Title: Lawyer Regulation System of the State of Wisconsin v. Joan F. Kessler

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 121 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1529-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joan F. Kessler, Attorney at Law:   
 
Lawyer Regulation System of the State of 
Wisconsin by Gregory S. Bonney, Special 
Investigator,   
     Complainant,  
 
v. 
Joan F. Kessler   
     Respondent.   
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KESSLER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 14, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 121 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP1529-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joan F. Kessler, Attorney at Law: 
 
Lawyer Regulation System of the State of 
Wisconsin by Gregory S. Bonney, Special 
Investigator, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joan F. Kessler, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 14, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.  Proceeding dismissed. 
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   This 
is 
an 
attorney 
disciplinary 
proceeding against Joan F. Kessler.  Ms. Kessler is currently a 
judge on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  At the time of the 
events that formed the basis for the complaint filed on behalf 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
2 
 
of the Lawyer Regulation System (LRS),1 Ms. Kessler was a 
practicing attorney and a partner in the Milwaukee office of the 
law firm of Foley & Lardner.  The LRS is seeking to have 
discipline imposed on Ms. Kessler as a lawyer, not as a judge.  
Consequently, this opinion will refer to her as Attorney 
Kessler. 
¶2 
In this proceeding, we review the recommendation of 
the referee, John Nicholas Schweitzer, that the disciplinary 
complaint against Attorney Kessler be dismissed.  Because no 
party has appealed from the referee's report and recommendation, 
our review proceeds pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).2 
                     
1 The complainant in this disciplinary proceeding is the 
Lawyer Regulation System rather than the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR).  This is due to the fact that during the time 
of the underlying events before her election to the court of 
appeals, Attorney Kessler served as a referee in attorney 
disciplinary proceedings.  Thus, the OLR was required under 
SCR 22.25 to appoint a special investigator who was not a 
participant in the lawyer regulation system and was not on the 
panel of counsel whom the OLR could retain to assist it in its 
duties.  In this case, Attorney Bruce Rosen was initially 
appointed as the special investigator.  Attorney Rosen was 
subsequently replaced as the special investigator by Attorney 
Gregory S. Bonney.  When a participant in the lawyer regulation 
system, such as Attorney Kessler, is alleged to have committed 
misconduct, 
the 
matter 
is 
also 
referred 
to 
the 
special 
preliminary review panel, which is separate from the preliminary 
review panel to which regular attorney disciplinary matters are 
referred.  Thus, because the OLR is not involved in any way in 
investigating or prosecuting a complaint against an attorney who 
is a participant in Wisconsin's lawyer regulation system, the 
complaint 
is 
brought 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Lawyer 
Regulation System by the special investigator. 
2 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
(continued) 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
After 
thoroughly reviewing the matter under the 
required standard of review, we conclude that the referee's 
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and that those 
factual findings require the dismissal of the disciplinary 
charges brought by the LRS against Attorney Kessler.  In most 
instances, such a dismissal would occur by unpublished order.  
Because of the fact that the respondent attorney in this matter 
is now a sitting judge and due to the need to provide a full 
explanation for the decision we reach, we are issuing our 
decision in the form of a detailed, published per curiam 
opinion. 
¶4 
This attorney disciplinary proceeding was formally 
initiated with the filing of a complaint and order to answer by 
the LRS.  The LRS's complaint alleged two counts of professional 
misconduct against Attorney Kessler.  In Count One, the 
complaint alleged that at an interview with the special 
investigator on June 8, 2004, Attorney Kessler had falsely 
stated that to her knowledge neither she nor anyone in her 
campaign nor anyone she knew had any part in the filing of a 
complaint against Judge Charles Schudson with the Wisconsin 
Judicial Commission.  Count One further alleged that Attorney 
                                                                  
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
4 
 
Kessler had reiterated that false statement under oath at a 
subsequent 
interview 
with 
the 
special 
investigator 
on 
September 1, 2005.  It claimed that these two knowingly false 
statements 
to 
a 
LRS 
special 
investigator 
had 
violated 
SCRs 20:8.13 and 20:8.4(c).4 
¶5 
Count Two of the complaint similarly alleged that 
Attorney Kessler had falsely stated during the two separate 
interviews identified above that she did not know who had leaked 
information about the Judicial Commission complaint against 
Judge Schudson to the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.  Count Two 
claimed that Attorney Kessler's knowingly false statements on 
this topic also violated SCRs 20:8.1 and 20:8.4(c). 
                     
