Title: Barbara B. v. Dorian H.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 6 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1877 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Paternity of John R. B.: 
 
Barbara B.,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dorian H.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  269 Wis. 2d 543, 674 N.W.2d 681 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 20, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Barbara A. Kluka   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Renee E. Mura and Renee E. Mura, S.C., Kenosha, and oral 
argument by Renee E. Mura. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief by Barbara 
J. Beardsley, and oral argument by Barbara J. Beardsley. 
 
 
2005 WI 6 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-1877  
(L.C. No. 
80 PA 1109) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Paternity of John R. B.: 
 
Barbara B.,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dorian H.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 20, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   Because we conclude 
that retroactive applications of Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and 
(1r) (2000-01)1 do not violate Dorian H.'s (Dorian) right to due 
process, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In 1982, Dorian and Barbara B. (Barbara) entered into 
a stipulation that formed the basis of a paternity judgment and 
child support order.  The parties stipulated that Dorian was the 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
2 
 
father of John R.B. (John), born November 8, 1979, and that 
Dorian would make a payment of $30.00 per week to the clerk of 
court for John's support.  This case arises out of an Order to 
Show Cause filed by Barbara on April 9, 2001 in Kenosha County 
Circuit Court, alleging that Dorian violated the 1982 child 
support order.2  The Kenosha County Child Support Agency 
determined 
that 
Dorian 
owes 
$24,690.00 
in 
child 
support 
arrearages and $42,612.90 in interest. 
¶3 
On December 21, 2001, Family Court Commissioner James 
E. Fitzgerald held an evidentiary hearing, at which both Barbara 
and Dorian testified.  In a written order dated January 21, 
2002, the commissioner found that Dorian had not made any child 
support payments since 1983, but that Dorian had paid John's 
tuition while John was still a child and attending a private 
school.  The commissioner additionally found that "there was an 
agreement made between the parties that the mother would not 
pursue child support in return for the father not having 
visitation with the child."  The commissioner decided that 
Barbara was "not allowed to recoup the past child support money, 
as the child is now an adult, and she did not seek such payments 
while the child was a minor. Equity now demands that [Dorian] 
not be held to this large amount of child support and 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.415(2) (2003-04) provides that "[a]n 
action to collect child . . . support owed . . . shall be 
commenced within 20 years after the youngest child for whom the 
support was ordered under the judgment or order reaches the age 
of 18 or, if the child is enrolled full-time in high school or 
its equivalent, reaches the age of 19." 
No. 
03-1877   
 
3 
 
arrearages."  The commissioner ordered Barbara estopped from 
pursuing past child support and denied her request for payment 
of the child support arrearages. 
¶4 
Barbara sought review in circuit court.  There, the 
Honorable Barbara A. Kluka conducted a de novo review of the 
evidence that had been presented to the commissioner.  In an 
oral decision, the court found that there "was some type of an 
agreement between [Barbara] and [Dorian] with respect to the 
payment of child support, visitation issues, and the child's 
attending [a private school]" and that Dorian directly paid the 
private school $800 a year through John's sixth grade year.  The 
court concluded that application of the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel 
is 
inappropriate 
under 
existing 
Wisconsin 
law, 
specifically Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1r) and the court of appeals 
decision in Monicken v. Monicken, 226 Wis. 2d 119, 593 N.W.2d 
509 (Ct. App. 1999).  The court explained in its oral decision 
that Dorian did not meet any of the criteria listed in 
§ 767.32(1r) that would allow credit against a child support 
arrearage and further determined that retroactive application of 
§ 767.32(1r) is not unconstitutional.   
¶5 
While both the court commissioner and the circuit 
court found that Barbara and Dorian had an agreement regarding 
Dorian's child support obligations, neither made a finding as to 
when that agreement was reached.  Dorian, however, alleges that 
the parties entered into the extrajudicial agreement in 1983. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Dorian appealed to the court of appeals, and the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court decision.  Dorian then 
filed a petition for review, which we granted.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶7 
Dorian argues that it violates his right to due 
process 
under 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions 
to 
retroactively apply Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r) instead of 
the law that was in place at the time he alleges that he and 
Barbara entered into the extrajudicial agreement.   
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
Whether the retroactive application of a statute 
violates due process is a question of law that we review 
de novo.  Neiman v. American Nat'l Prop. and Cas. Co., 2000 WI 
83, ¶8, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160.  
B. 
Revision of Child Support Arrearages 
¶9 
In 1983, the year Dorian alleges that the parties 
entered into the extrajudicial agreement, the circuit court had 
the discretion to revise a child support arrearage upon a 
showing of cause or justification.  Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis. 2d 
574, 593, 598, 456 N.W.2d 312 (1990) (noting this discretionary 
power of the circuit courts prior to the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
5 
 
§ 767.32(1m) in 1987);3 see Rust v. Rust, 47 Wis. 2d 565, 570-73, 
177 N.W.2d 888 (1970)4 (upholding circuit court's cancellation of 
arrearages because the findings in the underlying child support 
order had been incomplete); Foregger v. Foregger, 40 Wis. 2d 
632, 641-43, 162 N.W.2d 553 (1968)5 (upholding offset of 
duplicative 
child 
support 
payments 
against 
arrearages).  
Subsequent to 1983, when the oral modification of support 
allegedly occurred, Wisconsin appellate courts addressed whether 
a child 
support payer was 
entitled 
to credit 
based on 
expenditures 
made 
on 
the 
child's 
behalf 
and 
whether 
an 
extrajudicial agreement between a child support payer and payee 
was enforceable.   
¶10 Whether a child support payer is entitled to credit 
against court-ordered child support was addressed in 1984, in 
Hirschfield v. Hirschfield, 118 Wis. 2d 468, 347 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. 
                                                 
3 1987 Wis. Act. 27 created Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m), which 
provided that "[i]n an action . . . to revise a [child support 
judgment] . . . the court may not revise the amount of child 
support . . . payments due . . . except to correct previous 
errors in calculations."  1987 Wis. Act. 27, § 2135i.  The court 
in Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis. 2d 574, 456 N.W.2d 312 (1990), held 
that 
this 
statute 
applied 
prospectively, 
but 
that 
legal 
principles in place prior to the statute coming into effect 
applied where child support arrearages had accrued pursuant to 
an order entered before the statute's effective date of 
August 1, 1987.  Id. at 598-99. 
4 Rust v. Rust, 47 Wis. 2d 565, 177 N.W.2d 888 (1970), is 
cited for historical background, not as current precedent. 
5 Foregger v. Foregger, 40 Wis. 2d 632, 162 N.W.2d 553 
(1968), is cited for historical background, not as current 
precedent. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
6 
 
App. 1984), where the court of appeals held that "a parent 
ordered to pay child support is not entitled to credit for 
voluntary expenditures for the child not made in the manner 
specifically ordered."  Id. at 470-71.  However, in 1990, we 
carved out two exceptions to the Hirschfield rule.  Schulz, 155 
Wis. 2d at 603-04.  We identified two circumstances "of an 
equitable nature," id. at 602, under which the payer's direct 
expenditures made for a child may be credited:  (1) "under 
compulsion of circumstances" or (2) "with express or implied 
consent of the custodial parent."  Id. at 604.  Circuit courts 
were further instructed to allow credit under these two 
circumstances only where "manifest injustice" would otherwise 
result and where a particularized burden of proof, outlined 
within the decision, was met.  Id.  
¶11 It was not until April 1993, in Harms v. Harms, 174 
Wis. 2d 780, 498 N.W.2d 229 (1993), that the issue, whether 
parties' extrajudicial agreement could be enforced against a 
custodial parent seeking payment of child support arrearages, 
was addressed by a Wisconsin appellate court.  In Harms, the 
custodial 
parent 
sent 
the 
child 
support 
payer 
a 
letter 
"informing him that she had moved the children to the state of 
Florida and that she no longer expected him to pay child support 
or hospital insurance," id. at 782, and as a result of the 
letter, the child support payer stopped paying child support, 
id.  The custodial parent subsequently brought a contempt motion 
due to the cessation of child support payments, but we 
determined that the extrajudicial agreement between the parties 
No. 
03-1877   
 
7 
 
was enforceable.  Id. at 785.  Citing the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, we held for the child support payer.  Id.6   
¶12 However, later in 1993, Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1r) was 
created, which provided:  
In an action . . . to revise a judgment or order 
with respect to child support or family support, the 
court may not grant credit to the payer against 
support due prior to the date on which the action is 
commenced for payments made by the payer on behalf of 
the child other than payments made to the clerk of 
court under s. 767.265 or 767.29 or as otherwise 
ordered by the court. 
1993 Wis. Act 481, § 119 (emphasis added).  The same legislative 
act amended § 767.32(1m), which as amended provided: 
In an action . . . to revise a judgment or order 
with respect to child support . . . the court may not 
revise the amount of child support . . . due, or an 
amount of arrearages in child support . . . that has 
accrued, prior to the date that notice of the action 
is given to the respondent, except to correct previous 
errors in calculations. 
1993 Wis. Act. 481, § 118 (emphasis added).   
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32(1m) initially was created by 
1987 Wis. Act 27, § 2135i, but we construed it to apply only 
prospectively, so that a child support arrearage that had 
accrued pursuant to an order entered prior to August 1, 1987 was 
unaffected by the new statute.  Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 598-99.7  
However, 1993 Wis. Act. 481 brought an explicit reference to 
child support arrearages to § 767.32(1m), 1993 Wis. Act. 481, 
                                                 
6 Harms v. Harms, 174 Wis. 2d 780, 498 N.W.2d 229 (1993), is 
cited for historical background, not as current precedent. 
7 See supra note 3. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
8 
 
§ 118, and also required courts to apply both § 767.32(1m) and 
(1r) "regardless of when the judgment or order under which the 
arrearages accrued, or the child support . . . payments are 
owed, was entered," 1993 Wis. Act. 481, § 9326. 
¶14 In Douglas County Child Support Enforcement Unit v. 
Fisher, 200 Wis. 2d 807, 547 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1996), the 
court 
of 
appeals 
explained 
that 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.32(1m) and (1r), as respectively amended and created by 
1993 Wis. Act. 481, circuit courts "cannot grant credit for 
direct payments for support made in a manner other than that 
prescribed in the order or judgment providing for support."  Id. 
at 813.  The Fisher court further held that this new law applies 
retroactively, so that as of its effective date, June 11, 1994, 
"a court is without discretion to grant credits against 
arrearages regardless of when the judgment or order was 
entered."  Id. at 814; accord Monicken, 226 Wis. 2d at 129.   
¶15  More latitude to grant a child support payer credit 
against an arrearage came in 1997, when the legislature amended 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1r).  As amended the subsection provided: 
the court may grant credit to the payer against 
support due prior to the date on which the petition, 
motion or order to show cause is served for payments 
made by the payer other than payments made as provided 
in s. 767.265 or 767.29, in any of the following 
circumstances . . . ."   
1997 Wis. Act 273, § 1 (emphasis added).  The legislature then 
enumerated the circumstances under which such credit could be 
No. 
03-1877   
 
9 
 
granted in newly created § 767.32(1r)(b)-(f).8  1997 Wis. Act. 
273, §§ 3-7.  In Monicken, the court of appeals made clear that 
the revised § 767.32(1r) changed the law regarding the granting 
of credit to child support payers who were in arrears, 
superceding the Harms and Schulz holdings on that point.  
Monicken, 226 Wis. 2d at 130-31.  Based on 1997 Wis. Act 273, 
§ 10,9 the Monicken court also held that the 1997 changes to 
§ 767.32 apply retroactively.  Id. at 131-32.  Therefore, after 
the law's effective date, which the legislature set at June 25, 
1998, a circuit court is permitted to grant credit against child 
support arrearages pursuant only to the limited circumstances 
enumerated 
in 
§ 767.32(1r)(b)-(f), 
regardless 
of 
when the 
underlying child support order was entered.  Id. at 131-32. 
¶16 Dorian does not contest the circuit court's conclusion 
that none of the circumstances allowing credit against a child 
support arrearage under Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1r) was met here.10  
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32(1r) and (1m) are unchanged in the 
2001-02 version in all material respects from those effective 
June 25, 1998. 
9 1997 Wis. Act. 273, § 10 provided, "Initial applicability.  
(1) This act first applies to arrearages existing and child or 
family support payments past due on the effective date of this 
subsection, regardless of when the judgment or order under which 
the arrearages accrued or the child or family support is owed 
was entered."  (Emphasis added.) 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32(1r)(b) provides that a circuit 
court may grant credit where: 
[t]he payer shows by documentary evidence that the 
payments were made directly to the payee by check or 
money order, and shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the payments were intended for support 
No. 
03-1877   
 
10 
 
Rather, Dorian argues that the retroactive applications of 
§ 767.32(1r) and (1m), which limit a circuit court's power to 
grant him credit against child support due, violate his right to 
due process under Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
We disagree. 
C. 
Due Process and Retroactive Legislation  
¶17 Retroactive legislation is presumed constitutional. 
Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶16.  It is the challenger's burden to 
overcome that presumption, Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 
200, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), by demonstrating the statute's 
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt, Matthies v. 
Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 82, ¶26, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 
N.W.2d 842. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and not intended as a gift to or on behalf of the 
child, or as some other voluntary expenditure, or for 
the payment of some other obligation to the payee. 
In the circuit court's oral decision, it noted that this 
statutorily enumerated circumstance was not met.  The circuit 
court also referenced the language of § 767.32(1r)(c), which 
provides for granting credit where: 
[t]he payer proves by clear and convincing evidence, 
with evidence of a written agreement, that the payee 
expressly agreed to accept the payments in lieu of 
child or family support paid as provided in s. 767.265 
or 767.29 not including gifts or contributions for 
entertainment. 
The circuit court explained in its oral decision that this 
circumstance was also not met, as there was no written 
agreement.   
No. 
03-1877   
 
11 
 
¶18 We have determined that the due process clauses of 
Article 1, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution11 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution are substantially 
equivalent.12  Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶8; Martin, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 198 n.6.  The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in 
pertinent part provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  In arguing that retroactive 
applications 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.32(1m) 
and 
(1r) 
are 
unconstitutional, the particular right Dorian appears to be 
                                                 
11 Article 1, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
"All people are born equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed." 
12 This court has also said that it "will not be bound by 
the minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States if it is the judgment of this court that the 
Constitution 
of 
Wisconsin . . . require[s] 
that 
greater 
protection of citizens' liberties ought to be afforded."  See 
State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977). 
No. 
03-1877   
 
12 
 
asserting is the right not to be deprived of property,13 without 
due process of law.14 
¶19 As the parties correctly note, this court adopted a 
balancing test to determine whether a retroactive statute 
comports with due process.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201.  The 
Martin balancing test examines whether the retroactive statute 
has a rational basis,15 Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶27; Neiman, 
236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶9, requiring a reviewing court to "weigh the 
public interest served by the retroactive statute against the 
                                                 
