Title: LEONARD LEBSACK v. TOWN OF TORRINGTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEONARD LEBSACK v. TOWN OF TORRINGTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION1985 WY 54698 P.2d 1141Case Number: 84-109Decided: 04/25/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
LEONARD LEBSACK, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

TOWN OF TORRINGTON, APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, GoshenCounty, George P. Sawyer, 
J.

 
 
Robert T. 
Moxley, Wheatland, for 
appellant.

Michael A. 
Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for 
appellees; A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., 
John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and 
Stephen H. Graham, Atty. for Town of Torrington, on brief.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal in a 
worker's compensation case from the district court order awarding 25 percent 
permanent partial disability for injury to appellant's back, and denying any 
compensation for an alleged injury to appellant's knee. Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN FAILING TO AWARD 100% PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY.

"II. THE TRIAL COURT 
IMPROPERLY DENIED MEDICAL TREATMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS TO WHICH APPELLANT IS 
ENTITLED BY REASON OF HIS KNEE INJURY.

"III. THE [TRIAL] COURT 
ASSIGNED AN INCORRECT DATE TO THE APPELLANT'S DISABILITY.

"IV. THE AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS INADEQUATE AND UNREASONABLE.

"V. THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS `POST-TRAUMATIC 
NERVOUS INSTABILITY' IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant, while an 
employee of the Town of Torrington, fell from a loader in September of 
1978. He continued working for a time, but eventually filed a report of the 
accident on June 27, 1979 and was awarded worker's compensation. He alleged knee 
and back injuries, but compensation for the alleged knee injury was denied early 
in the procedural history of the case. Appellant returned to work in the summer 
of 1979, but then again quit in September of 1980. He then underwent two back 
operations. On December 16, 1983, appellant filed an Addendum to Petition for 
Relief, requesting an award of 100 percent permanent total disability. The 
matter went to trial on January 4, 1984. The trial court denied the claim for 
knee injury and awarded a 25 percent permanent partial disability for back 
injury.

I.

[¶4.]     Appellant contends that 
the trial court erred in failing to award 100 percent permanent total 
disability. Permanent total disability is defined in § 27-12-405(a), W.S. 1977, 
as follows:

"(a) Permanent total 
disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of eyesight, 
paralysis or other conditions permanently incapacitating the employee from 
performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited 
by experience or training."

Permanent 
partial disability is defined in § 27-12-403(a) and (h), W.S. 1977, as follows: 

"(a) Permanent partial 
disability means the loss or permanent impairment of a limb or sense, or any 
other injury known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent impairment of 
a bodily function.

* * * * * 
*

"(h) For any other injury 
known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent partial disability, the 
employee shall receive compensation in the amount proportional to the extent of 
permanent partial disability based as near as may be upon the foregoing 
schedule. One (1) factor to be considered is the ability of the employee to 
continue to perform work for which he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training prior to the injury."

[¶5.]     In finding a 25 percent 
permanent partial disability the trial court made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. On appeal, we presume the findings of fact to be correct, 
and we will not disturb them absent a finding that they are clearly erroneous or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Rocky Mountain Turbines, Inc. v. The 660 
Syndicate, Inc., Wyo., 623 P.2d 758 (1981). Also, we will not 
overturn or modify the lower court's finding of disability if there is 
substantial evidence to support such finding. Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522 (1983); State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation v. Colvin, Wyo., 681 P.2d 269 (1984). If there is substantial 
evidence to support the factual determination made by the trial court, this 
court, on appeal, will not invade the province of the trier of fact by reaching 
a different conclusion. Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, supra; Matter of 
Creek, Wyo., 657 P.2d 353 (1983); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219 (1977); Rocky Mountain Tank and Steel Company v. 
Rager, Wyo., 423 P.2d 645 
(1967).

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
he sustained his burden of proof for an award of 100 percent permanent total 
disability under the "odd-lot doctrine." This doctrine was adopted by this court 
in In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 
(1941), and has been discussed in several more recent cases. The district court, 
in its conclusions of law, summarized the doctrine as 
follows:

"6. In cases such as this 
one, where a claim is for permanent total disability, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
has adopted the `odd-lot doctrine'. Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522, 525 
(1983), citing Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 
603 P.2d 862 (1979).

"7. The `odd-lot 
doctrine' provides that a permanent total disability may be found in the case of 
a worker who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, is so disabled that 
he or she will not be regularly employable in any well-known branch of the labor 
market. Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 
603 P.2d 862, 863-864 (1979).

"8. The burden of proof 
initially is assigned to the injured worker to show that he is incapacitated 
from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably 
suited by experience or training; that is, he is so disabled that the services 
which he is reasonably equipped to perform by prior experience or training are 
rendered nonmarketable in all well-known branches of the labor market in the 
community so as to provide a steady and continuous source of income rather than 
sporadic or intermittent employment. Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522, 528 (1983), citing 2 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 57.51 (1982).

"9. The burden is also 
upon the injured worker to show efforts to obtain suitable employment which are 
reasonable under the circumstances. Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522, 530 
(1983).

"10. Should these 
showings be made, the burden is then shifted to the employer to show that light 
work of a special nature not generally available which could be performed by the 
injured worker, is in fact available. In 
re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 452, 110 P.2d 826 (1941). 

"11. The claimant in this 
matter failed to meet his burden of proof sufficiently to shift the burden of 
proof to the employer under the `odd-lot doctrine'.

"12. Specifically, 
substantial evidence and testimony was presented tending to establish that 
claimant is presently employable as a janitor, small parts delivery person, as 
well as various other well-known and generally available branches of the labor 
market in the Torrington area.

"13. Additionally, 
claimant has failed in his burden to show reasonable efforts to obtain suitable 
employment; specifically, even claimant testified that he has made no efforts 
whatsoever to find work since September of 1980."

[¶7.]     This is a correct 
statement of the law concerning the "odd-lot doctrine."

[¶8.]     Appellant testified 
that he had not looked for a job since September of 1980. He testified, "Well, I 
can't work in my condition. How am I going to work in my condition?" He argues 
that:

"The trial court, 
probably relying on the Schepanovich case, seems to have blindly applied the 
rule that unless the Employee-Claimant has unsuccessfully searched for work, he 
cannot establish a prima facie case of unemployability. But just as there are 
many ways to skin a cat, there must necessarily be many factual scenarios 
wherein a person who has not sought work may nonetheless be deemed to be 
unemployable."

While this may 
be true, this case is not one of those scenarios. Appellant did testify that he 
cannot perform the intellectual tasks required of most sedentary jobs. However, 
he also testified that he had worked in the past at various jobs, including 
common labor, farming, janitorial work, small auto parts delivery, street 
cleaning and truck driving. Dr. Grizzle testified at trial that appellant's 
disability would not stop him from doing sedentary or other types of work that 
would not require a lot of bending or lifting or crawling under objects of 
machinery. Dr. Grizzle further testified:

"A. Well, I would think 
that if he didn't have a lot of heavy lifting to do he might be able to do 
janitorial work in the school, for instance.

"Q. Any other 
examples?

"A. Oh, maybe certain 
types of handiman [sic] work if he didn't have to crawl under, well, for 
instance, if he didn't have to crawl under a sink, for instance, to fix it. I 
think he could do it, but over a long period of time that might be difficult for 
him.

"Q. Doctor, how about, 
provided he didn't have to travel for extended periods of time or over very long 
distances, could he deliver small parts by driving a 
pickup?

"A. Oh, yes. If he has 
driven down 76 miles to my office, well, then he could drive and deliver 
packages around town."

[¶9.]     In addition, there was 
testimony from the office manager for the Torrington Job Service-Employment 
Security Commission, State of Wyoming, that 
there were many jobs generally available in the Torrington area for which appellant would be 
educationally qualified. In light of this testimony, we hold that appellant did 
not present a prima facie case to shift the burden of proof to appellee under 
the "odd-lot doctrine."

[¶10.]  Several doctors testified at trial, some 
through depositions, as to the amount of appellant's disability. Dr. Grizzle 
testified that appellant suffered from between 20 and 25 percent disability of 
the body as a whole. Dr. Preston testified that appellant carries no more than a 
25 percent permanent partial disability of the lower back, which would convert 
to a 5 percent total body disability.

[¶11.]  Inasmuch as appellant failed to bring 
himself within the "odd-lot doctrine" and in light of the above-referenced 
testimony, we cannot say that the trial court erred in failing to award 100 
percent permanent total disability.

[¶12.]  Appellant raises as a separate issue, but 
also argues under this issue, that the trial court erred in failing to 
specifically address "post-traumatic nervous instability" in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, and that the court failed to recognize the 
existence or compensability of post-traumatic nervous 
instability.

[¶13.]  The trial court did include in its 
findings of fact:

"14. Claimant is 
presently and since August 6, 1981, has been suffering from a permanent partial 
disability of 25 percent of the body as a whole, relating to his back injury of 
September 24, 1978."

In its 
conclusions of law the trial court included the following:

"18. Rather, claimant's 
September 24, 1978, accident has resulted in a 25 percent permanent partial 
disability as that term is defined in Section 27-12-403(h), Wyoming Statutes 
1977, and that this condition has existed since as early as August 6, 
1981."

[¶14.]  Appellant's contention that the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are not complete is not well taken. We have 
stated that a request for findings under Rule 52(a), W.R.C.P., is not in the 
nature of a request for answers to special interrogatories directed to the 
court. The request is only for findings which are sufficient to indicate the 
basis or steps taken for the decision "upon the contested matters," Cline v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725, 730 
(1979), and that the requested findings need not be set forth in elaborate 
detail but need only be clear, specific and complete in concise language 
informing the appellate court of the underlying basis for the trial court's 
decision. They are an aid to the appellate court on appeal affording it a 
clearer understanding of the trial court's decision. Whitefoot v. Hanover Insurance Company, 
Wyo., 561 P.2d 717, 720 (1977).

[¶15.]  Dr. Grizzle testified concerning the 
post-traumatic nervous instability, and he then said:

"Q. And you will on that 
basis, then - or you have rated Leonard Lebsack at a 25 percent disability; is 
that not true?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. And does that take 
into account his entire physical condition and all of your knowledge of the 
man's physical condition?

"A. 
Yes."

[¶16.]  It is thus clear on the record that the 
trial court had the testimony of Dr. Grizzle, who, accounting for the 
post-traumatic nervous instability, testified to a 25 percent disability when it 
made its finding of a 25 percent permanent partial disability. Obviously this 
includes the post-traumatic nervous instability.

II.

[¶17.]  Appellant's next contention relates to 
his knee condition. The testimony at trial was uncontradicted that appellant's 
present knee condition is a result of an injury sustained in 1964 while 
appellant was employed by Holly Sugar. The injury in 1964 had previously 
resulted in a worker's compensation claim and surgery.

[¶18.]  Dr. Preston testified as 
follows:

"Q. * * * Okay. This 
osteoarthritic, if I got it right, this osteoarthritic knee process, is this a 
disease or is this something that's brought on or that occurs in an instant with 
an injury like a broken leg?

"A. No, I felt that this 
was the end result of his knee problem dating back to 
1964.

"Q. Okay. So this is 
something that started in motion in '64 and had developed to the point you were 
viewing it at in 1978?

"A. It had developed to 
that point when I saw him in 1979.

"Q. Excuse 
me?

"A. I did not feel that 
it was in any way related to his injury of September 1978.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. I 
see.

"Getting to Leonard's 
knee condition, is that just a pure case of arthritis?

"A. His knee condition 
was a very clear cut standard, routine, normal response to an injury that 
resulted in a torn cartilage. We see this very commonly. I saw no reason not to 
feel that that injury was not related to the injury back in the sixties when he 
was working for Holly Sugar. And I could see nothing that would cause that 
injury to be related to the injury of 1978."

[¶19.]  Dr. Preston was the physician who had 
originally seen appellant for the knee injury in 1964 and so was in the best 
position to determine if the present state of appellant's knees was due to the 
1964 or the 1978 incident. His testimony was not substantially refuted. Dr. 
Gasser, an orthopedic surgeon, saw appellant specifically for evaluation of 
appellant's knee. He testified:

"Q. Would Mr. Lebsack's 
condition as you diagnosed it, would it be a condition that occurs over a 
substantial period of time?

"A. These conditions can 
occur over a period of time merely from the wear and tear of everyday work and 
use or they can be secondary to an acute traumatic 
episode.

"And that sets the stage 
for it. And it later develops over a period of time. And I don't know of any way 
other than the history as given by the patient to tell one from the 
other.

"Q. Okay. Based upon the 
history given by Mr. Lebsack, do you have an opinion as to which one of the 
situations we're dealing with here?

"A. Mr. Lebsack states 
that he was doing well until he slipped and fell in 1978 and since then he's had 
pain in his knees. So based upon that history, I would say that probably the 
arthritis is related to that or at least was aggravated by that. But that is the 
only thing that I have to really connect the two.

* * * * * 
*

"In other words, what is 
happening to his knees is that they're wearing out and we commonly see this with 
older people. Joints just weren't designed to really last as long as what they 
do any more. And they're wearing out. And it takes a significant period of time 
for those changes to develop."

The trial court 
found:

"6. In addition to his 
1978 injury to his back, claimant suffered an injury to his right knee in 1964 
while working for Holly Sugar Corporation, requiring surgery to be performed by 
Paul J. Preston, M.D.

"7. Presently, claimant's 
1964 knee injury and resulting surgery, coupled with his age and the general 
wear and tear which occurs both at work and away from work, has caused 
claimant's knees to develop an osteoarthritic condition. After claimant's 1964 
knee injury at Holly Sugar Corporation, he worked for Holly Sugar Corporation 
during each year's sugar beet campaign for over ten (10) years; and after his 
September 24, 1978, injury, he worked for the Town of Torrington from November, 
1979, to approximately October 15, 1980.

* * * * * 
*

"15. Claimant is 
presently suffering from a five percent (5%) permanent partial disability of 
each leg above the knee, relating to his knee injury of 1964, coupled with the 
general wear and tear of work and everyday activities away from work, occasioned 
since 1964.

* * * * * 
*

"14. Claimant's 
impairment to his knees is not causally related to the September 24, 1978, 
accident, but rather is a result of the 1964 injury, resulting surgery, and 
long-term wear and tear.

"15. As a result, 
claimant's motion for appointment of another physician to treat his knee 
condition should be and is hereby denied."

[¶20.]  We find the evidence sufficient to 
support these findings and conclusions.

III.

[¶21.]  Appellant claims that the court assigned 
an incorrect date to his disability, it being appellant's contention that the 
date of the injury is different from the date of the accident, and the former 
ought to be the key date for purposes of calculating benefits. The accident in 
question occurred on September 24, 1978. Appellant first filed a report of 
injury on June 27, 1979. Appellant claims that the date of injury is August 6, 
1981. The trial court entered the following finding of 
fact:

"14. Claimant is 
presently and since August 6, 1981, has been suffering from a permanent partial 
disability of 25 percent of the body as a whole, relating to his back injury of 
September 24, 1978."

The court 
entered the following conclusion of law:

"18. Rather, claimant's 
September 24, 1978, accident has resulted in a 25 percent permanent partial 
disability as that term is defined in Section 27-12-403(h), Wyoming Statutes 
1977, and that this condition has existed since as early as August 6, 
1981."

The court's 
Judgment contained the following language:

"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 
AND DECREED that the claimant be awarded 25 percent permanent partial 
disability, and judgment in favor of the claimant is hereby entered 
accordingly."

[¶22.]  We cannot ascertain from the record 
exactly what appellant's complaint is. It appears that the court below 
determined that the date of the "compensable injury" was August 6, 1981 (see 
Conclusion of Law No. 18), and that is the date appellant 
wants.

[¶23.]  We dealt with a similar issue in Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531 
(1936). There the issue was on what date the time limitation for filing a claim 
for relief under worker's compensation began to run. We said that it ran from 
the date of the "compensable injury."

"* * * It is true that an 
accident frequently, perhaps usually, at the exact time of its happening, 
produces a compensable injury, but, as the cases cited above make clear, that is 
not always so." Id. 62 P.2d  at 539.

We went on to 
say:

"* * * [I]t should become 
the clear duty of the trier of fact to determine upon proper and due 
preponderance of evidence the time when the employee actually suffered a 
compensable injury. * * *" Id. 62 P.2d  at 539.

We extended this 
rule "to include the applicability of compensation statutes at the time of the 
`compensable injury'" in Bemis v. Texaco, 
Inc., Wyo., 401 P.2d 708, 709 (1965).

[¶24.]  It is therefore the duty of the trier of 
fact to determine when the compensable injury occurred, and therefore ascertain 
the applicable payment rates from the worker's compensation statutes. It appears 
from the record that the date assigned was August 6, 1981. We therefore make no 
sense of appellant's argument.

IV.

[¶25.]  Appellant's last issue relates to the 
award of attorney's fees. Section 27-12-604(c), W.S. 1977, reads in pertinent 
part as follows:

"* * * The district court 
may appoint an attorney to represent the employee or claimants and shall allow 
him a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceeding. The 
attorney shall be paid according to the order of the court either by the 
director or from the amounts awarded to the employee or claimants or from the 
employer. * * *"

[¶26.]  We have said many times that the worker's 
compensation law is to be liberally construed in favor of the worker. We have 
also said that this liberal construction should not be extended for the benefit 
of counsel in providing attorney's fees, unless such allowance can be related 
directly to the benefit of the worker. Williams v. Northern Development 
Company, Wyo., 425 P.2d 594 (1967).

[¶27.]  The award of attorney's fees necessarily 
carries with it a considerable amount of discretion in the trial court. This 
discretion is based upon the court's experience and knowledge in that 
professional field in which it is deemed to have peculiar competence. Combs v. Walters, Wyo., 518 P.2d 1254 
(1974). Merely because the trial court does not award the amount of attorney's 
fees requested by an attorney does not make such amount awarded unreasonable. We 
see nothing in the record to make us overcome our natural reluctance to overturn 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees.

[¶28.]  Affirmed.