Title: Bing v. Haywood

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JENNIFER BING 
 
v.  Record No. 102270 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2, 2012 
TERESA W. HAYWOOD, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
R. Bruce Long, Judge 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court for 
Middlesex County (the "trial court") erred when it granted, 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-243.2, the special plea of the statute 
of limitations filed by Teresa W. Haywood ("Haywood"), Teddy 
Bagby ("Bagby"), and Mary M. Hodges ("Hodges").  
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
On May 28, 2008, Jennifer Bing ("Bing") was arrested by 
Deputy Christopher W. Rhoades ("Deputy Rhoades") of the Mathews 
County Sheriff's Department on suspicion of drug possession and 
distribution.  Police found narcotics and paraphernalia in the 
car in which Bing had been riding as a passenger and on the 
seat of Deputy Rhoades' police cruiser after Bing had been 
placed in the vehicle.  After her arrest, Bing was transported 
to the Middle Peninsula Regional Security Center (the "Security 
Center"). 
Deputy Rhoades told the staff at the Security Center that 
Bing "might be hiding narcotics on or in her person."  Bing 
alleged that, at the direction of shift commander Bagby, 
 
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Haywood, the medical supervisor, and Hodges, a lieutenant, 
"conducted a full cavity search on Bing . . . searching her 
anus, vagina and other body parts without a court order and 
without the search being performed by a medically trained 
person who was on duty at the time of the search." 
On May 21, 2010, almost two years later, Bing filed a 
complaint against Haywood, Bagby, and Hodges (collectively, 
"the defendants") in the trial court.  In her three-count 
complaint, Bing alleged that she suffered an assault and 
battery by Haywood, Bagby, and Hodges; the search authorized by 
Babgy and performed by Haywood and Hodges was illegal; and the 
actions of Deputy Rhoades,* Haywood, Bagby, and Hodges 
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Bing 
sought $250,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in 
punitive damages, alleging that the defendants "acted 
consciously in an unjustifiable, willful, wanton and reckless 
disregard of [Bing's] rights." 
In response, the defendants filed an answer raising 
several affirmative defenses including probable cause to search 
Bing and consent by Bing to the search.  Also, the defendants 
filed a demurrer and a plea of the statute of limitations.  The 
defendants demurred as to count three, arguing that Bing failed 
to allege facts necessary to support a cause of action for 
                     
* Deputy Rhoades was not named as a defendant. 
 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In the plea of 
the statute of limitations, the defendants argued that Bing's 
claim was based upon the conditions of her confinement; "Code 
§ 8.01-243.2 prescribes a one-year statute of limitations for 
inmate claims based on conditions of confinement"; and Bing's 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 
The trial court held a hearing on the defendants' demurrer 
and plea of the statute of limitations.  We need not address 
the demurrer because the trial court did not decide that 
question.  Rather, the trial court sustained the plea of the 
statute of limitations and dismissed the complaint.   
Bing timely filed her petition for appeal, and we granted 
Bing's appeal on the following assignment of error:   
1. 
The trial judge erred by sustaining Defendants' 
Special Pleas, by holding that Plaintiff's claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations and by 
dismissing with prejudice the instant cause of 
action. 
 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Well-settled principles of statutory review guide our 
analysis in this case. 
[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a pure 
question of law which we review de novo.  When 
the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are 
bound by the plain meaning of that language.  
Furthermore, we must give effect to the 
legislature's intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of 
 
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the language would result in a manifest 
absurdity.  If a statute is subject to more than 
one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the 
legislative intent behind the statute. 
 
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 
104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted). 
B. Statute of Limitations 
 
On appeal, Bing contends that the trial court erred in 
granting the defendants' plea of the statute of limitations and 
dismissing her case with prejudice because the trial court 
improperly applied the one-year statute of limitations in Code 
§ 8.01-243.2 instead of the two-year statute of limitations 
prescribed by Code § 8.01-243.  Specifically, Bing argues that 
she was not "confined" within the meaning of Code § 8.01-243.2 
and that "her complaint did not relate to the conditions of her 
confinement."  We disagree.  
Code § 8.01-243.2 provides that, 
No person confined in a state or local 
correctional facility shall bring or have 
brought on his behalf any personal action 
relating to the conditions of his confinement 
until all available administrative remedies are 
exhausted.  Such action shall be brought by or 
on behalf of such person within one year after 
cause of action accrues or within six months 
after all administrative remedies are exhausted, 
whichever occurs later. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  For the one-year provision in Code § 8.01-
243.2 to apply, the plaintiff must have been "confined" at the 
 
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time the cause of action accrued, and the cause of action must 
relate to plaintiff's "conditions of confinement."  Code 
§ 8.01-243.2. 
While we have not yet addressed whether the one-year 
provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 applies to a pre-trial detainee 
such as Bing, we have interpreted Code § 8.01-243.2 in the 
context of a post-conviction inmate on two prior occasions.  
Billups v. Carter, 268 Va. 701, 604 S.E.2d 414 (2004); Ogunde 
v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 639, 628 S.E.2d 370 (2006).  Billups 
and Ogunde were serving prison terms in state correctional 
centers when their respective causes of actions accrued.  
Billups, 268 Va. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416; Ogunde, 271 Va. at 
641, 628 S.E.2d at 371. 
Billups, a prisoner at a correctional center, brought an 
action under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the Virginia Department of 
Corrections and a correctional center employee.  Billups, 268 
Va. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416.  The claim against the 
correctional center employee included a count for assault and 
battery.  Id.  Billups' complaint was filed more than one year 
but less than two years after the occurrence of the incident 
giving rise to the lawsuit.  Id. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416-17.  
The trial court held "that the statute of limitations 
applicable to § 1983 actions was one year, as prescribed by 
Code § 8.01-243.2, which governs personal actions brought by 
 
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inmates of correctional institutions relating to the conditions 
of their confinement."  Id. at 710, 604 S.E.2d at 419.  We 
reversed and held that: (1) "§ 1983 actions brought in Virginia 
courts are governed by the two-year limitation prescribed" in 
Code § 8.01-243(A); and (2) Billups' assault and battery claim, 
based on an alleged sexual assault, was governed by the one-
year statute of limitations provision prescribed in Code 
§ 8.01-243.2.  Id. 
Ogunde was a prisoner at a state correctional center who 
filed a complaint under the Virginia Tort Claims Act alleging 
"that the Commonwealth's employees negligently assigned him to 
an upper bunk bed and, in December 2002, ordered him to climb 
down from the bed for roll call when they knew, or should have 
known, that he had an injured knee and could fall."  Ogunde, 
271 Va. at 641, 628 S.E.2d at 371.  The Tort Claims Act's 
statute of limitations, Code § 8.01-195.7, requires a claimant 
to file a notice of claim within one year of the accrual of the 
cause of action, and the claimant must commence the suit within 
eighteen months of filing the notice of claim.  Id. at 642, 628 
S.E.2d at 371-72.  We concluded that Ogunde's cause of action 
was related to the conditions of his confinement; however, we 
held that the Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations applied 
to Ogunde's action because "[t]he Act is self-contained, 
 
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incorporating its own statute of limitations, which likewise is 
self-contained."  Id. at 643-44, 628 S.E.2d at 372-73. 
 
Our holdings in Billups and Ogunde are not directly on 
point with the present case.  Bing stipulated that her 
complaint "sets forth state-law causes of action only, and does 
not purport to set forth a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983"; whereas, Billups asserted a federal claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  Billups, 268 Va. at 705, 604 S.E.2d at 416.  
However, Bing's case is similar to Billups in that both Bing 
and Billups alleged a count of common-law assault and battery.  
Id.  Bing's case is distinguished from Ogunde because Bing's 
complaint was not brought under the Tort Claims Act.  Ogunde, 
271 Va. at 641, 628 S.E.2d at 371. 
 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia has held that the one-year statute of limitations 
provision in Code § 8.01-243.2 applied to a pre-trial 
detainee's common-law assault and battery claim.  Harris v. 
Commonwealth, No. 3:07CV701, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33834, at 
*16 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2008).  Irrespective of Harris' status 
as a pre-trial detainee, the court concluded that our holding 
in Billups "is applicable to the facts of [the] instant case," 
and the court held that Harris' common-law assault and battery 
claim is "subject to [Code] § 8.01-243.2's one-year period of 
limitations."  Harris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33834, at *17. 
 
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For the one-year statute of limitations to apply, Bing 
must have: (1) been a "person confined in a state or local 
correctional facility"; and (2) "brought on [her] behalf [a] 
personal action relating to the conditions of [her] 
confinement."  Code § 8.01-243.2.  The word "confine" is 
defined as "the state of being imprisoned or restrained."  
Black's Law Dictionary 318 (9th ed. 2009).  The statute further 
provides that such confinement must be in a state or local 
correctional facility.  Code § 8.01-243.2.  The Security Center 
is clearly such a facility, and it was there that she was 
clearly confined.  Her status as a pre-trial detainee is 
immaterial to this determination.  
Each claim in Bing's three-count complaint was based upon 
the body cavity search.  Because she was confined at the time 
of the body cavity search, the question remains whether the 
search related to the conditions of Bing's confinement.  
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that 
"it is reasonable to search [a] person to prevent the 
introduction of weapons or contraband into [a] jail facility 
and to inventory the personal effects found on [a] suspect."  
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 258 n.7 (1973).  
Without question, governmental officials operating jails, 
detention centers, and prisons have a compelling interest in 
 
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maintaining a drug free, contraband free, and weapon free 
environment in their facilities.   
Additionally, Code §§ 53.1-30 and -127, respectively, 
provide that any person entering a correctional facility "shall 
be subject to a search," and the search shall be "reasonable 
under the circumstances."  As a result, searching a prisoner 
prior to placing the prisoner within a prison population to 
prevent contraband, whether drugs, weapons, or other 
substances, from entering the facility is related to the 
conditions of confinement.  We express no opinion whether the 
body cavity search was done properly.  In this case we are 
concerned only with the issue of the statute of limitations for 
her claim. 
III. Conclusion 
We hold that the trial court did not err when it granted 
defendants' plea of the statute of limitations because Bing was 
"confined" within the meaning of Code § 8.01-243.2, and the 
body cavity search related to the conditions of her 
confinement.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed.