Title: Cremer v. State Bd. of Control

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cremer v. State Bd. of Control1984 WY 3675 P.2d 250Case Number: 5793, 5794Decided: 01/09/1984CURTIS (BUDDY) CREMER, APPELLANT (PETITIONER), FRANK BOSLER, (PETITIONER),

v.

STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, SCHMID PROPERTIES, INC., AND LARAMIE VALLEY MUNICIPAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS).

FRANK BOSLER, APPELLANT (PETITIONER), CURTIS (BUDDY) CREMER, (PETITIONER),

v.

STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, SCHMID PROPERTIES, INC., AND LARAMIE VALLEY MUNICIPAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS). 
Supreme Court of Wyoming
CURTIS (BUDDY) CREMER, APPELLANT (PETITIONER), FRANK 
BOSLER, (PETITIONER),

v.

STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, 
SCHMID PROPERTIES, INC., AND LARAMIE VALLEY MUNICIPAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS).

FRANK BOSLER, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER), CURTIS (BUDDY) CREMER, (PETITIONER),

v.

STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, SCHMID PROPERTIES, INC., AND 
LARAMIE VALLEY MUNICIPAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS).

Appeal from the District Court,AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Jack R. Gage of 
Hanes, Gage & Burke, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant 
Cremer.

Jay Dee Schaefer 
of Jay Dee Schaefer & Associates, Laramie, for appellant 
Bosler.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Walter Perry, III, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., John D. Erdmann, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee State 
Board of Control.

William R. Jones 
and Eric M. Alden of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellee Schmid Properties, 
Inc.

C.M. Aron of 
Aron & Hennig, Laramie, for appellee    
Laramie   
Valley Municipal Irr. 
Dist.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     On August 20, 1980 a 
petition in abandonment was filed with the Wyoming Board of Control, the purpose 
of which was to seek the abandonment of water rights and water works authorities 
associated with JamesLake in Albany County, Wyoming, in which appellants Bosler and Cremer 
had an interest.1

[¶2.]     On the 2nd of 
September, 1981, the Board of Control responded to the abandonment petition by 
ordering water rights in James Lake Reservoir and Supply system to be partially 
abandoned in that the order limited storage in the lake to three feet above the 
bottom of its outlet, which limitation represented an abandonment of 
approximately 90% of the reservoir capacity. The Board abandoned one of 
appellants' sources of water supply and drastically reduced the capacity in 
their water transfer canal, thus inhibiting its ability to transport water from 
its principal remaining sources. Further, the Board abandoned all of the 
appellants' distribution system downstream from the reservoir as well as all of 
their secondary permits.

[¶3.]     JamesLake - 
some 18 miles northwest of the city of Laramie, 
Wyoming - is a shallow, natural basin located 
at the terminus of Seven Mile Creek which flows out of the mountains west of 
Laramie. 
Beginning in 1908 the James Lake Reservoir Company undertook to obtain various 
permits from the State Engineer for the purpose of constructing and operating an 
irrigation system in the JamesLake area. The acquisition of permits 
continued through 1912, construction of the system was accomplished in the very 
early part of the century, and beneficial use was established on the land 
described in the permits prior to 1925.

[¶4.]     Appellee Schmid 
Properties, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Schmid, Inc.) owns the Hunt Ranch 
attached to which are various upstream underlying or base2 water rights on streams and 
ancillary drainages which also serve the JamesLake system. The underlying or base Hunt 
appropriations carry priorities which predate 1945 and are senior to the same 
classification of JamesLake permits in which the appellants have 
an interest and which, as has been noted, also predate the year 1945.3

THIS COURT'S 
HOLDING

[¶5.]     We will reverse the 
court of first instance which had affirmed the order of the Board of Control and 
we will hold that, since Schmid, Inc.'s pre-1945 water rights were senior to 
appellants' pre-1945 rights, and it appearing that appellee Schmid, Inc. does 
not complain that these rights are not being serviced, it follows that, absent 
the enactment of the surplus water act of 1945, the appellees would have no 
standing to bring abandonment against the underlying or base rights of the 
appellants.4 We will further hold that the 
surplus water act did not serve to confer upon Schmid, Inc. such standing as 
would permit it to successfully petition in abandonment in the case at 
bar.

SCHMID, INC.'S 
CONTENTION

[¶6.]     Schmid, Inc. contends 
it has standing to bring abandonment proceedings against the base or underlying 
as well as the surplus water rights of the appellants under § 41-3-401(b), W.S. 
1977 which provides:

"When any water user who might be affected by 
a declaration of abandonment of existing water rights, desires to bring 
about a legal declaration of abandonment, he shall present his case in writing 
to the state board of control."5 (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶7.]     Schmid, Inc.'s legal 
position comes more sharply into focus when its brief and hearing contentions 
are taken into account. In its brief, Schmid, Inc. says:

"Appellants state in 
their briefs that all of the Hunt Ranch's water rights are senior to the rights 
being abandoned. This is simply not true. Like all water rights in existence in 
Wyoming as of 
March 1, 1945, the Hunt Ranch permits have two water rights attached to them. The first right has a priority date based on 
the time of filing of the original application for a permit, the second right, 
in the amount of 1 c.f.s. per 70 acres, has a priority date of March 1, 1945, 
pursuant to § 41-4-320. It is this second right, the right created by the 
Wyoming Surplus Water Law, which will be affected by a declaration of 
abandonment of the permits in question in this action." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶8.]     Schmid, Inc.'s attorney 
took a similar position in arguing against the contestee's motion to dismiss the 
abandonment petition before the water superintendent who conducted the motion 
hearing. Schmid, Inc.'s counsel was addressed by the 
superintendent:

"Mr. Jones, I would like 
to ask you to explain more fully your position that you could be injured on the 
basis of your surplus water assignment.

"MR. JONES: The existence 
of these rights, all of which we are 
seeking to have abandoned, are rights which, if they are determined to be 
validly existing, will be entitled to satisfaction prior to the time that the 
rights of the Petitioner would receive a double appropriation. And that's the 
position." (Emphasis added.)

[¶9.]     It is, then, the 
contention of Schmid, Inc. that it and the appellants are possessed of two 
classes of water rights upon the same stream system - i.e., (1) water rights 
under pre-1945 adjudication and (2) surplus water rights under the legislative 
adjudication of March 1, 1945. Schmid, Inc. argues that, in passing the surplus 
water act of 1945, it was the intention of the legislature to cause surplus 
water rights to become junior to pre-1945 rights, thereby bestowing such 
standing under the abandonment statute, § 41-3-401(b), as would permit any 
surplus user on a stream system to bring abandonment proceedings against 
pre-1945 and surplus water rights of any other user on the same water 
system.

APPELLANTS' 
CONTENTION

[¶10.]  It is the appellants' contention that 
Schmid, Inc. has no standing to bring abandonment proceedings because its 
appropriation will not be "affected" under the abandonment statutes in 
that:

[¶11.]  (1) The benefit which Schmid, Inc. seeks 
through abandonment is not such "benefit" as is concerned with the protection of 
its water rights, and

[¶12.]  (2) The surplus water statute, § 
41-4-324, prohibits the diversion or taking of water "other than surplus water," 
and the appellee Schmid, Inc. seeks, contrary to law, to take the water 
authorized by the appellants' pre-1945 permits which is not "surplus 
water."

THE BOARD OF CONTROL'S 
DECISION

[¶13.]  Prior to the proceedings before the Board 
of Control, Bosler and Cremer joined in a motion to dismiss the abandonment 
petition upon the grounds that Schmid, Inc. was not possessed of standing to 
complain since Schmid, Inc. was receiving all of the water to which it was 
entitled under both appropriations, and therefore could not be said to be a 
"water user who might be affected by a declaration of abandonment of existing 
water rights." (§ 41-3-401(b), supra.) The motion was denied for the reason that 
the abandonment of the appellants' water rights would result in a "benefit" to 
Schmid, Inc. In its Findings of Fact, the Board found:

"15. THAT * * * a declaration of abandonment would benefit 
the Petitioner by allowing the continued use of surplus waters from Four 
Mile and Seven Mile Creeks to supply its prior rights, since only so much of the 
water rights from these sources not abandoned by this order could be used to 
fill the James Lake Reservoir * * *. Similarly, the Petitioner's prior right on 
the Snake Ditch would be benefited by 
continued use of surplus flows in the Little Laramie River and Mill Creek, 
when available, because the appropriations to supply James Lake Reservoir would 
be reduced or eliminated." (Emphasis added.)

[¶14.]  In its Conclusions of Law the Board says, 
at ¶ 4:

"* * * The Petitioner has 
standing to have its Petition for Abandonment heard and decided by the State 
Board of Control. Its standing pertains 
to all of the permits in question. As against the diversions from the Little 
Laramie River and Mill Creek, the Petitioner is affected because of its prior 
downstream rights in the Snake Ditch. And as against the impoundment of the 
Seven Mile Creek flood flows and the diversion of Four Mile Creek waters into 
James Lake Reservoir, the Petitioner is affected because of its direct flow 
water rights in the same two sources of supply. Under the Surplus Water Law, W.S. 41-4-317 
through W.S. 41-4-324, the Petitioner and its predecessors have enjoyed a 1945 
junior priority right to the distribution of the surplus waters from all four 
sources of supply. If this petition is not granted, the Petitioner could lose 
the benefit of its surplus water rights due to demands for regulation of 
these sources of supply for the purpose of filling James Lake Reservoir." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶15.]  The sum and substance of the Board's 
resolution of the issue is that Schmid, Inc. had standing to bring abandonment 
because it was an appropriator whose surplus water adjudication made its rights 
junior to the appellants' base rights and, because it would "benefit" from the 
abandonment of Bosler's and Cremer's water rights, was, therefore, an "affected" 
water user under the abandonment statute, § 41-3-401(b).

THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DECISION

[¶16.]  The district court in its order emanating 
from the appellants' petition for review affirmed the Board of Control's order 
with respect to Schmid, Inc.'s standing to bring an abandonment 
petition.

RELEVANT SURPLUS WATER 
STATUTES

[¶17.]  Section 41-4-317, W.S. 1977 contemplates 
the determination of priorities of rights of use, the amounts of the 
appropriations based upon the acreage irrigated, limitations of water to be 
allotted and disposition of excess water, and provides in relevant 
part:

"* * * [P]rovided, 
further, where there may be in any stream water in excess of the total amount of 
all appropriations from said stream, such 
excess shall be divided among the appropriators therefrom in proportion to the 
acreage covered by their respective permits * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶18.]  Surplus water is defined in § 41-4-318, W.S. 1977 to be that water which 
"at any time       
          [exceeds] the total amount 
required to furnish to all existing 
appropriations" (emphasis added) the amount of water which had been granted 
as of March 1, 1945.

[¶19.]  Section 41-4-320, W.S. 1977 provides in 
part:

"(a) A right to the use 
of surplus water as herein defined in 
the amount of one (1) cubic foot of water per second for each seventy (70) acres 
of land having an adjudicated water right or a water right under permit is hereby adjudicated to attach to all 
original direct flow water rights * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

SURPLUS WATER 
DISTRIBUTION IN WYOMING

[¶20.]  In Budd v. Bishop,    Wyo., 543 P.2d 368 
(1975), we identified, with approval, the manner in which the State Engineer was 
allocating surplus water rights when we said:

"The defendants [State 
Engineer] consistently have interpreted the Wyoming Surplus Water Law to the end 
that each water right with a priority date of March 1, 1945 or earlier, is 
entitled to divert water in the volume of two cubic feet per second of time for 
each 70 acres of land before any water is made available to the holder of a 
water right with a priority date after March 1, 1945. If there is not sufficient 
water to furnish two cubic feet per second to each pre-March 1, 1945 water 
right, but more than enough to furnish one cubic foot per second to each of such 
rights, then the surplus water is divided among those rights on a pro rata 
basis. If there is so little water that each pre-March 1, 1945 right cannot 
receive one cubic foot per second, they are regulated on a strict priority 
basis. Should there be sufficient water to furnish two cubic feet per second for 
each 70 acres of land to the pre-March 1, 1945 water rights and to furnish one 
cubic foot per second for each 70 acres of land for the post-March 1, 1945 water 
rights, and should there be excess water beyond that, it is allowed to the 
post-March 1, 1945 appropriators up to the extent of two cubic feet per second 
of time for each 70 acres." 543 P.2d  at 370.

THE LAW OF STANDING - 
GENERALLY

[¶21.]  We discussed the law of standing in Washakie County School District 
Number One v. Herschler,       
        Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 317, cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), 
where, in summary, we said that for a party to have standing to sue he must have 
a legally protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation, 
Guidry v. Roberts, La. App., 331 So. 2d 44, 47 (1976); he must be such a 
party as is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy 
is presented to the court, Washakie County School District Number One v. 
Herschler, 
               
                 
            
                
             
         supra, citing 
67A C.J.S. Parties § 12, p. 662; he must be such a party as is entitled to a 
"right to relief," 67A C.J.S. Parties, supra, at p. 662; the question of whether 
a party has standing "goes to the existence of the cause of action," 67A C.J.S. 
Parties, supra, at p. 662; the interest of the plaintiff must be a "present, 
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or future, 
contingent interest," 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parties, § 28, Present substantial interest 
as requisite, p. 379; and the same text in the same section contemplates that 
the plaintiff when commencing the action must have a valid and subsisting title 
or right to the subject thereof. His subsequent acquisition, or perfection of a 
right to the subject of the action during the pendency of the suit, will not 
remedy the defect so as to enable him to maintain the 
action.

THE LAW OF THIS 
CASE

The contestant cannot 
show that its water rights are abridged and thus it is not an "affected" water 
user under the abandonment statute, § 41-3-401(b).

[¶22.]  Before the surplus water act of 1945, Schmid, Inc. would not have been 
possessed of standing to bring abandonment proceedings against the base or 
underlying water rights of the appellants because Schmid, Inc.'s rights were 
senior to the rights of Cremer and Bosler and it would, therefore, be unable to 
successfully assert that it is a water user who would "be affected" (abandonment 
statute language) by a declaration of abandonment of "existing water rights." 
Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. Whiting,       
            
           
              
              
           
          59 Wyo. 
52, 136 P.2d 502, 508 (1943).

[¶23.]  A water user is statutorily "affected" by a declaration of abandonment if 
his water rights are abridged. Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln 
Land Co.,       
            
      54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572, 580 (1939), with citations. In Horse Creek we said that a 
water user's rights would be abridged when they are "changed to his 
disadvantage." (Emphasis added.) We put the concept this way in    
              
            
     Horse Creek:

"Finally, returning again to the opening words in the 
sentence last above quoted from the procedural statute, Section 122-422, supra, 
`when, pursuant to the provisions of § 122-421, any water user who might be 
affected   
             
            
       by a declaration of abandonment,' etc., it 
is manifest that the italicized word, `affected,' is both significant and 
controlling. It indicates to our mind that it was not the legislative purpose to 
open the door to any person whomsoever to undertake proceedings to procure a 
declaration of abandonment. Those who are authorized to use the procedure set 
forth in Sections 122-422 to 122-427, W.R.S. 1931, inclusive, are only those 
whose rights would be `affected.' "* * * Our statute evidently means, therefore, 
that if a party's water rights would be abridged in some way, i.e., changed to 
his disadvantage, he may invoke the statutory procedure." 92 P.2d  at 
580.

[¶24.]  It was said in Haige v. Lincoln Land Co.,         
D.C.Wyo., 18 F. Supp. 637, 639 (1937), where Wyoming's abandonment statute was 
under consideration:

"* * * It is claimed by 
the defendant that the plaintiff is not legally qualified to challenge the water 
rights of the defendant because of the fact that he does not come within the 
provisions of the statute as one eligible to present a contest. Section 122-422, 
W.R.S. 1931, provides in part: `When, pursuant to the provisions of § 122-421, 
any water user who might be affected by a 
declaration of abandonment of existing water rights, desires to bring about 
a legal declaration of such abandonment, he shall present his case in writing to 
the board of control.'

"In respect of this 
statute it is urged that the plaintiff is in no wise affected through the use of 
water by the defendant in the manner which has been above outlined. If it be 
held that the plaintiff is affected through the use of water by defendant on Fox 
creek, ten miles below plaintiff's land under the facts in this case, it would 
mean that pure theory must place plaintiff in a position to become a contestant 
of defendant's rights. The evidence in this case from the practical standpoint 
shows rather conclusively that the plaintiff's rights could in no way be 
affected injuriously or otherwise by the exercise of the defendant in its 
claimed right of appropriation. Apparently the Supreme Court of this state has 
not passed upon this feature of the statute. Cases from other jurisdictions have been 
cited which announce the principle that one purporting to complain of a 
diversion must show that he will suffer from it. In United States v. Haga 
(D.C.) 276 F. 41, the principle is stated in the syllabus as follows: `An appropriator from a main channel can 
complain of a diversion from a tributary only if and when such tributary would, 
if not interfered with, make a valuable contribution to the main stream.'" 
(Emphasis added.)

In 
Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co.,   
   55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, 140, reh. denied 55 Wyo. 
347, 102 P.2d 745 (1940), we said:

"Before a party may 
attack the right of another, either on constitutional or other grounds, he must 
first show that he himself has a right which has been invaded thereby. He must 
have an interest which is affected."

[¶25.]  The theme of Horse Creek, supra, Haige, supra, and Campbell, 
supra, threads its way through our opinion in Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. 
Whiting,       
             
   supra, 136 P.2d 502, where we held that a prior appropriator (of nonsurplus water) cannot 
interfere with the rights of a junior appropriator so long as the senior 
receives all the water to which his appropriation entitles him. In 
Mitchell,        
            
              
   we said:

"2 
Kinney, on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d Ed., 1377, Section 789 remarks that: 
`So long as the prior appropriator obtains all the water of satisfactory quality 
to the full extent of his appropriation, he has no right to interfere with or 
complain of the enjoyment of the rights of subsequent appropriators on the 
stream.' * * * See, also, Clough v. Wing,    
               
             
             
              
    2 Ariz. 371, 17 P. 453; 
Albion-Idaho Land Company v. Naf Irrigation Company et al.,      
    10 Cir., 97 F.2d 439, 444." 136 P.2d  at 
508.

[¶26.]  In Mitchell,  we also quoted 2 Weil, Water 
Rights in the Western States, 3d Ed., § 1155, where it is 
said:

"`To entitle the 
complaining party to relief against the distant use while not himself using the 
water on his land, and hence suffering no present damage, it must actually 
appear that the impairment of water supply by diversion for distant use will 
interfere with the use of the water by complainant on his land in the future, or 
will deteriorate the value and adaptability to full use of his land, or that a 
taking for distant use will interfere with his enjoyment of his rights in a 
watercourse.'" 136 P.2d  at 508.

[¶27.]  We therefore reiterate the historic rule (which is nothing more than the 
law of standing applied to water users in an abandonment proceeding) that an 
appropriator's rights are not "affected" for the purpose of bringing abandonment 
unless those rights are changed to his disadvantage. In other words, he has to 
be able to show injury.      
               
           
           
            A water user may 
not bootstrap standing for the purpose of bringing abandonment of his neighbor's 
water rights when the only effect of the abandonment would be to enlarge the 
contestant's appropriation as distinguished from protecting his right to use his 
previously appropriated water.

[¶28.]  Given these concepts, which were 
developed before the enactment of the surplus water law of 1945, the question in 
the case at bar is:

The effect of the surplus 
water act upon Schmid, Inc.'s standing to bring abandonment of the appellants' 
base and surplus water rights.

[¶29.]  In addressing this issue, it is necessary 
to keep in mind that we are, in this appeal, concerned with two different 
categories of water rights: First, there are the base rights of both the appellants and 
the appellees, concerning which Schmid, Inc. is senior to Cremer and Bosler, 
and, secondly, all parties are possessed of surplus water rights which are 
"attach[ed]"6 to all original and direct-flow 
water rights in the state as of March 1, 1945. 

[¶30.]  Without either urging or proving that its 
use of its water rights are being or will be abridged, Schmid, Inc.'s rationale, 
which is supported by the Board of Control and the trial court, is that it has 
standing to bring abandonment since it would "benefit" if more surplus water 
were made available in the stream. It goes on to argue that, since all surplus 
water is, by statute, inseparably attached to base rights, it follows that all water rights of the appellants must 
necessarily be abandoned so that Schmid, Inc. may realize the "benefit" from the 
release to the stream of the appellants' water.

[¶31.]  Under the authority set out above, we 
hold that Schmid, Inc.'s contention must fail because it cannot show and has not 
shown that its water rights under either its original or surplus water 
appropriations have been or will be abridged. Its original rights have not been 
abridged because they are senior to and take priority over all of appellants' 
contested water rights. Its surplus rights have not been abridged because, 
pursuant to §§ 41-4-318 and 41-4-320, supra, and our approval of the Board of 
Control's distribution of surplus water,7 such rights are mere entitlements 
to participate in the existing pool of surplus water according to a formula 
which contemplates the inclusion of all appropriators' authorized irrigable 
acreage and is applied to the amount of water in the stream system at any given 
time. Since surplus rights do not confer authority to divert a specified amount 
of water, there is no quantifiable appropriation subject to protection through 
abandonment proceedings. Furthermore, an action in abandonment based on its 
surplus rights, if permitted, would only have the effect of enlarging Schmid, 
Inc.'s appropriation through an increase in the stream system's surplus water 
supply but would not be possessed of standing's necessary and corollary 
requirement of protecting Schmid, Inc.'s 
statutory right to take its proportionate share from the existing pool of 
surplus water.

The surplus water 
statute, § 41-4-317, W.S. 1977 prohibits the taking of the appellants' base 
rights.

[¶32.]  It seems to be conceded that the surplus water of the state of Wyoming 
attaches to base appropriations and the acreage contemplated thereby. See § 
41-4-317, § 41-4-318, § 41-4-320, and Budd v. Bishop,        
             
            
 cited and discussed supra. This being so, it follows that a 1945 surplus 
water appropriation could not be abandoned for nonuse without abandoning the 
water right upon which it depends and to which it is "attach[ed]" (§ 41-4-320, 
supra). Therefore, an abandonment proceeding brought under any theory that 
Schmid, Inc. may be "affected" by Cremer's and Bosler's utilization of their 
water adjudications depends upon an allegation of standing to bring abandonment 
against the appellants' pre-1945 appropriations. This is prohibited by § 
41-4-324 of the surplus water statute, which provides:

"Nothing in this act [§§ 
41-4-317 to 41-4-324] shall be so construed as to permit, authorize or make 
lawful the diversion or taking of any water other than surplus water as herein 
defined."

This section of 
the statute spells out the intent of the legislature not to allow the surplus 
water act to confer standing to attack nonsurplus water rights. Since the 
surplus water rights involved in this appeal came into being through attachment 
to existing pre-1945 appropriations and cannot claim separate and independent 
existence, it follows that it is not possible to abandon the appellants' surplus 
water rights without abandoning their base rights. This, the statute 
prohibits.

SUMMARY

[¶33.]  We hold, then, that the surplus water law 
does not authorize its utilization for the purpose of bestowing junior 
appropriator standing upon a base right senior appropriator such as Schmid, Inc. 
in order that such senior appropriator may establish that he is "affected" 
within the purview of the abandonment statute. This holding contemplates these 
propositions: First, the base and surplus water rights of Schmid, Inc. are not 
being abridged by the appellants' utilization of the water contemplated by their 
corresponding appropriations. Secondly, it would be necessary to abandon the 
appellants' base rights in order to effect abandonment of their surplus water 
rights, and the surplus water law (§ 41-4-324, supra) prohibits its utilization 
for the purpose of taking or diverting other than surplus 
water.

[¶34.]  Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 In this opinion we have 
reference to Curtis (Buddy) Cremer and Frank Bosler when we speak of the 
"appellants."

2 We use the terms 
"underlying" and "base" to describe the nonsurplus water rights to which this 
opinion has reference.

3 The year 1945 is 
significant because it was on March 1st of that year that the Wyoming surplus water 
law, § 41-4-317 through § 41-4-324, W.S. 1977, became 
effective.

4 
Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. Whiting,     
 59 Wyo. 52, 136 P.2d 502 
(1943).

5 Those who are authorized 
to utilize the abandonment procedure under this section of the 
statute

"* * 
* are only those whose water rights would be `affected.'" Horse Creek 
Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co.,       
           
   54 Wyo. 320, 342, 92 P.2d 572, 580 
(1939).

6 Section 41-4-320, 
supra.

7 
Budd v. Bishop,    
supra.