Title: The Florida Bar v. Henry John Martocci

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC95315
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
HENRY JOHN MARTOCCI,
Respondent.
[April 26, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by
respondent Henry John Martocci (Martocci).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the referee’s findings of
fact, conclusions of guilt, and recommended discipline.
On April 14, 1999, based on Martocci’s representation of Francis Berger in a
dissolution of marriage and child custody action and a child dependency action,
The Florida Bar filed a two-count complaint against Martocci.  In count one, the
Bar alleged that, in various instances during the course of the Berger proceedings,
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Martocci made unethical, disparaging, and profane remarks to belittle and humiliate
the opposing party, Florence Berger, and her attorney, Diana Figueroa.  The
allegation of unethical behavior in count two arose from a confrontation between
Martocci and James Paton, the father of Ms. Berger, during the recess of a hearing
on May 8, 1998.  After a three-day hearing in September 1999, the referee, Judge
Cynthia G. Angelos, found Martocci guilty on both counts of violating rule 4-8.4(d)
of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.  The referee made the following findings
of fact.
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the referee made findings
as to specific instances of Martocci’s misconduct.  Regarding count one, the
referee found that, in December 1996, Martocci called Ms. Berger a “nut case.” 
After a deposition on May 5, 1998, Martocci referred to Ms. Berger as a “crazy”
and a “nut case.”  During another deposition on May 5, 1998, Martocci made
demeaning facial gestures and stuck out his tongue at Ms. Berger and Ms.
Figueroa.  After a hearing on June 24, 1998, upon exiting an elevator, Martocci told
Ms. Figueroa that she was a “stupid idiot” and that she should “go back to Puerto
Rico.”  In another incident, on June 19, 1998, during an intermission of a
deposition, Ms. Figueroa telephoned the office of Judge Edward J. Richardson and
reached Pamela Walker, a judicial assistant.  After Ms. Figueroa spoke to Ms.
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Walker, Martocci took the telephone and yelled the word “bitch.”  Martocci
admitted that because the phone was dead when he received it from Ms. Figueroa,
he said “son of a bitch” as a frustrated response to missing the opportunity to
speak to Ms. Walker.  Martocci claims that he did not say these words to anyone in
particular.  The referee also found that throughout the Berger proceedings Martocci
repeatedly told Ms. Figueroa that she did not know the law or the rules of
procedure and that she needed to go back to school.
As to the second count, the referee found that on May 8, 1998, during a
recess to a hearing in the Berger proceedings, when Mr. Paton entered the
courtroom, Martocci said “here comes the father of the nut case.”  Mr. Paton
responded by approaching respondent and saying, “If you have something to say
to me, say it to my face, not in front of everyone here in the courtroom.” 
Thereafter, in open court and for all to see, Martocci closely approached Mr. Paton
and threatened to beat him.  Upon Ms. Figueroa’s attempt to intervene, Martocci
told her to “go back to Puerto Rico.”  This confrontation only ended when a bailiff
entered the courtroom.
On the basis of such misconduct, the referee recommended the imposition
against Martocci of a public reprimand and a two-year period of probation with
conditions including an evaluation by Florida Lawyers Assistance for possible
1Martocci was admitted to practice in Florida on July 1, 1977.
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anger management or mental health assistance or both.  In recommending
discipline, the referee noted that the underlying Berger proceedings were difficult
cases which caused frustration to all the parties involved, including the presiding
judges.  The referee also noted that Martocci had a good reputation for
representing his clients and had no prior disciplinary convictions.  In aggravation,
the referee recognized that, despite Martocci’s substantial experience in the practice
of law,1 Martocci engaged in a pattern of unethical misconduct and refused to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.
In seeking review, Martocci raises four general claims:  (1) the findings of
fact are clearly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence in the record; (2) even
if the findings of fact are correct, they legally do not constitute a violation of rule 4-
8.4(d); (3) the referee erroneously shifted to Martocci the burden of proving his
innocence; and (4) the public reprimand penalty is excessive, and the misconduct
only warrants a private reprimand.  Martocci further argues that a public reprimand
is not in accordance with the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions or
the purposes of attorney discipline.  Claims one, two, and four merit discussion
and are analyzed in turn.  Review of the record, however, demonstrates that claim
2Specifically, Martocci’s third claim is that the referee’s mere inquiry as to the
factual findings in Florida Bar v. Martocci, 699 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1997), in which
Martocci was found not guilty of misconduct, and her bringing to the hearing the
report she wrote in that case prove that the referee shifted to respondent the burden
to prove his innocence.  This claim, which we recognize as an attempt to overturn the
referee’s findings of guilt couched in a burden of proof argument, is without merit.
The record reveals no such shifting of the burden.  Moreover, the referee’s report
expressly states that no prior disciplinary convictions or measures were considered,
and the record reveals nothing to the contrary.
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three is without merit, and we dispose of it summarily.2 
REFEREE’S FINDINGS
A referee’s findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in
the record.  See Florida Bar v. Summers, 728 So. 2d 739, 741 (Fla. 1999).  If the
referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, we do not re-
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the referee.  See id.  To
overturn the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of guilt Martocci must
demonstrate that the findings are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.
Martocci challenges the testimonial evidence presented by the Bar as
imprecise, contradictory, unreliable, and without any support in the record. 
Martocci further argues that the finding that he yelled profanity through the
telephone during the intermission of a deposition is a clearly erroneous
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interpretation of Ms. Walker’s testimony.  Finally, Martocci argues that, in making
findings of fact based on Ms. Figueroa’s testimony, the referee did not
appropriately consider the testimony of several attorneys who testified that Ms.
Figueroa did not have a good reputation for truth and veracity in the legal
community.
Review of the record reveals that there is competent, substantial
documentary and testimonial evidence to support the referee’s findings of fact and
conclusions of guilt.  See Summers, 728 So. 2d at 741.  The deposition transcripts
in the record alone establish that Martocci engaged in the unprofessional conduct
of seeking to belittle and humiliate Ms. Figueroa and Ms. Berger.  The record
reflects that Martocci:  (1) made insulting facial gestures to Ms. Berger and Ms.
Figueroa; (2) called Ms. Figueroa a “bush leaguer”; (3) told Ms. Figueroa that
depositions are not conducted under “girl’s rules”; (4) continually disparaged Ms.
Figueroa’s knowledge and ability to practice law; and (5) threatened Mr. Paton
physically within the courtroom during a recess to a hearing.  The entire record is
replete with evidence of Martocci’s verbal assaults and sexist, racial, and ethnic
insults supporting the referee’s conclusion that Martocci engaged in patently
unethical behavior designed to belittle and humiliate Ms. Berger and Ms. Figueroa
and threaten Mr. Paton.
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Furthermore, as to factual findings based on witness testimony, we have
stated, “[t]he referee is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses,
and his judgment regarding credibility should not be overturned absent clear and
convincing evidence that this judgment is incorrect.”  Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733
So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Florida Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177,
1178 (Fla. 1991)).  Thus, although Martocci offered evidence that may have put
Ms. Figueroa’s credibility in doubt, we find no indication that the referee’s
assessment of her credibility was clearly erroneous.  We reject Martocci’s version
of the controverted evidence because competent, substantial evidence exists to
support the referee’s resolution of the debatable issues in favor of the Bar.  See
Florida Bar v. Schultz, 712 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1998) (“A party does not satisfy
his or her burden of showing that a referee’s findings are clearly erroneous by
simply pointing to the contradictory evidence where there is also competent,
substantial evidence in the record that supports the referee’s findings.”); Florida
Bar v. Niles, 644 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1994) (“The responsibility for finding facts
and resolving conflicts in the evidence is placed with the referee.”).
Martocci’s second claim is that, even if the referee’s findings of fact are
correct, Martocci’s conduct was not prejudicial to the administration of justice as it
did not rise to a level that violated rule 4-8.4(d).  In support of this proposition,
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Martocci argues that Florida Bar v. Martocci, 699 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1997),
established a distinction between unprofessional conduct and unethical conduct
violating rule 4-8.4(d).  In that case, we upheld the referee’s conclusion that the Bar
did not clearly and convincingly prove that Martocci violated rules 4-8.4(c) and (d),
although Martocci used profanity against the opposing attorney and threatened the
court reporter.  However, we find Martocci to be distinguishable from the case
before us today.
In Martocci, we reasoned that, despite the contrary evidence in the record,
there was competent, substantial evidence to support the referee’s resolution of the
debatable issues in respondent’s favor.  See Martocci, 699 So. 2d at 1360. 
Likewise, in the present case, because there is competent, substantial evidence
supporting the referee’s conclusion of guilt, we will not substitute our judgement
for that of the referee.  Such misconduct clearly prejudiced the administration of
justice by further exacerbating relationships between respondent, opposing counsel,
and the various judges involved in the already difficult underlying Berger cases. 
See Florida Bar v. Wasserman, 675 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1996) (attorney was
disciplined under rule 4-8.4(a), violating Rules of Professional Conduct, for
swearing at a judicial assistant over telephone after receiving unfavorable response
to question posed to judge presiding over his case); Florida Bar v. Uhrig, 666 So.
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2d 887 (Fla. 1996) (attorney violated rule 4-8.4(d) by mailing insulting letter to
opposing party who was a member of a minority group).
We previously have admonished members of the Bar to refrain from
offensive conduct.  See Martocci, 699 So. 2d at 1360.  Martocci’s disrespectful
and abusive comments cross the line from that of zealous advocacy to unethical
misconduct.  See Florida Bar v. Buckle, 771 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2000) (“A
lawyer’s obligation of zealous representation should not and cannot be transformed
into a vehicle intent upon harassment and intimidation.”).  Such unethical conduct
shall not be tolerated.
DISCIPLINE
We disagree with Martocci’s claim that the referee’s recommended discipline
is excessive and only warranting of a private reprimand.  Martocci disrupted the
already difficult Berger cases by engaging in a pattern of unethical conduct against
the opposing litigant, her family, and her counsel.  In addition, several cases
support the referee’s conclusion that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction
for Martocci’s misconduct.  First, in Martocci, where this Court affirmed the
referee’s not-guilty finding, we found that: 
[W]e find the conduct of the lawyers involved in the incident giving
rise to these proceedings to be patently unprofessional. . . .  We
should be and are embarrassed and ashamed for all bar members that
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such childish and demeaning conduct takes place in the justice system. 
It is our hope that by publishing this opinion and thereby making
public the offending and demeaning exchanges between these
particular attorneys, that the entire bar will benefit and realize an
attorney’s obligation to adhere to the highest professional standards of
conduct no matter the location or circumstances in which an
attorney’s services are being rendered.
Martocci, 699 So. 2d at 1360 (emphasis added).  Second, in Buckle and in Uhrig,
this Court publicly reprimanded the attorneys for violating rule 4-8.4(d) by sending
the opposing party letters deemed to be discriminatory, disparaging, or frightening. 
See Buckle, 771 So. 2d at 1133; Uhrig, 666 So. 2d at 887.  In the case before us,
Martocci’s behavior is more egregious than that in Buckle or Uhrig because
Martocci engaged in a consistent pattern of unethical misconduct.  Finally, the
referee’s report reflects that the aggravators and mitigators that were considered
and the recommended sanctions serve the purposes of lawyer discipline.
We consider the violations very serious, and we approve the referee’s
recommended sanctions but only because they include a two-year probation
period.  Henry John Martocci is to be publicly reprimanded by a personal
appearance before The Florida Bar Board of Governors and by the publication of
this opinion.  The two-year period of probation with the conditions outlined in the
referee’s report, including an evaluation by Florida Lawyers Assistance for possible
anger management or mental health assistance or both, will become effective upon
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the filing of this opinion.  Judgment for costs in the amount of $5,187.63 is entered
against Henry John Martocci and in favor of The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee
Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Division
Director, Tallahassee, Florida; and Frances R. Brown-Lewis, Bar Counsel, Orlando,
Florida,
       for Complainant
Henry J. Martocci, pro se, Rockledge, Florida,
       for Respondent