Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. James E. Hammis

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP468-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  James E. Hammis,  Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross-
Appellant, 
     v. 
James E. Hammis, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HAMMIS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 20, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross-appellant there were 
briefs by Robert G. Krohn and Roethe Pope Roethe LLP, Edgerton, 
and oral argument by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs by Lester A. Pines and Cullen Weston Pines & Bach LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Lester A. Pines. 
 
 
2011 WI 3
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP468-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against James E. Hammis, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
James E. Hammis, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 20, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney James E. Hammis appeals a 
report filed by Referee Lisa Goldman on January 7, 2010, 
concluding that Attorney Hammis committed 10 of 13 alleged 
counts of professional misconduct, recommending this court 
suspend him for a period of four months, and recommending 
imposition of costs.  Attorney Hammis does not appeal the 
referee's findings or conclusions of law but seeks a shorter 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
2 
 
suspension.  The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) cross-appeals 
contending the referee should not have recommended dismissal of 
one of the disciplinary counts and seeks a longer suspension.  
The court heard oral argument in this matter on September 14, 
2010. 
¶2 
Attorney Hammis was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1988.  He has not previously been disciplined.  He 
currently practices in Stoughton, Wisconsin.  The allegations 
contained in the OLR complaint pertain to alleged misconduct 
involving two clients, practicing law while administratively 
suspended, and Attorney Hammis' subsequent failure to cooperate 
with the OLR investigation.  On February 24, 2009, the OLR filed 
a 13-count complaint against Attorney Hammis alleging misconduct 
related to Attorney Hammis' representation of S.H. in a parole 
revocation matter (Counts 1 through 3); billing anomalies 
related to the representation of S.H. (Count 4); practicing law 
and/or misrepresenting his status while under suspension (Counts 
5 through 8); failing to respond to the OLR (Count 9); and 
Attorney Hammis' representation of V.T. (Counts 10 through 13).  
Attorney Hammis admitted six of the 13 charges (Counts 2, 5, 7, 
8, 9, and 12).  He contested the other seven allegations.  The 
referee conducted the evidentiary hearing on September 10, 2009, 
and rendered her report and her recommendation for a four-month 
suspension.  
¶3 
The issues on this appeal involve the appropriate 
discipline and whether the referee should have recommended 
dismissal of one of the charges.  Thus, the parties do not 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
3 
 
dispute the referee's factual findings and we agree that the 
record supports those findings.   
¶4 
Attorney Hammis accepted an appointment from the 
Office of the State Public Defender (SPD) to represent S.H. in a 
parole revocation matter on February 8, 2007.  Attorney Hammis 
provided S.H. with a copy of the revocation materials and met 
with S.H. twice prior to the revocation hearing.  During one of 
these meetings S.H. told Attorney Hammis that he believed he had 
a potential sentence credit issue.  At the revocation hearing, 
Attorney Hammis requested additional time to investigate the 
possible sentence credit issue.  
¶5 
On or about May 8, 2007, S.H. sent a letter to 
Attorney Hammis specifically asking Attorney Hammis for the case 
file if Attorney Hammis was not going to assist S.H. with the 
sentence credit issue.  
¶6 
Attorney Hammis responded in a letter dated May 26, 
2007, advising S.H. that the sentence credit issues were beyond 
the scope of his appointment and that S.H. should contact the 
SPD for further assistance.    
¶7 
S.H. testified that he never received this letter.  
S.H. then sent Attorney Hammis a written request for his 
complete file.  Attorney Hammis did not respond to this request.  
On July 15, 2007, S.H. filed a grievance with the OLR regarding 
Attorney Hammis' representation.  The OLR duly sent Attorney 
Hammis a letter regarding this grievance that stated in the 
event Attorney Hammis was still representing S.H. that he notify 
S.H. regarding the status of the representation and send a copy 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
4 
 
of such letter to the OLR.  Attorney Hammis did not respond to 
this or to several subsequent written requests for information 
from the OLR.1 
¶8 
After terminating his representation of S.H., Attorney 
Hammis billed the SPD for his work on this file.  The SPD 
challenged Attorney Hammis' billing records in the S.H. matter 
and in 93 other cases he handled for the SPD.  Eventually, at 
the SPD's direction, Attorney Hammis conducted an audit of some 
63 cases he had handled for the SPD.  Attorney Hammis eventually 
admitted that he had billed the SPD for work on S.H.'s case, 
including an appeal, that he did not actually perform.2   
¶9 
Meanwhile, Attorney Hammis failed to comply with his 
continuing legal education (CLE) requirements.  By letter dated 
March 30, 2007, Attorney Hammis was notified by the Board of Bar 
Examiners (BBE) that he would be automatically suspended from 
                                                 
1 On December 17, 2007, the OLR filed a motion with this 
court seeking an order to show cause as to why Attorney Hammis' 
law license should not be suspended for failing to cooperate 
with the investigation.  Attorney Hammis then responded.  He 
provided the OLR with S.H.'s entire file on January 9, 2008.  
The OLR withdrew its motion for a temporary suspension.  
2 Counsel for the SPD testified she thought Attorney Hammis' 
billing was "out of control."  He "was repeatedly billing more 
than 15 hours in a single day."  Attorney Hammis later admitted 
that approximately half of the 63 files he audited contained 
billing "errors."  
The SPD and Attorney Hammis entered into a settlement 
regarding these billing anomalies and Attorney Hammis was 
directed to remove himself from the list of eligible private bar 
attorneys accepting SPD appointments.  The billing anomalies in 
other cases are not part of the disciplinary matter presently 
before the court. 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
5 
 
the practice of law at 4:30 p.m. on May 29, 2007, if he did not 
comply with CLE reporting requirements.  Attorney Hammis failed 
to comply and was administratively suspended.  On June 1, 2007, 
Attorney Hammis personally signed for a certified letter from 
the BBE which notified Attorney Hammis of this suspension.  
¶10 Attorney 
Hammis continued to practice law after 
receiving notice of his administrative suspension.  He appeared 
in several client criminal matters after May 29, 2007, in 
violation of his suspension.  
¶11 On 
June 
8, 
2007, 
while 
his 
license 
was 
under 
administrative suspension, Attorney Hammis appeared before the 
Honorable Randy Koschnick in a Jefferson County case.  Judge 
Koschnick 
had 
heard 
that 
Attorney 
Hammis 
had 
been 
administratively suspended.  Before the scheduled hearing he 
asked Attorney Hammis if this had been resolved.  Attorney 
Hammis claimed he had cleared up the matter the previous 
afternoon.  Based on Attorney Hammis' misrepresentation, Judge 
Koschnick allowed Attorney Hammis to proceed with the scheduled 
hearing. 
¶12 Later that same day, Attorney Hammis registered and 
signed in for a 3 1/2 hour CLE class titled, "Agricultural and 
Business" at the Wisconsin State Bar Center.  This class was 
scheduled to begin one hour from the time Attorney Hammis 
arrived at the center.  Attorney Hammis then left the State Bar 
Center and drove to the BBE office to file his petition for 
reinstatement.  The petition for reinstatement stated that 
Attorney Hammis had completed the "Agricultural and Business" 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
6 
 
class when, in fact, the course had not begun at the time 
Attorney Hammis filed his petition with the BBE.  Attorney 
Hammis then traveled to a meeting in Portage, Wisconsin, and did 
not return to the CLE course until after 2:15 p.m.  The BBE 
denied Attorney Hammis' petition for reinstatement because it 
ascertained he had filed his petition prior to completion of the 
necessary CLE course.  
¶13 On June 12, 2007, Attorney Hammis did complete a two-
credit CLE course.  On June 13, 2007, he filed a second petition 
for reinstatement.  In his second petition he affirmed he had 
not practiced law during his administrative suspension and 
claimed that he had instructed his office to continue matters 
that were scheduled for the weeks of June 4, 2007, and June 11, 
2007, while he was suspended.  The reinstatement petition failed 
to disclose that Attorney Hammis had actually appeared on behalf 
of six separate clients during his suspension, including the 
plea hearing before Judge Koschnick.  Attorney Hammis also 
failed to notify clients, courts, and opposing counsel in 
pending matters of his administrative suspension between May 30, 
2007, and June 14, 2007.  The BBE, Judge Koschnick, and the SPD 
each separately notified OLR that Attorney Hammis had appeared 
in court while suspended.  Attorney Hammis then failed to 
respond to multiple OLR inquiries regarding these allegations.   
¶14 Following an investigation the OLR filed a 13-count 
complaint against Attorney Hammis.  As noted, Attorney Hammis 
conceded some of the allegations and contested others.  On this 
appeal the only charge that remains in dispute is Count 11.   
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
7 
 
