Title: Mantia v. Missouri Department of Transportation

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc
      ) 
LINDA MANTIA, 
      ) 
      ) 
Respondent,          
      ) 
      ) 
v.   
      ) 
No. SC95885 
      ) 
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF 
      ) 
TRANSPORTATION, 
      ) 
      ) 
            Appellant, 
      ) 
      ) 
and 
      ) 
      ) 
TREASURER OF MISSOURI, AS 
      ) 
CUSTODIAN OF THE SECOND 
 
      ) 
INJURY FUND, 
 
      ) 
      ) 
Respondent. 
      ) 
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 
The Missouri Department of Transportation (hereinafter, “Employer”) appeals 
from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s (hereinafter, “the Commission”) 
decision awarding Linda Mantia (hereinafter, “Employee”) workers’ compensation 
benefits representing 50 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole and 
the right to future medical care for her work-related mental injury.  Employer claims the 
Opinion issued September 12, 2017
2 
 
Commission misapplied the law and its award was not supported by sufficient, 
competent, and substantial evidence.   
This Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 10, of the Missouri 
Constitution, because it granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals.  The 
Commission’s decision is vacated and the cause is remanded because the Commission 
failed to apply the applicable and clear statutory standards.   
Procedural and Factual Background 
Employee worked for Employer for more than twenty years.  Employee became a 
crew leader and, eventually, a supervisor.  Her duties included providing traffic control 
and assistance at motor vehicle accident scenes on Missouri highways.  Early in her 
career, Employee observed accident scenes as often as four times per week.  In the 1990s, 
motorist assist workers responded to the less serious accidents; yet, Employee and her 
crew responded to the more serious accidents, which often included fatalities.   
 
In February 2008, Employee’s primary care physician diagnosed her with 
depression and referred her to Dr. Asif Habib (hereinafter, “Dr. Habib”).  Employee 
reported conflicting symptoms to Dr. Habib, and he prescribed her several medications.  
Employee stopped seeing him because she believed he was more interested in prescribing 
medications than in treating her. 
 
Employee then began counseling with Dr. Timothy Jovick (hereinafter, “Dr. 
Jovick”) from August 2008 until early 2013.  Employee talked with Dr. Jovick about her 
experiences and psychiatric symptoms.  Employee described her belief that her 
motivation and self-image as a supervisor had declined, she became angry at motorists 
3 
 
who sped in construction zones, and she “stopped doing things.”  Dr. Jovick encouraged 
Employee to drive by the areas she sought to avoid.  Employee stopped seeing Dr. Jovick 
because she felt speaking with him only caused her to relive her traumatic experiences.   
In October 2008, Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking benefits 
for mental injuries and disability arising from her work.  Employee presented her claims 
in a hearing before an administrative law judge (hereinafter, “ALJ”).  Both Employee and 
Employer presented medical expert testimony.   
Employee presented Dr. Jovick as her expert.  Dr. Jovick testified he relied only 
upon the medical history Employee provided and did not review any other medical 
records.  Dr. Jovick concluded Employee suffered work-related depression and her 
condition represented major depressive disorder.  Dr. Jovick also believed Employee 
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by her work.  However, Dr. Jovick 
conceded that a “more comprehensive assessment” of Employee, including an 
independent psychological and neuropsychological evaluation, may be warranted for 
purposes of adjudicating workers’ compensation matters. 
Employer presented Dr. Wayne Stillings (hereinafter, “Dr. Stillings”) as its expert.  
Dr. Stillings testified he treated Employer’s workers, Illinois Department of 
Transportation workers, and workers from private companies who work on highway 
scenes.  Dr. Stillings explained it is not unusual or extraordinary for highway workers to 
witness human tragedy at highway scenes.  Dr. Stillings concluded Employee suffered a 
depressive disorder and the prevailing cause was her employment.  Dr. Stillings opined 
Employee’s work-related depressive disorder resulted in permanent partial disability.  
4 
 
The ALJ denied Employee’s claim for compensation because she failed to prove 
she suffered extraordinary and unusual work-related stress as required by section 
287.120.8.1  The ALJ specifically noted Employee’s testimony that other supervisors 
witnessed the same type of accident scenes as she did and Dr. Stillings’ testimony that it 
was not extraordinary or unusual for highway employees to view human tragedy when 
responding to an accident.  Employee sought review by the Commission. 
The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision.  The Commission awarded 
Employee benefits based on 50 percent permanent partial disability as a result of her 
mental injury and ordered Employer to pay for future medical care to treat her mental 
injury.  Employer appeals. 
Standard of Review 
This Court may modify, reverse, remand, or set aside the Commission’s decision 
only when:  (1) the Commission acted ultra vires; (2) the decision was procured 
fraudulently; (3) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; (4) there 
was not sufficient competent evidence to support the award.  Greer v. SYSCO Food 
Servs., 475 S.W.3d 655, 664 (Mo. banc 2015); section 287.495.1, RSMo 2000.   
The whole record must be examined in order to determine whether there is 
sufficient and competent evidence to support the Commission’s decision.  Hampton v. 
Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222-23 (Mo. banc 2003).  Questions of law are 
                                                 
1 All statutory references herein are to RSMo Supp. 2005, unless otherwise noted. 
5 
 
reviewed de novo.  Malam v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 492 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Mo. banc 
2016). 
Discussion 
Employer raises three points on appeal, alleging the Commission erred because 
there was insufficient competent, substantial, and objective evidence:  (1) to support the 
award; (2) to conclude Employee suffered a permanent partial disability of 50 percent of 
the body; and (3) to support awarding Employee future medical care.  This Court need 
only address Employer’s first point on appeal; the resolution of that point renders the 
remaining points moot. 
Under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law (hereinafter, “the Act”), an 
employer is liable to provide compensation pursuant to the terms of the Act for an 
employee’s personal injuries.  Section 287.120.1.  Section 287.120.8 provides the 
framework for determining when a mental injury is compensable under the Act.  A 
“[m]ental injury resulting from work-related stress does not arise out of and in the course 
of the employment, unless it is demonstrated that the stress is work related and was 
extraordinary and unusual.  The amount of work stress shall be measured by objective 
standards and actual events.”  Id. 
“Workers’ compensation law is entirely a creature of statute, and when 
interpreting the law the court must ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms and give effect to that intent if possible.”  
Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 381 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting 
Greenlee v. Dukes Plastering Serv., 75 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Mo. banc 2002)).  The primary 
6 
 
rule of statutory construction is to determine the legislature’s “intent from the language 
used, give effect to that intent if possible, and consider the words used in their plain and 
ordinary meaning.”  Treasurer of State-Custodian of Second Injury Fund v. Witte, 414 
S.W.3d 455, 461 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting State ex rel. Nixon v. QuickTrip Corp., 133 
S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. banc 2004)). 
This Court presumes every word, sentence, or clause in a statute has effect, and 
the legislature did not insert superfluous language.  Wehrenberg, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 
352 S.W.3d 366, 367 (Mo. banc 2011).  “In the absence of statutory definitions, the plain 
and ordinary meaning of a term may be derived from a dictionary, and by considering the 
context of the entire statute in which it appears.”  State ex rel. Burns v. Whittington, 219 
S.W.3d 224, 225 (Mo. banc 2007) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  This 
Court must strictly construe the provisions of the Act.  Section 287.800.1. 
 
To recover under section 287.120.8, a claimant must demonstrate “by objective 
standards and actual events” the amount of work stress endured was both “work related 
and was extraordinary and unusual.”  The claimant must also demonstrate that based on 
this work-related stress, he or she suffered a mental injury.  Id.  The Commission 
recognized section 287.120.8 required Employee to meet an objective standard for 
recovery, but it failed to apply the legal meaning of “objective.”   
An objective standard is “[a] legal standard that is based on conduct and 
perceptions external to a particular person.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1624 (10th ed. 
2014).  An objective standard contrasts with a subjective standard, which is defined as, 
7 
 
“A legal standard that is peculiar to a particular person and based on the person’s 
individual views and experiences.”  Id.   
Here, Employee’s testimony and her doctors’ testimony regarding her work-
related stress was relevant to show she sustained an injury and its cause.  Yet, this 
testimony was insufficient to meet the statutorily required objective standard of proving 
Employee’s stress was extraordinary and unusual.  Section 287.120 “does not clearly set 
forth what objective standards should be used to discern the extraordinary and unusual 
nature of an employee’s work-related psychological injury.”  37 Mo. Prac., Employment 
Law & Practice sec. 10:16.  However, it is clear that objective standards are well defined 
in our case law.   
This Court long has held in tort cases, “‘The standard of conduct exacted by the 
law is an external and objective standard ***,’ and not the personal, individual, 
subjective standard of the actor involved.”  Hodges v. Am. Bakeries, Co., 412 S.W.2d 
157, 162 (Mo. banc 1967) (quoting Dixon v. Gen. Grocery Co., 293 S.W.2d 415, 421 
(Mo. 1956)).  In malpractice cases, an expert opinion must be based on the “objective 
legal standard of care” rather than on the expert’s “own undisclosed subjective 
conception.”  Id.; see also MAI 11.06 (“The term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in 
this [these] instruction[s] means the failure to use that degree of skill and learning 
ordinarily used under the same or similar circumstances by members of defendant’s 
profession”).  Similarly, in negligence cases, a defendant’s conduct is evaluated not by 
whether the defendant subjectively believed his or her conduct was appropriate, but 
rather based upon the care an ordinarily careful person would use under the same or 
8 
 
similar circumstances.  See MAI 11.02 (“The term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in 
this [these] instruction[s] means the failure to use that degree of care that an ordinarily 
careful person would use under the same or similar circumstances.”).   
Further, in cases involving unusual plaintiffs with specialized standards of care, 
the MAI provides additional guidance.  MAI 11.04 states that when the plaintiff is a 
minor, the jury should be told, “The term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in this 
[these] instruction[s] with respect to [plaintiff] … means the failure to use that degree of 
care which an ordinarily careful [boy] [girl] of the same age, capacity and experience 
would use under the same or similar circumstances.”  Our cases apply this same standard 
in judging the standard of care for children as compared to other similarly situated 
children.  See, e.g., Lester v. Sayles, 850 S.W.2d 858, 867 (Mo. banc 1993) (finding the 
standard of care in crossing street is determined “in relation to the expectations held for 
other children in the same or similar circumstances”); Root By & Through Root v. Mudd, 
981 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (finding child bicyclist would be judged by 
“the care that a ‘very careful child’ of ‘the same age, capacity and experience’ would use 
under the same or similar circumstances”).  The requirement that the jury find how a 
person would act – “under the same or similar circumstances” – is of key importance in 
Employee’s case, where the statute requires the Commission to determine objectively 
whether Employee’s stress was “extraordinary and unusual.”   
Accordingly, the objective standard for determining whether Employee’s stress 
was compensable is whether the same or similar actual work events would cause a 
reasonable highway worker extraordinary and unusual stress.  Such evidence might be 
9 
 
introduced through the testimony of other highway workers as to the circumstances that 
are experienced as part of the job in general, but individualized, subjective reactions to 
those circumstances are irrelevant.  Employee need not show the subjective experiences 
of her fellow workers were not as severe as her experiences, but rather, she must 
demonstrate the actual events she experienced were such that a reasonable highway 
worker would experience extraordinary and unusual stress.   
There may be multiple approaches to meet this objective standard, which may 
vary from case to case.  Most commonly, a claimant will meet this standard by 
comparing the claimant’s level of stress with the level of stress faced by other employees 
in the same profession.  See Schaffer v. Litton Interconnect Tech., 274 S.W.3d 597, 601 
(Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (finding a claimant must compare the level of work-related stress 
with other employees in similar positions to meet an objective standard) and Carnal v. 
Pride Cleaners, 138 S.W.3d 155, 158 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (same).   
The evidence submitted showed actual work events Employee experienced 
exposed her to stress.  Yet, Employee also needed to present evidence the actual work 
events comprising the “same or similar conditions” would have caused extraordinary and 
unusual stress to a reasonable highway worker.  It was then up to the Commission to 
evaluate this evidence. 
There was no evidence presented in this case that Employee’s work-related stress 
was objectively “extraordinary and unusual” as statutorily required.2  Employee 
                                                 
2 An examination of section 287.120 in its entirety further supports this result.  Section 
287.120.10 provides, “The ability of a firefighter to receive benefits for psychological 
10 
 
undoubtedly found her employment to be extremely stressful.  Yet, an award of workers’ 
compensation benefits must be based upon what Employee can objectively prove, which 
is not merely what she subjectively thought and felt.  Given the confusion as to the 
appropriate test for meeting the statutory objective standard for proof of extraordinary 
and unusual work-related stress, it is unclear whether Employee would have been able to 
present evidence sufficient to meet the statutory requirements. 
Conclusion 
The Commission failed to apply the proper objective standard when reviewing 
Employee’s claim.  Accordingly, the Commission’s award is vacated, and the cause is 
remanded for a proper review of Employee’s claim.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE 
All concur. 
                                                 
stress under section 287.067 shall not be diminished by the provisions of subsections 8 
and 9 of this section.”  See Byous v. Mo. Local Gov’t Emps. Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trustees, 157 
S.W.3d 740, 756 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (Smart, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (noting the legislature’s exception for firefighters in section 287.120.10 could be 
“because the legislature believed stress is such a regular matter for firefighters that it 
would be difficult to show that stress was of an ‘extraordinary and unusual’ degree for 
those in that occupation”).  If claimants were not required to demonstrate unusual and 
extraordinary stress by an objective standard, there would be no need to create an 
exception for firefighters in section 287.120.10.  The legislature made a clear exception 
for firefighters seeking workers’ compensation benefits that was not provided to any 
other class of claimants.  “When interpreting statutes, courts do not presume that the 
legislature has enacted a meaningless provision.”  State ex rel. Nothum v. Walsh, 380 
S.W.3d 557, 576 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Edwards v. Gerstein, 237 S.W.3d 580, 581 
(Mo. banc 2007)).  Allowing only subjective evidence to meet the objective standard 
announced in section 287.120.8 would render the firefighter exception in 287.120.10 
meaningless.