Title: State ex rel. Chuvalas v. Tompkins

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. CHUVALAS, APPELLANT, v. TOMPKINS, DIRECTOR, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Chuvalas v. Tompkins (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Mandamus to compel Director of Department of Human Services to reinstate 
relator to her prior position in the Support Enforcement Tracking Systems 
and Direct Services Unit — Writ denied, when. 
(No. 97-2233 — Submitted June 24, 1998 — Decided September 23, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD10-1331. 
 
Appellant, Sharon Chuvalas, is a classified civil service employee of the 
Ohio Department of Human Services (“DHS”).  Chuvalas held the job 
classification title of Human Services Program Administrator 3 and served as the 
Administrative Chief of the Child Care Program Development Section of the DHS 
Bureau of Child Care. 
 
Chuvalas filed a notice of appeal with the State Personnel Board of Review 
(“board”), alleging that, contrary to law, DHS reduced her position by changing 
her job duties.  In August 1995, Chuvalas and DHS entered into an “Agreed 
Entry/Settlement Agreement and Release” concerning the appeal and filed it with 
the board.  Under the settlement agreement, DHS agreed to transfer Chuvalas to 
position control number 74001.2(22) in the Support Enforcement Tracking 
Systems & Direct Services Unit (“SETS”) of the DHS Child Support Enforcement 
Division, and Chuvalas waived her right to her former position.  The parties 
agreed that Chuvalas’s job classification title would remain as Human Services 
Program Administrator 3.  Both Chuvalas and DHS requested that the board make 
their agreed entry, which included their settlement agreement and release, a board 
order. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the board entered an order of dismissal.  In its order, the 
board, after noting that the parties’ settlement agreement had been signed and 
 
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incorporated into the record, ruled that “[b]ased on the fact that the parties have 
settled this matter, the Board hereby orders that this appeal be DISMISSED.”   The 
board did not adopt the agreed entry as part of its order. 
 
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, DHS transferred Chuvalas into 
position control number 74001.2(22) with SETS in August 1995.  At the time of 
her transfer, the sole focus of SETS was its preparation for a federal certification 
review.  SETS is a statewide automated system that permits case management of 
child support cases.  The certification review required all SETS staff, including 
management, to complete tasks ranging from high-level systems work to minor 
clerical duties.  According to her supervisor, Chuvalas lacked the knowledge to 
immediately perform the duties of her position description, although she had been 
provided with the requisite training materials. 
 
In October 1995, Chuvalas voluntarily left SETS to go to the Bureau of 
JOBS Unit in the DHS Family Assistance and Child Support Division. When 
Chuvalas left SETS, DHS dissolved position control number 74001.2(22) because 
existing staff already handled some of these duties and the remaining specified 
duties were not critical to the certification review. 
 
In May 1997, DHS transferred Chuvalas to its Bureau of Employer 
Outreach and Linkage.  Despite the transfers, Chuvalas kept her job classification 
title of Human Services Program Administrator 3, and her salary and benefits 
remained the same. 
 
After Chuvalas complained to DHS that it had failed to abide by the terms 
of the settlement agreement and board order by not employing her in position 
control number 74001.2(22) with SETS, she filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County. In her complaint, as subsequently amended, 
Chuvalas requested a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, DHS Director Arnold 
 
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Tompkins, to reinstate her to position control number 74001.2(22) in SETS and to 
assign her the duties associated with that position.  The parties submitted evidence 
and briefs. 
 
The court of appeals denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Suzanne M. Stasiewicz, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Margaret A. Telb, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In her sole proposition of law, Chuvalas asserts that the court 
of appeals erred in denying the writ because extraordinary relief in mandamus is 
appropriate when a public employer like DHS fails to comply with a State 
Personnel Board of Review order. 
 
For the following reasons, however, this assertion lacks merit, and the court 
of appeals correctly denied the writ. 
 
First, DHS complied with the board’s order.  The board never adopted the 
parties’ agreed entry and settlement agreement as a board order.  Instead, the board 
merely noted that the agreement had been filed with it and relied on the fact that 
the parties had settled Chuvalas’s appeal.  DHS also initially placed Chuvalas in 
the SETS position specified by the settlement agreement. 
 
Second, Chuvalas waived any right she had under the settlement agreement 
to the SETS position when she voluntarily left SETS for a different position.  “ 
‘As a general rule, the doctrine of waiver is applicable to all personal rights and 
privileges, whether secured by contract, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the 
Constitution, provided that the waiver does not violate public policy.’ ”  Sanitary 
 
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Commercial Serv., Inc. v. Shank (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 178, 180, 566 N.E.2d 1215, 
1218, quoting State ex rel. Hess v. Akron (1937), 132 Ohio St. 305, 307, 8 O.O. 
76, 77, 7 N.E.2d 411, 413. 
 
Third, to the extent that Chuvalas asserts that DHS’s actions constitute a 
wrongful reduction in her position, she had an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law by way of administrative appeal under R.C. 124.34.  “ ‘Where a 
constitutional process of appeal has been legislatively provided, the sole fact that 
pursuing such process would encompass more delay and inconvenience than 
seeking a writ of mandamus is insufficient to prevent the process from constituting 
a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Toledo Metro Fed. Credit Union v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
529, 532, 678 N.E.2d 1396, 1398, quoting State ex rel. Willis v. Sheboy (1983), 6 
Ohio St.3d 167, 6 OBR 225, 451 N.E.2d 1200, paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Mandamus may not be employed as a substitute for a civil service appeal.  State ex 
rel. Minor v. Eschen (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 136, 656 N.E.2d 940, 943. 
 
Finally, contrary to Chuvalas’s contention on appeal, the court of appeals 
could properly consider the affidavits attached to appellee’s brief filed in that 
court in its merit determination.  Chuvalas waived any objection to these affidavits 
by not moving to strike them or otherwise specifying their alleged impropriety.  
See, e.g., Evid.R. 103(A)(1); cf. State ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning 
Comm. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 301, 685 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (“ ‘While the 
court of appeals may consider evidence other than that listed in Civ.R. 56 when 
there is no objection, it need not do so.’ ”). 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
denying the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.