Title: John D. Freeman v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-2007
____________
JOHN D. FREEMAN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 11, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
John D. Freeman (Freeman), a death row inmate, appeals an order of the trial
court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons more fully set forth below, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief. 
The facts, as set forth in Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2000), are
as follows:  
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John D. Freeman (Freeman) was convicted of first-degree
felony murder for the 1986 killing of Leonard Collier (Collier). 
Freeman was sentenced to death, and both the conviction and
sentence were affirmed on appeal.  See Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d
73 (Fla. 1990).  Collier caught Freeman in the act of burglarizing his
home.  Freeman claimed that Collier pointed a gun at him and
threatened to shoot him to prevent his escape.  The two struggled over
the gun and fell outside into the front yard.  When Freeman obtained
possession of the gun, he used the gun to repeatedly strike Collier in
the head ten to twelve times.  Collier died from the head wounds.  
Id. at 1058.  The Collier murder was the second murder that Freeman committed
within twenty-two days.  The first murder was committed in a similar manner—the
victim, Alvin Epps (Epps), came home to find Freeman burglarizing his home and
Freeman stabbed him to death.  In the Epps case, Freeman was convicted of first-
degree murder, the jury recommended a life sentence, the judge overrode the jury
recommendation, and this Court reversed the override.  Freeman v. State, 547 So.
2d 125 (Fla. 1989).  
After Freeman's direct appeal was concluded in the Collier murder, he filed a
motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court summarily denied.  See
Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2000).  Freeman appealed the summary
denial of his postconviction motion to this Court, and also filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.  The cases were consolidated for our consideration.  After
considering Freeman's appeal, we remanded Freeman's 3.850 motion for an
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evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See id.  In all
other respects, we affirmed the trial court's denial of Freeman's postconviction
motion.  We also denied Freeman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  See id.  
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the remanded claim and
denied relief.  Freeman now appeals that denial, raising two claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel:  whether trial counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase trial
for failing to object to the State's alleged improper reliance on racial factors in
seeking the death penalty, and whether trial counsel was ineffective in the penalty
phase trial for failure to present evidence in mitigation.  For the reasons explained
below, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief.
Ineffective Assistance at Guilt Phase Trial
Freeman alleges defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the
State's decision to pursue the death penalty was based upon improper racial
considerations.  He claims the prosecutor rejected Freeman's offer to plead guilty in
the Epps and Collier cases in exchange for two consecutive life sentences because
the State needed to seek the death penalty in more cases where Caucasian
defendants killed African-American victims. 
Although the decision to seek the death penalty is within the prosecutor's
discretion, that discretion may be curbed by the judiciary where motives such as
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bad faith, race, religion, or a desire to prevent the defendant from exercising his
constitutional rights contributes to the prosecutor's decision.  See State v. Bloom,
497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986).  Freeman claims that race was the motive behind the
prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty in this case.
At the evidentiary hearing, Freeman presented the testimony of then Assistant
State Attorney John Bradford Stetson, Jr., State Attorney Ed Austin, Assistant
Public Defender Ann Finnell (who was Freeman's co-counsel at the Epps trial), and
Assistant Public Defender Patrick McGuinness (Freeman's trial counsel for both
the Collier and Epps murders).  The testimony showed that prior to trial, Freeman's
trial counsel approached the prosecutor with an offer to plead guilty to both the
Epps and Collier murders in exchange for two consecutive life sentences with
twenty-five-year mandatory minimum terms.  The testimony showed that both
parties were aware of the then pending federal case, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987).  McCleskey involved an allegation that prosecutors were seeking the
death penalty disproportionally against African-American defendants.  Freeman
alleges that when his trial counsel presented the plea offer to the prosecutor, the
prosecutor refused the offer for fear that defense attorneys in other cases would
argue that he was favoring Caucasian defendants.  Freeman argues that the State
relied on race in making its decision, that the reliance created a reverse-McCleskey
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claim, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim because he
admittedly did not know how to do so.  
The trial court found that, although the prosecutor's response to defense
counsel's plea offer was "a somewhat ill-considered retort," the evidence
demonstrated that the State did not pursue the death penalty based on Freeman's
race.  The evidence the trial court relied upon included the testimony of Ed Austin,
the State Attorney at the time of trial.  Austin stated that his office never prosecuted
a defendant based on his or her race.  Austin also stated that although he had no
recollection of Freeman's case, at the time of Freeman's trial it was standard policy
for him to discuss the case with the prosecutor and determine the elements of the
crime, the aggravation and mitigation, and whether the State should go forward and
seek the death penalty.  Austin commented on the ongoing accusations that his
office too often sought the death penalty in cases where the victims were Caucasian
and the defendants were African-American.  He stated there were a lot of
newspaper articles criticizing the State Attorney's Office, but those accusations had
nothing to do with the decision to file and prosecute a homicide as a first-degree
murder case.  The decision to seek the death penalty, Austin stated, was made on
the basis of the facts of the case.  When Austin was asked about the public's
perception of the State Attorney's Office, he stated that perceptions have nothing to
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do with how a case is prosecuted, or the decision to seek the death penalty, or
whether there is aggravation that outweighs mitigation.  Austin stated that the only
time race is considered in the prosecution is if race is an element of the crime, and
that during his tenure as a State Attorney, his office never filed a case for the wrong
reasons.  The cases were filed based on the law.  Prosecutor Stetson also testified
at the evidentiary hearing.  He stated that under the facts of this case, irrespective of
race, the aggravating circumstances clearly supported the decision to seek the death
penalty. 
For ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in postconviction
proceedings, the appellate court affords deference to findings of fact based on
competent, substantial evidence and independently reviews deficiency and
prejudice as mixed questions of law and fact.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d
1028, 1033-34 (Fla. 2000) (setting forth standard of appellate review following an
evidentiary hearing on motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims);
see also State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2000); Cherry v. State, 781 So.
2d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 2000) ("[W]e review the prongs of . . . ineffective assistance of
counsel as questions of mixed law and fact.").  Therefore, we give deference to the
findings of fact regarding the conversations between the prosecutor and defense
counsel, the conversations between the prosecutor and the State Attorney, and the
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testimony as to how and why the State chose to seek the death penalty in this case.
The trial court's finding that the State did not prosecute Freeman because of his
race is based on competent, substantial evidence in the record. 
Next, we review whether these findings constitute a deficiency in
performance that prejudiced Freeman.  This Court reviews de novo the issue of
whether defense counsel was deficient at trial and, if so, whether the defendant was
prejudiced.  See Stephens, 748 So. 2d at 1033-34.  Freeman argues that defense
counsel was ineffective because he admittedly did not know what legal mechanism
to employ to address the issue of the prosecutor's perceived reliance on race as a
factor in the decision to seek the death penalty.  
As stated in Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59, 64-65 (Fla. 2001), for a
defendant to succeed in his ineffectiveness claims, he must satisfy two elements:
first, he must show that counsel's performance was deficient; and second, he must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  In order to prove
these elements, a defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
and that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial
where the result is reliable.  Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984)).  "[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not
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necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong." 
Stewart, 801 So. 2d at 65; see also  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ("[T]here is no
reason for a court deciding an effective assistance claim . . . to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
one."); Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 518 n.19 (Fla. 1999) (finding no need to
address prejudice prong where defendant failed to establish deficient performance
prong).
 
Even if we assume defense counsel was deficient in his inability to address
this issue at the time of trial, Freeman has failed to establish that the State relied on
race when it decided to seek the death penalty, and thus has not demonstrated
prejudice.  The testimony establishes only that the prosecutor was aware of the
McCleskey issue and perceptions and accusations made about his office.  State
Attorney Austin confirmed that race was not a factor in deciding to seek the death
penalty in Freeman's case.  The trial court accepted this testimony as true, and there
is nothing in the record to refute it.  The trial court's finding that the prosecutor did
not rely on this defendant's race in seeking the death penalty is supported by the
competent, substantial evidence in the record.  Therefore, we find no error in the
trial court's denial of relief on this claim.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase Trial
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Freeman claims defense counsel was ineffective in the penalty phase trial for
failing to investigate and present to the jury mitigating evidence from friends and
family about Freeman's abusive home life, for failing to have mental health experts
review his family history and present this evidence along with evidence of alcohol
and drug abuse, and for failing to present the live testimony of David Sorrells,
Freeman's best friend, who would have testified to abuse Freeman suffered as a
child.
As stated above, for Freeman to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, two
elements must be satisfied.  First, he must show that counsel's performance was
deficient, or that counsel made errors so serious that he or she did not function as
the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, he must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  See Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59,
64-65 (Fla. 2001).  This second prong requires showing that counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial with a reliable result.  Id. (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  The trial court considered
each of the alleged deficiencies and found that trial counsel was not deficient.  We
agree. 
