Title: Fred A. Barry v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 101 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2557 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Fred A. Barry,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Employers Mutual Casualty Company, a foreign 
corporation,  
 
Defendant, 
Ameritech Corporation, f/d/b, Wisconsin Bell, 
Inc., a domestic corporation,  
 
Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent- 
 
Cross-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Dave Trojan Contractors, Inc., a domestic 
corporation, Continental Western Insurance 
Company, a foreign corporation,  
 
Third-Party Defendant-Cross-Respondent, 
The Burgmeier Company, Inc., a domestic 
corporation, and Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company, a foreign corporation,  
 
Third-Party Defendant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 168 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 125, 617 N.W.2d 493 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 10, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 6, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
2 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross respondent-
petitioner there were briefs by Michael I. Tarnoff, Frank T. 
Crivello II and Warshafsky, Rotter, Tarnoff, Reinhardt & Bloch, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Michael I. Tarnoff. 
 
 
For the defendant-third party plaintiff-
respondent-cross appellant there was a brief by Peter F. Mullaney 
and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Peter F. Mullaney. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David M. 
Skoglind and Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2001 WI 101 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2557 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Fred A. Barry,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Employers Mutual Casualty Company, a  
foreign corporation,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Ameritech Corporation, f/d/b, Wisconsin  
Bell, Inc., a domestic corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff- 
          Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Dave Trojan Contractors, Inc., a domestic  
corporation, Continental Western  
Insurance Company, a foreign corporation,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
The Burgmeier Company, Inc., a domestic  
Corporation, and Aetna Casualty & Surety  
Company, a foreign corporation,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
2 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J.   This 
case 
arises 
under 
Wisconsin's safe place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11 (1995-96),1 
and raises the question of whether a loose stairway nosing that 
caused the plaintiff to fall down a flight of stairs on the 
defendant's property constituted a "structural defect" or an 
"unsafe condition associated with the structure."  If it was a 
"structural defect" the property owner is liable under the 
statute regardless of whether it had notice of the defect.  If 
it was an "unsafe condition associated with the structure" the 
property owner is liable only if it had actual or constructive 
notice of the condition. 
¶2 
Other issues are also raised: 1) whether, if notice is 
required, a new trial should be granted; 2) whether the causal 
negligence of the subcontractor who installed the nosings should 
be imputed to the property owner; 3) whether retroactive 
application of the 1995 amendment to the comparative negligence 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045, is constitutional; and 4) whether 
sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the 
plaintiff was ten percent contributorily negligent. 
¶3 
We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the loose nosing was an "unsafe condition associated with the 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.    
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
3 
structure" rather than a "structural defect."  Thus, the 
plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant property 
owner had notice of the condition.  We disagree, however, with 
the court of appeals' conclusion that a new trial is not 
required.  Because the jury was not instructed on the notice 
issue, the case was not fully tried and therefore must be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability. 
I 
¶4 
Plaintiff Fred A. Barry worked as a project manager 
for Dave Trojan Contractors, Inc., which handled all project 
management 
for 
construction 
and 
remodeling 
of 
defendant 
Ameritech Corporation's data center in Pewaukee, Wisconsin.  The 
data center building featured a curved stairway between the 
first floor and the ground floor.  Originally, the stairway was 
fully carpeted.  Problems developed when the glue stopped 
holding the carpeting at the bottom edge of each step.  The 
carpeting began coming loose and attempts to reglue it failed.   
¶5 
To fix the problem, Ameritech hired The Burgmeier 
Company to install vinyl strips, called nosings, on the front of 
each step to hold the carpeting in place.  This work was 
completed in September 1991.   
¶6 
After the nosings were in place, Ameritech received 
complaints from women who had caught their heels on the edges of 
the new nosings.  Dan Wilson, the environmental manager at the 
data center, investigated and discovered that there was a one-
eighth-inch discrepancy between the height of the nosing and the 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
4 
adjoining carpeting.  Ameritech solicited, and Barry submitted, 
a proposal for eliminating the discrepancy. 
¶7 
On January 7, 1993, Barry went to the data center to 
take 
some 
measurements 
and 
also 
to 
meet 
with 
Ameritech 
employees.  Barry began descending the stairway when he noticed 
another individual coming up the stairs.  He moved aside so that 
the other person could pass.  As he did so, he felt his legs go 
out from under him and he landed on his back on the stairs. 
¶8 
After 
his 
fall, 
Barry 
alerted 
Wilson 
and 
they 
investigated.  The two noticed that the nosing on the step where 
Barry fell had become loose and was partially detached from the 
step itself.  Although Barry initially thought he was just 
shaken by the fall, he eventually became sick and was taken to 
the hospital where he was diagnosed with severe head, neck, and 
back injuries. 
II 
¶9 
Barry sued Ameritech under the safe place statute.  
Ameritech, 
in 
turn, 
commenced 
a 
third-party 
action 
for 
contribution against Burgmeier and for indemnification from 
Trojan under the Ameritech/Trojan contract.   
¶10 In May 1998 a jury trial was held in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court.  At the close of Barry's case, Ameritech moved 
for dismissal, arguing that the loose nosing was not a 
"structural defect" but instead was an "unsafe condition 
associated with the structure," which required Barry to prove 
that Ameritech had actual or constructive notice of the 
condition, and that he had not done so.  The circuit court, the 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
5 
Honorable Victor Manian, denied the motion, agreeing with 
Barry's position that the loose nosing was a "structural defect" 
and therefore no notice was required.  Consequently, the court 
did not instruct the jury on the issue of notice.  See Wis JI——
Civil 1900.4 (directing that the notice instruction should be 
omitted when the unsafe condition is a structural defect rather 
than an unsafe condition associated with the structure).   
¶11 The jury found that Ameritech was negligent in failing 
to maintain the stairway in as safe a manner as the nature of 
the premises reasonably permitted, and that Burgmeier was 
causally 
negligent 
in 
installing 
the 
nosing. 
 
