Title: The People v. Wayne Davis

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 86  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Wayne Davis, 
            Appellant.
Amy Donner, for appellant.
Lori Glachman, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
In this appeal arising out of defendant's conviction
for failure to comply with a posted sign indicating a New York
City park's closing time, we conclude that Criminal Procedure Law
§ 350.20, which permits class B misdemeanors to be tried and
determined by judicial hearing officers (JHOs) "upon agreement of
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the parties" is constitutional and that the parties' agreement to
engage in JHO adjudication here -- as evidenced by a signed
consent form and defense counsel's participation in the JHO
proceeding -- was valid.  In addition, we apply the standard of
common sense and reasonable pleading and hold that the People's
information was sufficient.
I.
An information charged defendant with violating New
York City Parks Department Rule 1-03 (c) (2), which prohibits
persons from being in city parks after their posted closing times
(see [56 RCNY] § 1-03 [c] [2]).  Although the Rule contains
qualifying language stating that a person may disregard a park
sign "upon order by a Police Officer or designated Department
employee" (id.), the information -- which was prepared by a
police officer -- did not state whether that portion of the Rule
applied to defendant.  Rather, it indicated that the officer had
observed defendant in Brooklyn's Betsy Head Park at 2:06 A.M., on
December 15, 2005, despite the fact that a park sign stated a
closing time of 9 P.M.  Violation of Rule 1-03 (c) (2) is
punishable as a class B misdemeanor (see [56 RCNY] § 1-07 [a];
Penal Law 70.15 [2]), the maximum penalty for which is ninety
days imprisonment and a $ 1,000 fine (see [56 RCNY] § 1-07 [a]).  
On February 16, 2006, defendant -- represented by
counsel -- was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.  The court
informed defendant that he would need to return for trial and
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that he would receive certain "paperwork."  Contained in
defendant's Criminal Court file is a form entitled "CONSENT TO
ADJUDICATION BEFORE A JUDICIAL HEARING OFFICER (JHO)."  Although
the form explains that defendant's case was being referred to a
JHO for "trial and/or final disposition and sentence," it
explicitly stated that defendant had "the right to adjudicate
this case before a Criminal Court judge."  Further, the form
listed the scope of the JHO's authority as derived from CPL
350.20.  Thus, it stated that:
"The Judicial Hearing Officer who adjudicates
this case will:
a) determine all questions of law; and
b) act as the exclusive trier of all issues
of fact; and 
c) render a verdict; and 
d) impose a sentence if required."
Accordingly, the form indicated that the JHO presiding over
defendant's class B misdemeanor trial "shall have the same powers
as a Criminal Court judge and any action taken by the Judicial
Hearing Officer shall be deemed the action of the Criminal
Court."  The form also stated that defendant would have the right
to seek an appeal from the JHO's decision in his case in the same
manner as he would had it been tried by a Criminal Court judge. 
Finally, immediately above its signature line, the form clarified
that "[b]y signing this form[,] you hereby consent to having your
case adjudicated before a Judicial Hearing Officer."  
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No. 86
1  Before the Appellate Term, defendant seemed to
acknowledge in his brief that the signature on the form was his
own by arguing that "although appellant signed a form purporting
to consent to adjudication by a Judicial Hearing Officer" the
trial court erred in failing to elicit his consent on the record. 
In the same brief, though, defendant complained that the trial
court had not inquired whether the "signature was his signature"
or whether he understood the meaning or significance of his
consent to adjudication before a JHO.  In his present appeal,
defendant refers to the signature on the consent form as a
"purported" one.  Putting aside defendant's ostensibly shifting
positions on the authenticity of the signature on the JHO consent
form, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
signature is not defendant's and, as such, we will presume that
it was.  
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Defendant apparently signed the JHO consent form.1 
With the assistance of counsel, he proceeded to trial before a
JHO and was convicted of violating the relevant Parks Department
Rule based on the testimony of the observing officer.  During
trial, defendant did not attempt to prove that he had been
granted permission by a police officer or Parks Department
employee to remain in Betsy Head Park past its posted closing
time.  On April 17, 2006, he was sentenced to a $ 75 fine or ten
days in jail.  Approximately nine months later, he was
resentenced to time served.  
The Appellate Term affirmed.  The court held that the
People were not required to plead that the qualifying language in
(56 RCNY) § 1-03 (c) did not apply to defendant.  Further, the
court concluded that defendant had given a valid consent to JHO
adjudication that was supported by his counsel's participation --
without objection -- in defendant's trial before a JHO.  A Judge
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of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal and we now
affirm.  
