Title: In the Matter of Leon St. Clair Nation v. The City of New York

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 63  
In the Matter of Leon St. Clair 
Nation,
            Respondent,
        v.
The City of New York, et al.,
            Appellants.
Cheryl Payer, for appellants.
Gregory Chillino, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
We conclude that the Commissioner of the New York City
Department of Buildings (DOB) properly relied on New York City
Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) in refusing to accept any
documents submitted by petitioner, a professional engineer, for
two years, followed by a three-year probationary period.
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No. 63
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Petitioner Leon St. Clair Nation is an engineer
licensed by the New York State Department of Education.  In 2004,
he placed his seal on digitally altered photographs submitted to
DOB in connection with a pavement plan for a building under
construction in Brooklyn.  In early 2005, petitioner attested the
accuracy of a falsified photograph in support of another pavement
plan for a separate Brooklyn property.  The following year, he
offered a false application to DOB for alterations to a
nonexistent second floor of a third Brooklyn parcel.
As a result of these filings, DOB commenced an
administrative proceeding before the New York City Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings seeking to revoke petitioner's
professional certification privileges.  Following a hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that petitioner had negligently certified the accuracy
of the altered photographs and submitted a deceptive application,
resulting in a recommendation that his professional certification
privileges be rescinded.
The DOB Commissioner adopted the ALJ's recommendation
and revoked petitioner's certification privileges with respect to
the agency's "Limited Supervisory Check and/or Professional
Certification Program" (see 1 RCNY 21-01).  Relying on a recently
enacted provision -- Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) -- the
Commissioner further precluded petitioner from filing any
application or document with DOB, whether in connection with the
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No. 63
1  Petitioner has not challenged in this Court the Appellate
Division's conclusions that the determination was supported by
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Limited Supervisory Check/Professional Certification Program or
otherwise, for two years, effective January 15, 2008, to be
followed by a three-year probationary period.
Petitioner responded by commencing this CPLR article 78
proceeding challenging the Commissioner's determination.  He
argued that the determination was not supported by substantial
evidence; that the revocation of his certification privileges was
excessive; and that Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) was
inapplicable because it was enacted in 2007 after he engaged in
the acts charged against him.
Upon transfer of the proceeding to the Appellate
Division, that Court modified to the extent of vacating the
penalty imposed pursuant to Administrative Code § 26-124 (c), and
otherwise confirmed the determination (60 AD3d 468 [1st Dept
2009]).  The Court held that substantial evidence supported the
Commissioner's determination that petitioner negligently
certified the accuracy of submissions and that the Commissioner's
revocation of certification privileges did not shock the judicial
conscience.  But the Court held that Administrative Code § 26-124
(c) could not be applied retroactively by the Commissioner to bar
petitioner from submitting any documents to DOB for two years,
together with the three-year probationary period.  We granted DOB
leave to appeal (12 NY3d 713 [2009]).1
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No. 63
substantial evidence and that revocation of petitioner's
certification privileges under the Limited Supervisory
Check/Professional Certification Program did not shock the
conscience.
2  Pursuant to Local Law No. 8 (2008) of the City of New
York, New York City Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) was
recodified with minor changes in wording as Administrative Code 
§ 28-211.1.2.
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New York City Administrative Code § 26-124 (c)
provides, in relevant part:
"In addition to any other penalty provided by
law, the commissioner may refuse to accept
any application or other document . . . that
bears the signature of any person who has
been found, after a hearing at the office of
administrative trials and hearings pursuant
to the department's rules, . . . to have
knowingly or negligently falsified or allowed
to be falsified any certificate, form, signed
statement, application, [or] report."2
Adopted by the Legislature in 2007, this provision was designed
to "promote public safety and prevent the waste of taxpayer
dollars by eliminating the repeated filing of false information
relating to the construction and repair of buildings in New York
City" (Senate Introducer Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2007, ch
542, at 8).
DOB argues that the Appellate Division erred in
concluding that Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) was inapplicable
in this proceeding.  Relying on Matter of Miller v DeBuono (90
NY2d 783 [1997]), DOB submits that the Commissioner's refusal to
accept documents from petitioner for a future period of time did
not amount to an improper retroactive application of the
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No. 63
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provision.  We agree.
It is well settled under New York law that retroactive
operation of legislation "is not favored by courts and statutes
will not be given such construction unless the language expressly
or by necessary implication requires it" (Majewski v Broadalbin-
Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 584 [1998]).  But it is
also true that "[a] statute is not retroactive . . . when made to
apply to future transactions merely because such transactions
relate to and are founded upon antecedent events" (Forti v New
York State Ethics Commn., 75 NY2d 596, 609 [1990] [internal
quotation marks and citation omitted]).
In Miller, a nurse aide physically abused a nursing
home patient in 1991.  After a hearing, the Commissioner of
Health sustained the charge of patient abuse.  Pursuant to 10
NYCRR 415.4 (b) (1) (ii) (b), enacted after the incident took
place, the nurse aide was fired and prohibited from future
employment with any nursing home.  She commenced a CPLR article
78 proceeding, challenging the Commissioner's retroactive
enforcement of a regulation barring future employment once a
finding of abuse had been lodged with the Nurse Aide Registry.
In rejecting the nurse aide's contention, we concluded
in Miller that the regulation had not been inappropriately
applied retroactively.  We reasoned that "where the requirements
for engaging in specified professional activity are changed to
govern future professional eligibility, a statute does not
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No. 63
3  For the same reason, we reject petitioner's contention
that Administrative Code § 26-124 (c), as applied to him,
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operate retroactively in any true sense even though its
application may be triggered by an event which occurred prior to
its effective date" (90 NY2d at 790 [internal quotation marks,
citations, brackets and emphasis omitted]).  We further explained
that the provision was a safety measure designed to regulate
future employment by precluding nursing homes from hiring nurse
aides who had been previously found guilty of abuse.  As a
result, the Commissioner's application of the regulation was not
improper merely because the nurse aide's disqualifying conduct
occurred before its promulgation.
The Miller rationale controls the question of
retroactivity in this case.  Administrative Code § 26-124 (c)
authorizes the Commissioner to refuse to accept applications or
documents from "any person" found to have knowingly or
negligently submitted falsified materials to DOB.  By its terms,
the provision aims to regulate future professional eligibility. 
And similar to the regulation at issue in Miller, the underlying
purpose of the code provision is to promote public safety given
the vast number of documents filed with and relied upon by DOB
each year.  The fact that petitioner's inability to file papers
with DOB for a future period of time is predicated on prior false
filings does not render the Commissioner's application of the
provision retroactive.3  Hence, contrary to petitioner's
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No. 63
constitutes an ex post facto law in violation of the Federal
Constitution (see Forti, 75 NY2d at 610 n 4).
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position, "the principles of statutory construction which require
clear expression of a legislative intention to make a new
provision retroactive are inapplicable here" (Forti, 75 NY2d at
610 [internal citations omitted]).
The Commissioner therefore properly relied on
Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) in determining that DOB would
preclude petitioner from submitting any documents for two years,
with a three-year probationary period thereafter.  Based on
petitioner's repeated certification and submission of false
materials, we further conclude that the Commissioner's
determination does not shock the conscience (see Matter of Kelly
v Safir, 96 NY2d 32, 38 [2001], rearg denied 96 NY2d 854 [2001]).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs, and the
petition dismissed in its entirety.
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Judgment, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with costs, and
petition dismissed in its entirety.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and
Jones concur.
Decided April 29, 2010