Title: Daily v. Bone

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Daily v. Bone1995 WY 185906 P.2d 1039Case Number: 94-251Decided: 11/09/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Vicki Jo DAILY,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Ingrid BONE, 
Administratrix, of the Estate of John Earl Bone, and Douglas Case, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Robert W. Horn 
of Robert W. Horn, P.C., Jackson, and Steven D. Olmstead, Jackson, for 
Appellant.

R. Michael 
Mullikin of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for 
Appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      John Bone drove 
Douglas Case's snowmobile through a stop sign onto a major highway, causing a 
collision with Vicki Jo Daily's pickup truck. Although not physically injured, 
Vicki Jo Daily was emotionally traumatized by John Bone's abrupt death at the 
scene. Vicki Jo Daily sued John Bone's estate and Douglas Case alleging, 
inter alia, negligence and negligent entrustment. Perceiving an action 
grounded in negligent infliction of emotional distress, the district court 
granted summary judgment for John Bone and Douglas Case.

[¶2]      This case sounds 
in negligence and is remarkable only because the injuries are mental rather than 
physical. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for a trial on the 
merits.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, Vicki 
Jo Daily (Daily), stated the following issue in her opening brief:

I. Where the primary 
victim involved in a serious snowmobile/truck wreck and its aftermath suffers a 
mental injury in the occurrence, after experiencing the especially horrendous 
death of the operator of the snowmobile, may the victim seek compensation from 
the owner of the snowmobile and the estate of the deceased snowmobile operator 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress?

[¶4]      Appellees, Ingrid 
Bone, administratrix of John Bone's estate (Bone), and Douglas Case (Case), 
articulated the following issues:

I. Whether appellant has 
waived the right to appeal as to the court's judgment in favor of appellee 
Douglas Case on the theory of negligent entrustment.

II. Whether the alleged 
negligent acts of appellee John Bone, deceased, in causing an 
automobile/snowmobile collision constitute the legal and proximate cause of 
appellant's alleged psychic injuries.

III. Whether the claim of 
appellant comes within the limitations of the rule in Gates v. Richardson [719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986)].

IV. Whether this Court 
should create an additional actionable claim for pure psychic injury beyond the 
limitations of the rule in Gates v. Richardson.

[¶5]      Thus challenged, 
Daily submitted a timely reply brief, positing two supplemental 
issues:

I. Does Gates v. 
Richardson prohibit compensation to a person who is a victim of negligence 
rather tha[n] a bystander observer of the consequences of 
negligence?

* * * * * *

II. Whether the appellant 
waived or abandoned her appeal of the summary judgment pertaining to defendant, 
Douglas Case?

II. 
FACTS

[¶6]      Bone, a 
fifty-six-year-old North Carolinian vacationing in Teton County, Wyoming, agreed 
to a snowmobile excursion with his friend, Case. Case, who had twenty years of 
snowmobiling experience, drove his own machine and provided Bone, a snow machine 
novice, with a high-performance machine for the trip. On the morning of February 
4, 1993, Case and a friend found themselves waiting on their snowmobiles at the 
crest of a small hill, looking back across U.S. Highway 261 at Bone, who had stopped the 
machine he was driving on the trail, thirty or forty feet short of the 
highway.

[¶7]      U.S. Highway 26 
was clear and dry on that February morning as Daily and her daughter drove south 
to honor a business commitment in Riverton, Wyoming. The speed limit on that 
stretch of road is fifty-five miles per hour, but Daily was proceeding at about 
forty-five miles per hour, having seen Case and being concerned about snowmobile 
traffic. Inexplicably, Bone then drove Case's snowmobile through a clearly 
posted "STOP" sign directly into Daily's path. Daily had no opportunity to avoid 
the impact, which all agree was directly attributable to operator error on 
Bone's part.

[¶8]      On impact, Daily 
saw Bone's helmet fly off as he was propelled on to the hood of her pickup, only 
to slide off as Daily stopped. Neither Daily nor her daughter sustained 
immediate physical injury, but Daily rushed to comfort and care for Bone, who 
was seriously injured. Daily cushioned Bone's head from the pavement, speaking 
to him reassuringly. Luckily, it seemed, an emergency medical technician arrived 
almost immediately and Daily assisted his efforts. However, Bone became agitated 
and was moved into an ambulance from which Daily was barred.

[¶9]      A medical 
evacuation helicopter circled the area and left without landing. Daily cannot 
remember who told her that Bone had died, but she does remember becoming 
distraught at the news and needing to be driven home. Thereafter, Daily's 
emotional equipoise deserted her, leaving her unable to work, fearful of leaving 
her home, and unable to relate well to others, including her husband and 
daughter. Daily was diagnosed as suffering from post traumatic stress disorder, 
depression and agoraphobia, all stemming directly from the accident. One expert 
calls her prognosis guarded, while another terms it positive "due mostly to her 
commitment to therapy and her desire to improve and master the feelings she is 
experiencing."

[¶10]   Daily sued, alleging negligence and 
recklessness against Bone's estate while accusing Case of negligence and 
negligent entrustment. Case filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 56(b), asserting that Case was neither negligent nor negligent in 
entrusting his snowmobile to Bone. Bone's estate filed a similar motion, 
suggesting Daily is not a "permissible plaintiff" in a suit alleging negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and, in any event, arguing that Daily's 
injuries were not proximately caused by the impact with Bone.

[¶11]   Recognizing a suit "for various 
forms of negligence," the district court nonetheless concluded that lack of a 
familial relationship barred Daily from recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress against Bone's estate and, consequently, barred any 
claim against Case. The district court also opined that no material factual 
issues would exist, even were negligent infliction of emotional distress a claim 
available to Daily.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. SCOPE AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶12]   Summary judgments are a beneficial 
tool for eliminating formal trials where only questions of law are at issue. 
Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 1986). Unadulterated issues of 
law must present themselves in the context of settled facts. Iberlin v. TCI 
Cablevision of Wyoming, Inc., 855 P.2d 716, 719 (Wyo. 1993). Accordingly, where 
genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment is inappropriate. Hanna 
v. Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 532 (Wyo. 1995). Materiality is a function of a 
disputed fact's capacity to establish or refute an essential element of any 
asserted cause or defense thereto. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶13]   Our perspective on factual matters 
in review of summary judgments affords a de novo review of the same record 
available to the district court. Forbis v. Minter, 869 P.2d 151, 152 (Wyo. 
1994). We indulge the materials of the party opposing summary judgment with 
every favorable inference which may fairly be drawn from the record. Tidwell v. 
HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1995). A general reluctance to place our 
imprimatur upon summary judgments redoubles in negligence cases which often turn 
on the factual issue of whether an actor behaved reasonably under the 
circumstances. Calkins v. Boydston, 796 P.2d 452, 454 (Wyo. 1990).

B. 
NEGLIGENCE

[¶14]   Three counts of Daily's complaint 
allege negligence. The elements of negligence are: (1) a duty, (2) a violation 
thereof, (3) which violation is the proximate cause of, (4) injury to the 
plaintiff. Thomas By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wyo. 1985); Hines v. Sweeney, 28 Wyo. 57, 201 P. 1018, 1021 
(1921).

1. 
DUTY

[¶15]   Without duty, negligence is not 
actionable. MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990). The 
existence of duty is a question of law, making an absence of duty the surest 
route to summary judgment in negligence actions. Tidwell, 896 P.2d  at 
1325.

[¶16]   Had he been at the wheel of an 
automobile, Bone's duty to stop would be a foregone conclusion. Rogers v. 
Hansen, 361 P.2d 676, 678 (Wyo. 1961). Because his vehicle was Case's 
snowmobile, the stop sign on Bone's trail only enhanced a pre-existing statutory 
duty of "yielding the right-of-way to all traffic in the main-traveled roadway." 
Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-801 (1994).

[¶17]   In Wyoming, duty may arise by 
operation of statute. Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 463, 344 P.2d 146, 156 
(1959). The facts developed for summary judgment show, as a matter of law, that 
Bone owed a duty to motorists like Daily to avoid collision. Existence of that 
legal duty is sufficient to commend the factual issue of Bone's negligence in 
colliding with Daily to a jury's deliberation. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 190 (Wyo. 1979).

2. VIOLATION 
OF DUTY

[¶18]   Automobile accidents involving 
violation of a duty to yield create issues of fact for examination by a jury. 
Brockett v. Prater, 675 P.2d 638, 641 (Wyo. 1984); Wilhelm v. Cukr, 68 Wyo. 1, 
23, 227 P.2d 988, 996 (1951). We can perceive no rational basis for withholding 
such factual matters from a jury merely because one vehicle happens to be a 
snowmobile.

3. PROXIMATE 
CAUSE

[¶19]   Whether the injury was the natural 
and probable consequence of Bone's collision with Daily is also a question of 
fact normally not to be taken from the jury. Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1993). Typically, a causal link is sought between a 
defendant's tort and compensable physical injury to the plaintiff. 
Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 115 (Wyo. 1992). Here, Bone's alleged 
negligence placed Daily, through no fault of her own, in the position of being 
the cause of Bone's demise. Somewhat paradoxically, then, although the physical 
injury was incurred by Bone, it is alleged to have caused pain and suffering to 
the physically uninjured Daily.

[¶20]   The operator of an instrumentality 
which causes the death of another might naturally be expected to suffer 
emotional distress, even in the complete absence of culpability. Outten v. 
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74, 79 (3rd Cir. 1991). In Wyoming, it 
is not necessary that a defendant anticipate the precise injury incurred - only 
that he be able to anticipate some injury as a result of his tort. Hines, 201 P. 
at 1021.

4. INJURY TO 
PLAINTIFF

[¶21]   Daily is armed with substantial 
evidence on the factual issue of damages. Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 11-12 
(Wyo. 1980) (quoting Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351, 352 (La. 1974)). However, because Daily alleges mental injury, the district 
court was drawn down the garden path of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress by resourceful counsel for Bone's estate and Case.

[¶22]   A certain historic reluctance to 
assess damages based upon mental suffering, alone, may be attributable to 
uncritical acceptance of "sonorous" though suspect assertions that "[m]ental 
pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the 
unlawful act complained of causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 
598, 11 Eng.Rep. 854, 863 (1861) (quoted in Calvert Magruder, Mental and 
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1033 
(1936)).

[¶23]   Surprisingly, though, a 
pre-Chaucerian English barmaid successfully sued the irate customer who sought 
better service with a hand axe which flew wide of its mark only when the serving 
girl ducked. I de S v. W de S, 22 Y.B. Edward III, f. 99, pl. 60 (1348). Chief 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. understood the logic of that ancient victory 
sufficiently to write for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that: "it 
is an arbitrary exception, based upon a notion of what is practicable, that 
prevents a recovery for visible illness resulting from nervous shock alone." 
Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 N.E. 737, 737 
(1902).

[¶24]   Homans concerned a rail passenger 
who received a slight blow as a consequence of the rail company's fault in the 
operation of a train and "afterwards had a good deal of suffering of a 
hysterical nature * * *." The passenger eventually claimed damages solely for 
"nervous shock" arising from the battery. Id. Chief Justice Holmes wrote that 
such injuries were compensable "when there has been a battery and the nervous 
shock results from the same wrongful management as the battery[.]" 
Id.

[¶25]   It is a fair statement of Wyoming 
law that Daily

"had a right to go about 
the public roads or places on [her] own business, free from molestation by 
[Bone] or any one, so long as [she] conducted [her]self in an orderly manner. * 
* * And any one guilty of violating any of these rights is liable for the actual 
damages suffered therefrom by the injured person. It matters not whether the 
wrong be one of pure neglect or a wanton or willful wrong; an action will lie 
for the actual damages suffered."

Williams v. 
Campbell, 22 Wyo. 1, 6, 133 P. 1071, 1072 (1913). The record before us suggests 
that Bone negligently injured Daily by the collision. If she can prove 
negligence, impact, and damages proximately flowing therefrom, recovery should 
not be denied simply because her injuries are mental rather than 
physical.

[¶26]   Such a recovery would be predicated 
upon the traditional, completed tort found when the negligence of one party 
results in an automobile collision which causes injury to the other party. 
"Whether there can be a recovery for the consequences of fright caused by 
unintentional want of care depends in the first place upon the question whether 
a legal right of the plaintiff has been invaded by the defendant's negligence." 
Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431, 433 (1931). Here, the impact was 
an invasion of Daily's right to go about her business "free from molestation[.]" 
Williams, 133 P.  at 1072.

[¶27]   When duty, breach and cause are 
established, recovery of damages for mental injury is not novel to Wyoming 
jurisprudence. W.C.P.J.I., No. 4.01 shows pain and suffering to be the first 
claimed element of damages. In the aftermath of a negligent impact, each 
succeeding element of damages in that instruction might be susceptible of proof 
notwithstanding the purely mental character of the injury. W.C.P.J.I., No. 
4.01(b) through (f).

C. NEGLIGENT 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

[¶28]   Like the familiar outlaws of a 
Bgrade western, scraping brush across their tracks and riding through water, the 
facts of this case do plenty to obscure the trail leading to our holding. Not 
only does Daily allege mental and emotional injuries, but instead of assigning 
physical injury to herself as the cause, she faults trauma to the alleged 
tortfeasor, Bone. Capitalizing thereon, Bone's estate and Case endeavor to 
divert attention from the underlying negligent impact to the proposition that 
Daily's claim is for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, as 
recognized by Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶29]   Negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is a tort theory currently in flux. R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 
1994). Care must be employed, however, to distinguish that tort from actions 
where a plaintiff is the direct victim of a traditional, completed tort. The 
nature of injuries caused by such a tort is neither the threshold nor the 
definitive question. Rather, as Chief Judge Cardozo recognized:

[L]iability is always 
anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences that go with 
liability. If there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider 
what damage might be recovered if there were a finding of a tort. We may assume, 
without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the abstract, but in 
relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences, 
however novel or extraordinary.

Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928). Daily's case is grounded 
in Bone's negligent collision with her, and appellees' maneuvering cannot 
obfuscate that well-settled basis. Bone's duty was not to collide with Daily. 
Duties giving rise to the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress 
have no application.

D. EXISTENCE 
OF FACTUAL ISSUES

[¶30]   The order being appealed concludes 
in a somewhat cryptic fashion:

4. Even if the Court was 
inclined to [accept] Plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, the Court does not agree there are genuine issues of material fact as 
to the negligent entrustment or general negligence claim. As such, genuine 
issues of material fact are not at issue in this case and the defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶31]   Without accepting the application 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress to the facts of this case, our 
holding is that Bone had a duty to avoid the collision with Daily. The existence 
of that duty obliges the district court to submit the factual issues of breach, 
proximate cause, injury and damages to a jury.

[¶32]   There is no question that Daily has 
a tough row to hoe on the issue of negligent entrustment, which we have held to 
require a showing that the "entruster either knew or should have known that the 
person to whom the instrumentality was entrusted was incompetent." Moore v. 
Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo. 1979) (citing Finch v. Canaday, 75 Wyo. 472, 
487, 297 P.2d 594, 598 (1956) and Restatement of Torts (Second), § 390 (1965)). 
The Restatement provides, however, that competence may be measured by 
inexperience, which Daily has alleged and appellees have admitted as to Bone 
(albeit in varying degrees) sufficient to create an issue of fact for a 
jury.

[¶33]   Finally, Daily predicates a request 
for punitive damages against Bone's estate upon allegations that Bone drove in a 
reckless manner. This claim must fail, as a matter of law, because punitive 
damages may not be recovered from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. Parker v. 
Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 525 (Wyo. 1995).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶34]   Almost a century has passed since 
Chief Justice Holmes recognized the ill-founded, archaic and arbitrary nature of 
the rule precluding recovery for mental distress occasioned by a battery but 
unaccompanied by profound physical trauma. Notwithstanding Chief Justice Holmes' 
sentence, we realize that some persist in characterizing the tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress more by virtue of the injury's nature than by 
consideration of the duty breached. See Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 611 So. 2d 1294 (Fla.App. 1992). This may render the district court's view 
of this case understandable. It cannot, however, summon our 
approval.

[¶35]   Case had a duty not to negligently 
entrust a snowmobile to an incompetent operator, and Bone had a duty not to run 
into Daily. Whether either negligently breached their duties causing damages for 
which Daily should be compensated are factual questions for a jury. Measurement 
of the legitimacy and proper extent of claims for mental and emotional damages 
stemming from a traditional, completed tort is the proper role of 
juries.

[¶36]   The summary judgment entered by the 
district court is reversed and the matter is remanded for a trial on the 
merits.

Footnote

1 The primary and most 
direct route linking Teton County with central Wyoming.