Title: Safeco Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co.

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

66 Wn.2d 38 (1965) 401 P.2d 205 SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., Respondent, v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY CO., Appellant.[*] No. 37446. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. April 15, 1965. Guttormsen, Scholfield, Willits & Ager, by Jack P. Scholfield, for appellant. *39 Clinton, Moats, Andersen & Fleck, by James A. Andersen, for respondent. BARNETT, J.[] This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of King County in which plaintiff (respondent) obtained a judgment against defendant (appellant) in the sum of $3,618, plus costs. Final determination is sought as to which of two insurance policies covers liability arising out of a collision between two automobiles. Only one accident occurred and each insurance company contends the other is primarily liable. The respondent Safeco Insurance Company of America, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Safeco), carried the liability insurance of one Arnold W. Gilbert. The appellant Pacific Indemnity Co. (hereinafter referred to as Pacific), carried the liability insurance of Claude Larson, doing business as Larson Auto Brokers. The case was tried without a jury and the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to Safeco. The court found, inter alia, Pacific assigns as error the admitting into evidence of certain testimony of James Gilbert. He testified by deposition. The question propounded was: The court sustained the objection to the first sentence and admitted the last. It is argued that the answer was not responsive. Patently the answer was competent and admissible with reference to the implied permission of James Gilbert to drive the car and it was not reversible error requiring a new trial. Bussard v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 44 Wn.2d 417, 267 P.2d *41 1062. Furthermore, the testimony was adduced by deposition. The court can see upon inspection that, although the form of the question may be technically objectionable, the answer furnishes proper evidence. Substance, rather than form, should be heeded. See 16 Am. Jur. Depositions § 132, p. 757. The second assignment of error focuses attention upon finding of fact No. 4. It is contended that the evidence does not support a finding that Laddie Henderson was told that the car was for James Gilbert, when that salesman stated as much in a conversation he had with Arnold Gilbert and James Gilbert. It is urged, also, that there is no evidence that persons under 21 would be permitted to take cars out if accompanied by a responsible adult, or that James Gilbert was given implied permission to drive the car. The testimony of James Gilbert to which we have previously made reference sustains the finding that the salesman knew that the car was intended for James Gilbert. Relating to whether persons under 21 would be permitted to take cars out, Claude Larson's pretrial deposition reads in part: Later at trial, on cross-examination, Mr. Larson testified: On direct examination, Mr. Larson testified to the effect that he would not let a teenager drive unless he or a salesman went along. [1] Pacific contends that the testimony elicited from Mr. Larson leads to a contrary inference than that persons under 21 would be permitted to take cars out if accompanied by a responsible adult. Such an argument relates to the weight of the evidence only rather than to the lack *42 of it. Since there was substantial evidence to warrant the trial court's finding, we will not disturb that finding. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183. The second and third assignments of error question whether there was sufficient evidence to find that James Gilbert was given implied permission to drive the car and was an insured under Pacific liability. The omnibus clause in the Pacific liability policy provides as follows: In the instant case, we have a 16-year-old boy who went with his father to a used car lot for the purpose of looking at a used car to be purchased for the son. The boy was a licensed driver. A salesman showed a car owned by the Larson Auto Brokers to the father and son. The salesman knew the car was being purchased for the son. It was part of the established practice and usage at this lot to let prospective purchasers try out automobiles before they bought them. Approximately 5 per cent of the cars sold at this time at this lot were sold to persons under 21 years of age. It was the established custom and usage at this lot that when persons under 21 years of age came in with a responsible adult they would be permitted to take out a car together. The father was given express permission to drive the car. There was no admonition against the car being driven by the son. Does the evidence justify a finding that Larson gave implied permission to James to drive the car? [2] This court, in McKee v. Garrison, 37 Wn.2d 37, 39, 221 P.2d 514, discussed "implied permission" contained in a policy of liability insurance: ".... Pacific relies heavily upon McKee, supra, because the court held that where the owner of an automobile requested a neighbor to find out what was wrong with the brake which was "grabbing," permission to drive the automobile could not