Title: Oregonians for Health and Water v. Kitzhaber

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: September 16, 1999 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SENATE BILL 686

OREGONIANS FOR HEALTH AND WATER,
an Oregon nonprofit corporation;
MICHAEL FEVES; JOE LEARY; DARREN
C. PENNINGTON, and E. LEE REEDY,

Petitioners,

	v.

JOHN A. KITZHABER, Governor of the
State of Oregon; and the DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondents.

State ex rel OREGONIANS FOR HEALTH
AND WATER, an Oregon nonprofit
corporation; MICHAEL FEVES;
JOE LEARY; DARREN C. PENNINGTON;
and E. LEE REEDY,

Plaintiffs-Relators,

	v.

PHIL KEISLING, Secretary of State
of the State of Oregon,

Defendant.

(SC S46770; S46771)

	En banc

	Petition for judicial review and original proceeding in
mandamus.

	Argued and submitted September 10, 1999.

	James N. Westwood, Miller, Nash, Wiener, Hager & Carlsen,
LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

petitioners, plaintiffs-relators.  With him on the briefs was
William H. Walters, Portland.

	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondents and
defendant.  With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	GILLETTE, J.

	The petition for review is dismissed.  The petition for a
peremptory writ of mandamus is denied.

		GILLETTE, J.	

		These consolidated proceedings present a challenge to
the validity of the emergency clause in Senate Bill (SB) 686, an
act passed during the last legislative session and signed by the
Governor on August 20, 1999.  The legislation concerns the siting
of a women's correctional facility and intake center complex. 
The underlying question in each proceeding is whether SB 686 is
an act "regulating taxation or exemption" under Article IX,
section 1a, of the Oregon Constitution, for which "[t]he
Legislative Assembly shall not declare an emergency * * *."(1) 

		Petitioners Oregonians for Health and Water, Michael
Feves, Joe Leary, Darren C. Pennington, and E. Lee Reedy
(collectively OHW) have filed both a petition for review and a
petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus in this court.  Both
petitions asks us to invalidate the emergency clause in SB 686 so
that OHW may attempt to have the legislation referred to the
voters under Article IV, section 1(3)(a), of the Oregon
Constitution.(2)  For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the
petition for review and deny the petition for a peremptory writ
of mandamus.

		We first examine the act itself.  Among other things,
SB 686 requires the Department of Corrections (DOC), upon
executive order of the Governor, to propose a site for the
construction and operation of a women's correctional facility and
intake center complex (complex) in this state.  Id., § 3(1). 
Section 12(1) of the act provides:

		"Except as provided in section 9 of this 1999 Act
[inapplicable here] and notwithstanding ORS 183.400,
183.482, 183.484 or 197.825 or any other law, exclusive
jurisdiction for review of the constitutionality of
sections 2 to 11 of this 1999 Act and any decision
relating to the siting of a women's correctional
facility and intake center complex under sections 3, 4,
5, 8, 10 and 11 of this 1999 Act is conferred upon the
Supreme Court."

Sections 14 and 15 of the act provide:

		"SECTION 14.  The condemnation of any real
property required under this 1999 Act by the Department
of Corrections, or on behalf of the department, shall
be conducted according to the applicable provisions of
ORS chapter 35.  Amounts paid in just compensation for
condemned real property shall be determined according
to ORS 35.346.

		"SECTION 15.  This 1999 Act being necessary for
the immediate preservation of the public peace, health
and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this
1999 Act takes effect on its passage."

		We turn to the procedural posture of these proceedings. 
On August 16, 1999, Reedy filed a prospective referendum petition
for SB 686 with the Secretary of State.  On August 20, 1999, the
Secretary of State's office rejected the filing, concluding that
"the Oregon Constitution does not allow the power of the
referendum on a bill with an emergency clause."  OHW responded on
August 30, 1999, by filing a petition for review of the
constitutionality of the emergency clause of SB 686 in this
court, asserting that section 12(1) of the act gives this court
original jurisdiction of the matter.

		On August 31, 1999, this court issued a show cause
order stating, in part:

		"Neither section 12(1) nor any other provision of
Senate Bill 686 appears to confer jurisdiction on this
court to review the constitutionality of section 15 of
Senate Bill 686 in the context of an original
proceeding under Section 12."

OHW responded to the show cause order; respondents the Governor
and DOC waived filing a response.

		Together with its response to the court's show cause
order, OHW also filed a petition for a peremptory writ of
mandamus declaring section 15 of SB 686 unconstitutional and
compelling the Secretary of State to accept OHW's prospective
referendum petition for the bill.  This court consolidated the
proceedings and specially set the matters for oral argument.  

		We first address OHW's petition for review.  The
question whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding is one of statutory construction to which the
methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), applies.  The court first
reviews the text and context of the statutory provisions at
issue.  Id. at 610-11.  If the intent of the legislature is clear
at that level of inquiry, then the court proceeds no further. 
Id. at 611.  That is the case here.

		OHW argues that it has not

	"'asked the court to review the constitutionality of
section 15' of the Act.  It is the Act as a whole that
is unconstitutional, and it is the Act as a whole that
needs to be considered in addressing this Court's
jurisdiction."

OHW's argument, however, is aimed only at section 15 of the act. 
The text of SB 686 expressly states that the court has original
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of "sections 2 to
11" of the bill.  The legislature did not include section 15
within the ambit of this court's statutorily authorized original
jurisdiction, and we may not insert into a statute that which has
been omitted.  ORS 174.010; see also Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories
Corp., 327 Or 433, 445-46, 963 P2d 678 (1998) (rejecting tolling
argument where statute under which claim was brought was "not
included in the list of statutes enumerated in" the tolling
statute).  Moreover, nothing in the context of SB 686 suggests a
construction other than that mandated by the express wording of
the act.  We dismiss the petition for review for lack of
jurisdiction.

		We turn to OHW's petition for a peremptory writ of
mandamus.  OHW seeks to invoke this court's original jurisdiction
under Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Under that provision, "the supreme court may, in
its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus proceedings."  Mandamus in this court
is an extraordinary remedy, Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or 6, 12, 725
P2d 886 (1986), and generally will lie only when a relator has no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel Carlile
v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 611, 956 P2d 202 (1998).  

		This court has chosen, on rare occasions, to exercise
its authority in circumstances in which, at least technically,
the petitioning party also could have invoked the mandamus
authority of the circuit court.  In such a case, however, this
court warned:

		"This does not mean * * * that a petition invoking
this court's extraordinary and discretionary
jurisdiction under Article VII, section 2 of the Oregon
Constitution will in the future be regarded as the
accepted and proper way to secure judicial review of
decisions of the Secretary of State under the elections
laws."

State ex rel Sajo v. Paulus, 297 Or 646, 648, 688 P2d 367 (1984). 
In this proceeding, we need not determine whether OHW was correct
to seek mandamus from this court because, even if it were, OHW's
petition does not support issuance of a writ.

		As noted, Article IX, section 1a, identifies two
species of acts for which the legislature may not declare an
emergency: those regulating "taxation" and those regulating
"exemption."  Nothing in SB 686 suggests in any way that the act
regulates taxation, and OHW's counsel conceded as much at oral
argument.  Accordingly, we focus on the question whether SB 686
is an act that regulates exemption.

		On its face, no provision of SB 686 seeks to effect or
regulate an exemption from taxation.  OHW, therefore, is left to
advancing a derivative argument, viz., that the provision of SB
686 respecting condemnation compels the conclusion that the act
regulates exemption because "[t]aking property by condemnation
effectively exempts that property from taxation."  That
derivative argument, however, suffers from two flaws.

		First, OHW's argument is speculative.  It presupposes
the hypothetical situation that DOC, or an entity on DOC's
behalf, actually will condemn private property for the siting and
construction of the complex.  SB 686, however, does not require
the condemnation of any property.  Section 14 merely sets out, by
statutory reference, the procedures to be followed for "[t]he
condemnation of any real property required under" the act.  DOC
remains free, subject to the other provisions of the act, to site
and construct the complex on land that the state already owns. 
If that were to occur, there would be no condemnation.  We
decline to adopt a construction of SB 686 that would call its
constitutionality into question, when the proffered construction
is based on a set of hypothetical facts that might never come to
pass.

		Moreover, and even if we were to assume that
condemnation will occur under SB 686, OHW's derivative argument
remains an attenuated one.  OHW asks us to conclude that any act
that provides for condemnation, by that fact alone, is an act
that regulates exemption from taxation.  The case upon which OHW
primarily relies, however, Wieder v. Hoss, 143 Or 57, 21 P2d 227
(1933), demonstrates that OHW's argument is untenable.  

		In Wieder, the act at issue -- which the court
concluded did regulate taxation and exemption -- provided for the
election of a state power commission and further provided:

		"'Section 14.  Plants, Exempt from Taxation. 
Plants and other property owned or controlled and/or
operated by the commission shall be exempt from state,
county and municipal taxes of any and all kinds.'"

Wieder, 143 Or at 60.  In concluding that the act regulated
exemption from taxation, the court stated:

	"The only method of regulating exemption from taxation
is by declaring what, if any, property shall be wholly
or partly exempt.  When certain property is declared to
be exempt, necessarily the result is to that extent a
regulation of taxation."

Id. at 61 (emphasis added).

		OHW argued at oral argument that the foregoing passage
has to be read in context.  We agree.  But the obvious difference
between the act at issue in Wieder and SB 686 is that SB 686
contains no declaration that certain property is to be exempt
wholly or partly from taxation.  The fact that an act
contemplates a condemnation is a far cry from "declaring what * *
* property shall be * * * exempt."  Acknowledging the possibility
of condemnation does not transform legislation into an act
regulating exemption under Article IX, section 1a, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Nor does the decision in Wieder hold to the
contrary.  Instead, the court in that case noted

	"that by the terms of said section 14 the exemption is
not confined to property of which the state is the
legal or beneficial owner, but extends to all property
controlled or operated by the commission.  In this
respect, the act in question amends by implication the
existing law regulating taxation and exemption."

Wieder, 143 Or at 61.  The same cannot be said of SB 686.  That
act does nothing more than contemplate the potential for
condemnation.  It effects neither directly nor by implication any
change in the existing law regulating taxation or exemption. 
OHW's reliance on Wieder is misplaced; OHW is not entitled to the
relief it seeks from this court in mandamus.

		The petition for review is dismissed.  The petition for
a peremptory writ of mandamus is denied.

1. 	Article IX, section 1a, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:

	"The Legislative Assembly shall not declare an
emergency in any act regulating taxation or exemption."

2. 	Article IV, section 1(3)(a), of the Oregon
Constitution, provides:

		"The people reserve to themselves the referendum
power, which is to approve or reject at an election any
Act, or part thereof, of the Legislative Assembly that
does not become effective earlier than 90 days after
the end of the session at which the Act is passed."