Title: MIGUEL ANGEL RIVERA-CERRITOS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREPROMULGATED BYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED AS AUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANY COURTOF THIS STATE. MIGUEL ANGEL RIVERA-CERRITOS 2002-SC-0355-MR APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE GARY D . PAYNE, JUDGE 2001-CR-0428 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLIS COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Miguel Angel Rivera-Cerritos ("Rivera") appeals, as a matter of right, his conviction of intentional murder and sentence to 20 years' imprisonment . For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Rivera's conviction and sentence . On December 31, 1999, Rivera shot and killed his lover, Penny Stone, in her bathtub . As Rivera knew, Stone did not have an exclusive relationship with Rivera . Stone was also sleeping with another man, Jose Soto. On December 30, Soto slept with Stone at her apartment. The next day, after Soto had left for work, Rivera came to Stone's apartment. Rivera testified that he and Stone got into an argument because Rivera had slept with Stone's roommate, Connie Bryant. While it is unclear exactly what happened during their altercation, it is undisputed that Rivera was shot once in the stomach by the same gun that lodged two lethal bullets into Stone . After the shootings, Rivera left the apartment and, eventually, was taken by a friend to the hospital where he underwent surgery . Rivera is Mexican, cannot speak English and needs an interpreter . Upon questioning by the Lexington Police Department, Rivera at first claimed he was the victim of a drive-by-shooting . However, a few days later, when the police discovered that Rivera and Stone had been shot by bullets from the same gun, Rivera admitted that he had been in Stone's apartment . Rivera now claimed Stone had been discussing a cocaine deal with a third party who eventually shot both Stone and Rivera before fleeing the scene . Having failed to report Stone's death, Rivera was deported to Mexico for falsely reporting an incident . Despite being deported, Rivera returned to the United States . Rivera was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") in Atlanta, Georgia, which extradited him to Kentucky where he was arrested for the murder of Penny Stone . At trial, the defense argued that Stone had learned that Rivera slept with her roommate, flew into a rage, shot him in the stomach, and then went to the bathroom . Suffering extreme emotional distress, Rivera shot and killed Stone . The prosecutor argued that Rivera shot Stone because he did not want her to sleep with Soto or anyone else . Rivera was convicted of intentional murder . On appeal, Rivera argues that the trial court committed reversible error by 1) failing to properly instruct the jury on extreme emotional distress and failing to explain reasonable doubt ; 2) precluding Rivera from putting on evidence that Stone slept with other men in addition to Mr . Soto; 3) failing to excuse for cause a juror whose cousin works in the Fayette Commonwealth's Attorney office ; and 4) allowing the prosecutor to tell the jury in closing argument that the defense never questioned the accuracy of the interpretation of Rivera's statements to investigators . JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS Appellant admits that his EED challenge to the jury instructions was not preserved for appeal, but nonetheless asks this Court to review this claim of error under RCr 10 .26 . RCr 10 .26 provides that an appellate court may consider unpreserved error if it is a "palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party . . . [and reverse] upon determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error." In order to grant relief under RCr 10.26, this Court must conclude, after considering the whole case, that a substantial possibility exists that the result would have been different . Partin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S .W .2d 219, 224 (1996) . Rivera argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding reasonable doubt and EED . According to Rivera, the jury should have been instructed that if it had a reasonable doubt as to whether Rivera was acting under the influence of EED, it could not find him guilty of murder, but instead would have to find him guilty of first- degree manslaughter. We hold that there is no palpable error in the jury instructions and no resulting manifest injustice . A reasonable doubt instruction was given as to EED on the charge of murder. The intentional murder instruction specifically instructs the jury that Rivera could be found guilty of murder : "if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following : A. That . . . he killed Penny Stone by shooting her ; AND B . That in so doing, he caused the death of Penny Stone intentionally ; AND C. That in so doing, he was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance ." Rivera's next argument, that EED should have been included in the first-degree manslaughter instruction is contrary to law. See Baze v. Commonwealth , Ky., 965 S .W.2d 817, 823 (1997) (holding that it is error to require the Commonwealth to prove the presence of extreme emotional disturbance as an element of the offense of first- degree manslaughter), cert . denied, 523 U .S . 1083, 118 S . Ct . 1536, 140L . Ed . 2d 65 (1998) . EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE The trial court excluded evidence concerning alleged relationships Stone had with men other than Soto or Rivera . Under KRS 403, the trial court held that even if relevant, any probative value of such testimony would be substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice . A relevancy determination by the trial court will not be disturbed unless we find an abuse of discretion . Partin v . Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1996) . Under KRE 401, evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence . Here, Ms. Stone's relationship with other men is not relevant to the determination of whether Rivera shot Stone under the influence of EED . In determining EED, the question is the killer's state of mind, i.e., what was going on in Rivera's head . Stone's mental well-being or lack thereof is irrelevant . Rivera's argument regarding EED is somewhat confusing . On the one hand, Rivera argues that "EED occurred in this case because Ms . Stone could not accept that Mr . Rivera had slept with another woman, her roommate." However, Stone's state of mind is irrelevant to Rivera's emotional state in determining EED . Then, Rivera argues that he had known that Stone dated other men and was not surprised by this information and thus would not have killed Stone because of other men . But, this has no relevancy to Rivera's EED, as EED requires a triggering event . Springer v . Commonwealth , Ky., 998 S .W.2d 439, 452 (1999) . Here, under Rivera's theory of the case, the triggering event was the fact that Stone flew into a jealous rage and shot him in the stomach . The triggering event was Rivera getting shot in the stomach . Stone's relationship with other men is irrelevant. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of such relationships, particularly where Rivera was allowed to testify to the jury that he was well aware that Stone's relationship with him was not exclusive . Even if such evidence was relevant, exclusion was harmless, as it was cumulative. JUROR SELECTION Rivera argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to strike for cause a juror whose cousin worked in the Commonwealth's Attorney office . The juror testified that he only saw his cousin at family gatherings and that he did not think it would affect his ability to be impartial . The trial court denied defense counsel's motion to strike for cause, forcing Rivera to use a peremptory challenge on the juror. Motions to strike jurors for cause are within the sound discretion of the trial judge . Woodall v . Commonwealth , Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104 (2001) . Nothing in the record indicates that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendant's motion to strike . Rivera has presented no evidence on appeal that in any way supports a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in believing the juror's ability to be impartial . ACCURACY OF INTERPRETATIONS Rivera argues reversible error occurred during closing argument when the prosecution "lied" to the jury by stating that Rivera had never challenged the accuracy of the interpretations of his statements to the authorities . Rivera claims such challenge was nestled in his motion in limine to preclude the introduction of interpreters' statements for lack of proper qualifications pursuant to KRS 30A.400 . KRS 30A.400 requires that "[i]f a person has been detained in police custody or has been arrested, an interpreter shall be provided prior to any interrogation . . . ." KRS 30A.400(1) . Statements may be used against a person entitled to interpreter services "only if the statement was made, offered, or elicited in the presence of a qualified interpreter." KRS 30A.400(3) . KRS 30A.400 provides that an individual's eligibility for an interpreter may be challenged, but here, no such challenge was made as it is uncontested that Rivera cannot speak English and needs an interpreter . On appeal, we assume Rivera means to challenge the qualifications of the interpreter, not Rivera's actual right to have the services of an interpreter. KRS 30A.405 provides that "[a]ny person appointed as interpreter pursuant to this chapter shall be qualified by training or experience to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary ." Rivera challenged the interpreters' qualifications on grounds that they were not impartial or accurate . Standards for interpreter qualifications are prescribed by this Court . KRS 30A.405(2) . When Rivera was first interrogated by the police, his interpreter was a police officer, who, in addition to serving as a translator for a fellow officer, also engaged in independent questioning of Rivera . During Rivera's second interrogation, Rivera's interpreter was an INS agent, Agent Farrow. Rivera argues that both of these interpreters were acting in their roles as law enforcement agents while interviewing him and, therefore, their interpretations were tainted and biased by their superseding law enforcement objectives . If we accepted Rivera's position, then any statement gained in the process of law enforcement activities requiring the use of an interpreter would be tainted . This goes far beyond the requirements of this Court . Our Administrative Procedures only require that, pending implementation of a recognized certification process, "all efforts shall be made to obtain an interpreter with training or experience in non-English speaking translation ." Ky . AP Part IX § 4 (S) . Further, the procedures suggest that qualified interpreters can be found for non-English speaking persons by contacting "universities, schools, or other resources known in your community." Ky . AP Part IX § 5 (2) (b) . The trial court held qualification hearings on both interpreters . Both were found qualified and nothing in the record warrants reversal of the trial court's finding . As for Rivera's claim that the prosecution lied in closing argument, we disagree . The prosecution stated that Rivera never challenged the accuracy of the statements taken by the interpreters . From Rivera's perspective, the statements taken by the interpreters accurately reflected his testimony . Rivera's counsel did challenge the accuracy of Agent Farrow's interpretations on technical grounds : i.e. , she used the third person instead of the first person and she used the word gun instead of pistol . However, such technicalities did not affect Agent Farrow's qualifications to accurately interpret Rivera's statement . Further, these challenges do not go to the accuracy of the content of Agent Farrow's interpretations, which Rivera never did challenge . We reject this argument as baseless as this substantively accurate claim falls within the range of latitude allowed counsel in closing argument . See Butcher v . Commonwealth , Ky., 96 S.W.3d 3 (2002) ; Slaughter v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 744 S .W.2d 407, 412 (1987) . For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court . All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Karen Maurer Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : A . B . Chandler, III Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204