Title: MARRIAGE OF KARTES

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-415 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 LAURA MAY BRUNTON KARTES, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . THEODORE C. KARTES, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin Honorable W . W . Lessley, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana Charles Moses argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Goetz and Madden, Bozeman, Montana James Goetz argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: September 22, 1981 Decided : fiN 2 i 1981 Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an a c t i o n based on t h r e e a l l e g e d agreements, one w r i t t e n and two o r a l , between a husband and w i f e . The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e w r i t t e n agreement and a re- l a t e d o r a l agreement were e n f o r c e a b l e a g a i n s t t h e husband by h i s w i f e ; a l l c l a i m s r e l a t i n g t o t h e t h i r d o r a l agreement were d i s m i s s e d . Both p a r t i e s a p p e a l . Laura May Brunton married Theodore K a r t e s on J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1973. They e n t e r e d i n t o a p r e n u p t i a l agreement which provided t h a t t h e r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of each would remain s e p a r a t e . I n 1974 Theodore K a r t e s brought s u i t a g a i n s t h i s two s i s t e r s f o r t i t l e t o 320 a c r e s of land i n G a l l a t i n County, Montana. He had h i r e d an a t t o r n e y who e s t i m a t e d t h a t h i s f e e s f o r t h e a c t i o n would range from $5,000 t o $7,500. Theodore and Laura Kartes d i s c u s s e d p r i v a t e l y how they would f i n a n c e t h e l e g a l expenses. A handwr i t t e n agreement was executed by them on September 18, 1974, i n which Laura K a r t e s agreed t o pay t h e l e g a l f e e s of Theodore K a r t e s ' q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n and i n exchange Theodore K a r t e s would g i v e t o Laura K a r t e s 10% of h i s 320 a c r e s or t h e v a l u e t h e r e o f . Theodore K a r t e s was s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court l e v e l . Laura K a r t e s p a i d her husband's l e g a l f e e s amounting t o $8,627.86. T h e o d o r e K a r t e s ' s i s t e r s a p p e a l e d t h e d e c i s i o n . Laura R a r t e s c l a i m s t h a t a t t h i s t i m e , J u l y 20, 1976, Theodore K a r t e s agreed t o convey an a d d i t i o n a l 10% of t h e 320 a c r e s i f she f i n a n c e d t h e a p p e a l . Theodore Kar t e s d e n i e s t h a t he made t h i s o r a l agreement. Theodore K a r t e s ' q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n was s u c c e s s f u l on appeal and, a g a i n , Laura K a r t e s p a i d her husband's l e g a l f e e s amounting t o $7,049.79. Theodore K a r t e s has taken no a c t i o n t o convey t o Laura K a r t e s any p o r t i o n of t h e 320 a c r e s or any v a l u e t h e r e o f . Laura K a r t e s c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e was a t h i r d agreement between h e r s e l f and her husband. She c l a i m s t h a t i n J a n u a r y 1973, s h e agreed t o advance funds t o h e r husband f o r t h e i r l i v i n g expenses and t h a t he would repay her e x p e n d i t u r e s . She is c l a i m i n g repayment of $143,457.53. Theodore K a r t e s d e n i e s making such an agreement t o reimburse h i s w i f e f o r t h e i r j o i n t l i v i n g expenses. Theodore K a r t e s does admit t h a t he e n t e r e d i n t o a l i m i t e d agreement t o repay h i s wife f o r money s h e advanced him f o r l i v i n g and ranch expenses. H e c l a i m s t h a t t h e f u l l amount of t h e money advanced by h i s w i f e is evidenced by t h r e e promissory n o t e s amounting t o approximately $4,800. Laura K a r t e s c l a i m s , however, t h a t t h e c h a t t e l mortgage executed a t t h e same t i m e a s t h e n o t e s , i n d i c a t e s t h a t her husband owed her a t o t a l of $20,123, and t h a t t h e promissory n o t e s were o n l y a p a r t of t h e o b l i g a t i o n owed t o h e r . A t t r i a l , L a u r a K a r t e s s u b m i t t e d v o l u m i n o u s a c c o u n t i n g s of her expenses s i n c e 1973, i n c l u d i n g a l l of her l i v i n g expenses, some of her b u s i n e s s expenses, and some expenses f o r t h e s u p p o r t of her son. She admitted a t t h e t r i a l t h a t some of t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s were i n e r r o r and t h a t some of t h e expenses should n o t have been included i n t h e a c c o u n t i n g s . On A p r i l 10, 1980, a t r i a l was h e l d w i t h o u t a j u r y . The District Court held that the written agreement for 10% of Theodore Kartes' ranch and the oral agreement for an additional 10% were enforceable against Theodore Kartes. The District Court ordered that Theodore Kartes pay Laura Kartes 20% of the value of the ranch and that the value be determined at the time he elected to pay her and based upon 20% of the value of the whole ranch. The District Court dismissed all of Laura Kartes' claims relating to the oral agreement for living expenses and found that the promissory notes from Theodore Kartes to Laura Kartes had been repaid in full. Both parties appeal. Under Rule 29(d), M.R.Civ.P., the parties agree that Laura Kartes is the appellant and Theodore Kartes is the respondent. We affirm the District Court's holding that Theodore Kartes owes Laura Kartes 20% of his land and affirm the dismissal of Laura Kartes' claim for living expenses. We reverse the District Court's interpretation of the enforceable contracts to the extent that Theodore Kartes must pay 20% of the value of his land as a whole. We recognize that Theordore Kartes has the option to transfer whichever acreage he chooses, or the value thereof determined at the time of transfer. Essentially three issues have been raised by the par ties: 1. Whether the District Court erred in its interpretation of the written agreement? 2. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the District Court's finding of an oral agreement for an additional 10% of Theodore Kartes' land; if so, is the agreement nevertheless barred by the statute of frauds? 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by d i s m i s s i n g a l l of Laura K a r t e s ' c l a i m s f o r l i v i n g expenses? Respondent, Theodore K a r t e s , admits t h a t under t h e w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t he h a s an o b l i g a t i o n t o c o n v e y t o a p p e l l a n t 10% of h i s ranch or t h e v a l u e t h e r e o f . H e c l a i m s , however, t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by o r d e r i n g t h a t he m u s t convey 10% of t h e v a l u e of h i s land a s a whole i n an amount d e t e r m i n e d a t t h e t i m e he makes t h e t r a n s f e r . Respondent contends t h a t t h e second paragraph of t h e w r i t t e n agreement g r a n t s h i m t h e o p t i o n t o pay i n money o r l a n d and g r a n t s him t h e s o l e d i s c r e t i o n t o choose which t h i r t y - t w o a c r e s t o t r a n s f e r . T h i s c o n t e n t i o n of respondent is well-taken. The second paragraph of t h e w r i t t e n agreement p r o v i d e s : ". . D e s c r i p t i o n a s t o what m e t e s and bounds t o be e s t a b l i s h e d w i l l be done by Ted - - - - - C . K a r t e s o r money t o b e E a i d i n h a n d t o - ------ -------------- Laura May Brunton by Mortgage t o F e d e r a l Land Bank i n t h e amount s o s t a t e d above." (Empha- sis s u p p l i e d . ) The D i s t r i c t Court i t s e l f observed a t t r i a l t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had t h e o p t i o n t o s e l e c t t h i r t y - t w o a c r e s wherever he wanted. A p p e l l a n t h a s admitted t h a t t h e r e was no q u e s t i o n about r e s p o n d e n t ' s r i g h t t o choose what l a n d t o convey. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court awarded damages t o a p p e l l a n t i n an amount of 10% of t h e p r o p e r t y t a k e n a s a whole. A s t h i s Court h a s h e l d many t i m e s , where t h e language of a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t is c l e a r and unambiguous, t h e r e is nothing t o c o n s t r u e ; t h e d u t y of t h e c o u r t is simply t o apply t h e language a s w r i t t e n t o t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e . Danielson v. Danielson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 55, 560 P.2d 893, 894, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . See s e c t i o n 1-4-101, MCA. F u r t h e r , i f an e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t h a s been e n t e r e d l n t o by t h e p a r t i e s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court cannot a l t e r t h e terms of t h e e x p r e s s a g r e e m e n t . S e e McNulty v . Bewley C o r p o r a t i o n (1979) - Mont . , 596 P.2d 474, 36 St.Rep. 1110, c i t i n g K e i t h v . K o t t a s ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 98, 172 P.2d 306. L a s t l y , it is r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o i n s e r t i n t o a c o n t r a c t language n o t p u t t h e r e by t h e p a r t i e s . H e r r i n v. H e r r i n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 595 P.2d 1152, 36 St.Kep. 193. Here, t h e w r i t t e n agreement is c l e a r t h a t respondent has t h e o p t i o n t o choose which p r o p e r t y t o convey. The D i s t r i c t Court may n o t d i s r e g a r d t h i s e x p l i c i t language of t h e c o n t r a c t by o r d e r i n g respondent t o convey 10% of t h e v a l u e of h i s l a n d a s a whole. Respondent a l s o c l a i m s t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s was t h a t t h e l a n d would be valued a t t h e t i m e of t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e agreement i n 1974. S i n c e no c o n t r a c t language a d d r e s s e s t h i s q u e s t i o n , it was t h e d u t y of t h e c o u r t t o d i s c e r n t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s from t h e i r testimony. The D i s t r i c t Court chose t o b e l i e v e a p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e p a r t i e s intended t o value t h e p r o p e r t y a t t h e time of r e s p o n d e n t ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . The c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s and t h e weight t o be g i v e n t h e i r testimony a r e m a t t e r s e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n a nonjury c a s e . H a r r i s v. H a r r i s ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 616 P.2d 1099, 1102, 3 7 St.Rep. 1696, 1699. W e must t h e r e f o r e uphold t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t t h a t t h e v a l u e of t h e land is t o be determined a t t h e time of r e s p o n d e n t ' s performance. On t n e grounds s t a t e d above, however, we must r e v e r s e t h e District Court's order to the extent it requires respondent to pay 10% of the value of the land taken as a whole, and we recognize respondent's right under the written agreement to transfer any thirty-two acres of his land or value thereof. In the second issue, respondent contends that there is not substantial evidence to support the District Court's finding of an oral agreement for an additional 10% of respondent's land. Even assuming that suck an agreement existed, respondent claims that it is barred by the statute of frauds and i s against public policy. As mentioned earlier, the credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence are matters for determination by the District Court in a nonjury case. The rules governing claims of insufficient evidence are well-established. These rules were set down recently in Harris where we addressed a claim similar to that of respondent: "It is the petitioner's position that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that an oral agreement existed between the parties. In the resolution of this issue, we are guided by a number of well-established principles adhered to by this Court. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters which are exclusively the province of the District Court in a nonjury case. Corscadden v. Kenney (1977), 175 Mont. 98, 572 P.2d 1234. In examining the sufficiency of the evidence we review the same in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we further presume the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the District Court to be correct. Rock Springs Corp. v. Pierre (1980), - Mont . , 615 P.2d 206, 37 St.Rep. 1378, - 1384. only if our review discloses a decided reEonderance of evidence c o n t r a 9 to the E- - --- - - - - - - - findings and conclusions of the District ..................... Court, will --- we disturb the judgment of the District Court. Morqan and Oswood Const. Co. v. Big Sky of ~ o n t a n a (1976), 171 Mont. 268, 275, 557 P.2d 1017, 1021." 616 P.2d at 1102. (Emphasis supplied.) 