Title: Kelly J. Harvot v. Solo Cup Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1396 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kelly J. Harvot, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Solo Cup Company and Solo Cup Operating Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 6, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Karen L. Seifert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Peter J. 
Culp and Dempsey, Williamson, Kelly & Hertel, LLP, Oshkosh, and 
oral argument by Peter J. Culp. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by John E. 
Murray, Robert J. Simandl, and Simandl & Murray, S.C., Waukesha, 
and oral argument by John E. Murray. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1396   
(L.C. No. 
2007CV194) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kelly J. Harvot, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Solo Cup Co. and Solo Cup Operating Co., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a decision and order of the Circuit Court for 
Winnebago County, Karen L. Seifert, Judge.   Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61 (2007-08).1  The issues presented examine whether there 
is a right to jury trial in a civil action to recover damages 
under Wisconsin's Family or Medical Leave statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
2 
 
¶2 
Subsection (13) of that statute reads in part: "Civil 
Action.  (a) An employee or the [D]epartment [of Workforce 
Development] may bring an action in circuit court against an 
employer to recover damages caused by a violation of sub. (11) 
after the completion of an administrative proceeding, including 
judicial review, concerning the same violation."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(13)(a). 
¶3 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
certifies 
the 
following 
questions: (1) Does the Wisconsin Family or Medical Leave Act 
(WFMLA) confer an implied statutory right to a jury trial in a 
civil action for damages? (2) In the alternative, under the test 
set forth in Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 
2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177, does the Wisconsin 
State Constitution confer the right to a jury trial in a WFMLA 
civil action for damages? 
¶4 
We conclude that the WFMLA does not confer an implied 
statutory right to jury trial in a civil action to recover 
damages for a violation of the WFMLA.  We further conclude that 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not 
afford the right to jury trial in a civil action to recover 
damages for a violation of the WFMLA.  Consequently, we affirm 
the order of the circuit court. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
In 1984, Kelly J. Harvot (Harvot) began working for 
Hoffmaster Solo Cup Co. (Hoffmaster) at its production facility 
in Oshkosh.  The company produces disposable foodservice items 
such as cups, bowls, plates, napkins, and placemats.  Harvot was 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
3 
 
employed 
as 
a 
full-time 
stock 
handler 
in 
the 
shipping 
department, driving a forklift.  During her tenure, she 
developed a serious and painful back condition that was 
diagnosed as a cervical disk bulge with moderate to advanced 
degenerative changes in the lumbar spine. 
¶6 
Harvot's condition worsened in 2005.  On January 24, 
she was treated by Dr. Lynda Kasper (Dr. Kasper) for back spasms 
and was given mild pain medication.  Harvot missed three days of 
work, which she counted as sick leave.  
¶7 
Harvot 
was 
covered 
by 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement between Hoffmaster and Harvot’s union.  Under the 
agreement, union employees were entitled to six days of sick 
leave per year.  These sick days were not reduced when an 
employee took approved medical leave under the WFMLA.  Company 
approval of medical leave under the WFMLA was important because 
unapproved medical leave amounted to an attendance violation 
after the six days of authorized sick leave had been exhausted.  
Hoffmaster's 
attendance 
policy 
provided 
for 
progressive 
discipline, up to and including discharge at the fourth 
attendance violation.     
¶8 
By October 2004, Harvot was subject to discharge for 
any further attendance violation, including unapproved medical 
leave. 
¶9 
In May 2005, Harvot again sought treatment from Dr. 
Kasper for her back condition.  Dr. Kasper prescribed two pain 
medications and directed Harvot to a pain clinic for further 
treatment.  Dr. Kasper retained supervision and responsibility 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
4 
 
for 
Harvot's 
treatment 
and 
medication. 
 
Because 
of 
her 
condition, Harvot missed work on May 3, 4, and 5.  By May 3, she 
had only two days of sick leave remaining under the collective 
bargaining agreement.  For her May 5 absence, Harvot submitted a 
medical leave request under the WFMLA.  The request for leave 
was denied because it was filed more than 15 days after her 
absence, making the request untimely under company policy.  
¶10 Nonetheless, Harvot put Hoffmaster on notice of her 
health condition when she filed the request for an approved 
leave for May 5 because she included a Health Care Provider 
Certification signed by Dr. Kasper.  In the certification, Dr. 
Kasper listed the May 3-5 treatment dates and indicated that the 
treatment was "ongoing."  Dr. Kasper also stated that Harvot's 
condition would require intermittent periods of absence that 
should be considered medically necessary. 
¶11 On June 8, 2005, Harvot submitted a request for leave 
for June 22, because she was scheduled to receive an epidural 
injection from the pain clinic that day.  For this request, she 
submitted another Health Care Provider Certification, signed by 
Dr. Kasper, which verified that her appointment for the 
injection was medically necessary.  On June 10, Hoffmaster 
approved the request. 
¶12 Harvot was absent from work again on June 11, 2005.  
Later in the month she requested leave for this absence by 
submitting another Health Care Provider Certification.  Dr. 
Kasper signed the certification and indicated that Harvot's June 
11 absence was due to her medical condition.  Dr. Kasper made 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
5 
 
this representation by relying on Harvot's description of her 
symptoms and her previous treatment history, but Harvot did not 
go to Dr. Kasper's office for examination.  On July 1, 
Hoffmaster approved the June 11 leave request. 
¶13 Harvot was absent from work on June 22 for the 
epidural injection, as previously approved.  She was absent on 
July 25, August 1, and August 2 as a result of her health 
condition.  She also was absent on July 26 as the result of a 
previously scheduled vacation day.  On July 25, Harvot spoke 
with a nurse at Dr. Kasper's office who, in turn, consulted with 
Dr. Kasper.  Dr. Kasper ordered a refill for one of Harvot's 
medications, but she did not think it necessary to examine 
Harvot at that time.  On August 1, 2005, Harvot again spoke with 
a nurse at Dr. Kasper's office and complained of severe lower 
back pain and the inability to get up or roll over in bed.  Dr. 
Kasper, 
again 
thinking 
it 
unnecessary 
for 
a 
physical 
examination, reviewed the information and ordered a stronger 
pain medication for Harvot. 
¶14 Harvot timely requested WFMLA leave for her July 25, 
August 1, and August 2, 2005 absences.  She submitted a medical 
release authorization, which is a standard form Hoffmaster 
requires whenever leave is requested.  Hoffmaster never used the 
authorization to contact Dr. Kasper or any of Harvot's other 
medical providers to obtain more information related to her 
absences.  
¶15 In addition to the medical release authorization, 
Harvot submitted another Health Care Provider Certification on 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
6 
 
August 12 that was signed by Dr. Kasper.  In the certification, 
Dr. Kasper noted that Harvot's last office visit was on June 13, 
2005, that Harvot's work absences were taken on an emergency 
basis, and that Harvot's condition would require her to be 
absent from work for "separate blocks of time."  Dr. Kasper also 
attempted to contact Hoffmaster in regard to Harvot's condition, 
but her call was never returned. 
¶16 On August 15, 2005, upon arriving at work, Harvot was 
informed that her leave request for July 25, August 1, and 
August 2 was being denied and that she was being terminated for 
a fourth violation of the company's attendance policy.  On 
August 
17, 
Harvot 
received 
a 
memorandum 
from 
Hoffmaster 
officially informing her of its decision to deny her leave 
request for those three days.  The memorandum indicated that the 
denial was based, at least in part, on the fact that Harvot had 
not been examined by Dr. Kasper on or around the dates she 
requested for leave.  Harvot contacted Hoffmaster regarding the 
memorandum and was given the opportunity to present additional 
information to show that her absences were related to an ongoing 
medical condition.  Evidence suggests, however, that Hoffmaster 
was 
not 
completely 
forthcoming 
in 
advising 
Harvot 
what 
deficiencies in her request materials it wanted her to correct. 
¶17 Harvot quickly submitted copies of her medical records 
and a letter from her treating physician at the pain management 
clinic.  Hoffmaster refused to accept this information because 
it did not indicate that Harvot went to see a doctor on or 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
7 
 
around the days she was absent.  As a result, Harvot was 
terminated from her employment. 
¶18 On September 1, 2005, Harvot filed a complaint with 
the Equal Rights Division of the Wisconsin Department of 
Workforce Development (the DWD).  The complaint alleged that 
Hoffmaster violated the WFMLA by denying Harvot's leave request 
for her July 25, August 1, and August 2 absences.  A hearing was 
held on December 20, 2005, and was continued on February 27, 
2006, before Administrative Law Judge Larry R. Jakubowski.  On 
November 3, 2006, Judge Jakubowski issued his decision and made 
the following conclusions of law: 
[Hoffmaster] 
discriminated 
against 
[Harvot] 
by 
interfering with, restraining, or denying her the 
exercise of a right provided under the [WFMLA] by 
denying her Medical Leave for the absences on July 25, 
August 1, and August 2, 2005[,] and by assessing her 
penalties 
under 
the 
attendance 
policy 
and 
by 
terminating her employment under its attendance policy 
for the absences from work on those dates. 
Harvot v. Hoffmaster Solo Cup Co., ERD No. 200503272 (DWD, Nov. 
3, 2006). 
¶19 Accordingly, Judge Jakubowski ordered that Hoffmaster 
complete the following tasks: (1) cease and desist from further 
discrimination and give training to those employees responsible 
for administering WFMLA requests; (2) amend its records to 
reflect that Harvot was on medical leave under the WFMLA on the 
three days at issue; (3) remove the fourth attendance violation 
from Harvot's records and make a written offer of reinstatement 
to Harvot, guaranteeing her seniority upon return; (4) make 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
8 
 
Harvot "whole for all lost wages and benefits incurred as a 
result of its unlawful discrimination," and reimburse Harvot for 
the interest on such damages at the annual rate of 12 percent; 
(5) reimburse Harvot for reasonable attorney fees and costs, 
which were calculated to be $14,381.35; and (6) submit a 
compliance order to the DWD "detailing the actions that it has 
taken to comply with" Judge Jakubowski's decision and order.  
Id. 
¶20 On November 20, 2006, Hoffmaster sought judicial 
review of the administrative decision and order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.53.  The petition for review was filed in Winnebago County 
Circuit Court.  On January 4, 2007, however, Hoffmaster filed a 
request for voluntary dismissal, and Winnebago County Circuit 
Judge Scott Woldt entered an order for voluntary dismissal. 
¶21 Harvot subsequently filed suit in Winnebago County 
Circuit Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13)(a), which as 
noted above, provides a private right of action against an 
employer to recover damages that are caused by violation of the 
WFMLA.2 
                                                 
2 
(13) CIVIL ACTION.  (a) An employee or the 
department may bring an action in circuit court 
against an employer to recover damages caused by a 
violation of sub. (11) after the completion of an 
administrative proceeding, including judicial review, 
concerning the same violation. 
 
(b) An action under par. (a) shall be commenced 
within the later of the following periods, or be 
barred: 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
9 
 
¶22 In her complaint, Harvot recited the outcome of the 
administrative proceeding and discussed the same allegations she 
made against Hoffmaster in the administrative action.  She 
demanded a judgment against Hoffmaster for the following alleged 
damages suffered as a result of the WFMLA violations: (1) an 
award of compensatory damages; (2) an award of punitive damages; 
(3) "an award of pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum 
legal rate"; (4) an award of costs, disbursements, and attorney 
fees; and (5) an award of "such other and further relief this 
[c]ourt may deem just and equitable."3   
¶23 Harvot also demanded that her damages claim be heard 
by a jury. 
¶24 On March 6, 2007, Hoffmaster filed its answer.  It 
acknowledged generally that the factual allegations in the 
complaint were true and that the allegations regarding the legal 
violations of the WFMLA also were true.  Hoffmaster, however, 
denied that interest, attorney fees, or equitable relief were 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1. 
Within 60 days from the completion of an 
administrative proceeding, including judicial review, 
concerning the same violation. 
 
2. 
Twelve months after the violation occurred, 
or the department or employee should reasonably have 
known that the violation occurred. 
Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13). 
3 During oral argument to this court, when asked to describe 
what damages Harvot is seeking in the civil action considering 
that she was "made whole" by the administrative action, her 
attorney responded that she would be seeking compensatory 
damages for past and future pain and suffering and possibly 
punitive sanctions against Hoffmaster. 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
10 
 
available for Harvot's claim.  It also asserted an affirmative 
defense and argued that the damages sought in the legal action 
were already awarded to Harvot in the administrative action, and 
"[t]herefore, she may not recover any damages for these amounts 
in the present action."  To support this argument, Hoffmaster 
cited Butzlaff v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Family 
Services, 223 Wis. 2d 673, 590 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶25 Hoffmaster also filed a motion to strike Harvot's jury 
request, claiming that the WFMLA does not create a right to a 
jury trial and that no right exists by virtue of Article I, 
Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  In its supporting 
brief, Hoffmaster argued that no right to a jury trial exists in 
the statute, and therefore, if Harvot does have that right, it 
must be found in the Wisconsin Constitution.  Hoffmaster 
contended that Harvot's claim did not exist at common law in 
1848 and therefore did not satisfy the test this court set out 
in Village Food.  It summarized its position as follows: "The 
WFMLA creates new rights for employees which did not exist under 
the common law 160 years ago.  In 1848, employees had no common 
law right to protected leave for family or medical emergencies.  
They also had no common law right to challenge a discharge which 
violated Wisconsin's public policy."  Therefore, Hoffmaster 
concluded, Harvot did not have a constitutionally based right to 
a jury trial. 
¶26 Harvot carefully briefed her response to Hoffmaster’s 
motion.  Her arguments are discussed infra. 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
11 
 
¶27 Hoffmaster's motion to strike Harvot's demand for a 
jury trial was heard on June 8, 2007, before Winnebago County 
Circuit Judge Karen L. Seifert.  Judge Seifert granted the 
motion, stating as follows: "Both sides did a wonderful job of 
arguing the case; but based on the review and the arguments you 
made today, I don't find that the statute expressly allows a 
jury trial.  I'm not convinced that there is an implied right to 
it." 
¶28 Judge Seifert also rejected Harvot's constitutional 
argument saying that she did not find anything in common law at 
the time the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted that was 
"anywhere close to the case at hand."  Judge Seifert set forth 
her decision in an order on June 15, 2007. 
¶29 Harvot filed a petition for leave to appeal the 
circuit court's order.  On July 11, 2007, the court of appeals 
granted the motion "to address an issue of first impression and 
one involving the right to a jury trial."  Thereafter, the court 
of appeals certified two issues to this court with the following 
explanation: 
 
Whether the WFMLA creates an implied right to a 
jury trial is a novel and important question.  This is 
particularly pressing because the federal FMLA cases 
demonstrate that jury trials are often afforded.  In 
the alternative, whether the WFMLA is an essential 
counterpart 
to 
common 
law 
labor 
standards 
and 
employment law has never been addressed.  A decision 
by the supreme court will develop and clarify the law, 
assuring that the constitutional right to a jury trial 
is not inconsistently interpreted.  A pronouncement of 
the law in this regard will have widespread impact on 
WFMLA actions throughout the state.  For these 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
12 
 
reasons, we respectfully request that the supreme 
court accept certification of the issue. 
¶30 On August 15, 2008, we accepted the following issues 
certified by the court of appeals: 
 
1. 
Does the . . . WFMLA, Wis. Stat. § 103.10, 
confer an implied statutory right to a jury trial in a 
civil action for damages? 
2. 
In the alternative, under the test set forth 
in 
Village 
Food[], 
does 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Constitution confer the right to a jury trial in a 
WFMLA civil action for damages? 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶31 We review both issues presented in this appeal de 
novo.  First, deciding whether the WFMLA "confer[s] an implied 
statutory right to a jury trial in a civil action for damages" 
requires that we interpret Wis. Stat. § 103.10.  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 853, 434 
N.W.2d 773 (1989).   
¶32 Second, 
deciding 
"[w]hether 
there 
is 
a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial for a 
particular cause of action requires us to interpret a provision 
of the state constitution, which we do independently of the 
lower courts."  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶7 (citing State 
v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 
N.W.2d 526). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶33 Harvot argues that the circuit court's decision was 
erroneous for two reasons: first, the structure of the WFMLA 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
13 
 
implicitly signifies the legislature's intent to provide a jury 
trial for civil litigants pursuing damages under Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(13); second, Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution preserves a litigant's jury trial right in a civil 
action for damages under the WFMLA.  
¶34 We 
will 
discuss 
these 
arguments 
in 
turn 
after 
examining the WFMLA. 
A. 
Employee Rights Under the WFMLA 
¶35 The Wisconsin Family or Medical Leave Act was adopted 
by the legislature in 1988 and took effect on April 26 of that 
year.  1987 Wis. Act 287.  It has been amended several times 
since its adoption.  The WFMLA preceded the federal Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which was enacted on February 5, 1993, 
with an effective date of August 5, 1993.  See The Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.  
¶36 Wisconsin employees who have "been employed by the 
same employer for more than 52 consecutive weeks and who worked 
for the employer for at least 1,000 hours during the preceding 
52-week period," Wis. Stat. § 103.10(2)(c), are eligible to take 
defined amounts of unpaid leave time each year for either family 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
14 
 
or medical leave,4 see Wis. Stat. § 103.10(3)-(4).  If an 
eligible employee takes leave, she is entitled to her previous 
position, or an equivalent position, upon returning to work, 
including restoration of benefits and seniority.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(8)-(9). 
¶37 "No person may interfere with, restrain or deny the 
exercise of any right provided under" the WFMLA.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(11)(a).  If an employee's WFMLA rights are violated, 
she may file a complaint with the DWD within 30 days.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 103.10(12)(b).  The DWD must investigate the complaint 
and attempt to resolve the matter with the parties.  Id.  If the 
                                                 
4 An employee may take family leave for any of the following 
three reasons: (1) "The birth of the employee's natural child, 
if the leave begins within 16 weeks of the child's birth"; (2) 
"The placement of a child with the employee for adoption or as a 
precondition to adoption under s. 48.90(2), but not both, if the 
leave begins within 16 weeks of the child's placement"; and (3) 
"To care for the employee's child, spouse or parent, if the 
child, spouse or parent has a serious health condition."  Wis. 
Stat. § 103.10(3)(b).  The employee must schedule leave time 
with his employer "after reasonably considering the needs of his 
or her employer."  Wis. Stat. § 103.10(3)(c). 
An employee also may schedule medical leave time "as 
medically necessary," Wis. Stat. § 103.10(4)(c), if the employee 
"has a serious health condition which makes the employee unable 
to 
perform 
his 
or 
her 
employment 
duties," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.10(4)(a) (emphasis added). 
As used in both subsections, "'[s]erious health condition' 
means a disabling physical or mental illness, injury, impairment 
or condition involving any of the following: 1. Inpatient care 
in 
a 
hospital, . . . nursing 
home, . . . or 
hospice. 
 
2. 
Outpatient 
care 
that 
requires 
continuing 
treatment 
or 
supervision 
by 
a 
health 
care 
provider." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.10(1)(g). 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
15 
 
matter is not resolved and the DWD finds probable cause for a 
violation, a hearing will be held within 60 days of the DWD's 
receipt of the complaint.  Id.  The DWD is directed to issue its 
decision and order within 30 days after the hearing.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(12)(d). 
¶38 If the DWD decides that the employer violated an 
employee's rights under the WFMLA, it may "order the employer to 
take action to remedy the violation, including providing 
requested 
family 
leave 
or 
medical 
leave, 
reinstating 
an 
employee, providing back pay accrued not more than 2 years 
before the complaint was filed and paying reasonable actual 
attorney fees to the complainant."  Id.   
¶39 Within 60 days of the completion of the administrative 
action, including judicial review of that action, either the 
complainant or the DWD may bring a civil action in circuit court 
against the employer to recover damages caused by the same WFMLA 
violation that was established previously in the administrative 
proceeding.  See Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13). 
B. 
Claimed Statutory Right to Jury Trial 
 
¶40 There is no explicit statutory right to a jury trial 
for civil actions under § 103.10(13).  This is acknowledged by 
Harvot. 
 
She 
claims, 
however, 
that 
"[e]ven 
though 
the 
legislature did not expressly provide for a jury trial right in 
the actual words of the WFMLA, they created such right sub 
silentio." 
¶41 Harvot 
makes 
several 
arguments 
to 
support 
this 
proposition.  First, unlike many Wisconsin statutes, the WFMLA 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
16 
 
does not expressly limit a civil litigant to a bench trial.  
Harvot 
cites 
several 
provisions 
scattered 
throughout 
the 
Wisconsin Statutes that explicitly require the circuit court to 
hear the matter "without a jury."  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§§ 5.90(3), 
9.01(7)(b), 
62.50(21), 
66.1337(4)(b), 
76.08(1), 
125.12(2)(d), 
174.11(2)(d), 
227.57(1), 
289.95(2)(c), 
302.114(5)(b), 801.08(1), and 971.14(4)(b).5  Harvot asserts 
that, because there is no express limitation on the right to a 
jury 
in 
the 
WFMLA, "one can reasonably infer that the 
legislature intended for a damages action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(13) to be triable to a jury." 
¶42 Second, Harvot reasons that such an inference may be 
drawn from the "remedial scheme of the WFMLA," which "provides 
sufficient indicia of legislative intent on the mode of trial in 
a civil damages action under the WFMLA."   She points to the 
statute's distinction between the availability of equitable 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 103.10(12)(d) and the availability of 
legal damages under Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13).  According to 
Harvot, the distinction "provides material insight into the 
legislature's intent to furnish the right to a jury trial in a 
civil action for damages under the WFMLA."   
¶43 Harvot supports her reading of the statute by relying 
on federal court interpretations of the federal FMLA.  Harvot 
                                                 
5 To 
illustrate, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57(1), 
relative 
to 
judicial 
review 
under 
the 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Act, 
provides that review "shall be conducted by the court without a 
jury." 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
17 
 
claims that, although the federal FMLA does not contain an 
express jury trial right, "virtually every federal court that 
has examined the . . . issue under the federal counterpart of 
the WFMLA has favored Harvot's position."  She points especially 
to the holding of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Frizzell 
v. Southwest Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 642-43 (6th Cir. 
1998), which found an implied right to a jury trial under the 
federal FMLA.  The Sixth Circuit made its decision, according to 
Harvot, based upon "the structure of the federal FMLA's remedial 
provisions that provide for 'damages' and additionally for 
'equitable relief.'"  Harvot relies upon the following statement 
from 
Frizzell: 
"[T]he 
structure 
of 
the 
FMLA's 
remedial 
provisions indicates that Congress intended to create a right to 
a jury. . . .  The distinction between 'damages' and 'equitable 
relief' reflects Congress's intent to make juries available to 
plaintiffs pursuing remedies [for 'damages'] . . . ."  Id. at 
643. 
¶44 Third, Harvot claims that Wisconsin tribunals have 
relied on this same distinction to determine whether there is a 
right to a jury trial under Wisconsin's Open Housing Act.  Her 
argument is that in Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council 
v. Goetsch, ERD No. 9051656 (LIRC, Dec. 6, 1991), the Labor & 
Industry 
Review 
Commission 
(LIRC) 
refused 
to 
award 
the 
Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council compensatory damages 
because of concern that "an administrative tribunal [awarding] 
legal 
damages 
without 
a 
jury 
could 
abridge 
a 
party's 
constitutional right to a jury trial."  She then notes that, 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
18 
 
after Goetsch, the legislature amended the Open Housing Act to 
make available both an administrative action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 106.50(6) and a civil action under Wis. Stat. § 106.50(6m).  
Harvot quotes the following passage from Humphrey v. Comfort 
Inn, ERD No. 9203044 (LIRC, Sept. 6, 1994) to illustrate how 
LIRC interpreted the legislation:  
After a charge is filed under the amended Open Housing 
Act either party may elect to have the claims asserted 
in that charge decided in a civil action in lieu of an 
administrative hearing.  Therefore, the parties are 
guaranteed a right to trial by jury and may obtain 
such a trial. . . .  
(Emphasis added by Harvot.)  Harvot concludes that "[i]f parties 
are guaranteed a jury trial in Open Housing claims based on the 
remedial statutory scheme that almost mirrors that of the WFMLA, 
so too should parties to WFMLA claims." 
¶45 We are not persuaded by these arguments.  The statute 
is silent on a party's right to a jury trial under Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.10(13).  A judicial determination that a party has a 
constitutional right to a jury trial in a civil action is quite 
different from a judicial determination that the Wisconsin 
Legislature intended such a right but inadvertently neglected to 
provide it in the statute. 
¶46 The court has held that, "[f]or new statutory schemes, 
the legislature retains the flexibility to create an appropriate 
fact-finding procedure——including the right to a jury trial——if 
the legislature finds it appropriate."  Village Food, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, ¶14 (citation omitted); see also Bergren v. 
Staples, 263 Wis. 477, 483, 57 N.W.2d 714 (1953) ("[I]t is 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
19 
 
competent for the legislature when it provides a new remedy, to 
prescribe the procedure by which the remedy may be enforced."); 
Bentley v. Davidson, 74 Wis. 420, 424, 43 N.W. 139 (1889) ("It 
is competent for the legislature, when it gives a new remedy, to 
prescribe the procedure by which the remedy may be enforced.  It 
may prescribe a purely equitable or a purely legal procedure, or 
it 
may blend 
the 
two . . . .").  Unless it is somehow 
constrained by the constitution, the legislature is free to 
choose whether a statutory cause of action is subject to a jury 
trial.  See Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶14.  For more than 
20 years, the legislature has not done so with respect to WFMLA 
damages claim. 
¶47 Our precedent suggests that, when a statute is silent 
with regard to the right to a jury trial, no jury trial is 
required unless the right is preserved by Article I, Section 5 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See id., ¶¶13-14; Bekkedal v. 
City of Viroqua, 183 Wis. 176, 192-93, 196 N.W. 879 (1924); 
State v. Ameritech Corp., 185 Wis. 2d 686, 698, 517 N.W.2d 705 
(Ct. App. 1994).   
¶48 In Bekkedal, after determining that the constitution 
did not preserve the right to a jury trial in a dispute 
involving tax assessments by a municipality, the court stated 
that "unless the statute itself makes provision for a jury 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
20 
 
trial, the parties are not entitled thereto."  Bekkedal, 183 
Wis. at 192 (emphasis added).6   
¶49 This principle was reaffirmed in Ameritech, where the 
court of appeals stated the following: 
[T]here is no dispute that in 1848, the State had no 
right to commence a civil suit to collect forfeitures 
for 
deceptive 
advertising 
or 
violation 
of 
the 
[Wisconsin Consumer Act].  Thus, any right to a jury 
trial would be by legislative grant rather than 
constitutionally 
protected. 
 
But 
as 
the 
State 
concedes, neither [statute] specifically provides for 
a jury trial to determine a party's liability.  Nor 
are there any references to [the pertinent statutes] 
in any procedural statutes which permit parties to 
request a jury.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial 
court correctly granted Ameritech's motion to strike 
the demand for a jury. 
Ameritech, 185 Wis. 2d at 698 (emphasis added).  Similarly, 
Village Food implies that, whenever a statute "is silent with 
respect to the right of a jury trial," we turn to the 
constitution and the Village Food test governs.  Cf. Village 
Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶¶12-14 (noting that its "test will not 
result in affording the right to a jury trial in all statutory 
                                                 
6 Bekkedal v. City of Viroqua, 183 Wis. 176, 192, 196 N.W. 
879 (1924) cited Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 (*461), 504 
(*465) (1861), where the court made the following statement:  
The constitution provides that the "right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate," which evidently had 
reference to the condition of the law as it existed 
when the constitution was adopted.  It, therefore, did 
not preserve it as a matter of right, in those cases 
which, by the law and practice then existing, were 
submitted entirely to the judgment of the court. 
(Citation omitted.) 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
21 
 
actions in which the legislature is silent with respect to the 
right of a jury trial") (emphasis added). 
 
¶50 Asking this court to discover an implied statutory 
right to trial by jury in situations where the legislature has 
not prescribed such a right and where the constitution does not 
afford such a right would open a can of worms.  Statutes vary 
widely.  Ad hoc judicial discovery of implied statutory rights 
to trial by jury would not yield a meaningful legal test that 
could carry over from case to case.  It would instead invite ad 
hoc argument whenever the statutes are silent.  This would not 
be desirable.  If the legislature wants to provide a right to 
trial by jury in new causes of action, it has broad power to do 
so. 
 
¶51 Even if we were to entertain the notion of an implied 
statutory right, we would easily distinguish the Frizzell case 
interpreting 
federal 
law. 
 
The 
Frizzell 
decision 
is 
distinguishable because the federal FMLA is distinguishable from 
the WFMLA.  The Frizzell decision explains that an employee who 
violates 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006)7 shall be liable to any eligible 
employer affected: 
 
A. 
for damages . . . and 
 
B. 
for 
such 
equitable 
relief 
as 
may 
be 
appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and 
promotion. 
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the United States Code are to 
the 2006 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
22 
 
 
¶52 Subsection (a)(2) then provides the following: 
An action to recover the damages or equitable 
relief prescribed in paragraph (1) may be maintained 
against any employer (including a public agency) in 
any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction 
by any one or more employees for and in behalf of—— 
(A) the employees; or 
(B) the employees and other employees similarly 
situated. 
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 
¶53 Frizzell observes, "The distinction between 'damages' 
and 'equitable relief' reflects Congress's intent to make juries 
available to plaintiffs pursuing remedies that fall under 
section 2617[(a)](1)(A) [namely, damages], while leaving it to 
the judge to determine whether equitable relief is warranted 
under section 2617[(a)](1)(B)."  Frizzell, 154 F.3d at 643. 
 
¶54 There are three major distinctions between the FMLA 
under federal law and the WFMLA under state law.  First, the 
Seventh Amendment has been more broadly interpreted than Article 
I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution in cases involving 
statutory rights and claims.  In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 
189, 194 (1974), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Seventh 
Amendment [right to civil jury trial] does apply to actions 
enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon 
demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, 
enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of 
law."  See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978); 
Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1979).  
No.  2007AP1396  
 
23 
 
This broad interpretation of the Seventh Amendment colors the 
interpretation of federal statutes. 
 
¶55 Second, while a plaintiff-employee under the federal 
FMLA may file an action to recover damages "in any Federal or 
State court of competent jurisdiction," 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2), 
a defendant-employer will have a right to litigate the threshold 
question of whether it violated 29 U.S.C. § 2615.8  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 103.10, a Wisconsin employer has no right to ask a jury 
to determine whether it violated the WFMLA.  Thus, under the 
FMLA, the right to trial by jury is valuable to both employers 
and employees; under the WFMLA, the right to trial by jury would 
largely benefit employees, as employers would be defendants in 
damage-suit jury trials where their liability had already been 
determined administratively.   
¶56 Third, 
29 
U.S.C. 
§ 2617(a)(1)(A) 
specifies 
what 
damages are available to employees.  Consequential damages are 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Seventh Circuit Proposed Pattern Family and 
Medical 
Leave 
Act 
Jury 
Instructions, 
2.a. 
(2008) 
("This 
instruction (or a variant of it) is intended to cover cases in 
which the plaintiff's right to FMLA leave is alleged to have 
been denied or otherwise interfered with."); Eleventh Circuit 
Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases), § 1.8.1 Substantive 
Claims and Retaliation Claims, at 180 (2005) ("In this case the 
Plaintiff claims that the Defendant violated a federal law known 
as the Family and Medical Leave Act. . . .  The Defendant denies 
that it violated the Act in any way and asserts that [describe 
the Defendant's theory of defense].") (bracketed language in 
original). 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
24 
 
not available,9 and punitive damages are not available.10  In 
Wisconsin, it is not entirely clear what "damages caused by a 
violation of sub. (11)" means, and what limitations on damages, 
if any, may apply. 
¶57 Thus, if Harvot is entitled to seek consequential and 
punitive damages in state court, she will be seeking damages 
that she would not be entitled to seek under the federal FMLA.  
A jury would be asked to decide on those damages after 
Hoffmaster's violation had been determined and after substantial 
damages had already been awarded.  See supra, ¶¶18-19, 21-22. 
¶58 Harvot has not pointed to any legislative history in 
Wisconsin that supports legislative contemplation of a right to 
jury trial.  This contrasts with the legislative history of the 
federal FMLA.  See Frizzell, 154 F.3d at 644.  We also note that 
the state and its municipalities are covered by the WFMLA.  See 
Butzlaff, 223 Wis. 2d at 682-83.  Thus, we think it somewhat 
unlikely that the legislature intended to give juries the right 
to impose punitive damages for WFMLA violations against the 
state and other Wisconsin governments. 
                                                 
9 Harley v. Health Ctr. of Coconut Creek, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 
2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Johnson v. Georgia Television Co., 435 
F. Supp. 2d 1237 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Beebe v. Williams College, 430 
F. Supp. 2d 18 (D. Mass. 2006); Canterbury v. Federal-Mogul 
Ignition Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (S.D. Iowa 2006); Sheaffer v. 
County of Chatham, 337 F. Supp. 2d 709 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Knussman 
v. State, 65 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D. Md. 1999); Lloyd v. Wyoming 
Valley Healthcare Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 288 (M.D. Pa. 1998). 
10 Collins v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 262 F. Supp. 2d 959 (C.D. 
Ill. 2003); Keene v. Rinaldi, 127 F. Supp. 2d 770 (M.D.N.C. 
2000). 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
25 
 
¶59 Harvot's reliance on the Open Housing Statute works 
against her as well.  Wisconsin Stat. § 106.50(6m)(a) reads as 
follows: "Any person alleging a violation of sub. (2), (2m), or 
(2r), including the attorney general on behalf of an aggrieved 
person, may bring a civil action for injunctive relief, for 
damages, including punitive damages, and, in the case of a 
prevailing plaintiff, for court costs and reasonable attorney 
fees."  
We have 
been directed to no published opinion 
recognizing trial by jury under this statute.  The statute 
refers specifically, in paragraph (c), to the court's power to 
issue a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order 
and the court's power to order other relief "that the court 
considers appropriate, including monetary damages, actual and 
punitive."  Wis. Stat. § 106.50(6m)(c) (emphasis added).  In any 
event, as the Humphrey decision recognized, a civil action would 
be "in lieu of an administrative hearing," not a civil action 
with a jury trial after liability was determined in an 
administrative hearing without a jury.  See Humphrey, ERD No. 
9203044. 
¶60 In sum, we are not only unpersuaded by the argument 
for an implicit statutory right to trial by jury but also 
concerned about the new precedent that would be created by such 
a holding for situations in which the legislature has been 
silent. 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
26 
 
 
C. 
Claimed Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial 
 
¶61 We turn now to Harvot's contention that she has a 
constitutional right to trial by jury to determine damages for 
her WFMLA claim. 
¶62 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads, in relevant part, as follows: "The right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law 
without regard to the amount in controversy . . . ."  (Emphasis 
added.)  This constitutional provision preserves the right to a 
civil jury trial11 "as it existed at the time of the adoption of 
                                                 
11 See State v. Schweda, 2007 WI 100, ¶17, 303 Wis. 2d 353, 
736 N.W.2d 49; Dane County v. McGrew, 2005 WI 130, ¶13, 285 
Wis. 2d 519, 699 N.W.2d 890; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 74, 
14 N.W. 912 (1883).   
The right to a jury trial in criminal cases is governed by 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Schweda, 
303 Wis. 2d 353, ¶17.   
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not 
apply in state courts.  See Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶7 
n.3 (citing Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877)). 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
27 
 
the constitution in 1848."  Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 17 
Wis. 2d 623, 635, 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962).12  
¶63 Our recent precedent firmly establishes a two-pronged 
test that governs the constitutional analysis regarding whether 
a particular statutory cause of action includes the right to a 
jury trial.  See Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶¶11, 14, 16; 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Schweda, 
2007 
WI 
100, 
¶¶20-21, 
303 
Wis. 2d 353, 736 N.W.2d 49; McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶¶18-19.   
¶64 A party has a constitutional right, under Article I, 
Section 5, to have a statutory claim tried to a jury "when: (1) 
the cause of action created by the statute existed, was known, 
or was recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of 
the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848 and (2) the action was 
regarded at law in 1848."  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶11.  
Although "[t]his court has been unanimous in concluding that the 
Village Food test is the correct test to apply in determining 
whether a cause of action gives rise to a constitutional right 
                                                 
12 See also McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶¶15-16, 18; Village 
Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶10 ("[N]on-statutory causes of action at 
law, where a jury trial was guaranteed before the passage of the 
state constitution, would continue to have a guaranteed right to 
a 
jury 
trial 
attached 
even 
after 
the 
passage 
of 
the 
constitution."); Bekkedal, 183 Wis. at 192 ("From an early day 
it was held that the constitutional provision preserving 
inviolate the right of trial by jury preserves that right 
inviolate as it existed at the time of the adoption of the 
constitution."); Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 490 (*503), 494 
(*506) (1857) ("Again, this clause of the constitution provides 
that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.  We 
suppose this expression must have reference to the state of the 
law 
as 
it 
existed 
at 
the 
formation 
of 
the 
constitution . . . ."). 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
28 
 
to a jury trial," the application of the test to particular 
causes of action "has not occasioned similar consensus."  
Schweda, 303 Wis. 2d 353, ¶21. 
¶65 Most of our disagreement in applying the Village Food 
test relates to the first prong.  For instance, the court in 
Village Food split four-to-three over whether a civil action for 
damages caused by a violation of the minimum mark-up law for 
gasoline satisfied the first prong of the test.  See Village 
Food, 
254 
Wis. 2d 478, 
¶¶33-36. 
 
The 
majority 
rejected 
comparisons to "business fraud, and torts such as cheating, 
fraud, deceit, and business slander" but concluded that the 
common law unfair trade practices of forestalling the market, 
regrating, and engrossing were "of the same 'nature'" as the 
cause of action under the minimum mark-up law.  Id., ¶¶23-25, 
27, 31.  The majority reasoned that "[t]hese offenses are 
clearly forerunners of modern unfair trade practice statutes, as 
each involves the prohibition of deliberate manipulation of 
market prices by a market participant in a controlled market."  
Id., ¶27.   
¶66 On the other hand, Justice Jon P. Wilcox, joined by 
Justices N. Patrick Crooks and Diane S. Sykes, was concerned 
that the majority's application of the first prong was too 
broad.  Id., ¶36 (Wilcox, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
 
Specifically, 
Justice 
Wilcox 
made 
the 
following 
observations: 
These 
offenses 
[of 
forestalling, 
regrating, 
and 
engrossing] 
are 
certainly 
forerunners 
of 
modern 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
29 
 
antitrust 
and 
unfair trade practice statutes in 
general, as each involves the artificial manipulation 
of market factors by a market participant.  However, 
they are only similar to the present cause of action 
in that general sense. 
. . . . 
 
The simple fact that the present cause of action 
involves behavior that affects market prices is, in my 
opinion, simply not sufficient to show that the pre-
1848 claims were substantially codified in a form as 
they existed then.  In essence, the majority's holding 
is that the mere classification of the cause [of] 
action as an "unfair trade practice" is enough to 
constitutionally guarantee the right to a jury trial.  
This 
not 
only 
goes 
against 
our 
precedent, 
but 
essentially renders the test a nullity, as present 
causes of action of all sorts assessed under this test 
will only have to be compared generally to past causes 
of action in order to invoke the constitutional 
protection to a trial by jury. 
Id., ¶¶41, 46 (Wilcox, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
¶67 The disagreement over application of the first prong 
continued in McGrew, where the defendant sought a 12-person jury 
in his trial for speeding.  McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶¶1-2; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h).  A majority of four justices 
concluded that the defendant had a constitutional right to a 
jury trial.  McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶¶3 n.2 (lead opinion), 70 
n.1 (Bradley, J., concurring).  The lead opinion did not agree.  
Id., ¶3 (lead opinion). 
¶68 The majority's conclusion regarding the first prong of 
the Village Food test was that general "laws of the road"13 in 
                                                 
13 The specific "law of the road" the majority of the court 
utilized for comparison reads as follows: 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
30 
 
existence in 1848 were "predecessors to the 'rules of the road' 
violations recognized today," such as speeding.  Id., ¶¶60 
(Bradley, J., concurring), 74 (Butler, Jr., J. dissenting).  
"Rather than narrowly focusing on each individual violation," 
the majority of the court "broaden[ed] its lens to focus on 
violations of the 'rules of the road.'"  Id., ¶57 (Bradley, J., 
concurring).  By contrast, the lead opinion focused more 
narrowly on whether a speeding offense was in existence in 
1848,14 not simply a statute ordering a vehicle to "keep to the 
right side of the road."  See id., ¶30 (lead opinion). 
¶69 More recently, in Schweda, the court split four-to-
three with regard to whether a defendant charged with violating 
a number of waste disposal regulations had a constitutional 
right to a jury trial.  See Schweda, 303 Wis. 2d 353, ¶¶3, 57 
(Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  The 
majority 
rejected 
the 
defendant's 
contention 
that 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Whenever any persons shall meet each other on any 
bridge or road, travelling with carriages, waggons, 
sleds, sleighs, or other vehicles, each person shall 
seasonably drive his carriage or other vehicle to the 
right of the middle of the travelled part of such 
bridge or road, so that the respective carriages, or 
other vehicles aforesaid, may pass each other without 
interference. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 1 (1849).  As Justice Louis B. Butler, Jr., 
noted, "In 1849, 'seasonably' was understood as meaning not done 
rashly or in haste."  McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶75 (Butler, Jr., 
J., dissenting). 
14 In McGrew, all seven justices rejected the comparison of 
speeding to common law nuisance as being too broad.  See id., 
¶25 (lead opinion). 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
31 
 
environmental regulatory violations being charged against him by 
the state were "analogous to common law nuisance claims."  Id., 
¶¶2, 14.  While the majority noted that "[t]here is no question 
that modern environmental law finds its roots in common law 
nuisance," id., ¶31, it refused to analogize the broad common 
law claim of nuisance to contemporary environmental regulations, 
id., ¶40.  The majority justified its conclusion on the fact 
that common law nuisance required a showing of harm, whereas 
harm was not an element in the environmental regulations at 
issue.  Id., ¶42 ("Thus, where such a vital aspect of a common 
law nuisance cause of action, i.e., harm, is not part of a 
contemporary cause of action, it is our determination that the 
two are not sufficiently analogous to pass the first prong of 
the Village Food test."). 
¶70 Article I, Section 5 of our constitution reads, in 
part, as follows: "The right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law. . . . "  If 
this provision were interpreted to read, "The right of trial by 
jury . . . shall extend to all cases at law," this court would 
concentrate on whether the modern statutory cause of action at 
issue is "at law."  However, our precedent directs us to look 
backward to the time of statehood with respect to both prongs in 
the Village Food test.  This makes application of Article I, 
Section 5 difficult to apply in statutory causes of action, 
where it is disputed whether a similar cause of action "existed, 
was known, or was recognized at common law at the time of the 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
32 
 
adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848."  Village Food, 
254 Wis. 2d at 478, ¶11. 
¶71 Returning to the first prong, the majority in Village 
Food borrowed a word from the court of appeals decision in 
Ameritech.  The word was "counterpart."  Having established its 
two-part or two-pronged test, the court stated the following: 
 
The cause of action under the Unfair Sales Act 
involves 
allegations 
of 
a 
similar 
unfair 
trade 
practice [namely, "selling below cost"] . . . .  The 
fact that the type of unfair trade practice prohibited 
at common law differs slightly in its means from the 
unfair trade practice prohibited under the Unfair 
Sales 
Act 
is . . . an 
insufficient 
distinguishing 
characteristic to restrict a jury trial in this case.  
They are essentially "counterpart[s]" in combating 
unfair trade practices.  See Ameritech, 185 Wis. 2d at 
697. 
Id., ¶28 (emphasis added). 
¶72 We believe it would be hard to show that a modern 
statutory cause of action is essentially the counterpart of a 
cause of action existing in 1848 if the two causes of action do 
not share a similar purpose.  Hence, comparing the purpose 
underlying the modern statute to the purpose underlying its 
alleged common law counterpart will be helpful in applying the 
first prong of the Village Food test.  See Schweda, 303 
Wis. 2d 353, ¶34; McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶¶74-76 (Butler, Jr., 
J., dissenting); Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶27.   
¶73 To illustrate, in Village Food, the purpose underlying 
both the minimum mark-up law for gasoline and the common law 
causes of action of forestalling the market, regrating, and 
engrossing was to prevent "deliberate manipulation of market 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
33 
 
prices by a market participant in a controlled market."  Village 
Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶27.  In McGrew, the contemporary rules 
on speeding and the common law "laws of the road" were designed 
for the same basic purpose: to facilitate safe and expeditious 
travel on the roadways.  See, e.g., McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, 
¶¶74-76 (Butler, Jr., J., dissenting).  In Schweda, a majority 
of the court appeared to find that common law nuisance and 
modern environmental regulations did not have the same purpose: 
Here, the causes of action are not essentially 
counterparts to the public nuisance actions that 
existed at common law.  A cause of action for public 
nuisance 
requires 
a 
showing 
of 
substantial 
and 
unreasonable 
harm 
to 
interests 
in 
the 
use 
and 
enjoyment 
of 
land. 
 
Under 
historic 
common 
law 
nuisance, a party should not seek recovery until an 
actual nuisance has been committed, or at all events 
until it is quite clear that the [conduct] will 
inevitably result in a nuisance.  Modern environmental 
regulatory laws, however, regulate more subtle and 
attenuated harms than the common law of nuisance does; 
a land use that creates a common law nuisance is thus 
likely to be an a fortiori violation of statutory 
environmental law.  
Schweda, 303 Wis. 2d 353, ¶35 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted) (alteration in original).   
 
¶74 Having said that, we think the court's decision in 
Schweda represents a narrowed application of the test in Village 
Food. 
 
¶75 In Village Food, the defendant was charged with 
violating the minimum mark-up laws in the sale of motor vehicle 
fuel.  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶¶1, 3.  A competitor 
claimed that the defendant had violated the law on 103 different 
occasions.  Id., ¶3.  The competitor sought $2,000 in damages 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
34 
 
for each violation and for each day of continued violation.  
Id., ¶4.  The defendant sought to present its defense to a jury.  
Id., ¶¶3-4.  In these circumstances, the court rendered a broad 
reading of the constitution. 
 
¶76 In McGrew, the defendant was convicted of speeding by 
a 6-person jury.  McGrew, 285 Wis. 2d 519, ¶7.  He argued that 
he had a constitutional right to a 12-person jury.  Id., ¶2.  A 
majority of justices ruled that McGrew had a constitutional 
right to a jury but only one justice concluded that McGrew had a 
right to a jury of 12.  See id., ¶¶3 n.2 (lead opinion), 70 n.1 
(Bradley, J., concurring), 72 (Butler, Jr., J. dissenting).  
Thus, the court essentially preserved the status quo. 
¶77 In Schweda, a defendant asked for a jury trial on the 
state's complaint 
of multiple violations of environmental 
regulations, 
Schweda, 
303 
Wis. 2d 353, 
¶1, 
resulting 
in 
forfeiture of $219,120 plus other costs, totaling $365,373.54, 
id., ¶¶86, 86 n.12 (Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  The court was unanimous that some of the violations 
had no pertinent counterpart at common law.  See, e.g., id., 
¶57.  It was divided on others.  Id.  The majority opinion 
amounted to a narrower interpretation of the Village Food test 
and the term "counterpart" than was evident in the two earlier 
cases. 
¶78 In this case, we do not see any cause of action 
existing in 1848 as an essential counterpart, with a similar 
purpose, to a suit for damages for a violation of the WFMLA. 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
35 
 
¶79 The purpose of the WFMLA was explained in Kelley Co. 
v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 248, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  The 
WFMLA "sets forth minimum rights for family and medical leave."  
Id.  The legislative history of the WFMLA reveals that the law 
was "intended to assist workers in handling conflicts between 
the demands of their work and the needs of their families."  Id. 
at 248-49. 
The [WFMLA] was a response to the increased entry of 
women, 
the 
persons 
traditionally 
responsible 
for 
family care giving, into the work force.  The [WFMLA] 
was 
designed 
to 
accomplish 
the 
following: 
make 
employees more productive on the job because they will 
have dealt with family crises while on leave; help 
ease the day care shortage; save health care costs by 
allowing children to care for seriously ill parents at 
home; and make bonding for new infants and adjustment 
periods for adopted children go easier which will have 
long term psychological benefits for children. 
 
The [WFMLA] is designed to protect employees' 
jobs and benefits while on leave to care for their 
families or their own medical needs. 
Id. at 249 (internal footnotes omitted). 
¶80 The WFMLA is modern social legislation.  It may be 
viewed as fundamental today, but it was quite unheard of in 
1848.   
¶81 Harvot suggests the WFMLA entails labor standards and 
that labor standards of one sort or another have existed for 
centuries.  This claim is too broad to be meaningful.15 
                                                 
15 In General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 662 v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 21 Wis. 2d 242, 252, 124 
N.W.2d 123 (1963), the court observed the following:  
[R]espondent's argument that it is being deprived of 
the right to a trial by jury . . . fails for the 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
36 
 
¶82 Harvot points to Chapter 81 of the 1849 Wisconsin 
Statutes, which she asserts provided protection for apprentices 
in the case of cruelty by masters, failure of masters to educate 
apprentices, and breach of masters' duties to apprentices.  Wis. 
Stat. ch. 81 (1849).  The predecessor of this statute existed in 
the Wisconsin Territory.  See 1838-39 Statutes of Wisconsin at 
134-36. 
¶83 This statute is not a counterpart of the WFMLA, as can 
be 
seen 
in Section 1, Chapter 81, which describes the 
relationship between master and servant: 
 
Section 
1. 
 
Every 
male 
infant, 
and 
every 
unmarried female under the age of eighteen years, with 
the consent of the persons or officers hereinafter 
mentioned, may, of his or her own free will, bind 
himself or herself in writing, to serve as clerk, 
apprentice, or servant, in any profession, trade, or 
employment, if a male, until the age of twenty one 
years, and if a female until the age of eighteen 
years, or until her marriage within that age, or for 
any shorter time; and such binding shall be as valid 
and effectual as if such infant was of full age, at 
the time of making such engagement. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reason that the right which is constitutionally 
protected is the right which existed under the common 
law 
at 
the 
time 
our 
constitution 
came 
into 
being. . . . 
 
Since 
unfair 
labor 
practice 
litigation . . . was not in existence at the time that 
the Wisconsin [C]onstitution came into being, there is 
no constitutional obligation to afford a jury trial in 
such proceedings. 
(Citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 
(1937.)) 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
37 
 
Wis. Stat. ch. 81, § 1 (1849).  The relationship between master 
and apprentice or servant in 1848 was very different from the 
usual employer-employee relationship today. 
¶84 Harvot 
also 
points 
to 
Sir 
William 
Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Law of England, especially "Chapter the 
Fourteenth," at 2 Commentaries 328, dealing with master and 
servant, as did Wis. Stat. ch. 81 (1849).  She makes much of the 
following passage in Robert J. Steinfeld's book, The Invention 
of Free Labor: The Employment Relation in English and American 
Law & Culture, 1350-1870 31 (1991): 
The master was legally obliged to maintain his 
servant, as he was his apprentice, but servants were 
also entitled to wages.  Indeed, a master was 
obligated to continue to pay his servant's wages even 
"if a servant retained for a year, happen within the 
time of his service to fall sick, or to be hurt or 
disabled by the act of God, or in doing his master's 
business."  Naturally, a master was not permitted to 
send such a servant away. 
(Internal footnotes omitted.) 
¶85 Superficially, this is the most analogous common law 
cause of action that Harvot presents.  Unfortunately, she does 
not acknowledge that this common law cause of action was 
actually an action for the breach of an employment contract.  
See id.  In fact, the sentences immediately preceding the cause 
of action cited by Harvot state the following: 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
38 
 
 
Whether by retainer for a year or by indenture, 
once the oral agreement between master and resident 
servant had been assented to or the indentures had 
been signed, the parties, as in apprenticeship, were 
bound by their undertakings, both those explicitly 
stated and those implied by law. 
Id. (emphasis added).   
¶86 Consequently, the apparent purpose underlying this 
common law action for breach of a retainer agreement (employment 
contract) was to ensure that the servant (employee), who could 
be criminally prosecuted for departing before his term of 
employment was complete, was cared for and compensated as he was 
promised.  See id.  Assisting an employee to balance work and 
family demands was not a purpose of this common law cause of 
action.  As a result, we cannot say that this common law cause 
of action for breach of an employment contract serves a purpose 
similar to that of Harvot's civil action for damages under the 
WFMLA.  It is not a counterpart, and it fails to satisfy the 
first prong of the Village Food test.  Moreover, the procedure 
Harvot seeks——a jury trial on damages after an administrative 
finding of facts and liability——also was not present in the 
1840s. 
¶87 In conclusion, it would be hard to imagine that 
Harvot's civil action for damages under the WFMLA "existed, was 
known, or was recognized at common law . . . in 1848" when we 
consider that the creation of the WFMLA was a response to the 
change in composition of the modern-day work force.  See Kelley 
Co., 172 Wis. 2d at 248-49.  Because we conclude that Harvot 
cannot satisfy the first prong of the Village Food test, we hold 
No.  2007AP1396  
 
39 
 
that she has no constitutional right to a jury trial in her 
civil action for damages caused by a violation of the WFMLA. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶88 We conclude that the WFMLA does not confer an implied 
statutory right to jury trial in a civil action to recover 
damages for a violation of the WFMLA.  We further conclude that 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not 
afford the right to jury trial in a civil action to recover 
damages for a violation of the WFMLA.  Consequently, we affirm 
the order of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision and order of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
1 
 
¶89 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  At issue in 
this case is a narrow question: Does the Wisconsin Family or 
Medical Leave Act (WFMLA)1 confer an implied statutory right to a 
jury trial?  Despite the narrow focus of the question, the 
majority renders a sweeping determination.  It holds that "when 
a statute is silent with regard to the right to a jury trial, no 
jury trial is required unless the right is preserved by Article 
I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution."  Majority op., ¶47.   
¶90 The majority warns that finding implied statutory 
rights to trial by jury would "open a can of worms."  Majority 
op., ¶50.  I conclude, however, that it is the majority opinion 
that 
opens the proverbial can of worms.  Its sweeping 
proclamation calls into question the status of a host of jury 
trials in this state and misapprehends the law.  Because I 
determine that there exists an implied statutory right to jury 
trial for WFMLA actions, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶91 The 
majority 
correctly 
observes 
that 
the 
WFMLA 
contains no express statement providing for a jury trial.  
Quoting language from three cases,2 it concludes that when the 
statute is silent on the issue, the legislature necessarily 
meant for there to be no jury trial in a civil action.   
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13)(a). 
2 See Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 
2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177; Bekkedal v. City of 
Viroqua, 183 Wis. 176, 197 N.W. 707 (1924); State v. Ameritech 
Corp., 185 Wis. 2d 686, 517 N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994).   
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
2 
 
¶92 Warning of dire consequences, the majority observes: 
"Asking this court to discover an implied statutory right to 
trial by jury in situations where the legislature has not 
prescribed such a right . . . would open a can of worms. . . .  
Ad hoc judicial discovery of implied statutory rights to trial 
by jury would not permit a meaningful legal test that could 
carry over from case to case."  Majority op., ¶50 (emphasis in 
original). 
¶93 After finding no implied statutory right to a jury 
trial, the majority proceeds next to examine whether the right 
to a jury trial can be found in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Ultimately, 
the 
majority 
voices 
dissatisfaction 
with 
the 
established test for assessing the existence of a constitutional 
right, invents its own, and concludes that no right exists. 
II 
¶94 The majority's sweeping statement that there can be no 
implied statutory right to a jury trial calls into question the 
validity of a host of jury trials.  Although I have not done an 
exhaustive study, two examples readily come to mind.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 218.0171 (Wisconsin's Lemon Law) provides a remedy for 
an automotive dealer who fails to replace or refund a customer's 
purchase of a defective car.  The remedial portion of the 
statute is silent on the issue of whether the action is to be 
tried to the court or to a jury: 
In addition to pursuing any other remedy, a consumer 
may bring an action to recover for any damages caused 
by a violation of this section.  The court shall award 
a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the 
amount of any pecuniary loss, together with costs, 
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
3 
 
disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate.  
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7) (emphasis added).   
¶95 Despite 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
expressly provide for a jury, Lemon Law cases have been tried to 
juries around the state for years.3  Moreover, the Civil Jury 
Instruction Committee has drafted a special verdict form as well 
as a variety of pattern jury instructions for the trial by jury 
of Lemon Law cases.4   
¶96 The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law provides a second 
example.  Wisconsin Stat. § 135.03 states that no grantor may 
"terminate, cancel, fail to renew or substantially change the 
competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good 
cause."  The statute also provides a remedial scheme that is 
silent on the issue of whether the action is to be tried to the 
court or to a jury: 
                                                 
3 See, for example: Brown County: Schonscheck v. Paccar, 
Inc., 2003 WI App 79, 261 Wis. 2d 769, 661 N.W.2d 476; Dane 
County: Dobbratz Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. PACCAR, Inc., 
2002 WI App 138, 256 Wis. 2d 205, 647 N.W.2d 315; Waukesha 
County: Estate of Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 234, 248 
Wis. 2d 193, 635 N.W.2d 635; Clark County: Gosse v. Navistar 
Intern. Transp. Corp., 2000 WI App 8, 232 Wis. 2d 163, 605 
N.W.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1999); Sheboygan County: Hartlaub v. 
Coachmen Indust., Inc., 143 Wis. 2d 791, 422 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. 
App. 1988); Fond du Lac County: Creighbaum v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 
No. 1990AP1281, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 
1991). 
4 See Wis JI——Civil 3300; see also id. 3301 (Lemon Law 
Claim: Nonconformity); id. 3302 (Lemon Law Claim: Four Attempts 
to Repair: Same Nonconformity); id. 3303 (Lemon Law Claim: Out 
of Service Warranty Nonconformity); id. 3304 (Lemon Law Claim: 
Failure to Repair). 
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
4 
 
If any grantor violates this chapter, a dealer may 
bring an action against such grantor in any court of 
competent jurisdiction for damages sustained by the 
dealer as a consequence of the grantor's violation, 
together 
with 
the 
actual 
costs 
of 
the 
action, 
including reasonable actual attorney fees . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 135.06 (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, there are 
numerous appellate decisions from around the state that reflect 
that the action was tried to a jury.  Notably, the Wisconsin 
Civil Jury Instruction Committee has drafted a special verdict 
form and pattern jury instructions for jury trials under 
Wisconsin's Fair Dealership Act.  See Wis JI——Civil 2769-2772. 
¶97 It 
is 
unclear 
how 
the 
majority's 
sweeping 
pronouncement will affect the past judgments rendered and the 
future cases to be tried under Wisconsin's Lemon Law and Fair 
Dealership Act.  Can past judgments be challenged?  Should 
future cases be tried to a jury?  What role, if any, should 
advisory juries play?5  What is clear, however, is that now that 
the majority opens this can of worms, we will be faced with 
untold litigation attempting to answer the questions raised by 
the majority's broad pronouncement.   
III 
¶98 In addition to unsettling the status of these cases, 
the majority misapprehends the law.  The Wisconsin cases the 
majority cites for the proposition that there can be no implied 
jury trial are not on point.  See Village Food & Liquor Mart v. 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 805.02(1) provides: "In all actions not 
triable of right by a jury, the court upon motion or on its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury."  Trial by 
advisory jury requires the consent of both parties.  Id., 
§ 805.02(2). 
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
5 
 
H&S 
Petroleum, 
Inc., 
2002 
WI 
92, 
254 
Wis. 2d 478, 
647 
N.W.2d 177; Bekkedal v. City of Viroqua, 183 Wis. 176, 197 N.W. 
707 (1924); State v. Ameritech Corp., 185 Wis. 2d 686, 517 
N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994).  None of the cases relied upon by 
the majority addresses the question of an implied statutory 
right to a jury trial.  Rather, the issue addressed was whether 
a constitutional right to a jury trial can be found in the 
absence of an expressed statutory right.   
¶99 Contrary to the majority, I ground my analysis in an 
interpretation of the statute and conclude that the WFMLA has an 
implied right to a jury trial in a civil damage action.  A 
comparison between the WFMLA and the federal Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) supports this conclusion.  
¶100 The Wisconsin Act and the federal FMLA contain a 
similar remedial scheme and structure.  Notably, like the 
Wisconsin Act, the federal act does not expressly provide for a 
jury trial in actions for damages based on violations of the 
FMLA.  Nevertheless, federal courts have concluded that there is 
an implied right to a jury trial.  See Frizzell v. Southwest 
Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1998).          
¶101 Like the Wisconsin law,6 the federal law provides two 
distinct types of remedies: equitable relief and monetary 
damages: 
                                                 
6 The relevant language from Wis. Stat. § 103.10(12)(d) and 
(13)(a) is as follows: 
[The Department] may order the employer to take action 
to remedy the violation, including providing requested 
family 
leave 
or 
medical 
leave, 
reinstating 
an 
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
6 
 
(1) Liability.  Any employer who violates [the act] 
shall be liable to any eligible employee affected:  
(A) for damages equal to (i) the amount of (I) any 
wages, 
salary 
employment 
benefits, 
or 
other 
compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason 
of the violation; or (II) in a case in which wages, 
salary, employment benefits, or other compensation 
have not been denied or lost to the employee, any 
actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a 
direct result of the violation . . . . 
(B) for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, 
including employment, reinstatement, and promotion. 
29 U.S.C. § 2617. 
¶102 Federal courts have relied on the remedy scheme and 
structure to determine that there is an implied statutory right 
to a jury trial in an action for damages: 
The 
distinction 
between 
"damages" 
and 
"equitable 
relief" reflects Congress's intent to make juries 
available to plaintiffs pursuing remedies that fall 
under section 2617(1)(A), while leaving it to the 
judge 
to 
determine 
whether 
equitable 
relief 
is 
warranted under section 2617(1)(B).  While Congress's 
intent would be clearer if the FMLA included the word 
"legal" 
to 
label 
the 
damages 
available 
under 
2617(1)(A), the FMLA's division between "damages" and 
"equitable relief" still indicates an intent to make 
juries available. 
Frizzell, 154 F.3d at 643; see also Arban v. West Publ'g Corp., 
345 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2003); Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 
F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1999); Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 
                                                                                                                                                             
employee, providing back pay accrued . . . and paying 
reasonable actual attorney fees . . . . 
An employee . . . may bring an action in circuit court 
against an employer to recover damages caused by a 
violation of [the WFMLA] after the completion of an 
administrative proceeding, including judicial review, 
concerning the same violation. 
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
7 
 
151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998); Bryant v. Delbar Prods., Inc., 18 
F. Supp. 2d 799, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Helmly v. Stone 
Container Corp., 957 F. Supp. 1274, 1276 (S.D. Ga. 1997); 
Souders v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 218, 219 (D. Neb. 
1997). 
¶103 Relying on the rationale of the federal courts, I 
determine that the creation of a separate cause of action for 
damages demonstrates that the legislature intended civil actions 
under the WFMLA to be tried by a jury.  Therefore, I conclude 
that the failure to expressly provide for a jury trial in the 
WFMLA does not automatically negate that right.  Rather, I 
determine that even in the absence of express language, there is 
an implied statutory right to a jury trial under the WFMLA.    
IV 
¶104 Although 
I 
need 
not 
address 
the 
constitutional 
arguments because I decide the case on statutory grounds, I 
pause briefly to comment on the majority's treatment of the 
established test for assessing the constitutional right to a 
jury 
trial in a 
civil action.  The majority expresses 
dissatisfaction with the Village Food test and highlights the 
court's split decisions when applying the test: "Although this 
court has been unanimous in concluding that the Village Food 
test is the correct test to apply, . . . the application of the 
test to particular causes of action has not occasioned similar 
consensus."  See majority op., ¶64 (quoting State v. Schweda, 
2007 WI 100, ¶21, 303 Wis. 2d 353, 736 N.W.2d 49); see also  
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
8 
 
Dane County v. McGrew, 2005 WI 130, 285 Wis. 2d 519, 699 
N.W.2d 890; Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478. 
¶105 Under the Village Food test, the court examines 
whether a statutory cause of action is "essentially [a] 
counterpart to," "sufficiently analogous to," and "of the same 
nature" as an 1848 action at law.  Schweda, 303 Wis. 2d 353, 
¶¶23, 41.  The Village Food test can be easily manipulated, 
depending on the focus of the lens.  We have disagreed over how 
broadly or narrowly to focus the lens when determining whether 
two causes of action are "counterparts."  
¶106 In attempting to remedy this infirmity, the majority 
creates out of whole cloth a new test: "similar purpose."  
Majority op., ¶72.  Yet, the majority's new innovation suffers 
from the same infirmity.  How broadly or narrowly are we to 
construe the purpose of a cause of action?  I predict that the 
majority's addition of "similar purpose" will lend no more 
consistency to our application of the Village Food test and 
instead adds but another layer of analysis.     
¶107 Accordingly, 
for 
the 
reasons 
stated 
above, 
I 
respectfully dissent.   
¶108 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2007AP1396.awb 
 
1