Title: AAA Disposal Services v. Eckert

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
AAA DISPOSAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL. 
v. Record No. 030465   OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 5, 2004 
JAMES R. ECKERT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Stanley P. Klein, Judge 
 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a 
confession of judgment for the amount specified in an ad 
damnum clause is valid and binding in the absence of a 
plaintiff’s willingness to accept that amount of principal 
and interest.  We conclude that such a confession of 
judgment is not valid in light of the plain terms of Code 
§ 8.01-431 requiring that a plaintiff be willing to accept 
a judgment for the principal and interest contained in a 
confession of judgment.  Therefore, the circuit court did 
not err in granting the plaintiff’s motion to nonsuit this 
action. 
 
James R. Eckert filed a motion for judgment against 
AAA Disposal Services, Inc., and Miguel A. Aragon-Campos 
(collectively, “the defendants”), alleging personal injury 
as a result of an automobile accident and seeking damages 
in the amount of $60,000.1  More than two months before a 
scheduled trial date, Eckert moved the court for leave to 
increase the ad damnum in his motion for judgment to 
$350,000.  Eckert claimed that, instead of sustaining 
merely soft tissue injuries, he had suffered a herniated 
disc as a result of the accident and would require surgery 
to correct that condition.  A few days later, the 
defendants moved the court for leave to amend their 
responsive pleadings by admitting liability.  At a 
subsequent hearing, the circuit court denied Eckert’s 
motion to increase the ad damnum because the motion came 
too close to the trial date, but the court granted the 
defendants’ motion to admit liability. 
 
The defendants then filed a confession of judgment, 
stating that they, “jointly and severally, [are] justly 
indebted to and do hereby confess judgment in favor of 
JAMES R. ECKERT in the total sum of Sixty Thousand Dollars 
($60,000.00), which is the amount sued for in the ad damnum 
of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, as well as the 
plaintiff’s costs and interest as allowed by law as pled in 
the original motion for judgment.”  Aragon-Campos executed 
the confession of judgment in his own behalf, and Steven A. 
                     
1 Several automobiles were involved in the accident, 
one of which was a truck owned by AAA Disposal Services and 
driven by its employee, Aragon-Campos. 
 
2
Smith, Assistant General Manager, signed the document on 
behalf of Republic Services of Virginia, L.L.C., the 
successor in interest to AAA Disposal Services.  However, 
the acknowledgement by the notary public stated that Tim 
Hayes executed the confession of judgment for AAA Disposal 
Services. 
The circuit court clerk’s office accepted the 
confession of judgment for filing on December 4, 2002.  The 
next day, Eckert filed a motion to nonsuit his case.  At 
that time, no entry of judgment had been docketed, nor had 
a final order been entered in the case.  Eckert had not 
consented to entry of a judgment by confession for the 
amount for which he had sued. 
 
The circuit court subsequently heard oral argument on 
Eckert’s motion for a nonsuit.  Eckert asserted that a 
confession of judgment was not a submission to the court 
for a decision within the meaning of Code § 8.01-380 and 
that, therefore, he was entitled to a nonsuit as a matter 
of right.  The defendants argued that a confession of 
judgment for the amount requested by Eckert in the ad 
damnum clause of his motion for judgment effectively ended 
the case and that a nonsuit could not be taken after a case 
is concluded. 
 
3
In a letter opinion, the circuit court first reasoned 
that the confession of judgment was “ineffective” because 
the person recited as confessing judgment for AAA Disposal 
Services was not the person who actually did so.  The court 
further explained that, pursuant to the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-432, judgment may be confessed “for only such 
principal and interest as [the] creditor may be willing to 
accept a judgment for.”  This language, in the court’s 
view, implied that a creditor must be willing to accept the 
confessed judgment before it is final and that Eckert had 
not done so.2  For these reasons, the circuit court 
concluded that the case had not been submitted to the court 
for a decision within the meaning of Code § 8.01-380(A) and 
that Eckert therefore was entitled to a nonsuit.  The court 
entered an order nonsuiting the case without prejudice.  
The defendants appeal from that judgment, and Eckert 
assigns cross-error to the circuit court’s refusal to allow 
him to amend the motion for judgment by increasing the 
amount of the ad damnum. 
The dispositive inquiry in this appeal is whether the 
confession of judgment was valid and binding on Eckert in 
                     
2 The circuit court cited Code § 8.01-432, but the 
defendants confessed judgment pursuant to the provisions of 
Code § 8.01-431.  However, Code § 8.01-431 contains 
language similar to that quoted by the court. 
 
