Title: Wilbanks v. State

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

224 Kan. 66 (1978)
579 P.2d 132
ROBERT H. WILBANKS, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 48,676

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 6, 1978.
S. Richard Mellinger, of Roach & Mellinger, of Emporia, argued the cause and *67 was on the brief for the appellant.
Philip E. Winter, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
Petitioner, Robert H. Wilbanks, appeals from an order of the district court of Lyon County, Kansas, dissolving a writ of habeas corpus in an action brought to challenge extradition proceedings.
Petitioner contends that it was error to dissolve the writ of habeas corpus when there was no showing that a magistrate, before issuing an arrest warrant, had made an independent evaluation of the complaint to determine if probable cause existed that a crime had been committed and that Wilbanks committed it. Stated another way, he contends that the complaint, filed with an Idaho magistrate, was in itself insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, and there being no indication that affidavits or other evidence were presented to the magistrate, the issuance of the warrant is constitutionally invalid and will not support extradition. With the exception of his attack upon the initial Idaho complaint, petitioner does not challenge the extradition proceedings or the governor's warrant. We need not discuss those matters further.
The initial complaint was filed in the state of Idaho on September 3, 1975. It reads as follows:
"COMPLAINT-CRIMINAL
"COUNT I
Six days later, a warrant was issued by G.D. Carey, another magistrate in the same Idaho judicial district, for the arrest of Wilbanks. The complaint is drawn under section 18-3106 of the Idaho Code (1977 Supp.), which reads as follows:
................
A comparison of I.C. 1977 Supp. 18-3106 (a) with the complaint shows that the complaint is written in almost the exact terms of the statute.
Three other sections of the Idaho Code are pertinent. These are I.C. 1977 Supp. 19-504, I.C. 1977 Supp. 19-505, and I.C. 19-506. These read as follows:
Our own statute governing the issuance of warrants for arrest upon the filing of complaints is K.S.A. 22-2302. It reads:
The Judicial Council note appended thereto states that "This section parallels, with slight modifications, Rule 4 (a) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure...." The federal rule reads:
Charles Alan Wright, in Federal Practice and Procedure, comments on this rule as follows:
................
................
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
This section has been held applicable to the issuance of warrants for arrest as well as warrants authorizing a search. Similar language is contained in section 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights. As we noted in State v. Wood, 190 Kan. 778, 788, 378 P.2d 536 (1963):
In a long line of oft-cited and now familiar cases, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly set forth these rules:
1. The standard for arrest, mandated by the Fourth Amendment, is probable cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-112, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975), and cases cited therein.
2. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 83 S. Ct. 1623 (1963); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 91 S. Ct. 1031 (1971).
3. The Fourth Amendment requires that before a warrant for arrest or search may be issued, there must be a probable cause finding by a neutral and detached magistrate. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 92 L. Ed. 436, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1154, 88 S. Ct. 2120 (1968); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 32 L. Ed. 2d 783, 92 S. Ct. 2119 (1972); and Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444, 97 S. Ct. 546 (1977).
4. The Fourth Amendment probable cause standards require that before a warrant for either an arrest or a search can be issued, *72 the magistrate must be supplied with sufficient factual information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists. The magistrate must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts; he should not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusions; and he should not be a mere "rubber stamp" for law enforcement officers. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 11 L. Ed. 2d 887, 84 S. Ct. 825 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas, supra; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969); and Whiteley v. Warden, supra.
5. The same probable cause requirements cover the issuance of both federal and state warrants. Ker v. California, supra, and Whiteley v. Warden, supra.
6. Hearsay, set forth in a warrant application, may be relied upon and form the basis for a probable cause finding, so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented. Aguilar v. Texas, supra; and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725 (1960). We note that rule 4 F.R. Crim. P. has been amended to clarify this issue. The rule now includes the following statement: "The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part." (Rule 4[b] F.R. Crim. P.)
7. An affidavit, or complaint, otherwise insufficient as a warrant application, cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed by the complainant or affiant when he sought the warrant, if that information was not disclosed and brought to the attention of the magistrate before the warrant was issued. Giordenello v. United States, supra; Aguilar v. Texas, supra; and Whiteley v. Warden, supra.
