Title: State v. Jonathan J. Hubbard

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2753-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jonathan J. Hubbard, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 240 
Reported at: 306 Wis. 2d 356, 742 N.W.2d 893 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Wolfgram   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, JR., JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by 
Steven W. Zaleski and The Zaleski Law Firm, Janesville, and oral 
argument by Steven W. Zaleski. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 92
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF32) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jonathan J. Hubbard, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed and remanded 
the judgment and orders of the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, 
Thomas R. Wolfgram, Judge.   
¶2 
Defendant Jonathan J. Hubbard (Hubbard) was convicted 
in a jury trial of injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a).2  During deliberations, 
                                                 
1 State v. Hubbard, 2007 WI App 240, 306 Wis. 2d 356, 742 
N.W.2d 893. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
2 
 
the jury requested clarification of a word or term in the jury 
instructions.  The jury had been instructed that to convict 
Hubbard it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(1) Hubbard operated a vehicle; (2) Hubbard's operation of the 
vehicle caused great bodily harm; and (3) Hubbard was under the 
influence of prescription medication at the time he operated the 
vehicle.  The court added that "'under the influence' means that 
the defendant's ability to operate a vehicle was materially 
impaired because of consumption of a prescription medication."  
This part of the court's instruction was based upon Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.22(42).   
¶3 
The court sent a copy of its instructions to the jury 
room with verdict forms.  After deliberating, the jury sent 
Judge Wolfgram a question: "Could the judge define 'materially' 
impaired?  Does this mean that he was impaired enough to have an 
effect on outcome?  If not, what?" 
¶4 
We are asked to address whether the circuit court 
erred when it responded to the jury's request for clarification 
by directing the jury to "give all words not otherwise 
defined in the jury instructions their ordinary meaning."  The 
State asserts that the circuit court's response was correct 
because the term "materially impaired" has no peculiar meaning 
in the context of criminal law.  Hubbard contends that the 
circuit court's response was erroneous because "materially 
impaired" has a peculiar meaning in the law that was established 
by this court's decision in State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 386 
N.W.2d 47 (1986).  Hubbard asserts that Judge Wolfgram should 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
3 
 
have instructed the jury as to the meaning of "materially 
impaired" by using certain phrases in the Waalen decision.   
¶5 
We conclude that the circuit court's response to the 
jury's request for clarification was not error.  The term 
"materially impaired" does not have a technical or peculiar 
meaning in the law beyond the time-tested explanations in 
standard jury instructions; therefore, the circuit court's 
response to the jury was not error, comported with Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01, and did not constitute an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.  
I. BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On January 27, 2005, Hubbard was involved in a two car 
accident.  Hubbard's Mitsubishi sports utility vehicle rear-
ended a Volkswagen Jetta and pushed it off the highway into a 
tree.  The crash caused serious injuries to a nine-year-old girl 
who was a passenger in the Volkswagen.  She suffered injuries to 
her head, collarbone, arm, and face.  An officer at the scene 
described Hubbard as "disoriented" after the accident.  Hubbard 
told the officer he had taken 13 pills of a prescription anxiety 
medication called Xanax3 in the 24-hour period preceding the 
                                                 
3 Xanax is a brand name for the generic prescription drug 
alprazolam. 
 
WebMD, 
Drugs 
and 
Treatments 
– 
Xanax 
Oral, 
http://www.webmd.com/drugs/drug-9824-
Xanax+Oral.aspx?drugid=9824&drugname=Xanax+Oral 
(last 
visited 
June 30, 2008).   
The most frequent side effects of alprazolam include 
drowsiness and lightheadedness.  Physicians' Desk Reference 3044 
(62d ed. 2007).  "Manifestations of alprazolam overdosage 
include somnolence, confusion, impaired coordination, diminished 
reflexes, and coma."  Id. at 3045. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
4 
 
accident.  Xanax is a controlled substance.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.20(2)(a) (Alprazolam). 
¶7 
On January 31, 2005, the State charged Hubbard with 
one count of injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a).  Ultimately, a jury trial 
was scheduled for March 21, 2006. 
¶8 
The parties briefly addressed jury instructions at a 
pretrial hearing on January 17, 2006.  The State indicated that 
"there isn't a specific instruction dealing with causing injury 
by operation of a vehicle under the influence of a controlled 
substance."  It suggested merging Wis JI——Criminal 12624 with Wis 
                                                                                                                                                             
The record indicates that the 13 Xanax pills consumed by 
Hubbard in the 24-hour period preceding the accident exceeded 
the dosage prescribed by his doctor.   
4 Wis JI——Criminal 1262 deals with causing great bodily harm 
by operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a).  The 
instruction defines "under the influence of an intoxicant" as 
follows:   
"Under the influence of an intoxicant" means that 
the defendant's ability to operate a vehicle was 
materially impaired because of consumption of an 
alcoholic beverage.   
Not every person who has consumed alcoholic 
beverages is "under the influence" as that term is 
used here.  What must be established is that the 
person has consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to 
cause the person to be less able to exercise the clear 
judgment and steady hand necessary to handle and 
control a motor vehicle.   
It is not required that impaired ability to 
operate be demonstrated by particular acts of unsafe 
driving.  What is required is that the person's 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
5 
 
JI——Criminal 26645 to tailor an instruction to the facts of the 
case.  This suggestion corresponded with notes 1 and 7 of the 
comment to Wis JI——Criminal 1262 (2004).6 
                                                                                                                                                             
ability to safely control the vehicle be materially 
impaired.   
Wis JI——Criminal 1262 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
5 Wis JI——Criminal 2664 deals with operating a vehicle under 
the influence of a controlled substance in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), which applies if "the total number of 
suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 
343.307(1) 
within 
a 
10-year 
period, 
equals 
2." 
 
