Title: Meikle v. Nurse

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11859  
 
 
 
 
GARTH MEIKLE  vs.  PATRICIA NURSE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 5, 2015. - April 27, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Practice, Civil, Summary process, Counterclaim 
and cross-claim.  Landlord and Tenant, Security deposit, 
Termination of tenancy, Eviction.   
 
 
 
 
Summary process.  Complaint filed in the Boston Division of 
the Housing Court Department on June 11, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by MaryLou Muirhead, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Louis Fisher (Patricia Whiting with him) for the defendant.
 
Garth Meikle, pro Se. 
 
Peter Vickery, for Worcester Property Owners Association, 
Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Maureen McDonagh & Julia Devanthéry, for City Life/Vida 
Urbana, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this appeal we decide whether a tenant may 
assert a violation of the security deposit statute, G. L. 
2 
 
c. 186, § 15B, as a defense to a landlord's claim for possession 
in a summary process action brought under G. L. c. 239, § 1A.  
The issue arises from a Housing Court judge's disposition of a 
summary process action brought by Garth Meikle, the landlord, 
against Patricia Nurse, the tenant.  After a trial, the judge 
ruled that the tenant properly could assert a violation of the 
security deposit statute as a counterclaim for damages, but that 
a counterclaim on this basis is not a defense to the landlord's 
claim for possession.  The tenant appealed, arguing that the 
plain language of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, buttressed by its 
legislative history, establishes that a violation of the 
security deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to a 
landlord's claim for possession and that the judge erred in 
rejecting this interpretation of the statute.  We transferred 
the appeal to this court on our own motion.1   
 
We conclude that a violation of the security deposit 
statute is encompassed within the definition of "counterclaim or 
                                                          
 
 
1 The judge's ruling in this case conflicts with other 
Housing Court decisions on this issue. See, e.g., Patnod vs. 
King, Worcester Hous. Ct., No. 14-SP-3620 (Sept. 29, 2014) 
(landlord failure to notify lessee of location of security 
deposit and failure to deposit in interest-bearing account 
created defense to possession); Gouveia vs. Noel, Southeast 
Hous. Ct., No. 13-SP-02987 (Sept. 19, 2013) (failure to place 
security deposit in interest bearing account constituted defense 
to no-fault eviction); Dunn vs. Cox, Boston Hous. Ct., No. 99-
SP-03639 (Aug. 23, 1999) (statutory violation of security 
deposit law prohibited landlord action to recover possession). 
 
3 
 
defense" in G. L. c. 239, § 8A, and that a counterclaim or 
defense on that basis may be asserted as a defense to a 
landlord's possession in a summary process action under G. L. 
c. 239, § 1A.  Therefore, we reverse the Housing Court judgment 
granting possession to the landlord and remand for a hearing in 
accordance with the provisions of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par.2 
 
Background.  We summarize the judge's findings of fact, 
which we accept unless they are clearly erroneous.  Martin v. 
Simmons Props., LLC, 467 Mass. 1, 8 (2014).  In October, 2011, 
Nurse moved into a residential building owned by Meikle.  The 
parties executed a one-year lease under which Nurse paid a 
security deposit in the amount of $1,300, equivalent to one 
month's rent.  Meikle failed to give Nurse a receipt 
acknowledging acceptance of the deposit, failed to provide Nurse 
with a receipt indicating the bank account into which he 
deposited the funds, and failed to pay Nurse interest earned. On 
expiration of the lease, Nurse continued to live in the premises 
as a tenant at will until Meikle terminated the tenancy in 
April, 2014, to provide housing to members of his extended 
family.  Meikle then instituted a no-fault summary process 
action for possession of the premises, G. L. c. 239, § 1, and 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by City 
Life/Vida Urbana and Worcester Property Owners Association, Inc. 
 
4 
 
for recovery of monies due for use and occupancy, G. L. c. 239, 
§ 2, for the months of May, June, and July, 2014.  Nurse 
counterclaimed,3 alleging violations of G. L. c. 186, § 15B 
(security deposit statute), and G. L. c. 93A, in addition to 
improper termination, insufficient notice to quit, retaliation, 
and breach of the warranty of habitability.   
 
After a two-day bench trial, the judge found for Meikle on 
all but the security deposit claim, ruling that his failure to 
provide Nurse with an acceptance receipt, a bank deposit 
receipt, and the interest earned from the security deposit 
violated G. L. c. 186, §§ 15B (2) (b),4 (3) (a),5 and (3) (b),6 
                                                          
 
 
3 Pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 8A, "tenant[s] or occupant[s]" 
may defend against a landlord's claim of possession.  This 
includes lessees, tenants at will, and tenants at sufferance who 
meet the statutory requirements to attain standing.  See Rubin 
v. Prescott, 362 Mass. 281, 290-291 (1972) (declining to rule 
whether tenants at sufferance are barred from raising sanitation 
code violations as defense to summary process but nonetheless 
reaching § 8A claims of tenants at sufferance); Hodge v. Klug, 
33 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 754 (1992) ("the statute would be 
defanged if a tenant at sufferance could not employ its 
machinery").  Thus, Patricia Nurse may enlist § 8A in defense of 
her tenancy. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 186, § 15B (2) (b), requires that "[a]ny 
lessor or his agent who receives a security deposit from a 
tenant or prospective tenant shall give said tenant or 
prospective tenant at the time of receiving such security 
deposit a receipt indicating the amount of such security 
deposit, the name of the person receiving it and, in the case of 
an agent, the name of the lessor for whom such security deposit 
is received, the date on which it is received, and a description 
of the premises leases or rented.  Said receipt shall be signed 
by the person receiving the security deposit." (Emphasis added.)  
 
5 
 
respectively. The judgment awarded possession and unpaid rent 
($3,900) to Meikle, to be offset by the amount due to Nurse on 
her security deposit counterclaim ($1,304.61), resulting in net 
damages to Meikle in the amount of $2,595.39.  Nurse's motion to 
reconsider was denied, and she timely appealed.    
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review questions 
of statutory interpretation de novo."  Commerce Ins. Co. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 (2006).  Here we apply 
the "general and familiar rule . . . that a statute must be 
interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature 
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished."  Lowery v. 
Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 576-577 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
5 General Laws c. 186, § 15B (3) (a), provides in relevant 
part:  "A receipt shall be given to the tenant within thirty 
days after such deposit is received by the lessor which receipt 
shall indicate the name and location of the bank in which the 
security deposit has been deposited and the amount and account 
number of said deposit.  Failure to comply with this paragraph 
shall entitle the tenant to immediate return of the security 
deposit." (Emphasis added.)   
 
  
 
6 General Laws c. 186, § 15B (3) (b), requires that "[a] 
lessor of residential real property who holds a security deposit 
pursuant to this section for a period of one year or longer 
. . . shall . . . pay interest at the rate of five per cent per 
year . . . payable to the tenant at the end of each year of the 
tenancy."  
6 
 
286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  The language of a statute is 
interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, and if the 
"language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the 
intent of the Legislature."  Commissioner of Correction v. 
Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of 
Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. 
Clerk-Magistrate of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court 
Dep't, 439 Mass. 352, 355-356 (2003).  Also, insofar as relevant 
here, "a remedial statute . . . should be given a broad 
interpretation . . . in light of its purpose and to 'promote the 
accomplishment of its beneficent design.'"  Seller's Case, 452 
Mass. 804, 810 (2008), quoting Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't 
of Indus. Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 73 (1995).  
 
2.  Violation of the security deposit statute as a defense 
to possession.  The trial judge, without explaining her 
reasoning, ruled that the tenant's counterclaim for violation of 
the security deposit statute, while properly asserted as a claim 
for damages, did not constitute a defense to Meikle's action for 
possession.  This was error.  
 
General Laws c. 239, § 8A, sets forth in broad outline the 
defenses and counterclaims available to a tenant in a summary 
process action and, in certain circumstances, authorizes a 
prevailing tenant to retain possession of the premises.  More 
specifically, G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par., provides in 
7 
 
relevant part: 
"There shall be no recovery of possession under 
this chapter if the amount found by the court to 
be due the landlord equals or is less than the 
amount found to be due the tenant or occupant by 
reason of any counterclaim or defense under this 
section.  If the amount found to be due the 
landlord exceeds the amount found to be due the 
tenant or occupant, there shall be no recovery of 
possession if the tenant or occupant, within one 
week after having received written notice from 
the court of the balance due, pays to the clerk 
the balance due the landlord, together with 
interest and costs of suit, less any credit due 
the tenant or occupant for funds already paid by 
him to the clerk under this section."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Drawing from the plain language of the statute, a tenant may 
retain possession only if two conditions are met:  (1) the 
tenant prevails on a counterclaim or defense brought "under this 
section"; and (2) the damages on that defense or counterclaim 
exceed the amount due the landlord, or if the damages are less 
than the amount due the landlord, the tenant pays to the court 
the amount due within one week.  The matter of damages is purely 
a factual question and needs no further explanation.  Therefore, 
we focus on the specific issue of statutory interpretation 
presented here:  whether we may deem the tenant's counterclaim 
for violation of the security deposit statute to have been 
brought "under this section." 
 
