Title: Loper v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LARRY L. LOPER, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 204, 2010 
 
 
 
Defendant Below, § 
 
 
 
Appellant,  
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
               
 
 
v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0901005714 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  October 6, 2010 
                                            Decided: 
November 19, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
John S. Malik, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
 
 
Larry L. Loper (“Loper”), the defendant below, appeals from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and his subsequent conviction 
for trafficking in phencyclidine (PCP) over 100 grams,1 possession with intent to 
deliver PCP,2 use of a vehicle for keeping controlled substances,3 and possession of 
drug paraphernalia.4   On appeal, Loper claims that the Superior Court erred in 
denying his suppression motion, because the State did not establish a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the police 
stopping and questioning him.  We find no error and affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On January 8, 2009, Officer Steven P. Cancila stopped Loper for speeding in 
the 900 block of West 2nd Street in Wilmington, Delaware.  Officer Cancila asked 
Loper to produce his driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance card.  
Loper did that; however, his insurance card had expired on December 21, 2008.  
Officer Cancila also requested identification from Loper’s passenger, who first 
responded that he had no identification.  Loper then told Officer Cancila, “He is a 
juvenile, sir.”  The passenger then told Officer Cancila that he was seventeen years 
                                                           
1 16 Del. C. § 4753A(a)(6)(c). 
 
2 16 Del. C. § 4752. 
 
3 16 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5). 
 
4 16 Del. C. § 4771. 
 
2 
 
old, that his name was “Scott Stevens,” and that his date of birth was January 1, 
1991.  As Cancila was documenting the passenger’s response in his police 
notebook, the passenger then told him that his real name was actually Faheem 
Kennedy, and that he had an outstanding warrant “for curfew.” 
 
Officer Cancila conducted a DELJIS check, and found an active outstanding 
capias for Kennedy for criminal impersonation.  Cancila immediately requested 
additional assistance, because he intended to make an arrest.  After Officer John 
Santiago arrived, Cancila told Santiago that Kennedy had an outstanding warrant, 
and that the driver (Loper) was acting suspiciously. 
 
Officer Santiago asked Loper to exit the car when Officer Cancila arrested 
Kennedy, and Loper did so.  Santiago then asked Loper if he had “anything illegal” 
on his person.  Loper responded that he had some “weed” in his front pocket.  
Santiago reached into Loper’s front pocket and retrieved a bag containing twenty-
two plastic vials of what appeared to be marijuana.  Santiago also found, in 
Loper’s pocket, a small bottle containing yellow liquid, which (Loper told Santiago) 
was codeine.  Loper was then arrested.  During a search of the car incident to the 
3 
 
arrest, Santiago found a second bottle of yellow liquid.  Laboratory tests later 
identified the yellow liquid in both bottles as PCP.   
 
On October 27, 2009, Loper moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a 
result of the pat down search.  At the suppression hearing, a Superior Court judge 
denied Loper’s motion after hearing testimony from Loper, Santiago, and Cancila.  
The Superior Court ruled that the officers had a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to stop and search Loper because:  (i) Loper’s volunteered statement 
about “weed” constituted a consent to the search; (ii) even if Loper did not consent, 
the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Loper was engaged in 
criminal activity when Kennedy gave Officer Cancila a false name and Loper told 
Cancila that Kennedy was a juvenile; (iii) the police had probable cause to arrest 
Kennedy and to detain Loper, because Loper’s insurance card had expired and 
Kennedy had an outstanding capias; and (iv) the police had a basis to search 
Loper’s person after Loper volunteered that he had “weed” on his person.  After a 
bench trial, Loper was convicted of trafficking in PCP over 100 grams, possession 
with intent to deliver PCP, use of a vehicle for keeping a controlled substance, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  This is Loper’s direct appeal from those 
convictions. 
 
 
4 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Loper claims that the Superior Court erred in denying his 
suppression motion, because the evidence was the fruit of an illegal search and 
seizure in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States, and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware, Constitutions.5  Loper argues that 
the police:  (i) did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain him 
after making the initial traffic stop, (ii) failed to give Miranda warnings before 
questioning him, and (iii) had neither a reasonable suspicion that he was armed, 
nor his consent, to justify conducting a Terry pat down search.  Loper also asserts 
that even if his statement about carrying “weed” amounted to consent to a search, 
that consent was still invalid because he was illegally detained. 
                                                           
5 Although Loper raises claims under both the U.S. and Delaware Constitutions, he has not fully 
and fairly presented his Delaware constitutional claim.  See infra at Section I.C.  See also Jenkins 
v. State, 970 A.2d 154, 158 (Del. 2009) (holding that “[t]o present properly an alleged violation 
of the Delaware Constitution, a defendant must discuss and analyze one or more of the following 
non-exclusive criteria [as set forth in Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 864-65 (Del. 1999)]:  ‘textual 
language, legislative history, preexisting state law, structural differences, matters of particular 
state interest or local concern, state traditions, and public attitudes.’”); Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 
285, 290-91 (Del. 2005) (same).  We, therefore, decline to address that claim.   
 
5 
 
 
This Court reviews a Superior Court denial of a motion to suppress for abuse 
of discretion.6  Questions of law are reviewed de novo,7 and questions of fact are 
reviewed for “clear error.”8 
I.  Did the Police Have Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion 
 
to Detain Loper Beyond The Initial Traffic Stop?                 
 
 
Loper claims that the Superior Court erred in denying his suppression 
motion, because the police did not possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion to 
detain him beyond the initial traffic stop.  Loper concedes the legality of the initial 
traffic stop,9 but contends that the follow-up search and seizure exceeded the scope 
of the initial traffic stop and, therefore, was unreasonable.  Loper advances three 
arguments to support that claim.  First, he argues that Officer Cancila exceeded the 
scope of the traffic stop investigation by asking Loper’s passenger (Kennedy) to 
identify himself and then performing a background check.  Second, Loper contends 
that even if the police were entitled to question Kennedy, Loper’s detention was 
unreasonably prolonged by Kennedy’s arrest.  Third, Loper claims that the 
evidence seized was the result of a warrantless search and seizure accomplished 
without reasonable suspicion or consent. 
                                                           
6 Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del. 2001). 
 
7 Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 828 (Del. 2008). 
 
8 Woody, 765 A.2d at 1261. 
 
9 Loper admitted that he was speeding when he was stopped by the police. 
6 
 
A.  The Police Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Traffic Stop 
 
Loper’s first claim, that Officer Cancila exceeded the scope of the initial 
traffic stop by questioning Kennedy, runs as follows:  Had Cancila not questioned 
Loper’s passenger, the police would have never discovered the PCP on Loper’s 
person or in his car.  Because the police had no right to question Kennedy, the 
evidence ultimately seized as a result of searching Loper should have been 
suppressed.  Loper’s argument fails, because he cannot show that by questioning 
Kennedy, the police exceeded the scope of the traffic stop or acted unreasonably 
under the circumstances.  The United States Supreme Court has observed that 
during a routine traffic stop, all passengers are subject to some scrutiny.10  This 
Court has also held that during a routine traffic stop, the police may question a 
passenger about his or her identity, and that those questions are not beyond the 
scope of a reasonable investigation.11  Accordingly, the trial judge properly held 
that Officer Cancila did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop 
by asking Loper’s passenger for identification and then running a background 
check. 
                                                           
10 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257 (2007) (“[E]ven when the wrongdoing is only bad 
driving, [a] passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny. . . .”). 
 
11 Mills v. State, 900 A.2d 101 (Table), 2006 WL 1027202, at *2 (Del. 2006) (“[Q]uestions 
concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part [of an investigatory stop].”) 
(quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)). 
 
7 
 
B.  Loper’s Detention Was Not Unreasonably Extended 
 
Loper next contends that even if the police did not err in questioning 
Kennedy during the traffic stop, the police unreasonably extended Loper’s 
detention when they arrested Kennedy.  This argument lacks merit, because the 
delay caused by Kennedy’s arrest was not unreasonable.  Once Kennedy gave the 
police his name and birth date, Officer Cancila promptly ran a background check.  
He then immediately called for assistance upon learning that Kennedy had an 
active outstanding capias on a criminal impersonation charge.  Officer Santiago 
arrived at the scene two or three minutes later.  If Loper’s detention was delayed 
by Kennedy’s arrest, any delay was de minimis and not unreasonable.12  The 
Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Loper’s suppression motion 
on this ground. 
C.  The Search and Seizure Of The PCP Vials Was Valid 
 
Loper next claims that the police lacked both a reasonable suspicion and his 
consent to conduct a warrantless search and seizure of his person and his car.  
Therefore, he urges, the seized evidence should have been suppressed.   
 
                                                           
12 Howard v. State, 931 A.2d 437 (Table), 2007 WL 2310001, at *3 (Del. 2007) (holding that a 
40-minute delay in waiting for the arrival of a drug dog was not unreasonable following a routine 
traffic stop); Bunting v. State, 860 A.2d 809 (Table), 2004 WL 2297395, at *2 (Del. 2004) 
(concluding that a 13-hour detention was not unreasonable because the police had probable cause 
to believe that the defendant had committed a criminal offense following his initial detention).  
 
8 
 
 
1.  Loper’s Claim That There Was A Second Seizure 
 
Loper contends that his detention after Kennedy’s arrest constituted a second 
seizure that was not independently supported.  Stated differently, Loper argues that 
a second “seizure” occurred when Officer Santiago ordered him to exit his car, 
thereby initiating another investigation beyond the initial traffic stop.  Loper claims 
that because only the facts existing at the time of the seizure are relevant to a 
“reasonable suspicion” analysis, the trial court should not have considered the PCP 
found during the second seizure in determining whether the police had a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct the first search and seizure.  Loper 
relies on Jones v. State, where this Court held that Article 1, § 6 of the Delaware 
Constitution provided greater protection than its Fourth Amendment counterpart 
and that a “seizure” occurs only if, viewing the totality of the circumstances, a 
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to ignore police presence.13 
Loper’s reliance on Jones is misplaced.  In Jones, the police did not have a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion when they limited the defendant’s mobility by 
                                                           
13 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 866-69 (Del. 1999) (rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s 
definition of “seizure” in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991), which requires 
“either physical force . . . or . . . submission to the assertion of authority,” and concluding that 
“[i]n our view, the question presented by Jones of when a seizure has occurred under Article I, § 
6 of the Delaware Constitution requires focusing upon the police officer’s actions to determine 
when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police 
presence.”); Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1351 (Del. 1991) (“[T]he police can be said to 
have seized an individual only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”) (quoting Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)). 
 
9 
 
ordering him to stop.  The police suspicions were triggered by Jones’ refusal to 
obey their order to stop, and his repeated attempts to leave.14  Here, however, at the 
time Officer Santiago ordered Loper out of the car, Loper was already lawfully 
detained as a consequence of the valid traffic stop.  Loper’s mobility having 
already been validly limited, he was not subject to a “second seizure” when the 
police ordered him to exit his car.  As the United States Supreme Court held in 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the police may order the driver or a passenger to exit the 
car after a valid traffic stop, and that order is not a “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment.15  Loper has cited no authority, nor made any cogent legal argument, 
for why this Court should expand the meaning of “seizure” under Jones and Article 
1, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution, to hold that a person already being lawfully 
                                                           
14 Jones, 745 A.2d at 859.  In Jones, the police had received an anonymous tip reporting that a 
“suspicious black male wearing a blue coat” had been standing in front of a public park for some 
time.  Id. at 858.  When the police approached Jones, instead of asking him for his name and 
identification as required under 11 Del. C. § 1902, the officers ordered Jones to “stop and 
remove his hands from his coat pockets.”  Id. at 859.  We concluded that at the time the officers 
made a showing of their authority and ordered Jones to stop, he had been “seized” within the 
meaning of Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution, even though the police had not used 
actual force to stop Jones.  Id. at 863-69. 
 
15 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107-11 (1977).  In Mimms, the police ordered the 
defendant to exit the car after a valid traffic stop.  Id. at 107.  The Supreme Court weighed the 
interest of the driver’s personal liberty against the safety of the police officer, and held that “once 
a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officer may order the 
driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of 
unreasonable search and seizure.”  Id. at 111 n.6.  See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 
413-15 (1997) (holding that a police officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit 
the car pending completion of stop). 
 
10 
 
detained as a result of a valid traffic stop is “seized” a second time when ordered to 
leave his car.16  The constitutional claim, therefore, fails. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that a second “seizure” occurred when the police 
ordered Loper to leave his car, the seizure was reasonable.  Loper relies on 
Caldwell v. State.17  In Caldwell, the police approached the defendant, who was 
illegally parked in a fire lane.  They ordered him to exit his car immediately after 
obtaining his license and registration information. 18   Rather than continue to 
question the passengers in Caldwell’s car, the officer frisked and handcuffed 
Caldwell and detained him until another officer arrived.19  In those circumstances, 
we concluded that a second “seizure” had occurred, because the officer’s actions 
exceeded the permissible scope of the initial traffic stop, and the police lacked 
additional facts sufficient to justify the second “seizure.”20 
                                                           
16 Our case law suggests otherwise.  See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 812 A.2d 899 (Table), 2002 WL 
31796193, at *2 (Del. 2002) (holding that the police acted reasonably where, after stopping the 
defendant for driving under 10 mph in a 25 mph zone and weaving, they ordered the defendant to 
exit the vehicle); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1045 n. 27 (Del. 2001) (recognizing that 
under the Fourth Amendment, the police can order a driver and his or her passengers to exit the 
car during the course of a valid traffic stop).   
 
17 Caldwell, 780 A.2d 1037. 
 
18 Id. at 1049. 
 
19 Id. 
 
20 Id. 
 
11 
 
Here, in contrast, Officers Santiago and Cancila questioned Loper and 
Kennedy, and received suspicious responses, before they ordered Loper to exit the 
car.  Loper provides no support for his claim that giving the police a false identify 
and age does not raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion under the Fourth 
Amendment.21  The Superior Court did not err in holding that, in the totality of the 
circumstances, there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a search and 
seizure.22 
2.  Loper’s Claim That He Did Not Give Consent 
Loper next contests the Superior Court’s conclusion that he had voluntarily 
told the police that he was carrying “weed.”  Alternatively, Loper argues, even if 
his statement was voluntary it was not a “consent” to search his car.  Whether 
                                                           
21 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979) (noting 
that a defendant bears the burden of establishing that the search and seizure violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
 
22 There does not seem to be any Delaware case law on whether a passenger’s false identification 
or age can raise a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a seizure of the driver.  There are 
cases holding that a driver’s false identity or false claim of age can raise a reasonable suspicion.  
See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that 
police had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was lying and attempting to escape 
when the defendant reported a false name); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 
1993) (driver’s false identity and inconsistent stories are enough to raise reasonable suspicion); 
Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230, 1241 n.8 (Del. 2000) (defendant gave a false name and address 
when questioned by police; court held that the police had reasonable suspicion based on the 
defendant’s evasiveness and because he matched the description of a wanted suspect).  Here, 
however, Loper’s expired insurance card could be taken into consideration in determining 
whether there was reasonable suspicion.  See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 
(10th Cir. 1998) (suspended license, no insurance card nor proof of authority to use the car, 
nervous behavior, and inconsistent responses are enough to raise reasonable suspicion). 
  
12 
 
consent was given to a police search is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of the circumstances.23  Absent a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
Loper was engaged in criminal activity, the consent must be voluntary to justify a 
warrantless search and seizure. 24   After hearing testimony and weighing the 
witnesses’ credibility, the trial judge concluded that Loper’s response–that he had 
“weed” on his person, when asked “if he had anything illegal on himself,”–was 
voluntary.  That factual finding is not clearly erroneous. 
II.  Did The Police Fail to Give Loper A Miranda Warning? 
Loper’s second claim of error is that the police violated his constitutional 
rights, because they did not give him a Miranda25 warning before questioning him.  
Loper argues that because a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore the 
presence of a police officer, he was “in custody” when ordered to exit his car.  
Therefore, when the police asked Loper whether he had anything “illegal” on him, 
that constituted an interrogation which required a Miranda warning. 
                                                           
23 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Huntley, 777 A.2d 249, 257 
(Del. Super. Ct. 2000). 
 
24 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
 
25 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
13 
 
For Miranda to apply, the defendant must be: (i) in custody or in a custodial 
setting, and (ii) the questioning must rise to the level of an interrogation.26  Loper’s 
Miranda claim cannot succeed because he was not “in custody” when being 
questioned.  A person is “in custody” when, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, “a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would feel a restraint on 
his freedom of movement fairly characterized as that ‘degree associated with 
formal arrest’ to such an extent that he would not feel free to leave.” 27  In 
Berkemer v. McCarty, the police stopped the defendant after observing his car 
weave in and out of a highway lane, and ordered the defendant to exit his car.28  An 
officer asked the defendant whether he was intoxicated without first giving him 
Miranda warnings.29  The defendant replied that he had consumed two beers and 
had smoked marijuana.30  The defendant later claimed that his Fifth Amendment 
                                                           
26 McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1125-26 (Del. 2002) (emphasizing that both “custody” and 
“interrogation” are required for Miranda to apply); see California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 
624-26 (1991) (explaining the meaning of “custody”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-
302 (1980) (explaining the “interrogation” requirement). 
  
27 McAllister, 807 A.2d at 1126 (citing Torres v. State, 608 A.2d 731 (Table), 1992 WL 53406, at 
*2 (Del. 1992)).  
  
28 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 423 (1984). 
 
29 Id. 
 
30 Id. 
 
14 
 
rights had been violated and moved to suppress the evidence.31  The United States 
Supreme Court held that the “noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts 
us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in 
custody’ for purposes of Miranda.”32  Berkemer is dispositive here.  Even if Loper 
did not feel free to leave when being asked to exit his car, his Miranda argument 
gains no traction because he was not “in custody.” 
III.  Was The Police’s Terry Search Proper? 
Loper’s final claim is that the Superior Court erred in denying his 
suppression motion, because the police conducted a Terry33 pat down search of his 
person without his consent or any articulable basis to suspect that he was involved 
in criminal activity or that he possessed a weapon.  Alternatively, Loper contends 
that even if he voluntarily told the police that he had “weed,” that admission did 
not cure the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain him after 
the initial traffic stop. 
Loper’s claim fails for want of a factual predicate.  After reviewing the 
evidence, the Superior Court concluded that Loper had not been subjected to a pat 
                                                           
31 Id. at 424. 
 
32 Id. at 440. 
 
33 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 
15 
 
down search–a conclusion that Loper has not shown is erroneous.  We will not 
disturb the trial court’s factual findings absent clear error.34   
Nor was Loper’s consent tainted.  Loper relies on State v. Heath to support 
his legal argument that where a person who is illegally detained consents to a 
search, that consent is deemed tainted by the illegal detention, and is therefore 
ineffective to justify the subsequent search.35  Loper’s argument is without merit.  
As earlier discussed, the initial traffic stop and the subsequent investigation were 
constitutionally valid.  Therefore, they could not have “tainted” Loper’s voluntary 
consent.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Loper’s 
suppression motion on this basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                                           
34 Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del. 2001). 
 
35 State v. Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 411 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006).