Title: Addison v. Jurgelsky

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Mims, JJ., and Carrico, 
Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
JERRY K. ADDISON, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH A. ADDISON, 
DECEASED, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092361 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
January 13, 2011 
WILLIAM JURGELSKY, JR., M.D., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 
Patrick R. Johnson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether a wrongful death action 
brought by one of two co-administrators of an estate was 
properly dismissed as time-barred when the second co-
administrator was joined as a plaintiff after the expiration of 
the statute of limitations. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
The decedent, Joseph A. Addison (“Joseph”), died on April 
3, 2004 after having been treated at Clinch Valley Medical 
Center.  Joseph’s parents, Jerry K. Addison (“Jerry”) and 
Shirley B. Addison (“Shirley”) (collectively, “the Addisons”), 
qualified in the circuit court as co-administrators of his 
estate.  On March 21, 2006, Jerry, as administrator, filed a 
complaint pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, Code § 8.01-50, 
alleging medical malpractice against Joseph’s treating 
physicians, William Jurgelsky, Jr., M.D., Antonio M. Peralta, 
M.D., Thomas Cortellesi, D.O., Edna A. Griffenhagen, M.D., and 
Galen-Med, Inc.  Jurgelsky, Peralta, Cortellesi, and Galen-Med, 
Inc. filed motions to abate due to the nonjoinder of Shirley as 
co-administrator, asserting that “[a] single administrator of 
an estate that has two co-administrators has no right, standing 
or authority to file an action at law without the other co-
administrator joining in the case.”  The circuit court denied 
the motion to abate and granted Jerry leave to file an amended 
complaint joining Shirley as a plaintiff.  Jerry filed an 
amended complaint including Shirley as a party plaintiff and 
naming only Jurgelsky, Peralta, and Cortellesi as defendants 
(collectively the “Defendants”) on September 12, 2008. 
 
The Defendants then filed pleas of the statute of 
limitations to the amended complaint.  They asserted, inter 
alia, that the two-year limitation period set forth in Code 
§ 8.01-244 was not tolled prior to Shirley’s joinder because an 
action by only one of two co-administrators was a nullity.  
Consequently, the limitations period had expired.  Following 
argument, the circuit court granted the pleas and dismissed the 
amended complaint with prejudice.  We awarded the Addisons this 
appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
This appeal presents purely legal questions of statutory 
construction which we review de novo.  Conger v. Barrett, 280 
Va. 627, 630, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2010).  There are two 
 
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assignments of error.  The Addisons argue that the circuit 
court erred in ruling that Jerry lacked standing as a single 
co-administrator to maintain a wrongful death action.  
Alternatively, they argue that Shirley, as a necessary party, 
could be joined as a party plaintiff after expiration of the 
relevant statute of limitations.  We must first determine 
whether a single co-administrator may file an action under the 
Wrongful Death Act. 
 
Code § 8.01-50(B), in pertinent part, states, “Every such 
action under this section shall be brought by and in the name 
of the personal representative of such deceased person within 
the time limits specified in § 8.01-244.”  In this action, the 
specified time limit is two years.  See Code § 8.01-244.  The 
Addisons argue that this language does not require that all co-
administrators must join as plaintiffs and that a single co-
administrator may maintain a wrongful death action.  We 
disagree. 
 
We look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, 
Conger, 280 Va. at 632, ___ S.E.2d at ___, and presume that 
“ ‘the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it 
enacted the relevant statute.’ ”  City of Virginia Beach v. ESG 
Enters., 243 Va. 149, 153, 413 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1992) (quoting 
Barr. v. Town & Country Props., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 
672, 674 (1990)).  If the General Assembly had intended for any 
 
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one of two or more administrators to pursue a wrongful death 
action, it could have used the indefinite articles “a” or “any” 
rather than the definite article “the” prior to the term 
“personal representative.”  By using the term “the personal 
representative,” while knowing that more than one individual 
may qualify as administrator or executor, the General Assembly 
intended a unity of action whether there is one personal 
representative or more than one. 
 
This interpretation is consistent with this Court’s 
holding in a context other than the Wrongful Death Act.  In 
Beavers v. Beavers, 185 Va. 418, 39 S.E.2d 288 (1946), we 
stated, “The court never forces a joint administration, and for 
an obvious reason – because it is necessary for the 
administrators to join in every act – there might be a complete 
contrariety of action, and it would be in the power of any one 
of them to defeat the whole administration.”  Id. at 424, 39 
S.E.2d at 291 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).1  
As the circuit court accurately noted in its letter opinion in 
this case, “independent actions by co-administrators would 
force defendants to litigate two or more separate suits on the 
same issue and may result in multiple recoveries for the same 
                     
 
1 See also William H. Bryson, Bryson on Virginia Civil 
Procedure § 5.02[3](4th ed. 2005 & Supp. 2010) (“Co-executors 
and co-administrators must all join or be joined as co-
plaintiffs or co-defendants”). 
 
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cause of action.”  We agree that Code § 8.01-50 precludes such 
a result. 
 
However, the circuit court based its dismissal upon the 
conclusion that Jerry did not have standing to sue on behalf of 
his decedent.  That conclusion was error:  an administrator (or 
executor) is the only person with standing to sue under the 
Wrongful Death Act.  See Code § 8.01-50(B).  Jerry was not a 
plaintiff without statutory authority to act; rather, the 
correct inquiry was whether Jerry could maintain the action 
solely or whether Shirley also was a necessary party plaintiff. 
 
Having determined that a single co-administrator may not 
maintain a wrongful death action, we now turn to the remaining 
issue, whether the absent co-administrator may be joined as a 
party plaintiff pursuant to Code § 8.01-5 after expiration of 
the statute of limitation. 
 
In its letter opinion, the circuit court found that 
Shirley was a necessary party and that Jerry lacked standing to 
sue alone.  The circuit court relied upon Cook v. Radford 
Community Hospital, Inc., et al., 260 Va. 443, 451, 536 S.E.2d 
906, 910 (2000), to rule that whether “an original party lacks 
standing is not an issue of misjoinder or non-joinder, rather a 
necessary party may not be added or a new plaintiff substituted 
for an original party that lacked standing to sue.” 
 
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However, Cook is distinguishable from this case.  In Cook, 
the sole plaintiff had no statutory authority to file the 
action, whether individually or in concert with another.  Id. 
at 448, 536 S.E.2d at 908.  Consequently, to maintain the 
action, the only plaintiff would have to be dismissed and a new 
plaintiff substituted in her stead.  Since she had no authority 
to act under any circumstances, the Court ruled that her filing 
had to be dismissed.  Id. 
 
Code § 8.01-5(A) states, in pertinent part: 
No action or suit shall abate or be defeated by 
the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties, 
plaintiff or defendant, but whenever such 
nonjoinder or misjoinder shall be made to appear 
by affidavit or otherwise, new parties may be 
added and parties misjoined may be dropped by 
order of the court at any time as the ends of 
justice may require. 
The plain language of this statute would permit the joinder of 
Shirley Addison as an additional party plaintiff at any time as 
the ends of justice may require.  The statute is remedial in 
nature and therefore should be liberally construed.  Carroll v. 
Johnson, 278 Va. 683, 693, 685 S.E.2d 647, 652 (2009). 
The Defendants rely on this Court’s decisions in 
Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper, Inc., 239 Va. 71, 387 S.E.2d 
468 (1990), and Ahari v. Morrison, 275 Va. 92, 654 S.E.2d 891 
(2008), in support of their assertion that when a claim is 
 
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time-barred as to a necessary party the entire claim must be 
dismissed.  These cases are distinguishable. 
Mendenhall involved the application of Virginia’s 
mechanic’s lien statute.  The suit to enforce the lien named 
only the property developer as a party defendant and it omitted 
subsequent purchasers and deed of trust trustees and 
beneficiaries, all of whom are necessary parties defendant 
pursuant to the statute.  Id. at 75, 387 S.E.2d at 470.  This 
Court ruled that the necessary parties defendant could not be 
added and the “suit, time-barred as to any necessary party, 
must be dismissed because such necessary party is not subject 
to the court’s jurisdiction.”  Id. 
In Ahari, the plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 
1:8 for leave to amend her complaint to add additional parties 
defendant.  275 Va. at 93-94, 654 S.E.2d at 892.  The motion 
was filed prior to expiration of the relevant statute of 
limitation but was granted by order entered after expiration of 
the statute.  Id.  The trial court dismissed the amended 
complaint as time-barred.  Id. at 95, 654 S.E.2d at 893.  This 
Court affirmed, stating that when a new party defendant is 
joined, “the operative filing date” was when the trial court 
granted leave to amend.  Id. at 96, 654 S.E.2d at 893-94. 
Unlike Mendenhall and Ahari, in this case the absent 
necessary party was a plaintiff who sought to be joined to a 
 
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pending claim rather than a defendant who would have resisted 
such joinder.  This distinction is fully consistent with the 
policy that underlies statutes of limitation, which are 
intended to protect non-parties from becoming subject to 
judicial claims when the passage of time may have increased the 
difficulty of defending such claims.  See, e.g., Carter v. 
Carter, 232 Va. 166, 172, 349 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1986) (recognizing 
that a purpose of statutes of limitation is to “protect 
defendants against the problems of proof following lapse of a 
lengthy period of time”); Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 227 
Va. 354, 359, 315 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1984) (same).  In Burns, we 
explained that “statutes of limitation serve an important and 
salutary purpose. Without them, defendants could find 
themselves at the mercy of unscrupulous plaintiffs who hoard 
evidence that supports their position while waiting for their 
prospective opponents to discard evidence that would help make 
a defense.”  Id. 
The mere addition of a co-administrator (or co-executor) 
of an estate as a necessary party plaintiff who willingly 
submits to the court’s jurisdiction does not offend the public 
policy underlying the statutes of limitation and does not 
 
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prejudice any defendant in an action bringing claims only of 
the estate.2 
We hold that Code § 8.01-5 permits the joinder of a co-
administrator to a wrongful death action under Code § 8.01-50 
when the other co-administrator is already a party plaintiff 
and the claims in the suit do not change as a result of the 
joinder.  We further hold that Jerry’s initial filing, without 
his co-administrator, of the wrongful death claim tolled the 
statute of limitations for that claim.  See Code § 8.01-244(B).  
The circuit court therefore erred in sustaining the Defendants’ 
plea of the statute of limitations.  We will reverse and remand 
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
 
2 The present case presents no prospect of a counterclaim 
against the newly added co-administrator, so the Court has no 
occasion in this opinion to comment on the statute of 
limitation issues that might arise in that circumstance.  See 
Code § 8.01-233. 
 
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