Title: State v. Blackman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP450-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Adam M. Blackman, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94  
PDC No:  2016 WI App 69 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Gary R. Sharpe 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs, joined by GABLEMAN, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Dennis M. Melowski and Melowski & Associates, LLC, Sheboygan, 
with whom on the briefs were Chad A. Lanning and Lubar & 
Lanning, LLC, West Bend, and oral argument by Dennis M. 
Melowski. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Michael C. 
Sanders, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general, and an oral argument by Michael C. Sanders. 
 
 
2017 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP450-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF659) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Adam M. Blackman, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing a decision 
of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac County, Gary R. Sharpe, 
Judge.1  The circuit court granted Adam M. Blackman's motion to 
suppress the results of a blood test obtained under Wisconsin's 
                                                 
1 State v. Blackman, 2016 WI App 69, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 
N.W.2d 94.   
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
2 
 
implied consent law, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. (2013-14).2  
The court of appeals reversed the order of the circuit court. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether the consequences for 
refusing to submit to a blood test requested under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2. were misrepresented to Blackman and, if so, 
whether that misrepresentation rendered Blackman's consent to 
the blood draw coerced, that is, not freely and voluntarily 
given under the Fourth Amendment.3  Furthermore, if the court 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Blackman presented three issues in his petition for 
review:  
1. Whether the circuit court properly suppressed Mr. 
Blackman's warrantless blood test because he was 
unconstitutionally coerced into taking the test when 
he was read the informing the accused form which 
incorrectly told him that he faced a revocation and 
other penalties if he refused chemical testing, when 
he was actually only facing a possible arrest? 
2. Whether the circuit court below properly suppressed 
Mr. Blackman's blood test where Mr. Blackman was 
unconstitutionally coerced into taking the blood test, 
under the totality of the circumstances, when he 
acquiesced to the unlawful assertion by the officer 
that they take blood samples in cases like his——in 
addition to being told that he faced a revocation and 
other penalties if he refused?  
3. 
Whether 
Section 
343.305(3)(ar)2. 
is 
unconstitutional on its face and as-applied because it 
coerces consent to otherwise unconstitutional searches 
without due process of law? 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
3 
 
concludes that Blackman's consent to the blood draw was not 
voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment, the issue becomes 
whether the court should apply the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule and admit the evidence of the blood alcohol 
concentration from the blood draw. 
¶3 
For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals, affirm the suppression order of the 
circuit court, and decline to apply the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule in the instant case.   
¶4 
The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a search 
warrant for a blood draw unless one of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement exists.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. 
Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016).  In the instant case, the only exception 
to the warrant requirement at issue is whether Blackman's 
consent to the blood draw was given freely and voluntarily under 
the Fourth Amendment.  When the legality of a warrantless search 
is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent must be 
freely and voluntarily given.  State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, 
¶16, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182 (citing State v. Phillips, 
218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998); Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).   
                                                                                                                                                             
We need not and do not address the second and third issues 
presented.  The second issue is substantially the same as the 
first issue.  Our decision on the first issue is dispositive of 
the instant case.  Accordingly, we need not and do not address 
the third issue challenging the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2.   
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
Blackman submitted to a blood draw after Deputy 
Sheriff John Abler stated the consequences of refusing to submit 
to a test:  Blackman (who was not suspected of a drunk-driving 
offense) was told that his operating privilege would be revoked 
if he refused to submit to a blood draw.  This information was 
not accurate.  A driver who was not suspected of a drunk-driving 
offense would prevail at a refusal hearing and his operating 
privilege 
would 
not 
be 
revoked. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.a.       
¶6 
For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the State 
did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Blackman's 
consent to the blood draw was valid, that is, that it was freely 
and voluntarily given under the Fourth Amendment.  Because the 
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect will be served in instant 
case by suppressing evidence of Blackman's blood test, we 
decline to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  The results of Blackman's blood draw are therefore 
suppressed.  
¶7 
Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court to reinstate its order suppressing the evidence and for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with the decision of this 
court.  
¶8 
Our decision is organized as follows:  
I. We state the facts.  
II. We state the standard of review. 
III. Our analysis proceeds as follows:   
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
5 
 
(A) 
We examine Wis. Stat. § 343.305 to determine whether 
license revocation is a statutory consequence had 
Blackman refused to submit to a chemical test under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2.  We conclude that it is 
not. 
(B) 
We determine whether Blackman's consent to the blood 
draw 
was 
obtained 
through 
misrepresentation, 
rendering his consent coerced, that is, not voluntary 
and free consent under the Fourth Amendment.  We 
conclude that the consent was obtained through 
misrepresentation and was coerced.   
(C) 
We 
determine 
whether 
to 
apply 
the 
good 
faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule in the instant 
case.  We conclude that the good faith exception does 
not apply in the instant case.     
I 
 
¶9 
For purposes of the motion to suppress evidence of 
Blackman's blood test, the statement of facts is brief and not 
in dispute.   
¶10 At about 10 A.M. on the morning of June 22, 2013, 
Blackman was driving his car in a northeast direction on County 
Highway WH in the Town of Taycheedah, Fond du Lac County.  
Blackman made a left turn onto Lakeview Road.  As he was 
turning, his car collided with a bicyclist travelling in a 
southwest direction on County Highway WH.   
¶11 A witness at the scene explained that Blackman's car 
collided with the bicyclist, causing the bicyclist to "fly up in 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
6 
 
the air, over the car, and land on the roadway."  The bicyclist 
suffered great bodily harm, including a mandibular fracture, 
fractures to both forearms, rib fracture, sinus fracture, a C6 
vertebrae fracture, liver laceration, lung contusion, and a 
subdural hemorrhaging brain bleed.   
 
¶12 Blackman and the witness both stopped to check on the 
bicyclist.         
 
¶13 Shortly after the collision, Fond du Lac Deputy 
Sheriff John Abler was dispatched to the scene.    
 
¶14 Deputy Sheriff Abler testified at the suppression 
hearing that he had reason to believe that Blackman may have 
violated a state or local traffic law by failing to yield to the 
bicyclist and that the bicyclist sustained great bodily harm.     
 
¶15 Deputy Sheriff Abler also testified that before the 
blood test was administered he did not have reason to believe 
that Blackman was under the influence of intoxicants.  Deputy 
Sheriff Abler testified in response to questions by the 
prosecutor about any signs of intoxication as follows:  
Q: You noticed no odor of intoxicants coming from him? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: You noticed no slurred speech 
A: That is correct. 
Q: You noticed no bloodshot eyes? 
A: Correct. 
Q: You noticed no glassy eyes? 
A: Correct. 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
7 
 
Q: You noticed no glassy eyes? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Okay. You noticed no signs with his balance or 
coordination? 
A: I did not notice anything. 
Q: You did not notice any mental impairment on his 
part, meaning it didn't seem like he was intoxicated 
or impaired in any way.  Would you agree? 
A: I agree. 
Q: Okay. And, in fact, during your entire contact with 
Mr. Blackman, you never observed anything that you 
would have attributed to even the consumption of 
alcohol.  Would you agree? 
A: I agree. 
¶16 Despite the absence of any signs that Blackman was 
intoxicated, Deputy Sheriff Abler testified that he explained to 
Blackman that it was "standard operating procedure for the 
department, when drivers are involved in accidents of a serious 
nature, to obtain a blood sample."  Blackman went to the 
hospital and submitted to a blood test.  Although Blackman rode 
in Deputy Sheriff Abler's squad car to the hospital, he was not 
considered under arrest.   
¶17 At the hospital, Deputy Abler read the statutory 
Informing the Accused Form4 to Blackman verbatim and requested 
that Blackman submit to a blood draw.  The test of his blood 
revealed an alcohol concentration of .104. 
                                                 
