Title: Oken v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Oken v. State
No. 117, September Term, 2002
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - CAPITAL PUNISHMENT - BURDEN OF
PROOF
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413(h), part of the Maryland death penalty statute, provides that,
if the sentencing authority finds that one or more mitigating circumstances exist, it shall
determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  If it finds that they do, the sentence is death; if it
finds that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a
sentence of death may not be imposed.  The ultimate determination must be unanimous and
in writing.
The § 413(h) weighing process is not a fact-finding one based on evidence. Mitigating
circumstances do not negate aggravating circumstances, as alibi negates criminal agency or
hot blood negates premeditation.  The statutory circumstances specified or allowed under 
§ 413(d) and (g) are entirely independent from one another--the existence of one in no way
confirms or detracts from another.  The weighing process is purely a judgmental one, of
balancing the mitigators against the aggravators to determine whether death is the appropriate
punishment in a particular case.  A determination that aggravators outweigh mitigators by a
preponderance of the evidence does not violate a defendant’s Sixth or Eighth Amendment
rights.  Accordingly, neither Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) nor Ring v.
Arizona, 53 U.S. 584 (2002), impugn the Maryland statute.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 117
September Term, 2002
STEVEN HOWARD OKEN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge and Raker, JJ., dissent
Filed:    November 17, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
1 See Ex Parte Hodges, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 84 (14 March 2003); Ex Parte Waldrop
2002 Ala LEXIS 336 (22 November 2002); State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915 (Az. 2003); People
v. Prieto 66 P.3d 1123 (Cal. 2003); People v. Navarette, 66 P.3d 1182 (Cal. 2003); Woldt v.
People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003); Bottoson v.
Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla. 2002); People v. Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788 (Ill. 2002); State v.
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d (Mo. 2003); Johnson v State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002); Torres v.
State, 58 P.3d 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).  In Olsen v. State, relied on by the dissent, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed the burden of persuasion in the process of weighing
aggravating against mitigating factors under Wyoming’s death penalty statute; however, the
court did not consider the effect of Ring upon Wyoming’s capital punishment scheme.  Olsen
v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 576, 590 (Wyo. 2003).
It is Maryland’s turn to consider the effect, if any, of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002), upon
its capital punishment statutory scheme.  At least eleven state supreme courts have preceded
us in pondering the same question as regards their respective statutes.1  Of those states, four,
Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, and Nevada, concluded that Ring compelled invalidation of
some part of their statutes as written.  The remaining six states, Alabama, California,
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, and Oklahoma, concluded that Ring had no ill effect on their
statutory schemes.  For  reasons to be explained infra, we determine that Ring does not affect
adversely the Maryland statute.
I.
The present case is Mr. Oken’s fourth in this Court, see Oken v. State, 367 Md. 191,
786 A.2d 691 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1074, 122 S. Ct. 1953, 152 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2002)
(Oken III) (application for leave to appeal denials of motion to re-open post-conviction case
and motion to correct illegal sentence, both based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)); Oken v State, 343 Md. 256, 681 A.2d 30 (1996),
2 In addition, see Oken v Nuth, 64 F. Supp. 2d 488 (D. Md. 1998), aff’d, Oken v.
Corcoran, 220 F. 3d 259 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 121 S. Ct. 1126, 148
L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001), Oken’s federal habeas corpus petition.  See also Oken v. Nuth, 30 F.
Supp. 2d 877 (detailing the procedural history of Oken’s habeas corpus petition, including
Oken’s motion to declare Maryland a non-opt-in State under the Anti Terrorism Death
Penalty Act).  Subsequent to his conviction in this case for the murder of Dawn Garvin, Oken
pled guilty to the murder of Patricia Hirt.  See Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 644 n. 4, 612 A.2d
258, 266 n.4 (1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 931, 113 S. Ct. 1312, 122 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1993).
Little more need be said in this opinion regarding the facts underlying Oken’s convictions
in the present case.
3 The complete rationale for this Court’s rejection of the Apprendi claim is contained
in Borchardt v State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001), decided one day prior to the filing
of our opinion in Oken III.
2
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079, 117 S. Ct. 742; 136 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1997) (Oken II) (post-
conviction case); Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
931, 113 S. Ct. 1312; 122 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1993) (Oken I) (direct appeal).2  Oken III was the
result of Oken filing three pleadings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, all addressing
the applicability of Apprendi to the Maryland death penalty statute: (1) a Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence and/or Motion for New Sentencing Based on Mistake or Irregularity; (2) a
Motion for New Trial (filed by Mr. Oken, pro se); and (3) a Motion to Reopen Post-
Conviction Proceeding.  All were denied.  This Court granted Oken’s Application for Leave
to Appeal and, on 14 December 2001, denied relief on the Apprendi claim.3  A petition for
Writ of Certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court on 13 May 2002.  Oken v.
Maryland, 535 U.S. 1074, 122 S. Ct. 1953, 2 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2002).
On 27 January 2003, a Warrant of Execution issued from the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County commanding that Oken be executed at some time during a five day period
4 The Motion to Reopen was denied on 11 February 2003.  An Application for Leave
to Appeal that decision was filed with this Court on 11 March 2003 and denied.
5 Rule 4-345 states in relevant part:
(a)  Illegal sentence - The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time.
(b) Modification or reduction - Time for.   The court has revisory power
and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its
imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and
(2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed.  Thereafter, the
court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud,
mistake, or irregularity, or as provided by section (e) of this Rule.
3
commencing 17 March 2003.  Also on 17 March, Oken filed in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and/or Motion for New Sentencing
Based Upon Mistake or Irregularity.  The motion argued that the U. S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Ring overruled, sub silentio, this Court’s decisions in Borchardt v State, 367 Md.
91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001), cert denied  535 U.S. 1104, 122 S. Ct. 2309, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1064
(2002) and Oken III.  On 29 January 2003, the Circuit Court denied the Motion to Correct
Illegal/Irregular Sentence.4  Oken thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal.  On 10 February 2003,
Oken filed in this Court a Motion for Stay of Execution.  On 11 February 2003, we issued
an Order granting the request for a stay of execution, pending resolution of the present case.
As he did in Oken III, Oken claims that his death sentence for the murder of Dawn
Garvin in November of 1987 is illegal and irregular, as those terms are used in Maryland
Rule 4-345,5 because Maryland’s death penalty statute unconstitutionally provides for the
imposition of the death sentence if the sentencing authority determines, by a preponderance
6 See Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 712-13, 759 A.2d 764, 797 (2000); Conyers v. State,
354 Md. 132, 197-99, 729 A.2d 910, 945 (1999); Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 206-07, 699
A.2d 1170, 1194 (1997); Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 299, 696 A.2d 443, 466 (1997);
Clermont v. State, 348 Md. 419, 456, 704 A.2d 880, 898 (1998); Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204,
247-48, 686 A.2d 274, 295 (1996); Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 231-32, 670 A.2d 398,
425 (1995); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 82-83, 665 A.2d 223, 248-49 (1995); Wiggins
v. State, 324 Md. 551, 582-83, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374 (1991); Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269,
296, 586 A.2d 1, 14 (1990); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 728-34, 415 A.2d 830, 848-50
(1980).
4
of the evidence, that aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
Throughout the years since Maryland’s last major overhaul of its capital punishment statute
in obedience to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court, and most recently in Borchardt and
Oken III (adopting Borchardt as dispositive), this Court has concluded otherwise.6  In the
present case, Oken argues that Borchardt has been overruled by Ring and, therefore, the
Circuit Court judge erred when he declined to invalidate Oken’s sentence of death.
II.
Petitioner presents the following questions for our consideration:
I.
Whether, in light of Ring v. Arizona, this Court should
overrule Borchardt v. State and  hold that the Maryland
death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face
because it provides that a sentence of death may be
imposed if the State proves only that the aggravating
factors 
outweigh 
any 
mitigating 
factors 
by 
a
preponderance of the evidence.
II.
Whether, on collateral review, this Court can reach the
merits of Mr. Oken’s Apprendi/Ring arguments as the
application of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi
and Ring to the Maryland death penalty scheme represent
a new rule of constitutional law that fundamentally alters
7 With regard to Petitioner’s first issue, he broadly asserts at the beginning and end
of his argument that, because the Maryland death penalty statute provides that the weighing
of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances is by a preponderance of the
evidence standard, the statute “violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and Articles 16, 21, 23, 24, and 25 of the Maryland
Constitution.”  (Petitioner’s Brief at 17, 31).  The majority of Petitioner’s argument,
however, is devoted almost entirely to arguing the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
issues that were the focus of Apprendi, Ring, and Borchardt, and rightfully so.  The principal
reason this case was taken by the Court is to determine if Ring affects Borchardt.  Petitioner
presents no meaningful, additional supporting arguments indicating that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ring should change this Court’s previously articulated understanding of
the federal Fifth Amendment, and/or the Maryland constitutional provisions in a way that
would make the Maryland death penalty statute unconstitutional.  See e.g. Borchardt, 367
Md. at 127-28 n.6, 786 A.2d at 652-53 n.6 (as to Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights).  We therefore address only the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
implications of Petitioner’s first issue.
5
the standard of proof and the manner in which capital
sentencing hearings are to be conducted in this State.
III.
Do special circumstances exist which excuse Mr. Oken’s
failure to raise the standard of proof issue on direct
appeal or in his first previous post-conviction
proceeding?
IV.
Whether a capital sentencing proceeding that employs an
unconstitutionally low standard of proof results in the
imposition of an illegal or irregular sentence.
Because, as to Petitioner’s first issue, we find that Ring bears no adverse implications for
the Maryland death penalty statute, we do not reach petitioner’s other issues.7  We shall
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
III.
6
The U.S. Supreme Court has been diligent in developing death penalty jurisprudence
in the twenty-plus years since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed.
2d 346 (1972), with the result that this department of the law is now a labyrinth.  In order to
navigate  this cat’s cradle, as well as to understand the underpinnings of our decision in the
case sub judice in light of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this arena, it is necessary to
review its development since Furman.  Fortunately, much of that history is found in a single
place, the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S. Ct.
3047, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1990), a case of some import to the matter before us.  Although
extensive block quotations are the bane of readers of, and commentators upon, appellate
opinions, we are moved at the beginning to quote in detail from Justice Scalia’s concurrence
because it traces up to that point the lineage of two lines of the Supreme Court’s relevant
jurisprudence regarding death penalty statutes, which lines culminate in Ring.  As Justice
Scalia explains: 
Over the course of the past 15 years, this Court has
assumed the role of rulemaking body for the States'
administration of capital sentencing -- effectively requiring
capital sentencing proceedings separate from the adjudication of
guilt, see, e. g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301-
305, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S.
Ct. 2909 (1976) (opinion announcing judgment), dictating the
type and extent of discretion the sentencer must and must not
have, see, e. g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973,
98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978) (plurality opinion); Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980),
requiring that certain categories of evidence must and must not
be admitted, see, e. g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 90
7
L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986); Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), undertaking
minute inquiries into the wording of jury instructions to ensure
that jurors understand their duties under our labyrinthine code of
rules, see, e. g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed.
2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
367, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988), and prescribing
the procedural forms that sentencing decisions must follow, see,
e. g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d
369, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990).  The case that began the
development of this Eighth Amendment jurisprudence was
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 92 S. Ct.
2726 (1972) (per curiam), which has come to stand for the
principle that a sentencer's discretion to return a death sentence
must be constrained by specific standards, so that the death
penalty is not inflicted in a random and capricious fashion.
  
In Furman, we overturned the sentences of two men
convicted and sentenced to death in state courts for murder and
one man so convicted and sentenced for rape, under statutes
that gave the jury complete discretion to impose death for those
crimes, with no standards as to the factors it should deem
relevant.  The brief per curiam gave no reasons for the Court's
decision, other than to say that "the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."  Id., at 239-240.  To uncover the reasons
underlying the decision in Furman, one must turn to the
opinions of the five Justices forming the majority, each of whom
wrote separately and none of whom joined any other's opinion.
Of these opinions, two rested on the broadest possible ground --
that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment in all
circumstances.  See id., at 305 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id.,
at 369-371 (MARSHALL, J., concurring).  A third, that of
Justice Douglas, rested on a narrower ground -- that the
discretionary capital sentencing systems under which the
petitioners had been sentenced were operated in a manner that
discriminated against racial minorities and unpopular groups.
See id., at 256-257 (concurring opinion). 
8
The critical opinions, however, in light of the subsequent
development of our jurisprudence, were those of JUSTICES
Stewart and WHITE.  They focused on the infrequency and
seeming randomness with which, under the discretionary state
systems, the death penalty was imposed.  Justice Stewart wrote:
"These death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all the
people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967
and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners are among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death
has in fact been imposed. . . . The Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed."  Id., at 309-
310 (concurring opinion) (footnotes omitted).
JUSTICE WHITE took a similar view.  In his opinion the
death sentences under review violated the Eighth Amendment
because "as the statutes before us are now administered, the
penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is
too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice."
Id., at 313.  "There is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not," ibid., so that it constitutes a "pointless and needless
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any
discernible social or public purposes," id., at 312.  The opinions
of both Justice Stewart and JUSTICE WHITE went out of the
way to say that capital punishment was not in itself a cruel and
unusual punishment, and that a mandatory system of capital
sentencing, in which everyone convicted of a particular crime
received that punishment, would "present quite different issues."
Id., at 310-311 (WHITE, J., concurring); see also id., at 307-308
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
Furman led at least 35 States to adopt new capital
sentencing procedures that eliminated some of the discretion
9
previously conferred to impose or withhold the death penalty.
See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 179.  In 1976, we upheld
against Eighth Amendment challenge three "guided discretion"
schemes representative of these measures, which, in varying
forms, required the sentencer to consider certain specified
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching its
decision. In the principal case, Gregg v. Georgia, supra the
three-Justice opinion announcing the judgment read Furman as
"mandating that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body
on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human
life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action," id., at 189 (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS,  JJ.) (emphasis added).  See
also id., at 221-222 (WHITE, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and
REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 251, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976)
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at
260 (WHITE, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J.,
concurring in judgment); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 49
L. Ed. 2d 929, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 279 (WHITE, J., joined by
Burger, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). 
Since the 1976 cases, we have routinely read Furman as
standing for the proposition that "channeling  and limiting . . .
the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty" is a
"fundamental 
constitutional 
requirement," 
Maynard 
v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372, 108 S. Ct.
1853 (1988), and have insisted that States furnish the sentencer
with "'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and
detailed guidance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the
process for imposing a sentence of death,'" Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. at 428 (footnotes omitted).  Only twice since 1976
have we actually invalidated a death sentence because of
inadequate guidance to the sentencer, see Maynard, 486 U.S. at
362-364; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-429, 433, but we have
repeatedly incanted the principle that "unbridled discretion" is
unacceptable, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326, 106 L. Ed.
2d 256, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), that capital sentencing
10
procedures must constrain and guide the sentencer's discretion
to ensure "that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily and
capriciously," California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1171, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983), that "the State must establish
rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment,"
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 107
S. Ct. 1756 (1987), that "death penalty statutes [must] be
structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered
in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion," California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538, 541, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987), that
our cases require "procedural protections . . . to ensure that the
death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner,"
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1134, 103
S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), and
that "[States] must administer [the death] penalty in a way that
can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom
death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not,"
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340, 104
S. Ct. 3154 (1984).  See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
877, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 102 S. Ct. 869
(1982); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 104
S. Ct. 871 (1984); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. at 502; Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. at 374; Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,
244, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988). 
Shortly after introducing our doctrine requiring
constraints on the sentencer's discretion to "impose" the death
penalty, the Court began developing a doctrine forbidding
constraints on the sentencer's discretion to "decline to impose"
it.  McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, at 304 (emphasis deleted).  This
second doctrine -- counterdoctrine would be a better word -- has
completely exploded whatever coherence the notion of "guided
discretion" once had.
 
Some States responded to Furman by making death the
mandatory punishment for certain categories of murder.  We
invalidated these statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976), and Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974, 96 S. Ct. 3001
11
(1976), a plurality of the Court concluding that the sentencing
process must accord at least some consideration to the "character
and record of the individual offender."  Woodson, supra, at 304
(plurality opinion).  Other States responded to Furman by
leaving the sentencer some discretion to spare capital
defendants, but limiting the kinds of mitigating circumstances
the sentencer could consider.  We invalidated these statutes in
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 98 S. Ct. 2954
(1978), a plurality saying the Eighth Amendment requires that
the sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis  for a sentence less than death," id., at 604
(opinion of Burger, C. J., joined by Stewart, Powell, and
STEVENS, JJ.) (emphasis omitted and added).  The reasoning
of the pluralities in these cases was later adopted by a majority
of the Court. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 97 L. Ed. 2d
56, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987) (embracing Woodson); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, supra (embracing Lockett).
These decisions, of course, had no basis in Furman. One
might have supposed that curtailing or eliminating discretion in
the sentencing of capital defendants was not only consistent with
Furman, but positively required by it -- as many of the States, of
course, did suppose.  But in Woodson and Lockett, it emerged
that uniform treatment of offenders guilty of the same capital
crime was not only not required by the Eighth Amendment, but
was all but prohibited.  Announcing the proposition that "central
to the application of the [Eighth] Amendment is a determination
of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of
punishment," Woodson, supra, at 288, and pointing to the steady
growth of discretionary sentencing systems over the previous
150 years (those very systems we had found unconstitutional in
Furman), Woodson, supra, at 291-292, the pluralities in those
cases determined that a defendant could not be sentenced to
death unless the sentencer was convinced, by an unconstrained
and unguided evaluation of offender and offense, that death was
the appropriate punishment, id., at 304-305; Lockett, supra, 438
U.S. at 604-605.  In short, the practice which in Furman had
been described as the discretion to sentence to death and
12
pronounced constitutionally prohibited, was in Woodson and
Lockett renamed the discretion not to sentence to death and
pronounced constitutionally required. 
As elaborated in the years since, the Woodson-Lockett
principle has prevented States from imposing all but the most
minimal constraints on the sentencer's discretion to decide that
an offender eligible for the death penalty should nonetheless not
receive it.  We have, in the first place, repeatedly rebuffed
States' efforts to channel that discretion by specifying objective
factors on which its exercise should rest.  It would misdescribe
the sweep of this principle to say that "all mitigating evidence"
must be considered by the sentencer.  That would assume some
objective criterion of what is mitigating, which is precisely what
we have  forbidden.  Our cases proudly announce that the
Constitution effectively prohibits the States from excluding from
the sentencing decision any aspect of a defendant's character or
record, or any circumstance surrounding the crime. . .
 * 
*
* 
*
*
To acknowledge that "there perhaps is an inherent
tension" between this line of cases and the line stemming from
Furman, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 363 (BLACKMUN,
J., dissenting), is rather like saying that there was perhaps an
inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in
World War II.  And to refer to the two lines as pursuing "twin
objectives," Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 459, is rather like
referring to the twin objectives of good and evil.  They cannot
be reconciled.  Pursuant to Furman, and in order "to achieve a
more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty,"
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181, 101 L. Ed. 2d 155, 108
S. Ct. 2320 (1988), we require that States "channel the
sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that
provide 'specific and detailed guidance,'" Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. at 428. In the next breath, however, we say that "the
State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion . . . to consider
any relevant [mitigating] information offered by the defendant,"
McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, at 306 (emphasis added), and that
the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained discretion to decide
8 See State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 118 n.4, 352 A.2d 829, 832 n.4 (1976); Blackwell,
278 Md. at 473-75, 365 A.2d at 549-50.
13
whether any sympathetic factors bearing on the defendant or the
crime indicate that he does not "deserve to be sentenced to
death," Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, at 326.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 657-65, 110 S. Ct. at 3059-63, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 530-36 (plurality)
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443,
153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 577 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
IV.
In response to the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence in this area, Maryland’s
death penalty statutory scheme has undergone multiple changes in the last thirty-one years.
Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 413, provided in relevant part that
“[e]very person convicted of murder in the first degree . . . shall suffer death, or undergo a
confinement in the penitentiary of the State for a the period of their natural life.”  This
version of Art. 27, § 413 was found to be unconstitutional as regards the death penalty in
Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972), in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Furman.  It was replaced by Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Article 27,
§ 413, applicable to offenses committed on or after 1 July  1975,  which in turn was found
to be unconstitutional in Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 365 A.2d 545 (1976).8  The statute
declared unconstitutional in Blackwell was replaced by renumbered Maryland Code (1957,
1976 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 412, applicable to offenses committed on
9 For provisions controlling the effective date and application of statutory revisions,
see Md. Const., Article XVI, § 2.
14
or after 1 July 1978.  This version has remained substantively unchanged and is the first
version of the current Maryland death penalty scheme, along with Maryland Code (1957,
1976 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.), §§ 413 and 414, containing the additional sentencing
and review elements at issue in the present case.  Additional minor amendments were made
in 1995 and 1996.  Article 27, §§ 412, 413, and 414 were repealed by Ch. 26, Acts 2002,
effective October 1, 2002 and re-enacted without substantive change as Maryland Code
(1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), Criminal Law Article, §§ 2-101, 2-201, 2-202, 2-203,
2-301, 2-302, 2-303 and 1-401.9
Because Oken was convicted prior to the 2002 re-enactment of the Code and to avoid
confusion by using citation forms differing from our opinions decided prior to that re-
enactment, we shall address Oken’s arguments referring to  the Code sections as they existed
prior to the 2002 re-enactment.  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.),
Art. 27 § 412 set forth the punishment for murder, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Designation of degree by court or jury. - If a person
is found guilty of murder, the court or jury that determined the
person’s guild shall state in the verdict whether the person is
guilty of murder in the first degree or murder in the second
degree.
(b) Penalty for first degree murder.- Except as provided
under subsection (g) of this section, a person found guilty of
murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to death,
imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for life without the
15
possibility of parole.  The sentence shall be imprisonment for
life unless:(1)(i) the State notified the person in writing at least
30 days prior to trial that it intended to seek a sentence of death,
and advised the person of each aggravating circumstance upon
which it intended to rely, and (ii) a sentence of death is imposed
in accordance with § 413; or (2) the State notified the person in
writing at least 30 days prior to trial that it intended to seek a
sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole under § 412 or § 413 of this article.
(c) Notice of intent to seek death penalty.- (1) If a State’s
Attorney files or withdraws a notice of intent to seek a sentence
of death, the State’s Attorney shall file a copy of the notice or
withdrawal with the clerk of the Court of Appeals.
(2) The validity of a notice of intent to seek a sentence of
death that is served on a defendant in a timely manner shall in
no way be affected by the State’s Attorney’s failure to file a
copy of the death notice in a timely manner with the clerk of the
Court of Appeals.
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27 § 413 sets forth the
sentencing procedure upon a finding of guilt as to first degree murder as follows:
(a) Separate sentencing proceeding required. - If a
person is found guilty of murder in the first degree, and if the
State had given the notice required under § 412(b), a separate
sentencing proceeding shall be conducted as soon as practicable
after the trial as been completed to determine whether he shall
be sentenced to death.
(b) Before whom proceeding conducted. - The proceeding
shall be conducted:
(1) Before the jury that determined the defendant’s guilt;
or
(2) Before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the
proceeding if;
(i) The defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty;
(ii) The defendant was convicted after a trial before the
court sitting without a jury;
16
(iii) The jury that determined the defendant’s guilt has
been discharged by the court for good cause; or 
(iv) Review of the original sentence of death by a court
of competent jurisdiction has resulted in a remand for
resentencing; or
(3) Before the court alone, if a jury sentencing
proceeding is waived by the defendant.
(c) Evidence; argument; instructions. - (1) The following
type of evidence is admissible in this proceeding:
(i) Evidence relating to any mitigating circumstance
listed in subsection (g) of this section;
(ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance
listed in subsection (d) of this section of which the State had
notified the defendant pursuant to § 412(b) of this article.
(iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions, pleas or
guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of such prior
convictions or pleas, to the same extend admissible in other
sentencing procedures.;
(iv) Any presentence investigation report.  However, any
recommendation as to sentence contained in the report is not
admissible; and
(v) Any other evidence that the court deems of probative
value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is
accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements.
(2) The State and the defendant or his counsel may
present argument for or against the sentence of death.
(3) After presentation of the evidence in a proceeding
before a jury, in addition to any other appropriate instructions
permitted by law, the court shall instruct the jury as to the
findings it must make in order to determined whether the
sentence shall be death, imprisonment for life, and the burden of
proof applicable to these findings in accordance with subsection
(f) or subsection  (h) of this section.
(d) Consideration of aggravating circumstances. - In
determining the sentence, the court or jury, as the case may be,
shall first consider whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of
the following aggravating circumstances exist:
(1) One or more persons committed the murder of a law
enforcement officer while in the performance of his duties;
17
(2) The defendant committed the murder at a time when
he was confined in any correctional institution;
(3) The defendant committed the murder in furtherance
of an escape or an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful
custody, arrest, or detention of or by an officer or guard of a
correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer;
(4) The victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the
course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt to kidnap or
abduct;
(5) The victim was a child abducted in violation of § 2 of
this article;
(6) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an
agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise or
remuneration to commit the murder;
(7) The defendant engaged or employed another person
to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant
to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration;
(8) At the time of the murder, the defendant was under
sentence of death or imprisonment for life.
(9) The defendant committed more than one offense of
murder in the first degree arising out of th same incident; or
(10) The defendant committed the murder while
committing or attempting to commit a carjacking, armed
carjacking, robbery under § 486 or § 487 of this article, arson in
the first degree, rape or sexual offense in the first degree.
(e) Definitions. - As used in this section, the following
terms have the meanings indicated unless a contrary meaning is
clearly intended from the context in which the term appears: 
(1)(i) The terms “defendant” and “person”, except as
those terms appear in subsection (d)(1) and (7) of this section,
include only a principal in the first degree.
(ii) In subsection (d)(1) of this section, the term “person”
means:
1.  A principal in the first degree
2.  A principal in the second degree who:
A.  Willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation
intended the death of the law enforcement officer;
B. Was a major participant in the murder; and
18
C.  Was actually present at the time and place of the
murder.
(2) The term “correctional institution” includes any
institution for the detention or confinement of persons charged
with or convicted of a crime, including Patuxent Institution, any
institution for the detention or confinement of juveniles charged
with or adjudicated as being delinquent, and any hospital in
which the person was confined pursuant to an order of a court
exercising criminal jurisdiction.
(3)(i) The term “law enforcement officer” has the
meaning given in § 727 of this article.
(ii) The term “law enforcement officer”, as used in
subsection (d) of this section, includes:
1.  An officer serving in a probationary status;
2.  A parole and probation officer;
3.  A law enforcement officer of a jurisdiction outside of
Maryland; and
4.  If the law enforcement officer is wearing the uniform
worn by the law enforcement officer while acting in an official
capacity or is prominently displaying his official badge or other
insignia of office, a law enforcement officer privately employed
as a security officer or special policeman under the provisions
of Article 41 §§ 4-901 through 4-913 of the Code.
(4) “Imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole” means imprisonment for the natural life of an inmate
under the custody of a correctional institution, including the
Patuxent Institution.
(f) Finding that no aggravating circumstances exist.- If
the court or jury does not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall
state that conclusion in writing, and a sentence of death may not
be imposed.
(g) Consideration of mitigating circumstances.- If the
court or jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more
of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall then consider
whether, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any of the
following mitigating circumstances exist:
(1) The defendant has not previously (i) been found
guilty of a crime of violence; (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had a
19
judgment of probation on stay of entry of judgement entered on
a charge of a crime of violence.  As used in this paragraph,
“crime of violence” means abduction, arson in the first degree,
escape in the first degree, kidnapping, manslaughter, except
involuntary manslaughter, mayhem, murder, robbery under
§ 486 or § 487 of this article, carjacking or armed carjacking, or
rape or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or an
attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun
in the commission of a felony or another crime of violence.
(2) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s
conduct or consented to the act which caused the victim’s death.
(3) The defendant acted under substantial duress,
domination or provocation of another person, but not so
substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the
prosecution.
(4) The murder was committed while the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental
disorder or emotional disturbance.
(5) The youthful age of the defendant at the time of the
crime.
(6) The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate
cause of the victim’s death.
(7) It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further
criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to
society.
(8) Any other facts which the jury or the court
specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating
circumstances in the case.
(h) Weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
- (1) If the court or jury finds that one or more of these
mitigating circumstances exist, it shall determine whether, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
(2) If it finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be
death.
20
(3) If it finds that the aggravating circumstances do not
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a sentence of death may
not be imposed.
(i) Determination to be written and unanimous. - The
determination of the court or jury shall be in writing, and, if a
jury, shall be unanimous and shall be signed by the foreman.
(j) Statements required in determination. - The
determination of the court or jury shall state, specifically:
(1) Which, if any, aggravating circumstances it finds to
exist;
(2) Which, if any, mitigating circumstances it finds to
exist;
(3) Whether any aggravating circumstances found under
subsection (d) of this section outweigh the mitigating
circumstances found under subsection (g) of this section;
(4) Whether the aggravating circumstances found under
subsection (d) do not outweigh mitigating circumstances under
subsection (g); and 
(5) The sentence, determined in accordance with
subsection f) or (h).
(k) Imposition of sentence. - (1) If the jury determines
that a sentence of death shall be imposed under the provisions
of this section, then the court shall impose a sentence of death.
(2) If the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to
agree as to whether a sentence of death shall be imposed, the
court may not impose a sentence of death.
(3) If the sentencing proceeding is conducted before a
court without a jury, the court shall determine whether a
sentence of death shall be imposed under the provisions of this
section.
(4) If the court or jury determines that a sentence of death
may not be imposed, and the State did not give the notice
required under § 412 (b) of this article of intention to seek a
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) If the State gives the notice required under § 412 (b)
of this article of intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole but does not give notice of
intention to seek the death penalty, the court shall conduct a
21
separate sentencing proceeding as soon as practicable after the
trial has been completed to determine whether to impose a
sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole.
(6) If the State gives the notice required under § 412 (b)
of this article of intention to seek the death penalty in addition
to the notice of intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole, and the court or jury
determines that a sentence of death may not be imposed under
the provisions of this section, that court or jury shall determine
whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.
(7)(i) In determining whether to impose a sentence of
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, a jury
shall agree unanimously on the imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.
(ii) If the jury agrees unanimously to impose a sentence
of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, the
court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without
the possibility of parole.
(iii) If the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to
agree unanimously on the imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, the court
shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for
life.
(8) If the State gives the notice required under § 412 of
this article of the States intention to seek a sentence of
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding as soon as
practicable after the trial has been completed to determine
whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.
10 See also Maryland Rule 8-306, applicable to review of capital cases in the Court of
Appeals.
22
(emphasis added).  In addition, Article 27 provides for the mandatory review of all death
sentences by this Court. 10  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 414(e), in
pertinent part provides:
(e) Consolidation by the Court of Appeals. - In addition
to the consideration of any errors properly before the Court on
appeal, the Court of Appeals shall consider the imposition of the
death sentence.  With regard to the sentence, the Court shall
determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s
finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 413 (d);
and 
(3) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances.
In the Borchardt case, we explained Borchardt’s Apprendi argument as to § 412(h)
of Maryland’s statutory scheme:
The Apprendi issue posited by Borchardt arises from
§ 413(h), dealing with the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.  That section provides that, if the jury
finds that one or more mitigating circumstances exist, "it shall
determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating
circumstances." (emphasis added).  If the jury finds that they do,
the sentence is death; if it finds that the aggravating
circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a
sentence of death may not be imposed.  The ultimate
determination must be unanimous and in writing.  See § 413(i).
11 As does Oken in the present case.
12 See also Foster v. State, 304 Md 439, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985); Tichnell v. State, 287
Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980).
23
Borchardt contends[11] that, under Apprendi, due process
requires a determination that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh any mitigating circumstances to be made beyond a
reasonable doubt and not by a mere preponderance of evidence.
Section 414, as supplemented by Maryland Rule 8-306,
provides for automatic appellate review by this Court whenever
the death penalty is imposed.  In addition to considering any
errors alleged by the defendant, we are required by § 414(e) to
consider the imposition of the death sentence itself, including
(1) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor, (2) whether the
evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance under § 413(d), and (3) whether the evidence
supports the jury's or court's finding that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
367 Md.at 103, 786 A.2d at 638.12  In Borchardt, based only on an analysis assessing the
impact of Apprendi, we found constitutional the standard of whether aggravating factors
outweigh mitigators by a preponderance of the evidence.  Oken’s position here, in a nutshell,
is that Ring requires us to revisit that holding in Borchardt and to find that § 413(h) is
unconstitutional because, in his view, under the holdings of Apprendi and Ring, the
determination that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances must be
made based on the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, and not by preponderance of the
evidence.  We disagree.
24
We discussed the legal reasoning of the Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi in our
decision in Borchardt as follows:
[In Apprendi,]  the defendant was convicted, on a plea of
guilty, of using a firearm for an unlawful purpose, a second-
degree offense under New Jersey law that carried a sentence
range of five to ten years in prison.  There was evidence, which
Apprendi disputed, that his offense was racially motivated - that
he fired shots into the home of an African-American family
because he did not want them as neighbors.  New Jersey  had a
separate "hate crime" statute that increased the punishment for
a second-degree offense to a prison term of 10 to 20 years if the
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant committed the underlying offense with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group because of race, color, gender,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. Apprendi was
not charged under the hate crime law, and, though pleading
guilty to the underlying offense, he objected to the sentence
enhancement under that law.  The judge rejected the challenge
and sentenced Apprendi to 12 years. 
The Supreme Court believed that the case was controlled
by the footnote statement made in Jones [v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999)] - that
under the 14th Amendment (as under the Fifth and Sixth, which
applied to the Federal prosecution in Jones) "any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476,
120 S. Ct. at 2355, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 446 (quoting from Jones,
526 U.S. at 243 n.6, 119 S. Ct. at 1224 n.6, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 326
n.6).
13 The principal holding of the Supreme Court in Apprendi is:
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and
of the history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that
we expressed in Jones.  Other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond  the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  With that exception, we
endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring
opinions in that case: "It is unconstitutional for a legislature to
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed.  It is equally clear that such facts must be established
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  526 U.S. at 252-253
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); see also 526 U.S. at 253 (opinion of
SCALIA, J.). 
530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455.  
25
Borchardt, 367 Md. at 112-13, 786 A.2d at 643-44.13  Borchardt argued, as does Oken, that
the weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances is a “finding” which increases
the maximum penalty, and therefore, under Apprendi and Ring, must be “found” by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Oken correctly points out that our holding in Borchardt, that Apprendi does not
invalidate the Maryland death penalty scheme, rested on three pillars of reasoning.  The first
of these was based on language in Apprendi expressly indicating that its holding was not
intended to apply to capital sentencing schemes, a result which would bring Apprendi into
conflict with Walton.  As we pointed out in Borchardt:
Perhaps the easiest answer lies in the unequivocal
statement by the Apprendi majority that its decision did not
26
render invalid State capital sentencing schemes, such as
approved in Walton, that allowed the judge, not sitting as the
trier of fact, to find and weigh specific aggravating factors.  If
it is permissible under Apprendi for the law to remove that fact-
finding and fact-weighing process entirely from the jury and
leave it to the judge as a legitimate sentencing factor, without
specifying a reasonable doubt standard, it can hardly be
impermissible for a jury that has found the prerequisite
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt to apply a
preponderance standard in weighing them against any mitigating
circumstances.  The Walton scheme, in other words, is in far
greater direct conflict with the underpinning of Apprendi than
the Maryland approach.  Thus, if the aggravating circumstances
do not constitute elements of the offense or serve to increase the
maximum punishment for the offense in the Walton context,
they cannot reasonably be found to have that status under the
Maryland law.  If Apprendi renders the Maryland law
unconstitutional, then, perforce, it likely renders most of the
capital punishment laws in the country unconstitutional.  We
cannot conceive that the Supreme Court, especially in light of its
 contrary statement, intended such a dramatic result to flow from
a case that did not even involve a capital punishment law.  
367 Md. at 121-22, 786 A.2d at 649 (footnotes omitted).
Our second reason for denying relief in 
Borchardt was because Apprendi  applies only
when a defendant receives a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.  Borchardt noted
that Apprendi required that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  367 Md. at 123, 786 A.2d at 650 (quoting Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 455) (emphasis removed).  We
observed that the statute established the penalty for murder as encompassing a range of three
potential sentences: life imprisonment,  life imprisonment without parole, or death.  We held
14 We reached a similar conclusion in Blackwell, involving the predecessor death
penalty statute, noting that “[§] 413 does not create a new crime; it is simply a penalty statute
for murder in the first degree, which authorized the imposition of one of two punishments
for the offense – life imprisonment or death.”  278 Md. at 473, 365 A.2d at 549.
27
that the determination whether aggravators outweighed the mitigators, therefore, does not
serve to increase the statutory maximum or even the statutory range of possible punishment.
Rather, the existence or non-existence of the statutory circumstances  served only to assist
the sentencing authority in “determining which sentence within the statutory range is to be
imposed.”  367 Md. at 123, 786 A.2d at 650 (emphasis removed).14
Third, we held in Borchardt that Apprendi did not apply to the weighing of
aggravators and mitigators because the jurors’ determination of that issue is not one that
involves fact-finding, but rather “[t]he weighing process is purely a judgmental one, of
balancing the mitigator[s] against the aggravator[s] to determine whether death is the
appropriate punishment in the particular case.  This is a process that not only traditionally,
but quintessentially is a pure and Constitutionally legitimate sentencing factor, one that does
not require a determination to be made beyond a reasonable doubt.”  367 Md. at 126-27, 786
A.2d at 652.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ring necessarily alters our reasoning and
conclusions in Borchardt, but only as to the first two of the three prongs upon which
Borchardt rests.  Ring does not, however, require that we reach a different outcome.  In order
to understand this result, it is necessary to understand the development of death penalty
28
sentencing jurisprudence since Furman, developments which in turn influenced the
development of the Maryland death penalty statute.  It is only with an understanding of this
history that the limited impact of Ring and how its holding fits within this framework can be
understood.  As will be seen, infra, when taken in the context of the Supreme Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence, Ring only implicates the finding of aggravating circumstances, and
not the process of weighing aggravating against mitigating factors.  Of particular import is
that jurisprudence which distinguishes those elements of the sentencing process which make
a defendant death-eligible from those elements involved in selecting those death-eligible
defendants who actually will be sentenced to death.
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area has forced states to adopt systems of
sentencing which conform to the two lines of cases described by Justice Scalia in Walton,
supra.  These two lines of cases describe a sentencing process divided into two distinct
phases, each with separate and distinct constitutional requirements.  The first line of cases,
running directly from Furman, addresses the first phase of the sentencing process, the
determination of eligibility.  With regards to the eligibility phase, the Court has made it clear
that state statutes must function to limit the class of individuals who may be deemed death-
eligible.  This is usually accomplished by requiring the sentencing authority to find an
aggravating factor.  It is the finding of an aggravating factor which turns a convicted
defendant into a death-eligible defendant. 
15 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-74 & n. 12, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2741 & n. 12,
77 L. Ed. 235, 247-48 & n.12 (1983) (noting that in a weighing state, “not only must the jury
find at least one aggravating circumstance in order to have the power to impose the death
sentence; in addition, the law requires the jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances
against the mitigating circumstances when it decides whether or not the death penalty should
be imposed”).
29
The second line of cases addresses the second phase of the sentencing process, the
selection phase.  In this phase, the sentencing authority is allowed to identify and consider
factors in mitigation and is allowed to elect to impose a sentence less than death if it views
the circumstances as warranting a lesser punishment.  While the Supreme Court repeatedly
has stated that there are no constitutional requirements as to how the states must design the
selection phase, other than that they may not curtail the sentencing authority’s ability to
consider factors in mitigation, the states generally have adopted one of two methods.  In
some states the sentencing authority, after determining the existence of at least one
aggravating factor making the defendant death-eligible, is instructed to determine if there are
mitigating factors which justify not imposing the death penalty.  In other “weighing” states,
like Maryland, the sentencing authority is instructed, after determining the existence of at
least one aggravating factor making the defendant death-eligible, to weigh the mitigators
against the aggravators.15
The distinction may seem, at first blush, to be predicated on semantics as in both
scenarios the sentencing authority is comparing the relative weight of circumstances in
mitigation to determine if mercy is appropriate, but the distinction between the two is real
16 See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 137 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1997);
Espinoza v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 120 L. Ed.2d 854 (1992); Sochor v.
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 119 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503
U.S. 222, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 117 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1992); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,
110 S. Ct.1441, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1990).
17 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-1101, 26-1311, 26-1902, 26-2001, 26-2201, 26-3301 (1972).
30
and critical to proper constitutional analysis.  The reason is that, in “weighing” states, an
appellate determination that one or more of the statutorily defined aggravating factors found
in a given case fails to meet constitutional muster requires a re-weighing of the remaining
aggravators and mitigators, as the impermissible aggravator potentially acted as a “thumb on
the scales” during the original weighing.16  Such a defect does not arise in a non-weighing
state, where the defect may be resolved under a “harmless error” analysis.  Regardless, under
the Supreme Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence, in both weighing and non-weighing
schemes, it is the finding of an aggravating circumstance which makes the defendant death-
eligible.  The selection process that follows determines, under both weighing and non-
weighing statutes, whether, in the judgment of the sentencing authority, the penalty actually
should be applied.
V.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976), the Court
effectively approved the bifurcated system we employ in Maryland today.  In Gregg, the
Court reviewed Georgia’s post-Furman death penalty statute.  That statute17 retained the
death penalty for murder and five other crimes.  Guilt or innocence was determined in the
31
first stage of a bifurcated trial.  Upon a guilty verdict or plea, a pre-sentence hearing was
held.  At this hearing, the judge or jury would hear additional extenuating or mitigating
evidence and evidence in aggravation of punishment.  Under the statute, at least one of ten
possible aggravating circumstances was required to be found to exist by the sentencing
authority, whether judge or jury, beyond a reasonable doubt before the death sentence may
be imposed.  The defendant was required to be given pre-trial notice of the state’s intention
to prove specified aggravators.  In addition, the jury was authorized to consider any other
appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  Where the jury was the sentencing
authority, it was not required to find any mitigating circumstance in order to make a binding
recommendation of mercy to the trial court, but it was required to find a statutory 
aggravating
circumstance before recommending a sentence of death.  The sentencing judge was bound
by the recommended sentence of the jury.  In its statutorily-required review of the death
sentence,  the Georgia Supreme Court was required to consider: (1) whether the sentence was
influenced by passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; (2) whether the evidence
supported the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance; and, (3) whether the death
sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the particular crime and the particular defendant.
