Title: State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA12-577 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 20 November 2012 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Johnston County 
No. 11 CRS 52711 
JERRY WADE GRICE  
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 December 2011 
by Judge James G. Bell in Johnston County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 24 October 2012. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Jay L. Osborne, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender Jon H. Hunt & Assistant Appellate Defender 
Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, for defendant-appellant.  
 
 
HUNTER JR., Robert N., Judge. 
 
 
Jerry Wade Grice, Jr. (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment 
sentencing 
him 
to 
a 
suspended 
sentence 
of 
6–8 
months 
imprisonment following a jury verdict convicting him of one 
count of manufacturing marijuana.  On appeal, Defendant argues 
the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motion to 
suppress 
and 
by 
admitting 
evidence 
Defendant 
claims 
was 
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unconstitutionally seized.  We agree and grant Defendant a new 
trial.        
I. Factual and Procedural History 
On 11 July 2011, the Johnston County grand jury indicted 
Defendant on charges of manufacturing marijuana and maintaining 
a dwelling house for the keeping of a controlled substance, in 
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-95(a)(1) and 90-108(a)(7). 
On 5 May 2011 Detectives Jason Guseman and Chadwick Allen 
of the Johnston County Sheriff’s Office went to Defendant’s home 
in order to investigate an anonymous tip that Defendant was 
growing and selling marijuana.  The detectives’ supervisor 
directed them to perform a “knock and talk” investigation in 
response to the tip.  They arrived at Defendant’s residence and 
drove about a tenth of a mile up a driveway to Defendant’s home, 
where they parked behind a white car in the driveway.  When the 
detectives exited their patrol car, Detective Guseman walked up 
the driveway to knock on the door, while Detective Allen stayed 
in the driveway.  
While Detective Guseman was knocking on the door, Detective 
Allen, standing in the driveway, looked “around the residence  
. . . from [his] point of view.”  As he looked over the hood of 
the white car, he observed four plastic buckets about fifteen 
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yards away.  Plants were growing in three of the buckets.  
Detective 
Allen 
immediately 
identified 
these 
plants 
as 
marijuana.  He pointed out the plants to Detective Guseman, who 
also believed they were marijuana.  Both detectives then walked 
to the backyard where the plants were growing beside an 
outbuilding.  
The 
detectives 
then 
contacted 
their 
supervisor, 
who 
instructed them to seize the plants and return to the Sheriff’s 
Office so that they could then apply for a search warrant.  The 
detectives then took some photographs of the surrounding area 
and uprooted the plants.  
The next day, after applying for and receiving a search 
warrant, the detectives and two other officers returned to the 
residence to execute the warrant.  The officers “forced the door 
open” and handcuffed Defendant and two other individuals who 
were also inside the home.  Defendant admitted to owning the 
seized plants, and upon hearing that the officers were there to 
search for drugs and paraphernalia, also admitted to having a 
small amount of marijuana in his living room.  After finding 
this marijuana, the officers arrested Defendant. 
The matter came on for trial at the 13 December 2011 
criminal session of the Johnston County Superior Court.  The 
-4- 
 
 
trial 
court 
held 
a 
pre-trial 
suppression 
hearing, 
where 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
“knock and talk” investigation.  The trial court denied 
Defendant’s motion.  Defendant did not object at trial to the 
introduction of the plants seized or to other evidence derived 
from the seizure.   
On 14 December 2011, a jury convicted Defendant of 
manufacturing marijuana.  The trial court then sentenced 
Defendant as a Level II offender to a suspended sentence of 6–8 
months imprisonment and placed Defendant on supervised probation 
for 30 months.  Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open 
court.  
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
As Defendant appeals from the final judgment of a superior 
court, an appeal of right lies with this Court pursuant to N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2011). 
Our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial 
judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent 
evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on 
appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the 
judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.”  State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 
-5- 
 
 
132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).  However, “[t]he trial 
court’s conclusions of law . . . are fully reviewable on 
appeal.”  State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 
631 (2000).  
Because Defendant failed to object to the introduction of 
the seized evidence at trial, we review any error on the part of 
the trial court for plain error.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4); 
see also State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 622, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 
(2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 835 (2008).  “For error to 
constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a 
fundamental error occurred at trial.  To show that an error was 
fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice that, after 
examination of the entire record, the error had a probable 
impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.” 
State v. Lawrence, __ N.C. __, __, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  
III. Analysis 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his pre-
trial suppression motion and by allowing the State to introduce 
evidence derived from the warrantless seizure of the marijuana 
plants at trial.  Defendant argues that Detectives Guseman and 
Allen had no right to enter his property and seize the plants 
-6- 
 
 
without first securing a warrant.  Defendant contends this 
seizure was per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and 
as such, any evidence obtained from the illegal seizure was 
inadmissible at trial.  The State contends that because the 
plants were in plain view, their seizure did not implicate 
Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  We agree with Defendant. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  As a general rule, searches 
and seizures “conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  One such exception is the 
“plain view” doctrine.  Under the plain view doctrine, police 
may seize contraband or evidence without a warrant if “(1) the 
officer was in a place where he had a right to be when the 
evidence was discovered; (2) the evidence was discovered 
inadvertently; and (3) it was immediately apparent to the police 
that the items observed were evidence of a crime or contraband.”  
State v. Graves, 135 N.C. App. 216, 219, 519 S.E.2d 770, 772 
-7- 
 
 
(1999).  This first requirement means that “[n]ot only must the 
officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can 
be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of 
access to the object itself.”  Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 
128, 137 (1990) (emphasis added).  
The State contends Detectives Guseman and Allen had a 
“lawful right of access” to the plants, because they were 
lawfully on the property under the auspices of a valid “knock 
and talk” investigation.  We disagree. 
“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”  Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).  “With few exceptions, the 
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable 
and hence constitutional must be answered no.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. 
at 31.  Our courts have long recognized that this heightened 
expectation of privacy extends not only to the home itself, but 
also to the home’s “curtilage.”  See United States v. Dunn, 480 
U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (“The curtilage concept originated at 
common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a 
dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as 
-8- 
 
 
was afforded the house itself.”)  “[T]he curtilage is the area 
to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 
‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ and 
therefore has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.”  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 
(1984) (citation omitted).  In North Carolina, “curtilage of the 
home will ordinarily be construed to include at least the yard 
around the dwelling house as well as the area occupied by barns, 
cribs, and other outbuildings.”  State v. Frizzelle, 243 N.C. 
49, 51, 89 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1955) (emphasis added). 
The State is correct in noting that officers may conduct 
“knock and talk” investigations that do not rise to the level of 
a Fourth Amendment search.  See State v. Wallace, 111 N.C. App. 
581, 585, 433 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1993) (“Law enforcement officers 
have the right to approach a person’s residence to inquire 
whether the person is willing to answer questions.”); see also 
State v. Church, 110 N.C. App. 569, 573–74, 430 S.E.2d 462, 465 
(1993) (“[W]hen officers enter private property for the purpose 
of a general inquiry or interview, their presence is proper and 
lawful . . . . [O]fficers are entitled to go to a door to 
inquire about a matter; they are not trespassers under these 
circumstances.”) 
(quotation 
marks 
and 
citation 
omitted).  
-9- 
 
 
However, officers generally may not enter and search the 
curtilage of a home without first obtaining a warrant.  See 
State v. Rhodes, 151 N.C. App. 208, 213–16, 565 S.E.2d 266, 269–
71 (2002) (holding warrantless search of defendant’s trash can 
unconstitutional when it was within the curtilage of his home).  
Moreover, this Court has expressly rejected the notion that “law 
enforcement officers may enter private property whenever they 
are conducting ‘legitimate law enforcement functions.’” See 
State v. Nance, 149 N.C. App. 734, 742, 562 S.E.2d 557, 563 
(2002) (recognizing the validity of “knock and talk” inquiries, 
but holding that the line of cases authorizing them do not 
“stand[] for the proposition that law enforcement officers may 
enter private property without a warrant and seize evidence of a 
crime”)            
In this case, we decline to adopt the State’s argument that 
the initiation of a valid “knock and talk” inquiry gave 
Detectives Guseman and Allen a lawful right of access to walk 
across Defendant’s backyard in order to seize the plants.  If we 
were to adopt such an approach, it would be difficult to 
articulate a limiting principle such that “knock and talk” 
investigations would not become a pretense to seize any property 
within the home’s curtilage, so long as that property otherwise 
-10- 
 
 
satisfied the remaining prerequisites for seizure under the 
plain view doctrine.  As this Court has observed, “[t]he 
implication that police officers have the right to seize any 
item which comes into their plain view at a place they have a 
right to be is fraught with danger and would sanction the very 
intrusions into the lives of private citizens against which the 
Fourth Amendment was intended to protect.”  State v. Bembery, 33 
N.C. App. 31, 33, 234 S.E.2d 33, 35, disc. review denied, 293 
N.C. 160, 236 S.E.2d 704 (1977).  Accordingly, we hold the trial 
court erred in its conclusion that no Fourth Amendment violation 
resulted from the seizure in light of the fact “Detective Allen 
visually observed what he believed to be marijuana plants in 
plain view.”  
In the alternative, the State argues that since the trial 
court found the detectives’ seizure of the plants “was to 
prevent their destruction,” that the seizure was valid under the 
“exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement.  
We disagree, because no evidence was presented at trial to 
support the trial court’s finding to that effect. 
Our Supreme Court has held that “[i]f the circumstances of 
a particular case render impracticable a delay to obtain a 
warrant, a warrantless search on probable cause is permissible.” 
-11- 
 
