Title: Michigan v. Dupree (Opinion on Application - Remand to TC)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

PEOPLE v DUPREE 
 
Docket No. 161589.  Argued on application for leave to appeal October 12, 2022.  Decided 
March 21, 2023. 
 
 
Robert M. Dupree was convicted following a jury trial in the Macomb Circuit Court of 
armed robbery, and he was sentenced by the trial court, Carl J. Marlinga, J., as a fourth-offense 
habitual offender to serve 360 to 720 months in prison.  Defendant robbed a store with two 
accomplices in 2012.  One of defendant’s accomplices was armed.  The armed robber held the 
store’s clerk at gunpoint while defendant and the other accomplice bound the clerk with duct tape.  
The armed robber also struck the clerk with the gun during the robbery.  Defendant and his 
accomplices fled after the robbery, but in 2014, defendant was charged with armed robbery in 
connection with the offense.  Defendant’s accomplices were not arrested or charged.  Defendant 
appealed his conviction and sentence in the Court of Appeals, arguing, in part, that Offense 
Variable (OV) 1, MCL 777.31, and OV 2, MCL 777.32, had been wrongly scored.  The Court of 
Appeals (BECKERING, P.J., and CAVANAGH and STEPHENS, JJ.) affirmed defendant’s convictions 
and sentence in an unpublished per curiam opinion.  The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral 
argument on whether to grant defendant’s application for leave to appeal or take other action.  508 
Mich 1019 (2022). 
 
 
In a per curiam opinion signed by Justices VIVIANO, BERNSTEIN, CAVANAGH, and WELCH, 
the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
Under MCL 777.31(1)(c), 15 points should be assessed for OV 1 when a firearm was 
pointed at or toward a victim.  Five points should be assessed for OV 2, MCL 777.32(1)(d), when 
the offender possessed or used a weapon.  There was no evidence that defendant was the offender 
who was armed during the robbery.  Despite this fact, the circuit court relied on the multiple-
offender provisions in MCL 777.31 and MCL 777.32 in assessing defendant 15 points for OV 1 
and 5 points for OV 2.  Under the multiple-offender provisions in these statutes, in cases involving 
multiple offenders, if one offender is assessed points for the OV, all offenders must be assessed 
the same number of points.  The plain language of these provisions sets forth two conditions that 
must be satisfied before the provisions are triggered.  The first condition is that the case must be a 
multiple-offender case.  The second condition is that one offender is assessed points for possessing 
a weapon.  Although the first condition was satisfied in this case, given that there were three 
offenders, the second condition was not; defendant was the only person charged with and convicted 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
of armed robbery, and no other offender was charged or convicted, let alone assessed points for 
possessing a weapon.  Because defendant was the only person arrested and convicted, points could 
only be assessed under OVs 1 and 2 if defendant had possessed and/or used the weapon himself.  
There was no contention that defendant did so, so no points should have been assessed under those 
variables.  The prosecution argued that, pursuant to caselaw, a court must first accurately determine 
a defendant’s score without regard to other co-offenders by punishing an aider and abettor as 
though they were the principal.  However, MCL 777.31(2)(b) and MCL 777.32(2) plainly require 
“1 offender [to be] assessed points” before “other offenders” are also assessed the same points.  
Under these provisions, defendant would be an “other offender,” as a person who did not possess 
or use the weapon.  The aiding-and-abetting statute, MCL 767.39, requires an aider and abettor to 
be “punished” as if they had directly committed the offense, but the effect of this statute is that 
aiders and abettors are to be charged with the same offense(s) as the principal—it does not speak 
to the scoring of the OVs.  If MCL 767.39 were interpreted to require that, in the case of an aider 
and abettor, every OV must be scored in accordance with the conduct of the principal, this would 
be contrary to the plain language of several OVs.  Because MCL 777.31 and MCL 777.32 clearly 
required that an “other offender” be assessed points before points could be assessed to defendant 
on a multiple-offender theory, the trial court should have assessed zero points to defendant for 
OVs 1 and 2.  Defendant was entitled to resentencing because the Court’s decision resulted in a 
20-point reduction in his guidelines score and thus reduced the top end of his guidelines minimum 
sentence range.  In all other respects, defendant’s application for leave to appeal was denied. 
 