3 SCR 20:8.1 states: 
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a 
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application 
or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall 
not:   
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material 
fact; or  
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct 
a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen 
in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a 
lawful demand for information from an admissions or 
disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not 
require disclosure of information otherwise protected 
by SCR 20:1.6.  
4 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
5 
 
¶6 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the referee 
found that the relevant facts were as follows.  In July 2002 
then-Court of Appeals Judge Charles Schudson wrote a letter (the 
Schudson letter) to United States District Judge Charles 
Clevert, in which Judge Schudson commented favorably on Attorney 
Charles Hausmann.  At the time of the letter, Attorney Hausmann 
was awaiting sentencing before Judge Clevert following Attorney 
Hausmann's criminal conviction.   
¶7 
Attorney Kessler ran against Judge Schudson for a seat 
on the court of appeals in 2004.  Attorney Kessler testified at 
the disciplinary hearing that prior to beginning her campaign, 
she learned of the Schudson letter.  She considered the Schudson 
letter to be a possible violation of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct5 and determined that she wanted to see the letter and 
other relevant documents before using the issue of the letter in 
her campaign against Judge Schudson. 
¶8 
In September 2003, after learning that the federal 
court's physical case file in the Hausmann case was then located 
                     
5 Supreme Court Rule 60.03(2), which generally prohibits the 
use of the prestige of a judicial office to advance the 
interests of the judge or others, provides that "[a] judge may 
not testify voluntarily as a character witness."  The comment to 
that provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct explains how the 
rule applies to the sending of letters or the giving of 
testimony in the context of a sentencing decision by another 
judge:  "However, a judge must not initiate the communication of 
information to a sentencing judge or a probation or corrections 
officer but may provide to such persons information for the 
record in response to a formal request."  SCR 60.03(2) 
(comment). 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
6 
 
at the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Chicago, Attorney Kessler asked a colleague in Foley & Lardner's 
Chicago office to obtain a copy of the Schudson letter and the 
trial court docket record for the Hausmann case.  The docket 
record was necessary to ascertain whether Judge Schudson had 
written the letter in response to a formal request or whether he 
had written the letter of his own accord.  See SCR 60.03(2). 
¶9 
In 
response 
to 
Attorney 
Kessler's 
request, 
the 
colleague provided Attorney Kessler with a copy of a 16-page 
docket record from the Hausmann case that was printed from the 
federal PACER system (the PACER document).  The PACER system is 
a federal internet-based service that allows individuals or law 
firms to access documents or information from federal judicial 
case files.  In order to use the PACER system, one needs to 
register and obtain a PACER login code.  When one connects to 
the PACER system, there is a separate field that allows the user 
to enter a "client code." 
¶10 The 
docket 
record 
shown 
on 
the 
PACER 
document 
indicated that the Schudson letter was a public document and a 
part of the official case record in the Hausmann federal 
criminal proceeding.  The final page of the PACER document the 
colleague provided to Attorney Kessler contained a "Transaction 
Receipt."  That receipt indicated that the PACER document had 
been generated on September 29, 2003.  The receipt shows a 
"PACER Login" of "fl0025" and a "Client Code" of "460439-0001 
LT." 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
7 
 
¶11 Attorney 
Kessler 
talked 
with 
her 
husband, 
Fred 
Kessler,6 about the Schudson letter and whether it constituted a 
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Fred Kessler is an 
attorney licensed to practice law in this state and is currently 
a member of the Wisconsin legislature.  He was heavily involved 
in assisting Attorney Kessler's 2003-04 judicial campaign.  When 
Attorney Kessler obtained the PACER document, she provided a 
copy of it to her husband.  In addition, Attorney Kessler also 
gave copies of the PACER document to one or more friends who 
were also assisting her judicial campaign. 
¶12 According 
to 
Fred 
Kessler's 
testimony 
at 
the 
disciplinary hearing, in October 2003 he had lunch with Mary 
Moser, the wife of former Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judge 
William Moser.  Mrs. Moser had earlier indicated that she would 
be willing to assist Attorney Kessler's campaign.  During their 
meeting, Fred Kessler asked Mrs. Moser to file a complaint 
against Judge Schudson with the Wisconsin Judicial Commission 
regarding the Schudson letter.7  He drafted a complaint letter 
                     
6 In order to avoid confusion between the two Kesslers, this 
opinion will refer to Attorney Frederick P. Kessler as "Fred 
Kessler." 
7 An attorney disciplinary complaint was later filed against 
Fred Kessler arising out of a statement he allegedly made to 
Mrs. Moser during the October 2003 meeting suggesting that she 
not answer truthfully any questions about the source of her 
knowledge of the Schudson letter.  The disciplinary proceeding 
against Fred Kessler is being resolved in a separate opinion 
also issued today.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fred 
Kessler, 2010 WI 120 (Case No. 2008AP834-D). 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
8 
 
for her signature and provided to her, among other things, a 
copy of the Schudson letter and a copy of the PACER document to 
be used as attachments to her complaint letter.  On October 31, 
2003, as requested by Fred Kessler, Mrs. Moser filed the 
complaint letter with the Judicial Commission, with the copies 
of the Schudson letter and the PACER document attached. 
¶13 Judge Schudson became aware of the complaint filed 
against him.  He has acknowledged that after learning of the 
complaint against him, he discussed it with other judges.  In 
February 2004 Judge Schudson filed a grievance against Attorney 
Kessler with the OLR concerning a number of issues.  Because 
Attorney 
Kessler 
had 
served 
as 
a 
referee 
in 
attorney 
disciplinary cases, the grievance against her was referred to 
Attorney Bruce Rosen as a special investigator pursuant to 
SCR 22.25. 
¶14 On March 8, 2004, a column in the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel published information about the substance of the 
complaint against Judge Schudson that had been filed with the 
Judicial Commission.  The information about the filing of the 
complaint was supposed to have been maintained as confidential 
at that time under Wis. Stat. § 757.93 because the Judicial 
Commission had not filed a petition or formal complaint against 
Judge Schudson.8 
                     
8 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 757.93 
(2003-04) 
provided:  
Confidentiality of proceedings.  
(1)(a) All proceedings under ss. 757.81 to 757.99 
relating to misconduct or permanent disability prior 
(continued) 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
9 
 
                                                                  
to the filing of a petition or formal complaint by the 
commission are confidential unless a judge or circuit 
or supplemental court commissioner waives the right to 
confidentiality in writing to the commission. Any such 
waiver does not affect the confidentiality of the 
identity of a person providing information under par. 
(b).  
(b) Any person who provides information to the 
commission concerning possible misconduct or permanent 
disability 
may 
request 
that 
the 
commission 
not 
disclose his or her identity to the judge or circuit 
or supplemental court commissioner prior to the filing 
of a petition or a formal complaint by the commission.  
(2) If prior to the filing of a formal complaint 
or a petition an investigation of possible misconduct 
or permanent disability becomes known to the public, 
the commission may issue statements in order to 
confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify 
the 
procedural 
aspects 
of 
the 
disciplinary 
proceedings, to explain the right of the judge or 
circuit or supplemental court commissioner to a fair 
hearing without prejudgment, to state that the judge 
or circuit or supplemental court commissioner denies 
the allegations, to state that an investigation has 
been completed and no probable cause was found or to 
correct public misinformation.  
(3) The petition or formal complaint filed under 
s. 757.85 by the commission and all subsequent 
hearings thereon are public.  
(4) This 
section 
does 
not 
preclude 
the 
commission, in its sole discretion, from:  
(a) Referring to the director of state courts 
information relating to an alleged delay or an alleged 
temporary 
disability 
of 
a 
judge 
or 
circuit 
or 
supplemental court commissioner.  
(b) Referring to an appropriate law enforcement 
authority information relating to possible criminal 
conduct 
or 
otherwise 
cooperating 
with 
a 
law 
enforcement authority in matters of mutual interest.  
(continued) 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
10 
 