To begin the analysis, we accept that the only logical 
interpretation of the "under this section" language in G. L. 
8 
 
c. 239, § 8A, fifth par., is as a reference to G. L. c. 239, 
§ 8A, first par., the sole statutory provision describing the 
counterclaims or defenses that may be asserted by a tenant in a 
summary process action.  The reference to "counterclaim[s] or 
defense[s] [brought] under this section" without further 
explication necessarily connects the two provisions.  They are 
to be read together in determining whether, in a given case, a 
tenant may defeat a landlord's claim for possession.  We turn 
then to the definition of counterclaims and defenses in G. L. 
c. 239, § 8A, first par., taking note that "[w]here the 
Legislature uses the same words in several sections which 
concern the same subject matter, the words 'must be presumed to 
have been used with the same meaning in each section.'" 
Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. 745, 747 (2011), quoting 
Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 
188-189 (1969). 
 
a.  General Laws c. 239, § 8A, first par.  Section 8A, 
first par., specifies that a tenant who faces eviction in a 
summary process action for nonpayment of rent, or because the 
tenancy is terminated without fault of the tenant, has the right 
to raise certain defenses or counterclaims in that proceeding.  
It provides, in relevant part:  
"In any action under this chapter to recover possession of 
any premises rented or leased for dwelling purposes, 
brought pursuant to a notice to quit for nonpayment of 
9 
 
rent, or where the tenancy has been terminated without 
fault . . . , the tenant or occupant shall be entitled to 
raise, by defense or counterclaim, any claim against the 
plaintiff relating to or arising out of such property, 
rental, tenancy, or occupancy for breach of warranty, for a 
breach of any material provision of the rental agreement, 
or for a violation of any other law" (emphasis added). 
   
Based on the plain language of the statute, an actionable 
counterclaim or defense under this provision must meet two 
requirements:  (1) the defense or counterclaim must "relat[e] to 
or aris[e] out of" the tenancy; and (2) the subject matter of 
the defense or counterclaim must be based on either "a breach of 
warranty," "a breach of any material provision of the rental 
agreement," or "a violation of any other law."  Id.    
 
The first requirement, that a counterclaim or defense be 
related to or arise out of the tenancy or occupancy, reflects 
the Legislature's concern that summary process actions be 
unencumbered by landlord-tenant disputes that have nothing to do 
with the tenancy.  Thus, it imposes an appropriate limitation on 
the defenses or counterclaims that may be asserted by the 
tenant.  A counterclaim or defense based on a violation of the 
security deposit statute fits squarely within this framework; it 
indisputably relates to or arises out of the tenancy.  The 
tender of a security deposit by a tenant to a landlord is well 
established as a prerequisite to most residential tenancies.  
The centrality of a security deposit to the landlord-tenant 
relationship is further evidenced by the Legislature's enactment 
10 
 
of the security deposit statute, G. L. c. 186, § 15B, as part of 
an elaborate scheme of rights and duties to prevent abuses and 
to insure fairness to the tenant.   
 
The second requirement, that the counterclaim or defense 
must relate to a breach of warranty, breach of any material 
provision of the rental agreement, or a violation of any other 
law, further limits the subject matter of the actionable 
counterclaims or defenses to these specific categories.  As 
neither a breach of warranty nor a breach of the rental 
agreement is applicable here, we consider only whether the 
violation of the security deposit statute fits within the 
remaining category, "violation of any other law."   
 
Although the Legislature's choice of the phrase "violation 
of any other law" suggests that the universe of laws might be 
available as the source of a tenant's counterclaim or defense, 
we see no need to assume such an intent in this case.  In the 
context of a summary process action, we have no difficulty 
interpreting the phrase "violation of any other law" to include 
any law enacted to protect a tenant's rights in the landlord-
tenant relationship.7  See Lawrence v. Osuagwu, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 
60, 63 (2003) (interpreting "violation of any other law" to 
                                                          
 
 
7 Our confidence is buttressed by language in the same 
paragraph, permitting "such other damages as may be authorized 
by any law having as its objective the regulation of residential 
premises."  G. L. c. 239, § 8A, first par. 
11 
 
include counterclaim for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment 
under G. L. c. 186, § 14).  The security deposit statute is one 
such law.  Indeed, the security deposit statute has no raison 
d'être other than to insure fairness to a tenant who pays a sum 
to the landlord and relies on the landlord's good faith for the 
return of the portion to which he or she is entitled at the end 
of the tenancy.   
 
Our cases involving the security deposit statute 
demonstrate its importance in the scheme of protections afforded 
a tenant.  This court has recognized for some time that the 
Legislature views violations of the security deposit statute, 
G. L. c. 186, § 15B, as serious violations.  See Hampshire 
Village Assocs. v. District Court of Hampshire, 381 Mass. 148, 
151-152, cert. denied sub nom. Ruhlander v. District Court of 
Hampshire, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980) ("Section 15B is not without 
reason.  The question of security deposits has long been 
agitated; the problems are well known; and the Legislature has 
attempted progressively to deal with them" [footnote omitted]).  
Indeed, the security deposit statute provides for treble 
damages, costs, and attorney's fees.  See G. L. c. 186, 
§ 15B (7).  Thus, it would be contrary to legislative intent to 
interpret "violation of any other law" in a manner that would 
undermine a tenant's right to assert the range of protections 
available under the summary process statute. 
12 
 
 
The legislative history of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, supports 
this interpretation.  Within a ten-year time frame, the 
Legislature acted on more than one occasion to increase the 
availability of counterclaims to tenants.  See St. 1965, c. 888 
(creating counterclaims to allow enforcement of sanitation 
code); St. 1967, c. 420, § 1 (permitting counterclaims for 
sanitary code violations in no-fault evictions); St. 1975, c. 
467, § 3 (expanding counterclaims to include breach of 
warranty).  The most substantive expansion occurred in 1977, 
when the Legislature removed the language that had limited 
defenses or counterclaims to the condition of the premises and 
retained the current language permitting "any claim against the 
plaintiff . . . for a violation of any other law" (emphasis 
added).  St. 1977, c. 963.  The steady progression in the 
availability of tenant defenses, culminating in the elimination 
of conditions-based restrictions, confirms the Legislature's 
intent to provide tenants with a broad set of defenses and 
counterclaims in the summary process action, including the 
defense asserted by the tenant in this case. 
 
b.  Application of G. L. c. 239, § 8A, fifth par.  Having 
determined that a counterclaim for violation of the security 
deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to possession, we 
now address whether the judge properly applied G. L. c. 239, 
§ 8A, fifth par., in granting possession to the landlord.  Here, 
13 
 
the judge's ruling erroneously foreclosed the tenant's right to 
make payment as required to retain possession of the premises.  
Where a tenant prevails on a defense or counterclaim and is 
awarded damages in an amount less than the amount owed to the 
landlord, the statute provides that "no judgment shall enter 
until after the expiration of the time for such payment and the 
tenant has failed to make such payment."  Id.  Accordingly, the 
tenant is entitled to the opportunity to pay the amount due 
within one week and retain possession. 
 
 Last, for the sake of clarity, we emphasize that a tenant 
who retains possession under this provision of the statute does 
not enjoy that right in perpetuity.  The statute does not impose 
an obligatory tenancy on the landlord.  Nothing in the statute 
prevents the landlord from bringing a second summary process 
action for possession after he or she has remedied the violation 
of the security deposit statute.  Also, even where the tenant 
agrees to pay the amount due the landlord to exercise the right 
to possession, the landlord may thereafter commence a summary 
process action.  We interpret the Legislature's intent in 
providing for the tenant's right to retain possession as a time-
limited equitable remedy for the particular conduct underlying 
the tenant's defense or counterclaim.   
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons explained above, we reverse 
the judge's order granting possession to the landlord and remand 
14 
 
for entry of an order providing notice to the tenant of the 
right to retain possession in compliance with G. L. c. 239, 
§ 8A, fifth par.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.