Title: CURETON v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CURETON v. STATE2003 WY 4465 P.3d 1250Case Number: 02-52Decided: 03/31/2003
October Term, A.D. 2002

 

 

TRAVIS 
LEE CURETON,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel; Jason M. Tangeman, Interim Director, Wyoming 
Defender Aid Program; Lindsay A. Hoyt, Student Director; and Douglas Stevens, 
Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Stevens.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Hugh Kenny, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Kenny.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      After 
trial, a jury convicted appellant Travis Cureton of burglary.  Appellant appeals the judgment and 
sentence imposed upon his conviction claiming only that insufficient 
evi­dence was presented to the jury to sustain his conviction for 
burglary.  Upon our review, we find 
sufficient evidence and, therefore, affirm.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶2]      At approximately 
8:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 5, 2001, a bartender at the American Legion in 
Sheridan, Wyoming observed appellant in front of the safe holding a bank 
bag.  Upon being noticed, appellant 
immediately fled the premises and headed in a northerly direction.  About four hours later, Michelle Baldwin 
arrived at her Sheridan residence located north of the American Legion to find 
the door open and a half eaten piece of pizza on the floor.  Because Ms. Baldwin believed someone had 
illegally entered her home and her husband was at work, she summoned the 
police.  The police responded to the 
call and searched the house but found no one.  The police then left without collecting 
any evidence but asked Ms. Baldwin to search her home to see if anything was 
missing.  Later, Ms. Baldwin 
reported that various items were missing from her home.  

 

[¶3]      On Monday, May 7, 
2001, Lieutenant Glen Wright began looking for appellant as a suspect in the 
American Legion incident, as appellant had been identified by the bartender in a 
photo lineup.  While looking for 
appellant, Lt. Wright spotted a white automobile in which he believed appellant 
was a passenger.  Upon stopping the 
vehicle, appellant was positively identified.  However, when officers tried to take 
appellant into custody, appellant ran.  
Shortly thereafter, appellant was caught and arrested.  When he was advised that he was being 
arrested for his participation in the American Legion incident, he denied any 
knowl­edge of this event.  

 

[¶4]      After the arrest, 
Lt. Wright took appellant back to the vehicle so appellant could gather his 
possessions from the automobile.  
Appellant identified that certain items were his, and both he and these 
possessions were transported to the detention center.  Later, the driver of the vehicle in 
which appellant was riding when arrested contacted the police and asked if he 
could view the property taken when appellant was arrested to ensure that the 
police had not taken any of the driver's property.  When this person viewed the property, he 
indicated that two bottles of shampoo, some change, and a CD belonged to 
him.  The police noticed that some 
of the remaining property matched the description of the Baldwins' missing 
prop­erty.  The Baldwins 
subsequently identified that four shirts, a sweatshirt, a DVD case, three Play 
Station games, a flashlight, a black case with a Play Station II, and a hand 
held tape recorder in appellant's possession belonged to them.  

 

[¶5]      Appellant was 
charged with petit larceny with respect to the American Legion inci­dent and 
burglary stemming from what had occurred at the Baldwin residence.  Initially, appellant pled not guilty to 
both charges.  However, appellant 
subsequently pled guilty to the petit larceny charge regarding the American 
Legion incident.  Appellant was 
convicted of the burglary charge concerning the Baldwin home following a trial 
by jury.  

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      The standard of 
review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well established.  We must assess whether all the evidence, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, is adequate to form the 
basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt drawn by the finder of 
fact.  We do not consider the 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party which conflicts with the successful 
party's evidence, and we afford the successful party's evidence every favorable 
inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from that evidence.  Even though it is possible to draw other 
inferences from the evidence presented, it is the jury which has the 
responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine 
whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, 
have come to the same result the jury actually did.  Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶4, 
46 P.3d 298, ¶4 (Wyo., 2002); Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1228 (Wyo. 
2000); Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1123 (Wyo. 1997); Blake v. 
State, 933 P.2d 474, 480 (Wyo. 1997).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      Appellant 
contends the evidence is insufficient to convict him of burglary.  He argues that he was never placed at or 
near the scene of the crime, that he never fled the scene because he never left 
Sheridan, and that he made no effort to hide from law enforcement authorities 
because he was driving around with his friend when he was apprehended.  He also asserts there was no evidence of 
forced entry into the Baldwin residence and no fingerprints or other evidence 
were found in that residence identifying him.  He posits that he was never seen near 
the Baldwin residence, he did not live near this residence, and he had never 
visited this residence.  Appellant 
contends, therefore, that no evidence was presented connecting him directly to 
the Baldwin home, as no "slightly corroborative" evidence was introduced.  

 

[¶8]      Appellant further 
asserts that his possession of property stolen from the Baldwin resi­dence 
is insufficient, in and of itself, to support his conviction.  He argues that the items were found in 
his friend's car, not his car, and he only identified the stolen property as his 
because he had recently been maced by the police and was under pressure of the 
watchful eye of the police when he identified this property.  He also contends that his flight from 
the officers at the time he was stopped was not indicative of guilt because his 
flight was in response to his involvement in the American Legion incident and 
not the Baldwin burglary.  He claims 
the fact that the Baldwin residence was north of the American Legion and in the 
same direction in which he fled does not satisfy adequate "proximity" 
evidence.

 

[¶9]      Finally, 
appellant argues that the State failed to show any nexus between the 
Ameri­can Legion incident and the Baldwin burglary.  Appellant claims the American Legion 
incident is dissimilar from the Baldwin residence incident because the former 
situation was an attempt to steal money, while particular property items were 
taken from the Baldwin resi­dence.  
Appellant asserts that the State's entire case is based on appellant's 
involvement in the American Legion incident on the same night as the Baldwin 
residence burglary.  
Never­theless, there was not a sufficient nexus between these two 
crimes to link appellant to both crimes.  

 

[¶10]   Viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the State under the applicable stan­dard of review, rather 
than from the viewpoint most advantageous to appellant as urged by appellant, we 
conclude that sufficient evidence existed to support appellant's conviction for 
the crime of burglary.  

 

[¶11]   Upon being confronted by Officer 
Hill and told he was under arrest without any fur­ther explanation, 
appellant struggled free and ran in an attempt to avoid arrest.  We have held that flight is admissible 
as evidence of guilt and is admissible as tending to show conscious­ness of 
guilt.  Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 760 (Wyo. 1995); Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Wyo. 
1991); Smizer v. State, 752 P.2d 406, 411 (Wyo. 1988); Jones v. 
State, 568 P.2d 837, 845 n.10 (Wyo. 1977).  Flight by itself is not sufficient to 
establish guilt, but it may be considered together with other factors as tending 
to show a consciousness of guilt.  
Miller v. State, 830 P.2d 419, 427 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Jones v. 
State, 568 P.2d  at 845 n.10).  

 

[¶12]   Although appellant tries to dismiss 
his flight as pertaining only to his admitted actions at the American Legion, 
there remains a competing inference that his flight may have been in response to 
his fear of being arrested for the Baldwin residence burglary.  The State is not required to prove the 
purpose of appellant's flight.  
Rather, it is up to the jury to fairly draw reasonable inferences as to 
the purpose of appellant's actions.  
Even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence 
presented, the jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the 
evidence.  This court will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury.  Henderson v. State, 976 P.2d 203, 
208 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1160-61 (Wyo. 
1997)).  Simply stated, the jury was 
free to consider appellant's flight as showing consciousness of guilt for the 
Baldwin burglary. 

 

[¶13]   Furthermore, the jury was presented 
with appellant's possession of the Baldwin prop­erty and appellant, himself, 
claimed ownership of this property.  
After a brief chase, appellant was apprehended and arrested and advised 
that he was being arrested for his participation in the American Legion 
incident.  Appellant denied any 
knowledge of this event.  
Subsequently, Lt. Wright took appellant back to the vehicle so appellant 
could gather his possessions from the automobile.  Appellant identified that certain items, 
including those items that were later identified as property of the Baldwins, 
were his and both he and these possessions were transported to the detention 
center.  

 

[¶14]   In particular, on some occasions, 
appellant personally pointed out the item as being his possession whereupon the 
officer would hold it out for confirmation again by appellant before it was 
placed in a separate pile for items identified as appellant's property.  On other occasions, appellant personally 
grabbed items which he stated belonged to him.  Still, with smaller items, the police 
officers went through each item with appellant whereupon he would identify it as 
his possession or not.  For 
instance, this process was utilized with respect to DVD discs.  Eventually appellant identified every 
item that was removed from the vehicle as his property.  

