Title: Lisa M. Peters v. Menard, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1514 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Lisa M. Peters, individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Brian C. Peters, 
deceased, and Dean R. Rohde as Guardian ad Litem 
for Jared L. Peters, Mandi J. Peters and Kristen 
M. Peters,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Menard, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Associated Indemnity Corporation,  
 
Defendant, 
Advanced Private Investigations,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Scottsdale Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 2, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 7, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
LaCrosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis G. Montabon 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs 
by Susan M. Glasser, Dean R. Rohde and Bye, Goff  Rohde, Ltd., 
River Falls and oral argument by Dean R. Rohde. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Menard, Inc., there 
was a brief by Webster A. Hart, Stephanie L. Finn and Herrick, 
Hart, Duchemin, Spaeth, Sullivan & Schumacher, S.C., Eau Claire 
and oral argument by Webster A Hart. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Advanced Private 
Investigations, there was a brief by William F. Bauer, Kirtt E. 
Godager and Coyne, Niess, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, S.C., Madison 
and oral argument by William F. Bauer. 
 
 
No. 97-1514 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1514  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lisa M. Peters, individually and as  
Personal Representative of the Estate of  
Brian C. Peters, deceased, and Dean R.  
Rohde as Guardian ad Litem for Jared L.  
Peters, Mandi J. Peters and Kristen M.  
Peters,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Menard, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Associated Indemnity Corporation,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Advanced Private Investigations,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Scottsdale Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant.  
FILED 
 
MAR 02, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for La Crosse 
County, Dennis G. Montabon, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96).1  Brian Peters’ estate and 
                     
1 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise stated.  
No. 97-1514 
 
2 
family members filed a wrongful death action in La Crosse County 
against Menard, Inc. (“Menard”), Advanced Private Investigations 
(“API”), and their insurers, alleging negligence.  Peters 
drowned while fleeing API security guards after allegedly 
shoplifting a drill from Menard's store.  The circuit court, 
Judge Dennis G. Montabon presiding, entered summary judgment in 
favor of defendants API and Menard, finding that they were 
immune from liability under subsection (3) of Wisconsin’s retail 
theft statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.50.  The court also determined 
that "no reasonable fact finder could conclude on these facts 
that the defendants in this case are more than 50 percent or 51 
percent negligent."  Motion Hearing Tr., Mar. 13, 1997 at 17. 
¶2 
In its certification to this court, the court of 
appeals framed the issue as whether a merchant or its agents are 
immune from liability under Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) for actions 
taken while attempting to detain a suspected shoplifter by 
pursuing him or her off of the merchant's premises.2  We hold 
that § 943.50(3) provides immunity to a merchant or its agents 
for actions taken while attempting to detain a person, including 
pursuit, as long as the statute’s three “reasonableness” 
requirements are met:  (1) there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the person violated § 943.50; (2) the detention and the 
actions taken in an attempt to detain are “reasonable in 
manner”; and (3) the detention and the actions taken in an 
                     
2 Although this issue was the one posed in the court of 
appeals’ certification, this court granted the certification and 
accepted the appeal for consideration of all issues raised in 
the court of appeals.  See Order Granting Certification, Mar. 
17, 1998 at 1.   
No. 97-1514 
 
3 
attempt to detain last only for a “reasonable length of time.”  
§ 943.50(3).   
¶3 
We do not decide whether the three “reasonableness” 
requirements were met in this case because we uphold the circuit 
court’s grant of summary judgment on a different ground.  
Namely, we hold that summary judgment was warranted because 
Peters’ negligence exceeded any possible negligence of the 
defendants as a matter of law.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit 
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Menard and API.   
     
I. 
¶4 
On May 5, 1994, Chad Wright, an employee of API, was 
working as a plain clothes security guard at Menard’s La Crosse, 
Wisconsin, store.  He observed a person he later identified as 
Brian Peters take a box containing a drill off of a shelf.  
Wright saw Peters place the box into his shopping cart and push 
the cart through an exit door located in the carpet department. 
 The door led to Menard’s lumber yard, where Wright continued to 
watch Peters.  Peters pushed the cart to a parked truck and 
placed the drill box into the back seat of the truck’s extended 
cab.  He then returned the cart to the store, walked back to the 
truck, and sat down in the back seat. 
¶5 
Wright flagged down one of Menard’s lumber yard 
employees and asked him to watch Peters.  Wright went into a 
back office of the store and reported his observations to Dean 
King, the store manager.  King instructed Wright to keep him 
informed.  After their brief conversation, Wright went back 
outside.  
No. 97-1514 
 
4 
¶6 
When he returned to the lumber yard, Wright saw two 
other people get into the truck.  The truck proceeded to another 
area of the yard to pick up materials and then drove toward the 
guard shack to exit the yard.  Dan Kind, another API employee, 
was stationed at the guard shack.  Wright asked Kind to perform 
his normal check-out duties while Wright approached the truck.  
¶7 
Wright walked to the truck and asked to speak with the 
rear seat passenger, Brian Peters.  When Peters got out of the 
truck, Wright identified himself and asked about the drill.  
Wright could see the drill box, which appeared to be open, in 
the truck’s back seat.3  According to the driver of the truck, 
Wright’s tone of voice clearly indicated that he was upset. 
¶8 
Peters denied any knowledge of a stolen drill.  
According to Wright, Peters kept “dodging the issue.”  Wright 
Dep. at 38-39.  Wright eventually requested that Peters take the 
box and accompany him back into the store to speak with the 
store manager.  At that point, Peters took off running. 
¶9 
Wright shouted at Peters to “stop,” but Peters 
continued running.  Peters sprinted across Menard’s premises to 
Monitor Street, traveled west on Monitor, and ran up onto an 
                     
3 Although the record is unclear, there may have been an 
orange "Menards" sticker on the drill box, which would indicate 
that the drill had been paid for.  Apparently, two identical 
drill boxes were found in the back of the truck after the 
incident.  The driver of the truck stated in his deposition that 
just two days prior to the incident in this case, his brother, 
Jim, had bought a drill from Menards identical to the one Peters 
allegedly shoplifted.  In addition, the driver himself had owned 
the same model of drill for approximately two years before the 
incident.  Only one of the boxes found in the truck had an 
orange "Menards" sticker on it and only one of the boxes had a 
drill in it.  It is not clear from the record whether the box 
containing the drill was the one which bore the sticker. 
No. 97-1514 
 
5 
embankment.  Wright ran after Peters, closing within ten feet of 
Peters at times.  When Wright reached the top of the embankment, 
he dove at Peters, but missed him.  According to Wright, his 
intent in diving at Peters was to stop him. 
¶10 After the dive, Wright fell down.  When he got up 
again, Peters was almost to the point at which the bike path 
intersects the embankment.  Wright began running again, but at a 
much slower pace.  According to Wright, he was tired and was 
simply trying to see where Peters was going.  At that moment, 
Wright noticed for the first time that Dan Kind was coming 
across Monitor Street.  Wright slowed to a walk to wait for 
Kind. 
¶11  According to Wright, Kind took over the pursuit at 
that point, and Wright lagged behind.  Kind followed Peters onto 
the bike path, where he chased Peters for about 100 yards.  
Throughout the chase, both guards shouted “stop” repeatedly at 
Peters, to no avail.  Kind followed as Peters exited the path 
and ran down an embankment and into the woods.  About fifteen to 
twenty yards into the woods, Kind dove or fell toward Peters but 
never made contact with him.4   
                     
4 Wright thought that he witnessed Kind dive at Peters, but 
Kind stated in his deposition that he merely slipped and fell in 
the direction of Peters.  Whether or not Kind’s action was an 
attempted dive, it is uncontested that Kind never touched 
Peters.   
No. 97-1514 
 
6 
¶12 After Kind’s fall, Wright and Kind terminated their 
pursuit.5  According to Kind, the chase had gone on for about 
seven minutes.  Peters continued to run into a flooded marsh 
area toward the swollen La Crosse River, while Wright and Kind 
walked back to the bike path and stood there talking.  Wright 
later stated that he knew that the marsh area was flooded and 
thought that Peters would eventually make his way back to them. 
 After a few seconds, however, Wright heard splashing.  The 
guards ran to the flooded area and Wright saw Peters enter the 
flooded La Crosse River. 
¶13 According to Wright, both guards were “stunned” that 
Peters would jump into the river.  Wright Dep. at 49.  When 
Peters attempted to swim across the river, however, the guards 
yelled words of encouragement to Peters and attempted to get him 
to grab onto a fallen tree.  Peters did try to grab a downed 
tree near the other side of the flooded river.  Unfortunately, 
the fast-moving current swept Peters back to the river’s middle, 
where he went underwater.   
¶14 Kind and Wright both entered the flooded river to try 
and save Peters.  Wright positioned himself on a fallen tree 
                     
5 In their depositions, both security guards elaborated on 
their reasons for undertaking the chase in the first place.  
Wright stated that he pursued Peters in order to identify Peters 
as the person he observed shoplifting the drill.  According to 
Wright, his purpose was to achieve a detention so that he could 
“present Peters to a law enforcement officer.”  Wright Dep. at 
52.  In addition, although Wright did not actually observe the 
drill or its box on Peters’ person, he thought that the box he 
observed in the truck had been opened and expressed concern that 
Peters may try to discard the drill during the chase.  Kind 
stated that he had followed Wright because he had been taught in 
his police science training that he was always to assist an 
officer in a chase for safety reasons. 
No. 97-1514 
 
