Title: JOHNSON v. REIGER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHNSON v. REIGER2004 WY 8393 P.3d 992Case Number: 03-123Decided: 07/15/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

JOAN 
REA JOHNSON, Individually and as

Conservator 
for DONALD R. JOHNSON,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

LINDA 
J. REIGER and GERALD REIGER,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
R. Michael Shickich of the Law Offices of R. Michael Shickich, LLC, 
Casper, Wyoming and Keith P. Tyler of Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Shickich.

 

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Pro se.  Argument by 
Mr. Reiger.  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Joan Rea Johnson 
(Mrs. Johnson), individually and as conservator for her husband, Donald R. 
Johnson (Mr. Johnson), filed claims for undue influence, constructive fraud, 
conversion and replevin against her daughter and son-in-law, Linda and Gerald 
Reiger (the Reigers), alleging that they wrongfully persuaded Mr. and Mrs. 
Johnson to transfer over to them 596 shares of stock in the Johnson family ranch 
valued at $1,500 per share.  The 
claims against the Reigers were tried to a jury but at the close of Mrs. 
Johnson's case the district court entered judgment as a matter of law for the 
Reigers.  Mrs. Johnson appeals that 
judgment and we reverse, holding that questions of fact existed for jury 
determination on the claims of undue influence, constructive fraud and 
conversion.   

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mrs. Johnson 
raises the following issues:

 

(1)       Whether the 
trial court improperly analyzed the law of undue influence when it entered 
judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

 

(2)       Whether the 
trial court improperly analyzed the law of constructive fraud when it entered 
judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

 

(3)       Whether the 
trial court improperly analyzed the law of conversion when it entered judgment 
as a matter of law on this claim.

 

(4)       Whether the 
trial court erred when it denied plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence.

 

(5)       Whether the 
trial court improperly decided damage questions, rather [than] allowing the 
jury, when it entered judgment as a matter of law.

 

[¶3]      The Reigers, 
appearing pro se, did not present any issues for 
review.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The Rim Rock 
Ranch, located in Natrona County, Wyoming, has been owned and operated by the 
Johnson family since it was homesteaded in the early 1900s.  Mr. and Mrs. Johnson were married in 
1946 and have lived and worked on the ranch since that time.  When Mr. Johnson's father passed away, 
ownership of the ranch passed to Mr. Johnson and his brother, and Mr. Johnson 
took over ranch operations.  

 

[¶5]      In 1999, Mr. 
Johnson fell ill, and the Reigers moved him to Denver to be near them while he 
recuperated.  Not long thereafter, 
Mrs. Johnson was diagnosed with congestive heart failure.  Mr. Johnson was subsequently declared 
legally incompetent and Mrs. Johnson was appointed guardian. 

 

[¶6]      Up until his 
illness in 1999, Mr. Johnson took care of the couple's financial affairs.  Mrs. Johnson had not been involved in 
and had no knowledge of the ranch finances.  After Mr. Johnson's illness, a family 
meeting was convened at the ranch over Labor Day 1999 and was attended by Mrs. 
Johnson, the Reigers, the Johnsons' other daughter Melissa Larson and her 
husband Tim, and the Johnsons' son Johnny Johnson and his wife Patty.  The Johnsons' other son Paul was not 
present at the meeting.  The purpose 
of the meeting was to assist Mrs. Johnson in figuring out the couple's 
finances.  During the weekend, the 
family discovered that Mr. Johnson had been covering expenses with credit cards 
and had incurred $54,000 in credit card debt.  At this, and subsequent meetings, family 
members devised a plan for payment of the credit card debt whereby each of the 
four Johnson children would be responsible for one-quarter of the debt.  In exchange for their assumption of the 
debt, Mrs. Johnson would transfer the stock in the ranch to the four 
children.  In all, Mrs. Johnson 
claimed she transferred to her four children 596 of the 614 shares held by her 
and Mr. Johnson.  Valued at $1,500 
per share, the total value of the transferred stock was 
$894,000.

 

[¶7]      In May of 2001, 
Mrs. Johnson filed a complaint against three of her children claiming undue 
influence, conversion, constructive fraud, replevin and civil conspiracy. Prior 
to the filing, the oldest son, John, returned the stock he had received to his 
mother. After the complaint was filed, Paul Johnson and Melissa Larson returned 
the stock they had received and were dismissed from the action.  The case went to trial against the 
Reigers, who appeared in the action pro se, as they do on appeal.  Mrs. Johnson proceeded on the theory 
that, due to her husband's illness, her own poor health, her lack of knowledge 
and experience with financial matters, and her reliance on Mr. Reiger who 
allegedly had some expertise in financial matters, she was unduly influenced 
into transferring stock in exchange for her children's assumption of a debt  
stock of significantly greater value than the debt assumed.  On the third day of trial, after the 
close of Mrs. Johnson's case-in-chief, the trial court granted the Reigers' 
sua sponte motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding in relevant 
part as follows:  

 

(1)   undue 
influence is not an independent cause of action under Wyoming law, and although 
undue influence may be considered in connection with the plaintiff's other 
claims, plaintiffs  presented  no  
evidence  that  they  actually  were

influenced 
by the defendants, whether unduly or otherwise; (2) constructive fraud is an 
equitable claim and the plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the defendants 
had any legal or equitable duty to the plaintiffs, or that, assuming such a duty 
existed, there was a breach of this duty; (3) plaintiffs' conversion claim fails 
because plaintiffs transferred title to the stock at issue and there is no 
evidence that the transfer was the result of undue influence by the defendants 
under the definitions of undue influence that exist in Wyoming case law; . . . 

 

The 
trial court determined the maximum number of shares at issue was 144 shares and 
held the Reigers were entitled to retain that number of shares.  Mrs. Johnson timely appealed, claiming 
that 225 shares with a value of $337,500 were at issue and that sufficient 
evidence was presented on her claims of undue influence, conversion and 
constructive fraud to warrant denial of the Reigers' motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.     

            

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

 [¶8]     Judgment as a matter of 
law should be granted cautiously and sparingly.  Dewey v. Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶ 
28, 38 P.3d 402, ¶ 28 (Wyo. 2002).  
However, where the evidence is not legally sufficient to support a claim, 
the district court has an obligation to enter such a judgment.  Id.  We review de novo a decision to grant or 
deny judgment as a matter of law, meaning we examine the record anew affording 
no deference to the district court's views.  Id.  The test is whether the evidence 
appearing in the record is such that reasonable persons could reach but one 
verdict.  Id.  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.  Id.  When the evidence permits more than one 
reasonable inference or the inferences favorable to the moving party are subject 
to doubt, the matter is properly for the jury to decide and a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law must be denied.   Id.     

  

 

DISCUSSION

1.         
Undue Influence

 

[¶9]      Mrs. Johnson 
claims the district court improperly analyzed the law of undue influence when it 
granted the Reigers' motion.  She 
claims, first, the district court erred in summarily concluding there was no 
confidential relationship between the parties as required for an undue influence 
claim; second, the district court erred when it held in essence that an undue 
influence claim cannot be established by circumstantial evidence; and, third, 
even under the strictest of standards, the evidence was sufficient to withstand 
the motion and submit the issue of undue influence to the jury.  The Reigers respond generally that the 
evidence presented by Mrs. Johnson did not substantiate her allegations and was 
disproved by other evidence presented to the district court.1  We hold that the district court erred in 
granting the Reigers' motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.

 

[¶10]   Contrary to the district court's 
conclusion that undue influence is not an independent cause of action in 
Wyoming, this Court has recognized the claim in a number of cases involving 
inter vivos or testamentary transactions.  Marchant v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551 
(Wyo. 1998); Bowers v. Hawkey, 837 P.2d 78 (Wyo. 1992); In re Estate 
of Waters v. Holkan, 629 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1981).  In order to prove undue influence in an 
inter vivos transaction, the plaintiff must show:  1) opportunity to control; 2) a 
condition permitting subversion; and 3) activity on the part of the person 
charged.  Marchant, 967 P.2d  
at 558.  We have said transactions 
will be carefully scrutinized where the parties involved have a confidential 
relationship.  Id.  Once the person seeking to void the 
transaction establishes that a confidential relationship existed between the 
grantor and grantee, the burden shifts to the grantee to prove the transaction 
was fair and conducted in good faith.  Id.  The party asserting the claim must 
present evidence showing the actual application of control and undue influence 
by the party charged with exercising undue influence.  Id. 

 

[¶11]   In the context of an undue 
influence claim, the existence of a family relationship alone is not enough to 
establish the requisite confidential relationship.  Walsh v. Walsh, 841 P.2d 831, 835 
(Wyo. 1992).  Such a relationship 
can be shown, however, by evidence that one party is under the domination of 
another or, because of the relation between them, is justified in assuming that 
the other party will not act in a manner inconsistent with his or her 
welfare.  Johnson v. Soulis, 
542 P.2d 867, 874 (Wyo. 1975); Walsh, 841 P.2d  at 834.  A grantor's dependence on the grantee 
may also create a confidential relationship.  Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776, 
783 (Wyo. 1991); Walsh, 841 P.2d  at 835.   

