Title: State v. Carter

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Carter , 93 Ohio St.3d 581, 2001-Ohio-1614] 
 
 
THE  STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CARTER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Carter (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 581.] 
Appellate procedure — Second application filed for reopening appeal from 
judgment of conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel after first application denied — Court of appeals’ 
denial of application affirmed — Successive petition barred by doctrine 
of res judicata. 
(No. 01-977 — Submitted September 18, 2001 — Decided November 14, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-920604. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant, Cedric Carter, was convicted of the aggravated 
murder of Frances Messinger, and sentenced to death.  The court of appeals 
affirmed his convictions and sentence.  State v. Carter (Nov. 3, 1993), Hamilton 
App. No. C-920604, unreported, 1993 WL 512859.  We also affirmed Carter’s 
convictions and death sentence.  State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 651 
N.E.2d 965, certiorari denied (1995), 516 U.S. 1014, 116 S.Ct. 575, 133 L.Ed.2d 
498. 
 
Subsequently, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
deny Carter’s petition for postconviction relief.  State v. Carter (Nov. 14, 1997), 
Hamilton App. No. C-960718, unreported, 1997 WL 705487.  We refused to 
accept Carter’s appeal of that decision.  State v. Carter (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
1467, 690 N.E.2d 1287. 
 
On June 9, 1999, Carter filed an application with the court of appeals to 
reopen his initial appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan (1992), 
63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, alleging ineffective assistance of his 
appellate counsel before the court of appeals in his first appeal.  However, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
court of appeals denied Carter’s application because he had failed to show good 
cause for the delay in applying to reopen his appeal.  State v. Carter (Oct. 21, 
1999), Hamilton App. No. C-920604, unreported.  Carter did not appeal that 
decision; hence, that decision became final. 
 
On July 19, 2000, Carter requested that the court of appeals appoint 
counsel for him to prepare and file an application to reopen his direct appeal 
pursuant to App.R. 26(B).  The court of appeals denied Carter’s motion.  State v. 
Carter (Aug. 10, 2000), Hamilton App. No. C-920604, unreported. 
 
On September 28, 2000, Carter’s present counsel filed a second 
application to reopen his initial appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. 
Murnahan.  The court of appeals denied Carter’s motion to reopen his direct 
appeal on the basis that App.R. 26(B) “makes no provision for filing successive 
applications to reopen.”  State v. Carter (Apr. 9, 2001), Hamilton App. No. C-
920604, unreported.  The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of 
right. 
 
Carter raises five issues in this appeal. In his second proposition, Carter 
argues that his appellate counsel’s failure to file an appeal to this court, following 
the court of appeals’ dismissal of his first application to reopen his direct appeal 
pursuant to App.R. 26(B), constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, 
Carter had no constitutional right to counsel to pursue an appeal to this court 
following the court of appeals’ denial of his application under App.R. 26(B).  
State v. Buell (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 1211, 639 N.E.2d 110.  Therefore, Carter 
could not be unconstitutionally deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by 
his counsel’s failure to file such an appeal.  Wainwright v. Torna (1982), 455 U.S. 
586, 587-588, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 1301, 71 L.Ed.2d 475, 477-478. 
 
For the same reason, Carter cannot complain about the court of appeals’ 
refusal to appoint new counsel to pursue that appeal as he argues in his first 
proposition. “ ‘[T]he right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal as of 
January Term, 2001 
3 
right, and no further.’  (Emphasis added.)”  State v. Buell, 70 Ohio St.3d 1211, 
639 N.E.2d 110, quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987), 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 
S.Ct. 1990, 1993, 95 L.Ed.2d 539, 545. 
 
In his third proposition, Carter argues that he established “good cause” for 
his failure to file a timely application pursuant to App.R. 26(B). However, the 
court of appeals dismissed Carter’s first application to reopen his direct appeal, 
finding no good cause.  No appeal was made of that decision.  Thus, Carter’s 
second application to reopen his direct appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) is 
foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata.  See State v. Bell (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
32, 34, 652 N.E.2d 191, 192. 
 
Carter’s fourth and fifth propositions relate to the merits of issues that he 
claims his former appellate lawyers should have raised.1  Carter claims that his 
appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective because they failed to raise 
twenty-six specific assignments of error on his direct appeal before the court of 
appeals.2  Since we have found his successive petition to be barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata, we need not consider those issues. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Keith A. Yeazel, for appellant. 
__________________ 
                                                          
 
1. 
Carter’s fifteenth assignment of error reiterates his fifth proposition. 
2. 
Carter’s first assignment of error appears to reiterate his second proposition.