¶15 Count 1 of the OLR complaint alleged that by failing 
to communicate with S.H. between May and December of 2007, 
Attorney Hammis violated former SCR 20:1.4(a)3 and current 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4).4  
¶16 Attorney 
Hammis 
contested 
this 
allegation 
in 
proceedings before the referee.  The referee found that Attorney 
Hammis had sent S.H. a closing letter on May 26, 2007, although 
it appears S.H. did not receive the letter.  The referee thus 
concluded that OLR had failed to meet its burden as to Count 1 
and recommended dismissal of this charge.  OLR does not appeal 
this conclusion.   
¶17 Count 
2 
alleged 
that 
Attorney 
Hammis 
violated 
SCR 22.03(2),5 made actionable via SCR 20:8.4(h),6 by his failure 
                                                 
3 Former SCR 20:1.4(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
stated, "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information." 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4) provides that a lawyer shall "(3) 
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter;" and "(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
by the client for information; . . . ." 
5 SCR 22.03(2) states:   
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
8 
 
to respond to numerous requests for information from the OLR.  
Attorney Hammis conceded the ethical violations described in 
Count 2. 
¶18 Count 3 alleged that Attorney Hammis violated former 
and current SCR 20:1.16(d)7 by failing to provide S.H. with a 
copy of his file upon request or take appropriate steps after 
                                                                                                                                                             
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
6 SCR 20:8.4(h) states it is professional misconduct for a  
lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by 
SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or 
SCR 22.04(1); . . . ." 
7 Former SCR 20:1.16(d) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned or 
incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the 
client to the extent permitted by other law. 
Current SCR 20:1.16(d) (effective July 1, 2007) provides as 
follows: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
9 
 
termination of his representation.  The referee noted that on 
May 2, 2007, S.H. specifically requested that Attorney Hammis 
forward all transcripts and revocation materials to S.H.  
Attorney Hammis testified that S.H. already had his entire file.  
However, the referee noted that nothing in the record indicated 
that Attorney Hammis advised S.H. or the OLR that he believed 
S.H. already had his entire file.  Therefore, whether or not 
S.H. had his entire file, S.H. was left with the impression that 
Attorney Hammis had failed to provide him with documents he 
thought he needed to pursue his sentence credit issue.  
¶19 On January 7, 2008, nearly six months later, Attorney 
Hammis provided OLR with a copy of the entire S.H. file.  
Attorney Hammis later admitted that he never provided S.H. with 
a copy of his entire file or sent a letter responding to the 
file request.  Thus, the referee concluded that Attorney Hammis' 
conduct violated SCR 20:1.16(d).  Attorney Hammis did not appeal 
this conclusion.   
¶20 Count 4 of the OLR complaint alleged Attorney Hammis 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c)8 by billing the SPD for work he did not 
perform in S.H.'s case.  Attorney Hammis' billing statement 
included an entry for 2.8 hours to draft and file an appeal as 
well as an entry to obtain and review a transcript and a 
reference to a letter to S.H. outlining the transcript.  
Attorney Hammis did not actually draft or file an appeal for 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
10 
 
S.H. or send this letter.  The referee concluded that the OLR 
had showed by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 
Attorney Hammis violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by engaging in a repeated 
pattern involving dishonesty when he overbilled the SPD on this 
case.  Attorney Hammis does not appeal this conclusion.   
¶21 Turning to the allegations related to practicing law 
while under suspension, the OLR complaint alleged in Count 5 
that by failing to comply with CLE attendance requirements, and 
for appearing in court on behalf of several clients after he 
knew his license had been suspended for failing to comply with 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
11 
 
CLE requirements, Attorney Hammis violated SCR 31.10(1),9 made 
actionable by former SCR 20:8.4(f).10  
¶22 Attorney Hammis conceded the misconduct alleged in 
Count 5 of the complaint.  Despite his notice and his acceptance 
of a certified letter from the BBE on June 1, 2007, Attorney 
Hammis decided to appear in multiple courts for clients while he 
was suspended.   
¶23 Count 6 of the complaint alleged that Attorney Hammis 
lied to Judge Koschnick on June 8, 2007, about his suspension 
                                                 
9 SCR 31.10(1) provides:   
If a lawyer fails to comply with the attendance 
requirement of SCR 31.02, fails to comply with the 
reporting requirement of SCR 31.03(1), or fails to pay 
the late fee under SCR 31.03(2), the board shall serve 
a notice of noncompliance on the lawyer.  This notice 
shall advise the lawyer that the lawyer’s state bar 
membership 
shall 
be 
automatically 
suspended 
for 
failing to file evidence of compliance or to pay the 
late fee within 60 days after service of the notice.  
The board shall certify the names of all lawyers so 
suspended under this rule to the clerk of the supreme 
court, all supreme court justices, all court of 
appeals and circuit court judges, all circuit court 
commissioners appointed under SCR 75.02(1) in this 
state, all circuit court clerks, all juvenile court 
clerks, all registers in probate, the executive 
director of the state bar of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender’s Office, and the clerks of the 
federal district courts in Wisconsin.  A lawyer shall 
not engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin while 
his or her state bar membership is suspended under 
this rule. 
10 Former SCR 20:8.4(f) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
stated it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "violate a 
statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order or supreme 
court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers; . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
12 
 
status and proceeded to appear before his court while suspended 
in violation of former SCR 20:3.3(a)(l).11  Attorney Hammis 
repeatedly argued that he did not mislead Judge Koschnick 
regarding his suspension status.  Attorney Hammis testified, "I 
looked right in his eyes and I said It's being taken care of 
today, Judge, exactly into his eyes and he said it better be, 
and then he let me go back to the desk."  
¶24 The referee observed that this statement implied that 
Judge Koschnick was willing to bend the rules with Attorney 
Hammis after realizing Attorney Hammis was suspended.  The 
referee explicitly found Attorney Hammis' testimony in this 
regard was "untruthful."  The referee noted, further, that 
Attorney Hammis' claims were inconsistent with his later 
testimony at the hearing.  There, Attorney Hammis admitted that 
at the time of the plea hearing, he knew he was not authorized 
to practice law.  Attorney Hammis was asked, "Knowing that you 
were suspended when you appeared in his court, why did you go 
ahead at that point and make that appearance?"  Attorney Hammis 
replied, "I wanted the client to be on probation as soon as 
possible.  I knew that I was going to have it resolved that day 
or thought in my mind I would have it resolved that day, and I 
made a really bad mistake."  The referee thus found that 
Attorney Hammis appeared before Judge Koschnick knowing he was 
suspended.  The referee observed: 
                                                 
11 Former SCR 20:3.3(a)(l) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided that a lawyer shall not knowingly "make a false 
statement of fact or law to a tribunal; . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
13 
 
Perhaps [Attorney Hammis] lied to Judge Koschnick 
because he did not want the hearing to be rescheduled.   
Perhaps, he lied because he did not want to admit to 
his client, his client's wife, and the district 
attorney that his license to practice law had been 
suspended.  Regardless, I find that Hammis' version of 
what he said to Judge Koschnick when asked about his 
suspension cannot be believed.  I find Judge Koschnick 
correctly reported to OLR the day of the hearing, 
June 8, 2007, that Hammis falsely stated he "'had 
taken care of it' yesterday afternoon and that he was 
no longer suspended."  
The referee noted further that: 
This count more than any of the other counts in the 
complaint cause one to pause and take note of all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding this incident.  It 
is this count which most clearly shows Attorney 
Hammis' willingness to bend the rules, lie, and 
proceed 
recklessly 
with 
his 
obligations 
and 
responsibilities under SCR Chapter 20. 
In sum, the referee found that Attorney Hammis knowingly made a 
false statement of fact to Judge Koschnick regarding his ability 
to practice law on June 8, 2007.  Thus, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Hammis violated former SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).  Attorney 
Hammis does not appeal this conclusion.   
¶25 With respect to Count 7, the OLR complaint alleged 
that Attorney Hammis averred to the BBE that he had attended a 
3 1/2 hour CLE course ("Agricultural and Business") on June 8, 
2007.  In fact, the program had not yet commenced when Attorney 
Hammis filed his petition for reinstatement.  The referee 
concluded this conduct violated SCR 20:8.4(c).  Attorney Hammis 
does not appeal this conclusion.   
¶26 Count 8 of the complaint alleged and the referee 
concluded that Attorney Hammis' failure to notify clients, 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
14 
 
courts, 
and 
opposing 
counsel 
of 
his 
suspension 
violated 
SCR 22.26(1),12 
made 
actionable 
via 
former 
SCR 
20:8.4(f) 
                                                 
