Title: Melanson v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MONA MELANSON 
 
v.  Record No. 000497 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
January 12, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
John E. Kloch, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether mailing a notice of 
claim by certified mail, return receipt requested, is the 
exclusive method of filing a notice of claim against the 
Commonwealth under the Virginia Tort Claims Act (“the Act”). 
Code §§ 8.01-195.1 through –195.9.  Holding that it is, we 
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion for judgment 
by Mona Melanson (“Melanson”) against the Commonwealth. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings 
On September 6, 1996, Melanson was injured as a result of 
a falling traffic sign allegedly owned and maintained by the 
Virginia Department of Transportation (“VDOT”).  On September 
4, 1997, Melanson mailed a letter by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, to D.B. Smit (“Smit”), Acting Director of 
the Division of Risk Management of the Commonwealth.  The 
letter described Melanson’s injuries and the event that caused 
them, and requested compensation from the Commonwealth for 
negligent maintenance of the highway sign.  The return receipt 
from the certified mailing indicated that the letter was 
received on September 16, 1997, more than one year from the 
date of her injuries.  In addition to mailing the letter to 
Smit, counsel for Melanson hand-delivered a copy of the letter 
to the Division of Risk Management on September 5, 1997, 
within one year from the date of her injuries. 
Melanson filed a motion for judgment against the 
Commonwealth in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria 
under the provisions of the Act, alleging negligence by agents 
and employees of the Commonwealth.  The Commonwealth filed a 
special plea of sovereign immunity, asserting that Melanson 
had failed to satisfy the notice requirements of the Act.  The 
trial court granted the Commonwealth’s special plea and 
dismissed Melanson’s motion for judgment, finding that she 
“did not file a notice of her claim against the Commonwealth 
with the Director of the Division of Risk Management or the 
Attorney General by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
within one year after her cause of action accrued to her.” 
On appeal, Melanson contends that the trial court erred 
in dismissing her motion for judgment.  She asserts that 
“filing” and “mailing” are separate concepts and that mailing 
is not the only method of satisfying the filing requirement 
under Code § 8.01-195.6.  Melanson maintains that her notice 
of claim was timely filed because it was hand-delivered to the 
Division of Risk Management within the one year period 
 
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mandated by Code § 8.01-195.6.  The Commonwealth argues that 
mailing is the only method of filing permitted under § 8.01-
195.6 and her mailing was not received within one year of the 
accrual of her cause of action. 
II.  Analysis 
 
In the absence of express statutory or constitutional 
provisions waiving immunity, the Commonwealth and its agencies 
are immune from liability for the tortious acts or omissions 
of their agents and employees.  An express but limited waiver 
of the Commonwealth’s immunity from tort claims was provided 
by the enactment of the Virginia Tort Claims Act in 1981.  The 
Act is in derogation of common law, and, therefore, its 
limited waiver of immunity must be strictly construed. 
Baumgardner v. Southwestern Va. Mental Health Inst., 247 Va. 
486, 489, 442 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1994). 
 
Code § 8.01-195.6, the Notice of Claim provision of the 
Act, provides in relevant part: 
 
Every claim cognizable against the 
Commonwealth . . . shall be forever barred 
unless the claimant or his agent, attorney or 
representative has filed a written statement of 
the nature of the claim, which includes the 
time and place at which the injury is alleged 
to have occurred and the agency or agencies 
alleged to be liable.  The statement shall be 
filed with the Director of the Division of Risk 
Management or the Attorney General within one 
year after such cause of action accrued if the 
claim is against the Commonwealth. . . .  The 
claimant or his agent, attorney or 
 
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representative shall, in a claim cognizable 
against the Commonwealth, mail the notice of 
claim via the United States Postal Service by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, 
addressed to the Director of the Division of 
Risk Management or the Attorney General in 
Richmond. . . . 
 
 
In any action contesting the filing of the 
notice of claim, the burden of proof shall be 
on the claimant to establish mailing and 
receipt of the notice in conformity with this 
section.  The signed return receipt indicating 
delivery to the Director of the Division of 
Risk Management, [or] the Attorney General 
. . . when admitted into evidence, shall be 
prima facie evidence of filing of the notice 
under this section.  The date on which the 
return receipt is signed by the Director, [or] 
the Attorney General . . . shall be prima facie 
evidence of the date of filing for purposes of 
compliance with this section. 
 
