Title: Tye v. McFetridge

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: December 14, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
John P. Tye, Claimant.
JOHN P. TYE,
Respondent on Review,
v.
GARY McFETRIDGE
and SAIF CORPORATION,
Petitioners on Review,
and
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SERVICES,
Intervenor.
(WCB 02-01738; CA A122013; SC S52964)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 12, 2006.
David L. Runner, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for petitioners on review.
R. Adian Martin, Portland, argued the cause for respondent
on review.
Judy C. Lucas, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for intervenor.  With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the Workers' Compensation Board is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings.  
*Judicial Review from the Workers' Compensation Board. 199 Or App 529, 112 P3d 435 (2005). 
**Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this workers' compensation case, the issue is how to
calculate temporary total disability benefits for an injured
seasonal worker (claimant) under applicable laws and regulations. 
The Court of Appeals held that those benefits should be
calculated based on claimant's average weekly earnings for the
period that he actually worked before the injury, rather than 
over the previous 52 weeks (which included a period when the
worker was not employed).  Tye v. McFetridge, 199 Or App 529, 112
P3d 435 (2005).  For the reasons that follow, we now affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
With a single exception that we note below, the facts
are undisputed.  The Court of Appeals described them this way:  
"For 20 years, claimant has been a logger and mill
worker.  He works seasonally in Wallowa County.  The
work season is determined by the ground conditions for
logging and when the local mill will begin accepting
logs.  Typically, he is off for about five months when
the forests are too wet for logging.  He began working
for McFetridge (employer), doing business as Haywire,
on November 30, 1998, and that season continued through
March 1, 1999.  The next season ran from June 15, 1999
to February 22, 2000.  Claimant began work again on
June 1, 2000, and continued until January 26, 2001.  He
started the following season on July 1, 2001.  On
November 21, 2001,[ (1)] claimant sustained the injury
that is the subject of this claim.  At the time, the
season was expected to continue for several months. 
During all of the described seasons, claimant worked
for employer.  After the last two seasons, claimant
filed unemployment claims listing Haywire as his 'most
recent,' 'second most recent,' and 'third most recent'
employer, mirroring the seasons indicated above.  For
each of those periods, he checked the box 'Lack of
Work' as reflecting the reason for the end of his
employment.  The claim information submitted by
employer states that claimant worked eight-hour shifts
Monday through Friday and that his wages were $22 per
hour.  Claimant testified that his work hours could
vary between 35 and 42 hours per week.  The
administrative law judge (ALJ) found that '[c]laimant
had been working at an hourly rate of $22.00 per hour
over work weeks ranging from 35 to 40 to 42 hours since
returning to work on or about July 1, 2001[,]' and
there is substantial evidence in the record to support
those findings."
Tye, 199 Or App at 531 (brackets in original).
After claimant was injured, he filed a workers'
compensation claim with his employer's insurer, SAIF.  SAIF
initially denied the claim, but it eventually notified claimant
that it would accept the claim, although it would calculate his
temporary disability payment by averaging his weekly wages for
the entire 52-week period preceding his injury, a period that
included about 22 weeks when claimant had been laid off. 
Claimant requested a hearing on the matter.  The ALJ
directed SAIF to recalculate claimant's temporary disability
payments based on claimant's average weekly wages for the 52-week
period before he was injured, excluding the period between
January and July 2001 when he was not working.  The ALJ ruled
that that outcome was required under the applicable statute and
regulations.  In particular, the ALJ observed that ORS
656.210(2)(d)(A) requires an individual's temporary disability
compensation to be calculated based on "the wage of the worker at
the time of injury."  And, the ALJ noted, the applicable Workers'
Compensation Division rule for seasonal and other irregularly
employed workers who had worked less than 52 weeks or where
extended gaps existed in their work history was OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A), (2) which directs insurers to use "the actual
weeks of employment (excluding any extended gaps) with the
employer at injury up to the preceding 52 weeks."  Accordingly,
the ALJ ruled that the calculation of claimant's temporary
disability payments should not include the period of time that
claimant was laid off. 