The Supreme Court in Gregg began its evaluation of the Georgia statute by reviewing
the impact of Furman.  The Court observed that:
While Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death
penalty per se violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and
32
unusual punishments, it did recognize that the penalty of death
is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under
our system of criminal justice.  Because of the uniqueness of the
death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under
sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. . . . 
Indeed, the death sentences examined by the Court in Furman
were "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all the people convicted
of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners [in Furman  were] among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed. . . .   [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed."  Id.,  at 309-310 (STEWART, J.,
concurring).
Furman  mandates that where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.  
It is certainly not a novel proposition that discretion in the
area of sentencing be exercised in an informed manner.  We
have long recognized that "[f]or the determination of sentences,
justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the
circumstances of the offense together with the character and
propensities of the offender."
The cited studies assumed that the trial judge would be
the sentencing authority.  If an experienced trial judge, who
daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a vital
need for accurate information about a defendant and the crime
he committed in order to be able to impose a rational sentence
in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing
information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned
determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury
33
of people who may never before have made a sentencing
decision.  
Jury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital
cases in order "to maintain a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system - a link without which
the determination of punishment could hardly reflect ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’”
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-90, 96 S. Ct. at 2932-33, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 883-84 (footnotes omitted
and some internal citations omitted).  Thus, in Gregg we see the beginnings of the Supreme
Court’s approval of the bifurcated sentencing procedure reflected in the current Maryland
death penalty statutory scheme.  In upholding the Georgia statute as constitutional, the Court
noted the critical function of what would later become identified as the eligibility phase of
the sentencing process, observing that: 
The basic concern of Furman  centered on those
defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously
and arbitrarily.  Under the procedures before the Court in that
case, sentencing authorities were not directed to give attention
to the nature or circumstances of the crime committed or to the
character or record of the defendant.  Left unguided, juries
imposed the death sentence in a way that could only be called
freakish.  The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast,
focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the
crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual
defendant.  While the jury is permitted to consider any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and
identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may
impose a penalty of death.  In this way the jury's discretion is
channeled.  No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly
impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the
legislative guidelines.  In addition, the review function of the
Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the
34
concerns that prompted our decision in Furman  are not present
to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07, 96 S. Ct. at 2940-41, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 893 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is the finding of an aggravating factor which makes a defendant death-eligible, not
that mitigating facts are weighed and found insufficient to justify mercy.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct.
2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 913 (1976), decided on the same day the Court decided Gregg.  In
Proffitt, the Court was reviewing Florida’s post-Furman death penalty statute, a statute
differing in many respects from the Georgia statute at issue in Gregg.  Florida, unlike
Georgia, implemented what would later be referred to as a “weighing” statute.  The Court
described the workings of the Florida statute as follows:
In response to Furman  v. Georgia,  408 U.S. 238 (1972),
the Florida Legislature adopted new statutes that authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on those convicted of first-
degree murder.  At the same time Florida adopted a new capital-
sentencing procedure, patterned in large part on the Model Penal
Code.  Under the new statute, if a defendant is found guilty of
a capital offense, a separate evidentiary hearing is held before
the trial judge and jury to determine his sentence. Evidence may
be presented on any matter the judge deems relevant to
sentencing and must include matters relating to certain
legislatively specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Both the prosecution and the defense may present argument on
whether the death penalty shall be imposed.
At the conclusion of the hearing the jury is directed to
consider "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist...
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist;
and... [b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant
should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death."  The jury's
35
verdict is determined by  majority vote.  It is only advisory; the
actual sentence is determined by the trial judge.  The Florida
Supreme Court has stated, however, that "[i]n order to sustain a
sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the
facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." 
The trial judge is also directed to weigh the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when he determines
the sentence to be imposed on a defendant.  The statute requires
that if the trial court imposes a sentence of death, "it shall set
forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is
based as to the facts: (a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating
circumstances  exist... and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient
[statutory] mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances."
The statute provides for automatic review by the Supreme
Court of Florida of all cases in which a death sentence has been
imposed.  The law differs from that of Georgia in that it does not
require the court to conduct any specific form of review.  Since,
however, the trial judge must justify the imposition of a death
sentence with written findings, meaningful appellate review of
each such sentence is made possible, and the Supreme Court of
Florida, like its Georgia counterpart, considers its function to be
to "[guarantee] that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons
present in one case will reach a similar result to that reached
under similar circumstances in another case. . . .  If a defendant
is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in light of the
other decisions and determine whether or not the punishment is
too great."
On their face these procedures, like those used in
Georgia, appear to meet the constitutional deficiencies identified
in Furman.   The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial judge,
is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven
mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty shall
be imposed.  This determination requires the trial judge to focus
on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the
individual defendant.  He must, inter alia,  consider whether the
36
defendant has a prior criminal record, whether the defendant
acted under duress or under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, whether the defendant's role in the crime
was that of a minor accomplice, and whether the defendant's
youth argues in favor of a more lenient sentence than might
otherwise be imposed.  The trial judge must also determine
whether the crime was committed in the course of one of several
enumerated felonies, whether it was committed for pecuniary
gain, whether it was committed to assist in an escape from
custody or to prevent a lawful arrest, and whether the crime was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  To answer these
questions, which are not unlike those considered by a Georgia
sentencing jury, see Gregg  v. Georgia, ante, at 197, the
sentencing judge must focus on the individual circumstances of
each homicide and each defendant.  
The basic difference between the Florida system and the
Georgia system is that in Florida the sentence is determined by
the trial judge rather than by the jury.  This Court has pointed
out that jury sentencing in a capital case can perform an
important societal function, but it has never suggested that jury
sentencing is constitutionally required.  And it would appear
that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater
consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital
punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in
sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
The Florida capital-sentencing procedures thus seek to
assure that the death penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary
or capricious manner.  Moreover, to the extent that any risk to
the contrary exists, it is minimized by Florida's appellate review
system, under which the evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances is reviewed and reweighed by the
Supreme Court of Florida "to determine independently whether
the imposition of the ultimate penalty is warranted."  The
Supreme Court of Florida, like that of Georgia, has not hesitated
to vacate a death sentence when it has determined that the
sentence should not have been imposed.  Indeed, it has vacated
8 of the 21 death sentences that it has reviewed to date.
37
Under Florida's capital-sentencing procedures, in sum,
trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist
them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or
imprisonment for life.  Moreover, their decisions are reviewed
to ensure that they are consistent with other sentences imposed
in similar circumstances.  Thus, in Florida, as in Georgia, it is no
longer true that there is "'no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.'" Gregg  v. Georgia, ante, at 188,
quoting Furman  v. Georgia,  408 U.S., at 313 (WHITE, J.,
concurring).  On its face the Florida system thus satisfies the
constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. 
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-253, 96 S. Ct. at 2964-67, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 920-23 (emphasis added;
some internal citations omitted; footnotes omitted).
In addressing the constitutionality of the weighing process in Proffitt, the Court
observed:
In a similar vein the petitioner argues that it is not possible to
make a rational determination whether there are "sufficient"
aggravating circumstances that are not outweighed by the
mitigating circumstances, since the state law assigns no specific
weight to any of the various circumstances to be considered.
While these questions and decisions may be hard, they
require no more line drawing than is commonly required of a
fact-finder in a lawsuit.  For example, juries have traditionally
evaluated the validity of defenses such as insanity or reduced
capacity, both of which involve the same considerations as some
of the above-mentioned mitigating circumstances.  While the
various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do
not have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements
of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's
discretion is guided and channeled by requiring examination of
specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of
the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and
capriciousness in its imposition. 
38
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the various
aggravating circumstances to be weighed against the mitigating
ones.  As a result, the trial court's sentencing discretion is guided
and channeled by a system that focuses on the circumstances of
each individual homicide and individual defendant in deciding
whether the death penalty is to be imposed.
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257-58, 96 S. Ct. at 2969, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 926 (citations omitted).
In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976),
another case decided at the same time as Gregg, the Supreme Court struck down North
Carolina’s statutory response to Furman.  North Carolina had chosen to eliminate the defects
of arbitrariness in its pre-Furman death penalty statute by making the death penalty
mandatory for all persons convicted of first degree murder.  Obviously, such a system
required that the sentencing authority, knowing that the penalty would be death, find that the
defendant in question was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  In rejecting such a mandatory
sentencing scheme, the Court observed:
A separate deficiency of North Carolina's mandatory
death sentence statute is its failure to provide a constitutionally
tolerable response to Furman's rejection of unbridled jury
discretion in the imposition of capital sentences.  Central to the
limited holding in Furman was the conviction that the vesting of
standardless sentencing power in the jury violated the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.  It is argued that North Carolina
has remedied the inadequacies of the death penalty statutes held
unconstitutional in Furman by withdrawing all sentencing
discretion from juries in capital cases.  But when one considers
the long and consistent American experience with the death
penalty in first-degree murder cases, it becomes evident that
mandatory statutes enacted in response to Furman have simply
39
papered over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury
discretion. . . . 
North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute
provides no standards to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise
of the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall
live and which shall die.  And there is no way under the North
Carolina law for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious
exercise of that power through a review of death sentences.
Instead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory
scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman
by resting the penalty determination on the particular jury's
willingness to act lawlessly.  While a mandatory death penalty
statute may reasonably be expected to increase the number of
persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill Furman's basic
requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion
with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03, 96 S. Ct. at 2990-91, 49 L. Ed 2d at 959-60 (citations omitted).
The above cases firmly established the requirements of the eligibility phase of the
sentencing process.  It is not the mere fact of conviction which makes a defendant death-
eligible, but rather the finding of an aggravating factor.  The Court’s jurisprudence on this
point makes it clear that states must specify aggravating factors in order to direct and limit
the sentencing authority’s discretion as to the class of convicted defendants to which the
death penalty may apply.  Only when an aggravating circumstance is found beyond a
reasonable doubt may a defendant be deemed death-eligible.
The Court, however, took a different tack when dealing with circumstances which
might mitigate the actual imposition of the death penalty upon a death-eligible defendant.
40
In both Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978), and Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982), the Supreme Court
reversed death sentences because either the statute (Lockett) or the judge (Eddings)
impermissibly limited consideration of mitigating factors.  With regard to the actual
imposition of the death penalty, the Court, in Eddings, observed that the states were free to
assign whatever weight to the mitigating circumstances they felt were appropriate, stating:
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in
Lockett.  Just as the State may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may
the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant
mitigating evidence.  In this instance, it was as if the trial judge
had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence
Eddings proffered on his behalf.  The sentencer, and the Court
of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be
given relevant mitigating evidence.  But they may not give it no
weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration. 
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-15, 102 S. Ct. at 876-77, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983), the
Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of the Georgia death statute it previously
upheld in Gregg.  The issue before the Court in Zant was whether, an a non-weighing state,
a death sentence could survive where one of the aggravating factors upon which it was based
subsequently was found to be invalid.  The Court upheld the sentence, reasoning that the
invalidation of one of several aggravating factors did not require reversal where the purpose
of the jury’s finding of such circumstances was to limit the discretion in imposing the death
41
penalty, and where state appellate review was designed to ensure that a death penalty would
be set aside if it were arbitrary or capricious.  The Court left open the question of whether
the subsequent invalidation of a factor would have the same result in a weighing state, such
as Maryland, stating:
Finally, we note that in deciding this case we do not express any
opinion concerning the possible significance of a holding that a
particular aggravating circumstance is "invalid" under a
statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically
instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the
death penalty.  As we have discussed, the Constitution does not
require a State to adopt specific standards for instructing the jury
in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
and Georgia has not adopted such a system. 
Zant, 462 U.S. at 890, 103 S. Ct at 2750, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 258 (some internal citations
omitted).  Nevertheless, as the above language makes plain, the Court’s analysis in Zant of
the respective roles of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the sentencing process
is relevant to weighing states as well.
In analogizing the sentencing process, the Court in Zant noted with approval
responses from the Georgia Supreme Court to a certified question, observing that: 
In its response to our certified question, the Georgia
Supreme Court . . . explained the state-law premises for its
treatment of aggravating circumstances by analogizing the entire
body of Georgia law governing homicides to a pyramid.  It
explained: 
All cases of homicide of every category are contained
within the pyramid.  The consequences flowing to the
perpetrator increase in severity as the cases proceed from the
42
base to the apex, with the death penalty applying only to those
few cases which are contained in the space just beneath the
apex.  To reach that category a case must pass through three
planes of division between the base and the apex. 
The first plane of division above the base separates from
all homicide cases those which fall into the category of murder.
This plane is established by the legislature in statutes defining
terms such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary
manslaughter, and justifiable homicide.  In deciding whether a
given case falls above or below this plane, the function of the
trier of facts is limited to finding facts.  The plane remains fixed
unless moved by legislative act. 
The second plane separates from all murder cases those
in which the penalty of death is a possible punishment.  This
plane is established by statutory definitions of aggravating
circumstances.  The function of the factfinder is again limited to
making a determination of whether certain facts have been
established.  Except where there is treason or aircraft  hijacking,
a given case may not move above this second plane unless at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists.
The third plane separates, from all cases in which a
penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it shall
be imposed.  There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to
place any given case below the plane and not impose death.  The
plane itself is established by the factfinder.  In establishing the
plane, the factfinder considers all evidence in extenuation,
mitigation and aggravation of punishment.  There is a final
limitation on the imposition of the death penalty resting in the
automatic appeal procedure: This court determines whether the
penalty of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; whether the statutory
aggravating circumstances are supported by the evidence; and
whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases.  Performance of this
function may cause this court to remove a case from the death
penalty category but can never have the opposite result. 
43
The purpose of the statutory aggravating circumstances
is to limit to a large degree, but not completely, the factfinder's
discretion.  Unless at least one of the ten statutory aggravating
circumstances exists, the death penalty may not be imposed in
any event.  If there exists at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance, the death penalty may be imposed but the
factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giving any
reason.  In making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder
takes into consideration all circumstances before it from both the
guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial.  These
circumstances relate both to the offense and the defendant. 
A case may not pass the second plane into that area in
which the death penalty is authorized unless at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance is found.  However, this
plane is passed regardless of the number of statutory aggravating
circumstances found, so long as there is at least one.  Once
beyond this plane, the case enters the area of the factfinder's
discretion, in which all the facts and circumstances of the case
determine, in terms of our metaphor, whether or not the case
passes the third plane and into the area in which the death
penalty is imposed.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 870-72, 103 S. Ct. at 2739-40, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 245-47 (internal citations
omitted).
The Court in Zant next turned its attention to the sentencing process set forth in the
Georgia statute, finding it to be constitutional.  In doing so, the Court specifically pointed out
that it is not constitutionally required that there be specific standards for balancing
aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in a sentencing statute.  The
Court stated: 
In Georgia, unlike some other States, the jury is not
instructed to give any special weight to any aggravating
circumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances
44
any more significant than a single such circumstance, or to
balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant
to any special standard.  Thus, in Georgia, the finding of an
aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the
sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its
function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder
who are eligible for the death penalty.  For this reason,
respondent argues that Georgia's statutory scheme is invalid
under the holding in Furman v. Georgia.
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Respondent argues that the mandate of Furman is
violated by a scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled
discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be
imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the
class made eligible for that penalty by statute.  But that
argument could not be accepted without overruling our specific
holding in Gregg.  For the Court approved Georgia's capital
sentencing statute even though it clearly did not channel the
jury's discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the
jury's 
consideration 
of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating
circumstances. 
Zant, 462 U.S. at 873-75, 103 S. Ct. at 2741-42, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 247-49.
In a corresponding footnote, the Court further explained:
The joint opinion [in Gregg] specifically described the
Georgia scheme in these terms: 
"Georgia did act, however, to narrow the class of
murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10
statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be
found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a
death sentence can ever be imposed.  In addition, the jury is
authorized to consider any other appropriate aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.  The jury is not required to find any
mitigating circumstance in order to make a recommendation of
mercy that is binding on the trial court, but it must find a
45
statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a
sentence of death."
The joint opinion issued the same day in Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976), makes clear that specific standards for
balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances are not
constitutionally required.  In Jurek we held that the State's action
in "narrowing the categories of murders for which a death
sentence may ever be imposed" served much the same purpose
as the lists of statutory aggravating circumstances that Georgia
and Florida had adopted.  We also held that one of the three
questions presented to the sentencing jury permitted the
defendant to bring mitigating circumstances to the jury's
attention.  Thus, in Texas, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances were not considered at the same stage of the
criminal prosecution and certainly were not explicitly balanced
against each other.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 875 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 2742 n.13, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 249 n.13 (some internal
citations omitted).  The Court also explained the distinction between weighing states, such
as Maryland, and non-weighing states, such as Georgia, noting the separate, but dual,
function of aggravating factors in a weighing state.  The Court further illustrated, citing four
state cases from weighing states, why the holdings in the cases from the weighing states
would not be applicable to the situation where an aggravating factor subsequently was found
to be invalid under a non-weighing statute.  The Court stated:
In each of these cases, the State Supreme Court set aside a death
sentence based on both valid and invalid aggravating
circumstances.  Respondent advances these cases in support of
his contention that a similar result is required here.  However,
examination of the relevant state statutes shows that in each of
these States, not only must the jury find at least one aggravating
circumstance [in the eligibility phase] in order to have the power
to impose the death sentence; in addition, the law requires the
18 As will be seen, infra, the Court later would explain that, in a weighing state, the
inclusion of an invalid circumstance in the weighing process can act as a “thumb on the
scale” of the sentencing authorities deliberations as to whether to impose the death penalty
during the selection phase.  See supra, note 16.
46
jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstances when it decides whether or not the
death penalty should be imposed [the selection phase].
Zant, 462 U.S. at 873 n.12, 103 S. Ct. at 2741 n.12, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 247 n.12 (emphasis
added; internal citations omitted).18
The Court concluded its discussion of the roles of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and the weighing process, by reaffirming its prior holdings that it is the
finding of an aggravating circumstance, and not the weighing process, which makes a
defendant eligible for the death penalty, noting that:
Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating
circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the
stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty.  But the Constitution does
not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors
in the process of selecting, from among that class, those
defendants who will actually be sentenced to death.  What is
important at the selection stage is an individualized
determination on the basis of the character of the individual and
the circumstances of the crime.  See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 110-112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601-
605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana,
431 U.S. 633, 636-637 (1977); Gregg, 428 U.S., at 197 (opinion
of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S., at 251-252 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and
STEVENS, JJ.); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303-304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
19 The distinction between the eligibility phase and the selection phase was reiterated
in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 108 L. Ed. 2d 255, (1990),
involving a weighing statute.  The Pennsylvania death penalty statute provided that "the
verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating
circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or
more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances."  42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)(1988).  Blystone argued that the death penalty statute was
unconstitutional because it mandated a sentence of death based on the outcome of the
weighing process.  The Court summarily rejected this argument, noting:
The presence of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose
of limiting the class of death-eligible defendants, and the Eighth
Amendment does not 
require 
that 
these 
aggravating
circumstances be further refined or weighed by a jury.  See
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) ("The use of
'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means
of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and
thereby channeling the jury's discretion").  The requirement of
individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by
allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.
494 U.S. at 306-07, 110 S. Ct. at 1083, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 264.
47
Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79, 103 S. Ct. at 2743-44, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 250-51.19
In Barclay v. Florida 463 U.S. 939, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1134, (1983)
(plurality opinion), the Supreme Court considered a situation where the sentencing authority
imposed a death sentence on the basis of several aggravating factors, one of which, while
constitutionally permissible, was impermissible under the state statute.  In reviewing the
requirements of the Florida statute and case law in question, the Court observed:
[The Florida statute, like the Georgia statute at issue in Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), requires the sentencer to find at
least one valid statutory aggravating circumstances before the
death penalty may even be considered, and permits the trial
48
court to admit any evidence that may be relevant to the proper
sentence.  Unlike the Georgia statute, however, Florida law
requires the sentencer to balance statutory aggravating
circumstances against all mitigating circumstances and does not
permit nonstatutory aggravating circumstances to enter into this
weighing process.  The statute does not establish any special
standard for this weighing process.
Although the Florida statute did not change significantly
between Proffitt and the decision below, the Florida Supreme
Court has developed a body of case law in this area.  One
question that has arisen is whether defendants must be
resentenced when trial courts erroneously consider improper
aggravating factors.  If the trial court found that some mitigating
circumstances exist, the case will generally be remanded for
resentencing.  If the trial court properly found that there are no
mitigating circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court applies a
harmless-error analysis.  In such a case, "a reversal of the death
sentence would not necessarily be required," because the error
might be harmless.