Because Melanson hand-delivered her notice of claim within the 
one year period required by the statute but receipt of her 
notice by “certified mail, return receipt requested” was 
beyond the one year period, we must decide if the mailing 
requirement is the exclusive method for giving notice of claim 
under the Act. 
 
In Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 467 S.E.2d 
783 (1996), we considered whether a plaintiff complied with 
the notice requirements of the Act.  The plaintiff was injured 
when she fell in a parking lot at George Mason University, a 
state-supported institution.  She forwarded several letters, 
describing her accident and the extent of her injuries, to the 
 
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Director of the Division of Risk Management.  Upon motion of 
the Commonwealth, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
motion for judgment because her notice of claim did not 
sufficiently identify the place where her injuries occurred. 
 
We stated, in Halberstam, that “strict compliance with 
all [the Act’s] provisions is required.”  Id. at 251, 467 
S.E.2d at 784.  We also stated that under the Act, “notice 
must be sent through the United States Postal Service by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the 
Director of the Division of Risk Management or the Attorney 
General.”  251 Va. at 251, 467 S.E.2d at 785.  Melanson 
contends that nothing in the Act or our opinion in Halberstam 
excludes filing by hand delivery as long as certified mailing 
is accomplished as well.  We disagree. 
 
In Halberstam, the plaintiff argued that if her notice of 
claim, a letter dated March 14, 1994, lacked the specificity 
required by the Act, then, any deficiencies were cured by her 
prior collateral correspondence.  Rejecting her contention, we 
held that “[o]nly the March 14 letter . . . was sent to an 
official designated in the statute and in the manner 
prescribed by the statute, certified mail with a return 
receipt requested.  Thus, in this case, that letter alone must 
contain the statutorily required information.”  Id. at 252, 
467 S.E.2d at 785.  In Halberstam, we confined our 
 
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consideration of proper filing of a notice of claim to that 
which was mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested.  
No other form of communication or delivery was considered to 
be “in the manner prescribed by the statute.”  Id.
 
As we have previously noted: 
The primary objective of statutory construction 
is to ascertain and give effect to legislative 
intent.  The plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning of a statute is to be preferred over 
any curious, narrow, or strained construction.  
A statute is not to be construed by singling 
out a particular phrase; every part is presumed 
to have some effect and is not to be 
disregarded unless absolutely necessary. 
 
Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 
(1998) (citations omitted).  Acceptance of Melanson’s 
contention that filing is not dependent upon mailing would 
render the mailing requirement superfluous.  If the concepts 
of filing and mailing are separate as she urges, there would 
be no stated time within which the mailing would have to be 
received. 
 
Additionally, the Act anticipates controversy over timely 
notice and provides: “In any action contesting the filing of 
the notice of claim, the burden of proof shall be on the 
claimant to establish mailing and receipt of the notice in 
conformity with this section.”  The juxtaposition of 
controversy over “filing” with proof requiring “mailing” amply 
demonstrates the legislature’s intention that mailing “in 
 
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conformity with [the Act]” is the exclusive method of filing a 
notice of claim under the Act. 
 
Finally, Melanson argues that the Commonwealth had actual 
knowledge of the claim within the one year period provided by 
the Act and such knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the notice 
requirement.  We have previously stated that “actual notice 
does not obviate [the] duty to strictly comply with the Act’s 
notice provisions.”  Halberstam, 251 Va. at 252, 467 S.E.2d at 
785. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
The Commonwealth’s limited waiver of immunity for tort 
claims must be strictly construed.  “For this Court to place 
any limitation on the clear and comprehensive language of the 
statute, or to create an exception where none exists under the 
guise of statutory construction, would be to defeat the 
purpose of the enactment and to engage in judicial 
legislation.”  Town of Crewe v. Marler, 228 Va. 109, 114, 319 
S.E.2d 748, 750 (1984).  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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