Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Kevin R. Rosin

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2024 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2024AP156-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Kevin R. Rosin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Kevin R. Rosin, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ROSIN  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam.  
  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 29
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2024AP156-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Kevin R. Rosin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Kevin R. Rosin, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.  We review a stipulation filed by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Kevin R. Rosin 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.12.1  In the stipulation, 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.12 provides: 
(1) 
The director may file with the complaint a 
stipulation of the director and the respondent to the 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (continued) 
facts, conclusions of law regarding misconduct, and 
discipline to be imposed, together with a memorandum 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
2 
 
Attorney Rosin does not contest that he committed two acts of 
professional misconduct as alleged by the OLR in its complaint 
against him.  Attorney Rosin also does not contest that a six-
month 
suspension 
of 
his 
Wisconsin 
law 
license, 
imposed 
                                                                                                                                                             
in support of the stipulation.  The respondent may 
file a response to the director's memorandum within 14 
days of the date of filing of the stipulation.  The 
supreme 
court 
may 
consider 
the 
complaint 
and 
stipulation without the appointment of a referee, in 
which 
case 
the 
supreme 
court 
may 
approve 
the 
stipulation, reject the stipulation, or direct the 
parties to consider specific modifications to the 
stipulation. 
(2) If the supreme court approves a stipulation, 
it shall adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of 
law and impose the stipulated discipline. 
(3) If the supreme court rejects a stipulation, a 
referee shall be appointed and the matter shall 
proceed as a complaint filed without a stipulation. 
(3m) If the supreme court directs the parties to 
consider specific modifications to the stipulation, 
the parties may, within 20 days of the date of the 
order, file a revised stipulation, in which case the 
supreme court may approve the revised stipulation, 
adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of law, and 
impose the stipulated discipline.  If the parties do 
not file a revised stipulation within 20 days of the 
date of the order, a referee shall be appointed and 
the matter shall proceed as a complaint filed without 
a stipulation. 
(4) A stipulation rejected by the supreme court 
has no evidentiary value and is without prejudice to 
the respondent's defense of the proceeding or the 
prosecution of the complaint. 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
3 
 
consecutively to his one-year suspension that recently concluded 
on May 25, 2024,2 is appropriate discipline for his misconduct. 
¶2 
Upon careful review of the matter, we approve the 
stipulation and suspend Attorney Rosin's law license for six 
months, 
imposed 
consecutively 
to 
his 
recently 
expired 
suspension.   Although we do not order restitution, we condition 
the reinstatement of Attorney Rosin's law license on his 
satisfaction of a judgment entered in his former law firm's 
civil lawsuit against him in connection with the misconduct 
described below.    Because this matter has been resolved by a 
stipulation under SCR 22.12 without the need for the appointment 
of a referee, we impose no costs on Attorney Rosin. 
¶3 
The facts of this disciplinary matter, as stipulated 
by Attorney Rosin, are as follows.  Attorney Rosin was admitted 
to the practice of law in Wisconsin in May 2004.  He does not 
have an address on file with the State Bar of Wisconsin.  The 
most recent address known to the OLR for Attorney Rosin is in 
Cedarburg, Wisconsin.  Attorney Rosin's disciplinary history 
consists of a one-year license suspension, effective May 25, 
2023.  See Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rosin, 2023 WI 32, 
407 Wis. 2d 1, 988 N.W.2d 681 ("Rosin I").   We discuss this 
case more fully below.   
                                                 
2 Although Attorney Rosin's one-year suspension concluded on 
May 25, 2024, he has not regained his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin.  That will require him to successfully complete the 
formal reinstatement process.  See SCR 22.28(3).  
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
4 
 
