Title: People v. Cross

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Filed 5/18/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S212157 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C070271 
JOSHUA CROSS, 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. 09F06395,  
 
) 
11F03888 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
Penal Code section 273.5 defines various domestic violence crimes.  
Defendant Joshua Cross was charged with felony infliction of corporal injury in 
violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 273.5(a)).  The 
information further alleged that Cross had suffered a prior conviction under 
section 273.5.  At trial, Cross stipulated to the prior conviction, and the trial court 
accepted the stipulation without advising Cross of any trial rights or eliciting his 
waiver of those rights.  The jury found Cross guilty of the charged offense under 
section 273.5(a) and also found true the prior conviction allegation.  As provided 
in section 273.5, former subdivision (e) (now § 273.5, subd. (f)), Cross‘s prior 
conviction exposed him to a prison term of two, four, or five years instead of two, 
three, or four years.  The trial court sentenced Cross to the maximum term of five 
years. 
 
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On appeal, Cross argues that, because his unwarned stipulation to the prior 
conviction had the direct consequence of subjecting him to a longer prison term, 
the stipulation was invalid under In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 (Yurko).  We 
agree and therefore conclude that Cross‘s sentence must be set aside. 
I. 
On May 20, 2011, Cross went to see the mother of his children at her 
apartment.  In the course of a dispute, Cross slapped, punched, and choked her, 
resulting in a charge of felony infliction of corporal injury in violation of Penal 
Code section 273.5(a).  (All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 
Code.)  A violation of section 273.5(a) is punishable by two, three, or four years in 
prison or up to one year in the county jail. 
The information further alleged that Cross had previously been ―convicted 
of the crime of spousal abuse in violation of Section 273.5 of the Penal Code, 
within the meaning of the [sic] Section 273.5(e)(1) of the Penal Code.‖  Section 
273.5 provides that ―[a]ny person convicted of violating this section for acts 
occurring within seven years of a previous conviction under subdivision (a) . . . 
shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or 
by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or five years, or by both 
imprisonment and a fine . . . .‖  (§ 273.5, former subd. (e)(1), as amended by Stats. 
2007, ch. 582, § 1, p. 4894; see Stats. 2013, ch. 763, § 1 [redesignating former 
subd. (e)(1) as subd. (f)(1)]; hereafter section 273.5(f)(1).) 
At trial, defense counsel stipulated that ―[o]n January 15, 2010, [Cross] was 
convicted of a felony violation of Penal Code Section 273.5 . . . in relation to [a] 
domestic violence incident on August 14th of 2009.‖  The trial court accepted this 
stipulation without advising Cross of any trial rights or the penal consequences of 
admitting a prior conviction.   
 
3 
 
A jury convicted Cross of violating section 273.5(a) and found true the 
allegation that he suffered the prior conviction.  In light of the prior conviction, the 
trial court sentenced him to the maximum term of five years for his current section 
273.5(a) offense. 
On appeal, Cross challenged the true finding on the prior conviction 
allegation on the ground that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his trial 
rights before stipulating to the prior conviction.  The Court of Appeal rejected 
Cross‘s argument and affirmed the sentence.  Relying on People v. Witcher (1995) 
41 Cal.App.4th 223 (Witcher) and declining to follow People v. Shippey (1985) 
168 Cal.App.3d 879 (Shippey), the court concluded that ―the stipulation to the 
existence of a prior conviction was not tantamount to admitting all the elements of 
an enhancement; rather, the existence of the prior conviction was instead a 
sentencing factor authorizing the trial court to impose a more severe alternative 
sentencing scheme.  As a result, the trial court was not required to advise 
defendant of his fundamental trial rights and solicit waivers of them before giving 
effect to the stipulation.‖  We granted review. 
II. 
When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to 
ensure that the plea is knowing and voluntary.  (See Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 
U.S. 238, 243–244 (Boykin).)  As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform 
the defendant of three constitutional rights — the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one‘s 
accusers — and solicit a personal waiver of each.  (People v. Howard (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 1132, 1179 (Howard); see Boykin, at pp. 243–244; In re Tahl (1969) 1 
Cal.3d 122, 130–133 (Tahl).)  Proper advisement and waiver of these rights, 
conducted with ―the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable,‖ are necessary 
 
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―to make sure [the accused] has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and 
of its consequence.‖  (Boykin, at pp. 243–244.) 
In Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, we unanimously held that the same 
requirements of advisement and waiver apply when a defendant admits the truth of  
a prior conviction allegation that subjects him to increased punishment.  The 
defendant in Yurko admitted, without adequate advisement or waiver, the truth of 
three prior felony convictions, resulting in an enhanced sentence of life 
imprisonment for his current first degree burglary offense.  (Id. at p. 860 & fn. 1.)  
We explained:  ―Because of the significant rights at stake in obtaining an 
admission of the truth of allegations of prior convictions, which rights are often of 
the same magnitude as in the case of a plea of guilty, courts must exercise a 
comparable solicitude in extracting an admission of the truth of allegations of prior 
convictions. . . .  As an accused is entitled to a trial on the factual issues raised by 
a denial of the allegation of prior convictions, an admission of the truth of the 
allegation necessitates a waiver of the same constitutional rights as in the case of a 
plea of guilty.  The lack of advice of the waivers so to be made, insofar as the 
record fails to demonstrate otherwise, compels a determination that the waiver was 
not knowingly and intelligently made.‖  (Id. at p. 863.)  We concluded that 
―Boykin and Tahl require, before a court accepts an accused‘s admission that he 
has suffered prior felony convictions, express and specific admonitions as to the 
constitutional rights waived by an admission.  The accused must be told that an 
admission of the truth of an allegation of prior convictions waives, as to the 
finding that he has indeed suffered such convictions, the same constitutional rights 
waived as to a finding of guilt in case of a guilty plea.‖  (Ibid.) 
We went on to say that a defendant must also be advised of ―the full penal 
effect of a finding of the truth of an allegation of prior convictions.‖  (Yurko, 
supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 865.)  We held ―as a judicially declared rule of criminal 
 
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procedure‖ that an accused, before admitting a prior conviction allegation, must be 
advised of the precise increase in the prison term that might be imposed, the effect 
on parole eligibility, and the possibility of being adjudged an habitual criminal.  
(Id. at p. 864.) 
In Howard, we reaffirmed Yurko‘s requirements of ―explicit admonitions 
and waivers.‖  (Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1178–1179.)  But we clarified that 
Yurko error is not reversible per se.  Instead, the test for reversal is whether ―the 
record affirmatively shows that [the guilty plea] is voluntary and intelligent under 
the totality of the circumstances.‖  (Howard, at p. 1175; see People v. Mosby 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361–365 (Mosby) [applying Howard‘s totality of the 
circumstances test].) 
In addition, our case law since Yurko has drawn a distinction between, on 
one hand, ―a defendant‘s admission of evidentiary facts which [does] not admit 
every element necessary to conviction of an offense or to imposition of 
punishment on a charged enhancement‖ and, on the other, ―an admission of guilt 
of a criminal charge or of the truth of an enhancing allegation where nothing more 
[is] prerequisite to imposition of punishment except conviction of the underlying 
offense.‖  (People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal.4th 570, 577 (Adams).)  The 
requirements of Boykin-Tahl and Yurko apply to the latter type of admission but 
not the former.  (Adams, at pp. 580–583.) 
In Adams, for example, we held that a mere stipulation to being on bail 
―does not admit the truth of . . . every fact necessary to imposition‖ of additional 
punishment under section 12022.1 and therefore ―does not have the definite penal 
consequences necessary to trigger the Boykin-Tahl requirements.‖  (Adams, supra, 
6 Cal.4th at p. 580.)  Similarly, in People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413 
(Newman), we held that the Boykin-Tahl requirements did not apply to the 
defendant‘s stipulation to his status as a felon because ―no penal consequences 
 
