Title: Valenta v. Life Insurance Company of North America

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

196 N.W.2d 393 (1972) Marie C. VALENTA, also known as Mrs. Francis Valenta, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. No. 8793. Supreme Court of North Dakota. March 29, 1972. Rehearing Denied May 1, 1972. *394 Wattam, Vogel, Vogel & Peterson, Fargo, for defendant and appellant. Conmy, Feste, DeMars & Bossart, Fargo, for plaintiff and respondent. TEIGEN, Judge. The defendant (hereinafter insurance company) has appealed from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the failure of the jury to agree on a verdict. This is an action brought by the widow, designated and named as the beneficiary of an accident insurance policy insuring F. C. Valenta against accidental bodily injury and death. The issues were tried *395 and submitted to a jury. At the close of all the testimony the insurance company moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove that Mr. Valenta's death resulted from accidental injury, directly and independently of all other causes, and that the evidence established that Mr. Valenta was afflicted with a disease at the time of his death and that this disease caused his death. Counsel for the plaintiff resisted this motion and it was denied. The case was submitted to the jury; however, the jury was unable to agree on a verdict and was discharged. The insurance company thereupon moved for judgment notwithstanding the disagreement of the jury, under Rule 50(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, in accordance with its motion for directed verdict. The motion was denied by the trial court and the insurance company has appealed. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the failure of the jury to agree on a verdict calls for a review of the grounds assigned in support of the motion for a directed verdict. Hanson v. Fledderman, 111 N.W.2d 401 (N.D.1961); Leach v. Kelsch, 106 N.W.2d 358 (N.D.1960). The only question for us to review is whether the motion for directed verdict should have been granted had the court not been prohibited from granting the same under Rule 50(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. The scope of review from the court's order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the disagreement of the jury is the same as if the motion were one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the motion should not be granted unless the moving party is entitled to judgment on the merits as a matter of law. Bartholomay v. St. Thomas Lumber Company, 148 N.W.2d 278 (N.D.1966); Leach v. Kelsch, supra; Olson v. Cass County Electric Co-operative, Inc., 94 N.W.2d 506 (N.D.1959). A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict admits the truth of the evidence against the movant and the inferences and conclusions which may reasonably be deduced from such evidence which are favorable to the party opposing the motion. Linington v. McLean County (two cases), 146 N.W.2d 45 (N.D.1966), and 161 N.W.2d 487 (N.D.1968); Lindenberg v. Folson, 138 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1965); Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145 (N.D.1965). The motion does not go to the weight of the evidence and the motion should not be granted unless the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. Frelich, 165 N.W.2d 343 (N.D.1969); Pocta v. Kleppe Corporation, 154 N.W.2d 177 (N.D.1967). It is undisputed that Mr. Valenta, at the time of his death, was an insured under an accident and disability insurance policy which his employer, Schultz and Lindsay Construction Company, purchased from the defendant insurance company. The policy covered certain losses resulting from accidental bodily injuries: Part II of this policy, entitled "EXCLUSIONS", provides, in part: The insured Valenta died July 24, 1969, while the policy was in effect. The insurance *396 company refused to pay the plaintiff, as beneficiary under the policy. It specifically denied that Valenta's death resulted "directly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injuries" and claimed that his death was caused by a disease, or that the disease contributed to his death. It appears that Mr. Valenta, who was 51 years of age, on the evening of July 14, 1969, was helping his son carry a water-soaked rug from the basement of the Valenta home which had become flooded with about four inches of water. As they started for the stairway, Mr. Valenta slipped and fell, striking his left side on the concrete basement floor. He complained of severe pain and, after several hours, was taken to the emergency room of the hospital where X rays were taken. The X rays revealed a recent fracture of his left eighth and ninth ribs. He was treated for broken ribs and sent home. The pain continued and, in the early morning hours of July 16, Mrs. Valenta called a doctor. Mr. Valenta was then taken by ambulance to the hospital where he was place in an oxygen tent. He apparently had a great deal of distress from pain in his left chest and had difficulty in breathing. A trache-ostomy was performed, which seemed to improve his breathing. However, during the evening of July 16, he suffered a cardiac arrest. His heart was resuscitated. During the night of July 18 he had three additional cardiac arrests but each time his heart was resuscitated by external cardiac massage. He expired at 11:05 a. m. on July 24, 1969, approximately ten days after his fall. After being hospitalized Mr. Valenta was attended by Dr. Barth. Following Mr. Valenta's death, Dr. Barth requested an autopsy. The autopsy was performed by Dr. Lunseth with Dr. Barth present throughout. Dr. Barth completed the death certificate. He noted on the certificate that the immediate cause of death was an acute myocardial infarction with cardiac arrest, with the onset approximately two weeks prior to death. He listed pneumonia and rib fractures as conditions which gave rise to the immediate cause of death. He also listed arteriosclerotic heart disease as a significant condition contributing to death. There was considerable medical testimony introduced by both parties. The medical history of the insured Valenta indicated that when he was eighteen years of age he contracted rheumatic fever. It caused endocarditis, which is explained as being an inflammation of the lining of the heart, which left Mr. Valenta with a heart murmur. He was classified as 4-F during World War II. In 1962, when Mr. Valenta was forty-four years of age, he consulted with doctors at a medical clinic. He complained of a numbness over the back of his right hand and, when under pressure, felt heart palpitations. X rays taken at that time disclosed a straightening of the left heart border and the possibility that he was suffering from some chronic inflammatory disease. His cholesterol count was 338 as compared to the normal range of 140 to 200. The electrocardiogram was abnormal with the cardiologist noting that the readings suggested he had ischemia, which meant that the heart muscle was receiving an inadequate blood supply. He was placed on a cholesterol-lowering diet, advised to drink no alcohol, and was prescribed medication in the form of a vitamin. It appears that on the basis of this history and the results of the autopsy there was considerable medical testimony introduced to the effect that Mr. Valenta's pre-existing heart disease was a significant contributing cause and factor of his death, and opinions were expressed that the pre-existing heart disease was the cause of death or an important factor in contributing to his death. However, his attending physician during his last illness, who also assisted in the autopsy after death and who completed and signed the death certificate, testified, in part, as follows: The witness testified that he had an opinion as to the cause of death and was asked to state that opinion: In explanation of the entries contained on the death certificate, he gave the following testimony: Another doctor, called on behalf of the plaintiff, testified in response to a hypothetical question that he had an opinion as to the cause of death of the insured, Mr. Valenta, as follows: Two doctors also testified for the defense. Their testimony did not completely agree with the two doctors who testified on behalf of the plaintiff. It may fairly be said that their testimony, in some respects, is in conflict, although a great portion of it is in harmony. Dr. Story testified for the defense as follows: The doctor who performed the autopsy following Mr. Valenta's death testified, in part, as follows: He also testified in explanation of his autopsy findings and concluded that, in his opinion, Mr. Valenta died because his heart had been severely weakened by chronic coronary artery disease in which all three main arteries of his heart were constricted with atherosclerosis, one of which became blocked, causing a massive and fatal myocardial infarction. The trial court, in a well-reasoned, thorough memorandum opinion in which it reviewed the salient evidence, concluded: The insurance policy in question insured the life of Mr. Valenta in the event his death should result "directly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injuries" and excluded from coverage death "caused by or resulting from * * * illness, disease * * *" Similar language has heretofore been considered by this court in Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Assn., in two cases, one reported in 69 N.D. 632, 289 N.W. 591 (1940) and the other in 70 N.D. 566, 582, 296 N.W. 545, 555 (1941). The court said, in the latter case: We applied this doctrine in the interpretation of similar language in Grabau v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 149 N.W.2d 361 (N.D.1967), and we subscribe to it in this case. It is our conclusion that the evidence introduced in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff who resisted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the disagreement of the jury, establishes that the defendant would not have been entitled to a directed verdict at the close of the trial. Therefore the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the failure of the jury to arrive at a verdict, and a new trial must be had. The order of the district court is affirmed. STRUTZ, C. J., and ERICKSTAD, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.