Title: Kirby v. NMC/Continue Care

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Kirby v. NMC/Continue Care1999 WY 173993 P.2d 951Case Number: 98-69Decided: 12/21/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DONNA KIRBY, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

NMC/CONTINUE CARE, 
Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, The Honorable Dan R. Spangler, 
Judge.

Jeffrey C. 
Gosman of Gosman Law Office, Casper, WY. Argument by Mr. Gosman, Representing 
Appellant.

Thomas F. Reese 
of Brown, Drew, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, WY., Argument by Mr. Reese, 
Representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      NMC Continue Care 
(NMC) provided Donna Kirby (Kirby) with a customized wheelchair; but, because 
the chair did not meet the required specifications, Kirby rejected it. After NMC 
refused to refund the purchase price or to cure the chair's defects, Kirby filed 
suit against NMC asserting both contract and negligence claims. NMC moved for 
summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The primary issue on appeal is 
whether Kirby can recover the amount paid on the contract even though Medicaid 
paid for the wheelchair. Because we conclude that Kirby is a buyer under the UCC 
as adopted in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-103 (Lexis 1999), we reverse the trial 
court's finding that Kirby suffered no contract damages.

[¶2]      Affirmed in part, 
and reversed and remanded in part.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Kirby presents 
the following issues for review:

1. Did the 
district court err in its conclusion that the appellant suffered no contract 
damages?

2. Does a home 
health care provider that agrees to provide a custom fitted wheelchair to its 
patient owe a duty of care that would support an action for 
negligence?

NMC rephrases 
the issues:

1. Was there a 
material question of fact which would have prevented summary judgment on the 
contract issues?

2. Was there 
cogent authority to support a claim of negligence independent of the duty 
imposed by contract?

FACTS

[¶4]      Starting in 1995, 
NMC provided Donna Kirby with in-home nursing care services. Shortly thereafter, 
Kirby, missing a leg and without a functional prosthetic device, needed a new 
wheelchair. In the fall of 1995, Kirby, a Medicaid recipient, received a 
prescription for a new wheelchair and contracted with NMC for a custom 
wheelchair. Kirby requested that the wheelchair be light enough for her to lift 
and small enough to fit through the doorways of her house. An NMC employee 
visited Kirby at home to take the appropriate measurements. However, the chair 
NMC delivered was too heavy and would not fit through Kirby's doorways. Kirby 
rejected delivery of the wheelchair by stating, "[t]hat's not my chair." 
Meanwhile, Medicaid submitted partial payment for the wheelchair to NMC, which 
NMC still possesses. Kirby filed suit on June 6, 1997, claiming: conversion, 
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty.1 NMC moved for summary judgment, 
which the trial court granted on January 15, 1998.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶5]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 
947 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 56(c). Where the case only involves 
questions of law, summary judgment allows parties to forgo a formal trial. 
England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Wyo. 1986). "We review a grant of 
summary judgment deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to 
the district court's ruling." Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 
1275 (Wyo. 1997).

DISCUSSION

Breach of 
Contract

[¶6]      NMC disputes the 
existence of a contract, but argues that even if a contract existed, Kirby 
suffered no damages and is not entitled to any relief. The trial court agreed, 
stating: "Plaintiff cannot recover on the contract because she did not suffer 
any contract damages."

[¶7]      A contract for 
the sale of goods is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as adopted in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34.1-2l-101 through -725 (Lexis 1999). To evaluate whether 
Kirby suffered any contract damages, we must first determine whether Kirby is a 
buyer under the UCC. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-103(a)(i) (Lexis 1999) defines a 
buyer as "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods[.]" Article 2 of the UCC 
expands traditional contract law. 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, 
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-2 (4th ed. 1995). Kirby contracted with NMC to buy a 
custom wheelchair, paid for with her Medicaid benefits. Kirby chose to allocate 
her limited Medicaid benefits to purchase the wheelchair from NMC and, thus, 
provided consideration for the wheelchair contract. As the party who contracted 
to buy the wheelchair and paid for the chair with Medicaid benefits, Kirby 
qualifies as a buyer under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-103(a)(i). Under the UCC's 
definition of a buyer, it is inconsequential that the actual payment came 
directly from Medicaid and not from Kirby.

[¶8]      The parties do 
not dispute that Kirby rejected the wheelchair. As a buyer who rightfully 
rejected the chair, Kirby is entitled to the remedies available in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34.1-2-711 (Lexis 1999), which states:

(a) Where . . . 
the buyer rightfully rejects . . . with respect to any goods involved, and with 
respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (section 
34.1-2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may . . . 
recover[] so much of the price as has been paid[.]

(Emphasis 
added.) Following the seller's breach and with proper rejection, the buyer may 
cancel the contract and recover contract damages by receiving a refund of the 
amount of the purchase price paid. Baker v. Wade, 949 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Mo.App. 
1997); Johnson v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motors Div., 668 P.2d 139, 142 
(Kan. 1983); 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 
8-1.

[¶9]      NMC received 
partial payment from Medicaid. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-711(a), Kirby, as 
a buyer, is entitled to recover that partial payment. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that Kirby should receive the refund. When applying for 
Medicaid benefits, Kirby assigned her right of recovery to Medicaid. Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 42-4-201 through -208 (Michie 1997); Cargill v. State, Dep't of Health, 
Div. of Health Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 1998). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
42-4-201(a) (Michie 1997) states, in part:

If the recipient 
recovers from the third party in any manner, including judgment, compromise, 
settlement or release, the state is entitled to be reimbursed for all payments 
made, or to be made, on behalf of the recipient under this 
chapter.

Consequently, 
even though Kirby is entitled to recover the amount paid on the contract, she is 
statutorily required to reimburse Medicaid for the payment made to NMC on her 
behalf. With such a statutory mandate, and since Medicaid was not joined in this 
action and is unable directly to receive such payment, Kirby should be ordered 
to forward the purchase price NMC refunds to her to Medicaid. Our decision is 
contingent on the assumption that NMC has not already reimbursed Medicaid. If 
NMC has done so, then Kirby should not recover.

[¶10]   In fashioning this remedy, we are 
mindful of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-1-106(a) (Lexis 1999). That section provides: 
"The remedies provided by this act [§§ 34.1-1-101 through 34.1-10-104] shall be 
liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good 
a position as if the other party had fully performed." Because our resolution of 
this issue attempts to put Kirby in as good a position as if NMC had delivered a 
conforming wheelchair, we believe it is consistent with the intent of the UCC's 
drafters. This portion of the trial court's order is reversed and remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Breach of 
Warranty Claims

[¶11]   Although neither party explicitly 
listed the breach of warranty claim in the issues presented for review, both NMC 
and Kirby devoted a significant portion of their briefs to arguing the issue; 
and, therefore, it is appropriate to address it. Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
699 P.2d 277, 280-81 (Wyo. 1985). Kirby claims NMC breached express warranties, 
the implied warranty of merchantability, the warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, and that such breaches caused her personal injury. Under the 
UCC, a non-breaching buyer's remedy is dictated by whether the buyer has 
accepted or rejected the goods. 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, 
Uniform Commercial Code § 10-1. A buyer who rightfully rejects the goods can 
pursue a breach of contract action with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-711 (Lexis 
1999).2 However, only with acceptance may a 
buyer seek relief with a breach of warranty action. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34.1-2-714(a) (Lexis 1999).3 Additionally, a buyer may seek 
personal injury damages only in a breach of warranty action under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34.1-2-715(b)(ii) (Lexis 1999).

[¶12]   Absent Kirby's acceptance and use 
of the chair, neither a breach of warranty cause of action nor a request for 
personal injury damages is appropriate. Both parties agree that Kirby rejected 
delivery of the wheelchair, and NMC acknowledged such rejection. With rejection, 
Kirby's relief lies in a breach of contract claim pursuant to sections 711, 712, 
and 713. The trial court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of NMC on the breach of warranty claims.

Negligence

[¶13]   In her negligence claim, Kirby 
alleged NMC lacked sufficient training to fulfill its duty and carelessly took 
measurements. In granting summary judgment on the negligence claim, the trial 
court stated: "[A] breach of a contract does not give rise to a tort action in 
the absence of some independent legal duty owed by NMC to 
[Kirby]."

[¶14]   We have often declared the elements 
required for a successful negligence cause of action: the defendant owed a duty 
to the plaintiff; the defendant breached that duty; the defendant's breach 
proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries; and the plaintiff was injured. 
Anderson v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 442 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51 (Wyo. 1997); Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 1995)). To 
prevail, the plaintiff must prove all four elements of the negligence claim. 
Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 1997). When a party seeks damages in 
tort against the other party to a contract, we have stated the general rule that 
tort liability can only result when a contracting party has a duty independent 
of its contractual duties. JBC of Wyoming Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 843 P.2d 1190, 1197 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Preferred Marketing Assoc. Co. v. Hawkeye Nat'l 
Life Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1990)). The court must decide if a duty 
exists as a matter of law. Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 
384 (Wyo. 1995); W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
§ 37 (5th ed.1984).

[¶15]   Here, NMC had a contractual duty to 
deliver a custom wheelchair to Kirby, which obligated NMC to have the requisite 
proper training and cautiously perform all aspects of procuring the wheelchair. 
Kirby failed to produce evidence or present legal argument to show that NMC owed 
any additional legal duty to Kirby beyond its contractual duties. Since Kirby 
failed to prove an essential element of the negligence claim, the duty, the 
negligence claim is without merit. The trial court, therefore, correctly granted 
NMC summary judgment as a matter of law on Kirby's negligence 
claim.

CONCLUSION

[¶16]   Under the UCC, as adopted by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-711(a) (Lexis 1999), Kirby, as a buyer, is entitled to a 
refund of the purchase price paid to NMC. Since the trial court erred as a 
matter of law by finding that Kirby suffered no contract damages, we reverse 
that portion of the trial court's order for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. Because Kirby rejected the chair and failed to establish that NMC owed 
an additional duty beyond its contract duty, the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment on Kirby's claims for breach of warranty and 
negligence.

[¶17]   Affirmed in part, and reversed and 
remanded in part.

Footnotes

1 Kirby 
dropped the conversion claim following NMC's 
answer.

2 "The 
remedies listed here are those available to a buyer who has not accepted the 
goods or who has justifiably revoked his acceptance." § 34.1-2-711, cmt. 1. 
(emphasis added.)

3 "This 
section deals with the remedies available to the buyer after the goods have been 
accepted and the time for revocation of acceptance has gone by." § 34.1-2-714, 
cmt. 1. (emphasis added.)