6 
 
flowed directly from the stipulation, and the prosecutor still was required to prove 
the remaining elements of the [felon in possession of a firearm] offense.‖  
(Newman, at p. 422.)  Adams and Newman make clear that the Boykin-Tahl 
requirements do not apply to a stipulation of ―evidentiary facts, even facts crucial 
to a conviction,‖ if the stipulation does not encompass ―all of the evidentiary facts 
necessary to imposition of the additional penalty.‖  (Adams, at p. 582.)   
With these principles in mind, we turn to the case before us. 
III. 
At the outset, the Attorney General argues that Cross has forfeited his claim 
because he did not object to the lack of advisement and waiver at trial.  Although 
the Attorney General did not raise this issue in the Court of Appeal (see Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 8.500(c)(1)), it presents a ―pure question[] of law, not turning upon 
disputed facts.‖  (People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 901, 
fn. 5.)  Accordingly, we shall exercise our discretion to address the forfeiture issue 
before turning to the merits of Cross‘s claim. 
A. 
In support of forfeiture, the Attorney General relies on People v. Vera 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 269 (Vera), where we held that ―[a]bsent an objection to the 
discharge of the jury or commencement of court trial, defendant is precluded from 
asserting on appeal a claim of ineffectual waiver of the statutory right to jury trial 
of prior prison term allegations.‖  (Id. at p. 278.)  We explained that the right to 
have a jury determine the truth of a prior conviction allegation ―is derived from 
statute,‖ not from the state or federal Constitution, and does not implicate any 
constitutional requirement of express and personal waiver.  (Vera, at pp. 277–278; 
see § 1025.)  A defendant is ―therefore obligated to bring the alleged error to the 
attention of the trial court in order to preserve his claim for appellate review.‖  
(Vera, at p. 281.) 
 
7 
 
Vera is inapposite here, however, because the defendant in Vera did not 
admit the truth of a prior conviction allegation.  Instead, Vera waived his statutory 
right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial.  (Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 273.)  
We said the denial of a jury trial on the prior prison term allegations raised no due 
process concerns because Vera ―does not assert, nor does the record in this case 
suggest, he was denied a fair trial.‖  (Id. at p. 280; see id. at p. 281 [―[T]he 
substitution of a fair court trial for jury trial on a sentence enhancement allegation 
does not constitute a violation of federal due process.‖].)  Thus, the forfeiture in 
Vera arose from the defendant‘s acquiescence to a bench trial instead of a jury 
trial, not from his acquiescence to no trial at all. 
Notably, our opinion in Vera strongly implied that defendants have a due 
process right to receive a fair trial on the truth of prior prison term allegations.  
(See Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 281 [―So long as defendant received a fair court 
trial on the truth of the prior prison term allegations . . . his claim of ineffectual 
waiver does not constitute a federal due process claim.‖]; id. at p. 280 [―[B]ecause 
defendant was afforded a fair determination of the truth of the prior prison term 
allegations by the trial court sitting as a trier of fact, he was afforded ‗due process 
of law . . . .‘ ‖].)  Although post-Yurko case law has clarified that there is no 
constitutional right to a jury trial on a prior conviction allegation (see Vera, at 
pp. 274, 277; People v. Wiley (1995) 9 Cal.4th 580, 589; Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224), Yurko correctly concluded that ―an accused is 
entitled to a trial on the factual issues raised by a denial of the allegation of prior 
convictions . . . .‖  (Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 863, italics added.)  Indeed, it is 
well established that, while there is no single ― ‗best‘ recidivist trial procedure,‖ 
due process requires ―adequate notice‖ and ―an opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy and validity of the alleged prior convictions.‖  (Spencer v. Texas (1967) 
385 U.S. 554, 567; see Oyler v. Boles (1962) 368 U.S. 448, 452 [―[A] defendant 
 
8 
 
must receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to the 
recidivist charge . . . .‖].)  When a defendant forgoes this basic protection, his or 
her decision must be ―knowingly and intelligently made.‖  (Yurko, at p. 863.)  
Cross‘s unwarned stipulation to the truth of the prior conviction allegation did not 
merely waive a jury trial; it waived any trial at all. 
In this context, we find instructive our recent decision in People v. Palmer 
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, which held that the defendant did not forfeit a claim that 
the trial court violated section 1192.5 by making an inadequate inquiry into the 
factual basis for his guilty plea.  (Palmer, at p. 117.)  Palmer ―waived a 
preliminary hearing and probation report, and he acknowledged having discussed 
the charge and defenses with his counsel as well as his satisfaction with the advice 
he received.  Defendant did not assert below that the procedure the trial court 
followed failed to satisfy section 1192.5, and he made no claim that the court or 
counsel should have identified a document or documents supporting the factual 
basis of the plea.‖  (Id. at pp. 115–116.)  The Attorney General argued forfeiture, 
relying on Vera.  But we said that Vera‘s ―application in the present context would 
be inappropriate, given the prophylactic purpose behind the factual basis 
requirement, a purpose analogous to that behind the prophylactic advisements of 
applicable federal constitutional rights given a defendant before his or her guilty 
plea is taken, which ‗helps ensure that the ―constitutional standards of 
voluntariness and intelligence are met.‖ ‘  ([Citation]; cf. Boykin v. Alabama 
(1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243 . . . .)‖  (Palmer, at p. 116.)  The same constitutional 
standards of voluntariness and intelligence apply when a defendant forgoes a trial 
on a prior conviction allegation.  (Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 863, 865.)  Thus, 
just as Palmer could not forfeit his claim that the trial court should have ensured 
his plea was voluntary and knowing by inquiring into its factual basis, Cross 
cannot forfeit his claim that the trial court should have ensured his stipulation was 
 
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voluntary and knowing by advising him of his right to ―a fair determination of the 
truth of the prior [conviction] allegation[].‖  (Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 280.) 
B. 
We turn now to the merits of Cross‘s appeal.  The Attorney General argues 
that this case is indistinguishable from Adams.  In Adams, the defendant was 
charged with several theft-related crimes.  (Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 574, 
fn. 3.)  The information alleged that he committed these offenses while ―released 
from custody‖ under section 12022.1 pending trial for another crime.  (Adams, at 
p. 574.)  Adams stipulated that at the time he allegedly committed the theft-related 
offenses, he was ― ‗out of custody on his own recognizance, or on bail for other 
charges . . . .‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The jury convicted him of the theft-related offenses and 
found the ―on bail‖ allegation true.  (Id. at p. 575.) 
On appeal, Adams argued that the trial court was required to give him 
Boykin-Tahl admonitions before accepting his stipulation.  We disagreed, 
explaining that Adams ―stipulated only that he had been released on bail when the 
offense charged against him was committed.  Before the enhanced penalty 
authorized by section 12022.1 could be imposed the People not only had to prove 
that defendant committed the secondary offense [i.e., the current charged offense], 
but also convict him or demonstrate that he had been convicted of the primary 
offense [i.e., the offense for which he was released on bail].‖  (Adams, supra, 6 
Cal.4th at p. 582; see id. at p. 580 [―Unless he stipulates both to the bail/own 
recognizance element of the enhancement and that he is guilty of or has been 
convicted of the primary offense, his stipulation to the former will not necessarily 
lead to imposition of the enhanced penalties authorized by section 12022.1.‖].)  
Because Adams had stipulated only that he was on bail pending trial on another 
crime and not that he was guilty of that other crime, we concluded that his 
―stipulation that he was on bail was an ordinary evidentiary stipulation.‖  (Id. at 
 
10 
 
p. 582.)  The stipulation did not admit ―every fact necessary to imposition of the 
additional punishment other than conviction of the underlying [theft-related] 
offense[s]‖ and therefore did ―not have the definite penal consequences necessary 
to trigger the Boykin-Tahl requirements.‖  (Id. at p. 580.) 
Here, by contrast, section 273.5(f) authorized the trial court to impose a 
greater punishment on Cross if the jury found that he was guilty of the charged 
offense under section 273.5(a) and that he had previously been convicted of 
violating section 273.5.  Cross stipulated that he had previously been ―convicted of 
a felony violation of Penal Code Section 273.5.‖  Because he admitted ―every fact 
necessary to imposition of the additional punishment other than conviction of the 
underlying offense‖ (Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 580), he was entitled to receive 
Boykin-Tahl warnings before he made this admission. 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that Cross‘s ―stipulation to the existence of a 
prior conviction was not tantamount to admitting all the elements of an 
enhancement; rather, the existence of the prior conviction was instead a sentencing 
factor authorizing the trial court to impose a more severe alternative sentencing 
scheme.‖  But we do not see a meaningful distinction between an ―enhancement‖ 
and an ―alternative sentence scheme‖ in this context.  Cross was sentenced to five 
years in prison under section 273.5(f).  But for his stipulation to a previous 
conviction of another section 273.5(a) offense within the past seven years, Cross 
faced no more than four years in prison for his current section 273.5(a) offense.  In 
Adams, we said that a stipulation has ―definite penal consequences‖ if it 
establishes ―every fact necessary‖ to support an ―additional punishment.‖  (Adams, 
supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 578, 580; accord, People v. Newman, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 
p. 421.)  A stipulation may establish every fact necessary to support an increased 
punishment even if the trial court decides not to impose that punishment.  Thus, 
our cases suggest that the phrase ―definite penal consequences‖ means definite 
 
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exposure to additional punishment.  Because the stipulation here established every 
fact necessary to expose Cross to a penalty beyond the four-year maximum term 
available under section 273.5(a), it resulted in a definite penal consequence.  
―[N]othing more was prerequisite to imposition of [the elevated] punishment 
except conviction of the underlying offense . . . .‖  (Adams, at p. 577.) 
In so concluding, we follow the same approach as in Yurko, where we 
considered the ―practical aspects‖ of admitting the truth of a prior conviction 
allegation.  (Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 862.)  We said:  ―The admission of the 
truth of the allegation of prior convictions has been differentiated from a plea of 
guilty through a characterization of the former as merely allowing a determination 
of a ‗status‘ which can subject an accused to increased punishment.  [Citations.]  
Although this may be technically correct, the distinction is meaningless if, as in 
the case of a plea of guilty, the accused nevertheless will be held to have waived, 
without proper protections, important rights by such an admission.  Undoubtedly 
the particular rights waived by an admission of the truth of the allegation of prior 
convictions are important.  Although there is not at stake a question of guilt of a 
substantive crime, the practical aspects of a finding of prior convictions may well 
impose upon a defendant additional penalties and sanctions which may be even 
more severe than those imposed upon a finding of guilt without the defendant 
having suffered the prior convictions.‖  (Ibid.) 
The Attorney General argues that Yurko‘s requirement of advisement and 
waiver does not apply here because ―[s]ection 273.5([f])(1) does not set forth an 
enhancement, i.e., a term of punishment in addition to the punishment set forth for 
an underlying offense.‖  According to the Attorney General, section 273.5(f)(1) 
defines an ―aggravated offense,‖ and Cross‘s stipulation established only one 
element of the offense, leaving intact ―his right to jury trial on the present 
aggravated offense in the same way as if he had stipulated to any other element, 
 
