Title: Quisenberry v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Mims, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ., and 
Millette, S.J. 
 
WESLEY QUISENBERRY, PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE  
OF WANDA QUISENBERRY, DECEASED 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 171494 
   SENIOR JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 October 11, 2018 
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED 
 
UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered an order of 
certification requesting that this Court exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 of 
the Constitution of Virginia and Rule 5:40 and answer the following question of law: 
Does an employer owe a duty of care to the family member of an employee who 
alleges exposure to asbestos from the work clothes of the employee, where such 
exposure takes place off of the employer’s premises and the employer has no 
relationship with the family member? 
 
We accepted the certified question, and, for the reasons stated herein, we now restate the 
question pursuant to our authority under Rule 5:40(d),1 as follows: 
Does an employer owe a duty of care to an employee’s family member who 
alleges exposure to asbestos from the work clothes of an employee, where the 
family member alleges the employer’s negligence allowed asbestos fibers to be 
regularly transported away from the place of employment to the employee’s 
home? 
 
                     
 
1 Rule 5:40(d) states that “[t]his Court may in its discretion restate any question of law 
certified,” and the Court has previously exercised its discretion to restate certified questions 
based on the authority of this rule “when doing so will aid in producing a determinative answer 
in the proceedings.”  Blount v. Clarke, 291 Va. 198, 202 n.1, 782 S.E.2d 152, 153 n.1 (2016) 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also VanBuren v. Grubb, 284 Va. 584, 589, 
733 S.E.2d 919, 921 (2012) (same). 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
So stated, we answer in the affirmative. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The certified question of law arises following a motion before the district court to dismiss 
this action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
Accordingly, we take the factual allegations stated in the first amended complaint (“the 
complaint”) as true “for the purposes of framing an answer that is responsive to the needs of the 
district court.”  Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 Va. 685, 689, 725 S.E.2d 555, 556 (2012) (citing 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990)). 
 
Plaintiff alleges that from approximately 1942 to 1977, Wanda Quisenberry’s father, 
Bennie Plessinger, was employed by Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock, now known as 
Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (“the Shipyard”), in various capacities in which he was 
routinely exposed to asbestos and in which asbestos dust adhered to his clothing.  He brought 
home asbestos fibers and his car was contaminated with these fibers.  His daughter, Wanda, lived 
in his home and was exposed to asbestos beginning in 1942.  Beginning in 1954, she regularly 
helped launder her father’s clothes, shaking off and breathing in asbestos dust in the process.  
She moved out of the home in 1969. 
 
In December 2013, Wanda Quisenberry was diagnosed with malignant pleural 
mesothelioma, caused by exposure to asbestos dust and fibers.  She died from the disease three 
years later.  Her son, Wesley Quisenberry, administrator of her estate, brought this action in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Newport News.  As is relevant to this certified question, the 
complaint alleges that in the years Wanda was exposed to asbestos, particularly between 1950 
and 1969, the Shipyard knew or had reason to know of the dangers that asbestos posed to 
workers’ family members and members of the public, including Wanda.  The complaint alleges 
 
3 
the Shipyard was negligent in choosing not to exercise reasonable care to, among other things, 
sufficiently warn workers not to wear work clothes home; educate workers about safeguards 
such as coveralls; provide a locker room, showers, or laundry service; and adhere to various 
statutes, regulations, and guidelines.  The complaint further alleges that this negligence 
proximately resulted in Wanda’s death.  A separate count alleges gross negligence and wanton 
and willful conduct on the part of the Shipyard. 
 
After removing to federal court, the Shipyard sought to dismiss this action on the basis 
that the plaintiff’s theory relied on “take home” exposure liability.  Although this Court has not 
addressed the specific issue, the Shipyard represented that Virginia precedent did not support 
imposing a legal duty on an employer for injury to an employee’s family member that occurred 
outside the premises.  Agreeing that this Court had not addressed this issue, Quisenberry argued 
that the majority, although not all, of the circuit courts from Virginia that had considered the 
issue had recognized such a duty.  The Shipyard then moved to certify the question to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia to resolve the issue.  On November 3, 2017, the Eastern District 
issued a certification order requesting that this Court exercise its discretion to consider this 
dispositive question of law.  On November 16, 2017, this Court issued an order accepting the 
certified question for oral argument and requesting briefing.  We now consider the question. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Restating the Question 
The certified question in this case characterizes the Shipyard and Wanda as having “no 
relationship.”  The pleadings clearly indicate they lack a contractual, familial, employer-
employee, or agency-agent relationship, or facts giving rise to a “special relationship.”  See 
Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 Va. 121, 129, 540 S.E.2d 123, 127 (2001) (collecting 
 
4 
examples of special relationships recognized in Virginia).  They are, generally speaking, 
strangers under the law.  This is not, however, dispositive as to the existence of a duty.2  Whether 
the circumstances surrounding the issue now being litigated created a sufficient relationship for 
duty to lie in a general negligence claim is a question of law.  This inquiry is distinct from the 
traditional characterizations of “relationship” above and is dependent on whether plaintiff has 
pled a set of circumstances where the Shipyard placed Wanda within reach of the Shipyard’s 
                     
 
2 Compare Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 327, 626 S.E.2d 428, 435 (2006) 
(“the common law imposes a duty” due to the “the special relationship of innkeeper and guest”); 
Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood Apartments, 261 Va. 97, 107, 540 S.E.2d 134, 139 (2001) (for a 
plaintiff tenant to allege negligence of landlord for failure to warn of violent crimes committed 
by third parties around the housing development, “the plaintiff must establish that there is a 
special relationship, either between the plaintiff and the defendant or between the third party 
criminal actor and the defendant”); Terminal Cars, Inc. v. Wagnar, 205 Va. 214, 219, 135 S.E.2d 
802, 805 (1964) (respecting a passenger, a common carrier owes a duty of “utmost care, 
diligence and foresight in the operation and management of the vehicle” the passenger is riding); 
Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 533, 362 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1987) (“a business invitor, whose 
method of business does not attract or provide a climate for assaultive crimes, does not have a 
duty to take measures to protect an invitee” from such crimes), with RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 
260, 276, 764 S.E.2d 8, 17 (2012) (reiterating that “the common law requires that every person 
must exercise ordinary care in the use and maintenance of his own property to prevent injury to 
others,” and imposing a duty where defendant negligently stacked lumber unreasonably 
impairing the view of a trucker, a stranger, approaching a railroad crossing); Perlin v. Chappell, 
198 Va. 861, 864, 96 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1957) (defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, a stranger, 
when defendant allowed a cow to escape his premises on the basis that the common law 
“imposes upon every person the duty to exercise ordinary care in the use and maintenance of his 
own property to prevent injury to others”); Rice v. Turner, 191 Va. 601, 605, 62 S.E.2d 24, 26 
(1950) (duty where defendant’s cow escaped the premises and was struck by a car operated by a 
stranger because “[t]he common law imposes upon every person the duty to exercise ordinary 
care in the use and maintenance of his own property to prevent injury to others”); Overstreet v. 
Security Storage & Safe Deposit Co., 148 Va. 306, 317, 138 S.E. 552, 555 (1927) (as a stranger, 
“[t]he security company owed [plaintiff] only the duty it owed to mankind generally — that is, 
not to do any act which a person of ordinary prudence could reasonably apprehend, as a natural 
and probable consequence thereof, would subject him to peril”); Haywood v. South Hill Mfg. 
Co., 142 Va. 761, 765-66, 128 S.E. 362, 364 (1925) (where an 11-year-old boy, a stranger, was 
non-fatally electrocuted when he touched defendant’s transformer, “[r]easonable care requires 
those using dangerous agencies to avail themselves of the best mechanical contrivances and 
inventions in practical use which are effectual in preventing injury to persons and property”); 
King v. Hartung, 123 Va. 185, 188, 96 S.E. 202, 203 (1918) (property owner had a duty to avoid 
harm to passersby, though strangers, where “owners themselves created the danger”). 
 
5 
conduct, within a class of persons at recognizable risk of harm.  Accordingly, in order to prevent 
the language of “relationship” in the certified question from creating assumptions as to duty 
under the law, we restate the original question as follows: 
Does an employer owe a duty of care to an employee’s family member who 
alleges exposure to asbestos from the work clothes of an employee, where the 
family member alleges the employer’s negligence allowed asbestos fibers to be 
regularly transported away from the place of employment to the employee’s 
home? 
 
“[W]hether a legal duty in tort exists is a pure question of law.”  Volpe v. City of 
Lexington, 281 Va. 630, 636, 708 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The “finding of a legal duty” is a “prerequisite to a finding of negligence.”  Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. 
Gamble, 256 Va. 144, 149, 501 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1998).  “Without a legal duty there can be no 
cause of action for an injury.”  Id. at 147, 501 S.E.2d at 396.  Accordingly, the question before us 
is a dispositive threshold question, Marshall v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 318, 389 S.E.2d 902, 904 
(1990), in that if it is answered in the negative there can be no action in negligence based upon 
Virginia law before the federal court for the Eastern District. 
B. Analysis 
The principles of duty in general negligence claims under such circumstances in Virginia 
are familiar and established.  They were set forth in RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 260, 275, 764 
S.E.2d 8, 16 (2012), and we reaffirm them today.3  “General negligence principles require a 
person to exercise due care to avoid injuring others.”  Id. (citing Overstreet v. Security Storage & 
Safe Deposit Co., 148 Va. 306, 317, 138 S.E. 552, 555 (1927)); Charles E. Friend, Personal 
                     
 
3 While RGR concerns a defendant landowner and a plaintiff who is injured adjacent to 
the land, it is neither a premises liability case nor unique to real property, but based firmly in 
general negligence principles.  RGR invoked precedent from negligence cases addressing real 
property, personal property, and conduct and is one of this Court’s benchmarks in the area of 
general negligence. 
 
6 
Injury Law in Virginia § 1.1.1., at 2 (3rd ed. 2003) (“There is . . . a general duty not to injure 
others [that] arises whenever [a] defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm to others.”).  
Specifically, the common law requires that “‘every person [must] exercise ordinary care in the 
use and maintenance of his own property to prevent injury to others.’”  Perlin v. Chappell, 198 
Va. 861, 864, 96 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1957) (quoting Rice v. Turner, 191 Va. 601, 605, 62 S.E.2d 
24, 26 (1950)); accord Standard Oil Co. v. Wakefield, 102 Va. 824, 828, 47 S.E. 830, 831 (1904) 
(recognizing the “duty of every man to so use his own property as not to injure the persons or 
property of others”).  As we reiterated in RGR, the “‘broad common law maxim’ sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas requires that ‘one must so use his own rights as not to infringe upon the 
rights of another.’”  288 Va. at 275-76, 764 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, 
284 Va. 102, 107, 726 S.E.2d 14, 17 (2012)). 
This duty is not abstract:  a specific course of conduct gives rise to a specific duty 
extending to specific persons.  Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 241 Va. 
270, 278, 401 S.E.2d 878, 883 (1991) (“The scope of the duty will vary with the circumstances 
of each case, but it is always a duty owed to a discernible individual, or to a class of which that 
individual is a member.”) 
In defining those to whom a duty is owed, we have said this general duty is owed “to 
those within reach of a defendant’s conduct.”  RGR, 288 Va. at 276, 764 S.E.2d at 17. 
This is because “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and 
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”  Palsgraf 
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).  This relationship, however temporary, is 
essential to duty, and the question of whether there exists a relationship between the parties goes 
to the heart of the inquiry before this Court.  We have said “there is no such thing as negligence 
 
7 
in the abstract, or in general, or as sometimes is said, in vacuo.  Negligence must be in relation to 
some person.”  Kent v. Miller, 167 Va. 422, 425-26, 189 S.E. 332, 334 (1937) (emphasis added).  
This ancient common law principle is quoted in Dudley: 
The question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is established 
that the man who has been negligent owed some duty to the person who seeks to 
make him liable for his negligence . . . A man is entitled to be as negligent as he 
pleases toward the world as a whole if he owes no duty to them. 
 
241 Va. at 277, 401 S.E.2d at 882 (quoting with approval Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 
(1893)).  Dudley goes on, id. at 278, 401 S.E.2d at 882, to cite with approval the similar views 
expressed in Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99-101, numerous treatises, and our own cases, including 
Kent, 167 Va. at 425-26, 189 S.E. at 334. 
Where no relationship exists, it is axiomatic that there is no duty.  Yet “[t]he existence of 
[a] duty does not depend on proving a particular relationship,” but “‘arises from that basic and 
necessary regulation of civilization which forbids any person because of his own convenience, to 
recklessly, heedlessly or carelessly injure another.’”  RGR, 288 Va. at 279-80, 764 S.E.2d at 19 
(quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. O’Neil, 119 Va. 611, 627, 89 S.E. 862, 866 (1916) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)) (emphasis added).  Thus, “[i]n the vast majority of 
negligence actions, the parties were strangers at the time of the incident, and the action is based 
upon the broad duty . . . not to injure others by acts of omission or commission.”  Friend, 
Personal Injury Law in Virginia § 1.1.1., at 2.  The motorist undertakes a duty to other nearby 
motorists and pedestrians – the class of persons which he places in a “recognizable risk of harm” 
– to exercise due care in his conduct as he drives.  Parker v. Debose, 206 Va. 220, 223, 142 
S.E.2d 510, 512 (1965); Dudley, 241 Va. at 278, 401 S.E.2d at 882-83 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 281 cmt c).  The transient relationship of a motorist to another motorist or to 
a pedestrian is rooted in the recognizable risk posed by negligent driving and gives rise to a duty 
 
8 
of care, despite the fact that the parties are complete strangers.  We have previously held that this 
duty can arise vis-a-vis multiple individuals or to a class of persons, provided they are “within 
reach of a defendant’s conduct.”  RGR, 288 Va. at 276, 764 S.E.2d at 17. 
As set forth in both RGR and Dudley, “‘[i]n order for the actor to be negligent with 
respect to the other, his conduct must create a recognizable risk of harm to the other individual, 
or to a class of persons — as, for example, all persons within a given area of danger — of which 
the other is a member.’”  RGR, 299 Va. at 279, 764 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting Dudley, 241 Va. at 
278, 401 S.E.2d at 882-83 and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 cmt c).  Here, Wanda is 
alleged to be one such person within a “given area of danger.”  Id.  “The only ‘relationship’ 
which must exist [for a duty to arise] is a sufficient juxtaposition of the parties in time and space 
to place the plaintiff in danger from the defendant’s acts.”  RGR, 288 Va. at 280, 764 S.E.2d at 
19 (quoting Friend, Personal Injury Law in Virginia § 1.1.1., at 2; see also Rice, 191 Va. at 605, 
62 S.E.2d at 26) (emphasis added). 
Our precedent makes clear that this “juxtaposition of time and space” does not require 
actual interaction between the parties, but sufficient relation to place plaintiff within reach of 
defendant’s conduct.  We have recognized the duty of a negligent actor can arise through his 
conduct to the class of persons exposed to the recognizable risk he creates.  This Court has found 
that a property owner had a duty to prevent his cow from wandering onto nearby roadways by 
virtue of the proliferation of paved roads in the Commonwealth and the “common knowledge” 
that cows on a roadway can pose a hazard to motorists.  Rice, 191 Va. at 605, 62 S.E.2d at 26.  
The proximity of the owner or his farmhands to the motorist, or a prior existing relationship, was 
not relevant to the question of duty, but rather the proximity of the cows to the roadway and the 
recognizable risk of harm to the class of persons on the road.  Id.  In RGR, we held that the 
 
9 
artificial hazard of defendant’s making – stacks of lumber restricting visibility at a railroad 
crossing – placed the plaintiff crossing adjacent railroad tracks within reach of defendant’s 
conduct and thus created a duty to the plaintiff.  RGR, 288 Va. at 281, 764 S.E.2d at 20.  
Similarly, a company’s negligent discharge of toxic chemicals into a river would not result in an 
absence of duty to injured swimmers downstream merely because the harm to plaintiffs did not 
occur contemporaneously and geographically adjacent to defendant’s actions. 
Thus, that harm in the present case occurred at a location removed from the employer’s 
business and after hours is a distinction without a difference.  The artificial hazard created by the 
Shipyard – asbestos dust – was allegedly released through the Shipyard’s course of conduct and 
moved to place Wanda in danger.  The nature of the hazard allegedly created by the Shipyard’s 
conduct was that asbestos fibers, the inhalation of which could cause mesothelioma, regularly 
accumulated on the clothes of workers during the day and were released again when those 
workers returned home and had their clothes washed, thus placing Wanda and others similarly 
situated within reach of the Shipyard’s conduct and within the “zone of danger.”  This created a 
“recognizable risk of harm” to those sharing living quarters with the workers, resulting in a duty 
of ordinary care to that class of persons. 
While “[f]oreseeability [of harm], it has been many times repeated, is not to be equated 
with duty,” Holiday Motor Corp. v. Walters, 292 Va. 461, 478, 790 S.E.2d 447, 455 (2016) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added), we have also recognized that it is a necessary consideration 
in establishing the “reach” of defendant’s conduct or “recognizable risk of harm” discussed by 
the Court in RGR, 288 Va. at 279, 764 S.E.2d at 19.  See Dudley, 241 Va. at 279, 401 S.E.2d at 
883 (recognizing that the class to whom a duty is owed is established by determining who is 
“directly and foreseeably exposed to the risk of bodily harm” as a result of the defendant’s 
 
10 
actions) (emphasis added); Overstreet, 148 Va. at 318, 138 S.E. at 555 (“[W]henever the 
circumstances attending the situation are such that an ordinary prudent person could reasonably 
apprehend that, as a natural and probable consequence of his act, another person rightfully there 
will be in danger of receiving an injury, a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent such injury 
arises.”) (emphasis added).4 
As pled, workers accumulated asbestos dust on their clothes.  As pled, in the absence of 
on-site laundry, lockers, or warning to the contrary, these individuals would regularly wear those 
clothes into their home environment and have them laundered there.  As pled, the fibers traveled 
on the clothes of persons who worked with asbestos, and the fibers posed a danger to individuals 
who breathed in the asbestos dust in the home environment.  The pleadings support a 
“recognizable risk of harm” to a class of persons “within a given area of danger” of defendant’s 
conduct, including Wanda and the class of persons similarly situated.  
We have repeatedly said: 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard 
to another . . . that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct 
with regard to those circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to the person 
or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such 
injury. 
 
                     
4 This Court has also observed, ‘“Imposition of a duty does not depend upon 
foreseeability alone.’”  Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841, 845 
(1974) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); accord Wright, 234 Va. at 531, 362 S.E.2d at 921.  
We are hardly an outlier in according foreseeability some consideration in our duty analysis.  
“[A]lmost every jurisdiction does treat foreseeability as a significant factor . . . in analyzing 
whether the duty element is met in a negligence claim. . . .  The reality . . . is that forty-seven 
states plainly do give foreseeability a significant role in duty analysis.”  Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Third Restatement of Torts: Issue Two: Article and Commentary: Foreseeability in Breach, Duty 
and Proximate Cause, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1247, 1258 (2009). 
 
 
11 
RGR, 288 Va. at 276, 764 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting Southern States Grain Mktg. Coop., 205 Va. at 
761, 139 S.E.2d at 793 and Standard Oil, 102 Va. at 832, 47 S.E. at 832); Friend, Personal Injury 
Law in Virginia § 1.1.1., at 2.  The Shipyard, by virtue of Wanda’s father’s regular accumulation 
of asbestos fibers on his work clothes, was placed in such a position with regard to Wanda that if 
it did not use ordinary care and skill, it would subject Wanda to regular danger of injury from 
asbestos fibers.  Accordingly, a duty arose to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such injury to 
Wanda, as well as other persons similarly situated. 
 
The Shipyard argues that, in this case, no duty can lie because asbestos dust traveled on 
the backs of employees.  This is likewise a distinction without a difference.  The concept of a 
mobile hazard that leaves a premises is not new to this Court, and asbestos that predictably 
leaves the property is not unlike livestock or any other hazard posing a risk of harm to persons 
outside the premises.  Rice, 191 Va. at 605, 62 S.E.2d at 26 (finding a duty from premises owner 
to motorist because a cow wandering outside a premises poses a recognizable risk should it 
wander onto a highway).  As pled, the workers were not informed of the dangers of the asbestos 
dust.  Absent knowledge, the workers were simply vehicles or carriers of the asbestos dust:  they 
were a means of dispersal yielding various foreseeable and unforeseeable routes of exposure to 
the hazard created by the Shipyard’s conduct in engaging in industrial practices that create 
asbestos dust.5 
                     
5 The circumstances are analogous to this Court’s recognition of a duty sounding in 
nuisance for noxious substances.  Trevett v. Prison Ass'n of Va., 98 Va. 332, 336, 36 S.E. 373, 
374 (1900) (finding a duty to other riparian owners to leave water free of substances which 
“substantially impair value for the ordinary purposes of life . . . thus impair[] the comfortable or 
beneficial enjoyment of property in its vicinity”).  Just as water or air is the force that disperses 
toxins in a nuisance case, so did work clothes covered with dust on the back of an uninformed 
worker disperse the asbestos hazard here when the worker foreseeably travels home at the end of 
the day and has his clothes laundered. 
 
12 
We have said, in the context of products liability, that “[t]he purpose of making the 
finding of a legal duty as a prerequisite to a finding of negligence . . . is to avoid the extension of 
liability for every conceivably foreseeable accident, without regard to common sense or good 
policy.”  Holiday Motor Corp., 292 Va. at 478, 790 S.E.2d at 455 (quoting Jeld-Wen, Inc., 256 
Va. at 149, 501 S.E.2d at 397 (emphasis omitted)).  And the common law has recognized some 
exceptions to duty arising from foreseeable harm.6  At the same time, “the law, which restrains a 
man from doing mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes the natural [liberty], 
increases the civil liberty of mankind.”  1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *125-26.  This 
case relies on an existing duty of care, firmly established in Virginia law and well-rooted in 
common law, establishing liability to those members of a class of persons facing a recognizable 
risk of harm from one’s conduct.  And, under the facts as alleged in this complaint, the family 
members of asbestos workers are one such class of persons.  The Shipyard argues that 
establishing a duty in this area must fall to the legislature.  Although the legislature is of course 
free to intervene so as to calibrate in either direction the scope of the duty, default principles 
rooted in the common law establish the existence of a duty here.  Legislative action is not 
necessary to establish a rule that already exists at common law.7 
                     
 
6 For example, Virginia does not recognize Dram Shop liability.  The common-law rule 
that a vendor of alcoholic beverages is not liable for injuries to a third party that result from the 
intoxication of his patron is that “individuals, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts 
and that . . . drinking the intoxicant, not furnishing it, is the proximate cause of the injury.”  
Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 353, 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1986).  The instant case, 
however, is more analogous to a grocery store that negligently provides free but contaminated 
food to its unsuspecting employees, knowing the employees will take some of that food home to 
share with the employees’ families:  the store owner, and not the employees, is responsible for 
resulting illness. 
7 While courts nationwide are split on the issue, and many have not had occasion to rule 
directly on the matter, we are far from the first jurisdiction to recognize a duty to cohabitants of 
employees in asbestos cases.  See, e.g., Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 855 F.3d 1294, 1307 
(11th Cir. 2017) (applying Alabama law) (finding that “TVA did have a duty not to expose [its 
 
13 
In RGR, we clarified that the Court did not proclaim a “new duty” to protect sight lines 
but rather upheld a long-standing duty to use one’s property with ordinary care.  RGR, 288 Va. at 
280, 764 S.E.2d at 19.  We do the same today.  The question of whether under these particular 
facts the Shipyard was actually responsible for creating a dangerous condition in the home is a 
question of proof rather than duty, depending on evidentiary matters not relevant to this certified 
question. 
Finally, as we observed in RGR, a determination of an absence of duty in this instance 
“would result in the wholesale rejection of a duty to exercise ordinary care in circumstances such 
as those here and would absolve one of liability for negligence no matter how dangerous the 
conduct or foreseeable the injury.”  RGR, 288 Va. at 283, 764 S.E.2d at 21 (citing Cleveland v. 
Danville Traction & Power Co., 179 Va. 256, 259, 18 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1942); 2 Dan B. Dobbs 
et al., The Law of Torts § 253, at 9 (2d ed. 2011) (“Elevating a decision about particular facts to 
a no-duty rule will . . . exclud[e] liability not only in the particular case but also in others that are 
                     
employee’s wife] to the dangers of take-home asbestos”); Kesner v. Super. Ct., 384 P.3d 283, 
301 (Cal. 2016) (holding that employers and property owners owe members of a worker’s 
household a duty to prevent take-home exposure to asbestos); Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., 947 
So. 2d 171, 183-84 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding defendant “owed a duty to [its employee’s wife] 
to guard against her household exposure to asbestos from laundering her husband's work 
clothes.”); Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind. 2002) (“[T]he reasonably 
expected use of asbestos products encompasses the cleaning of asbestos residue from one’s 
person and clothing at the end of the workday.”); Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 
1149 (N.J. 1998) (“Exxon Mobil owed a duty to spouses handling the workers’ unprotected work 
clothing based on the foreseeable risk of exposure from asbestos borne home on contaminated 
clothing.”); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 369 (Tenn. 2008) (“Alcoa 
had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent exposure to asbestos fibers not only to its employees 
but also to those who came into close regular contact with its employees’ contaminated work 
clothes over an extended period of time.”); Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 2007 Wash. 
App. LEXIS 2392, at *13 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) (unpublished) (“[E]ven in the absence 
of any special relationship between them, Kimberly-Clark had a duty to prevent [the employee’s 
wife’s] injury if its use of asbestos was unreasonably risky, and if [the wife’s] injury was a 
foreseeable consequence of its risky actions.”). 
 
14 
quite different on their facts and may call for a different result.”)).  The existence of a duty is a 
mere threshold question in the proof of negligence.8  Marshall, 239 Va. at 318, 389 S.E.2d at 
904.  The scope of the duty and what constitutes negligence is inexorably reined in by what is 
reasonably foreseeable at the time, because a jury can only hold a defendant to the ordinary care 
and skill employed given the knowledge at the time.  RGR, 288 Va. at 282, 764 S.E.2d at 20.  
Yet plaintiffs would be devoid of the opportunity to proceed with any such action, and thus make 
those proofs, absent this Court’s recognition of a legal duty. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
“Nobody is permitted by the law to create with impunity a stumbling block, a trap, a 
snare or a pitfall for the feet of those rightfully proceeding on their way.”  RGR, 288 Va. at 279-
80, 764 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 119 Va. at 627, 89 S.E. at 866).  
The innocent cohabitator represents the quintessential class of persons “rightfully proceeding on 
their way” yet placed in a “given area of danger.”  Id.  Because we find a duty does indeed lie to 
such persons in the recognizable and foreseeable area of risk, we answer the certified question, 
as restated, in the affirmative. 
Certified question, as restated, answered in the affirmative. 
 
 
                     
8 While much of this discussion is set forth in the context of ordinary negligence, where a 
duty lies between two parties in an ordinary negligence case, so may it lie to avoid gross 
negligence or willful or wanton conduct.  The latter terms 
have been grouped together as an aggravated form of negligence, differing in 
quality rather than in degree from ordinary lack of care. . . .  They apply to 
conduct which is still, at essence, negligent . . . but which is so far from a proper 
state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were so intended.  Thus it is 
held to justify an award of punitive damages, and may justify a broader duty. 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 34, at 212-13 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis 
added).  Accordingly, the pleadings support a duty as to the plaintiff’s count of heightened 
negligence as well as ordinary negligence. 
 
15 
CHIEF JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN and JUSTICE KELSEY 
join, dissenting. 
 
“In the early English law, there was virtually no consideration of duty.”  W. Page Keeton 
et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984).  “The defendant’s obligation to 
behave properly apparently was owed to all the world, and he was liable to any person whom he 
might injure by his misconduct.”  Id. at 357.  “[W]hen negligence began to take form as a 
separate basis of tort liability, the courts developed the idea of duty, as a matter of some specific 
relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, without which there could be no liability.”  Id. 
 
Today a majority of the Court: (1) eviscerates the well-established tort concept of 
particularized duty; (2) conflates duty and proximate cause by relying on foreseeability to 
determine whether a duty exists; (3) undermines the Workers’ Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-
100, et seq., a carefully balanced bargain defining how injuries arising from the workplace are to 
be compensated; (4) creates a new cause of action in territory that should be the domain of the 
legislature; and (5) creates a duty to a potentially limitless class of plaintiffs.  This opinion 
adopts the concept of duty to mankind generally, an empty duty “owed to all the world,” and is 
unprecedented in Virginia.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
“All negligence causes of action are based on allegations that a person having a duty of 
care to another person violated that duty of care through actions that were the proximate cause of 
injury to the other person.”  Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC, 284 Va. 282, 286, 726 
S.E.2d 251, 254 (2012).  “An action for negligence only lies where there has been a failure to 
perform some legal duty which the defendant owes to the party injured.”  Balderson v. 
Robertson, 203 Va. 484, 487, 125 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1962) (quoting Williamson v. Southern Ry. 
Co., 104 Va. 146, 149, 51 S.E. 195, 196 (1905)).  “[T]here is no such thing as negligence in the 
 
16 
abstract, or in general, or as sometimes is said, in vacuo.  Negligence must be in relation to some 
person.”  Kent v. Miller, 167 Va. 422, 425-26, 189 S.E. 332, 334 (1937). 
The question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is 
established that the man who has been negligent owed some duty 
to the person who seeks to make him liable for his negligence. 
 
Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration, Inc., 241 Va. 270, 277, 401 S.E.2d 878, 882 (1991) 
(quoting Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 (1893)). 
 