 

[¶12]   We applied these factors in 
Marchant to uphold summary judgment on an undue influence claim where the 
party asserting the claim testified she had no facts tending to show that the 
party against whom she alleged the claim exercised control over, manipulated or 
directed the grantor to transfer the stock at issue and, in fact, had no 
information whatsoever concerning the grantor's reasons for making the 
transfer.  We concluded from this 
testimony that the undue influence claim was based upon suspicion rather than 
actual facts.  Id. at 
558.  We said the evidence was 
insufficient to show that the grantor's mental abilities were failing or that 
the party charged with undue influence was aware his abilities were 
failing.  Id.  We also held specific evidence proving 
the exertion of undue influence or control was required.  Id.  

 

[¶13]   We reached the same result in 
Estate of Short, 785 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Wyo. 1990), affirming summary 
judgment on an undue influence claim where no evidence was presented that the 
party against whom the claim was made controlled or influenced the transaction 
at issue and two witnesses testified the grantor managed his own financial 
affairs.  Likewise, we affirmed a 
summary judgment in Walsh, 841 P.2d  at 835, where there was no showing of 
a confidential relationship, dependency or reliance by the grantor or 
involvement in the transaction by those charged with undue 
influence.

 

[¶14]   In contrast, in Bowers, 837 P.2d 78 (Wyo. 1992), we affirmed the trial court's finding of undue influence 
where the evidence presented showed in pertinent part: 

 

[The 
grantor]'s condition and situation were such that he needed guidance, direction, 
and advice on business and legal matters. The [grantees] recognized this and, in 
fact, provided such assistance. . . . [They] accompanied  [him] on trips to the attorney's office 
and helped counsel and advise him in the course of the proceedings. . . 
.

 

[The 
grantor] trusted the [grantees] and believed that they were looking out for his 
best interest.

 

. 
. . 

 

            
The [grantees'] close and confidential relationship with [the grantor] 
provided them an opportunity to exert influence and control, and [the grantor's] 
mental condition and alcoholism certainly were such as to permit subversion. 
There was activity on the part of the [grantees]. They guided [the grantor] 
through business and legal matters and then into execution of the subject lease. 

 

 

[¶15]   With this precedent in mind, we 
examine the evidence supporting Mrs. Johnson's undue influence claim.2  Mrs. Johnson testified Mr. Johnson took 
care of the ranch finances and she had no understanding of their financial 
affairs when he became ill in August of 1999.  She testified that after the Reigers 
took Mr. Johnson to Denver and she was diagnosed with congestive heart failure, 
she turned to her children because she "needed help to figure out where [she] 
was headed."  She testified that she 
looked specifically to Mr. Reiger for help because he had the most business 
experience of all her children and in-laws.  

 

[¶16]   Mrs. Johnson testified that before 
the Labor Day family meeting, her children told her to work up a yearly budget, 
which she attempted to do despite her limited knowledge of financial matters 
such as property and income taxes.  
During the Labor Day weekend, Mrs. Johnson's daughter, Melissa, 
discovered the credit card statements as she was looking through papers in Mr. 
Johnson's office.  The children 
informed Mrs. Johnson about the $54,000 credit card debt that weekend.   

 

[¶17]   Later in September, Mr. and Mrs. 
Johnson, their daughter Melissa, their son John and his wife Patty, and Mr. 
Reiger met with a lawyer and an accountant.  Mrs. Johnson testified that Mr. Reiger 
had an agenda prepared, which was followed during the meeting, and she relied 
upon him during the meeting.  After 
the meeting, she received pressure from the Reigers to transfer the stock.  During this same time, Mrs. Johnson went 
back to the doctor and learned she had other serious health problems. She 
testified she thought at the time her days were numbered.  She also learned during this time frame 
that her son Paul had suffered a heart attack. 

 

[¶18]   The day after she learned about 
Paul's heart attack, Mrs. Johnson's son-in-law Tim Larson arrived at the ranch 
from Colorado.  Mrs. Johnson signed 
over her stock certificates, retaining ten shares for Mr. Johnson and eight 
shares for herself and giving the remainder of the stock she and Mr. Johnson 
owned to Mr. Larson.  She testified 
her children suggested she transfer the stock and she did not understand the 
consequences of the transfer, did not know how much the stock was worth, was 
feeling overwhelmed at the time and gave the certificates to her son-in-law 
because she did not believe she was going to live much longer.  She also testified she thought she and 
her children and their families were working together as a family to figure out 
the finances.