7 
downstream in the hopes that he could grab Peters as Peters was 
carried by.  Peters bobbed up and down in the rushing river.  
The last time Wright saw Peters surface, he was within ten feet 
of Wright.  Kind swam to the area where Peters last went 
underwater.  Kind dove underwater several times in search of 
Peters but was unable to find him. 
¶15 Peters' estate, widow, and children brought a wrongful 
death suit against Menard, API, and their insurers, alleging 
that the negligent conduct of the Menard and API employees 
caused Peters' death.6  Defendants Menard and API both filed 
motions for summary judgment which were granted by the circuit 
court, Judge Dennis G. Montabon presiding, during a hearing on 
March 13, 1997. 
¶16 The circuit court specified two grounds for its grant 
of summary judgment to defendants Menard and API.  First, the 
circuit court ruled that defendants were immune from liability 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3).  The court found that the 
Menard and API employees had reasonable cause to believe that 
Peters shoplifted the drill.  The court also found that the 
security guards' actions were reasonable under the circumstances 
of the case and that there was "no dispute as to any material 
fact regarding that [issue]."  Motion Hearing Tr., Mar. 13, 1997 
at 16.    
                     
6  Both Peters’ widow and his children asserted that Peters’ 
death 
 
deprived 
them 
of 
Peters’ 
“services, 
society, 
companionship and consortium.”  Am. Compl. at 3.  In addition, 
Peters’ 
widow 
claimed 
damages 
including 
loss 
of 
marital 
property. 
No. 97-1514 
 
8 
¶17 Second, the circuit court determined that Peters’ 
negligence was equal to or greater than any negligence which 
could be placed upon defendants.  The court stated: 
 
[N]o reasonable fact finder could conclude on these 
facts that the defendants in this case are more than 
50 percent or 51 percent negligent.  The act is the 
wrongful death of Mr. Peters.  That was caused by his 
actions.  The undisputed facts show that the chase was 
 -- basically was completed and then they heard 
[Peters] splashing and tried to save him from his 
contributory negligence of jumping into a flooded 
river.  I think to say otherwise borders on ludicrous 
. . . . If [a fleeing suspect] chooses to jump in the 
water and drown, that’s very unfortunate, but it’s not 
the fault of the defendants. 
 
Motion Hearing Tr., Mar. 13, 1997 at 17.  Accordingly, in a 
written order filed April 16, 1997, the circuit court dismissed 
the complaint. 
¶18 The court of appeals certified the plaintiffs’ appeal 
to this court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61.  In its 
certification, the court of appeals stated, “the question we 
certify is whether a merchant or the merchant’s employees and 
agents may be immune from civil or criminal liability under 
§ 943.50(3), Stats., when their attempt to ‘detain’ a person 
suspected of retail theft includes pursuit of that person to a 
place other than the merchant’s establishment.”  Certification 
at 3.  In granting the certification, this court accepted review 
of all issues raised before the court of appeals. 
II. 
¶19 We 
begin 
by 
addressing 
the 
certified 
question:  
whether a merchant or its agents are immune from liability under 
No. 97-1514 
 
9 
Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) (reprinted below)7 for actions taken while 
attempting to detain a suspected shoplifter by pursuing him or 
her off of the merchant's premises.  This issue requires that we 
interpret the meaning of the word “detain” in Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.50(3).  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
which this court reviews de novo.  Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 271, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  We benefit, 
however, from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Aiello v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 
70, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996).   
¶20 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to 
determine the legislature’s intent.  Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 271; 
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 632, 547 
N.W.2d 602 (1996).  First, we examine the plain language of the 
statute.  Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 271.  When reasonable minds 
                     
7 Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) provides: 
 
(3) A merchant, a merchant’s adult employe or a 
merchant’s security agent who has reasonable cause for 
believing that a person has violated this section in 
his or her presence may detain the person in a 
reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time to 
deliver the person to a peace officer, or to his or 
her parent or guardian in the case of a minor.  The 
detained person must be promptly informed of the 
purpose for the detention and be permitted to make 
phone calls, but he or she shall not be interrogated 
or searched against his or her will before the arrival 
of 
a 
peace 
officer 
who 
may 
conduct 
a 
lawful 
interrogation of the accused person.  The merchant, 
merchant’s adult employe or merchant’s security agent 
may release the detained person before the arrival of 
a peace officer or parent or guardian.  Any merchant, 
merchant’s adult employe or merchant's security agent 
who acts in good faith in any act authorized under 
this 
section 
is 
immune 
from 
civil 
or 
criminal 
liability for those acts. 
  
No. 97-1514 
 
10
could attribute more than one meaning to a word or phrase in the 
statute, the word or phrase is ambiguous.  State v. Sweat, 208 
Wis. 2d 409, 416, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997); UFE v. LIRC, 201 
Wis. 2d 274, 283, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  In that case, we resort 
to extrinsic aids such as the statute’s history, purpose, scope 
and context to discern the intent of the legislature.  Miller, 
219 Wis. 2d at 271; Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 415, 417; UFE, 201 
Wis. 2d at 281-82.  In addition, we employ rules of statutory 
construction to give meaning to the statutory language.  UFE, 
201 Wis. 2d at 283. 
¶21 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) allows 
“[a] merchant, a merchant’s adult employe or a merchant’s 
security agent who has reasonable cause for believing that a 
person has violated this section in his or her presence” to 
“detain the person in a reasonable manner for a reasonable 
length of time to deliver the person to a peace officer. . . .” 
  § 943.50(3).  Section 943.50(3) provides immunity from civil 
or criminal liability to “[a]ny merchant, merchant’s adult 
employe or merchant’s security agent who acts in good faith in 
any act authorized under this section.”  § 943.50(3).  It is 
clear from this language that immunity from liability for 
detaining a person exists only when three “reasonableness” 
requirements are met.  See Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 271-73; Hainz 
v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 359 N.W.2d 397 
(Ct. App. 1984).  These requirements are:  (1) there must be 
reasonable cause to believe that the person violated § 943.50; 
(2) the manner of the detention and the actions taken in an 
attempt to detain must be reasonable; and (3) the length of time 
No. 97-1514 
 
11
of the detention and the actions taken in an attempt to detain 
must be reasonable.  See § 943.50(3).  See also Miller, 219 
Wis. 2d at 271-73; Hainz, 121 Wis. 2d at 173.   
¶22 The language of the statute does not clarify, however, 
the particular steps which may be taken by a merchant or its 
agents in order to effect a detention.  The word “detain” is not 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) and the statutory text 
provides few clues as to its meaning.  As this case exemplifies, 
“detain” may reasonably be understood to mean only the holding 
of a person or it may be interpreted as including any of a 
number actions taken to stop a person in order to hold him or 
her.  Therefore, we conclude that the word “detain” in 
§ 943.50(3) is ambiguous.  Accordingly, we look to extrinsic 
aids for evidence of the intent underlying § 943.50(3).   
¶23 This court must presume that the legislature intends 
for a statute to be construed in a manner that furthers the 
statute’s underlying purpose.  Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 635.  
The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) is to provide merchants 
with a mechanism for protecting themselves against shoplifters 
while safeguarding customers’ liberty interests.  See Johnson v. 
K-Mart Enters., Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 533, 541, 297 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. 
App. 1980).  It surely must have occurred to the legislature 
that for a variety of reasons, including guilt and fear of 
public 
humiliation, 
many 
suspected 
shoplifters 
would 
be 
unwilling to stop and submit to detention upon a merchant’s 
verbal requests.  In such situations, the legislature must have 
envisioned that merchants would take steps, including pursuing a 
suspect, in order to achieve a detention.  A reasonably 
No. 97-1514 
 
12
conducted pursuit would not violate customers’ rights in any 
way.  Without the ability to pursue, however, merchants would 
have no meaningful way to protect themselves from any suspected 
shoplifters who chose to simply ignore the merchant and walk 
away.  The purpose of the statute would be defeated. 
¶24 Further, when the legislature enacts a statute, it is 
presumed to do so with full knowledge of the existing law.  See 
City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 183-84, 532 
N.W.2d 690 (1995).  Section 120A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts existed when Wis. Stat. § 943.50 was enacted in 1969.  See 
ch. 254, Laws of 1969; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 120A 
(1964).  Section 120A provides: 
 
One 
who 
reasonably 
believes 
that 
another 
has 
tortiously taken a chattel upon his premises, or has 
failed to make due cash payment for a chattel 
purchased or services rendered there, is privileged, 
without arresting the other, to detain him on the 
premises for the time necessary for a reasonable 
investigation of the facts. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 120A (1964).  There is a caveat 
to § 120A, which reads, “The Institute expresses no opinion as 
to whether there may be circumstances under which this privilege 
may extend to the detention of one who has left the premises but 
is in their immediate vicinity.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 120A caveat (1964).  There is also a comment on the caveat, 
part of which states, “[T]he Caveat is intended to leave open 
the question whether the privilege extends to the detention of 
one who has left the premises but is still in their immediate 
vicinity, as, for example, where the person suspected has gone 
out of the door of a shop, and is half-way across the sidewalk 
No. 97-1514 
 
13
on the way to his [or her] car.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 120A caveat, cmt. i (1964). 
¶25 Although § 120A of the Restatement contains language 
expressly restricting merchants to detentions “on the premises,” 
Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) contains no such phrase.  Both the caveat 
and the specific example given in the comment would lead one to 
believe 
that 
Wisconsin’s 
legislature 
was 
alert 
to 
the 
possibility that detentions could occur off of the merchant’s 
premises due to a merchant’s pursuit of a suspected shoplifter 
off of the store premises.  The legislature’s conspicuous 
omission from § 943.50(3) of the Restatement’s “on the premises” 
language plainly suggests that the legislature intended to allow 
merchants to follow suspected shoplifters off of the store’s 
premises in order to detain them.             
¶26 The context of Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) also suggests 
that the legislature intended for “detain” to include pursuit.  
An examination of other subsections of § 943.50 reveals that 
evidence of “intent to deprive the merchant permanently of 
possession, or the full purchase price, of the merchandise" is a 
necessary element of retail theft.  § 943.50(1m).  Under 
subsection (2) of § 943.50, “[t]he intentional concealment of 
unpurchased merchandise which continues . . . beyond the last 
station 
for 
receiving 
payments 
in 
a 
merchant’s 
store” 
constitutes evidence of this “intent to deprive.”  § 943.50(2). 
 It is common knowledge that the checkout stations in many 
stores are located at or near the stores’ outside doors or 
boundaries.  In such situations, reasonable cause for believing 
that a person violated § 943.50(1m) would not arise until the 
No. 97-1514 
 
14
person left the store premises.  If the legislature did not 
intend to allow merchants to follow or pursue suspects off of 
store premises in order to detain them, merchants in stores with 
such checkout station locations may have a hard time developing 
this reasonable cause and thereby obtaining the right to detain 
persons suspected of retail theft under § 943.50(1m).  It is 
unlikely that the legislature intended for § 943.50(3) to 
provide merchants with so little protection in such a common 
scenario.      
¶27 Additional support for our conclusion is provided by 
the rule that "where a statute would change the common law, the 
legislative intent to change the common law must be clearly 
expressed."  Benjamin Plumbing, Inc. v. Barnes, 162 Wis. 2d 837, 
859, 470 N.W.2d 888 (1991) (internal quotation omitted).  We 
have already determined that the legislature did not clearly 
express its intent in § 943.50(3) as to the word “detain,” nor 
did it clearly express any intent to change the common law.  
Section 943.50(3) was derived from the merchant’s common law 
right to stop and detain, but not to arrest, suspected 
shoplifters believed to have committed misdemeanors.  State v. 
Lee, 157 Wis. 2d 126, 129, 458 N.W.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1990).  
Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged upon questioning during oral 
argument that the pursuit in this case would have been permitted 
under the common law as long as there was reasonable cause to 
believe that Peters had shoplifted.  We agree that the common 
law permitted the pursuit in this case, provided that the three 
“reasonableness” 
requirements 
of 
the 
statute 
were 
met.  
No. 97-1514 
 
15
Therefore, we conclude that the legislature intended that the 
pursuit be allowed under § 943.50(3). 
¶28 Finally, public policy supports a construction of 
“detain” which would include pursuit.  This court will not adopt 
statutory constructions which lead to absurd or unreasonable 
results.  Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 636.  A decision by this 
court denying immunity under Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) to merchants 
or 
their 
agents 
who 
pursue 
suspected 
shoplifters 
while 
attempting to detain them would have at least two adverse 
effects on society.  First, it would strip merchants of much of 
their ability to recover shoplifted merchandise and apprehend 
shoplifters.  Shoplifting is a widespread societal problem.  A 
failure to catch shoplifters would likely result in merchants 
raising their prices to make up for increased losses of stolen 
goods.  Second, shoplifters, knowing that merchants could not 
pursue them, would be encouraged to dash out of stores with 
their stolen loot as fast as their legs could carry them.  The 
potential would increase for injuries to innocent shoppers 
caused by fleeing shoplifters.  See generally Liability of 
Storekeeper for Injury to Customer Arising Out of Pursuit of 
Shoplifter, 14 A.L.R.4th 950 (1982) (discussing cases from 
around the United States which involved customers injured by 
fleeing 
shoplifters). 
 
Indeed, 
this 
court 
has 
already 
encountered a case involving a store customer who was injured 
when a fleeing shoplifter collided with her.  See Radloff v. 
National Food Stores, Inc., 20 Wis. 2d 224, 226, 121 N.W.2d 865 
(1963).  In short, a ruling by this court that “detain” does not 
include pursuit would invite shoplifters to flee and increase 
No. 97-1514 
 
16
the risk of harm to merchants and innocent customers.  This 
court will not adopt a ruling which would create such an 
undesirable risk.       
¶29 Plaintiffs contend that even if Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) 
sanctions pursuit of suspects on the merchant’s premises, it 
does not in any circumstances allow pursuit of suspects off of 
the store’s premises.  Neither the statute nor case law provides 
a basis for a rule which per se prohibits pursuit off of a 
merchant’s premises, and we decline to impose one.  As we have 
already pointed out, both the context of the statute and section 
120A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggest that the 
legislature intended to permit pursuit off of the premises.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 943.50(3) limits the amount of pursuit via its 
three 
“reasonableness” 
requirements. 
 
We 
find 
these 
“reasonableness” requirements to be sufficient to prevent any 
potential for abuse by merchants of the ability to pursue 
suspects.  
¶30 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 943.50(3) provides immunity 
to a merchant or its agents for actions taken while attempting 
to detain a person, including pursuit, as long as the statute’s 
three 
“reasonableness” 
requirements 
are 
met. 
 
The 
“reasonableness” requirements are:  (1) there must be reasonable 
cause to believe that the person violated § 943.50; (2) the 
manner of the detention and the actions taken in an attempt to 
detain must be reasonable; and (3) the detention and the actions 
taken in an attempt to detain must continue for only a 
reasonable length of time.  See § 943.50(3).  In light of our 
decision that the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment may 
No. 97-1514 
 
17
be upheld on the ground that Peters' negligence, as a matter of 
law, exceeded any negligence which could be placed upon the 
defendants, we decline to decide whether the circuit court was 
correct in holding that the three “reasonableness” requirements 
were met in this case.   
III. 
¶31 Next, we determine whether the summary judgment may be 
upheld on the ground that Peters’ negligence exceeded any 
negligence which could be placed on defendants, as a matter of 
law.  In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we are to apply 
the same standards used by the circuit court in making its 
initial decision.  Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 630; Green Spring 
Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  
These standards are contained in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), which 
provides that the circuit court shall enter a summary judgment 
“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 
 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  See also Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 
630; Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.   
¶32 Four elements must exist for a plaintiff to maintain a 
cause of action for negligence:  "(1) A duty of care on the part 
of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 
connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual 
loss or damage as a result of the injury."  Rockweit v. Senecal, 
197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (citations omitted). 
 In Wisconsin, every person owes a duty of care to the entire 
No. 97-1514 
 
18
world to refrain from conduct which foreseeably could cause harm 
to others.  Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 260.  In addition, "[e]very 
person in all situations has a duty to exercise ordinary care 
for his or her own safety."  Wis JICivil 1007.  See also 
Murawski v. Brown, 51 Wis. 2d 306, 314, 187 N.W.2d 194 (1971); 
Frederick v. Hotel Invs., Inc., 48 Wis. 2d 429, 435, 180 N.W.2d 
562 (1970); Johnson v. Grzadzielewski, 159 Wis. 2d 601, 608, 465 
N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1990).  As this court stated in Miller: 
 
A person fails to exercise ordinary care, when, 
without intending to do any harm, he or she does 
something or fails to do something under circumstances 
in which a reasonable person would foresee that by his 
or her action or failure to act, he or she will 
subject a person or property to an unreasonable risk 
[of] injury or damage. 
 
Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 261 (quoting Wis JICivil 1005).  
¶33 A plaintiff whose negligence is greater than the 
negligence of any defendant cannot recover damages for that 
defendant's negligence.  Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).  Generally, 
the allocation of negligence is a question for the trier of 
fact.  Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 744, 218 
N.W.2d 279 (1974).  However, when it is apparent to the court 
that the plaintiff's negligence is, as a matter of law, greater 
than any negligence on defendant's part, it is the court's duty 
to so hold.  See id.; Gross v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 49, 212 
No. 97-1514 
 
19
N.W.2d 2 (1973); Johnson, 159 Wis. 2d at 608.  See also 
§ 895.045(1).8  
¶34 Public policy considerations can also preclude the 
imposition of liability on a defendant, even where it has been 
proven that negligence was a cause-in-fact of the injury.  
Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 264.  This court has identified six 
public policy reasons for denying recovery: 
 
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or 
(2) The injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm;  or 
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or 
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely 
to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) 
allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point.   
 
Id. at 265 (quoting Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 
Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979)); see also Coffey v. 
Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  Whether 
                     
8 We note that since the plaintiffs' loss of consortium 
claims are derivative, any contributory negligence on Peters’ 
part is imputed to the plaintiffs.  See White v. Lunder, 66 
Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).  In addition, under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, Menard and API are responsible 
for the negligent conduct of their employees while the employees 
were acting within the scope of their employment.  See Shannon 
v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 364, 370, 289 N.W.2d 564 
(1980).  
We also note that the parties dispute whether the claims of 
Peters’ children are valid since Peters’ spouse survived him.  
See Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 475, 187 N.W.2d 151 
(1971)(stating that surviving children cannot bring an action 
for wrongful death of one of their parents when the other parent 
survives).  As we uphold the summary judgment against the 
plaintiffs on negligence grounds, we do not address this 
argument.  
No. 97-1514 
 
