Title: State v. Cassano

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CASSANO, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder of cellmate in correctional institution — 
Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 1999-1268 — Submitted April 23, 2002 — Decided August 7, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Common Pleas Court of Richland County, No. 98-CR-171H. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶1} 
On October 17, 1997, inmate Walter Hardy moved into a cell at 
Mansfield Correctional Institution (“MANCI”) and became the cellmate of 
appellant August A. Cassano.  Despite complaints by Cassano, authorities did not 
remove Hardy from the cell.  On October 21, 1997, at about 2:30 a.m., Cassano 
killed Hardy by stabbing him approximately seventy-five times with a shank 
(prison-made knife).  A jury convicted Cassano of aggravated murder.  Cassano 
was sentenced to death. 
Facts 
Prior Events 
{¶2} 
Cassano was serving time at MANCI because he had been 
convicted of aggravated murder in Summit County on May 25, 1976. 
{¶3} 
On January 31, 1992, five years before he killed Hardy, Cassano 
stabbed inmate Troy Angelo inside Angelo’s locked prison cell.  Cassano had tied 
a shank to his hand with a shoestring and had stabbed Angelo approximately 
thirty-two times in the face, neck, chest, back, arms, head, and hand.  Angelo 
escaped when a correctional officer opened the cell door.  As Cassano was being 
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led away, he looked at Angelo and said, “I hope you die.”  On November 6, 1992, 
Cassano was convicted of felonious assault for stabbing Angelo. 
{¶4} 
Inmate Gerald Duggan testified that when Cassano became his 
cellmate in 1996, Cassano had told him that “if [Duggan] ever snitched on him 
he’d kill [him].”  Duggan also said that Cassano “liked a lot of time in the cell by 
himself” and that Duggan had requested a night job to accommodate Cassano.  
Cassano had told Duggan that he didn’t fight anymore, he stabbed.  On September 
18, 1997, Cassano reminded Juanita Murphy, a case manager, that he “had 
stabbed an inmate in 1992 and that that was why he had been sent to Lucasville.” 
The Killing 
{¶5} 
On the morning of October 17, 1997, Cassano sent a written 
message to Unit Manager Ted Harris, noting that he did not have a cellmate and 
that he wanted Alfred Gibson to be his cellmate.  Harris denied this request.  
Cassano had not received Harris’s written reply when he stabbed Hardy. 
{¶6} 
On the afternoon of October 17, Hardy moved into Cassano’s cell.  
Hardy and others had been in the segregation unit for two days under suspicion of 
possessing a shank, but Hardy had been exonerated.  Inmates described Hardy as 
weak, even though he became paranoid when he used drugs. 
{¶7} 
According to Ollie King, a MANCI sergeant/counselor, Cassano 
was very upset about having Hardy as his cellmate.  On October 17, Cassano told 
King that “he didn’t want that snitching ass faggot in his cell and that we better 
check [Cassano’s] record.”  King told him to send a message to Ted Harris, the 
unit manager.  Cassano’s friend, inmate Michael Cruz, agreed that Cassano was 
“very angry” about having Hardy as his cellmate.  He also stated that Cassano had 
told authorities, “You just can’t put any type of motherfucker in my cell, * * * 
check my record.” 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶8} 
After Hardy moved in, Cruz remarked to Cassano that he had a 
new cellmate.  Cassano replied, “Not for long.”  That same day, Cassano told 
Duggan that when Cassano had been in Lucasville, prison authorities would not 
assign him a cellmate unless it was absolutely necessary. 
{¶9} 
Cassano became very upset when Hardy broke a TV cable outlet.  
On October 18, Cassano told inmate James Pharner that Hardy “was driving him 
nuts, that [if] Harris didn’t move [Hardy] out [of] the cell, that he would * * * 
remove him himself.” 
{¶10} On October 21, 1997, at 2:25 a.m., Donald Oats, a MANCI 
correctional officer, noted that all was quiet.  He recalled that the two inmates in 
Cassano’s cell had been in their bunks doing nothing unusual.  Around 2:35 a.m., 
upon hearing a commotion, Oats hurried to Cassano’s cell.  He saw two inmates 
fighting and ordered them to stop.  He also signaled a “man down” alarm and 
went to call for help.  Oats heard Hardy yelling, “[Cassano] has a knife and he’s * 
* * trying to kill me.”  When Oats looked into the cell, Cassano was standing over 
Hardy and stabbing him with a shank. 
{¶11} Oats yelled and banged on the cell door and ordered Cassano to 
stop.  Twice, Cassano looked at the light Oats shined on him and then “went right 
back to sticking inmate Hardy.”  Cassano continued to stab Hardy “hot and heavy, 
except for the two times that he looked at [Oats] for a second or two.”  Cassano 
never said anything, but Hardy was “pleading for help.”  Cruz heard Hardy 
screaming, “[L]let me out, * * * he’s killing me, he’s stabbing me.” 
{¶12} Corrections officers James Miller and Dwight Ackerman 
responded to the “man down” alarm within a minute.  Ackerman looked into the 
cell, saw Cassano bent over “assaulting the other inmate,” and ordered him to 
stop.  Cassano stood up, and Ackerman saw that Cassano had a shank in his right 
hand.  Cassano then continued stabbing Hardy.  Miller ordered Cassano to stop, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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but Cassano “didn’t look at [Miller.]  He looked down and plunged a weapon into 
inmate Hardy.” 
{¶13} Although unarmed, Oats opened the cell door and ordered Cassano 
to the back of the cell.  Cassano obeyed that order; he continued to hold the shank, 
which was tied to his right hand by a laundry-bag string.  Cassano “was trying to 
untie it” but apparently had difficulty because his hand was covered with blood.  
Cassano wore a glove on his right hand. 
{¶14} When Miller pulled Hardy out of the cell, Hardy told him, “I am 
not going to make it.”  Within three to five minutes of the alarm, MANCI nurses 
arrived and began to treat Hardy.  Then Hardy was taken to a hospital, where he 
was pronounced dead at 3:37 a.m. 
{¶15} Dr. Keith Norton, a pathologist, concluded that Hardy bled to death 
and that his collapsed lungs contributed to his death.  Dr. Norton found 
approximately seventy-five knife wounds, including eight wounds to the head, 
nine to the neck, twenty-four to the back, fifteen to the chest, and various other 
wounds to the abdomen, hips, legs, arms, and hands.  Any one of ten specific 
wounds could have caused Hardy’s death, including several to the lungs and one 
that pierced the heart.  Dr. Norton also found abrasions and scratches on Hardy’s 
body.  A toxicologist found cocaine residue in Hardy’s urine but not the blood, 
which indicated use within the last twenty-four to forty-eight hours. 
{¶16} In Cassano’s cell, investigators found many bloodstains, including 
some on the top bunk sheets where Hardy slept.  They also found a bloody right-
hand glove on the floor and the unsoiled left-hand mate of that glove in a closed 
desk drawer that belonged to Cassano. 
{¶17} Throughout that morning, Cassano made various unsolicited 
comments.  As Cassano walked by Hardy after the attack, he asked, “Is he dead?”  
