Title: Ault v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1551 
____________ 
 
HOWARD STEVEN AULT,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 9, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Howard Steven Ault, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals from an 
order denying a motion to vacate convictions for first-degree murder and sentences 
of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Because the order 
concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of 
death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, 
section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief on Ault’s guilt phase claims 
and do not address his penalty phase claims because Ault is entitled to a new 
penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The facts of this case were set forth in Ault’s first direct appeal: 
Howard Steven Ault was charged with two counts of first-
degree murder in the deaths of two young sisters, eleven-year-old 
Deanne Mu’min and seven-year-old Alicia Jones.  Ault was also 
charged with two counts of sexual battery on a child under twelve 
years old, two counts of kidnaping a child under thirteen years old, 
and two counts of aggravated child abuse. 
The evidence and testimony presented at trial established the 
following facts. The two victims were living with their mother Donna 
Jones and their two-year-old sister in a pop-up trailer attached to the 
family car.  When the mother could afford the camping fee, the family 
would camp at John Easterlin County Park in Broward County.  The 
family had been camping at the park on and off for many months.  
Ault met the family at Easterlin Park a few days before the girls 
disappeared. He offered to let the family shower at his house, and 
gave Jones a hand-drawn map to his house.  Ault also gave the two 
sisters a ride in his truck the same day and their mother scolded them 
for getting in his truck.  A few days before the two sisters 
disappeared, a witness saw Ault talking to the girls and buying them 
snacks at a convenience store which the girls passed on their way 
home from school. 
On Monday, November 4, 1996, the two girls left school at 
2:05 p.m. Witnesses saw the girls walking home, but the girls never 
arrived at the park.  Their mother looked for them at school and 
eventually went to Ault’s house later in the evening.  Ault stated that 
he had not seen the girls and asked the mother not to call the police as 
he had some problems with the police in the past.  The mother went to 
her cousin’s house and called the police.  The police went to Ault’s 
apartment and asked whether he had seen the girls.  Ault stated that he 
had not seen the girls and allowed the officers to look around his 
apartment. 
Ault and his wife voluntarily agreed to come to the Oakland 
Park Police Department to give sworn statements the next day.  
Detective William Rhodes, the lead officer on the case, interviewed 
Ault and his wife at the police department.  Ault stated that he had 
only met the girls once a few days earlier in Easterlin Park, and that 
the girls had never been in his truck. Shortly after this interview, 
 
 
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Officer Deborah Cox of the Broward County Sheriff’s Department 
arrested Ault on an unrelated charge of attempted sexual battery of a 
minor that had occurred eleven months earlier.  Ault was taken to the 
Broward County jail.  In the meantime, Rhodes located witnesses who 
had seen the girls in Ault’s truck, had seen Ault with the girls on 
several occasions, and had seen Ault and his vehicle at the 
convenience store at the approximate time that the girls were walking 
home from school on the day they disappeared, all of which 
contradicted Ault’s voluntary statement. 
The next day, Rhodes visited Ault at the Broward County jail 
and explained that his investigation of the girls’ disappearance 
indicated that Ault had lied at the initial interview.  When Ault 
indicated his desire to speak to Rhodes, Rhodes read Ault his 
Miranda1 rights and Ault waived these rights.  Ault confessed that he 
had killed the girls within an hour after he had taken them to his 
apartment.  Ault agreed to show Rhodes where the bodies were.  Ault 
led the police to his apartment, confessed that the girls were in the 
attic, and explained that the officers who had looked around the night 
before had not looked in the attic.  Ault signed a consent-to-search 
form and the police found the girls’ bodies in the attic as Ault had 
stated. 
Ault was taken to the Oakland Park Police Department and 
insisted that he would only speak to Rhodes.  Ault then gave a taped 
confession in which he revealed the following details.  Ault planned to 
sexually assault the girls when he met them in front of the 
convenience store about 2:30 p.m. on November 4, 1996.  He offered 
the girls a ride, and lured them to his house with the promise of candy.  
He sexually assaulted eleven-year-old Deanne with his finger and also 
penetrated her with his penis.  When Deanne started to scream and 
fight, Ault strangled her until she stopped screaming.  He then 
strangled seven-year-old Alicia to keep her from telling anyone about 
the incident, but he did not sexually assault her.  Ault redressed 
Deanne and put the bodies of both girls in his attic.  Ault said that he 
killed the girls because he was afraid they would tell someone what he 
had done.  Because he was already on community control for sexual 
assault on a child under twelve years of age, he feared that he would 
go to jail for at least twenty-five years.  He also stated that he thought 
                                          
 
 
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 86 (1966). 
 
 
- 4 - 
about the trauma his wife had experienced when he was previously 
arrested and did not want to put her through that trauma again. 
The medical examiner testified that both girls died from manual 
strangulation, that there was bruising and hemorrhaging of Deanne’s 
vaginal tissue, that Deanne had been dead for approximately two days 
when her body was found, and that, based on the decomposition of her 
body, Alicia had died twelve to eighteen hours after Deanne.  Based 
on the lesser state of decomposition of Alicia’s body and a white 
foamy substance coming from her mouth, the medical examiner stated 
that Alicia appeared to have been alive, albeit comatose, at the time 
she was placed in the attic. 
The defense rested without presenting any evidence, except for 
two documents: Ault’s notice to invoke his rights to counsel and to 
remain silent in the unrelated attempted sexual battery case, and the 
court order acknowledging that invocation of rights.  The jury found 
Ault guilty on all charges.  At the request of defense counsel, the 
penalty phase proceeding was scheduled approximately six weeks 
after the guilt phase concluded. 
After the presentation of penalty phase evidence and testimony 
by witnesses for both the State and the defense, the jury recommended 
death on both counts of murder by a nine-to-three vote.  The trial 
judge followed the jury’s recommendation and imposed two death 
sentences.  The judge found six aggravating circumstances: Ault was 
previously convicted of a felony and placed on community control 
(great weight); Ault was previously convicted of a violent felony 
(great weight); the murders were committed while Ault was engaged 
in sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, and kidnapping (great 
weight); the murders were committed to avoid arrest (full weight); the 
murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); the victims 
were less than twelve years of age (great weight).  The court found no 
statutory mitigators and six nonstatutory mitigators: family relations 
and troubled childhood (little weight); prenatal care (little, if any, 
weight); sexual and physical abuse (some weight); organic brain 
damage (little weight); pedophilia and compulsive mental disorder 
(some weight); and remorse (some weight).2  The trial court 
concluded that the aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigating 
                                          
 
 
2.  The circuit court grouped the seventy-one nonstatutory mitigators 
proposed by Ault into these six categories. 
 
 
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factors and that the circumstances of the case and Ault’s history 
placed the case in the category of the most aggravated and least 
mitigated of first-degree murders.  Thus, the court sentenced Ault to 
death for both murders. 
Ault appeals his convictions and sentences to this Court, raising 
nine issues on appeal.  Ault contends that: (1) the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police; (2) the 
trial court erred in granting the State’s challenge for cause of juror 
Reynolds; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a penalty 
phase mistrial based on the prosecutor’s questioning of witnesses 
about collateral crimes; (4) the trial court erred by not allowing a 
defense expert to express his opinion as to the applicability of a 
statutory mental mitigating factor; (5) the trial court erred in 
permitting two penalty phase witnesses to testify about hearsay 
evidence; (6) the trial court erred in denying his request to discharge 
penalty phase counsel; (7) the aggravating circumstance that the 
murder was committed in the course of a specified felony is 
unconstitutional; (8) his death sentence violates the principles 
announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, (2000); and (9) 
the trial court erred in sentencing him under the 1995 sentencing 
guidelines for the noncapital offenses and in imposing a departure 
sentence without contemporaneous written reasons for the departure.  
The State addresses one issue relating to this Court’s proportionality 
review of the death sentences on appeal.  The State contends that 
Ault’s two death sentences are proportional in light of the six 
aggravating factors, no statutory mitigating factors, and the weak 
nonstatutory mitigating factors. 
 
Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 677-79 (Fla. 2003) (hereinafter “Ault I”).  This Court 
affirmed Ault’s convictions, vacated his death sentence, and remanded for a new 
penalty phase based on the error in jury selection.  Id. at 683-88.  This Court also 
remanded for resentencing of the non-capital counts for use of proper guidelines.  
Id. at 688. 
 
Resentencing began July 30, 2007: 
 
 
 
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The State began its case by presenting evidence of Ault’s 
criminal history.  Three witnesses testified that as young girls they 
were sexually assaulted by Ault, the first in 1988 when she was 
twelve years old, the second in 1994 when she was seven years old, 
and the third in 1995 when she was eleven years old.  The last of these 
three witnesses testified that after the assault Ault told her that what 
he did was wrong and that she needed to call the police.  The jury was 
also read the testimony of another witness, a police officer, who had 
testified at the previous trial that Ault and another man attacked him at 
knifepoint in 1986. 
The State also presented evidence relating to the deaths of 
Deanne Mu’min and Alicia Jones.  The original crime scene 
investigator was called to identify photos of the locations in which the 
events surrounding the offenses took place.  The medical examiner 
who conducted the victims’ autopsies was also called to testify 
regarding the causes of death.  Finally, the State called William 
Rhodes, who recounted his role in the investigation and identified the 
audio recording of his interrogation of Ault, which was played to the 
jury.  The State also called witnesses to give victim impact evidence, 
including the victims’ mother, one of the victims’ teachers, and other 
individuals who knew their family. 
At the close of the State’s case, the defense presented three 
witnesses to establish mitigation.  The first witness, psychiatrist Dr. 
David Kramer, testified that he had conducted a two-hour psychiatric 
screening of the defendant and had reviewed mental health reports on 
Ault written by other doctors.  Regarding Ault’s family background, 
Dr. Kramer testified that Ault’s family moved frequently when he was 
a child and that Ault’s parents had a dysfunctional marriage.  
According to Dr. Kramer, Ault reported that his older brother began a 
pattern of forced sexual abuse when he was seven years old, and that 
his brother sometimes used a knife or gun.  Dr. Kramer testified that 
such experiences would have a negative effect on a child’s mental 
health and sexual development, and diagnosed Ault with complex 
posttraumatic stress disorder.  Dr. Kramer also diagnosed Ault with 
pedophilia, which he defined as an intense persistent arousal to 
inappropriate stimuli, being prepubescent children in an adult, and 
found that Ault had a history of alcohol abuse and dependency and 
some history of other substance use. 
The next defense witness, neurologist Dr. David Ross, testified 
that he conducted various tests on Ault and concluded that Ault 
 
 
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suffered from deficiencies in the frontal and temporal lobes of his 
brain.  Dr. Ross testified that someone with these deficiencies may 
have problems with the execution of complex ideas, impaired 
judgment, difficulties with impulse control and emotional issues, and 
possible hypersexuality.  He also stated that these deficiencies are 
consistent with individuals diagnosed with pedophilia. 
The final witness presented by the defense was Robert Buckley, 
a private investigator.  Buckley testified that he spoke with Ault’s 
mother, Barbara [Matson], who told him that Ault no longer had a 
relationship with his older brother Charles due to the sexual abuse that 
occurred when Ault was younger.  According to Buckley, [Matson] 
stated that she was aware of the molestation but explained that the 
matter was not talked about in their family.  At the end of Buckley’s 
testimony, the defense rested. 
In rebuttal, the State read to the jury the transcript testimony of 
Dr. Sherry [Bourg] Carter, a psychologist who had testified at Ault’s 
previous trial.  Dr. Carter testified that, at the time of her initial 
meeting with Ault, Ault reported that he had heard voices and suffered 
from hallucinations in the past, but that he was on medications to 
control these conditions.  However, she found that his descriptions of 
his symptoms were inconsistent with each other and were also not 
consistent with medical knowledge regarding hallucinations. Based on 
interviews with Ault and a review of other records, Dr. Carter 
diagnosed Ault with severe psychopathy.  Dr. Carter explained that 
this was a personality disorder rather than a mental illness.  She 
defined a major mental illness as a condition that causes someone to 
be out of touch with reality or to lose control of his or her thought 
process.  By contrast, individuals with personality disorders have 
reasonable control over their actions, but are impaired in their ability 
to relate to others, experience emotion, or behave in a socially 
appropriate manner.  Such individuals, she explained, view others as 
objects rather than as people and have difficulty experiencing 
remorse.  Overall, Dr. Carter concluded that Ault was faking mental 
illness in order to avoid responsibility for his actions.  Dr. Carter also 
found that Ault was inconsistent in his reports of the sexual abuse he 
claimed to have suffered as a child and that, because he had given so 
many different versions of the events, it was difficult to evaluate 
whether any of his claims were truthful. 
At the end of the proceedings, the jury recommended death by a 
vote of nine to three for the murder of Deanne Mu’min and 
 
