Title: Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc.1994 WY 14868 P.2d 893Case Number: 92-43Decided: 02/08/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Beverly J. EISELEIN,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

K-MART, 
INC.,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from The District Court, Campbell County,

Dan 
R. Price, II, J.

Representing 
Appellant:

Thomas 
E. Lubnau II and Daniel B. Bailey of Lubnau & Bailey, 
Gillette.

Representing 
Appellee:

J. 
Stan Wolfe and C. John Cotton, Gillette.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this outdoor 
slip-and-fall case, appellant Beverly Eiselein appeals the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to K-Mart on appellant's claims of negligence and 
premises liability. The district court determined appellant's claims were barred 
by the obvious danger and natural accumulation rules.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand for a new summary judgment hearing.

ISSUES

[¶3]      In her initial 
appeal, appellant raised the following issues for our review:

I. 
The District Court erred in resolving the following fact questions as a matter 
of law:

B. 
Whether the Plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe 
condition;

A. 
Whether the hazardous condition was open and obvious;

C. 
Whether the hazardous condition was a natural accumulation.

II. 
The District Court erred in applying the "Known and Obvious Danger" rule, thus 
negating Defendant's duty, and barring recovery, in contravention of Wyoming's 
Comparative Negligence Statute Section 1-1-109.

[¶4]      After considering 
these issues, this court determined that resolution of the case would be 
benefitted by additional briefing and argument. Consequently, the parties were 
ordered to submit additional briefing to address the continued viability of the 
obvious danger and natural accumulation rules.

[¶5]      In her 
supplemental brief appellant presented the following issue for our 
review:

The 
District Court erred in applying the "Known and Obvious Danger" rule, thus 
negating Defendant's duty, and barring recovery, in contravention of Wyoming's 
Comparative Negligence Statute Section 1-1-109.

[¶6]      Appellee K-Mart 
responded with this statement of the issues:

A. 
Did the enactment of the comparative negligence statute, W.S. Section 1-1-109, 
modify the long standing rule of law that there is no duty to remove natural 
accumulations of ice and snow?

B. 
Should current law regarding the natural accumulation rule be changed, 
regardless of the intended effect of the comparative negligence 
statute?

C. 
Even if long standing precedent regarding the natural accumulation rule is 
rejected, and the law argued by Appellant adopted, should the summary judgment 
granted by the trial court be reversed?

FACTS

[¶7]      At approximately 
8:27 p.m. on December 18, 1987, appellant drove her truck to the K-Mart store in 
Gillette, Wyoming, to purchase a strand of Christmas lights. She parked her 
truck in the K-Mart parking lot in a space near the front of the store. As she 
exited her vehicle, her left foot slipped, she heard a crack like "splitting 
wood," and she fell to the ground, ending up on her bottom. She severely 
fractured her left ankle and has required extended medical treatment including 
surgery.

[¶8]      Appellant never 
actually saw what she slipped on; however, as she tried to push herself up off 
the ground, she felt something slippery. When asked in her deposition to 
describe the substance in more detail, she explained that "[i]t was solid. It 
was raised. It was cold so I deduced that it was ice." Appellant's husband 
returned to the K-Mart parking lot the following day and inspected the area 
surrounding the truck. Near the driver's side door of the truck he discovered a 
patch of ice which he described as "black ice." In his deposition, he testified 
the ice appeared to have formed when chunks of snow and ice melted and 
accumulated in a low spot in the parking lot.

[¶9]      Appellant 
subsequently filed a complaint and amended complaint against K-Mart to recover 
for her injuries on the basis of negligence and premises liability. She claimed 
K-Mart had negligently maintained its parking lot, allowing depressions to form 
where water could accumulate, freeze and create a safety hazard. She further 
contended that K-Mart was negligent in its failure to inspect its parking lot, 
warn its customers of the icy condition, and place salt or sand on the icy 
spots.

