Title: McLEAN v. HYLAND ENTERPRISES, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McLEAN v. HYLAND ENTERPRISES, INC.2001 WY 11134 P.3d 1262Case Number: 00-184,00-185,00-186Decided: 11/14/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                        LINDA 
McLEAN,                                        

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

HYLAND 
ENTERPRISES, INC.,

 Appellee(Defendant).

 

HYLAND 
ENTERPRISES, INC.                                          

 Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

LINDA 
McLEAN,

 Appellee(Plaintiff).

 ROBERT M. 
McLEAN,     

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

                                                                                                

HYLAND ENTERPRISES, INC.,

 Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County

The Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge 

  

Representing Linda McLean and Robert M. 
McLean:

            
Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 Representing Hyland Enterprises, Inc.::

            
Judith Studer of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN and HILL, JJ., and SPANGLER, 
D.J., (Ret.)

  

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1]           
These three consolidated appeals arise from related 
facts.  Rob and 
Linda McLean, husband and wife, worked for Hyland Enterprises.  In appeals No. 
00-184 and No. 00-186, the McLeans allege they both were wrongfully terminated 
from Hyland Enterprises in retaliation for Rob McLean's refusing to perform what 
he believed to be an unsafe order.  They also allege they were terminated in 
violation of terms contained in the company's employee policy manual.  Hyland Enterprises 
denies the claim of wrongful termination, alleges that the appropriate relief 
for such a claim is not a tort action but rather an administrative action 
pursuant to the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-11-101 through § 27-11-114 and corresponding rules, and denies having any 
employee policy manual.

 

[¶2]           
Summary judgment was granted to Hyland Enterprises on all 
but one count of the complaints filed in the district court.  The one remaining 
count was the breach of implied contract action by Linda McLean wherein she 
claimed her at-will employment status was modified by an employee handbook and 
she was terminated in violation of terms contained in the employee 
handbook.  In 
appeal No. 00-185, Hyland Enterprises appeals the denial of summary judgment on 
this one remaining count.  The district court's denial of summary 
judgment is not subject to appeal, and therefore appeal No. 00-185 is hereby 
dismissed, and that matter is remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings.  
As to appeals No. 00-184 and No. 00-186, we affirm the district court's 
granting of summary judgment.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

 

[¶3]           
Appellant Linda McLean states the issues as:

 

Was summary judgment proper in plaintiff's claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when there is evidence that 
plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for her and her husband's complaints 
about safety and termination for refusal to work?

 

Appellee Hyland Enterprises' issues are:

 

Did the district court judge properly grant summary 
judgment on the violation of public policy claim?

 

A.  Can a spouse base a claim on her husband's 
complaint about alleged safety violations?

 

B.  Can a claim be sustained when there is no 
public policy violation?

 

C.  Are there other remedies available that 
preclude this claim?

 

 

Appeal No. 00-185

 

[¶4]           
Appellant Hyland Enterprises' states the issues as:

 

Did a draft employment manual create an implied contract of 
employment under the facts of this case?  Stated in more precise terms:

 

I.  Can a reasonable employee expect that a 
personnel manual that she has not read or received constitute[s] an offer by her 
employer?

 

II.  Does there exist consideration to support an 
implied contract when there is no widespread distribution of the manual and the 
employee has not provided any additional benefit or suffered any detriment?

 

Appellee Linda McLean's issues are:

 

A.  Where an employer has represented a policy 
manual containing job security rules as being "our company policies," is there 
sufficient evidence of intent to enter an employment contract to preclude 
summary judgment in a wrongful termination case?

 

B.  Where an employer has rules regarding job 
security, must an employee supply additional consideration over her continued 
employment?

 

 

[¶5]           
Appellant Rob McLean's issues are:

 

A.  Was summary judgment proper when evidence 
showed that the plaintiff's presumptive status as an "at-will" employee was 
modified by the company's adopted policy providing for for-cause termination and 
that no action would be taken against an employee who refused to perform an 
unsafe directive?

 

B.  Was summary judgment proper when there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that a well established public policy 
against unsafe working conditions, for which there was no other adequate remedy, 
was undermined by a discharge motivated by disregard of such policy?

 

C.  Was there sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
a prima facie case? 

 

Appellee Hyland Enterprises' states the issues as:

 

1.  Did the district court judge properly grant 
summary judgment on the basis that there was no implied contract of 
employment?  
Specifically, is an undistributed manual not seen by the appellant during 
his employment an implied contract of employment?

 

2.  Did the district court judge properly grant 
summary judgment on the violation of public policy claim?  Specifically when 
there exists no violation can such a claim be sustained?  Does there exist 
other remedies that preclude the claim?

 

 

 

[¶6]           
Although many material facts in this case are disputed, 
pursuant to the well-established standards applying to a review of summary 
judgment, we summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
parties.  Doug 
Dowlin is the president and majority stockholder in Hyland Enterprises, Inc. 
(Hyland).  
Hyland engages in many different business enterprises including working 
on commercial water wells.  Linda and Rob McLean are husband and 
wife.  Linda 
was hired to work in the business office of Hyland in 1990.  At that time, 
Hyland did not have a company policy manual in effect.  Rob McLean was 
hired by Hyland in 1994.   Mr. McLean did not fill out an 
employment application form.   No employee policies were discussed 
with Mr. McLean when he was hired.  

 

[¶7]           
Sometime in 1994, Hyland contracted with a consulting firm 
to draft various company operating policies and procedures.  Hyland paid the 
consulting firm approximately $40,000 for the policy and procedure 
proposals.  
When received by Hyland, the various proposed operating policies and 
procedures were stored together in one book in Mr. Dowlin's office.  They covered a wide 
range of topics including not only employee policies but also accounting and 
invoicing procedures and safety policies among other topics.  The proposed 
employee policies contained in the book were not widely distributed to 
employees.  Rob 
McLean never saw the employee policies while working for Hyland.  

 

[¶8]           
Linda McLean, because of her office position, knew of the 
draft policy book.   Mrs. McLean alleges that Mr. Dowlin 
told her that the various draft policies in the book were the company's 
policies.  When 
the draft policies were received, Mr. Dowlin told her that the book would be 
kept in his office and that she could read the policies.  Mrs. McLean 
referred to specific sections in the book as necessary to help her complete her 
office duties relating to invoicing and personnel issues.  She used 
information from the policy book concerning such issues as vacation policies and 
confidentiality policies as well as many others.  

 

[¶9]           
Rob McLean was hired primarily as a welder but was asked to 
perform other tasks on occasion.  On August 27, 1996, Mr. Dowlin met with Mr. 
McLean and asked him to pull a well.  Mr. Dowlin told Mr. McLean to take a 
particular mast truck for the job.  This truck had been modified in-house by 
Hyland. Mr. McLean had several concerns regarding the adequacy of the modified 
mast truck to pull the well safely and expressed these concerns to Mr. 
Dowlin.  Mr. 
Dowlin disagreed with Mr. McLean, believing that the truck was adequately 
designed and modified to do the job.  Mr. McLean, however, continued to express 
concerns and refused to accept the assignment using that particular truck.  Mr. Dowlin fired 
Mr. McLean for his refusal to use the modified mast truck. 

 

[¶10]       Mr. McLean contacted the Division of Workers' Safety and 
Compensation of the Wyoming Department of Employment (the Division) and filed a 
complaint alleging he had been fired for refusing an unsafe work 
assignment.  On 
September 5, 1996, Mr. Dowlin told Linda McLean that Rob McLean had better get 
on with his life and stop causing trouble and that she was replaceable.  On September 20, 
1996, Mr. Dowlin fired Linda McLean.  Mr. Dowlin refused to give a reason for the 
termination, saying only that Mrs. McLean was an at-will employee and he did not 
have to give a reason for terminating her.  Mrs. McLean complained to the Division that 
she had been fired in retaliation for her husband's report to the Division. 

