Title: Teleguz v. Commonwealth (order)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 15th day of 
January, 2010. 
 
Ivan Teleguz, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
    against  
Record No. 080760 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed April 21, 2008, and the respondent’s motion to dismiss, the 
Court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted and the 
writ should not issue. 
Ivan Teleguz was convicted in the Circuit Court of Rockingham 
County of capital murder for hire.  Finding that the Commonwealth 
had proven the aggravating factors of "future dangerousness" and 
"vileness" beyond a reasonable doubt, see Code § 19.2-264.2, the 
jury fixed Teleguz’s sentence at death.  The trial court sentenced 
Teleguz in accordance with the jury verdict, and this Court 
affirmed Teleguz’s conviction and sentence.  Teleguz v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 466-67, 643 S.E.2d 708, 714 (2007), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1191 (2008). 
In claim (I), petitioner alleges he is actually innocent. 
The Court holds that claim (I) is barred because assertions of 
actual innocence are outside the scope of habeas corpus review, 
which concerns only the legality of the petitioner’s detention.  
 
2
Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259, 585 S.E.2d 801, 826-27 (2003). 
In claim (II), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to challenge the 
Commonwealth’s alleged motive for the crime and failed to "offer a 
viable alternative theory."  Petitioner contends that the 
Commonwealth’s theory that petitioner had his ex-girlfriend, 
Stephanie Sipe, killed because he was upset about paying child 
support could have been rebutted by evidence that Sipe’s death 
would not have impacted petitioner’s child support obligation.  
Petitioner contends that counsel should have called petitioner’s 
child support case manager to testify that petitioner paid adequate 
child support both before and after Sipe’s murder.  Petitioner 
further contends that counsel failed to present evidence that 
petitioner’s "former friends and associates" had motive and 
opportunity to kill Sipe, or that Aleksey Safanov and Gene Popov 
knew of Sipe’s "family drug activity," providing another reason for 
Safanov and Popov’s involvement in Sipe’s murder. 
The Court holds that claim (II) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
Petitioner fails to provide affidavits from any of the witnesses he 
contends counsel should have called; fails to allege that, had 
these issues been presented, the jury would have found him not 
 
3
guilty; and fails to allege that he knew that he would still be 
obligated to pay child support if Sipe died.  Furthermore, counsel 
elicited testimony from a key Commonwealth’s witness that Sipe was 
involved with drugs, and that petitioner was not solely upset about 
his child support obligation.  Notably, counsel also raised the 
child support issue during closing argument, stating, "It is common 
sense to know that if the mother of a child was killed . . . child 
support is still owed to a child," thus touching on the very issue 
petitioner now alleges counsel failed to raise.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient 
or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (III), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to present an 
alibi defense.  Petitioner contends that under the Commonwealth’s 
theory of the case, he could not have left Harrisonburg on the day 
of the murder before 4:15 a.m.  Petitioner alleges that the trip 
from Harrisonburg to Ephrata, Pennsylvania, where petitioner 
traveled upon leaving Virginia, takes three hours and fifty-three 
minutes.  Petitioner contends that he provided investigators with a 
receipt from an Ephrata Wal-Mart for items he purchased at 
approximately 8:14 a.m. after he had allegedly taken a shower and 
 
4
gotten dressed at his home in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, which is 
just south of Ephrata.  Petitioner contends that he informed 
counsel of this receipt, which would have demonstrated that he 
could not have left Harrisonburg as late as 4:15 a.m., but counsel 
unreasonably failed to request it or petitioner’s bank records. 
The Court holds that claim (III) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Leaving Harrisonburg at 4:15 a.m. and 
making a purchase at the Wal-Mart in Ephrata at approximately 8:14 
a.m. is not implausible, particularly in light of petitioner’s 
contention that the trip takes under four hours if obeying all 
speed limits.  Furthermore, petitioner does not allege how the 
outcome would have been different had the receipt been entered into 
evidence.  Exactly when petitioner left Virginia was not relevant 
to whether he had hired the killers, because no one contended that 
petitioner was at the scene of the murder when it took place or 
otherwise participated in the actual killing.  Thus, petitoner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (IV)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
 
5
impeach petitioner’s co-defendant’s account of the time of Sipe’s 
death.  Michael Hetrick testified that he killed Sipe early in the 
morning, but petitioner contends that several witnesses reported 
seeing Sipe alive later that afternoon and early evening.  
Petitioner further contends that testimony from these witnesses 
would have been consistent with the medical examiner’s opinion that 
Sipe died at 8:00 p.m., and with evidence that Sipe usually gave 
her son a bath in the afternoon or early evening, and that she was 
giving her son a bath when Hetrick killed her. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(A) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Sipe’s precise time of death was not 
relevant to whether petitioner hired the killers, and petitioner 
does not allege how presenting these issues would have changed the 
outcome at trial.  Furthermore, such evidence would have been 
cumulative of the medical examiner’s testimony that Sipe likely 
died around 8 o’clock in the evening. In addition, the record, 
including the trial transcripts, demonstrates that counsel 
thoroughly cross-examined petitioner’s co-defendants.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
 
6
In claim (IV)(B), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
impeach petitioner’s co-defendants’ testimony that petitioner had 
solicited them to kill Sipe at Dave Everhart’s birthday party in 
June 2001.  Petitioner contends that counsel unreasonably failed to 
call Latesha and Dave Everhart, who could have testified that 
petitioner was not at this party.  
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B) fails to satisfy the 
"prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Although petitioner alleges the Everharts would have contradicted 
Hetrick’s testimony that petitioner was at the birthday party, 
petitioner does not demonstrate, or even allege, how that testimony 
would have changed the outcome of the trial.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In a portion of claim (IV)(C), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel 
failed to impeach Hetrick’s testimony that Hetrick called 
petitioner after the murder to confirm that the killing had taken 
place and to arrange for his payment.  Petitioner contends that 
there is no evidence that he received a phone call at the phone 
number attributed to him by the Commonwealth, or that either 
 
7
Hetrick or Edwin Gilkes had a cellular phone, as Hetrick had 
testified.  Furthermore, the Commonwealth did not introduce any 
phone records. In support of his claim, petitioner provides a 
variety of phone records purportedly for the number(s) attributed 
to him by the Commonwealth, which he contends do not show a phone 
call was received from Hetrick "on or about July 23-24, 2001."  
Petitioner contends further that counsel should have challenged 
both the inconsistencies between Hetrick’s testimony and his 
statement to police, and Hetrick’s assertion that petitioner paid 
him on the Tuesday following the murder, as petitioner alleges he 
was either at work or being questioned by police that day. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IV)(C) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that counsel cross-examined Hetrick about 
inconsistencies in Hetrick’s testimony and his prior statements to 
police. Furthermore, Hetrick’s testimony provided evidence that 
Hetrick and Gilkes had a cellular phone, which Hetrick believed 
they used to contact petitioner.  The phone records provided by 
petitioner do not include July 24, 2001, and do not identify with 
clarity the source of the phone calls or the recipient.  These 
records, however, do reflect that two calls were received from 
unknown cellular numbers on July 23, 2001.  Therefore, the evidence 
 
8
petitioner now provides does not demonstrate that Hetrick did not 
call petitioner, as he had testified.  Petitioner does not allege 
how presenting such evidence would have changed the outcome of the 
trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (IV)(C), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel 
failed to impeach Hetrick’s testimony that petitioner picked him up 
on Saturday night at 8:00 p.m. on the night before the murder.  
Petitioner contends that counsel should have called Mike Millay to 
testify that petitioner was with Millay at 8:00 p.m. on that night. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (IV)(C) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including Millay’s 
affidavit and the trial transcript, demonstrates that Millay stated 
that he and petitioner parted ways between 9:00 p.m and 10:00 p.m., 
and Hetrick testified that petitioner picked him up after dark, 
"approximately nine, ten o’clock at night, possibly."  Therefore, 
presenting testimony that petitioner was with Millay at 8:00 p.m. 
the night before the murders would not have changed the outcome of 
the proceedings.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
 
