Title: Britt Construction v. Magazzine Clean, LLC

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
BRITT CONSTRUCTION, INC.  
 
v.  Record No. 051004   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
January 13, 2006 
MAGAZZINE CLEAN, LLC, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
Thomas D. Horne, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 43-4 requires 
that a general contractor, as a condition of perfecting a 
mechanic’s lien, contemporaneously file with the memorandum of 
lien a “certification” that a copy of the memorandum has been 
mailed to the property owner. 
In February 2003, Magazzine Clean, L.L.C. (Magazzine Clean) 
hired Britt Construction, Inc. (Britt) as the general contractor 
for construction of a commercial car wash facility on Magazzine 
Clean’s property in Loudoun County.  As a result of disputes 
between the parties during the construction process, Britt 
recorded 12 separate memoranda of mechanic’s liens against 
Magazzine Clean’s property.1 
Britt recorded the memoranda of liens in Loudoun County 
between June 18, 2004 and October 14, 2004.  However, Britt did 
not mail copies of these memoranda of liens to Magazzine Clean, 
nor did Britt file certifications of such mailings at the time 
                                                 
1 Britt did not perform any further work on the project 
after August 31, 2004. 
 
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of filing its memoranda.  Instead, Britt waited until December 
17, 2004 to record certifications of mailing for each of the 12 
memoranda previously filed. 
Magazzine Clean initiated this suit by filing a petition to 
invalidate the mechanic’s liens pursuant to Code § 43-17.1.2  
Magazzine Clean argued that none of the mechanic’s liens met the 
perfection requirements contained in Code § 43-4 because Britt 
did not mail copies of the memoranda of mechanic’s liens to 
Magazzine Clean, nor did Britt file certifications of mailing 
along with the memoranda.  As amended by the General Assembly in 
2003, Code § 43-4 states in relevant part that: 
A general contractor . . . in order to perfect the 
lien given by § 43-3 . . . shall file a memorandum of 
lien at any time after the work is commenced or 
material furnished, but not later than 90 days from 
the last day of the month in which he last performs 
labor or furnishes material, and in no event later 
than 90 days from the time such building . . . is 
completed, or the work thereon otherwise 
terminated. . . .  A lien claimant who is a general 
contractor also shall file along with the memorandum 
of lien, a certification of mailing of a copy of the 
                                                 
2 Code § 43-17.1 provides that: “Any party, having an 
interest in real property against which a lien has been filed, 
may, upon a showing of good cause, petition the court of equity 
having jurisdiction wherein the building . . . is located to 
hold a hearing to determine the validity of any perfected lien 
on the property.  After reasonable notice to the lien claimant 
and any party to whom the benefit of the lien would inure and 
who has given notice as provided in § 43-18 of the Code of 
Virginia, the court shall hold a hearing and determine the 
validity of the lien.  If the court finds that the lien is 
invalid, it shall forthwith order that the memorandum or notice 
of lien be removed from record.” 
 
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memorandum of lien on the owner of the property at the 
owner's last known address. . . .3 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
After considering the parties’ briefs and arguments, the 
circuit court granted Magazzine Clean’s amended petition and 
invalidated the liens.  The circuit court held that the 
mechanic’s liens were invalid because Britt did not file 
certifications of mailing along with the memoranda of liens.  
Britt appealed from the circuit court’s decree. 
Britt argues that the provision in Code § 43-4 directing a 
general contractor to file a certification of mailing is not a 
requirement for perfection of the general contractor’s 
mechanic’s lien.  Britt asserts that the statute’s only 
requirement for perfection of such a lien is the timely filing 
of the memorandum of lien, and that the certification of mailing 
need only be filed in order for a property owner to be deemed to 
have notice of the lien.  Thus, Britt maintains that the 
statutory directive for filing a certification of mailing is 
merely a notice provision that should be construed liberally. 
In support of its argument, Britt notes that two other 
statutes, which address liens of subcontractors and persons 
performing labor or furnishing materials for a subcontractor, 
expressly require as a condition of perfecting a lien that 
                                                 
3 The General Assembly amended Code § 43-4 to include the 
certification of mailing requirement effective July 1, 2003. 
 
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written notice of the lien be given to the owner.4  See Code 
§§ 43-7 and -9.  Britt contends that because Code § 43-4 does 
not contain similar express language, the General Assembly did 
not intend to impose such a requirement in this statute.  We 
disagree with Britt’s arguments. 
We consider the language of Code § 43-4 under basic rules 
of statutory construction.  We examine the statute in its 
entirety and determine the General Assembly’s intent from the 
plain and natural meaning of the words used in the statute.  
West Lewinsville Heights Citizens Ass’n v. Board of Supervisors, 
270 Va. 259, 265, 618 S.E.2d 311, 314 (2005); Capelle v. Orange 
County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005); Vaughn, Inc. 
v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677, 554 S.E.2d 88, 90 (2001). 
When statutory language is unambiguous, we are bound by the 
plain meaning of that language.  Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 
Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2003); Woods v. Mendez, 265 
Va. 68, 74-75, 574 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2003); Earley v. Landsidle, 
257 Va. 365, 370, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999).  Therefore, when 
the General Assembly has used words of a definite import, we 
cannot give those words a construction that amounts to holding 
that the General Assembly meant something other than that which 
                                                 
4 Code §§ 43-7 and -9 provide, in relevant part, that “in 
order to perfect the lien . . . [the contractor] shall comply 
with [the provisions of] § 43-4, and in addition [thereto] give 
notice in writing to the owner of the property . . . .” 
 
 
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it actually expressed.  Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 439, 621 S.E.2d 78, 87 (2005); 
Williams, 265 Va. at 271, 576 S.E.2d at 470; Vaughn, 262 Va. at 
677, 554 S.E. at 90. 
We further observe that when a statute has been amended, 
there is a presumption that the General Assembly intended to 
effect a substantive change in the law.  West Lewinsville 
Heights Citizens Ass’n, 270 Va. at 265, 618 S.E.2d at 314; 
Virginia-American Water Co. v. Prince William County Serv. 
Auth., 246 Va. 509, 517, 436 S.E.2d 618, 622-23 (1993).  Thus, 
we will assume that a statutory amendment is purposeful, rather 
than unnecessary.  West Lewinsville Heights Citizens Ass’n, 270 
Va. at 265, 618 S.E.2d at 314; AAA Disposal Servs. v. Eckert, 
267 Va. 442, 446, 593 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2004); Virginia-American 
Water Co., 246 Va. at 517, 436 S.E.2d at 623. 
Because the mechanic’s lien statutes are in derogation of 
the common law, the statutory requirements regarding the 
existence and the perfection of a mechanic’s lien must be 
strictly construed.  Carolina Builders Corp. v. Cenit Equity 
Co., 257 Va. 405, 410, 512 S.E.2d 550, 552 (1999); American 
Standard Homes Corp. v. Reinecke, 245 Va. 113, 119, 425 S.E.2d 
515, 518 (1993); Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 576, 379 S.E.2d 
323, 325 (1989).  A mechanic’s lien must be perfected within the 
specific time frame and in the manner set forth in the statutes, 
 
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or the lien will be lost.  Carolina Builders Corp., 257 Va. at 
411, 512 S.E.2d at 552; American Standard Homes Corp., 245 Va. 
at 119, 425 S.E.2d at 518; Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 40, 
12 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1941). 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the 
certification of mailing requirement of Code § 43-4 is plain and 
unambiguous.  The statute expressly requires that a general 
contractor “file along with” the memorandum of lien a 
certification that the general contractor has mailed a copy of 
the memorandum of lien to the owner at the owner’s last known 
address. 
By using the word “file,” the General Assembly made its 
intention clear that the certification of mailing is not merely 
a notice provision.  Moreover, in requiring that the 
certification be filed “along with” the memorandum of lien, the 
statutory language directs that the memorandum of lien cannot be 
filed alone without the certification of mailing, and that both 
documents must be filed in order to perfect the lien.5 
                                                 
5 The absence of any reference to a certification of mailing 
in the “safe harbor” form of Code § 43-5 does not affect our 
analysis of Code § 43-4.  That form addresses only the 
sufficiency of a memorandum of lien and affidavit filed under 
Code § 43-4.  Also, the “safe harbor” forms of Code §§ 43-8 and 
–10 are not relevant to the issue before us because they pertain 
to subcontractors and to persons furnishing labor or materials 
to a subcontractor and, thus, do not affect the unambiguous 
requirements imposed on a general contractor by Code § 43-4. 
 
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Britt’s contrary argument is unavailing because it would 
permit a general contractor to mail a copy of its memorandum of 
lien and to file its certification of mailing at a time of the 
general contractor’s own choosing.  This result would render the 
plain language of the statutory amendment meaningless and would 
undermine the clear intent of the amendment to prevent a general 
contractor from filing undisclosed liens against an owner’s 
property. 
Because the certification provision of Code § 43-4 imposes 
an additional requirement for perfecting a mechanic’s lien, we 
are not permitted to construe the requirement liberally.  
Instead, we impose a strict construction standard in accordance 
with our established precedent.  See Carolina Builders Corp., 
257 Va. at 410, 512 S.E.2d at 552; American Standard Homes 
Corp., 245 Va. at 119, 425 S.E.2d at 518.  Here, Britt did not 
file the required certifications of mailing along with its 
memoranda of liens but waited more than two months after filing 
the final memorandum of lien to record the certifications.  
Thus, Britt’s actions clearly demonstrate its failure to comply 
with the certification requirement of Code § 43-4. 
Our conclusion regarding the plain meaning of Code § 43-4 
is not altered by Britt’s observation that this statute, unlike 
Code §§ 43-7 and -9, does not expressly state that written 
notice to the owner is a condition of perfecting a mechanic’s 
 
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lien.  When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we will 
not look to other provisions of the Code to interpret that 
statute.  Carolina Builders Corp., 257 Va. at 409, 512 S.E.2d at 
552.  Thus, the fact that the General Assembly chose to use 
different language in stating a perfection requirement in those 
other statutes cannot alter the plain language of Code § 43-4, 
which requires that a general contractor “file” its 
certification of mailing “along with” its memorandum of lien. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed.