Title: In re Barnds

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 125,968 
 
In the Matter of CHRISTOPHER C. BARNDS, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed June 16, 2023. Three-month suspension, stayed 
pending successful completion of two-year period of probation. 
 
Matthew J. Vogelsberg, Chief Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and was on the formal 
complaint for the petitioner. 
 
Christopher C. Barnds, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the Office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent Christopher C. Barnds, of Overland 
Park, an attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas in September 2012.  
 
On August 25, 2022, the Disciplinary Administrator's office filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer to the formal complaint on September 
15, 2022. A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys held a hearing on 
December 1, 2022. The respondent appeared with counsel, Diane L. Bellquist.  
 
At the end of the hearing, the panel determined that the respondent violated KRPC 
3.4(c) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 394) (knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists), 
2 
 
 
 
 
KRPC 4.4(a) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 405) (shall not use means that have no substantial 
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person), KRPC 8.4(a) (2023 
Kan. S. Ct. R. 433) (to violate the rules or knowingly assist another to do so), KRPC 
8.4(d) (engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and KRPC 
8.4(g) (engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law). The panel set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with 
its recommendation on disposition, in a final hearing report, the relevant portions of 
which are set forth below. The respondent initially filed exceptions to the hearing panel's 
report but later withdrew them. 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Count 1-DA13,349 
 
"9. 
In March 2017, respondent entered his appearance on behalf of [R.R.] in 
a post-divorce, child-custody dispute in Johnson County District Court Case No. 2015-
CV-724. 
 
 
"10. 
Around the time respondent entered his appearance, [R.R.]'s ex-wife, 
[M.], had filed an emergency motion to suspend [R.R.]'s parenting time of the former 
couple's two minor children. [M.] was also seeking the court's permission to relocate with 
the children to the state of Washington. 
 
 
"11. 
On April 3, 2017, the presiding judge, Hon. Christina Dunn Gyllenborg, 
appointed attorney Tobi Bitner to serve as the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) to represent the 
bests interests of the children pursuant to K.S.A. Supreme Court Rule 110A (2022 Kan. 
S. Ct. R. at 193). 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
"12. 
Rule 110A(c)(1) states in pertinent part: 
 
 
'Conducting an Independent Investigation. A guardian ad litem must 
conduct an independent investigation and review all relevant documents and 
records, including those of social service agencies, police, courts, physicians, 
mental health practitioners, and schools. Interviews—either in person or by 
telephone—of the child, parents, social workers, relatives, school personnel, 
court-appointed special advocates (CASAs), caregivers, and others having 
knowledge of the facts are recommended. Continuing investigation and ongoing 
contact with the child are mandatory.' 
 
 
"13. 
In April 2017, [R.R.] was the defendant in a pending criminal case. That 
same month, both [R.R.] and respondent sent emails to Bitner, indicating that she could 
communicate directly with [R.R.]'s criminal defense attorney, Trey Pettlon, about the 
pending criminal case. 
 
 
"14. 
In December 2017, there was a change in the individual appointed by the court to 
monitor [R.R.]'s parenting time. On December 14, 2017, respondent sent Bitner an email 
regarding the changes in the monitor and manner in which supervised exchanges were taking 
place. In his email, respondent wrote: 
 
 
'I very honestly feel like these changes are retaliatory against my  
client 
and I for having a legitimate difference in opinion as to what was ordered last 
week. If you want to dislike me, or punish me in some way, that's fine. I sadly 
understand how personal feelings can play a role in these cases, and I can accept 
that and work with that.  
But I do not think it's fair (among a lot of other 
concerns) that my client gets punished because his attorney is telling him he 
understood the court's orders to be something different then what the GAL 
thought.' 
 
 
"15. 
On December 18, respondent sent a follow-up email to his December 14 email to 
Bitner. In the email, respondent wrote:  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'I am not showing any response to my email below. I would like to 
 
arrange a time to talk to you. This can occur over the phone or in 
 
person, although my availability for the latter will be more limited. 
 
I am also hoping you have seen the recent ROA notes that were recently 
 
uploaded. As one of the issue [sic] I want to discuss is how we plan 
 
to make up some of the time dad lost this past week.' 
 
 
 
"16. 
That same day, Bitner responded by email, stating: 
 
 
'In the past few weeks, you have sent an onslaught of emails stating 
 
you continue to be confused over the Court's orders, implying I am 
 
not only that I am [sic] impartial, but that I have some sort of a 
 
personal vendetta against you, and making false statements about 
 
me to the professionals involved in this case.  
 
 
'You emailed me on Friday, 12/8/17, and requested a time to meet 
 
with me in my office. I replied the same day with my availability 
 
(choosing from the times you suggested) and held that time open on 
 
my calendar for Monday, 12/11/17. You didn't reply and never showed 
 
up. I emailed a follow up the same day and you replied, telling me you 
 
would get back to me with additional times to speak. You never replied 
 
again. Then, you sent the email on this email chain, alleging my 
 
impartiality again, on 12/14/17.  
 
 
'Now, you email me and request I set aside more time to talk.  
 
 
'Given all of your allegations, your continued misunderstandings  
about 
 
orders, and the fact you've misrepresented my statements to 
 
professionals in this case, I believe the only communication we need 
 
to have at this juncture should be in written form or on the record.' 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
"17. 
On December 20, 2017, Bitner filed a Motion for an Emergency Hearing 
to Modify the Temporary Parenting Plan, alleging that [R.R.] was refusing to comply 
with the parameters set forth by the parenting time supervisor and her to assure all parties 
were following the court's temporary orders. Accordingly, Bitner moved the court to find 
that it was in the best interest of the minor children for [R.R.] to have supervised 
parenting time through the Layne Project until further order of the court. 
 
 
"18. 
At 2:04 p.m. on December 20, Bitner sent an email to counsel for the 
parties with the subject line:  'Reed 15CV0724—EMERGENCY Motion Attached—
request for hearing.' Attached to the email was a copy of Bitner's emergency motion. 
 
 
"19. 
At 2:16 p.m., respondent sent an email to Bitner with the subject line:  'REED:  
Sincere Ethical Concerns.' In the email, respondent wrote: 
 
 
'As you have requested we only communicate via email, and have 
 
stated you do not wish to talk to me over the phone or in person, I 
 
have no other option but to communicate this message via email. 
 
 
'I have concerns you have violated your ethical obligations in this case 
 
as a GAL. Specifically, I have been advised you have spoken to other 
 
third-parties about this case without having any formal or legal release to 
 
do so. Among those who have been reported you talked to, is attorney 
 
Trey Pettlon. Can you please immediately forward [to] me the release 
 
that has been executed authorizing you to speak with Mr. Pettlon, or any 
 
release for that matter that you presently have from my client authorizing 
 
you to speak with any third-party.' 
 
 
"20. 
At 2:31 p.m., Bitner replied to respondent's 'Ethical Concerns' email and carbon 
copied attorney Pettlon on the email. In the reply email, Bitner stated: 
 
 
'I can assure you that I have upheld my ethical obligations, pursuant 
 
to the Court's Orders and Rule 110A. It is also my understanding 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
that Mr. Pettlon can make any disclosures necessary, in his client's 
 
best interest, he believes are appropriate. However, I will let Mr.  Pettlon 
 
speak for himself.' 
 
 
 
"21. 
Respondent replied at 2:36 p.m., stating:  'Are you indicating you do not 
believe you needed a release to speak directly with my client's criminal attorney?' 
 
 
"22. 
At 3:03 p.m., respondent replied to Bitner's emergency motion email, 
stating: 
 
 
'Didn't want to mention anything about the kids commenting on being 
 
exposed to Grandparents over the last 24 hrs? I think we both see where 
 
this is going. I will be filing a Motion to have you removed, as I think 
 
you are incapable of providing objective and impartial representation for 
 
the children. You have taken a personal issue with me, and apparently 
 
with my client, and let it turn into something much greater. That is not 
 
o.k.' 
 
 
"23. 
At 3:22 p.m., Bitner responded to respondent's email regarding a release to speak 
to Pettlon. Bitner stated: 
 
 
'I am not sure what you seek to gain from continuing to ask me the same 
 
question. Not only is your allegation out of bounds, but it is completely 
 
unfounded. [R.R.] requested I communicate with Mr. Pettlon and, as 
 
counsel for [R.R.], you are aware of this and have even participated in 
 
email exchanges with Mr. Pettlon and myself.' 
 
 
"24. 
At 3:28 p.m., Bitner responded to respondent's emergency motion email, telling 
respondent that he was free to file whatever motion he felt was appropriate and beneficial to his 
client. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
"25. 
At 5:10 p.m., respondent replied to Bitner's email regarding speaking to Pettlon, 
stating: 
 
 
'I understand your position. Should I feel the need to further discuss 
 
this issue, I will reach out. I am going to try and step away from our 
 
email communications until after the Christmas holiday, as I think 
 
we would both agree they are no longer helping to resolve anything, 
 
and only deteriorating the situation further. With time being 
 
arranged through Sunday, I also do not see a need to contact until 
 
after the holiday. 
 
 
'Hope you have a merry Christmas.' 
 
 
"26. 
On February 6, 2018, respondent, on behalf of [R.R.], filed a motion entitled, 
'Time Sensitive Motion to Immediately Remove Current Guardian Ad Litem and Appoint Case 
Manager or New Guardian Ad Litem.' In the motion, respondent alleged that Bitner needed to be 
immediately removed as the GAL because of a 'fundamental conflict between Ms. Bitner's duties 
and responsibilities to the minor children and the court in this matter, and Ms. Bitner's actions in 
this case over recent months.' 
 
 
"27. 
In the motion, respondent alleged that Bitner had (1) made a social media post 
mocking respondent; (2) demonstrated prejudice towards [R.R.]; (3) called [R.R.] an 'idiot' during 
Judge Assisted Mediation; (4) intentionally failed to vet the possibility of the children's paternal 
grandfather serving as a parenting time monitor; (5) intentionally failed to investigate allegations 
of child alienation by [M.]; (6) attempted to force the new parenting time monitor's services upon 
[R.R.] sooner than what the court had ordered; (7) seeking to limit [R.R.]'s parenting time out of 
bias, vindictiveness, and prejudice; (8) issuing a unilateral 'order' to stop [R.R.]'s parenting time; 
(9) reporting to professionals (but not the court) that she believed [M.] raised allegations of abuse 
against [R.R.] to assist her in her quest to relocate herself and the children to Washington; and 
(10) reporting to the court that 'every professional' [R.R.] encountered regarding the custody case 
had problems with him. 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
"28. 
Both Bitner and [M.]'s counsel filed responses, denying the allegations. 
 
 
"29. 
On February 28, 2018, Judge Gyllenborg conducted a hearing on respondent's 
motion. From the bench, Judge Gyllenborg denied the motion and directed respondent to prepare 
a proposed journal entry pursuant to Rule 170 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 236). 
 
 
"30. 
In March of 2018, Judge Gyllenborg recused herself and Judge Robert Wonnell 
was assigned to preside over the case. 
 
 
"31. 
Because Bitner and [M.]'s counsel objected to the proposed journal entry that 
respondent prepared, respondent submitted the proposed journal entry and accompanying 
objections to the district court to settle the journal entry pursuant to Rule 170(d)(3). 
 
 
"32. 
Prior to the district court settling the journal entry, respondent sent an email to 
Bitner on April 6, 2018, advising her that if she did not voluntarily withdraw as GAL from the 
case, 
 
 
'I fully intend on filing a Motion for Reconsideration before Judge 
 
Wonnell as soon as the JE from our Feb. 28th hearing is actually entered. 
 
As you likely know, I cannot file that motion until the judge signed JE is 
 
actually on file. Which is the only reason such a Motion has not been 
 
filked [sic] yet. From the date the JE is formally entered, I have 28 days 
 
to file my Motion. A Motion I again fully intend to file if you do not 
 
wish to  recuse yourself in line with Father's statutory rights. At which 
 
point I also intend to have Judge Wonnell fully review each and every 
 
allegation I levied against you. As the bias, prejudice, and favoritism in 
 
this case has gotten beyond control—and at this point it is becoming 
 
severely detrimental to the emotional and psychological well being of 
 
two very young children.' 
 
 
"33. 
On June 12, 2018, Judge Gyllenborg issued a journal entry regarding the orders 
she made at the February 28, 2018 hearing, which included denying [R.R.]'s Motion to Remove 
9 
 
 
 
 
Bitner as the GAL. In denying this motion, the court found that 
 
 
'GAL Bitner has put in countless hours, that she has previously made 
 
recommendations to the Court that have been at times beneficial to 
 
Father, and at times beneficial to Mother. GAL Bitner has not 
 
presented to this Court as being prejudiced to either party, and she 
 
has not displayed animosity toward Father. GAL Bitner previously 
 
recommended an expansion of Father's time with the minor children 
 
despite objection by Mother. The Court followed that GAL 
 
recommendation. The Court additionally finds that GAL  
Bitner is still 
 
committed to work diligently to seek a good relationship by working 
 
with both the children and the parents. GAL Bitner's investigation is 
 
ongoing. The Court is not surprised by the ongoing disputed issues 
 
between the parties. The Court is amazed by the time GAL Bitner 
 
has put into the case, despite respondent  
being behind on his payment of 
 
GAL fees.' 
 
 
"34. 
Notably, the court ordered 'in the event a party intends to file a pleading that 
contains information regarding attorney misconduct, such pleading shall first be emailed to 
opposing counsel and a copy emailed to the Court for a threshold determination of whether the 
pleading will be allowed to be filed, and whether such pleading shall be filed under seal.' 
 
 
"35. 
Finally, the court granted [M.]'s request for an award of attorney fees against 
Father for 2.75 hours of attorney time required to respond to the Motion to Remove Guardian ad 
Litem. 
 
 
"36. 
On July 10, 2018, respondent, on [R.R.]'s behalf, filed a Motion for New Trial or 
in the Alternative, to Alter or Amend pursuant to K.S.A. 60-259 and Motion for Appointment of 
Case Manager. In the motion, respondent argued that the court's June 12 journal entry amounted 
to an 'erroneous ruling' and was 'contrary to the evidence that was available to be presented at a 
hearing on the motion' and 'additional evidence that has came to light since.' 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
"37. 
In addition to some of the previous allegations respondent raised in his February 
6, 2018, motion, respondent claimed in the current motion that Bitner had failed to respond to 
several emails he had sent to her on March 20, 22, 28, and April 23, 2018, asking Bitner to 
articulate the safety concerns she had regarding father having parenting time with the children. 
Respondent stated that '[d]espite email, after email, after email being sent requesting this 
information, the GAL never responded to a single email. And still has not responded to any such 
emails to this date. These emails can be submitted to this Court as record evidence at a hearing on 
this Motion.' (Emphasis added.) Respondent claimed that Bitner's alleged failure to respond to 
these emails 'was yet another example' of her 'extreme bias and prejudice' in this matter, which 
respondent claimed was the result of [R.R.] failing to timely submit payments to Bitner for her 
GAL services, compared to [M.], who timely paid Bitner. 
 
 
"38. 
Subsequently, Bitner and [M.]'s counsel filed responses to respondent's motion, 
both noting that respondent had failed to comply with the district court's June 12, 2018, journal 
entry, requiring any party that intends to file a pleading containing information regarding alleged 
attorney misconduct to first email the pleading to opposing counsel and the court 'for a threshold 
determination of whether the pleading will be allowed to be filed, and whether such pleading 
shall be filed under seal.' Bitner again denied the allegations contained in respondent's motion. 
Regarding the allegation that she failed to respond to the emails mentioned above, Bitner stated:  
'The GAL vehemently denies the allegations in this subparagraph and asserts she diligently 
responds to the parties in this case, despite [R.R.]'s continuing failure to comply with the Orders 
of this Court and remit payment to the GAL.' 
 
 
"39. 
On September 6, 2018, the district court conducted a hearing and ultimately 
denied the motion for new trial. 
 
 
"40. 
On December 17-18, 2018, the district court conducted a hearing on [M.]'s 
motions for sole legal custody of the children and to relocate them to Washington and [R.R.]'s 
motion to modify the parenting plan. Subsequently, the court issued a journal entry denying the 
motion to relocate the children and granting in part and denying in part the remaining motions. 
 
 
"41. 
On February 7, 2019, attorney Catherine Zigtema entered her appearance on 
11 
 
 
 
 
behalf of Bitner and filed a motion seeking judicial review of a proposed Motion for Sanctions 
and Attorney's Fees pursuant to the district court's June 12, 2018, journal entry. The motion asked 
the court to provide direction on whether the proposed motion should be publicly filed or filed 
under seal. Copies of the proposed Motion for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees were emailed to the 
court and counsel for the parties. 
 
 
"42. 
After receiving approval, Bitner publicly filed her Motion for Sanctions and 
Attorney's Fees on February 14, 2019. Within the motion, Bitner asked that [R.R.] and respondent 
be sanctioned for (1) repeated violations of court orders and directives in this matter; (2) repeated 
use of improper litigation tactics alleging unfounded ethics violations; (3) repeated use of other 
cumbersome, excessive, and improper litigation tactics; (4) and repeated failure to conduct 
litigation in a civil and appropriate manner consistent with the pillars of professionalism. 
 
 
"43. 
Bitner pointed out that respondent violated the court's June 12, 2018, journal 
entry by publicly filing his July 10, 2018 motion for a new trial (alleging that Bitner had engaged 
in attorney misconduct) without first submitting it to the court for review to determine whether 
the motion should be publicly filed or filed under seal. 
 
 
"44. 
In addition to respondent's allegations against Bitner in publicly filed motions, 
Bitner also noted that respondent had alleged in emails and phone calls to her that she had 
engaged in unethical conduct. Bitner stated that respondent's allegations 'appear to be an attempt 
to coerce the Guardian Ad Litem to take a particular action or make a particular recommendation 
favorable to his client' and noted the December 20, 2017, email she had received from 
respondent, claiming that she had improperly communicated with third parties regarding [R.R.], 
including [R.R.]'s criminal defense attorney. 
 
 
"45. 
Finally, Bitner argued that respondent's conduct towards her was substantially 
similar to his conduct in a Wyandotte County domestic case where respondent had also filed a 
motion to remove and replace the GAL. Bitner argued that the GAL in that case filed a response 
to the motion by filing an affidavit with the court, which documented her efforts in the case and 
described a phone call she had with respondent where respondent accused her of ethical 
violations. Notably, the GAL stated she believed respondent engaged in the conduct to 
12 
 
 
 
 
improperly influence her decisions. 
 
 
"46. 
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion on March 29, 
2019. 
 
 
"47. 
On July 18, 2019, the district court issued its journal entry regarding the March 
29, 2019, hearing. The district court found that respondent had violated the court's previous June 
12, 2018, journal entry by filing his July 11, 2018, motion for new trial without first seeking 
judicial review of whether the motion should be filed publicly or under seal. The court noted that 
respondent's motion 
 
 
'contained allegations of misconduct by the GAL and its filing, without 
 
court permission, was in direct violation of the current, standing 
 
applicable order. The fact that the judge ruling on the matter had 
 
changed did not negate the prior Judge's order. The filing of this motion 
 
in direct violation of the court's directive is sanctionable conduct.' 
 
 
"48. 
As a sanction, the court ordered respondent to personally pay $250 to Bitner and 
$250 to [M.]'s counsel. 
 
 
"49. 
The court also found troubling the email respondent sent to Bitner on December 
20, 2017, stating that he had 'concerns' Bitner had violated her ethical obligations as GAL in the 
case, accusing her of speaking to 'third-parties about this case without having any formal or legal 
release to do so,' and asking her to forward the executed release that authorized her to speak with 
third parties. The court stated: 
 
 
'If [Respondent] had knowledge of any action, inaction, or conduct which 
 
in his opinion constituted misconduct of the GAL, he had an obligation 
 
to inform the appropriate professional authority. See Rule 226, Kan. R. 
 
Prof. Conduct 8.3. Second, he is alleging that the GAL engaged in 
 
improper communications without a release and  demanded to see her 
 
authority. Again, this request does not serve a legitimate  
purpose as the 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
original order appointing the GAL clearly states that the GAL has the 
 
court-ordered authorization to review the records of and/or interview 
 
any agency, school, school district, organization, person or office, 
 
including the Clerk of the Court, any police department or law 
 
enforcement agency, any pediatrician, psychologist, psychiatrist, 
 
hospital, mental health treatment facility, medical provider, social 
 
worker, welfare agency, doctor, nurse, teacher, school official, staff, 
 
etc. In the email, [Respondent] states that he has  
'been advised' (although 
 
he does not say by whom) that GAL has spoken to third-parties without 
 
a release to do so. This is simply false. Third, [Respondent] implies 
 
that it was improper for the GAL to have spoken with [R.R.]'s other 
 
attorney. [R.R.]'s other attorney would have the responsibility to decide 
 
what matters could be discussed with the GAL. Additionally, 
 
[Respondent] himself emailed the GAL and specifically stated that 
 
the emails had a "clear release" and [R.R.] could save some money 
 
if the GAL would email [R.R.] directly and not have [Respondent] 
 
relay information.' 
 
 
"50. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the email 'served no legitimate purpose' 
and that its timing (sent 12 minutes after the GAL notified respondent that she would be filing an 
emergency motion) left the court 'with no other conclusion [but] that the email from [Respondent] 
was meant to harass or intimidate the GAL and that [Respondent] acted in bad faith in sending 
the email.' 
 
 
"51. 
The district court also took issue with the allegation respondent made in his July 
10, 2018, Motion for New Trial, claiming that Bitner had failed to respond to his emails 
requesting the safety concerns she had regarding [R.R.] having parenting time and that she 'still 
has not responded to any such emails to this date.' The district court noted that at the March 29, 
2019, hearing, [R.R.] 'affirmed [Respondent's] statement that the list of safety concerns was 
actually received by [Respondent] in June 2018.' The court also noted that respondent offered no 
evidence to support the allegation made in the July 10, 2018, motion 'that the GAL was 
responding to emails from [M.] because she was paying her bills and ignoring [R.R.]'s emails 
14 
 
 
 
 
because he was late on payments to the GAL.' 
 
 
"52. 
The district court took judicial notice of the Wyandotte County child custody 
case that Bitner had noted in her motion for sanctions. The court noted that the pleadings 
respondent filed in the Wyandotte County case regarding the GAL were substantially similar to 
the pleadings he filed in the current case. The court concluded that in both cases, respondent 
would accuse the GAL of 'extreme bias and prejudice' whenever the GAL happened to advocate 
for a position contrary to that of respondent. 
 
 
"53. 
In taking judicial notice of the Wyandotte County case, the court stated that it 
was 'not taking judicial notice as to whether or not the assertions actually occurred or of the 
Judge's ultimate ruling, but rather only of the fact that Respondent's counsel filed a pleading 
making these allegations against another GAL.' 
 
 
"54. 
The court specifically found that respondent acted in bad faith when he engaged 
in the conduct noted above. As a result, the district court ordered respondent to personally pay 
$2,500 in attorney's fees to Zigtema. This was in addition to the $500 in attorneys' fees he was 
ordered to pay Mother's counsel and Bitner for filing his July 11, 2018, motion without first 
seeking court approval. 
 
 
"55. 
Subsequently, both Judge Wonnell and Zigtema filed complaints with the Office 
of the Disciplinary Administrator (ODA) regarding respondent's conduct. The matter was 
docketed for investigation as DA13,349. 
 
