Title: ODIS LUGO V AMERITECH CORP INC

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 3, 2001  
ODIS LUGO,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 112575  
AMERITECH CORPORATION, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
This premises liability action arises from a fall in a  
parking 
lot 
possessed by defendant.  Plaintiff apparently fell  
after stepping in a pothole in the parking lot. The circuit  
court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, but  
the Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting defendant’s position  
that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the “open and obvious  
 
danger” doctrine.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.  The  
pothole was open and obvious, and plaintiff has not provided  
evidence of special aspects of the condition to justify  
imposing liability on defendant despite the open and obvious  
nature of the danger.  
I  
Plaintiff was walking through a parking lot toward  
defendant’s building to pay a telephone bill when she  
apparently stepped in a pothole and fell.  Plaintiff testified  
at her deposition that she was not watching the ground and  
that she was concentrating on a truck in the parking lot at  
the time.  However, she also testified that nothing would have  
prevented her from seeing the pothole.  
Defendant moved for summary disposition, claiming that  
the pothole constituted an open and obvious danger from which  
it had no duty to protect plaintiff.1
 The circuit court  
granted the motion, stating:  
I am going to take the position that there is 
no material question of fact. I think it is quite 
clear that the lady was walking along without 
paying proper attention to the circumstances where 
she was walking, and there is a legal duty to look  
1The motion for summary disposition was filed under both 
MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). While not expressly stated, it 
is clear that the trial court granted the motion under 
subsection (C)(10) because the trial court’s discussion 
involved evidence beyond the pleadings.  
2  
where you are walking. I can’t be anymore precise 
than that.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary  
disposition in a two-to-one decision.  The Court of Appeals  
majority concluded that the circuit court erred in holding  
that plaintiff’s legal duty to look where she was walking  
barred her claim.  The Court stated that, under principles of  
comparative negligence, a plaintiff’s negligence can only  
reduce the amount of recovery, not eliminate altogether a  
defendant’s liability.  The Court also determined that the  
open and obvious danger rule did not apply because there was  
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant  
should have expected that a pedestrian might be distracted by  
the need to avoid a moving vehicle, or might even reasonably  
step into the pothole to avoid such a vehicle.  
We disagree with the holding of the Court of Appeals.  
Further, while we do not embrace the reasoning of the circuit  
court, we agree with its result.  
II  
The proper focus in this case is the extent of the open  
and obvious doctrine in premises liability cases.  In general,  
a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee to exercise  
reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable  
risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.  
Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185  
3  
(1995).
 However, this duty does not generally encompass  
removal of open and obvious dangers:  
[W]here the dangers are known to the invitee 
or are so obvious that the invitee might reasonably 
be expected to discover them, an invitor owes no 
duty to protect or warn the invitee unless he 
should anticipate the harm despite knowledge of it 
on behalf of the invitee. [Riddle v McLouth Steel  
Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 
(1992).]  
Accordingly, the open and obvious doctrine should not be  
viewed as some type of “exception” to the duty generally owed  
invitees, but rather as an integral part of the definition of  
that duty. This Court further elaborated in Bertrand, supra  
at 611:  
When §§ 343 and 343A [of the Restatement 
Torts, 2d] are read together, the rule generated is 
that if the particular activity or condition  
creates a risk of harm only because the invitee  
does not discover the condition or realize its  
danger, then the open and obvious doctrine will cut 
off liability if the invitee should have discovered 
the condition and realized its danger.  On the  
other 
hand, 
if 
the 
risk 
of 
harm 
remains  
unreasonable, despite its obviousness or despite 
knowledge 
of 
it 
by 
the 
invitee, 
then 
the  
circumstances may be such that the invitor is 
required to undertake reasonable precautions.  
In sum, the general rule is that a premises possessor is not  
required to protect an invitee from open and obvious dangers,  
but, if special aspects of a condition make even an open and  
obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises possessor  
has a duty to undertake reasonable precautions to protect  
invitees from that risk.  
4  
The following language from Bertrand provides a more  
concrete discussion of these abstract concepts:  
With the axiom being that the duty is to 
protect invitees from unreasonable risks of harm, 
the underlying principle is that even though 
invitors have a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
protecting their invitees, they are not absolute 
insurers 
of 
the 
safety 
of 
their 
invitees.  
Quinlivan [v The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co,  
Inc, 395 Mich 244, 261; 235 NW2d 732 (1975).] 
Consequently, because the danger of tripping and 
falling on a step is generally open and obvious, 
the failure to warn theory cannot establish  
liability.  However, there may be special aspects 
of these particular steps that make the risk of 
harm unreasonable, and, accordingly, a failure to 
remedy the dangerous condition may be found to have 
breached the duty to keep the premises reasonably 
safe. [Bertrand, supra at 614.]  
Consistent with Bertrand, we conclude that, with regard to  
open and obvious dangers, the critical question is whether  
there is evidence that creates a genuine issue of material  
fact regarding whether there are truly “special aspects” of  
the open and obvious condition that differentiate the risk  
from typical open and obvious risks so as to create an  
unreasonable risk of harm, i.e., whether the “special aspect”  
of the condition should prevail in imposing liability upon the  
defendant or the openness and obviousness of the condition  
should prevail in barring liability.  
An illustration of such a situation might involve, for  
example, a commercial building with only one exit for the  
general public where the floor is covered with standing water.  
5  
 
 
While the condition is open and obvious, a customer wishing to  
exit the store must leave the store through the water.  In  
other words, the open and obvious condition is effectively  
unavoidable. Similarly, an open and obvious condition might  
be unreasonably dangerous because of special aspects that  
impose an unreasonably high risk of severe harm.  To use  
another example, consider an unguarded thirty foot deep pit in  
the middle of a parking lot.  The condition might well be open  
and obvious, and one would likely be capable of avoiding the  
danger.  Nevertheless, this situation would present such a  
substantial risk of death or severe injury to one who fell in  
the pit that it would be unreasonably dangerous to maintain  
the condition, at least absent reasonable warnings or other  
remedial measures being taken.2  In sum, only those special  
2  In considering whether a condition presents such a 
uniquely dangerous potential for severe harm as to constitute 
a “special aspect” and to avoid barring liability in the 
ordinary manner of an open and obvious danger, it is important 
to maintain the proper perspective, which is to consider the 
risk posed by the condition a priori, that is, before the 
incident involved in a particular case.  It would, for 
example, be inappropriate to conclude in a retrospective 
fashion that merely because a particular plaintiff, in fact, 
suffered harm or even severe harm, that the condition at issue 
in a case posed a uniquely high risk of severe harm.  This is  
because a plaintiff may suffer a more or less severe injury 
because of idiosyncratic reasons, such as having a particular 
susceptibility 
to 
injury 
or 
engaging 
in 
unforeseeable 
conduct, 
that are immaterial to whether an open and obvious danger is 
nevertheless unreasonably dangerous. Thus, contrary to the 
possible implication of Justice Weaver’s concurrence, this 
opinion does not allow the imposition of liability merely 
(continued...)  
6  
 
  
2(...continued) 
because a particular open and obvious condition has some 
potential for severe harm.  Obviously, the mere ability to 
imagine that a condition could result in severe harm under 
highly unlikely circumstances does not mean that such harm is 
reasonably foreseeable.  However, we believe that it would be 
unreasonable for us to fail to recognize that unusual open and 
obvious 
conditions 
could 
exist 
that 
are 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
because they present an extremely high risk of severe harm to 
an invitee who fails to avoid the risk in circumstances where  
there is no sensible reason for such an inordinate risk of  
severe harm to be presented.  
We consider it unnecessary to express a view as to how 
Singerman v Municipal Service Bureau, Inc, 455 Mich 135; 565 
NW2d 383 (1997), should have been decided. Nevertheless, we 
do not perceive why Justice Weaver concludes that this opinion 
would seem to require that “the question whether the risk of 
harm caused by the lighting defect [in Singerman] was 
unreasonable despite its obviousness would be for the jury.” 
Post at 3-4. We express no view on that question. Further, 
as reflected in the result of the present case, this opinion 
does not preclude a grant of summary disposition in favor of 
a defendant in a premises liability action where no reasonable 
person could conclude that the open and obvious condition at 
issue involved special aspects that presented an unreasonable 
risk to invitees.  
Finally, to get to the heart of this, what concerns us 
about Justice Weaver’s position is that it might be taken to 
mean no matter what the open and obvious peril, even a thirty­
foot-deep unguarded or unmarked pothole, if it was open and 
obvious, no tort claim would lie. 
While we imagine that 
Justice Weaver would deny that such a result would follow from 
her position, she seems to reject the idea “that the degree of  
potential harm is relevant to whether the risk of harm posed 
by a condition remains unreasonable despite its obviousness.” 
Post at 2. Yet, it appears obvious to us that the degree of 
potential harm from an open and obvious condition may, in some 
unusual circumstances, be the key factor that makes such a 
condition unreasonably dangerous.  To consider our admittedly 
extreme example, while it is reasonable to expect invitees to 
avoid common potholes, that does not mean it is reasonable to 
leave a gaping hole in a parking lot even though the 
difference in the degree of harm likely to follow from an 
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
aspects that give rise to a uniquely high likelihood of harm  
or severity of harm if the risk is not avoided will serve to  
remove that condition from the open and obvious danger  
doctrine.3  
However, typical open and obvious dangers (such as  
ordinary potholes in a parking lot) do not give rise to these  
special aspects.4  Using a common pothole as an example, the  
condition is open and obvious and, thus, cannot form the basis  
of liability against a premises possessor. The condition does  
not involve an especially high likelihood of injury.  Indeed,  
an “ordinarily prudent” person, Bertrand, supra at 615, would  
typically be able to see the pothole and avoid it. Further,  
there is little risk of severe harm.  Unlike falling an  
extended distance, it cannot be expected that a typical person  
tripping on a pothole and falling to the ground would suffer  
2(...continued) 
invitee’s failure to avoid the hazard is the only material 
difference between the two situations.  
3  Contrary to the indication of Justice Weaver’s  
concurrence, post at 1, our conclusion regarding the special 
aspects of an open and obvious condition that are required in 
order to remove such a condition from the scope of the open 
and obvious doctrine is not mere “dicta.”  On the contrary, 
the lack of such special aspects in the present case forms the 
basis of our holding that defendant was entitled to a grant of 
summary disposition in its favor.  
4  Indeed, the result that we reach in the present case 
underscores that vitality of the open and obvious doctrine as 
a bar to liability in cases involving typical open and obvious 
conditions such as the common pothole at issue in this case.  
8  
severe injury.  
III  
Applying these general principles to the case at hand, we  
conclude that defendant was entitled to summary disposition  
under 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10), 
which 
provides 
for 
summary 
disposition  
when “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no  
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is  
entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.”  
Further, the party opposing a motion for summary disposition  
(in this case plaintiff) is required by MCR 2.116(G)(4) to  
“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine  
issue for trial” with regard to the issues raised in the  
summary disposition motion. In this case, the disputed issue  
was whether plaintiff’s claim was barred by the open and  
obvious danger doctrine.  
The evidence submitted to the trial court allows for no  
genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether  
plaintiff’s claim was barred by the open and obvious danger  
doctrine.  This case simply involved a common pothole in a  
parking lot.  While plaintiff argues that the pothole was  
filled with debris, the evidence presented to the trial court  
simply does not allow a reasonable inference that the pothole  
was obscured by debris at the time of plaintiff’s fall.  
9  
 
Indeed, plaintiff’s testimony at her deposition was that she  
did not see the pothole because she “wasn’t looking down,” not  
because of any debris obscuring the pothole.  
The present case is substantially similar to Maurer v  
Oakland Co Parks & Recreation Dep’t, one of the two  
consolidated cases decided by this Court in Bertrand.  In  
Maurer, the plaintiff slipped and fell on an “unmarked cement  
step” as she was leaving a rest room area at a park.  The  
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent for not  
marking the step with a contrasting color or warning of the  
existence of the step. Bertrand, supra, at 618.  Similar to  
plaintiff in the present case tripping over the pothole  
because she did not see it, the plaintiff in Maurer testified  
at her deposition that she “just didn’t see the step there.”  
Id. at 619.  
The Bertrand Court held that the defendant in Maurer was  
entitled to summary disposition on the basis of the open and  
obvious danger doctrine because the plaintiff had shown  
nothing unusual about the step:  
The plaintiff’s only asserted basis for  
finding that the step was dangerous was that she 
did not see it.  We hold that the plaintiff has 
failed to establish anything unusual about the step 
. . . .  Because the plaintiff has not presented 
any facts that the step posed an unreasonable risk  
of harm, the trial court properly granted summary 
disposition.
 [Id. at 621 (emphasis in the  
original).]  
10  
 
In sum, the plaintiff in Maurer could not avoid summary  
disposition because the evidence showed only that she tripped  
and fell on a common step that she failed to notice.5  
Likewise, the evidence in the present case reflects that  
plaintiff tripped and fell on a common pothole because she  
failed to notice it.  While plaintiff argues that moving  
vehicles in the parking lot were a distraction, there is  
certainly nothing “unusual” about vehicles being driven in a  
parking lot, and, accordingly, this is not a factor that  
removes this case from the open and obvious danger doctrine.  
In Bertrand, this Court stated:  
[B]ecause steps are the type of everyday 
occurrence that people encounter, under most  
circumstances, a reasonably prudent person will 
look where he is going, will observe the steps, and 
will take appropriate care for his own safety. 
Under ordinary circumstances, the overriding public 
policy of encouraging people to take reasonable 
care for their own safety precludes imposing a duty 
on the possessor of land to make ordinary steps 
“foolproof.”  Therefore, the risk of harm is not 
unreasonable. [Id. at 616-617.]  
Likewise, potholes in pavement are an “everyday occurrence”  
that ordinarily should be observed by a reasonably prudent  
5 This should not be understood as meaning that the claim 
of the plaintiff in Maurer was barred because she did not use  
appropriate care for her own safety. The level of care used  
by a particular plaintiff is irrelevant to whether the 
condition created or allowed to continue by a premises 
possessor is unreasonably dangerous.  Rather, the important 
point is that the plaintiff in Maurer offered nothing to 
distinguish the steps at issue from ordinary steps in terms of 
the danger that they presented.  
11  
person.  Accordingly, in light of plaintiff’s failure to show  
special aspects of the pothole at issue, it did not pose an  
unreasonable risk to her.  
While we agree with the result reached by the trial  
court, we consider it important to disapprove part of its  
apparent rationale. The trial court’s remarks indicate that  
it may have granted summary disposition in favor of defendant  
because 
the 
plaintiff “was walking along without paying proper  
attention to the circumstances where she was walking.”  
However, in resolving an issue regarding the open and obvious  
doctrine, the question is whether the condition of the  
premises at issue was open and obvious and, if so, whether  
there were special aspects of the situation that nevertheless  
made it unreasonably dangerous.  In a situation where a  
plaintiff was injured as a result of a risk that was truly  
outside the open and obvious doctrine and that posed an  
unreasonable risk of harm, the fact that the plaintiff was  
also negligent would not bar a cause of action.  This is  
because Michigan follows the rule of comparative negligence.  
Under 
comparative 
negligence, where both the plaintiff and the  
defendant are culpable of negligence with regard to the  
plaintiff’s injury, this reduces the amount of damages the  
plaintiff may recover but does not preclude recovery  
altogether.  See, e.g., Riddle, supra at 98 (under comparative  
12  
 
negligence, 
“a 
defendant may present evidence of a plaintiff’s  
negligence in order to reduce liability”).  
Accordingly, it is important for courts in deciding  
summary disposition motions by premises possessors in “open  
and obvious” cases to focus on the objective nature of the  
condition of the premises at issue, not on the subjective  
degree of care used by the plaintiff.  In the present case,  
there was no evidence of special aspects that made the open  
and obvious pothole unreasonably dangerous.  
IV  
There is much agreement between our opinion and the  
concurrence authored by Justice Cavanagh.  We agree “that a  
premises possessor is not generally required to protect an  
invitee from open and obvious dangers.” Post at 2. We also  
agree that, consistent with the 2 Restatement Torts, 2d,  
§§ 343 and 343A, circumstances may arise in which an open and  
obvious 
condition 
is 
nevertheless 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
so 
as  
to give rise to a duty upon a premises possessor to in some  
manner remove or otherwise appropriately protect invitees  
against the danger.  We further agree that any comparative  
negligence by an invitee is irrelevant to whether a premises  
possessor has breached its duty to that invitee in connection  
with an open and obvious danger because an invitee’s  
comparative negligence can only serve to reduce, not  
13  
 
