Title: Reynolds v. Guardianship of Sears

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Bill D. REYNOLDS v. GUARDIANSHIP OF Grace L.
SEARS

96-1111                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 24, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- probate cases -- standard of review. -- The supreme
     court reviews probate matters de novo on appeal and will not
     disturb the probate judge's decision absent an abuse of
     discretion or upon findings that the judge's decision was
     clearly erroneous.

2.   Venue -- probate court correctly determined venue. -- Where it was
     undisputed that the incapacitated party had established
     domicile in Washington County that continued until the date
     that she was transferred to Crawford County, the supreme court
     agreed with the probate court's determination that venue was
     proper in Washington County.

3.   Guardian & ward -- probate court correctly found that appellant attorney
     was neither guardian nor party. -- The probate court correctly found
     that appellant attorney, who was not related to the
     incapacitated party but who had been named a potential
     cotrustee of her revocable trust, was neither a guardian nor
     a party and, following the provision of Ark. Code Ann.  28-
     65-204 relating to preferences for appointment as guardian of
     persons having a "relationship by blood or marriage to the
     person for whom guardianship is sought," correctly found two
     of the incapacitated party's children to be her preferred
     guardians.

4.   Civil procedure -- proper plaintiff -- requirements. -- To be a proper
     plaintiff in an action, one must have an interest that has
     been adversely affected or rights that have been invaded;
     courts will not allow suit by one who is a "stranger to the
     record" or for the purpose of vindicating an abstract
     principle of justice.

5.   Civil procedure -- standing -- record did not reflect that appellant
     attorney sought to intervene or had interest to be protected. -- The
     language of ARCP Rule 12 clearly addresses party litigants,
     referring to "a defendant," "a party," "every defense," "upon
     motion by a party," "responsive pleading,"  and "adverse
     party"; specifically, Rule 12(b) prescribes the mechanisms for
     filing defenses in relation to filing responsive pleadings;
     for a nonparty to enter into this proceeding, the proper
     procedural method would have been a motion to intervene
     pursuant to ARCP Rule 24, which allows a nonparty to intervene
     into a proceeding, either by right or by permission, if he has
     a protectable interest in the outcome; the record did not
     reflect that appellant attorney sought to intervene or that he
     had an interest that should be protected.

6.   Civil procedure -- standing -- probate court did not err in denying
     appellant time to plead further because he lacked standing and was
     nonparty. -- The supreme court held that the probate court did
     not commit error in denying appellant attorney additional time
     to plead further because he lacked standing and was a nonparty
     to the proceeding.


     Appeal from Washington Probate Court; Thomas F. Butt, Probate
Judge; affirmed.
     Bethell & Cromwell, P.L.C., by: Bruce H. Bethell, for
appellant.
     Michael E. Stubblefield, P.A., for appellees.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     This case involves the appointment of a guardian of the person
and estate of Grace L. Sears, age seventy, a resident of
Fayetteville, Arkansas, who was found to be incapacitated and
unable to manage her own affairs.  In early February 1996, family
members became convinced that Mrs. Sears was in need of a
guardianship.  With the consent of three of her four children,
Clifford, Fran, and William Sears, she was placed in the Washington
Regional Medical Center on February 12, 1996, for a four-week
evaluation.  Two days later without notice to Clifford or Fran, Mr.
Bill Reynolds, an attorney, who is not related to Mrs. Sears but
who had been named a potential cotrustee of Mrs. Sears's revocable
trust, together with Mr. and Mrs. William Sears, caused her to be
checked out of the Washington County medical facility and
transported to Brownwood Manor Nursing Facility in Crawford County.
     Upon discovering this move, Clifford and Fran filed a petition
in Washington County Probate Court for temporary guardianship on
February 16.  On February 27, the petition was amended to seek full
guardianship.  The probate court scheduled a hearing for March 27,
and notice was served.  While William Sears neither joined in their
guardianship petition nor responded to the petition, he was present
at the hearing; furthermore, he did not seek to be named as a
guardian or take timely action to contest or protest the
guardianship.  The whereabouts of the other sibling, Donna Sue
Haas, is unknown.
     Representing himself to be the guardian of Mrs. Sears, Mr.
Reynolds challenged venue in Washington County.  When the matter
was heard, the probate court determined that venue was properly in
Washington County, that Mr. Reynolds was not a party to the
proceeding, and that no person having standing to object or
otherwise respond to the petition had done so.  All persons related
to Mrs. Sears agreed that she was incapacitated and that guardians
should be appointed.  The probate court then named the two children
of Mrs. Sears who had filed the petition as guardians.
     Mr. Reynolds appeals from this decision, asserting that he
should have been permitted to file a responsive pleading following
the denial of his venue-based motion to dismiss.  Because we agree
with the probate court that Mr. Reynolds was not a party to the
proceeding and had no standing to contest the appointment of
guardians, we affirm.
     We review probate matters de novo on appeal, and will not
disturb the probate judge's decision absent an abuse of discretion
or upon findings that the judge's decision was clearly erroneous. 
Mangum v. Estate of Fuller, 303 Ark. 411, 797 S.W.2d 452 (1990);
see also White v. Welsh, 323 Ark. 479, 915 S.W.2d 274 (1996).
     It is undisputed that Mrs. Sears was incapacitated and in need
of a guardian.  Before reaching the guardianship issue, the first
matters considered by the probate court were the issues of standing
and venue.  Mr. Reynolds contended that his position as attorney-
in-fact gave him standing in the guardianship proceeding.  With
reference to these issues, the following colloquy ensued, which is
abstracted as follows:
     MR. SELF [counsel for appellant]:  Your Honor, Mr.
Caddell is co-trustee of the estate, along with Mr.
Reynolds who is also a party.
     THE COURT:  Well, I'm not sure they are parties in
this proceeding.  I don't think their status as co-
trustees or attorney -- with Power of Attorney -- I don't
think that makes them parties.
     MR. STUBBLEFIELD [counsel for appellee]:  That would
be our argument, Your Honor.  And in the Probate Court,
I believe the statutes of Arkansas make it fairly clear
that the Probate Court has no jurisdiction over a trust. 
So we're not here arguing the trust today.
     THE COURT:  I think they are not entitled to remain,
Mr. Self.
     MR. SELF:  On the question of venue, the motion
filed by Mr. Reynolds, he is a party to that motion, is
that correct?
     THE COURT:  Well, he's a party to the motion, but I
don't know whether he's a party to this case.
...
     THE COURT:  Well, I don't think the question of
standing to file a motion has been raised.  But the
motion describes himself as guardian.  There is nothing
in this file to show that he is the guardian.  I think it
is alleged somewhere in the original petition or the
amended petition that the gentleman holds a Power of
Attorney for Mrs. Sears.  But I don't think that
constitutes him as a party to this proceeding to inquire
into the providence of the suggested guardianship.
     MR. SELF:  Then I will call Mr. Bill Reynolds as my
first witness.
     THE COURT:  Do you wish to raise the question of the
standing of Mr. Reynolds to take part in this proceeding?
     MS. DILLON [co-counsel for appellee]:  Yes, we do,
Your Honor.
     THE COURT:  I think that's a very significant
request, Mr. Self, whether your client has standing to
appear in this matter and to challenge the venue.
Mr. Stubblefield withdrew his objection to allowing Mr. Reynolds to
testify on venue, but maintained his objection that Mr. Reynolds
was not a party to the guardianship proceeding.  With regard to
venue, it was undisputed that Mrs. Sears had established domicile
in Washington County that continued until February 16, the date
that she was transferred to Crawford County.  We agree with the
probate court's determination that venue was proper in Washington
County.
     We next consider the issue whether Mr. Reynolds is a party to
the guardianship petition.  On November 28, 1995, Mrs. Sears was
the grantor of a revocable trust into which she transferred
substantial assets for her own benefit as primary beneficiary of
the trust.  She designated herself as the original trustee, to
serve during her life or until she became unable or unwilling to
serve as trustee.  She nominated Fred L. Caddell or Bill D.
Reynolds to serve as successor trustee in the event of her removal
as trustee.  At the time of the hearing, she had not been removed
as trustee, and Mr. Reynolds was only a potential successor
cotrustee with dormant powers.  On November 28, Mrs. Sears also
published her last will and testament naming Mr. Caddell and Mr.
Reynolds as her executors, and providing that all of her estate
would be added to the trust that was contemporaneously established. 
Mr. Reynolds contends that on the same day, she executed two
separate but identical durable powers of attorney, one naming Mr.
Mr. Reynolds (and the other one naming Mr. Caddell) as her
attorney-in-fact with broad powers over her property.  The original
documents granting the durable powers of attorney could not be
located at the time of the hearing.  However, while the original
document giving Mr. Reynolds a power of attorney was not in
evidence, a document purported to be a copy had been attached as an
exhibit to the guardianship petition that he had filed in Crawford
County on March 18.
     We note that the copy contains no provision for legal
recognition of a copy as the original, nor does it nominate the
attorney-in-fact as guardian in the event such proceedings are
initiated.  Consequently, there is no showing that Mr. Reynolds had
standing to appear as a party.  As Judge Thomas Butt correctly
observed:
I don't see that anyone who by statute is a proper or
necessary party and therefore required to be notified has
filed any responsive pleading at all on the principal
issue of a guardianship.
     The law requires that the spouse, if any, of the
alleged incapacitated person must be served and notified. 
If no spouse, then at least one of the next of kin. 
Well, in this instance, two of the next of kin are the
petitioners.  Obviously, it s a vain endeavor that they
are required to notify themselves.
     As a matter of common sense o[r] decency and
courtesy, if there is another or other persons in the
same degree of kin, that person or persons ought to be
notified, and I believe Mr. Williams here [William E.
Sears] was notified.  And there has been no pleading
filed in his behalf.  So I think there is no litigious
purpose to be served, or interest to be protected in
further postponing the matter.
The probate court determined that Mr. Reynolds lacked standing to
be a party in this action.  Having made this ruling, the court
proceeded to decide the matter of Mrs. Sears's incapacity and to
appoint guardians.  The court's selection of guardians followed the
provision of Ark. Code Ann.  28-65-204 relating to preferences for
appointment as guardian of persons having a "relationship by blood
or marriage to the person for whom guardianship is sought."  Id. 
28-65-204(b)(4).  The probate court correctly found that Mr.
Reynolds was neither a guardian nor a party, and found Clifford and
Fran to be the preferred guardians of Mrs. Sears.
     The one remaining issue is whether the denial of Mr.
Reynolds's motion to dismiss for improper venue automatically
extends to a nonparty the right to file a responsive pleading
pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12.  The principle may be stated as
follows:
To be a proper plaintiff in an action, one must have an
interest which has been adversely affected or rights
which have been invaded.  Courts will not allow suit by
one who is a "stranger to the record" or for the purpose
of vindicating an abstract principle of justice.
David Newbern, Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure  5-15, at 61-
62 (2d ed. 1993).
     In applying that principle to estate administration, we have
held that a person who was neither an heir nor a creditor and did
not declare any interest in the property or indicate any
entitlement to the proceedings was not an interested person;
therefore, he had no standing to question a court order.  White v.
Welsh, supra.
     A helpful analogy can be found in our cases involving wills
and trusts.  In these cases we have found that a person lacks
standing to raise a will or trust issue in probate court if the
record shows no evidence that he has any interest in the trust or
will.  See, e.g., Wells v. Estate of Wells, 325 Ark. 16, 922 S.W.2d 715 (1996).
     While we note that Mr. Reynolds correctly asserts that a
motion to dismiss based on venue may be made before the filing of
a responsive pleading, Inmon Truck Sales, Inc. v. Wright, 294 Ark.
397, 743 S.W.2d 793 (1988), we find that this rule does not apply
to him because he lacks standing.
     The language of Ark. R.Civ. P. 12 clearly addresses party
litigants.  The language throughout that rule refers to "a
defendant," "a party," "every defense," "upon motion by a party,"
"responsive pleading,"  and "adverse party".  Specifically, Rule
12(b) prescribes the mechanisms for filing defenses in relation to
filing responsive pleadings.  For a nonparty to enter into this
proceeding, the proper procedural method would have been a motion
to intervene pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 24.  That rule allows a
nonparty to intervene into a proceeding, either by right or by
permission, if he has a protectable interest in the outcome.  The
record does not reflect that Mr. Reynolds sought to intervene or
that he had an interest that should be protected.
     In summary, we find that the probate court did not commit
error in denying Mr. Reynolds additional time to plead further
because he lacked standing and was a nonparty to the proceeding. 
We affirm.