Title: In re Estate of Mason

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Estate of Mason, 109 Ohio St.3d 532, 2006-Ohio-3256.] 
 
 
 
IN RE ESTATE OF MASON. 
[Cite as In re Estate of Mason, 109 Ohio St.3d 532, 2006-Ohio-3256.] 
Execution of judgments — Dormancy and revivor statutes — R.C. 2329.07 and 
2325.15 — Once installment support order is reduced to lump-sum 
judgment, dormancy and revivor statutes apply — Legatees’ interest in 
estate is equitable and therefore attachable only by creditor’s bill until 
probate court makes an order of distribution or fiduciary has definite 
amount ready to distribute — Once probate court has made an order of 
distribution or a definite amount is ready to distribute, legatee’s interest 
becomes legal interest subject to garnishment. 
(No. 2004-1974 — Submitted January 10, 2006 — Decided July 12, 2006.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hancock County,  
No. 5-04-01, 2004-Ohio-5644. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
Once an installment support order is reduced to a lump-sum judgment, the 
obligation becomes a fixed and unalterable amount, and, thus, Ohio’s 
dormancy and revivor statutes, R.C. 2329.07 and 2325.15, begin to apply. 
2. 
A legatee’s interest in an estate is equitable and attachable only by a 
creditor’s bill until the probate court makes an order of distribution or until 
the fiduciary holds a definite amount ready to distribute to the legatee.  
After that point, the legatee’s interest in the estate becomes an attachable 
legal interest subject to garnishment. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} Dorothy L. Mason passed away on December 3, 1999, and her will 
was admitted to probate on January 10, 2000.  In her will, Dorothy Mason left her 
son, Richard F. Mason, a one-fourth interest in the proceeds from the sale of the 
real property in her estate. 
{¶ 2} In June 2000, a law firm, appellee and cross-appellant, Rakestraw 
& Rakestraw, revived a judgment it had obtained against Richard Mason in 1994.  
A few months after reviving the 1994 judgment, Rakestraw & Rakestraw filed a 
garnishment action to attach Richard Mason’s interest in the estate of his mother 
and served the notice of garnishment on the executor of the estate. 
{¶ 3} Over one year later, in late December 2001, the Hancock County 
Child Support Enforcement Agency filed a motion to intervene in the probate of 
Dorothy Mason’s estate to present a creditor’s bill on behalf of appellant and 
cross-appellee, Wilma J. Mason, in an attempt to collect on two postdivorce 
lump-sum judgments for spousal support arrearages she had obtained against 
Richard in 1991 and 1992.  No certificates of judgment or execution on these 
judgments had been filed at the time the Hancock County Child Support 
Enforcement Agency moved to intervene on Wilma Mason’s behalf. 
{¶ 4} On February 12, 2002, Dorothy Mason’s estate sold a piece of real 
property, which resulted in funds becoming available for distribution to Richard 
Mason under the terms of his mother’s will.  Later that month, Rakestraw & 
Rakestraw filed a motion to intervene in the probate of Dorothy Mason’s estate in 
order to present a creditor’s bill against Richard Mason’s interest in the estate. 
{¶ 5} On March 7, 2002, appellee Lila Fagan obtained a judgment 
against Richard Mason for money owed.  A few days later, she filed a 
garnishment action to attach Richard’s interest in his mother’s estate and served 
the notice of garnishment on the executor of the estate. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 6} On April 4, 2002, Wilma Mason revived her 1991 and 1992 lump-
sum judgments against Richard Mason.  That same month, Lila Fagan filed a 
motion to intervene in the probate of Dorothy Mason’s estate to present a claim in 
the nature of a creditor’s bill against Richard Mason’s share of the estate. 
{¶ 7} In evaluating the competing claims against Richard Mason’s share 
of the estate, the probate court ruled that a claim against a legatee’s distributive 
share does not become a legal claim, and thus subject to garnishment, until the 
distributee’s right to possess the gift becomes certain.  The trial court further 
explained that the certainty of a gift becomes fixed at the earlier of the date of 
distribution or the date on which claims against the estate expire pursuant to R.C. 
2117.06(B), which at the time of Dorothy Mason’s death was one year after the 
decedent’s death.1  146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3899. 
{¶ 8} Since there was no distribution, the probate court found that 
Richard Mason’s interest in his mother’s estate became fixed, and therefore 
subject to garnishment, one year after Dorothy Mason’s death.  The court held that 
Richard’s interest in his mother’s estate prior to that date was equitable and 
therefore attachable only through a creditor’s bill. 
{¶ 9} Further, the probate court ruled that Wilma Mason’s 1991 and 
1992 postdivorce judgments for past due spousal support were dormant and, 
therefore, unenforceable at the time she attempted to use a creditor’s bill to attach 
Richard’s interest in the estate.  Although Wilma Mason had revived her 
judgments, she never filed for garnishment.  Thus, the probate court determined 
that the priority of the competing claims against Richard’s share of Dorothy 
Mason’s estate was as follows: (1) Lila Fagan, (2) Rakestraw & Rakestraw, and 
(3) Wilma Mason. 
                                                 
1.  R.C. 2117.06(B) has since been amended and currently provides six months from the date of 
the decedent’s death for a creditor to present claims against the estate.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 10} Wilma Mason appealed and Rakestraw & Rakestraw cross-
appealed the probate court’s decision to the Third District Court of Appeals.  The 
appellate court reversed the probate court’s holding that a legatee’s interest in an 
estate automatically becomes subject to garnishment one year after the decedent’s 
death, but affirmed the court’s judgment, including its priority determination.  In 
re Estate of Mason, Hancock App. No. 5-04-01, 2004-Ohio-5644. 
{¶ 11} The appellate court ruled that a legatee’s interest in an estate 
remains contingent, and thus equitable and attachable, only through a creditor’s 
bill until the executor of the estate has a definite amount available for distribution 
to the legatee.  Id. at ¶ 30.  The court explained that once the executor possesses a 
definite amount ready to distribute to the legatee, the legatee’s interest becomes an 
attachable legal interest subject to a garnishment action.  Id.  Consequently, the 
appellate court determined that prior to the February 12, 2002 sale of real property 
by Dorothy Mason’s estate, Richard Mason’s share of his mother’s estate was 
equitable and could be attached only by a creditor’s bill.  Id. at ¶ 31.  Further, the 
court found that after the sale on February 12, 2002, the executor had a definite 
amount ready for distribution to Richard, thus making his interest in the estate a 
legal interest subject to garnishment.  Id. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, the appellate court rejected Wilma Mason’s argument 
that Ohio’s dormancy and revivor statutes do not apply to her 1991 and 1992 
postdivorce judgments for past due spousal support.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Rather, the court 
ruled that once an installment support order is reduced to a lump-sum judgment, 
the dormancy and revivor statutes begin to apply.  Id. at ¶ 15.  The appellate court 
reasoned that since Wilma Mason had her unpaid spousal support orders from 
1989 to 1991 reduced to two lump-sum judgments in 1991 and 1992, and because 
she never executed upon the judgments within five years of their issuance, these 
judgments became dormant.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 13} Therefore, the appellate court determined that only Wilma Mason 
had filed a creditor’s bill before the February 12, 2002 sale and that only Lila 
Fagan had filed a garnishment after February 12, 2002.  Id. at ¶31.  However, 
because Wilma Mason’s 1991 and 1992 judgments were dormant when she filed 
her creditor’s bill, the appellate court held that the creditor’s bill was 
unenforceable.  Id. at ¶ 32.  Accordingly, the appellate court held that Lila Fagan’s 
garnishment was the only instrument that properly attached Richard Mason’s 
share of the estate, giving Lila Fagan first priority to the proceeds from the 
February 12, 2002 sale.  Id. at ¶ 33.  As between Rakestraw & Rakestraw and 
Wilma Mason, the appellate court held that Rakestraw & Rakestraw had been the 
first to revive its judgment and file an action against Richard Mason’s share of the 
estate, thus affording it priority over Wilma Mason.  Id. 
{¶ 14} The cause is now before this court pursuant to our acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  In this case, we are asked to address the following two 
issues: (1) whether a lump-sum judgment for spousal support arrearages is subject 
to Ohio’s dormancy and revivor statutes and (2) at what point in the probate of a 
decedent’s estate a legatee’s interest in the estate converts from an equitable 
interest, attachable by a creditor’s bill, to an attachable legal interest subject to 
garnishment. 
Lump-Sum Judgments for Spousal Support Arrearages 
{¶ 15} Ohio’s dormancy statute, R.C. 2329.07, provides that “[i]f neither 
execution on a judgment rendered in a court of record or certified to the clerk of 
the court of common pleas in the county in which the judgment was rendered is 
issued * * * within five years from the date of the judgment * * *, then * * * the 
judgment shall be dormant and shall not operate as a lien upon the estate of the 
judgment debtor.”  This court has held that a decree for alimony is not a judgment 
within the meaning of Ohio’s dormancy and revivor statutes.  Lemert v. Lemert 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(1905), 72 Ohio St. 364, 368, 74 N.E. 194.  In Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 
447, 450-451, 7 O.O.2d 276, 156 N.E.2d 113, we expanded on this principle, 
holding that an installment support order is not subject to Ohio’s dormancy and 
revivor statutes at least until the rights of the parties with respect to the 
unalterable amount remaining due on the order are fixed.  In reaching this 
conclusion, this court reasoned that an installment support order or judgment is 
unique as compared to other judgments due to its uncertainty of amount.  Id. at 
450, 7 O.O.2d 276, 156 N.E.2d 113.  Applying that same rationale to this case, we 
hold that once an installment support order is reduced to a lump-sum judgment, 
the obligation becomes a fixed and unalterable amount, and, thus, Ohio’s 
dormancy and revivor statutes, R.C. 2329.07 and 2325.15, begin to apply. 
{¶ 16} The mere fact that Wilma Mason’s judgments involve spousal 
support arrearages does not exempt them from the provisions of Ohio’s dormancy 
statute.  Indeed, R.C. 2329.07 does not contain any language excluding or 
exempting lump-sum judgments for spousal support arrearages from its 
provisions.  Moreover, this court in Smith excluded installment support orders 
from Ohio’s dormancy and revivor provisions not because of the fact that the 
order involved support, but because of the uncertainty of the amount that would 
be due on the order.  Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. at 451, 7 O.O.2d 276, 156 
N.E.2d 113. 
{¶ 17} Here, the judgments that Wilma Mason attempted to attach through 
a creditor’s bill are not installment support orders.  Rather, Wilma Mason 
converted spousal support arrearages in 1991 and 1992 into postdivorce lump-sum 
judgments.  Unlike an installment support order, the 1991 and 1992 judgments are 
not uncertain in amount.  Therefore, the dormancy provisions of the laws of Ohio 
applied to Wilma Mason’s 1991 and 1992 postdivorce judgments from the date of 
their issuance.  Since Wilma Mason did not execute upon these judgments within 
January Term, 2006 
7 
five years from the date of their issuance, the judgments were dormant until she 
revived them on April 4, 2002. 
Legatee’s Interest in An Estate 
{¶ 18} Next, this case presents the question of when a legatee’s interest in 
an estate converts from an equitable interest attachable by a creditor’s bill to a 
legal interest subject to garnishment.  Garnishment is an action in law “by which a 
creditor seeks satisfaction of the indebtedness out of an obligation due the debtor 
from a third person, the garnishee.”  Union Properties, Inc. v. Patterson (1944), 
143 Ohio St. 192, 195, 28 O.O. 111, 54 N.E.2d 668.  Alternatively, a creditor’s 
bill is an action in equity by which a judgment creditor seeks to subject an interest 
of the judgment debtor that cannot be reached on execution to the payment of the 
creditor’s existing judgment.  Id.; see, also, R.C. 2333.01. 
{¶ 19} In Orlopp v. Schueller (1905), 72 Ohio St. 41, 73 N.E. 1012, this 
court addressed the issue of whether a creditor can attach a legatee’s interest in an 
estate through a garnishment action.  In that case, this court ruled that a legatee’s 
interest in an estate cannot be reached by garnishment before an order of 
distribution is made.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  This court held that as 
long as an estate remains unsettled, or at least until an order of distribution is 
made, the property in the estate does not vest in, or become the property of, the 
legatee.  Id. at 58-59, 73 N.E. 1012.  In reaching such a conclusion, this court 
explained that, even if an executor could say that there would probably be 
something due to the legatee, the legatee’s interest remains uncertain and 
contingent until an order of distribution or final settlement. 
{¶ 20} By contrast, in Union Properties, Inc. v. Patterson, this court held 
that a judgment creditor may reach a legatee’s interest in an estate through a 
creditor’s bill before an order of distribution is made.  143 Ohio St. 192, 28 O.O. 
111, 54 N.E.2d 668, at syllabus.  Accordingly, the above cases establish a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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precedent that a legatee’s interest in an estate is equitable and attachable by a 
judgment creditor only by a creditor’s bill prior to an order of distribution or final 
settlement and is a legal interest subject to garnishment after an order of 
distribution or final settlement. 
{¶ 21} Since Orlopp and Union Properties, changes have been made to 
the Revised Code regarding the probate process.  Now, R.C. 2113.53(A) permits 
the administrator or executor of an estate to distribute the assets of an estate at any 
time after his or her appointment, thus negating the requirement that the fiduciary 
have an order of distribution before distributing funds or assets of the estate.  
However, this change does not alter the nature of a legatee’s interest in an estate 
as set forth in the above precedent.  The fact that R.C. 2113.53 gives the fiduciary 
discretion to distribute estate assets at any time after appointment does not also 
mean that the statute confers on the legatee a right of possession immediately after 
the appointment.  Although the fiduciary, once appointed, may make a 
distribution at any time, he or she is required to do so only when ordered by the 
probate court.  See R.C. 2109.36. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, even though a legatee may possess an expectancy in the 
estate’s assets, it is only a contingent, equitable interest until such time as there is 
an order of distribution by the probate court or an action by the fiduciary to 
distribute the assets of the estate prior to an order of distribution.  Accordingly, a 
legatee’s interest in an estate is equitable and attachable only by a creditor’s bill 
until the probate court makes an order of distribution or until the fiduciary holds a 
definite amount ready to distribute to the legatee.  After that point, the legatee’s 
interest in the estate becomes an attachable legal interest subject to garnishment. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} As the lower court explained, the executor of Dorothy Mason’s 
estate did not have a definite amount ready to distribute to Richard Mason under 
January Term, 2006 
9 
the terms of his mother’s will until the February 12, 2002 sale of real property in 
the estate.  Prior to that sale, Richard Mason’s interest in the estate was equitable 
and attachable only by a creditor’s bill.  However, after the February 12, 2002 
sale, Richard Mason’s interest in the estate became a legal interest subject to 
garnishment. 
{¶ 24} Although Wilma Mason was the first to file a creditor’s bill when 
Richard Mason’s interest in the estate was equitable, the 1991 and 1992 
judgments that served as the basis of her creditor’s bill were dormant and, 
therefore, unenforceable at the time she filed her action.  Moreover, Rakestraw & 
Rakestraw failed to properly attach Richard Mason’s interest in the estate because 
it filed a garnishment action when Richard’s interest was still an equitable interest 
and filed a creditor’s bill after Richard’s interest in the estate became a legal 
interest subject to garnishment.  Therefore, Lila Fagan was the first to properly 
attach Richard Mason’s interest in the estate by a garnishment action following 
the February 12, 2002 sale. 
{¶ 25} As between Wilma Mason and Rakestraw & Rakestraw, Rakestraw 
& Rakestraw revived its 1994 judgment against Richard Mason and attempted to 
attach Richard’s interest in the estate by a garnishment and creditor’s bill before 
Wilma Mason revived her 1991 and 1992 dormant judgments.  Therefore, we 
agree with the lower court’s determination that the priority of the competing 
claims against Richard Mason’s share of his mother’s estate is as follows: (1) Lila 
Fagan, (2) Rakestraw & Rakestraw, and (3) Wilma Mason. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
John A. Kissh Jr., for appellant and cross-appellee, Wilma J. Mason. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Rakestraw & Rakestraw, Adam E. Rakestraw, and Gregory A. Rakestraw, 
for appellee and cross-appellant, Rakestraw & Rakestraw. 
 
Robroy L. Crow, for appellee, Lila Fagan. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Diane 
Richards Brey, Deputy Solicitor, and Henry G. Appel, Assistant Solicitor, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General. 
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