Title: Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1681 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Steven J. Piper, Robert Bue, Scott R. Olson and 
Leslie T. Smith, 
          Plaintiffs, 
Jonathon Kracht, Gary Benes and Charles Manley, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Jones Dairy Farm, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 28, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., joined.  
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs (in the court 
of appeals) filed by Bernard J. Bobber, Keith E. Kopplin, Christina 
L. Wabiszewski and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Bernard J. Bobber. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) filed by Micheal J. Modl and Axley Brynelson, 
LLP, Madison and Douglas J. Phebus, Victor Arellano, and Arellano 
 
 
2 
& Phebus, S.C., Middleton. There was an oral argument by Michael 
J. Modl. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 28
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1681 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV1210) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steven J. Piper, Robert Bue, Scott R. Olson and 
Leslie T. Smith, 
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
Jonathon Kracht, Gary Benes and Charles Manley, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Jones Dairy Farm, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., joined.  
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.   
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Jefferson 
County, William F. Hue, Judge.  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Current and former employees 
of Jones Dairy Farm (the employees) filed suit in December 2010 
seeking unpaid wages for time spent at the start and end of their 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
2 
 
shifts "donning and doffing" personal protective equipment and 
walking to and from their workstations.  Jones Dairy Farm (JDF) 
denied liability, alleging the employees bargained over their 
right to compensation for this time during collective bargaining 
negotiations.  Alternatively, JDF asserted that the doctrine of 
de minimis non curat lex rendered this time non-compensable and 
that equitable defenses precluded the employees' recovery of 
damages.  The circuit court denied JDF's motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that:  (1) the donning and doffing time was 
compensable; (2) the employees could not modify or eliminate 
compensation 
for 
donning 
and 
doffing 
through 
collective 
bargaining; (3) the time was not rendered non-compensable by the 
de minimis doctrine; and (4) JDF's four equitable defenses did not 
preclude the employees' recovery of damages.1 
¶2 
On bypass from the court of appeals,2 JDF presents one 
principal issue:  under Wisconsin law can compensation for donning 
and doffing personal protective equipment be modified or 
eliminated through collective bargaining?  In the alternative, JDF 
contends that the de minimis doctrine renders the donning and 
doffing time non-compensable and that the equitable defenses of 
promissory estoppel, waiver, laches, and unjust enrichment 
preclude the employees' recovery of damages.   
                                                 
1 Judge William F. Hue of Jefferson County Circuit Court 
presided. 
2 Jones Dairy Farm filed a petition to bypass pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) § 809.60 (2017-18).  All subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We conclude that under Wisconsin law, compensation for 
donning and doffing cannot be modified or eliminated through 
collective bargaining.  We assume without deciding that the 
de minimis doctrine applies to claims arising under Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 272.12 (May 2019),3 and determine that the time the 
employees spent donning and doffing was not de minimis.  Lastly, 
we conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it summarily dismissed JDF's equitable defenses on 
the basis of Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5) and we remand for full 
consideration of those defenses.  We therefore affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand the case to the circuit court.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
JDF operates a food production plant in Fort Atkinson, 
Wisconsin.  JDF requires its employees to wear personal protective 
equipment, including safety footwear, frocks, hairnets, aprons, 
ear plugs, and plastic bump caps.  The employees are required to 
put on (don) and take off (doff) company-required equipment at the 
beginning and end of their shifts. 
¶5 
The employees' wages have historically been set by a 
collective bargaining agreement between the United Food and 
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 538 (the Union) and 
JDF.  The 1979 collective bargaining agreement between the parties 
expressly compensated the employees for donning and doffing their 
personal protective equipment.  As part of the collective 
bargaining negotiations, in 1982, the parties stipulated that the 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wis. Admin. Code ch. DWD 
272 are to the May 2019 register date unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
4 
 
"daily credit" of compensated donning and doffing time would be 
reduced from 12 minutes to six minutes.  In 1985, JDF and the Union 
agreed to eliminate the provision that compensated the employees 
for donning and doffing.  In 1994, the Union proposed that JDF 
once again compensate the employees for 12 minutes of donning and 
doffing time.  At some point during the negotiations, the Union 
withdrew the proposal.  Collective bargaining resulted in an 
increase in the employees' base wages of $.60/hour.   
¶6 
When the parties reconvened for negotiations in 1997, 
the Union once again proposed 12 minutes of compensated time for 
donning and doffing.  The Union later withdrew the proposal and 
collective bargaining resulted in an increase in the employees' 
base wages of $.90/hour.  Again, when the collective bargaining 
agreement expired in 2000, the Union made a proposal for 
compensated donning and doffing time, which it later withdrew.  
This time, collective bargaining resulted in the employees 
receiving a base wage increase of $1.50/hour.  The same pattern 
occurred in 2004 and 2009:  the Union's proposal was withdrawn, 
and base wages were ultimately increased by $1.25/hour.4   
¶7 
JDF asserts that this extensive bargaining history 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
Union 
withdrew 
its 
proposals 
for 
compensation for donning and doffing in exchange for an increase 
in base wages.  However, it admitted at oral argument that the 
                                                 
4 In 2006, the Union sent JDF a letter declaring that failure 
to compensate the employees for donning and doffing and walking to 
workstations violated the law and "must be remedied immediately."  
The Union did not follow up or file a related grievance or wage 
claim with the Department of Workforce Development (DWD). 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
5 
 
record established "no direct tie" between the Union's withdrawal 
of the proposal and the employees receiving an increase in base 
wages. 
¶8 
In 2010, the employees filed this suit seeking unpaid 
wages for time spent donning and doffing personal protective 
equipment and walking to and from their workstations.5  In 
response, JDF pleaded numerous affirmative defenses, including 
promissory estoppel, waiver, laches, and unjust enrichment.  The 
parties stipulated that the total time employees spent donning and 
doffing was 4.3 minutes per day.6  The stipulation also included 
the amount of time the employees spent walking to and from their 
workstations, up to 4.33 minutes per day.  The agreed-upon relevant 
time period at issue for the employees' claims was December 10, 
2008, to November 25, 2013.7   
¶9 
JDF moved for summary judgment alleging that the Union 
repeatedly proposed wages for donning and doffing during 
collective bargaining negotiations and withdrew its proposals in 
                                                 
5 The employees filed a class action made up of approximately 
227 current and former employees.  The employees and JDF stipulated 
to the certification of four subclasses based upon the type of 
work that the employees performed.   
6 The only exception was for the employees who worked in the 
shipping department, where the vast majority of donning and doffing 
activities were not required. 
7 In August 2013 the court of appeals concluded that donning 
and doffing was compensable time under the "plain terms of the DWD 
code."  Weissman v. Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 109, 
¶2, 350 Wis. 2d 380, 838 N.W.2d 502.  Several months later, on 
November 25, 2013, JDF began compensating its employees for donning 
and doffing.   
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
6 
 
exchange for higher base wages.  In the alternative, JDF asserted 
that the time was rendered non-compensable by the de minimis 
doctrine and that recovery of damages was precluded by the 
equitable defenses of promissory estoppel, waiver, laches, and 
unjust enrichment. 
¶10 The circuit court determined that pursuant to United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1473 v. Hormel Foods Corp., 
2016 WI 13, 367 Wis. 2d 131, 876 N.W.2d 99, the time employees 
spent donning and doffing was compensable.  The circuit court 
further concluded that "there is no exception under Wisconsin law 
permitting 
collective 
bargaining 
to 
modify 
or 
eliminate" 
compensation for donning and doffing.  Finally, the circuit court 
decided that the donning and doffing time here was not de minimis 
and that JDF's four equitable defenses did not preclude the 
employees' recovery of damages.  
¶11 JDF petitioned this court for bypass of the court of 
appeals, which we granted.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 We review a decision on summary judgment using the same 
methodology 
as 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
Green 
Spring 
Farms 
v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  
Summary judgment shall be granted where the record demonstrates 
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
7 
 
¶13 This case involves interpretation and application of 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 (April 2018).8  We interpret an 
administrative 
regulation 
using 
the 
rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶30.  While 
we benefit from the analysis of the circuit court, the 
interpretation of an administrative regulation is a question of 
law which this court reviews de novo.  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 
131, ¶18, 298 Wis. 2d 37, 725 N.W.2d 262.   
¶14 We also examine the circuit court's discretionary 
determination as to the applicability of JDF's four equitable 
defenses, which we review under an erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard.  See Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶22, 339 
Wis. 2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756.  A circuit court erroneously 
exercises its discretion when it applies an improper legal standard 
or makes a decision not reasonably supported by the facts of 
record.  Id.; State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 371, 334 
N.W.2d 903 (1983).   
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶15 We initially consider whether, under Wisconsin law, 
compensation for donning and doffing can be modified or eliminated 
through collective bargaining.  We next address JDF's contention 
that the time spent donning and doffing was rendered non-
compensable by the de minimis doctrine.  Finally, we resolve 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wis. Admin. Code ch. DWD 
274 are to the April 2018 register date unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
8 
 
whether the circuit court erred in concluding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 109.03(5) barred JDF's four equitable defenses.  
 
A. An employee's right to compensation for donning and 
doffing personal protective equipment cannot be modified or 
eliminated through collective bargaining. 
¶16 The main issue presented on appeal is:  under Wisconsin 
law, can compensation for donning and doffing personal protective 
equipment be modified or eliminated through collective bargaining?  
Because time spent donning and doffing comprises "hours worked" 
under Wis. Admin. Code. § DWD 272.12, and the law does not exempt 
donning and doffing from the statutory requirement that employees 
be paid for all hours worked, the answer is no.  Contrary to JDF's 
argument, neither Aguilar v. Husco International, Inc., 2015 WI 
36, 361 Wis. 2d 597, 863 N.W.2d 556, nor Hormel Foods Corp., 367 
Wis. 2d 131, indicate otherwise.   
¶17 DWD is charged with "adopt[ing] reasonable and proper 
rules and regulations" related to wage and labor laws in Wisconsin.  
See Wis. Stat. § 103.005(1).  DWD regulations determining an 
employee's hours worked for purposes of compensation are found in 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12.  This section requires employees to 
be paid for all time spent in "physical or mental exertion (whether 
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and 
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer's 
business."9  Compensable time is defined as "the time on any 
                                                 
9 "Administrative 
rules 
enacted 
pursuant 
to 
statutory 
rulemaking authority have the force and effect of law in 
Wisconsin."  Staples v. DHSS, 115 Wis. 2d 363, 367, 340 N.W.2d 194 
(1983). 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
9 
 
particular workday at which such employee commences their 
principal activity or activities."  § DWD 272.12(1)(a)2.  The term 
"principal activity" "includes all activities which are an 
integral part of a principal activity."10  § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.   
¶18 We first address whether the employees' time spent 
donning and doffing personal protective equipment at the beginning 
and end of the workday is an integral part of a "principal 
activity" pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e) and is 
therefore compensable.  In Tyson Foods, the court of appeals 
concluded that donning and doffing personal protective equipment 
within the prepared food industry was an "integral part of a 
principal activity," and therefore compensable.  Weissman v. Tyson 
Prepared Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 109, ¶2, 350 Wis. 2d 380, 838 
N.W.2d 502 ("Tyson Foods").  In Hormel Foods Corp., a majority of 
this court adopted the reasoning of Tyson Foods, and concluded 
that donning and doffing protective clothing and equipment at the 
beginning and end of the day11 was compensable because it was an 
                                                 
10 The regulation provides three examples of what "is meant 
by an integral part of a principal activity."  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.  The third example is a chemical plant worker 
who dons and doffs clothing and equipment at the beginning and end 
of his shift.  See § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.c. 
11 The parties in Hormel Foods Corp. also stipulated to the 
employees' time spent walking to and from the workstations.  The 
lead opinion reasoned that "the time spent walking to or from 
workstations or washing hands occurs after the employees' 
'workday' begins and is thus compensable."  United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1473 v. Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 
WI 13, ¶21 n.6, 367 Wis. 2d 131, 876 N.W.2d 99 (Abrahamson, J., 
joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.). 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
10 
 
integral part of the principal activity of food production.12  See 
Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶78 (Abrahamson, J., joined 
by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) ("[W]e conclude that donning and doffing 
the clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day in 
the instant case is 'integral and indispensable' to the employees' 
principal activities of producing food products."); id., ¶108 
(Roggensack, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined 
by Prosser, J.) ("While I do not join the lead opinion, I agree 
with its conclusion that donning and doffing of company-required 
clothing and gear at the beginning and end of the workday is 'an 
integral 
part 
of 
a 
principal 
activity' . . . for 
which 
compensation is required." (internal footnotes omitted)).   
¶19 In this case, the personal protective equipment that the 
employees are required to don and doff is similar to that in Hormel 
Foods Corp. and Tyson Foods, and the activities of the employees 
likewise occur within the food production industry.  We clarify 
that the employees' time spent donning and doffing personal 
protective equipment at the beginning and end of the workday in 
this case is an "integral part of a principal activity," and is 
therefore compensable under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e).13    
                                                 
12 The main dispute between the lead opinion and Chief Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence/dissent in Hormel Foods Corp. was whether 
the donning and doffing was compensable when it occurred over the 
lunch hour.  See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶109. 
13 JDF conceded at oral argument that the time employees spent 
donning and doffing was compensable pursuant to Tyson Foods, 350 
Wis. 2d 380, and Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
11 
 
¶20 We next resolve whether compensation for donning and 
doffing can nonetheless be modified or eliminated through 
collective bargaining.  The Wisconsin Statutes provide that an 
employer may not contractually avoid its obligation to pay an 
employee for all compensable time.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 109.03(1), 
109.03(5); Kieninger v. Crown Equip. Corp., 2019 WI 27, ¶15 & n.7, 
386 Wis. 2d 1, 924 N.W.2d 172.  There is no Wisconsin statute or 
DWD regulation that expressly allows an employer to modify or 
eliminate compensation for donning and doffing personal protective 
equipment.  This is in contrast to the federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA), which specifically permits collective bargaining over 
compensation for donning and doffing, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012).14  
Although Wisconsin's wage law is modeled after the FLSA, there is 
no Wisconsin statute or regulation that is equivalent to § 203(o).  
See Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶76 ("No counterpart to 
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) exists in Wisconsin law."). 
                                                 
14 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1947 to 
add what is now 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).  That provision provides: 
In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 
of this title the hours for which an employee is 
employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in 
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of 
each workday which was excluded from measured working 
time during the week involved by the express terms of or 
by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-
bargaining agreement applicable to the particular 
employee. 
See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 226 (2014) (noting 
that § 203(o) "provides that the compensability of time spent 
changing clothes . . . is a subject appropriately committed to 
collective bargaining"). 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
12 
 
¶21 JDF maintains that even though there is no express 
exception in Wisconsin law permitting collective bargaining over 
compensation for donning and doffing, a combination of two 
footnotes in separate writings in Hormel Foods Corp., 367 
Wis. 2d 131, indicates that a majority of the court has stated 
otherwise.  JDF cites to one footnote from the concurrence/dissent 
of Chief Justice Roggensack which states: 
Hormel does not argue that no compensation is due because 
such compensation was bargained away in a collective 
bargaining agreement, which is permitted under state and 
federal law.  See Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., 2015 WI 
36, ¶24, 361 Wis. 2d 597, 863 N.W.2d 556; Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 274.05; see also Sandifer v. [U.S.] Steel 
Corp., [571] U.S. [220], 134 S. Ct. 870, 878-79, 187 
L.E.2d 729 (2014). 
See Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶113 n.6 (Roggensack, 
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Prosser, 
J.).  JDF also cites to a footnote in Justice Gableman's dissent 
which states: 
The Wisconsin Administrative Code allows employees to 
bargain away rights they would otherwise have under the 
Code as long as the parties enter into a [collective 
bargaining agreement] and apply for a waiver or 
otherwise meet the factors required for a waiver.  See 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 247.05; Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, 
Inc., 
2015 
WI 
36, 
¶11, 
361 
Wis. 2d 597, 
863 
N.W.2d 556. . . .  
But, as the concurring/dissenting opinion points out, 
"Hormel does not argue that no compensation is due 
because such compensation was bargained away in a 
collective bargaining agreement, which is permitted 
under state and federal law."  Concurrence/Dissent, ¶113 
n.6. 
Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶145 n.3 (Gableman, J., 
dissenting, joined by Ziegler, J.). 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
13 
 
¶22 For a number of reasons, these two footnotes do not 
provide support for JDF's claim that compensation for donning and 
doffing can be modified or eliminated through collective 
bargaining.  First and foremost, whether compensation for donning 
and doffing can be modified or eliminated through collective 
bargaining was not at issue in Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131.  
Instead, the court addressed two issues:  (1) whether donning and 
doffing of company-required clothing and equipment was compensable 
time under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e); and (2) even if 
that time was otherwise compensable, whether it was rendered non-
compensable under the de minimis doctrine.  Hormel Foods Corp., 
367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶4.  The issue of whether the parties bargained 
over compensation for donning and doffing was not raised by the 
parties.15  Four Justices' views on an un-briefed issue, contained 
in separate writings that include those dissenting from the 
judgment, cannot signify a majority of this court.  See State v. 
Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶37 n.16, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567 
("Under Marks, the positions of the justices who dissented from 
the judgment are not counted in examining the divided opinions for 
holdings.") (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977)); see also State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 1, ¶70 n.1, 389 
Wis. 2d 627, 937 N.W.2d 579 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) 
("Although the vitality of Griep has been called into question, 
currently it remains in force.").   
                                                 
15 JDF critiques the lead opinion in Hormel Foods Corp., 367 
Wis. 2d 131, for not addressing the issue, while simultaneously 
acknowledging that the issue was not raised by the parties.  
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
14 
 
¶23 Additionally, these two footnotes rely upon Aguilar, 361 
Wis. 2d 597, federal law, and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 as 
support.  As we will illustrate, § DWD 274.05 and federal law do 
not apply to this case,16 and Aguilar is distinguishable.   
¶24 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 is the sole basis for 
obtaining a waiver or modification of Wisconsin wage law 
requirements pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.  It 
provides: 
Except 
as 
provided 
in [§] DWD 
274.08, 
where 
a 
collectively bargained agreement exists, the department 
may consider the written application of labor and 
management for a waiver or modification to the 
requirements of this chapter based upon practical 
difficulties or unnecessary hardship in complying 
therewith.  If the department determines that in the 
circumstances existing compliance with this chapter is 
unjust or unreasonable and that granting such waiver or 
modification will not be dangerous or prejudicial to the 
life, health, safety or welfare of the employees, the 
department may grant such waiver or modification as may 
be appropriate to the case.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶25 We rely on the same rules of construction to interpret 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 that we apply to interpret a statute.  
See Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶30 ("When interpreting 
administrative regulations the court uses the same rules of 
interpretation as it applies to statutes."); Orion Flight Servs., 
Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 2006 WI 51, ¶18, 290 Wis. 2d 421, 714 
N.W.2d 
130 
("Interpretations 
of 
code 
provisions, 
and 
the 
                                                 
16 JDF concedes that it does not prevail if Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 274.05 does not apply to this case. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
15 
 
determination as to whether the provision in question is consistent 
with the applicable statute, are subject to principles of statutory 
construction.").  We first look to the plain language of § DWD 
274.05 to determine its meaning.  Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 
131, ¶31.  We further consider the context of the regulation and 
the case law interpreting it.  Id.     
¶26 By its express terms, Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 is 
limited to "a waiver or modification to the requirements of this 
chapter . . . ," that is, ch. DWD 274 (emphasis added).  The 
requirement that an employee be compensated for donning and doffing 
is governed by Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e), which is found 
in a different chapter, ch. DWD 272.  The plain language of § DWD 
274.05 therefore does not support JDF's argument that the employees 
waived their right to compensation for donning and doffing, as 
mandated by § DWD 272.12(2)(e).  
¶27 JDF's argument also fails when Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.05 is considered in the context of surrounding regulations.  
"As with statutory interpretation, we interpret the language of 
a regulation in the context in which it is used, 'not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding 
or closely-related [regulations]; and reasonably, [so as] to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.'"  Williams v. Integrated Cmty. 
Servs., Inc., 2007 WI App 159, ¶12, 303 Wis. 2d 697, 736 N.W.2d 
226 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  
¶28 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 274.045, a surrounding 
regulation to § DWD 274.05, explicitly incorporates Wis. Admin. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
16 
 
Code § DWD 272.12.  Section DWD 274.045, entitled "Interpretation 
of hours worked," states that:  "[t]he provisions of s. DWD 272.12 
apply to the interpretation of hours worked under this chapter."  
The text makes clear that provisions of § DWD 272.12 apply when 
calculating "hours worked" under ch. DWD 274.  Conversely, Section 
DWD 274.05, entitled "Waiver or modification," does not explicitly 
incorporate provisions from § DWD 272.12 with language similar to 
§ DWD 274.045, such as:  "[t]he provisions of s. DWD 272.12 apply 
to a waiver or modification under this chapter."  DWD knew how to 
incorporate provisions from another chapter into regulations in 
ch. DWD 274, yet it did not do so in § DWD 274.05.  See Lake City 
Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 171, 558 N.W.2d 100 
(1997) ("It is clear that the legislature knew how to accomplish 
this goal [of qualifying the language of the statute], since it 
included similar qualifying language in this very same statute.").  
We therefore decline JDF's request to disregard the express textual 
limitation of "this chapter" included in § DWD 274.05.17   
¶29 We further observe that 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), the "federal 
law" referred to in the Hormel Foods Corp. footnotes, is not 
                                                 
17 There are no cases where Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 has 
been applied outside of ch. DWD 274. 
Even if § DWD 274.05 applied, it is undisputed that neither 
JDF nor the Union requested a waiver from DWD of JDF's obligations 
to compensate the employees for donning and doffing. 
Additionally, we observe that a waiver pursuant to § DWD 
274.05 is allowed only when DWD has determined that granting a 
waiver or modification "will not be dangerous or prejudicial to 
the life, health, safety or welfare of the employees . . . ."   
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
17 
 
dispositive because "[n]o counterpart to 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) exists 
in Wisconsin law."  Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶76.  As 
discussed above, Wisconsin law, unlike § 203(o), does not 
expressly allow modification or elimination of compensation for 
donning and doffing through collective bargaining.  The Seventh 
Circuit has rejected the contention that "§ 203(o) preempts 
[Wisconsin] law that lacks an equivalent exception."  Spoerle v. 
Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010).     
¶30 Finally, the citation to Aguilar in the Hormel Foods 
Corp. footnotes does not support JDF's assertion that compensation 
for donning and doffing can be modified or eliminated through 
collective bargaining.  In Aguilar, a union filed a complaint with 
DWD alleging that Husco owed back pay to its employees for 20-
minute meal breaks, which had been uncompensated pursuant to a 
provision in the parties' collective bargaining agreement.  
Aguilar, 361 Wis. 2d 597, ¶1.  The union argued that the collective 
bargaining agreement was in conflict with Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.02, which required employers to pay employees for meal breaks 
that were shorter than 30 minutes.18  Id.  DWD disagreed with the 
union because it determined that, although the 20–minute unpaid 
breaks technically violated § DWD 274.02, "the factors favoring a 
waiver [pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05] were present in 
this case (specifically, that the parties to the [collective 
                                                 
