Title: Jerry Wayne Suttles and City of Homewood v. Eldetraud "Trudy" Roy (Appeal Application Overruled; Opinion of May 21, 2010, Modified by substitution of pages 16 and 17.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:05/21/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
____________________
1071453
____________________
Jerry Wayne Suttles and City of Homewood
v.
Eldetraud "Trudy" Roy
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-07-900894)
SHAW, Justice.
The City of Homewood ("Homewood") and Jerry Wayne
Suttles, a police officer employed by Homewood, appeal by
permission, in accordance with Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., from
the denial of their motion for a summary judgment in a
personal-injury action filed by Eldetraud "Trudy" Roy.  We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
1071453
2
Facts and Procedural History
According to the complaint, in May 2006 Roy was walking
along Central Avenue in Homewood.  When she approached the
corner of 29th Court Street and Central Avenue, several
Homewood police officers on motorcycles were stopped at the
intersection directing traffic.  Apparently, a fund-raising
event known as the "Torch Run" was underway and participants
were about to proceed through that intersection. 
Roy alleges that she was given permission by one of the
police officers to cross the intersection.  As she did so, she
was struck by a motorcycle being driven by Suttles.  Roy
contended that, at the time of the collision, Suttles "was
driving at a high rate of speed while conducting 'leap frog'
maneuvers purportedly to control traffic during the Torch Run
event."  Roy suffered numerous injuries. 
On April 14, 2007, Roy filed a complaint seeking damages
from Homewood, Suttles, and fictitiously named defendants,
claiming that they had caused her injuries.  She also alleged
that Homewood was vicariously liable for Suttles's actions and
for the actions of certain fictitiously named defendants.  Roy
named Suttles in both his official capacity as a Homewood
1071453
3
police officer and in his individual capacity.  Suttles and
Homewood separately answered Roy's complaint. 
In September 2007, Suttles and Homewood filed a joint
motion seeking a partial summary judgment on the issue of
damages.  Specifically, they alleged that, at the time of the
accident, Suttles was acting in the line and scope of his
employment as a police officer of Homewood.  Under Ala. Code
1975, § 11-93-2 and §§ 11-47-24(a) and -190, they contended,
the maximum amount of damages Roy could recover in her action
against them was $100,000.  Thus, Homewood and Suttles sought
a partial summary judgment, stating: 
"The applicable law in the present case is
clear. Officer Suttles and the City of Homewood
cannot settle or compromise[] the plaintiff's claims
against them for any amount greater than the
statutory $100,000 cap. Rather than spend the
extraordinary time and expense involved with the
litigation of this cause of action, the defendants
should be allowed to settle the plaintiff's claims
pursuant to the statutory cap. Therefore, there is
no genuine issue of material fact as to the maximum
amount of damages that the plaintiff could recover
from the defendants, and the defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law pertaining to their
maximum liability of $100,000. 
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants
respectfully request this Honorable Court enter an
Order, as requested in defendants' Memorandum of
Law, granting Summary Judgment in their favor and
holding that the Statutory Cap of $100,000 applies
1071453
4
to this cause of action."
Suttles subsequently also moved for a summary judgment
claiming that he was entitled to State-agent immunity as to
the claims alleged against him in his individual capacity. 
Roy opposed Homewood and Suttles's motion for a partial
summary judgment on the damages issue, arguing that, although
the damages for claims against Homewood and against Suttles in
his official capacity may be capped at $100,000, the cap does
not apply to the claim against Suttles in his individual
capacity.
In an order dated June 12, 2008, the trial court granted
in part and denied in part the joint motion:  
"The City of Homewood['s] motion asking this
Court to enter judgment stating as a matter of law
that the Plaintiff Eldetraud 'Trudy' Roy cannot
recover against the city an amount exceeding the
damages limitations under Ala. Code [1975,] §
11-93-2, is hereby GRANTED.
"To the extent the Defendants' Motion for
Summary 
Judgment 
attempts 
to 
limit 
Officer
Suttles['s] 
liability of One Hundred Thousand
Dollars 
($100,000.00) 
under 
Plaintiff's 
claim
against him in his personal and individual capacity,
Defendants' Summary Judgment is DENIED.
"The Court further finds that there are genuine
issues of fact and that it is for a jury to decide
whether Officer Suttles is liable for claims against
1071453
Although the trial court's June 12, 2008, order did not
1
purport to rule on Suttles's separate summary-judgment motion
asserting State-agent immunity, the trial court nevertheless
ruled that Homewood and Suttles's immunity issue presented
genuine issues of fact.  
5
him in his individual and personal capacity." 1
   
The trial court subsequently certified its June 12 order
as appropriate for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5, Ala.
R. App P., and stated that the action presented three
controlling questions of law "as to which there are
substantial grounds for difference of opinion."  Homewood and
Suttles petitioned this Court for an interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Rule 5; we granted the petition and ordered answer
and briefs.
I.
The first question identified by the trial court is as
follows:  
"1. Given [Roy's] concession that the acts which
form the basis of her claims against the City of
Homewood and Officer Suttles were performed by
Suttles in the line and scope of his employment as
a police officer for the City of Homewood, can
[Roy] nevertheless state a cognizable, direct claim
for relief against Officer Suttles in his individual
and personal capacity?"
On appeal, Homewood and Suttles argue that because the
accident occurred while Suttles was working in the line and
1071453
6
scope of his employment for Homewood, Roy cannot pursue an
action against Suttles in his individual capacity.  Homewood
and Suttles's sole argument in support of this contention
relies on the rationale of our recent decision in Ex parte
Hale, 6 So. 3d 452 (2008).  In Hale, this Court, citing Ex
parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 2005), noted that sheriffs
(and deputy sheriffs) may be immune, under Ala. Const. 1901,
art. I, § 14, from a civil action seeking damages from them in
their individual capacities.  Hale, 6 So. 3d at 457.  See also
Davis, 930 So. 2d at 501 (noting that deputy sheriffs enjoy
the same immunity as sheriffs).  Homewood and Suttles contend
that Suttles should be afforded similar immunity from a suit
naming him in his individual capacity.  We disagree.
Sheriffs and municipal peace officers are protected from
suits seeking damages from them in their individual capacity
by two different forms of immunity: sheriffs are protected by
State immunity under § 14, and municipal peace officers are
protected by State-agent immunity.  These two types of
immunity, and accordingly sheriffs and municipal peace
officers, are treated differently under Alabama law.
Generally, sheriffs enjoy State immunity under § 14 from
1071453
7
actions against them in their individual capacities for acts
they performed in the line and scope of their employment.
Davis, 930 So. 2d at 500-01 (noting in an action against a
deputy sheriff that "a claim for monetary damages made against
a constitutional officer in the officer's individual capacity
is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the
basis of the alleged liability were performed within the
course and scope of the officer's employment"); see also Hale,
6 So. 3d at 457 (holding that acts by a sheriff, which gave
rise to the plaintiff's claim against him, were taken "in the
execution of his duties as sheriff," and, thus, the sheriff
was immune under § 14 from an action seeking damages against
him in his individual capacity).  This immunity is not
unlimited and, in certain instances, § 14 does not protect
sheriffs from an action against them in their individual
capacity.  Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala.
1994) (noting situations in which § 14 does not shield
sheriffs from an action brought against them in either their
official or individual capacities).
Conversely, peace officers are afforded immunity by Ala.
Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a), and the test for State-agent immunity
1071453
8
set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), as
modified in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala.
2006) (incorporating the peace-officer-immunity standard
provided in § 6-5-338(a) into the State-agent-immunity
analysis found in Cranman).  See Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d
1276 (Ala. 2008), and City of Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So. 2d
910, 916 (Ala. 2007) ("Immunity applies to employees of
municipalities in the same manner that immunity applies to
employees of the State." (citing Cranman, supra)).  Under that
formulation, 
"'[a] State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'....
"'(4) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement 
officers' 
arresting 
or
attempting to arrest persons, or serving as
peace 
officers 
under 
circumstances
entitling 
such 
officers 
to 
immunity
pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975.'"
Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 309 (quoting and modifying Cranman, 792
So. 2d at 405).  In certain circumstances, a peace officer is
not entitled to such immunity from an action seeking liability
1071453
9
in his or her individual capacity:
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  
The immunity provided to sheriffs and deputy sheriffs
stems from the fact that a sheriff is an executive officer of
the State: "A sheriff is an executive officer of the State of
Alabama, who is immune from suit under Article I, § 14,
Alabama Constitution of 1901, in the execution of the duties
of his office ...."  Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 442-43
(Ala. 1987).  See also Ala. Const. 1901, art. V, § 112 ("The
executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant
governor, 
attorney-general, 
state 
auditor, 
secretary 
of 
state,
state treasurer, superintendent of education, commissioner of
agriculture and industries, and a sheriff for each county.").
