Title: ROBERT ALLAN SWEET V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT ALLAN SWEET V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 87Case Number: S-09-0021Decided: 06/28/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ROBERT 
ALLAN SWEET,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Wyoming 
Public Defender Program.  Argument 
by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this appeal, 
Robert Allan Sweet, convicted by a jury of one count of sexual abuse of a minor 
in the second degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 36-2-315(a)(ii) and (b) 
(LexisNexis 2009),1 raises three issues in his effort 
to overturn the judgment and sentence of incarceration of not less than 30 
months nor more than 102 months, with credit for 315 days of presentence 
confinement.  Sweet and the State 
agree that, generally stated, the three issues are whether the State presented 
improper vouching evidence; whether the district court's Jury Instruction No. 11 
was improper; and whether cumulative error occurred because of alleged improper 
victim impact testimony, alleged judicial and prosecutorial bias in favor of the 
alleged victim, admission of alleged irrelevant evidence, and the prosecutor's 
multiple references to sexual assault.  
Because Sweet did not object at trial with respect to any of these 
issues, we shall apply our plain error standard of review in each 
instance.

 
 
[¶2]      For the reasons 
set forth below, we hold that the State's presentation of improper vouching 
evidence constituted plain error and, therefore, we reverse and remand for a new 
trial.  Although resolution of this 
issue is dispositive of this appeal, we shall also address the remaining issues 
because they may recur on retrial.

 
 

GENERAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On November 29, 
2007, thirty-seven-year-old Sweet was living in a trailer in Gillette, Wyoming, 
with a number of individuals, including CB and CB's twelve-year-old daughter, 
SM.  SM stayed home from school that 
day because she was feeling ill.  
Her mother and the others, except Sweet, left the trailer to take the 
children to school.  As SM lay on a 
recliner in the front room watching a video, Sweet was sleeping on the couch in 
the front room.  SM fell asleep in 
the recliner and was allegedly awakened by Sweet who was pushing her shoulder 
and grabbing her hands and holding them above her head.  According to SM, Sweet began to touch 
her breasts on the inside of her clothing, unzipped his pants and pulled out his 
penis, and told her not to tell anyone.  
SM said Sweet tried to pull down her pants, but she resisted his effort 
by pressing into the recliner.  SM 
said she was screaming and trying to kick Sweet between his legs.  She said Sweet had been drinking as she 
could smell it on him.  According to 
SM, Sweet started crying, stopped what he was doing, and went into the 
bathroom.  When SM's mother returned 
home, SM told her what happened, and her mother angrily confronted Sweet and 
called the police.  Sweet left the 
trailer and was shortly apprehended by law enforcement personnel inside a 
residence in the neighborhood.  
After being taken into custody, Sweet was transported by a deputy sheriff 
to the sheriff's department, interviewed, and placed under 
arrest.

 
 
[¶4]      On November 30, 
2007, the prosecutor filed a felony information charging Sweet with one count of 
sexual abuse of a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(ii) and 
(b).  On December 6, 2007, Sweet 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district 
court.  He was arraigned on February 
7, 2008, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.  On February 11, 2008, he filed a motion 
to suppress recorded statements made on November 29, 2007, to sheriff's deputy 
Duane Peyrot, alleging that any statements were not voluntarily made because of 
his alcohol consumption.  The State 
filed its traverse to this suppression motion on March 11, 2008. The district 
court filed its order denying the motion on April 22, 
2008.

 
 
[¶5]      On June 9, 2008, 
Sweet's jury trial began, and on June 10, 2008, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty.  The district court held a 
sentencing hearing on October 9, 2008, and entered sentence on November 14, 
2008.  Sweet timely filed a notice 
of appeal on November 19, 2008.   
Additional facts relevant to each of the three issues before us are set 
forth as necessary below.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Issue 
One:  Whether the State presented 
improper vouching evidence.

 
 

Background 
Facts

 
 
[¶6]      In the State's 
pretrial exhibit list, the prosecutor listed the compact disc recording of the 
interview between Deputy Duane Peyrot and Sweet conducted in an interview room 
in the sheriff's department in the early afternoon of November 29, 2007, the day 
of the alleged incident giving rise to the charge against Sweet.  Sweet's defense counsel had moved before 
trial to suppress the recording but only on grounds that Sweet's statements 
during the interview were involuntary, which motion the trial court had 
denied.  Defense counsel made no 
other objections to the admissibility of the recording, did not move in limine 
to redact any portions of the recording, and did not offer any cautionary jury 
instructions or admonitions concerning the recording.2  

 
 
[¶7]      During jury 
selection, the prosecutor informed the prospective jurors that they would get to 
hear Sweet's recorded interview. After the jury was empanelled, the prosecutor 
made his opening statement.  In the 
course of that statement, he commented on Deputy Peyrot's recorded interview 
with Sweet. The prosecutor stated that after Deputy Peyrot had talked in detail 
with SM and her mother, Deputy Peyrot returned to the sheriff's department and 
interviewed Sweet.  The prosecutor 
then stated: 

 
 
            
You will get to hear the deputy's 
impressions of Mr. Sweet as he sat there at that table; the fact that it was 
obvious to him that he had been drinking.  
You will get to hear Mr. Sweet's words as he responds to the questioning 
process.  As I recall it, that 
interview takes approximately a half hour.  
And I will request that you pay very, very close attention to that 
recording for a couple of reasons.

 
 
            
First, we think that you will see a shift in position by Mr. Sweet as the 
interview takes place.  We think you 
will see that he was able to understand the questions that he was asked; that he 
was able to defend the positions he took at various times during the interview, 
and we think toward the end of it you'll 
begin to hear a couple of things that become significant to 
you.

 
 
            
First of all, he'll agree he had a close relationship with the young 
girl, nearly a father/daughter type of relationship.

 
 
            
Second, we believe that you'll 
hear that he believed she's truthful.

 
 
            
Third, you'll be able to hear Mr. Sweet thought he might have done 
something in his sleep.

 
 
            
Now, of significance to this case  well, let me back up just a little 
bit.  Now, you'll be able to hear the entirety of that 
recording during Mr. Peyrot's testimony, and I may use it again in my 
closing argument.  But I must ask 
you to pay very close attention to that, because even though you'll be allowed 
to take the recording into the jury room, you will not get to play it 
again.  So it is significant evidence, and you need to 
concentrate on it.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶8]      Defense counsel 
did not object to the prosecutor's opening statements.  But, defense counsel did address in his 
opening statement what he called Sweet's "so-called confession."  He asked the jurors to listen very 
carefully and "to keep really careful notes of the things said in that."  He then stated:

 
 
            
One of the things that I'd like you to watch for is to see if Mr. Sweet 
ever says that I did this.  You're 
never going to hear that.  In fact, 
he says he didn't do it.  He didn't 
do it.  He says, Well, he admitted 
he might have been  done it in his sleep.  
No, that's not exactly right, and you'll have to be the judges of that, 
not me.

 
 
            
That what he says is that at one point, Well, if I did it, I must have 
been  I must have been asleep.  
Because he is denying that this ever happened, and that's what you're 
going to hear, and that's what  that's what it actually is.  Mr. Peyrot is a very good questioner and 
very experienced, and you'll hear that, too.  But you will not hear a confession out 
of it for this particular offense . . . .  

