Title: John W. McDonough v. State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3711-FT 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
John W. McDonough, D.O.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development, Labor & Industry Review Commission, 
Wausau Business Insurance, and City of Wisconsin 
Rapids,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 597, 586 N.W.2d 699 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 5, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis D. Conway 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Mark S. Zimmer and Hill, Glowacki, Jaeger, Reiley, 
Zimmer & Hughes, Madison and oral argument by Mark S. Zimmer. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Department of 
Workforce Development, the cause was argued by Lowell E. Nass, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. 
Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3711-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John W. McDonough, D.O.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of  
Workforce Development, Labor & Industry  
Review Commission, Wausau Business  
Insurance, and City of Wisconsin Rapids,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   John W. McDonough, D.O. 
(McDonough) requests review of a court of appeals’ decision 
which held that an appeal of a necessity of treatment order must 
be 
served 
on 
the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development 
(Department) and that service on the Labor and Industry Review 
Commission (Commission) was insufficient.  The issue presented 
is whether McDonough, appealing a necessity of treatment order 
of the Department, can achieve service by serving the Commission 
rather than the Department with enough copies of the summons and 
complaint as there are defendants.  We hold that, given the 
ambiguity presented by the interaction between the two statutes 
at issue, service for appeals from Department necessity of 
treatment orders can be achieved by timely serving either the 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
2 
Department or the Commission with enough copies of the summons 
and complaint as there are defendants.  Because McDonough served 
enough copies of the summons and complaint with the Commission 
as there are defendants, we conclude that he achieved service.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for proceedings on the 
merits. 
¶2 
McDonough provided medical services for a City of 
Wisconsin Rapids’ (Wisconsin Rapids) employee who injured his 
shoulder while at work on November 17, 1995.  Because the 
employee 
was 
injured 
while 
at 
work, 
his 
injuries 
were 
compensable under workers compensation, Wis. Stat. ch. 102.  
From January 3, 1996 through June 21, 1996, McDonough provided 
medical treatment to the Wisconsin Rapids employee.  McDonough 
submitted a claim to Wisconsin Rapids’ workers compensation 
insurance carrier, Wausau Business Insurance Company (Wausau 
Insurance).  Wausau Insurance refused to pay a portion of the 
claim, asserting that the treatment provided by McDonough after 
February 28, 1996, was not medically necessary.   
¶3 
In September 1996, McDonough filed a necessity of 
treatment dispute request with the Department1 pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 102.16(2m) (1993-94).2  On March 31, 1997, the Department 
                     
1 The Department of Workforce Development was previously 
known as the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations. 
 1995 Wis. Act 289, § 275; 1997 Wis. Act 3, §§ 151, 230. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
3 
determined that the services provided by McDonough were not 
medically necessary.  The order stated that it would become 
final within 30 days unless appealed to the circuit court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a). 
¶4 
McDonough filed a summons and complaint with the Wood 
County Circuit Court on April 28, 1997, within the 30 days 
allowed to seek judicial review.  One copy of the authenticated 
summons and complaint was personally served on a Program 
Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of the Department on 
April 29, 1997; four copies were personally served on the 
Chairperson of the Commission on April 29, 1997; one copy was 
served by sheriff’s service on the City Clerk of Wisconsin 
Rapids on April 30, 1997; and one copy was served by sheriff’s 
service on a employee of the Legal Support Office at Wausau 
Insurance on May 5, 1997.   
¶5 
The Department, Wisconsin Rapids, and Wausau Insurance 
moved to dismiss McDonough’s claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, or competency to proceed, arguing that Wausau 
Insurance was not served with an authenticated summons and 
complaint within 30 days from the issuance of the Department’s 
decision and order dated March 31, 1997, as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).  They argued that Wausau Insurance was a 
necessary and adverse party, and therefore, because McDonough 
failed to serve Wausau Insurance within 30 days after the 
Department’s decision and order, the court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction to proceed.  McDonough argued that service had been 
achieved on Wausau Insurance through timely service on the 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
4 
Commission, as required by the plain language of § 102.23(1)(b). 
  