See 
§ 346.65(2)(am)2.  The instruction defines "under the influence" 
as follows:   
"Under the influence" means that the defendant's 
ability to operate a vehicle was impaired because of 
consumption of a controlled substance.   
[Not 
every 
person 
who 
has 
consumed 
(name 
controlled substance) is "under the influence" as that 
term is used here.]  What must be established is that 
the person has consumed a sufficient amount of (name 
controlled substance) to cause the person to be less 
able to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand 
necessary to handle and control a motor vehicle.   
It is not required that impaired ability to 
operate be demonstrated by particular acts of unsafe 
driving.  What is required is that the person's 
ability to safely control the vehicle be impaired.   
Wis JI——Criminal 2664 (2004) (footnotes omitted).  
6 Notes 1 and 7 of the comment to Wis JI——Criminal 1262 
(2004) read as follows:  
1. 
This 
instruction 
is 
drafted 
for 
cases 
involving the influence of an intoxicant, which is 
defined to include "alcohol beverage or controlled 
substance under ch. 961 or both, . . . any other drug 
or . . . an alcohol beverage and any other drug."  See 
§ 939.22(42) in note 7, below.  For a model tailored 
to the influence of a controlled substance, see Wis 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
6 
 
¶9 
Hubbard's attorney pointed the court to Wis JI——
Criminal 2600 Operating While Intoxicated: Introductory Comment 
(2004).  He mentioned "materially impaired" and noted that there 
were "a lot of options I think for the court in this sense."  
The court did not rule on jury instructions at the January 17 
hearing. 
¶10 Prior to the opening of Hubbard's jury trial, Judge 
Wolfgram 
stated 
on 
the 
record 
that 
a 
jury 
instructions 
conference had been held in chambers regarding a dispute over 
                                                                                                                                                             
JI——Criminal 2664.  For a model tailored to the 
combined influence of an intoxicant and a controlled 
substance, see Wis JI——Criminal 2664A.   
. . . .   
7. 
The 
instruction 
is 
drafted 
for 
cases 
involving the influence of an intoxicant.  For a model 
tailored to the influence of a controlled substance, 
see Wis JI——Criminal 2664.  For a model tailored to 
the 
combined 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant 
and 
a 
controlled substance, see Wis JI——Criminal 2664A.  The 
definition in the instruction paraphrases the full 
definition provided in § 939.22(42):   
"Under the influence of an intoxicant" means 
that 
the 
actor's ability to operate a 
vehicle or handle a firearm or airgun is 
materially impaired because of his or her 
consumption of an alcohol beverage, of a 
controlled substance or controlled substance 
analog under ch. 961, of any combination of 
an alcohol beverage, controlled substance 
and controlled substance analog, or of any 
other drug or of an alcohol beverage and any 
other drug.   
For a discussion of issues relating to the 
definition of "under the influence," see Wis JI——
Criminal 2600 Introductory Comment, Sec. VIII. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
7 
 
the instruction defining "under the influence."  Judge Wolfgram 
concluded that he was going to include the word "materially" in 
the jury instructions in defining "under the influence" because 
Hubbard was charged under the Criminal Code.  Neither the State 
nor Hubbard objected to this decision. 
¶11 At trial the jury was instructed in part as follows:   
Section 940.25(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of 
Wisconsin is violated by one who causes great bodily 
harm to another by the operation of a vehicle while 
under the influence of a prescription medication.   
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following three elements were present.   
1. 
The defendant operated a vehicle. . . .  
2. 
The 
defendant's 
operation 
of 
a 
vehicle 
caused great bodily harm to [the victim]. . . .  
3. 
The defendant was under the influence of a 
prescription medication at the time the defendant 
operated a vehicle.   
"Under the influence" means that the defendant's 
ability to operate a vehicle was materially impaired 
because of consumption of a prescription medication. 
Not every person who has consumed Xanax or 
alprazolam is "under the influence" as that term is 
used here.  What must be established is that the 
person has consumed a sufficient quantity of Xanax or 
alprazolam to cause the person to be less able to 
exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary 
to handle and control a motor vehicle.   
It is not required that impaired ability to 
operate be demonstrated by particular acts of unsafe 
driving.  What is required is that the person's 
ability to safely control the vehicle is materially 
impaired.   
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
8 
 
¶12 Neither party objected to the instructions, which were 
tendered to the jury with verdict forms for "guilty" and "not 
guilty." 
¶13 According 
to 
the 
criminal 
court 
record, 
jury 
deliberations began at 11:05 a.m. on March 23, 2006.  Shortly 
after 1 p.m., the jury sent a written question to Judge 
Wolfgram, which stated: "Could the judge define 'materially' 
impaired?  Does this mean that he was impaired enough to have an 
effect on outcome?  If not, what?" 
¶14 Following the jury's question, Judge Wolfgram heard 
argument from Hubbard's attorney and the State regarding how to 
respond.  Initially Judge Wolfgram proposed using language from 
Waalen to define the term "materially impaired" for the jury.  
The proposed language, hereinafter referred to as "the Waalen 
language," was:  
"material impairment" under sec. 939.22(42), Stats., 
exists when a person is incapable of driving safely, 
or 
is 
without 
proper 
control 
of 
all 
those 
faculties . . . necessary to avoid danger to others. 
Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 27 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The State objected to the court using this language 
to respond to the jury's request for clarification. 
¶15 Judge Wolfgram noted that the jury's question included 
quotation marks around the word "materially," not the term 
"materially impaired."  The circuit court considered sending the 
jury definitions of the word "material," or variations of the 
word 
"material," 
from 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary, 
Webster's 
Dictionary, and Encarta Online Dictionary. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
9 
 
¶16 After hearing arguments from Hubbard's attorney and 
the State, Judge Wolfgram concluded that "the Waalen language" 
should not be submitted to the jury.  He concluded that "the 
Waalen language" did not define "materially impaired"; instead, 
it cited two examples of circumstances that constitute material 
impairment.  Over the objection of Hubbard's attorney, Judge 
Wolfgram submitted a printed note to the jury that read: "Please 
give all words not otherwise defined in the jury instructions 
their ordinary meaning."   
¶17 The jury returned a guilty verdict at 2:13 p.m., less 
than one hour after receiving the court's response.   
¶18 On April 11, 2006, Hubbard was sentenced.  Prior to 
sentencing, Hubbard filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that 
Judge 
Wolfgram's 
response 
to 
the 
jury's 
request 
for 
clarification was error.  The parties presented argument 
regarding the motion immediately after sentencing.  Hubbard 
maintained 
that 
"the 
Waalen 
language" 
defined 
"material 
impairment" and asserted that the introductory comment to Wis 
JI——CRIMINAL 2600 also indicates that "the Waalen language" 
should be used to define "material impairment."  Judge Wolfgram 
orally denied Hubbard's motion. 
¶19 On October 11, 2006, Hubbard filed a second motion for 
a new trial.  He filed a second motion because his first was 
filed and determined prior to the entry of the judgment of 
conviction.  Judge Wolfgram entered an order denying Hubbard's 
post-conviction motion for a new trial on October 19, 2006.   
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
10 
 
