Title: Brown v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-323 
____________ 
 
LAVERNE BROWN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
December 20, 2018 
 
LAWSON, J. 
 
We review the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Brown v. State, 
233 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).  In Brown, the Fifth District expressly 
declared valid section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2015), which requires that a 
qualifying offender whose sentencing scoresheet totals 22 points or fewer be 
sentenced to a nonstate prison sanction unless the trial court makes written findings 
that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  As explained below, because 
subsection (10) requires the court, not the jury, to find the fact of dangerousness to 
the public that is necessary to increase the statutory maximum nonstate prison 
 
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sanction, we hold that subsection (10) violates the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and quash the Fifth District’s decision. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Subsection (10) provides as follows: 
If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 
1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as 
defined in s. 776.08, and excluding any third degree felony violation 
under chapter 810, and if the total sentence points pursuant to s. 
921.0024 are 22 points or fewer, the court must sentence the offender 
to a nonstate prison sanction.  However, if the court makes written 
findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the 
public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional 
facility pursuant to this section. 
 
§ 775.082(10), Fla. Stat.  
 
But for subsection (10), the penalty for a third-degree felony would be “a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years” pursuant to section 775.082(3)(e), 
Florida Statutes (2015).  However, as this Court has previously explained, with the 
2009 addition of subsection (10), the Florida Legislature “reinstated” the “practice 
of upward departure sentences” by “requir[ing] a written finding regarding danger 
to the public” for offenders who would otherwise be entitled to a nonstate prison 
sanction pursuant to subsection (10).  Bryant v. State, 148 So. 3d 1251, 1258 (Fla. 
2014).  In other words, subsection (10) marks a change from the Criminal 
Punishment Code (CPC) that the Legislature adopted in 1998, in that the CPC 
 
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“does not contemplate upward departure sentences, because generally the statutory 
maximum sentence is the highest possible sentence for any crime.”  Id.  
 
In the decision on review, the Fifth District expressly declared subsection 
(10) valid in the context of rejecting Laverne Brown’s argument that “her state 
prison sentence violates the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, because the jury did not find that she 
presents a danger to the public under section 775.082(10).”  Brown, 233 So. 3d at 
1262.  Brown’s jury found her guilty of petit theft for stealing a DVD player from 
a store, which was a third-degree felony based upon Brown’s prior convictions.  
See id.  Although Brown’s scoresheet totaled 16.4 points, the trial court found that 
imposing a nonstate prison sanction presented a danger to the public and imposed 
an upward departure sentence of three years’ incarceration in state prison.  Id. at 
1263.  To avoid the constitutional problem of imposing an upward departure 
sentence based upon judicial factfinding (as opposed to facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant), the Fifth District adopted the Fourth 
District’s prior classification of subsection (10) as providing for “mandatory 
mitigation” of the maximum penalty of up to 5 years’ imprisonment that, but for 
subsection (10), would apply to Brown’s third-degree felony conviction pursuant 
to subsection (3)(e).  Id. at 1263-64 (citing Porter v. State, 110 So. 3d 962, 963 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also id. at 1265-66 (“[S]ection 775.082(10) is a 
 
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mitigation statute, and not one that unconstitutionally allows an increase in the 
statutory maximum based upon judicial fact-finding.”). 
Because Brown has since served her sentence and been released from 
custody, we limit our review to the jurisdictional issue of the Fifth District’s 
express declaration of subsection (10)’s validity and do not reach the parties’ 
arguments regarding harmless error and remedy.1  Cf. State v. Matthews, 891 So. 
2d 479, 483-84 (Fla. 2004) (retaining discretionary jurisdiction to address certified 
conflict concerning a sentencing issue, even though the defendant had been 
released from prison, explaining “[t]he mootness doctrine does not destroy [this 
Court’s] jurisdiction because the question . . . is one of great public importance and 
is likely to recur” and further “elect[ing] to proceed because the problem . . . is 
capable of repetition yet evading review”). 
 
 
                                          
 
1.  The statute’s constitutionality is a question of law we review de novo.  
See Caribbean Conservation Corp., Inc. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation 
Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 500 (Fla. 2003).  Although the 2015 version of the 
statute is at issue in this case, the language of subsection (10) has not changed 
since its addition in 2009.  In addition, we note that the remedy to be addressed in a 
future case relates to the remand instructions to be given by the appellate court if it 
finds that a sentencing court has improperly imposed a prison sentence without a 
jury finding of dangerousness.  In other words, whether the appellate court remand 
should instruct that a non-state prison sanction be imposed or afford the State an 
opportunity to present the dangerousness issue to a jury.    
 
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ANALYSIS 
In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact 
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).  In Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004), the Supreme Court defined the “statutory maximum” as 
“the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”   
We agree with Brown that subsection (10) unambiguously sets the statutory 
maximum penalty, for Apprendi purposes as defined by Blakely, as “a nonstate 
prison sanction,” § 775.082(10), Fla. Stat., for her and similarly situated offenders.  
This is because, absent a factual finding of “dangerousness to the public”—a 
finding not reflected in the jury’s verdict on the theft charge—the statute plainly 
states that “the court must sentence the offender to a nonstate prison sanction,” id. 
(emphasis added), given the crime charged and Brown’s criminal history as 
reflected on her criminal punishment code scoresheet.  Although it would have 
been possible for the Legislature to have written this statute as a “mitigation 
statute,” giving the court discretion to impose up to five years unless the defendant 
proved non-dangerousness, the Legislature did not do so.  We read statutes as they 
are written.  See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (“[W]hen the 
 
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language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation 
and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” 
(quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). 
Accordingly, we hold that subsection (10) violates the Sixth Amendment in 
light of Apprendi and Blakely based on its plain language requiring the court, not 
the jury, to find the fact of dangerousness to the public necessary to increase the 
statutory maximum nonstate prison sanction.  Cf. Booker v. State, 244 So. 3d 1151, 
1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (holding that “the second sentence of subsection (10) is 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment as applied to [the defendant]” 
because “the trial judge’s factual findings—and thereby [the defendant’s] enhanced 
sentence—were neither based on a jury finding that he poses a ‘danger to the 
public’ nor limited to only the fact that [the defendant] had prior convictions”); cf. 
also Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 95 (Fla. 2014) (“hold[ing] that upward departure 
sentences that are unconstitutionally enhanced in violation of Apprendi and Blakely 
patently fail to comport with constitutional limitations, and consequently, the 
sentences are illegal under rule 3.800(a)”).   
CONCLUSION 
Because subsection (10) violates the Sixth Amendment by requiring the 
court rather than the jury to make the finding of dangerousness to the public 
 
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necessary to increase the statutory maximum nonstate prison sanction to a state 
prison sentence, we quash the Fifth District’s express declaration of subsection 
(10)’s validity in Brown and disapprove the Fourth District’s decision in Porter 
rejecting a similar Sixth Amendment challenge to subsection (10).  In order for a 
court to impose any sentence above a nonstate prison sanction when section 
775.082(10) applies, a jury must make the dangerousness finding. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and 
LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 27, 2018.  A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION 
FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED ON OR BEFORE 
JANUARY 2, 2019.  NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO 
FILE A REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED, 
DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Statutory 
Validity/Constitutional Construction 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D16-1045 
 
(Orange County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Matthew Funderburk, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Wesley Heidt, Bureau 
Chief, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
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for Appellee