Title: Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Town of Shelby and County of LaCrosse,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Town of Shelby, County of LaCrosse, and  
Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance  
Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  224 Wis. 2d 269, 592 N.W.2d 15 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 6, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
LaCrosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis G. Montabon & Michael J. Mulroy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
PROSSSER, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH AND CROOKS, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by James R. Koby, Julie A. Mougin and Parke O’Flaherty, 
LTD., LaCrosse and oral argument by James R. Koby. 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Town of Shelby, 
there was a brief by William W. Ehrke and Crivello, Carlson, 
Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by 
William W. Ehrke. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, County of LaCrosse 
there was a brief by David L. Lange, Deputy Corporation Counsel, 
LaCrosse and oral argument David L. Lange. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Wisconsin Municipal 
Mutual Insurance Company, there was a brief by Bradley D. 
Armstrong, Steven A. Brezinski and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison 
and oral argument by Steven A. Brezinski. 
 
 
 
2000 WI 56 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Shelby, County of LaCrosse, and  
Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Willow Creek Ranch (Willow 
Creek) seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals that in these consolidated cases affirmed summary 
judgments in favor of the Town of Shelby (Town), the County of 
La Crosse (County), and Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance 
Company (WMMIC).1  Willow Creek contends that the Wisconsin 
                     
1 Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 224 Wis. 2d 
269, 592 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1998) (consolidated appeal 
affirming orders of summary judgment by La Crosse County Circuit 
Court, Dennis G. Montabon, J. and Michael Mulroy, J.).  
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2000 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
2 
Department 
of 
Natural 
Resources 
(DNR) 
has 
the 
exclusive 
authority to regulate the operation of a game bird farm and that 
the actions of the Town and the County in regulating the zoning 
of 
Willow 
Creek's 
game 
bird 
farm 
were 
illegal 
and 
unconstitutional.  
¶2 
We conclude that the DNR's statutory authority does 
not preclude the authority of the Town and the County to 
regulate the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird farm.  We 
further conclude that the Town's and the County's actions are 
immune from suit under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) (1995-96)2 and that 
the actions are legal and constitutional.  Finally, we determine 
that the Town and County are not equitably estopped from 
asserting immunity as a defense or preventing the operation of 
Willow Creek's game bird farm.  Accordingly, we affirm the court 
of appeals. 
¶3 
Willow Creek owns 115 acres of land in the Town of 
Shelby, La Crosse County.  Willow Creek's property is zoned as 
an "Exclusive Agricultural" district (Agricultural A) under La 
Crosse County Zoning Ordinance § 17.34.  Agricultural A district 
uses are limited to specific agricultural activities, while 
Agricultural B district uses include activities that are more 
commercial in nature.  The County has the authority to enact and 
enforce zoning ordinances while the Town has the power to veto a 
county zoning change. 
                     
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 volumes.  
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
3 
¶4 
In late 1993, Willow Creek contacted the Town to 
inquire whether a zoning change was required to operate a game 
bird farm on its property. The Town chairperson, Jeff Brudos, 
allegedly informed Willow Creek that no county rezoning was 
needed for Willow Creek's operation of a game bird farm.3  
Shortly prior to the opening of the farm in late 1994, and after 
already having expended substantial sums of money, Willow Creek 
obtained a DNR license.4 
¶5 
In 1995, the County notified Willow Creek that because 
it was conducting a commercial hunting enterprise on property 
zoned exclusively for agricultural purposes, it needed to 
petition for rezoning.  Subsequently, Willow Creek petitioned 
the County to rezone its property to Agricultural B.  Willow 
                     
3 Although the Town and County dispute the sequence of 
events leading to the citation of Willow Creek’s game bird farm, 
for the purposes of summary judgment they accept the facts as 
true.  
4 The record is unclear as to exactly when the DNR issued 
Willow Creek a license to operate a game bird farm.  One of the 
affidavits submitted by Willow Creek, as well as its complaint, 
alleges that the license was issued in June 1994, yet another 
affidavit alleges that the license was issued in October 1994.  
The record contains numerous copies of the October 1994 license, 
as well two subsequent ones, yet it is devoid of any June 
license.   
Regardless of whether the DNR issued a license in June or 
October, Willow Creek expended substantial sums to establish its 
game bird farm after initially meeting with Brudos in late 1993, 
without even having received a DNR license authorizing the 
operation of the farm.  The record indicates that the game bird 
farm opened either in late September or early October, after 
Willow Creek asserts that it invested $340,000 in preparation.  
   
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
4 
Creek also met with the Town to discuss the possibility of 
obtaining a conditional use permit that would enable it to 
continue operation as Agricultural A property.  The County and 
Brudos instructed Willow Creek to follow several conditions to 
guarantee the safe operation of the game bird farm.  Willow 
Creek agreed to follow those conditions and took steps to ensure 
compliance.  
¶6 
The County informed Willow Creek in December 1995 that 
it should cease operation pending the resolution of the zoning 
issues.  However, a month later, the County allowed Willow Creek 
temporarily to resume operation.  Responding to citizen concerns 
about safety and noise from the operation of the game bird farm, 
the Town passed a resolution in February 1996 indicating that it 
would neither approve the rezoning of Willow Creek's property 
nor grant a conditional use permit.   
¶7 
Although the County granted Willow Creek's petition 
for rezoning in March, the Town vetoed the County's decision 
consistent with the Town's prior resolution against rezoning and 
a conditional use permit.  Subsequently, the County issued 
Willow Creek a citation for violating the County's zoning 
ordinance 
by 
conducting 
commercial 
hunting 
activities 
on 
property zoned exclusively for agricultural purposes. 
¶8 
In May 1996, Willow Creek filed the first of two 
suits, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Town and County 
had acted in excess of their authority and had exercised their 
powers in an arbitrary and unconstitutional manner.  In addition 
to 
the 
declaratory 
judgment, 
Willow 
Creek 
requested 
an 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
5 
injunction prohibiting the Town and County from taking further 
action in interference with the operation of its game bird farm. 
 It also argued that the Town and County should be equitably 
estopped from preventing the operation of the game bird farm, 
because Willow Creek had relied to its detriment upon the 
misrepresentations of Town Chairperson, Jeff Brudos. 
¶9 
The Town and County moved for summary judgment 
asserting that they had acted according to their statutory 
authority in deciding to enforce the zoning ordinance and to 
veto Willow Creek's petition to rezone.  They also argued that 
the DNR's authority to issue a license for the operation of a 
game bird farm did not preclude the County's authority to devise 
and enforce zoning ordinances.   
¶10 Subsequently, Willow Creek filed a notice of claim 
with the Town and County pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), 
making a formal demand for money damages.  Upon the disallowance 
of its claims, Willow Creek filed a second suit raising 
essentially the same issues as in its first suit but this time 
seeking money damages.  
¶11 In July 1997, the circuit court granted the Town's and 
the County's motions for summary judgment and dismissed Willow 
Creek's first suit.  Subsequently, the Town, the County, and its 
insurer, WMMIC, moved for summary judgment on the second suit, 
arguing that claim preclusion barred Willow Creek's second suit 
and that the Town and County were immune from liability under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
because 
their 
actions 
represented 
discretionary acts.  In December 1997, the circuit court 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
6 
dismissed Willow Creek's second suit and granted the motions for 
summary judgment.  Willow Creek appealed both summary judgments, 
and the appeals were consolidated. 
¶12 The court of appeals determined that although the DNR 
has the statutory authority to regulate game farms, its 
licensing authority does not preclude the Town and County from 
creating and enforcing zoning ordinances.  In addition, the 
court concluded that the Town and County did not act arbitrarily 
or in excess of their statutory authority by issuing Willow 
Creek a citation for operating its game bird farm on property 
zoned exclusively for agricultural purposes.  The court also 
concluded that the Town and County are immune from liability 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
¶13 When we review motions for summary judgment, we follow 
the same methodology as does the circuit court.  Grams v. Boss, 
97 Wis. 2d 332, 337-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  If there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, the resolution of the action is 
appropriate for summary judgment.  Green Spring Farms v. 
Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).   
¶14  Our initial inquiry of whether the DNR's authority to 
regulate the operation of game farms prevents the Town and 
County from regulating the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird 
farm involves a matter of statutory interpretation and presents 
a question of law.  Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 
320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  Likewise, our subsequent 
inquiries of immunity and equitable estoppel present questions 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
7 
of law.  Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996); 
Harms v. Harms, 174 Wis. 2d 780, 784, 498 N.W.2d 229 (1993). 
This court reviews questions of law independently of the 
determinations of the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
while benefiting from their analyses.  Miller v. Thomack, 210 
Wis. 2d 650, 658, 563 N.W.2d 891 (1997). 
Licensing v. Zoning Authority 
¶15 We address first whether the DNR's authority to 
regulate the operation of game farms under Wis. Stat. § 29.574 
and Wis. Admin. Code NR § 16.02 prevents the Town and County 
from regulating the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird farm.5  If 
we decide that the DNR's authority to license precludes the 
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 29.574 states in relevant part: 
(1) The owner or lessee of any lands within the state 
suitable for the breeding and propagating of game, 
birds or animals as may be approved by the department 
shall have the right upon complying with this section, 
to establish, operate and maintain a game bird and 
animal farm for the purpose of breeding, propagating, 
killing and selling game birds and game animals on 
such lands . . . . 
Wisconsin Admin. Code NR § 16.02 contains essentially the same 
language as Wis. Stat. § 29.574 and states in relevant part: 
(1) Application.  This section applies to all game 
farms as provided in s. 29.867, Stats., including . . 
. shooting game farms . . . . The owner or lessee . . 
. shall have the right upon complying with this 
section to establish, operate and maintain a game bird 
and animal farm . . . .  
Chapter 29 of the Wisconsin Statutes was renumbered and 
revised by 1997 Wis. Act 248.  The former § 29.574 has been 
renumbered as § 29.867.  This change does not affect our 
analysis.   
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
8 
zoning  authority of the Town and the County, we need not 
address the remaining issues raised by Willow Creek on this 
appeal.  
¶16 Willow Creek maintains that because the regulation of 
game farms lies within the exclusive province of the DNR, the 
Town and County had no authority to restrict the operation of 
Willow Creek's farm through the enforcement of the County zoning 
ordinance and the veto of Willow Creek's rezoning petition.  We 
disagree.  The location of game bird farms remains subject to 
local zoning rules, notwithstanding a DNR license granting an 
owner the right to establish such a farm. 
¶17 Municipal 
bodies 
have 
only 
such 
powers 
as 
are 
expressly conferred upon them by the legislature or are 
necessarily implied from the powers conferred.  First Wis. Nat'l 
Bank of Milwaukee v. Town of Catawba, 183 Wis. 220, 224, 197 
N.W. 1013 (1924).   Wisconsin Stat. § 29.574 provides for the 
licensing of "game bird and animal" farms and gives the DNR the 
right to establish such farms.  Nothing in the text of the 
statute explicitly allows local regulation of game bird farms.   
¶18 In 
comparison, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 29.425(3)(c) 
grants 
municipal bodies the power to prohibit the sale of "live game 
animals."6  Chapter 29, however, demonstrates the legislature's 
conscious attempt to distinguish between "game birds" and "game 
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 29.425 (3)(c) states in relevant part: 
The governing body of any county, city, village or town 
may, by ordinance, prohibit the sale of any live game 
animal or fur-bearing animal.  
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
9 
animals," for they are defined separately under Wis. Stat. 
§ 29.01.7  While  § 29.425 evinces the intent to grant local 
control of the sale of game animals, the same is not true of 
game birds.  Thus, we cannot conclude that there is explicit 
local authority under Chapter 29 to regulate the operation of 
game bird farms.  See Ball v. Dist. No. 4, Area Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 
529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984) (legislature presumed to have 
known the words it has chosen).  
¶19 However, lack of such explicit authority under Chapter 
29 is not fatal.  County boards are granted broad zoning 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(4) to effectuate the purpose 
of promoting public health, safety, convenience, and general 
welfare as provided in § 59.69(1).  Specifically, § 59.69(4) 
states in relevant part: 
 
For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety 
and general welfare the board may by ordinance 
effective within the areas within such county outside 
the 
limits 
of 
incorporated 
villages 
and 
cities 
establish districts of such number, shape and area, 
and adopt such regulations for each such district as 
the board considers best suited to carry out the 
purposes of this section.  The powers granted by this 
section shall be exercised through an ordinance which 
may, subject to sub. (4e), determine, establish, 
regulate and restrict:  
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 29.01(6) defines "[g]ame animals" as 
including "deer, moose, elk, bear, rabbits, squirrels, fox and 
raccoon." 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 29.01(7) defines 
"[g]ame 
birds" as 
including "[w]ild geese, brant, wild ducks . . . pheasants . . . 
quail, California quail, and wild turkey." 
 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
10
 
(a) The areas within which agriculture, forestry, 
industry, mining, trades, business and recreation may be 
conducted (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, towns have the authority to disapprove or veto 
particular zoning amendments recommended by county boards.  Wis. 
Stat. § 59.69(5)(e)(6). 
¶20 Willow Creek argues that the County zoning ordinance 
is invalid because a municipality may not pass ordinances that 
infringe upon the spirit of a state law or are repugnant to the 
general policy of the state.  County of Dane v. Norman, 174 Wis. 
2d 683, 689, 497 N.W.2d 714 (1993).  Furthermore, when the state 
has manifested an intent to regulate a specific field or 
subject, conflicting municipal ordinances on the same subject 
are invalid to the extent of the conflict.  DeRosso Landfill Co. 
v. City of Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 651, 547 N.W.2d 770 
(1996).  
¶21 We are not persuaded by the authority Willow Creek 
offers for its proposition that the County's zoning ordinance 
conflicts with the state's exclusive control over hunting and 
with the DNR's exclusive right to grant licenses to conduct such 
hunting activities on game farms under Wis. Stat. § 29.574.  
See, e.g., DeRosso Landfill Co., 200 Wis. 2d at 664 (local 
ordinance conflicting with state policy exempting clean fill 
facilities from local approval); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. 
v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978) (city resolution 
repudiating chemical treatment of city lakes inconsistent with 
state statutes); Krenz v. Nichols, 197 Wis. 394, 222 N.W. 300 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
11
(1928) 
(state's 
broad 
authority 
to 
regulate 
hunting 
and 
disposition of fish and game). 
¶22 These cases do not address the interaction of zoning 
ordinances and state-regulated activity.  Rather they involve 
local ordinances that attempt to regulate the identical activity 
as the state and that are "diametrically opposed" to the state's 
policy.  Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 85 Wis. 2d at 535.  While we 
agree that the DNR has the exclusive right to license the 
operation of game bird farms, this right does not preclude the 
Town and County from regulating the zoning of such farms.  
Zoning and licensing powers represent distinct powers that do 
not conflict with each other.   
¶23 In this case, the purpose of the County zoning 
ordinance involves demarcating the appropriate areas or location 
where a game bird farm may operate.  It does not directly 
regulate the operation of the game bird farm.  Because the power 
to zone does not conflict with the right to issue a license for 
a specific activity, the DNR's authority to grant licenses to 
establish game bird farms does not prevent the Town and County 
from 
regulating 
the 
zoning 
of 
these 
farms 
by 
enforcing 
ordinances and vetoing specific zoning changes. 
Immunity 
¶24 Having determined that the DNR's authority to license 
the operation of game farms does not preclude the authority of 
the Town and the County to regulate zoning, we examine next 
whether Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) grants immunity to their actions 
in preventing the operation of Willow Creek's game bird farm.  
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
12
Willow Creek maintains that the actions of the Town and the 
County 
do 
not 
represent 
discretionary 
acts, 
but 
rather 
ministerial acts for which they are not immune. 
¶25 Under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), a municipality is immune 
from "any suit" for "acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions."8  These 
functions are synonymous with discretionary acts.  Lifer v. 
Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977). A 
discretionary act involves the exercise of judgment in the 
application of a rule to specific facts.  Id. at 512. 
¶26 This 
court 
has 
recognized 
four 
exceptions 
to 
governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  In Kierstyn 
v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 90-97, 596 N.W.2d 
417 (1999), we noted that immunity does not apply to the 
performance of: (1) ministerial duties; (2) duties to address a 
"known danger;" (3) actions involving medical discretion (the 
Scarpaci rule); and (4) actions that are "malicious, willful, 
and intentional."  The only exception advanced by Willow Creek 
in the present case is the performance of a ministerial duty, 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) states in full: 
 
(4) No suit may be brought against any volunteer 
fire 
company 
organized 
under ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employes for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
13
and therefore we need not address the remaining three exceptions 
to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
¶27 A 
ministerial 
act, 
in 
contrast 
to 
an 
immune 
discretionary act, involves a duty that "is absolute, certain 
and imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific 
task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode 
and occasion for its performance with such certainty that 
nothing remains for judgment or discretion."  C.L. v. Olson, 143 
Wis. 2d 701, 711-12, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988) (quoting Lister v. 
Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)). 
¶28 Decisions to enforce a zoning ordinance and to veto 
zoning changes represent legislative acts.  Quinn v. Town of 
Dodgeville, 122 Wis. 2d 570, 578, 364 N.W.2d 149 (1985).  Thus, 
they are discretionary decisions subject to the immunity 
provisions.  Beres v. City of New Berlin, 34 Wis. 2d 229, 232, 
148 N.W.2d 653 (1967).  Although Willow Creek concedes that the 
decision to enact a zoning ordinance represents a discretionary 
act, it maintains that the Town and County had a ministerial 
duty to defer to the state's exclusive authority to license and 
regulate game farms.  According to Willow Creek, the Town and 
County breached their ministerial duty by exercising the 
discretion to enforce the zoning ordinance and to veto Willow 
Creek's rezoning petition in opposition to the state's exclusive 
authority. 
¶29 However, we have already determined that the DNR's 
authority to license game farms does not preclude the Town and 
County from regulating zoning by enforcing zoning ordinances and 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
14
vetoing zoning changes.  Thus, Willow Creek has failed to 
demonstrate an absolute and certain ministerial duty to defer to 
the state.  In fact, when considering the zoning of the Willow 
Creek property, the Town and County have no duty whatsoever to 
defer to the state.  
¶30 Rather, the decisions to veto Willow Creek's rezoning 
petition and to enforce the County zoning ordinance by issuing a 
citation represent purely discretionary acts.9  Without Willow 
Creek's articulation of a specific ministerial duty and its 
subsequent breach, we conclude that the immunity provisions 
apply to the Town and County against Willow Creek's claim for 
money damages. 
¶31 Not only does immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
bar Willow Creek's suit against the Town and County for money 
damages, it also precludes suit in this instance for injunctive 
relief.  Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 352, 558 
N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996).  In Johnson, the plaintiff property 
owners sued the city for injunctive relief and damages for the 
                     
9 The dissent notes that the distinction between ministerial 
and 
discretionary 
functions 
is 
ill-defined 
and 
perhaps 
artificial.  See Dissent at ¶129, ¶136 (quoting 18 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) at § 53.04.10).  The dissent 
also states that this court last addressed the distinction in 
Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 
N.W.2d 417 (1999).  However, we refer the dissent to this 
court's recent decision in State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, 233 Wis. 2d 428, 
608 N.W.2d 679, in which the majority of the court affirmed the 
vitality 
of 
the 
distinction 
between 
ministerial 
and 
discretionary acts by adopting it in the wholly separate context 
of judicial substitution.      
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
15
city's refusal to open the unimproved "stub-end" of a city 
street so that the plaintiffs could gain access to their 
property.  Id. at 345.  The court held that the official 
immunity provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) are not limited to 
money damages or tort actions, but apply as well to actions 
seeking injunctive relief against municipalities and their 
employees.  Id. at 352.10  
¶32 The 
dissent 
attempts 
to 
establish 
that 
Johnson 
represents precedent with a dubious legal foundation that should 
be overruled, not "consecrated," by this court.  Reasoning that 
the reach of Johnson is indiscriminately broad, the dissent 
asserts that immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) was never 
intended to extend to injunctive relief based in tort, but 
rather was to be limited to money damages in tort. 
¶33 The "any suit" language contained in the immunity 
statute, however, does not limit suits to money damages in tort 
but also encompasses injunctive relief based in tort.  This 
interpretation furthers the policy rationales underlying tort 
immunity that officials not be "unduly hampered or intimidated 
in the discharge of their functions by threat of lawsuit or 
                     
10 The concurring opinion of the court of appeals' decision 
expresses concern over the broad reach of Johnson, particularly 
in its applicability to cases in which equitable estoppel may 
lie against a municipality so as to enjoin its enforcement of an 
ordinance.  See Willow Creek, 224 Wis. 2d at 286-87.  However, 
since we determine below that the actions of Town Chairperson, 
Jeff Brudos, do not afford a basis for equitable estoppel in 
this case, we leave resolution of the concurring opinion’s 
concern for another day.  
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
16
personal liability."  Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 
663, 682, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980) (citing Lister v. Board of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)).  The 
concerns over the expenditure of both time and resources apply 
with equal force to actions seeking injunctive relief as they do 
to actions for money damages.  We recognize, however, that the 
suits must be based in tort to garner the protection of immunity 
consistent with the statute. 
¶34 We agree with the dissent that the language in Johnson 
may have been overly expansive, reaching beyond actions based in 
tort to encompass contract and other actions as well.  However, 
we note that the actual narrow issue presented before the  
Johnson court was whether the plaintiffs were permitted to seek 
injunctive relief based on their claim of negligence against the 
city.  Thus, the Johnson court essentially addressed the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) to injunctive relief 
based in tort, concluding that the municipality's assertion of 
immunity barred such relief.  To the extent that the language in 
Johnson suggests otherwise by expanding immunity too broadly, we 
limit that language. 
¶35 In this respect, our rationale is consistent with 
Energy Complexes v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 466, 449 
N.W.2d 35 (1989), which held that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) does 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
17
not grant immunity to actions based in contract.11  Here, as in 
Johnson, Willow Creek's claim for injunctive relief is based in 
tort.  Thus, the Town and the County are afforded immunity 
against Willow Creek's request for an injunction.  
¶36 Although immunity serves as a bar to both money 
damages and injunctive relief based in tort, municipalities do 
not benefit from the shield of immunity in actions seeking 
declaratory relief.  Schmeling v. Phelps, 212 Wis. 2d 898, 915, 
569 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997).  The court in Schmeling noted 
that although public policy may require that local officials not 
be "unduly hamper[ed] or intimidate[d]" in the execution of 
their discretionary duties, public policy also requires that 
citizens be afforded the opportunity for a court to declare 
their rights.  Id.12  
                     
11 The dissent appears to recognize that the court of 
appeals 
in 
Johnson 
may 
very 
well 
have 
intended 
the 
interpretation we adopt.  Dissent at ¶93.  Yet, according to the 
dissent, this interpretation would have us read into the statute 
a "torts-only" limitation on government acts while reading out a 
"torts-only" limitation on suits.  Id.  We foresee no difficulty 
with such an interpretation in consideration of the purposes 
underlying the tort claims statute.  Immunity for torts is 
premised on avoiding the unnecessary hindrance of public 
officials in performing their official duties.  Scarpaci v. 
Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 682, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980); 
Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300, 240 N.W.2d 610 
(1976).  This purpose is served not only by limiting immunity to 
actions for money damages in tort but also applying immunity to 
claims for injunctive relief based in tort. 
12 Setting forth numerous examples, the dissent argues that 
extending immunity to claims for injunctive relief based in tort 
will leave citizens without recourse or remedies for a range of 
illegal and unfair governmental activity.  Dissent at ¶87.  
However, instituting an action for declaratory relief remains an 
avenue to challenge unfair and arbitrary governmental action.  
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
18
¶37 In this case, Willow Creek seeks a declaration that it 
may operate its game bird farm in contravention of the County 
zoning ordinance because Willow Creek has acquired a DNR 
license.   However, we have already determined that the Town and 
County have the authority to enforce the zoning ordinance and 
prevent the operation of Willow Creek's game bird farm, 
notwithstanding the DNR license granting Willow Creek the right 
to establish its farm.  Therefore, Willow Creek cannot benefit 
from a declaratory judgment on this basis. 
¶38 Willow Creek also seeks a declaration that the actions 
of the Town and the County as to Willow Creek's game bird farm 
were illegal and unconstitutional.  Willow Creek contends that 
by preventing the operation of its farm, the Town and County 
unconstitutionally exercised their police powers and applied the 
zoning ordinance in an arbitrary manner.   
¶39 In particular, Willow Creek maintains that its game 
bird farm did not violate the permitted activities under the 
Agricultural A district and that its farm operated similarly to 
other farms zoned within the same district.  Willow Creek also 
maintains that the game bird farm did not pose a significant 
                                                                  
Furthermore, certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) is 
available to check arbitrary municipal decisions.  The fourth 
exception 
to 
immunity 
set 
forth 
in 
Kierstyn, 
addressing 
"malicious, willful and intentional" conduct, also remains to 
remedy gross municipal wrongdoing.  228 Wis. 2d at 90 n.8 
(citations omitted).  Finally, an appropriate means to address 
government gone awry lies with the replacement of government 
officials through ballot and removal procedures, not with 
endless litigation in court.  See Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 299. 
 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
19
health or safety threat, drawing our attention to a range of 
safety measures Willow Creek implemented to ensure the safety of 
its neighbors.  Since preventing the operation of the game bird 
farm will neither promote health nor protect neighboring 
property owners, Willow Creek argues that the Town's and the 
County's actions were arbitrary and unconstitutional.  
¶40 A municipality's zoning decision represents a valid 
exercise of its police power.  State ex rel. American Oil Co. v. 
Bessent, 27 Wis. 2d 537, 540, 135 N.W.2d 317 (1965); State ex 
rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 155, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).  
Since zoning ordinances are enacted for the benefit and welfare 
of the citizens of a municipality, this court generally affords 
great deference to zoning decisions.  See Jelinski v. Eggers, 34 
Wis. 2d 85, 93-94, 148 N.W.2d 750 (1967).  However, we may 
declare a zoning ordinance or action unconstitutional when it 
serves no legitimate purpose and is arbitrary and unreasonable, 
having no substantial relation to public health or safety.  
Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d 640, 647, 211 N.W.2d 
471 (1973).  See also Cushman v. City of Racine, 39 Wis. 2d 303, 
311, 159 N.W.2d 67 (1968). 
¶41 Both the power to zone and the power to veto a zoning 
change represent legislative functions.  Quinn, 122 Wis. 2d at 
578.  Judicial review of legislative functions is limited to 
cases in which the authority acted in excess of its power or 
under error of law.  Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 
146, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966).  Although this court may debate the 
wisdom or the desirability of a particular zoning decision, we 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
20
are constrained from substituting our judgment for that of the 
zoning authority.  Bessent, 27 Wis. 2d at 546.  This rule 
applies not only to decisions as to the necessity of zoning but 
also to decisions as to the determination of whether a change in 
circumstances justifies rezoning.  Buhler, 33 Wis. 2d at 147. 
¶42 An Agricultural A district provides for a wide range 
of 
agricultural 
activities, 
including 
"[f]orest 
and 
game 
management." La Crosse Zoning Ordinance § 17.34(1)(c)(6).  An 
Agricultural B district allows for "riding and shooting clubs" 
and other parks of a more commercial nature.  La Crosse Zoning 
Ordinance § 17.37(1)(l).  Arguably, Willow Creek's game bird 
farm may belong in either agricultural district.  However, we 
may not substitute our judgment for that of the zoning authority 
if there is any "reasonable basis" for the action taken.  
Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 39, 62-63, 51 N.W.2d 518 
(1952).   
¶43 The County determined that the operation of Willow 
Creek's game bird farm was more consistent with the uses of an 
Agricultural B district.  According to the County, it was 
crucial to preserve the exclusively agricultural character of 
the Agricultural A district by disallowing commercial activities 
within that district.   Because there was a reasonable basis 
underlying 
the County's 
determination 
that 
Willow Creek's 
property was better suited for the Agricultural B district, we 
conclude that the County did not act in an arbitrary or 
unconstitutional manner. 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
21
¶44 Similarly, the Town and County did not act in excess 
of their power in preventing the operation of Willow Creek's 
game bird farm based on the reasoning that such action was 
necessary to protect the health and safety of the community.  
While it is true that Willow Creek implemented several safety 
measures to ensure the health and safety of its neighbors, we 
cannot conclude from the record that the Town and County acted 
arbitrarily in determining that the operation of the game bird 
farm would nevertheless pose a health and safety threat.  Absent 
evidence of arbitrary action, which Willow Creek has failed to 
produce, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
Town or County.  Buhler, 33 Wis. 2d at 146-47. 
¶45 Willow Creek also maintains that by denying its 
petition to rezone to an Agricultural B district, while granting 
a similar petition to the La Crosse Rifle Club, the Town and the 
County acted arbitrarily and in excess of their authority.  In 
our determination of whether the denial of Willow Creek's 
petition constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable action by the 
Town and the County, we are guided by the analysis in Schmeling 
v. Phelps, 212 Wis. 2d 898, 569 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997).   
¶46 The 
landowner in 
Schmeling 
sought 
a 
declaratory 
judgment invalidating the veto of his petition to rezone.  Id. 
at 903.  In particular, the landowner argued that the county 
executive had acted arbitrarily because he had failed to veto 
similar rezoning petitions. Id. at 904.  The court in Schmeling 
concluded that, even assuming the seven approved petitions were 
of a similar nature, the landowner had nevertheless failed to 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
22
satisfy his burden to show that the denial of his rezoning 
petition constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable action.  Id. 
at 917.  
¶47 Here, Willow Creek refers only to a single petition 
that was approved subsequent to the denial of its own similar 
petition.  Willow Creek offers no further evidence to show that 
the actions of the Town and the County were arbitrary.  Without 
further evidence, Willow Creek has failed to satisfy its burden 
of demonstrating that the Town and County acted in an arbitrary 
and unconstitutional manner.   
¶48 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
although 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) affords immunity to the Town and County for actions 
involving both money damages and injunctive relief based in 
tort, there is no immunity under § 893.80(4) for declaratory 
actions.  However, because the actions of the Town and the 
County were neither illegal nor unconstitutional, declaratory 
relief is unavailable in this case.       
Equitable Estoppel 
¶49 Finally, Willow Creek contends that the Town and 
County should be equitably estopped from asserting immunity as a 
defense and from preventing the operation of Willow Creek's game 
bird farm due to the negligent misrepresentations of Town 
Chairperson, Jeff Brudos.  Although municipalities are not 
wholly immune from the doctrine of equitable estoppel,13 it is 
                     
13 City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 27 Wis. 2d 53, 66, 
133 N.W.2d 393 (1965). 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
23
well established that erroneous acts or representations of 
municipal officers do not afford a basis to estop a municipality 
from enforcing zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to the police 
power.  Town of Richmond v. Murdock, 70 Wis. 2d 642, 654, 235 
N.W.2d 497 (1975); City of Milwaukee v. Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d 72, 
76-77, 142 N.W.2d 169 (1966).  See also Snyder v. Waukesha 
County Zoning Bd., 74 Wis. 2d 468, 476-77, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976); 
State ex rel. Westbrook v. City of New Berlin, 120 Wis. 2d 256, 
262, 354 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1984).14 
¶50 Binding municipalities to every representation made by 
subordinate employees would produce severe results for the 
municipalities.  Endless litigation would ensue over the words 
of those employees, and important municipal decisions would be 
delayed pending resolution of those suits.  Consistent with the 
above-cited, 
well-established 
law, 
we 
determine 
that 
the 
misrepresentations of Jeff Brudos may not serve as a basis for 
                     
14 The dissent's extensive recitation of the facts to depict 
the perceived injustice to Willow Creek ignores that the law of 
estoppel in the zoning context is well-defined.  Notwithstanding 
the unjust results of those acts, the erroneous acts of officers 
do not serve as a basis for estopping a municipality from 
enforcing an ordinance enacted pursuant to its police power.   
Furthermore, although the dissent sets forth the actions of 
the County to demonstrate why it is a named defendant, we note 
once again that the County voted in favor of rezoning the game 
bird farm to allow Willow Creek to legally operate its 
commercial enterprise.  The County's citation subsequent to the 
Town's veto of the rezoning petition is consistent with the 
representations made by the County that it did not foresee a 
problem with rezoning if the Town acquiesced.  See Dissent at 
¶105. 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
24
estopping the Town and County from enforcing the County zoning 
ordinance and vetoing Willow Creek's rezoning petition. 
¶51 Similarly, we conclude that the Town and County are 
not estopped from asserting immunity as a defense.  The cases 
Willow Creek offers in support of its argument do not involve 
the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the 
enforcement 
of 
zoning 
ordinances 
enacted 
pursuant 
to 
a 
municipality's police power.  See Anderson v. City of Milwaukee, 
208 Wis. 2d 18, 34, 559 N.W.2d 563 (1997) (waiver of 
discretionary immunity defense by omission); Fritsch v. St. 
Croix Cent. Sch. Dist., 183 Wis. 2d 336, 344, 515 N.W.2d 328 
(Ct. App. 1994)(estoppel of notice of claim defense). 
¶52 Willow Creek refers to Russell Dairy Stores v. 
Chippewa Falls, 272 Wis. 138, 74 N.W.2d 759 (1956), to buttress 
its 
position 
that 
equitable 
estoppel 
may 
lie 
against 
a 
municipality so as to prevent the enforcement of its zoning 
ordinance.  However, Russell Dairy Stores is distinguishable 
from the facts of the present case.  
¶53 In Russell Dairy Stores, the entire city council of 
Chippewa Falls had already granted the plaintiff a permit to 
construct a driveway.  In reliance on the city's permit, the 
plaintiff then invested a significant amount of money in the 
construction of the driveway.  A few months later, the city 
council voted to revoke the plaintiff's permit.  This court, 
determining that the issuance of the permit did not violate any 
law or the city's contract with the state, applied the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel to prevent the city of Chippewa Falls from 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
25
revoking a permit it had already granted to the owner of the 
driveway.  The court noted that the plaintiff had gained a 
vested right in the permit issued by the city, which could not 
then be arbitrarily revoked.   Russell Dairy Stores, 272 Wis. at 
145-46. 
¶54 There are several and significant differences between 
Russell Dairy Stores and the present case.  First, Russell Dairy 
Stores was decided prior to the formulation of the present 
immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The concept of 
immunity as a defense was not implicated in the case.  
¶55 Second, the basis for estoppel in Russell Dairy Stores 
involved the erroneous acts of the municipality, not its 
subordinate officers.  In Willow Creek's case, neither the Town 
nor the County had approved Willow Creek's petition to rezone 
before Willow Creek invested money to prepare for the operation 
of a game bird farm.  Willow Creek had not acquired a vested 
right in the operation of its farm on Agricultural B property.   
¶56 Rather, Willow Creek was informally advised by the 
Town Chairperson that it would not need to seek rezoning.  
Although 
equitable 
estoppel 
may 
be 
invoked 
against 
municipalities 
in 
certain 
cases, 
the 
erroneous 
acts 
of 
subordinate officers, rather than those of the municipality, may 
not serve as the basis for estoppel against a municipality in 
the enforcement of a zoning ordinance.  Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d at 
76-77. 
¶57 Finally, the issuance of the permit in Russell Dairy 
Stores did not violate any law or the city's contract with the 
No. 
97-2075 & 98-0138 
 
 
26
state.  The court determined that in revoking a legal permit, 
the city of Chippewa Falls had acted arbitrarily.  Russell Dairy 
Stores, 272 Wis. at 147-48.  In Willow Creek's case, however, 
there is an asserted violation of the County zoning ordinance.  
Moreover, as we have already determined, the decision to prevent 
the operation of Willow Creek's game bird farm due to a 
violation of Agricultural A uses was not arbitrary.  Thus, the 
Town and County are not equitably estopped from preventing the 
operation of Willow Creek's farm. 
¶58 In summary, we conclude that although the DNR has 
statutory authority to license the establishment of game farms, 
its authority does not preclude the Town and the County from 
regulating the zoning of Willow Creek's game bird farm.  We 
further conclude that the Town and County are immune from suit 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), and that their actions in 
preventing the operation of Willow Creek's game bird farm were 
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.  Finally, we determine 
that the Town and County are not equitably estopped from 
asserting immunity as a defense or from enforcing the zoning 
ordinance and vetoing Willow Creek's petition to rezone its 
property.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
1 
¶59 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (dissenting).  Wisconsin law has 
become unintelligible in explaining what rights and remedies are 
available to persons who have been injured by state or local 
government.  The purpose of this dissent is to provide an 
overview of this dilemma and to show how it has led to a serious 
injustice in the present case. 
I 
¶60 In 1962, this court abrogated the principle of 
governmental immunity from tort claims.  Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  Our court 
declared that few tenets of American jurisprudence had been so 
unanimously berated as the governmental immunity doctrine.  17 
Wis. 2d at 33.  We found that governmental-immunity had its 
origin in judicial decisions and concluded that the time had 
come to abolish the immunity, even though the legislature had 
not acted.  Id. at 37. 
 
¶61 The court then addressed the scope of abrogation, 
announcing 
that, 
henceforward, 
"so 
far 
as 
governmental 
responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is liabilitythe 
exception is immunity."  Id. at 39.  Further: 
 
Our 
decision 
does 
not 
broaden 
the 
government's 
obligation so as to make it responsible for all harms 
to others; it is only as to those harms which are 
torts that governmental bodies are to be liable by 
reason of this decision. 
 
This decision is not to be interpreted as imposing 
liability on a governmental body in the exercise of 
its legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial functions.  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
2 
Id. at 39-40 (citing Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 133 
(Fla 1957)). 
 
¶62 The court acknowledged that the legislature had the 
last word and was thus free to reinstate immunity, impose damage 
caps, 
and 
establish 
"administrative 
requirements . . . preliminary to the commencement of judicial 
proceedings for an alleged tort."  Id. at 40.15 
 
¶63 In 1963, the legislature responded to the Holytz 
decision by enacting Chapter 198, Laws of 1963, effective July 
27, 1963.  Chapter 198 created Wis. Stat. § 331.43, which in 
time became Wis. Stat. § 895.43 (1975-76) and is now Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80, 
the 
section 
that 
applies 
to this 
case. 
 The 
legislature has amended this provision several times. 
 
¶64 To understand the current statute, we must look 
backward.  Subsection (1) of the 1963 law directed that: "No 
action founded on tort, except as provided in s. 345.05, shall 
be maintained" against a local government entity, including a 
volunteer fire company, or "officer, official, agent or employe" 
of such entity, without first filing a timely notice of claim. 
 
¶65 Subsection (2) imposed a damage cap of $25,000 "in any 
action founded on tort" against local governments, and it 
precluded punitive damages in any such action. 
 
¶66 Subsection (3) stated: 
                     
15 The court determined that its ruling was prospective, 
except for Janet Holytz, the injured young child in the suit, 
and would "not apply to torts occurring before July 15, 1962," 
about five weeks after the decision.  Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
No suit shall be brought against any political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor shall any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
fire 
company, 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency 
or 
against 
its 
officers, 
officials, agents or employes for acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions. 
The latter half of subsection (3) tracked the language in 
Holytz, explicitly maintaining the immunity in tort for certain 
discretionary governmental functions.16 
¶67 Subsection (4) provided that "the provisions and 
limitations of this section shall be exclusive and shall apply 
to all actions in tort" against the enumerated entities.  The 
subsection also said: 
 
Nothing in this section shall bar an action or impose 
limitations in any action against any such officer, 
official, 
agent 
or 
employe 
individually 
for 
intentional torts.  When rights or remedies are 
provided by any other statute against any political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or agency or any 
officer, 
official, agent 
or 
employe thereof for 
injury, damage or death, such statute shall apply and 
the limitations in sub. (2) shall be inapplicable. 
¶68 In 1978, the legislature repealed and recreated Wis. 
Stat. § 895.43 as part of a larger bill "relating to a uniform 
procedure 
for 
claims 
brought 
against 
local 
governments."  
Chapter 285, Laws of 1977.  The legislature changed the title of 
the section from "Tort actions against political corporations, 
governmental subdivisions or agencies and officers, agents or 
                     
16 See Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 532, 247 N.W.2d 
132 (1976).  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
4 
employes; notice of claim; limitation of damages and suits" to 
"Claims 
against 
political 
corporations, 
governmental 
subdivisions or agencies and officers, agents or employes; 
notice of injury; limitation of damages and suits."  It dropped 
the phrase "action founded on tort" from subsection (1) and 
inserted instead the phrase "a claim or cause of action."  It 
renumbered subsection (3) to subsection (4).  It also renumbered 
subsection (4) to subsection (5) and changed the language in the 
subsection from "the provisions and limitations of this section 
shall be exclusive and shall apply to all actions in tort" to 
"the provisions and limitations of this section shall be 
exclusive and shall apply to all claims."  It also dropped from 
renumbered subsection (5) the sentence:  "Nothing in this 
section shall bar an action or impose limitations in any action 
against 
any 
such 
officer, 
official, 
agent 
or 
employe 
individually for intentional torts." 
¶69 The Prefatory Note to the revised section explained 
that the Wisconsin Statutes "contain a variety of procedural 
steps to follow when bringing a claim" against a local 
government.  The Note then stated: 
 
This bill consolidates these procedures [SECTIONS 1 to 
10 and 12] and makes them uniform by repealing and 
recreating s. 895.43, Wis. stats., [SECTION 11] to 
include the following procedures when prosecuting a 
claim against any volunteer fire company organized 
under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental 
subdivision or agency thereof or against any officer, 
official, 
agent or 
employe of 
such corporation, 
subdivision or agency or volunteer fire company for 
acts done in their official capacity or in the course 
of their agency or employment: 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
a) 
A 120-day period for filing written notice of 
injury.  However, the failure to give the 
required notice will not bar an action if the 
appropriate body had actual notice and failure to 
provide written notice was not prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
 
b) 
No time limit for filing a claim. 
 
c) 
A time limit of 120 days for disallowing a claim; 
the failure of an appropriate body to act on a 
claim 
within 
120 
days 
is 
treated 
as 
a 
disallowance. 
 
d) 
Notice of disallowance of a claim which shall 
include a statement of the date of disallowance 
and the time during which a claimant may commence 
a court action. 
 
e) 
A requirement that suits be commenced within 6 
months of the date of service of notice of 
disallowance. 
Ch. 285, Laws of 1977, p. 1233. 
¶70 The Prefatory Note to the 1978 legislation described 
procedures.  It did not explain or even mention the elimination 
of several references to tort.  The new legislation tied eight 
then-existing statutes, namely, Wis. Stat. §§ 59.76, 59.77(1), 
60.36, 62.25(1), 81.15, 118.26, 119.68, and 345.05(3) (1975-76), 
to the procedures in Wis. Stat. § 895.43.  These eight statutes 
authorized causes of actions or claims against counties, towns, 
cities, school districts, and against the state for motor 
vehicle accidents.  The objective of all this was to establish 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
6 
uniform procedures to be followed for claims against local 
governments.17 
¶71 In 
1979, 
the 
legislature 
renumbered 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.43 as § 893.80.  Section 893.80 has been amended several 
other times, but the language in subsection (4) exempting local 
governments and local officials from suits "for acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions" has always remained intact.   
¶72 This information serves as background for the review 
of two cases that have had a decisive influence on the present 
litigation.  The first case is DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 
2d 178, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994), which posed this question:  "Does 
sec. 893.80(1), Stats., the notice of claim statute, apply in 
all actions or only in tort actions?"  Id. at 182.  The court 
concluded that § 893.80(1) applies in all actions.  Id. at 183. 
 It pointed to the "plain language" of the statute.  Id. at 190. 
 It also quoted from Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 
52, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984), in which this court said: 
 
[I]t is apparent that sec. 893.80(1)(b), Stats., 
requires a list, item by item, of the kinds of relief 
sought.  One kind of relief sought might be, as here, 
money damages.  In another case, it might be a demand 
for relief by specific performance or by injunction.  
It should be noted that sec. 893.80 is not a statute 
only 
applicable 
to 
tort 
claims 
or 
claims 
for 
negligence.  The opening sentence of sec. 893.80 
                     
17 Disparity among the old statutes and the "confusion" it 
created is discussed in Schwartz v. Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 2d 119, 
123, 168 N.W.2d 107 (1969), and Harte v. Eagle River, 45 Wis. 2d 
513, 518-19, 173 N.W.2d 683 (1970).  In Schwartz, this court 
invited the legislature to change the law.  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
7 
recites its applicability to any cause of action.  
Sec. 
893.80, 
when 
initially 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature, applied only to tort claims, but by ch. 
285, Laws of 1977, the procedures were made generally 
applicable 
to 
any 
claims 
against 
the 
listed 
governments.  Accordingly, the statute provides for a 
method of securing relief against a city that may be 
different from, or in addition to, damages (emphasis 
added). 
¶73 In the Waukesha case, the court discussed three court 
of appeals decisions after 1978 that had ruled that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1) applied only to actions for money damages:  Kaiser 
v. City of Mauston, 99 Wis. 2d 345, 356, 299 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. 
App. 1980); Harkness v. Palmyra-Eagle Sch. Dist., 157 Wis. 2d 
567, 579, 460 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1990); and Nicolet v. Village 
of Fox Point, 177 Wis. 2d 80, 86, 501 N.W.2d 842 (Ct. App. 
1993).  184 Wis. 2d at 191.  The Waukesha court then said: 
 
[W]e now hold that sec. 893.80 applies to all causes 
of action, not just those in tort and not just those 
for money damages.  We therefore overrule Kaiser, 
Harkness and Nicolet to the extent that those opinions 
hold that sec. 893.80(1) applies only to tort claims 
and claims for money damages. 
Id.18 
¶74 In Waukesha, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
had sought an injunction against the City of Waukesha as well as 
forfeitures under one statute and penalties under another.  
                     
18 In footnote 10 of its decision, the court wrestled 
briefly with the problem of preliminary relief, saying:  "Such 
immediate relief is not possible if the claimant is required to 
follow the notice procedures. . . . [T]his issuewhether the 
notice requirements of sec. 893.80(1) apply in cases where the 
plaintiff seeks preliminary reliefis not before the court and 
we need not address it."  184 Wis. 2d at 193.  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
8 
Ultimately, the court reversed the decision of the circuit court 
to dismiss the DNR complaint.19  As a result, this court 
permitted the DNR to seek injunctive relief against the City. 
¶75 The second case is Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 
Wis. 2d 343, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996), decided two years 
after Waukesha.  In Johnson, the court focused on a different 
subsection of Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  The principal issue was 
"whether the immunity granted by § 893.80(4), STATS., is limited 
to actions in tort, or whether it extends to equitable actions 
seeking injunctive relief."  Id. at 345.  The court concluded 
that "the official immunity provisions of § 893.80(4), STATS., 
like the notice and claim provisions of § 893.80(1), are not 
limited to tort or money-damage actions, but are equally 
applicable to actions which . . . seek injunctive relief against 
the governmental subdivision or employee."  Id. at 352.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the 
language and analysis of the Waukesha case. 
¶76 The majority opinion today consecrates the Johnson 
decision as controlling Wisconsin law, declaring that: 
 
Not only does immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
bar Willow Creek's suit against the Town and County 
for money damages, it also precludes suit in this 
instance for injunctive relief.  Johnson v. City of 
Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 352, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  In Johnson,  . . . [t]he court held that 
                     
19 In Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 349, 558 
N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996), the court of appeals mistakenly 
stated:  "The [supreme court] upheld the trial court's dismissal 
of the action, holding that 'the notice of claim statute 
 . . . applied in all actions, not just in tort actions.'" 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
9 
the 
official 
immunity 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) are not limited to money damages or tort 
actions, 
but 
apply 
as 
well 
to 
actions 
seeking 
injunctive relief against municipalities and their 
employees. 
Majority op. at ¶31. 
 
¶77 In my view, some of the language used in Figgs and 
Waukesha was overly broad.  Some of the analysis in Waukesha was 
too sweeping.  When the court of appeals followed that analysis 
in lock step for its decision in Johnson, it marched directly 
into a bed of quicksand.  Close scrutiny of the statute and of 
the Waukesha opinion demonstrate why Johnson was incorrectly 
decided. 
II 
 
¶78 The legislation passed in 1963 was a direct response 
to the Holytz decision.  It was intended to deal with tort 
claims against local governments, create a procedure for 
handling these tort claims, solidify the tort immunity that the 
court had recognized for certain discretionary governmental 
acts, prohibit suits against local governments for intentional 
torts of employees, preclude punitive damages against local 
governments in tort actions, and establish damage caps in 
government tort cases. 
 
¶79 Subsection (3) of Wis. Stat. § 331.43 (1963-64) read: 
 
No suit shall be brought against any political 
corporation, 
governmental 
subdivision 
or 
agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor shall any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
fire 
company, 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency 
or 
against 
its 
officers, 
officials, agents or employes for acts done in the 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
10
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions. 
¶80 In subsection (3), the phrase "nor shall any suit be 
brought" refers to any suit in tort.  It is inconceivable that 
the legislature intentionally precluded a vast array of suits 
not founded in tort in this tort claims statute, did so in the 
middle of a sentence, and did so without ever revealing that 
that was its intention.  Certainly, the subsection was not 
interpreted to extend beyond tort suits until the Johnson case 
in 1996.20 
¶81 Renumbered subsection (4) of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 now 
reads: 
 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
                     
20 For instance, in Energy Complexes v. Eau Claire County, 
152 Wis. 2d 453, 465, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989), this court 
considered a defense by Eau Claire County that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) immunized a county from a breach of contract 
lawsuit.  This court said:   
Section 893.80(4), Stats., does not apply to suits 
involving 
a 
local 
government 
body's 
contractual 
obligations. 
 
The 
County 
concedes 
that 
when 
§ 893.80(4) was originally enacted, it only applied to 
tort actions.  The County argues, however, that 
§ 893.80(4) was made 
applicable to all 
actions, 
including contract actions, by amendments in Chapter 
285, Laws of 1977.  The County's argument must fail in 
light of the legislative history behind the 1977 
amendments.  The prefatory note to Chapter 285, Laws 
of 1977, shows that the intent of the legislature was 
merely to consolidate and make uniform the statutory 
procedures 
for 
commencing 
claims 
against 
local 
government entities. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
11
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employes for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
The 
legislature 
made 
no 
substantive 
changes 
in 
present 
subsection (4) over a 35-year period.  No critical language was 
added, and no critical language was deleted.  It is improbable 
that the legislature, in passing a bill prepared by the highly 
regarded Legislative Council, intended in subsection (4) to wipe 
out remedies long available to litigants without changing 
statutory language and without alerting anyone of its objective. 
 
¶82 The history of subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 
is quite different.  In 1978, the legislature repealed and 
recreated Wis. Stat. § 895.43(1), dropping the phrase "action 
founded in tort."  Whether the legislature actually intended its 
new phrase "a claim or cause of action" to apply to all claims 
beyond tort claims is debatable.  Nevertheless, the legislature 
deleted critical language from the subsection, and the resulting 
provision appears on its face to be much broader in scope than 
it was before.21  In addition, there is a clear rationale for 
requiring that a notice of claim be filed before suit is 
commenced against a local government:  A notice gives the local 
                     
21 In City of Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Bd., 216 Wis. 
2d 616, 624, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998), the majority went to the 
drafting files and found additional materials to support the 
court's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) applied to all 
causes of action.  The court said:  "It is clear from the plain 
language, especially as bolstered by the legislative history, 
that the legislature intended that § 893.80(1)(b) apply to 'all 
causes of action, not just those in tort and not just those for 
money damages'" (citing DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 
178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994)). 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
12
government an opportunity to investigate the claim and resolve 
the dispute before becoming enmeshed in costly litigation.  The 
1978 legislation had the announced purpose of making uniform the 
notice procedures affecting local governments.  Hence, there was 
good reason for the Waukesha court to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1) as applying to more than tort claims, reserving the 
issue of preliminary relief. 
 
¶83 Thereafter, however, the Johnson court substantially 
extended the Waukesha decision.  The Johnsons had argued that 
the Waukesha case was "precedentially binding only as to 
Subsection (1)."  207 Wis. 2d at 349.  The court replied that, 
"Given the [Waukesha] court's analysis . . . we question whether 
the decision may be so limited."  Id.  The court of appeals then 
gave three reasons why the analysis in Waukesha led it to 
interpret subsection (4) of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 the same as 
subsection (1). 
¶84 First, the court said, "the supreme court found 
significant, if not controlling, the absence of a specific 
limitation to tort claims in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)."  Id. at 
350-51.  Thus the court of appeals declared: 
 
The same may be said for the "immunity" provisions of 
subsection (4); they do not now containnor have they 
ever containedany such limitation.  The subsection 
states, simply and plainly, that acts done in the 
exercise of the subdivision's discretionary functions 
are immune from "any suit." 
Id. at 351. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
13
¶85 The absence of language in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
explicitly limiting the suits to which the subsection applies is 
discussed above in ¶80.  The context and history of the 
subsection suggest that the phrase "nor shall any suit be 
brought" is implicitly limited to suits in tort. 
¶86 What the court of appeals failed to recognize in 
Johnson is that when it jettisoned the implicit limitation in 
subsection (4) to suits in tort, it also jettisoned the 
limitation to immunity for tort.  Read literally, the subsection 
creates immunity for any 
acts done 
in the 
exercise of 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.  This arguably precludes claims in contract.22 
¶87 If a literal reading of the subsection were correct, 
how could a person challenge in court a decision made by a local 
school board to name a public school after Richard Speck or 
Jeffrey Dahmer?  Isn't the naming of a public school a 
legislative function?  How could a person challenge in court a 
decision by the school board to non-renew all teachers who were 
left handed or had red hair?  Isn't non-renewal a discretionary 
decision?  How could a person challenge the legality of an 
ordinance passed by a city council, a questionable expenditure 
by a county board, or the arbitrary refusal of a local 
government body to grant a permit?  Passing ordinances, spending 
public money, and granting or denying permits represent classic 
                     
22 As noted in footnote 6, this court unanimously rejected 
breach of contract immunity in Energy Complexes v. Eau Claire 
County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989).  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
14
legislative or judicial functions.  How could a person go to 
court to stop a continuing injury from the negligence or even 
intentional misconduct of a local government?  One cannot read 
"No . . . suit may be brought" literally without stripping 
citizens of fundamental protections and inviting misconduct by 
local governments.  One cannot read the language literally 
without 
producing 
absurd 
results 
never 
intended 
by 
the 
legislature in the 1978 law. 
 
