Title: In re Parental Rights as to G.R.S.

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

499New, Advance Opcion 10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL No. 83605
RIGHTS AS TO G.R.S., DOB: 6/12/15, A

MINOR UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE.

 

   
  

BRANDON S., FILED
Appellant, z
vs. JUL UE 20

 

STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT
OF FAMILY SERVICES; AND G.RS., A
MINOR,

Respondents.

‘Appeal from a district court order terminating appellant's

parental rights as to his minor child. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family
Division, Clark County; Margaret E. Pickard, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.

Santacroce Law Offices, Ltd., and Frederick A. Santacroce, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Michele C. Lau and Laurie A.
Iscan, Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County,
for Respondent State of Nevada Department of Family Services.

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Abraham G. Smith, Daniel F.
Polsenberg, and Chad D. Olsen, Las Vegas; Legal Aid Center of Southern
Nevada, Inc., and Adrian W. Rosehill, Las Vegas,

for Respondent G.R.S.

23- USD

 

 
—s

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, LEE, and
PARRAGUIRRE, JJ

OPINION

By the Court, HERNDON, J.

When respondent G.R.S. was removed from appellant Brandon
Ss care, Brandon was abusing prescription drugs and illegal substances,
However, at the time of the trial on the motion to terminate Brandon's
parental rights, Brandon had been sober for months and was successfully
participating in the drug court program. While the district court originally
continued the termination trial to allow Brandon to progress through that
program, after learning that suecessful completion of the program would
take Brandon at least another eight months, the district court proceeded
with the trial. Thereafter, the court entered an order terminating
Brandon's parental rights,

In this case, we take the opportunity to reiterate that under
Nevada law, a parent's substance abuse alone does not establish parental
fault based on unfitness. A finding of unfitness based on substance abuse
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's
substance abuse seriously and consistently prevents the parent from
providing proper care for the child. ‘That evidence is lacking here.
Additionally, while permanency is a factor in deciding whether termination
is in the child’s best interest, when there is evidence that a parent has been
successfully attempting to overcome an addiction to substances, there is no
law preventing the district court from continuing the termination
proceedings to allow the parent to make further progress and complete their
case plan. Because the record in this case does not support the district

court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Brandon's parental

 

 
rights was in G.R.S’s best interest, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 2019, G.R.S’s maternal grandmother reported that
Brandon had abused G.R.S. When respondent Department of Family
Services (DFS) and police officers arrived at Brandon's home, he declined to
release G.R.S., and the police officers refused to assist DFS in removing the
child from the home because the police officers did not observe a direct risk
to the child. After DFS obtained a court order directing Brandon to

 

relinquish G.R'S., Brandon complied. DFS then filed a protective custody
petition alleging that Brandon abused G.RS. by pulling her by her hair
across a room and was an unfit parent because he was abusing substances.

During the first 16 months of the protective custody action,

 

Brandon consistently visited G.R.S. and completed the required parenting
classes. He denied any substance use outside of prescribed drugs, and when
he submitted to drug tests, he generally tested positive for several
prescription drugs, including those that were identified as opioids,
morphine, and methadone on lab reports. Meanwhile, in July 2020, DFS

moved to terminate Brandon's parental rights.

‘The mother of G.R.S. was also a subject of the protective custody
petition, and her parental rights were ultimately terminated in the
challenged order. Because she did not appeal from the termination order,
we do not address her parental rights.

 

 

 
 

In November 2020, Brandon was arrested for a parole violation,
and the record supports that he has not abused any substance since his
arrest. Brandon was released to a sober living home through the drug court
program on March 23, 2021. The trial on the motion to terminate his
parental rights began a week and a half after Brandon's release. On the
first day of the trial, Brandon admitted to having abused substances for 15
years. He testified that before his November 2020 arrest, he would take
methadone, as prescribed, daily and would use heroin only when he could
not get his prescription for methadone filled. Specifically, he testified that
he would ingest either methadone or heroin every night after G.R.S. went
to bed and right before he went to sleep because he feared going through
withdrawals. He stated that by ingesting the substances at night, and
because of his high tolerance at that point, the effects of the substances
generally had worn off by the morning. He referred to himself as a
functioning addict because he never used drugs in front of people and
successfully held a job as a tattoo artist. He also testified that even without
his job, he had an inheritance that sufficiently covered his monthly
expenses. Brandon testified that he was embarrassed and ashamed of
himself, he apologized for the way he interacted with DFS before his arrest,
and he stated that he “screwed up for too long and I apologize for that.”
Further, he stated that he wanted nothing more than to watch G.R.S. grow
up.

