Title: BRIAN DEWAYNE RAWLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRIAN DEWAYNE RAWLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 59155 P.3d 1024Case Number: 05-164Decided: 04/11/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
BRIAN DEWAYNE 
RAWLE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The Honorable Jere 
Ryckman, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane 
Courselle, Director DAP; Meghan 
Reed and Cherie Trine, Student Interns DAP.  Argument by Ms. Courselle.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robert A. Nicholas, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Nicholas. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Rawle appeals 
his convictions for felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and conspiracy 
to commit aggravated robbery.  He 
contends he was convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor, but the 
information charging him with felony murder and the elements instruction 
required the State to prove that he actually killed the victim.  Additionally, Mr. Rawle claims that 
instructional error confused the jury and that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his convictions.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The State phrases 
the issues as:

 
 

I.                     
Was there a fatal 
variance between the pleadings and either the jury instructions or the facts 
proved at trial?

 
 

II.                   
Did the jury instructions 
accurately set out the law of felony murder, and did the instructions prejudice 
Appellant?

 
 

III.                  
Was there sufficient 
evidence to convict Appellant?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In early February 
of 2004, Mr. Rawle departed from South 
Dakota with his girlfriend, Eyvette Talley, and her 
three children, along with Ms. Talley's brother, Marco Lemus, his wife, Tiffany 
Lemus, and their three children.  
The group traveled in a 1989 Cadillac and headed to Arizona.  They passed through Wyoming and planned a stop in Kemmerer, Wyoming where Mr. Rawle had a connection with 
a drug dealer that he had established when he was previously employed in the 
area.  At some point during their 
trip, Mr. Lemus, Ms. Talley, and Mr. Rawle devised a plan to rob the drug 
dealer, Manuel Leon-Leyva.

 
 
[¶4]      When they arrived 
in Kemmerer, Mr. Rawle contacted Mr. Leon-Leyva and requested that they meet for 
a drug transaction at a local grocery store.  Mr. Lemus, Ms. Talley, and Mr. Rawle 
armed themselves with steak knives.  
They left Mrs. Lemus and the children in the Cadillac to meet Mr. 
Leon-Leyva, who arrived at the meeting location driving his vehicle.  Mr. Leon-Leyva was then robbed and 
stabbed to death in his vehicle.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Rawle drove 
Mr. Leon-Leyva's vehicle, followed by the Cadillac driven by Ms. Talley, to a 
remote location.  The three 
perpetrators burned the victim's vehicle and body in an attempt to destroy the 
evidence of their crimes.  The 
charred vehicle and remains were later discovered and an investigation 
ensued.

[¶6]      Mr. Rawle was 
eventually charged with three felony counts: Count I  felony murder in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2003); Count II  
attempted aggravated robbery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301 and 
6-2-401(a)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003); and Count III ---conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) and 
6-2-401(a)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003). 

 
 
[¶7]      A jury trial was 
held.  Mr. Rawle testified and 
admitted to arranging the meeting with Mr. Leon-Leyva and being with Marco Lemus 
and Eyvette Talley at the time of the murder.  He denied that he had formed any 
agreement or intent to commit a robbery.  
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all three charges.  Mr. Rawle was sentenced to life 
imprisonment on Counts I and II, which merged for sentencing, and to a 
concurrent prison term of ten to fifteen years on Count III.  This appeal followed. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Fatal Variance 

 
 
[¶8]      For Count I, 
felony murder, the State charged Mr. Rawle as follows:

 
 
On or about the 
6th or 7th day of February, 2004, in the County of 
Lincoln, State of Wyoming, the said BRIAN DEWAYNE RAWLE did kill a human being 
while attempting to commit the crime of aggravated robbery, in violation of § 
6-2-101(a) W.S. (2003) and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made 
and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Wyoming. 

 
 
The information tracked 
the language of the first degree murder statute, which 
provides:

 
 
      (a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated 
malice, or in the perpetration of, 
or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting 
arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, kills any human being is guilty of murder 
in the first degree.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 
(LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added).  
The information did not contain any reference to aiding and abetting or 
acting as an accessory before the fact.

