Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. DeLoach

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Akron Bar Assn. v. DeLoach, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-494.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-494 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. DELOACH. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Akron Bar Assn. v. DeLoach,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-494.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to act with reasonable diligence—Failure to 
timely return unearned portion of retainer—Failure to deposit retainer in 
client trust account—Failure to maintain proper records regarding client 
funds—Prior discipline—Multiple offenses—Failure to make restitution—
Two-year suspension with second year stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2014-0547—Submitted May 28, 2014—Decided February 19, 2015.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-034. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jana Bassinger DeLoach of Akron, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0071743, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1999.  In 
December 2010, we suspended her license for failing to comply with the 
continuing-legal-education requirements of former Gov.Bar R. X(5), but we 
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reinstated her the following month.  In re DeLoach, 127 Ohio St.3d 1493, 2011-
Ohio-8, 939 N.E.2d 190.  In August 2011, we sanctioned her with a stayed six-
month suspension and a two-year period of monitored probation for engaging in 
dishonest conduct during a disciplinary investigation.  Akron Bar Assn. v. 
DeLoach, 130 Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-4201, 956 N.E.2d 811.  And in October 
2012, we publicly reprimanded her for failing to properly notify clients that she 
lacked professional-liability insurance.  Akron Bar Assn. v. DeLoach, 133 Ohio 
St.3d 329, 2012-Ohio-4629, 978 N.E.2d 181. 
{¶ 2} In May 2013, relator, the Akron Bar Association, charged 
DeLoach with professional misconduct for neglecting a client matter, charging 
that same client an excessive fee, and failing to deposit the client’s retainer in her 
client trust account, among other alleged improprieties.  The parties entered into 
stipulations of fact and misconduct and jointly recommended that DeLoach serve 
a stayed one-year suspension.  After a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline1 dismissed one charge of the 
complaint and issued a report recommending that we find that DeLoach engaged 
in some of the charged misconduct, dismiss other charges for lack of sufficient 
evidence, and sanction DeLoach with a two-year suspension, stayed on 
conditions.  The board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety, and no party has 
filed objections to the board’s recommendation. 
{¶ 3} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, but we 
conclude that the circumstances here require that DeLoach serve an actual 
suspension from the practice of law.  Accordingly, DeLoach shall be suspended 
for two years, with the second year stayed on conditions. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} In April 2008, Rose Warren paid DeLoach a $7,000 retainer to 
investigate the murder conviction of Warren’s son, OsRouge Turner, and to 
obtain Turner’s release from prison.  DeLoach informed Warren that she would 
charge $250 an hour, “but if the hourly rate subsume[d] the $7,000.00 retainer 
fee,” she would continue to work on the case without further charge. 
Diligence and communication 
{¶ 5} After accepting the retainer, DeLoach unsuccessfully attempted to 
obtain the trial transcript and public records regarding Turner’s case.  However, 
she did not file a motion for resentencing—one of her stated goals of the 
representation and the first step in the process of obtaining Turner’s release—until 
May 2010, two years after Warren retained her.  Further, DeLoach’s motion was 
only three pages long, and she failed to file a brief in reply to the state’s ten-page 
memorandum in opposition.  After about nine months, the trial court had not yet 
ruled on DeLoach’s motion for resentencing.  She told Turner that she would 
update and resubmit the brief, but she failed to file anything additional with the 
court. 
{¶ 6} DeLoach has admitted that she did not act with diligence in filing 
the motion for resentencing and that some of her preliminary work, such as the 
public-records requests, was not necessary.  The board found that DeLoach “made 
several bad tactical decisions concerning how to proceed with Turner’s claim” 
and she “failed to appropriately manage her caseload so that she could handle 
Turner’s case competently.”  Based on this conduct, the board found, and we 
agree, that DeLoach violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client). 
{¶ 7} The board recommends that we dismiss the charged violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter) and 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon 
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as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client) for lack of 
sufficient evidence.  The board found that although DeLoach failed to represent 
Turner diligently, she sufficiently communicated with him regarding the limited 
information she had concerning his case.  We accept the board’s recommendation 
and hereby dismiss those charges. 
Excessive fees 
{¶ 8} In 2011, Warren, believing that DeLoach had not achieved 
anything in her son’s case, requested a full refund of the $7,000 retainer.  
DeLoach did not refund the money, nor did she provide a billing statement to 
Warren.  Indeed, only after relator commenced its investigation did DeLoach 
create an assessment of the time that she had spent on Turner’s case.  Using that 
assessment, relator’s expert opined that, at most, DeLoach could have legitimately 
billed a total of 16.6 hours in her postconviction representation of Turner.  And 
using DeLoach’s rate of $250 an hour, relator’s expert calculated that she could 
have charged a total of $4,150, leaving $2,850 from the retainer that should have 
been refunded to Warren.  During DeLoach’s disciplinary proceeding, she 
stipulated that Warren was entitled to this refund, but she did not make restitution 
until 36 days after the panel hearing. 
{¶ 9} DeLoach was permitted to retain only the earned portion of the 
$7,000 retainer—that is, the reasonable value of the legal services she rendered 
before her discharge.  See Columbus Bar Assn. v. Farmer, 111 Ohio St.3d 137, 
2006-Ohio-5342, 855 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31.  The board found that by retaining the 
entire $7,000 fee, DeLoach violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from charging or collecting a clearly excessive fee).  We agree with this finding 
of misconduct. 
Client-trust-account violations 
{¶ 10} Upon receiving the $7,000 retainer, DeLoach failed to deposit the 
money into her client trust account, and she did not maintain any records 
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regarding the money.  The parties stipulated and the board found that she violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client on 
whose behalf funds are held) and 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance 
legal fees and expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer 
only as fees are earned or expenses incurred).  We concur. 
Sanction 
{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).2  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  However, because each 
disciplinary case is unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B) and may take into account all relevant factors in determining 
which sanction to impose. 
Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board agreed that the following 
aggravating factors are present:  prior discipline, multiple offenses, and failure to 
make restitution.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (d), and (i).  The board 
acknowledged that DeLoach ultimately made restitution, but it nonetheless found 
that her delay in refunding Warren’s money was, on the whole, an aggravating 
factor.  See Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Wrentmore, 138 Ohio St.3d 16, 2013-
Ohio-5041, 3 N.E.3d 149, ¶ 18 (“payment of restitution [must] be timely to be 
deemed mitigating” [emphasis sic]).  We agree. 
                                                 
2 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
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{¶ 13} The board also recommends that we treat DeLoach’s previous 
disciplinary offenses as a “multiple offenses” aggravating factor rather than a 
“prior discipline” aggravating factor because the underlying misconduct here 
occurred “at a time concurrent” with DeLoach’s previous disciplinary offenses.  
There are cases in which relatively contemporaneous ethical infractions 
prosecuted separately do not justify a harsher sanction.  See, e.g., Akron Bar Assn. 
v. Snyder, 87 Ohio St.3d 211, 212, 718 N.E.2d 1271 (1999) (“The board properly 
noted that the misconduct charged in the complaint occurred in the same period of 
time as the charges involved in respondent’s previous disciplinary case, which 
resulted in an indefinite suspension, and that these new charges did not require a 
significantly different sanction”).  This is not one of those cases. 
{¶ 14} DeLoach’s misconduct in the present matter was not technically 
“concurrent” with the misconduct in her prior cases.  Relator filed its first 
complaint in February 2010, which was months before DeLoach filed her belated 
three-page motion for resentencing in Turner’s case and a year before she refused 
to refund Warren’s $7,000 retainer.  Thus, DeLoach committed some of the 
underlying misconduct while her first disciplinary case was pending. 
