Title: Ferguson v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2115 
____________ 
 
 
JOHN ERROL FERGUSON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[October 17, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
John Errol Ferguson appeals an order entered by the Eighth Judicial Circuit 
Court finding him competent to be executed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.  For the reasons expressed 
below, we affirm the circuit court’s Order Finding John Errol Ferguson Sane to be 
Executed.   
 
On September 5, 2012, Governor Rick Scott signed a death warrant for 
Ferguson and set the execution for Tuesday, October 16, 2012.  On September 24, 
2012, Ferguson submitted filings to the Governor, wherein he claimed that he is 
incompetent to be executed.  As required by section 922.07, Florida Statutes 
 
 
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(2012), the Governor temporarily stayed Ferguson’s execution on September 26, 
2012, and appointed a commission of three psychiatrists to examine Ferguson.  As 
a group, the psychiatrists conducted their examination and issued a joint report 
declaring Ferguson sane to be executed.  After receiving the report of the 
commission, the Governor determined that Ferguson had the mental capacity to 
understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was being 
imposed upon him.  The Governor lifted the stay and the execution remained set 
for Tuesday, October 16, 2012. 
 
On October 3, 2012, Ferguson filed a motion for stay and hearing after the 
Governor’s determination of sanity to be executed in the Eighth Judicial Circuit 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811(d) and 3.812.  The circuit 
court issued an order setting the evidentiary hearing for October 9 and 10, 2012.  
The court then issued a second order staying Ferguson’s execution until 4:00 p.m. 
Wednesday, October 10, 2012.   
 
On October 8, 2012, Ferguson filed a motion to stay his execution with this 
Court.  This Court denied the stay, but clarified that its scheduling order did not 
prohibit the circuit court from entering a longer stay if the circuit court deemed it 
necessary.  Upon this clarification, the circuit court extended the stay until Friday, 
October 12, 2012.  Ferguson filed another motion for stay with this Court on 
October 11, 2012.  This Court granted the stay until October 18, 2012. 
 
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, held on October 9 and 10, 2012, the circuit court 
heard testimony from Dr. George Woods, Dr. Richard Rogers, Dr. Wade Myers, 
Dr. Tonia Werner, Sgt. Randall Mobley, Correctional Officer Jay Taylor, Sgt. 
Gerald Whitehead, Warden John Palmer, Assistant Warden Brad Whitehead, 
Jennifer Sagle, Dr. Enrique Suarez, and one of Ferguson’s counsel who was 
present at the interview—Patricia Brannan.  The experts testified regarding 
Ferguson’s competency.  The lay witnesses testified regarding their daily 
interactions with Ferguson and all noted that he was not in the habit of making 
unusual requests or of being uncooperative.   After hearing the testimony, on 
October 12, 2012, the circuit court entered an Order Finding John Errol Ferguson 
Sane to be Executed.  This is Ferguson’s appeal, wherein Ferguson raises two 
issues. 
Sanity to be Executed 
 
Ferguson alleges that the circuit court improperly found him sane to be 
executed based on its finding that Ferguson’s delusions are a manifestation of a 
normal Christian belief.  Consequently, Ferguson argues that there is not 
competent, substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s determination.  
Alternatively, Ferguson argues that the circuit court’s determination was a 
misapplication of the standard pronounced in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 
(2007), and that this Court’s opinion in Provenzano v. State, 760 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 
 
 
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2000), is no longer good law.  The State maintains that Ferguson is competent and 
that no evidence in the record supports his assertion that he is currently insane to 
be executed.  The circuit court found “that though Ferguson does have a diagnosed 
mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia, there is no evidence that his mental illness 
interferes, in any way, with his ‘rational understanding’ of the fact of his pending 
execution and the reason for it.”  Ferguson v. State, No. 04-2012-CA-000507 at 18 
(Fla. 8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2012) (Order).  Because the trial court specifically found that 
Ferguson suffers from mental illness and rejected the State’s argument that 
Ferguson malingers, the narrow question for this Court is whether there is 
competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that 
Ferguson’s mental illness does not interfere with his rational understanding of the 
fact of his pending execution.  Whether Ferguson’s convictions are representative 
of mainstream Christian principles or delusions that derive from  his mental illness 
does not affect our inquiry.  For the reasons expressed below, we find competent, 
substantial evidence to affirm the circuit court’s order finding Ferguson sane to be 
executed. 
 
“In order for insanity to bar execution, the defendant must lack the capacity 
to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed.”  Johnston 
v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 26 n.8 (Fla.) (citing § 922.07(3), Fla. Stat. (2009)), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 459 (2010); Provenzano v. State, 760 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 
 
 
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2000) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.812(b) (“whether the prisoner lacks the mental 
capacity to understand the fact of the pending execution and the reason for it”)).  
The proper standard of review of a trial court’s order pursuant to rule 3.812 is 
whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the trial 
court’s finding.  See id.; Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1997). 
 
Florida’s method of determining a prisoner’s competence to be executed 
stems from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399 (1986).  In Ford, the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, 
pronounced that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a 
sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”  Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-410.  Ford 
had been sentenced to death in Florida, and his death warrant signed.  At the time, 
when a prisoner raised a question of his sanity to be executed, the Governor alone 
made the determination and there was no review of the determination by the 
courts.  The United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment entitled 
prisoners to an adversarial proceeding where a defendant can present evidence to 
support the assertion that the defendant is insane to be executed and cross-examine 
the witnesses presented by the State in support of the defendant’s competence.  In 
response, Florida promulgated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.812 
(providing for a hearing on the prisoner’s insanity to be executed where the court 
may admit evidence it deems relevant to the issues).  
 
 
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In Provenzano, we explained that Florida, through rule 3.812, adopted the 
standard promoted by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Ford.  
Provenzano, 760 So. 2d at 140 (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.812(b)).  We found that 
despite the case being troubling due to Provenzano’s mental health problems, “in 
this context, the Eighth Amendment only requires that defendants be aware of the 
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”  Id. at 140 
(citing Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 
Ferguson argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Panetti 
clarified the holding in Ford and constitutes a change in the standard to be applied 
in rule 3.812 proceedings to represent a stricter standard than that adopted by this 
Court in its decision in Provenzano.  We disagree.  The Panetti court explicitly 
declined to extend its ruling to all competency proceedings.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that Panetti represents any change in the Court’s jurisprudence, the change 
does not alter our decision in Provenzano.   
 
The issue in Panetti was whether “[t]he state court’s failure to provide the 
procedures mandated by Ford constituted an unreasonable application of clearly 
established law as determined by [the Supreme] Court.”  Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948.  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals required only that Panetti knew the fact of his 
impending execution and the factual predicate for the execution.  Panetti, 551 U.S. 
at 942.  Acknowledging that “[t]he opinions in Ford . . . did not set forth a precise 
 
 
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standard for competency,” the Court nevertheless found that the Fifth Circuit’s 
standard was not sufficient.  Panetti, 551 U.S. at 957-60.  The Court stated that “[a] 
prisoner’s awareness of the State’s rationale for an execution is not the same as a 
rational understanding of it [and] Ford does not foreclose inquiry into the latter.”  
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959.  The Court, accordingly, rejected the standard pronounced 
by the Fifth Circuit, but specified that it would “not attempt to set down a rule 
governing all competency determinations.”  Panetti at 960-61.  Consequently, 
Panetti is a narrowly tailored decision that does not overturn this Court’s decision 
in Provenzano.    
 
Similar to the facts in our decision in Provenzano, there is evidence that 
Ferguson suffers from some mental illness.  Specifically, the circuit court found 
that Ferguson has a documented history of paranoid schizophrenia.  Further, the 
circuit court found “little evidence . . . [that leads the circuit court] to believe that 
Ferguson’s ‘Prince of God’ delusion is anything other than genuine belief.”  
Additionally, unlike the record in Provenzano, the circuit court here found a “lack 
of sufficient evidence of malingering.”  However, the record also indicates that 
Ferguson understands what is taking place and why.  Specifically, the record 
indicates that Ferguson is aware that he has never before had a death warrant 
signed on his behalf and that he would be the first person to receive Florida’s 
current protocol of medications for lethal injection. 
 
 
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In this context, the Eighth Amendment requires only that defendants be 
aware of the punishment they are about to receive and the reason they are to 
receive it.  See Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).  Our decision in 
Provenzano requires that Ferguson understand the connection between his crime 
and the punishment he is to receive for it.  Provenzano, 760 So. 2d at 139.  In 
finding Ferguson sane to be executed, the circuit court found that “Ferguson is 
aware that the State is executing him for the murders he committed and that he will 
physically die as a result of the execution.  There is no evidence that in his current 
mental state Ferguson believes himself unable to die or that he is being executed 
for any reason other than the murders he was convicted of in 1978.”  Order at 18.  
We find that there is competent, substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s 
determination that Ferguson is sane to be executed. 
Due Process 
 
In his second argument on appeal, Ferguson alleges that he failed to receive 
a full and fair hearing because: (1) the State did not give him forewarning of its 
theory that his delusions constituted mainstream Christian beliefs; (2) he was not 
permitted to cross examine an expert witness; and (3) he was forced to proceed 
without a key witness.  We have carefully reviewed the parties’ arguments and the 
record in this case, and find each of these claims to be without merit. 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court finding 
Ferguson sane to be executed.  No rehearing will be entertained by this Court.  The 
mandate shall issue immediately.  We vacate the stay previously entered. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,  
David Allen Glant, Judge - Case No. 04-2012-CA-000507 
  
Benjamin J.O. Lewis of Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, New York, 
Christopher T. Handman, Hrishikesh Hari, Erica M. Knievel, and E. Desmond 
Hogan of Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, 
  
for Appellant 
  
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Scott Andrew Browne 
and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida,  
 
for Appellee 
 
Angela Coin Vigil of Baker & McKenzie LLP, Miami, Florida and Paul F. 
Enzinna of Brown Rudnick LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, 
 
for Amici Curiae