Title: Zhurbin v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ANDREY ZHURBIN, §
§ No. 681, 2013,
Defendant-Below, 5
Appellant, § Cour Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in
v. § and for New Castle County
8
‘STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plainiff-Below, §
Appellee. §

‘Submitted: October 8, 2014
Decided: October 17, 2014

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices.

‘Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office ofthe Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for
‘Appellant,

Karen V, Sullivan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.

STRINE, Chief Justice:
I INTRODUCTION

 

‘Andrey Zhurbin appeals from a conviction by a jury for leaving the scene of a
collision, in violation of 21 Del. C, §4201, following an accident that took place in the
‘Delaware Park Casino parking lot. Zhurbin alleges on appeal that his conviction should
bbe vacated because the collision occurred on private property, and he contends that
collision must occur ona public highway to give rise to an offense under 21 Del. C.

§ 4201. But Zhurbin misreads the Delaware Code; a collision can occur on public or
private property for purposes of § 4201, based on the plain language of the statute and the
General Assembly's express purpose in amending a previous version that did have such a

limitation, Further, because Zhurbin di

 

not raise this issue before the Superior Court,
‘any failure of the court to grant a judgment of acquittal because of this issue must be
plain error, which it was not. Zhurbin’s appeal is therefore without merit.
I BACKGROUND
‘The relevant facts from the record are undisputed. On the evening of October 9,
2012, Zhurbin was playing blackjack at the Delaware Park Casino when he was asked to

 

leave for engaging in “disorderly conduct.” Because he appeared to be intoxicated, the
casino’s security guard did not want Zhurbin to drive himself. Another patron, who did
not appear to know Zhurbin, volunteered to take him home, The security guard watched
the two exit the casino parking lot in the other patron's car. Buta short time later,
another patron saw Zhurbin's Pontiac Firebird crash in the casino’s parking lot, hitting
‘multiple median guards and spinning into a ditch, before exiting onto the public street.
‘That patron called 911 for assistance, then followed the car to a Denny's restaurant off of
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Route 273. When the police arrived, the patron identified Zhurbin as the person exiting
the vehicle, Zhurbin at first told the responding police officer that the Firebird was not
his, but he had the keys tothe car in his pocket, and he was injured in a manner consistent
with the accident described by the casino patron and the damage tothe vehicle. Zhurbin
later insisted tothe police officer that his friend “Bob” had been driving, but he could not
describe Bob or where he had gone after parking the ca.

Ziurbin was indicted on four counts related tothe accident: driving under the
influence, leaving the scene of an accident, removal ofa vehicle from an accident scene,
and no proof of insurance. He was acquitted by a jury of driving under the influence, and
the state dismissed the fourth count after Zhurbin provided evidence of insurance at trial.
‘Zoarbin was convicted of the remaining charges.' His only argument on appeal is that
his conviction for leaving the scene should be vacated, because the collision occurred on
private property, and he alleges that an accident giving rise to a conviction for leaving the
seene under § 4201 must occur on public property based on § 4101.

IIL. ANALYSIS

‘As noted, Zhurbin’s argument regarding § 4201 was not presented below. Even if
it was, and the Superior Court had ruled upon it, we review legal rulings including the
interpretation of statutes, de novo.? Our analysis ofthe partes’ arguments begins with

the plain language of the statute: “Where a statute contains unambiguous language that

* Zhurbin contends that his conviction for removal of a vehicle was likewise improper, but the
fine assessed ($75) was beneath the jurisdictional amount required to challenge it on appeal.
(Opening Br. at 10, .6, He does not challenge his conviction for careless driving, which also
sulted in a $75 fine.

See, eg., CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.24 1037, 1040 (Del. 2011).

2
clearly reflects the intent ofthe legislature, then the language ofthe statute controls.">
‘We also “read each relevant] section [ofthe statute] in light of all the others to produce
‘harmonious whole,""* But when a statute is ambiguous, the legislative record may be
‘eipful to resolve the ambiguity. ‘Thus, “this Court may refer to parts ofthe legislative
record to establish the purpose of legislation where the record reveals more information
about the enactments."*

Here, we must interpret 21 Del. C. § 4201(a), which establishes the duty of a
driver involved in a collision resulting in property damage or injury. ‘The statute provides
inrelevant part:

‘The driver of any vehicle involved in a collision resulting in apparent

damage to property shall immedistely stop such vehicle atthe scene ofthe

collision. Said stop should be made as close to the scene of the collision as
possible without obstructing traffic more than necessary. .... If such
collision resulted in injury or death, the driver shall comply with § 4203 of

this ttle, ... Ifthe damage resulting from such collision isto the property

of the driver only, with no damage to the person, property of another, or the

environment, the driver need not stay atthe scene ofthe collision but shall,

‘immediately make a report of the damage resulting as required by § 4203 of

this ttle.*

Zhurbin admits that on its face, § 4201 is not lit

 

public roadways, nor can he find any such restriction in Chapter 42, which generally

» Hoover v. Site, 958 A.2d 816, $20 (Del. 2008) (citing Sandtv, Del. Solid Waste Auth, 640
‘A.2d 1030, 1032 (Del. 1994)).

* Progressive N. Ins. Cov. Mohr, 47 A.3d 492, 496 (Del. 2012) (citing CML V, LLC, 28 A.3d at
1041). See also United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 484 U.S, 365,
371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme ~ because the same terminology is used elsewhere in context
that makes its meaning clea, or because only one ofthe permissible meanings produces 2
substantive effect that is compatible with the est ofthe law.”) (citations omitted).

* Progressive N. ns. Co., A3d at 496 (citing Stifelv. Malarkey, 378 A.2d 133, 138 (Del. Ch,
1977).

*21 Del C. § 42016).
governs accident reporting. But he argues nonetheless that § 4201 is modified by 21 Del
C.§4101(a), which states that “t]he provisions ofthis ttle [21] relating tothe operation
of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except...
[whhere a different place is specifically referred to in given section.” A highway is
defined elsewhere in Title 21 as “the entire width between boundary lines of every way
‘or place of whatever nature open to the use ofthe public as a matter of right for purposes
of vehicular travel, bt does not include a road or driveway upon grounds owned by
private persons ... or other institutions.” Because § 4201 is not specifically mentioned
4s exempt in § 4101, and § 4201 does not explicitly refer to a “different place,” Zhurbin
contends that violations of § 4201 can only oceur “upon highways,” not private
driveways or parking lots.

Notwithstanding Zhurbin’s argument, a plain reading of § 4201 itself and Chapter
42 more generally suggests that “the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident” means
ary vehicle, not only one on a public highway:* Moreover, § 4201 references § 4203,
‘hich deals with the duty ofa driver to report an accident tothe police. Section 4203

requires a driver first to comply with § 4201 or § 4202, the related provision that deals

721 Del. C. § 10122).
"The State argues that Zhurbin’s argument is incorrect because § 4201 does not “relatfe 0 the
‘operation of vehicles” within the meaning of § 4101. But by its plain terms, § 4201 clearly refers
to the “operation” of a vehicle, including its requirement thatthe driver stop the vehicle after the
collision takes place and then move the vehicle if needed to prevent obstructing traffic.
Collisions, by definition, tend to involve atleast one vehicle in operation, and the statute refers to
the duty of a “driver” to stop atthe scene, likey for that obvious reason. ‘As we have previously
held, “operation” is a broader term than driving, but driving a vehicle automatically constitutes
‘operating one: “while all driving is necessarily operation of a motor vehicle, not all operation is
necessarily driving.” MeDuellv. State, 231 Ad 265, 267 (Del. 1967).

4

 
‘with collisions resulting in death or injury to a person, and then mandates reporting tothe
police only when:

(When the collision results in injury or death to any person (-., when

§ 4202 applies); (2) When the collision occurs on a public highway and

results in property damage to an apparent extent of $500 or more; or

() When it appears that ary collision involving a driver whose physical

ability is impaired gs a result of the use of aleobol or drugs or any

combination thereof?

If, as Zhurbin claims, § 4101 applies to § 4201 and requires a collision to occur on
4 public highway forthe diver to be liable for not stopping, the specific reference in
§ 4203 to “public highway” would not make sense, “We presume that the General
‘Assembly purposefully chose particular language and therefore construe statutes to avoid
surplusage if reasonably possible."!®

‘Most important, § 4201 was amended in 1988 to remove explicit language
requiring that an accident occur“on the public highways.""" That is, before 1988, the
first sentence of §4202(a) read:

‘The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident on the public his

suing in apt danse 0 pope slimmed op sich vec
atthe scene of the

 

‘After the 1988 amendment, that section changed to:

‘The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in apparent
damage to property shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene ofthe
accident."

"21 Del. C. § 4203(a) (emphasis added).

' Sussex County Dept of Elections v. Sussex County Republican Comm. 58 A.34 418, 422 (Del.
2013)

1 oe 66 Del. Laws. ch. 238, § 1 (1988),

"221 Del. C.§ 4201(a) (1987) (emphasis added).

5

 
“In interpreting a statute, our primary job is to honor its apparent purpose based on.
‘a sensible reading of the text...” In the context of drafting complex agreements, even
hhighly paid seriveners will often fail to write with perfect clarity, That is also true of a

‘state legislature, such as our General Assembly, charged with the difficult task of crafting

 

In advancing his argument, Zhurbin contends that we may consider other parts of
the Code in interpreting § 4201, but not the form of the statute itself as it has evolved
over time, We disagree. It would be disrespectful of our General Assembly for us to
blind ourselves to the fact that § 4201 used to contain an express limitation to public
roadways that was specifically deleted. Without referring to any statement at a legislative

hearing or even the synopsis ofthe amending bill, the obvious import of that amendment

 

‘was to eliminate any requirement that a collision involving injury to property has to occur

‘on public roadways in order for the obligations in § 4201 wo apply. Itis nota

 

‘66 Del. Laws, ch. 238, § 1 (1988). The sentence was altered again by a 2008 amendment,
substituting the word “collision” for “accident.” 76 Del. Laws, ch. 401, §§ 1-2 2008).

"* Natiomvide Mut Ins. Co. v. Korngold, 318 A.24 606, 609 (Del. 1974) (citation omitted); see
‘also 73 AM. JuR. 2d Statutes § 146 (1974) (“To apply a statute the fundamental rule is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature"; ROMERT A. KATZMAN, JUDGING
‘STATUTES 4 (2014) (“Our constitutional system charges Congress, the people's branch of
representatives, with enacting laws. So, how Congress makes its purposes know, through text
and reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history, should be respected, lest the
integrity of legislation be undermined.”).

"See, eg, 1. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Clark, 88 A.24 436, $32 (Del. 1952) (“The court
must necessarily be guided by the presumption tha the Legislature didnot intend an
‘unreasonable, absurd or unworkable result. If from the statute asa whole the object sought to be
attained othe genera intent underlying the statutory language can be ascertained, it will be
siven effect by the cours.”

 

 

 

6
‘controversial exercise of statutory interpretation to determine that legislative amendments
‘have meaning and to give them effect."

Ifthe General Assembly's intent in deleting the public roadway limitation in
§ 4201 was solely to avoid surplusage from § 4101 forthe sake of Code-<rafting purity,
‘one would expect Zhurbin to point to legislative history to that effect. But he cannot, and
there isan important reason why that would be an odd way to understand the purpose of
the 1988 amendment. Before 1988, the same as it does today, § 4202 did not contain any
requirement fora collision to occur on public roadways.” Section 4202 deals withthe
category of collisions that might be thought to be the most important: those involving
injuries or death to human beings and not merely property damage. Yet § 4202 does not
‘mention § 4101. Zhurbin’s argument logically means that a driver could collide with a
pedestrian in a shopping center parking lot, and seriously injure or even kill the
pedestrian, and then fle the scene without consequence. That is, because § 4202, like

§4201,

 

silent on whether it applies o collisions on private property but is written to
‘suggest it applies to any collision, Zhurbin’s argument about § 4201 would apply to

§ 4202 as well,

‘See, €g., 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.30 (Sth ed. 1992) (he mere
fact that the legislature enacts an amendment indicates that it thereby intended to change the
‘original at by creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one"). In two unanimous
<ecisions, the U.S. Supreme Cour has also quoted Stone v. INS, $14 U.S. 386, 397, 115 S.Ct.
1537, 131 (1995), forthe proposition that “[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume
it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effec.” See U.S. v. Quality Stores, Inc, 134
S.Ct 1395 (2014); Perce County, Wash v, Guillen, $37 U.S. 129, 145 2003).