 

[¶19]   Mr. Reiger testified that the idea 
for the transfer of stock to the Johnsons' children was his and he proposed it 
to the rest of the family at the Labor Day meeting.  He also testified that he never told 
Mrs. Johnson that the "gift" of stock was worth considerably more than the 
$54,000 debt payment in return for which the stock transfer was made a 
condition.  Mrs. Reiger confirmed 
that it was her husband who made the proposal for paying off the $54,000 debt in 
return for the stock transfer.   

 

[¶20]   Bruce Kahn, M.D., a psychiatrist 
specializing in geriatric psychiatry, testified that in his opinion Mr. Johnson 
was suffering from unequivocal dementia and would not have had sufficient mental 
capacity to engage in financial transactions or manage his own personal or 
financial affairs in the fall of 1999.  
Douglas McLaughlin, the attorney the family met with in September 1999, 
also testified that Mr. Johnson was not competent to discuss financial 
decisions.  As for Mrs. Johnson, Dr. 
Kahn testified that in his opinion she was under considerable to extreme 
emotional distress due to the events occurring in her life in August and 
September of 1999 and was extremely susceptible to undue influence.     Mr. McLaughlin 
similarly testified that Mrs. Johnson did not look well and did not seem to 
understand the financial matters being discussed.  He testified that he had the impression 
Mr. Reiger was involved in the financial planning profession and that he and 
Mrs. Johnson's children dominated the meeting.     

 

[¶21]   Viewing this evidence in the light 
most favorable to Mrs. Johnson and giving to her all reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn from it, we conclude the evidence presented raised the inference 
that the Johnsons' decision to transfer the shares of stock to their children 
was unduly influenced by the Reigers.  
Mrs. Johnson presented evidence from which it might be concluded that a 
confidential relationship existed between herself and the Reigers, i.e. that she 
was dependent upon them for advice in sorting out her financial affairs and was 
justified in assuming they would not act in a manner inconsistent with her 
welfare.  Perry, 624 P.2d  at 
783.  Borrowing the language from 
Bowers 837 P.2d  at 80, the evidence presented raised an inference that 
Mrs. Johnson's "condition and situation were such that [she] needed guidance, 
direction and advice on [financial] matters" and that the Reigers "recognized 
this and, in fact, provided such assistance."  Additionally, as in Bowers, a 
reasonable inference could be made that the Reigers' active involvement in Mrs. 
Johnson's financial affairs after Mr. Johnson's illness "provided them an 
opportunity to exert influence and control" and Mrs. Johnson's own health 
problems combined with the other recent and ongoing events in her life permitted 
subversion.  Also as in 
Bowers, there was activity on the part of the Reigers, who helped guide 
Mrs. Johnson through her financial difficulties and came up with the plan for 
payment of the debt in exchange for transfer of the stock.  Although Bowers involved more 
compelling facts which showed the grantor depended upon others for his care, 
suffered mental limitations, was unable to make responsible decisions and was 
highly susceptible to the influence of others, facts that were not present in 
Mrs. Johnson's case, we conclude the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Mrs. Johnson, was sufficient at least to raise an inference that a 
confidential relationship existed, shifting the burden to the Reigers to show 
the transaction Mr. Reiger proposed was fair and conducted in good faith.  The entry of judgment as a matter of law 
was not appropriate on the undue influence claim but was properly a matter for 
the jury to decide.  

   

 

2.         
Constructive Fraud

 

[¶22]               
Constructive fraud has been defined as consisting of all acts, omissions, 
and concealments involving breaches of a legal or equitable duty resulting in 
damage to another, and exists where such conduct, although not actually 
fraudulent, ought to be so treated when it has the same consequence and legal 
effects.

 

In 
re Estate of Borton, 
393 P.2d 808, 812 (Wyo. 1964).  The 
district court held Mrs. Johnson's constructive fraud claim failed because she 
presented no evidence that the Reigers owed her a legal or equitable duty.  

 

[¶23]   Whether a duty exists is a question 
of law for the court to decide.  
Lee v. LPP Mortg. Ltd., 2003 WY 92, ¶ 20, 74 P.3d 152, ¶ 20 
(Wyo. 2003).  The existence of a 
duty is "to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, 
principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only 
by the court."   Id., 
quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 37 
(5th ed.1984).  Once it is 
determined that a duty exists as a matter of law, then any claimed breach of 
that duty presents a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.  Id.  

 

[¶24]   Ordinarily, for a duty to arise 
under circumstances like those presented in this case, a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence must exist between the parties.   Id., ¶ 21.  Two basic types of fiduciary 
relationships exist.  
Id.  The first type is 
based on formal legal relationships, such as trustee-beneficiary, partnership, 
attorney-client, and principal-agency relationships, and is clearly not 
applicable to the Johnsons' claim against the Reigers.  The second type is an informal fiduciary 
relationship, which is implied in law due to the factual situation surrounding 
the involved transaction, and the relationship of the parties to each other and 
to the transaction.  Id.  This second type of relationship is 
often called a confidential relationship and would be considered a relation of 
trust and confidence.  
Id.  When determining 
whether the second type of fiduciary relationship exists, we are to consider the 
relationship of the parties to each other and to the transaction.  Id.  Such a relationship exists when one 
party has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with 
the other's interests in mind.  
Id.  

 

[¶25]   Fiduciary relationships are 
extraordinary and not easily created.  
Id.  Because they 
carry significant legal relationships, they cannot be the product of wishful 
thinking.  Id.  They are not created by the unilateral 
decision to repose trust and reliance, but derive from the conduct or 
undertaking of the purported beneficiary.  
Id.

 

[¶26]   Viewing the evidence presented by 
Mrs. Johnson in the light most favorable to her, we hold that sufficient 
evidence was presented to overcome the motion for judgment as a matter of law 
and submit the constructive fraud claim to the jury.  Upon submission of the claim, the jury's 
task was to determine the factual issue of whether the relationship of the 
parties was one of trust and confidence.  
In the event of a jury finding that such a relationship existed, an 
implied-in-law duty existed, as a matter of law, on the part of the Reigers and 
it was then for the jury to determine whether they breached that duty.  This implied-in-law duty is based upon 
the relationship of the parties to each other and to the transaction.   It derives from the evidence 
presented that the Reigers undertook to act with the Johnsons' benefit in mind 
and, by that undertaking, assumed a duty of honest advice and full 
disclosure.  Whether or not a jury 
would have concluded the duty was breached, sufficient evidence existed to 
withstand the Reigers' motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.

 

 

3.         
Conversion

 

[¶27]   The district court held Mrs. 
Johnson's claim for conversion failed because she "transferred title to the 
stock at issue and there is no evidence that the transfer was the result of 
undue influence by the [Reigers]."  
Mrs. Johnson contends the Reigers obtained the stock by means of undue 
influence, which by definition is a conversion.  As we have said, undue influence 
constitutes an independent claim in Wyoming.  We have defined the tort of conversion 
as any distinct act of dominion wrongfully executed over one's property in 
denial of his right or inconsistent therewith.  Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding 
En Financiering, B.V., 816 P.2d 808, 813 (Wyo. 1991).  We said in Marchant, 967 P.2d at 
556:

 

Conversion 
occurs when a person treats another's property as his own, denying the true 
owner the benefits and rights of ownership. In order to establish a conversion 
claim, a plaintiff must show that:

 

(1) 
he had legal title to the converted property; (2) he either had possession of 
the property or the right to possess it at the time of the conversion; (3) the 
defendant exercised dominion over the property in a manner which denied the 
plaintiff his rights to use and enjoy the property; (4) in those cases where the 
defendants lawfully, or at least without fault, obtained possession of the 
property, the plaintiff made some demand for the property's return which the 
defendant refused; and (5) the plaintiff has suffered damage by the loss of the 
property. 

     

Given 
the elements necessary to state a claim for conversion, elements distinctively 
different than the elements of undue influence, Mrs. Johnson's argument that 
undue influence is by definition conversion is without merit.  The two are separate claims requiring 
proof of different elements.

 

[¶28]   Applying the elements of 
conversion, we held in Marchant, 967 P.2d  at 556, that a conversion claim 
was not proven where the plaintiff failed to prove she had legal title to the 
property or the right of possession at the time it was converted.  We said the fact that she was the 
property owner's daughter and allegedly an heir of his estate and beneficiary 
under his trust was not sufficient to support her conversion claim.  Id.  Absent evidence that the plaintiff 
enjoyed legal title or possessed an immediate right of possession to the 
disputed property at the time it was converted, we said summary judgment was 
proper.  
Id.

 

[¶29]   Unlike the party asserting the 
conversion claim in Marchant, the Johnsons had legal title to the stock 
at the time it was allegedly converted by the Reigers.  There was no dispute that the Johnsons 
held the stock in their name before they transferred it allegedly as a result of 
the Reigers' undue influence.  On 
this basis, Mrs. Johnson argues the district court erred in entering judgment 
for the Reigers on her conversion claim. 

 

[¶30]   In Kenyon v. Abel, 2001 WY 
135, ¶ 11, 36 P.3d 1161, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2001), we said conversion occurs when a 
person treats another's property as his own, denying to the true owner the 
benefits and rights of ownership.  
This statement arguably suggests that title to the property must remain 
in the party alleging conversion for the claim to survive.  However, we also said in Kenyon 
that a converter's title to stolen property is void, arguably suggesting that 
conversion can occur even where legal title to the property is transferred to 
the converter.   In Western 
Nat. Bank of Casper v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635, 640 (Wyo. 1978) we said, "the 
actual conversion occurred when the defendant improperly took and then 
transferred title to the mobile home to Darlington," again implying that the 
party claiming conversion need not retain title to the property but that 
conversion can occur where title is transferred. Similarly, Black's Law 
Dictionary references "direct conversion", defining it in pertinent part as the 
act of wrongfully assuming title to property of another in oneself.  Black's Law Dictionary 333 (7th 
ed. 1999).  On the basis of these 
latter authorities, we hold that Mrs. Johnson was required to show that she had 
legal title to the stock prior to its alleged conversion by the Reigers.  She was not required to show she 
retained legal title after the alleged conversion.  The district court erred in granting 
judgment as a matter of law for the Reigers on the conversion claim. 

 

    

4.         
Amendment of the Pleadings

 

[¶31]   After the district court ruled from 
the bench that it was dismissing her claims as a matter of law, Mrs. Johnson 
moved to have the pleadings conformed to the evidence presented at trial to 
allege a claim for quasi contract and/or unjust enrichment entitling her to 
redress in the form of restitution.  
The district court denied the motion without explanation.  Mrs. Johnson claims the district court 
erred in denying the motion.  She 
asserts the district court had no discretion to deny the amendment because 
restitution was at issue throughout the trial.  It is not clear from her argument 
whether she raised the issue for consideration by this Court only in the event 
we affirm the district court's judgment or whether she wished to have the issue 
addressed regardless of our holding on the other issues.  Given our resolution of those issues, 
and the fact that the case is remanded for a new trial on the claims of undue 
influence, conversion and constructive fraud, we find it unnecessary to address 
the issue of whether the district court erred in denying the motion to conform 
the pleadings to the evidence presented.  
Of course, Mrs. Johnson is free to renew her motion to amend her 
complaint on remand.  

 

 

            
5.         
Jury Consideration of Damages

 

[¶32]   The district court held that 144 
shares of stock were at issue. Mrs. Johnson presented evidence that 225 shares 
of stock were at issue.  Our holding 
that factual questions exist on Mrs. Johnson's claims of undue influence, 
conversion and constructive fraud requires remand of the case for a new 
trial.  If conflicting evidence is 
presented as to the number of shares transferred to the Reigers in exchange for 
the credit card debt payment, it will be for the jury to determine the correct 
number of shares.

 

[¶33]   Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.      

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1In 
their pro se brief, the Reigers do not directly address the issues 
presented by Mrs. Johnson.  Instead, 
their four page brief consists primarily of assertions that Mrs. Johnson failed 
to comply with various court rules, fabricated and distorted the facts and 
generally failed to produce evidence to support her claims.  They also accuse appellate counsel of 
attempting to deceive this Court and having a personal conflict with them.  The Reigers' assertions either are not 
responsive to the issues raised or are not supported by cogent argument or 
appropriate citation to the record and legal authority.   We, therefore, do not address 
them. 

  

2The 
Reigers point to no evidence supporting the trial court's decision.  In fact, their brief is devoid of any 
mention of any evidence presented at trial and contains no references to the 
district court record.  We have long 
held to the rule that while we may make allowances for pro se litigants, 
they are not excused from compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  Kelley v. Watson, 
2003 WY 127, 77 P.3d 691, 692 (Wyo. 2003).  
While we proceed to address the issues framed by Mrs. Johnson, we note 
that the Reigers' brief was of no assistance to this Court in resolving the 
issues presented.