Title: Matter of Paternity of JRW

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Paternity of JRW1991 WY 95814 P.2d 1256Case Number: C-90-3Decided: 07/02/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE PATERNITY OF JRW AND KB, MINORS: DLB, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

DJB 
and THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellees 
(Respondents)

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, the Honorable Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, Judge.

C. 
M. Aron and Patricia L. Simpson of Aron and Henning, Laramie, for appellant.

Linda 
S. Lewis of Blythe & Lewis, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C. J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 CARDINE, 
J., issued 
specially concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, 
Chief Justice.

 [¶1.]     In this case, the court 
must decide whether DLB, the appellant and presumed father of two minor children 
(hereinafter appellant), can raise the question of paternity more than two years 
after his divorce from DJB, appellee and the children's natural mother 
(hereinafter mother). Under the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
judicial estoppel, and because appellant failed to bring his paternity action 
within a "reasonable time," we affirm the order of the district court granting 
the mother's motion to dismiss appellant's petition to determine nonexistence of 
the father-child relationship pursuant to Wyoming's version of the Uniform 
Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120.

 [¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues on appeal:

1. 
Is a child support order in a divorce decree res judicata on the question 
of paternity so as to bar a statutory proceeding under the Wyoming Parentage 
Act?

2. 
Is a Parentage Act petition subject to dismissal because the petitioner has been 
ordered to pay child support?

 [¶3.]     In contrast, the mother 
identifies the issues as:

I. 
Does a divorce decree that specifically finds that two children were born as 
issue of a marriage operate to bar a proceeding under the Wyoming Parentage 
Act?

II. 
Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel bar appellant's paternity 
action?

III. 
Is the Wyoming Parentage Act applicable when paternity has been previously 
established?

IV. 
Was the appellant's petition to determine the non-existence of paternity timely 
filed under W.S. 14-2-104?

FACTS

 [¶4.]     The mother gave birth 
to JRW (the son) on November 13, 1984. Appellant and the mother were married 
thereafter on April 23, 1985 and then separated on February 11, 1986. Following 
the separation, the mother gave birth to KB (the daughter) on November 27, 1986 
which was followed by a divorce on May 14, 1987.

 [¶5.]     Appellant acknowledged 
paternity of the son in an affidavit filed with the state office for Vital 
Records Services shortly after his marriage to the mother. Appellant was named 
as the father on the child's birth certificate. Appellant admitted in his answer 
and counterclaim to the mother's complaint for divorce that the son was born "as 
issue" of the marriage. In the same document, appellant contested paternity of 
the daughter by stating that "[the mother] is on her proof that [appellant] is 
the father of [the daughter] since the possibility is remote." Subsequently, 
however, appellant and the mother stated in their property settlement agreement 
that both children were issue of the marriage. In addition, the decree of 
divorce specifically found that the son and daughter were offspring born as 
issue of the marriage. Appellant was ordered to pay monthly child support in the 
amount of $ 100 per child or twenty-five percent of his income up to $ 600 per 
month, whichever was greater. Appellant was represented by counsel throughout 
the divorce proceeding and no appeal was taken.

 [¶6.]     Shortly after the 
divorce, appellant became delinquent in making his monthly court-ordered child 
support payments. The State of Wyoming, as assignee of the mother's right to 
collect child support payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
provisions,1 brought an enforcement action 
against appellant. In an order reducing the arrearage to judgment and modifying 
the divorce decree, the state was granted judgment for past due support in the 
amount of $ 4,939.60 and appellant was also ordered to provide health insurance 
for the two children. Subsequently, appellant brought a Petition to Determine 
Nonexistence of the Father and Child Relationship pursuant to W.S. 
14-2-104(a)(ii). Alleging that the son and daughter were not his natural 
children, appellant requested appointment of a guardian ad litem for the 
children, an informal hearing and an order to conduct genetic testing to 
determine parentage. The requests were denied, the district court granted the 
mother's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

 [¶7.]     In Mostert v. CBL 
& Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987), we summarized our standard of review when a trial court grants a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6):

According 
to our standard of review we will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it 
shows on its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of 
facts. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Wyo., 
608 P.2d 1299 (1980). In considering such a motion, the "facts alleged in the 
complaint are admitted and the allegations must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs." Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 
Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979). Dismissal is a drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted. 
Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 
(1979).

 [¶8.]     In Texas West Oil 
and Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (1987), 
reconfirmed, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988), we answered the narrower question of whether res judicata or collateral estoppel 
defenses can be sustained on a motion to dismiss. We 
concluded:

This 
court follows the modern trend * * *, that if the information necessary for 
decision is available to the court by judicial notice, defendant can raise res 
judicata or collateral estoppel for consideration by a motion to 
dismiss.

Id. at 
858.

 [¶9.]     These principles 
control the disposition of this case. Despite the fact that motions to dismiss 
are generally not favored, we hold that the district court properly decided that 
appellant's petition to disestablish paternity was barred since it was not 
brought within the statutory "reasonable time." W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii). In 
addition, we hold that the petition is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, 
collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel.

 [¶10.]  In 1977, Wyoming adopted a slightly modified version of 
the Uniform Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. See generally, 
Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 287, 287-345 (1987 & 1991 Cum. Supp.). The 
Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws in response to several United States Supreme Court decisions premised on 
the discriminatory treatment of illegitimate children and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See 
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973) (holding that an illegitimate child is 
guaranteed a right of support from his father); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1972) (holding that penalizing the illegitimate child for 
the acts of the parent is an unconstitutional and ineffective deterrent and does 
not serve any state interest); and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436, reh'g denied 393 U.S. 898, 89 S. Ct. 65, 21 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute 
which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death 
of their mother). The Act is primarily designed to accord all children, whether 
legitimate or illegitimate, Fourteenth Amendment substantive legal equality. The 
Act is a legislative attempt to erase the stigma associated with out-of-wedlock 
birth. See Comment, Washington's Parentage  Act: A Step Forward for Children's 
Rights, 12 Gonzaga L. Rev. 455 (1977) and Note, The Uniform Parentage 
Act: What It Will Mean for the Punative Father in California, 28 Hastings L. J. 191 
(1976).

 [¶11.]  Appellant is the "presumed father" of 
both children under the statutory requirements in Wyoming's version of the 
Uniform Parentage Act. With regard to the son born approximately four and 
one-half months prior to appellant and the mother's marriage, W.S. 14-2-102 states in pertinent part:

(a) 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

* * 
*

(iii) 
After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother married * * *; 
and:

(A) 
He has acknowledged his paternity of the child in writing filed with the state 
office of vital records services; or

(B) 
With his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's birth 
certificate; or

(C) 
He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by 
court order * * *.

 The 
record indicates that appellant is the presumed father of the son by virtue of 
having married the mother and acknowledging his paternity in an affidavit filed 
with the state office for Vital Records Services. Appellant consented to being 
named as the father on the son's birth certificate. Also, appellant made a 
written voluntary promise to pay child support in a property settlement 
agreement and was ordered to do the same in the divorce decree. Thus, appellant 
satisfies all of the statutory alternatives for "presumed father" status of the 
son under the Act.

 [¶12.]  Similarly, appellant is the "presumed 
father" of the daughter pursuant to W.S. 14-2-102, which states in pertinent 
part:

(a) 
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

(i) 
He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and the 
child is born during the marriage, or within three hundred (300) days after the 
marriage is terminated by death, annulment or divorce or after a decree of 
separation is entered by a court * * *.

The 
daughter was born approximately six months before the parties divorced. Though 
the record, minimal as it is, suggests the parties had separated slightly more 
than nine months prior to the daughter's birth, no proceeding except for the 
subsequent divorce complaint is found. In Wyoming, a child born to a married woman or 
conceived during wedlock is presumed to be the child of the mother's husband. 
Thus, appellant also meets the statutory definition of "presumed father" of the 
daughter.

 [¶13.]  Legitimacy is one of the strongest presumptions known in the 
law. However, under the Uniform Parentage Act as adopted in Wyoming, the presumption 
is not absolute or conclusive. Under the Parentage Act, a "presumed father" has 
certain specific statutory rights to contest paternity. W.S. 14-2-104 states in 
part:

(a) 
* * * a man presumed to be [a child's] father under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or 
(iii) may bring action:

* * 
*

(ii) 
For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child 
relationship presumed under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) only if the 
action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant 
facts, but in no event later than five (5) years after the child's 
birth.

 [¶14.]  In this case, while appellant brought his 
petition to determine the nonexistence of the father-child relationship within 
five years of the birth of both children, he waited more than two years after 
the divorce before doing so. The district court, in adopting the findings and 
recommendations of the court commissioner, found that appellant failed to bring 
his action within a "reasonable time" and thus refused appellant's request for 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the children, an informal hearing, and 
genetic testing.2

 [¶15.]  Appellant argued before the district 
court and reiterates on appeal that the mandatory language in W.S. 14-2-107 
through 14-2-109 of the Parentage Act compels the district court to grant a 
presumed father's request for genetic testing to establish the nonexistence of 
paternity. This argument comes more than two years after the parties agreed that 
both children were born "of [the] marriage" and after appellant did not appeal 
the divorce decree stating that the son and daughter were "born as issue" of the 
marriage. Appellant cites Vigil v. Tafoya, 600 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1979) for the 
proposition that the Parentage Act is the exclusive means of determining 
parentage. Appellant reads the Parentage Act to invalidate any other paternity 
determination not made in strict compliance with the Act (i.e., any finding of 
paternity without the benefit of genetic testing is void).

 [¶16.]  Appellant's argument fails, however, 
since it ignores the clear policy implications underlying the Act. While genetic testing, appointment of a guardian ad litem and 
an informal hearing are mandatory in the case of an initial, contested paternity 
determination, the Act does not mandate that the same procedures be used when 
paternity has already been established with the consent of the parties in a 
prior adjudication. We read nothing in the Parentage Act which requires full 
procedural compliance with the Act before the question of paternity is resolved. 
Where, as here, appellant and the mother agreed that the children were born of 
the marriage and this agreement was reflected in the divorce decree, there has 
been no violation of the mandatory language in the Act. The Act, as applied to 
the circumstances in this case, made appellant the "presumed father" and, as 
such, a blood test was not mandatory to establish parentage at the time of 
divorce. Under W.S. 14-2-106(a)3 in effect at the time of the 
divorce, appellant failed to exercise the statutory option of challenging his 
"presumed father" status in a parentage action joined with the divorce 
proceeding.

 [¶17.]  Appellant finds support in this court's 
decision in Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 1989). However, appellant's reliance is 
misplaced since Matter of TLB is distinguishable from the present case in 
several ways. First, rather than attempting to verify the nonexistence of 
paternity, Matter of TLB involved a putative father trying to establish 
paternity. Second, the putative father and natural mother in Matter of 
TLB never married. Third, Matter of TLB involved a negotiated 
agreement in which the father stipulated that he was the natural father of the 
child, would pay child support, and, at the same time, agreed to relinquish all 
parental rights to the child. Finally, and most significantly, Matter of 
TLB did not involve a "presumed father" under the Act. Matter of TLB 
dealt with an initial determination of paternity in which the statutory 
requirements were not followed; in this case, we are reviewing a final 
determination of paternity made more than two years earlier by agreement of the 
parties and under the auspices of the district court. Thus, this court's finding 
in Matter of TLB that the district court's refusal to appoint a guardian 
ad litem or conduct an informal hearing rendered the paternity decree void has 
no bearing on the present case. Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d  at 
812-13.

 [¶18.]  While genetic testing may presumptively be necessary in a 
paternity action, the presumption can be effectively rebutted by the agreement 
of the parties. Matter of SAJ, 781 P.2d 528 (Wyo. 1989). The Act, 
seeking to "legitimize" children born outside the traditional family unit, 
presumes paternity under those certain circumstances which are present in this 
case and the obligation remains with the presumed father to bring a timely 
action under W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii) to rebut the 
presumption.

 [¶19.]  Consequently, we must interpret the 
language in W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii) as it relates to statutory limitations on 
bringing a paternity action under the Act. The statute dictates that an action 
must be brought "within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant 
facts, but in no event later than five (5) years after the child's birth." W.S. 
14-2-104(a)(ii).4 Appellant argues that five years is 
the controlling feature in the statute and any action brought within five years 
of birth is automatically viable. Accepting appellant's argument as correct 
would eviscerate the fundamental purpose of the Act; that is, to ensure every 
child's right to equal protection under the law by "legitimizing" a child at the 
earliest possible time. Appellant's argument would, in effect, allow every 
presumed father in the state a five year "window" in which to challenge 
paternity, wreak havoc on domestic tranquility, and attempt to escape parental 
support obligations. This result was surely not intended by the legislature when 
it adopted Wyoming's version of the Uniform Parentage Act 
in 1977.

