Title: Burns v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Elk Grove Village

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Burns v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Elk Grove Village, 
2020 IL 125714 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
TIMOTHY BURNS, Appellee, v. THE MUNICIPAL OFFICERS 
ELECTORAL BOARD OF THE VILLAGE OF ELK GROVE 
VILLAGE et al. (Benjamin R. Lee, Appellant). 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
125714 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
February 26, 2020 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Maureen O. 
Hannon, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Circuit court judgment reversed in part and vacated in part. 
Board decision affirmed.  
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Pericles C. Abbasi, of Chicago, for appellant. 
 
Burton S. Odelson and Ross D. Secler, of Odelson & Sterk, Ltd., of 
Evergreen Park for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
Digitally signed 
by Reporter of 
Decisions 
Reason: I attest to 
the accuracy and 
integrity of this 
document 
Date: 2021.02.09 
10:56:55 -06'00'
 
- 2 - 
 
Justices 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Burke and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and 
Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Justice Neville took no part in the decision.  
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this case we are asked to consider the validity of a referendum seeking to impose term 
limits on the elected offices of village president and village trustee in Elk Grove Village. The 
village electoral board concluded that the referendum violated section 3.1-10-17 of the Illinois 
Municipal Code. Pub. Act 101-114, § 5 (eff. July 19, 2019) (adding 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-17). On 
judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County reversed, holding that section 3.1-10-17 was 
unconstitutional and ordering that the term-limits referendum appear on the March 17, 2020, 
general primary ballot.1 The matter was appealed directly to this court pursuant to Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). For the following reasons, we reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court in part, vacate in part, and affirm the decision of the electoral 
board. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
On July 8, 2019, Timothy Burns, the principal proponent of a term-limits referendum, filed 
a petition seeking to place the question of whether to impose term limits on the elected offices 
of village president and village trustee in Elk Grove Village on the March 17, 2020, general 
primary election ballot. The proposed question asked:  
“Shall the terms of office for those persons seeking nomination or election to, or who 
are holding the office of, Village President (Mayor) and Village trustee in the Village 
of Elk Grove Village, be limited such that, at the February 23, 2021 Consolidated 
Primary Election and all subsequent elections, no person shall be eligible to seek 
nomination or election to, or to hold, elected office in the Village of Elk Grove Village 
where that person has held the same elected office for two (2) or more consecutive, 
four (4) year terms?” 
¶ 4 
 
Benjamin Lee, a registered voter of the village, filed an objection, relying on section 3.1-
10-17 of the Municipal Code. Lee argued that section provides that any term-limit referendum 
must be prospective only—that is, a referendum can only consider terms in office served after 
the passage of the referendum to determine a candidate’s eligibility. Lee maintained that the 
referendum proposed by Burns violated that section because it calculated and counted prior 
service as village president or village trustee before the passage of the referendum in 
determining eligibility to seek another term in that office. In response to the objection, Burns 
maintained that section 3.1-10-17 was unconstitutional, facially and as applied to his petition 
for referendum.  
 
 
1The election held on the third Tuesday in March is the “general primary election,” pursuant to the 
Election Code. 10 ILCS 5/2A-1.1 (West 2018).  
 
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¶ 5 
 
The electoral board agreed with Lee, 2 sustaining the objection to the petition on the 
grounds that the petition conflicted with section 3.1-10-17. The board found that the statute 
allowed term limits to be prospective only, that the referendum was not prospective in its 
consideration of prior service, and that the limited scope of the board’s authority required it to 
accept the validity of the statute without considering whether it was unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, the board ordered that the referendum should not appear on the ballot in the 
March 17, 2020, general primary election.  
¶ 6 
 
Burns sought judicial review in the circuit court of Cook County and requested that the 
court consider the constitutionality of the statute. The circuit court reversed the decision of the 
electoral board, holding that section 3.1-10-17 was unconstitutional on its face and as applied.  
¶ 7 
 
The circuit court found that the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to 
expressly restrict the power of home rule municipalities to ensure that term limits can only be 
instituted prospectively. However, the court ruled that section 3.1-10-17 unlawfully applied 
retroactively to term limits referenda that had already been approved by the voters in other 
municipalities since November 2016. The circuit court further found that the unlawful 
provisions could not be severed from the rest of the statute.  
¶ 8 
 
Thereafter, Lee filed a notice of appeal directly to this court pursuant to Rule 302(a)(1). Ill. 
S. Ct. R. 302(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). This court granted the parties’ agreed motion to expedite 
the appeal and set an expedited briefing schedule without oral argument. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(b) 
(eff. July 1, 2018). 
 
