Title: The People v. Rodriguece Garcia, Also Known as Carlos Rodriguez The People v. William Porto

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 219  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
William Porto,
            Appellant.
--------------------------------
No. 220  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Rodriguece Garcia, Also Known as 
Carlos Rodriguez,
            Appellant.
Case No. 219:
Carl S. Kaplan, for appellant.
Sara M. Zausmer, for respondent.
Case No. 220:
Matthew L. Mazur, for appellant.
Cynthia Carlson, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
The common issue presented in these appeals is whether
defendants' motions to substitute counsel were properly denied in
light of the "minimal inquiry" standard of People v Sides (75
NY2d 822 [1990]).  Finding no reversible error, we affirm both
convictions.  
- 2 -
No. 219 & 220
1 The pre-printed form read: [Defense counsel failed to]:
"(a) visit defendant at his place of confinement or have him
produced to the Court for a consultation; (b) provide copies and
inform defendant of any Motions filed, Responses and Court's
decisions thereto; (c) forward me copies of any bill of
particulars and or discovery in his/her possession."
- 2 -
People v Porto
On July 24, 2006, complainant Sai Hung Chui returned to
his apartment to find that he had been the victim of a burglary. 
The police recovered a fingerprint from a metal cookie tin that
had been displaced during the crime and determined that it
belonged to defendant William Porto.  Subsequently, defendant was
arrested on September 27, 2006 and charged with second, and third
degree burglary.
On June 11, 2007, the first morning of jury selection,
the trial court was informed that defendant had submitted a form,
pro se motion seeking reassignment of counsel.  The form motion
contained three pre-printed grounds for the motion,1 and a final,
blank paragraph for the movant to further address the grounds of
his application.  Defendant circled the three grounds for the
motion, but did not provide any information within the blank
space to elaborate upon his motion for new counsel.
The court engaged in a colloquy with defense counsel,
ascertaining whether he could effectively represent defendant. 
Defense counsel responded that he had been an attorney for the
Legal Aid Society since 1989, had conducted 30-40 felony trials,
and was not aware of any reason that would prevent him from
- 3 -
No. 219 & 220
2 On May 29, 2007 -- approximately thirteen days before
trial -- defense counsel first became aware that fingerprint
evidence had been recovered from a metal cookie tin, and that the
cookie tin had not been photographed or vouchered by the New York
City Police Department for defense expert's review.
- 3 -
providing defendant with effective representation.  Counsel also
stated that he was not seeking to be replaced and further
explained his belief that defendant's motion was based on
"frustration" regarding how fingerprint evidence had been
addressed.2  Defense counsel advised the court that he intended
to move to preclude such evidence in order to remedy any of
defendant's concerns.  The trial court denied the motion for
substitution of counsel, concluding that defense counsel was
capable of providing effective assistance and that the matter was
ready for trial.
Defendant's motion to preclude fingerprint evidence was
denied.  A jury convicted him of burglary in the second degree
and he received an enhanced sentence, as a persistent violent
felony offender, of sixteen years to life.
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the
conviction, concluding that defendant's day-of-trial motion
lacked specific allegations of a serious complaint to obligate
the trial court to inquire about the basis of the application (66
AD3d 430 [1st Dept 2009]).  Although there was no basis requiring
the trial court to engage in an inquiry, its colloquy with
defense counsel did not uncover any specific ground for
substitution of new counsel.  A Judge of this Court granted leave
- 4 -
No. 219 & 220
- 4 -
to appeal, and we now affirm.
People v Garcia a/k/a Rodriguez
On August 23, 2006, complainant Wilson Crispin, a truck
driver, discovered defendant Carlos Garcia inside the cab of his
truck.  Defendant displayed a knife, instructed complainant to
not call the police, and fled.  Complainant observed that the
passenger window had been broken and that a CB radio and his
identification card was missing.  Defendant was later arrested,
found carrying complainant's identification card.
