Title: State v. Gomes

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_GOMES.89-543; 162 Vt. 319; 648 A.2d 396

[Opinion Filed July 1, 1994]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 89-543


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

 David Gomes                                  February Term, 1993



 Dean B. Pineles, J.


 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Susan R. Harritt, Assistant Attorney
     General, and Gary Kessler, State's Attorneys and Sheriffs Department,
    Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Michael Rose, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      GIBSON, J.   Defendant David Gomes appeals his conviction on four
 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child in violation of 13 V.S.A.
 { 2602.  He claims three errors: (1) the informations were unduly vague,
 thwarting his ability to establish an alibi, (2) the denial of his request
 for access to attendance records of the day-care facility where the abuse
 allegedly occurred further frustrated his attempts to establish a defense,
 and (3) expert testimony regarding the credibility of the alleged victims
 was improper.  We conclude that defendant was entitled to the day-care
 attendance records, and, accordingly, we remand the matter for the trial

 

 court to determine if defendant was prejudiced by the court's refusal to
 allow defendant access to the records.
                                     I.
      The State brought charges against defendant after six children who
 attended a day-care facility operated by defendant's sister reported that
 defendant had sexually abused them.  The incidents of abuse allegedly
 occurred during the summer of 1985 through the summer of 1986, but the
 children did not disclose defendant's involvement until late 1987, gradually
 revealing, through the spring of 1988, further incidents.  Defendant argues
 that the time specified in the informations -- approximately May 1985 to
 September 1986 -- was too vague and broad, rendering it impossible for him
 to prepare an adequate defense, especially an alibi defense.
      In cases of juvenile sexual abuse, time of commission is not an
 essential element of the offense and need not be charged in the
 information.  State v. Ross, 152 Vt. 462, 465, 568 A.2d 335, 337 (1989).
 Because young children have difficulty specifying the date on which an
 incident occurred, the State must show only that the crime occurred within
 the statute of limitations.  See id.  "The fact that defendant raises an
 alibi defense does not alter these holdings and does not make time an
 essential element."  State v. Infante, 157 Vt. 109, 111, 596 A.2d 1289, 1291
 (1989).
      In determining whether the notice of time in the informations was
 reasonable, we consider all the circumstances of the case, including (1) the
 age and circumstances of the victim, (2) how the abuse was allegedly carried
 out, and (3) the State's ability to be more specific.  See Ross, 152 Vt. at
 465, 568 A.2d  at 337-38.  Here, the children were all preschool age at the

 

 time of the alleged offenses, and they did not report the abuse until more
 than a year after the last charged incident.  Not surprisingly, they were
 unable to identify the precise dates of the alleged offenses.  Despite an
 extensive investigation, the State could establish only that the offenses
 occurred while defendant was living in a trailer on the same property as the
 day-care facility.   Given the circumstances of this case, it was not
 unreasonable that the State could not be more precise.  See id. (because
 victim was only seven years old and delayed reporting abuse, it was not
 unreasonable that time of offense charged was not precise).
      Defendant must be given a "fair opportunity to prepare a defense in
 light of the circumstances of the case," id. at 465, 568 A.2d  at 337, but he
 has no vested right to an alibi defense.  State v. Dunbar, 152 Vt. 399, 404,
 566 A.2d 970, 973 (1989).  Although defendant was unable to establish an
 alibi for the entire time period alleged in the information, his inability
 to do so does not, by itself, show that he had no opportunity to prepare an
 alibi defense.
                                     II.
      Defendant also claims the trial court erred in denying him access to
 day-care attendance records that he believed were necessary to prepare his
 alibi defense and to challenge the children's testimony.  During discovery,
 defendant subpoenaed records documenting the attendance of the children at
 the day-care facility.  He was employed during some of the months covered by
 the informations, and hoped to show, among other things, that some or all of
 the children were absent on days when he was present at the facility.  The
 operators of the facility refused to turn over the attendance records,

 

 asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and
 defendant moved to compel production of the records.
      After an in camera inspection, the court concluded that the contents of
 the records were not privileged but that the act of producing the records
 would be "testimonial and incriminating" because their "production would be
 an admission that the records exist and that they are authentic."  Noting
 that "[a]uthentication of the records and proof of their existence could be
 a link in the chain of evidence showing that certain children were entrusted
 to [the day-care operators'] care on certain dates," the court concluded
 that, given the operators' potential liability under several criminal
 statutes, "proof of existence and authentication of the records could tend
 to incriminate them."  Based on this analysis, the court ruled that the
 Fifth Amendment protected the operators from producing the records.
      Defendant argues that the court's refusal to order disclosure of the
 attendance records based on the operators' Fifth Amendment privilege was
 erroneous because state regulations require such records to be kept by day-
 care operators and to be available for inspection by the Department of
 Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS).  See Agency of Human Services,
 Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Children's Day Care
 Licensing Regulations for Early Childhood Program { 3(5), (7), in 4 Code of
 Vermont Rules 13 162 001-49 (1993).  As defendant points out, SRS day-care
 licensing regulations require that daily attendance records be maintained
 for each child for at least a year after withdrawal from the day-care
 facility, and that the records be subject to inspection by SRS upon
 request.  The State counters that defendant is not entitled to the records
 because they are not open to the public, and, in any case, he cannot show

 

 prejudice resulting from the court's refusal to order the day-care operators
 to turn them over to him.  We conclude that production of the records is not
 protected by the Fifth Amendment, and that defendant was potentially
 prejudiced by his inability to obtain the records.
      In the principal case relied on by the trial court, the United States
 Supreme Court held that although the contents of voluntarily kept business
 records of sole proprietorships are not protected by the Fifth Amendment,
 the act of producing such records is protected when it would involve
 testimonial self-incrimination by the record holder.  United States v. Doe,