Title: Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. Du Pont. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Cross-Appeal, filed 01/11/2006 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

12 AON Loo

 

---000:

2
EXOTICS HAWAIT-KONA, INC, ; SHARON MURAKAMI,

as Special Representative for the ESTATE OF Gj)
CHIAKI KATO; HARVY TOMONO; ANDRAEA PARTNERS;
ARVAK AGRONOMICS, INC.; C & L ORCHIDS and ISLAND
AGRIBUSINESS, LTD.; ERNEST CARLBOM and DONNA CARLBOM;
CYMBIDIUM PARTNERS; FLORAL RESOURCES/HAWAII, INC.
FLOWERS, TNC. ; GLENWOOD CYMBIDIUM PARTNERS;
GREEN POINT NURSERIES, INC.; DANIEL HATA d/b/a

  

leg

   

 

HATA FARM; HANATIAN ANTHURIUMS, LTD.; HAWATZAN
GREENHOUSES, INC.; HAWATIAN HEART, INC.; ALBERT ISA
G/b/a ALBERT ISA NURSERY; KAIMU NURSERY, INC.
KAOHE NURSERY; MARGARET KINCAID and PETER KINCAID

@/b/a ANUENUE FARMS; KONA ORCHIDS, INC.: KUPULAU
ANTHURIUM PARTNERS; ALAN KUWAHARA @/b/a PUNA FLORICULTURE;

JAMES KUWAHARA 4/b/a JAMES S. KUWAHARA FARM; YOSO

KUWAHARA, INC. ; HENRY LILJEDAHL; NALAAI PARTNERS;

JAMES MCCULLY; MITSUO MIYATAKE d/b/a MIVATAKE FARMS;
CURTIS NAKAOKA G/b/a KONA GROWN NURSERIES; GEORGE J.
NAKASHIMA d/b/a NAKASHIMA FARM; JEFFREY NEWMAN d/b/a
NEWMAN'S NURSERIES; MARK KX. NOZAKI @/b/a NOZAKI FARMS:
BIG ROCK ANTHURIUNS, INC.; PATRICK OKA d/b/a OKA NURSERY;
CARL OKAMOTO d/b/a CARL OKAMOTO & LEHUA TROPICAL FLOWERS;
‘CLYDE OKAMOTO d/b/a HO'ONANEA FARMS; WADE OKAMOTO d/b/a

PARADISE ANTHURIUMS; RONALD OKAZAKI and DORA OKAZAKI

@/b/a LEHUA ANTHURIUM NURSERY; NEAL OKIMOTO 4/b/a

PACIFIC PARADISE ORCHIDS; ORCHID PARTNERS; PACIFIC

NURSERIES, INC.; POLYNESIAN ORCHIDS & ANTHURIUMS, INC. ;
PUNA FLOWERS & FOLIAGE, INC.; SUNSHINE FARMS; GEORGE
SHIROMA d/b/a G. SHIROMA FARMS; MASATO SHIROMA d/b/a

MAE'S NURSERY; MASAO SUNADA; SAMUEL H. TAKA & SYLVIA A.
TAKA d/b/a S. TAKA; YOSHIO TAKEMOTO, MIDORI TAKEMOTO,

CARY TAKEMOTO, MORRIS TAKEMOTO and NORMAN TAKEMOTO
@/b/a TAKENOTO' FARM; FETULIMA TAMASESE d/b/a PACIFIC
KONA ORCHIDS; HAROLD S. TANOUYE & SONS, INC.;

HENRY TERADA and LORAINE Y. TERADA d/b/a H & L TERADA
FARM; VANTANAGE PARTNERS; UNIWAI I LIMITED PARTNERS;
UNIWAI IT LIMITED PARTNERS; WAIAKEA PARTNERS; DWIGHT
E. WALKER, JR. and BERNICE X. WALKER d/b/a PUNA

HANA FLOWERS; MARK WILLMAN 6/b/a HAWAII ORCHIDS;
EXOTICS HAWAII, LTD., Plaintiffs-appellante/Cross-Appellees

 

 

 

 

 

 

ve

 

 

aats
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E. I. DU PONT De NEMOURS & COMPANY; ALLEN TESHINA;
and REGINALD HASEGAWA, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

 

no. 27489

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 97-103K)

NOVEMBER 21, 2007

MOON, €.9., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, JJ., AND CIRCUIT
‘To0GE LEE, IN PLACE OF DUFFY, J., RECUSED:
ACOBA, J., DISSENTING
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOOK, C.J.

‘The instant action arises from product ability cases
initiated by the pleintiffs-eppellants/cross-appellees Albert Isa
dba Albert Isa Nursery (Isa), Samuel H. Teka and Sylvia A. Taka
dba §. Taka (the Tekas), Mark Willman dba Hawai'i orchids
(witiman), and James Necully {hereinafter, collectively, the
plaintiffs} in 1992 end 1993 against, inter alia, the defendant-
appellee/cross-appellant F.1. du Pont de Nenours and Conpany
(DuPont), alleging that contaninated Benlate, an egricultural
fungicide manufactured by DuFont, had killed or damaged their

plants and nurseries.* Between 1994 and 1995, the plaintiffs

 

} there were originally sixty plaintiffs in the present action:
however, futty-sin pleintiiie resolved their coses sgeinst DuFont Guring the
Circuit court proceedings. Specifically, thirty-seven of the original sixty
pleintitfe settled their claine against DuFont en Septexber 27, 2002, four on
Beptenber 2, 2003, and thirteen on June 24, 2008. The remaining six
pleintiffe proceeded with their case te ite conclusion; however, epperently
(continued...)

 

  

 
 

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oy
settled their product liability cases. In 2000, the plaintiffs

commenced the instant action against, inter alia, DuPont,
alleging that only after settling their claims did they discover
that DuPont had improperly failed to reveal certain vital
scientific data and information indicating that Benlate was
contaminated. As such, the plaintiffs believed that DuPont was
guilty of fraudulently withholding such evidence in order to
induce them to eettle for less than the fair value of their
clains.

In three sumary judgment orders, the Circuit Court of
the Third Circuit, the Honorable Ronald J. tbarra presiding,
found in favor of DuPont on all of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Significantly, the circuit court, without determining whether
DuPont indeed committed fraud, found as a matter of law that the
plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proving damages.
According to the circuit court, the damages available to the
plaintiffs wes ‘the fair compromise value of the claim at the

time of the settlement." A judgment, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules

1. cont inves)
two of the six pleintiffe cettled thelr clains against DuPont inasmuch #8 only
{he Inetant four plesntiffe appealed to this court. Socn after the filing of
the notice of appeal. th intilfe thet apparently settled with DuPent
fied their stipulation of partial dismiceal of action with preiudice.
Accordingly, unvete ctherise incicated, any proceedsnge redeting to th
Fftyceix plaineiffe will not be menticned 4 ‘nencrandum inesmuch
are vot relevant to the disposition of the eppeal

     

   

          

‘they

 

   

 
 

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of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b) (2007),* in favor of DuPont

was entered on August 10, 2005.

 

The plaintiffs appeal -- ond DuFont cross appeals
from the HRCP Rule 54(b) judgment. The plaintiffs challenge,

{inter alia, the circuit court's order granting summary judgnent
on the basis that they were unable to prove damages. Although

DuPont's position is that the HRCP Rule $4(b) judgment should be

 

upheld, it cross appeals in apparent recognition of the
possibility that this court may not agree with its position,
challenging another order granting in part and denying in part
DuPont's motion for sunmary judgment, discussed infra.

For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the circuit
court properly granted sunmary judgment in favor of DuPont on the
basis that the plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, prove
damages and, therefore, affirm the circuit court's August 10,
2005 judgment.

I. BACKGROUND
‘This court has previously presented a brief factual

summary of the underlying product liability ceses in Exotics

Hewai‘i-Kona, Inc, v. E.I, Dupont De Nemours & Co., 104 Hawai'i

 

* MRCP Rute 54 (b) providi

 

in relevant part that

hen rere than one claim for relief ie prei
action, whether 26 # cleim, counterclaim,
thiré-arty claim, or when multiple parties are involves,
the court nay direct the entry of final judgment ae to one
or nore but fever than sll of the laine or parties only
pen an exprese determination that there ie no Just reason
For delay a6 Upon an express direction for the entry of
juegment,

   

 

 

 

 

 
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358, 90 P.34 250 (2004). However, given the resolution of this

case and the fact that the instant appeal involves only four of
the sixty original plaintiffs, see supra note 1, a concise
version of the facts dre provided below as they relate only to
those four plaintiffs and the pertinent summary judgment orders
-- specifically, the order granting summary judgment based on the
plaintiffs’ inability to prove damages.
A. The Complaint

As previously mentioned, between November 1992 and
March 1993, the plaintiffs, who were commercial growers, brought
product liability actions against, inter alia, Dupont, alleging
that ite Benlate product was defective and that it caused damage
to their plants and nurseries. In 1994 and 1995, the plaintiffs
entered into individual settlement agreements with DuPont that
resulted in DuPont's payment of certain sums in exchange for the
execution of releases by the plaintiffs. As a result of these
settlement agreements, the plaintiffs entered into stipulations
to dismiss their product 1iability actions with prejudice.

on January 6, 2000, the plaintiffs filed an eighty-four
page first amended complaint against, inter alia, DuFont. The
plaintiffs claimed that DuPont had defrauded them “into settling
for pennies on the dollar for danages* caused by its Benlate
product. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that DuPont
wrongfully, illegally, and fraudulently withheld from discovery

vital scientific éata and information that it was under an

 
 

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obligation to produce in the underlying product liability

actions, The plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleged that:

208. if, at the tine the (p)laintitts accepted
settlonent of their underlying (product liability] clains,
they hed received full, fair, truthful and complete
Gieclocure of material information, the [plaintiffs would
ot have sceepeed the coneiderstion offered for eettlanent
Which vas substantially lese than the loses which they had
suffered

209. [the pliaintitts would have continued to press
their Clains if full, complete and truthful disclosures had
been ade. Reliance by those ipliaintiffs on full, fair and
Gizclocure by Dofont, which in fact was not forthcoming,
Ferulted in injury in the form of settienent for lower
Compensation than wae adequate or would otherwise have been
available.

 

 

 

the plaintiffs asserted that the ‘appropriate measure of recovery

for said conduct is the difference between [the p]laintiffs’

actual

total damages (e.a,, crop and plant losses, soil injuries,

lost market positions and lost economic advantage) and the

amount,

if any, previously received" from DuPont. Accordingly,

the plaintiffs alleged ten counts, to wit:

1 intentional spoliation of evidence

 

2 [negligent spoliation of evidence
a _| frove

4 | Fravéulent misrepresentation
5

é

 

 

 

cation

 

negligent miarepren

 

 

 

 

non-@isclesure?

 

nondiecl

ond) of Torts § $61 (1977), entitled “Liability For
ovure,” provider in relevant pert:

  

(2) one who fails to disclose to another & fect that
he knows may justifiably induce the other to act oF refrain
from scting ins business transaction is subject te the sane
TTebility to the other as though he he reprevented the
Ronexistence of the matter that he has failed te eisclese,

Ge, but ony if, he ie under a duty to the other to exercice
wont inved...)

    

 

 

 

 
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| civil conspiracy
(9 | violation of due process rights and righte
Yova fair trial as guaranteed by article I.

   

Section € of the lawal's State Constitution

 

 

 

 

30 | exenplary dareses

 

DuPont filed ite answer to the first amended complaint on

February 14, 2000.

 

>(seontinved)
Feasorable care to disclose the matter in question.

(2) One party to a business transection ie under 6
duty to exercise reesonable care to disclose to the ocher
before the transaction is consumated|:)

(a) ‘nattere known to him that the other Se entstt

fo know Because of « flesctary or other eimilé
Felation of trust and confidence between them
ane

(b) Batters know to him thet he knows to be

Recestary to prevent his partial or anbi
Stetenent of the fects from being misleading:
and.
(cl) Subsequently acquired information that he knows
“ill make untrue or éeleading © previous
Fepresentetion that shen nede wee true oF
Believed to be 0; end

(a) the falsity of representation not made with
the expectation that it would be acted upon, if
he eubeequently learns that the other is about
fo act in reliance upon it ina traneaction with
Rims ane

(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that
the other ie shout to enter into st under 8
mistake as to them, and that the other, because
Of the velationship between then, the Custons of
the trade or other objective circunstances,
would reasonably expect © disclosure of those
fects

 

 

 

 

  
  

«tn angwering the complaint

seeking, inter sia. des
poreving their ecticn in violation of the settlement egveem

Covenant not to sue. Mewever, the circuit court has yet to
countercleim and, in fact, etéyed a1] proceedings relating to the counterclaim
Pending resolution of the instant appeal

 

   

 

 

 
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B. Exoceedings Regarding the Motions for Sunmary Judament

As previously stated, the circuit court, in three
summary judgment orders, found in favor of DuPont on all of the
plaintiffs’ claims. However, in light of our disposition, we
recount only two of the three motions, focusing especially upon
the motion concerning the plaintiffs’ lack of evidence to support
their damages. The other motion for summary judgnent is

addressed infra in section 111.A.2. as it becones relevant to the

 

plaintiffs’ other contentions.
1. Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Clains
on January 8, 2004, DuFont filed a motion for sunmary
judgment on all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Relying on this

court's answers to the questions certified by the United states

District Court for the District of Hawai'i in Matsuura v. ELI. a

Bont de Nemours & Co., 102 Hawai'i 149, 73 P.34 687 (2003)
[hereinafter, Matsuura 1], -- another Benlate settlement fraud

action -- DuPont argued, inter alia, that summary judgment was
proper for the non-fraud claims inasmuch as this court, in
Matsvura I, determined that "a party is not immune from liability

for civil damages based upon that party’s fraud engaged in during

 
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prior litigation proceedings." Id, at 162, 73 P.3d at 700.