On May 6, 2008, defendant accepted an offer to plead
guilty to attempted robbery in the first degree in exchange for a
sentence of seven years in prison with five years of post-release
supervision.  Defendant assured the court that he had not been
influenced in any way to accept the plea offer.  As a condition
of the plea agreement, defendant was required to speak with a New
York State Department of Probation officer regarding the facts of
the incident to help in the preparation of a pre-sentence report. 
He acknowledged this obligation after being unequivocally warned
by the court that failure to do so could result in the imposition
of an enhanced sentence.
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, on May 28, 2008,
the probation officer advised the court that defendant declined
to speak about the facts, and instead informed the officer that
he was considering withdrawing his plea.  When the court inquired
as to whether defendant wished to withdraw his guilty plea,
- 5 -
No. 219 & 220
- 5 -
defense counsel responded that defendant declined to do so.  The
court adjourned the hearing to provide defendant another
opportunity to speak with probation.
At the final sentencing hearing on June 24, 2008, the
probation officer apprised the court that defendant again
declined to discuss the facts of the case, and consequently,
failed to comply with the condition of the plea offer.  When the
court pronounced that it would enhance defendant's sentence for
his violation of the court's prior directive, defendant moved to
withdraw his plea and to substitute counsel.  Defense counsel
then indicated to the court that she was uncomfortable speaking
on the matter because it appeared that defendant took issue with
her performance as counsel, and she felt constrained by ethical
considerations from fully explaining the issue to the court. 
However, defense counsel did proffer a general complaint that
defendant believed he was coerced by counsel into accepting the
plea offer.  The court found this motion to be based on "a vague,
unspecified claim," and appeared dubious of the application,
referring to the prior hearings where defendant made assurances
that he was pleading guilty and would comply with conditions of
the plea offer. 
The court also spoke directly with defendant, who
alleged that he "was forced to take the plea bargain and [I] made
a decision and plead guilty . . . without making the decision." 
The court similarly questioned defendant about the prior hearings
- 6 -
No. 219 & 220
3 Defendant Garcia's sentence was enhanced six months by the
court.
- 6 -
where he had responded that his plea was voluntary and that
nothing affected his competency in accepting the plea offer.  The
court also referred to the probation officer's pre-sentence
reports where defendant reported that he was pleading guilty on
advice of counsel and did not intend to withdraw the plea.  The
court denied the motion to substitute counsel and sentenced
defendant to a term of seven years and six months, with five
years of post-release supervision.3
The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction
and found that the sentencing court engaged in a lengthy colloquy
where defendant and his counsel were only able to proffer
generalities as a basis of the motion to substitute counsel (71
AD3d 555 [1st Dept 2010]).  The court rejected defendant's
contention that the alleged conflict of interest prevented
further explanation of the complaint, concluding that his
attorney could have revealed the allegations without admitting
them.  A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal, and we now
affirm.
"Minimal Inquiry" Standard
It is well-settled that an indigent defendant is
guaranteed the right to counsel by both the Federal and New York
State constitutions (see US Const, 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, §
6), but this entitlement does not encompass the right to counsel
- 7 -
No. 219 & 220
- 7 -
of one’s own choosing (see People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 19
[1982]).  While a court has a duty to investigate complaints
concerning counsel, “this is far from suggesting that an
indigent’s request that a court assign new counsel is to be
granted casually” (id.).
Whether counsel is substituted is within the
"discretion and responsibility" of the trial judge (People v
Medina, 44 NY2d 199, 207 [1978]), and a court's duty to consider
such a motion is invoked only where a defendant makes a
“seemingly serious request” (Sides, 75 NY2d at 824 ).  Therefore,
it is incumbent upon a defendant to make specific factual
allegations of “serious complaints about counsel” (Medina, 44
NY2d at 207).  If such a showing is made, the court must make at
least a "minimal inquiry," and discern meritorious complaints
from disingenuous applications by inquiring as to "the nature of
the disagreement or its potential for resolution" (Sides, 75 NY2d
at 825).   