See 54 Del. Laws. ch. 160, § 1 (1963).

 

7
‘Courts should strive to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislature when
‘that yields a sensible result." The apparent intent ofthe General Assembly in removing
‘the words “on the public highways” was to do just that: eliminate the previous imitation
‘on the application of § 4201 beyond public highways. ‘The General Assembly plainly
intended to put collisions involving property on a more equal footing with collisions
involving injury or death forthe purposes of requiring drivers to stop, not, as Znurbin
‘would have us hold, that drivers involved in collisions resulting in death or injury on
private roadways are also not required to stop.

To the extent that Zhurbin attempts to blind us tothe specific deletion of words by
the legislature, we decline to do so. That would be disrespectful ofthe General
Assembly, Moreover, because Zhurbin must reach outside of the statutory provision at
issue, and even the chapter dealing withthe duty of drivers to stop, it is appropriate for us
to widen our own lens. The obvious effect ofthe deletion is as we have said. But tothe
‘extent that Zhurbin has any doubts, the synopsis tothe amending bill literally underlines
the intent behind the proposed change: “This Act addresses changes as to required
procedures in traffic accidents: 1. Drivers would be required to stop atthe scene of all

‘accidents. At the present time, drivers are not required to stop atthe scene of property

"See, eg, Application of Penny Hill Corp. 154 A.24 888, 891-92 (Del. 1959) ("To determine
the significance ofthese clauses as they appear inthis statute, we must look into the purpose and
intention ofthe Legislature and ascertain its meaning from an examination of every section of
the statute which in any way deals wit the question raised. ‘They must be given a reasonable
and sensible meaning, having in mind such itent and purpose." (citations omitted).

 
‘damage accidents on private property.” Thus, the only relevant legislative history is
consistent with the obvious intent ofthe amendment.

For these reasons, Zhurbin’s argument that he was not validly convicted of an
offense under § 4201 is without merit. Moreover, Zhurbin did not make any claims about
the appropriateness of charging him with a § 4201 offense for an accident that occurred
‘on private property during the trial in the Superior Court. “We generally decline to
review contentions not raised below and not fairly presented tothe trial court for
decision." To warrant review on appeal when the issue has not been fairly presented,
there must be “plain error.” That is, the error complained of must be “so clearly
‘prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the faimess and integrity of the trial
process.”#! “{T]he doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are
apparent onthe face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their
character, and which clearly deprive an accused ofa substantial ight, or which clearly
show manifest injustice,"

Zhurbin has not met this standard. Even if Zhurbin’s reading of § 4201 was
plausible, atrial judge cannot be faulted for plain error when he attempts, without
‘objection, to apply a seemingly applicable statute ina reasonable fashion. Plain error

‘must be that plain and obvious — and trial judges are generally entitled to rely upon the

° App. to Answering Br. at 4 (emphasis in org
2 Turner v. Sate, § A34 612,614 (Del. 2010).
* 1d. (quoting Wainwright v. State, 04 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986); Dutton , State, 452 A.24
127, 146 (Del. 1982) (intemal quotations omited).

® Wairwright, S04 A.2d at 1100 (citing Bromwellv. Site, 427 A.2d 884, 893 n.12 (Del. 1981)).

9

 

D
parties themselves to frame the statutory issues if there is a concer that a statute does not
faisly apply

‘As itwas although the Superior Court did err in instructing the jury, it did o in a
‘way thet favored Zhurbin, In enumerating the elements of the charge of leaving the
scene, the Superior Court instructed the jury that it needed to find thatthe State had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that: “The Defendant drove a motor vehicle on a
‘Public roadway, the Defendant was involved in a collision; the collision resulted in
apparent damage to property of someone other than the Defendant; andthe Defendant
{ailed to stop the vehicle atthe scene of the collision Because driving on a public
roadway when the collision occurred was not actually an element ofthe crime, any error
in including itn the jury charge was harmless. There is no contention that the jury did
‘not have sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Zhurbin

‘committed a

 

ation ofthe statutorily required elements. Zhurbin thus suffered no
“manifest injustice” warranting reversal
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Cout is hereby

AFFIRMED.

® App. to Opening Br. at 40 (emphasis added).
10