Title: State ex rel. McQueen v. Court of Common Pleas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., Slip Opinion 
No. 2013-Ohio-65.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-65 
THE STATE EX REL. MCQUEEN, APPELLANT, v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, PROBATE DIVISION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, Probate Div., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-65.] 
Guardianships—Hearings on continued necessity of guardianship—R.C. 
2111.49(C) and 2111.02(C)(7)(d)—Appointment of attorney at court 
expense required. 
(No. 2012-0923—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided January 16, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 97835, 2012-Ohio-1839. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal by appellant, James L. McQueen, an indigent 
ward subject to a guardianship, from a judgment entered by the court of appeals 
denying his request for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, the Court of 
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Probate Division, to appoint counsel at 
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court expense for him in a hearing to review the continued necessity of the 
guardianship.  Because McQueen established his entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and grant the writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In May 2010, the probate court granted the application of Karyn 
Seeger of Adult Guardianship Services to be appointed the guardian of McQueen 
and placed McQueen in a secured nursing facility.  The probate court in effect 
found that McQueen was incompetent because prior to his hospitalization and 
placement in the nursing home, he was “homeless * * * [and] without medication 
to control his diagnosed diabetes and schizophrenia, and was not compliant with 
his mental health case manager.”  The probate court had determined that 
McQueen was indigent and unable to retain counsel and sua sponte appointed an 
attorney to represent McQueen at the hearing on Seeger’s application to be 
appointed as his guardian.  The probate court later granted McQueen’s appointed 
counsel’s application for attorney fees in connection with his representation of 
McQueen for the hearing on the appointment of a guardian for him. 
{¶ 3} In September 2011, after more than 120 days had elapsed since the 
probate court’s appointment of the guardian for McQueen, he submitted a written 
request to the probate court for a review of the guardianship.  McQueen believed 
that he no longer needed a guardian and that he was being medicated against his 
will.  He requested that the case be set for a review hearing and that counsel be 
appointed for him.  A guardianship-review hearing was originally scheduled in 
the probate court for December 5, 2011, but the court did not appoint counsel to 
represent McQueen for the hearing. 
{¶ 4} The probate court rescheduled the review hearing for January 30, 
2012, and McQueen filed a motion for the appointment of counsel at court 
expense, an independent expert evaluation, and a continuance of the review 
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3 
 
hearing.  The probate court denied McQueen’s motion for a continuance, noted 
that it had already ordered a medical evaluation of him, and stated that all other 
matters raised by him—the request to appoint counsel—would be considered at 
the review hearing. 
{¶ 5} McQueen then filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ 
of mandamus to compel the probate court to appoint counsel for him at the court’s 
expense pursuant to R.C. 2111.49(C) and 2111.02(C)(7) for the guardianship-
review hearing.  After the parties submitted motions for summary judgment, the 
court of appeals granted the probate court’s motion and denied the writ. 
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court upon McQueen’s appeal as of 
right. 
Analysis 
Mandamus:  Clear Legal Right and Clear Legal Duty 
{¶ 7} To be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, McQueen had to 
establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of 
the probate court to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 
960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 8} For the first two requirements, McQueen claims that he has 
established a clear legal right to the appointment of counsel at state expense for 
the guardianship-review hearing and a corresponding clear legal duty on the part 
of the probate court to appoint counsel at state expense for the hearing based on 
R.C. 2111.49(C) and 2111.02(C)(7)(d). 
{¶ 9} “[U]nlike criminal litigation, there is no general right of counsel in 
civil litigation.”  State ex rel. Burnes v. Athens Cty. Clerk of Courts, 83 Ohio 
St.3d 523, 524, 700 N.E.2d 1260 (1998).  Nevertheless, we have recognized the 
right of indigent persons to appointed counsel at state expense when a statute 
provides it.  State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44, 693 N.E.2d 794 
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(1998) (right to appointment of counsel for persons in loco parentis to child in 
juvenile court custody proceeding under the applicable former version of R.C. 
2151.352). 
{¶ 10} The General Assembly has empowered probate courts to appoint a 
guardian of an incompetent person.  R.C. 2111.02(A).  R.C. 2111.02(C) specifies 
that “[p]rior to the appointment of a guardian * * *, the court shall conduct a 
hearing on the matter of the appointment” and that “[t]he hearing shall be 
conducted in accordance with all of the following” requirements: 
 
(1) The proposed guardian or limited guardian shall appear 
at the hearing and, if appointed, shall swear under oath that the 
proposed guardian or limited guardian has made and will continue 
to make diligent efforts to file a true inventory in accordance with 
section 2111.14 of the Revised Code and find and report all assets 
belonging to the estate of the ward and that the proposed guardian 
or limited guardian faithfully and completely will fulfill the other 
duties of guardian, including the filing of timely and accurate 
reports and accountings. 
(2)  If the hearing is conducted by a magistrate, the 
procedures set forth in Civil Rule 53 shall be followed. 
(3) If the hearing concerns the appointment of a guardian or 
limited guardian for an alleged incompetent, the burden of proving 
incompetency shall be by clear and convincing evidence. 
(4) Upon request of the applicant, the alleged incompetent 
for whom the appointment is sought or the alleged incompetent’s 
counsel, or any interested party, a recording or record of the 
hearing shall be made. 
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(5) Evidence of a less restrictive alternative to guardianship 
may be introduced, and when introduced, shall be considered by 
the court. 
(6) The court may deny a guardianship based upon a 
finding that a less restrictive alternative to guardianship exists. 
(7) If the hearing concerns the appointment of a guardian or 
limited guardian for an alleged incompetent, the alleged 
incompetent has all of the following rights: 
(a) The right to be represented by independent counsel of 
the alleged incompetent’s choice; 
(b) The right to have a friend or family member of the 
alleged incompetent’s choice present; 
(c) The right to have evidence of an independent expert 
evaluation introduced; 
(d) If the alleged incompetent is indigent, upon the alleged 
incompetent’s request: 
(i) The right to have counsel and an independent expert 
evaluator appointed at court expense; 
(ii) If the guardianship, limited guardianship, or standby 
guardianship decision is appealed, the right to have counsel 
appointed and necessary transcripts for appeal prepared at court 
expense. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2111.49, in turn, governs review hearings for existing 
guardianships and provides: 
 
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(C) Except as provided in this division, for any 
guardianship, upon written request by the ward, the ward’s 
attorney, or any other interested party made at any time after the 
expiration of one hundred twenty days from the date of the original 
appointment of the guardian, a hearing shall be held in accordance 
with section 2111.02 of the Revised Code to evaluate the continued 
necessity of the guardianship. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 12} “Venerable principles of statutory construction require that in 
construing statutes, we must give effect to every word and clause in the statute.”  
State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 
478, 2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 18.  “To discern legislative intent, we 
‘read words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance with rules of 
grammar and common usage.’ ”  State ex rel. Barley v. Ohio Dept. of Job & 
Family Servs., 132 Ohio St.3d 505, 2012-Ohio-3329, 974 N.E.2d 1183, ¶ 20, 
quoting State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 
856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 13} With these principles guiding our analysis, we now consider the 
mandamus claim. 
{¶ 14} McQueen submitted a written request for a guardianship-review 
hearing after the expiration of 120 days from the date the probate court had 
originally appointed a guardian.  Pursuant to R.C. 2111.49(C), the probate court 
was then required to hold a hearing “in accordance with” R.C. 2111.02.  The word 
“accordance” means “agreement, accord.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 12 (2002).  Therefore, the hearing requirements specified in R.C. 
2111.02 for hearings to initially determine whether to appoint a guardian for an 
alleged incompetent person are explicitly incorporated in the R.C. 2111.49(C) 
January Term, 2013 
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requirements for hearings on the necessity of continuing a guardianship.  The 
R.C. 2111.49(C) guardianship-review hearing must be conducted in agreement 
and accord with the R.C. 2111.02 hearing requirements.  One of these 
requirements is set forth in R.C. 2111.02(C)(7)(d)(i), which confers a right on the 
incompetent person to have counsel appointed at court expense. 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals held otherwise because it concluded that the 
pertinent statutes were unclear: 
  
In the present case, the lack of controlling authority, the reiteration 
of the burden of proof in both statutes, and the limiting language in 
subsection 7 of “if the hearing concerns the appointment of the 
guardian” and “the alleged incompetent” create doubt as to 
whether the General Assembly intended subsection 7 to be 
incorporated into the hearing on the necessity of continuing a 
guardianship.  The relator has not established the clear legal right 
and the clear legal duty enforceable in mandamus.  Accordingly, 
this court declines to issue the writ of mandamus and dissolves the 
alternative writ. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  2012-Ohio-1839, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals erred in so holding.  Although it is true that 
we cannot create the legal duty enforceable in a mandamus case, State ex rel. 
Baroni v. Colletti, 130 Ohio St.3d 208, 2011-Ohio-5351, 957 N.E.2d 13, ¶ 22, it is 
equally true that “courts in mandamus actions have a duty to construe 
constitutions, charters, and statutes, if necessary, and thereafter evaluate whether 
the relator has established the required clear legal right and clear legal duty,” and 
in doing so, the courts have a “duty to resolve all doubts concerning the legal 
interpretation of these provisions.”  State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle, 83 Ohio St.3d 
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123, 125, 698 N.E.2d 987 (1998); see also State ex rel. Melvin v. Sweeney, 154 
Ohio St. 223, 225-226, 94 N.E.2d 785 (1950).  By not resolving any doubt it 
found in the pertinent statutes in this mandamus proceeding, the court of appeals 
abdicated its duty to do so.  Fattlar. 
{¶ 17} Moreover, there is no doubt in the provisions.  R.C. 2111.49(C) 
expressly incorporates the hearing requirements relating to original appointments 
of guardians to proceedings concerning the continued necessity of guardianships.  
These requirements include the right of indigent wards to appointed counsel at 
court expense.  Adopting the court of appeals’ construction would make the R.C. 
2111.49(C) directive that the guardianship-review hearing “shall be held in 
accordance with section 2111.02 of the Revised Code” meaningless.  We must 
avoid this unreasonable construction by applying the plain language of these 
provisions.  Carna, 131 Ohio St.3d 478, 2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 19, 
quoting State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 95 
Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917) (“ ‘No part [of the statute] should be 
treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly required, and the court should 
avoid that construction which renders a provision meaningless or inoperative’ ”). 
{¶ 18} In addition, as McQueen’s evidence submitted in the court of 
appeals established, this construction is consistent with the practice of probate 
courts from Franklin, Summit, Medina, and Logan Counties.  And amici curiae 
claim that other states with statutes similar to the ones at issue here recognize the 
right to appointed counsel in guardianship-review hearings.  In fact, because the 
court of appeals determined that the issue was susceptible of different 
interpretations, it limited the reach of its holding by stating that it did not 
“preclude other courts from appointing counsel for indigent wards in review 
hearings, if the court concludes that such an appointment is necessary, 
appropriate, or required.”  2012-Ohio-1839, ¶ 13.  Again, the court erred in failing 
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to resolve any doubt it perceived in the statutes and in further finding that any 
doubt existed. 
{¶ 19} Therefore, based on the plain language of R.C. 2111.49(C) and 
2111.02(C)(7)(d)(i), McQueen has established a clear legal right to the 
appointment of counsel at court expense for the guardianship-review hearing and 
a clear legal duty on the part of the probate court to appoint counsel for him at its 
expense. 
Mandamus:  Lack of Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law 
{¶ 20} McQueen also established that he lacks an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law to challenge the probate court’s refusal to appoint counsel 
for him for the guardianship-review hearing at court expense.  See Asberry, 82 
Ohio St.3d at 49, 693 N.E.2d 794 (grandmother lacked adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law to challenge juvenile court judge’s refusal to appoint 
counsel for her in custody proceeding), and cases cited therein.  Mandamus is thus 
an appropriate remedy.  Id. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 21} Therefore, McQueen established his entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus.  We reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and grant the writ of mandamus to compel the probate court to appoint 
counsel to represent him in the guardianship-review proceeding. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Disability Rights Ohio, John R. Harrison, and Jason C. Boylan, for 
appellant. 
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Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Ohio Poverty Law Center, L.L.C., Michael R. Smalz, and Sarah E. Biehl, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Poverty Law Center, L.L.C., and National 
Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel. 
 
McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., and R. Jeffrey Pollock, urging reversal for 
amici curiae The Arc of Ohio, National Alliance on Mental Illness of Ohio, and 
People First of Ohio. 
Natasha A. Plumly, urging reversal for amicus curiae Southeastern Ohio 
Legal Services. 
John E. Schrider Jr., urging reversal for amicus curiae Legal Aid Society 
of Southwest Ohio. 
Paul E. Zindle, urging reversal for amicus curiae Community Legal Aid 
Services, Inc. 
William H. Fraser, urging reversal for amicus curiae Legal Aid Society of 
Columbus. 
Miriam Sheline, urging reversal for amicus curiae Pro Seniors, Inc. 
Aneel L. Chablani, urging reversal for amicus curiae Advocates for Basic 
Legal Equality, Inc. 
Thomas Malakar, urging reversal for amicus curiae Legal Aid Society of 
Cleveland. 
Veronica L Martinez, urging reversal for amicus curiae Legal Aid of 
Western Ohio. 
______________________