Title: State, Dept. of Family Services v. PAJ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State, Dept. of Family Services v. PAJ1997 WY 47934 P.2d 1257Case Number: C-96-2Decided: 03/20/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
Division of Public Assistance and Social Services, ex rel. 
MJJ,  

Appellant(Petitioner), 

 

v. 

 

PAJ and MJA,  

Appellees(Respondents). 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Fremont County 

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Cynthia L. Harnett, 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Richard D. Gist, Lander, for 
Appellee, PAJ.

MJA, Pro 
Se.

 

Before THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ., and SULLINS, District Judge.

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

SULLINS, District 
Judge. 

[¶1]      The claim of 
error in this case concerns the decision of the district court to vacate its 
earlier determination and judgment of paternity. Appellee, PAJ, was adjudged in 
uncontested paternity proceedings to be the natural father of the minor child, 
MJJ. Several months later, PAJ discovered information that led him to believe he 
was not the natural father of the minor child. Based upon that information, PAJ 
moved for relief from the judgment of paternity. After consideration of the 
evidence presented in support of the motion, which included the mother's 
admission that PAJ was not the natural father of the minor child and the results 
of DNA blood testing which excluded PAJ from being the biological father, the 
district court set aside its prior adjudication of paternity. We affirm that 
decision.

 

I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant, State 
of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, Division of Assistance and Social 
Services, ex rel., MJJ (State), presents these issues on 
appeal:

I. Do the doctrines of res judicata and judicial 
estoppel preclude the district court's vacating the judgment and order of 
paternity and support?

II. Did the court properly find actions of appellee 
[MJA] constituted fraud, misrepresentation, and other misconduct such as to 
afford relief to appellee [PAJ] under W.R.C.P. 60(b)?

III. Did the court properly find actions of appellee 
[PAJ] constituted mistake, inadvertence, and excusable 
neglect[?]

IV. Did the court properly find there was no 
presumption of paternity under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(c)?

 

[¶3]      PAJ adopts the 
same issues as recited and presented by the State.

 

II. 
FACTS

 

[¶4]      In the summer of 
1993, MJA was in the process of divorcing her husband of three years. She dated 
men other than her husband. One of those men was PAJ, and she had a sexual 
relationship with him. When MJA discovered she was pregnant, she told PAJ that 
he was the father of the expected child. MJA made that statement despite the 
fact she believed another man she had dated before meeting PAJ was the likely 
father.

 

[¶5]      Having been told 
that he was the father, PAJ accompanied MJA to the hospital when it was time for 
the child's birth. A baby girl, MJJ, was born in March of 1994. In the hospital, 
MJA signed an affidavit wherein she declared that she was not married at the 
time the child was conceived. Such was not true, as MJA was still married at the 
time of conception. PAJ also signed an affidavit acknowledging his paternity of 
the minor child.

 

[¶6]      In April 1994, 
the State initiated an action to establish the paternity of the minor child. The 
State's petition was not resisted. After a hearing in June 1994, a judgment of 
paternity and support was entered establishing that the man to whom MJA was 
married was not the biological father of the minor child, adjudicating PAJ to be 
the natural father of the minor child, and ordering PAJ to pay child support and 
maintain health and medical insurance for the minor child.

 

[¶7]      Many months 
following the entry of the decree of paternity, PAJ found reason to suspect that 
he might not be the father of the minor child. Third parties informed PAJ that 
MJA had been sexually involved with yet another man before she had met PAJ, and 
that the other man was the likely father of the minor child. PAJ went to the 
hospital where the minor child was born, and found that the minor child's 
medical records indicated that conception had occurred prior to the time that 
MJA and he first met.

 

[¶8]      Within a year 
after the entry of the decree of paternity, PAJ filed a motion for relief from 
that judgment. The motion was brought pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) on the grounds 
of fraud and excusable neglect.

 

[¶9]      Filed with the 
motion for relief from judgment was the affidavit of MJA. MJA's affidavit 
recited that she met PAJ on approximately July 2, 1993; she did not have sexual 
intercourse with PAJ until the middle of July 1993; she was married to another 
man until that marriage was terminated by divorce granted July 21, 1993; and she 
told PAJ more than once that "the child was his" when she suspected that the 
father was yet another man with whom she had sexual intercourse in the latter 
part of May 1993 or the first part of June 1993. The reason for her deception 
was her desire to protect the man she actually thought to be the father because 
he was married. Also filed were copies of the minor child's medical records 
indicating that the conception of the minor child was prior to the time PAJ had 
sexual intercourse with MJA.

 

[¶10]   The district court granted PAJ's 
motion for relief from judgment. The order granted the motion to set aside the 
prior decree of paternity, and required PAJ and the minor child to undergo DNA 
paternity blood testing. A paternity evaluation report reflecting the results of 
the testing was filed and the results excluded PAJ as the biological father of 
the minor child by DNA typing technology.

 

[¶11]   After the results of the blood 
testing were received, the matter returned for hearing before the district 
court. At the conclusion of that hearing, the district judge ruled that PAJ's 
request for relief from the judgment and order of paternity and support should 
be granted. The findings of the district court included a chronology of facts 
that excluded PAJ from having sexual contact with MJA at the time of the minor 
child's conception, and a determination that the DNA blood testing excluded PAJ 
from being the biological father of the minor child. In addition, the order 
included the following conclusions of law:

9. That the requirements of Section 14-2-102(c), 
Wyoming Statutes 1977, have not been complied with and therefore there is no 
presumption of paternity pursuant to Section 14-2-10[2](c) or (d) or (e) Wyoming 
Statutes 1977, that respondent/petitioner, [PAJ], is the natural father of the 
minor child, [MJJ].

10. That the actions of respondent, [MJA], as 
established by all pleadings filed herein constitutes and establishes fraud, 
misrepresentation and other misconduct on the part of respondent, [MJA], who is 
an adverse party to the respondent/petitioner, [PAJ], as required by and 
pursuant to Rule 60(B) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

11. The facts established by all pleadings filed 
herein constitute and establish mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect on 
the part of respondent/petitioner, [PAJ], in all his prior acknowledgments of 
paternity of the minor child, [MJJ] and for not raising the issue of paternity 
prior to the filing of his motion for relief herein on April 13, 
1995.

 

III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶12]   The standard of review applicable 
to motions brought under W.R.C.P. 60(b) is well established. The granting of 
relief pursuant to that rule is a matter of the exercise of discretion by the 
trial court, and appellate review is limited to the question of whether the 
trial court abused its discretion. Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301 
(Wyo. 1992) (quoting S.C. Ryan, Inc. v. 
Lowe, 753 P.2d 580, 582 (Wyo. 1988)). A court abuses its discretion when it 
exceeds the bounds of reason or commits an error of law, with the ultimate 
standard being whether or not the court could have reasonably concluded as it 
did. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 
213 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶13]   The appellant bears the burden of 
proof to show that the trial court abused its discretion and was clearly wrong 
in granting relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b). Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 193 
(Wyo. 1988). Absent such showing, the relief awarded by the trial court should 
be upheld. Id. at 193-94.

 

IV. 
DISCUSSION

 

[¶14]   The State urges that PAJ should 
have been preempted from obtaining relief from the prior adjudication of 
paternity in this case because of the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and 
judicial estoppel. We do not find those doctrines applicable to the W.R.C.P. 
60(b) relief granted in this matter where the district court vacated its earlier 
judgment of paternity in the same action and pursuant to the express authority 
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

 

[¶15]   The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar 
subsequent actions. Res judicata bars 
relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action, and collateral 
estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Slavens v. Board of County Com'rs 
for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685-86 (Wyo. 1993)). As recognized in this 
state, these doctrines incorporate a universal precept of common law 
jurisprudence to the effect that a "`right, question or fact distinctly put in 
issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot 
be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.'" Matter of Paternity of SDM, 882 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Montana 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 
(1979)).

 

[¶16]   In accord with this reasoning is 
the pronouncement of this court that "[c]ollateral estoppel prevents 
relitigation of issues actually and necessarily involved in the prior action 
between the same parties." Burlington 
Northern R. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 918 P.2d 987, 991 (Wyo. 1996). The motion 
for relief from judgment in this action was brought in the original litigation 
and cannot be said to constitute a relitigation of the issues 
presented.