DuPont, thus, maintained that:

Since St Se now clear in Hawai'i that, absent fraud,
i existe oa

fcr litigation *.. - DuPont therefore ie immune
from ali of [the plisincitie’ non-fraud clains because thes
Elaine exe besed on allegations of "misconduct engaged in
Goring pricr litigation’ such as improper discovery
Ferponses, false statements of counsel, etc.

    

(emphasis in original.)
Moreover, DuPont also argued that it was entitied to
summary judgment on the freud-based clains inasmuch as “no
zational jury could conclude that these (p)iaintitts reasonably
believed the truth of DuPont's alleged misrepresentation.*
(emphasis adéed.) In determining whether the plaintiffs are
precluded as a matter of lew from bringing @ cause of action for
fravdvlent inducenent to settle, this court in Matsuura
sclarif [ied] that, under Hawai'i lew, to prevail on a cleim of

fraudulent inducement, [the] plaintiffs must prove that their

+ priefly steted, the plaintiffe in Metevura J settled their product
Liabiaiey ecticne egainet DuPont, and, thereafter, Brought a cleim in the
feseral district court for, inter alia, fraud and interference with
prospective economic advantsge. 102 Hawai'i at 152, 73 P.3¢ at 690. The
Federal district court subsequently certified three questions te this court,
the anseere to which are discussed infra ac applicable. Id. at 154, 73.38
avez.

 

neo, during the pendency of Matsuura Z, the circuit court in the

inetant cose, at the request of the parties, submitted four reserved questions

iEthls court, three of which were identical to the certifies questions
‘natant ceee wot

consolidated with Hetauure Z for purposes of ore: eispesition

SE *rhe fourth renerved question, which 4s not relevant to thie

BesereS ty thie court in Exotics Heval ia

fitge, 300 uowas'i 388, 90 P-3a 250 12006)

     

 

        

 
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reliance upon a defendant's representations was reasonable." Id.
at 163, 73 P.3d at 701 (emphases added).* DuPont argued that:

In their product liability ceses, where (the
plaintiffs sued DuPont for millions of dollars claiming
Benlate wes defective, it was (the p]iaintiffs’ financial
interest to el Ineesbelieved

concerning the nature of and/or non-existence of [alaverse
Benlate (scientific data were false, and that they
Kneu/belleved that laldverse Benlate (scientific daca
quieted, And, as the record of thie [elourt denonstrates,
that Is exactly what [the pllaintiffe claimed =
consistently, repeatedly, and vehenently.

In thig case, however, where [the p)iaintiffe have
sued DuPont for millions of dollere claiming they were
"Sefrauded" in their product liability settienente, it Se in
[the pllaineifts' {ineneial interest to claim they did Mor

DePont“ etatenents concerning the nature of
and/or noh-extstence of Benlete {scientific data

    

 

 

 

  
   

Hom [the pllaintiffe’ elenpleint and nterrogatory
anevers, that ie exactly what they are claiming ==
Consistently, repeatedly, and vehenently.

 

(emphases and capitalization in original.)

on January 16, 2004, the plaintiffs filed their
menorandun in opposition to the motion. A hearing was held on
vanuary 26, 2004, wherein the circuit court orally denied the
motion to the extent that “there's @ genuine issue of material
fact as to the reasonableness of the fraud claims.* The circuit
court, however, granted the motion as to the clains of

intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence (Counts 1 and

 

 

+ re Ge weld-sereied that

[tle constitute fraudulent inducenent sufficient te
invalidate the terns of a contract, there must be (2) @
Fepresentetion of e material fect, (2) rade for the purpose
of inducing the other party to ect, (3) knew to be falee
but ressouably believed true by the other party. ané (é)
‘pen whieh the other party relies and acts to his OF her
carast

 

 

1G, at 162-63, 73 P.36 at 700-01 (citations ané internal brackets omitted)
(emphaeis edded).

  

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2), Antentional interference with prospective economic advantage
(Count 7), and violation of constitutional rights (Count 9). A
written order was entered on February 25, 2004, granting in part
and denying in part the motion for summary juégment.
Specifically, the circuit court granted summary judgment as to
the non-fraud clains, .e., Counts 1, 2, 7, and 9, and denied
summary judgment as to the fraud and deceit claims, i.e., fraud
(count 3), fraudulent misrepresentation (Count 4), negligent
nisrepresentation (Count 5), and non-disclosure (Count 6). The
circuit court also ruled that civil conspiracy (Count 8) and
exemplary damages (Count 10) ‘are not separate counts, but are
merely derivative to [the p]laintiffs’ remaining claims.*

2, The Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the
Plaintiffs’ Inability to Prove Danage:

on February 3, 2005, DuPont filed a motion for sunmary
Judgment based on the plaintiffs’ inability to prove damages.
Relying on E.L, Dufont de Nemours & Co. v. Florida Everareen
Eoliace, 744 A.24 457 (Del. 1999), Richardson v. Economy Fire &
Casualty Co,, 485 N.E.24 327 (711. 1985), and Urtz v. New York
Central & Huéson River Railroad Co., 95 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1911),
Giscussed infra, DuPont maintained that the plaintiffs’ remedies
are limited to either: (1) rescinding their settlement
agreements, returning any benefits they may have received, and
seeking @ return to the status quo ante; or (2) affirming the

agreenents and suing for daneges in a fraud action, which damages

one
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are measured based upon “the fair compromise value” of their

ctlement. DuPont further

 

released tort claims at the time of

contended that:

Despite electing to forego their clains for the actual
judgnent value of their (product Liability) clains ~
ingeed, settling these claine, releasing these clains, and
keeping DuPont's settlenent money for these elaine —~" [the]
Disintsffe nave not sousht the faix compromise value of
Their ipreduct 2iabiiity] claine as of the cay of their
settlenents.

Rather, [the] plaintiffs in thie case seek the “actual
Svdgment valve’ of thelr RELEASED [product Liability) casee
of today(, se ccronetreted by the plaintiffs’ statenent
Of the appropriate neneure of recovery in the first amended

complaint)

 

 

 

 

(emphases and capitalization in original.) DuFont argued that,

inasmuch as

hat the compreniee value factors are in a parti
fe well as hoy they would be evaluated in thet c
fattere within the common knowledge ané experience of
Surerel.) Capert cestinony By lawyere experienced in
[Veigating ana’ compromising cates is required to ald the
jury in cetermining the fair compronize valve of a case

 

(Footnote omitted.) (Emphases in original.) Consequently,
DuPont asserted that the plaintiffs did not have the expert
testinony required to sustain their burden of proof on the proper

measure of damages, stating that:

[the pleintstfe’ underlying product lability action)
lnwere(, in thely expert reports, as Glscusted infra, dsé)
not opine, shout the factorg Feievent ro the determination of

Of each plaintiff's cose on the
Eife‘et the settlenent, nor how these factors would be
applied -- to each case. They simply state, generally, that
their respective cliente’ [product liability) cases would
have been gizonser Fad they had the "hidden evidence,” and
thus the settienent value of the cases would heve been

higher.

(Emphases in original.)

 

 

 

 

In their memorandum in opposition to DuPont's motion,

filed February 17, 2005, the plaintiffs argued that their renedy

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should not be limited to the reasonable settlement value absent
fraud. Rather, they ergued the remedy should be measured by the
plaintiffs’ change in circumstances resulting from the fraudulent
conduct, which, according to the plaintiffs, is "the value of the
position that was foregone, plus any consequential costes incurred
as a result of the misconduct. The plaintiffs contended that:

If [the p)laintiffe in thie case are Linites by the [clourt
solely to the recovery of the value of a vreasenable"
Settlenent in 1994, DuPont receives the benefit of Ste
fraud, Such @ ruling would serve to encourage fraud in
settlénents. “Allowing s frevd-fearor to first reduce the
Value of a plaintiff's settienent (or even judgrent) by.
witmholdine evidence, but then, [if] froud ie discovered,
Liniting the veney i, 2, 3 (or, in thie cose, 12) yeare
later to thet ancunt the’ defendant ‘might heve paid towards
settlenent in the absence of that frevé, bot no nore, would
Feeard the fraudsfeasor, who would firet have had the use of
the unpaid portion of the nrecovered gettlenent or
Judgnent, end then protection from ehe court againet
imposition of any fuller reneéy. If that were the law,
every defendant in litigation would be motivated to fret
try fraud, and only later try te be “reasonsble

 

 

 

‘The plaintiffs maintained that

the duty of the jury will be to measure the entire velue of
[the pliaintiffe’ lee resulting from the freudulent induced
settionente, which naturally includes consideration of the
Value of the settled [preduet Tiability) claims. Tt will be
the jury's role to ceternine if the coneideration paid in
the Griginal settlenent is nore or less than the los.

3n this case, only after the jury had first considered the
Selue-of [the plisineltfe” [ered i
(rjuagnent valuer), should the jury next consider what the
value the Jury Believes wae actually lost through {reva,

 

      

s in original.) Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that their

 

(Emph
expert opinions fully satisfied the evidentiary requirements
inesmuch as these opinions “repeatedly touch{ed) on the issues of
factors related to ibility, settlenent, client reconmendations,
and the relation between Mebility, damages, settlement, end

judgments in the product [1ability) action(s).

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Following a hearing on the motion, the circuit court
‘entered an order on February 28, 2005, granting DuPont's motion

for sunmary judgment, concluding that,

audulentiy induced to 26th

Giscovery/iitiostion fraud. (s/he has two options [, i.e
wo-cholces of remedies): “G1 to sue to rescind the
Bettlerent contract; or (2) to-sffirm the contract and sue
for-traud. It eine chootes to sue for {raud, the remedy
Dusilsble to [che glisintit? ts the fair conpfosise valve of
Khe claim at the tine of the settlesent, In order to neck

‘helt burden of proving the fair cosproniae valve at the
Eine of settlenant. [the pilaineiffe would need to net thie

Burden with eavert lamer cestinony directed to the numerous
Eosprenise factors. and bow they would have applies to  gee, e.g, Turkish v. Kacenetz, 27 F.34 22, 26 (26 Cir. 1996)
applying New York law); authentic Ars ives ‘SoM Grou
piece, Fhe 628 cae 728 Gh Sgn.) HignanSnan Eee Hi 8

BES es wresda 227, 330. (212. 198s) citing & collection of ceses from
‘SSEtesat wichican and New York); Sleoe) v, Williams, 628 N.£.2¢ 510, £16 Ind.
Ce. App, 2004}; Ware v. State Farm Mut Auto, Ing. Co,, 31: 7,26 316, 320-22
(ran, Pas); Bilotei y-Accurate Formine Corp, 168 A-2é 24, 30-25 (io
3963): S14 £6.26. 730, 733, (N.C. Ct. App. 3999); Sabbatis
PEREES WE s0 28, 332 Ohio ce. App. 2006); Fields v. varboroven

cont need.)

      

   

 

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conclusion of the circuit court in the instant case to allow
defrauded tort plaintiffs the traditional contract renedies of
either (1) rescinding the contract, returning any benefits
received, and being returned to the status quo or (2) affirming
the contract, retaining the benefits, and seeking damages.

Additionally, when there exists two or more concurrent
but inconsistent remedies, as here, the equitable doctrine of
election of remedies provides that:

Ia] plaintséf need not elect, and cannot be compelled te

elect Between inconsistent renedies during the course of

trial. If, however, e plaintiff hee unequivocally and

Knowledceably elected to proceed on one of the Teneaies he

Sr she is porsving, ne or she ray be barred recource to the

Other. The doctrine acte as a bar precluding o pleintitt

from geeking an inconsistent renedy asa rerult of his or
her previous conduct or election

Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 80 Hawai'i 54, 72, 905 P.2d

29, 46 (1995) (internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and

 

 

 

is in original). The purpose of the

 

ellipses omitted) (emphat
election of remedies doctrine ‘is not to prevent recourse to any
remedy, or to alternative remedies, but to prevent double
recoveries or redress for a single wrong." 25 Am. Jur. 24
Election of Remedies § 3 at 665 (2004) (footnotes omitted).

In the instant case, the plaintiffs did not seek
rescission of their settlenent agreenents in their first amended
complaint. In fact, the complaint wholly rested upon allegations
of DuPont's fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment of

8. seontsnves)
or, Inc., #14 -F.26 164, 366 (S.C, 1992)

 
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scientific data and information that were allegedly vital to the
plaintiffs’ settlenent negotiations of their product liability
claims. Thus, based on the allegations of their complaint, the
plaintiffs have ‘unequivocally and knowledgeably" elected to
affirm their settlement agreements and pursue an action for
fraud. Consequently, we next examine the appropriate measure of
damages in the plaintiffs’ asserted fraud action.

b. the proper measure of damages

‘The circuit court concluded that, when a defrauded

party elects to affirm the settlement agreenent and sue for

fraud, ‘the remedy available [(i.e., damages)) . . . is the fair
compromise value of the claim at the tine of the settlement.+

(emphasis added.) The plaintiffs, however, argue that the
circuit court erroneously *limit{ed) the anount of recoverable
damages to the difference between what (they) actually settled
for, and what they could have settled for, had there been no
fraud.* Such limitation, according to the plaintiffs, ‘has never
been accepted in this jurisdiction. To the contrary, the Hawai'i
lalppellate [cJourts have continually held that the desired
remedy in fraud cases is to restore the victim to the position he
would have occupied but for the misrepresentation.* (Citations
omitted.) The plaintiffs, thus, believe that the circuit court's

ruling

deviated from the goal of the available veredy -- to restore
then to the former positions they occupied but. for DuPont's
Geceit ~~ and inetead cerved to deprive [the p)ieintitfe of

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any possibility of recovering that which, in all likelihood,
they’ could reasonably have achieved had the fraudulent
Condvet not occurred. ‘The decision was contrary. to the

tablished law of Hawai'i, and contrary to the proper
Sutcone dictated by the facts of the litigation, and should
now be set ssice.

 

 

DuPont, on the other hand, maintains that the “fair
compromise value is the proper measure of damages for full and

adequate compensation of a fraudulent inducement claim, and is

 

not a cap or limit on damages.” (Emphasis in original.)

 

(internal quotation marks and other emphases omitted.) In

DuPont's view,

[t]hie weasure of damages se consistent with the general
objective of freud, which is to place the Gefrovdes
pleintife Sn the position he would have been "but fort the
Fraud. Since [the plaintiffe] claim their cettlenent
ancunte were less than they were worth becouse DaPont had
Induced then to settle through certain fravéclent
nisrepresentations, their nessure of daneges logically ie
hat thelr eettienent ancunt would have been if there had
Been no fraus.

It is well-settled that all tort claims require that

 

  
 

    

damages be proven with reasonable certainty. see, e.¢., Weinber
vaMauch, 78 Hawai'i 40, 50, 690 P.24 277, 267 (1995) (*{Z]t is
of the essence in an action . . . that the plaintiff suffer
garages as @ consequence of the defendant's conduct, and these
ganages cannot be speculative or conjectural losses." (Internal

quotation marks and citation omitted.)); see also Hoxas

 

Marcos, 89 Howai'i 91, 141 n.33, 969 P.26 1209, 1259 n.33 (citing
a collection of cases for the sane proposition). specifically,
in a fraud case, “the plaintiff must have suffered substantial
actual darage, not nominal or speculative." zanakis-Pico v.
Cuter Dodce, Inc., 98 Hawei'i 308, 320, 47 P.36 1222, 1233

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(2002) (citation and emphasis omitted). The “plaintiffs suing in
fraud are required to show both that they suffered actual

pecuniary loss and that such damages are definite and

 

ascertainable, rather than speculative. Id.; see also Hawaii's
Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 286, 768 P.26 1293,
1301 (2989) ("plaintiff must show that he {or she) suffered
substantial pecuniary damage"). The aim of compensation ‘is to
put the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been had
he or she not been defrauded.* Zanakis-Pico, 98 Hawai'i at 320,
47 P.3d at 1233 (quoting Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 52-53,
451 P.24 614, 620 (1969)) (original brackets and ellipsis
onitted).

‘This court has further explained that:

1A Glatinction is nade in the law between the ancunt of proof
required to establish the fact that the injured party hse
fustained sone Canage and the measure of proof necessary to
enable the jury to determine the ancunt of danage. IE

 

 

zecovery is uncertaint ng not ae
Xo_ite fount, jiovever the rule that uncertainty ae to the
angunt does not necessarily prevent recovery te not to be
interpreted ai ara
-erteinty and th ing er concivsien
‘founded _ubon_nere speculation or ques.

Chung vy. Kacnohi Ctr, Co,, 62 Haw. 594, 605, 618 P.26 283, 290-91

(2980) (emphasis added) (citation and brackets omitted) (format

altered), abrocated on other arounds by Francis v. Lee Enters..

Ings, 89 Hawai'i 234, 971 P.24 707 (1999). In other words, where

 

 

the fact of damage is established, this court will not insist

upon a higher degree of certainty as to the amount of danages

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than the nature of the case permits, particularly where the

uncertainty was caused by the defendant's own wrongful acts.

Coney v. Lihue Plantation Co., 39 Haw, 129, 138 (1951). This
court, however, has recognized that

(t]he problem of how to measure danages, and how to
getablich then in frau@ caces, is slvays a cifficult one

Since the percon defrauded hag, because of the fraud, not
pursued alternative courses of action, and the results of
these untaken courses therefore renain speculative. In 3
Restatenent (Second) of Torts (1977), a discussion of the
problem of danages proof appears under § 549.("] in the

Coment to eubsection (2) of that section, the following

‘appeas

 

 
 
 

 

hen the plaintiff has made a bargain with
the defendant, however, situations arice in
which the rules stated in subsection (1), and
farticularly that stated in Clause (a) of that
Subsection, do not afford compensation that is
Suet ana eatistactory.

‘The frequency ef these eituations has 1ed
the great majority of the Anerican courts to.

 

 

 

 

- é ana
making that the normal measure of recevery in
betions of deceit

Leibert v. Fin, Factors, Ltd., 71 Haw. 285, 290-91, 788 P.24 833,

837 (1990) (emphases added); see also Zanakis-Pico, 98 Hawai'i at

 

* Section 548, entitied ‘Measure of Danages for Fraudulent
Mierepresentation,* provides that:

 

 

Sgeinet the ssker the pecuniary loss to him of which the
lerepresentation is a legal cause, including
(a). the difference Between the value of whet he hes
received in the yetion and 1
price or other valve given for st
(b)  Pecuntary lose euffered otherwice a6 8
Eonscquence of the recipient's reliance upon the
Bisrepresentation.
(2) the recipient of f fraudulent alerepresentation in
a businese transaction ie sico entitied to recover.
Seeitsonal Canegen sufficient to give him the benefit of hie
Contract with the meker, if these danages ave provee with
*  certeinty:

 

 

    

 

 

 

  

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320, 47 P.34 at 1233 (*In fraud or deceit cases, the measure of
pecuniary damages is usually confined to either the ‘out-of-
pocket’ loss or the ‘benefit of the bargain{.]'* (Citation and
ellipses omitted.)).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned well-established
general principles regarding the proof of Gamages, this court has
not had the occasion to articulate what must be proven in order

to bring a meritorious settlement fraud claim. To this end,

Living Desiong, Inc, v. E.1, Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.34
353 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 126 8. Ct. 2861

(2006), is instructive. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reversed

the federal district court’s ruling in Matsuure v. B.2. du Pont

de Nemours & Co., 330 F. Supp. 24 1101 (D. Haw. 2004)
Uhereinafter, Matsuura 11]. Relying upon Urtz v. New York

Central & Hudson River Railread Co., 95 N.E. 711 (N.¥. 1911), and
Automobile Underwriters, inc. v. Rich, $3 N-E.24 775 (Ind. 1944),

the federal district court in Matsuura 11 hed determined thet "a
‘settlement fraud’ plaintiff must prove not only that the settled
claim hed merit, but also that the value of the claim exceeded
the anount of the fraudulently-induced settlenent.* 330 F. Supp.
26 at 1123. applying this rule to the facts of that case, the
federal district court concluded that “DuFont [wa]s entitled to
sunmary judgnent on all of the Matsuura [p]laintiffs’ clains éve
to their inability to prove either the fact or [the] ancunt of
Gonages with reasonable certainty." Id, at 1125.

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In Urtz, the New York Court of Appeals determined that,
where the underlying claim has no viability, there is no
potential for recovery for fraud in the inducenent of settlement
because plaintiff would not be able to show any injury by reason
of abandonment of an entirely valueless claim. 95 N.E. at 713.
In Uxtz, the plaintiff, relying on alleged misrepresentations,
settled her claims for the wrongful death of her husband. Id, at
732, The jury found in favor of the plaintiff in her freud
8 bi

 

action but the appellate court revel 44 upon the trial
court's refusal to charge the jury that, in order to maintain the
action, the plaintiff must denonstrate that her original claim
for Wrongful death was valid and existing at the time of
settlement. Id, at 714. The court offered the following example
of a plaintiff claiming that she was fraudulently induced to

settle a claim besed on a promissory note and stated:

Isite, in an action to recover her damages caused by the
frandi,] must have given evidenc

ip proof of the validity
farting point for the

they found that the note
“ by [the] defendant, they would find
Reo that che had evetained no canage and coulé not raintain
the action, Unless she had the valid note of the defendant,
he had and released in the compromise nothing of value

  
     

Id. at 712. By ascribing error to the jury instructions, the
Urtz court essentially specified that, in the trial of a

the plaintiff carries the

 

fraudulently induced settlement claim,
burden of proving sone merit to the underlying cause of action.

Likewise, in Automobile Underwriters, the Indiana Supreme Court

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indicated that, when the plaintiff elects to proceed with the

fraud action, he or she

recognizes that the settlenent {sa ber to the original,
action and thee {et ove
snot only that the Settlement wea procures by fraud and to
Riis danage, but also

posinet the original tort teaser at the tine Of the
settlenent’

53 N.E.24 at 777 (emphases added) .

In Living Desiang, the Ninth Circuit implicitly
expressed its disapproval of Urtz and Automobile Underwriters to
the extent that these cases required a plaintiff in an action
based on settlement fraud to prove that he or she had a “good
cause of action against the tortfeasor at the tine of settlement.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, to concluée that

plaintiffs most denonstrate thet their settied claim hed

herit ie inconsistent with the sim of compensation in fraud

Cates, which ie to restore plaintiffs to the position they

Would’ be in abeent the fraud and to provide plaintiffs with

the benefit of the targain, see Leibert, (72 Hew. at 268

90,) 788 P.2d at 636-37, particularly ee a party's decision

fo settle i often made ae 2 recult of 2 cost-benefit
analysis rother then an asvcesnent of the claim's nerite

 

 

 

 

 

 

431 F.3d at 367. Father, the Ninth Circuit, relying upon

PiSabating, held that

the relative etrength of the claim in the absence of fraud
theuld be used by the trier of fact to determine the ancunt
of the defrauded party's danages. whether the defrauged
Party could have won its cese if it proceeded to trial 1s
[rrelevant co this calculation i ice

 

    

 

See reaches, Such ¢ determination ie not Beyond the pow?
bf a Jury to determine. The vee of probability anaiyeie
Yor example, in calculating settlenent Value is not

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431 F.3d at 368 (emphasis added) .*

As stated above, DiSabatino dealt with the question
whether the plaintiff was permitted to affirm the settlement
agreement and institute an independent cause of action based on
fraud, to which the court answered affirmatively. 635 F. Supp.
at 351. In declining to follow other courts’ limitation of

remedies to rescission based, inter alia, on the assunption that

 

damages are too speculative, the court explained that:

tn any action beeed on fraud, the fact finder will simply
Reasure the extent of the plaintiff's denages by exenining
het the agreement would have been, had the parties. known
the actual material facts. The nature of the injuries i
the foregone tort action are relevant ohly to the extent of
how they would affect the value of the claim to be
compromises.)

   

 

 

Ed, at 355. The court further indicated that:

ction exieted at the tine
fect that the parties

   

q Genscee fron the

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). According to the
pisebatino court, the better approach is for the trier of fact to
determine "the probsble amount of settlement in the absence of
fraud after considering 211 known or foreseeable facts and

circumstances affecting the value of the claim on the Gate of

 

+ gaged on evidence indicating that knowledge of the withheld evidence
fed the eettienent value of the ceees,
Jarger ancunts ené expert
Seve of fact oe
Into ruling, the
es were “not so speculative that canages are
Sneepable of calculation.” id. 0 369.