eliminate, the extent of liability.  
As 
we 
understand it, Justice Cavanagh’s basic position is  
that the inquiry into whether an open and obvious condition is  
unreasonably dangerous should not be focused on whether that  
condition involves special aspects that distinguish it from  
ordinary open and obvious conditions.  We disagree because we  
believe that this “special aspects” inquiry serves to  
concretely focus trial courts on the showing that must be made  
in 
evaluating 
motions for summary disposition in this context.  
In our view, this approach is consistent with § 343A of the  
Restatement, which indicates that a possessor of land is only  
liable to invitees for harm caused by an obvious condition if  
the possessor should “anticipate the harm.”  Post at 5.  
Simply put, there must be something out of the ordinary, in  
other words, special, about a particular open and obvious  
danger in order for a premises possessor to be expected to  
anticipate harm from that condition.  Indeed, it seems obvious  
to us that if an open and obvious condition lacks some type of  
special aspect regarding the likelihood or severity of harm  
that it presents, it is not unreasonably dangerous.  We cannot  
imagine an open and obvious condition that is unreasonably  
dangerous, but lacks special aspects making it so.6  
6  Justice Cavanagh states that “[a] more correct  
statement of the law [in Bertrand, supra] would have been to 
(continued...)  
14  
Justice Cavanagh agrees with our conclusion that  
plaintiff has failed to establish that the pothole in the  
present case “presented an unreasonable risk of harm.” Post  
at 21.  In this opinion, we explain concretely why that is so.  
It is because the evidence proffered by plaintiff establishes  
nothing more than the existence of a common, ordinary pothole.  
Because of the great variety of circumstances in which  
premises liability claims may be raised, it may be practically  
impossible to demarcate the extent of a premises possessor’s  
duties with great precision.  Nevertheless, we believe that  
our approach, focusing on the existence or absence of special  
aspects of an open and obvious danger, will guide the trial  
courts in considering whether particular open and obvious  
conditions posed an unreasonable risk of harm better than  
would be the case without this further exposition of the open  
and obvious doctrine.  
Finally, in response to Justice Weaver’s concurrence,  
this opinion does not require a premises owner or possessor to  
be an “insurer of the safety of invitees.”  Post at 5.  
Indeed, our resolution of the present case in favor of  
6(...continued) 
say that the duty to exercise reasonable care is not breached 
in cases involving ordinary steps.”  Post at 18. 
We agree 
that ordinary steps cannot be considered to present an 
unreasonably dangerous risk of harm.  This is consistent with  
our focus on the existence or absence of special aspects of an 
open and obvious condition.  
15  
defendant would belie any such a claim. However, a premises  
possessor does have a duty to undertake reasonable efforts to  
make its premises reasonably safe for its invitees.  This  
opinion attempts to provide a further explanation of the scope  
of that duty.  
For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit  
court.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
TAYLOR, J.  
16  
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ODIS LUGO, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 112575 
AMERITECH CORPORATION, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_____________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 
This premises liability suit arises out of the 
plaintiff’s claim that she fell and injured herself after  
stepping into a pothole in the defendant’s parking lot. The  
circuit court granted defendant summary disposition, and the  
Court of Appeals reversed.  The majority now reverses the  
Court of Appeals, and holds that (1) the pothole was open and  
obvious, and (2) there is no justification for imposing  
liability on the defendant despite the open and obvious nature  
of the danger presented by the pothole because the plaintiff  
failed to provide evidence that the pothole had “special  
aspects.”  
I join the majority’s decision to reverse the Court of  
Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court  
because I agree that the plaintiff failed to establish a basis  
for imposing liability despite the open and obvious nature of  
the pothole.  I also join the majority’s statement that the  
trial court erred in focusing on the plaintiff’s subjective  
degree of fault.  However, I write separately to express my  
disagreement with the majority’s “special aspects” analysis.  
I would instead prefer to work with the premises liability law  
already offered by this Court and to adopt an approach more  
true to the Restatement.  
I. The Majority Approach  
The majority offers an approach to open and obvious  
danger cases that focuses on the special aspects of a  
condition:  
In sum, the general rule is that a premises 
possessor is not required to protect an invitee 
from open and obvious dangers, but, if special 
aspects of a condition make even an open and 
obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises 
possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable  
precautions to protect invitees from that risk. 
[Slip op at 5.]  
I agree with the majority that a premises possessor is not  
generally required to protect an invitee from open and obvious  
dangers.
 Also, I agree with the majority that there are  
exceptions to the general rule.  However, I disagree with the  
majority that the issue can be simply summarized in terms of  
2  
whether “special aspects” of a condition make the risk of harm  
unreasonably dangerous.  Instead, the Court must make two  
inquiries: (1) whether the possessor may be held liable  
pursuant to the terms of 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343, and  
(2) whether liability is suspended under § 343A.  In order to  
determine whether liability should be imposed, a thorough  
consideration of the historical underpinnings of the open and  
obvious danger doctrine is in order.  I offer such an analysis  
in this opinion, with the hope that the majority opinion will  
not be read as limiting the scope of the doctrine.  
II. The Open and Obvious Danger Doctrine and the Restatement 
Approach  
Recovery has been barred in premises liability cases  
involving open and obvious dangers for at least a century.  
See, e.g., Caniff v Blanchard Navigation Co, 66 Mich 638; 33  
NW 744 (1887).  The Restatement approach has been key to  
Michigan’s open and obvious danger law for almost as long.  
The first explicit reference incorporating the Restatement  
approach is Goodman v Theatre Parking, Inc, 286 Mich 80; 281  
NW 545 (1938), where the plaintiff sought damages for a  
sprained ankle sustained after stepping on a cinder in the  
defendant's parking lot.1  Since that time, the Restatement  
1 
 At the time, 2 Restatement Torts, Negligence, under 
title of business visitors, § 343, set forth the following 
standard of care:  
(continued...)  
3  
 
 
has been cited repeatedly, even after its text was changed.  
See Quinliven v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich  
244; 235 NW2d 732 (1975)(quoting the Restatement with  
approval).  It is safe to say that the current version of  
Restatement §§ 343 and 343A form the basis for Michigan’s open  
and obvious decisional law.2  
A. What the Restatement says  
The applicable sections of the Restatement provide as  
follows:  
§ 343. DANGEROUS CONDITIONS KNOWN TO OR  
DISCOVERABLE BY POSSESSOR  
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a  
condition on the land if, but only if, he  
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable  
care would discover the condition, and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of  
harm to such invitees, and  
(b) should expect that they will not discover 
or realize the danger, or will fail to protect 
themselves against it, and  
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to  
1(...continued) 
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a 
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but 
only if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care could discover, the condition  
which, if known to him, he should realize as 
involving an unreasonable risk to them. [Goodman at  
82.]  
2 Section 343A was added to the Restatement after § 343, 
but the two sections are to be read together, as is indicated 
by comment (a) to § 343.  
4  
 
protect them against the danger.  
§ 343A. KNOWN OR OBVIOUS DANGERS  
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his 
invitees for physical harm caused to them by any 
activity or condition on the land whose danger is 
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor 
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge 
or obviousness.  
(2) In determining whether the possessor 
should anticipate harm from a known or obvious 
danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to 
make use of public land, or of the facilities of a 
public 
utility, 
is 
a 
factor 
of 
importance 
indicating that the harm should be anticipated.  
I read § 343 as providing a standard of care to be  
applied in cases where there exists a dangerous condition on  
the premises that the possessor knows about or could  
reasonably discover.3  If the possessor is charged with  
knowledge of the condition or the court finds that he could  
reasonably discover the condition, he can be liable if (1) he  
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect his invitees even  
though the possessor should realize that the condition poses  
an unreasonable risk of harm to an invitee, and (2) he should  
realize that an invitee will either fail to discover the  
condition, or fail to appreciate the danger of the condition  
if it is discovered, or fail to protect himself from the  
danger even if discovered or realized.  
3 
 As will be explained, however, the Court has not 
provided a uniform interpretation of the Restatement, and 
there has been some debate about whether the Restatement  
discusses duty or standard of care.  
5  
More instructive is the text of comment (a) to § 343,  
which provides that “This section should be read together with  
§ 343A, which deals with the effect of the fact that the  
condition is known to the invitee, or is obvious to him . . .  
. In the interest of brevity the limitation is not repeated  
in this section.”  Comment (a) is helpful in two ways: it  
illustrates that hidden or unknown conditions can be  
distinguished from known or obvious conditions and that § 343A  
is a rule designed to limit liability, whereas § 343 is  
designed to allow for the imposition of liability.  
It is important to realize that the comments to § 343A  
begin by saying, “The rule stated in this subsection applies  
to all persons who enter or remain on land in the capacity of  
invitees, as defined by § 332.”  (Emphasis added.) 
Thus,  
though §§ 343 and 343A must be read together, I believe that  
§ 343A needs to be read as its own rule, and not as an  
exception to § 343.  The general rule provided by § 343A is  
that a possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for  
injuries caused by activities or conditions on the land whose  
danger is known or obvious. The second clause of subsection  
(1) of § 343A provides the exception to this rule: if the  
possessor of land should anticipate the harm to the invitee  
despite 
the 
invitee’s 
knowledge 
or 
the 
condition’s  
obviousness, the possessor will not be relieved of liability  
under the general open and obvious rule.  
6  
 
  
 
B. Where does the Restatement come into play?  
The 
second 
imperative 
point 
to 
understand 
about  
Restatement §§ 343 and 343A is that they refer to the  
imposition of liability; they do not discuss whether a duty  
exists.  In fact, one of the very first cases incorporating  
the Restatement into our jurisprudence stated, “2 Restatement  
of the Law of Torts, Negligence, under title of ‘business  
visitors,’ § 343, sets forth the following standard of care  
which we believe is applicable here . . . .” Nash v Lewis,  
352 Mich 488, 492; 90 NW2d 480 (1958). In my view, § 343 and  
§ 343A assume that a duty has been imposed by virtue of the  
possessor and invitee relationship, but that liability  
nonetheless can be limited under certain circumstances.  
Unfortunately, the Restatement does not explicitly lay  
out the standard of care, it simply says that a possessor of  
land “is subject to liability” in § 343 cases, or “is not  
liable” in § 343A cases.  Thus, the Restatement only  
explicitly provides a liability shield. 
However, the  
Restatement’s use of phrases such as “should expect,”  
“unreasonable risk,” and “reasonable care” indicate that a  
premises possessor must protect his invitees “from an  
unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition of  
the land that the landowner knows or should know the invitees  
will not discover, realize, or protect themselves against.”  
Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185  
7  
(1995).  
Once this premises liability rule is plugged into the  
language of the Restatement, we would be left with the  
following rule in known or obvious danger cases: A possessor  
owes his invitees a duty of reasonable care in order to  
protect them from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a  
dangerous condition on the land; he breaches that duty by  
failing to protect his invitees from harm, though he should  
have anticipated that harm would result from the known or  
obvious danger despite the condition’s obviousness or the  
invitee’s knowledge of the danger.  When the invitor breaches  
his duty of care in this manner, he can be subject to  
liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a  
condition on the land if the conditions of § 343 are met.  
A second inquiry would then be whether, despite the  
possibility that liability could normally be imposed against  
the possessor because he has failed to reasonably protect his  
invitee, the possessor can nonetheless avoid liability on the  
basis that the danger was known or obvious to the invitee.  
When the danger is obvious, or when the invitee knows of it,  
§ 343A of the Restatement would suspend liability unless the  
possessor should anticipate harm flowing from the condition  
despite the invitee’s knowledge of the condition or the  
obviousness of the condition.  
8  
 
C. How the cases confuse the issue, and what contributory 
negligence has to do with it  
Unfortunately, the Restatement approach can be somewhat  
difficult to apply because it bears some similarity to the  
contributory negligence doctrine.  I believe that these  
similarities have caused Michigan’s case law on the open and  
obvious doctrine to be somewhat imprecise.  
The potential for confusion stems from the fact that, in  
both contributory negligence and in open and obvious cases,  
liability can be suspended because of action (or inaction) on  
the part of the plaintiff.  In both instances, a particular  
defendant may be absolved of liability for negligence even  
though he owes a duty to the plaintiff.  Despite that  
similarity, 
though, 
there is a distinct difference between the  
open and obvious rule and the rule of contributory negligence.  
In contributory negligence cases, a defendant is absolved of  
liability 
even 
where 
he 
acts 
completely 
negligently.  
Contributory negligence, a defensive mechanism, is based on  
the policy that damages are not recoverable where the  
plaintiff and the defendant are both partially at fault.  The  
open and obvious danger doctrine, on the other hand, relies on  
the standard of care.  Where the defendant fails to protect  
his invitees from an unreasonable risk of harm posed by a  
foreseeable danger, he will be liable.  If the defendant is  
absolved from liability under the open and obvious doctrine,  
9  
the reason for the absolution is not that the plaintiff acted  
negligently.  Instead, the reason is that the open and obvious  
danger of the condition is a “circumstance” under the standard  
of care. 
The possessor will be deemed to have acted  
reasonably under those circumstances.  
The idea that defendants should prevail where the  
plaintiff fails to heed an open and obvious danger has been  
around for a while, but, unfortunately, the focus on the  
standard of care has been lost in some instances.  The reason  
is partially that the open and obvious doctrine predates  
Michigan’s shift from contributory negligence to comparative  
negligence.  In the era of contributory negligence, failure to  
precisely separate concepts of duty, liability, and standard  
of care bore little consequence because plaintiffs could lose  
simply by virtue of their own negligence.  As Justice Levin  
pointed out in dissent in Riddle v McLouth Steel Products, 440  
Mich 85; 485 NW2d 676 (1992), these contributory negligence  
cases sometimes expressed their holdings in terms of a “no­
duty” rule: that a possessor owes no duty to protect his  
invitees from open and obvious dangers.  
For example, in Caniff, the plaintiff sought to recover  
damages for an injury sustained when he fell through a  
hatchway left open on the deck of a ship.  The Court denied  
recovery.  The primary reasons for the denial were that (1)  
the plaintiff was an experienced sailor who was familiar with  
10  
 
 
 
ships and who knew that hatchways were often left open while  
the ship was at port and, therefore, had reason to expect that  
the hatchway he fell into would have been left open, (2) that  
the plaintiff failed to exercise due care when he walked  
carelessly forward in the dark, (3) that the plaintiff’s  
actions constituted inexcusable negligence, and (4) that the  
general premises liability rule would not apply in cases where  
the plaintiff knows or should know that danger exists because  
it is upon the plaintiff to avoid the peril.  In other words,  
reduced to its simplest terms, Caniff held that the plaintiff  
should have known better and should have looked where he was  
going.  
In Garrett v WS Butterfield Theatres, Inc, 261 Mich 262;  
246 NW 57 (1933), the plaintiff was injured while entering a  
restroom.  The entryway required patrons to step down into the  
restroom.  Plaintiff failed to see the step, and fell upon  
entry.  The Court stated that “[d]ifferent floor levels in  
private and public buildings, connected by steps, are so  
common that the possibility of their presence is anticipated  
by prudent persons.  The construction is not negligent unless,  
by its character, location, or surrounding circumstances, a  
reasonably prudent person would not be likely to expect a step  
or see it.”  Id. at 263-264. 
The Court denied recovery,  
stating that the defendant was not guilty of negligence  
because it owed no duty to “prevent careless persons from  
11  
 
hurting themselves.” 
Id. at 264.  
Although these two early cases cited by the parties  
addressed the liability issue by stating that no duty was owed  
by the defendant to the plaintiff, it seems to me that the  
reason for the holding in both cases was that the plaintiff  
should have expected and heeded the danger.  I posit that  
contributory negligence principles actually would require a  
two-step inquiry: (1) would the premises owner normally owe a  
duty to the plaintiff to keep the premises reasonably safe,  
and (2) would the premises owner be relieved of liability  
because 
of 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
of 
contributory 
negligence?  
In these cases, in order to bar recovery on the basis of  
the plaintiff’s actions, the Court would have had to conclude  
either that there was no duty to keep the premises reasonably  
safe, that the premises were reasonably safe, or that the duty  
to keep the premises reasonably safe was offset by the  
plaintiff’s duty to care for his own safety.  If the court  
were to find that no duty existed, there would be no prima  
facie case of negligence.  Were the court to find that the  
premises were reasonably safe, there would be no breach of the  
standard of care. If it were the plaintiff’s own failure to  
protect himself that barred liability despite an unreasonable  
risk, liability would have been suspended under the  
contributory negligence doctrine.  
12  
Two later cases seemed to recognize that there is a  
difference between the duty owed and the effect of  
contributory negligence on that duty.  In Ackerberg v Muskegon  
Osteopathic Hosp, 366 Mich 596; 115 NW2d 290 (1962), the  
plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained when he  
fell from a platform located outside a hospital entrance.  The  
trial court denied recovery on two grounds.  First, it held  
that the plaintiff failed to show a duty or its breach.  
Second, it held that the plaintiff failed to exercise  
reasonable care for his own safety and that the claim was  
barred because of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.  
The language used by the Ackerberg trial court seemed to be in  
line with Caniff and Garrett. However, this Court reversed,  
stating 
that 
jury 
questions existed regarding both whether the  
defendant hospital had a duty to construct a guardrail and  
whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.  
Another relevant case is Quinliven, in which the  
plaintiff slipped and fell on some ice in the defendant’s  
parking lot. This Court held that the defendant owed a duty  
to the plaintiff to use reasonable care to protect against the  
hazards arising from the accumulation of ice and snow.  The  
case emphasized that business invitors owe invitees a duty to  
“be reasonably sure that [the invitor] is not inviting [the  
invitee] into danger, and to that end, he must exercise  
ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably  
13  
 
safe for the visit.”  Quinliven at 251 (quoting Blakely v  
White Star Line, 154 Mich 635, 637; 118 NW 482 (1908)).  
Quinliven overruled prior case law that said no duty was owed  
in cases involving the natural accumulation of ice and snow.  
Yet, the Court also noted that the plaintiff’s actions could  
be considered in the context of contributory negligence. In  
my view, Quinliven correctly determined the defendant’s duty  
by referencing the relationship between the parties as well as  
the danger presented, and then viewed the plaintiff’s  
negligence as affecting liability rather than alleviating the  
duty owed.  
In Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511  
(1979), this Court made the move from contributory to  
comparative negligence.  If a plaintiff’s negligence is  
considered in terms of liability rather than in terms of duty,  
the move would not necessarily have a huge effect on the  
scheme 
of 
analysis 
applied in premises liability cases, though  
it would have an effect on the plaintiff’s ability to recover.  
For example, if the Caniff case were analyzed under a  
Quinlaven approach, the defendant ship owner could have  
prevailed on one of two theories: (1) the ship was reasonably  
safe, and ordinary care was exercised despite the fact that  
the hatch was left open, or (2) it was unreasonable to leave  
the hatch open, but the plaintiff nonetheless would lose  
because his own failure to exercise due care for his own  
14  
 
safety contributed to his injury and barred recovery. Under  
comparative negligence principles, the defendant could still  
prevail if the ship was deemed reasonably safe despite the  
open hatch, but the ship owner would not necessarily prevail  
in the second instance.  As such, there is a significant  
difference between an interpretation of the open and obvious  
doctrine that says, “a defendant owes a duty to invitees to  
keep his premises reasonably safe, but that duty does not  
extend to protection against open and obvious dangers,” and to  
say that, “a defendant owes a duty to keep his premises  
reasonably safe, but he will not be held liable if the  
plaintiff fails to heed open and obvious dangers.”  It is this  
distinction that lies at the crux of the present case.  
D. Post-contributory cases  
What makes this case particularly difficult is that, in  
an attempt to be faithful to prior precedent, some of this  
Court’s decisions that attempted to apply the open and obvious  
danger doctrine in a post-contributory era confused the issue  
inadvertently.
 One such opinion, which I authored, is  
Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495; 418 NW2d  
381 (1988). In Williams, a store customer was injured after  
fleeing the store directly behind an armed robber.  The  
primary focus in Williams was whether a business owner has a  
duty to his invitees to insure against harm resulting from a  
third-party criminal act.  However, in a portion of the  
15  
opinion I wrote that the duty a possessor of land owes his  
invitees “does not extend to conditions from which an  
unreasonable risk cannot be anticipated or to dangers so  
obvious and apparent that an invitee might be expected to  
discover them himself.”  Id. at 500. 
The statement was  
supported with a citation to Restatement § 343A.  But it would  
have been more precise to say that liability would be  
suspended in such circumstances.  A better explanation of the  
duty issue was presented by the opinion’s discussion of § 343,  
which noted that invitors have a special relationship with  
invitees and that possessors of land owe a duty to their  
invitees to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from  
an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition  
on the land.  
A better approach to the Restatement is the one that I  
stated in a later opinion:  
When §§ 343 and 343A are read together, the 
rule generated is that if the particular activity 
or condition creates a risk of harm only because  
the invitee does not discover the condition or  
realize its danger, then the open and obvious 
doctrine will cut off liability if the invitee 
should have discovered the condition and realized  
its danger.  On the other hand, if the risk of harm 
remains unreasonable, despite its obviousness or 
despite knowledge of it by the invitee, then the 
circumstances may be such that the invitor is 
required to undertake reasonable precautions. The  
issue then becomes the standard of care and is for  
the jury to decide. [Bertrand at 611.]  
16  
  
 
 
Bertrand indicated that Williams should not be read too  
broadly. Bertrand cited Williams for the proposition that an  
invitor is not relieved of the duty to exercise reasonable  
care to protect invitees against known or discoverable  
dangerous conditions, even in cases where there would be no  
duty to warn. Bertrand went on to say that a duty exists by  
virtue of the relationship between the parties, and then the  
opinion examined whether the duty had been breached.  
I continue to believe that Bertrand correctly focused on  
liability and on breach.  Yet, given the discussions of late,  
I think Bertrand also may have been less precise in its  
terminology than it could have been.  
For example, at one point, I wrote,  
Under ordinary circumstances, the overriding 
public policy of encouraging people to take  
reasonable care for their own safety precludes 
imposing a duty on the possessor of land to make 
ordinary steps “foolproof.”  Therefore, the risk of  
harm is not unreasonable. However, where there is 
something unusual about the steps, because of their 
“character, location, or surrounding conditions,” 
then the duty of the possessor of land to exercise 
reasonable care remains.  If the proofs created a  
question of fact that the risk of harm was  
unreasonable, the existence of duty as well as 
breach become questions for the jury to decide. 
[Id. at 616-617.]  
This portion of the opinion directly followed a discussion of  
cases decided under contributory negligence, and was an  
attempt to incorporate the language of some prior cases.  A  
more correct statement of the law would have been that the  
17  
 
duty to exercise reasonable care is not breached in cases  
involving ordinary steps. In that context, it may have been  
more evident that Bertrand’s “unusual” characteristics  
discussion related to the foreseeability and unreasonableness  
of the risk of harm, rather than creating a special new rule.  
It should also be noted that the differing viewpoints I  
expressed in Williams and Bertrand are due in part to this  
Court’s intervening decision in Riddle v McLouth Steel  
Products.  The majority in Riddle held, in pertinent part,  
that an invitor has no duty to warn invitees of open and  
obvious dangers.  
Justice 
Levin 
wrote a dissenting opinion, which I believe  
to be the more correct approach.  In a nutshell, Justice Levin  
noted that the issue is a standard of care issue, not a duty  
issue. He also pointed out that the “no-duty” rule actually  
came about as one way of expressing that a plaintiff was  
contributorily 
negligent.  The defendant’s duty should be tied  
to the relationship between the parties, and that duty would  
be owed regardless of whether a comparative negligence or  
contributory negligence system is in place.  A finding of  
comparative negligence would assume that the defendant was in  
fact 
negligent, 
because comparative negligence is used only as  
a tool for apportioning damages after a breach of duty on the  
part of the defendant has been found. The primary questions  
for the jury to resolve in premises liability cases are,  
18  
 
first, whether the defendant has breached his duty of care,  
and, second, whether his liability is somehow limited by the  
plaintiff’s comparative negligence.  It is within this  
framework that the Restatement approach to the open and  
obvious danger doctrine must be viewed.  I agree with Justice  
Levin’s approach.  
III. Why the Majority Approach is Wrong  
In light of the principles underlying the open and  
obvious doctrine, I believe that it would be a serious mistake  
to rephrase the open and obvious rule in yet another imprecise  
fashion. I further believe that the majority is in error.  
In support of the “special aspects” test, the majority  
offers the following quotation from Bertrand at 614:  
With the axiom being that the duty is to 
protect invitees from unreasonable risks of harm, 
the underlying principle is that even though 
invitors have a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
protecting their invitees, they are not absolute 
insurers 
of 
the 
safety 
of 
their 
invitees.  
Quinlaven . . . .  Consequently, because the danger 
of tripping and falling on a step is generally open 
and obvious, the failure to warn theory cannot 
establish liability.  However, there may be special  
aspects of these particular steps that make the 
risk of harm unreasonable, and, accordingly, a 
failure to remedy the dangerous condition may be 
found to have breached the duty to keep the 
premises reasonably safe. [Slip op at 5 (emphasis 
added).]  
While Bertrand recognized that if a condition has special  
aspects that render it unreasonably dangerous, the possessor  
may be subject to liability; the quoted language in no way  
19  
 
implies that the possessor only has a duty to undertake  
reasonable precautions to protect his invitees when a  
condition has special aspects.  
Bertrand was intended as an application of the  
Restatement approach to open and obvious dangers.  Considered  
in the context of the language of the Restatement, it is clear  
that Bertrand’s focus was on whether the possessor failed to  
exercise reasonable care to protect his invitees against an  
unreasonable risk of harm flowing from a condition that the  
possessor knew about or should have discovered through the  
exercise of reasonable care, and whether the possessor should  
have expected that the invitees would not discover or realize  
the danger or would fail to protect themselves against it.  
Secondarily, 
Bertrand 
considered 
whether 
harm 
should 
have 
been  
anticipated by the possessor.  
In my view, special aspects of a particular condition may  
be relevant to a determination whether liability should be  
imposed; however, consideration of special aspects should be  
made in the context of the Restatement test.  For example, if  
a condition has special aspects that render it unusual, it is  
possible that a court could conclude that the possessor should  
have known that the condition could pose an unreasonable risk  
of danger to his invitees. If the court then concludes that  
the possessor knew about the condition or could have  
discovered it by the exercise of reasonable care, that the  
20  
possessor should have expected that the invitees would not  
discover or realize the danger or would fail to protect  
themselves against it, and that the possessor failed to  
exercise 
reasonable 
care in protecting his invitees, the court  
could hold that the defendant is subject to liability pursuant  
to § 343.  Moreover, the special aspects of a particular  
condition on the land might be relevant to a determination  
whether the possessor should have anticipated that the  
condition on his land would cause harm to his invitees.  If  
so, the liability shield of § 343A could be lifted.  
In sum, while “special aspects” may be considered in  
determining whether liability should be suspended, the  
existence or absence of special aspects in a particular case  
will not necessarily be outcome determinative.  Instead,  
pursuant to the Restatement, courts must focus on whether an  
unreasonable danger is presented, whether harm should be  
anticipated, and whether the duty of care has been breached.  
IV. An Alternative Approach  
I believe that the appropriate questions that should be  
taken up in this case are those posed by the Restatement. I  
would conclude that the plaintiff has failed to establish that  
the pothole in the defendant’s parking lot presented an  
unreasonable risk of harm. Because § 343 of the Restatement  
provides that a possessor can be liable only when a condition  
involves an unreasonable risk of harm, the plaintiff cannot  
21  
prevail.  Likewise, the plaintiff has failed to establish that  
the defendant should have anticipated that she would be  
injured by the pothole.  Rather, as the majority asserts, the  
pothole was the type of open and obvious condition that a  
reasonably prudent person would avoid.  Therefore, under §  
343A, the defendant is not liable for the physical harm caused  
by the condition.  
The plaintiff has failed to establish a material issue of  
fact.  The circumstances of this case reveal that the  
liability 
cannot 
be 
imposed against the defendant.  Therefore,  
I join the majority’s decision to reverse.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
22  
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ODIS LUGO, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 112575 
AMERITECH CORPORATION, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
____________________________________ 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of 
Plaintiff presented no evidence 
the 
that 
majority opinion. 
the pothole was 
unreasonably dangerous despite its obviousness.  
I write separately because the majority unnecessarily  
introduces—in dicta—a new standard by which open and obvious  
defects will be deemed unreasonably dangerous despite their  
open and obvious presence.  Rather than introduce new  
standards into the open and obvious doctrine, I would remain  
true to existing precedent.  See, e.g., 
Riddle v McLouth  
Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992), and  
Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 500; 418  
NW2d 381 (1988).  
The 
majority’s 
new standard focuses on special aspects of  
 
 
 
  
 
an open and obvious condition that give rise to the  
“unreasonable risk of severe harm.” Slip op at 6 (emphasis  
added).1
 This standard has no precedent in Michigan’s common  
law of the open and obvious doctrine.  This Court has not  
suggested—until today—that the degree of potential harm is  
relevant to whether the risk of harm posed by a condition  
remains unreasonable despite its obviousness.  
In an apparent effort to provide guidance to the bench  
and 
bar, 
the 
majority 
presents 
unlikely 
hypothetical 
examples.  
When launching new legal principles from a factual vacuum, it  
would be more helpful to apply this new severe-harm standard  
to an actual case that came before this Court, such as  
Singerman v Municipal Service Bureau, Inc, 455 Mich 135; 565  
NW2d 383 (1997).  Singerman was left unresolved by a three­
three split.  It is indeed unfortunate that the majority fails  
to take this opportunity to clarify its new standard by  
1The majority also offers a new definition of dicta to 
justify its adoption of the new severe-harm standard.  The  
majority states that “the lack of such special aspects [i.e., 
the unreasonable risk of severe harm] in the present case 
forms the basis of our holding that defendant was entitled to 
a grant of summary disposition in its favor.” Slip op at 9, 
n 3.  This explanation, in my view, acknowledges that the 
severe-harm standard is “dicta.”  “Dicta” is defined as  
“[o]pinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or 
determination of the specific case before the court.  
Expressions in court’s opinion which go beyond the facts 
before court and therefore are individual views of author and  
not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent.” Black’s  
Law Dictionary, 6th ed. 
The severe-harm standard is not at  
issue on the facts of this case, is not briefed by the 
parties, and is not essential to the determination of this 
case.  
2  
 
 
  
application to the facts of this recent case.  
In Singerman, the plaintiff alleging negligence sued the  
operator of a public hockey rink. 
Plaintiff was an  
experienced hockey player who joined or was observing a pick­
up game.  Plaintiff went onto the ice without protective  
equipment and, at one point, stood leaning on the goal net.  
As the scrimmage moved his way, plaintiff was hit in the eye  
by a puck shot on goal, and he sustained severe damage.  
Plaintiff testified that he saw the player take the shot, but  
was unable to avoid the puck because of poor lighting.  The  
issue presented was whether the defendant should have  
anticipated the harm despite plaintiff’s knowledge of the  
hazardous condition.  
Because severe harm is inherent to hockey, indeed the  
plaintiff in Singerman lost an eye, it would seem under the  
majority’s severe-harm standard the question whether the risk  
of harm caused by the lighting defect was unreasonable despite  
its obviousness would be for the jury.  This, despite the fact  
that the lighting in the rink was alleged to be consistently  
inadequate and there was no chance that plaintiff would forget  
the 
potentially 
hazardous 
condition 
“because 
the 
condition 
was  
constantly before him.” 
Singerman at 144 (WEAVER, J.,  
opinion). I believe that Singerman was an appropriate case  
for summary disposition in favor of the defendant because the  
3  
open and obvious danger of the inadequate lighting was not  
unreasonably dangerous despite the potential for severe harm. 
 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion that my position  
would allow “no tort claim [to] lie,” slip op at 8, my  
position 
simply 
remains 
true 
to 
well-established 
articulations  
of the open and obvious doctrine. These articulations focus  
on circumstances that make a risk unreasonable despite its  
openness and obviousness, rather than on the nature of the  
potential harm.  See, e.g., Riddle, supra at 96 (holding that  
“[w]here the dangers are known to the invitee or are so  
obvious that the invitee might reasonably be expected to  
discover them, an invitor owes no duty to protect or warn the  
invitee 
unless 
he 
should anticipate the harm despite knowledge  
of it on behalf of the invitee”); Williams v Cunningham Drug  
Stores, Inc, supra at 500 (stating that “[t]he duty a  
possessor of land owes his invitees is not absolute . . . .  
It does not extend to conditions from which an unreasonable  
risk cannot be anticipated or to dangers so obvious and  
apparent that an invitee may be expected to discover them  
himself.  Furthermore, ‘the occupier is not an insurer of the  
safety of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise  
reasonable care for their protection’”).  
4