 

[¶11]       The Division investigated the McLeans' complaint that the 
mast truck was unsafe, that Rob McLean had been fired in retaliation for 
refusing to run the truck, and that Linda McLean had been fired in retaliation 
for her husband's reporting the situation to the Division.  The Division 
inspected the mast truck on September 6, 1996, and interviewed several Hyland 
employees. The Division issued its final report on November 7, 1996. The 
Division determined that the mast truck at issue was safe for the proposed 
job.  The 
Division also determined that there was not enough credible evidence to support 
a prima facie case of retaliatory termination by the McLeans against 
Hyland.  No 
notice of violation was issued. 

 

[¶12]       Having failed to receive satisfactory relief from the 
administrative investigation, the McLeans proceeded to file the instant 
lawsuits.  
Linda McLean sued Hyland alleging wrongful termination, breach of 
contract, breach of covenant of good faith under both contract and tort 
theories, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Summary judgment in 
favor of Hyland was granted on all counts except the count for breach of 
contract.  In 
appeal No. 00-184, Mrs. McLean appeals only from the granting of summary 
judgment on the count for wrongful termination.  In appeal No. 00-185, Hyland appeals from the 
denial of its motion for summary judgment on the count for breach of 
contract.

[¶13]       Rob McLean filed suit against Hyland alleging wrongful 
termination and breach of contract.  Summary judgment in favor of Hyland was 
granted on both counts.  In appeal No. 00-186, Rob McLean appeals the 
granting of summary judgment on both counts.  

 

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶14]       The standard of review applied by this Court in reviewing 
the granting of summary judgment is well-settled.

 

When a motion for summary judgment is before the supreme 
court, we have exactly the same duty as the district judge; and, if there is a 
complete record before us, we have exactly the same material as did he.  We must follow the 
same standards.  
The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the 
correctness of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  This 
court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing 
in the record.  
We separate the formal and pretended from the genuine and substantial so 
only the latter may be considered in eliminating the burden of a formal trial if 
only questions of law are left to decide; there must be no issue of material 
fact to decide.  
Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984, 986-987 (1980).  A material fact, expressed in various ways, 
is one having legal significance which would in a given case control the legal 
relations of the parties; one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends 
in whole or in part; one on which the controversy may be determined; one which 
will affect the result or outcome of the case depending upon its resolution; or 
one which constitutes a part of the plaintiff's cause of action or the 
defendant's defense.  
Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 
(1975).  
Summary judgment affords an opportunity for prompt disposition of a 
lawsuit in its early stages, permitting an end to unfounded claims and avoiding 
the expense of a full-fledged trial to both litigants and the state's judicial 
machinery.  Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976).

 

Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. 
(Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 150-51 (Wyo. 1981).

  

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶15]       The district court denied Hyland's motion for summary 
judgment on Linda McLean's claim for breach of an implied employment 
contract.  In 
denying the motion for summary judgment, the district court specifically held 
that "there is a genuine issue of material fact, whether Hyland's conduct with 
respect to the employee manual manifested an intent to enter into an employment 
contract with" Linda McLean.  On the agreement of both parties, the 
district court certified the denial of the motion for summary judgment to this 
Court pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b).  

 

[¶16]       Although both parties agreed to the certification, and thus 
no objection has been made to this Court's jurisdiction, this Court must examine 
its jurisdiction to decide the issue of the denial of summary judgment presented 
in appeal No. 00-185.  
"Ordinarily this Court refrains from inquiring into questions not raised 
by the parties; however, because the right of appeal is statutory and 
jurisdictional, we have a duty to determine that the appeal has been properly 
taken so as to invoke our jurisdiction."  Basin Elec. Power 
Coop., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, State of Wyo., 970 P.2d 841, 847 (Wyo. 
1998).  If this 
Court does not have jurisdiction, it must dismiss the appeal.  

 

[¶17]       A denial of a motion for summary judgment is an 
interlocutory order and as a general rule is not subject to appeal.  In Re MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Wyo. 1998); State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 820 (Wyo. 1994); Equality Bank of Evansville, 
Wyo. v. Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 330 (Wyo. 1992) ("the right to appeal does not 
lie from a denial of a motion for summary judgment, as such is not a final 
order").  This 
Court has recognized two exceptions to this general rule.  First, a denial of 
summary judgment is appealable if it is coupled with the grant of a cross-motion 
for summary judgment.  
Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 
356 (Wyo. 2000) ("One exception we have adopted is that, when the district court 
grants one party's motion for a summary judgment and denies the opposing party's 
motion for a summary judgment and the district court's decision completely 
resolves the case, both the grant and the denial of the motions for a summary 
judgment are subject to appeal.").  The other exception is a denial of summary 
judgment regarding the issue of qualified immunity.  Lawson v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1996) 
("denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is 
an appealable final order").

 

[¶18]       The denial of Hyland's motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of breach of contract does not fit any recognized exception.  The district court 
denied the motion for summary judgment because it determined that there are 
triable issues of material fact to be resolved.  This denial is not a final, appealable 
order.  

 

[¶19]       In this case, the trial court directed the entry of a final 
judgment on the denial of summary judgment and certified the judgment to this 
Court pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b).  The district court is without authority, 
however, to certify a judgment under W.R.C.P. 54(b) unless the judgment disposes 
of at least one separate claim of a multi-claim action.  There must be a 
final decision, that is, "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim."  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436, 
76 S. Ct. 895, 900, 100 L. Ed. 1297 (1956).  A trial court's Rule 54(b) certification does 
not give this Court jurisdiction to decide an appeal from an order that in fact 
is not final.

 

[¶20]       As discussed above, the denial of summary judgment at issue 
is not a final order.  
The denial of summary judgment does not determine the merits of the 
controversy.  
It is simply a determination by the district court that a trial is 
necessary to resolve issues of material fact.  Because the denial of summary judgment in 
this case is not a final order, the district court was without authority to 
certify the judgment to this Court pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b).  This Court is 
without jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal, and appeal No. 00-185 
is hereby dismissed.  
Hansen v. Little Bear Inn Co., 9 P.3d 960, 
965 (Wyo. 2000); Wolter v. Equitable Resources Energy 
Co., Western Region, 979 P.2d 948, 953 (Wyo. 1999).  The matter is 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

 

 

 

[¶21]       Both Linda and Rob McLean are appealing the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Hyland on their respective claims of wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy.  For purposes of their wrongful termination 
claims, the McLeans accept that they were employees at will.  The at-will 
employment doctrine is firmly rooted in Wyoming and is based upon contract 
principles.  
The doctrine of at-will employment provides that employment is presumed 
to be at will unless an express or implied contract states otherwise.  Either party may 
terminate at-will employment at any time for any reason, or for no reason at 
all.  Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681, 685 
(Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶22]       As our previous jurisprudence has shown, this Court has 
steadfastly resisted judicially creating any exceptions to the doctrine of 
at-will employment in this state.  The at-will employment doctrine preserves 
stability in the business community because "employers' and employees' decisions 
remain subject only to the express or implied contracts into which they have 
voluntarily entered or subject to statute."  Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc., 947 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wyo. 1997).  

 

[¶23]       We have recognized a limited exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine to the extent that an employee may not be terminated for a 
reason that violates public policy.  This public policy exception is narrow in 
scope to avoid unreasonably eliminating employer discretion in terminating 
at-will employees.  

 

[¶24]       In order to prevail on a claim of wrongful termination 
against public policy, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements: 1) the 
termination violated a well-established public policy; and 2) no other remedy is 
available to protect the interests of the terminated employee or of 
society.  Boone, 987 P.2d  at 
688.  This 
Court strictly applies both elements of the claim of wrongful termination.  First, there must 
be a violation of a strong and well-established public policy.  Drake v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., 891 P.2d 80, 82 (Wyo. 1995) (no public policy violated 
when employee not allowed to exercise right to free speech in the workplace); Dynan v. Rocky Mountain 
Federal Sav. & Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 640 (Wyo. 1990) (internal loan 
approval rules not an issue of public policy).  Second, there also must not be any other 
remedy available.  
Hermreck v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1997) (collective 
bargaining agreement available to vindicate employees' rights and public 
policy); Allen v. 
Safeway Stores Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 285 (Wyo. 1985) (both Wyoming Fair 
Employment Practices Act and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982) provide remedies 
for termination based on sex discrimination).  Because of the narrow scope of the public 
policy exception, this Court to date has only recognized the application of this 
exception in response to the termination of an employee in retaliation for 
filing a worker's compensation claim.  Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 776 P.2d 752 
(Wyo. 1989).  

