Title: State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. WHITE ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. 
CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, APPELLANT AND CROSS-
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 
543.] 
Mandamus — Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to consider merits of appeal and 
cross-appeal where court of appeals’ entry issuing a writ of mandamus 
neither determined the action nor prevented a judgment — R.C. 2505.02, 
construed and applied. 
(No. 96-1545 — Submitted July 7, 1997 — Decided October 1, 1997.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
65936. 
 
Appellant and cross-appellee, Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority 
(“CMHA”), employed appellees and cross-appellants, John White, John K. Sellers, 
and Ernest Taggert.  Prior to their employment with CMHA, White and Taggert 
were employed by the state of Ohio, and Sellers was employed by the city of 
Cleveland.  Based on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas’ decision in 
Bakker v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. (Feb. 22, 1983), No. 82-36143, 
unreported, CMHA refused to count appellees’ and other employees’ prior service 
with the state or any political subdivision of the state to compute their vacation 
leave under R.C. 9.44. 
 
In August 1993, after Sellers had left his employment with CMHA, 
appellees, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated CMHA 
employees, filed an action in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ 
of mandamus to compel CMHA to credit their prior public employment service 
under R.C. 9.44 in order to compute their vacation leave.  Appellees also 
 
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requested in their complaint, as subsequently amended, that CMHA award 
vacation credits retroactively and prospectively, that they be awarded a money 
judgment for past vacation credit, and that former employees who had been 
employed by CMHA within six years prior to their suit be included in the class 
entitled to the writ of mandamus.  The court of appeals denied CMHA’s motion to 
dismiss, and CMHA subsequently filed an answer denying appellees’ entitlement 
to the requested relief. 
 
In February 1996, the court of appeals partially granted appellees’ motion to 
certify the case as a class action.  Although the court of appeals had not yet 
determined appellees’ entitlement to mandamus relief, it instructed the parties to 
submit briefs on remedies the court should order.  
 
After the parties filed the ordered briefs, the court of appeals entered a 
judgment granting a writ of mandamus in favor of the certified class.  The court of 
appeals ordered that CMHA (1) credit current employees with their prior Ohio 
political subdivision experience as mandated by R.C. 9.44; (2) award current 
employees back vacation time from six years prior to the commencement of the 
action, with “back vacation time” defined as the difference between vacation leave 
actually received and vacation leave to which they were actually entitled under 
R.C. 9.44; (3) permit current employees to use back vacation time without 
interrupting CMHA business; and (4) pay damages equivalent to back vacation 
time to CMHA employees who had left CMHA during the pendency of the action.  
The court of appeals instructed CMHA to prepare and release information 
necessary to calculate and verify the relief granted to individual class members, 
including vacation policies, dates on which each class member began employment 
with CMHA, and vacation time allotted to each class member.  In order to 
implement its ruling, the court of appeals provided for notification of class 
 
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members, a procedure for class members to apply and establish relief, and a 
procedure to resolve any future disputes between asserted class members and 
CMHA to be presided over by a court-appointed commissioner.  The court of 
appeals did not award a specific sum of money or vacation credit to the certified 
class. 
 
The cause is now before the court upon an appeal and cross-appeal from the 
court of appeals’ judgment. 
__________________ 
 
Butler, Feighan, Hyland & Modica, Dennis F. Butler and Joseph E. 
Feighan, for appellees and cross-appellants. 
 
Graves & Horton, Earle C. Horton, Harold C. Reeder and Brett E. Horton, 
for appellant and cross-appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Initially, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of this appeal and cross-appeal.  Subject-matter jurisdiction 
may not be waived or bestowed upon a court by the parties to the case.  State v. 
Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 46, 652 N.E.2d 196, 200.  It may be raised sua 
sponte by an appellate court.  State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 82, 84, 661 N.E.2d 728, 731. 
 
Appeals as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court in cases 
originating in courts of appeals, including actions involving extraordinary writs.  
Section 2(B)(2)(a)(i), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.  R.C. 2505.03 limits the 
appellate jurisdiction of any court, including the Supreme Court, to the review of 
final orders, judgments, or decrees.  Wright, 75 Ohio St.3d at 84, 661 N.E.2d at 
731.  R.C. 2505.02 defines a “final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
 
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modified, or reversed, with or without retrial” as “[a]n order that affects a 
substantial right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a 
judgment, an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or 
upon a summary application in an action after judgment, or an order that vacates 
or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial * * *.” 
 
The two categories of final orders that might apply to the court of appeals’ 
order are (1) orders that affect a substantial right in an action which in effect 
determine the action and prevent a judgment, and (2) orders that affect a 
substantial right made in a special proceeding.  R.C. 2505.02. 
 
Both of these categories require that the order affect a substantial right in 
order to be final and appealable.  A “substantial right” for purposes of R.C. 
2505.02 is a legal right enforced and protected by law.  State ex rel. Hughes v. 
Celeste (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 429, 430, 619 N.E.2d 412, 414; Noble v. Colwell 
(1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381, 1383.  Here, the court of appeals’ 
order granting extraordinary relief in mandamus affects substantial rights of the 
parties. 
 
The court of appeals’ order was not made in a special proceeding, as 
required by the second category of final orders under R.C. 2505.02.  Orders that 
are entered in actions that were recognized at common law or equity and were not 
specially created by statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant 
to R.C. 2505.02.  Polikoff v. Adam (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 616 N.E.2d 213, 
syllabus, overruling Amato v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 253, 21 
O.O.3d 158, 423 N.E.2d 452.  Since both class action suits and complaints for 
writs of mandamus were recognized at common law, orders entered in either 
action are not made in a special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02.  See, e.g., 
Blumenthal v. Medina Supply Co. (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 473, 475, 654 N.E.2d 
 
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368, 369, citing Hansberry v. Lee (1940), 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 
(“Class action suits were known at common law.”); State ex rel. Moyer v. Baldwin 
(1908), 77 Ohio St. 532, 538, 83 N.E. 907, 908 (“The jurisdiction in mandamus 
that is conferred by the [Ohio] Constitution is the common-law jurisdiction as it 
then was exercised in this state * * *.”); Shoff v. Shoff (July 27, 1995), Franklin 
App. No. 95APF01-8, unreported, 1995 WL 450249. 
 
Therefore, the dispositive jurisdictional issue is whether the court of 
appeals’ entry determined the action and prevented a judgment, as required by the 
first category of R.C. 2505.02 final orders.  The court of appeals ruled that CMHA 
was liable for prior service vacation credit, including back vacation time from the 
date the mandamus action was filed, but did not specify an amount of damages.  
Instead, the court of appeals provided a procedure to implement its order: 
notification of individual class members, application by class members to verify 
and establish prior qualifying service with appropriate documentation and 
vacation policies provided by CMHA, and resolution of disputes between any 
individual class member and CMHA by a court-appointed commissioner. 
 
Generally, orders determining liability in the plaintiffs’ or relators’ favor 
and deferring the issue of damages are not final appealable orders under R.C. 
2505.02 because they do not determine the action or prevent a judgment.  State ex 
rel. A & D Ltd. Partnership v. Keefe (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 50, 53, 671 N.E.2d 13, 
15-16; see, also, Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. BPS Co. (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 3, 4 
OBR 23, 446 N.E.2d 181.  This general rule is similar to that applied in federal 
cases to determine whether an order entered by a federal court is final and 
appealable under Section 1291, Title 28, U.S.Code.  See, e.g., Parks v. Pavkovic 
(C.A.7, 1985), 753 F.2d 1397. 
 
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Courts have recognized an exception to the foregoing general rule.  Under 
this exception, a judgment not completely determining damages is a final 
appealable order where the computation of damages is mechanical and unlikely to 
produce a second appeal because only a ministerial task similar to assessing costs 
remains.  See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert (1980), 444 U.S. 472, 479-480, 100 
S.Ct. 745, 750, 62 L.Ed.2d 676, 682-683, fn. 5; McMunn v. Hertz Equip. Rental 
Corp. v. Eichleay Corp. (C.A.7, 1986), 791 F.2d 88, 90; U.S.A. v. Brook 
Contracting Corp. (C.A.3, 1985), 759 F.2d 320, 323; Pledger v. Bosnick (1991), 
306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d 286.  
 
This exception is inapplicable here.  For example, in Boeing, 444 U.S. at 
476, 100 S.Ct. at 748, 62 L.Ed.2d at 680, fn. 1, the federal district court entered 
judgment in favor of the certified class for the principal sum of $3,289,359 plus 
statutory interest.  Although the amount due the individual class members had not 
been ascertained, “[n]othing in the court’s order made Boeing’s liability for this 
amount contingent upon the presentation of individual claims.”  Id., 444 U.S. at 
480, 100 S.Ct. at 750, 62 L.Ed.2d at 682, fn. 5.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States determined that the judgment awarding the class a fixed recovery was final 
and appealable.  Id., 444 U.S. at 480, 100 S.Ct. at 750, 62 L.Ed.2d at 683, fn. 5.  In 
contrast, the entry here did not fix CMHA’s total liability to the certified class. 
 
Similarly, unlike other cases applying the exception, it is not evident that 
only a ministerial task similar to executing a judgment or assessing costs remains 
for the court of appeals.  See Parks, McMunn, and Pledger.  In fact, the court of 
appeals’ entry envisions the possibility of disputes concerning alleged class 
members’ individual claims by providing a dispute resolution procedure and 
appointing a commissioner.  Subsequent appeals from orders resolving these 
disputes are not necessarily unlikely.  Further, the court of appeals has not yet 
 
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considered evidence regarding CMHA’s vacation policies.  See State ex rel. N. 
Olmsted Fire Fighters Assn. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 530, 534-535, 
597 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Court of appeals erred in not evaluating employee’s prior 
state service under city’s vacation accrual policy to determine whether prior state 
service satisfied policy’s conditions for vacation eligibility.). 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals’ entry issuing a writ of 
mandamus neither determined the action nor prevented a judgment.  The entry 
consequently is not a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02, and we lack the 
requisite jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal and cross-appeal.  
Accordingly, the appeal and cross-appeal are dismissed. 
Appeal and 
cross-appeal dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.