Title: Jane Hemberger v. Jo Ann Bitzer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2973 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Jane Hemberger,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jo Ann Bitzer, Alice Ruhland and Al Bennin, 
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Ed Ringgenberg, Kathy Plehn and Douglas 
Maxwell,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 13, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 3, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
P. Charles Jones 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs 
by Michael J. Modl and Axley Brynelson, Madison and oral argument 
by Michael J. Modl. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by 
Robert J. Gingras, Paul A. Kinne and Gingras & Cates, S.C., 
Madison and oral argument by Steven J. Schooler of Lawton & 
Cates, S.C., Madison. 
 
No. 96-2973  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2973  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jane Hemberger,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jo Ann Bitzer, Alice Ruhland, and Al  
Bennin,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Ed Ringgenberg, Kathy Plehn and Douglas  
Maxwell,  
 
          Defendants.  
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a decision and order of the Circuit Court for 
Dane County, P. Charles Jones, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   The 
narrow 
question 
presented on appeal is whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims brought 
in Wisconsin are governed by a three- or six-year statute of 
limitations.  The plaintiff, Jane Hemberger, claimed that the 
defendants violated her rights to free speech when they 
allegedly retaliated against her by terminating her employment. 
 She brought this action approximately four years after the 
termination.  Because Wis. Stat. § 893.53 (1991-92),1 providing a 
six-year 
statute 
of 
limitations, 
is 
Wisconsin’s 
residual 
                     
1 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1991-92 
version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 96-2973  
 
2 
personal injury statute of limitations, we conclude that 
Hemberger’s action was timely filed.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
¶2 
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. 
 Jane Hemberger was terminated from her employment on May 23, 
1989.  More than four years later, on August 26, 1993, she 
commenced this action.  Hemberger alleged that her termination 
by her former employer, Fitch-Rona Emergency Medical Service 
District, through the actions of people associated with her 
employer, violated her free speech rights protected by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and secured by 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (reprinted below).2  The circuit court denied the 
defendants’ 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.06(2), 
determining 
that 
the 
six-year 
statute 
of 
limitations of Wis. Stat. § 893.53 applies to actions brought 
under § 1983 and therefore, the plaintiff’s § 1983 action was 
not time barred.  The action proceeded to trial, and the jury 
found for the plaintiff against three of six defendants: JoAnn 
Bitzer, Alice Ruhland, and Al Bennin.  The defendants timely 
appealed the entry of judgment against them, raising on appeal 
                     
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. 
 
No. 96-2973  
 
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the issue of whether the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are time-
barred.  The court of appeals certified the case to this court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 to decide the appropriate 
statute of limitations in Wisconsin for claims under § 1983.  
¶3 
The appropriate Wisconsin statute of limitations to 
apply to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in accord with 
the standard set forth in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 
(1989), is a question of statutory construction which this court 
reviews de novo.  See Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 
Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996). 
¶4 
The defendants rely on the language of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.53 and 893.54, legislative history, and two Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals cases to assert that § 893.54 (reprinted 
below),3 the three-year statute, is the applicable statute of 
limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See 
Hanson v. Madison Service Corp., 125 Wis. 2d 138, 370 N.W.2d 586 
(Ct. App. 1985); Kempfer v. Evers, 133 Wis. 2d 415, 395 N.W.2d 
812 (Ct. App. 1986).  The plaintiff, relying on statutory 
language and case law, asserts that § 893.53 (reprinted below),4 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 893.54  “Injury to the person.  The following 
actions shall be commenced within 3 years or be barred: (1)  An 
action to recover damages for injuries to the person.  (2)  An 
action brought to recover damages for death caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of another.” 
4 Wis. Stat. § 893.53  “Action for injury to character or 
other rights.  An action to recover damages for an injury to the 
character or rights of another, not arising on contract, shall 
be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues, 
except where a different period is expressly prescribed, or be 
barred.”  
No. 96-2973  
 
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the six-year statute, is the applicable statute of limitations 
for actions brought under § 1983.  See Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 
399 (7th Cir. 1989).   
¶5 
Although this court has not previously addressed the 
specific issue presented by this case, the United States Supreme 
Court has given guidelines, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals have spoken 
on the issue.  We first provide a chronology of cases which have 
addressed the issue of which state statute of limitations 
applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   
¶6 
In April 1985, in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 
(1985), the United States Supreme Court recognized that its 
previous holdings, which required courts to apply the state 
statute of limitations most analogous to the underlying 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim, had resulted in confusion, inconsistency, 
and time-consuming litigation.  See 471 U.S. at 272-73.  
(Annot., 45 A.L.R.Fed. 548, 554 (1979) provides a comprehensive 
annotation 
of 
cases 
that 
have 
resulted 
in 
“uncertainty, 
confusion, and lack of uniformity in selecting the applicable 
statute of limitations in § 1983 suits.”  Id. at 272 n.25).  
Because 
the 
Court 
determined 
that 
a 
simple, 
broad 
characterization of § 1983 claims best fits that statute’s 
remedial purpose, the Court held that the most appropriate state 
statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims is the 
statute governing personal injuries.  See id. at 272, 280.  
¶7 
Within weeks of the Wilson decision, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 893.54, providing a 
No. 96-2973  
 