 

[¶25]       The McLeans now argue that this Court should recognize a 
claim for wrongful termination when a termination is in retaliation for an 
employee's reporting an unsafe working condition.  Hyland does not argue against the proposition 
that it is a well-established public policy in Wyoming that employees are 
entitled to a safe working environment.  We agree that providing a safe working 
environment to employees is a well-established public policy.  Abeyta v. Hensley, 
595 P.2d 71, 73 (Wyo. 1979) ("The nondelegable duty of a master or employer to 
provide an employee with safe working conditions . . . has been established in 
Wyoming for a long time."); see Engen v. Rambler Copper 
& Platinum Co., 20 Wyo. 95, 126, 121 P. 867, 874 (1912); McBride v. Union 
Pacific Ry. Co., 3 Wyo. 247, 252, 21 P. 687, 688 (1889).

 

[¶26]       The legislature officially recognized this public policy 
with the passage of the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act (WOHS Act), 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-11-101  114, which, among other things, requires every 
employer to "furnish to his employees, a place of employment and employment 
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or that are likely to 
cause death or serious physical harm."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-11-105(b)(vi)(A) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  
A critical element in maintaining a safe work environment is reporting by 
employees of unsafe conditions.  The Wyoming Legislature has recognized the 
importance of employee reporting of unsafe conditions and protects them by 
prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee or in any manner 
discriminating against an employee for reporting unsafe conditions.1  Thus, the well-established public policy that 
we now recognize is a policy requiring employers to provide a safe workplace, 
and included in that policy is the related goal of encouraging employees to 
report unsafe working conditions.

 

[¶27]       However, not every employment termination that has the 
effect of violating public policy is actionable.  Having satisfied the first prong of a claim 
for wrongful termination against public policy by finding that a 
well-established public policy has been violated, we now must look to the second 
prong.  The 
McLeans contend that this Court must recognize the tort of wrongful termination 
against public policy under these facts because there is no other remedy 
available to protect the interests of the terminated employee or of 
society.   

 

[¶28]       The McLeans argue that there is no available remedy 
provided under the WOHS Act.  The McLeans' position is that, while the 
Wyoming Legislature has acknowledged the public policy of protecting employees 
who report unsafe conditions, it has failed to provide any remedy to vindicate 
either public policy or an employee's interests.  The McLeans acknowledge that there ostensibly 
is a remedy available in Wyoming as established by administrative rule.  The McLeans argue 
that this administrative remedy as established by rule lacks appropriate 
statutory authority and is therefore void.  The argument continues that the failure of 
the legislature to provide a statutory remedy requires this Court to impose a 
judicial remedy.

 

[¶29]       It is true that the WOHS Act does not provide the specific 
remedy available under administrative rules.  The remedy provided by administrative rule to 
a wrongfully terminated employee includes compensation "for actual harms 
suffered as a result of the discrimination.  Such compensation includes, but is not 
limited to, reinstatement and back pay."  Occupational Health and Safety Comm'n and 
Dep't Rules of Practice and Procedure, Ch. IV, Sec. 7(b)(i)(C) (1998).  The WOHS Act 
contains no language specifically authorizing such a remedy.  Remedial action 
specifically authorized by the WOHS Act includes such actions as the imposition 
of criminal sanctions and civil monetary fines against an employer for violating 
any of the provisions of the act, § 27-11-107, and the seeking of an injunction 
to prevent an employer from violating any provision of the act, § 
27-11-110.  

 

[¶30]       An agency may not exceed its statutory authority in 
promulgating rules.  
"Administrative agencies have only those powers expressly conferred by 
statute.  This 
legal principle applies with equal force to an agency's authority to promulgate 
rules.  Rules 
promulgated in excess of an agency's statutory authority are null and 
void."  State ex rel. Dept. of 
Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 18 P.3d 1182, 1185-86 (Wyo. 2001) 
(citations omitted).  
Relying upon similar authority, the McLeans argue that the failure of the 
legislature to include a specific statutory remedy precludes the administering 
agency from promulgating rules that include the current remedy, thus making the 
rules void.

