Title: Cobble Hill Center LLC v. Somerville Redevelopment Authority

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13028 
 
COBBLE HILL CENTER LLC  vs.  SOMERVILLE REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2021. - April 22, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Urban Renewal.  Eminent Domain, Authority for taking, Purpose of 
taking, Validity of taking.  Constitutional Law, Eminent 
domain, Taking of property.  Redevelopment Authority.  
Words, "Demonstration." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 3, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Joseph F. Leighton, Jr., J., on 
motions for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
George A. McLaughlin, III (Joel E. Faller also present) for 
the plaintiff. 
 
James D. Masterman (James P. Ponsetto also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Denise A. Chicoine & Edward S. Englander, for Boston 
Redevelopment Authority, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The Somerville Redevelopment Authority (SRA) 
took by eminent domain 3.99 acres of land from Cobble Hill 
Center LLC (Cobble Hill) as a demonstration project under G. L. 
c. 121B, § 46 (f).  The issue presented is whether the broad 
eminent domain powers granted to redevelopment authorities by 
G. L. c. 121B, § 11 (d), include demonstration projects under 
§ 46 (f).  Relying on the express language of the statute, we 
conclude that they do.  We further define "demonstration" in 
accordance with its plain meaning and general use as requiring 
the test or development of a different, new, or improved means 
or method.  We conclude that the demonstration project plan at 
issue -- designed to "serve as a model, innovative approach to 
community development that combines a public use [a new public 
safety facility] successfully integrated with private 
development" and public transit to eliminate blight -- satisfies 
this definition for the purposes of § 46 (f).  Finally, we 
conclude that takings satisfying the requirements of § 46 (f) 
are constitutional.1 
 
Background.  1.  Statutory framework.  General Laws c. 121B 
provides for the creation of "housing and urban renewal" and 
redevelopment agencies.  See G. L. c. 121B, § 1 (defining 
operating agency as housing or redevelopment agency); § 9 (a) 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
3 
 
(including redevelopment authorities in urban renewal agencies).  
Their purpose is to identify and improve blighted land in order 
to serve the greater needs of the community.  See G. L. c. 121B, 
§ 45.  General Laws c. 121B, § 45, sets out the "urban renewal 
programs declaration of necessity," which explains this purpose: 
"It is hereby declared that . . . the redevelopment of land 
in decadent, substandard and blighted open areas in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan to promote the sound 
growth of the community is necessary in order to achieve 
permanent and comprehensive elimination of existing slums 
and substandard conditions and to prevent the recurrence of 
such slums or conditions or their development in other 
parts of the community . . . ; that the acquisition of 
property for the purpose of eliminating decadent, 
substandard or blighted open conditions thereon and 
preventing recurrence of such conditions in the area, . . . 
are public uses and purposes for which public money may be 
expended and the power of eminent domain exercised; and 
that the acquisition, planning, clearance, conservation, 
rehabilitation or rebuilding of such decadent, substandard 
and blighted open areas for residential, governmental, 
recreational, educational, hospital, business, commercial, 
industrial or other purposes, . . . are public uses and 
benefits for which private property may be acquired by 
eminent domain . . . . 
 
". . . 
 
"The necessity in the public interest for the provisions of 
this chapter relating to urban renewal projects is hereby 
declared as a matter of legislative determination." 
 
 
Urban redevelopment authorities, including the SRA, are 
broadly vested with "all the powers necessary or convenient to 
carry out and effectuate the purposes of relevant provisions of 
the General Laws," G. L. c. 121B, § 46, including the power to 
"take by eminent domain . . . any property . . . found by it to 
4 
 
be necessary or reasonably required to carry out the purposes of 
[G. L. c. 121B], or any of its sections, and to sell, exchange, 
transfer, lease or assign the same," G. L. c. 121B, § 11 (d).  
Those sections of G. L. c. 121B include urban renewal projects 
undertaken pursuant to urban renewal plans.  According to G. L. 
c. 121B, § 1, which defines certain statutory terms, an urban 
renewal plan is "a detailed plan" undertaken for the elimination 
and prevention of blight that must comply with local 
requirements and detailed statutory guidelines and regulations, 
and that is subject to public hearing and municipal approval.  
See G. L. c. 121B, § 1 (defining "urban renewal plan" and "urban 
renewal project"); § 47 (eminent domain procedures for urban 
renewal plans); § 48 (urban renewal project and plan 
procedures).  See also 760 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 12.00. 
 
