Title: Adams v. Delaware Harness Racing Commission

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BREWER ADAMS,
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No. 70, 2010
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below:  Superior Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for Kent County
DELAWARE HARNESS RACING
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COMMISSION,
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C.A. No. 09A-07-001 
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted:  June 23, 2010
Decided:  August 3, 2010
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.
Ronald G. Poliquin, Esquire, Young, Malmberg & Howard, P.A., Dover, Delaware
for Appellant.
Robert W. Willard, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellee.
BERGER, Justice:
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In this appeal we consider whether the Delaware Harness Racing Commission
(DHRC or Commission) improperly sanctioned a horse trainer after his horses tested
positive for a prohibited drug.  Appellant contends that his appeal to the Commission
should have been dismissed; that his hearing was not fair and impartial; and that the
Commission failed to consider mitigating circumstances.  We find no merit to these
claims, and AFFIRM.
Factual and Procedural Background
In November 2008, horses trained by Brewer Adams tested positive three times
for Buprenorphine, a prohibited Class 2 drug.  Following applicable procedure, two
urine samples were taken from Adams’ horses after each race.  The primary samples
were tested at a DHRC approved laboratory.  Adams exercised his right to have the
secondary samples tested elsewhere, and Adams instructed that the samples be sent
to Louisiana State University’s laboratory.  Adams was present when the secondary
samples were packaged.  A DHRC representative drove the samples to the United
Parcel Service for shipment to LSU, and received a receipt for each package.
Unfortunately, the samples never arrived at LSU, and they could not be found.
Based on the results of the primary samples’ testing, the judges at Dover Downs
issued three Notices of Fine or Suspension imposing the following penalties: i) $3,000
fine; ii) loss of the purse money from the races at issue; iii) a 270 day full suspension;
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and iv) the cost of testing.  Adams appealed, and a hearing was conducted by Hugh
Gallagher, Administrator of Racing, on March 18, 2009.  At the start of the hearing,
Adams moved for a determination that Gallagher could not be objective and should
not hear the matter.  In addition, Adams sought a determination as to the effect of the
lost secondary samples.  Gallagher denied both motions and the parties presented their
evidence.  Adams testified, among other things, that he never received notice of the
hearing.  
Gallagher reserved decision, and stated that he would “keep open” the option
of requesting additional evidence concerning the notice issue.  On April 9, 2009,
Gallagher notified the parties that he was considering allowing additional evidence
concerning notice.  The evidence consisted of an envelope stamped “unclaimed” and
a certificate of service, executed on April 9, 2009, stating that the notice was hand
delivered on December 18, 2008.  Gallagher gave the parties five days to “inspect and
rebut” the evidence.  Adams responded with a letter objecting to the new evidence and
renewing objections to Gallagher’s participation in the appeal.
On May 5, 2009, Adams moved to dismiss on the ground that the hearing
officer failed to issue a decision within 30 days of the hearing, as required by DHRC
Rule 10.3.13.  Six days later, Gallagher issued an Interim Order responding to Adams’
claim that he was not impartial.  Gallagher decided that, “in the interest of justice,” the
1752 A.2d 529, 531 (Del. 1999).
2Richards v. Delaware State Harness Racing Commission, 1998 WL 960717 at *2 (Del. Super.
Ct.).
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appeal should be referred to the Commission for hearing and resolution.  Gallagher
denied Adams’ motion to dismiss as moot.
The Commission heard Adams’ appeal de novo on June 9, 2009.  On the same
day, the Commission issued a decision affirming the judges’ findings and the penalties
imposed on Adams.  In January 2010, the Superior Court affirmed the Commission’s
decision.  This appeal followed.
 
Discussion
Adams first argues that Gallagher’s failure to render a decision within 30 days
of the initial hearing violated his due process rights.  DHRC Rule 10.3.13.1 does
require that a final order be issued no later than 30 days after the conclusion of a
hearing.  But the failure to comply with that rule does not automatically result in a
deprivation of due process.  As this Court noted in Dugan v. Delaware Harness
Racing Commission,1 “[i]f an agency rule is designed ‘to afford . . . due process of law
by providing safeguards against essentially unfair procedures,’ the action which
results from the violation of that rule is invalid.”  The 30 day rule, however, “is
intended to expedite the issuance of opinions . . . [and] does not enlarge or diminish
any substantial rights of appeal . . . .”2  Thus, absent a showing of prejudice, the failure
3Adams v. Delaware Harness Racing Comm’n, 2010 WL 201208 at *5 (Del. Super.).
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to comply with the 30 day rule is not actionable. 
          Adams claims that a prolonged denial of one’s livelihood constitutes substantial
prejudice, warranting dismissal.  He points out that horse owners must find new
trainers during his suspension, and that they are likely to continue with their new
trainers even when the suspension is later reversed.  There are two responses to this
argument.  First, there was no prolonged delay in the hearing process – the Interim
Decision was issued 53 days after the hearing.  Second, the harm Adams has suffered
is not the result of the slight delay in the first decision.  It is the result of the sanctions
imposed on him for drugging his horses.
Adams next argues that the conduct of the two Deputy Attorney Generals – one
representing the State and the other representing the Commission – deprived him of
a fair and impartial hearing at the June 9th hearing.  Adams complains that a variety
of statements by both attorneys misrepresented past proceedings and cast Adams in
a bad light.  After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that Adams’ claims of
misconduct are without merit.  As the Superior Court noted, “[n]ot only did the
attorneys involved act appropriately and professionally, they afforded great latitude
to Appellant, who was representing himself.”3
 
Finally, Adams argues that the Commission failed to consider mitigating and
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extraordinary factors in imposing its penalties.  He notes that, because the secondary
samples were lost, he was unable to rebut the findings from the first test.  In addition,
Adams was notified of the first two violations at the same time, while a third horse
was racing.  Thus, he had no opportunity to protect against medicated injections.
Adams also points out that he had no prior violations and that he was unrepresented
at the Commission hearing.  The argument, as we understand it, is that he would have
been able to convince the Commission to dismiss the charges if he had counsel.  We
find this argument unpersuasive because the Commission was lenient with Adams.
It treated all three offenses as first offenses and imposed the minimum penalties.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the Commission’s decision was based on
substantial evidence and free from legal error.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the Superior Court.