SAIF requested review before the Workers' Compensation
Board (board).  The board adopted the ALJ's findings of fact but
reversed the ALJ's legal ruling.  The board held that, because
claimant knew that there would be seasonal gaps in his
employment, and because he and employer had contemplated such
gaps when they formed their employment relationship, the January
through July period when claimant was not working did not qualify
as an "extended gap" under OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) and,
therefore, had to be included in the computation of claimant's
average weekly wage. (3)
Claimant sought judicial review of the board's decision
in the Court of Appeals.  Claimant asserted that the board's
conclusion that the 22-week period in which he was not working
was not an "extended gap" under OAR 436-060-0025 was erroneous. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the board's decision, but on
another ground.  The court analyzed the applicable rule and
concluded that the directive to exclude "extended gaps" from the
weekly wage computation applies only in those cases in which a
worker was regularly employed for the 52 weeks preceding the
injury.  Tye, 199 Or App at 535.  Because the board found that
the wage issue turned on whether claimant's gap was "extended,"
the Court of Appeals concluded that the board had to have found,
albeit implicitly, that claimant was regularly employed by
employer for the 52 weeks preceding his injury.  Id.  But,
according to the Court of Appeals, there was no evidence in the
record to support that finding. (4)  Id. at 536.  Therefore,
the court concluded, the board should have viewed claimant as a
worker who had been employed for fewer than 52 weeks.  Id.  And,
in such a case, the rule directs that claimant's average weekly
wage be calculated on the basis of the weeks he had actually
worked.  Id.  We allowed SAIF's petition for review.  
We begin our analysis with the operative statute.  ORS
656.210 (5) sets out a scheme for compensating workers who
temporarily are totally disabled through an on-the-job injury or
an occupational disease.  Subsection (1) of that statute provides
that such workers generally shall receive compensation equal to
two-thirds of their weekly wages.  Subsection (2) then provides,
in part: 
"For purposes of this section, the weekly wage of
workers shall be ascertained:
"(a) For workers employed in one job at the time
of injury, by multiplying the daily wage the worker was
receiving by the number of days per week that the
worker was regularly employed.
"* * * * * 
"(d)  For the purpose of this section:
"(A)  The benefits of a worker who incurs an
injury shall be based on the wage of the worker at the
time of injury.  
"* * * * *
"(e) As used in this subsection, 'regularly
employed' means actual employment or availability for
such employment. For workers not regularly employed and
for workers with no remuneration or whose remuneration
is not based solely upon daily or weekly wages, the
Director of the Department of Consumer and Business
Services, by rule, may prescribe methods for
establishing the worker's weekly wage." 
In this case, it is undisputed that claimant was paid
an hourly wage, based on the number of hours that he worked in a
given week, rather than a daily or weekly wage.  Claimant's
"remuneration," therefore, "is not based solely upon daily or
weekly wages."  It follows that claimant was not "regularly
employed" under ORS 656.210(2)(e) for purposes of computing the
wages on which to base his temporary total disability
compensation.  Rather, the statute requires that we derive
claimant's weekly wages through the method that the Department of
Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) has established by rule. 
That method determines the "wage of the worker at the time of
injury" because, under the statute, that is the wage on which
benefits "shall be based."  ORS 656.210(2)(d)(A).
DCBS established that method in OAR 436-060-0025.  At
the time that claimant was injured, that rule provided, in part:
"(3) The rate of compensation for regularly
employed workers shall be computed as outlined in ORS
656.210 and this rule.  As used in this rule,
'regularly employed' means actual employment or
availability for such employment.
"* * * * *
"(5) The rate of compensation for workers
regularly employed, but paid on other than a daily or
weekly basis, or employed with unscheduled, irregular
or no earnings shall be computed on the wages
determined by this rule. * * * 
"(a) For workers employed seasonally, on call,
paid hourly, paid by piece work or with varying hours,
shifts or wages:
"(A) Insurers shall use the worker's average
weekly earnings with the employer at injury for the 52
weeks prior to the date of injury.  For workers
employed less than 52 weeks or where extended gaps
exist, insurers shall use the actual weeks of
employment (excluding any extended gaps) with the
employer at injury up to the previous 52 weeks.  For
workers employed less than four weeks, insurers shall
use the intent of the wage earning agreement as
confirmed by the employer and the worker.  For purposes
of this section, the wage earning agreement may be
either oral or in written form."  
OAR 436-060-0025 (1996).  
At the time of his injury, claimant, as an hourly
employee, was "regularly employed but paid on other than a daily
or weekly basis" and, therefore, under OAR 436-060-0025(5)
(1996), claimant's "rate of compensation * * * shall be computed
on the wages determined by this rule."  
In addition, claimant was a seasonal worker.  For both
seasonal workers and hourly workers (as well as workers employed
under certain other types of arrangements -- workers on call,
paid by piece work, or having varying hours, shifts or wages),
the applicable part of "this rule" is OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)
(1996), which instructs insurers to compute average weekly
earnings using the directives set out in the following
subparagraph, OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996).  The central area
of disagreement in this case is over which of the directives in
that subparagraph obtains in claimant's situation.  
In interpreting an administrative rule such as OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996), our task is the same as that involved
in determining the meaning of a statute, which is to discern the
meaning of the words used, giving effect to the intent of the
body that promulgated the rule.  Abu-Adas v. Employment Dept.,
325 Or 480, 485, 940 P2d 1219 (1997).  And in so doing, we follow
the same methodology for interpreting rules as for construing
statutes.  Id.  That is, we begin by examining the text of the
rule itself, together with its context.  Marshall's Towing v.
Department of State Police, 339 Or 54, 62, 116 P3d 873 (2005). 
Context includes other provisions of the same rule, other related
rules, the statute pursuant to which the rule was created, and
other related statutes.  Abu-Adas, 325 Or at 485.  If the
promulgating body's intent is clear after that inquiry, the court
does not proceed further.  Id.  
OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996) begins with the
following general statement:  "Insurers shall use the worker's
average weekly earnings with the employer at injury for the 52
weeks prior to the date of injury."  That statement is followed 
by a somewhat different rule "[f]or workers employed less than 52
weeks or where extended gaps exist."  For those workers, "the
insurer shall use the actual weeks of employment (excluding any
extended gaps) with the employer at injury up to the previous 52
weeks."  Finally, subparagraph (5)(a)(A) provides a third rule
for workers employed for fewer than four weeks.  For those
workers, insurers are required to ascertain the intent of the
parties. 
The literal wording of the first sentence of
subparagraph (5)(a)(A) suggests that it applies to all injured
workers in all situations.  Nonetheless, all three sentences
appear in the same subparagraph setting out rules for computing
average weekly salary for temporarily totally disabled workers. 
The second and third sentences clearly differentiate treatment
according to the length and continuity of the worker's
employment.  That is, the second sentence applies to workers who
have been employed for fewer than 52 weeks and to workers with
"extended gaps" in their employment.  A worker who has been
employed for fewer than 52 weeks also may have "extended gaps"
but, in all those cases, the earnings computation rule is clear: 
insurers "shall use the actual weeks of employment (excluding any
extended gaps) with the employer at injury."  The third sentence
applies to workers who have been employed for fewer than four
weeks and, again, the instructions to the insurer are clear: 
ascertain the intent of the parties.  It is appropriate to infer
from the foregoing that the computation rule set out in the first
sentence covers workers who are not covered by the other two
sentences, i.e., workers who have been employed continuously for
the 52 weeks preceding the injury, including those workers whose
employment during that period contains gaps that were not
"extended."  For those workers, insurers are directed to average
all earnings over the prior 52-week period.  
It also is beyond reasonable dispute that the weekly
wages of any of the workers to whom OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A)
(1996) applies, i.e., seasonal workers, hourly workers, workers
on call, workers paid by the piece, and workers having varying
hours, shifts, or wages, could be determined by reference to the
applicable sentence in subparagraph (5)(a)(A), depending on the
particular circumstances of the case.  That is, at the time of
injury, any one of those workers could have been employed for 52
weeks or for fewer than 52 weeks, with extended gaps or with gaps
that were not extended (or with no gaps at all), or for fewer
than four weeks.  In each case, the rule applicable to that
situation would apply. (6)  
SAIF contends, to the contrary, that the weekly wages
of seasonal workers who have worked for one employer for more
than one season always are calculated by reference to the first
sentence of OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996), requiring insurers
to average weekly earnings over the previous 52-week period. 
That is so, according to SAIF, because that first sentence refers
to the worker's earnings "with the employer at injury" for the 52
weeks prior to the date of injury, and a worker who has worked
multiple annual seasons with the same employer would have
earnings with the employer at injury for a period of 52 weeks or
more.  Moreover, SAIF asserts, that sentence does not specify
that it applies only to workers who have been employed
continuously and that sentence is found immediately after an
introductory sentence referring to seasonal workers whose
employment is, by definition, noncontinuous.  That first sentence
then, must apply to the wages of seasonal workers who have worked
more than one season for the same employer.  Finally, according
to SAIF, the second sentence of subparagraph (5)(a)(A),
addressing workers who have been employed for fewer than 52 weeks
or who have extended gaps, does not logically apply to a seasonal
worker, because gaps that inhere in the very concept of seasonal
work cannot be "extended" for purposes of calculating average
weekly wages.  
