Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Carr

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Carr, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3633.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3633 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CARR. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Carr, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-3633.] 
Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct—Multiple 
violations, including improperly issuing capias warrants, engaging in 
improper plea bargaining and ex parte communications, issuing arbitrary 
dispositions, improperly using capias warrants and bonds to compel 
payment of fines and costs, exhibiting lack of decorum and dignity 
commensurate with judicial office, abusing contempt power, and failing to 
recuse—Indefinite suspension with conditions for reinstatement—
Immediate suspension from judicial office without pay. 
(No. 2021-1518—Submitted April 12, 2022—Decided October 18, 2022.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2020-054. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Pinkey Suzanne Carr, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0061377, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1993.  
Since January 2012, she has served as a judge of the Cleveland Municipal Court.  
She previously served for 13 years as an assistant prosecuting attorney for 
Cuyahoga County. 
{¶ 2} In a March 2021 amended complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, 
charged Carr with five counts of judicial misconduct.  Each count set forth 
numerous instances of misconduct that occurred over a period of two years and 
shared common elements that fall into one or more of the following categories: (1) 
issuing capias warrants and making false statements, (2) engaging in ex parte 
communications and improper plea bargaining and rendering arbitrary dispositions, 
(3) using capias warrants and bonds to improperly compel payment of fines and 
court costs, (4) exhibiting a lack of decorum and dignity in a judicial office, and (5) 
abusing contempt power and failing to recuse herself from contempt proceedings 
in which she had a conflict. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into 583 stipulations of fact and misconduct that 
span 126 pages and submitted more than 350 stipulated exhibits.  The hearing 
before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct was bifurcated 
to afford Carr additional time to develop mitigating evidence. 
{¶ 4} The panel accepted the parties’ stipulations of fact and misconduct 
and issued a 58-page report recounting limited—but representative—examples of 
Carr’s admitted misconduct.  The panel found that Carr “ruled her courtroom in a 
reckless and cavalier manner, unconstrained by the law or the court’s rules, without 
any measure of probity or even common courtesy” and that she “conducted 
business in a manner befitting a game show host rather than a judge of the 
Cleveland Municipal Court.”  The panel concluded that Carr’s actions “could not 
help but seriously compromise the integrity of the court in the eyes of the public 
January Term, 2022 
 
3 
and all who had business there.”  After weighing the applicable aggravating and 
mitigating factors, the panel recommended that Carr be suspended from the practice 
of law for two years and that certain conditions be placed on her reinstatement to 
the profession.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommended sanction.  The board further recommended that, in accordance 
with Gov.Jud.R. III(7)(A), Carr be immediately suspended from judicial office 
without pay for the duration of her disciplinary suspension. 
{¶ 5} Carr raises three objections to the recommended sanction.  She argues 
that the board applied the wrong legal standard and failed to accord proper 
mitigating effect to her mental-health disorders.  She further contends that the 
circumstances here support the imposition of a two-year suspension with 18 months 
conditionally stayed. 
{¶ 6} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct.  For the reasons that 
follow, we overrule Carr’s objections, reject the two-year suspension recommended 
by the board, indefinitely suspend Carr from the practice of law, and immediately 
suspend her from judicial office without pay for the duration of her disciplinary 
suspension. 
I. MISCONDUCT 
A. Count One—Issuing Capias Warrants and Making False Statements 
{¶ 7} In March 2020, Judge Michelle Earley, the administrative and 
presiding judge of the Cleveland Municipal Court, issued an administrative order 
suspending most courthouse activity in an effort to help prevent the spread of 
COVID-19.  Judge Earley ordered that all civil and criminal cases set for hearing 
between March 16 and April 3, 2020, be rescheduled for three weeks after the 
originally scheduled date.  The order directed the clerk of courts to issue 
summonses to all of the affected criminal defendants, compelling them to appear 
on the newly scheduled date, and similarly directed that all parties to the affected 
civil cases be notified of the postponement. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
{¶ 8} Despite Judge Earley’s order, Carr did not reschedule cases set on her 
docket.  On Monday, March 16, she presided over her regular docket—including 
eight criminal cases in which the defendants had not been jailed.  In each of those 
cases, Carr issued capias warrants for the defendants who did not appear in court.  
Her verbal statements on the record and her journal entries noted the defendants’ 
failure to appear; she issued capias warrants for their arrest and set bonds ranging 
from $2,500 to $10,000. 
{¶ 9} In contrast, Carr waived fines and court costs for defendants who were 
“brave enough” to appear in court despite the potential for exposure to COVID-19.  
And Carr informed the public defender assigned to her courtroom that defendants 
represented by that office should continue to appear in court contrary to the court’s 
press release regarding the administrative order. 
{¶ 10} On Tuesday, March 17, Carr presided over her regular docket as 
though the administrative order had never been issued.  Only a few nonjailed 
defendants and their counsel appeared.  Carr issued capias warrants and set bonds 
for seven defendants who did not appear.  When the public defender assigned to 
Carr’s courtroom asked whether his clients should plan to be in court the following 
day, Carr stated that they should.  The public defender then mentioned the 
administrative order and asked if there was any concern regarding COVID-19, but 
Carr replied that not everyone watches the news and that the public defender should 
not tell people to not show up, because she would be in court.  Shortly after the 
public defender left the courtroom, Carr turned to her staff and mocked him, calling 
him a “little idiot.” 
{¶ 11} After clearing her March 17 docket, Carr learned that pursuant to the 
administrative order, Matthew Woyma, the person responsible for scheduling the 
court’s cases, had cancelled her civil docket for March 26.  In open court, she 
instructed her bailiff to tell Woyma “to get his ass back on that phone and put all 
[her] civil cases back on.”  Woyma had already sent written notices of 
January Term, 2022 
 
5 
postponement to all parties.  As a result of Carr’s directive, Woyma had to notify 
every party to appear in court as originally scheduled. 
{¶ 12} On March 17, The Plain Dealer published an article on its website, 
Cleveland.com, with the headline “Cleveland judge flouts court’s postponements 
amid 
coronavirus 
pandemic, 
issues 
warrants 
for 
no-shows.” 
 
See 
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2020/03/cleveland-judge-flouts-courts-
postponements-amid-coronavirus-pandemic-issues-warrants-for-no-shows.html 
(accessed July 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/4U2E-U9UM].  Carr continued to 
conduct hearings. 
{¶ 13} Throughout the morning of March 18, Carr criticized Cleveland.com 
for accurately reporting that she was issuing warrants for people who did not come 
to court.  Between proceedings, Carr granted an interview to a reporter from a local 
television station in which she claimed that the Cleveland.com article was “untrue” 
and “reckless.”  She also denied issuing any arrest warrants for defendants who had 
failed to appear for proceedings in her courtroom that week.  After the interview, 
Carr continued to talk with the reporter who asked, “And you are not, to be clear, 
you are not issuing any warrants?”  Carr replied, “Absolutely not.”  However, that 
statement was untrue. 
{¶ 14} In a text-message exchange with Judge Earley later that day, Carr 
continued to falsely characterize her actions.  When Judge Earley asked Carr if she 
was issuing warrants for people who failed to appear, Carr responded, “Too late to 
ask that ridiculous question.  My [journal entries] reflect corona day 1, 2, or 3.  Time 
case was called and no defendant or [failed to appear] in which my journalizer notes 
NO WARRANT TO ISSUE.”  (Capitalization sic.)  That statement was patently 
false because none of Carr’s journal entries included the phrase “no warrant to 
issue.”  On March 20, the print edition of The Plain Dealer published an editorial 
about Judge Carr’s continuing to hold court in spite of the administrative order.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Judge Carr Put People at Risk in Defying Order of Court, The Plain Dealer (Mar. 
20, 2020) E2. 
{¶ 15} The board found that Carr’s failure to follow the administrative order 
proved to be a costly burden to the administration of justice.  When Judge Earley 
learned that Carr had, in fact, issued arrest warrants, she had to review all of Carr’s 
entries, recall the warrants, set bonds, and issue summonses for the next court 
appearances.  She also had to reschedule the civil cases that Carr had reset for 
March 26. 
{¶ 16} The Office of the Public Defender for Cuyahoga County filed a 
complaint in the Eighth District Court of Appeals seeking writs of mandamus and 
prohibition to compel Carr’s compliance with the administrative order.  That office 
also filed an affidavit of disqualification with the chief justice of this court, alleging 
that Carr had acted with a “calculated bias and disregard” for the welfare of those 
named in the affidavit and all other defendants appearing before her.  The court of 
appeals granted alternative writs of mandamus and prohibition, sua sponte, ordering 
Carr to comply with Judge Earley’s March 13, 2020 administrative order and 
issuing a stay of all orders and capias warrants issued by Carr after that date, and 
the chief justice disqualified Carr from presiding over the criminal and traffic cases 
of nonjailed defendants for the duration of Judge Earley’s order. 
{¶ 17} The board found that Carr “very publicly flouted her disregard of a 
court order that was designed to ensure the safety of the public and the court’s 
personnel during the pandemic,” that she punished members of the public who 
followed the administrative order and lied about it to the press and to the presiding 
administrative judge of her court, and that she thereby created the very danger that 
the order sought to prevent—the spread of the coronavirus in open court. 
{¶ 18} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that Carr’s 
conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a judge to act at all times in a manner 
that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of 
January Term, 2022 
 