While in the TV room, Cassano told Miller, “[t]hey’re going to have to check 
January Term, 2002 
5 
[Hardy] for internal injuries.”  At the clinic, Cassano asked if Captain Ben Rachel 
remembered him as “the one that had stabbed a guy thirty times” several years 
before. 
{¶18} At 3:50 a.m., Wanda Haught, a nurse, examined Cassano at the 
MANCI clinic and found no injuries except red marks caused by handcuffs.  
Cassano stated that he was not injured but that his shoulder was tired.  At 5:15 
a.m., Haught noticed a superficial scratch on Cassano’s left side that had not been 
present at 3:50 a.m. 
{¶19} Cassano’s pants, T-shirt, and tennis shoes had blood on them. 
Cassano asked investigators prior to his giving a blood sample, “What do you 
need my blood for, that’s all his blood?”  Cassano’s blood tested negative for 
drugs and alcohol. 
Events After The Killing 
{¶20} In the spring of 1998, Cassano talked to inmate Pharner about 
Hardy’s death.  Cassano said that he had acted in self-defense but blacked out 
after stabbing Hardy eight times.  Cassano stated that “Hardy was smoking crack 
and * * * jumping up and down on the bunk and it drove [Cassano] nuts and he 
just went off on him.”  Cassano said that he had received the shank from an 
inmate named Carpenter. 
{¶21} In April 1998, Cassano asked Duggan “to testify that [Duggan] had 
seen Hardy with the knife that was used to kill him so that [Cassano] could plead 
self-defense.”  Duggan had never seen Hardy with a shank. 
{¶22} At his trial, Cassano testified that he has been in prison since 1976 
and that he preferred being quiet and alone in his cell.  Cassano had no particular 
problems with Hardy as his cellmate, except when Hardy was irritable and 
paranoid because of drug use. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶23} According to Cassano, he and Hardy watched TV and showed each 
other family photographs on the evening before Hardy was killed.  Hardy had 
smoked crack cocaine that evening.  Around 2:30 a.m., when Hardy briefly got 
up, he showed Cassano a knife and asked him what he thought about it.  In 
response, Cassano “snatched it out of his hand” and told him the knife was “going 
out the window.”  Cassano stated that Hardy then grabbed him by the left 
shoulder, hit him in the face, and kneed him in the groin. 
{¶24} Cassano stated that Hardy retrieved the knife and said, “This is for 
you.”  Cassano reclaimed the knife from Hardy, stabbed him once, and told him to 
settle down.  However, according to Cassano, Hardy kept coming at him, and 
Cassano “stabbed him approximately four times.”  Cassano testified that he 
believed that he was in danger as long as Hardy kept attacking him.  Hardy also 
tried to hit Cassano with a chair.  According to Cassano, “after the last time that 
[Hardy] attacked * * *, [Cassano] totally * * * lost it.”  Cassano said that when 
the guard opened the cell door, he dropped the knife.  Cassano denied that the 
knife had been tied to his wrist, that he had worn a glove on his right hand, that he 
had “sneak-attacked” Hardy, or that he had planned to kill Hardy.  Cassano denied 
that he had continued to stab Hardy when the corrections officers arrived outside 
the cell.  Cassano also denied that he had made some of the statements that other 
inmates or prison officials had attributed to him related to Hardy. 
{¶25} During cross-examination, Cassano stated that while in prison, he 
had been in over one hundred fights and that he had stabbed four people.  Cassano 
admitted writing various letters to his family, including one letter stating that he 
would never “have to worry about having a cellmate ever again.” 
{¶26} Inmate Charles Pool testified for the defense and claimed that he 
sold the murder weapon to Hardy and another inmate in May or June 1997.  
January Term, 2002 
7 
Inmate Howard Watson testified that Hardy once held an ice pick to his throat and 
threatened him when Hardy discovered Watson in his cell. 
{¶27} Mary Hardy, the victim’s mother, testified that she had sent her son 
$7,100 in money orders during his four years in prison and that they had talked on 
the phone every day.  She stated that Hardy was up for parole in November 1997 
and had been trying to behave himself.  Sally Glover, the unit manager at MANCI, 
had moved Hardy into Cassano’s unit for safety reasons.  In his year at MANCI, 
Hardy had made sixteen cell moves and a total of forty-nine in the previous four 
years. 
{¶28} In rebuttal, the state presented testimony from two MANCI 
officials, Juanita Murphy and Joseph Henderson.  Murphy claimed that Cassano 
asserted that he had “blacked out” but had killed Hardy in self-defense.  
According to Murphy, Cassano also claimed that Hardy died because nurses had 
failed to cover the puncture wounds in his lungs.  Henderson, the food service 
manager at MANCI, had tried, at Hardy’s urging, to get Hardy moved out of 
Cassano’s cell. 
{¶29} A grand jury indicted Cassano for the aggravated murder of Walter 
D. Hardy with prior calculation and design.  There were two death-penalty 
specifications.  The first alleged that “the offense was committed while [Cassano] 
was a prisoner in a detention facility.”  RC. 2929.04(A)(4).  The second alleged 
that Cassano, “prior to [this] offense, * * * was convicted of * * * Aggravated 
Murder.” R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  The jury convicted Cassano as charged and 
recommended the death penalty.  The trial court sentenced Cassano to death.  The 
cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶30} In his appeal, Cassano advances fourteen propositions of law.  We 
have reviewed each and have determined that none justifies reversal of Cassano’s 
conviction or death sentence.  We have also independently weighed the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors and reviewed the death 
penalty for appropriateness and proportionality, as required by R.C. 2929.05(A).  
For the reasons that follow, we affirm Cassano’s conviction and death sentence. 
Preliminary Issues: Self-representation 
{¶31} In proposition of law I, Cassano argues that the trial court erred 
because it refused his request to represent himself “without making an in depth 
inquiry into Cassano’s competency and ability to waive his right to appointed 
counsel.” 
{¶32} We have recognized that “a defendant in a state criminal trial has 
an independent constitutional right of self-representation and * * * may proceed to 
defend himself without counsel when he voluntarily, and knowingly and 
intelligently elects to do so.”  State v. Gibson (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 74 
O.O.2d 525, 345 N.E.2d 399, paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Faretta v. 
California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.  If a trial court 
denies the right to self-representation, when properly invoked, the denial is per se 
reversible error.  State v. Reed (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 660 N.E.2d 456, citing 
McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984), 465 U.S. 168, 177, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122.  
To establish an effective waiver of the right to counsel, “the trial court must make 
sufficient inquiry to determine whether [the] defendant fully understands and 
intelligently relinquishes that right.”  Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 74 O.O.2d 525, 
345 N.E.2d 399, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶33} Following his indictment, Cassano filed several pro se motions, 
including a waiver of counsel, on May 14, 1998.  That same day, he also asked 
that appointed counsel, Robert Whitney and Bernard Davis, be dismissed and that 
Kort Gatterdam of the Ohio Public Defender’s Office be appointed as counsel.  
Thereafter, Whitney and Davis withdrew, and the court appointed the State Public 
Defender as counsel and Douglas Sexton as local counsel. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
{¶34} On September 25, 1998, Cassano filed a pro se motion requesting 
“hybrid” legal representation consisting of himself and Gatterdam.  At a hearing 
that day, Cassano asserted, “I have a right to be co-counsel with my attorneys.”  
