Title: State v. Deyo

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

387 S.W.2d 561 (1965)
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Grace DEYO, Appellant.
No. 50582.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.
March 8, 1965.
*562 Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen., James J. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Sam Appleby, Ozark, Edward R. Boyle, Clear Lake, Iowa, Clyde Rogers, Gainesville, for appellant.
FINCH, Judge.
Defendant Grace Deyo and one Bill Shindler were charged jointly with murder in the first degree by poison of Kenneth V. Deyo, husband of Grace Deyo. A severance was granted. Grace Deyo was tried and convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, that conviction was reversed and the case remanded. See State v. Deyo, Mo., 358 S.W.2d 816. The case was retried and defendant Grace Deyo again was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. A timely motion for new trial was filed and overruled, and this appeal was taken.
The evidence in the second trial was substantially the same as that in the first trial. The opinion on the first appeal detailed that evidence. It would serve no useful purpose to recite it again, and it will not be repeated herein except insofar as necessary in the consideration of specific issues.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove a conspiracy between appellant and Bill Shindler, and, additionally, that there was no evidence of any overt act by appellant, and that her motion for judgment of acquittal should have been sustained for those reasons. These issues were raised by appellant on the prior appeal, and this court held that the evidence was sufficient to show the existence of a conspiracy, and that evidence of an overt act by appellant under those circumstances was unnecessary. State v. Deyo, supra, 358 S.W.2d 816, 822 [9], [10], [11].
Appellant also complains that the trial court erred in admitting evidence, including statements of appellant, before the corpus delicti was proved. This same issue was raised on the prior appeal, and this court held that it is not essential that the independent proof of the corpus delicti come first in the order of proof. 358 S.W.2d 816, 819 [5]. In addition, appellant raises the proposition that there was no sufficient proof of the corpus delicti, but that question was ruled against appellant on the prior appeal. 358 S.W.2d 816, 821 [7].
Appellant also complains of the admission of proof of certain remarks of Bill Shindler on the basis that these were not made in the presence of appellant and were hearsay. This point was ruled against appellant on the prior appeal. 358 S.W.2d 816, 824 [12]. In view of the fact that there was evidence of a conspiracy, the statements of one of the conspirators were admissible against the other conspirator.
Appellant complains of the giving of Instruction No. 3 defining conspiracy, which was as follows:
No authority is cited by appellant in support of her position. A substantially similar instruction was approved by this court in State v. Hill, 273 Mo. 329, 201 S.W. 58 [4]. See also 2 Raymond's Missouri Instructions, Section 3092. This point is ruled against appellant.
The State relied heavily on statements, both oral and written, of the defendant Grace Deyo. Her written statement was received in evidence as State's Exhibit "A". Omitting caption and signatures, it read as follows:
"This statement is made in the presence of Sheriff George Rose of Ozark County Missouri, and to Trooper John Teichman of the Missouri Highway Patrol. It is made to these persons, without any threat or promise, and I *563 understand that it may be used either for or against me in a Court of Law.
The defense contended that this statement of Grace Deyo was not a voluntary one. In addition, the defense introduced testimony of Herman Melton, a teacher in special education, and Professor James Edward Bane, a psychology teacher at Southwest Missouri State College. Mr. Melton testified that he gave Grace Deyo the Kuhlman-Anderson test and the results disclosed an I.Q. of 74 and a mental age of 12. Professor Bane administered the revised Stanford-Binet test and Grace Deyo performed on the level of a normal 10-10½-year-old person, and had an I.Q. of 65. Professor Bane examined State's Exhibit "A" and then testified that, based on his experience and his test of Grace Deyo, he was of the opinion that she could not have made that statement. He was cross-examined extensively, but insisted that he would not expect her to do as well as that statement, or to be familiar with some of the words used in the statement.
The court gave three instructions which dealt with statements of the defendant. These were Instructions Nos. 11, 12 and 13, which were as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury that criminal responsibility does not depend on the mental age of the accused or upon the question of whether her mental age is above or below that of an average or normal person. Mere weakness of mind, ignorance, or deficiency in mental capacity does not excuse the perpetration of a criminal act, *565 unless the mentality of such person is of such subnormal character as to render her incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.
Appellant does not complain of Instructions Nos. 11 or 12. Neither does she complain of the first paragraph of Instruction No. 13. In fact, appellant's brief states that this paragraph represents a correct expression of the law. Appellant does contend, however, that the second paragraph is improper because it constitutes a comment on the evidence, and it improperly restricted the jury in considering evidence concerning the mental age, I.Q., or degree of mentality of defendant to the question of whether the statements were made voluntarily.
There was no plea in this case that defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. Neither Mr. Melton nor Professor Bane purported to testify in that regard. However, Professor Bane did testify that in his opinion defendant Grace Deyo could not have made the statement received in evidence as State's Exhibit "A". The State's evidence with respect to Exhibit "A" had been that it was typed by Sheriff Allen and then read and signed by the defendant. Trooper Teichman testified that the words used were the words of Grace Deyo but that the grammar or sentence structure was by Sheriff Allen. Sheriff Rose had testified that Sheriff Allen took down the statement as given by the defendant. This and other testimony of these witnesses raised a question of fact as to the reliability of State's Exhibit "A" and the extent to which it constituted the statement of Grace Deyo. This was not the same as the question of whether the statement was voluntary, which was also in issue. The latter is a question of whether the statement was induced by something such as intimidation or promises, and it also includes the question of whether the mental condition was such as to make the statement one which was not voluntary. However, the evidence as to her mental capacity also was relevant on the probative value, if any, of Exhibit "A" and the extent to which it should be considered by the jury as a confession by defendant. The weight to be given to Exhibit "A" on this latter question was for the jury under proper instructions.
In the case of State v. Church, 199 Mo. 605, 98 S.W. 16, this court dealt with the admissibility of an alleged confession of the defendant. Evidence of alleged insanity was offered prior to the admission in evidence of the confession for the purpose of establishing its inadmissibility. The court held that the exclusion of the testimony at that point was proper, and that the confession properly was received in evidence. In so holding, the court quoted with approval from State v. Haworth, 24 Utah 398, 68 P. 155 (which in turn quoted from State v. Feltes, 51 Iowa 495, 1 N.W. 755), as follows (98 S.W. 16, 22): "Evidence that the defendant at the time of the alleged confession was intoxicated or insane was proper to impair or destroy the effect of the confession. The defendant was allowed to introduce such evidence upon cross-examination. But he complains that he should have been allowed to introduce it first, for the reasons above set out. In our opinion the court did not err. It was for the jury to determine what weight should be given to his confession, in view of his mental condition as shown."
In 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 828, p. 228, the rule is stated as follows: "If mental incapacity *566 of accused at the time of making the confession is shown, the confession must be received with caution, and evidence of such mental calibre or condition is competent and material, if not too remote or indefinite, as the fact thereof is to be considered in determining the character of the confession, and in determining whether it was voluntary or involuntary, and also in determining the weight, credibility, and effect to be given the confession."
See also State v. Evans, 345 Mo. 398, 133 S.W.2d 389, 393 [9]; McAffee v. United States, 72 App.D.C. 60, 111 F.2d 199, 204 [3]; State v. Falbo, Mo., 333 S.W.2d 279, 286 [7], and 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 836, p. 253.
Instruction No. 13 told the jury to consider the testimony as to the mental age, I.Q., or degree of mentality of the defendant only on the question of whether her statement was voluntary or involuntary. It told the jury, in effect, that they could not consider the testimony of Mr. Melton and Professor Bane to impair or destroy the effect of the confession even though the jury should believe that part or all of Exhibit "A" did not represent what Grace Deyo said or was capable of saying. In so doing, Instruction No. 13 took away from the jury its right to determine the weight, credibility and effect to be accorded to this testimony on this question of fact. This was error, for which this case must be reversed and remanded.
Appellant complains that the court improperly permitted cross-examination of Professor Bane concerning details of the psychological test administered to the defendant. It is proper, however, to permit the validity and weight of the opinion of an expert witness to be tested on cross-examination. State v. Grapper, Mo., 328 S.W.2d 633, 635 [4]. This was not error.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
All of the Judges concur.