Title: People v. Buenrostro

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DORA BUENROSTRO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S073823 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
CR59617 
 
 
December 3, 2018 
 
Justice Kruger filed the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Mauro* concurred. 
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
S073823 
 
 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
After a jury found defendant Dora Buenrostro competent 
to stand trial, a separate jury convicted her of the first degree 
murders of her children, Susana, Vicente, and Deidra.  (Pen. 
Code, § 187.)  The jury found true three multiple-murder 
special-circumstance allegations (id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and 
allegations that defendant personally used a knife in the 
commission of each murder (id., §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23), 12022, 
subd. (b)).  After a penalty trial, the same jury returned a verdict 
of death.  The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new 
trial and for modification of the verdict (id., § 190.4, subd. (e)) 
and sentenced her to death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Id., 
§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
We affirm the judgment as to guilt, vacate two of the three 
multiple-murder special-circumstance findings, reverse the 
judgment as to the sentence of death, and remand the matter 
for a new penalty determination. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
The bodies of the three victims were found on October 27, 
1994.  Each victim had suffered fatal stab wounds.  Beginning 
on that date and continuing through her trial testimony, 
defendant blamed the murders on her estranged husband, 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
2 
Alejandro Buenrostro (who was known as Alex).  In closing 
argument, however, the defense conceded that Alex, who had an 
alibi, could not have killed the children.  The guilt phase focused 
on whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that 
defendant committed the murders and did so willfully and with 
premeditation and deliberation. 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
Defendant and Alex were married in 1982.  Until their 
separation several years later, they lived in Los Angeles with 
their three children, Susana, Vicente, and Deidra (ages nine, 
eight, and four, respectively, at the time of the murders).  Alex 
worked as an auto refinisher painter, and defendant worked for 
seven years as a file clerk and interpreter for a law firm.  In 
1990, defendant moved with the children to San Jacinto in 
Riverside County.  Alex remained at the Los Angeles residence 
and saw the children twice a month.   
a.  Events of Tuesday, October 25, 1994 
Between 5:00 and 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday, October 25, 1994, 
defendant was seen driving in her car with her three children.  
Around 6:30 p.m., defendant borrowed $10 from a neighbor, 
David Tijerina, for gasoline because she was going to drive to 
Los Angeles to see her husband.  Tijerina watched defendant 
drive out of the apartment complex with Deidra in the car.   
Defendant arrived at Alex’s residence in Los Angeles, 
alone and unannounced, about 11:00 p.m. and stayed for two 
hours.  She asked to see Alex’s gun.  He removed the bullets, 
showed her the gun, and then put it away.  He asked defendant 
about the children, and she told him they were fine.  At some 
point, defendant went to the kitchen and then approached Alex, 
who was in the bedroom.  She was holding a steak knife and 
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3 
wearing a red glove.  She made stabbing motions with the knife 
and asked Alex why he was afraid of dying.  She threatened to 
hit him where “it hurts the most” because he had “never given 
her our separation.”  He called 911.  Defendant swung at him 
with the knife a couple of times, but he was able to get away and 
ran outside.   
Police arrived within 20 minutes, at 1:15 a.m.  Defendant 
was standing in the doorway of the residence, holding the knife, 
but complied when police commanded her to drop it.  She told 
the police she was there to pick up her child, whom she accused 
Alex of taking to buy shoes earlier in the day and not returning.  
The police observed no children at the residence or in 
defendant’s car, a dark-colored four-door Oldsmobile lacking a 
child’s car seat.  The police advised her to return to San Jacinto 
and file a missing child report, and she left.   
b.  Events of Wednesday, October 26, 1994 
On Wednesday, October 26, 1994, about 10:30 a.m., 
defendant went to the San Jacinto Police Department and 
reported to Officer Blane Dillon that her estranged husband had 
taken her youngest child two days earlier and not brought her 
back.  The officer informed her law enforcement could not 
intervene unless her husband was in violation of a court order 
providing he was not permitted to visit with the child.  
Defendant left the police department. 
Later that day, about 2:00 p.m., defendant’s sister, Angela 
Montenegro, saw her at a gas station in San Jacinto.  Defendant 
was alone and driving her black Oldsmobile, which had been 
washed and had water dripping from the back bumper.  Neither 
Deidra nor a child’s car seat was in the car.  About 3:00 p.m., 
defendant’s next door neighbor, Velia Cabanila, saw Susana and 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
4 
Vicente when they stopped briefly to play at her apartment after 
school.  The children told Cabanila their mother had told them 
Deidra was with their father.  Deidra had visited Cabanila’s 
apartment the day before, by herself.  About 7:00 p.m., another 
neighbor saw defendant looking over the wall of her apartment.   
c.  Events of Thursday, October 27, 1994 
Cabanila’s and defendant’s apartments shared a common 
wall.  On Thursday, October 27, 1994, about 3:00 a.m., Cabanila 
heard a “really loud thump,” but no other noise, coming from 
defendant’s living room.   
At 6:40 a.m., defendant entered the San Jacinto Police 
Department and reported to the desk clerk her husband was at 
her apartment with a knife.  Police were immediately 
dispatched.  The officers entered the apartment and found two 
of defendant’s children, Susana and Vicente, lying on separate 
sofas in the living room, each covered as if sleeping.  Both were 
dead, with stab wounds to their necks.  Another sofa was 
standing on its end at the entrance to the hallway, blocking the 
path to the bedrooms and the bathroom.  Defendant admitted 
she had moved the sofa. 
Outside, defendant told police Alex had come to the 
apartment that morning.  She let him in, and he went to the 
bathroom.  Defendant thought he was acting strange, so she 
went to the police station to notify the police of his behavior. 
San 
Jacinto 
Police 
Detective 
Sergeant 
Frederick 
Rodriguez was assigned as lead investigator.  At the police 
station, he interviewed defendant, who was not in custody.  
Meanwhile, police focused their investigation on Alex.  By 9:00 
a.m., police located him at the office of his employer in Los 
Angeles and took him into police custody for questioning.  By 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
5 
early the next morning, the police ruled him out as a suspect 
and released him from custody.2  
Later, around 6:00 p.m., Deidra’s body was discovered by 
children playing in an abandoned post office in Lakeview.  A 
deputy with the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department 
responded to the scene and saw Deidra strapped in a child’s car 
seat.  There was blood and visible trauma to her mouth and 
neck.  An object with a handle, possibly a screwdriver or pen 
knife, was stuck in her throat.  
Officer Dillon arrived at the scene about 7:30 p.m. to 
investigate.  He had received information about the 
investigation from other officers during the course of the day.  
Based on inconsistencies in defendant’s versions of events, 
police focused on her as a suspect.3 
d.  Physical evidence 
Defendant’s car was removed from her apartment complex 
and processed for evidence.  Her purse and camera case and a 
red knit glove were discovered in the trunk of the car.  DNA 
testing established that six blood samples obtained from 
                                        
2  
Police spoke with Alex’s neighbor, who confirmed (as she 
did at trial) she had heard his shower running the morning of 
Thursday, October 27, and saw him leave his residence about 
7:20 a.m.  Given the distance between defendant’s apartment in 
San Jacinto and Alex’s workplace in Los Angeles, as well as the 
time defendant reported Alex was at her apartment in 
possession of a knife (6:40 a.m.), Alex was ruled out as a suspect. 
3  
Detective Rodriguez’s interview of defendant began 
around 10:30 a.m., shortly after the bodies of Susana and 
Vicente were discovered in her apartment.  A tape recording of 
the entire interview was played for the jurors.  A transcript of 
the recording was also given to the jurors.   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
6 
defendant’s car matched Deidra’s DNA profile.  Defendant, Alex, 
Susana, and Vicente were eliminated as sources for the blood.   
Hairs found on Deidra’s hand and leg were determined to 
be similar to defendant’s.  Tire impressions lifted from an area 
near the abandoned post office where Deidra’s body was found 
matched the tread designs of the three different types of tires on 
defendant’s car.   
e.  Autopsy results 
All three children bled to death from multiple stab wounds 
to the neck.  Susana suffered defensive wounds to her right 
hand; four stab wounds to the front of her neck, two of which 
went into the bone of her spine; superficial cuts to her neck; and 
a perforation of her left chest cavity.  The stab wounds ranged 
in depth from one to three inches.  One stab wound severed the 
left subclavian artery and another cut halfway through the 
external jugular vein.  These two injuries caused exceedingly 
rapid bleeding and likely rendered Susana unconsciousness in 
less than a minute. 
Vicente suffered numerous defensive wounds on his 
hands, two stab wounds to the front of his neck, and abrasions 
and contusions on his neck and right clavicle.  One of the stab 
wounds cut almost completely through the right common carotid 
artery, which comes from the heart.  Vicente died from rapid 
bleeding, which likely rendered him unconsciousness in less 
than a minute. 
Deidra died from multiple stab wounds to her neck.  A 
piece of a knife blade three-quarters of an inch wide by two to 
three inches in length had broken off and was embedded in the 
bone in her neck area.  A metallic tip of what appeared to be a 
ballpoint pen was found in the soft tissue of her neck.  Deidra 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
7 
had suffered a perforation of the chest cavity and blunt force 
trauma to her skull, which was consistent with her head being 
slammed against the car seat while she was being stabbed.  
There were no defensive wounds on her body.  Deidra’s body 
exhibited signs of decomposition.  The time of her death could 
not be determined. 
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant testified in her own defense.  On direct 
examination, she testified that the last time she saw Deidra was 
9:00 or 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October 25, 1994, when Alex 
came to her apartment and took her.  Between 11:00 a.m. and 
noon, defendant went to the San Jacinto Police Department to 
report Deidra missing.  At 11:00 p.m. that night, defendant 
drove to Alex’s residence in Los Angeles and checked the house 
for Deidra.  She picked up a knife to defend herself during an 
argument with Alex.  She threatened him but did not try to stab 
him, and she denied that she wore a red glove on her hand.  Alex 
called the Los Angeles Police, and defendant dropped her knife 
when ordered to do so.  She complained to police that Alex had 
taken Deidra and had not returned her.  When the police 
advised her to leave, she left and returned to San Jacinto.  The 
following morning, defendant went to the San Jacinto Police 
Department 
seeking 
assistance 
regarding 
Deidra’s 
disappearance. 
Defendant testified that at 5:00 a.m. on Thursday 
morning, October 27, 1994, Alex came to her apartment.  When 
she let him in, he went straight to the bathroom.  Defendant left 
the apartment because of the Tuesday evening altercation with 
him in Los Angeles.  She left Susana and Vicente in the 
apartment.  She arrived at the police department between 5:30 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
8 
and 6:00 a.m., telling police she had had an argument with Alex 
on Tuesday and he had taken her daughter.  She asked them to 
check her apartment and speak with Alex.  Defendant said he 
did not have a knife or other weapon. 
Defendant returned to her apartment complex with the 
police and waited outside.  About 7:30 a.m., she was informed 
her children were dead.  Defendant went to the police 
department, where she remained all day for questioning.  She 
denied killing the children, claiming someone had planted the 
blood evidence in her car.  She had no explanation for the tire 
impressions that matched the tires on her car and said the red 
gloves found in the passenger compartment and trunk of her car 
belonged to a Betty Buenrostro.  Defendant admitted having a 
prior felony conviction for grand theft. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s prior 
conviction for grand theft, her violent conduct while 
incarcerated, and the impact of the murders on the victims’ 
family members and on the community.  
a.  Prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 190.3, 
factor (c)) 
The parties stipulated that defendant pleaded guilty to 
felony grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487.1) on September 1, 1988. 
b.  Prior unadjudicated criminal activity involving 
the use of or express or implied threat to use 
force or violence (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b)) 
In February 1995, while awaiting trial in this case, 
defendant had a physical altercation with Deputy Johnnie 
Anaya and a nurse who was administering medications to 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
9 
inmates housed on the medical floor in the jail.  The altercation 
occurred when defendant stepped outside her cell, refused an 
order to return to her cell, and raised her hand to the deputy 
and nurse.  Defendant grabbed the nurse’s arm and, when her 
hand slipped, held tightly onto her sleeve.  Anaya forced 
defendant back into her cell.  The deputy and defendant 
struggled, fell to the floor, and struggled further before other 
deputies subdued defendant.4 
Another incident occurred in May 1996.  Deputy 
Stephanie Rigby was supervising inmates at the jail and 
permitted defendant to leave the day room.  Defendant walked 
into a sally port area and removed a wringer from a custodial 
mop bucket.  Observing her from a glass-enclosed control room, 
Deputy Rigby commanded her to return to the day room.  
Defendant refused to comply and held the mop wringer over her 
shoulder like a baseball bat.  When she refused to drop the 
wringer, back-up deputies were called to assist.  A deputy had 
to physically remove the wringer from her grip.  Defendant did 
not attempt to hit any of the deputies with the wringer.5 
c.  Victim impact testimony 
The prosecution presented the testimony of the victims’ 
older half-sister, Alejandra Buenrostro, their father, Alex 
Buenrostro, and Deborah De Forge, the principal of the 
                                        
4  
The trial court ruled evidence of the incident admissible 
under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), as showing a battery 
(id., § 242) involving the express or implied use of force or 
violence, or the threat of force or violence.   
5  
The trial court ruled the incident admissible under Penal 
Code section 190.3, factor (b), as misdemeanor exhibiting a 
deadly weapon in a threatening manner (id., § 417). 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
10 
elementary school Susana and Vicente attended.  The 
prosecution played a videotape of Alex at the police station 
showing the moment he learned Susana and Vicente had been 
murdered.  The prosecution also presented a video montage of 
photographs of the victims in life and their shared gravesite.   
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant testified on her own behalf, claiming she had 
been framed by police in general and Officer Blane Dillon in 
particular, whom she accused of having lied about the timeline 
of events and planting the incriminating evidence in her car.  In 
her view, the expert had testified the hairs found on Deidra 
could have belonged to anyone.  She denied being mentally ill.  
Defendant maintained her innocence of the charges and wanted 
to be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole because 
she had been framed.  
The defense also presented testimony from defendant’s 
former neighbor David Tijerina, niece Brenda Davalos, and 
sisters Martha Gudino and Maria Perez and their mother, 
Arcelia Zamudio.  The evidence briefly sketched defendant’s 
family background, portrayed her as a loving mother, and 
related a change in her attitude and behavior in the months 
preceding the murders.  Defendant’s family members asked for 
mercy. 
II.  COMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS 
A.  Factual and Procedural Background 
Before trial, the trial court declared a doubt as to 
defendant’s competence to stand trial and suspended the 
criminal proceedings under Penal Code section 1368 for a 
competency determination.  The question was submitted to a 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
11 
jury.  At the competency trial, defense experts — psychologists 
Michael Perrotti and Michael Kania and psychiatrist Mark 
Mills — testified that defendant was not competent to stand 
trial.  Court-appointed experts — psychiatrist Jose Moral and 
psychologist Craig Rath — testified that she was competent.  
The jury found defendant competent to stand trial.   
1.  Defense Evidence 
a.  Psychologist Michael Perrotti 
Psychologist Michael Perrotti, Ph.D., spent 10 hours 
administering psychological tests and evaluating defendant in 
March and July 1995.   
Defendant related to Dr. Perrotti that she had a ninth 
grade education and had been physically abused by her 
husband.  Regarding her current circumstances, defendant 
reported that “everyone was against her,” jail deputies 
conspired against her, she was being poisoned by a gas leak in 
her jail cell, she was hearing voices and acting aggressively to 
the point that she had to be handcuffed, and the medical staff at 
the jail was conducting experiments on her for research 
purposes.  Defendant appeared depressed and confused.  Her 
thoughts were disorganized and her speech pressured.  She 
suffered 
from 
significant 
impairment 
of 
memory 
and 
concentration caused by a mental disorder, and Dr. Perrotti 
believed there was “a possibility of a neuro-psychological 
problem.”  Dr. Perrotti did not perform neuropsychological 
testing because defendant would not cooperate.   
Dr. Perrotti opined defendant did not understand the legal 
system and had no insight into her lack of understanding.  
Everything with defendant was “clouded with suspicion, 
distrust, and [beliefs that] people are acting against her,” all of 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
12 
which hindered her ability to work with her attorney or any 
attorney.  Defendant was aware of the murder charges against 
her but denied knowing who the victims were.  She wanted to go 
to court so she could be released and return home.   
Dr. Perrotti 
diagnosed 
defendant 
as 
a 
paranoid 
schizophrenic.  He did not include this diagnosis in his written 
report because he believed a description of defendant’s behavior 
and her “problems” was easier to understand than a diagnostic 
label, and had not used the label “paranoid schizophrenic” with 
regard to defendant except with trial counsel.  Over the course 
of Dr. Perrotti’s evaluation of defendant, trial counsel would 
occasionally 
ask 
him, 
“Do 
you 
think 
[defendant’s] 
schizophrenic?”  He admitted that his diagnosis of defendant as 
a paranoid schizophrenic did not necessarily mean that she was 
incompetent.  Based on the test results, Dr. Perrotti found no 
signs defendant was malingering.   
b.  Psychologist Michael Kania  
Psychologist Michael Kania, Ph.D., met with defendant on 
six or seven occasions before he evaluated her for competency 
during his visits on March 3 and April 17, 1995.  He 
administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI) on December 17, 1994.  Dr. Kania explained that 
although this psychological test is not relevant to the issue of 
competency, a determination of malingering can be made based 
on a comparison of the test results to the clinician’s impressions.  
Dr. Kania found no evidence defendant malingered on the 
MMPI.  He acknowledged defendant’s scores had been evaluated 
by Dr. Alex Caldwell’s testing service, which produced a report 
stating 
her 
answers 
suggested 
“extensive 
intentional 
overstatement” and “some degree of deliberate malingering.”  
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
13 
The report also included a warning to use caution in 
interpreting defendant’s test results because she did not answer 
all items. 
Based on his interviews with defendant, Dr. Kania 
diagnosed her as suffering from delusional disorder with 
paranoid delusions.  For example, defendant thought her sister 
spoke a different language and had been influencing her 
children in this language.  Defendant also believed gas was 
being pumped into her jail cell.  He concluded she was 
incompetent to stand trial; although she understood the nature 
of the charges against her and had a basic understanding of the 
legal proceedings, she could not rationally assist counsel. 
c.  Psychiatrist Mark Mills 
Psychiatrist Mark Mills, M.D., met with defendant on 
November 16, 1994, and April 27, 1995, for a total of two hours.  
He questioned whether she had been forthcoming during the 
interviews and believed she may have been “paranoid but hiding 
symptoms.”  Defendant discussed her delusions with family 
members and others, but refused to talk with him about them.  
He diagnosed her as suffering from “a significant psychotic 
disorder, probably a delusional disorder.”  Because her diagnosis 
rendered her unable to work rationally with any attorney, he 
believed her to be incompetent to stand trial.6 
d.  Psychiatrist Herminio Academia 
On February 26, 1995, Riverside County Mental Health 
Department staff psychiatrist Herminio Academia, M.D., 
                                        
6  
Dr. Mills explained that although he did not explicitly 
state in his report that defendant was incompetent, he did so 
impliedly.  
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14 
treated defendant at the jail for about 20 minutes.  Defendant 
was complaining her cell was too hot, she was being “cooked,” 
and “gas was going to her cell.”  Dr. Academia diagnosed 
defendant with a nonspecific psychotic disorder and prescribed 
Haldol to relieve her delusions and paranoia, but she refused the 
medication.   
e.  Psychiatrist Austin Anthony 
On February 27, 1995, Riverside County Department of 
Mental Health staff psychiatrist Austin Anthony, M.D.,  treated 
defendant.  She spoke in a rambling manner about the room 
being hot and about the smell of gas.  She appeared friendly and 
cooperative and had good eye contact, but on occasion seemed 
confused and bewildered.  She refused to take medication 
prescribed for her.  On February 28, 1995, Dr. Anthony’s last 
appointment with defendant, he found her to be friendly and 
alert and no longer complaining of the gas smell. 
f.  Testimony of defendant’s family members and 
Regena Acosta  
Defendant’s sisters Angela Montenegro, Martha Gudino, 
and Maria Perez described her delusions and bizarre behavior.  
For example, Montenegro testified that in July 1994, when she 
and her two children were living with defendant and her three 
children, defendant came home from church one day and took 
the tacos the children were eating, threw them in the garbage, 
and told Montenegro to move out.  On several occasions during 
the next month, defendant accused Montenegro of feeding 
defendant’s children poisoned taco meat, being a witch, and 
turning into a snake and biting her (defendant’s) leg.  On cross-
examination, Montenegro testified she and defendant had 
attended the same church, and the church asked her 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
15 
(Montenegro) to quit attending services because of a 
relationship she had with a man named Roberto.  Defendant 
accused Montenegro of being a prostitute.  Montenegro told the 
police that defendant’s anger and name-calling might have had 
something to do with Roberto.   
Gudino visited defendant at the jail with their other sister, 
Perez, and their mother.  Trial counsel was also present during 
the visit and asked Gudino to persuade defendant to sign 
medical information release authorization forms for any medical 
provider who treated defendant during her life.  For about an 
hour and 45 minutes, Gudino, Perez, and their mother tried to 
persuade defendant to sign the forms.  She refused and told her 
family that they were against her. 
Regena Acosta read about defendant in the newspapers 
after the murders.  She was motivated to minister to defendant 
and visited her in jail four or five times between about 
November 1994 and February 1995.  Acosta testified defendant 
told her she believed the jail guards were putting “stuff” in her 
food to make her sick.  Defendant also told Acosta she did not 
understand what was going on at court.   
2.  Prosecution Evidence 
a.  Court-Appointed Psychiatrist Jose Moral  
On March 25, 1995, court-appointed psychiatrist Jose 
Moral, M.D.,  examined defendant at the jail.  She was alert and 
oriented and understood the purpose of his visit.  She knew she 
had been charged with murdering her three children.  She 
demonstrated knowledge and understanding of the criminal 
legal process, including the various stages from arrest through 
trial and sentencing.  Before having her children, she had been 
employed at a civil law firm as an assistant to the legal 
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16 
secretaries and worked with attorneys for about seven years.  
Defendant complained the proceedings were progressing too 
slowly.  She denied having delusions or hallucinations and 
exhibited no psychotic symptoms during the interview.   
On July 26, 1995, Dr. Moral interviewed defendant a 
second time.  Defendant again demonstrated knowledge of the 
legal system.  Her relationship with counsel had improved by 
this time.  She explained that her preoccupation with the smell 
of gas in her cell stemmed from news reports about deaths in 
Riverside caused by exposure to gas fumes.  She denied having 
the psychotic symptoms reported by other psychologists and 
psychiatrists and gave Dr. Moral reasonable explanations for 
the reported symptoms.  Defendant had no thought disorder.  
She was able to carry out her interview with Dr. Moral without 
difficulty and was “purposeful in her answers,” “cooperative,” 
“reasonable,” and “logical.”  Dr. Moral believed defendant was 
competent to stand trial.  During a break in the proceedings on 
the day he testified, Dr. Moral interacted with defendant and 
discussed competency issues with her.  After this contact, 
Dr. Moral continued to believe defendant was competent to 
stand trial.   
b.  Court-Appointed Psychologist Craig Rath 
Psychologist Craig Rath, Ph.D., was appointed on March 
14, 1995, to evaluate defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
Previously, on October 28, 1994, at the request of the Riverside 
District Attorney’s Office, Dr. Rath had interviewed defendant 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
17 
for about an hour after her arrest.7  He taped the interview, and 
the audiotape was played for the jury in its entirety.8  
Defendant’s demeanor during the interview was appropriate.  
She exhibited no signs of mental illness or psychosis putting her 
“out of contact with reality.”  Defendant’s long-term and short-
term memory were unimpaired.  She communicated very well 
and protected information she did not want to share.   
Dr. Rath administered the MMPI to defendant.  She 
completed 400 of 566 questions.  Her answers showed a “saw-
tooth profile,” which is a classic sign of malingering.  
After Dr. Rath was appointed by the court to evaluate 
defendant’s competency, he unsuccessfully attempted to 
evaluate defendant on March 24, 1995, and April 3, 1995.9  
Based on his October 28, 1994, interview with her shortly after 
the murders, Dr. Rath believed she was competent to stand trial 
because she “does not have any major mental illness [that] 
would preclude her from understanding what’s going on or 
cooperating with her attorney.”   
Although Dr. Rath had first interviewed defendant shortly 
after her arrest, at the request of the District Attorney’s office, 
he did not declare a conflict when the court appointed him on 
March 14, 1995, to render an opinion as to her competence to 
                                        
7  
Defendant had waived her right against self-incrimination 
and agreed to speak to a “doctor.”   
8  
The jury was also given a copy of the transcript of the 
interview. 
9  
On his first attempt, deputies at the jail informed Dr. Rath 
defendant had refused to be handcuffed, which was required 
when she was transported outside her cell because she “had 
been attacking people.”  When he returned to evaluate 
defendant in April, she refused to see him.   
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
18 
stand trial.  Dr. Rath denied he had a conflict under the Board 
of Medical Quality Assurance Ethics Committee’s standards.  
He testified he had contacted the committee and was told he had 
not acted unethically.  Regarding his initial visit with 
defendant, Dr. Rath pointed out it would have been unethical 
for him to refuse to see her, given she was potentially suicidal 
after the deaths of her three children.   
c.  Jail Psychiatrist Romeo Villar 
Between October 28, 1994, and March 1, 1995, jail 
psychiatrist Romeo Villar, M.D., saw defendant several times 
while she was in custody.  During his last contact with her in 
March 1995, defendant denied having hallucinations or suicidal 
ideations.  Dr. Villar testified defendant had fair insight and 
judgment, and her affect was subdued. 
3.  Defense Rebuttal Evidence 
Catherine Moreno, a paralegal employed by trial counsel, 
had had contact with defendant approximately 10 times by the 
time she testified at the competency trial.  Moreno testified that 
defendant could not structure coherent paragraphs, although 
Moreno could not recall ever having read anything written by 
defendant.  Moreno had never tried to talk with defendant about 
the facts of her case.  Defendant refused Moreno’s numerous 
requests to sign forms to authorize the release of information 
and failed to provide any explanation.  Moreno acknowledged 
she could have obtained the documents with a subpoena.  
Sherry 
Skidmore, 
Ph.D., 
a 
clinical 
and 
forensic 
psychologist, had served on local, state, and national 
psychological ethics committees.  She reviewed the results of the 
MMPI test Dr. Rath administered to defendant.  Based on those 
scores, Dr. Skidmore could not render an opinion as to whether 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
19 
or not defendant was malingering.  In her opinion, no 
psychologist would determine malingering from MMPI results 
alone.  A determination of malingering depends on a number of 
objective measures, including a follow-up interview to clarify 
specific parts of the malingering assessment, such as distortion 
and over-reporting of symptoms.  For a forensic psychologist to 
render an opinion regarding an individual’s competence based 
on an interview not conducted for the purpose of determining 
competence would fall below the standard of care.   
4.  Surrebuttal 
On October 27, 1995, George Groth, a mental health 
clinician at the jail, saw defendant at her request.  Defendant 
was anxious about her upcoming trial.  Groth found defendant’s 
thinking clear and her speech understandable, and she 
exhibited no signs of mental illness.  The parties stipulated this 
was the only time defendant was seen by the jail’s Forensic 
Mental Health unit between September 1, 1995, and the day her 
competency trial commenced, October 26, 1995.  
The parties also stipulated that on November 1, 1995, a 
search warrant was served in defendant’s jail cell.  Two 
documents written by defendant in Spanish were confiscated 
during the search.10   
                                        
10  
Additional details concerning the two documents are 
provided in part II.B.4., post.  
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
20 
B.  Discussion 
1.  Constitutionality of the Definition of Incompetence 
to Stand Trial Under Penal Code Section 1367, 
Subdivision (a), and CALJIC No. 4.10  
The due process guarantees of both the federal and state 
Constitutions forbid the trial of a criminal defendant while he 
or she is mentally incompetent.  (See People v. Mickel (2016) 2 
Cal.5th 181, 194–195.)  In California, the determination 
whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial is 
governed by Penal Code section 1367 (section 1367), which 
provides that a defendant is mentally incompetent “if, as a 
result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the 
defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a 
rational manner.”  (§ 1367, subd. (a).)  Consistent with that 
standard, the jury in this case was instructed with CALJIC 
No. 4.10 (Doubt of Present Mental Competence), which informed 
the jury that its task was to “decide whether the defendant is 
mentally competent to be tried for a criminal offense,” and went 
on to explain:  “Although on some subjects her mind may be 
deranged or unsound, a person charged with a criminal offense 
is deemed mentally competent to be tried for the crime charged 
against her if, one, she is capable of understanding the nature 
and purpose of the proceedings against her; two, she 
comprehends her own status and condition in reference to such 
proceedings; and, three, she is able to assist her attorney in 
conducting her defense in a rational manner.  [¶]  The defendant 
is presumed to be mentally competent.  The effect of this 
presumption is to place upon the defendant the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she is mentally 
incompetent as a result of a mental disorder.”   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
21 
Defendant contends that the statutory definition of 
mental competence in section 1367 is inadequate to safeguard a 
defendant’s due process rights because it requires proof that a 
mental disorder or developmental disability rendered the 
defendant unable to understand the proceedings against him or 
her or to assist counsel with his or her defense.  She also 
contends that both the statutory definition and CALJIC 
No. 4.10 are inadequate because they fail to require proof of (a) 
both a “rational” and a “factual” understanding of the criminal 
proceedings, and (b) a “present” ability to assist counsel in a 
rational manner.  She contends these infirmities, separately and 
together, violated her right to substantive due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and require reversal of the entire 
judgment.  Defendant’s contentions lack merit. 
a.  Legal background 
As a matter of due process, “[a] defendant may not be put 
to trial unless he ‘ “has sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding 
. . . [and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.” ’ ”  (Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 
517 U.S. 348, 354, quoting Dusky v. United States (1960) 
362 U.S. 402, 402 (per curiam) (Dusky).)  A trial court’s failure 
“to employ procedures to protect against trial of an incompetent 
defendant deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial 
and requires reversal of his conviction.”  (People v. Medina 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881–882, citing Drope v. Missouri (1975) 
420 U.S. 162, 171 (Drope).)  “ ‘Even when a defendant is 
competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must 
always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would 
render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence 
to stand trial.’  [Citation.]  State constitutional authority is to 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
22 
the same effect.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 668, 690–691 (Lightsey).)   
“The applicable state statutes essentially parallel the 
state and federal constitutional directives.”  (Lightsey, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 691.)  Section 1367, subdivision (a), provides in 
pertinent part:  “A person cannot be tried or adjudged to 
punishment . . . while that person is mentally incompetent.  A 
defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter 
if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the 
defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a 
rational manner.”   
Penal Code section 1368 (section 1368) provides in 
relevant part:  “(a)  If, during the pendency of an action and prior 
to judgment . . . , a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to 
the mental competence of the defendant, he or she shall state 
that doubt in the record and inquire of the attorney for the 
defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant 
is mentally competent.  If the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.  At the request of the 
defendant or his or her counsel or upon its own motion, the court 
shall recess the proceedings for as long as may be reasonably 
necessary to permit counsel to confer with the defendant and to 
form an opinion as to the mental competence of the defendant at 
that point in time.  [¶]  (b)  If counsel informs the court that he 
or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, 
the court shall order that the question of the defendant’s mental 
competence is to be determined in a hearing which is held 
pursuant to [Penal Code] Sections 1368.1 and 1369.  If counsel 
informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
23 
mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a 
hearing.” 
“[A] trial court is obligated to conduct a full competency 
hearing if substantial evidence raises a reasonable doubt that a 
criminal defendant may be incompetent.  This is true even if the 
evidence creating that doubt is presented by the defense or if the 
sum of the evidence is in conflict.  The failure to conduct a 
hearing despite the presence of such substantial evidence is 
reversible error.”  (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th 691, citing People 
v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 737–738.) 
The law presumes a person is competent to stand trial.  
(Pen. Code, § 1369, subd. (f).)  “When the defendant puts his or 
her competence to stand trial in issue, the defendant bears the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or 
she 
lacks 
competence.” 
 
(People 
v. 
Mendoza 
(2016) 
62 Cal.4th 856, 871; see § 1369, subd. (f); Medina v. California 
(1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446 (Medina) [allocation of the burden of 
proof to a criminal defendant to prove incompetence does not 
violate procedural due process].) 
b.  Penal Code section 1367’s requirement of proof 
of mental disorder or developmental disability 
Defendant contends that the definition of mental 
incompetence under section 1367, subdivision (a), fails to meet 
the constitutional standard because it requires proof of a mental 
disorder or developmental disability.  She contends that United 
States Supreme Court decisions, by contrast, have defined 
competence to stand trial solely in the functional terms of a 
defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the proceedings 
against her and to assist her attorney in preparing her defense 
in a rational manner.  (See Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402; 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
24 
Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 171.)  She contends that section 
1367’s requirement of proof of a mental disorder or 
developmental 
disability 
unconstitutionally 
narrows 
the 
definition of incompetence, thereby depriving a “subset of 
defendants”—those who are unable to understand the 
proceedings and assist counsel in a rational manner but do not 
“suffer from a recognized mental disorder or developmental 
disability”—of the right not to be tried while incompetent. 
In her briefing, defendant did not specify whether her 
claim relates to the facial validity of section 1367, subdivision 
(a), or the statute’s validity as applied to the particular 
circumstances of her case.  At oral argument, however, appellate 
counsel clarified that defendant’s challenge is a facial attack.  
“ ‘ “To support a determination of facial unconstitutionality, . . . 
[challengers] cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future 
hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly 
arise as to the particular application of the statute.” ’ ”  (Tobe v. 
City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.)  Rather, the 
“minimum” our cases have accepted is a showing that the 
statute is invalid “in the generality or great majority of cases.”  
(San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 643, 673; cf. Washington State Grange v. Washington 
State Republican Party (2008) 552 U.S. 442, 449 [noting that 
while some justices of the high court have embraced a more 
demanding standard, all justices “agree that a facial challenge 
must fail where the statute has a ‘ “plainly legitimate 
sweep” ’ ”].) 
In this case, defendant has failed to demonstrate that 
section 1367, subdivision (a), is facially invalid; indeed, she has 
failed to identify any case (including her own) in which section 
1367’s mental disorder or developmental disability requirement 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
25 
results in the violation of due process.11  Contrary to her 
argument, the due process right not to be tried while 
incompetent has long been understood in terms of the causal 
relationship between the defendant’s mental condition and his 
or her trial-related functional abilities.  As the high court 
explained in Drope, the constitutional right is rooted in the 
venerable common law rule “that a person whose mental 
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with 
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be 
subjected to a trial.”  (Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 171.) 
Section 1367, like many other similar statutes in other 
jurisdictions, thus articulates a causal relationship between the 
existence of a mental disorder and functional impairments.12  
                                        
11 
When pressed at oral argument, appellate counsel posited 
a scenario in which a defendant does not understand the nature 
of the proceedings because of cultural differences, as opposed to 
a mental disorder or developmental disability.  But cultural 
differences alone do not give rise to a lack of capacity to 
understand the nature of the proceedings or assist counsel in 
preparing a defense, as the Dusky standard requires.  
12 
When the statute was first enacted in 1872, section 1367 
provided:  “A person cannot be tried, adjudged to punishment, 
or punished for a public offense, while he is insane.”  Case law 
interpreting the provision established that, though a defendant 
may have claimed to be “deranged or unsound,” he was not 
“insane” for purposes of section 1367 unless he could not 
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him 
and could not aid his counsel to conduct his defense in a rational 
manner.  (People v. Perry (1939) 14 Cal.2d 387, 397, 399.)  In 
1974, the Legislature amended the statute to codify this 
standard, substituting the term “mentally incompetent” for 
“insane.”  (Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Ex Post Facto 
 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
26 
(See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) [federal statute forbidding trial of 
a defendant found to be “presently suffering from a mental 
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the 
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist 
properly in his defense”].)  The statutory language reflects a 
view that, “[a]s a matter of law and logic,” incompetence to stand 
trial “must arise from a mental disorder or developmental 
disability that limits his or her ability to understand the nature 
of the proceedings and to assist counsel.”  (Timothy J. v. 
Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 860.)  On this view, 
“[a] defendant who refuses to work with his lawyer out of spite 
alone is not incompetent,” for example, “even if that defendant 
has a serious mental disease or defect.”  (United States v. Garza 
(9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3d 1130, 1136.) 
The 
high 
court’s 
cases 
cast 
no 
doubt 
on 
the 
constitutionality of this approach.  On the contrary, that court 
has characterized a state statute establishing procedures to 
determine whether a person “ ‘as a result of mental disease or 
defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him 
or to assist in his own defense’ ” as facially “adequate to protect 
a defendant’s right not to be tried while legally incompetent.”  
(Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 173.)  And the court has since 
consistently referred to the incompetence inquiry under Dusky 
as one that focuses on the defendant’s mental condition and 
capacity.  (See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 401, 
fn. 12 (Moran); see also, e.g., Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 450 
[at a competency hearing, “psychiatric evidence is brought to 
                                        
Analysis of Assem. Bill. No. 1529 (1973 Reg. Sess.) June 12, 
1973, pp. 3–6; Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 2, eff. Sept. 27, 1974.)   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
27 
bear on the question of the defendant’s mental condition”].)  
Defendant has offered no sound basis to conclude that this focus 
is inconsistent with due process. 
To the extent defendant means instead to argue that the 
Dusky standard does not require a specific medical diagnosis 
drawn from the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, we do not disagree.  But neither 
does section 1367 impose this sort of requirement.  Although this 
statute requires that the defendant show that, because of a 
mental disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable 
to understand the nature of the proceedings or to rationally 
assist in his or her own defense, it does not require that the 
defendant’s mental disorder fit neatly within the standard 
diagnostic taxonomy.  We find no inconsistency with Dusky. 
c.   Asserted omission of certain elements from 
Penal Code section 1367’s definition of 
competence to stand trial and CALJIC No. 4.10 
Defendant next contends that the definition of competence 
in section 1367 and in CALJIC No. 4.10 omit necessary elements 
from the standard articulated in Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. 402 and 
thus fails to satisfy due process requirements.  Under Dusky, a 
defendant is competent to stand trial if he or she “ ‘has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding’ ” and “ ‘has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him [or her].’ ”  (Id. at p. 402, italics added.)  Defendant 
argues that section 1367 and CALJIC No. 4.10 omit the 
requirements of “a rational as well as factual” understanding of 
the proceedings and a “present” ability to rationally assist 
counsel.  She contends the jury should be instructed that a 
defendant’s understanding of the proceedings “must be based on 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
28 
reason, as opposed to delusion, fantasy or some other non-reality 
based perception” and encompass the ability to comprehend 
facts.  She also contends the instructions should require the jury 
to determine the defendant has a “present, already-existing 
ability,” as opposed to mere “potential capacity,” to rationally 
assist an attorney in conducting a defense.   
In response to similar arguments, “[w]e have previously 
observed that the language of section 1367, from which CALJIC 
No. 4.10 is drawn, ‘does not match, word for word, that of Dusky.  
But as the Court of Appeal noted in James H. v. Superior Court 
(1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 177, “To anyone but a hairsplitting 
semanticist, the two tests are identical.” ’ ”  (People v. Jablonski 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 808.)  What we have said before applies 
equally in this case.  The United States Supreme Court has itself 
articulated the standard for competency in terms similar to 
those in section 1367 and CALJIC No. 4.10.  (Moran, supra, 
509 U.S. at p. 402 [“Requiring that a criminal defendant be 
competent has a modest aim:  It seeks to ensure that he has the 
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.”].)  
Neither section 1367 nor the instruction is infirm merely 
because it fails to focus specifically on the defendant’s “rational 
and factual” understanding of the proceedings, as opposed to 
focusing on the defendant’s understanding of the proceedings 
more generally; we agree with the Attorney General that “one’s 
ability to grasp the nature of the proceedings necessarily 
encompasses one’s capacity to have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings.”   
Nor is the statute or instruction flawed because it fails to 
refer to the defendant’s “present” ability to assist counsel.  Both 
the statute and instruction are already phrased in the present 
tense, and the statutory scheme makes amply clear that the 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
29 
mental competence inquiry focuses on the defendant’s present 
abilities, as opposed to the possibility that the relevant abilities 
may be restored in the future.  (See Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. 
(a)(1)(B).)  To the extent defendant contends that the point 
should have been made even clearer to the jury, she made no 
such argument in the trial court and therefore has forfeited any 
objection she might have had to the omission of the term 
“present ability” from CALJIC No. 4.10.  (See People v. 
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 876–877 (Covarrubias).) 
2.  Exclusion of Psychologist Sherry Skidmore’s 
Rebuttal Testimony  
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously 
excluded 
rebuttal 
testimony 
from 
defense 
psychologist 
Dr. Sherry Skidmore.  The testimony was offered to impeach 
Dr. Rath’s testimony concerning his evaluation of defendant’s 
competence to stand trial (see Pen. Code, § 1369, subd. (d)).  
Specifically, 
Dr. Skidmore 
would 
have 
testified 
that:  
(1) Dr. Rath’s conclusion that defendant was competent to stand 
trial was invalid under professional standards because he did 
not conduct an evaluation for the purpose of determining 
competence, and (2) Dr. Rath had a conflict of interest because 
he was originally referred by the District Attorney to interview 
defendant on the day of her arrest and before the court 
appointed him to evaluate defendant’s competence.  Defendant 
asserts that the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Skidmore’s 
testimony violated her state and federal constitutional rights to 
due process, a fair trial, confrontation, compulsory process, and 
to present evidence in support of her case (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§§ 15, 16; U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.), and was 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
30 
prejudicial, requiring reversal of the entire judgment.13  The 
claim lacks merit. 
a.  Factual and procedural background 
Clinical psychologist Craig Rath, Ph.D., testified for the 
prosecution that he interviewed defendant and administered 
the MMPI on October 28, 1994, the day of her arrest for the 
murders.  Defendant had waived her Miranda14 rights and had 
agreed to speak to a doctor.  The purpose of the interview was to 
evaluate defendant for possible suicide risk and to gather 
                                        
13  
In this claim and most others on appeal, defendant 
contends the asserted error or misconduct she raises infringed 
various of her state and federal constitutional rights to a fair 
and reliable trial.  What we said in People v. Boyer (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 412, 441, footnote 17, is equally applicable here:  “In 
most instances, insofar as defendant raised the issue at all in 
the trial court, [s]he failed explicitly to make some or all of the 
constitutional arguments [s]he now advances.  In each instance, 
unless otherwise indicated, it appears that either (1) the 
appellate claim is of a kind (e.g., failure to instruct sua sponte; 
erroneous instruction affecting defendant’s substantial rights) 
that required no trial court action by the defendant to preserve 
it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal 
standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to 
apply, but merely assert that the trial court’s act or omission, 
insofar as wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, 
had the additional legal consequence of violating the 
Constitution.  To that extent, defendant’s new constitutional 
arguments are not forfeited on appeal.  [Citations.]  [¶]  In the 
latter instance, of course, rejection, on the merits, of a claim that 
the trial court erred on the issue actually before that court 
necessarily leads to rejection of the newly applied constitutional 
‘gloss’ as well.  No separate constitutional discussion is required 
in such cases, and we therefore provide none.”   
14  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
31 
information “for possible later use in court for one side or the 
other.”   
On March 14, 1995, without objection by the defense, the 
trial court appointed Dr. Rath to evaluate defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 1368, 1369, subd. 
(a).)  Defendant refused to meet with Dr. Rath after his 
appointment.  Based on his October 28, 1994, interview of 
defendant and the results of the MMPI, Dr. Rath opined 
defendant was competent to stand trial and did not have “any 
major mental illness which would preclude her from 
understanding what’s going on or cooperating with her 
attorney.”  Dr. Rath also opined defendant’s MMPI results 
showed a classic profile for malingering.   
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to 
impeach Dr. Rath by establishing that:  (1) his evaluation of 
defendant on the day of her arrest, October 28, 1994, was not a 
competency evaluation under section 1368 because he did not 
interview her for that purpose; and (2) his agreement to 
interview defendant for the District Attorney shortly after her 
arrest created a potential conflict of interest he was required to 
disclose when the trial court later appointed him to conduct a 
competency evaluation.   
Dr. Rath denied there were any ethical problems with the 
services he rendered.  He also testified that defendant 
demonstrated no mental illness during the October 28 interview 
and that her behavior at that time appeared to be “all 
volitional.”  He therefore considered her competent to stand trial 
and did not ask her specific questions about her knowledge and 
understanding of court proceedings.  When counsel attempted 
to place Dr. Rath’s ethics in issue because he relied on 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
32 
information he gathered during the October 28 interview and 
testing, neither of which were for the purpose of evaluating 
competency, the expert explained he included the circumstances 
of his interview in his written report.   
Counsel also asked Dr. Rath whether his inability to 
interview defendant in March and April 1995, after his court 
appointment, potentially affected the reliability of his opinion 
that she was competent to stand trial.  Dr. Rath testified he 
would have been able to elaborate more but thought his opinion 
would remain unchanged.  Counsel then asked Dr. Rath about 
an ethical standard prohibiting a psychologist from offering 
evidence about an individual’s psychological characteristics 
when the psychologist has not had “an opportunity to conduct 
an examination of the individual adequate to the scope of the 
statements, opinions or conclusions to be issued” and requiring 
psychologists to make “clear the impact of such limitations on 
the reliability and validity” of their testimony.15  Dr. Rath 
agreed that no expert should “go beyond the scope of his 
database” and claimed he satisfied this ethical requirement by 
“outlining exactly what the database is and whatever 
limitations there might be.”  Dr. Rath explained that in his 
report concerning defendant, he “clearly stated how much [he] 
had seen her and when [he] had not seen her. . . .”   
Dr. Rath agreed with counsel the American Psychological 
Association (APA) Guidelines contained in the APA’s Ethical 
Handbook governed his professional conduct.  Counsel asked 
whether he was obligated to comply with the standard directing 
that “[f]orensic psychologists avoid providing professional 
                                        
15  
Counsel did not provide a citation to the ethical standard 
he purportedly was quoting. 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
33 
services to parties in a legal proceeding with whom they have 
personal or professional relationships that are inconsistent with 
the anticipated relationship.”  Dr. Rath identified the quoted 
standard as having been taken from the Division 41 Guidelines 
for Forensic Psychologists, which he said had been rejected by 
the APA and the California licensing board as unclear and 
ambiguous.  He denied that his having interviewed defendant 
for the District Attorney before his court appointment for the 
competency evaluation amounted to a conflict of interest.  
Dr. Rath testified that he had contacted the Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance Ethics Committee and had been told “there 
[was] no conflict.”   
Counsel then asked Dr. Rath whether he had complied 
with the APA guidelines requiring disclosure to the parties of 
those factors that “might reasonably affect the decision to 
contract with the forensic psychologist[],” including “prior and 
current personal or professional activities, obligations, and 
relationships that might produce a conflict of interest.”  
Dr. Rath repeated that there was no conflict of interest.  Counsel 
asked Dr. Rath whether the APA guidelines required him to 
obtain consent from defendant or her counsel before conducting 
his October 28 interview, given that the interview was not court 
ordered.  Dr. Rath explained that because defendant had no 
attorney at that time and had waived her Miranda rights, there 
was no violation of the APA guidelines.   
On recross-examination, counsel sought to further 
question Dr. Rath about his ethical obligations, and the 
prosecutor objected on grounds of scope and relevance.  The trial 
court sustained the objection, stating, “We have covered this 
ethics thing completely” and “[w]e are done talking about 
ethics.”   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
34 
Outside the presence of the jury and before the 
prosecution rested its case, trial counsel sought permission to 
present testimony by forensic psychologist Sherry Skidmore, 
Ph.D., to rebut Dr. Rath’s testimony concerning a psychologist’s 
ethical obligations.  Specifically, Dr. Skidmore would have 
testified that:  (1) Dr. Rath’s competency evaluation was 
governed by ethical principles that he denied were applicable; 
(2) “it is unethical and scientifically invalid to reach a conclusion 
on the question of competency when [Dr. Rath] never actually 
interviewed [defendant] and performed a specific competency 
evaluation”; and (3) under professional standards for forensic 
psychologists, Dr. Rath had a conflict of interest because he 
interviewed defendant on October 28 at the request of the 
District Attorney before he was appointed by the court to 
evaluate her competency, and was required to “make certain 
disclosures.” 
 
Counsel 
argued 
Dr. Skidmore’s 
proffered 
testimony was proper rebuttal because the jury had no evidence 
other than Dr. Rath’s own testimony on which to base its 
determination whether Dr. Rath acted ethically.   
The prosecutor objected on the basis the proffered 
testimony was collateral and excludable under Evidence Code 
section 352.  The court sustained the objection, agreeing the 
proffered testimony was collateral and noting, “Dr. Rath is not 
on trial[,]” and “I allowed [defense counsel] to inquire into the 
ethical situation as Dr. Rath understood it, and [he] did and now 
we are done with that.”  The court permitted counsel to 
introduce 
Dr. Skidmore’s 
testimony 
refuting 
Dr. Rath’s 
interpretation of defendant’s MMPI test results.   
In rebuttal, Dr. Skidmore testified she had specialized 
experience in the areas of professional ethics and on scoring and 
evaluating MMPI tests.  She testified that a psychologist acts 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
35 
below the standard of care by rendering an opinion on 
competence to stand trial based on an interview conducted for a 
purpose other than determining competence.  When the defense 
inquired whether a forensic psychologist could reach a valid 
conclusion if, at the time of the interview, he or she was working 
“in a dual role,” the court sustained the prosecution’s objection 
before Dr. Skidmore answered.   
b.  Discussion 
In competency proceedings, each party may offer evidence 
to rebut evidence offered by the other side.  (Pen. Code, § 1369, 
subd. (d).)  Evidence bearing on the credibility of a witness is 
generally relevant, and therefore admissible, in such a 
proceeding.  (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350.) 
“As with all relevant evidence, however, the trial court 
retains discretion to admit or exclude evidence offered for 
impeachment.”  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9.)  The 
court “may exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  Such rulings are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Minifie (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 1055, 
1070; 
see 
People 
v. 
Young 
(2005) 
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1199.) 
Although the trial court characterized Dr. Skidmore’s 
proffered testimony as “collateral,” the testimony was 
unquestionably relevant:  Because professional psychologists 
and psychiatrists are permitted to render an opinion on the 
ultimate issue of the defendant’s competence, their adherence to 
or disregard of professional standards in forming those opinions 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
36 
is relevant to their credibility as experts.  The question here is 
whether the trial court appropriately weighed the probative 
value of the testimony against the probability that its admission 
would necessitate undue consumption of time, under Evidence 
Code section 352.  We ultimately need not answer the question, 
however, because even if we were to assume for the sake of 
argument that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
the evidence, any such error was clearly harmless. 
Dr. Skidmore would have testified that Dr. Rath violated 
professional ethical standards for a forensic psychologist 
because his evaluation of defendant’s competence to stand trial 
was based on an interview not designed for the purpose of 
evaluating competence to stand trial.  She also would have 
testified that Dr. Rath had a conflict of interest when he was 
appointed to evaluate defendant’s competence because before 
his appointment it was the prosecution that initially engaged 
him to interview her.  As defendant emphasizes, the trial court’s 
limitation on Dr. Skidmore’s testimony had the effect of 
precluding the jury from hearing from any expert, other than 
Dr. Rath himself, regarding relevant professional ethical 
standards for forensic psychologists. 
Ultimately, however, the circumstances of Dr. Rath’s 
prearrest examination and its limits on assessing competency 
were fully litigated, despite the limitation on the defense’s 
rebuttal evidence.  In response to defense questioning, Dr. Rath 
himself agreed that no expert should “go beyond the scope of his 
data base.”  As Dr. Rath also noted, his report had explained 
how much he had seen defendant and his failures to meet with 
her following his court appointment.  Further, the jury heard 
testimony from Dr. Skidmore that (1) it is “below the standard 
of care” for a forensic psychologist to render an opinion about an 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
37 
individual’s competence to stand trial when the individual was 
not interviewed for that purpose,16 and (2) it is unethical for a 
psychologist to form an opinion about malingering based on the 
limited information provided by MMPI results. 
Despite this evidence, as well as the testimony of two 
defense experts opining that defendant was incompetent, the 
jury was unconvinced.  Other evidence, including the writings 
taken from her cell, tended to show that defendant could 
communicate coherently and that she understood the nature of 
the proceedings against her.  There is no reasonable probability 
that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the 
defense been permitted to offer further rebuttal evidence to 
counter Dr. Rath’s claim that he accepted his court appointment 
without breaching any ethical rules or creating a conflict of 
interest.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)  
                                        
16  
On appeal, defendant for the first time suggests 
Dr. Skidmore’s testimony on this topic was incomplete because 
she “did not explain why a valid opinion about competence 
requires a specific kind of interview, did not describe the 
requirements for such a particularized interview, and did not 
explain why Dr. Rath’s investigative interview did not meet the 
professional standards for a competency interview.”  Trial 
counsel’s proffer did not include these specifics, and the trial 
court was never made aware of the testimony defendant now 
asserts was omitted from counsel’s proffer.  (See People v. Vines 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 868–869 [a reviewing court “may not 
reverse a judgment for the erroneous exclusion of evidence 
unless ‘[t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded 
evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, 
an offer of proof, or by any other means.’  (Evid. Code, § 354, 
subd. (a).)”].)  To the extent defendant claims the trial court 
erred by excluding the testimony, the issue is not properly before 
us.  (People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 780.) 
 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
38 
Assuming defendant has preserved a claim of federal 
constitutional 
error, 
and 
the 
error 
implicated 
federal 
constitutional rights, we conclude the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24.) 
3.  Exclusion of Portions of Defense Expert Testimony  
During the defense case, the trial court excluded 
Dr. Kania’s testimony about defendant’s delusions regarding 
computers and Dr. Mills’s testimony about the Caldwell testing 
service report on the results of the MMPI that Dr. Rath 
administered to defendant on the day of her arrest.  Defendant 
offered these portions of the experts’ testimony to support their 
opinions defendant was not competent to stand trial.  The court 
excluded the testimony because the defense did not timely 
provide discovery of the evidence to the prosecutor.  Defendant 
asserts that the court erroneously applied the criminal discovery 
statutes (Pen. Code, § 1054 et seq.) in excluding the evidence.  
She contends that the provisions of the Civil Discovery Act of 
1986 (Civil Discovery Act or Act)17 governed her competency 
proceeding, and that there was no violation of those provisions.  
Exclusion of the evidence, she asserts, was prejudicial error and 
denied her state and federal constitutional rights to due process 
                                        
17  
Effective July 1, 2005, the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016–2036) was repealed and reenacted 
without substantive changes by the Civil Discovery Act of 2004 
(id., § 2016.010 et seq.).  (Stats. 2004, ch. 182, § 61; see also Cal. 
Law Revision Com. com. to § 2016; Lee v. Superior Court (2009) 
177 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1123, fn. 2.)  Defendant refers to the 
repealed provisions of the 1986 Act because they were in effect 
at the time of her competency trial.  For convenience, we, too, 
refer to the repealed provisions of the 1986 Act effective at the 
time of defendant’s competency trial.   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
39 
and a fair competency trial, to present evidence in support of her 
case, and to contest the prosecution’s case.  The claim lacks 
merit. 
a.  Factual and procedural background 
i.  Dr. Kania   
During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned 
Dr. Kania extensively regarding defendant’s delusions.  On 
redirect examination, trial counsel asked Dr. Kania about his 
discussions with defendant regarding her delusional belief 
concerning computers.  Dr. Kania said defendant had stated 
that computers were running the world and killing people, and 
that she did not know whether the people she saw were alive or 
were computers.  The prosecutor objected to the line of 
questioning on the ground it was beyond the scope of cross-
examination and it was “all new information” that had “never 
been [included] anywhere in a report or anything.”  The court 
permitted trial counsel to reopen his examination on this topic, 
and the prosecutor again objected he had not been provided 
discovery.  The court asked counsel whether discovery of this 
particular delusion had been disclosed to the prosecutor.  When 
counsel responded that it did not appear in Dr. Kania’s report, 
the court sustained the prosecution’s objection and struck the 
portion of the expert’s testimony relating to defendant’s 
computer delusions.  The court admonished the jury to disregard 
the testimony.   
ii.  Dr. Mills   
During 
direct 
examination, 
Dr. Mills 
opined 
that 
defendant was not malingering and suffered from a psychotic 
disorder hindering her ability to work with an attorney.  Trial 
counsel then asked whether he had reviewed the results of an 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
40 
MMPI administered to defendant by the prosecution’s expert, 
Dr. Rath.  Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor 
objected to Dr. Mills’s testimony on the ground he was unaware 
that Dr. Mills had sent Dr. Rath’s raw data to the Caldwell 
testing service for evaluation; Dr. Mills’s report made no 
mention of this information or an opinion based on the test data.  
The prosecutor stated he had received no discovery on this 
particular issue.   
The court allowed trial counsel to question Dr. Mills 
outside the jury’s presence.  Dr. Mills testified both he and 
Dr. Kania sent Dr. Rath’s MMPI results to Caldwell and had 
each received a report from Caldwell.  Dr. Mills explained that, 
while there were slight differences between the reports he and 
Dr. Kania received, “for all practical purposes, they say the 
same thing.”  Counsel explained he sought admission of the 
Caldwell report sent to Dr. Mills because Dr. Mills had relied on 
the report in reaching his opinion.  Counsel also asserted the 
report sent to Dr. Mills was not “new material” because the 
prosecutor “had the copy of the report from [Dr.] Kania.”  
Finding that counsel had failed to provide discovery of 
Dr. Mills’s testimony concerning the Caldwell report, the court 
excluded the testimony.   
b.  Discussion 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the prosecutor’s objections and in excluding portions 
of Dr. Kania’s and Dr. Mills’s testimony as sanctions for 
discovery violations.  Because a competency proceeding under 
section 1368 is a special proceeding and not a criminal action 
(People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 114, fn. 3), she reasons, civil 
discovery rules apply rather than the criminal discovery statute.  
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
41 
(See Code Civ. Proc., former § 2016, subd. (b)(1).)  In support, 
she relies on Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 
478, 490–491, decided after her competency trial, which held 
that the Civil Discovery Act applies to competency hearings.  
Defendant argues that because the prosecutor did not comply 
with the civil rules for seeking discovery from her expert 
witnesses, in that he did not make a demand for the production 
“of all discoverable reports and writings” made by a designated 
expert in the course of preparing his or her opinion (Code Civ. 
Proc., former § 2034, subds. (a)(3), (g)), there was no basis for an 
order excluding the evidence for noncompliance with the Act’s 
requirements.  Absent a discovery violation under the Act, 
defendant contends, the court abused its discretion in excluding 
Dr. Kania’s testimony about her computer-related delusions and 
Dr. Mills’s testimony about the Caldwell report concerning the 
MMPI test results Dr. Rath obtained.    
The Attorney General, citing People v. Anderson (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 543, 592, footnote 17, and People v. Williams (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 153, 250, argues preliminarily that defendant’s claim 
under the Act is forfeited on appeal because she did not rely on 
the prosecutor’s alleged noncompliance with the Act in opposing 
the objections at trial.  Further, the Attorney General contends 
the trial court properly relied on the criminal discovery statutes 
in ruling on the prosecutor’s objection because no objection was 
made concerning their applicability and the state of the law was 
unsettled.  (Cf. In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 813–814 
[although the criminal discovery statute did not apply in a 
habeas corpus proceeding, the superior court judge logically 
cited the statute in crafting an order for limited discovery].)  The 
Attorney General argues the court properly excluded the 
evidence under Penal Code section 1054.5, subdivision (c), 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
42 
because the defense failed to disclose the “statements of experts 
made in connection with the case” and the results of the mental 
examination as required by Penal Code section 1054.3, 
subdivision (a)(1), of the criminal discovery provisions.  Finally, 
the Attorney General contends that, even assuming error, 
defendant suffered no prejudice because the excluded evidence 
was cumulative. 
We need not decide whether the Act or the criminal 
discovery statutes applied to defendant’s competency trial.  
Even assuming the court’s ruling excluding portions of 
Dr. Kania’s and Dr. Mills’s testimony constituted an abuse of 
discretion, the error was harmless under the “miscarriage of 
justice” standard for state law error under Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at page 836.  
The court’s ruling precluded the jury from considering 
Dr. Kania’s testimony relating to defendant’s purported 
delusional beliefs about computers and Dr. Mills’s explanation 
of his reliance on the Caldwell analysis of Dr. Rath’s MMPI test 
results.  Defendant offered the evidence in support of each 
expert’s opinion that defendant was incompetent to stand trial.  
The evidence was, however, cumulative of other testimony 
concerning defendant’s delusions.  Dr. Kania himself testified 
the primary symptom of defendant’s psychotic disorder was her 
delusions.  According to Dr. Kania, during his interviews with 
defendant, she expressed delusional beliefs that her sister was 
speaking a different language and influencing defendant’s 
children in this language, that gas was being pumped into her 
cell, and that people were trying to physically harm her and kill 
her with the gas.   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
43 
Dr. Perrotti similarly testified defendant had expressed 
delusional beliefs that she was being made the subject of a 
medical experiment, that people wanted to harm her, and that 
there was gas in her cell.  In addition, Regena Acosta, who 
befriended defendant in jail, testified that defendant believed 
staff at the jail cafeteria put “stuff” in her food to make her sick.  
Defendant’s family members also testified about her delusions, 
including, for example, her belief that her sister Angela 
Montenegro fed defendant’s children poisoned meat and that 
Montenegro was a witch.   
Defendant argues, however, that Dr. Perrotti’s testimony 
concerning defendant’s delusion about gas being pumped into 
her cell was not as persuasive as, and “did not compensate” for 
the exclusion of, Dr. Kania’s testimony because Dr. Perrotti 
observed the delusion only once.  She also asserts that the other 
evidence concerning her delusions came primarily from family 
members “whose impartiality the prosecutor called into 
question” and thus would not have been as persuasive as 
Dr. Kania’s account of her computer delusion.  The jury, 
however, heard ample evidence of defendant’s delusional beliefs 
from a variety of sources.  We see no reasonable probability that 
exclusion of Dr. Kania’s testimony about defendant’s particular 
delusional beliefs regarding computers affected the outcome of 
the proceedings.  Defendant also fails to show that exclusion of 
the evidence, even if erroneous under state law, rendered her 
competency proceeding fundamentally unfair or otherwise 
violated her due process rights.   
Regarding the exclusion of Dr. Mills’s testimony, trial 
counsel represented that the expert’s testimony would be 
essentially the same as Dr. Kania’s on this point because each 
expert had submitted the results of Dr. Rath’s MMPI to 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
44 
Caldwell for evaluation and each had received similar reports 
from the testing service.  During the hearing on the prosecutor’s 
objection, Dr. Mills testified that the reports he and Dr. Kania 
received from Caldwell “for all practical purposes, . . . say the 
same thing.”  At trial, Dr. Kania compared the Caldwell 
interpretations of the results of the MMPI tests he and Dr. Rath 
administered separately to defendant.18  Under these 
circumstances, testimony by Dr. Mills similar to Dr. Kania’s 
testimony on the same subject would have added little, if 
anything, to the weight of the evidence of incompetence.  
Defendant therefore was not prejudiced by exclusion of 
Dr. Mills’s testimony concerning the Caldwell report (Watson, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836) and she does not otherwise show that 
exclusion of the evidence resulted in a fundamentally unfair 
competency proceeding or violated her right to due process. 
4.  Admission of Defendant’s Jailhouse Writings  
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting certain jailhouse writings in the 
prosecution’s surrebuttal case.  The prosecution introduced the 
writings, which had been seized during a search of defendant’s 
jail cell the previous week, to refute defense investigator 
Catherine Moreno’s rebuttal testimony that defendant could not 
communicate coherently.  Defendant argues that the writings 
were improper surrebuttal because:  (1) her inability to converse 
coherently was at issue throughout the defense case-in-chief, 
                                        
18  
Among other things, Dr. Kania testified defendant’s 
MMPI results on the test he administered did not indicate 
malingering, but he acknowledged that the Caldwell report 
indicated that the results obtained by Dr. Rath suggested 
otherwise.   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
45 
meaning the prosecution should have offered the writings 
during its case-in-chief; and (2) the prosecutor had indicated he 
would not introduce the writings.  Defendant contends that 
admission of the writings deprived her of her state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair competency trial.  
We reject the argument.   
a.  Procedural background 
During defendant’s rebuttal, defense paralegal Catherine 
Moreno testified that she had visited with defendant about 10 
times during the previous year in an effort to get her to 
cooperate with the defense team.  Moreno had four or five 
conversations with defendant about witnesses in her case and 
found her to be unhelpful, incoherent, and unable to stay on 
topic.19  On cross-examination, Moreno testified she had never 
read any of defendant’s writings.   
Later the same day, and outside the presence of the jury, 
the prosecutor informed the court that defendant’s jail cell had 
been searched the previous week and writings had been seized, 
copies of which had been provided to counsel.  The prosecutor 
stated:  “I have been debating back and forth, and I am still not 
convinced this second, but I think I would like to introduce the 
writings that we found in her cell to the jury.  [¶]  The only 
hesitancy I have is, the majority of it is in Spanish, and I don’t 
know how the Court would feel about them getting a document 
that somebody’s going to need to interpret.”   
                                        
19  
Trial counsel asked Moreno, “Have [your conversations 
with defendant] been coherent on the part of [defendant]?” and 
“have you observed whether or not [defendant]’s able to 
structure coherent paragraphs?”   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
46 
The court responded:  “[W]hen . . . there is something 
written in a different language, it’s translated, and then the 
translated version is what is utilized[.]”  The court expressed its 
reluctance “to send a document in Spanish into a jury.  There 
may be some people who are fluent in Spanish, there may be 
some partially fluent.  You don’t want to do that because you 
don’t know what is going to be the result.”  The prosecutor 
responded, “All right.  That’s fine.  I will pass.”  The court said, 
“All right.  Let’s bring our jurors in.  I propose at this point we 
will just end for the day and start the arguments on Monday.”   
Trial was adjourned until Monday, November 13, 1995.  
On that date, the last day of the competency trial, the prosecutor 
revisited the issue of the writings seized from defendant’s jail 
cell.  He represented that the writings had been translated over 
the weekend by a certified interpreter, and he offered the 
translations, copies of which had been provided to counsel, to 
demonstrate defendant’s ability to write and form paragraphs 
and sentences.  The court described one document as “three 
pages of translation attached to a number of pages that are in 
Spanish.  The English portion here . . . [is] labeled, ‘Another 48-
Hour Appointment With Death,’ and, just perusing this in 
general, it appears to be a story, and it appears to be a story that 
closely parallels [defendant’s].”  The court described the second 
document as a one-page handwritten document in Spanish, the 
English translation of which comprised defendant’s “thoughts 
and/or prayers on behalf of the defendant dealing with this 
case.”   
Trial counsel objected to admission of the writings on the 
grounds the evidence should have been presented in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief and because the prosecutor had 
indicated in the prior proceeding he would not offer the evidence.  
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
47 
The court ruled:  “[W]e did not close [as] to evidence.  I did 
indicate we were going to leave it open for a ruling on People’s 
10 [jail records].  During the trial the seizure of this 
documentation was brought up.  [The prosecutor] mentioned 
last week it was in Spanish.  I mentioned to him last week, ‘How 
do you intend to introduce it, it is written in some Spanish, we 
can’t have the jurors translate it, we will have to have a 
translator translate the information.’  He did not indicate, 
necessarily, he intended to introduce it, it was considered, it was 
considered for purposes of introduction as evidence.  [¶]  I clearly 
remember that because I remember [thinking], ‘Isn’t that 
interesting, how are we going to go ahead with documents in 
Spanish when, obviously, they haven’t been translated?’  So, you 
are not going to be successful with an objection on those bases.”   
When the court asked trial counsel whether he had any 
objection to the contents of the writings, counsel repeated that 
at the previous proceeding, the prosecutor had indicated he 
would not offer the writings.  The court stated:  “I agree with 
you, the last thing we had was [People’s Exhibit] 10; however, 
we did not close [as] to evidence.  It is not a surprise, we did 
discuss the information.  I indicated I am not going to keep it 
out on that basis.”  The court granted trial counsel 15 minutes 
to review the pages and object to their content.  Trial counsel 
stated he wanted to consult with his experts “to see what, if any, 
change this would make in their diagnosis [sic].”  The following 
colloquy then occurred:   
“THE COURT:  Wait a minute.  [¶]  The way the trial 
proceeds, you go first, he goes next, you rebut, he rebuts.  We 
are at his rebuttal.  Do you have some authority that says you 
get a second rebuttal?  
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
48 
“[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  Well, I think in this instance, yes; 
not case authority, but this goes well beyond simply being 
rebuttal, this is much more in the nature of a case in chief.  It 
isn’t something that occurred over the weekend. 
“THE COURT:  You offered the testimony of Ms. Moreno 
from your office, who testified on rebuttal that your client could 
not form paragraphs, that she couldn’t put thoughts together 
and hold them together.  Just perusing this, it clearly seems to 
rebut that presentation by you.  [¶]  Now, if you don’t have any 
authority for a second rebuttal, that ends the issue here on that 
basis.”   
When trial counsel did not provide additional authorities, 
the court indicated that it would recess to give counsel an 
opportunity to read the translated writings and make any 
further objections.  After the recess, the court confirmed counsel 
had read the writings and asked if he had anything further.  
Counsel responded, “I have nothing additional.”  The parties 
stipulated that the writings were confiscated during a search of 
defendant’s jail cell, and the court admitted the writings and 
translations.   
b.  Discussion  
Penal Code section 1369 specifies the order of proof in a 
competency trial.  First, defense counsel offers evidence in 
support of the allegation of mental incompetence (id., subd. 
(b)(1)); next, the prosecution presents its evidence on the issue 
of the defendant’s present mental competence (id., subd. (c)); 
finally, “[e]ach party may offer rebutting testimony, unless the 
court, for good reason in furtherance of justice, also permits 
other evidence in support of the original contention” (id., subd. 
(d)).  Beyond these specifications, the order of proof is generally 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
49 
within the court’s discretion.  (Evid. Code, § 320.)  We review a 
trial court’s ruling as to the order of proof for abuse of discretion.  
(See People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 175.)   
Defendant argues that evidence of her writings was not 
admissible as surrebuttal evidence because it should have been 
introduced during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, given that it 
was relevant to the prosecution’s case and already in its 
possession.20  We disagree.   
During the defense case-in-chief, several witnesses, 
including Dr. Perrotti, jail nurse Terrill, and Dr. Mills testified 
that at times defendant did not express herself coherently.  
During its case-in-chief, the prosecution had introduced 
evidence to the opposite effect, including, for example, 
Dr. Moral’s 
testimony 
that 
defendant 
could 
effectively 
communicate about her family, medical, and mental health 
history and “keep in touch with [him] verbally, talking back and 
forth, without difficulty.”  In rebuttal, to counter the 
prosecution’s evidence that defendant could communicate 
                                        
20  
Defendant also argues that “the prosecutor did not 
establish that the writings seized from [defendant]’s cell 
reflected her present ability to communicate coherently” because 
“[t]he documents were undated and could have been written at 
any time during the year between [her] arrest and their 
admission at trial.”  At trial, however, defendant did not object 
to the admissibility of the evidence on this ground, thereby 
forfeiting this objection.  In any event, the writings were 
relevant to show defendant’s ability to communicate during the 
period before trial, as to which defense paralegal Moreno had 
also testified.  Defendant’s concern that the writings may not 
have been made during or immediately before trial goes to the 
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 
 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
50 
effectively and without difficulty, defense paralegal Moreno 
testified that defendant could not converse or structure 
paragraphs coherently.  The prosecutor offered defendant’s 
writings in surrebuttal to refute Moreno’s rebuttal testimony.  
This was not improper.  (Pen. Code, § 1369, subd. (d).)   
Defendant argues that the prosecution should have 
offered the writings in its case-in-chief because this issue was 
material to its case and already in its possession.  But the same 
is true of defense witness Moreno’s rebuttal testimony that 
defendant could not communicate coherently; that testimony 
was likewise material to defendant’s case-in-chief and already 
in her possession, but not offered until after the defense and 
prosecution had each presented its case-in-chief.  Under the 
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting the prosecution to rebut Moreno’s testimony with 
defendant’s writings.   
Further, the record does not support defendant’s 
contention that admission of the writings at the end of trial 
improperly allowed the prosecution to place undue emphasis on 
them.  The writings were addressed only briefly during the 
parties’ closing arguments.  The prosecutor asked jurors to 
consider all the evidence in deciding whether defendant was 
competent, telling them, among other things:  “[t]here is some 
evidence you have not seen . . . the notes we had translated from 
her jail cell, took [sic] about two weeks ago,” which they should 
“[r]ead . . . [and] make [your] own decisions as to how well she 
can think or not think, the cleverness, the detail, the subtleties.”  
The prosecutor also argued that the writings demonstrated 
defendant understood the nature of the legal proceedings 
against her.  Defense counsel countered that jurors should 
accord the writings little weight because they were not 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
51 
introduced earlier or given to the doctors who interviewed 
defendant.  Nothing in the record suggests that the prosecution 
placed undue emphasis on the late-introduced writings. 
Finally, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court’s 
ruling did not allow the prosecutor to “sandbag” the defense.  
The prosecution’s argument that the writings showed defendant 
was able to communicate coherently in writing did not inject an 
entirely new subject into the trial at the last moment.  Defense 
paralegal Moreno’s rebuttal testimony that defendant could not 
communicate coherently related to events in the previous year.  
Further, the writings were not available until about a week 
before the prosecutor first indicated he might want to introduce 
them.  The trial court found there was no surprise in the 
prosecution’s request to admit the writings because “we did 
discuss the information.”  The record supports this finding.  
Trial counsel was on notice on November 9, 1995, that the 
prosecutor might introduce the writings but that nothing 
further would occur until they were translated.   
Defendant makes much of the prosecutor’s “I will pass” 
comment, arguing it revealed an intention to forgo admission of 
the writings.  The trial court evidently understood the 
prosecutor’s comment differently.  When trial counsel objected 
on the same ground to the prosecutor’s efforts to introduce the 
writings on Monday, November 13, the court recalled that the 
prosecutor had been undecided; the court had mentally noted 
the documents had not been translated, as would be necessary 
before they could be introduced.  Even assuming the court’s 
recollection of the November 9 discussion was inaccurate, 
counsel did nothing to correct the error.  For these reasons, the 
court’s finding that the prosecutor’s request to introduce the 
exhibits was not a surprise was supported by substantial 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
52 
evidence.  The court’s granting the prosecutor’s renewed request 
to admit the writings on the following court day was not 
fundamentally unfair. 
5.  Asserted Bias in Evidentiary Rulings at the 
Competency Hearing  
Defendant contends that the trial court’s evidentiary 
rulings discussed above (pt. II.B.2.–.4., ante) demonstrated bias 
against her and in favor of the prosecution and violated her state 
and federal constitutional rights to due process.  We reject the 
argument. 
Defendant first complains that the court excluded portions 
of Dr. Kania’s and Dr. Mills’s testimony as a discovery sanction 
(pt. II.B.3., ante), but permitted the prosecution to introduce the 
writings seized from defendant’s jail cell over defense objections 
the evidence was improper rebuttal evidence and untimely 
(pt. II.B.4., ante).  Second, defendant asserts that the court 
treated the defense and the prosecutor differentially when it 
excluded the rebuttal testimony of defense expert Sherry 
Skidmore regarding professional standards governing forensic 
psychologists in a competency evaluation (pt. II.B.2., ante), but 
admitted the prosecution’s surrebuttal evidence of defendant’s 
writings, despite the prosecutor’s assertedly misleading 
representation he would not use the writings (pt. II.B.4., ante). 
Defendant forfeited the claim of bias by failing to raise it 
during the competency trial.  (People v. Pearson (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 393, 447; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 
1112 (Guerra).)  The claim lacks merit in any event.  “ ‘[A] trial 
court’s numerous rulings against a party—even when 
erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially 
when they are subject to review.’ ”  (People v. Fuiava (2012) 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
53 
53 Cal.4th 622, 732, quoting Guerra, at p. 1112; cf. Andrews v. 
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795 
[“There is no reason to explore the heart and mind of the 
[adjudicator] when effective relief is readily available if the 
reviewing court concludes a finding is unsupported by 
substantial evidence.  To hold otherwise would encourage a 
losing party to raise the specter of bias indiscriminately[.]”].)  
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the court engaged in any 
judicial misconduct or exhibited bias, “let alone misconduct or 
bias that was ‘so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of “ ‘a 
fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Avila (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 680, 696.) 
6.  Rejection of Proposed Instruction  
Defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that if she 
were found incompetent, she would not be released from 
custody.  The proposed instruction, which was patterned after 
CALJIC No. 4.01, stated in relevant part:  “A verdict of 
‘incompetent to stand trial’ does not mean the defendant will be 
released from custody.  Instead, she will remain in confinement 
at a state hospital or another public or private institution for 
treatment of the mentally disordered until the court determines 
that she had [sic] regained her competence.  [¶]  Moreover, if and 
when the defendant is found to be competent, the criminal 
proceeding that was pending against her will be reinstituted.  A 
finding by you, the jury, that the defendant is not competent to 
stand trial does not constitute the final disposition of the 
criminal case against her.  Rather it will have the effect of 
postponing that case until she is deemed to be competent to 
assist in her own defense.”  The trial court refused to give the 
instruction.   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
54 
On appeal, defendant contends that the court’s refusal to 
instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of 
incompetence was erroneous because there was a risk that the 
jurors in her trial would assume she could be immediately 
released from custody were she found incompetent, and 
therefore might find her competent to prevent her return to the 
community.  Defendant relies for her argument on People v. 
Moore (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 540, in which the Court of Appeal 
held a defendant in a sanity trial is entitled upon request to an 
instruction advising the jury that a verdict of “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” does not mean the defendant will be released 
from custody.  (Id. at p. 556.)  The Moore court reasoned that 
because some jurors may be unaware of the consequences of an 
insanity verdict, the instruction is necessary to guard against 
the possibility that the jurors would find the defendant sane 
because they feared an insanity verdict would result in his 
release from custody.  (Ibid.)  Defendant argues that this case 
involved a similar risk that jurors unfamiliar with competency 
proceedings might have found her competent simply to prevent 
her release from custody and the indefinite abeyance of her 
criminal case.  Defendant further contends that she was entitled 
to the proposed instruction under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In support of the argument, defendant 
cites the high court’s decision in Simmons v. South Carolina 
(1994) 512 U.S. 154, 168–169 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.) and 
its progeny, holding that, where future dangerousness is at 
issue, a capital defendant has a due process right to inform the 
jury that he or she will be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
We have previously rejected arguments similar to 
defendant’s, and do so again here.  In People v. Marks (2003) 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
55 
31 Cal.4th 197, for example, the defendant sought a similar 
instruction stating, in relevant part:  “ ‘If the defendant is found 
mentally incompetent to stand trial, criminal proceedings shall 
remain suspended until such time as he becomes mentally 
competent.  In the meantime, the court will order the defendant 
to be confined at a state hospital for the care and treatment of 
the mentally disordered where he will participate in a program 
designed to promote the defendant’s speedy restoration to 
mental competence.’ ”  (Id. at p. 221.)  We upheld the trial court’s 
refusal to give the instruction, explaining the instruction was 
flawed because it “characterized defendant’s return to 
competence 
and 
the 
eventual 
resumption 
of 
criminal 
proceedings as inevitable,” even though “there [is] no guarantee 
of a speedy recovery.”  (Id. at p. 222.)  We “declined to extend 
Moore beyond its original context,” i.e., sanity trials.  (Ibid.) 
Similarly, in People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861 
(Dunkle), the defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on its own motion regarding the consequences 
of a verdict of incompetence, also analogizing his case to Moore.  
We again “declined to apply Moore outside its original context.”  
(Id. at p. 897.)  We reasoned that “[b]ecause the outcome of any 
future efforts at restoring a defendant to competency is 
uncertain at the time when the jury must make its decision on 
competency, an instruction patterned after Moore and CALJIC 
No. 4.01 is necessarily speculative.”  (Ibid.)  
Here, 
defendant’s 
proposed 
instruction 
on 
the 
consequences of an incompetency verdict suffered from the same 
basic flaw.  It speculates as to defendant’s return to competence 
and resumption of criminal proceedings, matters that are 
inherently uncertain when the jury is determining competency.  
(Cf. Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 100–102 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
56 
[describing 
range 
of 
possible 
outcomes 
following 
a 
determination of incompetence].)  The court did not err in 
refusing defendant’s proposed instruction. 
7.  Cumulative Error at Competency Trial 
Defendant contends her entire death judgment should be 
reversed based on the cumulative effect of the prejudice 
resulting from all of the asserted errors in her competency trial.  
We have found no prejudicial error.  Where we have assumed 
the existence of error in the exclusion of portions of the 
Skidmore, Mills, and Kania testimony, we have concluded any 
error was harmless.  Considered in combination, these assumed 
errors do not establish that defendant was denied a fair 
competency proceeding. 
8.  Denial of Request for a Second Competency Trial 
Defendant contends that the court erred in denying her 
request for a second competency hearing under section 1368 
based on her assertion that she was increasingly unable to 
understand and respond to the legal proceedings and to 
cooperate with trial counsel in preparing her defense.  She also 
contends that the asserted error violated her state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.  We find no 
error. 
a.  Factual and procedural background 
As discussed above, on November 13, 1995, the jury 
returned its verdict finding defendant competent to stand trial 
in her criminal proceedings.  On January 3, 1996, during a 
pretrial in camera hearing held outside the presence of the 
prosecutor, the court denied defendant’s motion for substitution 
of defense counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.  
In the course of the proceeding, trial counsel declared a doubt 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
57 
about defendant’s competence and requested a second 
competency hearing under section 1368.  Although counsel 
offered no new information in support of his request, the court 
suspended the criminal proceedings and appointed two 
psychiatrists to evaluate defendant’s competence.  
On January 5, 1996, during proceedings at which both 
parties were present, the court vacated its order appointing 
psychiatrists pursuant to section 1368.  It explained:  “I was 
somewhat taken aback by [trial counsel]’s further declaration as 
to the defendant’s competency and forgot there was no District 
Attorney present, because we had a [Marsden] hearing prior to 
that, and I appointed doctors.  But on reconsideration I think we 
need to have a little further information and showing before that 
can be done again.”  The court informed counsel it was relying 
on our decision in People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 
(Medina II), for its authority to reconsider its prior order 
appointing the psychiatrists.  The court set the matter for a 
hearing to determine under Medina II whether there had been 
a “substantial change of circumstances” since the jury returned 
its verdict finding defendant was competent to stand trial.   
At a hearing on January 19, 1996, trial counsel renewed 
his request for appointment of mental health experts under 
section 1368 to evaluate defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
Counsel explained that his motion was based solely on new 
factual developments and not a new diagnosis.  During the two 
conferences he had had with defendant since the jury had found 
her competent on November 13, 1995, counsel said, she spoke in 
a “rambling fashion” about her dissatisfaction with his 
representation.  Although counsel tried to discuss the nature of 
her dissatisfaction and inform her of her options, she appeared 
to not understand his explanations.  Counsel asserted that 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
58 
defendant spoke no more than 10 words during the Marsden 
hearing21 and that her conduct demonstrated a “deepened 
inability” to understand and respond to the legal proceedings 
and cooperate with counsel.  In addition, after counsel informed 
her the District Attorney had filed a notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty, he questioned her to determine whether she 
understood the impact of the decision; she responded “with a 
blank stare.”   
The prosecutor argued that defendant’s incoherence and 
inability to understand the issues had been litigated at the 
competency trial, and counsel had presented no grounds for a 
new referral under section 1368.  Counsel acknowledged that 
the issues presented by his renewed motion were not different 
from those litigated at defendant’s first competency trial, i.e., 
her confusion and inability to understand the legal proceedings 
and to cooperate with counsel, but he maintained defendant had 
become “more disorganized, incoherent, and uncooperative.”  
The court denied the motion, finding counsel’s showing 
insufficient to distinguish defendant’s present condition from 
her condition before the competency trial.   
b.  Discussion 
“ ‘Once a defendant has been found competent to stand 
trial, a second competency hearing is required only if the 
                                        
21  
Actually, defendant spoke somewhat more than 10 words 
at the Marsden hearing.  When defendant complained about 
counsel’s representation, the court asked her to give examples.  
Defendant explained, “Okay.  Sometimes I asked him, like, for 
small things that he is able to do.  And he just cannot do them.  
Sometimes I ask him questions, and he never has an answer for 
them, you know.  And the way he has handled the case since the 
beginning, I just don’t like it.  I don’t agree with it.”   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
59 
evidence discloses a substantial change of circumstances or new 
evidence is presented casting serious doubt on the validity of the 
prior finding of the defendant’s competence.’ ”  (People v. 
Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1415, quoting Medina II, 
supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 734; see also People v. Jones (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153.)  “More is required than just bizarre 
actions or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of 
competency” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33), or 
“counsel’s unparticularized assertion that defendant’s condition 
had deteriorated, with no explanation of how it had done so” 
(Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 904).   
We conclude the court did not err in denying defendant’s 
motion for a new competency evaluation.  Trial counsel offered 
only unparticularized assertions and brief descriptions of 
isolated incidents that, in his view, reflected a “deepening” of 
defendant’s inability to understand the legal proceedings and 
cooperate with counsel.  Defendant’s behavior may, however, 
have simply been a display of her unwillingness to cooperate 
with counsel.  (See, e.g., Medina II, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 735 
[defendant’s “cursing and disruptive actions displayed an 
unwillingness to assist in his defense, but did not necessarily 
bear on his competence to do so, or reflect a substantial change 
of circumstances or new evidence casting serious doubt on the 
validity of the prior finding of the defendant’s competence”].)  In 
the absence of a more specific offer of proof, the trial court did 
not err in concluding that counsel had not presented evidence of 
changed circumstances or new evidence casting a serious doubt 
on the prior finding that defendant was competent to stand trial.   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
60 
III.  CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
A.  Jury Selection Issues 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it excused for cause two prospective 
jurors, B.R. and F.P., based solely on their written questionnaire 
answers concerning their personal views on the death penalty, 
in violation of her rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
(See Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412; People v. Stewart 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 440–455 (Stewart).)  In addition, 
defendant contends that the court erroneously excused for cause 
Prospective Juror R.J. after voir dire based on his death penalty 
views.  We conclude that the court erred in excusing Prospective 
Juror B.R. for cause based solely on her questionnaire 
responses.  Reversal of defendant’s penalty judgment is 
mandated under United States Supreme Court precedent.  
(Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 659–667 (Gray).)  In 
light of this conclusion, we need not decide whether the trial 
court erred in dismissing any of the remaining prospective 
jurors based on their death penalty views.  
1.  The Jury Selection Procedure and Written 
Questionnaire  
Four panels of prospective jurors were called for selection 
of the jury in this case.  After each panel was sworn, the court 
made its prefatory remarks and then screened prospective 
jurors for hardship excusals, almost all of which were resolved 
by stipulations of the parties.  The remaining prospective jurors 
were instructed to complete the jury questionnaire in the jury 
assembly room and to return the following Monday.   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
61 
The 32-page questionnaire contained 81 questions and 
included a section concerning the respondents’ “Opinions about 
the Death Penalty.”  The introduction to this section explained 
that if the jury found defendant to be guilty and a special 
circumstance true, a penalty trial would be held; the jury would 
choose a penalty of life without the possibility of parole or death; 
and in making the penalty choice, the jury would consider 
factors in aggravation and mitigation. 
On July 6, 1998, outside the presence of the prospective 
jurors, the court informed counsel that 122 prospective jurors 
with completed questionnaires were expected to arrive that 
morning for jury selection.  The court had “identified 
approximately 29 potential jurors from the reading of the 
questionnaires, which in my mind, if their answers were 
consistent in open court with their answers in the questionnaire, 
I would in all probability excuse them for cause.”  The court 
asked the parties to consider excusing the 29 prospective jurors 
by stipulation because the courtroom could seat a maximum of 
only 92 individuals.  In the alternative, the court proposed 
excusing the last 30 individuals from the random list of 
prospective jurors.  The court expressed hope that “[we] can 
work through the obvious individuals to stipulate for cause.”   
The 
court 
and 
counsel 
thereafter 
discussed 
the 
qualifications of the 29 prospective jurors based solely on their 
written questionnaire responses, beginning with Prospective 
Juror B.R.  When the court asked the parties for a response, trial 
counsel stated, “[W]e’ll submit it.  We can’t stipulate to them 
obviously, Your Honor, but we know what the Court’s concerns 
are.”  The prosecutor noted that B.R. was on his list of challenges 
for cause.  Without further discussion, the court ruled, “Based 
on the answers that the potential juror would not vote for death, 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
62 
and at this time [B.R.] would be excused for cause.”  No other 
cause for her excusal was identified.   
Prospective Juror F.P. was another of the 29 prospective 
jurors the court identified as probably disqualified based on her 
written questionnaire responses alone.  After the court and 
counsel discussed her responses, the prosecutor challenged F.P. 
for cause under Witt.  The court granted the challenge.   
The court subsequently conducted voir dire of the 
remaining prospective jurors in groups of 18.  Each party was 
permitted 30 minutes to ask follow-up questions.   
During the voir dire process, the court excused Prospective 
Juror R.J. for cause under Witt.  The court did not permit 
counsel to attempt to rehabilitate any of the prospective jurors 
the court had determined to be disqualified as “substantially 
impaired.”  The parties exercised their for-cause and peremptory 
challenges, and the jury was sworn.   
2.  Discussion 
“Under decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
prospective jurors who express personal opposition to the death 
penalty are not automatically subject to excusal for cause as 
long as ‘they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily 
set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.’  
(Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176; see Witherspoon 
v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522.)  To determine if a 
prospective juror is excusable for cause without compromising a 
defendant’s constitutional rights, we inquire whether the 
prospective juror’s views on the death penalty ‘would “prevent 
or substantially impair the performance” ’ of the juror’s duties 
in accordance with the court’s instructions and his or her oath.”  
(People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 778 (Riccardi); see 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
63 
People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 (Avila); Stewart, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 446–447.) 
“Before granting a challenge for cause, the ‘court must 
have sufficient information regarding the prospective juror’s 
state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether 
the juror’s views would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair’ ” ’ 
performance as a capital juror.  [Citation.]  Trial courts must 
therefore make ‘a conscientious attempt to determine a 
prospective juror’s views regarding capital punishment to 
ensure that any juror excused from jury service meets the 
constitutional 
standard.’ ” 
 
(People 
v. 
Leon 
(2015) 
61 Cal.4th 569, 592; accord, Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 863.) 
On appeal, we independently review a trial court’s 
dismissal of a prospective juror under Witt based solely on his or 
her written questionnaire responses.  (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 21, 37, citing Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 779.)  
“[A] prospective juror may be discharged for cause solely on the 
basis of written questionnaire responses only if it is ‘clear’ from 
those responses that the juror is unable or unwilling to 
temporarily set aside the juror’s beliefs and follow the law.  
([Riccardi], supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 11; [Avila], supra, 
38 Cal.4th at p. 531; see also People v. McKinnon (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 610, 647–648.)  Where a prospective juror’s written 
responses are ambiguous with respect to the individual’s 
willingness or ability to follow the court’s instructions in a 
potential penalty phase, the record does not support a challenge 
for cause.  (Stewart, at pp. 448–449.)”  (Zaragoza, supra, at 
pp. 38–39; see Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 863.) 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
64 
Preliminarily, the Attorney General argues defendant 
forfeited her claim by failing to object to the dismissal of 
Prospective Juror B.R. or request voir dire.  At the time of 
defendant’s trial, however, there was no requirement of a 
contemporaneous objection or statement of grounds to preserve 
a claim of Witherspoon/Witt error in the excusal of a prospective 
juror.22  (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 637.)  Nor did 
counsel forfeit the issue by submitting the question to the trial 
court.  (Ibid.; People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 733.)  We 
therefore proceed to the merits of defendant’s claim.   
In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror B.R. stated that 
she was a widowed 70-year-old retired payroll clerk and had 
been a resident of the city of Riverside for 42 years.  B.R. 
estimated that she had worked on the questionnaire for an hour.  
Of the 81 questions contained in the questionnaire, B.R. left 36 
questions unanswered.  
In response to Question 15, Prospective Juror B.R. 
identified herself as a religious person and indicated that her 
religious beliefs would not prohibit or make it difficult for her to 
sit as a juror.  The section entitled “The Charges Here” informed 
prospective jurors that defendant was charged with the murders 
of her three minor children by stabbing and with the special 
                                        
22  
In People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at page 643 
(McKinnon), 
we 
overruled 
People 
v. 
Velasquez 
(1980) 
26 Cal.3d 425, “to the extent it articulates a no-forfeiture rule 
with 
respect 
to 
Witherspoon/Witt 
excusal 
error” 
and 
prospectively held that in order to preserve a claim of such error 
for appeal, counsel—or defendant if proceeding pro se—“must 
make either a timely objection, or the functional equivalent of 
an objection, such as a statement of opposition or disagreement, 
to the excusal stating specific grounds under Witherspoon/Witt.”  
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
65 
circumstance of multiple murder.  In response to Question 37 in 
that section, B.R. indicated by circling “yes” that she had a 
“religious or moral feeling that would make it difficult for her to 
sit in judgment of another person.”  B.R. did not have any 
feelings, positive or negative, about the criminal justice system.   
The questions Prospective Juror B.R. left unanswered 
included the following:  “Would you automatically reject the 
testimony of a witness who admitted that he/she had used drugs 
or alcohol?”; “What is your opinion, if any, of psychologists or 
psychiatrists who testify in criminal cases?”; “Do you have the 
opinion that any mother who kills her children must be ‘crazy’?”; 
“Do you have any feeling about the nature of the charges in this 
case that would make it difficult or impossible for you to be fair 
or impartial?”; “Would you be reluctant to serve on a jury on a 
crime involving acts of violence and where graphic photographs 
of the victim will be in evidence?”; “Do you believe the criminal 
justice system makes it too hard for the police and prosecutors 
to convict people accused of crimes?”; and “If the judge gives you 
an instruction on the law that differs from your beliefs or 
opinions, will you follow the law at [sic] the judge instructs you?”  
She did not answer questions about her ability to follow 
instructions concerning the prosecution’s burden of proof.  She 
also failed to answer the following questions:  “Would you 
believe or disbelieve the testimony of a law enforcement officer 
simply because he/she is a law enforcement officer?”; “Would you 
automatically believe everything an expert said merely because 
the person is called an expert?”; and “What is it about yourself 
that makes you feel you can be a fair and impartial juror?” 
In the “Trial Issues” section of the questionnaire, 
Prospective Juror B.R. answered the following questions 
“unsure” instead of “yes” or “no”:  “Do you feel you can give the 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
66 
defendant and the People a fair trial?”; “Can you objectively view 
and consider graphic photos of dead children?”; “[C]ould you 
listen to your fellow jurors and receive from them the benefit of 
their thinking concerning the evidence in this case?”; “If during 
jury deliberations . . . you become convinced that you are wrong, 
could you reconsider your position?”; and “Would you change 
your position merely because the other jurors disagree with 
you?” 
Questions 68 through 73 and 76 through 78 of the 
questionnaire concerned a prospective juror’s death penalty 
views and duties as a capital juror.  In response to Question 68, 
which asked respondents to describe their “general feelings 
about the death penalty,” B.R. wrote:  “I wouldn’t want to make 
that decision.”  In part “a” of Question 68, which asked 
prospective jurors to rank their feelings about the death penalty 
on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating “strongly against the death 
penalty” and 10 being “strongly in favor of the death penalty,” 
B.R. ranked herself a “1.”   
In part “c” of Question 68, Prospective Juror B.R. circled 
“Yes” in response to the question, “If you are against the death 
penalty, would your opinion make it difficult for you to vote for 
the death penalty in this case, regardless of what the evidence 
was?”  In Part “e” of the same question, B.R. indicated that she 
had never held a different opinion about the death penalty.  In 
response to Question 73, “Do you have an opinion as to whether 
you think death or life in prison is the more severe 
punishment?,” B.R. answered, “No.”  B.R. left unanswered the 
remaining death penalty questions.  Among them was Question 
70, which asked, in essence, whether, no matter what the 
evidence was, the prospective juror would “ALWAYS” vote for 
the death penalty (pt. (a)) or would “ALWAYS” vote for life 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
67 
without possibility of parole (pt. (b)), or would consider all of the 
evidence and decide the appropriate penalty according to the 
law (pt. (c)).   
Based on our independent review of the record, 
Prospective Juror B.R.’s written questionnaire responses, taken 
together, did not clearly demonstrate that her death penalty 
views would prevent or substantially impair her ability to serve 
as a capital juror in accordance with the trial court’s instructions 
and her juror’s oath.  (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 647; 
Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 533.)  Crucially, B.R. indicated she 
“wouldn’t want” to make a decision involving the death penalty, 
not that she could not or would not make such a decision if 
instructed to do so.  B.R. also stated that her strongly held views 
against the death penalty would make it difficult to vote for the 
death penalty, but again, not that she could not or would not do 
so.  Our cases make clear that “mere difficulty in imposing the 
death penalty does not, per se, prevent or substantially impair 
the performance of a juror’s duties.”  (Avila, supra, at p. 530.)  
“A juror might find it very difficult to vote to impose the death 
penalty, and yet such a juror’s performance still would not be 
substantially impaired under Witt, unless he or she were 
unwilling or unable to follow the trial court’s instructions by 
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the 
case and determining whether death is the appropriate penalty 
under the law.”  (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447.) 
It is possible that Prospective Juror B.R.’s views might 
have been clearly revealed by her response to Question 70, 
which sought to determine whether prospective jurors would 
“always” vote for life imprisonment versus the death penalty.  
We have previously upheld the dismissal of jurors based on their 
written responses to questions that clearly ask whether the 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
68 
“juror would automatically vote one way or the other 
irrespective of the evidence.”  (People v. Wilson (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 758, 787 (Wilson) [questionnaire asking jurors 
whether, “ ‘[n]o matter what the evidence was,’ would they 
‘ALWAYS vote for the death penalty’ or ‘for life without 
possibility of parole.’ ”]; see id. at pp. 788–789.)  But B.R. did not 
respond to Question 70, and the remainder of her responses 
provided no sufficient basis to conclude that B.R. was “not 
willing or able to set aside . . . her personal views and follow the 
law.”  (Id. at p. 787.)   
The Attorney General argues that even if counsel’s failure 
to object to B.R.’s excusal did not result in forfeiture of the claim, 
counsel’s decision to submit the matter provided support for the 
trial court’s assessment that B.R. was excusable for cause under 
Witt.  The Attorney General relies on People v. Schmeck (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 240, 262 (Schmeck), in which we said trial counsel’s 
submission of the question of a prospective juror’s qualification 
to serve in a capital trial, like a failure to object, “ ‘does suggest 
counsel concurred in the assessment that the juror was 
excusable.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting People v. Cleveland (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 704, 734–735.) 
This case is distinguishable from Schmeck.  In Schmeck, 
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding, based 
on their voir dire responses and demeanor, that the prospective 
jurors in question were disqualified under Witt.  “All four 
prospective jurors indicated at various points during their voir 
dire that, in light of their views concerning the death penalty . . . 
they were unable to state that they could consider imposing the 
death penalty in this case as a reasonable possibility.”  
(Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262.)  Here, by contrast, the 
court excused Prospective Juror B.R. based solely on her 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
69 
questionnaire responses, finding she “would not vote for death.”  
As explained above, however, the evidence before the court was 
insufficient to establish that B.R.’s death penalty views would 
prevent or substantially impair her performance as a capital 
juror.  (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 643; Avila, supra, 
38 Cal.4th at p. 531.)  Moreover, during this portion of the jury 
selection process, the court did not permit the parties to attempt 
to rehabilitate any of the prospective jurors whom it had 
identified as excusable for cause.  Under the circumstances, trial 
counsel’s decision to submit B.R.’s excusal does not alter our 
conclusion that the excusal was improper. 
This case is likewise distinguishable from McKinnon, in 
which trial counsel not only submitted the matter of prospective 
jurors’ excusal for cause under Witherspoon/Witt based solely 
on their written questionnaire responses, but also declined the 
court’s offer to conduct voir dire.  (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at p. 650.)  In McKinnon, as in Schmeck, we reasoned that 
counsel’s conduct “signaled concurrence” in the trial court’s 
ruling; this concurrence, we said, “weigh[ed] heavily, along with 
the substance of [the] questionnaire responses, in favor of a 
determination on the merits that the excusal was proper.”  
(McKinnon, at p. 650; see id. at p. 651.)  In this case, as noted, 
trial counsel was not given the option of conducting voir dire.  
And more importantly, the substance of B.R.’s questionnaire 
responses—or nonresponses, as the case may be—did not clearly 
signal that B.R. held views about the death penalty that 
rendered her “unable to deliberate fairly on the issue of penalty.”  
(Id. at p. 649.)  Under the circumstances, even if we were to 
assume that counsel’s submission of B.R.’s excusal indicated 
acquiescence in the court’s ruling, it would not “weigh heavily” 
in favor of a finding that the ruling was proper.  The trial court 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
70 
erred in concluding B.R. was disqualified based solely on her 
written questionnaire responses; further inquiry was necessary 
to determine whether her death penalty views actually 
warranted excusal under Witherspoon/Witt. 
The Attorney General raises an alternative ground for 
affirming the excusal:  that B.R. failed to obey her juror oath and 
respond to all the questions in the questionnaire.  But even 
assuming that we may affirm B.R.’s dismissal on a ground 
entirely different from the ground the trial court cited, we reject 
the Attorney General’s argument.  The clerk administered the 
following oath to each panel of prospective jurors:  “You and each 
of you do understand and agree that you will accurately and 
truthfully answer under penalty of perjury all questions 
propounded to you concerning your qualifications and 
competency to serve as a trial juror in the matter now pending 
before this Court.”  In addition, after each panel was sworn, the 
trial court made its prefatory remarks and advised the 
prospective jurors of the importance of the juror questionnaire.  
It stated first the use of the questionnaire would “cut down the 
jury selection in this case by a number of days.”  It then informed 
the prospective jurors that “the attorneys will be reading the 
questionnaires in great depth because they will be utilizing that 
information to help them select the jury in this case.”  The 
“Instructions for Juror Questionnaire,” appearing on the second 
page of the questionnaire, largely repeated the trial court’s 
advisement of the questionnaire’s dual purpose and specifically 
encouraged prospective jurors to provide complete answers.  
Critically, however, the written questionnaire instructions 
included the following additional advisement, which was not 
provided orally by the trial court:  “If you cannot answer a 
question, please leave the response area blank.  During the 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
71 
questioning, you will be given an opportunity to explain or 
expand any answers if necessary.”  
The record does not reveal why Prospective Juror B.R. did 
not answer a substantial number of the questions on her 
questionnaire.  She may have had difficulty answering the 
questions and reasonably relied on the above advisement on the 
questionnaire, with the expectation that when she and the other 
prospective jurors returned to court, the judge and attorneys 
would question her and give her an opportunity to explain her 
blank responses.  Absent an explanation from B.R. as to why she 
failed to complete all of the questions, we cannot conclude she 
failed to obey her oath.  The unanswered questions provided a 
reason for the trial court to voir dire B.R., but not justification 
to excuse her for cause.  (See, e.g., Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 789 [a trial court should personally examine a prospective 
juror when it has “reason to suspect a prospective juror is a poor 
reader or may simply have misunderstood the questionnaire”].)   
Having found error, we turn to the question of remedy.  
“The general rule is that, absent a showing of prejudice, an 
erroneous excusal of a prospective juror for cause does not 
mandate the reversal of judgment.  This rule is based on the 
principle that a ‘[d]efendant has a right to jurors who are 
qualified and competent, not to any particular juror.’  [Citation.]  
But . . . under existing United States Supreme Court precedent, 
the erroneous excusal of a prospective juror for cause based on 
that person’s views concerning the death penalty automatically 
compels the reversal of the penalty phase without any inquiry 
as to whether the error actually prejudiced defendant’s penalty 
determination.  (Gray, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 659–667 (opn. of 
the court); id., at pp. 667–668 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id., 
at p. 672 (conc. opn. of Powell, J.).)”  (Riccardi, supra, 
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72 
54 Cal.4th at p. 783; see People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 
745.)  In accordance with this precedent, we must reverse the 
penalty judgment.23   
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Defendant’s Motion for Self-Representation  
Defendant argues that the trial court committed 
reversible error in denying her request for self-representation 
under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.  The claim is 
without merit.  
a.  Factual and procedural background 
On Monday, July 20, 1998, during the morning session on 
the second day of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor 
played for the jury a portion of the audiotape of defendant’s 
interview with San Jacinto Police Detective Frederick 
Rodriguez conducted on the day of the homicides.  Sometime 
after the morning recess, at lead defense counsel Jay 
Grossman’s request, the trial court conducted an in camera 
hearing with only Grossman and cocounsel David Macher 
present.  Grossman informed the court that defendant was 
dissatisfied with counsel’s representation and that he had 
                                        
23  
Defendant also contends that the court failed to make a 
case-specific determination concerning whether group voir dire 
was practicable, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 
223, and failed to conduct a voir dire adequate to identify 
prospective jurors who could not be impartial.  As a result, 
defendant contends, she was denied a fair and impartial jury at 
the penalty phase in violation of article I, section 16 of the state 
Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution.  Because we conclude the penalty 
judgment must be reversed due to Witherspoon/Witt error, we 
need not address this contention. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
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explained her options, one of which was to request self-
representation under Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806 
(Faretta).  Grossman had mentioned the option of self-
representation because “the things that she’s asking us to do, 
while not unethical, are simply not in her best interest.”  
Defendant told counsel that she “wanted to represent herself 
and wanted to talk with the Court.”  Grossman added, “this is a 
continuing problem [that is] exacerbated every day when there’s 
more testimony.”  Cocounsel Macher stated he would object to a 
Faretta motion as untimely and not in defendant’s best interest.  
The court indicated it would allow defendant to be heard on her 
request later that day.  After the hearing concluded, the 
remainder of the audiotape of defendant’s police interview was 
played to the jury.   
During the lunch recess, the court held a hearing under 
Marsden and Faretta.  Lead counsel Grossman informed the 
court that, while the audiotape was being played before the jury 
that morning, defendant mentioned for the first time that she 
believed the voice on the audiotape of her police interview was 
not hers.  Grossman and cocounsel Macher later met with 
defendant in a holding cell.  According to Grossman, defendant 
told them that the audiotape was a fraud, that the prosecution 
was trying to frame her for the murders, and that she expected 
her attorneys to call witnesses to prove the audiotape was a 
fraud.   
Grossman informed the court:  “I have no such witnesses 
and there’s never been a suggestion that that is not her voice on 
the tape.  And we tried to explain that to [defendant].  She then 
said that if we wouldn’t do it, basically it was her intention to do 
it by way of either testifying or managing the case on her own.”  
Grossman continued:  “[W]e have no witnesses who can contest 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
74 
the validity of that tape.  I don’t know who to call, no provisions 
have been made to do that because, frankly, there was never any 
expectation that this wasn’t her voice on the tape.  [¶]  And I 
tried to talk to [defendant] about . . . recognizing her voice.  I 
know I’m not a witness, but the information that was . . . being 
conveyed in that tape is of the nature that I told her I would find 
hard to believe a jury would believe the San Jacinto Police were 
getting somebody to invent the names of the children, the ages, 
the history with her husband, things like that.  [¶]  [Defendant]’s 
very adamant that it’s a fraud and insists that we go forward in 
some way to prove that it’s a fraud, and . . . this is another 
instance, in her own mind, that indicates to her that counsel is 
not making an effort to try to protect her legal rights and 
advance her interests in this case.”   
Grossman explained to the court it would be “the worst 
possible thing” for the defense to present evidence that the 
prosecution framed defendant for the murders and to also argue 
“the DNA and other things have all been fabricated.”  According 
to counsel, as of that morning, defendant was “adamant” that 
“she wanted to at least explore this issue with the Court, and 
again indicate her dissatisfaction to the Court.”   
Defendant told the court that she had never heard the 
audiotape of her interview with Detective Rodriguez before it 
was played for the jury.  Lead counsel Grossman informed the 
court:  “We have dealt with the tape issue, at least the statement 
issues, before, although I don’t recall ever playing portions of the 
tape to her in . . . jail.  We did have the transcript, but it never 
was brought to my attention that this was a fabrication.”   
The court asked defendant whether she was requesting to 
represent herself, and she answered, “Yes.”  The court noted 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
75 
that lead counsel Grossman had been assigned to defendant’s 
case for two years, and the prosecution was “halfway” through 
the presentation of evidence in its case-in-chief.  The court also 
stated that earlier that morning, it had overheard defendant 
yelling at both her attorneys in a “very raised, angry voice” in a 
holding cell directly adjacent to the courtroom, and asked 
Grossman, “Is that a very fair characterization?”  Grossman 
answered, “Generally, yes.”   
The court asked Grossman what his “take on this” was, 
and counsel said he believed defendant’s concern “is not one of 
delay[;] her concern in her own mind is presenting what she 
considers the true facts to be to this jury.”  Grossman stated that 
defendant had expressed no desire for a continuance, but 
essentially insisted that he call witnesses he did not have in 
order to dispute the accuracy of the audiotape of defendant’s 
police interview.  Grossman expressed frustration “that we are 
almost at total loggerheads, ‘we’ meaning [defense counsel], 
with [defendant] . . . .  And there’s a widening gulf between what 
she wants and what we can ethically do and what we think is in 
her best interests in terms of possible penalty in this case.”   
Cocounsel 
Macher 
added 
that 
after 
working 
on 
defendant’s case for two years, he considered her defense 
theories “implausible,” “fantasy,” and “just not based in reality.”  
Macher stated he could not present defendant’s theories in good 
faith because her defense “would be a disaster for both guilt and 
penalty, and we can’t do it.”  The following colloquy then 
occurred:   
“THE COURT:  So we have a clear record, in your opinion 
the defense that she wants presented, which she would like to 
present on her own behalf, is one, in part, based upon fantasy? 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
76 
“MR. MACHER:  Your honor, from what we’ve been able 
to see in two years of working on the case, I would agree that it’s 
just not based in reality.   
“THE COURT:  All right.  [Defendant], are you telling me 
you want to represent yourself today; is that what you’re saying? 
“[DEFENDANT]:  Yes, Your Honor. 
“THE COURT:  And how do you plan on doing that? 
“[DEFENDANT]:  As I have already seen how Mr. Macher 
conducted the cross-examination of Officer Blane Dillon, and 
there’s questions that could have been asked direct to him in 
regards to the timing, that he made like from San Jacinto Police 
Station to the apartments.  [¶]  And there’s a couple questions 
that we already have reports on that we could compare his 
answers with, because those reports are dated October 27th, 
1994.  They’re very accurate. 
“THE COURT:  All right.  And you’re telling me that you 
are—you feel that you are competent to proceed today, without 
any further delay, in representing yourself?   
“[DEFENDANT]:  From what I see in the way they have 
conducted the case, yes, I think so.  I think I would be. 
“THE COURT:  All right.  The Court is well aware of the 
admonition pursuant to Faretta and the right to self-
representation.  [¶]  And Mr. Grossman, I don’t think I am even 
going to go into it that far and advise her of the consequences of 
self-representation and the detriments thereto.  Obviously this 
is a death penalty case, [defendant] knows that, and she would 
not be given any special consideration.  [¶]  I’m not going to voir 
dire her on that because . . . in my view of the situation, her 
conduct today at this late stage is either an obstructionist tactic 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
77 
or one of delay.  It’s tardy.  [¶]  [Defense counsel] have been on 
this case for many, many, many months, and we’re halfway 
through the prosecution’s case.  And based upon the Marsden 
request that got this far, and based upon her attitude that she 
displayed to you in the holding cell today, that I overheard, as 
far as the raised voices—and again, I didn’t hear what she said, 
I just heard her yelling at you—and her demeanor and manner 
during the Marsden hearing, it’s clear to me that that request 
for self-representation is not in good faith, and I feel that it is 
one to obstruct these proceedings and it is untimely.  And that 
request is . . . denied.”24   
b.  Prior Marsden hearings 
On May 20, 1996, defense conflict panel attorneys Jay 
Grossman and Frank Peasley were appointed to represent 
defendant; 
thereafter, 
conflict 
attorney 
David 
Macher 
substituted for Frank Peasley.  Defendant made four 
unsuccessful attempts under Marsden to substitute appointed 
counsel Grossman and Macher at the in camera hearings held 
on April 2, May 4, July 14, and July 16, 1998.25 
i.  April 2 hearing 
At the April 2, 1998, Marsden hearing, the trial court 
addressed defendant’s letter to the court expressing her 
                                        
24  
We presume the trial court was referring to defendant’s 
Marsden motion that it heard and denied on July 16, 1998, the court 
day immediately preceding the current Faretta hearing.  We discuss 
this hearing below. 
25  
These hearings were held before two different judges:  The 
Honorable Vilia G. Sherman conducted the trial proceedings 
until she recused herself on June 16, 1998.  Thereafter, the 
Honorable Patrick F. Magers conducted defendant’s trial.   
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
78 
concerns about the defense DNA testing and the possibility that 
samples were lost when the DNA facility that conducted the 
analyses relocated its laboratory.  Based on counsel Macher’s 
representation that no DNA samples were lost during the move, 
the trial court found that defendant had a misunderstanding 
about the samples and “no grounds here for a Marsden motion.”   
When the trial court asked defendant if she had anything 
else to call to the court’s attention, defendant answered that she 
believed the contents of police reports she possessed contained 
errors.  The trial court explained to defendant that she should 
discuss her concerns with her attorneys.  Lead counsel 
Grossman informed the trial court that defendant and counsel 
had differences with respect to defense strategy and trial tactics, 
including whom to subpoena as witnesses.  Counsel said that he 
suspected that prior counsel had similar problems with 
defendant and that prior to trial the issue of “who is in charge of 
the trial, the attorneys or [defendant]” will have to be resolved.   
The trial court informed defendant that “[t]he law is that 
the attorneys have the last word on everything to do with tactics 
and strategy.”  Defendant told the court, “I’m not dissatisfied 
with [her attorneys], and I do not have a conflict with them.”  
She added, “All I really want is on the record two or three of the 
[police] reports.  That’s about it.  That is what I’m asking for.”  
Because defendant did not have the reports with her at the 
hearing, the trial court agreed to talk with her about them at 
the next proceeding.   
ii.  May 4 hearing 
At counsel Macher’s request, the trial court held a 
Marsden hearing to address counsel’s concern that after he and 
lead counsel Grossman met for hours with defendant, she voiced 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
79 
“substantial dissatisfaction” with counsel, which “carried over” 
to that morning’s proceedings.  Macher explained that although 
he and Grossman reviewed the evidence with defendant more 
than once and explained their defense theory, defendant told 
them that she would prepare her own defense.  Neither 
Grossman nor Macher believed the theory defendant wanted to 
present was “based upon any factual matters whatsoever.”  
Macher further informed the trial court that defendant said she 
would be ready to proceed “this morning.”  Both Grossman and 
Macher believed that any Faretta request was untimely and 
believed defendant’s dissatisfaction related to how counsel 
planned to conduct the defense rather than a breakdown in the 
attorney-client relationship.   
Defendant said that she was “somewhat dissatisfied” with 
defense counsel because apparently none of the defense 
witnesses included those whom she suggested.  When the court 
asked defendant whether she wanted new attorneys or to 
represent herself, defendant answered, “No.  Well, I’m just 
explaining the reason as to why I am somewhat dissatisfied.”  
Defendant also stated that she planned to meet with current 
counsel in the upcoming week to discuss her concerns and asked, 
“[C]an I ask the Court if I can hold my decision to see if I want 
a new counsel or not until Thursday after I speak to them?”  
When the court asked for her to clarify what she was asking, 
defendant stated, “Just for four days to find out if I will remain 
with them, stay with them until the proceedings start, until the 
trial, whatever.”  The court explained that it was presently 
conducting pretrial motions and that “[t]oday’s the date set for 
trial.”  Macher expressed concern that defendant might not have 
understood that if she waited to bring a Faretta motion until 
after she met with counsel during the week, which would occur 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
80 
after trial commenced, that the motion would be untimely.  The 
following colloquy ensued:  
“THE COURT:  Well, I was about to take that up with her, 
but I’m not clear on exactly what it is she’s asking for, to keep 
you until she hires somebody else or to represent herself in trial. 
So, [defendant], do you want to act as your own attorney 
and cross-examine witnesses and conduct the trial and call 
experts and be responsible for getting witnesses here and, in 
other words, do everything that Mr. Macher and Mr. Grossman 
are doing for you now?  Is that what you’re asking? 
“[DEFENDANT]:  Well, from the place that I am at it’s 
pretty hard for me to bring witnesses in. 
“THE COURT:  Exactly.  [¶]  So are you asking me to 
replace Mr. Grossman and Mr. Macher with other attorneys?  Is 
that what you’re asking? 
“[DEFENDANT]:  No.  I was just asking for a little time, 
but if you say we already start trial today— 
“THE COURT:  All right.  A little time for what? 
“[DEFENDANT]:  To speak to them and show them a 
couple of defense points that they could use. 
“THE COURT:  Well, I think that you will be speaking to 
them a great deal during this trial, and I’m sure they’ll be 
listening to you and the things you want them to do.  They may 
not necessarily agree with you, and as your expert lawyers, it’s 
up to them to decide how to conduct the case.  You need to 
understand that. 
“[DEFENDANT]:  Oh, okay.  Okay.” 
Before the trial court made its findings, Macher added 
that he and lead counsel Grossman reviewed a list of eight 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
81 
potential witnesses whom defendant identified as “very 
important” to her defense but found none relevant to any 
potential guilty phase issues.  Macher also informed the court 
that defendant’s theory “makes no legal sense and we cannot 
pursue it” and that the views he expressed would not change 
before he and Grossman next met with her.  Defendant told the 
trial court that she understood all that Macher had said.   
The trial court ruled, “To the extent that this was a 
Marsden motion, which I don’t believe it was in the true essence 
of the word, the motion is denied.”  The court found no 
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, because it found 
defendant would have the same complaints with “any other 
attorneys.”  Next, the trial court ruled that it “[didn’t] truly 
believe” defendant was making a Faretta motion; in the 
alternative, any Faretta motion was untimely.   
iii.  July 14 hearing 
At defendant’s request, the trial court conducted a 
Marsden hearing.  Defendant repeated her concerns about lost 
DNA samples, specific DNA tests, and the list of individuals she 
wanted counsel to call to testify on her behalf.  Cocounsel 
Macher reported that defendant “has been consistently confused 
despite our repeated explanations regarding the purported lost 
DNA.”  He explained that “DNA evidence has never been lost in 
this case either by the government or by the defense team” and 
that the defense previously litigated all DNA issues, which were 
preserved for appeal.  In addition, Macher, Grossman, and the 
defense investigator met “face-to-face” with defendant for two 
hours at the beginning of May to review her list of potential 
witnesses and unanimously agreed that none of the witnesses 
would be relevant to the guilt phase defense.  Having found no 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
82 
grounds for substitution of counsel, the trial court denied the 
Marsden motion.   
iv.  July 16 hearing 
On the first day of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, after the 
prosecution’s second witness was excused, and out of the 
presence of the jury, lead counsel Grossman informed the trial 
court that he wanted to address a “Marsden issue.”  When 
Grossman asked the prosecutor to leave (so the trial court could 
conduct a confidential Marsden hearing), defendant said she 
wanted him to stay.  The trial court cleared the courtroom of 
everyone except defendant and her counsel.  Grossman informed 
the trial court that during trial, defendant expressed 
dissatisfaction “with the defense efforts in this case.”  Grossman 
then stated, “Apparently, part of her complaint is that she wants 
to tell [the prosecutor] that he knows she’s innocent and is 
prosecuting her improperly.  I said, I didn’t think that was a 
wise thing for her to tell him because, in my opinion, I don’t 
think he believes that.”   
Defendant repeated her concerns about the DNA testing 
and specifically that her attorneys did not dispute the DNA 
testing results with their own defense expert.  Macher informed 
the trial court that the DNA admissibility issues had been 
litigated before and decided by Judge Sherman and were 
preserved for appeal.  Defendant then complained, “It appears 
pretty unfair that the DA has so much proof.  It’s like me being 
denied the access to an expert.”  Grossman then explained that 
“[defendant]’s problem is that she feels that we should have the 
laboratory that did the analysis for us come to court.  [¶]  The 
problem is that their analysis in many ways is the same, as 
harmful as, or more harmful as the state laboratory.  And I tried 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
83 
to explain to her this morning, there’s no sense calling somebody 
that hurts us.”  Grossman and Macher made a tactical decision 
to not present the defense DNA test results.   
The trial court asked defendant if she had anything 
further, and she stated, “I just don’t agree with the way they are 
conducting the whole entire case.  The way they are handling 
my case.”  The trial court ruled, “The Marsden request, if that’s 
a Marsden request, it will be denied.”   
c.  Discussion 
Defendant contends the court erred in denying her 
midtrial request for self-representation under Faretta, supra, 
422 U.S. 806.  We find no error.   
In Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to 
represent themselves.  Following Faretta, in People v. Windham 
(1977) 
19 Cal.3d 121 
(Windham), 
this 
court 
considered 
questions concerning the timing of a defendant’s self-
representation request.  We held that “in order to invoke the 
constitutionally 
mandated 
unconditional 
right 
of 
self-
representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an 
unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time 
prior to the commencement of trial.”  (Id. at pp. 127–128.)  
Otherwise, “once a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial 
represented by counsel, demands by such defendant that he be 
permitted to discharge his attorney and assume the defense 
himself shall be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”  
(Id. at p. 128; accord, e.g., People v. Bradford (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 1229, 1365 [“[A]lthough in a criminal trial a 
defendant has a federal constitutional, unconditional right of 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
84 
self-representation, in order to invoke that right, he or she must 
make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable 
time prior to the commencement of trial.”].)26  
We have held that “timeliness for purposes of Faretta is 
based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in 
the case at the time the self-representation motion is made.  An 
analysis based on these considerations is in accord with the 
purpose of the timeliness requirement, which is ‘to prevent the 
defendant from misusing the motion to unjustifiably delay trial 
or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ”  (People v. 
Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 724.)  In exercising its discretion 
to grant or deny an untimely self-representation request, we 
have held the trial court should consider, among other factors, 
“the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the 
defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for 
the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the 
disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to 
follow the granting of such a motion.”  (Windham, supra, 
19 Cal.3d at p. 128.)  When a court denies an untimely request, 
                                        
26  
After defendant’s trial, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 174–178, that 
a defendant may be denied the right to self-representation if he 
or she, although competent to stand trial, suffers from a severe 
mental illness and is unable to conduct trial proceedings without 
assistance of counsel.  In People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
519, 527–530, we adopted the Edwards standard for competence 
to represent oneself at trial.  This case, however, presents no 
issue under Edwards or Johnson; neither the court nor the 
parties addressed the question of defendant’s mental condition 
in connection with her Faretta motion. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
85 
its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (See People v. 
Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 103 (Valdez).)   
Defendant does not dispute that whether to grant an 
untimely Faretta motion is addressed to the trial court’s 
discretion.  But she argues that the only factor the trial court 
may properly consider is the potential for delay or other 
disruption resulting from the granting of the motion.  She 
argues Windham was wrong to permit courts to consider other 
factors—an error, she contends, that is traceable to a mistaken 
assumption that the self-representation right evaporates once 
trial has begun.  We agree with defendant that the potential for 
delay and disruption is an important factor in the analysis, but 
we disagree that it is the only factor the court may consider.  We 
see no reason why a court may not also consider, for example, 
whether the potential disruption is likely to be aggravated, 
mitigated, or justified by the surrounding circumstances, 
including the quality of counsel’s representation to that point, 
the reasons the defendant gives for the request, and the 
defendant’s proclivity for substituting counsel.  (See Windham, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.)  Defendant cites no authority, and 
we are aware of none, to suggest that these considerations are 
impermissible under Faretta.    
Here, defendant made her request on the second day of the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief and approximately two years after 
lead counsel Grossman and cocounsel Macher were appointed to 
represent her.  The request was untimely under Windham.  (See 
Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102 [Faretta motion made 
“moments before jury selection was set to begin” was untimely]; 
People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1110–1111 (Horton) 
[defendant’s motion for self-representation was untimely when 
made on the date scheduled for trial after numerous 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
86 
continuances]; People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 742 
[defendant’s request for self-representation was untimely when 
made on the eve of trial, over 10 months after appointment of 
trial counsel]; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 853 
[defendant’s Faretta request was untimely when made “after the 
case had been called for trial, both counsel had answered ready, 
and the case had been transferred to a trial department for 
pretrial motions and jury trial” and jury selection was to 
commence the next day]; cf. Avila v. Roe (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 
750, 753 [a Faretta request is timely if made before jury is 
empaneled, unless it is shown to be for the purpose of delay].)   
Defendant argues that her delay in requesting self-
representation was justified because she had not heard the 
audiotape of her interview with Detective Rodriguez until the 
prosecutor played it for the jury.  She asserts that she had no 
prior opportunity to discuss its authenticity with counsel.  Lead 
counsel Grossman, however, informed the trial court that he 
previously reviewed the transcript of the statements on the 
audiotape with defendant in her jail cell and that she had never 
previously complained that the audiotape was a fabrication.  If 
defendant believed that any statements were falsely attributed 
to her, she had prior opportunity to inform counsel of her 
concern that the police and prosecution fabricated the 
audiotape.  Defendant’s delay was not justified on this ground. 
Because defendant’s Faretta request was untimely, we 
must consider whether the court abused its discretion in 
denying the request.  No abuse of discretion has been shown.  
The source of defendant’s dissatisfaction with her attorneys was 
their unwillingness to make unsupported attacks on the 
prosecution case that in their professional judgment would have 
been contrary to their client’s interests.  Defendant had 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
87 
previously expressed similarly unfounded complaints about 
counsel and sought their replacement.  Although defendant did 
not explicitly request a continuance if she took on her own 
defense, and asserted she “th[ought]” she was “competent” to 
take over her defense immediately, the defense she apparently 
intended to take on—attempting to show that the tape of her 
police interview had been fabricated—would by its nature 
involve delay to investigate and secure witnesses.  The trial 
court reasonably concluded that defendant’s midtrial Faretta 
request was made for purposes of disruption or delay and that 
it would indeed have that effect.  Considering these 
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion.  (See 
Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 103; Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1110–1111; People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 853–
854; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 129–130.) 
2.  Jury Instructions on the Degree of Murder and on 
Motive  
Defendant contends that the trial court’s instructions to 
the jury on doubt as to the degree of murder (CALJIC No. 8.71), 
unanimity as to first or second degree murder (CALJIC 
No. 8.74), and motive (CALJIC No. 2.51) were flawed and 
diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof.  CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.74, she contends, were confusing and ambiguous regarding the 
degree of murder, and CALJIC No. 2.51 permitted the jury to 
find guilt based on motive alone and also placed a burden of 
proving innocence on the defense.  Defendant argues that these 
instructional errors require reversal of her death judgment.   
As an initial matter, the Attorney General contends 
defendant has forfeited these issues by failing to object to the 
challenged instructions at trial.  We agree in part.  In general, a 
defendant may raise for the first time on appeal instructional 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
88 
error affecting his or her substantial rights.  (Pen. Code, § 1259; 
People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 103, fn. 34.)  
But “[a] party may not argue on appeal that an instruction 
correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed 
clarification, without first requesting such clarification at trial.”  
(People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503.)  Here, 
defendant’s claim that CALJIC No. 2.51 improperly permitted 
the jury to find her guilty based on evidence of motive alone is 
forfeited because, at bottom, it is an argument that the 
instruction was incomplete.  Defendant was obligated to request 
a clarifying instruction and failed to do so, thereby forfeiting her 
appellate challenge.  (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1134.)  Her 
other claims, asserting the instructions were incorrect, are 
reviewable despite the lack of an objection below.  (People v. 
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 375, fn. 13.)  In any event, all 
of the claims fail on the merits. 
a.  CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.74 
Since defendant’s trial, we have twice addressed 
troublesome language in the 1996 revised version of CALJIC 
No. 8.71 given in this case.  (People v. Salazar (2016) 
63 Cal.4th 214, 246–248 (Salazar); People v. Moore (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 386, 410–411 (Moore).)  As given here, the instruction 
told the jury, “If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
and unanimously agree that the crime of murder has been 
committed by a defendant, but you unanimously agree that you 
have a reasonable doubt whether the murder was of the first or 
of the second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of 
that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
89 
second degree.”27  As we have acknowledged, the references to 
unanimity in this instruction are potentially confusing in light 
of their apparent contradiction of other instructions that 
correctly inform the jury that it must unanimously acquit the 
defendant of the greater offense before it may render a verdict 
on a lesser included offense.  We have concluded, however, that 
in light of the totality of the instructions there is no reasonable 
likelihood any confusion created by CALJIC No. 8.71 could be 
detrimental to the defendant.  “If anything, [this instruction] 
skewed the deliberations in [defendant’s] favor.  [It] could 
reasonably be understood to tell the jurors that if they all agreed 
there was reasonable doubt as to the degree of the crime, 
because some jurors were not convinced, then defendant was 
entitled to the benefit of the doubt and a verdict of the lesser 
offense.”  (Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 247.)  We reach the 
same conclusion in this case. 
Like the defendants in Moore and Salazar, defendant also 
argues that CALJIC No. 8.71 could have misled some jurors into 
believing they were foreclosed from giving her the “benefit of the 
doubt” if other jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that she was guilty of first degree murder.  The unconvinced 
jurors, defendant argues, would conclude from the unanimity 
language in the instruction that they could not give her the 
benefit of the doubt because not all jurors were unsure of the 
degree of the murder, and therefore the jurors with a doubt 
would be required to vote for first degree murder.  This 
argument also fails.  As we explained in Salazar, “No logical 
                                        
27  
The trial court did not give the jury the concluding 
bracketed portion of the pattern instruction, which read “as well 
as a verdict of not guilty of murder in the first degree.”   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
90 
reading of the instructions leads to a compelled verdict of first 
degree murder.”  (Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 247.) 
Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, as we must 
(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192), we conclude the 
jurors would have understood that they must be individually 
convinced of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before 
convicting her of first degree murder.  (See CALJIC Nos. 8.74 
[requiring a jury to unanimously agree on the degree of murder 
before returning a murder verdict]; 17.40 [requiring a juror to 
make an individual decision and not decide a question by merely 
following the majority vote]; 17.43 [directing the jury to address 
any question during deliberation to the trial court]; and 8.30 
[instructing the jury that unpremeditated second degree murder 
was an intentional unlawful killing with malice aforethought 
“but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and 
premeditation”].)  Any jurors who might personally have been 
persuaded to give defendant the benefit of the doubt regarding 
the degree of murder when other jurors had concluded she was 
guilty of first degree murder would have understood that they 
could not properly vote to convict her of first degree murder 
because, in their view, the prosecution had not proven her guilt 
of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See also People v. 
Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1262–1263 [instruction 
nearly identical to CALJIC No. 2.02, which was given in this 
case, provided adequate benefit-of-the-doubt instruction under 
People v. Dewberry (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557]; People v. 
Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 55 [despite the trial court’s failure to 
give CALJIC No. 8.71, in light of the giving of CALJIC Nos. 8.79 
and 17.10, among others, the jury was adequately instructed on 
the Dewberry benefit-of-the-doubt principle].)  In the scenario 
defendant envisions, a jury’s reasonable understanding of the 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
91 
instructions as a whole would result in a hung jury, not a 
directed verdict for first degree murder, as she appears to argue. 
Defendant lastly contends that CALJIC No. 8.74, which 
told the jury it “must agree unanimously as to whether she is 
guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second 
degree” before returning a verdict, was flawed because it did not 
clarify the confusion caused by giving CALJIC No. 8.71, nor did 
it mention the requirement to find the degree of murder beyond 
a reasonable doubt.28  As a result, she argues, CALJIC No. 8.74 
diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof.  We disagree.  As we 
have explained, CALJIC No. 8.71 is a benefit-of-the-doubt 
instruction concerning the role of the juror’s individual 
judgment in deciding between first and second degree murder.  
(Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 411.)  CALJIC No. 8.74 properly 
instructed the jurors on returning a verdict.  Specifically, the 
instruction correctly informed the jurors that if they 
unanimously found defendant guilty of murder, they had to 
unanimously agree on the degree of the murder before returning 
a verdict. 
Nothing 
in 
CALJIC 
No. 8.74 
contradicted 
other 
instructions clarifying the requirement that the jurors 
determine whether the prosecution proved defendant’s guilt of 
first degree or second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Jurors were instructed that the presumption of innocence places 
on the prosecutor “the burden of proving [defendant] guilty 
                                        
28  
CALJIC No. 8.74, as given in its entirety, provided:  
“Before you may return a verdict in this case, you must agree 
unanimously not only as to whether the defendant is guilty or 
not guilty, but also, if you should find her guilty of an unlawful 
killing, you must agree unanimously as to whether she is guilty 
of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree.”   
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
92 
beyond a reasonable doubt” (CALJIC No. 2.90) of “the crime of 
murder” (CALJIC No. 8.10).  CALJIC No. 8.70 instructed the 
jury that if it found defendant guilty of murder, it had to decide 
whether the murder was “of the first or second degree.”  The 
jurors were instructed on the elements of first degree murder 
(CALJIC Nos. 8.11, 8.20) and second degree murder (CALJIC 
Nos. 8.30, 8.31).  Finally, the jurors were instructed under 
CALJIC No. 2.01 (sufficiency of circumstantial evidence) that 
each fact on which an inference of guilt rests must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  We presume jurors understand and 
follow the instructions they are given, including the written 
instructions.  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 803.)  There is no 
likelihood the jurors misinterpreted the instructions concerning 
the prosecutor’s burden of proving first degree or second degree 
murder in a manner that violated defendant’s constitutional 
rights.   
b.  CALJIC No. 2.51 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s instruction on 
motive under CALJIC No. 2.5129 improperly allowed the jury to 
find her guilty based on motive alone and shifted to her the 
burden of proving an absence of motive in order to establish her 
innocence, thereby undermining the prosecution’s burden of 
proof.  We have previously rejected these claims (People v. Letner 
and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 191), and defendant provides no 
persuasive reason to revisit that conclusion. 
                                        
29  
CALJIC No. 2.51 states:  “Motive is not an element of the 
crime charged and need not be shown.  However, you may 
consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case.  
Presence of motive may tend to establish the defendant is guilty.  
Absence of motive may tend to show the defendant is not guilty.” 
PEOPLE v. BUENROSTRO 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
93 
3.  Superfluous Multiple-Murder Special-
Circumstance Findings  
Citing People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 422, 
defendant correctly notes that two of the three multiple-murder 
special-circumstance allegations were erroneously charged and 
found true in this case.  “In numerous cases involving the same 
kind of error, we have stricken the superfluous finding[s] and 
concluded the defendant suffered no prejudice.  [Citations.]”  
(Ibid.)  We do so again in this case.   
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
Defendant raises several claims of error at the penalty 
trial.  Because we conclude the penalty judgment must be 
reversed for Witherspoon/Witt error, we do not address these 
claims.  (See Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 839.)   
IV.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment as to guilt, vacate two of the three 
multiple-murder special-circumstance findings, reverse the 
judgment as to the sentence of death, and remand the matter 
for a new penalty determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
MAURO, J.*
                                        
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Buenrostro 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S073823 
Date Filed: December 3, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Patrick F. Magers 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Nina Rivkind, Nina 
Wilder and Arcelia Hurtado, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Annie Featherman Fraser, 
Felicity Senoski and Michael T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Nina Wilder 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607-4139 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Michael T. Murphy 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9211