The 
jury 
apportioned liability as follows: 45 percent to Ameritech, 45 
percent to Burgmeier, and ten percent to Barry.  The jury set 
damages at $80,500.   
¶12 Both parties filed postverdict motions.  Barry argued 
that 1) no credible evidence supported the jury's finding that 
he was ten percent contributorily negligent; 2) retroactive 
application of the 1995 amendment2 to the comparative negligence 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045, was unconstitutional; and 3) the 
non-delegable nature of Ameritech's safe place statute duty 
required that Burgmeier's negligence be imputed to Ameritech.   
¶13 Ameritech asked for judgment notwithstanding verdict 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.14, renewing its argument that the 
loose nosing was an "unsafe condition associated with the 
structure" requiring Barry to prove notice.  In the alternative, 
                     
2 See 1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1.  
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
6 
Ameritech moved for a new trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.15(1), limited to the issue of notice.  The circuit court 
denied all motions and entered judgment against Ameritech for 
its portion of the damages——$36,225 plus costs.  The court 
dismissed the third-party complaint against Trojan, awarding 
costs in the amount of $1,355.59, and dismissed the third-party 
complaint against Burgmeier without costs. 
¶14 Barry appealed, asserting three claims of error: 1) 
that 
Burgmeier's 
negligence 
should 
have 
been 
imputed 
to 
Ameritech because Ameritech had a non-delegable duty under the 
safe place statute; 2) that retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045 was unconstitutional; and 3) that no credible 
evidence supported the jury's finding that he was ten percent 
contributorily negligent. 
¶15 Ameritech cross-appealed, reasserting its contention 
that the circuit court erred by characterizing the loose nosing 
as a "structural defect" rather than an "unsafe condition 
associated with the structure," and consequently failing to 
instruct the jury on notice.   
¶16 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
loose nosing was an "unsafe condition associated with the 
structure" because it arose from "subsequent repair, maintenance 
or modification" of the property, and therefore proof of notice 
was required.  Barry v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 2000 WI App 
168, ¶¶13-14, 238 Wis. 2d 125, 617 N.W.2d 493.  The court of 
appeals declined, however, to remand for a new trial on the 
notice issue, because Barry had not requested one.  Id. at ¶20. 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
7 
 Because its characterization of the unsafe condition was 
dispositive, the court of appeals did not reach the issues 
raised by Barry.  We accepted review. 
III 
¶17 The primary issue in this case is how to classify the 
loose nosing that caused Barry's fall for purposes of the safe 
place statute——as a "structural defect" or as an "unsafe 
condition associated with the structure."  This requires us to 
interpret and apply the safe place statute to these facts and 
thus presents a question of law that we review de novo.  Geiger 
v. Milwaukee Guardian Ins. Co., 188 Wis. 2d 333, 336, 524 N.W.2d 
909 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶18 Wisconsin's 
safe 
place 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 101.11(1), is a negligence statute that, rather than creating 
a distinct cause of action, Krause v. Veterans of Foreign Wars 
Post No. 6498, 9 Wis. 2d 547, 552, 101 N.W.2d 645 (1960), 
instead establishes a duty greater than that of ordinary care 
imposed at common law.  Topp v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 83 Wis. 2d 780, 
788, 266 N.W.2d 397 (1978); Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 92 
Wis. 2d 17, 26, 284 N.W.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1979).   
¶19 Specifically, 
the 
statute 
requires 
that 
"[e]very 
employer and every owner of a place of employment or a public 
building now or hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair 
or maintain such place of employment or public building as to 
render the same safe."  Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1).  The statute 
defines "safe" as: 
 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
8 
[S]uch freedom from danger to the life, health, safety 
or welfare of employes or frequenters, or the public, 
or tenants, or fire fighters, and such reasonable 
means of notification, egress and escape in case of 
fire, and such freedom from danger to adjacent 
buildings or other property, as the nature of the 
employment, place of employment, or public building, 
will reasonably permit.   
Wis. Stat. § 101.01(13).   
¶20 By its plain terms, the statute imposes three duties 
on employers and owners of places of employment or public 
buildings: the duty to construct, to repair, and to maintain a 
safe place of employment or public building.  Ameritech is the 
owner of a place of employment and therefore was charged with 
these three statutory duties to frequenters3 of the place of 
employment, including Fred Barry.   
¶21 Safe place cases tend to focus on the property 
condition that caused the injury rather than on the duty that 
the property owner or employer breached.  The cases generally 
recognize three categories of unsafe property conditions, but 
only two are relevant to this case: "structural defects" and 
                     
3 A frequenter is "every person, other than an employe, who 
may go in or be in a place of employment or public building 
under circumstances which render such person other than a 
trespasser."  Wis. Stat. § 101.01(6).   
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
9 
"unsafe conditions associated with the structure."4  Howard H. 
Boyle, Jr., Wisconsin Safe-Place Law Revised 139 (1980).   
¶22 The classification of the hazardous property condition 
is often crucial in safe place cases because of the differing 
notice requirements for each.  A property owner or employer is 
liable for injuries caused by structural defects regardless of 
whether he or she knew or should have known that the defect 
existed.  Hommel v. Badger State Inv. Co., 166 Wis. 235, 242, 
165 N.W. 20 (1917); Hannebaum v. DiRenzo & Bomier, 162 Wis. 2d 
488, 500, 469 N.W.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1991); Boyle, supra 157.   
¶23 However, where the property condition that causes the 
injury is an unsafe condition associated with the structure, 
this court has grafted a notice requirement onto the safe place 
statute.  Pettric v. Gridley Dairy Co., 202 Wis. 289, 293, 232 
N.W. 595 (1930).  In Pettric the court imported common law 
notice 
principles 
into 
the 
safe 
place 
statute 
context, 
concluding that in order for an employer to be liable in cases 
involving repair or maintenance, he or she must have actual or 
constructive notice of the defect.   
 
                     
4 An employer, but not an owner of a public building, see 
Ruppa v. American States Insurance Co., 91 Wis. 2d 628, 639-40, 
284 N.W.2d 318 (1979), may also be liable for "unsafe conditions 
unassociated 
with 
structure," 
a 
category 
that 
has 
been 
extrapolated from the employer's duty to furnish "employment 
which shall be safe" under Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1).  See Niedfelt 
v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 of City of Viroqua, 23 Wis. 2d 641, 
647, 127 N.W.2d 800 (1964); Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Holy 
Ghost Congregation, 219 Wis. 209, 211-12, 262 N.W. 585 (1935).  
No one has raised this basis for safe place liability, however, 
and so we do not address it.  
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
10
In terms, the statute imposes the absolute duty upon 
the employer to repair and maintain the place of 
employment so as to render the same safe.  We have 
given consideration to the question of whether this 
statutory provision does impose an absolute duty on 
the employer so as to make him practically an insurer 
of the safety of his premises so far as repair and 
maintenance is concerned.  It would seem that in order 
to make an employer liable for defects in the nature 
of repair or maintenance he should have either actual 
or constructive notice of such defects.  Natural 
principles of justice would seem to require that.  
Such principles of justice are recognized by the 
common law, as indicated in Lundgren v. Gimbel Bros., 
191 Wis. 521, 210 N.W. 678, and cases therein cited.  
This is so in accord with the natural instincts of 
justice that a contrary purpose should not be imputed 
to a legislative act in the absence of an unequivocal 
declaration of such purpose.  We therefore consider 
that the legislative purpose will be given full scope 
if the language of the statute be interpreted in 
accordance with these natural principles of justice, 
and hold that the duty of the employer to repair or 
maintain his place of employment does not arise until 
he has either actual or constructive notice of the 
defect. 
Id.   
¶24 Safe place cases are highly fact-specific and arise 
under a multitude of circumstances that make it difficult to 
craft a precise test for determining whether a hazardous 
property condition is "structural" or "associated with the 
structure."  Furthermore, while the statute refers to the duties 
imposed upon employers and owners (to construct, repair and 
maintain a safe place of employment or public building), the 
cases refer to the conditions that arise from the breach of 
those 
duties 
(structural 
defects 
and 
unsafe 
conditions 
associated with the structure).   
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
11
¶25 We can extrapolate from the language of the statute 
and the cases, however, that a breach of the statutory duty to 
repair or maintain (as distinct from the statutory duty to 
safely construct) creates an "unsafe condition associated with 
the structure."  This is consistent with an authoritative 
treatise on the safe place statute:  
 
Conditions "associated with the structure" are 
those which involve the structure (or the materials 
with which it is composed) becoming out of repair or 
not 
being 
maintained 
in 
a 
safe 
manner. 
 
Such 
conditions are those referred to in the statutory 
injunction to "repair or maintain such place of 
employment or public building." 
Boyle, supra 143-44.   
¶26 Boutin v. Cardinal Theatre Co., 267 Wis. 199, 202, 64 
N.W.2d 848 (1954), confirms this interpretation.  In Boutin, the 
plaintiff was injured when he fell to the floor after attempting 
to sit in a theater seat that had a missing cushion.  Id. at 
201.  This court concluded that the missing cushion was an 
"unsafe condition associated with the structure," noting that 
although the theater seats were safely constructed, "seats 
originally safe are to be kept so.  That is the duty of 
maintenance and repair which the statute imposes."  Id. at 202. 
  