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three-year statute of limitations for “injuries to the person,” 
applied to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Hanson, 
125 Wis. 2d at 141.  Later, the court of appeals followed the 
holdings of Wilson and Hanson without discussion and again 
concluded that actions brought under § 1983 must be brought 
within the three-year statute of limitations according to 
§ 893.54.  See Kempfer, 133 Wis. 2d at 418.   
¶8 
In 1989, the United State Supreme Court again faced 
the question of the appropriate statute of limitations for 
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Owens v. Okure, 488 
U.S. 235 (1989).  The Court acknowledged that although Wilson 
supplied a clear answer in states with only one statute of 
limitations for all personal injury claims, confusion remained 
in states with one or more statutes of limitations for 
enumerated intentional torts and a residual statute for all 
other personal injuries.  See Owens, 488 U.S. at 236, 241.  The 
Court held that “where state law provides multiple statutes of 
limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering 
§ 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for 
personal injury actions.”  Id. at 249-50 (footnotes omitted).  
The United States Supreme Court believed that the state’s 
general or residual personal injury statute of limitations would 
be easily identifiable by its language and application.  See id. 
at 247. 
¶9 
Since Owens no Wisconsin appellate court has published 
an opinion addressing the specific question of which Wisconsin 
personal injury statute of limitations applies to claims brought 
No. 96-2973  
 
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, however, relied on Owens to determine that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.53, which provides a six-year statute of limitations for 
“action[s] to recover damages for an injury to the character or 
rights of another . . .,” is Wisconsin’s general or residual 
statute of limitations for personal injury actions.  See Gray, 
885 F.2d at 407-409.  The court relied on three factors to 
support 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
appropriate 
statute 
of 
limitations for § 1983 claims is six years under § 893.53.  
First, in a case for intentional interference with contractual 
relations the Wisconsin Court of Appeals interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.19(5) (1977), the predecessor to § 893.53, as the residual 
or general personal injury statute of limitations.  See id. at 
408 (referring to Segall v. Hurwitz, 114 Wis. 2d 471, 339 N.W.2d 
333 (Ct. App. 1983)).  The language of § 893.53 is virtually the 
same as the language of its predecessor, § 893.19(5).   
¶10 Second, the language of Wis. Stat. § 893.53, the 
statute of limitations for “injury to the character or rights of 
another” except as otherwise provided, is a much broader statute 
than Wis. Stat. § 893.54.  See Gray, 885 F.2d at 408.  “The 
broad language of the personal rights statute of limitations is 
also consistent with the purpose of § 1983, which is to provide 
a remedy for a ‘wide spectrum of claims’ that include more than 
just bodily injury.”  Id. (citing Owens, 488 U.S. at 249).   
¶11 Finally, the court in Gray acknowledged that Wisconsin 
federal district courts have, since Wilson, determined that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.53 was the appropriate personal rights statute of 
No. 96-2973  
 
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limitations.  See Gray, 885 F.2d at 408 (referring to Saldivar 
v. Cadena, 622 F. Supp. 949, 955 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Jordi v. Sauk 
Prairie School Bd., 651 F. Supp. 1566, 1573 (W.D. Wis. 1987); 
Thompson v. County of Rock, 648 F. Supp. 861, 866 (W.D. Wis. 
1986)).  The court in Gray also noted that the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals earlier determined that the appropriate statute of 
limitations was three years under Wis. Stat. § 893.54.  However, 
the court recognized that Hanson was decided before Owens and 
the Hanson court, therefore, did not have the benefit of the 
Owens analysis.  See Gray, 885 F.2d at 409.  
¶12 With this case law as a backdrop we now turn to the 
issue before us.  The issue is resolved by answering two 
questions.  First, is Wis. Stat. § 893.53, the six-year statute 
of limitations, a general or residual statute?  If so, does it 
apply to personal injury actions?  If the answer to both 
questions is “yes,” we are then constrained by Owens to find 
that the six-year statute of limitations is controlling for a 
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
¶13 The answer to the first question is easily decided 
from the language of the statute.  The language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.53 makes it clear that the statute is residual.  It 
applies 
“except 
where 
a 
different 
period 
is 
expressly 
No. 96-2973  
 
8 
prescribed.” Wis. Stat. § 893.53.5  As noted in Gray, § 893.53 is 
a much broader statute than Wis. Stat. § 893.54 which only 
applies to “action[s] to recover damages for injury to the 
person” and “action[s] brought to recover damages for death 
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another.”  
Wis. Stat. § 893.54.   
¶14 Wisconsin courts have also interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.53 
as 
Wisconsin’s 
residual 
statute 
of 
limitations, 
applying it when no other statute of limitations applies.  See, 
e.g., Segall, 114 Wis. 2d at 487; Acharya v. Carroll 152 Wis. 2d 
330, 337, 448 N.W.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1989); Milwaukee Partners v. 
Collins Engineers, 169 Wis. 2d 355, 364, 485 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. 
App. 1992).  Accordingly, we conclude that § 893.53 is a general 
or residual statute of limitations. 
¶15 We now turn to the second question: whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.53, 
the 
six-year 
statute 
of 
limitations 
regarding 
“injur[ies] to the character or rights of another,” pertains to 
“personal injuries” as the term is used by the Owens Court.  The 
goal of statutory construction is to discern the legislature’s 
intent.  See Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978 (citing Scott v. First 
State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 612, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990)).  
                     
5 The language of Wis. Stat. § 893.53 is similar to 
statutory language of other states cited in Owens v. Okure, 488 
U.S. 235, 246 n.9 (1989) as general statutes of limitations.  
For example, Ala. Code § 6-2-38(1) (Supp. 1988) applies to “any 
injury to the person or rights of another not arising from 
contract and not specifically enumerated.”  Owens, 488 U.S. at  
246 n.9.  
No. 96-2973  
 
9 
Although we must first look to the plain language of the statute 
to discern legislative intent, see Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978, 
the language of § 893.53 does not indicate whether injuries to 
the “character or rights of another” includes personal injuries. 
  
¶16 If the plain language of the statute is ambiguous we 
may turn to the statute’s scope, history, context, subject 
matter, and purpose.  See Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978.  Before 
1957 the provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 893.53 and 893.54 were 
combined 
in 
one 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 330.19(5) 
(1955), 
providing a six-year statute of limitations.  Chapter 435, Laws 
of 1957, divided the statute in two sections.  The legislation 
amended § 330.19(5) to provide a six-year statute of limitations 
for “action[s] to recover damages for an injury to property, 
real or personal, or for an injury to the character or rights of 
another, not arising on contract, except in a case where a 
different 
period 
is 
expressly 
prescribed.” 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 330.19(5) (1957).  The 1957 legislation also created Wis. 
Stat. § 330.205 to provide a three-year statute of limitations 
for an “action to recover damages for injuries to the person.”  
Wis. Stat. § 330.205 (1957).  Sections 330.19(5) and 330.205 
(1957) 
were 
later 
renumbered 
as 
§§ 893.53 
and 
893.54 
respectively.  See ch. 66, § 2, Laws of 1965.   
¶17 Defendants argue that this legislative history shows 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.53 is not a statute that applies to 
personal injuries because the 1957 legislation removed all 
references to personal injury from Wis. Stat. § 330.19(5) (now 
No. 96-2973  
 
10
§ 893.53) and created Wis. Stat. § 330.205 (now Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.54) applicable to personal injuries.  This assertion 
assumes that “personal injury” as used in Owens refers only to 
“bodily injury.”  We do not agree with that assumption. 
¶18 “Considerable authority exists for the proposition 
that a ‘personal injury’ encompasses not only physical injuries 
but also any affront to the body, reputation, liberty, or sense 
of enjoyment of persons.”  Eau Claire County v. Employers Ins., 
146 Wis. 2d 101, 113, 430 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1988).  Injuries 
to the character or rights of another, those covered by the 
statute of limitations of Wis. Stat. § 893.53, are also personal 
injuries, albeit not bodily injuries.  Accordingly we conclude 
that § 893.53 covers “personal injury actions” as the phrase is 
used in Owens. 
¶19 Defendants also argue that the court of appeals’ 
holdings in Hanson and Kempfer should control in this case.  We 
disagree.  As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Gray, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided both 
Hanson and Kempfer without the benefit of the analysis in Owens. 
 See Gray, 885 F.2d at 409.  Even if the holdings of Hanson and 
Kempfer, applying the three-year statute of limitations of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.54 to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were 
appropriate following Wilson, the holding of Owens provides a 
more clear direction when, as in Wisconsin, there are several 
statutes of limitation for personal injury actions and one 
residual or general statute of limitations. 
No. 96-2973  
 
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¶20 In sum, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.53, providing a 
six-year statute of limitations, is Wisconsin’s general and 
residual personal injury statute of limitations.  Therefore, it 
is applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Accordingly, Hanson is overruled and to the extent that Kempfer 
relied on Hanson, it too is overruled.  Therefore, we conclude 
that Hemberger’s action was timely filed. 
¶21 The court of appeals also certified a second question 
to this court: whether the court of appeals may overrule or 
modify a previously published decision of this court when the 
parties dispute whether the decision should or must be overruled 
or modified in light of later federal law.  We conclude that 
this question was appropriately answered by our holding in In re 
Marriage of Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997).  Only the supreme court, and not the court of appeals, 
“has the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a 
published opinion of the court of appeals.”  Id.  
 
The court of appeals, however, is not powerless 
if it concludes that a prior decision of the court of 
appeals or the supreme court is erroneous.  It may 
signal its disfavor to litigants, lawyers and this 
court 
by 
certifying 
the 
appeal 
to 
this 
court, 
explaining that it believes a prior case was wrongly 
decided.  Alternatively, the court of appeals may 
decide the appeal, adhering to a prior case but 
stating its belief that the prior case was wrongly 
decided. 
Id. at 190 (footnote omitted).   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
1