Title: Commonwealth v. Owens

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12494 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TERRY LYNN OWENS. 
 
 
November 7, 2018. 
 
 
Search and Seizure, Exigent circumstances, Securing of premises.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress.  Controlled Substances. 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth appeals from an order allowing Terry Lynn 
Owens's motion to suppress evidence discovered when police 
officers "froze" a house while they obtained a warrant.  In a 
divided opinion, the Appeals Court reversed, concluding that the 
police officers' actions were justified to prevent the removal 
or destruction of evidence.  Commonwealth v. Owens, 92 Mass. 
App. Ct. 193, 199 (2017).  A dissenting Justice opined that the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing did not establish 
that the officers had "specific information supporting an 
objectively reasonable belief that evidence will indeed be 
removed or destroyed unless preventative measures are taken."  
Id. at 203-204 (Henry, J., dissenting), quoting Commonwealth v. 
DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 621 (2003).  We allowed the defendant's 
application for further appellate review and now affirm the 
suppression order for essentially the reasons given by the 
dissenting Justice. 
 
 
Facts.  We summarize the motion judge's findings, which are 
more fully set forth in the Appeals Court's opinion.  Owens, 92 
Mass. App. Ct. at 194-196.  A team of Boston police officers 
believed, based on specific facts known to them, that a 
particular house in the Roxbury section of Boston was being used 
for prostitution.  The building was at least a two-family 
dwelling, and the owner, Farhad Ahmed, lived in an apartment on 
the first floor.  The police officers were informed that a woman 
known as "Cinnamon" worked there as a prostitute.  One of the 
2 
 
 
officers, posing as a prospective customer, made contact with 
Cinnamon, who, in a series of communications, described the 
services she offered, arranged to meet him, and gave him the 
address of the house.  The officer arrived at the house and 
entered.  Ahmed was present in the first-floor common hallway.  
The police officer was aware that Ahmed rented out one or more 
of the rooms on the second floor for twenty dollars per two 
hours.  The motion judge expressly rejected any finding that 
alcohol or drugs were being sold on the premises or that the 
police officers had probable cause to believe that they were.   
 
 
Cinnamon asked the officer for twenty dollars.  On the 
pretext of getting his wallet from his motor vehicle, the 
officer opened the door and signaled other police officers to 
enter.  They arrested Cinnamon and Ahmed.  Because the officers 
had seen other people enter the house and because they believed 
that a search warrant would be sought, they decided to "freeze" 
the house, meaning to remove all occupants from it.  One 
officer, hearing a noise from the second floor, ascended the 
stairs.  In a second-floor room, he found the defendant, who was 
sitting in front of a black plate on which there was a white 
powder and holding a pipe of a type used to smoke "crack" 
cocaine.  The substance and related items were seized later, 
when a search warrant was obtained and executed.1 
 
 
Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that the suppression 
order was improper because, among other reasons, the police 
officers were justified in conducting a warrantless search of 
the house, including the second floor, to prevent the loss or 
destruction of evidence.2  The motion judge properly found 
otherwise. 
                     
 
1 Neither the warrant nor the application was put in 
evidence at the suppression hearing. 
 
 
2 The Appeals Court unanimously rejected the Commonwealth's 
arguments that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the second-floor room and that a protective sweep of 
the house was warranted for officer safety.  See Commonwealth v. 
Owens, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 193, 197-199 (2017); id. at 202-203 
(Henry, J., dissenting).  As to the defendant's expectation of 
privacy, the Appeals Court concluded that he was lawfully on the 
premises (regardless of the legality of the activity in which he 
was engaged therein) and that it was reasonable to infer that 
the room had been paid for and the door closed to protect the 
occupants' privacy.  Id. at 197-198.  As to officer safety, the 
Appeals Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was 
3 
 
 
 
 
"[T]here is a fundamental difference between securing or 
controlling the perimeter of a dwelling from the outside and the 
entry and physical surveillance of a dwelling from the inside. 
. . .  [P]olice officers who secure a dwelling while a warrant 
is being sought in order to prevent destruction or removal of 
evidence may not enter that dwelling, in the absence of specific 
information supporting an objectively reasonable belief that 
evidence will indeed be removed or destroyed unless preventative 
measures are taken."  DeJesus, 439 Mass. at 621.  The record 
here does not satisfy this standard.  At the time the police 
officers decided to freeze the house, they knew only that the 
house was being used for prostitution and that there were other 
people in the house, including on the second floor.  However, 
there was a dearth of testimony supporting a reasonable belief 
that the house contained physical evidence that was at risk of 
loss or destruction.  The judge specifically found that the 
police lacked a reasonable basis to believe that Ahmed, the 
owner of the house, supplied drugs or alcohol, and there was no 
testimony that any drugs or alcohol was seen in the house before 
the police decided to freeze it.  There was some testimony, 
implicitly credited by the judge, that Ahmed was believed to 
supply condoms, but no testimony that any condoms were actually 
seen in the house.  The police officers did not identify any 
other physical evidence (of prostitution or of any other 
offense) in the house.  To the extent that the existence of 
physical evidence might be inferred from the fact that 
prostitution was taking place in the house, the record does not 
support any objective basis to believe that such evidence was 
"susceptible to destruction or removal," particularly where no 
evidence suggests that the second-floor occupants were aware of 
the police presence.  See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 
686 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 
465, 474 (2007).   
 
 
Moreover, as the dissenting Justice observed, "[t]he police 
in this case were at a loss during the suppression hearing to 
                     
no reasonable basis to believe that any person present in the 
house posed a danger to the police or to others, where "[t]here 
was no evidence that the prostitution business reportedly 
conducted at the house or by Ahmed in the past included acts of 
violence" and there was no "testimony reflecting specific 
concerns about violence here."  Id. at 199.  Moreover, the 
Commonwealth expressly declined to press the issue of officer 
safety at oral argument before us.  We agree with the Appeals 
Court's reasoning and result as to both of these issues. 
4 
 
 
articulate specific evidence or information that led them to 
act.  Instead, the generic explanations, offered in relation to 
why they were clearing the rooms, were 'to make sure that . . . 
nothing is moved, no evidence, nothing is taken out'; and 'to 
prevent anybody from going [back] in and destroying evidence or 
whatever.'"  Owens, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 206 (Henry, J., 
dissenting).  These generic explanations -- the only references 
in the testimony to the possible loss or destruction of evidence 
-- do not amount to "specific information supporting an 
objectively reasonable belief that evidence will indeed be 
removed or destroyed," as required by DeJesus, 439 Mass. at 621 
(emphasis added).  Of course, the potential loss or destruction 
of evidence can constitute an exigent circumstance justifying a 
warrantless entry and search, see id. at 620, but only if the 
Commonwealth proves that the officers' belief was objectively 
reasonable and supported by specific information.  On the record 
before us, there was an insufficient basis to believe that 
evidence would be lost or destroyed.  The motion to suppress was 
properly allowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  suppress affirmed. 
 
 
Edward C. Gauthier, IV, for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.