Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jason C. Gonzalez

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 104 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2148-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jason C. Gonzalez, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jason C. Gonzalez, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GONZALEZ 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 8, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
August 7, 2018 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Peyton B. Engel, Elizabeth L. Spencer, and Hurley, Burish & 
Stanton, S.C., Madison.  
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Jonathan E. Hendrix and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison.
 
 
2018 WI 104
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2148-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jason C. Gonzalez, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jason C. Gonzalez, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 8, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Jason C. Gonzalez has appealed 
a report filed by Referee James C. Boll, Jr., concluding that 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
committed 
five 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct and recommending that he be publicly reprimanded.  In 
his appeal, Attorney Gonzalez challenges three of the counts of 
misconduct found by the referee.  Specifically, he challenges 
the referee's findings of fact with respect to counts five, 
seven, and nine of the complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
2 
 
Regulation (OLR).  He also challenges the referee's conclusion 
of law with respect to count five.  Attorney Gonzalez argues 
that a private, rather than a public, reprimand is an 
appropriate sanction.  He also asks that the costs of the 
proceeding be reduced. 
¶2 
Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold all of 
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
conclude that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction for 
Attorney Gonzalez's misconduct.  In addition, we find it 
appropriate to follow our usual custom of imposing the full 
costs of this proceeding, which are $9,733.36 as of April 2, 
2018, on Attorney Gonzalez.  The OLR does not seek restitution 
and we do not impose a restitution order. 
¶3 
Attorney Gonzalez was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 2011 and practices in Madison.  He has no prior 
disciplinary history.   
¶4 
On November 3, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint 
alleging nine counts of misconduct with respect to two client 
proceedings.  Attorney Gonzalez filed an answer on December 6, 
2016.  The referee was appointed that same day. 
¶5 
Counts one through five of the OLR's complaint arose 
out of Attorney Gonzalez's representation of J.C.  In March of 
2013, J.C. was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), 
third offense.  J.C. hired Attorney Gonzalez to represent him in 
April of 2013.  J.C. signed a fee agreement, which required him 
to pay Attorney Gonzalez $2,500 in advanced fees.  J.C. informed 
Attorney Gonzalez that he wanted any sentencing to occur after 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
3 
 
September 2013.  In May of 2013, J.C. emailed Attorney Gonzalez 
and said he wanted to push any conviction past late November 
2013. 
¶6 
In July of 2013, the circuit court set J.C.'s trial 
for September 19, 2013.  Later that month, J.C. emailed Attorney 
Gonzalez 
several 
times 
asking 
for 
a 
status 
update 
and 
questioning why the court had set a trial date for September.  
Attorney Gonzalez did not respond.  In late August of 2013, the 
circuit court removed the September trial date. 
¶7 
On September 5, 2013, J.C. emailed Attorney Gonzalez 
with a new mailing address.  In October of 2013, J.C. emailed 
Attorney Gonzalez again to remind him to inform the circuit 
court of the address change.  Attorney Gonzalez did not inform 
the circuit court of the change. 
¶8 
In late October and early November 2013, J.C. again 
asked for status updates from Attorney Gonzalez.  Attorney 
Gonzalez promised J.C. he would contact him with information, 
but he never did. 
¶9 
On November 12, 2013, J.C. requested Attorney Gonzalez 
provide him with documents and information and with answers to 
specific questions about the case.  Attorney Gonzalez responded 
within a few hours, but he did not give J.C. the requested 
information. 
 
From 
January 
through 
May 
of 
2014, 
J.C. 
occasionally sought updates about the case, but received no 
substantive responses. 
¶10 On May 15, 2014, J.C. emailed Attorney Gonzalez saying 
he did not see any reason to delay the proceeding any longer.  
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
4 
 