 [¶20.]  In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91, reh'g denied 492 U.S. 937, 110 S. Ct. 22, 106 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1989), the United States Supreme Court considered the 
presumption of legitimacy under California's version of the Uniform Parentage 
Act. The United States Supreme Court stated that in California it is 
"irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived 
during, and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than 
the husband [of the mother]." Id. at 119 (emphasis in original). The 
United States Supreme Court found that the presumption of legitimacy is actually 
a substantive rule of law based on overriding social policy derived from the 
relationship of the presumed father and the child at the time of birth. 
Id. Applying the reasoning in Michael H. to this case, if we grant 
appellant the right to compel genetic testing, we effectively deny the 
children's protected interests in having their legitimacy presumed under the 
Act. The balance between the children's protected right not to be 
"bastardized" outweighs the father's interest in ascertaining paternity more 
than two years after acknowledging the same. See A v. X, Y & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Wyo.), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1982).

 [¶21.]  Also, to accept appellant's argument that 
five years is the controlling limitation in this case would violate our well 
established rules of statutory interpretation. In Deloges v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988), we stated:

Our general rules of statutory construction are well settled. 
If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must abide by the 
plain meaning of the statute, * * * but where a statute is ambiguous, the court 
will resort to general principles of statutory construction in an attempt to 
ascertain legislative intent. * * * Furthermore, it is a fundamental rule of 
statutory interpretation that all portions of an act must be read in pari 
materia, and every word,  clause, 
and sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous. * 
* * Additionally, we have held that this Court must assume that the legislature 
did not intend futile things, * * *, and that statutes should not be interpreted 
in a manner producing absurd results.

We 
have held that the Parentage Act must be "strictly construed and carefully 
adhered to" in order to give effect to the legislative intent. Matter of 
TRG, 665 P.2d 491, 497 (Wyo. 1983). In reading W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii) as 
a whole, we find that the legislature obviously intended that, for the sake of 
the child, an action to establish nonexistence of paternity must be brought 
promptly upon discovery of circumstances indicative of nonpaternity. "Within a 
reasonable time" is the operative hurdle which a nonexistence of paternity 
action must pass. Any dilatory action will not be saved by the five year 
ceiling.

 [¶22.]  Determination of what constitutes "reasonable time" is a 
question of fact for the trial court. This court recently stated the principle 
by the following quotation in Matney v. Webster, 808 P.2d 212, 214 
(Wyo. 
1991):

 What 
constitutes a reasonable time in any particular case is a question of fact. 
Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 907 (N.D. 
1975).

In 
the application of this rule and the further principle regarding appellate 
review, the court, in Miller v. Sybouts, 97 Wash. 2d 445, 645 P.2d 1082, 
1085 (1982), said that "[n]ormally we will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the trial court when there is support for its decision." We will follow those 
principles for this decision to concur with the decision of the trial court. 
Klawitter v. Crawford, 185 Ill.App.3d 778, 133 Ill.Dec. 721, 541 N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (1989).

 [¶23.]  Next, appellant argues that the district 
court, by adopting the findings of the commissioner, decided the case based on 
grounds other than the stated ground of res judicata as presented in the 
mother's motion to dismiss. Appellant contends this violates the court's 
standard of viewing the allegations of the petition in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion to dismiss.

 [¶24.]  We disagree. The mother's motion to 
dismiss filed in opposition to appellant's petition to establish the 
nonexistence of the father-child relationship stated the following as the 
underlying basis for dismissal:

2. 
Respondents allege that this matter is Res Judicata and that 
Petitioner is barred from action to determine the nonexistence of paternity at 
this time.

 (Emphasis 
added.) We read the basis of the mother's motion to dismiss to constitute two 
separate grounds -- res judicata being the first and a statute of limitations 
bar being the second. The district court essentially granted the motion to 
dismiss based on the second ground when it adopted the commissioner's conclusion 
that "while there may not be sufficient evidence before the Court to determine 
estoppel or res judicata, there is sufficient evidence that the action was not 
brought within a reasonable period of time after knowledge of the relevant 
facts."

 [¶25.]  Rule 301, Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of 
Wyoming states 
in part:

Each 
motion filed, except motions for summary judgment, shall set out the specific 
point or points upon which the motion is brought[.]

Thus, 
the mother was obligated to specify the grounds on which she based her motion to 
dismiss and the district court was required to grant the motion based on one or 
more of the stated grounds. The mother clearly failed to specify reliance on 
W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii)5 of the Parentage Act in her motion 
to dismiss; yet, it is equally clear that counsel for both sides argued the 
applicability of the statute before the commissioner. In addition, counsel for 
appellant addressed the timeliness issue in his statement of objection to the 
commissioner's report. We find, therefore, that if there was error in the 
district court's granting of the mother's motion to dismiss based on reasons not 
specifically set forth in the written motion, the error was harmless. W.R.A.P. 
7.04.

 [¶26.]  Differing somewhat from the conclusion of 
the commissioner as adopted by the district court, we also find that sustaining 
the motion to dismiss was justified by res judicata, which doctrine is well 
established in the Wyoming judicial system. The doctrine of res judicata

 
 
arises 
through public policy and necessity, it being in the interest of the state that 
there should be an end to litigation. Also, the doctrine arises from the need to 
prevent hardship on the individual and to prevent his being vexed twice for the 
same cause.

 Rubeling 
v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283, 284 (Wyo. 1965).

 [¶27.]  In Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 213-14 (Wyo. 1984), we discussed the policies behind 
the doctrine of res judicata and the related doctrine of collateral 
estoppel:

 As 
recognized in this state, these doctrines incorporate a universal precept of 
common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a "right, question or fact 
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction * * * cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same 
parties or their privies." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 
99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979), quoting from Southern Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. Ed. 355 
(1897). These doctrines  are founded 
upon the interest held by society in having differences conclusively resolved in 
a single action thereby avoiding the vexation and expense which are associated 
with piecemeal litigation. The necessity for sustaining this social interest is 
the justification for the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S.  at 153-154, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74; 
Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, supra, 652 P.2d at 398-399; and Rubeling 
v. Rubeling, supra, 406 P.2d  at 284. These doctrines, which inhibit the 
relitigation of claims or issues upon which there has been a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate in a court of competent jurisdiction, promote the 
reliance by citizens of the state upon courts to settle their disputes and they 
conserve judicial resources.

The 
interest served by both doctrines is essentially the same, but courts, including 
this court, have been careful to distinguish between the two. Res judicata can 
be described generally as that rule which precludes the presentation by parties 
or those in privity with them of the same claim that was resolved by an earlier 
judgment. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 
L.Ed 195 (1877); Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, supra, 557 P.2d  at 727; 
Willis v. Willis, supra, 49 P.2d  at 673; and Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, § 17 (1982). The effect of collateral estoppel is that of preventing 
relitigation of issues which were involved actually and necessarily in the prior 
action between the same parties. Roush v. Roush, supra, 589 P.2d  at 843; 
Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, supra, 557 P.2d at 726-727; Willis v. 
Willis, supra, 49 P.2d at 673-677; and Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 
27 (1982).

 Additional 
justification for the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
includes: prevention of inconsistent decisions ( Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 415, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980)); the concept that each party 
shall be limited to one opportunity to try his case on the merits (see CLS v. 
CLJ, 693 P.2d 774, 776 (Wyo. 1985)); and preventing the legal system from 
becoming unmanageable,  ( Manners 
v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 674-75 (Wyo. 1985)). As the United States Supreme 
Court has said, "'[the] doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of 
practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a 
rule of fundamental and substantial justice, "of public policy and of private 
peace," which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts * * *.'" 
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2429, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1981) (quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad 
Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S. Ct. 506, 508, 61 L. Ed. 1148 
(1917)).

 [¶28.]  A divorce decree is a final judgment and res judicata on all 
issues decided. Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo. 1987); Manners, 706 P.2d  at 674; Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1981); Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 30 
(Wyo. 1974). 
In the divorce context, we recognized the importance of finality when we said 
"[e]specially is this true in divorce cases when the emotional involvement  of the parties tends to magnify the 
importance of all matters in connection therewith." Heyl, 518 P.2d  at 
30.

 [¶29.]  Because of the potentially damaging 
effect that relitigation of a paternity determination might have on innocent 
children, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are rigorously 
observed in the paternity context.

A determination of paternity in a child support order, 
particularly where the issue has been contested or could have been contested, 
generally, precludes subsequent denials of paternity.

27C 
C.J.S. Divorce § 702 at 331 (1986).

If the paternity of a child is placed in issue in an action for 
a divorce and is adjudicated, the matter is res judicata as between the husband 
and wife in any subsequent action or proceeding[.]

24 
Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 1099 at 1084-85 
(1983).

Where the issue of paternity of a child has become res judicata 
upon the entry of the final judgment in the divorce action, the trial court may 
not thereafter grant a motion requiring blood tests of the parties and the 
child, even though the court believes that the tests would abate the husband's 
obsession that the child is not his.

24 
Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 1100 at 1086.

 [¶30.]  In Matter of Estate of Newell, 765 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1988), we identified the four criteria used to determine the applicability of res 
judicata. They are: "'(1) the parties were identical; (2) the subject matter was 
identical; (3) the issues were the same and related to the subject matter; and 
(4) the capacities of the persons were identical in reference to both the 
subject matter and the issues between them.'" Id. at 1355 (quoting Matter of Swasso, 751 P.2d 887, 890 (Wyo. 1988)). A party cannot relitigate issues 
which could have been presented in the previous suit. Davis v. Davis, 56 Wyo. 524, 111 P.2d 124 
(1941). The four criteria were met in this case: (1) appellant and the mother 
were the identical parties in the divorce proceeding; (2) the divorce proceeding 
dealt with the question of paternity and both the district court and the parties 
found that the son and daughter were born of the marriage; (3) the question of 
paternity was directly related to final adjudication of the divorce proceeding; 
and (4) both appellant and the mother  
had the same fundamental interests in determination of paternity in the 
divorce proceeding.

 [¶31.]  Similarly, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel would also be applicable in this case. The paternity issue was decided 
by the agreement of the parties in their property settlement and confirmed by 
the district court in the divorce decree. Appellant, as the party against whom 
the plea is asserted, was a party to the prior divorce adjudication. Finally, 
paternity was an issue "necessarily decided" in the prior action and appellant 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue at that 
time.

 [¶32.]  The final preclusive factor in 
appellant's fatherhood disinclination is based on the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel. The doctrine arises where, as here, the parties identified the 
children as "issue of [the] marriage" in the divorce proceeding. As defined in 
Black's Law Dictionary 761 (5th ed. 1979), judicial estoppel binds a party by his judicial declarations 
and he

 
 
may not 
contradict them in a subsequent proceeding involving [the] same issues and 
parties. * * * Under this doctrine, a party who by his pleadings, statements or 
contentions, under oath, has assumed a particular position in a judicial 
proceeding is estopped to assume an inconsistent position in a subsequent 
action.

 Thus, 
where appellant affirmatively asserted in the property 
settlement agreement that both children were "of [the] marriage," he is estopped 
from his current inconsistent claim that neither child is 
his.

 [¶33.]  An examination of case law from other 
jurisdictions supports our result. In states that have adopted the Uniform 
Parentage Act, courts have consistently applied the doctrines of res judicata 
and/or collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of paternity after paternity was 
established in a prior divorce proceeding. This is so despite the fact that 
blood or genetic testing was generally not done concurrently with the divorce 
proceeding and that, instead, paternity was established either by agreement of 
the parties and/or by judicial decree.6 The same result is also found in an 
overwhelming number of states that have not adopted the Uniform Parentage Act.7

CONCLUSION

 [¶34.]  We affirm the order of the district court 
granting the mother's motion to dismiss appellant's petition to determine 
nonexistence of the father-child relationship. Appellant, as a presumed father 
under Wyoming's Parentage Act, is barred from now 
contesting parentage of this young boy and girl by his failure to bring his 
action within a "reasonable time" pursuant to W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii) and by the 
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial 
estoppel.

CARDINE, 
J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring.

 [¶35.]  I concur in the affirmance of the trial 
court's order of dismissal and in so much of the opinion as holds appellant's 
action for determination of parentage was not commenced within a reasonable 
time.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Assignment of the right to collect child 
support payments is governed by 42 U.S.C.S. § 602(a)(26) (1985 & 1990 Cum. 
Supp.) and W.S. 20-6-106(a). See also 42 U.S.C.S. § 654 (1985 & 1990 
Cum. Supp.).

The record, in tragic form, shows 
the initiative cause for contested parentage was DPASS collection activity to 
secure support. The stipulation of parentage was filed and the decree entered on 
May 14, 1987 and by November, DPASS collection activities were underway. This 
proceeding followed two years later in September, 1989. Within this proceeding, 
appellant restates the moral boundaries of his relationship to the two 
children:

1. The Court Commissioner[] [found] 
that the underlying basis for the Petition is a desire to avoid payment of 
Court-ordered support. Although this finding is substantially true, it is 
incomplete. In fact, there is no evidence in the record -- other than the 
argument of counsel -- upon which to make such a finding. The complete argument 
of Petitioner, and the evidence which Petitioner would expect to offer at an 
evidentiary hearing in this matter, is that [appellant] wants to determine 
whether he is the father of these children so that he can properly support them 
and establish a paternal relationship with them if he is the father, and he can 
avoid the unjust burden of supporting them if he is 
not.

 
 

2Appellant based his request on three 
statutory provisions in the Wyoming act. W.S. 14-2-107 states in 
part:

The child shall be made a party to 
the action. If he is a minor he shall be represented by his guardian or a 
guardian ad litem appointed by the court.W.S. 14-2-108(a) states in 
part:

As soon as practicable after an 
action is brought to declare the existence or nonexistence of the father and 
child relationship, an informal hearing shall be held.W.S. 14-2-109(b) 
states in part:

The court may, and upon request by a 
party shall, require the child, mother or alleged father to submit to genetic 
tests.

 
 

3W.S. 14-2-106(a) 
states:

 
 
The district court has jurisdiction of 
an action brought under W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. The action may be joined 
with an action for divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, support or any 
action affecting the parent and child relationship.

 
 
Unlike Wyoming, other states compel joinder of 
parentage actions with divorce proceedings. See B.P. v. G.P., 222 
N.J.Super. 101, 536 A.2d 271 (1987).

 
 

4Washington and California eliminated the five year statutory 
limit on bringing an action to establish nonexistence of paternity; their 
statutes simply require that an action be brought "within a reasonable time" 
after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts. See Miller v. Sybouts, 97 Wash. 2d 445, 645 P.2d 1082, 1084 (1982); Wash.Rev. Code Ann. § 
26.26.060(1)(b)(1986); Cal. Civ. Code, § 7006(a)(2) (West 1991 
Supp.).

 
 

5The relevant portion of W.S. § 
14-2-104(a)(ii) requires an action to determine nonexistence of the father-child 
relationship be brought "within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of 
relevant facts, but in no event later than five (5) years after the child's 
birth."

 
 

6See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 473 So. 2d 502, 504 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984)(finding that 
the minor child was "'the parties' child'" in the pleadings and that the "child 
'was born to the marriage'" in the divorce decree was res judicata as to 
determination of paternity); De Weese v. Unick, 102 Cal. App. 3d 100, 162 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1980) (where the father stipulated to fatherhood in paternity 
proceeding and agreed to pay child support. That court said he was barred by res 
judicata from requesting a blood test four years later. The court took judicial 
notice of the pleadings in the paternity determination and also discussed the 
father's probable motivation in subsequently denying paternity); Brown v. 
Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco, 98 Cal. App. 3d 633, 159 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1979) (court said res judicata controlled despite the 
fact that presumed father knew the child was not his at time of divorce but did 
not contest the issue); A. G. v. S. G., 199 Colo. 403, 609 P.2d 121 
(1980) (once paternity is established when not contested in a divorce proceeding 
it is not necessary to apply the Uniform Parentage Act in a later challenge. If 
the Act were to be applied to children with presumed fathers, it would lead to 
unnecessary litigation, disruption of family relationships, and would be 
contrary to the public policy underlying the presumption of legitimacy); 
McNeece v. McNeece, 39 Colo.App. 160, 562 P.2d 767 (1977) (presumed 
father barred by res judicata and estoppel of judgments from raising paternity 
as a defense in a child support action); In re Marriage of Yakubec, 154 
Ill.App.3d 540, 107 Ill.Dec. 453, 507 N.E.2d 117 (1987) (the question of 
parentage was adjudicated and relied upon in determining the rights of the 
parties at the time the divorce decree was entered); B.P., 536 A.2d 271 
(where the mother was precluded from bringing an action to disestablish 
paternity when it had been agreed to in the divorce proceeding. That court said 
the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable because paternity was not 
actually litigated in the divorce action; however, the court applied the 
doctrine of repose based on the agreement of the parties); Callison v. 
Naylor, 108 N.M. 674, 777 P.2d 913 (1989) (court said collateral estoppel 
applied because father had the opportunity to raise the issue of parentage at 
the time of the divorce and failed to do so); Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571 (Minn.App. 1986), dismissed 484 U.S. 804, 108 S. Ct. 49, 98 L. Ed. 2d 14 
(1987) (presumed father stipulated to paternity in dissolution decree and was 
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from challenging paternity in a 
subsequent action); State ex rel. Ondracek v. Blohm, 363 N.W.2d 113 
(Minn.App.1985) (res judicata precluded a defense of nonpaternity despite the 
fact that paternity was not contested in a prior separation hearing); and In 
re Gilbraith, 32 Ohio St.3d 127, 512 N.E.2d 956 (1987) (court agreed that a 
non-adversarial dissolution of marriage was res judicata, thereby barring a 
subsequent paternity action brought pursuant to the Uniform Parentage 
Act).

 
 

7See State, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative 
Services Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Wright, 498 So. 2d 1008 (Fla.App. 1986) (appellate court 
quashed a trial court order for a blood test to determine paternity. The final 
judgment of dissolution of marriage resolved the issue of paternity and was, 
therefore, res judicata); Johnson v. Johnson, 395 So. 2d 640 (Fla.App. 
1981) (paternity issue resolved by stipulation of the parties and property 
settlement agreement in prior divorce was res judicata. The court stated: "To 
allow former husbands to come into court long after entry of final judgment and 
challenge the legitimacy of children born during their marriages would be 
chaotic at best. In addition, to require former wives and their children to 
submit to blood tests would, in many instances, be a humiliating experience for 
them." Id. at 641); East v. Pike, 163 
Ga.App. 375, 294 S.E.2d 597 (1982) (res judicata barred father's non-paternity 
defense in a URESA action); In re Marriage of Detert, 391 N.W.2d 707 
(Iowa App. 1986) (res judicata prevented introduction of new blood test evidence 
that showed ex-husband could not have been the child's father); Anderson v. 
Anderson, 407 Mass. 251, 552 N.E.2d 564 (1990) (held that divorce decrees 
are conclusive and binding on the parties with regard to all matters actually or 
necessarily determined, including paternity); Hackley v. Hackley, 426 
Mich. 582, 395 N.W.2d 906 (1986) (the need for finality as to a paternity 
determination compelled application of res judicata); Cogan v. Cogan, 119 
Mich.App. 476, 326 N.W.2d 414 (1982) (appellate court found that father's 
request for blood tests was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and 
that his appeal from a trial court determination holding the same was vexatious. 
The appellate court assessed punitive damages in an amount equivalent to the 
expenses incurred on appeal by the mother); Stewart v. Stewart, 91 
Mich.App. 602, 283 N.W.2d 809 (1979) (res judicata and doctrine of estoppel 
barred father from disestablishing paternity); In re Marriage of Campbell, 741 S.W.2d 294 (Mo.App. 1987) (despite no express finding of paternity in the divorce 
decree, the ex-husband was barred by res judicata from subsequently contesting 
paternity); Sutton v. Sutton, 56 N.C.App. 740, 289 S.E.2d 618 (1982) 
(court held divorce decree was binding on former husband despite the fact there 
was no finding in the decree as to paternity); Chrzanowski v. 
Chrzanowski, 325 Pa.Super. 298, 472 A.2d 1128 (1984) (appellate court 
vacated trial court order for a blood test and found full faith and credit 
should be accorded an out-of-state divorce decree based on the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel); and Walters v. Walters, 565 S.W.2d 586 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1978) (res judicata barred father from relitigating paternity); 
however, see Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1990) (where father 
was allowed to relitigate child support issue based on "newly discovered medical 
evidence" eleven years after the divorce. Id. at 599. The court viewed the 
circumstances of the case as highly unusual and stated that it "[did] not intend 
to create a new tactical nuclear weapon for divorce combatants." Id. at 
600).