12 SCR 22.26(1) states: Activities following suspension or 
revocation. 
(1) On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability 
to act as an attorney following the effective date of 
the suspension or revocation. 
(b) Advise the clients to seek legal advice of 
their choice elsewhere.  
(c) Promptly provide written notification to the 
court or administrative agency and the attorney for 
each party in a matter pending before a court or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as 
an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation.  The notice shall identify 
the successor attorney of the attorney's client or, if 
there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence.   
(d) Within the first 15 days after the effective 
date 
of 
suspension 
or 
revocation, 
make 
all 
arrangements for the temporary or permanent closing or 
winding up of the attorney's practice.  The attorney 
may assist in having others take over clients' work in 
progress.  
(e) Within 25 days after the effective date of 
suspension or revocation, file with the director an 
affidavit showing all of the following: 
(i) Full compliance with the provisions of the 
suspension or revocation order and with the rules and 
procedures regarding the closing of the attorney's 
practice. 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
15 
 
(effective through June 30, 2007).  Attorney Hammis does not 
appeal the conclusion that he committed the misconduct described 
in Count 8 of the complaint.   
¶27 With respect to Count 9, the OLR alleged that Attorney 
Hammis failed to respond to the OLR's multiple requests for 
information about the pending grievances.  The referee concluded 
that by failing to provide a written response to grievance 
matters until January 7, 2008, after three requests for a 
written response, and after this court ordered him to show cause 
why his law license should not be suspended for his failure to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(ii) A 
list 
of 
all 
jurisdictions, 
including 
state, federal and administrative bodies, before which 
the attorney is admitted to practice. 
(iii) A list of clients in all pending matters 
and a list of all matters pending before any court or 
administrative agency, together with the case number 
of each matter.   
(f) Maintain records of the various steps taken 
under this rule in order that, in any subsequent 
proceeding instituted by or against the attorney, 
proof of compliance with the rule and with the 
suspension or revocation order is available.   
(2) An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
practice 
of 
law 
or 
in 
any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may 
engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice 
of law.   
(3) Proof of compliance with this rule is a 
condition precedent to reinstatement of the attorney's 
license to practice law. 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
16 
 
cooperate with OLR's investigations, Attorney Hammis violated 
SCR 22.03(2) as actionable via SCR 20:8.4(h).  Attorney Hammis 
does not appeal this conclusion. 
¶28 The 
OLR 
complaint 
also 
alleged 
four 
counts 
of 
misconduct relating to Attorney Hammis' representation of V.T.  
Two allegations involve failure to refund unearned fees and 
failure to respond to the OLR.  Attorney Hammis conceded the 
misconduct in these two counts (Counts 12 and 13).  Attorney 
Hammis 
contested 
the 
other 
two 
counts 
relating 
to 
his 
representation of V.T.   
¶29 V.T. hired Attorney Hammis in July of 2007 to 
represent him in an action against the Rock River Leisure 
Estates and T.M. and C.M., residents of Rock River, for their 
alleged failure to abide by homeowner rules and regulations.  
Attorney Hammis conducted some initial discovery.  In October of 
2007 and January of 2008 Attorney Hammis prepared draft 
complaints in this matter, but it is undisputed that between 
October 2007 and March 2008 Attorney Hammis never filed the 
complaint, despite continued urging by V.T.  On March 11, 2008, 
V.T. fired Attorney Hammis.  
¶30 V.T. paid Attorney Hammis $2,000 between July 22, 
2007, and March 11, 2008.  Attorney Hammis did not deposit these 
fees in his trust account, and he did not provide written notice 
to V.T. regarding any rights V.T. had, or any obligations 
Attorney Hammis had, upon termination of the representation.  
V.T. subsequently filed a grievance with the OLR regarding 
Attorney Hammis' representation.  
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
17 
 
¶31 In Count 10 of the complaint the OLR alleged that 
Attorney Hammis violated SCR 20:1.113 when he failed to take 
reasonably available steps to pursue V.T.'s civil complaint.  
The referee acknowledged that Attorney Hammis' "conduct and 
procrastination with his client clearly fell below his client's 
expectations of him as his attorney."  However, the referee 
observed, a lawyer does not necessarily violate supreme court 
rules each time a client is dissatisfied with the representation 
received.  The referee ultimately concluded that OLR had failed 
to establish by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence 
that 
Attorney 
Hammis 
lacked 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for his 
representation of V.T.  The referee recommended dismissal of 
this charge.  OLR did not appeal this recommendation.   
¶32 OLR 
does 
appeal the referee's recommendation to 
dismiss Count 11.  There, the OLR alleged that by failing to 
pursue V.T.'s case for a period of over seven months from the 
time he was hired in July 2007 to the time of his discharge in 
March 2008, Attorney Hammis failed to proceed with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.3.14  The OLR asserts that the referee's analysis 
regarding Count 11 is clearly erroneous.  After careful 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:1.1 provides, "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." 
14 SCR 20:1.3 states "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
18 
 
consideration, 
we 
disagree 
and 
accept 
the 
referee's 
recommendation to dismiss Count 11.  
¶33 Attorney Hammis and V.T. exchanged a number of e-mails 
about the strategy and timing of a cease and desist letter and 
the drafting and filing of a separate summons and complaint.  On 
September 7, 2007, V.T. and Attorney Hammis decided to file a 
complaint.  The record demonstrates that over the following 
months V.T. asked, with increasing frustration, about the status 
of the complaint and Attorney Hammis responded with excuses for 
the continuing delay and promises of action that did not 
materialize.  Attorney Hammis and V.T. exchanged messages on 
September 7, 2007, September 26, 2007, October 2, 2007, and 
October 16, 2007, and on October 20, 2007, V.T. still had "yet 
to see the draft."  Three days later, V.T. again asked about the 
status of the complaint.  On October 28, 2007, Attorney Hammis 
made excuses for another delay.  After some further inquiries 
V.T. complained on November 1, 2007, that "getting anything 
substantive is getting to be painful."  On November 7, 2007, 
Attorney 
Hammis 
told 
V.T. 
he 
would 
file 
the 
complaint 
"tomorrow."  On November 19 V.T. again asked Attorney Hammis 
about the status.  By December 4, 2007, V.T., in frustration, 
claimed communication appears to be nonexistent and requested a 
refund of his deposit.  On December 23, 2007, he inquired, 
"STATUS?????"  By December 28, 2007, Attorney Hammis claimed he 
had the complaint and it was drafted against both parties.  In 
V.T.'s letter to Attorney Hammis of March 11, 2008, he referred 
to Attorney Hammis' "empty promises" and all of the delays over 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
19 
 
the past six months.  He asked for the return of his $2,000 
deposit.  Ultimately, V.T. filed a grievance regarding this 
matter.  
¶34 The 
referee 
and 
the 
OLR 
view 
this 
situation 
differently.  The referee acknowledges that Attorney Hammis' 
"conduct may have been unproductive to resolving [V.T.'s] case" 
and that "he did not prioritize [the] case," but ultimately 
concludes that such conduct does not rise to the level of a 
violation of SCR 20:1.3.  The referee explains: 
The record shows numerous [e-mails] back and forth 
between [V.T.] and Hammis.  [V.T.] is clearly asking 
Hammis 
to 
act, 
while 
Hammis' 
actions 
are 
not 
satisfactory to [V.T.]. But, Hammis responded to 
almost every [e-mail) [V.T.] sent him.  Hammis' 
conduct may have been unproductive to resolving 
[V.T.'s] case and it shows he did not prioritize 
[V.T.'s] case.  But it does not rise to the level of a 
violation of SCR 20:1.3 for failing to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness.  [V.T.] was able 
to pursue his matter with subsequent counsel and reach 
a resolution satisfactory to him. [V.T.] was not 
harmed by Hammis' inaction.  
Therefore, the referee concluded the OLR failed to demonstrate 
with clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney 
Hammis violated SCR 20:1.3 and recommended dismissal of the 
charge. 
¶35 The OLR contends this analysis is clearly erroneous.  
According to the OLR, Attorney Hammis' responses to V.T.'s e-
mails "only prolonged the client's frustration."  The OLR 
explains: 
[V.T.] was looking for action, not empty promises to 
act.  The fact that he was later able to pursue the 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
20 
 
case with another attorney may represent a mitigating 
circumstance as to sanction.  It is not a defense to 
the underlying charge.   
The 
unchallenged 
evidence 
is 
that, 
despite 
continuous prodding from the client and his own 
promises, Hammis, in fact, did nothing to meaningfully 
pursue this case for his client for a period of over 
seven months from the time he was hired in July of 
2007 until the time of his discharge in March of 2008.  
The referee admits this delay to be factually proven.  
Her rationale as to why it does not represent a 
violation of SCR 20:1.3 is flawed.  
However, while we do not condone the excessive delay or repeated 
excuses 
offered 
by 
Attorney 
Hammis, 
Attorney 
Hammis 
did 
communicate frequently with his client and was apparently 
attempting to craft an effective and accurate complaint.  We 
therefore accept the referee's recommendation to dismiss the 
claim that Attorney Hammis' conduct violated SCR 20:1.3. 
¶36 In Count 12, the OLR alleged, and Attorney Hammis 
conceded, that Attorney Hammis violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)15 by 
                                                 
15 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) states, in pertinent part, as follows:  
Alternative protection for advanced fees. 
A lawyer who accepts advanced payments of fees 
may deposit the funds in the lawyer's business 
account, 
provided 
that 
a 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction must ultimately approve the lawyer's fee, 
or that the lawyer complies with each of the following 
requirements: 
a. Upon accepting any advanced payment of fees 
pursuant to this subsection, the lawyer shall deliver 
to the client a notice in writing containing all of 
the following information: 
1. the amount of the advanced payment; 
2. the basis or rate of the lawyer's fee; 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
21 
 
initially depositing V.T.'s unearned advance fee payment in his 
business account rather than holding the fees in his client 
trust account until the fees were earned, without providing V.T. 
                                                                                                                                                             
3. any expenses for which the client will be 
responsible; 
4. that the lawyer has an obligation to refund 
any unearned advanced fee, along with an accounting, 
at the termination of the representation; 
5. that the lawyer is required to submit any 
dispute about a requested refund of advanced fees to 
binding arbitration within 30 days of receiving a 
request for such a refund; and 
6. the ability of the client to file a claim with 
the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection if 
the lawyer fails to provide a refund of unearned 
advanced fees.   
b. Upon termination of the representation, the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following: 
1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 
fees; 
2. notice that, if the client disputes the amount 
of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 
binding arbitration, the client must provide written 
notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 
the mailing of the accounting; and 
3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration. 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
22 
 
with 
a 
written 
notice 
as 
required 
pursuant 
to 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m).  
¶37 Finally, in Count 13, the OLR alleged and the referee 
agreed that by failing to refund V.T.'s unearned fee for four 
months following the March 11, 2008, letter terminating his 
services, Attorney Hammis failed to timely refund an unearned 
fee 
upon 
termination 
of 
representation 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:1.16(d).  No appeal from this recommendation was filed.   
¶38 We turn to the question of the appropriate sanctions 
for Attorney Hammis' misconduct.  Attorney Hammis asks the court 
to consider a lesser sanction than the four-month suspension 
recommended by the referee, namely a 60-day suspension.  The OLR 
asserts that four months is inadequate and requests a six-month 
suspension. 
¶39 Consideration of the appropriate discipline requires 
evaluating the following factors: (1) the seriousness, nature, 
and extent of the misconduct; (2) the level of discipline needed 
to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system from 
repetition of the attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to impress 
upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the 
need 
to 
deter 
other 
attorneys 
from 
committing 
similar 
misconduct.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  As 
is frequently the case, sanctions for misconduct can vary 
depending on the precise nature of the facts and any aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances specific to the case.   
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
23 
 
¶40 Attorney Hammis seeks a 60-day suspension.  He 
explains that he violated the supreme court rules during a 
period of stress and disruption in his solo practice, that he 
maintains the confidence and trust of his current clients, that 
the recommended four-month suspension is not consistent with 
this court's preference for progressive discipline, and asserts 
that a 60-day suspension would be more consistent with recent 
disciplinary decisions of this court. 
¶41 Attorney Hammis' appellate brief provides context for 
the misconduct.  He explains that during 2007, when he committed 
the bulk of the rule violations, two things happened: (1) his 
assignment as a receiver for a company in northern Wisconsin 
ballooned from a two-day-per-week obligation to more than full-
time; and (2) his partnership with another lawyer abruptly ended 
when she cleaned out their offices overnight, leaving him to 
find new office space and reorganize his cases.  Basically, he 
states that he "made a serious error: he tried to do too much; 
he tried to maintain his commitments to his Public Defender 
clients and to his private clients."  Attorney Hammis provides 
positive testimonials from several clients and argues that a 60-
day sanction will permit him to "still maintain his practice" 
while a "penalty of four months would make it virtually 
impossible for him to do so without essentially starting his 
practice over."   
¶42 The OLR, however, responds that stress is not a 
mitigating factor in imposing discipline.  Indeed, the OLR 
asserts that the only mitigating factor as to sanction is the 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
24 
 
absence of any prior disciplinary record.  OLR emphasizes the 
pattern of deceit reflected in Attorney Hammis' decisions and 
urges a six-month suspension.   
¶43 We consider appropriate discipline de novo but we are 
guided 
by 
the 
referee's 
thoughtful 
consideration 
and 
recommendations.  The referee stated: 
I am deeply troubled by Hammis' willingness to 
lie in furtherance of his own personal goals.  He 
willingly misled a sitting circuit court judge about 
whether or not he had a valid law license.  He 
repeatedly erred in his systematic billing practices 
to SPD to the point where he often billed for more 
than 15 hours in a day.  He lied on his petition for 
reinstatement when he asserted he had not practiced 
law without a license during his suspension.  An 
omission is as much of a lie as a false statement.  
Hammis' 
failure 
to 
notify 
other 
judges 
of 
his 
suspension and his failure to notify his clients of 
his suspension are lies too.  
The referee was thus of the opinion that Attorney Hammis had 
shown a repeated willingness to lie to satisfy his own interests 
or what he perceived as the prevailing interest.  She states: 
The 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Conduct, 
without 
equivocation, prohibit lying.  Our system relies upon 
the honesty of its participants.  It really [cannot] 
function otherwise.  Hammis has wholly failed in these 
matters to follow that basic rule.  It is clear that 
Hammis was under considerable stress after the demise 
of his law firm partnership and the increased stress 
associated 
with 
a 
particularly 
complicated 
and 
difficult case.  But, stress alone should not cause an 
attorney to be repeatedly untruthful.  
In light of the record before us and the referee's observations, 
we agree with the referee and the OLR that the 60-day suspension 
sought by Attorney Hammis is simply inadequate, particularly in 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
25 
 
light of the unacceptable pattern of lying and deceit committed 
by Attorney Hammis.  
¶44 Accordingly, we carefully consider the OLR's request 
for a more lengthy six-month suspension.  It is important to 
note that a six-month suspension involves more than just an 
additional two-month period of time.  Pursuant to the supreme 
court rules, a six-month suspension requires the suspended 
attorney 
to 
formally 
petition 
the 
supreme 
court 
for 
reinstatement pursuant to SCR 22.28(3), a process which requires 
a full evidentiary hearing and further delays a suspended 
attorney's return to practice for a significant length of time.  
See SCRs 22.29-22.33.  It was in part for this reason the 
referee opined that a six-month suspension would be too harsh 
considering the fact that Attorney Hammis has not previously 
been disciplined.  Both parties presented case law in support of 
their respective positions but the cases are highly fact 
specific.  On balance, we conclude that a four-month suspension 
is sufficient to accomplish the objective of professional 
discipline and is consistent with our precedent.  
¶45 Attorney Hammis concedes he committed these ethical 
violations at a time of significant disruption to his legal 
practice, 
while overextended professionally and trying to 
maintain 
his 
practice 
during 
the 
break-up 
of 
his 
legal 
partnership.  He acknowledges he "made a serious error: he tried 
to do too much."  Many of his ethical infractions such as 
failing to timely maintain compliance with CLE credits and 
billing anomalies, suggest office management issues.  We 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
26 
 
conclude that our goal of protecting the public from similar 
misconduct would be served by imposing certain conditions on 
Attorney Hammis' license to practice law and seeking to ensure 
better case handling practices in the future.  We direct him to 
successfully complete a law office management class approved by 
the OLR, such as the State Bar of Wisconsin's Law Office 
Management Program, within six months of the date of this order.  
Finally, we accept the referee's recommendation that we impose 
the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Hammis. 
¶46 IT IS ORDERED that the license of James E. Hammis to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of four 
months, effective March 1, 2011. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within six months of the 
date of this order James E. Hammis shall complete an OLR-
approved office management course.  If James E. Hammis fails to 
comply with this condition absent a showing of his inability to 
do so, James E. Hammis' license to practice law in Wisconsin may 
be suspended until further order of the court. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order James E. Hammis pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which total $16,526.73 
as of September 28, 2010.  If costs are not paid within the time 
specified and absent a showing of his inability to pay, James E. 
Hammis' license to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain 
suspended until further order of the court. 
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James E. Hammis shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
27 
 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
 
No. 
2009AP468-D   
 
 
 
1