Title: SELVEY v. SELVEY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SELVEY v. SELVEY2004 WY 166102 P.3d 210Case Number: 03-237Decided: 12/16/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 

                                                                                                                                   

ROBERT 
FREDERICK SELVEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
SHIRLEY 
JEAN SELVEY,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Donald E. Miller of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
William D. Hjelmstad, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and GUTHRIE, 
D.J.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Shirley J. 
Selvey (Mother) and Robert F. Selvey (Father) were divorced in August of 
2001.  They stipulated to joint 
legal custody of their child, R.S., with physical custody alternating 
yearly.  In February of 2003, Mother 
moved to Missouri with R.S. and petitioned to modify 
the decree.  She alleged in her 
petition that Father had engaged in prior inappropriate sexual behavior with two 
older daughters, and requested that visitation with R.S. be restricted.  Father answered by filing his own 
petition for modification claiming that Mother was not stable or fit to care for 
R.S.  The district court heard the 
matter and granted Mother primary custody of R.S. and ordered that Father's 
visitation with R.S. be supervised.  
Father appeals this determination.  
We affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Father presents 
only one issue for our review:

 
 
Did the 
trial court abuse [its] discretion when it allowed into evidence allegations 
that occurred prior to the original custody agreement and decree of 
divorce?

 
 
Mother 
presented five issues in her brief; however, Father's statement sufficiently 
characterizes the dispositive issue in this appeal.

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      In 1983, P.S. was 
born to Mother and Father.  Two 
years later, Mother and Father were married in Casper, Wyoming.  
Mother had a daughter from a previous marriage, C.R., who was 
approximately fourteen years old when Mother and Father married.  A third daughter, R.S., was born in 
1992.

 
 
[¶4]      Father has 
allegedly abused each of these three girls at one time or another.  With regard to the oldest daughter, 
C.R., Mother testified that in approximately 1986, the Department of Family 
Services (DFS) filed a complaint alleging that C.R. "would wake up in the middle 
of the night and [Father] would be standing over the top of her at the side of 
her bed."  At the time the complaint 
was filed, Father had gone to work in Alaska.  
Mother testified that DFS informed her that they would take C.R. from the 
home if Father returned.  C.R. was 
sent to live with her biological father, and Mother testified that nothing came 
of the DFS charges.

 
 
[¶5]      In 1999, the next 
oldest daughter, P.S., was taken into protective custody in Ohio after the director 
of a play in which P.S. was involved overheard a conversation wherein Father was 
verbally abusive to P.S.  The 
director reported the incident to the Sandusky County Department of Human 
Services.  The Sandusky County 
Department of Jobs and Family Services (Sandusky County DJFS) then took 
emergency custody of P.S. and filed a complaint.  The complaint alleged specific instances 
of verbal, emotional, and physical abuse, and additionally alleged that Father 
had subjected P.S. to inappropriate sexual touching.  Specifically, the complaint stated that 
P.S. reported that "on occasion she will wake up and her father will be sitting 
on the edge of her bed rubbing the inside of her leg, her lips and has put his 
hand on her skin directly above her breast."  Father denied these allegations.  Sandusky County DJFS completed an 
assessment and rated the case as moderate/high risk.  A case plan was implemented requiring 
supervised visitation between P.S. and Father, and recommending that both Mother 
and Father complete a parenting class and attend counseling.  The case plan also recommended that 
Father undergo a sexual offender assessment and complete all recommendations of 
that assessment, and that he participate in anger 
management.

 
 
[¶6]      Ten months later 
the court found that Mother and Father had made little progress toward 
reunification.  Sandusky County DJFS 
did not know where the parents were and was unable to verify compliance with the 
case plan.  As a result, the 
guardian with whom P.S. had been placed was awarded legal custody, and P.S. 
remained with this person until she became an adult.

 
 
[¶7]      Five months after 
P.S. was removed from her home, the Sandusky County DJFS filed a second 
complaint regarding the youngest daughter, R.S.  The following facts were alleged as the 
basis for this complaint:

 
 
1.         
On August 23, 1999, Sandusky County Department of Jobs and Family 
Services received custody of [P.S.] due to concerns of possible inappropriate 
touching by her father and physical altercations between [P.S.] and her 
father.  On August 24, 1999, a 
Complaint was filed on [P.S.] alleging abuse, neglect and dependency.  On November 15, 1999, the parties 
consented to an adjudication of dependency.

 
 
2.         
At the time of the investigation, [Mother] had moved to Missouri with [R.S.], while [Father] had stayed behind in 
SanduskyCounty.  Communications between agency personnel 
and the Selveys became very difficult for a time because their lawyer prohibited 
contact.

 
 
3.         
[Father], [Mother], and [R.S.] now reside in SanduskyCounty together.  Since approval of the case plan, the 
Selveys have not made any progress.  
In addition, the caseworker has not been allowed to access [R.S.] to 
check on her well-being.  The agency 
has also been informed that [P.S.] is recalling the fact that she may have been 
inappropriately touched by her father at an earlier age than she originally 
remembered.  An adult daughter also 
allegedly reports being touched by [Father] inappropriately when she was a 
teenager.

 
 
4.         
Recently, the Sandusky County Department of Jobs and Family Services 
received allegations that [R.S.] was being removed from school to be possibly 
home schooled.  [R.S.] would then 
have no outside source to report any inappropriateness, if it were to 
occur.

 
 
5.         
Due to the continued lack of cooperation that the Selveys show to the 
agency, the fact that the agency has been denied access to [R.S.] to check on 
her well-being, and especially with concerns of other girls being 
inappropriately touched, now possibly at an earlier age, the Sandusky County 
Department of Jobs and Family Services requests protective supervision over 
[R.S.].

 
 
This 
complaint was eventually dismissed because the Sandusky County DJFS was unable 
to serve process on the parents, as no one knew where they were.  Mother later testified that she and 
Father decided to leave Ohio because they feared R.S. would also be 
removed from the home; Mother stated, "the charges against [Father] were too 
strong not to remove her."

 
 
[¶8]      Mother eventually 
filed for divorce.  The stipulated 
divorce decree granted Mother and Father joint legal custody of R.S., with 
physical custody alternating yearly.  
The decree granted Father physical custody of R.S. during the first year 
following the divorce.  By the time 
the first year ended, Mother and Father had reconciled and were living together 
in Casper, Wyoming.  
Mother and R.S. eventually left Father's home and moved to a trailer on 
Father's property.  Approximately 
two months later, Mother and R.S. moved from Father's property to another 
residence in Casper.  
A short time later, Mother filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, 
and on the same day moved with R.S. to Missouri.

 
 
[¶9]      In her petition 
to modify, Mother stated that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred 
since the divorce decree.  In 
addition to the petition for modification, Mother filed a verified motion for 
temporary custody in which she requested that she be granted custody of R.S. and 
that Father's visitation be restricted until the modification petition was 
heard.  In support of her motion, 
Mother alleged that Father "is an extremely controlling individual using 
physical and mental menacing to accomplish his will," that he had committed 
inappropriate sexual touching with the two other daughters, that inappropriate 
touching with the other daughters commenced when they turned ten years old, and 
that R.S. had turned ten years old and was at severe risk if left unsupervised 
with Father overnight.  Attached to 
Mother's motion were records of the prior Ohio abuse allegations.

 
 
[¶10]   Father responded by filing his own 
petition for modification and a temporary restraining order.  Father's petition stated that a 
substantial change of circumstances had occurred and that he should be granted 
custody of R.S. until Mother underwent a psychiatric examination to prove her 
mental stability.  As a factual 
basis, Father alleged that Mother had moved many times since the divorce, 
refused to provide her current mailing address, was delinquent in her child 
support payments, failed to provide health insurance for R.S., refused to allow 
R.S. to continue counseling, recently filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy 
and was financially unstable, sought psychiatric help and was prescribed Prozac 
but refused to take it, and since Mother had taken custody of R.S. she had 
allowed Father very little visitation.  
Father's restraining order requested that Mother be restrained from 
leaving Wyoming with R.S. until a hearing was held on 
his petition.

 
 
[¶11]   The day after filing his answer and 
counterclaim, Father went to Missouri and picked R.S. up at her school, 
telling her that Mother had agreed that "he could take her for a ride."  He was driving a van belonging to his 
girlfriend.  Father proceeded with 
R.S. to Illinois where he switched vehicles and 
then drove to Ohio where his brother lived.  Father had informed his attorney that he 
would be making the trip to Missouri to see R.S.; however, he did not 
notify Mother or Mother's attorney that he would be in the state or that he 
intended to see R.S.  Upon learning 
that R.S. did not arrive at school, Mother contacted Missouri law enforcement 
officials and an "Amber alert" was issued.  
Police arrested Father at his brother's house in Ohio the next day and 
charged him with parental kidnapping.  
He was extradited to Missouri and released on 
bond.

 
 
[¶12]   The district court began hearing 
both petitions to modify on July 1, 2003, with the hearing continued to August 
19, 2003.  At the hearing, Mother's 
evidence consisted of her own testimony, the trial deposition of Kathleen Wolf, 
R.S.'s counselor in Missouri, and the videotaped trial deposition 
of the older daughter, P.S.  Mother 
described her current living situation and presented the testimony of Ms. Wolf, 
who reported that R.S. was doing well in her current environment. Mother also 
presented evidence regarding the pre-divorce allegations of sexual abuse, 
including P.S.'s videotaped deposition testimony explicitly describing the 
alleged abuse.  Father's attorney 
regularly objected to the introduction of all evidence relating to the 
pre-divorce allegations.

 
 
[¶13]   Although Father chose not to 
testify, apparently due to the pending custodial interference case in Missouri, 
he called four witnesses:  Leslie 
Witherell, a mental health therapist who performed a sexual offender evaluation 
of Father after the older daughter P.S. was removed from the home in Ohio; 
Christine Frude, the principal at R.S.'s elementary school in Casper; Sue 
McConaughey, a counselor that R.S. saw in Casper; and Rebecca Gurtler, R.S.'s 
school counselor.  Each of Father's 
witnesses testified that he was a good and responsible parent, and that R.S. had 
done well during the time that she was in his custody.  Also, Ms. Witherell explained to the 
court that her sexual evaluation revealed no risk factors associated with sexual 
offending behavior.

 
 
[¶14]   The district court's final order 
found that "[t]he parties are unable to make joint custody work, and a 
substantial change of circumstances exist to warrant a change in custody."  The order also found that "[Father] has 
a history of being physically, mentally and sexually abusive to the female 
teenage children living in his home."  
The order granted Mother primary care, custody, and control of R.S. and 
allowed Father "reasonable supervised visitation . . .."  Father timely appealed this 
order.

 
 

 
 

[¶15]   "We review a district court's order 
on a petition to modify a divorce decree under an abuse of discretion 
standard."  Leseberg v. 
Taylor, 2003 WY 131, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 201, 202 (Wyo. 2003). We 
will not interfere with the district court's decision regarding modification of 
custody absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion.  Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 
66, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 2002).  In determining whether the district 
court has abused its discretion, we must decide whether it could reasonably 
conclude as it did.  Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 
(Wyo. 2003).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d  at 644.  Under this standard, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's determination.  GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, ¶ 14, 39 P.3d 1066, 1074 (Wyo. 2002).  "We give the prevailing party all 
favorable inferences and do not consider the evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party."  Id.

 
 

 
 

[¶16]   Modification of divorce decrees is 
only appropriate in limited circumstances. Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 
WY 159, ¶ 9, 57 P.3d 324, 328 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993)).  A party seeking modification of the 
custody provision of a divorce decree bears the burden of demonstrating that: 
(1) a material and substantial change of circumstances affecting the child's 
welfare has occurred since the entry of the initial divorce decree, and (2) a 
modification is in the child's best interests.  Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 
150 (Wyo. 1998); 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2003).