 
 
[¶9]      Prior to 
arraignment, the State submitted its "Statement of the Elements" which stated 
the following for Count I:

 
 
FELONY 
MURDER,

§ 
6-2-101(a) W.S. (2003)

 
 

1.                  
The defendant Brian 
Dewayne Rawle,

2.                  
On or about the 
6th or 7th day of February, 2004,

3.                  
In the County of Lincoln, State of Wyoming,

4.                  
Did kill a human 
being,

5.                  
While attempting to 
commit the crime of aggravated robbery.

 
 
[¶10]   Based upon these pleadings, Mr. 
Rawle contends that the State gave notice of its intent to prove that he had 
inflicted the fatal stab wounds that killed Mr. Leon-Leyva.  Instead, at trial, the State relied upon 
an aiding and abetting theory to establish the elements of felony murder.  Defense counsel moved for a judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the State's case, arguing that he had not had prior 
notice of the State's theory.  In 
response, the State argued that it was not required to specifically charge Mr. 
Rawle as an aider and abettor, citing our decision in Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 
1995).  The district court denied 
the motion.1  

 
 
[¶11]   On appeal, Mr. Rawle asserts that 
the State's surprise theory at trial substantially impaired his ability to 
defend against the felony murder charge.  
He claims that the State's proof of felony murder fatally varied from the 
allegations contained in the information, requiring reversal of his 
conviction.  We have previously 
identified the principles applicable when reviewing a fatal variance 
claim:

 
 
[A]n information is 
sufficient if it: 1) contains the elements of the offense charged; 2) fairly 
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend; and 3) enables a 
defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for 
the same offense. Id. at 1351 (citing Stewart v. State, 724 P.2d 439, 440-41 
(Wyo. 1986)). 
A variance arises when the evidence presented at trial establishes facts that 
are different from those alleged in the indictment. Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 910 (Wyo. 
2000) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 
442 U.S. 100, 105, 99 S. Ct. 2190, 
2193-94, 60 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1979); and United States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 
1431 (10th Cir. 1992)). Similarly, a shift in the government's theory from the 
one set out in the indictment to that presented at trial may also constitute a 
prejudicial variance. United 
States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 831 (10th 
Cir. 2000). We will not reverse unless the variance affects the defendant's 
substantial rights. Capshaw, 11 P.3d  
at 910. Even in cases where an appellate court determines the existence of a 
variance, such a variance

"is not fatal unless 
the defendant could not have anticipated from the indictment what evidence would 
be presented at trial or unless the conviction based on an indictment would not 
bar a subsequent prosecution." 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 516 at 27 (2d ed. 1982); see Stoner [United States 
v.] 98 F.3d [527] at 536 [(10th Cir. 1996)].

 
 

Id.

Estrada-Sanchez v. 
State, 
2003 WY 45, ¶ 13, 66 P.3d 703, 708-09 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Rawle claims that the variation 
stems from the State's failure to phrase its allegations in the information in 
terms of the aiding and abetting statute, which provides:

 
 
§ 6-1-201. Accessory 
before the fact.

 

      (a)    A person who knowingly aids 
or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, 
commands or procures a felony to be committed, is an accessory before the fact. 

 

      (b)    An accessory before the fact: 

 
 

(i)           
May be indicted, informed 
against, tried and convicted as if he were a principal; 

 
 
      (ii)     May be indicted, 
informed against, tried and convicted either before or after and whether or not 
the principal offender is indicted, informed against, tried or convicted; and 

 
 
      (iii)    Upon conviction, is subject 
to the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment 
of the principal.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201 
(LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added).  
However, Wyoming law does not require that this statute 
be identified in the charging document.  
As we stated in Black:

 
 
[S]ince § 6-1-201 
provides that an aider and abettor is to be informed against, tried, and 
convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal, no distinction is made 
between an aider and abettor and principal. Hence, an aider and abettor is 
guilty of the principal crime. Proof of participation in either capacity is 
sufficient to convict a defendant as a principal, and it is not necessary that 
the information refer to the aiding and abetting statute. Hawkes v. State, 626 P.2d  at 1043; Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d  at 
1335.

 
 

Black v. 
State, 
2002 WY 72, ¶ 29, 46 P.3d 298, 303-04 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
[¶13]   While reference to § 6-1-201 in the 
charging document may be the better practice, the failure to specify that Mr. 
Rawle was an aider and abettor to felony murder did not render the information 
insufficient or restrict the State to proving that he had been the principal in 
the murder.  Accomplice liability 
for felony murder is unique in character.  
"Felony-murder is an unusual offense in that the death arising out of the 
robbery is purely an incident of the basic offense."  Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 491 
(Wyo. 
1992).  A killing occurring in a 
continuous transaction involving a robbery is a classic example of felony 
murder.  Jansen, 892 P.2d  at 1137.  

 
 
[¶14]   Contrary to Mr. Rawle's assertion 
that he had no idea that he was being prosecuted as an aider and abettor, other 
information in the record reveals that indeed, defense counsel had received 
notice that the State viewed the crimes charged as joint endeavors.  The affidavit of probable cause 
identifies all three perpetrators, describes the eyewitness testimony of Mrs. 
Lemus, and details the incriminating statements Mr. Lemus gave to the 
police.  Defense counsel obtained 
ample discovery from the State, including witness statements.  If any doubt remained concerning the 
nature of the State's case, it was resolved several weeks before trial when the 
State submitted its proposed jury instructions, including an aiding and abetting 
instruction.  Mr. Rawle never 
requested a bill of particulars and, even after receiving the State's proposed 
jury instructions, did not request a continuance or any clarification from the 
court or the prosecution.  

 
 
[¶15]   In arguing the motion for 
acquittal, defense counsel admitted that the State's proposed jury instructions 
did indicate reliance upon an aiding and abetting theory at trial.  The district court found defense 
counsel's expression of surprise that the State was relying on a joint endeavor 
theory unconvincing, in part because the nature of the case was readily apparent 
by the charging of Mr. Lemus and Ms. Talley with felony murder as well.  In candor, defense counsel affirmed that 
he had been aware all along that all three had been charged with felony 
murder.  In denying the motion, the 
district court acknowledged that the information could have been worded 
differently but agreed with the prosecutor that they were all aware that the 
case was implicitly a joint endeavor case. Based upon this record, we have 
difficulty concluding that Mr. Rawle could not have anticipated the State's case 
against him.

 
 
Jury 
Instructions

 
 
[¶16]   In his second claim of error, Mr. 
Rawle challenges the felony murder instructions given to the jury.  He focuses upon the following three 
instructions:

 
 
#19

 
 
The elements of the crime 
of Felony Murder, as charged in the case, are:

 
 
1.         
On or about the 6th or 7th 
day of February, 2004;

2.         
In Lincoln County, 
Wyoming;

3.         
The Defendant, Mr. Brian Dewayne Rawle;

4.         
Did kill Manuel Leon-Leyva[;]

5.         
While attempting to commit the crime of aggravated 
robbery.

 
 
                     
         
   


 
 
# 
26

 
 
If two (2) or more 
persons are jointly engaged in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate a 
robbery, and a human being is killed during its commission by any one of the 
persons so jointly engaged, then each of the offenders are equally guilty of the 
homicide.

 
 
#27 (Defendant's 
contentions)

 
 
It is the contention of 
the defense that the killing of Manuel Leon-Leyva occurred as a result of the 
actions of Marco Lemus.  
Therefore[,] unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian 
Dewayne Rawle killed Manuel Leon-Leyva in the commission of an aggravated 
robbery[,] you may not convict him of Felony Murder.

 
 
Further[,] the defense 
contends that Mr. Rawle had no knowledge and did not participate in a conspiracy 
or an attempt to commit an aggravated robbery if indeed such conspiracy or an 
attempt even occurred.

 
 
Instructions 19 and 26 
were proposed by the State several weeks before the trial.  Also prior to trial, Mr. Rawle proposed 
Instruction 27 as a defense theory of the case instruction.  Other than Instruction 27, the defense 
did not submit an instruction pertaining to the elements of felony murder, but 
did so for the other two charges.2  

 
 
[¶17]   We afford the trial court 
significant deference when reviewing claims of error involving jury 
instructions.  Luedtke v. State, 2005 WY 98, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Wyo. 2005).  We have previously 
noted:

 
 
A trial 
court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the 
instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant 
issue, reversible error will not be found.  
Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, 
or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation.  Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 5, 46 P.3d 298, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Ogden v. 
State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2001); Coburn v. State, 2001 WY 30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2001); Merchant v. 
State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 2000)).  
Prejudice will be determined to exist only where an appellant 
demonstrates that the instruction given confused or misled the jury with respect 
to the proper principles of law.  Black v. State, at ¶ 16 (citing Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo. 
2000); Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 
916 (Wyo. 2000)).

