Title: State of New Jersey v. Robert R. Simon

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This is Simon's direct appeal from his conviction for capital murder and his sentence of death. Sergeant Ippolito Gonzalez, a Franklin Township police officer, was shot twice and killed on the night of May 6, 1995. He was questioning Simon and another man, Charles Staples, who were sitting in their vehicle outside the Environmental Heating building not far from police headquarters. Sergeant Gonzalez and other officers suspected that a burglary was in progress. Shortly after arriving on the scene, Sergeant Gonzalez requested backup. Officers responding to the request heard a gunshot. Staples and Simon sped away, with police in pursuit. Soon thereafter, Staples lost control of the vehicle and crashed. Simon exited the vehicle from the passenger side, pointed his gun toward the pursuing officer, and ran. The officer fired three shots, one of which struck Simon in the leg. Simon fell and surrendered. Sergeant Gonzalez was shot twice. The first shot passed through the side of his neck, and knocked him down. The second and fatal shot entered his skull behind his right ear, the bullet lodging in his brain. A firearms expert testified that the gun found near Simon when he was apprehended was the murder weapon. Automobile insurance and registration cards were found in the vehicle with a bullet hole through them. Simon's Social Security Card and Staples' driver's license were found underneath Sergeant Gonzalez's leg with a bullet hole through them. An expert testified that the hole in the insurance card was made by a gun fired from a distance of 20 to 40 inches. Police found coins, jewelry, and rifles in the vehicle which belonged to occupants of the Environmental Heating building. Simon and Staples were indicted on charges of purposeful and knowing murder by their own conduct, burglary, and firearms offenses, among other crimes. Because the State was not certain whether Simon or Staples was the trigger-person, it decided to charge both of them with purposeful and knowing murder by his own conduct and require the jury to determine which one actually was the killer. On October 7, 1996, before the commencement of the guilt-phase trial, Simon announced his intention to plead guilty to all charges, including the murder. Defense counsel advised the trial court that they believed Simon was being pressured into pleading guilty. They noted that Simon and Staples were members of the Warlocks motorcycle gang, and produced a newspaper article indicating that the gang was urging Simon to change his plea to guilty. They also pointed out that a suspected member of the Warlocks gang was in the courtroom the week before, and was seen staring at Simon while punching his fist into his palm. That same day, Simon was given a note by Staples' counsel with the phone number of the president of the local Warlocks chapter. Finally, counsel represented that they asked Simon if he had been threatened, and Simon responded that he could not tell them, but that he did not have a choice and it was not his decision. The trial court conducted an in-camera meeting with Simon and his counsel. Simon insisted that no one had threatened him, and that he was entering a guilty plea of his own free will. Simon indicated that he had seen the Warlock member's gesture in court, and had spoken to someone later that day. Nonetheless, according to Simon, these individuals were not pressuring him, but instead were suggesting that he "do the right thing." Simon asserted that he wanted to plead guilty in order to help Staples. Based on Simon's statements, the trial court decided to proceed with the guilty plea proceedings. Simon was sworn and asked many of the questions he had been asked in the in-camera proceeding, answering them consistently. In establishing the factual basis, Simon testified that he got out of the car, Sergeant Gonzalez went for his gun, and Simon shot him "to get him away from me." He stated that he intended to shoot Gonzalez and to cause him serious bodily harm or to kill him, "if that is what it took to get him away from him." The prosecutor informed the court that the physical evidence and eyewitness accounts indicated that Sergeant Gonzalez's gun remained in its holster, and he had not undone either of the two snaps essential to removing the gun. He also stated that based on the ballistic's evidence, the shooter was two to three feet away from Sergeant Gonzalez. The trial court accepted Simon's guilty plea. On the same day, he dismissed the capital murder charge against Staples. A jury later convicted Staples of felony murder. Six days after the jury returned the felony-murder conviction against Staples, Simon moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. He asserted that he was coerced into pleading guilty, but refused to identify any of the individuals who had threatened him. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, concluding that Simon's testimony at the plea hearing was more credible than his testimony at the motion hearing. In the penalty phase, the State relied on four aggravating factors: (1) that Simon murdered a public servant while in the performance of his duties; (2) the murder occurred while Simon was engaged in flight after a burglary; (3) murder for the purpose of escaping detection; and (4) Simon had previously been convicted of murder (1982 Pennsylvania conviction for second-degree murder). Simon proffered numerous mitigating circumstances under the "catch-all" mitigating factor. This included evidence that Simon had a tragic childhood, suffered from drug abuse, joined an outlaw motorcycle gang when he was seventeen, had spent much of his adult life in prison, and suffered from an anti-social personality disorder. On April 2, 1997, the jury unanimously found all four aggravating factors, and that those factors together outweighed the mitigating factors. Simon was accordingly sentenced to death. HELD: Simon's convictions and death sentence are affirmed. 1. Simon argues that the capital murder indictment is invalid because the State could not make the requisite prima facie showing and the prosecutor misled the grand jury. The State can charge more than one defendant with capital murder, even where only one person actually killed by his or her own conduct, when there is sufficient evidence for the State to make a prima facie showing that each defendant committed the murder by his or her own conduct. There was no evidence to support Simon's argument that the grand jury was misled into thinking Simon could be liable for capital murder without actually being the shooter. (pp. 13-21) 2. Simon contends that his guilty plea was not voluntary, and was motivated by threats against himself and his family. He argues that all of the information before the court at the time of the plea requires a finding of coercion. The trial court rejected Simon's attempt to withdraw his plea, finding his claims of duress incredible and unpersuasive. These findings must be accorded due deference. They were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. (pp. 21-26) 3. According to Simon, his statements in the plea hearing failed to establish that he was the shooter or that he committed the murder purposely or knowingly. Three years prior to the shooting, the State Constitution was amended to permit capital punishment of a defendant who purposely or knowingly caused serious bodily injury resulting in death in addition to an intent to cause death. Simon's own words in the plea hearing indicated that he intended to cause serious bodily injury, if not to kill Sergeant Gonzalez. Common sense also informs us that when someone shoots at another in the upper body region twice, it is with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury that is practically certain to result in death. The record provides an adequate factual basis for the guilty plea, and the trial court expressly found that the evidence