The sections of G. L. c. 121B also include § 46 (f), which 
provides that an urban renewal agency shall have the additional 
power "to develop, test and report methods and techniques and 
carry out demonstrations for the prevention and elimination of 
slums and urban blight."  Unlike urban renewal projects 
undertaken pursuant to urban renewal plans, "demonstrations" are 
not expressly defined in G. L. c. 121B, § 1, or elsewhere in the 
statute, nor are they further defined by agency regulations. 
 
2.  Facts and procedural history.  This cases centers on 
the taking of a 3.99-acre property located at 90 Washington 
5 
 
Street in Somerville (property).  The property is located in the 
Inner Belt district of Somerville, a historically industrial 
neighborhood, across the street from the site for the new 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) East 
Somerville Green Line Station. 
 
Cobble Hill2 obtained the property in 1980 from the SRA by a 
land disposition agreement designed to realize the goals of a 
1968 plan for urban renewal of the Inner Belt neighborhood.  The 
property contains a strip mall built in 1982 and a parking lot.3  
In 2013, Cobble Hill received conditional approval to construct 
a six-story, mixed-use development on the property.  In 
preparation for construction, Cobble Hill evicted the property's 
tenants in 2014 and constructed a temporary fence around the 
property.  Due to litigation among Cobble Hill's partners, 
construction never began, and the permits expired in 2016.  The 
property was left abandoned and in poor condition. 
 
In 2019, the SRA adopted a "Demonstration Project Plan" 
(plan) regarding the property.  The plan is part of a larger, 
ongoing community-led revitalization of the Inner Belt 
 
 
2 The property was conveyed as part of a larger parcel to 
Cobble Hill's predecessor, Cobble Hill Associates. 
 
 
3 Cobble Hill developed an affordable housing complex on 
another portion of the parcel conveyed in 1980.  Subsequently, 
Cobble Hill subdivided the parcel in 2013.  The apartment 
complex and the land on which it stands are not at issue in this 
case. 
6 
 
neighborhood surrounding the property, which includes the goal 
of transforming the area "into [a] dynamic, mixed-use and 
transit-oriented district[] that serve[s] as [an] economic 
engine[] to complement the neighborhoods of Somerville."4  The 
plan was designed to (1) "eliminate blight on a vacant, decadent 
site which is detrimental to the safety, health, welfare, and 
sound growth of the surrounding community," (2) construct a new 
public safety building for the community, (3) serve other 
transformative development goals, and (4) "serve as a model, 
innovative approach to community development that combines a 
public use successfully integrated with private development."  
The Somerville city council and mayor approved the plan, and the 
SRA and the city council entered into an implementation 
agreement.  In order to carry out the goals of the plan, the SRA 
adopted and recorded an order of taking of the property in March 
2019 as a demonstration project pursuant to G. L. c. 121B, § 46 
(f), and awarded Cobble Hill $8,778,000 as pro tanto damages. 
 
 
4 In 2012, Somerville's planning board adopted a 
comprehensive community-led plan for growth and development 
called SomerVision that anticipated the extension of the MBTA 
Green Line into the Inner Belt.  In 2015, in response to the 
planned extension, Somerville created a master plan for 
development of the Inner Belt and Brickbottom neighborhoods.  
The master plan is an over-all guide for future development 
based on community input and does not include specific urban 
renewal projects pursuant to urban renewal plans under G. L. 
c. 121B, §§ 47-48. 
7 
 
 
Cobble Hill actively opposed the plan during its 
development and adoption.  Following the taking, Cobble Hill 
commenced a civil action, challenging the validity of the taking 
on the grounds that G. L. c. 121B, § 46 (f), does not authorize 
takings by eminent domain.  The parties cross-filed motions for 
judgment on the pleadings, and a trial court judge entered 
judgment in SRA's favor, from which Cobble Hill appealed.  We 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  The motion judge's 
decision allowing judgment on the pleadings and the judge's 
interpretation of G. L. c. 121B are both questions of law; 
therefore, we review them de novo.  See Perullo v. Advisory 
Comm. on Personnel Standards, 476 Mass. 829, 834 (2017); 
Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 
594, 600-601 (2010), S.C., 465 Mass. 297 (2013); Commerce Ins. 
Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 (2006). 
 
2.  Eminent domain power under G. L. c. 121B, § 46 (f).  a.  
Statutory authorization.  The central issue of this case is 
whether the SRA's taking of the property was authorized by § 46 
(f).  Cobble Hill argues that the Legislature has granted 
eminent domain power to urban renewal agencies only for urban 
renewal projects done pursuant to urban renewal plans, not 
demonstrations.  The SRA contends that the eminent domain power 
is not limited in this manner. 
8 
 
 
This court has previously addressed § 46 (f) in only one 
case, Marchese v. Boston Redev. Auth., 483 Mass. 149 (2019).  
There, we stated: 
"Section 11 grants [urban renewal agencies] the broad 
authority to 'take by eminent domain . . . any property, 
real or personal, or any interest therein, found by it to 
be necessary or reasonably required to carry out the 
purposes of [G. L. c. 121B], or any of its sections.'  
G. L. c. 121B, § 11 (d).  One such section under G. L. 
c. 121B is § 46 (f)." 
 
Id. at 152.  Ultimately, however, Marchese was decided on 
standing grounds, and we did not fully address the plaintiff's 
underlying claim regarding the powers granted by § 46 (f) or 
review the lower court's analysis of the issue.  See id. at 161 
(plaintiff lacked standing regardless of whether agency's use of 
§ 46 [f] was proper).  Therefore, a full analysis of the 
question is a matter of first impression in this court. 
 
The parties were able to identify only one other case 
addressing the § 46 (f) demonstration power:  Tremont on the 
Common Condominium Trust vs. Boston Redev. Auth., Mass. Super. 
Ct., No. 01-2705 (Suffolk County Sept. 23, 2002) (Tremont).  In 
Tremont, then Superior Court judge Margot Botsford concluded 
that "G. L. c. 121B furnishes [redevelopment authorities] with 
the requisite statutory power to take property by eminent domain 
in furtherance of a demonstration project under § 46 (f) to 
prevent and eliminate slums and urban blight, independent of an 
9 
 
'urban renewal plan' or 'urban renewal project.'"  Id.  We 
agree. 
 
"The language of the statute is the starting point for all 
questions of statutory interpretation."  Retirement Bd. of 
Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 130, 
135 (2016).  Where, as here, statutory language is unambiguous, 
"it is to be given its ordinary meaning" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018).  
General Laws c. 121B, § 11 (d), grants urban renewal agencies 
eminent domain power to take any property the agency finds 
"necessary or reasonably required to carry out the purposes of 
this chapter, or any of its sections" (emphasis added).  As we 
stated in Marchese, 483 Mass. at 152, one of those sections is 
§ 46 (f).  Section 46 (f) in turn imbues the SRA with "all the 
powers necessary or convenient" to "carry out demonstrations for 
the prevention and elimination of slums and urban blight."  
Therefore, it follows that § 11 (d) grants the SRA eminent 
domain power to effect takings for demonstrations under § 46 
(f), so long as the requirements of § 46 (f) are met. 
 
Section 46 (f)'s requirements contain no mention of urban 
renewal plans or projects, which, by contrast, are mentioned in 
other subsections of § 46.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 121B, § 46 (h) 
(granting power to "own construct, finance and maintain 
intermodal transportation terminals within an urban renewal 
10 
 
project area").  As Justice Botsford reasoned in Tremont, "if 
the [L]egislature had intended to tie 'demonstrations' to ones 
that formed components of an urban renewal plan, project, or 
project area, it would have so stated."  Tremont, Mass. Super. 
Ct., No. 01-2705, citing Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 199, 203 
(1977) (omission of term present throughout statutory scheme 
"casts substantial doubt" on assertion that Legislature 
contemplated its inclusion in section where omitted).5 
 
Cobble Hill nonetheless contends that the SRA's eminent 
domain power is limited to urban renewal projects by § 45, the 
act's declaration of necessity provision quoted above.  Cobble 
Hill's argument relies on three aspects of § 45:  first, the 
omission of any express reference to demonstrations; second, the 
reference to a comprehensive plan in the first paragraph; and 
finally, the reference to urban renewal projects in the last 
paragraph.  Combining these points, Cobble Hill concludes that 
§ 45 limits the legislative declaration of necessity and 
authorization for takings to urban renewal projects undertaken 
pursuant to urban renewal plans.  This reading, as explained 
above, ignores the express authorization of takings pursuant to 
 
 
5 Cobble Hill suggests that because § 46 states that its 
subsections are powers "in addition to" § 11 (d) powers, the 
§ 11 (d) powers do not apply to § 46 (f).  See G. L. c. 121B, 
§ 46.  This argument ignores the plain meaning of the phrase "in 
addition to," which is not exclusionary. 
11 
 
"any . . . section[]" of G. L. c. 121B.  G. L. c. 121B, 
§ 11 (d).  It also draws incorrect inferences from § 45. 
 
The omission of demonstration projects from § 45 is 
understandable, as the section is not a comprehensive 
restatement of the act.  Reading "the statutory scheme as a 
whole, so as to produce an internal consistency within the 
statute" (quotations and citations omitted), Plymouth Retirement 
Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605 
(2019), it is clear that § 11 (d) grants the SRA eminent domain 
power to effect demonstrations for the purposes articulated in 
§ 46 (f) itself, G. L. c. 121B, § 11 (d) (granting eminent 
domain power "to carry out the purposes of [G. L. c. 121B], or 
any of its sections" [emphasis added]).  Furthermore, § 45 
"supplies an unquestionably broad description of purposes for 
which [the SRA] may exercise the power of eminent domain."  
Tremont, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 01-2705.  Unless the specific 
provisions within § 45 necessarily preclude demonstrations, we 
will not limit the express authorization for takings provided 
elsewhere.  The two specific provisions relied on by Cobble Hill 
do not do so. 
 
The first paragraph of § 45 states that "the redevelopment 
of land in decadent, substandard and blighted open areas in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan . . . are public uses and 
purposes for which . . . the power of eminent domain [may be] 
12 
 
exercised."  As Justice Botsford explained in Tremont, Mass. 
Super. Ct., No. 01-2705, 
"[W]hile it mentions the need for redevelopment of land to 
be 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan,' the section 
nowhere defines that 'plan' as being limited to a formal 
'urban renewal plan' within the meaning of c. 121B, § 1, 
and more to the point, nowhere restricts an agency's power 
of eminent domain to taking property in conjunction with an 
approved 'urban renewal plan.'" 
 
"[W]here the Legislature has employed specific language in one 
paragraph, but not in another, the language should not be 
implied where it is not present" (citation omitted).  Souza v. 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227, 232 (2012).  Cobble 
Hill's argument that this court should interpret "comprehensive 
plan" to limit the eminent domain power to only urban renewal 
plans is therefore unavailing.6 
 
Cobble Hill's reliance on the final sentence of § 45 is 
also unpersuasive.  The sentence states: 
"The necessity in the public interest for the provisions of 
this chapter relating to urban renewal projects is hereby 
declared as a matter of legislative determination." 
 
G. L. c. 121B, § 45.  The Legislature's specific inclusion of 
"urban renewal projects" in § 45 does not exclude other types of 
 
 
6 The § 46 (f) demonstration at issue was part of a 
comprehensive planning effort, including a twenty-year 
community-led guide for neighborhood revitalization, approval by 
both the city council and the mayor, and an agreement of 
collaborative implementation between the SRA and the city 
council.  Although a § 46 (f) demonstration is not, as Cobble 
Hill suggests, subject to all the requirements of §§ 47-48, the 
steps taken by the SRA certainly indicate a comprehensive plan. 
13 
 
plans, such as demonstration plans, from being used to effect 
§ 45's purposes or purposes enumerated in other sections of 
G. L. c. 121B; we will not read in such an implied exclusion 
when doing so would contradict the grant of eminent domain power 
that is expressly provided elsewhere.  See Plymouth Retirement 
Bd., 483 Mass. at 605 (statutory scheme as whole must be 
interpreted to produce internal consistency); City Elec. Supply 
Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784, 789 (2019) ("We do not read 
into the statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there" [citation omitted]). 
 
Finally, Cobble Hill argues that § 47 limits the § 11 (d) 
eminent domain power to urban renewal plans.  Section 47 states 
that pursuant to certain statutory requirements, 
"an urban renewal agency may . . . take by eminent domain, 
as provided in clause (d) of section eleven . . . land 
. . . for which it is preparing an urban renewal plan." 
 
Cobble Hill's argument regarding § 47 mirrors its argument about 
§ 45:  the inclusion of the term "urban renewal plan" in this 
section must exclude demonstrations from the SRA's taking power 
under § 11 (d).  Once again, we disagree.  Section 47 lays out 
the specific requirements associated with the taking of land in 
preparation for an urban renewal plan, but it neither subjects 
demonstrations to those requirements nor, by failing to mention 
demonstrations, limits the § 11 (d) power that clearly extends 
to § 46 (f), as discussed above.  See G. L. c. 121B, § 11 (d) 
14 
 
(granting eminent domain power "to carry out the purposes of 
[G. L. c. 121B], or any of its sections" [emphasis added]); 
Plymouth Retirement Bd., 483 Mass. at 605 (statutory scheme as 
whole must be interpreted to produce internal consistency); City 
Elec. Supply Co., 481 Mass. at 789 (court will not imply 
provision that Legislature did not include).7 
 
b.  Demonstrations.  Cobble Hill further contends that the 
SRA's taking in this case was not a demonstration, but rather a 
run-of-the-mill urban renewal project that was not properly 
included in an urban renewal plan.  Instead, it was termed a 
demonstration "to avoid the oversight associated with a full-
blown urban renewal plan."  To assess this argument, we must 
first address the meaning of "demonstration." 
 
As explained above, § 46 (f) empowers urban renewal 
agencies "to develop, test and report methods and techniques and 
carry out demonstrations."  The term "demonstration" is not 
otherwise defined by the statute.  See G. L. c. 121B, §§ 1, 
46 (f).  "Words that are not defined in a statute should be 
given their usual and accepted meanings, provided that those 
 
 
7 If anything, the omission of the term "demonstration" from 
§ 47 supports the idea that demonstrations are not subject to 
§ 47's rigorous requirements.  See Tremont, Mass. Super. Ct., 
No. 01-2705, citing Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 199, 203 (1977) 
(omission of term present throughout statutory scheme "casts 
substantial doubt" on assertion that Legislature contemplated 
its inclusion in section where omitted). 
15 
 
meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose."  Seideman 
v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477–478 (2008).  "We derive the words' 
usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the 
statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts 
and dictionary definitions."  Id. at 478, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  We conclude that 
demonstration requires the testing or development of a 
different, new, or improved means or method of accomplishing a 
specific statutory purpose.  In this context, that purpose is 
the elimination of blight.  G. L. c. 121B, § 46 (f).  In other 
professions, this same idea has been expressed as a proof of 
concept.  Simply repeating a previously established practice 
without varying the means or methods, we conclude, would not be 
a demonstration. 
Dictionaries variously define demonstration as " the act of 
showing someone how to do something, or how something works";8 
"[t]he act or process of providing evidence for or showing the 
truth of something . . . [;] [a]n illustration or explanation, 
as of a theory or product, by exemplification or practical 
application";9 and " [a]n act of showing that something exists or 
 
 
8 Cambridge English Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge 
.org/dictionary/english/demonstration [https://perma.cc/6EHS-
4C7P]. 
 
9 American Heritage Dictionary, https://www.ahdictionary.com 
/word/search.html?q=demonstration [https://perma.cc/SEV4-5LWU]. 
 
16 
 
is true by giving proof or evidence."10  As we will discuss, 
these definitions are consistent with the usage of the term 
"demonstration" or "demonstration project" in other areas of law 
and governance. 
 
Notably, when our statute was drafted, there was a Federal 
model that included the concept of a housing demonstration as a 
means to assist "in developing, testing, and reporting methods 
and techniques, and carrying out demonstrations and other 
activities for the prevention and elimination of slums and urban 
blight."  Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, § 314, 68 
Stat. 590, 629 (1954).  Funding priority was given to projects 
"reasonably . . . expected to . . . improve[] . . . methods and 
techniques for the elimination and prevention of slums and 
blight" and "serve to guide renewal programs in other 
communities."  Id.  A year after the Federal statute was passed, 
Massachusetts adopted this language nearly verbatim in § 46 
(f)'s predecessor, now repealed G. L. c. 121, § 26AAA, inserted 
by St. 1955, c. 654, § 4 ("Such authority is further authorized 
to develop, test and report methods and techniques, and carry 
out demonstrations for the prevention and the elimination of 
slums and urban blight").  See 1969 Senate Bill No. 1226 (G. L. 
 
 
10 Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/definition/demonstration 
[https://perma.cc/P4S7-QXDE]. 
17 
 
c. 121B was "recodification [of] housing and urban renewal laws" 
making no change to section that is now § 46 [f]). 
 
Our statutory language, which mirrors the Federal Housing 
Act of 1954 cited above, was clearly enacted with knowledge of 
the Federal Housing Act's funding prioritization of 
demonstrations "reasonably . . . expected to . . . improve[] 
. . . methods and techniques for the elimination and prevention 
of slums and urban blight" and "serve to guide renewal programs 
in other communities."  Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, 
§ 314, 68 Stat. 590, 629 (1954).  Thus, § 46 (f) clearly 
contemplates the development and testing of new or different 
projects that may lead to future use and improvement, which is 
consistent with the common understanding of a demonstration. 
Other Massachusetts statutes use the term "demonstration" 
or "demonstration project" similarly.  Although they do not 
expressly define the meaning of demonstration, the context of 
the statutory language clearly reflects the concept of a 
demonstration as a means of testing and developing different, 
new, or improved means or methods of accomplishing statutory 
purposes.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 6C, § 32 (funding "demonstration 
projects . . . for the purpose of energy conservation for 
improved transportation management systems"); G. L. c. 16, § 20 
(authorizing "demonstration projects" alongside mandate to 
"encourage improved methods of solid waste disposal including 
18 
 
recycling"); G. L. c. 21, § 38 (authorizing "demonstration 
projects relating to . . . innovative water technologies, green 
infrastructure and other scientific and engineering studies 
relating to environmental quality [which] may include . . . new 
and improved methods"); G. L. c. 29, § 2OOOO (b) (10) 
(authorizing "demonstration projects . . . to determine the most 
likely successful training models to provide upward mobility"); 
G. L. c. 75, § 38 (b) (2) (authorizing "demonstration projects 
concerning new or modified industrial process design equipment 
or technologies for waste prevention").11 
 
11 Massachusetts State agency implementation of 
demonstration projects is consistent with this definition.  See, 
e.g., Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, Better Bus Team 
Evaluating Demonstration Project Ideas, https://www.mbta.com 
/projects/better-bus-project/update/better-bus-team-evaluating-
demonstration-project-ideas [https://perma.cc/FZ5Q-29Q4] 
(demonstration projects to "test new [transportation] service 
strategies that will guide the way for the design of different 
bus network alternatives"); Massachusetts Department of Children 
and Families, Title IV-E Demonstration Waiver, 5 (July 9, 2012) 
(new youth residential treatment programs demonstration projects 
to "fundamentally change the business model" of service 
implementation); The National Academies of Sciences Engineering 
and Medicine, Massachusetts Demonstration Project:  
Reconstruction of Fourteen Bridges on I-93 in Medford Using 
Accelerated Bridge Construction Techniques, 
https://trid.trb.org/view/1370469 [https://perma.cc 
/J8FE-E7AZ] (Sep. 29, 2015) (demonstration project to 
"demonstrate the use of proven, innovative technologies" to 
complete a large construction project "in less time than 
conventional construction"); Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection, Demonstration Project Instructions & 
Supporting Materials (June 2019) (demonstration project to 
develop "new or innovative solid waste, recycling, composting or 
conversion technologies or processes"); Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, CDC's Childhood Obesity Research 
19 
 
 
Federal sources also regularly employ the concept of a 
demonstration or demonstration project.12  Though, again, the 
term is not directly defined in most Federal sources, the 
statutory context reflects an understanding of a demonstration 
as the testing or development of a different, new, or improved 
means or method with some element of innovation required.  See 
Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 244-245 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(Social Security Act allows for experimental, pilot, or 
demonstration projects in State medical plans that would 
otherwise fall outside Medicaid's parameters in order to promote 
act's objectives).  See also Scharein v. Merit Sys. Protection 
Bd., 204 F. App'x 19, 21-22 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Civil Service 
Reform Act authorizes Office of Personnel Management "to conduct 
 
Demonstration (CORD) Project 2.0 (2016-2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/strategies/healthcare/cord2.html 
[https://perma.cc/23N6-BYR8] (listing Massachusetts Department 
of Health as grantee for demonstration project to evaluate 
effectiveness of programs designed to "improve obesity screening 
and counseling services for children" in order to "determine how 
similar programs may be developed in a sustainable way and 
disseminated across primary care practices in the state"). 
 
 
12 Multiple Federal statutes expressly authorize 
demonstration projects.  See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3906 
(authorizing "demonstration projects" to determine cost factors 
and maintenance of open dumps on tribal land); 42 U.S.C. § 505 
(authorizing "demonstration projects" for unemployment 
compensation); 42 U.S.C. § 17121 (authorizing "demonstration 
projects" of "green features" in Federal buildings). 
20 
 
demonstration projects that experiment with new and different 
personnel management concepts" [citation omitted]).13 
 
Reading § 46 (f) as a whole, we conclude that this broadly 
used understanding of a demonstration is consistent with the 
statutory language and purpose.  The statute in its entirety 
makes clear that demonstrations under § 46 (f) must be focused 
on innovative ways to "prevent[] and eliminat[e] . . . slums and 
urban blight."  Therefore, in the context of § 46 (f), a 
demonstration is a test or development of a different, new, or 
improved means or method of eliminating blight. 
 
Having thus defined "demonstration," we now turn to the 
question whether the SRA's taking at issue in this case was, in 
fact, a demonstration. 
 
By way of introduction to the plan, the SRA states that 
redevelopment of the property is best achieved through a 
demonstration because it will eliminate blight, deliver a much-
needed public safety building, meet other community objectives, 
and, most importantly for demonstration purposes, "serve as a 
 
 
13 Many of the Federal and State statutes cited here 
authorize the relevant authority to waive typical statutory 
requirements in order to implement a demonstration project.  
General Laws c. 121B does not include an analogous waiver, but 
this use of a demonstration alongside a waiver is consistent 
with a plain reading of G. L. c. 121B:  a demonstration is 
different from an urban renewal project and therefore need not 
undergo the requirements of an urban renewal project.  See G. L. 
c. 121B, §§ 1, 46-48. 
21 
 
model, innovative approach to community development that 
combines a public use successfully integrated with private 
development." 
 
The plan envisions using the portion of the property not 
used for the public safety building to "support a 
transformative, mixed-use development program" that will serve 
"important community needs and desires" by providing "an 
engaging and flexible mix of other uses in order to create an 
accessible, inclusive, and welcoming space."  This development 
is also closely linked to the anticipated extension of public 
transit into the area, making the demonstration property, which 
will serve multiple community purposes, a part of a "mixed-use, 
transit-oriented" district.  According to the plan, the 
successful integration of a public safety complex and "a 
comprehensive reuse plan . . . could provide a useful example 
for other communities throughout the Commonwealth" and "serve as 
a test for possible application elsewhere in Somerville and in 
other communities throughout the Commonwealth." 
 
Cobble Hill first contends that the plan cannot be a 
demonstration plan because its primary objective is to eliminate 
blight, which is the purpose of urban renewal plans.  In fact, 
this purpose is required for any demonstration under § 46 (f) 
(authorizing demonstrations "for the prevention and elimination 
of slums and urban blight").  The plan's objective of 
22 
 
eliminating blight qualifies it as a § 46 (f) demonstration, 
rather than prohibiting it. 
 
Cobble Hill next contends that the plan "does not identify 
any 'methods or techniques' that it is demonstrating."  We do 
take seriously Cobble Hill's concern that the SRA cannot simply 
circumvent the rigorous urban renewal plan requirements by 
labeling a plan a demonstration or "innovative."  An ordinary 
taking to construct a municipal public safety building, however 
described, would not qualify as a demonstration; meeting an 
expected community need in an established manner, while 
important, does not fall under the definition of a 
demonstration.  But that is not the case here.  The plan, albeit 
by no means comprehensive, contemplates the successful 
integration of a public safety complex with private development 
and nearby public transit in order to serve identified community 
goals.  The SRA describes its plan as a "unique combination of 
uses proposed" on a single site that will require a new level of 
collaboration between the SRA, the city, the community, and 
developers.  Whether or not it is entirely unique, there appears 
to be sufficient novelty in the integration of a public safety 
complex and private development on a single site to create a 
"mixed-use, transit-oriented" district to constitute a 
demonstration project under § 46 (f). 
23 
 
 
We do, however, emphasize in closing that future 
demonstration plans pursuant to § 46 (f), which will be 
undertaken with the benefit of this opinion and the definition 
therein, should identify with more specificity the unique or 
innovative nature of the demonstration, the difference in or 
improvement of the means used, and the manner in which reporting 
of the demonstration will be useful as a model for future plans. 
 
c.  Constitutionality.  To be constitutional, a taking must 
be made for a legitimate public purpose and the landowner must 
receive just compensation.  See, e.g., Blair v. Department of 
Conservation & Recreation, 457 Mass. 634, 642 (2010), citing 
art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; Benevolent & 
Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 65 v. Planning Bd. of 
Lawrence, 403 Mass. 531, 539-540 (1988) (Elks) ("Exercising the 
power of eminent domain is improper unless the taking is for a 
public purpose").  Cobble Hill briefly argues that permitting 
the SRA to exercise eminent domain power outside of the strict 
guidelines of an urban renewal project violates these 
constitutional principles.14 
 
 
14 Cobble Hill does not dispute the relevant mechanism for 
just compensation.  Section § 11 (d) authorizes eminent domain 
powers for G. L. c. 121B purposes pursuant to G. L. c. 79 or 
G. L. c. 80A, both of which provide for just compensation.  See 
G. L. c. 79, § 6; G. L. c. 80A, § 10. 
24 
 
 
In doing so, Cobble Hill relies primarily on Opinion of the 
Justices, 356 Mass. 775 (1969), a nonbinding advisory opinion 
that determined that legislation authorizing public 
appropriations in order to construct a stadium must "contain 
standards and principles governing and guiding the operation of 
the facilities in a manner which reasonably can be expected 
adequately (a) to protect all aspects of the public interest and 
(b) to guard against improper diversion of public funds and 
privileges for the benefit of private persons and entities."  
Id. at 796-797.  See Massachusetts Taxpayers Found., Inc. v. 
Secretary of Admin., 398 Mass. 40, 44 (1986) (Supreme Judicial 
Court advisory opinions are nonbinding). 
 
In addition to being nonbinding, our advisory Opinion of 
the Justices is easily distinguished from the present case.  
Opinion of the Justices dealt with special legislation in a 
particular situation regarding public appropriations for the 
construction of a stadium; it is not an urban renewal case and 
does not address G. L. c. 121B or the elimination of blight.  
Opinion of the Justices, supra. 
 
The SRA's exercise of eminent domain power for a 
demonstration comports with the constitutional requirements that 
a taking must be for a public purpose and the landowner must 
receive just compensation.  The public purposes are sufficiently 
defined in G. L. c. 121B, §§ 45 and 46 (f), to satisfy the 
25 
 
constitutional requirements.  See Kelo v. New London, Conn., 545 
U.S. 469, 480 (2005) ("Without exception, our cases have defined 
that concept [of public purpose] broadly, reflecting our 
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in 
this field").  As explained above, G. L. c. 121B justifies 
takings, including under § 46 (f) "for the prevention and 
elimination of slums and urban blight."  As explained in § 45, 
this is an important public purpose, and has been repeatedly 
found to satisfy constitutional requirements.  See, e.g., Kelo, 
supra at 481, citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
("redevelopment plan targeting a blighted area" was 
"unequivocally affirmed" as public purpose); Elks, 403 Mass. at 
539-540 ("Taking for redevelopment an area which is a 'blighted 
open area' . . . is a public purpose"). 
 
Takings pursuant to § 46 (f) must not only be for the 
purpose of eliminating blight, but must also satisfy the 
definition of demonstration, requiring that they test or develop 
different, new, or improved means of eliminating blight, further 
confining the exercise of this eminent domain power.  The proper 
exercise of eminent domain power pursuant to § 46 (f) is 
therefore constitutional.15 
 
15 The fact that the SRA plans to use some of the property 
as a municipal building and sell some of the property for 
development does not negate the public purpose of the taking.  
See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34 (public ends of eminent 
26 
 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the SRA's taking was a lawful 
demonstration under G. L. c. 121B, § 46 (f), and constitutional.  
The Superior Court judge's decision allowing SRA's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and denying Cobble Hill's cross motion 
is therefore affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
domain power do not require public ownership and may be better 
served through private enterprise); Elks, 403 Mass. at 551 
("Disposition to a private redeveloper of property acquired 
pursuant to a valid plan may be necessary to achieve the public 
purpose"); Papadinis v. Somerville, 331 Mass. 627, 632 (1954) 
("Once the public purpose contemplated by the statute has been 
achieved the authority is not obliged to retain the cleared land 
as unproductive property").  See also G. L. c. 121B, § 11 (d) 
(agency has power to "take by eminent domain . . . any property 
. . . found by it to be necessary or reasonably required to 
carry out the purposes of this chapter, or any of its sections, 
and to sell, exchange, transfer, lease or assign the same").  In 
this case, the plan provides that any private developer will be 
bound to a land disposition agreement that will contain 
safeguards, such as rights of reverter, to ensure that the 
proposal provides public benefits.