 

[¶31]       The McLeans' argument fails because it does not take into 
account the broad statutory grant of authority to the Wyoming Department of 
Employment (Department) and the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (Commission) under the WOHS Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-11-105 grants broad 
authority to both the Department and the Commission.  Section 
27-11-105(a)(ii) grants the Department, in consultation with the Commission, the 
power and the duty to "develop and formulate, a comprehensive program for the 
prevention, control and abatement of unsafe and unhealthy working 
conditions."  
Section 27-11-105(b)(i) grants the Commission the power and duty to 
"prescribe rules of practice and procedure."  Section 27-11-105(b)(ii) grants the 
Commission the power and duty to "promulgate, devise, formulate, adopt, amend, 
and repeal rules and regulations." 

 

[¶32]       The legislature granted both the Commission and the 
Department broad powers.  Indeed, the legislature charged these bodies 
with the duty to "develop and formulate, a comprehensive program" that will 
ensure workplace safety in Wyoming.  As already stated, a critical element in any 
effort to maintain a safe work environment is promoting the reporting of unsafe 
conditions by employees.  The legislature specifically passed 
legislation protecting employees who report unsafe working conditions.  Under the broad 
grant of authority, and the express charge given to the Department and the 
Commission, they have express authority from the legislature to fill in the 
blanks and determine how the statutory protection will be administered.  

 

[¶33]       This broad grant of authority is appropriate in this 
instance.  
Wyoming's Occupational Health and Safety Act is patterned after the 
federal Occupational Safety and Health Act.  The Department and the Commission thus have 
guidance from federal law and regulations in establishing Wyoming's 
program.  The 
administrative procedures and remedy adopted in Wyoming are almost identical to 
the procedures and remedy under the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Act.  The 
legislature may grant broad authority for the promulgation of rules creating an 
administrative procedure and remedy for discrimination complaints when such 
rules are to be patterned after the rules of a corresponding federal 
program.  

 

[¶34]       Pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, a 
rule is valid (and thus may be signed by the governor) if it is "within the 
scope of the statutory authority delegated to the adopting agency" and "appears 
to be within the scope of the legislative purpose of the statutory 
authority."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-103(d)(i), (ii) (LexisNexis 2001).  We hold that the 
rules creating an administrative procedure and remedy for discrimination 
complaints not only comply with the express statutory authority, they certainly 
fall "within the scope of the legislative purpose of the statutory 
authority."  

 

[¶35]       This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Wyoming 
Legislature has not amended the applicable statutes since the rules at issue 
were initially passed in 1984.2  Given the length of time the rules have been 
in effect, it can be assumed that the legislature is aware of the rules.  Legislative 
inaction on this issue is an indication of legislative intent.  Because the 
legislature has not acted in any manner contrary to the rules, an assumption 
arises that the rules have the tacit consent of the legislature.  Town of Pine Bluffs v. 
State Bd. of Control of State of Wyo., 647 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Wyo. 1982) 
("Administrative interpretation of a statute is . . . entitled to weight when 
the legislature has failed over a long period of time to make any change in the 
statute, since the failure to change the statute is some indication of an 
acquiescence by the legislature to administrative interpretation.").  Thus, the rules 
providing for an administrative procedure and remedy for discrimination 
complaints are valid as they are expressly authorized under the broad grant of 
authority contained in the Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act and 
reflect legislative intent.

 

[¶36]       The McLeans next argue that, even if an administrative 
remedy exists, this remedy is not adequate to protect the rights of an 
employee.  The 
McLeans take issue specifically with the administrative procedure involved.  The administrative 
remedy requires an employee to file a complaint within thirty days of the 
alleged violation with the appropriate agency.  The agency then investigates the 
complaint.  It 
is left completely to the discretion of the agency whether or not to pursue the 
claim against the employer.  If the investigating agency determines not to 
proceed with the complaint, there is no provision for an employee to pursue any 
further action.  
The McLeans argue that this procedure inadequately protects the rights of 
an employee and that this Court therefore must adopt the tort of wrongful 
termination to fully protect an employee's interests.  

