Title: Blittersdorf v. Eikenberry

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Blittersdorf v. Eikenberry1998 WY 99964 P.2d 413Case Number: 97-321Decided: 08/11/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

James 
Harold BLITTERSDORF, d/b/a Custom Log Homes or High Country Homes, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

F. William EIKENBERRY, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Albany County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J.

 

James K. Lubing of James K. 
Lubing Law Office, Jackson, for 
Appellant(Defendant).

A. Joe Hageman, Laramie, 
for Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Before LEHMAN, 
C.J.,* and THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and KALOKATHIS, 
D.J.

 * Chief Justice effective July 1, 
1998

 

KALOKATHIS, District Judge.

 [¶1] James Harold Blittersdorf, d/b/a Custom Log 
Homes or High Country Homes (Blittersdorf), appeals a default judgment against 
him in favor of F. William Eikenberry (Eikenberry). Blittersdorf raises three 
issues: (1) whether service of process was perfected at his "usual place of 
abode;" (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the default; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in 
the damage award.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                      
FACTS AND BACKGROUND

 

[¶3] On June 13, 1997, 
Eikenberry filed a complaint against Blittersdorf for breach of contract. 
Eikenberry alleged that Blittersdorf did not complete a contract for the 
construction of a log home. On July 8, 1997, the clerk of court entered default 
against Blittersdorf for failure to file an answer or otherwise plead, and the 
district court entered a default judgment against Blittersdorf in the amount of 
$60,243.65 plus interest.

 

[¶4] The facts surrounding 
service of process are as follows. On June 16, 1997, Ron Riccio (Riccio) and 
Joseph Morotti (Morotti) drove to the home where Blittersdorf's wife and 
daughter resided in Centennial, Wyoming. No one was home. As Riccio turned to 
leave, Mrs. Blittersdorf and her daughter arrived. Riccio asked Mrs. 
Blittersdorf if her husband was home, and she replied that he was not.  Riccio handed Mrs. Blittersdorf a gaily 
decorated gift bag and advised her it was for her husband. The gift bag 
contained the summons and complaint.

 

[¶5] The parties disagree as 
to what happened next. Riccio and Morotti testified that Mrs. Blittersdorf 
opened the bag and reviewed the papers for ten to fifteen seconds. Mrs. 
Blittersdorf testified that she did not read the papers, immediately entered her 
home, and burned the bag and its contents in her wood burning 
stove.

 

[¶6] At the time of service, 
Blittersdorf was living in Jackson, Wyoming, and had been since October 1996. 
Blittersdorf had a one-year lease on residential property in Jackson. He 
maintained a post office box in Jackson and registered some of his vehicles in 
Jackson.  His wife and daughter 
remained in Centennial so his daughter could complete the school 
year.

 

[¶7] Blittersdorf left tools 
and construction equipment at the Centennial home because he intended to return 
to Centennial at some time to complete a construction project. In the six months 
immediately preceding service of process, he visited his wife and daughter at 
the Centennial home approximately fourteen times. Blittersdorf is the sole 
director and shareholder of the corporation which owns the Centennial home. He 
voted in an Albany County election a month prior to service of process. 
Blittersdorf did not leave a forwarding address at the Centennial post office. 
Rather, his wife would forward his mail to him in Jackson.

 

[¶8] The complaint alleges 
that Eikenberry and Blittersdorf entered into a contract for the construction of 
a log home for $45,000.00.  
Blittersdorf performed part of the contract for which he was paid 
$30,500.00. However, he allegedly failed to complete the contract.  The complaint prayed for: (1) damages in 
the amount of $57,676.12;1 (2) $1,000.00 for attorney fees;2 and (3) 
interest.

 

[¶9] In support of the 
motion for default judgment, Eikenberry submitted an affidavit to support the 
default judgment in the amount of $60,243.65. The affidavit mirrored the damages 
claimed in the complaint.

 

[¶10] Blittersdorf moved to 
set aside the default judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(c) and W.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), 
(3), (4), and (6), claiming he never received notice of the summons and 
complaint and that the judgment is void because Eikenberry had not perfected 
service of process, as the Centennial home was not his "usual place of abode." 
Additionally, Blittersdorf sought a hearing on the issue of damages. Both 
motions were denied.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶11] Blittersdorf argues 
the Centennial home was not his "usual place of abode" because he was not 
actually living there at the time of service; therefore, the default judgment is 
void and must be set aside pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). Challenges to 
jurisdictional findings involve a de novo review of the record. Goodwin v. Hall, 
957 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Wyo. 1998). The factual findings at issue are reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star 
Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 481 (3rd Cir. 1993).

 

[¶12] Wyoming case law 
provides little guidance into the meaning of "usual place of abode" so we turn 
to relevant precedents from other jurisdictions. Sheldon v. Fettig, 129 Wn.2d 601, 919 P.2d 1209, 1213 (1996) (quoting Sheldon v. Fettig, 77 Wn. App. 775, 
781, 893 P.2d 1136 (1995) and Thoenes v. Tatro, 270 Or. 775, 529 P.2d 912 
(1974)) notes:

 

"The term 'usual place of abode' is used in the 
statute because it is the place at which the defendant is most likely to receive 
notice of the pendency of a suit.

 

          
* * *

 

* 
* * '[U]sual place of abode' must be taken to mean such center of one's domestic 
activity that service left with a family member is reasonably calculated to come 
to one's attention within the statutory period for defendant to 
appear."

 

[¶13] A former residence may 
be the "usual place of abode" if a nexus to that residence is retained, 
sufficient to afford a reasonable opportunity to receive notice. In Sheldon, the 
nexus with the former residence (her parents' home) involved periodic visits and 
the use of her parents' address as her own. Sheldon, 919 P.2d  at 1213. Likewise, 
Van Buren v. Glasco, 27 N.C. App. 1, 217 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1975), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982) involved 
regular weekend visits to the family home. These cases determined that the 
retained nexus was likely to result in notice to the defendant. As such, the 
former residence qualified as the "usual place of abode."

 

[¶14] The record here 
discloses that Mrs. Blittersdorf customarily forwarded her husband's mail to him 
in Jackson. In addition, Blittersdorf frequently visited the Centennial home. 
The district court noted in its decision letter:

 

Defendant's family resided at his Centennial address. 
He continued to receive mail at that address which was forwarded to him by his 
wife. He stored property, vehicles and tools on the property in order to 
complete work still remaining in the Centennial area. He returned to the 
property on numerous occasions to visit his family. The corporation, of which he 
is the sole stockholder, owned and continues to own the property. He maintained 
his voter registration in Albany County and voted in a local election only a 
month before the date of service. Mrs. Blittersdorf did not advise Mr. Riccio 
that her husband was residing in Jackson, but that he was "not home." The 
Blittersdorfs were not separated or divorced and no such actions were or are 
anticipated.

 

The district court correctly 
concluded that service at the Centennial address was reasonably calculated to 
result in notice to Blittersdorf.

 

[¶15] Blittersdorf next 
argues that even if service was valid, the district court erred because it did 
not consider "good cause" as a basis for setting aside the judgment. Good cause 
is not enumerated in W.R.C.P. 60(b),3 although that concept provides 
grounds for setting aside an entry of default.4

 

[¶16] A judgment can be set 
aside only upon the grounds enumerated in W.R.C.P. 60(b). The district court 
considered excusable neglect, and determined that Blittersdorf had not proven 
its availability. We have carefully reviewed the evidence, and find no error in 
this conclusion.

 

[¶17] Blittersdorf next 
argues that Eikenberry engaged in fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by 
obtaining a default judgment in circumvention of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Eikenberry met the requirements of W.R.C.P. 4, so he did not 
circumvent the rules. Moreover, a party seeking relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) 
must establish fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by clear and convincing 
evidence. Fluor Daniel (NPOSR), Inc. v. Seward, 956 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Wyo. 1998). 
Even though the district court made no specific finding on the issue of fraud, 
misrepresentation or misconduct, the record does not disclose evidence of any 
substance tending to prove fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct. In regard to 
this issue, we find no error.

 

[¶18] Finally, Blittersdorf 
claims the district court abused its discretion by refusing to hold a hearing on 
the issue of damages.  W.R.C.P. 
55(b) provides, in pertinent part:

 

          
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:

 

          
* * *

 

(2) By the Court. - In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor * * *. If, 
in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to 
the parties when and as required by any statute.

 

[¶19] The damages claimed 
were liquidated because they were "certain or, by computation, made certain," 
and were supported by affidavit. A hearing was not required. Halberstam v. 
Cokeley, 872 P.2d 109, 113 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶20] The judgment is 
affirmed.

 

                    

FOOTNOTES

1 The 
complaint set out the $57,676.12 amount as follows:

 

          
              
1. $65,663.46 - the amount Eikenberry expended to complete the 
contract.

 

          
              
2. $4,800.00 - alternative housing pending completion of the 
contract.

 

          
              
3. $9,230.42 - additional interest on Eikenberry's construction 
loans.

 

4. 
$14,500.00 - credit for the remainder due under the contract if Blittersdorf 
completed the contract.

 

5. 
$7,517.76 - credit for interest on Eikenberry's permanent financing he would 
have incurred if Blittersdorf timely completed the 
contract.

 

 

2 The 
default judgment included $1,000.00 for attorney fees. In the order denying 
Blittersdorf's motions, the district court reduced the default judgment by the 
$1,000.00 representing attorney fees.

 

 

3 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part:

 

On 
motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a 
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake; inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence * * *; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied * * *; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment.

 

 

4 Fluor 
Daniel (NPOSR), Inc. v. Seward, 956 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Wyo. 1998) determined that 
proof of any of the grounds enumerated in W.R.C.P. 60(b) amounts to good cause 
for purposes of W.R.C.P. 55(c) as it pertains to setting aside an entry of 
default. W.R.C.P. 55(c) provides: "For good cause shown the court may set aside 
an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)."