In concluding that the Shipyard owes a duty of care to “those sharing living quarters” 
with its employees, the majority opinion relies on the general principle that  
Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position 
with regard to another . . . that if he did not use ordinary care and 
skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances, he 
would cause danger of injury to the person or the property of the 
other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such 
injury. 
 
RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 260, 276, 764 S.E.2d 8, 17 (2014) (alteration and citation omitted).  
Justice Holmes described a similar principle, the rule that a “defendant was bound to use such 
care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances,” as a “featureless generality.”  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 100-01 (Paulo J. S. Pereira & Diego M. Beltran eds., 
2011).  He asserted that it is the “business of the court[s]” to “formulate these [general] 
standards” into duties that arise in “specific circumstances,” so that the law is “capable of being 
known” to the average person.  Id. 
If in the whole department of unintentional wrongs the courts 
arrived at no further utterance than the question of negligence, and 
left every case, without rudder or compass, to the jury, they would 
simply confess their inability to state a very large part of the law 
which they required the defendant to know, and would assert, by 
implication, that nothing could be learned by experience. But 
neither courts nor legislatures have ever stopped at that point. 
 
 
17 
Id. at 101.  The majority opinion holds that, based on general negligence principles, the Shipyard 
owed “a duty of ordinary care” to “those sharing living quarters” with workers the Shipyard 
exposed to asbestos.  This holding relies on a “featureless generality” instead of articulating a 
particular duty the Shipyard owed to the plaintiff.  It also abandons the Court’s role in 
determining whether a duty exists by using a “vague test” instead of “defining the precautions to 
be taken” under the circumstances presented by this case. Id. at 101. 
 
Additionally, the majority opinion conflates duty and proximate cause by relying on 
whether a defendant’s conduct “create[s] a recognizable risk of harm” to determine whether a 
duty exists.  A “recognizable risk” is one that is foreseeable.  This Court relies on the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff to determine proximate cause.  See VEPCO v. Winesett, 
225 Va. 459, 468, 303 S.E.2d 868, 874 (1983) (“To establish proximate cause . . . the plaintiff 
must only show that ‘a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances ought to have 
anticipated that an injury might probably result from the negligent acts.’” (quoting VEPCO v. 
Savoy Const. Co., 224 Va. 36, 46, 294 S.E.2d 811, 818 (1982)); Wyatt v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Tel. Co., 158 Va. 470, 477-78, 163 S.E. 370, 372 (1932) (“[I]n order to warrant a finding that 
negligence . . . is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural 
and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been 
foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.”  (quoting Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. 
Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1877)). 
 
Foreseeability is not a factor to be considered when examining whether a duty exists.  In 
the products liability context, we have observed that “‘[f]oreseeability [of harm], it has been 
many times repeated, is not to be equated with duty.”  Holiday Motor Corp. v. Walters, 292 Va. 
461, 477, 790 S.E.2d 447, 478 (2016) (quoting Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 
 
18 
1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974)) (alteration in original).  This is because “the purpose of making the 
finding of a legal duty as a prerequisite to a finding of negligence, or breach of implied warranty, 
in products liability is to avoid the extension of liability for every conceivably foreseeable 
accident.”  Id. at 478, 790 S.E.2d at 455 (quoting Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Gamble, 256 Va. 144, 149, 
501 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1998)).  Accordingly, in Holiday Motor Corp., we held that automobile 
manufacturers do not have a duty to design a convertible soft top that provides rollover 
protection because such protection is not an “intended or reasonably foreseeable use” of 
convertible soft tops, even though rollover accidents are “undoubtedly foreseeable.”  Id. at 478, 
482, 790 S.E.2d at 455, 458. 
 
We have declined to recognize a duty in other cases despite the foreseeability of harm to 
the plaintiff as well.  For example, in Gray v. Inova Health Care Services, 257 Va. 597, 598, 514 
S.E.2d 355, 355 (1999), we considered whether a hospital owed a duty to a mother who observed 
her daughter stop breathing during a medical procedure because she received an improper dose 
of medication.  While emotional harm to a mother is certainly foreseeable in these 
circumstances, we held that the hospital did not owe the mother a duty because she “was not the 
patient upon whom medical tests were being performed.”  Id. at 599, 514 S.E.2d at 356.  Holiday 
Motor Corp. and Gray confirm that it is not proper to consider foreseeability when determining 
whether a duty exists. 
 
The Supreme Court of Arizona recently clarified that “foreseeability is not a factor to be 
considered by courts when making determinations of duty.”  Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc., No. CV-16-
0248-PR, 2018 Ariz. LEXIS 146, at *6 (Ariz. May 11, 2018).  The court “remov[ed] 
foreseeability from [its] duty framework” because “determining ‘[w]hether an injury to a 
particular plaintiff was foreseeable by a particular defendant necessarily involves an inquiry into 
 
19 
the specific facts of an individual case,” and “[s]uch factual inquiries are reserved for the jury.”  
Id. at *7 (quoting Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 231 ¶ 16 (Ariz. 2007)).  However, the court 
“did not completely remove foreseeability from [its] negligence framework.”  Id. at *8.  
Foreseeability remains a factor “in determining breach and causation” under Arizona law.1  Id. 
 
As in Arizona, “foreseeability [is] ordinarily [a] question[] for the jury” in Virginia.  
Jordan v. Jordan, 220 Va. 160, 162, 257 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1979).  Because incorporating 
foreseeability into our duty framework will improperly require courts to engage in fact specific 
inquiries that are ordinarily reserved for juries, foreseeability should not be considered when 
                     
 
1 The Supreme Court of Arizona in Quiroz declined to impose a duty on employers to 
protect the public, including those who cohabitate with their employees, “from off-site contact 
with [an] employee who may have been carrying asbestos fibers on [his] work clothes.”  See id. 
at *2.  The court’s reasoning was based in part on its jurisprudence holding that “foreseeability is 
not a factor in determining duty.”  Id. 
 
Other courts have also declined to create a duty owed by employers to those who 
cohabitate with their employees.  See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams,  608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 
2005) (holding “an employer does not owe a duty of care to a third-party, non-employee, who 
comes into contact with its employee’s asbestos-tainted work clothing at locations away from the 
workplace” in part because the duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to persons 
outside the workplace.); Holdampf v. A.C. & S., Inc., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119-23 (N.Y. 2005) 
(declining to recognize a duty owed by an employer to prevent asbestos exposure that occurred 
outside an employer’s premises because foreseeability “does not define duty” and there was no 
relationship between the employer and the employee’s wife); Gillen v. Boeing Co., 40 F. Supp. 
3d 534, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding an employer does not owe a duty to protect against the 
dangers asbestos dust carried home on an employee’s clothes may pose to an employee’s family 
members in part because “foreseeability ‘is not alone determinative of the duty question,’ and ‘is 
not necessarily a dominant factor’ in the duty assessment under Pennsylvania law.” (citation 
omitted)); Cf. Miller v. Ford Motor Co., 740 N.W.2d 206, 209-10 (Mich. 2007) (holding the 
owner of “property on which asbestos-containing products were located did not owe [the 
plaintiff], who was never on or near that property, a legal duty to protect her from exposure to 
any asbestos fibers carried home on the clothing of a member of her household who was working 
on that property as the employee of independent contractors, where there was no further 
relationship between defendant and [the plaintiff].”); Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 
777 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 2009); (concluding the owners of a power plant owed no duty to 
warn the spouse of an independent contractor’s employee, who never visited the power plant, of 
the health risks posed by asbestos exposure). 
 
