Title: State v. Brian D. Robins

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 65 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2841-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Brian D. Robins,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael W. Gage   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Craig W. 
Albee and Glynn, Fitzgerald & Albee, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Craig W. Albee. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Jeffrey J. 
Kassel, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
2002 WI 65 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2841-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 53) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian D. Robins,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Outagamie 
County, Michael W. Gage, Circuit Court Judge.    Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.    This is a prosecution for 
attempted child enticement arising out of an internet "sting" 
operation by the Department of Justice (DOJ).  The primary issue 
is whether the child enticement statute is violated when there 
is no actual child victim, but, rather, an adult government 
agent posing online as a child.  The defendant also challenges 
the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint and the 
evidence at the preliminary hearing.  Finally, the defendant 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
2 
 
raises a First Amendment challenge to the statute as applied to 
child enticements initiated over the internet. 
¶2 The defendant raised these issues in various motions to 
dismiss in the Outagamie County Circuit Court.  The Honorable 
Michael W. Gage denied the motions, and the court of appeals 
granted interlocutory appeal.  We accepted the defendant's 
petition to bypass, and now affirm. 
¶3 We conclude that an attempted child enticement under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.07 
(1999-2000)1 
may 
be 
charged 
where 
the 
intervening 
extraneous 
factor 
that 
makes 
the 
offense 
an 
attempted 
rather 
than 
completed 
crime 
is 
the 
fact 
that 
unbeknownst to the defendant, the "victim" is not a child at 
all, but an adult posing as a child.  We further conclude that 
the allegations in the complaint and the evidence at the 
preliminary hearing were sufficient to establish probable cause 
in this case.  Finally, because the child enticement statute 
regulates conduct rather than speech or expression, the First 
Amendment is not implicated by this prosecution. 
I 
¶4 
The defendant Brian Robins was charged with attempted 
child enticement contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1), stemming 
from a DOJ internet "sting" operation.2  Beginning on January 31, 
                                                 
1 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 
1999-2000 
version 
of 
the 
statutes 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
2 The facts are from the criminal complaint and the 
preliminary hearing transcript, and are taken as true for 
purposes of resolving the legal issues on this review.  
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
3 
 
2000, Robins, using the screen name "WI4Kink," had a series of 
online conversations with "Benjm13," initially in an internet 
chat room known as "Wisconsin M4M."3  Unbeknownst to Robins, 
"Benjm13" was Thomas Fassbender, a 42-year-old DOJ agent posing 
online as a 13-year-old boy named Benjamin living in Little 
Chute, Wisconsin. 
¶5 The subject of "Benjamin's" age came up within the first 
12 minutes of the first online conversation between Robins and 
"Benjm13."  "Benjamin" told Robins that he was 13 years old.4  
The initial and subsequent online conversations and e-mails 
between Robins and "Benjm13" centered on explicit sexual matters 
(including, 
among 
other 
things, 
oral 
sex, 
masturbation, 
ejaculation, and penis size), and were recorded by Fassbender.5  
¶6 
Robins, who was 46 years old and lived in Wauwatosa at 
the time of the offense, suggested that the two meet: 
WI4kink: So you ever get to Milwaukee? 
Benjm13: sometimes withmy [sic] mom  
                                                 
3 Testimony at the preliminary hearing showed that "M4M" 
meant either Male For Male or Men For Men. 
4  
Benjm13:  ru my age 
  
Benjm13:  im 13 
 
WI4kink:  no older 
5 Fassbender testified at the preliminary hearing that the 
DOJ 
runs 
a 
computer 
program 
called 
Power 
Tools 
that 
automatically logs conversation and instant message or chat room 
conversations and saves these communications.  The agent then 
saves the communications to a disk and prints them off as paper 
copies.  
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
4 
 
WI4kink: cool so how would we ever meet? 
Benjm13: i dont know u can come here if u want 
WI4kink: ya that is true 
WI4kink: you have a place we could go? 
Benjm13: just my house but thats scary 
WI4kink: ya it would be, specially [sic] if someone 
comes home :)  
Benjm13: wow not cool 
WI4kink: no 
Benjm13: i dont know were [sic] to go 
WI4kink: could just get a room somewhere 
Benjm13: oh that would be cool – like a motel 
WI4kink: yup 
¶7 
Robins acknowledged that what he was proposing to do 
was illegal: 
Benjm13: im getting nervus [sic] already 
WI4kink: ok I understand well I am a little to [sic] 
this isn't legal you know 
Benjm13: i geus [sic] so 
¶8 
The second online conversation between Robins and 
"Benjamin" took place the next evening, February 1, 2000.  Again 
it involved mostly sexual topics, and Robins was persistent in 
setting up a meeting between the two on the following Saturday.  
The conversation makes clear that Robins was planning to find a 
motel room: 
WI4kink: what time of the day would be best? . . .  
Benjm13: after i get up would be ok 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
5 
 
WI4kink: as far as getting a room that should be like 
early afternoon 
¶9 
Robins also asked "Benjamin" for his telephone number.  
"Benjamin" appeared to be reluctant to give it to him.  After 
Robins assured "Benjamin" that he would only use the number to 
call on Saturday to confirm their meeting, "Benjamin" replied, 
"ok."  
¶10 On February 2 and 3, Robins and "Benjamin" "missed" 
each other online, and instead exchanged e-mail messages.  In 
one e-mail, "Benjamin" informed Robins that he had directions to 
Little Chute and that they could probably meet at the Burger 
King just off the highway.  Robins e-mailed "Benjamin" and asked 
him to send the directions.  He also told "Benjamin" that he was 
"still a little nervous" because he "would not want to get 
scammed."  "Benjamin" sent the directions, together with the 
message, "i'm a little scared to [sic].  u have to promise me 
not to tell anyone and to be nice ok. my mom would kill me."  In 
another e-mail, Robins advised that he would arrive in Little 
Chute around noon, but that "Benjamin" should give Robins his 
telephone number so that Robins could call on Saturday morning 
with an exact time.  Robins closed the e-mail by saying: "I know 
we must be very carefull. [sic]  I am looking forward to it." 
¶11 On Friday, February 4, 2000, Robins and "Benjamin" met 
online and engaged in another instant message conversation.  
This conversation confirmed that the two would meet the 
following day for the purpose of having sex.  Robins expressed 
his hope that "Benjamin" was "saving" himself for the following 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
6 
 
day (that is, he hoped "Benjamin" would not masturbate before 
their meeting) and that he (Robins) was "getting hard just 
talking to" him ("Benjamin").  Robins again asked Benjamin for 
his telephone number because Robins "want[ed] to make sure that 
["Benjamin" was] serious."  Because "Benjamin" appeared to be 
nervous about Robins calling his house, they decided to meet 
online again in the morning before Robins made the telephone 
call.6 
¶12 At a little after 10 a.m. on Saturday, February 5, 
2000, Robins and "Benjamin" met online for the fourth and final 
time.  "Benjamin" said he was "exited [sic] about goin to a 
motel."  Robins replied that it "should be hot."  "Benjamin" 
gave Robins his telephone number and they both signed off the 
internet.  
¶13 Soon after they signed off, Robins called the number 
"Benjamin"——Fassbender——had given him.  Officer Ray Lee of the 
Fox Valley Metro Police Department posed as "Benjamin" during 
the telephone conversation.  The conversation was recorded and 
Fassbender testified at the preliminary hearing that the content 
                                                 
6 During the course of the internet correspondence between 
Robins and "Benjamin," Robins sent four photo file attachments 
to the "Benjm13" e-mail address.  One was a photo of Robins 
fully clothed.  Another purported to be a photo of Robins' 
penis.  
The 
other two 
photos depicted naked 
young men 
masturbating.  These e-mails were the subject of additional 
charges for attempted distribution of harmful materials to a 
child, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 948.11(2)(a) and 939.32(1).  
These charges were later dismissed on the State's motion, 
pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 
52, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684.  
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
7 
 
