Title: Dolgencorp, LLC, d/b/a Dollar General, and Martin Sauceda v. Sakeena Rena Smith

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  November 5, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
____________________
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____________________
Dolgencorp, LLC, d/b/a Dollar General, and Martin Sauceda
v.
Sakeena Rena Smith
Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court
(CV-16-900444.80)
MENDHEIM, Justice.1
1This case was originally assigned to another Justice on this Court;
it was reassigned to Justice Mendheim on August 26, 2021.
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AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B) and (F), Ala. R. App. P.  
Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin and Shaw, JJ., dissent.
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SHAW, Justice (dissenting).
Dolgencorp, LLC, d/b/a Dollar General ("Dollar General"), and
Martin Sauceda, the defendants in a tort action below, appeal from a
judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Sakeena Rena
Smith. Because I would reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the
case, I respectfully dissent.
In July 2016, Smith went to a Dollar General store in Anniston to
purchase a beverage and a can of chili. While in the store, an altercation
occurred between Smith and Sauceda, the assistant store manager. Smith
and Sauceda provided differing accounts regarding the altercation.
According to Sauceda, Smith passed by him while walking through
the store cursing as Sauceda was stocking shelves. When he asked Smith
if she needed help finding anything, Smith cursed at him in saying that
she did not need his help.  Sauceda stated that he "let her go on her way"
and that he went back to stocking the shelves.
After locating her items to purchase, Smith proceeded to the front
of the store to check out. When Sauceda got to the front of the store, he
told Smith that she could check out at his register, but Smith responded
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with curses and indicated that she was fine where she was.  Sauceda then
told Smith that "that's no way to speak in the store" and asked her to
"calm down." According to Sauceda, at that point, Smith "became more
agitated and aggravated" and "just kept cussing, throwing a lot of F words
here and there." As their exchange continued, Smith threatened to "knock
the hell out of [Sauceda] with [her] can of chili" and that she was going to
"whoop [his] ass."
Sauceda told Smith that if she did not calm down, she would have
to leave the store or he would call the police. At some point, Smith
grabbed a store telephone that was near the register and threatened to
call the police herself. According to Sauceda, this scared him because that
telephone was his only means of contacting law-enforcement officers if
Smith attempted to harm him. Sauceda eventually walked around the
register and tried to retrieve the telephone from Smith.  As he did so,
Sauceda stated, Smith grabbed him by the hair and began repeatedly
hitting him in the face and head with the can of chili.  Evidence in the
record clearly indicates that Sauceda was beaten on the face with the can. 
Sauceda admitted to hitting Smith back but said that he felt that he had
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to do so to defend himself. At some point, Sauceda's coworker tried to
separate Smith and Sauceda but was unable to do so. The altercation
ended with all three of them falling on the ground.
Shortly thereafter, Smith got up and left the store, and Sauceda
called the police. While he was on the phone, Sauceda said, Smith came
back into the store acting like "she was ready for round two" and told him
that he was "in f*****g trouble." She then left. When law-enforcement
officers arrived, Sauceda told them what had occurred, but Smith was no
longer there.  Smith did not contact law-enforcement officers after she left.
Smith testified that, when she first entered the store, she recognized
Sauceda as a store employee who had previously accused her of
shoplifting, and Smith decided to avoid him. After locating the items she
needed, Smith proceeded to the front of the store to check out. When
Sauceda opened another register and told her to check out there, Smith
told Sauceda that she was fine where she was.  Smith claimed that
Sauceda then walked over to where she was and began moving her items
to his register. Smith said that Sauceda also told her that if she did not
come to his register, she would need to leave the store.  According to
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Smith, Sauceda's actions "made [her] feel angry," and she told him that he
could not make her leave. At that point, Smith said that Sauceda pointed
his finger in her face and told her, once more, to either come to his register
or leave the store.  Smith also indicated that he called her a "b***h."  She
told Sauceda that if he did not leave her alone she would  "knock the hell
out of him with [her] can of chili." 
Smith said that she felt uncomfortable, so she took the store phone
so that she could call the police. Sauceda then tried to grab the phone from
Smith's hands. As he did so, Smith said, she turned her back toward him.