II.
We have previously examined the legislative history of
the 1983 enactment (see L 1983, ch 840) codifying CPL 350.20 (see
People v Scalza, 76 NY2d 604, 608 [1990]).  The goal of this
legislation was to utilize the services of highly-qualified
retired judges, or JHOs, to alleviate the backlog and delay that
had begun to "seriously cripple" our State's court system and had
"undermine[d] public confidence in the fairness of justice in our
state" (see Report of the Committee to Utilize the Services of
Retired Judges, Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 840, at 60 [hereinafter
"Retired Judges Report"]).  One of the ways in which the
Legislature sought to alleviate these problems was by granting
judges the discretionary authority to assign class B and
unclassified misdemeanors to JHOs for adjudication "upon
agreement of the parties" (see CPL 350.20 [1]).  In such
capacity, JHOs would act as a court (see CPL 350.20 [1]-[3]). 
Thus, with consent of the litigants, JHOs would be empowered to
"(a) determine all questions of law; (b) act as the exclusive
trier of all issues of fact; and (c) render a verdict" (see CPL
350.20 [1] [a]-[c]).  Consensual JHO adjudication was intended to
contribute to the goal of reducing pernicious calendar
congestion, thereby fostering the more efficient administration
of criminal justice (see Retired Judges Report, Bill Jacket, L
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No. 86
2  Article VI, § 15 (c) specifies the range of the Criminal
Court's jurisdiction.
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1983, ch 840, at 74).  The question we must now decide is whether
CPL 350.20's pursuit of this worthy goal comports with the State
and Federal Constitutions.  For the reasons set forth below, we
hold that it does.  
III.
Defendant mounts two facial attacks against the
constitutionality of CPL 350.20.  He contends that it violates
New York Constitution Article VI, § 15 (a) which provides for the
establishment of the New York City Criminal Court and sets
certain qualifications for that court's judges.2  Defendant also
argues that he has both a federal and state due process right to
adjudicate his class B misdemeanor case before a Criminal Court
judge and that CPL 350.20 improperly abridges that right.  
To succeed in these arguments, defendant must shoulder
a "substantial burden" (see People v Scalza, 76 NY2d 604, 607
[1990]).  Duly enacted statutes enjoy a "presumption of
constitutionality" (see id.; Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243, 255
[2005]).  Thus, a party who asserts that a statute is facially
unconstitutional must demonstrate "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that the statute suffers from "wholesale constitutional
impairment" (see Matter of E.S. v P.D., 8 NY3d 150, 159 [2007],
quoting Matter of Moran Towing Corp. v Urbach, 99 NY2d 443, 448
[2003] [internal quotation omitted]; accord Scalza, 76 NY2d at
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607 ["The substantial burden of proving unconstitutionality
beyond a reasonable doubt rests with a statute's antagonist"]). 
Each prong of defendant's dual facial challenge fails to meet
this exacting standard.  
Defendant's Article VI, § 15 (a) argument is premised
almost entirely on our decision in Scalza.  In that case, we
dealt with CPL 255.20 (4), which permits a court to refer any
pre-trial motion in a criminal case to a JHO for the preparation
of a report setting forth the JHO's proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law (see Scalza, 76 NY2d at 606).  Such referral
may be made without consent of the parties and the court retains
power to accept, reject, or modify the JHO's findings or even to
review the motion de novo (see id. at 609).  The defendant in
Scalza argued that the non-binding referrals authorized by CPL
255.20 (4) were unconstitutional under Article VI, §§ 10 and 11
of the New York Constitution (see id.).  We rejected that
argument based on the lack of any "express or implied prohibitory
language" in those constitutional provisions that would prevent
the Legislature from authorizing non-consensual JHO referrals to
report (see id.).  As we explained, sections 10 and 11 "provide
essentially for the organization and jurisdiction of County
Courts" (id.).  
The same is true of Article VI, § 15 (a).  It requires
the Legislature to establish "a single court of city-wide
criminal jurisdiction in and for the city of New York" and
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No. 86
3  Additional criteria for service on the City's Criminal
Court are set forth in subsequent sections of Article VI (see NY
Const, art VI, §§ 20, 25).  