Barclay, 463 U.S. at 954-55, 103 S. Ct. at 3427, 77 L. Ed. at 1146-47 (some internal citations
omitted; footnotes omitted).  Because the error was one of state law, the factor involved was
but one of several found to exist, and no mitigating circumstances were present, the Court
upheld the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court in finding the error to be harmless.  In so
doing, the Court commented on the nature of the selection phase of the sentencing process,
distinguishing it in much the same terms we used to support our third rationale in Borchardt.
(See infra at 79-81).  The Court observed:
Any sentencing decision calls for the exercise of
judgment.  It is neither possible nor desirable for a person to
whom the State entrusts an important judgment to decide in a
vacuum, as if he had no experiences.  The thrust of our decisions
on capital punishment has been that "'discretion must be suitably
20 See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2951-52, 106
L. Ed. 2d 256, 284 (1989):
"In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must
(continued...)
49
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action.'"  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 874 (1983), quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.).
This very day we said in another capital case: 
"In returning a conviction, the jury must satisfy itself that
the necessary elements of the particular crime have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In fixing a penalty, however, there
is no similar 'central issue' from which the jury's attention may
be diverted.  Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within
the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the
death penalty, as did respondent's jury in determining the truth
of the alleged special circumstance, the jury then is free to
consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the
appropriate punishment."  California v. Ramos, [463 U.S. 992,]
1008, [103 S. Ct. 3446, 3457, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1171, 1185] (1983).
We have never suggested that the United States
Constitution requires that the sentencing process should be
transformed into a rigid and mechanical parsing of statutory
aggravating factors.  But to attempt to separate the sentencer's
decision from his experiences would inevitably do precisely that.
It is entirely fitting for the moral, factual, and legal judgment of
judges and juries to play a meaningful role in sentencing.  We
expect that sentencers will exercise their discretion in their own
way and to the best of their ability.  As long as that discretion is
guided in a constitutionally adequate way, see Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and as long as the decision is not
so wholly arbitrary as to offend the Constitution, the Eighth
Amendment cannot and should not demand more.  
Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950-51, 103 S. Ct. at 3425, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1144 (emphasis added).20
20(...continued)
narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the death sentence, the
Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's
discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to
decline to impose the death sentence."  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (emphasis in original).  Indeed, it is
precisely because the punishment should be directly related to
the personal culpability of the defendant that the jury must be
allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence
relevant to a defendant's character or record or the
circumstances of the offense.  Rather than creating the risk of an
unguided emotional response, full consideration of evidence that
mitigates against the death penalty is essential if the jury is to
give a "'reasoned 
moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime.'"  Franklin, 487 U.S., at 184 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S.,
at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).  In order to ensure "reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate  punishment in
a specific case,"  Woodson, 428 U.S., at 305, the jury must be
able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence
relevant to a defendant's background and character or the
circumstances of the crime.
(emphasis added).
21 Decided approximately three months prior to Walton v. Arizona.
50
The next case of importance, leading into  our specific consideration of the Maryland
statutory framework, is Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 108 L. Ed.
2d 725 (1990).21  In Clemons, the Court confronted the issue which it left open in Zant,
namely, whether, in a weighing state, such as Maryland, reversal was required where one of
several aggravating factors was found on direct appeal to be constitutionally invalid.  In
Clemons, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the error was harmless, and held
22 Mississippi Code Ann. § 99-19-101(3)(c) (Supp. 1989) provides that “[f]or the jury
to impose a sentence of death, it must unanimously find . . . (c) That there are insufficient
mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in subsection (6), to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.”
23 Nevertheless, because the record was unclear as to whether the state Supreme Court
actually conducted a reweighing, the sentence was vacated.
51
that upon re-weighing by it of the remaining factors, the death penalty was appropriate.22
Because one of the aggravating factors remained intact after appellate scrutiny, the question
of whether Mr. Clemons was death eligible was not before the Court; only questions
concerning the selection phase of the sentencing process were at issue.  Clemons argued that
the Mississippi Supreme Court, in finding that a jury would have found death appropriate
even without the presence of the invalid aggravating factor, improperly applied the harmless-
error rule.  He also argued that he had a liberty interest in having a jury make all the
determinations relevant to his sentence, and that an appellate court could not reweigh the
balance of factors.  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with Clemons on both issues,23
observing that:
Even if under Mississippi law, the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances were not an appellate, but a jury,
function, it was open to the Mississippi Supreme Court to find
that the error which occurred during the sentencing proceeding
was harmless.  As the plurality in Barclay v. Florida, supra,
opined, the Florida Supreme Court could apply harmless-error
analysis when reviewing a death sentence imposed by a trial
judge who relied on an aggravating circumstance not available
for his consideration under Florida law: 
"Cases such as [those cited by the petitioner]
indicate that the Florida Supreme Court does not
52
apply its harmless-error analysis in an automatic
or mechanical fashion, but rather upholds death
sentences on the basis of this analysis only when
it actually finds that the error is harmless.  There
is no reason why the Florida Supreme Court
cannot examine the balance struck by the trial
judge and decide that the elimination of
improperly considered aggravating circumstances
could not possibly affect the balance. . . . 'What is
important . . . is an individualized determination
on the basis of the character of the individual and
the circumstances of the crime.'  Zant, [462 U.S.],
at 879 (emphasis in original)."  Id., at 958.
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Nothing in this opinion is intended to convey the impression that
state appellate courts are required to or necessarily should
engage in reweighing or harmless-error analysis when errors
have occurred in a capital sentencing proceeding.  Our holding
is only that such procedures are constitutionally permissible.  In
some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that
peculiarities in a case make appellate reweighing or harmless-
error analysis extremely speculative or impossible.  We have
previously noted that appellate courts may face certain
difficulties in determining sentencing questions in the first
instance.  Nevertheless, that decision is for state appellate
courts, including the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case, to
make.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752-54, 110 S. Ct. at 1450-51, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 741-42 (footnotes
omitted; some internal citations omitted).
In holding that the reweighing of aggravating factors against mitigating factors did
not offend the federal Constitution, the Court observed:
In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), we determined that in
a State like Georgia, where aggravating circumstances serve
only to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty and not
53
to determine the punishment, the invalidation of one aggravating
circumstance does not necessarily require an appellate court to
vacate a death sentence and remand to a jury.  We withheld
opinion, however, "concerning the possible significance of a
holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is 'invalid'
under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is
specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to
impose the death penalty."  Id. at 890.  In Mississippi, unlike the
Georgia scheme considered in Zant, the finding of aggravating
factors is [also] part of the jury's sentencing determination, and
the jury is required to weigh any mitigating factors against the
aggravating circumstances.  Although these differences
complicate the questions raised, we do not believe that they
dictate reversal in this case. 
Nothing in the Sixth Amendment as construed by our
prior decisions indicates that a defendant's right to a jury trial
would be infringed where an appellate court invalidates one of
two or more aggravating circumstances found by the jury, but
affirms the death sentence after itself finding that the one or
more valid remaining aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating evidence.  Any argument that the Constitution
requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the
findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been
soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.  Cabana v.
Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), held that an appellate court can
make the findings required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982), in the first instance and stated that "[the decision
whether a particular punishment -- even the death penalty -- is
appropriate in any given case is not one that we have ever
required to be made by a jury."  474 U.S. at 385.  Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), ruled that neither the Sixth
Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor any other
constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to
have a jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence;
neither is there a double jeopardy prohibition on a judge's
override of a jury's recommended sentence.  Likewise, the Sixth
Amendment does not require that a jury specify the aggravating
factors that permit the imposition of capital punishment, Hildwin
54
v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989), nor does it require jury
sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings
of fact.  McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). 
 
To avoid the import of these cases, Clemons argues that
under Mississippi law only a jury has the authority to impose a
death sentence, and that he therefore has a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in having
a jury make all determinations relevant to his sentence.  He
therefore argues that an appellate court cannot reweigh the
balance of factors when the jury has found and relied on an
invalid aggravating circumstance.  Capital sentencing
proceedings must of course satisfy the dictates of the Due
Process Clause, and we have recognized that when state law
creates for a defendant a liberty interest in having a jury make
particular findings, speculative appellate findings will not
suffice to protect that entitlement for due process purposes.
However, these two general propositions do not lead to the
result Clemons seeks.
In Hicks v. Oklahoma, [447 U.S. 343 (1980)] sentence
had been imposed under an invalid recidivist statute that
provided for a mandatory 40-year sentence.  The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence because it was
within the range of possible sentences the jury validly could
have imposed.  Hicks claimed, and the State conceded, that in
Oklahoma only the jury could impose sentence.  We held that
under state law Hicks had a liberty interest in having the jury
impose punishment, an interest that could not be overcome by
the "frail conjecture" that the jury "might" have imposed the
same sentence in the absence of the recidivist statute.  We
specifically pointed out, however, that the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals did not "purport to cure the deprivation by
itself reconsidering the appropriateness" of the 40-year sentence,
thus suggesting that appellate sentencing, if properly conducted,
would not violate due process of law. 
Contrary to the situation in Hicks, the state court in this case, as
it had in others, asserted its authority under Mississippi law to
decide for itself whether the death sentence was to be affirmed
55
even though one of the two aggravating circumstances on which
the jury had relied should not have been, or was improperly,
presented to the jury.  The court did not consider itself bound in
such circumstances to vacate the death sentence and to remand
for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury.  We have no
basis for disputing this interpretation of state law, which was
considered by the court below to be distinct from its asserted
authority to affirm the sentence on the ground of harmless error,
and which plainly means that we must reject Clemons' assertion
that he had an unqualified liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause to have the jury assess the consequence of the
invalidation of one of the aggravating circumstances on which
it had been instructed.  In this respect, the case is analogous to
Cabana v. Bullock, supra, where we specifically rejected a due
process challenge based on Hicks because state law created no
entitlement to have a jury make findings that an appellate court
also could make.
Clemons also submits that appellate courts are unable to
fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence
presented by defendants at the sentencing phase in a capital case
and that it therefore violates the Eighth Amendment for an
appellate court to undertake to reweigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in an attempt to salvage the death
sentence imposed by a jury.  He insists, therefore, that he is
entitled to a new sentencing hearing before a jury and that the
decision below must be reversed.  We are unpersuaded,
however, that our cases require this result.  Indeed, they point in
the opposite direction.
The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context
has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and
circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime.
In scrutinizing death penalty procedures under the Eighth
Amendment, the Court has emphasized the "twin objectives" of
"measured consistent application and fairness to the accused."
Nothing inherent in the process of appellate reweighing is
inconsistent with the pursuit of the foregoing objectives. 
56
We see no reason to believe that careful appellate
weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances in
cases such as this would not produce "measured consistent
application" of the death penalty or in any way be unfair to the
defendant.  It is a routine task of appellate courts to decide
whether the evidence supports a jury verdict and in capital cases
in "weighing" States, to consider whether the evidence is such
that the sentencer could have arrived at the death sentence that
was imposed.  And, as the opinion below indicates, a similar
process of weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence is
involved in an appellate court's proportionality review.
Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that
meaningful appellate review of death sentences promotes
reliability and consistency.  It is also important to note that state
supreme courts in States authorizing the death penalty may well
review many death sentences and that typical jurors, in contrast,
will serve on only one such case during their lifetimes.
Therefore, we conclude that state appellate courts can and do
give each defendant an individualized and reliable sentencing
determination based on the defendant's circumstances, his
background, and the crime. 
This is surely the import of Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S.
376 (1986), which held that a state appellate court could make
the finding that Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982),
required for the imposition of the death penalty, i. e. whether the
defendant had killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.
Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (per curiam), is
likewise instructive.  There, a Florida trial judge relied on an
allegedly impermissible aggravating circumstance ("future
dangerousness") in imposing a death sentence on Goode.  The
Florida Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the
record, reweighed the mitigating and aggravating factors, and
concluded that the death penalty was warranted.  In a federal
habeas proceeding, Goode then successfully challenged the trial
court's reliance on the allegedly impermissible factor.  We
reversed the grant of the writ and concluded that even if the trial
judge relied on a factor not available for his consideration under
Florida law, the sentence could stand.  "Whatever may have
been true of the sentencing judge, there is no claim that in
24 See also, Parker v. Florida Dept of Corrections, 498 U.S. 308, 318-19, 111 S. Ct.
731, 738, 112 L. Ed. 2d 812, 824 (“As noted, Florida is a weighing State; the death penalty
may be imposed only where specified aggravating circumstances outweigh all mitigating
circumstances.”).
57
conducting its independent reweighing of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances the Florida Supreme Court considered
Goode's future dangerousness.  Consequently there is no sound
basis for concluding that the procedures followed by the State
produced an arbitrary or freakish sentence forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment." 
We accordingly see nothing in appellate weighing or
reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that
is at odds with contemporary standards of fairness or that is
inherently unreliable and likely to result in arbitrary imposition
of the death sentence.  Nor are we impressed with the claim that
without 
written 
jury 
findings 
concerning 
m itigating
circumstances, appellate courts cannot perform their proper role.
In Spaziano and Proffitt, we upheld the Florida death penalty
scheme permitting a trial judge to override a jury's
recommendation of life even though there were no written jury
findings.  An appellate court also is able adequately to evaluate
any evidence relating to mitigating factors without the assistance
of written jury findings.  
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 744-50, 110 S. Ct. at 1446-1449, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 735-739 (some
internal citations omitted; footnotes omitted).24
The next important case, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 111 L. Ed.
2d 511 (1990), is of particular importance to our discussion, as specific portions (and only
specific portions) of its holding were overruled by Ring.  In Walton, the defendant was found
guilty in an Arizona trial court of first-degree murder and was sentenced in a separate
58
sentencing hearing before the judge, as required by state law.  The Arizona statutes provided
that:
[a] person commits first-degree murder if "intending or knowing
that his conduct will cause death, such person causes the death
of another with premeditation" or if in the course of committing
certain specified offenses and without any mental state other
than what is required for the commission of such offenses, he
causes the death of any person.  After a person has been found
guilty of first-degree murder, the sentence for such crime is
determined in accordance with the provisions of § 13-703(B).
It is there directed that a "separate sentencing hearing . . . shall
be conducted before the court alone" to determine whether the
sentence shall be death or life imprisonment.  In the course of
such hearing, the judge is instructed to determine the existence
or nonexistence of any of the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances defined in subsections (F) and (G) of § 13-703.
Subsection (F) defines 10 aggravating circumstances that may
be considered.  One of them is whether the offense was
committed with the expectation of receiving anything of
pecuniary value.  Another is whether the defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.
Subsection (G) defines mitigating circumstances as any factors
"which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence
less than death, including any aspect of the defendant's
character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense, including but not limited to" five specified factors.
The burden of establishing the existence of any of the
aggravating circumstances is on the prosecution, while the
burden of establishing mitigating circumstances is on the
defendant.  The court is directed to return a special verdict
setting forth its findings as to aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and then "shall impose a sentence of death if the
court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in subsection (F) of this section and that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency."
25 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982)
(a defendant who was found guilty of felony murder could not be executed for taking part
in a robbery where he never intended that deadly force be used).
59
Walton, 497 U.S. at 642-44, 110 S. Ct at 3051-52, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 521-22 (some internal
citations omitted).
Walton’s primary argument was that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the
framework of the Arizona statute, in that it allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to determine
that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill,25 and  to find the existence of
aggravating factors.  Walton argued that these determinations were exclusively jury
functions.  The Court rejected Walton’s argument, observing:
Walton's first argument is that every finding of fact
underlying the sentencing decision must be made by a jury, not
by a judge, and that the Arizona scheme would be constitutional
only if a jury decides what aggravating and mitigating
circumstances are present in a given case and the trial judge then
imposes sentence based on those findings.  Contrary to Walton's
assertion, however: Any argument that the Constitution requires
that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings
prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly
rejected by prior decisions of this Court."  Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725, 110 S. Ct.
1441 (1990). 
We repeatedly have rejected constitutional challenges to
Florida's death sentencing scheme, which provides for
sentencing by the judge, not the jury.  Hildwin v. Florida, 490
U.S. 638, 104 L. Ed. 2d 728, 109 S. Ct. 2055  (1989) (per
curiam); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340,
104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 913, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).  In Hildwin, for example, we
stated that "this case presents us once again with the question
60
whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to specify the
aggravating factors that permit the imposition of capital
punishment in Florida," and we ultimately concluded that "the
Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by
the jury." 
The distinctions Walton attempts to draw between the
Florida and Arizona statutory schemes are not persuasive.  It is
true that in Florida  the jury recommends a sentence, but it does
not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence
of 
mitigating 
or 
aggravating 
circumstances 
and 
its
recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.  A Florida
trial court no more has the assistance of a jury's findings of fact
with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in
Arizona. 
Walton also suggests that in Florida aggravating factors
are only sentencing "considerations" while in Arizona they are
"elements of the offense."  But as we observed in Poland v.
Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 90 L. Ed. 2d 123, 106 S. Ct. 1749
(1986), an Arizona capital punishment case: 
Aggravating
circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are
'standards to guide the making of [the] choice' between the
alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment.  Thus, under
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, the judge's finding of any
particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself 'convict'
a defendant (i. e., require the death penalty), and the failure to
find any particular aggravating circumstance does not 'acquit' a
defendant (i. e., preclude the death penalty)."
Our holding in Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 88 L.
Ed. 2d 704, 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986), provides further support for
our conclusion.  Cabana held that an appellate court could
constitutionally make the Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73
L. Ed. 2d 1140, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982), finding -- that the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill -- in the
first instance.  We noted that "Enmund, 'does not affect the
state's definition of any substantive offense, even a capital
offense,'" 474 U.S. at 385 (citations omitted), and that "while the
61
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of such defendants,
it does not supply a new element of the crime of capital murder
that must be found by the jury."  Enmund only places "a
substantive limitation on sentencing, and like other such limits
it need not be enforced by the jury."  If the Constitution does not
require that the Enmund finding be proved as an element of the
offense of capital murder, and does not require a jury to make
that finding, we cannot conclude that a State is required to
denominate aggravating circumstances "elements" of the offense
or permit only a jury to determine the existence of such
circumstances. 
Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-49, 110 S. Ct. at 3054-55, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 524-25 (some internal
citations omitted).  This holding was reversed in part by Ring, but only to the extent that
Walton held that the Constitution did not require aggravating factors to be found by a jury.
Employing multiple understatement, the Court in Ring stated:
Although"'the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental
importance to the rule of law[,]' . . . our precedents are not
sacrosanct."  "We have overruled prior decisions where the
necessity and propriety of doing so has been established."  We
are satisfied that this is such a case. 
For the reasons stated, we hold that Walton and Apprendi
are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot
be home to both.  Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent
that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find
an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the
death penalty.  Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating
factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense," Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09, 122 S. Ct at 2442-43, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 576-77 (emphasis added;
some internal citations omitted).
62
By the mid 1990's, the Supreme Court’s post-Furman death penalty jurisprudence
reached a point of maturity and relative stability.  In Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,
114 S. Ct. 2630, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1994), the Court reviewed its handiwork and  explained
and affirmed the distinctions it had developed between the eligibility phase and the selection
phase of the death sentence apparatus.  The Court stated:
Our capital punishment cases under the Eighth
Amendment address two different aspects of the capital
decision-making process: the eligibility decision and the
selection decision.  To be eligible for the death penalty, the
defendant must be convicted of a crime for which the death
penalty is a proportionate punishment.  To render a defendant
eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we have
indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of
murder and find one "aggravating circumstance" (or its
equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase.  See, e. g.,
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-246, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568,
108 S. Ct. 546 (1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878, 77
L. Ed. 2d 235, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).  The aggravating
circumstance may be contained in the definition of the crime or
in a separate sentencing factor (or in both).  As we have
explained, the aggravating circumstance must meet two
requirements.  First, the circumstance may not apply to every
defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a
subclass of defendants convicted of murder.  See Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 123 L. Ed. 2d 188, 113 S. Ct. 1534
(1993) ("If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an
aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for
the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm").
Second, 
the 
aggravating 
circumstance 
may 
not 
be
unconstitutionally vague.  Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
428, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980); see Arave, supra,
at 471 (court "'must first determine whether the statutory
language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide
any guidance to the sentencer'") (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 654, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990)).
63
We have imposed a separate requirement for the selection
decision, where the sentencer determines whether a defendant
eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that
sentence.  "What is important at the selection stage is an
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime."  Zant, supra, at
879; see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-
304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976) (plurality opinion).
That requirement is met when the jury can consider relevant
mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant
and the circumstances of the crime.  Blystone v. Pennsylvania,
494 U.S. 299, 307, 108 L. Ed. 2d 255, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990)
("requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is
satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating
evidence").
The eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined
classification.  Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an
answer to a question with a factual nexus to the crime or the
defendant so as to "make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death."  The selection decision, on the
other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be
expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence
so as to assure an assessment of the defendant's culpability.  The
objectives of these two inquiries can be in some tension, at least
when the inquiries occur at the same time.  There is one
principle common to both decisions, however: The State must
ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard
against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision.  See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.)
(procedures must "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action").  That is the controlling objective when we
examine eligibility and selection factors for vagueness. Indeed,
it is the reason that eligibility and selection factors (at least in
some sentencing schemes) may not be "too vague."  Walton,
supra, at 654.
64
Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-73, 114 S. Ct. at 2634-35, 129 L. Ed. 2d 759-60 (emphasis added;
some internal citations omitted).
Defendant Tuilaepa had argued, among other things, that the California statute was
unconstitutional because it did not require selection factors to meet the same requirements
as eligibility factors and did not sufficiently instruct the sentencer as to how to weigh the
factors in arriving at an appropriate sentence.  The Court rejected both of these arguments,
and with regard to weighing stated:
A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any
particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.  In California
v. Ramos, for example, we upheld an instruction informing the
jury that the Governor had the power to commute life sentences
and stated that "the fact that the jury is given no specific
guidance on how the commutation factor is to figure into its
determination presents no constitutional problem."  463 U.S. at
1008-1009, n. 22.  Likewise, in Proffitt v. Florida, we upheld
the Florida capital sentencing scheme even though "the various
factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities [did] not
have numerical weights assigned to them."  428 U.S. at 258.  In
Gregg, moreover, we "approved Georgia's capital sentencing
statute even though it clearly did not channel the jury's
discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances."
Zant, 462 U.S. at 875.  We also rejected an objection "to the
wide scope of evidence and argument" allowed at sentencing
hearings. 428 U.S. at 203-204.  In sum, "discretion to evaluate
and weigh the circumstances relevant to the particular defendant
and the crime he committed" is not impermissible in the capital
sentencing process.  "Once the jury finds that the defendant falls
within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for
the death penalty, . . . the jury then is free to consider a myriad
of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate
punishment."  Indeed, the sentencer may be given "unbridled
discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be
65
imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the
class made eligible for that penalty."  Zant, supra, at 875; see
also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-951, 77 L. Ed. 2d
1134, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (plurality opinion).  In
contravention of those cases, petitioners' argument would force
the States to adopt a kind of mandatory sentencing scheme
requiring a jury to sentence a defendant to death if it found, for
example, a certain kind or number of facts, or found more
statutory aggravating factors than statutory mitigating factors.
The States are not required to conduct the capital sentencing
process in that fashion. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199-200, n. 50.
Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979-80, 114 S. Ct. 2638-39, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 764-65 (some internal
citations omitted).
The Court reiterated the point in its decision in Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 115
S. Ct. 1031, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1995), stating:
We have rejected the notion that "a specific method for
balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital
sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required."  Equally
settled is the corollary that the Constitution does not require a
State to ascribe any specific weight to particular factors, either
in aggravation or mitigation, to be considered by the sentencer.
To require that "great weight" be given to the jury
recommendation here, one of the criteria to be considered by the
sentencer, would offend these established principles and place
within constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that
properly rest within the State's discretion to administer its
criminal justice system.
Harris, 513 U.S. at 512, 115 S. Ct at 1035-36, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 1014 (emphasis added; some
internal citations omitted).
 
And finally, in Buchanan v Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 118 S. Ct. 757, 139 L. Ed. 2d 702
(1998), the Court explained:
66
Petitioner initially recognizes, as he must, that our cases
have distinguished between two different aspects of the capital
sentencing process, the eligibility phase and the selection phase.
In the eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty, often through consideration of
aggravating circumstances.  In the selection phase, the jury
determines whether to impose a death sentence on an eligible
defendant. Petitioner concedes that it is only the selection phase
that is at stake in his case.  He argues, however, that our
decisions indicate that the jury at the selection phase must both
have discretion to make an individualized determination and
have that discretion limited and channeled.  He further argues
that the Eighth Amendment therefore requires the court to
instruct the jury on its obligation and authority to consider
mitigating evidence, and on particular mitigating factors deemed
relevant by the State. 
No such rule has ever been adopted by this Court. While
petitioner appropriately recognizes the distinction between the
eligibility and selection phases, he fails to distinguish the
differing constitutional treatment we have accorded those two
aspects of capital sentencing.  It is in regard to the eligibility
phase that we have stressed the need for channeling and limiting
the jury's discretion to ensure that the death penalty is a
proportionate punishment and therefore not arbitrary or
capricious in its imposition.  In contrast, in the selection phase,
we have emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all
relevant mitigating evidence to allow an individualized
determination.
In the selection phase, our cases have established that the
sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not
refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence.  However, the State may shape and structure the jury's
consideration of mitigation so long as it does not preclude the
jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence.  Our
consistent concern has been that restrictions on the jury's
sentencing determination not preclude the jury from being able
to give effect to mitigating evidence.  Thus, in Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316, 110 S. Ct.
67
1190 (1990), we held that the standard for determining whether
jury instructions satisfy these principles was "whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of
constitutionally relevant evidence."
But we have never gone further and held that the state
must affirmatively structure in a particular way the manner in
which juries consider mitigating evidence.  And indeed, our
decisions 
suggest 
that 
complete 
jury 
discretion 
is
constitutionally permissible.  See Tuilaepa, supra, at 978-979
(noting that at the selection phase, the State is not confined to
submitting specific propositional questions to the jury and may
indeed allow the jury unbridled discretion); Stephens, supra, at
875 (rejecting the argument that a scheme permitting the jury to
exercise "unbridled discretion" in determining whether to
impose the death penalty after it has found the defendant eligible
is unconstitutional, and noting that accepting that argument
would require the Court to overrule Gregg, supra). 
Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275-77, 118 S. Ct. 761-62, 139 L. Ed. 2d 709-10 (some internal
citations omitted).
VI.
We now come to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556
(2002), the case whose proper application is at issue in the present case.  It is in Ring that the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence meets its Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence on the subject.  In Ring, the defendant raised an Apprendi challenge to his
death sentence, arguing that the Arizona death penalty statute violated his Sixth Amendment
right to have all findings exposing him to the maximum penalty made by a jury according to
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  Specifically, Ring argued that Arizona’s capital
sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a
68
judge the finding of an aggravating factor, see Walton, supra, thus raising the defendant’s
maximum penalty to death.  Arizona argued that the Court previously  upheld its death
penalty scheme in Walton, and had stated in Apprendi that its decision in  that case did not
implicate its Walton holding.  The Court in Ring overruled Walton “to the extent that it
allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.”  536 U.S. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, 153
L. Ed. 2d at 576-77.
The Court described the workings of the Arizona death penalty statute as follows:
Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, the
statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder, unless
further findings were made.  The State's first-degree murder
statute prescribes that the offense "is punishable by death or life
imprisonment as provided by § 13-703."  The cross-referenced
section, § 13-703, directs the judge who presided at trial to
"conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the
existence or nonexistence of [certain enumerated] circumstances
. . . for the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed."
The statute further instructs: "The hearing shall be conducted
before the court alone.  The court alone shall make all factual
determinations required by this section or the constitution of the
United States or this state."
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge is to
determine the presence or absence of the enumerated
"aggravating 
circumstances" 
and 
any 
"mitiga ting
circumstances."  The State's law authorizes the judge to sentence
the defendant to death only if there is at least one aggravating
circumstance and "there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." 
69
Ring, 536 U.S. at 592, 122 S. Ct. at 2434-35, 153 L. Ed.2d at 566 (footnotes omitted; some
internal citations omitted).  Having described the workings of the Arizona death statute, the
Court observed:
Based solely on the jury's verdict finding Ring guilty of first-
degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have
received was life imprisonment.  The question presented is
whether that aggravating factor may be found by the judge, as
Arizona law specifies, or whether the Sixth Amendment's jury
trial guarantee,  made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires that the aggravating factor determination
be entrusted to the jury. 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, 122 S. Ct. at 2437, 153 L. Ed.2d at 569 (footnote and internal citation
omitted).  As the Court pointed out, Ring’s claim was tightly delineated:
He contends only that the Sixth Amendment required jury
findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him.
No aggravating circumstance related to past convictions in his
case; Ring therefore does not challenge Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 118 S. Ct. 1219
(1998), which held that the fact of prior conviction may be
found by the judge even if it increases the statutory maximum
sentence.  He makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to
mitigating circumstances.  See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490-491, n. 16, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348
(2000) (noting "the distinction the Court has often recognized
between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in
mitigation" (citation omitted)).  Nor does he argue that the
Sixth Amendment required the jury to make the ultimate
determination whether to impose the death penalty.  See
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913, 96 S.
Ct. 2960 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("It has never [been]
suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.").
He does not question the Arizona Supreme Court's authority to
reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances after that
court struck one aggravator. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
70
U.S. 738, 745, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
Finally, Ring does not contend that his indictment was
constitutionally defective.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, n. 3
(Fourteenth Amendment "has not . . . been construed to include
the Fifth Amendment right to 'presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury'"). 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4, 122 S. Ct. at  2437 n.4, 153 L. Ed.2d at 569 n.4 (emphasis added).
The Court next addressed the impact of the application of its holding in Apprendi
upon the Arizona death penalty statute.  The Court explained:
The defendant-petitioner in [Apprendi] was convicted of,
inter alia, second-degree possession of a firearm, an offense
carrying a maximum penalty of ten years under New Jersey law.
See id., at 469-470.  On the prosecutor's motion, the sentencing
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi's
crime had been motivated by racial animus.  That finding
triggered application of New Jersey's "hate crime enhancement,"
which doubled Apprendi's maximum authorized sentence.  The
judge sentenced Apprendi to 12 years in prison, 2 years over the
maximum that would have applied but for the enhancement. 
We held that Apprendi's sentence violated his right to "a
jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."
That right attached not only to Apprendi's weapons offense but
also to the "hate crime" aggravating circumstance.  New
Jersey, the Court observed, "threatened Apprendi with certain
pains if he unlawfully possessed a weapon and with additional
pains if he selected his victims with a purpose to intimidate them
because of their race."  "Merely using the label 'sentence
enhancement' to describe the [second act] surely does not
provide a principled basis for treating [the two acts] differently."
The dispositive question, we said, "is one not of form, but
of effect."  If a State makes an increase in a defendant's
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that
fact -- no matter how the State labels it -- must be found by a
71
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  A defendant may not be
"exposed . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury
verdict alone."  "All the facts which must exist in order to
subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be
found by the jury."
Walton could be reconciled with Apprendi, the Court
finally asserted.  The key distinction, according to the Apprendi
Court, was that a conviction of first-degree murder in Arizona
carried a maximum sentence of death."  Once a jury has found
the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which
carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be
left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather
than a lesser one, ought to be imposed."
The Apprendi dissenters called the Court's distinction of
Walton "baffling."  The Court claimed that "the jury makes all
of the findings necessary to expose the defendant to a death
sentence."  Ibid.  That, the dissent said, was "demonstrably
untrue," for a "defendant convicted of first-degree murder in
Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes
the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor
exists.  Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to
which the defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the
death penalty."  Ibid.  Walton, the Apprendi dissenters insisted,
if properly followed, would have required the Court to uphold
Apprendi's sentence.  "If a State can remove from the jury a
factual determination that makes the difference between life and
death, as Walton holds that it can, it is inconceivable why a State
cannot do the same with respect to a factual determination that
results in only a 10-year increase in the maximum sentence to
which a defendant is exposed."
The Arizona Supreme Court, as we earlier recounted,
found the Apprendi majority's portrayal of Arizona's capital
sentencing law incorrect, and the description in JUSTICE
O'CONNER's dissent precisely right: "Defendant's death
sentence required the judge's factual findings."  Recognizing
that the Arizona court's construction of the State's own law is
72
authoritative, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 44 L.
Ed. 2d 508, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975), we are persuaded that
Walton, in relevant part, cannot survive the reasoning of
Apprendi. 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 601-603, 122 S. Ct. at 2439-40, 153 L. Ed.2d at 572-73 (emphasis added;
some internal citations omitted).  The Court concluded that:
For the reasons stated, we hold that Walton and Apprendi are
irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be
home to both.  Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent
that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find
an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the
death penalty.  Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating
factors operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense," the Sixth Amendment requires that they be
found by a jury.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, 153 L. Ed.2d at 576-77 (internal citations omitted).
As is readily apparent from the opinion of the Court, Ring only addresses the
eligibility phase of the sentencing process.  Those aggravating factors which narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants for Eighth Amendment purposes must be found by a proper
sentencing authority beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comply with the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment.  Contrary to the present assertions of Oken, Ring holds no
implications for the selection phase of Maryland’s sentencing process.  This is emphasized
in the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, noting that:
[t]oday's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing.  What
today's decision says is that the jury must find the existence of
the fact that an aggravating factor existed.  Those States that
leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may
continue to do so -- by requiring a prior jury finding of
73
aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or, more simply, by
placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically
belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-13, 122 S. Ct. at 2445, 153 L. Ed.2d at 579.  That Ring is inapplicable
to Maryland’s death penalty statute is further highlighted by the dissenting opinion of Justice
O’Connor, observing that the Majority Opinion effectively identified Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nebraska, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana as the affected States.  Justice
O’Connor observed:
Not only was the decision in Apprendi  unjustified in my
view, but it has also had a severely destabilizing effect on our
criminal justice system.  I predicted in my dissent that the
decision would "unleash a flood of petitions by convicted
defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or  in
part on the authority of [Apprendi]."  As of May 31, 2002, less
than two years after Apprendi was announced, the United States
Courts of Appeals had decided approximately 1,802 criminal
appeals in which defendants challenged their sentences, and in
some cases even their convictions, under Apprendi.  These
federal appeals are likely only the tip of the iceberg, as federal
criminal prosecutions represent a tiny fraction of the total
number of criminal prosecutions nationwide.  ("In 1998 . . .
federal criminal prosecutions represented only about 0.4% of the
total number of criminal prosecutions in federal and state
courts").  The number of second or successive habeas corpus
petitions filed in the federal courts also increased by 77% in
2001, a phenomenon the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts attributes to prisoners bringing Apprendi claims.
This Court has been similarly overwhelmed by the aftershocks
of Apprendi.  A survey of the petitions for certiorari we received
in the past year indicates that 18% raised Apprendi-related
claims.  It is simply beyond dispute that Apprendi threw
countless criminal sentences into doubt and thereby caused an
enormous increase in the workload of an already overburdened
74
judiciary. 
The decision today is only going to add to these already
serious effects.  The Court effectively declares five States'
capital sentencing schemes unconstitutional.  See ante, at 21, n.
5 (identifying Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska as
having sentencing schemes like Arizona's).  There are 168
prisoners on death row in these States, each of whom is now
likely to challenge his or her death sentence.  I believe many of
these challenges will ultimately be unsuccessful, either because
the prisoners will be unable to satisfy the standards of harmless
error or plain error review, or because, having completed their
direct appeals, they will be barred from taking advantage of
today's holding on federal  collateral review.  Nonetheless, the
need to evaluate these claims will greatly burden the courts in
these five States.  In addition, I fear that the prisoners on death
row in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, which the
Court identifies as having hybrid sentencing schemes in which
the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the
ultimate sentencing determination, see 
ante, at 21, n. 6, may also
seize on today's decision  to challenge their sentences.  There are
529 prisoners on death row in these States.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 619-21, 122 S. Ct. at 2449-50, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 583-85 (footnotes omitted
and some internal citations omitted).  Because the Maryland statute already requires that the
finding of the existence of an aggravating circumstance must be made by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Maryland statute is unaffected by the Ring holding.
VII
In Borchardt, we observed that:
The issue of whether § 413(h) violates due process by
excusing the State from the burden of proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances found by
the jury outweigh any mitigating circumstances it finds to exist
has been resolved by this Court on numerous occasions,
75
beginning with Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 729-34, 415 A.2d
830, 848-50 (1980), and ending, most recently, in Ware v. State,
360 Md. 650, 712-13, 759 A.2d 764, 797 (2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1115, 121 S. Ct. 864, 148 L. Ed. 2d 776 (2001).  We
have consistently found no due process violation in the
provision directing that the weighing process be based on a
preponderance of the evidence.  That is the scheme ordained by
the Legislature, and we have declared, at least 12 times, that it
complies with the requirements of due process.
367 Md. at 121, 786 A.2d at 648-49.  Today we so hold again.  According to the Petitioner
here, the rationale of Ring effectively overrules sub silentio our holding in Borchardt that
nothing in Apprendi invalidates Maryland’s capital sentencing statutes.  Petitioner is
incorrect.  Despite our conclusion, however, that the holding in Ring is inapplicable to the
selection phase of the Maryland sentencing process, and thus inapplicable to the weighing
of aggravating and mitigating factors, Borchardt does not survive Ring totally unscathed.
As noted, supra, we presented three rationales supporting the conclusions  reached in
Borchardt.  Least important of these was our observation that the Apprendi majority
explicitly stated that its decision did not render its holding in Walton invalid.  367 Md. at
121-22, 786 A.2d at 649.  Obviously, the Ring holding specifically overruling Walton and
requiring that aggravating factors must be found by the proper sentencing authority beyond
a reasonable doubt, eliminates this comparison as a rationale for holding that the Maryland
death penalty is unaffected by Apprendi. 
The second rationale advanced by the Court majority in Borchardt relied upon a plain
language reading of Maryland’s death penalty statute.  The majority noted that § 412(b) set
76
forth a range of potential sentences, with life imprisonment as the low end and death as the
high end.  The majority stated:
As noted, Maryland law makes death the maximum penalty for
first degree murder.  Under § 412(b), death is the high end of the
statutory range that has life imprisonment as the low end and life
imprisonment without possibility of parole as the median.
Neither the existence of an aggravating circumstance, nor the
absence of any mitigating circumstances, nor the jury's
determination that the aggravating circumstance(s) it has found
to exist outweighs any mitigating circumstances, serves to
increase in any way "the prescribed statutory maximum" or,
indeed, the statutory range.  The existence of those
circumstances and the relative weight to be given to them are
nothing more than standards that, pursuant to Supreme Court
mandate, the Legislature has required to be applied in
determining which sentence within the statutory range is to be
imposed.
367 Md. at 123, 786 A.2d at 650.  As Ring now makes clear, this statement is not entirely
correct, as it places both the finding of aggravating factors and the finding and weighing of
factors in mitigation on the selection side of the sentencing process.
Oken advances two arguments why our second rationale in Borchardt is incorrect and
for support turns to the dissenting opinion in Borchardt and to language in Ring.  Petitioner
specifically looks to the following language from the Borchardt dissent:
More importantly, unlike the Arizona death penalty
statute at issue in Walton, the Maryland death penalty statute
establishes life imprisonment as the basic, default maximum
penalty for murder, a characteristic that makes Maryland unique
among American death penalty jurisdictions.  In most states, a
defendant essentially becomes "death eligible" upon conviction
of a potentially capital crime, and the sentencing proceeding is
merely a vehicle through which the sentencing authority selects
77
from within a potential range of sentences, usually between life
imprisonment and death.  In Maryland, however, a defendant is
not eligible to receive a death sentence after being convicted of
first degree murder.  Rather, certain additional conditions must
be met, including a finding by the sentencing authority that the
aggravating 
circumstances 
outw eigh 
the 
mitigating
circumstances.  As a result, in Maryland, the finding that
aggravators outweigh mitigators is much more akin to the
finding that aggravating circumstances exist, which must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, than it is to a finding that
there are mitigating circumstances to be considered.  Within the
holding of Apprendi, therefore, due process requires that it be
made beyond a reasonable doubt. 
367 Md. at 158-59,  786 A.2d at 671 (internal citations omitted) (Dissent by Raker, J., joined
by Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J.).  This assertion by the dissent in Borchardt is  incorrect.  If,
as the dissent suggested there, defendants in most States were death-eligible prior to the
finding of aggravating circumstances, the death statutes in those states would be
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence.  As we pointed out,
supra, however, it is the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance that makes a
defendant death-eligible.  The distinction the quoted passage from  the Borchardt dissent
attempts to make is, therefore, factually and legally incorrect, and reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the requirements of the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence,
and particularly the distinction between the eligibility phase and the selection phase of the
sentencing process.  See discussion of Buchanan, supra at 65-66.  As both the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and its holding in Ring make clear, it is the finding of an
aggravating circumstance, and only the finding of an aggravating circumstance, which makes
26 To be sure, Borchardt, in his Reply Brief (at 2) in this Court, narrowed the basis of
his relevant flagship argument to that of a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge,
expressly eschewing reliance on the Eighth Amendment.  (“The issue presented by Mr.
Borchardt is a Fourteenth Amendment due process consideration, not an Eighth Amendment
consideration.”).
78
a defendant death-eligible.  Thus, Oken gains no traction from the Borchardt dissent to
advance his position here.
Oken’s reliance on language in the Ring opinion for support of his contention that the
second Borchardt rationale is no longer valid, however, is at least partially meritorious.  In
Ring, Arizona made an almost identical statutory interpretation argument as the reasoning
employed by the Borchardt majority, asserting that the Arizona statute set forth a range of
possible sentences and, therefore, the defendant was death-eligible upon conviction.  Under
Eighth Amendment analysis, and for the same reason that the dissent in Borchardt quoted
above is in error, such an interpretation does not consider the post-Furman jurisprudence
requiring that the class of defendants be narrowed by the finding of an aggravating factor
during the eligibility phase of the sentencing process.26  It is this Eighth Amendment
requirement which Ring overlays with a Sixth Amendment requirement.  In rejecting the
“range of sentencing options” rationale, the Supreme Court in Ring observed:
This argument overlooks Apprendi's instruction that "the
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect."  In effect, "the
required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] exposed
[Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's
guilty verdict."  The Arizona first-degree murder statute
"authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal
sense," for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision
79
requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before
imposition of the death penalty.  ("First degree murder is a class
1 felony and is punishable by death or life imprisonment as
provided by § 13-703."  (emphasis added)).  If Arizona prevailed
on its opening argument, Apprendi would be reduced to a
"meaningless and formalistic" rule of statutory drafting.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 604, 122 S. Ct. at 2440-41, 153 L. Ed.2d at 573-74 (alteration in original;
internal citations omitted).
Maryland Code, Art 27, § 412 expressly references § 413 with regard to capital
sentencing.  We know from the legislative history, discussed infra, that the 1978 statute was
drafted to conform with the Supreme Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence.  As a result, while
the majority in Borchardt was correct in observing that § 412 prescribed a range of
sentencing, it is the finding of an aggravating factor during the sentencing process as required
by § 413, not the mere finding of guilt, which makes a defendant death-eligible.  This is so
because the statute was designed to conform with the post-Furman requirement that the class
of defendants be narrowed by the finding of an aggravating circumstance in order to ensure
that the death penalty not be imposed in an “arbitrary” or “freakish” manner.  The Ring
holding makes clear that the act of finding an aggravating circumstance in order to meet the
class-narrowing requirements of the Eighth Amendment, at the same time, acts for Sixth
Amendment purposes to elevate the maximum sentence of an individual for whom an
aggravating factor is proven.  This is because, once proven, the existence of an aggravating
circumstance removes a defendant from the class of the convicted, where the possibility of
death existed as a potential punishment for the crime, to the narrower class of those who are
80
actually death-eligible.  Because  the Maryland statutory scheme was written to be in
conformance with the Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence, a defendant may not be subjected
to the death penalty under the Maryland statute unless an aggravating factor is proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.  Because the Maryland statute requires that the finding of an aggravating
factor be made by the proper sentencing authority beyond a reasonable doubt, the Maryland
statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment requirements most recently explained in
Apprendi and Ring.
The third and final rationale upon which the majority rested the Court’s decision in
Borchardt  survives scrutiny under Ring unblemished.  As we pointed out in Borchardt:
Although the dissenters in Apprendi perhaps had some
reason for concern as to whether a Walton-type scheme might be
jeopardized, in the sense that the determination of whether
aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist is in the nature of
a fact-finding process, in which the ultimate determination must
be based on evidence, it is a stretch to apply that concern, as
Borchardt and the dissent would do, to the weighing process
provided for in §§ 413(h).  Notwithstanding the language in
Article 27 §§ 414(e)(3) directing this Court, on appellate review,
to determine whether "the evidence supports the jury's . . .
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances," the weighing process is not a fact-
finding one based on evidence.  Mitigating circumstances do not
negate aggravating circumstances, as alibi negates criminal
agency or hot blood negates malice.  The statutory
circumstances specified or allowed under §§ 413(d) and (g) are
entirely independent from one another - the existence of one in
no way confirms or detracts from another.  The weighing
process is purely a judgmental one, of balancing the mitigator(s)
against the aggravator(s) to determine whether death is the
appropriate punishment in the particular case.  This is a process
that not only traditionally, but quintessentially, is a pure and
Constitutionally legitimate sentencing factor, one that does not
require a determination to be made beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp. 1388, 1421-22 (D. Ariz.
1995), aff'd, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525
27 See discussion of Barclay, supra at 47-49, Penry, supra at 49, n 20.
28 In addition to those cases cited supra, the distinction between the eligibility phase
and the selection phase of sentencing also was noted when the Court reviewed the South
(continued...)
81
U.S. 903, 119 S. Ct. 237, 142 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1998) (Constitution
does not require weighing beyond a reasonable doubt); State v.
Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), cert. denied, 468
U.S. 1220, 104 S. Ct. 3591, 82 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1984); Miller v.
State, 623 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind. 1993) (weighing is a balancing
process, not a fact to be proven; reasonable doubt standard does
not apply).
The incongruity of applying Apprendi to this process is
particularly apparent with respect to the requirement that, if the
determination that aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances is treated as an element that must be
proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, it also must be
sufficiently alleged in the indictment.  Borchardt has made that
argument under both Federal due process and Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  No case, to our knowledge,
has required that aggravating circumstances, mitigating
circumstances, or a weighing of them be set forth in the
indictment, yet, if Apprendi and Jones are applicable, that
clearly would be so under Federal due process and likely would
be so as well under Article 21.
267 Md at 126-27, 786 A.2d at 652.27  Ring, by its terms, only addresses the finding of
aggravating factors during the eligibility phase of the sentencing process, as dictated by the
Supreme Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence.  Ring does not pertain to the selection phase
of the sentencing process.  The Supreme Court consistently has stated, as pointed out in the
cases reviewed supra, that so long as there are no undue restraints upon the sentencing
authority’s ability to consider mitigating circumstances, there are no constitutional
requirements regarding the actual act of selection, or regarding the relative weight attached
to the factors.28
28(...continued)
Carolina death statute in Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 149 L.
Ed.2d 178 (2001).  There the Court explained:
South Carolina, in line with other States, gives capital
juries, at the penalty phase, discrete and sequential functions.
Initially, capital juries serve as factfinders in determining
whether an alleged aggravating circumstance exists.  Once that
factual threshold is passed, the jurors exercise discretion in
determining the punishment that ought to be imposed.  The trial
judge in Shafer's case recognized the critical difference in the
two functions.  He charged that "[a] statutory aggravating
circumstance is a fact, an incident, a detail or an occurrence,"
the existence of which must be found beyond a reasonable
doubt. App. 203.  Turning to the sentencing choice, he referred
to considerations of "fairness and mercy," and the defendant's
"moral culpability."  App. 204.  He also instructed  that the jury
was free to decide "whether . . . for any reason or no reason at
all Mr. Shafer should be sentenced to life imprisonment rather
than to death."  App. 203.
* 
*
*
*
*
The jury, as aggravating circumstance factfinder,
exercises no sentencing discretion itself. If no aggravator is
found, the judge takes over and has sole authority to impose the
mandatory minimum so heavily relied upon by the South
Carolina Supreme Court. See supra, at 8-9, 12. It is only when
the jury endeavors the moral judgment whether to impose the
death penalty that parole eligibility may become critical. 
Shafer, 532 U.S. at 50-51, 121 S. Ct. at 1272-73, 149 L. Ed.2d at 191-92.
82
VIII
Oken’s final contention relies on  the semantic observations of the Borchardt dissent
when he argues that the plain language of the Maryland statute requires that we view the
weighing process as a “factfinding,” and, thus, subject to Apprendi.  The dissenters in
Borchardt wrote:
83
In light of the structure of the Maryland statute governing
imposition of the death penalty, and consistent with the language
in Johnson [v. State, 362 Md. 525, 529, 766 A.2d 93, 96 (2001)]
the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, pursuant to § 413 (h), clearly  exposes
a defendant to an increased potential range of punishment
beyond the mere conviction for first degree murder. 
In keeping with McMillan's [McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1986)] deference
to the legislative determination of the elements of a particular
crime, it is the particular structure of the Maryland statutes and
rules governing imposition of the death penalty that guides the
analysis of the requirements of due process under Apprendi.  In
enacting §§ 413 and 414 of the death penalty statute, the
General Assembly expressed an intention to base death
sentences in Maryland on a factual finding within the meaning
of Apprendi in two ways: first, by mandating that the sentencer
find that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators by a
preponderance of the evidence; and, second, by requiring that
the Court of Appeals review that factual finding for sufficiency
of the evidence. 
While ordinarily, the broad deference accorded to state
legislatures  in defining the elements of offenses under Winship
[In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368
(1970)] and its progeny results in state statutes being upheld
against the minimal requirements of due process, in the present
case, the way that the Maryland General Assembly has chosen
to define the death penalty procedures is precisely what
implicates and offends the strictures of the Due Process Clause.
The fact that the General Assembly prescribed a burden of proof
for the weighing process of § 413 (h) at all is the clearest
indication that the legislature envisioned this determination as
a factual finding. 
29 The dissent in Borchardt further noted:
Unlike most states that establish a punishment range of
life imprisonment to death for first degree murder and then
delegate to the sentencing authority the choice between the two
based upon a normative judgment, the Maryland statute
prescribes that the penalty for first degree murder is life
imprisonment, unless a series of additional conditions are met,
including the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances mandated by § 413.  See § 412 (b).  Death
sentences are then automatically reviewed by this Court for
sufficiency of the evidence.  See § 414 (e).  The General
Assembly could not have conceived of this sentencing
determination as the type of "purely judgmental" choice, see
maj. op. at 36, within a range of permissible sentences, like the
statutes at issue in Walton, etc., but rather established a death
sentence as an enhanced penalty based upon the establishment
of additional facts (namely, that there are aggravating
circumstances that outweigh mitigating circumstances) by a
particular standard of proof that is reviewable, as a matter of
law, at the appellate level.  It is this fact- finding process that
brings § 413 within the strictures of Apprendi and the Due
Process Clause, even though it is still an open question whether
statutes like the one upheld in Walton will survive Supreme
Court review after Apprendi. 
367 Md. at 161-62, 786 A.2d at 673.
84
367 Md at 156-57, 786 A.2d at 669-70.29  The dissent in Borchardt cited  no legislative
history or other authority to support its conclusory insights as to legislative intent.  That is
explained by the fact that  no such support exists.  A review of the relevant legislative history
indicates that neither the Legislature nor the Governor intended the meaning ascribed to the
words of the statute by the Borchardt dissent.
30 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976).
85
After we declared the Maryland death penalty unconstitutional in Blackwell for the
second time since Furman, our Legislature set about writing a new Maryland statute which
would conform with the Supreme Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence.  The fruit of those
efforts was Senate Bill (S.B.) 374 and House Bill (H.B.) 604 of 1978, which became the
current statute.  In 1977, a prior, related bill, S. B. 106, had been vetoed by then Governor
Marvin Mandel. Vol. II, Laws of Maryland 1977 at 3771.  A proper understanding of the
intent of the 1978 legislation requires consideration of both years’ efforts.
As Governor Mandel’s 1977 veto message regarding S.B. 106 explained, after our
decision in Blackwell, the Governor asked the Attorney General’s office to prepare a bill, as
an  Administration initiative, “that would conform to the underlying Constitutional
requirements, that would be free from ambiguity and interpretive problems, and that could
be effectively administered.”  Id at 3772.  The Legislature ultimately ignored the
Administration’s bill, and instead enacted S.B. 106, which Governor Mandel vetoed.
Attached to his veto was a letter from the State Law Department reviewing the bill adopted
by the Legislature.  The first two pages of that letter recite the Legislature’s concern with
creating a bifurcated procedure which would be in conformance with the requirements set
forth by the Supreme Court in Furman, Gregg, Jurek,30 and Proffitt, observing that “these
considerations were of paramount importance in the review of the presently existing
86
Maryland death penalty statute conducted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in its opinion
delivered on 9 November 1976, in Blackwell v. State.”  Id. at 3775.
The State Law Department’s letter makes perfectly clear what the Legislature’s
understanding of what would be required for a statute to pass constitutional muster.  The
analysis in the letter states:
From our previous analysis of the Supreme Court
decisions on capital punishment we may conclude that the states
have been afforded reasonable latitude in enacting laws relating
to the death penalty.  The statutes of Florida, Georgia and Texas
utilized three distinct and different procedures for imposition of
the death penalty and each was upheld.  Three broad
requirements run through the Supreme Court analysis of these
statues which govern the constitutional acceptability of a death
penalty statue, viz: (1) a bifurcated hearing on the issue of guilt
and penalty, (2) most importantly (and what we judge to be an
absolute prerequisite), a procedure which permits the sentencing
judge or jury to focus on both the circumstances of the offense
and the individual defendant, with the opportunity to consider
the character and record of the defendant with particular
reference to mitigating factors, and (3) meaningful appellate
review which permits a comparison of the sentence with the
penalties imposed in similar cases throughout the State.  Based
upon these factors we believe Senate Bill 106 meets these basic
requirements and would pass constitutional scrutiny on its face.
We must recognize that all death penalty or other
sentencing statutes could be found, in particular cases or classes
of cases, to have been unconstitutionally applied.  However,
with respect to Senate Bill 106, we believe that the statutory
directions to the sentencing authority to objectively consider the
nature of the offence (the aggravating circumstances), and more
importantly the mitigating factors applicable to the particular
person and to the circumstances of the criminal action in
question, provide the basic type of focus and guidance deemed
to be of the utmost importance by the Supreme Court.  Use of
87
the bifurcated proceeding with imposition of the death penalty
limited 
to 
those 
cases 
where 
specified 
aggravating
circumstances were established, coupled with provisions for a
trial court report and automatic, expedited appellate review,
represents the general scheme regarded by the Supreme Court as
preferable from the constitutional viewpoint.  Accordingly, we
conclude that Senate Bill 106 would, on its fact meet the
constitutional tests of Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and its
companion Supreme Court cases.
Id. at 3779-80 (emphasis added).
The State Law Department, however, did identify one problem with S.B. 106 that it
felt had constitutional dimensions, a problem which, as will be seen, was rectified in the 1978
statute.  The Department observed that:
A particularly significant problem is presented by the
failure of Senate Bill 106 to identify the standards or burden of
proof by which the jury or judge should determine the presence
of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, or the relative
balancing of the two, in order to reach a sentencing decision.
The statute is silent as to whether the State must prove the
existence of one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt, by clear and convincing evidence, by
substantial evidence, by a preponderance of the evidence, or by
some other standard.  Similarly, the statue does not deal with the
burden of proof applicable to a determination of whether one or
more mitigating circumstances are present.  Finally, assuming
one or more aggravating circumstances are demonstrated, by
whatever burden of proof is applied, and one or more mitigating
circumstances are established, by whatever burden of proof is
applied, the statute fails to tell us what standards should be
applied in weighing the aggravating against the mitigating
circumstances.
In this respect Senate Bill 106 shares a defect present in
the Florida statute, upheld  as facially constitutional in Proffitt
v. Florida, supra.  The Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
31 Footnote 20 of the Department’s letter notes that “The Florida pattern jury
instructions confirm the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for aggravating circumstances
but do not specifically deal with the standard applicable to mitigating circumstances or the
weighing process.”
32 Footnote 21 of the Department’s letter notes that the Bill proposed by the
Administration “specifically applied a beyond a reasonable doubt test as to the aggravating
circumstances and a preponderance of the evidence test as to mitigating circumstances and
the weighing process.”
88
Dixon, 283 So2d 1, 9 (1973) partially answered the burden of
proof question under the Florida law as follows:
“The aggravating circumstances of Fla.
Stat. Sec. 921.141(6) actually define those crimes
- when read in conjunction with Fla. Stat. Section
782.04(1) and 794.01(1) - to which the death
penalty is applicable in the absence of mitigating
circumstances.  As such they must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt before being
considered by judge or jury.”
The Court in Dixon went on to describe the process of weighing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances without truly defining
the quantum or weight of evidence or burden on either of the
parties to prove or disprove the existence of mitigating
circumstances or to show the at they do or do not outweigh any
aggravating circumstances found to exist.31  It may well be that
the Maryland Court of Appeals would follow the holding in
State v. Dixon that the aggravating circumstances must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and we consider such a result
likely if not certain.  While we incline towards the view that the
burden of proof with respect to mitigating circumstances and the
weighing process will be some lesser standard, we cannot
predict with any degree of certainty just what standard the
Maryland Court of Appeals may ultimately require.32  Just as we
are left to speculate, so too will trial court judges, as they
preside over capital punishment trials - at least until the first
occasion on which the Court of Appeals addresses the question.
Until that question is definitively resolved, as it should have
been in Senate Bill 106, trial court judges will proceed to
33 Footnote 22 of the Department’s report observes: “We cannot say with any degree
of certainty that the Court of Appeals, in conjunction with the Rules Committee, would
consider adopting pattern jury instructions for statewide application on the burden of proof
and other matters pertinent to capital punishment trials.  The Court of Appeals might well
feel that it lacks the power to adopt a rule governing a substantive matter such as the burden
of proof in a capital sentencing proceeding, and even if it felt it possessed the power to adopt
such a rule, it might well choose not to do so but to simply await the presentation of the issue
in a case brought up on appeal.
89
fashion jury instruction which they believe to be appropriate
and will apply the burdens and standards which they believe are
applicable to their own sentencing decision, but they will do so
at some risk.  There is no assurance whatsoever that one trial
judge will adopt the same burdens of proof and instructions as
another trial judge, and it is distinctly possible that defendants
will be tried in various jurisdictions throughout the State under
different burdens of proof and different jury instructions.  While
this may all be resolved on day by the Court of Appeals, the
uncertainty which will exist in the meantime, and the uneven
application of the death penalty statute which is likely to occur,
will hardly be conductive to the kind of fair and evenhanded
administration of a capital punishment law which the Supreme
Court has set forth as the constitutional objective which must be
pursued by a valid statutory scheme.33
Id. at 3793-95 (emphasis added).  
As noted, S.B. 106 was vetoed by Governor  Mandel.  The next year, his successor,
Governor Blair Lee III, signed into law the successor legislation.  In a letter, dated 24 January
1978, then Maryland Attorney General Francis B. Burch advised Governor Lee as to the
constitutionality of the new law.  After discussing the focus of the Bill in conforming to the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Furman, Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt, the Attorney General
concluded, at pp. 10-11:
90
As we have previously noted, the General Assembly did
not enact the Administration Bill at its last session, but did enact
Senate Bill 106 which was another attempt to provide for the
death penalty as an optional sentence for certain types of first
degree murder.  Following consideration of an exhaustive
analysis of the bill by this office, Governor Mandel vetoed
Senate Bill 106, not because of his or our belief that it was
facially unconstitutional or that it failed to meet the broad
outlines set forth by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,
supra and its companion cases, but rather because of the serious
ambiguities and uncertainties contained in Senate Bill 106, as
amended, which would have inevitably resulted in substantial
litigation and consequent delay in the actual implementation of
the Bill.  As we noted in our opinion to Governor Mandel, the
very infrequency of imposition could serve to reduce its efficacy
as a deterrent force and create a constitutional deficiency.  See
the veto message of Governor Mandel, Vol. II, Laws of
Maryland 1977, p. 3771.
The one question which concerned us the most with
respect to Senate Bill 106 was its failure to identify the
applicable burdens of proof by which the jury or judge should
determine the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances as well as the relative balancing of the two.  We
also identified the following other significant concerns in our
analysis of Senate Bill 106 as amended: (1) the uncertainties
surrounding the result in the event of a “hung jury” at the
sentencing proceeding, (2) the lack of a clear requirement for
pretrial notification that the State will seek the death penalty
with specific reference to each aggravating circumstance on
which it will rely; and (3) the potential uncertainty surrounding
the degree of specificity required of the jury in giving its
recommendation.  Since Senate Bill 106 was patterned closely
after the Florida statute, we believe that the extensive judicial
interpretation of that statute by the Florida courts played a great
part in the Supreme Court’s approval of that capital punishment
statute.  There had been, of course, no such period of judicial
interpretation in Maryland and we foresaw delays in the
implementation of the statute while the interpretive questions
were considered seriatim by the Court of Appeals.
91
Both Governor Mandel and I suggested last spring that
the legislature should consider a death penalty statute which is
both facially constitutional and more precise than Senate Bill
106, as amended, at the next (this year’s) session of the General
Assembly.  I believe that the new Administration Bill (pre-filed
Senate Bill 371 and House Bill 604) meets these criteria and will
rectify the difficulties which we noted in our analysis of last
year’s Senate Bill 106.
Far from supporting the contentions of the Borchardt dissent that weighing was
intended to be “a factual finding within the meaning of Apprendi,” this history reveals
exactly the opposite intent.  The requirements for mandatory review were deemed necessary
by the Supreme Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence, viewed as requiring automatic and
meaningful appellate review,  nothing more.  As for weighing, the legislative history makes
clear that the intention behind supplying a standard at all was an attempt to insure that the
statute would be applied in a consistent manner between the various county circuit courts of
the State, thus frustrating inconsistences in application which would violate the post-Furman
requirements and result in successful Eighth Amendment attacks on the statute.  
IX
Our review of the Constitutional requirements set forth by the Supreme Court’s post-
Furman jurisprudence, as well as the legislative history of the modern iterations of the
Maryland death penalty statute, leads us to conclude that the Sixth Amendment requirements
of Apprendi and Ring must be viewed within the context of the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence to which the Maryland statutes were designed to conform.  It is
beyond dispute that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence approves the use
92
of a bifurcated system where sentencing is separate from trial and conviction.  It is equally
beyond dispute that the sentencing process itself is a bifurcated proceeding involving an
eligibility phase and a selection phase, each of which operates within a separate and distinct
constitutional jurisprudence.  It is within this framework that the Sixth Amendment
requirements of Ring must be viewed.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated, as has the legislative history of the
Maryland statute, that it is the finding of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances
which makes a convicted defendant death-eligible.  It is this finding which performs the
function of narrowing the class of eligible defendants as required by Furman.  By reverse
implication, it is also this finding which exposes the convicted defendant to the statutory
maximum.  Ring, which by its terms addresses only the finding of aggravating circumstances,
makes clear that these are opposite sides of the same coin.  We therefore conclude that the
selection phase of the sentencing process, involving weighing, is not affected by the
requirements of Ring.
We also conclude that the Maryland death penalty statute cannot be read to be
implicated by Ring under any theory of legislative interpretation.  The legislative history
indicates that the weighing process never was intended to be a component of a “fact finding”
process required to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants.  Rather, the history shows
that the Legislature and Governor understood that the finding of an aggravating circumstance
alone performed that Furman requirement.  Far from being designed to further refine the
93
class of death-eligible defendants, the assignment of a standard to the weighing process was
intended to protect the statute from Constitutional attack by such defendants.
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 89CR3102
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 117
September Term, 2002
____________________________________
STEVEN HOWARD OKEN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
____________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J., in which
Bell, C.J. and Eldridge, J., join
____________________________________
Filed:    November 17, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.  
 
1The majority opinion cites to the Maryland Code as it existed prior to the 2002
recodification.  Maj. op. at 14.  For consistency, I will do the same.  Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references are to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum.
Supp.), Article 27.
2Future references to the sentencing authority will be to a jury, with the recognition
that the defendant may waive the right to have the sentence determined by a jury and may
elect to have the court sentence.  See Art. 27. § 413 (b)(3)(k)(3).
Raker, J., with whom Bell, C.J. and Eldridge, J., join, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the portion of Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 413(h)1 that provides that punishment shall be
death if the sentencing authority2 finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors by a preponderance of the evidence violates due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  I adhere to my views expressed in the dissent in
Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting, joined by Bell,
C.J. and Eldridge, J.), stating that the sentencing authority must find that aggravating factors
outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and not by a preponderance of the
evidence.  I would sever the unconstitutional portion of the statute, require the reasonable
doubt standard to be applied as a matter of law, and vacate appellant’s sentence of death
imposed pursuant to § 413. 
Summary of Discussion
Under the Maryland death penalty scheme, the State must give notice of an intent to
seek the death penalty and allege in that notice, the existence of a statutory aggravating
-2-
factor.  With the exception of a contract murder and the killing of a law enforcement officer,
the jury must find that the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
was a principal in the first degree. The jury must find that the State has proven, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one aggravating factor.  The jury must also find
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.  The statute states that the
sentence shall be death if the jury finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors by a preponderance of the evidence.  This finding is a necessary predicate to the
imposition of a sentence of death.  In my view, the jury must find this last and ultimate
“finding” beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), in the
framework of the Maryland death penalty statute, mandate that the jury must find that
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and not by a mere
preponderance of the evidence.  Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490,
120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455.  Ring made clear that Apprendi applied to death
penalty proceedings, reasoning that “[c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants
. . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
-3-
increase in their maximum punishment.”  Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S. Ct. at 2432, 153 L.
Ed. 2d at 564.
The maximum sentence for first degree murder in Maryland is life imprisonment.  Life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole and death are enhanced penalties and may not
be imposed unless the State meets the statutory requirements justifying enhancement.  The
Maryland statutory scheme requires that before a sentence of death may be imposed, the jury
must make certain additional findings beyond the finding of guilt of the murder.  Those
findings increase the maximum penalty from life to death.
The plain language of the Maryland death penalty statute requires certain findings
during the weighing stage as an absolute precondition for the imposition of the death penalty,
a determination on which the Maryland General Assembly conditioned an increase in the
penalty from life imprisonment to death.  These findings are, at a minimum, partially factual
and are quintessentially Apprendi type findings, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
I.  Maryland Death Penalty Statute
The penalty for first degree murder in Maryland is “death, imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.”  § 412(b).  The sentence shall be
imprisonment for life unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with § 413.  Id.
The statute mandates that the jury first consider and 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether
any alleged aggravating circumstances exist.  § 413(d) & (f).  The jury must then consider
3Maryland is regarded as a “weighing” state.
-4-
and find, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether one or more mitigating circumstances
exist.  § 413(g).  Finally, the jury must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence,
whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.3  § 413(h)(1).
If the jury finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances,
“the sentence shall be death.” § 413(h)(2).  The trial court is then instructed to impose a
sentence as decided by the jury. § 414(k)(1).  After sentence is imposed, Maryland Rule 4-
343(k) requires the trial judge to promptly prepare, send to the parties, and file with the Clerk
of the Court of Appeals a report in the form prescribed by the Rule, including a
recommendation of the trial court as to whether imposition of a death sentence is justified.
The statute requires the Court of Appeals to review the imposition of the death penalty and,
inter alia, to determine “[w]hether the evidence supports the jury’s or court’s finding that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” § 414(e)(3) (emphasis
added).
II.  Borchardt v. State
In Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001), a divided Court held that the
Maryland death penalty scheme does not run afoul of Apprendi and that the statute passes
constitutional muster.  The Court rejected appellant’s arguments in that case on three
grounds: (1) that Apprendi did not apply to capital sentencing schemes; (2) that the maximum
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penalty for first degree murder in Maryland was death and that Borchardt did not receive a
sentence in excess of the statutory maximum; and (3) that Apprendi is inapplicable to the
weighing of aggravators against mitigators because the process is a purely judgmental one
and the weighing process is a sentencing factor.  In rejecting appellant’s arguments in
Borchardt, the majority reasoned as follows:
“Perhaps the easiest answer lies in the unequivocal statement by
the Apprendi majority that its decision did not render invalid
State capital sentencing schemes, such as approved in Walton,
that allowed the judge, not sitting as the trier of fact, to find and
weigh specific aggravating factors.  If it is permissible under
Apprendi for the law to remove that fact-finding and fact-
weighing process entirely from the jury and leave it to the judge
as a legitimate sentencing factor, without specifying a
reasonable doubt standard, it can hardly be impermissible for a
jury that has found the prerequisite aggravating factors beyond
a reasonable doubt to apply a preponderance standard in
weighing them against any mitigating circumstances.  The
Walton scheme, in other words, is in far greater direct conflict
with the underpinning of Apprendi than the Maryland approach.
Thus, if the aggravating circumstances do not constitute
elements of the offense or serve to increase the maximum
punishment for the offense in the Walton context, they cannot
reasonably be found to have that status under the Maryland law.
If Apprendi renders the Maryland law unconstitutional, then,
perforce, it likely renders most of the capital punishment laws
in the country unconstitutional.  We cannot conceive that the
Supreme Court, especially in light of its contrary statement,
intended such a dramatic result to flow from a case that did not
even involve a capital punishment law.”
Id. at 121-22, 786 A.2d at 649 (footnote omitted).  
That reasoning was wrong.  The majority acknowledges that it was wrong.  See maj.
op. at 75, 76.  As a result, the foundation of the majority’s reasoning set out in Borchardt no
-6-
longer exists.  In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S. Ct. at 2432, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 564,
the Supreme Court expressly overruled Walton because the reasoning in Apprendi is
“irreconcilable” with the holding in Walton.
The majority continues to rely on the third Borchardt prong—the only one the
majority finds to survive Ring.  See maj. op. at 79.  The majority maintains that “the weighing
process is purely a judgmental one, of balancing the mitigator[s] against the aggravator[s]
to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment in the particular case.  This is a
process that not only traditionally, but quintessentially is a pure and Constitutionally
legitimate sentencing factor, one that does not require a determination to be made beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  Maj. op. at 26-27 (quoting Borchardt, 367 Md. at 126-27, 787 A.2d at
652).
III.  Ring v. Arizona and Apprendi v. New Jersey
Ring and Apprendi entitle a capital defendant to a jury determination of the facts on
which eligibility for a death sentence is predicated.  In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct.
at 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455 (2000), the Supreme Court held that regardless of the
labeling by a State, “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The Court made clear that “the relevant inquiry is
one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
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punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”  Id. at 494, 120 S. Ct. at 2365,
147 L. Ed. 2d at 457.
In Ring, the Supreme Court held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional
because under that statute, a judge, rather than a jury, was required to determine the existence
of an aggravating factor, thereby making the factual findings prerequisite to the imposition
of the death penalty following a jury determination of a defendant’s guilt of first degree
murder.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 576-77.  The Court held
that the Arizona statute violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.  Id.
The Court expressly overruled Walton in favor of Apprendi’s Sixth Amendment approach,
reasoning that “[c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants . . . are entitled to
a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment.”  Id. at 589, 122 S. Ct. at 2432, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 564.  The Court
concluded that the Arizona statute was invalid because the “enumerated aggravating factors
operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’” and therefore “the
Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”  Id. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, 153
L. Ed. 2d at 577 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 n.19, 147 L.
Ed. 2d at 457 n.19).
Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion in Borchardt that Apprendi has no
application to death penalty sentencing proceedings, the Supreme Court applied the Apprendi
holding that “the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be ‘expose[d] . . . to a
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penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected
in the jury verdict alone.’”  Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89, 122 S. Ct. at 2432, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 564
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S. Ct. at 2359, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 450).
The Ring Court pointed out that every fact that the legislature requires before death
may be imposed be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court reiterated that “the
dispositive question . . . ‘is one not of form, but of effect.’”  Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.
Ct. at 2439, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 572 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S. Ct. at 2365, 147
L. Ed. 2d at 457).  The Court stated:
“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no
matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
IV.  Application of Ring/Apprendi
The weighing portion of Maryland’s death penalty law violates due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because the balancing serves as an absolute
prerequisite finding to a death sentence and, thus, must be subject to the reasonable doubt
4I need not recount the history of the rule announced in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), that due process requires that every fact necessary
to the crime charged be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1975) through Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,
119 S. Ct. 1215, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999) and Apprendi and Ring.  See also Borchardt, 367
Md. at 151-52, 786 A.2d at 667 (Raker, J., dissenting); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 550-51,
499 A.2d 1261, 1294 (1985) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) (reasoning that “the basic principles
of [due process as explicated in] Winship, Mullaney and Patterson require[] that the burden
of persuasion on this ultimate issue must be upon the State, and the jury must be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances before the penalty of death can be imposed”).
-9-
standard.4  Accordingly, under Ring and Apprendi, the trier of fact must find that the
aggravating outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
A defendant does not become death-eligible under the Maryland statutory scheme
until the jury finds that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators.  Under the Maryland statute,
the weighing process includes the jury determination that the ultimate penalty of death is the
appropriate sentence.  Until the jury makes this finding, the defendant is not eligible for a
sentence of death.
The maximum penalty for first degree murder in Maryland is life imprisonment; death
or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are enhanced sentences for first degree
murder, and are dependent upon special circumstances.  See maj. op. at 75; Borchardt, 367
Md. at 154-55, 786 A.2d at 668-69 (Raker, J., dissenting); Johnson v. State, 362 Md. 525,
529, 766 A.2d 93, 95 (2001).  It is the jury finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances that increases the penalty for first degree murder in Maryland
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.  See Johnson, 362 Md. at 529, 766 A.2d at 95
-10-
(holding that “basic sentence” for first degree murder is life imprisonment and that life
without parole and death are enhanced penalties); Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 520, 671 A.2d
495, 498 (1996) (holding that maximum penalty for first degree murder is life imprisonment).
Because the default penalty for first degree murder in Maryland is life imprisonment, a jury’s
determination that aggravating circumstance[s] outweigh mitigating circumstance[s] is an
additional finding beyond that of guilt that serves to make a defendant eligible for the
enhanced penalty of death.  Ring and Apprendi require that such a finding be made beyond
a reasonable doubt.
It is the unique structure of the Maryland death penalty statute that distinguishes the
statute from many others, if not all, in the country.  Under Maryland law, jurors are
factfinders throughout the entire sentencing procedure.  Before the sentencing commences,
a defendant must be found guilty of first degree murder and at least one aggravating
circumstance must be alleged.  The State must then present evidence supporting the
aggravating circumstance[s].  The jury then engages in a three-step process and proceeds to
each succeeding phase of that process only after it makes findings with respect to the
preceding phase.  First, the jurors must find at least one aggravating circumstance
unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, the jury determines the existence vel non
of any mitigating circumstances, based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.  Third
and finally, the jury weighs the aggravating against the mitigating circumstances.  Thus,
before a defendant is eligible for the death penalty in Maryland, the jury must determine that
-11-
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  Included within that
determination is the conclusion that death is the appropriate sentence.
Section 413 permits the jury to find as a mitigating circumstance, in addition to those
enumerated in § 413(g)(1)-(7), “[a]ny other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets
forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case.”  § 413(g)(8).  This
provision, known as the “catchall” provision, permits a jury to extend mercy, if it is so
inclined.  See Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 756, 506 A.2d 580, 615 (1986).  We stated
in Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 474-75, 499 A.2d 1236, 1254 (1985), that the jury,
“unconvinced that death is appropriate, may list as a mitigating circumstance whatever factor
or factors may have led to this conclusion, irrespective of what the defendant produced or
argued.  If the sentencing authority perceives anything relating to the defendant or the crime
which causes it to believe that death may not be appropriate, it may treat such factor as a
mitigating circumstance and decide that it outweighs the aggravating circumstances.”
Ring describes a substantive element of a capital offense as one which makes an
increase in authorized punishment contingent on a finding of fact.  Using this description,
the substantive elements of capital murder in Maryland are the jury’s finding of the
aggravating circumstance[s] necessary to support a capital sentence and the fact that the
aggravators outweigh the mitigators.  It is the latter finding, that aggravators outweigh
mitigators, including the determination that death is appropriate, that ultimately authorizes
jurors to consider and then to impose a sentence of death.  That is, the increase in punishment
-12-
from life imprisonment to the death penalty is contingent on the factual finding that the
aggravators outweigh the mitigators.  Under the statute, then, when the jury finds that the
aggravating outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the defendant is exposed to an increased
potential range of punishment beyond that for a conviction for first degree murder.  See
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2419, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524, 544
(2002) (plurality opinion) (“Read together, McMillan and Apprendi mean that those facts
setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements
of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis.”) (emphasis added).  It is evident
by reading § 413 and § 414 that the Legislature intended to base a death sentence on a factual
finding, first by mandating that the jury find that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators by
a specific burden of proof, i.e., by a preponderance of the evidence, and second, by requiring
that this Court review that finding for sufficiency of the evidence.
Step three, the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, in my view, is a
factual determination.  Unless, and until, the jury finds that the aggravating factor[s]
outweigh the mitigating factor[s], the defendant is not eligible for the death penalty.  Because
it is a factual determination which raises the maximum penalty from life to death, Ring
requires that the standard be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Three aspects of the statute show that all three steps in the Maryland death penalty
scheme are factual in nature.  First, the Legislature has provided for a burden of proof in the
weighing process.  Second, this Court is mandated to review the jury finding of death for
-13-
sufficiency of the evidence.  Finally, the repeated use of the word “find” suggests the
determination of an observable fact, see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 852
(1961) (defining “finding” as “the result of a judicial or quasi-judicial examination or inquiry
especially into matters of fact as embodied in the verdict of a jury or decision of a court,
referee, or administrative body”).
A standard of proof has commonly been applied to factual findings.  See Olsen v.
State, 67 P.3d 536, 589 (Wyo. 2003) (stating that the language of the statute “that
aggravating circumstances be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigating
circumstances be proved by a preponderance of the evidence references burdens assigned to
factual issues”) (emphasis added).  The prescription by the General Assembly of a specific
burden of proof, ordinarily reserved for factual findings, is the clearest indication that the
Legislature envisioned this determination as a factual finding.
The burden of proof consists of two components: the burden of going forward and the
burden of persuasion.  McCormick on Evidence describes the term as follows: “One burden
is that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in issue.  The
second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true.”  McCormick
on Evidence § 336, at 409 (Strong 5th ed. 1999) (footnote omitted).  In the context of the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we refer to the burden of persuasion.
In the ordinary civil case, “proof by a preponderance, seems to be proof which leads the jury
to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”  Id.
-14-
at 422.  The clear-and-convincing burden of persuasion has been described to mean that a
fact is “proved” only if the evidence leads the factfinder to the conclusion that the truth of
the contention is highly probable.  Id. at 425.  As expressed by Justice Harlan, in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 378 (1970) (concurring
opinion), the expression of a “choice of the standard for a particular variety of adjudication
does . . . reflect a very fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous
factual determinations.”  In discussing the function of a standard of proof, he further noted:
“[A] standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions
for a particular type of adjudication.  Although the phrases
‘preponderance of the evidence’ and ‘proof beyond a reasonable
doubt’ are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate to the
finder of fact different notions concerning the degree of
confidence he is expected to have in the correctness of his
factual conclusions.”
Id. at 370, 90 S. Ct. at 1076, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 379 (emphasis added). 
 
The Maryland Legislature, in providing for a specific burden of proof, recognized that
the weighing process was a factual finding, at least in part, that could be satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence standard.  This statute was enacted before the Supreme Court
spoke in Apprendi and in Ring.  If the majority’s view is correct, and the weighing
determination is not susceptible of a burden of proof and is merely a judgment call, why
would the Legislature have provided for any particular burden of proof?  As to the two
burdens, Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court observed:
-15-
“The ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard may, of course, be
considered similar in its function to proof by a preponderance of
evidence, i.e., both standards are used to resolve factual
disputes.”
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 275 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).  The majority characterizes
Oken’s contention regarding “factfinding” as merely semantics.  See maj. op. at 82.  The
majority is resorting to form over substance and relying on labels to avoid the application of
Ring and Apprendi.
The Maryland Legislature has provided for automatic review by the Court of Appeals
of the jury’s sentence of death for “sufficiency of the evidence.”  § 414.  The Legislature
could not have conceived of the death penalty sentencing determination as a “purely
judgmental choice” if it provided for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, a
traditional review of findings of fact.  The Legislature established the sentence of death as
an enhanced penalty, to be imposed upon the establishment of additional facts (with the
ultimate factual finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors) by a
particular standard of proof that is reviewable, as a matter of law, at the appellate level.
Commentators recognize that balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances
is a factfinding process.  For example:
“Although there are many variations among the capital
sentencing statutes currently in existence, most of these statutes
employ a common, tripartite factfinding process that involves
the sentencer’s making factual findings on three different issues:
the existence of aggravating circumstances; the existence of
mitigating aspects of the defendant’s character, record, or
offense; and whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh
-16-
the mitigating circumstances.  The portion of this tripartite
structure that has been the central focus of Sixth Amendment
scrutiny up to this point has been the first prong: factfinding on
the existence of aggravating circumstances.  This was the
factfinding determination that the now-overruled Walton
decision and its jurisprudentially linked predecessor, Hildwin,
deemed suitable for a judge.  And it is the factfinding
determination that Ring, in overruling Walton, reserved for the
jury.  In the wake of Ring, the inevitable next questions for
resolution are whether the Ring rationale requires a jury also to
make the second and third factfinding determinations—the
determination of the existence of mitigating circumstances and
the assessment whether aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances.”
B. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the
Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 1091, 1121 (2003) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted) (hereinafter Stevenson).  See also id. at 1129 n.214 (recognizing that balancing of
aggravating against mitigating factors is a factual finding: “In Alabama, as in Arizona and
Florida, defendants are not eligible for the death penalty unless a factfinding is made that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.  Ala. Code §13A-5-46(e)(2)
(2003) (providing that if jury determines that aggravating circumstances do not outweigh
mitigating circumstances, jury ‘shall’ return advisory verdict recommending life
imprisonment without parole)”).
Noting the tripartite nature of the Arizona death penalty statute, Professor Stevenson
argues that the Ring reasoning as to the first determination, the finding of an aggravating
factor, applies equally to the other two determinations.  He reasons as follows:
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“All of the features of the aggravation finding that the Ring
Court regarded as significant are equally true of the two other
components of the tripartite sentencing determination.  Arizona
law conditions a death sentence upon not just a finding of an
aggravating circumstance, but also a determination—after
identification of any mitigating circumstances in the case—of
whether the ‘“mitigating circumstances [are] sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency.”’  Thus, as the Ring Court itself
remarked, a defendant cannot ‘be sentenced to death [under
Arizona law] . . . unless [these] further findings [are] made.’
Indeed, the statutory feature that the Ring Court deemed
essential to rejecting the state’s characterization of Arizona law
as treating a conviction of first-degree murder as sufficient
authorization for a death sentence—that the first-degree murder
statute itself cross-referenced the aggravation finding as a
necessary additional predicate for a sentence of death—applies
equally to the other two findings.  The statutory cross-reference
is not merely to the provision governing the finding of
aggravating circumstances:  It references the entire tripartite
structure for determining the existence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and gauging their relative weight.”
Id. at 1126-27 (footnotes omitted).  Inasmuch as the Maryland statute requires that the
aggravators outweigh the mitigators as an essential predicate for imposition of the death
penalty, the central reasoning of Ring should apply.
Other states have concluded that Ring/Apprendi applies to the balancing process in
death cases and, as a result, have held that due process requires that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  Recently,
the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that a balancing of aggravating factors and
mitigating factors can go to a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty.  In Woldt v.
People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003), following Ring, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded
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that the Colorado death penalty statute, like the Arizona statute, improperly assigned a
factfinding role to a judge in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  Noting that “[i]n a weighing
state, the trier of fact must weigh the aggravating factors against all the mitigating evidence
to determine if the defendant is eligible for death . . . A standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt applies to eligibility fact-finding.”  Id. at 263.  The Colorado statute has four steps,
with the third step the weighing one.  The court noted that “[t]hrough the first three steps,
Colorado’s process resembles a weighing state.  ‘The eligibility phase continues through step
three, when the jury weighs mitigating evidence against statutory aggravators .’” Id. at 264
(citation omitted).  The fourth step, determining whether under all the circumstances, death
should be imposed, is the selection stage.  The court held that “[b]ecause the Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury find any facts necessary to make a defendant eligible for the
death penalty, and the first three steps of [the statute], required judges to make findings of
fact that render a defendant eligible for death, the statute under which Woldt and Martinez
received their death sentences is unconstitutional on its face.”  Id. at 266-67.  The court found
the balancing stage to be a factfinding stage, required to be determined by a jury and beyond
a reasonable doubt as required under Ring.  Id. at 265.
In Maryland, the weighing stage includes elements of eligibility and selection.  In that
single stage, in concluding that aggravators outweigh mitigators, the jury is both weighing
the factors and also determining whether death is appropriate.
5In Missouri, step four of the statute requires the jury to assess and declare the
punishment at life imprisonment if it decides under all of the circumstances not to assess and
declare the punishment at death.  Step four in Missouri gives the jury the discretion to give
a life sentence.  Under the Maryland statute, the Missouri steps three and four are collapsed
into one step—step three.  Thus, step three in Maryland is a factual finding.
-19-
Missouri considered the question of whether the principles set out in Ring invalidated
a death sentence when a judge made the factual determinations on which eligibility for the
death sentence was predicated in State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003).  Step three
of the Missouri statute requires the jury to determine whether the evidence in mitigation
outweighs the evidence in aggravation.  Id. at 259.  Like the Maryland statute, “[i]f it does,
the defendant is not eligible for death, and the jury must return a sentence of life
imprisonment.  While the State once more argues that this merely calls for the jury to offer
its subjective and discretionary opinion rather than to make a factual finding, this Court again
disagrees.” Id.  The court held that steps one, two, and three (similar to the Maryland steps)
“require factual findings that are prerequisites to the trier of fact’s determination that a
defendant is death-eligible.”  Id. at 261.5  The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the state’s
argument that the finding merely required a subjective finding by the trier of fact, noting as
follows:
“But, the State fails to note that this Court rejected this very
argument in its opinion on Mr. Whitfield’s appeal of his initial
conviction, in which it remanded for the new trial at issue here.
In that decision, this Court held that step 2 requires a ‘finding of
fact by the jury, not a discretionary decision.’  Whitfield, 837
S.W.2d at 515.  This holding is supported by the plain language
of the statute.  In order to fulfill its duty, the trier of fact is
required to make a case-by-case factual determination based on
-20-
all the aggravating facts the trier of fact finds are present in the
case.  This is necessarily a determination to be made on the facts
of each case.  Accordingly, under Ring, it is not permissible for
a judge to make this factual determination.  The jury is required
to determine whether the statutory and other aggravators shown
by the evidence warrants the imposition of death.”
Id. at 259 (emphasis omitted).
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court, in Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002),
held that the weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances is in part a factual
determination falling within the Ring rubric.  The court stated:
“Moreover, Nevada statutory law requires two distinct findings
to render a defendant death-eligible: ‘The jury or the panel of
judges may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least
one aggravating circumstance and further finds that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances found.’  This second finding
regarding mitigating circumstances is necessary to authorize the
death penalty in Nevada, and we conclude that it is in part a
factual determination, not merely discretionary weighing.  So
even though Ring expressly abstained from ruling on any ‘Sixth
Amendment claim with respect to mitigating circumstances,’ we
conclude that Ring requires a jury to make this finding as well:
‘If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no
matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.’”
Id. at 460 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Wyoming, a weighing state like Maryland, recently addressed the burden of
persuasion on the process of weighing aggravating factors against mitigating factors under
the state’s death penalty statute.  See Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536 (Wyo. 2003).  The
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Wyoming statute does not assign a specific burden in directing the jury to “consider
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  Id. at 587.  Nonetheless, the court directed that
the jury should be instructed that before the sentence may be death, each juror “must be
persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the
mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of a life sentence.”  Id. at 588.  The
court went on to state that the burden of proof in a capital case necessary for a sentence of
death remains on the state, and that if the jury is to be instructed to “weigh,” the defendant
must produce evidence of mitigating circumstances.  Id. at 589.  The court concluded that,
“just as with affirmative defenses, the ultimate burden of negating such defenses by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the State.”  Id. at 589 n.12.  See also State v. Rizzo,
266 Conn. 171, 236, 2003 Conn. LEXIS 394, at *99 (Conn. Oct. 14, 2003) (noting that
“Imposing the reasonable doubt standard on the weighing process, moreover, fulfills all of
the functions of burdens of persuasion.  By instructing the jury that its level of certitude in
arriving at the outcome of the weighing process must meet the demanding standard of beyond
a reasonable doubt, we minimize the risk of error, and we communicate both to the jury and
to society at large the importance that we place on the awesome decision of whether a
convicted capital felon shall live or die.”).
Finally, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915 (Ariz. 2003), on
remand from the Supreme Court, rejected the state’s argument that the Arizona death penalty
statute requiring a judge to weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances did not
6Footnote 4 in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597-98, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2437, 153 L.
Ed. 2d 556, 569, makes clear that the weighing process was not before the Court.  The Court
stated:
“Ring’s claim is tightly delineated:  He contends only that the
Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating
circumstances asserted against him.  No aggravating
circumstance related to past convictions in his case; Ring
therefore does not challenge Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, which held that the fact of prior conviction may be found
(continued...)
-22-
require a factual determination.  The Arizona court, in concluding that Ring required that
finding to be made by a jury, necessarily concluded that the determination was a factual one.
Id. at 942-43.
V.  The Majority’s “Eligibility” Distinction
The majority maintains that “Ring only implicates the finding of aggravating
circumstances, and not the process of weighing aggravating against mitigating factors.”  Maj.
op. at 27.  It is correct that the Ring Court did not address specifically the issue of whether,
in weighing the aggravators against the mitigators, Apprendi applies or whether the jury must
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt before death may be imposed.  The Court did not
do so, however, most likely because Ring did not argue anything with respect to mitigators
or balancing.  Ring presented a “tightly delineated” claim, Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4, 122 S.
Ct. at 2437 n.4, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 569 n.4, raising only the question of whether a trial judge,
sitting alone, could determine the presence or absence of the aggravating factors required by
Arizona law for imposition of the death penalty.6  Ring, 536 U.S. at 588, 122 S. Ct. at 2432,
(...continued)
by the judge even if it increases the statutory maximum
sentence.  He makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to
mitigating circumstances.  Nor does he argue that the Sixth
Amendment required the jury to make the ultimate
determination whether to impose the death penalty.  He does not
question the Arizona Supreme Court’s authority to reweigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances after that court struck
one aggravator.  Finally, Ring does not contend that his
indictment was constitutionally defective.”
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
-23-
153 L. Ed. 2d at 563.  Ring argued that the Arizona death penalty statute violated the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments because it entrusted to a judge the finding of a fact raising the
defendant’s maximum penalty from life to death.  Id. at 595, 122 S. Ct. at 2436, 153 L. Ed.
2d at 568.  Nonetheless, Ring set out the general principles that courts must apply in deciding
what issues may be decided by a judge and those for which a defendant is entitled to a jury
determination, as well as the applicability of the higher reasonable doubt standard at least as
to the finding of aggravators.  Moreover, as noted earlier, on remand, the Arizona Supreme
Court rejected the contention that the requirement that mitigating circumstances be
considered and weighed against aggravators was not a factual predicate for imposition of the
death penalty.  See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d at 942-43.
The majority’s thesis rests upon the view that due process only requires the finding
of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and not the process of weighing
aggravating against mitigating factors.  See maj. op. at 27 (stating that “Ring only implicates
the finding of aggravating circumstances, and not the process of weighing aggravating
-24-
against mitigating factors”).  It is the majority’s view that the Supreme Court death penalty
jurisprudence requiring the reasonable doubt standard applies only to the part of the
sentencing process which makes a defendant death-eligible, as opposed to those elements
involved in selecting those death-eligible defendants who will be actually sentenced to death.
The majority concludes that the selection process, that which determines whether in the
judgment of the jury, the death penalty should be applied, may constitutionally be determined
based on the preponderance of the evidence.  See maj. op. at 29-30.
The majority’s sole focus is upon the eligibility phase of the sentencing process.  The
majority concludes that “the [Supreme] Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and its
holding in Ring make clear, it is the finding of an aggravating circumstance, and only the
finding of an aggravating circumstance, which makes a defendant death-eligible.”  Maj. op.
at 77.  The majority recognizes that “states must specify aggravating factors in order to direct
and limit the sentencing authority’s discretion as to the class of convicted defendants to
which the death penalty may apply.”  See maj. op. at 39.
The Supreme Court’s discussion of eligibility versus selection arose in the context of
the Court’s requirement that a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty.  The Supreme Court has stated that the cruel and
unusual prohibition of the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing the death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  Accordingly, the sentencing authority must
be provided with standards which will genuinely narrow the class of crimes and the persons
-25-
against whom the death penalty is imposed by allowing it to make an individualized
determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the
crime.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-80, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2743-44, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235,
250-51 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2940-41, 49 L. Ed.
2d 859, 893 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293-94, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2754-55, 33
L. Ed. 2d 346, 380-81 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The majority ignores several important considerations.  First, the majority
underestimates the impact and reach of Ring.  It has been said of Ring v. Arizona that it is
“clearly the most significant death penalty decision of the U.S. Supreme Court since the
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972),
invalidating the death penalty schemes of virtually all states.”  Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d
693 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J., concurring).  Ring has been called a “monumental decision
that will have extensive implications across the country.”  Note, The Death Penalty and the
Sixth Amendment: How Will the System Look After Ring v. Arizona?, 77 St. John’s L. Rev.
371, 399 (2003).  Ring discusses the death penalty for the first time within the framework of
the Sixth Amendment.  It has been suggested that the Supreme Court’s overruling of Walton
raises questions about the viability of earlier capital cases.  See Stevenson, supra, at 1111,
1122 (noting that “A central difficulty in resolving these second-stage issues is that the
jurisprudential tools that one would naturally use to analyze the questions—the Supreme
-26-
Court’s prior decisions on the jury’s role in capital sentencing—are now inherently suspect
in light of Ring.”).
But even if the “eligibility” versus “selection” distinction holds in the context of the
weighing process, the language and structure of the Maryland statute put the weighing
process on the eligibility side rather than the selection side.  I reiterate my analysis in
Borchardt:
“Under § 412(b), a defendant is not ‘death-eligible’ merely by
having been found guilty of first degree murder.  Rather, at the
conclusion of the guilt/innocence phase and a finding of guilty
of first degree murder, the defendant is eligible only for a
sentence of life imprisonment.  The defendant cannot receive a
sentence of death unless the additional requirements of § 413
have been met, i.e., that at least one aggravating factor has been
proven, that the defendant is a principal in the first degree, and
that the aggravating circumstance[s] outweigh any mitigating
circumstances.  See § 413(h).  Just as the presence of the hate
crime enhancement in Apprendi transformed a second degree
offense into a first degree offense under the New Jersey hate
crime statute, the finding that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances transforms a life sentence
into a death sentence under the Maryland death penalty statute.”
367 Md. at 154-55, 786 A.2d at 668-69.
VI.  State Grounds
In addition to affronting the guarantee of federal due process, Maryland’s death
penalty scheme violates Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the basic
principles of fundamental fairness guaranteed by the State Constitution.  Article 24 of the
-27-
Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, “That no man ought to be . . .
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but . . . by the Law of the land.”  Long before
Apprendi, Maryland law recognized that any fact relating to the circumstance of an offense
that exposed a defendant to enhanced punishment had to be determined by the trier of fact
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., Fisher & Utley v. State, 367 Md. 218, 280-82, 786
A.2d 706, 743-44 (2001) (holding that imposition of enhanced penalty under child abuse
statute where abuse causes the death must be alleged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt);
Wadlow v. State, 335 Md. 122, 132, 642 A.2d 213, 218 (1994) (holding that when the State
seeks enhanced penalties, provided by statute, for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, the State must allege the necessary fact concerning the amount of controlled
dangerous substance, and prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt); Jones v. State, 324 Md.
32, 37, 595 A.2d 463, 465 (1991) (holding that for imposition of enhanced penalty provided
for by Legislature, the State must prove all statutory conditions precedent beyond a
reasonable doubt).
Permitting a jury to sentence a person to death based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard, i.e., that death is more appropriate than not, offends Maryland due process
and  principles of fundamental fairness.  Cf. State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 151, 156
(N.J. 1987); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80-81 (Utah 1981).
The allocation of a particular burden of proof reflects the gravity of the task before
the factfinder, the relative importance of the decision, and “a fundamental value
-28-
determination of our society[.]”  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372, 90 S. Ct. at 1077, 25 L. Ed.
2d at 380 (Harlan, J., concurring).  In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60
L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979), Chief Justice Burger expressed for the Court the significance of the
highest level of requisite proof as follows:
“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of
factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree
of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.’  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring).  The standard serves to allocate the risk of error
between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision.
Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law has
produced across a continuum three standards or levels of proof
for different types of cases.  At one end of the spectrum is the
typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private
parties.  Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome
of such private suits, plaintiff’s burden of proof is a mere
preponderance of the evidence.  The litigants thus share the risk
of error in roughly equal fashion.
 
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the
defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without
any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected
by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible
the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.  In the administration
of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of
error upon itself.  This is accomplished by requiring under the
Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In re Winship, supra.”
Id. at 423-24, 99 S. Ct. at 1808, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 329 (footnote omitted).  The more serious the
risk of error, the higher the requisite standard of proof.
7In State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 238 n.37, 2003 Conn. LEXIS 394, at *102 n.37
(Conn. Oct. 14, 2003), the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the dissent’s argument that
the jury’s determination in the weighing process is a moral judgment, inconsistent with a
reasonable doubt standard.  The court reasoned as follows:
“We disagree with the dissent of Sullivan, C. J., suggesting that,
because the jury’s determination is a moral judgment, it is
somehow inconsistent to assign a burden of persuasion to that
determination.  The dissent’s contention relies on its
understanding of the reasonable doubt standard as a quantitative
evaluation of the evidence. We have already explained in this
opinion that the traditional meaning of the reasonable doubt
standard focuses, not on a quantification of the evidence, but on
the degree of certainty of the fact finder or, in this case, the
sentencer.  Therefore, the nature of the jury’s determination as
a moral judgment does not render the application of the
reasonable doubt standard to that determination inconsistent or
confusing.  On the contrary, it makes sense, and, indeed, is quite
common, when making a moral determination, to assign a
degree of certainty to that judgment.  Put another way, the
notion of a particular level of certainty is not inconsistent with
the process of arriving at a moral judgment; our conclusion
simply assigns the law’s most demanding level of certainty to
the jury’s most demanding and irrevocable moral judgment.”
-29-
Included within step three of the Maryland statute, the weighing provision, is the
ultimate decision that death is the appropriate sentence.  The reasonable doubt standard
communicates to the jury the degree of certainty it must possess before arriving at the
ultimate decision that death is the proper sentence.  See State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 2003
Conn. LEXIS 394 (Conn. Oct. 14, 2003);7 People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 795 (Colo.
1990).
-30-
We pay mere lip service to the principle that death is different and yet continue to
impose a lower level of certainty in the death penalty context than we do for other lesser
important interests in Maryland.  Maryland has required a higher burden of persuasion than
preponderance of the evidence in situations involving penalties far less severe than the
ultimate penalty at stake under § 413.  See, e.g., 1986 Mercedes v. State, 334 Md. 264, 282-
83, 638 A.2d 1164, 1173 (1994) (requiring the state to prove the requisite elements under
drug forfeiture laws by clear and convincing evidence); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 207,
618 A.2d 744, 753 (1993) (requiring clear and convincing evidence for the withdrawal of
life-sustaining medical treatment); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469, 601 A.2d
633, 657 (1992) (requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard for proof of punitive
damages); Washington County Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Clark, 296 Md. 190, 197, 461 A.2d
1077, 1081 (1983) (requiring proof of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence
in order to terminate parental rights); Coard v. State, 288 Md. 523, 525, 419 A.2d 383, 384
(1980) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence in civil commitment proceedings);
Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 320, 413 A.2d 170, 178 (1980) (requiring the heightened
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence for libel and slander).  Cf. Summerlin
v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “We do not execute people
according to ordinary legal principles that may be good enough for our more routine
decisions.  When the state assumes the role of the Deity, it must exercise greater care.”); see
-31-
also Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 99 S. Ct. at 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 330 (stating that “[i]n
cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, ‘[t]he standard of proof [at a
minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’”).
VII.  The Reasonable Doubt Standard
It is correct that states must narrow the class of persons deemed to be death-eligible,
in order to eliminate total arbitrariness and capriciousness in the imposition of the death
penalty.  But reliability is equally as important.  Even assuming arguendo that the weighing
portion of M aryland’s death penalty scheme is purely a matter of selection, which I do not
accept, I would nonetheless hold that a finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating
factors should be determined beyond a reasonable doubt.  A jury engaging in the relative
comparison of aggravating factors to mitigating factors is making the final determination of
whether to grant mercy and spare a defendant’s life.  It seems entirely incongruous that we
should require the highest standards of proof when a jury decides whether a defendant is
“eligible” to be executed, yet lower the bar when the jury decides whether or not the
defendant is “eligible” to be spared.  These life and death decisions are two sides of the same
coin and they should be subject to the same level of proof.
8A question arises as to whether Ring requires strict rules of evidence during the entire
post-conviction part of a death penalty trial.
-32-
Requiring a finding “beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defendant should be given a
death sentence is in line entirely with the procedural safeguards of Maryland’s death penalty
scheme.  A death penalty sentencing phase differs markedly from a typical sentencing in
Maryland.  In Maryland, a jury may impose a sentence only in a death penalty proceeding.
In all other cases, a judge imposes the sentence.  In the capital case sentencing phase,
evidence is presented, a jury must pass judgment on this evidence, and the rules of evidence,
although somewhat relaxed, are in force.8  If the State must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, every element of a crime, why should it not need to prove every element of a capital
murder proceeding in the punishment phase?
Reflected throughout the Supreme Court jurisprudence underlying the Eighth
Amendment is the principle that death is different.  See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct.
2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556; Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2602, 91
L. Ed. 2d 335, 347 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that “This especial concern [for
reliability in capital proceedings] is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution
is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393, 401 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d
-33-
944, 961 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman, 408 U.S. at 289, 92 S. Ct. at 2752, 33 L. Ed.
2d at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring).  In a death proceeding, the Supreme Court has
recognized that “the Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding
than would be true in a noncapital case.”  Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342, 113 S. Ct.
2112, 2117, 124 L. Ed. 2d 306, 318 (1993).  Justice Kennedy has observed that “all of our
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerning capital sentencing is directed toward the
enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense.”  Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243,
110 S. Ct. 2822, 2832, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 212 (1990).
Ring dealt with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Not to be overlooked,
however, is the right to a fair and reliable sentencing determination.  Throughout the
jurisprudence on the death penalty is the universal recognition that death is different.  See
Zant, 462 U.S. at 884-85, 103 S. Ct. at 2747, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 255 (noting that “because there
is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment,
‘there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death
is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’”) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305, 96
S. Ct. at 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 961); Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357, 97 S. Ct. at 1204, 51 L. Ed.
2d at 401.  Because the death penalty is qualitatively different from a prison sentence, the
Supreme Court, and our Court, requires that the death penalty may not be imposed unless the
jury makes an individualized determination that death is the appropriate sentence for the
-34-
particular defendant.  Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04, 96 S. Ct. at 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 960-
61.  In Furman, 408 U.S. at 306, 92 S. Ct. at 2760, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 388 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), Justice Stewart stated:
“The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind.  It is unique in its total
irrevocability.  It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.  And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our
concept of humanity.”
Because death is fundamentally different, heightened reliability is required at all
stages of a death penalty trial.  That includes the guilt/innocence phase, and the entire
sentencing process.  In discussing the unique nature of capital punishment, Justice Stevens
in dissent noted in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 22 n.9, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2777 n.9, 106
L. Ed. 2d 1, 19 n.9 (1989), as follows:
“In 1983, 11 years after Furman had been decided, Justice
O'Connor observed in a majority opinion that the ‘Court, as well
as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Justices,
has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all
other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.’  California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-999; see id., at 999, n. 9 (citing
cases).  See also, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411
(1986) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) (‘In capital proceedings
generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures
aspire to a heightened standard of reliability. . . . This especial
concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that
execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of
penalties; that death is different’); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
-35-
68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment) (‘In capital
cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections
that may or may not be required in other cases’); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) (‘From the point of view of the defendant, it is
different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of
view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of
one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other
legitimate state action.  It is of vital importance to the defendant
and to the community that any decision to impose the death
sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion’).”
In sum, the touchstone of Apprendi, applied to capital cases in Ring, is to decide
whether a requisite finding exposes the defendant to a higher sentence than can be imposed
solely on the basis of a criminal conviction.  As the Ring Court stated, “If a State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that
fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S. Ct. at 2439, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 572.  Because in Maryland the
finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors is a necessary predicate for the
imposition of the death penalty, Apprendi and Ring require that this finding be made, by a
jury, and not by a preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge authorize me to state that they join in this
dissenting opinion.