¶88 The 
Johnson 
court 
gave 
a 
second 
reason 
for 
interpreting subsection (4) as broadly as subsection (1).  The 
court argued that "the immunity from any suit language of 
§ 893.80(4), STATS., significant in itself, becomes even more so 
when considered in context."  207 Wis. 2d at 351.  The court 
contrasted 
the 
reference 
to 
intentional 
torts 
with 
the 
subsequent prohibition of "any suit" in the same sentence: 
 
Not only is there, as we have just noted, no limiting 
language here, but in the preceding clause of the same 
subsection, the legislature made a specific reference 
to 
actions 
for 
intentional 
torts. . . . When 
the 
legislature 
uses 
different 
terms 
in 
a 
statuteparticularly in the same sectionwe presume 
it intended the terms to have distinct meanings.  We 
do not believe it would be reasonable to read a 
"torts-only" limitation into the "any suit" language 
of § 893.80(4). 
Id. 
 
¶89 There are several responses to this argument.  At the 
time the subsection was enacted in 1963, a faithful construction 
of 
the 
subsection 
would 
have 
recognized 
a 
"torts-only" 
limitation to the "any suit" language because the language was 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
15
part of a tort claims statute.  The language was construed that 
way for more than 30 years.  To construe the language 
differently in 1996 required the court to read the "torts-only" 
limitation out of the subsection, in effect overruling countless 
court decisions.  This was contrary to the principle set forth 
in Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 185-190, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997), that the court of appeals may not overrule, modify or 
withdraw language from a previously published decision of the 
court of appeals.  Johnson would have had to be decided 
differently if it had followed rather than preceded the Cook 
decision. 
¶90 The 
three 
court 
of 
appeals 
decisions 
partially 
overruled in Waukesha serve to illustrate the point.  In Kaiser 
v. City of Mauston, 99 Wis. 2d 345, 299 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 
1980), the court of appeals affirmed a permanent injunction 
against the City of Mauston and its Lake Improvement District.  
The defendants were enjoined from giving effect to a lake 
rehabilitation plan created in part by the city council.  The 
defendants contended that the suit was barred by a failure to 
comply with the notice provision of Wis. Stat. § 62.25(1), which 
was tied to then Wis. Stat. § 895.43(1).  The court of appeals 
disagreed, and it upheld the injunction.  Although this court 
overruled Kaiser on the notice of claim issue in Waukesha, it 
did not say that a circuit court could not issue an injunction 
against a city.  The Johnson decision implies that the remedy 
employed in Kaiser has been eliminated. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
16
 
¶91 In Harkness v. Palmyra-Eagle Sch. Dist., 157 Wis. 2d 
567, 460 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1990), a probationary teacher was 
not renewed by the school board.  She sued for reinstatement and 
money damages, claiming that the school board had violated 
certain procedures established by statute.  The court rejected 
her claim for money damages on grounds that the school district 
had immunity for discretionary acts, but the court ruled that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80 did not bar her claim for reinstatementnon-
monetary injunctive relief in the form of an order to reinstate 
her to her former teaching position.  The court of appeals 
stated:  "We conclude . . . that sec. 893.80(4), Stats., does 
not bar Harkness's claim for reinstatement."  157 Wis. 2d at 
580.  This court never overruled that portion of the Harkness 
decision in Waukesha, but the Johnson decision appears to 
eliminate the remedy of a suit for reinstatement. 
 
¶92 Nicolet v. Village of Fox Point, 177 Wis. 2d 80, 501 
N.W.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1993), was an action for declaratory 
judgment seeking confirmation that the plaintiffs owned certain 
land, and for injunctive relief.  The suit was dismissed by the 
circuit court on grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to 
comply with the notice of claims statute.  The court of appeals 
reversed, 
maintaining 
that 
some 
of 
the 
supreme 
court's 
pronouncements in Waukesha were dicta.  The court said that "any 
holding to the contrary would render meaningless most attempts 
to gain timely, effective injunctive relief against governmental 
units."  177 Wis. 2d at 89-90.  The ruling permitted the lawsuit 
to go forward.  Although the Waukesha case overruled the Nicolet 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
17
holding on notice of claim, the Waukesha court never precluded 
injunctive relief against a municipality.  Rather, the Waukesha 
case itself gave a green light to injunctive relief against a 
municipality.  Thus, when the Johnson case held that injunctive 
relief may not be sought against a municipality, it effectively 
overruled both Nicolet and Waukesha.   
 
¶93 The argument might be made that the court of appeals 
intended to prohibit injunctive relief against local government 
torts but not against other local government action.  But that 
would require a court to read into the statute a "torts-only" 
limitation on acts while reading out of the statute a "torts-
only" limitation on suits.23 
 
¶94 The fallout from Johnson appeared almost immediately 
in Schmeling v. Phelps, 212 Wis. 2d 898, 569 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. 
App. 1997).  One of the questions in Schmeling was whether Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) barred a declaratory judgment action against a 
county executive on an allegedly illegal veto.  The court 
concluded 
that 
"a 
declaratory 
judgment 
action 
is 
not 
a 
'suit . . . brought against' [Richard] Phelps or Dane County 
within the meaning of § 893.80(4), STATS.  [The] action seeks 
                     
23 The majority attempts to limit the holding in Johnson, 
asserting in ¶33 that "suits must be based in tort to garner the 
protection of immunity consistent with the statute."  This was 
not the intent of the Johnson decision, as the concurring 
opinion by Judge Vergeront in Willow Creek testifies.  Willow 
Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 224 Wis. 2d 269, 286-87, 
592 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1998).  See ¶118, n.21 below.  The 
majority's interpretation will transform suits against local 
governments into disputes about whether the suit is "based in 
tort."  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
18
neither money nor injunctive relief from Phelps or the county; 
they are named as parties only so that they can be heard on the 
question presented."  212 Wis. 2d at 914-15. 
 
¶95 The Schmeling court's conclusion that a declaratory 
judgment action is not barred by subsection (4) was correct; but 
the court was forced to dance around the Johnson court's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) in a valiant effort to 
preserve declaratory judgment actions against local government. 
 The court left open the question of what would have happened if 
a plaintiff had requested an injunction to block enforcement of 
an ordinance that a court had declared unlawful, or if a 
taxpayer had tried to stop a public expenditure that a court had 
ruled illegal.  In Schmeling, the court was forced to identify 
specific statutes authorizing suit.  It said these specific 
statutes took precedence over Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Suppose 
there 
had 
been 
no 
specific 
government-focused 
statutes 
authorizing suitonly general statutes describing procedural 
remedies?  Would that mean that those remedies would not be 
available in a suit against a local government?  
 
¶96 As it examined context, the Johnson court neglected to 
take account of the following language in Figgs: 
 
[I]t is apparent that sec. 893.80(1)(b), Stats., 
requires a list, item by item, of the kinds of relief 
sought.  One kind of relief sought might be, as here, 
money damages.  In another case it might be a demand 
for 
relief 
by 
specific 
performance 
or 
by 
injunction. . . .   [T]he statute provides for a 
method of securing relief against a city that may be 
different from or in addition to, damages (emphasis 
added). 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
19
121 Wis. 2d at 52.  Wouldn't it be pointless to require a party 
to file a notice that it intended to seek injunctive relief if 
it were never entitled to seek injunctive relief? 
 
¶97 Two years before Johnson, the court of appeals relied 
on the Figgs case as authority to estop a school district from 
asserting a defense.  Fritsch v. St. Croix Cent. Sch. Dist., 183 
Wis. 2d 336, 343, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1994).  The court 
said: 
 
The purpose of § 893.80, STATS., is to afford the 
government an opportunity to compromise and settle the 
claim without litigation.  Figgs v. Milwaukee, 121 
Wis. 2d 44, 53, 357 N.W.2d 548, 553 (1984).  There is 
nothing in 893.80 to suggest that the legislature 
intended any different or additional purpose for this 
statute.  Figgs, 121 Wis. 2d at 53-54, 357 N.W.2d at 
553. 
The Johnson court reached a mistaken conclusion, in part, 
because it disregarded many years of precedent from its own 
court.   
 
¶98 The Johnson court offered a third argument for its 
literal interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), namely that 
immunity provisions derive from public policy considerations.  
207 Wis. 2d at 352.  It listed these considerations as follows: 
 Public officers should not be unduly hampered or intimidated in 
the discharge of their functions by threat of lawsuit or 
personal liability.24  Courts should not pass judgment on the 
                     
24 Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 682, 292 
N.W.2d 816 (1980).  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
20
policy decisions of coordinate branches of government.25  The 
valuable time of public officials should not be drained by 
lawsuits.26  The sum total of these policy considerations comes 
close to the proposition that we should eliminate all court 
remedies against local governments because it is just too 
burdensome to hold governments accountable to the people.27   
¶99 In some ways, the Johnson case puts ordinary citizens 
in a worse position than they were before Holytz.  There is no 
evidence the Wisconsin legislature intended that result.  The 
Johnson case was wrongly decided and under no circumstances 
should it be sanctified by this court as controlling law.  It 
should be overruled. 
III 
 
¶100 This brings us to the facts of this case.  They are 
restated here to report events and details that have been 
omitted from the majority opinion and to show why the County is 
a named defendant.   
                     
25 Hillman v. Columbia County, 104 Wis. 2d 376, 397, 474 
N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1991).  
26 Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976).  
27 The majority argues in ¶33 that the "any suit" language 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) applies to suits for money damages in 
tort and "injunctive relief based in tort."  It repeats the 
policy rationales underlying tort immunity.  The majority's 
analysis implies that these same policy rationales do not apply 
in suits against local governments when the suits are based on 
some theory other than tort.  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
21
¶101 On May 16, 1996, Willow Creek Ranch filed a complaint 
against the Town of Shelby and La Crosse County.28  In Claim I of 
the complaint, Willow Creek sought a declaratory judgment, 
alleging that the Town of Shelby and La Crosse County had 
represented to Willow Creek that Willow Creek had the proper 
zoning for the operation of a game bird farm and that Willow 
Creek 
"relied 
on 
the 
Defendants' 
representation 
to 
its 
detriment."  In Claim II, Willow Creek asked for an injunction 
to enjoin the Defendants from interfering in the operation of 
the game bird farm and from prosecuting Willow Creek for the 
operation of the farm.  Early in the litigation, Willow Creek 
moved unsuccessfully for a temporary restraining order and then 
a temporary injunction. 
 
¶102 The County and Town each answered the complaint, and 
both moved to dismiss.  Willow Creek filed supporting affidavits 
and exhibits, and the County and Town also filed affidavits and 
exhibits.  The filing of the supporting documents converted the 
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.29  In any 
                     
28 This dissent does not discuss Willow Creek's second suit.  
29 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.06(2)(b) provides in part: 
If on a motion asserting the defense described in par. 
(a)6. to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . matters 
outside of the pleadings are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in 
s. 
802.08, 
and 
all 
parties 
shall 
be 
given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by s. 802.08.  
 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
22
event, La Crosse County explicitly moved for summary judgment on 
September 9, 1996, and the Town followed with its own motion on 
October 25, 1996.  The Circuit Court of La Crosse County, Dennis 
G. Montabon, Judge, granted the motions for summary judgment and 
motions to dismiss on April 16, 1997. 
 
¶103 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2), provides that summary 
judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Summary judgment is a drastic 
remedy.30  It deprives the losing party of the opportunity for a 
trial or even an evidentiary hearing.  Consequently, a motion 
for summary judgment initiates a search of the existing record,31 
including the pleadings, to determine whether a claim has been 
stated.  In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court may 
consider all allegations contained in the pleadings plus the 
affidavits and other materials filed, in search of a claim. 
 
¶104 Willow Creek made the following allegations in its 
pleadings and other materials.  On a motion for summary 
                                                                  
See Johnson v. Johnson, 179 Wis. 2d 574, 580, 508 N.W.2d 19 (Ct. 
App. 1993); Fritsch v. St. Croix Cent. Sch. Dist., 183 Wis. 2d 
336, 342, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1994). 
30 Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston, 81 Wis. 2d 
183, 189, 260 N.W.2d 241 (1977).  
31 Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Standard Printing Co., 19 
Wis. 2d 27, 31, 119 N.W.2d 378 (1963)  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
23
judgment, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the 
court must accept all these allegations as true. 
¶105 In October 1993, Willow Creek's vice president, Kevin 
Churchill, telephoned the La Crosse County Zoning and Land 
Information Office and asked whether Willow Creek could operate 
a game bird farm, with hunting activities, on its 115-acre 
property in the Town of Shelby.  An official at the La Crosse 
County Zoning Office told Churchill that La Crosse County would 
not object to a game bird operation and advised him to contact 
Jeffrey L. Brudos, chairman of the Town of Shelby, to see if the 
Town had any objections.  The official said that if the Town had 
no objections, Willow Creek could operate a game bird farm.  
Churchill and Mary McLoone, president of Willow Creek, then 
telephoned Brudos and asked him whether a zoning change was 
required to operate a game bird farm, including hunting.  Brudos 
told McLoone and Churchill that no zoning change was required. 
¶106 Relying on these assurances, Willow Creek began work 
to obtain a license for a game bird farm from the DNR and to 
develop its property for the farm.  Over the next 11 months, 
Willow Creek made building improvements, constructed pens, 
repaired wells, did electrical work, purchased birds, purchased 
and trained dogs, transferred land, conducted a survey, and paid 
accounting and legal fees to prepare for a September 1994 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
24
opening.  It also obtained the DNR license.32  Willow Creek 
expended more than $340,000 on payroll and operating expenses 
and on capital investments before it opened the game bird farm. 
 
¶107 On September 30, 1994, McLoone and Churchill met at 
the farm with Harlan Ruskell, retiring assessor for the Town of 
Shelby, and Drew Heiden, Ruskell's successor.  Ruskell and 
Heiden evaluated the improvements to the property for tax 
purposes.  After looking at the property, Heiden upgraded the 
classification of the land and "hiked the land value."33  A few 
days later, Willow Creek hosted an open house to show neighbors 
the new game bird farm. 
 
¶108 The Willow Creek officers were optimistic about their 
initial success.  In December 1994, Mary McLoone and Susan 
McLoone, another Willow Creek employee, contacted La Crosse 
County official Mike Weibel to discuss the possibility of 
building an office to handle the overflow of customers at Willow 
Creek Ranch.   
¶109 Between October 1993 and June 1995, Willow Creek 
officers had several communications with the County and Town.  
At no point during this time did local officials inform Willow 
                     
32 Paragraph 4 and n.4 of the majority opinion attempt to 
discredit Willow Creek by implying that Willow Creek was late in 
obtaining a DNR license to operate a game bird farm.  In my 
view, the record does not support an inference that Willow Creek 
was careless or delinquent in obtaining a state license.  
33 The record is not clear who initiated the September 30 
meeting.  A meeting initiated by the town assessor would imply 
knowledge on the part of the Town of developments at the 
property. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
25
Creek that it needed a zoning change to operate a game bird 
farm. 
 
¶110 On June 21, 1995, 20 months after the initial contact 
with the County and Town, a County official, Dan McDonald, 
called Mary McLoone to suggest that at some point Willow Creek 
should 
change 
its 
zoning 
from 
Exclusive 
Agricultural 
to 
Agricultural B.  McDonald told McLoone that the County had been 
aware of the game bird farm for some time, but the County had 
not done anything because Willow Creek officials had been in 
contact with the County Zoning Office.  McDonald said McLoone 
should speak again to Shelby Town Chairman Jeffrey Brudos.  When 
McLoone made the call, Brudos stated that he did not think it 
was necessary for Willow Creek to change its zoning because it 
was his impression that Willow Creek's zoning was appropriate 
for what it was doing.  Brudos said he would check into it and 
get back to McLoone. 
 
¶111 Brudos did not get back to McLoone.  In July and 
August, McLoone made seven telephone calls attempting to reach 
the Town Chairman.  On the seventh call, Brudos told her that a 
zoning change would be necessary.  McLoone promptly met with Dan 
McDonald, who told her that La Crosse County did not have a 
problem with rezoning the property. 
 
¶112 In October 1995, Willow Creek hired a surveyor to 
secure a legal description of the property and set up a buffer 
zone between the hunting area and the nearest neighbors.  It 
also invited members of the Town Board to visit the ranch.  No 
one came.  On November 6, 1995, Mary and Susan McLoone attended 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
26
a Town Board meeting to inquire about rezoning procedure.  
Chairman Brudos told the McLoones to contact La Crosse County, 
and he informed them it would not be necessary to attend another 
Town Board meeting. 
¶113 In November 1995, Willow Creek petitioned La Crosse 
County to rezone the property from Exclusive Agricultural to 
Agricultural B.  Members of the La Crosse County Zoning 
Committee visited the game bird farm.  The Zoning Committee then 
scheduled a meeting for December 4.  On that day, Mary McLoone 
attended a session of the Town Board.  Jeffrey Brudos informed 
her that she did not have to attend the meeting with the County 
Zoning Committee.  The Town Clerk, Ted Ernst, corrected Brudos 
and advised McLoone that she should attend the meeting.  She 
did, and no objectors appeared when Willow Creek's proposed 
zoning change was discussed.  Four days later, however, La 
Crosse County, through Mike Weibel, informed McLoone that Willow 
Creek would have to cease its business until the zoning issue 
was resolved. 
¶114 Brudos accused Willow Creek of attempting to pull a 
fast one by attending the December 4 meeting with the County 
Zoning Committee after he said it was not necessary.  In 
subsequent meetings, Brudos attempted to mislead Willow Creek 
and to stifle persons who wished to speak on Willow Creek's 
behalf. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
27
 
¶115 The months of January, February, and March 1996 saw 
considerable maneuvering and negotiation among the parties.34  
Eventually, on March 21, the La Crosse County Board voted to 
grant Willow Creek's petition for rezoning from Exclusive 
Agricultural to Agricultural B.  This zoning change was vetoed 
by the Town of Shelby.  Jeffrey Brudos voted to veto the zoning 
change, culminating several months of opposition to any zoning 
modification that would permit the game bird farm to operate. 
 
¶116 In its affidavits, Willow Creek asserted that Gary 
Wickus, a neighbor and opponent of the game bird farm, spoke at 
a meeting of the La Crosse County Zoning Committee on January 
29, 1996, and said that he had been calling La Crosse County 
since 1993 to complain about the proposed game farm, thereby 
confirming La Crosse County's longstanding knowledge of the 
Willow Creek project.  Willow Creek also alleged that at a 
meeting of the La Crosse County Board on February 15, 1996, Jeff 
Bluske, Director of the La Crosse County Zoning and Land 
Information Office, admitted that Willow Creek had informed La 
Crosse County about Willow Creek's intention to open a game 
farm.  Bluske explained that La Crosse County had given its 
approval because the County's definition of a game farm did not 
include hunting.  Bluske's sworn affidavit does not disavow 
these representations. 
                     
34 Willow Creek spent additional money for noise studies, 
safety studies, and experts.  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
28
 
¶117 In light of these allegations, the circuit court 
acknowledged that "there is a disputed fact as to whether 
officials of the County and Town governments told the plaintiff 
that it complied with current zoning law."  The court denied 
summary judgment on that issue.  Nonetheless, the court 
dismissed the suit, asserting that:  (1) erroneous acts of 
municipal officers do not afford a basis to estop a municipality 
from enforcing a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to the police 
power; and (2) Wis. Stat. § 893.80 "provides immunity to 
municipal governments for their 'discretionary' actions relating 
to all causes of action, including injunctive relief and 
estoppel claims."  As authority for the second proposition, the 
court cited Johnson and Waukesha.  Id. at 12.  The court 
candidly acknowledged that it was asked to delay its decision 
until the opinion in Johnson was ordered published, so that the 
case could be cited as precedent.  Id. at 3. 
 
¶118 When the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
it stated: 
 
Willow Creek . . . asserts that the Town and County 
are not immune under § 893.80(4), STATS., from claims 
for equitable relief.  We addressed the scope of 
§ 893.80(4), as it relates to equitable relief in 
Johnson v. City of Edgerton. . . . We concluded that 
the 
public 
policy 
considerations 
underlying 
§ 893.80(4) "apply just as earnestly to an equitable 
action seeking injunctive relief against the agency or 
the official as they do to one for the recovery of 
money." . . . [S]imilar 
to 
Johnson, 
this 
is 
a 
negligence claim in which the plaintiffs are seeking 
equitable relief.  Therefore, we are satisfied that we 
can apply the holding in Johnson to this case. . . .  
 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
29
In sum, because we have concluded that governmental 
immunity shields the Town and County from suits for 
equitable relief, we need not address the merits of 
Willow Creek's estoppel argument regarding Budros 
[sic] alleged misrepresentation. 
Willow Creek, 224 Wis. 2d at 283-85.35 
 
¶119 There can be no doubt that Johnson played a pivotal 
role in the decisions of both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  This court has held that a complaint fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted if the defendant is 
immune from liability for the activity alleged in the complaint. 
 C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 706-07, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988); 
Energy Complexes v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 463, 449 
N.W.2d 35 (1989).  The mistaken law in Johnson must have 
influenced judicial thinking. 
                     
35 In an insightful concurring opinion, Judge Vergeront 
expressed concern 
over the reach of our decision in Johnson v. City of 
Edgerton. . . .  Under Johnson, a citizen may not 
obtain injunctive relief against a municipality or a 
municipal official even if equitable estoppel would 
otherwise 
lie 
to 
prevent 
the 
municipality 
from 
enforcing an ordinance. . . . [T]here are situations 
in which it may be appropriate to enjoin on equitable 
grounds a municipality from enforcing an ordinance.  
See, e.g., Russell Dairy Stores v. City of Chippewa 
Falls, 272 Wis. 2d 138, 148, 74 N.W.2d 759, 765 
(1956). . . .  The case before us may not be one of 
those few cases where a municipality should be 
equitably estopped from enforcing an ordinance, but 
even if it were, under Johnson the municipality would 
be immune from suit seeking injunctive relief.  I 
question whether the legislature intended such a 
result. 
 
Willow Creek, 224 Wis. 2d at 286-87. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
30
IV 
 
¶120 The law on governmental immunity has become so muddled 
that it no longer provides reasonable guidance about when local 
governments may be sued, what remedies are available to persons 
claiming 
injury, 
and 
the 
circumstances 
in 
which 
local 
governments and their employees may be held liable.  At the 
center of this confusion is Johnson v. City of Edgerton.  Hence, 
as the first step to restore coherence to the law, the Johnson 
case 
should 
be 
overruled, 
and 
this 
court 
should 
assert 
unequivocally that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) applies only to tort 
suits for money damages. 
¶121 Recent 
interpretations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1) 
illuminate the problems ahead for § 893.80(4).  As noted above, 
§ 893.80(1), the notice of claim statute, has been held to apply 
to all causes of action, not just those in tort and not just 
those for money damages.  Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 191; City of 
Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Bd., 216 Wis. 2d 616, 622, 575 
N.W.2d 712 (1998).  In the Racine case, the court held that the 
notice requirement even applies to the filing of a counterclaim 
or cross-claim seeking a declaratory judgment.  Id. at 620.  
However, in Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 
597, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996), the court held unanimously that 
actions seeking to enforce Wisconsin's open meetings and open 
records laws are exempt from § 893.80(1).  Moreover, in Gillen 
v. City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998), the 
court sided with plaintiffs who sued three defendants, including 
the City of Neenah, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
31
The court held that the plaintiffs could bring a suit under Wis. 
Stat. § 30.294 to abate a nuisance, without first filing a 
notice of claim.  The court said: 
 
We conclude that there is an exception to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) 
where 
the 
plaintiffs' 
claims 
are 
brought pursuant to the public trust doctrine under 
Wis. Stat. § 30.294, which provides injunctive relief 
as a specific enforcement remedy.  It is irrelevant 
that the requested injunction in this case was not 
against the City of Neenah. 
Id. at 826.36 
 
¶122 In a concurring opinion in Gillen, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson 
asserted 
that 
"the 
rationale 
of 
the . . . opinion . . . directly contradicts the Waukesha case." 
 Id. at 836.  "Waukesha made clear that unless preliminary 
injunctive relief is requested, a notice of claim must be filed 
with the defendant city.  The Waukesha court held that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) applies to an action against a city for 
injunctive relief."  Id. at 838. 
 
¶123 The 
inconsistent 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1) is a reliable precursor of what lies ahead for 
§ 893.80(4) because the analysis of subsection (1) in Waukesha 
was applied by the Johnson court to subsection (4).  Looking 
forward, this court's literal reading of subsection (1) in 
Racine, making it apply to a counterclaim seeking a declaratory 
judgment, undermines the validity of Schmeling and raises 
                     
36 The court also pointed to Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 
(1988), which held that Wisconsin's notice of claim statute had 
to yield to the supremacy of actions authorized under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
32
questions about the application of subsection (4) when a party 
joins a prayer for injunctive relief with an action for 
declaratory judgment.  On the other hand, the Gillen case 
recognizes once again that litigants may seek injunctions 
against local governments.   
 
¶124 This court's ratification of Johnson in the present 
case is likely to open the floodgates of local government 
defenses.  In the future, every remedy that a litigant seeks to 
utilize in a suit against a local government may be challenged 
to test the reach of the Johnson decision.  By contrast, 
overruling Johnson would confine subsection (4) to its original 
objective and put Willow Creek's claims in a new light. 
V 
 
¶125 Overruling Johnson is only part of the work necessary 
to clarify the law of governmental immunity.  This court should 
reexamine the circumstances in which local governments and local 
officials may be liable in tort. 
 
¶126 Governmental immunity was abrogated in Holytz.  It was 
not 
restored 
in 
the 
1963 
legislation 
or 
in 
subsequent 
legislation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) proves this point.  
Subsection (3) limits the amount recoverable "for any damages, 
injuries or death in any action founded on tort" against local 
governments or their officers, agents or employes "for acts done 
in their official capacity or in the course of their agency or 
employment" 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
plain 
implication 
of 
subsection (3) is that local governments and local officials may 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
33
be sued in tort for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their employment or agency.37 
 
¶127 Subsection (4) takes away part of what is granted in 
subsection (3).  It provides that local governments may not be 
sued directly for the intentional torts of their officers, 
officials, agents, or employees, "nor may any suit be brought 
against [these potential defendants] for acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions." 
 
¶128 In summary, local governments may be sued for non-
intentional 
torts 
committed 
outside 
"the 
exercise 
of 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions," even if the acts amounting to torts are done in an 
official capacity.38  The breach of a ministerial duty resulting 
in damages is one of the torts for which local governments and 
local government officials may be sued. 
 
¶129 In tort cases, a line must separate actions taken in 
the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions and are immune from actions taken in an 
official capacity or in the course of government employment or 
                     
37 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(5) recognizes that rights or 
remedies for injury may also be provided in some other statute.  
38 This formulation, which attempts to follow statutory 
language, is different from the formulation in Lister v. Board 
of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), in which 
the court said:  "The general rule is that a public officer is 
not personally liable to one injured as a result of an act 
performed within the scope of his official authority and in the 
line of his official duty." 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
34
agency that are not immune.  How do we find and identify this 
line?  As early as 1867, this court stated:  "It is sometimes 
difficult to draw the exact line of distinction between 
ministerial and discretionary or judicial authority.  The same 
officer may act sometimes in one capacity, and sometimes in the 
other."  Druecker v. Saloman, 21 Wis. 628, 637 (1867). 
 
¶130 The majority opinion outlines four "exceptions" to 
government immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Majority op. 
at ¶26.  The word "exception" is curious with respect to 
"ministerial duties" because there is an assumption that 
discretionary actions of the sort immunized in § 893.80(4) and 
ministerial duties do not overlap.  Ministerial duties, which 
are essentially non-discretionary, fall logically on one side of 
the line; discretionary acts of a legislative or judicial 
character fall on the other. 
 
¶131 In contrast, actions that are "malicious, willful, and 
intentional" and actions or inactions concerning a "known 
danger" may fall on either side of the line.  As a result, these 
actions may truly be court-created "exceptions" to the immunity 
recognized 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
when 
they 
entail 
discretion. 
 
¶132 What is not clear is whether the four "exceptions" 
that have been created under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) to authorize 
money damages for torts are the only exceptions that will ever 
be recognized by Wisconsin courts and whether these exceptions 
should be treated the same when the relief sought does not 
involve money damages. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
35
MINISTERIAL DUTIES 
 
¶133 Assuming that ministerial duties are separate from 
discretionary functions, nothing in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
stands as an obstacle to a suit demanding relief for breach of a 
ministerial duty unless the breach is intentional.  A local 
government may have defenses against a suit for negligent breach 
of a ministerial duty, but these defenses are not found in 
subsection (4).  They must be grounded in some other source of 
law. 
 
¶134 In this case, Willow Creek contends that the Town of 
Shelby and La Crosse County represented to Willow Creek that 
Willow Creek had the proper zoning for a game bird farm and that 
Willow Creek relied on these representations to its detriment.  
The initial question is whether this alleged conduct by local 
officials breached a ministerial duty. 
¶135 The frequently cited test for ministerial duty is 
derived from Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300-
301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976): 
 
The most generally recognized exception to the rule of 
immunity is that an officer is liable for damages 
resulting from his negligent performance of a purely 
ministerial 
duty. 
 
A 
public 
officer's 
duty 
is 
ministerial only when it is absolute, certain and 
imperative, involving merely the performance of a 
specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and 
defines 
the 
time, 
mode 
and 
occasion 
for 
its 
performance with such certainty that nothing remains 
for judgment or discretion. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
36
 
¶136 The Lister language comes from Meyer v. Carman, 271 
Wis. 329, 332, 73 N.W.2d 514 (1955), in which the court quoted 
from 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), § 53.33: 
 
Official 
action . . . is 
ministerial 
when 
it 
is 
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely 
the execution of a set task, and when the law which 
imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that 
nothing remains for judgment or discretion. 
It must be noted that McQuillin's commentary has been updated.  
The revised third edition drops § 53.33 and comments in new 
§ 53.04.10 that: 
 
Stating the reasons for the discretionary-ministerial 
distinction 
is 
much 
easier 
than 
stating 
the 
rule. . . . [T]he difference between "discretionary" 
and "ministerial" is artificial.  An act is said to be 
discretionary when the officer must exercise some 
judgment in determining whether and how to perform an 
act.  The problem is that "[i]t would be difficult to 
conceive of any official act, no matter how directly 
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in 
the manner of its performance, even if it involved 
only the driving of a nail."  (quoted source omitted) 
 
¶137 The court last dealt with ministerial duty in Kierstyn 
v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 N.W.2d 417 
(1999).  The case involved a "benefits specialist" for the 
Racine School District who allegedly gave John and Judith 
Kierstyn incorrect information about state disability benefits 
for Mrs. Kierstyn, costing Mr. Kierstyn hundreds of dollars per 
month in survivor benefits.  This court upheld the circuit 
court's summary judgment against the plaintiff on grounds of 
public officer immunity. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
37
 
¶138 The court noted that the benefits specialist provided 
general information about employment benefits, including union 
benefits.  "He was not, however, an agent of the [Wisconsin 
Retirement System] and could not authoritatively represent to 
District employees what WRS benefits they were entitled to 
receive."  Id. at 85. 
 
¶139 Discussing ministerial duty, the court quoted the test 
from Lister, then concluded that the benefits specialist "was 
under no duty that was 'absolute, certain and imperative' which 
'impose[d], prescribe[d] and define[d] the time, mode and 
occasion for its performance.'"  Id. at 91.  It said that 
Kierstyn had pointed to no statutory obligation to advise school 
district employees of their state disability benefits.  Id. 
 
¶140 Kierstyn argued that the disability benefits statute 
was unambiguous.  The court replied: 
 
We 
cannot 
accept 
Kierstyn's 
argument 
that 
an 
unambiguous statute creates a ministerial duty.  As 
noted above, a public officer's duty must arise from 
some obligation created by law.  The District was 
under 
no 
legal 
obligation 
to 
hire 
a 
benefits 
specialist. 
 
In 
like 
fashion, 
[the 
benefits 
specialist] was under no legal obligation to offer 
advice 
about 
WRS 
benefits 
to 
employees 
of 
the 
District. 
Id. at 92. 
 
¶141 Kierstyn also argued that even if the benefits 
specialist were under no ministerial duty to provide the 
disability information, his choosing to do so created a 
ministerial duty to provide correct information.  Id. at 92-93. 
 The court acknowledged several cases that held that once public 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
38
officers choose in their discretion to act, they are bound by a 
ministerial duty to act in a certain manner.  The court 
thereafter distinguished these cases from the Kierstyn facts. 
 
¶142 The 
present 
case 
is 
different 
from 
Kierstyn.  
Accepting Willow Creek's allegations of fact as true, Willow 
Creek 
telephoned 
the 
La 
Crosse 
County 
Zoning 
and 
Land 
Information Office to ask specifically whether it could operate 
a game bird farm in the Town of Shelby.  The Zoning Office is 
the most authoritative source of information about zoning in La 
Crosse County.  There is no higher authority.  The office exists 
to administer the county zoning ordinance on a daily basis.  It 
has a duty to answer questions about and make determinations 
under the zoning ordinance.  It does much more than offer 
advice.  The office gave its approval to Willow Creek to operate 
a game bird farm. 
 
¶143 The 
zoning 
ordinance 
was 
either 
ambiguous 
or 
unambiguous.  If we assume the zoning ordinance was clear and 
unambiguous and that it did not permit a game bird farm to 
operate on land zoned Exclusive Agricultural, zoning officials 
had a ministerial duty to inform Willow Creek that it could not 
operate a game bird farm on its property without first obtaining 
a zoning change.  Instead, the authoritative interpreters of the 
ordinance gave their approval for the game bird farm and watched 
the farm develop and operate, knowing that Willow Creek was 
relying on their representation of approval.  Twenty months 
later they decided to enforce the ordinance. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
39
 
¶144 If we assume the zoning ordinance was ambiguous, 
County officials should not have answered Willow Creek's zoning 
inquiries as they did.  They could have asked that Willow Creek 
put its question in writing.  They could have asked for more 
information or more time.  They could have raised doubts and 
denied approval, or raised doubts and suggested a zoning change. 
 Instead, they gave approval.  When these County officials later 
learned of opposition to the farm, as confirmed by Gary Wickus, 
they could have taken a second look at the zoning issue and 
warned Willow Creek of a potential problem.  Instead, they did 
nothing.  For months and months, they did not take any steps to 
address the issue.  Twenty months after being consulted, nine 
months after the game bird farm had opened, and six months after 
Willow Creek had come to the County again to discuss building an 
office, the zoning officials suggested that Willow Creek seek a 
zoning change.  Although County zoning officials at first 
offered encouragement, they ultimately opposed the change. 
 
¶145 One might argue that La Crosse County zoning officials 
had the discretion in 1993 to interpret the ordinance any way 
they wanted.  Once they made their decision, however, the 
officials were not free to reverse their position and attempt to 
enforce an ordinance they had earlier informed Willow Creek was 
not a problem, particularly after waiting so long.  The real 
world cannot function if citizens are not able to rely on the 
individualized decisions of authoritative government officials. 
 If 
authoritative 
government 
officials 
are 
free 
to 
make 
decisions upon which individuals are expected to rely and then 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
40
are permitted to disregard those individualized decisions, at 
any 
time, 
without 
consequence 
to 
themselves 
or 
their 
governments, there will be no confidence in our governmental 
institutions and no stability in our economy or the law. 
 
¶146 Jeffrey Brudos was the elected chairman of the Town of 
Shelby.  He was the person to whom the County referred Willow 
Creek for reaction.  Told of Willow Creek's plans, Brudos 
presented no objections and said a zoning change was not 
necessary. 
 
Many 
months 
later 
he 
repeated 
that 
view.  
Subsequently, Brudos altered his position and worked to prevent 
any 
zoning 
change, 
including 
the 
adoption 
of 
reasonable 
conditions that would allow Willow Creek to operate. 
 
¶147 Town of Shelby officials reassessed the Willow Creek 
property so that additional taxes could be collected, based upon 
improvements implicitly approved by Shelby's town chairman.  The 
record does not reveal any building permits, but given the 
extent of construction, well repair, and electrical work, the 
town 
may 
have 
issued 
building 
permits 
to 
authorize 
the 
improvements it later assessed and taxed. 
 
¶148 Chairman Brudos had the ability to deliver what he had 
promised.  He not only failed to deliver but also failed to 
mitigate the harsh effect of his change in position.  He waged a 
campaign to obstruct the zoning change he once asserted was not 
necessary.  It would be difficult to argue that Brudos was not 
acting in an official capacity when he informed Willow Creek 
that a zoning change was not needed.  But if he were acting 
outside his official capacity, he would not enjoy governmental 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
41
immunity.  The circuit court did not decide whether Chairman 
Brudos was acting in his official capacity when he spoke to 
Willow Creek. 
 
¶149 In my view, Willow Creek's allegations state a claim 
that County zoning officials and the Shelby Town Chairman 
breached ministerial duties.  A breach of ministerial duty is 
not immune from suit under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Because 
Willow Creek presented a valid claim in tort, its suit should 
not have been dismissed. 
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶150 There are several theories of municipal liability.  
McQuillin's The Law of Municipal Corporations (3rd ed. 1993), 
§ 53.04.25, discusses the "public duty rule and the special 
relationship exception."  McQuillin states: 
 
The 
public 
duty 
rule 
provides 
that 
where 
a 
municipality has a duty to the general public, as 
opposed to a particular individual, breach of that 
duty does not result in tort liability.  The rule 
protects municipalities from liability for failure to 
adequately enforce general laws and regulations, which 
were intended to benefit the community as a whole 
(emphasis added). 
¶151 This court rejected the "public duty rule" in Coffey 
v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 536-37, 247 N.W.2d 132 
(1976), because it was too narrow.  The court explained that 
when Holytz abrogated the immunity for local government torts, 
it effected a broad abrogation, not a narrow abrogation that 
applied only to persons with whom the local government was in 
privity. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
42
¶152 Nonetheless, McQuillin's description of the special 
relationship exception to the public duty rule is useful because 
it is eerily descriptive of the factors at play in this case.  
McQuillin states: 
 
The public duty rule does not protect a municipality 
where there was a "special relationship" between a 
public official and a particular individual that gave 
rise to a duty to that individual separate from the 
official's duty to the general public. . . . Special 
duties can be grounded in reliance, dependence, or the 
creation by the public entity of a known risk.  Courts 
have identified a variety of criteria which help 
identify a special relationship.  These criteria 
include 
the 
following: 
 
direct 
contact 
between 
municipal agents and the plaintiff; an assumption by 
the municipality, through promises or actions, of an 
affirmative duty to act on the plaintiff's behalf; 
knowledge by the municipal agent that inaction could 
lead to harm; the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on 
the municipal agent, occurrence of the injury while 
the plaintiff is under the direct control of municipal 
agents, municipal action that increases the risk of 
harm, and the existence of a statute that imposes a 
duty to a narrow class of individuals rather than to 
the public at large. 
Id. at 166. 
¶153 In this case, there was a "special relationship" 
between Willow Creek and both the County zoning officials and 
the Shelby Town Chairman. 
 
Willow 
Creek 
went 
to 
these 
authorities to ask a specific question related to their core 
duties.  They gave Willow Creek an answer.  They knew that 
Willow Creek would rely on their representations and that 
reliance could lead to economic harm if their representations 
were wrong.  Willow Creek's officers assert unequivocally that 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
43
they would not have made the investment they did if they had not 
had official approval.   
 
¶154 This court should adopt a "special relationship" rule 
for situations in which government actions or inactions do not 
constitute ministerial duties per se but the development of a 
"special relationship" has created a duty to perform in a 
specific manner. 
ESTOPPEL 
 
¶155 Willow Creek also had a claim in equitable estoppel. 
¶156 Justice Bablitch dissented in the Kierstyn case, 228 
Wis. 2d at 100-105, asserting that "if a public officer or 
employee chooses, in his or her discretion, to undertake a task, 
he or she may have a ministerial duty to carry out that task in 
accord with given rules or statutes."  Id. at 101.  He cited 
Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 100-01, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973) 
(relying on Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis. 2d 352, 130 N.W.2d 835 
(1964)). 
 
¶157 In Firkus, an injured driver sued a municipality for 
failing to restore a stop sign at an intersection after the 
municipality learned that the sign had been removed by vandals. 
 The circuit court ruled that the town "was charged with the 
duty of maintaining the stop signs so as to avoid a trap for 
motorists."  25 Wis. 2d at 358.  This court upheld the circuit 
court, observing that: 
 
The town had no affirmative duty to erect the sign in 
the first instance, but having done so it was 
incumbent upon it to properly maintain the sign as a 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
44
safety precaution to the traveling public which has a 
right to rely on its presence. . . .  
 
The potentiality of a dangerous situation is greatly 
increased by the failure to maintain warnings upon 
which the public has come to rely.  It is the creation 
of the right of reliance and its protection which is 
the basis of the duty.  This is not unlike the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in the field of 
contracts (emphasis added). 
Id. at 358-59. 
 
¶158 The majority concedes that municipalities are not 
wholly immune from the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  Majority 
op. at ¶49, citing City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 27 
Wis. 2d 53, 66, 133 N.W.2d 393 (1965).39  Yet, the circuit court 
here ruled otherwise, saying that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
"provides 
immunity 
to 
municipal 
governments 
for 
their 
'discretionary' actions relating to all causes of action, 
                     
39 In City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 27 Wis. 2d 53, 
66, 133 N.W.2d 393 (1965), the court said:  "In Wisconsin a 
municipal body is not immune from the application of the 
doctrine of estoppel and it makes no difference whether the 
activities are governmental . . . or proprietary."  The court 
relied on Lang v. Cumberland, 18 Wis. 2d 157, 118 N.W.2d 114 
(1962); Park Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 78, 100 
N.W.2d 571 (1960); Milwaukee County v. Badger Chair & Furniture 
Co., 223 Wis. 118, 269 N.W. 659 (1936); Eau Claire Dells 
Improvement Co. v. Eau Claire, 172 Wis. 240, 179 N.W.2 (1920); 
St. Croix County v. Webster, 111 Wis. 270, 87 N.W. 302 (1911).  
See also Fritsch v. St. Croix Cent. Sch. Dist. 183 Wis. 2d 336, 
515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. City of Green Bay, 96 
Wis. 2d 195, 200-202, 291 N.W.2d 508 (1980); Village of 
McFarland v. Town of Dunn, 82 Wis. 2d 469, 263 N.W.2d 167 
(1978); Granis v. Melrose-Mindoro Jt. Sch .Dist., 78 Wis. 2d 
569, 254 N.W.2d 730 (1977); Harte v. Eagle River, 45 Wis. 2d 
513, 173 N.W.2d 683 (1970); Galewski v. Noe, 266 Wis. 7, 62 
N.W.2d 703 (1954); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Department of 
Taxation, 260 Wis. 551, 51 N.W.2d 796 (1952); Marathon County v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 225 Wis. 514, 272 N.W. 437 (1937). 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
45
including . . . estoppel claims."40  The circuit court cited 
Johnson and Waukesha as authority.  The court of appeals never 
addressed the estoppel issue.41   
¶159 This court cannot now assert that local governments 
are not wholly immune from estoppel claims without repudiating 
or at least explaining the Johnson case.  The majority skips 
over this inconsistency, stating that it is well established 
that "erroneous acts or representations of municipal officers do 
not afford a basis to estop a municipality from enforcing zoning 
ordinances enacted pursuant to the police power."  Majority op. 
at ¶49. 
 
¶160 This statement has a history.  In 1963, Justice George 
Currie wrote a concurring opinion in Schober v. Milwaukee, 18 
Wis. 2d 591, 598, 119 N.W.2d 316 (1963), in which he stated:  "A 
municipality should not be precluded by the acts of any 
municipal officers from enforcing any ordinance enacted pursuant 
to the police power for the promotion of the general welfare."  
During the next term, Currie became the chief justice.  In 
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc., 22 Wis. 2d 240, 253, 125 
N.W.2d 625 (1964), he wrote that, "Estoppel will not lie against 
a municipality so as to bar it from enforcing an ordinance 
enacted pursuant to the police power," citing his concurring 
                     
40 This is directly contrary to Fritsch v. St. Croix Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 183 Wis. 2d 336, 344, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 
1994).  
41 Willow Creek v. Town of Shelby, 224 Wis. 2d at 285. 
97-2075.dtp 
 
 
46
opinion in Schober.  Two years later in Milwaukee v. Leavitt, 31 
Wis. 2d 72, 76-77, 142 N.W.2d 169 (1966), he reiterated that: 
 
While municipal and other government units are not 
wholly immune from application of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel, this court is firmly committed to 
the principle that "estoppel will not lie against a 
municipality so as to bar it from enforcing an 
ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power." 
The principal authorities cited were Justice Currie's opinion in 
Milwaukee Amusement and his concurrence in Schober. 
 
¶161 In Town of Richmond v. Murdock, 70 Wis. 2d 642, 653-
54, 235 N.W.2d 497 (1975), the Currie language was quoted again 
in the text and in a footnote.  But this citation came almost as 
an afterthought.  The case involved the operation of a 
commercial enterprise known as Kentwood Farm on land zoned 
agricultural.  The commercial enterprise was developed after a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance had been enacted.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued an injunction to 
stop the operation.  It rejected an estoppel claim by the 
defendant that the defendant had been told by the town board 
that "nothing in the ordinance" prohibited the planned use of 
the land.  The circuit court noted that there was nothing in the 
town board minutes to support the defendant's contention.  The 
court specifically found that the evidence did not support the 
contention that such a statement was made by the town board.  
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47
The defendant did not prove the facts necessary for estoppel.  
The circuit court decided the estoppel issue on the merits.42 
 
¶162 In Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Board, 74 Wis. 2d 
468, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976), this court was asked to approve a use 
variance for a porch after the variance had been denied by the 
Waukesha County Zoning Board and the circuit court.  Among his 
arguments, Snyder contended that he obtained a building permit 
for an addition to his house.  A year later he decided to 
include a porch, which was not authorized by the permit.  A 
building inspector told him to go ahead with construction and 
the inspector would take care of getting the permit.  In a later 
discussion, the inspector had "an honest misunderstanding" as to 
how close the porch would be to the lot line, and so he again 
gave Snyder and his builder approval to go ahead.  Snyder 
contended that he met the criteria for a variance because he did 
not himself create the hardship that prompted him to seek 
relief.  He argued that the building inspector had created the 
hardship.  The court replied that, "To allow this contention 
would constitute estoppel of the municipality from enforcing its 
zoning ordinance."  Id. at 476. 
 
The rule of law in this state is clear that no such 
estoppel may arise against a municipality for the 
unauthorized acts of its officers.  Town of Richmond 
v. Murdock . . .  Milwaukee v. Leavitt. . . .   Even 
if the inspector issued a building permit, such a 
                     
42 The facts of the case show that Shawano County made 
extensive efforts to permit Kentwood Farm to operate with a 
conditional use permit.  The circuit court found that Murdock 
violated the conditions.  
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48
permit would have been void as issued for the 
structure 
which 
is 
forbidden 
by 
the 
ordinance. . . . [T]he mere statements or assurances 
of the building inspector cannot confer such a right. 
 The appellant is charged with knowledge of the zoning 
ordinance. 
Id. at 476-77.  Significantly, the court inserted the phrase 
"unauthorized acts" of its officers into its test.  It also 
stated that Snyder was charged with knowledge of the zoning 
ordinance.   
¶163 Here, the La Crosse County zoning officials were fully 
authorized to interpret the zoning ordinance.  They made 
statements to Willow Creek, but they also must have had internal 
discussions as they learned of opposition to the game bird farm 
and as time passed.  Still, they did nothing.  Willow Creek 
cannot be expected to have had more knowledge of the ordinance 
than the experts who administered the ordinance. 
¶164 Both the zoning officials and the town chairman may 
testify that they never said or did what is alleged, or that 
they had an honest misunderstanding of what Willow Creek had in 
mind.  But that possibility is of no consequence on a motion for 
summary judgment where Willow Creek alleged that these officials 
understood what they were doing.43 
¶165 In my view, if Willow Creek is able to prove its 
allegations, it should be able to estop the County from 
                     
43 Apparently the majority court does not consider full 
knowledge of the Willow Creek situation by local officials as a 
relevant factor in estoppel.  
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49
enforcing the zoning ordinance.  See Russell Dairy Stores v. 
Chippewa Falls, 272 Wis. 138, 74 N.W.2d 759 (1956).44 
¶166 An estoppel is a rule of substantive law that 
precludes a party from taking a particular legal position 
because of some impediment or bar recognized by the law.45  One 
example is equitable estoppel.  Equitable estoppel requires 
action or nonaction by one party that induces reliance by 
another party to the other party's detriment.46  The reliance may 
                     
44 The majority attempts to distinguish Russell Dairy Stores 
v. Chippewa Falls, 272 Wis. 138, 74 N.W.2d 759 (1956), from the 
present case.  First, the majority argues that the 1952 case was 
decided "prior to the formulation of the present immunity 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The concept of immunity as a 
defense was not implicated in the case."  Majority op. at ¶54.  
The bulk of this dissent is devoted to rebutting the premise of 
this argument.  Second, the majority argues that Russell Dairy 
Stores is grounded on the distinction between the erroneous acts 
of the municipality and the erroneous acts of the municipality's 
subordinate 
officers. 
 
Majority 
op. 
at 
¶¶55-56. 
 
This 
distinction is unpersuasive in the present case.  The local 
officials here were the officials operating the zoning office 
and the Town Chairman acting in his official capacity.  Finally, 
the majority argues that the permit in Russell Dairy Stores did 
not violate any law but in Willow Creek's case, "there is an 
asserted violation of the County zoning ordinance."  Majority 
op. at ¶57.  To date, Willow Creek has not been found in 
violation of the County zoning ordinance. 
45 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 105, 733 (5th ed. 1984).  
46 Kohlenberg v. American Plumbing Supply Co., 82 Wis. 2d 
384, 396, 263 N.W.2d 496 (1978); Chicago & Northwestern Transp. 
Co. v. Thoreson Food Products, Inc., 71 Wis. 2d 143, 153, 238 
N.W.2d 69 (1976). 
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50
play out in action or nonaction,47 and the reliance must be 
reasonable48 and justifiable.49 
¶167 Equitable estoppel is not as readily available against 
a governmental unit as it is against a private party.50  It is, 
though, available as a defense against the government "if the 
government's conduct would work a serious injustice and if the 
public's interest would not be unduly harmed by the imposition 
of estoppel."51  Hence, to secure equitable estoppel against the 
government, a person must show, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that three facts are present:  (1) action or nonaction 
which has induced, (2) reliance by a person, and (3) to the 
person's detriment.  Thereafter, the person must persuade the 
court to determine that the injustice that might be caused if 
the estoppel is not applied outweighs the public interests at 
stake if the estoppel is applied. 
 
¶168 This discussion is academic if Willow Creek and others 
similarly situated may never bring a suit for equitable estoppel 
against a local government under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), as the 
                     
47 Kohlenberg, 82 Wis. 2d at 396.  
48 Chicago & Northwestern, 71 Wis. 2d at 154.  
49 Matter of Alexander's Estate, 75 Wis. 2d 168, 183-84, 248 
N.W.2d 475 (1977).  
50 Beane v. City of Sturgeon Bay, 112 Wis. 2d 609, 620, 334 
N.W.2d 235 (1983); Ryan v. Department of Revenue, 68 Wis. 2d 
467, 470, 228 N.W.2d 357 (1975). 
51 Beane, 112 Wis. 2d at 620 (citing Department of Revenue 
v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610, 638, 279 N.W.2d 213 
(1979)).  
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51
circuit court determined.  Because the circuit court decision 
was wrong, there must be fact finding so that the circuit court 
can attempt to strike the balance described in Department of 
Revenue v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610, 638, 279 N.W.2d 
213 (1979).  That would require a remand in this case. 
¶169 In a future hearing, Willow Creek might try to estop a 
forfeiture action, using estoppel almost like an entrapment 
defense, or it might try to estop a county injunction on 
equitable grounds.  See Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 
579 N.W.2d 715 (1998).  Willow Creek might also attempt to estop 
the local government from claiming statutory defenses in a 
traditional tort suit for damages. 
¶170 This dissent does not seek to determine the ultimate 
outcome of this dispute.  Local officials may win their case on 
the facts. 
¶171 What local officials may not do is engage in a lengthy 
course of conduct that induces reasonable reliance and causes 
great detriment, and then expect to wash their hands and walk 
away without consequence.  Because the majority believes 
otherwise, I dissent. 
 
¶172 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and JUSTICE N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissenting 
opinion. 
 
 
 
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