13 Dorian asserts that his "economic viability" and his 
"ability . . . to freely contract with others" are affected.  
(Pet. Br. at 15.) 
14 Dorian 
does 
not 
explain 
whether 
he 
believes 
the 
retroactive applications of these statutes violate his right to 
substantive due process or to procedural due process.  The right 
to substantive due 
process 
"protects 
against 
governmental 
actions that are arbitrary and wrong 'regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them,'" Monroe County Dep't 
of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶19, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 
678 N.W.2d 831 (citation omitted), whereas procedural due 
process addresses the fairness of the manner in which a 
governmental action is implemented, State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 
¶10 n.8, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784 (citation omitted).  
Dorian is not arguing that the procedure applied in his case was 
unfair.  Instead, he is arguing that it is unfair to apply Wis. 
Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r) retroactively because he believes 
that it is wrong to apply those substantive rules to his case in 
light of the law that he alleges had previously been in place.  
See Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 598.  Thus, it appears that Dorian is 
asserting a substantive due process claim, rather than a 
procedural due process claim. 
15 The United State Supreme Court has explained that, for 
the purpose of due process, the retroactive application of 
legislation must be justified by a rational, as opposed to 
arbitrary and irrational, purpose.  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. R.A. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30, 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984). 
No. 
03-1877   
 
13 
 
private interests that are overturned by it,"  Martin, 192 
Wis. 2d at 201 (citation omitted).  "Implicit within this 
analysis is a consideration of the unfairness created by the 
retroactive legislation."  Id. (citation omitted).  
¶20 However, our precedent instructs us to determine first 
whether application of the statute in question to the party 
challenging the statute actually has a retroactive effect, 
Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶19, Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14; 
see Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 199-200, an inquiry that turns on 
whether the right is "vested," Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶¶21-
23; see Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14.  As noted in Neiman, 
"[t]he concept of vested rights is 'conclusory——a right is 
vested when it has been so far perfected that it cannot be taken 
away by statute.'"  Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14 (citation 
omitted).  Only upon concluding that the statute in question 
"retroactively affects a substantive right that accrued before 
the passage of the legislation," do we proceed with the Martin 
balancing test.  Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶27.  
¶21 As discussed above, in 1983 the circuit court had 
discretion to make a revision if cause or justification was 
shown, but it had no obligation to do so.  See supra Section 
II.B.  In 1982, Dorian was ordered to pay child support.  The 
circuit court's discretionary power to reduce or cancel Dorian's 
arrearages at a particular point in time after that did not vest 
a right in him to have the arrearages reduced or cancelled.  
Woodmansee v. Woodmansee, 151 Wis. 2d 242, 248-49, 444 N.W.2d 
No. 
03-1877   
 
14 
 
393 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Miller v. Miller, 67 Wis. 2d 435, 
448, 227 N.W.2d 626 (1975)).  
¶22  However, because neither party argued that Dorian did 
not have a vested right, we will assume he did have a vested 
right and turn to applying the Martin test.  We begin by 
considering 
the 
public 
interest 
served 
by 
retroactive 
applications of Wis. Stat. § 767.32 (1m) and (1r).  The 
retroactive application of legislation must serve a public 
purpose that is "'substantial, valid and intended to remedy a 
general economic or social issue.'" Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 
¶31 (quoting Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶23). 
¶23 In reviewing the steps the legislature took to arrive 
at the current formulations under Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and 
(1r), we see that its first step in restricting a court's 
authority to revise past due child support amounts began with 
1987 Wis. Act. 27, § 2135i.  The revision was made on the 
recommendation of the Governor's Welfare Reform Commission ["the 
commission"].  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting Record for 
1987 Wis. Act. 27.  The commission recommended implementing "a 
new federal requirement that prohibits retroactive adjustments 
to child support orders," Governor's Welfare Reform Commission, 
Report on Recommendations of the Governor's Welfare Reform 
Commission 13 (May 22, 1987), apparently referring to 42 U.S.C. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
15 
 
§ 666(a)(9)(C).16  The State may have risked jeopardizing its 
eligibility for certain federal funds if it had not complied.  
See Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 594-95; Woodmansee, 151 Wis. 2d at 
246-47.  As one commentator has summarized the pertinent 
legislative history,  
the Commission and the Legislature (1) were concerned 
about the loss of federal . . . funds; (2) wanted to 
reduce the welfare budget by having non-custodial 
parents (instead of the state) support their children; 
and (3) wanted to protect custodial parents from 
having to return child support payments should the 
support order later be reduced.     
Aaron Bransky, An Unfortunate Change of Circumstances: Wisconsin 
Prohibits Retroactive Revision of Child Support Orders, 1988 
Wis. L. Rev. 1123, 1138. 
¶24 Further restriction on retroactive modification of 
child support arrearages was passed in 1993, which prohibited 
credit to the obligor against child support arrearages, 1993 
Wis. Act. 481, § 119, regardless of when the underlying child 
support order was entered, id. at § 9326.  These amendments were 
also intended to bring Wisconsin into compliance with federal 
                                                 
16 42 U.S.C. § 666 provides that "each State must have in 
effect laws requiring . . . that any payment or installment of 
support under any child support order . . . is . . . not subject 
to retroactive modification," with one limited exception.  42 
U.S.C.A. § 666(a), (a)(9)(C).  The law was introduced in 1986.  
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-509, 
§ 9103, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986).  See generally Lisa Dukelow, 
Child Support in North Carolina: What is the State of the Law 
And How Did We Get Here?, 22 N.C. Cent. L.J. 14, 18 (1996); 
Aaron Bransky, An Unfortunate Change of Circumstances: Wisconsin 
Prohibits Retroactive Revision of Child Support Orders, 1988 
Wis. L. Rev. 1123, 1135-38. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
16 
 
law.  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting Record for 1993 S.B. 
44.17  Prior to the 1993 statutory changes, the court of appeals 
had recognized the soundness of a rule prohibiting credit 
against an arrearage for voluntary expenditures made in a manner 
not specifically ordered, noting that "[a]llowing credit for 
such payments or expenditures would condone the unilateral 
modification of court orders and interference with the custodial 
parent's right to decide how support money should be spent."  
O'Brien v. Freiley, 130 Wis. 2d 174, 181, 387 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (citing Hirschfield, 118 Wis. 2d at 471).  After the 
1993 statutory changes, the court of appeals explained that the 
amendments 
apparently 
were 
based 
on 
a 
public 
policy 
determination that "the public interest in addressing the 
problem of nonpayment of child support is best served by 
limiting payments to those made in accordance with the divorce 
judgment.  This policy fixes arrearages with certainty and 
facilitates the determination as to who owes arrearages and what 
amount."  Fisher, 200 Wis. 2d at 815. 
¶25 Then, in 1997, the Family Law Section of the State Bar 
of Wisconsin recommended language that it believed both complied 
with federal law and was fair, allowing credit to be granted a 
child 
support 
obligor 
under 
specifically 
articulated 
circumstances.  Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting Record for 
                                                 
17 Language essentially identical to May 1994 Senate Bill 2, 
§§ 118-19, 9326, which created 1993 Wis. Act 481, §§ 118-19, 
9326, (2), was earlier considered by the legislature in 1993 
Senate Bill 44, §§ 3637-38, 9326(2g)(b).  
No. 
03-1877   
 
17 
 
1997 Wis. Act. 273.  The State Bar's proposal served as the 
foundation for 1997 Wis. Act. 273, which allowed credit to be 
granted under carefully described circumstances.  See id.; 1997 
Wis. Act 273 §§ 1-7. 
¶26 In sum, the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.32(1m), which generally forbids modification of past due 
child support, serves: (1) the general public purpose of 
financially providing for children; (2) the more particular and 
corollary purpose of requiring parents, rather than the State, 
to provide financial support for their children; and (3) the 
pragmatic goal of securing federal funds for the State via 
compliance with federal law.   
¶27 The 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.32(1r), which allows a child support payer to be granted 
credit only under specifically enumerated circumstances, was 
also enacted to maintain the State's eligibility for certain 
federal funds, but further recognizes the public's interest in 
having changes to child support arrangements be supervised by a 
court, so that children's needs are met as fully as possible by 
their parents. 
¶28 Having considered the public interest served by Wis. 
Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r), in accordance with the Martin test, 
we next consider the private interest affected.  Of primary 
concern is whether the retroactive statute unfairly overturns 
the challenger's settled expectation in any accrued rights.  
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶26, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 
266; Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶¶42-43; Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 
No. 
03-1877   
 
18 
 
411, ¶¶20, 22.  Consistent with that concern, we also consider 
whether the statute's challenger had reasonably relied on prior 
law.  Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶21.  
¶29 As noted earlier, Dorian contends that his right to 
due process, that is, the right not to be deprived by the State 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, is 
violated here.  At stake, according to Dorian, is his private 
interest in property, specifically his economic viability and 
his ability to contract freely. 
¶30 Although the total amount Dorian will have to pay in 
order to satisfy the child support arrearages, plus interest, is 
considerable, we conclude that in light of the circumstances,  
his private interest in property here is weak.  Dorian's 
obligation to pay $30 a week in child support to the county 
clerk was explicit in the 1982 court order.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 767.32 provided Dorian the opportunity to return to court and 
request a modification of the order.18  He chose not to do so.  
Instead, he waited until he was called into court to pay the 
arrearages. 
¶31 Dorian argues that his extrajudicial agreement with 
Barbara subsequent to the 1982 order was enforceable at the time 
of its creation, which he alleges was in 1983.  However, as 
discussed above, the prevailing law in 1983 regarding revision 
of child support arrearages was that the circuit court had 
                                                 
18 In the current codification, such a request would be 
filed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a). 
No. 
03-1877   
 
19 
 
discretion to make a revision if cause or justification was 
shown.  See supra Section II.B.  As all that Dorian had to rely 
on under prior law was the court's discretionary power, Dorian's 
expectation that he could successfully enforce his extrajudicial 
agreement with Barbara regarding child support was far from 
settled.19 
¶32 In sum, we conclude that Dorian has not established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that retroactive applications of Wis. 
Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r) violate his right to due process.  
Balancing 
the 
public's 
interest 
against 
Dorian's 
private 
interest, we weigh the public interest as more substantial.  
Retroactive 
applications 
of 
§ 767.32(1m) 
and 
(1r) 
serve 
significant public purposes, while remedying general social and 
economic issues.  Any expectations Dorian may have had regarding 
his child support obligation were not well-founded in the law, 
and moreover, throughout these proceedings, Dorian has never 
asserted that he was unable to pay $30/week in support or that 
John had no need for his financial support.  Accordingly, his 
private interest in property is weak.  As the Martin analysis 
demonstrates, retroactive applications of § 767.32(1m) and (1r) 
                                                 
19 In their briefs, the parties did not argue whether the 
agreement between Dorian and Barbara was enforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds.  Wis. Stat. § 241.02(1).  Accordingly, we do 
not address this issue. 
No. 
03-1877   
 
20 
 
are rational and do not violate state or federal constitutional 
due process provisions.20 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶33 Because we conclude that retroactive applications of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r) do not violate Dorian H.'s 
right to due process, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Dorian makes two additional arguments that are without 
merit.  First, he argues that retroactive applications of Wis. 
Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r) violate Article I, § 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which guarantees a "certain remedy in 
the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which [a person] may 
receive in his person, property, or character," Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 9.  We agree with the court of appeals that this argument 
fails because the legislature has provided both a procedure and 
a forum that accommodate his concerns.  Barbara B. v. Dorian H., 
No. 03-1877, slip op. at 8-9 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003).  Dorian 
also urges us to adopt equitable remedies, such as equitable 
estoppel, to address the interest he has been ordered to pay on 
the child support arrearages.  However, we are unpersuaded by 
these arguments because Dorian had the use of the funds that he 
should have paid to support his son, and the legislature has 
clearly articulated its policy determinations in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.25(6) regarding interest on child support arrearages.  
Further, the legislature has decided that the interest provided 
for in  § 767.25(6) "shall," that is, must, accrue and be paid.  
See State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶31, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 
N.W.2d 1 (holding that the word "shall" in a statute is 
generally presumed to be mandatory). 
No. 
03-1877   
 
 
 
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