 
"56. 
On September 16, 2019, the ODA received respondent's response to the 
complaints, contending that he did not engage in any unethical conduct. In part, he claimed that if 
he would have received sufficient notice that he needed to present evidence at the March 29, 
2019, hearing of Bitner's extreme prejudice against [R.R.] due to [R.R.]'s failure to timely pay 
Bitner's GAL fees, respondent would have presented such evidence. Furthermore, respondent 
claimed that the email he sent to Bitner on December 20, 2018, regarding the ethical concerns he 
had with Bitner was not sent in bad faith or in retaliation for Bitner filing her motion asking for 
an emergency hearing to modify the temporary parenting plan. 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"57. 
In the underlying custody case, respondent sought to challenge the district court's 
journal entry by filing a motion for new trial or alter or amend the judgment on August 15, 2019. 
After that motion was denied on September 11, 2019, respondent filed a notice of appeal on 
October 8, 2019. 
 
 
"58. 
In October 2019, Bitner and Zigtema retained attorney Eric Kraft to collect the 
attorneys' fees that Barnds was ordered to pay to them. On October 24, Kraft obtained an order of 
garnishment for a bank account that respondent had with Commerce Bank. 
 
 
"59. 
Ultimately, respondent did not appeal the district court's journal entry. Instead, he 
settled the judgments he owed to Zigtema and Bitner, with satisfactions of judgment being filed 
on November 12, and December 2, 2019, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Count II-DA13,563 
 
 
"60. 
Based on an incident that occurred on April 1, 2020, J.S. filed a petition for 
protection from abuse (PFA) pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3101 et seq. against M.S. in Johnson County 
District Court on April 22, 2020 (Case No. 20-CV-1790). That same day, temporary orders were 
issued, which prevented M.S. from contacting J.S. 
 
 
"61. 
Prior to J.S. filing the PFA petition, J.S. and M.S. had dated intermittently for 
approximately 10 years. In May 2019, J.S. was arrested and charged in Johnson County District 
Court with domestic battery (Case No. 19-DV-00640). M.S. was the alleged victim. In November 
2019, the State dismissed the charge without prejudice. 
 
 
"62. 
Shortly after filing the PFA petition, J.S. retained attorney Joseph Booth to 
represent her. 
 
 
"63. 
M.S. initially retained attorney Suzanne Hale Robinson to represent him. 
Robinson entered her appearance in the case on May 7, 2020, but subsequently filed a motion to 
withdraw five days later. On May 19, Robinson was allowed to withdraw, and respondent 
16 
 
 
 
 
formally entered his appearance on behalf of M.S. 
 
 
"64. 
The day before, May 18, respondent and Booth began exchanging emails 
regarding the PFA case. Booth informed respondent that M.S. had been calling J.S. and leaving 
her several voice messages in violation of the temporary orders. 
 
 
"65. 
That same day, respondent sent a reply email to Booth, thanking him for the 
information. [R]espondent also wrote: 
 
 
'What time are you available tomorrow afternoon? I would like to 
 
talk timely, as [J.S.] has a lot of property and money of [M.S.], and 
 
I need to assess if I need to file separate actions for those issues and 
 
the allegations being levied. He is also noting concerns of tax fraud 
 
on [J.S.'s] behalf, due to large sums of monies she has received in 
 
the past. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
'These parties have a troubled history (see Case No. 19DV00640). 
 
I would like to keep this matter from blowing up if we can.' 
 
(Emphases added.) 
 
 
"66. 
Subsequently, Booth and respondent arranged to have a phone call on May 19, 
2020. 
 
 
"67. 
On May 20, 2020, respondent sent an email to Booth with an attached 'copy of 
the proposed Settlement and Release that I am working on getting [M.S.] to sign.' Respondent 
stated in the email: 
 
'As I noted in my call yesterday, it is my hope we can keep a reasonable lid on 
this matter and not have it blow up into further litigation and law suits [sic].  
 
17 
 
 
 
 
'I believe having the parties' enter into the attached mutual settlement agreement 
would be a tremendous first step in that direction. 
 
'I know you have reviewed the 19DV case where my client is the victim and 
yours the assailant. There is a lot more to that case than I believe either you or I 
have been able to wrap our head around at this point. There was also a prior 
incident with [sic] the parties' lived in MO when your client slit the forearm of 
my client from nearly elbow to wrist. There are medical records and police 
reports that would correspond and support.  
 
'Unfortunately, I think there is even more to these two parties past than the above. 
My client is also starting to produce documentation, which I am working to 
organize in a presentable fashion, supporting his claims of monies and property 
your client has in essence unlawfully converted to her own. Now, there may [be] 
both facts and evidence that your client has to contest those assertions and 
allegations, but that is precisely the point I am trying to get at. That is, that if we 
fail to keep a reasonable lid on this matter early, it is without question going to 
spill over into more litigation. 
 
'I am working on a separate letter today (05/20) also, one that I plan to forward to 
you by this evening. The letter will address some of the personal property and 
money matters. 
 
'All of the above said, in the spirit of candor and professionalism, please know on 
the front end that [M.S.] has indicated he will not agree to a no-contest consent 
order is [sic] this matter. As that would not only affect his ability in the future to 
find housing and employment, but would also, in practice, take away his 2nd 
Amendment Rights. That is not something he can agree to. I believe [J.S.] could 
understand why that is the case. In the event a trial will ultimately be necessary, I 
will need time to issue business record subpoenas and get in contact with at least 
one or two additional witnesses. I also believe will we [sic] need at least a half-
day for the trial. These are all points I intended to relay to the Court at the Status 
18 
 
 
 
 
Hearing on Friday, thus why I wanted to provide you some advance notice of 
same in the spirit of openness.' (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
"68. 
After not receiving a response, respondent sent Booth a follow-up email on May 
22, 2020. In the email, respondent noted that he was still working with M.S. 'to get clear on the 
property and money issues, and am preparing a corresponding letter to your attention.' 
Respondent noted that the previous day, M.S. had told him that he had proof J.S. had written a 
fraudulent check from M.S.'s checking account. Respondent said, 'I have of course asked my 
client to forward what documentation he has in this regard, so I can forward it on to you. The 
check was apparently written somewhat recently based on what was initially stated to me.' 
Respondent concluded his email by stating: 
 
 
'As I noted in my earlier messages, I would very much like to avoid 
 
this thing blowing up like a powder keg. I plan to ask for Pretrial to 
 
be set a few weeks out, to give you and I time to talk, and me time 
 
to look at what discovery, if any, I will truly need if this matter were 
 
to have to go to Trial. Just brief heads up there.' (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
"69. 
Booth responded back a few minutes later, stating: 
 
 
'We are nowhere near an agreement at this time. Send me credible 
 
evidence of issues like the accusation that [J.S.] wrote a check on 
 
his account and I will respond. 
 
 
'Since this action has nothing to do with personal property, it is our 
 
intention to not engage in discussions over personal property issues until 
 
appropriate protections are in place for [J.S.].' 
 
 
"70. 
In May 2020, M.S. was charged with violating the temporary orders (Johnson 
County Case No. 20-DV-00678). On May 26, 2020, M.S. was arrested pursuant to a warrant. 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
"71. 
That same day, respondent sent an email to Booth. In the email, respondent wrote: 
 
 
'[M.S.] has asked about the possibility of a 4-way settlement 
 
conference to be attended by counsel and the parties.  
 
 
'I know in past emails and during the Status Hearing held last week 
 
you have stated [J.S.] does not wish to discuss any property matters, 
 
and only wishes to focus on the protection claims. Notwithstanding, 
 
it was still my sincere hope the parties might be able to save 
 
themselves a lot of expense and time by trying to timely resolve all 
 
matters pending between them, in an amicable setting? 
 
 
'I would appreciate it if this request could be relayed to [J.S.] as timely 
 
as possible. We could file a short agreed order allowing attendance and 
 
communication at this conference once coordinates [sic] In the 
 
alternative, I have relayed to [M.S.] that should [J.S.] not wish to 
 
hold such discussions, the only option will be to file a corresponding 
 
civil action to deal with property and money matters.' (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
"72. 
Booth responded that same day, indicating that he would forward the request to 
J.S. Booth also asked respondent to provide information regarding the property and money M.S. 
claimed J.S. had wrongly taken. 
 