¶20 Hubbard appealed the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction and its orders denying his motions for a new trial.  
The court of appeals determined that "materially impaired" has a 
"peculiar meaning in the context of criminal charges" and that 
Waalen clarified the meaning of the term.  Hubbard, 306 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶12.  The court of appeals concluded that "the 
Waalen language" defined "materially impaired" and that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
declined to instruct the jury on the Waalen definition of 
"materially impaired."  Id., ¶17.  The court of appeals reversed 
and remanded for a new trial in the interest of justice because 
it was not convinced the real controversy had been fully tried.  
Id., ¶20. 
¶21 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on January 22, 2008. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 This case involves construction of the statutory term 
"materially impaired," which was used in a criminal jury 
instruction.  We review jury instruction issues that involve the 
construction of statutory terms de novo.  See State v. Harmon, 
2006 WI App 214, ¶8, 296 Wis. 2d 861, 723 N.W.2d 732 (citing 
State v. Neumann, 179 Wis. 2d 687, 699, 508 N.W.2d 54 (Ct. App. 
1993)). 
¶23 A court has broad discretion in deciding whether to 
give a particular jury instruction.  State v. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, 
¶9, 281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594.  The court's determination 
will not be reversed absent an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
11 
 
State v. Miller, 231 Wis. 2d 447, 464, 605 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 
1999); State v. Morgan, 195 Wis. 2d 388, 448, 536 N.W.2d 425 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶24 This case involves the narrow question whether the 
circuit court erred when it responded to a jury's request for 
clarification of a word used in jury instructions by instructing 
the jury to "give all words not otherwise defined in the jury 
instructions their ordinary meaning."  We are not asked to 
address whether the initial jury instructions provided by the 
court were correct for the offense charged.7  Neither party 
contends that these instructions were erroneous. 
¶25 First, we will set forth some general principles about 
instructing and reinstructing a jury.  Second, we will discuss 
this court's decision in Waalen.  Finally, we will evaluate 
whether the circuit court's response to the jury's request for 
clarification was erroneous in light of Waalen. 
A. 
General Principles 
¶26 "The purpose of a jury instruction is to fully and 
fairly inform the jury of a rule or principle of law applicable 
to a particular case."  Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 
WI 112, ¶36, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301 (citing Grube v. 
Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 549, 570 N.W.2d 851 (1997); Nowatske v. 
Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 428, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996)).  The 
                                                 
7 Hubbard acknowledges, as did the court of appeals, that 
"the standard instructions given by the trial court were 
arguably legally sufficient."  Hubbard, 306 Wis. 2d 356, ¶10. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
12 
 
objective of "an instruction is not only to state the law 
accurately but also to explain what the law means to persons who 
usually do not possess law degrees."  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
¶27 "Jury instructions are not to be judged in artificial 
isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall 
charge."  State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 637-38, 492 
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684, 704-05 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Barrera v. 
State, 109 Wis. 2d 324, 330-31, 325 N.W.2d 722 (1982); State v. 
Reynosa, 108 Wis. 2d 499, 510, 322 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1982)).  
"If the overall meaning communicated by the instructions was a 
correct statement of the law, no grounds for reversal exist."  
Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 850, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992) 
(citing White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 954-55, 440 N.W.2d 557 
(1989); State v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 108, 315 N.W.2d 350 
(1982)). 
¶28 "A circuit court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to give a requested jury instruction."  State v. 
Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996) (citing 
State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 690, 312 N.W.2d 489 (1981)).  
"'The decision to give or not to give a requested jury 
instruction lies within the trial court's discretion' and will 
not be reversed absent an erroneous exercise of discretion."  
Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61, ¶42, 281 Wis. 2d 
173, 696 N.W.2d 194 (quoting Miller, 231 Wis. 2d at 464).   
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
13 
 
¶29 This case involves a question regarding a circuit 
court's 
reinstruction 
of 
a 
jury 
after 
a 
request 
for 
clarification during deliberations.8  "The necessity for, the 
extent of, and the form of re-instruction rests in the sound 
discretion of the court."  Hareng v. Blanke, 90 Wis. 2d 158, 
166, 279 N.W.2d 437 (1979) (citing Seitz v. Seitz, 35 Wis. 2d 
282, 300, 151 N.W.2d 86 (1967); Olson v. Siordia, 25 Wis. 2d 
274, 279, 130 N.W.2d 827 (1964)). 
B. 
State v. Waalen 
¶30 This 
court's 
decision 
in 
Waalen 
is 
central 
to 
resolving the issue before us; therefore, it is appropriate to 
review Waalen before proceeding to analyze whether the circuit 
court's response to the jury's request for clarification was 
error. 
¶31 A jury convicted David A. Waalen (Waalen) of operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (1981-82) of the Motor 
Vehicle Code.  Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 19.  The Waalen case 
involved a single issue: "whether the circuit court properly 
                                                 
8 Chapter 805 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which addresses 
civil procedure for trials, includes a section governing 
reinstruction of a jury.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(5) states: 
"Reinstruction. 
 
After 
the 
jury 
retires, 
the 
court 
may 
reinstruct the jury as to all or any part of the instructions 
previously given, or may give supplementary instructions as it 
deems appropriate."   
Wisconsin Stat. § 972.10, the Criminal Code counterpart to 
Wis. Stat. § 805.13, does not include a specific provision 
governing reinstruction of a jury. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
14 
 
instructed the jury regarding the definition of 'under the 
influence.'"  Id. at 20.  The circuit court instructed the jury 
as follows:   
The phrase "under the influence of an intoxicant" 
covers not only the well-known and easily recognized 
conditions and degrees of intoxication but also any 
abnormal mental or physical conditions which [are] the 
result of indulging in any degree in intoxicating 
liquors, including beer, which tends to deprive one of 
the clearness of intellect and self control which one 
would otherwise possess.  
Not every person who has consumed alcoholic 
beverages falls within the ban of the statute. If that 
consumption of alcoholic beverages does not cause the 
person to be influenced in the ordinary and well-
understood meaning of the term, the person is not 
under the influence of an intoxicant within the 
meaning of the statute. 
Id. at 22.  The circuit court's instruction was based largely on 
the 1981 version of the standard jury instruction for operating 
while under the influence of an intoxicant, Wis JI——Criminal 
2663 (1981).  Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 22.  The 1981 standard 
instruction was, in turn, "virtually identical" to language this 
court had previously endorsed in Fond du Lac v. Hernandez, 42 
Wis. 2d 473, 167 N.W.2d 408 (1969).9  Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 26. 
                                                 
9 The jury instruction for "under the influence of an 
intoxicant" that this court endorsed in Fond du Lac v. 
Hernandez, 42 Wis. 2d 473, 475-76, 167 N.W.2d 408 (1969), was:   
The 
expression 
"under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant" covers not only all the well-known and 
easily 
recognized 
conditions 
and 
degrees 
of 
intoxication, but any abnormal mental or physical 
condition which is the result of indulging in any 
degree in intoxicating liquors, including beer, and 
which tends to deprive him of that clearness of 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
15 
 
¶32 Waalen contended that the circuit court erred in 
instructing the jury because its instruction describing "under 
the influence" differed from language used to define the term in 
the 1982 standard jury instruction as well as the definition 
found in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) of the Criminal Code.  Waalen, 
130 Wis. 2d at 20.  He asserted that the following instruction 
should have been given:   
"Under the influence" of an intoxicant means that 
a driver's ability to operate a vehicle is materially 
impaired because of his consumption of an alcoholic 
beverage.  
Not every person who has consumed alcoholic 
beverages is "under the influence" as that term is 
used here.  What must be established is that the 
person has consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to 
cause him to be substantially less able to exercise 
the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle 
and control a motor vehicle. 
                                                                                                                                                             
intellect and control of himself which he would 
otherwise possess. 
A person who is even to the slightest extent 
under the influence of an intoxicant in the common and 
well-understood acceptation of the term is——to some 
degree 
at 
least——less 
able 
either 
mentally 
or 
physically, or both, to exercise the clear judgment 
and steady hand necessary to handle as powerful and 
dangerous a mechanism as a modern motor vehicle with 
safety to himself and the public.  Not every man who 
has consumed alcoholic beverages falls within the ban 
of the statute.  If that consumption of alcoholic 
beverages does not cause him to be influenced in the 
ordinary and well understood meaning of the term, he 
is not under the influence of an intoxicant within the 
meaning of the statute or ordinance in this particular 
case. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
16 
 
It is not required that impaired ability to 
operate be demonstrated by particular acts of unsafe 
driving.  What is required is that the person's 
ability to safely control his vehicle be materially, 
that is substantially, impaired. 
Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Waalen's 
proposed jury instruction was the standard instruction found in 
Wis JI——Criminal 2663 (1982).  Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 21.   
¶33 In essence, Waalen argued that the 1982 standard jury 
instruction was mandatory.  He asserted that the definition of 
"under the influence" in the Motor Vehicle Code should align 
with the definition of "under the influence of an intoxicant" in 
the 1982 standard jury instruction, based on the Criminal Code 
at Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42).  Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 23.  In 
short, Waalen argued that to prove a defendant was "under the 
influence" for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Code, the state was 
required to demonstrate that a person's consumption of alcohol 
"materially" or "substantially" affected his ability to drive 
his 
vehicle, 
as 
indicated 
in 
the 
1982 
standard 
jury 
instruction's interpretation of "under the influence of an 
intoxicant" in the Criminal Code.  Id. at 23-24. 
¶34 This court rejected Waalen's arguments.  Id. at 26-28.  
First, it expressly upheld the circuit court's jury instruction, 
id. at 28, noting that the instruction was almost identical to 
the 1981 standard instruction and the one in Hernandez.  Id. at 
26, 
28. 
 The court concluded that the circuit court's 
instruction was "not inconsistent with the Criminal Code 
definition of 'under the influence.'"  Id. at 28.  It also 
indicated that the circuit court's definition of "under the 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
17 
 
influence"——"abnormal mental or physical conditions . . . which 
tends to deprive one of the clearness of intellect and self 
control which one would otherwise possess"——was an accurate 
description of when a driver is "under the influence" for a jury 
to 
infer 
that 
a 
defendant 
was 
"materially 
impaired" 
or 
"incapable of safely driving."10  Id. 
¶35 Second, the Waalen court rejected part of the 1982 
standard instruction and clarified the meaning of "material 
impairment," holding that "material impairment" does not mean 
"substantial impairment."  Id. at 27.11   
¶36 The Waalen court explained why "material impairment" 
and "substantial impairment" are incompatible:   
"Material impairment" should not be given a 
definition that is inconsistent with the purpose of 
the statute, which is to foster highway safety.  In 
the preface to the 1981 revisions of the Criminal 
Code, 
the 
legislature expressly stated that its 
purpose was to "provide maximum safety for all users 
of 
the 
highways 
of 
this 
state" 
from 
the 
harm 
threatened by persons who operate motor vehicles while 
under the influence of an intoxicant.  Laws of 1981, 
                                                 
10 The Waalen court noted that the "incapable of safely 
driving" language was added to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (1983-
84), the Motor Vehicle Code provision dealing with operating a 
vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant.  State v. Waalen, 
130 Wis. 2d 18, 27-28, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986).   
11 The court indicated that the Jury Instructions Committee 
had revised the 1981 standard instruction to eliminate a 
perceived inconsistency between the definitions of "under the 
influence" in the Motor Vehicle Code and the Criminal Code.  Id. 
at 26.  However, in doing so, the Jury Instructions Committee 
erred when it revised the 1981 instruction to define "material" 
as "substantial," citing no authority for the revision.  Id. at 
27.   
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
18 
 
ch. 20, secs. 2051(13)(a)1 and 2051(13)(b)1.  See 
State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 591, 363 N.W.2d 
574 (1985).  Requiring "substantial impairment" of an 
individual's ability to operate a vehicle before that 
person could be found "under the influence" would be 
inconsistent with the expressed legislative intent 
because it would not provide maximum safety for all 
users of state highways. 
Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 27.   
¶37 The Waalen court then gave two examples of "material 
impairment," stating that "'material impairment' under sec. 
939.22(42), Stats., exists when a person is incapable of driving 
safely, 
or 
is 
without 
proper 
control 
of 
all 
those 
faculties . . . necessary to avoid danger to others."  Id. at 27 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citation 
and 
internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted).  This quoted language——"the Waalen language"——is 
central to the issue before us. 
C. 
Analysis and Application of State v. Waalen 
¶38 We must put the Waalen decision in historical context 
to give it proper perspective.  David Waalen was involved in an 
automobile accident on or about May 28, 1982.  Id. at 20.  The 
date is important because the circuit court and this court 
utilized the 1981-82 Wisconsin Statutes in their analyses.  Id.   
¶39 In 1982 Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) and (2) (1981-82) read 
in part:   
Operating under influence of intoxicant.  (1) No 
person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while:  
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant or a 
controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant 
and a controlled substance . . .  
 . . . . 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
19 
 