 

[¶15]   Explicit declaration of ownership 
qualifies as corroboration and is an explanation which the jury could find to be 
false.  Downs v. State, 581 P.2d 610, 616 (Wyo. 1978); Newell v. State, 548 P.2d 8, 14 (Wyo. 
1976).  
Further,

 

[w]e have 
stated that the possession of stolen goods alone is not sufficient evidence to 
convict for burglary.  
. . .  However, we 
have also concluded with regard to burglary that, "[t]he most significant and 
material evidence of defendant's guilt is his pos­session of the stolen 
property.  Possession is a strong 
circum­stance tending to show guilt and only slight corroborative evidence 
of other inculpatory circumstances is required'" to convict.  Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Newell, 548 P.2d at 
13).

 

McGarvey v. 
State, 2002 WY 
149, ¶14, 55 P.3d 703, ¶14 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶16]   Similar to the circumstances that 
existed in the McGarvey case wherein McGarvey was found to be in 
possession of the stolen items approximately sixteen hours after the 
bur­glary occurred, appellant was found to be in possession of stolen items 
taken from the Baldwin residence just a few days previously.  A defendant's dealing with the property 
as his own in proximate time to a theft is a corroborating circumstance of 
burglary.  McGarvey, at 
¶15.  See also Downs v. 
State, 581 P.2d  at 616.

 

[¶17]   Likewise, the trial evidence showed 
that appellant was in proximity to the burglarized Baldwin home around the time 
that the burglary occurred.  As 
noted above, the American Legion incident occurred at approximately 8:00 p.m. on 
Saturday, May 5, 2001, just hours before the Baldwin burglary was 
discovered.  Upon his discovery 
within the American Legion, appellant fled this premises in a northerly 
direction.  The Baldwin home is 
located north of the American Legion. 

 

[¶18]   This evidence established that 
appellant was in proximity to the Baldwin home both in time and space.  A defendant's presence in the 
neighborhood of a burglary is an important circumstance that is not to be 
treated merely as coincidence.  
Placing a defendant in the area of the scene of the crime, coupled with 
his possession of the victim's property, is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction.  Because appellant was 
in proximity of the burglary, he had the oppor­tunity to commit the 
crime.  "Evidence of opportunity to 
commit the crime is a link which considered with other incriminating facts may 
establish the guilt of the defendant."  
McGarvey, at ¶16 (quoting Downs v. State, 581 P.2d at 
616).  

 

[¶19]   In addition, appellant's 
credibility was placed before the jury.  
As noted previously, upon his being advised that he was being arrested 
concerning the American Legion incident, appellant denied any knowledge of this 
event.  Yet, appellant eventually 
pled guilty to petit larceny stemming from the American Legion incident.  Of course, appellant was also 
posi­tively identified as taking part in the American Legion 
incident.

 

[¶20]   Finally, the record clearly 
establishes that the jury knew that it needed to find corrobora­tive 
evidence to convict because it sent a note to the court during deliberations 
asking what comprised "slight corroborative evidence" and requested examples and 
clarifi­cation.  The trial court 
properly responded to the jury's inquiry by indicating that these were questions 
that the jury must decide on its own.  
Upon deliberating further, the jury deter­mined that sufficient 
evidence existed to satisfy it of appellant's guilt of the alleged crime of 
burglary and issued a guilty verdict.  
Moreover, review of the record evidences that appel­lant's counsel 
made the very same arguments as are now presented before this court on 
appeal.  Nevertheless, the jury 
rejected these arguments. 

 

[¶21]   We hold that adequate evidence 
existed in this case for the jury to form the basis of an inference of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt when such evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State as required.  
As stated previously, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did.  Black v. 
State, at ¶4; Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d  at 1228.  See also Blake v. 
State, 933 P.2d  at 480 and Harris v. State, 933 P.2d  at 
1123.  We determine that a quorum of 
reasonable individuals could have come to the same result reached by the jury in 
this case.

 

 

CONCLUSION
 

[¶22]   For the foregoing reasons, 
appellant's conviction for burglary is affirmed.