Title: Commonwealth v. Jarrett

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13243 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEROME JARRETT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 9, 2022. - March 10, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Revocation of probation, Identification of 
defendant in courtroom.  Identification.  Evidence, 
Identification.  Due Process of Law, Identification.  
Controlled Substances. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 10, 2016. 
 
A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by 
Robert L. Ullmann, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Joseph Visone for the defendant. 
Monica J. DeLateur, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
Radha Natarajan, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  The probationer, Jerome Jarrett, appeals from 
a Superior Court judge's order revoking his probation and 
imposing the remainder of his suspended sentence.  The 
probationer challenges the determination that he violated the 
terms of his probation.  In particular, he argues that the judge 
could not have found him in violation without relying upon an 
unreliable, in-court identification by a witness who had made no 
prior, out-of-court identification.  The probationer asks us to 
extend the rule excluding such identifications in criminal 
trials without a showing of good reason, see Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241 (2014), to probation violation 
hearings, because such identifications are just as inherently 
suggestive and unreliable at those proceedings as they are in a 
criminal trial.  The probationer also challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence that he violated the terms of his probation by 
committing a new criminal offense. 
 
We decline to extend Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241, to 
probation violation hearings.  In addition, we conclude that 
sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing for the judge 
to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
3 
 
probationer had violated a term of his probation by committing a 
new offense.1 
 
1.  Background.  In September of 2018, the probationer 
pleaded guilty to two counts of attempting to derive support 
from a prostitute, in violation of G. L. c. 274, § 6.  He was 
sentenced to a term of two and one-half years in a house of 
correction, with two years to serve and the balance suspended 
for eighteen months, with conditions of probation.  Among those 
conditions were that the probationer stay away from children 
under the age of sixteen who were not family members and obey 
all local, State, and Federal laws.  Because the probationer had 
been held in pretrial detention for 763 days while awaiting 
trial, the two years were deemed served. 
 
In June of 2019, the probation department issued a notice 
of surrender based, in part, on allegations that the probationer 
had violated a term of his probation by committing a new offense 
related to the distribution of cocaine.  A Superior Court judge 
held a probation violation hearing on November 22, 2019.  The 
evidence at the hearing consisted primarily of the testimony of 
Boston police Officer Shana Rivera.  The judge also considered 
several exhibits introduced by the Commonwealth:  the notice of 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and the New England Innocence 
Project. 
4 
 
violation, the order of probation, and a summary of the 
probationer's financial information.  Based on the evidence 
presented, the judge could have found the following. 
 
At around 1:30 P.M. on the afternoon of June 17, 2019, 
Rivera and her partner, Officer Chris Adams, were patrolling in 
an area of downtown Boston that included Tremont, Winter, and 
Summer Streets.  Rivera had been employed as a police officer 
for three years and had received specialized training on 
identifying controlled substances and identifying drug 
transactions. 
 
While on routine patrol, Rivera saw Gregory Gomes, whom she 
knew to be a drug user, and an unknown white male, later 
identified as Sean McCarthy, following a tall, thin Black male 
with a red shirt and a "man bun,"2 walking into a nearby mall.  
Rivera then saw McCarthy hand Gomes a sum of money.  Rivera 
testified that, once Gomes noticed her and Adams, he started 
walking quickly and met the probationer immediately inside the 
mall doors.  All three men left the mall within approximately 
one minute from when they entered, from which Rivera inferred 
that they had not been in the mall to shop.  The probationer 
headed toward Tremont Street, while McCarthy and Gomes walked 
 
 
2 A man bun is "a hairstyle for men, comprising long hair 
looped into a bun and fixed in position with a hair tie."  
Macquarie Dictionary (7th ed. 2017). 
5 
 
toward Washington Street.  Rivera and Adams followed McCarthy 
and Gomes to Bromfield Street, where they observed Gomes hand 
McCarthy an object later learned to be a piece of "crack" 
cocaine. 
 
