Title: Rich by and Through Brown v. Nevels

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

578 So. 2d 609 (1991) Wilma RICH By and Through Her Conservators Betty Brown and Jean Jennings v. Bobbie Nell NEVELS. No. 89-CA-1121. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 13, 1991. Rehearing Denied May 8, 1991. *610 Gary Street Goodwin, Goodwin & Goodwin, Columbus, for appellant. James W. Kitchens, Constance L. Johnson, Kitchens & Ellis, Jackson and Ronald L. Whittington, Whittington & Burkhalter, McComb, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ. PRATHER, Justice, for the Court: This negligence case involves primarily the issue of whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a motion to set aside a default judgment. This Court affirms with the exception of the damages award of $180,000. The award is vacated and the issue remanded because the record is devoid of evidentiary support. On October 16, 1984, an individual burglarized a boarding house[1] in Jackson and violently attacked one of the elderly residents, *611 Bobbie Nevels. On July 16, 1987, Nevels filed a complaint in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the owner of the house, Wilma Rich, for her alleged negligence in failing "to provide appropriate and necessary security to assure the reasonable protection of the ... residents." Nevels claimed that she sustained "grievous physical injuries, pain and emotional distress, all of which required and continues to require medical and psychiatric care." Nevels "demanded" $250,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. Rich subsequently received a summons from Nevels on July 27, 1987; however, she wholly failed to respond. Thus, on December 9, 1987, Nevels moved for and secured an entry of default. Six months later, on June 6, 1988, Nevels filed a motion for default judgment. On August 12, 1988, Judge Charles Barber held a hearing, granted the motion, and awarded Nevels $180,000. Judge Barber entered the final judgment on August 15. On June 20, 1989, Nevels filed a "Motion for Examination of Judgment Debtor"; the next day, Judge Barber granted the motion. Finally, on July 14, 1989 over two years after Nevels filed her complaint and nearly one year after Barber granted the motion for a default judgment Rich responded. Actually, Betty L. Brown and Jean Jennings filed a motion on Rich's behalf asking that the service of process be quashed or that the default judgment be set aside. (Brown and Jennings are relatives of Rich and were appointed her conservators only two days prior to their filing of the motion.) Specifically, the conservators contended that the summons contained a misnomer i.e., it incorrectly identified Wilma Rich as "Wilma Ritchie." The conservators nonetheless conceded that the sheriff "in fact served" Rich. The conservators added that, although Rich was served, she "was thoroughly incompetent to have any meaningful understanding of the process that had been served upon her." Alternatively, the conservators contended that "reasonable and valid grounds" exist for "setting aside the default judgment." They based this contention on Rich's "medical condition, age, thorough ignorance of the summons, and thorough ignorance to notify other family members of [the] summons served upon her." And they explained that a "defense to the merits of [Nevels'] claim" exists and that "no prejudice [would] be suffered by [Nevels] if the default judgment is set aside." The trial judge held a hearing and denied the conservators' request. (The judge also ordered that all instances of "Wilma Ritchie" found in the dockets and minutes of the court be amended to reflect her correct name, "Wilma Rich.") The conservators appealed and presented two issues: (1) Whether the service of process should have been quashed and default judgment set aside because Nevels incorrectly identified Rich on the summons as "Ritchie?" (2) Whether the default judgment should have been set aside? The conservators' one-page argument regarding this issue is simple. They contend that Rich has no recollection of being served; therefore, she may have been misled by the misnomer. Nevels counters that, indisputably, Rich received a summons and that her alleged lack of "recollection" due to alleged incompetency is unproven. Nevels adds that case law is supportive of the trial judge's refusal to quash the service of process and his order to amend all instances of "Wilma Ritchie." Southern Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Mississippi Sand & Gravel, Inc., 483 So. 2d 321 (Miss. 1986) is dispositive of the issue. In Southern Trucking, the issue was one of first impression, so this Court considered the various views espoused by other jurisdictions. *612 In sum, this Court decided to reject the admittedly harsh minority view which holds that a misnomer should mean the death-knell of a case. Id. at 323 (citing case law from other jurisdictions). This Court instead adopted the "general view" which holds that a misnomer is not fatal so long as the incorrectly-identified party knew what was meant. Id. (citing Bank of America v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. App. 3d 555, 110 Cal. Rptr. 709, 710 (1973) (bank "knew at all times the case it had to meet" despite the