Two of the cases cited above are particularly instructive. In Giordenello, a federal warrant for the arrest of Giordenello had been issued by a United States Commissioner, based upon a complaint filed with the Commissioner. The complaint, sworn to by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, recited merely that on or about the date upon which the complaint was filed:
*73 Giordenello contended that the complaint was defective in that it in effect recited no more than the elements of the crime charged, and provided no basis for a probable cause determination by the Commissioner. After discussing Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the commands of the Fourth Amendment, the Court said:
Whiteley v. Warden, supra, involved a complaint filed in a Wyoming state court, and the validity of the warrant issued thereon. The complaint, signed before a Justice of the Peace by the Sheriff of the county in which the offense occurred, read as follows:
The court said:
................
Applying these principles to the complaint before us, filed in the Idaho court, it is clear that no probable cause information is contained therein. The complaint is drawn in the wording of the Idaho statute, and discloses no factual basis for the belief by the person who signed the complaint that Wilbanks committed the offense charged. The purpose of a complaint is to provide an answer to the magistrate's hypothetical question, "What makes you think that the defendant committed the offense charged?" (Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224-225, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345, 85 S. Ct. 1365 [1965].) The belief of the complainant may have been based upon statements given law enforcement officers by the owner or employees of Power Shop Equipment and Supply; the defendant may have been identified photographically or by fingerprints on the check; the bank upon which the check was drawn may have provided further information. These, however, are suppositions; none of this information is provided in the complaint; none of it was provided to the magistrate so far as we are aware; and no such information is disclosed in the record before us.
We are not unmindful of the cases in which we have said in substance that a properly verified complaint, charging an offense substantially in the language of the statute, is sufficient authority for a finding of probable cause and the issuance of an arrest warrant. For example, see State v. Giddings, 216 Kan. 14, 17, 531 P.2d 445 (1975); State v. Greene, 214 Kan. 78, 79, 519 P.2d 651; State v. Woods, 214 Kan. 739, 741, 522 P.2d 967 (1974); State v. Addington, 205 Kan. 640, 644, 472 P.2d 225 (1970); Topeka v. *75 Raynor, 61 Kan. 10, 58 Pac. 557 (1899); Holton v. Bimrod, 61 Kan. 13, 58 Pac. 558 (1899); and State v. Brooks, 33 Kan. 708, 711, 7 Pac. 591 (1885). To whatever extent those cases are inconsistent with the views hereafter expressed, they are disapproved.
In recognition of the commands of the Fourth Amendment and section 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights, we have held that an affidavit by an officer that he believes or has good reason to believe that certain contraband items are located in a certain place is not sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. State v. McMillin, 206 Kan. 3, 5-6, 476 P.2d 612 (1970). In State v. Hart, 200 Kan. 153, 434 P.2d 999 (1967), Justice Fontron, speaking for a unanimous court, said:
Arrest and detention are no less serious invasions of the rights of a citizen than are searches of a citizen's house, automobile, or place of business. Warrants for arrest cannot be issued except upon probable cause. Statements to the contrary in our earlier cited cases notwithstanding, we now hold that a verified complaint couched in the language of a criminal statute, standing alone, is not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause and the issuance of an arrest warrant.
The purpose of a complaint, filed with a magistrate, is twofold: first, its function is to disclose sufficient factual information to enable a magistrate to make an intelligent and impartial finding that there is probable cause to believe that a specific crime has been committed, and that the defendant has committed or is committing it; and second, its function is to inform the defendant of the particular offense with which he or she is charged, and provide an accusation upon which a trial can be held.
Criminal statutes, such as those contained in chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, set forth the statutory definitions of crimes, generally in terms of act and intent. A verified complaint, drawn in the language of a criminal statute, and merely stating *76 that the defendant did certain acts with a specific intent, is not sufficient in itself to support a finding of probable cause. In order to support such a finding, a complaint must disclose the factual reasons for the complainant's belief. The statement of the facts, in most instances, can be concise: the complainant saw the defendant commit the offense; the owner reports a car stolen, and the defendant is apprehended shortly thereafter, driving the vehicle; the occupant of a building discovers evidence of a forced entry and finds various items of personal property missing, and the items are found later that day in defendant's possession; a merchant identifies defendant as the person who obtained merchandise by the use of a credit card issued in the name of a third person, and the third person states that the card was stolen, and defendant was not authorized to use it.
Rule 4, Fed. R. Crim. P., limits the magistrate to consideration of "the complaint, or ... an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint." Our statute, K.S.A. 22-2302, provides that a magistrate may consider "other evidence." It is preferable, and the most desirable practice, to include probable cause information in the body of the complaint. However, we recognize that under the statute a separate affidavit or affidavits may be filed with the complaint, or sworn testimony may be offered. Such testimony should be recorded and preserved, either by a court reporter or through electronic means.
The important point, which we emphasize, is that sufficient factual information must be presented to enable the magistrate to make an independent finding of probable cause before a warrant is issued, as mandated by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and section 15 of the Bill of Rights.
The Idaho complaint, upon which the warrant was issued, and upon which extradition proceedings are premised, was not sufficient in itself to support a finding of probable cause, upon which the issuance of the Idaho warrant could be based. This brings us to the crucial issue: whether the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment is applicable in extradition proceedings. Petitioner contends that it is, and he cites various cases from other jurisdictions in support of his claim; we will examine those presently.
Article IV, § 2, clause 2, of the United States Constitution provides the foundation upon which extradition proceedings are based. It provides:
Our statute, K.S.A. 22-2703, is a part of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act passed by the Kansas Legislature in 1970. It provides in substance that demands for extradition must be in writing, must allege that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and thereafter fled from the state, and the demand must be "accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon ... The indictment, information affidavit or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner contends that he is not "charged" as that term is used in article IV, § 2, and that the complaint does not "substantially charge" him with a crime, as those words are used in K.S.A. 22-2703, and thus the extradition request is invalid. We find that the great majority of the recent pronouncements on the subject support the position taken by petitioner. Most, if not all, of these cases were decided following the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on the Fourth Amendment in the 1960's  Jones, Ker, Rugendorf, Aguilar, Jaben, and Spinelli.
The first and perhaps the leading case in this area is Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.1967). Florida authorities sought to extradite Kirkland from the District of Columbia. The police officer's affidavit, serving as a complaint, and upon which the arrest warrant was based, recited simply that on or about a given date, Kirkland "DID THEN AND THERE: unlawfully, wilfully, maliciously and feloniously set fire to and burn or cause to be burned a certain building, to wit: The Hut Bar ... the said bar being the property of one Fredrich Ritter." The Chief Judge, in the extradition hearing, ruled that Kirkland was "substantially charged" and ordered extradition. Kirkland then sought habeas corpus in the district court, which ruled that the affidavit was *78 "sufficient" and discharged the writ. Kirkland appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Florida affidavit was insufficient. The rationale of the Kirkland decision is set forth as follows:
................
We should note that 18 U.S.C. § 3182 the federal extradition statute referred to in the quoted portion of the Kirkland opinion, requires the state seeking extradition to produce "a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate ... charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime ..."
Kirkland has been followed in New York, Delaware, Nevada, Wisconsin, Connecticut, Illinois, Colorado, New Hampshire, Michigan, the First and Third Circuits, and the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. See People v. Artis, 32 A.D.2d 554, 300 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1969); People ex rel. Porzio v. Wright, 59 Misc.2d 1056, 301 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1969); People ex rel. Miller v. Krueger, 35 A.D.2d 743, 316 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1970); People ex rel. Cooper v. Lombard, 45 A.D.2d 928, 357 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1974); Grano v. State, 257 A.2d 768 (Del. Super. 1969); Sheriff v. Thompson, 85 Nev. 211, 452 P.2d 911 (1969); State v. Towne, 46 Wis.2d 169, 174 N.W.2d 251 (1970); Brode v. Power, 31 Conn. Sup. 411, 332 A.2d 376 (1974); Ierardi v. Gunter, 528 F.2d 929 (1st Cir.1976); Wellington v. State of S.D., 413 F. Supp. 151 (D.S.D. 1976); United States ex rel. Grano v. Anderson, 446 F.2d 272 (3d Cir.1971); People ex rel. Kubala v. Woods, 52 Ill. 2d 48, 284 N.E.2d 286 (1972); Pippin v. Leach, 188 Colo. 385, 534 P.2d 1193 (1975); Smith v. Helgemoe, 117 N.H. 91, 369 A.2d 218 (1977); and People v. Doran, 401 Mich. 235, 258 N.W.2d 406 (1977).
Ierardi, supra, was decided after Gerstein, in which the United States Supreme Court held that "the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention." (420 U.S.  at 126.) The Ierardi court said:
To be sure, there are jurisdictions in which the Kirkland rationale is not followed. Garrison v. Smith, 413 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Miss. 1976) and Taylor v. Garrison, 329 So. 2d 506 (Miss. 1976), both reject the Kirkland view; however, these cases were preceded by a three-day evidentiary hearing in the Mississippi trial court during which proceeding probable cause was fully established. Similarly, in People ex rel. Kubala v. Woods, supra, there were factual affidavits made before a notary public which, if believed, supplied ample probable cause. The one case which fails to follow Kirkland, and where there appears to be no showing of probable cause, is Bailey v. State, 260 Ind. 448, 296 N.E.2d 422 (1973). We do not choose to follow Bailey.
We find the rationale of Kirkland and Ierardi, supra, persuasive, and conclude that Fourth Amendment standards apply in extradition proceedings, and that a person is not "charged" or *81 "substantially charged" by the filing of a complaint or affidavit which does not provide sufficient information to enable a "neutral and detached magistrate" to make an independent determination of probable cause. This holding places no burden on the demanding state which it does not already have under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We should point out that our ruling in this case applies only to warrants issued upon informations, affidavits or complaints; when warrants are issued upon indictments, a finding of probable cause has already been made by the grand jury which returned the indictment.
The record in McCullough v. Darr, 219 Kan. 477, 548 P.2d 1245 (1976), discloses that the prosecutions there were commenced by the filing of an information, supported by a detailed affidavit. The question of probable cause was not raised, perhaps because of the adequacy of the latter document. We there held that the Governor's warrant creates a prima facie case for the state, and that "[s]o long as the charge made against one whose extradition is sought legally constitutes a crime, technical defects in the extradition papers cannot prevent extradition." (p. 481.)
McCullough is distinguishable upon the facts. Further, we do not regard the total absence of any record showing of probable cause as a "technical" or inconsequential defect in the extradition papers, for probable cause is constitutionally mandated. The documents here before us do not disclose any facts upon which a probable cause finding could have been made. The prima facie case made by a Governor's warrant is overcome where, as here, the documents supporting the Governor's warrant do not "substantially charge" the defendant with a crime. A person is not "substantially charged" by the filing of documents which do not comport with Fourth Amendment standards.
Our holding herein, however, does not require the immediate issuance of the writ, or the discharge of petitioner. Like many of the courts following the Kirkland rationale, we conclude that the demanding state, Idaho, should be granted a reasonable time within which to demonstrate that it in fact had probable cause at the time the arrest warrant was issued. We conclude that thirty days is a reasonable period within which to make such a showing.
The judgment dissolving the writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court, with directions to discharge the petitioner, Robert H. Wilbanks, unless within thirty *82 days from the date of this opinion the respondent makes a showing of probable cause in accordance with this opinion.
FROMME, J., dissenting.
The shock of the foregoing opinion will reverberate throughout this state. Its impact will be felt in every courtroom, including our own. This court for almost one hundred years has advised prosecuting attorneys of the state that a verified complaint charging an offense substantially in the language of a statute proscribing certain acts is sufficient. See State v. Brooks, 33 Kan. 708, 711, 7 Pac. 591 (1885). It has been the practice in many counties, on the filing of such a complaint, for the magistrate to orally examine the complainant or other person appearing before him. If probable cause was found to credit the allegations in the complaint the magistrate issued the arrest warrant. Hereafter there is no presumption of probable cause attending the judicial determination of probable cause on which an arrest warrant is issued.
Now this court mandates before a warrant is issued that an additional affidavit be filed or a statement be included in the complaint to set forth the facts in detail and list the names of witnesses who will testify to those facts even though the complainant unequivocally swears on oath that the facts constituting the crime are true.
In the present case the complainant William Allan McAndy did not equivocate by swearing to the complaint on information and belief. He set out the facts constituting the crime along with a copy of the check and swore on oath that Robert H. Wilbanks committed the crime by issuing said check without funds, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the payee. It was sworn to before the magistrate. The prosecuting attorney of Ada County, Idaho, was David H. Leroy. The complainant, William Allan McAndy, is not one of the officers in the Ada County Sheriff's Office nominated as an agent of the State of Idaho to receive the fugitive. Therefore, there is no reason to hold that the complaint is insufficient for the issuance of a warrant on probable cause. The facts were sworn to from personal knowledge.
If I interpret the decision of the majority correctly no magistrate can safely make a judicial determination of probable cause without having a sufficient probable cause basis sworn to in writing. This must either be set forth in the complaint itself, in a *83 separate affidavit, or in the form of a transcribed statement of oral evidence taken before the magistrate.
The federal cases cited in the majority opinion are not authority for questioning probable cause in issuing the Idaho warrant in the present case. In Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958), a federal narcotics agent signed a one-sentence complaint. In Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 91 S. Ct. 1031 (1971), a sheriff signed a one-sentence complaint. In Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.1967), a police officer signed the initial complaint against Kirkland. In Ierardi v. Gunter, 528 F.2d 929 (1st Cir.1976), the information was executed by a Florida prosecutor and supported by an affidavit of a police officer. None of these officials had personal knowledge of the facts constituting the crime charged.
In order to understand the reasoning in the Kirkland and Ierardi cases it should be noted that the original complaints signed by state officials were executed under the Florida law as it existed prior to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975). Prior to Gerstein under Florida law an information alone was considered the equivalent of an indictment and sufficient in itself to establish probable cause. Therefore in Kirkland and Ierardi there was no judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to interstate requisition. Gerstein changed the Florida law in this respect holding the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention. I do not quarrel with that holding. There was a judicial determination in the present case.
The present practice of the United States District Attorneys of including two or three pages of information listing witnesses and what the investigators say the witnesses will testify to should not be adopted in the state courts. Such recitations are made from hearsay and, in my opinion, lend little if any credence to the judicial determination by the magistrate of probable cause. The witnesses listed are seldom if ever called before the federal magistrate. Our statute, K.S.A. 22-2302, provides:
The practice in Kansas and in Idaho of requiring the complaining *84 witness to sign a complaint under oath of his or her own personal knowledge should be sufficient to obtain a judicial determination of probable cause on which a warrant is issued. If the allegations in the complaint are questionable the magistrate may require some further showing, but once the magistrate issues the warrant based upon a sworn complaint charging an offense substantially in the language of the statute proscribing certain acts, then the requirements of our statute and of the constitutions have been met.
In McCullough v. Darr, 219 Kan. 477, 548 P.2d 1245 (1976), this court in unanimous accord held:
The majority here attempt to distinguish McCullough upon the facts. They disregard the basis for the decision, i.e., the presumption of validity which attends a warrant issued by a magistrate after a judicial determination, and say the documents supporting the Governor's warrant do not "substantially charge" the defendant with a crime in the present case. There is little doubt a crime was charged in McCullough and a crime was charged in the present case. In McCullough the presumption of validity was recognized by this court. In the present case it is not. The present case has the effect of overruling McCullough by holding that there is no presumption of validity which attends a Governor's warrant in extradition proceedings, and that full faith and credit will not be extended to a judicial determination made by a magistrate in another state.
In conclusion I wish to note from the record of proceedings in this habeas corpus case the petitioner Wilbanks appeared and offered no evidence to overcome the presumption which attends the judicial determination of probable cause entered by the magistrate in Idaho. The attorney for petitioner raised the question of *85 identity. The petitioner was identified by pictures and fingerprints furnished by the Idaho authorities. The Idaho fingerprints were compared with fingerprints of the petitioner by an expert witness, and the judge hearing the matter had ample opportunity to observe and compare the pictures with the appearance of the petitioner who was in the courtroom.
The district court properly dissolved the writ of habeas corpus after granting the petitioner a full hearing. I would affirm that action.
McFARLAND, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.