(2)(a) 
It is unlawful for any person to cause 
injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle 
while:  
1. 
Under the influence of an intoxicant or a 
controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant 
and a controlled substance. . . . 
¶40 In 1982 Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a) (1981-82) read:   
Injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  (1) Any 
person who does either of the following under par. (a) 
or (b) is guilty of a Class E felony:  
(a) Causes great bodily harm to another human 
being by the operation of a vehicle while under the 
influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance 
or a combination of an intoxicant and a controlled 
substance. 
¶41 In 1982 Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) (1981-82) defined the 
term "under the influence of an intoxicant" in the Criminal Code 
as follows:  
Words and phrases defined.  In chs. 939 to 948, 
the following words and phrases have the designated 
meanings unless the context of a specific section 
manifestly requires a different construction: 
. . . .  
(42) "Under the influence of an intoxicant" means 
that the actor's ability to operate a vehicle or 
handle a firearm is materially impaired because of his 
consumption of an alcohol beverage or controlled 
substance under ch. 161. 
¶42 In 1982 there was no statutory language in the Motor 
Vehicle Code defining "under the influence."  By contrast, there 
was a statutory definition for that phrase in the Criminal Code.  
See Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1981-82).  Thus, there was good 
reason for this court to seek a uniform interpretation of the 
words "under the influence" in the two codes, and that meant 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
20 
 
embracing the term "materially impaired" from the definition in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1981-82). 
¶43 The court understood, however, that the definition of 
"under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(42) (1981-82) had been part of the Wisconsin Criminal 
Code since the 1955 session of the legislature.  Ch. 696, Laws 
of 1955.  In the 1955-56 Wisconsin Statutes, § 939.22(42) read: 
"'Under the influence of an intoxicant' means that the actor's 
ability to operate a vehicle or handle a firearm is materially 
impaired because of his consumption of an alcoholic beverage, a 
narcotic drug or other intoxicating substance."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.22(42) (1955-56) (emphasis added).  Thus, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) had coexisted in the 
statutes for three decades.  Moreover, the definition of "under 
the influence" in § 939.22(42) was "based upon the [definition] 
traditionally used by the courts in this state.  See, for 
example, 
Devine 
v. 
Bischel, 
215 
Wis. 
331, 
335 
(1934); 
Steinkrause v. Eckstein, 170 Wis. 487, 491 (1920)."  5 Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal 
Code, at 17 (1953). 
¶44 This is why the Waalen court confidently endorsed the 
circuit court's jury instruction, as well as the instruction in 
Hernandez.  See Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 26, 28.  The court saw no 
incompatibility or inconsistency between the term "under the 
influence" in Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)(1981-82) and the phrase 
"materially impaired because of his consumption of an alcohol 
beverage" in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1981-82).  However, the 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
21 
 
court was forced to repudiate the notion that "material 
impairment" meant "substantial impairment," as suggested by the 
Criminal Jury Instructions Committee, Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 27, 
because that notion appeared to undermine the purpose of the 
statute by raising the proof requirement for "under the 
influence" and because the language had no basis in statutory 
text or legislative history.   
¶45 The Waalen court made the point that the Motor Vehicle 
Code did not contain a definition of "under the influence" "at 
the time th[e] case was initially tried."  Id. at 25.  But the 
court recognized that the legislature had changed the statute to 
a "degree" in 1984 by 1983 Wis. Act 459, § 12.  See Waalen, 130 
Wis. 2d at 27-28.  Section 12 amended Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) 
(1981-82), so that the statute read:   
Operating under influence of intoxicant or other 
drug.  (1) No person may drive or operate a motor 
vehicle while: 
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant or a 
controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant 
and a controlled substance, under the influence of any 
other drug to a degree which renders him or her 
incapable of safely driving, or under the combined 
influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a 
degree which renders him or her incapable of safely 
driving; . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)(1983-84) (emphasis added). 
¶46 The underscored language above is the language added 
by 1983 Wis. Act 459.  This change did not modify or condition 
the existing language, that is, the language "under the 
influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
22 
 
combination of an intoxicant and a controlled substance."  
Consequently, the Waalen court was mistaken in 1986 when it 
implied that the language "to a degree which renders him or her 
incapable 
of 
safely 
driving" 
modified 
all 
provisions 
in 
subsection (a) of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(1983-84).  This 
language applied only to "any other drug" or the combination of 
an intoxicant and "any other drug." 
¶47 The Waalen court was correct when it wrote: "'material 
impairment' under sec. 939.22(42), Stats., exists when a person 
is incapable of driving safely, or is without proper control of 
all those faculties . . . necessary to avoid danger to others."  
Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 27 (emphasis added) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  These phrases are used as 
examples.  But the court was not correct if it implied that the 
phrase 
"incapable 
of 
safely 
driving" 
from 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) is part of the definition of "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1983-84).   
¶48 We acknowledge that 1995 Wis. Act 448 amended both 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) in 1996, 
but, in our view, these amendments do not affect or alter this 
analysis.12 
                                                 
12 1995 Wis. Act 448 adopted the revised Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act and made other changes in the statutes relating 
to controlled substances.  These changes included adding the 
phrase "controlled substance analog" to Wis. Stat. § 346.63 and 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42), as well as multiple other sections.  
1995 Wis. Act 448, §§ 342, 445.  These changes had no effect on 
the limited application of "incapable of safely driving." 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
23 
 
¶49 Building on these observations, we turn to the 
question whether the circuit court's response to the jury's 
request for clarification was error in light of Waalen. 
¶50 The State asserts that "the Waalen language" did not 
ascribe a "peculiar" meaning to the term "materially impaired" 
in the context of criminal charges; thus the circuit court's 
response to the jury was acceptable and did not constitute 
error. 
¶51 Hubbard counters, and the court of appeals held, that 
Judge 
Wolfgram's 
response 
to 
the 
jury's 
request 
for 
clarification should have provided "the Waalen language" (i.e., 
"incapable of safely driving") because the Waalen court's 
discussion of "material impairment" created a "peculiar meaning 
in the context of criminal charges."  Hubbard, 306 Wis. 2d 356, 
¶12.  Hubbard argues that this language clarified the meaning of 
"materially impaired" and that the circuit court should have 
instructed the jury accordingly. 
¶52 We disagree.  The phrase "to a degree which renders 
him incapable of safely driving" does not affect the definition 
of "under the influence" in the Criminal Code.  For the circuit 
court 
to 
have 
acceded 
to 
Hubbard's 
request 
for 
this 
"clarification" 
it 
would 
have 
rewritten 
the 
statute 
for 
Hubbard's benefit.  He was not entitled to such largesse.   
¶53 The Waalen court did not give "materially impaired" a 
"technical" or "peculiar" meaning unique to criminal law.  
Specifically, "the Waalen language" was not intended to define 
the statutory term "materially impaired."  Instead, the Waalen 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
24 
 