18 The Aguilar court noted that although Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 274.05 allows employers and unions with a collective 
bargaining agreement to request a waiver, no such request was made.  
Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., 2015 WI 36, ¶2 & n.2, 361 
Wis. 2d 597, 863 N.W.2d 556. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
18 
 
bargaining agreement] had agreed to the provision and that there 
was no evidence that the shorter meal breaks jeopardized the life, 
health, safety or welfare of employees)."  Aguilar, 361 
Wis. 2d 597, ¶3.  This court upheld DWD's interpretation of § DWD 
274.02 and its decision not to seek recovery of back pay since it 
was "reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the regulation."  
Aguilar, 361 Wis. 2d 597, ¶7.   
¶31 Aguilar is distinguishable from this case in two 
important respects.  First, Aguilar involved collective bargaining 
for meal breaks, which are regulated by Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.02.  Unlike the section regulating donning and doffing, which 
is found in Wis. Admin. Code ch. DWD 272, the section regulating 
meal breaks is found within Wis. Admin. Code ch. DWD 274 and 
therefore fits explicitly within the language of Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 274.05 allowing for waiver of collective bargaining within 
"this chapter."  
¶32 Second, although in Aguilar there was no formal request 
for a waiver under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05, see Aguilar, 361 
Wis. 2d 597, ¶2, the unpaid meal breaks were expressly agreed upon 
and written into the collective bargaining agreement between the 
parties.  Here, it is undisputed that there was nothing written 
into 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
indicating 
that 
compensation for donning and doffing was bargained over.  Discovery 
has been completed and, as JDF concedes, there is nothing in the 
record that directly ties the Union's withdrawal of the proposal 
for compensated donning and doffing time in exchange for an 
increase in employees' base wages.  Aguilar falls far short of 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
19 
 
supporting JDF's argument that if an employee brings an unpaid 
wage claim for donning and doffing under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
272.12, it is subject to the waiver provision in § DWD 274.05. 
¶33 Ultimately, the two footnotes that JDF relies upon from 
Hormel Foods Corp. do not provide support for JDF's claim that 
compensation for donning and doffing can be modified or eliminated 
through collective bargaining.  We reject JDF's attempt to ignore 
the plain language of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 and transform 
four Justices' views on an un-briefed issue, contained in separate 
writings that include those dissenting from the judgment, into a 
bargaining right under state law that is commensurate with 29 
U.S.C. § 203(o).   
¶34 We conclude that under Wisconsin law, compensation for 
donning and doffing cannot be modified or eliminated through 
collective bargaining.  We therefore affirm the circuit court's 
denial of summary judgment on this issue.  
  
B. The time employees spent donning and  
doffing was not de minimis. 
¶35 In the alternative, JDF asserts that the donning 
and doffing 
time 
was 
rendered 
non-compensable 
because 
of 
the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, which means "the law does 
not govern trifles."  "De minimis non curat lex," Merriam 
Webster Online 
Dictionary 
(2020), 
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/de%20minimis%20non%20curat%20lex.  The de 
minimis doctrine "'permits employers to disregard . . . otherwise 
compensable work '[w]hen the matter in issue concerns only a few 
seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours.''"  
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
20 
 
Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶97 (quoted source omitted).  
The United States Supreme Court has reasoned that a few seconds or 
minutes may be dismissed as de minimis because such "[s]plit-
second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working 
conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act."  
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946), 
superseded by statute as noted in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. 
v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014).  "The de minimis rule is concerned 
with the practical administrative difficulty of recording small 
amounts of time for payroll purposes."  Lindow v. United States, 
738 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1984).  In determining whether 
otherwise compensable time is de minimis, courts have considered 
the practical difficulty of recording the additional time, the 
size of the aggregate claim, and whether the work was performed on 
a daily basis.  Id. at 1062-63 (citing national cases for this 
proposition).  
¶36 In Hormel Foods Corp., Justice Abrahamson's opinion and 
Chief Justice Roggensack's partial concurrence both concluded that 
the de minimis doctrine did not bar compensation for stipulated 
time spent donning and doffing at the beginning and end of the 
work day because it was "not a 'trifle'" and amounted to over $500 
a year per employee.  Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶105 
(Abrahamson, J., joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.); id., ¶137, 
(Roggensack, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined 
by Prosser, J.) ("I conclude that . . . the de minimis rule does 
not apply to preclude compensation for 5.7 minutes per day for 
each food preparation employee who dons whites and required gear 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
21 
 
at the start of the workday and doffs them at the day's 
conclusion."). 
 
Justice 
Abrahamson's 
opinion 
acknowledged, 
however, that "[a]lthough the de minimis non curat lex doctrine is 
an established feature of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, no 
Wisconsin cases, statutes, or regulations state that the 
de minimis doctrine applies to Wisconsin DWD regulations or in 
employment disputes."  Id., ¶99 (footnote omitted). 
¶37 In this case, the parties stipulated that the total time 
employees spent donning and doffing was 4.3 minutes per day and 
that the amount of time the employees spent walking to and from 
their workstations was up to 4.33 minutes per day.  As a result, 
we need not be a "time-study professional" to determine the amount 
of time at issue.  See id., ¶104.  The average amount of damages 
sought per employee is approximately $675 per year, for five 
years.19  This amount is not a "trifle"; viewed in the aggregate 
it is a significant amount of compensation for tasks that the 
employees completed daily.   
¶38 We assume without deciding that the de minimis doctrine 
applies to claims arising under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12, and 
conclude that the time spent donning and doffing here was not de 
minimis.  We therefore affirm the circuit court's denial of summary 
judgment on this issue. 
C.  JDF's equitable defenses are not barred by 
Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5). 
                                                 
19 The time employees spent walking to and from the various 
departments and work areas was included in this calculation. 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
22 
 
¶39 JDF 
raised 
several 
"alternative 
and 
affirmative 
defenses" in its answer to the employees' complaint.  JDF asserts 
that since 1994 there has been an agreement that the Union, as the 
authorized representative of the employees, would withdraw its 
request for compensation for donning and doffing in return for JDF 
increasing the employees' base wages.20  According to JDF, the 
employees are now "double dipping" by seeking reimbursement for 
compensation they have previously collectively bargained not to 
receive. 
¶40 On summary judgment, JDF raised four equitable defenses:  
promissory estoppel, waiver, laches, and unjust enrichment.  The 
circuit court summarily rejected JDF's equitable defenses without 
analyzing their merits.  As support, the circuit court cited to 
                                                 
20 In support, JDF points to two of the uncontested facts in 
the record on summary judgment: 
 
77. During the back and forth of the labor contract 
negotiations, when the Union would withdraw one of its 
economic proposals it did so with the expectation that 
it was creating an incentive for the Company to make 
some positive movement in increasing its economic offer.   
 
102. The Company would not have been willing to 
agree to give the same level of wage rate increase in 
2009 if the Union insisted and prevailed on the Company 
to pay an extra amount for donning/doffing and related 
walking time. 
However, it is undisputed that proposals can be withdrawn for 
a multitude of reasons.  As the employees assert, throughout the 
parties' long bargaining history there have been hundreds or 
thousands of proposals that were withdrawn during the course of 
bargaining.  JDF admitted at oral argument that there was nothing 
in the record that explicitly tied the increase in the employees' 
base wage to the Union's withdrawal of its proposal for compensated 
donning and doffing time.   
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
23 
 
Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5),21 which it concluded "prevented clauses in 
contracts from precluding the right to court access."  The circuit 
court viewed the four equitable defenses as contravening this 
"strong statement of broad public policy supporting access to 
courts."  
¶41 We 
review 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
determination to dismiss JDF's equitable defenses using an 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  See Johnson, 339 
Wis. 2d 493, ¶22.  A circuit court erroneously exercises its 
discretion when it applies an improper legal standard or makes a 
decision not reasonably supported by the facts of record.  Id.; 
McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d at 371.   
¶42 The circuit court incorrectly concluded that the mere 
existence of a statutory cause of action bars equitable defenses.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 109.03(5) is a vehicle for employees to assert 
their right to unpaid wages in state court.  See, e.g., Aguilar, 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 109.03(5) states: 
Except as provided in sub. (1), no employer may by 
special contract with employees or by any other means 
secure exemption from this section.  Each employee shall 
have a right of action against any employer for the full 
amount of the employee's wages due on each regular pay 
day as provided in this section and for increased wages 
as provided in [§] 109.11(2), in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.  An employee may bring an action against 
an employer under this subsection without first filing 
a wage claim with the department under [§] 109.09(1).  
An employee who brings an action against an employer 
under this subsection shall have a lien upon all property 
of the employer, real or personal, located in this state 
as described in [§] 109.09(2). 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
24 
 
361 Wis. 2d 597, ¶12 ("The plaintiffs then brought suit in state 
court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5), which authorizes such 
claims . . . ."); Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶10, 267 
Wis. 2d 92, 673 N.W.2d 676 ("Wisconsin Stat. § 109.03(5) grants 
employees a right of action against employers for all unpaid wages 
due to the employee.").  Principles of equity, on the other hand, 
are not bound by statute and a determination as to their 
applicability is within a circuit court's discretion.  See Culbert 
v. Ciresi, 2003 WI App 158, ¶16, 266 Wis. 2d 189, 667 N.W.2d 825 
("Whether to apply estoppel to preclude a party from raising a 
defense is within the trial court's discretion."); see also Prince 
v. Bryant, 87 Wis. 2d 662, 674, 275 N.W.2d 676 (1979) (emphasizing 
that a circuit court has the power to apply an equitable remedy as 
necessary to meet the needs of a case).   
¶43 We conclude that the circuit court applied an improper 
legal standard when it determined that Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5), 
which outlines the right of an employee to bring a wage claim, 
acted as a complete bar to JDF's equitable defenses.  We therefore 
remand the case to the circuit court for full consideration of 
each of the equitable defenses and a determination as to whether 
any of these defenses preclude the employees' recovery of damages.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 We conclude that under Wisconsin law, compensation for 
donning and doffing cannot be modified or eliminated through 
collective bargaining.  We assume without deciding that the de 
minimis doctrine applies to claims arising under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12, and conclude that the time the employees spent 
No. 
2018AP1681   
 