12 
 
such as whether the victim was his cohabitant, or whether he willfully inflicted 
corporal injury.‖ 
Were we to adopt this characterization of section 273.5(f)(1), however, it 
would follow that the sentencing provision at issue in Yurko also defined an 
―aggravated offense‖ or ―alternative sentencing scheme,‖ not an ―enhancement.‖  
That provision read:  ― ‗Every person convicted . . . of . . . burglary of the first 
degree . . . who shall have been previously three times convicted, upon charges 
separately brought and tried, and who shall have served separate terms therefor in 
any state prison . . . , of the crime of robbery, burglary . . . shall be adjudged an 
habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 
life.‘ ‖  (Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 860, fn. 1, quoting former § 644, subd. (b).)  
We are unable to discern any relevant difference between that language and the 
language of section 273.5(f)(1):  ―Any person convicted of violating this section 
for acts occurring within seven years of a previous conviction under subdivision 
(a) . . . shall be punished by [among other options] . . . imprisonment in the state 
prison for two, four, or five years . . . .‖  Indeed, the two statutes are virtually 
parallel.  But Yurko did not treat former section 644, subdivision (b) as a statute 
defining an aggravated offense, of which the prior convictions were merely one 
element.  And Yurko did not parse whether former section 644, subdivision (b) 
specified an ―enhancement‖ or an ―alternative sentencing scheme.‖  Such 
nomenclature played no role in our analysis.  What mattered was that the 
defendant‘s unwarned admission of prior convictions automatically exposed him 
to ―added penalties.‖  (Yurko, at p. 863.) 
The Court of Appeal relied on Witcher, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 223, and 
declined to follow Shippey, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 879.  Both Witcher and 
Shippey involved an admission of a prior conviction allegation without Yurko 
advisements in the analogous context of section 666, which punishes petty theft 
 
13 
 
with a prior conviction.  In Shippey, the defendant admitted a prior misdemeanor, 
and the Attorney General sought to ―distinguish the instant case from Yurko on the 
sole basis that Yurko involved a prior felony conviction.‖  (Shippey, at p. 888.)  
The court held that Yurko‘s rationale ―does not appear to be so limited‖ (Shippey, 
at p. 888) and ―is equally applicable to an admission of a prior misdemeanor 
conviction which may result in greatly increased potential punishment‖ (id. at 
p. 889).  ―Proof of a prior under section 666 raises a misdemeanor crime 
punishable by a fine or county jail sentence to a felony punishable by 
imprisonment.  In the instant case this is certainly true.  Admitting the prior petty 
theft ultimately resulted in defendant‘s sentence to state prison for three years.‖  
(Id. at p. 888.)  Applying Yurko, the Shippey court held that the defendant should 
have been advised of his trial rights and the consequences of his admission.  (Id. at 
p. 889.) 
A decade later, the court in Witcher (without mentioning Shippey) found 
Yurko‘s requirements inapplicable to the defendant‘s admission of two prior 
conviction allegations under section 666.  (Witcher, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 233–234.)  There the defendant, through a lengthy colloquy with the trial 
court, indicated that he wished to admit the two prior convictions in order to 
foreclose the prosecution from presenting evidence of those prior convictions.  (Id. 
at pp. 228–231.)  During the colloquy, the trial court advised the defendant of his 
right to a jury trial, but he ―was never advised of his privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination and his right to confront his accusers,‖ he ―did not expressly 
waive those rights,‖ and he ―was never informed of the penal consequences of his 
admission of the priors.‖  (Id. at p. 231; see id. at p. 234 [under § 666, prior 
convictions ―serve to raise a petty theft to a felony with attendant penal 
consequences‖].)  Despite these ―mistakes‖ (id. at p. 231), the Witcher court 
explained that ―appellant‘s pretrial ‗admission‘ of [the prior convictions] was, in 
 
