Title: State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-980.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-980 
THE STATE EX REL. TURNER, APPELLANT, v. CORRIGAN, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-980.] 
Writ sought to compel judge to resentence petitioner de novo—Petitioner had 
adequate remedy at law—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of 
mandamus affirmed. 
(No. 2013-1811—Submitted August 19, 2014—Decided March 24, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 100102, 2013-Ohio-4717. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Donald Turner, appeals the judgment of the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals denying his petition for a writ of mandamus.  We 
affirm. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Turner was convicted of robbery in October 2006.  State v. Turner, 
Cuyahoga C.P. case No. CR-453056.  The trial court, Judge Brian Corrigan, 
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sentenced him to five years in prison and three years of postrelease control 
(“Sentencing Order 1”). 
{¶ 3} On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated 
Sentencing Order 1 and remanded the cause for resentencing because the trial 
court had failed to advise Turner about the particulars of postrelease control at the 
sentencing hearing.  8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88958, 2007-Ohio-5732, ¶ 54-57. 
{¶ 4} On May 29, 2008, Turner appeared before the trial court for 
resentencing.  In open court, the trial judge advised Turner that he would be 
subject to three years of postrelease control and that a failure to abide by the terms 
of postrelease control could result in additional prison time.  The corresponding 
entry issued by the trial court did not include the means of conviction or the 
prison term but instead referred only to the postrelease-control term: “The court 
amends its sentencing entry to include 3 years of PRC [postrelease control]” 
(“Sentencing Order 2”). 
{¶ 5} Turner then appealed from Sentencing Order 2.  On October 31, 
2008, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for 12 days only, 
with instructions to clarify Sentencing Order 2.  Specifically, the appellate court 
ordered the trial court to produce a new entry containing all required information, 
including the means of conviction and the terms of the sentence, in a single 
document.  8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91695 (Oct. 31, 2008). 
{¶ 6} On November 12, 2008, the trial court issued Sentencing Order 3 
in response to the remand order.  One month later, on December 18, 2008, the 
court of appeals dismissed Turner’s appeal for failure to file a transcript of the 
May 2008 resentencing hearing.  8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91695, 2008-Ohio-
6648.  The judgment did not mention Sentencing Order 3.  Turner sought 
discretionary review in this court, but his appeal was not accepted.  121 Ohio 
St.3d 1476, 2009-Ohio-2045, 905 N.E.2d 655. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
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Subsequent procedural history 
{¶ 7} Turner alleges that the appellate court mandated a de novo 
resentencing and that Sentencing Order 3 did not comply with that mandate.  He 
claims he has still not been validly sentenced and that Judge Corrigan remains 
under a clear legal duty to resentence him de novo. 
{¶ 8} Turner sought relief by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
only to find that nonjurisdictional sentencing errors are not cognizable in habeas 
corpus.  Turner v. Brunsman, 123 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009-Ohio-5588, 917 N.E.2d 
269, ¶ 1.  He then commenced an original action for a writ of mandamus against 
Judge Corrigan (and other respondents) in this court.  State ex rel. Turner v. 
Stewart, case No. 2012-1867.  In his third ground for relief in his mandamus 
action, Turner challenged the validity of the sentencing entries issued after the 
first remand.  We granted respondents’ motions to dismiss, without opinion, on 
January 23, 2013.  134 Ohio St.3d 1413, 2013-Ohio-158, 981 N.E.2d 881. 
{¶ 9} On July 11, 2013, Turner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in 
the Eighth District Court of Appeals.  Turner sought a writ compelling Judge 
Corrigan to resentence him de novo, which he claimed was required by the 
appellate court’s decision in his appeal from Sentencing Order 1. 
{¶ 10} Judge Corrigan filed a motion for summary judgment in lieu of an 
answer.  On October 22, 2013, the court of appeals granted summary judgment in 
favor of Judge Corrigan, for three reasons: (1) Turner failed to attach an affidavit 
to his mandamus complaint, as required by Loc.App.R. 45(B)(1)(a) of the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals, (2) Turner had an adequate remedy at law, and (3) res 
judicata applied. 
{¶ 11} Turner timely appealed to this court, raising five arguments in four 
propositions of law, which we now address. 
 
 
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Legal analysis 
The absence of a Civ.R. 56(C) affidavit (proposition of law No. 1) 
{¶ 12} In his first proposition of law, Turner objects to the court of 
appeals’ granting of summary judgment based on exhibits that were not 
authenticated by affidavit, contrary to Civ.R. 56(C).  This argument is not well 
taken. 
{¶ 13} The court required no evidentiary materials to determine that 
Turner’s affidavit was defective or that he had failed to state a claim in 
mandamus.  All that was required was an examination of the complaint itself.  
Indeed, with respect to the court’s ruling that the affidavit was defective, the court 
made clear that it was not granting summary judgment, but rather was dismissing 
the petition. 
{¶ 14} The first proposition of law has no merit. 
Mootness (proposition of law No. 2) 
{¶ 15} In his second proposition of law, Turner asserts that the court of 
appeals erred in paragraph four of its decision, when it dismissed his complaint as 
moot.  However, the only thing the court of appeals did in paragraph four was 
acknowledge that Judge Corrigan raised mootness as a defense.  The court of 
appeals never adopted mootness as a basis for dismissing the present case, and 
therefore, this proposition of law has no merit. 
The affidavit requirement (proposition of law No. 3) 
{¶ 16} Turner argues in proposition of law No. 3 that it was error to 
dismiss his petition for violating Loc.R. 45(B)(1)(a).  Although we agree with this 
proposition of law, it does not alter the outcome of the appeal, as discussed below. 
{¶ 17} The Eighth District Court of Appeals’ local rule governing original 
actions provides: “All complaints must contain the specific statements of fact 
upon which the claim of illegality is based and must be supported by an affidavit 
from the plaintiff or relator specifying the details of the claim.”  
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Loc.R. 45(B)(1)(a).  Turner’s affidavit incorporated the factual allegations of the 
complaint by reference and then stated that the allegations were “true and correct 
to the best of [his] own personal knowledge, information, and belief.”  The court 
of appeals dismissed Turner’s petition for failure to comply with Loc.R. 
45(B)(1)(a). 
{¶ 18} The Ohio Constitution permits a court to adopt local rules 
governing practice in that court, so long as the rule in question is not inconsistent 
with any rule governing practice or procedure promulgated by the Ohio Supreme 
Court.  Article IV, Section 5(B), Ohio Constitution; State ex rel. Henneke v. 
Davis, 25 Ohio St.3d 23, 24, 494 N.E.2d 1133 (1986).  We have previously held 
that a statute requiring complaints to include affidavits of verification is 
unenforceable because it conflicts with Civ.R. 11, which states that pleadings 
“need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.”  See Hiatt v. S. Health 
Facilities, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 236, 237-238, 626 N.E.2d 71 (1994) (striking down 
statute requiring the submission of an affidavit as part of a medical-malpractice 
complaint); State ex rel. Madison v. Cotner, 66 Ohio St.2d 448, 449, 423 N.E.2d 
72 (1981) (declining to enforce requirement in R.C. 2731.04 that an application 
for a writ of mandamus be “verified by affidavit”). 
{¶ 19} Judge Corrigan argues that the rule articulated in Madison should 
not apply to a local rule, but offers no explanation for why this should be so.  
Article IV, Section 5(B) makes clear that rules of procedure promulgated by this 
court supplant conflicting local rules.  See In re Appeal of Little Printing Co., 70 
Ohio App.2d 182, 184 435 N.E.2d 687 (10th Dist.1980) (holding that Civ.R. 
41(B)(1), which requires notice before an involuntary dismissal, trumps local rule 
permitting dismissals without notice). 
{¶ 20} Judge Corrigan correctly notes that this court has affirmed the 
dismissal of a mandamus petition for violating this exact requirement of 
Loc.R. 45(B)(1)(a).  State ex rel. Leon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
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123 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-4688, 914 N.E.2d 402, ¶ 1.  However, the relator 
in Leon argued that because he was a pro se litigant, he did not have to comply 
with the local rule; he did not challenge the enforceability of the rule, and so we 
were not called upon to address the issue. 
{¶ 21} Based on this analysis, Turner’s third proposition of law has merit. 
Adequate remedy at law and res judicata (proposition of law No. 4) 
{¶ 22} In its decision, the court of appeals held, “Turner had an adequate 
remedy at law through a direct appeal, and he has already unsuccessfully sought 
to obtain the same relief through his petition for a writ of mandamus that has been 
dismissed by the Ohio Supreme Court.”  8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100102, 2013-
Ohio-4717, ¶ 8.  In proposition of law No. 4, Turner challenges both conclusions.  
The first issue is dispositive of this appeal. 
{¶ 23} The court of appeals offered no explanation for its conclusion that 
Turner had an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal.  Judge Corrigan 
contends that Turner had an adequate opportunity to appeal the May 30, 2008 
sentencing order (“Sentencing Order 2”), and in fact did pursue that appeal until 
the appeal was dismissed for failure to file a transcript. 
{¶ 24} The issue of the sufficiency of Sentencing Order 2 became moot 
when, on remand, the trial court issued Sentencing Order 3.  The court of appeals 
made Sentencing Order 3 a part of the appellate record in this case.  2013-Ohio-
4717, ¶ 3.  Judge Corrigan says nothing about whether Turner had an adequate 
remedy at law to challenge Sentencing Order 3. 
{¶ 25} Turner arguably had no realistic opportunity to raise arguments in 
the court of appeals regarding Sentencing Order 3.  The court of appeals issued its 
dismissal entry soon after jurisdiction returned to that court, without affording the 
parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs, and its decision did not discuss 
the effect of Sentencing Order 3.  But Turner still had the option of making 
Sentencing Order 3 part of his discretionary appeal to this court, and he chose not 
January Term, 2015 
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to do so.  See Turner’s memorandum in support of jurisdiction filed in Supreme 
Court case No. 2009-0329, on February 12, 2009. 
{¶ 26} A discretionary appeal to this court qualifies as an adequate 
remedy at law, which will preclude an extraordinary writ, even if this court 
declines to hear the case.  State ex rel. Smith v. O’Connor, 71 Ohio St.3d 660, 
663, 646 N.E.2d 1115 (1995).  Therefore, the court of appeals correctly declined 
to issue a writ of mandamus on the grounds that Turner had an adequate remedy 
at law. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Donald Turner, pro se. 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James 
E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________________