Title: PEOPLE OF MI V LEONARD LEPPEL JACKSON

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

FILED SEPTEMBER 7, 2010 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 138988
 
LEONARD LEPPEL JACKSON, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except DAVIS, J.) 
 
HATHAWAY, J.  
We heard oral argument on whether to grant defendant’s application for leave to 
appeal.  At issue is whether defendant is entitled to resentencing for an armed-robbery 
conviction when the Court of Appeals vacated his concurrent convictions for felonious 
assault that had been used as a factor in calculating his sentence for armed robbery.  
Court of Appeals remands for resentencing are governed by MCL 769.34, which requires 
that cases be remanded when the sentence is based on inaccurate information.  We 
conclude that defendant is entitled to resentencing because defendant’s sentence is now 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Alton Thomas Davis 
 
 
 
 
2
based on inaccurate information.  We further conclude that because defendant requested a 
remand for resentencing as part of his appeal to vacate the felonious-assault convictions, 
he complied with the requirement of MCL 769.34(10), which mandates that a request for 
remand be made in a proper motion filed in the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by failing to remand for resentencing.  In 
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision 
that concluded that the Court could not remand for resentencing.  We therefore vacate 
defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On the evening of January 12, 2007, Sherry Taylor was leaving a store with her 
two young children.  As she was helping her children into her car, she noticed a man, 
who was later identified as defendant, running toward her.  Taylor claimed that defendant 
approached her, pointed a gun at her children, and threatened to shoot them unless Taylor 
gave him all her money.  Taylor gave defendant $120 and some other items, and then 
defendant ran away.  He was apprehended several months later when Taylor happened to 
recognize him in public and called the police.  The gun that Taylor claimed to have seen 
was never recovered. 
 
 
 
 
3
Defendant was charged with armed robbery,1 two counts of felonious assault,2 
felon in possession of a firearm,3 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony.4  At a bench trial, defendant was acquitted of the charges of felon in possession of 
a firearm and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after the court 
determined that the prosecution had failed to prove defendant actually had a gun when he 
demanded Taylor’s money.  Defendant was convicted of armed robbery.  Additionally, 
despite the lack of proof that defendant had a weapon, defendant was also convicted of 
two counts of felonious assault.   
During the calculation of defendant’s recommended minimum sentence range for 
armed robbery under the sentencing guidelines, defendant was assessed 20 points under 
prior record variable 7 (PRV 7) as a result of the two felonious-assault convictions.5  
Consequently, his minimum sentence range was 108 to 270 months.  Had defendant not 
been assessed 20 points under PRV 7, his minimum sentence range would have been 81 
                                              
1 MCL 750.529. 
2 MCL 750.82. “‘The elements of felonious assault are (1) an assault, (2) with a 
dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable 
apprehension of an immediate battery.’”  People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 8; 742 
NW2d 610 (2007) (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
3 MCL 750.224f. 
4 MCL 750.227b. 
5 See MCL 777.57(1)(a) (stating that 20 points should be assessed if “[t]he 
offender has 2 or more subsequent or concurrent convictions”).   
 
 
4
to 202 months.6  The trial court stated its intention to sentence defendant at the lower end 
of the guidelines range and sentenced defendant as a third-offense habitual offender7 to 
concurrent prison terms of 108 to 240 months for armed robbery and 24 to 96 months for 
each felonious-assault conviction.   
Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals and argued that the trial court erred by 
convicting him of two counts of felonious assault while simultaneously finding that he 
did not have a gun during the commission of the armed robbery.  Defendant argued that 
felonious assault requires the prosecution prove that a dangerous weapon was used in the 
commission of the crime as an element of the crime, thus making the convictions 
inconsistent with the trial court’s factual findings.  As part of his appeal, defendant also 
requested that his case be remanded for resentencing on his armed-robbery conviction 
because of this error. 
The Court of Appeals agreed that it was error to convict defendant of felonious 
assault when defendant did not have a dangerous weapon at the time of the crime.  The 
Court opined that while an armed robbery can be committed without the use of a 
                                              
6 Our opinion only addresses defendant’s guidelines range with respect to the PRV 
7 assessed points, and not the two additional errors that were made in scoring offense 
variable (OV) 1 and OV 2, as discussed by the Court of Appeals, because defendant did 
not raise the two OV scoring errors in the appeal in this Court.  However, as recognized 
in the concurrence, defendant’s correct guidelines range with the two additional scoring 
errors removed is 51 to 127 months.  Nothing in this opinion precludes the trial court 
from reviewing and correcting the OV scoring errors, as found by the Court of Appeals, 
on remand for resentencing. 
7 MCL 769.11. 
 
 
5
dangerous weapon, a felonious assault cannot.8  In light of this error, the Court vacated 
defendant’s felonious-assault convictions.  However, the Court rejected defendant’s 
request for resentencing on the armed-robbery conviction, concluding that it was required 
by MCL 769.34(10) to affirm defendant’s sentence because the sentence remained 
“within the appropriate guidelines range” and defendant had not raised the issue “‘at 
sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand’ . . . .”9 
Defendant applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we heard oral argument on 
whether to grant the application or take other preemptory action.  At issue is whether 
defendant was entitled to resentencing under these circumstances.10 
 
 
 
                                              
8 People v Jackson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, 
issued March 26, 2009 (Docket No. 281380), pp 2-3, citing Chambers, 277 Mich App at 
9.   
9 Jackson, unpub op at 5, quoting MCL 769.34(10). 
 
10 People v Jackson, 485 Mich 968 (2009).  The order provided: 
We direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant 
the application or take other peremptory action.  MCR 7.302(H)(1). The 
parties shall submit supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this 
order addressing whether the defendant is entitled to resentencing, where 
the Court of Appeals vacated two of the defendant’s three convictions, 
resulting in a reduction of the guidelines sentence range, but where the 
defendant’s minimum sentence is within the corrected guidelines sentence 
range.  MCL 769.34(10); People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82 [711 NW2d 44] 
(2006).  The parties should avoid submitting a mere restatement of the 
arguments made in their application papers.  [Id. at 968-969.] 
 
 
6
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues in this case involve the proper interpretation and application of the 
statutory sentencing guidelines, which are both legal issues that this Court reviews de 
novo.11   
III.  ANALYSIS 
At issue in this case is whether defendant is entitled to resentencing for his armed-
robbery conviction when the Court of Appeals vacated his concurrent convictions for 
felonious assault that were used as a factor in calculating the sentence for armed robbery.  
The Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s felonious-assault convictions; however, the 
Court refused to remand the case for resentencing, concluding:  
Although we conclude that these variables [PRV 7, OV 1, and OV 2] 
were improperly scored, as discussed below, we must affirm defendant’s 
sentence because it “is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range” 
and defendant failed to raise this issue “at sentencing, in a proper motion 
for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand” filed with this Court.[12] 
 
The Court of Appeals focused on two specific provisions within MCL 769.34(10): 
whether the sentence was “within the appropriate guidelines” range and whether 
defendant raised the issue “at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a 
                                              
11 In re Investigation of March 1999 Riots in East Lansing, 463 Mich 378, 383; 
617 NW2d 310 (2000); People v Morson, 471 Mich 248, 255; 685 NW2d 203 (2004). 
12 Jackson, unpub op at 4, quoting MCL 769.34(10). 
 
 
7
proper motion to remand . . . .”  Thus, the proper interpretation of MCL 769.34(10) 
governs the result in this case.13   
 
In interpreting statutes, we follow established rules of statutory construction.  
Assuming that the Legislature has acted within its constitutional authority, the purpose of 
statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.14  
Accordingly, the Court must interpret the language of a statute in a manner that is 
consistent with the legislative intent.15  In determining the legislative intent, we must first 
look to the actual language of the statute.16  As far as possible, effect should be given to 
every phrase, clause, and word in the statute.17  Moreover, the statutory language must be 
read and understood in its grammatical context.18  When considering the correct 
interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole.19  Individual words and phrases, while 
important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme.20  In defining 
                                              
13 We recently addressed the proper application of MCL 769.34(10) in People v 
Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006); however, the case before us presents 
additional issues not addressed in Francisco. 
14 Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397, 411; 774 NW2d 1 (2009), citing Sun Valley 
Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). 
15 Potter, 484 Mich at 410-411.  
16 Id. at 410. 
17 Sun Valley, 460 Mich at 237. 
18 Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570 (2008). 
19 Sun Valley, 460 Mich at 237. 
20 Herman, 481 Mich at 366. 
 
 
8
particular words within a statute, we must consider both the plain meaning of the critical 
word or phrase and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.21   
MCL 769.34(10) specifically governs remands for resentencing.  This subsection 
provides:   
If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence 
range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand 
for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or 
inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant's sentence.  
A party shall not raise on appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the 
sentencing guidelines or challenging the accuracy of information relied 
upon in determining a sentence that is within the appropriate guidelines 
sentence range unless the party has raised the issue at sentencing, in a 
proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in 
the court of appeals.  [Emphasis added.]   
A 
We first review whether a remand for resentencing was barred because 
defendant’s minimum sentence was within the appropriate guidelines range.  The first 
sentence of MCL 769.34(10) governs when the Court shall or shall not remand for 
resentencing: “If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, 
the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing 
absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied 
upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.”  (Emphasis added.)  The clear meaning of 
this sentence is that the Court shall not remand for resentencing unless there was either an 
error in scoring or defendant’s sentence was based on inaccurate information.22  
                                              
21 Id.   
22 See Francisco, 474 Mich at 88-89. 
 
 
9
Conversely, this means that the Court is required to remand whenever one of these two 
circumstances is present.23  Thus, the Court may not ignore the two criteria for when a 
case should be remanded merely because the sentence is within the appropriate guidelines 
range.  When the defendant’s sentence is based on an error in scoring or based on 
inaccurate information, a remand for resentencing is required.24   
In this case, the trial court had assessed points for convictions that were vacated on 
appeal.  Before the felonious-assault convictions were vacated, defendant was assessed 
20 points under PRV 7 for his armed-robbery conviction because the felonious assaults 
were concurrent convictions.  Consequently, his minimum sentence range for the armed 
robbery was 108 to 270 months.  Had defendant been correctly assessed zero points 
instead of 20 under PRV 7, his minimum sentence range would have been 81 to 202 
months.  Thus, assessing defendant 20 points under PRV 7 resulted in a sentence based 
on inaccurate information.  Because the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 
769.34(10) requires a remand for resentencing when the sentence is based on inaccurate 
information, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that it was barred from remanding 
the case for resentencing based on the plain language of the statute. 
Moreover, this is the same analysis and conclusion that we arrived at in People v 
Francisco.  In Francisco, this Court held that a defendant is entitled to resentencing when 
                                              
23 See id. at 90-91. 
24 We emphasize that this does not mean that the trial court is required to change 
the sentence on remand.  See id. at 91.  However, a remand to the trial court is required in 
these circumstances so that the issue of resentencing can be considered by the trial court 
in light of the new information. 
 
 
10
the trial court erred in scoring an offense variable, and the error affected the statutory 
sentencing guidelines range.  The trial court had sentenced the defendant to a minimum 
of 102 months imprisonment under the mistaken belief that the proper guidelines range 
was 87 to 217 months, when the correct range was actually 78 to 195 months.25  
Although the defendant’s minimum sentence was still within the guidelines range, we 
held that a remand for resentencing was required26 because the statutory phrase at issue—
“absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied 
upon in determining the defendant’s sentence”—“makes clear that the Legislature 
intended to have defendants sentenced according to accurately scored guidelines and in 
reliance on accurate information . . . .”27  As a result, we held that when “appellate 
correction of an erroneously calculated guidelines range” results in a sentence that 
“stands differently in relationship to the correct guidelines range,” a defendant is “entitled 
to be resentenced.”28  As we stated in Francisco, this interpretation of MCL 769.34(10) is 
consistent with the clearly expressed legislative intent and prior case law:  
MCL 769.34(10) makes clear that the Legislature intended to have 
defendants sentenced according to accurately scored guidelines and in 
reliance on accurate information (although this Court might have presumed 
the same even absent such express language).  Moreover, we have held that 
“a sentence is invalid if it is based on inaccurate information.”  People v 
Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997).  In this case, there was a 
                                              
25 Francisco, 474 Mich at 91. 
26 Id. at 92. 
27 Id. at 89. 
28 Id. at 91-92. 
 
 
11
scoring error, the scoring error altered the appropriate guidelines range, and 
defendant preserved the issue at sentencing.  It would be in derogation of 
the law, and fundamentally unfair, to deny a defendant in the instant 
circumstance the opportunity to be resentenced on the basis of accurate 
information.  A defendant is entitled to be sentenced in accord with the law, 
and is entitled to be sentenced by a judge who is acting in conformity with 
such law.[29]  
In the present case defendant’s sentence was based on inaccurate information, and 
he is entitled to resentencing.30  Accordingly, we conclude that that the Court of Appeals 
erred by holding that it was barred from remanding for resentencing because the 
minimum sentence was within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range.   
                                              
29 Id. at 89-91. 
30 We note that the trial court in this case stated that it intended to sentence 
defendant at the lower end of the guidelines range and that defendant’s minimum 
sentence for armed robbery is no longer at that lower end as a result of the scoring 
adjustment.  While such an expression of intent is not outcome determinative for 
purposes of deciding whether resentencing should occur, it indeed illustrates one of the 
several reasons why fairness dictates this result.  As we stated in Francisco, 
[w]hile the difference between the mistaken and the correct guidelines 
ranges is relatively small, the fundamental problem nonetheless is 
illustrated.  The actual sentence suggests an intention by the trial court to 
sentence defendant near the bottom of the appropriate guidelines range—
specifically, fifteen months or 17 percent above the 87-month minimum.  
Had the trial court been acting on the basis of the correct guidelines range, 
however, we simply do not know whether it would have been prepared to 
sentence defendant to a term 24 months or 30 percent above the new 78-
month minimum.  Indeed, appellate correction of an erroneously calculated 
guidelines range will always present this dilemma, i.e., the defendant will 
have been given a sentence which stands differently in relationship to the 
correct guidelines range than may have been the trial court's intention.  
Thus, requiring resentencing in such circumstances not only respects the 
defendant’s right to be sentenced on the basis of the law, but it also respects 
the trial court’s interest in having defendant serve the sentence that it truly 
intends.  [Id. at 91-92.] 
 
 
12
B 
We next consider whether defendant was barred from requesting resentencing by 
the second sentence of MCL 769.34(10), which states:   
A party shall not raise on appeal an issue challenging the scoring of 
the sentencing guidelines or challenging the accuracy of information relied 
upon in determining a sentence that is within the appropriate guidelines 
sentence range unless the party has raised the issue at sentencing, in a 
proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in 
the court of appeals.  [Emphasis added.]   
The prosecution argues that this language limits requests for resentencing to those made 
by one of three specific procedural processes: either at sentencing, in a proper motion for 
resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in the Court of Appeals.  The 
prosecution further argues that because defendant made his request for a remand for 
resentencing in his brief on appeal, rather than in a separate motion for remand in the 
Court of Appeals, the Court was precluded from granting his request.  The Court of 
Appeals agreed with this argument.  We, however, do not agree with such a narrow 
interpretation of this statute because this interpretation disregards the plain language of 
the statute and our court rules. 
The prosecution is correct that the statute limits the processes and timing of a 
request by a defendant to request resentencing.  According to the statute, there are two 
ways for the defendant to make this request at the trial court level: either by making the 
request at sentencing or in a proper motion for resentencing.  In cases on appeal, the 
request must be made in a proper motion to remand filed in the Court of Appeals.  In this 
case, we need not address whether defendant followed the procedures to request relief in 
 
 
13
the trial court for the scoring based on the felonious-assault convictions because either 
procedure would have been futile until such time as the Court of Appeals affirmed or 
reversed the felonious-assault convictions.  Nor would we expect a trial court to 
anticipate that its rulings might be found incorrect or force it to entertain such a motion.  
Accordingly, given the circumstances in this case, the only issue presented is whether 
defendant made a proper motion to remand in the Court of Appeals.   
To determine whether defendant complied with this section of the statute, we must 
first determine what constitutes a proper motion to remand in the Court of Appeals.  
What constitutes a proper motion in any court is not within the purview of the Legislature 
because defining the procedures for filing a motion presents a procedural issue.31  Nor 
will we assume that the Legislature intended to impose any particular method by which 
such a filing must be undertaken.  Accordingly, it is entirely within this Court’s purview 
to determine what constitutes a proper motion and what procedures and timing best suit 
our appellate courts practices.   
                                              
31 It is well established that the rules of procedure in judicial matters rest 
exclusively with the judiciary and this Court.  This rule-making authority can be traced 
from our earlier constitutions to its current form, which states: “The supreme court shall 
by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all 
courts of this state.  The distinctions between law and equity proceedings shall, as far as 
practicable, be abolished.  The office of master in chancery is prohibited.”  Const 1963, 
art 6, § 5.   
In Perin v Peuler (On Rehearing), 373 Mich 531, 541; 130 NW2d 4 (1964), 
overruled in part on other grounds by McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 32; 597 NW2d 
148 (1999), this Court opined that the “function of enacting and amending judicial rules 
of practice and procedure has been committed exclusively to this Court; a function with 
which the legislature may not meddle or interfere save as the Court may acquiesce and 
adopt for retention at judicial will.”  (Citations omitted.) 
 