court used the language to describe two circumstances in which 
material impairment "exists."  Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 27.  These 
were examples, not definitions.  Therefore, the Waalen court was 
not defining "materially impaired" with "the Waalen language."   
¶54 Other parts of the Waalen decision indicate acceptable 
means for a circuit court to instruct a jury regarding the 
definition of "under the influence."  See id. at 26, 28.  
Hubbard has not argued that the specific jury instructions 
endorsed by the Waalen court should have been given by the 
circuit court.  These instructions would not have benefited him 
because "the Waalen language" is not part of any of the specific 
jury instructions endorsed by the Waalen court.  Id. at 22, 25-
26 (reciting the circuit court's instruction in Waalen and the 
instruction given 
in Hernandez).  Consequently, Hubbard's 
argument 
that 
"the 
Waalen 
language" 
defined 
"materially 
impaired" to give the term a "technical" or "peculiar" meaning 
in the context of criminal law is untenable. 
¶55 Thus, when the jury asked Judge Wolfgram to define 
"'materially' impaired," he was on solid footing in relying on 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1), which provides in pertinent part: "All 
words and phrases shall be construed according to common and 
approved usage"; and he did not erroneously exercise his 
discretion when he directed the jury to "give all words not 
otherwise defined in the jury instructions their ordinary 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
25 
 
meaning."  The court would not have been correct to give 
Hubbard's clarification request.13 
¶56 We note that the circuit court was also correct on the 
facts.  The jury's request for clarification focused on the word 
"materially," not on the term "materially impaired."  The adverb 
"materially" is a word more likely to crop up in a lawyer's 
vocabulary than in common parlance, and the jury's probing 
question about the word was a very good one.  The court's 
answer, to "give all words not otherwise defined in the jury 
instructions their ordinary meaning" was sound, responsive, and 
did 
not 
constitute 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶57 The circuit court had discretion to determine the 
necessity for, extent of, and form of reinstruction of the jury 
when responding to its request for clarification.  Hareng, 90 
Wis. 2d at 166 (citations omitted).  Judge Wolfgram could have 
exercised his discretion by instructing the jury to re-read the 
jury instructions in their possession in light of the jury's 
request for a definition of "materially" impaired.  "[A] court 
                                                 
13 Hubbard's position regarding "the Waalen language" also 
runs contrary to common sense.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.22 acts 
like a dictionary for the Criminal Code.  It is counterintuitive 
that a statutory definition in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42), which is 
undeniably intended to create a unique and peculiar meaning for 
a term in the law, would have imbedded within it another 
"technical" or "peculiar" explanatory term requiring further 
definition.  This interpretation would render statutory language 
virtually impenetrable, which belies the inherent premise of 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) and the specific definitions found in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22——clarity. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
26 
 
is not obligated to provide a jury with information solely 
because the jury believes it is important to its decision."  
State v. Lombard, 2004 WI App 52, ¶20, 271 Wis. 2d 529, 678 
N.W.2d 338.  However, once Judge Wolfgram correctly determined 
that "materially impaired" was not defined by "the Waalen 
language," he did not erroneously exercise his discretion by 
responding that the jury should give undefined words in the jury 
instructions their ordinary meaning.  "If the overall meaning 
communicated by the instructions was a correct statement of the 
law, no grounds for reversal exist."  Fischer, 168 Wis. 2d at 
850 (citations omitted). 
¶58 We hold that the court of appeals erred when it 
determined that this court's decision in Waalen gave the 
statutory term "materially impaired" a "peculiar meaning in the 
context of criminal charges," Hubbard, 306 Wis. 2d 356, ¶12, and 
that the jury should have been instructed accordingly.  Id., 
¶17.  Thus, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion 
when 
it 
responded 
to 
the 
jury's 
request 
for 
clarification by indicating that the jury should "give all words 
not otherwise defined in the jury instructions their ordinary 
meaning."  This succinct answer may not always suffice, but it 
was correct on the facts presented. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶59 We conclude that the circuit court's response to the 
jury's request for clarification was not error.  The term 
"materially impaired" does not have a technical or peculiar 
meaning in the law beyond the time-tested explanations in 
No.  2006AP2753-CR  
 
27 
 
standard jury instructions; therefore, the circuit court's 
response to the jury was not error, comported with Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01, and did not constitute an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2006AP2753-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  In an 
effort to sustain the circuit court's erroneous instruction, the 
majority opinion adopts a self-contradictory and unworkable 
approach to Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1), which makes it a Class F 
felony to cause great bodily harm to another by operation of a 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.       
¶61 Here are the essential facts: The State charged the 
defendant under Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a), which provides that a 
person is guilty of a Class F felony if he or she "[c]auses 
great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant" (emphasis 
added).  The phrase "under the influence of an intoxicant" is 
defined 
in 
a 
separate 
statutory 
provision, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(42), which provides in relevant part that the term 
"'[u]nder the influence of an intoxicant' means that the actor's 
ability to operate 
a vehicle . . . is materially impaired 
because of his or her consumption of an alcohol beverage [or] a 
controlled substance . . . " (emphasis added).  The present case 
focuses on the meaning of the words "materially impaired" in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42).    
¶62 The circuit court's initial instructions to the jury 
helped to clarify the meaning of "materially" for purposes of 
the statute.  In its initial instructions, the circuit court 
stated in part that "[w]hat must be established is that the 
person has consumed a sufficient amount of Xanax or alprazolam 
to cause the person to be less able to exercise the clear 
No.  2006AP2753-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
judgment and steady hand necessary to handle and control a motor 
vehicle."  The circuit court's instructions were largely based 
on Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instruction No. 1262 (relating to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a)), which the circuit court merged with 
Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instruction No. 2664 (relating to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), a Motor Vehicle Code provision).1     
¶63 In the course of its deliberations, the jury posed the 
following question to the circuit court: 
Could the judge define "materially" impaired?  Does 
this mean that he was impaired enough to have an 
effect on outcome?  If not, what? 
¶64 The jury's confusion is understandable.  As the court 
of appeals stated, "[g]iven the attention the term 'materially 
impaired' has attracted from the courts, the legislature, and 
the jury instruction committee, it is no wonder that a jury 
would also wrestle with what it actually means."2   
                                                 
1 See Wis JI——Criminal 1262 at 2 (stating that "[w]hat must 
be established is that the person has consumed a sufficient 
amount of alcohol to cause the person to be less able to 
exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle 
and control a motor vehicle.").  
Wis JI——Criminal 1262 is written to be applied in cases in 
which the intoxicant allegedly consumed by the defendant is 
alcohol.  The circuit court's instructions substitute "Xanax or 
alprazolam" for "alcohol."   
During oral argument, this court focused many of its 
questions on whether the circuit court's initial instructions to 
the jury were correct.  The majority opinion does not address 
the court's and counsel's confusion about what instruction was 
most appropriate for the fact situation presented.  The majority 
opinion's footnote, majority op., ¶24 n.7, does not reflect this 
court's difficulty in grappling with this issue.     
2 State v. Hubbard, 2007 WI App 240, ¶12, 306 Wis. 2d 356, 
742 N.W.2d 893. 
No.  2006AP2753-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶65 The circuit court responded to the jury's question by 
instructing the jury to give the statutory term "materially 
impaired" its ordinary meaning.  The circuit court answered the 
jury's question as follows: 
PLEASE GIVE ALL WORDS NOT OTHERWISE DEFINED IN THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS THEIR ORDINARY MEANING. 
¶66 Here is the problem: Although the circuit court's 
reply to the jury may seem reasonable enough at first glance, it 
conflicts 
with 
this 
court's 
longstanding, 
precedential 
interpretation 
of 
the 
word 
"materially" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(42).   
¶67 The 
ordinary 
meaning 
of 
"materially" 
is 
"substantially."3   
¶68 However, in State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 386 N.W. 
2d 47 (1986), this court expressly held that for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42), "materially" cannot be given the 
meaning of "substantially."4  Because the ordinary meaning of 
                                                 
3 See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (1961) at 1392 
(defining "material" as "being of real importance or great 
consequence: 
SUBSTANTIAL.") 
(capitalization 
in 
original); 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 
1992) at 1109 (defining "materially" to mean "[t]o a significant 
extent or degree; substantially.").  
4 See State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 27, 386 N.W.2d 47 
(1986) (rejecting the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee's 
conclusion that the meaning of "material" is equivalent to the 
meaning 
of 
"substantial" 
for 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(42)).   
No.  2006AP2753-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
"materially" is "substantially," and the Waalen decision held 
that "materially" cannot be given the meaning of "substantially" 
for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42), the circuit court's 
reply to the jury question contradicted the Waalen court's 
interpretation of the statute. 
¶69 Such is the dilemma that this court confronts in the 
instant case: Either the circuit court is correct that the 
statutory term "materially" should be given its ordinary meaning 
(i.e., "substantially") or Waalen is correct that the statutory 
term 
"materially" 
cannot 
be 
given 
the 
meaning 
of 
"substantially."  The circuit court and Waalen cannot both be 
right. 
¶70 Here is the majority opinion's answer to the problem: 
The majority opinion adopts each of the two contradictory 
interpretations 
of 
the 
word 
"materially" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(42).  The majority opinion reaffirms the Waalen court's 
holding that the statutory term "materially" cannot mean 
"substantially."5  The majority opinion then goes on to uphold 
the 
circuit 
court's 
instruction 
that 
the 
statutory 
term 
"materially" should be given its ordinary meaning as a synonym 
of "substantially."6   
                                                                                                                                                             
The Waalen court construed the word "materially" in light 
of the statutory purpose instead of giving the word its ordinary 
meaning as the circuit court instructed the jury to do in the 
present case.  The Waalen court stated that "'[m]aterial 
impairment' 
should 
not 
be 
given 
a 
definition 
that 
is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute . . . ."  Waalen, 
130 Wis. 2d at 27. 
5 See majority op., ¶¶35-36.   
6 Majority op., ¶¶55-56.   
No.  2006AP2753-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶71 The majority opinion's mangled interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 939.22(42) is a disservice to Wisconsin's circuit 
courts, district attorneys, defense counsel, and the Wisconsin 
Jury Instruction Committee, all of whom rely upon this court for 
guidance on matters of statutory interpretation.  Section 
939.22(42)'s 
definition 
of 
"under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant" (which provides in part that a person is under the 
influence of an intoxicant when he or she is "materially" 
impaired) is incorporated into many statutes.  See, for example, 
statutes that criminalize causing death by use of a vehicle or 
firearm while under the influence of an intoxicant,7 sexually 
assaulting a victim who is under the influence of an intoxicant,8 
causing great bodily harm by operation of a vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant,9 and operating or going armed 
with a firearm while under the influence of an intoxicant.10  
This court has failed in its obligation to provide a clear and 
coherent sense of what the phrase "materially impaired" means. 
¶72 Here is my answer to the problem: I would stick with 
Waalen and hold that the circuit court erroneously instructed 
the jury in response to its question.  The circuit court could 
have answered the jury's question in a manner consistent with 
Waalen's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42).   
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a), (c); (1g)(a), (c).   
8 Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(cm).   
9 Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a), (c).   
10 Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b).   
No.  2006AP2753-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶73 For example, the circuit court could have accepted the 
defendant's suggestion to draw language directly from the Waalen 
opinion, which states that a person is "materially" impaired for 
purposes of § 939.22(42) when he or she "is incapable of driving 
safely, or is without proper control of all those faculties 
necessary to avoid danger to others."11  Or the circuit court 
could 
have 
repeated 
language 
from 
its 
own 
instructions, 
reiterating to the jury that "[w]hat must be established is that 
the person has consumed a sufficient amount of Xanax or 
alprazolam to cause the person to be less able to exercise the 
clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle and control a 
motor vehicle."  Either approach, in my view, would have been 
sufficient.   
¶74 I also conclude, however, that the circuit court's 
error was harmless error under the circumstances of the present 
case.  The Waalen court made clear that the meaning of 
"materially" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) is less 
demanding of the prosecution than the term "substantially" which 
constitutes the ordinary dictionary meaning of "materially."12  
As the State explains in its brief to this court, "[i]f the 
trial court's direction to the jury in this case to give the 
words 'materially impaired' their 'ordinary meaning' opened the 
                                                 
11 Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 27 (quotation marks, ellipsis, and 
citation omitted).   
12 Id. 
("Requiring 
'substantial 
impairment' 
of 
an 
individual's ability to operate a vehicle before that person 
could be found 'under the influence' would be inconsistent with 
the expressed legislative intent because it would not provide 
maximum safety for all users of state highways.").   
No.  2006AP2753-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
door to the possibility that some jurors might impose a higher 
threshold [of guilt] . . . it was the state, not Hubbard, that 
was prejudiced by that possibility.  Hubbard cannot complain 
about an instruction that . . . potentially made it harder for 
the state to convict him."13   
¶75 For the reasons set forth, I concur in the court's 
mandate but write separately. 
¶76 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
                                                 
