Title: Akers v. Simpson

State: texas

Issuer: Texas Supreme Court

Document:

445 S.W.2d 957 (1969) James AKERS, Petitioner, v. Jay SIMPSON, Respondent. No. B-1453. Supreme Court of Texas. October 15, 1969. *958 Jesse Shivers, John Holloway, Houston, for petitioner. Vinson, Elkins, Searls & Connally, Gerald P. Coley and James R. Bertrand, Houston, for respondent. STEAKLEY, Justice. James Akers, Petitioner, an employee of Fred Hayden, d/b/a Houston International Airport Limousine Service, and Jay Simpson were involved in a traffic accident on August 30, 1967. Akers was driving an airport limousine owned by Hayden. On October 23 Simpson filed a personal injury suit in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, against Hayden and Akers, and on November 20 an answer in the from of a general denial was filed in their names. On December 8 Akers filed a personal injury suit against Simpson in the District Court of Harris County, and on January 23, 1968, Simpson filed an answer to the merits. On May 28 an agreed judgment was entered in the suit of Simpson against Hayden and Akers, the terms of which were: "All costs herein are adjudged against the defendants, for which let execution issue if same are not seasonably paid." On July 5 Simpson filed a motion for summary judgment in Akers' suit in which he invoked Rule 97(a), Texas Rules of *959 Civil Procedure, the compulsory counterclaim rule. Akers countered Simpson's motion for summary judgment by filing his affidavit and that of the Deputy Constable who handled the citations issued in Simpson's suit and made the returns thereon. These affidavits established that Hayden, the employer of Akers, was personally served with citation and that the Constable was instructed to leave the Akers citation with his employer; the return, however, recited that service was had on Akers. It was further established that the answer filed in the Simpson suit on behalf of Hayden and in the name of Akers was filed by an attorney who represented either Hayden or his insurer and that Akers did not know of and did not authorize the filing of the answer in his name. The trial court granted Simpson's motion for summary judgment and this was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, 437 S.W.2d 429. Our principal reason for granting the application of Akers for writ of error was to review the basic question of whether the lower courts correctly considered Akers an "opposing party" in the earlier Simpson suit and judgment. All other requirements for application of Rule 97(a) in Akers' suit against Simpson were clearly present. The judgment in the Simpson suit, above quoted, recited that Akers was a party defendant and appeared through an attorney of record. It is the firmly established rule in Texas that a defendant who is not served and who does not appear may not, as a matter of public policy, attack the verity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; the jurisdictional recitals import absolute verity. Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 33 S.W. 325 (1895), Levy v. Roper, 113 Tex. 356, 256 S.W. 251 (1923), and State Mortgage Corporation v. Traylor, 120 Tex. 148, 36 S.W.2d 440 (1931); see Hodges, Collateral Attacks on Judgments, 41 Tex.L.Rev. 162-198, 499-544 (1962). A collateral attack on a judgment is an attempt to avoid its binding force in a proceeding not instituted for such purpose, Crawford v. McDonald, supra, and such is the case here. Akers chose not to institute a direct attack on the Simpson judgment by means of which he could have avoided the compulsory counterclaim effect of the judgment in the suit of Akers against Simpson. Not having done so, the jurisdictional recitals of the judgment in the Simpson. Not having done so, the jurisdictional recitals of the judgment in the Simpson suit bring Akers under the decisions which hold that Rule 97(a) bars a subsequent suit growing out of the same accident when a prior suit between the same parties is concluded by a judgment pursuant to a compromise settlement agreement. Harris v. Jones, 404 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Civ.App.1966, writ ref.); Stringer v. Munnell, 390 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App. 1956, writ ref.); and Beach v. Runnels, 379 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ ref.). This opinion will not be further extended since we also agree with the holdings of the Court of Civil Appeals upon the other questions there decided and brought forward in the application for writ of error. The judgments below are affirmed.