 
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recommended death by a vote of ten to two for the murder of Alicia 
Jones.  In his written sentencing order, the trial judge found six 
aggravating circumstances applicable to both murders: (1) Ault was 
previously convicted of a felony and placed on community control 
(significant weight); (2) Ault was previously convicted of another 
capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
another person (great weight); (3) the capital felony was committed 
while Ault was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit 
the crimes of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, and kidnapping 
(great weight); (4) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest (significant weight); (5) the 
victim of the crime was a person less than twelve years of age; (6) the 
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) 
(maximum weight). 
The court found no statutory mitigating circumstances and three 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Ault was raised in a 
dysfunctional family (little weight); (2) Ault was not adequately 
supervised by the Department of Corrections (little weight); (3) Ault 
told a victim of a prior sexual assault to call the police and that what 
he did was wrong (some weight).  The court determined that the 
aggravating circumstances far outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances, noting specifically that the single aggravator of the 
murders being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel was of such a 
magnitude as to overwhelm the mitigators.  Following the jury’s 
recommendation, the trial judge sentenced Ault to death for each 
count of first-degree murder, and to fifteen years in prison for each of 
the remaining offenses.  Ault appeals, raising numerous claims of 
error. 
 
Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 184-86 (Fla. 2010) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter 
“Ault II”).   
In the direct appeal of his new penalty phase, Ault argued that the trial court 
erred in rejecting mitigating factors.  This Court agreed, but found the error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the extensive aggravation in Ault’s 
case.  Id. at 195-96.  Ault also challenged his sentences based on proportionality, 
 
 
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the admission of photographic evidence, the weight given to the jury’s 
recommendation, the failure to prepare a Presentencing Investigation Report, 
Ault’s exclusion from a pretrial conference, a motion to disqualify the judge based 
on bias, the denial of Ault’s pro se motions, and the constitutionality of Florida’s 
death penalty scheme.  Id. at 196-207.  This Court affirmed his sentences of death.  
Id. at 207.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 3, 2011.  
Ault v. Florida, 565 U.S. 871 (2011). 
Ault filed an initial motion for postconviction relief on September 18, 2012, 
and an amended motion on July 19, 2013, alleging that both guilt and penalty 
phase counsel were ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  In his initial and amended rule 3.851 postconviction motions, Ault alleged 
the following distinct claims: (1) guilt phase counsel Kevin Kulick’s performance 
was deficient because he made omissions and conceded guilt in the opening 
statement, failed to cross-examine witnesses, and failed to investigate defenses 
such that Ault was prejudiced; (2) penalty phase counsel Mitchell Polay was 
ineffective for failing to raise rejected statutory mental health mitigation as 
nonstatutory during the 2007 penalty phase; (3) Mr. Polay was ineffective for 
failing to investigate and raise Ault’s low IQ as mitigation; (4) Mr. Polay was 
ineffective for failing to adequately prepare Dr. Kramer for trial; (5) Mr. Polay was 
ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation; (6) Mr. Polay was 
 
 
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ineffective for allowing the State to read Dr. Bourg Carter’s 1999 penalty phase 
testimony into evidence rather than seeking her live testimony in the 2007 penalty 
phase; and (7) Mr. Polay was ineffective for failing to move the trial court for 
dismissal, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to make a claim based 
on Ault’s demands for speedy trial.3  The postconviction court granted an 
evidentiary hearing on a portion of the claim relating to expert witness Dr. Bourg 
Carter’s prior testimony and summarily denied the other claims.  In this appeal, 
Ault argues that the postconviction court erred in denying each of the claims, 
                                          
 
 
3.  In his initial rule 3.851 postconviction motion, Ault alleged the following 
claims: (1) penalty phase counsel Mitchell Polay was ineffective for failing to 
object to Dr. Bourg Carter’s 1999 testimony being read into evidence and failing to 
prepare during the 2007 penalty phase; (2) Mr. Polay was ineffective for failing to 
raise rejected statutory mitigation as non-statutory during the 2007 penalty phase; 
(3) Mr. Polay was ineffective for failing to investigate Ault’s low IQ which should 
have been found as a mitigating factor; and (4) Mr. Polay was ineffective for 
failing to adequately prepare Dr. Kramer for trial.  Ault alleged the following 
claims in his amended rule 3.851 postconviction motion: (1) guilt phase counsel 
Kevin Kulick’s performance was deficient because he made omissions and 
conceded guilt in opening statement, failed to cross-examine witnesses, and failed 
to investigate defenses such that Ault was prejudiced; (2) Mr. Polay was 
ineffective for failing to move the trial court for dismissal, and appellate counsel 
was ineffective for failing to make a claim based on Ault’s demands for speedy 
trial; (3) Mr. Polay was ineffective for failing to object to Dr. Bourg Carter’s 1999 
testimony being read into evidence and failing to prepare during the 2007 penalty 
phase; (4) Mr. Polay was ineffective for failing to raise non-statutory mental health 
mitigation during the 2007 penalty phase; and (5) Mr. Polay was ineffective for 
failing to investigate Ault’s low IQ, which should have been found as a mitigating 
factor.  
 
 
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except Ault does not challenge the denial of the claim related to his demands for 
speedy trial. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF GUILT PHASE COUNSEL 
When evaluating an initial rule 3.851 postconviction motion, an evidentiary 
hearing must be held if the movant makes a facially sufficient claim requiring a 
factual determination.  See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852 
& 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 491-92 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (hereinafter “Amendments I”).  
Because the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is 
based on written materials before the court, the court’s ruling is a pure question of 
law this Court reviews de novo.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 
2003).  When reviewing the summary denial of an initial rule 3.851 motion, this 
Court must accept the movant’s factual allegations as true and affirm the ruling 
only if the filings show that the movant has failed to state a facially sufficient claim 
or that there is no issue of material fact to be determined.  See generally 
Amendments I, 772 So. 2d at 491-92 n.2.   
Where there is any question that a facially sufficient claim in an initial rule 
3.851 motion requires a factual determination, this Court presumes an evidentiary 
hearing is required.  See id.  This Court will affirm a summary denial “only when 
the claim is legally insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or [is] 
positively refuted by the record.”  Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d 447, 460 (Fla. 2013) 
 
 
- 12 - 
(quoting Reynolds v. State, 99 So. 3d 459, 471 (Fla. 2012)); see also Boyd v. State, 
200 So. 3d 685, 699 (Fla. 2015).  Conclusory, nonspecific allegations are 
insufficient to obtain an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel in 
capital cases.  See Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 388-89 (Fla. 2014); Doorbal v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482-83 (Fla. 2008).   
This Court has determined that, in order to succeed on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, two elements must be satisfied: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court defers to the circuit court’s factual findings that are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence, and reviews the circuit court’s legal conclusions 
de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).   
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  This Court must make “every effort   
. . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances 
 
 
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of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  The defendant carries the burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.”  Id.  In Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000), this 
Court held that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s 
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”   
In the first claim of Ault’s amended motion, Ault argued that guilt phase 
counsel Kevin Kulick mounted a constitutionally insufficient defense.  Ault alleged 
Mr. Kulick’s performance was deficient for conceding guilt when he told the jury 
in opening statement about Ault’s prior crimes, including arrest for rape and sexual 
battery of a child, and about a news media interview Ault gave.  Ault claimed Mr. 
Kulick’s conduct was deficient when he told the jury Ault is borderline 
intellectually disabled and presented no supporting evidence in the guilt phase.  
Ault also alleged that counsel was deficient for discussing a voluntary intoxication 
defense, for telling the jury that an instruction on voluntary intoxication would be 
given, and for ultimately not securing the instruction.  Ault further argued that Mr. 
Kulick was deficient for only cross-examining State witness Detective William 
 