of the telephone conversation consisted mainly of setting the 
final arrangements for the meeting——what Robins would be 
wearing, what kind of car Robins would be driving, what 
"Benjamin" would be wearing and what he looked like.  Fassbender 
testified that "Mr. Robins said, we'll have to find a motel when 
I get up there, something to that effect." 
¶14 In the meantime, Fassbender had determined through 
America Online that the screen name "WI4kink" belonged to 
Robins.  The DOJ set up surveillance outside Robins' home in 
Wauwautosa.  Shortly after Robins' telephone conversation with 
"Benjamin" on Saturday, February 5, 2000, Robins left his house.  
He was surveilled from his home to the Burger King in Little 
Chute.  Robins parked in the Burger King parking lot, got out of 
his car, and was arrested as he walked towards the restaurant. 
¶15 Robins admitted in a statement to police that he had 
met "Benjm13" in an internet chat room, that "Benjm13" told 
Robins that he was a 13-year-old boy, that they'd had sexually 
explicit conversations, and that Robins had e-mailed sexually 
explicit materials to "Benjm13".  Robins further admitted that 
he had set up the meeting with "Benjm13" for the purpose of 
having sex with him.  Robins also stated that he had told 
"Benjm13" that they would go to a motel room for that purpose. 
¶16 Just before the preliminary hearing, Robins filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause.  
Because of the short notice, the motion was not immediately 
decided.  The preliminary hearing was held, and the State's 
motion for bindover was granted, over Robins' objection.     
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
8 
 
¶17 Following 
arraignment, 
Robins 
moved 
to 
dismiss, 
alleging insufficient evidence to support the bindover.  He also 
challenged 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.07 
as 
applied to child enticements initiated over the internet. 
¶18 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
motions, 
finding 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause and rejecting 
Robins' constitutional attack on the statute.  The circuit court 
was not persuaded by Robins' argument that the statute as 
applied here impermissibly infringed First Amendment rights.  
The circuit court held that the child enticement statute "does 
not ban expression, but a particular type of conduct involving 
children that may or may not flow from protected speech."   
¶19 Robins petitioned the court of appeals for leave to 
appeal the circuit court's non-final orders, which the court of 
appeals granted.  Robins then petitioned this court for 
permission to bypass the court of appeals.  The State joined in 
the request, citing the substantial number of pending child 
enticement prosecutions involving internet "sting" operations in 
which government agents pose online as children.  We granted 
bypass. 
II 
¶20 The applicability of the child enticement statute to 
an internet "sting" operation that involves an adult undercover 
officer posing online as a child is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84, ¶12, 236 Wis. 2d 
521, 613 N.W.2d 170.  The sufficiency of the allegations in the 
complaint 
is 
also 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
9 
 
independently, as is the defendant's challenge to the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing.  In re 
A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶26, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712; State v. 
Williams, 104 Wis. 2d 15, 21, 310 N.W.2d 601 (1981).  In 
addition, the constitutionality of a statute is determined 
without deference to the lower courts.  State v. Johnson, 2001 
WI 52, ¶10, 243 Wis. 2d 365, 627 N.W.2d 455. 
III 
¶21 Robins claims that he is being prosecuted for a non-
existent crime.  He characterizes the charge against him as an 
"attempt to attempt a crime," or an "attempt to commit a strict 
liability crime," neither of which, he says, is recognized under 
Wisconsin law.  Alternatively, he argues that because there was 
no actual child victim, the crime of child enticement was 
legally impossible and the charge must be dismissed. 
¶22 Arguments like these have already been specifically 
rejected by the court of appeals, and rightly so.  In State v. 
Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, 242 Wis. 2d 693, 626 N.W.2d 359, the 
court of appeals was confronted with a factual scenario almost 
identical to the one presented here.  Koenck, using the screen 
name 
"dirtboy69," 
engaged 
in 
sexually 
explicit 
internet 
conversations with "Teddie" and "Georgie," who told "dirtboy69" 
during these online encounters that they were 11-year-old twin 
sisters.  In reality, "Teddie" and "Georgie" were fictional 
online 
profiles 
created 
by 
Nancy 
A.C., 
a 
46-year-old 
Pennsylvania woman who founded a group known as Internetwatch, 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
10 
 