misnomer). Thus, "an amendment correcting a misnomer is permissible at any time or any stage in the proceedings." Id. at 324 (citing 67A C.J.S. Parties § 172); see also Donald v. Luckie Strike Loans, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 318, 251 S.E.2d 168, 169-70 (1978). "When a judgment is amended, it is as though the entire action had been conducted in the correct name of the [party]." Southern Trucking Serv., Inc., 483 So. 2d at 324. In sum, under Mississippi law, an amendment is permitted so long as the evidence does not suggest that the misnomer "misled the parties into thinking that another [party] was meant." Id. (quoting Cigan v. St. Regis House Hotel, 72 Ill. App.3d 884, 29 Ill.Dec. 38, 41, 391 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1979). In the case sub judice, no one disputes that Rich received a summons. The conservators simply explain that Rich didn't "remember anything about it" and that she was possibly misled by the misnomer or was not sufficiently competent to appreciate the consequences of her failure to respond. Record Vol. II, at 83. This explanation proved unpersuasive with the trial judge: Id. at 162-64. This Court concurs in this decision; the misnomer should not be deemed fatal. The *613 record and appellant's brief are devoid of any evidence proving that the misnomer misled Rich. Most notable is Nevels' failure to claim during her testimony that the misnomer actually misled her; instead, she merely conceded that "she don't remember anything about [being served]." Rich admitted that she knows Nevels and remembers the attack; thus, it seems more likely than not that she understood the summons since it correctly identified Nevels as the "complainant." The process server, Deputy Ralph Gray, testified that Rich acknowledged she was indeed the individual named on the summons. According to Deputy Gray, Rich "acted normal" when he served her. And although several of Rich's family members testified that she was probably incompetent at the time, they did not seek to establish a conservatorship until 1989 years after Rich received her summons. Id. at 45. In sum, the evidence does not support the conservators' claim that the slight misnomer misled Rich. The judge's decision does not reflect an abuse of discretion and, therefore, this Court affirms. This issue is two-fold; it questions the propriety of the default judgment itself and the propriety of the damages award of $180,000. A motion to set aside a default judgment or an order may be made under Miss. R.Civ.P. 60(b).[2] Relief may be granted upon a sufficient showing of fraud, mistake, or other justifiable reason. Generally, a Rule 60(b) motion will not be granted unless a three-prong "balancing" test is satisfied. Under this test, one must determine: (1) Whether the movant's basis for requesting relief is legitimate (e.g., Whether a justifiable reason is evidenced)? (2) Whether the movant has a colorable defense to the merits of the adjudged case? and (3) Whether the non-movant will be unduly prejudiced if the motion is granted? King v. King, 556 So. 2d 716, 719 (Miss. 1990). This Court has stated that "[t]o be sure, default judgments are not favored and trial [judges] should not be grudging in the granting of orders vacating such judgments where showings within the rules have arguably been made." Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 387 (Miss. 1987); see also Bailey v. Georgia Cotton Goods Co., 543 So. 2d 180, 182 (Miss. 1989). But granting of relief is not "a matter of right"; it is a matter "addressed to the sound discretion of the [judge]." Id. at 388 (citing Rules 55(c) and 60(b)). And this Court may not disturb a judge's exercise of discretion unless abuse is shown. Id. The following sub-sections discuss the parties contentions regarding each of the three prongs. In their attempt to satisfy the first prong, the conservators (movants) contend that the justifiable reason for setting aside the default judgment is Rich's incompetence. See M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). Specifically, they cite Rich's age, lack of memory, and poor health (she supposedly has or had melanoma). In short, they suggest that her condition is reflective of "classic senile dementia." To support their contention, the conservators presented the testimony of various family members: (1) Betty Brown, who is Rich's daughter and one of Rich's two conservators; (2) Jean Jennings, Rich's granddaughter and the other conservator; (3) Rich, the defendant; and (4) Debbie McAdory, Rich's granddaughter.