 
 

Id., 
quoting Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Rawle contends that Instruction 
26 was inconsistent with the other instructions because it eliminated a required 
element of felony murder as set forth in Instruction 19  that he killed Mr. 
Leon-Leyva.  We disagree.  Instruction 26 was a proper statement of 
the law regarding accomplice liability for felony murder; it is nearly verbatim 
the instruction approved in Jansen.  See also Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837, 846 
(Wyo. 1977). 
Instruction 26 informed the jury how the killing element of Instruction 19 could 
be satisfied.   Mr. Rawle also asserts that "jointly 
engaged" should have been defined for the jury.  However, we do not find these words to 
have a technical meaning and find a reasonable jury capable of understanding the 
language of the instruction in the absence of further 
definition.

 
 
[¶19]   To further support his contention 
that the instructions were confusing, Mr. Rawle directs us to the jury's note 
during deliberations requesting a definition for felony murder.3  He does not explain how the jury's 
request supports an inference that it was having difficulty reconciling 
Instructions 19, 26, and 27, and we are not convinced that such was the 
case.  After discussing the matter 
with counsel in chambers and reaching a consensus concerning an appropriate 
response, the district court advised the jury to reread the instructions 
provided.  The jury then continued 
its deliberations and returned its verdict without further inquiries.  We conclude that when reading the 
instructions as a whole, the jury was properly and adequately instructed 
regarding felony murder.  We do not 
have "doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been 
committed."  Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 
(Wyo. 
1995).

 
 
[¶20]   If any confusion arose, it likely 
stemmed from Instruction 27, which reiterated only one of the elements from 
Instruction 19 and did not state a cognizable defense under Wyoming law.  Instruction 27 is similar to one which 
we rejected in Jansen that was 
"designed to insulate [the defendant] from culpability" by arguing that his 
cohort actually killed the victim.  
892 P.2d  at 1140.  We held a 
defendant is not entitled to such an instruction because "that approach has no 
place in the felony murder doctrine." Id.  Accordingly, the district court could 
have properly rejected Instruction 27, but having given it, we find the error 
more prejudicial to the State than to Mr. Rawle.  Pursuant to the doctrine of invited 
error, this instruction requested by the defense cannot provide grounds for 
reversal unless it was "necessarily prejudicial," which has not been 
demonstrated.  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1213 (Wyo. 2007); Butcher v. 
State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 29, 123 P.3d 543, 552 (Wyo. 
2005).

            

Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

            
            

[¶21]   In considering Mr. Rawle's 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, and any 
applicable inferences based on the evidence, in a light most favorable to the 
State.  Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 46, 148 P.3d 23, 37 (Wyo. 2006).  In conducting such a review, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a 
quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have found 
the essential elements of each of the crimes were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id.

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Rawle asserts that the State 
did not present sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that he had 
any agreement concerning a robbery or had any intent to steal.  Therefore, he claims that reversal of 
all three of his convictions is required.  
We disagree, finding that sufficient evidence supported each of the 
convictions.  

 
 
[¶23]   The State presented testimony from 
two eyewitnesses, Tiffany Lemus and FT, the teenage daughter of Mr. Rawle's 
girlfriend.  Both of these witnesses 
discussed the conduct of Mr. Rawle and his co-conspirators before, during, and 
after the robbery and murder.   We have recognized that "although a 
defendant's presence at the time and place of the crime does not establish guilt 
as an aider, abettor, or principal, an intent to engage in the criminal venture 
may be shown by the relationship of the parties and by their conduct before and 
after the offense."  Black, ¶ 10, 46 P.3d  at 301.  

 
 
[¶24]   From the eyewitness testimony, the 
jury heard how the four adult drug users freely talked about and carried out 
their drug related activities in front of the children on their journey.  Mr. Lemus, Ms. Talley, and Mr. Rawle 
also planned and discussed the robbery in front of the children.  They carried out their plan, and Mr. 
Leon-Leyva was stabbed to death in a vehicle parked in front of the Cadillac, 
with the children and Mrs. Lemus in it.  
FT saw the body, the murder weapons, and blood on Ms. Talley and Mr. 
Rawle, and watched them dispose of evidence afterward.  Both FT and Mrs. Lemus testified 
concerning Mr. Rawle's active role in driving Mr. Leon-Leyva's vehicle to a 
remote location and burning it with the dead body inside.  A substantial portion of Mr. Rawle's 
testimony corroborated what was described by FT and Mrs. 
Lemus.

 
 
[¶25]   True, FT was the only witness to 
provide testimony of the conspiracy.  
Mr. Rawle claims that her descriptions of the conversations she overheard 
were too vague, and that she failed to attribute specific statements directly to 
him.  For example, she testified 
that "they all talked about the same thing, so they all pretty much said the 
same thing: knock him out and take the drugs.  Well, I don't know if they were going to 
knock him out, but rough him up a little bit and take the drugs, pretty much 
knock him out."  She did, however, 
identify Mr. Rawle's specific role in the plan to rob his drug source.  He would "talk to the guy, like make it 
okay and everything."  Affording 
every favorable inference to the State, FT's testimony was sufficient to 
establish the conspiracy, especially when considered with the other evidence of 
the behavior of the co-conspirators immediately before and following the robbery 
and murder.

 
 
[¶26]   Furthermore, Mr. Rawle admitted 
that he was well aware of the intentions of Mr. Lemus and Ms. Talley to rob Mr. 
Leon-Leyva using steak knives.  It 
was undisputed that armed with this knowledge, he contacted Mr. Leon-Leyva and 
arranged the meeting anyway.  
Although Mr. Rawle wants to characterize his actions as innocent, the 
jury could easily infer that he was fulfilling his role in the criminal scheme 
to rob Mr. Leon-Leyva.  

 
 
[¶27]   Following the murder, Mr. Rawle 
actively assisted in burning the victim's vehicle and body, and disposing of 
other evidence.  Although he claims 
to have acted under threats from Mr. Lemus, the testimony from Mrs. Lemus and FT 
did not support reluctance or duress.  
The jury was allowed to weigh the evidence and could have easily 
concluded that Mr. Rawle's undisputed participation in destroying evidence was 
corroborative of his involvement in the crime.  Additionally, the eyewitnesses described 
several items of property taken from the victim that were brought back to the 
Cadillac after the murder.  We have 
also recognized that possession of stolen items is strongly corroborative of an 
intent to steal.  Jansen, 892 P.2d  at 1137; Cowell v. State, 719 P.2d 211, 215 
(Wyo. 
1986).

 
 
[¶28]   Nevertheless, Mr. Rawle states that 
his "actions, conduct, words and the circumstances of the case could lead to one 
of two contradictory reasonable inferences: (1) that he may have had the 
required intent to rob Mr. Leon-Leyva; or the equally reasonable inference that 
(2) he wanted to buy drugs from Mr. Leon-Leyva and had no intention of robbing 
him."  He contends that because the 
only evidence of his intent was circumstantial, that the State's proof had to be 
"inconsistent with any other rational conclusion" in reliance upon Mulligan v. State, 513 P.2d 180, 181 
(Wyo. 1973). 
  Mulligan has long been overruled on this 
point, in favor of our current standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a verdict, which do not distinguish between direct and 
circumstantial evidence.  Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 863 
(Wyo. 
1975).  The fact that Mr. Rawle's 
testimony provided an alternative explanation for his behavior is 
irrelevant.  Viewed in a light most 
favorable to the State, the evidence supported the jury's finding of 
guilt.

 
 
[¶29]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Rawle 
did not renew his motion at the close of evidence.  He acknowledges that his failure to do 
so and proceeding to present evidence waived subsequent challenge to that ruling 
under Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 
339 (Wyo. 1995).  See also Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d 543, 548 (Wyo. 2005); Robinson v. 
State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 

2The 
defense's proposed instructions were accompanied by a cover sheet listing a 
description of the instructions requested, including proposed instruction "L" 
described as "Elements of Felony Murder."  
However, the instructions were not separately labeled with letters and 
the defense's proposed instruction setting forth the elements of felony murder 
does not appear in the record on appeal.

 
 

3The note 
does not appear in the record on appeal, but a copy was appended to Mr. Rawle's 
opening brief.