At a status hearing four days later, the court sua sponte
brought up the idea of continuing the trial to allow Brandon time to further
address his substance abuse issues while out of custody. The court then
decided to proceed with the second day of trial, as it was already scheduled,

 

 
but indicated it would continue the remainder of the trial for 90 days to see
if Brandon continued to progress positively.

Two weeks later, on the second day of the trial, Brandon
testified that he was subject to random drug tests; had a curfew; attended
drug court every Friday; and was participating in life skills classes, therapy,
and anger management classes. He further testified that he loves G.RS.,
she would want for nothing while he is alive, they have a strong and visible
connection, and he wants to be there for her through the rough times and
the good times. He also testified that he had offered money to the foster
family, but they refused it, so he contributed some groceries when he visited,

‘At a status hearing roughly 90 days later, the district court
reviewed a status report, which stated that Brandon had been released from
the sober living home, had completed the early recovery skills course, was
participating in therapy and treatment programs, and continued to test
negative for drugs. In short, Brandon appeared to be showing the positive
progression the court previously expressed a desire to see. However, the
domestic violence program DFS had asked Brandon to complete refused to
enroll him until he had completed the drug court program, which he was
not scheduled to complete until March or April 2022. DFS argued that it
could not assess Brandon's progress “because he's not in a completely
uncontrolled environment until he completes the drug court program” and
that it was unable “to do an accurate assessment of {his} behaviors and his
desires to engage in behavior change regarding his substance abuse issues
until he's completed with drug court and doesn’t have the threat of
incarceration over him.” The district court expressed concern that G.RS.
had already been out of Brandon’s care for two years and Brandon could not

complete services for another eight or nine months, so permanency for

 

 
 

GRS. likely would not be achieved for another year. Based on those
timelines, the court concluded that the termination trial must proceed, even
though Brandon was sober and still successfully participating in the drug
court program.

‘The trial resumed in August 2021 with testimony from two DFS
caseworkers. The caseworker who had the case from G.R.S.’s removal until
May 2021 testified that Brandon initially refused to acknowledge he had a
substance abuse problem, but after his release from jail, the caseworker saw
a change in him where he wanted to work with DFS to reunify with G.RS.
‘The current DFS caseworker testified that Brandon had completed anger
management classes, was seeing a therapist, was participating in AA, NA,
Moral Reconation Therapy, and group therapy through the drug court, and
‘was doing well in drug court. The current caseworker had directed Brandon
to submit to three drug tests, and they were all negative. The caseworker
also testified that Brandon regularly and consistently visited G.R.S. Lastly,
the caseworker testified that because the domestic violence program DFS
referred Brandon to would not enroll him until he completed the drug court
program, Brandon, on his own, found a different program that would enroll
him and began taking weekly classes.

Next, the foster mother, Crystal D.., testified that she and her
husband were willing to adopt G.RS. but only if it was a closed adoption,
She further testified that G.R.S. calls her “Aunt” and Crystal's husband
“Uncle” but still calls Brandon “Dad.” Crystal also testified that before
Brandon’s incarceration, the only problem she had with his visitation was
that Brandon would come too often. Additionally, she stated that if
Brandon was under the influence during those early visitations, she was

unaware because she never saw any evidence indicating Brandon was

 

 
suffering from a substance abuse problem. Crystal confirmed that since

 

Brandon’s release from jail, he has visited G.R.S. weekly, is always on time,
and sometimes joins them for ice cream outings after the visitation. Crystal
also testified that Brandon poses no threat to G.R.S. during their visits, he
is very attentive to her, and he is cooperative and helpful. She testified that
he was a good dad and “Brandon's constantly there for her, answers the
phone[.J ...at the school, things of that nature.” She testified that GRS.
is bonded to Brandon,
over, and G.R.S, has consistently asked why she cannot return to Brandon's

 

.R.S. gets upset when her visits with Brandon are

home.

Lastly, Brandon testified again about his progress in the drug
court program. He stated that he had been living on his own and was still
under a curfew but his GPS monitor was removed by the drug court a week
prior. Further, he is drug tested three times a week, and the tests have all
been negative. He also stated that he was starting a four-month
professional chef program and that he volunteers to feed the homeless once
aweek,

During closing arguments, G.R.S’s attorney opposed
termination of Brandon's parental rights and argued “that [it is] in the best
interest of (G.R.S1], that her father be given the opportunity to continue to
demonstrate his efforts and desire to get his daughter back, and that his
rights not be terminated.” G.R.S’s attorney argued that “Brandon for the
most part, from his release of incarceration, has moved mountains by
comparison to his efforts prior to him being incarcerated” and “he is a loving,
supportive, involved, engaged parent with (G.R.S.. That he's basically a

changed person . . . . [HJe is making the effort. He is making the changes.”

 

 

 
Following the trial, the district court granted the motion to
terminate Brandon's parental rights. The court noted that Brandon could
not be considered as a placement option until he completed the drug court,
program in April 2022, and while his participation in drug court signaled
progress, the case had been open for 24 months and he had multiple
opportunities to address his problems but had failed to do so. Thus, the
court found that termination was in G.RS.’s best interest and that four
grounds of parental fault existed: (1) neglect/parental unfitness, (2) failure
to adjust the circumstances that led to the removal, (3) token efforts, and
(4) risk to the child's well-being if returned to Brandon's care. Brandon
appeals, and while G.R.S. is named as a respondent, she joins Brandon's
arguments on appeal and seeks reversal of the district court's order.

DISCUSSION

‘To terminate parental rights, the district court must find clear
and convineing evidence that (1) at least one ground of parental fault exists
and (2) termination is in the child's best interest. NRS 128.105(1); In re
Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126,
1

 

-33 (2000). “The primary consideration in any proceeding to terminate
parental rights must be whether the best interests of the child will be served
by the termination.” NRS 128.105(1). “Because the termination of parental
rights is an exercise of awesome power that is tantamount to imposition of
a civil death penalty, a district court's order terminating parental rights is
subject to close scrutiny.” In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914,
918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). For this
court to sustain an order permanently depriving a person of parental rights,
the district court’s factual findings must be supported by substantial

 

evidence. Id.

 

 
‘The parental-fault findings are not supported by substantial evidence

Brandon contends that the district court erred in finding clear
and convineing evidence of each of the parental-fault grounds.* We agree.?

Parental unfitness

Brandon asserts that the district court erred in finding he was
an unfit parent because there was not clear and convincing evidence that
his substance abuse persistently prevented him from caring for G.R.S.*
Termination of a parent's parental rights may be warranted when the

2As Brandon's brief includes citations to both the record and legal
authorities, and G.R.S. filed an appendix with the transcripts of the hearing
and the trial, we reject DFS's assertion that this court should decline to
consider Brandon's arguments on appeal.

3As DFS's answering brief fails to address Brandon's challenge to the
district court's failure-to-adjust parental-fault finding, we conclude DFS has
confessed error on this ground, and we do not further address it. See Bates
v. Chronister, 100 Nev. 675, 682, 691 P.2d 865, 870 (1984) (treating a
respondent's failure to address an argument in their answering brief as a
confession of error).

‘Although the parties address the parental-fault grounds of neglect
and parental unfitness as one, and the district court’s order includes the
heading “neglect/unfitness” with citation to the neglect statute, the court
expressly found only that Brandon was an unfit parent. Neglect and
parental unfitness are often two sides of the same coin in that “[nJeglect
defines a condition of the child; unfitness describes a condition of the
parent,” Champagne v. Welfare Div. of Nev., State, Dep't of Human Servs.,
100 Nev. 640, 648, 691 P.2d 849, 855 (1984), overruled on other grounds by
Inre N.J., 116 Nev. at 799-800, 8 P.3d at 132, but they are separate parental
fault grounds. Because the district court did not specifically find that G.RS.
was a neglected child, we do not address neglect here.