¶4 
As of November 2020, Rosin was employed by an 
intellectual property law firm in Wisconsin that we will refer 
to as "Firm 1."  Attorney Rosin's employment with Firm 1 
required him to be a full-time employee and to bill all legal 
and patent-related services provided during his employment 
through Firm 1.  Attorney Rosin received a base salary of 
$110,000 annually from Firm 1, plus quarterly bonuses based on 
productivity.  Firm 1's bonus schedule provided that bonuses 
earned for services provided or collections received during the 
third quarter would be paid on December 15, 2020. 
¶5 
Firm 1's employee handbook, which was provided to all 
employees, stated that outside employment at another law firm 
was forbidden.  It also required employees to notify Firm 1's 
management of any outside employment, and it provided that Firm 
1's management reserved the right to determine if the outside 
employment would cause a conflict of interest. 
¶6 
Firm 1 also had a strict conflicts check policy.  This 
policy required all firm attorneys to allow the firm to perform 
a conflicts check before any substantive conversations with a 
client or performing any work for a new client.  Required 
conflicts checks could not be performed unless Attorney Rosin 
notified Firm 1 of any prospective client for whom he intended 
to provide services. 
¶7 
Attorney Rosin's employment agreement with Firm 1 
provided that he would forfeit any quarterly bonuses based on 
production or other compensation above his actual wages for the 
hours worked if he left his employment with Firm 1 without 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
5 
 
giving, and working throughout, a one-month period of advance 
notice.  The employment agreement also provided that, if 
Attorney Rosin left his employment with Firm 1, he needed to 
work diligently toward a smooth transition and fulfill the 
required notice period in order to receive any quarterly bonus 
or other compensation beyond the salary for his actual hours 
worked during the notice period. 
¶8 
A law firm we will refer to as "Firm 2" is an 
intellectual property law firm located in Illinois.  On 
approximately November 6, 2020, Attorney Rosin began speaking 
with representatives of Firm 2 about leaving his employment with 
Firm 1 and becoming an employee of Firm 2.  On November 11, 
2020, Firm 2 made Attorney Rosin an offer of employment.   
¶9 
Attorney Rosin formally accepted Firm 2's offer and 
signed an offer letter on November 13, 2020.  Attorney Rosin's 
employment agreement with Firm 2 provided that he was a "full-
time" employee with Firm 2 and required Attorney Rosin to 
provide and bill all legal and patent-related services provided 
during his employment through Firm 2.   
¶10 On November 16, 2020, Attorney Rosin proposed to Firm 
2 that he begin his employment on December 2, 2020.  Firm 2 
accepted Attorney Rosin's proposed December 2, 2020 start date.  
The start date was Attorney Rosin's choice, and was not 
negotiated by or the result of pressure from Firm 2 for Attorney 
Rosin to start on that date. 
¶11 On 
November 
17, 
2020, 
Attorney 
Rosin 
told 
the 
attorney-owner of Firm 1 that he had received a job offer from 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
6 
 
another firm and that he was considering that offer.  Between 
November 17 and 30, 2020,  Attorney Rosin did not tell the 
attorney-owner of Firm 1 that he had had already accepted 
employment with Firm 2, that he had already signed Firm 2's 
offer letter, or that he had agreed to start employment with 
Firm 2 on December 2, 2020. 
¶12 After business hours on November 30, 2020, Attorney 
Rosin removed his personal belongings from Firm 1's office.  On 
the evening of November 30, 2020, Attorney Rosin sent an email 
to the attorney-owner of Firm 1 giving written notice of the 
termination of his employment with the firm.  Attorney Rosin 
wrote that he would work through December 17, 2020, asserting 
that working through December 17, 2020, would provide Firm 1 
with a full month of notice of his planned departure.   
¶13 Attorney Rosin worked remotely for Firm 1 during the 
period of November 30, 2020, to December 16, 2020, and went into 
the office only for part of the day on December 17, 2020.  
Attorney Rosin worked this largely remote schedule during this 
time period even though Firm 1's employees were generally 
required to work from its office, and even though he had rarely 
worked remotely prior to November 30, 2020.   Attorney Rosin did 
not tell anyone at Firm 1 that he intended to work this largely 
remote schedule during this period.  Instead, Attorney Rosin 
told Firm 1 staff several times during that period to mark him 
as working remotely on an ad hoc, day-to-day basis. 
¶14 Meanwhile, Attorney Rosin began his employment with 
Firm 2 on December 2, 2020.  Between December 2 and 17, 2020, 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
7 
 
Attorney Rosin was simultaneously employed by both Firm 1 and 
Firm 2; he drew his salary from Firm 1 and his monthly draw 
toward compensation from Firm 2 for this period.  He did not 
tell anyone associated with either firm that he was or intended 
to be simultaneously employed by both firms.   
¶15 Neither Firm 1 nor Firm 2 would have authorized 
Attorney Rosin to violate the firms' respective policies against 
outside employment to be simultaneously employed by both firms.  
In addition, both firms were concerned that simultaneous 
employment, like Attorney Rosin's, would prevent them from 
conducting adequate conflicts checks.  For its part, Firm 1's 
conflicts check procedures required its staff to screen for 
conflicts not only by client, but by the subject matter of the 
representation or patent.  Attorney Rosin could not have 
effectively performed such a conflicts check himself because he 
would not have known the subject matter of all representations 
and all patents for clients of Firm 1, especially clients and 
matters for which other employees of Firm 1 were responsible, 
which could include hundreds of patent applications for some 
clients. 
¶16 At Firm 1, Attorney Rosin had the option of keeping 
work for himself if he desired, or assigning it to another firm 
attorney.  Attorney Rosin therefore had control over how much 
work he performed for Firm 1 between December 2 and 17, 2020.  
Between December 2 and 17, 2020, Attorney Rosin logged only 
21.80 hours of work for Firm 1.  During this time period, he 
failed to perform work on client matters that he had taken on 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
8 
 
prior to November 17, 2020, and that he could have completed 
prior to December 17, 2020.   
¶17 Attorney Rosin failed in other ways to properly finish 
his work at Firm 1.  He was supposed to review specific physical 
files to facilitate the transition of work to other staff prior 
to December 17, 2020, but he failed to do so.  Also, prior to 
December 17, 2020, Attorney Rosin deleted his entire email box 
at Firm 1, including all subfolders, sent items, and deleted 
items.  Doing so violated Firm 1's "Email, Internet, and 
Computer Use Policy," which Attorney Rosin had signed on March 
26, 2019. 
¶18 Firm 1 paid Attorney Rosin bonuses based on its belief 
that he remained a full-time employee of Firm 1 through December 
17, 2020, and that he had not started his employment with a 
competing employer prior to that date.  In May 2023, Firm 1 
filed a lawsuit against Attorney Rosin, claiming the firm had 
suffered damages of not less than $32,515.31 due to Attorney 
Rosin's failure to comply with his contractual obligations to 
provide one-month notice and to work diligently for Firm 1 
during that month.  In July 2023, Attorney Rosin served on Firm 
1 an offer of judgment, allowing Firm 1 to take a judgment 
against Attorney Rosin for $32,515.31, plus accrued interest at 
the rate of five percent, and statutory costs.  Later that same 
month, Firm 1 accepted the offer of judgment.   
¶19 On April 25, 2023, this court issued its decision in 
Rosin I.  That case concerned similar misconduct that Attorney 
Rosin committed after joining Firm 2.  Among other things, 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
9 
 
Attorney Rosin formed a new law firm during his employment with 
Firm 2; solicited a client of Firm 2 to become a client of his 
new firm while still employed by Firm 2; provided and billed for 
legal services to that client outside of Firm 2 while still 
employed by Firm 2; and made misrepresentations to Firm 2 when 
initially confronted with questions about his actions.  Rosin I, 
407 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶11-12, 16.   
¶20 When the attorney-owner of Firm 1 read Rosin I, he 
realized that Attorney Rosin had been simultaneously employed by 
both Firm 1 and Firm 2 in December 2020.  The attorney-owner 
then filed the grievance with the OLR that gave rise to the two 
misconduct claims that the OLR brought against Attorney Rosin in 
its complaint, which it filed on January 30, 2024.  Those two 
claims are as follows: 
Count 1:  By engaging in the course of conduct that 
included allowing both [Firm 1] and [Firm 2] to 
believe he was a full-time and exclusive employee of 
each firm between December 2 and 17, 2020, failing to 
tell either firm of his simultaneous employment by 
both firms, and/or misleading one or both firms as to 
the simultaneous employment, [Attorney] Rosin violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c).3 
Count 2:  By engaging in the course of conduct that 
included allowing both [Firm 1] and [Firm 2] to 
believe he was a full-time and exclusive employee of 
each firm between December 2 and 17, 2020, failing to 
tell either firm of his simultaneous employment by 
both firms, and/or misleading one or both firms as to 
the simultaneous employment, [Attorney] Rosin breached 
his fiduciary duties to both firms, and his duty of 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
10 
 
honesty in his professional dealings with both firms, 
thereby violating a standard of conduct established by 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Wisconsin 
in 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 527 N.W.2d 
314 (1995), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f).4 
¶21 Attorney Rosin did not file an answer to the OLR's 
complaint.  In March 2024, however, Attorney Rosin entered into 
a stipulation and no-contest plea to the complaint.  Attorney 
Rosin stipulated to all of the facts alleged in the complaint; 
to the two counts of misconduct alleged in the complaint; and to 
the imposition of a six-month suspension of his Wisconsin law 
license to run consecutively to the one-year suspension issued 
in Rosin I.   
¶22 In the stipulation, Attorney Rosin agrees that this 
court may use the allegations of the disciplinary complaint as 
an adequate factual basis for a determination of misconduct.    
Attorney Rosin also agrees that the stipulation is not the 
result of plea bargaining, but the result of his voluntary 
decision to not further contest this matter.  Attorney Rosin 
also 
agrees 
that 
he 
fully 
understands 
the 
misconduct 
allegations, his rights to contest this matter, and the 
ramifications of his entry into the stipulation.  Attorney Rosin 
states that he fully understands his right to consult with 
counsel and has consulted with counsel about this matter.  
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 
order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
11 
 
Attorney 
Rosin 
also 
represents 
that 
his 
entry 
into 
the 
stipulation is made knowingly and voluntarily. 
¶23 In its memorandum in support of the stipulation, the 
OLR submits that a six-month suspension is appropriate because, 
had it known of the allegations from the attorney-owner of Firm 
1 during the disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the Rosin 
I decision, it would have sought a year-and-a-half suspension of 
Attorney Rosin's law license rather than the one-year suspension 
to which the parties stipulated.    The OLR explains that in 
Rosin I, it weighed as a mitigating factor Attorney Rosin's 
acceptance of responsibility for his actions and his expression 
of remorse.  The OLR concedes that, given the misconduct at 
issue here, its assessment of Attorney Rosin's contrition in 
Rosin I was inaccurate——while he appeared to be remorseful 
regarding what appeared to be an isolated example of bad 
decision-making, he in fact had committed essentially the same 
misconduct in the past.  The OLR explains that had it been aware 
of that fact, it would have assessed Attorney Rosin's misconduct 
to be more akin to that in In Re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hotvedt, 2016 WI 93, 372 Wis. 2d 68, 888 N.W.2d 393.  
There, we imposed an 18-month license suspension on an attorney 
who converted over $173,000 in funds belonging to his law firm 
by writing-off fees owed to the firm, depositing client fee 
payments directly into his own personal bank account rather than 
depositing the fees into the firm account, and establishing a 
consulting firm for the purpose of converting client fees owed 
to the firm.  Id., ¶¶11, 17.  The attorney had no disciplinary 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
12 
 
history but failed to cooperate with the OLR's investigation.  
Id., ¶¶3, 11, 17.  Consistent with the 18-month suspension 
imposed in Hotvedt, the OLR asks that the court issue a six-
month suspension of Attorney Rosin's Wisconsin law license that 
would run consecutively to the one-year suspension issued in 
Rosin I. 
¶24 The facts and law readily support this requested 
discipline.  Today is the second time in roughly the past year 
that we must consider suspending Attorney Rosin for playing fast 
and loose with the truth of the circumstances of his employment.  
As in Rosin I, these actions were transparently unprofessional——
the most basic ethical duty of an attorney is to act with 
honesty, and simultaneously working for and collecting pay from 
two 
unsuspecting 
law 
firms 
that 
had 
prohibited 
outside 
employment, as Attorney Rosin did here, is patently dishonest.  
Had we been aware when deciding Rosin I of the misconduct now 
considered, we are confident we would have imposed an even 
longer suspension; thus, a consecutively imposed suspension is 
in order.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss, 2015 
WI 104, ¶24, 365 Wis. 2d 442, 871 N.W.2d 859.  Adding a six-
month consecutive suspension to the one-year suspension ordered 
in Rosin I is a result that fits comfortably within our case 
law.  See Hotvedt, 372 Wis. 2d 68 (citing In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Brown, 2005 WI 49, 280 Wis. 2d 44, 695 
N.W.2d 295) (imposing a stipulated 18–month suspension on an 
attorney who, among other things, converted over $16,000 in fees 
belonging to his law firm, made multiple misrepresentations to 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
13 
 
his law partner and associate, and made misrepresentations to 
the OLR).  We trust that lengthening Attorney Rosin's suspension 
in this way will drive home the importance of his professional 
obligations, encourage other attorneys to deal forthrightly with 
their employers, and repair the public confidence in the legal 
profession that is inevitably damaged by cases such as this. 
¶25 Accordingly, we accept the stipulation and impose the 
requested six-month suspension, to run consecutively to the one-
year suspension that we imposed in Rosin I and that recently 
expired on May 25, 2024.5  We do not order restitution; as 
mentioned above, the OLR has not requested it, and Attorney 
Rosin has been obligated through a civil judgment to repay the 
funds he owes to Firm 1.  However, we deem it appropriate to 
require, as a condition of reinstatement of his Wisconsin law 
license, that Attorney Rosin satisfy this judgment.  See 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krill, 2020 WI 20, ¶58 n.15, 
390 Wis. 2d 466, 938 N.W.2d 589.  Because the stipulation was 
filed at the outset of this proceeding, thereby avoiding 
litigation costs and the need to appoint a referee, we impose no 
costs on Attorney Rosin. 
                                                 
5  We note that, given the issuance date of this decision, 
this consecutively imposed suspension has about a one-month 
retroactive period.  We have previously held that a retroactive 
suspension is generally not favored in the absence of some 
"compelling circumstance."  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Boyd, 2009 WI 59, ¶34, 318 Wis. 2d 281, 767 N.W.2d 226.  
Such a circumstance is present here given the modest retroactive 
period of the suspension, and given that Attorney Rosin's 
misconduct in this case occurred before his misconduct in Rosin 
I.  See In re Disciplinary Proc. Against Schoenecker, 2016 WI 
27, ¶17, 368 Wis. 2d 57, 878 N.W.2d 163. 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
14 
 
¶26 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Kevin R. Rosin to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, to run consecutively to the discipline imposed in 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rosin, 2023 WI 32, 407 Wis. 2d 
1, 988 N.W.2d 681, and therefore effective as of May 25, 2024.  
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, Kevin 
R. Rosin shall satisfy the judgment issued against him and in 
Firm 1's favor in connection with the misconduct described 
herein.  
¶28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kevin R. Rosin shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶29 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See SCR 
22.28(3). 
 
 
 
No. 
2024AP156-D   
 
 
 
1