Title: Finch v. Fitzpatrick

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

254 So. 2d 203 (1971)
Leonard FINCH, Petitioner,
v.
Hon. W.L. FITZPATRICK, As Judge of the Circuit Court of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Washington County, Florida, Respondent.
No. 41096.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 20, 1971.
Rehearing Denied November 29, 1971.
*204 J. Ben Watkins, of Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen. T. Edward Austin, State's Atty., and Charles P. Pillans, III, Asst. State's Atty., for respondent.
ADKINS, Justice.
This is an original proceeding in prohibition or, in the alternative, quo warranto proceedings, attacking the authority of an assigned state attorney. A rule nisi was issued and a return has been filed.
T. Edward Austin, State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, was assigned by then Governor Kirk on November 16, 1970, to act as State Attorney of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit. This assignment was under Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A., which reads as follows:
Informations were signed and filed by Austin on November 24, 1970, charging petitioner with the offenses of assault with intent to commit murder and shooting into a dwelling.
Petitioner says that the executive order of the Governor assigning Austin was not in accordance with Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A., quoted above because it fails to state "good and sufficient reason" for assigning Austin.
In his executive order the Governor, after reciting that he had information concerning the
and
specifically found
It is the duty of the Governor under Fla. Const. F.S.A., art. IV, § 1(a) in the exercise of his executive power to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The exercise of this power and the performance of this duty are clearly essential to the orderly conduct of government and the execution of the laws of this State. An executive order assigning a state attorney is exclusively within the orbit of authority of the Chief Executive when exercised within the bounds of the statute. See Kirk v. Baker, 224 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1969). *205 The Governor is given broad authority to fulfill his duty in taking "care that the laws be faithfully executed," and he should be required to do no more than make a general recitation as to his reasons for assigning a state attorney to another circuit.
No further recitation for the Governor's reasons for making the assignment was necessary. See Johns v. State, 144 Fla. 256, 197 So. 791 (1940). The purpose of the time limitation in the statute is to prevent the Chief Executive from frustrating the will of the voters of a judicial circuit by replacing any elected state attorney with one chosen by the Governor from another circuit. The Chief Executive has a broad discretion in determining "good and sufficient reason" for assigning a state attorney to another circuit, and is not required to delineate in particularity his reason for the assignment.
On March 23, 1971, Governor Reubin O'D. Askew entered another executive order wherein he found
Governor Askew then revoked the executive order of 1970, and pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 27.15, F.S.A., ordered State Attorney Austin and his assistants
Fla. Stat. § 27.15, F.S.A., authorizing the Governor to assign state attorneys to assist in other circuits contains the following:
On April 3, 1971, Governor Askew entered another executive order reciting that the investigation had been completed, the informations had been filed and finding that
This order assigned State Attorney Austin and his assistants
This executive order was an assignment under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A., quoted above.
On May 3, 1971, petitioner instituted the present proceedings by filing his suggestion for issuance for a writ of prohibition or in the alternative for a writ of quo warranto. Petitioner says that State Attorney Austin was assigned to the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit for a period in excess of sixty days in a calendar year without approval by order of the Supreme Court, as required by Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A. The respondent says that this requirement of Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A., is unconstitutional. It is well settled that this Court will not decide the constitutionality of a statute where its decision can rest on other ground. Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971).
The original executive order of November 16, 1970, was issued under Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A., and the informations were filed within the 60-day period and in the "calendar year" 1970.
The term "calendar year" as used in the statute means the year from January 1st to December 31st inclusive, and not a period of twelve months commencing at any fixed or designated month and terminating with the day of the corresponding month in the year succeeding year. See Carroll v. Wright, 131 Ga. 728, 63 S.E. 260, 267 (1908); Bell v. Mackey, 191 S.C. 105, 3 S.E.2d 816, 831 (1939); Clopton v. Scharrenberg, 106 Cal. App. 2d 430, 235 P.2d 84, 88 (1951); In re Rosenstein's Estate, Sur., 124 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1953); McGinness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 177 Pa.Super. 104, 110 A.2d 918, 920 (1955); Newman v. Borough of Fairlawn, Bergen County, 31 N.J. 279, 157 A.2d 314 (1960); State ex rel. Gareau v. Stillman, 18 Ohio St.2d 63, 247 N.E.2d 461 (1969).
The executive order of March 23, 1971, was issued under the authority of Fla. Stat. § 27.15, F.S.A. Where one state attorney is assigned to another circuit under this statute for the purpose of assisting the resident state attorney, the statute does not require that such assignment be limited to a period of sixty days.
The executive order of April 5, 1971, was issued during a new "calendar year" under the authority of Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A. This, of course, is the statute which contains the 60-day limitation, but the present proceedings were instituted prior to the expiration of sixty days from the date of the issuance of this executive order. In other words, the record does not disclose that State Attorney Austin has served under any executive order of assignment issued under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 27.14, F.S.A., for a period in excess of sixty days in any one "calendar year."
The reasons for the assignments are sufficiently stated in the executive orders and State Attorney Austin was properly performing his duty under the executive order.
By motion to quash, the defendant challenged the authority of Austin and his assistants to continue the prosecution. In *207 its order denying this motion, the Court stated:
The constitutionality of the statute was not properly before the trial judge, and the above-quoted portion of his order is hereby expunged from the record.
The rule nisi in prohibition is discharged and these proceedings are dismissed.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C.J., and ERVIN, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.