Title: State v. Hairston

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

185 S.E.2d 633 (1972) 280 N.C. 220 STATE of North Carolina v. Charles Curtis HAIRSTON. STATE of North Carolina v. Edward Alexander HOWARD. STATE of North Carolina v. Earnest McINTYRE, Jr. No. 130. Supreme Court of North Carolina. January 14, 1972. *636 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Associate Atty. Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Raleigh, for the State. Stephen G. Calaway, Winston-Salem, for defendant Hairston, appellant. William G. Pfefferkorn, Winston-Salem, for defendant McIntyre, appellant. J. Erle McMichael and Thomas W. Moore, Jr., Winston-Salem, for defendant Howard, appellant. MOORE, Justice. On appeal defendants set forth 21 assignments of error. Assignments Nos. 3, 11, 12, and 18 are not discussed in defendants' briefs and are therefore deemed abandoned. Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 254 N.C. 783, 810 (1961). Nevertheless, since these are capital cases, these assignments have been carefully considered and found to be without merit. Defendant McIntyre first assigns as error the court's failure to provide him with counsel at the preliminary hearing. On 8 March 1971 McIntyre appeared before Judge Sherk of the District Court for a hearing to determine whether counsel should be appointed to defend him. The court found that defendant had a job with George Sparks Construction Company and made $90 per week, that his wife worked and made $385 per month, and that they owned an automobile and furniture. Based on these findings, the court refused to appoint counsel. On 11 March 1971 defendant McIntyre appeared before Judge Sherk for a preliminary hearing. At that time the court inquired into whether the defendant wanted counsel appointed. Defendant specifically refused the appointment of counsel, stating that he had had trial experience in the service and did not need an attorney. Before trial, William G. Pfefferkorn was appointed counsel for McIntyre. Counsel then moved that the indictment against McIntyre be quashed and that all proceedings against defendant be dismissed with prejudice for the reason that a preliminary hearing was held for the defendant on the capital offense of murder, and at said time defendant was not appointed counsel as required by the Constitution and statutes of North Carolina and by the Constitution of the United States. On 18 May 1971 a hearing was held on this motion before Charles Kivett, Judge Presiding, at which hearing the State offered the testimony of Judge A. Lincoln Sherk, before whom the preliminary hearing was held; Mr. George Thomas, an attorney at law in the city of Winston-Salem; Mr. R. H. Frye, one of the investigating officers from the Winston-Salem Police Department; and James C. Yates, III, the assistant *637 solicitor. Defendant McIntyre took the stand and testified in his own behalf. After this hearing, the court made, among others, the following findings: The court further found: *638 In North Carolina a preliminary hearing is not a constitutional requirement nor is it essential to the finding of an indictment. Gasque v. State, 271 N.C. 323, 156 S.E.2d 740 (1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 1030, 88 S. Ct. 1423, 20 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1968). The preliminary hearing may be waived (G.S. § 15-85), in which case the defendant is bound over to the superior court to await grand jury action without forfeiting any right or defense available to him. State v. Hargett, 255 N.C. 412, 121 S.E.2d 589 (1961). However, G.S. § 7A-451(b) (4) provides that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding and that an indigent person is entitled to services of counsel at such hearing. Defendant relies on Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970). This decision also holds that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage of the proceeding so as to require the presence of counsel. In Coleman, the opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan states: Both Coleman and G.S. § 7A-451 (b) (4) apply to an indigent person. Judge Sherk, upon competent evidence, found that for the purpose of the preliminary hearing defendant McIntyre was not an indigent and was in a position to employ his own attorney. This Court is bound by that finding. State v. McRae, 276 N.C. 308, 172 S.E.2d 37 (1970); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968); State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1 (1966). Not being indigent for the purpose of the preliminary hearing, McIntyre did not have the right to appointed counsel, and he could waive counsel and elect to defend himself. Before the preliminary hearing began, the court again inquired as to whether or not McIntyre wished counsel to be appointed. He specifically replied that he did not, stating that he had had some experience while in the service and wished to represent himself. He then signed a written waiver of counsel which he had a right to do. State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 339, 163 S.E.2d 353, 361 (1968), and cases therein cited. In State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 268, 139 S.E.2d 667, 672 (1965), this Court said: Under the circumstances of this case, the refusal of the trial court to appoint counsel to represent defendant McIntyre at the preliminary hearing was not error, and the court properly overruled defendant's motion to suppress all evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. Before the trial, Judge Kivett, in accordance with G.S. 7A-450(c), which provides that the question of indigency may be determined or redetermined by the court at any stage of the action, made a further finding that for the purpose of trial defendant McIntyre was an indigent and appointed William G. Pfefferkorn to represent *639 him. Mr. Pfefferkorn was later appointed to perfect this appeal. It appears from the record that R. H. Frye talked to defendant McIntyre on 9 March 1971 prior to the preliminary hearing. At that time Mr. Frye told defendant that he would need a lawyer for the preliminary hearing. Defendant stated that he was going to leave it up to his wife as to whether or not he should employ an attorney. After that, and before the hearing, defendant told Mr. Frye he was going to represent himself at the preliminary hearing. These facts all fully support the findings of Judge Kivett: And they also support Judge Kivett's conclusion: See Coleman v. Alabama, supra; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). Defendants next assert that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it allowed the State's witness Dr. Wisotzkey to give expert testimony before he was found by the court to be an expert witness. Dr. Wisotzkey testified: After stating these qualifications, Dr. Wisotzkey testified at length as to what he found at the autopsy. When asked if he had an opinion satisfactory to himself as to the cause of Mr. Minor's death, defendants objected. The jury was sent out, and Dr. Wisotzkey was again examined as to his qualifications. Following this examination, the court found him to be an expert medical doctor, specializing in pathology, and qualified to give his opinion in that regard. Dr. Wisotzkey then testified that in his opinion Mr. Minor died of severe brain injury due to a gunshot wound in the head. In State v. Perry, 275 N.C. 565, 169 S.E.2d 839 (1969), this Court said: However, in the present case, when defendants objected to the doctor's giving an opinion as to the cause of death, the court did examine the witness further as to his qualifications and found him to be a medical expert. This finding will not be disturbed when, as here, there was ample evidence to support it. State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 278, 20 S.E.2d 313 (1942). This assignment is overruled. Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in allowing testimony to the effect that defendants were members of a group known as the "Mau Mau." Defendants contend that this evidence was irrelevant and that its admission was error in that it tended to prejudice the defendants in the eyes of the jury. There was no evidence concerning the nature of the group except that the membership was composed of the three defendants in this case and Bobby Hairston and Durkin Woodruff; that the leader of the group was Earnest McIntyre; that the group met twice a week at each other's homes; and that the members would go out into the woods and practice shooting. This evidence was pertinent to the State's case. It showed that defendants knew each other, associated together, had access to firearms, and had practice and training in the use of such firearms, all of which was relevant and material to support the State's theory of a conspiracy to rob and, if necessary, to kill Mr. Minor. In State v. Cox, 201 N.C. 357, 160 S.E. 358 (1931), this Court said: And in State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954), it is stated: See also State v. Sneeden, 274 N.C. 498, 502, 164 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1968); 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law § 33, p. 532. This assignment is overruled. Defendants next contend that the court erred in charging the jury that "general malice is wickedness, a disposition to do wrong, a black and diabolical heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief," for the reason that it was prejudicial to defendants; that the use of the word "black" made reference to the fact that the defendants were Negroes, and that this reference to race was prejudicial error. This assignment is without merit. The word "black" was not used with reference to the color of the defendants, but rather as an adjective synonymous with evil. In State v. Knotts, 168 N.C. 173, 184, 83 S.E. 972, 977 (1914), the Court approved the same definition of general malice. This is also the definition given in Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, p. 1109. Defendants next contend that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying defendants' motions for nonsuit at the close of the State's evidence and at the *641 close of all the evidence. This assignment is overruled. There is ample evidence from which the jury could find that while defendants were carrying out a conspiracy to rob Mr. Minor, and while actually engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the felony of robbery, one of the defendants shot and killed Mr. Minor. This is sufficient to overcome the motions for judgment as of nonsuit. State v. Fox, 277 N.C. 1, 175 S.E.2d 561 (1970), and cases cited therein. Defendants next contend that it was error for the court to allow the witness Bobby Hairston to testify that on the way from his house to the wooded area behind Mr. Minor's store he asked the group where they were going and received the answer that they "were going to knock a store off." Defendants insist that this testimony should have been excluded as hearsay because the witness did not know who answered his question. When a conspiracy has been established, declarations of any one of the conspirators made while the conspiracy is in existence and in furtherance of the common design are admissible against the other conspirators. Here, all the evidence tended to show that a conspiracy to rob Mr. Minor existed, and that the declaration was made by one of the defendants while on the way to the scene of the crime. For that reason, the testimony would be competent. State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970); State v. Conrad, 275 N.C. 342, 168 S.E.2d 39 (1969); State v. Gallimore, 272 N.C. 528, 158 S.E.2d 505 (1968); State v. Davis, 177 N.C. 573, 98 S.E. 785 (1919); Stansbury, N.C. Evidence § 173 (2d Ed. 1963); 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Conspiracy § 5. Defendants next contend that the court erred in allowing the solicitor to ask leading questions of State's witness Bobby Hairston, who himself was involved in the perpetration of the crime charged. In his initial statement to the police, this witness had not implicated defendant McIntyre in the shooting, and the leading questions were intended to show why he had not done so. The witness was naturally hesitant to testify, explaining that he was afraid of McIntyre because McIntyre had threatened to kill him if he talked. The court has discretionary power to permit leading questions to be asked and when there is no abuse of this discretion it will not be reviewed on appeal. State v. Johnson, 272 N.C. 239, 158 S.E.2d 95 (1967); State v. Painter, 265 N.C. 277, 144 S.E.2d 6 (1965); State v. Pearson, 258 N.C. 188, 128 S.E.2d 251 (1962); State v. Beatty, 226 N.C. 765, 40 S.E.2d 357 (1946); Stansbury, N.C. Evidence § 31 (2d Ed.1963). No abuse of discretion is shown, and this assignment is overruled. Sergeant Burke, a member of the detective division of the Winston-Salem Police Department, testified that he viewed the scene of the crime on the night of the murder and the next day, and that when standing in the place from which the shot allegedly was fired, he could see the spot where Mr. Minor fell. Defendants contend that the admission of this testimony was error. Defendants in their briefs quote from 3 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Evidence, § 19, p. 625: The fact that Sergeant Burke examined the scene the night of the murder and again the next morning meets the requirement that there be a reasonable proximity *642 in time. Moreover, the determination of competency of such evidence rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. Jenkins v. Hawthorne, 269 N.C. 672, 153 S.E.2d 339 (1967). Here, no abuse of discretion is shown. It is also noted that Sergeant Burke had previously given the same testimony without objection. For this reason, the benefit of the later objection would be lost. Stansbury, N.C. Evidence § 30 (2d Ed.1963); Shelton v. Southern R. R., 193 N.C. 670, 139 S.E. 232 (1927); Smith v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 163 N. C. 143, 79 S.E. 433 (1913). This assignment is overruled. Defendants contend that the trial court failed to correctly charge on the law of accomplice testimony. The court charged as follows: Defendants contend that in lieu of the above the court should have charged as follows: While it is true that the charge as contended for by the defendants is correct, it is equally true that the charge as giventhat the jury should examine the testimony of the accomplices with the "greatest care and caution"is in fact stating to the jury that they "should scrutinize and look carefully into the testimony of the accomplices." Defendants' contentions are based on a distinction without a difference. The charge as given by the court is very similar to that adopted by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the North Carolina Conference of Superior Court Judges. N. C.P.I.Crim. (tentative) 104.25. There is no merit to this assignment. Defendants next assign as error the failure of the court to instruct the jury that they could find the defendants guilty of murder in the second degree. This assignment is without merit. G.S. § 14-17 provides in pertinent part: "A murder . . . which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree.. . ." A murder committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony within the purview of G.S. § 14-17 is murder in the first degree, irrespective of premeditation or deliberation or malice aforethought. State v. Maynard, 247 N.C. 462, 101 S.E.2d 340 (1958), and cases cited. Accord, State v. Rich, 277 N.C. 333, 177 S.E.2d 422 (1970); State v. Fox, supra; State v. Henderson, 276 N.C. 430, 173 S.E.2d 291 (1970); State v. Hill, 276 N.C. 1, 170 S.E.2d 885 (1969). The evidence in the present case is to the effect that this group of five assembled at the home of Bobby Hairston; that they proceeded to an area near Mr. Minor's grocery store and there discussed robbing Mr. Minor and which one would do the shooting; that after some discussion they split into two groups, two staying in the wooded area near the grocery store and three proceeding to the store to rob Mr. Minor; and that one of the two who stayed in the woods, upon seeing Mr. Minor emerge from the grocery store, shot and killed him. All the evidence is to the effect that Mr. Minor was killed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felonyrobbery. Under these circumstances, it was not necessary for the court to charge on second degree murder, and the failure to do so was not error. Defendants next contend that the court should have instructed the jury on the law regarding the abandonment of a conspiracy, and further that if the conspiracy was abandoned, the other defendants would not be accountable for the independent act of Charles Hairston. Bobby Hairston testified in part: Durkin Woodruff testified: This testimony clearly shows that the original conspiracy to rob Mr. Minor had not been abandoned, and that the defendants were continuing their efforts to carry out the plan to rob him. *644 In State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 400, 405, 20 S.E.2d 360, 363-364 (1942), it is said: In the present case, the evidence shows that all defendants had formed a conspiracy to rob Mr. Minor, and that in attempting to perpetrate this crime Charles Hairston shot and killed Mr. Minor. Under these facts, each and all of the conspirators are guilty of murder in the first degree, and the court correctly refused to charge that the conspiracy had been abandoned, and that the other defendants were not accountable for the act of Charles Hairston. The other assignments of error, although formal, have been carefully considered and found to be without merit. For the reasons indicated, the verdicts and judgments will not be disturbed. No error.