4 The form is set forth verbatim in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
8 
 
¶18 The State charged Blackman with multiple offenses: 
Reckless 
driving 
causing 
great 
bodily 
harm,5 
injury 
by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle,6 injury by use of a vehicle with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC),7 operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) first 
offense,8 and operating a motor vehicle with a PAC.9   
¶19 At a pretrial suppression hearing, the circuit court 
suppressed the evidence obtained from the blood draw on the 
ground that Blackman's consent was obtained by misstatements 
about the consequences of his refusal to take the test and 
therefore his consent was coerced.   
¶20 According to the circuit court, the Informing the 
Accused Form under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) misstates the law by 
declaring 
that 
the 
refusal 
to 
take 
a 
test 
under 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2. will lead to revocation of a driver's 
operating 
privilege. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
revocation for a refusal under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. 
would be "statutorily unenforceable" because the issues at a 
refusal hearing are "limited to" whether the officer had 
probable cause to arrest for an OWI-related offense, whether the 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 346.62(4).  
6 Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a). 
7 Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(b).  
8 Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(a)1.  
9 Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(a)2.   
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
9 
 
officer complied with and read the Informing the Accused form, 
and whether the driver refused to permit the test.   
¶21 Because the Deputy Sheriff had no probable cause to 
arrest Blackman for an OWI-related offense, the circuit court 
concluded that "if the statutory scheme does not support a 
revocation that is threatened, this Court finds that coercion 
has occurred."  The circuit court ordered the evidence of the 
blood test suppressed.   
¶22 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
order.  It ruled, relying on State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 
354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867, that Blackman "impliedly 
consented" to the blood draw by driving in Wisconsin; that 
Blackman had a choice to submit a sample (actual consent) or to 
withdraw consent (refusal); that Blackman freely chose not to 
withdraw consent; that the Deputy Sheriff's misstatement of the 
statute did not "transform Blackman's freely given actual 
consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into a coerced 
submittal."  State v. Blackman, 2016 WI App 69, ¶¶2, 5, 10-12, 
371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94.  
¶23 The concurring opinion in the court of appeals 
acknowledged that Blackman had a "legitimate gripe" about the 
form read to him.  According to the concurrence, even if the 
form is "technically correct," it is "incomplete and imprecise, 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
10 
 
no doubt" but "not inaccurate," and the "threat of revocation 
was real, even if its longer term effects were in doubt."10     
¶24 For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals, affirm the circuit court's order, and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with the decision of this court.  
II 
 
¶25 We first address the standard of review.  "Our review 
of an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence 
presents a question of constitutional fact."  State v. Tullberg, 
2014 WI 134, ¶27, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120.  We review a 
question of constitutional fact under a two-step inquiry:  
First, we will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact 
unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  Second, we conduct 
an 
independent, 
de 
novo 
analysis 
of 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional principles to the facts found.  State v. 
Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463.     
¶26 We are also asked to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305, 
the 
implied 
consent 
law. 
 
Interpretation 
and 
application of a statute is generally a question of law that 
this court decides independently of the circuit court or court 
of appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.  State v. 
Harrison, 2015 WI 5, ¶37, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 858 N.W.2d 372; State 
v. DuBose, 2005 WI 126, ¶16, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. 
                                                 
10 Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶¶16, 18 (Hagedorn, J., 
concurring). 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
11 
 
III 
¶27 As we stated earlier, the issue presented is whether 
the consequences for refusing to submit to a blood test 
requested 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2. 
were 
misrepresented 
to 
Blackman 
and, 
if 
so, 
whether 
that 
misrepresentation rendered Blackman's consent to the blood draw 
coerced under the Fourth Amendment.  We answer both parts of 
this question in the affirmative.      
A 
 
¶28 We first consider the statutory provisions.  
 
¶29 Under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2), any person who drives 
or operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of 
Wisconsin is "deemed to have given consent to one or more tests 
of his or her breath, blood, or urine . . . when requested to do 
so by a law enforcement officer under [Wis. Stat. § 343.305] 
sub. (3)(a) or (am) or when required to do so under sub. (3)(ar) 
or (b)."   
 
¶30 In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Abler requested 
Blackman to submit to a blood draw pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2., which provides in relevant part as follows: 
If a person is the operator of a vehicle that is 
involved in an accident that causes the death of or 
great 
bodily 
harm 
to 
any 
person 
and 
the 
law 
enforcement officer has reason to believe that the 
person violated any state or local traffic law, the 
officer may request the operator to provide one or 
more 
samples 
of 
his 
or 
her 
breath, 
blood, 
or 
urine . . . . If a person refuses to take a test under 
this subdivision, he or she may be arrested under par. 
(a). (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
12 
 
 
¶31 Five observations about Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2.:   
¶32 First, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. provides that if 
the driver refuses to take a test, he or she may be arrested.11  
Blackman's blood was drawn for a test.  He was not arrested. 
¶33 Second, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. does not provide 
that if the driver refuses to take a test, the driver's 
operating privilege will be revoked.      
¶34 Third, under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2., unlike 
under other provisions of § 343.305, an officer may request a 
blood draw without having a scintilla of a suspicion that the 
driver is intoxicated.  The officer need have reason to believe 
only that a driver violated a state or local traffic law and was 
in an accident that caused great bodily harm.12   
¶35 Fourth, the State argues that if Blackman were 
arrested for refusing to take a test under Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
11 Upon a Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. refusal, the person 
may be arrested, and asked to submit to a test under 
§ 343.305(3)(a).  A refusal under § 343.305(3)(a) will lead to 
revocation and "other penalties" under § 343.305(9)(a):  "If a 
person refuses to take a test under sub. (3)(a), the law 
enforcement officer shall immediately prepare a notice of intent 
to revoke . . . ."  
In discussing arrest in the instant case, the circuit court 
exclaimed:  "The question of the century is arrested for what?" 
12 In 
2009, 
the 
legislature 
added 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2. to the implied consent law.  See 2009 Wis. 
Act 163.  Prior to this Act, a law enforcement officer was 
authorized to request that a driver submit to a test only after 
the driver had been arrested for an OWI-related violation or the 
officer had probable cause to believe the driver was under the 
influence.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a)-(b) (2006-07). 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
13 
 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2., and if the officer then requested a sample 
under § 343.305(3)(a), and if Blackman refused to give a sample, 
the officer would be required to prepare a notice of intent to 
revoke Blackman's operating privilege by court order under 
§ 343.305(9)(a).  Thus the State argues that revocation is 
ultimately 
available 
under 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2. 
through 
§§ 343.305(3)(a) and 343.305(9)(a).13     
¶36 Fifth, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) sets forth the text 
that a law enforcement officer shall read to a person from whom 
a test specimen is requested under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a), 
(am), or (ar).  We refer to the text as the "Informing the 
Accused" form.  
¶37 Deputy Sheriff Abler read the full text of the form to 
Blackman as provided in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) as follows: 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3)(a) provides in relevant 
part:  
[U]pon arrest subsequent to a refusal under par. (ar), 
a law enforcement officer may request the person to 
provide one or more samples of his or her breath, 
blood or urine for the purpose specified under sub. 
(2).  Compliance with a request for one type of sample 
does not bar a subsequent request for a different type 
of sample.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(9)(a) provides in relevant part:  
(9) Refusal; Notice and Court Hearing.  (a) If a 
person refuses to take a test under sub. (3)(a), the 
law enforcement officer shall immediately prepare a 
notice of intent to revoke, by court order under sub. 
(10) . . . . 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
14 
 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) Information.  [At the time 
that a chemical test specimen is requested under sub. 
(3)(a), (am), or (ar), the law enforcement officer 
shall read the following to the person from whom the 
test specimen is requested]:[14] 
You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or 
you are the operator of a vehicle that was involved in 
an accident that caused the death of, great bodily 
harm to, or substantial bodily harm to a person, or 
you are suspected of driving or being on duty time 
with respect to a commercial motor vehicle after 
consuming an intoxicating beverage. 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or 
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system.  If any test shows more alcohol in your 
system than the law permits while driving, your 
operating privilege will be suspended.  If you refuse 
to take any test that this agency requests, your 
operating privilege will be revoked and you will be 
subject to other penalties.  The test results or the 
fact that you refused testing can be used against you 
in court. 
If you take all the requested tests, you may choose to 
take further tests.  You may take the alternative test 
that this law enforcement agency provides free of 
charge.  You also may have a test conducted by a 
qualified person of your choice at your expense.  You, 
however, will have to make your own arrangements for 
that test. 
If you have a commercial driver license or were 
operating 
a 
commercial 
motor 
vehicle, 
other 
consequences may result from positive test results or 
from refusing testing, such as being placed out of 
service or disqualified.  (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
14 We include this introductory material to demonstrate that 
the legislature requires a law enforcement officer to read the 
full text.  We assume that the law enforcement officer did not 
read this introductory material to Blackman.   
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
15 
 
¶38 The form differs from Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)(2), 
the statute applicable in the instant case.  The form states 
that 
if 
a 
driver 
refuses 
to 
take 
any 
test 
under 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2., the driver's "operating privilege will be 
revoked" and the driver "will be subject to other penalties."  
The statute states only that if a driver refuses to take any 
test under § 343.305(3)(ar)2. the driver may be arrested.  The 
form, therefore, does not comport with § 343.305(3)(ar)2.  The 
proper advice to Blackman under § 343.305(3)(ar)2. was that his 
operating privilege would be revoked if he failed to request a 
refusal hearing.   
¶39 Blackman contends that the text of the form applied to 
him is erroneous as a matter of law, misrepresented the 
consequences if he refused a blood test, and rendered his 
consent to the blood test coerced consent under the Fourth 
Amendment.   
¶40 We 
agree 
with 
Blackman 
that 
revocation 
of 
the 
operating privilege is unenforceable against a driver who has 
refused a test under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. if the driver 
requests a refusal hearing.    
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(9)(a) provides the penalty 
for refusing a post-arrest request for a chemical test under 
§ 343.305(3)(a); this is not the penalty for refusing to take a 
test under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2.  Section 343.305(9)(a) 
states in part:  
If a person refuses to take a test under sub. (3)(a), 
the law enforcement officer shall immediately prepare 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
16 
 
a notice of intent to revoke, by court order under 
sub. (10), the person's operating privilege.15    
¶42 Following receipt of notice of the State's intent to 
revoke his or her operating privilege pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a), the driver may request "a hearing on the 
revocation within 10 days . . . . If no request for a hearing is 
received within the 10-day period, the revocation commences 30 
days after the notice is issued."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4.  
See also § 343.305(10)(a).  
¶43 Regarding 
the 
refusal 
hearing, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5. limits the issues as follows:  
5. [The] issues of the hearing are limited to: 
a. Whether the officer had probable cause to 
believe the person was driving or operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, a controlled substance or a controlled 
substance analog or any combination of alcohol, a 
controlled substance and a controlled substance 
                                                 
15 Under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a), the circuit court 
shall revoke the driver's license only after it determines that 
the driver improperly refused to take a test or that the driver 
did not request a refusal hearing.  Section 343.305(10)(a) 
provides:  
(a) If the court determines under sub. (9)(d) that a 
person improperly refused to take a test or if the 
person does not request a hearing within 10 days after 
the person has been served with the notice of intent 
to revoke the person's operating privilege, the court 
shall proceed under this subsection.  If no hearing 
was requested, the revocation period shall begin 30 
days after the date of the refusal.  If a hearing was 
requested, the revocation period shall commence 30 
days after the date of refusal or immediately upon a 
final determination that the refusal was improper, 
whichever is later. 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
17 
 
analog, under the influence of any other drug to 
a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving, or under the combined influence 
of alcohol and any other drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely driving, 
having a restricted controlled substance in his 
or her blood, or having a prohibited alcohol 
concentration . . . . 
b. Whether the officer complied with sub. (4).[16] 
c. Whether the person refused to permit the 
test. . . .   (Emphasis added.)   
¶44 Were Blackman to have had a refusal hearing, the 
issues would have been "limited to" the State proving (a) that 
the officer had probable cause to believe that the driver was 
driving or operating a motor vehicle "under the influence"; (b) 
that the officer complied with reading the Informing the Accused 
form set forth in § 343.305(4); and (c) that the driver refused 
to permit the blood test.  If the State did not prove all three 
issues——and in the instant case, it could not prove that the 
Deputy Sheriff had probable cause to believe that Blackman was 
driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol——Blackman's operating privilege would not have been 
revoked at the refusal hearing.   
¶45 The 
State 
challenges 
this 
interpretation 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 343.305.   
¶46 The State contends that if the driver refuses a test 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2., which, as we stated 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) pertains to reading the 
Informing the Accused form to the driver.  
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
18 
 
previously, is not an OWI-related offense, the officer can 
arrest the driver.  On arrest, the driver comes under 
§ 343.305(3)(a), and the officer can request the driver to 
submit to a blood test under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a).  If the 
driver refuses to submit to a blood test under § 343.305(3)(a), 
the officer may issue a notice of intent to revoke the person's 
operating privilege.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a).   
¶47 The State acknowledges that Deputy Sheriff Abler did 
not 
arrest 
Blackman, 
did 
not 
proceed 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(a), and did not inform Blackman of each step of the 
process.  But the State argues that the Deputy Sheriff properly 
informed Blackman of the end result, that is, that Blackman's 
operating privilege would be revoked.   
¶48 The State further contends that Blackman would have 
had his operating privilege revoked at the refusal hearing 
because under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5. the only issues that 
a driver who refused a test under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. 
may raise at a refusal hearing are whether he or she was read 
the Informing the Accused form and whether he or she actually 
refused to submit to a chemical test.  
¶49 The State supports this interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5. by relying on the legislative history of 2005 
Wis. Act 413 and 2009 Wis. Act 163.  According to the State, the 
legislature did not intend to allow a person from whom a sample 
is requested under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to challenge 
probable cause to arrest for an OWI-related offense at a refusal 
hearing; the legislature intended that the only issues at the 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
19 
 
refusal hearing would be those listed in § 343.305(9)(a)5.b. and 
c.: "whether the officer complied with sub. (4)," and "whether 
the person refused to permit the test."  The State argues that 
the 
failure 
to 
remove 
an 
OWI-related 
probable 
cause 
determination from a refusal hearing under § 343.305(3)(ar)2. 
was a drafting error.17   
¶50 An 
alternative 
interpretation, 
however, 
which 
we 
adopt, based on the text of the statute, is that the 
legislature's failure to amend Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a) meant 
that 
it 
did 
not 
remove 
the 
OWI-related 
probable 
cause 
requirement from a refusal hearing.  The text of the statute 
clearly provides that when an officer requests a blood test 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2., the State cannot 
prevail at the refusal hearing because probable cause is a 
prerequisite to revocation of an operating license.       
 
¶51 Because the State cannot prevail at a refusal hearing 
following a driver's denial of a request for a blood test under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2., the Deputy Sheriff's reading of 
the text of the "Informing the Accused" form misstated that 
Blackman's operating privilege will be revoked.   
                                                 
17 The court of appeals seemed persuaded in the instant case 
that the legislature committed a drafting error.  The court of 
appeals wrote:  "The fact that Blackman could have prevailed at 
a refusal hearing due to the legislature's failure to amend the 
refusal hearing statute does not transform Blackman's freely 
given actual consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into 
a coerced submittal."  Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶12 (emphasis 
added). 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
20 
 
B 
 
¶52 We next determine whether Blackman's consent to the 
blood draw was obtained through misrepresentation, rendering his 
consent coerced, that is, not voluntarily and freely given under 
the Fourth Amendment.   
¶53 Blood draws are searches under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution18 and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.19  See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173; 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).  Warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable and are unlawful, subject to a 
few "clearly delineated" exceptions.  State v. Artic, 2010 WI 
83, ¶29, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430.    
                                                 
18 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
19 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
21 
 
 
¶54 In the instant case, the State relies on the consent 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.  The 
State must prove that consent to the blood draw was "given in 
fact by words, gestures, or conduct" and that the consent was 
"voluntary."  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶30 (emphasis added).  
Further, the State must satisfy that burden by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶32; see also 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).20  
¶55 Whether the consent was given in fact is a "question 
of historical fact."  The finding of the circuit court will be 
upheld "if it is not contrary to the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence."  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶30.  
The circuit court found that the defendant consented to 
providing a blood sample but concluded that the consent was 
coerced.     
                                                 
20 The State appears to argue that, under the implied 
consent law, all persons are deemed to have given actual consent 
to a blood draw when they operate a vehicle on a Wisconsin 
highway.  
The State does not argue, however, 
that law 
enforcement officers have the authority to compel drivers to 
submit to a blood draw without a warrant or an exception to the 
warrant requirement.  The State acknowledges that drivers have a 
"statutory opportunity to withdraw [their] consent."  Brief and 
Supplemental Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner (State 
of Wisconsin) at 17.  According to the State, a driver's choice 
when asked to submit to a blood test "is to submit and affirm 
the consent the person has already given, or refuse and withdraw 
that consent, and face penalties."  Brief and Supplemental 
Appendix 
of 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner 
(State) 
at 
10.  
Withdrawal of consent is not an issue in the instant case.     
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
22 
 
¶56 If the State establishes consent in fact, the State 
must prove that the consent was given voluntarily and freely.  
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 225 (1973).  
Voluntary 
consent 
must 
be 
"'an 
essentially 
free 
and 
unconstrained choice,' not 'the product of duress or coercion, 
express or implied.'"  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶32 (quoting 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 227 (emphasis added)).21   
¶57 The determination of voluntariness is based upon an 
evaluation of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.  
Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶32.  Misrepresentation is an important 
aspect of the totality of circumstances in the instant case. 
¶58 In Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186, the Court concluded 
that the officer inaccurately advised the accused that the law 
required him to submit to a warrantless blood test.  The Court 
remanded the cause to the state court to reevaluate the 
accused's consent in light of the inaccuracy.   
¶59 In Artic, quoting State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
¶33, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998), the court provided multiple non-
exclusive factors, including misrepresentation, to determine 
whether consent was given voluntarily:  
(1) whether the police used deception, trickery, or 
misrepresentation in their dialogue with the defendant 
to persuade him to consent; (2) whether the police 
threatened or physically intimidated the defendant or 
                                                 
21 See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 
(1968):  "[A] prosecutor [who] seeks to rely upon consent to 
justify the lawfulness of a search[ ] has the burden of proving 
that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."). 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
23 
 
"punished" him by the deprivation of something like 
food or sleep; (3) whether the conditions attending 
the request to search were congenial, non-threatening, 
and 
cooperative, 
or 
the 
opposite; 
(4) 
how 
the 
defendant responded to the request to search; (5) what 
characteristics 
the 
defendant 
had 
as 
to 
age, 
intelligence, 
education, 
physical 
and 
emotional 
condition, and prior experience with the police; and 
(6) whether the police informed the defendant that he 
could refuse consent. 
Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33 (citing Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 
198-203) (emphasis added). 
¶60 Although the most pertinent consideration in the 
instant case is whether misrepresentation rendered Blackman's 
consent coerced, we also consider the other factors described in 
Artic and Phillips.  See Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33.  
¶61 Here 
are 
the 
other 
considerations. 
 
This 
was 
Blackman's first OWI offense.  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Blackman was physically intimidated or that 
Blackman was uncooperative.  The Deputy Sheriff testified that 
Blackman's response to the request for a blood draw was that he 
did not specifically agree or disagree or refuse or give any 
indication that he was going to refuse.22  Blackman was informed 
                                                 
22 The prosecutor's question and the Deputy Sheriff's answer 
at the suppression hearing regarding whether Blackman was 
coerced into taking a blood test is as follows: 
Q: [Prosecutor] . . . Is there anything else you can 
tell me that would give us some information as to 
whether or not Mr. Blackman was forced or coerced or 
threatened in any way to consent to an evidentiary 
chemical test of his blood? 
A: [Deputy Sheriff Abler] No, he was not.  In fact he 
was very cooperative throughout the whole procedure. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
24 
 
that he could refuse to take the test.  He was incorrectly 
informed that his operating privilege would be revoked if he 
refused the request for a blood draw. 
¶62 We 
therefore 
address 
the 
effect 
of 
the 
Deputy 
Sheriff's "inaccuracy" or "misrepresentation" of consequences on 
the validity of Blackman's consent under the Fourth Amendment.   
¶63 We conclude that because Blackman's consent was the 
product of misrepresentation by the State, and under the 
totality of the circumstances, the State has not carried its 
burden of proving that Blackman's consent was voluntarily and 
freely given under the Fourth Amendment.  The State did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
The circuit court's questioning of the Deputy Sheriff about 
Blackman's taking a blood test is as follows:  
Q: [The Circuit Court] Did you tell him why you were 
going to the hospital and why he should ride in your 
car?  
A: [Deputy Sheriff Abler] Well, I'm sure I told him 
that.  I know I explained our normal procedure is when 
there is a serious accident like this that we do take 
blood samples.  
Q: Okay.  So he knew he was going to the hospital for 
a blood sample?  
A: Yes, he did.  
Q: Did he say anything to you about agreeing to have a 
blood sample and when you got in the car and before 
you guys took off to go to the hospital?  
A: I don't know that he specifically agreed, but he 
did not disagree or refuse or give me any indication 
that he was going to refuse.  
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
25 
 
prove Blackman's consent was the result of "an essentially free 
and unconstrained choice."  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.   
¶64 In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Abler was directed 
by statute to read the Informing the Accused form to Blackman.  
The text of the form advised Blackman that the Deputy Sheriff 
was requesting to test a sample of Blackman's blood.  The form 
inaccurately advised Blackman of the penalty for refusal.  The 
text of the form inaccurately advised Blackman that his 
operating privilege would be revoked.  This penalty did not 
apply to Blackman. 
¶65 The 
Deputy 
Sheriff 
advised 
Blackman 
that 
the 
Department's standard operating procedure was to take blood 
under the circumstances in the instant case.  Although the 
Deputy Sheriff did not tell Blackman that a blood draw would be 
performed without his consent, Blackman could have drawn this 
inference from the statement of the Department's policy and 
could have concluded that he had no real choice but to take a 
blood test.   
¶66 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that 
Blackman voluntarily and freely consented to the blood draw 
under the Fourth Amendment.  All things considered, Blackman's 
consent to the blood draw was not voluntary and free, and was 
not an unconstrained choice; it was the product of coercion, 
express or implied, and therefore was invalid under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
26 
 
¶67 Thus, the evidence obtained through the blood draw was 
the result of an unlawful search. 
C 
 
¶68 Ordinarily, evidence obtained through an unlawful 
search is excluded at trial.  The exclusionary rule generally 
serves to "deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, 
or 
in 
some 
circumstances 
recurring 
or 
systemic 
negligence."  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 150-51 
(2009).  In State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶36, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 
786 N.W.2d 97, the court stated the circumstance under which the 
exclusionary rule applies as follows: 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must 
be 
sufficiently 
deliberate 
that 
exclusion 
can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that 
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 
system.  As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary 
rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring 
or systemic negligence. 
¶69 The State asks that the results of the blood draw in 
the instant case be admitted in evidence because Deputy Sheriff 
Abler acted in good faith. 
¶70 Courts have applied the good faith exception and 
deviated from the exclusionary rule in only a few types of cases 
and in limited circumstances.  The good faith exception has 
generally been applied when a law enforcement officer has 
reasonably and objectively relied on settled law (whether 
statute23 or binding judicial precedent24) that was subsequently 
                                                 
23 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987). 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
27 
 
overruled or a warrant that was subsequently invalidated25 or 
that was based on erroneous information resulting from isolated 
police negligence attenuated from the arrest.26 
¶71 The parties cite no case, and we have found none, 
applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to a 
situation in which a law enforcement officer followed the 
requirements of a statute and gave an accused inaccurate 
information upon which the accused's coerced consent was based.   
¶72 The State argues that Deputy Sheriff Abler's conduct 
and the Department's procedure complied with the statute; that a 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011). 
25 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995); United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). 
Although the court often interprets Article I, Section 11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
in 
conformity 
with 
the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, in State v. Eason, 2001 
WI 98, ¶3, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625, the court adopted a 
"Leon-plus" good faith rule relying on Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  The court concluded that this 
provision "guarantees more protection than the Fourth Amendment 
provides under the good faith exception as adopted in Leon:"  
We hold that the good faith exception applies where 
the State has shown, objectively, that the police 
officers reasonably relied upon a warrant issued by an 
independent magistrate.  The burden is upon the State 
to also show that the process used in obtaining the 
search warrant included a significant investigation 
and a review by either a police officer trained and 
knowledgeable in the requirements of probable cause 
and 
reasonable 
suspicion, 
or 
a 
knowledgeable 
government attorney.  (Emphasis added.) 
26 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137, 147-48 
(2009). 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
28 
 
law enforcement officer cannot be expected to question a 
legislative 
enactment 
or 
Department 
procedure; 
that 
the 
exclusionary rule is not intended to deter the legislature; and 
that the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on law enforcement 
conduct would not be served by suppressing the evidence of the 
blood draw in the instant case.   
¶73 The State's argument is not persuasive.  The error in 
the instant case is not an error attributable solely to the 
legislature.  Nor does the instant case present an isolated or 
nonrecurring error in the criminal justice system.  It evinces 
the potential of a "recurring or systemic" error, a widespread 
error, affecting the rights of an accused.  The accused has a 
constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment, unless another 
exception to the warrant requirement exists, for law enforcement 
officers to obtain his or her free and voluntary consent to a 
blood draw or to obtain a search warrant for the blood draw.  
Unless the evidence in the instant case is suppressed, law 
enforcement officers across the state will continue to read the 
Informing the Accused form to accuseds in the same situation as 
Blackman without providing correct information to provide the 
basis for the accused's voluntary consent.   
¶74 The exclusionary rule's deterrent effect will be 
served if the evidence in the instant case is suppressed.   
¶75 The application of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule is not appropriate in the instant case.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence of Blackman's blood 
test should be suppressed. 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
29 
 
¶76 The dissent contends that Washburn County v. Smith, 
2008 WI 23, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d 243, contravenes our 
holding that the misrepresentation in the Informing the Accused 
Form requires suppression of the evidence and that the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in the 
instant case.  The dissent errs.  Smith is inapposite. 
¶77 In Smith, unlike in the instant case, the information 
in the Informing the Accused Form was not challenged as 
incorrectly applying to the accused.  Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 
¶¶65, 77.  
¶78 The alleged misrepresentation in Smith was that the 
law enforcement officer gave additional information that was 
incorrect to the accused from whom a breath test (not a blood 
test) was requested.  Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶¶54, 78.  The 
accused did not take the breath test and faced a refusal 
hearing. 
¶79 The accused, who held a Louisiana driver's license, 
argued at the refusal hearing that the deputy gave him incorrect 
information about the penalties under Louisiana law and that 
therefore his refusal was justified.  The court was unconvinced 
by the accused's argument about Louisiana law.  The court held 
that the Informing the Accused Form accurately stated Wisconsin 
law and that neither the deputy nor the accused believed that 
the deputy was stating Louisiana law.  Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 
¶¶81, 82. 
¶80 The accused also alleged that the deputy gave him an 
additional item of misinformation.  Because no factual finding 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
30 
 
had been made about this allegation, the court assumed for 
purposes of its decision that the deputy misinformed the accused 
that he would be entitled to a refusal hearing within 10 days.  
Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶84.  The correct information was that 
the accused could request a refusal hearing within 10 days.   
¶81 Under the applicable law at that time, in order to 
prevail, the accused in the Smith case had the burden to make a 
prima facie showing that the deputy's erroneous statement about 
the timing of the refusal hearing contributed to his refusal to 
submit to the breath test.  Smith, 308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶86.  The 
accused failed to make this essential showing.  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the accused improperly refused to submit to 
the breath test under the Implied Consent Law.  Smith, 308 
Wis. 2d 65, ¶¶87-89.    
¶82 The Smith court did not address the driver's Fourth 
Amendment rights regarding a breath or blood test, the concept 
of voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment, or the 
exclusionary rule.  These issues were not raised in the Smith 
decision.  The Smith case is not pertinent to the instant case. 
* * * * 
¶83 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the State 
did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Blackman's 
consent to the blood draw was valid, that is, that it was 
voluntarily and freely given under the Fourth Amendment.   
 
¶84 Because the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect will 
be served by suppressing the evidence of Blackman's blood test, 
we decline to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
No. 
2015AP450-CR   
 
31 
 
rule.  The results of Blackman's blood draw are therefore 
suppressed.   
 
¶85 Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court to reinstate the order suppressing the evidence and for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with the decision of this 
court.    
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded.  
No.  2015AP450-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶86 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the court's opinion with a few exceptions and a few caveats. 
Because I am able to join most, but not all, of the court's 
opinion, I write to provide further clarity of that opinion.  
¶87 At the outset, I am compelled to clarify what was and 
was not the "misrepresentation" in this case.  Here, the term 
"misrepresentation" is being used in the context of law 
enforcement reading a required form completely accurately but 
the standard form that was read verbatim inaccurately stated the 
law.  This court has framed that misstatement of law by using 
the phrase "misrepresentation."  To be clear, there are a number 
of occasions where law enforcement may appropriately use 
"misrepresentations" in the context of an investigation or 
otherwise.  See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 
208-09 (1966) ("Indeed, it has long been acknowledged by the 
decisions of this Court that, in the detection of many types of 
crime, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal 
the identity of its agents." (citations omitted)); United States 
v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 464 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring) ("Police engage in deceit all the time in order to 
induce suspects to reveal evidence. . . . Deception plays an 
important and legitimate role in law enforcement."). 
¶88 In the case at issue, the word "misrepresentation" is 
used not because law enforcement spoke in an effort to induce 
coercion, but rather, is used in the literal sense that the 
language on the form read misrepresented what the law actually 
was.  Thus, it is not law enforcement action that caused the 
No.  2015AP450-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
misrepresentation, but rather the inaccuracy of the form, 
properly read verbatim, that inaccurately informed the defendant 
of the state of the law.  The phrase "misrepresentation" is used 
in the opinion but the use of that term should not be confused 
with a more typical scenario involving misrepresentations made 
by law enforcement.1  The opinion should not be read to suggest 
that 
any 
misrepresentation 
by 
law 
enforcement 
would 
automatically render a subsequent action to be deemed coerced.  
One does not automatically influence the other.  
¶89 Second, I further write to clarify that the court's 
opinion should not be read as inconsistent with my view of the 
constitutional theory behind Wisconsin's implied consent law.  
See, e.g., State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, ¶¶52-87, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 
893 N.W.2d 812 (Gableman, J., concurring).  The court sensibly 
does not opine on this matter in this case and I write to alert 
the reader that this decision should not be interpreted as doing 
so.  
¶90 Third, I do not join that part of the opinion which 
discusses the inferences that Blackman might have drawn from one 
of Deputy Abler's statements in this case.  See majority op., 
¶65.  Specifically, Deputy Abler's reference to department 
policy to draw blood and what Blackman might have thought that 
                                                 
1 When it comes to misrepresentations by law enforcement, 
the proposition that misrepresentation is or is not deemed to be 
permissible 
oversimplifies 
the 
reality 
of 
when 
or 
if 
a 
misrepresentation by law enforcement has been approved by the 
courts.  See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 
(1966); United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 464 (7th Cir. 
1998) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
No.  2015AP450-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
to mean is a disputed fact between the parties.  Resolution of 
the meaning of the statement is not necessary to the disposition 
of this case.  If we were to review this, the inquiry would not 
be as subjective as the court's discussion might seem.  Cf., 
e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("The standard 
for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness——what would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect?").  
¶91 Fourth, the good faith exception applies in specific, 
narrowly-defined circumstances.  See, e.g., State v. Dearborn, 
2010 WI 84, ¶46, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97 ("[U]nder our 
holding today, the exclusionary rule is inappropriate only when 
the officer reasonably relies on clear and settled precedent.  
Our holding does not affect the vast majority of cases where 
neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court have 
spoken with specificity in a particular fact situation."); Davis 
v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238-39 (2011) (listing cases).  
In my view, the facts of this case do not constitute one of the 
rare occasions where the good faith exception applies.  This is 
not a case, for example, where law enforcement followed the law 
in existence at the time, where the error will not occur in the 
future given the current state of the law, and where future 
action is already deterred because of the correction in the law.  
Instead, the law enforcement officer inaccurately explained 
existing law, and this error might continue to occur in the 
future such that the deterrent effect will be served by the 
No.  2015AP450-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
suppression of evidence.  While deterrent effect is not the sole 
consideration, I am able to join the court's discussion 
understanding that although "[r]eal deterrent value is a 
'necessary 
condition 
for 
exclusion,' . . . it 
is 
not 
'a 
sufficient' one.  The analysis must also account for the 
'substantial social costs' generated by the rule."  Id. at 237 
(citation omitted) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
596 (2006)).  The result reached in this case is not 
inconsistent with this approach. 
¶92 Fifth, 
while 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
that 
the 
information given to Blackman in the instant case was inaccurate 
under the law, I do not necessarily join the court's inference 
that certain advice should be given to Blackman under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2.  We need not go that far. 
¶93 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶94 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶95 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Wisconsin's legislature repeatedly has enacted laws to lessen 
the carnage that drunk drivers inflict on those who use 
Wisconsin 
roads. 
 