¶ 9 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 10 
 
When an election board’s decision is challenged in the circuit court pursuant to section 10-
10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2018)), the proceeding is one of 
administrative review. Accordingly, it is the election board’s decision that is ultimately before 
us, and not the decision of the circuit court. However, the election board has no authority to 
declare a statute unconstitutional or to question the validity of the statute. Goodman v. Ward, 
241 Ill. 2d 398, 411 (2011). Thus, it is the circuit court’s declaration that section 3.1-10-17 is 
unconstitutional that warrants this court’s direct review. The constitutionality of a statute 
involves a question of law, making our review de novo. Bartlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152, 
¶ 17. 
¶ 11 
 
Section 3.1-10-17 provides as follows: 
 
“(a) The imposition of term limits by referendum, ordinance, or otherwise must be 
prospective. Elective office held prior to the effective date of any term limit imposed 
by a municipality shall not prohibit a person otherwise eligible from running for or 
holding elective office in that municipality. Term limits imposed in a manner 
 
 
2The electoral board agreed with Lee on remand from the circuit court, after initially dismissing 
Lee’s objection as “premature.” Lee had filed his objection on October 22, and the electoral board 
reasoned that he had to wait until December 17. See 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2018) (requiring objections 
to petitions for referendum to be “duly made in writing within 5 business days after the last day for 
filing the *** petition for a public question”). After the electoral board found for Lee on remand, the 
circuit court ruled on Burns’s counterpetition in an order captioned Burns v. Municipal Officers 
Electoral Board, No. 19-COEL-37 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Jan. 15, 2020).  
 
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inconsistent with this Section remain valid prospectively, but are invalid as they apply 
to service prior to the enactment of the term limits. 
 
(b) The imposition of term limits by referendum, ordinance, or otherwise shall only 
apply to terms for the same office or that category of municipal office. Term limits 
imposed in a manner inconsistent with this subsection are invalid as they apply to 
service in other categories of municipal offices. 
 
(c) A home rule unit may not regulate term limits in a manner inconsistent with this 
Section. This Section is a limitation under subsection (i) of Section 6 of Article VII of 
the Illinois Constitution on the concurrent exercise by home rule units of powers and 
functions exercised by the State. 
 
(d) This Section applies to all term limits imposed by a municipality by referendum, 
ordinance, or otherwise passed on or after November 8, 2016.” Pub. Act 101-114, § 5 
(eff. July 19, 2019) (adding 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-17).  
¶ 12 
 
There is no dispute here that, if valid, the term-limits statute would bar the referendum 
question from the ballot. However, Burns contends that section 3.1-10-17 unlawfully deprives 
the voters of the village and the voters of other municipalities their state constitutional right to 
choose by referendum the terms and manner of selecting their elected municipal officers. He 
maintains that the statute is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to this case. 
¶ 13 
 
A facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount because a statute will 
be deemed facially invalid only if no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would 
be valid. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305-06 (2008). An as-applied 
challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the constitution as it applies to the facts 
and circumstances of the challenging party. City of Chicago v. Alexander, 2017 IL 120350, 
¶ 27.  
¶ 14 
 
Under either, we are mindful that statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. 
Oswald v. Hamer, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 29. “The party challenging the validity of a statute has 
the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional infirmity.” Id. If reasonably 
possible, it is the court’s duty to construe the statute in a way that will uphold its 
constitutionality, and any doubt in the statute’s construction will be resolved in favor of the 
statute’s validity. Id.  
¶ 15 
 
Contrary to Burns’s assertion, we agree with the circuit court that the General Assembly 
has the authority to legislate in this area prospectively because it has expressly indicated its 
intent to do so. 
¶ 16 
 
In order to understand Burns’s argument that the legislature exceeded its authority, we must 
first consider the relationship between the State and the units of local government under the 
1970 Illinois Constitution. Generally, every subject within the scope of governmental affairs 
rests in the General Assembly, unless inhibited by some constitutional provision. See Ill. Const. 
1970, art. II, § 2; Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 1 (the General Assembly is vested with all 
legislative power by the constitution). Article VII, section 6, of the constitution provides home 
rule units with certain powers with respect to local concerns. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a) 
(“a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its 
government”).  
¶ 17 
 
Relevant to this referendum, Elk Grove Village is a home rule municipality. As such, it is 
specifically governed by article VII, section 6(f), of the Illinois Constitution, which addresses 
 
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a home rule municipality’s manner of selection of officers and implementation of terms of 
office. That section empowers a home rule municipality to “provide for its officers, their 
manner of selection and terms of office only as approved by referendum or as otherwise 
authorized by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(f). Thus, under section 6(f), in the absence 
of a legislative grant of authority, a home rule municipality is authorized to “chang[e] the 
eligibility requirements for those candidates running [for office]” by limiting the officeholder’s 
term via a referendum approved by the voters. Johnson v. Ames, 2016 IL 121563, ¶ 19.  
¶ 18 
 