'The record does not disclose a preponderance of the evidence contrary to the District Court's finding that the oral agreement for an additional 10% of respondent's land existed. The District Court's finding must therefore stand. Respondent contends also that even if one assumes that the parties made such an oral agreement, it is barred by the statute of frauds, as provided in section 28-2-903, MCA. He claims that it is an agreement which by its terms cannot be performed within one year (section 28-2-903(a), MCA), and is an agreement for the sale of real property (section 28-2-903(d), MCA). The District Court accepted appellant's position that the statute of frauds does not bar the oral agreement because appellant fully performed her part of the bargain. See section 30-11-111, MCA. Respondent testified that he believed the written agreement for 10% of his land was to cover the costs of appeal as well as costs at the District Court level. According to respondent, then, appellant's payment of the costs on appeal can be reasonably explained on these grounds as her performance of the written agreement. The District Court did not find that the written agreement covered legal costs for appeal. The record does not disclose any evidence other than respondent' s testimony to support his contention. Since the District Court is in the best position to view witness testimony and decide credibility, and since the record does not disclose a preponderance of the evidence contrary to its findings, respondent's contentions of error here lack merit. Since the District Court found that the oral agreement for an additional 10% of Theodore Kartes' land contained the same terms as the written agreement, and there is evidence t o s u p p o r t t h i s f i n d i n g , Theodore K a r t e s must s e l e c t another t h i r t y - t w o a c r e s t o t r a n s f e r t o h i s w i f e o r pay t h e e q u i v a l e n t v a l u e determined a t t h e time of payment. I n t h e l a s t i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by d i s m i s s i n g a l l of her c l a i m s f o r l i v i n g expenses. The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e promissory n o t e s given by respondent t o a p p e l l a n t f o r h i s ranch and l i v i n g expenses had been p a i d and t h a t any expenses a c c r u i n g p r i o r t o A p r i l 25, 1973, were b a r r e d by t h e five-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a s provided i n s e c t i o n 27-2-202(2), MCA. The D i s t r i c t Court concluded a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t a l l of t h e evidence submitted by a p p e l l a n t under her c l a i m f o r l i v i n g expenses was " s p e c u l a t i v e , u n c l e a r , f i l l e d with e r r o r s i n c a l c u l a t i o n s [ a n d ] f i l l e d w i t h many i t e m s a d m i t t e d on cross-examination a s being improperly i n c l u d e d , " and t h e evidence t h e r e f o r e should be d i s a l l o w e d i n i t s e n t i r e t y . Appellant cannot e x p e c t t o , i n e s s e n c e , have a l l h e r a c c o u n t s a t t h e c o u r t and t r a n s f e r t h e burden of proof t o t h e respondent t o prove what evidence is n o t e n t i t l e d t o be a d m i t t e d . The g e n e r a l accepted procedure is f o r t h e moving p a r t y t o l a y a f o u n d a t i o n f o r each a c c e p t a b l e account and t h e n have t h e a d v e r s e p a r t y proceed w i t h i t s c h a l l e n g e , i f any. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s a l l o w a n c e of a p p e l l a n t ' s evidence f o r l i v i n g expenses was p r o p e r . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t b e c a u s e t h e r e was no s u b s t a n t i a l evidence c h a l l e n g i n g a m a j o r i t y of her l i v i n g expenses, a simple c h a l l e n g e t o some should n o t p r e v e n t recovery on t h e balance of proper e v i d e n c e . Appellant h a s t w i s t e d t h e meaning of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence r u l e . The rule means only that an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's conclusions if there is substantial evidence on the record to support its findings. See Barrett v. Ballard (1980), - Mont . , 622 P.2d 180, 185, 37 St.Rep. 2038, 2042-2043. Therefore, tne judgment of the District Court is affirmed in the following matters: (I) respondent owes appellant 10% of his 320 acres under the written agreement between the parties; (2) respondent owes appellant an additional 10% of his 320 acres as provided in the oral agreement between them; and (3) appellant's claims for living expenses are dismissed. The judgment of the District Court is reversed wherein it requires respondent pay 20% of the value of his land as a whole. Respondent may choose which sixty-four acres to convey, or he may pay the value of those sixty-four acres as determined at the time of payment. - Justice We concur: , , 8' Ldl- ; Z - , & I d w i Justices