Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF CARL L. BALDWIN: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. CARL L. BALDWIN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF CARL L. BALDWIN: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. CARL L. BALDWIN2008 WY 125Case Number: S-07-0284Decided: 10/10/2008NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF CARL L. 
BALDWIN: STATE OFWYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellant(Petitioner),v.CARL L. 
BALDWIN,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. 
Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Donna 
D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Carl L. Baldwin 
(Baldwin) suffered a work-related injury and 
temporary total disability benefits were approved.  After receiving a permanent partial impairment 
rating, Baldwin applied for permanent partial 
disability (PPD) benefits.1  The Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division (the Division) denied benefits on the ground that he could return to 
his previous employment.  A 
contested case hearing was held, after which the hearing examiner reversed the 
Division's decision and awarded Baldwin PPD benefits.  The district court affirmed and the 
Division has appealed to this Court.  We conclude the hearing examiner's 
decision awarding PPD benefits to Baldwin was 
supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Division 
presents two issues for review:

 
 
1.   Whether the hearing examiner's 
decision granting permanent partial disability benefits to Baldwin is in accordance with the 
law?

 
 
2.   Whether substantial evidence 
supports the hearing examiner's decision granting permanent partial disability 
benefits to Baldwin?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On August 11, 
2003, Baldwin suffered a work-related injury to 
his lower back.  He was examined by 
Dr. Ludwig Kroner and diagnosed with left-sided radiculopathy with severe muscle 
spasm and neurological deficit.  
After Baldwin was unresponsive to conservative treatment, Dr. Kroner 
performed a left-sided L5-S1 laminotomy, discectomy, and nerve root 
decompression on Baldwin's lower back.  Ten weeks after the surgery, Dr. Kroner 
examined Baldwin and found that he was able to 
walk on his heels and toes, squat, and bend forward to his ankles.  Baldwin 
reported "a little bit" of pain in the left side of his lower back and buttock, 
but no radicular pain.  Dr. Kroner 
released Baldwin to work on December 15, 
2003.

 
 
[¶4]      At the Division's 
request, on February 11, 2004, Dr. Paul E. Ruttle performed an Orthopedic 
Medical Evaluation of Baldwin.  Dr. 
Ruttle reviewed Baldwin's medical records, 
conducted an interview, and performed a physical examination.  Dr. Ruttle concluded that Baldwin had suffered an 11% whole person impairment.  Dr. Ruttle advised that Baldwin could return to work as an oilfield laborer, but 
advised against lifting greater than 60 pounds on a one-time basis, or 40 pounds 
on a repetitive basis.  Dr. Ruttle 
submitted his report to the Division on February 20, 2004.

 
 
[¶5]      On October 8, 
2004, Baldwin submitted an application for a 
PPD award.  On October 12, 2004, the 
Division issued a Final Determination denying the application on the ground that 
"[y]ou do not meet the eligibility requirements for PPD.  Medical evidence indicates that you can 
return to your previous occupation, and were assigned no permanent restrictions 
that preclude your return to employment to which you are suited."  On October 25, 2004, Baldwin requested a hearing and his case was referred to 
the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for a contested case hearing and 
final determination.

 
 
[¶6]      On April 2, 2005, 
Baldwin participated in a vocational 
assessment.  The vocational 
evaluator concluded that jobs for which Baldwin would likely qualify, given his 
health restrictions and skill set, would pay between $7 to $10 per hour, with 
some paying higher  up to $20 per hour depending on experience.  The evaluator also attached a list of 
potential employers.  The vocational 
report was submitted to the Division.

 
 
[¶7]      On January 12, 
2006, the OAH held a contested case hearing.  The hearing examiner issued Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 29, 2006, awarding PPD benefits to 
Baldwin.  The Division filed a petition for review 
and the district court affirmed the OAH's decision on October 22, 2007.  The Division filed a timely notice of 
appeal to this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]                  
W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) directs us to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2007) for the matters to 
be considered in the review of administrative action.  We recently said the following with 
regard to the standard of review when we are required to examine the evidentiary 
findings of an agency:

 
 
Section 
16-3-114(c)(ii) provides only one evidentiary standard of review.  Under the plain language of the statute, 
reversal of an agency finding or action is required if it is "not supported by 
substantial evidence."  Because 
contested case hearings under Wyoming's Administrative Procedures Act, are 
formal, trial-type proceedings, use of the substantial evidence standard for 
review of evidentiary matters is more in keeping with the original intent of the 
drafters of the administrative procedures act.  33 Fed. Prac. & Proc., Judicial 
Review §§ 8333, 8334.

 
 
Thus, in the interests of simplifying the 
process of identifying the correct standard of review and bringing our approach 
closer to the original use of the two standards, we hold that henceforth the 
substantial evidence standard will be applied any time we review an evidentiary 
ruling.  When the burdened party 
prevailed before the agency, we will determine if substantial evidence exists to 
support the finding for that party by considering whether there is relevant 
evidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the agency's conclusions.  If the 
hearing examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of 
proof, we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
agency's decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by 
considering whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence in the record as a whole.  
See, Wyo. Consumer Group v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 
(Wyo. 1994); 
[Board of Trustees of Laramie County 
School Dist. No. 1 v.] Spiegel, 
549 P.2d [1161,] 1178 [(Wyo. 1976)] (discussing the definition of 
substantial evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence").  If, in the course of 
its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence and explains 
its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility or other 
factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under the 
substantial evidence test.  
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether 
we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude 
as it did, based on all the evidence before it.

 
 

Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 
2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 21-22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008).2  An agency's conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo, and are affirmed if 
they are in accordance with the law.  
Id., 2008 WY 84, 
¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 562.  "[W]e afford 
no deference to conclusions reached by the district court, but review the case 
as if it had come directly from the agency."  Loomer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2004 WY 47, ¶ 15, 88 P.3d 1036, 1041 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 

Gray 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2008 WY 115, ¶ 5, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      The Division does 
not dispute that Baldwin was injured or that his injuries were work related; 
rather, the Division takes exception to the hearing examiner's award of PPD 
benefits, which action is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i) and 
(iii) (LexisNexis 
2007):

 
 
(h)   An injured employee awarded 
permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a permanent disability award 
subject to the following terms and conditions:

(i)      The injured 
employee is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a wage that 
is at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the monthly gross earnings the employee 
was earning at the time of injury;

. 
. . .

(iii)    The employee has actively 
sought suitable work, considering the employee's health, education, training and 
experience.

 

Actively 
Sought Suitable Work

 

[¶10]   As the above statute indicates, 
when awarding PPD benefits, the hearing examiner is required to determine 
whether a claimant has actively sought suitable work. See Hermosillo v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 175, ¶ 9, 58 P.3d 924, 
927 (Wyo. 2002).  We have said 
that "[t]here is no magic formula for what constitutes 
actively seeking suitable 
work' and no particular level of education, training or experience 
is required to decipher the phrase.  One is either actively 
looking for work, or one is not."  Abeyta v. State ex. rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div.,  2004 WY 50, ¶ 11, 88 P.3d 1072, 1076 
(Wyo. 2004)

 
 
[¶11]   The Division argues that the 
decision that Baldwin actively sought suitable 
work was not supported by substantial evidence, as the hearing examiner failed 
to make findings of basic fact on this issue.  We disagree.  With regard to Baldwin's efforts to seek employment, the hearing officer 
made the following findings:

 
 
3. 
The Claimant testified that at the time of the injury he was making $17.00 an 
hour.  He was working 21 days on and 
then 7 days off, 8 hours a day.  He 
has since the injury sought employment.  
He worked in a carpentry shop for 5 months and was terminated.  He sought other employment where he was 
working as a maintenance man at $14.00 an hour doing light duty work.  He also testified that he had 10 years 
of carpenter experience with the union.  
However, he also testified that there are no union jobs that would meet 
his limitations. 

 
 
The 
evidence presented at the contested case hearing supports the conclusion that 
Baldwin sought employment since his 
injury.  Baldwin testified at the hearing as 
follows:

 
 
Q    What did your job search 
consist of?

 
 
A    I went to the Unemployment 
Office and filed with the Unemployment Office, I looked through the newspaper 
looking for, you know, jobs that I could possibly do, I called on the telephone 
many a time looking for a job.

 
 
Q    Did you fill out 
applications?

 
 
A    Yes, I have filled out many 
applications.

 
 
Also, 
Baldwin testified that he had registered with 
the Wyoming Job Network and described a number of employers whom he had 
contacted.  The hearing examiner 
found Baldwin to be 
credible.

 
 
[¶12]   The Division cites three cases, Abeyta v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2004 WY 50, 88 P.3d 1072 (Wyo. 2004), Ludwig v. State ex 
rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 34, 86 P.3d 875 (Wyo. 
2004), and Hermosillo v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 175, 58 P.3d 924 (Wyo. 
2002), to support its argument that Baldwin failed to establish that he actively 
sought suitable work.  In each of 
the cases, the hearing examiner determined the claimant failed to demonstrate 
that he actively sought suitable work.  Abeyta, 2004 WY 50, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d  at 
1074; Ludwig, 2004 WY 34, ¶ 3, 86 P.3d  at 877; Hermosillo, 2002 WY 175, ¶ 5, 58 P.3d  at 
925-26.  In contrast, the hearing 
examiner in Baldwin's case found that he 
successfully demonstrated that he had actively sought suitable employment.  Giving necessary deference to the 
hearing examiner's credibility and factual determinations, we hold that the 
conclusion that Baldwin actively sought 
suitable work is supported by substantial evidence.

 
 
[¶13]   The Division also argues that the 
hearing examiner committed an error of law when he cited the wrong definition of 
"actively seeking work" from the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Rules and 
Regulations.  The definition cited 
by the hearing examiner was that used in Olivas v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2006 WY 29, 130 P.3d 476 (Wyo. 2006), and 
reads:

 
 
For 
purposes of benefit eligibility, an individual is actively seeking work if 
they:

(i)            
Have 
engaged in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain 
work;

(ii)          
Register[ 
] for work and continue[ ] to report to a department office in effort to obtain 
suitable employment;

(iii)        
Are 
available for suitable employment;

(iv)        
Furnish[ 
] the department with tangible evidence of their effort; or 

(v)          
Have 
contacted the employer from the time of injury to inquire if they have work 
available within their medically documented restrictions.

 
 

Id., 
2006 WY 29, ¶ 14, 130 P.3d  at 483 (emphasis in original).  This rule was amended in 2001 to change 
the word "or" to "and."  Because 
Baldwin's injury occurred in 2003, the amended 
rule should have been cited.

 
 
[¶14]   Although the hearing examiner cited 
to the older version of the rule, his application of the rule is consistent with 
the proper definition.  The hearing 
examiner found that Baldwin continued to seek 
appropriate work, as required by paragraph (i).  He referred to Baldwin's registration with the Wyoming Job Network, as 
required by paragraph (ii).  Baldwin's availability for suitable employment, as 
required by paragraph (iii), is not contested by the Division.  The hearing examiner discussed and 
referred to the tangible evidence of his job search efforts (work search record) 
provided to the department as required by paragraph (iv).  Finally, the hearing examiner addressed 
requirement (v) when he found that there was limited work available within 
Baldwin's medically documented 
restrictions.  As such, we conclude 
that if error did occur, it did not affect the analysis or ultimate outcome and 
was therefore harmless.  See RK v. State ex rel. Natrona County Child 
Support Enforcement Dep't, 2008 WY 1, ¶¶ 17-20, 
174 P.3d 166, 171 (Wyo. 2008); Walton v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2007 WY 46, ¶ 37, 153 P.3d 932, 940 (Wyo. 2007); Chapman 
v. Meyers,  899 P.2d 48, 52 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
Return 
to work at 95% of pre-injury wage

 
 
[¶15]   "[W]hen an injury deprives the 
worker of the ability to rely on prior experience and training in a particular 
occupation, which results in a decrease of the worker's earning capacity, the 
injured workman is entitled to compensation."  State ex rel.      Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Borodine, 784 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1989).  To be awarded PPD benefits, Baldwin had to show that he was unable to return to 
employment at a wage that was at least 95% of his pre-injury wage.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  

 
 
Impairment 
of earning capacity is determined by taking into consideration the following 
factors:

(a)   Physical impairment--the nature and 
extent of injury.

(b)   The worker's 
age.

(c)   The worker's 
education.

(d)   Ability to continue pre-injury 
employment.

(e)   Post-injury employment 
prospects.

(f)    Pre-injury 
earnings.

(g)   Post-injury 
earnings.

No 
single factor of those listed above is determinative of the extent or existence 
of loss of earning capacity. They are all evidence to be considered together 
with all of the other facts and circumstances in determining whether a loss of 
earning capacity in fact occurred and, if so, the percentage of loss. 

 
 

State 
ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. White, 
837 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 1992).  "The extent of the injured 
worker's disability pursuant to the loss of earning requirement becomes a 
question of fact.  Any evidence, 
medical and non-medical, that is relevant may be considered by the hearing 
officer."  Borodine, 784 P.2d  at 231.  

 
 
[¶16]   Baldwin was earning $17.00 per hour when he was 
injured.  To qualify for PPD, 
Baldwin was required to show that he was unable 
to secure employment at a wage equal to 95% of his pre-injury pay  $16.15 per 
hour.  The hearing examiner 
concluded that Baldwin satisfied this 
requirement.  The Division contends 
that the hearing examiner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence 
because he failed to consider the vocational evaluation, which listed jobs 
paying over 95% of Baldwin's pre-injury wage. 
 Additionally, the Division contends 
that the hearing examiner failed properly to resolve conflicting medical reports 
concerning Baldwin's physical 
limitations.

 
 
[¶17]   With regard to the medical evidence 
and availability of jobs, the hearing examiner found:

 
 
14. 
The medical evidence further supports the Claimant's limited employment.  The Office points out that Dr. Kroner's 
evaluation of [Baldwin] stated that the 
Claimant would have no restrictions, but does not appear to be very detailed and 
is discounted by the Office.  On the 
other hand, Dr. Ruttle's observation was that the Claimant could return to his 
job in the oilfield but that he has lifting restrictions of 60 pounds once a day 
and 40 pounds repetitively.  The 
Office questions the value of Dr. Ruttle's opinion as to the Claimant returning 
to a job in the oilfield; in that the Office questions Dr. Ruttle's knowledge as 
to the actual functional capacity oilfield employment entails.  Nevertheless, Dr. Ruttle's testimony as 
to the Claimant's physical limitations is conclusive.

  

15. 
The employment available to the Claimant is limited to heavy manual labor.  The above mentioned factors restrict the 
type of employment available to the Claimant.  In addition, his percentage of physical 
impairment and lifting restrictions limit these employment options 
further.

  

16. 
Therefore, the Office does conclude that the Claimant had lifting restrictions 
as a result of his work related accident.  
These restrictions resulted in his being unable to return to employment 
at a rate within 95% of the amount he was making at the time of his injury, 
which was $17.00 an hour.  Most of 
the jobs that appeared on the job search records were in the $12.00-to-$14.00 an 
hour range if they could accommodate the Claimant's limitations.  Therefore, the Office finds that the 
Claimant has shown by substantial evidence that he is eligible for a permanent 
partial disability award and benefits should be awarded 
accordingly.

 
 
[¶18]   
It is true that there was conflicting medical evidence concerning 
Baldwin's physical limitations.  In December of 2003, Dr. Kroner released 
Baldwin to work without restriction.  Then, in February of 2004, as the result 
of an Orthopedic Medical Evaluation, Dr. Ruttle imposed certain physical 
restrictions.  As the finder 
of fact, it is the hearing 
examiner's duty to weigh the 
evidence and resolve such conflicts.  Kuntz-Dexter v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 101, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 190, 193 (Wyo. 
2002).  The hearing examiner 
addressed the conflicting evidence when he discounted Dr. Kroner's opinion 
because of its lack of detail and accepted the restrictions imposed by Dr. 
Ruttle.  While the evidence was such 
that the hearing examiner could have reasonably accepted Dr. Kroner's opinion 
and disregarded the opinion of Dr. Ruttle, "the possibility of drawing two 
inconsistent conclusions from a body of evidence does not prevent a finding that 
the conclusion drawn by the administrative agency was supported by substantial 
evidence."  Vandehei Developers v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
Wyo., 790 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Wyo. 
1990).

 
 
[¶19]   The Division also asserts that the 
hearing examiner failed properly to consider the vocational evaluation.  We find this contention to be without 
merit.  Citing Lunde v. State ex. rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 6 P.3d 1256 (Wyo. 2000), the hearing examiner stated: "Vocational 
evaluations should be based on available jobs in Wyoming, and evaluation of such 
jobs must be conducted with some basis in reality which gives recognition to the 
worker's disability."  The 
vocational evaluation stated:  "Labor market research indicated that 
jobs, for which Mr. Baldwin would likely qualify, would pay between $7-$10 an 
hour, with some jobs paying higher, i.e. up to $20 an hour depending on 
experience."  Our review of the 
record and the job listings provided in the vocational evaluation reveals that 
the bulk of the jobs for with Baldwin would 
qualify were in the $7-$10 range.  
The "up to $20" jobs were more skilled positions requiring experience, or 
oilfield jobs for which Baldwin would not 
qualify because of his physical restrictions.  Thus, the hearing examiner's 
determination that Baldwin could not return to 
employment at 95% of his pre-injury wage is supported by substantial 
evidence.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The hearing examiner's findings 
that Baldwin was actively seeking suitable 
employment and that he was unable to return to work at a job paying at least 95% 
of his pre-injury wage were supported by substantial evidence and in accordance 
with the law.  Therefore, the award 
of PPD benefits to Baldwin is affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"Permanent 
partial disability" is defined as "the economic loss to an injured employee . . 
. resulting from a permanent physical impairment[.]"   Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xv) (Lexis Nexis 
2005).  See also, Phillips v. TIC, 2005 WY 40, ¶ 29, 109 P.3d 520, 533 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

2Although 
not relevant in the instant case, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard 
remains as a "safety net" for certain agency action that may be related to the 
evidence, but which action is not a true evidentiary question.  Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d  at 
561.