9
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (V), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to impeach 
Aleksey Safanov, who testified that petitioner had asked him to 
kill Sipe a few months before Sipe was murdered.  Petitioner 
contends that trial counsel should have questioned Safanov about 
his prior inconsistent statements, the federal gun and drug 
trafficking charges against him arising from a scheme into which he 
had "temporarily lured" petitioner, his extensive criminal record, 
and the Commonwealth’s indication that he would receive leniency in 
exchange for his testimony.  Petitioner alleges trial counsel had 
documents and an audiotape that could have been used to clarify 
these issues and effectively impeach Safanov, which petitioner  
contends would have exposed why Safanov and his associates would 
have wanted to falsely incriminate petitioner. 
The Court holds that claim (V) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that counsel thoroughly cross-examined 
Safanov in an attempt to impeach his credibility.  Specifically, 
counsel questioned Safanov about his criminal convictions and the 
 
10
pending charges against him, including the federal gun trafficking 
charges, and whether he was testifying because he hoped he would 
receive leniency in those matters.  Safanov acknowledged that he 
had contemplated implicating petitioner in Sipe’s murder in order 
to receive a beneficial plea deal.  Questioning Safanov in further 
detail about his federal gun trafficking charges would have 
emphasized petitioner’s involvement in illegal weapons 
distribution, and could have lent credence to Hetrick’s belief that 
petitioner was a member of the "Russian Mafia."  Therefore, 
presenting such evidence "would have represented a ‘two edged 
sword’ that counsel often confront when constructing the strategy 
most likely to assist rather than harm a client."  Shaikh v. 
Johnson, 276 Va. 537, 548, 666 S.E.2d 325, 330 (2008).  Counsel 
also questioned Safanov about his inability to remember the 
specific time and place of the conversation in which he alleged 
petitioner had approached him about killing Sipe.  Petitioner fails 
to demonstrate what testimony counsel would have elicited had he 
conducted additional cross-examintion, and fails to allege how   
further exploration of these areas would have altered the outcome 
of the proceedings.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
11
In claim (VI), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to present 
testimony from FBI Agent Levphuk and from a confidential informant 
used to implicate Safanov in the federal gun trafficking case.  
Petitioner contends that testimony from Levphuk and the 
confidential informant would have effectively attacked Safanov’s 
conduct, character, and credibility. 
The Court holds that claim (VI) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner has failed to identify the 
confidential informant, proffer the testimony he contends the 
witnesses would have provided, or provide affidavits from Levphuk 
or the confidential informant identifying the testimony.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (VII), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to effectively 
cross-examine Detective Whitfield, one of the lead investigators of 
Sipe’s murder.  Petitioner contends that Whitfield should have been 
asked if his departure from the police department before 
petitioner’s trial was a result of his taping a conversation with 
 
12
an FBI agent without permission; whether Whitfield understood the 
ethical implications of taping such a conversation; if Levphuk had 
promised him anything; whether the Commonwealth took any measures 
to ensure Safanov was reliable and not involved in the murder; and 
why the Commonwealth had sought Safanov’s phone records. 
The Court holds that claim (VII) satsfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that Whitfield was cross-examined 
extensively.  Petitioner has not alleged what answers Whitfield 
would have provided to additional questions.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In a portion of claim (VIII), petitioner alleges the 
Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Petitioner contends that the 
Commonwealth did not provide counsel with the Wal-Mart receipt, 
which petitioner contends he gave to Detective Whitfield.  
Petitioner alleges the receipt would have established his alibi 
that he was in Ephrata, Pennsylvania at a time inconsistent with 
the Commonwealth’s theory of the case. 
 