14 
 
effect, a stipulation to their validity for the purpose of keeping them from the jury.  
Appellant has cited no authority for the proposition that a defendant must be 
admonished about his constitutional rights when he enters into such a self-serving 
stipulation, and we decline to create such authority.  He has received the benefit of 
his bargain.  The prosecution was not allowed to prove his prior felony convictions 
and incarcerations before the jury.  We will not now countenance an after-the-fact 
contention that his stipulation did not meet minimum constitutional standards.‖  
(Id. at pp. 233–234.)  We find this reasoning unpersuasive. 
If, as the court in Witcher found, the defendant was not adequately apprised 
of his trial rights (Witcher, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 231) and, as a result, his 
admission ―cannot be said to be ‗knowing and voluntary‘ ‖ (id. at p. 233), then he 
―received the benefit of his bargain‖ (id. at p. 234) only at a cost not fully known 
to him.  In other words, although the trial court told the defendant what he was 
getting by stipulating to the prior convictions, the court did not make him fully 
aware of what he was giving up. 
It may be that many defendants who admit a prior conviction do so in order 
to obtain some benefit.  But the fact that a defendant may derive a benefit is not 
itself a sufficient reason to dispense with proper advisement.  This court in Yurko 
was aware that ―[t]here are many tenable reasons‖ why a defendant might ―admit 
charges of prior convictions.  For instance, when an accused admits priors they 
may not be alluded to in any way during trial except for impeachment purposes if 
he elects to testify.  [Citations.]  Further, a denial of priors would result not only in 
their existence being brought to the attention of the jury, but it would give undue 
emphasis to such priors as the People would then be required to submit proof 
thereof.‖  (Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 866; cf. Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 240 
[―Trial strategy may of course make a plea of guilty seem the desirable course.‖].)  
But such considerations had no bearing on our rationale for the necessity of 
 
15 
 
advisement.  (Yurko, at pp. 862–863.)  To be sure, the particular benefit sought by 
a defendant in admitting a prior conviction may reveal the extent of his awareness 
of his trial rights or the penal consequences of his admission.  For example, a 
desire to keep a prior conviction away from the jury demonstrates a defendant‘s 
awareness of the right to a jury trial.  But the mere fact of receiving a benefit, 
without more, does not preclude a defendant from claiming inadequate 
advisement. 
The Court of Appeal in this case, noting that ―unlike in Witcher, 
defendant‘s stipulation did not result in the benefit of keeping the facts of the prior 
conviction out of evidence,‖ seized on a different aspect of Witcher‘s reasoning.  
Witcher observed that proof of prior convictions neither constitutes an element of 
the section 666 offense nor results in a sentencing enhancement under section 666 
as it does under section 667, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e), and section 667.5, 
subdivision (b).  (Witcher, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 226, 233–234.)  Relying 
on this taxonomy as well as other cases that have said (in the context of pleading 
requirements) that section 666 does not establish an enhancement or a substantive 
offense (see, e.g., People v. Robinson (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 275, 281–282), the 
Court of Appeal here advanced the theory that section 273.5(f), like section 666, is 
an ―alternative sentencing scheme‖ and, as such, does not implicate Boykin, Tahl, 
or Yurko. 
It is true that some of our cases have distinguished between a sentence 
enhancement and an alternative sentencing scheme.  (See, e.g., Robert L. v. 
Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 898–900; People v. Acosta (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 105, 118–120.)  But we have also recognized that the distinction is not 
always relevant.   (See, e.g., People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 476–479 
[repeatedly stating that § 666 specifies a sentencing ―enhancement‖].)  Neither 
Witcher nor the Court of Appeal in this case explained why the characterization of 
 
16 
 
section 666 or former 273.5(f)(1) as an ―alternative sentencing scheme‖ and not an 
―enhancement‖ should make a difference from the standpoint of the substantive 
concerns animating our decision in Yurko.  Yurko did not examine whether the 
statute at issue defined an enhancement or an alternative sentencing scheme; our 
concern was that the defendant‘s unwarned admission of prior convictions 
automatically exposed him to increased punishment.  While seeming to 
acknowledge that Cross‘s stipulation likewise exposed him to increased 
punishment, the Court of Appeal said:  ―Merely because an alternative sentencing 
scheme has the same effect as an enhancement does not mean it must be treated 
the same way‖ for purposes of advisement and waiver.  We conclude, to the 
contrary, that Yurko applies precisely because section 273.5(f)(1) has the same 
effect as an enhancement:  It makes the admission of a prior conviction, by itself, a 
sufficient ―prerequisite‖ for increased punishment, with ―nothing more‖ required 
―except conviction of the underlying offense.‖  (Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 
p. 577.)  Because Witcher‘s reasoning led the Court of Appeal to err, we 
disapprove Witcher, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 223, to the extent it is inconsistent with 
this opinion, and our citation to Witcher with approval in Newman, supra, 21 
Cal.4th 421, 423, should no longer be followed.  
As noted, Yurko was decided before our cases clarified that the right to a 
jury trial on a prior conviction allegation ―is derived from statute‖ and not from 
the state or federal Constitution.  (Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 274.)  Since then, 
we have not decided the precise contours of the advisement that is constitutionally 
required in this context.  (Cf. Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 360 [―When trial is 
required by statute, we shall assume . . . that a defendant‘s due process trial rights, 
at least under our state Constitution, encompass the rights to remain silent and to 
confront witnesses.‖].)  We need not do so in this case either.  At a minimum, 
Cross was entitled to be advised of his right to a fair determination of the truth of 
 
17 
 
the prior conviction allegation.  Without such advisement, Cross ―waived, without 
proper protections, important rights by [his] admission‖ of the prior conviction.  
(Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 862.) 
While leaving for another day what additional advisements are 
constitutionally required, we take this opportunity to affirm the judicially created 
rule of criminal procedure requiring full Boykin-Tahl advisements for all guilty 
pleas in criminal trials regardless of whether the defendant‘s rights are derived 
from statute or from the state or federal Constitution.  (See Mosby, supra,  33 
Cal.4th at pp. 359–360; Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 864 & fn. 7.)  Adherence to 
this rule will provide a measure of certainty and uniformity for the trial courts. 
IV. 
The failure to properly advise a defendant of his or her trial rights is not 
reversible ―if the record affirmatively shows that [the admission] is voluntary and 
intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.‖  (Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at 
p. 1175.)  In Howard, we found a knowing and voluntary waiver despite a lack of 
advisement because the record ―affirmatively demonstrate[d] that defendant knew 
he had a right not to admit the prior conviction and, thus, not to incriminate 
himself.  The court specifically informed defendant that he had a right to force the 
district attorney to prove the prior conviction in a trial and that, in such a trial, he 
would have the rights to a jury and to confront adverse witnesses.‖  (Id. at 
p. 1180.)  In Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th 353, 361, we clarified that in applying the 
totality of the circumstances test, a reviewing court must ―review[] the whole 
record, instead of just the record of the plea colloquy,‖ and that ―previous 
experience in the criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivist‘s ‗ ―knowledge 
and sophistication regarding his [legal] rights‖ ‘ ‖ (id. at p. 365). 
 
18 
 
Here, the record contains no indication that Cross‘s stipulation was 
knowing and voluntary, and the Attorney General does not contend otherwise.  
After counsel read the stipulation in open court, the trial court immediately 
accepted it.  The court did not ask whether Cross had discussed the stipulation 
with his lawyer; nor did it ask any questions of Cross personally or in any way 
inform him of his right to a fair determination of the prior conviction allegation.  
(Cf. Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 357–358.)  The stipulation occurred during 
the prosecutor‘s examination of the first witness in the trial; the defense had not 
cross-examined any witness at that point.  (Cf. id. at p. 364.)  Further, we have no 
information on how the alleged prior conviction was obtained.  (Cf. id. at p. 365.)  
Even if the complaint‘s express mention of ―Section 273.5([f])(1) of the Penal 
Code‖ was sufficient to put Cross on notice of the penal consequence of his 
stipulation, nothing in the record affirmatively shows that Cross was aware of his 
right to a fair determination of the truth of the prior conviction allegation.  
Accordingly, Cross‘s stipulation must be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment 
affirming the true finding on the prior conviction allegation and the five-year 
sentence.  In all other respects, we affirm the Court of Appeal‘s judgment, and we 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cross 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 216 Cal.App.4th 1403 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S212157 
Date Filed: May 18, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Greta Fall 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
John Hargreaves, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and William W. Lee, under appointment by the 
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, David Andrew Eldridge and Catherine Tennant 
Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John Hargreaves 
Central California Appellate Program 
2150 River Plaza Drive, Suite 300 
Sacramento, CA  95833 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Catherine Tennant Nieto 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-6307