The officers then followed McCarthy and Gomes into Wesleyan 
Place, a location known as a place for drug users to consume 
drugs.  When McCarthy entered a no-trespassing area, Rivera 
stopped him and found that McCarthy had a piece of crack cocaine 
and a crack pipe on his person.  McCarthy told her that he had 
obtained it from Gomes, who had received it from a tall Black 
male with a red shirt and dreadlocks.  Gomes fled as soon as he 
saw the officers stop to talk to McCarthy.3 
 
Rivera returned to the mall, where she saw the probationer.  
Upon seeing Rivera and Adams, the probationer rushed into a 
nearby gym.  The officers followed the probationer inside and 
stopped him.  They found a digital scale and $292 of currency on 
his person.  Rivera testified that the man she had arrested was 
the same man she had seen with Gomes and McCarthy shortly 
before, i.e., the tall, thin, Black male wearing a red shirt and 
with "dreads" formed into a "man bun," whom she identified at 
the hearing as the probationer. 
 
 
3 Gomes and McCarthy subsequently were issued summonses for 
possession of a class B substance. 
6 
 
 
The judge concluded that there was an "extremely strong" 
circumstantial case to support a finding, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the probationer had violated the terms of his 
probation by committing a new offense.  Subsequently, on January 
3, 2020, the judge found the probationer in violation of 
probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve the 
remaining six-month balance of his committed sentence.  The 
probationer filed a timely notice of appeal in the Superior 
Court and then filed an appeal in the Appeals Court.  We 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  A judge's 
decision to revoke probation involves a two-part inquiry:  the 
judge must determine first whether the probationer willfully has 
violated a condition of probation and, second, if such a 
violation is found by a preponderance of the evidence, whether 
the violation warrants revocation of probation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 101 (2018), and cases 
cited.  In considering an appeal from a decision that a 
violation of probation occurred, a reviewing court must 
determine "whether the record discloses sufficient reliable 
evidence to warrant the findings by the judge[, by a 
preponderance of the evidence,] that [the probationer] had 
violated the specified conditions of his [or her] probation."  
See Commonwealth v. Morse, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 582, 594 (2000).  
7 
 
The court reviews a determination to revoke probation for an 
abuse of discretion.  See Eldred, supra. 
 
b.  Applicability of Crayton.  The probationer argues that 
Crayton's rule precluding in-court identifications in criminal 
trials absent good reason, where there was no prior out-of-court 
identification, see Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241, should be 
extended to other proceedings where liberty is at stake.  We do 
not agree. 
 
In Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241, we held that "[w]here an 
eyewitness has not participated before trial in an 
identification procedure, we shall treat the in-court 
identification as an in-court showup, and shall admit it in 
evidence only where there is 'good reason' for its admission."  
"Good reason" may exist where "the eyewitness was familiar with 
the defendant before the commission of the crime, such as where 
a victim testifies to a crime of domestic violence," or "where 
the witness is an arresting officer who was also an eyewitness 
to the commission of the crime."  Id. at 242.  In both 
circumstances, the identification is only "confirmatory" in 
nature, as the jury will understand the in-court showup as 
indicating that "the defendant sitting in the court room is the 
person whose conduct is at issue rather than as identification 
evidence."  Id.  "[I]n both of these circumstances, where the 
witness is not identifying the defendant based solely on his or 
8 
 
her memory of witnessing the defendant at the time of the crime, 
there is little risk of misidentification arising from the in-
court showup despite its suggestiveness."  Id. at 243. 
 
Pragmatic concerns specific to criminal trials, and 
"[c]ommon law principles of fairness," guided our reasoning in 
adopting this approach (citation omitted).  See id. at 240, 241 
n.16.  More specifically, we recognized three key distinctions 
between in- and out-of-court identifications in the context of a 
criminal trial.  First, with an in-court identification, the 
jurors serve collectively as the fact finder and see the 
identification procedure as it unfolds.  Therefore, a juror is 
"better able to evaluate the reliability of the identification 
because he or she can observe the witness's demeanor and hear 
the witness's statements during the identification procedure."  
Id. at 239.  The juror also can note "indications of witness 
certainty or hesitation during [that] process, including facial 
expression, voice inflection, and body language" (citation 
omitted).  Id.  Second, an in-court identification benefits from 
immediate challenge through cross-examination.  Id. at 240.  
Third, because defense counsel has advance notice of the 
Commonwealth's intended in-court identification, counsel has the 
opportunity to propose less suggestive identification 
procedures.  Id. at 241. 
9 
 
 
We recognized, however, that neither immediate cross-
examination nor the jury's ability to observe the identification 
in person guarantees an accurate identification.  Id. at 240-
241.  Accordingly, we limited the use of in-court identification 
of a defendant, where a witness had never made a nonsuggestive 
out-of-court identification, to situations in which there was 
"good reason" to use such a procedure.  Id. at 241-242.  We also 
left open to defendants the ability to challenge the use of an 
in-court identification even where there was good reason for its 
use.  Id. at 243.  Notably, however, we did not adopt the 
approach followed by courts in other jurisdictions that places 
the burden on the defendant to propose less suggestive in-court 
identification procedures.  Id. 
 