[3] The *614 family members simply agreed that Rich was old, lacked a good memory, and was in poor health. Surprisingly, no expert testimony was presented to show that Rich was incompetent. Nevels counters by first noting that, although Rich's relatives claim that Rich was too incompetent to receive a summons, they curiously did not seek a conservatorship until after they learned of the default judgment. Nevels contends that the evidence simply does not "demonstrate ... a condition of incompetence and affords no legitimacy" to Rich's utter failure to respond to the summons. Moreover, "[i]n Mississippi, as elsewhere, the law presumes sanity until the contrary is shown ... [o]ld age, weakening of the memory and understanding, and occasional eccentric acts are not of themselves sufficient evidence of incapacity." Appellee's Brief at 7-8 (quoting Scott v. United States, 190 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir.1951)). The conservators cite the following as support for their contention that a colorable defense to the merits of Nevels' case exists: (1) "[T]he facts are clear that the attack was in fact the act of an intruder." (2) "[I]t is clear ... that the attacker came through an unlocked door [and that] the unlocked door was not due to any fault of Mrs. Rich, but rather Mrs. Nevels' roommate." (3) "Clearly, defendant proved ... there were defenses of contributory negligence and unforeseeable intervening acts of a third party." (4) And the evidence does not support the damages award. Appellant's Brief at 12-13. Nevels counters that the conservators offered no testimony "to demonstrate any reasonable conduct on the part of the defendant in maintaining reasonable security in the boarding house premises" which is located in a "slum section" of Jackson. "To the contrary, the only testimony addressing the events surrounding the assault suffered by Ms. Nevels relates to what [security measures were taken] after the [assault]." Appellee's Brief at 8-9. Finally, Nevels contends that she presented convincing testimony and exhibits to prove damages; for example, she presented the expert testimony of Barbara Goff, M.D., who treated her "for psychiatric problems and emotional upset" due to the assault. The conservators contend that no prejudice will result for the simple reason that Nevels had been "inordinately tardy and negligent in prosecuting her action." Appellant's Brief at 3. Nevels counters that "substantial" health and financial prejudice will certainly result if the judgment is overturned. Appellee's Brief at 4 & 10-11. The trial judge rejected the conservators' contentions and rendered the following lengthy opinion from the bench: Vol. II, at 164-70. Perusal of the record and briefs leads this Court to conclude that the record is devoid of evidence reflecting error of law or abuse of discretion. Indeed, the conservators' contentions pale when compared to another case in which this Court unanimously refused to set aside a default judgment. Compare H & W Transfer & Cartage Serv., Inc. v. Griffin, 511 So. 2d 895, 899 (Miss. 1987) (case in which this Court refused to set aside default judgment because the defendant "imprudently ... did nothing, made no follow-up inquiry, and for all practical purposes let the matter drop until some five months later when it found out about the default judgment"), with the case sub judice (Rich's conservators did nothing until some two years later when they found out about the default judgment). In sum, this Court after having balanced the interest of Nevels and Rich's conservators concludes that an inequity would result if the judgment were not given any future force or effect. The default judgment must remain undisturbed. The judge's refusal to set it aside is affirmed. The damages award of $180,000 is without evidentiary support and cannot be affirmed. The only evidence discoverable in the record are two one-page bills: (1) one from Dr. Charlton S. Stanley in the amount of $120.00 for "forensic consultation" and a "telephone conference," and (2) *617 the other from Dr. Barbara Goff in the amount of $1045.00[4] presumably for psychiatric care. This simply does not add up to the award of $180,000. Assuming arguendo that this award also accounts for punitive damages, the dollar amount is not determinable from the record. In his written "judgment," the trial judge merely concluded that Nevels "should be and hereby is awarded judgment ... in the sum of $180,000." Vol. I, at 11. This Court cannot "blind" itself and permit an award which is virtually devoid of substantiation. See Hooten v. State, 492 So. 2d 948, 950-51 (Miss. 1986) (Writing for the Court, Justice Patterson declared: "[W]e are ... authorized to reverse for an abuse of discretion [if] we find [that the trial judge's decision] was `arbitrary.'"). See also Strickland v. Rossini, No. 07-CA-59266, Slip Op. at 11-12 ___ So.2d ___, ___-___ (Miss. Dec. 12, 1990). In sum, the award is vacated. The case is remanded for a hearing on the damages issue alone. This opinion should serve as notice that damages awards must be supported by evidence, and such evidence must be reflected in the record if it is to be affirmed on appeal. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed with the exception of the damages award. The damages award is vacated and the issue is remanded for an evidentiary hearing. DENIAL OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. DAMAGES AWARD VACATED AND REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., not participating. [1] Basically the boarding house was a group home for former mental patients of Whitfield State Hospital. [2] Rule 55(c) also provides an avenue of relief: "For good cause shown, the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." [3] Bill Brown, Rich's grandson, also testified; however, he did not provide any information regarding her mental competence. He did note that she had had surgery for melanoma. [4] This amount seems to have been offset by payments by Rich's insurer.