Title: Spry v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

George Junior Spry v. State of Maryland, No. 42, September Term, 2006.
CRIMINAL LAW – FAILURE TO OBEY POLICE OFFICER: 
Petitioner, George Junior Spry, sought review of a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals
affirming his conviction for failure to obey a police officer’s reasonable and lawful order to prevent
a disturbance to the public peace, in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article,
Maryland Code (2002).  Spry was convicted after he had been arrested pursuant to a warrant secured
on the day following the disturbance.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and held that
a police officer does not have to arrest an individual immediately after the first disobedience of a
lawful order made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace to initiate prosecution under Section
10-201 (c)(3).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 42 
September Term, 2006
GEORGE JUNIOR SPRY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J. Dissents
Filed:   January 16, 2007
1
Section 10-201 (c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article states that, “[a] person may not
willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order that a law enforcement officer makes to
prevent a disturbance to the public peace.”  Maryland Code (2002), Section 10-201 (c)(3) of
the Criminal Law Article.
2
Federalsburg is a small municipality, with a population of approximately 2,620, on
Maryland’s Eastern Shore, located on the Marshyhope Creek in the southern-most part of
Caroline 
Coun ty. 
 
Maryland 
Manual 
On-Line 
(2006), 
available 
at
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/ mdmanual/html/mmtoc.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
3
The record does not reflect any familial relationship between the two Wilcoxes.
Petitioner, George Junior Spry, seeks review of a judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals affirming his conviction for failure to obey a police officer’s reasonable and lawful
order to prevent a disturbance to the public peace, in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3) of the
Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002),1 where Spry had been arrested after a warrant
was secured on the day following the disturbance.  We hold that a police officer does not
have to arrest an individual immediately after the first disobedience of a lawful order made
to prevent a disturbance to the public peace, nor does he have to arrest at the scene in order
to initiate prosecution under Section 10-201 (c)(3).
I.  Introduction
During the evening of April 19, 2004, between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m., the Federalsburg 2
Police Department intervened in several disputes in progress, all resulting from an argument
between Alexander Wilcox and Derrick Wilcox.3  Officer Pennell Jester observed the two
squabbling near Academy Avenue in Federalsburg, and requested backup.  When Officer
Brian McNeill responded, both officers approached, and the Wilcoxes left the area.
The quarrel migrated to a nearby street corner where a large crowd began to gather.
According to Officer Jester, “there was a lot of heated activity at the corner,” which
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“appeared to be we’re gonna get somebody or something was going to be happening.”  Both
police officers interceded and ordered the crowd to disperse.  
Over the next ten minutes, the group gradually scattered, and the officers followed
both Wilcoxes to the Lucky Corner Store.  After leaving the store, another confrontation
began among the Wilcoxes and two other individuals.  Officer Jester testified that “it looked
like there was gonna be a fight again,” and both officers separated the four men.  By that
time, a larger crowd of eight to ten people had gathered.  The officers again ordered the
gathering to disperse.
A larger throng, between twenty and thirty people, began to gather at a nearby street
corner.  The participants shouted and were loud as they walked throughout traffic.  Officers
Jester and McNeill again approached and moved the participants out of traffic and away from
the street corner.  
The conflagration continued to migrate to a nearby parking lot.  Officer Jester testified
that “it appeared that there was going to be an immediate altercation [with] . . . a whole
bunch of people just acting completely out of control,” and that he “thought a riot was
ensuing” because “there was enough people there” and it “was getting way out of control,
way too fast.”  Officers Jester and McNeill intervened, interposed themselves within the
crowd, and, to no avail, ordered the participants to disperse.  Over time, eventually the
maelstrom died down, and the crowd dissipated.
Around 7:20 p.m., the next altercation occurred, this time at the Garden Court
Apartments.   Officers Jester and McNeill were dispatched to the scene after the Caroline
4
Spry acknowledged in his testimony that, at the time, he was not a resident of the
Garden Court Apartments, but that he was visiting family.  Officer Jester also testified that
he knew Spry was not a resident of the Garden Court Apartments.
-3-
County Sheriff’s Department received a 911 call regarding a fight between forty and sixty
people.  When they arrived, Officer Jester determined that the argument was over, but that
numerous people, including Spry, were loitering at the location.  The situation was “very
heated,” and along with Officers McNeill, Wielgosz, and Adams, and Deputy Sheriff
Gestole, Officer Jester ordered those present to immediately leave the location if they did not
live in the Garden Court Apartments.  Officer Jester testified that he ordered the crowd to
depart the area because there were “forty to fifty people standing in the middle of the
roadway and the parking lot, screaming, yelling loud, [and] carrying on . . . .”
Spry, who was not a resident of the Garden Court Apartments,4 refused to leave.
What happened next was the subject of the following testimony of Officer Jester:
[T]hat’s where Mr. Spry became involved in the incident.  He
was in the apartments there, he’s not a resident of those
apartments.  He was advised by myself to move along, and Mr.
Spry right in my face, looked at me and said, “Fuck you bitch.”
He continued to stand in front of me defiantly refusing to move
and to leave the area.
*     *     *
He stood his ground firmly, like he’s not going anywhere . . . .
*     *     *
Mr. Spry refused to move.  Again I advised Mr. Spry it was time
to move along which he responded with to me, with more
profanity.  Mr. Spry continued to, what we called eyeball, just
glare at me, like he was looking through me.
-4-
Officer Jester then ordered Spry to move along “at least four or five times” within the space
of five to ten minutes.
Officer McNeill testified similarly about the interaction at the Garden Courts
Apartment complex, noting that there were many individuals, including Spry, who were
menacing, shouting obscenities at the officers, and creating a disturbance:
Mr. George Spry was yelling numerous profanities at officers,
and as Officer Jester walked to Mr. Spry’s location they were
like in a Mexican stand off.  Mr. Spry was standing in, it
appeared a defiant stance to Officer Jester . . . .
*     *     *
His jaw was clenched, he was standing with his arms down by
his side, his left fist appeared to be balled; it was completely
balled, it was just curled up forming more of a balled fist
looking, as opposed to an open relaxed hand.  And as Officer
Jester continued to approach him, Mr. Spry stood still, stood at
the same position where he was at.  I then began to walk
towards Officer Jester and Mr. Spry’s location, at that point and
time some associates of Mr. Spry began tugging at him, saying,
come on George, let’s go.  And Mr. Spry then walked away,
along with his associates continuing to yell profanities back at
the police.
*     *     *
I heard Officer Jester direct Mr. Spry to leave the area, as he was
telling other individuals. . . . After each directive from Officer
Jester, Mr. Spry made a comment like, fuck the police, nobody’s
scared of you fucking cops, or something like fuck you all.  I
just kept hearing the word fuck come out of his mouth. 
In response to a question about the volume of Spry’s invocations, Officer McNeill replied
that the volume of his voice was “elevated, he projected throughout the . . . immediate area
5
Section 10-201 (c)(4) of the Criminal Law Article provides that “[a] person who
enters the land or premises of another, whether an owner or lessee, or a beach adjacent to
residential riparian property, may not willfully:  (i) disturb the peace of persons on the land,
premises, or beach by making an unreasonably loud noise; or (ii) act in a disorderly manner.”
Maryland Code (2002), Section 10-201 (c)(4) of the Criminal Law Article.
6
Section 10-201 (c)(5) of the Criminal Law Article declares that, “[a] person from any
location may not, by making an unreasonably loud noise, willfully disturb the peace of
another; (i) on the other’s land or premises; (ii) in a public place; or (iii) on a public
conveyance.”  Maryland Code (2002), Section 10-201 (c)(5) of the Criminal Law Article.
7
Section 10-201 (c)(1) of the Criminal Law Article requires that, “[a] person may not
willfully and without lawful purpose obstruct or hinder the free passage of another in a public
place or on a public conveyance.”  Maryland Code (2002), Section 10-201 (c)(1) of the
Criminal Law Article.
8
Section 10-201 (c)(2) of the Criminal Law Article mandates that, “[a] person may not
willfully act in a disorderly manner that disturbs the public peace.”  Maryland Code (2002),
(continued...)
-5-
where we responded to.”
Officer Jester filed a statement of charges during the afternoon of the following day,
formally charging Spry with one count of riot, one count of obstructing and hindering a
police officer, one count of failing to obey a lawful order that a law enforcement officer
makes to prevent a disturbance to the public peace in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3) of
the Criminal Law Article; one count of disturbing the peace in violation of Section 10-201
(c)(4) of the Criminal Law Article;5 one count of disturbing the peace by making an
unreasonably loud noise in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(5) of the Criminal Law Article;6
one count of disturbing the peace by hindering the free passage of another in violation of
Section 10-201 (c)(1) of the Criminal Law Article;7 and one count of disorderly conduct in
violation of Section 10-201 (c)(2) of the Criminal Law Article.8  Spry was arrested pursuant
8
(...continued)
Section 10-201 (c)(2) of the Criminal Law Article.
9
The application for an arrest warrant against Spry was based on the affidavit of
Officer Jester recounting the facts presented above.  Officer Jester averred in his affidavit
that:
This officer was and other [Federalsburg Police Department]
officers were dispatched by [the Caroline County Sheriff’s
Department] to the [Garden Court Apartments] in reference to
a large fight in progress.  Upon arrival this officer observed a
large crowd and attempted to disperse the crowd which the
defendant was part of.  The defendant was loud and disorderly
and was ordered by this officer to disburse, to which the
defendant advised this officer “Fuck you bitch” and refused to
leave the area while taking an aggressive stance with this officer
and glaring at this officer defiantly.  The defendant was again
ordered to leave the area and continued to use profanity at police
within hearing distance of residents of the Garden Apartments.
The defendant’s actions incited others to become disorderly and
caused officers to have to focus their attention at disbursing
more disorderly persons in the area.  The defendant continued to
be disorderly using profanity and challenging this officer to a
confrontation.
-6-
to a warrant on April 21, 2004.9
Spry requested a jury trial on June 28, 2004, and the case was removed to the Circuit
Court for Caroline County.  On September 24, 2004, the first day of trial, the State nolle
prossed the charges for riot, disturbing the peace, and disturbing the peace by making an
unreasonably loud noise.  After the State rested, Spry’s counsel moved for judgment of
acquittal on the four remaining charges, which was granted as to the charges for disturbing
the peace by hindering the free passage of another and obstructing and hindering a police
officer, as well as for the disorderly conduct charge.  Spry was convicted by a jury on the
10
Section 10-201 (d) provides that “[a] person who violates this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 60 days or a fine
not exceeding $500 or both.  Maryland Code (2002), Section 10-201 (d) of the Criminal Law
Article.
11
Spry was joined in his appeal by Menyonne Fletcher and Shavonne Parker, who had
been convicted of both failure to obey a police officer’s reasonable order and disorderly
conduct.  Neither Fletcher nor Parker filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court.
-7-
only remaining count, failing to obey a lawful order that a law enforcement officer makes to
prevent a disturbance to the public peace in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3).  Spry was
sentenced to sixty days imprisonment with all but two consecutive weekends suspended, as
well as one year of unsupervised probation.10
Spry noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the evidence
was not legally sufficient to support his conviction, and posing one question of “whether
tardy compliance is violation of the statute.”11  In an unreported opinion, the intermediate
appellate court characterized the incidents in Federalsburg on the evening of April 19th,
2004, as a three-round scuffle, “riotous,” and almost reducing “the peace and tranquility . .
. to a civil war battlefield,” and described Spry as a “leading voice of defiance,” and
“truculent.”  In affirming his conviction and finding that the evidence was sufficient to
convict, the appellate court determined that “the question is where on the intervening
continuum to place the critical point where Section 10-201 (c)(3) is violated,” a question
“entrusted to the collective wisdom of our judicial fact finders.”  The court also stated that
“a snarling compliance twenty minutes after an order is given does not negate nineteen
antecedent minutes of non-compliance.”  
-8-
We granted Spry’s petition for writ of certiorari, which presented the following
question for our review:
Was Petitioner improperly convicted of failing to obey a police
order to leave the scene when he did leave and there was no
attempt to arrest him when the order was given? 
Spry v. State, 393 Md. 477, 903 A.2d 416 (2006).  We hold that a police officer does not
have to arrest an individual immediately after the first disobedience of a lawful order made
to prevent a disturbance to the peace, nor does a police officer have to arrest the individual
at the scene.
II.  Discussion
Spry contends that he was improperly convicted for failure to obey Officer Jester’s
order to leave the scene in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3) because arrest is an element of
the offense, such that he must have been arrested at the scene, when he first disobeyed the
police order.  Spry also argues that, because he eventually did leave the Garden Court
Apartments, he complied with Officer Jester’s order, so that there is not sufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction.
The State, conversely, argues that there was sufficient evidence to support Spry’s
conviction for failure to obey Officer Jester’s order to leave the scene because Spry failed
to obey Officer Jester’s order which had to be repeated four or five times.  The State also
maintains that police are not required to arrest for violations of Section 10-201 (c)(3)
immediately after the first disobedience of a lawful police order, or at the scene.
Spry argues that a law enforcement officer must arrest an individual who violates
12
The first statutory enactment of the crime for failure to obey a lawful order that a law
enforcement officer makes to prevent a disturbance to the public peace occurred in 1998,
when Senate Bill 390 codified the crime within Section 121 (b)(3), Article 27.  1998 Md.
Laws, Chap. 383.  A Committee Note from the Committee to Revise Article 27 was included
within Senate Bill 390, indicating that the provision was “intended to codify the common law
on failure to obey the lawful order of a police officer.”  Senate Bill 390 (1998), Committee
Note, Committee to Revise Article 27.  See also Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill
Analysis, Senate Bill 390 (1998) (stating that “the offense of failing to obey the lawful order
of a law enforcement officer made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace as constituting
disorderly conduct is not codified, and is only found in case law,” and providing the example
of Harris v. State, 237 Md. 299, 206 A.2d 254 (1965)).  Article 27, Section 121 (b)(3) was
recodified in 2002, without substantive change, as Section 10-201 (c)(3) of the Criminal Law
Article.  2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 26, Section 2.
-9-
Section 10-201 (c)(3) at the scene in order to enforce the statute, and immediately after the
first disobedience.  Although the violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3), a misdemeanor, occurred
in the presence of Officer Jester, Spry was not arrested until after Officer Jester secured a
warrant on the following day.  Effectively, Spry contends that, because the arrest was not
made at the scene, and immediately after the first disobedience, police lost the ability to arrest
him for a violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3).
The relevant portion of Section 10-201 of the Criminal Law Article provides that “[a]
person may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order that a law enforcement
officer makes to prevent a disturbance to the public peace.”  Maryland Code (2002), Section
10-201 (c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article.  This Section codifies one aspect of the common
law crimes of disorderly conduct and breach of the peace.12
Our jurisprudence has not included arrest as an element of the offenses of disorderly
conduct and breach of the peace.  Rather, in Wanzer v. State, 202 Md. 601, 97 A.2d 914
13
Disorderly conduct offenses are codified in Section 10-201 of the Criminal Law
Article, which provides:
(a) Definitions.  — (1) In this section the following words have
the meanings indicated.
(2) (i) “Public conveyance” means a conveyance to which the
public or a portion of the public has access to and a right to use
for transportation. 
(ii) “Public conveyance” includes an airplane, vessel, bus,
railway car, school vehicle, and subway car.
(3) (i) “Public place” means a place to which the public or a
portion of the public has access and a right to resort for
business, dwelling, entertainment, or other lawful purpose.
(ii) “Public place” includes:  1.  a restaurant, shop, shopping
center, store, tavern, or other place of business; 2.  a public
building 3.  a public parking lot; 4. a public street, sidewalk, or
right-of-way; 5.  a public park or other public grounds; 6.  the
common areas of a building containing four or more separate
dwelling units, including a corridor, elevator, lobby, and
stairwell; 7.  a hotel or motel; 8.  a place used for public resort
or amusement, including an amusement park, golf course, race
track, sports arena, swimming pool, and theater; 9.  an
institution of elementary, secondary, or higher education; 10.  a
place of public worship; 11.  a place or building used for
entering or exiting a public conveyance, including an airport
terminal, bus station, dock, railway station, subway station, and
wharf; and 12.  the parking areas, sidewalks, and other grounds
and structures that are part of a public place.
(b) Construction of section. — For purposes of a prosecution
(continued...)
-10-
(1953), this Court interpreted what constitutes a breach of the peace, noting that it signifies
disorderly, dangerous conduct, “an affray, actual violence, or conduct tending to or
provocative of violence by others.”  Id. at 609, 97 A.2d at 918.  In Drews v. State, 224 Md.
186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961), we  noted that, while disorderly conduct offenses are presently
codified in Section 10-201 of the Criminal Law Article,13 “[t]he gist of the crime of
13
(...continued)
under this section, a public conveyance or a public place need
not be devoted solely to public use.
(c) Prohibited. — (1) A person may not willfully and without
lawful purpose obstruct or hinder the free passage of another in
a public place or on a public conveyance.
(2) A person may not willfully act in a disorderly manner that
disturbs the public peace.
(3)  A person may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and
lawful order that a law enforcement officer makes to prevent a
disturbance to the public peace.
(4) A person who enters the land or premises of another,
whether an owner or lessee, or a beach adjacent to residential
riparian property, may not willfully:  (i) disturb the peace of
persons on the land, premises, or beach by making an
unreasonably loud noise; or (ii) act in a disorderly manner.
(5) A person from any location may not, by making an
unreasonably loud noise, willfully disturb the peace of another;
(i) on the other’s land or premises; (ii) in a public place; or (iii)
on a public conveyance.
(6) In Worcester County, a person may not build a bonfire or
allow a bonfire to burn on a beach or other property between 1
a.m. and 5 a.m.
(d) Penalty.  — A person who violates this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not
exceeding 60 days or a fine not exceeding $500 or both.
Md. Code (2002), Section 10-201 of the Criminal Law Article.
-11-
disorderly conduct . . . as it was in the cases of common law predecessor crimes, is the doing
or saying, or both, of that which offends, disturbs, incites, or tends to incite, a number of
people gathered in the same area.”  Id. at 192, 167 A.2d at 343-44.  See Sharpe v. State, 231
Md. 401, 404, 190 A.2d 628, 630 (1963).
Likewise, we have never held that arrest is an element of what was defined
specifically as the failure to obey a police officer’s lawful command, another type of
-12-
disorderly conduct.  In Drews, supra, this Court addressed the sufficiency of evidence for the
conviction of a group of individuals for refusing to leave an amusement park after being
asked to do so several times by park employees and police, who feared that the increasingly
inhospitable crowd would erupt into a mob; we stated:
[I]t has been held that failure to obey a policeman’s command
to move on when not to do so may endanger the public peace,
amounts to disorderly conduct. . . .  [R]efusal to obey an order
of a police officer, not exceeding his authority, to move on
“even though conscientious . . . may interfere with the public
order and lead to a breach of the peace,” and that such a refusal
“can be justified only where the circumstances show
conclusively that the police officer’s direction was purely
arbitrary and was not calculated in any way to promote the
public order.”
224 Md. at 192-93, 167 A.2d at 344, quoting People v. Galpern, 181 N.E. 572, 574 (N.Y.
1932) (citations omitted).  See Polk v. State, 378 Md. 1, 21, 835 A.2d 575, 587 (2003);
Dennis v. State, 342 Md. 196, 201, 674 A.2d 928, 930 (1996); Sharpe, 231 Md. at 404, 190
A.2d at 630; Harris, 237 Md. at 303, 206 A.2d at 256.
Concomitantly, we have never held that a person must be arrested after the first
disobedience rather than after repeated refusal to move in order for a conviction to be
sustained.  Rather, we have affirmed convictions for failing to abide by a police officer’s
lawful order even though the individual was issued multiple orders and was not arrested
immediately after the first order was disobeyed.  See Polk, 378 Md. at 17-18, 835 A.2d at 585
(sustaining conviction for violation of disorderly conduct statute after refusal to abide by four
or five police orders to remain quiet and leave premises); Drews, 224 Md. at 193, 167 A.2d
-13-
at 344 (upholding conviction of a group of individuals for disorderly conduct for refusing to
follow multiple orders to leave an amusement park).
Spry argues, nonetheless, that police are required to arrest for a violation of Section
10-201 (c)(3) immediately after the first disobedience, because otherwise, the violator’s
actions must be construed as compliance with the order.  In asserting this, however, the
emphasis is on the wrong actor – it is the police officer who retains the discretion to affect
an arrest.  We have iterated that the decision to arrest is an important “discretionary
judgmental power granted to a police officer,” and one that is “basic to the police power
function of government[] . . . and . . . critical to a law enforcement officer’s ability to carry
out his duties.”  Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 633, 510 A.2d 1078, 1086
(1986), quoting Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1985).
The discretionary aspect of a law enforcement officer’s authority when arresting
without a warrant at the scene of a misdemeanor, such as in the present case, is limited
ordinarily only by a need for the arrest to be effectuated in “due time.”  In Childress v. State,
227 Md. 41, 175 A.2d 18 (1961), we analyzed the validity of a warrantless arrest for
disorderly conduct made as the defendant was leaving the scene, when the defendant had
been observed by a police officer directing traffic near a busy intersection during rush hour
and causing “considerable confusion and some rather minor bumps.”  Id. at 42, 175 A.2d at
19.  When the officer attempted to arrest Childress, he left the scene and entered a nearby
rooming house where he was arrested.  We acknowledged that where a misdemeanor is
committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer, a warrantless arrest must be made
14
Other courts have utilized similar criterion to determine whether a warrantless arrest
was reasonable because of the time lapse between the misdemeanor violation and its
subsequent arrest.  In Commonwealth v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 1989), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the authority of a deputy sheriff to arrest a person
without a warrant for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a
misdemeanor.  The court answered the question in the affirmative, noting that a warrantless
arrest is appropriate because the offense “is still continuing at the time of the arrest or only
interrupted, so that the offense and the arrest form parts of one transaction.”  Id. at 678.  Cf.
State v. Warren, 709 P.2d 194, 200 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a two and one half
hour delay in executing a warrantless arrest for drinking in public, a misdemeanor, was
unreasonable because the officer delayed in making the arrest “for purposes disassociated
with the arrest . . . [and] for such a length of time as to necessarily indicate the interposition
of other purposes”).
-14-
within “due time” of the offense, but affirmed defendant’s conviction because the arrest was
made “almost at once.”  Id. at 43, 175 A.2d at 19.  See also Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589,
600-01, 105 A.2d 661, 666 (1954) (“There is another common law doctrine of fresh pursuit
whereby a peace officer may arrest, without a warrant, for misdemeanors committed in his
presence within a reasonable time thereafter.  The fresh pursuit affects only the
reasonableness of the lapse of time between the commission of the offense and the arrest
thereof.”).  Cf. Torres v. State, 147 Md. App. 83, 98, 807 A.2d 780, 789 (2002) (finding that
delay of thirteen days between misdemeanor committed in the presence of a law enforcement
officer and warrantless arrest did not comply with the “reasonable promptness rule”).14
In the present case, Officer Jester arrested Spry two days after the violation, which
may or may not have implicated the issue of delay had the arrest been without a warrant.
Spry’s arrest, however, occurred after a warrant had been secured.
We have recognized, as has the Supreme Court, that arrests with warrants provide
-15-
safeguards for putative defendants by allowing “a neutral judicial officer to assess whether
the police have probable cause to make an arrest . . . .”  Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1648, 68 L.Ed.2d 38, 46 (1981).  See Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md.
652, 668, 898 A.2d 961, 971 (2006) (noting that there is a “strong preference for warrants”
because a decision by a neutral magistrate “is a more reliable safeguard . . . than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime’”), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14, 104 S.Ct. 3405,
3415-16, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 692-93 (1984).  A warrant is a “checkpoint between the
Government and the citizen . . . to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting
the contemplated action against the individual’s interests in protecting his own liberty . . . .”
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212, 101 S.Ct. at 1648, 68 L.Ed.2d at 46.
Spry, nevertheless, asserts that Officer Jester, as well as any other officer at the scene,
lost his ability to effectuate the arrest when the officer submitted his observations to judicial
review and secured a warrant after the melee in Federalsburg ended.  He, however, alleges
no actual prejudice occurring to him on account of the two-day delay between the occurrence
of the offense and the time that he was arrested with a warrant which could implicate due
process, as we have heretofore recognized in Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 774 A.2d 1136
(2001):
[A]bsent a showing of actual prejudice, compared to possible
prejudice, “the applicable statute of limitations . . . is usually
considered the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale
criminal charges.” . . . Where a defendant can demonstrate
actual prejudice, however, in circumstances where the delay
-16-
between the occurrence of the criminal offense and the date of
arrest . . . is unduly long and the actions of the State in delaying
were unreasonable, deliberate and oppressive, the due process
clause would demand a dismissal . . . .
Id. at 645 n.25, 774 A.2d at 1156 n.25, quoting Dorsey v. State, 34 Md. App. 525, 537-38,
368 A.2d 1036, 1044 (1977).
It would be illogical and unreasonable to limit the discretion of the officers in the
present case by the adoption of Spry’s stance just because the officers secured an arrest
warrant after the conflagration ended.  When confronted with other substantial concerns such
as when a disturbance to the public peace has occurred, or when a riot or more serious
situation is looming, police reasonably focus on quelling the disturbance, rather than formally
arresting each perpetrator immediately.  The discretion to do so, especially when thereafter
the officer secures an arrest warrant, should not be circumvented.
In the present case, Officer Jester, after a tumultuous series of events, arrived at the
Garden Court Apartments on April 19, 2004, during a volatile and heated situation with
“forty to fifty people standing in the middle of the roadway and parking lot, screaming,
yelling . . . [and] carrying on.”  To squelch the disturbance, he ordered those present, who did
not live at the Garden Court Apartments, to disperse, which included Spry.  Instead, Spry
refused to leave, acted menacingly and loudly.  Although Spry eventually left, it was at the
insistence of a colleague and after Officer Jester had repeated his order at least four or five
times.  Spry’s noncompliance until that point is not negated by his eventual and untimely
decision to leave.
-17-
Thus, we affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 42
September Term, 2006
GEORGE JUNIOR SPRY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND 
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J. 
Filed:   January 16, 2007
1
The petitioner also was charged with riot, obstructing and hindering a police officer,
disorderly conduct, Maryland Code (2002) § 10-201 (c) (2), and a number of disturbing the
peace offenses: §§10-201 (c) (1); 10-201 (c) (4); 10-201 (c) (5).   He was either acquitted or
(continued...)
George Junior Spry, the petitioner, was a part of a gathering of approximately forty
to fifty people gathered at the Garden Court Apartments in Federalsburg, who, according to
the police, in the aftermath of a fight or an argument, were loitering, “standing in the middle
of the roadway and the parking lot, screaming, yelling loud, carrying on....”  The police
ordered the crowd to disperse, an order that many in the crowd, including the petitioner, did
not immediately heed.  The petitioner’s refusal apparently caught the police’s attention,
especially because it was not a silent refusal or a dawdling, gradual refusal.  It was, instead,
an emphatic and vocal one.    As described, and emphasized, by Officer Jester, one of the
police officers on the scene and the arresting officer, “[h]e stood his ground firmly, like he’s
not going anywhere,” standing in front of him, eyeballing him, glaring at him, “like he was
looking through [him],” “defiantly refusing to move and to leave the area,” and his adamance
was punctuated and emphasized by profanity, especially the word, “fuck”: “Fuck you bitch,”
“fuck the police, nobody’s scared of you fucking cops or something like fuck you all.”   
Despite his defiance and adamance about not leaving, after being ordered to do so four or
five times over a five to ten minute time span, the petitioner left the area, thus complying
with the police order.    That was not the end of the matter, however.
The following day, the police obtained a warrant charging the petitioner with, inter
alia,1 willful failure to obey a lawful order of a law enforcement officer made to prevent a
1
(...continued)
the State nolle prossed each of these offenses.
2
Maryland Code (2002) §10-201 (c) (3) of the Criminal Law Article provides:
“A person may not willfully fail to obey a reasonable and lawful order that a
law enforcement officer makes to prevent a disturbance to the public peace.”
-2-
disturbance of the peace, pursuant to Maryland Code (2002) §10-201 (c) (3) of the Criminal
Law Article.2    The petitioner was convicted of that offense after a jury trial and sentenced.
In sending the case to the jury, the trial court opined: “a snarling compliance twenty minutes
after an order is given does not negate nineteen antecedent minutes of non-compliance.”  In
affirming the conviction, the majority makes a similar statement:
“To squelch the disturbance, [the officer] ordered those present, who did not
live at the Garden Court Apartments, to disperse, which included Spry. 
Instead, Spry refused to leave, acted menacingly and loudly.   Although Spry
eventually left, it was at the insistence of a colleague and after Officer Jester
had repeated his order at least four or five times.   Spry’s noncompliance until
that point is not negated by his eventual and untimely decision to leave.”
Spry v. State, __ Md. __, __, __ A.2d __, __ (2007) [slip op. at 16-17].
The offense of which the petitioner was convicted is willfully failing to obey a law
enforcement officer’s reasonable and lawful order made to prevent a disturbance to the
public peace.    Because the object of the statute is the prevention of a disturbance of the
public peace, when the arrest is made the threat to the public peace must yet exist, and the
willful failure to obey the order made in pursuance of abating it must also persist.   Under this
statute, there is no offense committed if the defendant complies and if there is no threat to
the public peace.    Here, the petitioner complied with the officer’s order, albeit quite
belatedly.   The statute does not provide a temporal or numerical standard by which a
3
The statute is clear in its requirements, a police order, reasonable and lawful, aimed
at preventing a disturbance of the public peace and a willful failure to comply with that order.
To reach the result the majority does, one has to read into the statute a further requirement,
that there can be gradations of willful refusal and, if not a temporal factor, an officer
tolerance one.   This would suggest that the statute is ambiguous.   Ambiguity, however,
implicates the rule of lenity, the result of which is an interpretation favorable to the
petitioner.
4
The majority cites, in support of its assertion that “we have never held that a person
must be arrested after the first disobedience rather than after repeated refusal to move in
order for a conviction to be sustained,’ __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ [slip op. at 12], Polk v.
State, 378 Md. 1, 17-18, 835 A.2d 575, 585 (2003); Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 193, 167
A.2d 341, 344 (1961).   That may be so, but it also is true that, until today, we had not held
that a person who ultimately complied with a police order after multiple failures to do so,
could be charged under § 10-201 (c) (3).   Today’s holding certainly does not follow from
Polk and Drews.    In both those cases, the conduct was on-going; it had not ceased.
-3-
defendant’s refusal or compliance is be judged.   Nor is there a provision requiring that the
compliance be cheerful, willful or even the opposite of “snarling,” or that it must be the
defendant’s alone; a third person’s persuasive influence on a defendant is not singled out as
a factor to be discounted when a defendant is tardy complying with the order to leave the
area, but leaves on that third person’s “insistence.”    The fact is that when a defendant
leaves, even if after multiple orders from the police, and even if at the insistence of a friend
or done grudgingly or cheerfully, the defendant complies with the order and the threat to the
public peace is abated.3   
The majority rejects this common sense approach, suggesting that whether to arrest,
and when, is matter of the police officer’s discretion.4   That discretion, it reminds us, “is
‘basic to the police power function of government[] ... and ... critical to a law enforcement
officer’s ability to carry out his duties.   __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ [slip op. 13], quoting
-4-
Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 633, 510 A. 2d 1078, 1086 (1986), quoting
Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1985).   I do not disagree with the proposition
that discretion to arrest is critical to the police function.   I do not agree, however, that the
issue is presented in this case.    It simply does not apply where the conduct that constitutes
the offense consists of the defendant’s failure to respond to a police order.   The police have
the authority, discretion, to arrest so long as the defendant’s conduct and their order are at
variance - so long as the defendant does not conform his conduct to that the police require.
When, however, the defendant conforms his conduct to what is being required by the police
there really is no longer any discretion, there being no longer any offense to be violated.   
It may well be that, during his refusal and perhaps the refusal itself, the petitioner may
have committed some other criminal offense - he was charged with, but acquitted of, several
- that, however, is not an issue to be decided here.   A § 10-201 (c) (3) conviction will not lie,
and should not lie, to vindicate the officer’s apprehension or dignity.    What is quite evident
on this record is the exception that the police took to the language that the petitioner used in
stating his refusal to leave and the attitude, lack of respect, if you will, for the officers, rather
than for authority, that he displayed toward them.   The use of profanity and the failure to
show what an officer may regard as proper respect are not the elements of the offense with
which the petitioner was charged and, consequently, can not, and should not, be the basis for
his conviction.
I dissent.