Smith testified that Sauceda eventually put all of his weight on her, which
resulted in her falling to the ground. As she tried to push Sauceda off of
her, Smith said, he started hitting and kicking her. In an effort to defend
herself, Smith said, she hit Sauceda with her can of chili. At that point,
Smith said, she hit her head on the floor and Sauceda continued to hit and
kick her. When the altercation finally ended, Smith said, she got up and
left.  
Smith later commenced a tort action against Dollar General and
Sauceda ("the defendants"). Following a jury trial, Smith received a
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verdict in her favor and was awarded $75,000 in compensatory damages
and $225,000 in punitive damages. After the trial court entered judgment
on the jury's verdict, the defendants filed a postjudgment motion in which
they argued, among other things, that they were entitled to a new trial
because one of the jurors, Q.M., had failed to give a necessary response to
a question during voir dire. That motion was denied by operation of law
pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. The defendants appealed.
A challenge alleging juror misconduct because of a juror's failure to
properly answer a question during voir dire may be raised for the first
time in a motion for a new trial. See, e.g., Hood v. McElroy, 127 So. 3d
325, 327 (Ala. 2011), and Holly v. Huntsville Hosp., 925 So. 2d 160, 161
(Ala. 2005). In addressing the standard for determining whether juror
misconduct warrants a new trial, this Court has previously stated:
"The proper standard ..., as set out by this Court's
precedent, is whether the misconduct might have prejudiced,
not whether it actually did prejudice, the [complaining party].
See Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d 12 (Ala. 1993). ... The
'might-have-been-prejudiced' standard, of course, casts a
'lighter' burden on the [complaining party] than the
actual-prejudice standard. See Tomlin v. State, ... 695 So. 2d
[157] at 170 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1996)]. ...
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"It is true that the parties in a case are entitled to true
and honest answers to their questions on voir dire, so that they
may exercise their peremptory strikes wisely. ... However, not
every failure to respond properly to questions propounded
during voir dire 'automatically entitles [the complaining party]
to a new trial or reversal of the cause on appeal.' Freeman v.
Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 166, 238 So. 2d 330, 335 (1970). ... As
stated previously, the proper standard to apply in determining
whether a party is entitled to a new trial in this circumstance
is 'whether the [the complaining party] might have been
prejudiced by a veniremember's failure to make a proper
response.' Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d at 124."
Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 763, 771-72 (Ala. 2001).  " 'The determination
of whether the complaining party was prejudiced by a juror's failure to
answer voir dire questions is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be reversed unless the court has abused its discretion.' "
Holly, 925 So. 2d at 162 (quoting Union Mortg. Co. v. Barlow, 595 So. 2d
1335, 1342 (Ala. 1992)). 
In the present case, during voir dire, Smith's counsel posed the
following question to the veniremembers:
"Now, as far as the altercation in this case, it was something
that started as a verbal altercation, and then it became
physical. I am going to ask the question if anybody in here has
ever been in a physical fight. If it is something that you don't
want to talk about ... then we can talk about it at the end. But
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has anyone ever been in a physical fight, and are you okay to
talk about it?"
One veniremember responded that he had gotten into many physical
fights with his siblings when he was growing up. Another veniremember
admitted that she had been in a physical altercation with her mother and
sister. Both of those veniremembers were ultimately struck from the jury.
Q.M., however, did not respond to the question. 
After the jury rendered its verdict and the trial ended, defense
counsel discovered an online newspaper article from November 2014 that
stated that Q.M. was among six high-school football players who had been
suspended from playing in a high-school playoff game because they had
been involved in an "incident" during a previous game. According to the
article, the incident had occurred toward the end of the game, when the
final play ended near one team's bench, which resulted in both teams
running onto the field and players confronting each other. Witnesses
described the six players that were ultimately suspended as having been
"under attack" by players from the other team, with one of Q.M.'s
teammates stating: "I didn't want to go out and fight with [the other
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team's players] .... [But when] they came off their sideline and got into it
with my teammates, I [wasn't] going to let that happen."
In light of that newspaper article, the defendants argued that Q.M.'s
failure to disclose information about the fight had denied them the
opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike him from the
venire. In support of their motion, the defendants attached a copy of the
November 2014 article along with affidavits from their trial counsel. In
each of their affidavits, the defendants' attorneys confirmed that Q.M. did
not respond when asked if any of the jurors had ever been involved in a
physical fight and explained that, had they known about the fight
discussed in the November 2014 article, they would have used a
peremptory strike to remove Q.M. from the jury.  As stated previously,
that motion was denied by operation of law.
On appeal, the defendants maintain their position that Q.M.'s failure
to disclose his involvement in the fight at his high-school football game
requires a new trial. Smith contends, however, that, although the
defendants included with their motion for a new trial a copy of the online
article and affidavits from their trial counsel, the evidence on the motion
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for a new trial was neither presented to the trial court in a hearing on
that motion nor properly "verified" by the defendants' trial counsel. 
Our appellate courts have previously recognized: 
" 'Assertions of counsel in an unverified[ or unsupported]
motion for new trial are bare allegations and cannot be
considered as evidence or proof of the facts alleged.' Smith v.
State, 364 So. 2d 1, 14 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978). 'A motion for a
new trial must be heard and determined on the evidence
submitted on that motion and on the evidence heard on the
main trial, though not reintroduced.' Taylor v. State, 222 Ala.
140, 141, 131 So. 236[, 238] (1930)."
Daniels v. State, 416 So. 2d 760, 762 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (emphasis
added). It is when nothing is offered in support of a motion for a new trial
-- by verification or evidence -- that the assertions contained in the motion
are deemed unsupported "bare allegations" requiring the denial of the
motion. Id.
Affidavits may be used to support a motion for a new trial. See Loera
v. Loera, 553 So. 2d 128, 128 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989), and Rule 43(e), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  The defendants' trial counsel each submitted affidavits in which
they stated that, had they known that Q.M. was involved in the fight
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following the high-school football game, they would have struck him from
the jury, just as had been done with other similarly situated jurors. 
This Court has previously stated that affidavits in support of a
motion for a new trial " 'should be based on the knowledge of the affiant,
and not on hearsay, ' " and that " 'hearsay evidence is not admissible in
support of a motion for new trial.' " Jefferson Cnty. v. Kellum, 630 So. 2d
426, 427-28 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 172 (1970)).
Generally, newspaper articles, like the one in the present case, constitute
hearsay. See Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 627 (Ala. 2003).
Nevertheless, this Court has held that "an affidavit containing hearsay ...
is competent evidence in support of a motion for a new trial" when no
objection to that affidavit is made. Petty-Fitzmaurice v. Steen, 871 So. 2d
771, 775 (Ala. 2003).  Nothing in the record indicates that Smith objected
either to the November 2014 article or to the contents of the affidavits
submitted in support of the motion for a new trial. Thus, contrary to
Smith's contention, the defendants provided "competent evidence" in
support of their motion for a new trial.  Id. 
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Smith also argues, however, that the defendants still have not
established that they were prejudiced by Q.M.'s failure to disclose the
information at issue.  
" 'Although the factors upon which the trial court's
determination of prejudice is made must necessarily vary from
case to case, some of the factors which other courts have
considered pertinent are: temporal remoteness of the matter
inquired about, the ambiguity of the question propounded, the
prospective juror's inadvertence or willfulness in falsifying or
failing to answer, the failure of the juror to recollect, and the
materiality of the matter inquired about.' " 
Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 2007)
(quoting Freeman v. Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 167, 238 So. 2d 330, 336 (1970)). 
First, with regard to temporal remoteness, the matter about which
juror Q.M. failed to respond -- the fight at his high-school football game --
took place in November 2014.  The trial in the present case began in
November 2019.  Smith points to that length of time, states that the
incident occurred when Q.M. "was a school boy," and concludes that the
remoteness of the incident "does not weigh in favor a new trial."  Smith's
brief at 42.  The defendants, however, note that because Q.M. was
suspended from participating in a postseason football game, which they
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describe as "a highlight of the season for a football player," the defendants'
brief at 46-47, it "is unlikely to have slipped his mind. Certainly, it was
not so temporally remote that one could reasonably conclude that it could
not affect his decision-making as a juror in the instant case."  Id. at 46. 
I see nothing indicating that the period between the fight and the trial is
too remote as a matter law.  Given the unique nature of the fight, this
factor weighs in favor of the defendants' arguments.  
With regard to the "ambiguity of the question propounded" during
voir dire, the defendants contend that there "is nothing ambiguous about
the question" because other jurors understood it, responded, and were
ultimately struck as a result of their responses. Id. Smith argues,
however, that the question was ambiguous because the article that the
defendants attached to their motion did not explicitly state that the
"incident" in which Q.M. and his teammates became involved was in fact
a "physical fight." I disagree.  The article relates that witnesses described
Q.M. and his teammates as being "under attack," and one of Q.M.'s
suspended teammates even stated that he  "didn't want to go out and fight
with [the other team's players]" but that, "when they came off their
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sideline and got into it with my teammates, I [wasn't] going to let that
happen." These facts indicate that a fight took place.  Further, the
question contained no legal jargon that might confuse a nonattorney. 
Thus, under these circumstances, I see nothing ambiguous or unclear
about the question.
Next, with regard to the possibility of the "inadvertence or
willfulness" of a prospective juror's failure to disclose certain information
and the failure of the juror to recollect the information not disclosed, this
Court has previously stated that the "concealment by a juror of
information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in
order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the
resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same." Sanders v.
Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215, 219, 224 So. 2d 247, 251 (1969) (finding prejudice
when jurors failed to reveal that they had commenced a personal-injury
case). See also Dunaway v. State, 198 So. 3d 567, 583 (Ala. 2014).
Similarly, in Alabama Gas Corp. v. American Furniture Galleries, Inc.,
439 So. 2d 33, 36 (Ala. 1983), this Court stated: "Nevertheless, if the
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failure to answer was prejudicial to the inquiring party, the result is the
same as if it had been deliberate." 
The defendants contend that, "[b]ecause the fight [Q.M.] was
involved in resulted in his suspension from participating in his high school
football team's post-season playoff game, a highlight of the season for a
football player, one cannot reasonably conclude that he simply failed to
recollect the event."  The defendants' brief at 46-47.  Smith contends,
however, that there is no evidence indicating that Q.M. was "intentionally
dishonest" about the incident.   Although it may be unclear if Q.M.
deliberately failed to respond to the question at issue, as shown by the
caselaw discussed above, any inadvertence in a prospective juror's failure
to respond to questioning on voir dire does not foreclose the probability of
prejudice resulting from the nondisclosure. 
Finally, with regard to the materiality of the matter inquired about
during voir dire, this Court has previously stated:
"In the context of a juror's failure to disclose requested
information, 'a material fact [is] " 'one which an attorney[,]
acting as a reasonably competent attorney, would consider
important in making the decision whether or not to excuse a
prospective 
juror.' " ' 
Conference 
America, 
Inc. 
v.
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Telecommunications Coop. Network, Inc., 885 So. 2d 772, 777
(Ala. 2003)(quoting Gold Kist v. Brown, 495 So. 2d 540, 545
(Ala. 1986))."
Jimmy Day Plumbing, 964 So. 2d at 5. 
"If the party establishes that the juror's disclosure of the truth
would have caused the party either to (successfully) challenge
the juror for cause or to exercise a peremptory challenge to
strike the juror, then the party has made a prima facie
showing of prejudice. ... Such prejudice can be established by
the obvious tendency of the true facts to bias the juror ... or by
direct testimony of trial counsel that the true facts would have
prompted a challenge against the juror, as in State v.
Freeman, 605 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)." 
Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d at 773 (emphasis added).  
The defendants' attorneys testified by affidavit that, had they known
about Q.M.'s participation in the fight after the football game, they would
have struck him from the jury. Moreover, in the newspaper article,
witnesses described the players that were ultimately suspended, which
included Q.M., as having been "under attack," and one of Q.M.'s
suspended teammates stated that he "didn't want to go out and fight with
[the other team's players]" but that, "when they came off their sideline
and got into it with my teammates, I [wasn't] going to let that happen." 
Q.M.'s actions caused him and five teammates to be suspended from
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playing in a postseason playoff football game a few days later. The fact
that Q.M. was the victim of an attack indicates an "obvious tendency" to
bias Q.M. in favor of a plaintiff, like Smith, who also claimed to have been
attacked. Dobyne, 805 So. 2d at 773. Thus, under the legal principles
discussed above, the defendants demonstrated probable prejudice
warranting a new trial. Smith offered nothing to rebut the defendants'
arguments or evidence.
As stated previously, to prevail on their juror-misconduct claim, the
defendants were required to demonstrate that Q.M.'s misconduct "might
have prejudiced" them.  Id. at 771. Given that all the factors above are
met, they satisfied that burden and are entitled to a new trial.  Based on
the foregoing, I believe that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
failing to grant their motion for a new trial. Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, J., concur.
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