Title: Boucher v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DONALD J. BOUCHER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 145Case Number: S-12-0045Decided: 11/20/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
DONALD 
J. BOUCHER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable Michael 
K. Davis, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate 
Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; Sara 
Caty, Student Director.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney 
General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN*, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden retired effective 
September 30, 2012.
 
KITE, Chief 
Justice.
 
[¶1]  
After this Court affirmed his six sexual assault convictions in 
Boucher v. State, 2011 WY 2, 245 P.3d 342 (Wyo. 2011), Donald 
J. Boucher filed two motions for sentence reduction, one through counsel and one 
pro se.  The district court denied the pro se 
motion without mentioning counsel’s motion.  Mr. Boucher 
appeals, claiming the district court erred as a matter of law when it denied his 
motion without considering his change of circumstances.  We 
find no error and affirm the district court’s order. 

ISSUE
 
[¶2]  
Mr. Boucher asserts the district court erred in denying his motions for 
sentence reduction.  The State asserts the district court 
properly exercised its discretion and denied the motions upon finding the 
sentence fair and just.   
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]  
After a jury convicted Mr. Boucher on six felony charges involving sexual 
assault, the district court sentenced him to consecutive prison sentences 
totaling 30 to 50 years.  Mr. Boucher appealed the convictions 
to this Court and we affirmed.  Boucher, 
id.  Mr. Boucher timely filed motions for sentence 
reduction, one through counsel and one pro se.  In the 
first motion, he asserted sentence reduction was appropriate based upon his 
rehabilitation efforts.  In his second motion, he asserted it 
was appropriate not only because of his rehabilitation efforts, but also because 
he was going blind in both eyes and his condition could be reversed only if he 
was not incarcerated and able to seek outside medical 
attention.    

[¶4]  
The district court denied the pro se motion without a 
hearing.  The order does not mention the motion filed by 
counsel; however, that motion was based on Mr. Boucher’s rehabilitation efforts 
which he also raised in his pro se motion.  Therefore, 
in denying the pro se motion the district court effectively ruled on the 
motion filed by counsel and we treat the latter motion as having been denied. 

 
[¶5]  
In denying Mr. Boucher’s motions, the district court considered the 
following factors:  the benefit of finality for the victims; 
the sentencing court’s task “to impose the fairest sentence possible in the 
first instance” and to reduce a sentence when in retrospect it appears the 
sentence was not in fact fair, or has become unfair due to unanticipated 
circumstances; its determination that the sentence imposed in this case was fair 
and just and imposed only after considering appropriate factors; and Mr. 
Boucher’s motion contained no new information persuading it to reduce the 
original sentence.  Mr. Boucher timely appealed the district 
court’s order denying the motions.
 
 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶6]  
The denial of a motion for sentence reduction is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Eckdahl v. State, 2011 
WY 152, ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 22, 27 (Wyo. 2011).  The 
district court’s decision is given considerable deference unless no rational 
basis exists for its conclusion.  Mack v. State, 
7 P.3d 899, 900 (Wyo. 2000).  To the extent we are 
asked to determine whether a court applied the correct rule of law, our review 
is de novo.  Baker v. State, 2011 WY 123, ¶ 10, 
260 P.3d 268, 271 (Wyo. 2011).  
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]  
Mr. Boucher contends the district court applied the wrong legal standard 
in considering his motions for sentence reduction.  He asserts 
the district court incorrectly perceived it was precluded from reducing the 
sentence if it was “fair and just” at the time it was imposed.  
Mr. Boucher argues that addressing his motions from this perspective 
effectively denied him the review to which he is entitled.  He 
contends the district court “frankly admitted it did not take [his] successful 
rehabilitation or any of the developments since incarceration into 
account.”  He further asserts the district court relied on 
factors it should not have in denying his motions.  
Specifically, Mr. Boucher argues the district court erred in considering 
the victims’ interest in finality and the powers of the governor and parole 
board to alter prison sentences.  
 
[¶8]  
The State asserts Mr. Boucher misconstrues the district court’s 
ruling.  Contrary to Mr. Boucher’s interpretation, the State 
asserts the district court did not find that it could not reduce a fair 
and just sentence; rather, the district court found that it would not do 
so under the circumstances presented in this case.  The State 
maintains that the district court properly considered the evidence Mr. Boucher 
submitted and was not persuaded to reduce his sentence.  
Finally, the State asserts the district court considered appropriate 
factors in denying the motions.
 
[¶9]  
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) addresses motions for sentence reduction in 
pertinent part as follows:
 
            
A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, . . . within one year after 
receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the 
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one year after entry of any order 
or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court . . . having the effect of upholding, a 
judgment of conviction . . . .  The court shall determine the 
motion within a reasonable time.  Changing a sentence from a 
sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall constitute a permissible 
reduction of sentence under this subdivision.  The court may 
determine the motion with or without a hearing.
 
[¶10]  
The purpose of Rule 35 “is to give a convicted defendant a second round 
before the sentencing judge (a second bite at the apple as it were) and to give 
the judge the opportunity to reconsider the original sentence in light of any 
further information about the defendant.”  Patrick v. 
State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 9, 108 P.3d 838, 841 (Wyo. 2005), quoting 
Nelson v. State, 733 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Wyo. 1987).  
The sentencing judge is in the best position to decide if a sentence 
modification is appropriate, Capellen v. State, 2007 
WY 107, ¶ 29, 161 P.3d 1076, 1084 (Wyo. 2007), and is free to accept 
or reject information submitted in support of a sentence reduction at its 
discretion.  Hodgins v. State, 
1 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 2000).   
 
[¶11] 
In Montez v. State, 592 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Wyo. 1979), the 
district court determined the information offered in support of a sentence 
reduction was entitled to less weight than “the interest of permanency of 
sentence.”  We held that determination was “within the scope 
of broad discretion permitted a district court on a motion to reduce sentence” 
and upheld the order denying the motion.  
Id.  To do otherwise, we concluded, would be to 
usurp the function of the sentencing court. 
 Id.  In Carrillo v. State, 
895 P.2d 463, 464 (Wyo. 1995), we reiterated that evidence of a 
defendant’s commendable conduct while incarcerated does not usurp the trial 
court’s discretion to decide whether a sentence reduction is 
appropriate.  In Hodgins, 
1 P.3d  at 1262, we upheld the sentencing court’s order denying 
sentence reduction based upon its finding that the parole board was better 
suited to decide at the proper time whether early release was 
appropriate.   
 
[¶12]  
In the present case, the district court had before it two motions for 
sentence reduction that fully explained Mr. Boucher’s rehabilitation efforts and 
his health issue.  Counsel attached to the first motion two 
letters from the department of corrections detailing Mr. Boucher’s 
progress.  Mr. Boucher attached to his pro se motion a 
five page affidavit explaining his progress and his health concerns.  
The district court’s order denying the motions for sentence reduction 
expressly references Mr. Boucher’s pro se motion.  The 
fact that the order does not describe the specific information Mr. Boucher and 
his counsel provided in support of his motion does not establish an abuse of 
discretion.  Nothing in the record supports Mr. Boucher’s 
assertion that the district court did not consider the information 
provided.  
 
[¶13]  
We also find nothing in the record supporting Mr. Boucher’s contention 
that the district court believed it was precluded from reducing his sentence if 
the sentence was just and fair when imposed.  To the contrary, 
in its order the district court expressly acknowledges that a court may properly 
reduce a sentence based upon circumstances that were not anticipated at the time 
the sentence was imposed.  It is clear from the order that the 
district court simply was not persuaded that when weighed against other factors, 
such as the gravity of the offenses, the new circumstances warranted a reduction 
of Mr. Boucher’s sentence.  
 
[¶14]  
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Boucher’s 
motions for sentence reduction.  The order is 
affirmed.