 
Chief Justice CLEMENT, joined by Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, disagreed with the majority 
that MCL 777.31 and MCL 777.32 mandated that defendant could not be assessed points for OVs 
1 and 2 because his co-offender, who had possessed a firearm, was not apprehended, convicted, or 
assessed points for these OVs.  Instead, she would have concluded that even if a co-offender is not 
assessed points under a multiple-offender provision, the defendant may still be assessed points for 
an OV if they aided and abetted the conduct addressed by that OV.  Under MCL 767.39, the 
distinction between an accessory and a principal is abolished in Michigan.  Reading MCL 767.39 
in pari materia with MCL 777.31 and MCL 777.32 led to the conclusion that a defendant could 
properly be assessed points under an OV if the defendant aided and abetted the specific conduct 
that served as the basis for scoring the OV.  She cautioned that there was a distinction between a 
defendant’s aiding-and-abetting conduct supporting a conviction and a defendant’s aiding-and-
abetting conduct supporting a specific sentence.  If aiding and abetting only the crime itself 
justified scoring the OVs based on the principal’s conduct alone, the aider and abettor would 
always be assessed the same points as the principal and there would be no need for OVs 1, 2, and 
3 to contain a multiple-offender provision stipulating that a co-offender’s conduct alone may 
justify the assessment of points.  While a defendant may not be assessed points solely on the basis 
of a co-offender’s conduct unless the OV states otherwise, a defendant may be assessed points 
when they aided and abetted the conduct that serves as the basis for scoring the OV—not because 
they merely aided and abetted the crime itself. 
 
 
Justice BOLDEN did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 
considered it before she assumed office. 
 
FILED  March 21, 2023 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 161589 
 
ROBERTO MARCELLO DUPREE, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except BOLDEN, J.) 
 
PER CURIAM.  
The issue in this case is the proper scoring of Offense Variables 1 and 2, which 
concern the possession or use of a weapon during the commission of a crime.  Because 
there is no contention that defendant possessed a weapon during the offense at issue, and 
because no other offender was assessed points for either offense variable, both offense 
variables should have been scored at zero points.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals in this regard and remand for resentencing.  
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement   
 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
I.  FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant and two accomplices robbed a store in Clinton Township on 
December 15, 2012.  Only one of the three robbers was armed.  The armed robber held the 
clerk at gunpoint while the other robbers bound him with duct tape and moved him to the 
back of the store.  The armed robber struck the clerk with the gun during the robbery.  The 
robbery was captured on surveillance video, which was viewed by Clinton Township 
Police Sergeant Deena Terzo.  Sergeant Terzo described the armed robber as a thin Black 
man, probably in his late 20s, with no gloves or mask.  Sergeant Terzo described the second 
robber as a heavy-set, light-skinned man with a shaved head wearing clear or yellow rubber 
gloves, and she described the third robber as a medium-built Black man wearing one white, 
dark-palmed glove.  After the robbers fled, the clerk was able to call the police.  A police-
tracking dog followed the robbers’ scent from the store, and officers found rubber gloves 
along the path of the robbers’ flight.   
A lead developed in 2014 implicating defendant, which ultimately led to a charge 
of armed robbery.  While defendant was the only person arrested or charged, there was no 
contention that defendant had been the robber wielding the gun.  A jury convicted 
defendant of the charged crime.  The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense 
habitual offender, subjecting him to a mandatory 25-year minimum prison term pursuant 
to MCL 769.12(1)(a).  However, defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range actually 
allowed for a longer minimum sentence.  Specifically, defendant fell into the F-III cell of 
the Class A sentencing grid, yielding a minimum sentence range of 135 to 450 months in 
prison.  The trial court sentenced defendant to 360 to 720 months (30 to 60 years) in prison, 
to be served concurrently with a sentence of 93 days for contempt of court.   
 
 
 
3 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal concerns the interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines, 
MCL 777.1 et seq., which are legal questions that this Court reviews de novo, People v 
Morson, 471 Mich 248, 255; 685 NW2d 203 (2004). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The circuit court assessed 15 points for Offense Variable (OV) 1 and 5 points for 
OV 2.  Fifteen points should be assessed for OV 1 when “[a] firearm was pointed at or 
toward a victim,” MCL 777.31(1)(c); five points are assessed for OV 2 when “[t]he 
offender possessed or used a pistol, rifle, shotgun, or knife or other cutting or stabbing 
weapon,” MCL 777.32(1)(d).  There is no evidence that defendant was the offender who 
wielded the gun in this robbery.  Despite this fact, in assessing 15 points for OV 1 and 5 
points for OV 2, the circuit court relied on the instruction contained in both OVs that “[i]n 
multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for possessing a weapon, all 
offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.”  MCL 777.32(2); see also MCL 
777.31(2)(b).  On direct appeal, defendant challenged the scoring of OVs 1 and 2 on the 
basis that no other offender was assessed points for possessing a weapon.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed: 
The sentencing guidelines do not require that the other offenders be 
identified, charged, and convicted before any of the offenders may be 
assessed points under OV [1].  That defendant was the first, and might be the 
only, offender identified, charged, and convicted of the armed robbery is 
irrelevant for purposes of scoring OV 1.  Further, a person convicted of 
committing a crime under an aiding-and-abetting theory “shall be punished 
as if he had directly committed such offense.”  MCL 767.39.  Scoring the 
sentencing guidelines is an integral part of determining the punishment for 
one convicted of a crime. 
 
 
 
4 
 
In the present case, the evidence established that the principal pointed 
a gun at the victim during the robbery, the jury convicted defendant of armed 
robbery as an aider and abettor, MCL 767.39 requires defendant to receive 
the same “punish[ment] as if he had directly committed [armed robbery,]” 
and OV 1 requires all offenders to receive the same score, without regard to 
whether the other offenders were prosecuted and convicted.  [People v 
Dupree, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
February 6, 2020 (Docket No. 344603), p 6.] 
The Court of Appeals applied this same reasoning to OV 2 and held that the trial court did 
not err in scoring either variable.  Id.  We disagree.   
The plain language of MCL 777.31(2)(b) and MCL 777.32(2) sets forth two 
conditions that must be satisfied before those provisions are triggered.  The first condition 
is that the case is a “multiple offender case[].”  The second condition is that “1 offender is 
assessed points” for possessing a weapon.  Here, there were three offenders, which makes 
this a “multiple offender case,” satisfying the first condition.  However, defendant was the 
only person charged and convicted of armed robbery; no other offender has been charged 
or convicted, let alone assessed points for possessing a weapon.  Therefore, the second 
condition, requiring another offender to have been assessed points for possessing a weapon, 
was not satisfied.  Since defendant was the only person arrested, convicted, and assessed 
points under OVs 1 and 2, points could only be assessed under OVs 1 and 2 if he had 
possessed and/or used the weapon himself.  There is no contention that he did so.  
Therefore, no points should have been assessed under OV 1 or OV 2. 
The prosecutor argues that the Court of Appeals was correct to find that no other 
co-offenders need to be convicted before defendant is assigned points for OVs 1 and 2, 
citing People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353; 650 NW2d 407 (2002).  The defendant in 
Libbett was accurately assessed 15 points for OV 1 on the basis of the facts of the case, 
 
 
 
5 
 
while another co-offender had been erroneously assessed 5 points after entering a plea.  Id. 
at 364, 367.  The defendant argued that he should be assigned the same number of points 
as the other offender under MCL 777.31(2)(b).  Libbett, 251 Mich App at 364.  The Libbett 
Court rejected this argument, explaining:  
Although defendant would be correct if we were to read subsection 2(b) in 
isolation, we are not permitted to read the statute in that manner.  Rather, this 
Court is required to construe a statute in light of the other statutory provisions 
in order to carry out the intent of the Legislature.  [People v Morey, 461 Mich 
325, 329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999)]; In re Messer Trust, 457 Mich 371, 
380; 579 NW2d 73 (1998). . . .   
When reading MCL 777.31 in its entirety, it is clear that the 
Legislature intended for the sentencing courts to first accurately determine 
the highest number of points that are to be scored under MCL 777.31(1)(a)-
(e) and then to assess the same number of accurately scored points to multiple 
offenders in the same case under MCL 777.31(2)(b).  [Id. at 366-367.] 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant’s reading of MCL 777.31(2)(b) failed 
to give effect to MCL 777.31(1).  Libbett, 251 Mich App at 367.  The prosecutor here 
argues that, reading Libbett together with the aiding-and-abetting statute, a court must first 
“accurately determine” the score, without regard to other co-offenders, by punishing an 
aider and abettor as though they were the principal.  
Libbett is inapposite here, where the issue is not whether MCL 777.31(1) and MCL 
777.31(2)(b) conflict but, rather, whether MCL 777.31(2)(b) and MCL 777.32(2) are even 
triggered under these facts.  The Court of Appeals’ assertion that “[t]he sentencing 
guidelines do not require that the other offenders be identified, charged, and convicted 
before any of the offenders may be assessed points under [the] OV” ignores the clear 
statutory requirements of MCL 777.31(2)(b) and MCL 777.32(2).  Dupree, unpub op at 6.  
Under those provisions, this defendant would be an “other offender[],” as the person who 
 
 
 
6 
 
did not possess or use the weapon.  The provisions plainly require “1 offender [to be] 
assessed points” before “other offenders” are also assessed the same points.  
The Court of Appeals and the prosecution also rely on the aiding-and-abetting 
statute, as does the dissent.  The aiding-and-abetting statute says that a person convicted 
under an aiding-and-abetting theory “shall be punished as if he had directly committed 
such offense.”  MCL 767.39.  The effect of this statute is that aiders and abettors are to be 
charged with the same offenses as principal offenders—but it does not speak to the scoring 
of the OVs.  “ ‘[S]pecific [statutory] provisions . . . prevail over any arguable inconsistency 
with the more general rule’ ” in a different statute.  Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 481 Mich 601, 
613; 751 NW2d 463 (2008) (citation omitted; first alteration in original).  To ignore the 
specific statute relating to the scoring of the OVs in favor of the general aiding-and-abetting 
statute would be contrary to this canon of statutory interpretation. 
Moreover, if MCL 767.39 works here as the Court of Appeals and the prosecution 
suggest, that would mean that every OV scored in the case of an aider and abettor would 
be scored in accordance with the conduct of the principal offender.  This is contrary to the 
plain language of several OVs, some of which are silent on co-offender conduct and some 
of which explicitly instruct courts to rely on co-offender conduct.  For example, OVs 1, 2, 
and 3, MCL 777.31 to MCL 777.33, have provisions for scoring “other offenders” 
according to the score of one offender in multiple-offender cases, but OVs 4 through 19, 
MCL 777.44 to MCL 777.49, do not offer guidance on whether co-offenders must be 
 
 
 
7 
 
assessed the same number of points as each other.1  In fact, OV 14 addresses the role of 
offenders who act in concert with others and requires the court to score the variable when 
the offender acted as a leader.  MCL 777.44(1)(a).  This requires the court to score OV 14 
differently for some offenders than others in a multiple-offender situation.2  Here, MCL 
777.31(2)(b) and MCL 777.32(2) clearly require that another offender be assessed points 
as a threshold matter before points may be assessed to this defendant on a multiple-offender 
theory.   
The dissent’s view of the aiding-and-abetting statute is more nuanced.  The dissent 
notes that the statute says aiders and abettors should be “ ‘prosecuted, indicted, tried and 
on conviction shall be punished as if [they] had directly committed such offense.’ ”  
Quoting MCL 767.39 (emphasis added by the dissent).  Because the Legislature included 
the word “punished,” the dissent reasons that the statute must have some application to 
sentencing.  According to the dissent, “it is appropriate to assess points under an OV if the 
defendant aided and abetted the specific conduct that serves as the basis for scoring the 
OV,” and the multiple-offender provisions allow for co-offender conduct to provide the 
basis for OV scoring even if the defendant did not aid or abet that conduct. 
 
1 Some OVs are completely silent on multiple-offender cases, and some require a scoring 
difference if there were multiple offenders but do not address appropriate scores for aiders 
and abettors on the basis of the principal’s conduct.  See MCL 777.31 et seq. 
2 MCL 777.44(2)(b) states that “[i]f 3 or more offenders were involved, more than 1 
offender may be determined to have been a leader.”  See People v Rhodes (On Remand), 
305 Mich App 85, 88; 849 NW2d 417 (2014).  The implication of MCL 777.44(2)(b) is 
that when there are exactly two offenders, only one may be assessed 10 points for OV 14.  
Generally, OV 14 is clearly meant to ascribe greater culpability to some offenders than to 
others in multiple-offender situations. 
 
 
 
8 
 
Regardless of how we interpret and apply MCL 767.39, it remains significant that 
only defendant was convicted and sentenced in relation to the robbery.  Even if defendant 
aided and abetted his codefendants in using a firearm to carry out the robbery, the language 
of OVs 1 and 2 does not support the contention that points may be assessed when only one 
defendant in a multiple-offender scenario is convicted and sentenced.  Again, we may not 
ignore the plain language of the OV statutes in favor of applying the broader aiding-and-
abetting statute, and to do so would be contrary to the general rules of statutory 
interpretation.  Miller, 481 Mich App at 613.  Further, we disagree with the dissent’s 
application of MCL 767.39 in this case.  The dissent directly addresses the use of a firearm 
during the robbery: 
Defendant was present during the armed robbery when his co-
offender was using the weapon.  After his co-offender pointed the gun at the 
victim, defendant helped to bind the victim with duct tape.  Later, after 
defendant and his co-offender tried to escape, the co-offender hit the victim 
on the head with the firearm.  Defendant’s conduct constitutes aiding and 
abetting the use of the firearm.   
MCL 767.39 assigns liability when a co-defendant “procures, counsels, aids, or abets” the 
conduct of another.  What the dissent describes is defendant and the co-offender equally 
participating in the robbery, and the co-offender aiding and abetting the actions of 
defendant in perpetrating the robbery.  But nothing in this description specifically amounts 
to defendant procuring, counseling, aiding, or abetting the co-offender’s use of the firearm.   
Finally, there is a difference in the phrasing of OVs 1 and 2, which lends some 
support to the prosecution’s reading of OV 1.  OV 1 assigns points for the “aggravated use 
of a weapon” and describes aggravated uses in the passive voice.  Specifically, OV 1 refers 
to whether “[a] firearm was pointed at or toward a victim . . . .”  MCL 777.31(1)(c).  OV 2 
 
 
 
9 
 
assigns points on the basis of the “lethal potential of [a] weapon possessed or used” and 
describes each category of possession in the active voice.  MCL 777.32(1).  Specifically, OV 
2 refers to whether “[t]he offender possessed or used a pistol . . . .”  MCL 777.32(1)(d).  One 
could argue that while OV 2’s plain text ties possession to individual offenders, OV 1’s plain 
text assesses points to all offenders based on the conduct of co-offenders.  While there seems 
to be no dispute that defendant neither possessed a pistol nor pointed one at a victim, there also 
seems to be no dispute that his co-offender did.  So, a firearm was indeed pointed at a victim.   
However, relying on this argument would create a counterintuitive difference in the 
operation of OVs 1 and 2 and render MCL 777.31(2)(b) nugatory.  OVs 1 and 2 have 
parallel functions and purposes.  As discussed above, OV 1 assigns points on the basis of 
how a weapon is used (that is, whether it was used in a particularly dangerous manner), 
while OV 2 assigns points on the basis of the inherent dangerousness of a weapon.  
Additionally, each OV has a nearly identical provision for tying together conduct of co-
offenders.  MCL 777.31(2)(b); MCL 777.32(2).  Given the similarities in purpose and 
structure of the OVs, it would be odd if use of the passive voice in OV 1 resulted in courts 
according a different meaning to the nearly identical language of the co-offender provisions 
in both OVs.  At any rate, this reading would render MCL 777.31(2)(b) redundant.  
Generally, “[w]hen interpreting a statute, we must give effect to every word, phrase, and 
clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or 
nugatory.”  People v Propp, 508 Mich 374, 383; 976 NW2d 1 (2021) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  But if the passive nature of OV 1’s wording were sufficient to transmit 
liability among co-offenders, there would be no work left for MCL 777.31(2)(b) to do.  
This is a complicating piece of the puzzle of these statutes, but it does not change the result. 
 
 
 
10 
 
It is true that the proper interpretation of the statutory language precludes assessing 
points under OVs 1 and 2 against defendants whose co-offenders have evaded capture or 
are not brought to trial but allows scoring in cases where all offenders are sentenced and 
assessed points at the same time.  This might strike some as an incongruous result.  But 
this is a policy decision left to the Legislature, not the judiciary.  See Nieminen v Isle Royale 
Copper Co, 214 Mich 212, 214; 183 NW 9 (1921) (“This language is simple, clear and 
unambiguous, and we think is controlling.  Counsel argue and give illustrations that are 
persuasive that this construction of the statute may in certain instances work a great 
hardship.  If it be conceded that the argument is true, still we think it one to be addressed 
to the legislature and not the court.”).  And the Legislature could easily amend the statute 
to address this issue.  For example, it could make the multiple-offender provisions 
applicable if an offender “is or could be assessed points.”  See MCL 777.31(2)(b) and MCL 
777.32(2). 
Having concluded that the trial court erred in scoring OV 1 and OV 2, we must 
determine whether defendant is entitled to resentencing as a result.  “A defendant is entitled 
to be sentenced by a trial court on the basis of accurate information.”  People v Francisco, 
474 Mich 82, 88; 711 NW2d 44 (2006); see also MCL 769.34(10).  A scoring error requires 
resentencing when it results in a miscalculation of the sentencing range.  Francisco, 474 
Mich at 88.  While defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years 
pursuant to MCL 769.12(1)(a), resentencing is still required when the upper range of the 
sentencing guidelines would change.  In Francisco, this Court explained: 
Indeed, appellate correction of an erroneously calculated guidelines range 
will always present this dilemma, i.e., the defendant will have been given a 
sentence which stands differently in relationship to the correct guidelines 
 
 
 
11 
 
range than may have been the trial court’s intention.  Thus, requiring 
resentencing in such circumstances not only respects the defendant’s right to 
be sentenced on the basis of the law, but it also respects the trial court’s 
interest in having defendant serve the sentence that it truly intends. 
[Francisco, 474 Mich at 91-92.] 
Here, defendant’s minimum sentence range was 135 to 450 months.  Because he was 
subject to a statutory mandatory minimum of 300 months (25 years), in effect, the range 
for his minimum sentence was 300 to 450 months.  The circuit court imposed a sentence 
of 360 to 720 months (30 to 60 years).  Defendant needs a reduction of one point to change 
his minimum sentence range from F-III to F-II in the Class A grid (126 to 420 months), 
and 19 points to move to F-I (108 to 360 months).  This Court’s decision results in a 20-
point reduction.  While defendant is still subject to the mandatory minimum, effectively 
setting the lower end of his sentencing range at 300 months, the top of the minimum 
sentence range is now significantly reduced.  Resentencing is required.  Id. at 92.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the circuit court erred by assessing 15 points to defendant for OV 
1 and 5 points for OV 2, and we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
Because this Court’s reversal reduces defendant’s OV score by 20 points, resulting in a 
new minimum sentencing guidelines range, we remand to the circuit court for resentencing 
consistent with this opinion.  In all other respects, defendant’s application for leave to 
appeal is denied.  We do not retain jurisdiction. 
 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 161589 
 
ROBERTO MARCELLO DUPREE, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
CLEMENT, C.J. (dissenting). 
This case presents a textual wrinkle—given that certain offense variables (OVs) 
mandate that in multiple-offender cases all offenders should be assessed the same number 
of points, how should those OVs be scored when a defendant’s co-offenders were not 
apprehended and therefore were never assessed points under those OVs?  It is undisputed 
that defendant’s armed co-offender, if apprehended and convicted, would have been 
assessed points for OVs 1 and 2, which concern aggravated use of a weapon and lethal 
potential of a weapon, respectively.  Nevertheless, the majority opinion holds that 
defendant should not be assessed points for OVs 1 and 2 because he was unarmed and his 
armed co-offender, who remains at large, has of course not been assessed points for those 
OVs.  This is a curious result, that a defendant should benefit because his co-offenders 
were not apprehended.  I do not believe that the statutes require this to be so.   
Put simply, I believe a defendant must be assessed OV points if they aided and 
abetted the conduct that serves as the basis for scoring the OVs.  Accordingly, even if a co-
offender is not assessed points under an OV with a multiple-offender provision, rendering 
 
2 
 
that multiple-offender provision inapplicable, the defendant must still be assessed points 
for that OV if the defendant aided and abetted conduct addressed by that OV.  This reading 
of the OV statutes is consistent with the aiding-and-abetting statute1 and our caselaw.  
Further, this reading would not render the multiple-offender provisions in OVs 1 and 2 
nugatory.  Rather, the existence of a multiple-offender provision means that aiding and 
abetting the crime itself is sufficient to warrant scoring the defendant identically to their 
co-offenders; so long as one co-offender is assessed points for an OV with a multiple-
offender provision, those who aided and abetted the crime may be assessed points for that 
OV.  For OVs without a multiple-offender provision, or when that provision is 
inapplicable, a defendant must have aided and abetted the conduct that supports assessing 
points for the OV at issue; that is, merely aiding and abetting the crime itself does not 
support assessing points for an OV without a multiple-offender provision.  Therefore, 
because defendant aided and abetted conduct that must be scored under OVs 1 and 2, I 
dissent from this Court’s conclusions that OVs 1 and 2 should have been scored at zero 
points in this case and that defendant is entitled to resentencing.   
I agree with the majority’s summary of the facts.  In short, defendant and two 
accomplices robbed a store in 2012.  Only one of the three was armed, and it was not 
defendant.  Of the three offenders, only defendant was apprehended.  He was convicted of 
armed robbery and was sentenced, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, to serve 360 to 
720 months (30 to 60 years) in prison.  Defendant appealed, challenging the scoring of 
OVs 1 and 2, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.   
 
1 MCL 767.39. 
 
3 
 
This case turns on the correct scoring of OVs 1 and 2, which the sentencing court 
scored at 15 points and 5 points, respectively.  Fifteen points should be assessed for OV 1, 
concerning aggravated use of a weapon, when “[a] firearm was pointed at or toward a 
victim . . . .”  MCL 777.31(1)(c).  Five points should be assessed for OV 2, concerning the 
lethal potential of the weapon used, when “[t]he offender possessed or used a pistol, rifle, 
shotgun, or knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon . . . .”  MCL 777.32(1)(d).  Both OVs 
contain the same language, which is the source of the dispute in this case.  The statutes 
instruct, “In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for [the OV], all 
offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.”2   
As an initial matter, I agree with defendant and the majority that defendant’s own 
conduct during the offense does not directly support scoring OVs 1 and 2, given that 
defendant did not personally use or possess the gun during the armed robbery and that he 
did not point the gun at the victim.  I also agree with defendant and the majority that the 
multiple-offender provisions in OVs 1 and 2 are not triggered because none of defendant’s 
co-offenders was “assessed points” under OVs 1 and 2.  The language contains two 
conditions—first, the case must be a multiple-offender case, and second, one offender “is 
assessed” points for the OV.  Because the second condition is not satisfied here, the 
instruction to assess defendant the same number of points as his co-offenders is 
inapplicable.  Nonetheless, I disagree with the majority that defendant may not be assessed 
points under those OVs based on his conduct during the offense.   
 
2 MCL 777.31(2)(b) (“In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for the 
presence or use of a weapon, all offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.”); 
MCL 777.32(2) (“In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for possessing 
a weapon, all offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.”).   
 
4 
 
First, the majority’s conclusion improperly disregards MCL 767.39, which 
abolishes the distinction between an accessory and a principal in Michigan.  MCL 767.39 
states, “Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly 
commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its 
commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be 
punished as if he had directly committed such offense.”  The majority contends that MCL 
767.39 means that an aider and abettor should be charged with the same offense as if they 
were the principal but that the statute does not apply to the scoring of the OVs.   
I disagree with the majority’s narrow reading of MCL 767.39.  The language of that 
statute is broad, saying that an aider and abettor should be “prosecuted, indicted, tried and 
on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  If the Legislature meant to indicate only that a defendant should be charged with 
the crime that the principal committed, the Legislature could have stated merely that an 
aider and abettor should be “prosecuted, indicted, [and] tried” as if they were the principal 
and there would be no need for the statute’s reference to punishment.  In other words, the 
instruction in MCL 767.39 that an aider and abettor “shall be punished as if he had directly 
committed [the] offense” cannot mean, as the majority contends, only that the aider and 
abettor is charged with the same crime as the principal, because that would be subsumed 
within the language in MCL 767.39 instructing that the aider and abettor be “prosecuted, 
indicted, [and] tried . . . as if he had directly committed [the] offense.”  Accordingly, MCL 
767.39 must have some application to punishment, and specifically to the OVs.3 
 
3 MCL 767.39’s reference to the “offense” includes not only the crime itself but also the 
“offense” for which the OV is scored.  Merriam-Webster defines “offense,” in relevant 
part, as “an infraction of law.”  Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, offense 
 
5 
 
Reading MCL 767.39 in pari materia with the OV statutes, MCL 777.31 et seq., it 
is appropriate to assess points under an OV if the defendant aided and abetted the specific 
conduct that serves as the basis for scoring the OV.4  Such a reading is consistent with our 
caselaw.  In People v Gloster, 499 Mich 199, 202; 880 NW2d 776 (2016), the defendant 
drove his codefendants to Hamtramck, where the codefendants singled out and attacked a 
woman, attempting to steal her necklace.  The codefendants fled the scene, and the 
defendant later picked them up and drove them away from the area where the crime had 
occurred.  Id.  The defendant was convicted of armed robbery under an aiding-and-abetting 
theory, id. at 203, and the trial court assessed the defendant 15 points for OV 10, which is 
appropriate when “[p]redatory conduct was involved.”  MCL 777.40(1)(a).  The Court of 
Appeals upheld the trial court’s score, concluding that the defendant aided and abetted in 
the commission of an offense that involved “the exact sort of predatory conduct [that] OV 
10 is designed to punish.”  Gloster, 499 Mich at 203 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
 (accessed December 12, 2022) 
[https://perma.cc/W7VQ-RKAF].  Not only are traditional crimes obviously infractions of 
law, but the various kinds of conduct addressed by the OVs are also infractions of law that 
the OV statutes punish through the assessment of points, which, in turn, can raise a 
defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range.   
4 Reading MCL 767.39 in pari materia with MCL 777.31 et seq. is appropriate.  “Under 
the doctrine [of in pari materia], statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a 
common purpose should, if possible, be read together to create a harmonious body of law.  
An act that incidentally refers to the same subject is not in pari materia if its scope and aim 
are distinct and unconnected.”  People v Mazur, 497 Mich 302, 313; 872 NW2d 201 (2015) 
(citation omitted).  Both MCL 767.39 and MCL 777.31 et seq. are in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which has the purpose of “provid[ing] for judgments and sentences of persons 
convicted of criminal offenses and ordinance violations . . . .”  1994 PA 445, title.  
Therefore, MCL 767.39 and MCL 777.31 et seq. do not merely incidentally refer to the 
same subject, but rather, they share a common purpose. 
 
6 
 
This Court reversed and unanimously held that because of the multiple-offender 
provision exclusive to OVs 1, 2, and 3,5 “a defendant shall not have points assessed solely 
on the basis of his or her co-offenders’ conduct unless the OV at issue specifically indicates 
to the contrary.”  Id. at 206.  This Court cited People v Hunt, 290 Mich App 317; 810 
NW2d 588 (2010), which considered OV 7 and held that the defendant could not be 
assessed points when he took no part in the conduct serving as the basis for scoring OV 7.  
Gloster, 499 Mich at 206 n 16.  Hunt reasoned:  
[W]hile defendant was present and armed during the commission of the 
crimes here, he did not himself commit, take part in, or encourage others to 
commit acts constituting “sadism, torture, or excessive brutality” under 
OV 7.  Moreover, unlike OV 1, OV 2, and OV 3, OV 7 does not state that 
“[i]n multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for [the 
applicable behavior or result], all offenders shall be assessed the same 
number of points.”  For OV 7, only the defendant’s actual participation 
should be scored.  [Hunt, 290 Mich App at 325-326 (citations omitted; 
emphasis added; second and third alterations in original).] 
Thus, the reasoning of Hunt and Gloster supports the conclusion that, outside of OVs 1, 2, 
and 3, to be assessed points under an OV a defendant must have actually participated in 
the conduct by either committing, taking part in, or encouraging others to commit the 
conduct addressed by the OV.6    
 