The court responded, “I can’t allow you to represent yourself. * * * I’m willing to 
look into that further, but at this point we’re going to proceed with these 
gentlemen.” 
{¶35} Following lengthy hearings on April 23, 1999, Cassano queried, “Is 
there any possibility I could represent myself?  I’d like that to go on record.”  The 
trial court replied that it would not be in Cassano’s best interest to represent 
himself. 
{¶36} In response, the prosecutor stated that Cassano is “essentially 
asking that the case be continued so that [another of Cassano’s attorneys] would 
have a chance to prepare more.”  Sexton and Gatterdam stated that they were fully 
prepared for trial.  Sexton and Gatterdam also stated that Andrew Love was lead 
counsel and that he had not had much time to prepare the case for trial, though he 
would be present at the start of the trial.  The court stated that voir dire would start 
on Monday, but if “additional time is needed and it can be justified, [the court] 
can certainly consider that.”  Cassano proceeded to trial represented by counsel 
and did not again mention that he wanted to represent himself. 
{¶37} We reject Cassano’s claim that his rights of self-representation 
were violated.  Cassano’s initial demand to represent himself focused on hybrid 
representation.  Cassano’s only written motion on that point was made in 
September 1998 and related solely to hybrid representation.  Cassano did not 
mention that he wanted to represent himself alone until April 23, 1999, only three 
days before the start of the trial.  “A defendant has no right to a ‘hybrid’ form of 
representation wherein he is represented by counsel, but also acts simultaneously 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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as his own counsel.”  State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 138, 689 N.E.2d 
929, citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122. 
{¶38} Cassano did not unequivocally and explicitly invoke his right to 
self-representation, even on April 23, 1999.  “The constitutional right of self-
representation is waived if it is not timely and unequivocally asserted.”  Jackson v. 
Ylst (C.A.9, 1990), 921 F.2d 882, 888.  See, e.g., Reese v. Nix (C.A.8, 1991), 942 
F.2d 1276, 1281 (“I don’t want no counsel then” was not a clear and unequivocal 
pro se demand requiring Faretta inquiry); United States v. Frazier-El (C.A.4, 
2000), 204 F.3d 553, 558 (assertion of the right of self-representation “must be * 
* * clear and unequivocal”). 
{¶39} We find that Cassano’s April 23, 1999 statement was not an 
explicit and unequivocal demand for self-representation.  Accordingly, the court 
did not deny his right to self-representation. 
{¶40} We also find that Cassano’s request was untimely because it was 
made only three days before the trial was to start.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Mackovich (C.A.10, 2000), 209 F.3d 1227, 1237 (requests made six to ten days 
before trial “were merely a tactic for delay”); United States v. George (C.A.9, 
1995), 56 F.3d 1078, 1084 (request made on eve of trial untimely); United States 
v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 560 (the “right does not exist * * * to be used as a tactic 
for delay”). 
{¶41} Cassano was represented for over ten months by the same counsel.  
In that time, he did not ask that those counsel be discharged so that he could 
proceed alone and without counsel.  Cassano referred to self-representation on 
April 23 only in the context of supporting his last-minute request for delay.  We 
conclude that Cassano made this remark about representing himself as an attempt 
to delay the trial. 
January Term, 2002 
11 
{¶42} Finally, we conclude that Cassano abandoned any intention to 
represent himself when he did not pursue the issue of self-representation after the 
court told him it would not be a good idea.  See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182, 104 
S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (defendant can waive his right to self-representation by 
allowing counsel to participate in trial).  Accord Wilson v. Walker (C.A.2, 2000), 
204 F.3d 33, 38 (failure to reassert a desire to proceed pro se constituted a 
waiver).  For the foregoing reasons, we reject proposition of law I. 
Trial Issues 
Other Acts Evidence 
{¶43} In proposition of law II, Cassano argues that the trial court erred 
and that he was unfairly prejudiced when it admitted evidence showing Cassano’s 
criminal propensity.  Cassano particularly complains about evidence that he 
stabbed inmate Troy Angelo in 1992. 
{¶44} Under Evid.R. 404(B), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove” a defendant’s propensity toward criminal behavior.  “It 
may, however, be admissible [to show] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  The exception 
allowing the evidence “must be construed against admissibility, and the standard 
for determining admissibility of such evidence is strict.”  State v. Broom (1988), 
40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶45} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 
OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Thus, we review the 
trial court’s decision on an abuse-of-discretion standard.  See State v. Finnerty 
(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 107, 543 N.E.2d 1233; State v. Hymore (1967), 9 Ohio 
St.2d 122, 128, 38 O.O.2d 298, 224 N.E.2d 126.  We conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence relating to the stabbing of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Angelo.  That evidence helped to establish “prior calculation and design,” a key 
element of the aggravated murder charge against Cassano. 
{¶46} Cassano mentioned his record to prison authorities several times in 
an attempt to dissuade prison authorities from assigning a cellmate to him.  
Evidence about the attack against Angelo explains the significance of Cassano’s 
remarks about his record.  In short, Cassano’s own demands that prison officials 
check his record made evidence of his assault against Angelo relevant in his trial. 
{¶47} Moreover, that evidence was otherwise relevant to Cassano’s 
“motive” and his “plan” within the context of Evid.R. 404(B).  The attacks on 
Angelo and Hardy were similar.  In both cases, Cassano was angry at an inmate 
and stabbed the inmate in a locked cell, using a shank tied to his wrist by a string.  
In both assaults, Cassano repeatedly stabbed the inmate predominantly in the face, 
head, neck, chest, and back. 
{¶48} Finally, we conclude that the evidence of the assault on Angelo 
was harmless and that Cassano’s substantial rights were not prejudiced.  At trial, 
Cassano testified that he had been in over one hundred fights in prison and had 
stabbed four people.  Thus, the jury would have known about Cassano’s criminal 
behavior. 
{¶49} Moreover, we find that the evidence of Cassano’s guilt was 
overwhelming.  While in a locked prison cell, Cassano stabbed his cellmate 
approximately seventy-five times, using a knife tied to his wrist, and then 
attempted to claim self-defense.  That Cassano was the killer was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
{¶50} Cassano also complains that Angelo introduced evidence of other 
criminal acts that Cassano had committed.  Angelo disclosed that in 1992, 
Cassano used drugs and made sexual proposals to Angelo.  This evidence formed 
part of Angelo’s explanation about the motive for the assault.  Although we find 
January Term, 2002 
13 
that evidence to be of questionable relevance, Cassano either failed to object to 
the evidence at trial or his counsel elicited the evidence on cross-examination.  No 
plain error occurred. 
{¶51} Since the trial court did not err in admitting the “other acts” 
evidence in the trial phase, the jury could properly consider it during the penalty 
phase.  The evidence related to Cassano’s “history, character, and background,” 
which a jury must consider in the penalty phase.  R.C. 2929.04(B).  See, e.g., State 
v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 428, 588 N.E.2d 819.  We reject proposition 
of law II. 