 

[¶37]       Legislation such as the WOHS Act reflects the proper 
balance between the competing interests of employer and employee and public 
policy as determined by the legislature.  We already have held that the rules 
promulgated pursuant to the legislative grant of authority under the WOHS Act 
are valid and accurately reflect legislative intent.  Because the balance 
was established and has been maintained by the legislature, the McLeans' 
argument is more appropriately addressed to the legislative branch of 
government.  
This Court hereby declines in this situation to second-guess the policy 
decisions of the other branches of government and will not impose a judicial 
remedy where an administrative remedy has already been provided.

 

[¶38]       Other jurisdictions have held similarly.  The Supreme Court 
of Connecticut recently faced this precise issue in Burnham v. Karl & 
Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178 (Conn. 2000).  In Burnham, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that an 
at-will employee was precluded from bringing a claim for wrongful termination 
against public policy when the employee was allegedly terminated after reporting 
unsafe working conditions in violation of federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSH Act) standards.  The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the 
claim was precluded because the federal OSH Act provided a remedy.  The plaintiff in Burnham 
specifically argued that the remedy under the federal OSH Act was 
inadequate.  
The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed that the administrative remedy 
available was not equivalent to a common-law claim for wrongful termination but 
held that nothing requires the administrative remedy to be equivalent to a 
common law claim.  
The Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned that "the statutory remedial 
scheme [should] be adhered to since we can presume that the legislature would 
have provided additional relief in the statute if it thought it was 
necessary."  Id. at 185 

 

[¶39]       Similarly, in Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1991), the 
Supreme Court of Alabama declined to recognize a claim for wrongful termination 
against public policy in a case where at-will employees were fired for reporting 
certain hazardous workplace conditions to the federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration.  The Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that it 
was for the legislature to "ameliorate some of the harshness of the 
employee-at-will doctrine."  Id. at 256.  The Court held that 
the remedy provided by the federal OSH Act was adequate to protect the interest 
of the public and the rights of the employee and determined that it was 
therefore "unnecessary to create a new tort remedy to cover this kind of 
situation."  Id. at 257.  See generally Miles v. Martin Marietta, 861 F. Supp. 73 (D. Colo. 
1994) (federal OSH Act provides wrongful termination remedy so common law tort 
not available); Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 563 P.2d 1205, 1208 
(Or. 1977) (no need to extend an additional tort remedy because federal OSH Act 
provides a remedy for wrongful termination).

 

[¶40]       We hold that there is no claim for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy under Wyoming law under the circumstances of this 
case where an administrative remedy exists.  The remedy was crafted with the implicit 
knowledge and consent of the legislature and any challenge to the remedy should 
be addressed to the legislature.  Summary judgment was properly granted against 
both Rob and Linda McLean on their respective counts for wrongful 
termination.

 

 

 

[¶41]       The last remaining issue is whether summary judgment was 
properly granted against Rob McLean on his allegation that he was terminated in 
violation of terms in an employee handbook that applied to him.  Mr. McLean's 
position is that the presumption of at-will employment is rebutted in his case 
because of the existence of an employee policy manual.  Mr. McLean argues 
that the very existence of an employee policy manual creates an implied contract 
of employment and he can only be terminated within the terms contained in the 
manual.  That 
he never saw the employee policy manual while employed is irrelevant, he 
contends, because Hyland is bound by the terms of its manual.  Mr. McLean 
declares, "[t]he important question is not whether the employee, Rob McLean, 
knew the contents of Hyland's rules or whether he even knew there were 
rules.  What is 
important is whether the employer intended to have rules." 

 

[¶42]       We disagree.  An employer is free to have rules without the 
rules being applicable to every employee.  The employment relationship is a relationship 
based in contract.  
The basic elements of a contract are offer, acceptance and 
consideration.  
Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 946 
(Wyo. 1999).  
An employer is free to make individual offers of employment to each 
individual employee.  
That an employer may have an employee policy manual does not mean that 
the policy manual automatically extends to all employees.  An employer is free 
to hire employees as either at-will employees or "for-cause" employees and is 
free to have both types of employees in the workforce.  Thus, the question 
is not whether the employer intends to have rules, but rather whether the 
employer intends to extend an offer to be bound by certain rules to particular 
employees.

 

[¶43]       The specific question here, then, is whether Hyland 
intended to create an implied "for-cause" contract of employment with Mr. 
McLean.  
Implied employment contracts are created by "a mutual agreement and 
intent to promise which is found in the acts or conduct of the party sought to 
be bound."  Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).  
"The test is whether there has been an objective manifestation of assent 
to an employment contract containing a job security provision."  Bear v. Volunteers of America, 964 P.2d 1245, 1250 
(Wyo. 1998).  
Assent must come from both parties.  Bouwens, 974 P.2d  
at 946.

 

[¶44]       In the instant case, there is no objective manifestation of 
an offer from Hyland to Mr. McLean.  There is no evidence of any action on behalf 
of Hyland that could be interpreted as an offer to Mr. McLean to be bound by the 
terms of an employee policy manual.  Mr. McLean admits Hyland never gave him a 
copy or otherwise made employee policies available to him.  There is no 
evidence that Hyland ever distributed to employees in general the book 
containing the policies that the McLeans allege were the official company 
policies.  

 

[¶45]       Mr. McLean contends that Bear 
supports his argument.  In Bear, a manual 
of employment was generally distributed to all new employees.  In Bear, the employee claimed that she was not bound by a 
disclaimer found in the general employment manual because she did not receive 
the disclaimer with the employment manual given to her.  This Court held in 
Bear that an employee will be held to all terms in 
an official, widely distributed employee manual, whether or not the particular 
employee is aware of all terms in the manual.  Bear, 964 P.2d  at 
1251.  Because 
the issue in Bear dealt with the terms of the 
contract already formed, Bear is inapposite to this 
case in which the critical issue is whether Hyland ever made an offer.  

 

[¶46]       Directly on point is Boone v. 
Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1999).  The employee, 
Boone, claimed that the existence of an employment manual created an implied 
contract for continued employment.  Boone admitted that, although he knew of the 
existence of the manual, and had seen it on occasion, the employer never gave 
him a copy and he never read the manual.  The employment manual, in fact, was 
distributed only to members of management and some supervisors.  This Court applied 
a contract analysis to determine if the employer had made an offer to Boone to 
be bound by the terms of the employment manual.  The Court stated that it "looks at the 
external or objective manifestations of the parties' intentions as revealed by 
their actions.  
We determine whether a reasonable man in the position of the offeree 
would have believed that the other party intended to make an offer."  Id. at 687 (citation omitted).  This Court 
determined that "a reasonable person in Boone's position would not have 
considered the undistributed employment manual to be an offer."  Id. at 687-88.

 

[¶47]       Because there is no evidence in the record that Hyland 
acted in any manner that could be interpreted as offering Mr. McLean employment 
governed by the terms of an employee policy manual, summary judgment was 
properly granted on this issue.  No reasonable person in Mr. McLean's position 
would have considered the undistributed employment manual to be an offer.

  

CONCLUSION

 

[¶48]       Because another remedy exists in this case, the tort of 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy is not available.  There is no 
evidence that Hyland committed any act objectively manifesting assent to enter 
into a contract of employment with Mr. McLean by which the actions of both 
parties would be governed by the terms of an employee policy manual.  Thus, Mr. McLean 
was an at-will employee and not covered by an implied contract stating 
otherwise.  

 

[¶49]       The grant of summary judgment on the issues appealed from 
is affirmed.  
Hyland's appeal of a denial of summary judgment, appeal No. 00-185, is 
dismissed, and that matter is remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-11-109(e) (LexisNexis 2001) provides: "No employer shall discharge or in any 
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any 
notice of complaint or has instituted, or caused to be instituted, any 
proceeding under or related to this act or has testified or is about to testify 
in any such proceeding, or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of 
himself or others any right afforded by this act."  It seems obvious 
that threatening an immediate family member with termination in retaliation for 
the good faith exercise of an employee of any rights under the WOHS Act is a 
form of discrimination and prohibited under this statute.  See Moyer v. Allen Freightlines, Inc., 885 P.2d 391 
(Kan. 1994).

2The rules providing the 
procedure and remedy for an allegation of discrimination have not materially 
changed since 1984.