Title: Attorney Grievance v. Pawlak

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Thomas F. Pawlak, AG No. 1, September Term 2008
Headnote:  Indefinite suspension—Indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction for an
attorney who violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a)
and (d), due to the attorney’s inadequate representation in connection with an estate matter,
and his failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s repeated attempts to contact him concerning the
complaint.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-08-004003 OC
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 1
September Term, 2008
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
THOMAS F. PAWLAK
                   Bell, C.J.
                   Harrell
                   Battaglia
                   Greene
                   Murphy
                   Adkins
                   Barbera
                              JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Filed: April 14, 2009
1  Maryland Rule 16-751(a) provides in pertinent part:
   (a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.  (1) Upon approval
of Commission. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of
Appeals.
2  The relevant provisions of those MRPC state:
Rule 1.1 Competence.
   A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.3 Diligence.
   A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client.
Rule 8.1 Bar admission and disciplinary matters.
   An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
    (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
    (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
(continued...)
           The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar
Counsel and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a),1 filed a Petition for Disciplinary and
Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Thomas F. Pawlak, Respondent.  Bar Counsel charged
Respondent with violating the following Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
(“MRPC”):  1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 8.1(a) and (b) (Disciplinary Matters), and
8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct).2 
2(...continued)
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except
that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6.
  
Rule 8.4 Misconduct.
   It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
   (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts
of another;
***
   (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]
3  Maryland Rule 16-752(a) provides:
   (a) Order.  Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record.  The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of
motions, and hearing.
4  Maryland Rule 16-757(c) provides:
(continued...)
-2-
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a),3 we referred the petition to the Honorable
Judith C. Ensor of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, to conduct an evidentiary hearing
and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Judge Ensor held a hearing on
September 4, 2008, and on October 21, 2008, issued her findings of fact and recommended
conclusions of law, pursuant to 16-757(c).4   Judge Ensor found by clear and convincing
4(...continued)
   (c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law.  If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed.  Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than
45 days after the conclusion of the hearing.  The clerk shall mail a copy of the
statement to each party.
5  Judge Ensor did not specify which of the subsections of Rules 8.1 and Rule 8.4 she
found Respondent to have violated.  It is clear, however, from the charges contained in the
Petition, the findings of fact Judge Ensor made concerning the Rule 8.1 and 8.4 charges, and
the judge’s comments concerning her conclusions of law on those charges, that she found
Respondent to have violated Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(a) and (d). 
-3-
evidence that Respondent had violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d).5 
I.  FACTS
Respondent was admitted as a member of the Bar of this Court in July 1970.  The
Petition stemmed from a complaint concerning Respondent’s representation of an estate.  The
complaint was filed by a party with an interest in the estate.
Judge Ensor made the following findings of fact concerning the charges in the
Petition, beginning with general background facts that set her complaint-specific findings in
context.  Judge Ensor wrote:
Introduction
By way of background, Thelma Werner (“Ms. Werner”) moved home
to 3909 Pinewood Avenue in Baltimore City in order to care for her aging
mother and stepfather, Daniel G. Imhoff (sometimes “Mr. Imhoff”).  After her
mother passed, Ms. Werner continued to care for and reside with Mr. Imhoff
until his death on November 11, 1977.  Upon his death, Mr. Imhoff left to Ms.
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Werner a life estate in the 3909 Pinewood Avenue home.  At the conclusion
of the life estate, the home was to be sold, with the proceeds to be distributed
pursuant to Mr. Imhoff’s will.
Ms. Charlotte W. Main (sometimes “Ms. Main”), an attorney, was
appointed personal representative of Mr. Imhoff’s Estate.  Ms. Main died in
1994.
By letter dated March 31, 1997, Mr. Pawlak contacted Ms. Werner and
informed her that he and another attorney by the name of Mr. Prem had
succeeded Ms. Main as the attorneys for the Estate of Daniel G. Imhoff. 
At the time that this letter was sent, there was in existence an estate
checking account with NationsBank, now Bank of America.
On July 28, 1998, Mr. Pawlak wrote to Ms. Pauline Wolfe (“Ms.
Wolfe”), another member of Ms. Werner’s family, and acknowledged that he
had received the requested list of surviving heirs.  Mr. Pawlak reiterated that
he had “succeeded to the law practice of Charlotte W. Main, Co-Personal
Representative” of Mr. Imhoff’s Estate.  Respondent made clear that he
intended “to petition the Court to be appointed as Successor Personal
Representative for the purpose of completing the administration and
distribution of Uncle Dan’s Estate through the sale of 3909 Pinewood Avenue
when Thelma Werner’s life estate ends.”  Mr. Pawlak further promised to
move forward to obtain the heirs’ consents to his appointment “within the next
ninety days.”  The letter also referenced the checking account with Bank of
America. 
On August 17, 1998, Mr. Pawlak obtained a Consent to Appointment
of Personal Representative and Waiver of Bond from Irvin I. Imhoff (Mr.
Imhoff’s Brother), through his Power of Attorney, Ms. Wolfe. 
Mr. Pawlak met with Ms. Wolfe, Ms. Longenecker (another relative),
and their respective husbands at the 3909 Pinewood Avenue residence on
August 17, 1998.  He followed that meeting with a letter dated August 21,
1998.  In that correspondence, Mr. Pawlak confirmed that the estate checking
account had a balance of $3,000.  He also reiterated the importance of having
a successor personal representative appointed “to protect the Imhoff heirs’
financial interests in the Estate and to provide the legal expertise necessary for
the ultimate distribution to the heirs. . . .”  Again, Mr. Pawlak promised to
forward consents to the Imhoff heirs within the September/October time frame.
-5-
Mr. Pawlak did not prepare and/or file with the Court the pleadings
 necessary to have himself appointed successor trustee.    
Judge Ensor then turned to her findings concerning the charges in the Petition.  
She wrote:
Findings of Fact
The parties, for the most part, are in agreement as to the material facts
and circumstances surrounding the charges lodged against Mr. Pawlak.  In
August, 2006, twelve years after Ms. Main had passed and nine years after Mr.
Pawlak had indicated his intention to petition the Court to appoint a successor
trustee, Ms. Werner was 96 years old and suffering from dementia.  Ms.
Werner had previously given her power of attorney to Roy Sanders, the
husband of her niece, Delores Sanders (sometimes “Ms. Sanders”).  The
Sanders ultimately determined that Ms. Werner could no longer safely reside
in the Pinewood Avenue home.  Mr. and Mrs. Sanders decided that it would
be in Ms. Werner’s best interest to relinquish the life estate and move to an
assisted living facility.  To this end, Ms. Sanders attempted to contact Mr.
Pawlak in order to advise him of the change in circumstances and inquire as
to the status of the estate issues.
According to Ms. Sanders, she obtained Mr. Pawlak’s telephone
number from her aunt and placed calls to him on a number of occasions, all
without success.  Ms. Sanders testified that she reached a law office and left
messages on the firm answering machine.  She further testified that these calls
were not returned.  According to her testimony, having failed to reach Mr.
Pawlak by phone, Ms. Sanders wrote to him at least twice.  Ms. Sanders’ first
letter to Mr. Pawlak, dated August 20, 2006, was admitted into evidence [].
In this correspondence, Ms. Sanders, among other things, requested
information as to whether Respondent still had possession of the records
pertaining to the matter and inquired as to “how it is to be handled.”  Ms.
Sanders closed her letter by asking Mr. Pawlak to respond to her inquiries “as
soon as possible.”  Ms. Sanders pointed out in the letter that “[w]henever
Thelma vacates the house someone must take charge of it.” 
Mr. Pawlak denies ever having received the August 20, 2006 letter.
During his testimony, he emphasized that, while the address was correct, Ms.
Sanders failed to include the appropriate suite number.  Ms. Sanders, however,
testified that the letter was never returned to her.
6  We have omitted from our recitation of Judge Ensor’s conclusions of law the text
of the various charged rule violations.
-6-
Roy Sanders testified that, during the Spring of 2006, he sent Mr.
Pawlak an up-to-date list of current heirs to the Imhoff Estate, together with
their contact information.  According to Mr. Sanders, he and his wife met with
Mr. Pawlak at the Pinewood Avenue address in June, 2006.  Mr. Sanders
testified that, during this meeting, Mr. Pawlak again promised that he would
handle the matters on behalf of the estate and “get this through the courts.”  At
that same time, Mr. Pawlak discussed with the Sanders the need to sell the
house as well as the need to obtain an appraisal of the personal property in the
home belonging to the estate.  
In February 2007, Mr. and Ms. Sanders moved Ms. Werner to an
assisted living facility in York, Pennsylvania.  After the move, for some period
of time, the Sanders continued to maintain the Pinewood Avenue home.  They
also left in the home several personal items belonging to the estate.  In May or
June of that same year, however, the Sanders relinquished the keys to 3909
Pinewood Avenue to Mr. Pawlak.  Since that time, Mr. Pawlak has maintained
the property, using his personal funds to do so.  
Based on these findings, Judge Ensor drew the following conclusions of law.6
Rule 1.1 Competence.
After considering all of the facts and circumstances presented by way
of live testimony and documentary evidence, this Court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 1.1 of the Maryland
Rules of Professional [C]onduct.  Obviously, the significant delay, in and of
itself, is deeply concerning.  That said, perhaps even more disturbing is Mr.
Pawlak’s own testimony that, after Ms. Main’s death and his letter of March,
1997, he saw no reason to petition the Court for a successor trustee.  At a
minimum, Mr. Pawlak knew there existed an estate checking account with a
balance of approximately $3,000.  He knew this money was to be used to
finance capital repairs on the Pinewood Avenue home. He knew that the
account listed Ms. Main as the personal representative and that, absent action
on his part, the funds could not be accessed.  He knew that, absent activity on
the account, the funds would be deemed abandoned and would eschew [sic]
to the State.  Certainly, Mr. Pawlak’s inaction demonstrates a lack of
-7-
thoroughness and preparedness.  His failure to appreciate the ramifications of
this inaction constitutes lack of the legal knowledge required to handle this
representation.
Rule 1.3 Diligence.
This court finds, again by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr.
Pawlak violated Rule 1.3 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  In
March, 1997, Mr. Pawlak undertook to represent the Imhoff Estate.  Literally,
more than one decade later, the appropriate paperwork has not been filed with
the Court.  The home is currently vacant and uninsured.  Moreover, the
beneficiaries have yet to receive their distributions.  In addition, Mr. Pawlak
failed to respond to Ms. Sanders’ inquiries.  There is no question that Mr.
Pawlak has been less than diligent. 
Rule 8.1(a), (b) Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.
Mr. Pawlak is charged with knowingly failing to respond to a lawful
demand for information from a disciplinary authority.  He readily concedes
that he received correspondence from Bar Counsel on October 23, 2006,
December 7, 2006, January 10, 2007, and again on January 24, 2007.  Mr.
Pawlak admits that, in each of these letters, Bar Counsel sought a response to
Ms. Sanders’ Complaint.  Mr. Pawlak failed to respond to any of these letters.
Indeed, he took no action whatsoever until a Bar Counsel Investigator
contacted him in March 2007.
-8-
At the September 4th hearing, Mr. Pawlak indicated that he failed to
respond to the various correspondence from Bar Counsel because he could not
locate the Imhoff file.2  It is noteworthy, however, that Mr. Pawlak never
contacted Bar Counsel to inform her that the file was missing.  
_________________________
2 If, indeed, Mr. Pawlak could not find the file, this fact would further support
the findings that with respect to Rules 1.1 and 1.3.
_________________________
It is noteworthy, however, that Mr. Pawlak never contacted Bar Counsel to
inform her that the file was missing.  Based in large part on Mr. Pawlak’s own
testimony, this Court finds that the Respondent was embarrassed by the course
of his representation and further ashamed to discover that he was the subject
of a Complaint.  He was aware of the Complaint, knew that Bar Counsel was
repeatedly seeking information from him, and failed to respond.  Therefore,
this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Pawlak violated
Rule 8.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 8.4(a), (d) Misconduct.
Mr. Pawlak’s lack of diligence and competence in handling the instant
matter clearly amounts to a violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct.  As stated previously, Mr. Pawlak undertook to
represent the Imhoff Estate more than a decade ago.  To date, a successor
trustee has not yet been appointed.  Obviously, this significant delay amounts
to misconduct, but Mr. Pawlak further violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct by not responding promptly to correspondence from Bar Counsel,
despite admitting that he was aware that a Complaint had been filed against
him and that Bar Counsel had repeatedly sought information from him.  
Additionally, Mr. Pawlak’s conduct has been prejudicial to the
administration of justice given that the property located at 3909 Pinewood
Avenue currently remains vacant and uninsured, and the beneficiaries of the
Imhoff Estate have yet to receive their distributions.  Furthermore, Mr. Pawlak
allowed the Bank of America account, with approximately $3,000 to eschew
[sic] to the State.  This conduct has served to undermine the public’s trust in
the legal system.  Therefore, this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that Mr. Pawlak’s conduct with regard to the handling of the Imhoff Estate
rises to the level of misconduct pursuant to Rule 8.4.
-9-
Judge Ensor summarized her conclusions of law, as follows.
Conclusions of Law
This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 by failing to petition the
Court for a successor trustee despite the serious ramifications of not doing so,
including allowing $3,000 in the estate checking account with Bank of
America to eschew [sic] to the State.
This Court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
violated Rule 1.3 by failing to file the appropriate paperwork to become
successor trustee despite undertaking to represent the Imhoff Estate more than
a decade ago.
This Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated Rule 8.1 by failing to respond timely to correspondence
sent by Bar Counsel.
This Court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
violated Rule 8.4 by failing to petition the Court for a successor trustee despite
undertaking to represent the Imhoff Estate nearly a decade ago and by failing
to respond timely to the various correspondence sent by Bar Counsel.  This
Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant’s actions
were prejudicial to the administration of justice given that the property located
at 3909 Pinewood Avenue currently remains vacant and uninsured, the
multiple beneficiaries of the Imhoff Estate have yet to receive their
distributions, and Mr. Pawlak allowed the Bank of America account with
approximately $3,000 to eschew [sic] to the State.
Judge Ensor found the following facts in mitigation.
Mitigating Factors
Mr. Pawlak was admitted to the Maryland Bar in June, 1970.  This is
the first time in his thirty-eight years of practice that he has been accused of
any sort of misconduct.  At the hearing, Mr. Pawlak appeared genuinely
remorseful, indicating several times that he was ashamed and embarrassed
about the manner in which he handled the case.  He made clear that he was not
trying to hide anything, and that he did not intend for this situation to occur.
Mr. Pawlak indicated that he has been in denial about the status of this matter.
-10-
He clearly now understands that his failure to prudently address the situation
has, in his own words, “tarnished his reputation.”
Mr. Pawlak has not sought attorney’s fees in this manner.  Additionally,
Mr. Pawlak has advanced $2,000 of his own funds to maintain the 3909
Pinewood Avenue property, paying, among other things, property taxes and
utility bills.  He has also utilized his own funds to maintain the lawn at the
property on a regular basis.
Furthermore, at the hearing on this matter, Mr. Pawlak made clear that
he accepts full responsibility and stands ready to make things right.  The
Respondent stated that he would like the opportunity to take the necessary
steps to retrieve the $3,000 that was once in the estate checking account with
Bank of America.  Mr. Pawlak promised that, if that amount is no longer
recoverable, he will personally reimburse the estate.  He also asked for another
opportunity to file the requisite substitution paperwork with the Court.
Mr. Pawlak’s actions in the case at bar appear to be an aberration.
II.  EXCEPTIONS
Neither Petitioner nor Respondent has filed exceptions to Judge Ensor’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We recently set forth the standard by which we consider attorney grievance matters:
This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline
proceedings in Maryland.  Even though conducting an independent review of
the record, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless they are found
to be clearly erroneous.  This Court gives deference to the hearing judge’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses.  Factual findings by the hearing
judge will not be interfered with if they are founded on clear and convincing
evidence.  All proposed conclusions of law made by the hearing judge,
however, are subject to de novo review by this Court. 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 368, 952 A.2d 226, 235-36 (2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
7  Maryland Rule 16-757(b) provides:
   (b) Burdens of proof.  The petitioner has the burden of proving the
averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.  A respondent who
asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the
burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.
8  Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A) provides in relevant part:
   (b) Review by Court of Appeals.
***
   (2) Findings of fact.  (A) If no exceptions are filed.  If no exceptions are
filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of
determining appropriate sanctions, if any.
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“[T]he hearing judge must ‘apply the clear and convincing standard of proof when
weighing the evidence’” in order to find the facts.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind,
401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ward,
394 Md. 1, 16, 904 A.2d 477, 486 (2006)); see Md. Rule 16-757(b).7  “‘The clear and
convincing standard of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence standard,
which is generally applied to civil cases, and beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which is
applied to most crimes.’”  Siskind, 401 Md. at 54, 930 A.2d at 335 (quoting Ward, 394 Md.
at 16, 904 A.2d at 486).
IV.  DISCUSSION
We have stated that no exceptions have been filed.  Therefore, pursuant to Rule 16-
759(b)(2)(A),8 we shall “treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of
determining appropriate sanctions, if any.”  Accord Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
9  Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(1), provides:
   (b) Review by Court of Appeals.  (1) Conclusions of law.  The Court of
Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge’s conclusions of law.
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Elmendorf, 404 Md. 353, 360, 946 A.2d 542, 546 (2008).  In the exercise of our independent
review of the record, moreover, we hold that Judge Ensor’s conclusions of law are supported
by clear and convincing evidence.  Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1);9 see Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 156, 939 A.2d 732, 741 (2008).
All that remains, then, is the task of determining the appropriate sanction for
Respondent’s violations of the MRPC.  Bar Counsel recommends an indefinite suspension
because “Respondent has evidenced by his actions a sufficient and persistent disregard for
his clients [sic] best interest by failing to move the matter forward for over a decade.”
“Our goal in attorney discipline matters is to protect the public and the public’s
confidence in the legal profession rather than to punish the attorney.”  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 348, 946 A.2d 500, 539 (2008) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).  We seek to deter other attorneys from violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct.  Id.  “The severity of the sanction depends on several things, including
‘the circumstances of each case, the intent [with] which the acts were committed, the gravity,
nature and effects of the violations as well as any mitigating factors.’”  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Nichols, 405 Md. 207, 217, 950 A.2d 778, 785 (2008) (citation omitted).
We consider the following facts and circumstances presented by the case at bar.
Respondent, having repeatedly assured Ms. Werner, her family, and the heirs to the Imhoff
-13-
Estate that he would represent the Estate, owed them competent and diligent representation.
Respondent did not carry out either obligation.  He failed for nearly a decade to follow
through on his promise to several of the interested parties that he would petition for
appointment as substitute personal representative.  His years of inaction caused the Estate
checking account (the existence of which he was fully aware) to escheat to the State.
Moreover, in 2006 he failed to respond to Ms. Sanders’s multiple efforts to obtain his
assistance in handling the disposition of the Pinewood Avenue property. 
Even after Respondent took over some responsibility for the property the following
year, his efforts on behalf of the Estate were modest at best.  Importantly, he made no effort
even then to carry out his promise to seek appointment as substitute personal representative,
sell the house, and distribute the residue of the Estate to the heirs.  Respondent’s conduct in
connection with the Imhoff Estate led, at the least, to significant delay in closing the Estate,
and violated MRPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(a) and (d). 
Moreover, Respondent intentionally and repeatedly failed to cooperate with Bar
Counsel’s inquires during investigation of this matter.  Respondent’s recalcitrance in that
regard violated MRPC Rule 8.1(b), and, like his conduct in connection with the Imhoff
Estate, shows a disregard for the proper administration of justice, thereby violating MRPC
Rule 8.4(a) and (d). 
The mitigating facts that Judge Ensor found include that Respondent has been an
attorney for 38 years and has not previously been charged with professional misconduct.  He
did not seek fees in connection with the Imhoff matter, and he advanced nearly $2,000 of his
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own funds to maintain the Pinewood Avenue property.  The judge also noted that
Respondent’s conduct in this matter appears to be an aberration, and he has shown genuine
remorse.  
Judge Ensor considered as well that Respondent “made clear that he accepts full
responsibility and stands ready to make things right.”  The judge noted Respondent’s
testimony “that he would like the opportunity to take the necessary steps to retrieve the
$3,000 that was once in the estate checking account with Bank of America.”  Judge Ensor
also noted that Respondent “promised that, if that amount is no longer recoverable, he will
personally reimburse the estate.”  Judge Ensor noted, too, that Respondent “asked for another
opportunity to file the requisite substitution paperwork with the Court.”
We accept Judge Ensor’s observations as supported by the facts presented to her at
the time.  We received information from Bar Counsel at oral argument in this case, however,
that now casts into serious doubt at least one of the judge’s observations.  Bar Counsel
informed us that, as of February 2, 2009 (three days before the date of oral argument before
us), Respondent still had not followed through on his promise to seek appointment as
personal representative of the Imhoff Estate and complete the final administration of the
Estate.  In noting that fact, we are aware that the Imhoff heirs may not wish Respondent to
pursue such appointment.  However, unless or until the wishes of the Imhoff heirs are made
clear in that regard, we are left only with the representation of Bar Counsel that Respondent,
so far, has reneged on his express promise to the court to try to remediate his past
transgressions. 
-15-
We have held in the past that indefinite suspension is the proper sanction to impose
when an attorney has violated  “various [] provisions of the MRPC coupled with a violation
of MRPC 8.1.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 50, 785 A.2d 1260,
1268 (2001); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 564-65, 903 A.2d
895, 906 (2006) (holding that “[i]ndefinite suspension from the practice of law is the proper
sanction where the attorney violates MRPC 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) by failing to
communicate with the client and failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel and where the
attorney’s conduct is not so egregious that only disbarment can adequately protect the
public”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Granger, 374 Md. 438, 443-450, 462, 823 A.2d
611, 614-18, 626 (2003) (imposing indefinite suspension, with the right to reapply in six
months, for an attorney’s first disciplinary proceeding, where the attorney (1) failed to timely
file the necessary documents for his client’s imminent bankruptcy and foreclosure, and (2)
made false representations to Bar Counsel during its investigation, thereby violating MRPC
1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 8.1, 8.4 (c) and (d)); cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Kendrick, 403 Md. 489, 520, 522, 943 A.2d 1173, 1190, 1192 (2008) (holding that an
indefinite suspension was the proper sanction in a case involving an attorney’s administration
of an estate, where the attorney had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.15).
Indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s violations, given
all of the circumstances surrounding this case—the number and sort of violations, the
mitigating factors, and Respondent’s seeming failure to follow through on his promise to the
hearing judge that he would attempt to “make things right” in the Imhoff matter.  That
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sanction, moreover, is in line with the sanction imposed in the cases we have cited.  The
suspension shall commence thirty days from the date of filing of this Opinion.  
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761,
FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST
THOMAS F. PAWLAK.