supported Simon's claim that he was the gunman. (pp. 26-40) 4. Simon's 1982 Pennsylvania conviction of second-degree murder satisfies the c(4)(a) prior murder aggravating factor. The prior murder aggravating factor includes foreign judgments of convictions for murder in the first or second degree. The Court rejects Simon's speculation that the Pennsylvania conviction could have been no more than manslaughter under our Code. The circumstances of that shooting, where Simon had shot his girlfriend at close range twice, once between the eyes and once in the neck, demonstrated a knowing or purposeful state of mind rather than a reckless one. (pp. 40-55) 5. The Court finds no reversible error in Simon's other arguments. (pp. 55-88) The convictions and sentence of death are AFFIRMED. JUSTICE O'HERN, concurring in part, and dissenting in part , is of the view that the trial court erred in accepting Simon's plea in the first place, since the record does not establish that the plea was voluntary. JUSTICE HANDLER, dissenting, is of the view that by failing to apply enhanced standards of protection for capital defendants while professing to do so, the Court creates a climate in which trial courts are more likely to apply reduced standards of protection in all criminal cases. JUSTICE STEIN, dissenting, is of the view that a foreign conviction for murder can qualify as a statutory aggravating factor for imposition of the death penalty only when the foreign state's definition of murder is consistent with New Jersey's; and that the murder for which Simon was convicted in Pennsylvania was not so defined. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK and GARIBALDI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in Parts I, II, and IV-XII of the majority opinion, and dissenting in Parts III and XIII, in which JUSTICES HANDLER and STEIN join. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE HANDLER joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-149/ 150 September Term 1997 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ROBERT R. SIMON, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Argued September 29, 1998 -- Decided August 11, 1999 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Gloucester County. Marcia H. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender and Paul M. Klein, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Linda A. Rinaldi, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. On October 8, 1996, defendant, Robert Simon, pled guilty to burglary, theft, unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, felony murder, and purposeful and knowing murder by his own conduct of Sergeant Ippolito On Monday, October 7, 1996, before the commencement of the guilt-phase trial, defendant announced to the trial court his intention to plead guilty to all of the charges against him, including the murder. Prior to giving his guilty plea, defendant stated: About a week ago I think it was I came into the court and said I wanted to fire these guys, my attorneys, for reasons that they were incompetent and deceitful and I would not feel safe going into court with them and then the next day you told me, I think it was the next day, you told me, well, you have to take them, that's it, you're going to use these guys, even after there was a conflict of interest. Now, to avoid all this conflict of interest and everything, I'm going to enter a plea of guilty right now and maybe it will help out my co-defendant. I don't see a reason for both of us going down the tubes. The trial court explained to defendant that if he pled guilty, he would be giving up the presumption of innocence, the right to a trial by jury, the right to testify on his own behalf before a jury, the right to present any defenses, the right to confront and call witnesses, and the right to file any additional motions that may assist him in his defense. Defendant stated that he understood that he would be giving up each of those rights, and that he still wanted to plead guilty. In response to defendant's preliminary statement, defense counsel informed the trial court that they were taken by surprise by defendant's desire to enter a guilty plea because each time they had discussed a potential guilty plea with him, defendant had said he intended to plead not guilty. Defense counsel believed that defendant was pressured into pleading guilty. To support that claim, defense counsel showed the trial court a newspaper article that stated that members of the Warlocks motorcycle gang were urging defendant to change his plea to guilty. Additionally, one of the members of the Warlocks gang, who was present in the courtroom the week before defendant pled guilty, was seen punching his fist into his palm. On that same day, defendant was handed a note containing the phone number of the president of the local Warlocks chapter. When defense counsel asked defendant if he had been threatened, defendant responded that he could not tell them, but that he did not have a choice and it was not his decision. Defendant also advised counsel that he would be able to try to save his own life at the penalty trial once Staples' guilt-phase trial had been concluded. As a follow-up to defense counsel's assertion of potential threats, the trial court conducted an in-camera meeting with defendant and his counsel and asked defendant if he had been threatened. Defendant responded that no one had threatened him, and that he was entering a guilty plea of his own free will. Later, he told the trial court that part of the reason for his choice to plead guilty was that he did not want to go to trial with his attorneys. Yet when the trial judge asked if new lawyers would make a difference, defendant responded no and reasserted that he wanted to plead guilty in order to help Staples. When asked whether he saw the man punching his fist into his palm, defendant explained: "I think I may have caught a glimpse of it, yeah. He was like come on, man, do the right thing, like that. Yeah, all right. It wasn't like, you know, hey, man, you better get it right or something." The trial court also asked defendant if he would cooperate with his attorneys at the penalty phase of the trial and whether he wanted to die. Defendant responded that he was not going to commit suicide, but that he did not care if he died. Based on defendant's statements, the court decided to proceed with the guilty plea proceedings. After defendant was administered the oath, he informed the trial court that he understood the "plea agreement" he had signed and that he was feeling well and not intoxicated. The trial court repeated many of the prior questions that had been asked of defendant during the in-camera meeting regarding why defendant was pleading guilty and whether he understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Defendant repeated his responses from the in-camera meeting. In an attempt to obtain the factual basis for the proposed guilty pleas, the trial court asked defendant about the events on the night of the murder. Defendant testified that he exited Staples' vehicle to talk to Sergeant Gonzalez. He explained: "When I got out of the car Officer Gonzalez was going for his gun and I just wanted him away from me, your Honor. I went for mine and I shot him." Defendant estimated that he was six feet from Sergeant Gonzalez when he fired the gun. The trial court then questioned defendant concerning his purpose in shooting Sergeant Gonzalez and whether he intended to kill him. Defendant explained: "I intended to cause to get him away from me. . . . I intended to get him away from me, your Honor. I guess if that took killing him, you know." He also testified that, although he did not aim the gun at the victim, shooting Gonzalez in the upper body or head is what it took to get Gonzalez away from him. He said that he intended to shoot Gonzalez, and that he intended the bullet to hit Gonzalez, rather than warn or scare him. He explained that his purpose in shooting Sergeant Gonzalez was to cause him serious bodily harm or to kill him, if that is what it took to get him away from him. Jury selection for the penalty phase trial was conducted between March 3 and March 24, 1997. The State relied on four aggravating factors: (1) that defendant murdered Sergeant Gonzalez, a public servant, while Gonzalez was in the performance of his official duties, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(h); (2) that Sergeant Gonzalez was murdered while defendant was engaged in flight after committing burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g); (3) that the murder of Sergeant Gonzalez was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense or offenses committed by defendant, namely burglary and theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f); and (4) that defendant previously had been convicted of another murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a). The State presented evidence regarding the events of May 6, 1995. The State also established that in 1982, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing a nineteen year-old woman in Pennsylvania for which he was sentenced to ten to twenty years in prison. The defense, under the "catch-all" mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:3c(5)(h), proffered 126 mitigating circumstances related to defendant's life. The enormous amount of mitigating evidence included evidence of defendant's tragic childhood, which was replete with physical and verbal abuse from his parents, drug abuse, and petty theft-type offenses such as breaking and entering and writing bad checks. Between the ages of seventeen and twenty-three, defendant lived as an outlaw motorcycle gang member, committing multiple thefts and regularly using drugs. Shortly after his twenty-fourth birthday, defendant was sentenced to five to ten years in prison for offenses ranging from aggravated assault to burglary. While serving those sentences, defendant was convicted in 1982 for the Pennsylvania murder that was used as an aggravating factor in this case. In 1984, defendant killed an inmate and was placed in isolation for six and one-half years. He was acquitted of the 1984 inmate killing because it was committed in self-defense. The defense also presented expert testimony that defendant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder, and that by the time he reached adulthood he had no moral compass. On April 2, 1997, the jury unanimously found all four aggravating factors proffered by the State. The jury also found thirty-seven of the mitigating factors unanimously and forty eight of the mitigating factors non-unanimously. Despite the large number of mitigating factors found in defendant's favor, the jury unanimously found that the four aggravating factors together outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was accordingly sentenced to death. Defendant contends that the capital murder indictment was invalid and should have been dismissed for two reasons: (1) there was no prima facie showing that defendant killed Sergeant Gonzalez by his own conduct; and (2) the prosecutor violated defendant's due process rights by suggesting, in response to a grand juror's question, that a capital murder charge may be based on accomplice liability. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that the grand jury was not required to consider the "own conduct" requirement. The trial court also found that the prosecutor's response to the grand juror's question was not misleading, and that there was evidence before the grand jury that reasonably could have lead to an ultimate finding that either defendant or co-defendant killed the victim by his own conduct, even though the evidence pointed "more strongly to one than the other." Defendant argues that it was improper for the State to charge both him and Staples with capital murder when it was clear that only one of them killed Sergeant Gonzalez. Because the State was not clear on which one of them was the killer, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he committed Sergeant Gonzalez's murder by his own conduct. Defendant also points out that guideline two of the Prosecutor's Guideline for Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecutions, which was adopted by the New Jersey County Prosecutors Association and the Attorney General in 1989, provides that a prosecutor "must be satisfied that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, by his own conduct, actively and directly participated in causing the death of the victim." Rule 3:7-3b requires that an indictment for murder specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2) or (3), and whether or not it is alleged that the defendant committed the murder by his or her own conduct, paid another to commit the murder, or is the leader of a drug-trafficking network who secured the murder in furtherance of a conspiracy. A grand jury may return an indictment if there is a prima facie showing that the accused has committed a crime. State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 96 N.J. 8, 27 (1984). For the crime of purposeful or knowing murder, the prosecutor was not required to state in the indictment whether the murder was committed by defendant's own conduct. The "own conduct" requirement is not an element of purposeful or knowing murder; it is "merely a triggering device for the death penalty phase of the trial." State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 99 (1988) (quoting State v. Moore, 207 N.J. Super. 561, 576 (Law Div. 1985)). The "own conduct" requirement is analogous to the filing of a notice of aggravating factors that a prosecutor must file before subjecting a defendant to a capital trial. We have stated: Like the indictment, the notice of aggravating factors is the turn-key to a capital prosecution. Implicit in both is the notion that the allegations derive from some verifiable source. The need to ensure that such a source exists compels some preliminary review to satisfy the interest of the public and the defendant that such charges not proceed to trial without a factual mooring. [State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 143 (1984).] Under McCrary, the prosecutor must show that there was sufficient evidence to allege the aggravating factors. Id. at 140-41. That means that when a prosecutor indicts a person for capital murder, he or she must, among other requirements, (1) make a prima facie showing to the grand jury that the person committed the murder, and (2) present some evidence that one of the triggering devices applies to the facts of the case. Defendant's reference to the Prosecutor's Guideline for Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecution does not weigh into our decision. The standard stating that a prosecutor "must be satisfied that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, by his own conduct, actively and directly participated in causing the death of the victim" is only a guideline establishing uniformity for prosecutors to follow when determining whether to seek the death penalty. It holds no legal significance. Our examination of the record convinces us that there was a sufficient amount of evidence before the grand jury against both defendants which, if believed, reasonably could lead to a finding that either defendant or Staples murdered Sergeant Gonzalez by his own conduct. Because Simon is the defendant in this appeal, we will focus only on the evidence against him. The grand jury was presented with evidence that Simon was the passenger and that the shot was fired from the passenger side of the vehicle. In addition, Simon exited the passenger side of the vehicle with the murder weapon in his hand after the crash. That evidence satisfies the State's burden of making a prima facie showing that defendant murdered Sergeant Gonzalez by his own conduct. Hence, the indictment was proper. We also reject defendant's contention that the State could not charge him and Staples with capital murder because it was clear that only one of them murdered Sergeant Gonzalez. In State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298 (1990), two defendants were indicted for capital murder. The Court noted that the petit jury found both Clausell and his co-defendant guilty of purposeful and knowing murder, and found that Clausell, but not his co defendant, had committed the homicidal act by his own conduct. Id. at 312. This Court neither questioned nor criticized the fact that two defendants, in a single-shooter murder, were charged with capital murder for killing the same victim, and that the petit jury was left to decide, if it could, who was the actual shooter. Similarly, in State v. Brown, Brown and a co defendant were both indicted for capital murder, although a jury did not have to decide who actually killed the victim by his own conduct because Brown's co-defendant pled guilty. 138 N.J. 481 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326 (1997). In addition, the Legislature specifically discussed situations in which there were more than one participant in a murder when drafting the death penalty statute. The Legislature noted that an accomplice to a murder would not be subjected to the death penalty, but that when the line between principal and accomplice was blurred, it is "up to the jury" to "decide who pulled the trigger." Public Hearing Before Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill No. 112 (Death Penalty) at 18 (Feb. 26, 1982). We conclude that as long as there is sufficient evidence for the State to make a prima facie showing that each defendant committed the murder by his or her own conduct, the State is permitted to charge more than one defendant with capital murder, even where it is clear that only one person actually killed the victim by his own conduct. Defendant also contends that the prosecutor misled the grand jury into thinking that a person may be liable for capital murder despite not being the shooter. The issue is posed in the context of the following colloquy between a grand juror and the prosecutor: JUROR: With the first two charges, they're both being charged with murder. MR. LYNCH: Yes, sir. JUROR: I want to make sure that I got it right. That there's felony murder; okay. The way that it's worded is they worked together and they caused somebody's death. But, murder, is it required -- the fact that they were there and didn't pull the trigger, does that constitute murder under the law? MR. LYNCH: There is accomplice liability under the law which I will review with you. By the wording of these two charges, accomplice liability is not being alleged, direct participation is being alleged against the two individuals. Accomplice liability could be considered by the panel. It could be made a separate charge against both or either defendant that he acted as an accomplice, but the allegation that's set forth in the charges that you're being asked to consider that I've reviewed with you is direct participation and causation rather than accomplice liability. Is that responsive to your question, sir? Does that help you? JUROR: I think so; yeah. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's answer was misleading because it did not inform the grand jury that accomplice liability does not apply to capital murder. Defendant argues that if the grand jury had understood that only the shooter could be convicted of capital murder, they might not have been willing to indict both him and Staples, but rather would have required more evidence regarding who was the shooter. The foregoing colloquy does not reveal that the prosecutor's responses improperly infringed upon the grand jury's decision making function. The prosecutor's response made it clear that an indictment was sought charging both Simon and Staples with direct participation in Sergeant Gonzalez's murder. The prosecutor explained that accomplice liability was not alleged in the two murder counts, but that accomplice liability could be considered by the panel in other connections. The grand juror who asked the question said the answer was clear. Therefore, we reject defendant's speculation that the grand jury was misled. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea to Capital Murder Simon's Plea Establishing Capital Murder The Criminal Law Revision Commission (Commission) in 1971 proposed the New Jersey Penal Code (Proposed Code). When the Commission began its study, the murder statutes in New Jersey and Pennsylvania were virtually identical. In fact, New Jersey had followed the Pennsylvania model when it divided murder into first and second degrees. II Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission 168 (1971) (Final Report). The Code as proposed by the Commission redefined murder to consist of criminal homicides that were committed purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, and felony murder. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a (Proposed Draft 1971). The Proposed Code also established the death penalty and provided death eligibility for a purposely committed murder and for felony murder. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b, -3a(1), -3a(4) (Proposed Draft 1971). One of the proposed "aggravating circumstances" that would subject a defendant to the death penalty was the fact that he or she previously had been convicted of "murder, manslaughter, robbery, aggravated rape, aggravated sodomy, kidnapping or other crime involving the use of violence to the person." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-7c(2) (Proposed Draft 1971). Some of the provisions of the Proposed Code were enacted in 1978 as the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code). L. 1978, c. 95, effective September 1, 1979. However, the Proposed Code's death penalty and aggravating circumstances provisions were not adopted as part of the Code. In addition, the Code reduced the scope of murder from that contained in the Proposed Code by defining murder as follows: a. Except as provided in N.J.S. 2C:11-4 [manslaughter] criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or (2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or (3) It is committed when the actor [commits felony murder.] [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a.] Thus, the Code as enacted defines three types of murder: "purposeful murder (with intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily injury), knowing murder (with knowledge/awareness that death or serious bodily injury will occur), and felony murder." Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 359. Approximately two and one-half years after the Code became effective, a Death Penalty Act was introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill No. 112. That Bill also included a prior murder as an aggravating factor. Specifically, it provided: "The defendant has previously been convicted of murder for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable, or [felony] murder under 2C:11-3(a)(3)." Senate Bill No. 112 lines 121-25. Before enactment, the Attorney General suggested that the proposed language be broadened to provide "(a) [t]he defendant has previously been convicted of murder." Public Hearing Before Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill No. 112 (Death Penalty) at 14 (Feb. 26, 1982). Thus, under the Proposed Code, the previously convicted felon death-eligibility trigger included the three common law degrees of homicide, first-degree murder, second-degree murder and manslaughter; most of the common-law felonies; and any other crimes that involved the use of violence. When the Death Penalty Act was introduced after the Code had become effective, the previously convicted felon aggravating factor was reduced to prior murders "for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable, or [felony] murder under 2C:11-3(a)(3)." Senate Bill No. 112 lines 121-25. Although the record does not reflect the legal analysis that inspired the Attorney General to suggest, or the Legislature to accept the suggestion, that all terms modifying the prior murder aggravating factor be dropped, we find substantial legal reasons for the change. That the prior murder aggravating factor contained in Senate Bill No. 112 was limited to those for which a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death could have been imposed meant that, under pre-Code law, only first-degree murder was contemplated. Felony murder was first-degree murder. N.J.S.A. 2A:113-2 to -4 (repealed 1978); Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 360. Under prior law, first-degree murder was the only homicide that made a defendant eligible for death or a life sentence. N.J.S.A. 2A:113-4 (repealed 1978); State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 520 n.12 (1980); State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 68, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942, 92 S. Ct. 2849, 33 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1972). All homicides were presumed to be murder in the second degree. N.J.S.A. 2A:113-4 (repealed 1978); State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 17 (1968). In contrast, the maximum punishment for second-degree murder was thirty years of imprisonment. Bess, supra, 53 N.J. at 18. That maximum sentence exposure would have precluded second-degree murder as a prior murder aggravating factor as originally proposed in Senate Bill No. 112. By accepting the Attorney General's suggestion, the Legislature agreed that it did not intend to be that restrictive. We conclude that when the Legislature adopted the Attorney General's suggested change, it intended to make any prior murder committed by a defendant at any time and at any place an aggravating factor. We are also persuaded that the Code's early sentencing options for murder support the conclusion that the c(4)(a) prior murder aggravating factor includes foreign judgments of convictions for murder in the first or second degree. From the inception of the Code there were two sentencing options for murder: (1) a sentence of thirty years of which the defendant must serve fifteen years without parole, and (2) an extended term sentence between thirty years and life, with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years of parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7a(1) and b. A third sentencing option of a different extended term was available in the Code as enacted in 1978. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b; Maguire, supra, 84 N.J. at 521. That option was eliminated, however, when the death penalty became available in 1982. State v. Serrone, 95 N.J. 23, 26 (1983). Nonetheless, this Court has concluded that the extended term option that was repealed when the Death Penalty Act became effective is an indication that the Legislature intended the Code's definition of "prior conviction" used as part of the criteria for extended term sentencing, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3, also be used when considering sentencing issues related to murder. Biegenwald, supra, 96 N.J. at 636. A prior murder conviction in another jurisdiction satisfies the Code's definition of a "prior conviction." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4c. "It is not unreasonable to surmise that the Legislature intended the definition of 'prior conviction,' as articulated in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4b, to apply to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) as well." Biegenwald, supra, 96 N.J. at 636. This Court also has held that a prior murder conviction under our former Title 2A, now repealed, satisfies the prior murder conviction aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11 3c(4)(a). State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 272-75 (1987). Additionally, the Court has allowed an out-of-state prior murder conviction to satisfy the c(4)(a) aggravating factor. State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 265-66 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1989). Although the method for establishing the existence of prior convictions vary between jurisdictions, New Jersey has adopted a statutory procedure as simple as the introduction of a judgment of conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4d. See generally Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S. Ct. 648, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967) (upholding Texas procedure for enforcing its habitual criminal statutes through allegations in indictment of prior offenses and introduction of proof respecting past convictions with charge by court that such matters are not to be taken into account in assessing defendant's guilt or innocence). We reject defendant's contention that the State was obligated to prove that Pennsylvania's prior second-degree murder conviction satisfies the murder requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:11 3a(1) or (2). In 1970, the Appellate Division, in a non-capital case, rejected the argument that before a foreign conviction may be used for sentence enhancement, the State must prove that the foreign conviction was equivalent to, or congruent to, a similar criminal offense in this State. State v. Hines, 109 N.J. Super. 298, 305-06 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 56 N.J. 248, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867, 91 S. Ct. 108, 27 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1970). The court in Hines held that to determine whether Pennsylvania burglary and larceny convictions were similar to New Jersey's requirements for similar offenses, a court need only examine the indictment and the nature of the evidence presented that led to the convictions. Ibid. That approach has been accepted in a capital case as well. In Ramseur, defendant contended that his prior conviction for the murder of his wife should not be used as a c(4)(a) aggravating factor in his capital punishment trial because his non vult plea to the indictment for that murder made it unclear whether the jury found him guilty of manslaughter or murder. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 272. In rejecting that argument, the Court held that for sentence enhancement, a court should "not look behind the fact of the conviction because the conviction itself is the statutory aggravating factor." Id. at 276. That rationale remains sound for domestic and foreign convictions because the statute refers to a prior conviction "at any time, of another murder." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a). Ordinarily, the State proves the existence of a prior murder conviction as an aggravating factor by simply introducing into evidence a judgment of conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4d; State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 13 (1991). The judgment of conviction for a prior murder is introduced into evidence during the penalty phase of a trial for the limited purpose of aiding the jury in its determination of whether to impose a life or death sentence. Because a prior murder conviction is not relevant to guilt, and a penalty jury is not concerned with guilt, definitions of the elements that comprised the prior murder conviction cannot affect the value of the prior murder conviction to the deliberating jury in the penalty phase. Similarly, other states have concluded that prior foreign convictions can be established for sentence enhancement purposes without looking behind the facts, provided that the foreign convictions satisfy the home state's statutory aggravating factor requirement. Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Ark. 1983); People v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255, 267 (Ill. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S. Ct. 3241, 97 L. Ed. 2d 746 (1987); State v. Taylor, 283 S.E.2d 761, 780 (N.C. 1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3552, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983); Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 808-09 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 626 A.2d 499, 501-02 (Pa.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 995, 114 S. Ct. 558, 126 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1993). South Carolina reached a different conclusion when its Supreme Court ruled that a Virginia second-degree murder fell between South Carolina's crimes of murder and manslaughter. State v. Norris, 328 S.E.2d 339, 344-45 (S.C. 1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991). Even if the South Carolina approach was followed, and we were to look behind the foreign conviction, the prior Pennsylvania murder satisfies the requirements of our prior murder aggravating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a). Defendant was tried in Pennsylvania for first and second-degree murder of a former girlfriend, Beth Smith Dusenberg. The murder occurred on January 13, 1974. At that time, New Jersey and Pennsylvania defined first and second-degree murder essentially the same. State v. Williams, 30 N.J. 105, 114-15 (1959); N.J.S.A. 2A:113-2 (repealed 1978). As of January 1974, both states divided murder into first and second-degree offenses. In January 1974, murder was defined in Pennsylvania as follows: (a) Murder of the first degree.--A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree if the actor is engaged in or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, or kidnapping. (b) Murder of the second degree.--All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the second degree. Murder of the second degree is a felony of the first degree. [18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 2502 (West 1998) (Historical and Statutory Notes).] Pennsylvania required malice to be established as an element of both first and second-degree murder in 1974. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 334 A.2d 610, 613 (Pa. 1975). Consistent with Pennsylvania law, the trial court in its jury charge defined malice as either "an express intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or of a 'wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty' indicating an unjustified disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human life." Ibid. (quoting Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963)). The trial court also clarified its malice charge by informing the jury that "a killing is with malice if it is with the specific intent to kill and without any legal justification or excuse, or circumstances which would reduce the killing to voluntary manslaughter." First-degree murder was distinguished from second-degree murder based on willfulness, deliberateness, and premeditation. Commonwealth v. Jones, 50 A.2d 317, 319 (Pa. 1947). Prior to enactment of the Code in 1979, murder was charged in a statutory form. The jury was required to designate whether the murder was first or second-degree for sentencing purposes. Graves v. State, 45 N.J.L. 347, 358 (E. & A. 1883); State v. Paris, 8 N.J. Super. 383, 385 (Law Div. 1949). The law presumed that unlawful killings were second-degree murders. State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J. 279, 294, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880, 82 S. Ct. 130, 7 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1961). The statutory form of murder simply codified the common law definition of murder prior to 1979. Brown, supra, 22 N.J. at 410. Like Pennsylvania, New Jersey required proof of malice for first and second-degree murder. New Jersey defined malice as a state of mind to mean, "(a) [a]n intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, any person, . . . [and/or] (b) [k]nowledge that the act which causes death will probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, . . . , although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused." State v. Gardner, 51 N.J. 444, 458 (1968) (quoting Great Britain, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report 1949-1953, 27 (1953)). As difficult as malice has been to define, the essence of malice is an "evil or wicked state of mind." State v. Williams, 29 N.J. 27, 36 (1959). We reject defendant's speculation that the Pennsylvania second-degree murder conviction could have been no more than manslaughter under our Code. First, passion/provocation or voluntary manslaughter as an available option in Pennsylvania in 1974 was presented to, and rejected by, the jury in the trial. Malice as defined by Pennsylvania and New Jersey was not an element of manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Rife, 312 A.2d 406, 410 (Pa. 1973); Williams, supra, 29 N.J. at 36; Brown, supra, 22 N.J. at 411; State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1828). The jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of second-degree murder is a clear finding that he acted with malice. The fact that the jury rejected passion/provocation or voluntary manslaughter as a potential verdict is further corroboration that defendant acted with malice. Furthermore, our "pre-Code analogue of passion/provocation manslaughter was referred to as 'voluntary manslaughter,' which typically involved an intentional killing rather than one committed recklessly." State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 144 (1986) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 311 (1980)). Similarly, under the Code a claim of "passion/provocation usually causes an intentional reaction and that it is rare for passion/provocation to lead to recklessness." Grunow, supra, 102 N.J. at 144. Second, the victim of the second-degree murder in Pennsylvania died from a gunshot wound to the head after being shot once in the neck and once in the head. The fatal bullet entered between her eyes. There was evidence presented to the jury that defendant pulled a gun from his waistband and shot the victim after she had called him a derogatory name. Although he was charged with first-degree and second-degree murder, the jury reasonably could have found the absence of premeditation or deliberation or both based on the suddenness of defendant's response. Third, under our Code, defendant's conduct reasonably can be viewed as sufficient to satisfy a purposeful or knowing murder rather than manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2). When the Pennsylvania court defined malice, use of the phrase "recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty indicating an unjustifiable disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human life," does not come close to being equivalent to the recklessness standard required for manslaughter under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4. The phrase in the Pennsylvania malice charge that included "recklessness" when viewed in the context of shooting the victim through the neck and between the eyes more closely satisfies the definitions of acting purposely or knowingly, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1) and (2), than the definition of recklessness in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3). Recklessness can generally be distinguished from purposely and knowingly based on the degree of certainty involved. Purposely and knowingly states of mind involve near certainty, while recklessness involves an awareness of a risk that is of a probability rather than certainty. Shooting the victim between the eyes created a "practical certainty[] that death would result." State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 606 (1987); see Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 484 (stating a person who fires a shotgun into the abdomen of another at point blank range "'is practically certain' that such conduct will cause the victim's death"); State v. Tansimore, 3 N.J. 516, 529 (1950) (stating that firing multiple shots into body of victim from close range creates a presumption of intent to kill). We conclude, therefore, that the foreign second-degree murder conviction was properly used as a c(4)(a) aggravating factor. Biased Jurors Defendant claims that New Jersey's Death Penalty Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c to -3i, violates the Eighth Amendment. The basis for this claim is that the death-penalty statute fails to adequately "narrow and define the class of individuals eligible for death" and fails "to provide for a system of meaningful appellate review." Thus, defendant insists that his death sentence should be reduced to a term of imprisonment. This Court has repeatedly rejected this claim and has upheld the constitutionality of the death-penalty statute. Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 333; Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 221-22; Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 185-97. Defendant has presented no persuasive reason for retreating from that view. We, therefore, reaffirm our decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Act. Defendant contends that New Jersey's Death Penalty Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c to -3i, violates international customary law and should be invalidated. He maintains that there is a trend in international law toward the abolition of the death penalty. Defendant further contends that in recent years N.J.S.A. 2C:11 3c(6), the victim impact statute, and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3i, a provision making conduct causing serious bodily injury resulting in death eligible for the death penalty, were expansions to the Death Penalty Act. According to defendant, those expansions resulted in a violation of customary international law. As a result, he insists that this violation requires a reversal of his sentence. We disagree. The Court previously rejected this argument in State v. Nelson when we stated that "[i]nternational law does not require invalidation of New Jersey's death penalty." 155 N.J. 487, 512 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 890, 142 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1999). We reaffirm our decision finding that international law does not invalidate New Jersey's Death Penalty Act. We affirm defendant's convictions and capital and noncapital sentences. We grant defendant's request that this Court conduct proportionality review of his death sentence, and that he be allowed to make full argument at that time. The State argues on cross-appeal that the trial judge erred in allowing into evidence a supplemental report summarizing an interview with a doctor and a lawyer regarding the conditions in the Pennsylvania prison isolation units where defendant spent six and one-half years of his twenty years in prison. That issue would be relevant only in the event of a new penalty trial. Because we are affirming defendant's convictions, we need not address that issue. Affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK and GARIBALDI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in Parts I, II, and IV-XII of the majority opinion, and dissenting in Parts III and XIII, in which JUSTICES HANDLER and STEIN join. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE HANDLER joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ROBERT SIMON, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. O'HERN, J., concurring in Parts I, II, and IV-XII and dissenting in Parts III and XIII. I concur in the opinion of the Court except with respect to Part III, in which the Court concludes that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in rejecting defendant's application to withdraw his guilty plea. By posing the wrong question, the Court has reached the wrong conclusion. The real question is whether the trial court should have accepted the plea in the first place. SIMON: I was making a comment to him [counsel] that if -- if I'm wrong, tell the Judge. I said, like I could go to court and we could beat this whole thing or do whatever we're going to do and then two minutes after I walk out of the courtroom and I'm back in prison somebody could stab me in the back. That's the way life is. You know, it wasn't like somebody was threatening me that they were going to stab me in the back. I love threats, your Honor. I'm telling you the truth. I love them cause then I know some a------'s going to try something. That's the type of person to threaten somebody. SIMON: That's right. THE COURT: What did that mean? SIMON: I can't tell you. Really, if it means anything to you or to them, but I just can't tell you. THE COURT: Did someone inform you about something between Thursday and Friday [October 3 and 4] that you didn't know Thursday, that you did learn of and, therefore, know about on Friday? SIMON: Something like that. I mean, you can talk all around it and all day long. I'm not telling you what happened and, like, it's nothing where it's a threat toward me or anybody I know. Simon believed that he could defeat the capital aspect of the case and offered no reason for risking his life by pleading to capital murder. The colloquy continued: THE COURT: Did you tell your attorneys, as they reported to me, that you recognize, that you believe them, that they have a fair shot, whether they said a good shot or real good shot, pretty good shot, but some reasonable shot at avoiding a death penalty phase, because-- SIMON: I told them that. THE COURT: Because they think that it would be hard for the prosecutor to convince all twelve jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that you were the trigger man. SIMON: I told them that. THE COURT: Do you feel that way? Was that something that was the truth when you told them that, that you do really believe that? SIMON: I believe that if we went to court I'd have a shot at not even getting a death penalty, but I don't care. Like I said, I don't care. I mean, like I don't want to spend the rest of my life in prison. Okay? So, like if I get the death penalty, I get it. Who cares? I don't care. THE COURT: So, your reason for giving up the shot that you have, which you acknowledge is at least a reasonable shot at not having to face the death penalty, is you just don't care? SIMON: I don't care. Simon received no legal benefit in exchange for the plea. The only benefit of the plea was to Staples: THE COURT: [I]s it your expressed desire to plead guilty, does it have to do with exonerating Staples from having to face the possibility of a death sentence on his part? SIMON: That could help, but don't use that against me. You know, I'd like to help Staples. I would. I can't see, like I said in the beginning, I can't see the both of us going down the tubes. No reason for that. SIMON: I don't know. I have no idea. I want to take some of the burden off of Shovel's [Staples's] family. You know, I think that would help them out cause they're going to put -- have to put out a whole bunch of money to this clown that's representing Shovel. THE COURT: Is that because-- you tell me in your own mind why do you want to take this burden off Shovel and his family? SIMON: Cause I think that would be the right thing to do. THE COURT: Are you under any pressure from anyone else to do that? SIMON: Not at all. THE COURT: Either through Shovel or his family? SIMON: No. I'm trying to be a nice guy here. Maybe that's the last good gesture I'll be able to do in my life, you know.See footnote 22 Simon's lawyers believed that Simon was entering the plea under duress and urged the court not to accept the plea. They also requested that the court seal the proceedings to protect Simon and asked to be removed as counsel so that they could testify without a conflict of interest, should their replacement counsel find it necessary to offer their testimony at a future date. The court refused to remove them as counsel and took no testimony other than during the in camera hearing. Finally, Simon himself indicated that he did not want to plead but had to plead and expressly told the court that he could not reveal his reason for doing so. SIMON: Of course it was. I did it. THE COURT: Does it have something to do with Mr. Staples and his -- whatever his outcome in this case might be? SIMON: I told you, I'm not saying no more about it, your Honor. It was something personal and I can take care of whatever it is. I give you my word it's nothing where I was threatened or I'm worried about anything. It's just the way -- it's the way I'm going to do things. At the in-court hearing on the plea, it was the court's suggestions to defendant that furnished the reasons for the plea. Defendant was smart enough to realize that the court would accept the plea if he repeated the language suggested by the court. After defense counsel identified legal inconsistencies between Simon's account and the elements of capital murder, the court subjected Simon to further questioning. Simon eventually stated that he had fired the gun with the intention of hitting the officer. Defense counsel then stated that the forensics of this case are essentially inconsistent with the recitation that Mr. Simon just rendered to this court. Recall that the deceased officer, Sergeant Ippolito Gonzales, was found with Simon's social security card and Staples's driver's license under his leg with a bullet hole through them. The automobile insurance and registration cards were found in the vehicle with a bullet hole through them. A forensic expert testified that one of the two shots was fired at a distance of perhaps twenty inches from the insurance card. There was evidence of gun powder grains found on the insurance card of Mr. Staples, that was apparently in the hand of the police officer when he was shot. Officer Kenneth Crescitelli, Sergeant William Clay, and a neighbor, John Lyman, all observed Officer Gonzalez talking to the driver at different times during the stop. No one saw the officer talking to the passenger. Simon testified that he was sitting on the passenger side of the car and had just stepped out of the car when he saw the officer reaching for his gun. Simon told the court, I got out with the intent of trying to talk to him and I started to say something and as I did he started to go for his gun, so then I went for mine. Simon testified that he fired two shots at a distance of about six feet from Sergeant Gonzalez. When pressed by the court, Simon answered, He was about six foot from my body. Maybe when I held the gun out he might have been three foot from that. Because defense counsel was unwilling to help Simon further improve his plea, counsel declined the court's offer to be more specific about his objections: Justices Handler and Stein join in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-149/ 150 September Term 1997 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ROBERT SIMON, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. HANDLER, J., dissenting. I dissent for the reasons expressed in the opinions of Justices O'Hern and Stein.See footnote 33 Accordingly, I, too, believe that defendant's death sentence should be vacated. I write separately to address concerns related to the Court's review of the adequacy of defendant's plea. The enhanced protections constitutionally required in capital prosecutions demand that the adequacy of guilty pleas to capital murder be reviewed with particular rigor and care, by standards pursuant to which the plea in this case would certainly have been rejected. Such precautions should follow evidently from the importance law and society place upon avoiding wrongful convictions and, especially, executions. The Court's failure to require a more exacting standard of review coupled with its failure to reject the plea in the present case is, moreover, reflective and indeed an active component of a more invidious and wide-ranging development: Death penalty jurisprudence is weakening the constitutional protections of general criminal law. A. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ROBERT SIMON, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. STEIN, J., dissenting. Simply stated, a critical issue posed by this capital appeal is whether a defendant's second-degree murder conviction in Pennsylvania, following a jury charge that permitted a finding of malice on the basis of a mental state equivalent to that required for aggravated manslaughter under New Jersey's Code of Criminal Justice, can qualify as a prior murder and serve as an aggravating factor under New Jersey's Death Penalty Act. Remarkably, the Court concludes that the Legislature intended to make any prior murder committed by a defendant at any time and at any place an aggravating factor. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 49). That conclusion cannot be sustained because it would permit the definition of murder adopted by other states, rather than New Jersey's definition of murder, to determine whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) allowed the jury to consider, as an aggravating factor weighing on defendant's death-worthiness, its finding that [t]he defendant ha[d] been convicted, at any time, of another murder. In this appeal defendant challenges the admissibility of a foreign murder conviction as an aggravating factor in a capital penalty proceeding. In addition, defendant contends that as a prerequisite to the admission of a prior murder conviction from another state, the prosection must establish that the foreign jurisdiction's definition of murder at the time of defendant's prior conviction comported substantially with the offense of murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. Although I agree with the majority's holding that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) contemplates the admissibility as a statutory aggravating factor of a murder conviction entered at any place as well as at any time, I cannot endorse the majority's view that a foreign conviction for murder, no matter how defined, is admissible in a capital penalty phase. Under the majority's holding, a defendant's death-worthiness may depend on whether that defendant's prior homicide was committed in this State, or in a foreign jurisdiction that chooses to define murder as including conduct that would support no more than a conviction for the lesser offense of aggravated manslaughter in New Jersey. To allow a jury to impose a death sentence based on a foreign conviction for murder when that murder, as defined by the foreign jurisdiction, would not qualify as a statutory aggravating factor in this State would inject an arbitrariness into our death-penalty jurisprudence that this Court has heretofore been unwilling to tolerate. Because I believe that the majority's holding wrongly expands the category of death-eligible defendants and undermines the Legislature's explicitly stated intention to strictly limit death eligibility to the circumstances enumerated under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, I dissent. NO. A-149/150 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ROBERT R. SIMON, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. DECIDED August 11, 1999 Chief Justice Poritz When the defendant is charged with a crime punishable by death, no factual basis shall be required from the defendant before entry of a plea of guilty to a capital offense or to a lesser included offense, provided the court is satisfied from the proofs presented that there is a factual basis for the plea. The rationale for this singular exception is that a defendant exposed to the death penalty should not be required to state anything that can support an aggravating factor; he need not aid in rendering his own death sentence. State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 285 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Comment, Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Procedure, reprinted in Pressler, Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, 533 (1989)).