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
12
¶27 "Unsafe conditions associated with the structure" have 
been found in cases involving: improper lighting;5 the failure to 
remedy the movement of gravel that resulted in a height 
disparity between the edge of a paved parking lot and an 
abutting gravel strip;6 a loose window screen;7 and an improperly 
connected elevator motor.8  The common theme of these cases is 
that the property hazards arose from the failure to keep an 
originally 
safe 
structure 
in 
proper 
repair 
or 
properly 
maintained. 
¶28 If an "unsafe condition associated with the structure" 
arises from a breach of the statutory duty to repair or 
maintain, then a "structural defect" arises from a breach of the 
statutory duty to construct a safe building.  A defect is 
structural if it arises "by reason of the materials used in 
construction or from improper layout or construction."  Boyle, 
supra 140.  Thus, unlike a condition associated with the 
structure, which may develop over time, a structural defect is a 
                     
5 Zimmers v. St. Sebastian's Congregation of Milwaukee, 258 
Wis. 496, 501, 46 N.W.2d 820 (1951); Helms v. Fox Badger 
Theatres Corp., 253 Wis. 113, 118, 33 N.W.2d 210 (1948); Heiden 
v. City of Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 102, 275 N.W. 922 (1937); 
Pettric v. Gridley Dairy Co., 202 Wis. 289, 290, 232 N.W. 595 
(1930).  
6 Topp v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 83 Wis. 2d 780, 782, 266 N.W.2d 
397 (1978).  
7 Wright v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, Racine, 
265 Wis. 502, 503, 61 N.W.2d 900 (1954).  
8 Kaczmarski v. F. Rosenberg Elevator Co., 216 Wis. 553, 257 
N.W. 598 (1934).    
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
13
hazardous condition inherent in the structure by reason of its 
design or construction.  See Carl Neprud Otjen, Note, Safe Place 
Statute——Section 101.06——New Applications, 1948 Wis. L. Rev. 
568, 569 (1948).   
¶29 "Structural 
defects" 
have 
been 
found 
in 
cases 
involving: the failure to install a handrail along a staircase;9 
a trapdoor that was not surrounded by a railing;10 a balcony 
railing that was not high enough;11 and a false ceiling that did 
not support a worker's weight.12 
¶30 We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the loose stairway nosing that caused Barry's fall was an 
"unsafe condition associated with the structure" rather than a 
"structural defect," because it resulted from a failure to 
repair or maintain the stairway, not a failure to safely 
construct the stairway.  As the court of appeals noted: "nosings 
added to the original stairway are not part of the original 
structure, but rather, are 'associated with the structure.'  To 
conclude 
otherwise 
would 
be 
to 
accept . . . 'circular 
reasoning,' effectively 'transmogrify[ing] all maintenance and 
                     
9 Harnett v. St. Mary's Congregation, 271 Wis. 603, 74 
N.W.2d 382 (1956); Burling v. Schroeder Hotel Co., 235 Wis. 403, 
291 N.W. 810 (1940); Washburn v. Skogg, 204 Wis. 29, 233 N.W. 
764 (1930).  
10 Wannmacher v. Baldauf Corp., 262 Wis. 523, 55 N.W.2d 895 
(1952).  
11 Frion v. Coren, 13 Wis. 2d 300, 108 N.W.2d 563 (1961).    
12 Bellmann v. Nat'l Container Corp. of Mich., 5 Wis. 2d 
318, 92 N.W.2d 762 (1958).    
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
14
repair defects into structural defects.'"  Barry, 2000 WI App 
168, ¶14.  Thus, because the accident was attributable to the 
failure to safely repair or maintain the steps rather than a 
defect in the original structural design or construction of the 
steps, the law requires proof of actual or constructive notice. 
¶31 Barry analogizes this case to Candell v. Skaar, 3 
Wis. 2d 544, 89 N.W.2d 274 (1958).  There, the plaintiff fell on 
a set of outdoor steps that were not finished with a non-
slippery surface as required by regulatory agency orders.  Id. 
at 548.  Barry argues that there is no difference between a step 
that is unsafe because it lacks a non-slip surface and a step 
that is unsafe because it has a loose nosing.  A stairway that 
is constructed without a regulation non-slip surface is properly 
characterized as a defect in the stairway's design.  The same 
cannot be said for a loose nosing strip that was placed on a 
stairway sometime after its original construction.  There may be 
a factual dispute about whether the nosings became loose due to 
improper 
installation 
(by 
the 
subcontractor) 
or 
improper 
maintenance (by the property owner), but that factual dispute 
does not affect the legal classification of the defect for 
purposes of determining whether notice is required. 
¶32 Our conclusion that a "structural defect" relates to a 
breach of the duty to safely design and construct while an 
"unsafe condition associated with the structure" relates to a 
breach of the duty to repair or maintain is consistent with the 
logic behind the notice requirement.  In cases of structural 
defect, it makes perfect sense that no notice should be 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
15
required.  However, in order to fulfill the duty to repair or 
maintain, the property owner or employer must have actual or 
constructive notice of the hazardous condition requiring repair 
or maintenance.   
IV 
¶33 Because the loose nosing was an "unsafe condition 
associated with the structure" rather than a "structural 
defect," the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
on the notice issue.  Where actual or constructive notice is 
required, the supplemental jury instruction is given:  
 
[Note: The following paragraph should not be given 
where the defect is a structural defect.  To find that 
(defendant) 
failed 
to 
(construct) 
(repair) 
or 
(maintain) the premises in question as safe as the 
nature of the place reasonably permitted, you must 
find that (defendant) had actual notice of the alleged 
defect in time to take reasonable precautions to 
remedy the situation or that the defect existed for 
such a length of time before the accident that 
(defendant) or its employees in the exercise of 
reasonable 
diligence 
(this includes the 
duty of 
inspection) should have discovered the defect in time 
to 
take 
reasonable 
precautions 
to 
remedy 
the 
situation.  However, this notice requirement does not 
apply where (defendant)'s affirmative act created the 
defect.] 
Wis JI——Civil 1900.4.  As indicated, this instruction is not 
given where the defect is structural.  Id.  The circuit court 
did not give the supplemental instruction in this case because 
it concluded that the loose nosing was structural.   
¶34 The parties dispute the appropriate remedy for this 
error.  Ameritech argues that Barry is not entitled to a new 
trial on liability because his strategic choices in the circuit 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
16
courtarguing 
that 
the 
loose 
nosing 
was 
a 
"structural 
defect"prevented the notice instruction from being given.  
Barry argues that a new trial is necessary in the interest of 
justice because the real controversy has not been tried. 
¶35 We have discretionary authority to order a new trial 
under Wis. Stat. § 751.06: 
 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial . . . . 
The 
statute 
specifies 
two 
circumstances 
in 
which 
this 
discretionary authority may be invoked: 1) when the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, and 2) when justice has 
probably miscarried.  Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶88, 235 
Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659.   
¶36 In Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 20, 456 N.W.2d 797 
(1990), we identified jury instruction and verdict form error as 
falling within the ambit of the statute, even where the error 
was waived.  Specifically, we held that "where an instruction 
obfuscates the real issue or arguably caused the real issue not 
to be tried, reversal would be available . . . ."  Id. at 22.   
¶37 In Air Wisconsin, Inc. v. North Central Airlines, 
Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 301, 296 N.W.2d 749 (1980), we concluded that 
the use of an erroneous jury instruction prevented a "full, fair 
trial of the issues."  Id. at 318.  More recently, in State v. 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
17
Perkins we noted that insufficient jury instructions may result 
in a controversy not being fully tried, therefore warranting a 
new trial.  State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶49, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 
626 N.W.2d 762.   
¶38 We conclude here that a new trial is warranted because 
the jury was not given the required supplemental instruction and 
therefore decided the case based upon an erroneous statement of 
law.  We cannot say how a properly instructed jury might have 
decided the notice issue.  The question of whether Ameritech had 
notice of the loose nosing goes to the heart of Ameritech's 
liability for Barry's injuries in this case.  The jury did not 
consider the notice issue at all, because it was not told to do 
so.  As such, the case was not fully tried.  
V 
¶39 Barry also argues that because Ameritech's duty under 
the safe place statute was non-delegable, see Dykstra v. Arthur 
G. McKee & Co., 100 Wis. 2d 120, 132, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981), any 
causal negligence attributed to Burgmeier should be imputed to 
Ameritech.  Ameritech disagrees, noting the general rule that 
one who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the 
negligence of the independent contractor.  See Smith v. 
Milwaukee Builders' & Traders' Exch., 91 Wis. 360, 64 N.W. 1041 
(1895).   
¶40 Smith is distinguishable because it states the general 
common law rule.  The claim against Ameritech was brought 
specifically under the safe place statute, which, as we have 
discussed, imposes duties beyond the common law.   
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
18
¶41 In some situations, tort law imposes liability upon 
one who was not negligent, but who, because of the nature of the 
enterprise and his or her relationship to the plaintiff, has a 
duty that cannot be delegated.  W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 71, at 511 (5th ed. 1984).  A 
non-delegable duty may be imposed by contract, franchise or 
charter, the common law, or statute.   
¶42 The duties imposed on employers and property owners 
under the safe place statute are non-delegable.  Novak v. City 
of Delavan, 31 Wis. 2d 200, 207, 143 N.W.2d 6 (1966); Criswell 
v. Seaman Body Corp., 233 Wis. 606, 290 N.W. 177 (1940).  "[T]he 
person who has that duty [under the safe place statute] cannot 
assert that another to whom he has allegedly delegated the duty 
is to be substituted as the primary defendant in his stead for a 
violation of safe place provisions.  Under any circumstance, it 
is the owner or the employer who must answer to the injured 
party."  Dykstra, 100 Wis. 2d at 132 (emphasis added).   
¶43  Barry's safe place statute claim against Ameritech is 
separate and distinct from Ameritech's claim for contribution 
against Burgmeier.  See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Schara, 
56 Wis. 2d 262, 201 N.W.2d 758 (1972).  Ameritech's duty under 
the safe place statute is non-delegable, and therefore Ameritech 
must answer to Barry for any violation of that duty regardless 
of whether another party contributed to the violation.  That 
Ameritech may have contribution rights against Burgmeier to the 
extent of Burgmeier's negligence does not diminish the nature of 
Ameritech's statutory duty to the plaintiff.  See Dykstra, 100 
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19
Wis. 2d at 132 (safe place statute duties are non-delegable, and 
"whether the owner or employer is to be made financially whole 
from another source by principles of law or contract is an 
entirely different question").   
¶44 The jury was properly instructed to determine the 
percentage of negligence attributable to Burgmeier in this case, 
despite the fact that Ameritech's duty arose under the safe 
place statute and Burgmeier's under the common law.  See Payne 
v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 432, 195 N.W.2d 641 (1972).  
Indeed, it was necessary to do so in order to properly apportion 
Burgmeier's negligence for purposes of Ameritech's claim for 
contribution. 
 
However, 
the 
apportionment 
of 
Burgmeier's 
negligence 
is 
only 
relevant 
to 
Ameritech's 
claim 
for 
contribution.  Because Ameritech's duties under the safe place 
statute 
were 
non-delegable, 
upon 
retrial, 
Burgmeier's 
negligence, if any, should be imputed to Ameritech. 
VI 
¶45 We need not address Barry's final two arguments.  Our 
decision in Matthies v. Positive Safety Co., 2001 WI 82, __ 
Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, concluded that retroactive application 
of Wis. Stat. § 895.045 is unconstitutional.  Second, Barry's 
challenge to the jury's finding of contributory negligence is 
rendered irrelevant by our remand for a new trial on the issue 
of liability.  
¶46 We conclude that the loose nosing that caused Barry's 
fall was an "unsafe condition associated with the structure" 
rather than a "structural defect."  Accordingly, Barry was 
No. 
98-2557 
 
 
20
required to prove that Ameritech had actual or constructive 
notice of the condition in order to establish safe place statute 
liability.  Because the jury was not instructed on the notice 
issue, it could not give proper legal or factual consideration 
to the liability question.  We remand for a new trial on the 
issue of liability.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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98-2557 
 
 
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