Title: ANDREW ELI GOMEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ANDREW ELI GOMEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 108237 P.3d 393Case Number: S-09-0162Decided: 08/03/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ANDREW 
ELI GOMEZ,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program.  Argument 
by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. 
Smith, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Andrew 
Eli Gomez (Gomez), challenges the district court's decision to deny his motion 
to transfer the criminal matters that underlie this appeal to the juvenile 
court.  Gomez was convicted of 
felony interference with a police officer (intentionally and knowingly caused 
bodily harm) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-5-204(b), as well as three 
misdemeanors; youthful driver with detectable alcohol, reckless driving, and 
failure to stop vehicle where accident involved death or personal injuries.  Gomez was convicted of all the charged 
crimes.  He was sentenced to six to 
ten years of incarceration for his felony conviction, with a recommendation for 
placement in the Youthful Offender Program (Boot Camp).  Additional concurrent sentences were 
imposed for the misdemeanor convictions.

 
 
[¶2]      In addition, 
Gomez challenges the constitutionality of the statute which establishes the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court; claims the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain the conviction for felony interference with a police officer (no 
evidence of specific intent); asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion in disallowing evidence from Gomez's expert witness (this issue 
includes a contention that the ruling violated Gomez's right to compulsory 
process); and, that the district court failed to instruct the jury as to the 
effect of Gomez's intoxication at the time the crime was committed.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Gomez raises 
these issues:

 
 

I.              
W.S. 
§ 14-6-203 is unconstitutional.

II.            
Alternatively 
to Issue I, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant 
[Gomez's] motion to transfer his felony case to Juvenile 
Court.

III.           
There 
was insufficient evidence of specific intent to sustain [Gomez's] felony 
conviction for interference  attempting to cause bodily 
injury.

IV.       The trial 
court erred in refusing to answer a question about the "ultimate issue" in the 
case.  Also, this ruling violated 
[Gomez's] Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.

IV.          
The 
trial court erred in failing to give an instruction to the effect of [Gomez's] 
intoxication [at the time the crime was committed].

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues:

 
 

I.              
Does 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203 violate due process by enhancing a person's sentence 
without a jury finding?

II.            
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to grant [Gomez's] motion to 
transfer his felony case to Juvenile Court?

III.           
Was 
[Gomez] charged with and found guilty of attempting to cause bodily 
injury to a peace officer or was he charged with and found guilty of 
causing bodily injury to a peace officer?  [Underscoring 
added.]

IV.       Did the 
trial court err in refusing to allow [Gomez's] expert witness to answer a 
question about the "ultimate issue" in this case?

IV.          
Was 
a voluntary intoxication instruction warranted, considering [Gomez] was charged 
with a general intent crime?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      On October 15, 
2008, Gomez was charged with the crimes set out heretofore, in the district 
court.  All of the crimes for which 
Gomez was convicted occurred around 9:30 p.m. on October 10, 2008.  A 911 call directed the attention of 
multiple law enforcement officers to an apartment building in Rawlins to 
investigate a fight in progress.  
Gomez was at the scene of that fight and he was fleeing as the police 
arrived.  Police Officer Chris 
Gulbrandson arrived at the scene to further investigate and he parked his car so 
as to block an exit.  The headlights 
of Gulbrandson's patrol car were on and the car had reflective stripes and an 
LED light bar, but he had not activated the vehicle's overhead lights.  When he got out of his car onto the 
roadway, Gomez ran into him with his pickup, "sandwiching" Gulbrandson between 
his patrol car and Gomez's pickup.  
Officer Gulbrandson recognized the vehicle as belonging to Gomez and he 
could clearly see him through the driver's side window as he was hit.  Gulbrandson was seriously injured by 
this occurrence.  Gomez fled the 
scene of the incident and was later found hiding in his bedroom at home.  Police officers arrested him there and 
he resisted their efforts to make that arrest.  Once in jail, Gomez was given a sobriety 
test which showed a BAC of .13.

 
 
[¶5]      On January 6, 
2009, Gomez filed a motion to transfer the proceedings in his case to the 
juvenile court.  By order entered on 
January 29, 2009, the district court denied that motion.  As necessary, additional facts and 
circumstances will be provided in our discussion of the issues 
raised.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Constitutionality 
of Juvenile Court Statutes

 
 
[¶6]      The essence of 
Gomez's constitutional issue is that the governing statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-203 (LexisNexis 2009),

 
 
places 
into the hands of the prosecuting attorney, and upon motion such as this, the 
trial court, the decision of whether to place Mr. Gomez, a juvenile, in juvenile 
court, with the attendant consequences, or to place Mr. Gomez in district court, 
where he was made a felon and faced greatly enhanced penalties, including 
imprisonment, which he then received.  
This statute, on its face, violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d. 2d 435 (2000).

 
 
Gomez 
concedes that this issue was not raised in the district court and asserts that, 
therefore, this Court should consider this error under a plain error 
analysis.  In such instances we 
apply this standard of review:

 
 
We 
review constitutional questions de 
novo.  Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 13, 
129 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2006); Giles v. 
State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 2004).  Because Stokes did not raise the issue 
of the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat.  
Ann. § 14-3-105 in the district court, our review of Stokes' claim is 
confined to a search for plain error.  
Plain error exists when:  (1) 
the record is clear as to the incident alleged as error; (2) the error 
transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the error adversely 
affected a substantial right of the accused which materially prejudiced 
him.  Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 7, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005); Pierson v. 
State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 

Stokes 
v. State, 
2006 WY 134, ¶ 6, 144 P.3d 421, 423 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶7]      In 1 Michael J. 
Dale, et al., Representing the Child 
Client ¶ 5.03[13][k] (Application of Apprendi Doctrine to Juvenile 
Delinquency Cases) (2008) the authors note:

 
 
            
The United States Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey [530 U.S. 455, 
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)] that any facts other than prior 
convictions, which increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory limit, 
must be submitted to a jury and then proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  The ruling struck down a New Jersey law 
authorizing an increase to the maximum sentence for a crime if the trial judge 
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had committed the 
crime "to intimidate an individual because of race, color, gender, handicap, 
religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity."  The Supreme Court found the statute 
violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process 
and trial by jury.

 
 
            
Although Apprendi involved an 
adult defendant, a growing body of case law involves the application of the Apprendi doctrine in the juvenile 
delinquency context.  One example is 
the transfer of juveniles to adult court for prosecution.  It has been argued that juvenile court 
procedures used to prosecute children as adults violate Apprendi because adult prosecution 
results in an increased sentence based upon facts not submitted to a jury or 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  A 
violation of Apprendi also may arise 
under an "extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution (EJJ)."  In EJJ cases in Illinois, if prosecution 
of a child results in a guilty plea, a finding of guilt, or a verdict of guilt, 
the court will impose one or more juvenile sentences and an adult criminal 
sentence which will be stayed on the condition that the child not violate the 
provisions of the juvenile sentence or commit a new crime.  A third situation where an Apprendi violation may occur is in 
jurisdictions with "youthful offender" statutes authorizing judges to increase 
the punishment for juveniles convicted of certain offenses beyond the statutory 
maximum otherwise permitted for juveniles, if certain conditions are 
met.

 
 
            
Courts have generally been reluctant to apply Apprendi in juvenile delinquency 
settings not specifically involving questions of the child's guilt or 
innocence.  Proceedings determining 
which system is appropriate for a juvenile offender are considered outside of 
the scope of Apprendi [citing In re J.W., 304 Ill. App. 3d 1, 
804 N.E.2d, 1094, 1102 (2004).]

 
 
[¶8]      In the case In re J.W., an Illinois appellate court 
ruled that an EJJ case does not implicate the rule articulated in Apprendi.  J.W., at 804 N.E.2d 1101-03 (citing 
other similar Illinois cases).  In State v. H.O., 81 P.3d 883, 885-86 
(Wash.App. 2003) a Washington appellate court rejected a contention that Apprendi and its progeny mandate a 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to decline juvenile jurisdiction.  
In State v. Mays, 85 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Kan. 2004), the Kansas Supreme Court held that the Kansas procedure 
for authorizing adult prosecution, which is similar to Wyoming's, falls outside 
the dictates of Apprendi.   In Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.2d 445, 453 (Ky. 2004), the Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted the same rule as did 
Kansas.

 
 
[¶9]      A different 
result was reached in State v. Rudy 
B., 216 P.3d 810, 812-25 (N.M. 2009), where, in a lengthy decision, the 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico discussed its "unusual" system of handling 
juvenile cases.  Id. at 815.  The opinion in that case resulted in a 
significant change in how New Mexico viewed its juvenile court proceedings in 
light of Apprendi and its 
progeny.  The appellate court 
determined that New Mexico's existing procedures were unconstitutional and 
further determined that its decision was a "new rule" that would apply only to 
new cases and those that are on direct review where the Apprendi issue has been preserved for 
appeal.  Id. at 824-25.  Also see Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d 781, 788-90 (Mass. 2001) wherein the Massachusetts appellate court adopted the 
Apprendi rule to the extent that any 
increase in penalty for youthful offenders must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

 
 
[¶10]   Applying the plain error rule, we 
conclude that the error asserted was not considered in the district court and is 
not reflected at all by the record on appeal.  Furthermore, it does not transgress a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
Therefore we decline to further consider the issue in this 
case.

 
 
Refusal 
of Motion to Transfer to Juvenile Court an Abuse of 
Discretion

 
 
[¶11]   The district court's decision not 
to transfer Gomez's case to juvenile court, from the district court, is reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard.

 
 
Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; and it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what 
is right under the circumstances, and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.

 
 

Vaughn 
v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶12]   On January 29, 2009, the district 
court held a hearing so as to consider the merits of Gomez's motion to transfer 
his case to the juvenile court.  We 
note at the outset that the county prosecutor or district attorney has the 
responsibility for making an initial determination whether or not to charge a 
juvenile with a felony, in either the district court or the juvenile court.  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 14-6-203(f) (LexisNexis 
2009); and see generally, Hansen v. 
State, 904 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶13]   Gomez was 17 years old at the time 
he committed the crime at issue here.  
Section 14-6-203(f)(iii) provides that in cases where the juvenile has 
attained the age of 17, the prosecuting attorney must consider the factors set 
out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237(b)(i) through (vii) (LexisNexis 2009), in 
making the decision whether to prosecute a juvenile in district court or 
juvenile court.  Those factors 
are:

 
 
(i) 
The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the 
protection of the community required waiver;

            
(ii) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner;

            
(iii) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against 
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if 
personal injury resulted;

            
(iv) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in 
one (1) court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults 
who will be charged with a crime;

            
(v) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and 
pattern of living;

            
(vi) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous 
contacts with the law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other 
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this court, or prior commitments to 
juvenile institutions;

            
(vii) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the 
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have 
committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities 
currently available to the juvenile court.

 
 
[¶14]   Those factors are also used by the 
district court in a transfer hearing as a part of its discretionary 
decision-making process.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-6-237(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2009).  At the transfer hearing in this matter, 
Gomez presented evidence from his stepfather, Marvin Brown, that in October of 
2005, at age 15, Gomez was given a ticket and fined for "breach of 
peace--fighting," but he was not given any counseling.  In June of 2006, Gomez received a 
driver's license violation just before he was 15 and was given a ticket and 
fined, but again received no counseling.  
Mr. Brown testified that he and Gomez's mother were concerned about the 
path Gomez was taking, but conceded that counseling assistance was not sought 
because they could not afford it.  
Mr. Brown's testimony continued that in July of 2006, Gomez was ticketed 
for failure to report an accident and a driver's license violation.  Once again, Gomez received no 
counseling.  In February of 2007, 
Gomez again was ticketed for driving under 15 years of age, but no counseling 
was sought or given him.  In May of 
2007, Gomez was ticketed and fined for imprudent driving and a restricted 
driver's license violation, and again did not receive counseling.  Next, Gomez was ticketed in August of 
2007, for another driver's license offense, as well as breach of 
peace--fighting.  Still, Gomez 
received no treatment or counseling.

 
 
[¶15]   In December of 2007, Gomez was 
arrested for youthful driving under the influence of alcohol.  For that offense, Gomez was placed on 
probation and he began counseling with Ada Fowler.  In this same time frame, Gomez was 
ticketed for speeding.  In February 
of 2008, Gomez was again ticketed for breach of peace--fighting and his 
probation was revoked.  In March of 
2008, Gomez was ticketed for minor in possession of alcohol, and he continued 
his counseling with Ada Fowler.  The 
central concern expressed by Gomez's counselor, as well as his parents, was that 
Gomez had a drinking problem.  That 
problem was addressed in part by Gomez going to Laramie for further 
counseling.  His parents' efforts to 
rein in his bad conduct are the subject of extensive testimony.  In response to cross-examination by 
Gomez's attorney, Mr. Brown indicated that he wished the courts, probation 
personnel, and school personnel had provided better services for Gomez early on 
in the course of his unlawful behavior patterns.  The failure of the "system" to provide 
Gomez with counseling and rehabilitative services serves as one of the primary 
bases for his contention that he should have been prosecuted in juvenile court, 
rather than the district court.

 
 
[¶16]   Ada Fowler, a juvenile probation 
agent in Carbon County, also testified about Gomez's conduct.  At the heart of Gomez's legal 
difficulties was his alcohol problem.  
It was Agent Fowler's opinion that Gomez needed inpatient 
treatment.

 
 
[¶17]   At the close of the hearing, the 
district court made an oral ruling on the motion to transfer Gomez's case to 
juvenile court:

 
 
            
We are all in agreement that Mr. Gomez bears the burden of proof since he 
is the party seeking relief and has filed the motion to transfer to juvenile 
court.  We are also in agreement 
that there are seven determining factors set out in 14-6-237(b).  The first of those factors is the 
seriousness of the alleged offense to the community.  This is extremely serious, a violent 
attack upon a uniformed police officer.

            
Second, was the alleged offense committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner?  The 
facts as alleged by the State, are all of those:  aggressive, violent, premeditated and 
willful.

            
Whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, this was a 
violent attack on a uniformed police officer.

            
Number 4 does not seem to be applicable to this case.  The desirability of trial or disposition 
in one court.  There is only one 
defendant in one incident.

            
Number 5, the sophistication or the maturity of the juvenile, his home, 
his environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living seems to 
tie in with Number 6, the record and previous history of the juvenile, previous 
contacts with law enforcement, juvenile courts, periods of probation.  This young man has a long and detailed 
criminal history.

            
[Defense counsel] has brought that criminal history before the Court, and 
it cuts both ways.  This young man 
has shown  in spite of all the attempts to provide him help from his mother, 
his stepfather, from Ms. Fowler, has shown a pattern of breaking the 
law.

            
Finally, Number 7, prospects for adequate protection of the public and 
the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile.  This Court takes seriously protecting the 
public from violent young criminals.  
And the reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation of the juvenile is just 
as likely in felony adult court as it is in juvenile 
court.

            
Finally, this defendant will turn 18 [very soon] and is set for trial on 
the 28th.  He will be a 
full-fledged adult when this case goes to trial.  He was almost an adult when the alleged 
offense occurred.

Those 
are the factors considered by the Court.  
That is the reasoning of the Court, and the Court denies the motion to 
transfer to juvenile court.

 
 
[¶18]   We have carefully examined the 
materials in the record on appeal that bear on this issue, and we conclude that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 
transfer this case from the district court to the juvenile 
court.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence  Attempt to Cause Bodily Harm

 
 
[¶19]   The benchmark for reviewing a 
sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether the evidence, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State, is adequate to permit a reasonable trier of 
fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury.  Instead, we will 
determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even 
could, have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Pryor v. State, 2009 WY 95. ¶ 7, 212 P.3d 635, 637 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶20]   In this appeal, Gomez was convicted 
of a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009), which 
provides:

 
 
(b) 
A person who intentionally and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily 
injury to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years.