20
public policy considerations will result in nonliability is a 
question of law for the court to decide.  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 425.  
¶35 The court of appeals has applied these principles in 
two cases similar to the instant case.  In Johnson v. 
Grzadzielewski, the court of appeals upheld the circuit court’s 
grant of summary judgment to the defendants, who included the 
manufacturer and the installer/maintainer of 
an 
elevator.  
Johnson, 159 Wis. 2d at 605-07.  The plaintiff in Johnson was 
injured after he tampered with the elevator in order to increase 
its speed and then tried to crawl out the top hatch of the 
elevator when it stopped.  Id.  The court of appeals held that 
the plaintiff was barred from recovery under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045 because his contributory negligence was greater than 
that of any defendant.  Id. at 605, 609.  The court reasoned 
that the plaintiff breached his duty of ordinary care for his 
own safety by taking the actions which caused his injuries.  Id. 
at 608-09.  
¶36 The court in Johnson also based its decision on the 
public policy grounds that plaintiff’s injury was too remote 
from the negligence and was completely out of proportion to the 
culpability of the defendants.  Id. at 609.  Further, the court 
expressed concern that it would enter an area for which there 
would be no sensible stopping point if it allowed the plaintiff 
to recover.  Id. at 610.  The court stated, “This court cannot 
allow the claim under circumstances in which an injured party 
was the major cause of his own injuries.”  Id. 
No. 97-1514 
 
21
¶37 In an earlier case, the court of appeals dealt with a 
factual scenario even more like the one in the present case.  
See Brunette v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company, 
107 Wis. 2d 361, 320 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1982).  The plaintiff 
in Brunette sued a city and one of its police officers for 
injuries he received when the police officer struck the 
plaintiff’s motorcycle following a high-speed chase.  Brunette, 
107 Wis. 2d at 362-63.  The chase ensued after the plaintiff ran 
a stop sign and refused to pull over when the police officer 
attempted to stop him.  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, holding 
that the plaintiff’s negligence exceeded the police officer’s 
negligence as a matter of law.  Id. at 362, 364.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the plaintiff “intentionally and without 
cause placed himself in a position of known danger.  The fact 
that there was substantial risk inherent in [the plaintiff's] 
conduct would be apparent to any ordinarily prudent person.”  
Id. at 364.  The court stated: 
 
[The plaintiff] does not dispute that he intentionally 
fled 
from 
[the 
police 
officers]. 
 
By 
his 
own 
admission, he could have stopped at any time after he 
was aware that [the police officer] wanted him to 
stop.  He nevertheless continued to flee, at grossly 
excessive and unsafe speeds.  He knew, or should have 
known, that his actions involved a substantial risk of 
injury, not only to innocent members of the public, 
but also to himself and the pursuing police officers. 
 We 
see 
no difference 
between 
[the plaintiff’s] 
conduct and the conduct of other individuals to whom 
the court has denied recovery for intentional and 
unjustified exposure to a known risk. 
 
No. 97-1514 
 
22
Id. at 364 (citing numerous cases in which the court denied 
recovery to a plaintiff whose own negligent conduct precluded 
recovery).    
¶38 The court of appeals also cited public policy reasons 
for its decision in Brunette.  See id. at 365.  The court 
stated, “By denying recovery to [the plaintiff], the court 
furthers a necessary state policy of encouraging traffic 
violators to submit to lawful arrests. . . . [The plaintiff] 
should be penalized, not rewarded, for his lawless conduct, 
which created a situation of imminent danger of serious bodily 
harm to himself and to others.” Id.   
¶39 In the present case, the circuit court found that 
Peters’ negligence exceeded any negligence which could be placed 
on Menard and API as a matter of law.  We agree.  In 
intentionally and voluntarily entering the La Crosse River, 
Peters failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.  The 
substantial risk inherent in jumping into a plainly flooded 
river 
with 
fast-moving 
current 
would 
be 
apparent 
to 
an 
ordinarily prudent person.  Any such person would recognize that 
the river was of unknown depth due to the flooding and had a 
swift current.  It is well known that entering rushing waters 
can result in serious injuries or drowning.  Likewise, Peters 
knew, or should have known, that his decision to get into the 
river to evade the security guards involved a substantial risk 
that he would be seriously injured or would drown.  Like the 
plaintiff in Brunette, Peters "placed himself in a position of 
known danger" by attempting to escape detainment in a risky and 
unsafe way.  Brunette, 107 Wis. 2d at 364.  We conclude that 
No. 97-1514 
 
23
Peters’ unreasonable and dangerous behavior constituted a clear 
and extreme breach of his duty of care for his own safety.    
¶40 The conduct of the security guards was far less 
culpable by comparison, if it was culpable at all.  The guards, 
like everyone, had a duty to refrain from acts or omissions 
which foreseeably could cause harm to others.  See Miller, 219 
Wis. 2d at 260.  The guards' actions, however, were taken 
entirely in response to Peters' own conduct.  There is no 
evidence that the guards threatened Peters with harm or used any 
type of force.  It is undisputed that the guards never touched 
Peters and that they abandoned their pursuit before they reached 
the flooded river.  The guards could not have foreseen that 
Peters would go to such dangerous lengths to escape from them, 
especially after they quit pursuing him.  Moreover, the guards 
both subjected themselves to substantial risk of harm by 
entering the river themselves in an attempt to rescue Peters 
from the peril he created.9  There is no question that even if 
any negligence could be attributed to the security guards, it 
does not even come close to the much greater negligence 
exhibited by Brian Peters.  Therefore, we hold that Peters' 
negligence exceeded any negligence which could be placed on 
defendants as a matter of law. 
                     
9 In general, a person attempting to make a rescue is not 
negligent if the one to be rescued "was actually in imminent 
danger of death or injury," the person "acted as a reasonably 
prudent person" in making the choice to attempt the rescue, and 
"in carrying out the rescue attempt, the person used ordinary 
care with respect to the means and manner of making the rescue." 
 Wis JICivil 1007.5.    
No. 97-1514 
 
24
¶41 We also base our decision on public policy grounds.  
Peters’ injury is remote from any negligence of the security 
guards and is completely out of proportion to any possible 
culpability on their parts.  Peters drowned as a result of his 
own conduct.  It was Peters who chose to take off running, 
Peters who chose the route, Peters who chose to continue running 
despite the guards' requests that he stop, and Peters who chose 
to go into the river.  Any negligence on the guards' parts was 
not a significant factor in Peters' injury, if it was a factor 
at all.  
¶42 Moreover, allowing recovery in this case would enter a 
field with no sensible stopping point.  Suspected shoplifters 
who fled could recover from merchants and security companies for 
any injuries suffered while being pursued by security guards.  
This court does not wish to reward fleeing suspects who 
unreasonably place themselves in danger while attempting to get 
away from merchants and their security agents by allowing them 
to recover from the merchant and security company afterward.  
The preferable policy is to encourage suspected shoplifters to 
submit to lawful detentions by merchants and their agents. 
¶43 Therefore, we hold that plaintiffs are barred from 
recovery pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) because Peters' 
negligence exceeded any negligence which could be placed upon 
defendants, as a matter of law.  In addition, we conclude that 
plaintiffs are barred from recovery as a matter of law on public 
policy grounds. 
¶44 Our holding that defendants are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, however, is not sufficient by itself to 
No. 97-1514 
 
25
uphold the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in 
defendants' favor.  In order for summary judgment to be 
appropriate, we must also find that there is no genuine issue as 
to any fact material to our determination.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2); Verdoljak, 200 Wis. 2d at 603; Green Spring Farms, 
136 Wis. 2d at 315.  All of the facts we have cited in our 
comparative analysis of the relative negligence of Peters and 
the security guards are uncontested.  Most importantly, it is 
undisputed 
that 
Peters 
jumped 
into 
the 
flooded 
river 
intentionally and upon his own volition after the security 
guards had ended their pursuit.  Nevertheless, plaintiffs' 
counsel would have us assume that Peters jumped into the river 
because he felt threatened by the allegedly angry manner of the 
guards.  Even if we so assume, the fact remains that Peters, of 
his own volition, intentionally entered the river.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that there is no genuine issue as to any fact 
material to our comparison of negligence in this case.   
¶45 We hold, therefore, that the plaintiffs are barred 
from recovery as a matter of law pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045 because, as a matter of law, Peters' negligence 
exceeded 
any 
possible 
negligence 
on 
defendants' 
parts.  
Plaintiffs are also barred from recovery on public policy 
grounds.  Because we also hold that there are also no genuine 
issues as to any material facts, we affirm the circuit court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Menard and API.  
IV. 
¶46 In sum, we conclude that § 943.50(3) immunizes a 
merchant or its agents from civil or criminal liability for 
No. 97-1514 
 
26
actions taken while attempting to detain a person, including 
pursuit, as long as the statute’s three “reasonableness” 
requirements are met.  These three requirements are:  (1) there 
must be reasonable cause to believe that the person violated 
§ 943.50;  (2) the detention and the actions taken in an attempt 
to detain must be “reasonable in manner”; and (3) the detention 
and the actions taken in an attempt to detain must continue for 
only a “reasonable length of time.”  § 943.50(3).   
¶47 We do not decide whether the three “reasonableness” 
requirements were met in this case because we uphold the summary 
judgment for a different reason.  We conclude that as a matter 
of law, Peters’ negligence exceeded any negligence which could 
be attributed to defendants.  We also hold that public policy 
considerations prevent plaintiffs from recovering.  Therefore, 
we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Menard and API. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed.   
 
No. 97-1514 
 
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