Title: Garcia v. Sanchez

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

362 P.2d 779 (1961) 68 N.M. 394 Agapito B. GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gregorio SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant. No. 6711. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 12, 1961. *780 McAtee, Toulouse, Marchiondo, Ruud & Gallagher, Albuquerque, for appellant. Chavez & Cowper, P. Pablo Marshall, Belen, for appellee. CHAVEZ, Justice. This is a suit for damages sustained by plaintiff, appellee herein, when struck by appellant's automobile, while plaintiff was walking across the street or Highway 85 within the corporate limits of Belen, New Mexico. The jury found for plaintiff and judgment was entered accordingly. Defendant seeks a reversal of said judgment. The parties will be designated as they appeared in the court below. Plaintiff and his wife live in their tourist court located on the west side of the street or Highway 85 which runs from north to south through Belen. On the evening of September 4, 1957, at approximately 7:40 P.M., plaintiff, clad in a white undershirt and black trousers, went to call his wife who was then across the street in front of the home of Mrs. Willie Rivera. The street or highway is black-topped, 23 feet wide, with a white centerline marking. There are businesses and houses on both sides of the street in the neighborhood and vicinity of the scene of the accident. A street light is located just south of Mrs. Rivera's home and she had her porch lights on. There was also a light at plaintiff's tourist court and the lighting was good on the street. It was not dark but was getting dark. The accident did not occur on a crosswalk or intersection. The evidence is in conflict as to the speed of defendant's car. Plaintiff's evidence indicates that defendant was driving from 40 to 45 miles per hour and that he did not decrease his speed from the time he was first seen to the point of impact, and if he did decrease his speed it was very slightly. Defendant's evidence is that his speed was only 25 or 30 miles per hour. The speed limit at the point of impact was 35 miles per hour. The road at the point of impact is straight for a distance of 150 yards to the north, whereupon it curves. Plaintiff's witnesses testified that at the time plaintiff was struck he was on the east side of the highway. Defendant could see from 100 to 150 feet ahead; he had his headlights dimmed, and he did not apply his brakes or sound his horn. He did not see plaintiff until he was very close to him, approximately five feet. Plaintiff testified that he came out of his tourist court going east and that when he was about to cross the road he stood at the end of a fence which is west of the highway, in order to allow two or three cars to pass. The cars were going in a southerly direction. There was no traffic from south to north. Plaintiff then looked north and south and, seeing no traffic coming, started to cross the road walking normally. When he crossed the white centerline defendant's car struck him. He did not see the car until it struck him. Defendant, who was driving in a southerly direction on said highway, testified that he was driving at a speed of approximately *781 25 or 30 miles per hour, his lights were on dim and he did not see plaintiff until he was very close to him, approximately five feet in front of his car. He tried to miss him by turning to the right. When defendant was asked to describe what plaintiff was doing when he first saw him he answered: Defendant could not see whether plaintiff was walking or running. There is also testimony that at the time defendant's car struck plaintiff two of the wheels of defendant's car were on each side of the centerline. Defendant claims that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant, or in the alternative, in refusing to enter judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. Defendant relies upon Button v. Metz, 66 N.M. 485, 349 P.2d 1047, as well as Sandoval v. Brown, 66 N.M. 235, 346 P.2d 551. Button v. Metz, supra, was an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian when he was struck in a parking lot by defendant's backing automobile. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendant moved and the trial court directed the jury to find for the defendant, stating that plaintiff had not carried the burden of proof; that plaintiff had not proved his case by a preponderance of the evidence and had not proved any negligence on the part of the defendant. The trial court also remarked that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Defendant, in the case before us, also argues that plaintiff failed in his burden of proof as a matter of law that defendant was negligent, and claims further that if defendant was negligent it was not the proximate cause of the accident. In Button v. Metz, supra, we said: We further held that the proof offered was sufficient to make the issue of appellee's negligence one for the jury, stating: We then laid down the rule as follows: The trial judge, who refused to direct a verdict for the defendant, evidently felt that reasonable men might differ on the question of defendant's negligence, and once that was determined the matter became one for the jury to decide. Reasonable men might differ as to whether defendant failed to keep a proper lookout, or keep his automobile under proper control, and whether he exercised the care and caution commensurate with the situation confronting him. This is particularly true when we consider that defendant was driving within the corporate limits of Belen, on the main thoroughfare and in an area where there are businesses and homes on both sides of the street or highway. The time that the accident occurred and the period of the year must also be considered. Reasonable minds might differ as to whether defendant's failure to apply his brakes and sound his horn was negligence on his part. We cannot say that under the facts of the case before us that the trial court committed error under this point. Under point II error is claimed for the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict for defendant on the ground that plaintiff's own negligence contributed to the accident. Defendant cites Sandoval v. Brown, 66 N.M. 235, 346 P.2d 551, 554, wherein we affirmed the action of the district court in instructing the jury to return a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff's case on the ground that the defendant was guilty of contributory negligence. In Sandoval v. Brown, supra, we quoted from Gray v. Esslinger, 46 N.M. 421, 130 P.2d 24, as follows: Under the facts in Sandoval v. Brown, supra, we properly stated: The facts in the case before us are distinguishable from the facts in Sandoval v. Brown, supra. We believe that the facts in the case before us are similar to the facts in Terry v. Bisswell, 64 N.M. 153, 326 P.2d 89, 92, wherein we quoted from Williams v. Haas, 52 N.M. 9, 189 P.2d 632, as follows: We hold that under the facts of the case before us that reasonable minds might very well differ on the question of plaintiff's *783 negligence and whether such negligence contributed proximately, with the negligence of the defendant, to cause the injury, and thus the matter is issuable before a jury. Under point III defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of misconduct of the jury. Under this point defendant argues that the trial court committed error in three particulars, to-wit: During the course of the trial counsel for the defendant examined one Fernando Sanchez, a witness for defendant and the person who was a guest of the defendant and in his car at the time of the accident. The following took place when counsel for the defendant was questioning Fernando Sanchez: The trial court also gave the following instruction to the jury: The cause was submitted to the jury for deliberation at 4:45 P.M. on May 29, 1959, and the jury deliberated until approximately 8:00 P.M., whereupon the jury returned into open court and advised the court that they desired further instructions. The trial court advised the jury that he could not give them further instructions; that it would require a re-reading of all of the instructions previously given; and inquired numerically as to where the jury stood at that time. The foreman of the jury replied that the vote was seven to five. The trial court then gave to the jury the following supplemental instruction at 8:05 P.M.: At 8:15 P.M. the jury returned into open court and rendered its verdict for the plaintiff. On June 8, 1959, the following affidavit was filed with the clerk of the district court: Defendant quotes from Theurer v. Holland Furnace Co., 10 Cir., 124 F.2d 494, 499, that: With the above statement of the law we have no quarrel. However, in Finck Cigar Co. v. Campbell, 134 Tex. 250, 133 S.W.2d 759, 761, it is said: In Lambert v. Polen, 346 Pa. 352, 30 A.2d 115, 116, a motion for withdrawal of a juror was made under the following circumstances: During cross-examination of appellees' witness to statements made by appellant prior to trial, counsel for appellant asked the witness: "Q. Was anything else said?" and the witness answered, "He said he thought the case was settled. He said he carried insurance and said he thought the case was settled." Counsel for appellant thereupon moved to withdraw a juror on the ground that this remark was improper as a reference to an insurance company being interested in the verdict, which motion was refused. The court, in passing upon the question, stated: See also Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa.Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105; Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627, 72 A.L.R.2d 893. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 21, § 12834, p. 513, states the rule as follows: Since the injection of insurance in the case before us was brought out by defendant's counsel in examining his own witness, the defendant may not complain and the trial court was correct in refusing to declare a mistrial. Defendant's claimed error due to what he refers to as the trial court's "shotgun" instruction is without merit. A careful reading of the supplemental instruction clearly indicates its propriety. Defendant's designation of the trial court's supplemental instruction as a "shotgun" instruction is improper and incorrect and did not improperly coerce the jury. It is always within the realm of permissible comment for trial courts, where the jury has been unable to agree, to urge the jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with the view of reaching an agreement, without violence to the individual judgment of the juror. The trial court did not commit error in giving its supplemental instruction. Lastly, defendant contends that the jury improperly considered the matter of insurance coverage and claims misconduct on the part of the jury. This contention is based upon the affidavit of Tom Morris and Gregorio Sanchez hereinbefore quoted in full. Defendant directs our attention to some federal and Texas cases touching upon the question of the jury considering extraneous matters and misconduct on the part of the *787 jury. As to the Texas cases, both in the federal and state courts, it is only necessary to say that Texas has a special rule of procedure, Vernon's Annotated Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 327, which provides that when a motion is made of misconduct of the jury it shall be the duty of the court to hear evidence upon the question and the court may grant a new trial if misconduct is proved. We do not have such a rule in New Mexico. As to the other federal cases cited by defendant, we do not believe that they are applicable or controlling. In New Mexico this court has passed upon the question of whether a jury or a juror can "impeach its verdict." In McKinney v. Smith, 63 N.M. 477, 322 P.2d 110, 111, this court, speaking through Justice Lujan, said: Again in Scofield v. J.W. Jones Construction Company, 64 N.M. 319, 328 P.2d 389, 392, we said: The record discloses that after the matter of insurance was injected into the case by defendant the trial court, from the bench, instructed the jury to disregard the answer made by the witness to the effect that defendant told the officers that he was covered by insurance. Also, in the trial court's instructions to the jury he again admonished the jury to disregard the fact that a person does or does not have insurance, and further instructed the jury that they were not permitted to be influenced in bringing a verdict for or against the defendant upon the possibility that he may or may not be covered by insurance. The court also pointed out to the jury that under the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act (1953 Comp. § 64-24-1 et seq.) every driver of a motor vehicle is compelled to carry insurance or post adequate security in lieu thereof. For a very enlightening discussion upon the question of disclosure of insurance coverage, the matter of financial responsibility, and involving the question of parties to an automobile collision carrying insurance, see Runnacles v. Doddrell, 1960, 59 N.J. Super. 363, 157 A.2d 836. See also McCormick on Evidence, (1954), § 168, p. 357; Dickinson Law Review, (1960), Vol. 65, pp. 19-33. Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered. *788 COMPTON, C.J., and NOBLE, J., concur. CARMODY and MOISE, JJ., not participating.