 
State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 141, 257 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1979).  
One such exigent circumstance is the “probable destruction or 
disappearance of a controlled substance.”  State v. Nowell, 144 
N.C. App. 636, 643, 55 S.E.2d 807, 812 (2001); Wallace, 111 N.C. 
App. at 586, 433 S.E.2d at 241–42 (noting that an “officer’s 
reasonably objective belief that the contraband is about to be 
removed or destroyed” is a factor in determining whether, with 
probable cause, a warrantless seizure is justified).   
On appeal this Court is “strictly limited to determining 
whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are 
supported by competent evidence, in which event they are 
conclusively binding on appeal.” Cooke, 306 N.C. at 134, 291 
S.E.2d at 619.  Upon review of the record, we cannot ascertain 
the basis for the trial court’s finding that the plants were 
seized “to prevent their destruction.”   
Detective Guseman testified that he knocked on Defendant’s 
door “numerous times” and no one answered.  He further 
testified:  
Q. [H]ad you determined that there was 
anyone at the house? 
 
A. No one would come to the door if there 
was anyone at the house. 
 
Q. Had you determined that there was anyone 
who had detected your presence at the house? 
-12- 
 
 
 
A. No. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q. Was there anything that prevented you 
from securing the area and then getting a 
search warrant? 
 
A. No. I had done exactly what Captain Fish 
instructed me to do and that was to seize 
the plants, come back to the Sheriff’s 
office and apply for a search warrant for 
the residence. 
      
Detective Guseman further testified that he had no knowledge of 
any illicit transactions occurring on the property within the 
prior three days.  A review of the record produces no evidence 
contrary to Detective Guseman’s testimony.      
The State contends that evidence was presented which could 
support the trial court’s finding, arguing that: 
[t]he 
record 
contains 
several 
facts 
supporting the trial court’s conclusion. 
First, the record indicates that there was a 
white vehicle parked in the driveway of the 
house, and that no one came to the door 
after 
the 
officers 
knocked 
repeatedly. 
Suspects sometimes do not come to the door 
when law enforcement knocks, as is readily 
apparent from defendant’s choice to not 
answer the door when served the search 
warrant the next day. From this evidence, 
the trial court could reasonably conclude 
that defendant or someone else may have been 
in the house waiting for the officers to 
leave in order to destroy the marijuana 
plants. 
Additionally, 
because 
three 
-13- 
 
 
marijuana 
plants 
is 
a 
relatively 
small 
quantity, the court may have concluded they 
were more readily destructible.  
 
Although the record does reveal that there was in fact a 
white car in the driveway, and that there were only three 
plants, nothing in the record suggests that this provided the 
impetus for the seizure.  Accordingly, the trial court’s finding 
“[t]hat this seizure was to prevent [the plants] destruction” is 
not supported by competent evidence in the record.  Absent a 
finding supported by evidence that the detectives had a 
“reasonably objective belief that the contraband [was] about to 
be removed or destroyed,” Wallace, 11 N.C. App. at 586, 433 
S.E.2d 
at 
241–42, 
“exigent 
circumstances” 
cannot 
be 
a 
justification for this warrantless seizure.1           
Therefore, we hold the trial court erred in concluding that 
Defendant “did not have an expectation of privacy in this 
instance and [that] there [was] no Fourth Amendment violation” 
and that “the evidence obtained was properly seized.” 
                     
1 We note that although the trial court made a finding of fact 
that 
the 
seizure 
was 
performed 
to 
prevent 
the 
plants’ 
destruction, the court made no conclusion of law explicitly 
mentioning “exigent circumstances” as justification for the 
seizure.  To contrast, the court did conclude that “plain view . 
. . is an exception to the warrant requirement” such that “[t]he 
evidence obtained was properly seized.”  
-14- 
 
 
We must then turn to the issue of whether the erroneous 
admission of this evidence by the trial court rises to the level 
of plain error such that it “had a probable impact on the jury’s 
finding that the defendant was guilty.”  Lawrence, __ N.C. at 
__, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
We conclude the trial court’s failure to grant Defendant’s 
motion to suppress does rise to the level of plain error in this 
case.  Had the trial court granted Defendant’s motion, the State 
would have been barred from introducing not only the plants 
themselves, but also the close-up photographs of the plants, the 
expert testimony identifying the plants as marijuana, and 
Defendant’s statements regarding the plants.  See State v. 
Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 244, 681 S.E.2d 492, 497 (2009) 
(“Evidence that is discovered as a direct result of an illegal 
search or seizure is generally excluded at trial as fruit of the 
poisonous tree unless it would have been discovered regardless 
of the unconstitutional search.”) (citing Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)).  Thus, the only evidence 
the State could have presented was Detectives Guseman and 
Allen’s testimony regarding their identification of the plants 
as marijuana, with no physical evidence to support those 
-15- 
 
 
determinations.  We conclude the jury probably would have 
reached a different result had this been the case.       
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons we vacate Defendant’s conviction, 
reverse the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and 
remand for a 
NEW TRIAL. 
Judges HUNTER, R.C. and CALABRIA concur.