5 While OV 3 is not at issue in this case, like OVs 1 and 2, OV 3 contains a multiple-
offender provision; that provision states, “In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is 
assessed points for death or physical injury, all offenders must be assessed the same number 
of points.”  MCL 777.33(2)(a). 
6 Notably, aiding and abetting can take several forms.  MCL 767.39 penalizes one who 
“procures, counsels, aids, or abets in [a crime’s] commission . . . .”  We have noted that 
such language was essentially the traditional definition of aiding and abetting, which was 
to “ ‘[h]elp, assist, or facilitate the commission of a crime, promote the accomplishment 
thereof, help in advancing or bringing it about, or encourage, counsel, or incite as to its 
 
7 
 
That is, with respect to all OVs, aiding and abetting the conduct addressed by the 
OV always warrants the assessment of points for that OV.  With regard to OVs 1, 2, and 3, 
aiding and abetting the crime generally is sufficient to warrant scoring the defendant 
identically to their co-offenders, so long as one co-offender is assessed points for the OV.  
But even if a co-offender is not assessed points under OVs 1, 2, and 3—such that the 
multiple-offender provisions do not apply—the defendant may still be assessed points for 
those OVs if they aided and abetted the conduct addressed by those OVs.  This is consistent 
with MCL 767.39’s statement that aiders and abettors should be punished as if they directly 
committed the offense.   
Importantly, this interpretation of the OV statutes does not render the multiple-
offender provisions in OVs 1, 2, and 3 nugatory.  Indeed, if aiding and abetting the crime 
itself justified scoring the OVs based on the principal’s conduct alone, then the aider and 
abettor would always be assessed the same points as the principal and there would be no 
need for OVs 1, 2, and 3 to make clear that a co-offender’s conduct alone may justify the 
assessment of points.  Therefore, there must be a distinction between a defendant’s aiding-
and-abetting conduct supporting a conviction and a defendant’s aiding-and-abetting 
conduct supporting a specific sentence.  That distinction exists by recognizing that while a 
defendant may not be assessed points based solely on a co-offender’s conduct unless the 
OV states otherwise (i.e., a multiple-offender provision), a defendant may be assessed 
points when they aided and abetted the conduct that serves as the basis for scoring the 
OV—not merely aided and abetted the crime itself.   
 
commission.’ ”  People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 8 n 17; 715 NW2d 44 (2006) (alteration 
in original), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 63. 
 
8 
 
Applying that rule to the instant case, although the multiple-offender provisions of 
OVs 1 and 2 do not apply, defendant aided and abetted the conduct at issue in OVs 1 and 
2.  Defendant was present during the armed robbery when his co-offender was using the 
weapon.  After his co-offender pointed the gun at the victim, defendant helped to bind the 
victim with duct tape.  Later, when defendant and his co-offender tried to escape, the co-
offender hit the victim on the head with the firearm.  Defendant’s conduct constitutes aiding 
and abetting the use of the firearm.  Defendant at least promoted and encouraged the use 
of the gun by actively taking part in the armed robbery while his co-offender was using the 
gun, and he took advantage of the fear that the gun inspired in the victim by binding the 
victim after the gun was wielded against him.  Unlike the defendant in Gloster, defendant 
here was not a getaway driver with possibly no knowledge that his co-offender had used a 
firearm.  Instead, he aided and abetted his armed co-offender in the exact conduct addressed 
in OVs 1 and 2. 
Importantly, the majority’s holding has eyebrow-raising practical effects.  The 
majority’s ruling provides a fairly significant benefit to defendants in multiple-offender 
situations so long as their co-offenders are never caught.  Why the Legislature might have 
wanted to do that is anybody’s guess.  While I believe the text of the statute controls and, 
for the reasons discussed, that the text supports my reading, the practical implications of 
the majority’s holding should be enough to warrant at least a pause to consider whether the 
Court is truly on the right track.7   
 
7 Additionally, I question whether, under the majority’s interpretation, defendant’s co-
offenders, if any of them were to be apprehended and convicted in the future, must also be 
assessed zero points for OV 1 and OV 2 because this score was assigned to defendant.  In 
that scenario, one offender, namely defendant, would arguably have been assessed points 
 
9 
 
The majority’s reading of the statutory scheme will lead to some perplexing results.  
For the reasons set out in this opinion, I do not believe the text of the statute mandates such 
results.  Reading MCL 777.31 and MCL 777.32 in pari materia with MCL 767.39 and 
applying our reasoning from Gloster, I conclude that even without the application of the 
multiple-offender provisions, a defendant can be assessed points under OVs 1 and 2 if they 
aided and abetted the conduct at issue in those OVs.  Under these facts, I believe defendant 
here did aid and abet the conduct at issue, and OVs 1 and 2 were consequently properly 
scored.  Therefore, I dissent. 
 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
BOLDEN, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 
considered it before she assumed office. 
 
under the OV; although the sentencing court assessed defendant zero points, that is 
plausibly still the assessment of points.  Both conditions of the multiple-offender provision 
being met in this hypothetical scenario, MCL 777.31(2)(b) and MCL 777.32(2) may 
mandate, according to the majority’s ruling, that the co-offenders be “assessed the same 
number of points.”