25 
 
donning and doffing was not de minimis.  Finally, we conclude that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion and the 
case should be remanded for full consideration of JDF's four 
equitable defenses.  We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and remand the case to the circuit court.   
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is affirmed 
in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
 
 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
1 
 
¶45 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I write 
separately because the majority errs when it concludes that 
compensable donning and doffing time is not subject to collective 
bargaining.  It is.  The majority concludes otherwise because it 
gives short-shrift to clearly contrary statements from four 
justices of this court, and ignores the plain language of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code ("the Code").  I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶46 I conclude that compensation for donning and doffing is 
subject to collective bargaining and may be bargained away, 
modified, or waived under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 (April 
2018).1  I also conclude that there is an issue of material fact 
regarding whether compensation for donning and doffing was 
actually bargained away in this case.  Finally, I conclude that 
the de minimis doctrine applies in Wisconsin.  I take issue with 
the majority's failure to answer the important question whether 
the de minimis doctrine applies and the majority's failure to 
provide guidance regarding equitable defenses.  Accordingly, I 
would remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
¶47 While I disagree with the majority's conclusions, the 
majority aptly summarizes the relevant and undisputed facts of 
this case.  I will not separately summarize the facts.  Rather, 
this writing assumes the reader's familiarity with the relevant 
facts and will reference them as needed. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code ch. DWD 274 are to the April 2018 register date unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
2 
 
 
I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶48 "This court applies the same summary judgment standards 
as the circuit court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) and Bell 
v. County of Milwaukee, 134 Wis. 2d 25, 30, 396 N.W.2d 328 (1986).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no issues of 
material fact and only a question of law is presented.  Id."  
Aguilar v. Husco Int'l., Inc., 2015 WI 36, ¶17, 361 Wis. 2d 597, 
863 N.W.2d 556. 
¶49 In order to determine whether compensation for donning 
and doffing was subject to collective bargaining in this case, we 
must interpret the language of the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
and then apply that language to the facts of this case.  "The 
interpretation and application of a statute present questions of 
law that this court reviews de novo while benefiting from the 
analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court."  State v. 
Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (citing 
State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 
N.W.2d 238).  "When interpreting administrative regulations the 
court uses the same rules of interpretation as it applies to 
statutes."  United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1473 v. 
Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 WI 13, ¶30, 367 Wis. 2d 131, 876 
N.W.2d 99.  Accordingly, the interpretation and application of the 
administrative code is a question of law we review de novo using 
traditional tools of interpretation. 
¶50 "We begin our analysis with the language of the relevant 
[administrative regulation].  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
3 
 
The purpose of [our] interpretation is to give the [regulation] 
'its full, proper, and intended effect.'  Id., ¶44.  If the 
[regulation's] language is plain, we end the inquiry and give the 
language its 'common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except [we 
give] technical or specially-defined words or phrases . . . their 
technical or special definitional meaning.'  Id., ¶45."  State v. 
Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶10, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125.  "This 
court also analyzes the context and structure of a [regulation] to 
determine its meaning.  [Regulation] language 'is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related [regulations] . . . .' [Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46].  'A 
[regulation's] purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related [regulations]——that is, from its context or the structure 
of the [regulation] as a coherent whole.'  Id., ¶49."  Lopez, 389 
Wis. 2d 156, ¶11. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  JDF Conceded That Its Employees' Donning  
And Doffing Is Compensable. 
¶51 Under the Wisconsin Administrative Code, employees are 
entitled to compensation for certain activities.  Generally 
speaking, under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(1)(a) (May 2019)2: 
1.  Employees subject to the statutes must be paid 
for all time spent in "physical or mental exertion 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code ch. DWD 272 are to the May 2019 register date unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
4 
 
(whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by 
the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for 
the benefit of the employer's business." The workweek 
ordinarily includes "all time during which an employee 
is necessarily required to be on the employer's 
premises, on duty or at a prescribed work place." 
2.  "Workday," in general, means the period between 
"the time on any particular workday at which such 
employee 
commences 
their 
principal 
activity 
or 
activities" and "the time on any particular workday at 
which they cease such principal activity or activities." 
The "workday" may thus be longer than the employee's 
scheduled shift, hours, tour of duty, or time on the 
production line. Also, its duration may vary from day to 
day depending upon when the employee commences or ceases 
their "principal" activities. 
§ DWD 272.12(1)(a)1.-2. (emphases added). 
¶52 Employees' daily preparatory and concluding activities 
are not always compensable as "workday" "principal activities."  
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e).  Rather, they may be 
categorized as non-compensable "preliminary" and "postliminary" 
activities.  § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.c.  Compensable "principal 
activities" include only "activities which are an integral part of 
a principal activity."  § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.  An activity is 
"integral" if it is "closely related" and "indispensable" to 
performance 
of 
an 
employee's 
principal 
activity. 
 
§ DWD 
272.12(2)(e)1.c.  For example: 
If an employee in a chemical plant . . . cannot perform 
their principal activities without putting on certain 
clothes, changing clothes on the employer's premises at 
the beginning and end of the workday would be an integral 
part of the employee's principal activity.  On the other 
hand, if changing clothes is merely a convenience to the 
employee and not directly related to their principal 
activities, it would be considered as a "preliminary" or 
"postliminary" activity rather than a principal part of 
the activity.  However, activities such as checking in 
and out and waiting in line to do so would not ordinarily 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
5 
 
be regarded as integral parts of the principal activity 
or activities. 
Id. (emphases added).   
¶53 Accordingly, changing clothes or donning and doffing 
protective gear requires compensation only if it is "integral" to 
an employee's principal activity——only if it is "closely related" 
and "indispensable" to the employee's principal activity——but not 
if it is "merely a convenience."   
¶54 In this case, JDF requires its employees to don and doff 
"safety footwear, frocks, hairnets, aprons, ear plugs, and plastic 
bump caps" "at the beginning and end of their shifts."  Majority 
op., ¶4.  As the majority notes, "JDF conceded at oral argument 
that the time employees spent donning and doffing was compensable" 
under Hormel Foods Corp. and Weissman v. Tyson Prepared Foods.  
Majority op., ¶19 n.13.  See also Hormel Foods Corp., 367 
Wis. 2d 131; Weissman v. Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 
109, 350 Wis. 2d 380, 838 N.W.2d 502.  In light of that concession, 
I assume without deciding that the donning and doffing at issue in 
this case is integral to JDF's employees' principal activity. 
 