 
 
[¶9]      Following the 
opening statements, the State presented its case-in-chief.  The prosecutor called as witnesses, in 
order, SM; SM's mother, CB; John Wilkey, at whose residence Sweet was located 
after leaving the trailer when SM's mother angrily confronted him; Deputy 
Sheriff Kim Benedict, who drove Sweet to the sheriff's department after he had 
been taken into custody at Mr. Wilkey's residence; and Deputy Sheriff Duane 
Peyrot, who interviewed both SM and Sweet on the day of the alleged 
incident.

 
 
[¶10]   Because the appellate issue of 
improper vouching focuses on Deputy Peyrot's statements concerning Sweet's 
mendacity and guilt and SM's truthfulness appearing in his recorded interview 
with Sweet, we shall begin with a review of relevant portions of the 
prosecutor's direct examination of Deputy Peyrot which explored both the 
deputy's interview of SM and his interview of Sweet.  In response to the prosecutor's 
preliminary questions, the deputy testified briefly about his fifteen years in 
law enforcement which included the most recent eight years as a felony 
investigator.  The prosecutor then 
questioned the deputy about his interview of SM and SM's mother at their 
residence:

 
 
Q.        And 
did you go inside the residence?

 
 
A.        I 
went inside where I met [CB], introduced myself to her.  She introduced me to [SM].  Those are the two people in the house at 
the time.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  Once you'd been introduced 
to both of them, what did you do, sir?

 
 
A.        Well, 
briefly I talked to [CB].  She was 
very animated.  She was angry.  Her hand was bleeding.  She was talking very rapidly, and she 
explained to me what she had done.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  After talking with her, what 
did you do then?

 
 
A.        After 
 after talking to her briefly, I introduced myself to [SM].  I told [SM] that one of the jobs that I 
did, in addition to everything else she understood police officers to do, was 
that frequently I worked with children, 
and frequently I worked with children who are involved in cases like the one 
that we thought we had on our hands at the time.

 
 
            
I asked [SM] if her and I could talk.  At the beginning of that she decided she 
wanted her mother to be present, so we sat in the living room where we started 
to talk.  Shortly after [SM] 
started, and I started to get down to the nuts and bolts of our conversation, 
[her mother] excused herself.

 
 
Q.        Do 
you have any idea as to why she did that?

 
 
A.        Well, 
I was encouraging her to, just because my experience with young ladies is that 
they're a little more comfortable  if they're comfortable with me, they're 
comfortable with me without a parent; but also [her mother] was extremely angry, 
and I didn't want her to influence [SM] by saying things or by exploding when a 
certain something come out of [SM's] mouth.  So it worked out good for both of us she 
wanted out of there.

 
 
Q.        Can 
you estimate for the jury just how long it was that you interviewed [SM] that 
day?

 
 
A.        Well, 
. . . I think between 35 to 40 minutes.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Q.        All 
right. Have you had specialized training 
in interviewing children?

 
 
A.        I 
have.

 
 
Q.        About 
how much, sir?

 
 
A.        Basic 
interview schools that police officers go to especially as they become 
investigators or detectives are general in nature and, therefore, not 
specifically designed for children.  
I've been to at least two of those.

 
 
            
In November of 2005 I went to Minnesota to a college to a special class, 
forensic interviewing of children 
put on by the national organization called Corner House, and that training 
includes especially conversations and interview techniques and ideas and 
situations to use especially with younger children. After about five minutes of 
talking to [SM], I decided not to do so much of a formal forensic interview with 
her like I would if she was younger.

 
 
Q.        And 
you made that decision based on her responses to your questioning at the early 
phase?

 
 
A.        I 
did.  As we got to know each other a 
little bit, one of the things that I went through with [SM] was that I'm a 
police officer and that I deal with kids and that I understand that kids aren't 
like adults and they can't all the time stand straight up and look you in the 
eyes and answer questions.

 
 
            
I let her know that if I got something wrong, if I was reading something 
I thought she said, if I got it wrong or if I misunderstood her, she was 
completely okay to correct me.  She 
was to line me out if I was even making her uncomfortable or misinterpreting 
her. I asked her if she knew the 
difference between what the truth is and what the lie is.  By the Corner House standards, if you go 
through those kind of initial questioning with a kid, what you're trying to do 
is find out how comfortable the child is talking to an adult, talking to an 
adult in uniform carrying a firearm.  
And it wasn't too long where I was pretty comfortable.  I thought [SM]  I thought [SM] was 
ready to get going about the nuts and bolts of what I was there to talk to her 
about, and I kind of skipped over the rest of it.  

 
 
Q.        So 
would it be fair to characterize your interview with her then as essentially 
that of a near adult?

 
 
A.        I 
think that's fair, yes.

 
 
Q.        Could 
you estimate for the jury during your 
entire career how many children that you've interviewed regarding sex 
crimes?

 
 
A.        Well, 
for  since January of 2000 I have been responsible for probably 90 percent of 
the sex crimes investigated at the sheriff's department, probably 95 percent of 
those involving children.  Children victims, technically under the age 
of 18 are juveniles, probably I would say 125 to 150 
victims.

 
 
Q.        Go 
ahead, please.

 
 
A.        Since receiving the specialized training in 
interviewing children, probably  probably 50 children since about the fall 
of '05 since I had the specialized training.

 
 
Q.        So 
the grand total would be what approximately?

 
 
A.        125 
to 150.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  Now, did there come a time 
when you talked with a gentleman by the name of Robert 
Sweet?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
there was.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶11]   At this point in the prosecutor's 
direct examination of Deputy Peyrot, the prosecutor had him identify Sweet in 
the courtroom; identify that the recorded interview of Sweet took place in the 
sheriff's department; and describe the interview room, its lighting, and its 
furniture.  Next, the prosecutor had 
the deputy identify for the record the CD interview recording and moved its 
admission into evidence. The prosecutor then played the recorded interview 
between the deputy and Sweet.  

 
 
[¶12]   The parties have not provided the 
Court with a transcript of the recorded interview.  The Court has, however, listened 
carefully to the recording.  Its 
playing length is twenty-nine minutes, fourteen seconds.  The following excerpts from that 
recording are the ones of most interest with respect to the improper vouching 
issue.  After brief introductions, 
Deputy Peyrot said, "Let me tell you what's going on . . . but I think you know, 
I just came from talking to [SM]  uh  she told me a story and I think you've 
done something very dumb today and, uh, and that's why I'm here to try to 
straighten out with you  because either dumb or planned  and I hope it's not 
planned."  Here, Sweet interjected 
"I didn't do anything."  Deputy 
Peyrot goes on, "Ok, we're going to do this the right way because I know that's 
not true and I know you remember."  
The deputy then informed Sweet why he was in custody and that he could 
not leave.  The deputy then said, "I 
know you've had a hard day and I know you've done some things today that you 
normally wouldn't have done."  Sweet 
again interjected, "I didn't do anything wrong."  The deputy continued, "My job is to find 
out what led you to some poor choices today.  Ok, so with that in mind, I'm going to 
go ahead and read you your rights." Following that advisement, Sweet agreed to 
have a conversation with the deputy.  
The deputy briefly related his investigation which included talking to SM 
and SM's mother.  The deputy then 
said that SM seemed to him like a very nice young lady.   

 
 
[¶13]   The deputy and Sweet then talked 
about Sweet's drinking and events preceding the alleged incident.  The deputy then stated that he had 
talked to SM and her story was the only one the deputy had so far, and Sweet was 
the only one who could tell his story.  
The deputy and Sweet then briefly talked about Sweet's having left the 
trailer because SM's mother had angrily accused him of raping SM, and the deputy 
stated he knew it wasn't true that Sweet had done that.  Then Deputy Peyrot stated, "My only 
interest here is the truth."  For 
the next five minutes of the recording, Sweet spoke generally about the events 
of the morning including SM's mother taking the other children in the trailer to 
school; SM's being sick and staying home; his being asleep; the friendship and 
trust between him and SM; and that he did not rape or touch SM.  The deputy then stated that, in view of 
that relationship built on trust, the deputy was left with confusion why what 
happened with SM happened, unless alcohol got the best of Sweet.  At this, Sweet asked, "What did she say 
happened?" Deputy Peyrot then related what SM had told him, including the size 
of Sweet's penis.  Sweet replied 
that he does undo his jeans (when sleeping).  The deputy stated there was only one way 
SM knew about Sweet's penis and that was because "she's telling me the truth and 
you've made a gravest mistake today, a huge mistake today . . . and lost control 
of yourself somehow, which is very unfortunate, I got to tell you [SM's] heart 
is broken . . . ."  

 
 
[¶14]   Throughout the deputy's statements, 
Sweet stated that he was sleeping and nothing happened.  Deputy Peyrot then stated that he knew 
Sweet was not sleeping and Sweet felt bad about what happened. The deputy asked 
if Sweet had any remorse about what happened; Sweet said nothing happened; and 
the deputy stated, "I know that you did, I know that [SM] saw your penis this 
morning."  Sweet replied that SM was 
wrong, to which Deputy Peyrot rhetorically asked, "She's a liar," and Sweet 
stated he won't call her a liar. The deputy next stated that he has had a lot of 
experience with men who live with single moms with kids and become their best 
friend for purposes of sexually taking advantage of their children.  The deputy stated that there are only 
two ways for what happened, one is that Sweet planned and organized it or he 
made a bad decision. After stating he wondered if he needed to talk to every 
young lady Sweet had been around, the deputy said, "Well, I know this happened 
today, I know you reached in her shirt and felt her boobs"  Sweet interjected, 
"No, I did not"  I know that you unzipped your pants and took your penis out, 
ok, because there's only one way twelve-year-old [SM] who adores you like a 
father saw your penis and that's that her story is true and you're feeling holy 
shit what happened today."   

 
 
[¶15]   After further conversation 
concerning Sweet's leaving the trailer and going to another trailer that he was 
not supposed to be in, SM's statement to the deputy, and Sweet's denial, Deputy 
Peyrot said this was not a situation where Sweet was going to "insult [SM's] 
honesty . . . my intelligence . . . and your own dignity by telling me that you 
were asleep . . . ."  Sweet then 
stated he has a history of sleepwalking; he said, "maybe I did it in my sleep, I 
don't know."  Sweet said, "I might 
have done it, but I was sleeping."  
He said, "If it happened, I will not disrespect what she said, but I 
apologize very much so because . . . I did, I went to sleep."  After stating Sweet was claiming it 
happened in his sleep, the deputy said, "Yet, I know it happened and you're 
saying, maybe, Duane, I did it in my sleep." The deputy said that even in his 
biggest drinking weekend he never grabbed a twelve-year-old girl and told her, 
"Don't ever tell anybody about this and took my penis out, that's what happened 
this morning and I want to know why."  
Sweet responded that he didn't believe the deputy and didn't believe SM. 
Sweet then said if it happened, he was extremely sorry, but he didn't believe it 
did, because he was asleep.  Deputy 
Peyrot then said that the only deviation between what SM had told him and what 
Sweet was telling him were the things that were trouble for a 
thirty-seven-year-old man.  Sweet 
replied he did not touch SM, to which the deputy said, "Well, I believe that you 
did."  When Sweet reiterated that he 
was not lying, the deputy replied, "I gotta tell you I'm not lying either.  I believe the things that [SM] told me." 
The deputy told Sweet he was not buying his sleepwalking. Sweet again said 
nothing happened. Apparently at this point in the interview, Deputy Peyrot 
momentarily left the room.

 
 
[¶16]   When the deputy resumed his 
interview, he again reviewed what SM had said about Sweet's penis and that he 
didn't think she was making a false report. When Sweet said he didn't recall 
doing anything, the deputy said, "You see the problem I'm in because I believe 
her hundred percent."  In concluding 
the interview, Deputy Peyrot said:

 
 
You 
know what, this is what I'm going to do, ok, I'm going to arrest you based upon 
the things that [SM] said.  [SM] 
said, "He tried to rape me."  I 
think that's true and that's what you're going to jail for.  And, you know what, when we're talking 
about being decent . . . ok, I think that you need to be decent enough to admit 
that there was a mistake made today.  

 
 
[¶17]   Following the playing of this 
recorded interview, the prosecutor continued his direct examination of the 
deputy and asked questions about the deputy's perceptions of 
SM:

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  Thank you.  Now, sir, you were present in the 
courtroom when [SM] testified earlier today, were you not?

 
 
A.        I 
was.

 
 
Q.        You 
had a chance to observe her demeanor and how she related to being talked to by 
myself and by [defense counsel].

 
 
A.        I 
did.

 
 
Q.        Could 
you contrast and compare that with how her mannerisms were when she talked with 
you in her mother's residence on November 29, sir?

 
 
A.        Well, 
[SM's] demeanor was quite a lot different with me.  I have had  excuse me  I've had just a lot of success talking with 
kids over my career.  I think that's 
both related to the training, the fact that I'm a dad, the fact I'm pretty 
empathetic.  [SM] and I talked for 
that 40 minutes.  I felt like she 
was comfortable talking to me.  I 
felt like she was truthful talking to me.  I felt like she was  the things she was 
saying to me, relating to me as facts, fit the situation as I observed them, you 
know; as you can compare facts being stated to you to the environment and to the 
feeling you're getting as you're talking to the person.

 
 
Q.        And 
how about her volume of voice when she talked with you at the residence, 
sir?

 
 
A.        Well, 
she's  she's a 12-year-old girl talking to a strange adult male, of which I 
learned there wasn't a lot of adult males in her life, especially any that would 
be anything close to a role model.  
But I thought she made good eye 
contact.  I thought  I thought she 
was decisive in answering my questions when I would say, who, where, what, 
how.

 
 
Q.        Did 
she display any inconsistencies in the interview that you conducted with 
her?

 
 
A.        No, 
she didn't.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶18]   At this point in the deputy's 
direct examination, after a side-bar among the prosecutor, defense counsel, and 
the trial judge, the prosecutor continued his direct examination of the deputy 
to address apparent inconsistencies in SM's earlier cross-examination testimony 
brought out by Sweet's defense counsel. The prosecutor addressed these matters 
by having Deputy Peyrot recount SM's interview statements to him on those 
specific points brought out under defense counsel's cross-examination of 
SM.  At the conclusion of that 
direct examination, the prosecutor turned back to the deputy's interview of 
Sweet:

 
 
Q.        Now, 
sir, let's turn to your interview with Mr. Sweet.  What was Mr. Sweet's appearance and 
demeanor at the beginning of the interview, sir?

 
 
A.        I had 
been informed that the deputies thought that he was  had been drinking.  I was pleasantly surprised when I got in 
the interview room  because I'd never met him before  that he was very 
articulate; that his speech was very easily understood; that he reacted 
certainly appropriately to my questioning.

 
 
Q.        
Uh-huh.  As the interview 
wore on, did his appearance or demeanor change in any fashion?  

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.        All 
right.  Was there anything unusual about the 
position he took in this case during the interview?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        What 
was that, sir?

 
 
A.        Well, 
I felt throughout the interview with Mr. 
Sweet that he was trying to deflect me.  He would bring up  

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  Your Honor, I'm going to 
object to all of these impressions.  
Everybody in the courtroom heard the interview. 

 
 
THE 
COURT:            
Sustained.

 
 
Q.        (By 
[prosecutor]):      
Did he appear to maintain his faculties through the entire 
interview?

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  I'll object to the same 
question.

 
 
THE 
COURT:            
Sustained.

 
 
Q.        (By 
[prosecutor]):      
Did the demeanor change from start to end, sir?

 
 
A.        No. 
 [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶19]   Defense counsel conducted a brief 
cross-examination of the deputy.  
The prosecutor announced that the State's case was concluded.  Defense counsel called no witnesses and 
rested the defense case.  

 
 
[¶20]   During the prosecutor's closing 
argument, he recounted SM's testimony about the alleged incident, and he 
said:

 
 
            
And remember Duane Peyrot when he was talking with Mr. Sweet.  He found it very interesting, in fact, 
very surprising, that this young lady, at 12 years of age, with little, if any, 
knowledge of sex  of adult sex, would be able to describe this man's penis as 
small, soft and wrinkly.  Think 
about that very carefully, please, ladies and gentlemen.  

 
 
Following 
further argument, the prosecutor played the deputy's interview with Sweet in its 
entirety.  In this regard, he 
commented:

 
 
            
Ladies and gentlemen, I played the entire interview out of fairness to 
the defendant.  It may have been 
overly lengthy.  If so, I apologize 
for that.  But, again, I felt if we 
were going to hear his statement to Deputy Peyrot, we should hear all of 
it.  

 
 
After 
further argument, the prosecutor concluded, saying:

 
 
            
So when Deputy Peyrot says on 
the tape he finds it very interesting 
[SM] was able to describe his penis that morning, I think you should find that very 
interesting, too.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶21]   In defense counsel's closing 
argument, he emphasized that on the recording Sweet consistently denied the 
alleged incident happened; that SM's interview statements and trial testimony 
contained numerous and serious inconsistencies; that there was no physical 
evidence of the alleged incident, such as bruises on SM's person; and that the 
recorded interview was a "strange confession" because Sweet consistently denied 
SM's accusation.  Defense counsel 
remarked that "[a]lmost all of the testimony was from Mr. Peyrot, as he's saying 
things.  He's a very skilled 
interrogator, very skilled, one of the best we have around here, and did he ever 
get Mr. Sweet to say that?  
No."  

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶22]   We noted at the beginning of this 
opinion that, because Sweet's defense counsel did not object on improper 
vouching grounds to the admission into evidence of the recorded interview 
between Deputy Peyrot and Sweet, the plain error standard of review applies to 
this issue.  "Plain error exists 
when:  1) the record is clear about 
the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice."  Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 19, 
228 P.3d 874, 882 (Wyo. 2010).  

 
 

Analysis

 
 
[¶23]   The State agrees that the incidents 
alleged by Sweet to be error are clear on the record as is evident from the 
above and foregoing references.  The 
parties part company, however, on the second requirement of the plain error 
standard.  Sweet maintains that a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious way.  In his appellate brief, he 
states:

 
 
            
This Court has a long-standing rule that an expert may not vouch for the 
truthfulness or credibility of a victim, or any other witnesses.  Dean v. State, 2008 WY 124, ¶ 15, 194 P.3d 299, 304 (Wyo. 2008), citing, Seward 
v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 19, 76 P.3d 805, 814 (Wyo. 2003).  Otherwise, evidentiary issues are 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and this Court will not 
reverse unless it finds a clear abuse of discretion.  Solis v. State, [9]81 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
            
Further, it is improper for one witness to comment that another witness 
is lying.  "The admonition against 
asking the appellant whether other witnesses lied applies equally to asking any 
witness whether another witness has lied.  
State v. Manning, 270 Kan. 
674, 19 P.3d 84, 100-01 (2001).  
That is because such questions invade the province of the jury to 
determine witness credibility.  Id."  Profitt v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 16, 193 P.3d 228, 236 (Wyo. 2008). . . .

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
            
This Court has examined vouching-type testimony, evidence and argument in 
a number of contexts.  See Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 17, 
197 P.3d 156, 162 (Wyo. 2008) (prosecutor's remark in opening statement that 
witness was a pretty honest man was error, but not prejudicial); Drury v. State, 2008 WY 130, ¶ 10, 194 P.3d 1020, 1021 (Wyo. 2008) (police officer testified as lay witness, and tried 
to interject opinions as to credibility of those interviewed; harmless error 
found); Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶¶ 
20-22, 184 P.3d 687, 694 (Wyo. 2008) (prosecutor's statements that he stood 
behind law enforcement constituted improper vouching, but no prejudice found); 
and numerous other cases.

 
 
[¶24]   In addition to the authority cited 
by Sweet, we are mindful of this Court's additional authority, from earlier to 
more recent times.  See Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 
1198-99, 1200 (Wyo. 1977) (not error for trial court to reject psychologist's 
testimony concerning defendant's propensity to tell the truth as such testimony 
invades the province of the jury; expert witness, cloaked in garb of expertise, 
cannot testify as to the truthfulness of the defendant's version in that it 
assumes the function of the jury); Zabel 
v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 360, 362 (Wyo. 1988) (well established in Wyoming 
that an expert witness cannot vouch for the truthfulness or credibility of an 
alleged victim; "a clear and unequivocal rule of law exists concerning this type 
of testimony: [t]he credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the 
jury and may not be the subject of expert testimony"); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 67-68 
(Wyo. 1989), overruled on other grounds 
by Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807 (Wyo. 2008) (error to permit a 
witness, lay or expert, to articulate an opinion as to accused's guilt and error 
to permit expert to vouch for the truth of the victim who did testify; such 
testimony encourages jury to abdicate its responsibility); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881-82 
(Wyo. 1990) (error for investigating officer to state opinion that defendant was 
drug dealer and guilty because it invades jury's function); Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 
1337-1341 (Wyo. 1992) (investigating deputy sheriff's direct examination 
testimony that he listened to alleged victim and determined she had been raped 
was inferential vouching for truth of alleged victim's testimony which invaded 
jury's function); Wilde v. State, 
2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 15-19, 74 P.3d 699, 708-09 (Wyo. 2003) (error to admit evidence 
vouching for alleged victim's credibility as it invades jury's function to 
assess credibility issues); Seward v. 
State, 2003 WY 116, ¶¶ 18-29, 76 P.3d 805, 812-18 (Wyo. 2003) ("forensic 
interviewer" and investigating detective both improperly vouched for credibility 
of alleged victim who also testified at trial);  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶¶ 9-25, 98 P.3d 143, 146-51 (Wyo. 2004) (same "forensic interviewer" in Seward and Wilde improperly vouched for credibility 
of alleged victim who also testified at trial); Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶¶ 10-12, 
153 P.3d 256, 260-61 (Wyo. 2007) (State concedes violation of clear and 
unequivocal rule of law that prohibits "were-they-lying" questions in 
examination of witness); and Schreibvogel, ¶¶ 41-43, 228 P.3d  at 888 
(State concedes violation of clear and unequivocal rules of law that prohibit a 
witness's comment on the truthfulness or veracity of another witness and 
prohibit "were-they-lying" questions in examination of witness as violation 
invades province of jury).

 
 
[¶25]   Although the State concedes our 
abundant authority prohibiting vouching, it maintains that no decision from this 
Court addresses "the ultimate question of whether the introduction of a police 
interview, in which officers employed such accepted interviewing techniques as 
expressing disbelief of an interviewee's story, actually and unequivocally 
constitutes vouching."  Moreover, 
the State canvasses ten decisions from eight other jurisdictions to demonstrate 
that "various conclusions have been drawn by courts as to whether police 
statements made in an interrogation or interview should be considered vouching 
or commenting upon an individual's guilt when referenced at trial."3  

 
 
[¶26]   Both Sweet and the State recognize 
that in Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 
36, 180 P.3d 212 (Wyo. 2008), we considered a factual situation somewhat similar 
to the instant situation.  In that 
case, Pendleton, who did not object at trial to, but advocated for the 
admissibility of, a three-hour recorded police interview which was played to the 
jury, claimed on appeal that in a short excerpt from that recorded interview the 
officers expressed opinions of guilt and implicitly vouched for the credibility 
of the State's witnesses when they accused Pendleton of lying.  Id., ¶ 10, 180 P.3d  at 216.  Instead of addressing the first two 
requirements of the plain error standard  the incident is clear on the record 
and the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law  this Court only 
analyzed whether prejudice resulted when the jury heard the short excerpt about 
which Pendleton complained.  Id., ¶ 11, 180 P.3d  at 216.  We found no prejudice because Pendleton 
had advocated for the admissibility of the recording; Pendleton's opening 
statement and closing argument repeatedly referred to the short excerpt in 
question and emphasized to the jury to listen to the entire recording as a 
whole; it was apparent that Pendleton intended to use the recorded interview as 
a means of presenting her version of the events without testifying in open 
court; the recorded interview appeared to have been an integral part of 
Pendleton's trial strategy; and the jury instruction that it was for the jury to 
determine the credibility of all witnesses and the evidence mitigated any 
adverse effect that the alleged improper statements might have had on the 
jury.  Id., ¶¶ 13-19, 180 P.3d  at 
217-18.

 
 
[¶27]   Sweet distinguishes Pendleton from his situation by noting 
that he, unlike Pendleton, did not advocate for the admissibility of the 
recorded interview; rather, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the interview, 
albeit on involuntariness grounds.  
For its part, the State argues that in Pendleton we made no finding and did not 
discuss whether the short excerpt in question actually constituted the giving of 
vouching testimony.  We 
disagree.  Implicit in our review 
were our determinations that the record clearly showed the incident and a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law had been violated.  Had that not been implicit, we would not 
have gone directly to the prejudice requirement.

 
 
[¶28]   We have carefully considered the 
contending arguments and must hold that Deputy Peyrot's numerous statements in 
both the recorded interview and his trial testimony, as identified by Sweet in 
his argument and as identified in our recounting of his trial testimony, 
violated in a clear and obvious way this Court's long-standing rules prohibiting 
a witness to express opinions about the accused's mendacity and guilt and about 
the alleged victim's truthfulness and credibility; such statements invade the 
exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and 
the evidence.

 
 
[¶29]   With regard to prejudice, the third 
requirement of the plain error standard, Sweet emphasizes that the prosecution 
rested entirely upon the hotly contested credibility of SM, as there was no 
physical evidence that the alleged abuse had occurred.  He points out that his cross-examination 
revealed numerous inconsistencies in her testimony and interview 
statements.  He argues there was an 
implication that SM's motive in her accusation was to leave her mother's 
household and live with her father.  
He notes that the recorded interview was played to the jury twice, during 
the prosecution's direct examination of Deputy Peyrot and again in the 
prosecution's closing argument.  He 
argues that because the prosecution's case rested entirely on the inconsistent 
and suspect word of SM, the overwhelming amount of improper vouching ensured 
that prejudice existed.

 
 
[¶30]   In response, the State argues that 
Sweet has failed to show he was prejudiced by the recorded interview.  The State notes that Sweet relied 
heavily upon the recorded interview in his closing argument, pointing out that 
he never admitted to any wrongdoing and that he stated at least twenty-five 
times that he did not do what SM accused him of.  The State also reminds us that the jury 
was instructed about its exclusive role in determining witness credibility and 
that we presume the jury follows this instruction.  According to the State, it is likely the 
jury understood that Deputy Peyrot's statements during the recorded interview 
were part of an interrogation technique.  
We think that unlikely since there is no evidence that the deputy 
explained that in his trial testimony.  
In its brief, the State claimed that nothing in Deputy Peyrot's trial 
testimony came remotely close to resembling vouching for SM; however, we commend 
the State for correcting that claim in oral argument.  In that particular instance, one finds 
in the deputy's testimony on direct examination this 
statement:

 
 
I've 
had just a lot of success talking with kids over my career.  I think that's both related to the 
training, the fact that I'm a dad, the fact I'm pretty empathetic.  [SM] and I talked for that 40 
minutes.  I felt like she was 
comfortable talking to me.  I felt 
like she was truthful talking to me.  
I felt like she was  the things she was saying to me, relating to me as 
facts, fit the situation as I observed them, you know; as you can compare facts 
being stated to you to the environment and to the feeling you're getting as 
you're talking to the person.  

 
 
Finally, 
the State points to the prosecutor's closing argument in which he reminded the 
jury that it was for the jury alone to decide what the evidence was and the 
weight to be given each person's testimony and the 
evidence.

 
 
[¶31]   Under plain error analysis, to 
establish material prejudice an appellant must show a reasonable possibility 
that he would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the 
error.  Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 362.  Our examination takes into account the 
entire record.  Pendleton, ¶ 11, 180 P.3d  at 216; Talley, ¶ 14, 153 P.3d  at 261.  When the error concerns the admission of 
improper evidence, among the considerations are:

 
 
(1)  whether the evidence furnished important 
corroboration of other testimony; (2) whether it related to a material, 
consequential fact; (3) whether counsel relied on the evidence in argument; (4) 
whether the evidence was cumulative; and (5) the effect of any instructions 
given to the jury.  1 Weinstein's 
Evidence, ¶ 103[06] (1986).

 
 

Zabel, 
765 P.2d  at 362.  We have recognized 
that "perhaps the single most significant factor in weighing whether an error 
was harmful is the strength of the case against the defendant."  Id. (quoting 3A Charles A. Wright, et 
al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 854 at 305 (2d ed. 1982)).

 
 
[¶32]   In this case the State's evidence 
of Sweet's guilt was not overwhelming; the State provided no physical evidence 
as there was none; it relied solely on testimonial evidence.  A close factual dispute existed between 
SM's testimony and Sweet's statements contained in the recorded interview.  In the State's opening statement to the 
jury, it told the jury that the recorded interview was "significant evidence" on 
which it needed to concentrate and that it would hear on the recording that 
Sweet believed SM was truthful.  In 
the State's case-in-chief, the prosecution presented Deputy Peyrot as an expert 
"forensic interviewer" and the deputy testified that, during his interview of 
SM, he asked her if she knew the difference between the truth and a lie.  Under the prosecutor's questioning, the 
deputy testified as to his opinion of SM's mannerisms and demeanor during her 
interview with him and her testimony at trial; he testified "I felt like she was 
truthful talking to me."  The 
prosecutor played the recorded interview between the deputy and Sweet during the 
deputy's trial testimony and again during the prosecution's closing 
argument.

 
 
[¶33]   During the prosecutor's closing 
argument, he asked the jury to remember that Deputy Peyrot found it "very 
interesting, very surprising" in his interview with Sweet that SM would be able 
to describe Sweet's penis; the prosecutor asked the jury to think about that 
very carefully and told the jury "I think you should find that very interesting, 
too."  Our impression is that the 
prosecutor relied on the deputy's interview statements and trial testimony to 
paint Sweet in an unfavorable light and his accuser in a favorable 
light.

 
 
[¶34]   While Sweet relied on the recorded 
interview to show his repeated denials of the deputy's accusations, he had 
little choice since the court had denied his suppression motion.  In that respect, this case is 
distinguishable from Pendleton in 
which the defendant advocated for the admissibility of the recorded 
interview.

 
 
[¶35]   Although the jury instructions 
correctly informed the jury of its role in determining credibility, we are 
concerned that no cautionary instructions were given to the effect that the 
deputy's statements were not to be considered as evidence.  

 
 
[¶36]   Credibility was the pervasive issue 
for the jury in this trial.  In our 
view, a reasonable possibility exists that in the absence of the deputy's 
statements in the recorded interview and in his trial testimony which commented 
on the alleged victim's truthfulness and the accused's mendacity and guilt the 
verdict might have been more favorable to Sweet.  Consequently, we reverse and remand for 
a new trial in which these errors will not be repeated.

 
 

Issue 
Two:    Whether Jury 
Instruction No. 11 was improper.

 
 

Background 
Facts

 
 
[¶37]   The trial court gave Jury 
Instruction No. 11 which read "Corroboration of an alleged victim's testimony is 
not necessary to obtain a conviction for sexual assault."  The record is not clear who proposed 
this instruction.

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶38]   As noted previously, the applicable 
standard of review is plain error.

 
 

Analysis

 
 
[¶39]   Sweet claims error because he was 
charged with "sexual abuse," not "sexual assault" as this instruction 
reads.  While he and the State argue 
back and forth about the evolution of the Wyoming statutes covering the various 
sexual assault and sexual abuse provisions, we find it unnecessary to sort that 
out because, as we recently observed in Garza v. State, 2010 WY 64, ¶ 21, 
­­­­__ P.3d __, __ (Wyo. 2010), we disapproved of a similar jury 
instruction in Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1044-46 (Wyo. 1986).  On 
retrial of this case, the trial court shall not give this jury 
instruction.

 
 
Issue 
Three: Whether cumulative error occurred 
because of alleged improper victim impact testimony, alleged judicial and 
prosecutorial bias in favor of the alleged victim, admission of alleged 
irrelevant evidence, and the prosecutor's multiple references to sexual 
assault.

 
 
Standard 
of Review and Cumulative Error

 
 
[¶40]   As previously stated, the 
applicable standard of review is plain error. With respect to assignments of 
cumulative error, we have said:

 
 
The 
purpose of evaluating for cumulative error is to address whether the cumulative 
effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to 
prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a single reversible 
error.

 
 

Guy 
v. State, 
2008 WY 56, ¶ 45, 184 P.3d 687, 701 (Wyo. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).  When making this evaluation, we consider 
only matters that were determined to be errors, and not any matter assigned as 
error but determined not to be erroneous.  
Id.; Eaton v. State, 2008 WY 97, ¶ 105, 192 P.3d 36, 79 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

Analysis

 
 

1.         
Improper Victim Impact Testimony

 
 
[¶41]   Sweet claims the prosecutor asked 
SM and her mother questions designed to produce inappropriate victim impact 
responses and claims the prosecutor argued victim impact information in his 
closing argument.  All of the 
instances Sweet cites in his brief are clear from the record, satisfying the 
first part of the plain error standard of review.  However, he has failed to demonstrate a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  We have said:

 
 
Broadly 
speaking, victim impact evidence is that evidence relating to the victim's 
personal characteristics and to the physical, emotional, or social impact of a 
crime on its victim and the victim's family.

 
 

Smith 
v. State, 
2005 WY 113, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d 411, 416 (Wyo. 2005).  For victim impact testimony to be 
admissible, it must be relevant:

 
 
The 
evidence must be relevant to be admissible.  W.R.E. 402.  Evidence is relevant if it has "any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." W.R.E. 401.  
In criminal cases, "[e]vidence is always relevant if it tends to prove or 
disprove one of the elements of the crime charged."  Gomez v. State, 2003 WY 58, ¶ 6, 68 P.3d 1177, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Geiger v. 
State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo. 1993)).  
Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  W.R.E. 403.

 
 

Moore 
v. State, 
2003 WY 153, ¶ 26, 80 P.3d 191, ¶ 26 (Wyo. 2003).  The testimony of victims of a crime 
describing how it affected their lives after the crime is irrelevant with 
respect to issues before a jury.  Moore, ¶ 27 (citing Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010-11 
(Wyo. 1989)).

 
 

Jensen 
v. State, 
2005 WY 84, ¶ 16, 116 P.3d 1088, 1094 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶42]   The specific excerpts pointed out 
by Sweet do not fit our definition of victim impact testimony and, even if they 
did, the testimony was otherwise relevant.  
Sweet claims the following portion of SM's testimony was 
error:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:     [SM], how did you feel while this 
was going on?

 
 
[SM]:     Scared.

 
 
Q:        Were 
you crying?

 
 
A.        
Yes.   

 
 
When 
we consider the context of that testimony, it is seen that the prosecutor was 
having the victim testify as to the totality of the circumstances at the time 
the alleged incident occurred and immediately thereafter.  Just before those questions were asked, 
SM had testified about telling her mother about the incident.  It was clear by this point that Sweet's 
defense was to discredit SM with seemingly inconsistent statements made before 
her trial testimony.  Thus, this 
information was relevant to bolster SM's credibility by showing that at a 
relevant time she exhibited a demeanor consistent with having experienced a 
traumatic event, and to give the jury a reason as to why her previous statements 
and trial testimony may have appeared inconsistent.  See White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 20, 
80 P.3d 642, 651 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶43]   Sweet also claims the testimony of 
CB, SM's mother, contained victim impact testimony:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:    
What was your state of mind at that time, ma'am?  Were you upset?

 
 
[CB]:   Very.

 
 
Q.        
Describe to us a little bit about what you were feeling at the 
moment?

 
 
A.        Heart 
broke.  Just so angry that I could  
I punched a wall.

 
 
Q.        Did 
you hurt yourself?

 
 
A.        
Yeah.  

 
 
This 
testimony was elicited as the prosecutor was having the mother testify to the 
events occurring immediately after her daughter informed her about the 
incident.  It was relevant as it 
provided the context of and the likely reason for Sweet's flight from the home, 
which lead to the subsequent police action.  As this testimony was relevant, it 
clearly did not qualify as victim impact testimony.  As noted above, victim impact testimony 
is "evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and to the 
physical, emotional, or social impact of a crime on its victim and the victim's 
family."  Smith, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d  at 416.  This testimony described the 
circumstances at the time of and shortly after the incident, not how the 
incident has further impacted SM or her mother.

 
 
[¶44]   Finally, the prosecutor's closing 
argument did not reference any victim impact testimony.  Sweet has cited one paragraph of a 
closing statement that consumed ten and a half pages of transcript and, when we 
consider that argument in its entirety, it is clear that  in the single 
challenged paragraph  the prosecutor was trying to help the jury understand 
SM's demeanor while testifying and why she previously may have made statements 
inconsistent with her trial testimony:

 
 
I'd 
like to talk with you a little bit about [SM] in this sense. You got to see her 
on the witness stand yesterday. You got to see her demeanor, her mannerisms as 
she talked with you. And I think what you saw was a very shy 13-year-old girl in 
the early stages yet of puberty, perhaps reluctant, wouldn't you think, to be 
talking about things like this in a great big courtroom with a microphone in 
front of her, in front of people whom she's never before met in her life, about 
things of an embarrassing nature. 

And, 
please, no one answer these questions, but let's consider this. What if someone 
came up to you and said, I would like you, in front of a great big group of 
strangers, to tell us in intimate detail about the best possible sexual 
experience you've ever had in your life. How would you feel about that? How 
would you feel about that?  

Let's 
flip the question over. What if someone came up to you and said, I want you to 
tell me in great detail about the worst sexual experience you've ever had in 
your life. How would you like to deal with that question? And how would you 
handle it? How would a 13  girl now 13 years old handle it? Well, we saw. 

Now 
let's talk a little bit about inconsistencies. I don't know how you viewed 
[defense counsel's] cross-examination of [SM] yesterday. My thoughts aren't 
important. Yours are. But [defense counsel] attempted to develop some areas of 
inconsistency. 

Was 
she wearing a bra? Was she not? Did [Sweet] have black sweat pants on, or was he 
wearing black jeans? These kinds of things. 

Did 
she come out of her mother's room on her own, or did he invite her out? 

Was 
Scooby Doo on, or was it not? 

Did 
you notice something? He stayed away from the sexual assault entirely. He never 
went there. He never went there. 

Now, 
think about the events of that day occurring November 29, 2007, a little over 
six months ago now if my elementary math is correct, and think about your own 
common experience and common sense you had of human affairs, and think whether 
or not a person's memory of detailed events gets better with time or worse with 
time. 

And 
considering her credibility, why don't you consider this? What if every single 
thing she had told you yesterday dovetailed 110 percent with what she told 
Deputy Peyrot? Wouldn't that give you reason to be more suspicious of her 
testimony? Wouldn't you think she had been rehearsed to the very last ultimate 
detail, if that had occurred? 

It 
did not occur. The reason why, it was because she was testifying based on her 
best present memory of the events that occurred.  

When 
the challenged statement in the third paragraph quoted above is put into context 
of the closing argument as a whole, we see that the prosecutor was not trying to 
discuss the impact the crime had on SM. Instead, he was asking the jury to 
consider such circumstances as the passage of time and the stresses of 
testifying when it considered the credibility of SM's testimony, particularly in 
conjunction with statements she had previously made.  Consequently, Sweet has failed to show 
any error regarding victim impact testimony or argument that could be considered 
in a cumulative error analysis. 

 
 

2.         
Whether the prosecutor and district court exhibited bias toward 
SM. 

 
 
[¶45]   Sweet claims that the district 
court and the prosecutor exhibited bias towards SM at trial, as they used terms 
of endearment such as "My Dear" and "Hon" when speaking to her. While it is 
clear from the record the prosecutor and district court did use these terms and 
phrases, Sweet has failed to show a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law. 

[¶46]   We have previously defined bias, 
specifically in the judicial context: 

 
 
Bias 
is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another. The 
"bias" which is a ground for disqualification of a judge must be personal, and 
it must be such a condition of the mind which sways judgment and renders the 
judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a given case or which is 
inconsistent with a state of mind fully open to the conviction which evidence 
might produce. 

Pearson 
v. State, 
866 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008, 1031 
(Wyo. 1984)).   Our review of 
the record does not reveal any exhibition of bias or favoritism towards SM on 
the part of the district court when it called SM "My Dear" one time; nor does 
the prosecutor's calling her "Hon" on four occasions manifest any undue bias in 
that direction. Instead, the record simply shows with respect to the latter that 
the prosecutor, at four random points during his direct and cross-examination, 
used a term of address commonly employed when referring to others, particularly 
children. This does not demonstrate bias towards a victim or, more importantly, 
against Sweet. Nor would the jury likely interpret that usage as manifesting 
bias. When the district court referred to SM as "My Dear," SM was under 
aggressive cross-examination by defense counsel and she began shying away from 
the proceedings and speaking in a softer voice: 

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]: Okay. Did you testify differently to us at the County Attorney's 
Office? Do you understand what I mean? Did you ever say something different? 

 
 
[SM]:   Not that I know of I haven't. 

 
 
Q:        Okay. 
Why don't you turn to page 9. 

 
 
Look 
at about the fifth line down. One that starts: Yeah, how long had you been sick? 

 
 
A: 
       Yes. 

 
 
Q: 
       And 
then you answered the next line. What did you say? 

 
 
A: 
       It 
started that day, and I think I was gone the next day. 

 
 
THE 
BAILIFF: The jury cannot hear. 

 
 
THE 
COURT:   [SM], I need you to 
pull that microphone and I need you to talk right into it, because none of us 
can hear you, My Dear. So I need you to do your best. I know you're trying, so 
pull that microphone down, talk right into it. Thank you. 

 
 
There 
is nothing in the record that shows the use of the phrase "My Dear" arose out of 
any bias or was likely to be understood by the jury as an expression of 
favoritism on the part of the trial court.  The court simply used a common moderately 
informal term of address, particularly applicable to children, when attempting 
to get SM to speak into the microphone.  We see nothing in that exchange 
indicating the court's resort to that familiar phrase revealed bias against 
Sweet.   Sweet has failed to 
demonstrate error that could be considered in a cumulative error analysis. 

 
 
3. 
        
Admission of alleged irrelevant evidence: Testimony regarding Sweet's 
actions after the incident and his subsequent 
arrest.

 
 
[¶47]   Sweet maintains that testimony 
regarding his actions after he was confronted by SM's mother and his subsequent 
arrest was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. The testimony is clear from 
the record but Sweet has failed to demonstrate a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.   SM's 
mother testified that, after she found out about the incident, she confronted 
Sweet and told him she was going to call the police. She further testified that, 
at that point in time, Sweet got into his car and left the scene. Deputy 
Benedict then testified to the facts surrounding Sweet's apprehension, including 
the suspicion he was hiding inside a residence, and Deputy Benedict's transport 
of Sweet to the detention center. The jury was also informed that the residence 
to which Sweet went belonged to a neighbor and Sweet did not have permission to 
be in the residence.

 
 
[¶48]   As Sweet points out in his brief, 
we have held that evidence of "flight is admissible as evidence of guilt and is 
admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt." Cureton v. State, 2003 WY 44, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003).  Sweet 
suggests, however, his actions in and of themselves could not be properly 
received as evidence of flight, and that the prosecutor needed to affirmatively 
show his actions constituted fleeing from the scene of the crime.  Sweet's claim is without merit. 

 
 
[¶49]   In Cureton, the appellant tried to dismiss 
flight as a reason for his actions as well. We held: 

 
 
The 
State is not required to prove the purpose of appellant's flight. Rather, it is 
up to the jury to fairly draw reasonable inferences as to the purpose of 
appellant's actions. Even though it is possible to draw other inferences from 
the evidence presented, the jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in 
the evidence. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. 
Simply stated, the jury was free to consider appellant's flight as showing 
consciousness of guilt for the Baldwin burglary. 

Id. 
¶ 12, 65 P.3d  at 1253 (internal citations omitted).  Because a jury could have reasonably 
inferred that Sweet's actions constituted fleeing from the scene of the crime, 
the evidence was relevant to show his consciousness of guilt.  Therefore, the evidence was admissible, 
and Sweet has failed to show an error that can be considered in a cumulative 
error analysis. 

 
 
4.         
The Prosecutor referred to Sweet's actions as an "assault" or "sexual 
assault."

 
 
[¶50]   Sweet's last contention is that it 
was error for the prosecutor to refer to Sweet's actions as a "sexual assault" 
or an "assault."  As in Sweet's 
argument concerning Jury Instruction No. 11, the basis for this argument is that 
he was charged with the crime of sexual abuse of a minor and not sexual assault. 
 However, the crime for which he was 
charged is contained within Article Three of Chapter Two of the Wyoming Criminal 
Code of 1982, which is entitled "Sexual Assault." 

 
 
[¶51]   Moreover, we find that common 
definitions of the terms "assault" and "sexual assault" show that, although the 
statutory title of the particular crime for which Sweet was convicted may not 
include the word "assault," SM was nonetheless subjected to an assault: 

 
 

assault, 
n. 
1. Criminal & tort law. The threat or use of force on another 
that causes that person to have a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or 
offensive contact; the act of putting another person in reasonable fear or 
apprehension of an immediate battery by means of an act amounting to an attempt 
or threat to commit a battery. 

Black's 
Law Dictionary 130 (9th ed. 2009). 

 
 

sexual 
assault. . 
. . 2. Offensive 
sexual contact with another person, exclusive of rape. 

Id. 
at 131.   We hold it was not 
error for the prosecutor to refer to Sweet's actions as an "assault" or a 
"sexual assault," as those are proper descriptions of his alleged conduct, 
although not the specific name of the crime. Therefore, Sweet has failed to show 
an error that can be considered in a cumulative error analysis. 

 
 
[¶52]   In conclusion, we hold that no 
error occurred with respect to any of Sweet's claims, and none of the trial 
events he has challenged carried any potential to prejudice him or otherwise 
affect the outcome of his trial.  Therefore, his cumulative error claim 
fails.

 
 
[¶53]   Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 6-2-315. 
Sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree; penalties.

 
 
            
(a) Except under circumstance constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the 
first degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314, an actor commits the crime of sexual 
abuse of a minor in the second degree if:

 
 
                        
* * * *

            
(ii) Being sixteen (16) years of age or older, the actor engages in 
sexual contact of a victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of 
age;

            

                        
* * * *

            
(b) A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is subject to 
imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, unless the person convicted 
qualifies under W.S. 6-2-306(e).

 
 

2W.R.E. 105 provides "[w]hen evidence is admissible as to one (1) party or 
for one (1) purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its 
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."

 
 

3"In 
Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14 
(Ky. 2005), the Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed whether the vouching rules 
applied to non-testimonial statements made by a police officer during an 
interrogation of a criminal suspect as part of the overall interrogation 
technique.'  Id. at 23.  In that case, the interrogation included 
statements by the officer that he believed the appellant was lying.  Id. at 19.  The court began by reviewing the rules 
established by other jurisdictions, but eventually recognized the difficulty in 
conjuring from them anything that could confidently be declared a majority 
rule.  Id. at 23-26 (citing State v. O'Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 221 
(Mo. 1993) (holding the testimony was not error because the officer "was not 
telling the jury that, in his opinion, the defendant is a liar.  Rather, the witness was describing the 
give-and-take of his interrogation of [the defendant]."'); Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 730 A.2d 513, 
521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that statements made in an interrogation accusing a defendant of lying were 
inadmissible because they were "akin to a prosecutor offering his or her 
opinion of the truth or falsity of the evidence presented by a criminal 
defendant . . . [or] a prosecutor's personal opinion, either in argument or via 
witnesses from the stand, as to the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant . 
. . ."'); State v. Demery, 30 P.3d 1278, 1282-83 (Wash. 2001) (plurality holding that officers' comments on the 
tape "were not offered during live testimony at the trial" and were "part of a 
commonly used police interview technique, designed to see whether a defendant 
will change her story during the course of an interrogation."' The plurality 
also stated that the statements were necessary to show the context of 
defendant's responses.); Dubria v. 
Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1148 (2001) 
(holding that "[t]he questions and comments by [the officer] placed [the 
defendant's] answers in context, much like a prosecutor's questions at trial." 
The court also noted that because the comments arose in the context of a 
pre-trial interview, "[t]hey were not the type of statements that carry any 
special aura of reliability [with the jury]."'); State v. Cordova, 51 P.3d 449, 453-55 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (holding that statements during interview that appellant 
was lying were admissible because they provided context for the defendant's 
answers.'); State v. Elnicki, 105 P.3d 1222, 1227-29 (Kan. 2005) (holding that there is no difference between 
statements made on the witness stand pertaining to one's credibility, and ones 
presented in a videotape.)). See also 
State v. Boggs, 185 P.3d 111, 121 (Ariz. 2008) (holding that [b]ecause [the 
officer's] accusations were part of an interrogation technique and were not made 
for the purpose of giving opinion testimony at trial, we find no fundamental 
error.'). 

"The 
Kentucky Supreme Court further recognized that, while there is not a clear 
majority rule, 

[a]lmost 
all of the courts that have considered the issue recognize that this form of 
questioning is a legitimate, effective interrogation tool. And because such 
comments are such an integral part of the interrogation, several courts have 
noted that they provide a necessary context for the defendant's responses. We 
agree that such recorded statements by the police during an interrogation are a 
legitimate, even ordinary, interrogation technique, especially when a suspect's 
story shifts and changes. We also agree that retaining such comments in the 
version of the interrogation recording played for the jury is necessary to 
provide a context for the answers given by the suspect. 

Lanham, 
171 S.W.3d  at 27. 

"In 
Lanham and the cases cited therein, 
the courts' somewhat divergent rules were concerned with statements made by 
officers during interrogation which indicated a belief that the defendant was 
lying. The rules are just as divergent when it comes to officers making 
statements during interviews which indicate they believe the victim. In Clark v. Commonwealth, No. 
2006-SC-000379-MR, 2008 WL 4692347 (Ky. Oct. 23, 2008), the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky decided to not extend the rule of law from Lanham to situations where an officer 
states to a suspect during an interview that he believes the victim. The court 
held that the rule from Lanham was 
limited to accusations by an officer that the defendant is not being truthful. 
Unwilling to extend the rule, the court concluded that the recorded interview 
with the statements regarding the victim telling the truth amounted to vouching 
for the victim's credibility. Id. at 
*5. 

"However, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals extended its rule from Cordova, and allowed statements 
regarding the credibility of a child victim's accusations. In State v. Flegel, No. 32956, 2007 WL 
4247653 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2007), the jury heard a recorded interview that 
included statements by a detective expressing her opinion regarding the truth of 
the victim's accusations. Id. at *5. 
The court, in reviewing its holding in Cordova, stated that a suspect's answers 
to police questioning are only admissible to the extent that they are relevant. 
Thus, an interrogator's comments that he or she believes the suspect is lying 
are only admissible to the extent that they provide context to a relevant answer 
by the suspect.' Id. Based upon this 
rule of the law, the court held that the detective's statements regarding the 
victim's credibility were necessary to provide context for the appellant's 
responses and, therefore, admissible. Id. at *6."