Title: DEAN GROMMET, MALINDA GROMMET, husband and wife, and MICHELLE COSTI V. BLAIR NEWMAN, d/b/a NEWMAN REALTY; BLAIR NEWMAN, d/b/a NEWMAN REALTY V. DEAN GROMMET, MALINDA GROMMET, husband and wife, and MICHELLE COSTI

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DEAN GROMMET, MALINDA GROMMET, husband and wife, and MICHELLE COSTI V. BLAIR NEWMAN, d/b/a NEWMAN REALTY; BLAIR NEWMAN, d/b/a NEWMAN REALTY V. DEAN GROMMET, MALINDA GROMMET, husband and wife, and MICHELLE COSTI2009 WY 150220 P.3d 795Case Number: S-08-0148, S-08-0149Decided: 12/10/2009Modified: 12/29/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DEAN 
GROMMET, MALINDA GROMMET, husband and wife, and MICHELLE 
COSTI,Appellants(Defendants),v.BLAIR NEWMAN, d/b/a 
NEWMAN REALTY,Appellee(Plaintiff). 

BLAIR 
NEWMAN, d/b/a NEWMAN 
REALTY,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.DEAN GROMMET, MALINDA 
GROMMET, husband and wife, and MICHELLE 
COSTI,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Dean and Malinda Grommet and Michelle Costi:

Patrick 
J. Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper Wyoming; and 
Thomas S. Peters of Peters Associates, LLC, Teton Village, Wyoming.  Argument presented by Mr. 
Murphy.

 
 

Representing 
Blair Newman:

Michael 
E. Warren of Sawyer & Warren, P.C., Torrington, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]    Blair Newman, dba Newman 
Realty (Newman), initiated this litigation by filing his complaint in the 
district court on June 19, 2006.  
Newman asserted that he was owed a real estate commission by Dean Grommet 
[Grommet], in accordance with the terms of a real estate listing agreement 
between them.1  Newman also sought an award of 
attorney's fees from Grommet as provided for in the listing agreement, if he was 
successful in his action.  It 
enhances the clarity of our opinion to note at this juncture that the real 
estate sale at issue here affected a large ranch property owned by Grommet, and 
that the Wyoming National Guard (WNG) was the purchaser.  That ranch was contiguous with existing 
WNG properties near Guernsey.

 
 
[¶2]    On April 8, 2008, the 
district court entered its judgment awarding Newman damages in the amount of 
$537,000.00, plus prejudgment interest of 7% per annum from July 10, 2006, until 
the judgment was entered, as well as post judgment interest of 10% per annum 
from the date the judgment was entered until it was paid in full.  The district court declined to award 
attorney's fees in Newman's favor.  
In Case No. S-08-0148, we will affirm the district court's judgment with 
respect to the damages awarded to Newman.  
In Case No. S-08-0149, we reverse the district court's judgment insofar 
as it declined to award attorney's fees to Newman and we remand to the district 
court with directions that it award reasonable attorney's fees to Newman in 
accordance with the contract.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]    In Case No. S-08-0148, 
Grommet raises these issues:

 
 
A.  Whether 
the district court erred when it found that [Grommet] acted in bad faith toward 
[Newman] where [Grommet] acted in full accordance with the parties' real estate 
contract.

 
 
B.  Whether 
the district court denied [Grommet] procedural due process when it imposed 
liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
after ruling, during trial, that this case was not being tried on the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.

 
 
C.  Whether 
the district court erred when it ruled that the parties' real estate contract 
was not void and unenforceable for [Newman's] failure to provide and obtain the 
statutory brokerage disclosures.

 
 
D.  Whether 
[Newman] committed fraud on [Grommet] and the Wyoming Real Estate Commission 
with his redacted 2003 disclosure statement.

 
 
E.  Whether 
the district court erred when it failed to award [Grommet] any damages for 
[Newman's] wrongful filing of a Lis 
Pendens against [Grommet's] ranch.

 
 
F.  Whether 
the district court erred in finding that [Newman] did not breach his fiduciary 
duties to [Grommet] where, as here, the undisputed evidence showed 
otherwise.

 
 
G.  Whether 
the district court erred when it rejected [Grommet's] counterclaims, and whether 
[Grommet is] lawfully entitled to compensatory damages and [his] attorney's fees 
under the real estate contract and the common law.

 
 
Newman 
essentially conforms his statement of the issues to that articulated by Grommet 
for this appeal.

 
 
[¶4]    In his reply brief, [Grommet] 
asserted that these new issues were raised by Newman in his brief for this 
case:

 
 
A.  Newman 
makes numerous misrepresentations and material omissions in his brief which must 
be corrected to avoid injustice.

 
 
B.  Newman's 
misstatements, in his brief, as to the reasons he failed to obtain a signed 
brokerage disclosure from [Grommet] in August 2005, warrant reversal and entry 
of judgment for [Grommet].

 
 
C.  Sellers 
who honor the terms of their express contracts do not act in bad 
faith.

          
1.  [Grommet was] permitted and authorized by [his] CONTRACT 
with Newman to hire subsequent brokers after expiration of Newman's listing 
period.

          
2.  Newman cannot link [Grommet's] alleged prevention of 
Newman's performance to any of the proscribed conduct in Havens.2

          
3.  Newman did not prove he was "plainly or evidently 
approaching success in his undertaking" when Grommet terminated Newman's 
services in late March 2006.

          
4.  [Grommet's] desire to realize $8.5 [million] for [his] 
property  instead of $7.7 [million]  after Newman's listing period expired is 
never bad faith.

          
5.  The district court's finding of bad faith imposes liability 
in the absence of any objective standard, or criteria, of bad 
faith.

 
 
D.  None 
of the evidence supports a finding of an implied, extended contract after the 
2/12/06 expiration of Newman's listing period.

 
 
E.  The 
general and special Statutes of Fraud bar any commission for 
Newman.

 
 
F.  Newman's 
receipt of [Grommet's] 3/25/06 letter on 3/30/06 does not affect or invalidate 
the 3/29/06 listing agreement of Brockman and [Grommet].

 
 
G.  The 
district court's revival of Newman's bad faith claim at trial, and the district 
court's imposition of bad faith liability under Scherer3 following trial, violated 
[Grommet's] right to due process.

 
 
H.  Newman's 
other misstatements must be corrected.

 
 
[¶5]    We will set out the issues in 
case No. S-08-0149 in a separate section of this opinion.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶6]    At the outset we note that 
Grommet's appeal hinges on his contention that the district court resolved the 
issues in this case on "perceived equities," rather than the four corners of the 
governing contract.  He also 
contends that the district court erred in applying this Court's decision in Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist 
Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, 18 P.3d 645 (Wyo. 2001) rather than Havens v. Irvine, 61 Wyo. 309, 157 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1945).

 
 
[¶7]    Newman 
was a real estate broker who operated his principal office in Goshen 
County.  He sold real estate 
throughout Wyoming, including Platte County.  Grommet owned real estate near Guernsey 
known as the Gray Rocks Ranch.  In 
1992, Grommet purchased the Gray Rocks Ranch for approximately $1,050,000.00, 
with Newman acting as the listing agent.  
Grommet listed that ranch for sale with Newman as the real estate broker 
(who was working for Garver Realty at that time) in 1998, for $4.9 million at a 
commission of 8%.  Portions of the 
ranch were sold and various land purchases and trades were made in the 
intervening years which enlarged the ranch and made it contiguous to Camp 
Guernsey.  Grommet worked with 
Newman in approximately 21 real estate transactions over the years.   The ranch was taken off the market 
for a time, but Grommet again listed the ranch with Newman in December of 2003, 
by way of an exclusive listing contract that was to run through December of 
2005.  The listing price was $7.3 
million for the ranch as a whole, but if the ranch were sold in two distinct 
parcels, the total would be $7.7 million.  
The final listing agreement between these parties supplanted that 
mentioned immediately above and was dated August 12, 2005, and was to expire on 
February 12, 2006.  That contract 
set a price of $7.7 million for the entire ranch.  Newman's commission was to be 6%, and he 
was to receive a $75,000 bonus if he sold the ranch for a full-price 
offer.