 

[¶17]   With respect to the principle of 
judicial estoppel, it has been stated:

"It is an expression of the maxim that one cannot 
blow hot and cold in the same breath. A party will just not be allowed to 
maintain inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings * * 
*."

 

Dunkelberger, 918 P.2d  at 991-92 (quoting Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 
1142 (Wyo. 1976)). Prior case law has established the principle that a party is 
judicially estopped from asserting inconsistent positions in different judicial 
proceedings. Zwemer v. Production Credit 
Ass'n of Midlands, 792 P.2d 245, 246 (Wyo. 1990). Under this definition, 
inconsistent claims made within a judicial proceeding do not create a judicial 
estoppel issue. B & R Builders v. 
Beilgard, 915 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wyo. 1996). While PAJ did change his position 
after the entry of the initial paternity decree in this case, he at no point in 
time maintained inconsistent positions in different judicial proceedings. PAJ 
simply sought the relief available to him in this action in accord with the 
procedural rules applicable to all civil cases.

 

[¶18]   The State's assertion that the 
district court erred in not applying the doctrines of res judicata and judicial or collateral 
estoppel must fail. In the matter at hand, there was no prior suit or action, 
and the relief granted to PAJ pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) was granted in the same 
case in which the original paternity decree was entered. The principles and 
authorities of W.R.C.P. 60(b), therefore, had application in this case to set 
aside the district court's decision, in whole or in part, on the basis specified 
under the rule. Kreuter v. Kreuter, 
728 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1986).

 

[¶19]   In its next argument, the State 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion in granting relief 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) because the circumstances presented in this case do 
not warrant such relief. The State argues there was no sufficient showing of 
fraud or excusable neglect to support the finding that relief from judgment was 
appropriate.

 

            
W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides, in relevant part:

On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party * * 
*.

 

[¶20]   Appellate review of a district 
court's decision on a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion is generally limited to the question 
of whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Forney v. Minard, 849 P.2d 724, 727-28 
(Wyo. 1993). Under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court is 
given wide discretion which will not be disturbed "`unless appellant 
demonstrates that the trial court abused it and was clearly wrong.'" Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1030 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 
996 (Wyo. 1993)).

 

[¶21]   In its order granting PAJ's motion 
for relief from the judgment of paternity, the district judge made the following 
findings of fact:

7. That the respondent, [MJA], knowingly concealed 
from respondent, [PAJ], that she had had sexual intercourse with another man in 
late May or early June, 1993, while she was, in fact, married to a third man. 
That this sexual intercourse occurred before respondent, [MJA], and respondent, 
[PAJ], first had sexual intercourse with one another in the middle of July, 
1993. The respondent, [MJA], became pregnant with the minor child, [MJJ], in 
early June 1993. That respondent, [MJA], repeatedly, after telling respondent, 
[PAJ], she was pregnant, told him the child was his because she had not had 
sexual contact with anyone else.

8. That the DNA blood testing excludes respondent, 
[PAJ], from being the biological father of the minor child, 
[MJJ][.]

 

[¶22]   It cannot be said that the above 
findings of fact are erroneous in any way. The misrepresentations made to PAJ 
are documented in the verified motion, affidavit, and medical records filed in 
this case. The State presented no opposing facts. Therefore, it is easily 
concluded that there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support the findings 
of fraud, misrepresentation, and other misconduct on the part of MJA, and 
mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect on the part of PAJ in this case. Little v. Kobos By and Through Kobos, 
877 P.2d 752, 755 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶23]   This court has recognized that 
fraud requires a false representation made by a party which is relied upon by 
another to his damage or detriment. 
Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 870 P.2d 382, 383 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Lavoie v. Safecare Health Service, 
Inc., 840 P.2d 239, 252 (Wyo. 1992)). The district court's findings in this 
case list unchallenged, specific false representations made by MJA to PAJ 
concerning the paternity at issue. Under the circumstances presented, it is 
rational to believe that those false representations did induce action by PAJ 
because he reasonably believed them to be true. Husman, Inc. v. Triton Coal Co., 809 P.2d 796, 799 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Garner 
v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1985)). It was reasonable for PAJ to 
then not contest the same until he was made aware of facts to the 
contrary.

 

[¶24]   The facts of record in this appeal 
also support the finding of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect 
attributable to PAJ. The scenario presented clearly demonstrates both mistake 
and inadvertence on PAJ's part. Further, PAJ's actions constitute excusable 
neglect since such were in comport with "`such behavior as might be the act of a 
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.'" Whitney v. McDonough, 892 P.2d 791, 794 
(Wyo. 1995) (quoting Carlson, 836 
P.2d at 303). The State urges that PAJ did not act diligently in ascertaining 
the true state of affairs concerning the paternity of the minor child. However, 
the facts presented do not support that position. PAJ did act prudently and 
diligently in ascertaining the true state of affairs concerning the paternity of 
the minor child as soon as he had reason to believe that there was a mistake and 
that MJA had been untruthful. After being made aware of the deception, PAJ 
proceeded to investigate the suspicions raised concerning his fatherhood of the 
minor child, and he then sought judicial relief pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
within the prescribed one-year limit from the date the judgment was 
entered.

 

[¶25]   The final argument asserted by the 
State is that the district court improperly found that there was no presumption 
of paternity under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(c) (Cum.Supp. 1996). The State's 
position is that the disjunctive phrasing of the statute providing "[t]he 
consent of the mother shall include an affidavit stating that she was not 
married at the time of conception or at the time of birth of the child," 
requires an interpretation that the affidavit is valid if the mother was not 
married at the time of the child's birth, even if she was married at the time of 
conception.

 

[¶26]   PAJ, however, submits that the 
clear meaning of the quoted statutory provision is that the mother cannot file 
the consenting affidavit provided for in Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(c) if she is 
married either at the time of conception or at the time of birth of the child. 
In fact, MJA's affidavit contained the following language: "Under Wyoming 
Statute 35-1-411 this affidavit may only be filed if the mother was not married 
at the time of conception or birth of this child." We agree with PAJ that the 
district court's conclusion of law is correct, and there can be no presumption 
of paternity pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(c), (d), or (e) mandating PAJ to 
be the natural father of the minor child.

 

[¶27]   The general rules of statutory 
construction apply to the interpretation of Wyoming's paternity statutes, and as 
noted in Matter of Paternity of JRW, 
814 P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988)), those rules 
include:

"Our general rules of statutory construction are well 
settled. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must abide by 
the plain meaning of the statute, * * * but where a statute is ambiguous, the 
court will resort to general principles of statutory construction in an attempt 
to ascertain legislative intent. * * * Furthermore, it is a fundamental rule of 
statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari 
materia, and every word, clause, and sentence must be construed so that no part 
is inoperative or superfluous. * * * Additionally, we have held that this Court 
must assume that the legislature did not intend futile things, * * *, and that 
statutes should not be interpreted in a manner producing absurd 
results."

 

[¶28]   Applying those rules of 
construction to the situation presented in this appeal, it is proper to conclude 
that MJA's affidavit cannot be used to establish a statutory presumption of 
PAJ's paternity. The proper reading of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-102(c), when read in 
accordance with the related paternity statute found at Wyo. Stat. § 35-1-411 
(1994), is that the mother cannot file such affidavit of paternity if she was 
married either at the time of conception or the time of birth of the child.1 The statute is clear and 
unambiguous and, therefore, we must abide by its plain meaning. 

 

V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   PAJ unfortunately, but not without 
cause, relied upon the false representations of MJA in accepting the minor child 
to be his own. When he discovered the falsehood of those representations, he 
acted diligently in seeking to reverse the acknowledgment of paternity he had 
made, and in seeking relief from the court in which the decree of paternity had 
been entered. The district court was correct in granting relief from its prior 
determination of paternity pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) on the grounds of fraud, 
mistake, and excusable neglect. Therefore, we affirm the district court's order 
vacating the judgment and order of paternity and support.

 

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. § 35-1-411 provides, in 
pertinent part:

(a) If the mother was married either at 
the time of conception or birth of child, the name of the husband shall be 
entered on the certificate as the father of the child, unless paternity has been 
determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, in which case the 
name of the father as determined by the court shall be 
entered.