’s guest, the duty to “[k]eep all common areas of the premises 
in a safe and sanitary condition,” pursuant to R.C. 5321.04(A)(3).  A violation of 
the duty imposed by R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) constitutes negligence per se and 
obviates the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine. 
{¶ 34} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals and remand the cause to the trial court. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________________________ 
Michael T. Irwin, for appellee. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Brian D. Sullivan, Martin T. Galvin, Kevin P. 
Foley, and Nicole M. Koppitch, for appellant. 
Giorgianni Law, L.L.C., and Paul Giorgianni, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, the Ohio Association for Justice. 
____________________________________