Title: McAllister v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CURTIS E. McALLISTER, 
 
§ 
§ 
Defendant Below,  
§ 
Appellant,  
 
§ No. 222, 2000 
§ 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ Court Below: Superior Court  
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ for New Castle County  
   
 
 
 
 
 
§ Cr. A. Nos. IN97-03-1772, 1775, 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 1776, and 1779 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: June 26, 2002 
Decided: 
August 30, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices. 
 
Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire (argued) and Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, 
Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WALSH, Justice: 
 
 
2 
In this appeal from the Superior Court, we consider whether a warrantless search 
of a probationer’s person and residence, conducted by State probation officers, was 
proper.  We conclude that, given the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s 
confrontation with probation officers, the officers had probable cause to conduct the 
search and the Superior Court correctly concluded that the drugs subsequently seized 
from the defendant should not have been suppressed.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
I. 
On March 14, 1997, the appellant, Curtis McAllister (“McAllister”), was arrested 
on drug charges following a search of the Wilmington home in which he resided.  On 
that date, shortly after 9:00 a.m., Gregory Morehart (“Morehart”), a probation officer 
with the Delaware Department of Correction, received a telephone tip from a 
confidential informant that illegal drugs could be found in a padlocked bedroom at the 
residence shared by two probationers, Norma Johnson  and Curtis McAllister.  The 
informant had previously provided Morehart with similar information, but was not one 
of his probationers.  At the time, both Johnson and McAllister were serving a term of 
probation for previous convictions of drug offenses.   
 
 
3 
After receiving the tip, Morehart proceeded to a previously scheduled event and 
did not return to his office until midday.  When he returned, Morehart called Johnson, 
whom he was assigned to supervise, and informed her that he wanted to make a home 
visit.  Johnson told Morehart that she was about to leave, but would wait for Morehart 
to arrive.  McAllister’s assigned probation officer was not working that day.  Before 
going to the Johnson residence, Morehart attempted to reach Thomas Scully, a higher 
ranking probation officer who also supervised McAllister’s probation officer.  Scully was 
out of the office, however, and could not be reached.   
Morehart was concerned that Johnson would not continue to wait for him, so he 
requested the assistance of three other probation officers to accompany him 
immediately to the Johnson residence.  Morehart asked Scully’s secretary to continue to 
try to contact Scully, and informed her where he and the other officers were going.  
When they arrived at the Johnson residence, Johnson allowed the probation officers 
into the house.  Morehart explained that he had received information that there were 
drugs in a padlocked room.  Johnson acknowledged that one room was padlocked, but 
that McAllister occupied the room and she did not have a key.  While the officers were 
speaking with Johnson, Morehart saw McAllister’s car pull up outside.  Morehart went 
out to meet McAllister and escorted him inside.  Without administering a Miranda 
 
 
4 
warning, Morehart questioned McAllister about the allegations made by the informant. 
 McAllister admitted that he had a key to the padlocked room and that he sometimes 
slept there.  When Morehart informed McAllister that he intended to search the room 
in order to determine the validity of the allegation, McAllister became agitated and 
attempted to flee the residence.  The probation officers restrained and handcuffed 
McAllister.  The officers then conducted a search of McAllister’s person and found a 
large bundle of cash in his pocket, as well as a set of keys.  The Wilmington police were 
called to assist the probation officers.    
At this point, one of the probation officers, Mark Herron, finally spoke with 
Scully, who had called the residence.  After describing the circumstances leading up to 
that point in time, Scully authorized the probation officers to search McAllister’s room. 
 Using a key obtained from McAllister, Morehart and Herron entered the room and 
saw what appeared to be drugs lying on the bed.  The probation officers left the room 
and informed the police of their discovery.  McAllister and Johnson were taken into 
custody and, after obtaining a search warrant, the police confiscated the contraband 
from McAllister’s room.   
Prior to his trial on the drug charges, McAllister filed a motion to suppress the 
contraband and the statements he made to Morehart, alleging that the evidence was 
 
 
5 
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.  The trial court denied that motion, 
and the case proceeded to trial.  A jury found McAllister guilty of trafficking in heroin, 
possession with intent to deliver heroin, maintaining a dwelling for the use or 
consumption of narcotics, conspiracy in the second degree, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  This appeal followed.   
 
