Title: Lourim v. Swensen

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  April 8, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

DANIEL LOURIM,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

JOHN SWENSEN, 

	Defendant,

	and

CASCADE PACIFIC COUNCIL, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA,

an Oregon non-profit corporation;

and THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA,

a congressionally chartered corporation, authorized to do business in Oregon,

	Respondents on Review.

(CC C95-1000CV; CA A92903; SC S44383)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 10, 1998.

	Kelly Clark, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.

	Thomas Christ of Mitchell Lange & Smith, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondents on review.

	David Slader, Portland argued the cause for amici curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association, Oregon Coalition Against
Domestic and Sexual Violence, National Alliance of Sexual Assault
Coalitions, and National Association of Counsel For Children. 
With him on the brief was Michael S. Morey.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed
in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.

	*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court,

	 Michael J. McElligott, Judge.

	 147 Or App 425, 936 P2d 1011 (1997).

	**Leeson and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the

	 consideration or decision of this case.

		GILLETTE, J.

		This case arises out of allegations by plaintiff that
he was sexually abused by his Boy Scout leader, Swensen, 
approximately 30 years earlier, when plaintiff was a minor.  In
1995, plaintiff brought the present action against Swensen as
well as the Cascade Pacific Council and Boy Scouts of America
(collectively, the Boy Scouts), claiming that Swensen had
sexually abused him from 1965 until 1967.  As against the Boy
Scouts, the complaint alleges that the Boy Scout organizations
are vicariously liable for Swensen's tortious conduct under the
doctrine of respondeat superior and that the Boy Scouts are
directly liable to plaintiff for negligently failing to have
implemented a screening program to prevent child abusers from
becoming Boy Scout leaders.  

The Boy Scouts moved, under ORCP 21, to dismiss the
action on the grounds that both claims are time-barred and that
the complaint fails to state ultimate facts sufficient to
constitute a tort claim for vicarious liability based on the
doctrine of respondeat superior.(1) The trial court granted the
motion as to both claims.  Plaintiff appealed.  

		On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.  Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or App 425, 936 P2d
1011 (1997).  That court concluded that plaintiff's direct
liability negligence claim is time-barred, because the complaint
fails to allege conduct "knowingly allowing, permitting or
encouraging child abuse" by the Boy Scouts as required by ORS
12.117(1)  Id. at 444.  The court further held that the complaint
contains no facts from which it reasonably could be concluded
that Lourim's sexual assaults on plaintiff were within the scope
of his employment.  Id. at 438.  In light of those holdings, the
court did not consider whether the respondeat superior claim also
is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  Id.

		Plaintiff seeks review of the Court of Appeals'
decision only insofar as it affirmed the trial court's order with
respect to the dismissal for failure to state a claim based on
respondeat superior.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude
that the allegations contained in the amended complaint
pertaining to the claim for vicarious liability against the Boy
Scouts based on respondeat superior are sufficient to withstand
an ORCP 21 motion to dismiss.  We therefore reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals to that extent.  We also hold that
plaintiff's claim is not, on the record before us, time-barred as
a matter of law.  

		ORCP 18 A requires that a complaint contain "[a] plain
and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim
for relief without unnecessary repetition."  In determining the
sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint, we accept all well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true and give plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the
facts alleged.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 325 Or
185, 196-97, 935 P2d 411 (1997).  Conclusions of law alone,
however, are insufficient.  See Zehr v. Haugen, 318 Or 647, 655-56, 871 P2d 1006 (1994) (allegations in complaint do not state
ultimate facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of warranty
despite inclusion of such conclusory terms as "warranty
agreement").

		The following facts are alleged in the complaint.  From
1965 to 1967, Swensen was a volunteer Boy Scout leader, duly
authorized by the Boy Scouts to act as such.  As part of his
volunteer duties with the Boy Scouts, he was directed to fulfill
the role of troop leader or assistant troop leader to plaintiff's
troop.  Plaintiff and his family became close to Swensen, and
Swensen was a frequent guest in their home.  Swensen gained the
trust and confidence of plaintiff's family as a suitable friend,
guide, mentor, and role model to plaintiff, then an adolescent. 
By virtue of that relationship, Swensen gained the support,
acquiescence, and permission of plaintiff's family to spend
substantial periods of time alone with plaintiff.  

		Swensen also won the friendship and admiration of
plaintiff himself.  He was his mentor and role model.  Swensen
gained the opportunity to socialize with plaintiff and to spend
time alone with him and together with other boys in remote
places.  Swensen also used his position of trust to gain the
opportunity to touch plaintiff physically.  Eventually, Swensen
committed a series of sexual assaults on plaintiff.  At the time
of those assaults, plaintiff was a minor. 

		The complaint describes Swensen's performance of his
duties as troop leader in developing a trust relationship with
plaintiff and his family, together with the eventual sexual
assaults, as "[m]anipulations."  Plaintiff alleges in the
complaint that the manipulations were committed in connection
with Swensen's performance of his duties as troop leader: 

	"The [m]anipulations * * * were committed within the
time and space limits of his responsibilities as troop
leader, were committed out of a desire, at least
initially and partially, to fulfill his duties as troop
leader, and were generally actions of a kind and nature
which Swensen was required to perform as troop leader." 

		A complaint is sufficient to state a claim for
vicarious liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior
if the allegations that it contains, if true, would establish
that the employee's acts were committed within the scope of his
or her employment.  Stanfield v. Laccoarce, 284 Or 651, 588 P2d
1271 (1978).  In Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or 439, 442, 753 P2d
404 (1988), this court set out three requirements that must be
met to establish that an employee's conduct was within the scope
of employment:  (1) the conduct must have occurred substantially
within the time and space limits authorized by the employment;
(2) the employee must have been motivated, at least partially, by
a purpose to serve the employer; and (3) the act must have been
of a kind that the employee was hired to perform.  Applying that
framework in this case, the Court of Appeals held that the
complaint failed to state a claim, because 

	"[t]here simply are no allegations of fact that satisfy
all three of the elements of vicarious liability.  In
particular, there are no facts from which it reasonably
could be concluded that Swensen's sexual assaults were
acts 'of a kind [an] employee was hired to perform.'"

Lourim, 147 Or App at 438 (quoting Stanfield, 284 Or at 655).

		In Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or __, __ P2d __ (April 8,
1999), we addressed whether a complaint against the Archdiocese
of Portland in Oregon (Archdiocese) for vicarious liability for a
priest's acts of child abuse was sufficient to state a claim. 
The allegations contained in that complaint were not materially
different from those in plaintiff's complaint here.  The Court of
Appeals in Fearing relied on the same reasoning that it employed
in the present case to affirm the trial court's order dismissing
the claim.  In that case, we held that, in the intentional tort
context, it usually is inappropriate for the court to base its
decision regarding the adequacy of allegations supporting a claim
for vicarious liability based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior on whether the intentional tort itself was committed in
furtherance of any interest of the employer or involved the kind
of activity that the employee was hired to perform.  We held that
the proper focus rather was whether the complaint contained
sufficient allegations of employee conduct that arguably resulted
in the acts that led to plaintiff's injury.  We concluded that a
jury reasonably could infer that the priest's conduct in
cultivating a trust relationship with the plaintiff was
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to further the interests
of the Archdiocese, that that conduct was of a kind that the
priest was hired to perform, and that that conduct led to the
sexual assaults.  Accordingly, we held that the complaint was
sufficient to state a claim for vicarious tort liability based on
the doctrine of respondeat superior, and we reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals.  328 Or at ___ (slip op at 9).  

		The same is true in the present case.  Accepting the
allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor, a jury reasonably could
infer that the sexual assaults were merely the culmination of a
progressive series of actions that involved the ordinary and
authorized duties of a Boy Scout leader.  Additionally, a jury
could infer that, in cultivating a relationship with plaintiff
and his family, Swensen, at least initially, was motivated by a
desire to fulfill his duties as troop leader and that, over time,
his motives became mixed.  A jury also reasonably could infer
that Swensen's performance of his duties as troop leader with
respect to plaintiff and his family was a necessary precursor to
the sexual abuse and that the assaults were a direct outgrowth of
and were engendered by conduct that was within the scope of
Swensen's employment.  Finally, a jury could infer that Swensen's
contact with plaintiff was the direct result of the relationship
sponsored and encouraged by the Boy Scouts, which invested
Swensen with authority to decide how to supervise minor boys
under his care.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude, as we did
in Fearing, that the amended complaint contains allegations
sufficient to satisfy all three Chesterman requirements.  The
Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.

		Notwithstanding that conclusion, the Boy Scouts argue
that dismissal of the complaint is proper on a ground not
considered by the Court of Appeals and not present in Fearing. 
They assert that the doctrine of respondeat superior is premised
on the existence of a master-servant relationship which, they
argue, is not adequately alleged in the present complaint.  For
the following reasons, we disagree.  

		It is well established that one can be a servant even
though the service is performed gratuitously.(2)  Kowaleski v.
Kowaleski, 235 Or 454, 458-59, 385 P2d 611 (1963).  The relevant
inquiry in determining whether a master-servant relationship
exists for respondeat superior purposes is whether the master has
the right to control the actions of the servant.  Id. at 458-59. 
Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of plaintiff's
respondeat superior claim, we must determine whether plaintiff
adequately has alleged that the Boy Scouts had the right to
control Swensen's actions.  

		The complaint alleges that, "[a]t all relevant times,
Swensen was a volunteer Boy Scout leader, duly authorized by the
Boy Scouts and the Cascade Pacific Council to act in that
capacity" and that, "[a]s part of his volunteer duties with the
Boy Scouts and the Cascade Pacific Council, Swensen was directed
to fulfill the role of troop leader or assistant troop leader to
[plaintiff's] troop."  Again, for the purpose of ruling on the
Boy Scouts' ORCP 21 motion to dismiss, we accept those
allegations as true and give plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those allegations.  

		A jury reasonably could infer from the allegation that
"Swensen was directed to fulfill the role of troop leader or
assistant troop leader to [plaintiff's] troop" (emphasis added)
that the Boy Scouts directed his activities and, thus, that the
Boy Scouts had the right to control Swensen's activities as troop
leader or assistant troop leader.(3)  In this regard, although the
complaint does not contain a specific allegation setting forth
the typical duties of a troop leader or what, specifically,
Swensen was directed to do as a Boy Scout leader, such an
allegation is unnecessary.  It is sufficient, we believe, that
the complaint allege that Swensen did certain acts while acting
as a Boy Scout leader and that the plaintiff was injured while
Swensen was acting in that capacity.  The connection between the
two fairly may be inferred.  Other inferences might be drawn
instead, but that is a matter for the trier of fact.  Stanfield,
284 Or at 655.  We hold, therefore, that the complaint is
sufficient to state a claim against the Boy Scouts for liability
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.  

		We turn to the issue not addressed by the Court of
Appeals:  The timeliness of the action under ORS 12.117.  That
statute provides:

		"(1)  Notwithstanding [statutory sections not
relevant here], an action based on conduct that
constitutes child abuse or conduct knowingly allowing,
permitting or encouraging child abuse accruing while
the person who is entitled to bring the action is under
18 years of age shall be commenced not more than six
years after the person attains 18 years of age, or if
the injured person has not discovered the injury or the
causal connection between the injury and the child
abuse, nor in the exercise of reasonable care should
have discovered the injury or the causal connection
between the injury and the child abuse, not more than
three years from the date the injured person discovers
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered the injury or the causal connection between
the child abuse and the injury, whichever period is
longer.

		"(2)  As used in subsection (1) of this section,
'child abuse' means any of the following:

		"* * * * * 

		"(c) Sexual abuse, as defined in ORS chapter 163,
when the victim is a child."

		The Boy Scouts argue that, in the event that we hold
that the vicarious liability claim is adequately pled, we should
remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the
proper interpretation of the foregoing statute.  Remand for that
purpose is unnecessary, however, because we addressed that
precise issue in Fearing.  In that case, under circumstances very
similar to those presented here, we held that the complaint,
seeking damages against the Archdiocese for injuries that the
plaintiff suffered 20 years previously arising out of sexual
abuse committed by a priest, was not time-barred as a matter of
law.  Although liability in the Archdiocese was based on the
doctrine of respondeat superior, we concluded that the action was
one "based on conduct that constitutes child abuse," because the
Archdiocese would be liable, if at all, for damages for injuries
suffered as a result of the child abuse.  328 Or at ___ (slip op
at 14-15). Accordingly, ORS 12.117 effectively extended the
statute of limitations to three years from when the plaintiff
discovered the causal connection between the child abuse and his
injuries.

		Similarly, plaintiff's claim for vicarious liability
against the Boy Scouts is not, on the record before us, time-barred as a matter of law.  At this point in the proceedings, it
is undisputed that Swensen's alleged sexual assaults constitute
"child abuse" within the definition of that term in ORS
12.117(2)(c) and that the complaint alleges that the action was
brought within three years of plaintiff's discovery of the causal
connection between the child abuse and his injuries.(4)  As in
Fearing, the fact that the Boy Scouts' liability is vicarious and
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior does not alter our
conclusion that the action is one "based on conduct that
constitutes child abuse" and, therefore, is subject to the
extended statute of limitations set out in ORS 12.117.

		In the Court of Appeals, the Boy Scouts argued that
application of the extended limitations period in ORS 12.117(1)
to claims that a defendant is vicariously liable for abuse
perpetrated by someone else would render surplusage that part of
the statute that applies to "conduct knowingly allowing,
permitting or encouraging child abuse," because an action based
on conduct allowing or permitting child abuse also is an action
"based on" child abuse.  Instead, the Boy Scouts advocated an
interpretation of the phrase, "an action based on conduct
constituting child abuse," that would extend the statute of
limitations only for actions directly against the alleged
perpetrator.

		In interpreting a statute, this court employs the
methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  At the first level of our analysis,
we look at the text of the statute, in context, giving words of
common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.  Id. at
610-11.  An action for vicarious liability that alleges that an
employee committed child abuse is an "action based on conduct
that constitutes child abuse" under a plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning of that phrase.  The Boy Scouts' interpretation,
by contrast, "omits what has been inserted," in violation of the
statutory directive found in ORS 174.010.  Additionally, as
contextual support, we note that there is no explicit reference
to a statute of limitations for actions for vicarious liability
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.  The limitations
period is the same as that for the underlying tort.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.

1. 	Swensen ultimately settled all claims with plaintiff.

2. 	Moreover, although the doctrine of charitable immunity
historically protected charitable institutions from vicarious
liability for the torts of their servants, that doctrine was
abolished in Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium, 235 Or 412, 416,
384 P2d 1009 (1963). 

3. 	  The Boy Scouts cite several cases from other
jurisdictions in which courts have concluded that neither the Boy
Scouts nor the regional councils in fact have the right to
control the activities of individual troop leaders.  Those cases
are irrelevant to the present inquiry, because they all were
decided after the presentation of evidence on the subject of
control.  As noted, our review of the matter is confined to the
allegations in the complaint and the reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from them.  We do not speculate whether plaintiff
ultimately might be able to prove the existence of a right of
control on the part of the Boy Scouts.  

4. 	The Boy Scouts did assert in the Court of Appeals that
the allegation in the complaint that "[o]n or about April 1994
plaintiff discovered the causal connection between the Assaults
and the damages he suffered as a result of the Assaults" was a
legal conclusion and not a statement of ultimate fact.  We
disagree.  Whether plaintiff actually discovered the connection
in April 1994 or at some other time is a question of fact, to be
proved or disproved at trial.