 
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Rhodes and resting without presenting any evidence.  As to Strickland prejudice, 
Ault alleged generally that Mr. Kulick’s alleged deficiencies collectively created a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt phase would be different, 
undermining confidence in the verdict such that Ault was prejudiced. 
We affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of this claim because 
the record conclusively refutes the existence of Strickland prejudice.  See Boyd, 
200 So. 3d at 699.  Regardless of what further investigation, cross-examination, or 
alternative defenses Mr. Kulick might have conducted, the jury would still have 
heard Ault’s detailed confession, in which he described how he tested the victims’ 
trust by giving them a ride before the assault, the details of the assault, and how he 
believed he had to kill the victims so that he would not go back to jail and further 
traumatize his wife.  In light of the evidence of Ault’s guilt, there is no reasonable 
probability that the alternative defense strategies Ault suggests in this claim 
undermine confidence in his convictions.  Because Ault failed to establish 
prejudice, we need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of 
the Strickland ineffective assistance test.  Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  Therefore, 
we deny relief on this claim. 
HURST RELIEF 
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, this Court interpreted 
Hurst v. Florida to “require[] that all the critical findings necessary before the trial 
 
 
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court may consider imposing a sentence of death must be found unanimously by 
the jury.”  Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla. 2016) (hereinafter “Hurst”).  
These findings “include the existence of each aggravating factor that has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the finding that the aggravating factors are 
sufficient, and the finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances.”  Id.  This Court has determined that Hurst applies to a sentence 
that was final in 2009.  See Mosley v. State, No. SC14-436, slip op. at 63 (Fla. 
Dec. 22, 2016).  Ault’s sentence was final in 2011.  See Ault v. Florida, 565 U.S. at 
871.  Therefore, Hurst is also applicable to Ault’s case, and this Court must 
examine whether any Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We explained the appropriate standard for harmless error review in Hurst: 
 
Where the error concerns sentencing, the error is harmless only 
if there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
sentence.  See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 2000).  
Although the harmless error test applies to both constitutional errors 
and errors not based on constitutional grounds, “the harmless error 
test is to be rigorously applied,” [State v.] DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 
[1129,] 1137 [Fla. 1986], and the State bears an extremely heavy 
burden in cases involving constitutional error.  Therefore, in the 
context of a Hurst v. Florida error, the burden is on the State, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury’s failure to unanimously find all the facts necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to Hurst’s death 
sentence in this case.  We reiterate:  
 
The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct 
result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more 
probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an 
overwhelming evidence test.  Harmless error is not a 
 
 
- 16 - 
device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the 
trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus 
is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  
 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139.  “The question is whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the [sentence].”  Id. 
 
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68 (alteration in original).  In other words, it must be clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found all facts necessary 
to impose death unanimously and would have determined that death is the 
appropriate sentence.  In Ault’s case, there is no such clarity for either 
recommendation of death. 
 
After resentencing, the jury recommended death for the murder of Deanne 
Mu’min by a vote of nine to three and for the murder of Alicia Jones by a vote of 
ten to two.  The circuit court agreed with the jury, finding three nonstatutory 
mitigators given some or little weight and six statutory aggravators, each given 
great, significant, or maximum weight.  In light of the nonunanimous 
recommendations of death and failure of the jury to make any findings as to the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, any attempt to discern what jurors would have 
done if properly instructed under Hurst is purely speculative.  Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that the Hurst error in Ault’s resentencing was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief 
on Ault’s ineffective assistance of guilt phase counsel claim, we do not address his 
remaining ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel claims, and we grant 
relief under Hurst.  Accordingly, we vacate his sentences of death and remand his 
case for a new penalty phase. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Marc H. Gold, Judge - Case No. 061996CF021248A88810 
 
Young T. Tindall, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee