Title: State ex rel. Turner v. Eberlin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Turner v. Eberlin, 117 Ohio St.3d 381, 2008-Ohio-1117.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. TURNER, APPELLEE, v. EBERLIN, WARDEN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Turner v. Eberlin, 117 Ohio St.3d 381, 2008-Ohio-1117.] 
Mandamus – Prisoners – Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03(E) – Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction –  Attachment by department of cash gifts 
to prisoner to pay outstanding common pleas court judgment – Gifts are 
“income” within meaning of rule – Department’s attachment authorized 
by rule – Writ denied. 
(No. 2007-2013─Submitted March 12, 2008─Decided March 19, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Belmont County,  
No. 07 BE 6, 2007-Ohio-5042. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of mandamus 
compelling a prison warden to refrain from attaching funds belonging to an 
inmate when those funds are not “income” within the meaning of the relevant 
administrative rule.  Because the administrative rule permitted the warden’s 
attachment of money received as gifts, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and deny the writ. 
{¶ 2} In 2005, the Stark County Court of Common Pleas convicted 
appellee, James D. Turner, of having weapons while under disability and carrying 
concealed weapons and sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of four years 
with a fine of $1,000.  The common pleas court also ordered Turner to pay the 
costs of the case.  The Stark County Clerk of Courts sent to Belmont Correctional 
Institution, the prison at which Turner is incarcerated, a statement listing 
$1,956.89 as the total amount Turner owed to the court.  The prison thereafter 
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notified Turner that he owed this amount to the court and that the prison cashier 
would place a hold on his inmate account. 
{¶ 3} In September 2006, Turner received a $15 gift in the form of a 
money order.  Turner later received money orders in the amounts of $100 and 
$25.  The prison officials attached these gifts to pay the common pleas court 
judgment against Turner. 
{¶ 4} In February 2007, Turner filed a petition in the Court of Appeals 
for Belmont County to compel appellant, Belmont Correctional Institution 
Warden Michele Eberlin, to comply with Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03(E) by not 
attaching the gifts to pay the common pleas court judgment.  The warden filed an 
answer, and the parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus compelling the 
warden to comply with the administrative rule, prohibiting her from attaching any 
of Turner’s future nonincome receipts, and ordering that future attachments of 
income cease until the wrongly attached funds are repaid to him. 
{¶ 6} In her appeal as of right, the warden asserts that the court of 
appeals erred in granting the writ.  To be entitled to the writ, Turner must 
establish a clear legal right to keep the money he received as gifts, a 
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the warden to refrain from attaching 
those gifts, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. Blandin v. Beck, 114 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-4562, 872 N.E.2d 
1232, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 7} R.C. 5120.133 requires the Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction to use money in a prisoner’s account to satisfy a judgment the prisoner 
owes, with certain exceptions: 
{¶ 8} “(A) The department of rehabilitation and correction, upon receipt 
of a certified copy of the judgment of a court of record in an action in which a 
prisoner was a party that orders a prisoner to pay a stated obligation, may apply 
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3 
toward payment of the obligation money that belongs to a prisoner and that is in 
the account kept for the prisoner by the department.  The department may transmit 
the prisoner’s funds directly to the court for disbursement or may make payment 
in another manner as directed by the court.  Except as otherwise provided in rules 
adopted under this section, when an amount is received for the prisoner’s 
account, the department shall use it for the payment of the obligation and shall 
continue using amounts received for the account until the full amount of the 
obligation has been paid.  No proceedings in aid of execution are necessary for 
the department to take the action required by this section. 
{¶ 9} “(B) The department may adopt rules specifying a portion of an 
inmate’s earnings or other receipts that the inmate is allowed to retain to make 
purchases from the commissary and that may not be used to satisfy an obligation 
pursuant to division (A) of this section.  The rules shall not permit the application 
or disbursement of funds belonging to an inmate if those funds are exempt from 
execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a judgment or order 
pursuant to section 2329.66 of the Revised Code or to any other provision of 
law.”  (Emphases added.) 
{¶ 10} Pursuant to this statutory authorization, the department adopted 
Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03 “to establish guidelines and procedures for 
withdrawing money that belongs to an inmate and that is in an account kept for 
the inmate by the department of rehabilitation and correction (DRC), upon receipt 
of a certified copy of a judgment of a court of record in an action in which an 
inmate was a party that orders an inmate to pay a stated obligation.” 
{¶ 11} Turner relies on Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03(E) to support his 
entitlement to the writ.  That section provides: 
{¶ 12} “If withdrawals are authorized and if there are insufficient funds in 
the inmate’s account to satisfy the amount shown as due, a monthly check shall be 
issued payable to the appropriate clerk’s office or in another matter as directed by 
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the court, for the amount of monthly income received into the inmate’s account 
which exceeds ten dollars until the full amount of the court obligation has been 
paid.  The hold shall remain on the inmate’s account until sufficient funds have 
been paid to satisfy the amount shown as due on the balance remaining thereon.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals concluded that because “income” as used in 
the administrative rule does not include gifts, the warden erred in using the gifts 
received by Turner to satisfy the court judgment against him.  The warden 
counters that the word “income” in Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03(E) includes gifts. 
{¶ 14} “The interpretation of statutes and administrative rules should 
follow the principle that neither is to be construed in any way other than as the 
words demand.”  Morning View Care Center-Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human 
Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518, 2002-Ohio-2878, 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36.  We must 
read undefined words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance 
with rules of grammar and common usage.  State ex rel. Heffelfinger v. Brunner, 
116 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-Ohio-5838, 876 N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 35 (applying this rule 
to statutory construction); Ashland Chem. Co. v. Jones (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 234, 
749 N.E.2d 744 (applying this rule to construe an administrative rule). 
{¶ 15} In holding that “income” must be derived from capital or labor and 
therefore cannot include gifts, the court of appeals relied on a dictionary 
definition of “income” that we used to construe a workers’ compensation statute.  
See State ex rel. McDulin v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 390, 392, 732 
N.E.2d 367, quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1143 
(“ ‘Income,’ on the other hand, represents ‘a gain or recurrent benefit that is 
[usually] measured in money and for a given period of time, derives from capital, 
labor, or a combination of both’ ”).  In McDulin, however, we were not asked to 
address whether the term “income” could reasonably include gifts.  Instead, we 
merely applied the foregoing definition of “income” to hold that “[i]ncome is a 
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much broader term than ‘earnings’ or ‘wages,’ and [the terms] cannot, therefore, 
be used interchangeably.”  Id. at 392, 732 N.E.2d 367. 
{¶ 16} In fact, a commonly accepted definition of “income” includes gifts.  
See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 778, defining “income” as the “money 
or other form of payment that one receives, usu. periodically, from employment, 
business, investments, royalties, gifts, and the like.”  (Emphases added.)  We have 
often applied definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary to determine the meaning 
of undefined statutory language.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Citizens for Open, 
Responsive & Accountable Govt. v. Register, 116 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-5542, 
876 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 30; State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 
2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 23-24. 
{¶ 17} Courts must give due deference to the department’s reasonable 
interpretation of Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03(E).  See Northwestern Ohio Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Conrad (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 282, 287, 750 N.E.2d 
130 (“A court must give due deference to the agency’s reasonable interpretation 
of the legislative scheme”); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. (1984), 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (“if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute”); see also State ex rel. Schaengold v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 114 
Ohio St.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-3760, 870 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 18} Because the department’s interpretation of “income” in Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-5-03(E) is supported by a commonly accepted definition of the 
term, the court of appeals erred in failing to defer to the department’s reasonable 
conclusion that “income” includes gifts.  The department was authorized under 
the rule to apply the gift money received by Turner to the unsatisfied judgment 
owed by him in his criminal case as long as $10 was left in his account. 
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{¶ 19} Based on the foregoing, Turner cannot establish either a clear legal 
right to the requested relief or a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the 
warden to provide it.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and deny the writ.  By so holding, we do not address the warden’s remaining 
arguments, which are moot.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Lewis v. Rolston, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 293, 2007-Ohio-5139, 874 N.E.2d 1200, ¶ 23. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ denied. 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
James D. Turner, pro se. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Mary Anne Reese and Dierdra M. 
Howard, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. 
______________________