Title: In Re Nystuen's Estate

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

80 N.W.2d 671 (1956) In the Matter of the ESTATE of Albert NYSTUEN, Deceased. Ferdinand T. NYSTUEN and Raymond Nystuen, Respondents, v. Mrs. Sam NYSTUEN, Wallace Thompson, Executor; Joyce Racine Nystuen; Our Saviours Church of Zahl, North Dakota; Richard Earl Nystuen; Wayne David Nystuen; Orland Eugene Nystuen and James Carroll Nystuen; Mrs. Eva Nystuen, Special Guardian of James Carroll Nystuen, a minor, Appellees, Richard Earl Nystuen; Wayne David Nystuen; Orland Eugene Nystuen; James Carroll Nystuen; Eva Nystuen, Special Guardian of James Carroll Nystuen, a minor, Appellants. No. 7577. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 31, 1956. Rehearing Denied February 8, 1957. *673 Everett E. Palmer and Ray H. Walton, Jr., Williston, Clayton A. Gay, Morris, Minn., for appellants. Paul Campbell, Minot, for respondents. SATHRE, Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Williams County, reversing a decree of distribution of the county court of Williams County, in a proceeding for the probate of the last will and testament of Albert Nystuen, deceased. The decedent Albert Nystuen died testate on the 8th day of August 1951, Proceedings were thereafter had for admission of the said last will and testament to probate in the county court of Williams County, North Dakota. The pertinent provisions of the will are as follows: The will was witnessed by Gina Fero and Walter O. Burk residing at Williston, North Dakota, who stated that they signed the said will as witnesses at the request of the testator in his presence and in the presence of each other. There was no contest in the county court as to the validity of the will, The only question for determination by the county court was the identity of the beneficiaries thereunder. The difficulty with reference to the identity of the beneficiaries under the will was due to the language in the following paragraph. It is established by the record that the decedent had no brother by the name of Elmer Nystuen. He had however a nephew by the name of Elmer Nystuen who had four sons namely Richard Earl Nystuen, Wayne David Nystuen, Orland Eugene Nystuen, and James Carroll Nystuen. The only brother who had four sons was Peter Nystuen. The will was prepared by an attorney of Williston, North Dakota, Walter O. Burk. He testified in county court that on the 6th day of April 1951 a nurse at the hospital where the decedent was at the time called him stating that Mr. Nystuen desired to see him. Mr. Burk accordingly went to the hospital but at that time the decedent had such a coughing spell and choking and gasping for breath that he could not make any intelligible statement. Mr. Burk called at the hospital sometime later the same day. At that time there were present Mr. and Mrs. Wallace Thompson, a Lutheran minister Pastor Bue, and Mr. Burk. Mr. Burk at that time took notes on a yellow pad statements made by the testator as to the disposition of his property. Mr. Burk was a witness at the hearing in county court for the admission of the will to probate. He testified there that he could not recall that the testator had made any statement as to a deceased brother. He testified further that he probably inserted the word deceased in the will of his own accord. Mr. and Mrs. Wallace Thompson who also were witnesses at the same hearing testified to the same effect as testified to by Mr. Burk. Thereafter in due course the executor filed his final report and account. The order for hearing upon said final report and account contained the following recitation: The order and notice thereon fixed the hearing for the 26th day of July 1954. At the hearing in county court upon the petition of the executor for approval of the final report and accounting the four sons of Elmer Nystuen, namely Richard Earl, Wayne David, Orland Eugene, and James Carroll, appeared and filed their answer to said petition in which they claimed that they were the beneficiaries under the will of the testator Albert Nystuen, and that said testator did not have a brother named Elmer Nystuen, but that the testator had *675 five brothers, namely: Olaf Nystuen, Henry Nystuen, Emil Nystuen, Sam Nystuen, and Peter Nystuen, all of whom had predeceased said testator; that none of said brothers had any children except Peter Nystuen, who had six children namely Elmer Nystuen, Joyce Nystuen Racine, Ferdinand T. Nystuen, Rueben Nystuen, Raymond Nystuen and Arnold Nystuen. Rueben had predeceased the testator. The answer further alleged that it was the intention of Albert Nystuen, the testator, to leave the items mentioned in paragraph III of said will and the residue mentioned in the residuary clause therein to the said four sons of Elmer Nystuen. On September 17, 1954 the county court made its order approving the final report and account of the executor, there being no objection to same. The order further provided that the "bulk" of the evidence presented at the hearing points to the fact that it was the intention of the decedent Albert Nystuen that the four sons mentioned in paragraph III of the will were the sons of the nephew whose name was Elmer Nystuen. The concluding paragraph of the said order was as follows: Thereafter and on February 17, 1955, the final decree of distribution was entered in the said estate. The final decree provided as follows: The final decree was filed and recorded in the office of the county court of Williams County on the 17th day of February, 1955. Thereafter and on the 23rd day of February, 1955, Ferdinand T. Nystuen and Raymond Nystuen, sons of Peter Nystuen, brother of the testator, filed and served notice of appeal from the final decree of distribution to the district court and demanded a trial de novo. The respondents in county court made a motion to dismiss the appeal of the appellants to the district court on the following grounds: 1. That the appeal from the order allowing the final report and account and determining that the four sons of Elmer Nystuen were the legatees and devisees under the provisions of the last will and testament of said decedent was not taken within 30 days as provided by Section 30-2603, NDRC 1943. 2. That all matters in controversy in this action and upon this application had become res adjudicata by the failure of the appellants to appeal in a timely fashion as appears from the records and files in the county court. 3. That under Section 114 of the State Constitution which provides that: "Appeals shall lie from the county court, final decisions of justices of the peace and police magistrates in such cases and pursuant to such regulations as may be prescribed by law," the legislature was without power to enact Section 30-2623, NDRC 1943 in that said section provides that if an appeal is taken from a decree or an order of the county court generally, all the issues must be tried and determined anew in the district court, and that therefore said section is violative of Section 114 of the State Constitution. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal and upon the merits reversed *676 the final decree entered by the county court and held that Elmer Nystuen, Ferdinand T. Nystuen, Raymond Nystuen, and Arnold Nystuen, sons of the testator's deceased brother Peter Nystuen, were the beneficiaries under the will of the testator and judgment was entered accordingly. The four sons of Elmer Nystuen appealed and demanded a trial de novo in this court. Numerous specifications of error are assigned, but may be consolidated and considered upon three grounds: 1. That the district court erred in denying appellee-appellants' motion to dismiss the appeal from the county court to the district court. 2. That under Sections 111 and 114 of the State Constitution the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters and on appeal the district court has appellate jurisdiction only and is limited to a review of errors committed by the county court. 3. That on the merits the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment. The motion to dismiss the appeal from the county court to the district court on the grounds that such appeal was not taken within 30 days after the entry of the order approving the final report and account we conclude was without merit. The final order or judgment was the final decree of distribution which determined who were the beneficiaries under the will of the testator. The appeal from that decree was taken within a few days after its entry. We conclude therefore that the district court was correct in denying the motion to dismiss the appeal on that ground. The next ground is whether or not under Sections 111 and 114 of the State Constitution the district court had the power to try the case de novo. Section 111 of the Constitution provides that county courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters. Section 114 of the Constitution provides that appeals shall lie from the county court, final decisions of justices of the peace and police magistrates in such cases and pursuant to such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The appellant argues that the legislature cannot under Sections 103 and 114 of the Constitution confer upon the district court the power to try a case de novo on appeal from a judgment of county court; that under Section 111 of the Constitution the county court had exclusive original jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters and that under Sections 103 and 114 of the Constitution the district court, on appeal, must be limited only to a review of errors committed by the county court. The appellant argues therefore that it must follow that Section 30-2623 NDRC 1943 is unconstitutional in that it attempts to confer upon the district courts the power of trial de novo on appeals from the county court. The language of Section 30-2623 is practically identical with the language of Section 7985, R.C.1905. The validity of this statute was directly challenged in the case of In re Peterson's Estate, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751, 755. In that case an appeal was taken from a final decree of the county court of Benson County and a trial de novo had in district court. It was contended that under Section 111 of the Constitution the district court had no jurisdiction to try the action de novo. We quote from the opinion: We quote further from the case of Christianson v. Farmers' Warehouse Association cited in Re Peterson's Estate, supra [5 N.D. 438, 67 N.W. 302]: The constitution of the State of Nebraska, art. 5, § 16, provides that "County courts shall be courts of record, and shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, * * * appointment of guardians" etc. Another section of the Constitution provides: "Appeals to the district court from the judgments of county courts shall be allowed in all criminal cases, on application of the defendant; and in all civil cases, on application of either party, and in such other cases as may be provided by law." Art. 5, § 17. Nebraska also has a statute, Section 24-503 pertaining to the powers of county courts, which provides that "The county court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills, the administration of estates of deceased persons, and the guardianship of minors, insane persons and idiots." Notwithstanding the statutory provision that county courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters, the rule seems to be established in Nebraska that where an appeal is *678 taken from the county court to the district court the case is there triable anew. In re Ray, 77 Neb. 377, 109 N.W. 496, 498, it was held: In the case of In re Estate of Glavkee, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300, 308, an appeal was taken from a final decree of distribution of Grant County to the district court where the case was tried de novo and thereafter appealed to this court. The validity of Section 30-2623, NDRC 1943 was not challenged on constitutional or other grounds. Its provisions were followed and applied to the facts and issues in the case. The grounds upon which the appeal to this court was taken were stated in the opinion written by the late Judge Christianson as follows: We quote paragraph 9 of the Syllabus in that case: The State of Utah has a constitutional provision, Article 8, Section 7 which is as follows: In the case of State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1038, the question of original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction was before that court. We quote from the opinion: And in 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 17, page 79: After a careful consideration of the judicial decisions cited and the law we have reached the conclusion that the legislature had the power under Section 114 of the Constitution to prescribe the procedure on appeal from the county court to the district court, and that Section 30-2623, NDRC 1943 is a valid enactment. It follows, therefore, that on the appeal from the county court to the district court all of the issues may be tried anew. We now come to a consideration of the issues presented on the merits. As already pointed out herein the will of the testator provides that the beneficiaries thereunder are "the four sons of my deceased brother Elmer Nystuen share and share alike". While the language of the will appears to be clear as to who are the beneficiaries thereunder, it is established by extrinsic facts that the decedent had no brother, dead or alive, by the name of Elmer Nystuen. He had however a brother, Peter Nystuen, who predeceased him and who had five sons, Elmer Nystuen, Ferdinand T. Nystuen, Raymond Nystuen, Arnold Nystuen and Rueben Nystuen. Rueben Nystuen had predeceased the testator, and there were only four sons of Peter Nystuen living at the time of the execution of testator's will. The language of the will therefore gives rise to a latent ambiguity as to who are the beneficiaries thereunder. It will therefore be necessary to resort to extrinsic evidence in order to determine the intent of the testator. Section 56-0524, NDRC 1943 reads as follows: In 3 C.J.S., Ambiguity, page 1035, latent ambiguity is defined as follows: In the case of In re Kahoutek's Estate, 39 N.D. 215, 166 N.W. 816, 819, this court said: And in the case of Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 6 S. Ct. 617, 619, 29 L. Ed. 86 the Court said: At the hearing in county court upon the petition of the executor for approval of his final report and account all of the testimony was taken in shorthand by a court reporter and thereafter transcribed and is *681 before us as an exhibit on this appeal. There is no material dispute in the testimony of the witnesses in this case. Mr. Burk, the lawyer who drew testator's will, testified at the hearing in county court and at the trial in district court, and his testimony is substantially as follows: On August 6, 1951 he received a call from Mercy Hospital advising him that Albert Nystuen, a patient at the hospital, wished to see him. In response to the call Mr. Burk went to the hospital and found that Albert Nystuen wished to have him prepare his will. However he was too ill at that time to give any directions or to engage in any conversation. Mr. Burk then left the hospital but returned a few hours later when he found that Nystuen's condition was considerably better. Mr. Burk had with him a yellow sheet of paper upon which he made notations in accordance with the directions given him by the testator. This sheet of paper was introduced in evidence as an exhibit both at the hearing in county court and at the hearing in district court and is as follows: When Mr. Burk made these notations in accordance with directions given by the testator there were present Wallace Thompson and his wife and also a Lutheran minister. After having made the notations referred to Mr. Burk went to his office and there typed the will and returned to the hospital and read the will to the testator. He made some corrections as directed by the testator and the will was signed by the testator and witnessed by a nurse at the hospital Gina Fero and by Mr. Burk. The testator died two days thereafter on August 8, 1951. Mr. Burk testified further that to the best of his recollection the testator did not refer to Elmer Nystuen as a "deceased" brother, and that he, Burk, inserted the word "deceased" of his own accord. Mr. and Mrs. Wallace Thompson who were present in the room of the hospital when Mr. Burk made the notations preparatory to drafting the will, testified that the testator did not refer to Elmer Nystuen as a "deceased" brother. They also testified that after making the notations on his memorandum sheet Mr. Burk asked Mrs. Thompson: "Have I got this right, it's the four sons of Elmer Nystuen?" And she replied "that is correct." Mr. Wallace Thompson who was named as executor of the will testified that he had known the testator since 1923 and that they were friends and visited back and forth. He was present in the hospital room when Mr. Burk was making notes on a yellow sheet of paper and he read the notes after they were written. He testified further that Mr. Burk turned to Mrs. Thompson after having made his notations and asked: "have I got this right, the four sons of Elmer Nystuen?" She said "that is correct." With reference to this conversation Mr. Burk stated: "I don't recall if it was exactly that way. I know I talked to her in an effort to find out the names of those nephews because I wanted them in the will." Mr. Burk further testified that it was his impression at the time he was talking to the testator that the nephews mentioned were the four sons of Elmer Nystuen. Mr. Thompson testified that the testator said that the store building at Hancock, Minnesota, was to go to Elmer's four boys and that the farm land should also go to the four boys. Mr. Thompson testified further that the testator had been sick and in the hospital "a couple times" before his *682 last illness and that he asked the Thompsons to call Mrs. Elmer Nystuen, and that they called her, and that he also asked them to call Mrs. Elmer Nystuen during his last illness. Mrs. Eva Nystuen, wife of Elmer Nystuen testified that the testator visited her and her husband about once a year at their home at Morris, Minnesota, when he came down on business; that he sent for her in October 1950 when he was ill and that she visited him in the hospital at that time; that at his request testator's doctor and nurse called her to come during his last sickness. The testimony of Wallace Thompson and his wife is the only testimony in the case having any reference to the directions given by the testator to Mr. Burk preparatory to drafting the will. The testimony of the other witnesses establishes the fact that the testator had five brothers, all of whom had predeceased him, and that only one of them, Peter Nystuen, had any children. Five of the children were living at the time of the execution of testator's will, namely Ferdinand T. Nystuen, Raymond Nystuen, Elmer Nystuen, Arnold Nystuen and Joyce Nystuen Racine. The will as originally drawn by Mr. Burk provided that "I devise to Mrs. Sam Nystuen a life estate in the house which I own at Hancock, Minnesota and upon her death such property shall descend to her daughter Joyce Nystuen". When Mr. Burk read the will to the testator he, the testator, objected to the words "her daughter" and said it was wrong and that she was not a daughter of Mrs. Sam Nystuen. The words "her daughter" were stricken before the testator signed the will. Paragraph III of the will provided that certain property mentioned therein shall go "to the four sons of my deceased brother Elmer Nystuen". Paragraph VI of the will provided that "all the rest and residue of the property which I may own or have power to dispose of at the time of my death I devise and bequeath equally to my four nephews above mentioned and to my niece Joyce Nystuen." The language quoted from paragraph III and VI presents no ambiguity. In paragraph III the testator makes it clear that the property mentioned therein shall go to the four sons of a deceased brother, and in paragraph VI he identifies the four sons mentioned in paragraph III as his four nephews and Joyce Nystuen as his niece. The latent ambiguity arises because of the fact that the testator had no deceased brother named Elmer Nystuen. Had the testator named Peter instead of Elmer as his deceased brother there would have been no latent ambiguity. By substituting the name Peter for Elmer it becomes clear that the objects of the testator's bounty were his four nephews and his niece since they are the only living children of a deceased brother. The latent ambiguity is thus removed and the intent of the testator clearly expressed by the words he had chosen. The principle of construction applicable in such cases is stated in 57 Am.Jur., Wills, Sec. 1109, page 710. The will as read to the testator and as signed by him in the presence of witnesses provided specifically that the rest and *683 residue of his property should go to "my four nephews above mentioned and to my niece Joyce Nystuen." Under the language of the will and the record before us it clearly was the intention of the testator, Albert Nystuen, to make his four nephews and his niece, children of his deceased brother, Peter Nystuen, the beneficiaries under his will. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. BURKE, C. J., and GRIMSON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. MORRIS, Judge (concurring specially). I concur in the opinion prepared by Judge SATHRE. Bryan v. Miller, 73 N.D. 487, 16 N.W.2d 275, and Nomland Motor Company v. Alger, 77 N.D. 29, 39 N.W.2d 899, have been cited as supporting the argument that Section 30-2623, NDRC 1943 is unconstitutional. They deal exclusively with the jurisdiction of the justice court but they do contain language which expresses a line of reasoning that is not in accord with our conclusion that Section 30-2623 is constitutional. Those cases involve a different statute and are not in conflict with this decision but the insistence with which they are stressed prompts me to express what I believe to be further cogent reasons why the decision in this case is correct. In addition to the general presumption that enactments of the legislature are constitutional we have in this case two additional rules that support constitutionality, The first is that long acquiescence in the constitutionality of a statute may properly be considered in determining its validity in a doubtful case. The second rule is that where the highest court of the state has held a statute constitutional and the statute is subsequently attacked upon identical grounds the statute will not be held invalid except for the most convincing and compelling reasons. In this state the practice of trying a case completely anew in the district court upon an appeal from the county court is innate. It was provided for in Section 326 of the Territorial Probate Code and was adopted in substantially its present form by Section 6275 of the Revised Codes of 1895. A trial anew in the manner prescribed by Section 30-2623 has been the practice generally accepted and followed by the bench and bar since statehood. A number of cases that were tried anew have been appealed from the district court to this court without challenge to the method of trial in the court below, among the more recent being: In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300; In re Bratcher's Estate, 76 N.D. 194, 34 N.W.2d 825; Stormon v. Weiss, N.D., 65 N.W.2d 475; Bender v. Bender, N.D., 72 N.W.2d 220. The widespread acquiescence in not only the existence of the statute in question but in its general use throughout practically the entire history of the state by the legislature, the people, the lawyers, and the courts weighs in favor of its constitutionality. Linck v. City of Litchfield, 141 Ill. 469, 31 N.E. 123; Goodall v. Henkel, 60 Mich. 382, 27 N.W. 556; Miller v. Enterprise Canal & Land Co., 142 Cal. 208, 75 P. 770, 100 Am.St.Rep. 115; County Commissioners of Somerset County v. Pocomoka Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874 and note; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sections 81 and 83; Kyle v. Abernathy, 46 Colo. 214, 102 P. 746. The acquiescence heretofore discussed has had one interruption as disclosed by the opinion of this court in the case of In re Peterson's Estate, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751, when the statute under consideration, then Section 7985, Revised Codes of 1905, was held constitutional against the identical challenge now urged. That decision was rendered January 11, 1912, and stood without being questioned in this court for over 44 years. In that case the question of constitutionality then and now at bar was considered and discussed in both the original *684 opinion and in an opinion filed on petition for rehearing wherein the same arguments are considered that are now made in this court. In passing upon the constitutionality of a statute relating to the publication of a notice permitting redemption of real estate sold at tax sale the supreme court of Montana said: In Walling v. Brown, 9 Idaho 740, 76 P. 318, 2 Ann.Cas. 720, it is said: Both of the foregoing quotations appear in the more recent case of Scott v. Gossett, 66 Idaho 329, 158 P.2d 804. In State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club, 127 Tenn. 292, 154 S.W. 1151, 1154, Ann.Cas. 1914B, 1243, it is said: This quotation is repeated in Humphries v. Manhattan Savings Bank & Trust Co., 174 Tenn. 17, 122 S.W.2d 446. To the same effect Daniel's Administrator v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 155 S.W.2d 469. For reasons herein set forth as well as those expressed in the majority opinion I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of the district court. I am authorized to state that Judge JOHNSON concurs herein. SATHRE, Judge. The appellants have petitioned this court for a rehearing. The petition is a reargument of the facts. All of the points raised in the petition were fully considered and disposed of in the original opinion herein. The petition states further that the propriety of the trial court's finding allowing the respondents costs and reimbursements was raised in their brief but was not touched upon by this court in its opinion herein. The matter of costs was not argued in appellant's brief or on oral argument. It must therefore be deemed abandoned and cannot now be raised on petition for rehearing. Assignments of error and issues not argued in briefs are deemed abandoned and need not be considered on appeal. Clark v. Josephson, N.D., 66 N.W.2d 539; Mevorah v. Goodman, N.D., 68 N.W.2d 469; Iszler v. Jorda, N.D., 80 N.W. 2d. 665. Rehearing denied. GRIMSON, C. J., and MORRIS, BURKE and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.