Title: Nelson v. IDOL and Franklin Group

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47061 
 
CHRISTINE L. NELSON, 
 
     Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
THE FRANKLIN GROUP, INC., Employer; 
and IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
 
     Respondents. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
) 
 
 
Boise, April 2020 Term 
 
Opinion filed: April 30, 2020 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
 
The decision of the Industrial Commission is reversed and remanded. 
 
Christine L. Nelson, Pocatello, Appellant pro se.   
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General; Scott Keim, Deputy Attorney 
General, Boise, for Respondents.   
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
 
MOELLER, Justice. 
This is an appeal from a self-represented litigant concerning the denial of unemployment 
benefits by the Idaho Department of Labor. The appeals examiner concluded that Nelson’s letter 
of protest was untimely because the date of the postmark on her letter was illegible, thereby 
rendering the filing date indeterminable. The Idaho Industrial Commission affirmed. For the 
following reasons, we reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission and remand for further 
proceedings.  
 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
After Christine Nelson quit her job at Franklin Building Supply in Pocatello, Idaho, due 
to what she described as a hostile and demeaning work environment, she filed for unemployment 
benefits with the Department of Labor. The Department denied Nelson’s request for benefits, 
concluding that she quit her job without good cause because “reasonable alternatives were not 
 
2 
 
exhausted prior to quitting.” The Department also informed Nelson that if she disagreed with the 
determination, she could fax, hand deliver, or mail a protest within 14 days. The notice sent by 
the Department designated March 6, 2019 as the “last day to protest.” For protests1 sent by U.S. 
mail, the notice stated that the letter had to be postmarked no later than March 6, 2019.  
Nelson mailed her protest via the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) from Pocatello, Idaho. 
Her letter arrived at the Department’s offices in Boise on March 7, one day past the deadline. 
Because the postmark did not indicate the date of mailing, Nelson’s protest was dismissed by the 
Department for being untimely. In support of her claim that she mailed the letter before March 7, 
as required, Nelson presented a receipt for a book of stamps purchased from the post office on 
March 1, 2019. Nelson claims that her husband took the letter to the post office on that day 
“because he had to buy stamps in order to mail the letter.” While at the post office, Nelson 
claims her husband put two stamps on the envelope to ensure “there would be enough postage” 
and then gave the envelope to a postal worker.  
On March 28, the appeals examiner held a hearing on the matter. At the hearing, Nelson 
explained that she mailed her protest near the date she wrote it—February 26, 2019—and that the 
mail sometimes runs late because it has to go through distribution in Salt Lake City. Nelson also 
stated she did not know why the date was missing from the USPS postmark.  
Q: But you indicated you composed the document and, then, your husband is the 
one who mailed it? 
A. Yeah. And he mailed it that day. We made sure that we mailed it within the — 
the time frame, so that it would get to you and it stated on the -- on the -- I then on 
the -- if we contested it, as long as it had post date, which I’m really surprised that 
it doesn’t show a post date. It’s got something at the bottom, which I think is part 
of the post office, but there is no post date. So, I don’t know. But he did mail it 
and we mailed it within the time frame and, like I said, it goes down -- the 
distribution center now is down in Salt Lake City, so it goes from Pocatello down 
to Salt Lake City and, then, they do whatever and, then, they mail it to Boise or 
mail it out to wherever it goes. 
Q. Do you have any further testimony in regards to the timeliness of your appeal? 
                                                 
1 While the IDAPA guidelines cited by the the Appeals Examiner and the Industrial Commission designate this 
initial response to a denial of benefits as an “appeal,” the Department’s letter to Nelson repeatedly refers to it as a 
“protest,” notwithstanding that it was to be mailed to the Appeals Bureau of the Department. See IDAPA 
09.01.06.012.01 and .03 (March 11, 2015). See also I.C. § 72-1368(3)(c). To avoid confusion, this Opinion will 
refer to Nelson’s initial objection to the Department’s determination as a protest and her subsequent objections to the 
appeal examiner’s and the Commission’s decisions as an appeal. 
 