13 Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 11.   
No.  2006AP2753-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶77 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's concurrence.  However, I am compelled to 
write separately to make it clear that the majority's opinion 
should not be construed as precedent for sanctioning the 
criminal prosecution of an individual who takes prescription 
medication——medicine that is designed to maintain his or her 
health and general welfare——at its prescribed dosage, only to 
then find him or herself arrested for driving under the 
influence.   
¶78 The purpose of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
is to prevent abuse of drugs, not to create new criminal 
penalties for those who properly take prescription medicine as 
prescribed by their physicians in order to be more functional.  
See Wis. Stat. § 961.001: 
Declaration of intent.  The legislature finds 
that the abuse of controlled substances constitutes a 
serious problem for society.  As a partial solution, 
these laws regulating controlled substances have been 
enacted with penalties.  The legislature, recognizing 
a need for differentiation among those who would 
violate 
these 
laws 
makes 
this 
declaration 
of 
legislative intent:  
(1g) Many of the controlled substances included 
in this chapter have useful and legitimate medical and 
scientific purposes and are necessary to maintain the 
health and general welfare of the people of this 
state.   
(Emphasis added.)  As this statutory language acknowledges, many 
of those drugs labeled as "controlled substances" are prescribed 
for the very purpose of helping individuals function better in 
society, and have beneficial medicinal purposes, making it 
No.  2006AP2753-CR.lbb 
 
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safer, not more dangerous, both for those behind the wheel and 
those in their paths. 
¶79 The case at hand involves prescription drug abuse 
involving a medication taken in excess of its prescribed dosage.  
The majority points out the dangers resulting from an overdosage 
of the prescription drug Xanax, such as somnolence, confusion, 
impaired coordination, and diminished reflexes.  Majority op., 
¶6 n. 3.  The majority also correctly observes that the 
defendant in this case took 13 Xanax pills before the automobile 
accident, which exceeded his prescribed dosage for the drug.  
Id. 
¶80 This is not a case involving an individual taking a 
medication at its prescribed dosage.1  It is critical to make 
this distinction clear, lest today's opinion be misread as 
sending a dangerous message to individuals taking prescription 
medications to disregard their doctor's orders and stop taking 
their prescribed medications if they want to retain their right 
to drive and thereby continue participating fully in society.  
¶81 Prescription medications serve a critical role in the 
preservation of health and safety of individuals.  This court 
                                                 
1 I recognize that some prescriptions include warnings 
clearly specifying that a person taking the medication should 
not operate an automobile because of the effects the medication 
would have on the person.  Failing to follow the prescription's 
instructions, in my view, would be improper and potentially 
subject a person to criminal prosecution.  
Other prescriptions include warnings clearly indicating 
that before a person operates an automobile, the person should 
first determine what effects the medication might have.  This 
opinion does not address such situations.  
No.  2006AP2753-CR.lbb 
 
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has long recognized that "[i]t is not only desirable that the 
drugs be dispensed to the public by skillful and competent 
persons to avert peril from occasional mistakes, but it is far 
more desirable, nay, practically essential, that medicines be 
within prompt and easy reach by the public."  State v. Evans, 
130 Wis. 381, 388, 110 N.W. 241 (1907). 
¶82 Our state already recognizes that "the effects of 
prescription medication can form the basis of an involuntary 
intoxication defense."  State v. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32, 40, 
601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1999); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave & 
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 4.10(f), at 560 
(1986).  Under the Model Penal Code, intoxication that is not 
self-induced is an affirmative defense when it renders the actor 
incapable of appreciating the criminality of his or her conduct.  
Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40; see also Model Penal Code § 2.08(4) 
(1962).  An exclusion to the definition of "self-induced" 
intoxication exists when the actor knowingly introduces into his 
or her body substances pursuant to medical advice.  Gardner, 230 
Wis. 2d at 41; see also Model Penal Code § 2.08(5)(b); Phillip 
E. Hassman, When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary so as to 
Constitute a Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 195 § 7 
(1977). 
 
Thus, 
the 
"involuntary 
intoxication 
defense 
is 
available 
when 
the 
intoxication 
was 
due 
to 
prescription 
medication taken as directed."  Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 35. 
¶83 Moreover, the legislature has specifically adopted a 
valid prescription defense in OWI cases for detectable amounts 
of 
methamphetamine, 
gamma—hydroxybutyric 
acid, 
or 
delta—9—
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4 
 
tetrahydrocannabinol in a defendant's blood.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(d).2  It is ludicrous to suggest that the legislature 
would provide a valid prescription defense for these otherwise 
illegal restricted controlled substances, while at the same time 
refusing to recognize a valid prescription defense for properly 
dispensed medicine taken at its proper dosage.  
¶84 An 
improper 
reading 
of 
today's 
opinion 
would 
contravene 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature 
in 
addressing 
"controlled substances" within the Wisconsin Statutes.  The 
statutes addressed by the majority creating criminal penalties 
for the inappropriate use and abuse of controlled substances 
must be read in conjunction with the provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.001 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act quoted above, 
with our state's recognition of an involuntary intoxication 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63 provides in relevant part: 
(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: 
 . . . . 
(am) The person has a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood. 
 . . . . 
(d) In an action under par. (am) that is based on the 
defendant 
allegedly 
having 
a 
detectable 
amount 
of 
methamphetamine, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has 
a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he 
or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one 
of its metabolic precursors, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or 
delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol. 
(Emphasis added). 
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defense, and with our state's recognition of an OWI prescription 
defense in cases involving a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in a defendant's blood.  
¶85 The Uniform Controlled Substances Act reveals the 
legislature's intent to criminalize only that behavior linked to 
the abuse of controlled substances, and not to criminalize that 
behavior involving the proper use of prescription medicine.  We 
must not lose sight of this essential distinction.  If 
prescription medication is of the type that may assist a person 
in functioning more healthily, it is important to make sure that 
our evaluations of OWI cases do not impede the progress to be 
gained through the medication's use.  Because it is clear that 
the legislature intended to penalize those who abuse drugs, 
while not extending criminal penalties to those who take at its 
proper dosage medicine that is properly prescribed under the 
direction of a doctor or pharmacist, that legislative purpose 
should not be undermined.  
 
¶86 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
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