an organization that monitors the internet, mainly for purveyors 
of child pornography. 
¶23 
Eventually, 
Koenck, 
who 
lived 
in 
Iowa, 
made 
arrangements 
online 
to 
meet 
"Teddie" 
and 
"Georgie" 
in 
Brookfield, 
Wisconsin, 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
having 
sexual 
intercourse.  He rented a hotel room and arranged to meet 
"Teddie" and "Georgie" at a McDonald's restaurant in Brookfield.  
The Wisconsin DOJ was contacted, and the defendant was arrested 
when he arrived at the designated meeting place. 
¶24 Koenck, like Robins, was charged with attempted child 
enticement contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1).  Like Robins, he 
promptly moved to dismiss, claiming that the statute required an 
actual child victim.  The court of appeals disagreed. 
¶25 The court of appeals first noted that the child 
enticement statute encompasses the completed act of enticement 
as well as its attempt: 
948.07 Child enticement.  Whoever, with intent to 
commit any of the following acts, causes or attempts 
to cause any child who has not attained the age of 18 
years to go into any vehicle, building, room or 
secluded place is guilty of a Class BC felony: 
(1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
the child in violation of s. 948.02 or s. 
948.095. 
(2) Causing the child to engage in prostitution. 
(3) Exposing a sex organ to the child or causing the 
child to expose a sex organ in violation of 
948.10. 
(4) Taking a picture or making an audio recording of 
the child engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
11 
 
(5) Causing bodily or mental harm to the child. 
(6) Giving or selling to the child a controlled 
substance 
or 
controlled 
substance 
analog 
in 
violation of ch. 961. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.07 (emphasis added); Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, 
¶9.  See also State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶¶17-19, 236 Wis. 2d 
721, 734, 613 N.W.2d 833 (holding that the act of enticement, or 
attempted enticement, with intent to commit one or more of the 
enumerated underlying offenses, is the gravamen of the crime, 
rather than the underlying offense itself). 
¶26 The court of appeals in Koenck noted that when 
attempted 
child 
enticement 
is 
charged, 
the 
pattern 
jury 
instructions call for the addition of the legal definition of 
"attempt."  Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, ¶17; see Wis JI——Criminal 
2134, n. 3.  An attempt is defined in the statutes as follows: 
An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor 
have an intent to perform acts and attain a result 
which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime 
and that the actor does acts toward the commission of 
the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under all 
the circumstances, that the actor formed that intent 
and would commit the crime except for the intervention 
of another person or some other extraneous factor. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 939.32(3). 
¶27 The court of appeals viewed the fact that Koenck's 
"victims" were fictitious as the "extraneous factor" that 
intervened to make Koenck's crime an attempted rather than 
completed act of child enticement: 
Within the contemplation of Wis. Stat. § 948.07, 
an attempt is complete when the defendant, with intent 
to commit a crime, takes action in furtherance of such 
intent and the failure to accomplish the crime is due 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
12 
 
to a factor beyond his or her control or one unknown 
to 
him 
or 
her . . . . 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
fictitiousness of the girls constituted an extraneous 
factor beyond Koenck's control that prevented him from 
successfully enticing a child for the express purpose 
of sexual intercourse or contact . . . . Koenck did 
everything necessary to insure the commission of the 
crime intended, and his conduct is not excused because 
of the fortuitous circumstance rendering it impossible 
to effectuate the intended result . . . .  
Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, ¶28 (citations omitted).  The court of 
appeals concluded that the absence of an actual child victim 
constituted "an extraneous factor beyond Koenck's control that 
prevented successful enticement while not excusing the attempt 
to entice."  Id. at ¶29. 
¶28 The court of appeals' interpretation of the child 
enticement statute in Koenck was entirely correct, and we reject 
Robins' argument that the case should be overruled.  Here, as in 
Koenck, the extraneous factor that intervened to make the crime 
an attempted rather than completed child enticement is the fact 
that "Benjm13" was an adult government agent rather than a 13-
year-old boy.  That there may be or could have been other 
intervening 
factors 
does 
not 
make 
this 
an 
impermissible 
prosecution for an "attempt to attempt a crime." 
¶29 Nor is it an impermissible prosecution for an "attempt 
to commit a strict liability offense," as Robins contends.  He 
cites State v. Briggs, 218 Wis. 2d 61, 66, 579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. 
App. 1998), in which the court of appeals held that "attempted 
felony murder" is not a recognized crime.  The court noted that 
"under Wisconsin law, one cannot attempt to commit a crime which 
does not itself include an element of specific intent."  Id. at 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
13 
 
66.  The court concluded that because felony murder does not 
include an intent element, one cannot "attempt" a felony murder.  
Id. 
¶30 In contrast to felony murder, however, the crime of 
child enticement does contain a mens rea or specific intent 
element.  The child enticement statute is not violated unless 
the perpetrator committed or attempted the act of enticement 
with one or more of the specific enumerated prohibited intents, 
most of which involve sex crimes against children.  See Derango, 
2000 WI 89, ¶¶17, 20, and 31.  Child enticement is a strict 
liability offense only in the sense that the State need not 
prove the defendant's knowledge of the child's minority and the 
defendant cannot use mistake as to the child's minority as a 
defense.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.43(2)("[a] mistake as to the age 
of a minor . . . is not a defense"); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.23(6)("[c]riminal 
intent 
does 
not 
require 
proof 
of 
knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material 
element 
in 
the 
crime"). 
 
 
Accordingly, 
attempted 
child 
enticement is not an "attempt to commit a strict liability 
crime," impermissible under the rationale of Briggs. 
¶31 Finally, Robins' assertion of the "legal impossibility" 
defense is foreclosed by the court of appeals' decision in State 
v. Kordas, 191 Wis. 2d 124, 528 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1995).  
There, the defendant was charged with attempt to receive stolen 
property.  The charge arose out of an undercover operation in 
which the police made certain modifications to a Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle to make it appear as though it was stolen, and passed 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
14 
 
it off as stolen to the defendant, who allegedly bought it with 
that understanding and intent.  Id. at 126.  Because the 
motorcycle was not stolen, however, the defendant argued that it 
was legally impossible for him to have committed the crime of 
attempt to receive stolen property; the circuit court agreed, 
and dismissed the complaint.  Id. 
¶32 The court of appeals reversed, holding that legal 
impossibility is not a defense to the crime of attempt: 
[A] defense of legal impossibility is no defense to an 
attempt to commit a crime, absent the defendant's 
"mistake."  Section 939.43(1), STATS., defines the 
defense of "mistake": 
An honest error, whether of fact or of law 
other than the criminal law, is a defense if 
it negatives the existence of a state of 
mind essential to the crime. 
(Emphasis added.)  Therefore, a fact of which a 
defendant has no knowledge, such as the fact that an 
apparently stolen motorcycle is not stolen, cannot 
form the basis for the defense of mistake.  As the 
supreme 
court 
explained, 
"[s]ound 
public 
policy" 
supports the view that: 
impossibility not apparent to the actor 
should not absolve him from the offense of 
attempt 
to 
commit 
the 
crime 
he 
intended . . . . In so far as the actor 
knows, he has done everything necessary to 
insure the commission of the crime intended, 
and he should not escape punishment because 
of 
the 
fortuitous 
circumstance 
that 
by 
reason of some fact unknown to him it was 
impossible 
to 
effectuate 
the 
intended 
result. 
State v. Damms, 9 Wis. 2d 183, 190-91, 100 N.W.2d 592, 
596 
(1960)(impossibility 
for 
defendant 
to 
commit 
murder because gun was not loaded did not preclude 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
15 
 
conviction 
for 
attempted 
murder 
where 
defendant 
intended to kill and believed gun was loaded).  
Id. at 129-30. 
 
¶33 Kordas controls here.  Robins tries to distinguish it 
by reverting to his argument that child enticement is a strict 
liability offense, making the defendant's state of mind about 
the age of the victim irrelevant and the rationale of Kordas 
inapplicable.  But the defendant's state of mind is not 
irrelevant in a child enticement prosecution.  Indeed, as we 
have noted above, the State must prove that the defendant 
possessed one or more of the prohibited intents itemized in the 
statute (here, intent to commit a second-degree sexual assault 
of a child) before it can convict on either a completed or 
attempted child enticement.  That the State need not prove the 
defendant's knowledge of the child's minority and the defendant 
cannot assert mistake as to the child's minority as a defense 
does not take this statute outside the holding of Kordas.7 
                                                 
7 Robins also claims State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 549 
N.W.2d 232 (1996) requires dismissal of the charge against him.  
Smith involved a charge of second-degree sexual assault (by use 
or threat of force) of a 16-year-old girl.  Pursuant to plea 
negotiations, the defendant entered an Alford–plea to a reduced 
charge of child enticement contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1).  
Id. at 23-24.  This court reversed.  Child enticement under Wis. 
Stat. § 948.07(1) is predicated on intent to commit a first- or 
second-degree sexual assault of a child, which requires the 
victim to be under 13 and 16 years of age, respectively.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) and (2).  Since the victim was 16 years 
old, the defendant could not legally be convicted of child 
enticement under that subsection of the statute.  Id. at 28.  
Smith, however, concerned a conviction for a completed act of 
child 
enticement, 
not 
an 
attempted 
child 
enticement.  
Accordingly, Smith has no application here.  
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
16 
 
 
¶34 We conclude, then, pursuant to Koenck and Kordas, that 
the crime of attempted child enticement contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.07 may be charged where the extraneous factor that 
intervenes to make the crime an attempted rather than completed 
child enticement is the fact that, unbeknownst to the defendant, 
the "child" is fictitious.    
IV 
 
¶35 Robins also claims the allegations in the criminal 
complaint and the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing 
are insufficient to establish probable cause.  At most, he says, 
the evidence establishes "mere preparation" to commit a crime or 
"an appointment" with a potential victim, neither of which is 
legally sufficient to support a probable cause finding. 
 
¶36 We have held that the crime of attempt has two 
elements: "(1) an intent to commit the crime charged; and (2) 
sufficient acts in furtherance of the criminal intent to 
demonstrate unequivocally that it was improbable the accused 
would desist from the crime of his or her own free will."  State 
v. Stewart, 143 Wis. 2d 28, 34, 420 N.W.2d 44 (1988).  While it 
is unquestionably true that "[t]he law does not ordinarily 
punish a person for guilty intentions alone," the law of attempt 
does not punish guilty intentions but "acts that further the 
criminal objective."  Id. at 37. 
¶37 The crime of attempt is complete when the intent to 
commit the underlying crime is coupled with sufficient acts to 
demonstrate the improbability of free will desistance; the 
actual intervention of an extraneous factor is not a "third 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
17 
 
element" of the crime of attempt, although it is often part of 
the proof.  See id. at 39-42; see also, Hamiel v. State, 92 Wis. 
2d 656, 662-68, 285 N.W.2d 639 (1979).  There is no statutory 
defense of voluntary abandonment once an attempt is completed, 
and this court has declined to create such a defense at common 
law.  Stewart, 143 Wis. 2d at 45-46. 
 
¶38 The allegations in the complaint and the evidence 
elicited at the preliminary hearing are more than sufficient to 
establish probable cause for the crime of attempted child 
enticement under the test articulated in Stewart.  The complaint 
and preliminary hearing establish that the defendant engaged in 
sexually-explicit online "chats" and e-mails with a person he 
thought was a 13-year-old boy, for the express purpose of 
illegally soliciting that boy for sex; that he arranged a 
meeting time and place to effectuate that purpose; and that he 
traveled to and arrived at the agreed-upon meeting place, where 
he was arrested.  These allegations easily establish probable 
cause to believe that Robins attempted the crime of felony child 
enticement; that is, that he possessed the intent to entice a 
child for sexual intercourse and that he engaged in unequivocal 
acts in furtherance of that criminal objective such that it was 
improbable that he would desist of his own free will. 
V 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
18 
 
¶39 Finally, Robins raises a First Amendment8 challenge to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.07 as applied to child enticements initiated 
over the internet, citing our decisions in State v. Weidner, 
2000 WI 52, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684, and State v. 
Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999).  Both Weidner 
and Zarnke, however, involved First Amendment challenges to 
variable obscenity statutes, and their holdings are therefore 
inapplicable here. 
¶40 In Weidner, the defendant challenged Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2), which prohibits the transfer, sale or exhibition of 
harmful (generally, sexually explicit) material to a child, as 
applied to internet transfers of sexually explicit material.  
Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶¶8-9.  In Zarnke, the defendant challenged 
Wis. Stat. § 948.05, which generally prohibits the sale or 
distribution of child pornography.  Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d at 121-
22.  Both statutes imposed a form of strict liability, in that 
the State was not required to prove the defendant's knowledge of 
the victim's age.  Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶12; Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 
at 123-24. Because the distribution of non-obscene, sexually 
                                                 
8 The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."  Although 
Robins does not assert a separate state constitutional claim, we 
note that Article I, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
also provides a fundamental right to freedom of speech: "Every 
person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no 
laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of 
speech or of the press. . . ." 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
19 
 
explicit material to adults and the distribution of non-obscene, 
sexually explicit material depicting adults are protected by the 
First Amendment, this court held that the lack of a knowledge 
requirement as to the victim's age rendered the statutes 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  Weidner, 2000 WI 
52, ¶37; Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d at 132-33. 
¶41 In contrast to the statutes invalidated in Weidner and 
Zarnke, the child enticement statute at issue here is not a 
variable obscenity statute, nor does it regulate speech or 
expression, either 
on 
its 
face or 
as applied 
to 
child 
enticements initiated over the internet.  The United States 
Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the First 
Amendment extends to speech that is incidental to or part of a 
course of criminal conduct.  Giboney v. Empire Storage, 336 U.S. 
490, 
498 
(1949)("It 
rarely 
has 
been 
suggested 
that 
the 
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity 
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute.  We reject the contention 
now."). 
¶42 It is not "an abridgement of freedom of speech or press 
to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct 
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of 
language, either spoken, written, or printed."  Id. at 502 
(citing Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915), and 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
20 
 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).9   Given 
today's technology, we would add electronic language to this 
list. 
¶43 The child enticement statute regulates conduct, not 
speech.10  The statute protects against the social evil and grave 
threat presented by those who lure or attempt to lure children 
into secluded places, away from the protection of the general 
public, for illicit sexual or other improper purposes.  Derango, 
2000 WI 89, ¶¶17-19.  That an act of child enticement is 
initiated or carried out in part by means of language does not 
                                                 
9 See also State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 181, 485 
N.W.2d 807 (1992), (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) rev'd by 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) ("Bigots are free to 
think and express themselves as they wish, except that they may 
not 
engage 
in 
criminal 
conduct 
in 
furtherance 
of 
their 
beliefs."). 
10 City of Madison v. Schultz, 98 Wis. 2d 188, 295 N.W.2d 
798 (Ct. App. 1980) provides an example of the distinction 
between speech and conduct in a First Amendment challenge.  
There, the court of appeals held that First Amendment rights 
were not implicated by an ordinance that prohibited naked 
genital massage in commercial massage establishments.  The court 
said: "We agree with the United States Supreme Court's statement 
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), that 
'[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled as 'speech' whenever the 
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an 
idea.'  The only idea expressed by the masseuse was her 
willingness to take her clothes off to enhance the sexual 
experience of the paying patron . . . . [A] masseuse's actions 
in disrobing do not constitute 'speech' which the first 
amendment protects."  City of Madison v. Schultz, 98 Wis. 2d at 
203. 
    