3 
 
A. I don’t. I mean I don’t know what else to say, other than I do know that we 
mailed it and I would say by the post date – or the – the appeals date that’s on the 
– on the letter.  
During the rest of the hearing, the appeals examiner asked Nelson questions concerning her prior 
employment and the circumstances of her resignation.  
After the hearing, the appeals examiner concluded that although there was a USPS post-
mark stamped on the envelope, the red ink “blend[ed] with the red stamps,” obscuring the date. 
Thus, while Salt Lake City—the distribution center—could be discerned from the postmark, “the 
remainder of the postmark [was] illegible.” Because the envelope lacked a date on the postmark, 
the appeals examiner concluded that the envelope should be treated as if it had no postmark at 
all, thereby making the date of filing the date received, which was March 7, 2019—one day too 
late.  
 
Nelson timely appealed the decision of the appeals examiner to the Industrial 
Commission, arguing that the letter was mailed by March 1 and that she had no control over its 
late arrival or the absence of a legible postmark. After reviewing the evidence, the Industrial 
Commission affirmed the determination of the appeal’s examiner that the protest was untimely. 
As the Commission explained:  
There is no reason to doubt Claimant’s account that her husband placed the letter 
in a post office box prior to the protest deadline. Unfortunately, the postmark in 
this case is illegible, and as such, there is no way to determine on which date [the] 
U.S. Postal Service took possession of the letter or to establish the date of mailing 
as the filed date. Therefore, the Commission has no alternative but to establish the 
date the envelope was delivered to the Appeals Bureau as the filing date. 
Nelson timely appealed.  
II. 
  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing decisions from the Industrial Commission, we freely review questions of 
law. Smith v. Idaho Dep’t of Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 73, 218 P.3d 1133, 1134 (2009). This Court 
will not disturb findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, which 
“is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Desilet v. 
Glass Doctor, 142 Idaho 655, 657, 132 P.3d 412, 414 (2006).   
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Nelson’s first issue raised on appeal concerns the Department’s original eligibility 
determination, which concluded that she lacked good cause to leave her employment. However, 
 
4 
 
neither the Department of Labor nor the Industrial Commission considered this issue, instead 
focusing entirely on the issue of timeliness. Because our review is “limited to the evidence, 
theories and arguments that were presented . . . below,” this Court cannot consider a new issue 
for the first time on appeal. Obenchain v. McAlvain Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443, 
444 (2006). Thus, the single inquiry before us is whether Nelson’s protest to the Department’s 
eligibility determination was untimely. Nelson argues that her March 1 receipt for stamps and the 
simple fact that the letter arrived on March 7 proves that she mailed her protest on or before the 
filing deadline of March 6, 2019. The Department contends that Nelson failed to meet her burden 
of proof that there was a postal-service error. We disagree.  
The “statutory requirements governing the right of appeal under the Employment 
Security Law are mandatory and jurisdictional.” In re Dominy, 116 Idaho 727, 729, 779 P.2d 
402, 404 (1989). Idaho Code section 72-1368(3)(c) provides that a determination by the 
Department becomes “final unless, within fourteen (14) days after notice, as provided in 
subsection (5) of this section, an appeal is filed by an interested party with the department.” The 
Idaho Administrative Code then in effect provided:  
If mailed, the appeal shall be deemed to be filed on the date of mailing as 
determined by the postmark on the envelope containing the appeal, unless a party 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error by the U.S. 
Postal Service, the envelope would have been postmarked within the period for 
timely appeal. If such a postal error is established, the appeal shall be deemed to 
be timely filed.  
IDAPA 09.01.06.012.01 (March 11, 2015). The USPS describes a “postmark” as “an official 
Postal Service™ imprint,” which “indicates the location and date the Postal Service accepted 
custody 
of 
a 
mailpiece.” 
United 
States 
Postal 
Service 
Handbook, 
1-1.3, 
https://about.usps.com/handbooks/po408/ch1_003.htm (last visited April 22, 2020).  
This Court has repeatedly held that the postmark date is the date of filing an appeal. See 
e.g. Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 75, 218 P.3d 1133, 1136 (2009). Where the 
letter lacks a USPS postmark, the appellant bears the burden of providing evidence that USPS 
took custody of the letter on a particular day. Id. at 76, 218 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2009). For 
example, in Smith, the notice mailed by the appellant lacked a postmark and arrived at the 
Industrial Commission nearly two weeks past the filing deadline. Id. at 73, 218 P.3d at 1134. The 
only evidence the appellant provided of a timely filing was a dated meter-mark on the envelope 
and an affidavit from his office manager that the metered mailing date was accurate. Id. at 73, 
 
5 
 
218 P.3d at 1134. That evidence was held to be insufficient and an unreliable means of 
determining when the notice was filed. Id. Thus, the Court upheld the Commission’s ruling that 
Smith’s appeal was untimely. Id.  
 
In contrast to Smith, in Moore v. Melaleuca, Inc., the appellant dated her letter and 
delivered it to the post office on May 26, the last day for her to file the appeal. 137 Idaho 23, 25, 
43 P.3d 782, 784 (2002). Despite the appellant’s timeliness, the letter was not postmarked until 
the following day in another city. Id. The appeals examiner in that case found the filing untimely, 
but his decision was reversed by the Industrial Commission. Id. The Commission found the 
appeal timely after reviewing a letter from the USPS worker claiming fault for the delayed 
postmark. Id. This Court ultimately concluded that those facts were sufficient for the 
Commission to accept the appellant’s explanation for the delayed postmark. Id. at 27–28, 43 P.3d 
at 786–87. The distinguishing factor in Moore was the appellant’s presentation of evidence to 
explain why an error existed in the postmarking process after it entered USPS custody. Id. at 27, 
43 P.3d at 786.  
Here, Nelson presented evidence that her husband purchased stamps on March 1. We find 
such evidence to be inconclusive and taken alone, inadequate to carry her burden of proof for the 
reasons we explained in Smith. However, Nelson argues persuasively that it was impossible for 
her letter to have arrived at the Department of Labor on March 7 unless it had been mailed on or 
before March 6, regardless of the lack of a date on the postmark. The record is clear that the 
letter would have had to travel from the Pocatello post office, to the Salt Lake City mail 
distribution center, and then to the Boise post office, before it was ultimately delivered to the 
Department’s Appeals Bureau. This fact was reiterated in Nelson’s briefing, early testimony, and 
can be inferred from the appeals examiner’s own finding that the only legible information on the 
postmark were the words “Salt Lake City.” Thus, the record clearly establishes that the letter 
could not have been mailed and delivered within the same day. Additionally, since once a letter 
is deposited for mailing it is entirely within the control of the USPS, the obscured date on the 
postmark stamp could only have been a result of USPS error. Thus, by the application of reason 
and common sense, the delivery of this letter on March 7—even with an illegible date on the 
postmark—conclusively proves that Nelson must have deposited her appeals letter into USPS 
custody on or before the March 6 filing deadline. In fact, the Commission itself acknowledged 
 
6 
 
that “[t]here is no reason to doubt Claimant’s account that her husband placed the letter in a post 
office box prior to the protest deadline.”  
While appeals examiners and commissioners, like judges, swear an oath to remain 
faithful to the law, this does not mean they have divorced themselves from common sense in 
applying it. Applying the provisions of Idaho’s administrative code, along with what we know of 
the laws of time, space, and logic to the undisputed evidence in the record, supports only one 
conclusion: the letter must have been deposited into USPS custody on or before March 6. Taken 
as a whole, the evidence of (1) the postmark’s presence on the envelope, (2) the USPS’s error in 
legibly affixing the postmark, and (3) the letter’s arrival in Boise on March 7, were the type of 
substantial and competent evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept” to support the 
conclusion that the letter was timely filed. Desilet, 142 Idaho at 657, 132 P.3d at 414. Although 
this Court continues to recognize the importance of strict adherence to filing deadlines, the 
conclusions of the appeals examiner, as affirmed by the Industrial Commission, were a 
divergence from common sense and the substantial and competent evidence in the record. The 
law is not blind to common sense, nor should it be. Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has wryly 
observed, “common sense often makes good law.” Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 46 (1957).  
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand this matter for consideration of 
Nelson’s protest to the denial of benefits on the merits. Costs are awarded to Nelson pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40.  
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BRODY, BEVAN and STEGNER CONCUR.