Title: State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-542.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-542 
THE STATE EX REL. AKRON PAINT & VARNISH, INC., APPELLEE, v. GULLOTTA 
ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-542.] 
Workers’ compensation—R.C. 4123.52—Continuing jurisdiction—Commission 
erred in exercising continuing jurisdiction to renew payment of temporary 
total disability benefits—Allowance of additional condition does not 
constitute new or changed circumstances sufficient to justify exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction when claimant’s loss of earnings was caused by 
refusal of suitable light-duty work rather than by industrial injury. 
(No. 2010-0636—Submitted November 15, 2011—Decided February 15, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 09AP-492, 2010-Ohio-1321. 
__________________ 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellants, Guiseppe Gullotta and the Industrial Commission of 
Ohio (“commission”), have filed an appeal of right from a judgment of the 
Franklin County Court of Appeals ordering the commission to vacate its order of 
July 16, 2008, awarding Gullotta compensation for temporary total disability 
(“TTD”).  The court of appeals determined that the commission had abused its 
discretion when it awarded TTD compensation based on new and changed 
circumstances from the commission’s previous order of November 29, 2007, that 
denied TTD benefits. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons set forth, we hold that Gullotta did not present 
evidence to justify the commission’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction under 
R.C. 4123.52 and that Gullotta was ineligible to receive TTD compensation for 
the period requested because his injury was not the reason that he could not return 
to his former position of employment.  Consequently, the court of appeals 
correctly concluded that the commission had abused its discretion when it 
awarded TTD to Gullotta. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} In January 2007, Gullotta injured his back while working for 
appellee, Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. (“APV”).  His industrial claim was allowed 
for lumbar sprain, and he received TTD compensation for several weeks before 
returning to light-duty work consistent with his doctor’s medical restrictions. 
{¶ 4} On March 14, 2007, Gullotta’s then treating physician, Dr. Stephen 
A. Lohr, found that Gullotta’s physical capabilities had improved and reduced his 
work restrictions.  Based on the new, lesser restrictions, APV began to increase 
Gullotta’s job duties.  Gullotta saw Dr. Lohr again on April 11, 2007, but his 
work restrictions remained the same. 
{¶ 5} Gullotta complained to his employer about his job duties, and on 
April 16, 2007, he met with Michael Summers, a vice president at APV.  
January Term, 2012 
 
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Summers offered him another position also within his physical limitations.  
Gullotta told Summers that he did not want that job either, and he immediately 
resigned and left the premises. 
{¶ 6} Four months later, Gullotta submitted another request to the 
commission for TTD compensation for the period April 24 through November 4, 
2007.  A district hearing officer denied the request, concluding that Gullotta had 
voluntarily abandoned his employment and thereby removed himself from the 
workforce.  On November 29, 2007, the staff hearing officer vacated that order 
and entered a new order, still denying benefits, but for a different reason.  The 
staff hearing officer determined that the period of disability for which Gullotta 
was requesting compensation was not causally related to his industrial injury, but 
rather was due to his refusal to return to his light-duty job or to accept the suitable 
alternative employment that had been offered by APV.  The staff hearing officer 
expressly noted that Gullotta was medically unable to return to his former position 
of employment at the time he quit, so his resignation could not be termed a 
voluntary abandonment.  Gullotta did not appeal, and the November 29, 2007 
order became final. 
{¶ 7} In March 2008, Gullotta’s claim was additionally allowed for 
aggravation of preexisting hypertrophy.  As a result, Gullotta filed a new motion 
for TTD benefits along with a report from his treating physician, Dr. Brent A. 
Ungar.  A district hearing officer denied the request on the basis that Gullotta had 
refused a light-duty job offer and that he had failed to present evidence that his 
additionally allowed medical condition resulted in any different work restrictions. 
{¶ 8} On July 16, 2008, a staff hearing officer reversed.  The staff 
hearing officer determined that Gullotta’s newly allowed medical condition was 
evidence of new and changed circumstances.  The hearing officer determined that 
Gullotta’s medical condition had worsened and that this change warranted 
payment of TTD compensation for the period November 5, 2007, through May 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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16, 2008.  The staff hearing officer emphasized that the commission’s previous 
order of November 29, 2007 had determined that Gullotta’s resignation in April 
2007 was not a voluntary abandonment of employment that would preclude future 
TTD benefits, since he was unable to return to his former position at the time. 
{¶ 9} APV filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, 
alleging that the commission had abused its discretion.  The matter was referred to 
a magistrate, who agreed that the commission had abused its discretion when it 
relied on the additionally allowed medical condition as a new and changed 
circumstance since the previous order of November 29, 2007.  Instead, the 
magistrate concluded that Gullotta had not submitted evidence that would  justify 
renewed TTD in light of his previous refusal of the work made available by APV 
within his physical capabilities.  The magistrate further concluded that even if 
there were medical evidence that Gullotta’s condition had worsened since his 
resignation, he “has lost no wages during the period of claimed disability for 
which he can be compensated.” 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings.  The 
appellate court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate the 
July 16, 2008 order and to enter an order denying TTD compensation. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 11} “For mandamus to issue, it must be demonstrated that: (1) the 
relator has a clear legal right to the relief requested; (2) respondents are under a 
clear legal duty to perform the acts requested; and (3) relator has no plain and 
adequate remedy at law.”  State ex rel. Stafford v. Indus. Comm., 47 Ohio St.3d 
76, 77-78, 547 N.E.2d 1171 (1989).  The relator has the burden to show that the 
commission abused its discretion by entering an order that is not supported by any 
evidence in the record.  State ex rel. Bradley v. Indus. Comm., 77 Ohio St.3d 239, 
242, 673 N.E.2d 1255 (1997); State ex rel. Hutton v. Indus. Comm., 29 Ohio St.2d 
9, 278 N.E.2d 34 (1972). 
January Term, 2012 
 
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Legal Analysis 
{¶ 12} “A temporary total disability is one that prevents a return to the 
former position of employment.”  State ex rel. Johnson v. Rawac Plating Co., 61 
Ohio St.3d 599, 600, 575 N.E.2d 837 (1991).  Compensation for TTD terminates 
when the employee returns to work, is medically capable of returning to work, or 
has reached maximum medical improvement.  R.C. 4123.56(A).  Compensation 
for TTD is also barred when “work within the physical capabilities of the 
employee is made available by the employer or another employer.”  Id. 
{¶ 13} If an employee’s TTD compensation is terminated, the employee 
may seek renewed compensation if the employee again becomes temporarily total 
disabled.  Id.  In such a case, the commission may exercise continuing jurisdiction 
and may modify or change its former findings or orders when justified.  R.C. 
4123.52(A).  That is, the commission may reopen the issue of eligibility for TTD 
compensation if there are new and changed circumstances.1  
{¶ 14} At issue here is the commission’s July 16, 2008 order, in which a 
staff hearing officer granted Gullotta TTD compensation for a period of time after 
he left APV.  We review the appellate court’s decision that the commission 
improperly exercised continuing jurisdiction in light of its prior order on 
November 29, 2007. 
{¶ 15} In the July 16, 2008 order, the staff hearing officer expressly relied 
on Gullotta’s additionally allowed medical condition as evidence of new and 
changed circumstances justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction.  The 
hearing officer stated that this change was a worsening of Gullotta’s medical 
condition that warranted the payment of TTD compensation.  Regarding the 
commission’s prior order of November 29, 2007, the staff hearing officer stated 
                                      
1 The other prerequisites for exercising continuing jurisdiction are fraud, clear mistake of fact, 
clear mistake of law, and error by an inferior tribunal.  State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm., 81 
Ohio St.3d 454, 459, 692 N.E.2d 188 (1998).   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that Gullotta had quit a light-duty job that had been within his medical 
restrictions, but that this resignation did not amount to a voluntary abandonment, 
because he had been unable to return to his former position at the time he 
resigned. 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals agreed with the magistrate’s conclusion that 
Gullotta had not presented evidence of new and changed circumstances from the 
November 29, 2007 order denying TTD compensation.  The magistrate further 
concluded that even if the medical evidence submitted showed new and changed 
circumstances for the purpose of continuing jurisdiction, it “cannot alter the 
previously determined fact that claimant has no job to return to” as a result of 
Gullotta’s unjustified refusal to accept the other light-duty work offered. 
{¶ 17} We agree.  Although the worsening of an existing medical 
condition or a newly allowed medical condition often serves as new and changed 
circumstances justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction to modify a 
previous order, see State ex rel. Bing v. Indus. Comm., 61 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 
575 N.E.2d 177 (1991); State ex rel. Josephson v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 
195, 2004-Ohio-737, 803 N.E.2d 799, in this case, the previous order denying 
TTD was not based on medical evidence but rather on the statutory bar of 
compensation when a claimant unjustifiably refuses light-duty work made 
available by the employer. 
{¶ 18} Here, Gullotta presented no evidence that his employment situation 
had changed.  With no loss of wages, an award of TTD compensation is not 
warranted. State ex rel. Glenn v. Indus. Comm., 122 Ohio St.3d 483, 2009-Ohio-
3627, 912 N.E.2d 592, ¶ 7 (the purpose of TTD benefits is to compensate for loss 
of earnings).  Thus, the commission abused its discretion when it exercised 
continuing jurisdiction and ordered TTD compensation. 
{¶ 19} Gullotta admits that his prior request for TTD benefits was barred 
by his refusal to accept a suitable job.  Nevertheless, he argues that the 
January Term, 2012 
 
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additionally allowed medical condition presented new physical restrictions and 
that APV did not offer alternative employment consistent with his new physical 
restrictions.  He contends that APV must make a new good-faith offer of 
employment taking into account his new work restrictions caused by the new 
condition—one that was recognized after he no longer worked at APV. 
{¶ 20} When Gullotta resigned from APV, his employer had placed him 
in a light-duty position consistent with his medical restrictions.  When he 
complained about those duties, APV made available another light-duty position 
similarly consistent with his medical restrictions as they then existed.  Gullotta 
refused both positions.  The additionally allowed medical condition, recognized 
since his resignation, does not change the fact that Gullotta unjustifiably refused 
light-duty work in April 2007. 
{¶ 21} Thus, we agree with the court of appeals that the commission 
abused its discretion when it determined that there was evidence to support a 
finding of new and changed circumstances since the November 2007 order.  
Nothing had changed that would affect the finding in that order that Gullotta had 
unjustifiably refused to do his light-duty job and also refused his employer’s offer 
of an alternative light-duty position.  He presented no evidence of circumstances, 
new or changed, that would demonstrate a loss of wages as a result of TTD.  The 
commission abused its discretion when it exercised continuing jurisdiction.  Thus, 
we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Richard L. Williger Co., L.P.A., and Richard L. Williger, for appellee. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Ross R. Fulton, and Philip J. Fulton, for 
appellant Giuseppe Gullotta. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman and Elise 
Porter, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
______________________