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
21 
 
make the child enticement statute susceptible of First Amendment 
scrutiny.11 
¶44 Robins' 
internet 
conversations 
and 
e-mails 
with 
"Benjm13" do not by themselves constitute the crime of child 
enticement.  Rather, Robins' internet conversation and e-mails 
are circumstantial evidence of his intent to entice a child, 
which, combined with his actions in furtherance of that intent, 
constitute probable cause for the crime of attempted child 
enticement.  That some of the proof in this case consists of 
internet "speech" does not mean that this prosecution, or 
another like it, implicates First Amendment rights.  Simply put, 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 189, (Bablitch, J., 
dissenting):  
However, if words are used to prove the crime, the 
words uttered are not the subject of the statutory 
prohibition; 
rather, 
they 
are 
used 
only 
as 
circumstantial 
evidence 
to 
prove 
the 
intentional 
selection.  Permitting the use of such evidence does 
not chill free speech . . . words of defendants are 
frequently used to prove the element of intent in many 
crimes without violating the First Amendment . . . It 
is no more a chilling of free speech to allow words to 
prove the act of intentional selection [an element of 
the crime] in this "intentional selection" statute 
than it is to allow a defendant's words that he "hated 
John Smith and wished he were dead" to prove a 
defendant intentionally murdered John Smith. 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
22 
 
the First Amendment does not protect child enticements, whether 
initiated over the internet or otherwise.12  
                                                 
12  For examples of cases which come to a similar 
conclusion, see United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th 
Cir. 2000)("Defendant simply does not have a First Amendment 
right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex 
acts"); United States v. Powell, 1 F.Supp. 2d 1419, 1422 (N.D. 
Ala. 1998) ("[t]he court finds it difficult to ascertain how the 
First Amendment is violated by a law that prohibits an 
individual from attempting to knowingly persuade, induce, and 
entice a person under eighteen years of age to engage in an 
illegal sexual act."); New York v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 132 
(N.Y. 2000)("courts have recognized that speech used to further 
the 
sexual 
exploitation 
of 
children 
does 
not 
enjoy 
constitutional protection").  See also United States v. DeBeir, 
186 
F.3d 
561 
(4th 
Cir. 
1999)(upholding 
the 
defendant's 
conviction under a comparable federal statute, 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2423(b), in a fact scenario similar to that presented here); 
United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2001)(upholding 
the defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. 2422(b) for 
attempting to entice a minor to engage in criminal sexual acts 
when the "minor" was an adult undercover agent); Thibeault v. 
Florida, 732 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)(upholding the 
defendant's conviction for attempted child enticement via the 
internet when the minor child was an adult deputy sheriff posing 
as a minor child); Hudson v. Florida, 745 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1999)(affirming the conviction of a defendant who 
attempted child enticement by writing letters to a "child" who 
was actually an adult law enforcement officer); Illinois v. 
Patterson, 734 N.E.2d 462 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)(affirming the 
conviction of a defendant who attempted to induce a child into 
sexual acts using the internet when the child was an adult 
detective); 
Attorney 
Grievance 
Commission 
of 
Maryland 
v. 
Childress, 770 A.2d 685 (Md. 2001)(suspending indefinitely the 
law license of an attorney who engaged in acts which equated to 
enticement of a child via the internet, where the "child" was an 
FBI agent); In re Harlow, 280 A.D.2d 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001)(disbarring an attorney after he was convicted of enticing 
an actual child over the internet); Chen v. Texas, 42 S.W.3d 926 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (affirming the defendant's conviction for 
attempted child enticement using the internet when the child was 
an undercover officer). 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
23 
 
¶45 Accordingly, we conclude that the offense of attempted 
child enticement under Wis. Stat. § 948.07 may be charged where 
the intervening extraneous factor that makes the offense an 
attempted 
rather 
than 
completed 
crime 
is 
the 
fact 
that 
unbeknownst to the defendant, the "victim" is not an actual 
child, but, rather, an adult government agent posing as a child.  
We also conclude that the allegations in the complaint and the 
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing are sufficient to 
establish probable cause in that they establish, to the 
requisite degree, that Robins intended to commit the crime of 
child enticement and would have done so but for the intervention 
of an extraneous factor.  Finally, we conclude that the First 
Amendment is not implicated by the application of the child 
enticement statute to child enticements initiated over the 
internet, because the statute regulates conduct, not speech.  
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's order denying the 
defendant's 
motions 
to 
dismiss, 
and 
remand 
for 
further 
proceedings. 
By the Court.—The order of the Outagamie County Circuit 
Court is affirmed and cause remanded.   
 
 
 
No. 
00-2841-CR   
 
 
 
1