Title: Rhode Island Grand Jury v. Doe

State: rhode-island

Issuer: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Document:

641 A.2d 1295 (1994) RHODE ISLAND GRAND JURY v. John DOE. No. 93-674-M.P. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. May 20, 1994. Joseph A. Kelly, Keith B. Kyle, Carroll, Kelly & Murphy, Providence, for plaintiff. Jeffrey Pine, Atty. Gen., J. Richard Ratcliffe, Aaron Weisman, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant. WEISBERGER, Acting Chief Justice. This case comes before us on a petition for certiorari filed by John Doe in order to review an order entered by the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court. The order required that John Doe produce before the grand jury certain books and records pertaining to his administration of a governmental entity that he served as chief executive. After granting the writ of certiorari, reviewing the record in the case, and hearing oral argument on April 8, 1994, this court issued an order dated April 14, 1994, 639 A.2d 986. This order read as follows: This opinion sets forth the reasons upon which the foregoing order was based. In the briefs filed and in his oral argument, John Doe conceded that as the representative of a collective entity, he could not assert a personal privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in respect to producing the records of such collective entity. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 101 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1988); In re Sealed Case (Government Records), 950 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.1991). Essentially John Doe's argument to this court was based upon the proposition that he was entitled to more protection under article 1, section 13, of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island than under the counterpart privilege set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. However, this court has previously considered such an argument in State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14 (R.I. 1991), and reached a result contrary to that urged by John Doe. In that case we recognized that states may, in applying provisions of their constitutions, afford their citizens greater protection and security than are provided under the United States Constitution. We reaffirm that proposition pursuant to Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 575 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S. Ct. 788, 791, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 734 and have granted additional protection in certain areas. See, e.g., Pimental v. Department of Transportation, 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1980). Nevertheless, in Bertram, 591 A.2d at 21, we noted: The collective-entity doctrine is well supported by persuasive opinions issued by the Supreme Court of the United States over a period of nearly ninety years. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906), held that a corporation had no privilege against self-incrimination. This case was followed by Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771 (1911), which held that a corporation's president could not resist a subpoena demanding corporate records on the ground that these records might tend to incriminate him. This same principle was applied in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1944), to a union official who sought to resist a subpoena to produce documents of an unincorporated labor organization on self-incrimination grounds. In more recent years the collective-entity doctrine has been applied to a small law partnership, Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 94 S. Ct. 2179, 40 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974), and most recently to a corporate president who held all of the stock of two corporations, Braswell v. United States, supra. The persuasiveness of the rationale behind the foregoing opinions of the Supreme Court, as well as our prior determination in State v. Bertram, supra, leads us to the conclusion that we should continue to interpret article 1, section 13, of the Rhode *1297 Island Constitution as coextensive with the protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. As the representative of a governmental agency, John Doe may not resist responding to the subpoena on self-incrimination grounds insofar as the subpoena demands production of records of the governmental entity. In re Sealed Case (Government Records), 950 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.1991). As set forth in Braswell, the prosecution can make no evidentiary use of the fact that John Doe has produced the records. The production of the records must be regarded as the act of the governmental entity. However, the prosecution has the right to use the entity's act of production against the custodian. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118, 108 S. Ct. at 2295, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 114. For the reasons stated, the petition for certiorari is denied, the writ heretofore issued is quashed, and the papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon.