Title: Foggy v. Eyman

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 185 (1973) 516 P.2d 321 Henry FOGGY, Appellant, v. Frank A. EYMAN, Warden, Arizona State Prison and State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Appellees. No. 10931. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 3, 1973. Henry Foggy, in pro. per. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, by John S. O'Dowd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, for appellees. *186 CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Pinal County denying the defendant Foggy's petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, we are called upon to consider the action of the Superior Court in refusing to review the decisions of the Arizona State Board of Pardons and Paroles in (1) denying the defendant's application for parole, and (2) in denying the defendant a commutation hearing. The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. The defendant Henry Foggy is an inmate of the Arizona State Prison serving a life term for second degree murder. For a more complete factual background see State v. Foggy, 101 Ariz. 459, 420 P.2d 934 (1966) and State v. Foggy, 107 Ariz. 307, 486 P.2d 789 (1971). According to the brief of the defendant Foggy, he appeared before the Board of Pardons and Paroles on 20 March 1972 and after a hearing of about fifteen minutes the petitioner requested that the reasons for the Board's decision be given. According to petitioner's brief: Defendant later, on 10 April 1972, filed an application for commutation of sentence with the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles on a form supplied by the Board. This application was denied without a hearing. The petitioner was notified by the Clerk of the Board as follows: Defendant "in pro se" filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Pinal County asking that the trial court order the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles to provide petitioner with a written statement of the reasons for denial of parole, which statement should include as a minimum six listed criteria. Defendant also requested that the Superior Court "order, command and direct the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles * * * to grant him a hearing on his application for commutation of sentence." The trial court had jurisdiction to hear the application despite the apparent mislabeling of the nature of relief requested as habeas corpus. Stevenson v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 109 Ariz. 412, 510 P.2d 384 (1973). The trial court ruled: Petitioner appealed to this court (in pro se) and after the matter became at issue, timely moved for oral argument. On 18 September 1973 this court issued the following order: The matter was heard at the State Prison by the Hearing Officer of the Arizona Supreme Court and a videotape of said hearing was filed in this court. On 20 November 1973, in the courtroom of the Arizona Supreme Court, the members of said court viewed a videotape playback of the hearing conducted by Mrs. Grant at the Arizona State Prison and thereafter ordered the matter submitted for decision and opinion. REVIEW OF THE ACTION OF THE PAROLE BOARD IN DENYING PAROLE Defendant contends that he was denied his fundamental constitutional rights because the parole board did not provide him with the reasons for denying his application for parole. The courts have the jurisdiction to review actions of the parole board only for the purpose of determining whether or not there has been a denial of due process in a parole hearing. The court may not, however, invade the province of the parole board in determining who is to be paroled. We have stated: In the instant case, the petition to the Superior Court on its face did not indicate a lack of due process by the parole board which would warrant the trial court's interference. Our Court of Appeals has stated: REQUEST FOR COMMUTATION HEARING Defendant also contends that he was denied due process in that he was denied a hearing on his application for commutation. The State pointed out in its brief that the petitioner appeared before the parole board on 20 March 1972 on his application for parole. When this was denied, he then, on 10 April 1972, applied for commutation of his sentence. Defendant contends in his reply brief: The statute reads as follows: This court has held, in a case wherein the applicant was sentenced to death, that a hearing must be held upon a proper application for commutation of sentence pursuant to § 31-411 A.R.S.; McGee v. Arizona State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 92 Ariz. 317, 376 P.2d 779 (1962). In another case involving a commutation of sentence our Court of Appeals has stated: While the statute and the case law indicate that the parole board is required to grant a hearing on an application for commutation, this does not mean that the prisoner is entitled to bring successive applications for relief to the point that it becomes an unreasonable burden upon the parole board and indirectly upon the other prisoners whose applications the Board must consider. In the instant case, the Board had just heard applicant's request for parole and was in a position to know that a hearing upon the application for commutation of sentence would be futile. We do not find an absence of due process in the denial of a hearing on the application for commutation of sentence under the facts in the instant case. Order affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.