Title: BEAGLE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BEAGLE v. STATE2004 WY 3086 P.3d 1271Case Number: 03-39, 03-40Decided: 03/25/2004
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                            

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION

OF 
ACTION BAILBONDS FOR REMISSION

OF 
A JUDGMENT OF BOND FORFEITURE:

JEANINE 
BEAGLE, d/b/a ACTION BAILBONDS,

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Respondent).

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION

OF 
NORTHWEST BAIL BONDS, INC. TO

SET 
ASIDE BOND FORFEITURE:

NORTHWEST 
BAIL BONDS, INC.,

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

Representing 
Appellants:

Rick L. Koehmstedt of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, 
Casper, Wyoming; and John H. Robinson of Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming

 
 
            
         

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Daniel M. Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
            
          
    

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

GOLDEN, 
J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
     

GOLDEN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
These 
matters were previously before the Court.  
Action Bailbonds v. State, 2002 WY 103, 49 P.3d 992 (Wyo. 2002) 
(hereafter Action); In the Matter of Northwest Bail Bonds, Inc., 2002 WY 
102, 50 P.3d 313 (Wyo. 2002) (hereafter Northwest).  They were remanded to the district court 
to take additional evidence and to consider Action's and Northwest's contentions 
that the district court should remit all, or something close to all, of the 100% 
bond forfeitures originally ordered by it.  
In the case of Action, the district court originally ordered the $5,000 
bond forfeited.1  It later remitted to Action $1,500 of 
that forfeiture.  On remand the 
district court increased the remission to $2,500.  In the case of Northwest, the district 
court originally ordered the $7,500 bond forfeited.  It later remitted to Northwest $2,500 of 
that forfeiture.  On remand the 
district court increased the remission to $3,750.  Both Action and Northwest contend the 
district court's rulings are an abuse of discretion.  We will 
affirm.

  

[¶2]           
The 
sole issue is again whether the district court abused its discretion in 
remitting only 50% of the bonds. The pertinent facts are fully set forth in our 
prior opinions.  We will employ the 
same standard of review as we did in our earlier opinions.  

DISCUSSION

 

[¶3]           
The basis for our remand was articulated in our previous 
decisions:

 
 
         

An 
appellate court will not interfere with a trial court's discretionary rulings 
absent a clear abuse of discretion.  
Semler v. Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 424 (Wyo. 1996).  This general rule applies to decisions 
on motions to set aside a bond forfeiture.  
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a remission is a discretionary one that 
will only be overturned on appeal for a patent abuse of discretion amounting to 
arbitrary and capricious action."  
Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 
1983).  Assessing whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion involves determining whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the district court's decision.  Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 
353 (Wyo. 1995).  One factor in that 
assessment is whether the district court's "conclusions [were] drawn from 
objective criteria."  Mintle v. 
Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).  The 
burden is upon the appellant to show an abuse of discretion.  Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 
(Wyo. 1997).

* 
* * *

It 
is important to note the procedural context of a contested bond forfeiture.   W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(1)[2] provides that "[i]f there is a 
breach of condition of a bond, the court shall declare a 
forfeiture of the bail."  (Emphasis 
added.)   Use of the word 
"shall" indicates that this decision is mandatory rather than 
discretionary.  LePage v. State, 
Dep't of Health, 2001 WY 26, ¶¶11, 12, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶¶11, 12 (Wyo. 
2001).  The bail must be 
forfeited.  The discretion of the 
district court is exercised under W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(2):

The 
court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside in whole or in part, upon such 
conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon execution of an 
appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surrendered by the surety into 
custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require the 
forfeiture.

These 
rules being structured as they are, the issue comes to the district court not by 
way of a motion from the State to forfeit the bail, but by way of a motion from 
the appellant to set aside the forfeiture.  
The intent and effect of this structure is to place the burden on the 
surety to show why the forfeiture should be set aside.  State v. Martinez-Gonzales, 145 
Ariz. 300, 701 P.2d 8, 10 (Ariz.App. 1985); Bob Cole Bonding v. State, 
340 Ark. 641, 13 S.W.3d 147, 149 (2000); State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 547, 
514 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1999).

            
Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. recited both general 
principles and specific factors that a judge should consider when faced with a 
motion to set aside a bail bond forfeiture.  The general principles 
include:

The 
purpose of a bail bond is not punitive.  
Its object is not to enrich the government or punish the defendant.  Nor can it be "used as a balm to soothe 
the disappointment resulting from the inability to punish and rehabilitate." . . 
. "Neither frustration nor its kinsman vindictiveness should be of weight in 
tipping the scales by which the elements of the court's decision is 
weighed."

Application 
of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 
664 P.2d  at 1325-26 (quoting United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 444 
(5th Cir. 1979)).

            
Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., at 1325-26 (citing 
United States v. Castaldo, 667 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert 
denied 456 U.S. 978, 102 S. Ct. 2245, 72 L. Ed. 2d 853 (1982), and United 
States v. Parr, at 444) also enunciated that the district court should 
specifically consider in making its determination:

1.  The willfulness of the defendant's 
breach of conditions;

2.  The reasonable relationship between the 
forfeiture ordered and the cost and inconvenience to the government of regaining 
custody of the defendant;

3.  The participation of the surety in 
apprehending the defendant;

4.  The cost, inconvenience, and prejudice 
suffered by the government as a result of the defendant's 
breach;

5.  The amount of delay caused by the 
defendant's default and the stage of the proceedings at the time of the 
disappearance;

6.  The public interest and necessity of 
effectuating the appearance of the defendant; and

7.  Any explanation or mitigating factors 
presented by the defendant.

Northwest 
Bail Bonds, Inc., 
¶¶6, 8-10; Action Bailbonds, ¶¶17-19.

 

[¶4]           
Our 
previous decisions are enhanced by the following analysis found in 3B Wright, 
King, & Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 3d  § 777 (2004):

            
Former Rule 46(e) had contained, since 1972, the provisions that before 
that had been designated Rule 46(f).  
Pursuant to the 2002 amendments, former Rule 46(e)(2) and (4) have been 
redesignated back to Rule 46(f)(2) and (4).  Rule 46(f)(2) provides that a forfeiture 
may be set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if (A) the 
surety later surrenders into custody the person released on the surety's 
appearance bond; or (B) it appears that justice does not require the enforcement 
of the forfeiture.  Rule 46(f)(4) 
provides that after a judgment of default on a forfeited bond, the court may 
remit it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to setting aside a 
forfeiture.  If forfeited bail has 
been paid into the Treasury, and a remission is later ordered, there is 
statutory authority for refund of the money.

            
These provisions of Rule 46 give the court a freer choice than it had 
prior to their adoption.  The former 
law had been that the only circumstance under which the surety could avoid 
forfeiture was a showing that the default of his principle had not been 
willful.  The rule is not so 
limited, and a showing of lack of willfulness is no longer essential.  Instead the court may now take into 
consideration the expense and inconvenience to the government in determining 
whether to allow a remission.  If 
there has been no injury to the government, or there is a satisfactory 
explanation for the default, remission of the entire sum may be ordered.  The expense and inconvenience to the 
government may suggest instead a partial remission.

            
The district court is given wide discretion with regard to ordering a 
remission, and ordinarily an appellate court will not interfere with its 
decision, but the appellate court will reverse if the action of the trial court 
is an abuse of discretion.

            
If the surety locates the defaulting defendant, and returns him to the 
court, some remission is ordinarily proper, but this is not always the case, and 
a remission may be refused.  The court should not order a remission if 
defendant's failure to appear is the result of inadequate supervision of the 
defendant by the surety, or if the cost to the government occasioned by the 
default approaches the face amount of the bond, or if for any other reason the 
surety has failed to establish that justice does not require enforcement of the 
forfeiture.

 
 
             
              
             
               
      

[¶5]           
We 
have carefully reviewed the record developed in the district court after our 
remand.  We conclude that the 
district court provided adequate findings and reached a sustainable conclusion 
in remitting 50% of the bonds at issue.  
We would be remiss if we did not take note that the district court was 
not aided by the State in resolving these important issues.  Indeed, the State refused to present any 
evidence of substance, and its arguments foundered on a na¯ve assumption that 
words such as "willfulness," "cost," "prejudice" and "inconvenience" applied 
only in a colloquial sense.  In 
context, the language used by the rules and by the courts has a more precise 
meaning than that ascribed to it by the State.  The representatives of the State evinced 
a lack of understanding of the technical language pertinent to this matter, as 
well as the applicable legal principles.3  The State's arguments to the district 
court were puerile, and its cross-examination of cooperative witnesses was 
abusive and focused on irrelevant matters.   The State essentially conceded 
that it incurred no costs and suffered no inconvenience or prejudice. We 
construe the district court's finding to conclude that neither defendant in 
these cases acted "willfully," though the district court did opine that it 
bordered closely on it.  However, the district court's focus on the 
public's interest and the court's interest in ensuring the timely appearance of 
defendants in criminal matters, as well as the lack of mitigating factors which 
favored Action and Northwest, serve to sustain these discretionary rulings.

 
 
             
             
            
   

[¶6]           
Finally, 
we note that the State chose to interpret our remand as a mandate for the State 
and the district court to merely "go through the motions and say the 
words."  We view such an attitude as 
a dereliction of duty that is repugnant both to the courts and to the citizens 
of this State, and Natrona County in particular.  In addition, it was the State's 
contention that our former opinion was, "more than anything, this is yet another 
opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court that seems to indicate they have no concept 
of how a busy docket runs.  
None.  This is a classic 
example."  The prosecutor's fit of 
pique served no role in these proceedings other than to disparage this very 
important process and to demonstrate his unbridled arrogance.  This sort of mindless posturing serves no 
useful purpose.

 
      
  

[¶7]           
In 
conclusion, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in remitting 
only 50% of the bonds at issue and, thus, we affirm.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
   

[¶8]           
I 
concur in the result and reasoning of the majority opinion.  I 
write separately only to note that I continue to hold to the position espoused 
in the dissents published in the earlier incarnation of these cases.

 
        
             
    

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-10-105 (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides:

Any proceeds recovered as 
a result of the forfeiture of bail in any criminal case shall be paid into the 
county treasury to the credit of the public school fund of the county in which 
the defendant was admitted to bail.

 
 
              
               
          

   2W. R. Cr. P. 
46(f) provides:

(f) 
Forfeiture of bail. --

            
(1) Declaration. -- If there is a breach of condition of a bond, the 
court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.

            
(2) Setting Aside. -- The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside 
in whole or in part, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if a person 
released upon execution of an appearance bond with a surety is subsequently 
surrendered by the surety into custody or if it otherwise appears that justice 
does not require the forfeiture.

            
(3) Enforcement. -- When a forfeiture has not been set aside, the court 
shall on motion enter a judgment of default and execution may issue 
thereon.  By entering into a bond, 
the obligors submit to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoint the 
clerk of the court as their agent upon whom any papers affecting their liability 
may be served.  The obligor's 
liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent 
action.  The motion and such notice 
of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court, 
who shall forthwith mail copies to the obligors to their last known 
addresses.

            
(4) Remission. -- After entry of such judgment, the court may remit it in 
whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting aside of 
forfeiture in paragraph (2).

 
              
             
   

   3For 
example:

            
"Willfulness," as used here, is more akin to "[v]oluntary and 
intentional, but not necessarily malicious" than it is to "inconsiderate."  Black's Law Dictionary 1593 
(7th ed. 1999).

            
"Cost" is more akin to actual "price or expenditure," than it is to a 
circumstance having no significant economic implications.  Black's Law Dictionary 349 
(7th ed. 1999).

            
"Prejudice," connotes "[d]amage or detriment to one's legal rights or 
claims" and not just a brief delay in fully vindicating those rights or 
claims.  Black's Law Dictionary 1198 
(7th ed. 1999).

            
"Inconvenience" suggests "the sacrifice . . . of important public 
interests or hampering the legitimate activities of government" and not a 
subjective sense of personal frustration.  
Black's Law Dictionary 766 (6th ed. 1990).