Title: The Florida Bar v. Daniel Mark Cohen

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2724 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
DANIEL MARK COHEN, 
Respondent. 
 
[February 12, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that respondent Daniel 
Mark Cohen be found guilty of professional misconduct in violation of the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules) and receive a public reprimand, among 
other sanctions.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  As discussed 
in this opinion, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as 
to guilt.  However, we disapprove the referee’s recommendation for a public 
reprimand.  We conclude instead that a public reprimand and a ten-day suspension 
are appropriate. 
FACTS 
 
 
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In December 2012, The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Cohen, 
alleging that he engaged in misconduct in violation of the Bar Rules.  A referee 
was appointed to consider the matter.  Following a hearing, the referee submitted 
her report for the Court’s review, in which she made the following findings and 
recommendations. 
 
Cohen was hired to represent a client at a resentencing hearing in the client’s 
criminal case pursuant to Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  On March 15, 
2012, Cohen was mailed a Notice of Hearing, indicating that the resentencing 
hearing was scheduled for March 28, 2012.  The referee found that Cohen received 
the Notice on March 19.  On the same day, Cohen filed a “Motion to Continue 
Resentencing Hearing and Notice of Unavailability,” asserting that the notice 
provided for the Graham resentencing hearing was not reasonable and that he did 
not have adequate time to prepare; Cohen also stated in the motion that he was 
unavailable on March 28 because he was previously retained to prepare a petition 
for writ of certiorari on behalf of another client.  Significantly, Cohen did not 
indicate in the motion whether the State agreed to the continuance, he did not 
submit a copy directly to the presiding judge, and he did not set the motion for a 
hearing. 
 
Because the client’s resentencing hearing had not been continued, on the day 
set for the hearing, March 28, 2012, the presiding judge traveled from the county 
 
 
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where he was then assigned to the county where the hearing was to take place; the 
judge had reserved a courtroom and scheduled court staff in order to conduct the 
hearing.  The assistant state attorney, the client, and the client’s former appellate 
attorney were also present.  However, Cohen did not appear.  As a result, the 
presiding judge was forced to reschedule the hearing for a later date.  The judge 
testified before the referee, without hesitation, that had Cohen appeared at the 
hearing and requested a continuance, the judge likely would have granted his 
request.  The assistant state attorney also testified that she had no objection to 
Cohen’s request for a continuance.  However, Cohen simply chose not to attend.  
The referee found that Cohen has substantial experience in the practice of law, and 
particularly in the practice of criminal law, and he should have known that his 
motion to continue was not self-executing.  The resentencing hearing was properly 
noticed and it had not been continued; thus, Cohen was required to appear. 
Following the hearing, the referee noted that Cohen made no personal effort 
to contact the presiding judge to explain his absence.1  Accordingly, the judge 
reported Cohen’s conduct to the Bar. 
                                          
 
 
1.  During the hearing before the referee, there was testimony presented that 
another attorney called the presiding judge later in the day on March 28, 2012, and 
asked the judge’s judicial assistant what had happened at the hearing.  Cohen 
indicated that he retained an attorney for the purpose of calling the judge’s office 
to inquire about the hearing; he stated that he did not make the call himself because 
 
 
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Based on these facts, the referee recommended that Cohen be found guilty of 
violating two Bar Rules: 4-1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
 
The referee found two aggravating factors in this case: Cohen has substantial 
experience in the practice of law, and he has refused to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his misconduct.  The referee also found five mitigating factors: Cohen 
has no prior disciplinary record; he was suffering from personal or emotional 
problems at the time of his misconduct; he exhibited a cooperative attitude during 
the disciplinary proceeding; he demonstrated good character and reputation; and he 
showed remorse. 
 
In making her recommendation as to the sanction, the referee expressly 
found that Cohen’s conduct caused harm to the legal system: 
 
While minimal direct prejudice, harm or injury resulted to [the client], 
the Respondent’s actions ultimately required [the client’s] 
resentencing hearing to have to be postponed.  The delay to the court 
system was proven and evident.  Continuing court hearings and 
having litigants come to court without being able to resolve the issues 
result in undue hardship to the administration of justice.  This also 
results in additional expense and unnecessary use of work hours and 
                                          
 
he was not prepared to respond if the conversation became contentious.  The 
referee found that Cohen’s conduct in this regard was “troublesome.”   
 
 
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administrative functions, such as the transportation of inmates (in this 
case [the client] was an inmate and had to be transported for the 
hearing).  Thus, the Respondent’s ethical misconduct is harmful to the 
legal system and cannot be tolerated by an officer of the court. 
 
Accordingly, the referee recommended that Cohen receive a public reprimand 
before The Florida Bar Board of Governors.  The referee also recommended that 
Cohen make an appointment with Florida Lawyer’s Assistance, Inc. (FLA), 
undergo a full evaluation, and abide by all of FLA’s recommendations (including a 
rehabilitation contract if necessary).  The referee recommended that Cohen 
schedule a review of his law practice by the Law Office Management Assistance 
Service (LOMAS), and fully comply with any of its recommendations.  Finally, the 
referee awarded costs to the Bar in the amount of $2,830.28. 
 
Cohen filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Review of Report of Referee 
challenging the referee’s recommendations as to guilt.  In July 2014, the Court 
issued an order directing him to show cause why the referee’s recommended 
sanction should not be disapproved and a more severe sanction imposed.  Cohen 
filed a response to the order. 
ANALYSIS 
Initially, because the essential facts in this case are not disputed, we approve 
the referee’s findings of fact without further comment.  We address here Cohen’s 
argument that the referee erred in recommending that he be found guilty of 
violating Bar Rules 4-1.3 and 4-8.4(d).  The Court has repeatedly stated that the 
 
 
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referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support 
the recommendations as to guilt.  See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 
(Fla. 2005). 
 
The referee first recommended that Cohen be found guilty of violating Bar 
Rule 4-1.3, which provides that a lawyer “shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  Here, the referee found that Cohen failed to 
attend a properly noticed, and not continued, resentencing hearing in his client’s 
case, causing the hearing to be postponed.  Cohen contends that the referee’s 
recommendation of guilt is not supported because there is no evidence that his 
client suffered any harm.  Indeed, it appears the client’s resentencing hearing was 
rescheduled and the client ultimately received a lesser sentence.  Cohen also 
presented evidence to show that the client and his family were satisfied with 
Cohen’s representation.  Nonetheless, we have previously explained there is no 
requirement that a client suffer actual harm as a result of an attorney’s lack of 
diligence in order to find a violation of rule 4-1.3.  See Florida Bar v. Solomon, 
711 So. 2d 1141, 1146 (Fla. 1998) (stating that “actual harm or prejudice is not an 
element of incompetence or lack of diligence under the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar.”).  The referee’s findings in this case demonstrate that Cohen failed to 
act diligently on behalf of his client when he chose not to appear for the client’s 
resentencing hearing, causing that hearing to be postponed until a later date.  
 
 
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Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommendation that Cohen be found guilty 
of violating Bar Rule 4-1.3. 
 
The referee also recommended that Cohen be found guilty of violating Bar 
Rule 4-8.4(d).  The rule provides that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”  In this instance, we agree with the referee’s conclusion that Cohen’s 
failure to attend the resentencing hearing was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.  Cohen has conceded that he received the Notice of Hearing indicating that 
the resentencing hearing was scheduled for March 28, 2012, and that he knowingly 
did not attend the hearing.  Although Cohen filed a motion to continue, as well as a 
notice indicating that he was “unavailable” to attend the hearing, he did not 
indicate whether the State agreed to the continuance and he did not set the motion 
for a hearing.  As an attorney with experience in criminal law, Cohen should have 
known that a “Notice of Unavailability” or a motion to continue are not self-
executing; they required a ruling from the presiding judge.  Cohen had an 
obligation to appear at the hearing on his client’s behalf; his decision not to attend 
the hearing, regardless of the reason for doing so, is not acceptable. 
 