[¶10]   Following discovery K-Mart moved 
for summary judgment on the ground it owed no duty to appellant. The district 
court agreed and granted K-Mart's motion for summary judgment, declaring that 
"the plaintiff must show an unnatural accumulation of ice, snow or water." The 
district court determined no genuine questions of material fact existed 
concerning whether the ice appellant slipped on was a natural accumulation, 
whether the defendant had taken steps to maintain the premises in a reasonably 
safe condition, and whether K-Mart had actual or constructive knowledge that an 
unsafe condition existed. This appeal followed.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶11]   Summary judgment is proper when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist, and the prevailing party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Lynch v. Norton Constr., 861 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 
1993); Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Wyo. 1993). "When reviewing the 
propriety of a grant of summary judgment, we review the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the facts." Lynch, 861 P.2d  at 1097; Miller v. 
Campbell County, 854 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo. 1993). "If no issue of material fact is 
found to exist, summary judgment is appropriate, even in a negligence case." 
Lynch, at 1097 (quoting Brown, 850 P.2d at 614).

DISCUSSION

1. 
Viability of the Natural Accumulation Rule

[¶12]   As a general rule, a possessor of 
land owes a duty to his business invitees to maintain his premises in a 
reasonably safe condition. Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1098 
(Wyo. 1987). However, this court has adopted the rule that an owner or occupier 
of a premises will not be liable for injuries resulting from a slip and fall on 
a natural accumulation of ice or snow. Petersen v. Campbell County Memorial 
Hosp. Dist., 760 P.2d 992, 994 (Wyo. 1988); Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 1981); 
Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976); Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963).

[¶13]   This appeal presents us initially 
with the question whether the legislature's adoption of comparative negligence 
abrogated the natural-accumulation rule. In Sherman, in which the plaintiff 
slipped on an obvious patch of ice in a sheriff's parking lot, this court 
specifically rejected such a claim. Writing for the court, Justice Raper 
succinctly stated:

Comparative 
negligence only abrogated absolute defenses involving the plaintiff's own 
negligence in bringing about his or her injuries. However, it did not impose any 
new duties of care on prospective defendants. Since the law of this state is to 
the effect that there is no duty to remove or warn of an obvious danger or one 
that is known to the plaintiff, no change was accomplished in that law by the 
adoption of comparative negligence.

Sherman, 
642 P.2d  at 790 (citation omitted).

[¶14]   Closely related to the 
natural-accumulation rule is the open and obvious danger rule which provides 
that no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a 
warning of its existence. In O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1283 
(Wyo. 1985), this court held that "[a]n inflexible rule that a known and obvious 
danger is an absolute bar to recovery is not compatible with the doctrine of 
comparative negligence." We did not conclude, however, that the comparative 
negligence statute completely abrogated the rule; rather, we indicated it 
modified the known and obvious danger rule, restricting its application to known 
and obvious dangers resulting from natural causes. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d  at 
1282.

[¶15]   We find support for the Sherman and 
O'Donnell decisions in the language of Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, 
WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988). We construe this statute according to our well 
established rules of statutory construction, as recently summarized in Parker 
Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993). 
"[T]he intent [of the lawgiver] is the vital part, and the essence of the law * 
* *. Such intent, however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the 
statute * * * under consideration." Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1042 (quoting Rasmussen 
v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897)). "The initial step in arriving 
at a correct interpretation is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection." 
Parker, 845 P.2d at 104? (quoting Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 135, 50 P. at 823). "[I]f 
the statutory language is unambiguous, the court may not resort to application 
of rules of construction"; the court must apply the plain meaning of the 
statute. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043. Finally,

 [t]his court presumes that the 
legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the 
law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection 
and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform 
system of jurisprudence.

Parker, 
845 P.2d  at 1044 (quoting Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 
57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)).

[¶16]   The language of WYO. STAT. § 
1-1-109 is unambiguous. The relevant portion reads:

(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said 
person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed 
to the person recovering.

[¶17]   The plain language of the statute 
cannot be read to impose new duties of care on prospective defendants. Since we 
presume the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of existing law and 
with reference to it, we must assume the legislature understood that there 
exists no duty to warn of or remove natural accumulations of ice and snow. 
Therefore, had the legislature intended to impose that duty upon prospective 
defendants, the legislature would have expressly provided for such a result in 
the statute. However, by adopting the comparative negligence statute, the 
Wyoming legislature simply instituted a fair system of apportionment of damages. 
Before adoption, a plaintiff could not recover in a negligence action if found 
to be contributorily negligent; after adoption, the defendant, as an affirmative 
defense, may present evidence of a plaintiff's negligence in order to reduce 
damages. Although the legislature intended to limit a defendant's defenses, it 
did not intend to affect the defendant's initial duty.

[¶18]   The purposes of the comparative 
negligence statute were plainly expressed in the enacting clause when passed by 
the legislature in 1973. The first purpose expressed in the enacting clause is 
"abolishing common law defense of contributory negligence," and the second is 
"establishing a rule of comparative negligence." 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 28. 
This statute treats and is limited to the extent of liability for damages 
arising from an occurrence. Its purpose is to distribute liability on the basis 
of causal fault, and the legislature's only intention in passing the statute was 
to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence bar. See Barnette v. 
Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo. 1981) and Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 
(Wyo. 1979). It does not concern the nature and extent of the duty owed, but 
rather concerns itself with the "all or nothing" philosophy which previously 
attended tort negligence actions when the plaintiff's contributory negligence, 
however slight, foreclosed all defendant's responsibility for plaintiff's 
injuries. The enactment of the statute did not affect or change the basic duty 
vel non of any person to the rest of the world; in particular, it did not speak 
to the duty vel non of the owner or occupier of premises to persons entering the 
premises.

[¶19]   We find additional support for our 
conclusion, that the natural-accumulation and obvious-danger rules survive 
adoption of comparative negligence, in the authority of other jurisdictions 
which have reached the same conclusion that both rules concern a defendant's 
duty, and comparative negligence imposes no new duties on prospective 
defendants. See, e.g., Ward v. K-Mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 
554 N.E.2d 223 (1990); Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp., 440 Mich. 85, 485 N.W.2d 676 (1992); Carrender v. Fitterer, 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120 
(1983).

[¶20]   In Riddle, the Michigan Supreme 
Court held:

The 
adoption of comparative negligence * * * does not abrogate the necessity of an 
initial finding that the premises owner owed a duty to invitees. Moreover, we 
find that the duty element and the comparative negligence standard are 
fundamentally exclusive - two doctrines to be utilized at different junctures in 
the determination of liability in a negligence cause of action.

Riddle, 
485 N.W.2d  at 681. The Illinois Supreme Court elaborated on the difference 
between duty and apportionment of fault, noting that allowing the obvious danger 
rule to act as a bar to recovery was not tantamount to "a resurrection of 
contributory negligence." Ward, 143 Ill.Dec. at 295, 554 N.E.2d  at 230. 
That court concluded that "the scope of a defendant's duty is not defined by 
reference to plaintiff's negligence or lack thereof." Ward, 143 Ill.Dec. 
at 295, 554 N.E.2d  at 230. In determining the existence of a duty, the focus 
must be on the defendant and upon public policy considerations such as the 
likelihood of injury, the possible serious nature of such an injury, the 
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of 
placing that burden upon the defendant. Ward, 143 Ill.Dec. at 295, 297, 
554 N.E.2d  at 230, 232.

[¶21]   We agree with the Illinois Supreme 
Court's observation that

the 
fact a person's injury resulted from his encountering a known or open and 
obvious condition on a defendant's premises is a proper factor to be considered 
in assessing the person's comparative negligence. It is unquestionably relevant 
to whether the injured party was exercising a reasonable degree of care for his 
own safety. And in this respect a plaintiff's own fault in encountering such a 
condition will not necessarily bar his recovery. * * * [H]owever, * * * the 
obviousness of a condition is also relevant to the existence of a duty on the 
part of defendant.

