Title: Engberg v. Meyer

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Engberg v. Meyer1991 WY 128820 P.2d 70Case Number: 87-15Decided: 10/17/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROY LEE 
ENGBERG, APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOSEPH B. 
MEYER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, AND DUANE SHILLINGER, WARDEN OF THE WYOMING STATE 
PENITENTIARY, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, and Martin J. 
McClain, Deputy State Public Defender, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., and John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellees.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J.,* Ret., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
writing for the Court on the issues affecting guilt or innocence, and CARDINE, Justice, writing for the Court 
on the issues affecting the imposition of the capital 
sentence.

 
 

MACY, 
J., filed an 
opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
J., filed an 
opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part.

 
 

THOMAS, 
J., filed an 
opinion dissenting with respect to the reversal of the capital sentence, in 
which BROWN, C.J., Ret., 
joined.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this appeal from the 
denial of post-conviction relief in a capital murder case, the issues divide, as 
does the pertinent statute, between those matters that affect the determination 
of guilt or innocence and those that impact the imposition of the capital 
sentence. Because of a division of the court with respect to the disposition of 
this case, with three justices agreeing that Roy Lee Engberg (Engberg) was 
lawfully convicted of first degree murder but one of those justices agreeing 
with the other two that the capital sentence should be set aside, the majority 
opinion of the court with respect to those issues affecting guilt or innocence 
has been assigned to Justice Thomas and the majority opinion of the court with 
respect to the issues affecting the imposition of the capital sentence has been 
assigned to Justice Cardine.

 
 
THOMAS, 
Justice (on the question of guilt or innocence of first degree 
murder).

 
 

[¶2.]     The first function of 
the court in this appeal is to apply our rule of procedural waiver. Next, 
questions that could not be presented on direct appeal or for which cause exists 
to avoid procedural waiver must be examined for error of constitutional 
magnitude. With respect to the conviction of the crime of first degree murder, 
these questions include: failure of the prosecution to advise Engberg of a 
hypnotic session with a key witness; a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal (this issue requires that we afford incidental 
attention to two other contentions); a claim of cumulative error that was 
prejudicial to Engberg's right to a fair trial; a charge of conflict of interest 
because a member of the attorney general's legal staff had served as counsel for 
Engberg on his direct appeal; and a claim that this court has structured an 
unfair and constitutionally infirm process for seeking post-conviction relief. 
All but five of the claims asserted by Engberg as fatally affecting his 
conviction fall under the rule of procedural waiver. With respect to the others, 
we conclude that none serve as a ground for setting aside the conviction of 
first degree murder. We affirm the dismissal by the trial court of Engberg's 
petition for post-conviction relief insofar only as that dismissal relates to 
the propriety of his conviction.

 
 

[¶3.]     Engberg was convicted, 
after a trial by jury, of the crimes of felony murder in violation of § 
6-4-101(a), W.S. 1977, and armed robbery in violation of § 6-4-402, W.S. 1977. 
Following these findings of guilty, the jury received evidence with respect to 
whether capital punishment should be imposed and, in accordance with § 6-2-102, 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), found five statutory aggravating circumstances and 
no statutory mitigating circumstances, but did determine, as a non-statutory 
mitigating circumstance, the fact that the crimes may have been induced by 
economic and family conditions. The jury then recommended capital punishment, 
which was imposed by the court pursuant to § 6-2-102(f), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Repl.). A sentence of twenty-five to thirty years was imposed for the aggravated 
robbery. Engberg appealed the judgment and sentence for these crimes, and this 
court affirmed. A more detailed statement of the facts underlying Engberg's 
conviction can be found in Engberg v. 
State, 686 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984).

 
 

[¶4.]     After this court 
affirmed his convictions and denied his petition for rehearing, counsel was 
appointed for Engberg to assist him in presenting a petition for post-conviction 
relief. Engberg asserted twenty issues to the district court in support of his 
petition for rehearing. The State of Wyoming moved to dismiss the petition pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P. Following oral argument, the trial court entered a 
memorandum of findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining its decision to 
grant the State's motion. An order was entered in the district court dismissing 
Engberg's petition for post-conviction relief. This appeal is taken from that 
order.

 
 

[¶5.]     For the sake of 
completeness, all of the issues asserted by Engberg are set forth in Appendix I to this opinion. Our examination of those 
issues convinces the court that all but six of them could, or should, have been 
raised on direct appeal, and no good cause is shown in this appeal for the 
failure to include them in the direct appeal. We have 
said:

 
 
"* * * This 
court has taken a disciplined approach to post-conviction relief, pointing out 
that it is not a substitute for the right of review upon appeal from a 
conviction nor is it to be treated as an appeal. Questions which may be raised 
by a motion for post-conviction relief are limited to those of constitutional 
magnitude which manifest a miscarriage of justice. Those issues which could have 
been presented on appeal are not open to challenge by a motion for 
post-conviction relief because they are foreclosed by the doctrine of res 
judicata." Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wyo. 1988) (citations omitted).

 
 
This is a 
rule of procedural waiver very like that applied in the federal 
courts.

 
 
"* * * [A] 
convicted person is foreclosed from raising in a post-conviction proceeding any 
claim of error which he could or should have presented on appeal unless he 
demonstrates good cause for not presenting the issue on appeal and actual 
prejudice arising from the failure to present it. This adoption of a rule 
parallel to the rule applied in the federal courts will facilitate in a material 
way the task of the federal courts in examining issues raised in federal 
post-conviction proceedings in which review is sought of a conviction in the 
State of Wyoming." Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 
1262.

 
 
This rule 
of procedural waiver is applicable to, and forecloses from direct consideration, 
the first issue and the third through the fifteenth issues set forth in the 
appendix.

 
 

[¶6.]     The remaining issues as 
articulated by Engberg are:

 
 
"2. Whether 
the State's failure to disclose its use of hypnosis as means of enhancing Kay 
Otto's memory violated its ethical obligations and denied appellant his right to 
due process of law, his right of confrontation, and his right to effective 
assistance of counsel.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"16. 
Whether appellant's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to 
due process was violated by the jury's finding as aggravating circumstances that 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and while the defendant was engaged 
in the commission of a robbery when the robbery had already been used to elevate 
the crime to capital murder.

 
 
"17. 
Whether the cumulative nature of the error is such that, regardless of the 
harmlessness of any one error, together they prejudiced appellant's rights to 
due process, fundamental fairness, and a reliable determination that the death 
penalty should be imposed.

 
 
"18. 
Whether appellant was afforded effective assistance of counsel during his appeal 
to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

 
 
"19. 
Whether it was improper for the office of the Attorney General to represent the 
State in post-conviction proceedings to urge that an Assistant Attorney 
General's proper representation was a procedural bar to the issues raised in 
appellant's petition for post-conviction relief.

 
 
"20. 
Whether this Court's discussion and holding in prior cases with regard to 
petitions for post-conviction relief ignore the plain and obvious statutory 
language and establish a procedure which is violative of fundamental fairness 
due process and equal procedure and whether it has established a confusing and 
unworkable process wherein courts simply dismiss petitions for post-conviction 
relief to get rid of them."

 
 

[¶7.]     The State of Wyoming styles these 
issues as arguments and, responding first to "Issue 20," states them as 
follows:

 
 
"I. Was 
there error in the procedures followed in the lower court on Engberg's petition 
for post-conviction relief?

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"VIII. Was 
Engberg deprived of a fair trial, due process or confrontation by the failure of 
the State to disclose Kay Otto's contact with a hypnotist?

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"XIII. Was 
the jury properly instructed as to statutory aggravating circumstances; was 
Engberg denied due process or subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment?

 
 
"XIV. Did 
Engberg receive effective assistance of counsel on appeal?

 
 
"XV. Does 
the cumulative nature of any errors in this case warrant 
relief?

 
 
"XVI. Is 
the Attorney General's entire staff disqualified from post-conviction 
proceedings because one of Engberg's four attorneys on direct appeal has since 
become an Assistant Attorney General?"

 
 

 [¶8.]    Engberg urges with respect to 
these issues that error was committed during or after his direct appeal or that 
he has demonstrated good cause for not presenting the issues at that time. We 
agree that Issues 18, 19 and 20 quoted above could not have been raised on 
direct appeal. We conclude that good cause has been demonstrated to avoid the 
rule of procedural waiver with respect to Issues 2 and 16. As to the former, the 
prosecutor did not disclose the hypnotic session to Engberg, and it was not 
discovered until after his direct appeal. With respect to Issue 16, it is 
premised upon recent federal decisions which would require a conclusion that 
Engberg's sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the 
United States of 
America, if we should accept the principles 
found in those cases. The change in the law demonstrates sufficient cause to 
avoid our rule of procedural waiver. Finally, the claim of cumulative error will 
be considered, but only with respect to those issues properly before the court 
in this appeal.

 
 

[¶9.]     We first address 
Engberg's claims relating to the hypnosis of a key witness, Kay Otto, the 
victim's sister, who was with the victim when he was shot and killed by Engberg. 
We are satisfied that good cause has been demonstrated for not presenting this 
issue on appeal, and error must be found for violation of the standards set 
forth in our precedents. Even though some of our state standards were 
articulated subsequent to Engberg's conviction, he would have been entitled to 
invoke them because his case had not been decided finally at the time those 
rules were promulgated. We conclude, however, that this error does not require 
that post-conviction relief be granted because Engberg has not demonstrated 
substantial prejudice.

 
 

[¶10.]  The record now discloses that a hypnotic 
session was conducted in an effort to enhance Kay Otto's recollection of the 
events at the time her brother was killed. This information was not disclosed to 
Engberg or his counsel prior to the return of the jury's verdict and, in fact, 
was not discovered until the preparation of Engberg's petition for 
post-conviction relief. When the question was raised, the district court 
permitted interrogatories to be filed and, in response, the State admitted the 
hypnotic session. By the affidavits of Kay Otto and the police officer who 
conducted the hypnotic session, the State suggests that the hypnosis was 
unsuccessful. Engberg contends that an evidentiary hearing must be conducted in 
order to resolve that question. We are satisfied that no hearing is required 
because, under our case law, any attempt to hypnotize a witness must be 
disclosed.

 
 

[¶11.]  The State relies upon language from Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 284 
(Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1987), in which the court 
stated:

 
 
"* * * 
[T]he State must advise the defendant of the fact that a witness has been 
previously hypnotized and make available to the defendant on request all 
statements and proceedings relating to the hypnosis."

 
 

See also 
Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983); Chapman v. State, 
638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). The State insists that this language reaches only 
situations in which the witness actually was hypnotized. In Chapman, however, we articulated the 
proposition that the fact or degree of hypnosis is difficult to evaluate. We are 
satisfied that a defendant need not depend upon the conclusion of the State with 
respect to that fact. We never have suggested that the requirement of disclosure 
is dependent upon the success of the effort at hypnosis. See Haselhuhn; Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 
1985); Chapman.

 
 

[¶12.]  We also are satisfied that Engberg was 
entitled to claim the benefit of this disclosure requirement. He was convicted 
on December 20, 1982. Our decision in Gee was announced on April 28, 1983. 
While we suggested in that decision that the rule articulated was implicit in Chapman, which did antedate Engberg's 
conviction, we do not rely upon the proposition that the State was on notice by 
virtue of Chapman. Engberg was 
entitled to the benefit of the rule announced in Gee because it must be applied 
retroactively. 

 
 

[¶13.]  In Ostwald v. State, 538 P.2d 1298 (Wyo. 
1975), we adopted the principles set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967), in order to determine whether a defendant should 
receive the benefit of retroactive application of a decision by this court.1 We applied those principles, as they 
should be applied in this case, when we said in Flores v. State, 572 P.2d 746, 747 (Wyo. 
1977):

 
 
"Where the 
purpose served by the ruling would be to `substantially improve the accuracy of 
the fact finding process at trial' a retroactive application of such decision is 
mandated, United States v. United States 
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 91 S. Ct. 1041, 1046, 28 L. Ed. 2d 434 
(1971) * * *."

 
 
Essentially, 
this is the rule advanced in Solem v. 
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 79 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1984); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 
102 S. Ct. 2579, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1982); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 97 S. Ct. 2339, 53 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1977); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 
91 S. Ct. 1148, 28 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1971). In such an instance, neither good faith 
reliance on the old law nor the impact on the administration of justice are 
sufficient to require only prospective application. Williams. The product of our decisions 
concerning hypnosis is that the rule does enhance the fact finding process 
because of its utility in testing the credibility of the 
witness.

 
 

[¶14.]  Furthermore, retroactive application is 
not foreclosed on grounds that Engberg's case was "finally decided." E.g., Flores, 572 P.2d 746; Ostwald, 538 P.2d 1298. Our rule with 
respect to "finally decided" cases relates to the availability of appeal after 
the judgment of conviction has been rendered. When appeal has been exhausted, we 
hold the case to have been "finally decided." Flores; Ostwald. See also Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844 
(Wyo. 1978), confirmed on reh'g sub nom. Summers v. 
State, 731 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1989) (rule 
enunciated in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), applied retroactively to cases on direct appeal). Because Engberg's 
appeal had not been decided at the time we decided Gee, 662 P.2d 103, Engberg should 
receive the benefit of the rule announced in Gee.

 
 

[¶15.]  Even in light of these principles, our 
examination of the record persuades us beyond a reasonable doubt that this error 
was not prejudicial. There is no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict 
would have been different had the use of hypnosis with respect to Kay Otto been 
disclosed. This is not an instance in which she was the only witness who 
identified Engberg; several other witnesses testified that he was the murderer. 
In addition, the record contains an abundance of circumstantial evidence linking 
Engberg to the robbery and the murder. On the day of the murder, he inexplicably 
departed from Casper where the murder occurred; he had acquired money on that 
day, but the source of those funds is unexplained; he paid his overdue rent and 
rent for a week in advance even though he abandoned the rented premises that 
same day; he used aliases to conceal his identity; he was deceptive with respect 
to the purpose for which he purchased a used car in Rawlins after the car driven 
from Casper failed; material evidence was found along the road between Rawlins 
and Salt Lake City, Utah; at various times, Engberg, or his wife, had pawned a 
.38 caliber revolver; a round of ammunition which would fit that revolver was 
discovered in the pocket of a vest in the abandoned mobile home; additional 
rounds were located in Engberg's motel room when he was arrested; and, in the 
automobile purchased in Rawlins, an orange-toned, multicolored ski cap and a 
brown lightweight jacket similar to those worn by the killer were found. See Engberg, 686 P.2d 541. Under these 
circumstances, the loss of the opportunity to impeach Kay Otto with respect to 
the use of hypnosis could not lead to any different 
result.

 
 

[¶16.]  We also address Engberg's argument that 
the failure to disclose the use of hypnosis constituted a violation of his right 
to due process as announced in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Brady requires the state to disclose 
"evidence that is both favorable to the accused and `material either to guilt or 
punishment.'" United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3379, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); Brady. Impeachment evidence, like 
exculpatory evidence, is within the Brady rule and must be disclosed if 
material. Bagley; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). We have stated previously that evidence of 
hypnosis is valuable for impeachment purposes:

 
 
"* * * 
[T]he credibility of a witness could be seriously impaired by hypnosis under 
certain circumstances inasmuch as:

 
 
"`The issue 
relative to the admissibility of testimony of witnesses who were previously 
hypnotized is whether the product of the hypnosis was to refresh or develop the 
witness' own recollection or to teach the witness and add additional facts to 
the recollection beyond that which has been mentally stored in the memory, 
consciously or unconsciously. The issue is properly one for the fact finder - as 
are all issues relative to the credibility of the witness.' [Chapman v. State,] 638 P.2d  at 
1282.

 
 
"And we 
carefully inquired in Chapman v. 
State, supra, as to whether or 
not the defendant had adequate opportunity to determine and present to the jury 
the evidence relative to aspects of hypnotism and its use on the particular 
witness." Gee, 662 P.2d  at 
104.

 
 

See 
Chapman, 638 P.2d 1280; Napue v. People of the State of 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959); People v. Pugh, 156 Cal. App. 3d 544, 203 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1984). The failure to disclose the use of hypnosis deprived 
Engberg of the opportunity to effectively cross-examine an important eye 
witness; the jury was not privy to the use of hypnosis in weighing the 
credibility of Kay Otto.

 
 

[¶17.]  The federal standard is that the failure 
of the prosecution to disclose evidence found to be material requires reversal 
of a conviction. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 
94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987). In a shift from the approach suggested in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), the Supreme Court held in Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 
that no specific request is required for disclosure of impeachment evidence. The 
test with respect to materiality, however, now reads:

 
 
"* * * The 
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 33.

 
 
The federal 
courts of appeal have considered the rule in Bagley to be retroactive. Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597 (10th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 929, 108 S. Ct. 296, 98 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1987); United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408 
(1st Cir. 1986); Brogdon v. 
Blackburn, 790 F.2d 1164, reh'g 
denied 793 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S. Ct. 1985, 95 L. Ed. 2d 824, reh'g denied 
483 U.S. 1012, 107 S. Ct. 3245, 97 L. Ed. 2d 749, cert. denied sub nom. Brogdon v. Butler, 483 U.S. 1040, 108 S. Ct. 13, 97 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1987); United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224 
(3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1046, 106 S. Ct. 1263, 89 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1986); State v. Hall, 329 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 
1985). Trial counsel for Engberg did request all statements of proposed 
witnesses and submitted a general request for all exculpatory evidence. These 
requests were granted by the trial court. We need not determine whether the 
request should have been understood to cover use of hypnosis to enhance the 
testimony of the witness. If the evidence of hypnosis was material under the 
federal definition, disclosure was required. Brady; Bagley.

 
 

[¶18.]  The reasoning which explains that there 
was no prejudicial error under our state rule also applies to the claim under Brady and Bagley. This conclusion is consistent 
with several federal cases which have found that the product of overwhelming 
evidence is that any evidence relating to hypnosis is not material and that no 
error occurred under federal standards. Trujillo; Ingraldi; Pflaumer; United States v. 
Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986). Compare Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 458, 93 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1986) (identification evidence against 
defendant significantly impeachable by withheld evidence and case otherwise 
weak); Hall, 329 S.E.2d 860 (most 
important issue was identification testimony of a witness which was subject to 
impeachment by withheld evidence). This analysis under the federal standard 
resulting in a conclusion that non-disclosed evidence of hypnosis was not 
material further persuades us that the failure to disclose the hypnotic session, 
in accordance with Gee, 662 P.2d 103, 
was harmless.2

 
 

[¶19.]  Engberg's claim that he was denied 
effective assistance of appellate counsel, as advanced in his 18th stated issue, 
is not subject to the rule of waiver because it could not be raised in his 
appeal. His argument that ineffective assistance may be found because of the 
failure of counsel to raise every issue argued in his motion for post-conviction 
relief is not persuasive. The failure to raise an issue on appeal, even if 
meritorious, does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Cutbirth, 751 P.2d 1257. We noted in 
Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 1263, that, as 
a matter of tactical choice, counsel presenting an appeal may choose not to 
raise certain issues to avoid lessening "the impact of specific issues which 
counsel feels offer a reasonable chance of success," citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983). See Kennedy 
v. Shillinger, 759 F. Supp. 1554 (D.Wyo. 1991). We have followed the 
majority of the federal courts in adopting the standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g 
denied 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), for the purpose 
of determining effective assistance of appellate counsel. Appellant must 
persuade us that the representation afforded to him was deficient by 
demonstrating errors so serious that appellate counsel could not be considered 
to be functioning in accordance with the constitutional guarantee and that, 
furthermore, the deficient performance was prejudicial to the 
appellant.

 
 

[¶20.]  Because of the inherent difficulty in 
applying that standard, developed for evaluating the effectiveness of trial 
counsel, to appellate proceedings, we adopted a process in Cutbirth pursuant to which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is resolved by the application of 
objective criteria. We held that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is 
demonstrated by showing: first, the particular facts, as found in the trial 
record without resort to speculation or equivocal interference, upon which the 
claim of inadequate representation by appellate counsel rests; and, second, that 
those record facts serve to invoke a clear and unequivocal rule of law which was 
transgressed in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. In addition, the 
appellant must show that he was prejudiced because the failure to present the 
issue on direct appeal resulted in an adverse effect upon some substantial right 
possessed by him; that is, had this court been presented the issue on direct 
appeal, it would have reversed the conviction.

 
 

[¶21.]  We have weighed Engberg's claims against 
this standard, and we conclude that most of his arguments do not even suggest a 
clear and obvious transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule. It is 
appropriate to consider specifically two of those claims because, arguably, they 
meet the standard. We shall consider Engberg's contention that he should have 
been permitted to present expert testimony relating to the identification by an 
eye witness. We also will consider his claims relating to the exclusion of the 
testimony of his wife, Donna Engberg.

 
 

[¶22.]  Engberg claims that the trial court erred 
in refusing to allow the testimony of an expert witness, Dr. Loftus, with 
respect to factors which she, and others, have identified, through experimental 
research, as influencing the reliability of eye witness identification. Engberg 
presented a memorandum to the trial court in which he advanced the following 
reasons for admissibility of the testimony:

 
 
"1. It will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine the facts in 
issue.

 
 
"2. The 
unreliability of eyewitness identification poses one of the most serious 
problems in the administration of criminal justice.

 
 
"3. The 
psychological facts and their effect on the witness' credibility are clearly 
beyond the common knowledge of most juries.

 
 
"4. The 
psychological expert does not invade the province of the jury because it need 
not involve any opinion on the credibility of a particular witness' testimony, 
but merely reviews the relevant psychological findings and enumerates the 
various factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness 
identification."

 
 
The State 
of Wyoming 
opposed admission of the testimony by a memorandum which advanced these 
arguments:

 
 
"1. Such 
testimony is not proper subject matter for expert testimony under Wyoming law as it relates 
to opinion evidence in the area of common knowledge.

 
 
"2. Such 
testimony at best could be classified as speculation, generalization and 
theory.

 
 
"3. 
Cross-examination and argument are the proper means of dealing with eye-witness 
identification testimony.

 
 
"4. The 
testimony would be an invasion of the jury's function to be the sole judge of 
the weight and credibility of evidence.

 
 
"5. Any 
probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by prejudice to the 
State.

 
 
"6. Any 
probative value of the testimony is also substantially outweighed by its 
tendency to mislead, distract and confuse the real issues of the 
case."

 
 
The 
district court ruled that the testimony would not be received because it invaded 
the province of the jury. In addressing this claim in the post-conviction 
proceeding, the trial court determined that exclusion of the testimony was 
within its discretion and, further, that any error was 
harmless.

 
 

[¶23.]  A traditional rule had been developed, 
prior to Engberg's trial, that courts generally would not admit expert testimony 
as to the reliability of eye witness identification because that testimony 
either would not be helpful or would invade the province of the jury.3 More recent research seems to demonstrate 
that the process is more complex than earlier assumed, and some of the research 
findings are contrary to intuitive perceptions. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 
(Cal. 1984), 
and articles cited therein. Furthermore, the liberal policy reflected in Rule 
702, F.R.E., which is identical to Rule 702, W.R.E., and the elimination of the 
ultimate issue rule has caused some courts to review the viability of previously 
accepted holdings with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony relating 
to eye witness identification. United 
States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied 791 F.2d 928 (1986); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 
(3rd Cir. 1985). There does appear to be a modern trend more favorable to the 
admission of expert testimony relating to eye witness identification. The rule 
still is, however, that such testimony is subject to the discretion of the trial 
court in any given instance. United 
States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462; opinion amended, reh'g. denied 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986); Moore; United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 868, 105 S. Ct. 213, 83 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1984); Downing; Chapple; McDonald; People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96 
(Colo. App. 1986); Bloodsworth v. 
Maryland, 307 Md. 164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986), cert. denied 548 A.2d 128 (1988); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio.St.3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 240, 93 L. Ed. 2d 165, reh'g denied 479 U.S. 1000, 107 S. Ct. 609, 93 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1986); State v. 
Moon, 45 Wn. App. 692, 726 P.2d 1263 (1986), appeal after remand 48 Wn. App. 647, 739 P.2d 1157 (1987). When we couple that specific concept with our consistent rule 
in Wyoming that the admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of 
the trial court, Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909 (Wyo. 1991); Triplett v. 
State, 802 P.2d 162 (Wyo. 1990); Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092 (Wyo. 
1987); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 
(Wyo. 1984); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981); we must conclude that there was no transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law. Also, if the effectiveness of appellate 
counsel is evaluated in the light of the prevailing law at the time of the 
appeal, which is appropriate, the case law clearly favored exclusion of the 
testimony. Although this claim would not have been specious if raised on appeal, 
the failure to raise it did not constitute ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.

 
 

[¶24.]  We also shall consider Engberg's sixth 
claim of error, set forth in the appendix, under the claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. In arguing that the trial court erred in 
permitting his wife to invoke the privilege of spousal immunity despite his 
waiver, Engberg contends that the privilege is that of the party spouse. He also 
asserts error in the exclusion of hearsay testimony of Janet Garner, who would 
have testified as to earlier statements by the wife, Donna Engberg. Engberg's 
position is that Donna's refusal to testify made her an unavailable witness and 
this circumstance justified admission of the hearsay pursuant to Rule 804, 
W.R.E. At trial, and in its resolution of Engberg's motion for post-conviction 
relief, the district court found that the spousal privilege was vested in the 
witness spouse. It also ruled that the proffered hearsay testimony of Janet 
Garner could not be received.

 
 

[¶25.]  Early in the case, Engberg Invoked his right to prevent his 
wife from testifying against him under the privilege of spousal immunity. When 
it later became apparent that certain damaging hearsay testimony concerning what 
Donna Engberg had stated to a police officer could be received, Engberg then 
waived his right to prevent his wife from testifying. It appears that this 
tactical decision was premised on the proposition that Engberg would benefit if 
Donna testified favorably to him and, if she did not, that is, if her testimony 
was consistent with what she earlier told the police officer, Engberg would be 
able to impeach her by relying upon the statements that she had made to Janet 
Garner.

 
 

[¶26.]  Subsequent to Engberg's advice to the 
court of his decision to waive the privilege, given in chambers, Donna Engberg 
was called to the stand by the State.4 We quote the ensuing dialogue from the 
record: 

 
 
"MR. GUETZ: 
Mrs. Engberg, you are the wife of the defendant, Roy Engberg, are you 
not?

 
 
"MRS. 
ENGBERG: Yes.

 
 
"MR. GUETZ: 
Is it your wish to testify in this case?

 
 
"MRS. 
ENGBERG: No.

 
 
"MR. GUETZ: 
Are you willing to testify in this case.

 
 
"MRS. 
ENGBERG: Not if I don't have to.

 
 
"MR. GUETZ: 
Mrs. Engberg, you know, that is your choice to make and we are asking you now 
what choice you want to make in this case, whether you want to testify or 
not?

 
 
"MRS. 
ENGBERG: No, I don't.

 
 
"MR. GUETZ: 
May we approach the bench, Your Honor?

 
 
"THE COURT: 
You may."

 
 
Thereafter, 
this discussion was conducted at the bench:

 
 
"THE COURT: 
Mr. Guetz, she doesn't want to testify.

 
 
"MR. GUETZ: 
We can't force her to.

 
 
"THE COURT: 
No, you can't force her to.

 
 
"MR. 
SKAGGS: I want the opportunity to cross-examine her and assert the immunity on 
every question.

 
 
"THE COURT: 
You want what?

 
 
"MR. 
SKAGGS: I want the opportunity to cross-examine her and assert the immunity on 
every question.

 
 
"THE COURT: 
I don't think if she refused to testify that - I would ask you, Mr. Guetz, to 
explain to her clearly that she has spousal immunity and she doesn't have to 
testify.

 
 
"MR. 
SKAGGS: I oppose that. She does not have the privilege. Roy has the 
privilege.

 
 
"THE COURT: 
She can assert the privilege.

 
 
"MR. 
SKAGGS: Your Honor, under case law, it is Roy's privilege to assert, not 
hers.

 
 
"THE COURT: 
Under the more recent rule, she can assert the immunity herself. Absolutely, she 
can assert that immunity on her own.

 
 
"MR. 
SKAGGS: Your Honor, now the prosecution is going to be in a position where they 
can comment on her asserting the immunity.

 
 
"MS. 
MILLER: If we could take a short recess. Obviously the State has had an 
opportunity to talk to her. Perhaps we should have the same opportunity to talk 
to this witness before she asserts the immunity on behalf of our 
client.

 
 
"THE COURT: 
Do you have an objection?

 
 
"MR. GUETZ: 
I suppose not, Your Honor, but she voiced what her feelings 
are."

 
 
We 
understand the trial judge's reference to the modern rule to reflect a 
misapprehension on his part that his decision was controlled by recent authority 
from the Supreme Court of the United States. The same position is 
reflected in the conclusions of law filed in connection with the denial of 
Engberg's motion for post-conviction relief.

 
 

[¶27.]  In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S. Ct. 906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that a witness spouse may invoke the privilege of spousal immunity. That 
was said to be the rule of the federal common law and was contrary to what had 
been proposed as Rule 505, W.R.E., which would have limited the privilege of 
spousal immunity to the party spouse but was not adopted by Congress. In a 
similar vein, the court rejected the earlier decision of Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 
79 S. Ct. 136, 3 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1958), in which the court held that the privilege 
of spousal immunity could be claimed by both the witness spouse and the party 
spouse. The United States Supreme Court decisions are not controlling. 
Consequently, the position of the federal courts with respect to federal common 
law is nothing more than persuasive authority.

 
 

[¶28.]  The rule of privilege arising out of 
spousal immunity is set forth in Wyoming by statute. Section 1-12-101, W.S. 
1977, provides:

 
 
"(a) the 
following persons shall not testify in certain respects:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(iii) 
husband or wife, except as provided in W.S. 1-12-104; * * 
*."

 
 
In the 
absence of the exception, this statutory provision would sound in competency, 
not privilege. Section 1-12-104, W.S. 1977, referred to in the preceding 
statute, then provides:

 
 
"No husband 
or wife shall be a witness against the other except in criminal proceedings for 
a crime committed by one against the other, or in a civil action or proceeding 
by one against the other. They may in all civil and criminal cases be witnesses 
for each other the same as though the marital relation did not 
exist."

 
 
This 
statutory language described different situations to which different rules 
apply. The first sentence of the statute clearly states that a husband or wife 
shall not be a witness against the other except in certain situations which are 
not found in the circumstances of this case. The second sentence provides that a 
husband or wife may be a witness for the other as though the marital relation 
did not exist. Engberg's claim of error must be examined under the first 
sentence of this statute because the record is clear that his wife was called as 
a witness by the State. A spouse who is called as a witness by the State in a 
criminal proceeding perforce must be called as a witness against the defendant. 
The record also is clear that Engberg did not attempt to call his wife as a 
witness for him.

 
 

[¶29.]  In the prior cases in which this court 
has considered the statute, it never has had occasion to address a situation 
like this. In Chamberlain v. State, 
348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1960), the wife was called as a rebuttal 
witness against the husband in a prosecution of the husband for statutory rape 
of a minor child. The court there concluded that the statute was subject to 
judicial interpretation; that the exception relating to a crime committed by one 
against the other was not limited to corporal violence against the person of the 
wife; and that the crime for which the defendant was prosecuted was such a 
special wrong and personal offense against his wife as justified her being 
permitted to testify. In Pike v. 
State, 495 P.2d 1188 (Wyo. 1972), the court recognized that it would be 
error per se, if the husband 
objected, to permit a wife to testify when called by the State as a witness 
unless the exception found in the statute was invoked. The court also held that 
the error under the circumstances of that case was not prejudicial. In Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516, cert. denied 409 U.S. 886, 93 S. Ct. 104, 
34 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1972), the court recognized a waiver of the privilege by the 
husband who was the defendant. When the claim of privilege was asserted, the 
trial court ruled that the State could use the transcript of her testimony at 
the preliminary examination, which was given prior to the marriage, if the wife 
did not testify. Although complaining that he was forced to so elect, the 
husband waived the privilege, and this court found no error. Then in Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 
1978), the court, citing Chamberlain, 
held that, in a case in which the charge was first degree murder of a child, the 
testimony of the wife is equally available to the State and to the defendant 
under this statute. The husband complained, on appeal, of comment by the 
prosecutor upon his failure to call the wife as a witness, and the court simply 
held that was not plain error. The court relied upon State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551 (1956), in which the court held that it was proper to comment upon the 
defendant's failure to produce the wife as a witness when she was available to 
him but not to the prosecution. 

 
 

[¶30.]  In none of these cases did the court 
directly consider whether a witness spouse might directly invoke the privilege 
if called to testify against a party spouse. Because we address the issue only 
with respect to the effective assistance of appellate counsel, we are limited to 
a determination of whether a clear and unequivocal rule of law was transgressed. 
In this regard, it seems fair to say that the first sentence of § 1-12-104, W.S. 
1977, perpetuates the common law rule of the privilege of spousal immunity in 
instances in which the testimony of a spouse is offered against a party spouse, 
although the statute, as construed, may explain the exception of what 
constitutes a crime against a witness spouse. See Chamberlain. We again turn to the 
eminent authority on rules of evidence, Professor Wigmore, relied on in Chamberlain. In 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2241 (McNaughton rev. 1961), 
there is a discussion of who possesses the privilege. It begins with the 
recognition that the reason most commonly offered in support of this privilege, 
the prevention of marital dissention, results in the privilege belonging to the 
party only and not to the witness. It goes on:

 
 
"* * * But 
taking the other suggested reason for the privilege, namely, immunity from the 
repugnant situation of being condemned by one's spouse or of becoming the 
instrument of a spouse's condemnation (§ 2228 supra), the privilege seems to be equally that of party and of witness. In other words, while the 
defendant husband is entitled to be protected against condemnation through the 
wife's testimony, the witness wife is also entitled to be protected against 
becoming the instrument of that condemnation - the sentiment in each case being 
equal in degree and yet different in quality.

 
 
"The latter 
view seems generally to be accepted by implication underlying the various 
judicial utterances, but precise rulings are naturally rare and depend much on 
the wording of statutes. It is established in some courts that at least the 
privilege belongs to the party spouse 
against whom the other is offered as a witness. Rarely is the privilege denied 
to belong to the witness spouse; and 
rarely also is it denied to belong to the party spouse. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2241 
at 254-55 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (footnotes omitted; emphasis in 
original).

 
 
A 
conclusion that the legislature intended to make the privilege available to both 
the witness spouse and the party spouse is consistent with this language. The 
mandatory words "shall be," read in the light of the concept of privilege, 
properly can be construed to permit the witness spouse to avoid "becoming the 
instrument of that condemnation" even though the party spouse chooses to waive 
that protection. If we accept Wigmore's description of the concept of 
entitlement to invoke the privilege, it certainly is arguable that the trial 
court correctly ruled that Mrs. Engberg could claim the privilege albeit an 
erroneous reason may have been advanced. Under those circumstances, we cannot 
discern any clear and unequivocal rule of law which was violated and, therefore, 
we cannot find ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to assert 
error in the direct appeal with respect to permitting the witness spouse to 
claim the privilege. We agree with the trial court that Engberg was not entitled 
to post-conviction relief for these reasons.

 
 

[¶31.]  To complete the examination of Engberg's 
contentions in this regard, we also consider the claim of error premised upon 
the refusal of the trial court to admit the hearsay testimony of Janet Garner. 
That hearsay testimony could only be received if Donna Engberg were not 
available as a witness. Engberg 
Insists that the extension to Donna Engberg of the right to claim the 
privilege of spousal immunity made her unavailable but, at that stage in the 
trial, she was unavailable as a witness only for the State of Wyoming. Even 
though she might have been the possessor of a privilege not to testify against 
Engberg, nothing in the statute extends a privilege to the spouse when called by 
the defendant in a criminal case. In order for Engberg to demonstrate 
unavailability to him, he had to call his wife as a witness. If she then had 
continued to refuse to testify, the court could have found that she was 
unavailable and the Janet Garner testimony possibly would have been admissible. 
In the absence of an effort to call her as a witness in his behalf, Engberg 
cannot assert error for the refusal of the trial court to receive the hearsay 
testimony.

 
 

[¶32.]  Even assuming that Engberg was misled by 
the trial court and, for this reason, believed he could not call his wife as a 
witness on his behalf, we still could find no error in the decision of the trial 
court not to receive the hearsay testimony of Janet Garner. If a witness is 
allowed to rely upon a privilege erroneously, unavailability has been found by 
some courts. See United 
States v. McCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 
1982). But see United States v. 
Mathis, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977); 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 406 at 1029 (1985). 
Unavailability is only one prerequisite for receiving hearsay testimony under 
Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E. See Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 
(Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). As the language of the rule requires, the hearsay 
testimony also must be supported by circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness. The contradictory versions of the events reported by Donna 
Engberg to the police officer and Janet Garner concerning Engberg's involvement 
in the murder demonstrate that the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness 
was not present. There was no corroborating evidence presented which could be 
relied upon to enhance the trustworthiness of the version reported to Janet 
Garner. In the absence of the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the 
hearsay testimony could not be admitted properly. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 491, and cases cited 
at n. 12. For the same reason, admission of this testimony was not required in 
order to meet fundamental standards of due process. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1979); Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973).

 
 

[¶33.]  Our conclusions with respect to these 
issues also dispose of the claim of cumulative error which Engberg asserts. See Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 
(Wyo. 1986); Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889 
(Wyo. 1982). 
The result of those cases depends, of course, upon the existence of error. In 
this instance, we conclude that there was no error and, consequently, there is 
no claim to consider of the cumulative effect of trial errors. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1991); Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 

[¶34.]  As a final matter, we turn to Engberg's 
arguments raised in issues 19 and 20. We can see no demonstration of any 
prejudice to Engberg even if one could conclude that error was committed by the 
representation by the attorney general of the state in this action when a 
present member of his staff represented Engberg In his direct appeal. We can 
discern no way in which that alleged conflict would have been disadvantageous to 
Engberg In the post-conviction 
process. Furthermore, in Wyoming, we require something more than simply 
assertions of impropriety. We cannot acknowledge, without some factual showing, 
that a member of the attorney general's staff who had a conflict of this nature 
would have any involvement in, or knowledge of, the work done on behalf of the 
State of Wyoming. In addition, the objective evaluation 
of effective assistance of counsel on appeal avoids the concern that the 
attorney general might involve the member of his staff who did serve as counsel 
for Engberg In order to insulate that 
staff member from the ineffectiveness accusation.

 
 

[¶35.]  As to Engberg's argument that the 
post-conviction procedure which has been adopted in Wyoming is fundamentally 
unfair, that argument must be advanced by someone who was disadvantaged by the 
process. We are satisfied that Engberg's claims have received every 
consideration to which they are entitled under our statute and under the 
Constitutions of the State of Wyoming and the 
United 
States. If a different post-conviction 
procedure is to be invoked, that is a matter which must be addressed by the 
legislature. The one which is in place, as applied to Engberg, did not result in 
any deprivation of his constitutional rights.

 
 

[¶36.]  Our review of the issues raised by Engberg In this appeal from the denial 
of his motion for post-conviction relief persuades this court that, with respect 
to Engberg's conviction of first degree murder, we correctly held 
that:

 
 
"* * * Our 
examination of the record and the law persuades us that there is no error with 
respect to any of the claims made by the appellant, * * *." Engberg, 686 P.2d  at 
544.

 
 
Insofar as 
his guilt of the crime of first degree murder is concerned, we affirm the order 
of the district court dismissing Engberg's petition for post-conviction relief 
and conclude that Engberg has exhausted any substantial state 
remedies.

 
 

APPENDIX 
I

 
 
STATEMENT 
OF THE ISSUES

 
 
1.         
Whether the Court's refusal to permit appellant to call an expert on 
eye-witness       
identification was error which deprived appellant of his right to a 
fundamentally fair trial and his right to compulsory 
process.

 
 
2.         
Whether the State's failure to disclose its use of hypnosis as means of 
enhancing Kay Otto's memory violated its ethical obligations and denied 
appellant his right to due process of law, his right of confrontation, and his 
right to effective assistance of counsel.

 
 
3.         (a) 
Whether appellant was denied due process of law by the extradition procedure 
used to bring him to Wyoming such that the proceedings here must be 
declared null and void.

 
 
(b) Whether 
appellant was denied due process by the introduction of evidence that he had to 
be beaten by the police officers who arrested him in order to prevent him from 
fleeing.

 
 
4.         
Whether the State's introduction of evidence showing that appellant 
frequently used aliases denied him his right to a fundamentally fair 
trial.

 
 
5.         (a) 
Whether appellant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated when 
evidence that he refused to wear a stocking cap so that he could be photographed 
was introduced at his trial and argued as evidence of 
guilt.

 
 
(b) Whether 
appellant's right to confront witnesses was denied him by the court's refusal to 
permit cross-examination of the police officer who photographed him concerning 
appellant's medical condition.

 
 
6.         (a) 
Whether a defendant's spouse can invoke spousal privilege and decline to testify 
when the defendant seeks to have the spouse testify.

 
 
(b) Whether 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution were violated by the trial judge's erroneous ruling that 
appellant could not call Donna Engberg as a witness, cross-examine her, nor 
introduce her prior statements for impeachment purposes.

 
 
(c) Whether 
a defendant's spouse who refuses to testify is an unavailable witness whose 
hearsay statements may be admitted into evidence.

 
 
7.         
Whether the use of a conclusive presumption to convict appellant of first 
degree murder is plain error and requires reversal of the 
conviction.

 
 
8.         
Whether appellant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated 
by the introduction of evidence seized by the police during a warrantless search 
of appellant's trailer.

 
 
9.         
Whether the testimony of the ballistics expert was incompetent and should 
have been disregarded, and should be disregarded now, and thus whether there is 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction.

 
 
10.       (a) Whether the 
prosecution's use and manipulation of the press prior to appellant's trial 
deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial.

 
 
(b) Whether 
appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel was denied him by his 
initial court-appointed attorney's failure to combat the prosecution's misuse of 
the media.

 
 
11.       Whether the trial 
court's failure to excuse venireman Alberts for cause deprived appellant of his 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

 
 
12.       Whether the voir 
dire procedure used at appellant's trial denied him his right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury.

 
 
13.       (a) Whether the 
introduction of evidence in the penalty phase that appellant had escaped from 
the authorities in Missouri denied him his right to due process 
and a fundamentally fair finding that the death penalty should be 
imposed.

 
 
(b) Whether 
the prosecutor's closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial deprived 
appellant of his right to due process and fundamentally fair trial when the 
prosecutor argued appellant needed to be executed in order to restrain him and 
when the Wyoming Supreme Court has previously recognized that kind of argument 
is only proper where the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance 
is involved.

 
 
14.       Whether the 
court's refusal to permit appellant the opportunity to present evidence of a 
mitigating circumstance, the cruelty of the manner of execution, denied 
appellant his right to due process of law and a fundamentally fair finding to 
impose the death penalty.

 
 
15.       Whether 
appellant's right to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment was violated by the statutory presumption in favor of death under 
Wyoming law 
which requires the defendant to bear the burden of demonstrating that sufficient 
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances so as to warrant 
leniency.

 
 
16.       Whether 
appellant's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to due 
process was violated by the jury's finding as aggravating circumstances that the 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain and while the defendant was engaged in 
the commission of a robbery when the robbery had already been used to elevate 
the crime to capital murder.

 
 
17.       Whether the 
cumulative nature of the error is such that, regardless of the harmlessness of 
any one error, together they prejudiced appellant's rights to due process, 
fundamental fairness, and a reliable determination that the death penalty should 
be imposed.

 
 
18.       Whether appellant 
was afforded effective assistance of counsel during his appeal to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court.

 
 
19.       Whether it was 
improper for the office of the Attorney General to represent the State in 
post-conviction proceedings to urge that an Assistant Attorney General's proper 
representation was a procedural bar to the issues raised in appellant's petition 
for post-conviction relief.

 
 
20.       Whether this 
Court's discussion and holding in prior cases with regard to petitions for 
post-conviction relief ignore the plain and obvious statutory language and 
establish a procedure which is violative of fundamental fairness due process and 
equal procedure and whether it has established a confusing and unworkable 
process wherein courts simply dismiss petitions for post-conviction relief to 
get rid of them."

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1      In Ostwald v. State, 538 P.2d 1298 
(Wyo. 1975), we quoted from Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1970, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967), the following:

 
 
"* * * The 
criteria guiding resolution of the question implicates (a) the purpose to be 
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement 
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of 
justice of a retroactive application of the new 
standards."

 
 

2      The State has 
suggested that this issue should be treated under the newly discovered evidence 
standard articulated in Opie v. 
State, 422 P.2d 84 (Wyo. 1967), as recently applied in Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), 
appeal after remand 766 P.2d 1149 
(Wyo. 1988). See Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364 (Wyo. 1990). The fact that the evidence was not 
discovered because of a failure by the prosecution to follow the rule of Gee is a significant distinction. Under 
those circumstances, it is inappropriate to invoke the newly discovered evidence 
rule. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976). As quoted in Agurs, 427 U.S.  at 111, "If the standard 
applied to the usual motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence 
were the same when the evidence was in the State's possession as when it was 
found in a neutral source, there would be no special significance to the 
prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice."

 
 

3      E.g., Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.App. 1977), 
cert. denied 434 U.S. 973, 98 S. Ct. 529, 54 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1977); United States 
v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1100, 97 S. Ct. 1122, 51 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1977); United 
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).