7 
the judiciary, and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety), 2.2 
(requiring a judge to uphold and apply the law and to perform all duties of judicial 
office fairly and impartially), 2.5(B) (requiring a judge to cooperate with other 
judges and court officials in the administration of court business), and 2.8(B) 
(requiring a judge to be patient, dignified, and courteous with litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity) 
and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
B. Count Two—Ex Parte Communications, Improper Plea Bargaining, and 
Arbitrary Dispositions 
{¶ 19} The parties’ stipulations describe 34 cases in which Carr engaged in 
ex parte communications and improper plea bargaining with defendants and made 
arbitrary rulings between May 2019 and December 2020. 
{¶ 20} In open court on June 15, 2020, Carr unabashedly told her staff, 
“[T]he prosecutor isn’t here.  Let’s see how much we can get away with.”  
Similarly, in open court on June 18, 2020, Carr told one defendant, “Well the 
prosecutor isn’t here, so we need to get as many of these done before he or she gets 
here * * *.”  She then offered that defendant a plea deal that he accepted.  Carr 
admitted that she routinely conducted hearings without a prosecutor being present 
so that she could avoid complying with the requisite procedural safeguards set forth 
in R.C. 2937.02 et seq. (requiring a judge to inform the accused, among other 
things, of the nature of the charge, the identity of the complainant, the right to 
counsel, and the effect of a plea of guilty, not guilty, or no contest) and Crim.R. 11 
and Traf.R. 10 (both requiring a judge to engage in a personal colloquy with the 
accused to ensure that a plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered).  Carr also 
unilaterally recommended pleas to unrepresented defendants when no prosecutor 
was present and accepted the pleas without explanation or discussion of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
consequences of entering the plea, as required by Crim.R. 11 and Traf.R. 10.  In at 
least 6 of the 34 cases identified in this count, Carr unilaterally amended the charges 
against the defendant and falsely attributed those amendments to the prosecutor in 
her judgment entries. 
{¶ 21} After unilaterally entering no-contest pleas on behalf of defendants, 
Carr routinely found them not guilty of the charged offenses.  But even when she 
found defendants guilty, she arbitrarily waived fines and costs without any inquiry 
into the defendant’s ability to pay.  She then falsified her journal entries to conceal 
her actions.  In fact, Carr frequently stated that she was waiving fines and costs 
based on the defendant’s birth date or its proximity to the date of the hearing, a 
holiday, her own birthday, or the birth dates of her family and friends—even when 
the prosecutor was present in her courtroom.  Carr’s entries in at least 24 of the 34 
cases identified in Count Two falsely stated that she had conducted ability-to-pay 
hearings and had determined that the defendants were unable to pay fines or costs. 
{¶ 22} For example, M.T. was charged with speeding, a fourth-degree 
misdemeanor, and a seatbelt violation, a minor misdemeanor.  He was arraigned 
before Carr on June 15, 2020.  Earlier in the day, Carr had waived a defendant’s 
fine and costs simply because the defendant’s birthday was in June.  With no 
prosecutor present, Carr told M.T., “I’ll give you the same deal, even though your 
birthday is in September.”  She then asked M.T. whether he would like to plead 
guilty to a nonmoving violation.  M.T. nodded his head, and Carr replied, “Yeah, 
yeah, yeah.  I see your birthday is in September.  We’ll waive your fine and cost.  
Okay.  Good-bye.  You’re free to leave.” 
{¶ 23} M.T. did not orally enter a plea, nor did Carr advise him of the 
consequences of entering a plea.  Yet Carr dismissed his speeding charge and 
entered a guilty plea to the seatbelt offense.  On the journal entry, Carr wrote, “Fine 
& cost waived.”  She also checked boxes falsely indicating that she had conducted 
a hearing regarding M.T.’s ability to pay a fine and costs and that she had found 
January Term, 2022 
 
9 
him indigent and waived costs when, in fact, she had conducted no such hearing.  
The prosecutor entered the courtroom as Carr spoke with M.T., but he took no part 
in M.T.’s case.  After the prosecutor informed Carr that he was the prosecutor for 
her courtroom that day, Carr said, “Oops, prosecutor’s here,” and her staff laughed. 
{¶ 24} Similarly, M.H. was charged with fourth-degree-misdemeanor 
open-container and loud-noise offenses.  The prosecutor was not present when 
M.H. appeared before Carr for his arraignment.  Carr asked M.H. how he wanted 
to proceed, and he stated that he wanted to plead no contest to both offenses.  Carr 
suggested that she amend the loud-noise charge to a minor misdemeanor and let 
him plead to that offense so that he would not have an alcohol-related offense on 
his record.  She also told him that that course of action would allow him to avoid a 
mandatory fine of $75 and require him to pay just $5, plus court costs.  On the 
journal entry under “Prosecutor Amends Charge,” Carr wrote “601.08,” which 
refers to the charge of attempting to commit an offense.  See Cleveland Codified 
Ordinances 601.08.  However, it was Carr—not the prosecutor—who unilaterally 
amended the charge. 
{¶ 25} Carr’s practice of issuing journal entries falsely attributing amended 
charges to the prosecutor or falsely stating that she had conducted ability-to-pay 
hearings may violate Ohio laws, including R.C. 2921.13, which provides that a 
person who knowingly makes a false statement (1) in any official proceeding, (2) 
on a form, record, or other writing that is required by law, or (3) in a document that 
purports to be a judgment and is filed with the clerk of a court of record, commits 
the offense of falsification, a first-degree misdemeanor.  See R.C. 2921.13(A)(1), 
(11), and (13); see also R.C. 2921.13(F)(1). 
{¶ 26} Based on the parties’ stipulations and the evidence adduced at the 
hearing, the board found that Carr’s conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, 2.8(B), 
and 2.9(A) (prohibiting a judge from initiating, receiving, permitting, or 
considering ex parte communications, except in specifically enumerated 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
circumstances) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).  We adopt these findings of 
misconduct. 
C. Count Three—Improper Use of Capias Warrants and Bonds to 
Compel Payment of Fines and Costs 
{¶ 27} Under Loc.R. 4.07 of the Cleveland Municipal Court, at the time of 
sentencing, a defendant may request time to pay their fines and costs.  The 
sentencing judge may grant that request and set the payment due date.  The 
defendant is then directed to the clerk’s office to complete a time-to-pay (“TTP”) 
contract.  See Loc.R. 4.07(A)(1).  If the defendant cannot pay the fine by the due 
date, the defendant can file a motion to set an ability-to-pay hearing, which the 
clerk’s office sets before the sentencing judge.  See Loc.R. 4.07(B)(3)(b). 
{¶ 28} In her answer to relator’s amended complaint, Carr stated that she 
was “unaware of the dictates of Local Rule 4.07 of the Cleveland Municipal Court.”  
However, in her testimony during the disciplinary hearing, Carr stated that in 2017, 
her bailiff told her that the clerk’s office had a very low success rate when it came 
to actually collecting fines levied by the court.  Carr interpreted the bailiff’s 
statements as a suggestion that she ignore Loc.R. 4.07, and she followed that 
suggestion.  As a result, when a defendant was convicted of an offense, Carr would 
set a date for the defendant to pay his or her fines and costs.  Immediately after 
imposing the defendant’s sentence and without any motion by the defendant, Carr 
would set her own ability-to-pay hearing to occur a few days after the TTP due 
date—without notifying the defendant or the clerk’s office.  When the defendants 
failed to appear for those hearings, Carr would issue a capias warrant and set a bond 
between $2,500 and $25,000 based on the defendant’s failure to pay fines and costs 
that were typically just hundreds of dollars.  She would then write on the journal 
entry, “Post bond or pay fines and costs in full.  No [Community Work 
January Term, 2022 
 
