Title: Wilson v. Witt

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wilson v. Witt1998 WY 7952 P.2d 214Case Number: 97-143Decided: 01/16/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

William A. WILSON, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Raymond W. WITT and Irene F. Witt, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District Court, Platte County, Keith 
G. Kautz, J.

Eric M. Alden, Wheatland, 
for Appellant.

Douglas W. Weaver, 
Wheatland, for Appellees.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant William 
Wilson (the buyer) appeals from the order which held that Appellees Raymond Witt 
and Irene Witt (the sellers) properly terminated the parties' agreement for a 
warranty deed.

[¶2] We affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶3] The buyer presents the 
following issues for our review:

          
1. In Wyoming is a default notice provision which requires only mailing, 
without delivery, contrary to public policy?

          
2. Once a mailed notice of default is returned undelivered, is there any 
obligation to attempt delivery by other means which are readily available and 
apparent?

          
3. Where notice is mailed alleging multiple defaults, does acceptance of 
tender of partial cure limit the notifying party's right to strictly enforce the 
time limits of the original mailing on remaining alleged 
defaults?

          
4. Where the only existing default is cured immediately upon actual 
notice being given, may a forfeiture provision be strictly 
enforced?

          
5. Where a contract purchaser has substantial equity interest in 
property, does strict technical application of contract provisions require 
forfeiture without resort to equitable jurisdiction?

FACTS

[¶4] The parties entered 
into an agreement for a warranty deed on May 16, 1995, whereby the buyer agreed 
to purchase a parcel of real estate from the sellers. The parties agreed that 
the buyer would make monthly payments, pay the real property taxes, and maintain 
property insurance.

[¶5] On August 7, 1996, the 
sellers sent a letter to the buyer by certified mail, informing him that he was 
in default under the terms of the agreement. Specifically, the sellers stated 
that the buyer failed to make a monthly payment, to pay the 1995 taxes, and to 
carry property insurance. The letter recited the terms of the agreement and 
notified the buyer that he had "30 days from the date of this letter to correct 
the defaults. In the event you fail to correct the defaults, the [sellers] shall 
take immediate possession of the premises and keep all payments which you have 
made to date."

[¶6] The post office 
delivered notices to the buyer on August 8, 1996, and August 16, 1996, notifying 
him that he had a certified letter waiting for him at the post office. Although 
the buyer admitted that he had received the notices, he did not claim the 
letter. The post office subsequently returned the unclaimed letter to the 
sellers on August 23, 1996.

[¶7] The sellers hand 
delivered a letter to the escrow agent on September 12, 1996, in which they 
declared that they were terminating the agreement for a warranty deed pursuant 
to the default provision of that agreement. They also delivered a copy of this 
letter to the buyer on the same date. The buyer filed a complaint against the 
sellers on September 13, 1996, praying for specific performance of the 
agreement. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the agreement had 
been properly terminated and entered a judgment in

favor of the sellers. The 
buyer appeals from that judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Notice by Mail

[¶8] The buyer contends that 
a default notice provision which requires only mailing, without delivery, is 
contrary to public policy. The sellers respond by insisting that such provision 
is not against public policy when the addressee fails to claim a default notice 
that has been sent by certified mail.

[¶9] No Wyoming cases are 
directly on point regarding this issue. We, therefore, find guidance from other 
jurisdictions. In Rhoden v. City of Akron, 61 Ohio App.3d 725, 573 N.E.2d 1131, 
1132 (1988), the Ohio Court of Appeals held: "A person who fails to claim a 
letter sent by certified mail may not later complain that he did not receive 
notice." The Georgia Court of Appeals rendered a similar decision, stating: 
"[R]efusal to accept a letter delivered to the proper address with adequate 
postage is the equivalent of receipt."  
Crenshaw v. Georgia Underwriting Association, 202 Ga. App. 610, 414 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1992). We agree with the holdings in these cases. The buyer 
cannot ignore certified letter notices and then complain that he was not advised 
that he was in default when the certified letter set out the nature of the 
defaults. 

B. Additional Notice

[¶10] The buyer poses the 
question of whether the sellers were obligated to further attempt to deliver a 
notice of default once the mailed notice had been returned unclaimed. Our 
resolution of the buyer's first issue is dispositive of this inquiry under the 
facts and circumstances of this case. 

C. Waiver

[¶11] The buyer asserts 
that, when the sellers accepted the late July payment, they waived their right 
to terminate the agreement because the defaults had been partially cured. He 
maintains that, as a result of this waiver, the sellers had to provide him with 
additional notice of the remaining defaults. The sellers contend that the 
agreement was properly terminated because the buyer failed to cure all the 
defaults which were specified in the notice within the thirty days dictated by 
the agreement.

[¶12] In Bouwkamp v. 
McNeill, 902 P.2d 725, 727 (Wyo. 1995), this Court stated that acceptance of a 
late payment may operate to cure a late payment default under a lease agreement. 
We went on to say, however, that, if insurance coverages were not maintained as 
required under the lease agreement, a default would still exist and the 
agreement could be terminated in accordance with its express terms. 902 P.2d  at 
727.

[¶13] The default notice in 
this case gave the buyer thirty days from the date of the notice to pay the late 
payment, pay the delinquent taxes, and obtain insurance on the property. The 
buyer tendered the late payment but failed to pay the delinquent taxes before 
the thirty days expired. His failure to pay the delinquent taxes and provide 
proof of insurance to the escrow agent were violations which went to the heart 
of the parties' agreement. The sellers, therefore, had a right to terminate the 
agreement pursuant to the terms of the

agreement.

D. Equitable Relief

[¶14]The buyer maintains 
that, because he had gained a substantial equity interest in the property and he 
immediately paid the delinquent taxes after the sellers hand delivered the 
default notice to him, he should be entitled to receive equitable relief from 
strict enforcement of the default provision.

[¶15] This Court generally 
does not favor forfeiture of contractual rights. Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 886 P.2d 589, 594 (Wyo. 1994).  However, 
where the parties' intentions regarding default are clearly set forth in an 
agreement, we will not rewrite a default provision. Id.  We have stated:

[A]fter competent parties have solemnly contracted 
and agreed to certain conditions, courts should exercise restraint in nullifying 
the terms thereof or rewriting the contract. It is said that this is "a 
dangerous jurisdiction which should not be extended," Carter v. Brownell Auto 
Co., 217 Ala. 690, 117 So. 304, 305; Douglas v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance 
Company, 83 N.Y. 492, 504 (1881); Pierce Oil Corporation v. Voran, 136 Va. 416, 
118 S.E. 247, 254. It does not extend so far as to authorize a court of equity 
to disregard and set aside a valid stipulation of the parties upon the 
performance of which their rights are made to depend in the absence of some 
equitable basis. Consistent with this view we find the following statement in 2 
Warvelle on Vendors, § 822, p. 964 (2d Ed.):

"As 
has been stated, the doctrine is that if, upon the face of a contract, it 
clearly appears to have been the distinct understanding and agreement of the 
parties that if a stipulated act was not performed within a specified time 
certain consequences were to follow; and if default has been made in the 
performance within the time, a court of equity will give no relief unless a 
strict performance was either waived by the party entitled to its benefits or is 
excused on some special ground of equitable cognizance."

Younglove v. Graham & 
Hill, 526 P.2d 689, 692-93 (Wyo. 1974). See also McMurry Oil Company v. 
Deucalion Research, Inc., 842 P.2d 584, 589 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶16] Under the default 
provision in this case, the buyer had thirty days from the date the notice was 
mailed in which to cure all violations. The buyer failed to pay the taxes within 
that prescribed time. We recognize that the termination of the agreement is a 
harsh result, but nothing in the record provides a sufficient equitable basis to 
persuade us to rescue the buyer from an express term

that he agreed to abide 
by.

CONCLUSION

[¶17] The trial court 
correctly ordered that the agreement for a warranty deed had been properly 
terminated.

[¶18] Affirmed.