be inferred merely because the neighbor, in experimenting with the operation of the brake, thought such a venture would better enable him to discover the cause of its "grabbing." We said, p. 40: Is there any doubt that the used car salesman in the instant case, knowing that the car was to be purchased for the boy, entertained the slightest notion that the boy *44 would not drive the car to test it with his father? A woman may not know how brakes are tested, but surely a used car salesman knows that a father is going to let his son test-drive a car that is bought for the son. The sagacious trial judge did not err in his ruling. Safeco also contends in essence that, because Arnold Gilbert was given express permission to use the car, to try it out, there being no deviation from that use, Arnold Gilbert had implied permission to delegate the driving to James. Not only was it the son's purpose to look for a car for himself, but looking for a car for his son was likewise the father's purpose. The accident occurred near the used car lot just after the Gilberts had picked up the car and, while the Gilberts were fulfilling the purpose of trying it out, the son was permitted by the father to drive. These facts come within the purview of Wood v. Kok, 58 Wn.2d 12, 360 P.2d 576. In that case, Kok was granted permission by the owner of the car to take possession for the purpose of trying it out in contemplation of trading automobiles. He permitted a 14-year-old girl friend, an unlicensed driver, to drive the car. While she was driving and he was sitting next to her, the accident occurred. The Woods were granted judgment against Kok. The girl driver was a stranger to the owner of the car, who did not know Kok was permitting her to drive until after the accident. In holding that Kok came within the omnibus clause of a policy, this court said, p. 15: See, also, 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile Insurance § 117, p. 435. [3] In a case, not cited in the briefs, recently decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, State Farm Mut. *45 Auto Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 331 F.2d 517, 520, the court said: Here, we have the relationship of father and son, each looking for a car for the son. Under this second theory also, Arnold Gilbert had implied permission to delegate the driving of the car to his son James. Referring now to the fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error, Pacific contends that, in the event the court should find it liable, the loss should be sustained by both companies on a pro rata basis. This argument is premised on the respective provisions of the two policies. The Safeco policy provides: The Pacific policy reads: It is argued that the two policies are in conflict and there is no logical reason or legal basis for the court to prefer one over the other. In approaching this question, we call attention to Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of *46 America, 181 Wash. 353, 43 P.2d 12, not cited in the briefs of either counsel. In that case, where the liability insurer of a real-estate company and the liability insurer of an agent of that company on account of whose negligence in driving her automobile it appeared that the policy issued to the agent specifically indemnified her from action taken against her individually by her employer, it was held that the insurer of the real-estate company could not be held liable until liability exceeded the coverage afforded by the policy issued to the agent, since the former policy was an excess limit policy only. In 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4914, p. 400, it is said: [4] The question to be determined is who has the primary liability. In 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile Insurance § 202, p. 544, the rule is stated as follows: It is argued that the "excess" provision in Safeco's policy conflicts with the "prorating" provision in Pacific's policy. This is not necessarily so, however. In 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4914, p. 403, it is said: In American Surety Co. of New York v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir.1958), it was held that an excess insurance clause in a motor vehicle liability policy is neither invalid nor unconscionable and may be given effect without invalidating a pro rata contribution clause in a policy providing other protection. In Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189, 193 (6th Cir.1959), the court, citing the majority view, held that In Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Cas. Co., 135 Mont. 475, 342 P.2d 748, the court cited Appleman, supra, in holding that even though a garage policy provided that its coverage applied only pro rata that excess coverage provided by a nonownership policy was not other insurance as to which liability could be applied. We have examined numerous authorities dealing with this problem and find that the overwhelming majority view supports the finding of the trial court that Pacific has the primary liability under the provisions of the two policies. Judgment affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., WEAVER, HUNTER, and HAMILTON, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 401 P.2d 205. [] Judge Barnett is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.