Title: TR v. Washakie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TR v. Washakie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services1987 WY 50736 P.2d 712Case Number: C-86-1Decided: 04/27/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
TR, 
Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
WASHAKIE 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee 
(Plaintiff)

 
 
H. 
Richard Hopkinson and Charles K. Moss, for Appellant.

 
 
A. 
G. McClintock, Attorney General; Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Richard E. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of 
Wyoming.

 
 
Jeffrey 
A. Donnell, for Guardian Ad Litem. 

 
 
Before 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit and Macy, JJ.  Cardine, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.  Urbigkit, J., 
filed a concurring opinion. 

 
 
THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The foremost issue in 
this sad case is whether the record encompasses sufficient evidence to justify 
the termination of a young mother's parental rights with respect to her three 
daughters. The mother also contends that the trial court erred in failing to 
invoke a less intrusive or restrictive alternative to the termination of her 
parental rights, and she attacks the court's instruction in which the 
contentions and theories of the parties were articulated. In addition, she 
asserts unconstitutional vagueness with respect to material provisions of the 
statutes which authorize the termination of parental rights and argues the 
statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to incorporate standards 
for determining when a petition to terminate parental rights should be filed. We 
conclude, as did the trial court, that the evidence is ample to sustain the 
findings of the jury in its special verdict. We hold that the trial court did 
not err by refusing to invoke a less intrusive or restrictive alternative to 
termination of parental rights and that the challenged instruction was 
appropriate. Valid principles of appellate jurisprudence foreclose us from 
addressing the claims of unconstitutionality submitted by the appellant. The 
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 
 

[¶2.]     After almost six years 
of efforts to adjust the parenting practices of this young mother and relieve 
the deplorable conditions in which her three daughters were being raised, the 
Washakie County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (DPASS) 
filed a petition in district court for the termination of the parental rights of 
the mother. The petition invoked the provisions of § 14-2-309(a)(iii), W.S.1977, 
and alleged that each of the children had been neglected or abused by the 
mother, the efforts of DPASS to rehabilitate the family had been unsuccessful, 
and the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if they 
remained with or were returned to the mother.

 
 

[¶3.]     The district court 
appointed counsel to represent the mother who has prosecuted these proceedings 
as a poor person without funds to secure representation of her rights, and the 
several children were represented separately by a guardian ad litem in 
accordance with § 14-3-211, W.S.1977. In due course, the case came on for a jury 
trial which was requested by the mother, and the jury returned a special verdict 
finding against the mother with respect to each of the daughters. The district 
court entered its order terminating the mother's parental rights. The mother 
then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a 
new trial, both of which were denied by the district court. The mother appeals 
from the order terminating her parental rights and also the order denying her 
motion for a directed verdict and her motion for a new 
trial.

 
 

[¶4.]     By her Brief of 
Appellant, the mother submits the following issues in this 
appeal:

 
 
"1. 
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that 
the parental rights of [the mother] to her children should be 
terminated.

 
 
"2. 
Whether or not the trial court erred in failing to apply a less intrusive or 
restrictive alternative before terminating parental rights of 
appellant.

 
 
"3. 
Whether or not Wyoming Statute Sections 14-2-309(a)(iii) and 14-3-202(a)(vii) 
are unconstitutionally vague.

 
 
"4. 
Whether or not jury instruction number 5 on contentions of the parties was 
improper.

 
 
"5. 
Whether or not Wyoming's termination of parental rights statutes are 
unconstitutional because they do not contain standards to determine initially 
when a petition to terminate these rights should be 
filed."

 
 
The 
guardian ad litem filed a Brief of Appellee and accepted the issues as stated by 
the mother. DPASS set forth the issues in this way in its Brief of 
Appellee:

 
 
"I. 
There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

 
 
"II. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to apply a less intrusive or restrictive 
alternative.

 
 
"III. 
W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iii) and W.S. 14-3-202(a)(vii) are not 
unconstitutional.

 
 
"IV. 
Jury Instruction Number Five as to the contentions of the parties was 
proper.

 
 
"V.  Wyoming statutes on termination of 
parental rights are not unconstitutional for lack of standards to determine when 
a petition to terminate should be filed."

 
 

[¶5.]     The several special 
verdicts submitted to the jury track the requirements of the statutes as they 
have been interpreted by this court. Each of those forms 
read:

 
 
"VERDICT

 
 
"With 
respect to [the child], we the jury find:

" 
1. [The child] has been abused or neglected by her mother, [mother's 
name].

"CHECK 
ONE          
            
YES                
NO

 
 
"2. 
That the health and safety of [the child] would be seriously jeopardized by 
remaining with her mother, [mother's name].

"CHECK 
ONE          
            
YES                
NO

 
 
"3. 
That efforts by an authorized agency have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating 
the family or the family has refused rehabilitative 
treatment.

"CHECK 
ONE          
            
YES                
NO

 
 
"If 
you answer all of the above questions "YES " the parental rights of [mother's 
name] to [the child] will be terminated; if you answer any of the 
questions "NO " her parental rights will not be 
terminated."

 
 
As 
to each of the children, the jury checked yes in response to each of the 
questions on the verdict form.

 
 

[¶6.]     The statute pursuant to 
which the termination of rights proceeding was initiated provides for the 
termination of parental rights if it is established by clear and convincing 
evidence that:

 
 
"The 
child has been abused or neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized 
agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating 
the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown 
that the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining 
with or returning to the parent;" Section 14-2-309(a)(iii), W.S.1977 (July 1986 
Revision).

 
 
In 
applying this statute, we have said that three elements must be established 
before the termination of parental rights is justified:

 
 
"(1) 
Abusive treatment or neglect by the parent; (2) unsuccessful efforts to 
rehabilitate the family (i.e. termination of parental rights is the least 
intrusive means to satisfy the State's interest); and (3) the child's health and 
safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent." Matter of GP, Wyo., 679 P.2d 976, 1005 
(1984).

 
 

[¶7.]     Because the right of 
familial association is a fundamental liberty, our rule is that the application 
of the statutes for termination of parental rights is a subject of strict 
scrutiny. DS and RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911 (1980). See also, Matter of Parental Rights 
of PP, Wyo., 648 P.2d 512 (1982); State in Interest of C, Wyo., 638 P.2d 165 (1981). The strict scrutiny standard arises form the conflict between 
the fundamental liberty of familial association and the compelling interest of 
the state in protecting the welfare of children. Matter of MLM, Wyo., 682 P.2d 982 (1984); Matter of SKJ, Wyo., 673 P.2d 640 (1983); Matter of 
GP, supra.

 
 

[¶8.]     Even though the 
application of the termination of parental rights statutes is a matter for 
strict scrutiny, the standard for reviewing evidence was articulated in DS 
and RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, supra, at 
919-920 in this way:

 
 
"* 
* * * We will examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee 
and will resolve all conflicts in evidence for the appellee. Gray v. 
Fitzhugh, Wyo., 576 P.2d 88 (1978). We will assume the evidence in favor of 
the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely evidence of 
the unsuccessfully party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference which may fairly be drawn from it. 
Hammer v. Town of Jackson, Wyo., 524 P.2d 884 (1974); Mellor v. Ten 
Sleep Cattle Co., Wyo., 550 P.2d 500 (1976); Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 1137 (1976); and Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Ass'n v. Cross, 
Wyo., 569 P.2d 1280 (1977)."

 
 
This 
standard has been followed consistently in cases involving the termination of 
parental rights. Matter of SKJ, supra; Matter of Parental Rights of 
PP, supra. We must follow it in addressing the first issue raised by the 
mother in this appeal. The record demonstrates sufficient evidence to justify 
the jury's conclusion with respect to each daughter, under the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, that the State established each of the necessary 
elements to terminate the mother's parental rights under § 14-2-309(a)(iii), 
supra.

 
 

[¶9.]     While there could be 
honest debate over the sufficiency of the evidence to establish abuse, the 
record is not equivocal with respect to neglect. The statutory definition for 
neglect is:

 
 
"* 
* * * [A] failure or refusal by those responsible for the child's welfare to 
provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical 
or any other care necessary for the child's well being." Section 
14-3-202(a)(vii), W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1985.

 
 
The 
testimony of witnesses at the trial established, in accordance with the clear 
and convincing standard, that the mother did not provide adequate care to these 
children; she failed to provide proper maintenance and supervision; she failed 
to provide for their education and medical needs; and generally, she failed to 
provide other care necessary for their well being.

 
 

[¶10.]  There were two occasions in which police 
officers found the children away from their home playing near the street, and 
when the officers returned the children to their home, the discovered that 
appellant was asleep during the middle of the day. When confronted with these 
situations, the appellant advised that she would obtain padlocks to keep the 
children in, but there was no follow through with respect to that inappropriate 
plan. It is clear that the appellant was asleep in the middle of the day on one 
occasion when oneof the children set fire to a blanket on a bed which resulted 
in a fire in a bedroom of the apartment where the family was living that 
endangered the lives of all the occupants, including the 
children.

 
 

[¶11.]  Other witnesses testified that the 
children were often left in a filthy condition. On occasions in which the 
children were moved into foster homes, they were described as extremely dirty, 
and it sometimes took several baths to get them clean. Some of these same 
witnesses testified that these children appeared to be unfamiliar with eating 
utensils and that their custom was to obtain drinking water from the toilet. 
When the oldest of the children was enrolled in a Headstart program, she often 
was sent to that program in an unkempt and dirty condition. This parental 
failure caused difficulty for the child because other children would not 
associate with her. It inhibited interaction and at times even led to isolation. 
On one occasion, the child complained that her feet were sore. When the teacher 
removed her shoes, she discovered that the little girl's feet were raw, and the 
shoes and feet reeked of cat feces to such an extent that the teacher literally 
gagged.

 
 

[¶12.]  The childrenwere often described as 
hungry, and inquiry into their eating habits disclosed a lack of effort to 
provide an appropriate diet. Cereal and "junk" food seemed to be the primary 
diet which the mother was furnishing for them. The teacher in charge of the 
Headstart program said that the oldest child often was hungry, and complained 
that she had not had breakfast prior to attending the 
program.

 
 

[¶13.]  During a period of time when DPASS had 
temporary custody, the little girls were taken to a dentist who examined their 
teeth and determined that all of them had badly decayed teeth. Some teeth were 
abscessed, and one of the girls had a front tooth broken off which was 
abscessed. The dentist testified that the condition of these teeth in children 
of the young age of these girls was due to lack of proper nutrition and 
supervision. The dentist prepared a treatment plan so that the necessary 
approval for DPASS to pay the dental expenses could be obtained. Even after the 
payment for the dental expenses had been arranged, the mother still failed to 
take the children for their appointments, and the dental treatment was only 
completed during a subsequent period of temporary custody by 
DPASS.

 
 

[¶14.]  Other appropriatemedical care for the 
children was not pursued by the mother, including the usual immunizations for 
DPT, polio and MMR. Ultimately, the oldest child received the required 
immunizations in order to attend school but not as a product of routine medical 
attention being provided. The record also contains evidence that the mother did 
not provide proper medical attention for one of the little girls who had a hip 
condition which needed surgical treatment. This medical care was not pursued 
even though the child complained of pain.

 
 

[¶15.]  As isolated instances, perhaps none of 
these events would justify the termination of the mother's parental rights under 
a standard of strict scrutiny. When these matters are aggregated and the 
testimony of all of the witnesses is developed, an overall pattern of neglect is 
evidence. The case fits what we said in Matter of MLM, supra, 682 P.2d at 
988:

 
 
"In 
the ordinary parental rights termination case consideration is given to a 
combination of factors, incidents and conditions that demonstrate the neglect 
required to justify termination of rights. Rarely do we find a single condition 
or incident that standing alone would justify termination. Neglect isusually 
manifested by numerous incidents and conditions extending over a considerable 
length of time."

 
 
Neglect 
in this case extended over a period of almost six years and is apparent by the 
occasions and conditions described by the witnesses and in the exhibits. This 
record discloses long-term general neglect.

 
 

[¶16.]  The evidence also is clear and convincing 
that rehabilitative efforts by authorized agencies were unsuccessful. DPASS made 
numerous attempts to assist the mother in providing adequate care for her 
children. Services which were made available included emergency financial 
assistance, homemaker services and various counseling services. The record 
discloses that the mother utilized those services which assisted in meeting her 
personal needs and were financially beneficial. The impression which this 
created was that primarily it was those services she sought. With respect to 
services which would have furnished benefits to her children and assisted her in 
becoming a better parent, she either refused those offers or did not attempt to 
take full advantage of them. The arrangement for dental services is an example; 
the mother continually failed to keep appointmentsfor the children which 
resulted in refusal by the dentist to do further work until someone else would 
be responsible for seeing that the children kept their appointments. 
Housekeeping assistance was offered, but the mother refused that service 
insisting that the house in which the children lived was taken care of properly 
and that she did not need that assistance. The record is replete with evidence 
describing the filthy condition of the house. DPASS continually attempted to 
assist the mother in improving her parenting and nurturing skills which were 
things that were desperately needed to improve the lot of these children, and 
the mother continually refused such assistance. She basically denied the 
existence of a problem. Only when the mother became present to the possibility 
of termination of her parental rights does it appear that she made any real 
effort to improve her parenting skills. Those rehabilitative efforts were 
short-lived, however, and the mother quickly reverted to her usual style of 
behavior.

 
 

[¶17.]  It is an apparent that future 
rehabilitative efforts would be unsuccessful as it is that they were not 
successful in the past. The mother and the children were examined by a 
clinicalpsychologist who specialized in child psychology. The psychologist 
testified that the mother's neglect of her children was a product of a long-term 
developed personality rather than any short-term situation. In response to a 
question concerning the mother's emotional and social development, the doctor 
explained that she had difficulty differentiating between people and objects. He 
testified:

 
 
"* 
* * * The three things we look [at] are the way a person relates to objects, to 
animals and to people. In [the mother's] case there is a kind of blending, and 
she relates similarly to all three. So that one might put a personal possession 
such as a car, something people think highly of, or a pet, or a child, and they 
would all enjoy similar attention or neglect, whatever the case may be. But the 
point of it is and the significance of it is that here is a low level of ability 
to differentiate between those three important areas of relationship in life, 
and those are the three that one looks at. So, when I describe her as a 
borderline personality, that is the main thing that I see, that one looks at. 
And then along with that is a tendency to react to situations in extremes, so 
thereis a tendency to relate based on what will provide immediate sense, 
gratification, that will have some immediate tangible results rather than make 
long-range goals."

 
 
According 
to Reed v. Hunter, Wyo., 663 P.2d 513 (1983), the jury, having heard this 
testimony, was free to disregard any or all of it. They were also free, however, 
to accept it and conclude that it was consistent with the past behavioral 
patterns of the mother. It is fair then to conclude that future rehabilitative 
efforts would not be successful. On the evidence in the record, the jury was 
justified in deciding that the efforts to effect the rehabilitation of the 
family were unsuccessful and that future efforts would be equally 
unavailing.

 
 

[¶18.]  We have pointed out that neglect is not 
demonstrated by low socio-economic standing and the simple failure to provide 
all the advantages that a more affluent or better-educated parent might provide. 
Neither is it demonstrated merely by slovenliness of the house or the children. 
In DS and RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 
supra, 607 P.2d  at 919, we noted that such behavior "may offend many of us and 
may, by some, be characterized as neglect, but is not such neglect -- assuming 
no serious health effect or risk -- as will justify termination of parental 
rights." The evidence in this case, however, did demonstrate that the neglect 
endangered the health and safety of the children. This is the third element 
which the State must establish in order to justify the termination of parental 
rights. The evidence disclosed that the children's physical and psychological 
health both would be endangered by remaining with the mother. Her persistent 
failure to furnish proper medical attention and supervision placed the 
children's health and safety in constant jeopardy. The clinical psychologist 
testified that the children's mental health was deteriorating, despite the fact 
that all of the children were of normal intelligence, and one was described as 
possibly gifted. That expert witness attributed the deterioration to the 
environment in which the children lived and the failure of the mother to have 
any positive interaction with them. We do not hold that failing to provide 
maximum intellectual stimulation satisfies the third element which the 
statements established, but it is a factor which may be combined with others to 
demonstratethat health and safety as in this case would be seriously jeopardized 
if the children remained with the parent:

 
 
"* 
* * * A child has a fundamental right to live in an environment free from filth, 
health hazards and danger. A child has a right to be properly nourished and 
educated, and receive necessary medical attention. When the rights of a parent 
and the rights of a child are on collision course, the rights of the parent must 
yield. The appropriate state agencies need not wait for a catastrophic event to 
occur before it takes action." Matter of MLM, supra, 682 P.2d  at 
990.

 
 

[¶19.]  The mother urges the proposition that 
these children still are functioning which indicates that they are healthy and 
safe within the strict scrutiny standard for applying the statute. The guardian 
ad litem, however, pointedly noted that their right to adequate care necessary 
for their well being must be something more than the care that would be afforded 
a family pet. The jury in this case was justified in finding that Washakie 
County DPASS had produced clear and convincing evidence that the children's 
health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if they should remain with or 
if they shouldbe returned to the mother.

 
 

[¶20.]  Under the standard of strict scrutiny, 
the statute properly was applied in this instance to terminate the mother's 
parental rights. The evidence of record is more than sufficient to satisfy our 
rules.

 
 

[¶21.]  Turning to the second issue presented in 
the appellant's brief, we conclude that the trial court did not err in any 
failure to apply some less intrusive or restrictive alternative to the 
termination of appellant's parental rights. The appellant is correct in arguing 
that, under the strict scrutiny standard, the State must demonstrate that a less 
intrusive or restrictive method of protecting a child has been attempted or is 
impractical in order to justify the termination of parental rights. DS and RS 
v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, supra; Matter of 
Parental Rights of PP, supra. The record in this case demonstrates that less 
intrusive means were attempted, but that the result was not favorable. Washakie 
County DPASS attempted to furnish various rehabilitative services and programs 
for the appellant, and consistently, she refused them or did not follow through 
in pursuing them. In several instances, these little girls were placedin the 
temporary custody of foster families under the 72-hour protective provision in 
the statute. The efforts to deal with the situation continued over a period of 
six years. Consistently, the mother demonstrated in an ascending manner that she 
either is unwilling or is unable to provide adequate and necessary care and 
supervision for her children. We cannot discern that the State failed to attempt 
any effort which now could be applied other than termination of the mother's 
parental rights.

 
 

[¶22.]  The testimony of the expert at trial was 
to the effect that taking the children out of the mother's home now, placing 
them in a foster home temporarily and then returning them to her custody at some 
later time would be more detrimental to these children than either leaving them 
with the mother or permanently placing them in foster care. Because the mother 
has demonstrated that she is unable to provide the necessary nurturing and care 
for her children and also has demonstrated that she is unwilling or unable to 
improve her efforts, this record satisfactorily demonstrates that a less 
intrusive means would be impractical in the future just as it has not worked in 
the past. The mothernow claims that she should be given still another chance and 
that she can change and become the mother she ought to be. The record belies her 
willingness to change her lifestyle, and merely claiming that one is willing to 
change a behavioral pattern evidenced over a period of six years is not 
sufficient to rebut the strong evidence in this record that further 
rehabilitative efforts would be impractical and that no less intrusive means to 
protect these children exist. Under the strict scrutiny standard, there was no 
error by the trial court in entering its judgment insofar as the need to 
consider less intrusive and restrictive alternatives is 
concerned.

 
 

[¶23.]  The appellant then complains of 
Instruction No. 5 which was given to the jury. That instruction 
reads:

 
 
"The 
State contends that [the mother] has neglected her children, * * * *; that the 
health and safety of these children would be seriously jeopardized by remaining 
with their mother; and that the efforts of an authorized agency, the Washakie 
County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (D-PASS) have been 
unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family, or that services have been 
refused.

 
 
"[The 
mother] deniesthe State's contentions and she contends:

 
 
"1. 
That she has provided the children with the best physical care available given 
her family's limited income,

"2. 
That the children have not been neglected by her, and

"3. 
That the children are not in jeopardy by remaining with 
her.

"[The 
mother] further contends:

"1. 
She has given the children all necessary medical care,

"2. 
That the best place for the children is with their natural mother, 
and

"3. 
That the State has not made reasonable or good faith efforts at rehabilitating 
the family."

 
 

[¶24.]  The mother's argument in connection with 
her motion for a new trial was that this instruction placed her in a false light 
and did not fairly articulate her true contentions. She argued that she was not 
proposing or attempting to appear to be unwilling to work with DPASS or to 
fulfill any plan or condition which DPASS might require. As we understand this 
instruction, it states only that the appellant denies each of the elements which 
must be found to have been established by clear and convincing evidence before 
her parental rights properly could be terminated. We are unable to perceive how 
it places her in a falselight. She additionally contends before this court that 
the instruction was misleading and was not sustained by the evidence at trial. 
Again, we cannot perceive how the instruction was either misleading or not 
sustained by the evidence. Apparently, it was appellant's desire that no 
instruction such as this be given because she simply objected to it and did not 
offer an alternative.

 
 

[¶25.]  The jury must be instructed on the 
material essentials of any case. Murdock v. State, Wyo., 351 P.2d 674 
(1960). The State as a party was entitled to request and have given an 
instruction with respect to its contention and theory of the case. Langdon v. 
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, Wyo., 494 P.2d 537 (1972). As we 
understand this instruction, it stated no more than the elements that the State 
was required to prove before the parental rights of the mother could be 
terminated; that the State contended the elements were met and that the mother 
contended they had not been met. We find no error with respect to this 
instruction either in its wording or the fact that it was 
given.

 
 

[¶26.]  The other contentions of the mother 
address the constitutionality of the statute. The rule to be applied is well 
settled: 

 
 
"* 
* * * [T]hat in the absence of fundamental error affecting a substantial right 
of the appellant or involving the jurisdiction of the court, we do not consider 
questions sought to be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, unless 
plain error is present, questions concerning the constitutionality of a statute 
are not considered on appeal if the party presenting them failed to present or 
argue the contentions in the trial court." Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 692 P.2d 911, 928 (1984). (Citations omitted.)

 
 
There 
is no question that termination of parental rights is directed toward a right 
that is fundamental and substantial. Matter of GP, Wyo., 679 P.2d 976 
(1984), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969). Even though a fundamental right is involved, the 
appellant's contentions do not raise a fundamental error or jurisdictional 
issue. Furthermore, there is no indication of plain error. The record and the 
brief do not demonstrate the existence of a "clear and unequivocal rule of law, 
which particular facts show was transgressedin a clear and obvious, not merely 
arguable way." Jahnke v. State, supra, at 928. The argument of appellant 
that someone, somehow, might be affected adversely does not suffice to 
demonstrate fundamental or plain error. The mother's attempt to raise an 
arguable constitutional contention coupled with her failure to show how she 
herself was in any way denied due process or how any alleged vagueness in the 
statute failed to provide her fair warning concerning what parental conduct was 
expected of her comes too late. We will not address the constitutional 
arguments. Our comment of 60 years ago still is true:

 
 
"* 
* * * Constitutional questions are too important to be answered by this court at 
random, and they should not be answered unless fully presented." Salt Creek 
Transportation Company v. Public Service Commission, 37 Wyo. 488, 263 P. 621, 622 (1928).

 
 

[¶27.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 

 
 
Cardine, 
J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
Urbigkit, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.

 
 
Cardine, 
Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶28.]  The opinion of the court is an excellent 
statement of what is statutorily required for termination of the rights of a 
natural parent by a state agency. I fully agree with the opinion and writethis 
special concurrence only to make clear that I also am "indelibly committed" to 
the best interest of a child, but wish to make clear that while of paramount 
importance, the best interest is not the sole consideration in deciding these 
difficult cases. It is important that we acknowledge our sworn duty to uphold 
the law and apply statutes enacted by the legislature, which is the branch of 
government authorized by the constitution to legislate and establish the means 
and manner of terminating parental rights. It is important also that we 
understand that each case is different and must be governed by its own special 
facts and circumstances. Thus, the contest might be between parents having an 
equal right to custody of a minor child or, as in this case, it might be between 
a natural parent and a state agency seeking termination of parental rights. As 
described in the majority opinion of the court, there is a comprehensive set of 
statutes which prescribe with specificity the matters which must be considered, 
the rights of the respective parties, and what must be established to terminate 
the right of the natural parent to the custody of her child. An individual judge 
has a duty to actin accordance with those statutes and not the freedom to do on 
an ad hoc basis what according to his education and experience is in his opinion 
an appropriate disposition.

 
 

[¶29.]  Suppose the contest were between a 
natural mother and a young woman who kidnapped a one-day-old baby from a 
hospital. The kidnapper was not discovered for three years, during which time 
she mothered and raised this child, provided all necessities, cared for the 
child very well, and provided an excellent home. The kidnapper is a modestly 
wealthy person who can give this child all advantages with respect to education, 
upbringing, and a stable home. The best interests of this child might be that 
the parental right of the natural mother be terminated and custody be awarded to 
the kidnapper. There is no legal precedent of which I am aware that would 
support such a result, and I would hope that even a judge "indelibly committed" 
to the best interests of the child would not propose that a person who obtains 
possession of a child by their wrongful act should somehow gain personal custody 
as against a natural parent.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice, concurring.

 
 

[¶30.]  In concurring with this thoughtfully 
considered and exhaustivelydetailed opinion, my concern must be expressed that 
it is not the parental right which should be given primary concern, whether 
constitutional or otherwise, when weighed against the best interest of the 
children as statutorily directed and constitutionally protected. In this case, 
the detail of invidious and pervasive failure in parenting should not become the 
minimum requisite in future cases for societal protection for children in 
contested parental-rights termination.

 
 

[¶31.]  This Supreme Court is the final 
repository of constitutional responsibility and should speak to the rights of 
the children in a balancing test of parental claim against the children's 
welfare in judicial strict scrutiny. Asserted constitutional rights in parental 
relationships can be as directly disaffected by adverse social conduct as would 
effectively result from proscribed behavior under criminal laws. I remain 
indelibly committed to the best-interest criterion. See my dissent in Matter 
of Adoption of BGD, Wyo., 719 P.2d 1373 (1986), and Note, Contested 
Consent to Adoption: No Longer a Decision in the Child's Best Interest, XXII 
Land and Water L. Rev. 203 (1987).