 
II. 
McAllister challenges the trial court's refusal to suppress evidence seized from his 
person and room, as well as statements he made to the probation officers upon initial 
questioning.  This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, after an 
evidentiary hearing, under an abuse of discretion standard.  Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 
1379 (Del. 1993); Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 308  (Del. 1989).  To the extent 
McAllister’s claims of error implicate questions of law, however, this Court will exercise 
de novo review.  Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del. 1990).  Finally, factual 
findings made by the trial court will be disturbed only if not the result of a logical and 
orderly deductive process.  Id. 
Initially, we dispose of McAllister’s claim that the trial court used an incorrect 
legal standard in ruling on his motion to suppress.  The State concedes that the trial 
 
 
6 
court improperly placed the burden on McAllister to establish that his Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated by the challenged search.  See Vale v. Louisiana, 
399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 1987) (both holding 
the State bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an exception to the 
warrant requirement).   Following the initial briefing in this case, we ruled that the 
Superior Court had improperly allocated the burden when deciding McAllister’s 
motion to suppress.  We remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of 
the motion to suppress under the appropriate burden of proof.  The trial court 
submitted a supplemental report that, in essence, confirmed its original decision, 
holding that the State had carried its burden of  proving that an exception to the 
warrant requirement existed under the circumstances.  Accordingly, we find the trial 
court’s original error in assigning the burden of proof to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. State, 791 A.2d 750 (Del. 2002). 
McAllister mounts a broad-ranging attack upon the constitutionality of the 
statutory authority exercised by probation officers and the specific conduct of the officer 
who confronted McAllister at the time of his arrest.  The legislative authority permitting 
probation officers to effect searches of the individuals they supervise is found in 11 Del. 
C. § 4321.  The Department of Correction has, pursuant to that authority, adopted 
 
 
7 
regulations regarding warrantless searches of probationers.  Those regulations provide 
that, prior to a personal search or a living quarters search, the probation officer and the 
supervisor “shall have a case conference” and “[t]he Pre-Search Checklist should be used 
as a guideline unless emergency circumstances dictate otherwise.”  Dept. of Correction 
Procedure 7.18.  Further, “before any search is conducted, Officers must first have the 
approval of a supervisor or designee, unless emergency circumstances dictate otherwise.” 
Dept. of Correction Procedure 7.19.  There is no dispute that Morehart did not have a 
case conference with a supervisor before proceeding to the Johnson residence, nor did 
he complete a pre-search checklist.  Morehart testified, however, that he did consider 
the elements of the checklist “in his mind” before deciding to search.  Supervisory 
approval for a search was obtained before the search of McAllister’s room. 
 
 
III.     
The search in this case was conducted by probation officers, acting in their 
official capacity as supervisors of Johnson and McAllister’s probation.  See 11 Del. C. § 
4321(d)* (authorizing probation officers to conduct searches of individuals under 
                                                 
*11 Del. C. § 4321(d), in its entirety, provides: 
 
 
 
8 
probation supervision in the performance of the lawful duties of their employment).  As 
the United States Supreme Court has observed, “inherent in the very nature of 
probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled.”  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (internal citations omitted).  
Given that backdrop, we address the validity of the search as it unfolded.  First, the 
probation officers had a legitimate right to enter the Johnson residence with Johnson’s 
consent.  Searches conducted pursuant to a valid consent represent an exception to the 
warrant requirement. Scott v. State, 672 A.2d 550, 552 (Del. 1996) (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1973)).  In order to be valid, a consent must be 
voluntary and given by a person with the authority to do so. Id.  There is no dispute in 
this case that Johnson’s consent was valid.  
Once lawfully present in the Johnson residence, the probation officers were able 
to corroborate the tip Morehart received.  Johnson confirmed that there was a 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as constables 
under the laws of this State and may conduct searches of individuals under 
probation and parole supervision in accordance with Department procedures 
while in the performance of the lawful duties of their employment and shall 
execute lawful orders, warrants and other process as directed to the officer 
by any court, judge or Board of Parole of this State; however, a probation and 
parole officer shall only have such power and duties if the officer participates 
in and/or meets the minimum requirements of such training and education 
deemed necessary by the Department and Board of Examiners. 
 
 
9 
padlocked bedroom in the house and that it was occupied by McAllister.  It is at this 
point, after the independent corroboration of a tip from a confidential informant, that 
McAllister’s first contact with the officers occurred.  An informant's tip that is 
corroborated by independent police work can form the basis for probable cause, 
regardless of what is known about the informant’s personal credibility or reliability.  
Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Del. 1985).   
When McAllister arrived at the residence, which was presumably McAllister’s 
intended destination, Morehart went outside to meet him.  Morehart identified himself 
to McAllister (whom he had met previously), indicated that he was interested in 
speaking with McAllister, and escorted McAllister inside.  Once inside, McAllister was 
informed of the tip received by Morehart.  McAllister acknowledged that he sometimes 
slept in the padlocked room and that he had a key.  Morehart told McAllister that he 
wished to search the room in order to verify the validity of the tip.  It was at that point 
that McAllister attempted to flee and was detained by the probation officers. 
When McAllister attempted to flee, the probation officers had a right to detain 
him, because probable cause existed to believe that McAllister was in violation of his 
probation.  See Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1265 (Del. 2001) (holding a defendant’s 
unprovoked flight is a proper consideration in probable cause analysis).  The probable 
 
 
10 
cause standard is a practical, nontechnical concept that must be measured by the totality 
of the circumstances. Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988). This requires 
a case by case review of the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.  Hovington v. State, 616 A.2d 
829, 833 (Del. 1992).  In this case, the officers had a verified tip from a confidential 
informant, coupled with an admission and suspicious behavior from the defendant, a 
probationer.  The totality of theses circumstances gave the officers authority to detain 
McAllister.  See King v. State, 633 A.2d 370 (Del.1993) (tip from past proven reliable 
confidential informant, coupled with detectives’ observations at the scene, clearly 
established probable cause to arrest). The subsequent search of McAllister’s person, 
incident to his detention, was also proper.  See id.; citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 763 (1969) (search incident to arrest is permissible, in order to remove any 
weapons and to seize evidence on arrestee’s person). 
Having lawfully retrieved a key to the padlocked room from McAllister’s pocket, 
the probation officers then used the key to enter his room.  Before doing so, the 
probation officers obtained permission from a supervisor, who verified that the 
circumstances justified the intended search.  Given the totality of the circumstances, 
including McAllister’s status as a probationer and his limited privacy rights resulting 
 
 
11 
therefrom, the officers’ use of the key to open the locked door was reasonable and did 
not contravene the Fourth Amendment or Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.  
See U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) 
(upholding warrantless searches of probationer’s homes under the Fourth Amendment, 
so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances).  Once the door was opened, 
items that appeared to be illegal narcotics were in plain view.  The probation officers 
then handed the investigation over to the Wilmington police, who obtained a valid 
search warrant before entering the room and confiscating the drugs.  
Although we affirm the trial court’s denial of McAllister’s motion to suppress in 
this case, we note that probation officers are not sworn police officers, and are subject 
to constraints that do not apply to police officers.  Probation officers have authority to 
detain probationers and execute searches of their persons or property only to the extent 
granted them by the General Assembly.  Particularly when conducting warrantless 
searches, probation officers may act only pursuant to explicit statutory authority.  While 
the conduct of the probation officers in this case was haphazard and uncoordinated, 
they did not overstep their supervisory authority over a person who continued under 
the control of the Department of Correction.   
 