 
 

4      Engberg has not 
chosen to challenge the invocation of the privilege in front of the jury. We 
already have considered situations in which witnesses have invoked their own 
privilege not to testify because of their right not to incriminate themselves. 
Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 
(Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1987); 
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 
(Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). More recently we have reversed a conviction in a 
case in which the trial court permitted the prosecution to call witnesses in the 
presence of the jury who the court and the prosecution knew would invoke the 
Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. Jones v. State, 777 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 1989). 
In an instance such as this, as in Haselhuhn and Hopkinson, if counsel or the court is 
aware that the privilege may be invoked, it is far better to approach the matter 
in chambers. Certainly, the proceeding should be adjourned to chambers as soon 
as that possibility becomes apparent. Otherwise, there is a clear risk of a 
reversal as in Jones. We deplore the unnecessary presentation of such an issue 
in front of the jury because of the potential for 
prejudice.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
concurring in the opinion of THOMAS, 
Justice, except with respect to issues relating to the sentencing phase of the 
trial.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶37.]  The jury returned a death verdict in 
appellant's sentencing trial. This case is before us upon a petition for 
post-conviction relief. Death penalty cases are different from all other cases. 
The punishment is final. If it is wrong, it cannot be corrected; it cannot be 
undone; it cannot be made right. And so, we review this case with utmost care 
and detail for the purpose of assuring ourselves that we do not impose the death 
penalty unlawfully, arbitrarily, or unjustly by slavish adherence to doubtful 
application of technical doctrine.

 
 

[¶38.]  Appellant claims error, presenting the 
following issue for our review: 

 
 
"Whether 
appellant's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to due 
process were violated by the jury's finding as aggravating circumstances that 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and while the defendant was engaged 
in the commission of a robbery when the robbery had already been used to elevate 
the crime to capital murder."

 
 

[¶39.]  This issue was raised in part on direct 
appeal and addressed in part by Justice Rose, dissenting, in Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 558-62 
(Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984) (Engberg I.) Subsequent developments in 
case law and revision of our statutes require that we review death penalty 
sentencing in this post-conviction relief proceeding.

 
 

[¶40.]  The issues we here address are whether 
the use of the underlying robbery to support two independent aggravating 
circumstances, and the use of the robbery as an aggravating circumstance when it 
had already been used to elevate the crime to capital murder were permissible. 
We conclude that both uses of the robbery were impermissible; that jury 
instructions relating to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were 
incorrect; and that, accordingly, appellant's sentence must be vacated and this 
case remanded for resentencing.

 
 

[¶41.]  Appellant was convicted of felony murder 
under W.S. 6-4-101 (Dec. 1977 Repl.) (now W.S. 6-2-101):

 
 
"(a) 
Whoever * * * in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any * * * 
robbery * * * kills any human being * * * is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

 
 
"(b) A 
person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or 
life imprisonment according to law."

 
 

[¶42.]  Wyoming allows assessment of the death penalty 
only upon conviction of first degree murder, which is murder with premeditated 
malice or felony murder. Felony murder occupies a unique place in our 
jurisprudence. It allows a defendant who commits an unpremeditated murder to be 
convicted of first degree murder. The only requirement is that the murder occur 
during the defendant's perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, one of the 
felonies listed in the statute. Thus, we consider whether the death penalty was 
properly invoked following appellant's conviction of first degree (felony) 
murder, the felony being robbery.

 
 

[¶43.]  The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
prohibits a state from imposing the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. Instead, the sentencing body must be provided with standards which will 
genuinely narrow the class of crimes and the persons against whom the death 
penalty is imposed by allowing it to make an individualized determination on the 
basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-80, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 
2743-44, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983)

 
 
"To avoid 
[unconstitutional, arbitrary and capricious sentencing], an aggravating 
circumstance * * * must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe 
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Id., 462 U.S.  at 877, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2742.

 
 
See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 
2940-41, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, reh. denied 
429 U.S. 875, 97 S. Ct. 197, 50 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2754-55, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (Brennan, J., concurring), reh. denied 409 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 89, 
34 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1972).

 
 

[¶44.]  Wyoming has chosen to meet this requirement by 
creating a separate statutory sentencing procedure under which the jury 
considers aggravating and mitigating factors in deciding whether the death 
penalty should be imposed in each case of first degree murder. The pertinent 
part of Wyoming's death penalty statute read as 
follows:

 
 
"(d)(i) 
After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render a 
recommendation of sentence to the judge, based upon the 
following:

 
 
"(A) 
Whether one (1) or more sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as set forth 
in subsection (h) of this section;

 
 
"(B) 
Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as set forth in subsection (j) 
of this section which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; 
and

 
 
"(C) Based 
upon these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or 
life imprisonment.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(e) The 
death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one (1) of the aggravating 
circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this section is found. The jury, if 
its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing signed by 
the foremen of the jury the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it 
found beyond a reasonable doubt. * * * If the jury cannot, within a reasonable 
time, agree on the punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a life 
sentence.

 
 
"(f) Unless 
the jury trying the case recommends the death sentence in its verdict, the judge 
shall not sentence the defendant to death but shall sentence the defendant to 
life imprisonment as provided by law. Where a recommendation of death is made, 
the court shall sentence the defendant to death.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(h) 
Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following:

 
 
"(i) The 
murder was committed by a person under sentence of 
imprisonment;

 
 
"(ii) The 
defendant was previously convicted of another murder in the first degree or a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the 
person;

 
 
"(iii) The 
defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more 
persons;

 
 
"(iv) The 
murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, sexual assault, arson, burglary, 
kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging 
of a destructive device or bomb;

 
 
"(v) The 
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest 
or effecting an escape from custody;

 
 
"(vi) The 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain;

 
 
"(vii) The 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel;

 
 
"(viii) The 
murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney, former 
district attorney or former county and prosecuting attorney, during or because 
of the exercise of his official duty.

 
 
"(j) 
Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:

 
 
"(i) The 
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal 
activity;

 
 
"(ii) The 
murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance;

 
 
"(iii) The 
victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the 
act;

 
 
"(iv) The 
defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his 
participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor;

 
 
"(v) The 
defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of 
another person;

 
 
"(vi) The 
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially 
impaired;

 
 
"(vii) The 
age of the defendant at the time of the crime." W.S. 6-4-102 (Dec. 1977 Repl. 
& 1982 Cum.Supp.).

 
 

[¶45.]  The jury, applying the statutory 
provisions detailed above, found the following aggravating 
circumstances:

 
 
"1. That 
the murder was committed by a person under sentence of 
imprisonment.

 
 
"2. That 
the Defendant was previously convicted of another murder in the first degree or 
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the 
person.

 
 
"3. That 
the Defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more 
persons.

 
 
"4. That 
the murder was committed while the Defendant was engaged in the commission of or 
an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit any 
robbery.

 
 
"5. That 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain."

 
 
The 
constitutional difficulty with W.S. 6-4-102 as it existed at the time of 
Engberg's sentencing was that it allowed Engberg's felony murder to both convict 
him and, without more, sentence him to death by allowing imposition of the death 
penalty upon the jury finding: "at least one (1) * * * aggravating circumstance" 
- that being "(h)(iv) murder * * * committed * * * in the commission of * * * 
any robbery." This statute provided no requirements beyond the crime of felony 
murder itself to narrow and appropriately select those to be sentenced to death 
and therefore, on its face, permitted arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 
This statutory scheme of death sentencing preserved in felony murder the very 
evil condemned and held unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726. It permitted in felony murder cases a sentence to death without 
applying any standards that generally narrowed the class of crimes and persons 
who were given the death penalty. The statute recreated a sentencing scheme that 
the United States Supreme Court found resulted in death sentences being imposed 
unevenly, unfairly, arbitrarily and capriciously. The infirmity in this statute 
has since been corrected by the legislature as we shall later 
discuss.

 
 

[¶46.]  In Furman, the Court, faced with the same 
kind of sentencing scheme as now before us, observed that:

 
 
"Juries (or 
judges, as the case may be) have practically unTrammeled discretion to let an accused 
live or insist that he die." 408 U.S.  at 248, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2731.

 
 
and stated 
further that:

 
 
"When the 
punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is 
legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being 
inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system." 
408 U.S.  at 293, 92 S. Ct.  at 2754 
(Brennan, J., concurring).

 
 
The Court 
held that imposing the death penalty under statutes without guidelines and 
criteria to rationally and uniformly select cases for imposition of death rather 
than life to be arbitrary in application and therefore 
unconstitutional.

 
 

[¶47.]  In this case, the enhancing effect of the 
underlying felony (robbery) provided two of the aggravating circumstances which 
led to Engberg's death sentence: (1) murder during commission of a felony, and 
(2) murder for pecuniary gain. As a result, the underlying robbery was used not 
once but three times to convict and 
then enhance the seriousness of Engberg's crime to a death sentence. All felony murders involving robbery, by 
definition, contain at least the two aggravating circumstances detailed above. 
This places the felony murder defendant in a worse position than the defendant 
convicted of premeditated murder, simply because his crime was committed in 
conjunction with another felony. This is an arbitrary and capricious 
classification, in violation of the Furman/Gregg narrowing 
requirement.

 
 

[¶48.]  Additionally, we find a further Furman/Gregg problem because both 
aggravating factors overlap in that they refer to the same aspect of the 
defendant's crime of robbery. While it is true that the jury's analysis in 
capital sentencing is to be qualitative rather than a quantitative weighing of 
aggravating factors, Engberg I, at 
553, the jury should not be presented with two aggravating factors merely 
because the underlying felony was robbery, rather than some other felony. The 
mere finding of an aggravating circumstance implies a qualitative value as to 
that circumstance. The qualitative value of an aggravating circumstance is 
unjustly enhanced when the same underlying fact is used to create multiple 
aggravating factors. 

 
 

[¶49.]  When an element of felony murder is 
itself listed as an aggravating circumstance, the requirement in W.S. 6-4-102 
that at least one "aggravating circumstance" be found for a death sentence 
becomes meaningless. Black's Law 
Dictionary, 60 (5th ed. 1979) defines "aggravation" as 
follows:

 
 
"Any 
circumstance attending the commission of a crime or tort which increases its 
guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences, but which is above and beyond the essential 
constituents of the crime or tort itself." (emphasis 
added)

 
 
As used in 
the statute, these factors do not fit the definition of "aggravation." The 
aggravating factors of pecuniary gain and commission of a felony do not serve 
the purpose of narrowing the class of persons to be sentenced to death, and the 
Furman/Gregg weeding-out process 
fails.

 
 

[¶50.]  In our review of state precedent applying 
the Furman/Gregg criteria to 
statutory aggravating factors, we find the case of State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 941, 100 S. Ct. 2165, 64 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1980), particularly persuasive. In that 
case, the defendant shot and killed a supermarket employee during a robbery. The 
jury convicted the defendant of felony murder. During the sentencing phase, the 
jury was submitted, and found as an aggravating circumstance, among others, that 
the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of 
robbery with a firearm. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[o]nce the 
underlying felony has been used to obtain a conviction of first degree murder, 
it has become an element of that crime and may not thereafter be the basis for 
additional prosecution or sentence." Cherry, 257 S.E.2d  at 567. The court 
held that "when a defendant is convicted of first degree murder under the felony 
murder rule, the trial judge shall not submit to the jury at the sentencing 
phase of the trial the aggravating circumstance concerning the underlying 
felony." Id., at 
568.

 
 

[¶51.]  We distinguish Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568, reh. denied 485 U.S. 944, 108 S. Ct. 1126, 99 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1988), which involved the killing of three 
persons and a conviction of three counts of first degree murder in Louisiana. The sole 
aggravating circumstance found by the jury was that "the offender knowingly 
created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person." Lowenfield, 484 U.S.  at 243, 108 S. Ct.  at 554. The Court reaffirmed the requirement of a statutory narrowing 
scheme for application of the death penalty, stating:

 
 
"To pass 
constitutional muster, a capital-sentencing scheme must `genuinely narrow the 
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found 
guilty of murder.' Zant v. Stephens, 
462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976)." 484 U.S.  at 244, 108 S. Ct.  at 
554.

 
 

[¶52.]  That Court noted the statutes of the 
state of Louisiana provide five grades of homicide and, 
within the statute, narrows the class of offenders who receive death or life by 
providing separately for those who receive life without possibility of parole. 
Thus, two statutory schemes were permissible. The Court 
stated:

 
 
"[T]he 
narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment may be provided 
in either of these two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of 
capital offenses, as Texas and Louisiana have done, so that the jury finding of 
guilt responds to this concern, or the legislature may more broadly define 
capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating 
circumstances at the penalty phase." Lowenfield, 484 U.S.  at 246, 108 S. Ct.  at 555.

 
 
and 
continued:

 
 
"Here, the 
`narrowing function' was performed by the jury at the guilt phase when it found 
defendant guilty of three counts of murder under the provision that `the 
offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more 
than one person.' The fact that the sentencing jury is also required to find the 
existence of an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the 
constitutionally-required narrowing process, and so the fact that the 
aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not 
make this sentence constitutionally infirm. There is no question but that the 
Louisiana 
scheme narrows the class of death-eligible murderers and then at the sentencing 
phase allows for the consideration of mitigating circumstances and the exercise 
of discretion." 484 U.S.  at 246, 108 S. Ct.  at 
555.

 
 
The United 
States Supreme Court found in the Lowenfield case that Louisiana provided the 
narrowing process at the guilt phase of the trial. The clear provisions of the 
Wyoming 
statute provide that the narrowing occur in the sentencing phase of the trial. 
Lowenfield, therefore, does not 
govern our disposition in this case.

 
 

[¶53.]  Another compelling reason for reversing 
appellant's death sentence is that since he was sentenced, the legislature has 
modified the death penalty statute by making three changes which affect the 
aggravating circumstances used in his case.

 
 

[¶54.]  First, the legislature removed most of 
the previous list of felonies, including robbery, from the list of crimes which 
constitute aggravating circumstances in W.S. 6-2-102(h)(iv). The new version 
reads as follows:

 
 
"The murder 
was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting 
to commit, any aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging 
of a destructive device or bomb." W.S. 6-2-102(h)(iv) (1991 
Cum.Supp.).

 
 

[¶55.]  Second, the legislature has qualified the 
question of what kinds of crimes are deemed motivated by pecuniary 
gain:

 
 
"The murder 
was committed for compensation, the collection of insurance benefits or other 
similar pecuniary gain." W.S. 6-2-102(h)(vi) (1991 
Cum.Supp.)

 
 

[¶56.]  Finally, the legislature made murder 
connected with other violent felonies an aggravating circumstance only when 
premeditated malice is present:

 
 
"The 
defendant killed another human being purposely and with premeditated malice 
and while engaged in, or as an accomplice in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any 
robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping." W.S. 6-2-102(h)(xii) 
(1991 Cum.Supp.). (emphasis added)

 
 

[¶57.]  We think these changes demonstrate a 
recognition by the legislature that the system of aggravating circumstances in 
place at Engberg's sentencing was problematic because of the bootstrapping 
effect of felony murder convictions. The current statute should govern a second 
sentencing phase trial because it does not contain the deficiency of the earlier 
statute. Cf. Attletweedt v. State, 
684 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 

[¶58.]  Our disposition in this case requires 
that we overrule a portion of our opinion in Engberg I. In Engberg I, we addressed the contention 
that submission to the jury of "murder for pecuniary gain" and "murder * * * 
committed while the defendant was engaged * * * in the commission of * * * any 
robbery" was improper because both aggravating circumstances referred to the 
same aspect of the defendant's crime. We found the reasoning of the North Carolina court 
persuasive:

 
 
"In State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981), that court held that the aggravating circumstance identified as 
murder for pecuniary gain examines the defendant's motive, not his conduct, and 
while not an element of the offense the jury properly may consider his motive 
with respect to the issue of a capital sentence. Later that court held that the 
aggravating circumstance of murder for pecuniary gain almost always 
appropriately will be submitted to the jury where the murder is committed during 
the course of an armed robbery. State v. 
Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981). The thrust of the North Carolina court's 
holdings is that these two aggravating circumstances both may be submitted to 
the jury." Engberg, 686 P.2d  at 
553.

 
 
Since the 
entry of our opinion in Engberg I, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court - relied upon and cited by us with approval - 
has further explained Oliver, in State v. Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 354 S.E.2d 446 (1987). In Quesinberry, 
the court synthesized Oliver and Cherry and held that, where a defendant 
is convicted of felony murder only, it is inappropriate to consider both 
pecuniary gain and the fact that a robbery was committed as separate aggravating 
factors because the motive cannot be divorced from the act for the purpose of 
aggravation. Quesinberry, 354 S.E.2d  
at 452. Accordingly, we no longer find Oliver valid for the principle cited in 
Engberg I. We agree with the 
North Carolina 
court and, for this and the other reasons cited, overrule Engberg I to the extent that it is 
inconsistent with this opinion. We now hold that where an underlying felony is 
used to convict a defendant of felony murder only, elements of the underlying 
felony may not again be used as an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase. 
We acknowledge the jury's finding of other aggravating circumstances in this 
case. We cannot know, however, what effect the felony murder, robbery and 
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances found had in the weighing process and 
in the jury's final determination that death was 
appropriate.

 
 

[¶59.]  Although the above issues are dispositive 
in the penalty phase of this case, we also make note of amended W.S. 6-2-102 
concerning jury determination of mitigating circumstances. W.S. 6-2-102(e) (1991 
Cum.Supp.) states in part:

 
 
"(e) The 
death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one (1) of the aggravating 
circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this section is found. In nonjury 
cases the judge shall make such designation. If the jury cannot, within a 
reasonable time, agree on the punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a 
life sentence. The jury, if its verdict 
is a sentence of death, shall designate in writing signed by the foreman of the 
jury:

 
 
"(i) The aggravating circumstance or 
circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt;

 
 
"(ii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances 
which it unanimously found by a preponderance of the evidence; and

 
 
"(iii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances 
which any individual juror found by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 
(emphasis added)

 
 
The 
emphasized portion was added in 1989. 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 1. The 
version of the statute in effect at the time of the sentencing phase simply 
stated:

 
 
"(e) The 
death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one (1) of the aggravating 
circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this section is found. The jury, if 
its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing signed by 
the foreman of the jury the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it 
found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such 
designation. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree on the 
punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a life sentence." 1977 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 122 § 1. See W.S. 
6-4-102 (Dec. 1977 Repl.).

 
 
The change 
reflects the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988), a decision made while this petition was 
still pending before this court. In Mills, the Court held that the trial 
court in a death sentence case must clearly instruct the jury that each 
individual juror may consider any mitigating circumstance he or she finds to 
exist in making a sentencing determination, regardless of whether the jury 
unanimously found that mitigating circumstance to exist. 486 U.S.  at 377-80, 
108 S. Ct.  at 1867-68. Reversal is required unless a "substantial possibility" 
that this occurred can be ruled out. 

 
 

[¶60.]  The sentencing phase instructions in this 
case required that the jury find an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt and mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of evidence. The 
instruction for weighing the factors against each other did not indicate whether 
the mitigating factors must be found unanimously. Another instruction told the 
jury that it must unanimously agree on a verdict of death, and if it is unable 
to do so, the court will impose a sentence of life. The verdict form gave the 
jury two choices. The jury could either find the mitigating circumstances 
outweighed the aggravating circumstances and sentence Engberg to life, or that 
the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and 
sentence him to death. Nowhere in the instructions or verdict form was the jury 
told that the mitigating circumstances need not be found unanimously by the jury 
but that the mitigating circumstances may be found by individual jurors and 
weighed by them individually in deciding the life or death 
question.

 
 

[¶61.]  Because W.S. 6-2-102 (1991 Cum.Supp.) 
will govern retrial of the sentencing phase of this case, we need not decide 
whether to extend the Mills decision 
to Engberg in a retroactive manner. See 
Sawyer v. Smith, ___ U.S. 
___, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989); 
Flores v. State, 572 P.2d 746 
(Wyo. 1977). 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that our law has always been "that 
matters which convict require unanimity, and failure to convict can result from 
the vote of one juror and that aggravating and mitigating circumstances should 
be dealt with in the same way." Hopkinson 
v. State, 798 P.2d 1186, 1190 (Wyo. 1990) (Cardine, J., dissenting). The 
right to a unanimous verdict is beyond dispute. Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 853 
(Wyo. 1980); 
see Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 9. It is 
essential that Engberg be accorded the proper instructions on finding and 
considering mitigating circumstances in a retrial of the penalty phase of his 
felony murder conviction.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶62.]  The dissenting opinion quotes the author 
of this opinion's writing from Hopkinson, at 1188 - first out of 
context and then to suggest that I have no feeling for victims of 
crime.

 
 

[¶63.]  First, out of context, I am quoted as 
refusing to accept the law of capital punishment because "I am convinced now 
that this is an unwise policy." Omitted from the quote is the very next 
sentence:

 
 
"I am 
convinced also that, at this time in our history, these statutes are 
constitutional and, therefore, the law. I have taken an oath to support, obey 
and defend the constitution and will honor that oath." Hopkinson, at 
1188.

 
 

[¶64.]  Second, it is said that my discussion of 
death and killing applies only to perpetrators, implying that I have no feeling 
for victims of crime. Thus, quoting me again from Hopkinson and then editorializing it is 
stated:

 
 
"These are 
noble words. Would they had been uttered to memorialize a torture victim, a 
family literally blown apart, or an innocent victim of an armed robbery rather 
than in support of convicted, cold-blooded killers." Thomas, J., dissenting, at 
5.

 
 
I assure 
the dissenting justice that my feelings about life and death and killing apply 
to victims as well as all mankind. I do not apologize for a feeling of regret 
over the killing of other human beings - something in which others seem to 
revel. My greatest hope is that someday we, as a civilized society, will stop 
the slaughter - the killing - of all human beings. Educating people about how to 
live with each other is the surest path to achievement of this result. Now we do 
it either poorly, or not at all.

 
 

[¶65.]  The dissent, after quoting other writings 
of the author of this opinion, referencing him by name and stating that his 
words have a "hollow ring," incredulously asserts that these references are not 
to that justice at all. The illogical discussion to support this claim could be 
understood only had it come from Alice in 
Wonderland, see Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 113 (Wyo. 1989) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). The dissent lectures that the majority opinion, because joined by 
two other justices, is the product of the court, not the drafter, and therefore 
a direct reference to a single justice is not a reference to that justice at 
all. Surely, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The dissenting 
opinion is joined by a second justice. Therefore, it is the product of the court 
in dissent and, as suggested, nothing said in reference to a justice is a 
reference to that justice at all.

 
 

[¶66.]  With that rule established, and being 
sensitive to the feelings of my colleagues, I agree that the time has come for 
candor in our discussion. Perhaps the real basis for my esteemed colleague's 
vigorous dissent can be gleaned from its observation that the majority opinion 
would "have the effect of eliminating the death penalty in the only two 
remaining cases in Wyoming * * *." Op. at 168. How tragic it is 
to lament the perceived loss of opportunity to kill these two men. However, 
there is no need for sorrow. The statement is incorrect. It is incorrect because 
Engberg will now, on remand, be given a lawful sentencing hearing at which a 
jury can correctly consider life or death upon proper instructions on the law 
and, if appropriate, impose the death penalty.

 
 

[¶67.]  The dissent criticizes the majority for 
its citation of a dissenting opinion and alleged reliance on dictum. Op. at 168. 
However, the proposition that "`matters which convict require unanimity, and 
failure to convict can result from the vote of one juror and that aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances should be dealt with in the same way,'" Hopkinson v. State, 798 P.2d 1186, 1190 
(Wyo. 1990) (Cardine, J., dissenting), is not merely dictum or a hypothetical 
argument in a dissent. Rather, that is the premise for the current statutory 
scheme and required instruction under the Wyoming death penalty statute. W.S. 
6-2-102(e)(i) through (iii). The changes in the statutory mitigating factor 
scheme are relevant and not an "effort to eliminate capital punishment in 
Wyoming, * * * 
by articulating dictum," dis. op. at 3, because Engberg will be resentenced 
under that amended scheme. Therefore, the revised Wyoming statutory scheme as 
well as the controlling United States Supreme Court precedent of Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988), are mandatory and important considerations 
in our disposition of this case and not merely "articulating 
dictum[.]"

 
 

[¶68.]  The dissent states - without empirical 
data, study, citation of authority or any basis whatsoever - that "there is 
evidence of the fact that prosecutors are not seeking the death penalty in cases 
in which a sentence to death well might be appropriate because they do not 
believe that the judiciary will permit the execution." Op. at 168. This bald 
assertion is unsupported. But there is evidence to support the proposition that 
spending limits in district attorneys' offices result in plea bargains. As a 
long-time, most respected Wyoming district attorney said when 
interviewed,

 
 
"he is 
aware of two possible capital cases in other counties that never went to court 
because the counties couldn't afford the expense. The prosecutors settled for a 
plea bargain."

 
 
and

 
 
"[i]f a 
prosecution means bringing in witnesses from out-of-state, the cost may be the 
deterrent that fosters a plea bargain." Barron, Defense needs $, prosecutor can deal, 
Casper Star-Tribune, Sept. 22, 1991, at A8, col. 3, 4.

 
 

[¶69.]  Unfounded, unsupported blame for lack of 
death penalty executions placed on decisions of this court is neither 
constructive nor helpful. The effect, as always, is to oversimplify the debate 
with the `I'm tough-on-crime, you're soft-on-crime' accusations. It is the sort 
of demagoguery that political candidates seize upon and unfairly exploit. The 
problem with these simplistic buzz words and slogans is that they often obscure 
the real and specific issues and do not aid in the solution of pressing 
problems. For example, a populous state in this country recently passed a 
milestone in that, for the first time in its history, it counted more than 
100,000 persons incarcerated in its prisons. That is a milestone because it is 
more persons in prison than in any industrialized nation anywhere in the world, 
except the United States of 
America. Should we begin to look at that 
state's milestone and ask ourselves if the `tough-on-crime' approach is really 
working? We have more violent crime than any of the other western industrialized 
nations. We have a greater drug problem than any others. We have more murders. 
We are one of a small minority of developed countries that retains the death 
penalty. All of this deserves serious and thoughtful study. While recognizing 
that crime must be punished and offenders incarcerated, we should also 
understand that in doing so we treat the disease and not the cause. The causes 
are many, and they deserve serious study, debate, and 
consideration.

 
 

[¶70.]  The business of law, by its very nature, 
involves conflict, controversy, and disagreement. A healthy discussion of 
different points of view is the very essence of law - it is the way we grow, 
live better with each other, and improve our system of law to better serve 
society. It was in this spirit that discussion of the important questions 
presented in this case was undertaken.

 
 

[¶71.]  It is said by the dissent that we have 
abolished the death penalty. The claim is absurd. The death penalty exists 
pursuant to legislation adopted in 1989 by the Wyoming legislature. Because we are a 
government of laws and not of men, we must reverse the sentencing phase of this 
case.

 
 

[¶72.]  Whether a prosecutor, a member of the 
executive branch of government, seeks capital punishment or life imprisonment is 
a decision placed with his office. The decision ought to result from an honest, 
fair assessment of the facts and circumstances present in each particular case. 
I am confident the prosecutor will not shirk the duty in this case by whining 
about the court or complaining about the difficulty caused by delay. Presenting 
to a sentencing jury aggravating and mitigating factors is not really burdensome 
or difficult. Surely the prosecutor will eschew the suggestion of such 
difficulty and do his job honestly, reasonably, and as required by 
law.

 
 

[¶73.]  Conviction affirmed. Sentence vacated and 
case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting in part and concurring in part.

 
 

[¶74.]  I dissent to that portion of Justice 
Thomas' opinion pertaining to the question of Engberg's guilt or innocence. It 
is unreasonable for this Court to require that, in order to avoid procedural 
default, defense counsel should have called Engberg's wife a second time after 
she had already refused to testify. This is the very type of secondguessing of 
defense counsel's trial strategy which we have said we will not do when we are 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Seeley v. State, 715 P.2d 232 
(Wyo. 1986). 
Also, while the record shows that at trial both counsel and the court ignored 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-104 (1988), Justice Thomas' construction of the statute 
violates Engberg's constitutionally protected right to obtain witnesses in his 
favor. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10. See also Section V.B. of Chief Justice 
Urbigkit's opinion dissenting in part and concurring in 
part.

 
 

[¶75.]  I concur with Justice Cardine that it was 
impermissible to use the underlying robbery as an aggravating circumstance when 
it had already been used to elevate the crime to first-degree murder. It is also 
impermissible to use the robbery to support two independent aggravating 
circumstances.

 
 
TABLE OF 
CONTENTS

 
 


I. 
      HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND ISSUES PRESENTED

96

II. 
      FACTS

100

III. 
      SCOPE OF REVIEW

100

            
      A. Introduction and Outline

100

            
      B. Scope of Review in Death Penalty Cases

101

            
      C. Constitutional Right Forfeiture by Procedural 
      Default

103

IV. 
      INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL

104

V. 
      GUILT PHASE ISSUES

116

            
      A. Errors Contended

116

            
      B. The Refusal by the Trial Court to Allow Engberg the Right to 
      Call his Wife as a Witness

116

            
      C. What the Record and Totality of Procedures 
      Established

122 
      

            
      D. Use of Secondary Evidence From an "Unavailable 
      Witness"

123 
      

            
      E. Prejudice in Witness Presentation in Open 
      Court

127 
      

            
      F. Eyewitness Identification Witness - Refusal of the Trial Court 
      to Allow the Engberg to Call an Expert Witness to Testify on the Potential 
      for Error in Identification

128

            
      G. The Failure of the Prosecutor to Inform Engberg and His Attorney 
      That They Had the Principal Eyewitness Hypnotized to Enhance Her Memory 
      and Subsequent Denial of a Post-Trial Hearing

139

            
      H. Additional Guilt Phase Issues Raised by 
      Engberg

152

VI. 
      DEATH PENALTY ISSUE

153

            
      A. The Death Penalty in "Modern" America

154 
      

            
      B. Felony Murder as a Predicate for Capital 
      Punishment

156 
      

            
      C. Present Wyoming Statute

160 
      

            
      D. Weighing and Burden of Persuasion Conflicts Now Ameliorated by 
      Present Law

163

            
      E. Other Death Penalty Issues

165

VII. 
      CONCLUSION

166

 
 

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice, dissenting in part and concurring in part.

 
 

[¶76.]  This post-conviction-relief appeal 
provides this court's second consideration of Roy Lee Engberg's conviction and 
death sentence for the murder of a Wells Fargo guard delivering money to a 
grocery store in Casper, 
Wyoming. I dissent in this second 
absolution of trial and appellate advocacy errors involved in conviction and 
concur with the opinion of Justice Cardine in death penalty 
reversal.

 
 
I.

 
 
HISTORY OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS AND ISSUES PRESENTED

 
 

[¶77.]  Following jury verdict and death 
sentence, initial appeal was taken with five issues stated: (1) right to 
individual voir dire of jurors; (2) peremptory challenges used to create a death 
qualified jury; (3) insufficient evidence of intent to kill to justify the death 
penalty; (4) duplicate use of robbery and an offense committed for pecuniary 
gain as aggravating factors; and (5) proportionality of the death 
penalty.

 
 

[¶78.]  In Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 544 
(Wyo.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984) (Engberg 
I), this court observed that "[t]he only factual issue at the trial of this 
case was the identity of the perpetrator." In decision, this court found "[t]he 
desideration and methodology of voir dire examination of the jurors" was 
discretionary. Id. at 547. On 
the second issue, use of peremptory challenges going beyond Witherspoon expendables, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 
88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, reh'g 
denied 393 U.S. 898, 89 S. Ct. 67, 21 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1968), we 
said:

 
 
Within the 
limits imposed by Swain v. State of 
Alabama, supra [380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, reh'g 
denied 381 U.S. 921, 85 S. Ct. 1528, 14 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1965)], peremptory 
challenges must be recognized as partisan in nature and idiosyncratic in 
application. They are part of the tools of interested and able advocates. As 
such they always have been viewed as wholly discretionary and beyond inquiry 
with respect to motivation and intention.

 
 

Engberg 
I, 686 P.2d  
at 549. The intent to kill issue was addressed by this court in decision that 
intentional homicide would not be a requirement for the felony murder death 
penalty sentence.

 
 

[¶79.]  The most significant issue addressed in 
Engberg I was dual use of murder for 
pecuniary gain and robbery as distinct aggravating circumstances. In validating 
the instruction, this court concluded that "the rule [permitting submission of 
both as separate circumstances] is premised upon an assumption that the number 
of aggravating circumstances has some independent significance." Id. at 553. This 
was the thesis of aggregating numerically aggravating circumstances. Finally, Engberg I determined that the death 
penalty was neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared with other 
capital cases in Wyoming. Id. 
at 555.

 
 

[¶80.]  Initial appellate briefing was apparently 
prepared by law school students in the Defender Aid Program at the University of Wyoming. The appellate attorney in the 
public defender's office left that position and new counsel filed a petition for 
rehearing first presenting what is now the Lockhart-Lowenfield issue, Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1013, 
106 S. Ct. 546, 88 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1985); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568, reh'g 
denied 485 U.S. 944, 108 S. Ct. 1126, 99 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1988), of use of the 
aggregative factor to achieve the felony murder status and then use of the same 
factor for an aggravating death penalty circumstance. The issue was foreclosed 
to Engberg by the denial of the petition for rehearing.

 
 

[¶81.]  In this second appeal (Engberg II), following trial court 
denial of post-conviction relief, we are now presented with a 212-page appellant 
brief stating additional or differently phrased issues:

 
 
ISSUE 
1

 
 
* * * the 
court's refusal to permit appellant to call an expert on eye-witness 
identification was error which deprived appellant of his right to a 
fundamentally fair trial and his right to compulsory 
process.

 
 
ISSUE 
2

 
 
* * * the 
State's failure to disclose its use of hypnosis as means of enhancing Kay Otto's 
memory violated its ethical obligations and denied appellant his right to due 
process of law, his right of confrontation, and his right to effective 
assistance of counsel.

 
 
ISSUE 
3

 
 
(a) * * * 
appellant was denied due process of law by the extradition procedure used to 
bring him to Wyoming such that the proceedings here must be declared null and 
void.

 
 
(b) * * * 
appellant was denied due process by the introduction of evidence that he had to 
be beaten by the police officers who arrested him in order to prevent him from 
fleeing.

 
 
ISSUE 
4

 
 
* * * the 
State's introduction of evidence showing that appellant frequently used aliases 
denied him his right to a fundamentally fair trial.

 
 
ISSUE 
5

 
 
(a) * * * 
appellant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated when evidence that 
he refused to wear a stocking cap so that he could be photographed was 
introduced at his trial and argued as evidence of guilt.

 
 
(b) * * * 
appellant's right to confront witnesses was denied him by the court's refusal to 
permit cross-examination of the police officer who photographed him concerning 
appellant's medical condition.

 
 
ISSUE 
6

 
 
(a) * * * a 
defendant's spouse can invoke spousal privilege and decline to testify when the 
defendant seeks to have the spouse testify.

 
 
(b) * * * 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution were violated by the trial judge's erroneous ruling that 
appellant could not call Donna Engberg as a witness, cross-examine her, nor 
introduce her prior statements for impeachment purposes.

 
 
(c) * * * a 
defendant's spouse who refuses to testify is an unavailable witness whose 
hearsay statements may be admitted into evidence.

 
 
ISSUE 
7

 
 
* * * the 
use of a conclusive presumption to convict appellant of first degree murder is 
plain error and requires reversal of the conviction.

 
 
ISSUE 
8

 
 
* * * 
appellant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution were violated by the introduction 
of evidence seized by the police during a warrantless search of appellant's 
trailer.

 
 
ISSUE 
9

 
 
* * * the 
testimony of the ballistics expert was incompetent and should have been 
disregarded, and should be disregarded now, and thus whether there is 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction.

 
 
ISSUE 
10

 
 
(a) * * * 
the prosecution's use and manipulation of the press prior to appellant's trial 
deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial.

 
 
(b) * * * 
appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel was denied him by his 
initial court-appointed attorney's failure to combat the prosecution's misuse of 
the media.

 
 
ISSUE 
11

 
 
* * * the 
trial court's failure to excuse venireman Alberts for cause deprived appellant 
of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

 
 
ISSUE 
12

 
 
* * * the 
voir dire procedure used at appellant's trial denied him his right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury.

 
 
ISSUE 
13

 
 
(a) * * * 
the introduction of evidence in the penalty phase that appellant had escaped 
from the authorities in Missouri denied him his right to due process and a 
fundamentally fair finding that the death penalty should be 
imposed.

 
 
(b) * * * 
the prosecutor's closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial deprived 
appellant of his right to due process and fundamentally fair trial when the 
prosecutor argued appellant needed to be executed in order to restrain him and 
when the Wyoming Supreme Court has previously recognized that kind of argument 
is only proper where the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance 
is involved.

 
 
ISSUE 
14

 
 
* * * the 
court's refusal to permit appellant the opportunity to present evidence of a 
mitigating circumstance, the cruelty of the manner of execution, denied 
appellant his right to due process of law and a fundamentally fair finding to 
impose the death penalty.

 
 
ISSUE 
15

 
 
* * * 
appellant's right to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment was violated by the statutory presumption in favor of death under 
Wyoming law which requires the defendant to bear the burden of demonstrating 
that sufficient mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances 
so as to warrant leniency.

 
 
ISSUE 
16

 
 
* * * 
appellant's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to due 
process were violated by the jury's finding as aggravating circumstances that 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and while the defendant was engaged 
in the commission of a robbery when the robbery had already been used to elevate 
the crime to capital murder.

 
 
ISSUE 
17

 
 
* * * the 
cumulative nature of the error is such that, regardless of the harmlessness of 
any one error, together they prejudiced appellant's rights to due process, 
fundamental fairness, and a reliable determination that the death penalty should 
be imposed.

 
 
ISSUE 
18

 
 
* * * 
appellant was afforded [in]effective assistance of counsel during his appeal to 
the Wyoming Supreme Court.

 
 
ISSUE 
19

 
 
* * * it 
was improper for the office of the attorney general to represent the State in 
post-conviction proceedings to urge that an assistant attorney general's proper 
representation was a procedural bar to the issues raised in appellant's petition 
for post-conviction relief.

 
 
ISSUE 
20

 
 
* * * this 
court's discussion and holding in prior cases with regard to petitions for 
post-conviction relief ignore the plain and obvious statutory language and 
establish a procedure which is violative of fundamental fairness[,] due process 
and equal procedure [sic] and whether it has established a confusing and 
unworkable process wherein courts simply dismiss petitions for post-conviction 
relief to get rid of them.

 
 
The State 
frames these issues as:

 
 
Argument 
I

 
 
Was there 
error in the procedures followed in the lower court on Engberg's petition for 
post-conviction relief?

 
 
Argument 
II

 
 
Was it 
error to admit evidence of consciousness of guilt at 
trial?

 
 
Argument 
III

 
 
Was 
Engberg's motion to suppress evidence seized at the trailer properly 
denied?

 
 
Argument 
IV

 
 
Did any 
impropriety or illegality in Engberg's extradition to Wyoming affect the jurisdiction of the Wyoming 
courts?

 
 
Argument 
V

 
 
Was Engberg 
denied a fair trial due to pretrial publicity; was Engberg denied effective 
trial counsel due to pretrial publicity?

 
 
Argument 
VI

 
 
Was the 
jury selection process * * * proper?

 
 
Argument 
VII

 
 
Was the 
admission or exclusion of expert testimony discretionary and did the exercise of 
that discretion affect a constitutional right in this 
case?

 
 
Argument 
VIII

 
 
Was Engberg 
deprived of a fair trial, due process or confrontation by the failure of the 
State to disclose Kay Otto's contact with a hypnotist?

 
 
Argument 
IX

 
 
Was Engberg 
denied due process by the trial court's ruling that his spouse had a privilege 
not to testify?

 
 
Argument 
X

 
 
Was 
evidence of Engberg's status as an escapee properly admitted in the penalty 
phase; was the prosecution's closing argument at the penalty phase 
proper?

 
 
Argument 
XI

 
 
Was 
Engberg's proffer of evidence in "mitigation" to show the effects of lethal gas, 
etc., properly excluded; is this issue moot?

 
 
Argument 
XII

 
 
Is there a 
presumption in favor of the death penalty under Wyoming statutes in violation of due process 
or cruel and unusual punishment?

 
 
Argument 
XIII

 
 
Was the 
jury * * * properly instructed as to statutory aggravating circumstances; was 
Engberg denied due process or subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment?

 
 
Argument 
XIV

 
 
Did Engberg 
receive effective assistance of counsel on appeal? 

 
 
Argument 
XV

 
 
Does the 
cumulative nature of any errors in this case warrant 
relief?

 
 
Argument 
XVI

 
 
Is the 
attorney general's entire staff disqualified from post-conviction proceedings 
because one of Engberg's four attorneys on direct appeal has since become an 
assistant attorney general?1

 
 
II.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶82.]  Vernon Rogers and his sister, Kay Otto, 
employed by Wells Fargo, were making an armored van money delivery to a grocery 
store in Casper. 
The two left the store to find themselves face to face with a man armed with a 
gun. Vernon Rogers was almost instantly shot and killed in front of his sister 
and the robber escaped with a bag of money. About a week later, Engberg was 
arrested while drunk in Las 
Vegas, Nevada on New 
Years Day following a family violence complaint by his wife. The injury Engberg 
received from the police during arrest required both hospitalization and a 
surgical operation.

 
 

[¶83.]  Engberg was eventually brought to 
Wyoming and 
charged with premeditated murder and felony murder. During the trial, Engberg 
was denied the right to call his wife as his witness when the trial judge 
incorrectly applied federal rather than controlling state law on testimonial 
privilege. Additionally, he was denied the opportunity to introduce expert 
witness testimony on the potential for error in eyewitness identification. 
Furthermore, Engberg and his attorney were kept unaware that the police 
attempted to have the principal eyewitness hypnotized to enhance her memory. 
Engberg was convicted of felony murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to 
death on the murder conviction and a consecutive term of twenty-five to thirty 
years on the robbery conviction.2

 
 
III.

 
 
SCOPE OF 
REVIEW

 
 
A. Introduction and 
Outline

 
 

[¶84.]  Consideration of this death penalty 
appeal within the limited issues raised on initial appeal and the broad based 
attack now made in post-conviction relief requires application of three 
different concepts. First, the heightened scrutiny standard of review for death 
penalty cases requires recognition. Second is the limitation that 
post-conviction relief addresses a constitutional issue which is found in this 
case to be primarily ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in failure to raise 
the issues in initial appeal. Finally, constitutional forfeiture by procedural 
default is presented in contended waiver by the omission of appellate counsel in 
the initial appeal since Cutbirth v. 
State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988) must also be considered. I cannot 
join the majority of this court for guilt phase resolution which justifies the 
conviction by a combination of our absolution and denial of procedural default 
committed by both trial and appellate counsel.

 
 

[¶85.]  This court should assess these concepts 
within post-conviction-relief review standards applicable to a capital case. I 
will pursue the substantive issues, including denied testimony of Engberg's 
wife, expert eyewitness identification and hypnotism of a witness. Other Engberg II issues will only be 
considered to the extent that consideration will be helpful for future cases, 
although I will not significantly reconsider the issues raised and determined in 
initial appeal which occurred before I came on this court. This is not a broad 
based sufficiency of the evidence case but instead confined to 
post-conviction-relief review of W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 initially 
enacted by the Wyoming legislature to address constitutional 
issues in criminal convictions. Present discussion is developed within a massive 
body of case law since this homicide occurred and also since the opinion in Engberg I was written. Thousands of 
appellate death penalty decisions have been published and segmented issues, 
penalty or guilt, have been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in at 
least thirty significant decisions.3

 
 
B. Scope of Review in Death Penalty 
Cases

 
 

[¶86.]  When the penalty of execution is provided 
for criminal punishment, this court should consider assignments of error now 
first presented under the same standard used by the supreme courts of Utah, Louisiana, and 
Ohio. These 
courts carve out a death penalty exception to their contemporaneous objection 
rule.

 
 
     The State responds to 
a number of defendant's claims of reversible error by urging this Court not to 
consider or rule on such claims because they were inadequately preserved at 
trial. We decline to adopt that approach and instruct the State to hereafter 
brief all issues on their merits in death penalty cases.

 
 
     A general rule of 
appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous objection or 
some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the 
trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal. 
As early as 1931, however, this Court recognized an exception to the general 
rule governing the scope of appellate review in criminal cases where the death 
penalty was imposed. * * * Nevertheless, because of the serious and permanent nature 
of the penalty imposed in such cases, there needs to continue to be a death 
penalty exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Accordingly, this 
Court has customarily considered assignments of error which were not preserved 
at trial but were raised and briefed for the first time on 
appeal.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     * * * [W]e have the 
sua sponte prerogative in such cases to notice, consider, and correct manifest 
and prejudicial error which is not objected to at trial or assigned on appeal, 
but is palpably apparent on the face of the record. Not only is such standard in keeping with controlling 
statutory and case law, but it also furthers the policy of safeguarding a 
defendant's right to a fair trial in a death penalty case by permitting 
review of the proceedings below even in the absence of compliance with 
procedural technicalities.

 
 

State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551-53 (Utah 1987) (footnotes omitted and emphasis 
added). See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2760, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, reh'g denied 409 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 89, 
34 L. Ed. 2d 164, reh'g denied 409 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 89, 34 L. Ed. 2d 163, reh'g 
denied 409 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 90, 34 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1972), Stewart, J., 
concurring; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 65, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1262, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957), Harlan, J., concurring; Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 808 
(Fla. 1988), Barkett, J., dissenting; State v. Bay, 529 So. 2d 845 (La. 1988); 
and State v. Kirkpatrick, 443 So. 2d 546 (La. 1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 993, 104 S. Ct. 2374, 80 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1984). The Louisiana Supreme Court uses the 
same standard and holds that "in cases where the death penalty is imposed, this 
Court reviews assignments of error not briefed as a matter of policy." Kirkpatrick, 443 So. 2d  at 553. The 
Supreme Court of Ohio phrases their approach similarly:

 
 
     Our analysis begins by 
addressing the propositions of law advanced by appellant. Because of the gravity of the sentence that 
has been imposed on appellant, we have reviewed the record with care for any 
errors that may not have been brought to our attention. In addition, we have 
considered any pertinent legal arguments which were not briefed or argued by the 
parties.

 
 

State v. 
Williams, 38 
Ohio St.3d 346, 528 N.E.2d 910, 914, reh'g denied 39 Ohio St.3d 717, 534 N.E.2d 93, cert. denied 489 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 1176, 103 L. Ed. 2d 238, reh'g denied 493 U.S. 948, 110 S. Ct. 355, 107 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1989) (emphasis added). In similar 
summation, see State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 
45, 548 A.2d 846 (1988). For a broad perspective, see Ledewitz, Procedural Default in Death Penalty Cases: 
Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice and Actual Innocence, 24 Crim.L.Bull. 379 
(1988).4

 
 

[¶87.]  The New Mexico Supreme Court recently 
stated in State v. Henderson, 109 
N.M. 655, 789 P.2d 603, 607 (1990):

 
 
"[T]he 
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a 
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing 
determination." Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2639, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 
U.S. [992] at 998-99, 103 S.Ct. 
[3446] at 3452 [77 L. Ed. 2d 1171 (1983)]).

 
 

[¶88.]  The foundational Wyoming judicial legacy 
is not inapposite. Indeed, traditional Wyoming jurisprudence found greater value in 
affirming a death sentence only with caution than in devotion to procedural 
technicalities. In State v. Morris, 
41 Wyo. 128, 
146-47, 283 P. 406, 411 (1929) (emphasis added), Justice Riner 
indicated:

 
 
But the 
familiar rule heretofore announced by this court in Parker v. State, 24 Wyo. 491, 161 P. 552 
[(1916)]; Cirej v. State, 24 Wyo. 
507, 161 P. 556 [(1916)]; and Ohama v. 
State, 24 Wyo. 513, 161 P. 558, [(1916)], touching the failure to save 
exceptions to prejudicial rulings and instructions in capital cases, should, we 
think, govern here. Under that rule, which we believe to be a wholly salutary 
one, it is our duty to consider and determine the effect of [the 
contended error] attacked by appellant in his brief, as before 
indicated.

 
 

[¶89.]  The editor in 5 ABA Remand Nos. 3-4, 
Review of Capital Cases: Should Death 
Make a Difference?, at 1 (1990) stated:

 
 
     "What is this mystery 
that men call death?" The question broached by poet Jerome Bell is much on the 
minds of appellate judges these days. In state and federal circuits where the 
death penalty exists, judges are finding that capital cases impose extraordinary 
demands upon their time, their emotions and their intellectual resources. 

 
 
     In the abstract, 
capital cases are like other forms of litigation. They require appellate courts 
to apply legal principles to facts found at the trial level. Yet these cases, 
where life hangs in the balance, are akin to the "great" cases described by 
Justice Holmes, where "immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure 
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well 
settled principles of law will bend." Northern Securities Co. v. United 
States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 [24 S. Ct. 436, 468, 48 L. Ed. 679] (1904).5

 
 
The 
significance occurs here not in contended omissions by very competent trial 
counsel, but in failure of appellate counsel on first appeal to present issues 
clearly developed in the trial. Harris v. 
Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, reh'g denied 470 U.S. 1065, 105 S. Ct. 1783, 84 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985); Comment, Harris v. Reed: A New Look at Federal Habeas 
Jurisdiction Over State Petitioners, 58 Fordham L.Rev. 493 
(1989).

 
 

[¶90.]  The finality of capital punishment 
mandates that states insure reasonable, rational and fair procedures when 
imposing it, State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied 
459 U.S. 1137, 103 S. Ct. 770, 74 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1983) (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, reh'g denied 
429 U.S. 875, 97 S. Ct. 198, 50 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1976)), and adequate assistance of 
counsel constitutes the first constitutional requirement. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, 
due process of law; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, right of accused to defend. See 
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective 
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299 (1983) and 
Comment, The Ohio Supreme Court's Move 
Toward Quality Control of Court-Appointed Counsel for Indigent Defendants 
Charged With Capital Offense Crimes, 21 Akron L.Rev. 503 
(1988).

 
 
C. Constitutional Right Forfeiture By 
Procedural Default

 
 

[¶91.]  Although my disagreement is well stated 
therein, constitutional forfeiture by procedural default as defined in Cutbirth, 751 P.2d 1257 cannot be 
morally or constitutionally ignored here. See also Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206 
(Wyo. 1989); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1989); and Amin v. 
State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1989). Within the strictures of Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1038, this court is 
required to address constitutional ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984) for illustration of the failure of the attorneys responsible to brief 
and present obvious claims of trial error on initial appeal. Any application of 
the Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 
97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, reh'g 
denied 434 U.S. 880, 98 S. Ct. 241, 54 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1977) cause and prejudice 
factors as presently denominated in Cutbirth will not be ignored within the 
trial issues which are hereinafter substantively discussed in 
detail.

 
 

[¶92.]  On one issue, for example, where the 
attorney general admitted error in oral argument, it would not have been 
unreasonable for the importance and pervasiveness of the subject to have been 
recognized by Engberg's law school and public defender representation 
considering the singular exposure it had at trial. Furthermore, by reversal and 
remand, we should not only here but as we did in Jones v. State, 777 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 1989) recognize 
prejudice. The egregiousness of the Jones problem for this case was 
highlighted by parading Engberg's wife, previously identified in opening 
statement by the prosecutor to have turned in her husband in the Nevada police complaint, 
to then appear openly at the guilt phase of the trial and refuse to testify 
before the jury. In Jones, 777 P.2d  
at 60, we said: 

 
 
Under the 
circumstances of this case the invoking of the Fifth Amendment in the jury's 
presence by Keeler and Haefner, who the jury at least suspected to be alleged 
co-conspirators with appellants in the attempted murder, was too strongly 
prejudicial to be overcome by a cautionary instruction. We cannot consider this 
error harmless. The jury could easily have inferred, and the only purpose this 
testimony could have served was to demonstrate, that the witnesses were invoking 
the Fifth Amendment because they were guilty of the underlying conspiracy. The 
probability that the jury could reasonably infer an admission of guilt through a 
transfer process to appellants is highly prejudicial. Because of the extreme 
probability of transference, the calling of Keeler and Haefner added critical 
weight to the prosecution's case by creating the quintessential inference of 
guilt not clearly elicited through other testimony at 
trial.

 
 
For Engberg In trial perspective, the 
participation by his wife in the "flight to Las Vegas" accentuated the suggestion 
persuasively created by open presentation and non-testimony at trial that she 
would have only confirmed guilt if her testimony had been permitted. Of no less 
importance, the very serious death penalty phase trial defect questions will be 
avoided by retrial under the present statute.

 
 
IV.

 
 
INEFFECTIVENESS 
OF COUNSEL

 
 

[¶93.]  To the extent that within this present 
society denominated by greed, characterized by cruelty and energized by 
extremism, leaving little to be actually shocking, a current article, Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense 
Lawyering in Capital Cases, XVIII N.Y.U.Rev.L. & Soc. Change 245, 249-54 
(1990-91) (quoting Minority Report of Stephen B. Bright, Toward a More Just and Effective System of 
Review in State Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations and Report of the ABA Task 
Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus app., at A-38 (1989) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932)) (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted), 
is profoundly shocking in two illustrative segments:

 
 
Some 
attorneys (undoubtedly those in House [v. 
Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 870, 105 S. Ct. 218, 83 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1984)] and Mitchell 
[v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1026, 107 S. Ct. 3248, 97 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1987)]) are simply incompetent. Approximately 90% of 
capital defendants are poor, and the poor all too frequently are represented by 
the incompetent or inexperienced. Amazingly, one-quarter of Kentucky's death row 
inmates had trial attorneys who have since been disbarred or resigned rather 
than face disbarment!

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     * * * Put in a 
nutshell, it is possible that much of this country simply lacks the political 
will to stop the type of travesty embodied in cases such as House and Mitchell.

 
 
     Yet, stop it we must. 
To quote Steve Bright, the death-penalty expert who served as Tony Amadeo's 
lawyer in the Supreme Court: "There are many small communities that do not have 
surgeons. But that does not mean that we allow chiropractors to do brain surgery 
in those communities." We do, however, let "chiropractors" with law degrees 
perform the equivalent of brain surgery in capital cases and, predictably, the 
"patient" often dies. This is intolerable. Whatever the views of particular 
lawyers might be on the merits of capital punishment, members of the bar should 
at least support the proposition - accepted since Powell v. Alabama [287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932)] - that a defendant may not be condemned and sent to his 
death without "the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him." In the last decade of the twentieth century, the promise of Powell 
remains to be kept.

 
 

See O'Brien, 
Addressing the Needs of Attorneys for the 
Damned, 58 UMKC L.Rev. 517, 518 (1990), where the expression was changed to 
substitute a podiatrist for the chiropractor. See also Burr, Representing the Client on Death Row: The 
Politics of Advocacy, 59 UMKC L.Rev. 1 (1990).

 
 

[¶94.]  Engberg II portrays an inextricable 
principle of logic enfolding constitutional right forfeiture by procedural 
default and ineffectiveness of counsel. By definition, if there was a right which 
was subjected to constitutional forfeiture by procedural default, the 
represented accused was subjected to ineffectiveness of counsel. 
Consequently, any contention of constitutional forfeiture always raises an 
equivalent ineffectiveness issue. The jurist is obligated to substantively 
analyze the scope of the right defaulted in order to weigh the dispossessive 
effect of the failure of counsel to avoid the default invoked error in competent 
practice. For this reason, we serve justice quicker and better by addressing 
claimed mistakes in justice delivery system operation directly instead of first 
raising the specter of constitutional right forfeiture by procedural default and 
then centering on the required second phase for consideration of why the trial 
counsel permitted the procedural default to occur. I would eliminate 
constitutional right forfeiture and procedural default as buzz phrases6 of denied due process and equal 
protection in the search for justice and directly examine in one single 
analysis: what happened, why, was it wrong, and what was its 
effect.

 
 

[¶95.]  The packaging into which mistakes, 
neglect, and sloppy counseling is last stuffed to avoid and ignore its practical 
harm is the unreality to ignore ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. It is 
obvious that the Cutbirth, Amin, 
Murray, and Kallas7 attachment to Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
is embodied in a self-produced justification that conviction should be affirmed 
without regard for the due process, fairness, and even reasonably error-free 
proceeding from which the conviction is grasped. To revisit the record is to 
contemplate the enormity of this capacity to ignore. In actual fact, the guilt 
phase majority simply does not substantively address the ineffectiveness issue, 
except as this case was pre-staged by the Cutbirth opinion and followed by Amin, Murray, and Kallas.8 In most jurisdictions, post-conviction 
relief is the preferable process to consider ineffectiveness issues and 
inevitably required where evidence is obtained to challenge the conduct of first 
appeal appellate counsel. United States v. Pelletier, 845 F.2d 1126 (1st Cir. 
1988); Williams v. Lockhart, 849 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Griffin, 699 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Cordero, 46 Cal. 3d 161, 249 Cal. Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370 (1988); Heyward v. State, 524 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. 
App. 1988); Com. v. Moore, 373 Pa. 
Super. 603, 542 A.2d 106 (1988); State v. 
Tooher, 542 A.2d 1084 (R.I. 1988). See Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 
(10th Cir. 1988).

 
 

[¶96.]  Appellate counsel, in initial appeal, 
only presented for review a composite jury inquiry concern embracing in part the 
Witherspoon expendable issue and 
individual voir dire for adequacy of prejudicial examination. Then finding 
intent to kill as an issue, counsel recognized the division of robbery into two 
circumstances, but not the improvidence of the robbery itself, which then became 
a proportionality issue. Broad, clear, and well-defined concerns, including both 
guilt and penalty phase questions, were unnoticed or ignored, not the least of 
which was the clearly defined Sandstrom issue of the reversed or 
presumed burden of proof. Any second-year law school student's familiarity with 
criminal law should have afforded immediate recognition of the aggravating issue 
of including robbery in the felony murder as only first raised on petition for 
rehearing and then summarily ignored by this court. Admittedly, I would find 
this court to have been procedurally wrong there, as it is substantively wrong 
now. If what we are presented in totality in this case constitutes effective 
assistance of counsel, woe to the common litigants who are faced with that 
standard in seeking justice within this jurisdiction.

 
 

[¶97.]  To understand the ineffective issue as 
presented, it is seen that the first appellate counsel found (1) individual voir 
dire; (2) intent to kill; (3) divided use in penalty or pecuniary gain and 
robbery; and (4) constitutionality of death penalty. Apparently not seen, but in 
any event certainly not included initially, were twenty-six subjects presented 
in post-conviction, including eyewitness identification challenge, undisclosed 
hypnosis (not available to first appeal), extradition, arrest beating/bad person 
evidence, alias bad person evidence, refusal to be photographed in hospital as 
consciousness of guilt, denied cross-examination, spousal immunity, admissible 
substantive hearsay, Sandstrom 
conclusive presumption, search and seizure, invalidly used expert, excess 
prejudicial publicity pre-trial process, misuse of media, voir dire - Witherspoon expandable, prior reputation 
bad person evidence, prosecutorial misconduct in final argument - need to be 
killed like animal - evidence of manner of execution as cruel and inhumane, 
improper burden of proof in penalty phase, double up of divided pecuniary gain 
and robbery for felony murder to become dual aggravating factors for death 
penalty, as well as cumulative error. Those subjects as presented could not 
include the additional present issues of conflict of interest of first appellate 
counsel (not available to first appeal), inaneness of Wyoming's post-conviction 
relief (not available to first appeal), and ineffectiveness of prior appellate 
counsel (not available to first appeal). The litany is overwhelming in 
demonstrated ineffectiveness of counsel for first appeal.

 
 

[¶98.]  The duplicitous cause and result 
conclusions derived in Cutbirth 
cannot academically be emplaced to justify result by preordained conclusion. Osborn, 861 F.2d 612. Procedural default 
is inimical to competency of performance. The majority cannot properly ignore 
the character of appellate counsel nonperformance which occurred in this case 
and excommunicate those concerns by virtue of the nonperformance, and then say 
that nothing is left to be considered. Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553 (10th 
Cir. 1988); Robson & Mello, Ariadne's 
Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, 
Adequate and IndependentState Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty, 76 Calif.L.Rev. 
89 (1988). Cf. Harris v. State, 528 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1988) (majority and dissent). A reversal of Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 
1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1051, 
104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1984) by the federal judiciary affirming Osborn v. Shillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610 
(D.Wyo. 1986), aff'd 861 F.2d 612 
(10th Cir. 1988), can hardly afford comfort to this court in present conclusions 
and reasoning in an ineffectiveness of counsel issue now presented in this 
succeeding death case. 

 
 

[¶99.]  The obvious failure of the appellate 
attorneys in this case is not dissimilar from trial performance reflected in the 
Nebraska case of State v. Broomhall, 
221 Neb. 27, 374 N.W.2d 845 (1985) (Broomhall I) where, on direct appeal, 
the conviction was affirmed on a trial court discretionary decision to deny a 
continuance to obtain an important witness after due diligence by the 
defendant's counsel was not shown. On post-conviction, raising the same lack of 
due diligence of counsel, the conviction was reversed. State v. Broomhall, 227 Neb. 341, 417 N.W.2d 349 (1988) (Broomhall II). In 
that reversal, as a critique of conduct of counsel, the court 
enumerated:

 
 
It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to understand how the failure to call a highly 
qualified and apparently credible witness to refute the most important 
ingredient of the State's case - witness credibility - could by any stretch of 
the imagination amount to reasonable trial strategy. Certainly defense counsel 
did not advance such reason during his testimony.

 
 

Broomhall 
II, 417 N.W.2d  at 354.

 
 

[¶100.]            
Similarly, Justice Mosk addressed this subject in In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969, 971-72 (1970) (quoting from People v. Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d 444, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21, 23 (1967)):

 
 
"Counsel 
must prepare a brief to assist the court in understanding the facts and the 
legal issues in the case. The brief must set forth a statement of the facts with 
citations to the transcript, discuss the legal issues with citations of 
appropriate authority, and argue all issues that are arguable. Moreover, counsel 
serves both the court and his client by advocating changes in the law if 
argument can be made supporting change. * * *." * * *

 
 
     Judged by the 
foregoing criteria, representation by the appointed counsel for petitioner 
before the Court of Appeal was demonstrably inadequate. Indeed, petitioner would 
have fared better had his attorney withdrawn in favor of a pro se brief from 
petitioner, despite petitioner's acknowledged legal ineptitude. In a case 
bristling with arguable claims of error, petitioner's counsel filed an opening 
brief consisting of a 20-page recitation of the facts and a one-page argument. * 
* *

 
 
     Of course, an 
appellate counsel is not to be held responsible for an actual frivolous appeal 
by his client, and we do not hold that Anders [v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967)] and Feggans require the advocate to contrive 
arguable issues. But in the instant action, each of the counts on which 
petitioner was convicted was potentially vulnerable to legitimate and 
provocative appellate contentions that should have been manifest to an alert and 
responsive attorney.

 
 

See also In 
re Cordero, 756 P.2d  
at 1377 as addressing errors of not only ignoring obvious defenses of 
impairment, but also failure to object to statement introduction, failure to 
research and argue defenses of law and failure to introduce evidence of third 
party ownership of an inculpatory article as described by the court as 
"fail[ing] egregiously to pursue the leads and evidence made available to 
him."

 
 

[¶101.]            
As illuminated in this case, I find thoughtful theory and powerful 
persuasion in the critique of David Rudovsky in Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack, 136 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 1965, 1971-72 (1988):

 
 
     This problem is 
seriously aggravated by the failure of the courts to establish meaningful 
standards to test the effectiveness of trial counsel. The most incompetent and 
indefensible actions of defense counsel are rationalized as tactical decisions. 
In all too many cases, lawyering that should trouble the collective conscience 
of the courts and bar is determined to be within the realm of competent 
assistance.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
* * * I 
find it somewhat ironic that while we are increasing our ethical demands on 
defense counsel, we denigrate the central purpose of the sixth amendment: 
meaningful and effective assistance of counsel.

 
 
 

 
 
However, 
compare the analysis in Hayes v. 
Lockhart, 852 F.2d 339, 352 (1988), reh'g denied 869 F.2d 358 (8th Cir.), cert. granted and judgment vacated 491 U.S. 902, 109 S. Ct. 3181, 105 L. Ed. 2d 691 (1989) (quoting from Blackmon v. White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 
(8th Cir. 1987)):

 
 
     In holding that 
defense counsel's representation was not constitutionally deficient, we are 
mindful that our function is not to insulate trial counsel's performance from 
post-trial review and criticism, especially in death penalty cases, for a 
lawyer's professional reputation is not to be preserved at the expense of a 
defendant's constitutional rights. At the same time, however, we must 
resist

 
 
"the 
temptation to second-guess a lawyer's trial strategy; the lawyer makes choices 
based on the law as it appears at the time, the facts as disclosed in the 
proceedings to that point, and his best judgment as to the attitudes and 
sympathies of judge and jury."

 
 

[¶102.]            
No counsel is probably not much worse than incompetent counsel. Cf. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 
Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 100 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1988) and Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th 
Cir.), cert. granted 488 U.S. 923, 
109 S. Ct. 303, 102 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1988), rev'd 492 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 83, 112 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1990). The Wisconsin process assures that counsel has looked at the 
record and considered the appeal substantively. Anders v. State of California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, reh'g 
denied 388 U.S. 924, 87 S. Ct. 2094, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1967). By its very 
nature, this could not be a first appeal issue even if in the unusual case 
appropriate there. Turner v. Company, 
827 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied 489 U.S. 1059, 109 S. Ct. 1327, 103 L. Ed. 2d 595, reh'g denied 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S. Ct. 1770, 104 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); Harris v. 
Reed, 822 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted in part 485 U.S. 934, 108 S. Ct. 1107, 99 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1988), judgment rev'd 489 U.S. 255, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989); People v. Pope, 
23 Cal. 3d 412, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859 (1979). "Typically, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal because its 
resolution often requires evidence which is not contained in the record on 
appeal." Harris, 822 F.2d  at 686. See 
comprehensive consideration in Osborn, 861 F.2d  at 626 n. 13. See also United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1988) and United States v. 
Dubray, 727 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1984).

 
 

[¶103.]            
Another problem strains forth out of this morass. This record is barren 
of any justification of why the attorney who worked on the initial appeal chose 
to disregard trial error objections originally established by Engberg's 
attorney. Lacking an evidentiary foundation for explanation to be provided by 
hearing which most courts require for ineffectiveness consideration, procedural 
default apparently anticipates that neither the adequate testimony of the client 
nor more particularly the testimony of trial counsel should be preserved for 
review. State v. Hatch, 144 Wis.2d 
810, 425 N.W.2d 27 (1988). See also 
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S. Ct. 263, 96 L. Ed. 232 
(1952). This is not the state of this appeal since the record actually shows the 
specific procedural defaults which, by definition, constitute malpractice and 
ineffectiveness whenever the omitted issue had any arguable validity in a case 
such as this death penalty appeal. On this record we can see what did not happen 
on first appeal. The federal cases teach that "when a court disposes of a 
[post-conviction relief] petition without a hearing, allegations must be 
accepted as true except to the extent they are contradicted by the record, 
inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact." 
United 
States v. Mosquera, 845 F.2d 1122, 1124 (1st 
Cir. 1988). Here, as there, absent 
requested hearing for explanation of cause for observable ineffectiveness, 
"[p]etitioner's allegations are not contradicted by the record." Id. at 1124 
(emphasis added).

 
 

[¶104.]            
At the time of Engberg's first appeal, as today, the University of Wyoming, College of Law sponsored a law school student 
defender aid program to provide students with clinical trial experience under 
the supervision of a law professor. Appellate counsel for the public defender's 
office assigned Engberg's case to that clinical program for brief writing 
assistance. Nothing of record now available on this appeal or from documentation 
furnished on the first appeal reveals who did what in issue analysis or 
preparation of appellate briefs, but relevant comparisons in scope and strength 
are informatively valuable. The direct appeal appellate brief for this death 
case cited forty-five cases, a half dozen texts and considered four issues. A 
statement of facts occupied thirty-nine pages and legal argument only seventeen 
more, not including the conclusion. In relative comparison, we are now faced 
with twenty-six numbered and subcategory issues, in a brief of 212 pages, 
citation of about 160 cases, with a singular number of pages attached in 
appendices.

 
 

[¶105.]            
The syllogism as defined within this Cutbirth - Engberg definition of 
Wyoming 
justice cannot be utilized for declination to realistically consider basic 
rights of an individual to be adequately represented. A difficult death penalty 
case with novel and significant issues was given the most cavalier treatment by 
both appellate counsel for Engberg and this court on first appeal decision. See Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty 
Trial, XVIII N.Y.U.Rev.L. & Soc. Change 273 
(1990-91).

 
 

[¶106.]            
The hard work and perceptiveness of successor appellate counsel is now 
denied effective consideration to most guilt phase questions by the majority's 
application of procedural default resulting from failure and defect of 
representation by counsel on first appeal. In result, procedural default is then 
used to deny ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. The majority uses the 
conclusion to prove the premise and then uses the premise to establish the 
appropriateness of the result determined conclusion. The anomaly of this case is 
self-illustrated, but the procedural result in substantive conclusion is far 
more disturbing. An absurdly insufficient death penalty case brief is filed 
under at least the primary responsibility of a representative of the office of 
the public defender. After that representative leaves before completion of 
appeal, rehearing is denied for an issue which should have been included in the 
initial brief. Post-conviction relief in reality becomes the only comprehensive 
and matured appellate process that this death penalty case has before and will 
now receive in the state court system.

 
 

[¶107.]            
This decision is a classic example of why I would follow the spirit of 
the post-conviction-relief statute to assure that in criminal cases, all 
legitimate legal issues relating to post-conviction relief are accorded one 
substantive review without the existentialism of cause and prejudice so that 
constitutional rights of the accused do not become synonymous with appellate 
counsel lawyer bashing and defensive rationalizations of the obvious error, 
mistake, neglect or ignorance. Williams, 849 F.2d 1134; State v. Wiley, 228 Neb. 608, 423 N.W.2d 477 (1988). How much preferable both to the justice delivery system and to this 
court would it have been if the State brief and present court could have 
substantially determined appellate issues instead of determining that prior 
counsel, for undisclosed reasons, waived those interests of Engberg by failure 
to initially present in initial appeal? I find in present context at this 
post-conviction relief juncture that Engberg has an ineffectiveness of counsel - 
conflict of interest - contention that, for whatever else may be stated, 
bypasses Cutbirth and mandatorily 
requires substantive consideration of each appellate issue presently 
offered.

 
 

[¶108.]            
Osborn, in present context, 
should teach us that much. A further difficulty exists here in that the State 
organized its order of presentations in its appeal brief differently from 
Engberg. Innumerable hours of coordination analysis is consequently required 
which is saved to the majority by procedural disposition in its constitutional 
forfeiture versus ineffectiveness of counsel dual decision. Without realistic 
attention to the real issues, I would not find, under these circumstances of 
insufficiency of representation on initial appeal, that Cutbirth is controlling since Engberg 
was neither given personal choice nor a fair hearing which would meet state or 
federal constitutional criteria. See 
Cutbirth, 751 P.2d 1257, Urbigkit, 
J., dissenting. This is not the deliberative action waiver of Coleman v. O'Leary, 845 F.2d 696 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 972, 109 S. Ct. 507, 102 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1988). See 
Hardin v. Black, 845 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1988).

 
 

[¶109.]            
As I stated in dissent in Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 
1292:

 
 
Syllogisms 
aside, neglect or deficient decision of the attorney is innately prejudicial, 
and the only question for address is to what extent and with what reasoned 
result. * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
* * * If 
pragmatism in result is justified, pragmatism in calling the procedural process 
what it is will be more appropriate in reason and logic. Knowing the fiction of 
client waiver, this court poses an irrational burden on the liberty interest of 
the client to demonstrate effectiveness where stupidity, slovenliness or just 
lack of reasoned preparation will not necessarily suffice.

 
 

[¶110.]            
The vice of Cutbirth is 
failure to recognize that procedural default, and particularly so for appellate 
counsel, does not occur in a vacuum. The action or inaction of brief writing 
counsel was either intended or unintended, negligent or slothful, misguided or 
ignorant and by definition if defaulted cannot be wise, thoughtful or 
intelligently presented. Only what is 
wrong can be defaulted; what is right cannot be. The majority has not 
afforded any facts or even viably presented contentions why brief writers on 
initial appeal in Engberg completely failed to present an adequately planned 
review as an adequate address for a death case appellate brief. Waiver of the 
omission of earlier challenge is certainly not here in issue. People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973); Wiley, 423 N.W.2d 477; Moore, 542 A.2d 106. Moreover, 
the standard of effectiveness is the same for both appellate and trial counsel. 
Thompson v. State, 525 So. 2d 816 
(Ala.Cr.App. 1984), aff'd 525 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 1985), cert. denied 488 U.S. 834, 109 S. Ct. 94, 
102 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1988); Heyward, 524 N.E.2d 15; Com. v. Knapp, 374 
Pa. Super. 
160, 542 A.2d 546 (1988).9

 
 

[¶111.]            
At a minimum in post-conviction relief, evidence addressing the subject 
should be developed before the convicted death penalty criminal is assigned the 
ultimate responsibility of execution or even now a life sentence as a direct 
result of the sins of omission or commission by counsel.10 Osborn, 861 F.2d 612. See also Osborn v. State, 806 P.2d 259 
(Wyo. 1991). In this case, cross-examination inquiry of brief writers of initial 
appeal, whoever they were and whatever they separately did, would be informative 
including time spent, research made, conferences regarding issues, effort 
expended in review of the original record, and especially why so many clearly 
developed trial time issues were casually ignored in the appeal. In context, the 
brief, as then filed, seems to have ended before it began with the foreclosed 
issue of the constitutional viability of the death penalty. I would uniformly 
and always reject procedural default absolution of legal malpractice - 
ineffectiveness of counsel - unless the record is clear on its face that neither 
ineffectiveness nor malpractice existed, or unless alternatively, the record is 
comprehensively developed in post-conviction proceedings. Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609 
(1985), reh'g denied 785 F.2d 1037 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied 477 U.S. 905, 106 S. Ct. 3275, 91 L. Ed. 2d 565, reh'g denied 478 U.S. 1032, 107 S. Ct. 12, 92 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1986). As currently witnessed in Jurek, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950, and 
more recently revisited in Franklin v. 
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 101 L. Ed. 2d 155, reh'g denied 487 U.S. 1263, 109 S. Ct. 25, 101 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1988) death case brief writing is a proper responsibility 
for the dedicated, experienced specialist and perhaps not for the willing, 
thoughtful, but untrained college law student.11

 
 

[¶112.]            
It is in the nature of a recognition of practical experience and training 
as related to competency that Rule 1.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys at Law was provided. This subject was specifically 
addressed in United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648, 653-54, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2043, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984) (quoting from 
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n. 14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970)) (footnotes 
omitted):

 
 
     An accused's right to 
be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice 
system. Lawyers in criminal cases "are necessities, not luxuries." Their 
presence is essential because they are the means through which the other rights 
of the person on trial are secured. Without counsel, the right to a trial itself 
would be "of little avail," as this Court has recognized repeatedly. "Of all the 
rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by 
far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he 
may have."

 
 
     The special value of 
the right to the assistance of counsel explains why "[i]t has long been 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel."

 
 

[¶113.]            
The relationship of constitutional right to counsel has been 
intrinsically woven into the fabric of American society since at least the 
clarion call of Justice Sutherland in Powell, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55. Not 
only must we be concerned with the competency of counsel, but also the level of 
effective assistance from that "competent" attorney. Procedural default in 
appellate brief omission is the anathema of both performance and competency. 
Being merely a spectator does not suffice in the death penalty adjudicatory 
process for the defense counsel. Smith, 777 F.2d 609. Reasonable 
competence and undivided loyalty is required. Williams, 849 F.2d 1134; Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 908, 109 S. Ct. 260, 102 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1988). As is well-stated generally and with 
specificity by Judge Seymour in Osborn, 861 F.2d  at 624 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063):

 
 
"The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result."

 
 

[¶114.]            
That ineffectiveness shown was so egregious that the defendant was in 
effect denied meaningful assistance in the appellate representation. Cf. Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897, 901 n. 
5 (11th Cir. 1984), as a chronic failure as well as a conceptual investigation 
of the Strickland, 466 U.S. 668,000 
104 S. Ct. 2052 delineation. This is not totally different from the "failure to 
participate * * * deliberate trial tactic * * *." Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th 
Cir. 1984). In like accord, see Broomhall 
I, 374 N.W.2d 845 and Broomhall 
II, 417 N.W.2d 349. As there, my imagination does not stretch sufficiently 
here to justify any strategy for the omitted presentation of appellate issues on 
initial appeal. This is not dissimilar to trial counsel failure to present 
mitigative circumstance of mental defect. Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, reh'g denied 849 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied 488 U.S. 872, 109 S. Ct. 189, 102 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1988); Wilson v. 
Butler, 813 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S. Ct. 1059, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1021, reh'g denied 
485 U.S. 1015, 108 S. Ct. 1491, 99 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1988); Smith v. Martin, 37 Ohio App.3d 213, 525 N.E.2d 521 (1987). See also Com. v. 
Rounds, 518 Pa. 204, 542 A.2d 997 (1988) (failure to object to testimony of 
expert witness). See likewise on the conflict of interest denigration of 
representation, People v. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d 712, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490 (1988).

 
 

[¶115.]            
In Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 
Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court related that an appeal omission 
was by counsel, not client:

 
 
The 
allegations of ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel, if true, 
would warrant a finding that the omission in the prior postconviction proceeding 
of the allegations now being raised anew by Palmer was not a result of an 
active, knowing choice made by Palmer through this prior court-appointed 
attorney, and would therefore provide sufficient reason for permitting the newly 
asserted allegations to be raised in the instant petition. Other jurisdictions 
have similarly held that a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
or prior postconviction counsel provides sufficient reason to permit newly 
asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding. 
See Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420 
(Iowa 1980); Curtis v. State, 37 Md. 
App. 459, 381 A.2d 1166 (1978) rev'd on 
other grounds, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Stewart v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 
92 Nev. 588, 555 P.2d 218 (1976).

 
 

[¶116.]            
Engberg has not been given any post-trial demonstration of any reasonably 
arguable, realistic and plausible, or academically premised tactical choice 
justifying appellate counsel's failure to present appropriate appellate issues 
as so easily perceived and comprehensively presented in this present 
proceeding.12 I will not subscribe to or accept the 
dual standard of attorney competency performance recently attributed to the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:

 
 
The court's 
approach to the performance of trial counsel depends on the context. In claims 
by the petitioner of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court was content 
with extremely low standards for trial counsel. On the other hand, in claims by 
the state that a claim is barred by a procedural default by the defendant's 
trial counsel, the Fifth Circuit held trial lawyers to a very strict 
standard.

 
 
Floyd, Survey, Criminal Procedure, 22 Tex.Tech 
L.Rev. 493, 525 (1991) (footnote omitted). See also Coyle, Effective Assistance: Just a Nominal 
Right?, 12 Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, No. 40, at 42.

 
 

[¶117.]            
In comprehensive research, although confined to trial as I would 
recognize to be applicable to appeal, the author considered and concluded in 
part in Goodpaster, supra, 58 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 360 (footnotes omitted):

 
 
     This discussion leads 
to the conclusion that, absent some kind of capital case attorney certification 
system, there is no feasible way to insure attorney competence in advance of 
trial. Direct and collateral postconviction review, as inefficient and 
inadequate as they may be, remain the best means of vindicating a capital 
defendant's right to the effective assistance of a competent attorney. The only 
issues regarding such review are its nature and what specific competency 
standards it is to apply.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     In a capital case, 
defense counsel has duties and functions definably different from counsel in 
ordinary criminal cases. The Constitution requires great reliability and 
individualization in capital sentencing and gives a capital defendant the right 
to present his sentencer with any mitigating evidence [expert presentation on 
appeal] that might save his life. These particular sentencing requirements shape 
capital duties and functions and provide the basis for defining "reasonably 
competent counsel" in capital cases.13

 
 

See 
also Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction 
Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 Am.U.L.Rev. 513 
(1988).

 
 

[¶118.]            
In analysis by Geimer and Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative 
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am.J.Crim.L. 1, 53 (1988) 
(quoting from an undisclosed source), we learn that defense counsel performance 
is indeed significant in the outcome as related by a juror in a death case where 
execution resulted:

 
 
"I 
shouldn't say it, but I feel it in my heart and always have, his lawyer left a 
lot to be desired. I realize he was hired by the state to do a job and probably 
not paid much. . . . I didn't mention it at the jury room but I think he was not 
determined enough. He didn't try enough and that affected the jury. They had 
less sympathy, I guess. I mean, clearly he was guilty, but there were times 
that, and I know I'm not a lawyer, but even I know, times when he should have 
been on his feet and he wasn't. That's sad because even if (defendant) was a 
sorry one, he deserved a trial and someone to care for him and look out for 
him."

 
 
Of similar 
conclusion, see Tabak, The Death of 
Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 
1980s, 14 N.Y.U.Rev.L. & Soc. Change 797, 848 (1986), as an item in 
verse description, and then to recite as ineffectiveness:

 
 
Too many 
attorneys for capital defendants, due to a combination of inexperience and lack 
of time and resources, fail to mount adequate defenses, particularly in 
sentencing proceedings.

 
 
Tabak then 
concludes in effect that the death penalty system is not working and should be 
abolished for the arbitrary and capricious way in which it operates. See also Sevilla, Investigating and Preparing an Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claim, 37 Mercer L.Rev. 927 (1986) and particularly 
footnote three thereof. Likewise informative is Ruthenbeck, You Don't Have to Lose Your Shirt on Death 
Penalty Cases, ABA Criminal Justice, Spring 1988, at 
10.

 
 

[¶119.]            
Of even more concern in effectiveness consideration and the need for 
particular expertise is Amsterdam, The 
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 14 Human Rights 14 (1987), where the 
author discerns that the death-proneness in the United States means that system 
protection is less - not more - than in other cases, and consequently, that a 
higher level of counsel expertise is required. See Catz, The Death Penalty and Federal Habeas Corpus: 
A Modest Legislative Proposal, 20 Conn.L.Rev. 895 (1988) and Ledewitz, supra, 24 Crim.L. Bull. 
379.

 
 

[¶120.]            
The level of our state's ignorance or inattention is more starkly 
reflected in the Goodpaster article where, in footnote, he relates to the 
Wyoming home 
grown variety:

 
 
Some 
experienced criminal trial counsel simply do not understand the nature or 
significance of the penalty trial in a capital case. In Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 
(Wyo. 1981), 
for example, defense counsel competently conducted the guilt phase trial of a 
complex and lengthy capital case. Before the penalty trial, however, when asked 
by the trial judge how much time he would need for the sentencing hearing, 
counsel replied: "Two minutes. I'm serious. I have been in this position 
probably more than anybody in this room, multiplied by 5, okay, and there ain't 
nothing you can say. They [the jury] will do what they want and there is no 
point." Id. at 197 n. 13 
(Rose, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).

 
 
Goodpaster, 
supra, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 303-04 n. 
22. Neither Engberg nor the large volume of death cases, which by some 
statistics are reversed at least in part nearly fifty percent of the time, can 
afford the luxury and attitude that "appellate courts increasingly find 
themselves questioning the competency of appellate counsel who are questioning 
the competency of trial counsel." People 
v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391, 395 (1974). See Radelet & Mello, Executing Those Who Kill Blacks: An Unusual 
Case Study, 37 Mercer L.Rev. 911 (1986) and Tabak, supra, 14 N.Y.U.Rev.L. & Soc. Change 
797. Those authors reflect the obvious fact that the escalated and pervasive 
ineffectiveness challenges are the direct result of the arbitrary elimination of 
rights of the defendant by virtue of counsel conduct, unapproved and usually 
unknown to the client. Since the criminal defendant facing a death penalty lives 
or dies with the character of legal representation, he is called to question the 
justice delivery system if substantial mistake of his attorney is beyond review. 
Although differing only as trial counsel, the factual array of failure of 
representation found in United States ex 
rel. Kubat v. Thieret, 679 F. Supp. 788 (N.D.Ill. 1988) is disturbingly 
similar to the service afforded Engberg on his appeal. Reliance on mercy is not 
sufficient.

 
 

[¶121.]            
Although conviction review by a post-conviction-relief proceeding 
searches for constitutional right violations which ordinarily considers errors 
of law, questions of ineffective assistance of counsel address the "`fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.'" State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 
(Iowa 1987) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069). See 
People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2632, 110 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1990) 
and Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817 
(Ind. 1989). 
See also Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, reh'g denied 885 F.2d 877 (11th 
Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1011, 110 S. Ct. 573, 107 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1989) and Fitzpatrick v. 
McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 203, 107 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1989).

 
 

[¶122.]            
The review is de novo, Mannhalt, 847 F.2d 576, considering the 
totality of the circumstances in application of a prescription that counsel 
performed competently. Van Hoff v. 
State, 447 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa App. 1989). The search is for a full and fair 
review, Martin v. Dugger, 891 F.2d 807 (1989), reh'g denied 898 F.2d 160 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 222, 112 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1990), and the right to counsel is the 
right to effective assistance of counsel which is for this case to provide 
proper appellate review. State v. 
Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989) (citing and quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2063). Obviously, the measure of an advocate's competency depends on the task 
to be accomplished. The best intentions and the most devoted of efforts do not 
necessarily equate with capital competence. We expect capital defense (or 
appellate) counsel to have an expertise regarding the specific considerations 
present in capital cases. Davis, 561 A.2d  
at 1089.

 
 

[¶123.]            
This present proceeding comes from the failure of Engberg's appellate 
counsel to discuss, by inclusion in the initial appeal, well matured contentions 
of trial court errors. Strickland, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052. This appeal is essentially presented with 
dispositive questions whether Engberg's life and death trial issues, which were 
then identified by objection, could now be waived by incompetently performing 
appellate counsel by issue exclusion from the Engberg I appeal. Smith, 547 N.E.2d 817. A simple 
comparison of the post-conviction brief with the initial appellate brief relates 
the entire story.

 
 

[¶124.]            
The answer is provided by assessment of what did occur at trial, did 
error happen and was it prejudicial. Smith, 547 N.E.2d 817. Proper review 
requires us now to consider substantive trial issues and their effect on the 
fairness of the trial to assess whether Engberg was provided the 
constitutionally required competent counsel for first appeal when those trial 
objections were apparently disregarded. It is to be recognized that a 
constitutional error committed in a criminal proceeding is not harmless unless 
the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable 
jury would not have reached the same conclusion about the error. State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32, 750 P.2d 632 
(1988).14 See Johnson v. State, 806 P.2d 1282 
(Wyo. 1991), Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting; Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) and Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh'g 
denied 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 1283, 18 L. Ed. 2d 241 
(1967).

 
 

[¶125.]            
It can be found by case analysis that habeas corpus reversals in federal 
courts for ineffectiveness of counsel in state courts demonstrate normally that 
an equal or greater failure of appellate counsel compared to trial counsel can 
be found if a proper appeal was ever originally taken. Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440, reh'g granted and opinion vacated 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1990); Chambers v. 
Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 369, 112 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1990); Murphy v. 
Puckett, 893 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1990); Nixon v. Newsome, 888 F.2d 112 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Harrison v. Jones, 880 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1989); Fitzpatrick, 869 F.2d 1247.

 
 

[¶126.]            
Whether an attorney has rendered effective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of law and fact reversible de novo on appeal. Fitzpatrick, 869 F.2d  at 1251; Mannhalt, 847 F.2d 576. See also Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper 
Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S.Cal. 
L.Rev. 235 (1991). The same standard applies to both trial and appellate 
counsel. Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F.2d 1430, 1435 (11th Cir. 1987). In the state courts, the rule is identically 
structured in an astronomical number of cases. Cacatian v. State, 70 Haw. 402, 772 P.2d 691 (1989); State v. Bryant, 237 N.J. 
Super. 102, 567 A.2d 212 (1988), rev'd 117 N.J. 495, 569 A.2d 770 (1990); 
State v. Burgins, 44 Ohio App.3d 158, 542 N.E.2d 707 (1988); Com. v. Melson, 383 Pa. Super. 139, 556 A.2d 836 (1989); Grier v. State, 299 S.C. 
321, 384 S.E.2d 722 (1989); Long v. 
State, 764 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App. 1989); Pennington v. State, 768 S.W.2d 740 
(Tex. App. 
1988).

 
 

[¶127.]            
I revisit the enormity of the problem presented for justice by this 
court's pathway from Cutbirth v. 
State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983); Amin, 774 P.2d 597; Kallas, 776 P.2d 198 through Murray, 776 P.2d 206 in an effort to 
directly face the simple axiom that procedural default - constitutional or 
otherwise - in counseled trial processes cannot occur without counsel mistake. 
If it exists to be defaulted, it was 
created by mistake. It is far better to look first at the conduct instead of 
reaching for the absolution by characterization to try to sweep under the rug 
where justice is not to be found. Compare Meders v. State, 260 Ga. 49, 389 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1990) in which the Supreme Court granted remand for a current and 
immediate hearing to examine ineffectiveness of counsel following the wise request of counsel for the 
state. Understanding the constitutional requirement involved, I will move to 
the Engberg substantive issues in appellate review.

 
 
V.

 
 
GUILT PHASE 
ISSUES

 
 
A. Errors Contended

 
 

[¶128.]            
In present appeal, the guilt phase issues presented 
include:

 
 
1. In open 
court, Engberg's wife was presented by the State as its witness after Engberg's 
waiver of interspousal privilege and, in the presence of the jury, she was given 
the election not to testify;

 
 
2. Engberg 
was consequently denied the right to call his wife as his 
witness;

 
 
3. After 
invocation by his wife of a privilege not to testify, Engberg was also denied 
introduction of her statements to a third party as inadmissible 
hearsay;

 
 
4. Denial 
of the right by Engberg to present a witness to provide expert testimony on the 
validity of eyewitness identification at the crime scene; 
and

 
 
5. 
Attempted hypnotism of the principal identifying witness had not been revealed 
to Engberg until after conviction when first discovered during 
post-conviction-relief investigation.

 
 

[¶129.]            
Cursory consideration will then be given for bad acts evidence of being 
badly beaten by police officers at the time of arrest, which is contended to be 
evidence of fleeing and constituting evidence of guilt, and bad acts evidence of 
the use of an alias. Further included will be the introduction of evidence of 
events at the Nevada hospital where Engberg was taken 
following his injury during arrest. This testimony discussed his refusal to put 
on a stocking cap for a photograph in the absence of and without advice of the 
right to an attorney and was introduced for primary proof substantively 
demonstrating the attempt to avoid detection as evidence of guilt. This will be 
followed by subsequent denial of the trial right of Engberg to introduce the 
doctor's statement concerning delusional state when photographed in the hospital 
bed without the cap. Finally, Engberg was denied cross-examination of the police 
officer about his injured and delusional condition during the photography 
session.

 
 
B. The Refusal by the Trial Court to Allow 
Engberg the Right to Call His Wife as a Witness

 
 

[¶130.]            
A principal issue presented involves Engberg's challenge of the trial 
court decision to deny him the right to call his wife as a witness. I would 
reverse on this obvious and clearly significant error.

 
 

[¶131.]            
In oral argument before this court, the State's appellate counsel related 
that "[o]n the issue of spousal 
privilege, it is our position that there was probable error here in the 
exclusion of the spouse's testimony." (Emphasis added.) The State then 
explains the exclusion to have been harmless error. I conclude the denial of the 
testimony to be not only erroneous, but prejudicially harmful. It does not even 
come close to the constitutional criteria for harmless error. It not only may 
have but probably did have an effect on the decision of the jury. See Jones, 777 P.2d 54. Accord Limbaugh v. State, 549 So. 2d 582 
(Ala.Cr.App. 1989) and Cooper v. 
State, 769 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App. 1989). The prosecutor's opening 
statement discussed Engberg's Las Vegas arrest 
and claimed Donna Engberg fingered her husband for the Casper murder. The opening 
statement by Engberg's attorney denied that claim and indicated the defense 
would produce evidence at trial to show the prosecution was wrong. That intended 
proof was circumvented when the State successfully invited Engberg's wife to 
assert her privilege not to testify. She complied.15 The issue environment for jury 
understanding had been prejudicially created without evidence and Engberg was then 
denied opportunity to contest or defend.

 
 

[¶132.]            
On October 25, 1982, Engberg's counsel moved "to sup[p]ress testimony by 
his spouse as such testimony is completely inadmiss[i]ble by reason of Wyo. 
Stat.Ann. * * *." At a subsequent hearing on November 17, 1982, the subject was 
again addressed:

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: 
Okay, Your Honor, we want - I think this motion for disclosure of informer is 
the easiest one. The State of Wyoming in its pretrial memorandum stated they 
have an informer and I don't know who the informer is.

 
 
     It would be paragraph 
8(k), use of informer. There was an informer involved and I would assume from 
the giggle at counsel table over here that it was, probably, Donna Engberg, but 
I want to make sure.

 
 
     [Prosecution Counsel]: 
His assumption is correct, Your Honor.

 
 
     THE COURT: That's 
correct, Mr. Skaggs; that takes care of that.

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: We 
have a ruling on that, that it is disclosed as Donna 
Engberg?

 
 
     THE COURT: Yes, 
counsel.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: 
Now, Your Honor, you have not made a motion - let's see - let's take up an 
easier one first. We have filed a motion to suppress the testimony of one Donna 
Engberg who just happens to be the wife of Roy Lee Engberg. I am at that time - 
at this time going to withdraw that motion. We have been given a notice of 
hearsay statements by Donna Engberg, so it's apparent that if the State of 
Wyoming cannot 
force her to testify, they will just simply rely on this hearsay statement that 
they have already obtained from her which may or may not be admissible; I don't 
know. I haven't looked into it far enough, but I am going to withdraw the motion 
to suppress her testimony and at this time will give notice that I will consent 
to her being allowed to be called in the State's case in 
chief.

 
 
     At this time I would 
respectfully give notice that I am going to object to the use of hearsay 
statements upon my withdrawal of the motion to suppress her 
testimony.

 
 
     THE COURT: 
Okay.

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: So 
that part of my pretrial memorandum where I said we would rely on that, I'm 
going to drop that. It's an interesting issue, what would come up if we were 
forced into the issue of spousal testimony, whether or not her hearsay 
statements would be admissible; it would be interesting.

 
 

[¶133.]            
On November 4, 1982, the State had a subpoena served on Donna Engberg In Gothenburg, Nebraska.16 

 
 

[¶134.]            
The trial panorama then developed in mid-trial:

 
 
     [Prosecution Counsel]: 
As the Court is aware, the next witness we intend to call is Donna Engberg, the 
wife of the Defendant, and we are now here in chambers and the Defendant is 
present with his attorneys and we want to make it absolutely clear on the record 
that they are willing to waive any privilege or immunity for the wife to testify 
and agree to allow her to testify.

 
 
     THE COURT: Mr. 
Skaggs?

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: 
Okay, Your Honor, at this particular point, we have advised our Defendant - with 
respect to this particular problem, we have advised him that it is his absolute 
right to claim spousal immunity and prevent her from testifying. We have further 
advised our client that if he elects to claim spousal immunity, there is a 
chance of the hearsay statements from Las Vegas to Officer Jim Cooper becoming 
available for use by the prosecution under the witness unavailable exception to 
the hearsay rule. Those statements are extremely damaging in themselves. We have 
reason to believe that she may change her testimony to some degree from those 
statements of benefit to Roy. Secondly, we have advised Roy of Wyoming 
Supreme Court decisions that indicate if the Defendant were to claim spousal 
immunity the prosecution could comment in closing on the Defendant's failure to 
call his wife as a witness. Those factors mitigated against claiming any spousal 
immunity. Roy, 
at this time, do you wish to assert the privilege of spousal 
immunity?

 
 
     THE DEFENDANT: No, go 
as you suggested, Wyatt. Let her get on the stand.

 
 
      THE COURT: 
You're saying, Mr. Engberg, that you are waiving spousal 
immunity?

 
 
     THE DEFENDANT: That is 
really the only alternative, isn't it?

 
 
     THE COURT: Well, I am 
not -

 
 
     THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I 
will waive. 

 
 
     THE COURT: Okay, we 
will convene in about five minutes, folks.

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: 
Your Honor, at this time we would request that after her testimony on       direct, we 
all have a recess so we can go over her testimony.

 
 
     THE COURT: I have no 
problems with that.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     [Prosecution Counsel]: 
* * * The State calls Donna Engberg.

 
 
DONNA 
ENGBERG

 
 
having been 
called as a witness by the State, was first duly sworn and testified as follows, 
to wit:

 
 
DIRECT 
EXAMINATION

 
 
BY 
[Prosecution Counsel]:

 
 
Q. For the 
record, could you please tell the Court and jury your 
name?

 
 
A. Donna 
Engberg.

 
 
Q. Where do 
you reside?

 
 
A. 
Gothenb[u]rg, Nebraska.

 
 
Q. Mrs. 
Engberg, you are the wife of the Defendant, Roy Engberg, are you 
not?

 
 
A. 
Yes.

 
 
Q. Is it 
your wish to testify in this case?

 
 
A. 
No.

 
 
Q. Are you 
willing to testify in this case?

 
 
A. Not if I 
don't have to.

 
 
Q. Mrs. 
Engberg, you know, that is your choice to make and we are asking you now what 
choice you want to make in this case, whether you want to testify or 
not?

 
 
A. No, I 
don't.

 
 
     [Prosecution Counsel]: 
May we approach the bench, Your Honor?

 
 
THE COURT: 
You may.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     THE COURT: Mr. Guetz, 
she doesn't want to testify.

 
 
     [Prosecution Counsel]: 
We can't force her to.

 
 
     THE COURT: No, you 
can't force her to.

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: I 
want the opportunity to cross-examine her and assert the immunity on every 
question.

 
 
     THE COURT: You want 
what?

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: I 
want the opportunity to cross-examine her and assert the immunity on every 
question.

 
 
     THE COURT: I don't 
think if she refused to testify that - I would ask you, Mr. Guetz, to explain to 
her clearly that she has spousal immunity and she doesn't have to 
testify.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: I oppose that. She does not have the privilege. Roy has the 
privilege.

 
 
     THE COURT: She can 
assert the privilege.

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: 
Your Honor, under case law, it's Roy's privilege to assert, not 
hers.

 
 
     THE COURT: Under the 
more recent rule, she can assert the immunity herself. Absolutely, she can 
assert that immunity on her own.

 
 

[¶135.]            
The trial court was misadvised when it applied the federal Trammel rule on testimonial privilege 
which says "the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify 
adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from 
testifying." Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 100 S. Ct. 906, 914, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980). "Testimonial privilege" prevents a spouse from testifying 
against the other. A "confidential communication privilege" prevents testimony 
which would reveal what was said in marital confidence.17

 
 

[¶136.]            
The trial court should have applied Wyoming law found in W.S. 
1-12-104:

 
 
    No husband or wife shall be 
a witness against the other except in criminal proceedings for a crime committed 
by one against the other, or in a civil action or proceeding by one against the 
other. They may in all civil and criminal cases be witnesses for each other the 
same as though the marital relation did not exist.

 
 

[¶137.]            
This Wyoming statute has remained substantively 
unchanged since enacted in 1899. W.S. § 3681 (1899); Note, Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases, 19 
Wyo.L.J. 35, 40 (1964). Direct consideration or at least implication of the 
issue of spousal testimony in Wyoming cases is found in Biggs v. State, 13 Wyo. 94, 77 P. 901 
(1904); Strand v. State, 36 Wyo. 78, 
252 P. 1030 (1927); Fox v. Fox, 75 
Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252 (1956); State v. 
Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551 (1956); Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 
1960); Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516 
(Wyo.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 886, 93 S. Ct. 104, 34 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1972); Pike v. 
State, 495 P.2d 1188 (Wyo. 1972); Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 
1978); and Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

[¶138.]            
It is obvious that these cases afford no support for the present decision 
unless the second sentence of the law is disregarded.18 To analyze the explicit Wyoming statute in 
relation to this case requires consideration of due process, constitutional 
fairness, or even whether any clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated by 
the trial court's rejection of the testimony which was compounded by appellate 
counsel's failure to present the issue on original appeal. Specifically, in 
close review of each one of these prior Wyoming 
cases, there is nothing in Wyoming law and precedent to state that a wife 
has a privilege not to testify when affirmatively requested to testify by her 
husband in a criminal prosecution.

 
 

[¶139.]            
Among these numerous prior cases, W.S. 1-12-104 was considered in Amin, 695 P.2d 1021 in the context of a 
joint trial invoking spousal testimony in her own defense. This court settled 
the statutory violation problem in coerced result by first noting that privilege 
was not presented in objection to trial joinder and then concluding that the 
wife's testimony was not, in that court's present conception, exculpatory, 
although actually placing her husband at the scene with an availability of a gun 
for an armed robbery charge. Amin 
simply cannot support the present decision on the application of the Wyoming privilege statute 
as affording a right to the witness-spouse to refuse to testify when approved 
and requested to do so by the defendant. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2242 
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Consequently, this present post-trial construction of 
W.S. 1-12-104, which is now adopted, develops a differentiated application that 
has never been accepted in any prior 
Wyoming 
case.

 
 

[¶140.]            
Argument that the legislature intended to make the privilege available to 
both the witness-spouse and the party-spouse is unsupported by case law or 
apparent statutory text. Since Engberg wanted to call his wife as a witness, 
there was no privilege for Donna Engberg to exercise and avoid testifying. 
Engberg was denied the constitutional right to call a potentially beneficial 
witness and was also denied due process under both the Wyoming and federal 
constitutions. After the education of the jury had been completed by 
prosecutorial opening statements, response and contradiction by Engberg became a 
problem of high stakes and compelling significance for any attack on the 
eyewitness identification case structure to hope to achieve an acquittal. 
Realistically by opening statement and trial presentation, Donna Engberg became 
a prosecutorial witness with a persuasion that Engberg could not diminish or 
defeat by any validly submitted actual evidence.

 
 
     While the admission of 
the wife's testimony in a criminal case where her husband is defendant is error 
per se unless coming under the exceptions of § 1-142 [W.S. 1-12-104], and 
circumstances determine whether or not it is prejudicial, nevertheless in view 
of the potential reversible error, no valid reason can be conceived why a trial 
court would admit the evidence of a spouse contrary to the directions of that 
statute.

 
 

Pike, 495 P.2d  
at 1189 n. 2. There is nothing in Wyoming law to support the claim that a wife 
has a privilege not to testify when requested to do so by her husband in a 
criminal prosecution.

 
 

[¶141.]            
In the circumstance of this case, since Engberg elected to permit the 
testimony as intended to be favorable by whomever presented, there was no 
privilege previously provided by Wyoming law for Donna Engberg to exercise in 
denial of his right to have admissible and singularly important defense 
evidence. Consequently, Engberg, as husband, was denied a constitutional right 
to a witness and also denied due process under both the Wyoming and federal 
constitutions. It is said with compelling logic in 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2241 at 
254:

 
 
     But taking the other 
suggested reason for the privilege, namely, immunity from the repugnant 
situation of being condemned by one's spouse or of becoming the instrument of a 
spouse's condemnation * * *, the privilege seems to be equally that of party and of witness.

 
 
The trial 
court's adoption of the Trammel rule 
renders the Wyoming statute meaningless if the wife can 
elect not to testify for her husband when corrosive prosecutorial pressure is 
applied. With the explicit state statute in place, adoption of the inapplicable 
federal Trammel rule becomes 
reversible error.

 
 

[¶142.]            
Wyoming 
is not the only jurisdiction to reject the Trammel rule. The Texas court distinguished 
and disregarded Trammel in relying on 
their state statute in Young v. 
State, 603 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980). Similarly said in Montana:

 
 
     Whatever merit this 
view may possess [Trammel], it 
applies only in the federal courts and is contrary to the statutory law of 
Montana. Our 
duty is to construe the law as we find it. * * * Absent constitutional or 
statutory infirmities, this Court is not empowered to change the statutory law 
of this state.

 
 

State v. 
Roberts, 633 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Mont. 1981). See also State 
v. Shafer, 609 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1980); State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 
1979); and State v. Evans, 170 W. Va. 
3, 287 S.E.2d 922 (1982). It was recognized "[i]n Michigan, for well over a 
century, the spousal privilege has been controlled by statute." People v. Wadkins, 101 Mich. App. 272, 
300 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1980). See People v. 
VerMeulen, 432 Mich. 32, 438 N.W.2d 36 (1989). See also People v. Hamacher, 432 
Mich. 157, 438 N.W.2d 43 (1989); People v. Thompson, 111 Mich. App. 324, 314 N.W.2d 606 (1981); and Note, People v. 
Hamacher: The Parameters of Privileged Marital Communications, 1990 
Det.C.L.Rev. 177 (1990). Consider also the prosecutorial use under W.R.E. 
804(b)(6) and 803(24) in State v. 
Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1987).

 
 

[¶143.]            
Kentucky recognizes two separate statutory 
limitations on husband-wife testimony. One is disclosure of confidential 
communication and the second is privilege to refuse to testify. Although 
different in text from Wyoming, the statutory system is controlled. 
Estes v. Com., 744 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 
1987). Cf. Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 768 (Ind.), appeal 
dismissed 459 U.S. 808, 103 S. Ct. 33, 74 L. Ed. 2d 47, reh'g denied 459 U.S. 1059, 103 S. Ct. 479, 74 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1982), where only "privileged communication" is 
recognized.

 
 

[¶144.]            
After first recognizing that the error in form and substance is 
unquestioned, it becomes a bizarre recreation of the trial events to absolve the 
improper decision of the trial court by charging defendant's trial counsel with 
procedural default. Any such argument is misplaced in suggesting that for 
Engberg to protect the record against the error committed when the State called 
his wife to the stand in front of the jury, Jones, 777 P.2d 54, that he thereafter 
had to recall her again in his case to re-emphasize the prejudicial effect on 
the jury by her second election not to testify. No factual basis for charging 
trial counsel with this constitutional forfeiture by procedural default is found 
in trial events unless we ignore Engberg's continued effort to obtain the 
testimony of Donna Engberg. Obviously, to reach that answer to excuse the trial 
error, it is necessary to attach the procedural default failure and mistake to 
trial counsel. That would be novel both factually and in briefing for this case. 
Even if we adopt the convoluted construction of these facts argued by the State, 
then either appellate counsel had a duty to raise the failure as an 
ineffectiveness contention on initial appeal or that status is now properly 
before us as ineffectiveness of counsel, which has never been suggested by any 
prior brief writer, Engberg, the State or this court on initial appeal. 
Actually, there was no notice of objection failure of any significance by trial 
counsel and to suggest otherwise now in decision is highly 
inappropriate.

 
 
C. What the Record and Totality of Procedures 
Established

 
 

[¶145.]            
The majority, in present decision, converts what was confused and 
confessed error into a non-argued and non-briefed conclusion to disregard the 
error. First, in the face of the specific ruling of the trial court that Donna 
Engberg would not testify, the defense thereafter had to again call her to the 
stand to be protected from something in the nature of "waived error" so that the 
trial court would make the same ruling. This contention belies recognition that 
the federal rules and succeeding Wyoming rules now in effect for more than a 
quarter of a century were intended to eliminate this kind of needless 
regurgitation in pointless process and procedure. See W.R.C.P. 1. Additionally, 
trial counsel should have been able to rely on the trial court's statement that 
"Donna Engberg has used her privilege" and believe that the trial court meant 
what was said; that the issue was decided as repeated by the trial court in 
answer to the State's objection to the offer of proof and hearsay introduction. 
Denial to Engberg of his wife's testimony was disastrous as the case developed 
from opening statement into other testimony intimating his involvement. In basic 
terms, the denial to Engberg of any testimony from his wife contravenes the 
posture of Washington v. State of 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967), defining the 
right of the accused defendant to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in 
his behalf. See Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
10.

 
 

[¶146.]            
The federal approach which misdirected the trial court started with Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 
79 S. Ct. 136, 3 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1958), holding modified sub nom. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 
100 S. Ct. 906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980), where conviction was reversed after the 
government used defendant's wife as a witness over his privilege objection based 
on a common law premise and construction. Justice Stewart, in concurrence, 
contended that the privilege should be that of the witness and not of the 
accused and said that "[u]nder such a rule the defendant in a criminal case 
could not prevent his wife from testifying against him, but she could not be 
compelled to do so." Id. 358 U.S.  at 82, 79 S. Ct.  at 141. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which did not apparently like 
its reversal in Hawkins, sent Trammel to the United States Supreme 
Court by denial of error in a co-conspirator spouse case where immunity was 
granted to the wife and she then elected, pursuant to her immunity, to testify 
over the husband's claimed privilege objection. Substantively, the common law 
evaluation was pursued.

 
 
     The various judicial 
utterances on the matter of the exercise of the privilege establish that the 
privilege belongs to the party spouse 
against whom the other is offered as a witness; however, it is firmly 
established that the privilege also belongs to the witness spouse.

 
 

United 
States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. 
granted 440 U.S. 934, 99 S. Ct. 1277, 59 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1979), aff'd 445 U.S. 40, 100 S. Ct. 906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980) (emphasis in original).

 
 

[¶147.]            
The United States Supreme Court authenticates its decision for federal 
law within historical perspective, changed mores, and review of the common law 
as adverse to limited testimony for the non-statutory purposes of federal rules 
of evidence. "Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified 
so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; 
the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying." 
Trammel, 445 U.S.  at 53, 100 S. Ct.  at 914.

 
 

[¶148.]            
No principle or concept was utilized in decision which applied to state 
rules of evidence or specific state statutes on privilege. See Evans, 287 S.E.2d 922. Also not 
considered was the exercise of the privilege by the witness-spouse when the 
accused in seeking her testimony, specifically withdrew any privilege.19 See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir. 1976), where the activities of the prosecution "convinced" the 
witness as defendant's girlfriend to take the fifth amendment rather than 
testify in favor of defendant as a denial of the constitutional right which 
affords the opportunity to call a defense witness. See likewise United States v. Hammond, 
598 F.2d 1008, reh'g 605 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979) and United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 
(6th Cir. 1973).

 
 

[¶149.]            
In this case, we consider and apply an explicit Wyoming statute and not 
an abstract and attacked "sentimental relic" or "reasoned historical principle." 
Since the Wyoming privilege is not the 
provence of the federal judicial system, 
neither is it the right of the Wyoming courts to ignore what the legislature 
has provided as an established standard which has now existed for most of a 
century. VerMeulen, 438 N.W.2d 36. In 
the crucible of this case from opinion statement to appearance of this witness 
before the jury as the State's last witness, communicated prejudice from denied 
availability is undeniable. Whatever the testimony might have been, Engberg 
clearly expected it to be preferable to whatever the police officer from 
Las Vegas would 
say Donna Engberg said when she filed the January complaint against her 
husband.

 
 

[¶150.]            
To conclude to the contrary directly violates the constitutional rights 
of the defendant to present relevant testimony addressed by Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987). See also 
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 109 S. Ct. 480, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1988); 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798, reh'g denied 485 U.S. 983, 108 S. Ct. 1283, 99 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1988); and Washington, 388 U.S. 14. We then 
have a further and even more serious defect, constitutional in nature, created 
by the majority's decision in justification of the denial to the accused of 
desired testimony of his wife. The denial of Engberg's access to the testimony 
denies a right to adequately defend and forecloses an interest protected by both 
state and federal constitutions (Sixth Amendment). Exculpatory testimony desired 
for use by Engberg was rejected by this decision. The right to defend including 
introduction of available material testimony has been addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Rock, further 
considered in Olden and Taylor and is controlling and decisive. 
Clearly, on this simple yet direct constitutional basis, Engberg's conviction 
resulted from his denial of Sixth Amendment rights to defend. Reversal is, as a 
result, constitutionally required.

 
 
D. Use of Secondary Evidence From an "Unavailable 
Witness"

 
 

[¶151.]            
Since the testimony of Donna Engberg by direct examination had been 
denied, Engberg's counsel raised the subject again: 

 
 
     [Defense Counsel]: 
Okay, now, Your Honor, we would have an offer of proof related to Donna Engberg. 
We would offer at this particular time - and I have Janet Garner here and I will 
put her on the stand with respect to hearsay evidence that Donna Engberg has 
told her. Would that be okay? After that I would move to admit it under the 
hearsay exception.

 
 
     THE COURT: 
[Prosecution Counsel], do you have any comment on that?

 
 
     [Prosecution Counsel]: 
Well, as far as they want to preserve the record on that, I don't know if that 
is the proper way of going about this or not, but -

 
 
     THE COURT: Well, I'll 
tell you what, Gentlemen. Donna Engberg has used her privilege. She is a spouse. 
It is her privilege and I'm not going to allow the hearsay 
evidence.

 
 
The effort 
was supported by an offer of proof in chambers, outlining the proposed trial 
testimony from an investigator which, as presenting statements from Engberg's 
wife, would have factually attacked the State's case and specifically 
controverted the opening statement contentions of the 
prosecution.

 
 

[¶152.]            
Following the offer of proof defining the prospective direct testimony of 
Donna Engberg, defense counsel pursued admissability in text substance as W.R.E. 
804 evidence through testimony of an interviewing 
investigator:

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Your Honor, at this particular point, I will make a motion to admit 
the testimony of Janet Garner pursuant to Rule 804. Under 804(b)(6) and (b)(5), 
I would state at this time that Mrs. Engberg Is an unavailable witness. She 
is unavailable because of 804(a)(1). She is exempted on the grounds of privilege 
or, secondly, she fits under 804(b)(5) as being admissible because it is a 
statement of recent perception. Also, she fits under 804(b)(6) under the other 
exceptions, the catch-all phrase to 804. It is a statement offered as evidence 
of a material fact. It is a statement more probative on the point to which it is 
being offered than any other evidence which a proponent can procure through 
reasonable effort and I would state at this time we have made other efforts to 
procure her testimony and on these particular facts, there is no way we can 
procure any other testimony. We believe that under (c), 804(b)(6)(c), the 
general purpose of the rules in the interest of justice will best be served by 
the admission of her statement to Janet Garner into 
evidence.

 
 
     THE COURT: Thank you. 
Would you respond to that, [Prosecution Counsel], please?

 
 
     [Prosecution Counsel]: 
Just briefly, Your Honor. We have discussed this matter previously. With respect 
to the recent perception, there has been no evidence that this matter is a 
recent perception. With regard to the other items, we have discussed this matter 
in that she has exercised her spousal privilege, a privilege she holds. She 
desires not to testify and there is abundant authority that when one exercises 
that privilege, that even hearsay would be inadmissible and we would request 
that the motion be denied.

 
 
     THE COURT: That is 
also my understanding. I'm going to deny the motion.

 
 

[¶153.]            
The obvious justification for admission was provided by Simms, 492 P.2d 516, where defense 
counsel was faced with prior testimony of a witness in a preliminary hearing 
when the parties were not married. The actual testimony in court after which 
defendant waived his right not to have his wife testify against him was 
available for introduction, including both her live testimony and hostile 
witness examination from the prior transcript. This court in Simms, 492 P.2d  at 521 (footnote omitted 
and citing 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1409 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)) said "that a 
disqualification of a witness by exercise of a privilege makes the witness's 
present testimony unavailable and accordingly should allow resort to his former 
testimony, a doctrine which was not accepted by early English common law courts 
but was well established in chancery practice and would probably be generally 
followed in our courts." 

 
 

[¶154.]            
Why in this case similar evidence is not available to Engberg through the 
testimony of the witness investigator is not refined or defined, except in the 
context of what is good for the prosecution is frequently not available in 
defense. The State would ask us to ignore the phraseology of Simms. "Having chosen to have his wife 
testify as a witness, defendant is in no position to argue about his `forced' 
election * * *." Simms, 492 P.2d  at 
521. See also Pike, 495 P.2d  at 1189 
n. 2. Whatever else might be said about the harmless error application in Pike as was impaled in dissent, the 
right of the defendant to foreclose 
the adverse testimony of the spouse 
was not in question.

 
 

[¶155.]            
Overtly and explicitly stated, the decision of the trial court was based 
solely on the exercised privilege as first announced when Donna Engberg was 
called as a witness by the State to continue to be determinative for her status 
as a witness for Engberg, or his introduction of hearsay testimony and 
statements that were available. It should also be recognized that within the 
analysis of Simms, 492 P.2d 516, 
exercise of privilege resulted in the unavailability of the witness, permitting 
substitute evidence introduction under W.R.E. 804(b)(6) (the same as F.R.E. 
804(b)(5)). See also State v. Fisher, 
141 Ariz. 227, 686 P.2d 750, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066, 105 S. Ct. 548, 83 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1984). This decision, albeit consistent in denial, 
added a third error as directly contrary to our precedent in Simms.

 
 

[¶156.]            
In citing that Wyoming case, Engberg claims that his wife became an 
unavailable witness by virtue of the privilege decision and that the hearsay was 
consequently admissible under W.R.E. 804(b)(6) and supported as well by the 
cases of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); and Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), which encompass a United States 
constitutional due process denial. In answer, the State now contends in 
appellate brief that the use of the hearsay evidence was properly denied because 
no subpoena by the defense for the spouse was ever obtained and she "never 
became a witness." The validity of the response within the facts of the trial 
are so selfevident that further comment is unneeded to dispose of this 
contention. Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 
33, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988). Next, argument is presented that the testimonial 
privilege exclusion was valid which continues to disregard the specific criteria 
of the Wyoming 
statute providing the right to access, W.S. 1-12-104.

 
 

[¶157.]            
The more distinct and powerful argument supplied by the State for support 
of denial was procedural in failure of Engberg to give advance trial notice of 
intent to admit the hearsay. This basis was never considered by the trial court 
under the circumstances presented either before or at trial and is no more 
justified now. Finally, the State in appellate brief summarizes the evidence and 
contends that "[t]here is no possibility based on the offer of proof made at 
trial that the excluded hearsay testimony of Janet Garner would have affected 
the outcome of the proceedings. Appellant was convicted by overwhelming 
evidence." In critical fact, the majority here again by this conclusion converts 
what was confused and confessed error into a non-argued and non-briefed issue 
decision based on separate evidentiary analysis.

 
 

[¶158.]            
Heaping hyperbole on imposed justification, the substantive basis of the 
majority, which occasions my most severe rejection, is the present and now first 
time determination as an analysis of the evidence that there was no 
corroborating evidence presented which could be relied upon to enhance the 
trustworthiness of the version reported to the investigator and lacking 
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," the hearsay testimony could not 
be admitted properly. 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 491 
(1980). It is possible, although not stated, that the majority now determines 
that the trial court should have determined that the investigator, Janet Garner, 
was herself untrustworthy. The more distinct problem with this conception is 
that it is unearthed for the first time. The trial court denied admissibility on 
the basis of privilege and no corroborative pursuit was possible or considered. 
What the majority now does is to determine, as a first-time judicial inquiry as 
if it might have been the trial court, what a present construction of the 
reliability of unavailable witness repeated statements of the wife may have been 
in order to justify the trial court inadmissibility decision. See Black, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 
804(b)(5) - The Residual Exceptions - An Overview, 25 Hous.L.Rev. 13 (1988) 
and 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, §§ 472 and 491. In factual 
content and authoritative relevance, the unavailability case of United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982) is directly in point.

 
 

[¶159.]            
It might be that the countervailing interests of justice attainment 
versus corroboration factors would weigh adversely to the criminal defendant's 
interest even where the evidence was not otherwise available. Such a decision 
may be sustained on appeal as exercised discretion of the trial court. That is not what occurred in this trial. 
The trial court did not rule on this basis and the objections by the State 
neither there, nor now here, were made on that basis. Consequently, the majority 
now presumes wrongly to exercise a nisi prius type discretionary evaluation of 
the evidence in denial of availability of testimony of a wife which was to be 
presented to support the trial posture of her defendant husband. Obviously, the 
premiere mistake made was in denial of the trial evidence. The second mistake 
made by appellate counsel was negligence and neglect to present this obvious 
trial court mistake on first appeal. Now, the majority compounds by 
extrapolation in utilizing its evidence weighing to determine by justification 
for what should have been considered and determined by the trial court. We again 
ignore the procedural posture long held by this court requiring discretionary 
decisions to be made by the trial court as repeated in Smith v. State, 715 P.2d 1164 (Wyo. 
1986), involving the identical subject of W.R.E. 804(b)(6) in criminal case 
defense.

 
 

[¶160.]            
The availability of W.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6) to the criminal 
defendant is unquestionable for the prosecution. See MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 and 4 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, §§ 
472 and 491. The right to witness requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 and 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution are clearly presented. As 
the best possible proof available to a defendant facing death-conviction 
execution, the testimony should have been admissible for the weight to which it 
would have been justified to the jury. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, § 491 and Black, supra, 25 Hous. L.Rev. 13. The subject 
should never have been reached since the wife should have testified when 
privilege was released by the husband.

 
 

[¶161.]            
The principle where we find ourselves, however, which should be applied 
is found in the converse of the Morrison, Thomas and Hammond line of cases as stated in United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 914, 97 S. Ct. 2174, 53 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1977), where the defendant scared the 
witness into taking the Fifth Amendment and the witness then became available to the state for prosecutorial 
use of other testimony. See Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 
and Thomas, 488 F.2d 334. Here, in 
exercised due process, this same right should apply in favor of Engberg. That 
result was afforded after reversal in MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, where denial 
of proffered prior testimony use by defendant was erroneously excluded when the 
witness took the Fifth Amendment under pressure from the prosecutor. See also United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2nd Cir. 1991), where the prosecution withheld immunity and then 
opposed prior testimony under a hearsay objection resulting in a thirteen month 
"megatrial" reversal.

 
 

[¶162.]            
Surely the majority would not intend that, in consideration of state 
constitutional rights, W.R.E. 803(24) or 804(b)(6) are only available to 
prosecute but never to defend. The substantive justice considerations of Williams v. Collins Communications, 
Inc., 720 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1986) would 
justify usage and the right to present witnesses in criminal defense under the 
Wyoming and 
United States Constitutions. Rodriguez v. 
State, 711 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1985); Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525. Cf. Smith, 715 P.2d 1164; Washington, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920, and Thomas, 488 F.2d 334. This court should take stock of the well reasoned analysis of rights 
of a defendant to secure testimony in Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, but then this is 
only what we have done for the prosecution in Cardenas v. State, 811 P.2d 989 (Wyo. 
1991).

 
 

[¶163.]            
This error alone substantively requires conviction reversal to provide a 
new trial.

 
 
E. Prejudice in Witness Presentation in 
Open 
Court

 
 

[¶164.]            
This concern is created by the trial process where the non-testifying 
witness was presented before the jury to invoke privilege or immunity. This 
subject is resolved by Jones, 777 P.2d 54.20 In initial trial, the significance for 
jury effect was initiated by opening statements by the prosecution in discussing 
the arrest in Las 
Vegas and outlining evidence that Donna Engberg, in 
essence, turned in her husband. Argument response by Engberg was that this was 
not true, to be addressed by Engberg's evidence. Opportunity to present the evidence was precluded by the 
State's invitation for Donna Engberg to assert her privilege not to testify. The 
process used by the State commencing with opening statement to final appearance 
before the jury ran directly into the prosecutorial prejudice campaign rejected 
by most authorities. See Douglas v. State 
of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965); 
Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S. Ct. 1151, 10 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1963); 
People v. Pirrello, 166 Ill. App.3d 614, 117 
Ill.Dec. 238, 520 N.E.2d 399 (1988); and People v. Crawford Distributing Co., 
Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 70, 34 Ill.Dec. 296, 397 N.E.2d 1362 (1979). This was 
additional error in calling the witness for privilege exercise in open court 
with the near certainty that the jury would draw unfavorable inferences against 
Engberg solely from Donna Engberg's predetermined refusal to testify. 
United 
States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, reh'g denied 874 F.2d 821 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied 493 U.S. 932, 110 S. Ct. 321, 107 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1989) (not plain error, however); Limbaugh, 549 So. 2d 582. The Texas cases have been 
exceptionally expressive on the subject of reversible error in calling a 
recalcitrant witness before the jury where the spousal immunity exists. Stewart v. State, 587 S.W.2d 148 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Johnigan v. 
State, 482 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.Cr. App. 1972); Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1967). See also Johnson v. 
State, 803 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2914, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1078 (1991) and Cooper, 769 S.W.2d 301; but see People v. Ford, 45 Cal. 3d 431, 
247 Cal. Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168 (1988). Wyoming should now have settled this issue in 
Jones, 777 P.2d 54.

 
 

[¶165.]            
The touchstone of Jones, 777 P.2d 54 was conscious prosecutorial impropriety by reference to Douglas, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074 and Namet, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S. Ct. 1151. Once that analysis is completed, I then consider the effect of an 
"admission of guilt through a transfer process" to the accused defendant. Jones, 777 P.2d  at 60. The exchange here 
whereby the wife asked and was given the right to refuse to testify in open 
court could only serve to confirm her guilty knowledge as evidence of the guilt 
of her husband. The prejudice in this case was even more apparent and insidious 
than was the case when the two alleged uncharged coconspirators were called to 
the witness stand and refused to testify as described in Jones.

 
 

[¶166.]            
It is apparent from close record review that the State brought Donna 
Engberg from Nebraska for the purpose of establishing a 
basis of unavailability to admit her prior statements as made to police officers 
under the purview of W.R.E. 804(b) if she chose not to testify or Engberg did 
not waive his privilege. Engberg's decision to withdraw suppression and release 
privilege was premised on a preference for her live testimony. Thereafter, when 
the trial court invoked her privilege by effectively excluding the provisions of 
the second sentence of W.S. 1-12-104, Engberg turned himself to hearsay as 
preferential to a record without any of her testimony by recognition of the 
intrinsic participation which other evidence had radiated about 
her.

 
 

[¶167.]            
Trial events not only denied Engberg the right to call his wife for 
desired testimony, but created a prejudice by implication with the jury that her 
testimony would have been hostile since 
she was called and excluded as an apparent State witness in open court. With 
Donna Engberg thus called as the last and apparently decisive witness, to then have her openly invoke a privilege 
before the jury created inferences and innuendos of Engberg's guilt. Prejudice 
in the eyewitness identification preeminence of proof of the case cannot be 
doubted. Jones, 777 P.2d 54; Limbaugh, 549 So. 2d  at 583; State v. McGinty, 14 Wn.2d 71, 126 P.2d 1086 (1942); State v. Winnett, 48 Wn. 
93, 92 P. 904 (1907). With reversal of guilt conviction on other bases, we avoid 
either review of this issue on the basis of plain error or retroactivity of 
application of a determined principle of Wyoming law. See for example, in federal law, 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, reh'g 
denied 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S. Ct. 1771, 104 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1989) and Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S. Ct. 2878, 92 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1986). Unless totally unexpected, any invocation by a 
witness of immunity or privilege should occur outside of the presence of the 
jury. Jones, 777 P.2d 54; State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 777 P.2d 1226 (1989).21 See also Jones v. State, 86 Md. App. 
204, 586 A.2d 55 (1991).

 
 
F. Eyewitness Identification Witness - Refusal 
of the Trial Court to Allow the Engberg to Call an Expert Witness to Testify on 
the Potential for Error in Identification

 
 

[¶168.]            
But just how accurate are eyewitnesses? The possibility of over 5,000 
wrongful convictions in the United States annually and the steady 
trickle of news accounts of innocent persons imprisoned alert us to the fact 
that the human and legal process of identification contains risks of error. This 
conclusion is amply supported by research.

 
 
Zalman 
& Siegel, The Psychology of 
Perception, Eyewitness identification, and the Lineup, 27 Crim.L.Bull. 159, 
160 (1991) (footnote omitted).

 
 
     Mistaken 
identification is one part of a broader misidentification problem. A 
comprehensive public policy approach must suggest several techniques for 
lessening the incidence of wrongful convictions. For example, where guilt is 
based entirely on eyewitness testimony, extraordinary attention must be paid to 
the general and specific questions of reliability. Expert witnesses must always 
be allowed to testify on the issue of reliability and special training be given 
to police officers and to high-risk employees (e.g., of banks and convenience 
stores) on observation and documentation during criminal 
incidents.

 
 

Id. at 174 
(footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶169.]            
Before any competent counsel today puts his client on trial in a case 
involving significant proof by eyewitness identification, reasonable competency 
would require reading the current book of E. Loftus & K. Ketcham, Witness for the Defense: The Accused, The 
Eyewitness and The Expert Who Puts Memory on Trial (1991). The authors lead 
us to initial thought by a quotation from William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene 
ii:

 
 

Hamlet: Do you 
see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel?

 
 

Polonius: By the 
mass, and 'tis like a camel, indeed.

 
 

Hamlet: Methinks 
it is like a weasel.

 
 

Polonius: It is 
backed like a weasel.

 
 

Hamlet: Or like a 
whale?

 
 

Polonius: Very like 
a whale.

 
 
The 
dedication to the book provides: "We dedicate this book to the women and men who 
have been wrongfully accused, convicted, imprisoned, or have otherwise suffered 
because of faulty eyewitness testimony." As will be later related, Elizabeth 
Loftus was the witness called to testify in this case regarding the singularly 
significant eye-witness identification evidence provided for conviction.22

 
 

[¶170.]            
One of the difficult issues of this appeal was denial to Engberg of the 
use of an identification expert witness. Within this fast evolving and 
tremendously litigated eyewitness issue involving usage of the expert witness or 
submission of a special jury instruction, little national consistency exists. 
Actually, within this state, the expert witness has been used in serious cases 
and, for appellate review, only this case has reached us. Similarly, the Telfaire instruction has been given and 
denied and denial has been previously approved on appeal.

 
 

[¶171.]            
When faced with a claimed error from denial to Engberg of an expert 
witness, the State again contended a constitutional forfeiture by procedural 
default "solution." This is an unsupportable resolution of the appellate issue 
created by trial rejection and exasperated by the failure of appellate counsel 
to include it in first appeal. As direction for retrial, I cannot casually 
disregard the constitutional rights of Engberg under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, 
right of accused to defend, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, due process of law, in 
conjunction with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525. 
This issue should be properly presented when intermixed with predominating 
consideration of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Curry v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527, 371 S.E.2d 647 (1988); Palmer, 635 P.2d  at 960; 
Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 
1980); Curtis v. State, 37 Md. App. 
459, 381 A.2d 1166 (1977), rev'd on 
other grounds 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Stewart v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 92 Nev. 588, 555 P.2d 218 (1976). Cf. Valeriano v. 
Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 546 A.2d 1380 (1988).

 
 

[¶172.]            
I do not understand why this issue was not raised on initial appeal 
considering the expense incurred by the public defender (at state expense) in 
having the witness available for the trial. This is re-emphasized by the fact 
that the same witness had previously testified in another Wyoming death case also 
involving identification. Alberts v. 
State, 642 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1982). There has to be a differentiation between 
justification, incapacity or misguided disinclination in adequacy of 
representation. Appellate counsel has a responsibility to pursue issues 
established at trial unless non-pursuit is mandated by research. Valeriano, 546 A.2d 1380. See McCoy, 108 S. Ct. 1895. Cf. Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396. Extrication of the issue from appellate review cannot realistically 
be called thoughtfully unintended. See E. Arnolds, W. Carroll, M. Lewis 
& M. Seng, Eyewitness Testimony: 
Strategies and Tactics (1984) (hereafter E. Arnolds) and N. Sobel, Eyewitness Identification: Legal and 
Practical Problems (1988).

 
 

[¶173.]            
Since the denial, neglect or negligence of appellate counsel to include 
this issue on appeal is unexplained, we are mandated to a substantive analysis 
for post-conviction review. Initially, the hypnotism issue in this case 
aggravates the due process concern of the eyewitness identification validity. 
Justice in evenhanded application should require this court to reject any double 
standard of due process where the kind of experts available to the prosecution, 
if they assist the jury with foundational knowledge, would not be the kind of 
experts available to defend as either not helpful or invading the provence of 
the jury. See Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1978); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); and Note, Eyewitness Identification in Utah: A Changing Perspective, 1988 Utah L.Rev. 113 (1988). 
See also State v. Whaley, 406 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1991).

 
 

[¶174.]            
Analysis of eyewitness identification as a function of criminal 
prosecution presents that timeless clash between necessity and questionable 
validity. Little need be said about necessity. In many cases, eyewitness 
identification is the only or at least the principle prosecutorial evidence. See United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 
434 U.S. 1021, 98 S. Ct. 747, 54 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1978), Hufstedler, J., specially concurring. Extensive and well documented 
research suggests that eyewitness testimony is not only suspect and frequently 
completely mistaken, but the degree and frequency of error in such 
identification remains undisclosed to the fact-finding jury. Faulty eyewitness 
identification, second only to perjury, is considered a major cause of the 
conviction of innocent persons. See 
Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan.L.Rev. 21 (1987). This problem 
was highlighted by Justice Frankfurter in F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (1927). 
We could go back even further and find that Sir Walter Raleigh lost his head as 
the result of both hearsay and faulty identification.

 
 

[¶175.]            
Judicial consideration of the problem is not new. In the 1896 case of In re Bryant's Estate, 176 Pa. 309, 35 A. 571, 577 
(1896), it was stated:

 
 
The parties 
to the present litigation are claimants of his estate, and their claims depend 
upon the question of identity. There are few more difficult subjects with which 
the administration of justice has to deal. The carelessness or superficiality of 
observers, the rarity of powers of graphic description, and the different force 
with which peculiarities of form or color or expression strike different 
persons, make recognition or identification one of the least reliable of facts 
testified to even by actual witnesses who have seen the parties in question; 
and, where they have not, there is the added obstacle of the inadequacy of 
language to describe the minute variations of feature and color which go to make 
up the individual personality.

 
 

[¶176.]            
The incantation to keep the jury ignorant of the high degree of erroneous 
eyewitness identification has not diminished over a half century. Louisiana is alert to the 
problem with eyewitness identification to convict. "Where the key issue is the 
accused's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was 
committed, the state is required to negate any reasonable probability of 
misidentification." State v. Carter, 
522 So. 2d 1100, 1109 (La. App. 1988). This is true since reliability is the 
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Walker v. State, 523 So. 2d 528 
(Ala.Cr.App. 1988) (quoting Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977)). See also People v. 
Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 517 N.E.2d 520 
(1987).

 
 

[¶177.]            
One of the most thoughtful judicial treatments on this is found in People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461, 468 (1973):

 
 
     The psycho-legal 
fundamentals in this case derive from the tension between four factors involved 
in eyewitness identification in criminal cases. The four factors 
are:

 
 
1. The 
natural and usually necessary reliance on eyewitness identification of 
defendants by the police and prosecution;

 
 
2. The 
scientifically and judicially recognized fact that there are serious limitations 
on the reliability of eyewitness identification of 
defendants;

 
 
3. The 
scientifically and judicially recognized fact that frequently employed police 
and prosecution procedures often (and frequently unintentionally) mislead 
eyewitnesses into misidentification of the defendant;

 
 
4. The 
historical and legal fact that a significant number of innocent people have been 
convicted of crimes they did not commit and the real criminal was left at 
large.

 
 

[¶178.]            
In United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1971), Chief Judge Bazelon responded to the problems of 
eyewitness identification by stating "[n]o other aspect of the accusatory 
process creates so much opportunity for miscarriage of justice - for punishment 
of an innocent man." "Unquestionably, identifications are often unreliable - 
perhaps consistently less reliable than lie detector tests, which we have in the 
past excluded for unreliability." Id. at 145 n. 
1.23

 
 

[¶179.]            
Erroneous eyewitness identification, many times given confidently in good 
faith, has led to the conviction and execution of innocent people charged with 
capital crimes. See Bedau & 
Radelet, supra, 40 Stan.L.Rev. at 
91-172 (Appendix A: Catalogue of Defendants). The problem of faulty eyewitness 
identification has been comprehensively addressed in books, scientific 
publications and legal journals. For Wyoming law to be as fundamentally fair as we 
can make it, a defendant should be able to present evidence which can shake the 
confidence in eyewitness identification - just as the prosecution is free to use 
eyewitness identification. It is a matter of fundamental fairness.24 After analyzing the unquestioning 
reliance on eyewitness identification by the legal system, two prominent 
scholars argue for uniform rules to govern such 
identification:

 
 
In light of 
the unenumerated inadequacies of eye-witness identification and testimony, new 
procedural safeguards are required. The following proposed protections are not 
suggested as alternatives to eyewitness evidence, for such evidence can play a 
very vital role in investigative and trial proceedings. Rather, these safeguards 
are suggested in order that eyewitness evidence might be presented to a jury in 
its proper and least prejudicial perspective.

 
 
Cunningham 
& Tyrrell, Eyewitness Credibility: 
Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Alabama Lawyer 563, 585 (1975). These scholars 
recommend that police avoid using suggestive lineups and that courts provide 
special jury instructions, require corroborating evidence, employ protective 
procedures for in-court identification, and require pretrial identification 
procedures (Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967) (Denno hearing)).

 
 

[¶180.]            
The literature is nearly endless. A representative analysis is found in 
Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of 
Criminal identification: The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1079, 
1079 (1973) (quoting United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1936, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967) and footnotes omitted), which 
stated:

 
 
     On June 12, 1967, the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States in a trilogy of cases, United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California and Stovall v. Denno, dealt with the 
constitutionality of police practices and procedures in obtaining eyewitness 
identifications. These decisions marked the Supreme Court's first major attempt 
to confront the "dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the 
suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification." The 
Court's primary concern was to evolve legal standards and remedies that would 
substantially reduce erroneous identification.

 
 
Katz & 
Reid, Expert Testimony on the Fallibility 
of Eyewitness Identification, 1 Crim.Just.J. 177, 177 (1977) 
describes:

 
 
     Many psychologists 
believe the testimony of an eyewitness to a crime may often be unreliable. This 
article addresses the question whether behavioral scientists should be permitted 
to testify at criminal trials to explain to the jury the inherent danger of 
relying on eyewitness identifications.

 
 
      After a 
discussion of the legal admissibility of this testimony, an analysis of the 
nature and scope of the problem is presented, followed by a discussion of 
specific topics upon which an expert in eyewitness identification may testify. 
In conclusion, this article presents some guidelines to assist the trial judge 
in his exercise of discretion on this matter.

 
 
O'Connor, 
"That's the Man": A Sobering Study of 
Eyewitness Identification and the Polygraph, 49 St.John's L.Rev. 1, 1-2 
(1974) (footnote omitted) states:

 
 
     It is almost four 
o'clock in the morning, and, as he stands in the lighted doorway of the squad 
room at the 110th precinct, Manny Balestrero is tired - but, worse still, he is 
scared, more scared than he has ever been in his life. Things seem to be closing 
in around him. His interrogation since earlier that evening has not, by any 
standard, been brutal; no force has been used - just persistent, relentless, 
ceaseless questioning by two detectives who are so skeptically polite, so 
adamantly unbelieving!

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     The drama moves 
swiftly to its bitter end. Manny again senses, rather than sees, movement in the 
darkened room. Then come the whispered words: "That's the man!" Manny's whole 
world collapses.

 
 
(After a 
mistrial and, in the interim, the real perpetrator was 
apprehended.)

 
 

[¶181.]            
"It is an article of faith within the legal profession that eyewitness 
testimony is unreliable." Pulaski, Neil 
v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process 
Protection, 26 Stan. L.Rev. 1097, 1097 (1974).

 
 
     The unreliability of 
eyewitness identification evidence poses one of the most serious problems in the 
administration of criminal justice. Identifying the defendant as the wrongdoer 
presents an issue, and often the sole one for determination, in every criminal 
trial. Yet, commentators extensively have documented the frequency of wrongful 
convictions resulting from mistaken identifications and long have recognized the 
threat that such misidentification poses to the ideals of criminal justice. As 
Justice Felix Frankfurter once noted, "The identification of strangers is 
proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a 
formidable number of instances in the records of English and American 
trials."

 
 
Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert 
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 
29 Stan.L.Rev. 969, 969 (1977) (quoting F. Frankfurter, supra, at 30) (footnotes omitted). The 
variety and detail of just a few of the other articles on this subject are 
astounding.25

 
 

[¶182.]            
In current literature, Fassett, The Third Circuit's Unique Response to 
Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception: Is What You See What You Get?, 19 
Seton Hall L.Rev. 697, 722 (1989) provides a thoughtfully detailed and 
documented exposition and then concludes:

 
 
     The inherent 
unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence, combined with the dilution 
of constitutional protections designed to exclude unreliable identifications, 
necessitates the adoption of additional judicial safeguards where such evidence 
is both critical and disputed. The most effective such safeguard, expert 
identification testimony, should be admitted far more frequently than presently 
allowed by the majority Amaral [488 F.2d 1148] standard. Enunciated over fifteen years ago by the Ninth Circuit, 
that standard is inconsistent with the more liberal criteria of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and has resulted in the near-blanket exclusion of such 
testimony.

 
 
     In Downing, the Third Circuit recognized 
the flaws of the Amaral standard and recommended more lenient admission of 
expert identification testimony. However, the tremendous discretion Downing 
afforded district courts, coupled with its open invitation to exclude such 
testimony in all cases except those based solely upon a single uncorroborated 
identification, will regrettably prevent any significant increase in its 
admission. Hence, criminal defendants who require expert testimony to attack 
unreliable identifications shall continue to face closed doors needlessly shut 
by a judiciary intent on limiting the scope and duration of trials. Given the 
dismantling of the constitutional protections developed twenty-two years ago to 
ensure the exclusion of unreliable identification evidence arising from unduly 
suggestive pretrial procedures, those closed doors will almost certainly and 
tragically facilitate the conviction of innocent 
defendants.

 
 

[¶183.]            
When invoking the reliability of the expert witness analysis in 
eyewitness identification, four concerns are found in review of the many cases 
and expansive literature:

 
 
1. The test 
for admissibility of expert testimony is F.R.E. 702, with application of either 
the Frye test, Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 
293 F. 1013 (1923), or a currently modernized standard.

 
 
2. There 
are generally agreed and determined practical validity concepts for eyewitness 
identification testimony.

 
 
3. Fairness 
is implicated in equality for availability of the expert witness to the 
defendant as to the prosecution.

 
 
4. The 
nature and the essential characteristics of the trial court exercised discretion 
presented by contentions of identification invalidity.

 
 

[¶184.]            
Judicial answers to the acknowledged problem have taken three directions. 
The first is to do nothing with the clearly unjustified hope that either the 
jury will be smart enough to adequately discount identification testimony, or 
second, that the other evidence is sufficient so that the invalid testimony does 
not really matter. Alternatively, reliance on the power of cross-examination is 
also frequently given as a justification for the uncontrolled procedure as an 
adequate validation of eyewitness identification testimony. Since none of these 
explanations assure reliability of result for those who are innocent in a 
significant number of cases, the only remaining solace comes from the 
possibility that the guilty individual will confess or be otherwise uncovered, 
post-conviction processes will be remedial or that the normal justification is 
sufficient of a utilitarian society concept of a wrong-place, wrong-time - so 
what tragedy resolution. To one federal court, this latter precept was not 
acceptable where unreliable eyewitness identification was used. Jackson, 589 F.2d 108. The case was critiqued by the federal appellate court as "the rare case of 
a record almost entirely bare of credible untainted evidence of guilt" as 
founded on eyewitness identification. Id. 
at 108. See similar suggestive processes of identification in United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 
(6th Cir. 1976).26

 
 

[¶185.]            
The second and spreading effort to test contended prosecutorial 
identification reaches to education of the jury by special instructions. The 
most common application is the usage of some version of the Telfaire instruction which provides four 
factors a jury should consider when deciding how much reliance eyewitness 
testimony might be given. United 
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). See Note, Eyewitness 
Identification Testimony and the Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions in 
Criminal Cases, 60 Wn. U.L.Q. 1387 (1983). In Hampton v. State, 92 Wis.2d 450, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979) (citing Chapman v. 
State, 69 Wis.2d 581, 230 N.W.2d 824 (1975) and State v. Williamson, 84 Wis.2d 370, 267 N.W.2d 337 (1978)), testimony of the expert witness was permitted, although 
restricted in scope, while the special instruction was denied. The special 
instruction approach has found broad usage, but unfortunately has been 
previously rejected by this court in a plain error context without any 
substantive consideration of its broad perspective. Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358 
(Wyo. 1979); but see Thomas v. State, 784 P.2d 237 
(Wyo. 1989), 
Urbigkit, J., specially concurring. Cf. 
United States v. Hodges, 
515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 
1974); State v. Wheaton, 240 Kan. 345, 
729 P.2d 1183 (1986); State v. 
Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); and State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165 (R.I. 
1988). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted an intermediate position 
posited upon unavailable collaborative testimony. United States v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1167 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1094, 109 S. Ct. 2439, 104 L. Ed. 2d 995 (1989).

 
 

[¶186.]            
The third ameliorative approach addresses the jury by the use of expert 
witness testimony pursuant to W.R.E. 702.27 The decisional process used is 
significant, including both the propriety and advisability of a Denno hearing or 
motion in limine resolution in advance of trial.

 
 

[¶187.]            
As general principles for expert witness testimony, the separately 
definable considerations by the trial court include (a) competency and 
qualification of the witness, see State 
v. Vineyard, 497 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App. 1973) and Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. 
Co., 105 N.J. 373, 522 A.2d 405 (1987); (b) appropriateness of the subject 
for testimony under W.R.E. 702, see 
People v. Cole, 47 Cal. 2d 99, 301 P.2d 854 (1956); Windmere, Inc., 522 A.2d 405; State v. Spry, 87 S.D. 318, 207 N.W.2d 504 (1973), overruled sub nom. State v. 
Buckingham, 90 S.D. 198, 240 N.W.2d 84 (1976), modified sub nom. State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 1977) and Giannelli, The 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A 
Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1197 (1980) (as affording the three-test 
function); (c) creation of undue prejudice under W.R.E. 403, see Foster v. State, 508 So. 2d 1111 
(Miss. 1987); and (d) probative value compared to prejudicial effect as a 
general power of exercised trial court discretion to deny a litigant his desired 
evidence, see Scott v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 
(9th Cir. 1973); and Fensterer v. 
State, 493 A.2d 959 (Del.Super.), cert. granted and judgment vacated 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985).

 
 

[¶188.]            
The admissibility standard for expert testimony is somewhat differently 
phrased by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. granted 
484 U.S. 894, 108 S. Ct. 225, 98 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1987), judgment aff'd and remanded, 487 U.S. 931, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 101 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1988) (emphasis in original) as a 
four-part test:

 
 
For expert 
testimony to be admissible under Rule 702, a four-part test must be met: (1) a 
qualified expert; (2) testifying on a proper subject; (3) in conformity to a generally accepted 
explanatory theory; (4) the probative value of which outweighs any 
prejudicial effect.

 
 
It is 
noteworthy that a difference can be assessed between a test for scientific evidence compared with expert testimony. Id. at 1214, 
Guy, J., dissenting.

 
 

[¶189.]            
One of the more lucid reviews of the admissibility of expert testimony is 
found in statements of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Windmere, Inc. in regard to the 
particular topic of voice prints which was ultimately found inadmissible. That 
court recognized:

 
 
     There are generally 
three ways in which a proponent of expert testimony or scientific results can 
prove the required reliability in terms of its general acceptance within the 
professional community: (1) the testimony of knowledgeable experts; (2) 
authoritative scientific literature; and (3) persuasive judicial decisions which 
acknowledge such general acceptance of expert testimony.

 
 

Windmere, 
Inc., 522 A.2d  
at 408.28 That case 
applied a reasoned approach by factual analysis of each acceptability 
criteria.

 
 

[¶190.]            
The Frye test has been 
generally superseded by F.R.E. 702, and the more current recognition of 
science's relationship to the fact-finding search for truth in trial inquiry.29 The psychological principles as 
psycho-legal fundamentals are enumerated to be derived from four factors 
involved in eyewitness identification quoted earlier in Anderson, 205 N.W.2d  at 468 (with 
exhaustive bibliography).

 
 

[¶191.]            
The line of authority where trial denial resulted in reversal on appeal 
began in State v. Chapple, 135 
Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) and People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984). These cases have presented the expanding philosophy 
that the expert witness testimony should be admissible when properly directed 
and adequately presented. A principal support for the eyewitness invalidity 
inquiry was provided in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals case of United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 
1230-31 (3rd Cir. 1985):

 
 
[W]e find 
persuasive more recent cases in which courts have found that, under certain 
circumstances, this type of expert testimony can satisfy the helpfulness test of 
Rule 702. * * *

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     We agree with the 
courts in Chapple, Smith, and McDonald that under certain 
circumstances expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications 
can assist the jury in reaching a correct decision and therefore may meet the 
helpfulness requirement of Rule 702.30

 
 
Retained 
discretional jurisdiction in making the probative versus prejudicial evaluation 
is further reflected in United States v. 
Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, reh'g 
denied 791 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1986) and State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 704 P.2d 238 (1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1048, 106 S. Ct. 1268, 89 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1986). The more recent realistic and 
responsible analyses have generally concluded that the issue whether to reject 
requires an affirmative conclusion of trial prejudice. See State v. Hamm, 146 Wis.2d 130, 430 N.W.2d 584, 591 (1988). Perhaps the case most viably addressing eyewitness 
identification invalidity and the justification for relevant expert testimony 
comes from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dispensa v. Lynaugh, 847 F.2d 211 (5th 
Cir. 1988), as now addressed after release of the defendant from state 
penitentiary after serving four years on the fifteen year 
sentence.

 
 

[¶192.]            
Under present general standards which apply to discretion under W.R.E. 
403 and 702, expert witnesses who evaluate the eyewitness identification clearly 
meet criteria of either the Frye test 
or the more modern approach of W.R.E. 702. Discretion in 1988 concept cannot 
properly be used to deny validity of knowledgeable testimony as long as the 
evidence is retained within proper bounds as not individualized to separately 
attest to the validity or invalidity of the critiqued eyewitness. It is also 
recognized that the discretion in exercise has a proper place under W.R.E. 403 
or 706 to reject testimony which may be redundant, lacking benefit, unduly 
prejudicial, or otherwise excludable as would similar expert witness information 
on subjects such as speed, point of impact, occurrence of a sexual offense, or 
psychological explanation of a delayed report. See State v. R.W., 200 N.J. Super. 560, 491 A.2d 1304, cert. granted 101 N.J. 206, 501 A.2d 891 (1985), judgment aff'd and 
modified, 104 N.J. 14, 514 A.2d 1287 (1986) (psychiatric analysis of 
testimonial capacity).

 
 

[¶193.]            
Clearly, the trial court is not required within the proper exercise of 
discretion to always permit this evidence in every case where eyewitness 
identification exists. Close analysis justifies the exclusion where the 
identification testimony is unquestionably valid, such as a case of personal 
acquaintanceship, significant occurrence contact, or other clear identification 
by an obviously competent and knowledgeable witness. Similarly, where 
identification is not important to conviction, exclusion is justified since the 
testimony serves no probative function. The Arizona courts recognized these discretionary constraints 
in the case of State v. Poland, 132 
Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982). Utah has followed a similar 
path in State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 
(Utah 
1989).

 
 

[¶194.]            
The evidence reaches relevance and admissability where identification is 
highly significant and, perhaps, reasonably questionable. In such a case, 
exclusion of the expert witness may factually constitute a directed verdict of 
conviction against the defendant. If we define discretion in real terms of 
judgmental decision and apply the principles emplaced in W.R.E. 702, answers in 
modern terms for expert witness testimony on eyewitness identification 
validation assume a rational structure. "Where the key issue is the accused's 
identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the 
state is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification." Carter, 522 So. 2d  at 
1109.

 
 

[¶195.]            
The admissibility issues for use of the expert witness should be 
determined in advance of trial by Denno hearing or a motion in limine 
resolution. State v. Porraro, 121 
R.I. 882, 404 A.2d 465 (1979). This is more rationally justified by planning, 
scheduling and expeditious trial proceedings. Also, since the cost of the 
attendance of the expert will usually fall upon the public, whether or not the 
witness testifies, savings are accommodated by advance decision in the Denno motion disposition. This process 
permits (a) determination of the expert status of the witness; (b) determination 
of the scope of the proposed testimony; and (c) application to the case as a 
discretional conclusion in consideration of the trial purpose and function. 
Function and purpose present discretional decision assessing whether there 
really is a viable issue of identification about which the scientific knowledge 
of the expert witness can aid the jury. 6 Ordover, Criminal Law Advocacy, at 6-1 
(1988).

 
 

[¶196.]            
For the trial of Engberg (as was recognized in Engberg I), identification was central 
to prosecution and critical in defense. First to be questioned is the competency 
and qualification of the witness. Second is the appropriateness of the subject 
for expert witness testimony in a jury trial context. Third is the conformity of 
the testimony to the explanatory theory, and fourth is the eternal resolution in 
admissibility of weighing probative value versus prejudicial 
effect.

 
 

[¶197.]            
Dr. Elizabeth Loftus was clearly qualified by national exposure and 
experience and particularly so since she had testified in Alberts v. State, 745 P.2d 898 
(Wyo. 1987). 
See E. Loftus & J. Doyle, Eyewitness 
Testimony: Civil and Criminal (1987). The next step in properly considered 
analysis is assessment of expert testimony for admissibility validity. Clearly, 
this criteria was met and the proposed text enunciated within the offer of proof 
could not justify denial as validated with a witness of national reputation with 
an extensive history of courtroom forensic expert appearances. Her testimony 
came within the parameters of Downing, 753 F.2d 1224; Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208; and McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 as defined by the 
proper bounds of expert testimony under W.R.E. 702. Eyewitness identification 
legal jurisprudence has advanced too far since 1896 in In re Bryant's Estate, 35 A. 571, and 
even earlier studies, to now sustain denial of use of the expert criticism of 
impreciseness and invalidity.

 
 

[¶198.]            
Consequently, it is then in the fourth concept that the trial court 
should exercise discretion when presented the conflicting genesis for decision. 
For a proper exercise of discretion, see 
State v. Cooper, 708 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. App. 1986), where the jury would have 
been bored with unconvincing evidence or insulted with an attack on their 
intelligence since no real issue of identification was presented. Bruce, 779 P.2d  at 652. The test for use 
is a function of properly exercised discretion which should be essentially the 
same to address the admissibility of any 
expert witness testimony. Discretion is reasonableness when balancing 
probative function as a benefit and prejudice as a detriment. Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

[¶199.]            
The Supreme Court of Colorado has most recently spoken on this subject in 
Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991) in following 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 which is the 
pathway in justice and logic this court should also take. In other 
jurisdictions, the recent case law continues without remission from State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 
(Iowa 1979) 
through McDonald and Chapple to People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561 (1990), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2249, 114 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1991) and then Parker v. State, 
568 So. 2d 335, 339 (Ala.Cr. App. 1990); State v. Hall, 244 Mont. 161, 797 P.2d 183 (1990); Melson, 556 A.2d 836 and State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah 
App.), cert. denied 800 P.2d 1105 
(Utah 1990). 
See also Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury 
Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Criminal 
Trials, 80 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 585 (1989) and Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness 
Identification: The Constitution Says, "Let the Expert Speak", 56 Tenn. 
L.Rev. 735 (1989). Wyoming sadly fails to turn forward to 
modernization at this crossing in criminal law adjudication. Additionally well 
critiqued, we would find Loftus & Schneider, "Behold With Strange Surprise": Judicial 
Reactions to Expert Testimony Concerning Eyewitness Reliability, 56 UMKC 
L.Rev. 1 (1987).31

 
 
G. The Failure of the Prosecutor to Inform 
Engberg and His Attorney That They Had the Principal Eyewitness Hypnotized to 
Enhance Her Memory and Subsequent Denial of a Post-Trial 
Hearing

 
 

[¶200.]            
This appeal, unbelievably now first in post-conviction relief, combines 
four uncomfortable subjects for the majority to resolve in one harmless error 
resolution after the trial court denied a factual hearing to responsively 
consider following a full evidentiary presentation of what really happened. In Engberg II, combined issues are presented 
of eyewitness identification, plus hypnosis, plus Brady non-disclosure, plus 
post-trial hearing denial. Here, neither defense counsel nor trial court knew 
until after the trial was completed that the principal witness had been 
subjected to hypnosis prior to any identification of Engberg. Prosecutorial 
non-disclosure was prejudicial error. United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 
(2nd Cir. 1969); People v. Schreiner, 
77 N.Y.2d 733, 570 N.Y.S.2d 464, 573 N.E.2d 552 (1991); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 466 N 
YS.2d 255, 453 N.E.2d 484 (1983), cert. 
denied, 492 U.S. 908, 109 S. Ct. 3221, 106 L. Ed. 2d 571 
(1989).

 
 

[¶201.]            
In post-conviction investigation, the successor appellate counsel 
discovered that hypnotism of the principal eyewitness had both been "attempted" 
and undisclosed to Engberg either before or during trial. In the 
post-conviction-relief proceeding, Engberg asked for an opportunity to have an 
evidentiary hearing to establish what had occurred in attempted hypnotism and 
why the activity was hidden from his counsel. After discovery, the trial court, 
in post-conviction decision denied any evidentiary hearing. The decision 
eliminated any proper examination by oral inquiry, leaving only the decedent's 
sister's denial by affidavit that she had actually succumbed when hypnotism was 
attempted on her by the police representative. State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984). Cf. People v. 
Romero, 745 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 990, 108 S. Ct. 1296, 99 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1988).

 
 

[¶202.]            
Both case law and academic writing considering the subject are again 
almost endless, including the right to defend case of Rock, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704. See People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635 (1984); Note, Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnosis and the Criminal Defendant's Right to 
Testify, 41 Ark. L.Rev. 425 (1988); and Note, Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnosis and the Prejudice Rule - 
Your Memories May Not Be Your Own, 21 J. Marshall L.Rev. 409 (1988). See 
also Note, Hypnosis and Criminal 
Defendants: Life in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond, 53 Mo.L.Rev. 823 
(1988).

 
 

[¶203.]            
An extensive list of comparable cases can be found in Rock, as well as the principal case of 
People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775 
(Cal.), republished 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354, cert. denied 459 U.S. 860, 103 S. Ct. 133, 74 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1982). See State v. 
Coe, 101 Wn.2d 772, 684 P.2d 668 (1984); State v. Martin, 101 Wn.2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984); and State v. Laureano, 
101 Wn.2d 745, 682 P.2d 889 (1984), where independent verification is required. 
See also Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S. Ct. 2857, 101 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1988). Also, in review, see Note, Hypnosis and the Defendant's Right to 
Testify in a Criminal Case, 1989 Utah L.Rev. 545 
(1989).

 
 

[¶204.]            
A thoughtful analysis is provided by Comment, Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony: Has it Lost 
its Charm?, 15 S.Ill. U.L.J. 289, 293-95 (1991) (footnotes 
omitted):

 
 
     The scientific 
consensus is that hypnosis does enhance recall. If this were the only factor to 
be considered, there would be no argument about its use. But the problems 
associated with hypnosis create the conflict. These problems lie in four major 
areas: suggestibility, confabulation, deliberate fabrication, and increased 
confidence.

 
 
     Suggestibility is 
inherent in the hypnotic process. A hypnotic subject is intensely focused on the 
hypnotist and has an increased desire to please the hypnotist by complying with 
both implicit and explicit demands. Leading questions can imply the correct 
answer. However, the suggestions need not be verbal. The attitude, demeanor, and 
expectations of the hypnotist, coupled with tone of voice and body language, can 
convey suggestive messages to the subject. Most subjects will respond to these 
subtle hints and answer accordingly.

 
 
     Often, the subject's 
desire to please will affect the truth of their statements. The subject may not 
be able to remember details which are being asked for by the hypnotist. The 
subject will then hallucinate or imagine the missing details. This pseudomemory 
will be remembered as being accurate. This fantasizing of information that seems 
plausible is called confabulation. The subject does not mean to lie, but the 
mind creates additional facts to make the story more 
logical.

 
 
     The danger of someone 
deliberately lying while under hypnosis is minimal. The larger problem is that 
someone may pretend to be hypnotized and lie to enhance his version of the 
story. Only someone who has a working knowledge of hypnotic techniques could 
adequately fake the results. However, experiments in the area have shown that 
even the best in the field have difficulty distinguishing between those who are 
faking and those who are not. Feigned hypnosis presents the same problems as 
when a defendant commits perjury. The hypnotist can attempt to determine the 
veracity of the statements in the same manner that a jury would decide whether a 
witness was lying. Generally, the incentive for a witness to lie is much less 
than that of the actual defendant.

 
 
     The last area of 
concern is the increased confidence that a subject has after hypnosis. The 
details that are confabulated are often assimilated by the mind and the subject 
believes that they are real memories. The amount of confidence that one has 
regarding the recalled materials is based on responsiveness to hypnosis rather 
than the accuracy of the information. This misplaced confidence creates a more 
credible witness, who is harder to cross-examine. The difficulty in testing the 
witness, when combined with the other concerns, provides the basis for the 
opposition to the use of hypnosis. However, the fact that hypnosis reveals 
relevant evidence can not be rebutted.

 
 

[¶205.]            
In State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Utah 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1018, 110 S. Ct. 1323, 108 L. Ed. 2d 498 
(1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
Over the 
course of the last twenty years or so, courts across the nation have taken 
different approaches to this issue at different times. Initially, the courts 
displayed a tendency to admit such evidence, accepting it as "scientific" and 
reliable. * * * However, after a period of time this trend was reversed as the 
results of carefully controlled scientific studies accumulated. The later 
decisions tended to exclude such evidence and to permit witnesses to testify 
only to their prehypnotic recall. * * *

 
 
     This trend toward 
inadmissibility has gathered considerable momentum and now represents the 
undisputed direction of the law in this area. * * * Only a few recent decisions 
permit the admission of hypnotically enhanced testimony, even on a case-by-case 
basis.

 
 

See Recent 
Developments in Utah Law, 1991 
Utah L.Rev. 
119 (1991). See also Bruce, 779 P.2d 646. Additionally, see Romero, 745 P.2d 1003; Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989); Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571; State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 
48, 529 N.E.2d 898, reh'g denied 40 
Ohio St.3d 707, 534 N.E.2d 850 (1988); and, in particular, the procedural 
perilousness in trial usage, People v. 
Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d 284, 137 Ill.Dec. 568, 546 N.E.2d 513 (1989). The 
Illinois courts have even more recently spoken 
in Tardi v. Henry, 212 Ill. App.3d 1027, 157 
Ill.Dec. 1, 571 N.E.2d 1020 (1991).

 
 

[¶206.]            
It is apparent that a close division has previously existed within this 
court on the usage of hypnotically induced testimony. Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 
(Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1987), 
Brown and Urbigkit, JJ., dissenting; Pote 
v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985); Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983); Chapman 
v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).32 Without regard for the meandering of 
our precedent, we have a high degree of hypothetical question here since prior 
opportunity was not provided counsel to accurately develop by examination and 
investigation what really did happen. I would strongly advise bench and bar that 
a Denno hearing in advance of trial 
should be provided permitting the trial court to assess any proper infection by 
the hypnotically induced testimony. Comment, supra, 15 S.Ill.U.L.J. 289. The trial 
court may find that the witness was actually not hypnotized. The trial court 
might also find that her identification testimony, whether or not hypnotized, 
was not inflicted by hypnotic suggestion if it did occur. In the absence of any 
confinement of a potential testimony related to or affected by hypnosis, we 
write in this decision by assumption, absolution or 
ignorance.

 
 

[¶207.]            
The three-fold problem explicitly presented by this hypnosis issue is: 
(1) hypnosis of the principal witness was attempted; (2) prosecution then 
intentionally withheld the hypnosis activity from the defense pretrial; and (3) 
no post-trial hearing was provided for Engberg to rationally determine what 
actually happened. We only know factually as the "beyond a question of doubt" 
standard that hypnosis, which was never voluntarily revealed by either police or 
prosecution, was attempted on Kay Otto, who was the principal witness for 
eyewitness identification shortly after the robbery. About two years after the 
trial was concluded, the possibility of pretrial hypnotism of witnesses was 
first anticipated by astute appellate counsel and then confirmed by a private 
investigator. The issue within the present indeterminate factual record, in 
addition to substantive issues of hypnotically circumscribed testimony as 
particularly relating to eyewitness identification testimony, raises the 
question of prosecutorial non-disclosure.

 
 

[¶208.]            
Review of the record reflects an inordinate factual question as this 
court is faced, like counsel for Engberg, with "guessing what happened." This is 
truly adjudicating from ignorance. See Cutbirth, 751 P.2d 1257, Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting and Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1988), Urbigkit, J., specially concurring. Cf. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 
1986). An evidentiary comparison can be made with the evidence of what did occur 
in Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), cert. denied sub nom Tichnell v. Maryland, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S. Ct. 2374, 80 L. Ed. 2d 846, reh'g denied 467 U.S. 1268, 104 S. Ct. 3564, 82 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1984) (videotape, audio tape, independent expert witness). 
In stark contrast to the evidentiary opportunity not afforded Engberg, this case 
is not comparable to Bundy v. State, 
455 So. 2d 330, 343 (Fla. 1984), cert. 
denied 476 U.S. 1109, 106 S. Ct. 1958, 90 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1986), where "the 
circumstances of the hypnosis and the procedure used were fully disclosed to the 
jury and the defense had every opportunity to attack the credibility of [the 
witness] based on the fact that she had been hypnotized." See also Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 849, 102 L. Ed. 2d 980 (1989); and Johnston, 529 N.E.2d  at 903 n. 4.

 
 

[¶209.]            
We arrive in post-conviction process with present appellate counsel only 
first involved in a denied petition for rehearing after the original 
incomprehensibly inept appellate effort predictably failed. The post-conviction 
appellate counsel examined the trial transcript and argued in 
briefing:

 
 
     78. The prosecutor's 
questioning was intentionally leading. It was designed to keep the witness from 
explaining that she had been hypnotized or at the very least that the State had 
attempted to hypnotize her. The prosecutor did not want a repeat of State v. Gee, where the witness 
disclosed while testifying at trial that she had been hypnotized. Here, the 
prosecution had successfully kept the Petitioner and his attorneys from 
discovering the State's use of hypnosis before trial, and it wanted to make it 
through trial without letting the defense catch on that the State was 
uncomfortable with Ms. Otto's testimony.

 
 
     79. The State's 
actions were prosecutorial misconduct; hypnosis is exculpatory evidence which 
must be disclosed.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     109. On December 31, 
1984, Martin McClain was appointed to represent Petitioner for purposes of 
pursuing available post-conviction relief.

 
 
     110. On February 25, 
1985, four days before the date this Petition was due, Mr. McClain learned that 
hypnosis was in fact involved, at least with regard to Kay 
Otto.

 
 
     111. This information 
was obtained as a result of investigative work done on Mr. McClain's behalf and 
not because of a decision by the prosecution to comply with Petitioner's Brady request, or Disciplinary Rule 
7-103(B), or the Wyoming Supreme Court's ruling in Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 
1983).

 
 
     112. Petitioner has 
not attached evidence of those matters which appear of record or those documents 
the State already should have. At this point in time, affidavits regarding the 
hypnosis are not available. Moreover, the State has more knowledge regarding 
this issue than Petitioner does. For these reasons, Petitioner has not attached 
any supporting evidence, and does not understand that this failure constitutes a 
waiver.

 
 

[¶210.]            
That post-conviction-relief petition, as filed March 4, 1985, more than 
two years after the sentencing date of December 20, 1982, was preceded by a 
motion of Martin J. McClain of the Public Defender's office, filed January 31, 
1985, regarding a special investigator which exposed the newly discovered and 
extremely interesting information of hypnotism.33 In accord with this resulting 
investigation, Engberg asked for an evidentiary hearing, which was never provided by the trial court. With petition 
amendment on attached affidavit, Engberg presented the following information 
developed by a special investigator:

 
 
     5. On February 26, 
1985, at approximately 2:20 P.M., I contacted Bill Claxton in Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
     6. Mr. Claxton stated 
that he had attempted to hypnotize Kay Otto some time after the December 22, 
1981, robbery of Ms. Otto and another Wells Fargo agent outside of a Buttreys 
Food store in Casper, 
Wyoming; however, he was unsure of 
the date.

 
 
7. Mr. 
Claxton said that no tape recording was made of his attempt to hypnotize Ms. 
Otto.

 
 
     8. Subsequently, I 
checked with the Casper Police Department and was informed that the Department 
had made a verbal report to County Attorney Burton Guetz and as a result no 
written documentation of the hypnosis session exists. No records were available 
to pinpoint the date on which the hypnosis attempt had 
occurred.

 
 

[¶211.]            
The State responded, without justifying earlier non-disclosure, by three 
affidavits - a conclusory hearsay affidavit of an investigating officer, a 
second by the hypnotist, and the other by Ms. Otto. Denied to defense was the 
critically important right to test validity of those affidavits as tendered to 
contradict actual hypnosis by Engberg's clarification in cross-examination 
embodying his right of confrontation. With the record devoid of factual denial 
that the hypnotic effort was deliberately withheld from defense counsel prior to 
trial or thereafter, it was a clear Brady violation. Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194; Ex Parte Dickerson, 517 So. 2d 628 (Ala. 
1987). In answer by general denial to the post-conviction-relief petition, the 
response given by the State was at best only half true where hypnosis had been 
at least attempted and was withheld 
as exculpatory information before, during and after trial.

 
 

[¶212.]            
After some sparring on the subject of hypnosis at a trial court hearing 
on May 9, 1985, the issue was comprehensively addressed in oral argument without the requested evidentiary hearing at the 
post-conviction-relief petition hearing held in August, 1985. See Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 
1988), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. Engberg's counsel again presented the subject 
in a motion for post-conviction-relief hearing:

 
 
     Issue XII deals with 
the refusal to permit Petitioner to call an expert on eyewitness identification. 
Now, the particular witness involved was Elizabeth Loftus. Now, I do not 
disagree with the State. The decision on whether or not an expert can testify is 
an evidentiary ruling, and under the rules of evidence it is within the trial 
court's discretion. I don't dispute that at all.

 
 
     However, I - it's my 
concern that, where the trial court abuses its discretion and denies the 
Defendant his ability to call a witness, then the constitutional right under the 
Sixth Amendment, the right to defend, is implicated.

 
 
     It's my contention 
that there was an abuse of discretion in this case and, first, just on the basis 
of what occurred at trial, I would rely on the cases cited in my brief from 
Arizona, California, and, I believe, the Third Circuit. 
More recently, in the last two years, those courts have ruled that eyewitness 
identification is a field that the jury needs help with and an expert on 
eyewitness identification can provide the jury the help that is necessary to 
consider all the possibilities and to view the evidence properly, and it's my 
contention that, on the basis of those cases, there was an abuse of discretion 
here.

 
 
     However, it's more 
complicated than that because it's complicated by Issue VII, the hypnosis issue. 
We have a situation where the witness - and the particular one we were focusing 
on was Kay Otto. There was an attempt to hypnotize her. The State wanted to 
hypnotize her because they were concerned about her in the first place. That 
adds more reason why we needed the expert, to help unravel this, and then, added 
to that, is the witness' inability to be hypnotized and what effect - how did 
that - how might that have affected the trauma that she was experiencing, would 
it have heightened it, would it have made her more concerned about helping the 
police capture somebody, etc.

 
 
     And because of Issue 
VII and because of the failure to disclose the hypnosis aspect of this case, 
that affects Issue XII, and Issue XII should be viewed with Issue VII in mind. 
In light of the new information that we have under Issue VII, if there wasn't an 
abuse of discretion on Issue XII before, there certainly is now, and as a result 
Petitioner was denied his right to call a witness, which is part of his right to 
defend, under Faretta vs. 
California.

 
 
The State, 
in response, stated:

 
 
     Concerning hypnosis in 
this case, I still don't feel that the Petitioner has come anywhere near making 
a factual showing that would require this Court to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing on this question. We have four affidavits in that regard, the same 
affidavits we had the last time we had a hearing before this Court. The defense 
has not come forward - or the Petitioner has not come forward with anything in 
addition to that, and I think at this time the Court has enough before it to 
decide that issue on the merits.

 
 
     As concerns the burden 
of proof on hypnosis, we have cited to the Court U.S. vs. Bagley, and we would also 
call to the attention of the Court Hopkinson 4, which talks about this kind 
of newly discovered evidence in a Post-Conviction context, and in Hopkinson 4, the Court saId that newly discovered 
evidence should be treated the same as a motion for a new trial, and if we're 
talking about impeachment evidence, that's for the defense to show it would 
likely result in acquittal, and I think the burden that concerns this issue and 
whether it's harmful or prejudicial is set forth in cases like Bagley and Hopkinson 4.

 
 
Without any 
evidentiary hearing as to what exactly happened and why, the trial court's 
decision in form and exact phraseology as filed by the State 
provided:

 
 
     At ¶ L Consolidated 
Petition as Amended Engberg asserts that the State's failure to disclose the use 
of hypnosis denied him a fair trial. At ¶ P he asserts that leading questions 
were used to cover up such hypnosis. Under ¶ W he repeats ¶ L but includes an 
invocation of due process.

 
 

Findings of 
Fact:

 
 
     41. The State has 
provided the Court with three affidavits made on personal knowledge and under 
oath by Kay Otto, James Cooper and William E. "Bill" Claxton. The affidavits of 
Otto, Cooper and Claxton reveal that Kay Otto met with Bill Claxton, a 
hypnotist, but was never hypnotized.

 
 
     42. Kay Otto's 
testimony was not hypnotically enhanced.

 
 
     43. Petitioner claims 
that Kay Otto's trial testimony varied from her preliminary hearing testimony 
due to hypnosis. Yet, Kay Otto met with Bill Claxton long before the preliminary 
hearing. The preliminary hearing was on March 18, 1982. Kay Otto met with Bill 
Claxton on or about December 22, 1981, more than three months earlier. If 
Claxton influenced her, that influence would appear in the preliminary hearing 
testimony. The purported variances between Kay Otto's testimony at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial were all de minimis, natural and believable, 
and adequately explored on cross-examination and recross.

 
 
     44. Petitioner's claim 
that the prosecution's redirect of Kay Otto employed leading questions to cover 
up the subject of hypnosis, is unconvincing. The form of the questions as well 
as the answers, were unobjected to at trial.

 
 

Conclusions 
of Law:

 
 
     Hypnotically enhanced 
testimony is not for that reason alone inadmissible in Wyoming. Chapman v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1280 (1982); Gee v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 103 
(1983). And the testimony of a witness who may have been hypnotized is clearly 
admissible when the testimony is not hypnotically enhanced. Pote v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 617, 627 
(1985). It follows that a witness who has never been under hypnosis, as Kay 
Otto, is not precluded from testifying, simply for having met with a 
hypnotist.

 
 
     Strictly speaking, the 
use of hypnosis is not exculpatory evidence. It may in fact be quite the 
contrary. Gee v. State, supra, at 104. Our court has made the 
matter one of compulsory disclosure for the prosecution outside of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Gee was decided more than a year after 
Roy Engberg was tried. Chapman, supra, was decided a month after 
Engberg's trial. Neither case applies as Kay Otto was never hypnotized and did 
no more than meet with a hypnotist. See 
Pote v. State, supra; Bundy v. State, Fla., 455 So. 2d 330 (1984), cert. denied [476] U.S. [1109], 106 S. Ct. 1958, 90 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1986) (Bundy 
I).

 
 
     If we assume that even 
the extremely limited role played by a hypnotist in this case must, for whatever 
reason, be disclosed to the defense, [Petitioner] still can take no solace. For 
such an unprecedented ruling should be applied prospectively only. See Lemieux v. Superior Court of 
Arizona, Ariz., [132 Ariz. 214] 644 P.2d 1300 (1982) (a civil case); and State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 
Ariz., [132 Ariz. 180] 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (a criminal case); Bundy v. State, Fla., 471 So. 2d 9 (1985) 
(Bundy II).

 
 
     Furthermore, if the 
ruling were applied to this case, we are still dealing with testimony unaffected 
by hypnosis under Pote v. State, supra, and any error is harmless. See 
also Bundy II, supra, [471 So.2d] at 
19.

 
 
     If the meeting of Kay 
Otto with the hypnotist is to be considered Brady material in the sense that it was 
impeachment evidence, see Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972), then this 
case is controlled by United States v. 
Bagley, [473] U.S. [667], 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 
(1985).

 
 

[¶213.]            
In effect, Engberg is presented with a further constitutional right 
denial as a mutation derived from Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d 280, where 
inadequate time was allowed for that defendant to get an expert on the subject 
of hypnotism following hypnotic effort by a pseudo expert. As different here, 
the facts of the hypnotic activity were undisclosed pretrial which then 
precluded all trial cross-examination on the subject. Had the hypnotic sequence 
been revealed and had Engberg's witness on eyewitness examination been allowed 
to testify, the result would have been most interesting. See the more 
enlightened criteria found in Coe, 
684 P.2d 668; Martin, 684 P.2d 651; 
and Laureano, 682 P.2d 889, where 
independent verification is required. See 
also Johnston, 529 N.E.2d  at 905. 

 
 

[¶214.]            
In due process aspects, this case is directly contrary to the current 
decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Little, 835 F.2d  at 1243, where the 
federal court defined that "[w]hen the state brings criminal charges against an 
indigent defendant, it must take steps to insure that the accused has a 
meaningful chance to present his defense." As a basis that an expert on hypnosis 
is required to consider the validity and effect of hypnotic adjusted testimony, 
it was stated:

 
 
Though 
studies have shown that hypnosis leads to an increase in a subject's 
recollections, both true and imagined memories may result. * * * Thus, some 
experts have concluded that while hypnosis is useful in investigation and 
establishing leads, it is less useful as a truthdead. * * 
*

 
 
     Three major 
characteristics of hypnosis can lead to inaccurate memories. The first is 
confabulation, the process by which the subject fills in gaps in her memory to 
make her recall more coherent. Sometimes the added information is accurate, 
other times it is purely imagined. The subject cannot distinguish between the 
true and imagined memories. The second problem is suggestibility. The subject 
wishes to please the hypnotist, so she answers questions the way the hypnotist 
wants, not necessarily correctly. Suggestion by the hypnotist can be wholly 
unintended; he or she may suggest a response through tone of voice, demeanor, or 
body language. The third problem is memory-hardening. Hypnosis gives the subject 
great confidence in the memories reviewed. Because she now believes in the 
accuracy of her memory, regardless of its actual truth, the witness will be 
difficult to shake under cross-examination.

 
 

Id. at 1244 
(footnote omitted). See the requirement for admissibility in Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898.

 
 

[¶215.]            
I cannot accede to the extremist and unjustified posture adopted by this 
court generally on hypnosis, Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d 280; Gee, 662 P.2d 103 and Chapman, 638 P.2d 1280, but certainly 
even if that premise is accepted, this case still cannot be justified in logic 
or precedence. For a more realistic approach, see Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78, cert. granted 479 U.S. 947, 107 S. Ct. 430, 93 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1986), which was reversed for testimony of the 
defendant in Rock, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987).34 The discredited position adopted by 
Wyoming finds 
little present comparable support in other jurisdictions.

 
 
     In contrast to this 
disarray of conflicting and discredited theories, the basic rule we adopted in 
Shirley - that hypnotically induced 
testimony is inadmissible per se - continues to draw new adherents. * * 
*

 
 
     * * * [A]nd all follow 
the spirit if not the letter of our decision on the principal issue at hand: 
they agree that the consensus of the scientific community continues to oppose 
the use of hypnosis to restore the memory of potential witnesses on the ground 
that it is inherently unreliable and impairs the defendant's right of 
confrontation, and all therefore hold hypnotically induced testimony 
inadmissible in their respective jurisdictions.

 
 

Guerra, 690 P.2d  
at 662-63 (footnotes omitted).

 
 

[¶216.]            
In an extended and detailed analysis in Note, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments - A 
Constitutional Paradigm for Determining the Admissibility of Hypnotically 
Refreshed Testimony, 78 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 853, 857 n. 36 (1988), 
the authgr concisely reflected that "[a] comprehensive survey of the extensive 
legal literature devoted to the use of hypnosis in the criminal justice system 
would be onerous and of little help." The article's expansive analysis of 
differing approaches includes comment that twenty-one states uniformly reject 
hypnotic usage.35 See also Tuttle, 780 P.2d  at 1208 where 
the Utah Court found denied introduction in twenty-five states and one federal 
circuit.

 
 

[¶217.]            
Although recognizing non-disclosure and denied factual hearing, the 
majority attacks the contention of Engberg in two campaigns. First, the majority 
denies any right to a post-conviction evidentiary hearing since it is now 
disclosed that there was an attempt to hypnotize the witness. This deliberately 
withheld information is then absolved by the bland statement that there is no 
reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different had the 
use of hypnosis with respect to Kay Otto been disclosed. Nowhere, except in the 
mind's eye of the opinion writer, is there any compelling evidence upon which 
this supposition can be factually advanced.

 
 

[¶218.]            
Secondly, by stating "[t]he failure to disclose the use of hypnosis 
deprived Engberg of the opportunity to effectively cross-examine an important 
eyewitness; the jury was not privy to the use of hypnosis in weighing the 
credibility of Kay Otto", the majority recognizes that the impeachment evidence, 
like other exculpatory evidence, is within the Brady rule and, to avoid violation, must 
be disclosed if material. Consequently then, as the majority states, the federal 
standard found in Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) is that the 
failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence found to be material requires 
reversal of a conviction. To initiate the escape from the compelling syllogism 
after proclaiming the status of federal law, the majority deduces that "[w]e 
need not determine whether the request should have been understood to cover use 
of hypnosis to enhance the testimony of the witness. If the evidence of hypnosis 
was material under the federal definition, disclosure was required." Then, to 
complete the escape, the majority concludes:

 
 
      The reasoning 
which explains that there was no prejudicial error under our state rule also 
applies to the claim under Brady and 
Bagley. This conclusion is consistent 
with several federal cases which have found that the product of overwhelming 
evidence is that any evidence relating to hypnosis is not material and that no 
error occurred under the federal standards. * * * This analysis under the 
federal standard resulting in a conclusion that non-disclosed evidence of 
hypnosis was not material further persuades us that the failure to disclose the 
hypnotic session, in accordance with Gee, 662 P.2d 103, was 
harmless.

 
 

[¶219.]            
The majority postulates an interesting rule of materiality of witness 
hypnosis if denial for defendant's usage for impeachment is characterized to be 
only harmless. In first analysis, before those federal citations are reviewed, 
it is necessary to know what the majority defines to be harmless: identification 
by the principal witness; possible hypnotic affect on identification by the 
principal witness; non-disclosure of the hypnosis which singularly affected 
opportunity for cross-examination or just the action of prosecution in 
deliberately failing to provide information which may have been both exculpatory 
in substance and useful in cross-examination. Perhaps it is more than one, maybe 
even all of 
them.

 
 

[¶220.]            
Cited by majority are four federal cases, none of which support this 
strange rule or define the substance of the asserted harmless concept. United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 923, 107 S. Ct. 329, 93 L.E.2d 302 (1986), was a witness tampering case with a 
prosecutorial witness on an undisclosed "pay" basis for testifying. The issue 
was credibility, not substantive hypnosis. Although I question the present 
validity of that case in current analysis, it does not even in text offer 
anything about materiality of principal witness hypnosis whether independent of 
the strength or weakness of the prosecutorial evidence. In United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408 
(1st Cir. 1986), again not a hypnotized witness case, a delayed prosecutorial 
revelation of the witness's informer status was held harmless since available at 
trial. That case is the direct opposite of this case where information for 
cross-examination here was not available. Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 458, 93 L.E. 2d 404 (1986) was again a prosecutorial withheld information 
situation, not hypnosis, which could have been used for impeachment and in 
result required habeas corpus reversal of the state court conviction. The Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 929, 108 S. Ct. 296, 98 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1987) consideration involved cumulative nature of the 
victim's propensity to violence and does not assist here in these circumstances 
of undisclosed hypnosis.

 
 

[¶221.]            
We cannot escape so lightly as the majority attempts from a very basic 
and pervasive Brady issue in a case 
so comprehensively infected with hypnosis, eyewitness examination and a 
presently inadequate record. In Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196, the court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment * * *." In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), the thought is further extended: "A fair analysis of the 
holding in Brady indicates that 
implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed 
evidence may have affected the outcome of the trial." In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985), actually differing from the exculpatory 
evidence considered in Brady and Agurs, impeaching information withheld 
by the prosecutor from defense counsel was considered.

 
 
The 
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.

 
 

Bagley, 473 U.S. 
at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383, Cf. Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 
(1974).

 
 

[¶222.]            
We are now provided a claim of denied access necessary to prepare the 
defense. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989. 
Lacking knowledge of the existence of hypnosis, cross-examination of the 
principal witness on the subject of identification was severely confined. 
Clearly, her identification, as the court acknowledged in first appeal, was the 
principal source of conviction. Another problem is created which reaches the Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985) concept. Not only would cause for the 
expert witness on eyewitness identification have been improved, but the witness 
could then have evaluated the affect of hypnosis on the principal witness of 
identification. This right for defense to know that hypnosis was involved had 
been specifically recognized by this court in Gee. See also Tuttle, 780 P.2d  at 1208. The 
non-disclosed hypnosis reaches confrontation and the assistance of an expert 
witness in order to properly defend which are constitutional guarantees provided 
to the accused. Rock, 107 S. Ct. 2704 
also teaches the concept of the right to present evidence as included within the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees.

 
 

[¶223.]            
The Brady-Agurs-Bagley 
non-disclosure occurrence is not without other recent federal and state cases 
defining the totality of inappropriateness of the majority decision. 
Non-disclosed evidence relating to validity of identification required habeas 
corpus reversal of the state conviction in McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S. Ct. 1172, 103 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1989). Reversal came in Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3rd 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S. Ct. 711, 98 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1988) upon non-disclosed adverse lie detector tests administered to an 
important prosecutorial witness. The prosecutorial hiding of the criminal record 
of a principal witness also invoked reversal in Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied 481 U.S. 1054, 107 S. Ct. 2192, 95 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1987) where the court cited in addition to Brady, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972) and Napue v. People of the State of 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959). For 
recognition of the remand requirement to "establish the trial facts," see Haber v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d 1520 (11th 
Cir. 1985). The right to a hearing to determine facts is similarly recognized in 
Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898 (11th 
Cir. 1990). Stano alleged prosecutorial suppression of collusion involving is 
own attorney resulting in a confession. A Brady issue was found which required a 
remand for hearing. In Coleman v. 
Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 22, 111 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1990), the court held that withheld information must 
be considered in the context of the whole picture. Surely the whole picture in 
Engberg Includes hypnosis in 
conjunction with the cross-examination questions of the principal identification 
witness and the fact that defendant was denied his expert witness on 
identification.

 
 

[¶224.]            
Brady-Bagley issues are not confined to the 
federal courts. See Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898 which also was a hypnosis case and involved documentation about a 
different place where the actual homicide had occurred and a different 
participant as the killer for information withheld from the accused. The court's 
confidence in the trial's outcome had been undermined. Pretrial withheld 
information about misidentification by a principal witness would also require a 
new trial as a matter of state law. State 
v. Van Den Berg, 164 Ariz. 192, 791 P.2d 1075 (1990); State v. Moriwaki, 71 Haw. 347, 791 P.2d 392 (1990); Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736; Welch v. State, 566 So. 2d 680 (Miss. 
1990).

 
 

[¶225.]            
Although this case presents a federal constitutional violation in the 
withheld information required for adequate defense, there is also a state 
constitutional interest presented under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, due process of 
law, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, right of accused to defend. The Court of 
Appeals of New 
York provides a better standard founded in morality and 
fairness for prosecutorial non-disclosure which essentially retains the Agurs rule without the decimation 
inflicted by later cases, including specifically Bagley. The New York standard is 
predicated upon both "elemental fairness" to the defendant and upon concern that 
the prosecutor's office discharges official and professional obligations. That 
test is reasonable possibility to be applied to define materiality. People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 555 N.E.2d 915 (1990). The New York court declined to abandon the broad 
concept of Brady-Agurs in favor of the lesser protection 
of Bagley and 
stated:

 
 
     We agree * * * that a 
showing of a "reasonable possibility" that the failure to disclose the 
exculpatory report contributed to the verdict remains the appropriate standard 
to measure materiality, where the prosecutor was made aware by a specific 
discovery request that defendant considered the material important to the 
defense. * * *

 
 
     Further, a 
backward-looking, outcome-oriented standard of review that gives dispositive 
weight to the strength of the People's case clearly provides diminished 
incentive for the prosecutor, in first responding to discovery requests, 
thoroughly to review files for exculpatory material, or to err on the side of 
disclosure where exculpatory value is debatable. Where the defense itself has 
provided specific notice of its interest in particular material, heightened 
rather than lessened prosecutorial care is appropriate.

 
 

Vilardi, 556 N.Y.S.2d  at 523, 555 N.E.2d  at 920. See also Note, Specific Requests and the Prosecutorial Duty 
to Disclose Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986 Duke L.J. 
892 (1986).

 
 

[¶226.]            
Unfortunately, there is a basic inconsistency and incongruity which is 
stark and unclothed. The difference should be compared to People v. Hayes, 49 Cal. 3d 1260, 265 Cal. Rptr. 132, 783 P.2d 719 (1989), where eyewitness hypnosis required 
conviction reversal. For an identical result in similar factual situations, see 
Stokes, 548 So. 2d 188 and People v. Lee, 434 Mich. 59, 450 N.W.2d 883, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 211, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1990).

 
 

[¶227.]            
Even the Wyoming cases as a historical minority view do not provide 
support for the present decision from Chapman, 638 P.2d  at 1285, where the 
court had before it a posture of "adequate means to determine that which 
transpired" and opportunity for attack on credibility to explore suggestive role 
playing and general enhancement unreliability as well as incompetency of the 
alleged hypnotist. See Justice 
Brown's dissenting opinion in Chapman, 638 P.2d 1280.36 Then, in Gee, 662 P.2d  at 104, the court 
said:

 
 
     Implicit in the Chapman v. State, supra, holding is the requirement that 
the defendant be advised by the State of the fact that a witness had been 
previously hypnotized and that all statements and proceedings relative thereto 
be made available to the defendant on request. This requirement goes beyond 
those concerning discoverable materials for purposes of impeachment * * 
*.

 
 

[¶228.]            
This court retreated into the asylum of ignorance in Haselhuhn by denying opportunity when 
hypnotic effort was established to reasonably or even seasonably obtain an 
expert witness to counterpoint the power plant maintenance employee doubling as 
a hypnotist. Now regression is total since any "protection" so willingly 
asserted in Gee, 662 P.2d 103 and Chapman, 638 P.2d 1280 is denied with 
the hypnotic effect having been hidden until after trial. At a minimum, a full 
evidentiary hearing in conjunction with eyewitness expert analysis is required 
for any semblance of due process. The 
unrealistic and logically misplaced conception is presented that the testimony 
of the sister of the decedent, who was present at the occurrence, is not 
material in conviction. The thesis - that in assuming deletion of her 
testimony there would be no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would 
have been different - is beyond the wildest imagination; the court need only 
look at the detailed discussions in Little, 835 F.2d 1240; Guerra, 690 P.2d 635; Shirley, 641 P.2d 775; and Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898. See 
particularly in current review, Tardi, 157 Ill.Dec. 1, 571 N.E.2d 1020.

 
 

[¶229.]            
Rock, 107 S. Ct. 2704 is 
pertinent as founded on defendant's constitutional right to testify in order to 
countervail the opportunity of prosecution to use tainted evidence. Whatever 
observation is made, it is otherwise obvious that Wyoming is missing the 
modern trend.37

 
 
     What happens when the 
black letter of the law confronts the black art of hypnosis? At this point, the 
question remains unresolved. While hypnosis seemingly represents a method for 
the discovery of truth, its potential unreliability signals that it may 
nonetheless provide an inappropriate basis for a verdict against a criminal 
defendant. Until there is conclusive evidence establishing the accuracy of 
hypnosis as a method of refreshing recollection, the use of hypnosis in a 
criminal trial must be cautiously approached and seriously 
questioned.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     * * * Until the 
trustworthiness of forensic hypnosis is established, the law must exercise 
caution, lest the system of justice also falls prey to the mesmerizing powers of 
the unconscious mind.

 
 
Comment, The Use of Hypnosis in Criminal Trials: The 
Black Letter of the Black Art, 21 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 635, 705-06 
(1988).

 
 

[¶230.]            
Rock itself provides an 
excellent review, since although premised on defendant's constitutional right to 
testify, the opinion recognizes the doubts about hypnotically enhanced testimony 
and discerns at least some opportunity for amelioration.

 
 
     Responses of 
individuals to hypnosis vary greatly. The popular belief that hypnosis 
guarantees the accuracy of recall is as yet without established foundation and, 
in fact, hypnosis often has no effect at all on memory. The most common response 
to hypnosis, however, appears to be an increase in both correct and incorrect 
recollections. Three general characteristics of hypnosis may lead to the 
introduction of inaccurate memories: the subject becomes "suggestible" and may 
try to please the hypnotist with answers the subject thinks will be met with 
approval; the subject is likely to "confabulate," that is, to fill in details 
from the imagination in order to make an answer more coherent and complete; and, 
the subject experiences "memory hardening," which gives him great confidence in 
both true and false memories, making effective cross-examination more difficult. 
* * *

 
 
     The inaccuracies the 
process introduces can be reduced, although perhaps not eliminated, by the use 
of procedural safeguards. One set of suggested guidelines calls for hypnosis to 
be performed only by a psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in its 
use and who is independent of the investigation. * * *

 
 
     The more traditional 
means of assessing accuracy of testimony also remain applicable in the case of a 
previously hypnotized defendant. Certain information recalled as a result of 
hypnosis may be verified as highly accurate by corroborating evidence. 
Cross-examination, even in the face of a confident defendant, is an effective 
tool for revealing inconsistencies. Moreover, a jury can be educated to the 
risks of hypnosis through expert testimony and cautionary instructions. Indeed, 
it is probably to a defendant's advantage to establish carefully the extent of 
his memory prior to hypnosis, in order to minimize the decrease in credibility 
the procedure might introduce.

 
 

Rock, 107 S. Ct. 
at 2713-14 (footnotes omitted). See also 
Bundy, 850 F.2d 1402.

 
 

[¶231.]            
The critique of Justice Frankfurter in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 117, 
60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940), aptly characterizes the majority decision in 
this case: "Such an essay in linguistic refinement would still further embarrass 
existing intricacies. It might demonstrate verbal ingenuity, but it could hardly 
strengthen the rational foundations of law." The majority's rationalizations in 
a result-oriented decision derives effect from premise to conclusion without the 
utilization of intervening logic, fact or reason. The purpose for a requested 
hearing would have been to determine what actually happened and why those facts 
were hidden from defense by the law enforcement agency and prosecution. How much 
more sanctified and believable all of this could now be had a diligent trial 
type examination with cross-examination and factual review been afforded to 
Engberg for present appellate review. In conclusion, I find the majority opinion 
as written is, in reality, a result searching in vain for a plausible reason. See People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 
243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150 (1988).

 
 

[¶232.]            
On this issue alone, reversal of the post-conviction-relief petition 
denial is required.

 
 
H. Additional Guilt Phase Issues Raised by 
Engberg

 
 

[¶233.]            
Engberg additionally leaves this court in this proceeding with a colloquy 
of evidentiary-procedural issues, most of which were raised at trial, none 
previously considered on initial appeal and all of which are now disregarded by 
the majority. In each case, Engberg's presentation is attacked by the attorney 
general's office as a constitutional forfeiture by procedural default defense. 
In overall evaluation, the disconsonance is presented that by ignoring 
presentation, the law student brief writers, as supervised however they may have 
been, were wiser in ignoring the issues than the experienced trial attorney or 
the present appellate counsel. I will avoid adding further disconsonance to this 
phalanx of issues except where present comment should provide assistance for 
future cases. Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 566 A.2d 111 
(1989).

 
 

[¶234.]            
Issues include evidence of guilt of the Casper homicide derived from 
obstreperousness at the Nevada arrest, subsequent refusal in the Nevada hospital 
to be photographed in a cap following hospitalization and surgery while still 
under medication, denied cross-examination of the photographer about his 
observations of the subject's physical condition and the use of an alias 
pre-homicide while living in Casper. Although evidence of attempted escape may 
be considered as a factor to establish guilt, 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 
214 (13th ed. 1972), the contention of "escape" as that consciousness of guilt 
must relate to the offense charged. See 
Bedford, 566 A.2d 111, where evidence of walking away in the courthouse was 
admissible, but the evidence of possession of a sharpened wire was inadmissible 
and reversible error on introduction which caused reversal of the death penalty 
conviction.

 
 

[¶235.]            
An issue of validity of extradition was presented in denied 
constitutional rights upon transfer from Nevada 
back to Casper 
for this trial. Further significant question is presented about warrantless 
search and seizure of the Casper apartment where the incriminating 
evidence of one unspent cartridge in a vest was discovered. Excluding 
extradition and legality of search and seizure, the category of arguments 
present questions of determined relevancy. What do they prove about 
consciousness of guilt and to what degree are they simply prejudicial background 
information relating to the character of the defendant? As presented on this 
record, much of the "information" seems to provide no evidence of probability 
that Engberg committed this robbery/murder in Casper. This record is unconvincing about 
connective proof even as a matter of discretion of the court to supply validity 
of probativeness which exceeds the prejudicial effect of disassociative bad 
character evidence, which in itself provides no evidence to verify guilt in 
fact.

 
 

[¶236.]            
The test whether evidence is admissible is whether the evidence tends to 
prove the offense charged and whether it is relevant, i.e., whether it tends to 
make the question of guilt more or less probable. Evidence may be rejected as 
irrelevant and of little probable value if it is only remotely probative or 
would cause possible prejudice. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling 
on materiality and relevancy issues and its ruling will only be reversed upon 
abuse of discretion. Martin, 720 P.2d 894; Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, 
Inc., 664 P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1983); Barnard v. Wendling, 627 P.2d 603 (Wyo. 
1981); People v. Castro, 190 Ill. 
App.3d 227, 137 Ill. Dec. 717, 546 N.E.2d 662 (1989). W.R.E. 401 
provides:

 
 
     "Relevant evidence" 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.

 
 
Evidence 
which may tend to affect the jury's decision may not necessarily be admissible 
as factually relevant. Velos v. 
State, 752 P.2d 411 (Wyo. 1988); Shields v. Carnahan, 744 P.2d 1115 
(Wyo. 1987); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 
(Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

[¶237.]            
The weighing process envisioned by W.R.E. 401 for the determination of 
relevancy by the trial court within the concept of prejudice delineated by 
W.R.E. 403 is vested in the trial court's sound discretion. The preclusive 
question is how, if at all, does the proffered evidence tend to prove guilt and 
what extraneous injustice does it create? The central core of this case is 
opportunity, eyewitness identification and unexplained sudden wealth and 
accommodative departure from the scene of the murder along the route where 
evidence of the crime was later discovered. To the extent the basic items of 
proof are to be furnished by what may be perhaps extraneous evidence, the trial 
court is called to discretionally weigh relevance as a factor of probability 
with prejudice as a function of conviction by extraneousness. Probative facts 
and not bad character attribution is the historical touchstone and standard of 
this nation's criminal justice system and the substitution should not now be 
made to serve principally to convict by reputation for the expansion of 
penitentiary populations. Due process should be the guardian and not the victim 
of our system of criminal justice.

 
 

[¶238.]            
Consequently, I would reverse for retrial of guilt as well as 
penalty.

 
 
VI.

 
 
DEATH 
PENALTY ISSUE

 
 

[¶239.]            
Although I concur completely with the analysis and conclusion of Justice 
Cardine in present decision to reverse the death penalty, I write further in 
belief that some different subjects require address and some conclusion 
amplification. 

 
 
A. The Death Penalty in "Modern" 
America

 
 

[¶240.]            
Defined within the cognitive umbrella of the United States Supreme Court 
in Gregg and Furman, it may not be the provence of the state 
appellate court to question the pragmatic wisdom of the death penalty in our 
so-called modern society. Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 Yale 
L.J. 908 (1982). Furthermore, under the United States Constitution and for this 
case, that decision has previously been rendered by the Wyoming Supreme Court 
under the Wyoming Constitution in Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983) and Engberg 
I. The volume of critical literature is overwhelming38 with converse justification for 
litigative action based upon public opinion as almost completely limited in 
modern democracy to this nation. Levit, Expediting Death: Repressive Tolerance and 
Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59 UMKC L.Rev. 
55 (1990). Cf. Bigel, William H. Rehnquist on Capital 
Punishment, XVII Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 729 
(1991).

 
 

[¶241.]            
Given the system and the apparent societal circumference articulated in 
controlling cases of the United States Supreme Court for federal law, it remains 
incumbent upon the state tribunal to honor the prerequisites of the state 
constitution. In attempting to define a fair, evenhanded and reasonably applied 
death penalty, see Hopkinson, 664 P.2d 43 and Engberg I, 686 P.2d 541, 
Rose, J., dissenting. My conviction against the entire process, issue analysis 
and decision in this case is examined as a result lacking either fairness, equal 
protection or any rational justification in simple criminal law for what 
occurred in this, the Engberg case.39 The indeterminate future, definable 
once in accurate anticipation of total confusion by a law journal writer, is 
discernable in analysis by Professor Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating 
Circumstance in Capital Cases - The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L.Rev. 941 
(1986). See Maynard v. Cartwright, 
486 U.S. 356, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 
100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988), but then consider Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1988). What really exists is best recognized by Bright, Death by Lottery - Procedural Bar of 
Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of 
Indigent Defendants, 92 W.Va.L.Rev. 679, 695 (1990), where the author 
concludes, following advocacy of continued federal review, that "[o]therwise, 
the death penalty will too often be punishment not for committing the worst 
crime, but for being assigned the worst lawyer." See Death Penalty Litigation in the '90's-A 
Forum (ABA 1990); I. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of 
Review in State Death Penalty Cases (ABA 1990); and Fogel, A Fair Death: 
Arbitrariness, the Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1972-1989, 16 New 
Eng.J.Crim. & Civ. Confinement 1 (1990). Cf. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower 
Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C.L.Rev. 371 (1991). See also 
Project, The Death Penalty: Personal 
Perspectives, 22 Loy.U.Chi. L.J. 1, 1 (1990), initially quoting Plato's Apology of Socrates: "But now it is time 
to go away, I to die and you to live. Which of us goes to a better thing is 
unclear to everyone except to the god." For additional analysis, see Ledewitz, 
The Morality of Capital Punishment: An 
Exchange, 29 Duq.L.Rev. 719 (1991) compared with Comment, Barbarism in the Plastic Bubble: An 
Application of Existentialist Theory to Capital Punishment in the United 
States, 1990 Det.C.L.Rev. 1011 (1990).

 
 
B. Felony Murder as a Predicate for Capital 
Punishment

 
 

[¶242.]            
In the American justice system, constituting a disparate capital criminal 
adaptation, there are two paths to the death penalty. The first is the typical 
intent-driven premeditated killing. Note, Should Courts Use Principles of 
Justification and Excuse to Impose Felony-Murder Liability?, 19 Rutgers L.J. 451 (1988). The second is the dysfunctional 
category of felony murder where the malice or intent to kill is unnecessary to 
reach the death penalty plateau. People 
v. Hamilton, 
46 Cal. 3d 123, 249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348 (1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 1176, 103 L. Ed. 2d 238 
(1989); King v. Com., 6 Va. App. 351, 368 S.E.2d 704 (1988). In the trial of Engberg, the prosecution started down both paths and 
then stepped back before jury submission to have the trial court instruct only 
on felony murder so that intent to kill was never considered by the jury. Cf. Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909 (Wyo. 
1991). The dysfunction develops in result, since in most intentional death 
penalty cases, the factual events include both the intent and a corollary and 
separate non-homicide felony, while "pure" felony murder reaches a death penalty 
with only the felony and not the intent. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C.L.Rev. 1103 (1990).

 
 

[¶243.]            
Actually, in the vast majority of reported death penalty cases whether 
characterized as felony murder or intentional, the homicide was factually 
established as intentional. Cf. Com. ex 
rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970). An Engberg type 
felony murder when intent to kill is not established comes within a minority of 
the thousands of reported death penalty cases, but within a vast array of 
potential candidates if this kind of felony murder is to be indefinitely 
extended to its full potential. Death penalty vulnerability if every felony 
homicide creates the death-prone status could, nationwide, annually number, if 
including driving violations, in excess 
of forty thousand per year.40 Non-vehicular homicides now number 
around twenty-three thousand per year. Casper 
Star-Tribune (Casper, 
WY), March 25, 1991. To provide the 
death penalty for this number annually would require about three and one-half 
executions every hour, day and night somewhere in this country. It could become 
the greatest growth industry in the country and particularly since the federal 
government wants to join in the killing campaign. See Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, 
and Community Sentiment, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. 819 (1990). See also Comment, The 
Cost of Killing Criminals, 18 N.Ky.L.Rev. 61 (1990).

 
 

[¶244.]            
Realistically, only a small percentage of killings are not attended by 
some associative felony, whether involving financial gain or behavioral 
satisfaction. Excluding the vicarious thrill killer, perhaps the ego killers 
involving husband-wife-boyfriend, etc. stand as the only general exceptions to 
the included felony predominance in crime. Yet, in either of these exceptional 
circumstances, another felony offense may occur as often even a lesser included 
incident, such as breaking-and-entering, assault, fire arms violation, and so 
forth. The burden of this analysis is to perceive that the felony murder death 
case as here presented is an incongruity in most cases, since only pursued to 
eliminate a prosecutorial burden of proving malice and intent by substitution of 
the conclusive presumption for the death penalty exposure from associative 
conduct. It is also apparent that the legislature recognized this problem by 
almost completely changing statutory provisions for imposition of the death 
penalty by passage of Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171 (1989).41

 
 

[¶245.]            
In application of the Wyoming Constitution and analysis of the realistic 
posture of the thousands of present death cases since Furman, I would deny death penalty 
exposure, unless in felony murder the killing was found by the jury to be 
intentional or at least achieve Tison 
compliance if the actor was not an accessory or co-actor. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, reh'g denied 482 U.S. 921, 107 S. Ct. 3201, 96 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1987). In the present case, when the prosecution 
chose not to proceed to the jury with intent to kill, the State should have 
waived death penalty exposure for Engberg.42 See Rosen, supra, 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1169. 

 
 

[¶246.]            
The subject of felony murder as an American legal system phenomenon is 
not without criticism, analysis and comment. See 1 Model Penal Code & 
Commentaries, § 210.2 at 29 (1980), providing that felony homicide should only 
constitute death penalty murder if committed purposely, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting indifference to the value of human life; and 
Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: 
Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentencing After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 Tex.L.Rev. 
407 (1990). The further question, as earlier discussed by the majority death 
penalty opinion in conjunction with the doubling up factor, State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 110 S. Ct. 2587, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990), is that the constituent felony 
by-passes intent to achieve felony murder and then proceeds automatically, as 
applied by single or dual aggravating factors, to the death penalty 
determination.

 
 

[¶247.]            
Thus, society can achieve a death penalty for an offense which otherwise 
may not have been more than a voluntary or involuntary homicide in committing a 
major felony. Cf. DeShields v. State, 
534 A.2d 630 (Del.Super. 1987), cert. 
denied 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S. Ct. 1754, 100 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1988), found by the appellate court to be an execution-type slaying 
of a helpless victim in cold blood. Consider also the predecessor cases of Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581 
(Del.Super. 1985), cert. denied 480 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 1589, 94 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1987), where seventy-nine separate 
stab wounds in one victim and sixty-six in another were incompatible with 
accidental occurrence or unintended death as invoking a culpable mental state; 
Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552 
(Del.Super. 1985); Flamer v. State, 
490 A.2d 104 (Del.Super.), cert. 
denied 464 U.S. 865, 104 S. Ct. 198, 78 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1983), cert. denied 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 185, 88 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1985); and People v. 
King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949, cert. denied 479 U.S. 872, 107 S. Ct. 249, 93 L. Ed. 2d 173, reh'g denied 479 U.S. 956, 107 S. Ct. 449, 93 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1986), where felony murderer acted 
intentionally or knowingly in killing. See 1 Model Penal Code & 
Commentaries, supra, § 
210.6.

 
 

[¶248.]            
The basic thrust is demonstrated by Zimring & Hawkins, Murder, The Model Code, and the Multiple 
Agendas of Reform, 19 Rutgers L.J. 773, 783 (1988), where the authors 
believe that the model code mens rea doctrine is "the very feature that makes 
the felony-murder rule attractive to prosecutors * * *." Elimination of the 
requirement to prove intent improves and simplifies homicide proof for murder 
status. Cf. People v. Land, 169 
Ill. App.3d 
342, 119 Ill.Dec. 955, 523 N.E.2d 711 (1988) (intent in the underlying felony); 
and Jones v. State, 523 N.E.2d 750 
(Ind. 1988).

 
 

[¶249.]            
The felony murder rule, as in part embraced in the preclusive death 
penalty case law and discussion, has separately engendered substantial critique 
in law journals. As we find in Roth & Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L.Rev. 446, 446-48 (1985) (footnotes 
omitted and quoting 3 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 57, 
65 (1883); State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 
439, 442, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1977); Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. Toronto 
L.J. 1, 4 (1973); People v. Aaron, 
409 Mich. 672, 689, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1980); and Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof 
in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1383 (1979)):

 
 
     Few legal doctrines 
have been as maligned and yet have shown as great a resiliency as the 
felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon of everything 
that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine: it has been 
described as "astonishing" and "monstrous," an unsupportable "legal fiction," 
"an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law," and as an "anachronistic 
remnant" that has "`no logical or practical basis for existence in modern law.'" 
Perhaps the most that can be said for the rule is that it provides commentators 
with an extreme example that makes it easy to illustrate the injustice of 
various legal propositions.

 
 
     Despite the widespread 
criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * 
The United 
States thus remains virtually the only western 
country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious 
sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental 
homicide."

 
 
That 
article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment 
and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction (Sandstrom), or a form of criminal strict 
liability (Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982) and United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854, aff'd 438 U.S. 422, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1978), cert. denied 444 U.S. 884, 100 S. Ct. 175, 62 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1979)), and in summary, 
states:

 
 
     The felony-murder rule 
arose from obscure historical origins and has developed haphazardly into a harsh 
and unjust legal doctrine. It is perhaps fitting, therefore, that two separate 
lines of constitutional doctrines, developing independently, have come together 
in such a way that it is impossible to conceptualize felony murder in a manner 
that does not run afoul of constitutional guarantees. Courts and commentators 
have extensively documented the rule's weak policy justifications. This Article 
has demonstrated that the rule's infirmities have finally reached constitutional 
stature.

 
 

Roth & 
Sundby, supra, 70 Cornell L. Rev. at 
492.43

 
 

[¶250.]            
The confusion of philosophy engendered by the relatively few death cases 
of the nature of Engberg where the felony engineers the felony murder and then 
aggravates the offense to a capital status, provides the question whether the 
homicide was intentional, inopportune or accidental. The type normally reflected 
as intended homicide is evidenced by numerous cases.44 The same persuasion was once adopted 
by the California Supreme Court in Carlos 
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 
672 P.2d 862 (1983), but with jurist changes following an election campaign in 
1986, was reversed in People v. 
Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306 (1987). As 
adopted for that state, intent to kill is not a necessary element of the felony 
murder special circumstance which only differentiates prosecutorial requirements 
from factual components.45 

 
 

[¶251.]            
The principal result of the intent rejection answer of Tison is that the 
available death penalty class is so numerically expanded that in result, it may 
lead to the total collapse of the Eighth Amendment limitation standard. Note, Reckless Indifference as Intent to Kill: The 
Disproportionality of Punishment After Tison v. Arizona, 20 Conn.L.Rev. 723 (1988). It is 
rationally anticipated that neither American society nor the judicial system at 
its worst can accommodate more than a limited number of death penalty executions 
and certainly not the number that will result from the intrusion of the 
non-intent felony murder upon the Eighth Amendment and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 14 
and 15.

 
 

[¶252.]            
Significantly increasing the class of death penalty exposed miscreants 
will serve either or both to accelerate total abolition or limitation to 
offenses that are intent-defined to be death penalty justified. Perhaps the 
content of deleted intent for death penalty can be extracted from Lipkin, The Moral Good Theory of Punishment, 40 
U.Fla.L.Rev. 17 (1988). Harm happened, so punishment should be self-imposed by 
voluntary formulation. This could achieve a procedure so that if death is 
caused, another should die to balance the scales, and whether for retribution, 
deterrence, or rehabilitation, we need not inquire. If to be applied to motor 
vehicle usage, the standard could both serve to limit population increase and 
provide a new growth category of industry - executions.

 
 

[¶253.]            
For Engberg, I specially concur for reversal with a conclusion that 
felony constituents should not be recognized for aggravation circumstances in 
death penalty infliction unless intent to kill is proven. Engberg's prosecution 
failed to meet this standard. Specific and compelling authority is provided by 
the most recent case of State v. 
Ortega, ___ N.M. ___, 817 P.2d 1196 (N.M. 1991). Its decisive reasoning 
should now be adopted for Wyoming.

 
 
C. Present Wyoming Statute

 
 

[¶254.]            
By the 1989 Wyoming legislature's 
comprehensive change of the Wyoming death penalty provisions, the weighing 
and burden of proof issues which are pervasive in this appeal no longer occur 
under the replacement provisions. A difficult instruction problem for capital 
penalty that existed in the old statute has been removed by the new text. Upon 
retrial, if Engberg is again prosecuted for capital murder, assessment of death 
penalty will be under the current statutes instead of the prior provisions which 
supplied the significant question of erroneous instructions addressed in the 
present appeal.

 
 

[¶255.]            
There are two particularly relevant Wyoming death penalty statutes. W.S. 6-2-101 
states:46

 
 
     (a) Whoever purposely 
and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting 
arrest or kidnapping, or by administering poison or causing the same to be 
done, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

 
 
     (b) A person convicted 
of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or life imprisonment 
according to law, except that no person 
shall be subject to the penalty of death for any murder committed before the 
defendant attained the age of sixteen (16) years.

 
 
W.S. 
6-2-101 (1991 Cum.Supp.) (1989 statute). W.S. 6-2-102 
states:

 
 
     (d) Upon conclusion of 
the evidence and arguments the judge shall give the jury appropriate 
instructions, including instructions as to any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, as defined in subsections (h) and (j) of this section, or proceed 
as provided by paragraph (iii) of 
this subsection:

 
 
(i) After 
hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render a 
recommendation of sentence to the judge, based upon the 
following:

 
 
(A) Whether 
one (1) or more sufficient aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt as set forth 
in subsection (h) of this section;

 
 
(B) 
Whether, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as set forth in 
subsection (j) of this section which out weigh the aggravating circumstances 
found to exist; and

 
 
(C) The 
mere number of aggravating or mitigating circumstances found shall have no 
independent significance.

 
 

(C) (ii) Based upon these the considerations in paragraph (i) of this subsection, the 
jury shall unanimously determine whether the defendant should be sentenced 
to death or life imprisonment. The jury 
shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances unanimously found to 
exist, and each individual juror may also consider any mitigating circumstances 
found by that juror to exist.

 
 
[See, 
however, McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990) and Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988).]

 
 

(ii) (iii) In nonjury cases, the judge shall 
determine if any aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist and impose 
sentence within the limits prescribed by law, based upon the considerations 
enumerated in subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of paragraph (i) of this 
subsection.

 
 
(e) The 
death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one (1) of the aggravating 
circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this section is found. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such 
designation. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree on the 
punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a life sentence. The jury, 
if its verdict is a recommendation sentence of death, shall designate in 
writing signed by the foreman of the jury:

 
 
(i) The 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. If the jury 
cannot, within a reasonable time, agree on to punishment to be imposed, the 
judge shall impose a life sentence.;

 
 
(ii) The 
mitigating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found by a 
preponderance of the evidence; and

 
 
(iii) The 
mitigating circumstance or circumstances which any individual juror found by a 
preponderance of the evidence.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(h) 
Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following:

 
 
(i) The 
murder was committed by a person under sentence of 
imprisonment:

 
 
(A) 
Confined in a jail or correctional facility;

 
 
(B) On 
parole or on probation for a felony;

 
 
(C) After 
escaping detention or incarceration; or

 
 
(D) 
Released on bail pending appeal of his conviction.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(iv) The 
murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, 
kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or 
discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

 
 
(v) The 
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest 
or effecting an escape from custody;

 
 
(vi) The 
murder was committed for compensation, 
the collection of insurance benefits or other similar pecuniary 
gain;

 
 
(vii) The 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the 
victim;

 
 
(viii) The 
murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney, former 
district attorney, or former county and prosecuting attorney, defending attorney, peace officer, juror or 
witness, during or because of the exercise of his official 
duty;

 
 
(ix) The 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was less than 
seventeen (17) years of age or older than sixty-five (65) years of 
age;

 
 
(x) The 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was especially 
vulnerable due to significant mental or physical 
disability;

 
 
(xi) The 
defendant poses a substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or 
is likely to commit continued acts of criminal 
violence;

 
 
(xii) The 
defendant killed another human being purposely and with premeditated malice and 
while engaged in, or as an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to 
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual 
assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping.

 
 
(j) 
Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(vii) The 
age of the defendant at the time of the crime;

 
 
(viii) Any 
other fact or circumstance of the defendant's character or prior record or 
matter surrounding his offense which serves to mitigate his 
culpability.

 
 
W.S. 
6-2-102 (1991 Cum.Supp.) (1989 statute).

 
 

[¶256.]            
In the current Wyoming Criminal Code which was enacted in 1982 and 1983, 
a continuity provision was inserted to retain effectiveness of prior law for the 
determination of the existence of a criminal offense and to separately establish 
penalty assessment if less onerous in the new law. The saving clause, having 
first retained prior statutes to govern prosecutions for crimes occurring prior 
to the effective date of the act, then provided for penalty: "In a case pending 
on or after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to 
the effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different 
from the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser sentence." 
W.S. 6-1-101(b) and (c). This application of the new code, if the changed 
penalty was favorable to the convicted person, was confirmed in Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812 
(Wyo. 
1984).

 
 

[¶257.]            
Legislative enactment of Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171 (1989) relating to 
assessment of the death penalty following conviction of murder in the first 
degree now provides a more modern death penalty procedure. The new statute, in 
generally amending and re-enacting, included no reference to offenses committed 
prior to passage or for guilt determination thereafter except in Section 3: 
"This act is effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a 
bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming 
Constitution." Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 3 (1989). 
Consequently, with approval March 6, 1989, the law became effective on passage. 
I conclude that the present law determines any future death penalty assessment 
procedure which would include a penalty retrial for Engberg.47 Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 
1989); Reynoldson v. State, 737 P.2d 1331 (Wyo. 1987); Miller v. State, 
732 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1987); Attletweedt, 684 P.2d 812.

 
 
D. Weighing 
and Burden of Persuasion Conflicts Now Ameliorated by Present 
Law

 
 

[¶258.]            
The shifting standards for assessing the death penalty in modern American 
jurisprudence can be explained by the deviousness of philosophic differences 
within the great case volumes and the narrowness of the precepts by which it is 
determined that the defendant is or is not to be executed. By current Wyoming statutory 
changes, there have been contentious problems removed including the weighing and 
burden of persuasion conflicts. See 
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 
(1984); People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047 (1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1038, 110 S. Ct. 1501, 108 L. Ed. 2d 636, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2196, 109 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1990); and People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516 (1985), cert. 
granted in part 476 U.S. 1157, 106 S. Ct. 2274, 90 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1986), judgment rev'd 479 U.S. 538, 107 S. Ct. 837, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987). Demonstrating this clash of problems 
in its jurisprudence, California, as one of the major participants in present 
death penalty litigation, is illustrated by the majority and dissenting opinions 
in People v. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627 (1989), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 224, 112 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1990) when compared to the unanimous decision published the same date of People v. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d 957, 264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608 (1989), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 222, 112 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1990). See also State v. Deboue, 
552 So. 2d 355 (La. 1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 174, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 541, 112 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1990). The complexity is illustrated in the current 
appellate proceedings of Stano v. 
Dugger, 889 F.2d 962 (1989), reh'g 
granted and opinion vacated 897 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1990).48 Retrial application of the present 
Wyoming 
statute may avoid some of the major issues argued in complex detail by Engberg 
in this proceeding as his death penalty issues.49 Althouse, Essay. Standing, In Fluffy Slippers 77 
Va.L.Rev. 1177 (1991).

 
 
E. Other 
Death Penalty Issues

 
 

[¶259.]            
With some deference to Engberg's 212-page brief, some major and not so 
minor death penalty issues remain for this post-conviction-relief review. Upon 
retrial, if death penalty imposition is again undertaken, most of these peculiar 
Engberg-Hopkinson type of issues should 
disappear with a new trial and a changed statute. Only a brief mention will now 
be made of those issues to avoid further extension of this presently overlong 
writing.

 
 
1. The 
constitutionality under present concept and case law of the unanimity and 
mandatory weighing process provided in particularity by the prior statute. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. 1227; Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th 
Cir. 1990); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 
99, 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991); State v. 
Jones, 327 N.C. 439, 396 S.E.2d 309 (1990); State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 559 N.E.2d 710, reh'g denied 54 Ohio 
St.3d 710, 561 N.E.2d 945 (1990), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1092, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1196 (1991); State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 806 P.2d 92 (1991). Cf. Parker v. Dugger, ___ 
U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 731, 112 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1991). See also the cases cited in n. 
48, supra and Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided 
Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L.Rev. 
1147 (1991).

 
 
2. Improper 
instruction of mitigation and aggravation which in any light were specifically 
in conflict as given relating to the burden of persuasion. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. 1227; Mills, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860; Landrum, 559 N.E.2d 710. Compare People v. Bean, 
137 Ill. 2d 65, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258 (1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 1338, 113 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991) with State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 577 A.2d 419 (1990); State v. Sanderson, 
327 N.C. 397, 394 S.E.2d 803 (1990); and State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93, 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 212, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1990). Perhaps two cases most interesting in 
touching questions about the prior and the present Wyoming statute and the way 
the jury was actually instructed in Engberg (both ways) are People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786 (Colo. 
1990), addressing a prior Colorado statute, and the present statute declared to 
be unconstitutional in People v. 
Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1991).

 
 
3. 
Prosecutorial error in final argument minimizing the jury decisional 
responsibility and maximizing requirement as a matter of law to assess the death 
penalty and also expanding aggravative factors to include non-statutory 
elements. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985).

 
 
4. Improper 
documentation provided in death penalty trial session, including use of pure 
hearsay for prior conviction documentation. See generally Comment, The Evidence for Death, 78 Calif.L.Rev. 
973 (1990).

 
 
VII.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶260.]            
Given the serious nature of the death penalty and the heightened 
reliability most courts have consistently required in death sentencing 
procedures, People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 230 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 662, 112 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1991), Lohr, J., dissenting, I 
would find significant error in both guilt and penalty assessment which 
"sufficiently undermines the fairness and certainty of the death sentence 
returned in this case to require reversal." Although I would reverse the 
conviction of guilt for the clear trial errors defined within this record and 
dissent in that regard, I concur in reversal of the death penalty and agree that 
the case should be remanded for another trial on punishment if the prosecution 
elects to continue the litigation beyond the life sentence otherwise 
applied.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 In trial court filing 
during the pendency of the post-conviction-relief proceeding and by direct 
filing of a separate petition in this court, Engberg challenged the State's 
representation by the office of the attorney general since his appellate counsel 
for initial appeal had changed to join the staff of the attorney general's 
office. Representation preclusion attacks by Engberg were denied both in trial 
court and with rejection of the filing of the direct proceeding in this court by 
an order entered May 1, 1985. State ex 
rel. Roy Lee Engberg, Petitioner, v. A.G. McClintock, Attorney General of the 
State of Wyoming, The Office of the Attorney General, Gerald A. Stack, Deputy 
Attorney General, John W. Renneisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General of the 
State of Wyoming and J. Scott Evans, Natrona County District Attorney, 
Respondents, No. 85-76 (Wyo. 1985). For a recent comparison involving 
disqualification of defense counsel, see United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552 
(E.D.N.Y. 1991).

 
 

2 No appeal was taken 
from the robbery conviction and no double jeopardy question has ever been raised 
and need not now be considered. Schultz 
v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988); State v. Wood, 208 Conn. 125, 545 A.2d 1026, 
cert. denied 488 U.S. 895, 109 S. Ct. 235, 102 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1988); State v. Ah 
Choy, 70 Haw. 618, 780 P.2d 1097 (1989); Woods v. State, 547 N.E.2d 772 (1989), 
reh'g 557 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. 1990), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2911, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1991); State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 
(Utah 1990). 
See, in current review, Comment, Application of the Merger Doctrine to the 
Felony Murder Rule in Texas: The Merger Muddle, 42 Baylor L.Rev. 535 (1990). 
See also State v. Ortega, ___ N.M. 
___, 817 P.2d 1196 (N.M. 1991).

 
 

3 Recognition of the 
change of the law is found from the significant changes in Wyoming death penalty 
statutes in Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171 (1989). See, infra, majority opinion on death penalty 
by Justice Cardine and section VI(C) of this dissent. I would not conclude that 
the death penalty statute as applied in either Engberg I or the Hopkinson case could possibly meet any 
appropriate constitutional standards today. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 
(Wyo.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983). In addition, the conflicting aggravation-mitigation 
instruction actually given in this case meets neither present standards nor even 
proper application of constitutional principles when Engberg I was 
written.

 
 

4 The United States 
Supreme Court recently stated that "[w]e have recognized on more than one 
occasion that the Constitution places special constraints on the procedures used 
to convict an accused of a capital offense and sentence him to death." Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2769, 
106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 83, 112 L.E.2d 55 
(1990). It is recognized that this quotation is suspect considering the 
statements of limitation that followed. It is an interesting footnote to history 
that Joseph Giarratano received a death penalty commutation from the Governor of 
the State of Virginia. See also Essay, "To the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never 
Been Wrong": Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 Yale L.J. 
1005 (1991) and Essay, Teetering on the 
Brink: Between Death and Life, 100 Yale L.J. 993 
(1991).

 
 

5 If these authorities 
are not persuasive, we could find other justification for care and attention in 
this court's recent experience with the Osborn case, Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 
1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1051, 
104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1984); Osborn v. Shillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610 
(D.Wyo. 1986), aff'd 861 F.2d 612 
(10th Cir. 1988) and finally, Osborn v. 
State, 806 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1991).

 
 

6 Justice Holmes, 
dissenting in Hyde v. United States, 
225 U.S. 347, 391, 32 S. Ct. 793, 811, 56 L. Ed. 1114 (1912), said "[i]t is one of 
the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter 
* * * cease to provoke further analysis."

 
 

7 Amin, 774 P.2d 597; Murray, 776 P.2d 206; Kallas, 776 P.2d 198.

 
 

8 It has been necessary 
in this dissent to catalogue the arguments which Engberg's counsel failed to 
offer in behalf of her client, not because I conclude that Engberg was likely to 
obtain a reversal on appeal on each specific omission, but only to demonstrate 
that appellate counsel did not render the thoughtful service to which Engberg 
was entitled. Engberg need not establish that he was entitled to reversal in 
order to show prejudice in the denial of counsel.

 
 
I find "that the 
inexcusable failure of petitioner's appellate counsel to raise crucial 
assignments of error, which arguably might have resulted in a reversal, deprived 
petitioner of the effective assistance of appellate counsel to which he was 
entitled under the Constitution." In re 
Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969, 975 (1970). "`[W]e have 
never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual 
innocence.'" Osborn v. Shillinger, 
861 F.2d 612, 629 n. 17 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2586, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986)).

 
 
When justifying 
constitutional forfeiture by procedural default, the incapacity of appellate 
counsel to either find the forest or see the trees remains unexplained; one need 
only read the explicit Wyoming statute and evidence rule, W.S. 1-12-104 and 
W.R.E. 501, in conjunction with Note, Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases, 19 
Wyo. L.J. 35 (1964), as well as Comment, Symposium on the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if Adopted, XII Land & Water L.Rev. 
601, 628-29 (1977) (footnotes omitted), where the authors 
commented:

 
 
Some jurisdictions 
grant the witness-spouse the privilege not to testify and some grant the 
privilege to both. The issue is unresolved in Wyoming. The judicial analysis that does exist 
suggests that the privilege may belong only to the 
party-spouse.

 
 

9 It is worrisome that 
we find critiques of counsel performance as reflected in Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 780 (11th 
Cir. 1984), overruled sub nom. Peek v. 
Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 939, 107 S. Ct. 421, 93 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1986), reh'g 
denied 479 U.S. 1047, 107 S. Ct. 912, 93 L. Ed. 2d 862 
(1987):

 
 
Morgan also asserts 
ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal. It is uncontradicted in the record that 
Morgan's trial counsel did not file a notice of appeal and filed a brief only 
after the Georgia Supreme Court threatened to impose sanctions. The brief, which 
included only five pages of argument, failed to raise as an issue the trial 
court's charge to the sentencing jury. Counsel failed to attend oral argument 
before the Georgia Supreme Court and failed to heed a request by the court that 
he file a supplemental brief on the adequacy of the trial court's penalty 
charge. We find this conduct on the part of Mr. Morgan's attorney woefully 
inadequate and likely ineffective.

 
 
Despite what the 
federal court thereafter said, it is obvious that there was prejudice since the 
decision by the Georgia Supreme Court in Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485, 246 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S. Ct. 2418, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1073, reh'g denied 444 U.S. 976, 100 S. Ct. 475, 62 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1979) produced a dissent on the non-briefed issue and the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals then reversed by unanimous decision. There was 
not any prejudice left in ineffectiveness of counsel after the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals had corrected the trial mistake and appellate brief 
neglect.

 
 

10 The life, trials, and 
death of Willie Darden as so recently completed is expressively informative. Hatch, 425 N.W.2d 27.

 
 

11 There was adequate 
advance warning that Jurek was in trouble, but even the most thoughtful and 
informed may not necessarily have the perceptiveness to anticipate what the 
future of a majority of nine may foretell. See Floyd, Survey, Criminal Procedure, 22 
Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 493, 500 (1991) and Sicola & Shreves, Jury Consideration of Mitigating Evidence: A 
Renewed Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Texas Death Penalty 
Statute, 15 Am.J.Crim.L. 55 (1988). For an example, see Pyles v. State, 755 S.W.2d 98, 123 
(Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 986, 109 S. Ct. 543, 102 L. Ed. 2d 573 (1988).

 
 

12 Lint v. State, 750 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. App. 
1988). Compare the majority and dissent in People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127 (1987), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1038, 108 S. Ct. 2026, 100 L. Ed. 2d 613, reh'g denied 487 U.S. 1246, 109 S. Ct. 4, 101 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1988). See 
Stephens, 846 F.2d  at 651; United 
States ex rel. Kubat v. Thieret, 679 F. Supp. 788 (N.D.Ill. 1988) as 
compared to the state appeal of People v. 
Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d 437, 69 Ill.Dec. 30, 447 N.E.2d 247, cert. denied 464 U.S. 865, 104 S. Ct. 199, 78 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1983). See also 
Brevard County Bd. of County Com'rs v. Moxley, 526 So. 2d 1023 (Fla.App. 
1988); Owens v. State, 662 S.W.2d 323 
(Mo. 1983); Note, Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, Strickland and the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 1987 
U.Ill.L.Rev. 131 (1987); and Note, State 
v. Smith: The Standard of Effectiveness of Counsel in Hawaii Following Strickland v. Washington, 9 
U.Haw.L.Rev. 371 (1986).

 
 

13 Additionally, the 
author's guidelines and standards have applicability as preparation, research, 
communication, coordination and ingenuity in result as the lawyer's work product 
and responsibility:

 
 
These standards, as 
rules of conduct infused with the attitudes and orientations expressed by the 
guidelines, state the elements constituting reasonably competent attorney 
performance in capital cases. Only through such guidelines and standards, and 
close judicial scrutiny in enforcing them, will the death penalty be reserved 
for those few who, because there is truly nothing to mitigate their 
death-qualifying crimes or elicit mercy, may be deemed unworthy of life. This is 
the true purpose of the trial for life.

 
 
Goodpaster, supra, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 
362.

 
 

14 This court cannot 
accept the first year law student school test (even a first year law student 
would know that), State v. Bryant, 237 N.J. Super. 102, 
567 A.2d 212, 214 (1988), rev'd 117 
N.J. 495, 569 A.2d 770 (1989), as the measure of sufficiency for appeal in a 
serious criminal case and particularly so in a death penalty case. See Cooper v. State, 769 S.W.2d 301 
(Tex. App. 
1989). See also Sevilla, supra, 37 Mercer L.Rev. 927 and Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Strickland 
and the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 1987 
U.Ill.L.Rev. 131 (1987).

 
 

15 See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir. 1976), where the activities of the prosecution "convinced" the 
witness as defendant's girlfriend to take the fifth amendment rather than 
testify in favor of defendant as a denial of the constitutional right which 
affords the opportunity to call a defense witness. See also United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, reh'g 605 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979) and United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 
(6th Cir. 1973).

 
 

16 In pretrial 
conference form filed on October 14, 1982, the State 
stated:

 
 
K. Use of 
informer:

 
 
(1) There  x  was ___ was not an informer 
involved.

 
 
(2) The informer 
    will     will not be called as a witness at the 
trial.

 
 
(3)  x  It has supplied the name, address, and 
phone number of the informer.

 
 
(4)     The State will claim privilege of 
non-disclosure as to No. 8K - (1), (2), or (3).

 
 
Engberg referenced the 
same subject in Section K of his pretrial submission filed October 25, 1982 as 
follows:

 
 
K.  x  (1) Any information about the use of an 
informer or lookout in this case.

 
 

 X  (2) A statement of the State's intention 
of calling the informer or lookout as a witness.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
C.  x  Other motions to suppress: Motion to 
suppress testimony of the spouse of the Defendant on the grounds and for the 
reasons that there is absolute spousal immunity.

 
 
Thereafter, the motion 
to suppress was filed October 25, 1982, as well as a request for disclosure of 
informer:

 
 
COMES NOW, the 
Defendant, by and through his attorney and moves the Court for the disclosure of 
the Informer stated in Paragraph 8(k) of the State's Pretrial Conference Form, and 
whether the Informer will be called at trial.

 
 
(Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 
By a list of 
prospective witnesses filed October 29, 1982, Donna Engberg was included as an 
anticipated witness for the State.

 
 
Engberg, in defense 
witness list filed November 22, 1982, included:

 
 
1. All witnesses and 
addresses listed on State's Witness List and State's Supplementary Witness 
List.

 
 
An Application for 
Certificate for Attendance of Out Of State Witness was filed by the State on 
December 7, 1982, which included:

 
 
3. That petitioner 
believes that Donna Engberg Is 
residing in Gothenburg, 
Nebraska, is a necessary and 
material witness to be called in the prosecution of said action for the 
following reasons:

 
 
Donna Engberg was with 
defendant on December 22, 1981 and thereafter traveled with him to Las Vegas, Nevada where they stayed until defendant was 
arrested on January 1, 1982. Donna Engberg has given statements to law 
enforcement agents implicating the defendant in the crimes for which he is 
charged.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
Petitioner believes 
that unless said witness is taken into immediate custody she may fail to appear 
even though so ordered. Such belief is based on the fact that the said Donna 
Engberg agreed to appear in Douglas, Wyoming on the 6th day of December 1982 but 
has now failed to appear and has asserted that she will not appear. Petitioner, 
therefore, respectfully requests that the court recommend in its Certificate 
that said witness be taken into immediate custody and be delivered to the Deputy 
Sheriff of Converse County, State of Wyoming, an officer of the State of 
Wyoming, to assure [her] attendance in this state as a witness in said criminal 
proceeding.

 
 
On the same day, a 
Certificate for Attendance was issued by the trial court, as prepared by the 
county attorney, and in part stated:

 
 
3. That [the State] 
believes that Donna Engberg Is 
residing in Gothenburg, 
Nebraska is a necessary and 
material witness to be called in the prosecution of said criminal trial for the 
following reasons:

 
 
Donna Engberg was with 
defendant on December 22, 1982 and thereafter traveled with him to Las Vegas, Nevada where they stayed until defendant was 
arrested on January 1, 1982. Donna Engberg has given statements to law 
enforcement agents implicating the defendant in the crimes for which he is 
charged.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
7. That the court 
recommends that said witness be taken into immediate custody and be delivered to 
Deputy Sheriff of Converse County, State of Wyoming, to assure her attendance in 
the State of Wyoming, as a witness in said criminal 
proceeding.

 
 

17 Comment, Symposium on the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if 
Adopted, XIILand & Water L.Rev. 
601, 627 (1977). A detailed analysis of the Wyoming statute is also found in Note, Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases, 19 
Wyo.L.J. 35 (1964), which discusses witness disqualification and privileged 
evidence as a confidential communication.

 
 

18 Whatever standard of 
statutory interpretation this court applies, e.g., strict, realistic or 
accommodative, White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313 (Wyo. 1989); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988), the same 
standard should be consistently used and not whatever standard may from time to 
time serve to justify a result-oriented decision. In this case, the statute says 
what it says and should be applied as written without contra-effect flavoring. 
People v. VerMeulen, 432 Mich. 32, 
438 N.W.2d 36, 38 (1989). Compare, however, Justice Thomas' opinion and my 
specially concurring opinion on statutory consistency in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 223 (Wyo. 1991) (Thomas, J., majority; Urbigkit, 
C.J., specially concurring).

 
 

19 The troubling nature 
of Trammel, albeit as non-statutory 
adaptation through common law construction for the federal courts, is 
demonstrated by the question, conflict and confusion engendered. Consider the 
conflict found in the joint involvement case, United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408 
(4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 938, 108 S. Ct. 1118, 99 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1988) with Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 
Iowa L.Rev. 725 (1981); Note, The Joint 
Participation Exception to the Marital Testimonial Privilege: Balancing the 
Interests "In Light of Reason and Experience", 19 Ind.L.Rev. 645 (1986); 
Note, Federal Marital Privileges in a 
Criminal Context: The Need for Further Modification Since Trammel, 43 Wn. 
& Lee L.Rev. 197 (1986); Note, Partners in Crime: The Joint Participants 
Exception to the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony, 53 Fordham 
L.Rev. 1019 (1985); and Note, Adverse 
Spousal Privilege: Dead or Alive?, 63 Wn.U.L.Q. 509 
(1985).

 
 

20 
Technically speaking, 
open court presentation of the non-testifying witness is not presented by 
briefing as an issue for this appeal. First, justification can be found in the 
action of this court in Haselhuhn v. 
State, 727 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1987). See 
also Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1989), but see Jones, 777 P.2d 54. 
Additionally, trial court proceedings and events foreclosed proper opportunity 
for Engberg's counsel to object at that time since he did not actually know the 
trial court would provide the option to exercise privilege to the testifying 
spouse until the decision was made during trial. Any decision to have a 
privilege to testify exercise should be achieved without appearance and 
testimony before the jury in accord with the criteria this court has examined in 
Jones, 777 P.2d 54. In this case, 
Donna Engberg was factually in the custody of the prosecution by virtue of the 
out-of-state testimonial subpoena. Her intent not to testify if permitted by the 
trial court was undoubtedly known by the prosecution before she was put on the 
witness stand.

 
 

21 The reversible error 
of prejudice engendered by deliberately calling a non-testifying witness is 
frequently acknowledged in conviction reversal. This is exemplified prejudice by 
prosecution contrivance without a proper evidentiary purpose. Tallo v. United States, 344 F.2d 467 
(1st Cir. 1965); People v. Solis, 193 Cal. App. 2d 68, 13 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961); People v. Terramorse, 30 Cal. App. 267, 
157 P. 1134 (1916); Colson v. State, 
138 Ga. App. 366, 226 S.E.2d 154 (1976); State v. Chrismore, 223 Iowa 957, 274 N.W. 3 (1937); People v. Trine, 164 
Mich. 1, 129 N.W. 3 (1910); Warren v. 
State, 336 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1976); Outlaw v. State, 208 Miss. 13, 43 So. 2d 661 (1949); Hylton v. State, 100 Nev. 
539, 688 P.2d 304 (1984); Velasquez v. 
State, 700 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App. 1985), aff'd 727 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987); 
Johnigan, 482 S.W.2d 209; Caldwell v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 486, 
287 S.W.2d 176 (1956); Moore v. 
State, 45 Tex.Crim. 234, 75 S.W. 497 (1903); Wilson v. Com., 157 Va. 962, 162 S.E. 15 
(1932). Cf. Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d 280 
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting). See also De 
Gesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374 (1961); People v. Poma, 96 Mich. App. 726, 294 N.W.2d 221 (1980); Annotation, Propriety 
and Prejudicial Effect of Prosecution's Calling as Witness, to Extract Claim of 
Self-Incrimination Privilege, One Involved in Offense Charged Against 
Accused, 19 A.L.R.4th 368 (1983); Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Prosecution's Calling 
as Witness, to Extract Claim of Self-Incrimination Privilege, One Involved in 
Offense With Which Accused Is Charged, 86 A.L.R.2d 1443 (1962); Annotation, 
Calling or Offering Accused's Spouse as 
Witness for Prosecution as Prejudicial Misconduct, 76 A.L.R.2d 920 (1961); 
and 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice §§ 3-5.6(b) and 3-5.7(c) (2d ed. 
1980).

 
 

22One of the most 
interesting segments of the book is Chapter 4: "The All-American Boy: Ted 
Bundy". E. Loftus & K. Ketcham, supra, at 61.

 
 

23See also State v. 
Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 404 A.2d 465 (1979); the Wade trilogy, United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967) and subsequent cases.

 
 
An interesting 
analysis is provided in Note, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A 
Proposal to Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 Hofstra L.Rev. 583 
(1987). See also Comment, Erroneous 
Eyewitness Identification at Lineups - The Problem and Its Cure, 5 
U.S.F.L.Rev. 85 (1970), and compare the earlier article, Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the 
Eyewitness Identification Cases, 42 U.Colo.L.Rev. 135 (1970). In addition, 
see Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 
1987) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

 
 

24Representative only as 
more easily available sources are H. Munsterberg, On the Witness Stand (1908); E. 
Borchard, Convicting the Innocent 
(1932); F. Frankfurter, supra; P. 
Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in 
Criminal Cases (1975); E. Arnolds, supra; and N. Sobel, supra. See also an excellent review in 6 
Ordover, Criminal Law Advocacy 
(1988). With those standard texts must be included A. Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony 
(1979) and E. Loftus & J. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal 
(1987). As illustrative merely of a small portion of the societal, scientific 
and psychology monograms and article reviews, see M. Treadway & M. 
McCloskey, Cite Unseen: Distortions of 
the Allport and Postman Rumor Study in the Eyewitness Testimony Literature, 
11 Law and Human Behavior 19 (1987); D. Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial System: 
Broader Perspectives, 10 Law and Human Behavior 151 (1986); H. McAllister 
& N. Bregman, Juror Underutilization 
of Eyewitness Nonidentifications: Theoretical and Practical Implications, 71 
J. Applied Psychology 168 (1986); K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding 
Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 Law and Human Behavior 15 (1982); R. 
Christiaansen, K. Ochalek & J. Sweeney, Individual Differences in Eyewitness Memory 
and Confidence Judgments, 110 J. General Psychology 47 (1984); G. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: 
System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. Personality & Social 
Psychology 1546 (1978); R. Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness 
Identification, 1 Law and Psychology Review 75 (1975); T. Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness 
Identification, 4 Criminal Defense 5 (1977); S. Portman, Mistaken Eyewitness Identification: A 
Remedy, 3 Criminal Defense 4 (1976); R. Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in 
the Courtroom, 1 Criminal Defense 5 (1977); E. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible 
Eyewitness, 8 Psychology Today 116 (Dec. 1974); and G. Allport & L. 
Postman, The Psychology of Rumor 
(1947). See also Walker & 
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of 
Social Science in Law, 73 Va.L.Rev. 559 (1987) and How Did The Wrong Man Get Snared?, The 
National Law Journal (March 7, 1988). One of the more validated sources in 
teaching orientation to be found is E. Loftus, B. Bell & K. Williams, Powerful Eyewitness Testimony, 24 Trial 
64 (April 1988).

 
 

25

 
 
The major cause of 
injustice in the administration of the criminal law is not, as many believe, the 
use of confessions but the use of eyewitness 
identifications.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
Until recently, the 
judiciary had done little to correct the abuses of eyewitness 
identification.

 
 
Quinn, supra n. 23, 42 U.Colo.L.Rev. at 135 
(footnotes omitted).

 
 
The vagaries of visual 
identification evidence have traditionally been of great concern to those 
involved in the administration of criminal law. It has been thought by many 
experts to present what is conceivably the greatest single threat to the 
achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be 
punished.

 
 
McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal 
Identification, 12 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 235, 238 
(1970).

 
 
"All legal systems 
have made the mistake of suspecting and watching for voluntary errors in 
testimony, rather than for the involuntary ones. Yet it is comparatively rare in 
a civilized society for an innocent person to be put in peril of conviction by 
the lying testimony of the prosecution; the real danger is of mistaken 
evidence."

 
 
Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any 
Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the 
Innocent?, 72 Mich.L.Rev. 717, 719 (1974) (quoting G. Williams, The Proof of 
Guilt 89 (3d ed. 1963)).

 
 
"Although eyewitness 
identification is a highly regarded form of evidence in criminal trials, its 
inaccuracy has not gone unnoticed." Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness 
Perception, 82 Dick.L.Rev. 465, 465 (1978).

 
 
"`[I]nnocent people 
will be imprisoned, and many of the guilty will remain free.'" Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the 
Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 Wn.U.L.Q. 1387, 
1387 (1983) (quoting Jonakait, Reliable 
Identification: Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v. Brathwaite?, 52 
U.Colo.L.Rev. 511, 528 (1981)).

 
 
"Justice would less 
often miscarry if all who are to weigh evidence were more conscious of the 
treachery of human memory."

 
 
Throughout this 
century, experimental psychologists have demonstrated with increasing clarity 
that, due to normal deficiencies in the human memory process, eyewitness 
identification testimony is an inherently unreliable form of evidence. This 
inherent unreliability, in combination with the legal system's unwillingness to 
effectively safeguard against its disastrous effects, poses a serious threat to 
the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice in America.

 
 
Comment, Helping the Jury Evaluate Eyewitness 
Testimony: The Need for Additional Safeguards, 12 Am.J.Crim.L. 189, 189 
(1984) (quoting H. Munsterberg, supra 
n. 24).

 
 
Eyewitness testimony 
plays a critical role in the American judicial system. Many cases are decided 
daily based substantially or entirely on the testimony of eyewitnesses. Since 
this testimony is produced by inherently fallible human systems of perception, 
memory and recall, there is a constant concern that it may not be as accurate as 
it seems. Recently many psychologists and legal commentators have suggested that 
psychologists should be permitted to testify as experts to inform jurors of 
scientific findings relevant to eyewitness testimony and the facts of the 
particular case.

 
 
Comment, Do the Eyes Have It? Psychological Testimony 
Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy, 38 Baylor L.Rev. 169, 169 (1986) (footnote 
omitted).

 
 
Of all the areas where 
the very issue of participation of expert witness in criminal trials is at 
issue, perhaps the most controversial at the present time is eyewitness 
identification. With increasing frequency experts have been testifying in this 
area. Whether such testimony should be admitted has, however, been within the 
discretion of the trial court. Almost all appellate courts that have ruled on 
the matter have upheld the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony 
introduced to discuss the effects of various factors on eyewitness performances, 
or on juror assessment of eyewitness identification.

 
 
Recently, however, the 
supreme courts of Arizona in State v. Chapple [135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 (1983)] and California in People v. McDonald [37 Cal. 3d 351, 
375-76, 690 P.2d 709, 726-27, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 252-53 (1984)] have ruled that 
a trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to admit expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification. These are the first state courts to adopt this 
position. There are indications, however, that other jurisdictions may follow. 
And, it is important to keep in mind that many trial judges already admit this 
testimony in criminal trials.

 
 
Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial 
Identification Cases, XVII Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 1409, 1410-11 (1986) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

26A recommendation not 
found in any case, but probably justified in factual analysis, is that a 
polygraph, as it may be, is more reliable than eyewitness identification in many 
cases. Justice Frank O'Connor noted in O'Connor, supra, 49 St. John's L.Rev. at 30 (footnote 
omitted):

 
 
There remains 
unanswered the haunting inquiry of the nineteenth century student: "What would 
really prevent erroneous identification?" In the most perfect of worlds and with 
all the suggested guidelines adopted, perfected, implemented and in full force 
and effect, inequities, inequalities and injustices will continue to exist - at 
least in this life.

 
 
The author argues from 
his experience in litigation as a judge that the polygraph may serve as a more 
adequate answer than what presently is done. His reasoning in regard to the 
polygraph for expert witness examination is singularly applicable also to the 
psychological evaluation and scientific evidence expert who analyzes behavioral 
facts and identification questions.

 
 
In Jackson, 589 F.2d  
at 111, the court observed in regard to a Wade hearing:

 
 
The state trial judge 
made no detailed findings either as to suggestiveness or as to reliability and 
evidenced a basic lack of familiarity with the appropriate legal 
standards.

 
 

27The general concept 
rejecting the evidence from a scientific expert witness in a jurisdiction where 
the case does not demonstrate whether or nor the Telfaire instruction is used is most 
extensively stated in the denied availability posture as:

 
 
In holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit this expert 
testimony, we do not mean to suggest that we think the broader issue of 
reliability of eyewitness identification testimony is unimportant. Rather, we 
simply believe that requiring trial courts to admit this sort of evidence is not 
the answer. There is no one answer to the problem, but there are a number of 
safeguards to prevent convictions of the innocent based on unreliable eyewitness 
identification. Prosecutors do not have to prosecute if they think the evidence 
is unreliable. Trial courts may suppress identification testimony if the 
identification procedures rendered the evidence unreliable. Effective 
cross-examination and persuasive argument by defense counsel are additional 
safeguards. Proper instruction of the jury on the factors in evaluating 
eyewitness identification testimony and on the state's burden of proving 
identification beyond a reasonable doubt are other safeguards. The requirement 
of jury unanimity is also a safeguard. Finally, this court has the power to 
grant relief if it is convinced that the evidence of a convicted defendant's 
guilt was legally insufficient.

 
 

State v. 
Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 
(Minn. 1980). Unfortunately, the foregoing enumeration contemplates nothing 
different than what has historically occurred as insufficient to counteract the 
recognized insufficiencies and irregularities of the eyewitness identification 
testimony. For a recent example, see How 
Did the Wrong Man Get Snared?, The National Law Journal, supra and Memory on Trial. Witnesses of Crimes Are 
Being Challenged as Frequently Fallible, The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 
1988, at 1, col. 1, which states:

 
 
The new research 
indicates that such publicized cases of eyewitnesses' fallibility "are just the 
tip of a much larger iceberg," says Stephen D. Penrod, a memory researcher at 
the University of Wisconsin in Madison who holds doctorates in both psychology 
and law. "The rate of mistaken identification is significantly higher than most 
people tend to believe," he says.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
Suggestions can also 
become memories, experiments by Prof. Loftus suggest. * * 
*

 
 
Hypnotists also can 
deliberately or inadvertently implant an unreal or false memory in a witness in 
a similar fashion, experiments have shown.

 
 
Subtle suggestions by 
police can lead an eyewitness to err in picking a suspect out of a lineup, 
dozens of experiments indicate.

 
 

28 Cf. State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d 53, 
446 N.E.2d 444 (1983), where the evidence of the voice print was admissible as 
described to be "wretched results" by Professor Starrs in Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and 
Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 92, 
100 (1987).

 
 

29 United 
States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 
(Me. 1978); State v. Johnson, 717 S.W.2d 298 (Tenn. 
Cr.App. 1986); Giannelli, supra, 80 
Colum.L.Rev. 1197. A current evaluation analysis of rules of admissibility 
concerning scientific evidence is comprehensively presented in Rules for Admissibility of Scientific 
Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987), as supplementing the earlier Science and the 
Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983). See also Walker & Monahan, supra n. 24, 73 Va. L.Rev. 
559.

 
 

30 See also United States v. 
Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 868, 105 S. Ct. 213, 83 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1984). Further support is found in Skamarocius v. State, 731 P.2d 63 
(Alaska App. 1987); People v. Brooks, 
128 Misc.2d 608, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1985); and State v. Moon, 45 Wn. App. 692, 726 P.2d 1263 (1986).

 
 

31

While from the bounded 
level of our mind

Short views we take, 
nor see the lengths behind;

But more advanced, 
behold with strange surprise

New distant scenes of 
endless science rise!

 
 
Loftus & 
Schneider, supra, 56 UMKC L.Rev. at 1 
(quoting Pope, Essay on Criticism (1711)).

 
 

32

 
 
Centuries of 
conjecture, research, quackery, and experiment have resulted in little empirical 
certainty about the phenomenon of hypnosis. Defying definition, hypnosis has 
been endorsed as a therapeutic technique for three decades. To date, however, 
the scientific community has not encouraged the use of hypnosis as a 
truth-inducing device. Because this skepticism lies at the heart of the legal 
debate surrounding the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony, some 
understanding of the current state of scientific knowledge about hypnosis is 
required.

 
 
Typically, hypnosis 
sessions begin with a period known as induction. The hypnotist initially 
establishes some rapport with the subject by discussing the purpose of the 
session and by making certain that the subject freely wishes to proceed. Through 
a variety of methods, the subject is then asked to focus intensely on the 
hypnotist, to relax, and to try to visualize what the hypnotist is 
saying.

 
 
Once hypnotized, the 
subject generally becomes increasingly willing to suspend his or her critical 
judgment. Apparently, this results in a response criterion shift, which is a 
willingness to report details about events that are usually rejected as too 
unsure to relay. Unfortunately, this lax response criterion often results in an 
increase in inaccurate as well as accurate recollections.

 
 
Distinct from, yet 
congruent with, the lowered response criterion is the hypnotized subject's 
increased suggestibility resulting from the attention he or she focuses on the 
hypnotist. Having suspended his or her critical judgment, the subject may be 
anxious to please the questioner by responding favorably to both the explicit 
and implicit suggestions made by the hypnotist or anyone else present at the 
session. This may lead the subject to confabulate, or fill gaps in his or her 
memory with plausible, but not necessarily accurate, data. It may also result in 
pseudomemory, which is a perceived recollection where there is no memory at 
all.

 
 
Additionally, the 
subject's preconceptions about the ability of hypnosis to induce recollections 
and the nature of the hypnotist's questions enhance the possibility of 
inaccurate recall. A subject may unconsciously alter his or her responses during 
hypnosis in accordance with any expectations he or she has prior to the session. 
There is also evidence that hypnotized subjects make more errors in responding 
to leading questions than non-hypnotized subjects.

 
 
Compounding these 
accuracy problems is a change in confidence subjects often experience after 
hypnosis as a result of their perceived increased recollection. This phenomenon 
becomes particularly significant in the context of a trial. A witness who 
testifies with self-assurance, even if misplaced, and in great detail, though 
inaccurate, is considerably more credible to a jury than his or her less 
confident and less descriptive counterpart. A witness whose confidence has been 
artificially increased is also less vulnerable to cross-examination. Thus, the 
risk inherent in admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony in a trial is an 
outcome based on unreliable information. This risk forms the basis for the legal 
debate as to whether hypnotically refreshed testimony ought to be admitted in 
criminal trials.

 
 
Note, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments - A 
Constitutional Paradigm For Determining the Admissibility of Hypnotically 
Refreshed Testimony, 78 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 853, 854-57 (1988) 
(footnotes omitted). See similarly, Goleman, New Studies on the HypnoticState: Is it Real or Feigned?, New York Times News 
Service, Wyoming State Tribune (Cheyenne, WY), April 5, 1987. The conclusion of 
this writer perceives susceptibility and suggestion, but much of the scientific 
community questions suggestion and susceptibility to what?

 
 

33

 
 
COMES NOW, Roy Lee 
Engberg, by and through his court-appointed attorney, Martin J. McClain, and 
requests an order authorizing Mr. McClain or an investigator on his behalf to 
contact Kay Otto and other eye-witnesses to the Buttrey's robbery, as well as 
police investigators, in order to ascertain whether hypnosis was used to enhance 
the witnesses' memories. For his reasons, Mr. McClain states the 
following:

 
 
1. On December 31, 
1984, the Wyoming Supreme Court appointed Mr. McClain as Mr. Engberg's attorney 
for purposes of pursuing any available post-conviction relief, and ordered that 
the resources of the State Public Defender's Office be made available to assist 
in Mr. McClain's representation of Mr. Engberg.

 
 
2. In the course of 
examining the trial transcript, Mr. McClain was struck by questions and answers 
during Ms. Otto's redirect examination. Ms. Otto indicated that the discrepancy 
in her testimony regarding the length of time she had viewed the robber's face 
was caused by the fact that since the preliminary hearing, she counted the 
seconds she viewed the face and determined her initial estimate was in error. * 
* *

 
 
3. Mr. McClain also 
noted the sudden change in Robert Latham's recollection of the robber's identity 
which occurred at trial. * * *

 
 
4. Based on these 
oddities, Mr. McClain talked with Mr. Engberg's trial counsel, Wyatt Skaggs and 
Linda Miller, in order to ascertain whether they had received any information 
indicating that prosecution had hypnotically enhanced the eye-witnesses' 
memories.

 
 
5. Both trial counsel 
indicated they were never provided any information so indicating. However, Ms. 
Miller did indicate that she recalled in other cases in 1982, the Casper Police 
had used hypnosis to enhance a witness's memory.

 
 
6. Mr. McClain then 
checked the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision on the topic of hypnosis and 
discovered the case of Gee v. State, 
662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983). * * * During the cross-examination of one witness, the 
defense counsel discovered that the witness had been hypnotized to enhance her 
memory. The Supreme Court affirmed because materials had been furnished to 
defense counsel prior to trial with a notation that the witness had been 
hypnotized. However, the Court noted the failure to disclose would have been 
error under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).

 
 
7. Because of the 
testimony given in the present case and because of the similarities between it 
and Gee, there exists a suspicion 
that hypnosis may have been used here.

 
 

34 See also Guerra, 690 P.2d 635; Note, supra, 41 Ark.L.Rev. 425; and Note, supra, 21 J. Marshall L.Rev. 409. 
Extensive listings of comparable cases can be found in Rock, as well as the principal case of 
Shirley, 641 P.2d 775.

 
 

35 An argument as 
interestingly converse was presented in Rault v. Butler, 826 F.2d 299 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1042, 
108 S. Ct. 14, 97 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1987), where the convicted killer claimed error 
(rejected on appeal) in denial of his right to be hypnotized in open court and 
then to testify under that state as demonstrative 
evidence.

 
 

36 See also Pote, 695 P.2d 617, as 
affirmation that conviction was premised on the record, reports and information, 
which constituted adequate means to determine what 
happened.

 
 

37 Note, Evidence - Admitting Hypnotically Refreshed 
Testimony - State v. Haislip, 35 U.Kan. L.Rev. 219 (1986); Note, supra n. 8, 21 J. Marshall L.Rev. 
409.

 
 

38

 
 
But the outcome [of 
Furman] has been no more successful than that of the prior system of capital 
punishment. This failure has not resulted from lack of effort but rather from 
the impossibility of fashioning an acceptable method of administering capital 
punishment while maintaining the system of rights that our Constitution 
mandates.

 
 
Greenberg, supra, 91 Yale L.J. at 
928.

 
 
No theoretical 
penological justification for the death penalty supports the capital punishment 
system as it is now administered. Whatever view one takes of the deterrent 
capacity of the death penalty when it is the swift and certain result of 
criminal activity, the current, roller coaster system - though absolutely 
necessary to protect the innocent from execution, to safeguard basic 
constitutional rights, and to avoid racially motivated executions - makes swift 
and certain executions impossible. A hypothetical killer who calculates his 
chances of being executed before committing homicide must calculate that he or 
she is quite unlikely to be put to death.

 
 

Id. at 927. See also Amnesty International, 
United States of 
America: The Death Penalty 
(1987).

 
 
The pattern is so 
simple it is stunning. Every Western industrial nation has stopped executing 
criminals, except the United 
States. The unanimity is quite 
recent.

 
 
F. Zimring & G. 
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and The American Agenda, at 3 (1986). Amsterdam, supra, 14 Human Rights 14; Mello, supra, 37 Am.U.L.Rev. 513; Landis & 
Goodstein, When Is Justice Fair? An 
Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, 1986 Am. 
B.Found.Res.J. 675 (1986); Goldstein, Application of Res judicata Principles to 
Successive Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases: The Search for an 
Equitable Approach, 21 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 45 (1987); Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose 
Death, 68 Geo.L.J. 97 (1979); Geimer, Death At Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court's Recent Retreat From Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 
737 (1985); Note, Statistics and the 
Death Penalty: A Break With Tradition, 21 Creighton L.Rev. 265 (1987); Note, 
Tison v. Arizona: Justice O'Connor Creates a New 
Standard of Culpability for Capital Crimes, 21 Creighton L.Rev. 359 (1987); 
Letwin, Impeaching Defendants With Their 
Prior Convictions: Reconsidering the Dangerous Propensities of Character 
Evidence After People v. Castro, 18 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 681 (1985); Bedau, Thinking of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment, 18 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 873 (1985); Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions 
Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 
Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev. 211 (1987); Scheidegger, Capital Punishment in 1987: The Puzzle Nears 
Completion, 15 W.St.U.L.Rev. 95 (1987); Havlena, Abolishing the Death Penalty - Why? How? 
When?, 15 W.St.U.L.Rev. 127 (1987); Comment, Factual Innocence . . . Who Pays the 
Price?, 15 W.St.U.L.Rev. 319 (1987); Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital 
Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When 
the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 Tenn.L.Rev. 95 (1987); Paternoster & 
Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death 
Penalty in South 
Carolina: Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 
S.C.L.Rev. 245 (1988); Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death 
Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 Harv.L.Rev. 313 (1986); Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and 
the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital 
Punishment, 28 Ariz.L.Rev. 143 (1986); Project, Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure: United 
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 
1985-1986, 75 Geo.L.J. 713 (1987); Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and 
the Constitution, 85 Mich.L.Rev. 1741 (1987); Note, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Is the Current Test of 
the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment Proper? Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), XVII Land & Water L.Rev. 681 (1982); Dolinko, Foreword: How to Criticize the Death 
Penalty, 77 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 546 (1986); Allen, Supreme Court Review. Foreword - Evidence, 
Inference, Rules, and Judgment in Constitutional Adjudication: The Intriguing 
Case of Walton v. Arizona, 81 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 
727 (1991), Wright, Life Without Parole: 
The View From Death Row, 27 Crim.L.Bull. 334 (1991). See also Book Review, Serial Murder: An Elusive Phenomenon, 81 
J.Crim.L. & Criminology 1102 (1991).

 
 

39 For illustration of 
complexity, complication and frequent reversals, see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988); Franklin, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S. Ct. 2320; 
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988); Satterwhite, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S. Ct. 1792; Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 
108 S. Ct. 534, 98 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1988); and Ross v. Oklahoma, 484 U.S. 1054, 108 S. Ct. 1004, 98 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1988). See 
also Stout v. Oklahoma, 486 U.S. 1050, 108 S. Ct. 2814, 100 L. Ed. 2d 916 
(1988), remanded in light of Maynard v. 
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988); Hayes v. Oklahoma, 486 U.S. 1050, 108 S. Ct. 2815, 100 L. Ed. 2d 916 (1988), case below, Hayes v. State, 738 P.2d 533 (Okla. Cr. 
1987), remanded in light of Maynard, 
108 S. Ct. 1853; Jones v. Maryland, 
486 U.S. 1050, 108 S. Ct. 2815, 100 L. Ed. 2d 916, (1988), case below, Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 530 A.2d 743 (1987), remanded in light of 
Mills, 108 S. Ct. 1860; Woratzeck v. 
Ricketts, 486 U.S. 1051, 108 S. Ct. 2815, 100 L. Ed. 2d 916 (1988), cases 
below, Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 808 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1986) and Woratzeck 
v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987), remanded in light of Maynard, 108 S. Ct. 1853; Lankford v. Idaho, 486 U.S. 1051, 108 S. Ct. 2815, 100 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1988), case below, State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710 (1987), remanded in light of 
Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. 1792; Bennett 
v. Texas, 486 U.S. 1051, 108 S. Ct. 2815, 100 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1988), case below, 
Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1987), remanded in light of 
Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. 1792; Jones v. 
Mississippi, 487 U.S. 1230, 108 S. Ct. 2891, 101 L. Ed. 2d 925 (1988), cases 
below, Jones v. State, 461 So. 2d 686 
(Miss. 1984) and Jones v. State, 517 So. 2d 1295 (Miss. 1987), vacated and remanded to the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi in light of Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 2687 and Maynard, 108 S. Ct. 1853; Powell v. Texas, 487 U.S. 1230, 
108 S. Ct. 2891, 101 L. Ed. 2d 926 (1988), aff'd on remand 767 S.W.2d 759 
(Tex.Cr.App.), rev'd 492 U.S. 680, 
109 S. Ct. 3146, 106 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989), case below, Powell v. State, 742 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Cr. 
App. 1987), remanded in light of Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. 1792; Lloyd v. North Carolina, 488 U.S. 807, 
109 S. Ct. 38, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988), case below, State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 364 S.E.2d 316 (1988), remanded in light of Mills, 108 S. Ct. 1860; and Cook v. Texas, 488 U.S. 807, 109 S. Ct. 39, 102 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1988), case below, Cook v. State, 741 S.W.2d 928 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1987), remanded in light of Satterwhite, 108 S. Ct. 1792.

 
 

40 The relationship of 
the death penalty to felony murder was analyzed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-92, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3372-74, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982) (emphasis in 
original and footnotes omitted) and statistically 
considered:

 
 
Thirty-six state and 
federal jurisdictions presently authorize the death penalty. Of these, only 
eight jurisdictions authorize imposition of the death penalty solely for 
participation in a robbery in which another robber takes life. [As footnoted: 
California, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming] Of the remaining 28 jurisdictions, in 
4 felony murder is not a capital crime. Eleven States require some culpable 
mental state with respect to the homicide as a prerequisite to conviction of a 
crime for which the death penalty is authorized. Of these 11 States, 8 make 
knowing, intentional, purposeful, or premeditated killing an element of capital 
murder. Three other States require proof of a culpable mental state short of 
intent, such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life, before the 
death penalty may be imposed. In these 11 States, therefore, the actors in a 
felony murder are not subject to the death penalty without proof of their mental 
state, proof which was not required with respect to Enmund either under the 
trial court's instructions or under the law announced by the Florida Supreme 
Court.

 
 
Four additional 
jurisdictions do not permit a defendant such as Enmund to be put to death. Of 
these, one State flatly prohibits capital punishment in cases where the 
defendant did not actually commit murder. Two jurisdictions preclude the death 
penalty in cases such as this one where the defendant "was a principal in the 
offense, which was committed by another, but his participation was relatively 
minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution." 
[Quoting from Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103(5)(d) (1978) and 49 U.S.C. § 
1473(c)(6)(D)] One other State limits the death penalty in felony murders to 
narrow circumstances not involved here.

 
 
Nine of the remaining 
States deal with the imposition of the death penalty for a vicarious felony 
murder in their capital sentencing statutes. In each of these States, a 
defendant may not be executed solely 
for participating in a felony in which a person was killed if the defendant did 
not actually cause the victim's death. For a defendant to be executed in these 
States, typically the statutory aggravating circumstances which are present must 
outweigh mitigating factors. To be sure, a vicarious felony murderer may be 
sentenced to death in these jurisdictions absent an intent to kill if sufficient 
aggravating circumstances are present. However, six of these nine States make it 
a statutory mitigating circumstance 
that the defendant was an accomplice in a capital felony committed by another 
person and his participation was relatively minor. By making minimal 
participation in a capital felony committed by another person a mitigating 
circumstance, these sentencing statutes reduce the likelihood that a person will 
be executed for vicarious felony murder. The remaining three jurisdictions 
exclude felony murder from their lists of aggravating circumstances that will 
support a death sentence. In each of these nine States, a nontriggerman guilty 
of felony murder cannot be sentenced to death for the felony murder absent 
aggravating circumstances above and beyond the felony murder 
itself.

 
 
Thus only a small 
minority of jurisdictions - eight - allow the death penalty to be imposed solely 
because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a 
murder was committed. Even if the nine States are included where such a 
defendant could be executed for an unintended felony murder if sufficient 
aggravating circumstances are present to outweigh mitigating circumstances - 
which often include the defendant's minimal participation in the murder - only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant who 
somehow participated in a robbery where a murder occurred to be sentenced to 
die. Moreover, of the eight States which have enacted new death penalty statutes 
since 1978, none authorize capital punishment in such 
circumstances.

 
 

41 The differentiated 
list in current Wyoming law provides other problems of a 
rationally confined number of death penalty prone homicides. In present 
Wyoming 
statute, W.S. 6-2-102, in considering the twelve item categories of aggravating 
circumstances, the only homicides not statutorily subject to death penalty would 
involve as a class "sane" victims older than seventeen and younger than 
sixty-five exclusive of police officers.

 
 

42 Enmund, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); Note, Felony Murder: Driving Away From the Death 
Penalty, 12 Stetson L.Rev. 479 (1983); Comment, Constitutional Law: The Eighth Amendment 
Requires a Determination of Actual Personal Intent for the Death Penalty to be 
Imposed on Non-Triggermen Felony Murders, 35 U.Fla.L.Rev. 521 (1983); Note, 
Redefining a Culpable Mental State for 
Non-Triggermen Facing the Death Penalty, 33 Vill.L.Rev. 367 
(1988).

 
 

43 Articles which detail 
a large number of earlier writings include: Comment, Washington's Second Degree Felony-Murder 
Rule and the Merger Doctrine: Time for Reconsideration, 11 U.Puget Sound 
L.Rev. 311 (1988); Note, Reckless 
Indifference as Intent to Kill: The Disproportionality of Punishment After Tison 
v. Arizona, 20 Conn.L.Rev. 723 (1988); Note, 
supra, 19 Rutgers L.J. 451; Note, Tison v. Arizona: A New Standard of 
Culpability for Accomplice Felony-Murder, 39 Mercer L.Rev. 717 (1988); Note, 
Overstepping Precedent? Tison v. 
Arizona 
Imposes the Death Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C.L.Rev. 817 
(1988); and Note, The Constitutionality 
of Imposing Death on a Felony-Murder Accomplice, 12 Nova L.J. 1299 
(1988).

 
 

44 For example, see State v. Richmond, 136 Ariz. 312, 666 P.2d 57, cert. denied 464 U.S. 986, 
104 S. Ct. 435, 78 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1983); Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), cert. granted 423 U.S. 1082, 96 S. Ct. 1090, 47 L. Ed. 2d 93, aff'd 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); King, 488 N.E.2d 949 (intent, knowledge, or strong probability of death); Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 (malice 
required for murder); State v. Bates, 
495 So. 2d 1262 (La. 1986), cert. 
denied 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S. Ct. 1986, 95 L. Ed. 2d 826, reh'g denied 483 U.S. 1041, 108 S. Ct. 11, 97 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1987); State v. 
Anderson, 409 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1979); State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 872, 108 S. Ct. 206, 98 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1987); and Com. v. Spallone, 267 Pa. Super. 486, 
406 A.2d 1146 (1979).

 
 

45 The realism of result 
is recognized in felony murder death cases in Note, Disparity in Death Sentencing for Felony 
Murderers Created by Cabana v. Bullock, 37 De Paul L.Rev. 289, 313-16 
(1988), where the author, Mary von Mandel, accurately 
perceived:

 
 
The Bullock decision is problematic in two 
ways. First, it allows sentencing procedures which do not afford felony 
murderers the same protection as deliberate murderers. Second, it weakens the 
traditional role of the jury in sentencing procedures.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
[The case result] 
combines fact finding with appellate review in the same proceeding for felony 
murderers. This creates a distinction between felony murderers and deliberate 
murderers. A deliberate murderer is assured complete consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances while a felony murderer is 
not.

 
 

46 The bold italicized 
portion of the text in the current statute signifies the additions made in the 
1989 legislative session. The stricken portion indicates text that was 
deleted.

 
 

47 There are no ex post 
facto prohibitions invaded by application of the current enactment under either 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 or Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 35. This court has addressed 
those concerns in Loomer v. State, 
768 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1989). There we stated the ex post facto 
prohibitions turn on the issue of procedural or substantive detriment. "`Any 
statute * * * which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its 
commission, * * * is prohibited as ex post facto.'" Id. at 1049 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 2298, 
53 L. Ed. 2d 344, reh'g denied 434 U.S. 882, 98 S. Ct. 246, 54 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1977)). While the line between procedure and 
substance wavers at times, see Byrd v. 
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 78 S. Ct. 893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953, reh'g denied 357 U.S. 933, 78 S. Ct. 1366, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1375 (1958), a review of the new statute indicates the 
sentence of death is more difficult to impose than under the old W.S. 6-2-102. 
For instance, the new statute spells out an individual juror may consider any mitigating circumstance found by 
that juror to exist. Also, the new statute makes clear that the list of 
mitigating circumstances is illustrative only. Because W.S. 6-2-102 inures to 
the benefit of Engberg, ex post facto prohibitions are not applicable here. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798); cf. Miller v. 
Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 96 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1987) 
and United 
States v. Story, 891 F.2d 988 (2nd Cir. 
1989).

 
 
The advantages to any 
death charged defendant for application of the provisions of the most current 
Wyoming 
statute are self-evident. The Coleman v. 
McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 944, 110 S. Ct. 349, 107 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1989) ex post facto determinant consequently does not 
apply where the amendatory provisions for death penalty assessment will not 
disfavor the accused. The retrospective application addressed in Aden v. State, 761 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1988) 
is not appropriate for present decision to follow the general rule for the 
procedure to assess death penalty now in effect for retrial as more rational and 
objective, Id. at 90, and certainly 
thoughtfully composed by the legislature to address obvious concerns about the 
efficacy of the prior law.

 
 
For the purposes of 
W.S. 8-1-107, amendments to W.S. 6-2-102 for retrial do not affect a pending 
prosecution following prior reversal of conviction. We have applied the Attletweedt rule as exculpated from W.S. 
6-1-101(c). Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S. Ct. 2290. For amendatory purposes, the changes to the death penalty statute 
were procedural, Matter of Boyd's 
Estate, 606 P.2d 1243 (Wyo. 1980), and affected the penalty. Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S. Ct. 2290.

 
 

48 With the hundreds of 
new death penalty convictions each year and the small number of executions, the 
literature is constant and voluminous. In current analysis, Wells addresses the 
issue: "In the words of Justice Stevens, `[T]he Court has lost its way in a 
procedural maze of its own creation.' The only path leading out of this maze is 
by way of a return to the principles of Furman." Wells, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death 
Penalty: A Need for a Return to the Principles of Furman, 80 J.Crim.L. & 
Criminology 427, 490 (1989) (footnote omitted and quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 540, 
106 S. Ct. 2661, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See Acker & Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State 
Constitutions, 42 Vand.L.Rev. 1299 (1989); Note, Successive Chances for Life: Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson, Federal 
Habeas Corpus, and the Capital Petitioner, 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 455 (1989); and 
Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of 
Capital Punishment, 99 Yale L.J. 389 (1989). See also Goldberg, The Death Penalty Revisited, 16 
Hastings 
Const.L.Q. 1 (1988); Lushing, Capital 
Punishment: A Disputation, 42 Ark.L.Rev. 105 (1989); Note, Tison v. Arizona: A General Intent for Imposing Capital 
Punishment Upon an Accomplice Felony Murderer, 20 U.Tol.L.Rev. 255 (1988); 
Death Penalty, California Supreme Court 
Survey May 1988-July 1988, 16 Pepperdine L.Rev. 451 (1989); Comment, Capital Punishment, 102 Harv.L.Rev. 1035 
(1989); Welborn, A New Effort to 
Reinstate the Death Penalty in Michigan, 1988 Det. C.L.Rev. 33 (1988); Note, 
Preserving Integrity in Capital 
Sentencing: Booth v. Maryland, 22 Creighton L.Rev. 333 (1988); 
Note, Maynard v. Cartwright: How the 
Supreme Court Killed The Catchall Category in the Oklahoma Death Penalty, 24 Tulsa L.J. 215 (1988); Note, Oregon Joins Texas at the Constitutional Outpost: The Oregon Supreme Court Upholds the Death Penalty Statutes in 
State v. Wagner, 25 Willamette L.Rev. 653 
(1989); Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in 
the Legislature: Some Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 
U.Kan.L.Rev. 443 (1989); Note, State v. 
Coleman: The Felony Murder Rule and the Use of Presumptions to Fulfill Criminal 
Intent in Capital Cases, XV Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 119 (1988); Barnard, Death Penalty. The 1988 Survey of Florida Law, 13 Nova 
L.Rev. 907 (1989); Note, A Continuing 
Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death 
Penalty Sentencing, 41 Hastings L.J. 409 (1990); Note, supra, 53 Mo.L.Rev. 823; Note, Double Jeopardy and Resentencing in 
Bifurcated Criminal Proceedings: Bullington v. Missouri, 1982 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 192 (1982); Twelfth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 
12 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 115 (1989-90); McKay, Arizona's Death Penalty: The Eighth Amendment and 
Exclusion of Mitigating Circumstances, 20 Ariz.St.L.J. 779 (1988); and 
Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments 
by the Supreme Courts of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 
Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 237 (1989). Additionally, for a most current review, see Death Penalty Symposium, 58 UMKC L.Rev. 
517 (1990) and Death Penalty 
Symposium, 59 UMKC L.Rev. 1 (1990).

 
 
The recurrent problems 
encountered by the appellate courts in consideration of the burden of proof and 
weighing instructions for death penalty determination are excruciatingly 
illustrated by samples of current cases from illustrative 
jurisdictions:

 
 
Federal: Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 959, 110 S. Ct. 378, 107 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1989); Martin, 891 F.2d 807; Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328 (8th 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 110 S. Ct. 3301, 111 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1990); Pulley, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871; Williams v. Armontrout, 891 F.2d 656 
(1989), reh'g 912 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1092, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1197 (1991); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1051, 110 S. Ct. 854, 107 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1990); Lusk v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 332 (1989), reh'g denied 894 F.2d 414 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3297, 111 L. Ed. 2d 805, reh'g denied 
___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 10, 111 L. Ed. 2d 825 (1990); Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (1989), reh'g denied 898 F.2d 160 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2628, 110 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1990); Harris, 
874 F.2d 756; Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 874, 110 S. Ct. 206, 107 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1989); Coleman, 874 F.2d 1280; Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th 
Cir. 1988); Clark v. Ricketts, 886 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989); People v. 
Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25 (1988), cert. granted 490 U.S. 1097, 109 S. Ct. 2447, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1002 
(1989), aff'd 494 U.S. 370, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316, reh'g denied 
___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 1961, 109 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1990).

 
 

Alabama: Hallford v. State, 548 So. 2d 526 
(Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd 548 So. 2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 945, 110 S. Ct. 354, 107 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989); Hinton v. 
State, 548 So. 2d 547 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd 548 So. 2d 562 (Ala.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 969, 110 S. Ct. 419, 107 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1989).

 
 

Arkansas: Robertson v. State, 298 Ark. 131, 765 S.W.2d 936, 940 (1989), Hickman, J. 
concurring; Ruiz v. State, 299 
Ark. 144, 772 S.W.2d 297 (1989); Wilson v. State, 295 Ark. 682, 751 S.W.2d 734, opinion modified 295 Ark. 682, 752 S.W.2d 762 
(1988).

 
 

California: Lang, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627; 
People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal. 3d 935, 258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330 (1989); People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d 502, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129 (1989), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2576, 109 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1990); In re Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164 (1989).

 
 

Connecticut: State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 562 A.2d 1060 
(1989).

 
 

Florida: Bello v. State, 547 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 
1989).

 
 

Idaho: State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 775 P.2d 599, 
cert. denied 493 U.S. 923, 110 S. Ct. 290, 107 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1989).

 
 

Illinois: People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 
138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3296, 111 L. Ed. 2d 804, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 18, 111 L. Ed. 2d 831 (1990); People 
v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 136 Ill.Dec. 18, 544 N.E.2d 704 
(1989).

 
 
Indiana: Huffman v. State, 543 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. 
1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3257, 111 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1990); Minnick v. State, 544 N.E.2d 471 (Ind. 
1989); Games v. State, 535 N.E.2d 530 
(Ind.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 874, 
110 S. Ct. 205, 107 L. Ed. 2d 158, reh'g 
denied 493 U.S. 985, 110 S. Ct. 523, 107 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1989); Lowery v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1046 (Ind. 
1989); cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 217, 112 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1990); Smith, 547 N.E.2d 817.

 
 

Louisiana: State v. Lindsey, 543 So. 2d 886 
(La. 1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 1796, 108 L. Ed. 2d 798, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2579, 109 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1990).

 
 
Mississippi: Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 
1988), cert. granted ___ U.S. ___, 
110 S. Ct. 1921, 109 L. Ed. 2d 285, rev'd ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990); Clemons v. State, 
535 So. 2d 1354 (Miss. 1988), cert. 
granted in part 491 U.S. 904, 109 S. Ct. 3184, 105 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1989), judgment vacated 494 U.S. 738, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1990); Williams v. 
State, 544 So. 2d 782 (Miss. 1987); West v. State, 553 So. 2d 8 (Miss. 
1989).

 
 
New Jersey: State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 
330, 558 A.2d 1259 (1989); Davis, 561 A.2d 1082; State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 
580, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989); State v. 
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130 (1987); State v. Biegenwald, 
110 N.J. 521, 542 A.2d 442 (1988); State 
v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 594 A.2d 172 (1991).

 
 

New 
Mexico: State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S. Ct. 291, 107 L. Ed. 2d 271, reh'g denied 493 U.S. 998, 110 S. Ct. 555, 107 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989), overruled sub nom. State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 789 P.2d 603 
(1990).

 
 

North 
Carolina: State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989), cert. granted and vacated 
494 U.S. 1023, 110 S. Ct. 1466, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990); State v. 
Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), cert. granted and vacated ___ 
U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990).

 
 
Ohio: State v. Dickerson, 45 Ohio St.3d 206, 
543 N.E.2d 1250, reh'g denied 46 Ohio 
St.3d 706, 545 N.E.2d 1285 (1989), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 1836, 108 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990); State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, reh'g denied 46 Ohio 
St.3d 717, 546 N.E.2d 1335 (1989), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1431, 113 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1991); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, reh'g denied 43 Ohio 
St.3d 712, 541 N.E.2d 78 (1989), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3258, 111 L. Ed. 2d 768, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 16, 
111 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1990).

 
 

South 
Carolina: State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 1536, 108 L. Ed. 2d 775, reh'g denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2221, 109 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1990).

 
 

Virginia: Spencer v. Com., 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S. Ct. 759, 107 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1990).

 
 
The burden of this 
case law would have required reversal on Engberg's death penalty in any event. 
People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 
1991). Cf. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in 
Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52, Ohio St.L.J. 195 
(1991).

 
 

49 The Wyoming statutory 
changes assist this court in avoiding the criticism recognized by the critical 
scholars in death penalty case decisions described to be a failure to recognize 
the differentiated function of a court of appeals and a supreme court. The 
conflicting concepts as clearly delineated in the electoral change in California of 1986 is 
demonstrated in Uelmen, supra n. 48, 
23 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 237. In comparing the predecessor Bird court with the 
successor Lucas court, Professor Uelmen stated:

 
 
The thesis that will 
emerge is that, at least in reviewing death penalty judgments, two very 
different models of the appellate function are at work.

 
 
The Lucas court 
approaches the review of death penalty cases very much like intermediate 
appellate courts approach the review of ordinary criminal cases. The process 
closely matches the process described in a classic study of criminal appeals in 
the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District as it operated 
in the mid-1970s: "The court approaches its work from a perspective that is 
noninterventionist, nonsupervisory, and conflict avoiding. Its decision process accentuates 
the value of finality and is strongly inclined toward affirmance." That study 
noted that a high rate of affirmance of criminal appeals reflected basic 
institutional norms and perspectives. Essentially, the justices approached their 
task with great deference to the trial judge:

 
 
"As a result, the 
Court of Appeal seldom asks what the best or most appropriate answer to a legal 
issue would be; rather, it usually asks only whether the trial court's answer is 
within acceptable bounds. In addressing that latter question, the basic norms of 
appellate review collectively call for the Court of Appeal to defer to the 
judgment of the trial court if possible, and direct the Court of Appeal to 
resolve any doubts or ambiguities in the direction of 
affirmance."

 
 
The basic norms of 
appellate review thus become norms of affirmance. These include the principle of 
abstention in issues not presented below, the substantial evidence rule, and the harmless error 
rule. The common effect of each of these norms, as described by Dr. Davies, "is 
to cut off inquiry and transform problematic issues into routine affirmances. 
Once these norms are internalized by intermediate appellate judges, the norms 
create a perceptual filter that makes the appeals themselves appear to be devoid 
of any significant issues."

 
 

Id. at 238-39 (footnotes 
omitted and citing Davies, Affirmed: A 
Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of 
Appeal, 1982 Am.B.Found.Res.J. 543, 592, 607, 612 
(1982)).

 
 
THOMAS, 
Justice, dissenting with respect to the reversal of the capital sentence, with 
whom BROWN, Chief Justice, Retired, joins.

 
 

[¶261.]            
Despite the sincere attempt of the American Bar Association over the 
years to establish as the slogan or motto of the legal community that we enjoy 
"[a] government of laws, and not of men * * *," (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)), and without regard to the support of the bench and 
the bar for that concept, the precise converse must be accepted as true in 
Wyoming the instant this decision is filed. I have searched, in vain, for 
something different in this case with respect to the validity of the capital 
sentence imposed in Engberg v. State, 
686 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1984), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984). Nothing has 
changed about the case. The only discernible difference is that there are two 
new members on this court who apparently would espouse the views of the dissent 
in the first Engberg case and one 
member of the court who earlier had voted with the majority but has now had a 
change of heart.

 
 

[¶262.]            
Why then do I claim that Wyoming enjoys a government of men, not laws? 
First, because the majority opinion on the issue of capital punishment reaches 
out to capture a question that is not part of the Engberg case for the purpose of 
overruling the most recent affirmance of the sentence to death by this court in 
the Mark Hopkinson case. Hopkinson v. 
State, 798 P.2d 1186 (Wyo. 1990). Second, because the disposition of the 
sentence to death in the majority opinion on that issue is made in complete 
disregard of the doctrine of res 
judicata. Third, I cannot overlook the fact that one of the justices, who 
has assiduously recused himself from every case or matter involving Hopkinson since joining the court (I 
understand because of some contact with one of the parties while the justice 
still was in private practice), now joins a majority opinion that has no effect 
in this case but effectively overrules the prior decision of this court in Hopkinson, 798 P.2d 1186. After 
eschewing the front entrance to the Hopkinson case, it now seems that the 
justice is willing, even if unwittingly, to enter through the Engberg 
portal.

 
 

[¶263.]            
There are those who advocate the repeal of capital punishment statutes. 
If the judicial department is so philosophically opposed to capital punishment 
that it will find a reason in every case to set the death sentence aside, there 
may be merit in the repeal of the capital punishment statute. When that occurs, 
however, there is some justification for the suggestion that we indeed have an 
imperial judiciary that insists upon imposing its philosophy as to that question 
without regard for the majority will apparently articulated by a valid 
legislative adoption of capital punishment. As a member of the minority of the 
court on this question, I cannot change that result, but I can call attention to 
the event and its implications and, on behalf of the citizens, protest the 
resolution.

 
 

[¶264.]            
It is necessary to quote at length from the majority opinion on the issue 
of the death sentence to avoid taking the matter out of context. The majority 
opinion first quotes from an amendment to the Wyoming capital murder statute that was 
adopted some seven years after 
Engberg killed Vernon Rogers and some four years after his sentence to death 
became final after full appellate review. Then the majority 
says:

 
 
"The change 
reflects the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988), a decision made while this petition was 
still pending before this court. In Mills, the Court held that the trial 
court in a death sentence case must clearly instruct the jury that each 
individual juror may consider any mitigating circumstance he or she finds to 
exist in making a sentencing determination regardless of whether the jury 
unanimously found that mitigating circumstance to exist. 486 U.S.  at 377-80, 
108 S. Ct.  at 1867-68. Reversal is required unless a `substantial possibility' 
that this occurred can be ruled out.

 
 
"The 
sentencing phase instructions in this case required that the jury find an 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigating circumstance 
by a preponderance of evidence. The instruction for weighing the factors against 
each other did not indicate whether the mitigating factors must be found 
unanimously. Another instruction told the jury that it must unanimously agree on 
a verdict of death, and if it is unable to do so, the court will impose a 
sentence of life. The verdict form gave the jury two choices. The jury could 
either find the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating 
circumstances and sentence Engberg to life, or that the mitigating circumstances 
did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and sentence him to death. 
Nowhere in the instructions or verdict form was the jury told that the 
mitigating circumstances need not be found unanimously by the jury but that the 
mitigating circumstances may be found by individual jurors and weighed by them 
individually in deciding the life or death question. "Because W.S. 6-2-102 (1991 Cum. Supp.) will 
govern retrial of the sentencing phase of this case, we need not decide whether to extend the Mills decision to 
Engberg In a retroactive manner. See Sawyer v. Smith, ___ 
U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989); Flores v. State, 572 P.2d 746 (Wyo. 1977). Nevertheless, it is important to remember 
that our law has always been `that matters which convict require unanimity, and 
failure to convict can result from the vote of one juror and that aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances should be dealt with in the same way.' Hopkinson v. State, 798 P.2d 1186, 1190 
(Wyo. 1990) (Cardine, J., dissenting). The right to a unanimous verdict is 
beyond dispute. Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 853 (Wyo. 1980); see Wyo.Const. Art. I, § 9. It is 
essential that Engberg be accorded the proper instructions on finding and 
considering mitigating circumstances in a retrial of the penalty phase of his 
felony murder conviction." Majority opinion on the issues affecting imposition 
of the capital sentence, at 11 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶265.]            
I must respectfully remind the majority that the Wyoming law is not 
settled by what is articulated in a dissenting opinion in Hopkinson, 798 P.2d 1186, or any other 
case or matter. On that issue, the majority opinion in Hopkinson, 798 P.2d  at 1187, 
states:

 
 
"6. The 
Petitioner's earnest arguments that error occurred in the second penalty trial 
because of the instructions to the jury relating to mitigating circumstances in 
the light of Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988), and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 
110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), fail of persuasion because the record in 
this case would not have justified reversal based upon the legal principle 
articulated in those cases, the cases are distinguishable and, under the 
circumstances, the court is not required to, nor would it be appropriate, to 
apply those cases retrospectively. The issue of the instructions relating to 
mitigating circumstances has been before this court, Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo. 
1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983), and the United States District Court, Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 645 F. Supp. 374 (D.Wyo. 1986), reh. denied 648 F. Supp. 141 (D.Wyo. 1986), and the instructions were 
approved."

 
 
While one 
must grudgingly admire the assiduity and tenacity of the majority in the effort 
to eliminate capital punishment in Wyoming, attempting to do that by 
articulating dictum in a case in which, by the majority's own admission, "we 
need not decide" the issue and relying upon a dissenting opinion, the quotation 
from which is itself taken out of context, for the authority to justify the 
dictum falls short of my perception of intellectual 
honesty.

 
 

[¶266.]            
The only possible purpose for this aspect of the majority opinion is to 
furnish support to the federal court, in which the Hopkinson case is pending on a petition 
for post conviction relief, to set aside the sentence to death in the Hopkinson case. That effort would have 
the effect of eliminating the death sentence in the only two remaining cases in 
Wyoming in 
which it was imposed by the jury. Already, there is evidence of the fact that 
prosecutors are not seeking the death penalty in cases in which a sentence to 
death well might be appropriate because they do not believe that the judiciary 
will permit the execution. I rest my case on this aspect of the evidence that 
Wyoming now 
enjoys a government of men, not laws.

 
 

[¶267.]            
I turn to my second concern about the resolution of this case. One of the 
most revered doctrines in our jurisprudence is that of res judicata. Those matters that have 
been adjudicated between the same parties are accorded finality. Nothing could 
be more clear than the fact that these identical issues were before this court 
in the prior case and decided contrary to this decision. Were this not the same 
case, but a different one, the doctrine of stare decisis would suggest the same 
result. As Justice Cardine said:

 
 
"Perhaps 
only a Cassandra will be heard to mourn the neglected rule of stare decisis, but it is a sad day 
indeed when our declarations within the same case are subject to judicial 
revision. If we are unwilling to take seriously what we write, how can we expect 
others to take us seriously?" Jones v. 
State, 798 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Wyo. 1990), Cardine, J., 
dissenting.

 
 
With 
respect to the death sentence in this case, we have done the very thing that was 
so vigorously protested in Jones.

 
 

[¶268.]            
Furthermore, the majority has reached that result in a way that is 
particularly troublesome. Instead of applying settled law in the same case under 
either doctrine, res judicata or stare decisis, the majority has selected 
a rule adopted by judges in other places who have no commitment to serving the 
people of the State of Wyoming and has preferred that rule over the one 
previously adopted by Wyoming justices on this Court. This is done despite the 
fact that the decision of the Court was scrutinized by the United States Supreme 
Court for error under the Constitution of the United States 
and then not subjected to federal review. What we have then is an adaptation of 
a rule under another state constitution, adopted by judges in the different 
state, that has been imported to be substituted for solid Wyoming law. Is there any 
question that I must protest this result by dissenting from the majority opinion 
on the validity of the death sentence?

 
 

[¶269.]            
Perhaps the real justification for the majority position is best captured 
in the following:

 
 
"Few of us 
have directly faced the awesome task of deciding whether a fellow human being 
should, three days hence, be killed by execution. I face that immediate 
decision, alone for the first time, as another of life's sobering experiences by 
which we find out more about who we are and how we feel about life and death, 
our relationships with others, power, justice, and the law. The legislative 
branch has decided as a matter of policy that the penalty for first degree 
murder in the State of Wyoming should be death. Statutes have been 
enacted specifying death by lethal injection as punishment. I am convinced now that this is an unwise 
policy.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * To 
arrive at a rational decision, our focus ought to be on the death penalty 
itself. Every person who ever walked or will ever walk on the face of this earth 
is unique. There will never be another like that person. Life is precious. It is 
a gift that is so unique and wonderful that no mortal man should cheapen it by 
taking it from another. It has been said that killing begets killing. The more 
we kill, the more conditioned we become to killing until we are so conditioned 
that no one cares anymore. Someday every court in our land will recognize 
punishment by killing as cruel and unusual, but today we are not prepared to 
accept what someday will come to pass." Hopkinson, 798 P.2d  at 1188 and 1192, 
Cardine, J., dissenting (emphasis added).

 
 
These are 
noble words. Would they had been uttered to memorialize a torture victim, a 
family literally blown apart, or an innocent victim of an armed robbery rather 
than in support of convicted, cold-blooded killers. The court should not lose 
the fact that when he killed Vernon Rogers, Engberg was an escapee from the 
Missouri Department of Corrections minimum security facility, where he was 
serving a life sentence for murder in the first degree after the killing of a 
night watchman in connection with an armed robbery. I submit that noble words do 
not justify the result here and, instead of seizing upon justification from 
other jurisdictions, the rule of res 
judicata should control, and the capital sentence should be affirmed. I 
regret that the drafter of the majority opinion on the sentencing phase feels 
that there has been unfair and personal criticism in this dissenting opinion. I 
do, indeed, endeavor to be attentive to the feelings of my brothers on the 
court. On the other hand, there are situations in which candor is essential. I 
perceive this as one of those situations.

 
 

[¶270.]            
There is no justification for the drafter of the majority opinion to 
accept criticism as personal. A majority opinion is the product of a collegiate 
court and, when circulated for consideration by the other members of the court, 
or, at least, when filed, it no longer retains any proprietary aspect so far as 
the drafter is concerned. It becomes an institutional product that is owned only 
by the court. The opinion is the product of an institution that has no 
personality, but instead is a corporate identity. Certainly, this institutional 
identity encompasses one of the difficulties in serving on an appellate and 
collegiate court. The effort to articulate a committee decision in a way that is 
acceptable to all members of the committee is difficult and 
stressful.

 
 

[¶271.]            
Turning then to the reference to omitted material from the dissent in Hopkinson the full text of that material 
reads:

 
 
"Few of us 
have directly faced the awesome task of deciding whether a fellow human being 
should, three days hence, be killed by execution. I face that immediate 
decision, alone for the first time, as another of life's sobering experiences by 
which we find out more about who we are and how we feel about life and death, 
our relationships with others, power, justice, and the law. The legislative 
branch has decided as a matter of policy that the penalty for first degree 
murder in the State of Wyoming should be death. Statutes have been 
enacted specifying death by lethal injection as punishment. I am convinced now 
that this is an unwise policy. I am convinced also that, at this time in our 
history, these statutes are constitutional and, therefore, the law. I have taken 
an oath to support, obey and defend the constitution and will honor that oath. 
So, on to the law." Hopkinson, 798 P.2d  at 1188.

 
 
I was aware 
of the full text when this dissenting opinion was prepared initially. I also am 
aware that, in becoming attuned to what we colloquially call the "bottom line," 
the citizens in our society, indeed, pay attention to what we do as well as what 
we say.

 
 

[¶272.]            
Mature reflection demands acceptance of the proposition that, in many 
instances, actions speak more voluminously and more eloquently than any words 
that can be used to describe them. Consequently, I opted to omit the complete 
quotation from Hopkinson because the 
next to the last sentence seems to me to have a hollow ring in light of the 
impact of this decision upon the death penalty in Wyoming. Lip service to 
the constitutionality of the death penalty has no meaning so long as this court 
will reach and stretch to find technical justification for avoiding its 
implementation. In my view, that reaching and stretching is present here and, to 
the extent that the court now redecides the Hopkinson case, it is present 
there.

 
 

[¶273.]            
I add to what has been said the proposition that it is clear that at 
least one member of the court's majority now has read the dissenting opinion. 
There can be no question that the revisiting of Hopkinson to decide it in a different 
way is indeed intentional and not accidental. I would like to offer a solution 
to the abrogation of the capital sentencing statute in Wyoming but, as the 
saying goes, "When you have the votes, vote!" The majority have the votes; they 
have voted; and capital punishment is abolished in the State of Wyoming. That result is 
not required by the law, but instead it is reached as a choice of policy, a 
policy that is contrary to the one chosen by the 
legislature.

 
 

[¶274.]            
An affirmance of the capital sentence can clearly be justified by proper 
reasoning and authority. In most situations, Engberg's sixteenth issue, the 
impropriety of invoking as aggravating circumstances the commission of the 
murder by Engberg for pecuniary gain and while engaged in the commission of the 
robbery, after relying on the robbery to invoke the first degree murder statute, 
would be controlled by the doctrine of res judicata and the concept of waiver. 
Engberg's argument that his sentence was determined in a manner which violates 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States is 
a combination of an argument rejected by this court on his direct appeal, 
together with an issue which he did not raise, but which was addressed by a 
dissenting justice in Engberg, 686 P.2d 541. Engberg was encouraged to raise that issue in his petition for 
rehearing, and the court's order denying the petition 
stated:

 
 
"This case 
came on before the court upon the Petition for Rehearing filed herein by the 
appellant, Roy Lee Engberg, and the court, having carefully considered the 
Petition for Rehearing and being fully advised, finds that the petition does not 
encompass any question or matter necessary to correct a decision which has been 
overlooked by the court; seeks to present 
a point for the first time in the case; does not demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the court arrived at an erroneous conclusion; and that the 
Petition for Rehearing should be denied; and it therefore is * * *." Engberg, 686 P.2d  at 563 (emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶275.]            
I am persuaded that cause exists to avoid procedural waiver because of 
recent cases dealing with this issue. State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 
Teton County, 696 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1985). See also 
Perry v. Lockhart, 656 F. Supp. 46, 48 (E.D.Ark. 1986) ("the `novelty' of 
the pecuniary gain argument at the time of Perry's trial was sufficient to 
provide `cause' for his failure to raise this question"); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984).

 
 

[¶276.]            
Subsequent to the decision of the court in Engberg, a division developed in the 
federal courts on the question of whether an element of the underlying felony 
could be used as an aggravating circumstance without infringing upon the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S. Ct. 546, 88 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1985); Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1079, 
108 S. Ct. 1059, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1021, reh'g 
denied 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S. Ct. 1491, 99 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1988), following Welcome v. Blackburn, 793 F.2d 672 (5th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S. Ct. 1985, 95 L. Ed. 2d 825, reh'g denied 483 U.S. 1012, 107 S. Ct. 3245, 97 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1987). In addition, several decisions in the highest 
courts of the states, most notably the recent decision by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina in State v. 
Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 354 S.E.2d 446 (1987), appeal after remand 325 N.C. 125, 381 S.E.2d 681 (1989), cert. granted and 
judgment vacated ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 1465, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990), on remand 327 N.C. 480, 397 S.E.2d 233 
(1990), on remand 328 N.C. 288, 401 S.E.2d 632 (1991), have held that it is improper to submit statutorily 
overlapping aggravating circumstances to a jury in the sentencing phase of a 
capital case. We relied upon the rationale of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina found in State v. Oliver, 
302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981), in deciding Engberg, 686 P.2d 541, specifically 
rejecting the view of the Supreme Court of Florida. Since the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina now has ruled in a definitive way contrary to the holding which 
we adopted previously, I would address the merits of Engberg's sixteenth issue 
only to determine whether our prior conclusion should be changed or 
modified.

 
 

[¶277.]            
A constitutionally satisfactory procedure for imposing the death penalty 
requires assurance that the jury has made a specific determination that capital 
punishment is appropriate on the basis of the character of the individual 
defendant and the circumstances of that particular crime. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, reh'g 
denied 483 U.S. 1056, 108 S. Ct. 31, 97 L. Ed. 2d 820 (1987); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, reh'g 
denied 482 U.S. 921, 107 S. Ct. 3201, 96 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1987); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983). The legislature's selection of aggravating 
circumstances has been accepted by the United States Supreme Court as properly 
limiting the jury's discretion if they circumscribe the class of persons upon 
whom capital punishment may be imposed. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976), reh'g denied 429 U.S. 875, 97 S. Ct. 197, 50 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1976). See Hopkinson, 632 P.2d 79.

 
 
"* * * [A] 
jury's discretion to impose the death sentence must be `suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly, arbitrary and capricious action.' 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 
[96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859] (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell 
and Stevens, JJ.); * * *." Booth, 482 U.S.  at 502, 107 S. Ct.  at 
2532.

 
 

[¶278.]            
The provisions of the Constitution of the United States do 
not prohibit a state from imposing capital punishment on an individual defendant 
on the basis of a single aggravating circumstance, so long as the circumstance 
is not unconstitutionally vague.1 Even though an aggravating circumstance 
may meet the constitutional standard under this test, if the circumstance is so 
construed that it is vague as applied, the imposition of capital punishment will 
be set aside.

 
 
"Thus the 
validity of the petitioner's death sentences turns on whether, in light of the 
facts and circumstances of the murders that he was convicted of committing, the 
Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have applied a constitutional construction 
of the phrase `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they] 
involved * * * depravity of mind * * *.' We conclude that the answer must be no. 
The petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness 
materially more `depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder. His victims 
were killed instantaneously. They were members of his family who were causing 
him extreme emotional trauma. Shortly after the killings, he acknowledged his 
responsibility and the heinous nature of his crimes. These factors certainly did 
not remove the criminality from the petitioner's acts. But, as was said in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 
97 S. Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 [(1977)], it `is of vital importance to the 
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence 
be, and appear to be, based on reason, rather than caprice or 
emotion.'

 
 
"That 
cannot be said here. There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in 
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980), cert. 
denied 456 U.S. 919, 102 S. Ct. 1778, 72 L. Ed. 2d 180, reh'g denied 456 U.S. 1001, 102 S. Ct. 2286, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1296 (1982) (footnotes omitted).

 
 

[¶279.]            
The requisite narrowing also may be accomplished by defining the elements 
of the crime. The Supreme Court of the United States said in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-71, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2955-56, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976), reh'g denied 429 U.S. 875, 97 S. Ct. 198, 
50 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1976):

 
 
"While 
Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances the 
existence of which can justify the imposition of the death penalty as have 
Georgia and Florida, its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which 
a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 206 n. 
16, 91 S. Ct. 1454, 1466 n. 16, 28 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1971); Model Penal Code § 201.6, 
Comment 3, pp. 71-72 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). In fact, each of the five 
classes of murders made capital by the Texas 
statute is encompassed in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory 
aggravating circumstances. For example, the Texas statute requires the jury at the guilt 
determining stage to consider whether the crime was committed in the course of a 
particular felony, whether it was committed for hire, or whether the defendant 
was an inmate of a penal institution at the time of its commission. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.  at 165-166, 
n. 9, 96 S. Ct.  at 2921 n. 9; Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. [242] at 248-249, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. [2960] at 2965, n. 6 [49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976)]. Thus, in essence, the Texas statute requires that the jury find the 
existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may 
be imposed. So far as consideration of aggravating circumstances is concerned, 
therefore, the principal difference between Texas and the other two States is that the death penalty 
is an available sentencing option - even potentially - for a smaller class of 
murders in Texas. Otherwise, the statutes are similar. 
Each requires the sentencing authority to focus on the particularized nature of 
the crime."

 
 
In 
achieving this narrowing, however, the state may not remove the jury's 
discretion as to whether capital punishment should be imposed by a mandatory 
infliction of capital punishment even in narrowly circumscribed situations. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 97 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1987).2

 
 

[¶280.]            
My further reflection upon the rulings of the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States persuades me that an element of the 
underlying felony may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in a capital 
case. I conclude that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
adequately captured the justification for our position in Welcome, 793 F.2d 672, relied upon in Wilson, 813 F.2d 664, in which it 
said:

 
 
"Louisiana's inclusion as 
an element of the crime of first degree murder of the aggravating circumstance 
of committing multiple murders in a single consecutive course of conduct serves 
to cull out of the class of all murders, a small group which the State makes 
eligible for the death penalty. But finding that circumstance present in the 
course of determining guilt does not fix punishment. It only serves to 
permissibly advance the sentencing jury to the stage of weighing mitigating as 
well as aggravating circumstances in order to make an individualized 
determination of life or death based on the character of the individual and the 
circumstances of the crime. Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2743-44, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983). The 
finding of this aggravating circumstance as a part of the guilt determination 
process does not finally control the imposition of the death penalty. Such a 
finding only permits the death penalty to be considered." Welcome, 793 F.2d  at 
677.

 
 
The 
utilization of an aggravating circumstance, although it duplicates an element of 
the felony upon which the conviction of first degree murder was premised, does 
not fail to "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty." Zant, 462 U.S.  at 877, 103 S. Ct.  at 2742. This 
was the criticism levied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in Collins, 754 F.2d 258, and 
I conclude that the stance there taken is fallacious.

 
 

[¶281.]            
Statutory aggravating circumstances are invoked to circumscribe those 
instances in which capital punishment may be imposed after the defendant has 
been found guilty of a capital offense. If the jury finds, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that one of the legislatively defined aggravating circumstances has been 
established, it may impose capital punishment on the basis of all the evidence 
without transgressing the Constitution of the United States. 
Zant; Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1134, reh'g denied 464 U.S. 874, 104 S. Ct. 209, 78 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1983).

 
 
"Our cases 
indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally 
necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the 
class of persons eligible for the death penalty. But the constitution does not 
require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the process of 
selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be 
sentenced to death. What is important at 
the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the 
character of the individual and the 
circumstances of the crime." Zant, 462 U.S.  at 878-79, 
103 S. Ct.  at 2743-44 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶282.]            
Since a single aggravating circumstance can be used to narrowly define 
the offense and be construed as constitutional, or, alternatively, the same 
circumstance may be characterized as an aggravating circumstance to be 
considered by the jury in connection with all evidence bearing on the "character 
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime," I cannot be persuaded 
that an element of the underlying felony cannot be considered as an aggravating 
circumstance in the sentencing stage. In the form of statute that Wyoming has adopted, the 
definition of the crime serves a narrowing function with respect to those 
instances in which capital punishment may be imposed. Even though the same 
information is invoked as an aggravating circumstance following conviction, at 
that stage of the trial, it simply serves to further narrow the instances in 
which capital punishment may be and should be imposed. There is no justification 
for a contention that this sequential consideration simply results in arbitrary 
imposition.

 
 

[¶283.]            
In determining whether capital punishment should be imposed, the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States demands that the 
evidence against the defendant focus on his character and the circumstances of 
the crime. Booth, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529; Zant; Barclay. There is nothing in these 
interpretations of the constitution that justifies a rule that relevant evidence 
should be excluded from the jury's consideration in the sentencing phase simply 
because that evidence also established the defendant's guilt of the crime. 
Rather than assuring arbitrary action, the utilization of this evidence serves 
to avoid the possibility of capricious action.

 
 

[¶284.]            
The constitution does not require a state to limit the evidence presented 
against a defendant in the sentencing portion of a capital case, but it may 
choose to do so. Zant. In Wyoming, the legislature 
made a choice. It limited the evidence which may be presented and considered 
against a defendant to that which is relevant to one of the statutorily defined 
aggravating circumstances, even though it permitted any relevant mitigating 
evidence whether or not it is probative of one of the statutorily defined 
mitigating circumstances. Section 6-2-102(d), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.); Hopkinson, 632 P.2d 79. In performing 
this function, the jury is doing exactly that which the Supreme Court has 
indicated must be done. It is the classic sentencing function of imposing "[a]n 
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and 
the circumstances of the crime." Zant, 462 U.S.  at 
879, 103 S. Ct.  at 2744.3

 
 

[¶285.]            
Engberg's argument, based upon the rule in the Fifth Circuit, would be 
more persuasive if the duty of the jury at the sentencing stage was simply to 
count the number of aggravating circumstances against the number of any 
mitigating circumstances. We explained in Engberg, 686 P.2d 541, however, that the 
sentencing stage analysis in Wyoming is qualitative not quantitative, and 
we approved the instruction of the trial court which explained to the jury how 
that process should be accomplished. In considering the evidence as to the 
underlying felony at the guilt stage, the jury is concerned only with whether 
certain facts have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. When that same 
information is presented at the sentencing stage, however, the legislature has 
given the jury additional discretion that it may use to deny capital punishment. 
At this point in the trial, the jury must focus not upon whether facts have been 
proved, but upon the qualitative evaluation of those facts in the light of other 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The inevitable result is to narrow 
further the instances in which capital punishment will be the 
sentence.

 
 

[¶286.]            
Finally, the position of the Fifth Circuit simply fails to acknowledge 
the significance of mandatory appellate review. We explained in Hopkinson:

 
 
"A sentence 
of death is subject to automatic review by this court. We must consider, not 
only the errors enumerated by way of appeal, but also whether the sentence was 
the product of an arbitrary factor, the evidence supports the findings of the 
trier of fact, and the sentence is excessive or disproportionate when compared 
with similar cases. In addition to affirming or reversing the underlying 
conviction, we may affirm the sentence of death, set aside the sentence and 
impose a sentence of life imprisonment, or remand for resentencing by the trial 
judge." Hopkinson, 632 P.2d  at 
153.

 
 
It is our 
duty to determine that a capital sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner. The United States Supreme Court has recognized meaningful 
appellate review as a strong factor in determining whether a capital punishment 
statute adopted by a state is constitutional. E.g. Barclay, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S. Ct. 3418; Godfrey, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S. Ct. 1759; Zant.

 
 

[¶287.]            
I also would conclude to abide by our decision in Engberg, 686 P.2d 541, 
with respect to the claim that it was error to allow the jury to consider both 
aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murder was committed during the course 
of a robbery and (2) that it was committed for pecuniary gain. Again, I 
recognize that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has changed positions from Oliver, 274 S.E.2d 183, to Quesinberry, 354 S.E.2d 446. Again, the 
utilization of both aggravating circumstances would be more troublesome if the 
Engberg jury was performing a quantitative analysis. Because the jury in this 
state must invoke a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis of the 
aggravating factors, the significance of any overlap of the factors is 
diminished substantially. Furthermore, as the dissenting justice noted in Quesinberry, the act of robbery involves 
the consideration of the actus reus while the 
pecuniary gain circumstances considers the mens rea of the defendant. Perhaps the 
overlap is more imagined than real. In accord with the individualized 
determination requirement by the Supreme Court of the United States, Zant, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, I 
note that the act of the robbery focuses on a circumstance of the crime, whereas 
the reason for the robbery, that it was committed for pecuniary gain, focuses on 
the character of the defendant. The evidence relating to the circumstances may 
overlap, but the considerations are separate and 
meaningful.

 
 

[¶288.]            
I cannot share the confidence of the majority that "Engberg will now, on 
remand, be given a lawful sentencing hearing at which a jury can correctly 
consider life or death upon proper instructions on the law and, if appropriate, 
impose the death penalty." Majority opinion on the issues affecting imposition 
of the capital sentence, at 13. It may be that the majority intended to invoke 
the language of § 6-2-103(e)(iii), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1991), which provides 
that this court may "[s]et the sentence aside and remand the case for 
resentencing." The last sentence of the opinion, however, provides only "case 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion." In my view the 
likelihood of a new sentencing hearing is not high. The case is ten years old, 
and I think the prosecutor must be possessed of unusual tenacity and 
perseverance to pursue the capital sentence. The state secured a conviction and 
the imposition of a capital sentence in 1982, and the conviction and sentence 
were affirmed by this court in 1984. A petition for a writ of certiorari was 
denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. While the capital 
sentence was affirmed under the applicable rules, it now is set aside because in 
the interim someone in another place decided to modify Wyoming's rules. How is 
the prosecutor to understand, with any degree of confidence, that if another 
capital sentence is imposed, someone somewhere will not decide to change the 
rules while the new sentence is subject to review? The prosecutive effort would 
be frustrated again, as it is now. For me it is doubtful that Engberg will again 
face a capital sentence, and the humanitarian philosophy of the majority will be 
vindicated.

 
 

[¶289.]            
I would affirm both the conviction of first degree murder and the 
imposition of the sentence to death. The death sentence was arrived at in a 
lawful and rational manner, and it should be affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 If the aggravating 
circumstance is so vague as to permit a jury to impose capital punishment in a 
"wanton and freakish" manner, it will not pass constitutional muster. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976), reh'g denied 429 U.S. 875, 97 S. Ct. 197, 50 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1976).

 
 
"* * * [A] system 
`could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the 
sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of 
arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman 
could occur.' 428 U.S.  at 195, n. 46, 96 S. Ct.  at 2935, n. 46. To avoid this 
constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class 
of persons eligible from the death penalty and must reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found 
guilty of murder." Zant, 462 U.S.  at 877, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2742.

 
 

2 In Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 97 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1987), the Supreme Court noted that the Nevada statute 
permitted imposition of capital punishment upon the finding of a single 
aggravating circumstance and that circumstance was an element of the underlying 
felony. Even though the constitutionality of that statutory approach was not 
directly addressed, it is obvious that the Supreme Court was aware of the 
sequential evaluation of the same circumstance.

 
 

3 We note that our 
statute permits the sentencing hearing to be conducted before a new jury 
impaneled for that purpose if good cause exists. If the same jury did not serve 
at the sentencing stage, it would be essential that the information regarding 
the crime be submitted as an aggravating circumstance in order for the jury to 
adequately perform the sentencing function.