Title: LAPEER COUNTY CLERK V LAPEER CIRCUIT COURT

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 22, 2003  
In re LAPEER COUNTY CLERK  
LAPEER COUNTY CLERK,  
Plaintiff,  
v 
No. 121400  
LAPEER CIRCUIT COURT,  
Defendant,  
and  
COUNTY OF LAPEER,  
Intervening Defendant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
The Lapeer County Clerk has filed a complaint for  
superintending control pursuant to MCR 3.302. We are called  
to 
determine 
whether 
Lapeer 
Circuit 
Court 
Local 
Administrative  
Order No. 2002-01 (LAO 2002-01)1 impermissibly assigns duties  
of the county clerk to the staff of the family division of the  
circuit court.  We note, however, that a new plan for the  
operation of the family division of the circuit court must be  
agreed upon by July 1, 2003.  See Supreme Court Administrative  
Order No. 2003-2.  This administrative order requires that the  
clerk be given the opportunity to participate in the  
development 
of 
the 
plan provisions for managing court records,  
and the clerk may file a statement of concurrence or  
disagreement 
with 
the records- management portion of the plan.  
The order also calls for mediation of disagreements at the  
Supreme Court’s direction. Because LAO 2002-01 is no longer  
the operative plan, having expired on July 1, 2003, we decline  
to comment on it specifically, but we issue this opinion  
pursuant to our rule-making authority, Const 1963, art 6, § 5,  
to provide guidance to courts as they craft future  
administrative orders.  The complaint for superintending  
control is dismissed.  
After careful review of the constitution, we conclude  
that the clerk of the court must have the care and custody  of  
the court records.  Further, the circuit court clerk is to  
1Although plaintiff refers to LAO 2000-01 in her brief, 
the Lapeer Circuit Court is currently operating under LAO 
2002-01.
 Plaintiff did recognize LAO 2002-01 in her  
supplemental pleading and explained that LAO 2002-01 did not 
alter her position.  
2  
perform ministerial duties that are noncustodial as required  
by the court.  
Because a clerk’s care and custody function is  
contemplated by Const 1963, art 6, § 14, as evidenced by our  
historical understanding of that provision, the circuit court  
cannot 
interfere 
with 
the 
circuit 
court 
clerk’s 
constitutional  
obligation to perform that function.  The custodial function,  
however, is a limited one.  In acting as custodian of the  
records, 
the 
clerk 
is responsible for ensuring the safekeeping  
of the records.  Having care and custody of the records,  
however, does not imply ownership of the records. Rather, the  
clerk’s 
custodial 
function 
entails 
safeguarding 
the 
records 
on  
behalf of the circuit court, and making those records  
available to their owner, which is the circuit court.  The  
clerk is also obligated to make the records available to the  
public, when appropriate.  
Beyond having the care and custody of the court’s  
records, the circuit court clerk is also to perform  
noncustodial ministerial duties as directed by the court.  The  
determination of the precise noncustodial ministerial duties  
that are to be performed by the clerk, including their  
existence, 
scope, 
and 
form, 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
court  
administration and is therefore reserved exclusively for the  
judiciary under Const 1963, art 3, § 2, Const 1963, art 6, §  
3  
 
 
 
 
1, and Const 1963, art 6, § 5.  This judicial authority  
includes the discretion to create, abrogate, and divide  
between the clerk and other staff, noncustodial ministerial  
functions concerning court administration.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
In Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559,  
561-564; 640 NW2d 567 (2002), this Court summarized the  
factual history of the case.  
In 1996 PA 388, the Legislature created the 
family division of the circuit court. See MCL 
600.1001 et seq., effective January 1, 1998. The 
act 
consolidated 
in 
the 
family 
division  
jurisdiction of many types of proceedings formerly 
heard in the circuit court and the probate court. 
See MCL 600.1021.  
MCL 600.1011(1) provides for the development 
of a plan for the operation of the family division 
in each judicial circuit:  
“Not later than July 1, 1997, in each judicial 
circuit, the chief circuit judge and the chief 
probate judge or judges shall enter into an  
agreement that establishes a plan for how the 
family division will be operated in that circuit 
. . . .”  
On February 25, 1997, this Court issued  
Administrative 
Order 
No. 
1997-1, 
entitled  
“Implementation of the Family Division of the 
Circuit Court.” The order required all chief  
circuit and probate judges to “develop a plan for 
the implementation and operation of the family 
division, and to identify the manner in which 
services will be coordinated to provide effective 
and efficient services to families by the family 
division of the circuit court.” Chief judges were 
required to seek input from judges, court staff, 
and other entities providing service to families 
within the jurisdiction or who will be affected by  
4  
 
 
the operation of the family division. The order 
required filing of plans with the State Court 
Administrative Office and approval by that office 
before implementation.  
According to the affidavit of the chief judge 
of the Lapeer Circuit Court, he followed the 
implementation directive and met with the judges in 
the circuit. It was agreed that the family division 
would be staffed with the employees of the probate 
court, who were trained in and accustomed to  
dealing with juvenile cases and other matters 
formerly within the jurisdiction of the probate 
court. To implement the plan, Local Administrative 
Order No. 2000-1 was adopted on February 2, 2000, 
providing:  
“In order to implement the changes required by 
the legislation creating the Family Division of the 
Circuit Court (PA 374 and 388 of 1996), to enhance 
and clarify the procedures to be followed in the 
new Family Court, to clarify the role of the County 
Clerk in the operations of the Family Court, to 
merge 
the 
procedures 
previously 
followed 
in  
juvenile, 
child 
protective 
proceedings 
and  
ancillary proceedings into the Family Court, to 
maintain the Court's data entry system, and to 
adopt new procedures for efficient administration 
of the Family Court, the Court issues the following 
administrative order:  
“1. The County Clerk will continue to accept 
pleadings, maintain files and complete entries into 
the Court's data system in all domestic cases and 
PPOs and shall be responsible for the care and 
maintenance of those records.  
“2. The Family Court staff will continue to 
accept filings, maintain files, prepare orders and 
complete entries into the Court's data system in 
all juvenile cases, child protective proceedings, 
name changes, adoptions, and ancillary proceedings 
and shall be responsible for the care and  
maintenance of those records.  
“3. The Family Court staff will be responsible 
for scheduling all juvenile cases, child protective 
proceedings, name changes, adoptions, and ancillary  
5  
proceedings. In addition, the Family Court staff 
will 
be 
responsible 
for 
making 
referrals, 
scheduling hearings, preparation of orders and 
arranging pretrials and trials in domestic cases. 
The Family Court staff will make appropriate 
entries into the Court's data systems of these 
proceedings.  
“4. The County Clerk staff will continue to 
manage the motion day dockets, no-progress docket 
and non-service dismissals in domestic cases. The  
County Clerk staff will continue to attend the 
domestic motion docket sessions of the Family Court 
and make appropriate entries into the Court's data 
system of those proceedings.  
“5. The Family Court staff shall continue to  
be responsible for all filing fees, receipts, 
disbursements and accountings for support payments, 
restitution, administrative and program fees, and 
child care funds received in juvenile cases, child 
protective proceedings, name changes, adoptions and 
ancillary proceedings. The County Clerk shall  
continue to accept all filing fees in domestic 
cases for the Family Court.  
“6. Local Administrative Order 1999-2 is  
hereby rescinded and replaced by this order.  
“This order is issued pursuant to MCR 8.112 
and will be effective upon approval by the State 
Court Administrator. The matters covered in this  
order will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and this 
order will expire on December 31, 2000, unless 
extended by order of the Court.”[2]  
On February 9, 2000, the Acting Director of 
Trial 
Court 
Services 
for 
the 
State 
Court  
Administrative Office advised the circuit court  
that  
2As stated above, LAO 2002-01 replaced LAO 2000-01.  The  
only substantive change was that LAO 2002-01 gave the clerk 
responsibility for proceedings regarding name changes and 
deleted the references to name changes found in paragraphs 2, 
3, and 5.  
6  
“we 
have 
reviewed 
the 
above 
referenced  
Administrative Order and find that it conforms with  
the requirements of MCR 8.112(B). This order is 
being accepted and filed until advised by your 
court of any change.”  
The Lapeer County Clerk and the Michigan 
Association of County Clerks filed this original 
action in the Court of Appeals requesting a writ of 
superintending control. Their complaint alleged, 
among other things:  
“17. The Court's Administrative Order, No. 
2000-1 violates Michigan's Constitution, laws, and 
court rules by preventing the Clerk from performing 
her constitutional and statutorily mandated duties. 
Specifically, 
by 
issuing 
and 
implementing 
Administrative Order No. 2000-1, the Court usurped 
the Clerk's constitutional and statutory duties 
with respect to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the 
Order.  
* * *  
“18. Both family division judges in Lapeer 
County (Judges Preisel and Higgins) prohibit the 
County Clerk from performing her circuit court 
duties 
with 
respect 
to 
juvenile 
matters 
by 
preventing her from opening new cases, maintaining 
the care and custody of the court records, entering 
data into the Court's JIS system, performing court 
room functions, preventing the Clerk from assisting 
the public as well as other judicial staff and 
employees, and accounting for the court's finances.  
* * *  
“20. Judges Higgins and Preisel further refuse 
to allow the County Clerk to perform as Clerk of 
the circuit court with respect to trials.”  
Plaintiffs' complaint requested the Court of 
Appeals to declare unlawful the Lapeer Circuit 
Court administrative order, and to direct the 
judges of the family division of the Lapeer Circuit 
Court to comply with Const 1963, art 6, § 14, 
statutes, and court rules by permitting the county 
clerk to perform her legally authorized duties as  
7  
clerk of the court for the family division of the 
circuit court.  
Lapeer County, the local funding unit, intervened. The  
Court of Appeals granted the county clerk’s request for  
superintending control. In re Lapeer Co Clerk, 242 Mich App  
497; 619 NW2d 45 (2000).  This Court granted defendants’  
application for leave to appeal3 and issued an opinion per  
curiam 
holding 
that 
the Court of Appeals lacked subject-matter  
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint and reversing the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 465 Mich 574.  
Plaintiff then filed a complaint with this Court for an  
order of superintending control, and the case was scheduled  
for oral argument as on leave granted.4  
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION  
This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint  
for an order of superintending control as an original action.  
Id.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY  
As stated above, the contested administrative order, LAO  
2002-01 must be replaced by a new administrative order by  
July 1, 2003.  See Supreme Court Administrative Order No.  
2003-2.
 467 Mich ___ (2003). 
Under this administrative  
3463 Mich 969 (2001).  
4466 Mich 1222 (2002).  
8  
order, the clerk must be given the opportunity to participate  
in the development of the plan provisions for managing court  
records, and the clerk may file a statement of concurrence or  
disagreement with the records management portion of the plan.  
The order also calls for mediation of disagreements at the  
Supreme Court’s direction.  
In 
light 
of 
the 
impending new local administrative order,  
we need not specifically comment on the now-superseded plan  
and, instead, address it in our capacity to make rules for the  
judiciary pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 5,5 which entrusts  
this Court with the authority and duty to prescribe general  
rules governing the practice and procedure of all courts in  
the state. Accordingly, we invoke our rule-making authority  
to 
clarify 
the 
underlying issue, which undoubtedly affects the  
practice and procedure of the courts of this state.  
Therefore, we find it appropriate to address the issue of the  
constitutional 
functions of the circuit court clerk to provide  
guidance to circuit courts in crafting future administrative  
5Const 1963, art 6, § 5 provides:  
The supreme court shall by general rules 
establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice 
and procedure in all courts of this state. The 
distinctions between law and equity proceedings 
shall, as far as practicable, be abolished. The 
office of master in chancery is prohibited.  
9  
  
orders.  
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS  
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES OF A CIRCUIT COURT CLERK  
The threshold inquiry is what duties, if any, inhere in  
the position of clerk of the circuit court.  
The 
office 
of 
the county clerk is constitutionally based,  
thus we commence our analysis by examining the constitution  
itself.  When interpreting the constitution, our task is to  
give effect to the common understanding of the text:  
“A constitution is made for the people and by 
the people. The interpretation that should be given  
it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass  
of the people themselves, would give it.  ‘For as  
the Constitution does not derive its force from the  
convention which framed, but from the people who 
ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of  
the people, and it is not to be supposed that they 
have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the 
words employed, but rather that they have accepted  
them in the sense most obvious to the common  
understanding, and ratified the instrument in the 
belief that that was the sense designed to be 
conveyed.’ (Cooley's Const Lim 81).” [Traverse City  
School Dist v Attorney Gen, 384 Mich 390, 405; 185 
NW2d 9 (1971).]  
Words 
must 
be 
given 
their 
ordinary 
meanings, 
and  
constitutional convention debates and the address to the  
people are relevant, although not controlling. People v Nash,  
418 Mich 196, 209; 341 NW2d 439 (1983) (opinion by BRICKLEY,  
J.).
 Further, every provision must be interpreted in the  
light of the document as a whole, and no provision should be  
construed to nullify or impair another.  In re Probert, 411  
10  
Mich 210, 232-233 n 17; 308 NW2d 773 (1981).  
Under our constitution, the county clerk serves in the  
unique posture of being both an executive officer and an  
officer of the judicial branch.  Const 1963, art 7, § 4  
provides:  
There shall be elected for four-year terms in 
each organized county a sheriff, a county clerk, a 
county treasurer, a register of deeds and a  
prosecuting attorney, whose duties and powers shall  
be provided by law. The board of supervisors in any 
county may combine the offices of county clerk and 
register of deeds in one office or separate the 
same at pleasure. [Emphasis added.]  
Const 1963, art 6, § 14 provides:  
The clerk of each county organized for  
judicial purposes or other officer performing the 
duties of such office as provided in a county 
charter shall be clerk of the circuit court for  
such county. The judges of the circuit court may 
fill a vacancy in an elective office of county 
clerk 
or 
prosecuting 
attorney 
within 
their  
respective jurisdictions.  
In providing that the county clerk is to be the clerk of  
the circuit court, Const 1963, art 6, § 14 is silent regarding  
specific duties to be performed by the clerk in its judicial  
capacity.  In fact, although since 18356 the constitution has  
provided that the county clerk shall also function as clerk of  
the court, the duties of the clerk in its judicial capacity  
have never been enumerated in any version of our constitution.  
Because the text of the constitution itself provides no clear  
6See Const 1835, art 6, § 5.  
11  
 
answer, we must examine other sources to ascertain the common  
understanding of the term “clerk of the circuit court.”  
The office of clerk of the court existed in Michigan  
before statehood.  In 1823, the United States Congress passed  
an act that provided, “there shall be but one clerk of the  
Supreme Court of the territory of Michigan, who shall perform  
all the duties of the clerk of said court[.]” See Scott v  
Detroit Young Men’s Society’s Lessee, 1 Doug 119, 140 (1843).  
The county clerk was charged with the duties of the clerk of  
the circuit court in 1830.  Whallon v Circuit Judge for Ingham  
Co, 51 Mich 503, 511; 16 NW 876 (1883).  The office of the  
circuit court clerk was incorporated into our constitution in  
1835.  Const 1835, art 6, § 5. 
Evidence suggests that the  
provision in the 1835 constitution arose out of necessity, for  
at that time  
judges travelled a circuit and could not suitably 
carry out the ministerial functions of the circuit 
court.  Since a county clerk was maintaining county 
records and files, it was natural to delegate the 
judicial ministerial functions to the county 
clerk’s office.  Circuit court documents could then  
be filed and maintained daily at a fixed location 
in each county, instead of at those select times 
the circuit judge was in the county. [Metzger & 
Conley, Relationship of the county clerk to the  
circuit court, 60 Mich BJ 849 (1981).]  
In other words, it appears that the people ratifying Const  
1835, art 6, § 5 understood that the circuit court clerk was  
to have the care and custody of court records.  As such, we  
12  
 
conclude that the clerk has a constitutional obligation to  
have the care and custody of the circuit court’s records and  
that the circuit court may not abrogate this authority. See  
In the Matter of Head Notes to the Opinions of the Supreme  
Court, 43 Mich 640, 643; 8 NW 552 (1880)(“the essential duties  
[of a constitutional officer] cannot be taken away, as this in  
effect would result in the abolishment of the office . . .”).  
In addition to the clerk’s custodial duties, there are  
undoubtedly numerous other duties that have historically been  
performed for the circuit court by the clerk.  Although the  
complete scope of these noncustodial duties is unclear, what  
is clear is that throughout the history of the office, these  
noncustodial duties have been purely ministerial in nature.  
For example, the Revised Statutes of 1838, tit 1, ch 6, § 10,  
provided that upon court recess, the clerk of the circuit  
court was to make a complete record of all cases finally  
determined and present the record to the judge at the start of  
the next term.  In 1840, the law provided that the court clerk  
would be paid ten cents a folio for making a complete record  
of a case if required to do so by a party.  See Emery v  
Whitwell, 6 Mich 474, 486 (1859).7  Court clerks also computed  
7Significantly, these early laws setting forth the duties 
of the clerk were subject to repeal, demonstrating that 
although the clerk’s duties remained ministerial, the exact 
nature of the duties was subject to change. Id.  
13  
amounts 
due 
on 
bonds,8 
generated 
transcripts,9 
filed  
transcripts,10 entered and docketed judgments,11 advertised  
writs of judgment,12 certified and filed stipulations,13  
received court papers,14 transmitted certified copies of  
proceedings to the Supreme Court,15 certified various court  
documents,16 and accepted court filings.17  Court clerks could  
not undertake nonministerial functions, such as assessing  
damages in a contested action,18 exercising any judicial power  
over 
individuals,19 
or 
taking 
complaints 
and 
issuing  
warrants.20  In addition, it was well understood that these  
noncustodial ministerial functions were subject to change.  
8Id. at 487.  
9Lathrop v Hicks, 2 Doug 223, 227 (1846).  
10Jewett v Bennett, 3 Mich 198, 199 (1854).  
11Id.  
12Drew v Dequindre, 2 Doug 93, 96 (1845).  
13Farrand v Bentley, 6 Mich 281, 283 (1859).  
14Id.  
15Duffield v Detroit, 15 Mich 474, 478 (1867).  
16Id. at 477.  
17Clay v Penoyer Creek Improvement Co, 34 Mich 204, 206  
(1876).  
18O’Flynn v Holmes, 8 Mich 95, 97 (1860).  
19People v Swift, 59 Mich 529, 547; 26 NW 694 (1886).  
20People v Colleton, 59 Mich 573, 576; 26 NW 771 (1886).  
14  
 
Emery, supra at 486 (stating that, although at one time the  
clerk was required to make records of proceedings, the  
statutes requiring the records were repealed).  
There is no evidence that the common understandings of  
the custodial and ministerial functions of the circuit court  
clerk have changed significantly since the enactment of the  
constitution of 1835. See, e.g., Sabbe v Wayne Co, 322 Mich  
501, 503; 33 NW2d 921 (1948) (describing the role of county  
clerks in the circuit court as “purely ministerial”).  
Therefore, it appears that at the time the people ratified the  
constitution of 1963, the common understanding of the term  
“clerk of the circuit court” was that the clerk was to (1)  
have the care and custody of the court records and (2) perform  
noncustodial duties that are ministerial in nature, although  
those noncustodial ministerial duties are subject to change.  
B. THE CUSTODIAL FUNCTION  
As stated above, the historical evidence surrounding  
Const 1963, art 6, § 14 suggests that the circuit court clerk  
is obliged to have the care and custody of the court’s  
records.  Because we conclude that this custodial function is  
one contemplated by the ratifiers of the constitutional  
provision, the constitution must be interpreted as mandating  
this role.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court clerk  
must perform the custodial function, which the circuit court  
15  
may not abrogate.  
The scope of the custodial function is limited.  
Historically, 
circuit court clerks acted as guardians of court  
records, ensuring their safekeeping as the judges rode from  
circuit to circuit.  The circuit court clerk’s role of having  
the care and custody of the records must not be confused with  
ownership of the records. 
As custodian, the circuit court  
clerk takes care of the records for the circuit court, which  
owns the records.  Nothing in the constitutional custodial  
function gives the circuit court clerk independent ownership  
authority over court records.  Accordingly, the clerk must  
make those records available to their owner, the circuit  
court.
 The clerk is also obligated to make the records  
available to members of the public, when appropriate.  
C. THE NONCUSTODIAL MINISTERIAL FUNCTION  
In addition to the custodial function, the constitution  
contemplates noncustodial ministerial duties.  In order to  
determine the scope of a circuit court clerk’s noncustodial  
ministerial duties, because they are subject to change, we  
must first ascertain who has the authority to define the  
noncustodial ministerial duties of the court clerk.  Again, we  
turn first to the constitutional text.  Our constitution  
specifically addresses the doctrine of separation of powers:  
The powers of government are divided into 
three 
branches: 
legislative, 
executive 
and  
16  
 
judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch 
shall exercise powers properly belonging to another 
branch except as expressly provided in this  
constitution. [Const 1963, art 3, § 2.]  
As 
stated 
above, 
the 
constitution 
expressly 
provides 
that  
the county clerk, an executive officer, shall also be an  
officer of the judicial branch.  It does not follow, however,  
that the executive branch then has the ability to control that  
aspect of the judicial branch.  
Const 1963, art 6, § 1 provides:  
The judicial power of the state is vested 
exclusively in one court of justice which shall be 
divided into one supreme court, one court of 
appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction 
known as the circuit court, one probate court, and 
courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature 
may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members 
elected and serving in each house. [Emphasis 
added.]  
Further, Const 1963, art 6, § 5 provides:  
The supreme court shall by general rules 
establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice  
and procedure in all courts of this state. The  
distinctions between law and equity proceedings 
shall, as far as practicable, be abolished. The 
office of master in chancery is prohibited. 
[Emphasis added.]  
Again, 
no 
constitutional 
provision 
should 
be 
construed 
to  
nullify or impair another.  In re Probert, supra. 
To  
interpret Const 1963, art 7, § 4 (“[t]here shall be . . . a  
county clerk . . . whose duties and powers shall be provided  
by law”) to grant the executive branch the power to dictate  
the ministerial administration of the circuit court would  
17  
 
nullify both art 6, § 1 (providing that the judicial power of  
the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice) and  
art 6, § 5 (providing that the Supreme Court shall establish,  
modify, amend, and simplify the practice and procedure in all  
courts of this state).  
Further, to so interpret art 7, § 4 would violate the  
separation of powers doctrine of art 3, § 2.  Although the  
county clerk is expressly made an officer of the judiciary,  
neither art 7, § 4 nor art 6, § 14 expressly provides that the  
county clerk or any other executive-branch official may  
prescribe the ministerial operations of court practice and  
procedure.  Rather, that power is expressly and exclusively  
vested in the Supreme Court under art 6, § 5:  
The 
judicial 
powers 
derived 
from 
the  
Constitution include rulemaking, supervisory and 
other administrative powers as well as traditional 
adjudicative ones. 
They have been exclusively 
entrusted to the judiciary by the Constitution and 
may not be diminished, exercised by, nor interfered 
with by the other branches of government without 
constitutional authorization. [In re 1976 PA 267, 
400 Mich 660, 663; 225 NW2d 635 (1977).]  
Indeed, the power of the judiciary to direct its  
ministerial operations has been noted for well over a century.  
In Allor v Bd of Auditors of Wayne Co, 43 Mich 76, 97; 4 NW  
492 (1880), this Court held:  
[N]o court, in the exercise of its functions, 
can be lawfully subjected to the control or  
interference of any executive or ministerial  
authority, or can receive directions for any  
18  
 
 
purpose except from such other courts as are 
authorized 
by 
the 
Constitution 
to 
have  
“superintending control over inferior courts.” No  
court has a right to allow any other interference 
or to submit to it.  
And in this same regard it is also very 
clearly settled by the Constitution that judicial 
power can only be vested in courts and judicial 
officers[.]  
In Whallon, supra at 508, the Court explained that the circuit  
court clerks “are officers of the court, and subject to its  
direction in all things necessary to a proper administration  
of the law during its sessions.”  Further, in Smith v Kent  
Circuit Judge, 139 Mich 463, 464; 102 NW 971 (1905), the Court  
noted that the clerk of the circuit court, although also an  
executive officer, is subject to all legitimate court orders:  
The county clerk is a constitutional officer 
(Const. § 12, art. 6), and is by that section made 
the clerk of the circuit court of such county. 
Section 221, 1 Comp. Laws, requires him to attend 
every term of court; gives him the care of all the 
records, seals, books, and papers pertaining to the 
office of the clerk of such court, and filed or 
deposited therein. Neither the Constitution nor the  
statute prescribes his duties. He is therefore  
subject to all the legitimate orders of the court  
of which he is clerk. [Emphasis added.]  
Finally, in McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 30-31; 597 NW2d  
148 (1999), this Court recently addressed its exclusive  
constitutional authority regarding rules governing practice  
and procedure in the administration of the courts and  
concluded that if a court rule concerns only court  
administration, 
it 
prevails 
over 
contrary 
statutory  
19  
provisions.  
Therefore, we hold that prescribing the exact nature of  
a clerk’s noncustodial ministerial functions is a matter of  
practice and procedure in the administration of the courts.  
Accordingly, 
the 
authority 
to 
prescribe 
the 
specific  
noncustodial ministerial duties of the clerk of the circuit  
court lies exclusively with the Supreme Court under Const  
1963, art 6, § 5.  
As such, the judiciary is vested with the constitutional  
authority to direct the circuit court clerk to perform  
noncustodial 
ministerial 
duties 
pertaining 
to 
court  
administration as the Court sees fit. This authority includes  
the discretion to create duties, abolish duties, or divide  
duties between the clerk and other court personnel, as well as  
the right to dictate the scope and form of the performance of  
such noncustodial ministerial duties.  
IV. EFFECT OF STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
 Prescribing the duties that arise under the clerk’s  
noncustodial ministerial function is a matter of court  
procedure and administration.  We have already concluded that  
the constitution grants this Court the exclusive authority to  
determine, as a matter of court administration, which duties  
comprise 
the 
noncustodial 
ministerial 
functions 
of 
the 
circuit  
court clerk and how those duties are to be performed.  
20  
 
Therefore, should the Legislature enact statutory duties that  
conflict with this Court’s enumeration of duties in the court  
rules, the court rules must prevail.  McDougall, supra. This  
does not mean, however, that any statute pertaining to the  
duties of the clerk of the circuit court violates separation  
of powers. Rather, if there is no inherent conflict between  
the statutes and the court rules, “[w]e are not required to  
decide whether [the] statute is a legislative attempt to  
supplant the Court’s authority.”  Id. at 24, quoting People v  
Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 211; 551 NW2d 891 (1996).  
We conclude that the statutes pertaining to the duties of  
the county clerk are in harmony with our court rules.  MCR  
8.110(C)(3) clearly provides that the chief judge of the court  
has the power to direct matters relating to the administration  
of the court:  
As director of the administration of the  
court, a chief judge shall have administrative  
superintending power and control over the judges of 
the court and all court personnel with authority  
and responsibility to:  
(a)  supervise caseload management and monitor 
disposition of the judicial work of the court;  
(b)  direct the apportionment and assignment 
of the business of the court, subject to the 
provisions of MCR 8.111;  
(c) determine the hours of the court and the  
judges; coordinate and determine the number of 
judges and court personnel required to be present 
at any one time to perform necessary judicial and 
administrative work of the court, and require their  
21  
 
 
presence to perform that work;  
(d)  supervise the performance of all court 
personnel, with authority to hire, discipline, or 
discharge such personnel, with the exception of a 
judge's secretary and law clerk, if any;  
(e) 
coordinate 
judicial 
and 
personnel 
vacations and absences, subject to the provisions 
of subrule (D);  
* * *  
(h) effect compliance by the court with all 
applicable court rules and provisions of the law; 
and  
(i) perform any act or duty or enter any order  
necessarily incidental to carrying out the purposes  
of this rule. [Emphasis added.]  
MCR 8.105 sets forth the general duties of circuit court  
clerks:  
(A) Office Hours. The office of the clerk of 
every court of record must be open, and the clerk 
or deputy clerk must be in attendance, during 
business hours on all days except Saturdays, 
Sundays, and legal holidays, and at other times 
that the court is in session.  
(B) Court Records and Reporting Duties. The 
clerk of every circuit court shall maintain court 
records[21] and make reports as prescribed by MCR 
8.119.  
(C) Notice of Judgments, Orders, and Opinions. 
Notice of a judgment, final order, written opinion 
or findings filed or entered in a civil action in a 
court of record must be given forthwith in writing  
21We note that, in this context, it is clear that the word 
“maintain” refers to the clerk’s custodial duty. See Random  
House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001), which defines 
“maintain” as “1. to keep in existence or continuance; 
preserve.”  
22  
 
by the court clerk to the attorneys of record in 
the case, in the manner provided in MCR 2.107.  
(D) Filing of Assurance of Discontinuance 
Under MCL 445.870 . . . . The clerk of every 
judicial circuit shall, without charge, receive and 
file an assurance of discontinuance accepted by the 
Attorney General under MCL 445.870 . . . .  
MCR 8.119 sets forth the duties of circuit court clerks  
regarding court records and reports:  
(A) Applicability. This rule applies to all 
actions in every trial court except that subrule 
(D)(1) does not apply to civil infractions.  
(B) Records Standards. The clerk of the court 
shall comply with the records standards in this 
rule and as prescribed by the Michigan Supreme 
Court.  
(C) Filing of Papers. The clerk of the court 
shall endorse on the first page of every document 
the date on which it is filed.  Papers filed with 
the clerk of the court must comply with Michigan 
Court Rules and Michigan Supreme Court records 
standards. The clerk of the court may reject papers 
which do not conform to MCR 2.113(C)(1) and MCR 
5.113(A)(1).  
(D) Records Kept by the Clerk. The clerk of 
the court of every trial court shall keep records 
in the form and style the court prescribes and in  
accordance with Michigan Supreme Court records  
standards and local court plans. A court may adopt 
a computerized, microfilm, or word-processing 
system for maintaining records that substantially 
complies with this subrule.  
(1) Indexes and Case Files. The clerk shall 
keep and maintain records of each case consisting 
of a numerical index, an alphabetical index, a 
register of actions, and a case file in such form 
and style as may be prescribed by the Supreme 
Court. . . .  
* * *  
23  
 
 
(2) 
Calendars. 
The 
clerk 
may 
maintain  
calendars of actions. A calendar is a schedule of  
cases ready for court action that identifies times 
and places of activity.  
* * *  
(4) Other Records. The clerk shall keep in 
such form as may be prescribed by the court, other 
papers, documents, materials, and things filed with 
or handled by the court including but not limited 
to wills for safekeeping, exhibits and other  
discovery materials, requests for search warrants, 
marriage records, and administrative activities.  
(E) Access to Records. The clerk may not 
permit any record or paper on file in the clerk's 
office to be taken from it without the order of the  
court.  
(1) Unless access to a file, a document, or 
information contained in a file or document is  
restricted by statute, court rule, or an order 
entered pursuant to subrule (F), any person may 
inspect pleadings and other papers in the clerk's 
office and may obtain copies as provided in subrule 
(E)(2) and (E)(3).  
(2) If a person wishes to obtain copies of 
papers in a file, the clerk shall provide copies 
upon 
receipt 
of 
the 
reasonable 
cost 
of  
reproduction. If the clerk prefers, the requesting 
person may be permitted to make copies at personal 
expense under the direct supervision of the clerk. 
Except for copies of transcripts or as otherwise 
directed by statute or court rule, a standard fee 
may be established for providing copies of papers 
in a file.  
* * *  
(4) Every court, shall adopt an administrative 
order pursuant to MCR 8.112(B) to  
(a) make reasonable regulations necessary to 
protect its public records and prevent excessive 
and unreasonable interference with the discharge of  
24  
 
its functions;  
* * *  
(G) Reporting Duties.  
(1) The clerk of every court shall submit 
reports and records as required by statute and 
court rule.  
(2) The clerk of every court shall submit 
reports or provide records as required by the State 
Court Administrative Office, without costs.  
[Emphasis added.]  
MCL 600.571 provides:  
The county clerk of each county shall  
(a) Be the clerk of the circuit court for the 
county.  
(b) Attend the circuit court sessions.  
(c) Appoint in counties with more than 1 
circuit 
judge 
or 
having 
more 
than 
100,000 
population but less than 1,000,000 a deputy for 
each judge and approved by the judge to attend the 
court sessions. Each deputy shall receive a salary 
of at least $6,500.00.  
(d) On the first day of each court term render 
an accounting to the court of all funds, stocks or 
securities deposited with the court clerk pursuant 
to court order.  
(e) Within 10 days after the beginning of each 
court term pay over to the county treasurer all 
fees belonging to the county received during the 
preceding court term together with an accounting 
thereof.  
(f) Have the care and custody of all the  
records, seals, books and papers pertaining to the 
office of the clerk of such court, and filed or 
deposited therein, and shall provide such books for 
entering the proceedings in said court, as the  
judge thereof shall direct.  
25  
 
 
(g) Perform such duties as may be prescribed  
by court rule. Whenever in any statute of this 
state, the designation "register in chancery" 
occurs, it shall be deemed to apply to the clerk of 
the circuit court. [Emphasis added.]  
We find no conflict in the court rules and the statutes  
in this area, and note that this reinforces our analysis of  
the historical understanding of the role of the circuit court  
clerk as discussed above.  MCL 600.571(f) and (g) merely  
codify the historical understanding of the dual nature of the  
clerk’s function: subsection f refers to the custodial  
function, while subsection g refers to the noncustodial  
ministerial function.  
In addition, MCL 600.1007 provides:  
As with circuit court, the county clerk is the 
clerk of the court for the family division of the 
circuit court.  
Finally, MCL 600.1027 provides, in pertinent part:  
(1) At the time of commencing an ancillary 
guardianship or limited guardianship proceeding in 
the family division of circuit court, the party 
commencing the proceeding shall pay a $50.00 filing 
fee to the family division of circuit court.  
* * *  
(3) The clerk of the court, on or before the 
fifth day of the month following the month in which 
any fees are collected under this section, shall  
transmit to the county treasurer all fees collected 
under this section during the preceding month. 
Within 15 days after receiving the fees, the county 
treasurer shall transmit all fees collected to the  
state treasurer for deposit in the state court fund 
created by section 151a. [Emphasis added.]  
26  
 
Taken together, the statutes merely reiterate art 6, §  
14 and provide that the circuit court clerk must have the  
care and custody of court records and exercise the duties  
prescribed by court rule, including attending court sessions  
and transmitting fees received.  Although the statutes, like  
the court rules, set forth broad areas of responsibility,  
they 
refrain 
from 
specifying 
exactly 
what 
those  
responsibilities 
entail 
and 
how 
the 
clerk 
shall 
perform 
those  
responsibilities.  Rather, the statutes provide that either  
the judge22 or the court rules23 shall prescribe the exact  
noncustodial ministerial duties of the clerk.  In so doing,  
the 
statutes 
codify 
the 
historical 
custodial 
and  
noncustodial, ministerial functions of the circuit court  
clerks.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The constitutionally created office of the clerk of the  
circuit court must have the care and custody of the court  
records and can perform noncustodial ministerial functions  
of the court.  The custodial function requires that the clerk  
act as guardian of the records, providing for their  
safekeeping. 
 
The 
clerk’s 
noncustodial 
ministerial 
duties 
are  
directed by the Court, as the determination of the precise  
22MCL 600.571(f).  
23MCL 600.571(g).  
27  
 
noncustodial ministerial duties to be performed is a matter  
of court administration entrusted exclusively to the  
judiciary under Const 1963, art 3, § 2 and Const 1963, art  
6, §§ 1, 5.  
The complaint for superintending control is dismissed.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
28  
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re LAPEER COUNTY CLERK  
LAPEER COUNTY CLERK,  
Plaintiff,  
v 
No. 121400  
LAPEER CIRCUIT COURT,  
Defendant,  
and  
COUNTY OF LAPEER,  
Intervening Defendant.  
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree that intervening circumstances render moot the  
issues presented in this case.  However, they will arise  
again and require judicial resolution.  Therefore, I agree  
that the Court should address the issues at this time.  I  
write separately to indicate that I believe that certain of  
the 
majority's 
findings 
and 
its 
legal 
analysis 
are 
incorrect.  
 
  
SEPARATION OF POWERS--PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS  
The 
complex 
environment 
of 
the 
trial 
court 
requires 
that  
we allow chief judges to manage the day-to-day operation of  
their courts. Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v Michigan, 459 Mich  
291, 298-299; 586 NW2d 894 (1998). Accordingly, our court  
rules provide chief judges latitude in adapting the  
administration 
of 
their 
courts 
to 
their 
particular  
circumstances.1  
1For instance, MCR 8.110(C) provides, in part:  
(2) As the presiding officer of the court, a 
chief judge shall:  
* * *  
(c) initiate policies concerning the court's 
internal operations and its position on external 
matters affecting the court;  
* * *  
(3) As director of the administration of the 
court, a chief judge shall have administrative 
superintending power and control over the judges of 
the court and all court personnel with authority 
and responsibility to:  
(a) supervise caseload management and monitor 
disposition of the judicial work of the court,  
(b) direct the apportionment and assignment of 
the business of the court, subject to the  
provisions of MCR 8.111;  
* * *  
(f) supervise court finances, including financial 
planning, 
the 
preparation 
and 
presentation 
of 
budgets,and 
(continued...)  
2  
 
  
Our Legislature is also cognizant of the needs of the  
circuit courts.  Hence, it drafted MCL 600.571 to give them  
discretion in determining how best to utilize the services  
of the county clerks.  
I find no conflict between the  
statutes regulating the duties of the clerk of the circuit  
court and our court rules.  
The majority apparently agrees with this conclusion.  
Ante at 22-29. 
Yet, it engages in further analysis. 
In  
doing so, it holds that, as a matter of constitutional law,  
the judiciary alone may regulate the noncustodial duties of  
the clerk of the circuit court.  By reaching this issue, the  
majority violates the principle that we will not address a  
constitutional question unless necessary. Booth Newspapers,  
Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507  
NW2d 422 (1993).  However, because I do not believe that the  
majority's analysis supports its conclusion, I offer the  
following counter-analysis.  
COUNTER-ANALYSIS  
The Michigan Constitution vests this Court with the  
1(...continued) 
financial reporting;  
* * *  
(i) perform any act or duty or enter any order 
necessarily incidental to carrying out the purposes 
of this rule.  
3  
  
 
authority to prescribe the rules of practice and procedure  
in the courts.  Const 1963, art 6, § 5.  These attributes of  
judicial authority "may not be diminished, exercised by, nor  
interfered with by the other branches of government without  
constitutional authorization." In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich  
660, 663; 255 NW2d 635 (1977).  
Moreover, this Court has long recognized that  
[i]t is simply impossible for a judge to do 
nothing but judge; a legislator to do nothing but 
legislate; a governor to do nothing but execute 
the laws. The proper exercise of each of these 
three great powers of government necessarily 
includes some ancillary inherent capacity to do 
things which are normally done by the other  
departments.  
Thus, both the legislative department and the 
judicial department have certain housekeeping 
chores which are prerequisite to the exercise of 
legislative and judicial power. And, to accomplish 
those housekeeping chores both departments have 
inherently a measure of administrative authority 
not unlike that primarily and exclusively vested 
in the executive department. [Wayne Circuit Judges  
v Wayne Co, 383 Mich 10, 20-21; 172 NW2d 436 
(1969), superseded by 386 Mich 1; 190 NW2d 228 
(1971)(On Rehearing).]  
The majority carries this rationale much further,  
asserting that, if art 7, § 4 applied to the county clerk's  
duties as clerk of the court, it would necessarily violate  
the separation of powers clause.  I believe this assertion  
is inaccurate.  
Our constitution, in detailing the requirements of the  
separation of powers, provides:  
4  
 
 
 
The powers of the government are divided into 
three 
branches; 
legislative, 
executive, 
and  
judicial.  No person exercising the powers of one 
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to 
another branch except as expressly provided in 
this constitution. [Const 1963, art 3, § 2.]  
Thus, while our constitution mandates separation of powers,  
that mandate is qualified to allow the exercise of one  
branch's power by another branch when the constitution  
expressly provides for it.  It appears to me that art 7, §  
4 contains one such qualification.  
Article 7, § 4 provides that: "There shall be . . . a  
county clerk . . . whose duties shall be provided by law."  
We have consistently held that, when the constitution  
requires that details be provided by law, the Legislature  
alone can provide those details. People v Bulger, 462 Mich  
495, 508-509; 614 NW2d 103 (2000).2  There is no reason to  
deviate in this case from our previous holdings.  
There is some support for the conclusion that the  
drafters of the constitution made the county clerk the clerk  
of the circuit court to provide a check against judicial  
power.3  Consequently, it is possible that art 7, § 4 was  
2The majority apparently believes that, if it interprets 
art 7, § 4 so that it applies to the clerk's ministerial 
noncustodial duties, the executive branch would be empowered 
to define those duties.  Ante at 18-19. I believe this is an  
error that has misled the majority in its analysis.  
3See, e.g., the comments of Delegate Paul V. Gadola, a 
(continued...)  
5  
intended to set limits on the power of the judiciary by  
taking advantage of the constitutional qualification to  
separation of powers.  If this were the case, there would be  
no discord between art 7, § 4 and art 3, § 2.4  
If we ascribe to art 7, § 4 the meaning that I believe  
the framers of the constitution intended, it would scarcely  
render ineffectual the power of the judicial branch.  
Although the Legislature would have the authority to enact  
laws regulating the duties of the clerk of the circuit court,  
it would be bound by the same principles that constrain us.  
Thus, it could not extend the duties of the clerk beyond  
3(...continued) 
retired circuit judge, who stated:  
Remember that the clerk is the one that has  
charge of all the records of the circuit court. 
The clerk writes the journal. And, you know, the 
circuit judges can’t conceal too much, because 
every day there is a diary written of their doings 
and they sign it every day, and you can find it 
1,000 years from now if the records are kept.  [1 
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 
1371.]  
4There are possibly other policy considerations at work 
as well.  For instance, the drafters could have been concerned 
about cost and efficiency.  By providing that the county clerk 
serves as a depository for most of the documents in a county, 
the drafters potentially made access to important documents 
more efficient.  Also, the drafters may have been concerned 
that requiring the clerk to perform all the ministerial duties 
of the circuit court would be too costly.  Thus, they may have 
included a fiscal pressure valve within art 7, § 4 to allow 
the Legislature to limit the clerks' duties when the clerks 
become inefficient.  
6  
 
 
 
those that are purely ministerial; it could do no more than  
designate which ministerial noncustodial duties the clerk  
might perform.  
I conclude that the constitution has provided the  
Legislature with the authority to define and limit the  
ministerial 
noncustodial 
duties 
that 
the 
clerk 
of 
the 
circuit  
court 
may 
perform. 
 
However, 
because 
neither 
the 
constitution  
nor any legislative enactments at present limit the clerk's  
ministerial duties, the clerk is subject to all the  
legitimate orders of the court.  MCL 600.571(g); Smith v Kent  
Circuit Judge, 139 Mich 463, 464; 102 NW 1905 (1905).  
CONCLUSION  
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the issues  
presented in this case are moot but should be addressed at  
this time.  Additionally, I agree that the constitution  
protects the clerk's function as custodian of circuit court  
records.  Finally, I agree that there is no conflict between  
the statutes regulating the duties of the clerk of the court  
and the court rules.  
Beyond these limited observations, I cannot agree with  
the majority opinion.  
Marilyn Kelly  
7