Restraints During Trial 
{¶52} In proposition of law III, Cassano argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion by directing that his feet be shackled during the trial without making 
“findings or conduct[ing] an evidentiary hearing.”  Before trial, Cassano, through 
counsel, asked to appear at all hearings without restraints.  At a hearing on April 
1, 1999, the parties argued the issue.  The state presented a summary of Cassano’s 
prison record that reflected multiple threats to other inmates and a significant 
amount of fighting.  The defense did not offer contrary evidence.  On April 21, the 
court ordered that Cassano be restrained with leg shackles.  On April 23, the court 
ordered that counsel tables be skirted so that the shackles would not show. 
{¶53} At the start of trial on April 26, 1999, the defense suggested that 
despite the skirting, the jurors might be able to discern that Cassano was shackled.  
The court responded that shackles were necessary because Cassano had a history 
of violent crime and that he might attempt to “bolt through that door.”  Later, the 
court recognized that jurors might have glimpsed the leg shackles. 
{¶54} We have stated that “no one should be tried while shackled, absent 
unusual circumstances.”  State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 285, 513 
N.E.2d 311.  “However, shackling is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 358, 595 N.E.2d 915, citing State v. 
Woodards (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 23, 35 O.O.2d 8, 215 N.E.2d 568.  See, e.g., 
Woodards v. Cardwell (C.A.6, 1970), 430 F.2d 978, 982 (trial court must exercise 
its own discretion and not leave the issue up to security personnel).  Several courts 
have upheld the use of restraints in trials.  See, e.g., Harrell v. Israel (C.A.7, 
1982), 672 F.2d 632; Kennedy v. Cardwell (C.A.6, 1973), 487 F.2d 101; State v. 
Curry (Sept. 30, 1997), Scioto App. No. 95CA2339, 1997 WL 600056; State v. 
Bell (June 6, 1997), Scioto App. No. 96CA2472, 1997 WL 317425. 
{¶55} In this case, Cassano has not demonstrated that the trial court 
abused its discretion in directing that his legs be shackled.  Both of Cassano’s 
hands were free throughout the trial.  Moreover, the court held a hearing and 
considered the evidence presented, i.e., Cassano’s prison record, before finding 
that unobtrusive leg shackles, hidden by a skirt, were necessary.  Cassano’s prior 
convictions, his status as an inmate in a maximum security prison, and his 
documented history of violence even while in custody combine to convince us 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Cassano to be shackled. 
{¶56} Moreover, jurors knew that Cassano was an inmate and a convicted 
murderer, and they might have expected to see him restrained during his court 
appearances.  Cassano never asked for a cautionary jury instruction on the issue.  
Thus, as to an instruction, he waived all but plain error, which is not present.  The 
fact that Cassano was tried while wearing hidden leg shackles did not deprive him 
of a fair trial even though jurors might have been able to discern the shackles.  
See, e.g., Harrell, 672 F.2d at 637; Fountain v. United States (C.A.7, 2000), 211 
F.3d 429, 435-436.  We reject proposition of law III. 
Rejection of Defense Challenge of Juror 
{¶57} In proposition of law IV, Cassano argues that the trial court erred 
in rejecting a defense challenge for cause against juror Wendy White, who was 
January Term, 2002 
15 
later removed by a defense peremptory challenge.  Cassano argues error because 
White’s husband had been a MANCI correctional officer, because White favored 
the death penalty and thought the judicial process was too slow, and because she 
did not “think it would be fair” for her to sit on a jury. 
{¶58} Defendants are entitled to fair trials, an essential part of which is “ 
‘a panel of impartial, “indifferent” jurors.’ ”  Murphy v. Florida (1975), 421 U.S. 
794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589, quoting Irvin v. Dowd (1961), 366 U.S. 
717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751.  However, trial courts have discretion in 
determining a juror’s ability to be impartial.  State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 281, 288, 6 OBR 345, 452 N.E.2d 1323.  “ ‘Deference must be paid to the 
trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’ ”  State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 
24, 30, 553 N.E.2d 576, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 426, 
105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.  Thus, a “ruling on a challenge for cause will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary * * * so as to constitute an 
abuse of discretion.”  Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 31, 553 N.E.2d 576.  Accord State v. 
Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 679 N.E.2d 646. 
{¶59} In this case, the trial court could have sustained the challenge, but 
we conclude that the failure to do so was not an abuse of discretion.  White’s 
concern about fairness was based on her husband’s employment and concern 
about possible “repercussions” to her husband if she sat on the jury.  However, 
White noted that her husband had been assigned to another facility and no longer 
worked at MANCI.  She also stated that her husband’s employment would not 
“taint [her] view * * * of the evidence.” 
{¶60} Moreover, White acknowledged that she knew nothing about the 
case except that someone had been stabbed to death.  She agreed to consider the 
defendant’s background, if relevant, and also whether the victim had done 
anything to cause his own death.  She stated that she would be fair to both sides, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
keep an open mind, and consider all options.  She also stated that she would 
follow the court’s instructions and would not automatically vote for the death 
penalty.  Since White was qualified as a juror and agreed to be fair and follow 
instructions, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.  Cf. Williams, 79 
Ohio St.3d at 5, 679 N.E.2d 646; State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 179, 
17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984.  We reject proposition of law IV. 
Public Trial 
{¶61} In proposition of law V, Cassano argues that the trial court denied 
him his constitutional right to a public trial.  During pretrial hearings on April 23, 
1999, Cassano’s counsel asked that a suppression hearing involving testimony 
about Cassano’s felonious assault of Angelo be closed to the public to avoid 
prejudicial pretrial publicity.  The prosecution did not object, and the court 
granted Cassano’s request.  After five witnesses testified, the in-camera stage 
ended.  The court noted that the media could reenter; whether the doors were 
reopened is not on the record.  After a few other matters were discussed, the 
hearing ended. 
{¶62} We have long recognized that “the right to a public trial * * * is a 
fundamental guarantee of both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.”  State v. 
Lane (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 112, 14 O.O.3d 342, 397 N.E.2d 1338, paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  Moreover, “the right to a public trial * * * extends to pretrial 
proceedings.”  State ex rel. The Repository, Div. of Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Unger (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 418, 421, 28 OBR 472, 504 N.E.2d 37.  Accord 
State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Lias (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 497, 502, 628 
N.E.2d 1368. 
{¶63} In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for 
Riverside Cty. (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 13-14, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1, the 
Supreme Court of the United States noted that under the First Amendment, a 
January Term, 2002 
17 
preliminary hearing could not be closed (even at the defendant’s request) “unless 
specific, on the record findings * * * demonstrat[e] that ‘closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest,’ ” citing 
Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty. (1984), 464 U.S. 
501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629.  In Waller v. Georgia (1984), 467 U.S. 
39, 47, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the Press-Enterprise standards requiring strict justification for closure applied to 
pretrial suppression hearings. 
{¶64} In this case, we conclude that the trial court erred in closing the 
suppression hearing without conducting a separate hearing, making findings 
justifying such closure, and considering alternatives to closure.  See Waller, 467 
U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31.  However, reversal is not required 
because Cassano invited the error by requesting closure.  “A party cannot take 
advantage of an error he invited or induced.”  State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio 
St.3d 4, 17, 564 N.E.2d 408.  Accord State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 
535, 747 N.E.2d 765 (accused “actively responsible” for error cannot complain). 
{¶65} Moreover, closure did not affect the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of the trial.  Cf. United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 
S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508.  The evidence received was later heard at the public 
trial.  Even when a defendant objected to closure, reversal of the conviction was 
required only when a new public suppression hearing would result in suppression 
of material evidence not suppressed earlier.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50, 104 
S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31.  Nothing in the record suggests that another hearing 
would affect the result in this case. 
{¶66} Cassano also argues that the trial court remained closed after the 
in-camera hearing ended.  The record is unclear about whether the court remained 
closed.  Morever, any failure immediately to reopen the pretrial hearing was brief, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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inadvertent, and simply a continuation of the original invited error caused by 
Cassano.  See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams (C.A.2, 1996), 85 F.3d 39, 43-44 (brief 
and inadvertent continuation of proper courtroom closing not noticed by 
participants did not violate Sixth Amendment); United States v. Al-Smadi 
(C.A.10, 1994), 15 F.3d 153, 154-155.  We reject proposition of law V. 
Accused’s Absence From Jury View 
{¶67} In proposition of law VI, Cassano argues that the trial court 
violated his due process rights by denying his request to be present at the jury 
view of the crime scene.  Cassano does not claim that his counsel could not attend 
the view. 
{¶68} Here, the trial court erred in denying Cassano his right to attend the 
jury view.  The statute, R.C. 2945.16, specifies that “[t]he accused has the right to 
attend such view by the jury * * *.”  The trial court erred, even though the court 
acted as it did because of the complex logistical problems involved.  The court 
stated that prison authorities objected to the probable duration of the jury view.  
Further, the court expressed concern that the prison would have to be locked 
down, and Cassano would have been unshackled in his cell during the jury view.  
While the trial court’s concern is understandable, R.C. 2945.16 does not grant the 
court any discretion. 
{¶69} Nonetheless, the trial court’s decision refusing to allow Cassano to 
be present at the jury view did not deprive Cassano of due process.  In Snyder v. 
Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 122, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, the United 
States Supreme Court held  that denial of a defendant’s presence at a jury view did 
not violate due process.  The Snyder court recognized that “the presence of a 
defendant [in a felony prosecution] is a condition of due process to the extent that 
a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.”  
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, overruled on other 
January Term, 2002 
19 
grounds, Malloy v. Hogan (1964), 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653.  
Other courts have also rejected due process complaints when an accused did not 
attend a jury view of a crime scene within prison walls.  See, e.g., Devin v. 
DeTella (C.A.7, 1996), 101 F.3d 1206; Jordan v. State (1981), 247 Ga. 328, 346, 
276 S.E.2d 224, reversed on other grounds, Jordan v. Lippman (C.A.11, 1985), 
763 F.2d 1265. 
{¶70} Finally, the court’s refusal to allow Cassano to attend the jury view 
did not materially prejudice Cassano.  We have recognized that the jury’s “view of 
a crime scene is neither evidence nor a crucial stage in the proceedings.”  Richey, 
64 Ohio St.3d at 367, 595 N.E.2d 915, citing Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 38, 553 
N.E.2d 576.  See, also, State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 58, 512 N.E.2d 
585; State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 265, 750 N.E.2d 90.  We also 
note that the trial court authorized Cassano, his counsel, and any agent to view the 
crime scene before trial.  Cassano has failed to show that his due process rights 
were violated or that he suffered prejudice because of the court’s refusal to allow 
him to attend the jury view.  We reject proposition of law VI. 
Trial-phase Instructions on Self-defense 
{¶71} In proposition of law VII, Cassano argues that his prison cell was 
equivalent to his home and that therefore the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury that Cassano had a duty to retreat if attacked.  The court instructed the jury, 
over defense objection, that self-defense could be valid only if Cassano had not 
violated a duty to retreat.  Further, the court instructed that Cassano “had a duty to 
retreat if, A, the defendant was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the 
event which caused the death of Walter Hardy; or B, the defendant did not have 
reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief that he was in imminent danger 
of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from the danger 
was the use of deadly force.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶72} As we recently recognized in State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 
21, 759 N.E.2d 1240, “To establish self-defense, a defendant must prove * * * (1) 
that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the 
affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such 
danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any 
duty to retreat or avoid the danger.”  Id., 94 Ohio St.3d at 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240, 
citing State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 12 O.O.3d 84, 388 N.E.2d 755, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶73} In State v. Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 551 N.E.2d 1279, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, we held, “There is no duty to retreat from one’s 
home.”  Further, in State v. Jackson (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 22 OBR 452, 
490 N.E.2d 893, we stated that the “elements of self-defense are cumulative.  * * 
* If the defendant fails to prove any one of these elements by a preponderance of 
the evidence he has failed to demonstrate that he acted in self-defense.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  
{¶74} We conclude that in this case, the trial court erred in instructing on 
a duty to retreat.  Cassano was obligated by law and prison regulations to occupy 
the cell that he did.  Moreover, retreat from his locked prison cell, which was 
seven and a half feet by ten feet, was never an option for Cassano.  Thus, the trial 
court should not have instructed on a duty to retreat because retreat was 
impossible under the circumstances. 
{¶75} Nonetheless, Cassano suffered no material prejudice.  Even under 
Cassano’s version of events, Hardy never threatened him with the shank, but 
simply showed it to him.  Cassano became the aggressor by taking the shank 
away.  Then, according to Cassano, Hardy hit him and kneed him.  We conclude 
that Cassano was at fault in creating the situation leading to the affray. 
January Term, 2002 
21 
{¶76} The facts also show that Cassano had no basis for a “bona fide 
belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm” and could 
“escape from such danger” only by using deadly force.  Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 
74, 12 O.O.3d 84, 388 N.E.2d 755, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Even under 
Cassano’s version, when he stabbed Hardy, Hardy had no weapon.  Once Cassano 
retrieved the shank and held it in his hand, he was not in danger.  Cassano could 
have shoved the shank under the cell door out into the hallway, as he later did in 
response to orders from the corrections officers, or simply maintained control of 
the shank. 
{¶77} Third, Cassano repeatedly stabbed Hardy after Hardy had ceased to 
pose any conceivable threat to Cassano.  Cassano continued the attack even after 
the correctional officers were at the cell door and ordered him to stop.  Under 
these facts, Cassano was not prejudiced by the trial judge’s instruction on the duty 
to retreat.  Cf. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 22 OBR 452, 490 N.E.2d 893.  
No reasonable jury could have believed that Cassano acted in self-defense.  Cf. 
State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 564, 687 N.E.2d 685.  Proposition of 
law VII lacks any merit. 
Sufficiency of Evidence 
{¶78} In proposition of law VIII, Cassano challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence to prove prior calculation and design.  In reviewing a record for 
sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 
560. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶79} No bright-line test exists that “emphatically distinguishes between 
the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ ”  State v. Taylor (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 15, 20, 676 N.E.2d 82.  Yet “ ‘prior calculation and design’ is a 
more stringent element than the ‘deliberate and premeditated malice’ * * * 
required under prior law.”  State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 
381 N.E.2d 190, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “Instantaneous deliberation is not 
sufficient * * *.” Cotton, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “ ‘[P]rior calculation and 
design’ requires ‘a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill.’ 
”  State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 196, 616 N.E.2d 909, quoting 
Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d at 11, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 190. 
{¶80} In this case, there is ample evidence of prior calculation and 
design.  Cassano made several statements about what he might do to Hardy.  He 
told prison authorities that he would take matters into his own hands if Hardy was 
not moved.  Cassano told Sgt. King that “he didn’t want that snitching ass faggot 
in his cell and that we better check his record.”  Cruz testified that Cassano was 
very angry about Hardy’s presence in his cell and that Cassano said that Hardy 
would not be there “for long.”  After Hardy broke the cable outlet, Cassano stated 
that he would kill Hardy.  Cassano also said that if Hardy was not moved, he 
would “remove [Hardy] himself.” 
{¶81} The nature of the attack also suggests that it was the result of prior 
calculation and design.  The jury could reasonably find that Cassano’s assault was 
a sneak attack, carried out while Hardy slept in the top bunk.  When he stabbed 
Hardy, Cassano was already fully dressed and had already packed his bags to 
move.  Moreover, the shank was so securely tied to Cassano’s wrist that removing 
it took some time.  Cassano’s right hand was gloved, enabling him to better hold 
the knife. 
January Term, 2002 
23 
{¶82} The approximately seventy-five wounds that Cassano inflicted on 
Hardy required considerable time to inflict.  Three correctional officers arrived 
while Cassano was still stabbing Hardy.  They ordered Cassano to stop; he 
continued stabbing Hardy, further indication of his determination to carry out his 
plan to kill Hardy. 
{¶83} Finally, Cassano admitted to Pharner that he had brought the knife 
into the cell.  The fact that the knife was tied to Cassano’s wrist supports that 
admission. 
{¶84} All of these facts demonstrate strong evidence of prior calculation 
and design.  Cf. State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 334, 703 N.E.2d 
1251; State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d at 568, 687 N.E.2d 685; State v. 
Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d at 20-21, 676 N.E.2d 82.  We reject Cassano’s 
proposition of law VIII. 
Penalty-phase Issues 
Penalty-phase Instructions 
{¶85} In proposition of law IX, Cassano raises issues concerning the 
penalty-phase instructions and argues that his constitutional rights were violated.  
However, Cassano requested a specific penalty instruction, which was given, and 
did not object to others given at trial.  His failure to object “constitutes a waiver * 
* * unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been 
otherwise.”  State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 
1332, syllabus.  We find that the trial court’s penalty instructions involved no 
error, plain or otherwise. 
{¶86} Cassano argues that the court’s instructions failed to convey that a 
single juror could vote so as to require a life sentence.  See State v. Brooks (1996), 
75 Ohio St.3d 148, 162, 661 N.E.2d 1030.  Cassano complains because the court 
instructed the jury that “[w]henever all 12 of you agree upon your verdict, you 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
will complete the verdict form, sign it in ink, and summons the bailiff.”  We 
conclude that this instruction was not misleading and that it was intended to 
inform the jurors that all of them had to sign the verdict form. 
{¶87} The court instructed the jury, “You’re not required to unanimously 
find that the State failed to prove that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors before considering one of the life sentence options.  In other 
words, you should proceed to consider and choose one of the life sentence options 
if any one or more of you conclude that the State has failed to prove by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors.  A solitary juror may prevent a death penalty recommendation 
by finding that the aggravating circumstances in this case do not outweigh the 
mitigating factors. * * * [A]ny one of these mitigating factors standing alone may 
be sufficient to support a sentence of life imprisonment.”  These instructions, 
given pursuant to a defense request, explicitly recognize that a solitary juror could 
preclude the imposition of the death penalty. 
{¶88} The instructions indicated that “[t]he jury was free to consider a 
life sentence even if jurors had not unanimously rejected the death penalty.”  State 
v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 29, 676 N.E.2d 82.  Thus, unlike in State v. Brooks, 75 
Ohio St.3d at 159, 661 N.E.2d 1030, the jury was not told that it had “to determine 
unanimously that the death penalty is inappropriate before you can consider a life 
sentence.” 
{¶89} In numerous cases, we have rejected similar complaints that a trial 
court’s instructions violated Brooks.  Cf. State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 
280, 294, 731 N.E.2d 159; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 395, 721 
N.E.2d 52; State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 118, 666 N.E.2d 1099.  We 
find that Cassano’s complaint on this point lacks merit. 
January Term, 2002 
25 
{¶90} Cassano complains that the trial court did not sua sponte instruct 
that a jury’s verdict of a life sentence would be binding on the court.  However, 
Cassano never asked for such an instruction and cannot complain absent plain 
error.  We conclude that the court’s failure to instruct was not plain error.  See 
State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 518, 684 N.E.2d 47 (decision not to 
inform “jury of the binding nature of the life sentence recommendation does not 
constitute plain error”). 
{¶91} Cassano argues that the court “improperly instructed the jury as to 
the effect of their verdict should it be a life option.”  The trial court told the jurors 
that if they found that the state had not proved that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating factors, “then [they] will decide what the penalty 
should be” from among the life sentence options.  The court’s instruction was not 
error. 
{¶92} Cassano argues that the trial court’s instructions misled the jury as 
to the importance of their verdict.  The trial court instructed the jury that the 
sentence verdict “is more than a recommendation.  You are the trier of fact in this 
case. * * * You should approach your task with the utmost seriousness, because 
your weighing of the evidence is unlikely to be disturbed.  You should expect your 
sentence verdict * * * to be carried out.” 
{¶93} The court’s instruction accurately reflects Ohio law and does not 
diminish the jury’s overall sense of responsibility.  State v. Henderson (1988), 39 
Ohio St.3d 24, 29-30, 528 N.E.2d 1237; State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 
70, 77, 623 N.E.2d 75.  Moreover, the court’s strongly worded admonition to the 
jury as to the importance of its verdict reinforced the jury’s sense of the 
importance of its responsibility.  See, e.g., State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 
357, 375, 582 N.E.2d 972.  We reject Cassano’s proposition of law IX. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶94} In proposition of law X, Cassano argues that this court should 
vacate his death sentence because the prosecutor “diminish[ed] the severity of a 
life option by arguing that the law or policy may change which would allow the 
defendant to be released at an earlier date.” 
{¶95} Whether a prosecutor’s remarks constitute misconduct requires 
analysis as to (1) whether the remarks were improper and (2) if so, whether the 
remarks prejudicially affected a substantial right of the accused.  State v. Smith 
(1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  See State v. Lott 
(1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 165, 555 N.E.2d 293.  The touchstone of this analysis 
“is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips 
(1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78. 
{¶96} Initially, we evaluate Cassano’s complaints of prosecutorial 
misconduct in the context of the unconventional defense penalty-phase evidence.  
Cassano presented testimony from Sandra Schafer, an inmate records supervisor 
at MANCI who calculates inmate sentences.  Schafer testified that if Cassano 
were to receive the minimum sentence (life with possible parole after 25 years), he 
would be ineligible for parole until the year 2024.  According to Schafer, the 
Parole Board normally rejects first-time parole for an inmate convicted of 
aggravated murder.  She also stated that the Parole Board can continue to reject 
parole indefinitely for someone with a life sentence.  During cross-examination, 
Schafer asserted without defense objection that current law could change and 
thereby allow good time or parole consideration before the years 2024 or 2029 
(for a minimum 30-year sentence).  Schafer also stated that parole boards are 
governed by regulations, not law, and therefore could grant parole when an inmate 
first becomes eligible. 
{¶97} Additionally, Todd Ishee, a MANCI deputy warden, testified about 
conditions at the Ohio State Penitentiary (“OSP”), a super maximum security 
January Term, 2002 
27 
facility where Cassano was then confined.  At OSP, inmates are locked down in 
single cells for twenty-three hours a day, are restricted from direct contact with 
other inmates, and are under heavy guard and restraint when not in their cells.  
OSP inmates pose little risk to others.  On cross-examination, Ishee agreed 
without objection that OSP came into existence after the Lucasville riot. 
{¶98} Cassano challenges the propriety of the prosecutor’s cross-
examination of Schafer that the laws governing sentencing could change and that 
policy governing parole release might change.  However, Cassano did not object 
and thereby waived all but plain error.  Of course, a prosecutor should not 
speculate in argument on the “possibility of escape, commutation, and pardon.”  
State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 238, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  However, in 
this case, the prosecutor was not speculating about future events but simply 
testing, by cross-examination, the foundation of Schafer’s testimony. 
{¶99} The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by asking Ishee about 
the reason OSP was built.  Since Cassano relied heavily upon the strict conditions 
at OSP, where Cassano resided prior to trial, the state could cross-examine Ishee 
about the historical reasons behind those restrictions.  Cross-examination “shall be 
permitted on all relevant matters,” Evid.R. 611(B), and the scope of cross-
examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Slagle 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 605, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶100} Cassano complains about the prosecutor’s final penalty argument.  
Here, the prosecutor noted that future events might require abandoning OSP’s 
single-cell policy or might require transfer of some OSP inmates to other prisons.  
That argument rebutted defense counsel’s argument that Cassano would be 
functioning in a single cell and that prison authorities could have prevented 
Hardy’s death by housing Cassano alone.  Further, the prosecutor’s argument 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
rebutted defense assertions that Cassano no longer represented a danger because 
he would be under close scrutiny at the OSP. 
{¶101} A prosecutor can respond to issues raised by an accused.  State v. 
Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 336, 667 N.E.2d 960; State v. Lundgren (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 474, 491, 653 N.E.2d 304.  Moreover, “[p]rosecutors can urge the 
merits of their cause and legitimately argue that defense mitigation evidence is 
worthy of little or no weight.”  State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 399, 659 
N.E.2d 292. 
{¶102} Here, the state was not relying upon arguments about changes in 
the law or suggesting that Cassano might be released early.  Instead, the prosecutor 
responded to Cassano’s optimistic speculation that current conditions at the Ohio 
State Penitentiary would continue indefinitely.  The trial court properly rejected 
Cassano’s objection to that state argument. 
{¶103} We reject proposition of law X. 
Appropriateness of Death Penalty 
{¶104} In proposition of law XI, Cassano argues that the death sentence is 
not appropriate as applied to him.  We will consider these arguments during the 
independent sentence review. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶105} In proposition of law XII, Cassano argues that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance at trial.  Reversal of convictions on ineffective assistance 
requires the defendant to show “first, that counsel’s performance was deficient 
and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 669, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 
136, 142, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
January Term, 2002 
29 
{¶106} Cassano argues that his counsel were ineffective in failing to object 
to the court’s self-defense instructions imposing a duty to retreat on Cassano.  At 
trial, counsel objected to this instruction and preserved the issue.  As previously 
discussed in connection with proposition of law VII, the self-defense instruction 
did not materially prejudice Cassano. 
{¶107} Cassano complains that his counsel failed to object to penalty 
instructions relating to the verdict as a recommendation and the ability of a 
solitary juror to preclude the death penalty.  In our discussion of proposition of 
law IX, we concluded that the trial court properly instructed the jury on those 
points in the penalty phase. 
{¶108} Cassano suggests that counsel improperly moved to exclude the 
media from a suppression hearing.  However, counsel was protecting Cassano’s 
rights by trying to prevent public disclosure of “other acts” evidence that counsel 
hoped to suppress.  Attempting to exclude the media under those circumstances 
represented a sound tactical choice by counsel.  “[A] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Moreover, Cassano has failed to demonstrate prejudice, “a reasonable 
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different.”  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
{¶109} Cassano asserts “numerous instances” of reported ineffectiveness 
but fails to cite examples other than those already discussed.  Our review of the 
record does not disclose that counsel were constitutionally ineffective.  Instead, 
the record reveals that Cassano’s three lawyers fought diligently and competently 
throughout the proceedings to protect his rights.  Cassano’s claim that counsel 
were ineffective lacks merit.  We reject proposition XII. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
Settled Issues 
Peremptory Challenges 
{¶110} In proposition XIII, Cassano argues that the state improperly used 
peremptory challenges against jurors who were hesitant to impose the death 
penalty.  However, prosecutors are not prohibited from using peremptory strikes 
against prospective jurors opposed to the death penalty.  See State v. Cook (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 516, 518, 605 N.E.2d 70; Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d at 249, 586 N.E.2d 
1042.  We summarily reject proposition XIII.  State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568. 
Constitutionality 
{¶111} We also summarily reject Cassano’s proposition XIV challenging 
the constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty statute.  State v. Carter (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 593, 606, 734 N.E.2d 345; State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; Poindexter, 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, 
syllabus.  Moreover, Cassano waived any international law challenge by not 
raising that issue before the trial court.  State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 
271, 754 N.E.2d 1129; State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 22 OBR 199, 
489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
Penalty-phase Evidence 
{¶112} As previously noted, Sandra Schafer testified about the parole 
process and the remoteness of Cassano’s chances for parole.  Deputy Warden 
Ishee testified about the strict control over inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary, 
where Cassano had resided. 
{¶113} Carmella Tobias, Cassano’s sister, stated that she was in poor 
health and cared for their parents, who were in very poor health.  Tobias described 
Cassano as a good boy who had attended Catholic schools.  Unfortunately, 
January Term, 2002 
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Cassano got in trouble, was sent to the Training Institute of Central Ohio 
(“TICO”), a youth detention facility, and, when released, was “very angry.”  In 
1976, Cassano was sent to prison in Lucasville but did not fare well when he 
shared a cell with other inmates.  Tobias expressed her sorrow about what had 
happened to Hardy.  She asked the jury to spare her brother’s life. 
{¶114} Tobias stated that she, her sister, Augustina Winland, and their 
brother, Frank Cassano, do not have criminal records and that their parents had 
tried hard to raise them correctly.  She attributed the changes in Cassano’s 
personality to the time he had spent in TICO.  Tobias also stated that their father 
was an alcoholic and had been violent to their mother. 
{¶115} Augustina Winland described Cassano as a good boy who liked 
baseball, fishing, and his pets.  However, Cassano, like his father, had a temper.  
Their father did not show much affection for the children, and the family had 
financial difficulties because their father drank heavily and gambled. 
{¶116} Winland loves her brother very much and has visited him 
frequently in various prisons.  She expressed sorrow about what Cassano had 
done and expressed sympathy to the Hardy family.  Winland stated her desire that 
Cassano not receive the death penalty. 
{¶117} Dr. Clemons Bartollas, a professor of sociology anda  Presbyterian 
minister, worked as a social worker at TICO when Cassano was an inmate.  
According to Dr. Bartollas, Cassano, then sixteen years old, did not belong at 
TICO, which housed “the most severe hard core delinquents” in Ohio.  Cassano 
entered TICO “a desperate young man who was troubled.”  After being victimized 
at TICO, Cassano left as a bitter man with the life-long scars of a chronic victim.  
Cassano was “much more anti-social than when he came in.” 
{¶118} Dr. Bartollas claimed that the state made “serious mistakes” in 
dealing with Cassano, starting with placing him at TICO too soon.  The state’s 
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second mistake was treating Cassano as dangerous rather than as troubled.  Dr. 
Bartollas stated that Cassano’s nine suicide attempts and hunger strikes were an 
implicit cry for help.  The state also made a mistake by not keeping Cassano in a 
single cell and by placing Hardy, a young, vulnerable inmate, in the same cell with 
Cassano, who was hardened by his years in prison.  The “type of [Cassano’s] 
victimization” and the state’s cumulative errors “contributed to what happened in 
October of 1997.”  Dr. Bartollas believes that Cassano will do well at OSP, where 
he will have his own space. 
{¶119} On cross-examination, Dr. Bartollas confirmed that Cassano had a 
juvenile record, including purse snatching at age ten and throwing an egg at a 
teacher at age thirteen.  Cassano started fires in the home when he was five and 
eight years old.  He also stated that Cassano had difficulty adjusting to school and 
that he had cut his sister with a pair of scissors.  When Cassano was thirteen to 
fifteen, he used drugs and alcohol, and at age sixteen he was sent to TICO.  Dr. 
Bartollas conceded that the aggravated murder Cassano committed in 1976 had 
nothing to do with prison conditions. 
{¶120} Jody Devine, Cassano’s girlfriend when they were teenagers, 
described Cassano as a nice young man who worked steadily when she knew him.  
He did not use drugs or engage in any illegal activity when she dated him.  
Cassano was never violent towards her.  They kept in contact through letters while 
he was in prison.  Devine asked the jury to please allow Cassano to live. 
{¶121} In an unsworn statement, Cassano asserted that because he was 
deprived of freedom and love for twenty-three years, he had become “an unfeeling 
dehumanized person.”  He stated that “prison has made [him] hate with all [his] 
heart [and has] turned [him] into a cold-hearted person.”  Although “dehumanized 
and degraded,” he stated that he had kept his pride, dignity, and morals.  He 
“really and truly deeply loved” Jody, but otherwise his “heart is filled with hate.” 
January Term, 2002 
33 
{¶122} According to Cassano, his childhood was violent, and he grew up 
with “violence and more violence.” As a youth, he got into many fights, even 
when he tried to avoid them.  He began drinking and using drugs, including acid 
and  marijuana.  However, he was always kind to pets and animals.  Jody “tried to 
get [him] to go straight, but [he] didn’t listen.” 
{¶123} In prison, he saw men raped and killed and also saw more drugs 
than on the street.  At Lucasville, he started “using steel” rather than his hands in 
fights.  He felt that he had no choice in dealing with inmates who “tried to harm 
[him] or tried to force [him] to be a punk.”  In prison, he fought and “won [his] 
respect” and would not join any gangs.  In prison, he “was too honest for the 
convicts, [and] wasn’t for no games, preying on the weak to get money or drugs.”  
Cassano also believed that he should have been paroled a few years earlier.  Drugs 
were his downfall, but he has not used drugs since his 1976 conviction. 
{¶124} According to Cassano, Hardy would not “settle down” but “just 
kept attacking” Cassano.  Cassano “tried to avoid it,” and Hardy’s death “was not 
[his] fault.”  Cassano wanted the jury to spare his life and expressed sorrow about 
Hardy’s death. 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶125} Specification one charged, and the jury found, that Cassano killed 
Hardy while Cassano was an inmate in a detention facility.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(4).  
Specification two charged, and the jury found, that prior to this aggravated 
murder, Cassano had been convicted of a purposeful killing, aggravated murder, 
in Summit County on May 25, 1976.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  After independent 
assessment, we conclude that both aggravating circumstances were proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
{¶126} The nature and circumstances of the offense offer no mitigating 
features.  Although Cassano claimed self-defense and provocation, the evidence 
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34 
suggests a deliberate murder while Hardy lay on his top bunk, asleep.  Moreover, 
Cassano repeatedly stabbed Hardy and did so in their locked prison cell from 
which Hardy could not escape. 
{¶127} Cassano’s history and background provide little mitigation.  While 
Cassano’s father likely drank excessively and shared little affection with his 
children, those facts offer minimal mitigation.  Cassano’s parents cared for him 
and provided food, clothing, schooling, and an atmosphere where he could grow 
and prosper.  Cassano’s siblings appear to have risen above whatever aspect of 
their family life was dysfunctional.  Unfortunately, Cassano made a choice early 
in his life to live outside the law.  Even after being institutionalized as a youth, he 
persisted in living a life of crime.  His character offers no mitigation. 
{¶128} We find no significant evidence of statutory mitigating factors R.C. 
2929.04(B)(1) through (B)(6).  As to “other factors,” R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), we 
decline to grant any mitigating weight to the testimony of Dr. Bartollas, who 
faults the state for mistakes in dealing with Cassano.  Cassano made deliberate 
choices in his life and must bear the consequences of those choices.  We note that 
Cassano’s family loves him, as does his childhood girlfriend, and they do not want 
him executed. 
{¶129} After weighing each aggravating circumstance against the 
collective mitigating evidence, we conclude that each aggravating circumstance 
outweighs any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Killing another 
while an inmate and having previously been convicted of aggravated murder are 
grave aggravating circumstances.  Cassano by his acts has demonstrated that he is 
a menace to the life, health, and safety of others, even when he is in prison.  We 
find the death penalty to be  appropriate. 
{¶130} Moreover, we find the death penalty to be proportionate when 
Cassano’s offense is compared with other aggravated murders involving murders 
January Term, 2002 
35 
by inmates.  See, e.g., State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 750 N.E.2d 90; 
State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 705 N.E.2d 329; State v. Carter (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585. 
{¶131} We find the death penalty is also proportionate when Cassano’s 
case is compared with cases involving persons who were previously convicted of 
purposeful killings.  See, e.g., State v. Cowans (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 717 
N.E.2d 298; State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 676 N.E.2d 82; State v. Carter, 64 
Ohio St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595; State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 584 
N.E.2d 1192; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373; and State v. 
Mapes (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 108, 19 OBR 318, 484 N.E.2d 140. 
{¶132} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of common pleas is 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
James J. Mayer, Jr., Richland County Prosecuting Attorney, and John R. 
Spon, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David L. Doughten and John P. Parker, for appellant. 
__________________