{¶ 15} More importantly, we would have sanctioned DeLoach differently 
in her prior cases if we had been aware of the extent of her misconduct.  In 
DeLoach’s first disciplinary matter, she violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation) for falsely recreating client letters in an attempt to defend 
herself during a disciplinary investigation.  DeLoach, 130 Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-
Ohio-4201, 956 N.E.2d 811, at ¶ 7-9.  “A violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) will 
typically result in an actual suspension from the practice of law unless ‘significant 
mitigating factors that warrant a departure’ from that principle are present.”  Id. at 
¶ 12, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 126 Ohio St.3d 50, 2010-Ohio-2521, 
930 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 10.  We departed from our standard practice of imposing an 
January Term, 2015 
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actual suspension for DeLoach’s dishonesty because of the “[s]ignificant 
mitigating factors” present in her case, including our belief that her deceit was “a 
single case of misconduct.”  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 16} As it turned out, DeLoach’s first disciplinary offense was not a 
“single case of misconduct.”  During that same relative time period, she had also 
been failing to notify clients that she lacked malpractice insurance, which resulted 
in her second disciplinary sanction.  DeLoach, 133 Ohio St.3d 329, 2012-Ohio-
4629, 978 N.E.2d 181.  And she was also engaging in the serious offenses at issue 
here.  If we had been aware of all of these facts, the grounds for our departure 
from the actual-suspension standard likely would not have existed.  Thus, we 
decline to discount the aggravating effect of her prior discipline. 
{¶ 17} In mitigation, the board found the absence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative 
attitude toward the proceedings, and evidence of good character and reputation.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b), (d), and (e).  In addition, the board noted that 
DeLoach has complied with the conditions of her previous sanctions.  We agree 
with these findings, although we give little mitigating value to DeLoach’s 
character and reputation evidence.  During the panel hearing, the panel members 
noted that although the parties had stipulated to DeLoach’s good reputation, she 
did not submit any actual character evidence.  As a result, the panel allotted 
DeLoach an extra 30 days after the hearing to introduce letters of commendation 
and character references from individuals familiar with her work or her 
involvement in the community.  DeLoach, however, submitted letters only from 
herself, her brother, and an employee of the Akron Law Library.  The letters 
support DeLoach’s testimony that she is committed to pro bono work, but the 
letters do not describe DeLoach’s reputation in the community, as the panel 
requested. 
 
 
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Applicable precedent 
{¶ 18} To support its recommended sanction of a stayed two-year 
suspension, the board relies primarily on Akron Bar Assn. v. Tomer, 138 Ohio 
St.3d 302, 2013-Ohio-5494, 6 N.E.3d 1133.  In Tomer, the attorney had neglected 
a client matter, failed to notify clients about her lack of malpractice insurance, 
failed to promptly refund clients’ retainers, falsely created letters in a disciplinary 
investigation, and failed to properly maintain her client trust account.  Based 
mostly on the attorney’s “exceptionally strong” mitigation testimony—including 
significant remorse, numerous awards for community service, and an absence of 
prior discipline—we found that an actual suspension was not warranted but that a 
two-year suspension, stayed on conditions, was appropriate.  Id. at ¶ 15-17. 
{¶ 19} The board concluded that because the attorney in Tomer and 
DeLoach—when considering all three of her disciplinary cases—violated similar 
rules, DeLoach should be given the same sanction as Tomer.  We disagree.  The 
record here contains less mitigating evidence and more aggravating factors than in 
Tomer.  When DeLoach’s present misconduct is combined with her prior 
discipline, it is clear that her ability to practice law is in doubt and that an actual 
suspension is warranted. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} For the reasons explained above, Jana Bassinger DeLoach is 
hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for two years, with the second 
year stayed on the conditions that (1) she commit no further misconduct, (2) she 
complete 12 hours of continuing legal education focused on law-practice 
management and recordkeeping in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, 
and (3) upon reinstatement and for the remainder of her term suspension, she 
submit to monitored probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(21).  If DeLoach fails to 
comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted and she will serve 
the full two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to DeLoach. 
January Term, 2015 
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Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., and Steven Cox; Thomas P. Kot, Bar Counsel; 
and Young & Yeargin, L.L.C., and Rocco Yeargin, for relator. 
Jana Bassinger DeLoach, pro se. 
_________________________