¶15 Attorney Kessler defeated Judge Schudson in the April 
2004 general election for a seat on the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals.  Attorney Kessler began serving her first term as a 
court of appeals judge on August 1, 2004. 
¶16 On 
June 
8, 
2004, 
Special 
Investigator 
Rosen 
interviewed Attorney Kessler regarding the grievance filed by 
Judge 
Schudson.  
At the end of the interview, Special 
Investigator Rosen informed Attorney Kessler that he had 
received a copy of the complaint letter and the attachments that 
had been filed against Judge Schudson with the Judicial 
Commission.  He also stated that the complaint letter had been 
filed by Mrs. Moser.  He specifically showed Attorney Kessler 
the "Transaction Receipt" from the PACER document that had been 
attached to Mrs. Moser's complaint letter, with the "fl0025" 
Login Code.  Special Investigator Rosen then asked Attorney 
Kessler whether she, anyone in her campaign, or anyone she knew, 
to her knowledge, had any part in the filing of the complaint 
against Judge Schudson.  Attorney Kessler's response to that 
                                                                  
(c) Referring to an attorney disciplinary agency 
information relating to the possible misconduct or 
incapacity of an attorney or otherwise cooperating 
with an attorney disciplinary agency in matters of 
mutual interest.  
(d) Disclosing to the chief justice or director 
of state 
courts information relating to matters 
affecting the administration of the courts.  
(e) Issuing an annual report under s. 757.97. 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
11 
 
question was initially to become "extremely stoic."  She then 
answered, "No." 
¶17 The referee credited Attorney Kessler's testimony at 
the disciplinary hearing that she had become thoughtful in 
response to the question because she recognized the documents 
and realized the possibility that they could have come from 
someone associated with her campaign.9  The referee made a 
specific factual finding, however, that Attorney Kessler did not 
know at the time of the June 8, 2004, interview that the 
documents attached to the complaint had come from the copies she 
had distributed to her husband and to a few friends working on 
her campaign. 
¶18 Also during the June 8, 2004, interview, Special 
Investigator Rosen asked Attorney Kessler whether she, anyone in 
her campaign, or anyone she knew, to her knowledge, had leaked 
information about the complaint against Judge Schudson to the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.  Attorney Kessler again answered, 
"No."  The referee accepted Attorney Kessler's testimony on this 
issue, again finding that she, in fact, did not know who had 
leaked the information to the newspaper. 
                     
9 During 
the 
disciplinary 
hearing, 
Attorney 
Kessler 
specifically indicated that at the time of the June 8, 2004, 
interview, she had believed or realized that the page with the 
transaction receipt that was shown to her was connected to the 
PACER document she had obtained from her colleague in Chicago.  
She asserted that she did not mention this realization to 
Special Investigator Rosen because she "did not know what the 
connection was." 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
12 
 
¶19 The referee also credited Attorney Kessler's testimony 
that after the interview had ended, she called her husband and 
asked whether he had played any part in the filing of the 
complaint against Judge Schudson.  He responded that he had been 
involved. 
¶20 The referee further found that Attorney Kessler then 
spoke with her counsel and requested that he provide the 
information about Fred Kessler's involvement in the complaint 
against Judge Schudson to Special Investigator Rosen.  Attorney 
Kessler's counsel did speak to Special Investigator Rosen that 
same day and relayed the information that Fred Kessler had told 
Attorney Kessler——namely, that Fred Kessler had asked a third 
person to file the complaint against Judge Schudson with the 
Judicial Commission. 
¶21 Special 
Investigator 
Rosen 
conducted 
a 
second 
interview of Attorney Kessler on September 1, 2005.  This 
interview was conducted under oath and was transcribed.10  During 
this interview, Special Investigator Rosen again asked Attorney 
Kessler about her claims not to have known who filed the 
complaint against Judge Schudson or who leaked information about 
that complaint to the newspaper.  Attorney Kessler stated that 
                     
10 The transcript of this interview was marked as an exhibit 
for identification purposes at the disciplinary hearing but was 
not received into evidence.  The referee made certain factual 
findings regarding the content of this interview, however, based 
on admissions that Attorney Kessler made in her answer to the 
LRS's complaint. 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
13 
 
all of her answers given during the June 8, 2004, interview had 
been true and correct at the time she had provided them.  
Specifically, she asserted that at the time of the June 8, 2004, 
interview, she had not known who had filed or caused to be filed 
the 
complaint 
against 
Judge 
Schudson 
or 
who 
had 
leaked 
information about that complaint to the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel.  Moreover, she expressly averred that at the time of 
the original interview she had no knowledge that her husband had 
anything to do with the filing of the complaint against Judge 
Schudson. 
¶22 Given these facts as found by the referee, the referee 
considered the two professional misconduct charges set forth in 
the LRS's complaint.  With respect to the question of whether 
Attorney Kessler had lied about having no knowledge as to 
whether anyone in her campaign or anyone she knew had any part 
in the filing of the complaint against Judge Schudson, the 
referee concluded that the evidence was most consistent with a 
conclusion that Fred Kessler had not disclosed his participation 
in the filing of the complaint to Attorney Kessler and that 
Attorney Kessler had not, in fact, known that her husband had 
persuaded a third party to file the complaint.  The referee 
concluded that Attorney Kessler's "stoic" response at the 
June 8, 2004, interview was most likely due to her suspecting 
that the documents had come from her campaign and "beginning to 
connect some dots," but that she did not actually know that the 
documents attached to Mrs. Moser's complaint had come from 
someone associated with the campaign.   
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
14 
 
¶23 The referee acknowledged that one could interpret 
Attorney Kessler's "stoic" response as a realization that her 
ability to deny any connection with the complaint against Judge 
Schudson had been undermined because the paper trail could 
indeed tie her campaign to the complaint, but she nonetheless 
decided to falsely deny any involvement.  The referee further 
acknowledged that one would ordinarily expect some communication 
about the filing of an ethics complaint against an opponent in a 
judicial race between a candidate and her campaign manager, as 
well as between a candidate and her spouse.   
¶24 The 
referee nonetheless concluded that the more 
reasonable explanation here was that Fred Kessler had acted on 
his own and had chosen not to disclose his actions to his wife.  
The referee pointed to Fred Kessler's testimony that he felt 
Attorney Kessler might disagree with his strategy of using a 
third party to file a complaint against her opponent during a 
campaign and so he went with his own judgment.  Consequently, 
the referee concluded that the LRS had failed to prove a 
violation of either SCR 20:8.1 or SCR 20:8.4(c) by the required 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 
¶25 The referee similarly concluded that the LRS had 
failed to prove the allegations of Count Two to the required 
standard of proof.  He stated that the LRS had presented no 
evidence to counter Attorney Kessler's denial of knowledge of 
who had leaked the information about the complaint to the 
newspaper, other than the "weak inference" that Attorney Kessler 
must have known about the source of the leak because it would 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
15 
 
have been beneficial to her campaign.  The referee concluded 
that there were other possibilities regarding the leak of this 
information that were equally as plausible.  First, the leak 
could have come from Mrs. Moser since she had filed the 
complaint against Judge Schudson in the first place.  Second, 
the leak could have resulted, directly or indirectly, from Judge 
Schudson's 
discussions regarding the complaint with other 
judges.  Under either alternative scenario, there was no 
particular reason to believe that Attorney Kessler would have 
known of the source of the leak. 
¶26 The referee commented that in the end, Judge Schudson 
had been correct in surmising that the complaint against him to 
the Judicial Commission had been a campaign tactic that had 
originated with Attorney Kessler's campaign.  That fact, 
however, had not established that the candidate, Attorney 
Kessler, had known who had been involved in the filing of the 
complaint and had falsely denied such knowledge.  Because the 
evidence did not satisfy the LRS's burden of proving a violation 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, the referee 
recommended that the complaint against Attorney Kessler be 
dismissed. 
¶27 Our review of a referee's report and recommendation 
follows well-established standards of review.  We affirm the 
referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 
305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We review the referee's 
conclusions of law, however, on a de novo basis.  Id.  Finally, 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
16 
 
where misconduct is found, we determine the appropriate level of 
discipline given the particular facts of each case, independent 
of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from it.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶28 In this instance, our resolution of this matter 
directly results from the standard of review.  As noted above, 
we are bound by the referee's factual findings as to what 
occurred unless those factual findings are shown to be clearly 
erroneous.  In this case, the referee made several express 
findings of fact that are critical to the resolution of this 
matter.  First, the referee found that Fred Kessler acted on his 
own when he persuaded Mrs. Moser to file a complaint against 
Judge Schudson and to attach the PACER document and the Schudson 
letter to the complaint.  The referee also explicitly found that 
Fred Kessler did not disclose his involvement in the preparation 
of the complaint against Judge Schudson until after the June 8, 
2004, interview in which Attorney Kessler disclaimed knowledge 
of anyone she knew having played a part in the filing of the 
complaint.  Consequently, the referee further expressly found 
that Attorney Kessler did not know of the involvement of her 
husband and campaign manager until she spoke with him following 
the June 8, 2004, interview. 
¶29 Although the LRS argued for contrary findings before 
the referee, it has not appealed the referee's report and has 
not contended that the referee's findings are clearly erroneous. 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
17 
 
¶30 After reviewing the record ourselves, we also do not 
find a basis in the record to conclude that the referee's 
findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  There was no direct 
testimony 
or 
documentary evidence that clearly undermined 
Attorney Kessler's claim of a lack of knowledge at the time of 
her statements during the June 8, 2004, interview.  Indeed, the 
testimony of her husband that he acted on his own and did not 
disclose his meeting with Mrs. Moser to her supported her claim 
of ignorance.  The only testimony to the contrary was Special 
Investigator Rosen's testimony that he had concluded during his 
tenure as the special investigator that Attorney Kessler had 
lied to him at the June 8, 2004, interview.  Special 
Investigator Rosen, however, did not point to any specific 
evidence that supported his personal conclusion. 
¶31 The only possible grounds to overturn the referee's 
factual 
findings, 
then, 
are 
inferences. 
As 
the 
referee 
acknowledged, one could certainly draw inferences adverse to the 
ones drawn by the referee based on the relationship of Fred 
Kessler as Attorney Kessler's husband and campaign manager, and 
also 
based 
on 
Attorney 
Kessler's 
"stoic" 
response 
when 
confronted with the PACER document.  In addition to the possible 
adverse inferences mentioned by the referee, one could also 
infer that because Attorney Kessler recognized the transaction 
receipt as coming from the PACER document when that transaction 
receipt was shown to her during the June 8, 2004, interview, she 
had to know that someone from her campaign had been involved in 
the filing of the complaint since she testified that she had 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
18 
 
provided that document only to her husband/campaign manager and 
to friends who worked on her campaign.  Despite the fact that 
one could draw these inferences that Attorney Kessler had to 
know of her husband's (or some other campaign worker's) 
involvement in the preparation and filing of the complaint 
against Judge Schudson (and therefore made a false statement 
when she denied having such knowledge), those inferences are not 
so strong that they render the referee's inferences unreasonable 
and his resulting findings of fact clearly erroneous.  Under our 
standard of review, we are therefore obligated to accept the 
referee's findings of fact, without regard to whether or not 
members of this court would have reached the same findings if 
they had been required to make the call in the first instance.   
¶32 Given 
the 
facts 
as 
found 
by 
the 
referee, 
it 
necessarily follows that the LRS cannot prove by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Kessler 
knowingly made a false statement of fact in connection with a 
disciplinary investigation (SCR 20:8.1) or engaged in conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation 
(SCR 20:8.4(c)).  Under the facts of this case, a violation of 
either rule would require that Attorney Kessler's claimed lack 
of knowledge was false.  Because the referee found that Attorney 
Kessler did not, in fact, know of her husband's involvement in 
preparing the complaint against Judge Schudson and did not know 
who leaked the complaint information to the newspaper, the LRS 
cannot prove that she knowingly made a false statement of fact 
No. 
2009AP1529-D   
 
19 
 
or engaged in a misrepresentation.  The disciplinary proceeding 
against her must therefore be dismissed. 
¶33 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary proceeding against 
Joan A. Kessler is dismissed without costs. 
¶34 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2009AP1529-D.akz 
 
1 
 
¶35 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur, and I agree that in this case, the Lawyer Regulation 
System cannot prove that Attorney Kessler knowingly made a false 
statement of fact or engaged in a misrepresentation because of 
the deference due to the referee's findings of fact.  Per 
curiam, ¶32.  Specifically, "the referee found that Attorney 
Kessler did not, in fact, know of her husband's involvement in 
preparing the complaint against Judge Schudson and did not know 
who leaked the complaint information to the newspaper."  Id.  As 
the per curiam notes, however, based on the record, this court 
could certainly draw inferences that Attorney Kessler made a 
false statement when she denied having such knowledge, but we 
are nevertheless "obligated to accept the referee's findings of 
fact, without regard to whether or not members of this court 
would have reached the same findings" in the first instance.  
Id., ¶31.  As Justice Prosser, Justice Roggensack, and Justice 
Ziegler noted in the Gableman decision, see In re Judicial 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 62, ¶52, 325 
Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631, this court is to observe the 
findings of facts or stipulation of facts as they exist in the 
record.  As Justice Prosser, Justice Roggensack, and Justice 
Ziegler further observed in the Gableman decision, it is not 
within our province to call for a jury trial or a further fact-
finding process.  See id., ¶54 n.24.  I am pleased that we now 
have unanimous agreement on our proper role in such matters. 
¶36 Simply stated, the per curiam's analysis in this case 
is consistent with the analysis of Justice Prosser, Justice 
No.  2009AP1529-D.akz 
 
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Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler in the Gableman decision.  See 
id., ¶52 ("On review, we employ the rules applicable to civil 
proceedings and we accept the Panel's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  No party contends the Panel's fact 
findings are clearly erroneous or that there is any need for 
further fact-finding.").  However, the per curiam's analysis is 
inconsistent with the writing of Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
Justice Bradley, and Justice Crooks in the Gableman decision, in 
which those three justices disregarded the Judicial Conduct 
Panel's findings of fact and the parties' stipulation of facts.1  
See In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 
2010 WI 61, ¶¶37, 46, 325 Wis. 2d 579, 784 N.W.2d 605.  I am 
pleased to see that here, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice 
Bradley, and Justice Crooks afford proper deference to the facts 
before this court.  The level of deference which we apply to the 
referee's findings of fact in this case should be consistent 
with the deference we owed the Judicial Conduct Panel's findings 
                     
1 An example is instructive.  In this case, the per curiam 
accepts the referee's finding of fact that Attorney Kessler did 
not know of her husband's involvement in preparing the complaint 
against Judge Schudson and did not know who leaked the complaint 
information to the newspaper.  Per curiam, ¶30.  Notably, the 
per curiam accepts that finding of fact despite Special 
Investigator Rosen's conclusion that Attorney Kessler lied to 
him during the June 8, 2004, interview when she denied having 
such knowledge.  Id.  Conversely, in the Gableman case, Chief 
Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, and Justice Crooks called 
for further fact-finding even though there was no dispute that 
the subject language was true.   See In re Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 61, ¶¶19, 37, 325 Wis. 2d 
579, 784 N.W.2d 605. 
No.  2009AP1529-D.akz 
 
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of fact and the factual stipulation in the Gableman decision.  
See Gableman, 325 Wis. 2d 631, ¶52. 
¶37 For the foregoing reason, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2009AP1529-D.MJG 
 
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¶38 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
and 
fully 
adopt 
the 
conclusions 
of 
Justice 
Zeigler's 
concurrence.  This court should apply an appropriate level of 
deference to the referee's findings of fact by observing the 
findings of fact or stipulation of facts as they exist in the 
record.  As the per curiam notes, we are "obligated to accept 
the referee's findings of fact, without regard to whether or not 
members of this court would have reached the same findings" in 
the first instance.  Per curiam, ¶31.  Regardless of whether 
this court could have drawn inferences that Attorney Kessler 
made a false statement when she denied having knowledge of her 
husband's involvement in preparing the complaint against Judge 
Schudson, we are bound by the referee's findings of fact unless 
they have been shown to be clearly erroneous. I agree that in 
this case the Lawyer Regulation System failed to meet that 
standard. I write separately from Justice Zeigler's concurrence 
merely to avoid even the appearance of commenting directly or 
indirectly on a case in which I was a party. 
 
No.  2009AP1529-D.MJG 
 
1