 
 
 
 

 

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settlement[;] the amount in settlement already received should
[then] be deducted from this total amount. Id, at 355 (citation
omitted), Stated differently, the defrauded plaintiff may
‘recover such an amount as will make the settlement an honest
one.* Ia, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"(T]he measure of Gamages{, therefore,] is the loss of the
bargain." Id, (citation omitted).

Moreover, although the Ninth Circuit rejected the
holdings in Urtz and Automobile Underwriters that a defrauded
plaintiff must prove that his or her settled clains had merit,
the analyses of both courts as to the method of determining
damages are in accord with Living Desiang and Disabatino
specifically, the Urtz court explained that the measure of
damages is

how much could the plaintiff have reasonably denanded and
the defendant renecnably heve sllowed es (6) final
Compromise above end beyond the (amount) in fact allowed ané
Feceived? .. [In determining the amount. the jury] would
take into view the probebiiities of the successful
enforcenent of the Cause of action, the probable extent and
expense of the expected 1itigation over this disputed claim,

st ‘probebiiity of the continuing solvency
of the defendant, and such other facts pertinent to the
‘question of danages as the evidence presented.

 

 

  

 

95 NE, at 713. Stated differently, the court believed that “the
plaintiff, affirming the compromise agreement and unable to
recover the contract belance, is entitled in accordance with the
general rule to have such compromise agreenent made as good for

him as it reasonably and fairly would have been if only the truth

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had been told instead of a falsehood asserted." Id, at 714
(internal quotation marks omitted) .

‘The Automobile Underwriters court expressed that the
measure of damages in @ fraud action “must take into
consideration the salable value of the right of action for the
purpose of compromising, and the nature and extent of the
injuries known and foreseeable as of the time of the settlement,

then shown

 

under the particular circumstances of the parti
existing. 53 .N.E.24 at 777 (citations omitted), The proper

for

 

procedure for determining damages, in the court's view,

would

 

the jury to calculate the "probable amount’ the parti
have agreed upon absent the fraud, taking into account "all of

the known or foreseeable facts and circumstances which in any way

 

affected the value of the claim on the date of settlenent/.
1d. at 779, The amount received by the releasor in exchange for
signing the release is then deducted, and the balance constitutes
the “true messure of the danage suffered* inasmuch as “(t]he
ultimate fact to be ascertained is the actual damage caused by
the fraudulent representations and not the danage for the

see also Slotkin v, Citizens cas. Co. of
NewYork, 614 F.2d 301, 312-13 (28 Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449

original injury." 3¢

 

 

U.S. 981 (1980) (holding that, under New York law, the plaintiffs
could recover as Garages the “fair settlement value" less the sum
they had received under the settlement; the true measure of

Ganages was “the difference in settlement value before end after

 
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discovery of the frau"); Dillev v. Farmers Ins, Group, 441 P.24
594, 595 (Or. 1968) (tif fraud had been connitted, the measure of
damages was the difference between the amount plaintiff received
in settlement and that she would have received by way of
settlement had the alleged false representations not been made");
Rochester Bridge Co, v. McNeill, 122 N.B, 662, 6€5 (Ind. 1919)
(same) .

The plaintiffs, however, urge this court not to follow
the aforementioned measurement of damages enunciated by the Ninth

Circuit and other jurisdictions because such *limited* remedy

 

(2) 4s “contrary to several significant policy concerns
expressed by this court in Matewure I and (2) ‘clearly deviated
from the goal of the available remedy -- to restore them to their
former positions they eccupied but for DuPont's deceit.* the
plaintiffs’ contentions are without merit.

In support of their position that the limited remedy
imposed by the circuit court is contrary te policy concerns, the
plaintiffs rely upon this court’s pronouncenent in Matsuura I
that limiting liability for fraud is unfavored in light of the
policy of encouraging settlenents. 102 Hawai'i at 155-62, 73
P.3d at 693-700. Specifically, the Matevure 1 court was
presented with the certified question whether, under Hawai'i law,
a party is “inmune from lisbility for civil danages based on that
party's misconduct, ineluéing fraud, engaged in during prior
Litigation proceedings{.)* Id, at 184, 73 P.36 at 692. In

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answering negatively to the inguiry, we examined several policies
underlying the litigation privilege, such as those promoting the
candié, objective, and undistorted disclosure of evidence,
avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of
subsequent litigation, encouraging settlement, and discouraging
abusive litigation practices. Id, We essentially determined
that the policies associated with the litigation privilese
doctrine do not favor limiting liability in a subsequent
proceeding where there is an allegation of fraud committed in the
prior proceeding. 1d. at 155-62, 73 P.34 at 693-700. we,
therefore, concluded that, *[ulnder Hawai'i law, a party is not
immine from liability for civil damages based upon that party's
fraud engaged in during prior litigation proceedings.* Id, at
162, 73 P.34 at 700. The plaintiffs’ reliance upon the Matsuura
I's policy reasonings, however, is misplaced. The court in
Matsuura I wes not confronted with the issue concerning the
method of measuring Garages, but only whether a fraud action
based on a party's conduct in prior Litigation proceedings exists
in the first instance.

Furthernore, the plaintiffs’ argunent that the
Limitation of their Garages to the settlenent differential is
essentially contrary to the well-settled aim of compensation in
deceit cases, ie., "to put the plaintiff in the position he or
she would have been had he or she not been defravéed|,}" Zanakie-
Bice, 98 Hawai'i at 320, 47 P.36 at 1233 (citation and original

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brackets omitted), is unavailing. The plaintiffs argue that the
appropriate remedy i¢ to allow ‘the parties to determine what
damages they claim and seek to prove under the particular
circumstances of the claim." In other words, the plaintiffs
appear to assert that the proper measurement of their damages, if
the jury so determined, could be the ‘actual judgment value" of
their product liability claims (less the amount they received
pursuant to the settlement agreements) .

In support of their position, the plaintiffs cite to
Ei au Indiana v. 179 NB.28
760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962), Siecel
ct. App. 2004), and Edrei v, Copenhagen Hendelsbank A/S. No. 90
Civ, 1860 (CSH), 1992 WL 322027 (S.D.N.¥. oct. 29, 1992)

 

william, 818 N.E.24 510 (Ind.

(unreported). the plaintiffs partially quote from Zam Bureau
mutual Insurance that the proper evidence of danages involves
‘the nature end extent of the injuries inom end forseeable (sic)
a[t) the tine of the settlement, under the particular
circunstances of the parties then shown existing.” 179 N.E.28 at
764. ‘The full quote, however, actually makes clear that the
sature and extent of injuries’ are pertinent only for measuring
the *conpromise’ value of the claim:

[T]he neaeure of donages must Lake into consideration the

delable valve of the Fight of ection

sromising, and the nature ané extent of the ins)
Kno and fereecable {eie) alt} the tine of the
under the particular

 

 

      

    

 

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eee

Id. (emphases added). In fact, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance, an

Indiana appellate case, follows its supreme court’s Automobile

 

Underwriters case, which held that, when a plaintiff affirms the
ettlement agreement, his damages are the “probable amount" the
parties would have agreed upon absent the fraud, taking into
account ‘all of the known or foreseeable facts and circumstances
which in any way affected the value of the claim on the date of
settlement{.]* Automobile Underwriters, 53 .N.E.24 at 779.

Similarly, the plaintiffs rely upon Siegel to
demonstrate that the parties in that case proffered an estimation
of the potential jury verdict in the underlying claim as evidence
of damages. 818 N.E.2d at 513-14. The Siecel court, however,
was not presented with the issue as to what would be the proper
measure of damages. Rather, the issues before the court

concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of

 

fraud and the weight of expert testimony. Id. at 515-17.
However, Seicel is encther Indiana appellate court case and,
thus, followed Automobile Underwriters in allowing the plaintift
to recover the “probable” settlement amount, absent fraud.

the plaintiffs’ reliance on Eérei for the proposition
that ‘[t]he case law is clear that[,] when a party is defrauded

into releasing a cleim against another party, the proper measure

 

of danages is the value of the foregone claim," 1992 wh 322027,
at *4, is also mieplaced, The Edrei court, in explaining whet
the “value of the foregone claim’ means, quoted Slotkin for the

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proposition that the “true measure of damages was the difference

between the settlement value before and after the discovery of
the fravd{.]* Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

 

Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to provide any authority
that would convince us that the proper measure of damages should
be, as they contend, extended to the actual judgment value of
their product liability clains.’*

Indeed, as previously indicated, the plaintiffs hed
made an unequivocal and knowledgeable election of renedies to
affirm the settlement agreements and pursue an action for fraud.
However, the plaintiffs apparently sought to recover damages
based upon what they would have been able to recover in their

product liability suite against DuPont.” They cannot have it

% the plaintiffs also cite to number of cases that merely stand for
the general proposition that defrauded plaintifts are entitled co adequate
compensation or that the nescure of davages ig whatever losses were Sevelly
caused by the fraud or misrepresentation. For example, they ive to ane
provide parentheticale for the following ceses:

 

ch ie nea 1. 76 P38 66:
App. 2003] (plaintiffs entitled to ail danagee as
‘naturally, and proximately’ result fron the frevd); Matte
yu Erebbs, 962 P.26 387, 392 (1éaho 1996) (*[T]he victin of
Ereud is entitied co compensation for every wrong which ie
the naturel ané prexinate reeult of the fraud, The measure
of garages which should be adopted under the facts of a care
fe the one which will effect euch reault.*): See
Leavitt, 521 $..26 720, 612 (W.Va. 1998) (rit Se exienatie
thet (he plaintiff's measure of damages in a cause of action
for fraud woulé be Sny insory incurred es e result of the
Gefendant“e fraudulent conduct.) le]

 

tor. ee.)

 

 

‘These general principles le

 

ho support to the pleintiffe’ aforementioned

¥ puring the circuit court proceedings, the plaintitts’ discovery
ses confirmed thet they were claiming the totel product 15
ts Sune ¢, 2003 anewers to

 

         

(ont ined. =)
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both ways, i.e., affirm an agreement not to sue for such product
liability injuries and yet recover damages for those injuries.

In other words, they cannot accept the settlement money, sign a
release, affirm the release, keep the money, and then sue for the
same Gamages. As DuPont asserts, the plaintiffs ‘are seeking the
rescission remedy that, by their election to affirm their
settlenent contracts and sue . . . for fraud, is not available to
them.* (Emphasis in original.) See Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fid. &
Penosit Co, of Marviang, 768 F. Supp. 115, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating the rule that a plaintiff cannot elect to pursue danages

for fraud ang rescission because ‘an award of camages for fraud

 

2, scontinued)
conpencatcry ané punitive damages which coulé have been recovered by [the
p)ieintiffe at trial of [their product liability cases], Dut for the
Eracdulent cettienent.* In their June 10, 2003 anewers to interrogatories,
the plaintiffs, in response to the ingviry as to how the “actual gettienent
Value* wee determined and what factors were considered in reaching the valve,
stared:

 

Please note that “actual settlement velue* of the
underlying [product Iiability] case Goes not represent a
Sstatenent of danages for this "litigation freud" action,
the current cleins seek recovery of the lorees caused bY
[DuPont‘s) fraudulent conduet, which include But are not
Limited to the onrecovered value of the proguct clain(.)

 

   

Indeed, in their opening brief, the plaintiffs indicated that ‘their clains
were not confined to the ‘actual settlenent value” [DuPont night have paid hed
Ie hot ected fraudulently]. The plaintiffe further state that DuPont

 

was well advised through discovery, and through [the firet
Gnended] Complaint, of the nature of damages. (the
piieintiffe lain. (The plaintiffs’) fravd count
Banages clained are the “nonetary injuries" caused by
DuPont's fraud. The fraudulent mierepresentetion, negligent
Slerepresentation ané non-disclceure elaine nore
specifically seek Garages “equal te the cifference between
the actus] settienent or Sudgrent value of their [product
Liability) laine and the actual value, if any, received for
uch elaine

ee the

 

   

 

   

to the first avended complaint onsttes.)

 

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affirms the contract” while *(rJescission vitiates the contract
and places the partiés in status quo prior to the transaction")
(citation omitted); Davis v, Harcete, 92 $.8.24 782, 786 (N.C.
1956) (holding that the plaintiff could not affirm the release
and recover the difference between the value of his original
claim and what he received in settlenent) .

Here, the plaintiffs had foregone seeking the actual
judgment value of their product liebility clains via rescission

\4 elected to affirm the

 

of the settlement agreements and inst
agreenents and seek danages in a fraud action, and, thus, their
election precludes them from seeking danages for the injuries
sustained in the product lability actions. To conclude as the
plaintiffs would have it would constitute an impermicsible double
recovery. If this court were to permit the plaintiffs to retain
the benefits of the settlenent agreements while seeking to
recover the actual judgment value of their product liability
claims, the plaintiffs would be in a better position than they
would have been had the settlement negotiations been conducted in
good faith. Such a result would be inconsistent with the aim of
compensation in deceit cases, i.e., “to put the plaintiff in the
position he would have been had he not been defrauded." Ellis,
51 Haw. at 52, 451 P.26 at 820 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, we believe that the method enunciated by

the pisebstine court and followed by the Ninth Circuit in Living

 

Desions is pereusive -- namely, that the trier of

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determines "the probable amount of settlement in the absence of
fraud after considering all known or foreseeable facts and
circumstances affecting the value of the claim on the date of
settiement(.J* Dissbatine, 635 F. Supp. at 355 (citation
omitted). Stated differently, *{t]he critical consideration is
the settlement value of the case on the date settlement was
reached.* Living Desions, 431 F.3d at 368. Consequently, we
hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the
measure of damages for the plaintiffs’ fraud action is ‘the fair
compromise value of the claim at the time of the settlement.*

Inasmuch as the plaintiffs submitted evidence in
opposition to DuPont's motion, we examine whether the circuit
court properly determined thet the evidence was insufficient, as
a matter of law, to establish the plaintiffs’ damages.
preliminarily, however, we must first determine whether, in
proving danaces, i.e., the fair compromise value of the claim at
the time of the settlement, attorney expert testimony was
necessary in the first instance.

c. the requirement of attorney expert testimony

Lisbility for freud, as for other torts, requires proof
of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. Hong, 5 Haw.
App. at 161, 683 P.24 at 840 (*[f)raud is 8 common-law tort");
Von Holt v. Izumo Teisha Kvo Mission of Hawaii, 42 Hew. 671, 722
(1958) (“Fraud in its generic sense, especially as the word is
used in courts of equity, comprises all acts, omissions|,] and

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concealnents involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and

 

resulting in damage to another." (Internal quotation marks and

citation omitted.)), overruled on other arounds by State v.
Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 60 P.34 306 (2002). Specifically, to

establish a fraud claim based on a failure to disclose a material

fact,

there mst be (1) a representation of a material fact,
(2) sade for the purpose of inducing the other party to act,

 

i at 162-€3, 73 P.34 at 700-01 (citations

 

and internal brackets omitted) (emphases added). However,
DuPont's motion for summary judgment was premised solely on the
element of damsges, i.e,, the plaintiffs’ inability to prove

amages. In light of the circuit court’s ruling, it must be

 

assuned that the parties and the court presumed, for purposes of
sunmary judgment, that DuPont breached ite duty by disclosing
certain material scientific data and information that it knew to
be false, on which the plaintiffs reasonably relied and acted
upon to their detriment. Thus, the inguiry on appeal is whether
the plaintiffs have supplied the evidentiary showing of canages
necessary to defeat summary judonent.

According to the circuit court, to carry thelr burden

of proving camages, i.e., "the fair compromise value* of the

 

product liability claims at the time of settlement, the

plaintiffs ‘would need . . . expert lawyer testimony directed to

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the numerous compromise factors, and how they would have applied

to each [plaintiff's case.* The plaintiffs, however, argue

that

 

(Emphasis

(anphesis

provides that:

Moreover,

Tt has never béen the law in the State of Hawai"t that
expert evidence is a randatory element of a claimant's cese.
Nor hac it ever been required that such experts be of @
particular cceupation oF persuasion; it Se only necessary
that they be appropriately "qualified" to render an opinion
Which aeciste the trier of fact in ite eliberatione. The
(elircuit [cloure's ruling violated beth of these
established tenete.

    

omitted.)
In retort, DuPont contends that

determining the fair compromise value of a conplex products
Lfebility case, coking into consideration ail the facts and
circunstances of a particular case at a particular point in
Eine, is a complicated undertaking and something clearly
beyond the ability of a lay jury.” Gbvicusly, a jury should
pot speculate in an sree where i¢ could not be expected to
have sufficient knowledge or experience. And without preper
expert testinony, a jury would be specuiating because © Jury
Imply does not have the knowledge or experience to
determine the fair conpronise value of @ complex, products
ability action.

The Teason why expert testimony i required is
beceuse, unlike special and general cansges in ® typical
tort action, feir compromise value Ss not bered upon the
judgment of a reasonably prudent person, but the
a Feasonably prudent attorney. Clearly, whet ar
Knowledgeable’ an prudent attorney would do in a complex
producte Liability cave is beyond the experience of & ley,
Jury

in original.)

 

 

    

 

 

Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 702 (1993)

 

If scientific, technical, or other specializes
knowledge will cesist the trier of fect to understand the
evicence or to determine a fect in Semue, 8 witness
qualified es an expert by knowledge, ekiil, experience,
training, or edveation nay testify thereto in the form of an
opinion cr cthereive. in determining the iesve of
Steietance to the trier of fect, the court may consider the
rrostwerthiness and valigity of the selentifie technique oF
noe of analysis employed by the proffered expert.

 

 

 

this court has declared that:

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where the cubject matter is technical, scientific or
medical and not of common cbservation or knowledge, expert
Cestinony is allowed into evidence. Such testineny is to
‘aid the Jury in the determination of the issues involved and
fo provide sufficient basis for the conclusion to be éravn
by the jury rather than by conjecture snd cpeculaticn.
Expert testimony ie not conclusive and Iike any testimony,
the jury may sccept or reject it.

Rachran v, Morishiae, 52 Haw. 61, 67, 469 P.26 808, 812 (1970)
(citations omitted); see also State v, Batangan, 71 Haw. 562,

 

556, 799 P.24 48, $1 (1990) (Expert testimony assists the trier
of fact by providing @ resource for ascertaining truth in
relevant areas outside the ken of ordinary laity, Specialized
knowledge which is the proper subject of expert testinony is

knowledge not possessed by the average trier of fact who lacks

 

the expert's skill, experience, training, or education.*
(internal quotation marks ané citations omitted.)).

It ig well-settled that, in medical malpractice cases,
which have been generally predicated on the negligent feilure of

fa physician or surgeon to exercise the requisite degree of skill

 

and care in treating or operating on a patient,

the question of negligence met be decided by reference to
Felevant medical standarés of care for which the plaintiff
Carries the burden of proving throvgh expert mesical
Eestinony. The standard of care to which a doctor has
failed to adhere mst be established by expert teetineny
Because a jury generally lacks the requisite epecial
skgreund to be able to

 

  

craft vai" 287, 298, 893 P.24 138, 149 (1995)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As this court
has stated,

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[In the ordinery negligence case[,] the jury can determine
thetner there hes been # breach of defendant's guty to the
Plaintiff on the basis of their everyday experience,
Sbeervatione{,] ané judment. The erdinary negligence case
Will not require expert opinion evidence to delineate

nderée of cere. Mewever, in
Jay Jurore are {li prepared to
cal data for the purpose of
Setermining whether professional conduct conformed to a
Fessonable standard of care and whether there ies causal
Felationship between the violation of a duty and an injury
fo the patient, Therefore, expert opinion evidence is
Seneraiiy required to aid the Jury in ite terke

Bernard v. Char, 79 Hawai'i 371, 377, 903 P.24 676, 682 (App.
1995) (citations, brackets, and emphasis omitted); see alse Carx

 

 

 

  
 

ws Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 486, 904 P.24 489, 500 (1995) (in an
informed consent claim, expert medical testimony is required to
establish the materiality of the risk of harm that in fact
occurs); Phillins v. Queen’s Med, Ctr,, 1 Haw. App. 17, 18, 613
P.2d 365, 366 (1980) (in a case for wrongful death of the

wif

 

plaintitt

  

expert medical testimony as to the cau
death was necescary to sustain case against defendant hospital
and physicians). Clearly, a jury of lay persons generally lacks
the knowledge to determine the factual issues of medical
causation, the degree of skill, knowledge, and experience
required of the physician, and the breach of the medical standard
of care.

unlike medical malpractice cases, cases involving
actions against attorneys “have rarely involved questions of the

necessity ané adni

 

ibility of expert testimony, probably because

in such cases the court iteelf sits as an expert on the subject.*

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collins v. Greenstein, 61 Hew. 26, 39 n.8, 595 P.24 275, 283 n.8
(1979) (citation omitted). This court, however, recognized that:

More attention will probably be given in the future to the
need for expert evidence. In nany types of situations such
ae letting the statute of limitations run before a suit 8
fied, no testimony of lawyer

is one of intersretation re iikely to be

 

iu
1d. 40 n.9, 595 P.2d at 283 n.9 (emphasis added). Although this

case does not involve an attorney malpractice suit, the stated
principle in Collins that an issue concerning the interpretation
of law requires expert assistance is appliceble here. In our
view, the determination of the fair value of what the plaintiffs
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct at the
time of settlement entails guidance from legal experts.

Indeed, parties settle to avoid a trial on the merits
because of the uncertainty of the outcone and the high costs of
litigation. Gossincer v. Ass‘n of Apartment Owmers of Regency of
Ala Wai, 73 Haw. 432, 424, 835 P.2 627, 633 (1992) (noting that
public policy “favors the finality of negotiated settlements that
avoid the costs and uncertainties of protracted litigation")
(citation omitted). In every settlenent, the agreed upon arcunt
undoubtedly is not the "best case scenario" for either side, but
rather is a compromise of their respective positions to avoid the

multiple risks of trial where they might face their “worse case

 

scenario.’ Naturally, the compromise range of a claim will be

different at different points in time based upon what is known,

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——

or reasonably foreseeable, at the tine of the compromise,
including the state of the lew. In this respect, there are many
variables that experienced lawyers routinely consider in weighing
the potential risks and revards inherent in going forward with

Litigation against the certainty of @ compromise solution. This

 

court has enunerated sone of these factors in determining whether

 

a settlement was made in good faith, such ai

(2) the type of case and aifficulty of proof at trial, eas,
Fearsend motor vehicle collision, medicel malpractice
product 1iabilsty, ete.; (2) the realistic approximation of
Eotal Garages that the plaintiff secke; (3) the strength of
the plaintiff's claim and the reslistic likelihood of his or
her success at trial; (é) the predicted expense of
Titsgacions (5) the relative degree of fault of the settling
tortiesecrs; (6) the sncunt of coneiGeration paid to settle
the eleiss! (J) the insurance policy linies and solvency of
the Joint tortfeasers; (&) the relationship anong the
parties and whether it is condu

Conduct; ané (9) any other evie
Sined at injuring the intereste of @ non-settiing tortfeasor
or motivates by ether wrongfel purpose.

Trover v. Adame, 102 Hawai'i 399, 427, 77 P.3d €3, 112 (2003).

 

 

 

 

  

    

In other words, whether the fair settlenent value would have been
greater than the actual settlenent itself is @ matter that would
be nearly impossible for a lay person to determine without
guidance from expert legal testimony. Moreover, the fact that
the settlenent wes less than the potential recovery in the
underlying product Iisbility cases does not mean that the
plaintiffs suffered danages as a result of fraud. Rather, the
fred Gamage claim would be the difference between the fair
settlenent value absent frevd and the amount of the plaintiffs’

actual settlement. As one court indicated:

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‘The fact that proposed cettienent may only amount to
fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of
itself, mean that the proposed settlenent is grossly’
inadequate and should be disapproved. in fact.) there Se
no resson, ot least in theory, why & satisfactory settlenent
could not’ anount to a hundredth or even a thousandth part of
a single percent of the potential recovery.

‘In_xe Warner Conme'ns Sec, Litia., 618 F. Supp. 735, 745
(S.D.N.¥, 1985) (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495

P.2d 448, 455 n.2 (24 Cir, 1974)) (ellipsis and other citations

 

 

 

omitted).
For these sane reasons, the question whether DuPont's
fraudulent misrepresentation caused damage to the plaintiffs in
this case by preventing them from receiving the “fair compromise
value* of their claims is one upon which the trier of fact must
be guided by expert lecal testimony. Accordingly, we hold that
the circuit court did not err in concluding that “expert lawyer
testimony directed to the numerous compromise factors, and how
they would have applied to each (p]laintiff’s case” is required.

the plai + fail ir bur:

Proof as a matter of law

We next address whether the plaintiffs produced

 

sufficient evidence -- in the form of expert testimony -- to
defeat summary judgment. Preliminary, we recite the well-settled
legal principles governing motions for summary judgment --

specifically, that

eumary 4 tion challences the very existence or
Jecai_eutts £ the claim.

Bderensed. in effect, the soving
thet he oF she fs entitied to prevail becav
oppenent hae no valid claim for relief or defense to the
Section” Xecoresngly,

    

 

 

 

 

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Senonstrating the absence of =
he a
reat case went to triai [1th
ns tent eva a jusmment for bi

ch

= (1986) (a-carty moving for sumary sudenent under
federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56
esate his-or her crsonenk‘s claims, but need only goint out
‘that there te {an]-abeence of evidenes to supsors the
‘Supeent‘a cling), For if no evidence covle be mustered to
Sveeain the rermeving party's position, © trial would be
Seeleee.

‘Wien a notion for summary juégrent is rade and

supported,

‘an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
Silegations or denials of his or her pleads
but hie or her reeponte, by affidavite or a
otherwise provided in HRCP Rule 56, met set
forth specific facte showing that there is a
Senulne iseue fortriel. if he oF ene doet not
0 respond, sunnary judgment, if appropriate,
Shall be entered egainst him’ or her

 

   

 

 

WRCP Rule S6(e) (2998) (emphasis added). In other words, a

 

fetor fone thar
‘can prodice some evicence at that tine. On notice for
Suimary judgsent, the evidence is viewed in the Light most
favorable to the non-noving party.

Young v. Planning Comm'n of the County of Kaua'i, 89 Hawai'i 400,
407, 974 P.24 40, 47 (1999) (internal quotation marks, citation,
and original brackets omitted) (emphases adéed). Moreover,
“(t]he evidentiary standard required of a moving party in meeting
its burden on a summary judgment motion depends on whether the
moving party will have the burden of proof on the issue at

Qcwen Fed, Bank, FSB_v, Russell, 99 Hawai'i 173, 162, 53

P.34 312, 321 (App. 2002) (citation omitted). where the moving

 

trial.

party is the defendant, who does not bear the ultimate buréen of

 

proof at tril

party=plaintitt

 

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{nile to make a showing sufficient to establish the

Sn such @ situstion, there can be no genuine {neue os to any
material fact, since a conplete failure of proof concerning
fan extent ial elenent of the nomoving party's case
hecesearily rendere all other facts immaterial. the moving
party ie entitled to judgnent ae a matter of low because the
Pennoving party hae failed to make « sufficient showing on

‘essential elenent of her case with respect to which che
hae the burden of proof

 

 

 

dally, State, 7 Hew. App. 274, 264, 756 P.26 1048, 1055 (2988)
(emphasis aééed) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, we now turn
to the issue at hand, i.e., whether the plaintiffs’ expert
reports ere *legal{ly] sufficient)" to sustain their clains
against DuPont such that, “if the case went to trial[,) there
would be . . . competent evidence to support @ judgment’ in their
favor. Young, @9 Hawaili at 407, 979 P.24 at 47 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

Im this case, the plaintiffs proffered reports of their
economic expert and attorney experts as evidence of damages. AS
indicated above, one factor anong many relevant fectors in
Getermining the fair compromise value of a particular claim on

or lack thereof -- of

 

the date of settlement is the validity
the plaintiffs’ claim for dameges at the tine of trial: “The
nature of the injuries in the foregone tort action are relevant
only to the extent of how they would affect the value of the
Disahatino, 635 F. Supp. at 355
Indeed, such factor requires the application of economic

principles to ascertain the reascnably certain future

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income/profits of the plaintiffs in a particular market, and,
thus, economic experts would likely be necessary to aid the jury
in determining the underlying tort damages at least in the

affect the settlement

 

context of how those économic danagi
value, if at all.

The plaintiffs’ economic expert reports (prepared by
David J. Weiner of Valvoulis and Weiner) revealed that Necully

in the sum of $11,647,889.00, Willman in the

 

sustained danagi
in the sum of $967,222.00, and the

 

sum of $3,278,202.00, 1

 

Takas in the sum of $649,871.00, weiner calculated the total

 

value of each plaintiff’s underlying product liability claim,
beginhing with the alleged first day of Benlate loss through June
2005 -- ten years after their settlements, However, the

submission of the economic reports does not negate the fact that

the plaintiffs are also required to adduce evidence -- via
attorney expert testimony -- as to the factors that must be

considered when determining the fair compromise value for each of
the plaintiffs’ cases. In that regard, the plaintiffs presented
reports from five attorneys, designated as experts, four of whom
had litigated the underlying product liability actions. They
were: (1) Wayne D. Parsons, who elong with Kevin A, Malone” (a

Florida attorney) represented Isa and the Takas; (2) J. Richard

 

arly eitueced plaintiffs in Hewa's
ang Floriée and in ther cases filed ecrose the country." Netsvure 2. 102
Rawai's oe 181, 73 P.3@ av 68

 

 

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Peterson, who represented Willman; (3) Judith Pavey, who
negotiated Willnan’s settlement; (4) George W. Playdon, Jr., who
represented McCully; and (5) Jeffrey S. Portnoy, the only
designated expert not involved in the underlying product
ability cases.

According to the circuit court, however, the

aforementioned attorney expert report:

 

discussed more fully

 

infra, were insufficient as a matter of law to establish the

plaintiffs’ damages. Specifically, the circuit court ruled tha

 

[the pllaintifte have not submitted the expert veetinony
required to eustain their burden of proof on the proper
nescure of danages in their cares, The deadlines for [the
Pliaintiffe to subst their finsl expert reporte and anend
Eneir pleadings were October 18, 2004, and december 14,
2006, Feepectively. This court previcusly nade clear that
Expert reporte were to be final ané that the experts would
not be allowed to testify on matters beyond their respective
Feports in its Oréer Related te Trial Procedures, filea May
6, 2006. "(The pliaintiffe are therefore unable to prove the
fact or ancunt Of ettlenent fraud caneges as a matter of
aw, and summary judgrent is granted on all remaining claine
herein.

 

 

 

 

 

 

(enphasis omitted.) The plaintiffs, however, contend that the
circuit court ‘ignored the numerous expert attorney
[declarations which [the p}laintiffs did, in fact, submit to
substantiate their danages.* he plaintiffs argue that their
legal experts *averred that the valuation of (the plaintiffs’
cases would have been substantially higher had the truth of
DuPont's duplicity been known.* Conversely, DuPont maintains
that the plaintiffs

cennot establish [Jesther the fact [Jor the amount of
Gerage. (The plaintiffs) cannot meet this buréen for a
Variety of reasons, the pertinent one here being that they
Sinply connot prove the correct measure of {reud ersce

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based upon the way they have positiened thi
have no expert testimony to provide 2s6ie'
fon how to evaluate [the] fair compromise value of each [of
the plaintiffe’] eleine, what the pertinent settlenent
factore would be ang how they would be applied in this
hor what methodologies could be used to determine what those
‘snounts should be.

   

 

 

(emphasis omitted.)

As previously stated, although the determination of
Ganages is an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,
Ganages must be based on evidence that shows loss with reasonable
certainty and eliminates speculation. Chung, 62 Haw. at 605, 618
P.24 at 291 (*(T]he rule that uncertainty as to the snount does
not necessarily prevent recovery is not to be interpreted as
requiring no proof of the amount of damage. The extent of
plaintiff's loss must be shown with reasonable certainty and that
excludes any showing or conclusion founded upon mere speculation
or guess.* (Citation onitted.))

Parsons’ report described the documents that were not

 

properly produced during discovery in the product liability ca
by DuPont and contended that these docunents ‘would have proven
or tended to prove that Benlate caused the damages and losses to
crops suffered by [his] clients.‘ Parsons, therefore, concluded
that the concealed docunents would have ‘increased the strength
of the liability cases for (the p)laintiffs* and the plaintitts
swould have been in @ stronger position regarding settlenent.*
Parsons further concluded thet:

‘The decision of whether to settle the cese for the snount
Cfferes by DuPont to en individual client, or to take the
case to tris) before jury is ultimately the decision of

 

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the client
5 joreing the srcpeeition that
‘Benlate could couse darage to my cliente crops would have
reduced the risk of going to trial. ‘The client would have

een informed about the riek of going to trial in terms of

the strengeh of the (pllaineiffa’ liability elaine se well

ae the strength of the cliente’ damages cleine. If the’
rad to take the cia:

Knowing the [concealed docimentel would fave made the

plsintiffe’ csse stronger wnen taking an individval case to

‘Axial if the client reiected Dupont’s settlenent offer.
(Emphases added.)

 

before n-any event. and

 

Peterson's report opined that, had he and his client,
Willman, had the concealed information, *it most definitely would
have a substantial difference in [their] analysis of
Lability/causation in the case against DuPont. The information,
taken as a whole, would have greatly strengthened Mr. Wilinan’s
claim that Benlate was defective and the cause of hie crop damage
and loss.* Peterson believed that had

Willman now_in_Sentesber 192¢ a} the informationt.1 be

Bndagse to trial. The information is strong ond persuasive
that Benlere wae defectivel.) ..... Wiliman's case would

have been substantially stroneeri.j
(mnphases added.)

Pavey’s report averred that:

Tt has been 10 years eince we settled those cases, but 7

recall [that] we discueted and applied the came range of
probability of winning on negligence/product defect to #1)

 

 

 

 

[ability ascessnent was nade on the basis of the
evidence which had been produced by DuPont, evidence
Geveloped by us a6 of the time of tettienent and, te sone
extent, on pricr trial ané settienent cuteones. It ie clear
forme that DuPont fraudulently withheld significant evisence
from us an even more from plaintiffe who tried or settled
their cates pricr to the tine cur cliente settled.

 

 

 

fraudyi ent:
wit i rie6 oricr t
Shur settlerent.-Dufont would probably have teat ail ef those
‘sree on the sence and product defect. =

fet thet gone of the ca

 

Knew fore that settled pricr to

 

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our cares would have either been gettied for eubstantially
higher sune or gone co trial had DuFont vefuced to pay @
fair eettlenent{.

‘we Fepretented many clients, sone of whom had a
lengthy track record of Being successful nurserymen and
Earmere, other who 62 not. ‘There were Sndividval causation
and dansges issues that algo figured into our settlesent
fvalustione. However,

u findin
i slustior

"i ‘because, typically,
ie ig true that the stronger the liebility case, the nore
valve both sides assign to any canagen claim.

(Emphases added.) Playdon also stated that, in his opinion, “the

 

 

 

 

 

 

concealment and/or misrepresentation of factual information by

 

DuPont inpaired [his] ability to fairly evaluate the status of
(his) client's [product liability] litigation.’ He asserted that
the information would have made a ‘substantial difference’ in his

garding “the strength of the liability/cavsation

 

analysis
cases" against DuPont. Playdon concluded that, if the
information had been properly disclosed, he "would not have
reconmended {his} client settle his claim for the anount DuPont

offered during negotiations* becau:
{S)m (his) opinion, she valve of Ihiel cliente economic

Geses creat! 3 which
no 'In (his) opinion, assuming timely and
Sppropriate access to all of the infornation{,] and further

fetelenent consideration orester than that which wae in fact

 

rz ve taken the eli

(Emphases added.)
Lastly, the plaintiffs indicated in their answers to

DuPont’s June 4, 2004 interrogatories that “Portnoy’s opinion
will not be based on any particular documents of [the plaintiffs)

relating to the prior Benlate product litigation, but will be

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based on [the] general litigation experience of Mr. Portnoy.
consequently, in his report, Portnoy explained the general
Litigation and settlement practices and concluded that *had (he)
been representing these clainants, the settlenent value of the
cases would have been draratically impacted had the wrongfully
withheld information been available and ‘would have
significantly increased.*? In eum, the plaintiffs’ experts

offered es:

 

intially two opinions, to wit, that, if the plaintiffs
and/or their attorneys had known about the concealed evidence,
(2) they would not have settled and would have proceeded to trial
and (2) the valuation of the plaintiffs’ cases would have been
“eubstantially higher.*

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, as the nonnoving party, Lau v, Bautista, 61 Haw. 144,
147, 598 P.24 161, 163 (1979), we agree with the circuit court's
implicit ruling that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to damages to
defeat summary judgment. As indicated above, the plaintiffs’
attorney experts merely presented conclusory opinions that would

do little to assist @ jury. Of crucial importance is the fect

 

© tn thelr anewers to DuPont's interrogatories, the plaintifts sso
steted that Stanley Reehrig, couneel for the plaintitfe in another Benlate
product iebility cese, Kexcnate Ferme, inc. v. United seri Ereds., 66 Hewes't
Bie, 948 P.26 2055 (1997), "ney be celled to testify regarding the nature of
Garages cleined in thet action, and the darages awarded by the Sury in that
action.” he record ces not reflect that Roehrig cubsitted
expert ining that he would De permitted to tee
Roehrig's testinony would be directed only es to whet another jury ¢i¢ an
another cose

   

 

 

          

ty.

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that none of the attorney experts provide any opinion testimony

to what specific settlement factors were or should be

 

considered in settling each of the plaintiffs’ underlying product
liability cases and the evaluation of how those factors would
have been altered had they known about the concealed evidence.
Although the plaintiffs have filed their claims jointly, they
each have separate claims against DuPont, and each of their
claims must be individually established. The experts did not
explain how DuPont's conduct affected the plaintiffs’ evaluation
such that they would have settled for more, what each plaintiff
claimed as his damages in the product liability cases at the tine
he Settled and what he recovered, and how the settlement factors
would apply to each plaintiff's cese. It is not sufficient for
an expert to simply state that he or she believed that, had the
concealed evidence been known, the settlement value would have
been greater because the existence of the concealed evidence
strengthened the liability aspect of the litigation. See Accba
v.Gen. Tire, Inc., 92 Hawai'i 1, 14, 986 P.2a 288, 301 (1999)
("Although expert testimony may be more inferential than that of
fact witnesses, in order to defeat a motion for summary

judgment [,] an expert opinion must be more than a conclusory
aegertion about vltinate legal issues." (Internal quotation
marks and citation omitted.)); see, e.g,, Zelinski v, Brunswick
Corm., 185 F.34 2321, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (ruling that the
federal district court properly characterized patent attorney

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expert's statenent as conclusory because the statement was an
assertion without further explanation); Philline Petroleum Co, v.
Huntenan Polymers Corp., 157 F.34 866, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(reasoning that conclusory expert declarations devoid of facts
upon which the conclusions were reached fail to raise a genuine
issue of material fact to resist sunary judgment); Burrow v.
Arce, 997 8.W.24 229, 235-36 (Tex. 1999) (holding that the
attorney expert affidavit stating that he considered the relevant
facts and concluded that the settlenents were fair and reasonable
was conclusory because he did "not explain why the settlements
were fair and reasonable for each of the (plaintiffs) (emphasis
added); Griswold v. Kilpatrick, 27 P.34 246, 248-49 (Wash. ct.
App. 2001) (the plaintiff's expert testimony that, but for the
Gelay in prosecuting the case, the claim would have settled for a
larger sun was speculative and conclusory and therefore
insufficient to create a genvine issue of material fact ina
legal malpractice case). The unsubstantiated conclusions of the
plaintiffs’ experts are insufficient to raise 2 genuine issue of

material fact that would preclude summary judgment." The

 

sertion that, *[elven if
‘alculating éanages, [the

Me are unconvinced by the diesent's bald
the ‘fair compromise velue’ is used ae a basie for
piieintifte have eutficiently identified ‘compromise factors’ to pur the "fair
Conpronise valve’ in issue," L.e., creating "genuine issues of ssterial fact
be to the faiznese of the prior settlenent|-]*  Dieeent Op. at 17. The
Elesent feile to cite to eny authority in support of its position that the
Conclusory statenente found in the aferenentioned attorney expert reports are
Sufficient to create cenuine Jerues of saterial fact. instead, the dissent
sisply and inferences mist be viewed by this court in
Ligne more Ip)laintiffe.*” internal quotation
fake, citation, and oripinal srackere omitted.) 1d, Although the aiesent

(wont inved:.-)

 

     

   

 

    

        
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ee

circuit court properly concluded that the plaintiffs are ‘unable
to prove the fact or amount of settlement fraud damages as a
matter of law." Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court was

correct in granting stmary judgment in favor of DuPont.’

H(.. continued)
correctly relates the principle in reviewing an avaré of sunnary judgment,
Such principle Goes not negate the fact, as the Gievent even acknowl edat

that expert afficavite ‘oust at least include the factua) basis and the
os " inorder to defeat a
Ebtion for sumary sodgnent- (Enprasie added.) (interne) quotation rarks

Gnd citation omitted.) id, at 16 n.4. Yet, the diccent mistakenly believes
that the expert reports, whieh merely ‘opined that the settlenent value was
Higher than that fer which the case wae previously settled, were clearly based
wiepSces and inference drawn thereon." id. As stated above, for plaintiffs"
Gtperts to opine thet the plaintiffe would not have settled

frbceeded te trial hed they known of the concealed docunents
Rencealed inforration would have increseed the strength ef their product
STability cecee, does not render such opinion sufficient to identify the
Rnpronize factors of the plaintiffs’ particular cases, Sven seeuning, but
Sot agreeing, that the attorney expert reports sufficiently identified the
Conprenise factors, the reports fail to eet forth how these factors epplied to
Gach of their cases

 

     

 

 

Moreover, the dissent, relying upon HRE Rule 702 (governing

saniesibility of expert testimony], points out that the sttorney expert

Spores ‘would have been sdnieeible st trial-* Discent Op. et 12, 16. We

Etagree, Ae previously quoted, Rule 702 provides in relevent part that “(4)E

SEER Mic, “Eethniced. cr other specialised knowledge wil} assist the trier of
a seidencs

 

 

 

Gualifiee ae fence, training, or education
Sey cestify thereto in the form of én opinion er otherwise." (Biphasis
Gaded:) Ae Siscuseed supra, the plaintiffe’ attorney experte’ reports sinply
Gonsiated ef conclusory opinions, which would have provided "no assistance to
She Jury. snd therefore, should not be agcitred” pursvant to HAE Rule 702
Entangan. 13 Haw. at S56, 799 P.2d at $2 (observing that, expert testimony
sreeneeely stares s iegel conciveion ané that Goes not assist the jury in its
Getermination ip excludable under Rule 702)

    

 

   

She plaintiffe sdditionslly argue that the circuit court's ruling
exceeded the bounds of reson and disregarded rules or principles of law or
Stectice to the plaintiffe’ substantial detriment. First, the plaintiffs
REintain that, at the gene tine DuPont vas asserting that the proper nessure
Of damages was the fair conpromiee velve, it reserved the right te argue that
Sich danages were speculative. Durent, sowever, contends thet, bec
[eine contrelling Hewas's lew, ic reserved the right to later arg.
Hinority petition that eettlenent fraud canages are isherentiy speculative:
Honethelere, the plaintiffs do not explain how DuPont's reservation would
Prejudice tien. Feccnd, the pleintiffe argue that they were prejudiced by
Elfont's inconsistent position throughout thie 1itigetion that ii "would never
Fave poid ony nore te Settle the pleintitfe’ elaine than wes in fact pase sn
Eettienente'? ogein, the plaintiffs dié not explein how they were prejudiced
fy'bofont's aecerticn and euch ersertion is irFelevant to the determination of
Teontinved. .-)

 

 

 

 

 

   

   

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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the plaintiffs maintain

e

 

that:

At the tine [they] responded to DuFont's discovery, and
Submitced their final expert reporte for trial, 1)’ they
believed (and till believe) that Hewe!'i lew allowed for
recovery of the losses they sustained tnaturally” and
“proximately” from DuPont's misrepresentations, without
alnitation.” their trial preparation reflected th:
expectation of the availability of general damages for
fraud.

 

 

   

=-continved)
the iecuec in this appeal. Third, the plaintiffs contend that they were
prejudiced because DuPont's experte did not offer opinions on the fair
Ecuprenise value in their written reports. Indeed, the aicsent takes desue
with DuPont'® attorney expert reporte, stating that

Zt would be frente to sustain sunnary judgment in this
because epperently [DuPont] itself never named an expert
sttorney regarding “fair compromise value" factors pric: to
the expert Seadline and before the court's summary Judgment

ruling.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dissent Op. at 18. However, a€ DuPont points out, the burden se upen the
plaintiffs to prove damages, and the pleintsff® cannot complain thet DuPont,
814 not establish & prina facie elenent of ease. Ae
previously stated, DuPont, a5 the moving perty sn ® notion for sunmaxy
Susgment, may discharge (ies) burden by Genonstrating thati.) if the cose
ent to trial{,] there would be no competent evidence to support a judgment
for (the plainciffe).* Young, 69 Yawaii at 407, 97¢ P.2d ee 47 (estation
omitted); gee alse 10A Wright, Miller k Kane, and Fri
e2727, et 47 (1598) (7[I}e ie not necessary for the wovant to

Shereduce any evidence in crder to prevail on surmary judgment. Ratver, at
Least in cases in which the nonmoving perty will besr the burden of proof at
trial, the movant can seek summary judgeent by establishing that the opposing
party has insufficient evidence to prevail ae a matter of lew[-)*);

103 Nawai"i 468, 63 P.36 731 (2004) (cA® the Federal
Riles of Civil Procedure are substantially cimilar to the RCP,“ “this court
can lock to parallel federal lew for guidance.* (Internal quotation marke and
citation onitted.1)

Finally, the plaintiffe argue that they were prejudiced because Duront
arcerted attorney-client privilege regarding their analysis of the plaintiffs’
Underlying product 2iability ceses. Novever, the discussions between Duront
fang ite etterneys have no relevance to the ceterminetion of the fair
Eettlenent value. the pleintitfe provide no explanetion et to how they were
prejudiced by Dufont's cesertion of privilege,

 

 

 

    

   

 

 

 

ag previously indicated, the parties hed submitted their tina)
srt reporte by the tine DuPont Ercught its notion for summary judenent
Dated on the plaintiffs’ inebility to prove damages. The cireust court had
aleo nade clear thet the parties’ experts would not be allowed to testify on
attere beyond their respective reperte

    

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+ [T]he possibility of the {elircuit {elourt
imposing a'linited seettienent fraud" Teredy vas unknown to
the parties and wae not foreseeable under Hawaii law at the
Eine [the plaintiffs obtained their reporte, and anewered
Giseovery(")

 

Consequently, the plaintiffs request that, *{sJhould this [clourt
ultimately adopt the settlement differential as the prevailing
measure of damages,* i.e., the fair compromise value absent the

fraud, they should “be given the opportunity (on remand) to make

 

an appropriate record for such purpose." Stated differently, the
plaintiffs believe that, because it was "unknown" and *not
foreseeable" that the circuit court would adopt the fair
compromise value as the measure of damages in settlement fraud
actions, their case should be renanded to allow their legal
experts an opportunity to present their opinions regarding the
fair compromise value of the case absent the fraud.

In the instant case, DuPont filed a motion for summary
judgment, aeserting thet the plaintiffs’ danages were limited to
the ‘fair compromise value of their released tort claims at the
time of settlement. In opposition thereto, the plaintiffs
maintained -- as they had up to the time Duront filed the subject
motion for eunnary judgment -- that their éamages should not be
so restricted and should be extended to the judgment value of
their released claims, In giving the benefit of the doubt to the
plaintiffs, we presume that DuPont's theory of damages was either
first raised, or only became clear, upon the filing of its motion

for summary judgment. Therefore, it can hardly be said, es the

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plaintiffs contend, that it was “not foreseeable" for the
circuit court to conclude that the measure of danages would be
the fair conpronise value, especially in light of the arguments
advanced by DuPont in ite motion for summary judgment.”
Clearly, this is not a case where the circuit court gua sponte
rendered an outcome that could not have been expected by the

parti

 

More importantly, the opportunity the plaintiffs now
seek, i.e., to allow their experts the opportunity to opine

value of the case absent the fraud,

 

regarding the fair compronis

was available to them, via HRCP Rule 56(f) (2007), at the time

 

the circuit court was considering DuPont's motion for sunmary
Judgment. HRCP Rule 56(f) states that:
Shoulé it appear from the affidavite of party opposing the
notion that the party cannot for reasone steted present by

affidavit facts exvential to justify the party'® opposition,
2 speliestion

r lecovery to be be
(Emphases added.) Rule 56(f) -- like its federal counterpart,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 56(f), -- provides a

 

me @iesent contends that *[1Jt was not until the Februsry 28, 2005
corer, i.e.) the crder granting Dufont's motion for eumary judgrent,| that,
the pilaintitfe were nade cware of the specific standaré to which these
reeponse would be held. Dissenting Op. at 8. Mewever, the Giceent faile to
fake into secount that the plaintiffs were placed on notice of iduPent
position on damages ~~ at the latest ~- when Dufont filed ite notion for
Eumazy judgment. Father, the ditrent Ealély and mistakenly stetee thet the
fact *ic}hat {the p)leintitts nay have been put on notice of Dufont'® position
ae nothine to de with th ithe plieintifte were not
iwire of the specific camages hat would be adopted by the ceure
Until the Febroery 28, 2008 order." 34. (erphesis added) internal quotation
ris and citation to’ the ralerity opinion emitted) Inesd, ae incicated
nize, the plaintiffs cannot wait until efter Dufont prevaile on ite stated
theory to seek an alternative renedy.

 

 

   
  

     
      

 

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mechanism for litigants to seek a continuance or avoid summary
Judgment when they “need{] to discover essential facts" to
justify their opposition. Hall v. State of Hawai'i, 791 F.24
759, 761 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that FRCP Rule 56(f) empowers
the court to continue or deny a motion for sumary judgment “if
the opposing party needs to discover essential facts* to justify
the opposition) (citation omitted); see also Stallard v, Consol.
Maui. Inc., 103 Hawai'i 468, 475, €3 P34 731, 738 (2004) (vas
the (FRCP) are substantially similar to the HRCP, we look to
federal case law for guidance.*). The purpose of Rule S6(f) is
*to provide an additional safeguard against an improvident or
premature grant of summary juégnent.* Brice v, Gen, Motors
Corm., 931 F.24 162, 166 (2st Cir. 1991) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Moreover,

[e]he rule should be applied with a spirit of liberality.
Although Siscovery neeé not be complete before a case 18
Gienieeed, cunnary judgment is proper only if the nonnovant
bas had adequate tine for discovery. To this end, Rule
S6(t) allows a Farty to request « delay sn granting suery
Sudgent if the part
thea =

Rexty is required to show what specific facts further
‘Siscovery nicht unveil

McCabe v. Macaulay, 450 F. Supp. 2d 928, 933 (N.D. Towa 2006)

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citetions, original
brackets omitted) (fornat altered); ral Tire, Inc.,
92 Hewei'i 1, 11-12, 986 P.28 268, 298-99 (1999) (an MRCP Rule
56(£) affidavit must provide valid reesons why @ continvance is
necessary and denonstrate specifically how postponenent would

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enable rebuttal); Josue v. Isuzu Motors Am, Inc., 87 Hawai'i
413, 416, 958 P.2a 535, 538 (1998) (came). In sum, the circuit
court has the discretion to “deny the motion for summary
judgment, order a continuance for additional discovery or make
‘such other order as is just.‘* densen v, Redevelopment Agency
of Sandy City, 996 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993) (footnote
omitted); se@ also Josue, 87 Hawai'i at 416, 958 P.24 at 538 ("A

 

[circuit] court’s decision to deny a request for continuance
purevant to HRCP Rule 56(f) will not be reversed absent an abuse
of discretion. (citation omitted.)).

Here, rather than request a continuance of the hearing

“to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken

 

or discovery to be had or . . . [to seek] such other order es is
just,’ HRCP Rule S6(f), the plaintiffs continued to assert their

contrary position on damages, disregarding DuPont’

 

position and
the fact that the circuit court might be persuaded to adopt
DuPont's view of the measure of damages. Having failed to
request @ Rule 56(f) continuance, the plaintiffs cannot now
complain that the circuit court -- based on the submissions by

the plaintiffs -- granted summary judgment in favor of DuPont."

 

MWe are mindful that, at the tine DuPont filed the subject notion for
sumary jvégent, final expert reporte had been submitted pursuant to the
Circuit court's pretrial echedul ing oréer and that the circuit court hed
Geclared that testincny outside of the experte’ respective reports would not
be allowed. Indeed, the dissent go cheerves and contends that the pretrial
scheduling order "thus barred the possibility of a continuan
Elecovery* Dissenting Op. at 2) ‘footnote emitted). However,
Rule Se(f) "should be eppiied with a epirit of liberality,” uecCabe.
Supp. 2 at 935, and given the wide discretion efferded vO the cafe
(cone ined. =.)

 

   

 

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Weinbera v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 751 (th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotation marks, citation, and original brackets
omitted) (interpreting FRCP Rule $6(f) and holding that the
istrict court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants when the plaintiff ‘never moved the court under Rule
56(£) for additional time to obtain expert testimony necessary to
substantiate his allegations of damages"); see also Pasternak v
gar Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 628, 832-33 (10th Cir.
1986) (‘where a party opposing summary judgment and seeking a
continuance pending completion of discovery fails to take

advantage of the shelter provided by Rule S6(f) . . . , there is

 

no abuse of discretion in granting summary judgment")

 

keg Josue, #7 Havas! at 616, 958 P.2@ at $38 (citation enitted)), to “make
fueh other order ee is Just," MRCP Rule S6(f), eny grant by the cirevit court
Sta continvance to allow further Giscovery ahd the submistion of additional
Evidence from the plaintiffe' experts to rebst DuPont's position would have,
Sn cur slew, Sndiceted the circuit court’s implicit ruling that ite prior
STnitacion on expert testineny would be lifted with respect to the additional
evidence. See Spiller v. Ella Suithers Geriatric Cer., 919 F.24 338, 343 (Sth
Elz 1990) ‘Uindicating that, by allowing defencent to nove for summary
Sudment after cot-off date for pretrial motions, district court impliedly
Granted notion to anend scheduling créer). Thue, the dissent ’s contention
Shee Siche plisineif#e coulé not have eppropziately saved to, continve the
Gecision on [Dupont] ‘s motion for sumary judgnent,” dissenting op. a
Secieion on te Circuit court's pretrial achedsling order everiots’ the plain
Feeding of SRCP Rule 56(f), which confers upon the circuit court the authority
to snake euch other order se is just.’  voreover, although the deadline for
Eitelesion of expert reports had expired by the tine the circuit court entered
fee ruling on DuPont's eurnary Sudgrent, i.e., on Tebruary 26, 2008, the
Alecovery cot-off had net yet expired. ‘the diecovery cut-off date was set for
April 24, 2008)

 

 

 

 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Mid
South Grizzlies v. Nations) Foothal League, 720 F.26 772 (34 Cir. 1963),
SSUD thet treet courte which have coneicerea the iesue agree that [compliance
With the requirenente of Rule S6(f}) ie necessary for the preservation of
Fale Sete] “contention that eunmary’ Judgnent should be delayes pending further
Bitcovery" and cited to a cellection of cases for the eforenenticned
proposition. 28, et 760.n.6

  

 

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To permit the plaintiffs to now establish another
record relating to the proof of danages, after unsuccessfully
maintaining their position and failing to take advantage of the
Rule 56(£) remedy available to them, would entitle them to two
bites of the apple.” Daiichi Hewai's Real Estate Corp. v.
Lichter, 103 Hawai'i 325, 348, 82 P.34 411, 434 (2003) (in an
action seeking to vacate the arbitration decision, this court
stated that it “cannot accept that parties have a right to keep
two strings to their bow -- to seek victory before the tribunal
and then, having lost, seek to overturn it for bias never before

claimed"). Accordingly, in our view, the plaintiffs waived their

 

% Given the renedy available pursuant to HRCP Rule S6(f), we cannot
agree with the dissent that "the only opportunity [the p)laintiite would have
hed to acquire expert testinony re-evaluating their fraud elaine ‘ould
have been after the court nade its February 28, 2008 order granting summary.
judgnent.*" (bsecenting Op. a 26 (bold enphasic added) (underscored enphasis
in origins)

Moreover, the Gissent"s contention that, "per the Febrvary 28,
2005 order, [the circuit court) was not disposed to grant any motion for
further discovery even if [the p]laintiffs moved fer euch discovery" is
hothing more than sere speculation. Diesenting Op. at 28. However, inasmuch

the plaintiffs failed to move for a Rule S6(f) continuance, the circuit

Court var not precented with an opportunity €o pace on the iecue. Che

Eg, $1 Havel 319, 240, 98¢ P-2a 78, 99 (2998) (holding that the
Befendant *had the opportunity to raise the iesue [ (now challenged on appeal?)
sernetn the eireuse court, but he Gid not do £0. Insemuch ap he is the party,
anleging error, it vas his burden to reise the iseue, and any ambiguity in the
circuit court's ruling may therefore be attributed to hint). Interestingly,
the dissent exiticizes the najerity for "epecvlet|ing) that the (eireuie]
Court might have granted @ Rule S6(f) continuance’ if the plaintiffs had #0
Fequested. Diecenting Op. at 28. However, we do net opine #6 to whether the
circuit court would have granted the request for a continuence; rather, a
Sndiceted above, the plaintiffs dia not even request such relief, and, thus,
the cizevit court vas net given a chance te rule on the natter. ‘Hae the
notion been reieed ané 8 ruling nade, the seaue woud properly be before this
Court to review whether the circuit court abused ite Glecretion in granting or

Mewes at 416, 986 P-26 at S36 le censad

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

  
     

    
   

Senying the requert. fee Jcmus.
of ta Pequest for continuance pursuant te HACP Rule S€(f) will not be reversed
Gheent an abuse of discretion*) (citation omitted). However, euch ie net the
case here.

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opportunity to cecure further opinions from their experts to
submit to the circuit court and cannot now raise it on appeal.
‘See aenerally Chung v. McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co., 109 Hawas's
520, $37, 128 P.34 833, 850 (2006) ("the failure to properly
raise an issue at the {circuit} level precludes a party from
raising that issue on appeal") (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Avila v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652
F.2d 658, 660 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that *[a] contention by an
opposing party that he had insufficient time in which to present
specific facts in opposition to the motion [for summary judgment)
normally cannot be successfully raised for the first time on

appeal") (citation omitted) .*

 

1 the afesent contends thet, *[{Jnasmich as HACP Rule S6(f) wae not
raised by any party but by the majority gua sponte... . under the
Elreanatances St 18 not properly before thie court!,}° dissenting op. at 23
(enghosis cnitted), ie wholly izrelevent to the facte(,]" i6., and, that by
Applying BECP Rule S6(£), we *he[ve) given [DuPont] another “bite at the
piece id, st 24 The relevence of HACP Rule S6(f) is triggered by the
fikined#¢e/ alternetive argusent thet the case be reranded in order to allow
Rhein experte the opportunity to opine regarding the fair compromise valve and
fo present such evidence to he circuit court. As discussed supra, the
Pleineifs had at their Slepcea) the procedural nechaniem, Le, Rule S6(f),
Pode exactiy what tiey now eek. Noreover, as previously @iscussed, the
Foeeibitity chet the circuit court might elect the fair compromise value as
Peetneasare of cansses was not unforeseeable nor unknown to the plaintiffs.
Hheliy, we seiterate that ouPont wer the prevailing party at the circuit
Court; ihe plaintiffs, a2 the non-prevailing party end the

Spread, have the burden of Genonetrating that they sre entitied to the relief
Sought before thin court. See Eettencourt v. Bettencourt, 60 Wowai's 225,

350, 909 F.2d S53, £58 11995) ("t]he burden Ie upon eppellant in an eppeel to
thew error by reference to matters in the recorée") (internal quotation marks
Dd citation omitted). Ae etated in Costa v. Gunn, 5 Maw. App. 619, 697 P26
3 (3988)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      

 

 

 

(rihe boréen ie on appellant to convince the appellate body

[lat the presumptively correct ection of the cireuit court

fs incorrect, So great ie the burden on appellant to

cvercone the presumption ef correctness that appellee's

{allure co fsle an anewering Brief Goes not entitle

appellant to the relief cought from the eppellate court,
(eontinved. ..)

 

 

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2. The Plaintiffs’ Remaining Contention
‘The plaintiffs also challenge the circuit court's order

granting DuPont's motion for sunmary judgment based on the test
results conducted by Alta Analytical Laboratories, Inc. (Alta).
‘They contend, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in
concluding that the Alta test results were ‘not material’ to the
plaintiffs when they settled their cases and subsequently
dismissed them. However, in light of the foregoing conclusion
that the plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence on
damages to defeat summary judgment, we need not address the

instant issue.

 

(continued)
‘even though the court may accept appellant's statement of
facts 25 correct.

Id. at 430, 697 P.2¢ at 50-51 (citing HEAP Rule 30) (other citations omitted) .
Thos, it can hardly be aid that DoPont ie being afforded @
apple.

 

# pita wes hired on behalf of DuPont te conduct tests of oi] and
water collected from the properties of certain plaintiffs who hed brougne
Benlate cleint againet DoPent. Alta was one of the few isborateries, 1f not
the only one in the United states, capable of performing the sophisticated
soil ond weter aneiysie to determine whether the Benlate wee contaminates

   

 

   

 

During the couree of 1itigating the products liebslity actsone, the
following were concealed, withheld, and fraudulently mierepresentes fy DuFont
(2) the Alta test reculte; (2) the test results conéscted in Morte Viete.
Costa Aiea, denonetrating that Benlate wes harmful to Plante; end (3) the
teste perfcrned by A L Midwest lanoretories and by Dufont's in-house testing
facilities

 

 

68
*** FORPUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

B. _DuPont’p Crose-Appeal

on cross-appeal, DuPont raises an additional basis to
affirm the circuit court's judgment. Specifically, DuPont
challenges that part of the circuit court's order denying ite
first motion for summary judgnent as to the plaintiffe’ fraud
claims, contending that the circuit court erred in failing te
dismiss the fraud claims. However, based on the above
Aiscussion, we need not reach DuPont’s cross-appeal inasmuch as
it is essentially moot. Indeed, as DuPont maintains, its cross-
appeal was “filed only in the event this court reverses the
[circuit court's) dismissal of the entire case."

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

August 10, 2005 judgment.

 

on the brief
Melvin ¥. Agena, for :
plaintiffe-appellants/ ee Weharmoo—
Exoes-eppelices
we Price III Ree «
warren Price 111, oe
Kenneth 7. Okarote, ee OCKo.#
Robert A. Marks, and Ko
Susan C. Weleon’ (of Price
Okencte Mineno & Lun),
for Getendent appellee/
croses appellant E-1-

Du Pont de Nemours and
Company

 

-68-