As stated, Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241-243, addressed the 
introduction of in-court, showup identifications at criminal 
trials.  Probation violation hearings, however, are not one of 
the stages of a criminal prosecution.  See Commonwealth v. 
Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990).  Thus, a probationer is not 
entitled to all of the due process protections applicable at a 
criminal trial.  Id.  In addition, at a probation violation 
hearing, a judge acts as the fact finder and is able to assess 
an in-court identification, in conjunction with the other 
evidence presented, to determine whether the evidence contains 
substantial indicia of reliability.  The judge can make the same 
10 
 
observations of a witness's hesitancy or uncertainty that we 
concluded in Crayton, supra at 238-244, that a jury could make 
at a criminal trial, but without the same likelihood of being 
influenced by an identification that might appear unnecessarily 
suggestive to a jury, based on the witness's apparent 
confidence, see id. 
 
Moreover, at a probation violation hearing, concerns about 
injustice due to a potentially unreliable in-court 
identification are significantly reduced and conditional; 
"[w]hen an individual is on probation, the Commonwealth has 
already gone through the expense and effort of convicting him 
[or her]."  Durling, 407 Mass. at 115-116.  A probationer is 
released on probation, rather than having been incarcerated, as 
a "matter of grace."  Id. at 115.  Nonetheless, while 
probationers have fewer and "more flexible" due process rights 
at a probation violation hearing than do defendants at a 
criminal trial, those constitutional rights probationers do 
possess are protected with "equal vigilance."  See Commonwealth 
v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 319 (2013). 
 
In Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, this court examined at some 
length the minimum requirements of due process applicable at 
probation violation hearings, in reliance on the Federal 
requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).  The court 
11 
 
explained that, to comport with due process, a probationer must 
be provided with at least "(a) written notice of the claimed 
violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the 
[probationer or] parolee of the evidence against him [or her]; 
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses 
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); 
(e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional 
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to 
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] 
parole."  Durling, supra, quoting Gagnon, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 479 (2016). 
 
At the same time, given the differing concerns at a 
probation violation hearing, where the probationer already has 
been found guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt and is not at risk of conviction of any new offense, and a 
criminal trial, where the Commonwealth must prove a defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, probation violation hearings do 
not afford probationers the full panoply of constitutional 
protections afforded a defendant at a criminal trial.  See 
Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 34 (2010), citing 
Durling, 407 Mass. at 114-120.  In particular, probation 
12 
 
violation hearings are not subject to the rule against the 
introduction of hearsay.  See Abbott A., supra. 
 
The question we must address here is whether due process 
requires us to extend the protections against in-court showup 
identifications of defendants at criminal trials to probation 
violation hearings.  Given the flexible due process standard 
applicable to probation violation hearings, and given that the 
judge acts as the fact finder, in-court identifications may be 
introduced without arbitrarily depriving the probationer of his 
or her (attenuated) liberty interest.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the "good reason" standard set forth in Crayton, 470 Mass. 
at 238-244, regarding in-court showup identifications does not 
apply to probation violation hearings.4 
 
c.  Reliability of the in-court identification.  Although 
we conclude that the requirements of Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241-
243, are inapplicable here, that does not end our inquiry.  The 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth asks us, in effect, to broaden the type 
of testimony Crayton's "good reason" standard permits.  More 
specifically, the Commonwealth contends that if Crayton, 470 
Mass. at 238-244, is applicable to probation violation hearings, 
Rivera's in-court identification of the probationer as "being 
the person she saw near the [mall] being followed by Gomes and 
McCarthy," and the "person she arrested who had a digital scale 
and money on his person," would have been permissible, because 
she did not actually see an exchange of drugs for money.  In the 
Commonwealth's view, Rivera was not a percipient witness within 
the meaning of Crayton, supra, because she did not personally 
observe the probationer commit the offense for which he was 
arrested.  Because we conclude that Crayton is not applicable to 
probation violation hearings, we need not reach this issue. 
13 
 
"touchstone" of an "accurate and reliable determination," which 
underpins the due process question of fundamental fairness, 
remains.  See Durling, 407 Mass. at 117-118.  The probationer 
argues that, absent a nonsuggestive identification by McCarthy 
at the time of the probationer's arrest, Rivera's in-court 
identification was "inherently unreliable."  We do not agree. 
 
As stated, at a probation violation hearing, somewhat 
different concerns animate the inquiry concerning fundamental 
fairness from those at trial.  At such a hearing, the concern is 
whether an in-court identification is substantially reliable, 
and not whether there was "good reason" for the introduction of 
evidence that could appear to a jury to be worthy of an inflated 
level of confidence, due to the inherently suggestive nature of 
a showup identification.  Where evidence bears "substantial 
indicia of reliability," admission of the evidence furthers the 
shared interests of the Commonwealth and the probationer in 
reaching "a reliable, accurate evaluation of whether the 
probationer indeed violated the conditions of his [or her] 
probation."  Durling, 407 Mass. at 116, 118.  In making such a 
determination, the judge is guided by the principles that 
pervade all questions of due process and must carefully define 
the various interests involved and then balance those according 
to the weight society places on them.  Id. at 115. 
14 
 
 
Although, as the probationer argues, the Commonwealth's 
case would have been strengthened by a nonsuggestive 
identification of him by McCarthy at the time of the arrest, its 
absence is not fatal to a determination of reliability.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 67-68 (2006).  Police 
officers may be the only witnesses at probation violation 
hearings, even where they report on statements by others, and 
the proceeding may still comport with due process.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516, 520 (2014).  "[I]f 
reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is 
satisfied."  Id. at 522, quoting Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 
Mass. 685, 691 (2004).  Indeed, in Durling itself, the 
probationer was found in violation of a term of his probation by 
having committed a new crime, based on testimony by his 
probation officer reading from two police reports and the 
introduction of those reports; the probation officer had not 
been a witness to any part of the events described in the 
reports.  See Durling, 407 Mass. at 110. 
 
Here, Rivera provided a detailed account of the incidents 
she observed on the day of the probationer's arrest, including 
her observations of a man whose description matched that of the 
probationer.  Rivera testified that she was on routine patrol in 
an area she believed, based on her experience, to be one where 
drug transactions and drug use were frequent.  She saw an 
15 
 
unknown man hand money to someone whom she knew to be a drug 
user; the two followed a man who matched the description of the 
probationer into a mall and left within a minute.  Rivera then 
saw the man she knew to be a drug user hand something to the 
unknown man.  She followed the suspected buyer, stopped him, and 
found crack cocaine on his person.  He told her that he had 
asked the known drug user for drugs and had received them from 
someone matching the description of the man the two had followed 
into the mall.  When that man saw officers approaching, he 
rushed into a building.  They followed him, arrested him, and 
seized a digital scale and $292 in cash from his person.  Rivera 
testified that the man, whom she described as a tall, thin, 
Black man with a red shirt and a man bun, was the same one she 
had seen entering the mall followed by the others.  In these 
circumstances, the in-court identification was sufficiently 
reliable to be considered among the other evidence presented. 
 
d.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  Relatedly, the 
probationer also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that 
he violated the terms of his probation by committing a new 
crime, i.e., that he distributed cocaine.  At a probation 
violation hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving 
a violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Bukin, 467 Mass. at 520.  We review a decision to 
16 
 
revoke probation for an abuse of discretion.  See L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Here, the judge properly focused on the reliability of the 
in-court identification when deciding what weight it was due.  
Contrary to the probationer's argument, the judge did not rely 
solely on the hearsay evidence concerning McCarthy's reported 
statements; Rivera testified to numerous direct observations she 
made at the time of the offense that supported a determination, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer had 
participated in the distribution of cocaine, a controlled 
substance. 
 
In conjunction with the other evidence introduced, Rivera's 
in-court identification of the probationer provided sufficient, 
substantially reliable evidence for the judge to conclude, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer "more likely 
than not violated the conditions of his probation."  See 
Commonwealth. v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 324 (2013). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order finding the probationer in 
violation of his probation and revoking his probation is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.