 
 
20 
determining whether a duty exists.  Recognizing that foreseeability does not underlie our analysis 
of duty will not eliminate this concept from our negligence framework, as its centrality to our 
analysis of proximate cause will continue. 
 
At common law, employees constituted the class of persons to which an employer owed a 
duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace.  Swift & Co. v. Hatton, 124 Va. 426, 435, 97 S.E. 
788, 791 (1919) (“[T]he master is under an absolute obligation – is charged with a non-
assignable duty – to use due care in providing and maintaining a reasonably safe environment for 
his servants while engaged in their work.”)  We have never extended this duty to those 
cohabitating with an employee.  Traditionally, this Court has exercised great restraint in 
recognizing a duty that did not exist at common law.  See, e.g., Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, 284 
Va. 102, 110, 726 S.E.2d 14, 18 (2012) (declining to “impose a duty upon landowners to protect 
individuals traveling on an adjoining public highway from natural conditions on the landowner’s 
property,” in part, because “no such duty existed under relevant English common law”); 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 61, 365 S.E.2d 751, 754 (1988) 
(“[T]here is no duty of reasonable care imposed upon an employer in the supervision of its 
employees under these circumstances and we will not create one here.”); Williamson v. Old 
Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 354, 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1986) (declining to abrogate the common 
law rule against dram shop liability because “abrogat[ing] such a fundamental rule . . . is the 
function of the legislative, not judicial, branch of government”). 
 
Additionally, the creation of a duty in this case upsets the careful balance struck by the 
legislature in the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The Act “is based upon a quid pro quo, a societal 
exchange wherein employees are provided a purely statutory form of compensation for industrial 
injuries” that is “modest, but relatively certain.”  Roller v. Basic Constr. Co., 238 Va. 321, 327, 
 
21 
384 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989).  “In exchange, employers under the canopy of the Act are sheltered 
from common-law liability in tort.”  Id. 
 
The complaint alleges that the Shipyard exposed Wanda’s father, its employee, to 
asbestos during the course of his work.  He then carried asbestos fibers home on his clothes, 
allegedly causing Wanda’s exposure to asbestos.  Because Wanda’s exposure occurred as a result 
of her father’s exposure, she was a bystander, who was injured as a consequence of an 
employer’s tort against its employee.  Holding that the Shipyard owed Wanda a duty permits a 
negligence action by a non-employee through the conduit of an employee who, under the Act, 
has no right to bring a negligence action against his employer.  Given the policy considerations 
presented by allowing such tort actions, the legislative, not judicial, branch of government should 
determine whether those who cohabitate with employees can recover in tort under these 
circumstances. 
 
We have said that where “the issue involves many competing economic, societal, and 
policy considerations, legislative procedures and safeguards are particularly appropriate to the 
task of fashioning an appropriate change, if any, to the settled rule.”  Williamson, 232 Va. at 354, 
350 S.E.2d at 624. 
A legislative change in the law is initiated by introduction of a bill 
which serves as public notice to all concerned. The legislature 
serves as a forum for witnesses representing interests directly 
affected by the decision. The issue is tried and tested in the 
crucible of public debate. The decision reached by the chosen 
representatives of the people reflects the will of the body politic. 
 
Id. (quoting Bruce Farms v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 293, 247 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1978)).  By 
promulgating the Act, the legislature determined that employees should receive “modest, but 
relatively certain” compensation for injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment,” in 
exchange for foregoing the compensation they could receive for prevailing in a negligence 
 
22 
action.  Roller, 238 Va. at 327, 384 S.E.2d at 325; Code § 65.2-400.  The majority opinion’s 
creation of a duty that was not recognized at common law interferes with the “quid pro quo” of 
the Act by allowing those who cohabitate with employees to bring a negligence action that an 
employee is barred from bringing under the Act.  It is debatable whether allowing such actions is 
sound public policy, but it is beyond dispute that imposing a duty on employers to protect those 
who cohabitate with their employees is a major policy decision. 
 
A change of this magnitude should be accomplished by an act of the legislature, not by a 
judicial pronouncement.  The Act defines the scope of employers’ liability for workplace 
injuries, and the legislature should determine whether this scope should be expanded.  The 
legislatures of two states have promulgated statutes that bar recovery for injuries arising from 
asbestos exposure that occurs outside of a property owner’s premises.2 
 
The duty created by the majority today is limitless.  The majority opinion does not 
propose any framework for limiting an employer’s duty to those who share living quarters with 
its employees.  In declining to recognize a common law duty owed by employers to those 
exposed to asbestos outside the employer’s premises, the Supreme Court of Georgia observed 
that such a duty would “expand traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds and create 
an almost infinite universe of potential plaintiffs.”  CSX Transp., 608 S.E.2d at 209 (citation 
omitted). 
                     
 
2 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-4905(a) (“No premises owner shall be liable for any injury to any 
individual resulting from silica or asbestos exposure unless such individual’s alleged exposure 
occurred while the individual was at or near the premises owner’s property.”); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2307.941(A)(1) (“A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual 
resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the 
individual was at the premises owner’s property.”). 
 
23 
 
Expanding civil liability in this manner will push a wave of indeterminacy into the 
Commonwealth’s reputation for stable and predictable tort law.  At its most basic level, the 
majority’s innovation violates the first premise of the common law — that any judicially applied 
“legal standard must, in theory, be capable of being known.”  Holmes, supra, at 100.  “When a 
man has to pay damage, he is supposed to have broken the law, and he is further supposed to 
have known what the law was.”  Id. (emphases added).  Only “fixed and uniform standards” of 
liability make either of those suppositions legitimate.  Id.  The majority’s unprecedented 
expansion of tort liability in this case could not have been known by anyone, with any degree of 
confidence, prior to today — not in 1950, when Quisenberry claims the Shipyard began 
breaching its putative duty to her, or in 1969, when the alleged breach ended. 
 
Our Commonwealth cannot prosper when demarcations between liable and non-liable 
conduct remain in flux because of judicially recognized standards of liability that are as novel as 
they are unpredictable.  How will businesses calculate risk and confidently make informed 
decisions in light of such unpredictability?  Our emphatic duty “to say what the law is,” Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added), after all, implicitly forbids us 
from saying what the law should be according to our predilections.  “From the time of Alfred to 
the present day, statutes and decisions have busied themselves with defining the precautions to 
be taken in certain familiar cases; that is, with substituting for the vague test of the care exercised 
by a prudent man, a precise one of specific acts or omissions.”  Holmes, supra, at 101. 
 
 Before today, no one could have predicted that an employer owed a legal “take home” 
duty to a non-employee based solely on a tort committed by an employer against an employee, 
occurring at the employer’s work site, and arising out of and in the course of the employer’s 
 
24 
work.  To make matters worse, after today, no one will be able to predict who else among the 
host of possible targets will be subjected to this novel theory of liability. 
 
Historically, this Court has been reluctant to recognize a duty that did not exist at 
common law.   
Historically, this Court has deferred to the legislature when such a broad new 
cause of action is proposed.  Historically, this Court has recognized that creating new causes of 
action and extending liability beyond anticipated limits has enormous financial implications. 
 
The majority opinion is unprecedented in Virginia law. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE KELSEY join, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I fully agree with Chief Justice Lemons and join his cogent dissent.  As the Chief Justice 
writes, neither this Court’s precedent nor the public policy of Virginia supports the existence of a 
duty owed by the Shipyard to individuals who share living quarters with the Shipyard’s 
employees. 
I write separately to emphasize that the principles governing the liability of owners and 
occupants of land underlying this Court’s decision in RGR, LLC v. Settle, 288 Va. 260, 764 
S.E.2d 8 (2014), are inapplicable to this case.  Even so, no duty arises under application of the 
RGR analysis since Wanda and the Shipyard were not juxtaposed in time and space to place 
Wanda within a given area of danger – the determining test for existence of duty adopted in 
RGR.  Given the obvious difficulty in applying principles of landowner liability to the allegations 
in this case, the majority invokes the principle of foreseeability of harm as the source of duty.  As 
a result, the majority reaches a decision that has no basis under this Court’s established duty 
jurisprudence. 
 
25 
I. 
 
The majority’s reliance on RGR is misplaced because this case is premised on a duty 
owed to Wanda arising from the Shipyard’s employment of her father, not on a duty arising from 
the ownership or occupation of land. 
In RGR, a wrongful death action arising out of a collision between a vehicle and a train at 
a private railroad crossing, this Court held that RGR, the owner of a business occupying the 
premises adjacent to land on which the crossing was located, owed a duty to maintain the sight 
line for motorists, such as Settle, who used the crossing.  The Court’s imposition of a duty upon 
RGR was based on the common law tort principle applicable to owners and occupants of real 
property that “every person [must] exercise ordinary care in the use and maintenance of his own 
property to prevent injury to others.”  288 Va. at 276, 764 S.E.2d at 17.  As the Court explained, 
Settle alleged that RGR “‘owed a duty of reasonable due care’ to Settle ‘in the care, 
maintenance, upkeep, [and] inspection’ of both [the railroad]’s right-of-way and the property 
upon which the lumber was stacked” and that it breached these duties to Settle by “allowing . . . 
stacks of lumber to exist such that they blocked the view of motorists approaching the [railroad] 
[c]rossing.”  Id.  The Court held that the circuit court properly instructed the jury that “[e]very 
person has the duty to exercise ordinary care in the use and maintenance of its property to 
prevent injury or death to others.”  Id. at 278, 764 S.E.2d at 18. 
The Court’s reliance in RGR on the duties owed by owners and occupants of land for 
conditions existing on the land is further illustrated by the Court’s explanation that “[a]t common 
law, however, this duty did not extend to natural conditions existing on land as opposed to 
artificial conditions such as RGR’s lumber stacks.”  Id. at 277, 764 S.E.2d at 17.  The Court 
contrasted the case before it involving the artificial condition of RGR’s lumber stacks with 
 
26 
numerous cases finding no duty owed by landowners to motorists on adjacent highways with 
regard to natural conditions on the land.  Id. at 277-78, 764 S.E.2d at 17-18. 
In contrast, the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence in this case are based on a duty the 
Shipyard allegedly owed to Wanda arising from the Shipyard’s employment of her father.  
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the Shipyard: (a) failed to adequately or sufficiently warn its 
employees not to wear their work clothes home; (b) failed to educate Wanda’s father regarding 
reasonably safe and sufficient safeguards to prevent contaminating his work clothes; (c) failed to 
provide a locker room, showers, and/or laundry service for employees; (d) failed to take 
reasonable and sufficient precautions to instruct Wanda’s father about proper and safe handling 
of products containing asbestos; (e) failed to educate Wanda’s father about the dangers of 
wearing his work clothes home; and (f) failed to follow or adhere to various state and U.S. 
Government laws and guidelines pertaining to preventing contamination of employees’ homes 
with asbestos fibers.  These alleged acts of negligence are based on duties purportedly arising 
from the Shipyard’s employment relationship with Wanda’s father, not on duties an owner or 
occupant of land owes to “others in the vicinity” of its land.  Id. at 276, 764 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting 
W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 57, at 386 (5th ed. 1984)).1 
                     
 
1 Similarly, the principles governing the rights and duties of riparian owners and liability 
for maintenance of a private nuisance have no application here.  Plaintiff is not alleging any 
violation of rights of a swimmer or lower riparian owner.  See Shoffner v. Sutherland, 111 Va. 
298, 300, 68 S.E. 996 (1910) (stating that “any use of a stream that materially fouls and 
adulterates the water . . . that so far affects the water as to impair its value for the ordinary 
purposes of life, will constitute a nuisance  . . . for which a lower riparian owner injured thereby 
is entitled to redress”).  Plaintiff is also not alleging that the Shipyard’s operations constituted a 
nuisance to neighboring properties.  See National Energy Corp. v. O’Quinn, 223 Va. 83, 85, 286 
S.E.2d 181, 182 (1982) (stating that “[w]hen a business enterprise, even though lawful, becomes 
obnoxious to occupants of neighboring dwellings and renders enjoyment of the structures 
uncomfortable by virtue of, for example, smoke, cinders, dust, noise, offensive odors, or noxious 
gases, the operation of such business is a nuisance”). 
 
27 
II. 
 
Setting aside the majority’s misplaced reliance on RGR and other cases premised on 
landowner liability, it makes only a half-hearted effort to apply the RGR analysis.  This is not 
surprising since no “take home” duty exists under a straightforward application of the RGR 
analysis. 
 
In RGR, the Court rejected RGR’s assertion that plaintiff prove the existence of a 
“particular relationship” between RGR and Settle, and explained that the “only relationship 
which must exist is a sufficient juxtaposition2 of the parties in time and space” to place motorists 
“‘within a given area of danger’ created by the location of RGR’s lumber stacks.”  RGR, 288 Va. 
at 279-80, 764 S.E.2d at 19 (citation omitted).  The Court concluded that the parties were 
sufficiently juxtaposed in time and space because RGR’s lumber stacks were “situated within 
[the railroad]’s right-of-way and obstructed the sight line of motorists on [a particular roadway] 
as they approached the railroad crossing.”  Id. at 280, 764 S.E.2d at 19.  The Court specifically 
noted that Settle was within this “given area of danger” because he was traveling “within feet of 
RGR’s lumber stacks at the time of the accident.”  Id. 
 
Applying the RGR analysis here, it is clear that no duty was imposed upon the Shipyard 
to protect a non-employee family member such as Wanda from conditions created by the 
Shipyard’s business operations because the parties were not juxtaposed in time and space to 
place Wanda within a given area of danger.  In RGR, this requirement was satisfied because 
RGR’s lumber stacks were situated within Norfolk Southern’s right-of-way, the lumber 
obstructed the sight line of motorists such as Settle using the railroad crossing, and Settle was 
                     
 
2 The ordinary meaning of “juxtaposed” is “placed side by side.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1229 (1993).  The synonym for juxtaposed is “adjacent.”  Id. 
 
28 
“within feet of RGR’s lumber stacks” when the accident occurred.  Id.  Here, there is no 
allegation that Wanda was in close spatial proximity to the Shipyard or its business. 
Although the majority states that “juxtaposition of time and space” does not require 
actual interaction between the parties, that assertion – even if true – entirely misses the point that 
the “sufficient juxtaposition of the parties in time and space” requires, at the very least, that the 
injured party be “in the vicinity” of the land.  Id. at  276, 764 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting W. Page 
Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 57, at 386 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the duty to 
others affected by the use of the land recognizes that “[t]he possessor’s right is therefore 
bounded by principles of reasonableness, so as to cause no unreasonable risk of harm to others in 
the vicinity” of the land).  In point of fact, the Court in RGR held that the injured party need only 
be in close spatial proximity to the danger created by the occupant of land in direct response to 
RGR’s assertion that Settle was on another entity’s property when the collision occurred. 
The majority’s holding in the present case that the requirement is satisfied here since the 
asbestos fibers “moved” from the Shipyard’s business to Wanda’s home ignores the very 
premise on which the liability of RGR was based – that Settle and RGR were juxtaposed in time 
and space because Settle was “within feet of RGR’s lumber stacks” when the accident occurred.  
Id. at 280, 764 S.E.2d at 19.3  Indeed, the suggestion that individual “zones of danger” followed 
                     
3 The majority introduces the notion of a “mobile hazard” in an effort to satisfy this 
requirement.  In particular, the majority compares the Shipyard’s duty to protect individuals who 
cohabitate with its employees to a landowner’s duty to prevent his farm animals from escaping 
the boundaries of his land onto a public highway, see Rice v. Turner, 191 Va. 601, 605, 62 
S.E.2d 24, 26 (1950).  As explained previously, the duties imposed on the owners and occupants 
of land have no application to this case.  Furthermore, I find the comparison of a farm animal, 
subject to its owner’s restraint and control, to a human being, endowed with free will, to be 
injudicious, as I do the designation of the Shipyard’s employee as a “mobile hazard.”  I do not 
believe we should recognize a new tort duty based on this specious comparison. 
 
 
29 
the Shipyard’s employees to their respective homes is antithetical to the principles underlying 
landowner liability. 
III. 
Dismissing the requirement of a sufficient juxtaposition of the parties in time and space, 
which was central to the analysis in RGR, the majority relies on a “recognizable risk of harm,” 
i.e., foreseeability of harm, as the source of duty in this case.  This is in direct contravention of 
this Court’s holding in RGR that the question of duty does not depend on foreseeability of harm. 
In RGR, the Court made a clear distinction between the question of whether a duty 
existed and the question of foreseeability of harm.  As the Court stated, “[a]ctionable negligence 
requires that there must be a legal duty, a breach thereof and a consequent injury which could 
have been reasonably foreseen by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence.”  Id. at 281, 764 
S.E.2d at 19 (citation omitted).  The Court explained that foreseeability “pertains to what 
constitutes negligence, not to whether a duty to exercise ordinary care exists.”  Id.4  In other 
words, “[w]hether reasonable care was exercised depends upon what a reasonably prudent 
person, with knowledge of the circumstances, ought to have foreseen in regard to the 
                     
 
4 Our cases have treated the issue of foreseeability of harm variably as a factor in 
determining proximate cause and a factor in determining breach of duty.  Compare Wyatt v. 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 158 Va. 470, 477-78, 163 S.E. 370, 372 (1932) (noting that “in 
order to warrant a finding that negligence . . . is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear 
that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and 
that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances”) with Limberg v. 
Lent, 206 Va. 425, 426, 143 S.E.2d 872, 873 (1965) (noting that “the defendant did not fail to 
observe a duty owed . . . if it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s actions might cause 
injury”).  Our cases have consistently treated the issue of foreseeability of harm as distinct from 
the determination of the existence of a legal duty vel non. 
 
Furthermore, while the absence of foreseeable harm may defeat a potential duty to protect 
against third party conduct arising from a special relationship, it does not give rise to such a duty, 
which is premised on the relationship between the parties.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peterson, 
286 Va. 349, 357-59, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311-12 (2013). 
 
30 
consequences of his act or omission.”  Id.  Thus, “whether RGR breached its duty of ordinary 
care by stacking its lumber within Norfolk Southern’s right-of-way because it was reasonably 
foreseeable that [its] actions might cause injury, must be distinguished from the question whether 
a duty existed.”  Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Court elaborated on this distinction between the question of duty and the question of 
foreseeability of harm in response to RGR’s argument that it owed no duty to Settle because it 
possessed no knowledge that the lumber stacks created a dangerous condition to motorists using 
the railroad crossing.  And the Court specifically rejected RGR’s argument because its 
knowledge of the danger pertained to foreseeability not whether it owed a duty to Settle.  See id. 
We reiterated the distinction made in RGR between foreseeability of harm and existence 
of duty in Holiday Motor Corp. v. Walters, 292 Va. 461, 478, 790 S.E.2d 447, 455 (2016).  In 
Holiday Motor, we held that the determination of duty with regard to design of a convertible soft 
top required that we consider its reasonably foreseeable use.  Specifically, we stated that “[t]he 
determination of whether a vehicle manufacturer owes a duty to design a convertible soft top to 
provide occupant rollover protection, therefore, requires that we consider whether such 
protection is the intended or reasonably foreseeable use given the inherent characteristics, 
market purposes, and utility of a convertible soft top.”  Id. (emphasis added).  We did not 
consider the foreseeability of harm in determination of the duty to design the product and instead 
cautioned that while “the possibility that a convertible may be involved in a rollover accident is 
undoubtedly foreseeable,” foreseeability of harm “is not to be equated with duty.”  Id. 
Here, the majority holds that a duty was imposed upon the Shipyard to avoid injury to 
Wanda from exposure to asbestos fibers because its conduct “created a ‘recognizable risk of 
harm’ to those sharing living quarters with the workers.”  This is precisely the opposite of how 
 
31 
the Court approached the duty analysis in RGR, where the Court recognized that the duty was 
owed because Settle was traveling “within feet of RGR’s lumber stacks” so as to be physically 
placed within this “given area of danger.”  Id. at 280, 764 S.E.2d at 19.  The Court in RGR 
expressly stated that whether the risk to a motorist, such as Settle, was reasonably foreseeable 
was a separate question that “must be distinguished from the question whether a duty existed.”  
Id. at 282, 764 S.E.2d at 20. 
 
Our decision in Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 241 Va. 270, 
401 S.E.2d 878 (1991) does not justify the majority’s reliance on foreseeability of harm for the 
source of duty but rather undermines it.  In Dudley, we held that the private operator of a 
“halfway house” for convicted felons had a special relationship with its clients, giving rise to a 
potential duty of care to control its clients’ actions.  As in all actions premised on a duty to 
protect against third party conduct, the absence of foreseeable harm may defeat a potential duty 
to protect against third party conduct arising from a special relationship.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 286 Va. 349, 357-59, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311-12 (2013).  
Foreseeability of harm does not give rise to such a duty; the existence of a duty is premised on 
the relationship between the parties. 
 
The majority’s reliance on foreseeability of harm as the source of duty in this case is 
accompanied by its astonishing claim that “the common law has recognized some exceptions to 
duty arising from foreseeable harm.” (Emphasis added.)  In Virginia, there is no duty arising 
from foreseeable harm. The majority’s holding otherwise is in direct conflict with our established 
precedent, specifically including this Court’s recent decisions in RGR and Holiday Motors. 
 
 
 
32 
IV. 
 
None of the principles invoked by the majority give rise to any duty owed by an 
employer to individuals cohabitating with its employees.  The principles governing liability of 
landowners and occupants of land do not give rise to such a duty.  The principles governing the 
liability of riparian owners do not give rise to such a duty.  And the principles governing liability 
for the maintenance of private nuisances do not give rise to such a duty.  Furthermore, the 
majority’s reliance on the principle of foreseeability of harm as the source of such duty 
contravenes this Court’s admonition that foreseeability of harm “must be distinguished from the 
question whether a duty existed.”  RGR, 288 Va. at 281, 764 S.E.2d at 19 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
In short, the take-home duty recognized today by the majority is a newly created duty 
imposed as the basis for a newly created cause of action that is wholly unsupported by our 
precedent.5 
                     
 
5 In addition to holding that an employer owes a duty to an employee’s family member 
who alleges exposure to asbestos from the work clothes of the employee, the majority notes that 
the pleadings support plaintiff’s count alleging gross negligence, willful, and/or wanton conduct.  
The sufficiency of the allegations to support plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is not before 
this Court.