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mandates that the judges comprising that court be New York City
residents, who are appointed by the City's mayor to serve 10-year
terms (NY Const, art VI, § 15 [a]).3  It does not speak to
whether the Legislature may establish different tribunals with
concurrent jurisdiction or whether it may authorize litigants to
resort to those tribunals upon their agreement.  Nonetheless,
defendant maintains that Article VI, § 15 (a) somehow precludes
the Legislature from authorizing a JHO to determine a class B
misdemeanor case when all parties consent to such adjudication. 
Defendant points to nothing in the express text of section 15 (a)
to support this argument.  Nor have we been able to locate any
additional interpretative support for it (see Fourth Annual
Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York,
Comment, 92-93 [1959] [indicating that main purpose of section 15
(a) was to achieve administrative efficiency]; see also Carter,
New York State Constitution: Sources of Legislative Intent 64-65
& n 1 [2d ed]; NY CLS Const Article VI Note [2009] ["The purpose
of new Art(icle) 6 was to establish a unified court system"]).  
Defendant is, therefore, forced to rely on certain
statements drawn from Scalza.  Thus, he points to our recognition
of the trial court's "nondelegable and exclusive authority to
decide" a suppression motion referred to a JHO (see Scalza, 76
NY2d at 608), our acknowledgment that during the referral period
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that court "holds the tether on the case" (id. at 609), and our
statement that "CPL 255.20 (4) . . . does not undermine or
diminish the court's exclusive power to decide" (id.).  But as
the People correctly assert, defendant's constitutional argument
divorces these statements from the context in which they were
rendered.  
At its outset, Scalza held that because the trial court
retained the ultimate authority to determine a suppression motion
after referral to a JHO "no unauthorized or unconstitutional
diversion of the trial court's exclusive jurisdiction and
responsibility to decide is threatened" (76 NY2d at 607).  Thus,
the Scalza Court was not confronted, as we are here, with a
situation in which the Legislature acted expressly to permit JHOs
to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with that of a Criminal Court
judge in cases where the litigants expressly agree to JHO
adjudication of a class B misdemeanor.  
As noted earlier, a key piece of section 350.20's
legislative history is the Retired Judges Report.  In that
report, the Committee, under the direction of then-Chief Judge
Lawrence Cooke, recognized that "the hearing of more minor
matters in their entirety by retired judges would free lower-
court judges to try more significant matters" (Bill Jacket, L
1983, ch 840, at 74).  It thus recommended that JHOs "be
authorized to hear and determine, with the consent of the
parties, minor criminal matters not requiring a jury" (id.). 
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When JHOs were utilized in "this restrictive fashion," the
Committee did "not foresee any constitutional problems" (id.).  
To support its constitutional analysis, the Committee
cited the Appellate Division's decision in Glass v Thompson (see
Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 840, at 87 n 31, citing 51 AD2d 69 [2d
Dept 1976]).  In Glass, the court considered an Article VI, § 15
challenge to the legislation granting hearing officers --
subsequently re-named Housing Court Judges -- authority to hear
and determine summary proceedings in the Housing Part of the New
York City Civil Court (see 51 AD2d at 70).  The court had "no
problem" concluding that the legislation was constitutional (id.
at 72).  Analogizing hearing officers to "referees" who had been
traditionally empowered to hear and determine certain classes of
disputes, the court held that section 15 "creates the Civil Court
and specifies the method by which its Judges are to be selected;
it does not prohibit references" (see id. at 72-73).  Glass
further recognized that the Legislature had authority to provide
that certain matters be referred to expert non-judicial officers
even without the litigants' consent so long as the parties'
guaranteed constitutional rights, such as the right to trial by
jury, were not violated (see id. at 76).
We, too, have cited Glass with approval (see Motor
Vehs. Mfrs. Assoc. v State of New York, 75 NY2d 175, 185 [1990];
Matter of Met Council, Inc. v Crosson, 84 NY2d 328, 333 [1994]). 
Indeed, we did so in upholding the New Car Lemon Law, which gave
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consumers the option of bypassing a Supreme Court civil action by
compelling manufacturers to arbitrate claims arising out of
alleged car defects (Motor Vehs., 75 NY2d at 185).  Here, we do
not deal with such a "compulsory reference[]" to a JHO (see Motor
Vehs., 75 NY2d at 185), but with one that is consented to by
defendant and the People.  Moreover, as in Glass and Motor
Vehicles, defendant's jury trial rights are not threatened since
-- absent consent to JHO referral -- this class B misdemeanor
proceeding would have been adjudicated in a bench trial (see CPL
340.40 [2]; Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws
of NY, Book 11A, CPL 340.40, at 195 ["[T]here is no
constitutional requirement -- federal or state -- of a jury trial
for offenses punishable by six months or less"]).  Thus, as the
Legislature envisioned, the trial of defendant's case represented
the sort of referral "upon the consent of the parties" that has
long been permitted in this State (see Glass, 51 AD2d at 75; see
also Motor Vehs., 75 NY2d at 85; CPLR 4317 [a] ["The parties may
stipulate that any issue shall be determined by a referee"]).  
It is clear that "[l]egislation which affects the
jurisdiction" of a trial court is "not necessarily void" (Motor
Vehs., 75 NY2d at 184).  Indeed, in Matter of Dolce v Nassau
County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (7 NY3d 492 [2006]),
we held that the Legislature had authority to confer jurisdiction
over certain traffic and parking prosecutions to an
administrative arm of the Nassau County District Court staffed by
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JHOs (see id. at 495-496 & n 2).  Such jurisdiction was proper
even though JHO adjudication was permitted "without consent of
the parties" (see id. at 495, citing CPL 350.20 [5]).  Thus,
here, where consent is a prerequisite to JHO adjudication, we
have little difficulty concluding that nothing in Article VI, §
15 (a) prohibited the Legislature from enacting CPL 350.20.  
Defendant also asserts a violation of the Federal and
State Due Process Clauses.  To evaluate these claims, we must
balance "the interests of the parties to the dispute, the
adequacy of the contested procedures to protect those interests,
and the government's stake in the outcome" (see Scalza, 76 NY2d
at 610 [internal quotation omitted]; People v Thompson, 90 NY2d
615, 621 [1997]; see also United States v Raddatz, 447 US 667,
677 [1980], citing Matthews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 [1976]). 
We agree with the People that an application of these factors
demonstrates that CPL 350.20 easily passes constitutional muster. 
Initially, defendant incorrectly asserts that his due
process interest is that of having his class B misdemeanor case
determined by a "judge."  But what defendant is actually entitled
to is a "fair trial in a fair tribunal" (see Friedman v State, 24
NY2d 528, 542 [1969], quoting Matter of Murchison, 349 US 133,
136 [1955]; People v Moore, 42 NY2d 421, 431 [1977]).  Defendant
was charged with a "petty offense" or one which authorizes a
period of incarceration of six months or less (see Duncan v
Louisiana, 391 US 145, 160 [1968]; Baldwin v New York, 399 US 66,
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No. 86
4  In this respect, our Legislature has accorded defendants
in petty criminal cases more statutory protection than that
offered under federal law, which permits federal magistrates to
try all petty criminal cases without the defendant's consent (see
18 USC § 3401 [b] ["Any person charged with a misdemeanor, other
than a petty offense may elect . . . to be tried before a
district judge for the district in which the offense was
committed] [emphasis added]; 18 USC §§ 19, 3559 [a] [7]; see also
United States v Rivera-Negron, 201 FRD 285, 288-289 [D PR 2001],
citing United States v McCrickard, 957 F Supp 1149 [ED Cal 1996]
[rejecting constitutional challenge to § 3401 (b)]).   
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73 [1970]; Blanton v N. Las Vegas, 489 US 538, 543 [1989]). 
Indeed, in the absence of CPL 350.20 his case would have
proceeded to a bench trial before a Criminal Court judge (see CPL
340.40 [2]; People v Urbaez, 10 NY3d 773, 775 [2008]).  Defendant
points to nothing in the nature of a consensual JHO adjudication
that gives rise to any substantial concern that the presiding JHO
would lack the neutrality that is a fundamental command of due
process (see Marshall v Jerrico, Inc., 446 US 238, 242 [1980]). 
The breadth of defendant's interest here is further
circumscribed by the critical fact that the Legislature has
carefully provided that JHOs may only be assigned to adjudicate
class B misdemeanors "upon agreement of the parties" (CPL 350.20
[1]).4  But defendant says that consensual JHO references in
class B misdemeanor cases violate due process unless a Criminal
Court judge is required to pass upon the result reached by a JHO
before rendering a final determination.  Although this Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court have concluded that the non-consensual
referral of a pre-trial suppression motion comports with due
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No. 86
5  Scalza, of course, dealt with a statutory provision
potentially applicable in felony prosecutions (see CPL 255.20
[4]).  
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process because a judge retains ultimate authority to decide the
motion after the referral is completed (see Scalza, 76 NY2d at
609-610; Raddatz, 447 US at 680), these holdings do not control
where, as here, a referral to a JHO to decide a petty criminal
case is made upon consent of the parties.5  
In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in
Gomez v United States (490 US 858 [1989]) and Peretz v United
States (501 US 923 [1991]) are instructive.  Both cases concerned
the question whether the "additional duties" clause of the
Federal Magistrates Act (18 USC § 636 [b] [3]) permitted a
district judge to assign a federal magistrate to preside over
jury selection in a felony trial.  In Gomez, the Court answered
that question in the negative (see 490 US at 875-876).  But in
Peretz, it reached the opposite conclusion because, unlike in
Gomez, defense counsel had consented to the magistrate's
participation in voir dire (see 501 US at 933).  As the Court
explained, "the defendant's consent significantly changes the
constitutional analysis" (see id.).  We agree and perceive no due
process problem with CPL 350.20 since it only allows for the
adjudication of class B misdemeanors -- a type of petty crime --
upon the express consent of the parties (cf. Peretz, 501 US at
936 ["There is no constitutional infirmity in the delegation of
felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants
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consent"]; see also id. at 933 [noting that "with the parties'
consent, a district judge may delegate to a magistrate
supervision of entire civil and misdemeanor trials"]). 
We likewise conclude that CPL 350.20's consensual JHO
adjudication procedure adequately protects defendant's interest
in a fair trial.  Before their appointment, prospective JHOs are
carefully evaluated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts to
ensure that they possess the "physical and mental capacity,
competence, work ethic, experience and judicial temperament
necessary to perform the duties of a judicial hearing officer,
and [are] well qualified to serve on the panels in the courts to
which [they] will be designated" (see 22 NYCRR § 122.2 [a]; see
also Judiciary Law § 850).  If deemed fit for service, JHOs are:
appointed for potentially renewable one-year terms (see 22 NYCRR
§§ 122.3, 122.3-B), subject to performance evaluations (see 22
NYCRR § 122.3-A), assigned as necessary to "panels" of particular
courts based upon the determination of the Chief Administrator
(see 22 NYCRR § 122.5), assigned to preside over particular
matters or court parts based upon a variety of factors including
their "previous experience and expertise" (see 22 NYCRR 122.6
[a]-[b]), and are subject to removal "for unsatisfactory
performance or for any conduct incompatible with service as a
judicial hearing officer" (see 22 NYCRR § 122.5 [e]).  These and
other safeguards (see generally 22 NYCRR Part 122), when combined
with the consensual nature of JHO adjudication under CPL 350.20
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and the availability of appellate review (see CPL 350.20 [3])
persuade us that the statute under review adequately protects
defendant's due process right to a fair tribunal in which to
adjudicate this petty criminal case.  
As to the relevant governmental interest, CPL 350.20's
legislative history makes plain the detrimental effects that
congestion and backlog in our State's courts can have upon the
administration of justice (see Retired Judges Report, Bill
Jacket, L 1983, ch 840 at 60, at 74-75).  Indeed, such delay
represents a "recognized evil to the fair administration of the
criminal justice system" (see Scalza, 76 NY2d at 604; cf. Urbaez,
10 NY3d at 775 ["Especially in New York City, with its high
volume of misdemeanor cases, [CPL 340.40 (2)] furthers the
important public interest of effective judicial
administration"]).  Thus, the governmental interest in ensuring
the maintenance of a carefully-vetted, highly-qualified staff of
JHOs standing ready to fairly and efficiently adjudicate petty
criminal cases is substantial and further supports our conclusion
that defendant's facial due process challenge to CPL 350.20
cannot succeed.  
It is important to emphasize that the nature of this
case requires us to leave certain questions for another day. 
Among the issues not now before us is whether the Legislature
could empower a non-judge, without a defendant's consent, to
adjudicate even a petty criminal case in which -- as in this one
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-- imprisonment is a possible outcome (cf. Matter of Rosenthal v
Hartnett, 36 NY2d 269, 271 [1975] [approving administrative
adjudication of traffic infractions "where such determination may
result in the imposition of a fine but not imprisonment"]).  Nor
do we decide whether trials of felony or class A misdemeanors may
be assigned to a non-judge even though a defendant has consented
to such adjudication and waived the right to a jury trial. 
Although we hold that CPL 350.20 is constitutionally valid, our
holding is necessarily limited by the particular statutory and
factual context that we consider here.  There are unquestionably
constitutional limits on the extent to which the Legislature can
assign the task of adjudicating criminal cases to individuals who
are not judges or justices.  We have never decided, and do not
now decide, exactly what those limits are; we only hold that they
have not been exceeded here.  
IV.
Next, defendant contends that the consent to JHO
adjudication was ineffective because the trial court did not
engage him in an oral colloquy regarding whether he understood
the effect of the signed JHO consent form.  As an initial matter,
unlike other statutes governing waivers of rights in criminal
proceedings, CPL 350.20 requires the "parties['] agreement," not
defendant's personal consent (compare e.g. CPL 270.35 [1]
["defendant" must consent in writing and in open court to
replacement of alternate juror during deliberations]; CPL 320.10
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[1]-[2] [specifying procedure by which "defendant" may waive
right to jury trial]).  More significantly, though, defendant was
represented by counsel.  And "[i]t is well established that a
defendant, 'having accepted the assistance of counsel, retains
authority only over certain fundamental decisions regarding the
case' such as 'whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial,
testify in his or her own behalf or take an appeal'" (see People
v Colon, 90 NY2d 824, 826 [1997]).  
We hold that the decision whether to agree to JHO
adjudication of a petty criminal case represents the sort of
"tactical decision" best left to the determination of counsel
(cf. Gonzalez v United States, -- US --, 128 S Ct 1765, 1770
[2008]).  Such decision turns upon a myriad of case-specific
factors that a lawyer is well-suited to assess, including the
practices of members of the JHO panel in the relevant
jurisdiction, the likelihood that JHO adjudication will be more
expeditious and therefore beneficial to the defendant, and the
potential for having assigned to the defendant's trial a JHO
before whom counsel has previously had a favorable experience
(cf. People v Ferguson, 67 NY2d 383, 390 [1986]; Gonzalez, 128 S
Ct at 1770).  Here, defense counsel participated fully in a trial
held before a JHO without objection and the Criminal Court file
contains a JHO consent form signed by defendant.  We think that
the consent to JHO adjudication was sufficient for present
purposes.  
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V.
Lastly, defendant argues that the accusatory instrument
was jurisdictionally defective.  The facial sufficiency of the
People's information (see CPL §§ 100.40 [1], 100.15 [3]) turns
upon whether the statement "except such sign may be disregarded
upon order by a Police Officer or designated Department employee"
as found in the Parks Department Rule that defendant was
convicted of violating is, as defendant argues, a true
"exception" that must be pleaded by the People or whether it
operates as a "proviso" that defendant was required to raise as a
bar to prosecution (see [56 RCNY] § 1-03 [c]; People v Santana, 7
NY3d 234, 236 [2006]).  Although the murky contours of
"exceptions" and "provisos" have long been the subject of debate
(see People v Bradford, 227 NY 45, 48 [1919]; People v Devinny,
227 NY 397, 401 [1919]; Santana, 7 NY3d at 236-237), we continue
to utilize those ancient labels. 
The main goal of the interpretative rules governing
exceptions and provisos is to discover the intention of the
enacting body (see Santana, 7 NY3d at 237; see also McKinney's
Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 211, at 369 ["The distinction
between a proviso and an exception will be wholly disregarded, if
necessary to give effect to the manifest intention of the
Legislature"]).  Thus, the fact that Rule 1-03's qualifying
language is introduced by "except" is not determinative
(see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 211, at 370). 
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In Santana, we applied the general rule that qualifying language
found outside the text of a relevant Penal Law provision is in
the nature of a "proviso" (see 7 NY3d at 237), but our ultimate
conclusion was premised on the belief that the Legislature could
not reasonably have intended the People to negate the existence
of each of the myriad labor disputes delineated in Judiciary Law
§ 753-a in a prosecution for criminal contempt based on the
defendant's violation of an order of protection prohibiting him
from residing in an apartment (see id.).
Here, we conclude that, as a matter of common sense and
reasonable pleading (see Devinny, 227 NY at 401; accord Santana,
7 NY3d at 237), the City's Parks Department did not intend that
the People plead and prove that no police officer or Parks
Department employee had authorized defendant to ignore a posted
closing time.  Such information is uniquely within a defendant's
knowledge, and to require the People to plead and negate the
existence of the relevant permission would require them to go to
"intolerable lengths," including innumerable interviews of
officers and employees in the area during the date in question
(see id.).  These efforts would serve "no useful purpose of
narrowing issues or giving notice," but would merely give rise to
"technicalitie[s] that could be used belatedly to stifle an
otherwise viable prosecution" (cf. People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183,
191 [1972]).  As such, we hold that the Parks Department intended
the police officer/department employee qualifying language to
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operate as a "proviso" that must be pleaded and proved by the
defendant.     
We conclude that defendant's constitutional arguments
must fail, the consent to JHO adjudication was valid, and that
defendant's claim as to the jurisdictional deficiency of the
accusatory instrument is meritless, as are his remaining
contentions.  Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Term should
be affirmed.  
- 1 -
People v Davis
No. 86
JONES, J.(dissenting):
I join in Judge Ciparick's opinion except as to Section
IV, from which I dissent.  
Criminal Procedure Law § 350.20 permits the trial of an
information by a Judicial Hearing Officer.  This statute provides
that “the court may, upon agreement of the parties, assign a
judicial hearing officer to conduct the trial.”  Inasmuch as
there is no basis for a finding of a knowing waiver by defendant
of the right to a trial by a Judge, I would reverse this
conviction.
 The Legislature enacted this provision to ameliorate
the pernicious effects that the congestion and backlog of cases
in our state’s courts can have on the administration of justice.  
The majority tells us that under this statute a defendant’s
interest in a fair trial is protected because the defendant
consents to trial by a Judicial Hearing Officer.  Where that
consent is given, I agree.  However, the short shrift given to
the procedural safeguards in this case precludes a finding of
consent.
To show that the defendant waived his right to be tried
by a Judge of the Criminal Court, the People and the majority
rely on a form found in the court file which purports to be
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No. 86
- 2 -
signed by the defendant.  This form is neither dated, nor
witnessed by the Court, a court clerk or counsel.  In addition,
and more importantly, it is not mentioned on the record by the
defendant, the attorney, the court clerk or the Court.  Even
assuming defendant signed the form there is nothing in the record
to show that he knew what he was signing. 
 
The majority says there was no need here for any
colloquy between the court and the defendant because the statute
merely requires “agreement of the parties” for a waiver, not a
personal waiver by defendant.  However, we must ask who is the
“party” in this case, if it is not the defendant.  There is no
written waiver purported to be signed by any of the three
different lawyers who appeared on behalf of defendant prior to
his trial and conviction.  Neither is there any record of an oral
waiver of defendant’s right to be tried by a Judge by any of the
lawyers who represented defendant.  I agree that defendant could
waive his right through counsel, and I would not require
elaborate formalities to accomplish that.  But the waiver must at
least be mentioned on the record in defendant's presence, to
provide some assurance that defendant knew he was giving up the
right to be tried by a Judge. 
The majority points out the various waivers and rights
encountered in criminal proceedings from replacing an alternate
juror (CPL 270.35[1]) to waiver of a right to a jury trial (CPL
320.10).  Some waivers must be done by defendant, in writing and
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No. 86
- 3 -
in open court, and others may be done by counsel, on behalf of
the defendant.  However, the one common element is that they are
memorialized on the record in open court.  This is the way 
lawyers communicate when representing a client in the exercise of
a fundamental right.  
The majority asserts that the decision to waive a trial
by a Judge and proceed before a Judicial Hearing Officer is a
decision to be made by counsel.  There is no authority to support
that position; indeed, the Criminal Court form used to
communicate the waiver is to be signed by a defendant alone. 
Further, the majority surmises that an experienced defense
counsel makes a “tactical decision” to try a case before a
Judicial Hearing Officer.  This reasoning overlooks the fact that
in New York City Criminal Courts, attorneys from the 18-B Panel
may be assigned on a per diem basis to a particular court part to
handle all of the cases that are on the court calendar for the
day.  In fact, defendant was represented by no less than five
different attorneys during the pendency of this matter.  
As in all other waivers that occur in criminal
proceedings, there is no need for a particular catechism.
Nevertheless, there must be record evidence of a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to a trial by a
Judge.  Here, the complete absence of such record evidence
requires reversal.   
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No. 86
- 4 -
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Graffeo, Read and Pigott concur.  Judge Jones dissents
and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge Smith concurs.
Decided June 11, 2009