Title: Turner v. Hooks

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Turner v. Hooks, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-556.] 
 
*Reporter’s Note: This cause was decided on January 24, 2018, but was released to the public on 
February 15, 2018, subsequent to the resignation of Justice William M. O’Neill, who participated 
in the decision. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-556 
TURNER, APPELLEE, v. HOOKS, WARDEN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Turner v. Hooks, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-556.] 
Juvenile procedure—R.C. 2151.12(G)—Written notice of the time, place, and 
purpose of a hearing in juvenile court must be given to a parent, guardian, 
or other custodian—Notice requirement satisfied by service upon a 
biological parent whose parental rights had not been fully terminated. 
(No. 2016-0788—Submitted May 2, 2017—Decided January 24, 2018.*) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ross County, No. 15-CA-3477, 
2016-Ohio-3083. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  
{¶ 1} The Fourth District Court of Appeals granted a writ of habeas corpus 
to appellee, Denelle Turner, ordering his immediate discharge from the Ross 
Correctional Institution.  We reverse. 
 
 
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Background 
{¶ 2} On August 13, 2008, the state filed a complaint charging Turner with 
murder by means of a firearm.  Turner was 17 years old at the time of the offense, 
so the complaint was filed in the Juvenile Branch of the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas.  The state then filed a motion to transfer the matter to the general 
division of the common pleas court, to try Turner as an adult, which the juvenile 
court granted. 
{¶ 3} Turner was convicted of murder and sentenced to prison.  State v. 
Turner, Franklin C.P. No. 08CR-8193 (Oct. 6, 2010).  The Tenth District Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  State v. Turner, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1051, 2011-Ohio-
3705.  On January 8, 2015, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against 
Mark Hooks, warden of the Ross Correctional Institution, in the Fourth District 
Court of Appeals.  He argued that the general division of the common pleas court 
lacked jurisdiction to try him because the juvenile court had failed to meet the 
requirements of R.C. 2152.12(G) before transferring his case. 
{¶ 4} R.C. 2152.12(G) requires the juvenile court to give written notice of 
the time, place, and purpose of a hearing “to the child’s parents, guardian, or other 
custodian and to the child’s counsel at least three days prior to the hearing.”  Prior 
to Turner’s bindover hearing, the court served that notice upon his biological 
mother, Tara Turner.  The juvenile court also gave notice to Derrick Wilford, as 
Turner’s father, although his paternity has apparently not been established.  See 
2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, ¶ 25.  Regardless of Wilford’s paternity status, 
service upon Tara Turner alone would be sufficient.  R.C. 1.43(A) (the “singular 
includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular”); see also State v. Reynolds, 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-915, 2007-Ohio-4178, ¶ 11-12 (holding that 
interpreting the statute to require service on two parents in all circumstances would 
be illogical). 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 5} However, in October 2005, the Franklin County Juvenile Court had 
awarded legal custody of Turner to his grandmother, Sylvia Watts.  Although she 
remained legal custodian at the time of the transfer hearing, Watts was not given 
notice of the hearing.  In his habeas petition, Turner argued that the failure to notify 
his legal custodian was a violation of R.C. 2152.12(G) and, as a result, the common 
pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals agreed that the failure to serve Watts prior to the 
bindover hearing was a jurisdictional defect.  The court issued a writ of habeas 
corpus to compel Turner’s immediate release. 2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, at 
¶ 64. 
{¶ 7} Hooks appealed.  We stayed the appellate court’s order pending 
review.  146 Ohio St.3d 1462, 2016-Ohio-4968, 54 N.E.3d 173. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} We begin with Hooks’s second proposition of law, because it is 
dispositive.  As noted above, R.C. 2152.12(G) requires notice “to the child’s 
parents, guardian, or other custodian.”  The statute is written in the disjunctive, such 
that notification is sufficient if sent to the parents or a guardian or other custodian.  
Therefore, Hooks contends, the juvenile court satisfied the statutory requirements 
by serving notice on Turner’s biological mother, Tara Turner. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals disagreed, holding that “the legislature did not 
intend the term ‘parents’ to include a biological mother who has lost all but residual 
parenting rights and has been implicitly declared an unsuitable parent through a 
neglect or dependency adjudication.”  2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 133, at ¶ 46.  It 
arrived at this interpretation by applying a canon of statutory construction.  But 
there was no reason for the appellate court to resort to a canon of construction in 
the first place. 
{¶ 10} When the language of a statute is ambiguous, we resort to the rules 
of construction to discern its meaning.  Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 
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Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991) (“where a statute is found to be subject to 
various interpretations, a court called upon to interpret its provisions may invoke 
rules of statutory construction in order to arrive at legislative intent”).  We see 
nothing ambiguous in the language of R.C. 2152.12(G). 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals held that R.C. 2152.12(G) was ambiguous 
because the term “parents” is undefined in the Revised Code and has multiple 
meanings.  2016-Ohio-3083, 55 N.E.3d 1133, at ¶ 37-38.  The appellate court cited 
the following definition and usage notes for the word “parent”: 
 
“The lawful father or mother of someone.  •  In ordinary usage, the 
term denotes more than responsibility for conception and birth.  The 
term commonly includes (1) either the natural father or the natural 
mother of a child, (2) the adoptive father or the adoptive mother of 
a child, (3) the child’s putative blood parent who has expressly 
acknowledged paternity, and (4) any individual or agency whose 
status as guardian has been established by judicial decree.  In law, 
parental status based on any criterion may be terminated by judicial 
decree.” 
 
Id. at ¶ 37, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1137 (7th Ed.1999).  Viewing all these 
possibilities, the appellate court was unwilling to say that the statutory term had the 
single clear meaning of biological parent. 
{¶ 12} However, there is nothing ambiguous about the meaning of the word 
“parents” in the statute.  A statute is ambiguous “ ‘if a reasonable person can find 
different meanings in the [statute] and if good arguments can be made for either of 
two contrary positions.’ ”  (Emphasis added).  Sunset Estate Properties, L.L.C. v. 
Lodi, 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0023-M, 2013-Ohio-4973, ¶ 20, quoting 4522 
Kenny Rd., L.L.C., v. Columbus Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 152 Ohio App.3d 526, 
January Term, 2018 
 
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2003-Ohio-1891, 789 N.E.2d 246, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.); State ex rel. Bailey v. Madison, 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-284, 2012-Ohio-4950, ¶ 8.  In this case, the court is 
not confronted with contrary or inconsistent interpretations: the statutory notice 
requirement was satisfied here by service upon a biological parent whose parental 
rights had not been fully terminated.  And where, as here, “the language of a statute 
is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no 
need to apply rules of statutory interpretation.”  Cline at 96. 
{¶ 13} Turner contends that interpreting R.C. 2152.12(G) in the manner 
Warden Hooks suggests would lead to an absurd result, because it would deprive 
juvenile defendants of advice and guidance from a competent and fit parental figure 
at the hearings.  It is not the role of this court to decide whether Tara Turner was 
the best choice to receive notice of Turner’s hearings.  That is a matter of policy for 
the General Assembly to assess.  It is sufficient to say that notice to her satisfied 
the statutory requirements. 
{¶ 14} We agree with Hook’s second proposition of law, and therefore 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  Because we conclude that the state 
met its notice obligations under R.C. 2152.12(G), it is unnecessary to reach Hook’s 
remaining propositions of law. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2152.12(G) requires that before the juvenile court conducts a 
hearing to transfer a child charged with delinquency to the adult division, the court 
“shall give notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose” of any hearing “to the 
child’s parents, guardian, or other custodian and to the child’s counsel at least three 
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days prior to the hearing.”  The majority opinion holds that “the statutory notice 
requirement was satisfied here by service upon a biological parent whose parental 
rights had not been fully terminated.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 12.  The majority 
opinion rejects the Fourth District Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the statutory 
language—and, in particular, the word “parents”—is ambiguous. 
{¶ 16} But statutory interpretation is not necessary here.  Turner does not 
dispute that a parent was served with notice of his transfer hearing.  Instead, his 
objection is a factual one.  He argues that by serving his biological mother, who did 
not have legal custody, the notice was insufficient to satisfy R.C. 2152.12(G). 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2152.12(G) is a notice statute, so the central question is whether 
notice was sufficient.  Adequate notice—notice that satisfies one’s due-process 
rights—is that which is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.”  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).  Because the “notice 
required will vary with circumstances and conditions,” a rigid formula is 
impossible.  Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1956). 
{¶ 18} In R.C. 2152.12(G), the General Assembly provided options for who 
must receive the notice: “the child’s parents, guardian, or other custodian.”  Notice 
to any one or more of those persons may provide sufficient notice.  Any one or 
more of those options may not.  We may presume that the General Assembly 
intended to comply with the Ohio and United States Constitutions when enacting 
R.C. 2152.12(G).  See R.C. 1.47.  And Turner has not raised a facial challenge to 
these methods of notice set forth in the statute.  Thus, the question is whether, under 
the facts presented here, notice served on Turner’s mother met the “reasonably 
calculated” standard. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 19} The majority opinion has strayed beyond this scope by determining 
that notice to a biological parent with only residual parental rights is sufficient 
under the plain language of the statute, without any further inquiry.  The Fourth 
District similarly attempted to find a rule by holding that notice to Turner’s mother 
was inadequate under the statute because Turner’s mother no longer had a custodial 
role in her biological son’s life.  Both interpretations unnecessarily read into the 
statute a bright-line rule that invites due-process violations. 
{¶ 20} In In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Taxes, 62 Ohio St.2d 
333, 405 N.E.2d 1030 (1980), we considered a statute that required that notice of a 
foreclosure action be sent to an individual’s “address.”  We recognized that 
“because due process is a flexible concept demanding more, or less, depending 
upon particular factual circumstances,” imposing a single meaning on the word 
“address” in the notice statute was impossible.  Id. at 337.  Instead, we stated that 
“the address used must be such that a taxpayer may be ‘reasonably calculated’ to 
be in receipt of the notice.”  Id. 
{¶ 21} Similarly, here, imposing a single meaning on the word “parent” that 
could apply to satisfy the due-process considerations of a notice statute in every 
case is impossible.  For example, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which 
notice to a parent, including one with only residual rights, would not reasonably 
“apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 
314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865.  Consider a circumstance where a child’s parent 
is mentally incapacitated or has been deemed incompetent.  Or consider that a 
child’s parent may be unavailable due to active military duty.  Substitute legal 
custodian for parent and the same scenarios could be equally as ineffective at 
providing notice.  In these situations, service on the parent or custodian may meet 
the literal directive of the statute, but could miss the mark of the reasonably-
calculated standard. 
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{¶ 22} Rather than engage in unnecessary statutory interpretation or a 
debate about the General Assembly’s meaning of the word “parent,” I would 
consider the factual circumstances here to determine whether notice to Turner’s 
biological parent, rather than to his grandmother who was his legal custodian, met 
the reasonably-calculated standard. 
{¶ 23} Here, the juvenile complaint against Turner, dated August 13, 2008, 
listed Tara Turner as his “mother, guardian, or custodian.”  Two days later, on 
August 15, 2008, Turner’s mother attended a preliminary hearing at which the 
prosecutor presented her with a copy of the motion to relinquish jurisdiction that 
had been filed the day before.  At the hearing, the judge confirmed on the record 
with the prosecutor and Turner’s counsel their stipulation to service of that motion.  
The court continued the hearing on the motion to relinquish jurisdiction.  The same 
day, Turner’s mother signed an acknowledgement of a notice that the juvenile court 
would potentially relinquish jurisdiction, which was filed with the court.  By entry 
dated August 15, 2008, the judge memorialized the parties’ stipulation to service of 
the motion to relinquish jurisdiction. 
{¶ 24} On November 14, 2008, Turner’s mother attended the juvenile-court 
hearing on the motion to relinquish jurisdiction.  The prosecutor again noted, 
without objection from Turner’s counsel, that Turner’s mother was served with the 
motion to relinquish jurisdiction.  The hearing was continued until November 17, 
2008, and Turner’s mother signed a waiver of notice of the hearing, which was filed 
with the court.  Turner’s mother also attended the hearing on November 17, 2008.  
The record is devoid of any evidence that Turner objected to the court providing 
notice to his mother at any time between August 15, 2008, and November 17, 2008, 
or that he raised an issue regarding his grandmother’s custodial relationship. 
{¶ 25} Under the circumstances, it appears that notice to Turner’s mother 
was “reasonably calculated” to notify interested parties of the transfer hearing.  
Thus, I agree with the majority that notice here was sufficient under the statute.  
January Term, 2018 
 
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Because there is no need for this court to establish a bright-line rule through 
statutory interpretation, I concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} Respectfully, I must dissent. 
{¶ 27} In arriving at a predetermined conclusion, the majority fails to 
address what I believe is the most important fact in this and all bindover hearings: 
the transfer of a juvenile to an adult court dramatically changes the way that the 
juvenile is treated.  There was no meaningful consideration of maturity or 
amenability to rehabilitation and no recognition that Denelle Turner was not an 
adult.  Get the child convicted, sentenced, and incarcerated.  He committed a 
murder, after all.  But I see a problem.  The child has a statutory right to have a 
parent or guardian at his side to make decisions and advise him with only his 
welfare in mind.  That statutory right is bolstered by the constitutional right to due 
process—a right cast aside by the court today.  And because of that due-process 
right, a literal interpretation of R.C. 2152.12(G), which required that the child’s 
“parents, guardian, or other custodian” be notified of any hearing, is inadequate.  
Rather, this court should consider that a statute that would allow notice to be served 
on an adult who does not have legal custody of the juvenile presents a glaring 
constitutional problem.  And as the legislature has told us in R.C. 1.47(A), we 
should presume that the legislature intended a constitutional juvenile notice statute. 
{¶ 28} The opinion concurring in judgment comes closer to the mark.  I 
agree that we should presume that the legislature intended to comply with the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions when it enacted R.C. 2152.12(G).  But, alas, 
I cannot agree that the due-process right to notice of a juvenile’s transfer hearing 
permits service to just anyone claiming to be a parent who is skulking around the 
courthouse.  In this context, due process “does not allow a hearing to be held in 
which a youth’s freedom and his parents’ right to his custody are at stake without 
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giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they 
must meet.”  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).  
One of the Supreme Court’s primary considerations in extending traditional due-
process protections to juvenile proceedings is that there is a possibility the state 
may take custody of the child and interfere with the custody of a parent.  Id. at 17.  
This is because a child’s primary right is to have someone, whether a person or the 
state, take care of him.  Id. at 17, fn. 21.  For that reason, a statute requiring notice 
regarding a juvenile must at least require that the state inform the adult or adults 
with legal custody over the child in advance of the hearing in order to comply with 
constitutional protections. 
{¶ 29} This case is instructive.  In October 2005, the Franklin County 
Juvenile Court awarded legal custody of Turner to his grandmother, Sylvia Watts.  
This was a permanent custody order, and the court did not provide for annual 
review.  Although she remained Turner’s legal custodian at the time of the transfer 
hearing, Watts was not given notice of the hearing.  Notice was instead given to 
Turner’s mother, Tara Turner, at the beginning of the hearing on the state’s motion 
to relinquish jurisdiction to the adult court.  Under no tortured expansion of the 
English language can that service be considered notice to any person who had the 
right or duty to protect, train, or discipline the child.  See R.C. 2151.011(A)(21). 
{¶ 30} The Franklin County Juvenile Court made a reasoned decision that 
Tara Turner was no longer capable of making any decisions concerning Turner.  
She had a long history of neglecting her children.  Turner was placed in the state’s 
custody in 2004 when he was 13 years old.  Turner’s mother lost custody of her 
children after she left them alone for periods of time.  She had a history of alcohol 
or other drug abuse.  And not only does the record show no attempt by Tara Turner 
to regain custody at any time, it shows that she failed to complete the case-plan 
objectives, failed to complete a drug and alcohol assessment, again disappeared for 
periods of time, and failed to consistently show for scheduled visits.  Yet this is the 
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person the majority has announced was capable of counseling Turner during the 
most important hearing of his life. 
{¶ 31} I would hold that notice to a biological parent who no longer has 
legal custody is constitutionally insufficient under the only valid reading of R.C. 
2152.12(G).  Absent a proper bindover procedure, the juvenile court retained 
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.  State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 
40, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Turner could not waive 
the juvenile court’s exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction.  Id. at paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  That remains true notwithstanding the stipulation that Tara Turner 
received notice. 
{¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
_________________ 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Eric Hedrick, Assistant Public 
Defender, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Stephanie Watson, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant. 
_________________