On June 3, 2014, J.C. signed an affidavit which Attorney 
Gonzalez had prepared to collaterally attack one of the prior 
OWI 
convictions. 
 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
filed 
a 
motion 
to 
collaterally attack one of the prior convictions on October 13, 
2014.   
¶11 On October 20, 2014, the circuit court allowed 
Attorney Gonzalez to withdraw from representation, upon J.C.'s 
request.  The circuit court later appointed counsel for J.C.  
¶12 On October 22, 2014, J.C. requested a partial refund 
from Attorney Gonzalez.  Attorney Gonzalez responded that he 
would prepare and send J.C. an itemized bill. 
¶13 In December of 2014, J.C. pled no contest to and was 
convicted of fourth offense OWI after the State discovered an 
additional prior offense. 
¶14 On July 5, 2015, Attorney Gonzalez provided the OLR 
with a closing letter he purportedly sent to J.C. on October 30, 
2014.  The letter used a pre-September 2013 address for J.C.  
Attorney Gonzalez never sent J.C. an itemized bill, accounting 
of fees, or information on how to dispute the fee after the 
representation ended. 
¶15 In July 2015, Attorney Gonzalez told the OLR that J.C. 
had not requested a refund or contacted him to indicate that he 
believed Attorney Gonzalez had not earned the entire advanced 
fee paid. 
¶16 In addition to the OWI matter, the OLR's complaint 
detailed an additional matter involving J.C.  While the OWI 
charge was pending, in November 2013, the City of Horicon issued 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
5 
 
two municipal citations to J.C. regarding his car.  The 
appearance date to contest the citations was December 18, 2013.   
¶17 J.C. notified Attorney Gonzalez about the citations, 
but no representation agreement was ever signed concerning the 
citations. 
¶18 On December 1, 2013, Attorney Gonzalez emailed J.C. 
that he had entered not guilty pleas on the City of Horicon 
citations.  In fact, Attorney Gonzalez had not done so, nor had 
he entered an appearance in the City of Horicon cases.  On 
December 10, 2013, Attorney Gonzalez told J.C. he did not have 
to appear at the December 18, 2013, hearing because of the entry 
of the not guilty pleas. 
¶19 On December 18, 2013, the Horicon Joint Municipal 
Court found that J.C. had defaulted on the citations and 
assessed fines against him.  In late January 2014, Attorney 
Gonzalez and J.C. discussed reopening the City of Horicon 
citations.  Attorney Gonzalez told J.C. he would not pay the $50 
fee to reopen the citations, and J.C. subsequently paid the fee 
to reopen the matters. 
¶20 On February 18, 2014, Attorney Gonzalez wrote to the 
municipal court saying he represented J.C. in the reopened 
matters and at that time he also entered not guilty pleas on 
J.C.'s behalf.  In May 2014, the Horicon municipal court found 
J.C. guilty on both violations.  In July 2015, Attorney Gonzalez 
wrote to the OLR saying he did not represent J.C. in connection 
with the City of Horicon citations, but had done him a favor by 
"assisting" him. 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
6 
 
¶21 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Gonzalez's representation of 
J.C.: 
Count One:  By failing to diligently pursue resolution 
of the operating while intoxicated charge against 
J.C., Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.3.1 
Count Two:  By failing to promptly respond to J.C.'s 
requests 
for 
information 
throughout 
the 
representation, 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).2 
Count Three:  By failing to provide J.C. a written 
final accounting and the notices regarding how to 
dispute the fee, Attorney Gonzalez violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b.3 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
2 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides:  "A lawyer shall promptly 
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
3 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 
Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  Because 
the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016, 
unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court 
rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b. provided:   
Upon 
termination 
of 
the 
representation, 
the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following: 
 
1.  a final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 
fees; 
 
2.  notice that, if the client disputes the 
amount of the fee and wants that dispute to be 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
7 
 
Count Four:  By failing to enter not guilty pleas to 
J.C.'s municipal citations, Attorney Gonzalez violated 
SCR 20:1.3. 
Count Five:  By misrepresenting to the OLR that he had 
sent J.C. a letter dated October 30, 2014, accounting 
for his fee and providing the notices required under 
former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), and that he did not 
represent J.C. on J.C.'s municipal citations, Attorney 
Gonzalez in each instance violated SCR 22.03(6),4 
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).5 
¶22 The remaining four counts of misconduct alleged in the 
OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Gonzalez's representation 
of D.J.  In January 2013, D.J. was charged with three counts of 
sexual assault of a child.  D.J. hired Attorney Gonzalez to 
represent him in February 2013.  In March 2013, D.J. was charged 
with four felonies, including three for child enticement.  At 
                                                                                                                                                             
submitted to binding arbitration, the client must 
provide written notice of the dispute to the lawyer 
within 30 days of the mailing of the accounting; and 
 
3.  notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration. 
4 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's 
wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
5 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
8 
 
least one of the child enticement counts was for an attempt.  
Attorney Gonzalez agreed to represent D.J. in the child 
enticement case.   
¶23 The OLR's complaint alleged that with respect to the 
child enticement case, Attorney Gonzalez did not perform legal 
research on whether D.J.'s actions constituted an "attempt."   
¶24 On May 9, 2014, D.J. pled no contest to one count of 
attempted child enticement and one count of exposing a child to 
harmful materials in the child enticement case.  The State 
dismissed the charges in the sexual assault case.  In July of 
2014, D.J. was sentenced to six years in prison, followed by six 
years of extended supervision.   
¶25 In August 2014, Attorney Gonzalez filed a Notice of 
Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief on behalf of D.J.  In 
November 2014, the state public defender appointed Attorney Cole 
Ruby to represent D.J. in the postconviction matter.  In October 
2015, Attorney Ruby moved the court to vacate D.J.'s conviction 
and withdraw his guilty plea.  One of Attorney Ruby's arguments 
was that Attorney Gonzalez had been ineffective because the 
attempted child enticement charges lacked a factual basis and 
could have been dismissed. 
¶26 On January 12, 2016, Attorney Gonzalez testified at a 
hearing on the postconviction motion that he had not done any 
case law research on the meaning of "attempt."  In April of 
2016, the circuit court granted D.J.'s motion to withdraw his 
plea, citing as the basis Attorney Gonzalez's failure to 
understand and explain "attempt" to D.J.  In May 2016, the 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
9 
 
circuit court vacated D.J.'s conviction and reopened both the 
sexual assault case and the child enticement case. 
¶27 In 2013, Attorney Gonzalez also agreed to represent 
D.J. in an ongoing paternity and child support matter.  Attorney 
Alicia Nall represented the petitioner. 
¶28 In January 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on 
placement and granted D.J. telephone contact with his daughter.  
Attorney Gonzalez was ordered to prepare a written order but 
failed to do so. 
¶29 On January 22, 2015, Attorney Gonzalez and D.J. 
discussed D.J.'s ability to telephone his daughter.  Attorney 
Gonzalez told D.J. he would contact Attorney Nall.   
¶30 In February 2015, D.J. made numerous attempts to 
contact Attorney Gonzalez about having telephone contact with 
his daughter, without success.  In March 2015, D.J. wrote to the 
circuit court requesting a hearing about telephone contact with 
his daughter. 
¶31 In March 2015, the circuit court contacted Attorney 
Nall about the order which Attorney Gonzalez was supposed to 
have prepared.  Attorney Nall drafted an order and submitted it 
to the court.  In May 2015, Attorney Nall moved the circuit 
court for attorney's fees and sanctions against Attorney 
Gonzalez for his failure to draft the order. 
¶32 On May 11, 2015, D.J. wrote to Attorney Gonzalez about 
his lack of communication and inquired about setting up the 
telephone calls with his daughter. 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
10 
 
¶33 D.J. filed a grievance against Attorney Gonzalez in 
March 2015.  By letter dated May 19, 2015, the OLR notified 
Attorney Gonzalez that his written response to the grievance was 
required.  Attorney Gonzalez provided his written response to 
the OLR on July 5, 2015.  Attorney Gonzalez said D.J. had not 
attempted to contact him since he was incarcerated in 2014 and 
that it was up to D.J., not Attorney Gonzalez, to arrange 
telephone contact between D.J. and his daughter. 
¶34 Attorney Gonzalez did not disclose to the OLR his 
failure to prepare and submit the written order effectuating the 
ruling made in January 2015 that D.J. be allowed telephone 
contact with his daughter.  Attorney Gonzalez did not disclose 
to the OLR Attorney Nall's motion for sanctions based upon 
Attorney Gonzalez's failure to prepare the order as directed.   
¶35 On July 13, 2015, the circuit court ordered Attorney 
Gonzalez to pay $100 to Attorney Nall.  The circuit court also 
granted Attorney Gonzalez's motion to withdraw as D.J.'s 
counsel.  Attorney Gonzalez subsequently paid the $100 sanction 
to Attorney Nall. 
¶36 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Gonzalez's representation of 
D.J.: 
Count Six:  By failing to research case law on the 
issue 
of 
whether 
D.J.'s 
actions 
constituted 
an 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
11 
 
"attempt" 
at 
child 
enticement, 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
violated SCR 20:1.1.6 
Count Seven:  By failing to prepare the court order to 
permit D.J. to have telephone contact with his 
daughter, Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.3. 
Count Eight:  By failing to respond to D.J.'s 
inquiries regarding establishing telephone contact, 
Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4). 
Count Nine:  By misrepresenting to the OLR that D.J. 
had not contacted him about the paternity matter and 
by failing to disclose to the OLR that he was 
responsible 
for 
preparing 
the 
court 
order 
to 
facilitate D.J.'s phone visits with D.J.'s daughter, 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
in 
each 
instance 
violated 
SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
¶37 The parties filed a stipulation of facts on August 29, 
2017.  A hearing was held before the referee on August 31, 2017.  
The referee issued his report and recommendation on November 6, 
2017.  The referee found that the OLR had met its burden of 
proof on counts two, four, five, seven, and nine of the 
complaint, but had not met its burden of proof on counts one, 
three, six, and eight. 
¶38 With respect to count two, the referee said based on 
the long spans of Attorney Gonzalez having no communication with 
J.C. and his failure to respond to J.C.'s requests in a 
substantive way, the OLR demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).  With 
respect to count four, the referee said that Attorney Gonzalez 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:1.1 provides:  "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
12 
 
admitted that he lied to J.C. when he said he had filed the 
pleas to the City of Horicon citations and when he told J.C. he 
did not have to appear on the hearing date because not guilty 
pleas had been entered.   
¶39 The referee said Attorney Gonzalez did nothing to 
defend the citations after the matter was reopened, and J.C. was 
found guilty of the two citations.  The referee also said 
Attorney Gonzalez's testimony at the disciplinary hearing that 
he would not apologize to J.C. for lying to him was a troubling 
indication of a lack of remorse.  The referee found by clear and 
convincing evidence that by failing to enter not guilty pleas to 
J.C.'s 
municipal 
citations, 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
violated 
SCR 20:1.3. 
¶40 With respect to count five, the referee noted that 
J.C. was sometimes without a phone and at times was not 
accessible during regular hours.  In addition, J.C. changed his 
address several times during Attorney Gonzalez's representation.  
The referee found that Attorney Gonzalez did not misrepresent to 
the OLR that he sent an October 30, 2014 closing letter, and the 
referee termed this an administrative error that occurs in all 
businesses.   
¶41 The referee said there was nothing in the record to 
indicate that when Attorney Gonzalez represented to the OLR that 
he had sent the letter he was not being truthful.  The referee 
found, however, that Attorney Gonzalez did misrepresent to the 
OLR that he was "assisting" as opposed to representing J.C. 
regarding the City of Horicon citations, and the referee said 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
13 
 
the facts of record demonstrated that Attorney Gonzalez was 
serving 
the 
function 
of 
representing 
J.C., 
not 
merely 
"assisting" him.  Thus, the referee found by clear and 
convincing evidence that, when Attorney Gonzalez represented to 
the OLR that he "assisted" J.C. and did not represent him 
regarding 
the 
citations, 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
violated 
SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
¶42 With respect to count seven, the referee found that 
Attorney Gonzalez was working to obtain a facilitator for D.J. 
to arrange telephone contact with his daughter.  The referee 
found that Attorney Gonzalez's explanation that he could not 
draft the order pursuant to the circuit court's direction 
because he could not find a facilitator was not credible.  The 
referee noted that Attorney Nall was able to draft the order 
without obtaining a facilitator.  The referee found that by 
failing to prepare the court order to permit D.J. to have 
telephone contact with his daughter, Attorney Gonzalez failed to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3. 
¶43 Finally, with respect to count nine, the referee said 
Attorney Gonzalez admitted that his statement to the OLR that 
D.J. had not contacted him since he was incarcerated was untrue.  
While Attorney Gonzalez argued this was a misstatement and that 
he provided a letter contradicting the statement to the OLR, the 
referee said this was not the only misrepresentation contained 
in Attorney Gonzalez's response to the OLR regarding his 
representation of D.J. in the paternity matter.   
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
14 
 
¶44 The referee said Attorney Gonzalez stated it was up to 
D.J. to arrange telephone contact between D.J. and his daughter 
when this was not true.  The referee also said that Attorney 
Gonzalez neglected to notify the OLR of his failure to prepare 
and submit the written order effectuating the circuit court's 
January 13, 2015 order.  Finally, the referee said that Attorney 
Gonzalez failed to notify the OLR that Attorney Nall had filed a 
motion for sanctions against him for his failure to file the 
order and that the motion had been granted.  The referee found, 
based on these misstatements and omissions, that Attorney 
Gonzalez violated SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h). 
¶45 The referee concluded that a public reprimanded was an 
appropriate sanction for Attorney Gonzalez's misconduct.  The 
referee also recommended that the full costs of the proceeding 
should be assessed against Attorney Gonzalez. 
¶46 In his appeal, Attorney Gonzalez says he concedes 
count 2, i.e. that he failed to promptly respond to J.C.'s 
request for information.  He also concedes the substance of 
count 4 and admits that he failed to enter not guilty pleas for 
J.C.'s municipal citations and that he told J.C. he had done so.  
However, Attorney Gonzalez takes issue with the referee's 
conclusion that Attorney Gonzalez's invocation of the phrase 
"excusable neglect" in his motion to reopen the municipal 
citations was an untruthful statement to the municipal court.  
He also challenges the referee's statement that Attorney 
Gonzalez's unwillingness to apologize to J.C. represents a 
troubling lack of remorse.  He asks the court to take notice of 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
15 
 
these points insofar as they bear on the referee's findings that 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(6), 
enforceable 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h). 
¶47 Attorney Gonzalez also argues that the referee's 
conclusion of law with respect to count five is without support 
in the record.  Attorney Gonzalez does not dispute the referee's 
conclusion related to his sending a closing letter to J.C. dated 
October 30, 2014.  He does dispute the referee's finding that he 
misrepresented to the OLR that he was "assisting" as opposed to 
"representing" J.C. with respect to the City of Horicon 
citations.  Attorney Gonzalez continues to argue that his 
involvement with the citations was a favor to J.C., and he says 
neither party viewed the relationship as an attorney/client 
relationship.  Attorney Gonzalez asks this court to overturn the 
referee's 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Gonzalez 
violated 
SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h) when he stated he did 
not represent J.C. regarding the City of Horicon citations. 
¶48 Attorney Gonzalez also argues that the referee's 
findings of fact with respect to count seven are clearly 
erroneous because they relied on evidence not in the record.  He 
says that SCR 20:1.3 requires that an attorney "shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."  
He says the record reflects that D.J. did not want Attorney 
Gonzalez's representation.  He says pursuant to a request by 
D.J., Attorney Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw as D.J.'s 
counsel.  The motion was granted but the circuit court 
subsequently reappointed Attorney Gonzalez as counsel to avoid a 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
16 
 
delay.  Once D.J. entered a guilty plea and was sentenced, 
Attorney Gonzalez was replaced by Attorney Cole Ruby.  Attorney 
Gonzalez argues that once his involvement with D.J.'s criminal 
matters ended, so did the need for his involvement in the 
paternity action.   
¶49 Attorney Gonzalez says he has always acknowledged that 
he failed to prepare a court order regarding D.J.'s telephone 
contact 
with 
his 
daughter. 
 
He 
argues 
that 
under 
the 
circumstances he believed it was impossible to complete the task 
as assigned since he was unable to find a person acceptable to 
the child's mother who was willing to serve as a chaperone for 
calls between D.J. and his daughter.  Attorney Gonzalez says he 
has conceded he could have taken some action, but he argues 
anything he could have done would not have fulfilled the court's 
order.   
¶50 Attorney 
Gonzalez 
notes 
the 
referee 
found 
the 
explanation that he could not find a facilitator to be "not 
credible" since Attorney Nall was able to draft the order 
without obtaining a facilitator.  Attorney Gonzalez argues the 
referee's finding in this regard is partially made on facts not 
in the record since neither party offered either the order 
drafted by Attorney Nall or any testimony about its contents 
into evidence.  Attorney Gonzalez argues that because the 
referee's conclusion regarding count seven assumes facts not in 
evidence, this court should overturn the referee's conclusion of 
law with respect to count seven. 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
17 
 
¶51 Finally, Attorney Gonzalez argues that the referee's 
findings of fact with respect to count nine are clearly 
erroneous.  He concedes he made misstatements, but he argues 
they were never intended to mislead the OLR and that he 
corrected them and complied with any follow up investigation.  
He 
argues 
his 
mistakes 
in 
disclosing 
information, 
while 
unfortunate, were not an attempt to hinder or deceive the OLR.   
¶52 Attorney Gonzalez acknowledges that aspects of the 
record reflect poorly on him, but he says that to the extent he 
is to be disciplined, the discipline should be on the basis of 
legally and factually correct determinations and should be 
proportional to the degree of misconduct actually proved.  He 
says given his "otherwise untroubled history" the sanction 
"should be relaxed."  In his reply brief, Attorney Gonzalez 
suggests that a private reprimand would be an appropriate 
sanction. 
¶53 The OLR argues that the record supports the referee's 
findings of fact with respect to all of the counts on which the 
referee found the OLR met its burden of proof.  With respect to 
count four, the OLR says the record supports the referee's 
factual finding that Attorney Gonzalez indicated to the Horicon 
municipal court that the reason for the default on the citations 
was excusable neglect when that was not true.  The OLR says the 
referee's finding of fact in this regard is not clearly 
erroneous, and it is reasonable for the referee to infer that 
Attorney Gonzalez was being evasive during his testimony at the 
disciplinary hearing when he said, "I don't reference whose 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
18 
 
neglect it was or whether it was excusable."  The OLR also says 
the referee's finding that Attorney Gonzalez is not remorseful 
with respect to his handling of J.C.'s cases is clearly 
supported by the record. 
¶54 The OLR goes on to argue that the referee's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law with respect to counts five, 
seven, and nine are all supported by the record.  The OLR says a 
public reprimand is an appropriate sanction.  It also asserts 
that the full costs of the proceeding should be assessed against 
Attorney Gonzalez.  The OLR says although the referee found that 
the OLR did not meet its burden of proof on four of the nine 
counts alleged in the complaint, the referee did not find that 
any of the counts were improperly brought, and the referee was 
troubled by Attorney Gonzalez's conduct in regard to some of the 
unproven counts.  The OLR's position is that all of the 
litigation costs of the proceeding are reasonable and were 
necessarily incurred. 
¶55 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 
14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may impose 
whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶56 After careful review of the matter, we conclude there 
has been no showing that any of the referee's findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We further 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
19 
 
agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney 
Gonzalez violated the supreme court rules set forth above.   
¶57 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
we also agree with the referee that a public reprimand is an 
appropriate sanction.  Although Attorney Gonzalez has no 
disciplinary history, and even though the referee found that the 
OLR did not meet its burden of proof on all counts alleged in 
the complaint, the counts that were proven are serious enough to 
warrant public discipline.  We find the misconduct at issue here 
somewhat analogous to the Public Reprimand of Sarah Clemment, 
No. 
2011-6 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https:// 
compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002365.html), 
in 
which 
an 
attorney was publicly reprimanded for giving a client an 
incorrect date for a removal hearing, making a misrepresentation 
in a motion to reopen an order denying an asylum petition and 
ordering the client's deportation, failing to follow statutory 
requirements in pursuing an appeal, and lying to the client. 
¶58 Finally, we find it appropriate to follow our usual 
practice of imposing the full costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding on Attorney Gonzalez.  The OLR does not seek 
restitution, and we do not impose any. 
¶59 IT IS ORDERED that Jason C. Gonzalez is publicly 
reprimanded. 
¶60 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Jason C. Gonzalez pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $9,733.36.   
 
No. 
2016AP2148-D   
 
 
 
1