Title: Olson v. Felix

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

146 N.W.2d 866 (1966) Luella OLSON, widow of Lawrence Olson, deceased employe, Respondent, v. Myron FELIX et al., Relators. No. 40012. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 9, 1966. Quinlivan, Quinlivan & Williams, St. Cloud, for relators. Theodore F. Neils, St. Cloud, for respondent. SHERAN, Justice. Certiorari to review a decision of the Industrial Commission awarding benefits to the surviving wife of Lawrence Olson, deceased employee of Myron Felix. The employer-relator and Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, insurer-relator, *867 contend that the record compels a finding that intoxication was the proximate cause of the employee's fatal injury and that recovery should be denied under the provisions of Minn.St. 176.021, subd. 1. From the record it appears that the decedent was employed by a road contractor as a grader operator. He was so employed for a period of about 15 years and on one occasion was taken off the job because of drinking. His employer testified, however, that during the year of the accident he had not been drinking on the job. On the day of the accident he left home at about 8 a.m. and reported to his employer for work between 9 and 9:30 a.m. There was no evidence that he had been drinking at that time. He was assigned to do grading work on a county road. In his work he operated a road grader with tandem wheels, powered by a diesel engine. The machine weighed about 28,000 pounds. On the open road the grader traveled at about 20 miles an hour and moved at about 3 miles an hour when engaged in grading. At about 12:30 p.m. a farmer noticed the grader in a field adjoining the road and observed that it was moving at a "[r]eal slow speed, just like idling." He observed the body lying in the field and asked a neighboring farmer to report the fact to the sheriff. The tracks of the grader were visible, leading off the road into the field. The body was lying in the track of the left rear wheel between the grader and the road. Decedent's toolbox, which weighed about 20 pounds, was found near the body, as were a wrench and screwdriver. An examination of the grader disclosed that a small piece of the hydraulic control valve was broken which interfered with the steering of the grader and that the machine had been moved into the field to repair the defect. The employee was dead at the time the doctor arrived. It was determined that the cause of his death was "fractures of the skull and injuries of the brain and crushing of the chest." The autopsy disclosed there was an alcoholic content in his system of 0.3 percent. The referee found as facts that the employee "sustained a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment resulting in his death" and that "the defense of intoxication asserted by the respondents herein as being the proximate cause of the death of the employee was not supported by the evidence." The findings were reviewed by the Industrial Commission and affirmed in a unanimous opinion. It is not disputed by relators that decedent met his death in the scope of his employment and that his death is compensable "unless * * * the intoxication * * * is the proximate cause of the injury." Relators concede that the burden of proof of the defense of intoxication is upon the employer. In an able and persuasive argument relators assert that the evidence compels the conclusion that intoxication was in fact the proximate cause of injury and death. It is urged: "Whenever intoxication predominates as a factor in causing injury or death to the extent that other factors become an occasion rather than a cause, then intoxication is the proximate cause." Relators point to the record which contains the testimony of two pathologists to the effect that a person with the percentage of alcoholic blood content found in the decedent would lack rationality, would have poor judgment, and would be close to a comatose state. On the other hand, however, the record establishes that shortly before the accident took place, the decedent had completed a good grading job; that he had the judgment to turn off the road into the field to repair a defect in the equipment; and in turning into the field had raised the blade of the grader so it could proceed through a shallow ditch. The evidence established that he removed a toolbox weighing 20 pounds from the cab of the machine and chose the tools necessary to make the required repairs. *868 These tools were found lying alongside his toolbox. 1-2. Relators rely for reversal on our decision in Fogarty v. Martin Hotel Co., 257 Minn. 398, 101 N.W.2d 601. In that case we affirmed the Industrial Commission's holding that the death of an intoxicated employee did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. At the time of the accident which caused the death the employee had departed from the course of his employment. We there said (257 Minn. 405, 101 N.W.2d 606): Not only the clinical evidence but also the surrounding facts and circumstances established a state of intoxication which left the employee practically helpless. We fully discussed the law relating to the defense of intoxication in that case, quoting State ex rel. Green v. District Court, 145 Minn. 96, 98, 176 N.W. 155, 156, as follows: An important distinction between the case before us and the Fogarty case is that in Fogarty we were asked to reverse the Industrial Commission's order denying compensation. Here we are asked to reverse the order of the Industrial Commission granting compensation. In Fogarty we said (257 Minn. 403, 101 N.W.2d 605): The opinion of the Industrial Commission contains a succinct statement of the facts as they appear in the record. It states: While we agree that the commission might well have found otherwise, we are required to conform to our oft-repeated rules relating to the review of Industrial Commission findings. These rules apply with equal force, both to findings with reference to proximate cause and to those concerning whether or not the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. While it may be true that the intoxication of the decedent was a contributory factor in the accident, we cannot say that the commission was wrong in determining under the evidence that the intoxication was not the proximate cause. That conclusion is supported by circumstantial and physical evidence. It is known that individuals have different tolerances for alcohol and that, as the commission pointed out in its opinion, sober persons are sometimes injured while working under motor vehicles. Respondent is allowed $250 attorney's fees in this court. Affirmed.