As is evident from our discussion above, we disagree. 
When OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a) (1996) is read together with the
three sentences of OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996), it is clear
that the rule used for calculating average weekly wages in
subparagraph (5)(a)(A) for any of the types of workers described
in paragraph (5)(a) depends on the circumstances.  For example, a
seasonal worker can have been employed for fewer than 52 weeks
or, for that matter, fewer than four weeks, before suffering an
on-the-job injury, as could an hourly worker, a piece worker, or
a worker with varying shifts.  In any of those cases, the rule
set out in the second or third sentence would apply.  There is no
textual basis for concluding that only one provision of
subparagraph (5)(a)(A) applies to seasonal workers or that a
seasonally employed worker cannot have an "extended gap" in his
employment.  Moreover, as we discuss in more detail below, the
fact that a seasonal worker has worked for the same employer for
more than one season does not automatically mean that the first
sentence of OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996) applies.  Nor does
it otherwise change our conclusion that the applicability of one
of the three methods set out in OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996)
for calculating weekly wages depends on the circumstances of the
case.  
It follows from the foregoing that the outcome of the
present matter hinges on the factual question whether claimant
was "employed" by employer for 52 weeks prior to his injury or
for fewer than 52 weeks.  The board found as follows:  
"Claimant and the employer understood from the
beginning of his employment that claimant's work would
follow a seasonal pattern, with no work during periods
-- typically for about 5 months -- when the woods were
too wet for logging and the employer did not have
'clean up' contracts. * * * Claimant began working as a
logger for the employer on November 30, 1998 and he
worked until March 1, 1999, when work stopped that
season.  He began working again on June 15, 1999 and
continued until February 2000; he began working again
on June 1, 2000 and continued until January 2001.  In
[2001], claimant began working on July 1, [2001] and
continued until his November 23, [2001] injury.  Each
year, claimant stopped working as of the employer's
annual seasonal layoff -- until he was disabled after
his injury in November [2001]."  
The board made no other specific finding concerning claimant's
and employer's relationship.  Instead, the board addressed the
meaning of the term "extended gap" in OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A)
(1996), ultimately concluding that the January to July 2001
period when claimant was not working was not an "extended gap"
under that rule.  
On appeal, as noted, the Court of Appeals held that
there was no evidence in the record that claimant was "regularly
employed" during the period of seasonal layoff.  Thus, the court
held that claimant began "regular employment" with employer on
July 1, 2001, and there were no gaps in his employment, extended
or otherwise, between that date and the date of his injury. (7) 
Tye, 199 Or App at 536.  Accordingly, the court held that SAIF
should calculate claimant's disability benefits based on his
average weekly wages between July 1 and November 23, 2001.  Id.
at 539.   
SAIF criticizes the Court of Appeals for basing that
ruling on what SAIF characterizes as an erroneous "factual
assumption that claimant's employment with the employer began on
July 1, 2001."  It argues that the court must accept any board
findings that are supported by substantial evidence and that the
Court of Appeals was not entitled to make a factual assumption
that is at odds with the board's factual findings.  SAIF argues
that it is necessary to infer from the board's findings and its
ultimate conclusion that claimant had one continuous employment
relationship with employer from 1998 until the time of his injury
in November 2001, with seasonal gaps. (8) 
SAIF is correct that this court is bound by the board's
factual findings, if there is substantial evidence in the record
to support them.  ORS 656.298(7); ORS 183.482(7) and (8); Garcia
v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 295-96, 787 P2d 884 (1990).  
As this court stated in Garcia, 
"substantial evidence supports a finding when the
record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person
to make the finding.  ORS 183.482(8)(c).  A court must
'evaluate the substantiality of supporting evidence by
considering all the evidence in the record.' * * * That
is, the court must evaluate evidence against the
finding as well as evidence supporting it to determine
whether substantial evidence exists to support that
finding.  If a finding is reasonable in light of
countervailing as well as supporting evidence, the
finding is supported by substantial evidence." 
Garcia, 309 Or at 295 (citations omitted).    
Here, however -- and even assuming that the findings
that SAIF postulates are factual ones, rather than legal
conclusions -- the board did not specifically find that claimant
had one continuous employment relationship with employer that
spanned several years.  Rather, the board found that petitioner
worked for employer off and on, in a "seasonal pattern" involving
a period of work followed by "employer's annual seasonal layoff." 
A "layoff," in common parlance, is a period of unemployment. 
That interpretation of the board's actual factual finding is
amply supported in the record:  Claimant twice filed for
unemployment compensation during the layoff period, listing
employer as his first, second, and third most recent employers. 
That fact shows that claimant viewed the employment relationship
with employer as having terminated when he was laid off.  On the
other side of the coin, nothing in the record suggests that
claimant and employer had entered into any sort of contractual
arrangement, oral or written, that either would have entitled
claimant to return to work at the end of the seasonal layoff or
required employer to put claimant to work again.  
It follows that, to the extent that the board's ruling
depends on a factual inference that claimant had a continuous
employment relationship that spanned the "seasonal layoff," we
reject it as unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 
That factual proposition on which SAIF relies thus is
unavailable, and SAIF's arguments fail.
In our view, the record is clear that claimant began
his employment with employer on July 1, 2001.  Claimant,
therefore, had been employed for fewer than 52 weeks at the time
of his injury on November 23, 2001.  In that case, the second
sentence of OAR 436-060-0025(5)(a)(A) (1996) requires SAIF to
calculate claimant's disability benefits based on the wages that
claimant earned during the particular weeks that he actually
worked for employer, i.e., between July 1 and November 23, 2001. 
The Court of Appeals was correct in so holding.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
case is remanded to the Worker's Compensation Board for further
proceedings. 
1. Hospital and medical reports in the record state that
claimant was injured on November 23, 2001.
2. We set out the provisions of OAR 436-060-0025 and ORS
656.210 in the text below.  
3. Throughout its Order on Review, the board referred to a
"15-week period" in which claimant was not working, "from January
2002 through June 2002," and stated that claimant was injured in
"November 2002."  The record is clear that claimant was injured
in November 2001 and that the relevant seasonal unemployment
period was between January 26 and July 1, 2001.  That is a 22-week, not a 15-week, gap.  For purposes of this opinion, we
assume that the board would have reached the same conclusion had
it been aware that the gap actually was 22 weeks long.  
4. ORS 656.210(2)(e) defines the phrase "regularly
employed" to mean "actual employment or availability for such
employment."  The regulation contains the same definition.  OAR
436-060-0025(3) (so providing).  As the Court of Appeals
interpreted the phrase, a worker is not "available for such
employment" under OAR 436-060-0025(3) when the employer has no
work for the worker to do.  Tye, 199 Or App at 535-36.  Because
the question whether claimant was "regularly employed" is not
essential to our analysis in this case, we do not need to decide
whether the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the phrase
"availability for such employment" was correct.  
5. In its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals
applied the versions of the statute and rule that were in effect
at the time of claimant's injury.  More recent amendments to ORS
656.210 change the numbering of the applicable subsections but do
not otherwise affect our analysis of this case.  Therefore, for
ease of reference, we refer in this opinion to the current
version of that statute.  More recent amendments to the rule also
do not affect our analysis in this case, but they change the rule
in a way that would complicate our discussion.  Accordingly, we
continue to refer in this opinion to the version of the rule --
OAR 436-060-0025 (1996) -- that was in effect at the time
claimant was injured.  
6. DCBS agrees with the foregoing interpretation of its
rule.
7. As noted above, the Court of Appeals found it necessary
to determine whether claimant was "regularly employed," as that
phrase is used in OAR 436-060-0025(3) and (5) (1996), during the
layoff period.  That court concluded, after some analysis of that
phrase and its definition in OAR 436-060-0025(3) (1996), that
claimant was not "regularly employed" during the layoff period
because he was not "actually employed," nor was he "available for
such employment" because there was no evidence in the record that
employer had work for him to do during that period.  Tye, 199 Or
App at 536. Because we conclude that claimant was not in an
employment relationship with employer that spanned the layoff
period, and, therefore, that he was not employed during that
period at all, we need not address the meaning of the phrase
"regularly employed."  
8. For his part, claimant argues, simply, that he entered
into a new employment relationship at the beginning of each
logging season.