Ward, 
143 Ill.Dec. at 293, 554 N.E.2d  at 228. The factors relevant to defining a 
defendant's duty may be the same factors considered in apportioning fault. 
However, the adoption of comparative negligence does not foreclose consideration 
of those factors in defining the scope of a defendant's duty.

[¶22]   We conclude, therefore, that absent 
the legislature's express intention to abrogate the natural-accumulation and 
obvious-danger rules, the rules survive the adoption of comparative negligence. 
To hold otherwise would raise the question of what other new legal duties the 
statute imposes on other classes of potential defendants. For example, would the 
passerby who discovers another in harm's way due to a dangerous condition not of 
the passerby's making now owe a duty of care to that person in peril? Would the 
Wyoming municipality, which heretofore owed no duty to a citizen to remove snow, 
ice, or slush from streets or crosswalks, Norman v. City of Gillette, 658 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1983) and Smith v. Town of Lander, 67 Wyo. 121, 215 P.2d 861 (1950), 
now owe that duty? Would the tavern owner now owe a duty of care to the patron 
who takes his fight outside, White v. HA, Inc., 782 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 1989)? Would 
the owner of that little log cabin in the mountains now owe a duty of care to a 
friend who, when the owner is away, drops by for a stay and slips and falls on 
the naturally growing grass, Allen v. Slim Pickens Enter., 777 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 
1989)? Would the county that operates the garbage pit now owe a duty to modify 
the wall along one edge of the pit to prevent a citizen using the pit from 
losing his or her balance and falling into the pit, Radosevich v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs of Sweetwater, 776 P.2d 747 (Wyo. 1989)? Would the restaurant owner now 
owe a duty to provide first aid to a patron choking on food, Drew v. LeJay's 
Sportmen's Cafe, Inc., 806 P.2d 301, 2 A.L.R.4th 1172 (Wyo. 1991)?

[¶23]   We hold that in Wyoming, the rule 
remains that an owner or occupier of premises will not be liable for injuries 
resulting from a slip and fall on a natural accumulation of ice and snow. Having 
determined the natural-accumulation rule is the law in Wyoming, we must next 
determine the scope of that rule.

2. 
Scope of the Natural-Accumulation Rule

[¶24]   We adopted the natural-accumulation 
rule in Watts, 386 P.2d  at 719, and more clearly defined it in Bluejacket, as 
follows:

[A] 
proprietor is not considered negligent for allowing the natural accumulation of 
ice due to weather conditions where he has not created the condition. The 
conditions created by the elements, such as the forming of ice and falling of 
snow, are universally known and there is no liability where the danger is 
obvious or is as well known to the plaintiff as the property owner.

Bluejacket, 
550 P.2d  at 497. The rationale underlying this rule is that

in 
a climate where there are frequent snowstorms and sudden changes of temperature, 
these dangerous conditions appear with a frequency and suddenness which defy 
prevention, and usually, correction; consequently, the danger from ice and snow 
in such locations is an obvious one, and the occupier of the premises may expect 
that an invitee on his premises will discover and realize the danger and protect 
himself against it.

62A 
AM.JUR.2d Premises Liability § 699 (1990).

[¶25]   The justification for the 
natural-accumulation rule comports with the factors to be considered in 
determining the existence of a duty. The magnitude of the burden on defendant to 
prevent injuries from snow or ice is great. As noted above, natural winter 
conditions make it impossible to prevent all accidents. The plaintiff is in a 
much better position to prevent injuries from ice or snow because the plaintiff 
can take precautions at the very moment the conditions are encountered. Even if 
the plaintiff is unaware of the ice or snow he happens to slip on, he may be 
charged with knowledge that ice or snow is a common hazard in the winter, one 
which he must consistently guard against.

[¶26]   We agree with appellee that no 
justification exists for imposing on a property owner a duty to protect invitees 
from hazards which are naturally occurring and identical to those encountered 
off of the premises. However, the equities shift if the accumulation of ice or 
snow is not a natural accumulation, but rather an artificial condition created 
by the defendant. If the defendant creates the hazard, then it is within the 
defendant's control and he is in a better position to foresee and prevent 
injuries resulting from the hazard. If the condition occurs naturally, the 
defendant is in no better position than the plaintiff to prevent the injuries. 
See Tyrrell v. Investment Assoc., Inc., 16 Ohio App.3d 47, 48, 16 OBR 50, 50, 
474 N.E.2d 621, 624 (1984).

[¶27]   Our next step, then, is to 
determine what constitutes an artificial or unnatural accumulation of ice or 
snow. We are satisfied with the distinction adopted by 
Massachusetts:

The 
landowner has the right to improve his land by a change of grade or by the 
construction of buildings even if the natural course of surface water is thereby 
changed. But he has no right to collect surface water into an artificial channel 
and discharge it upon the way [or permit it to accumulate] in a greater quantity 
than would have been discharged if the natural conformation of his land had not 
been altered.

Harrison 
v. Poli-New England Theatres, Inc., 
304 Mass. 123, 23 N.E.2d 99, 100 (1939) (citations omitted).

[¶28]   We hold, therefore, that an owner 
or occupier of premises owes a duty to prevent injuries resulting from an 
unnatural accumulation of ice which will be found if the owner or occupier 
creates an accumulation of water in a manner substantially different in volume 
or course than would naturally have occurred. Other jurisdictions have adopted 
similar tests. See, e.g., Lash v. J.J. Newberry Co., 510 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(Vermont); Key v. Lerner Shops of Colorado, Inc., 472 P.2d 752 (Colo. App. 
1970); Young v. Talcott, 114 Conn. 675, 159 A. 881 (1932); Wells v. Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea, 171 Ill. App.3d 1012, 121 Ill.Dec. 820, 525 N.E.2d 1127 (1 Dist. 1988).

[¶29]   We wish to emphasize that the 
accumulation created by the owner or occupier must be substantially different in 
volume or course. Even the most ably constructed and carefully maintained 
parking lot will probably contain minor indentations in which naturally 
occurring water can accumulate and freeze. Naturally occurring water which 
naturally concentrates in such a lot is still considered a natural 
accumulation.

3. 
Remand

[¶30]   We are remanding for a new summary 
judgment hearing. This will provide both parties the opportunity to frame their 
issues in light of our definition of unnatural accumulation. The district court 
may then determine anew whether a genuine question of material fact 
exists.

[¶31]   As a final matter, we respond to 
K-Mart's contention that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of 
negligence because she did not demonstrate what caused her fall. Although 
appellant could not conclude with certainty what she slipped on, she did testify 
the substance was cold and hard, and we find this sufficient to raise a question 
of fact as to whether it was ice. Of course, before this question becomes 
relevant the district court must determine that a question of fact exists 
concerning whether the accumulation was natural or unnatural.

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   The natural-accumulation rule 
survived adoption of comparative negligence and applies in this instance. We 
remand for a new summary judgment hearing for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

MACY, 
C.J., and CARDINE, J., each filed a specially concurring 
opinion.

THOMAS, 
J., filed an opinion, concurring specially and dissenting.

MACY, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

[¶33]   I agree that the summary judgment 
should be reversed and that the case should be remanded for a trial. However, 
the opinion of the majority that a landowner owes no duty to his invitees to 
warn of or remove natural accumulations of snow and ice is incompatible with the 
plain, unambiguous language contained in Wyoming's comparative-negligence 
statute.

[¶34]   The majority applies an extensive 
statutory analysis to interpret the comparative-negligence statute. Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109(a) (1988). It concludes that the rule that landowners do not have a duty 
to warn of or remove natural accumulations of ice and snow survived the adoption 
of the comparative-negligence doctrine in Wyoming. In light of this Court's 
decision in O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985), such 
statutory-construction analysis is not necessary or proper in this 
case.

[¶35]   In O'Donnell, the Court considered 
the impact of the comparative-negligence statute on the open-and-obvious-danger 
rule as it applied to nonnatural conditions. The Court in that case did not go 
through the elaborate interpretation procedure employed by the majority in this 
case in construing the comparative-negligence statute. Instead, it appears that 
the Court found that the plain, unambiguous language of the statute warranted 
the conclusion that the open-and-obvious-danger rule was not compatible with the 
comparative-negligence statute, at least with respect to nonnatural dangers. 
Since the extensive statutory-construction analysis was not necessary in 
O'Donnell, it is not necessary in this case.

[¶36]   The majority's analysis of the 
comparative-negligence statute is not consistent with the established rules of 
statutory construction. Section 1-1-109(a) provides:

(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said 
person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed 
to the person recovering.

The 
proper method of interpreting statutes is explained in Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 
1993) (some citations omitted):

"[T]he 
intent [of the lawgiver] is the vital part, and the essence of the law. . . . 
Such intent, however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute . . 
. under consideration."

Rasmussen 
v. Baker, 
7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897). "[T]he initial step in arriving at a 
correct interpretation . . . is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection." 
Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 133, 50 P.  at 823. . . .

. 
. . .

  On numerous occasions the court has, 
over its long history, consistently followed a general rule that if the 
statutory language is unambiguous, the court may not resort to application of 
rules of construction.

The 
majority opinion recognizes that Wyoming's comparative-negligence statute is 
unambiguous. However, it incorrectly interprets the statute by going beyond the 
plain and unambiguous language.

[¶37]   Under the plain language of the 
statute: "Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any 
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence." Section 
1-1-109(a). The language of the statute clearly indicates that comparative 
negligence applies to all actions in negligence. The Legislature did not include 
an exception in the statute for landowners with regard to natural accumulations 
of snow and ice. The majority's interpretation effectively reads such an 
exception into the statute. This interpretation violates a basic tenet of 
statutory construction - that omission of words from a statute is considered to 
be an intentional act by the Legislature. This Court should not read words into 
a statute when the Legislature has chosen not to include them. Carroll by and 
through Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit Association, 755 P.2d 869, 
872-73 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶38]   It makes no sense for this Court to 
retain the no-duty rule for natural accumulations of snow and ice when we ruled 
in O'Donnell that the no-duty rule did not apply to nonnatural dangers under the 
comparative-negligence statute. See also Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Company, 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1989). In dicta in O'Donnell, we stated that the 
no-duty view of the open-and-obvious-danger rule should be retained when the 
danger stems from natural causes. Our reasoning for making nonnatural obvious 
dangers a factor to be weighed in determining the parties' respective negligence 
was that it would be irrational to "provide[] that one who creates a known and 
obvious danger has no duty to correct it because it is known and obvious." 
O'Donnell, 696 P.2d  at 1283. We did not really explain why the rule should be 
retained in conjunction with natural dangers except to say that the dangers were 
natural. Id.

[¶39]   The Idaho Supreme Court considered 
the relationship between Idaho's comparative-negligence statute and the 
open-and-obvious-danger rule in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 
(1989). That court held that the open-and-obvious-danger rule inappropriately 
barred recovery under Idaho's comparative-negligence statute in cases dealing 
with nonnatural dangers. In all relevant aspects, Idaho's comparative-negligence 
statute1 is identical to Wyoming's 
comparative-negligence statute. The Idaho Supreme Court quoted an Idaho Court of 
Appeals case in its decision:

"There 
is also a statutory reason in Idaho to treat an invitee's knowledge or the 
obviousness of a danger as a limitation of liability rather than as an excuse of 
duty. Since 1971, Idaho has been a comparative negligence state. I.C. § 6-801 
provides that the plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a 
negligence action, so long as his negligence is not as great as the negligence 
of the person against whom recovery is sought. Rather, any damages awarded to 
the plaintiff are reduced in proportion to the amount of causal negligence 
attributable to him.

"Prior 
to the advent of comparative negligence, contributory negligence was an absolute 
bar to recovery. Thus, it made little difference whether a known or obvious 
condition excused a land possessor's duty to an invitee, or simply insulated the 
possessor from liability for any breach of such duty. In either event, the 
injured invitee could not recover. But under the comparative negligence system, 
the difference is profound. If duty is not excused by a known or obvious danger, 
the injured invitee might recover, albeit in a diminished amount, if his 
negligence in encountering the risk is found to be less than the land 
possessor's negligence in allowing the dangerous condition or activity on his 
property. In contrast, if the invitee's voluntary encounter with a known or 
obvious danger were deemed to excuse the land owner's duty, then there would be 
no negligence to compare - and, therefore, no recovery. The effect would be to 
resurrect contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in cases 
involving a land possessor's liability to invitees."

Harrison, 
768 P.2d  at 1325 (quoting Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 
671 P.2d 1112, 1118-19 (1983)). See also Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989), cert. denied, 789 P.2d 33 (1990); Cox v. J.C. Penney 
Company, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987) (en banc), accord, Hefele v. 
National Super Markets, Inc., 748 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); 
Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or. 548, 687 P.2d 144 (1984) (en banc); and 
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).

[¶40]   The Idaho Supreme Court extended 
the Harrison ruling to natural accumulations of snow and ice in 
Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 793 P.2d 211, 213 
(Idaho 1990):

[W]e 
are not able to discern how we could construe the statute to allow an exemption 
for negligence as to natural accumulations. To do so would require us to 
construe the statute as allowing us to apply comparative negligence in some 
cases but not in others. As we read the statute, it does not allow us to do 
that. The statute speaks categorically about actions for negligence.

[¶41]   I agree with the analysis presented 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Wyoming's comparative-negligence statute forecloses 
the use of the open-and-obvious-danger rule to discharge a landowner from his 
obligation to exercise due care with respect to natural accumulations of snow 
and ice.

[¶42]   The majority's decision is not 
based in sound statutory interpretation. Instead, it represents a policy choice 
by this Court to insulate landowners from responsibility for their own 
negligence. This policy decision is improper in light of the Legislature's 
express direction that contributory negligence "shall not bar a recovery in an 
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence." Section 1-1-109(a).

[¶43]   In my opinion, we should abolish 
the distinction between nonnatural and natural dangers and treat the 
accumulation of snow and ice and the obviousness of the danger as being factors 
to be considered in determining the percentage of fault attributable to each 
party under the comparative-negligence statute. I would reverse and remand for a 
trial to determine the parties' relative percentages of fault.

[¶44]   The majority's decision places the 
state of the law in Wyoming in question with regard to nonnatural dangers. Does 
the majority decision effectively overrule O'Donnell? If the majority's 
rationale in this case is sound, should it now apply to nonnatural dangers as 
well? Until additional cases have been decided by this Court, the state of the 
law in Wyoming will, unfortunately, be in a state of flux.

CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶45]   I concur in the court's opinion 
insofar as it determines the issues presented by the facts in this case. To the 
extent that the opinion may go beyond this case in discussing the effect of the 
volume and course of water flowing to adjoining land, I take no position but 
prefer awaiting a factual presentation that requires our discussion of these 
questions.

[¶46]   The case we consider here requires 
resolution of the following:

1. 
Are there facts from which it could be found that this was an unnatural 
accumulation of ice or moisture?

2. 
Is so, was K-Mart negligent in construction or maintenance of the parking lot 
which permitted the accumulation?

3. 
Or, was K-Mart negligent in failing to warn of or remove the dangerous 
condition?

[¶47]   I would confine the discussion in 
our opinion to the above.

THOMAS, 
Justice, concurring specially and dissenting.

[¶48]   I agree the summary judgment in 
this case must be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. I 
cannot, however, subscribe to the rationale of the opinion of the 
Court.

[¶49]   We have chosen to use this case as 
a vehicle to debate the continuing viability of the no duty rule with respect to 
natural accumulation of moisture when we really are setting aside a summary 
judgment because of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the condition 
of which the injured party complains was the product of a natural accumulation. 
In the process we have imported some muddy water from Massachusetts to adopt a 
definition of an unnatural accumulation of water from a case that does not 
appear to have been resolved in the context of a rule of no duty relating to 
natural accumulations.

The 
Massachusetts court also said:

It 
was a question of fact whether the defendant was negligent in maintaining an 
improper or defective marquee from which water escaped upon the way and froze 
and in suffering the ice to remain upon the sidewalk up to the time the 
plaintiff was injured.

Harrison 
v. Poli-New England Theatres, Inc., 
304 Mass. 123, 23 N.E.2d 99, 100 (1939).

To 
paraphrase that concept for this case:

It 
was a question of fact whether K-Mart was negligent in maintaining an improper 
or defective parking lot on which water melted and froze and in suffering the 
ice to remain upon the parking lot up to the time the plaintiff was 
injured.

[¶50]   It would be far more helpful to the 
parties in this case, since we are opting to maintain the rule that an 
entrepreneur has no duty to protect customers from hazardous conditions 
attributable to the natural accumulation of ice and snow, to offer guidance as 
to the resolution of the case if the finder of fact should conclude the 
condition in this instance was not caused by a natural accumulation of ice and 
snow. If a duty exists on the part of the business proprietor to attend to the 
condition of the parking lot at some time subsequent to the natural accumulation 
(and I submit that such a duty does exist), then what are the rules that apply 
in identifying a breach of such a duty that may lead to liability?

[¶51]   It appears we all might agree a 
finder of fact could conclude the conditions in the parking lot were not the 
result of a natural accumulation of moisture (unless we also adopt a rule that 
all moisture comes from the sky and therefore moisture is always a natural 
accumulation). The resume of Wyoming cases found in O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 
696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985), then becomes useful in addressing this case. A fair 
summary of O'Donnell is that, if the applicable rule is the clear and obvious 
danger rule, the negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant must be compared 
in resolving the issue of liability. There is also to be gleaned from O'Donnell 
the proposition that an actor may have a duty to correct a known and obvious 
danger if the actor created it. It does not seem that it should be necessary to 
find a distinction between those situations in which the dangerous condition was 
created generally by, for example, the construction of a parking lot or 
specifically by, for example, spreading gravel on a street.

[¶52]   At this juncture, the known and 
obvious danger rule really comes down to a comparison between the actors as to 
which had the best opportunity to be aware of, and avoid, the injury. That 
comparison assumes each knew of the hazardous condition and, in this instance, I 
would extend the rule of Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 
20 A.L.R.4th 419 (Wyo. 1980), to satisfy the requirement for proving the 
knowledge of K-Mart. In light of the record information of the attention K-Mart 
paid to the parking lot, the application of the Buttrey rule must have been 
anticipated by K-Mart. Conceding that, in an imperfect world, it may not be 
possible to construct a perfect parking lot, a warning of a known hazardous 
condition is well within the realm of possibility.

[¶53]   In summary, I agree the summary 
judgment should be reversed and the case remanded because there is a genuine 
issue of a material fact, i.e., was the accumulation natural or unnatural. I 
would not, however, adopt the definition of an unnatural accumulation offered in 
the majority opinion, but might well leave that to the common sense judgment of 
the trier of fact. I would impose a duty upon an owner of land, particularly a 
business proprietor, to address the hazardous condition at some point in time 
after the moisture was deposited as a natural phenomenon. In so doing, I would 
apply the rule of Buttrey in determining whether the owner was chargeable with 
knowledge of the hazardous condition. The relative responsibility of the actors 
then should be weighed under the rule relating to comparative 
negligence.

[¶54]   I would reverse and remand because 
there is a genuine issue of material fact. I accept the natural accumulation 
rule of no duty, but I would attempt to afford guidance for the application of 
the clear and obvious danger rule in this instance.

Footnote

 1 Idaho Code I.C. § 6-801 
provides:

"Comparative 
Negligence - Effect of contributory negligence. - Contributory negligence shall 
not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to 
recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in 
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the 
negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, 
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person recovering."

Harrison, 
768 P.2d  at 1324 n. 1 (emphasis omitted).