Title: State v. Vasquez

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  April 15, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DANIEL OROZCO VASQUEZ,
aka David V. Orozco,
Respondent on Review.
(DC CF970282; CA A105506; SC S49148)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 6, 2003.
David John Amesbury, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
James N. Varner, Oregon Appellate Consortium, Newberg,
argued the cause for respondent on review.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, Jeffrey M. Wallace, Judge. 177 Or App 477, 34 P3d 1188 (2001).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal case, the issue is whether an 11-year
delay between the filing of a "complainant's information" against
defendant for murder and defendant's trial on that offense
violated defendant's right to a trial "without delay" under
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution or to a "speedy
trial" under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  The trial court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss the case on those grounds.  On defendant's appeal, the
Court of Appeals disagreed.  That court concluded that the delay
was unjustified and prejudicial to defendant and, therefore,
violated his constitutional rights.  State v. Vasquez, 177 Or App
477, 487-90, 34 P3d 1188 (2001).  Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court should have dismissed the
indictment against defendant.  Id. at 491.  We allowed review
and, for the reasons that follow, now reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals. 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On September
11, 1987, someone shot and killed a man named Torres outside the
Rest-A-Bit motel in Umatilla, Oregon.  Police investigators soon
suspected that defendant was responsible for that homicide. 
Defendant also was the chief suspect in the murder of a man named
Mendoza, which had occurred two days earlier in Yakima,
Washington.  
About two weeks after Torres's murder, the
investigating police officer filed two documents with the
Umatilla County District Court: (1) a "complainant's information"
accusing defendant of the crime of murder and (2) an affidavit in
support of an arrest warrant.  The "complainant's information"
recited that defendant was "accused by this information of the
crime of Murder" and went on to summarize details of the killing
of Torres.  The information bore the officer's notarized
signature, the stamp and signature of the trial court
administrator indicating the filing date, and the signature of
the Umatilla County District Attorney.  The accompanying
affidavit contained the officer's sworn statement that there was
probable cause to arrest defendant for murder, supported by the
officer's crime investigation report, which was attached.  Based
on that affidavit, the district court issued a warrant for
defendant's arrest. 
Defendant never was arrested on that warrant, however.
By the time that the Oregon arrest warrant issued, defendant had
fled to California, where he eventually was arrested for a murder
that he allegedly committed there.  By September 1988, the
Umatilla County District Attorney's Office had been notified that
defendant was incarcerated in California, but the District
Attorney made no effort to proceed against him.  Defendant was
tried and convicted of murder in California in 1989 and sentenced
to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 27 years.  
In the early 1990s, a fire at the Umatilla Police
Department destroyed much of the evidence that the police kept
there respecting the Torres homicide.  Among the items burned in
the fire were blood samples, bullets, a cartridge, a box-spring
mattress from the Rest-A-Bit motel, and articles of Torres's
clothing.  Other evidence in the case was not destroyed, however,
including two rounds of ammunition seized from a vehicle
connected with the murder, photographs of the crime scene and
from Torres's autopsy, and several statements made by two
witnesses regarding the murder.  
Meanwhile, Washington police detectives had continued
to investigate the Yakima murder.  They eventually charged
defendant with murdering Mendoza, and, in January 1997, defendant
pleaded guilty to first-degree murder for that crime.  The
Washington court sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment of
22 years and seven months, to be served consecutively to the
California sentence. (1)
Oregon authorities also took action to prosecute
defendant in 1997.  At that time, the Umatilla County District
Attorney's office obtained an indictment in the Umatilla County
Circuit Court against defendant for the Torres murder and
dismissed the earlier information. (2)
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory
and constitutional speedy trial grounds.  In his brief to the
trial court, defendant asserted in passing that the 11-year delay
from the filing of the complainant's information to the ultimate
trial in the case violated ORS 135.747, which provides:
"If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial
has not been postponed upon the application of the
defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not
brought to trial within a reasonable period of time,
the court shall order the accusatory instrument to be
dismissed."
(Emphasis added.)  However, because any dismissal under ORS
135.747 would be without prejudice to a subsequent prosecution,
defendant confined his arguments in the trial court to his
contention that the delay violated his state and federal
constitutional rights.  That argument, if accepted, would result
in dismissal of the murder charge with prejudice. (3)  In
support of his position, defendant argued that (1) the district
attorney's office had made no effort to pursue the prosecution in
the 11 years between the commission of the crime and the
indictment against defendant, despite the fact that it had known
of defendant's whereabouts since at least September 1988; and (2)
defendant was prejudiced by the delay because of the fire at the
police station, which destroyed a large part of the evidence. 
The trial court rejected those arguments. 
The case went to trial and, in December 1998, a jury
convicted defendant of murder.  As noted, on defendant's appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction and remanded
the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with
prejudice.  
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals first observed,
correctly, that defendant never has contended that the time
between the indictment against him and the trial in this case was
excessive or violated his constitutional rights in any way;
instead, his argument is premised on the notion that the event
triggering his right to trial without delay was the 1987 filing
of the complainant's information against him in Umatilla County. 
Vasquez, 177 Or App at 481.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
began by analyzing that premise under the Oregon
Constitution. (4)  Id.  The court ultimately concluded that the
filing of the information was sufficient to start the clock on
defendant's right, under Article I, section 10, to trial without
delay.  Id. at 484.  Having so concluded, the court examined
whether the circumstances surrounding the delay were such that
defendant had established a violation of his constitutional
rights.  Id. at 485-91.  The court answered that question in the
affirmative and concluded that defendant was entitled to have the
indictment dismissed.  Id. at 491.  
As did the Court of Appeals, we begin our analysis with
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.  That section
provides:
"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely
and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation."  
We interpret that original provision of the Oregon Constitution
according to the methodology that this court set out in Priest v.
Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992).  That is, we
consider the provision under three criteria:  "[i]ts specific
wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical
circumstances that led to its creation."  Id.  When we consider
the wording of the provision at issue, we examine it in its
context.  Id. at 416. 
The part of Article I, section 10, that is pertinent to
our analysis is the phrase "justice shall be administered * * *
without delay."  The right to a trial "without delay" can arise
in two different circumstances: (1) when a defendant has been
arrested on a charge and is being held in jail pending trial on
the charge; or (2) when a defendant, although not incarcerated on
that charge, faces trial for it.  This is not a case of the first
kind –- defendant never was arrested on this murder charge.  This
is, instead, a case of the second kind, viz., one in which a
defendant faces trial on a murder charge.  The case thus narrows
to this inquiry:  Which event -- the filing of the complainant's
information or the filing of the indictment -- triggered
defendant's right to a trial without delay? 
The text of Article I, section 10, does not identify
precisely the kind of event that will trigger the protections
afforded by that section, but we think that it does provide an
important clue:  The mandate, "without delay," describes the
manner in which "justice shall be administered."  At around the
time of the constitutional convention at which the Oregon
Constitution was adopted, "justice" had a meaning similar to that
of today: it generally referred to "giving to everyone what is
his due."  II Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language (1928), reprinted by Johnson Reprint Corp. (1970).  At
the same time, "administer" meant to "direct the execution or
application of laws" or, with particular reference to judicial
activity, to "app[ly laws] to particular cases or persons."  Id. 
Thus, the phrase "justice shall be administered" contemplated the
management or direction of a proceeding in which a person was to
be given his due, that is, a proceeding in which rewards or
punishments would be meted out. (5)
In the criminal context, of course, punishments are
meted out after successful prosecution.  By its plain terms,
Article I, section 10, directs us to determine when an official
action commencing a prosecution occurs and, then, to measure the
time within which the state has administered justice to determine
whether it has administered justice "without delay."
We turn from examining the constitutional text to our
case law, which is another aspect of the Priest methodology. 
Unfortunately, our case law is less than illuminating respecting
the precise question now before us -- what event triggers the
"without delay" protections of Article I, section 10?  That
doubtless is due in part to the fact that this court's earlier
decisions did not employ the Priest approach and, therefore, used
terms whose origins and meaning to the court that used them are
not self-evident today.  It also is due to the court's
undertaking analytical tasks not brought to it by the parties. 
The leading example in both these regards is State v. Vawter, 236
Or 85, 386 P2d 915 (1963), which is the principal case on which
both defendant and the Court of Appeals relied.
Vawter was convicted of converting entrusted property
under former ORS 165.030 (1963), repealed by Or Laws 1971, Ch
743, § 432.  He appealed, asserting that he had been denied a
speedy trial.  The procedural record disclosed that Vawter had
been arrested on July 12, 1962, on the conversion charge.  An
"information of felony" was filed against him in Portland
Municipal Court on July 16, 1962.  Based on that information of
felony, Vawter was brought before a municipal judge on July 17,
waived examination, was held to answer, and was committed to the
Multnomah County Jail.  Seventeen days later, on August 3, 1962,
he was returned to the Oregon State Penitentiary as a parole
violator.  The grand jury did not indict him until September 11,
1962, and no proceedings followed the indictment until Vawter was
arraigned on the indictment on February 26, 1963.  Shortly
thereafter, Vawter moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that he had been denied a speedy trial.  The motion was denied. 
Vawter, 236 Or at 86-87.  Vawter appealed to this court.
We set out the foregoing summary because it provides a
context for examining the peculiarities of the Vawter decision. 
The first peculiarity is the fact that Vawter's argument to this
court on his appeal was statutory, not constitutional.  Indeed,
he did not even cite Article I, section 10, in his briefing to
this court, much less rely on it as a source of law justifying
reversal of the trial court order.  Neither did he focus on the
time that had elapsed between his arrest and his trial, the time
frame that this court later used in its speedy trial
analysis. (6)
The court made short work of Vawter's statutory claims. 
See Vawter, 236 Or 88-90 (discussing topic).  Having done so, the
court then unaccountably went on to a constitutional discussion.
The court began by stating the following, on which defendant here
understandably relies:
"We think * * * that the requirement of Article I,
section 10 of the Constitution that 'justice shall be
administered * * * without delay' means that there
shall be no unreasonable delay after a formal complaint
has been filed against the defendant."
Vawter, 236 Or at 90-91 (emphasis added).  Having introduced the
topic, the court then proceeded to deal with the case as one
involving a seven-month, 17-day delay, commencing with the date
on which the information of felony was filed and concluding on
the day that Vawter moved to dismiss the indictment.  The court
summarized its analytical task this way:
 "This case * * * comes down finally to the
question whether this court should declare that a delay
of about seven and one-half months in bringing an
accused to trial in an ordinary criminal case in
Multnomah County -- there being no circumstances shown
other than that the accused was during this time a
prisoner in the penitentiary serving a sentence for
another offense -- is per se a violation of the
constitutional right of the defendant to a speedy
trial."
Id. at 92.  
Having posed the foregoing (unpreserved and uninvited)
question, however, the court then declined to answer it. 
Instead, the court went on to rule that, in any event, the
decision whether to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial
grounds was a question properly addressed to the discretion of
the trial judge and that the court could not, on the record
before it, say that the trial court had abused that discretion. 
Id. at 92-97.
Our extensive recitation of the Vawter opinion
demonstrates why we find it of little use.  The court purported
to answer an issue that was neither raised nor preserved, gave
the answer at the outset of its discussion without citation to
any authority that would elucidate the meaning of the
constitutional text, used a term ("formal complaint") that had no
constitutional or statutory source, and then, ultimately, based
its decision on another ground.
The court considered a related issue 10 years later in
State v. Serrell, 265 Or 216, 507 P2d 1405 (1973).  In that case,
the defendant was tried soon after he was indicted, so he made no
speedy trial challenge to the time between indictment and trial. 
Instead, he complained about a 141-day delay between the criminal
act that he committed (illegal sale of narcotics) and the date of
the indictment.  The Court of Appeals had addressed that argument
on the merits, apparently believing that such time was relevant
to a speedy trial calculation.  See State v. Serrell, 11 Or App
324, 327, 501 P2d 1324 (1972) (so holding).  This court wished to
correct that misimpression.  It stated:
"It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals
believes that the time between the state's knowledge of
a violation of the law by a defendant and its charging
him with that violation may be taken into consideration
in determining whether he has been given a speedy
trial.  The Court of Appeals is in error in this
respect. * * *.
"* * * * *
"In State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 90-91, 386 P2d 915
(1963), this court said:
"'* * * We think, however, that the
requirement of Article I, section 10, of the
Constitution that "justice shall be administered * * * without delay" means that there shall
be no unreasonable delay after a formal
complaint has been filed against the
defendant. * * * While Article I, section 10,
of the Constitution of this state does not
contain the word "accused," as do the
comparable provisions in the Constitution of
the United States * * * still, we think that
the same construction should be given to the
constitution of this state.  No different
measure of protection of the rights of
persons accused of crime can reasonably be
said to have been in the minds of the framers
of our constitution.'"
Serrell, 265 Or at 218-19 (other citations omitted).  
The court in Serrell then offered the following summary
of the relevant law:
"From the foregoing, it is plain that the time
elapsing prior to an arrest or a formal charge is not
taken into consideration in determining whether a
defendant has been given a speedy trial.  Since
defendant made no complaint concerning the lapse of
time between his indictment and trial, there is no
question of his case involving a speedy trial [issue]."
Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
Again, as in Vawter, the court used a term (this time,
"a formal charge") that does not appear in either the Oregon
Constitution or in contemporary statutes.  And again, as in
Vawter, we are left uninformed as to precisely what it was that
the court meant by the term.  In sum, we are forced to conclude
that our case law, such as it is, does not inform our inquiry on
the issue before us.
There is another source of contextual information,
however, that is of help.  That context is the criminal procedure
code that was in force in Oregon at the time that the Oregon
Constitution was drafted.  We turn to that source.
Before statehood, a territorial statue pertaining to
crimes and criminal proceedings provided, in part:
"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offence, unless on the presentment or indictment of a
grand jury; except in cases * * * cognizable by
justices of the peace [and in certain other instances
not comparable to the one before this court]."
An Act to Define Crimes and Misdemeanors, and Regulate Criminal
Proceedings, ch II, § 1 (1853), in The Statutes of Oregon Enacted
and Continued in Force by the Legislative Assembly (1855), p 207. 
A warrant could be obtained for the arrest of a person accused of
such criminal offenses without an indictment, but the case itself
could be tried only after an indictment was found.  Id. at ch
XVII, § 2.  Given this contemporaneous context for the creation
of Article I, section 10, it appears to us most likely that the
authors of the Oregon Constitution would have viewed the
requirement that "justice shall be administered * * * without
delay" as referring to the period of time after an accused had
been indicted. (7)  Put differently, we think that the only
kind of charging instrument that by itself triggers a "without
delay" analysis under Article I, section 10, is a document that,
as was true of an indictment at the commencement of Oregon
statehood, is sufficient, without more, to commence a
prosecution.  
Our assessment of the historical rationale underlying
the "without delay" guarantee in Article I, section 10, also
supports our conclusion that the constitutional right attaches
when a prosecution actually is commenced.  As this court
explained in State v. Harberts, 331 Or 72, 11 P3d 641 (2000), the
principal historical reason that the constitution guarantees all
persons the right to a speedy and impartial trial is to prevent
prolonged pretrial incarceration. (8)  Id. at 82.  Such
protection is not necessary before an official action directly
empowers the prosecution, without more, to take the defendant to
trial.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that an official
action that is sufficient, standing alone, to commence a
prosecution starts the running of the "without delay" clock.  As
noted, the only such action at the time of statehood was an
indictment.  However, times have changed.  To determine what kind
of official action meets that description today, we must turn
elsewhere.  That inquiry takes us to Article VII (Amended),
section 5, of the Oregon Constitution, which informs us of the
procedures that are required to commence a felony
proceeding. (9)
Article VII (Amended), section 5, of the Oregon
Constitution provides:
"(3) Except as provided in subsections (4) and (5)
of this section, a person shall be charged in a circuit
court with the commission of any crime punishable as a
felony only on indictment by a grand jury.
"(4) The district attorney may charge a person on
an information filed in circuit court of a crime
punishable as a felony if the person appears before the
judge of the circuit court and knowingly waives
indictment.
"(5) The district attorney may charge a person on
an information filed in circuit court if, after a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate, the person has
been held to answer upon a showing of probable cause
that a crime punishable as a felony has been committed
and that the person has committed it, or if the person
knowingly waives preliminary hearing."
Under Article VII (Amended), section 5, then, felonies are to be
tried in circuit court, and an indictment generally is necessary
to commence a felony prosecution.  Absent a knowing waiver of
indictment, a finding of probable cause after a preliminary
hearing, or a knowing waiver of the right to a preliminary
hearing, a defendant cannot be charged with a felony on an
information alone.  See State v. Clark, 291 Or 231, 233-34, 630
P2d 810 (1981) (district attorney may charge person on
information filed in circuit court "only after a showing of
probable cause in a preliminary hearing before a magistrate,
unless the person waives indictment or waives the preliminary
hearing"). (10)
Defendant contends that the "without delay" clock
begins to tick when the jurisdiction of the trial court is
invoked, that is, when an "action" is commenced.  He asserts that
that occurred when the police officer filed the complainant's
information in this case in 1987.  In support of that position,
defendant relies on ORS 131.005(4), which defines "complainant's
information" and states that a "complainant's information serves
to commence an action."  The Court of Appeals seems to have
agreed with that analysis, insofar as it found persuasive the
fact that the complainant's information is one of three types of
accusatory instruments defined in ORS 131.005(1) ("'accusatory
instrument' means a grand jury indictment, an information or a
complaint"), coupled with the fact that the information was duly
executed by a police officer in this case.  Based on the
foregoing, the Court of Appeals held that, "[c]onsequently, that
document constitutes a legally effective accusatory instrument
sufficient to trigger the speedy trial protections of Article I,
section 10."  Vasquez, 177 Or App at 484. 
That analysis misses the mark.  The fact that
applicable statutes define a "complainant's information" as an
"accusatory instrument" does not control our application or
interpretation of an original provision of the Oregon
Constitution.  Instead, the pertinent inquiry is whether the
state, without taking any other procedural steps, could have
brought defendant to trial under that document.  As we have
explained, defendant could not have been brought to trial under a
complainant's information in 1855.  Neither could he have been
brought to trial under the complainant's information that was
filed in this case in 1987, both because it was filed in district
court and because there was no waiver of his right to an
indictment or a preliminary hearing. (11)
Finally, the Court of Appeals found support for its
position that an information triggers the protections of Article
I, section 10, in the passing reference to an "information" that
we pointed out earlier in our discussion of State v. Vawter.  As
noted, in Vawter, this court counted the elapsed time by
reference to the date on which "an information of felony was
filed against the defendant."  Vawter 236 at 92.  The Court of
Appeals deemed that passing reference to an information
dispositive, Vasquez, 177 Or App at 484, but we do not.  In
Vawter, the court did not explain why it used that date for
purposes of calculating the delay; in fact, the court did not
find the date of the filing of the information important enough
to include it among the facts set out at the beginning of the
opinion.  The issue was not argued, the comment had no pertinence
to anything else that the court had to deal with, and the case
was decided on other grounds.  We conclude that the reference was 
dictum; we decline to follow it.
To summarize, none of the analytical grounds used by
the Court of Appeals supports its decision.  Instead, and
contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, the text of Article I,
section 10, and of Article VII (Amended), section 5, when taken
together, demonstrate that the state is not in a position
constitutionally to "administer justice" before a defendant
either is charged by an indictment or one of the constitutionally
prescribed procedures that are alternatives to an indictment has
been followed.  It follows that the speedy trial guarantee of
Article I, section 10, does not attach until that point.  
In the present case, defendant was not arrested for the
Torres murder after the investigating police officer filed the
complainant's information in the Umatilla County District Court
in 1987 and obtained the arrest warrant, the district court did
not have jurisdiction to try the alleged offense, no preliminary
hearing was held in connection with the 1987 information, and
defendant neither waived indictment nor waived preliminary
hearing.  Thus, the constitutional prerequisites for a felony
prosecution were absent at the time the complainant's information
was filed, and that instrument was not sufficient to commence a
prosecution of defendant for murder.  It follows that defendant
suffered no restraint of his liberty as a result of the filing of
the information (12) and further proceedings were necessary to
subject him to such a restraint.  In light of the foregoing, we
hold that the 1987 filing of the complainant's information was
not an event that triggered defendant's right to have justice
administered "without delay" under Article I, section 10, of the
Oregon Constitution.  The Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion
was in error.  
Defendant fares no better under the Sixth Amendment. 
See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 US 302, 310, 106 S Ct
648, 88 L Ed 2d 640 (1986) (quoting, United States v. Marion, 404
US 307, 320, 92 S Ct 455, 30 L Ed 2d 4768 (1971) ("[W]hen no
indictment is outstanding, only the actual restraints imposed by
arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge * * * engage the
particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth
Amendment.").  It follows that the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. Defendant will be eligible for parole in California in
2016; accordingly, that is the earliest date at which defendant
may begin serving the sentence in Washington.  Thus, irrespective
of our decision in this case, defendant will remain in prison
until approximately 2038.  
2. The factual record is somewhat vague as to the reason for
the delay in indicting defendant in Oregon.  However, the state
informed the trial court during a pretrial evidentiary hearing
that prosecutors had not become convinced that they could prove
that defendant murdered Torres until after defendant pleaded
guilty to Mendoza's murder in Washington.  Up to that point, the
state's case was based on the testimony of defendant's cousin,
Orozco.  Orozco had told police shortly after Torres's murder
that he thought that defendant suspected that Torres either had
had or wanted to have sex with defendant's wife.  Orozco,
however, was a convicted (and, at that time, incarcerated) felon
whom the state felt would not be convincing to a jury.  The
Umatilla County District Attorney believed that defendant's 1997
guilty plea in the Washington case helped to establish
defendant's actual motive in killing Torres:  Torres had been
present at Mendoza's murder and, immediately thereafter,
defendant had blamed Torres for that crime, knowing, as the
Umatilla County District Attorney put it, that Torres was "not
going to be in a position to deny that, because [defendant]
murdered him two days after murdering * * * Mendoza."  
3. In its response in the trial court, the state correctly
pointed out that defendant's statutory argument is unavailing in
any event, in light of the fact that the state dismissed the
information after a grand jury indicted defendant.  Under that
circumstance, defendant effectively received the statutory remedy
of dismissal without prejudice.  
4. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that it was proper
to deviate from the usual practice and address defendant's
constitutional arguments before considering his statutory
arguments because analysis of the constitutional claims could
result in more complete relief (dismissal with prejudice). 
Vasquez, 177 Or App at 481.  See State v. Harberts, 331 Or 72,
81, 11 P3d 641 (2000) (illustrating point).  In accordance with
our usual practice, the court addressed the state constitutional
claims first.  Vasquez, 177 Or App at 481.  See State v. Kennedy,
295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (Oregon courts turn to
federal constitutional arguments only if state law is not
dispositive)).  
5. The constitutional instruction that "justice shall be
administered * * * without delay" further suggests that those
court proceedings, once commenced, shall not be prolonged or
deferred.
6. The defendant in Vawter hardly could have done otherwise. 
His own abstract of record reflected that his motion to dismiss
the indictment had been based solely on the delay between the
date of the indictment and the date on which he was arraigned. 
Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record, p 2 (1703 Oregon
Briefs).  Thus, he had not preserved any alleged error respecting
any other or longer period of time.  
7. The qualification in the statute referring to justices of
the peace is not to the contrary.  Unlike proceedings in the
regular trial courts, justice court proceedings could begin with
a "complaint."  An Act Relating to Election of Justices of the
Peace, and Constables, and to Proceedings in Justices' Courts, ch
II, § 200, in The Statutes of Oregon (1855), p 325.  However, we
have found no provision for trying any crime charged by
indictment in a justice court.  Moreover, the offense charged in
justice court had to be tried within one day after the accused
was brought before the court, "unless continued for cause."  Id.
at § 202.  It thus would appear that justice court proceedings
would not have been considered as significant to the authors of
the Oregon Constitution in crafting the right to have justice
administered "without delay" under Article I, section 10.
8. Apart from the foregoing, the court in Harberts observed
that there is no record of any discussion of the phrase "without
delay" in connection with the adoption of Article I, section 10,
of the Oregon Constitution.  Harberts, 331 Or at 83.  
9. Murder is, of course, a felony.  The complainant's
information in this case was filed in district court –- a court
that did not have jurisdiction to try felonies.  ORS 46.040
(1985) (district courts have same criminal jurisdiction as
justice's courts and concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts
over misdemeanors committed or triable in their counties); ORS
51.040 (1985) (justice's courts have jurisdiction over certain
crimes committed or triable in their counties, including theft,
assault, and various misdemeanors, but not including murder).   
This case does not present the issue whether the filing of a
complainant's information like that filed in this case would be
sufficient to start the "without delay" requirement to run with
respect to a misdemeanor, and we express no opinion as to that
issue.
10. This court has stated that the requirement of a
preliminary hearing as a predicate to charging a person on an
information offers a suspect "a panoply of procedural guarantees
[to] protect the person's right to contest the evidence of
probable cause that he has committed a felony and his right not
to become a witness against himself."  Clark, 291 Or at 234.  The
preliminary hearing process also guarantees a suspect's rights to
the assistance of counsel, to subpoena witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, to make an unsworn statement subject
only to limited questioning by the magistrate, and to the
judgment of a trained judicial officer in determining whether
probable cause exists for the prosecution.  Id.  Those rights are
guaranteed by statute and constitute the formalities that must
either be observed or affirmatively waived before a district
attorney may charge a person on an information.  Id. (citing
statutory authorities for rights at preliminary hearings).  
11. The relevant statute provides the same outcome.  ORS
131.005(4), defining a "complainant's information," provides that
a "complainant's information serves to commence an action, but
not as a basis for prosecution thereof."  (Emphasis added.)  
12. In this case, of course, defendant's "liberty" was
restrained shortly after he committed the murder on which this
case is based, when he was arrested in connection with the
California murder, and it remains restrained today, in the sense
that defendant has not been free since that time.  However, the
relevant inquiry for purposes of our analysis in this case is
whether defendant suffered any additional restraint on his
liberty as a result of the filing of the 1987 complainant's
information.  He did not.