 
 
"This 
policy manifests a balance between the doctrine of finality of judgments which 
is supported by the doctrine of res judicata and the statutes providing 
for modification of the provisions of a decree relating to child custody, 
support, and alimony. The trial court is charged with resolving that tension, 
and it must do so in the exercise of discretion."

 
 

Ready v. 
Ready, 2003 
WY 121, ¶ 11, 76 P.3d 836, 839 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41 (Wyo. 1995)).

 
 
[¶17]   In his appellate brief, Father 
states that "the issue here is not whether there is a substantial change in 
circumstances, but whether pre-divorce action, which was clearly known by the 
parties, should have been considered by the court when making that change."  Essentially, he is arguing that the 
district court, when making its determination of what custody arrangement was in 
R.S.'s best interests, should not have considered evidence of pre-divorce 
allegations of sexual abuse.

 
 
[¶18]   Father makes two arguments 
supporting his position.  First, he 
points to the following language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-204(c):

 
 
A court 
having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question 
and that the modification would be in the best interests of the children 
pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a).

 
 

(Emphasis 
added.)  While this provision 
indicates that the district court may not consider pre-divorce evidence when 
determining whether there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances, no such limitation has been placed on the evidence 
available to the district court when making a best-interests 
determination.  Such a 
limitation would severely impede the district court's ability to make a thorough 
and accurate assessment of what custody arrangement would best serve the 
child.  When deciding a petition for 
modification, the district court's "prime if not sole judicial objective * * * 
is to serve the best interests of the child.'"  Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 
(Wyo. 1990) (quoting Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1963)).  We have "always recognized that the 
trial court exercises a broad discretion in the execution of its revisory powers 
in matters involving domestic relations."  
Gaines, 794 P.2d  at 570.  "The best-interest criterion of our law 
as the promise of our society should evoke every relevant factor, with the 
[weighing] to be vested in the discretion of the trial court."  Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 
353 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

[¶19]   Father's second argument relies on 
the concurring opinion in Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1995).  In Gurney, the parties stipulated 
to shared custody alternating every six months.  Id. at 53.  A short time after the decree was 
entered, the mother moved to a different town and the father petitioned to 
modify the decree.  Id.  The district court granted the 
father's petition and awarded him primary custody, which decision we 
affirmed.  Id. at 
56.  The concurrence took exception 
to the district court's consideration of mother's pre-divorce and pre-marriage 
romantic relationships at the modification hearing. Id. at 56 (Lehman, 
J., concurring in result).

 
 
Here the 
stipulation for joint custody included representations by the parties that 
sharing of custody was in the best interests of the child, and those 
representations were made by the parties with full knowledge of each other's 
history. A party, based on that representation, should be estopped from 
later arguing at a modification hearing that the other party should lose 
entitlement to joint custody because of premarriage and/or predivorce lifestyle. 
The determination at a modification of custody hearing to go back into time to 
revisit a party's predivorce, and in this instance premarriage, lifestyle seems 
obtrusive, especially where no connection was made depicting how the premarriage 
lifestyle relates to the present lifestyle or parenting abilities. 

 
 

Id.  While we do not believe that a party 
should be absolutely estopped from presenting pre-divorce evidence in a 
modification hearing, we do agree that when pre-divorce evidence lacks 
relevance, or fails to meet other evidentiary standards, it should either be 
excluded or be afforded less weight.  
However, we will continue to leave that determination to the district 
court.  Clark, 953 P.2d  at 150.  We will then determine on appeal, if 
necessary, whether the evidence was appropriately weighed and admitted.  Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, 
¶ 12, 35 P.3d 1240, 1244 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

[¶20]   The doctrine of res judicata 
presents another limitation on what evidence may be presented.  This doctrine prevents the district 
court from re-examining facts that were raised and fully adjudicated when the 
decree was entered.  CSP v. 
DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 532-33 (Wyo. 1992).  In cases like the present, where a fact, 
although known to one or both parties, was neither raised nor adjudicated at the 
time of the decree, courts have generally allowed evidence of that fact to be 
considered.  See Stewart v. 
Stewart, 86 Idaho 108, 383 P.2d 617, 619-20 
(1963); 
Harms v. Harms, 323 Ill.App. 154, 55 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1944); 
Hulm v. Hulm, 484 N.W.2d 303, 305 (S.D. 1992); and 
Rowles v. Reynolds, 29 Tenn.App. 224, 196 S.W.2d 76, 79 
(1946).  But see Swindle v. Swindle, 242 
Ark. 790, 415 S.W.2d 564, 567 
(1967) and Ostrander v. Ostrander, 
176 Wash. 669, 30 P.2d 658, 659 (1934).  This is especially true where the 
original decree was entered without true judicial consideration of that 
evidence, such as by stipulation or default.  24A Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation 
§ 982 (1998 & 2004 Supp.); 6 
Am.Jur. Proof of Facts.2d, Child Custody Modification, 6-499, § 6 
at 519 (1975); W.E. 
Shipley, Annotation, Material Facts Existing at the Time of Rendition of 
Decree of Divorce But Not Presented to Court, as Ground for Modification of 
Provision as to Custody of Child, 9 A.L.R.2d 623 (1950).  This was the approach the United States 
Supreme Court used in People of State of N.Y. ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 
330 U.S. 610, 613, 67 S. Ct. 903, 91 L. Ed. 609 (1947):

 
 
Facts 
which have arisen since the original decree are one basis for modification of 
the custody decree.  Frazier v. 
Frazier, 109 Fla., p. 168, 147 So., p. 465; 
Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 527, 23 So. 2d 623, 625.  But the power is not so restricted.  It was held in Meadows v. 
Meadows, 78 Fla. 576, 83 So. 392-393, that "the proper 
custody of the minor child is a proper subject for consideration by the 
chancellor at any time, even if facts in issue could have been considered at a 
previous hearing, if such facts were not presented or considered at a 
former hearing."  (Italics 
added.)  Or, as stated in Frazier 
v. Frazier, 109 Fla., p. 168, 147 So., p. 465, a custody decree "is not to 
be materially amended or changed afterward, unless on altered conditions shown 
to have arisen since the decree, or because of material facts bearing on the 
question of custody and existing at the time of the decree, but which were 
unknown to the Court and then only for the welfare of the child."  The result is that custody decrees of 
Florida courts are ordinarily not res 
judicata either in Florida or elsewhere, except as to the facts 
before the court at the time of judgment.  
Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 490-491, 149 So. 483, 
492.

 
 
We find 
that this approach effectively balances the doctrine of finality with the 
district court's important role in protecting the child's best interests. 

 
 
[¶21]   Although Mother had some knowledge 
of the alleged abuse at the time the divorce decree was entered, it is clear 
that no evidence of the prior abuse was presented to the district court at the 
time it entered its stipulated divorce decree.  Because that issue was never raised or 
subjected to judicial consideration, and because consideration of such evidence 
is clearly relevant to the district court's best interests determination in the 
instant case, the doctrine of res judicata cannot exclude such 
evidence.

 
 
[¶22]   Father states in his appellate 
brief that he is not complaining "that there was not sufficient evidence to 
grant custody to [Mother] or that the evidence is contrary to the trial court's 
findings."  His complaint, rather, 
is that the district court abused its discretion by allowing into the 
modification hearing evidence of pre-divorce allegations of sexual abuse.  We hold that those allegations were 
properly admitted and considered, that the district court's decision was 
reasonable, and therefore find no abuse of discretion.

 
 

 
 
[¶23]   When determining whether there has 
been a substantial and material change in circumstances warranting a 
modification of a divorce decree, the district court may rely only upon facts 
and circumstances that have occurred since the decree was entered.  However, when assessing what custodial 
and visitation arrangement will be in the child's best interests, the district 
court may take into consideration relevant evidence of pre-divorce facts and 
circumstances, where such evidence otherwise meets evidentiary rules and does 
not violate the doctrine of res judicata.

 
 
[¶24]   Affirmed.