Title: ROBERT A. SCOTT, JR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT A. SCOTT,  JR. v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 41153 P.3d 909Case Number: No. 05-288Decided: 03/13/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 

ROBERT 
A. SCOTT, JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Betsy 
A. Bernfeld, Student Intern.  
Argument by Ms. Bernfeld.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Robert Scott (the 
appellant) entered a conditional guilty plea on two counts of aggravated 
assault, felonies, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2005).  On appeal, he argues that he 
was denied a speedy trial in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the State 
failed to provide the appellant with a speedy trial because more than 180 days 
passed between his arraignment on November 5, 2004, and his guilty plea on June 
10, 2005.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant 
pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault arising out of an altercation at 
a party on October 9, 2004, wherein he stabbed two people with a knife.  He was arraigned on November 5, 2004, 
and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  Thereafter, the appellant filed a motion 
to suspend proceedings and for evaluation of his mental illness, which motion 
was granted by the district court on November 9, 2004.  On November 10, the appellant filed a 
motion to withdraw his previous motion to suspend the proceedings.  Five days later, he filed another motion 
seeking a setting for a re-arraignment to change his plea from not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency to "straight not 
guilty."

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant's 
second arraignment occurred on December 3, 2004, at which time he entered a plea 
of not guilty.  The district court 
initially set the appellant's trial for February 7, 2005.  The trial was continued twice1 until it was again scheduled to 
commence on May 16, 2005.  Prior to 
the May 16 trial date, however, the appellant filed a motion for continuance 
stating that "[d]ue to conflict concerns, the Public Defender's Office has not 
been able to reassign this Defendant to new counsel . . . ."  Finally, the district court scheduled the 
appellant's trial to commence on June 13, 2005.

 
 
[¶5]      Throughout the 
appellant's pretrial period he filed various motions demanding a speedy trial 
and seeking to enforce that right.  
On June 8, 2005, the appellant filed a motion to dismiss on that basis 
and the district court held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2005.  While the transcript on that hearing is 
incomplete, both parties agree that the motion was obviously denied because 
later that day the appellant conditionally pled guilty, preserving his right to 
appeal on the speedy trial issue, which appeal is now before us.2

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      "We review speedy 
trial claims to ensure that the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and constitutional 
guarantees have been met."  Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 17, 93 P.3d 222, 227 (Wyo. 2004).  In the 
instant case, the appellant only asserted that his procedural rights under 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) have been violated and he did not attempt to separately argue 
that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated under the four 
factor test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  Therefore, we will restrict our review 
to Rule 48(b).  

 
 
[¶7]      W.R.Cr.P. 48 
states:

 
 
(b)    Speedy trial.  

(1)     It is the 
responsibility of the court, counsel and the defendant to insure that the 
defendant is timely tried.

(2)     A criminal charge shall 
be brought to trial within 180 days following arraignment unless continued as 
provided in this rule.

(3)     The following periods 
shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:

(A)     All proceedings related 
to the mental illness or deficiency of the defendant;

(B)     Proceedings on another 
charge;

(C)    The time between the 
dismissal and the refiling of the same charge; and 

(D)    Delay occasioned by 
defendant's change of counsel or application therefor.

(4)     Continuances exceeding 
180 days from the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as 
follows:

(A)     On motion of defendant 
supported by affidavit; or

(B)     On motion of the 
attorney for the state or the court if:

(i)      The defendant 
expressly consents;

(ii)     The state's evidence is 
unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

(iii)    Required in the due 
administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced; and 

(C)    If a continuance is proposed 
by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified.  If the defendant objects, the defendant 
must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the 
defense.

(5)     Any criminal case not 
tried or continued as provided in this rule shall be dismissed 180 days after 
arraignment.

(6)     If the defendant is 
unavailable for any proceeding at which the defendant's presence is required, 
the case may be continued for a reasonable time by the trial court but for no 
more than 180 days after the defendant is available or the case further 
continued as provided in this rule.

(7)     A dismissal for lack of 
a speedy trial under this rule shall not bar the state from again prosecuting 
the defendant for the same offense unless the defendant made a written demand 
for a speedy trial or can demonstrate prejudice from the 
delay.

 
 
[¶8]      The appellant 
correctly computes that 217 days passed between his first arraignment on 
November 5, 2004, and his conditional guilty plea on June 10, 2005.  The appellant is further correct that 
May 4, 2005 was 180 days from November 5, 2004.  The appellant's speedy trial argument 
must fail, however, because of two admissions made by the appellant in his 
brief.  First, the appellant admits 
that ten days must be tolled on the speedy trial clock because the appellant 
initially pled guilty by reason of mental illness or defect according to 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(A), therefore the 180 day speedy trial clock lapsed on May 
14, 2005.  Next, the appellant 
acknowledges that the delay from May 16 until his guilty plea on June 10 was due 
to a change of his counsel, which delay tolled the computation of time under 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(D); however, the appellant argues that we need not consider 
this delay because it occurred after he had already been denied his procedural 
right to a speedy trial on May 14.

 
 
[¶9]      In Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶¶ 
12-15, 121 P.3d 790, 796 (Wyo. 2005), we held that a speedy trial clock cannot 
lapse on a weekend or holiday and, where the 180th day falls on a Saturday, 
Sunday, or legal holiday, W.R.Cr.P. 45(a)3 applies and the State has until the 
following business day to bring an appellant to trial or dismiss the case.  In the instant case, May 14, 2005 fell 
on a Saturday, therefore, the State had until the following Monday, May 16, to 
bring the appellant to trial.  As 
admitted by the appellant, however, he required a continuance of the May 16 
trial date in order to change counsel and that continuance tolled the time under 
Rule 48.  Due to this continuance, 
his trial was reset to begin on June 13; however, he lost his motion to dismiss 
on June 10 and he pled guilty later that day.

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant's admissions clearly 
indicate that no speedy trial violation occurred under W.R.Cr.P. 48, therefore 
we need not address the State's arguments on appeal that even more time should 
be tolled.  The State did not deny 
his procedural right to a speedy trial because, based on the appellant's own 
argument, the clock lapsed on a Saturday and under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a) and our 
holding in Sisneros, the final day to 
bring him to trial fell on the following Monday, May 16.  The appellant further admits that he 
required a continuance on the May 16 trial date and he pled guilty before the 
date on which the trial was reset.

 
 
[¶11]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1It 
appears that the appellant's case was part of a trial stack on February 7, 2005, 
and other cases took precedence on that day.  His trial was, therefore, continued 
until April 11, 2005.  On April 1, 
2005, the State filed a "Stipulated Motion for Continuance" which alleged that 
both parties required additional time to prepare for trial.  The district court subsequently reset 
the appellant's trial to occur on May 16, 2005.

 
 

2The 
transcript of the appellant's change of plea hearing is dated June 17, 2005; 
however, the appellant admits that the actual date of the hearing was June 10 
and an affidavit of the court reporter who transcribed the hearing is contained 
in the record, which affidavit confirms the June 10 date.

 
 

3W.R.Cr.P. 
45(a) states, in pertinent part:

 
 
In 
computing any period of time, the day of the act or event from which the 
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.  The last day of the period so computed 
shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday . . . 
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not one of 
the aforementioned days.