In his filings before this Court, Cohen contends that the presiding judge 
unilaterally scheduled the resentencing hearing without consulting Cohen, and that 
 
 
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the judge provided grossly insufficient notice and time to prepare.  However, 
Cohen’s arguments in this regard are misguided.  The referee found: 
 
[I]t is of no consequence as to how the hearing was set, by whom, or 
at whose request. . . . What is important is that a hearing was set and 
that the Respondent acknowledged that he was properly noticed for 
that hearing and knowingly and willfully failed to appear at the 
hearing.  It is also of little importance that six or seven working days’ 
notice was inadequate to prepare for this type of hearing.  These 
arguments were more appropriately the basis for the motion to 
continue which was never set for hearing or ruled on by the court. 
 
We agree with the referee—regardless of whether the hearing was properly 
scheduled—the fact remains that the hearing had not been continued by the 
presiding judge and thus Cohen was required to appear on his client’s behalf.  
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s recommendation that Cohen’s failure to 
attend the resentencing hearing, causing that hearing to be delayed, was prejudicial 
to the administration of justice in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(d). 
 
We turn next to address the referee’s recommended sanction, which includes 
a public reprimand.  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s 
scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact 
because, ultimately, it is our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
 
 
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and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).   
 
Although Cohen’s misconduct was relatively minor, and did not cause his 
client any actual harm, it was nonetheless harmful to the administration of justice 
and we conclude that his actions warrant harsher discipline than a public 
reprimand.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 6.22 (“Suspension is appropriate 
when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client or a party, or causes interference or potential 
interference with a legal proceeding.”).  Cohen’s failure to attend the resentencing 
hearing was knowing and intentional.  Moreover, the referee found that Cohen did 
not have a conflicting court date; rather, he was working on a filing for another 
client.  Ultimately, Cohen simply chose not to attend a hearing that he knew was 
scheduled in his client’s case and had not been continued.  We agree with the 
referee’s conclusion that Cohen’s actions were harmful to the legal system and that 
such conduct cannot be tolerated by an officer of the Court.  Thus, we conclude a 
ten-day suspension is appropriate.  See Fla. Bar v. Morse, 784 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 
2001) (suspending an attorney for ten days for failing to act diligently in his 
handling of a client’s estate); Fla. Bar v. Doltie, 606 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1992) 
(suspending an attorney for one month for failing to appear at a client’s final 
 
 
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hearing in an unemployment compensation case, and also for charging a client a 
fee in excess of the fee agreed to in the client contract). 
 
We have also considered the referee’s findings in aggravation and 
mitigation, and we approve those findings.  In particular, we note the referee found 
that Cohen has failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct or to 
accept responsibility for his own actions.  He continues to argue that the presiding 
judge is to blame because the judge provided unreasonable time to prepare for the 
resentencing hearing.  However, as we have stated, regardless of Cohen’s reasons 
for doing so, he may not choose not to attend a hearing scheduled in a client’s case.  
His misconduct warrants a ten-day suspension. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Daniel Mark Cohen is hereby ordered to receive a public 
reprimand as described in the referee’s report, and he is suspended from the 
practice of law for ten days.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the 
date of this opinion so that Cohen can close out his practice and protect the 
interests of existing clients.  If Cohen notifies this Court in writing that he is no 
longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this 
Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Cohen 
shall fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  Further, Cohen 
 
 
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shall accept no new business from the date of this opinion until the suspension is 
completed. 
 
Additionally, we approve the referee’s recommendation that Cohen undergo 
an evaluation with FLA, and that he be required to contact LOMAS and schedule a 
review of his law practice, as set forth in the Report of Referee. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Daniel Mark Cohen in 
the amount of $2,830.28, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.  
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; 
Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, and Alan Anthony Pascal, Bar Counsel, The 
Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Daniel Mark Cohen, pro se, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent