Title: Sue Kozlowski v. Dordija Dordieski, et al

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES DORDIESKI &  
John M. Sedia 
BRUSKOSKI 
Highland, Indiana 
James L. Clement, Jr. 
 
Merrillville, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE LAKE COUNTY 
PLAN COMMISSION 
 
George C. Patrick 
 
Scott A. Pyle 
 
Crown Point, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 45S05-0606-CV-223 
 
SUSAN KOZLOWSKI, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
 
v. 
 
DORDIJA DORDIESKI, LANA DORDIESKI, 
JON BRUSKOSKI, LIBERTY BRUSKOSKI, 
LAKE COUNTY PLAN COMMISSION,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellees (Defendants below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Lake Circuit Court, No. 45C01-0108-CP-859 
The Honorable Lorenzo Arrendondo, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 45A05-0502-CV-86 
_________________________________ 
 
June 22, 2006 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
A remonstrator to a real estate development sought judicial relief.  She prevailed in the 
Court of Appeals, which remanded for further proceedings.  She then sought injunctive relief in a 
 
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different court, which granted summary judgment against her on grounds that it “lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction.”  Actually, the second court did have subject matter jurisdiction, but was 
right to grant judgment because the same matter was pending in the court where the first action 
had been heard. 
 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
In 1992, Dordija and Lana Dordieski and Jon and Liberty Bruskoski (“Dordieski”) 
petitioned the Lake County Plan Commission for approval of a subdivision and a waiver of 
certain subdivision ordinance requirements.  The Commission approved the subdivision and the 
waiver.  Susan Kozlowski filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Lake Superior Court Room 
Five, challenging the Commission’s decision.  Over the next eight years, Dordieski made various 
improvements to the real estate that complied with the Commission’s approval and waiver, but 
not with certain aspects of the subdivision ordinance.  On May 19, 2000, the Lake Superior 
Court affirmed the Commission’s decision and denied Kozlowski’s petition for stay of work. 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that “[t]he Commission’s decision . . . appears to 
be based solely on ‘unspoken and unpresented facts not contained in the record,’ . . . and 
therefore is not supported by substantial evidence of probative value.  We accordingly reverse 
and remand to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”  Kozlowski 
v. Lake County Plan Commission, No. 45A05-0006-CV-253, slip op. at 5 (Ind. Ct. App. January 
30, 2001) trans. not sought. 
 
 
Later in 2001, Kozlowski filed a complaint for injunctive relief seeking demolition of the 
improvements and an injunction against any further work, this time in Lake Circuit Court.  The 
Plan Commission intervened, and in April 2003 filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in both the Circuit Court and Superior Court Room Five.  The Circuit Court granted the 
Commission summary judgment, stating that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, but 
rather Lake Superior Court Room Five did.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s 
decision, holding that “the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
 
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over these proceedings.”  Kozlowski v. Dordieski, No. 45A05-0502-CV-86, slip op. at 7-8 (Ind. 
Ct. App. July 26, 2005).  These decisions got to the right place, but “subject matter jurisdiction” 
was not the right reason. 
 
 
Action Pending Elsewhere 
 
 
The Lake Circuit Court certainly possessed subject matter jurisdiction (the power to hear 
the class of disputes to which the one in question belonged).  “The circuit court has original 
jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases, except where exclusive jurisdiction is 
conferred by law upon other courts of the same territorial jurisdiction.”  IND. CODE ANN. § 33-
28-1-2(a) (West 2004).  The Lake Superior Court is likewise a court of general jurisdiction.  IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 33-33-45-3, -6 (West 2004). 
 
 
However, this case is not about subject matter jurisdiction, but rather priority.  “As a 
general principle . . . when an action is pending before an Indiana court, the other Indiana courts 
must defer to that court’s authority.”  7 I.L.E. Courts § 87 (2000).  Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(8) 
allows a defendant to assert as an affirmative defense that the same action is pending in another 
state court.  “The rule recognizes that two courts may not simultaneously exercise jurisdiction 
over what amounts to the same case.”  Centex Home Equity Corp. v. Robinson, 776 N.E.2d 935, 
945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).  Both Dordieski and the Commission asserted this defense in their 
responsive pleadings, as required by Trial Rule 12(H)(1)(b).1
 
 
“Two cases are the same if the parties, subject matter, and remedies sought are 
substantially the same in both suits.”  Pivarnik v. N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 636 N.E.2d 131, 134 
                                             
 
1 Dordieski asserted in the answer that the matter was remanded to the Commission for further proceedings, and 
therefore the circuit court lacked “jurisdiction over the subject matter.”  (Appellees’/Dordieskis’ App. at 4.)  This 
characterization was understandable, given the prevalence among this state’s bench and bar of viewing various 
procedural defenses through a jurisdictional lens.  See Mishler v. County of Elkhart, 544 N.E.2d 149, 151-52 (Ind. 
1989) (recognizing that Indiana courts use “jurisdiction over the particular case” to describe a venue issue); City of 
Terre Haute v. Beach, 96 Ind. 143 (1884) (one of the earliest Indiana cases using the phrase “jurisdiction over the 
particular case” and equating it with subject matter jurisdiction); Indiana State Bd. of Health Facility Adm’rs v. 
Werner, 841 N.E.2d 1196, 1204-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (analyzing procedural AOPA issue as “jurisdiction over the 
particular case” issue); In re Chapman, 466 N.E.2d 777, 778-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (calling venue issue 
“jurisdiction over the particular case” issue).  
 
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(Ind. 1994).  In the 1992 certiorari petition, Kozlowski challenged the Commission’s approval of 
the Dordieski subdivision.  (Appellant’s App. at 19; Appellees’/Dordieskis’ App. at 1-2.)  In the 
2001 complaint for injunctive relief, Kozlowski sought demolition of the Dordieski subdivision 
improvements and an injunction against similar construction.   (Appellees’/Dordieskis’ App. at 
2.)  The only difference for 12(B)(8) purposes lies in Kozlowsi’s request in the second action to 
demolish the improvements, while the first action sought to prevent them from being made.  
Both cases had substantially the same parties, subject matter, and remedies sought.  The Lake 
Circuit Court was right to refrain from exercising authority over this case. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We hereby affirm the trial court’s order granting the Commission summary judgment and 
direct any further proceedings involving substantially similar parties, subject matter, and 
remedies sought to occur in Lake Superior Court Room Five. 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
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