Under the same constitutional framework, however, the General Assembly may choose to 
“preempt the exercise of a municipality’s home rule powers by expressly limiting that 
authority.” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (citing 
Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 287 (2001)). Under article VII, 
section 6(h), the General Assembly “may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise 
by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(h).  
¶ 19 
 
If the General Assembly has not expressly preempted an area and taken exclusive control 
over it, it may, instead, limit the power of home rule units to act concurrently with the State. If 
the General Assembly wishes to limit the power of home rule units in this way, it must also do 
so with express language to that effect. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i); 5 ILCS 70/7 (West 
2018) (providing that, if the legislature seeks to limit the exercise of home rule powers, the 
statute must contain an express statement to that effect). 
¶ 20 
 
Here, section 3.1-10-17 of the Municipal Code indeed contains an express limitation on 
the power of a home rule unit to regulate matters involving term limits. Subsection (c) 
specifically provides that  
“[a] home rule unit may not regulate term limits in a manner inconsistent with this 
Section. This Section is a limitation under subsection (i) of Section 6 of Article VII of 
the Illinois Constitution on the concurrent exercise by home rule units of powers and 
functions exercised by the State.” Pub. Act 101-114, § 5 (eff. July 19, 2019) (adding 
65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-17(c)).  
¶ 21 
 
Thus, while the General Assembly has not exclusively preempted a home rule unit from 
exercising its home rule powers with respect to term limits, it has chosen to place a limitation 
on the manner in which term limits are calculated in the next election and subsequent elections. 
By enacting section 3.1-10-17, the General Assembly demonstrated its intent that any term-
limit referendum must be applied prospectively, because only terms served after the passage 
of the referendum may be considered to determine a candidate’s eligibility. The General 
Assembly properly followed the required procedures and asserted its proper authority under 
the Illinois Constitution to limit a function of a home rule unit. Burns’s novel reading of section 
6(f) would read sections 6(h) and 6(i) out of the constitution. The General Assembly may 
always limit the powers of a home rule unit under sections 6(h) and 6(i) as long as it does so 
expressly.  
¶ 22 
 
Accordingly, consistent with the circuit court’s findings, this case presents a circumstance 
under which the statute can be validly applied. Accordingly, Burns’s challenge must fail, both 
as applied and facially. In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d 517, 537 (2006) (“[S]o long as there exists a 
situation in which a statute could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.)). 
 
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¶ 23 
 
Nevertheless, Burns additionally argues that the statute is otherwise invalid because it 
retroactively applies to other municipalities that have already passed term limits by 
referendum, nullifying their voters’ constitutional rights. The circuit court agreed, basing its 
ruling on what it perceived was a problem in the manner of the statute’s “retroactive 
application” in the last sentence in subsection (a) and in subsection (d). 
¶ 24 
 
The last sentence in subsection (a) provides that “[t]erm limits imposed in a manner 
inconsistent with this Section remain valid prospectively, but are invalid as they apply to 
service prior to the enactment of the term limits.” Pub. Act 101-114, § 5 (eff. July 19, 2019) 
(adding 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-17(a)). Subsection (d) is an express temporal limitation on 
subsection (a), providing that “[t]his Section applies to all term limits imposed by a 
municipality by referendum, ordinance, or otherwise passed on or after November 8, 2016.” 
Id. (adding 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-17(d)). 
¶ 25 
 
To the extent that these provisions refer to term limits that have already been imposed, they 
are not implicated here. No term limit has yet been imposed by Elk Grove Village. Thus, Burns 
is asking us to consider whether provisions in the statute that are not applicable here have any 
unlawful retroactive impact as applied to voters’ constitutional rights in other municipalities.  
¶ 26 
 
As we have explained, “ ‘[a] fundamental rule of constitutional law is that a court will not 
determine the constitutionality of a provision of a statute which does not affect the parties to 
the cause under consideration.’ ” Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 438-39 (2002) (quoting 
Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 
200, 206 (2000)); People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 11 (“courts do not rule on the 
constitutionality of a statute where its provisions do not affect the parties” (citing Klein v. 
Department of Registration & Education, 412 Ill. 75, 87-88 (1952))). Whether the statute 
implicates voters’ constitutional rights as applied to term limit referenda previously passed in 
other municipalities does not affect Elk Grove Village or its voters. Accordingly, we find the 
trial court erred in considering those provisions. 
 
¶ 27 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 28 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find the relevant provisions of section 3.1-10-17 of the 
Municipal Code to be constitutional both facially and as applied to the proposed referendum 
in Elk Grove Village. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, vacate that 
portion of the court’s ruling as to provisions that do not affect the parties, and affirm the 
decision of the electoral board, which found the proposed referendum invalid.  
 
¶ 29 
 
Circuit court judgment reversed in part and vacated in part. 
¶ 30 
 
Board decision affirmed. 
 
¶ 31 
 
JUSTICE NEVILLE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.