¶6 
The Wood County Circuit Court, the Honorable Dennis D. 
Conway presiding, granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed 
the case with prejudice.  The circuit court determined that a 
necessary and adverse party, Wausau Insurance, had not been 
served within 30 days of the Department’s order as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 102.23.  Therefore, the circuit court determined 
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction or competency 
to proceed.  
¶7 
McDonough 
appealed 
the 
circuit 
court’s 
judgment 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.25.  In an unpublished per curiam 
opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
dismissal of McDonough’s case.3  The court of appeals determined 
that “department” should be read in place of “commission” 
throughout Wis. Stat. § 102.23 when a party is appealing a 
Department decision and order under Wis. Stat. § 102.16(2m)(e). 
¶8 
McDonough petitioned this court for review pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and § (Rule) 809.62, which we granted.   
¶9 
The issue presented is whether a party appealing a 
necessity of treatment order of the Department pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 102.16(2m)(e) can achieve service by serving the 
Commission rather than the Department with enough copies of the 
summons and complaint as there are defendants.  Section 
                     
3 McDonough v. Department of Workforce Development, No. 97-
3711-FT, unpublished slip op. at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 
1998).  
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
5 
102.16(2m)(e) states that judicial review of Department orders 
must be done in the same manner that compensation claims are 
reviewed under Wis. Stat. § 102.23.  This issue requires that we 
interpret §§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 102.23(1)(b) and the interaction 
of these two statutes.   
¶10 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo.  Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 
Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  The goal of statutory 
interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature.  Id. 
 We turn first to the plain language of the statute.  Hemberger 
v. Bitzer, 216 Wis. 2d 509, 517, 574 N.W.2d 656 (1998).  If the 
plain language is ambiguous, we rely on extrinsic aids such as 
legislative history, scope, purpose, subject matter and context 
to determine the legislature’s intent.  Id.   
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.16(2m)(e) provides: “A health 
service provider, insurer or self-insured employer that is 
aggrieved by a determination of the department under this 
subsection [regarding challenging a necessity of treatment 
dispute order] may seek judicial review of that determination in 
the same manner that compensation claims are reviewed under s. 
102.23.”  At the direction of § 102.16(2m)(e), we turn to Wis. 
Stat. § 102.23 which provides for judicial review.  The section 
pertinent to the issue in this case is § 102.23(1)(b): 
 
(b) In such an action a complaint shall be served 
with an authenticated copy of the summons.  The 
complaint need not be verified, but shall state the 
grounds upon which a review is sought.  Service upon a 
commissioner or agent authorized by the commission to 
accept service constitutes complete service on all 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
6 
parties, but there shall be left with the person so 
served as many copies of the summons and complaint as 
there are defendants, and the commission shall mail 
one copy to each other defendant. 
¶12 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 102.16(2m)(e) 
directs parties to rely on Wis. Stat. § 102.23 to appeal a 
Department necessity of treatment order to the circuit court.  
The plain language of § 102.23 requires that service be achieved 
by serving a “commissioner” with enough copies of the summons 
and complaint as there are defendants.   
¶13 Although the statutes are plain on their face, 
statutes may be rendered ambiguous by their interaction with 
other statutes.  State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 295 N.W.2d 
346 (1980).  In this case, ambiguity is created by the 
interaction 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.16(2m)(e) 
and 
102.23(1)(b).  Section 102.16(2m)(e) provides for judicial 
review of a Department order regarding a necessity of treatment 
dispute.  However, such judicial review must be achieved “in the 
same manner that compensation claims are reviewed under s. 
102.23.”  Section 102.23 provides for judicial review of 
Commission orders, not Department orders.  To resolve the 
ambiguity created by the interaction between §§ 102.16(2m)(e) 
and 102.23(1)(b), we rely on extrinsic aids.   
¶14 McDonough relies on the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.23 to argue the statute allows that service in an appeal 
of a Department order can be achieved by serving the Commission 
with enough copies of the summons and complaint as there are 
defendants. 
 
The 
Department 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
7 
§§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 102.23(1)(b) must be read in pari materia. 
 That is, because the statutes relate to the same subject 
matter, they should be read together.  When read together, the 
Department asserts, the word “department” should be read into 
§ 102.23 where “commission” is used.   
¶15 We agree, to some extent, with both parties.  We hold 
that, given the ambiguity presented by the interaction of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 102.23(1)(b), service for appeals 
under § 102.16(2m)(e) can be achieved by timely serving either 
the Department or the Commission with enough copies of the 
summons and complaint as there are defendants.  See Wisconsin 
Finance v. Garlock, 140 Wis. 2d 506, 518, 410 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (construing Wis. Stat. §§ 180.11(2) and 801.11(5)(b) 
(1982) as providing “alternative options for a party seeking 
substitute service on a corporation if personal service is 
unavailable under sec. 801.11(5)(a).”).   
¶16 We agree with the Department that when two statutes 
deal with the same subject matter, we read them in pari materia. 
 Gottfried, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 145 Wis. 2d 715, 720, 429 
N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 
231, 
244, 
313 
N.W.2d 
819 
(1982)). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 102.23 both deal with appealing agency 
decisions under the Workers Compensation Act.  “It is our duty 
to construe statutes on the same subject matter in a manner that 
harmonizes them in order to give each full force and effect.”  
State v. Aaron D., 214 Wis. 2d 56, 66, 571 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 
1997) (citation omitted).  When the language of a statute and 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
8 
the legislative history are silent about the relationship 
between two statutes, we look to the purposes of the statutes to 
resolve questions.  Byers v. LIRC, 208 Wis. 2d 388, 395, 561 
N.W.2d 678 (1997).   
¶17 The purpose of the Workers Compensation Act, enacted 
as Wis. Stat. ch. 102, “is to give prompt relief to injured 
employees who are entitled to compensation.”  Cruz v. ILHR 
Department, 81 Wis. 2d 442, 449-50, 260 N.W.2d 692 (1978) 
(citing Schneider Fuel & Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm., 224 
Wis. 298, 272 N.W. 25 (1937)).  Provisions for service, first 
enacted in 1929, § 3, ch. 453, Laws of 1929, are part of the 
scheme to provide an injured employee prompt relief.  In 1991, 
the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 102.16(2m) to clarify the 
process by which the Department resolves a dispute regarding the 
necessity of treatment provided to an employee claiming workers 
compensation benefits.  See 1991 Wis. Act 285, Analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau.  Although not explicit, the 
purpose of § 102.16(2m)(e) also seems to be part of the scheme 
to provide prompt relief to health service providers who provide 
services to injured employees entitled to workers compensation.  
¶18 The purposes of both Wis. Stat. §§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 
102.23 can be achieved if they are read in pari materia.  
Reading 
“department” 
in 
place 
of 
“commission” 
throughout 
§ 102.23 when a party is appealing a Department order under 
§ 102.16(2m)(e) allows parties to promptly achieve judicial 
review and gives both statutes their full force and effect.  See 
Kaiser v. City of Mauston, 99 Wis. 2d 345, 362-63, 299 N.W.2d 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
9 
259 (Ct. App. 1980).  Achieving service by serving the 
Department with enough copies of the summons and complaint as 
there are defendants allows the Department to promptly forward 
the copies to the other defendants in the case.  
¶19 Our reading of the statutes in this way is also 
supported by common sense.  See State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 
231, 246, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982) (a statute should not be 
construed in derogation of common sense).  As the Department 
pointed out, the Commission is never involved in a necessity of 
treatment dispute.  These cases are handled by the Department 
and appealed directly to the circuit court.  The Commission has 
no file on necessity of treatment cases.  Given this situation, 
it conforms with common sense to achieve service by serving the 
Department.  The Department has handled the case and holds the 
relevant file and record information.  
¶20 Reading Wis. Stat. §§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 102.23 in pari 
materia and relying on common sense, we conclude that a 
reasonable interpretation of the statutes is that reading 
“department” where § 102.23 says “commission” is appropriate for 
appeals from Department orders under § 102.16(2m).  Accordingly, 
we hold that, given the ambiguity presented by the interaction 
of §§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 102.23(1)(b), service for appeals under 
§ 102.16(2m)(e) can be achieved by timely serving the Department 
with enough copies of the summons and complaint as there are 
defendants. 
¶21 Another equally reasonable interpretation of the two 
statutes as they interact is found by relying on the language of 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
10
the statutes.  In the present case, Wis. Stat. § 102.23 
specifically requires the plaintiff to achieve service by 
serving a “commissioner” with enough copies of the summons and 
complaint as there are defendants.  § 102.23(1)(b).  There is 
nothing complex or confusing about § 102.23the statute “plainly 
requires service on the commission.”  Gomez v. LIRC, 153 Wis. 2d 
686, 690, 451 N.W.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1989).  However, as discussed 
above, the direction of § 102.23(1)(b) is rendered ambiguous by 
its interaction with Wis. Stat. § 102.16(2m)(e). 
¶22 When an ambiguity exists regarding the specific party 
to be served, procedural statutes must be construed liberally to 
achieve determination of the merits of the controversy, if such 
construction is possible.  Dept. of Transportation v. Peterson, 
No. 97-2718, op. at 6 (S. Ct. June 8, 1999).  Where a procedural 
statute is ambiguous, whether that ambiguity is created by a 
statute itself or the interaction of two or more statutes, “the 
ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the person appealing the 
[agency’s] award of damages.”  Id. at 7.  Where the petitioner 
has complied with the language of § 102.23(1)(b) regarding the 
procedure for service, it would be extraordinarily harsh to cut 
off petitioners’ right to a review of the Department’s order.  
See id. (citing Trojan v. Board of Regents, 104 Wis. 2d 277, 
284, 311 N.W.2d 586 (1981)).   
¶23 As 
directed 
by 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.16(2m)(e) 
and 
102.23, 
and 
the 
Department’s 
order, 
McDonough complied with § 102.23 to appeal the Department’s 
order under § 102.16(2m).  Within 30 days after the Department 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
11
issued its order, McDonough served four copies of a summons and 
complaint, one for each defendant, upon a commissioner.  Faced 
with the ambiguity created by the interaction of the two 
statutes, but in accord with the language of the statutes, it 
was reasonable and logical for McDonough to achieve service by 
serving a commissioner with enough copies of the summons and 
complaint as there are defendants.   
¶24 Relying on the language of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.16(2m)(e) 
and 102.23(1)(b), we hold that, given the ambiguity presented by 
the interaction of the statutes, service for appeals under 
§ 102.16(2m)(e) can be achieved by timely serving the Commission 
with enough copies of the summons and complaint as there are 
defendants.  Accordingly, McDonough achieved service by timely 
serving a commissioner with enough copies of the summons and 
complaint as there are defendants.   
¶25 If the legislature or Department disagree with our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
interaction 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 102.16(2m)(e) and 102.23(1)(b), both are free to clarify the 
procedures an aggrieved party must follow to appeal a necessity 
of treatment order made by the Department.  See Peterson, slip 
op. at 7.  The legislature, of course, is free to amend either 
or both statutes.  The Department also can take steps to 
eliminate confusion.  See id.  Litigants should not be kept 
guessing as to which governmental entity to name and serve in 
proceedings 
for 
judicial 
review. 
 
Sunnyview 
Village 
v. 
Administration Dept., 104 Wis. 2d 396, 412, 311 N.W.2d 632 
(1981).  As in Sunnyview Village, “[w]e recommend that [the 
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
12
Department] 
adopt 
the 
practice 
of 
providing 
with 
their 
administrative 
decisions 
information 
on 
how 
to 
process 
proceedings for review, including which governmental entity is 
to be named and served as respondent.”  Id.  In this case, the 
Department’s order simply referred McDonough to § 102.23.  Where 
the Department’s order refers the party to a statute and that 
statute permits the party to achieve service by serving the 
Commission, the party cannot be faulted for doing exactly as 
instructed and as the statute directs.  
¶26 In sum, we hold that, given the ambiguity presented by 
the interaction between the two statutes at issue, service for 
appeals from Department orders under Wis. Stat. § 102.16(2m)(e) 
can be achieved by timely serving either the Department or the 
Commission with enough copies of the summons and complaint as 
there are defendants.  Because McDonough served enough copies of 
the summons and complaint with a commissioner as there are 
defendants, we conclude that he achieved service.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause to the circuit court for proceedings on the merits.4 
                     
4 Because we have determined that service for appeals from 
Department orders under Wis. Stat. § 102.16(2m)(e) can be 
achieved by timely serving either the Department or Commission 
with enough copies of the summons and complaint as there are 
defendants, 
and 
therefore, 
are 
remanding 
for 
judicial 
determination on the merits, we do not address other issues 
raised by the parties.  
No. 
97-3711-FT 
 
13
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
proceedings on the merits. 
 
 
 
1