Title: Justis v. Rist

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-297


 Charlotte A. Justis                          Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Family Court

 Gilbert W. Rist                              December Term, 1991



 Matthew I. Katz, J.

 James W. Murdoch of Wool, Murdoch & Hughes, Burlington, for plaintiff-
   appellee

         Lloyd A. Portnow, Samuel H. Press (Of Counsel), and Ira N. Morris, Law
   Clerk, of Portnow, Little & Cicchetti, P.C., Burlington, for defendant-
   appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   This appeal from a divorce order presents the issue of
 whether the family court has the authority to order the estate of the
 obligor spouse to continue maintenance payments in the event the obligor
 predeceases the recipient spouse.  We conclude that Vermont statutory law
 provides no such authority, and, accordingly, vacate the family court's
 order and remand the case for further proceedings.
      The parties married in 1977, four months after they had met.  It was
 the first marriage for the 62-year-old husband and the fourth for the 48-
 year-old wife.  During the entire thirteen-year marriage, the parties kept
 separate finances, resided in different states, and were apart except for
 approximately four months.
      The wife requested a property settlement in lieu of maintenance, but
 the court felt that "in light of the unique nature of this marriage, [the
 wife's] needs are better met through a maintenance award."  The court
 indicated that a property settlement was not appropriate because the husband
 had acquired most of his property, valued at about $500,000, long before the
 marriage.  Further, the court stated that it wanted to ensure reasonable
 support for the wife during her life without creating a windfall for her
 estate if there were a large property settlement and the wife, whose health
 was precarious, died soon thereafter.
      Accordingly, the court ordered the husband to pay the wife $40,000 in a
 lump-sum property settlement and $1600 per month in permanent maintenance,
 said maintenance to cease "only upon the death of the Plaintiff and . . .
 [to] be otherwise payable from the estate of the Defendant should he
 predecease her."  The court further ordered that a lien in the sum of
 $180,000 be placed on the husband's real estate to secure the maintenance
 payments.  In support of its authority to order post-mortem maintenance, the
 court noted that Vermont law gives the family court broad discretion in
 fashioning maintenance awards, and that other jurisdictions with statutes
 similar to Vermont's had ruled that the courts could order maintenance to
 continue beyond the death of the obligor spouse.  The husband appeals from
 that ruling.
      Vermont's maintenance statute, 15 V.S.A. { 752, authorizes the trial
 court to order either spouse to make rehabilitative or permanent maintenance
 payments if the other spouse lacks sufficient income to meet reasonable
 needs and is unable to maintain the standard of living established during
 the marriage.  The payments "shall be in such amounts and for such periods
 of time as the court deems just, after considering all relevant factors."  {
 752(b).  One of the factors listed is "the ability of the spouse from whom
 maintenance is sought to meet his or her reasonable needs while meeting
 those of the spouse seeking maintenance."  { 752(b)(6).  Once the court has
 found grounds for awarding maintenance, "it has broad discretion in
 determining the duration and amount" of the award.  Chaker v. Chaker, 155
 Vt. 20, 25, 581 A.2d 737, 740 (1990).
      Despite the trial court's broad discretion to fashion maintenance
 awards, no statutory language expressly authorizes the court to continue
 maintenance beyond the death of the obligor.  Whether the failure to address
 the issue of post-mortem maintenance was by design or omission is not
 apparent from the language of the statute itself.  One of the few clues we
 have in the statute is that the trial court must consider the reasonable
 needs of the obligor spouse when awarding maintenance.  This indicates that
 the legislature assumed the payments would be coming from the obligor
 personally rather than from the estate.  On the other hand, { 752
 authorizes the court to order "permanent" maintenance, which some may argue
 shows the legislature's intent to allow maintenance to be measured by the
 death of the recipient.  But "permanent" maintenance has traditionally been
 construed to be an indefinite award that ends with the death of either
 spouse or the remarriage of the recipient spouse.  2 H. Clark, The Law of
 Domestic Relations { 17.5, at 264 (2d ed. 1987).
      Because the statutory language is inconclusive on intent, we consider
 the context in which { 752 was amended and the state of the law on post-
 mortem maintenance at that time.  Section 752 was amended in 1981 as part of
 the legislature's general reform of divorce and support law in this state.
 See 1981, No. 247 (Adj. Sess.).  Many of the new provisions, including {
 752, follow closely the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. 147
 (1987) (Uniform Act).  For example, both { 752 and { 308 of the Uniform Act
 state that the maintenance order shall be in amounts and for such "periods
 of time" as "the court deems just."  The legislature, however, did not adopt
 { 316(b) of the Uniform Act, which states, in relevant part, that the
 obligation to pay maintenance terminates upon the death of either party
 unless the parties agree, or the court expressly orders otherwise.
      At the time { 752 was enacted, the generally accepted common-law rule
 was that the obligation to pay maintenance ceased upon the death of either
 party.  See, e.g., Aldrich v. Aldrich,