Upon such a review, counsel may be substituted only
where "good cause" is shown.  This Court has enumerated several
factors that should be weighed by a court in reviewing a motion
for new counsel.  "In determining whether good cause exists, a
trial court must consider the timing of the defendant's request,
its effect on the progress of the case and whether present
counsel will likely provide the defendant with meaningful
assistance" (People v Linares, 2 NY3d 507, 510 [2004]).  We have
- 8 -
No. 219 & 220
- 8 -
previously recognized two instances of good cause mandating
substitution of counsel.  "[F]irst, when an attorney is assigned
to represent two defendants between whom there is a conflict of
interest and second, when the defense counsel has 'not adequately
investigated his client's history of mental disorder'" (Linares,
2 NY3d at 511).  Here, neither appeal presents these two
situations, nor other factors meriting substitution of counsel.
In Porto, defendant contends that the trial court
failed to make a sufficient inquiry because it engaged in a
colloquy solely with defense counsel without directing any
questions towards defendant, and affording him a basis to explain
his petition.  We find defendant's argument unavailing.
While defendant seeks a rule of law requiring a court
to pose questions directly to every complaining defendant,
"practical constraints on the administration of a program for
providing legal assistance dictate that 'as long as assigned
counsel are men [and women] of ability and integrity, the
discretion and responsibility for their selection rest with the
court'" (Medina, 44 NY2d at 207 quoting People v Brabson, 9 NY2d
173, 181 [1961]).  Here, there is no evidence in the record
indicating an abuse of discretion by the court in denying the
motion for substitution of counsel where defendant failed to
proffer specific allegations of a "seemingly serious request"
that would require the court to engage in a minimal inquiry. 
Defendant's form motion did not contain any specific factual
- 9 -
No. 219 & 220
- 9 -
allegations that would indicate a serious conflict with counsel,
despite being provided the space to develop such a complaint (see
People v Thompson, 32 AD3d 743 [1st Dept 2006] ["summary denial
of defendant's conclusory application for new counsel was proper,
since defendant failed to make any serious complaint requiring
further inquiry"]; People v Stevenson, 36 AD3d 634, 635 [2d Dept
2007] ["Further inquiry was not required because his conclusory
assertions did not suggest the serious possibility of a genuine
conflict of interest"]).  Further, the trial court did engage in
a colloquy with defense counsel and properly exercised its
discretion by considering the timing of the motion -- the morning
of jury selection -- and expressing its confidence in the
abilities of defense counsel, who had conducted 30-40 felony
trials.  A vague, conclusory allegation of "frustration" was not
sufficiently specific to require a minimal inquiry by the court,
and certainly did not warrant a grant of his motion (see Medina,
44 NY2d at 208 [“tensions between client and counsel on the eve
of trial” is not good cause]).
While defendant urges that this is a more compelling
case than Sides, such an argument is not supported by the record. 
In Sides, the defendant's motion for new counsel was acknowledged
by the defense counsel who confirmed an apparent rift in the
attorney-client relationship.  This Court held that where
potential conflict is acknowledged by counsel's admission of a
breakdown in trust and communication, the trial court was
- 10 -
No. 219 & 220
- 10 -
obligated to make a minimal inquiry, but here, no facts exist to
mandate such a review.  A blank form motion and defense counsel's
explanation of defendant's "frustration" are not specific
allegations obligating the trial court to conduct a minimal
inquiry in light of the timing of the request on the morning of
jury selection and counsel's assurance of effective
representation based on his felony trial experience.  Rather,
here, as in People v Beriguette (84 NY2d 978, 980 [1994]), “we
reject defendant’s contention that [the court] . . . was
obligated to inquire further, after reviewing his motion for
reassignment of counsel, into the factual bases for his pro se
submission, as defendant failed to show good cause for
substitution."  As such, we find no basis to reverse the
Appellate Division and overturn defendant's conviction.
