Title: Day v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

431 So. 2d 1254 (1983)
John P. DAY
v.
MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE.
82-277.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 20, 1983.
*1255 Stephen R. Windom and M. Donald Davis, Jr., of McDermott, Slepian, Windom & Reed, Mobile, for appellant.
Richard G. Alexander and Michael B. Smith, of Alexander & Knizley, Mobile, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
The issues here are: whether the circuit court erred in granting plaintiff-bank's motion for summary judgment and whether the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney's fees to bank's counsel and denying defendant's motion to produce. We affirm.
The Merchants' National Bank, appellee, filed a complaint against John P. Day, appellant, for his failure to pay two promissory notes executed by him. The bank's first claim stated that on December 29, 1980, Day executed and delivered to the bank a promissory note wherein Day agreed to repay the principal sum of $23,000 plus interest at 16 ½ per annum. A provision included in the terms of the promissory note entitled the bank to recover "reasonable" attorney fees "not to exceed 15% of the unpaid debt of the original principal amount" in the event of default. In its second claim, the bank stated that on March 16, 1981, Day executed and delivered to the bank a promissory note wherein Day agreed to repay the principal sum of $13,500, plus interest at the rate of 16 ½ per annum. The second promissory note included the same cost of collection provision as the first note.
In its claim, the bank demanded judgment against Day in the amount of $30,850.14, which included the principal sum of $23,000, $3,826.21 in accrued interest and an attorney's fee of $4,023.93. Post judgment interest and costs were demanded as well. In its second claim, the bank demanded a judgment against Day in the amount of $17,693.59, which included the principal sum of $13,500, $1,885.73 in accrued interest, and an attorney's fee of $2,307.86. Post judgment interest and costs were also demanded in the second cause of action.
On April 20, 1982, Day answered the complaint with a general denial, and on May 6, 1982, the bank filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor on both claims, and attached to its motion the two promissory notes executed by Day and an affidavit by Paul J. Fleming, an assistant vice-president of the bank, wherein Fleming indicated that as of May 3, 1982, Day owed the bank a total sum of $42,212.04 as principal and accrued interest and that Day had made no payments on the indebtedness.
The case came up for hearing on the bank's motion for summary judgment on October 29, 1982. Counsel for Day filed in open court a motion to produce any and all notes, contracts, security agreements, ledger cards, records of payments and other documents in the bank's possession relating to loans made by the bank to Day or relating to the accounts on which he was a signatory. Day's counsel also presented a counter-affidavit in which Day stated:
The bank's counsel presented a second affidavit by Paul Fleming in which Fleming indicated that the accrued interest and principal as of October 15, 1982, amount to $46,401.02.
The trial judge denied Day's motion to produce, and granted the bank's motion for summary judgment and rendered a judgment in the bank's favor in the sum of $53,361.04, plus court costs. This appeal followed.
In his brief, Day makes the following assertions:
The standards applied by this Court when reviewing summary judgment motions are fully stated in Butler v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co., 402 So. 2d 949 (Ala.1981):
402 So. 2d  at 951.
Day's counter-affidavit, even when measured against the "scintilla rule," fails to present a genuine issue of material fact; therefore, the bank was entitled to prevail on the motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), ARCP.
Under Rule 56(e), ARCP, an opposing affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, and must set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated. The rule is stated in Butler:
402 So. 2d  at 952. Day never stated explicitly in his counter-affidavit that he did not owe the money as claimed by the bank, and as supported by its affidavits. Consequently, since Day's affidavit was made on mere belief, and was not based on personal knowledge, it is inadequate for purposes of Rule 56(e), ARCP; therefore, the trial judge properly granted the bank's motion for summary judgment. Sexton v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 405 So. 2d 18, 20 (Ala.1981).
Day also asserts that the attorney's fees awarded the bank were unsupported by any evidence and were unreasonable. The bank claimed an attorney's fee in the amount of $4,023.93 in its first claim on the $23,000 note and an attorney's fee of $2,307.86 in its second claim on the $13,500 note. Both notes contained the following provision:
We have examined the record and in view of the above provision, we do not find the attorney's fee awarded the bank by the court to be unreasonable.
With regard to the appellant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to produce, the Court has opined:
Campbell v. Regal Typewriter Co. Inc., 341 So. 2d 120, 123-124 (Ala.1976); Assured Investors Life Insurance Co. v. National Union Associates, Inc., 362 So. 2d 228, 231 (Ala. 1978).
The bank contends that Day's motion to produce was a dilatory tactic designed to delay the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. In support of its claim, the bank says that Day's motion to produce was filed some five months after the bank initially filed its motion for summary judgment. The bank likewise asserts, and its assertion is unchallenged, that:
*1258 In view of Day's five-month delay in filing his motion to produce and his failure to comply with Rule 4 of the local rules of the thirteenth judicial circuit, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to produce. Accordingly, the judgment below is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.