B.  Compensable Donning And Doffing Is  
Subject To Collective Bargaining. 
¶55 Four justices on this court have previously answered the 
question whether compensation for donning and doffing may be 
bargained away under Wisconsin law with a resounding "Yes" in 
Hormel Foods Corp.  In that case, Hormel did not argue that 
compensation for donning and doffing had in fact been bargained 
away in a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), but it was clear 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
6 
 
that it could have been.  See Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131.  
Chief Justice Roggensack wrote:  
 
Hormel does not argue that no compensation [for 
donning and doffing] is due because such compensation 
was bargained away in a collective bargaining agreement, 
which is permitted under state and federal law. See 
Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., 2015 WI 36, ¶24, 361 Wis. 
2d 597, 863 N.W.2d 556; Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05; 
see also Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., [571 
U.S. 220 (2014)].   
Id., ¶113 n.6 (Roggensack, C.J. concurring/dissenting, joined by 
Prosser, J.).  And Justice Gableman wrote:  
The Wisconsin Administrative Code allows employees 
to bargain away rights they would otherwise have under 
the Code as long as the parties enter into a CBA 
agreement and apply for a waiver or otherwise meet the 
factors required for a waiver.  See Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD [274.05]; Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., [362 Wis. 
2d 597, ¶11].   
Id., ¶145 n.3 (Gableman, J. dissenting, joined by Ziegler, J.).  
This four-justice conclusion that compensation for donning and 
doffing may be bargained away is correct and consistent with the 
plain language of the Wisconsin Administrative Code and this 
court's prior decision in Aguilar.  Here is why. 
¶56 First, the plain language of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.05 permits compensation for donning and doffing to be bargained 
away, waived, or modified.  The employees argue that compensation 
for donning and doffing is not subject to collective bargaining 
because compensation for donning and doffing is regulated under 
chapter 272 of the Code, and not chapter 274 (meaning § DWD 274.05 
does not apply to it).  The majority agrees.  Majority op., ¶¶28, 
34.  But, as counsel for JDF explained at oral argument, this 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
7 
 
interpretation is incorrect.  It is not true that chapters 272 and 
274 are "two silos" "and never the two shall meet." 
¶57 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 allows for the waiver 
or modification of compensation based on collective bargaining 
agreements.  It says: 
Except as provided in s. DWD 274.08, where a collectively 
bargained agreement exists, the department may consider 
the written application of labor and management for a 
waiver or modification to the requirements of this 
chapter based upon practical difficulties or unnecessary 
hardship in complying therewith.  If the department 
determines that in the circumstances existing compliance 
with this chapter is unjust or unreasonable and that 
granting such waiver or modification will not be 
dangerous or prejudicial to the life, health, safety or 
welfare of the employees, the department may grant such 
waiver or modification as may be appropriate to the case. 
§ DWD 274.05 (emphases added).  The employees and the majority 
focus on the "of this chapter" language but fail to appreciate 
what that language actually means.  Immediately prior to § DWD 
274.05, in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.045, the plain language "of 
this chapter"——chapter 274——incorporates "[t]he provisions of 
s. DWD 272.12."  § DWD 274.045.  It says, "The provisions of 
s. DWD 272.12 apply to the interpretation of hours worked under 
this chapter."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶58 The majority misunderstands the significance of this 
incorporation by reference.  The majority concludes that since 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.045 explicitly incorporates by 
reference Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12, and § DWD 274.05 does 
not, the donning and doffing at issue in this case is not subject 
to collective bargaining agreements under § DWD 274.05.  The 
majority's conclusion ignores the fact that § DWD 274.045 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
8 
 
incorporates § DWD 272.12 for "the interpretation of hours worked 
under this chapter"——all of chapter 274——not just § DWD 274.045.  
§ DWD 274.045 (emphasis added). 
¶59 Accordingly, chapter 274 explicitly incorporates by 
reference Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12, which defines "hours 
worked" for compensation purposes.  Thus, if and when donning and 
doffing is compensable under § DWD 272.12, that compensation is 
subject to collective bargaining and waiver or modification under 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05.  As noted above, JDF conceded that 
the donning and doffing at issue in this case is compensable under 
§ DWD 272.12.  Accordingly, it was clearly subject to collective 
bargaining and waiver or modification under § DWD 274.05.  
¶60 Neither party in this case actually applied for a waiver 
or modification of compensation for donning and doffing under Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 272.12.  But a formal application to the 
Department of Workforce Development is not always necessary.  Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 274.05 says: 
If the department determines that in the circumstances 
existing compliance with this chapter is unjust or 
unreasonable 
and 
that 
granting 
such 
waiver 
or 
modification will not be dangerous or prejudicial to the 
life, health, safety or welfare of the employees, the 
department may grant such waiver or modification as may 
be appropriate to the case. 
Id.  Thus, the right to compensation may be bargained away "as 
long as the parties enter into a CBA agreement and apply for a 
waiver or otherwise meet the factors required for a waiver.  See 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD [274.05]; Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., 
[362 Wis. 2d 597, ¶11]."  Hormel Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, 
¶145 n.3 (Gableman, J. dissenting, joined by Ziegler, J.) (emphases 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
9 
 
added).  Under the plain language of the Code, the right to 
compensation may be bargained away if (1) there is a CBA, and (2) 
the § DWD 274.05 factors are met.  And either the DWD or a reviewing 
court may determine whether the § DWD 274.05 factors are met.  We 
came to a similar conclusion in Aguilar. 
¶61 In that case, a union and Husco International, Inc. 
agreed in a CBA that employee meal breaks less than 30 minutes 
would not be compensated.  Aguilar, 361 Wis. 2d 597, ¶9.  The CBA 
was contrary to Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.02 (2006), which 
required compensation for meal breaks less than 30 minutes.  Id., 
¶¶22-23.  Later, as in this case, the union came back and asserted 
"that Husco was required to pay employees for the unpaid breaks 
notwithstanding the CBA."  Id., ¶10.  The union then filed a 
complaint with the DWD.  But "the DWD notified the union that the 
DWD would not seek back pay" of the meal break compensation.  Id., 
¶11.  The initial decision stated: 
"It is not disputed that the parties failed to request 
a waiver from the department under DWD 274.05.  However, 
that is a technical violation of the code."  After noting 
that there was no reason to think that the agreement 
"jeopardized the life, health, safety or welfare" of the 
employees and that the meal-break length had been a part 
of "the give and take of collective bargaining," the 
decision concluded, "Based on [DWD] review of this 
matter, the factors required to approve a waiver or 
modification of DWD 272.02 are present in the facts of 
this case." 
Id., ¶26 (emphasis added).  We upheld this determination as 
reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the regulation.  Id., 
¶¶36-37. 
¶62 Accordingly, the failure to request a waiver from the 
DWD is a mere technical violation.  A party may still argue to the 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
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DWD or a reviewing court that the right to compensation was 
bargained away, modified, or waived because (1) there is a CBA, 
and (2) the § DWD 274.05 factors are met.  See Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 274.05; Aguilar, 361 Wis. 2d 597, ¶¶26, 36-37. 
¶63 The facts of Aguilar are similar to those of this case.  
Here, the Union and JDF's negotiations during collective 
bargaining involved discussions of compensation for donning and 
doffing.  And now, despite their CBAs, the employees seek back pay 
for uncompensated donning and doffing.  Also as in Aguilar, neither 
party filed an application for a waiver with the DWD.  Under 
Aguilar, it is clear that the compensation for donning and doffing 
in this case still could have been bargained away.  It is also 
clear that compensation for donning and doffing was bargained away 
if (1) there was a CBA which bargained away compensation for 
donning and doffing, and (2) the § DWD 274.05 factors were met.  
What is less clear is whether the first prong is satisfied——whether 
the employees' right to compensation for donning and doffing was, 
in fact, bargained away. 
 
C.  There Is An Issue Of Material Fact Regarding 
Whether Compensation For Donning And Doffing  
Was In Fact Bargained Away. 
¶64 It is undisputed that the Union requested compensation 
for donning and doffing during collective bargaining negotiations 
in 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2009.  Majority op., ¶¶5-6.  It is 
also undisputed that, at some point during each negotiation, the 
Union withdrew its request.  Id.  And it is undisputed that each 
collective bargaining negotiation resulted in increased base wages 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
11 
 
for JDF employees.  Id.  Finally, JDF's Statement of Facts included 
two undisputed assertions relevant to the negotiations: 
 
77.  [In 2004,] [d]uring the back and forth of the 
labor contract negotiations, when the Union would 
withdraw one of its economic proposals it did so with 
the expectation that it was creating an incentive for 
[JDF] to make some positive movement in increasing its 
economic offer. 
 
102. [JDF] would not have been willing to agree to 
give the same level of wage rate increase in 2009 if the 
Union insisted and prevailed on [JDF] to pay an extra 
amount for donning/doffing and related walking time. 
Majority op., ¶39 n.20. 
¶65 On this record, it is undisputed that JDF and the Union's 
collective bargaining negotiations over the years involved 
discussions regarding compensation for donning and doffing.  But 
nothing in writing came out of the collective bargaining 
negotiations which specifically stated whether the right to 
compensation for donning and doffing was actually bargained away.  
If the relevant CBAs between the Union and JDF had said, "In 
exchange for the Union's waiver of compensation for donning and 
doffing protective gear, JDF will hereby increase base wages by X 
amount," then this would be an easy case.  The employees would 
have bargained away their right to compensation for donning and 
doffing.  But we have no such language in the CBAs.  Thus, there 
remains an issue of material fact: Was compensation for donning 
and doffing actually bargained away? 
¶66 Accordingly, I conclude that compensation for donning 
and doffing is subject to collective bargaining and may be 
bargained away under the plain language of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.05.  But I would remand for a factual determination under the 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
12 
 
first prong of § DWD 274.05——whether the right to compensation for 
donning and doffing was actually bargained away in this case.  The 
second prong——whether the § DWD 274.05 factors are met——also 
remains to be determined. 
 
D.  The Majority Fails To Decide Whether The De Minimis  
Doctrine Applies And Provides No Guidance 
Regarding The Applicability Of Equitable Defenses. 
¶67 In addition to my disagreement with the majority's 
conclusions, I also take issue with the majority because it dodges 
important questions squarely before this court.  The majority 
"assume[s] without deciding that the de minimis doctrine applies 
to claims arising under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12, and 
conclude[s] that the time spent donning and doffing here was not 
de minimis."  Majority op., ¶38.  Thus, the majority reaches its 
desired result without deciding an issue squarely presented to 
this court——whether the de minimis doctrine applies in Wisconsin.  
And the majority comes to a legal conclusion that the time is not 
de minimis without actually adopting a de minimis standard.  The 
majority dodges this important issue entirely the same way the 
lead opinion in Hormel Foods Corp. did four years ago.  See Hormel 
Foods Corp., 367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶181 (Gableman, J. dissenting, 
joined by Ziegler, J.) ("[T]he lead opinion, while pretending to 
engage in a de minimis-like discussion, does not actually answer 
the question before us.  Specifically, the lead opinion does not 
determine whether the de minimis doctrine applies in Wisconsin, 
does not explain what test or approach it used to reach its 
conclusion, and thus, does not provide any guidance for courts and 
parties moving forward."). 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
13 
 
¶68 I cannot join the majority's de minimis analysis because 
it leaves this important issue regarding the status of the de 
minimis doctrine in Wisconsin undecided.  Rather, I would conclude 
that the de minimis doctrine does indeed apply to claims arising 
under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained: 
When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or 
minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such 
trifles may be disregarded.  Split-second absurdities 
are not justified by the actualities of working 
conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.  It is only when the employee is required to give 
up a substantial measure of his time and effort that 
compensable working time is involved. 
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) 
(superseded by statute as noted in Integrity Staffing Solutions, 
Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014)). 
¶69 Furthermore, I cannot join the majority's de minimis 
analysis because the majority comes to a conclusion that the 
donning and doffing time is not de minimis without even adopting 
a standard.  Majority op., ¶37.  The majority leaves the bench and 
bar with nothing but confusion and unpredictability, just as the 
lead opinion did in Hormel Foods Corp.  See Hormel Foods Corp., 
367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶189 (Gableman, J. dissenting, joined by Ziegler, 
J.) (footnote omitted) ("The lead opinion tiptoes past this 
quagmire by sidestepping the question entirely.  Consequently, the 
question 
is 
left 
unanswered 
and 
Wisconsinites 
are 
left 
wondering."). 
¶70 The majority also "conclude[s] that the circuit court 
applied an improper legal standard when it determined that Wis. 
No.  2018AP1681.akz 
 
14 
 
Stat. § 109.03(5) . . . acted as a complete bar to JDF's equitable 
defenses."  Majority op., ¶43.  It then remands to the circuit 
court "for full consideration of each of the equitable defenses 
and a determination as to whether any of these defenses preclude 
the employees' recovery of damages."  Id.  I agree with the 
majority that § 109.03(5) is not a complete bar to equitable 
defenses, but I cannot join the majority opinion because it 
provides the circuit court with no guidance whatsoever regarding 
those equitable defenses. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶71 I conclude that compensation for donning and doffing is 
subject to collective bargaining and may be bargained away, 
modified, or waived under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05.  I also 
conclude that there is an issue of material fact regarding whether 
compensation for donning and doffing was actually bargained away 
in this case.  Finally, I conclude that the de minimis doctrine 
applies in Wisconsin.  I take issue with the majority's failure to 
answer the important question whether the de minimis doctrine 
applies and the majority's failure to provide guidance regarding 
equitable defenses.  Accordingly, I would remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
¶72 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
1 
 
 
¶74 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that Wisconsin law precludes parties from bargaining 
away employees' statutory rights to compensation.  However, I 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that the time spent by 
Jones Dairy Farm ("JDF") employees donning and doffing was de 
minimis.  I also disagree with the majority's decision to "assume 
without deciding" that the de minimis doctrine applies to claims 
under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12 (May 2019).  The de minimis 
doctrine is prevalent in other areas of Wisconsin law, and the 
doctrine applies to employment claims under federal law.  I would 
apply the de minimis doctrine to claims under Wisconsin's labor 
laws and conclude that the donning and doffing time in this case 
was de minimis.  I respectfully dissent.1  
I 
¶75 The doctrine of "de minimis non curat lex" recognizes 
that "[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles."  De Minimis 
Non Curat Lex, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  This 
doctrine appeared in 19th century Wisconsin cases and predates 
statehood.  See, e.g., Hass v. Prescott, 38 Wis. 146, 151 (1875) 
(concluding that even if the judgment was 24 cents in excess of 
what was appropriate, "it would not work a reversal of the 
judgment.  De minimis non curat lex"); Carman v. Hurd, 1 Pin. 619, 
624 (1846) ("An excess of some sixty-four cents . . . is 
complained of here.  This is a small matter to urge in this court:  
de minimis non curat lex.").  This court has applied the doctrine 
                                                 
1 Because I conclude the time at issue in this case was de 
minimis, I would not reach the equitable defenses raised by JDF.  
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
2 
 
in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., Village of Lannon v. Wood-
Land Contractors, Inc., 2003 WI 150, ¶46, 267 Wis. 2d 158, 672 
N.W.2d 275 (applying to use of personal property for tax 
exemptions); Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 189, 401 N.W.2d 568 
(1987) (applying to contract rights); Wisconsin Emp. Relations Bd. 
v. Lucas, 3 Wis. 2d 464, 469, 89 N.W.2d 300 (1958) (recognizing 
state labor relations board cannot take jurisdiction of unfair 
labor complaint if the allegation involves an actor engaging in 
"more than de minimis" interstate commerce). 
¶76 Wisconsin never affirmatively adopted or rejected the de 
minimis doctrine in employment law.  See majority op., ¶38 ("We 
assume without deciding that the de minimis doctrine applies to 
claims arising under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12[.]"); United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1473 v. Hormel Foods Corp., 
2016 WI 13, ¶¶98-100, 367 Wis. 2d 131, 876 N.W.2d 99 (Abrahamson, 
J., joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) ("Assuming, without deciding, 
that the de minimis doctrine is applicable to claims under Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
272.12[.]"); 
Id., 
¶181 
(Gableman, 
J., 
dissenting, joined by Zeigler, J.) ("[T]he lead opinion does not 
determine 
whether 
the 
de 
minimis 
doctrine 
applies 
in 
Wisconsin[.]").   
¶77 In contrast, the doctrine is well-established in federal 
employment law.  In a case involving compensation for time spent 
walking in the workplace, the Supreme Court stated:   
We do not, of course, preclude the application of a de 
minimis rule where the minimum walking time is such as 
to be negligible. . . .  When the matter in issue 
concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond 
the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be 
disregarded. . . .  It is only when an employee is 
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
3 
 
required to give up a substantial measure of his time 
and effort that compensable working time is involved.  
The de minimis rule can doubtless be applied to much of 
the walking time involved in this case[.] 
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) 
superseded by statute, Portal to Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 
80-49, 61 Stat. 84, as recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols., 
Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014).  In Integrity Staffing Sols., 
the Supreme Court again acknowledged the doctrine in the context 
of employment compensation, "reject[ing] the employees' argument 
that time spent waiting to undergo the security screenings is 
compensable [under federal law] because Integrity Staffing could 
have reduced that time to a de minimis amount."  Integrity Staffing 
Sols., 574 U.S. at 36.   
¶78 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
established criteria for determining whether otherwise compensable 
time is de minimis:  (1) "the amount of daily time spent on the 
additional work"; (2) "the practical administrative difficulty of 
recording the additional time"; (3) "the aggregate amount of 
compensable time"; and (4) "the regularity of the additional work."  
Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1984).  
Although no exact amount or rigid rule is determinative, "[m]ost 
courts have found daily periods of approximately 10 minutes de 
minimis[.]"  Id. at 1062 (citations omitted).  Applying these 
factors, the Lindow court deemed de minimis an average of 7 to 8 
minutes a day performing pre-shift activity because recording this 
time was administratively difficult and the employees did not 
regularly perform the pre-shift compensable work.  Id. at 1064.  
¶79 Other federal courts of appeal are in accord.  See, e.g., 
Kellar v. Summit Seating, Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 176-77 (7th Cir. 
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
4 
 
2011) (applying Lindow; concluding pre-shift work between 15 and 
40 minutes per day was not de minimis); Perez v. Mountaire Farms, 
Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 372-75 (4th Cir. 2011); (adopting the Lindow 
factors and holding 10.204 minutes per day was not de minimis); 
Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(holding the doctrine was not applicable after balancing the Lindow 
criteria); Reich v. Monfort, Inc., 144 F.3d 1329, 1333-34 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (applying the Lindow factors); Reich v. New York City 
Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the 
Lindow test and concluding extra time dog handlers spent attending 
their dogs was de minimis); see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.47 (2019).  I 
would join other courts in adopting Lindow's test for assessing 
whether the time Wisconsin employees spend donning and doffing is 
de minimis.  
II 
¶80 In this case, the parties stipulated that the total time 
an employee spent donning and doffing per day was 4.3 minutes.  
The time spent walking to the employees' workstations varied from 
.30 minutes to 4.33 minutes, depending on the department.  
Collectively, the employees seek pay for time ranging from roughly 
4 minutes and 40 seconds to roughly 8 minutes and 40 seconds.  In 
Lindow, the Ninth Circuit held that 7 to 8 minutes of time spent 
per day was de minimis.  See Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1064.  Even 
assuming 10 minutes of non-paid time, it was "negligible so that 
the de minimis rule . . . should be applied."  Green v. Planters 
Nut & Chocolate Co., 177 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cir. 1949).  Indeed, 
"[m]ost courts have found daily periods of approximately 10 minutes 
de minimis even though otherwise compensable."  Lindow, 738 F.2d 
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
5 
 
at 1062 (citations omitted).  As the dissent in Hormel noted, 
"Lindow itself stands for the proposition that 7 to 8 
minutes . . . qualified as de minimis."  367 Wis. 2d 131, ¶187 
n.24 (Gableman, J., dissenting joined by Zeigler, J.) (citing 
Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063-64); see also Hoyt v. Ellsworth Co-op. 
Creamery, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (W.D. Wis. 2008) ("Spending 
approximately 10 minutes per day changing may weigh in favor of 
the time being considered de minimis.").  This first factor 
suggests the time spent donning and doffing by JDF employees, as 
well as walking to their workstations, should be deemed de minimis.  
¶81 The next consideration is the "administrative difficulty 
of recording the additional time."  Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063.  In 
particular, the inquiry focuses on the "practical administrative 
difficulty of recording small amounts of time for payroll 
purposes."  Id. at 1062 (emphasis added; citation omitted).  While 
the parties stipulated to the time in this case, such an ex-post 
stipulation in the midst of litigation says nothing about the 
administrative difficulty of recording the additional time.  JDF 
explained it stipulated to the number of minutes because litigating 
the amount would be expensive due to the difficulty of accurately 
measuring and recording the time spent donning and doffing. 
¶82 One of the plaintiffs and another employee testified JDF 
employees often engaged in personal conversations or personal 
activities during the same pre- or post-shift time spent donning 
and doffing.  Under these circumstances, JDF would be challenged 
to measure the time spent donning and doffing without also 
capturing non-compensable personal activities.  See Lindow, 738 
F.2d at 1063-64 (concluding there would have been administrative 
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
6 
 
difficulty "monitoring [] pre-shift activity" in part because of 
a "wide variance in the amount of pre-shift time spent on 
compensable activities as opposed to social activities.").  
Similarly, there is no practical way JDF could account for the 
differing speeds with which employees don and doff their clothing, 
or walk to their stations.  See Monfort, Inc., 144 F.3d at 1334 
(concluding that where "employees used a variety of safety gear 
that 
took 
varying 
times 
to 
take 
on 
and 
off" 
it 
was 
"administratively difficult to record the actual time each worker 
engaged in these activities").  It would be nearly impossible for 
JDF to accurately account for each employee's time spent donning 
and doffing.  The administrative difficulty in recording this 
additional time weighs heavily in favor of the donning and doffing 
time being de minimis.  
¶83 The third Lindow factor examines the aggregate amount of 
the donning and doffing time.  The stipulated time range averages 
$675 per employee per year.  See majority op., ¶37.  Even if the 
aggregate compensable wages may weigh against determining the 
claim to be de minimis, this factor is not dispositive.  Rather, 
"the administrative difficulty of recording the time and the 
irregularity of the additional pre-shift work" renders the claim 
de 
minimis 
even 
if 
"plaintiffs' 
aggregate 
claim 
may 
be 
substantial."  Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1064.  
¶84 Lindow's final factor in the de minimis analysis 
considers the "regularity of the additional work."  Lindow, 738 
F.2d at 1063.  While the JDF employees don their clothes every day 
prior to their shifts and doff them each day at the end of their 
shifts, the irregularity in these activities, as in Lindow, stems 
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
7 
 
from "a wide variance in the amount of pre-shift time spent on 
compensable activities as opposed to social activities."  Id. at 
1063.  The personal activities periodically and unpredictably 
intermingled with donning and doffing, such as primping, 
socializing with co-workers, reading newspapers, texting, and 
surfing the internet, introduce irregularity in performing work 
tasks and weigh in favor of the time being deemed de minimis under 
the Lindow test.  Id. at 1063-64.   
¶85 While the aggregate size of the claim and daily practice 
of donning and doffing weigh against deeming plaintiffs' claim de 
minimis, the daily amount of time spent engaging in these 
activities, the variability among employees in the time spent on 
compensable 
work 
versus 
personal 
activities, 
and 
the 
administrative difficulty in recording the additional time all 
weigh in favor of deeming the time to be de minimis.  Lindow 
described the specific time spent each day performing the work as 
the "important factor" and noted the rule in its entirety focuses 
on the "administrative difficulty" consideration.  See Lindow, 738 
F.2d at 1062.  The Supreme Court has likewise placed more weight 
on the specific time spent each day on the challenged activity.  
In Anderson, the Court noted that it could apply the de minimis 
rule to "much of the walking time involved[,]" but remanded for a 
factual determination "as to the amount of walking time in issue."  
328 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added).  The Court was clear its main 
concern focused on the first factor adopted by Lindow: 
When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or 
minutes of working beyond the scheduled working hours, 
such trifles may be disregarded. . . .  It is only when 
the employee is required to give up a substantial measure 
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
8 
 
of his time and effort that compensable working time is 
involved.  
Id.  (emphasis added).  In rejecting application of the de minimis 
rule, the Court just a few years ago emphasized the specific time 
at issue.  See Integrity Staffing Sols., 574 U.S. at 36-37 
(rejecting an argument that the time spent was compensable because 
the employer "could have reduced that time to a de minimis amount."  
(emphasis added)).  
III 
¶86 In the context of labor law, Wisconsin cases provide no 
guidance regarding application of the de minimis doctrine, this 
court having declined to decide the issue.  We have already adopted 
the doctrine in other areas of law, see supra ¶75, and we should 
extend the doctrine to wage and hour claims, consistent with 
federal courts.  Harmonizing the Supreme Court's statements in 
Anderson and Integrity Staffing Sols. with the Ninth Circuit's 
holding in Lindow, the specific time spent each day on the activity 
and the administrative difficulty in recording the additional time 
are the most important considerations in the de minimis analysis.  
The roughly 4 minutes and 40 seconds to 8 minutes and 40 seconds 
spent per day donning and doffing and walking to workstations 
render the time de minimis, particularly when coupled with the 
administrative difficulty in recording this extra time for payroll 
purposes.  Accordingly, I would determine the time to be non-
compensable under the de minimis doctrine.  I respectfully dissent.   
   
No.  2018AP1681.rgb 
1