Title: Providian Nat. Bank v. Conner

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

898 So. 2d 714 (2004)
PROVIDIAN NATIONAL BANK
v.
Tina G. CONNER.
1021496.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 1, 2004.
*715 William H. Brooks and William H. Morrow of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Courtney R. Potthoff of Williams, Potthoff, Williams & Smith, L.L.C., Eufaula, for appellant.
Richard A. Harrison, Eufaula, for appellee.
BROWN, Justice.
Providian National Bank ("Providian"), the defendant in a proceeding in the Barbour Circuit Court, appeals from the trial court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration of the claims of Tina G. Conner, the plaintiff below. We reverse and remand.
Conner applied for and received a VISA credit card from Providian.[1] In March 2001, Providian mailed to its cardholders a notice of changes in the terms of their credit-card agreements with Providian. Conner's March statement contained the following language, prominently placed on the statement:
(Capitalization in original.)
A separate document entitled "IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE OF CHANGE TO YOUR ACCOUNT AGREEMENT" (hereinafter "the notice") was also enclosed with the March statement. The notice informed cardholders that an arbitration provision contained in the notice would become part of their existing credit-card agreements.
*716 The arbitration provision contained in the notice states that either the cardholder or Providian could elect to have the other party's claims resolved by arbitration, and it outlined the procedures that would be employed if either party elected to submit a claim to arbitration. The arbitration provision defined "claim" as
The notice further informed cardholders that the arbitration provision would "become effective forty-five (45) calendar days after the Statement Date on the enclosed billing statement... unless [Providian] receive[d] prior to then a letter from [the cardholder] stating that [the cardholder did] not want the Arbitration Provision to become a part of the Agreement." The notice also provided an address where any correspondence could be directed. Providian has no record of a letter from Conner exercising the option of not accepting the arbitration provision, and Conner does not contend that she did so.
On November 7, 2002, Conner sued Providian[2] asserting that Providian had wrongfully presented checks against Conner's personal checking account. Specifically, Conner alleged that in 2002 Providian obtained her personal checking-account information and then, allegedly without her permission, "wrongfully presented checks against [Conner's] checking account" for payment to her credit-card account. The complaint alleged conversion, trespass, conspiracy, fraud, negligence, the tort of outrage, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wantonness, and intentional interference with Conner's business relationship with her bank. Conner sought compensatory and punitive damages not to exceed the specific maximum sum of $74,999.
On December 19, 2002, Providian filed a motion to compel arbitration in this case. Providian argued that its relationship with Conner was governed by a contract that included an arbitration provision; therefore, it asked the trial court to direct Conner to submit her claims to arbitration. In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Providian submitted an affidavit of Michael Cioe, director of Providian Bancorp Services (a servicing affiliate of Providian); a copy of Conner's March 2001 statement; a copy of the notice; and copies of various rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Conner submitted a brief in opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. In support of her brief, Conner included what appears to be several pages from a response to an interrogatory in another action involving different parties. Conner offered no other evidence in support of her opposition to Providian's motion to compel arbitration.
On March 18, 2003, Conner amended her complaint, stating that Providian's actions in this case constituted felonies. She cited Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-370, which provides: "For any injury, either to person or property, amounting to a felony, a civil action may be commenced by the party injured without prosecution of the offender."
On March 19, 2003, the trial court held a hearing on Providian's motion to compel *717 arbitration. On April 16, 2003, the trial court issued an order denying Providian's motion and ordering Providian to comply with the discovery requests Conner had filed in the action. Providian appeals.
This Court reviews an order denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Potts v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 853 So. 2d 194 (Ala.2002); Vann v. First Cmty. Credit Corp., 834 So. 2d 751, 752-53 (Ala.2002). Furthermore,
Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saxton, 880 So. 2d 428, 430 (Ala.2003) (citations omitted).
Conner argues that the arbitration provision contained in the notice sent to cardholders is not part of her credit-card agreement with Providian. However, Providian produced substantial evidence indicating that the arbitration provision in the notice became part of the credit-card agreement. Specifically, Cioe testified in his affidavit (1) that Conner entered into a credit-card agreement with Providian, (2) that a copy of the notice (which contains the arbitration provision) was mailed to Conner with her March 2001 statement, and (3) that Conner did not opt out of the arbitration provision, as the notice indicated she could have.
This Court has previously held that this exact factual scenario, involving apparently the same notice and the same arbitration provision, results in the cardholder's acquiescing to the addition of the arbitration provision to the cardholder's credit-card agreement. In Providian National Bank v. Screws, 894 So. 2d 625 (Ala.2003), this Court held:
"(Capitalization in original.)
"We analyzed and approved a similar modification in terms in SouthTrust Bank, 775 So. 2d 184, 190:
Providian Nat'l Bank, 894 So. 2d  at 628. Under Providian National Bank, the arbitration provision mailed to Conner in March 2001 became part of the credit-card agreement between her and Providian when she failed to reject the arbitration provision as the notice indicated she could.
There is no dispute that the underlying contract in this case evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce. It is undisputed that Conner is a resident citizen of Alabama. Cioe's affidavit indicates that Providian's principal place of business is in New Hampshire, where Conner sent her monthly payments. Additionally, Providian sent Conner monthly bills from Columbus, Georgia. See Providian Nat'l Bank, 894 So. 2d  at 627 (noting that a contract "concerning the terms of a credit agreement between a national bank and the holders of its card  clearly involves interstate commerce").
Providian presented substantial evidence of the existence of a contract containing an arbitration provision and that the contract evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce. Thus, the burden shifted to Conner to present evidence that either the arbitration provision is not valid or that it does not apply to the dispute in question.
Conner claims that she did not assent to the addition of the arbitration provision to the credit-card agreement because, she says, she did not receive the notice and did not sign any document agreeing to arbitration. However, Conner made this assertion only in her brief opposing the motion to compel arbitration in the trial court. As this Court has noted, "`[s]tatements in motions and briefs are not evidence to be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration.'" Serra Toyota, Inc. v. Johnson, 876 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (Ala.2003) (quoting Tefco Fin. Co. v. Green, 793 So. 2d 755, 760 n. 6 (Ala.2001)). Furthermore, "[i]f [a] party presents no evidence in opposition to *720 a properly supported motion to compel arbitration, then the trial court should grant the motion to compel arbitration." Ex parte Greenstreet, Inc., 806 So. 2d 1203, 1209 (Ala.2001). Conner did not provide the trial court with an affidavit or other evidence establishing that she did not receive notice of the change in the credit-card agreement or that she otherwise did not agree to the arbitration provision. Therefore, she failed to meet her burden of production in establishing that the arbitration provision is invalid or that it does not apply to the dispute in this case.
Conner also maintains that because the underlying conduct she alleges Providian engaged in could constitute various felonies, arbitration is inappropriate. Conner explains this issue as follows:
Conner's brief at 17-18.
Conner asserts no authority for the proposition that, because the acts forming the basis of her civil complaint could constitute felonies, arbitration is inappropriate. Indeed, Conner does not explain how the fact that those acts could constitute felonies makes resolution of her civil claims more appropriate in the circuit court rather than in arbitration, or how such claims are otherwise not suited for arbitration. Therefore, we need not address this issue. See BankAmerica Hous. Servs. v. Lee, 833 So. 2d 609, 620-21 (Ala.2002) (noting that it is not the duty of an appellate court to undertake to do legal research or create legal arguments for a party on appeal); see also Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. (requiring that arguments in a brief contain "citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on").
Providian presented substantial evidence of the existence of a contract containing an arbitration provision and that that contract evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce. Conner failed to present evidence either that the arbitration provision is not valid or that it does not apply to the dispute in question. Therefore, the trial court's order denying Providian's motion to compel arbitration is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
NABERS, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  According to an affidavit in the record supplied by Providian, Conner's account with Providian was opened on April 3, 2000. At one point during the proceedings in the trial court Conner disputed this fact; however, no evidence was offered in the trial court contradicting Providian's assertion.
[2]  Conner also named Allied Interstate, Inc. ("Allied"), as a defendant. Although it appears from the record that Allied is a collection agency used by Providian, the parties do not explain Allied's role in this case, and Allied is not a party to this appeal.