 
"73. 
On June 10, 2020, respondent sent an email to Booth, trying to schedule a phone 
call sometime in the next two days to discuss with him  
 
 
'various pending issues between the parties that I would like to at least 
 
try and discuss with you, as I am presently preparing a Petition for 
 
Partition as well as a Complaint for Damages (both civil filings)  
that 
 
will be filled [sic] in Johnson County by weeks end. Thus, [J.S.] will 
 
have to confront these issues one way or another. As surprised as I 
 
was to hear it even today, [M.S.] would still like to avoid more legal 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
issues popping up for either party.' 
 
 
"74. 
Booth responded back that day, stating that he was available for a phone call that 
Friday. Booth also claimed that the civil actions respondent mentioned were 'not appropriate 
under the circumstances, as you know, I'm sure, the district courts handle these matters under the 
general divorce statutes.' 
 
 
"75. 
It appears that Booth and respondent were unable to speak that Friday. 
 
 
"76. 
On June 18, 2020, respondent emailed Booth, asking if he was available to speak 
that day or early the next day, prior to a status conference scheduled in the PFA case. Booth 
responded that he didn't have time to speak that day but maybe would have time to speak the next 
day. 
 
 
"77. 
That same day, respondent sent a follow-up email to Booth, stating: 
 
 
'As we are not talking today, and I want to give you a chance to hold a 
 
conversation with your client about a specific topic, I will provide the 
 
"short" version here. 
 
 
'In 2014, [J.S.] assaulted [M.S.] while intoxicated. Specifically, she 
 
slashed [M.S.] arm from elbow to wrist. It resulted in over $250,000.00 
 
in medical work. 
 
 
'At the time of the incident, your client called [A.K.], a mutual friend of 
 
the parties whom both went to high school with, and confessed to the 
 
crime. Your client was the one who actually called 911 because she was 
 
no [sic] nervous of what she had done.  
 
 
'Police showed up later that night, as did [A.K.]. At the time my client 
 
lied to police and told them it was an "accident." Police wanted to 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
pursue charges, but [M.S.] refused to change his story due to threats 
 
from your client at the time of making his life difficult. 
 
 
 
'My client has been in contact with the Cass County (MO) D.A.'s office, 
 
and as the incident would classify as a Class A felony—due to the extent 
 
of damages and medical bills—they can still pursue the charges. They 
 
are ready to do this.  
 
 
'While not as serious, a similar incident occurred in 2019. It is the DV 
 
charge. My client literally dogged [sic] the subpoena, so they could not 
 
pursue charges. [M.S.] has a call with their office next week to review 
 
the file. It would still be within the 3-yr statute of limitations.  
 
 
'There is also a serious tax fraud issue. I genuinely did not know before 
 
this matter that the IRS will literally provide financial rewards for those 
 
who turn in someone who has committed tax fraud, assuming charges are 
 
later substantiated. Your client engaged in same with [J.S.R.]. Owner of 
 
[J.S.R.] Home Builders. He provided [J.S.] with well over $100k in 
 
money. He also made a fake document indicating [J.S.] worked for 
 
[J.S.R.] Home's and made $6,000.00 a month income. This is how she 
 
applied for and was approved for an apartment at Watercrest at City 
 
Center. [J.S.R.] verified [J.S.] had a job, however [J.S.R.] never issued 
 
[J.S.] any paychecks. Rather, [J.S.R.] merely gave her money. The two 
 
were in a "romantic" relationship. Despite [J.S.R.] being married to 
 
[N.R.]. 
 
 
'Joe, I am providing the details I am above, and mentioning specific 
 
names, so you can hopefully speak with [J.S.] and let her know that the 
 
last thing either of our clients want to do is go to war with the other. 
 
 
'There is also the serious conversion issue with the $25k. Authorities in 
 
MO have updated Police Reports recently so as to confirm that it was 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
law enforcement who specifically directed [M.S.] to take his name 
 
off the joint account at the time, as he had his identity stolen. Again, 
 
law enforcement can verify this.  
 
 
'While somewhat surprising to me, [M.S.] still would like to have all four 
 
(4) of us sit down and work all this out, as opposed to all of us litigating 
 
out the matters over the next 12 months. If it would make you and [J.S.] 
 
more comfortable, we could even do a Video Conference where my 
 
client is with me in my office, and your [sic] with you.  
 
 
'As for tomorrow, I plan to tell the Judge we still want to keep the trial 
 
date held as is. That will hopefully allow time for our settlement 
 
conference.  
 
 
'[M.S.] again does not want to see your client or himself get into a bad 
 
spot. He even indicated that if this is about the $25k inheritance from my 
 
client's father, [M.S.] is willing to help [J.S.] some financially if she 
 
needs it. All details we could discuss during the settlement conference.' 
 
 
"78. 
Booth responded back by email that same day, June 18, stating: 
 
 
'First, Do [sic] you have any evidence you are willing to share that 
 
would support these claims? Any at all? 
 
 
'Second, are you saying that [M.S.] will pursue these various actions and 
 
claims unless [J.S.] does what? Sits down to talk, or are you asking her to 
 
drop the protection from abuse action in exchange.' 
 
 
"79. 
Respondent replied: 
 
 
'I am doubling check [sic] with [M.S.] to determine what he has now, 
 
specifically. I may also need to formally subpoena a police department or 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
two for a full report, as well as maybe a hospital. I will have more 
 
information by tomorrow morning to share one way or another.  
 
 
'The request to sit down has not changed. Was always [M.S.'s] desire, 
 
and still is, to have these two parties civilly resolve their issues as 
 
opposed to using the court system. He has known [J.S.] for going on 
 
some 25 yrs. as I understand it. I candidly am still trying  
to get caught up 
 
on that history, and all that has occurred. All I know right now is that my 
 
client believes if the parties' could talk civilly with one another, with the 
 
assistance of counsel in a secure setting, we might be able to work 
 
through a lot of issues.' 
 
 
"80. 
On June 19, 2020, respondent, on behalf of M.S., filed a separate action in 
Johnson County District Court—Petition for Partition & Complaint for Damages—Case No. 20-
CV-2599. In the petition, M.S. alleged that J.S. had wrongfully retained $25,500 of M.S.'s money 
and had taken various pieces of personal property from M.S. Subsequently, Booth, on behalf of 
J.S., filed an answer and counterclaim. 
 
 
"81. 
On July 10, 2020, Booth, on behalf of J.S., filed a Trial Brief and Motions for 
Sanctions, seeking sanctions against M.S. because of his multiple violations of the temporary 
orders established in the case and sanctions against respondent, based on the emails he sent to 
Booth (quoted above), suggesting that M.S. would pursue unrelated civil and criminal actions 
against J.S. unless she agreed to settle the pending PFA petition. 
 
 
"82. 
On July 23, 2020, respondent filed a response to the motion for sanctions, 
generally denying that the emails he sent to Booth were inappropriate. 
 
 
"83. 
A final hearing on the PFA petition was scheduled for July 24, 2020. At the 
hearing, M.S. indicated that he would be willing to enter into a final consent order regarding the 
PFA. The matter was then continued to August 14 for the parties to present the agreement and for 
the court to hear arguments regarding J.S.'s motion for sanctions and attorney fees. 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
"84. 
On August 14, 2020, the final consent order was filed in the case. The order notes 
that J.S. and M.S. 'have knowingly and voluntarily waived their rights to a hearing' and that M.S. 
'consents to the orders without finding of fact or fault.' That same day, the court conducted a 
hearing regarding the motion for sanctions and took the matter under advisement. 
 
 
"85. 
A transcript of the August 14, 2020, hearing could not be produced because the 
audio equipment being used to record the hearing was not working. 
 
 
"86. 
On August 21, 2020, the district court issued a journal entry denying the motion 
for sanctions. The journal entry indicates that the district court denied the motion for sanctions 
against M.S. because criminal proceedings were pending against him for violating the court's 
temporary orders. Regarding the motion for sanctions against respondent, the journal entry simply 
stated that the motion was denied. The journal entry did not provide the court's reasoning for 
denying the motion. 
 
 
"87. 
On August 26, 2020, the ODA received Booth's complaint against respondent 
regarding the emails (noted above) that he sent to Booth. 
 
 
"88. 
The matter was docketed for investigation as DA13,563. Respondent submitted a 
response to Booth's complaint and cooperated in the subsequent investigation. 
 
"Count III-DA13,665 
 
 
"89. 
In May 2016, [B.S.] filed for divorce from his wife, [T.], in Johnson County 
District Court, Case No. 16-CV-2992. Two children had resulted from the marriage, a 15-year old 
and an 11-year old. 
 
 
"90. 
Eventually, the parties entered into an agreement regarding a parenting plan and 
property division. A divorce decree was filed on September 1, 2017. 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
"91. 
In March 2018, attorney Kelli Cooper, on behalf of [T.], filed a motion to modify 
the parties' parenting plan, alleging that [B.S.] had engaged in physical and emotional abuse of 
the ex-couple's children. 
 
 
"92. 
In February 2019, while the motion to modify was still pending, respondent 
entered his appearance on behalf of [B.S.]. 
 
 
"93. 
Ultimately, a hearing on the motion to modify occurred June 17-19, 2019. 
Thereafter, on August 1, 2019, the court issued its journal entry, modifying the parenting plan. 
 
 
"94. 
On October 8, 2020, respondent, on behalf of [B.S.], filed a motion to modify the 
parenting plan. That same month, the court ordered the parties to participate in mediation. 
 
 
"95. 
Ultimately, a status conference was scheduled for March 3, 2021. 
 
 
"96. 
Prior to the status conference, respondent sent attorney Cooper an email on 
February 17, 2021. In the email, respondent noted that there were three attachments to the email: 
(1) a letter from respondent to Cooper; (2) a letter from [B.S.] to Cooper; and (3) a proposed 
Agreed Journal Entry to resolve [B.S.]'s pending motion to modify the parenting plan. Regarding 
the letter from [B.S.] to Cooper, respondent wrote:  
 
 
'At the request and insistence of [B.S.], I have also enclosed the latter 
document which [B.S.] has prepared himself independently. As a review of the 
additional PFD enclosure reflects, the enclosure contains the opinions and 
contentions of [B.S.] in the matter.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
'For whatever it may be worth, please know I have spoken with [B.S.] 
 
a few times recently as to the advantages of getting this matter 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
resolved without intensive court involvement, or anyone else for  that 
 
matter. Of course, [B.S.] has his own opinions and perceptions of 
 
the matter. As do you and I. However, I think all could agree an early 
 
global settlement would be the best way to insulate the parties' son from 
 
a parenting conflict, or that which may follow.' 
 
 
"97. 
In the attached letter from respondent to Cooper, respondent noted the proposed 
Agreed Journal Entry and asserted that it represented a reasonable settlement to the parties' 
disagreement over child custody. Respondent asked that the agreement be accepted by February 
25, 2021. 
 
 
"98. 
Respondent also noted in his letter the letter that [B.S.] provided to him to 
forward to Cooper. In a section of his letter titled 'Additional Considerations—Not "Business as 
Usual,"' Respondent stated: 
 
 
'[B.S.] has also asked that I relay another point in close. And that 
 
being the efforts he has made to ensure that if litigation does proceed 
 
forward, he does not intend to allow tactics utilized in the past to be 
 
utilized again.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
'I could expound on the [sic] all the research [B.S.] had done, or his 
 
efforts in getting in contact with the State AG's office to formalize a 
 
lengthy criminal complaint with reference to his concerns with how the 
 
matter was handled previously, and with intent to dual-copy the relevant 
 
BAR agencies, but I am cognizant that you know [B.S.], and that 
 
you can likely appreciate that this is not something he takes lightly. 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
'[B.S.] has prepared his own attachment to this Letter, which he has 
 
asked I forward. The attachment tracks his concerns in more detail. You 
 
may review same if you wish, and will note the time period covered. 
 
 
'All the above being said, I have advised [B.S.] that often one can 
 
attract more bees with honey. As opposed to something else. And for that 
 
reason, I am seeking to extend this sincere "olive branch" to resolve the 
 
matter timely and quickly for all parties and counsel's benefit. If this does 
 
not occur timely, however, I am inclined to speculate [B.S.] may  
indeed 
 
take a different approach to litigation moving forward, and those  
whom 
 
he may seek to involve starting the morning of Friday the 26th if we do 
 
not have an agreement. I would sincerely like to avoid having to even 
 
think about what that will entail. Rather just avoid it.' 
 
 
"99. 
In the letter from [B.S.] to Cooper, [B.S.] accused Cooper of committing 
numerous instances of unethical and criminal misconduct during her representation of [T.] and, 
consequently, threatened to file civil and criminal actions as well as file a disciplinary complaint 
against her. 
 
 
 
"100. 
After not receiving a response, respondent sent a follow-up email on February 
26, 2021, stating:  'To keep things short, I would sincerely like to get this one settled. As I fear it 
will get messy and complicated—not to mention costly for parties—if we can't stop the train 
before going off the tracks.' 
 
 
 
 
 
"101. 
Cooper replied on March 1, stating that her client would agree to the terms of the 
proposed journal entry. But, Cooper asked that they appear for the March 3 status hearing to put 
their agreement on the record. 
 
 
 
"102. 
At the March 3 hearing, Cooper expressed objections about respondent's 
February 17 email and attachments. Ultimately, the district court did not approve the proposed 
journal entry, citing concerns about possible coercion/blackmail arising from the email and 
attachments. 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"103. 
The registry of actions for Case No. 16-CV-2992 indicates that no further action 
was taken regarding [B.S.]'s October 8, 2020, motion to modify the parenting plan. 
 
 
"104. 
On March 11, 2021, the ODA received a disciplinary complaint from Cooper, 
contending that respondent's email and attached letters constituted an improper threat to her, i.e., 
that if [T.] did not accept [B.S.]'s proposed settlement agreement, [B.S.] would pursue civil and 
criminal actions against her as well as file a disciplinary complaint. 
 
 
"105. 
The matter was docketed for investigation as DA13,665. On April 9, 2021, the 
ODA received respondent's response to Cooper's complaint. In his response, respondent stated 
that it was not his intent to convey a threat to Cooper when he emailed [B.S.]'s letter to her. 
Respondent indicated that he was merely following [B.S.]'s directives in forwarding the letter to 
Cooper and that he did not share [B.S.]'s beliefs regarding Cooper's conduct in representing [T.]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"106. 
The hearing panel makes the following conclusions of law based on clear and 
convincing evidence.   
 
 
"107. 
All Kansas lawyers are bound by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 203 to comply 
with the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) found at Rule 240, Rules of the Kansas 
Supreme Court.   
 
 
 
"108. 
Misconduct—violation of the KRPC—is a ground for discipline by this Board. 
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 203(b). 
 
 
"109. 
The panel finds, on clear and convincing evidence, that respondent violated the 
following rules, in the cases filed against him, as follows: 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
"Count I-Case No. DA13,349 
 
 
"110. 
Judge Wonnell found that respondent committed sanctionable conduct in filing, 
without court permission, a motion alleging misconduct by the GAL, 'in direct violation of the 
current, standing applicable order.' Under Rule 220(b), this is prima facie evidence of a violation, 
imposing on respondent the burden to disprove the violation—which he failed to do. 
 
 
"111. 
Rule 3.4(c), KRPC provides: 
 
 
'A lawyer shall not: . . . (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the 
 
rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that 
 
no valid obligation exists';  
 
 
 
"112. 
Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c).   
 
 
"Count II-Case No. DA13,563 
 
 
"113. 
Respondent sent a threat to attorney Joseph Booth that, unless a suitable 
'settlement' were reached in the Protection From Abuse action filed by Booth's client—i.e. 
dismissal—then respondent's client would pursue criminal charges and tax fraud complaints 
against Booth's client. Such criminal and tax fraud claims had nothing to do with the underlying 
PFA action. 
 
 
"114. 
While threatening criminal charges to gain an advantage in a civil matter is not 
prohibited, it is necessary 'that the criminal matter is related to the client's civil claim.['] ABA 
Formal Opinion 92-363 (July 6, 1992), available online at 
https://www.americanbar.org/products/ecd/chapter/219928/. 
 
 
"115. 
As noted above, Rule 4.4(a) provides that a lawyer 'shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.' 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
"116. 
Respondent violated Rule 4.4(a) by threatening Booth's client with criminal and 
tax fraud charges unless the PFA were settled. 
 
 
"117. 
Rule 8.4(a), KRPC provides:  
 
 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to 
 
violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another'; 
 
 
"118. 
Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a), by parroting his client's words and conveying 
his client's threats. 
 
 
"119. 
Rule 8.4(d), KRPC provides: 
 
 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer [to]: . . . 
 
 
'(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice'; 
 
 
"120. 
Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) by threatening Booth's client with criminal and 
tax fraud charges unless the PFA were settled. In closing argument, respondent admitted a 
violation of Rule 8.4(d) in this Count. 
 
"Count III-Case No. DA13,665 
 
 
"121. 
In threatening attorney Cooper and her client, respondent conveyed his client's 
threatening letter, and supported with his own words, threatening criminal complaints against 
Cooper's clients and disciplinary complaints against Cooper, unless the divorce action were 
settled to the satisfaction of respondent's client. 
 
 
"122. 
As noted above, Rule 4.4(a) provides that a lawyer 'shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.' 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
"123. 
Respondent violated Rule 4.4(a) by threatening Cooper and her client with 
criminal charges and disciplinary complaints unless the divorce case were settled to the 
satisfaction of respondent's client. 
 
 
"124. 
As noted above, Rule 8.4(a), KRPC makes it misconduct to violate the rules or 
knowingly assist another to do so. 
 
 
"125. 
Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) by threatening Cooper and her client with 
criminal charges and disciplinary complaints unless the divorce case were settled to the 
satisfaction of respondent's client, and conveying his client's letter making those threats.   
 
 
"126. 
As noted above, Rule 8.4(d) makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
 
 
"127. 
Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) by threatening Cooper and her client with 
criminal charges and disciplinary complaints unless the divorce case were settled to the 
satisfaction of respondent's client. 
 
 
"128. 
Rule 8.4(g), KRPC provides: 
 
 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (g) engage in any other 
 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' 
 
 
"129. 
Because of the repeated nature of respondent's conduct in making threats to gain 
advantage for his clients, respondent violated Rule 8.4(g). See also, In re Pyle, 278 Kan. 230, 
241[,] 91 P.2d 1222 (2004) (finding violations of Rules 4.4 and 8.4(d) where respondent 'wrote 
the letter merely to threaten [opposing counsel] with the sole purpose "of attempting to frighten or 
to put pressure on opposing counsel to settle the lawsuit upon the terms dictated and desired by 
[respondent]."'); and In re Kenny, 289 Kan. 851, 217 P.3d 36 (2009) (finding violations of Rules 
4.4, 8.4(d) and 8.4(g) where lawyer conveyed client's threat to file disciplinary complaint against 
opposing counsel unless opposing party settled claims)[;] as his pattern of misconduct reflects 
adversely on his very fitness to practice. 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
"Recommended Discipline 
 
 
"130. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel considered the 
factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
(hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be considered are the duty 
violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
 
"131. 
Under Standard 6.2—Abuse of the Legal Process, Rule 6.22 states: 
 
 
'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that he or she 
 
is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a 
 
client or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with a 
 
legal proceeding.' 
 
 
"132. 
In the present case, respondent acted knowingly, and not negligently, in filing a 
motion in direct contravention of a court order expressly requiring him to submit the motion to 
the court before filing it. He knew he was violating the order because (a) he heard the court make 
the order; (b) he asked the court for clarification at the time the order was entered; and (c) he 
reviewed the draft and then saw the submitted and filed journal entry setting out the court's ruling. 
Injury was caused to other parties, who had to pay lawyers to oppose the motion, and to the legal 
system, which was burdened and delayed by the filing and prosecution of the motion. 
 
 
"133. 
Under Standard 7.0—Violations of Duties Owed As A Professional, Rule 7.2 
provides:  
 
 
'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages 
 
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a  
professional and causes 
 
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.' 
 
 
"134. 
In the present case, respondent acted knowingly, and not negligently, when he 
33 
 
 
 
 
made several inappropriate threats, and filed a motion in direct contravention of a court order that 
the motion be submitted to the court before it was filed. This knowing conduct violated the duties 
owed by respondent as a professional as enumerated above. The conduct also caused injury to 
[the] parties, court and the legal system, by requiring the expenditure of lawyer and court time 
and resources, and delaying the proceedings.  
 
"Aggravation and Mitigation 
 
"135. 
Pursuant to Rule 226(a)(1)(C), the panel considered and applied the following 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. 
Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a 
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating factors will not excuse a violation 
and are to be considered only when determining the nature and extent of discipline to be 
administered. 
 
"136. 
The panel applied the following aggravating factors from Rule 226: 
 
(c) 
a pattern of misconduct—the three charges are quite similar, and there 
was evidence that respondent has engaged in similar conduct in at least 
one other case; 
 
 
 
 
(d) 
multiple offenses—respondent is found to have violated a number of 
rules, in more than one case; and 
 
 
(g) 
refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of the conduct—respondent, 
while acknowledging most of the facts alleged, denied any violation of 
the KRPC and—while acknowledging some of his conduct to be 
'stupid'—he did not admit that any of it was misconduct. 
 
"136.[sic] 
The panel applied the following mitigating factors from Rule 226: 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
absence of a prior disciplinary record—respondent has had no prior 
complaints;  
 
 
(b) 
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive—it appears that respondent's 
motive was always to advance the cause of his clients, albeit sometimes 
overly zealously;  
 
 
(f) 
inexperience in the practice of law—at the time of the first complaint, 
respondent had been practicing law for a total of seven years, and he had 
practiced domestic relations law for some period less than that;  
 
 
(g) 
previous good character and reputation in the community including any 
letters from clients, friends, and lawyers in support of the character and 
general reputation of the attorney—it appears from Google ratings, Super 
Lawyers—Rising Stars, Attorney and Practice Magazine, and 
Expertise.com Best Divorce Lawyers, that respondent enjoys some 
degree of recognition among members of the public and some other 
members of the Bar. The panel would wish for letters of support from 
other lawyers separate from the respondent's own sister, who happens to 
be a lawyer but might be expected to express words of support regardless 
of the situation. But the various online ratings are sufficient to 
demonstrate some degree of respondent's reputation in the community;  
 
 
(k)      other sanctions—the panel does not conclude that the imposition of 
sanctions by the various courts as described were sufficient to mitigate 
the discipline here recommended; and 
 
 
(l) 
remorse—the respondent repeatedly stated his regret for the conduct, and 
that, given the opportunity, he would not repeat it. 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Discipline 
 
"137. 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, and 
applying the Standards described above, the panel concludes and recommends that respondent be 
suspended for a period of six months. 
 
"Probation Plan 
 
"138. 
On October 4, 2022, respondent timely presented a proposed probation plan in 
case the hearing panel found one or more violations of the rules by clear and convincing 
evidence. Respondent complied with Rule 227(a) by timely submitting a plan and with Rule 
227(c) by complying with the terms of the probation plan at least fourteen days prior to the 
hearing.   
 
"139. 
In his probation plan, respondent proposes, during the following twelve months: 
 
a. 
Monthly one-hour coaching sessions with Professor Michael Hoeflich of 
 
the University of Kansas School of Law, with Professor Hoeflich 
 
reporting to the ODA quarterly; 
 
b. 
Using the services of the Kansas Lawyers Assistance Program (KALAP) 
 
by: 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Implementing improvements suggested by KALAP; 
 
(2) 
Meeting with KALAP mentor, Jace McClasky, an experienced 
 
family law practitioner at least once per month; 
 
(3) 
Attending KALAP therapy sessions; and 
 
(4) 
Attending KALAP resiliency group meetings periodically. 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
c. 
Respondent cites two ethics CLE courses he has attended in the past 
 
fourteen months, and states that he will attend one-hour of additional 
 
ethics CLE per month, including five hours on civility and 
 
professionalism, over and above the hours required by Kansas Supreme 
 
Court Rule 804. 
 
d. 
Respondent will write and provide to the ODA memorandum on the key 
 
learning points from his coaching sessions and CLE. 
 
e. 
Respondent will engage in collaboration with other members of his law 
 
firm. 
 
 
"140. 
The panel finds that this proposed plan, while apparently workable, very 
substantial, and very detailed, it does not provide adequate safeguards to address the violations 
listed above, to protect the public while the plan can and should correct the violations found 
above, and is in the best interest of the bar and the public, the plan's proposed duration is too 
short. Therefore, the probation plan proposed by the respondent is rejected. However, the panel 
does believe that with one addition—requiring the plan to be in place for two years instead of 
one—the proposed plan would provide adequate safeguards to address the violations listed above, 
to protect the public, and to comply with the KRPC, that it can and should correct the violations 
found above, and is in the best interest of the bar and the public. So, with the additional condition 
that the probation plan remain in place for two years from the date of this order (rather than the 
one year proposed by the respondent), all of the other terms of the respondent's proposed 
probation plan are accepted and put into place, starting on the date of this Order. 
 
"Recommendation of the Hearing Panel  
 
"Therefore, based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the panel 
recommends that the respondent be suspended for a period of three months, but that this 
discipline be suspended and that respondent be placed on the probation plan he submitted with 
37 
 
 
 
 
the additional condition that it remain in place and be complied with for a period of two years 
from the date of this final hearing report. 
 
"Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by the ODA. 
 
"Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
 
 
"I concur in the other panel members' decisions on Case Nos. DA13,349 and DA13,665, 
 
but dissent on Case No. DA13,563, which I would vote to dismiss. I also dissent from the other 
 
panel members' decision as to discipline, and I vote for public censure. 
 
 
"141. 
The ODA and majority opinion cites Kansas Supreme Court Rule 220 reciting 
that a prior judicial decision based upon the same conduct as prima facie evidence of misconduct. 
With regard to Case No. DA13,563 the District Court DENIED the complainant's motion for 
sanctions. The trial court's decision is based upon the standard of proof of a preponderance of the 
evidence. In this proceeding, the applicable standard of proof is 'clear and convincing'. Further, 
Rule 220 provides that the party opposing the prior decision has the burden of proof to overcome 
the prima facie evidence of the prior adjudication. In this case, the ODA did not provide clear and 
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption created by the operation of Rule 220. 
 
 
"142. 
As to discipline, I dissent for the reason that these cases present the first 
opportunity for discipline to affect the conduct of respondent. It is clearly proven and true that 
Judge Wonell's [sic] civil adjudication in 2019, based upon the same conduct which first occurred 
in 2017, was a judicial determination on the issue of civil liability, not professional responsibility. 
Thus, no prior discipline has been imposed. Secondly, the second motion for sanctions resulted in 
dismissal of the sanctions motion said adjudication upon similar conduct as the present complaint 
in Case No. DA13,563 occurred in 2020 and the trial court decision entered in August of 2020. 
Therefore, at that time, there was no prior imposed discipline. Finally, in Case No. DA13,663 the 
conduct of respondent in March of 2021 is clearly misconduct as pronounced in the majority 
decision. However, there was no prior discipline imposed according to our system. There was no 
evidence given at hearing of prior reprimand nor cautionary letter to respondent from the ODA. 
38 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, in my opinion, the imposition of 'suspension' is not fair to a practicing attorney with no 
prior disciplinary history. Both cases in which I concur are first offenses.   
 
 
"143. 
While each case is serious giving rise to the need for discipline, since the filing of 
the last action in March of 2021, there are no further instances of bad conduct of respondent 
brought to our attention. Perhaps retaining good counsel, receiving the mentoring that has thus far 
occurred is sufficient to correct the misconduct and further dissuade others from considering use 
of the woeful tactics as shown in these cases. I was clearly convinced that resoibdebt [sic] had 
truthfully and professionally assisted in the investigation of all three of the complaints, assisted 
the assigned investigator and testified truthfully during the hearing of these cases. Since the ODA 
chose not to hear from the 'boots on the ground' investigator, this panel heard from the 
investigator only through the presentation of evidence by respondent. This testimony of Mr. 
Rowe, the assigned investigator, carries great weight with me. No one testified nor was heard to 
say that diversion would not have been a fair and reasonable resolution to the complaints, 
including the judges and attorney's who labored, endured and judged the prior bad acts of 
respondent. The testimony of Mr. Rowe, shedding light on the assistance of respondent, 
providing the background and obtaining the opinions of those involved, must not and cannot be 
ignored. If these seasoned lawyers and judges were satisfied with diversion, then perhaps the least 
sanction likely to do the most good, should now be administered.    
 
 
"144. 
It is for these reasons that I concur in the findings of misconduct in Case Nos. 
DA13,349 and DA13,665 even though the conduct at issue in Case No. DA13,349 occurred in 
2017 and July of 2018. The sequence of events sheds light to this analysis. The first abusive 
threat was in 2017. The formal complaint was not filed until September of 2022. As to discipline, 
there was no explanation of the delay in bringing these cases to hearing and this fact alone weighs 
heavily in my reasoning that 'suspension' is simply too harsh. It is my hope that if respondent had 
been timely punished for the 2017 and 2018 conduct, we could have avoided the remainder. 
Censure is more in line with violations of the MRPC for first time serious breaches of these 
pillars of professionalism. 
 
 
"145. 
I dissent from imposing discipline under Rule 8.4(g) as such imposition of 
discipline is not supported by the evidence. As stated above, there has been no prior discipline 
39 
 
 
 
 
upon which to opine respondent's conduct reflects a head strong disposition to engage in 
unprofessional conduct and therefore, unfit to practice law. The course of these three cases and 
public censure is a serious sanction and it adequately protects the public and provides 
considerable guidance for the benefit of all. Public censure is warranted." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the panel's findings, 
and the parties' arguments and determines whether KRPC violations exist and, if they do, 
what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme 
Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 281). "'Clear and convincing evidence is 
"evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that 'the truth of the facts asserted is highly 
probable.'"'" In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 218, 473 P.3d 886 (2020). 
 
The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he 
filed an answer. The respondent initially filed exceptions to the final hearing report but 
later withdrew them. Therefore, the panel's factual findings are considered admitted. 
Supreme Court Rule 228(g)(1), (2) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 288). The evidence before the 
hearing panel clearly established the charged misconduct violated KRPC 3.4(c) (2023 
Kan. S. Ct. R. 394) (knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except 
for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists), KRPC 4.4(a) 
(2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 405) (shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than 
to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person), KRPC 8.4(a) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 433) 
(violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so, or to do so through the acts of another), KRPC 8.4(d) (engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and KRPC 8.4(g) (engage in 
any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
The only remaining issue is to determine the appropriate discipline for the 
respondent's violations. Although the hearing panel first proposed a six-month 
suspension, its final recommendation was to suspend respondent for three months, but 
that this discipline be suspended and that the respondent be placed on the probation plan 
he submitted with the added condition that it remain in place for two years from the date 
of the final hearing report. One member of the hearing panel concurred in the panel's 
decisions on case nos. DA13,349 and DA13,665 but dissented with respect to case no. 
DA13,563. This member also dissented from the other panel members' decision as to 
discipline. The Disciplinary Administrator's office agrees with the panel's 
recommendation.  
 
After carefully considering the evidence presented, as well as the ABA Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, we adopt the panel's findings and conclusion, except for 
the recommendation that the probation plan be retroactively effective from the date of the 
final hearing report. We conclude it is in the best interest of the bar and the public to 
make the respondent's probation plan effective from the date this opinion is filed. 
Respondent is therefore suspended for three months, with the three-month suspension 
stayed pending successful completion of a two-year probation period, the terms of which 
are in the respondent's proposed probation plan, effective from the date this opinion is 
filed.   
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Christopher C. Barnds is suspended for a period 
of three months from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective from the date 
this opinion is filed, with the three-month suspension stayed pending successful 
41 
 
 
 
 
completion of a two-year probation period, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 
225(a)(3) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 281) for violating KRPC 3.4(c), 4.4(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(d), and 
8.4(g). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.