Title: State ex rel. Johnston v. Ohio Bur. of Workers Comp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Johnston v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 92 Ohio St.3d 
463, 2001-Ohio-1284] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. JOHNSTON, APPELLANT, v. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Johnston v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (2001), 92 Ohio 
St.3d 463.] 
Workers’ compensation — Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) is generally 
applicable to joint applications for approval of a State Fund settlement 
filed pursuant to R.C. 4123.65, provided claimant’s death occurs before 
settlement is approved by the Administrator of Workers’ Compensation 
— Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) is nullified by failure to process 
application within reasonable time. 
(No. 99-2122 — Submitted April 24, 2001 — Decided August 15, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP-1236. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A), which provides that the death of a 
claimant abates action on any administratively pending application filed 
by the claimant, is generally applicable to joint applications for approval 
of a State Fund settlement filed pursuant to R.C. 4123.65, provided that 
the claimant’s death occurs before the settlement is approved by the 
Administrator of Workers’ Compensation. 
2. 
Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) is nullified in those circumstances where 
the Administrator of Workers’ Compensation fails to process an 
application for approval of a State Fund settlement pursuant to R.C. 
4123.65 within a reasonable period of time. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  On April 30, 1992, James Johnston, now 
deceased, received an injury in the course of, and arising out of, his employment 
with Trans-Fleet Enterprises, Inc., a State Fund employer.  His workers’ 
compensation claim was allowed for “sprain lumbar; lumbar disc displacement 
with myelopathy at L3-4 left & L5-S1 right.”  James received temporary total 
disability compensation from May 16, 1992 to November 29, 1994, and began 
receiving wage-loss compensation on September 7, 1996, at an average rate of 
approximately $395 per week. 
 
On May 21, 1997, an “Application for Approval of Settlement 
Agreement,” signed by James and his employer, was filed with the Ohio Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation (“bureau”), requesting that the bureau approve a final 
settlement of the entire claim in the lump-sum amount of $90,000.  On January 
18, 1998, while the application for settlement was still pending, James died of a 
myocardial infarction unrelated to his employment. 
 
On January 21, 1998, James’s daughter, Pam Falkner, notified the bureau 
of her father’s death.  Two days later, on January 23, 1998, the bureau notified 
James’s counsel that it would approve a settlement in the amount of $50,000.  In 
deciding on this amount, the bureau considered the value of prospective wage-loss 
benefits, an eventual permanent partial disability award, and the potential for 
permanent total disability compensation.  On January 26, 1998, James’s counsel, 
acting on the instructions of James’s widow, appellant Judy Johnston, accepted 
the approved amount. 
 
On January 27, 1998, the bureau notified James’s counsel as follows: 
 
“The application is denied—All parties do not agree with the settlement 
terms. 
 
“Settlement application is abated by [injured worker’s] death on 1-18-98.” 
 
On March 19, 1998, appellant filed a “First Report of an Injury, 
Occupational Disease or Death,” requesting, “pursuant to R.C. 4123.60 * * *[,] 
January Term, 2001 
3 
payment of the settlement award that had been offered on January 23, 1998.”  By 
an order mailed July 11, 1998, a Staff Hearing Officer determined that the 
settlement “application was abated by claimant’s death” and denied appellant’s 
request. 
 
On September 28, 1998, appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the 
Court of Appeals for Franklin County seeking a writ directing appellees, James 
Conrad, Administrator of the bureau, and the Industrial Commission of Ohio 
(“commission”), to find that the settlement application was not abated by the 
death of James Johnston and to order that the claim be settled for the approved 
amount of $50,000.  The court of appeals denied the writ, finding that “at the time 
of the decedent’s death, which preceded any form of approval by the BWC, any 
and all action relating to claimant’s settlement application abated under Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A).” 
 
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals was compelled to write: 
 
“We additionally note that the present case does raise serious concerns 
regarding the advantage that accrues to the BWC [Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation] through sluggish processing of settlement applications, since 
sufficient delay could well lead to a significant number of claims abating due to 
the death of the claimant, with a corresponding decrease in settlement 
expenditures to the workers’ compensation system. * * * Such a delay, in the 
present case, appears to have worked exactly the type of inequitable result 
contemplated in [State ex rel. Nossal v. Terex Div. of I.B.H. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 
175, 712 N.E.2d 747].  Nonetheless, we find that no other statutory basis exists 
upon which to impose a time constraint upon the BWC for the processing of 
settlement applications [and that] we are without authority to amend any pertinent 
statute or administrative regulation in order to address what is an unequitable 
result.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
Judge Tyack, dissenting, opined that “we need to engraft an exception 
onto the legal provisions which call for abatement of a workers’ compensation 
claim.  The exception I propose would nullify the abatement requirement in those 
circumstances where the BWC and/or the Industrial Commission fail to process 
an agreed application for settlement within a reasonable time frame.  Our failure 
to engraft the exception here rewards the BWC for being inept at best and 
punishes the innocent family of a person who was seriously injured on the job.” 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right. 
 
The question presented for our determination is whether appellees abused 
their discretion in finding that the settlement application filed on May 21, 1997, 
was abated by the death of James Johnston on January 18, 1998.  Specifically, we 
are asked to decide (1) whether Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) applies to joint 
applications for approval of a State Fund settlement filed pursuant to R.C. 
4123.65 and (2) whether the bureau’s eight-month delay in processing decedent’s 
settlement application warrants a dispensation of the rule that a claim abates if the 
injured employee dies before a formal administrative award is made. 
Applicability of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) to Claims for Settlement 
 
Appellant’s first argument is that the abatement rule set forth in Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) is limited to applications “filed by the claimant,” and 
thus by definition “cannot apply to joint matters pending before either the Bureau 
or the Commission at the time of a claimant’s death.”  Appellant contends that 
ever since the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, effective October 20, 1993 
(145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3173), R.C. 4123.65 has required employers and 
employees to file joint applications for settlement with the bureau, and that since 
the procedure for settling workers’ compensation claims is governed solely by 
statute, abatement is inapplicable to settlement applications filed after October 20, 
1993.  In addition, appellant relies on Commission Policy Memo No. 0.7 and 
Estate of Orecny v. Ford Motor Co. (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 462, 467, 672 
January Term, 2001 
5 
N.E.2d 679, 682, for the proposition that the abatement regulation does not apply 
to the amended statute. 
 
While these arguments present some initial interpretive appeal, our review 
of the legal history concerning the settlement and abatement of workers’ 
compensation claims leads us to reject appellant’s assessment of the current 
interplay between R.C. 4123.65 and Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A). 
 
Agreements for final settlement of a workers’ compensation claim were 
recognized as valid and enforceable even before express statutory authority 
therefor was provided in the Workers’ Compensation Act.  “The right to settle a 
claim * * * after it has accrued is incidental to and necessarily included in the 
right of the claimant to assert his claim * * *.  Especially have such settlements 
been regarded as valid when approved by the Industrial Commission.”  State ex 
rel. Weinberger v. Indus. Comm. (1941), 139 Ohio St. 92, 96-97, 22 O.O. 59, 61, 
38 N.E.2d 399, 401-402. 
 
Likewise, the rule that unaccrued workers’ compensation payments abate 
upon the death of the claimant predates any regulatory provision to this effect and 
reflects the basic principle that, unlike tort recovery, the right to receive future 
workers’ compensation benefits is not inheritable.  Thus, in Ballard v. Ohio 
Edison Co. (1938), 134 Ohio St. 104, 11 O.O. 541, 16 N.E.2d 203, at the syllabus, 
we held: 
 
“When the dependent of a deceased employee enters into a contract of 
settlement under the supervision and approval of the Industrial Commission of 
Ohio, the administrator of the dependent is not entitled to recover from a self-
insuring employer any installment of compensation that is unaccrued at the time 
of the dependent’s death.” 
 
The General Assembly amended the Act in 1951 to provide expressly for 
the final settlement of a workers’ compensation claim.  124 Ohio Laws 806, 823.  
That provision became R.C. 4123.65 when the Ohio Revised Code was enacted, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
effective October 1, 1953.  Former R.C. 4123.65, as effective October 1, 1953, 
provided: 
 
“Before any final settlement agreement is approved by the industrial 
commission, application therefor shall be made to the commission.  Such 
application shall be signed by the claimant and shall clearly set forth the 
circumstances by reason of which the proposed settlement is deemed desirable 
and the nature of the controversy.  Notice of the hearing of such application shall 
be given to the employee and his representative and the employer and his 
representative.  Such application shall be heard by the members of the industrial 
commission or a majority thereof sitting en banc.  No member may delegate his 
authority to hear and determine the matters raised by such application.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The bureau promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21 in 1978, which 
provides: 
 
“(A) When a claimant dies, action on any application filed by the claimant, 
and pending before the bureau or the industrial commission at the time of his 
death, is abated by claimant’s death.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In cases involving the application of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) to 
lump-sum settlements under former R.C. 4123.65, the entire lump sum was 
considered to accrue on the date the commission approved the settlement 
agreement.  The injured worker’s right to receive the entire lump-sum amount 
was held to be inheritable on this date, but not before.  Thus, Ohio Adm.Code 
4123-5-21(A) was held applicable to abate even a joint application filed under 
former R.C. 4123.65 where the claimant died prior to a ruling on the application 
by the commission, but held inapplicable where death occurred after the 
settlement agreement was approved by someone authorized to act on the 
commission’s behalf.  See Finnerty v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. (1988), 47 
January Term, 2001 
7 
Ohio App.3d 186, 548 N.E.2d 949; Halley v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. 
(1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 391, 657 N.E.2d 340. 
 
It appears, however, that the commission’s involvement in the primary 
aspects of the settlement process proved counterproductive, resulting in too many 
settlements being rejected against the wishes of the parties directly involved.  In 
turn, the difficulty in closing files added to the complexity of managing the 
workers’ compensation system and forced a continued growth in the bureau’s 
reserves.  Thus, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, effective 
October 20, 1993, in part to facilitate the settlement of workers’ compensation 
claims.  See, generally, Fulton, Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law (2 Ed.1998) 
313-314, Section 10.4. 
 
With the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, the General Assembly made 
significant changes in former R.C. 4123.65.  Among other things, Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 transferred the primary authority to oversee settlements from the 
commission to the Administrator of Workers’ Compensation and substantially 
revised the procedure for filing and processing settlement applications.  The 
statute no longer requires the filing of an application for approval of settlement in 
self-insured claims.1  Instead, the self-insurer must mail a copy of the settlement 
agreement to the Administrator, who then sends it to the commission for 
assignment to a staff hearing officer.  R.C. 4123.65(A) and (D).  The staff hearing 
officer may disapprove the settlement agreement only upon finding it to be “a 
gross miscarriage of justice” or “clearly unfair.”  R.C. 4123.65(D).  A self-
insuring settlement takes effect “thirty days * * * after the self-insuring employer 
and employee sign the final settlement agreement.”  R.C. 4123.65(C). 
 
On the other hand, R.C. 4123.65(A) provides: 
                                                          
 
1.  Nonsubstantive changes were made to R.C. 4123.65 in 1996.  See 145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 
4646, 4656. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
“A state fund employer or the employee of such an employer may file an 
application with the administrator of workers’ compensation for approval of a 
final settlement of a claim under this chapter.  The application shall include the 
settlement agreement, be signed by the claimant and employer, and clearly set 
forth the circumstances by reason of which the proposed settlement is deemed 
desirable and that the parties agree to the terms of the settlement agreement 
provided that the agreement need not be signed by the employer if the employer is 
no longer doing business in Ohio. * * * ”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
A State Fund settlement does not “take effect until thirty days after the 
administrator approves the settlement.”  R.C. 4123.65(C). 
 
In Estate of Orecny, 109 Ohio App.3d 462, 672 N.E.2d 679, the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County considered the applicability of Ohio Adm.Code 
4123-5-21(A) to an application for lump-sum settlement filed under the amended 
statute.  In that case, John Orecny died of an occupational disease contracted in 
the course of his employment with Ford Motor Company, a self-insured 
employer.  His surviving spouse and claimant, Mary Orecny, brought a claim for 
death benefits pursuant to R.C. 4123.59, which was allowed by the commission.  
Ford appealed the allowance to the court of common pleas and, while that appeal 
was pending, the parties reached a settlement for the lump-sum amount of 
$37,000.  The cause was then dismissed subject to the commission’s approval of 
the settlement.  However, after the parties executed a settlement agreement, but 
before the matter was referred to the commission, the claimant (the widow) died 
of cardiac arrest.  Unaware of claimant’s death, the Attorney General sent a joint 
application for approval of the settlement to the commission, which then sent 
notice that the settlement abated due to the death of claimant. 
 
Ford then successfully had the trial court’s order vacated pursuant to 
Civ.R. 60(B), and the widow’s estate appealed.  The court of appeals reversed and 
found that Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) does not apply to self-insuring 
January Term, 2001 
9 
settlements under R.C. 4123.65, as amended October 20, 1993.  The court 
explained that “[t]he statute, which was a substantial revision of its predecessor, 
draws a significant distinction between settlements achieved by State Fund 
employers and those achieved by self-insurers like Ford * * *.”  Id., 109 Ohio 
App.3d at 465, 672 N.E.2d at 681.  In particular, “[t]he amended version gives 
much more latitude to self-insured employers to negotiate settlements with their 
employees.  No application for approval by a claimant is required.”  Id. at 466, 
672 N.E.2d at 682.  The court reasoned that since R.C. 4123.65 no longer requires 
the filing of an application for approval of settlement in self-insured claims, it 
could not be said that an “application filed by the claimant” was “pending” before 
the commission at the time of claimant’s death for purposes of Ohio Adm.Code 
4123-5-21(A).  Id. at 467, 672 N.E.2d at 682-683. 
 
Thus, contrary to appellant’s assertions, the court in Orecny did not find 
Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) inapplicable to joint settlement applications filed 
pursuant to amended R.C. 4123.65.  Instead, the court found the regulation 
inapplicable to settlement agreements between a claimant and a self-insured 
employer because the amended statute has dispensed with the requirement of 
filing an application for approval of settlement in self-insured claims.  Implicit in 
the Orecny court’s decision is the recognition that, in giving self-insured 
settlement agreements effective status without administrative approval, 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 effectively changed the accrual date for self-insuring 
settlements from the date the commission approves the settlement agreement to 
the date the parties sign the agreement.  However, the statute as amended still 
requires administrative approval, albeit by the Administrator rather than the 
commission, in order for a State Fund settlement to take effect.  R.C. 4123.65(C). 
 
Orecny was decided on February 20, 1996.  On November 18, 1996, 
Commission Policy Memo No. 0.7 was adopted, presumably as an internal 
regulation pursuant to R.C. 4121.32, to provide: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
“Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.65 as effective October 20, 
1993 settlements are not subject to the abatement provisions contained in Ohio 
Administrative Code Rule 4123-5-21 if the settlement had reached the stage of 
being approved by the Administrator in state fund claims or has been signed by 
both the employer and the injured worker in self-insured claims. * * * ”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
By necessary implication, this policy statement provides that State Fund 
settlements executed after October 20, 1993, are subject to abatement under Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-5-21 if the claimant dies before the settlement is approved by the 
Administrator.  Accordingly, we must also reject appellant’s assertion that 
“Commission Policy Memo No. 0.7 * * * specifically provides that settlements 
pursuant to R.C. [4123.65] effective 10/20/93 and [as amended] 10/01/96 are not 
subject to abatement.” 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the provisions of Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-5-21 are generally applicable to joint settlement applications 
filed pursuant to R.C. 4123.65 after October 20, 1993.  Specifically, we find that a 
joint settlement application filed pursuant to R.C. 4123.65 is an “application filed 
by the claimant” for purposes of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A).  An application 
is simply a request or claim for something and, in the final analysis, that 
something under both the regulation and the statute is the payment of workers’ 
compensation benefits to an injured employee or the dependents of a deceased 
employee. 
 
It is true, as appellant asserts, that Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) does not 
expressly provide that a claimant’s death will abate action on any application filed 
jointly by the claimant and the employer.  It is also true, as appellant reminds us, 
that R.C. 4123.95 requires a liberal construction of workers’ compensation laws 
in favor of employees.  But R.C. 4123.95 does not require us to feign ignorance of 
the procedural and historical background against which a statute is enacted or a 
January Term, 2001 
11 
regulation promulgated.  At the time Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21 was 
promulgated, former R.C. 4123.65 required only the claimant’s signature on an 
application for approval of settlement agreement, and thus there was no need for 
the regulation to provide specifically for the abatement of joint applications in 
order to encompass the abatement of settlements.  We cannot validly assume that 
the phrase “filed by the claimant” was inserted into the regulation for the purpose 
of excluding the abatement of joint settlement applications required under a 
statutory revision conceived some fifteen years later. 
 
Moreover, as indicated above, the principle that unaccrued settlement 
payments abate upon the claimant’s death has been recognized for as long as 
settlement agreements have been held valid and enforceable.  In cases involving 
the application of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) to lump-sum settlements under 
former R.C. 4123.65, the claimant’s right to the lump-sum payment was held 
unaccrued, and thus subject to abatement upon his or her death, until the 
commission formally approved the settlement.  R.C. 4123.65(C) now provides 
that no State Fund settlement shall take effect until after the Administrator 
approves the settlement.  Appellees should therefore be permitted to apply Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) to State Fund settlements pending approval by the 
Administrator without having to amend the regulation itself. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) is generally 
applicable to joint applications for approval of a State Fund settlement filed 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.65, provided the claimant’s death occurs before the 
settlement is approved by the Administrator of Workers’ Compensation. 
Administrative Delay 
 
Having held that Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) applies to abate 
applications for State Fund settlements pending approval by the Administrator, 
we now turn to consider whether this holding should apply where the 
Administrator fails to process the application within a reasonable period of time.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
Although this precise issue has not been addressed in any of our previous 
decisions, we find it useful to examine those cases in which the court has given 
general consideration to the inheritability of workers’ compensation claims and 
benefits. 
 
In our early cases, the question of whether a claimant’s entitlement to 
workers’ compensation benefits survived his or her death depended upon the type 
of compensation involved, the stage to which the claim had progressed, and the 
legal status of the person seeking to recover post mortem.  A dependent of a 
deceased employee, in his or her capacity as such, was statutorily authorized to 
recover any unpaid disability benefits that had accrued and been awarded during 
the employee’s lifetime.  However, an injured employee’s right to disability 
benefits was held not to pass to his or her estate, and, thus, the employee’s estate 
representative, or the employee’s dependent acting in the capacity of an estate 
representative, could not recover compensation to which the deceased employee 
was entitled while living.  The stated rationale is that Ohio workers’ 
compensation law, as expressed in both the Ohio Constitution and throughout the 
Act, goes only so far as to permit the State Insurance Fund to be used for the 
payment of compensation and benefits to living employees and their dependents 
after death.  Moreover, it was reasoned that if accrued but unpaid disability 
compensation was held inheritable, it could just as well be attached by the 
deceased employee’s creditors, which was statutorily prohibited.  See State ex rel. 
Petroff v. Indus. Comm. (1933), 127 Ohio St. 65, 186 N.E. 721; State ex rel. 
Rowland v. Indus. Comm. (1932), 126 Ohio St. 23, 183 N.E. 787; Bozzelli v. 
Indus. Comm. (1930), 122 Ohio St. 201, 171 N.E. 108; Indus. Comm. v. Terrell 
(1929), 120 Ohio St. 59, 165 N.E. 536. 
 
Given this rationale, one would expect that parallel results would have 
been reached in cases involving the inheritability of a dependent’s right to death 
benefits, since the same provisions that limit disability compensation payments to 
January Term, 2001 
13 
employees who are injured in the course of employment also limit death benefit 
payments to dependents of employees who are killed in the course of 
employment.  Yet each of these two types of compensation was expressly 
distinguished from the other for purposes of inheritability.  See Bozzelli, supra, 
122 Ohio St. at 207-208, 171 N.E. at 110; State ex rel. Hoper v. Indus. Comm. 
(1934), 128 Ohio St. 105, 107-108, 190 N.E. 222, 223. 
 
Thus, while the dependent’s estate could not recover installments of death 
benefits payable after the dependent’s death, the personal representative of a 
deceased dependent could recover from the State Insurance Fund the 
compensation to which the dependent was entitled while living, even where no 
award had been made during the dependent’s lifetime.  See Ballard v. Ohio 
Edison Co., supra; State ex rel. Hoper, supra; State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. 
Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 143 N.E. 574; Whitmore v. Indus. Comm. 
(1922), 105 Ohio St. 295, 136 N.E. 910; Indus. Comm. v. Dell (1922), 104 Ohio 
St. 389, 135 N.E. 669. 
 
As explained in State ex rel. Hoper: 
 
“The foregoing would seem to be a most salutary and humane rule of law.  
If it were otherwise, a dependent might be denied his entire compensation by 
reason of an extended period of delay, beyond which he might not survive.  It 
must at all times be remembered that one of the fundamental purposes of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Law is prompt and certain compensation to those 
rightfully entitled to receive it.”  Id., 128 Ohio St. at 108, 190 N.E. at 223-224. 
 
Later, the court reversed course and held that “[t]he legal representative of 
the estate of a workers’ compensation claimant may not appeal a decision of the 
Industrial Commission to a common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 4123.519.”  
Breidenbach v. Mayfield (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 138, 524 N.E.2d 502, syllabus.  In 
that case, the widow-claimant filed an application for workers’ compensation 
benefits on March 5, 1980, following the death of her husband.  The claim was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
disallowed administratively at the district hearing and regional board levels.  The 
claimant died on July 26, 1981, while her appeal was pending before the 
commission, and the court let stand the commission’s order that “her appeal of a 
previously disallowed death claim abated by reason of her death.”  Id., 37 Ohio 
St.3d at 139, 524 N.E.2d at 503. 
 
Justice Herbert R. Brown, dissenting in Breidenbach, argued as follows: 
 
“Dell, supra, Whitmore, supra, and Hoper, supra, should remain the rule 
of this court.  To deny benefits because a claimant fails to live long enough to 
survive delays in the administrative process is illogical and unfair.  The majority’s 
holding could encourage delay in processing claims, contrary to our statement in 
Hoper, supra, that:  ‘It must at all times be remembered that one of the 
fundamental purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Law is prompt and 
certain compensation to those rightfully entitled to receive it.’  Id. [128 Ohio St.] 
at 108, 190 N.E. at 224. 
 
“Further, the rule read into the statute by the majority works inequities.  
Claimants having identical claims could file on the same day, prosecute their 
claims through the system, and be awarded an entitlement to benefits on the same 
day.  However, under the majority’s decision, if one claimant died the day before 
entitlement was decided and the other the day after, the estate of one would 
receive benefits while the estate of the other would not.  That result is absurd.  
The legislature surely did not intend that a claimant’s right to recovery be 
contingent upon the ability to outlive the administrative process.”  Id., 37 Ohio 
St.3d at 143, 524 N.E.2d at 506. 
 
In State ex rel. Nossal v. Terex Div. of I.B.H., supra, we adopted the 
reasoning of Justice Brown’s dissent, overruled Breidenbach, and held: 
 
“Where the commission awards death benefits to the surviving spouse of a 
deceased employee, but the spouse dies before the funds are disbursed, accrued 
benefits for the period between the deceased employee’s death and the spouse’s 
January Term, 2001 
15 
death shall be paid to the spouse’s estate.”  Id., 86 Ohio St.3d 175, 712 N.E.2d 
747, at the syllabus. 
 
Finally, in State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
276, 737 N.E.2d 519, we decided that the estate of a deceased employee could 
recover the disability compensation that accrued but had not been paid to the 
employee prior to his death.  In so doing, we explained: 
 
“In State ex rel. Nossal * * *, we held that the estates of deceased 
dependents can recover R.C. 4123.60 compensation to which the dependent was 
entitled from the State Insurance Fund.  Thus, Walter, as executor of Robert’s 
estate, reasonably asks why estates of workers should not be able to collect 
accrued compensation when the estates of dependents are able to collect.  We see 
no reason for such an inequity.  Accordingly, we follow Nossal, and hold that 
Robert’s estate is entitled under R.C. 4123.60 to compensation that accrued to 
Robert, but had not been paid to him at the time of his death.”  Id., 90 Ohio St.3d 
at 282, 737 N.E.2d at 524. 
 
The foregoing examination reveals that this court considers the provision 
of prompt and certain compensation to deserving claimants as no less 
fundamental to Ohio workers’ compensation law than the principle that workers’ 
compensation benefits are generally uninheritable.  Similarly, R.C. 4121.31(A)(3)  
requires the Administrator and commission to jointly adopt a rule covering the 
following topic:  “All claims, whether of a state fund or self-insuring employer, 
be processed in an orderly, uniform, and timely fashion.”  Accordingly, Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123-3-01(E) provides:  “All claims shall be processed in an orderly, 
uniform and timely fashion.” 
 
Thus, albeit slowly and unevenly, we have come to recognize the inherent 
injustice of requiring a claimant, whether he or she be a dependent seeking death 
benefits or an injured employee seeking disability compensation, to outlive delays 
in the administrative process.  Regardless of the status of the claim at the time of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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death, the claimant’s estate may recover the compensation that the claimant would 
have received, but for administrative delays, during his or her lifetime. 
 
However, since these decisions address only the abatement of death and 
disability claims, it remains to be determined whether administrative delay should 
also preclude a pending settlement claim from abating upon the claimant’s death.  
Relying on State ex rel. Theodore v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (June 28, 
1996), Franklin App. No. 95APD09-1234, unreported, affirmed by entry only 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 531, 696 N.E.2d 1079, appellees argue that “the bureau is 
under no statutory obligation to approve settlement applications” and “absolutely 
no claimant possesses a right to have a claim settled.” 
 
In State ex rel. Theodore, the claimant filed an application to settle his 
claim for $276,000.  The bureau responded by offering claimant $15,000, which 
was apparently rejected.  The Administrator then disapproved the application, 
finding the requested amount to be excessive.  The claimant sought a writ of 
mandamus compelling the Administrator to settle the claim for $276,000.  In 
denying the writ, the court of appeals found that “not only has the Bureau 
indicated a basis for the denial of the settlement, relator can show no clear legal 
right to an order by this court to compel the respondent Bureau to settle the 
claim.”  Id., appellate decision at 4. 
 
In the course of its opinion, the court of appeals indicated that the claimant 
“does have a right to expect the Bureau to consider a settlement.”  Id.. at 2.  
However, two sentences later the court stated that “[t]he consideration of 
settlement and amounts being attributed to a given claim by way of settlement are 
not matters that can be compelled by a writ of mandamus.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id. at 3. 
 
In affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, our decision in State ex 
rel. Theodore reads, in its entirety:  “The judgment of the court of appeals is 
January Term, 2001 
17 
affirmed consistent with the opinion of the court of appeals.”  Id., 82 Ohio St.3d 
at 531, 696 N.E.2d at 1079. 
 
Less than a year later, we held that the bureau does have a duty to explain 
its disapproval of a settlement application.  State ex rel. Ochs v. Indus. Comm. 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 674, 710 N.E.2d 1126.  In particular, we found that a 
succinct statement setting forth the basis for the decision will enable a reviewing 
court “ ‘to readily discern the specific grounds relied upon and whether the record 
supports such a finding when a party to the proceeding initiates an action for a 
writ of mandamus.’ ”  Id., 85 Ohio St.3d at 675-676, 710 N.E.2d at 1127, quoting 
State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 484, 6 
OBR 531, 534, 453 N.E.2d 721, 725. 
 
In light of our decision in State ex rel. Ochs, it can hardly be suggested 
that our one-line affirmance in State ex rel. Theodore stands for the proposition 
that mandamus will not lie to compel the consideration of a settlement 
application.  Moreover, the notion that the bureau or the Administrator has no 
duty to approve propitious settlements is incongruous.  Not only does such a 
notion run contrary to those concerns over the commission’s inability to 
effectuate settlements and thus simplify the workers’ compensation system by 
closing files and reducing reserves that led to the 1993 amendments to R.C. 
4123.65, but it is belied by the express provisions of the legislation. 
 
In addition to the amendments made to R.C. 4123.65, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
107 also enacted (see 145 Ohio Laws Part II, 2990, 3071, 3075) R.C. 
4121.121(R), (now R.C 4121.121[B][18]), which sets forth the duties of the 
Administrator, to specifically provide that the Administrator shall: 
 
“Pursuant to section 4123.65 of the Revised Code, approve applications 
for the final settlement of claims for compensation or benefits under this chapter 
and Chapters 4123., 4127., and 4131. of the Revised Code as the administrator 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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determines appropriate, except in regard to the applications of self-insuring 
employers and their employees.”  (R.C. 4121.121[B][18].) 
 
While this provision does not require the Administrator to approve a 
settlement application on demand or accept the terms agreed to by the parties, nor 
does it give the Administrator the unfettered discretion to reject settlements out of 
hand.  There is nothing in the statute to support the notion that the Administrator 
can properly reject an application that he determines to be appropriate.  Semantics 
aside, the Administrator has an affirmative statutory duty to determine the 
propriety of settlement applications, the performance of which can be enforced by 
proceedings in mandamus. 
 
Thus, to the extent that State ex rel. Theodore has any persuasive, let alone 
controlling, value beyond its specific facts, it can mean no more than that this 
court has declined to grant the kind of relief in a settlement case that we have 
granted in permanent total disability cases under State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 
68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666.  But the present case has nothing to do with 
this kind of relief, and, therefore, appellees’ reliance on State ex rel. Theodore is 
misplaced. 
 
Theodore was not an abatement case, which is evident from the fact that 
the claimant in Theodore was alive during the mandamus and appellate 
proceedings.  Instead, the claimant was seeking a straightforward order 
compelling the Administrator to approve a settlement that was administratively 
rejected as excessive.  In contrast, the Administrator in the present case did not 
reject the claimant’s application for approval of settlement on its merits but held 
that it had abated.  In fact, the bureau actually approved a settlement in this case 
for $50,000, albeit posthumously, and appellant seeks to enforce that approval.  
Thus, we are not being asked to order the Administrator to approve a settlement 
that was rejected, or even to compel the Administrator to reconsider an 
application that was denied without adequate explanation.  We are asked to find 
January Term, 2001 
19 
only that the abatement regulation is inapplicable to preclude the settlement that 
was approved by the Administrator from passing to the claimant’s estate. 
 
We hold, therefore, that Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21(A) is nullified in 
those circumstances where the Administrator of Workers’ Compensation fails to 
process an application for approval of a State Fund settlement pursuant to R.C. 
4123.65 within a reasonable period of time. 
 
There is no serious contention by anyone in this case that it should 
reasonably take eight months for the Administrator or the bureau to process an 
application for approval of a settlement.  The majority of the court of appeals 
found that “[s]uch a delay, in the present case, appears to have worked exactly the 
type of inequitable result contemplated in Nossal,” noting the harsh results in the 
present case.  The dissenting judge referred to this delay as the bureau’s “fail[ure] 
to process an application for settlement in anything like a reasonable period of 
time.”  Appellees merely refer to the bureau’s eight-month time lag as “slow 
processing” and a “perceived delay [not] conducted in bad faith,” while informing 
us that “the bureau’s main business is not the settlement of claims.” 
 
In light of all of the foregoing, we find that the requested writ should have 
been granted, and, accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
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COOK, J., dissenting.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
for the reasons expressed in its opinion. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
Koltak & Gibson, L.L.P., Ronald J. Koltak and Peter J. Gibson, for 
appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Craigg E. Gould, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellees. 
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