Today, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
overturns 
legislation that holds those who drive with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration responsible for the injuries they cause by 
violating a traffic law when their intoxication is not readily 
apparent.   
¶96 The majority opinion errs for three reasons:  Adam M. 
Blackman's consent to blood tests was not obtained by law 
enforcement coercion; the majority opinion misinterprets the 
relevant statutes; and Deputy Sheriff Abler acted with a good 
faith belief that he was doing what the statutes required.  
Stated more fully:  (1) Deputy Abler's reading the Informing the 
Accused form to Adam Blackman was not sufficient to overcome 
Blackman's free will such that the reaffirmation of his consent 
to evidentiary tests was coerced rather than voluntary; (2) the 
controlling statutes, correctly interpreted, comport with the 
deputy's reading the Informing the Accused form to Blackman; and 
(3) Deputy Abler, in good faith, read what he believed the 
statutes required.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court of 
appeals, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶97 The majority opinion ably sets forth most of the 
factual background of this controversy, so I shall relate only 
those facts necessary to attuning the reader to my discussion 
that follows.   
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶98 At approximately 10:00 in the morning while driving 
his automobile, Blackman made a left-hand turn from a county 
highway onto an intersecting street.  In so doing, he crossed 
the path of an oncoming bicyclist, who collided with the right 
side of Blackman's car causing great bodily harm to the 
bicyclist.  
¶99 While medical personnel were attending to the injured 
bicyclist, Deputy Sheriff Abler spoke with Blackman, who had 
remained at the scene of the accident.  Abler testified that he 
believed that Blackman violated a traffic law by not yielding 
the right-of-way to the bicyclist when he made his left-hand 
turn.   
¶100 Because of the great bodily harm that the bicyclist 
suffered, Abler asked Blackman to provide a blood sample.  
Blackman agreed and was taken to a local hospital for the blood 
draw.  At the hospital, Abler read Blackman the Informing the 
Accused form.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) directs that it be 
read before a chemical evidentiary test is undertaken based on a 
driver's alleged traffic violation that causes great bodily harm 
to 
another 
person, 
i.e., 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2.   
¶101 The 
Informing 
the 
Accused 
form 
describes 
civil 
penalties that may follow from refusing to permit a chemical 
test.  The following questions were asked of the deputy about 
his interactions with Blackman and Blackman's consent to the 
evidentiary test in response to the Informing the Accused form.   
Q 
Do you recall, did Mr. Blackman consent to an 
evidentiary chemical test of his blood? 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
A 
Yes, he did. 
Q 
Okay.  At that time do you recall, did Mr. 
Blackman have any questions for you about the 
nature of that form? 
A 
No, I don't recall any questions. 
Q 
Okay.  At the time that was read, was Mr. 
Blackman confined in any way? 
A 
No, other than the fact that we were just sitting 
in a room at the hospital. 
Q 
Okay.  Is there anything else that you can tell 
me that would give us some information as to 
whether or not Mr. Blackman was forced or coerced 
or threatened in any way to consent to an 
evidentiary chemical test of his blood? 
A 
No, he was not.  In fact, he was very cooperative 
throughout the whole procedure.   
. . . . 
THE COURT:  Did you tell him why you were going 
to the hospital and why he should ride in your car? 
THE WITNESS:  Well I'm sure I told him that.  I 
know I explained our normal procedure is when there is 
a serious accident like this that we do take blood 
samples. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  So he knew he was going to the 
hospital for a blood sample? 
THE WITNESS:  Yes, he did. 
THE COURT:  Did he say anything to you about 
agreeing to have a blood sample and when you got in 
the car and before you guys took off to go to the 
hospital? 
THE WITNESS:  I don't know that he specifically 
agreed, but he did not disagree or refuse or give me 
any indication that he was going to refuse.     
¶102 Blackman, who was 20 years of age on the date he was 
requested to give a blood sample, reaffirmed his consent and his 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
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blood was drawn.1  The tests showed he had a .104 blood alcohol 
concentration.  He was charged with several crimes that related 
to his unlawful blood alcohol concentration and the great bodily 
harm the bicyclist suffered.   
¶103 Blackman moved to suppress the results of his blood 
test, claiming that his consent was not valid because the deputy 
misinformed him that he faced the civil penalty of license 
revocation if he refused, when he actually faced only an arrest 
for refusing the blood draw.  He also argued that if the implied 
consent law applied to him, and if his consent was valid, Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. was unconstitutional, both facially and 
as applied to him.    
¶104 The circuit court concluded that Abler did not 
misinform Blackman "because the potential for revocation was 
ultimately available through section (3)(a) if the refusal 
continued."  However, the circuit court granted Blackman's 
motion to suppress because it concluded Blackman's consent was 
coerced when he was told that if he refused to permit a blood 
draw his operating privileges would be revoked.  The court based 
this "coercion" on its conclusion that revocation for refusal 
under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2. would be "statutorily 
unenforceable." 
 
The 
court 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.a. required the State to prove that Abler had 
probable 
cause 
to 
arrest 
Blackman 
for 
a 
driving 
while 
                                                 
1 The record reflects that Adam Blackman was born November 
23, 1992 and his blood sample was drawn on June 22, 2013, the 
date of the offenses.   
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
intoxicated offense when the deputy had no facts to support 
probable cause at the time the blood sample was taken.   
¶105 The court of appeals reversed.  It concluded that 
Blackman was correctly informed that if he withdrew the consent 
he first provided by driving on the Wisconsin roadways and 
refused to submit to the requested blood draw, his operating 
privileges would have been revoked.  State v. Blackman, 2016 
WI App 69, ¶1, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94. 
¶106 The majority opinion disagrees with the court of 
appeals and suppresses the results of Blackman's blood test.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶107 Whether Blackman's reaffirmation of his consent to 
search was voluntarily given, in contrast to being obtained by 
law enforcement coercion, is a question of constitutional fact.  
State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195-96, 577 N.W.2d 794 
(1998).  We apply a two-step process to make this determination.  
Id. at 191.  Historical facts relevant to consent are affirmed 
unless clearly erroneous.  Id. at 190.  Voluntary consent is 
consent "given in the absence of duress or coercion, either 
express or implied."  Id. at 197 (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 
412 
U.S. 
218, 
248-49 
(1973)). 
 
Accordingly, 
voluntariness is a question of law that we decide after 
considering the totality of the circumstances.  Id. at 198 
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226)).  The totality of 
circumstances include "both the circumstances surrounding the 
consent and the characteristics of the defendant."  Id. (citing 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
State v. Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d 525, 534-36, 504 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. 
App. 1993)).   
¶108 This case also involves statutory interpretation and 
application.  These are questions of law that we independently 
determine.  State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶14, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 
808 N.W.2d 390.   
¶109 And finally, whether Deputy Sheriff Abler read the 
Informing the Accused form to Blackman in good faith such that 
the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to the results of 
Blackman's blood tests is also a question of law.  State v. 
Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶33, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97. 
B.  Coercive or Voluntary 
¶110 The majority opinion concludes that Blackman's consent 
given in response to Abler's request for blood tests was not 
voluntarily given because it was coerced by Abler's reading the 
Informing the Accused form to Blackman.  The form relates that 
refusal will result in revocation, when Blackman's driving 
privileges would not have been revoked if he had refused to 
provide an evidentiary sample.2  In so concluding, the majority 
opinion totally ignores the legal principles that come into play 
when a court assesses whether a defendant's free will has been 
overcome by law enforcement conduct for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.    
1.  General principles 
                                                 
2 "He was incorrectly informed that his operating privilege 
would be revoked if he refused the request for a blood draw."  
Majority op., ¶61.   
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶111 When the State asserts that a search was consensual, 
we must determine whether consent was voluntarily given.  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, ¶23.  The test for voluntariness of a 
search is "whether consent to search was given in the 'absence 
of actual coercive, improper police practices designed to 
overcome the resistance of a defendant.'"  Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d at 
532 (quoting State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 245, 401 N.W.2d 
759, 769 (1987)).  Mere acquiescence to police authority, such 
as when police display a search warrant to a defendant and he 
permits entry into his home, is not coerced consent in the 
context that Blackman contends occurred herein.  Rather, we 
consider a search done without a warrant that was based on law 
enforcement's request to search and Blackman's response to that 
request.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234.   
¶112 Whether a defendant's will was overborne such that his 
consent to search was not voluntary requires us to examine the 
details of the interactions between law enforcement and the 
defendant and the characteristics of the defendant.  Id. at 226.  
There is no one factor that will determine whether consent was 
coerced.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "The 
problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent 
searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect 
of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible 
touchstone."  Id. at 229.     
¶113 In regard to the interaction between law enforcement 
and 
the 
defendant, 
we 
examine 
whether 
law 
enforcement 
"threatened, physically intimidated, or punished the defendant," 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 199; whether the interactions between 
law enforcement and the defendant were under cooperative, 
nonthreatening conditions, id. at 200; whether the consent was 
the result of custodial interrogation, which the Supreme Court 
concluded was "inherently coercive" in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966).  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 240. 
¶114 Some factors relating to the defendant are:  his 
youth, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); education or 
lack thereof, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958); low 
intelligence or mentally compromised, see Fikes v. Alabama, 352 
U.S. 191, 196 (1957); questioning that occurred while defendant 
was in custody, State v. Michels, 141 Wis. 2d 81, 92, 414 N.W.2d 
311 (Ct. App. 1987).   
¶115 In a consent-search, it is the State's burden to show 
voluntariness; however, the State does not have the burden to 
show that the defendant's consent was "informed consent."  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 203 (citing Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d at 532).  
Stated otherwise, the State has no obligation to prove that the 
defendant consented to the search knowingly and intelligently, 
or that the defendant knew he could refuse to permit the 
requested search.  State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 109-10, 
349 N.W.2d 453 (1984) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229-32).   
¶116 Furthermore, 
the 
obligation 
to 
prove 
that 
a 
defendant's waiver of a trial right is knowing and intelligent 
is 
vastly 
different 
from 
the 
test 
for 
assessing 
the 
constitutional sufficiency of consent to search.  Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).  As the United States 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
Supreme Court has explained, "what is generally demanded of the 
many factual determinations that must regularly be made by 
agents of the government——whether the magistrate issuing a 
warrant, . . . or the police officer conducting a search or 
seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement——
is not that they always be correct, but that they always be 
reasonable."  Id. at 185. 
2. Blackman's consent 
¶117 There is nothing in the record that shows Abler 
coerced Blackman.  No threats were made to obtain his consent to 
the blood draw.  He was not punished by denying food, drink or 
rest periods.  No coercive, improper police conduct designed to 
overcome Blackman's free will occurred.  All that happened prior 
to the blood draw was Abler's reading the Informing the Accused 
form to Blackman.   
¶118 In regard to Blackman, he was 20 years of age when the 
accident occurred.  There is nothing in the record that would 
indicate he did not have the capacity to freely consent, or 
withdraw consent, for the blood draw.  He willingly went to the 
hospital and permitted blood to be drawn for testing.  Deputy 
Abler said that "he was very cooperative throughout the whole 
procedure." 
¶119 As I will explain below, I have concluded that the 
deputy properly read the Informing the Accused form, which Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4) requires.  However, even if I were to assume 
that the form should not have been read because Blackman's 
driving privileges could not have been revoked if he refused to 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
permit the blood test, law enforcement had no obligation to 
provide additional information to Blackman.  Constitutionally 
sufficient consent may be obtained when the consent is not 
knowingly and intelligently given.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
229-32; Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d at 109-10; Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d at 
532.  Reading the form simply gave Blackman a choice:  he could 
say yes or he could say no.    
¶120 Furthermore, if reading the Informing the Accused form 
to Blackman coerced his consent to a blood draw, reading the 
Informing the Accused form coerces every driver to whom it is 
read.  All have the same choice:  say yes or say no.  Requiring 
that accurate consequences of refusing to permit a blood draw 
are known to the defendant before his consent is held to be 
voluntary 
is 
contrary 
to 
Schneckloth, 
Rogers 
and 
Xiong.  
Knowledge of the consequences of refusal is outside the scope of 
Fourth Amendment consent to search protections.   
¶121 A common example shows the fallacy of the majority 
opinion's conclusion that Blackman's consent was coerced.  Let's 
assume that a driver belongs to a religious sect that prohibits 
blood-letting.  He refuses to give a blood sample after the 
Informing the Accused form is read to him.  The form is the same 
for all to whom it is read; yet, if a driver refuses to provide 
a blood sample based on a sincerely held religious belief, it is 
likely that his license will not be revoked.  See Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).  Therefore, the form will 
not provide an accurate description of the consequences of 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
refusing to provide the requested blood sample for such a 
driver.    
¶122 No coercion forced Blackman to provide a blood sample.  
Coercion requires unlawful police conduct designed to override 
the free will of a defendant.  There is nothing in this record 
to suggest unlawful police conduct; and there is nothing in this 
record to suggest that this 20-year-old man did not freely and 
voluntarily consent to the blood test.    
C.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶123 Proper interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 343.305 and its 
subsections show that the deputy correctly followed directives 
established by the legislature, which included reading the 
Informing the Accused form, § 343.305(4), and upon refusal, a 
refusal hearing would have followed, § 343.305(9)(c).   
1.  General principles 
¶124 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meanings of the words chosen by the 
legislature are plain, ordinarily we stop the inquiry.  State ex 
rel Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "Plain meaning may be ascertained 
not only from the words employed in the statute, but also from 
the context."  Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg, 2016 WI 49, ¶17, 369 
Wis. 2d 387, 882 N.W.2d 371.   
¶125 Interpreting a statute in context requires that we do 
not interpret statutory language in isolation, but rather in 
relation 
to 
surrounding 
and 
closely-related 
statutory 
provisions.  Id.  Here, I interpret the subsections of Wis. 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
Stat. § 343.305 as they relate to each other within Wisconsin's 
statutory scheme of implied consent.3   
2.  Relevant Statutes  
¶126 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 343.305(3)(ar)2., 343.305(4), and 
343.305(9) are implicated by Blackman's arguments that the 
majority opinion finds persuasive.4  Accordingly, I interpret 
those provisions in the context of Wisconsin's implied consent 
law, as they relate to each other. 
¶127 A vehicle operator whom a law enforcement officer has 
reason to believe committed a violation of a traffic law that 
caused great bodily harm to another may be charged with a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2.  An alleged violation 
of § 343.305(3)(ar)2. permits a law enforcement officer to 
request the vehicle operator to provide one or more samples of 
breath, blood or urine.  § 343.305(3)(ar)2.  There is no dispute 
that that interpretation is what the statute plainly provides.     
¶128 In regard to a request for samples to test for alcohol 
concentration, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) states in relevant part: 
At the time that a chemical test specimen is requested 
under sub. (3)(a), (am), or (ar), the law enforcement 
officer shall read the following to the person from 
whom the test specimen is requested: 
                                                 
3 I note that the "purpose behind the implied consent law is 
to combat drunk driving 'by facilit[ating] the gathering of 
evidence against drunk drivers.'"  State v. Piddington, 2001 
WI 24, ¶17, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528 (quoting State v. 
Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 203, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980)).   
4 Majority op., ¶¶30, 44. 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
You . . . are the operator of a vehicle that was 
involved in an accident that caused the death of, 
great bodily harm to, or substantial bodily harm to a 
person . . . . 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one 
or more samples of your breath, blood or urine . . . .  
If you refuse to take any test that this agency 
requests, your operating privilege will be revoked and 
you will be subject to other penalties. 
The Informing the Accused form, which is read before samples for 
chemical testing are secured, repeats the statutory admonitions 
of § 343.305(4).  The plain wording of subsec. (4) requires the 
officer to read the statutory provisions.  There is no dispute 
that the statutory provisions are contained within the Informing 
the Accused form.   
¶129 Where I part company with the majority opinion is in 
its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9).  It is not until 
there is a refusal and a timely request for a refusal hearing 
that § 343.305(9) comes into play.  Neither of these events 
occurred in the pending matter.  However, given the arguments 
made to us and the majority opinion's interpretation of the 
various provisions of subsec. (9), I, too, address § 343.305(9).    
¶130 I begin with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(c) because it is 
the paragraph in subsec. (9) that addresses refusal by a person 
from whom submission of a sample for testing was requested under 
subd. (3)(ar)2.  Paragraph (9)(c) provides: 
If a law enforcement officer informs the circuit or 
municipal court that a person has refused to submit to 
a test under sub (3)(a), (am), or (ar), the court 
shall be prepared to hold any requested hearing to 
determine if the refusal was proper.  The scope of the 
hearing shall be limited to the issues outlined in 
par. (a)5. or (am)5.  Section 967.055 applies to any 
hearing under this subsection.  
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶131 When a vehicle operator who is not a commercial motor 
vehicle operator refuses a request to submit a sample for 
testing 
based 
on 
a 
suspected 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2., any requested hearing cannot encompass more 
issues than those identified in subd. (9)(a)5.  However, there 
is nothing in para. (9)(c) that requires all three issues 
identified in subd. (9)(a)5. to be tried.  Rather, the issues 
that must be tried are whether the officer complied with sub. 
(4), subd. para. (9)(a)5.b., and whether the person's refusal 
was due to a physical inability to submit to the requested test 
because of a cause unrelated to the use of a prohibited 
substance, subd. para. (9)(a)5.c. 
¶132 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(9)(c) states that the "scope 
of the hearing shall be limited to the issues outlined in par. 
(a)5."  It does not say that the issues outlined in para. (a)5. 
shall be tried.   
¶133 When issues to be considered in a claim or a type of 
review are "limited," no unlisted issues can be considered, but 
every enumerated issue identified in the list does not have to 
be tried.  For example, in certiorari review the issues are 
limited to: 
(1) whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; 
(2) whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law; 
(3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the board might reasonably 
make the order or determination in question based on 
the evidence.   
FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 
733 N.W.2d 287.  However, there is no need to try all four 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
issues in order to prevail; simply proving that the board did 
not proceed on a correct theory of law is sufficient.  Id.   
¶134 Furthermore, 
even 
though 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.a. permits consideration of whether the officer 
had probable cause to believe the person was operating a motor 
vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, nothing in 
para. (9)(c) requires that issue be tried.  A plain reading of 
subd. (9)(a)5. in the context of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. 
demonstrates that requiring the State to litigate whether the 
officer had probable cause to believe the driver was impaired or 
had a prohibited alcohol concentration would make no sense 
because § 343.305(3)(ar)2. is based on the violation of a 
traffic law that causes death or great bodily injury, not on 
apparent intoxication.     
3.  Application of statutes to Blackman 
¶135 Deputy Abler had reason to believe that Adam Blackman 
violated a traffic law by failing to yield the right-of-way to 
oncoming traffic, which caused great bodily harm to another.  
Accordingly, Blackman was alleged to have violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(ar)2.  There is no question that the bicyclist 
suffered great bodily harm and no question that it was pursuant 
to § 343.305(3)(ar)2. that Abler requested that Blackman submit 
to a blood test.  It is also beyond dispute that the deputy 
complied with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) by reading Blackman the 
Informing the Accused form.   
¶136 Even though statutory interpretation arising from a 
refusal is not present in this case, if it were, I would 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(c) does not require that 
the issue of whether the deputy had probable cause to believe 
Blackman was impaired must be tried because Blackman was 
proceeded against pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2.  
There is nothing in the record to show that if Blackman had 
refused, such refusal would be excused because of an inability 
to submit to blood tests.  Accordingly, if he were to have 
refused, his driving privileges would have been revoked.   
¶137 The legislature made a policy choice to test whether a 
vehicle's operator was under the influence of intoxicating 
substances when accidents cause death or great bodily harm.  It 
did so because intoxication is not always readily apparent at 
the scene of a serious accident, but can nevertheless have 
contributed to loss of life and serious injuries.  That policy 
choice is Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2.   
¶138 Blackman's blood test showed a prohibited alcohol 
concentration of .104, well above the legal limit of .08 for an 
adult, and absolutely prohibited for a man who was underage to 
drink any alcohol on the date of the accident.    
D.  Good Faith 
¶139 Even if I were to assume that Blackman's consent was 
coerced and were to agree with the majority opinion's statutory 
interpretation, I nevertheless would conclude that the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies; and therefore, 
I would not suppress the results of the blood test.  
¶140 At the outset, I note that the majority opinion 
incorrectly frames the exclusionary rule as a remedy courts 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
apply liberally.  Without citation, the majority opinion states: 
"Ordinarily, evidence obtained through an unlawful search is 
excluded at trial."5  This is contrary to well-established law 
when innocent police conduct is the foundation from which 
objection to a search arises. 
¶141 The 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
concluded 
that 
"the 
[exclusionary] rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law 
enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging 
application of the rule."  Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. 
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1998) (quoting United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated that "[s]uppression of evidence" should be the 
"last resort, not our first impulse."  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
U.S. 586, 591 (2006); see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 
2061 (2016); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009).  
We 
have 
used 
similar 
admonitions 
when 
describing 
the 
exclusionary rule.  Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶35 (reasoning, 
"exclusion [of evidence] is the last resort").   
¶142 "The rule's sole purpose . . . is to deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations."  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 
229, 
236–37 
(2011). 
 
"Where 
suppression 
fails 
to 
yield 
'appreciable 
deterrence,' 
exclusion 
is 
'clearly . . . unwarranted.'"  Id. at 237 (quoting United States 
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).  "Police practices trigger 
the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶68.  
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
18 
 
enough to yield '[meaningfu[l]' deterrence, and culpable enough 
to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.'"  Davis, 564 
U.S. at 240 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 141).  
¶143 Moreover, "marginal deterrence is not enough to 
justify exclusion; 'the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the 
costs.'"  Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶35 (quoting Herring, 555 
U.S. at 129).  "The principal cost of applying the rule is, of 
course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go 
free—something that 'offends basic concepts of the criminal 
justice system.'"  Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (quoting United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984)).  Given the high cost 
to society of excluding probative evidence against a defendant 
in a criminal trial, suppression of the evidence is "the last 
resort" and the burden is on the defendant to show that 
exclusion is warranted.  Scott, 524 U.S. at 364-65.   
¶144 Good 
faith 
is 
a 
well-defined 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule.  See Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶37.  "The 
exclusionary rule does not serve its purpose when police act 
with a reasonable, good faith belief that their conduct is 
lawful."  State v. Oberst, 2014 WI App 58, ¶9, 354 Wis. 2d 278, 
847 N.W.2d 892; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 ("We have 
frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any 
deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the 
objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.").  The "good-faith inquiry is confined to 
the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably 
well-trained officer would have known that the search was 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
illegal in light of all of the circumstances."  Herring, 555 
U.S. at 145 (internal quotations omitted).  
¶145 The good faith exception applies when an officer 
relies on a statute that is later found unconstitutional.6  
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987).  "Unless a 
statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be 
expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed 
the 
law. 
 
If 
the 
statute 
is 
subsequently 
declared 
unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained pursuant to it 
prior to such a judicial declaration will not deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who has simply 
fulfilled his responsibility to enforce the statute as written."  
Id.   
¶146 In the present case, there is no deterrent value in 
suppressing the results of Blackman's blood test.  Deputy Abler 
was required to read the Informing the Accused form to Blackman.  
Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) provides that "the law 
enforcement officer shall read the following to the person from 
whom the test specimen is requested."  Excluding the results of 
Blackman's blood test "will not deter future Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
6 The good faith exception is not cabined to the factual 
circumstances in which it has previously been applied by the 
United States Supreme Court.  See People v. LeFlore, 32 N.E.3d 
1043, 1050 (Ill. 2015) ("Clearly, application of the good-faith 
inquiry is not limited to the specific circumstances addressed 
by the Supreme Court in Davis [v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 
(2011)] or any other Supreme Court case."); United States v. 
Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 337 (4th Cir. 2014) (declining to limit 
"the 
good-faith 
inquiry 
only 
to 
the 
precise 
factual 
circumstances addressed by the Supreme Court").  
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
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violations" because the "officer . . . simply fulfilled his 
responsibility to enforce the statute as written."  Krull, 480 
U.S. at 349-50.   
¶147 The deputy did not act with "deliberate, reckless, or 
grossly negligent conduct" and therefore, this case is not one 
in which suppression would yield "appreciable deterrence."  
Weighed against the high societal cost of exclusion, suppression 
of the blood test is not warranted in the present case.  After 
all, suppression is the "last resort."  The deputy did that 
which he was statutorily obligated to do; nothing more, nothing 
less.   
¶148 The majority opinion concludes that suppression is 
necessary to deter officers from continuing to read individuals 
"in the same situation as Blackman" the Informing the Accused 
form.7  However, this argument fails for an obvious reason:  
After the majority opinion in the present case concludes that it 
is impermissible for an officer to rely solely on reading the 
Informing the Accused form to obtain consent when a defendant is 
alleged to have violated Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2., an 
officer that does so will be unable to rely on the good faith 
doctrine.  Cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924 ("Nor are we persuaded that 
application of a good-faith exception to searches conducted 
pursuant 
to 
warrants 
will 
preclude 
review 
of 
the 
constitutionality of the search or seizure, deny needed guidance 
from the courts, or freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present 
state.").  
                                                 
7 Majority op., ¶73.  
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
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¶149 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has 
"'never applied' the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of nonculpable, innocent police conduct."  
Davis, 564 U.S. at 240.  In this case, the purported 
"misconduct" was the incorrect information provided to Blackman.  
Ironically, the author of the majority opinion has previously 
permitted 
officers 
to 
misinform 
an 
individual 
of 
the 
consequences of refusal specific to that individual.  See 
Washburn Cty v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, ¶80, 308 Wis. 2d  65, 746 
N.W.2d 243.  In Smith, an officer read an individual with a 
Louisiana driver's license the Informing the Accused form.  Id., 
¶53.  The Court recognized that the penalties in the form did 
not apply to the individual.  Id., ¶54.  Yet, the Court held 
that the misinformation provided to the defendant was irrelevant 
so long as the officer correctly read the Informing the Accused 
form.  Id., ¶81.  Here, the officer also read the Informing the 
Accused form correctly even if the penalties in the implied 
consent laws were not accurate with respect to the defendant.  
¶150 In sum, the deputy acted in good faith and his actions 
were confirmed by the court of appeals.  Accordingly, I conclude 
that even if I were to assume that Blackman's consent was 
coerced and were to agree with the majority opinion's statutory 
interpretation, the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule would apply, and the results of the blood tests are 
admissible. 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
¶151 I conclude that:  (1) Deputy Abler's reading the 
Informing the Accused form to Adam Blackman was not sufficient 
to overcome Blackman's free will such that the reaffirmation of 
his consent to evidentiary tests was coerced rather than 
voluntary; (2) the controlling statutes, correctly interpreted, 
comport with the deputy's reading the Informing the Accused form 
to Blackman; and (3) Deputy Abler, in good faith, read what he 
believed the statutes required.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
court of appeals, and I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion.   
 
No.  2015AP450-CR.pdr 
 
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