13
The Court holds that this portion of claim (VIII) is barred 
because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 
27, 29-30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 
(1975). 
In another portion of claim (VIII), petitioner alleges the 
Commonwealth violated its Brady obligation by failing to disclose 
information regarding a meeting that petitioner contends occurred 
between an Assistant United States Attorney and Safanov, and 
regarding follow-up correspondence, which petitioner contends 
occurred between Detective Whitfield and Levphuk.  Petitioner 
argues that such information would have been valuable impeachment 
evidence.  In support of his claim, petitioner references a 
transcript of an audiotape found in defense counsel’s file, in 
which Detective Whitfield can be heard asking Levphuk to help him 
find Safanov. 
The Court holds that petitioner has failed to establish that a 
Brady violation has occurred.  Petitioner has not established that 
the alleged withheld evidence he contends exists, that it contained 
exculpatory information, or that it would have been valuable for 
impeachment purposes. 
In claim (IX), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
 
14
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to request the 
transcript, notes or report of the alleged meeting between Levphuk 
and Safanov, or any subsequent correspondence between Detective 
Whitfield and Levphuk. 
The Court holds that claim (IX) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner has not established that a 
meeting between Levphuk and Safanov actually took place.  He has 
not provided information regarding the substance of the alleged 
meeting or affidavits from Levphuk or Safanov demonstrating that 
they met.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (X), petitioner alleges the Commonwealth knowingly 
created "false impressions" that petitioner was a member of the 
"Russian Mafia" and was present at the Everharts’ party.  In 
addition, petitioner contends the Commonwealth knowingly presented 
false testimony by making Safanov their "star" witness despite 
knowing that he was not credible. 
The Court holds that claim (X) is barred because this non-
jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on direct 
appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a petition for a writ of 
 
15
habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 29-30, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
In claim (XI)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
make a successful objection to the references to petitioner’s 
alleged ties to the "Russian Mafia."  Petitioner acknowledges that 
counsel argued that such evidence should not be admitted because 
petitioner was not Russian and there was no alleged connection 
between the "Russian Mafia" and the crime itself.  Petitioner 
contends, however, that counsel did not attack the Commonwealth’s 
argument that references to the "Russian Mafia" were not being 
offered for their truth, and should have argued that the trial 
court should weigh the probative value of the evidence against its 
likely prejudicial effect.  Furthermore, counsel should have 
pointed out that no reference to the "Russian Mafia" was necessary 
for Hetrick to explain why he feared petitioner.  Petitioner 
contends that, had counsel made proper objections, the trial court 
would have limited the references to the "Russian Mafia." 
The Court holds that claim (XI)(A) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including pre-trial motions, 
transcripts and orders, demonstrates that trial counsel filed a 
motion in limine seeking to prohibit the Commonwealth from 
introducing evidence or making comments concerning the "Russian 
 
16
Mafia."  Contrary to petitioner’s claim, counsel argued in the 
motion that the comments were not relevant, were highly 
prejudicial, and that the probative value was "substantially 
outweighed" by the prejudicial impact.  Additionally, at the 
hearing on the motion in limine, counsel argued that references to 
the "Russian Mafia" should be excluded because petitioner is 
Ukrainian; has no connection to the "Russian Mafia" or other 
criminal organization; any connection was irrelevant to the 
Commonwealth’s alleged motive for the murder; and such references 
would "inflame the jury’s passion and focus them on issues that 
[we]re not at hand in this case."  Again contrary to petitioner’s 
claim, counsel also argued that Hetrick could testify concerning 
why he was "scared or scared of retaliation" without referencing 
the "Russian Mafia." Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XI)(B), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
move for a mistrial after a juror asked the bailiff whether 
petitioner knew her identity or location.  Petitioner contends that 
the question revealed that the jurors were no longer following the 
trial court’s instructions and did not intend to base their verdict 
 
17
solely on the evidence and the law. 
The Court holds that claim (XI)(B) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that the trial court assured the jurors 
that the law requires that defense counsel be provided with the 
jurors’ names, addresses, and occupations, but that "[a]s a matter 
of course, attorneys do not provide copies of this master list to 
their clients."  This correct statement provided no basis for a 
mistrial.  Furthermore, the instruction should have sufficed to 
quiet the jurors’ concern, and jurors are presumed to follow the 
instructions of the trial court.  Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
451, 524, 619 S.E.2d 16, 58 (2005).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XI)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel unreasonably 
failed to interview jurors and present a post-trial motion arguing 
that jurors were so focused on the "Russian Mafia" that they feared 
for their lives.  Petitioner contends that jurors feared personal 
repercussions as a result of their involvement in the case, and 
counsel should have discovered this information and presented it to 
 
18
the trial court or included it in the argument on direct appeal. 
 
The Court holds that claim (XI)(C) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Virginia courts "have adhered strictly 
to the general rule that the testimony of jurors should not be 
received to impeach their verdict."  Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. 
Hulvey, 233 Va. 77, 82, 353 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1987).  "Moreover, the 
unanimous verdict is the best evidence of each juror’s opinion of 
the case."  Id.  Trial counsel’s "failure" to interview jurors and 
present a post-trial motion arguing the jury was unduly influenced 
as a result of the testimony and evidence at trial was, therefore, 
a reasonable one.  Furthermore, there is no evidence properly 
before this Court to support petitioner’s claim that jurors were so 
focused on the "Russian Mafia" that they feared for their lives.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XI)(D), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
rebut evidence regarding petitioner’s connection to the "Russian 
Mafia" by asking Dan Comer about his belief that there was no 
"Russian Mafia" and that petitioner was not a member. 
 
19
The Court holds that claim (XI)(D) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner has failed to present an 
affidavit from Comer to verify that Comer would have tesified as 
petitioner contends.  Furthermore, petitioner fails to articulate 
how Comer’s alleged "belief" would have been relevant or 
admissible.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s peformance was deficient or that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (XII), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to move for a 
mistrial when the Commonwealth "repeatedly and willfully violated 
the trial court’s order not to make reference to Teleguz’s alleged 
lack of emotion during pre-custodial questioning."  Petitioner 
contends also that counsel’s failure to present the testimony of a 
"cultural expert" to show that outward displays of emotion are 
unacceptable in Ukrainian society exacerbated the Commonwealth’s 
suggestion that petitioner lacked remorse.  Petitioner asserts that 
these references were prejudicial and there is a reasonable 
likelihood the trial court would have granted a mistrial had 
counsel moved for one. 
The Court holds that claim (XII) satisfies neither the 
 
20
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, pre-trial motions and orders of the trial court, 
demonstrates that the trial court did not rule that the 
Commonwealth could not refer to petitioner’s general "lack of 
emotion."  Rather, the trial court initially denied petitioner’s 
motion in limine to exclude evidence of petitioner’s pre-custodial 
silence in response to questioning.  The trial court further ruled 
that, before such evidence could be elicited, the court would 
revisit the issue outside the presence of the jury.  Thereafter, 
during opening statements, the Commonwealth informed the jury that 
it intended to present evidence that petitioner showed no remorse 
when he was informed that his ex-girlfriend had been murdered.  The 
trial court later ruled that petitioner’s "lack of remorse" upon 
being informed of Sipe’s murder had constituted an invocation of 
his right to remain silent and barred the Commonwealth from 
presenting such evidence at trial.  The Commonwealth’s last 
reference to petitioner’s "lack of remorse" concerned only 
petitioner’s demeanor during trial which was visible to the jury 
and did not implicate petitioner’s right to remain silent.  
Petitioner has, therefore, failed to establish any violation of the 
trial court’s ruling, or any valid legal basis upon which counsel 
could have objected.  Furthermore, petitioner fails to proffer any 
 
21
evidence to support his theory that a "cultural expert" would have 
testified as he contends.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XIII)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
object to the Commonwealth’s "improper and prejudicial" statements 
during closing argument.  Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth 
indicated that petitioner could arrange killings through the 
"Russian Mafia" even if incarcerated, and that this suggestion 
invited the jurors to decide the case based upon fear for their own 
personal safety and not upon the law and the evidence.  Petitioner 
asserts that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of 
the proceeding would have been different had the jurors not been in 
fear for their safety and for the safety of their families. 
The Court holds that claim (XIII)(A) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that during closing argument, the 
Commonwealth’s attorney stated that petitioner was a future danger 
because "he can pick up a phone . . . and dial up a murder because 
he can call another Aleksey Safanov or another Edwin Gilkes or 
 
22
another Michael Hetrick."  These were the facts of the case, not 
"improper" statements, and petitioner’s assertion that the 
Commonwealth referenced the "Russian Mafia" during this argument is 
unsupported by the record.  The Commonwealth further argued that 
the "community" and petitioner’s son needed protection from his 
future dangerousness.  Petitioner mischaracterizes these comments 
as a plea to the jurors’ sense of personal safety rather than what 
they actually were: specific references to the community where the 
murder took place and the child, who was in another room as his 
mother was killed.  Furthermore, in petitioner’s direct appeal, 
this Court specifically found "that the prosecutor's statements 
were not addressed to the jurors’ safety and security, and even if 
that was a fair inference, the record does not support a conclusion 
that the jury was concerned about the issue. Even assuming that the 
jurors harbored sufficient concern about their safety the record 
does not reveal that such concern influenced their decision to 
recommend the death penalty."  Teleguz, 273 Va. at 495, 643 S.E.2d 
at 731.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XIII)(B), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
 
23
object when the Commonwealth referenced the "worth" of the victim’s 
life during closing argument. Petitioner argues that because the 
jury had questioned the consequences of failing to reach a 
unanimous verdict, this was a close case, in which such arguments 
are prejudicial. 
The Court holds that claim (XIII)(B) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  This Court has previously held that 
"victim impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital 
murder prosecution in Virginia." Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (1994).  The record, including the 
trial transcripts, demonstrates that the Commonwealth’s comment 
about the "worth" of the victim’s life was based upon victim impact 
evidence already in the record.  Petitioner does not argue that the 
comments, standing alone, were factually inaccurate or unsupported 
by the record.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XIV), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to ensure that the 
jurors were properly instructed.  Petitioner proffers an affidavit 
from a juror indicating that the juror misunderstood the 
 
24
instructions and believed that, upon a finding of both aggravating 
factors, death was presumed the appropriate sentence.  Petitioner 
contends that counsel should have questioned the juror and raised 
this issue post-trial and on appeal.  
The Court holds that claim (XIV) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner demonstrates only that a 
juror misunderstood the instructions, but he does not allege that 
the jurors were improperly instructed. Furthermore, the record, 
including the trial transcript, written jury instructions, and 
verdict forms, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed. 
See Prieto v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 366, 682 S.E.2d 910 (2009).  
Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.  
Muhammad, 269 Va. at 524, 619 S.E.2d at 58.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (XV), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to present the 
testimony of petitioner’s mental health expert at sentencing.  
Petitioner contends that the expert would have explained the effect 
petitioner’s childhood had on his behavior, and counsel should have 
 
25
informed the trial court about the importance of this testimony in 
order to get it admitted.  Petitioner further alleges that counsel 
should have informed the trial court about a recent decision from 
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, allowing a defendant in a 
capital murder case to present expert testimony after the trial 
court advised the jury that the defendant had failed to cooperate 
with the Commonwealth’s expert. 
The Court holds that claim (XV) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Code § 19.2-264.3:1 provides for expert 
testimony in support of a claim in mitigation in capital murder 
cases relating to the defendant’s history, character, or mental 
condition.  If a defendant chooses to present such testimony, the 
Commonwealth may seek its own evaluation.  Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(F)(1).  Should the defendant refuse to be evaluated by the 
Commonwealth’s expert, the trial court may admit evidence of such 
refusal or, in the discretion of the court, bar the defendant from 
presenting his expert evidence.  Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2).  The 
record, including the trial transcripts, reveals that petitioner 
refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth’s expert and that the 
trial court explained to petitioner the ramifications that could 
result from refusing to cooperate with the Commonwealth’s expert, 
including the potential exclusion of his own expert’s testimony, 
 
26
and provided petitioner with another opportunity to be evaluated by 
the Commonwealth’s expert.  Petitioner again refused, and the trial 
court acted within its discretion in barring petitioner from 
presenting expert testimony.  Although petitioner alleges trial 
counsel should have informed the trial court of a different 
jurisdiction’s decision to admit a defendant’s expert’s testimony 
despite the defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth’s expert, petitioner can not demonstrate that such an 
argument would have altered the trial court’s exercise of 
discretion in this case and does not allege how the sentencing 
outcome would have been different had his expert been allowed to 
testify.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XVI), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to object to the 
trial court’s response to the jury’s question regarding the 
sentencing option of life imprisonment plus a fine.  Petitioner 
asserts that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question, 
that in all likelihood petitioner would not be able to pay a fine 
while incarcerated, indicated that a fine would have no consequence 
and essentially limited the jury’s sentencing options. 
 
27
The Court holds that claim (XVI) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, reveals that the trial court informed the jury that, 
"[a]s a practical matter a defendant who is incarcerated and is 
otherwise without means has no practical means of paying such a 
fine.  However, if that inmate were to inherit a large sum of money 
or in some way come in to a portion of sums of money the 
Commonwealth would have a claim on those funds."  Jurors are 
presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court.  Muhammad, 
269 Va. at 524, 619 S.E.2d at 58.  Furthermore, this response 
demonstrated to the jury that a fine would have a consequence, as 
any amount of money obtained by the petitioner would be subject to 
seizure, did not foreclose the option of fining the petitioner, and 
certainly did not improperly limit the jury’s choice as to 
sentence.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (XVII), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel unreasonably 
failed to object to the trial court’s response to a juror’s concern 
regarding petitioner’s potential access to the juror’s contact 
 
28
information, failed to propose a method to assure jurors that 
petitioner did not have access to their personal information, and 
failed to request the trial court re-open the evidence so that 
petitioner could present testimony regarding the inmate phone 
privileges. 
The Court holds that claim (XVII) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that the trial court assured the jurors 
that the law requires that defense counsel be provided with the 
jurors’ names, addresses, and occupations, but that "[a]s a matter 
of course, attorneys do not provide copies of this master list to 
their clients."  Petitioner does not suggest any legal grounds upon 
which counsel could have objected to this instruction.  
Furthermore, the instruction should have sufficed to quiet the 
jurors’ concern, and jurors are presumed to follow the instructions 
of the trial court.  Muhammad, 269 Va. at 524, 619 S.E.2d at 58.  
Petitioner also fails to proffer what evidence would have been 
gained from presenting testimony regarding inmate phone privileges.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
 
29
In claim (XVIII), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
insist on a ruling on his motion for a continuance after learning 
that Detective Whitfield was prepared to testify that Mark Moore 
had identified petitioner as someone he saw leaving Sipe’s 
apartment in the days before the murder.  Petitioner alleges Moore 
was the only witness who placed petitioner near the crime scene 
around the time of the murder, and the continuance would have 
allowed counsel time to gather evidence to impeach Moore and the 
investigator who showed him the photo lineup from which Moore 
identified petitioner. 
The Court holds that claim (XVIII) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner was not charged with being 
the actual perpetrator of the wounds inflicted on Sipe.  Therefore, 
impeaching Moore’s testimony regarding whether petitioner was 
present at Sipe’s and his child’s apartment in the days prior to 
her murder would not have undermined the testimony that petitioner 
had hired others to do the killing.  Furthermore, at the time 
Detective Whitfield testified that Moore identified petitioner from 
a photo lineup, Moore had already testified that he had done the 
same.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
 
30
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In a portion of claim (XIX), petitioner alleges he was denied 
the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to 
secure the testimony of two material witnesses: Kimberly Woods and 
Jessica Swartz.  Petitioner contends that the witnesses would have 
testified that Hetrick had bragged about killing other people, had 
threatened them, and was comfortable with knives.  Petitioner 
alleges counsel unreasonably failed to show that Swartz was a 
material witness requiring an out-of-state subpoena.  Petitioner 
further alleges that, after the trial court ruled Woods’ testimony 
irrelevant, counsel should have explained that the testimony would 
demonstrate that it was likely that Hetrick had decided to kill 
Sipe with a knife without petitioner’s suggestion.  Petitioner 
claims that the testimony would have rebutted the Commonwealth’s 
assertion that petitioner planned even the smallest details of the 
murder.  Petitioner further claims that the testimony would have 
rebutted the Commonwealth’s arguments that the vileness of the 
crime be imputed to petitioner because he specified the way in 
which the crime was to be committed, and that petitioner was more 
culpable than Hetrick.  Petitioner contends that had this evidence 
been admitted, the jury would not have found vileness, or would  
have assessed the moral responsibility for the crime differently 
 
31
and rendered a different sentence. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (XIX) satisfies 
neither the "performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, the pre-trial motions and orders from both the Circuit 
Court of Rockingham County and the Pennsylvania court, demonstrates 
that both courts accepted petitioner’s proffer that these witnesses 
were material.  The Pennsylvania court declined to compel Swartz to 
travel to Virginia and testify because she would have been caused 
an "undue hardship."  In response to the trial court’s 
determination that a continuance would not be granted to secure 
Woods’ presence because her testimony was irrelevant, counsel 
argued that her testimony would show that Hetrick had threatened to 
kill her before by "cut[ting] her throat," and that this would 
demonstrate that the plan to cut Sipe’s throat in the instant case 
did not originate with petitioner.  Furthermore, as the trial court 
held, the phrase "cut your throat" is not a term of art, and simply 
because Hetrick threatened to cut Woods’ throat does not mean that 
it was Hetrick’s idea alone to cut Sipe’s throat.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient 
or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
32
In another portion of claim (XIX), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel because 
counsel failed to preserve or adequately brief the issues related 
to Woods’ proffered testimony. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (XIX) fails to 
satisfy the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  Petitioner fails to articulate how Woods’ testimony 
would have been admissible, fails to demonstrate that it was 
relevant, and fails to proffer the valid legal arguments he 
contends counsel should have raised on appeal.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the appeal 
would have been different. 
In claim (XX), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to present risk 
assessment evidence to rebut the claim of future dangerousness 
during petitioner’s sentencing hearing.  Specifically, petitioner 
contends that counsel should have requested an expert on risk 
assessment to address the likelihood that petitioner would engage 
in violent behavior if sentenced to life imprisonment.  Petitioner 
alleges that counsel’s decision not to request such an expert was 
unreasonable in light of the fact that a risk assessment expert is 
routinely appointed in capital cases. 
 
33
The Court holds that claim (XX) satisfies neither the 
"performance" nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to proffer the specific 
testimony such an expert would have provided.  Furthermore, "a 
determination of future dangerousness revolves around an individual 
defendant and a specific crime," Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 
203, 249, 661 S.E.2d 415, 438 (2008)(internal quotation marks 
omitted), and "what a person may expect in the penal system is not 
relevant mitigation evidence," Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 
292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (1999).  Therefore, the testimony 
petitioner alleges counsel should have presented would have been 
inadmissible.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In an unnumbered claim, petitioner alleges that "[a]ll 
allegations of error and prejudice are made both as individual and 
cumulative error with both individual and cumulative effect."   
As addressed previously, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged errors.  "Having 
rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, there is no 
support for the proposition that such actions when considered 
collectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional right 
 
34
to effective assistance of counsel."  Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex 
I State Prison, 267 Va. 318, 340, 593 S.E.2d 292, 305 (2004). 
Upon consideration whereof, petitioner’s motions for the 
appointment of a risk assessment expert, for the appointment of a 
cultural expert, for an evidentiary hearing, to compel disclosure 
of discovery and exculpatory information, and to set aside the 
conviction and sentence are denied.  Upon consideration whereof, 
the respondent’s motion "to strike certain materials improperly 
submitted as affidavits" is denied.  The Court will, however, apply 
the appropriate evidentiary rules when considering the 
admissibility of the affidavits and of any statements contained in 
the affidavits. 
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy,   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk