Title: Meyer v. Brown

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ROBERT E. MEYER 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 971876 
June 5, 1998 
 
REGINALD D. BROWN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
James B. Wilkinson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a 
personal injury action, the dispositive question is whether the 
trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s objection to venue. 
 
In October 1994, appellee Reginald D. Brown, the plaintiff 
below, was injured in a collision in Prince George County between a 
motorcycle he was operating and a motor vehicle driven by appellant 
Robert E. Meyer, the defendant below.  In October 1996, the 
plaintiff filed the present negligence action against defendant in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond seeking recovery in 
damages for his injuries. 
 
The defendant filed an objection to venue and moved the trial 
court to transfer the action to either the Circuit Court of Prince 
George County or the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County.  The 
defendant asserted that venue was not proper in the  City of 
Richmond because the accident happened in Prince George County and 
defendant “resides and works in Chesterfield County.”  Following a 
hearing, at which the parties presented defendant’s deposition on 
the issue, the trial court overruled the objection. 
 
The case proceeded to trial before a jury, which fixed 
plaintiff’s damages at $1 million.  The court entered judgment on 
the verdict and we awarded defendant this appeal. 
 
Defendant assigns three errors, but we shall discuss only the 
second:  “The court erred in ruling that [defendant] was subject to 
venue in the City of Richmond when the accident sued upon happened 
in Prince George County and [defendant] lived and worked in 
Chesterfield County.” 
 
Code § 8.01-260 provides, as pertinent to this appeal, that 
“the venue for any action shall be deemed proper only if laid in 
accordance with the provisions of §§ 8.01-261 and 8.01-262.”  Code 
§ 8.01-261, enumerating forums deemed “preferred” places of venue, 
is inapplicable here. 
 
Code § 8.01-262, enumerating “permissible” forums, applies.  
In subsection (3), the statute provides that a permissible forum 
shall be a county or city “[w]herein the defendant regularly 
conducts affairs or business activity.”  The question then becomes 
whether, under the facts presented, this defendant regularly 
conducted affairs or business activity in the City of Richmond. 
 
According to defendant’s deposition testimony, given upon 
examination by plaintiff’s attorney, defendant was a 20-year 
employee of Tredegar Industries, which is “basically an aluminum 
and plastics company.”  The defendant, a resident of Chesterfield 
County, had worked at the company’s Chesterfield County business 
 
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location since 1989.  He was Tredegar’s “insurance manager,” 
administering company property and casualty insurance.  Defendant’s 
employer owned no facility within the City of Richmond. 
 
Defendant’s employment required him “to go into” the City 
“[o]n occasion” to confer with two separate insurance brokers, 
which maintained offices within the City.  He would visit one 
broker “[n]ot more than once a year” and would “be in the office” 
of the other “[m]aybe six times during the year.”   Visits to the 
brokers were “spaced out” during the year but occurred “a little 
more often in the fall” in connection with discussions regarding 
January 1 renewals of insurance contracts.  Defendant’s job duties 
also required him to attend insurance seminars “perhaps” three 
times a year at private clubs within the City. 
 
Defendant also testified he travelled through the City 
“[t]wice a year, perhaps” on “pleasure” trips en route to Northern 
Virginia to visit a son.  Additionally, he said, he was “in the 
City of Richmond either to pass through or stop somewhere for 
whatever reason no more than four or five times in a year on 
average.” 
 
According to the testimony, defendant “never” enters the City 
for entertainment, for “shopping,” or for medical attention.  He 
belongs to no professional or social organizations located within 
the City and he has not been in the City “within the last two years 
at any time for a social or recreational purpose of any kind.” 
 
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Urging affirmance of the judgment, the plaintiff argues the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in retaining venue.  
According to plaintiff, the “deposition transcript describes 
uniform business activities and affairs that the defendant conducts 
on a regular basis within the City of Richmond.”  Elaborating, 
plaintiff contends “defendant’s activities in the City of Richmond 
are usual and customary by occurring approximately once per month 
for business purposes in addition to six or seven visits per year 
for personal affairs, occur at regular intervals because they are 
evenly distributed throughout the year, and are regular in 
destination because his almost monthly trips pursuant to his 
employment are to one of two businesses on seven occasions and to 
one of two clubs for educational seminars on the remaining 
occasions, such that these routine activities are clearly ‘regular’ 
business activity or affairs, according to the plain language of 
Virginia Code § 8.01-262(3).”  We disagree. 
 
An objection to venue is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and the court’s action in overruling the objection 
will not be reversed on appeal unless the record affirmatively 
reflects an abuse of discretion.  See Norfolk and W. Ry. Co. v. 
Williams, 239 Va. 390, 392, 389 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1990).  The party 
objecting to venue has the burden of establishing that the chosen 
venue is improper.  The defendant has met that burden in this case, 
even though the facts were developed by the plaintiff. 
 
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In plain language, the General Assembly has specified that 
permissible venue under these circumstances shall be in the county 
or city “[w]herein the defendant regularly conducts affairs or 
business activity.”  The customary meaning of the noun “affairs” in 
this context is, “commercial, professional, or public business,” 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 35 (1971), and “[a] 
person’s concerns in trade or property; business,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 57 (6th ed. 1990).  The term refers to employment-related 
or personal business dealings as opposed to activity that is purely 
personal, such as recreational pursuits.  Therefore, the evidence 
of defendant’s pleasure trips through the City to visit a son and 
of his passing through the City or stopping there “for whatever 
reason” fails to demonstrate that defendant “conducts affairs or 
business activity” within the City. 
 
Thus, the issue remains whether evidence of defendant’s seven 
visits per year to insurance brokerage firms and three appearances 
per year at business seminars qualifies under the statute as 
“regularly” conducting affairs or business activity within the 
City.  We hold it does not. 
 
The customary meaning of the adverb “regularly” in this 
context is, “in a regular, orderly, lawful, or methodical way,” 
Webster’s 1913.  The customary meaning of the adjective “regular” 
in this context is, “Steady or uniform in course, practice, or 
occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation.”  
 
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Black’s 1285.  Indeed, we have said, “In common parlance, a 
‘regularly’ employed person is one required to work every working 
day.  Similarly, a person ‘regularly required to perform service at 
night’ is one required to work at night every working day.”  Gomes 
v. City of Richmond, 220 Va. 449, 452, 258 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1979).  
Regular action is more frequent than casual or occasional action. 
 
The evidence shows that defendant’s activity within the City 
of Richmond on behalf of his employer was merely casual or 
occasional, and not conducted in an orderly, methodical way.  
Significantly, defendant said he was required to enter the City “on 
occasion” to confer with the brokers, these sporadic visits being 
“spaced out” during the year but occurring “more often in the 
fall.”  In sum, defendant’s activity in the City was not so 
frequent as to be performed “regularly” within the meaning of 
§ 8.01-262(3). 
 
Accordingly, because the record affirmatively reflects the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sustain 
defendant’s objection to venue, the judgment appealed from will be 
reversed and the case will be remanded for a new trial.  Upon 
remand, the trial court shall conduct a hearing and shall order 
this action transferred to either Prince George County or 
Chesterfield County, in accordance with the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-264. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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