4
the absence of his willingness to accept the amount of 
principal and interest specified in that judgment.  We 
conclude that it was not. 
As previously noted, the defendants confessed judgment 
in this case pursuant to Code § 8.01-431.  In relevant 
part, that statute allows a defendant in any suit to 
“confess a judgment in the clerk’s office for so much 
principal and interest as the plaintiff may be willing to 
accept a judgment or decree for.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
underscored language is clear and unambiguous.  Hence, we 
construe such language according to its plain meaning 
without resort to rules of statutory interpretation.  
Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 598, 587 S.E.2d 
561, 564 (2003); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 
S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985); see also Industrial Dev. Auth. v. 
Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 
(2002). 
The plain terms of Code § 8.01-431 require that a 
plaintiff be willing to accept the amount of principal and 
interest for which a defendant is confessing judgment.  See 
Beazley v. Sims, 81 Va. 644, 647 (1886) (“[i]f a creditor 
accepts and ratifies a confession of judgment in his favor, 
it becomes, from the moment of its acceptance, valid”).  
Such acceptance is absent in this case.  The written 
 
5
statement of facts filed pursuant to Rule 5:11(c) specifies 
that Eckert “had not consented to entry of a judgment by 
confession for the amount sued for.”  Furthermore, the 
defendants confessed judgment for “interest as allowed by 
law as pled in the original motion for judgment.”  The 
record on this appeal is silent as to whether the amount of 
interest confessed included pre-judgment interest under 
Code § 8.01-382, and if it did not, whether Eckert would 
have accepted a judgment that did not include such 
interest. 
Relying on the principle that a plaintiff cannot 
recover more than the amount sued for, see Town & Country 
Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 249 Va. 387, 400, 457 S.E.2d 
356, 365 (1995), the defendants, nevertheless, assert that 
Eckert’s acceptance in this case was implied because they 
confessed judgment for the full amount of the ad damnum 
requested in the motion for judgment.  The defendants argue 
that, upon confessing judgment for that amount, the case 
was ended and could not thereafter be nonsuited. 
We agree that a plaintiff cannot recover more than the 
amount sued for, but that principle does not allow this 
Court to ignore the plain words of Code § 8.01-431 
requiring a plaintiff’s acceptance of the amount of a 
confessed judgment.  Notably, a prior version of this 
 
6
statute provided that a defendant “may confess a judgment 
in the clerk’s office .   . for the whole amount of the 
plaintiff’s demand in his writ or declaration set forth, 
and costs, or such part thereof as the plaintiff may be 
willing to accept a judgment for.”  2 Virginia Revised Code 
app. VI c. 1, p. 585 (1819).  The General Assembly deleted 
the reference to the “whole amount of the plaintiff’s 
demand” in the 1849 version of the statute, Code (1849) 
tit. 51 c. 171, § 41, and has not included that language in 
the current statute, Code § 8.01-431.  Thus, the General 
Assembly obviously knows how to allow a defendant to 
confess judgment for the amount sued for without a 
plaintiff’s consent when it wishes to do so.  We assume 
that the General Assembly’s change in a statute is 
“purposeful and not unnecessary or vain.”  Cape Henry 
Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 
S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985); accord Virginia-American Water Co. 
v. Prince William County Serv. Auth., 246 Va. 509, 517, 436 
S.E.2d 618, 623 (1993). 
In the absence of Eckert’s willingness to accept the 
amount of the principal and interest contained in the 
confession of judgment, we conclude that it was not valid 
and binding on him.  See Beazley’s Adm’r, 81 Va. at 647.  
Thus, this action had not ended, nor had anything been 
 
7
 
8
submitted to the circuit court for decision.  Under the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-380, Eckert was therefore 
entitled to take a nonsuit. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court.3 
Affirmed. 
                     
3 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address Eckert’s assignment of cross-error.