 
12 
Because we find that the search conducted by the probation officers was 
reasonable and supported by probable cause, we need not address McAllister’s claim 
that 11 Del. C. § 4321(d), and the accompanying Department of Correction regulations, 
are unconstitutional.  See DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d 630, 639 (Del. 1987) (a 
constitutional question will not be decided unless it is essential to the disposition of the 
case). 
We emphasize that this case does not implicate questions of whether probation 
officers can exercise the general constitutional power granted to police officers.  The 
case is unique because: (i) the officers were on the premises with the consent of the 
property owner who was also subject to visitation as a probationer; (ii) the probation 
officers’ contact with McAllister was non-confrontational until McAllister attempted to 
flee; and (iii) the probation officers possessed reliable and verified information about 
the alleged illegal activities of a probationer before confronting the probationer. 
 
IV. 
McAllister also claims that Morehart’s failure to administer Miranda warnings 
before questioning him required the suppression of his inculpatory statement admitting 
that the room was his.  Miranda warnings are required only where (1) questioning of a 
 
 
13 
suspect rises to the level of interrogation and (2) the interrogation occurs while the 
suspect is either in “custody” or in a “custodial setting.”  Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 
1192 (Del. 1992); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460- 461 (1966).  Moreover, 
although a probationer does not lose the privilege against self-incrimination because he 
is on probation, the United States Supreme Court has refused to extend the 
requirement of Miranda warnings to interviews with probation officers.  Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). The Superior Court accordingly denied the motion 
to suppress, holding that McAllister was not in custody when initially questioned by 
Morehart.  In reaching its decision, the Superior Court resolved certain credibility 
disputes in favor of the probation officers.  Such determinations by the trial court are 
entitled to substantial deference upon review.  Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 224 (Del. 
1999).   
"In order for a court to conclude that a suspect is in custody, it must be evident 
that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable man in the suspect’s position 
would feel a restraint on his freedom of movement fairly characterized as that ‘degree 
associated with formal arrest’ to such an extent that he would not feel free to leave." 
Torres v. State, 608 A.2d 731 (Del. 1992) (citations omitted).  At the time McAllister 
made the incriminating statement, he was in his own home, to which he had come 
 
 
14 
freely, there were no police officers present, the probation officers were not armed or 
blocking his exit in any way, and the questioning was direct and brief.  Under these 
circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the situation did not approximate 
formal arrest and was limited to the inquiries permitted between a probation officer and 
a person subject to supervision. 
    
V. 
Finally, McAllister objects to the introduction of Johnson’s statement to 
Morehart acknowledging that the padlocked room belonged to McAllister.  We review 
evidentiary decisions by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard.  Jones v. 
State, 798 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Del. 2002).  
Johnson was a reluctant State witness and, on direct examination, denied that 
McAllister had a key to the room.  The State then asked Johnson, as permitted by 11 
Del. C. § 3507, whether she had originally told Morehart that McAllister had a key to 
the bedroom.  Johnson replied that she did not remember.  Morehart was then called to 
the stand and questioned about what Johnson had told him.  Morehart testified that 
Johnson stated that McAllister stayed in the padlocked room.  McAllister objected 
because Johnson had been questioned only about possession of the key to the room, 
 
 
15 
not its occupancy.  The trial court withheld decision on the motion, giving the State an 
opportunity to recall Johnson to clarify.  The State decided not to recall Johnson, 
however.  Once the State indicated that it did not intend to recall Johnson, McAllister 
requested, and received, a curative instruction advising the jury to disregard any 
testimony that was the subject of a valid objection. 
McAllister argues that this instruction was not specific enough to cure the error.  
The State argues that any error was harmless because the fact that McAllister stayed in 
the room had already been established by other testimony.  We agree that the trial 
court’s instruction was sufficient to cure the defect and that, in any event, any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence solicited was merely 
cumulative.  DeAngelo v. State, 795 A.2d 667 (Del. 2002). 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.