Additionally, as DFS concedes that the district court's unfitness
finding was based on Brandon's substance abuse alone, we need not address
Brandon's arguments as to whether a single instance of physical abuse can
demonstrate unfitness.

 

 
parent is unfit. NRS 128.105(1(b). An unfit parent is defined as “any
parent of a child who, by reason of the parent's fault or habit or conduct
toward the child or other persons, fails to provide such child with proper
care, guidance and support.” NRS 128.018. NRS 128.106 lists conditions
the court may consider in determining parental unfitness and includes
“[elxcessive use of intoxicating liquors, controlled substances or dangerous
drugs which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the child.”
NRS 128.106(1)(@).

This court has previously recognized that “it is probably true
that all parents are at one time or another guilty of neglecting to give their
children ‘proper’ care,” so in order for termination to be warranted, the
failure to care for the child “must be serious and persistent and be
sufficiently harmful to the child.” Champagne, 100 Nev. at 648, 691 P.2d at
‘855. This court further explained that “a parent does not deserve to forfeit
the sacred liberty right of parenthood unless such unfitness is shown to be
severe and persistent and such as to render the parent unsuitable to
maintain the parental relationship.” Id. (footnote omitted). Applying this
principle, this court reversed the termination of a mother's parental rights
where the mother was an alcoholic, but during the protective custody

 

proceeding, she had obtained a stable job; demonstrated months of sobriety;

 

and married a man with a stable job, with no criminal history, and who did
not drink. In re Parental Rights as to Montgomery, 112 Nev. 719, 728, 917
P.2d 949, 956 (1996), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized
by In re N.J., 116 Nev. at 798-801, 8 P.3d at 131-38. This court concluded
that clear and convincing evidence did not show that the mother's
alcoholism was irremediable or prevented her from adequately caring for

10

 

 
the child, especially in light of the mother's significant progress in
addressing her alcoholism. Id.

Under this precedent and the plain language of NRS
128.106(1)(@), a parent's substance abuse alone does not establish parental
unfitness. Instead, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
parent's substance abuse consistently prevents the parent from providing
the child with proper care, guidance, and support.

‘Turning to this case, there is no clear and convincing evidence
in the record that Brandon's substance abuse severely and consistently
prevented him from properly caring for G.R.S. That is true even if the
district court only considered Brandon's conduct before DFS filed its motion
to terminate Brandon's parental rights. The evidence demonstrated that
when the police accompanied DFS to Brandon's residence to remove G.RS.,
the police refused to assist DFS in such an endeavor because the conditions
in the home did not indicate G.R.S. was at risk. Additionally, when
Brandon was still abusing substances, he maintained a job and provided
food and shelter for G.R.S. Further, G.R.S.’s foster mother stated that there
was never any outward indication that Brandon was abusing substances
even during the time when he admitted that he was doing so. Thus, the
record lacks evidence demonstrating that Brandon's substance abuse
consistently prevented him from properly caring for G.R.S.

When the evidence of Brandon’s efforts to maintain his sobriety
following his arrest is added to the picture, there is even less support for the
district court's finding of unfitness based on substance abuse. Significant
evidence demonstrated that Brandon had been sober for almost a year by
the end of the termination trial, successfully participating in a treatment
program and making the types of changes DFS sought in the case plan it

u

 

 
developed for reunification. ‘Thus, even if there had been evidence that
Brandon's substance abuse consistently prevented him from providing
GR. with proper care before his sobriety, the record demonstrates that
Brandon has made significant progress since his arrest and had maintained
his sobriety.

Further, it was improper for DFS to use Brandon's enrollment
in the drug court program as both a shield and a sword. According to DFS,
Brandon’s fitness could not be properly assessed while he was still enrolled
in the drug court program even though Brandon continued to successfully
participate in the program, but the time it would take Brandon to complete
the drug court program necessitated the termination of his parental rights
to ensure the child's stability. While DFS cited to the Federal Payments for
Foster Care, Prevention, and Permanency Act for the premise that the
federal government requires States to timely resolve termination of
parental rights actions, that statute does not require a termination
proceeding to conclude within a specific period. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(6)(B) (in the definition of a case review system, providing that a state
should file a petition to terminate parental rights when the child has been
in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months). And while we
acknowledge that NRS 128.055 encourages courts to conduct termination
proceedings within six months of the request to terminate parental rights,
that statute also does not require conclusion of the termination proceedings
by a certain time.

Because termination of parental rights has a permanent effect
on both the parents and the children, courts must consider each termination
request on a case-by-case basis. If additional time is needed in a particular

case to assess a parent's progress toward completion of a case plan, the court.

12

 

 
is not legally constrained from taking that time. Here, the district court
initially continued the trial because of Brandon's progress in the drug court
program but then restarted the trial based on concerns that if the court
waited for Brandon to complete the drug court program, the termination
proceeding might not be resolved within two years of the child's removal.
No statute or caselaw prevented the district court from continuing the trial
another eight months so that it would have a complete picture of Brandon's
progress, and under these circumstances, the district court should have
done so. In sum, substantial evidence does not support the district court's
parental-fault finding of unfitness, as DFS did not show with clear and
convincing evidence that Brandon's substance abuse prevented him from
consistently providing G.R.
Token efforts
Brandon next argues that the district court erred when it

with proper care, guidance, and support.

 

concluded that he did not overcome the presumption that he had only made
token efforts to care for G.R.S.% We agree.

Termination of parental rights may be warranted when a
parent makes only token efforts “() (tJo support or communicate with the
child; (I) {tJo prevent neglect of the child; (111) {tJo avoid being an unfit
parent; or (IV) [t]o eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or
‘emotional injury to the child.” NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6). If a child has resided
outside of the child’s home for 14 of any 20 consecutive months, “it must be

5Brandon also argues that the token-efforts presumption was
erroneously applied, as he was limited in his ability to engage in services
recommended by DFS because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the
record demonstrates that only the parenting classes Brandon was required
to take were limited, and he was nonetheless able to complete them, we are
not persuaded by Brandon's argument in this regard,

13

 

 
 

presumed that the parent or parents have demonstrated only token efforts
to care for the child” as set forth in NRS 128.105(1)(b\6).  NRS
128.109(1)(a). A parent may rebut that presumption by proving otherwise
by a preponderance of the evidence, which requires evidence that “lead{s}
the fact-finder to conclude that the existence of the contested fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.” In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 182 Nev.
209, 217, 371 P.8d 995, 1001 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)
Here, the district court properly applied the presumption that

Brandon had only made token efforts to care for G.R.S. because G.R.S. had

 

been out of Brandon's care for more than 14 consecutive months. But we
conclude that substantial evidence does not support the district court's
conclusion that Brandon failed to overcome that presumption. To the extent
that the district court based its conclusion solely on Brandon's efforts
preceding the motion to terminate his parental rights, it erred because the
presumption did not yet apply, given that G.R.S. had only been out of
Brandon's care for 12 months at that time. In fact, DFS requested in its
motion that the court consider whether the presumption would be
applicable at the time of the trial. Although Brandon's refusal to
acknowledge or address his substance abuse and his shortcomings in fully
complying with his case plan before the termination motion was filed may
support a token-efforts finding, the evidence demonstrates that Brandon's
efforts following his incarceration have been significantly more than token.
Brandon fully complied with the requirements placed on him by DFS,
including finding his own domestic violence class, drug testing clean three
times weekly, and consistently visiting and engaging appropriately with
GRS. Additionally, if the district court was concerned with Brandon’

 

efforts to provide financial support for G.R.S., his testimony regarding his

“4

 

 
 

employment, income, offers to provide financial support to the foster family,
and contributions of groceries was not rebutted. As discussed above, the
fact that Brandon still had a few more months in the drug court program
does not prechide the court from assessing his efforts or deferring such an
assessment through the date when Brandon was expected to complete the
program. When a parent is successfully working through a substance abuse
treatment program, but the length of the program prevents the parent from
immediately reunifying with the child, the court cannot conclude that the
amount of time left in the treatment program demonstrates the parent is
only making token efforts to care for the child. Therefore, we conclude that
the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the district
court’s finding that Brandon failed to rebut the token-efforts presumption
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Risk of serious injury

Parental fault may be established when there is a “[risk of
serious physical, mental or emotional injury to the child if the child were
returned to, or remains in, the home of his or her parent or parents.” NRS
128,105(1)(6)(5). ‘The district court found that, if returned to Brandon's
care, G.R.S. would be exposed “to parental drug use and potentially to
domestic violence” and that because Brandon has “not made substantial
efforts to address [his] substance abuse outside of a controlled environment,
[G.RS’s return to his care] poses an unacceptable risk of additional
physical, mental, or emotional injury to the child{ ].”

‘The record does not support the district court’s finding that
returning G.RS. to Brandon's care would result in G.R.S.’s exposure to
parental drug use, as Brandon had been sober since November 2020.

Further, it is inappropriate to use Brandon's successful participation in the

15

 

 

 
drug court program as a sword against him in asserting that because the
drug court program is a controlled environment, he failed to demonstrate a
change in his habits, such that he no longer poses a risk to G.RS.
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record, even including Brandon's
conduct prior to the motion to terminate, that showed he posed a risk of
serious injury to G.R.S. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence
does not support the district court’s finding that DFS proved by clear and
convincing evidence that returning G.R.S. to Brandon's care posed a risk of
serious injury to G.R.S. Thus, none of the district court's parental fault
findings are supported by substantial evidence. NRS 128.105(1); In re
Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. at 800-01, 8 P.3d at 182-
33

The best interest finding is not supported by substantial evidence

Lastly, Brandon argues that the district court erred in finding
that DFS demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that termination
of his parental rights was in G.R.S.’s best interest.° We agree.

“The primary consideration in any proceeding to terminate
parental rights must be whether the best interests of the child will be served
by the termination.” NRS 128.105(1). Of particular relevance here, NRS
128.108 identifies factors that the court must consider when a child in DFS's
protective custody has been placed with a foster family and DFS is seeking

“While G.R.S. argues that the district court erred by not considering
her capacity to express her preferences, as required by NRS 128.107(2), we
need not address this argument, as none of the parties objected to the court's
failure to evaluate G.R'S.'s capacity. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97
Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (“A point not urged in the trial court,
unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived
and will not be considered on appeal”).

16

 

 
 

termination of parental rights with the intention of having the foster family
adopt the child. ‘The factors the court is required to consider are meant to
inform the court on “whether the child has become integrated into the foster
family to the extent that the child's familial identity is with that family, and
whether the foster family is able and willing permanently to treat the child
as a member of the family.” NRS 128.108 (listing eight specific factors that

the court must consider when the child re:

 

les in foster care).

Here, the district court quoted NRS 128.108 in its order, but it
did not address each of the statutory considerations in relation to this case.
In fact, the district court devoted only 2.5 pages of its 49-page order to what
Nevada law says is the “primary consideration in any proceeding to
terminate parental rights"—the best interest of the child. NRS 128.105(1).
‘The evidence in the record does not demonstrate that G.R.S.'s familial
identity is with the foster family. G.R.S. refers to the foster mom as “Aunt”
and the foster dad as “Uncl
“Dad.” And G.R.S. is regularly upset when her visits with Brandon conclude

 

G.RS. continues to refer to Brandon as

and has consistently requested to return to Brandon's care. Considering
the lack of other evidence regarding G.R.S’s best interest, we conclude
substantial evidence in the record does not support the district court's
finding that termination of Brandon's parental rights was in G.R.S’s best
interest.
CONCLUSION

A district court cannot terminate a parent's parental rights
solely because the parent has or had a substance abuse problem. ‘There
must be evidence that the parent's substance abuse seriously and
consistently prevents the parent from providing the child with proper care,
guidance, and support. Additionally, no legal authority prevents a district

7

 

 
court from continuing a termination proceeding when the circumstances
warrant affording the parent more time to make the necessary changes so
that the child can be returned to the parent's care. Such circumstances, as,
the district court initially acknowledged, were present here. Because
substantial evidence does not support the district court's findings of
parental fault and that the termination of Brandon's parental rights was in
G.RSs best interest, we reverse and remand this matter to the distriet

court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

 

J
Herndon

We concur:
_ Pye 4
Lee

J.
Parraguirre

18