"[A] suit against a sheriff is 'essentially a suit against the
state' and thus 'not maintainable'" under § 14 of the
1071453
10
constitution.  Parker, 519 So. 2d at 446 (quoting Montiel v.
Holcombe, 240 Ala. 352, 199 So. 245 (1940)). 
Municipal peace officers, however, are "deemed to be
officers of this state" for purposes of Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-
338(a), and thus whether they are afforded immunity when sued
in their individual capacity is determined under a different
standard:
   
"'Whether [§ 14] immunity serves as a
defense to an action against a state
officer or employee sued in his individual
capacity depends upon the degree to which
the action involves a State interest....
"'When determining whether a State
interest in an action against a state
official 
or 
employee 
in 
his 
or 
her
individual 
capacity 
is 
sufficient 
to
trigger the immunity granted by § 14, our
cases distinguish between the standards
applied to those state agents or employees
whose 
positions 
exist 
by 
virtue 
of
legislative pronouncement and those who
serve as the constitutional officers of
this State.  We have held that State-agent
immunity may bar an action against a state
agent or employee under the principles
announced in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d
392 (Ala. 2000). See Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000) (adopting, by
majority, the Cranman restatement of the
rule 
governing 
State-agent 
immunity).
However, this Court has consistently held
that a claim for monetary damages made
against a constitutional officer in the
officer's individual capacity is barred by
1071453
11
State immunity whenever the acts that are
the basis of the alleged liability were
performed within the course and scope of
the officer's employment.'"
Hale, 6 So. 3d at 457 (quoting Davis, 930 So. 2d at 500-01
(emphasis in Hale omitted; other emphasis added)).  
Homewood and Suttles contend that "[t]here is no factual
or legal basis for treating these immunities any differently
under these circumstances."  Homewood and Suttles's brief at
15.  However, as the above authorities indicate, the
distinction between the type of immunity afforded sheriffs and
the type afforded municipal peace officers is rooted in the
unique 
constitutional 
status of sheriffs as executive
officers, juxtaposed against the position of municipal peace
officers, which is created by statute.  Although Suttles may
be entitled to State-agent immunity under the test in Cranman,
as extended in Hollis, Homewood and Suttles have not
demonstrated that he is entitled to § 14 immunity under the
rationale of Hale, or that Hale provides Suttles with blanket
immunity from an action against him in his individual
capacity.  Homewood and Suttles have thus not established that
the trial court erred in denying their motion for a summary
judgment on this ground.  
1071453
12
II.
The trial court's second controlling question of law is
as follows:  
"2. If [Roy] can state a cognizable, direct
claim against Officer Suttles in his individual and
personal 
capacity 
(notwithstanding 
[Roy's]
concession that Suttles'[s] alleged actions which
form the basis of her claims were performed by him
in the line and scope of his employment), does
Alabama law nevertheless cap at no more than
$100,000 the damages which, in the event of a
finding of liability, [Roy] may in the aggregate
recover against the City of Homewood and Officer
Suttles?"
Homewood and Suttles argue, citing Benson v. City of
Birmingham, 659 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1995), and Smitherman v.
Marshall County Commission, 746 So. 2d 1001 (Ala. 1999), that
if Roy can maintain an action against Suttles in his
individual capacity, then Alabama law caps the recoverable
damages against Suttles to $100,000.
Alabama Code 1975, § 11-47-190, states generally that a
city or town may be found liable for the actions of its
employees, and provides for a statutory cap of recovery:
"No city or town shall be liable for damages for
injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or
corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or
suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or
unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee
of the municipality engaged in work therefor and
1071453
"Governmental entity" is defined in Ala. Code 1975, § 11-
2
93-1(1), and includes both municipalities and counties.  
13
while acting in the line of his or her duty, or
unless the said injury or wrong was done or suffered
through the neglect or carelessness or failure to
remedy some defect in the streets, alleys, public
ways, or buildings after the same had been called to
the attention of the council or other governing body
or 
after 
the 
same 
had 
existed 
for 
such 
an
unreasonable 
length 
of 
time 
as 
to 
raise 
a
presumption of knowledge of such defect on the part
of the council or other governing body and whenever
the city or town shall be made liable for damages by
reason of the unauthorized or wrongful acts or
negligence, carelessness, or unskillfulness of any
person 
or 
corporation, 
then 
such 
person 
or
corporation shall be liable to an action on the same
account by the party so injured. However, no
recovery 
may 
be 
had 
under 
any 
judgment 
or
combination of judgments, whether direct or by way
of indemnity under Section 11-47-24, or otherwise,
arising out of a single occurrence, against a
municipality, and/or any officer or officers, or
employee or employees, or agents thereof, in excess
of a total [of] $100,000 per injured person up to a
maximum of $300,000 per single occurrence, the
limits set out in the provisions of Section 11-93-2
notwithstanding."
Section 11-93-2 similarly provides a $100,000 cap for recovery
against "a governmental entity" :
2
"The recovery of damages under any judgment
against a governmental entity shall be limited to
$100,000.00 for bodily injury or death for one
person in any single occurrence. Recovery of damages
under 
any 
judgment 
or 
judgments 
against 
a
governmental entity shall be limited to $300,000.00
in the aggregate where more than two persons have
claims or judgments on account of bodily injury or
1071453
See generally Prattville v. Corley, 892 So. 2d 845 (Ala.
3
2003), for a discussion of the difference in the scope of §
11-47-190 and § 11-93-2, which is not pertinent in the instant
case.
14
death arising out of any single occurrence. Recovery
of damages under any judgment against a governmental
entity shall be limited to $100,000.00 for damage or
loss 
of 
property 
arising 
out 
of 
any 
single
occurrence. No governmental entity shall settle or
compromise any claim for bodily injury, death or
property damage in excess of the amounts hereinabove
set forth."  
3
Further, under § 11-47-24(a), municipal corporations are
required to indemnify their employees in certain situations:
"Whenever any employee of a municipal corporation of
the State of Alabama shall be sued for damages
arising out of the performance of his official
duties, and while operating a motor vehicle or
equipment engaged in the course of his employment,
such government agency shall be authorized and
required to provide defense counsel for such
employees in such suit and to indemnify him from any
judgment rendered against him in such suit. In no
event shall a municipal corporation of the state be
required to provide defense and indemnity for
employees who may be sued for damages arising out of
actions which were either intentional or willful or
wanton."
In Benson, supra, this Court was called upon to determine
whether the $100,000 damages cap on municipal liability found
at § 11-93-2 was applicable to indemnity claims under §
11-47-24(a).  Specifically, the trial court in that case
entered a judgment on a jury verdict in a wrongful-death
1071453
15
action against the City of Birmingham ("the City") and one of
its police officers for $1,600,000.  The City made a payment
of $100,000, plus interest, to the plaintiff, arguing that
under § 11-93-2 it was required to pay no more than that
amount.  However, the plaintiff argued that § 11-47-24
required the City to indemnify its employee and that there was
no limitation on the amount of indemnity provided by that Code
section; thus, the plaintiff argued, the City was responsible
for the entire amount of the $1,600,000 judgment.  
This Court described the issue on appeal as "whether the
City may be liable for more than $100,000 when it is required
to indemnify a negligent employee."  659 So. 2d at 86.
Harmonizing the two Code sections, this Court stated: 
"For § 11-93-2 to be given proper effect, the
cap must be applicable to indemnity actions. If it
were not, the City could be subjected to judgments
over $100,000 just as surely as if the cap were not
in place, because almost all actions against
municipalities will be based on allegations of
negligence 
by 
municipal 
employees. 
Thus, 
if
plaintiffs were able to circumvent the cap simply by
naming an employee as a defendant and then requiring
the city to indemnify the employee for the entire
amount 
of 
a 
large 
judgment, 
the 
cap 
would
effectively be repealed. This result can be avoided
by construing the two statutes harmoniously--holding
that § 11-47-24 provides for indemnification only to
the limits of § 11-93-2."
1071453
16
659 So. 2d at 86.  We thus held "that a municipality may
indemnify a negligent employee only up to the limits specified
in § 11-93-2 ...."  659 So. 2d at 87.
Additionally, in Smitherman, supra, the plaintiffs sued
various county officials and employees for damage sustained
as the result of an allegedly improperly maintained roadway.
The Court held that the claims against the county officials
and county employees named in their official capacity were
subject to the $100,000 cap of § 11-93-2.  746 So. 2d at 1008.
This was because "claims against county commissioners and
employees in their official capacity are, as a matter of law,
claims against the county ...."  Smitherman, 746 So. 2d at
1007.  See also  Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep't of Human Res.,
835 So. 2d 131, 133 (Ala. 2002) ("A suit against ... State
agents in their official capacities[] is a suit against the
State.").   
Insofar as Roy's action seeks damages against Suttles in
his official capacity, which, as noted in Smitherman, is, as
a matter of law, effectively a claim against Homewood, the cap
of § 11-93-2 limits any recovery against Homewood and Suttles
to $100,000.  Suttles and Homewood thus contend that "it makes
1071453
17
no sense at all" for the claims against Suttles in his
official capacity "to be governed by the statutory damages
cap" without the claims against him in his individual capacity
also being subject to the cap.  Homewood and Suttles's brief
at 20.  This distinction-–capping damages for claims against
Suttles in his official capacity but not capping damages for
claims asserted against him in his individual capacity--
however, is clearly provided by the cited authorities.  
Section 11-93-2 caps the damages one may recover "against
a governmental entity."  The policy of § 11-93-2 is to
"preserve" and "protect[] the public coffers, for the benefit
of all of the citizenry ...."  Benson, 659 So. 2d at 86-87.
Because a claim against a county employee or municipal
employee in his or her official capacity is necessarily a
claim against the county or municipality, damages for such a
claim are capped by § 11-93-2 at $100,000.  A claim against an
employee in his or her individual capacity, however, does not
seek to recover damages from the governmental entity; thus, by
its plain language, § 11-93-2 has no application in such a
case.  See Gamble v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1513 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Whether a state
1071453
Homewood and Suttles in their initial brief appear to
4
cite Smitherman for the proposition that because the allegedly
tortious acts that form the basis of Roy's claims were
performed by Suttles while he was acting in the line and scope
18
officer is being sued for damages in an official or an
individual capacity is not mere semantics; the question is
whether the plaintiff is reasonably seeking relief from the
state coffers or from the individual's assets."  (quoted in Ex
parte Troy Univ., 961 So. 2d 105, 110 (Ala. 2006))).
Homewood and Suttles contend that at the time of Roy's
injuries Suttles was acting in the line and scope of his
employment and that there is no factual distinction between
Roy's claims against Suttles in his official capacity and in
his individual capacity.  They thus argue that "the
inescapable conclusion is that it makes no sense at all" for
damages sought against him in his official capacity to be
capped, while damages sought against him in his individual
capacity are not.  However, no authority is cited or argument
advanced demonstrating that this Court or the trial court can
consider the individual claim against Suttles as, in
substance, an official-capacity claim subject to the cap of §
11-93-2; further, nothing in Benson, Smitherman, or § 11-93-2
allows such a result.   "Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.,
4
1071453
of his employment, Roy could sue Suttles only in his official
capacity.  In an amicus curiae brief, the City of Huntsville
specifically argues that Smitherman held "that a public
officer or employee defendant engaged in the performance of
their official duties acts only within their official capacity
and may only be sued in that capacity."  Smitherman, however,
does not stand for this proposition.  In that case, the trial
court held that a county engineer sued in his individual
capacity was entitled to a summary judgment because there was
"no evidence" indicating that he "acted in his individual
capacity with regard to the issues" presented in the
complaint.  746  So. 2d at 1003.  We affirmed the trial
court's judgment because the appellant did not, on appeal,
challenge the summary judgment in favor of the county engineer
on the claim alleged against him in his individual capacity.
Although this Court went on to state, in dicta, that the
record supported the trial court's judgment, this Court did
not affirm on the basis of the rationale of the trial court's
holding.  Id. at 1004.  
Suttles and Homewood also state in the "summary of the
5
argument" and in the "conclusion" portions of their brief that
19
requires that an argument in an appellant's ... brief contain
'citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and
parts of the record relied on.'" Long v. Bryant, 992 So. 2d
673, 683 (Ala. 2008).  "'[W]here no legal authority is cited
or argued, the effect is the same as if no argument had been
made.'" Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So. 2d 488, 493 (Ala.
2005) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 506 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1987)).  Thus, Homewood and Suttles have not
demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying their
motion for a summary judgment on this issue.   
5
1071453
the plain language of § 11-47-190 provides that no recovery
may be had against an employee of a municipality in excess of
$100,000, regardless of whether the employee is sued in his
individual 
or 
official 
capacity. 
 
No 
explanation 
or
elaboration on this argument is found in the initial brief,
and no authority is cited supporting their interpretation of
the Code section.  Therefore, we decline to address this
issue.
20
III.
In its third question, the trial court asks whether a
determination of State-agent immunity under Cranman is a
question of law or a question of fact:  
"If [Roy] can state a cognizable, direct claim
against Officer Suttles in his individual and
personal 
capacity 
(notwithstanding 
[Roy's]
concession that Suttles'[s] alleged actions which
form the basis of her claims were performed by him
in the line and scope of his employment), [then]
Suttles'[s] liability is dependent on, among other
things, whether he is entitled to immunity under Ex
parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), and its
progeny. Is it a question of law for the court (as
is the similar defense of qualified immunity in
federal actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) or a
question of fact for the jury whether Suttles is
entitled to such immunity? If it is [a] question of
law for the court, then based on the record
evidence, is Suttles immune from [Roy's] claims?"
In its order denying Homewood and Suttles's motion for a
summary judgment, the trial court stated: "The Court further
finds that there are genuine issues of fact and that it is for
a jury to decide whether Officer Suttles is liable for claims
1071453
21
against him in his individual and personal capacity."
Homewood and Suttles construe this as a holding that the
availability of State-agent immunity is a question of fact for
the jury.   
Prior decisions of this Court state that "'"[t]he
applicability of the doctrine of discretionary function [now
called State-agent immunity] must be determined on a
case-by-case basis, and it is a question of law to be decided
by the trial court."'" Ex parte Sawyer, 984 So. 2d 1100,
1106-07 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21, 28
(Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685,
689 (Ala. 1998)).  See also Lightfoot v. Floyd, 667 So. 2d 56,
64 (Ala. 1995) ("The question whether a public official is
entitled to qualified immunity is one to be decided as a
matter of law.").  In determining whether immunity under
Cranman 
applies, 
this 
Court 
has 
established 
a
"burden-shifting" process:  
"In order to claim State-agent immunity, a State
agent bears the burden of demonstrating that the
plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would
entitle the State agent to immunity. Giambrone[v.
Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046,] 1052 [(Ala. 2003)]; Ex
parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala. 2002). If the
State agent makes such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent
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22
acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, or beyond his or her authority. Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex
parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998). 'A
State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore
not immune when he or she "fail[s] to discharge
duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations,
such as those stated on a checklist."' Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.
2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000))."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
When applied in the context of a motion for a summary
judgment, this process may result in an issue of disputed
material fact, and a determination of that fact may require
resolution by a jury: "If there is a genuine issue as to any
material fact on the question whether the movant is entitled
to immunity, then the moving party is not entitled to a
summary judgment. Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P."  Ex parte Wood,
852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002); Blackwood v. City of
Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495, 507 (Ala. 2006) (holding that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the State-
agent defendant's rate of speed; a jury's determination of
that speed would determine whether the defendant was entitled
to State-agent immunity and privilege under Ala. Code 1975, §
6-5-338(a) and § 32-5A-7(b)(3)).  The existence of a genuine
issue of material fact may require a factual issue to be
1071453
23
determined 
by 
a 
jury, 
"under 
appropriate 
instructions 
from 
the
trial court," Blackwood, 936 So. 2d at 507, but the
availability of State-agent immunity is ultimately a question
of law to be determined by the court.  To the extent that the
trial court held that the jury would determine the
availability to Suttles of State-agent immunity, and not just
disputed issues of fact, the trial court's denial of the
motion for a summary judgment is due to be reversed.   
Suttles and Homewood request this Court to review the
evidence and determine whether Suttles was entitled to State-
agent immunity under Cranman.  However, it is unclear whether
the trial court has yet undertaken such an examination.
Specifically, the third question states in part:  "If [the
existence of State-agent immunity] is [a] question of law for
the court, then based on the record evidence, is Suttles
immune from [Roy's] claims?" This issue must first be
addressed by the trial court, subject, under appropriate
circumstances, to review by this Court.  
Conclusion
The trial court's denial of Homewood and Suttles's motion
for a summary judgment as to the claims against Suttles in his
1071453
24
individual capacity is affirmed.  That part of the trial
court's judgment holding that the jury is to decide whether
Suttles is entitled to State-agent immunity is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for the trial court to determine whether
Suttles's summary-judgment motion demonstrates that he is
entitled to a judgment as a matter law on that issue.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.