In Garcia, the record is clear that throughout the
series of court hearings, defendant never indicated any
dissatisfaction with counsel until the morning of sentencing (see
Medina, 44 NY2d at 205 [no dissatisfaction with counsel until the
morning of trial]; Linares, 2 NY3d at 511-512 [defendant had no
discontent with counsel until the eve of trial]).  It was not
until the final hearing, where the court indicated that it would
enhance defendant's sentence for failure to comply with plea
offer conditions, that defendant sought new counsel.  Here, the
court engaged in sufficient minimal inquiry by directing
questions to both defendant and defense counsel, but counsel
- 11 -
No. 219 & 220
- 11 -
consistently evaded expounding upon the motion.  However, she did
acknowledge that defendant had professed a belief that he was
coerced by counsel into accepting the guilty plea, and defendant
offered a similarly general allegation.  The court also properly
considered the progress of the case, referring to prior
assurances by defendant that he would plead guilty and comply
with conditions of the plea offer.  It can also be inferred from
the record that the motion for new counsel was a possible delay
tactic in light of the timing of the request after defendant's
persistent refusal to comply with the court's directive. 
Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion by the court to
conclude that defendant's vague claims were unavailing and to
deny the motion, particularly where a lengthy inquiry could not
find further facts to support the allegation (Linares, 2 NY3d at
511 ["The court . . . reasonably concluded that defendant's vague
and generic objections had no merit or substance"]).
Defendant Porto's additional argument, raising an
Apprendi challenge to New York's mandatory persistent violent
felony offender statutes, is also meritless.  
Accordingly, in each case, the order of the Appellate
Division should be affirmed.
- 1 -
People v William Porto
No. 219 
PIGOTT, J. (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the trial court's
failure to ask defendant about his motion for assignment of new
counsel before denying it was reversible error.
I don't disagree with the majority's statement of basic
principles, i.e. that the right to counsel is guaranteed by both
the Federal and State Constitutions.  However, the trial court's
responsibility to protect a defendant's right to counsel does not
end with the assignment of a lawyer (People v Linares, 2 NY3d
507, 510 [2004]).  Because assigned counsel must be effective, we
have repeatedly held that "trial courts must carefully evaluate
serious complaints about counsel" (id., quoting People v Medina,
44 NY2d 199, 207 [1978] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and
"should substitute counsel when a defendant can demonstrate 'good
cause'" for substitution (Linares, 2 NY3d at 510).  
Where defendant's request for new assigned counsel on
its face suggests "a serious possibility" of good cause for
substitution, the trial court must inquire into the nature of the
problem and whether it may be resolved (People v Sides, 75 NY2d
822, 824-825 [1990]).  Indeed, although we used the term "minimal
inquiry" in People v Sides (75 NY2d at 825), implying that a
- 2 -
No. 219
- 2 -
lengthy or extensive inquiry is not necessarily required, we
evaluate such an inquiry by considering whether or not it was
"diligent and thorough" (Linares, 2 NY3d at 511).   
Whether the trial court is always obliged to make
inquiries of defendant himself is less clear; and this, in my
view, is where the experience of the court is most important and
where record support for the court's ruling must be found.  What
is certain is that a defendant must be given the opportunity to
demonstrate whether he has good cause for new assigned counsel,
and it seems to me that -- at least when the defense counsel whom
defendants wants replaced does not state in any detail
defendant's reasons for seeking new counsel -- a "diligent and
thorough" evaluation of defendant's complaint would necessarily
require making an inquiry of defendant himself.  One way or the
other, "the defendant must at least be given an opportunity to
state the basis for his application" (People v Bryan, 31 AD3d
295, 296 [1st Dept 2006]).
Here, defendant's written pro se motion on its own
suggests a "serious possibility" that he was in irreconcilable
conflict with a lawyer who, according to defendant, would not
visit him or keep him apprised of motion practice -- until the
eve of trial.  And certainly defense counsel's casual assertions
about defendant's frustration tend to support the conclusion of a
- 3 -
No. 219
1  Porto may reasonably have felt that his lawyer's
representation was flawed.  Defense counsel admitted that it was
only on May 29, 2007 that he became aware that defendant's
fingerprint had been taken from a cookie tin in complainant's
apartment and initiated the process of finding out whether the
tin had been photographed or vouchered.  Counsel must not have
read the Voluntary Disclosure Form and attachment that he
received from the District Attorney, at the time of defendant's
indictment some eight months earlier, carefully enough to see
that the cookie tin needed to be preserved.
- 3 -
breakdown of trust.1  Significantly, these remarks do not explain
away defendant's complaint, or give the trial court a basis on
which to make a careful evaluation of whether trusting
communication between attorney and client had been irretrievably
broken.  Defendant's motion, in conjunction with assigned
counsel's comments, warranted such an inquiry. 
The People argue that the trial court was able, on the
basis of counsel's remarks, to ascertain that the disagreement
between defendant and his lawyer concerned the mishandling of the
cookie tin issue and would be resolved by a motion to preclude
the cookie tin evidence.  It is far from clear that the cookie
tin issue was defendant's only concern about counsel's
representation, and I don't see how even that disagreement could
reasonably be thought to be have been resolved by defense
counsel's (unsuccessful) eve-of-trial oral motion to preclude.
The majority rests its decision primarily on the
failure of defendant to make "specific factual allegations that
would indicate a serious conflict with counsel, despite being
- 4 -
No. 219
- 4 -
provided the space to develop such a complaint" (maj opn at 9). 
In fact, defendant made three factual allegations in his pro se
application and, if they lack specificity, it is only because
they are negative in character, as one would expect from a
complaint that a lawyer has failed to communicate. 
Like the Appellate Division, the majority of this Court
makes much of the fact that defendant's motion was a mere "form"
motion (see maj opn at 2, 9, 10).  Leaving aside the fact that
most motions are a form of one nature or another, the majority's
conclusion seems to be that this type of pro se motion is to be
frowned upon.  To the contrary, I find the fact that a defendant
went to the trouble to find such a form, fill it out and submit
it to the Court to be a strong indication of the seriousness of
defendant's claim.  Many, if not most, such motions are either
made verbally at the time of appearance in court or through
counsel -- not, as here, in written form.  Rather than being
criticized, this practice should be encouraged and taken
seriously.
I also believe that the majority unfairly highlights
the "timing of the request on the morning of jury selection" (maj
opn at 10), when defendant's motion was apparently completed and
signed 10 days earlier, defendant told the trial court that he
had sent the application to the court, and the thrust of the
application is that defense counsel failed to communicate
effectively with defendant.  Defense counsel's motion to preclude
- 5 -
No. 219
- 5 -
the fingerprint evidence, let it be noted, was oral and also made
on the day of trial.
Defendant's motion and defense counsel's remarks taken
together suggest a serious possibility of irreconcilable conflict
between defendant and counsel.  Whether defendant actually had
good cause for assignment of new counsel is a different matter,
which should be carefully separated from whether defendant's
request suggested a serious possibility that he had good cause.
Finally, I note that harmless error analysis is not
applicable (People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 273 [1980] ["we
reject the People's contention that defendant is entitled to a
new trial only if he can demonstrate that he was prejudiced by
the court's denial of the request for substitution of retained
counsel and an adjournment to prepare for trial.  The
constitutional guarantee to be represented by counsel of one's
own choosing is a fundamental right, and the doctrine of harmless
error is inapplicable upon a showing that such right has been
abridged."]).
In my view, reversal is mandated in light of our clear
direction in Sides and Linares.  A defendant is entitled to a new
trial, where the trial court asked him no questions concerning a
serious pro se motion seeking substitution of counsel, but
instead limited its inquiry to a cursory questioning of the very
counsel with whom the defendant is alleging a conflict: in
essence hearing only one side of the story.
- 6 -
No. 219
- 6 -
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Case No. 219:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Smith
concur.  Judge Pigott dissents in an opinion.
Case No. 220: Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and
Pigott concur.
Decided December 21, 2010