Title: Brozovsky v. Norquest

State: nebraska

Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court

Document:

437 N.W.2d 798 (1989) 231 Neb. 731 Carol BROZOVSKY, Appellant v. Dean G. NORQUEST, Appellee. Dean G. NORQUEST and Grace E. Norquest, Appellees, v. Carol BROZOVSKY, Appellant. Nos. 87-476, 87-477. Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 7, 1989. *799 Lyle Joseph Koenig, Hebron, for appellant. John C. Hahn, of Jeffrey, Hahn, Hemmerling & Wade, P.C., Lincoln, for appellees. BOSLAUGH, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ., and KNAPP and ROWLANDS, District Judges. BOSLAUGH, Justice. These cases arise out of a controversy between Carol Brozovsky and Dean G. Norquest concerning the division and distribution of the assets of C.E. Norquest & Sons, Inc. Brozovsky was married to Clayton Norquest, who was a brother of Dean Norquest and who died in 1982. On May 4, 1982, Brozovsky and Dean Norquest executed a detailed written agreement providing for the division of the assets of the corporation. At that time, Brozovsky was represented by Wallace W. Angle, and Norquest was represented by Ray L. Svehla. The agreement was approved by both counsel. The agreement recited that the parties were the sole and equal shareholders of the corporation and provided for the division of both real and personal property and the assumption of indebtedness. Case No. 87-476 is an action commenced by Brozovsky to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the right of Dean Norquest to use a reuse pit located on land she received under the agreement, for partition of the pump located in the reuse pit, and for an accounting as to rent due her from Norquest for his use of her property. Case No. 87-477 is an action commenced by Dean Norquest and Grace E. Norquest against Brozovsky for damages the plaintiffs alleged they sustained because of Brozovsky's failure to comply with the terms of the May 4, 1982, agreement. The plaintiffs allege that Brozovsky was to assume an indebtedness of $121,900 on land Dean Norquest received under the agreement and that as a result of her failure to assume the debt and make the mortgage payments, the Federal Land Bank of Omaha commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage. On April 29, 1987, the plaintiffs in case No. 87-477 filed "Proposed Deposition Questions to Wallace W. Angle" and filed the same document in case No. 87-476 on May 1, 1987. "Objections to Deposition Questions" were filed in case No. 87-477 on May 5, 1987. The objections alleged that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Angle and Brozovsky, that the proposed deposition questions sought to discover privileged information, and that Brozovsky claimed the privilege provided by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-503(3) (Reissue 1985). On May 5, 1987, the objections filed by Brozovsky and a request for a protective order filed that day were heard and submitted to the trial court. On May 15, 1987, the plaintiffs in case No. 87-477 filed a notice to take the deposition of Angle and a praecipe for a subpoena duces tecum for Angle. A subpoena was issued the same day. On May 19, 1987, the trial court found that by pleading the "agreement upon which the action is based," Brozovsky had waived the attorney-client privilege. Angle was directed to testify and make himself available for the deposition. Brozovsky then filed a notice of appeal in each case. The first matter that must be determined is whether there is a final order in either case from which an appeal could be taken. Except in a very few situations where a special statute provides otherwise, the appellate jurisdiction of this court is limited to a review of final orders. In Lake v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 212 Neb. 570, 573-74, 324 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1982), we said: In the absence of a final order from which an appeal may be taken, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In Matter of Bartow, 101 N.M. 532, 685 P.2d 387 (1984), the appeal was from the trial court's denial of a request for a protective order. The court held: (Citations omitted.) Id. at 534, 685 P.2d at 389. See, also, Bartschi v. Chico Community Memorial Hosp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 502, 187 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1982); Breuer v. Flynn, 64 Md.App. 409, 496 A.2d 695 (1985). In 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2006 at 29-30, 33-36 (1970), the general rules applicable to discovery orders are stated as follows: A discovery order can always be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the case, even though it is difficult at that stage to show that the party has been prejudiced by the order, or that the question is not moot, and the harmless error doctrine, together with the broad discretion the discovery rules vest in the trial court, will bar reversal save under very unusual circumstances. This is especially true when the order has granted discovery, since there is no effective means of correcting such an order once *801 the discovery has been had. Reversal is more likely, although still unusual, when the trial court has erroneously denied or limited discovery. In Childs v. Kaplan, 467 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.1972), two judgment debtors attempted to appeal from an order requiring them to answer interrogatories regarding their assets. In holding the order not appealable the court said: 467 F.2d at 629-30. In Hudak v. Curators of University of Missouri, 586 F.2d 105 (8th Cir.1978), the court held that orders sustaining objections *802 to interrogatories and requiring the return of exhibits after the trial were not final orders which could be appealed. The court said at 106: In Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir.1976), Xerox attempted to appeal from discovery orders on the ground that the information sought was privileged from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The court said at 1031-32: (Citations omitted.) In Grinnell Corporation v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595 (1st Cir.1975), the court held that a discovery order was not appealable, although the appellant claimed the information sought was protected by the Constitution. The court said at 598: The Chamber could secure review of a criminal contempt finding. See Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 111, 42 S. Ct. 427, 66 L. Ed. 848 (1922). If the district court certified it as final under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), the Chamber could also appeal immediately from an order dismissing its complaint as the sanction for noncompliance. The rationale for the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25, 60 S. Ct. 540, 540-41, 84 L. Ed. 783 (1940), as follows: Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure. It was written into the first Judiciary Act and has been departed from only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all. Since the right to a judgment *803 from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice, Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration. Thereby is avoided the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective, judicial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a unified cause. Quoting from Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S. Ct. 356, 50 L. Ed. 686 (1906), the Court said: 309 U.S. at 327, 60 S. Ct. at 542. We conclude that the orders appealed from in these cases were interlocutory. The appeals must, therefore, be dismissed. APPEALS DISMISSED.