 
 
It 
was very clear from the outset that the State was prosecuting Gomez for 
"intentionally and knowingly" causing bodily injury to a peace officer, and not 
"attempting" to do so.

 
 
[¶21]   Gomez contends that there was 
insufficient time between Officer Gulbrandson's getting out of his car, and 
Gomez then running into him only a few seconds later, for Gomez to have formed 
the specific intent to "attempt to cause" bodily harm to Gulbrandson.  Gomez bases this contention on a video 
clip shown the jury, and contends that it outweighs Gulbrandson's testimony that 
he could clearly see Gomez's face, through the driver's side window of his 
vehicle, as he sped toward Gulbrandson.

 
 
[¶22]   We have examined this asserted 
error very carefully, and we are persuaded that Gomez's argument in this regard 
is not supported by the record on appeal.  
The instruction given the jury was this:

 
 
Instruction 
No. 5

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Interference with a Peace Officer  
Attempt to Cause Bodily Injury, as charged in Count I in this 
case, are:

 
 

1.            
 On or about the 10th day of October 2008:

2.            
In 
Carbon County, Wyoming;

3.            
The 
Defendant, Andrew Gomez;

4.            
Intentionally 
and knowingly caused bodily injury 
to a peace officer;

5.            
While 
that peace officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.  If, on the other hand, you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has 
not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
not guilty.  [Underscoring 
added.]

 
 
[¶23]   Gomez contends that there is a 
fatal flaw in the instruction that requires reversal.  The caption of the instruction contains 
the word "attempt," although the elements portion of the instruction  the 
material portion of it  does not include the word "attempt."  Gomez contends that this made the crime 
at issue a "specific intent" crime, and the evidence failed to prove that 
Gomez's "specific intent" was to cause bodily harm to Officer Gulbrandson.  Although not addressed by the briefs, we 
are duty bound to take note that the verdict form looked like 
this:

 
 
JURY 
VERDICT

 
 
COUNT 
ONE

 
 
1.  We, the jury, duly empanelled and sworn 
to try the above-entitled cause, do find that, as to the crime of Interference with a Peace Officer -- 
Attempt to Cause Bodily Injury, as charged in Count I of the 
Information, the Defendant, Andrew Gomez, is:

 
 
                                    
____ Not Guilty

 
 
                                    
   X    Guilty

 
 
[Underscoring 
added.]

 
 
[¶24]   Nonetheless, we reject Gomez's 
contentions in this regard for several reasons.  Gomez made no objection to this 
instruction at trial; indeed, it was given pretty much as offered by him.  Likewise the record shows no objection 
to the form of the verdict.  We have 
held as follows in this regard:

 
 
[I]n 
Leyva [v. State], 2005 WY 22, 
¶ 9, 106 P.3d [873] at 876, we held that, where a defendant fails to object 
to an instruction, our review is for plain error, which, of course, involves a 
search for prejudice.  Even where a 
defendant has not only not objected, but has actually offered the offending 
instruction, the invited error doctrine allows for review where the instruction 
is "necessarily prejudicial."  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 35, 
150 P.3d 1202, 1213 (Wyo. 2007).  
These cases reflect the confluence of W.R.Cr.P. 30(a), which states in 
part that "[n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury is instructed, 
stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection[,]" and W.R.Cr.P. 52(b), which states that "[p]lain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court."  We 
have followed this rule for a long time.  
See, e.g., Justice v. State, 
775 P.2d 1002, 1009 (Wyo. 1989); Cutbirth 
v. State, 663 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo. 1983); and Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935, 937 
(Wyo. 1982).

 
 

Snow 
v. State, 
2009 WY 117, ¶ 26, 216 P.3d 505, 513-14 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶25]   In addition, we have long 
held:

 
 
Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they 
can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts, 
instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of 
each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give an instruction 
on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a 
confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed. 

 
 

Montez 
v. State, 
2009 WY 17, ¶ 21, 201 P.3d 434, 441 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶26]   We have also 
held:

 
 
On 
appeal, Eres and the State dispute whether the district court erred in 
instructing the jury to determine the value of the stolen property at the time 
of its original theft. Sections 6-3-403(a)(i) and (iii) are ambiguous in the 
sense that they refer merely to "the value of the property" and do not identify 
the specific point in time that the value of property should be determined. 
Thus, as noted by the parties, the statute is susceptible to more than one 
meaning. This Court has not previously determined the meaning of "the value of 
the property" in the context of one charged with receiving stolen property. 
However, there is no need to decide this case of first impression on the matter 
because the timing of valuation-that is, the property's value on the date of 
receipt as compared to the date of theft-was not an issue at 
trial.

 
 
The 
record discloses that both the State and Eres proceeded at trial on the theory 
that no distinction existed in the property's value as between the date the 
property was stolen and the date Eres received it. No contention was made that 
the property's value varied between the date of theft and the date of receipt. 
Nor was there any attempt, through the introduction of evidence or otherwise, to 
differentiate the property's value among the criminal events. The parties 
basically presented two competing property valuations that did not distinguish, 
in any manner, the property's worth as between the time of the theft and the 
time of the receipt. Simply put, the parties did not provide any basis upon 
which the jury could rationally assess the property's value at the time Eres 
received it as compared to when it was stolen. Thus, the timing of the valuation 
of the stolen property is not an issue under the facts of this case. Eres' 
counsel even admitted as much at the instruction conference: "We're not really 
saying that the value was diminished in the time that someone else had it to the 
time Mr. Eres [received] it."

 
 
In 
any event, even assuming the district court misstated the law governing the 
valuation element, we are unable to conclude that the error mandates reversal of 
Eres' conviction. In Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 266, 271-72 (Wyo. 2008), we recognized that a trial court's failure to properly 
instruct on an element of a crime is not a fundamental error requiring automatic 
reversal but, rather, is a trial-type error. If a proper objection is made at 
trial, as in this case, an instructional error is evaluated in accordance with 
the harmless constitutional error standard described in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). 
Granzer, ¶ 16, 193 P.3d  at 271. Under that standard, an error will 
not result in reversal if we are convinced the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. Because of the lack of evidence of competing 
valuations, we are convinced there is no possibility that the jury verdict would 
have been different under the instruction requested by 
Eres.

 
 

Eres 
v. State, 
2010 WY 42, ¶¶ 7-9, 227 P.3d 854, 855 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
[¶27]   We deem the variance between the 
caption of the instruction and the body of the instruction to be, at most, an 
error that is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances of this 
case.  The specific enumeration of 
the elements in the body of the instruction fully informed the jury of the 
evidence the State was required to produce in order to justify a 
conviction.  Our conclusion in this 
regard is bolstered by Officer Gulbrandson's direct and very clear testimony 
that he recognized Gomez's pickup and was able to view his face through the 
driver's side window as Gomez was driving the vehicle directly at him.  Gomez did not offer this defense before 
the jury during his trial.  Rather, 
he defended on the basis that he accidentally hit Gulbrandson because he could 
not see him, as his view was obstructed by trees, darkness, and the inclement 
weather.

 
 
The 
Trial Court's Limitation of Expert Witness Testimony

 
 
[¶28]   Gomez called an accident 
reconstruction expert to testify on his behalf.  Gomez contends that in sustaining some 
objections to that testimony, made by the prosecutor, as well as one made by the 
district court itself, the district court abused its discretion with regard to 
the admission or exclusion of evidence.  
A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, Smith v. State, 
2009 WY 2, ¶ 35, 199 P.3d 1052, 1063 (Wyo. 2009).  In this argument, Gomez fails to give an 
exact description of what it is that the district court excluded that he 
believes should have been called to the jury's attention.  If it was the expert's opinion that 
Gomez did not intend to harm Officer Gulbrandson, then the district court's 
ruling was sound.  However, as the 
transcript bears out, the expert's theory was that Gomez's view of Officer 
Gulbrandson, and his police cruiser, was obscured by trees, darkness, and the 
snowy/rainy weather.  The expert 
witness was permitted by the district court to continue his expert analysis of 
the video tape taken from Officer Gulbrandson's patrol car and the crime scene 
in general, as well as his opinion that it would have been very difficult for 
Gomez to see Officer Gulbrandson and his police vehicle.  We see no indication in the record on 
appeal that the district court frustrated the expert witness's ability to fully 
explain his take on the accident scene.  
Given these circumstances, the limited objections sustained with respect 
to the expert's testimony do not arise to the level of an abuse of discretion, 
nor did it deprive Gomez of his right to compulsory 
process.

 
 
Instruction 
on Voluntary Intoxication

 
 
[¶29]   Gomez concedes that he did not 
offer an intoxication instruction and such an instruction was not given by the 
district court sua sponte.  It is 
not disputed that Gomez was intoxicated the night of the instant crimes.  Because Gomez did not offer an 
instruction of his own, we review his claim for plain error.  Under the plain error standard, Gomez 
must show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated, the violation 
clearly appears in the record, and it resulted in denial of a substantial right 
to his material prejudice.  Morris v. State, 2009 WY 88, ¶ 15, 
210 P.3d 1101, 1105 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶30]   We have held 
that:

 
 
Due 
process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to the jury that 
details the defendant's theory of the case when the theory is supported by 
competent evidence and is recognized by statute or case law.  Holloman v. State, 2002 WY 117, 
¶ 15, 51 P.3d 214, 219 (2002).  
This Court has recognized that intoxication is a defense to a specific 
intent crime.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 21, 
49 P.3d 975, 984-85 (2002).  An 
"attempt" is a "specific intent" crime.  
Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, 
¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1259, 1262 (2002).  
Thus, Mr. Hernandez was entitled to have the jury instructed on this 
theory that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to commit the offense of 
attempted second degree murder if there was competent evidence to support the 
theory.

 
 

Hernandez 
v. State, 
2007 WY 105, ¶ 29, 162 P.3d 472, 480 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶31]   Gomez's defense was not that he was 
too intoxicated to form specific intent.  
His defense was that his view was so obstructed that he could not see 
either Officer Gulbrandson or his squad car.  As previously noted more fully in our 
discussion of the instruction concerning Gomez's intentionally causing bodily 
injury to a peace officer engaged in his lawful duties, the body of the 
instruction correctly described a general intent crime and not a specific intent 
crime.  See King v. State, 2002 WY 27, 
¶¶ 22-23, 40 P.3d 700, 705-6 (Wyo. 2002).  If Gomez had defended on the basis that 
he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent to attempt to injure Officer 
Gulbrandson, then he would have been entitled to such an instruction had he 
asked for one.  The record is clear 
that Gomez did not defend on that theory, but rather that he was unable to see 
Gulbrandson and hitting him was an accident.  We also see in the record on appeal a 
tacit strategy by the defense to use Gomez's alcohol problems as a sword, rather 
than a shield.  His real theory was 
that the "system," and the State, had failed to provide him the services he 
needed to overcome his drinking problems.  
Thus, the seriousness of the consequences of his acts that night and the 
punishment for them should have been lessened to that which could be meted out 
in juvenile court.

 
 
[¶32]   For these reasons, we conclude that 
although the record demonstrates a possibility that an intoxication defense 
could have been pursued by Gomez, it was not.  Secondarily, Gomez does not point to a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law that such an instruction must be given, even 
when a defendant does not request it.  
Finally, we also conclude that the failure of the district court to give 
such an instruction sua sponte, did not prejudice Gomez under the circumstances 
of this case.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶33]   Although our review of most of the 
issues raised is limited by the plain error rule, we hold there is not a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law that would persuade us to decide that the Wyoming's 
juvenile court statute runs afoul of the rule articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Apprendi.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Gomez's motion to transfer his case to juvenile 
court.  The State's evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the conviction of Gomez for intentionally causing bodily 
harm to a peace officer in the performance of his duties.  The testimony of Gomez's expert witness 
was not curtailed in a way that constituted either an abuse of discretion by the 
district court, or a violation of Gomez's right to compulsory process.  Finally, the district court did not 
commit error in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with respect to 
voluntary intoxication.  The 
judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed in all 
respects.