11 
Service]/TTP.”1  She would also stamp on the journal entry “DEFENDANT DOES 
NOT QUALIFY FOR IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OR OVER THE COUNTER.  
JUDGE PINKEY S. CARR.”2  (Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 29} Carr admitted that by precluding defendants from participating in 
those programs, she ensured that they would be arrested and held on the bonds set 
in her journal entries.  Carr stipulated that “by tying the bond to the amount of the 
fine and costs, [she was] compelling the payment of fines and costs through 
incarceration, which is contrary to the law.”  See R.C. 2947.14 (requiring a judge 
to conduct a full hearing regarding an offender’s ability to pay a fine—during which 
the offender has the right to be represented by counsel, to testify, and to present 
evidence—and permitting a judge to commit an offender to a jail or workhouse 
upon finding that the offender is able to pay a fine but refuses to do so). 
{¶ 30} The board noted that this court had issued Carr a bench card 
outlining court practices for collecting costs and fines in adult courts; the bench 
card is replete with citations to caselaw and statutes indicating that a person’s ability 
to pay must be considered when assessing and collecting fines.  See Collection of 
Court 
Costs 
& 
Fines 
in 
Adult 
Trial 
Courts, 
available 
at 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/publications/jcs/finescourtcosts.pdf (accessed 
Aug. 2, 2022) [https://perma.cc/M9LH-APX8].  The bench card states that a formal 
hearing under R.C. 2947.14 “is the sole and exclusive method for imposing a jail 
sentence for willful refusal to pay a fine.”  Id., citing R.C. 2947.14 and State v. 
Ellis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22189, 2008-Ohio-2719.  Although Carr was 
admittedly aware of the requirements of Loc.R. 4.07 and R.C. 2947.14, she 
stipulated that she set up illusory hearings in the manner described above, and she 
 
1. Community Work Service is a program for people who do not have the funds to pay fines. 
 
2. In the Neighborhood and Over the Counter are public-service programs through the Cleveland 
Municipal Court clerk’s office that are designed to encourage people with outstanding warrants and 
tickets to obtain new court dates without the fear of being arrested. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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admitted that her conduct resulted in the arrest of six defendants, five of whom were 
incarcerated for some period of time as a result. 
{¶ 31} Carr admitted at the disciplinary hearing that her use of capias 
warrants and incarceration as a means to compel the payment of fines and costs by 
tying the bond to the amount of the fine and costs essentially created a modern-day 
debtors’ prison.  The board found that Carr eventually discontinued this approach 
to enforcing the payment of fines and costs and that she gave a “characteristically 
colorful explanation for doing so” in open court: 
 
You notice I’m no longer the bill collector for the Clerk’s Office.  
I’m not your b-i-t-c-h.  See, you get it?  Collect your own money.  
There you go, player, mm-hmm.  Collect your own money, player, 
mm-hmm.  I’m not your b-i-t-c-h.  Run tell that, mm-hmm.  Mm-
hmm.  How you like them apples?  Suckas. 
 
{¶ 32} Carr stipulated and the board found that her conduct with respect to 
Count Three violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).  We adopt 
these findings of misconduct. 
D. Count Four—Lack of Decorum and Dignity Consistent with 
Judicial Office 
{¶ 33} In addition to violating statutes, rules, and court orders designed to 
protect the legal interests of the public and the litigants in courtrooms throughout 
this state, Carr presided over her courtroom from a bench covered with an array of 
dolls, cups, novelty items, and junk that her own counsel found to resemble a flea 
market.  Carr testified that her bench had been that way since 2012, but that she had 
cleared it off a few months before her disciplinary hearing.  She also violated rules 
governing appropriate courtroom dress, order, and decorum.  From the appearance 
of her bench to the way she dressed and the way she treated the attorneys, litigants, 
January Term, 2022 
 
13 
and staff in her courtroom, Carr undermined public confidence in the independence, 
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 
{¶ 34} Cleveland Municipal Court’s website addresses appropriate 
courtroom dress and decorum for the public.  See Courtroom Decorum, 
https://clevelandmunicipalcourt.org/judicial-services/administrative-services 
/central-scheduling/courtroom-decorum#:~:text=Appropriate%20dress%20is%20 
required%2C%20including,exposed%20shoulders%2C%20and%20visible%20un
dergarments (accessed Aug. 2, 2022) [https://perma.cc/PT67-RF3A].  It states that 
all persons entering the court “shall conduct themselves with deference for the 
Court, displaying respect for the law, the judge or magistrate, parties, counsel, 
deputy bailiffs, and staff.”  Id.  It further identifies shorts and tank tops as 
“[p]otentially inappropriate dress.”  Id. 
{¶ 35} Despite the dress and decorum expectations for the general public, 
Carr presided over her courtroom wearing workout attire, including tank tops, t-
shirts (some bearing images or slogans), above-the-knee spandex shorts, and 
sneakers. 
{¶ 36} Carr was aware that the public took notice of her unconventional 
appearance.  She once told a defendant’s counsel, “Your client was scared to come 
in.  Officer Gray said he asked her, ‘Well, where is the Judge?’  She was like, ‘She 
in there,’ and he was like, ‘The one in the T-shirt?’  He said, ‘I’m calling my 
lawyer.’  He said, ‘Un-uh.  This couldn’t be real.’ ”  She then explained to counsel, 
“I dressed up Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.  It’s not happening today, and 
tomorrow is a national holiday, Juneteenth.  I’m not doing it, okay?” 
{¶ 37} The board found that Carr reveled in her lack of decorum, telling one 
defendant who apologized for his own attire, “You see how I’m dressed?  I have on 
my Cavs’ T-shirt.”  After another defendant expressed surprise that he had been 
found not guilty, Carr responded, “You can trust me.  I know I’m not dressed like 
a judge, but I’m really the judge.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
{¶ 38} During a series of proceedings in open court, Carr maintained a 
dialogue with her staff and defendants about the television series P-Valley, which 
is set in a Mississippi strip club.  Carr routinely referred to one of her bailiffs, Alicia 
Gray, as “Ms. Puddin” (or some variation thereof) in open court, and she asked one 
defendant if he knew “Ms. Puddin from P-Valley.”  She teased another bailiff about 
driving to P-Valley to “find him that little girl with the curly blonde hair.”  And in 
another display of inappropriate humor, she announced from the bench in open 
court, “You know what my P-Valley, my name gonna be Passion.  I got to go to 
that class though so I can learn how to climb that pole.” 
{¶ 39} Although Carr frequently behaved as though the rules of courtroom 
decorum did not apply to her, she did not hesitate to correct defendants for 
seemingly minor infractions.  The video evidence shows that she repeatedly 
admonished defendants for standing with their hands crossed or in their pockets 
instead of at their sides and screamed at them when they indicated that they had not 
heard what she said.  Carr also resented being called “ma’am” and berated 
defendants who attempted to show their respect for her by using that honorific.  
When male defendants referred to her as “ma’am,” Carr would chastise them, 
calling them “little boy.” 
{¶ 40} On multiple occasions, Carr joked that she would be amenable to 
some form of bribe in return for a lenient sentence.  In open court, she engaged in 
dialogues with defendants about accepting kickbacks on fines and arranging “hook-
ups” for herself and her staff for food and beverages, flooring, and storage facilities.  
For example, E.W. appeared before Carr on July 22, 2020, to request that she grant 
him driving privileges in his 2018 case for driving under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol.  After being informed that E.W. worked for an automotive company, Carr 
told her staff, “I got us another hookup.  We could get our cars fixed here,” and she 
stated that she had already gotten them some flooring and carpet.  E.W. told her to 
bring their cars in and that the company would love to take care of them.  Carr 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
replied, “Always getting us the hookups.  Don’t worry, we don’t have to pay.  It’s 
on him.” 
{¶ 41} Reinstatement of E.W.’s driving privileges was subject to a 
mandatory $50 fee.  But when E.W. indicated to Carr that he did not have the money 
to pay the fee, Carr said, “Well who’s going to pay his $50.  Puddin gets paid today, 
so does Mike.  They both got $50, after all, you hooking us up.  Maybe they will 
pay your $50.  $50 fee waived.  All right.  You’re all set.”  On the journal entry, 
Carr wrote “No Bitching Necessary.”  She then passed the journal entry to a bailiff 
and told him, “Show that [judgment entry] to Ms. Puddin.”  As Gray read the entry, 
Carr broke out laughing while her bailiff called the next case. 
{¶ 42} During Carr’s disciplinary hearing, her counsel questioned her about 
her undignified manner in the courtroom, including her loud, boisterous behavior, 
her use of a singsong tenor, and on at least one occasion, her use of a really loud 
voice when speaking to a defendant, as though the defendant would be more likely 
to understand her if she talked louder and slower.  But Carr offered no explanation 
for her behavior. 
{¶ 43} The parties stipulated and the board found that Carr’s conduct with 
respect to this count violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, 2.8(A) (providing that a judge 
shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the court), and 2.8(B).  We 
adopt these findings of misconduct. 
E. Count Five—Abuse of Contempt Power and Failure to Recuse 
1. A.B.’s Arraignment and First Contempt Charge 
{¶ 44} In May 2019, 20-year-old A.B. and her 19-year-old sister C.B. were 
arraigned before Carr.  The sisters had been charged with misdemeanor counts of 
assault and disorderly conduct for allegedly assaulting a 16-year-old girl.  Although 
Carr normally denied defendants personal bond when they were charged with a 
violent offense, she initially decided to release A.B. and C.B. on personal bond, 
provided that they wore global-positioning system (“GPS”) monitors. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
{¶ 45} For reasons that are unclear from the video recording of the 
arraignment, Carr made A.B. the focus of her attention.  Early in the proceeding, 
Carr stated, “Hi, I’m up here,” suggesting that A.B. may have looked away from 
Carr as she read the no-contact order that was a condition of A.B. and C.B.’s 
release.  Carr said to Maggie Walsh, the public defender representing the sisters, 
that A.B. “is going to get plenty of time with me.”  While Walsh conferred with her 
clients, Carr gave a monologue in a singsong voice about how nice it would be to 
have “company” in her courtroom, and she expressed her hope that A.B.’s case 
would be assigned to her.  She paused from time to time to laugh or hum a tune. 
{¶ 46} A few minutes after Carr resumed her docket, she said, “I knew I 
chose wisely.  I could tell, that little pleasin’ personality of hers.”  At that point, 
A.B. muttered something to the deputy about the way she was being treated and 
Carr snapped, “What did she say?  She said this Court is fucked.  What did she say?  
Oh, okay.  Corny as fuck.  Okay, corny as fuck.”  A.B. responded, “I said corny the 
way you’re treating me.  Like, I didn’t do—,” then Carr interrupted her, saying, 
“Oh, no problem.  Uh-huh.  Close your mouth.  Don’t interrupt my courtroom.  You 
don’t want to have a problem with me.  I told you that when—.”  At that point A.B. 
said something else.  Carr raised her voice and twice told A.B., “Close your mouth.”  
As A.B. continued to talk, Carr said to A.B., “Say one more thing,” and then to her 
bailiff, “Take her in the back for me, please.  Uh-huh.  Bye bye.” 
{¶ 47} A.B. left the courtroom in tears and remained in the lockup area for 
several hours until Carr had her brought back to the courtroom.  At that time, court 
staff informed Carr that while in the holding cell, A.B. had repeatedly referred to 
Carr as a “bitch” so loudly that another judge had to close his courtroom doors.  
After Walsh informed Carr that A.B. wanted to apologize to the court, Carr said 
that she did not need her apology.  Carr informed A.B. that she was being charged 
with two counts of contempt of court and one count of obstruction of official 
business. 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
{¶ 48} After A.B. was led out of the courtroom, Carr had her brought back 
in because A.B. was upset that she never had a chance to explain herself.  When 
Walsh encouraged A.B. to speak, A.B. said, “It doesn’t matter.  You don’t care.”  
But she continued, saying, “It doesn’t matter.  I’ve been trying to say anything.  I 
don’t even know what to say.  If I say anything, it’s just going against me.  It doesn’t 
matter.” 
{¶ 49} Carr asked A.B., “You think it’s acceptable behavior to call me 50 
bitches and say that the courtroom—this is some corny ass shit?”  A.B. said, “No, 
I’m trying to explain myself.  I walked up to the stand.  You read the paper.  You 
didn’t even let me talk.  You automatically changed your attitude from happy to 
just anything, like you was just basing me off of what—basically, just reading me 
off of a piece of paper.”  Carr started to explain that she had summoned the public 
defender to provide A.B. with legal counsel before she was equipped for GPS 
monitoring, and then she accused A.B. of rolling her eyes.  A.B. denied rolling her 
eyes and said that she was about to cry, but Walsh claimed that A.B. was not crying.  
As A.B. was led from the courtroom, Carr told Walsh that she could tell A.B. had 
a “screw loose.” 
{¶ 50} Carr charged A.B. with three counts of contempt of court in violation 
of R.C. 2705.02.  In an affidavit supporting those charges, Carr stated that A.B. 
“while in a courtroom, * * * did repeatedly refer to the court as a ‘bitch,’ and called 
the courtroom ‘shit.’ ”  But Carr did not personally hear A.B. say anything 
disrespectful.  On the contrary, court staffers had informed Carr that A.B. had 
mumbled a disparaging remark about the way she had been treated in the courtroom 
and that A.B. had called her a “bitch” several times while in the holding cell, outside 
of Carr’s presence. 
2. A.B.’s First Contempt Hearing 
{¶ 51} Despite Carr’s embroilment with A.B., she failed to recuse herself 
from A.B.’s contempt case.  On June 4, 2019, Carr called that case shortly before 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
9:00 a.m.  A.B. was not present, because she had an appearance before another 
judge on the underlying assault charge.  Carr asked A.B.’s counsel if he wanted to 
request a continuance to contact A.B.; then she said, “I would love to issue a capias, 
no bond.”  After A.B. arrived in the courtroom, Carr entered a not-guilty plea to all 
three charges on A.B.’s behalf, released her on a personal bond, and set a hearing 
date. 
{¶ 52} On August 13, 2019, A.B. appeared in Carr’s courtroom with 
counsel.  She withdrew her not-guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the first charge of 
contempt, a fourth-degree misdemeanor.  The prosecutor dismissed the remaining 
charges.  Before imposing a sentence, Carr offered an inaccurate summary of 
A.B.’s actions at her arraignment, falsely stating that A.B. had said, “I don’t have 
to look at you.” 
{¶ 53} Carr sentenced A.B. to 30 days in jail with 15 days suspended and 
five years of active probation; she imposed a $250 fine, which she suspended, and 
ordered A.B. to complete anger-management classes and read an apology letter 
aloud in open court on September 4. 
3. Presentation of A.B.’s Apology Letter and Second Contempt Charge 
{¶ 54} On September 4, A.B. appeared in court with her apology letter.  
A.B.’s attorney was late, and rather than wait for the attorney to arrive, Carr 
proceeded with the hearing.  Despite the fact that A.B. had completed the sentence 
that Carr imposed on August 13, Carr ordered her to submit to random substance-
abuse testing and to write an additional letter entitled “How would you feel if I 
called your mother a bitch?” 
{¶ 55} Carr continued to torment A.B. before her attorney arrived and gave 
the courtroom audience her own—not entirely accurate—version of A.B.’s 
underlying offense and behavior at her May 2019 arraignment. 
{¶ 56} A.B. interjected that Carr’s recitation of the case to the courtroom 
audience was inaccurate, and she continuously interrupted Carr.  After one 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
interjection, Carr asked, “What did she say?”  Her bailiff responded, “This is 
bullshit.”  Carr responded, “This is some bullshit?  Juanita, put her in the holding 
cell for me.  Uh-hmm.  Contempt charge again.  Thank you.  Appreciate it.  In the 
holding cell.  Bye-bye.  I’m not finished with this.”  A.B. attempted to interrupt 
Carr on several occasions to explain that she had not said what was attributed to her 
but had said, “Oh my goodness.”  A.B., who was then hysterical, was taken to the 
holding cell. 
{¶ 57} Later that morning, A.B.’s counsel appeared before Carr with A.B.  
Carr informed him of the events that had transpired and stated that she would be 
filing new contempt charges.  When A.B.’s counsel asked why Carr had proceeded 
in his absence when she knew that A.B. was represented by counsel, Carr stated 
that she was just accepting the written apology from A.B. and that her bailiff had 
attempted to call the attorney. 
{¶ 58} Carr failed to recuse herself from A.B.’s second contempt case.  In 
October 2020, A.B. pled no contest to the second contempt charge.  Carr sentenced 
her to 30 days in jail and ordered her to pay a $250 fine before suspending that 
sentence and waiving costs. 
{¶ 59} A.B. appealed the five-year community-control sanction imposed in 
her first contempt case, arguing that it was an improper penalty.  The court of 
appeals agreed and vacated that sanction.  See Cleveland v. [A.B.], 2020-Ohio-
5180, 163 N.E.3d 153 (8th Dist.). 
4. Findings of Misconduct with Respect to Count Five 
{¶ 60} The board found that the video of A.B.’s arraignment demonstrated 
that Carr “took an immediate dislike to A.B.” and that it was not apparent that A.B. 
had done anything to warrant 15 days in jail, mandatory drug testing, or five years 
of active probation.  The board noted that A.B. did not act out physically, refuse a 
lawful order, fail to cooperate, or engage in any conduct that required her to be cited 
in contempt as a means to alleviate an immediate threat to the administration of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
justice.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 163 Ohio St.3d 195, 2020-
Ohio-6732, 168 N.E.3d 1178, ¶ 24 (stating that because of the summary nature of 
punishment for a direct-contempt conviction, the obstruction must pose an 
imminent—not a likely or probable—threat to the administration of justice); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 165 Ohio St.3d 582, 2021-Ohio-3923, 180 N.E.3d 
1128. 
{¶ 61} During her disciplinary hearing, Carr admitted that charging A.B. 
with the first contempt for rolling her eyes in court and cursing in lockup was an 
abuse of her discretion.  She further admitted that she had antagonized A.B. from 
the bench, acted in a rude and discourteous manner, and instigated the incident that 
led her to cite A.B. in contempt for the second time.  Carr offered no real 
explanation for failing to recuse herself from the contempt cases. 
{¶ 62} Based on the parties’ stipulations and the evidence presented, the 
board found that Carr’s conduct with respect to A.B. violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, 
and 2.8(B) and that her failure to recuse herself from A.B.’s contempt cases violated 
Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(1) (requiring a judge to disqualify herself in any proceeding 
in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including when 
the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge 
of the facts that are in dispute in the proceeding) and 2.11(A)(2)(d) (requiring a 
judge to disqualify herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including circumstances in which the judge is 
likely to be a material witness in the proceeding).  We adopt these findings of 
misconduct. 
II. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION 
A. The Board’s Findings Regarding Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 63} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
January Term, 2022 
 
21 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 64} The parties stipulated and the board found that four aggravating 
factors and three mitigating factors are present in this case.  Aggravating factors 
consist of Carr’s dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple 
offenses, and the vulnerability of and resulting harm to the victims of her 
misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (3), (4), and (8).  Mitigating factors 
consist of Carr’s clean disciplinary record, her full and free disclosure to the board 
and cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and her good character and 
reputation. 
{¶ 65} Although the parties stipulated that Carr’s counsel had advised the 
authors of the 57 character-reference letters about the nature of the charges against 
Carr, the board noted that some of those letters “specifically state[d] that the author 
[had] no [personal] knowledge of the allegations and stipulated facts in this matter.”  
Moreover, the board found that as a result of Carr’s misrepresentations to her own 
counsel, Carr’s answer to relator’s amended complaint and her counsel’s 
correspondence soliciting character-reference letters from witnesses each falsely 
stated that Carr had negligently checked the box on court forms denoting that 
defendants had failed to appear in court and that Carr did not realize that a warrant 
would issue for those defendants.  But Carr, in fact, had also verbally ordered the 
warrants to issue in each of those cases. 
{¶ 66} In addition to the mitigating factors stipulated by the parties, Carr 
sought to establish that a mental disorder was a contributing cause of her 
misconduct.  Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) provides that a disorder may be a mitigating 
factor when all of the following are present: a diagnosis by a qualified healthcare 
professional, a determination that the disorder contributed to cause the misconduct, 
evidence of a sustained period of successful treatment, and a prognosis from a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
qualified healthcare professional that the attorney will be able to return to the 
competent, ethical practice of law under specified conditions. 
{¶ 67} To support her contention, Carr presented the reports and testimony 
of Jason R. Riebe, Psy.D, a forensic and clinical psychologist who conducted a 
three-part, independent psychological evaluation of Carr in May and June 2021 and 
issued a report regarding that evaluation in July 2021.  Riebe testified that in August 
2021, he transitioned to serve as Carr’s treating psychologist. 
{¶ 68} Dr. Riebe diagnosed Carr with a generalized-anxiety disorder and 
with a mood disorder due to menopause, sleep apnea, and stress.  Dr. Riebe 
conceded, however, that “mood disorder” is no longer recognized as a separate 
diagnostic category in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(5th Ed.2013).  While he described the term “mood disorder” as a broad 
classification for several types of depressive disorders and explained that Carr 
experienced significant depressive symptoms, he did not diagnose her with a 
depressive disorder. 
{¶ 69} Although he acknowledged that menopause and sleep apnea are very 
common conditions, he testified that in his opinion, Carr’s physical disorders 
contributed to her mental disorders and that her mental disorders contributed to her 
professional misconduct. 
{¶ 70} The board was troubled by Dr. Riebe’s limited knowledge of the 
facts and lack of familiarity with the breadth of Carr’s misconduct.  For example, 
Dr. Riebe had access to more than seven hours of video from Carr’s courtroom, but 
he admitted that he only viewed 15 to 30 minutes of that video.  He further 
acknowledged that his diagnoses and opinions were confined to what he had 
observed in the small sample of video that he had reviewed and that he could offer 
no analysis or opinion about other instances of misconduct set forth in relator’s 
complaint.  Although Dr. Riebe stated in his report that he had reviewed the 
pleadings in this disciplinary case, the board found that he was unaware of the 
January Term, 2022 
 
23 
potential consequences of Carr’s failure to abide by the administrative order that 
was issued at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, nor was he aware of the 
legal proceedings related to her noncompliance with that order.  And Dr. Riebe 
testified that he was unaware of Carr’s dishonesty in her answer to the charge of 
wrongfully issuing capias warrants in violation of the administrative order. 
{¶ 71} The board also noted that Dr. Riebe relied primarily on information 
provided by Carr and that his findings were undermined by her dishonesty.  For 
example, Carr lied to Dr. Riebe when she told him that she was unaware of Judge 
Earley’s March 13, 2020 order until April 2020, and she blamed her bailiff for her 
purported ignorance when, in fact, she was fully aware of the order on March 16.  
She also told Dr. Riebe that she had committed some “unintentional clerical errors” 
when, in fact, she had intentionally falsified numerous journal entries.  The board 
was also troubled by the fact that although Carr’s misconduct included a pervasive 
and disturbing pattern of lies, Dr. Riebe testified that there was no correlation 
between her mental disorders and her dishonesty. 
{¶ 72} Dr. Riebe testified that Carr is “a very sick individual” who requires 
“an extended course [of treatment] for a year.  And * * * more if need be.”  He 
recommended that Carr begin a course of cognitive-behavioral and supportive 
psychotherapy consisting of weekly sessions.  He also recommended that she meet 
with a psychiatrist and other physicians for a complete review of her medication 
regimen.  In addition, he opined that Carr was capable of competently and ethically 
performing the activities required of a lawyer and a judge.  But the board found, 
“Dr. Riebe walks a razor-thin line in testifying that [Carr] suffers from serious 
mental disorders that require a regimen of medication and at least a year of weekly 
sessions with a psychiatrist and a psychotherapist, but nevertheless is not so 
seriously impaired as to render her incapable of continuing to serve as a judge.” 
{¶ 73} As of the November 2021 hearing on mitigation, Carr had been in 
treatment for less than 90 days.  Dr. Riebe noted that while Carr had complied with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
treatment and was making progress, she still required an extended course of 
treatment and possessed personality traits that presented challenges to that 
treatment.  Specifically, he found that her tendency to present herself in a favorable 
light, her lack of self-awareness, and her reluctance to discuss her problems could 
signal an unwillingness to commit to treatment.  In his testimony before the panel, 
he also agreed that personality traits can be long-standing and difficult to change. 
{¶ 74} Although the board accepted Dr. Riebe’s diagnoses and treatment 
recommendations, it did not accept his conclusion that Carr’s misconduct—having 
occurred primarily in 2019 and 2020—could be attributed to his post hoc 
observation of anxiety and depressive symptoms in May 2021.  By that time, Carr’s 
disciplinary action had been pending for eight months.  The medical records 
summarized in Dr. Riebe’s report establish that Carr had been diagnosed with 
menopause and sleep apnea several years before her misconduct occurred.  
Moreover, those same medical records do not document any signs of depression or 
anxiety during the time when her misconduct occurred.  On the contrary, they state 
that Carr’s menopausal symptoms had improved with medication and that Carr was 
sleeping well.  Indeed, at many of her medical appointments, she reported that she 
was doing well or feeling great. 
{¶ 75} Finally, in contrast to Dr. Riebe’s assessment that Carr suffered from 
anxiety and an unspecified depressive disorder at the time of her misconduct, the 
board found that the 57 letters attesting to Carr’s character and the testimony of two 
character witnesses submitted on Carr’s behalf describe a person who was “the very 
antithesis of depressed and anxious.”  Those character witnesses attested to the 
positive character and cheerful nature Carr exhibited in church, in her community-
service activities, and in her social interactions with others.  One character witness 
described Carr as “always pleasant, respectful, witty, humorous, hard working and 
the life of the party,” while another stated that she adored Carr’s “positive vibe.”  
Yet a third stated that Carr’s “easy, outgoing nature and quick wit make her a joy 
January Term, 2022 
 
25 
to be around both in crowds and one-on-one” and that Carr “is the sun around which 
all her friends revolve.” 
{¶ 76} Notably, in a character-reference letter, Gray (one of Carr’s bailiffs, 
whom she referred to as “Ms. Puddin”) suggested that Carr’s depression and 
anxiety were the result, rather than the cause, of her disciplinary problems: 
  
Judge Carr has definitely changed since all the articles in the 
newspaper and this case began in March of 2020.  She is still caring 
and pleasant but more serious and very slow to respond.  Judge Carr 
loves her job, the defendants and employees.  But when we take our 
lunchtime walks, people often ask her if she’s still a judge because 
of all the negative newspaper articles.  Although she never says 
anything, I know it bothers her because it upsets me. 
 
{¶ 77} On those facts, the board found that Carr had failed to establish a 
causal link between her current mental disorders and her past misconduct and 
questioned whether the short duration of Carr’s treatment and her reluctance to 
accept her therapist’s opinion of her condition would have been sufficient to 
establish a sustained period of successful treatment as required by Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(7)(c).  Nevertheless, the board attributed some mitigating effect to Carr’s 
voluntary commitment to comprehensive mental- and physical-health evaluations, 
her adherence to Dr. Riebe’s treatment plan, and her decision to enter into a contract 
with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”).  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A) 
(directing the board to consider all relevant factors and the aggravating and 
mitigating factors set forth in that rule in determining the appropriate sanction for 
professional misconduct). 
{¶ 78} The board also acknowledged that Carr appeared to sincerely regret 
her misconduct and her betrayal of the public trust.  Carr testified that she has 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
sought counsel from Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Joan 
Synenberg, whom she considers to be a mentor, and has solicited constructive 
criticism from practicing attorneys and court personnel.  While the board accepted 
Carr’s representations that her behavior has improved, it noted that Carr could not 
escape sanction simply because her improved conduct did not appear to pose an 
imminent threat to the public at the time of her disciplinary hearing. 
B. Carr’s Objections to the Board’s Rejection of Her Diagnosed Mental 
Disorders as a Mitigating Factor 
{¶ 79} Carr objects to the board’s rejection of her mental disorders as a 
mitigating factor and contends that the board applied the wrong legal standard in 
evaluating those disorders.  She seeks to have the case remanded for further analysis 
under the appropriate legal standard.  Specifically, Carr contends that the board 
applied a “causal link” standard when the rule calls for proof that the disorder 
“contributed to cause the misconduct,” Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7)(b).  We find that 
Carr’s argument presents a distinction without a difference. 
C. The Board Properly Rejected Carr’s Mental Disorders as a Mitigating 
Factor 
{¶ 80} In summarizing the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), we 
have previously stated that in order to qualify as a mitigating factor, there must be 
 
(a) a diagnosis by a qualified health-care professional, (b) a 
causal relationship between the disorder and the misconduct, (c) a 
sustained period of successful treatment, and (d) a prognosis from a 
qualified health-care professional that the attorney will be able to 
return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vardiman, 146 Ohio St.3d 23, 2016-
Ohio-352, 51 N.E.3d 587, ¶ 14,  fn. 3.  See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Engel, 154 
January Term, 2022 
 
27 
Ohio St.3d 209, 2018-Ohio-2988, 113 N.E.3d 481, ¶ 11, fn. 1; Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Joltin, 147 Ohio St.3d 490, 2016-Ohio-8168, 67 N.E.3d 780, ¶ 22 (finding that 
“the evidence was insufficient to establish that Joltin suffered from a mental 
disorder that was causally related to his misconduct” [emphasis added]); Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Assn. v. King, 159 Ohio St.3d 122, 2019-Ohio-4715, 149 N.E.3d 444, 
¶ 10 (finding that an attorney had not sufficiently demonstrated that his mental or 
alcohol-use disorders were “causally related to his misconduct,” [emphasis 
added]); Disciplinary Counsel v. Rumizen, 156 Ohio St.3d 575, 2019-Ohio-2519, 
130 N.E.3d 283, ¶ 12 (rejecting a respondent’s mental disorder as a mitigating 
factor when “the board found the causal connection between the disorder and his 
underlying misconduct ‘to be thin, at best’ ” [emphasis added]).  Under this 
caselaw, there must be a causal nexus between a respondent’s mental disorders and 
the misconduct in order for the respondent’s mental disorders to qualify for 
mitigating effect—i.e., the disorders must be shown to have “contributed to cause” 
the misconduct. 
{¶ 81} In this case, the board cited numerous reasons for rejecting Dr. 
Riebe’s opinion that Carr’s diagnosed mental disorders contributed to cause her 
misconduct, not the least of which are (1) Dr. Riebe’s lack of familiarity with the 
full extent of Carr’s misconduct, (2) his admission that Carr’s diagnosed disorders 
did not account for her repeated acts of dishonesty, (3) evidence demonstrating that 
Carr did not exhibit symptoms of depression or anxiety in other aspects of her life 
or report such symptoms to her treating medical professionals, and (4) Carr’s 
admission that she had engaged in the same types of misconduct alleged in Count 
Two of relator’s amended complaint prior to 2018 and that her conduct in those 
instances was not affected by her physical or emotional issues but that it was just 
her judicial style. 
{¶ 82} We conclude that the board applied the proper legal standard in 
evaluating Carr’s mental disorders for mitigating effect and that the evidence 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
overwhelmingly supports the board’s rejection of Dr. Riebe’s opinion that those 
disorders contributed to cause Carr’s misconduct.  We also reject Carr’s contention 
that Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 131 Ohio St.3d 372, 2012-Ohio-1284, 965 
N.E.2d 294, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Chambers, 125 Ohio St.3d 414, 2010-
Ohio-1809, 928 N.E.2d 1061, support her request to have this case remanded to the 
board “for the limited scope of consideration of mitigating evidence.”  Both 
Johnson and Chambers were before this court on default proceedings.  After the 
respondents in those cases filed objections to the respective board reports and 
recommendations, we remanded those cases to the board for further proceedings, 
and in Johnson, we limited those proceedings to the consideration of supplementary 
mitigating evidence.  Because Carr fully participated in this disciplinary 
proceeding, in which the hearing was bifurcated to afford her two additional months 
to develop her mitigating evidence, neither Johnson nor Chambers has any 
application here.  We therefore overrule Carr’s objection on this point. 
{¶ 83} Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we adopt the board’s 
findings regarding the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. 
D. The Board Recommends That Carr Be Suspended for Two Years with 
Conditions on Reinstatement, and Carr Objects 
{¶ 84} After weighing Carr’s “breathtaking number of infractions,” the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanctions we have imposed on 
magistrates and judges who have engaged in similar—although fewer—acts of 
misconduct, the board recommended that we suspend Carr from the practice of law 
for two years with no stay and immediately suspend her from judicial office without 
pay for the duration of her disciplinary suspension. 
{¶ 85} Carr objects to the recommended sanction, arguing that it does not 
comport with the facts of her misconduct, the aggravating or mitigating factors 
present in this case, or the relevant caselaw.  She contends that if those factors are 
properly credited and weighed, her conduct warrants a sanction no greater than a 
January Term, 2022 
 
29 
two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed.  After considering Carr’s 
arguments, the numerosity and breadth of her misconduct, the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and the cases cited by the board, we overrule Carr’s objections 
and find that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension. 
E. Carr’s Misconduct Warrants an Indefinite Suspension 
{¶ 86} We hold judges to the highest standards of professional behavior 
because they are invested with the public trust.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57.  Canon 1 of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to “uphold and promote the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary,” and to “avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”  “ ‘The primary purpose of judicial 
discipline is to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of 
justice, and maintain and enhance the public confidence in the integrity of [the 
judiciary].’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Burge, 157 Ohio St.3d 203, 2019-Ohio-3205, 
134 N.E.3d 153, ¶ 36, quoting O’Neill at ¶ 33.  However, sanctions may also serve 
to deter other judges and attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.  See, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Horton, 158 Ohio St.3d 76, 2019-Ohio-4139, 140 N.E.3d 
561, ¶ 60, citing In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Brigner, 89 Ohio St.3d 
1460, 732 N.E.2d 994 (2000), citing In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against 
Morris, 81 Ohio Misc.2d 64, 675 N.E.2d 580 (1997). 
{¶ 87} In this case, the board considered several cases in which we imposed 
sanctions consisting of partially stayed term suspensions on judges for misconduct 
bearing some resemblance to Carr’s. 
{¶ 88} For example, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 Ohio St.3d 
251, 2004-Ohio-6402, 819 N.E.2d 273, we imposed an 18-month suspension with 
six months conditionally stayed on a judge who unilaterally negotiated and 
accepted one criminal plea outside the presence of the prosecutor and repeatedly 
engaged in ex parte communications with litigants.  Medley also falsified a single 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
journal entry to conceal an ex parte communication with a politically connected 
judgment debtor and issued arrest warrants to facilitate the collection of default 
judgments in small-claims proceedings.  Like Carr, Medley engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct, but he had previously been publicly reprimanded for other judicial 
misconduct and refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  
Nonetheless, he cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings and presented evidence 
of his good character and unlike Carr, he did not act with a selfish or dishonest 
motive. 
{¶ 89} The board found, and we agree, that Carr’s misconduct is readily 
distinguishable from that of Medley based on the sheer number of Carr’s offenses.  
While Medley accepted a single plea in violation of procedural standards and 
falsified a single journal entry to conceal an ex parte communication, Carr routinely 
undertook both actions.  And while both Medley and Carr improperly used arrest 
warrants and bonds to compel the collection of judgments or fines, there is no 
suggestion that Medley ever attempted to conceal those actions with false journal 
entries as Carr did on numerous occasions. 
{¶ 90} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007-Ohio-
5635, 876 N.E.2d 556, we imposed an 18-month suspension with six months 
conditionally stayed on a judge whose acts of misconduct were similar in quality 
and character to Carr’s misconduct in this case, even though the acts of misconduct 
themselves differed.  Parker intemperately, unreasonably, and vindictively ejected 
a spectator from his courtroom without cause and briefly jailed her for contempt, 
twice attempted to coerce plea agreements, and routinely mistreated criminal 
defendants and other participants in his courtroom.  He also presided over a 
criminal case after participating in the defendant’s arrest and abused the 9-1-1 
emergency-response system. 
{¶ 91} The aggravating and mitigating factors in Parker were virtually 
identical to those present here, except that Carr harmed multiple vulnerable victims 
January Term, 2022 
 
31 
and largely cooperated in the resulting disciplinary proceeding, while Parker 
impeded the investigation of his misconduct.  Although Carr was charged with 
fewer counts of misconduct than Parker, all but one of those counts involve 
repeated instances of the same misconduct.  But with the exception of Parker’s 
repeated mistreatment of courtroom participants (conduct that Carr also routinely 
engaged in), Parker’s other acts of misconduct involved isolated incidents that were 
not repeated on a large scale. 
{¶ 92} On the facts presented here, we conclude that Carr’s refusal to 
comply with Judge Earley’s administrative order during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
improper ex parte communications, improper plea bargaining and issuance of 
arbitrary dispositions, improper use of capias warrants and bonds to compel the 
payment of fines, falsification of entries, failure to recuse herself from a case in 
which she became personally embroiled with a defendant, and lack of proper 
courtroom decorum—namely, her dress, her unkempt bench, her undignified and 
demeaning treatment of defendants, and her efforts to obtain free or discounted 
goods and services—warrant a greater sanction than the 18-month partially stayed 
suspensions that we imposed in Medley and Parker. 
{¶ 93} We have imposed suspensions of six months and of one year for 
misconduct arising from single instances of abuse of a court’s contempt power.  See 
Bachman, 163 Ohio St.3d 195, 2020-Ohio-6732, 168 N.E.3d 1178 (magistrate’s 
conduct in summarily holding a woman in direct contempt of court and jailing her 
for screaming outside his courtroom warranted a six-month suspension); Repp, 165 
Ohio St.3d 582, 2021-Ohio-3923, 180 N.E.3d 1128 (judge’s repeated harassment 
of a spectator who sat silently in his courtroom, including holding her in contempt 
and jailing her for refusing to comply with his unlawful order that she submit to a 
drug test, warranted a one-year suspension). 
{¶ 94} In Bachman, we held that an abuse of judicial power is a significant 
violation of the public trust, particularly when it deprives a person of his or her 
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liberty.  Id. at ¶ 33.  We therefore rejected the board’s recommendation of a fully 
stayed six-month suspension.  Finding it necessary to send a strong message to the 
judiciary, to deter similar violations in the future, and to make crystal clear to the 
public that abuse of the contempt power will not be tolerated, we suspended 
Bachman for six months for his single incident of misconduct. 
{¶ 95} The deprivation of numerous defendants’ liberty occasioned by 
Carr’s misconduct vastly exceeds the one- or two-day jail stays occasioned by the 
misconduct of Bachman and Repp.  At least five of the victims identified in Count 
Three of this case spent time in jail as a result of Carr’s improper use of capias 
warrants.  And A.B. served 15 days in jail as a result of Carr’s abuse of her contempt 
power.  Furthermore, by issuing capias warrants for defendants who failed to appear 
for hearings in her courtroom between March 16 and March 18, 2020—hearings 
that Judge Earley had ordered to be continued—Carr created a risk that dozens of 
people would be wrongfully arrested and jailed if they were unable to pay their 
fines.  On these facts, Carr’s misconduct warrants a sanction far greater than the 
six-month and one-year suspensions imposed, respectively, in Bachman and Repp. 
{¶ 96} The board accorded substantial mitigating effect to Carr’s 
cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings and her commitment to a mental-health-
treatment program.  It found that but for those factors, her conduct would warrant 
an indefinite suspension.  Carr now argues that in addition to those factors, her clean 
disciplinary record, and evidence of her good character and reputation, this court 
should find mitigation based on her diagnosed mental disorders and the purported 
imposition of another penalty or sanction by virtue of pervasive negative media 
coverage.  We have already rejected Carr’s mental disorders as a mitigating factor 
based on the insufficiency of the evidence regarding their contribution to her 
misconduct.  We likewise decline to find that truthful media reports of Judge Carr’s 
flagrant disregard of the administrative order suspending most courthouse activity 
in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic constitute the imposition of a penalty 
January Term, 2022 
 
33 
or sanction that warrants mitigating effect under the purview of Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(6).  And while we acknowledge that Carr submitted letters from 57 
people attesting to her good character and reputation, those letters were procured 
with a false narrative in which Carr characterized her blatant and intentional 
misconduct as a series of inadvertent mistakes.  The remaining mitigating factors 
are simply insufficient to overcome the sheer volume of Carr’s misconduct, 
including her disregard for the rule of law, and the harm that her misconduct caused 
to the litigants in her courtroom and the honor and dignity of the judiciary. 
{¶ 97} Carr’s unprecedented misconduct involved more than 100 stipulated 
incidents that occurred over a period of approximately two years and encompassed 
repeated acts of dishonesty; the blatant and systematic disregard of due process, the 
law, court orders, and local rules; the disrespectful treatment of court staff and 
litigants; and the abuse of capias warrants and the court’s contempt power.  That 
misconduct warrants an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 98} Accordingly, Pinkey Suzanne Carr is indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  Pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. III(7)(A), she is immediately 
suspended from judicial office without pay for the duration of her disciplinary 
suspension.  In addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(25), Carr’s 
reinstatement shall be conditioned on her submission of (1) a report from a qualified 
healthcare professional stating that she is able to return to the competent, ethical, 
and professional practice of law and (2) proof of compliance with her October 30, 
2021 OLAP contract and any amendment or extension thereof.  Costs are taxed to 
Carr. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, MYERS, SADLER, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
BETH A. MYERS, J., of the First District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
DONNELLY, J. 
LISA L. SADLER, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 99} I agree with the majority’s determination that respondent, Pinkey 
Suzanne Carr, committed professional misconduct as found by the Board of 
Professional Conduct.  But because the board’s recommended sanction of a two-
year suspension from the practice of law would remove Carr from serving as a 
member of the judiciary, in my view, that sanction would protect the public from 
future misconduct.  I disagree with the majority’s decision to increase the sanction 
and impose an indefinite suspension.  I therefore dissent from the sanction imposed 
by the majority. 
{¶ 100} The focus of our judicial-discipline system is not punishing the 
offender.  Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 
815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53.  Rather, “[t]he primary purpose of judicial discipline is to 
protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintain 
and enhance public confidence in the integrity of [the judiciary].”  Id. at ¶ 33.  And 
the public would be protected if we imposed the board’s recommended sanction of 
a two-year suspension in this case. 
{¶ 101} Under R.C. 1901.10(B), “[a] vacancy in the office of [municipal 
court] judge exists upon the [judge’s] * * * absence from official duties for a period 
of six consecutive months.”  A term suspension of more than six months, then, 
would cause Carr to be removed from judicial office.  That consequence of Carr’s 
misconduct, by itself, would protect the public from future misconduct, because 
Carr cannot abuse judicial power if she no longer holds judicial office.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Burge, 157 Ohio St.3d 203, 2019-Ohio-3205, 134 N.E.3d 
January Term, 2022 
 
35 
153, ¶ 32 (“All of Burge’s misconduct occurred during his time as a judge and was 
related to his judicial duties and responsibilities; since he resigned from the 
common pleas court following his criminal convictions, his misconduct is unlikely 
to recur”).  It would also assure the evenhanded administration of justice and foster 
public confidence in the judiciary. 
{¶ 102} Importantly, because Carr was a full-time judge at the time of her 
misconduct, none of her misconduct involved the handling of client matters.  Yet 
the majority’s decision to indefinitely suspend Carr may result in her inability to 
practice law even after she completes two years of that suspension.  Readmission 
following an indefinite suspension is not automatic.  Compare Gov.Bar R. 
V(24)(C) with Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D)(1).  In addition to having to wait two years 
before applying for readmission to the practice of law, Gov.Bar R. V(25)(A)(1), an 
indefinitely suspended attorney must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that he or she possesses all the mental, educational, and moral qualifications 
required of an attorney and that he or she is now a proper person to be readmitted 
to the practice of law in Ohio, notwithstanding the previous disciplinary action, 
Gov.Bar R. V(25)(B)(5).  Carr’s misconduct in this case—i.e., engaging in 
improper plea bargaining and issuing arbitrary dispositions, improperly using 
capias warrants and bonds to compel the payment of fines, falsifying entries, 
lacking proper courtroom decorum—does not demonstrate that she is incapable of 
the competent and professional practice of law.  During her indefinite suspension, 
then, Carr will not only have lost her judicial office, but she may also lose the 
privilege to practice law as an attorney if a future majority of this court denies her 
readmission.  Our primary purpose in judicial-discipline cases is to protect the 
public—and because Carr would be removed from judicial office by imposition of 
a two-year suspension, imposing a greater sanction appears punitive. 
{¶ 103} The majority examines four cases that the board relied on involving 
“misconduct bearing some resemblance to Carr’s.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 87.  In each 
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36 
of these cases, this court imposed term suspensions; in none of them did we remove 
the disciplined judicial officer from the practice of law for more than a year.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 Ohio St.3d 251, 2004-Ohio-6402, 819 N.E.2d 
273, ¶ 43 (18-month suspension with six months conditionally stayed); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007-Ohio-5635, 876 N.E.2d 
556, ¶ 130 (18-month suspension with six months conditionally stayed); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 163 Ohio St.3d 195, 2020-Ohio-6732, 168 
N.E.3d 1178, ¶ 36-37 (six-month suspension); Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 165 
Ohio St.3d 582, 2021-Ohio-3923, 180 N.E.3d 1128, ¶ 33 (one-year suspension).  In 
distinguishing these cases, the majority concludes that Carr’s misconduct warrants 
a sanction greater than an actual suspension for one year, but it fails to muster any 
caselaw supporting its position that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate 
sanction. 
{¶ 104} “When imposing sanctions for judicial misconduct, we consider,” 
among other things, “the sanctions imposed in similar cases.”  Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Berry, 166 Ohio St.3d 112, 2021-Ohio-3864, 182 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 14.  A review 
of our caselaw reveals that when this court has indefinitely suspended judicial 
officers for misconduct, the judicial officer faced allegations of criminal conduct.  
See Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 39, 2009-Ohio-317, 901 N.E.2d 
798, ¶ 1 (indefinitely suspending magistrate who embezzled funds from a county 
agency); Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty, 140 Ohio St.3d 229, 2014-Ohio-3075, 
17 N.E.3d 521, ¶ 2, 26 (indefinitely suspending judge convicted of multiple counts 
of lying to the FBI during corruption investigation); Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Mason, 
152 Ohio St.3d 228, 2017-Ohio-9215, 94 N.E.3d 556, ¶ 1-3 (indefinitely 
suspending judge convicted of felonious assault and domestic violence); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Horton, 158 Ohio St.3d 76, 2019-Ohio-4139, 140 N.E.3d 
561, ¶ 1, 3, 79 (indefinitely suspending judge who sexually harassed staff, misused 
January Term, 2022 
 
37 
county resources for his judicial campaign, and was convicted of failing to file an 
accurate campaign statement). 
{¶ 105} I agree with the majority that Carr’s misconduct is more serious 
than the misconduct that occurred in Medley, Parker, Repp, and Bachman and that 
it warrants a greater sanction than was imposed in those cases.  But Carr did not 
commit misconduct leading to a criminal conviction, as was the case when we have 
indefinitely suspended judicial officers.  In my view, imposing an actual suspension 
from the practice of law for two years would be sufficient to protect the public from 
future misconduct.  I therefore dissent from the majority’s decision to impose an 
indefinite suspension. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle A. Hall, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Koblentz & Penvose, L.L.C., Richard S. Koblentz, Nicholas E. Froning, and 
Bryan L. Penvose, for respondent. 
_________________