 
14
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals failed to explain why it determined that a 
proper motion had not been filed.  We can only presume that the Court determined that 
the statute requires a separate motion be filed pursuant to MCR 7.211.  However, we do 
not agree because this rule does not provide grounds for a motion given the 
circumstances presented in this case.  MCR 7.211(C)(1) governs the general category of 
motions to remand in the Court of Appeals and provides: 
(a) Within the time provided for filing the appellant's brief, the 
appellant may move to remand to the trial court.  The motion must identify 
an issue sought to be reviewed on appeal and show:  
(i) that the issue is one that is of record and that must be initially 
decided by the trial court; or  
(ii) that development of a factual record is required for appellate 
consideration of the issue.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
In order to file a proper motion to remand under MCR 7.211(C)(1), a defendant 
must file the motion within the time provided for filing his brief on appeal, which could 
have been done by defendant.  However, the allowable grounds for maintaining such a 
motion are limited.  Under this rule, the motion must articulate that a remand is necessary 
because the issue is either (i) one that is “of record and . . . must be initially decided by 
the trial court” or (ii) one in which “development of a factual record is required for 
appellate consideration of the issue.”  MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(i) and (ii).  Subsection (i) 
clearly requires that remand be necessary because the underlying issue is one that the trial 
court must resolve before appellate adjudication.  Subsection (ii) clearly requires that 
remand be necessary because further factual development is needed before the case is 
ripe for appellate adjudication.  In this case, filing a motion under subsection (i) would 
 
 
15
not have been proper because the trial court could not have initially decided this issue.  
Filing a motion under subsection (ii) would also not have been proper because the issue 
was not one that required further factual development before the case was ripe for 
appellate review.  To the contrary, in this case, the issue was not ripe for remand to the 
trial court until the appellate court completed its review.  Thus, a proper motion to 
remand for resentencing could not have been filed under MCR 7.211(C)(1) because 
neither of these two grounds enumerated in the court rule applied to this circumstance.32  
We find that it would have been impossible for defendant to have filed a proper motion 
to remand in the Court of Appeals if we narrowly interpret the phrase a proper motion in 
MCL 769.34(10) to mean only a motion filed under 7.211(C)(1).   
We next examine what purpose is served by the requirement of a proper motion in 
order to determine if an adequate mechanism exists in our court rules to satisfy this 
statutory mandate.  The purpose of a motion is to request a court to rule on an issue on a 
timely basis when the issue is ripe for adjudication.  Given that defendant made his 
request as part of his brief on appeal, his request served this purpose.  It was presented on 
a timely basis and provided the Court of Appeals with all necessary information to make 
a decision.  The only possible defect in this process is that his request was not made in a 
                                              
32 This case presents unique circumstances.  Defendant is seeking a remand 
because his sentence for armed robbery is now based on inaccurate information.  
However, this sentence was not based on inaccurate information until the Court of 
Appeals determined that the felonious-assault convictions were erroneous.  The issue of a 
remand for resentencing was not ripe for adjudication until the Court of Appeals rendered 
its decision. 
 
 
16
separate pleading.  However, we cannot assume that the Legislature necessarily intended 
that a proper motion to remand be done in a separate filing.   
“Motion” is defined as a “written or oral application requesting a court to make a 
specified ruling or order.”33  “Application” is defined as a “request or petition.”34  Under 
this broad definition of a motion, a separate pleading was not required because defendant 
made a written request for the court “to make a specified ruling or order.”  Nothing 
further was required given these circumstances.  Requiring a defendant to file a separate 
pleading would necessitate a party to request review of an issue that is not ripe for 
review.  We conclude that when the request to remand will not be ripe for review until 
after the Court of Appeals has adjudicated the merits, the mandate of a proper motion in 
MCL 769.34(10) is met when a defendant makes a request to remand for resentencing 
with supporting grounds within his appellate brief. 
 
The Michigan Court Rules allow for this broad construction.  MCR 1.105 permits 
construction of the court rules “to secure the just, speedy, and economical determination 
of every action and to avoid the consequences of error that does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties.”  A just, speedy, and economical determination is served by not 
requiring that futile motions be filed, which only present issues to the court that are not 
yet ripe for review.  Further, our construction of the statute avoids the consequences of 
error that would result from imposing a dubious technical requirement that serves no 
                                              
33 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed). 
34 Id. 
 
 
17
purpose other than elevating form over substance.  Given that the prosecution had notice 
and the ability to present its counter arguments, no substantial right of the prosecution 
was impaired by imposing a broader construction of the statute.  
 
Moreover, “[i]t is difficult to imagine something more ‘inconsistent with 
substantial justice’ than requiring a defendant to serve a sentence that is based upon 
inaccurate information.”35  For these reasons, we decline to read MCL 769.34(10) as 
requiring that a defendant do the impossible in order to receive the relief that substantial 
justice requires.36  Clearly the circumstances before us mandate such a conclusion, and 
we accordingly hold that defendant filed a proper motion to remand in the Court of 
Appeals, as required by MCL 769.34(10). 
 
Finally, we decline to address defendant’s constitutional arguments, as we find it 
unnecessary to do so under these circumstances.  This Court has long held that courts 
should not grapple with finding a constitutional question when the case can be decided on 
other grounds.  Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 
507 NW2d 422 (1993); see also Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Auth, 297 US 288, 341, 
345-356; 56 S Ct 466; 80 L Ed 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States v 
                                              
35 Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 6.  Further, MCR 7.216(A)(7) allows the Court of 
Appeals to grant further or different relief as the case may require at any time on the 
terms it deems just.  Thus, the Court of Appeals has the discretion to remand for 
resentencing when it vacates a conviction as justice demands.   
36 See MCR 2.613(A) (stating that an error does not justify disturbing a judgment 
“unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice”); Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 6. 
 
 
18
Lovett, 328 US 303, 320; 66 S Ct 1073; 90 L Ed 1252 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).  Since the case before us can be decided on other grounds, we will not opine 
on the constitutional arguments presented. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We heard oral argument on whether to grant defendant’s application for leave to 
appeal.  At issue is whether defendant is entitled to resentencing for an armed-robbery 
conviction when the Court of Appeals vacated his concurrent convictions for felonious 
assault that were used as a factor in calculating his sentence for armed robbery.  Court of 
Appeals remands for resentencing are governed by MCL 769.34(10), which requires that 
cases be remanded when the sentence is based on inaccurate information.  We therefore 
conclude that defendant is entitled to resentencing because his sentence is now based on 
inaccurate information.  We further conclude that because defendant requested a remand 
for resentencing as part of his appeal to vacate the felonious-assault convictions, he 
complied with the requirement of MCL 769.34(10) that a request to remand be made in a 
proper motion filed in the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by failing to remand for resentencing, and 
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals in which it concluded that it could not remand for resentencing.  We therefore 
vacate defendant’s sentence and remand defendant’s case for resentencing. 
KELLY, C.J., and CAVANAGH and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with HATHAWAY, J. 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 138988
 
LEONARD LEPPEL JACKSON, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the majority’s result, but would decide this case on different grounds.  I 
would hold that defendant is entitled to resentencing because the Court of Appeals 
vacated for legal insufficiency his felonious assault convictions, which were used as a 
factor in calculating his sentence.  I do not believe that MCL 769.34(10) governs 
defendant’s entitlement to relief in this case when his request for resentencing is based on 
the Court of Appeals’ ruling, rather than any error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or 
inaccurate information relied on by the circuit court in determining his sentence.   
MCL 769.34(10) provides:  
If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence 
range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand 
for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or 
inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.  
A party shall not raise on appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the 
sentencing guidelines or challenging the accuracy of information relied 
upon in determining a sentence that is within the appropriate guidelines 
sentence range unless the party has raised the issue at sentencing, in a 
 
 
2
proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in the 
court of appeals. 
 
 
As the majority properly notes, the circuit court in this case assessed 20 points 
under prior record variable 7 (PRV 7)1 for the two felonious assault convictions that the 
Court of Appeals later vacated.2  The resulting minimum sentence range under the 
sentencing guidelines was 108 to 270 months.  Noting specifically that it was imposing a 
sentence at the lower end of the guidelines range, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 
a prison term of 108 to 240 months for the armed robbery conviction.  Without the two 
subsequently vacated felonious assault convictions, PRV 7 would have been scored at 
zero points, rather than 20 points.  Defendant also challenged the scoring of offense 
variable (OV) 1 (aggravated use of a weapon)3 and OV 2 (lethal potential of the weapon 
possessed or used)4 in the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals held that OV 1 should 
have been scored at 5 points instead of 15 points and that OV 2 should have been scored 
at zero points instead of 5 points.5  These corrections result in a corrected guidelines 
range of 51 to 127 months when adjusted for defendant’s third-offense habitual offender 
                                              
1 MCL 777.57(1)(a) provides that 20 points should be assessed if “[t]he offender 
has 2 or more subsequent or concurrent convictions[.]” 
2 The prosecution did not appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate the two 
felonious assault convictions. 
3 MCL 777.31(1). 
4 MCL 777.32(1). 
5 The prosecution did not appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision concerning OV 1 
and OV 2, nor did defendant address it in this Court.  
 
 
3
enhancement.6  Defendant’s minimum sentence of 108 months is within the corrected 
guidelines range of 51 to 127 months. 
The majority concludes that MCL 769.34(10), as interpreted in People v 
Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006),7 requires a remand for resentencing 
because defendant’s sentence “is now based on inaccurate information.”   
While I agree that defendant is entitled to resentencing, I respectfully disagree 
with the majority that MCL 769.34(10) governs under the circumstances of this appeal.  
Because defendant’s minimum sentence of 108 months is within the corrected guidelines 
range of 51 to 127 months, MCL 769.34(10), if applied here, would dictate that the Court 
of Appeals “shall affirm” defendant’s sentence and “shall not remand for resentencing 
absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon 
in determining the defendant's sentence.”  For purposes of this appeal, there is no claim 
of an “error in scoring the sentencing guidelines.”8  Thus, the relevant inquiry under 
                                              
6 The Court of Appeals incorrectly stated that the corrected guidelines range is 51 
to 127½ months. 
7 The majority in Francisco concluded that the defendant was entitled to 
resentencing under MCL 769.34(10) because although the defendant’s minimum 
sentence was within the appropriate guidelines sentencing range, a scoring error altered 
the appropriate guidelines range and the defendant had preserved the issue at sentencing.   
 
Francisco involved a claim of error in scoring the defendant’s guidelines 
sentencing range, a sentencing challenge that clearly falls under MCL 769.34(10).  For 
the reasons explained in this opinion, I would hold that MCL 769.34(10) does not apply 
here, where the Court of Appeals has vacated convictions used as a factor in defendant’s 
sentencing.  Accordingly, I do not believe that Francisco governs this case. 
8 As noted, the scoring of OV 1 and OV 2 was at issue in the Court of Appeals but 
has not been raised here. 
 
 
4
MCL 769.34(10) is whether the circuit court “relied upon” “inaccurate information . . . in 
determining the defendant’s sentence.”   
When interpreting statutes, “our primary task . . . is to discern and give effect to 
the intent of the Legislature.”  Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 
NW2d 119 (1999).  In interpreting a statute, “we consider both the plain meaning of the 
critical word or phrase as well as ‘its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.’”  
Id. at 237, quoting Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 
472 (1995).  “As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word 
in the statute.”  Sun Valley, 460 Mich at 237.  “The statutory language must be read and 
understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was 
intended.”  Id.  
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of “inaccurate information relied upon 
in determining the defendant’s sentence” as encompassing the circumstances of this case.  
In my view, a plain reading of this language suggests that it refers to factual information,9 
and this is consistent with our past understanding of the term.10  When the circuit court 
                                              
9 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2005) defines “information,” in 
relevant part, as follows: “1. knowledge communicated or received concerning a 
particular fact or circumstance.  2. knowledge gained through study, communication, 
research, etc.; data.  3. the act or fact of informing.”  “Inaccurate” is defined as “not 
accurate; incorrect, or untrue.”  Id. 
10 See People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96-97; 559 NW2d 299 (1997):  
A line of Michigan cases hold that sentences based on inaccurate 
information are invalid. People v Lauzon, 84 Mich App 201; 269 NW2d 
524 (1978) (the trial court erred when it sentenced the defendant under the 
 
 
 
5
determined defendant’s sentence, the relevant information—the fact of defendant’s two 
felonious assault convictions—was accurate.  The information concerning the two 
convictions is a different question than the legal validity of those convictions.  Because 
there was no inaccuracy in the information the circuit court relied on in determining 
defendant’s sentence, MCL 769.34(10) applied here dictated that that the Court of 
Appeals “shall affirm” defendant’s sentence and “shall not remand for resentencing.”   
I would hold, however, that MCL 769.34(10) does not apply here, where 
defendant seeks resentencing on the basis of the constitutional error in the felonious 
assault convictions used as a factor in his sentencing.11  The placement of MCL 
769.34(10) in the statutory scheme suggests that it addresses specific types of 
nonconstitutional sentencing errors, not a constitutional error in an underlying conviction.  
                                              
mistaken belief that he had committed a burglary while out on bond); 
People v Corlin, 95 Mich App 740; 291 NW2d 188 (1980) (the presentence 
report erroneously stated that the defendant had pleaded guilty of 
possession, which carried a maximum penalty of two years, rather than 
delivery, which carried a maximum penalty of seven years); People v Hale 
(After Remand), 106 Mich App 306; 308 NW2d 174 (1981) (error was 
found because the defendant's cooperation with the police was not made 
known to the court at the time of sentencing); People v Hildabridle, 45 
Mich App 93; 206 NW2d 216 (1973) (it was error for the court to sentence 
the defendant on the basis of inaccurate information regarding the value of 
the stolen property). 
11 “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”  In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 
(1970).  Legal insufficiency is a failure by the prosecution to prove each element of the 
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  See also People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 
722; 597 NW2d 73 (1999) (“‘The sufficient evidence requirement is a part of every 
criminal defendant’s due process rights.’”) (citation omitted). 
 
 
6
The provisions of MCL 769.34 address the application of the sentencing guidelines, when 
a court may depart from the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, when intermediate 
sanctions are to be imposed, and the like.  Reading in context, I see no indication that the 
Legislature intended MCL 769.34(10) to preclude resentencing when a court has vacated 
for insufficiency of evidence convictions used as a factor in sentencing.  I would hold that 
defendant is entitled to resentencing on the basis of the reversal of his felonious assault 
convictions and that MCL 769.34(10) does not apply.  See People v Conley, 270 Mich 
App 301; 715 NW2d 377 (2006).12  
                                              
12 In Conley, the circuit court improperly considered the defendant’s refusal to 
admit his guilt when imposing the defendant’s sentence.  The Court of Appeals observed 
that  
 
[r]ead literally in isolation, [MCL 769.34(10)] might seem to preclude this 
Court from granting relief on the basis of the trial court’s error in 
considering Conley’s refusal to admit guilt because it is undisputed that 
Conley was sentenced within the sentencing guidelines range and this error 
does not involve the scoring of the guidelines or the consideration of 
inaccurate information. 
 
But the erroneous consideration of Conley’s refusal to admit guilt 
was a constitutional error because it violated his constitutional right against 
self-incrimination.  It is axiomatic that a statutory provision, such as MCL 
769.34(10), cannot authorize action in violation of the federal or state 
constitutions.  Accordingly, we conclude that MCL 769.34(10) cannot 
constitutionally be applied to preclude relief for sentencing errors of 
constitutional magnitude.  We do not hold MCL 769.34(10) to be 
unconstitutional.  Rather, we construe MCL 769.34(10) as simply being 
inapplicable to claims of constitutional error.  [Conley, 270 Mich App at 
316.] 
 
See also United States v Tucker, 404 US 443, 447-449; 92 S Ct 589; 30 L Ed 2d 592 
(1972) (holding that when the sentencing court specifically considered convictions later 
deemed unconstitutional under Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 
 
 
 
7
For these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority but would hold 
that defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing because convictions used as a 
factor in his sentencing were later vacated for insufficiency of evidence.  I respectfully 
disagree with the majority because I do not believe that MCL 769.34(10) governs 
defendant’s entitlement to resentencing.  It is the Court of Appeals’ subsequent 
determination that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s felonious 
assault convictions,13 rather than any error in scoring the guidelines or inaccurate 
information relied on by the trial court, that entitles defendant to resentencing. 
YOUNG, J., concurred with CORRIGAN, J. 
DAVIS, J., did not participate in the decision of this case in order to avoid 
unnecessary delay to the parties in a case considered by the Court before he assumed 
office by following the practice of previous justices in transition and participating only in 
those cases for which his vote would be result-determinative.  His nonparticipation in this 
decision does not affect his eligibility to participate in deciding a motion for rehearing. 
                                              
2d 799 [1963], in imposing the defendant’s sentence, remand for resentencing was 
necessary in order to prevent “[e]rosion of the Gideon principle”). 
 
13 As the prosecution never filed an appeal, the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ 
ruling regarding the vacation of defendant’s felonious assault convictions is not before 
the Court.