Lay Witnesses
Defense counsel McGuinness testified at the evidentiary hearing that he made
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the decision to present the same mitigation at this trial as he presented in the Epps
trial since, in the Epps trial, the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. 
The only witnesses he called in the penalty phase were Mary Freeman (Freeman's
mother), Robert Jewell (Freeman's brother), and David Sorrells (Freeman's friend). 
Sorrells did not testify live at the trial, but the transcript of his testimony from the
Epps trial was read to the jury.  Defense counsel stated that he believed part of the
evidence in the penalty phase trial included evidence that Freeman was abused by
his stepfather.  As for evidence that Freeman's sister was sexually abused by
Freeman's stepfather, defense counsel testified that he did not have this
information, and he admitted he never spoke to Freeman's sister.  He stated that he
would have put on evidence of the sexual abuse only if he could have linked it to
Freeman.  He also stated that he knew of Freeman's use of drugs and alcohol, but
did not use that information in mitigation because he could not link it to the crime. 
He admitted that perhaps he should have "delved" more deeply into Freeman's drug
and alcohol use.  
Freeman argues that defense counsel should have presented more evidence
in mitigation, arguing that the result at trial would have been different if the jury had
heard about the scope of physical and sexual abuse in the Freeman household.  
The facts do not support the allegation that Freeman was sexually abused or
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was aware that his sister was sexually abused.  To find that trial counsel was
deficient in failing to present evidence of physical and sexual abuse, Freeman must
first show that a reasonable investigation would have uncovered the evidence.  See
Gorby v. State, 819 So. 2d 664, 676 n.11 (Fla. 2002) (finding that trial counsel was
not ineffective for not presenting evidence of the defendant's childhood sexual
abuse where there was no evidence that such abuse occurred).  The record in this
case does not demonstrate that any of the witnesses or potential witnesses knew of
the evidence of sexual abuse or would have told defense counsel about it if they did
know.  Freeman's sister testified at the evidentiary hearing that she kept the abuse to
herself until "later."  She testified that her mother knew of the abuse at the time of
Freeman's trial, but Freeman's mother did not volunteer this information to counsel. 
The trial court found that the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing
did not demonstrate physical abuse to the extent Freeman claims it occurred during
his childhood.  Each witness testified to single incidents of punishment that each
said occurred after Freeman misbehaved.  The trial court acknowledged the
testimony of Freeman's neighbors, Mary Holliman and Bobbie Hart, who both
described an incident where Freeman was whipped with a rubber hose.  However,
the severity of Freeman's claimed abuse was tempered by the testimony of Mitchell
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Tanner and Dwayne Watson, who stated that Freeman grew up like "all the rest of
us," that Freeman got into trouble and stayed out with his friends past his curfew,
and that Freeman knew when he went home he would have to face his stepfather. 
Freeman's neighbor, James Holliman, testified that he would hear Freeman and his
brother yell, "I won't do it anymore."  And Freeman's aunt, Sonja Bigdon, testified
that Freeman's stepfather yelled, as did Freeman's mother, but that his stepfather
loved Freeman in his own way and was good to Freeman at times.  
While additional evidence regarding specific examples of abuse could have
been presented, that is not the standard Strickland contemplates in evaluating
counsel's performance.  See Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002)
(finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence in
mitigation that was cumulative to evidence already presented in mitigation); see also
Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1051 (Fla. 2000) ("[E]ven if trial counsel should
have presented witnesses to testify about Cherry's abusive background, most of the
testimony now offered by Cherry is cumulative . . . . Although witnesses provided
specific instances of abuse, such evidence merely would have lent further support
to the conclusion that Cherry was abused by his father, a fact already known to the
jury.").  
The trial court acknowledged that the witnesses' combined testimony
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demonstrated that Freeman's stepfather was overly zealous in his punishment, but
the court also noted that the punishment described in the testimony was in response
to Freeman's misbehavior.  Further, as the trial court found, the information
presented at the evidentiary hearing was "largely cumulative" to that evidence
presented at trial, and that the combined testimony would not have outweighed the
statutory aggravating circumstances.  
It is clear from the testimony that Freeman suffered some physical abuse at
the hand of his stepfather.  In fact, the jury recommendation of life in the Epps trial
was based in part on the "history of abuse during Freeman's childhood."  Freeman,
547 So. 2d at 129.  However, the fact that Freeman was physically abused by his
stepfather was a fact made clear to this jury at trial.  Freeman's brother and mother,
as well as Dr. Louis Legum, a mental health expert, told the jury that Freeman was
abused by his stepfather.  In fact, the trial court accepted the nonstatutory
mitigating factor of abuse by Freeman's stepfather.  
Although the evidence presented at the postconviction hearing may have
painted a clearer picture as to the extent of the abuse, trial counsel is not ineffective
if he adequately made the point.  See Jennings v. State, 583 So. 2d 316, 321 (Fla.
1991) ("It is not negligent to fail to call everyone who may have information about
an event.  Once counsel puts on evidence sufficient, if believed by the jury, to
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establish his point, he need not call every witness whose testimony might bolster his
position.").  Even if counsel's failure to demonstrate the abuse with greater detail
can be considered error, it would be harmless because the abuse Freeman suffered
as a child was found as a mitigating factor.  
Expert Testimony
Freeman also called a number of friends and family members to testify at the
evidentiary hearing.  The testimony showed that Freeman suffered a head injury
when a neighbor accidently backed over him with a car when he was about two
years old, and another head injury after falling off a bicycle.  At the evidentiary
hearing, defense counsel testified that there were no medical records available to
indicate the nature or severity of either of the head injuries, the hospital records had
been destroyed, and the treating physician had no recollection of the injuries.  
Freeman then presented Dr. James E. Larson as an expert witness in forensic
psychology to testify that Freeman suffered from a "mild neuropsychological
impairment" and a "learning disability."  Dr. Larson administered certain tests to
Freeman and testified that Freeman performed poorly.  
The trial court found that
there was no materially significant information Dr. Larson possessed that defense
counsel did not provide to Dr. Legum at trial.  The trial court also held that because
Dr. Legum did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, there was no evidence that Dr.
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Legum's testimony at trial would have been any different had he been given Dr.
Larson's information.  Based on these facts, the trial court found that there was no
showing that trial counsel was deficient.  See Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917 (Fla.
2001) (finding that this Court will not substitute its judgment for trial court's
judgment on questions of fact, credibility of witnesses, and weight of evidence);
see also Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000); Whitfield v. State, 706 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1997).  
The trial court then considered the second prong of Strickland and held that
Freeman demonstrated no prejudice.  The trial court found that Dr. Larson's
opinion that Freeman possessed a "mild neuropsychological impairment" was
based on his speculative assessment of a combination of factors, which was
subject to impeachment by the State.  Furthermore, both Dr. Larson and Dr.
Legum would have testified that Freeman suffered from "anti-social personality
disorder" which is a trait most jurors tend to look disfavorably upon.  At best, the
trial court found, Dr. Larson's testimony would have established nonstatutory
mitigation.  See Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2000) (finding that trial
court properly rejected statutory mental mitigator where mental health expert
testified that defendant suffered from mental disturbance which was not "extreme");
see also Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1998); Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747
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(Fla. 1996); Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1995).  The trial court
concluded that Freeman's claim failed both prongs of the Strickland test for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
We accord deference to the trial court's findings of fact, and will uphold
them if the facts are based on competent, substantial evidence.  See Stephens v.
State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033-34 (Fla. 1999).  The facts the trial court relied upon
are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record.  Defense counsel
testified at the postconviction hearing that he provided Dr. Legum with Freeman's
school records, juvenile records, background information from his files, and any
other information he obtained as he acquired it.  Defense counsel informed Dr.
Legum that Freeman was sent to the hospital on a suicide watch prior to trial.  Dr.
Larson's testimony at the postconviction hearing was substantially similar to Dr.
Legum's testimony at trial.  Both experts testified to Freeman's IQ, intellectual
capabilities, and performance on achievement tests.  The fact that Freeman found a
new expert to provide more favorable mental health testimony does not, in itself,
render trial counsel deficient.  See Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2002)
(holding counsel's reasonable mental health investigation was not rendered
incompetent merely because defendant later secured testimony of more favorable
mental health expert and where expert's opinion at evidentiary hearing was
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cumulative to that already presented to trial court).  
The trial court's finding that Freeman's school records, juvenile records, and
other information in trial counsel's files were given to the trial expert is supported
by the competent, substantial evidence in the record based on trial counsel's own
testimony that he provided this information.  The facts in the record do not support
Freeman's claim that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to provide the trial
expert with pertinent background information, and relief on this claim is therefore
denied.  
Failure to Subpoena David Sorrells
Freeman claims that it was crucial to his defense that David Sorrells, his best
friend from childhood, testify live at his trial.  Sorrells testified live at the Epps trial. 
Defense counsel did not subpoena Sorrells for trial in this case because he
perceived Sorrells as a friendly witness and expected Sorrells would testify
voluntarily.  However, when the penalty phase trial began, defense counsel could
not locate Sorrells.  Counsel sent Freeman's brother to Sorrells' house and left a
message with Sorrells' girlfriend.  Counsel sought a continuance to find Sorrells and
bring him into the courtroom to testify, telling the judge that he knew where Sorrells
worked and could find him there.  However, because Sorrells had not been
subpoenaed, the trial judge refused to continue the penalty phase trial.  The trial
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judge had counsel read Sorrells' testimony from the Epps trial to the jury, and
instructed the jury to accept the testimony as if Sorrells had presented it live.   
Sorrells testified at the evidentiary hearing.  He stated that he had not been
contacted to testify at the trial, but would have done so.  Freeman now argues that
Sorrells' testimony should have been presented live, and when considered in
conjunction with the failure of trial counsel to present the other lay testimony, there
was clear prejudice.   He argues that without Sorrells' testimony along with the
testimony of other friends and neighbors, the jury believed that only family
members were willing to testify favorably about his character, and the jury never
understood that he is a human being with positive characteristics.
Sorrells testified at the Epps trial about two incidents of physical abuse
Freeman suffered.  At the evidentiary hearing Sorrells stated that had he been called
as a live witness, he would also have testified that Freeman was a hard worker,
Freeman enjoyed children, and he was well-mannered.  He would have also added
that Freeman's stepfather was "a pretty rowdy fella."  
Counsel's failure to subpoena a defense witness is not prejudicial where the
testimony is presented to the jury by other evidence.  See Melendez v. State, 612
So. 2d 1366, 1368 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel for
failure to subpoena defense witness because, when witness failed to appear, trial
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counsel was able to get testimony before jury by way of stipulation).  In this case,
Sorrells' testimony was presented by reading the transcript of his prior testimony.  
Furthermore, as the trial court found, trial counsel's failure to subpoena
Sorrells was a tactical decision to prevent the State from knowing who the defense
witnesses were.  Although trial counsel stated that he did not subpoena Sorrells
because he thought Sorrells would voluntarily appear, he also stated that, at the time
of this trial, there was no discovery regarding penalty phase witnesses and if he did
not subpoena a witness, the prosecutor would not know who his witnesses would
be.  Trial counsel stated, "I saw no reason to assist the State in preparing to meet
any of my witnesses."  Thus, the trial court's finding that this was a tactical reason
is supported in the record.  
As this Court stated in Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2000):
In order to obtain a reversal of his death sentence on the ground
of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, [the
defendant] must show "both (1) that the identified acts or omissions
of counsel were deficient, or outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance, and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense such that, without the errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances would have been different."
Id. at 1049 (quoting Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996)).  The evidence
Freeman now presents as evidence of mitigation would not alter the balance of the
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aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  There were three aggravating
circumstances found: (1) Freeman was previously convicted of first-degree murder,
armed robbery, and burglary of a dwelling with an assault (the Epps case); (2)
Freeman committed the Collier murder during the commission of a burglary of a
dwelling; and (3) Freeman committed the crime for pecuniary gain.  There were no
statutory mitigators found.  Four nonstatutory mitigators were found: (1) Freeman
was of low intelligence; (2) he had been abused by his stepfather; (3) he possessed
some artistic ability; and (4) he enjoyed playing with children.  Every item Freeman
presents as mitigation in this postconviction proceeding was considered by the jury
at trial.  The fact that Freeman's postconviction counsel can support the mitigation
with stronger evidence would not, with reasonable probability, alter the balance of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The trial court properly denied relief
on this claim.  
Therefore, based on the foregoing, we hereby affirm the trial court's denial of
postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ.,
and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Donald R. Moran, Jr., Judge - Case No. 86-11599-CFA
Michael P. Reiter, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-North, Harry P. Brody,
Assistant CCRC-N and Jeffrey M. Hazen, Assistant CCRC-N, Office of the
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - North, Tallahassee, Florida; and Frank J.
Tassone, Jr., Registry Counsel, Jacksonville, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee