Title: State of Florida v. Anthony Bodden

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC03-622
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
ANTHONY BODDEN,
Respondent.
[April 15, 2004]
PARIENTE, J.
In State v. Bodden, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2382 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 30, 2002),
the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question of great
public importance:
IN ADMINISTERING FLORIDA'S IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, IS
THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
REQUIRED TO ADOPT RULES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES [SIC] ACT
GOVERNING THE COLLECTION, PRESERVATION, AND
ANALYSIS OF URINE SAMPLES OBTAINED BY LAW
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
2.  Section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides in relevant part: 
(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the
influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if
the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within
this state and:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages,
any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance
controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the
person's normal faculties are impaired . . . .
Subsection (2)(a) provides the penalties which apply to a conviction under the
section.  See § 316.193(2)(a).
The police also searched Bodden and found less than twenty grams of
marijuana in his pocket, a marijuana pipe, and rolling papers.  Consequently, he
was also charged with one count of possession of cannabis in violation of section
893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of section 893.147, Florida Statutes (2002).  Those
2
ENFORCEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 316.1932(1)(a),
FLORIDA STATUTES.1 
Because we conclude that section 316.1932(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2002), does
not require that urine testing procedures be promulgated by rule in accordance
with the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA), we answer the certified
question in the negative.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of charges that Bodden was driving under the influence
in violation of section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (2002).2  During a traffic stop
charges are not at issue. 
3.  The implied consent law pertaining to operation of motor vehicles
encompasses sections 316.1932-.1934, Florida Statutes (2002).  See Mehl v. State,
632 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 1993).
4.  At the hearing on the motion Bodden stipulated that he submitted to a
urine test and the results were positive for a controlled substance. 
3
the police officer noticed that Bodden had red eyes and slurred speech, swayed
while he stood, and smelled of alcohol.  The officer read Bodden the implied
consent warning, and Bodden agreed to a breath test and a urine test.  The breath
test results indicated that Bodden's blood-alcohol level was between .060 and .065
percent.  The urine test results indicated the presence of a controlled substance. 
Bodden filed two motions in limine requesting that the trial court suppress
any reference to his urine test results because no regulatory criteria for testing had
been promulgated in accordance with chapter 120, Florida Statutes  (2002) (the
APA).  Bodden argued that section 316.1932, part of the implied consent law
pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles,3 requires that any scientific test
conducted pursuant to the implied consent law, including a urine test, be an
approved test.4  At the hearing on the motion, the State provided expert testimony
regarding the urine testing procedures employed by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE) Crime Laboratory in Tallahassee and verified that
5.  Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4)(A)-(B) vests
discretionary jurisdiction in the district courts of appeal to review certified
questions of great public importance from the county courts.  Specifically, rule
9.030(b)(4) provides:
(4) Discretionary Review.  District courts of appeal, in their
discretion, may review by appeal
(A) final orders of the county court, otherwise appealable to the
circuit court under these rules, that the county court has certified to be
of great public importance;
(B) non-final orders, otherwise appealable to the circuit court
under rule 9.140(c), that the county court has certified to be of great
public importance.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.160 governs the district courts'
discretionary proceedings to review county court decisions.
4
although FDLE procedures were adapted from published methods, FDLE's
specific procedures had not been published or promulgated in accordance with the
APA.
The county court judge determined that the implied consent law required
that urine testing procedures be promulgated in accordance with the APA, and
granted Bodden's motions to suppress.  The county judge also certified to the
Second District Court of Appeal the same question the Second District
subsequently certified to this Court in this case—that is, whether section
316.1932(1)(a)(1) requires that urine testing procedures be approved through
formal rule promulgation in accordance with the APA.5 
6.  The appellee in Pierre subsequently filed notice to invoke this Court's
discretionary jurisdiction based on certified conflict.  See Pierre v. State, No.
SC03-1691 (Fla. notice filed Sept. 22, 2003).  We have stayed Pierre pending the
decision in this case.  More recently, the Fourth District adopted the reasoning of
Pierre and certified conflict with Bodden.  See State v. Montello, 29 Fla. L.
Weekly D597 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 10, 2004), notice invoking discretionary
jurisdiction filed, No. SC04-512 (Fla. Mar. 25, 2004).
5
The Second District answered the question in the affirmative.  See Bodden,
27 Fla. L. Weekly at D2382.  According to the Second District, the sole question
to be answered was whether the term "approved" in section 316.1932(1)(a)(1)
refers to urine tests as well as breath and blood tests.  See id.  The Second District
determined that the implied consent statute was an ambiguous criminal statute,
and, as such, should be construed in favor of the accused.  Id.  Interpreting the
same statute under similar factual circumstances, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal in State v. Pierre, 854 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), reached a decision
contrary to that of the Second District in Bodden.  In Pierre, the Fifth District
concluded that section 316.1932, taken as a whole, "evinces an unambiguous
intent that urine tests need not be approved."  See id. at 233.  The Fifth District in
Pierre certified conflict with Bodden.  See id. at 232.6 
ANALYSIS
A.  Certified Question 
The certified question presents the narrow issue of whether section
7.  Section 120.54(3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Adoption procedures.--
(a) Notices.--
1.  Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule other
than an emergency rule, an agency, upon approval of the agency head,
shall give notice of its intended action, setting forth a short, plain
explanation of the purpose and effect of the proposed action; the full
6
316.1932 requires that procedures for the collection, preservation, and analysis of
urine samples be promulgated and approved by rule in accordance with the APA. 
As in all cases in which we are called upon to construe a statute, we begin with the
language used by the Legislature in the specific statutory provision.  
Subsection (1)(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of
this state of operating a motor vehicle within this state is, by so
operating such vehicle, deemed to have given his or her consent to
submit to an approved chemical test or physical test including, but not
limited to, an infrared light test of his or her breath for the purpose of
determining the alcohol content of his or her blood or breath, and to a
urine test for the purpose of detecting the presence of chemical
substances as set forth in s. 877.111 or controlled substances . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)  
The key to the resolution of the narrow issue we confront is whether the
word "approved" in section 316.1932(1)(a)(1) modifies "urine test." An
"approved" test under this provision is one that is adopted through rule
promulgation in accordance with the APA.  See § 120.54(3), Fla. Stat. (2003);7 see
text of the proposed rule or amendment and a summary thereof; a
reference to the specific rulemaking authority pursuant to which the
rule is adopted; and a reference to the section or subsection of the
Florida Statutes or the Laws of Florida being implemented,
interpreted, or made specific. The notice shall include a summary of
the agency's statement of the estimated regulatory costs, if one has
been prepared, based on the factors set forth in s. 120.541(2), and a
statement that any person who wishes to provide the agency with
information regarding the statement of estimated regulatory costs, or
to provide a proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative as
provided by s. 120.541(1), must do so in writing within 21 days after
publication of the notice. The notice must state the procedure for
requesting a public hearing on the proposed rule. Except when the
intended action is the repeal of a rule, the notice shall include a
reference both to the date on which and to the place where the notice
of rule development that is required by subsection (2) appeared.
2.  The notice shall be published in the Florida Administrative
Weekly not less than 28 days prior to the intended action. The
proposed rule shall be available for inspection and copying by the
public at the time of the publication of notice.
3.  The notice shall be mailed to all persons named in the
proposed rule and to all persons who, at least 14 days prior to such
mailing, have made requests of the agency for advance notice of its
proceedings. The agency shall also give such notice as is prescribed
by rule to those particular classes of persons to whom the intended
action is directed.
4.  The adopting agency shall file with the committee, at least
21 days prior to the proposed adoption date, a copy of each rule it
proposes to adopt; a detailed written statement of the facts and
circumstances justifying the proposed rule; a copy of any statement of
estimated regulatory costs that has been prepared pursuant to s.
120.541; a statement of the extent to which the proposed rule relates
to federal standards or rules on the same subject; and the notice
required by subparagraph 1.
7
also State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980) (recognizing that approved
8
testing methods are those which have been adopted in compliance with the implied
consent statutory provisions and the administrative rules).  We have recognized
that one purpose of establishing uniform, approved testing methods is to "ensure
reliable scientific evidence for use in future court proceedings and to protect the
health of those persons being tested."  Bender, 382 So. 2d at 699.  The results of
tests that must be approved "are admissible into evidence [under the implied
consent law] only upon compliance with the statutory provisions and the
administrative rules enacted by its authority."  Id. at 699.  In this case, if
"approved" modifies "urine test" then FDLE must promulgate uniform rules for
urine testing in accordance with the APA, which requires a notice and public
hearing.  To make the determination as to whether "approved" modifies "urine
test," we must engage in statutory construction.
We have explained that as a fundamental principle of statutory construction,
"legislative intent is the polestar that guides the Court's inquiry."  State v. Rife,
789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001) (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170,
1172 (Fla. 1998)); see also M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 100 (Fla. 2000) (same). 
Legislative intent is derived primarily from the language of the statute.  See Rife,
798 So. 2d at 292.  Thus, "it is axiomatic that in construing a statute courts must
first look at the actual language used in the statute."  Woodham v. Blue Cross &
9
Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 897 (Fla. 2002); see also Joshua v.
City of Gainesville 768 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 2000).  Applying that principle of
statutory construction, we conclude, contrary to the Second District, that the
language of the implied consent law provides that the methods for conducting
urine tests are not required to be "approved" through APA rule promulgation.
We begin with the actual language used by the Legislature in section
316.1932(1)(a)(1).  As we have explained,"[t]he legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of words and the rules of grammar, and the only way the court is
advised of what the legislature intends is by giving the generally accepted
construction, not only to the phraseology of an act, but to the manner in which it is
punctuated."  Florida State Racing Comm'n v. Bourquardez, 42 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla.
1949); see also State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 562 (Fla. 1999) (relying on
Bourquardez for this principle of statutory construction); Beach v. Great Western
Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 152 (Fla. 1997) (same), aff'd sub nom. Beach v. Ocwen
Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998). 
The grammatical structure of the first sentence of section 316.1932(1)(a)(1)
is such that the implied consent deemed to have been given by an operator of a
motor vehicle applies equally to two independent, unrelated tests—the first an
"approved chemical test" to determine blood- or breath-alcohol level, and the
8.  We recognize that the Legislature drafted section 322.63, Florida
Statutes (2002), which contains the implied consent law for commercial vehicles,
differently than section 316.1932.  However, section 322.63 is not at issue in this
case, and we therefore express no opinion on whether urine tests conducted under
that statute must be "approved."
10
second a urine test to determine the presence of chemical or controlled substances.
The grammatical structure can be illustrated as follows:
A person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state
of operating a motor vehicle within this state is, by so operating such
vehicle, deemed to have given his or her consent to submit 
to an approved chemical test or physical test including,
but not limited to, an infrared light test of his or her
breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of his or her blood or breath,
and
to a urine test for the purpose of detecting the presence
of chemical substances as set forth in s. 877.111 or
controlled substances,
As is illustrated, "approved" directly modifies only "chemical test."  It does
not modify "urine test."  In order to accept Bodden's argument that "approved"
modifies "urine test," this Court would be required to insert the word "approved"
between "a" and "urine," so that the implied consent created by the statute applies
"to an approved urine test."  This we decline to do.  The plain language of this
section demonstrates that "approved" does not modify "urine test."8  
In the alternative, Bodden argues that the Legislature intended for "urine
11
test" to fall within the subset of included approved chemical tests.  However, the
language of section 316.1932(1)(a)(1) in its entirety "makes a distinction between
the two tests in numerous places . . . , evincing that urine tests are not merely
subsets of 'chemical tests.'"  Pierre, 854 So. 2d at 233.  For example, this section
explicitly provides a method for urine testing: 
The urine test must be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered
at a detention facility or any other facility, mobile or otherwise, which
is equipped to administer such tests at the request of a law
enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe such person
was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
within this state while under the influence of controlled substances. 
The urine test shall be administered at a detention facility or any other
facility, mobile or otherwise, which is equipped to administer such
tests in a reasonable manner that will ensure the accuracy of the
specimen and maintain the privacy of the individual involved.
§ 316.1932 (1)(a)(1).  As the Fifth District recognized, if a urine test were
intended to fall within the subset of chemical tests subject to rule promulgation
through the APA, the language that sets forth explicit procedure for urine tests
would be unnecessary.  See id.
We have stated that words in a statute are not to be construed as superfluous
if a reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words.  See Hechtman v.
Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003) ("It is an
elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be
12
given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and
words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage."); State v. Goode,
830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002) ("[A] basic rule of statutory construction provides
that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should
avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.").  Applying that
principle here, we reject Bodden's alternative construction and decline to interpret
this statute in a way which would render superfluous the separate references to
urine tests throughout this section.
Our interpretation that urine tests are distinct from chemical tests is borne
out by a review of the remainder of section 316.1932.  Although we are initially
guided by the clear language of section 316.1932(1)(a)(1), we also look to the
other provisions of the implied consent law to discern if there is any indication
that the Legislature intended urine testing methods to be "approved."  Indeed, in
Mehl v. State, 632 So. 2d 593, 594-95 (Fla. 1993), this Court specifically
recognized that provisions of the implied consent law should be read in pari
materia as expressing a unified legislative purpose.  See also M.W., 756 So. 2d at
101 ("[A]ll parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent
whole.") (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control  Dist., 604 So.
2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992));  T.R. v. State, 677 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1996) (all parts
9.  Section 316.1932(1)(a)(2) provides:
The Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Law
Enforcement is responsible for the regulation of the operation,
inspection, and registration of breath test instruments utilized under
the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related
provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The
program is responsible for the regulation of the individuals who
operate, inspect, and instruct on the breath test instruments utilized in
the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related
provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The
program is further responsible for the regulation of blood analysts
who conduct blood testing to be utilized under the driving and
boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located
in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327.  The program shall:
a. Establish uniform criteria for the issuance of permits to
breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts,
and instruments.
b. Have the authority to permit breath test operators, agency
inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments.
c. Have the authority to discipline and suspend, revoke, or
renew the permits of breath test operators, agency inspectors,
instructors, blood analysts, and instruments.
13
of a statute must be read together so that the statute is consistent in its entirety).
Reading section 316.1932(1)(a)(1) in pari materia with the remainder of the
implied consent law leads to a logical and harmonious construction in which
"approved" does not modify "urine test."  The implied consent law as a whole
consistently treats tests relating to breath and blood distinctly from urine tests.  
For example, section 316.1932(1)(a)(2) confers on FDLE the responsibility
for the regulation and approval of blood and breath testing.9  
d. Establish uniform requirements for instruction and curricula
for the operation and inspection of approved instruments.
e. Have the authority to specify one approved curriculum for
the operation and inspection of approved instruments.
f. Establish a procedure for the approval of breath test operator
and agency inspector classes.
g. Have the authority to approve or disapprove breath test instruments
and accompanying paraphernalia for use pursuant to the driving and boating
under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter
and chapters 322 and 327.
h. With the approval of the executive director of the
Department of Law Enforcement, make and enter into contracts and
agreements with other agencies, organizations, associations,
corporations, individuals, or federal agencies as are necessary,
expedient, or incidental to the performance of duties.
i. Issue final orders which include findings of fact and
conclusions of law and which constitute final agency action for the
purpose of chapter 120.
j. Enforce compliance with the provisions of this section
through civil or administrative proceedings.
k. Make recommendations concerning any matter within the
purview of this section, this chapter, chapter 322, or chapter 327.
l. Promulgate rules for the administration and implementation
of this section, including definitions of terms.
m. Consult and cooperate with other entities for the purpose of
implementing the mandates of this section.
n. Have the authority to approve the type of blood test utilized
under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and
related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327.
o. Have the authority to specify techniques and methods for
breath alcohol testing and blood testing utilized under the driving and
boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located
in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327.
p. Have the authority to approve repair facilities for the
approved breath test instruments, including the authority to set
criteria for approval.
14
Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede
provisions in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The
specifications in this section are derived from the power and authority
previously and currently possessed by the Department of Law
Enforcement and are enumerated to conform with the mandates of
chapter 99-379, Laws of Florida.
(Emphasis supplied.)
10.  Section 316.1932(1)(b)(2) provides:
An analysis of a person's breath, in order to be considered valid
under this section, must have been performed substantially according
to methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement.  For
this purpose, the department may approve satisfactory techniques or
methods.
(Emphasis supplied.)
15
Specifically, sections 316.1932(1)(a)(2)(n) and 316.1932(1)(b)(2) grant FDLE the
authority to approve blood and breath testing techniques and methods,
respectively.10  Section 316.1932(1)(a)(2)(l) grants FDLE the authority to
"[p]romulgate rules for the administration. . . of [the] section, including
definitions," and sections 316.1932(1)(a)(2)(f), (g), and (p) address FDLE's
authority to "approve" operators, instruments, and repair facilities relating to
11.  Section 316.1933 addresses the right to use reasonable force when
conducting blood tests for impairment or intoxication in case of death or serious
bodily injury. 
12.  Section 316.1934 addresses testing methods that must be employed in
order for the State to benefit from the statutory presumption of impairment. 
13.  We also note that the subsequent legislative history of section
316.1932(1)(a)(1) buttresses our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend for
"approved" to modify "urine test."  See Lowry v. Parole & Probation Comm'n, 473
So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1985) ("When. . . an amendment to a statute is enacted
soon after controversies as to the interpretation of the original act arise, a court
may consider that amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original
law . . . .").  During the 2003 legislative session, the Legislature amended section
316.1932 in order to clarify that "approved" was not intended to modify "urine
testing."  See Ch. 2003-54, § 1,  Laws of Fla.  The chapter law created a new
subsection (1)(a)(1)(b), dealing exclusively with urine tests, and removed any
reference to urine tests in the context of discussing "approved chemical tests."  See
id. 
16
breath and blood testing.  Finally, sections 316.1933(2)(b)11 and 316.1934(3)12
both provide that chemical analysis of a person's blood and breath must be
performed "substantially in accordance with methods approved by [FDLE]." 
Significantly, there is no mention of urine testing in any of these subsections of the
implied consent law.13   As noted by the Fourth District in Montello, "[n]owhere in
Chapter 316 has the Legislature given FDLE the authority to promulgate rules for
urine testing for non-commercial drivers."  29 Fla. L. Weekly at D597.
To construe section 316.1932(1)(a)(1) in the manner urged by Bodden
would require the Court to "ignore the remainder of the statute, which, taken in its
14.  The test results may be admitted into evidence during trial so long as
the State lays the proper common law predicate set forth in Bender, which
includes a determination that the testing methods utilized are reliable.  See
Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783, 789 (Fla. 1992) (holding that when State fails
to comply with administrative rules and statutory provisions governing approved
testing methods, test results are admissible if State lays the common law
predicate). 
17
entirety, clearly conveys a contrary intent."  Pierre, 854 So. 2d at 233; see also
Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 2001) ("A basic
tenet of statutory interpretation is that a statute should be interpreted to give effect
to every clause in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts."). 
Accordingly, we hold that section 316.1932(1)(a), which requires that blood and
breath tests be approved, does not similarly require that urine tests be approved
through formal rule promulgation in accordance with the APA.14 
B.  Equal Protection
We next briefly address Bodden's argument that requiring approval for
blood and alcohol testing but not for urine testing violates his rights under the
equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.  Persons
charged with DUI are not a protected or suspect class under the equal protection
clauses.  See Graham v. Ramani, 383 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 1980) (holding that
suspect classes are those based on alienage, nationality, or race).  In the absence of
a suspect classification, equal protection demands only that a classification that
18
results in unequal treatment bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.  See Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 708, 712 (Fla. 2000).  Therefore, the
State may treat those charged with DUI based on blood and breath evidence of
alcohol differently from those charged because of urine test results, so long as
there is a rational basis for doing so.  
In this regard, we note that the goals of the breath and blood tests are
different from the goals of urine testing.  Breath and blood tests detect alcohol
content, whereas urine tests detect controlled substances.  See § 316.1932(1)(a)(1). 
If an individual has a certain level of alcohol in his or her system, the State
benefits from the presumption of impairment.  See § 316.1934.  However, because
there is no "legal limit" for controlled substances, there is no similar presumption
associated with urine test results.  A person is guilty of DUI only if the State
proves that the controlled substance impaired the person's normal faculties.   
We note that the testimony of the FDLE expert in this case further 
demonstrates the specific purpose and distinct nature of the urine test.  According
to the expert, unlike a breath or blood test which determines alcohol content, a
level of impairment cannot be extrapolated from a drug concentration detected in a
urine sample.  In other words, it would be very difficult to conclude that a person
was under the influence of a particular drug to the point that his or her normal
19
faculties were impaired at the time of his or her arrest based solely on the presence
of the drug in the person's urine. 
Moreover, as even the Second District noted in Bodden, "the methodology
for administering a urine test should be somewhat less complex than the
methodology necessary for administering a breath or blood test."  27 Fla. L.
Weekly at D2384.  The Fifth District similarly stated in Pierre that "[t]he
legislature apparently concluded that its own basic guidelines were sufficient for
this rather simple test, but that more comprehensive procedures should be
developed for blood testing, which is more intrusive, and breath testing, which is
more complex, than urine testing."  854 So. 2d at 233.  Based on these
distinctions, we conclude that a rational basis exists for treating the procedures for
administering urine tests differently from the procedures for administering breath
and blood tests and therefore reject Bodden's argument that the statute violates
equal protection.  
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that the implied consent law for operators of motor
vehicles does not require that urine testing methods be approved in accordance
with the APA.  We emphasize that we do not decide whether it would be
preferable for urine tests to be approved through rule promulgation.  Rather, we
20
resolve this case by applying well-established principles of statutory construction
to effectuate the legislative intent of the statute.  See Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co.,
748 So. 2d 993, 1000 (Fla. 1999).  Accordingly, we approve the Fourth and Fifth
Districts' reasoning in Montello and Pierre, answer the certified question in
Bodden in the negative, and quash the Second District's decision below.  We
remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance 
Second District - Case No. 2D01-3535
(Hillsborough County)
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Chief-Assistant Attorney
General, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals, and Jenny Scavino Sieg,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Eilam Isaak, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent