Title: Sweet v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

`Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Criminal No. 86388
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 82
September Term, 2001
______________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER SWEET
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, C.J. and Eldridge, J., concur and dissent
Battaglia, J., concurs and dissents
 ______________________________________________
Filed:   August 30, 2002
1Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory references are to Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), Article 27 (current version at Maryland Code (1957,
2001 Repl. Vol.) § 11-701 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code).
2Because we shall reverse the judgments of conviction in this case on the grounds that
the trial court erred by improperly restricting jury voir dire, we need not, and do not, address
the issue related to the receipt of the verdict.
Christopher Sweet, petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County of second degree assault and third degree sexual offense against a minor.  The court
ordered petitioner to register as a sexually violent predator on the basis of a prior sexually
based offense.  We granted certiorari primarily to decide whether, based upon Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), due process requires
that a jury determine the existence of the statutory factual condition precedent beyond a
reasonable doubt before an offender may be required to register as a sexually violent
predator pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) Article 27, § 792.1
We also granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court erred in failing to make
further inquiry of a juror that was arguably equivocal in announcing her verdict2 and
whether the trial court erred in refusing to pose a voir dire question requested by petitioner.
We shall hold that Apprendi does not apply to registration requirements under
Maryland’s Registration of Offenders statute.  We shall hold further, based upon Thomas
v. State, 369 Md. 202, 798 A.2d 566 (2002), that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to pose petitioner’s requested voir dire question relating to the crimes with which he
was charged because such question was reasonably likely to expose potentially disqualifying
juror bias.
-2-
I.
According to the testimony of the victim, Laquisha Franklin, an eleven-year-old girl,
one day in the summer of 1999, her mother and a family friend, named Annie Smith, went
shopping and left her home alone with petitioner, Ms. Smith’s boyfriend.  Petitioner and
Laquisha sat on the floor playing a video game, with Laquisha sitting between petitioner’s
legs.  Laquisha testified that petitioner commented on the size of her breasts.  She testified
that she “scooted” and petitioner “scooted” after her and that she felt his “private part . . .
bump” against her “butt” on two occasions.  Petitioner told Laquisha not to tell anyone what
had happened and threatened her with retaliation if she did so.  Laquisha did not mention
the incident to her mother until a few months later.
Laquisha’s mother testified that, when Laquisha informed her of the incident, she
notified Child Protective Services.  A social worker with Child Protective Services testified
that she interviewed Laquisha on September 23, 1999, and Laquisha told her about the
incident.
Two police officers testified that they arrested petitioner on September 30, 1999.
They testified that petitioner acknowledged that he noticed that Laquisha’s breasts were
growing and that he advised her that she should be careful around boys.  They testified that
petitioner also acknowledged that, while he was sitting on the floor, Laquisha’s buttocks
came in contact with his erect penis.
-3-
Petitioner was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
of second degree assault and third degree sexual offense.  After the verdict was rendered,
petitioner requested, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-327(e), that the jury be polled.  After the
jury was polled, the court excused the jurors, but asked them to assemble and wait in the
lobby for a few minutes before departing.  Defense counsel then approached the bench and
made a motion to have the verdict stricken, proffering that one of the jurors paused and
shook her head laterally while verbally responding affirmatively to her assent to the verdict.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion, expressing its unwillingness to look beyond the
juror’s clear verbal response to evaluate her body language.
The Circuit Court sentenced petitioner to seven years incarceration on each count, to
be served concurrently.  The court also ordered petitioner, who had a prior conviction for
a third degree sexual offense against a child, to register as a sexually violent predator
pursuant to § 792, concluding that petitioner was a sexually violent predator.  The trial court
made no factual findings regarding whether petitioner was at risk for committing a future
sexually violent offense.  The judge merely stated that “with respect to the defendant in this
case, Mr. Sweet, would qualify as one who has to comply with the violence [sic] sex
offender registration.”  
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that Apprendi was not
applicable, that the statute does not require a finding that the defendant is likely to re-offend,
that the trial court made no error with respect to the voir dire, and that there was no defect
-4-
3The states were required by the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994), to implement
sex offender registration programs as a condition of federal law enforcement funding.  See
§ 14071(g); Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 336, 772 A.2d 1225, 1229-30 (2001).  The
Wetterling Act was developed in response to national pressure to address crimes of violence
and molestation committed against children in the United States.  See id. at 336-37 n.8, 772
A.2d 1330 n.8.  The Wetterling Act established guidelines for registration and community
notification for persons convicted of criminal offenses against minors or who were
determined to be sexually violent predators.  See § 14071; Graves, 364 Md. at 336-37 n.8,
772 A.2d at 1330 n.8.  Among other things, a state must register persons convicted of certain
offenses and provide the information to the FBI and local law enforcement agencies.  See
§ 14071(a).  Federal law requires that registration information, at a minimum, include the
offender’s name, fingerprints, photo, and current address.  See § 14071(b)(1).  Federal law
also requires that the information be released to the extent necessary to protect the public
from specific individuals.  See § 14071(e)(2).  Nonetheless, when Congress enacted the
Wetterling Act, it afforded the states wide latitude in fashioning their sex offender
registration statutes and the criteria for which an individual may be classified as a sexually
violent predator, leaving to the state the questions of which offenders should be the targets
of disclosure, the information gathered and the extent of disclosure, and the standards and
procedures, if any, to apply to these determination.  See Graves, 364 Md. at 344, 772 A.2d
at 1234; Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process
and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1174
(1999).
Presently, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have
adopted some form of sex offender registration or community notification programs.  See
Graves, 364 Md. at 336-37 n.8, 772 A.2d at 1330 n.8; Logan, supra, at 1172.
“At present, jurisdictions use any (or some combination) of
three methods of dissemination: (1) ‘public access,’ which
requires community members to request information from a
given jurisdiction’s registry . . . ; (2) Internet web-site access;
and (3) affirmative community notification by law enforcement,
which can involve the use of informational fliers and door-to-
door visits by police.”
in the taking of the jury verdict.
II.  Sexually Violent Predator Registration and Community Notification3
-5-
Logan, supra, at 1174 n.35; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(a)(2) (1999); § 15-20-22(a)
(authorizing community notification by “flyer,” which contains, inter alia, offense
information, a photo, and the name and home address of the registrant, and which is
distributed primarily by hand, posting, local newspaper, and the Internet). 
Section 792 defines a “sexually violent predator” as an individual who is “convicted
of a second or subsequent sexually violent offense” and has “been determined . . . to be at
risk of committing a subsequent sexually violent offense.”  Section 792(a)(12).  Section
792(b) sets forth the procedure for determining if a person is a sexually violent predator, and
provides as follows:
“(b) Determination; procedure. – . . . if an individual is
convicted of a second or subsequent sexually violent offense,
the State’s Attorney may request the court to determine before
sentencing whether the individual is a sexually violent predator.
(2)  If the State’s Attorney makes a request . . . , the court shall
determine before or at sentencing whether the individual is a
sexually violent predator.
(3)  In making [the] determination . . . , the court shall consider:
(i)  Any evidence that the court considers appropriate to the
determination of whether the individual is a sexually violent
predator, including the presentencing investigation and sexually
violent offender’s inmate record;
(ii)  Any evidence introduced by the individual convicted; and
(iii)  At the request of the State’s Attorney, any evidence
presented by a victim of the sexually violent offense. . . .”
§ 792(b).  
Under the statutory framework, classification as a sexually violent predator requires
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the trial court to engage in a two-step analysis: first, the court must determine if the
defendant has committed more than one “sexually violent offense,” as defined in §
792(a)(11); second, the court must determine whether the person is at risk for committing
additional sexually violent offenses.  See § 792(a)(12); Graves, 364 Md. at 340, 772 A.2d
at 1233.  The finding that a defendant qualifies as a sexually violent predator subjects him
or her to the registration and notification requirements of the statute at the time of release.
See § 792(a)(7), (c).  The registrant must provide the supervising authority with a signed
statement that includes his or her name, address, place of employment, Social Security
number, and a description and location of the qualifying criminal conduct.  See § 792(d)(1).
As a sexually violent predator, petitioner was required to register every ninety days for a
period of ten years.  See § 792(d)(4).  Section 792 permits the Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services to post on the Internet a current listing of each registrant’s name,
offense, and other identifying information.  See § 792(j)(6).  In the time period since the case
sub judice was argued before this Court, the Department has begun to post registry
information on the Internet.
Petitioner argues that the sexual predator registration statute is a punitive statute that
imposed an additional penalty upon him and that, therefore, based upon Apprendi, due
process requires that future risk of re-offending be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Petitioner argues that requiring registration as a sexually violent predator, pursuant
to § 792, imposes an additional burden, which has the effect of increasing his sentence.  He
-7-
points to the legislative history of § 792, along with the burden and stigma of registration,
maintaining that it demonstrates that it constitutes additional punishment.  Petitioner argues,
in the alternative, that even if a jury finding is not required under Apprendi, petitioner was
entitled to have the trial court make explicit factual findings regarding the conditions
precedent to registration on the record below.  Petitioner concedes his current and prior
convictions, but argues that the trial court made no finding regarding the risk of committing
a future sexually violent offense, as required by § 792(a)(12).  Petitioner further argues that
the trial court erred because the State put on no evidence regarding petitioner’s potential
future conduct and that evidence of petitioner’s prior record, standing alone, cannot justify
a finding of future risk.
Petitioner’s Apprendi challenge to his conviction under the sexual predator
registration statute was essentially considered, albeit in a different context, and rejected by
this Court in Young v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2002).  In that case, Young
challenged the imposition of sexual offender registration as a condition of his probation,
relying, like petitioner, on Apprendi to argue that registration was a punishment that could
not be imposed absent a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of the predicate facts
necessary for its imposition.  We rejected that challenge, holding that registration under §
792 did not constitute punishment in the constitutional sense.  See id. at ___, ___ A.2d at
___.  We also held that the factual findings predicate to the imposition of registration did not
expose him to a greater penalty than the prescribed statutory maximum otherwise available.
-8-
See id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___.  The same reasoning is applicable in the case sub judice.
Therefore, based on Young, in the instant case, due process did not require that a jury find
the risk of committing a future sexually violent offense, as required by § 792(a)(12), beyond
a reasonable doubt.  
We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in failing to find, on the record, the
factual predicate necessary for finding that petitioner was a sexually violent predator as
defined by the statute.  The sentencing court merely found that “the defendant in this case,
Mr. Sweet, would qualify as one who has to comply with the violence [sic] sex offender
registration.”  As we have indicated, before an offender may be required to register as a
sexually violent predator, the sentencing court must make two findings: that the individual
has been convicted of a second or subsequent sexually violent offense and that the
individual is at risk of committing a subsequent sexually violent offense.  
Petitioner’s interest in not being designated as a sexually violent predator is great and
the State has an interest in making the determination that a convicted offender should be
required to register pursuant to § 792 an accurate one in effectuating the remedial purposes
of the statute.  Therefore, the guarantees secured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment require that § 792 be interpreted to require that the State prove the
facts predicate to sex offender registration to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the
evidence prior to imposition of registration requirements.  A sentencing court, in
implementing the mandate of § 792, should state, on the record, its reasons for making a
-9-
4Maryland Rule 4-342(f) states that a court “ordinarily shall state on the record its
reasons for the sentence imposed.”  Although registration requirements may be imposed as
a condition of probation, the rationale expressed in the Rule is applicable. 
determination that the offender is required to register pursuant to § 792,4 providing valuable
assistance to appellate courts on review.  
The record before us is devoid of any indication that the sentencing court had
considered petitioner’s future risk, as the statute required, or that the court found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that petitioner is at risk to commit a subsequent violent
offense. 
III.  Voir Dire
During voir dire, petitioner requested that the trial court ask the following question
of the venire: “(32) Do the charges stir up strong emotional feelings in you that would affect
your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?”  The court declined to pose the question.
The Court’s decision in petitioner’s case is essentially controlled by our recent
decision in Thomas v. State, 369 Md. 202, 798 A.2d 566 (2002).  In that case, we held that
it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to ask the venire panel if any of them
harbored “strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws” in a trial in which the
defendant was charged with possession and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance.
See id. at 204, 798 A.2d at 567.  We reasoned that the inquiry was directed at biases,
specifically those related to Thomas’s alleged criminal act, that, if uncovered, would be
-10-
disqualifying when they impaired the ability of the juror to be fair and impartial.  See id. at
211, 798 A.2d at 571.  The rationale of Thomas in this regard is fully applicable to the
instant case. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to pose
petitioner’s requested voir dire question, and petitioner is entitled to a new trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THAT
COURT  FOR A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Criminal No. 86388
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 82
   
 September Term, 2001
                                                                            
CHRISTOPHER SWEET
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                            
 Bell, C.J.
 Eldridge
 Raker
 Wilner
 Cathell
 Harrell
        Battaglia
                                                         
                  
           JJ.
                                                                            
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Bell,
C.J., in which Eldridge, J. joins.
                                                                            
Filed:   August 30, 2002
5Md.  Code art. 27, § 792 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.) was repealed and
reenacted by 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 10, § 2, effective October 1, 2001, and codified at Md.
Code art. 27, § 792,§§ 11-701-11-702 and 11-703- 11-721 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998
Supp.).   By Md. Laws, ch. 221, also effective October 1, 2001, § 11-702.1, pertaining to the
retroactive application of the registration law, was  added.
I agree that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals must be reversed and that
the petitioner, Christopher Sweet, is entitled to a new trial.   That is the case for the two
reasons Judge Raker explains.   Pursuant to Thomas v. State,  369 Md. 202; 798 A.2d 566
(2002), the prospective jurors were required to be voir dired with respect to whether the 
charges against the petitioner, second degree assault and third degree sexual offense against
a minor, stirred up in them strong emotional feelings that would affect their ability to be fair
and impartial in the trial of the case.    Moreover, the trial court never found the factual  
predicate underlying the factual finding that the petitioner was a sexually violent predator.
Therefore, I concur in the judgment.    The majority also concludes, and holds, however,  that
should that latter finding be made, requiring registration is not punishment and, thus, is not
subject to proof pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000).    I do not find the rationale underlying that holding to be at all
persuasive.
In Young v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___A. 2d ___ (2002), the petitioner was ordered to
register as a sexual offender, see Md. Code art. 27, § 792 (a) (6) (vii) (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol., 1998 Supp.),5  pursuant to §792 (c).    Although the registration requirement was
pursuant to § 792, the obligation to register was made a condition of the petitioner’s
probation.    The petitioner challenged the order to register as a sexual offender.   Relying on
-2-
Apprendi, he argued that registration was punishment and, thus, it could not be imposed
without a jury determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the facts necessary for its
imposition, in that case, because  the violation that triggered § 792 (a) (6) (vii)’s application
to the petitioner, the minority of the victim was critical, that the victim was under the age of
eighteen years of age.  To  reach that conclusion, the petitioner applied the “intent-effects”
analysis, a two part test, gleaned from Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 117 S. Ct.
2072, 2082, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 515 (1997) and Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 99-
100, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493-94, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450, 459 (1997).     
Also applying an “intent-effects” test, this one a three part one gleaned from
Hendricks and United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267, 288, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147, 135 L. Ed.
2d 549, 568 (1996), the majority rejected Young’s argument.    ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at
___ [slip op. at __].   It held that registration under § 792 is not punishment and that, in any
event, the factual findings necessary to ordering a defendant to register did not, in that case,
expose Young to greater punishment.   Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at ___]. 
Noting that the petitioner, although a violent sexual predator, rather than a sexual
offender,  makes a similar argument as Young made, the majority states that “the same
reasoning is equally applicable in the case sub judice.” ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___
(2002) [slip op. 7].    It therefore holds, “based on Young, in the instant case, due process did
not require that a jury find a risk of committing a future sexually violent act, as required by
§ 792 (a) (12).”  Id. 
6I was persuaded, as well, by the fact that the registration was ordered as a condition
of probation, pointing out :
“The majority acknowledges that the court ordered registration as a condition
of probation, but argues only that it was pursuant to § 792; it does not argue
that, as the trial court apparently believed, ... that the registration was
consistent with its authority to fashion conditions of probation.   That is not
surprising since  conditions of probation 
are clearly punishment.  See 
Spielman
v. State, 298 Md. 602, 610, 471 A.2d 730, ___ (1984) (“ It hardly can be
contended that one who has been ordered to pay restitution, as a condition of
probation, and is subject to revocation of that probation for failure to make
payment, has not received punishment.”).   The trial court also ordered that the
petitioner obtain psychological treatment.   Under the majority’s view, that also
is not punishment, presumably because it is intended to be remedial.”
-3-
Like the majority in Young, I did an extensive analysis of the cases and applied the
factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,  372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554,9 L. Ed. 2d 644
(1963), a part of both “intent-effects” tests.    I concluded, relying on   Kansas v. Myers, 923
P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118, 117 S. Ct. 2508 , 138 L. Ed. 2d 1012
(1997) and Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 151 L. Ed. 2d 966, 122
S. Ct. 1062, 151 L. Ed. 2d 966 (2002), and noting the breadth of the public disclosure of
registrant information, that the Maryland sex offender registration statute is punitive.6 
Accordingly, Apprendi applied and, because the order was made by the court without any
determination by a jury as to the predicate facts qualifying Young for sexual offender status,
I dissented from both the rationale of the majority and its judgment. 
For the same reasons, I would reach a similar result in this case.   Indeed, this is a
stronger case since the effect of the community notification provisions is even more
7Pertaining to sexually violent predators, § 792 (g) (3) provides:
“(3) (i) Every 90 days, the local law enforcement agency shall mail a
verification form, which may not be forwarded, to the last reported address of
a sexually violent predator.
“(ii) Within 10 days after receiving the verification form, the sexually
violent predator shall sign the form and mail it to the local law
enforcement
agency.
“(iii) Within 5 days after obtaining a verification form from a sexually
violent predator, a local law enforcement agency shall send a
copy of the verification form to the Department.”
8Section 792 (d) (4), as relevant, provides:
“(4) A sexually violent predator shall register every 90 days in accordance with
the procedures described in subsection (g) (3) of the section and for the term
provided under paragraph (5) (ii) of this subsection.
*     *     *     *
“(5) The term of registration is:
*     *     *     *
“(ii) Life if:
“1. The registrant has been determined to be a sexually violent
predator in accordance with the procedures described in
subsection (b) of this section.”
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damaging for sexually violent predators and the registration provisions are substantially more
onerous.   See § 792 (g) (3) 7 and § 792 (d) (4).8   Requiring registration every 90 days for life
is much like, but certainly more burdensome than, the duty imposed  on other defendants,
after conviction, to report regularly to a probation officer or to comply with the conditions
-5-
of supervised release.   
Therefore, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that registration
under the sexual offender registration statute is not punishment.     
Judge Eldridge joins in the views herein expressed.
 
Concurring and Dissenting opinion to follow:
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 82
September Term, 2001
________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER SWEET
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
by Battaglia, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   August 30, 2002
While I concur with the majority’s reasoning as to Part II, I must dissent from the
majority’s decision in Part III regarding voir dire for the reasons set forth in my dissenting
opinion in State v. Thomas, ____ Md. ____, 798 A.2d 566 (2002).  Accordingly, I would
affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.