Title: Martel v. Lanman

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Martel  v. Lanman (99-388); 171 Vt. 65; 759 A.2d 65 

[Filed 14-Apr-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 21-Aug-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-388

                              MARCH TERM, 2000

Eugene P. Martel	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Caledonia Superior Court
                                       }	
Kathleen Lanman, Superintendent,       }
Northern State Correctional Facility   }	DOCKET NO. 79-4-99 Cacv	

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       In this appeal from a Caledonia Superior Court decision granting the
  Department of Correction's  (DOC)  motion to dismiss, petitioner argues
  that the DOC did not properly credit him for time  served.  We affirm.  

       The relevant facts are undisputed.  On July 23, 1992, petitioner was
  sentenced for aggravated assault,  escape, simple assault, and violation of
  conditions of release, to a term of one-to-six years of  incarceration
  ("first sentence").  On March 29, 1994, petitioner was sentenced for sexual
  assault to  a term of fifteen-to-twenty years of incarceration ("second
  sentence").  The second sentence was  imposed consecutively to the first
  sentence.  See 13 V.S.A. § 7032(b) (granting court authority to  impose
  consecutive sentences "where a person is convicted of two or more offenses
  punishable by  imprisonment and is sentenced for more than one of these
  offenses").  The imposition of the fifteen-to-twenty year sentence for
  sexual assault, added to the one-to-six year sentence for petitioner's 1992 
  offenses, resulted in an aggregate sentence of a minimum term of sixteen
  years and a maximum term  of twenty-six years.  See 13 V.S.A. § 7032(c)(2)
  ("When [multiple prison terms are imposed]  consecutively, the minimum
  terms are added to arrive at an aggregate minimum to be served equal  to
  the sum of all minimum terms and the maximum terms are added to arrive at
  an aggregate  maximum equal to the sum of all maximum terms. ").  

       Petitioner's claim relates to a period of incarceration between March
  5, 1993, and March 29, 1994.  March 5, 1992, was the date on which he
  served the minimum term of his first sentence, and March  29, 1994, was the
  date his second sentence was imposed.  Petitioner argues that the DOC has
  not  properly awarded him credit toward the second sentence for this
  period.  The DOC responds that  petitioner received credit for the full
  period (approximately thirteen months) toward the first  sentence.  At
  issue is whether the superior court appropriately applied 13 V.S.A. §
  7031(b) in  denying petitioner's claim.  

 

  13 V.S.A. § 7031(b) provides:  

     The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense 
     shall commence to run from the date on which the person is received 
     at the correctional facility for service of the sentence.  The court shall 
     give the person credit toward service of his sentence for any days 
     spent in custody in connection with the offense for which sentence 
     was imposed. 

(Emphasis added.)  

       In State v. Blondin, 164 Vt. 55, 56-57,