 
 
[¶8]    The evidence was that Newman 
advertised the ranch extensively and spent considerable money doing so.  He contacted persons, entities, and 
other brokers.  He showed the 
property on multiple occasions.  
Newman also distributed and otherwise made available literature regarding 
the ranch.

 
 
[¶9]    In the fall of 2004, Colonel 
Steve Mount of the Wyoming National Guard saw some of Newman's advertising 
literature regarding the Gray Rocks Ranch.  
Colonel Mount was immediately interested in the property since the 
property was adjacent to the WNG's existing lands and WNG wanted to expand Camp 
Guernsey.  At that time, the asking 
price was $7.3 million.  Newman 
showed the property to several members of the WNG.  Major General Ed Wright, the Adjutant 
General of the Wyoming National Guard, met with the military affairs committee 
of the Wyoming State Legislature regarding funding to purchase the ranch.  In July of 2005, a story appeared in the 
Casper Star Tribune that stated that 
the WNG wanted an appropriation of $8 million, which was to be used, in part to 
purchase the Gray Rocks Ranch.  The 
WNG's intent and ability to purchase the ranch was contingent upon the 
legislature's appropriating the funds and the WNG obtaining an appraisal at 
least equal to the eventual purchase price.  On August 12, 2005, when it became known 
that the WNG was seeking an $8 million appropriation, Grommet had Newman write a 
letter to the WNG stating that the new listing price was $7.7 million for the 
entire ranch.  On September 22, 
2005, WNG wrote back and stated that it was very interested in purchasing the 
property, but it had to wait for an appropriation from the 
legislature.

 
 
[¶10]  On September 27, 
2005, General Wright met with Grommet and he expressed his interest in buying 
the property at $7.7 million.  
Grommet expressed his interest in selling the property to the WNG.  From Grommet's point of view, a sale to 
the WNG would keep the property from being subdivided and allow him to lease the 
ranch back.

 
 
[¶11]  The WNG hired two appraisers to evaluate 
the ranch.  Both appraisers were 
certified appraisers in the state of Wyoming.  Jim Hastings appraised the Gray Rocks 
Ranch at $7.5 million, while John Pexton appraised the ranch at $7.95 
million.  Both appraisals were 
submitted on November 16, 2005.  On 
November 19, 2005, another article appeared in the Casper Star Tribune that indicated the 
governor had put $10 million into his budget for the purchase of the Gray Rocks 
Ranch, as well as other properties.  
Between November of 2005 and February of 2006, Newman had numerous 
contacts with Grommet, the WNG, and others to facilitate the sale of the 
ranch.

 
 
[¶12]  In mid-February 2006, the listing 
agreement between Grommet and Newman expired.  There had been attempts to enter into 
another written listing agreement, but Grommet and Newman were not able to meet 
and sign a new agreement.  However, 
in its findings the district court concluded that the listing agreement was 
extended orally in that Grommet was giving directions to Newman to continue his 
efforts to aid the WNG in getting funding to purchase the ranch.  Furthermore, Newman was in contact with 
the WNG, legislators, and the governor on multiple occasions in order to get the 
legislature to approve an appropriation to purchase the Gray Rocks 
Ranch.

 
 
[¶13]  On March 30, 2006, Newman received 
Grommet's letter terminating him as 
the listing broker.  The district 
court found that the timing of that letter indicated that Grommet believed that 
Newman had continued working for him after expiration of the written listing 
contract.

 
 
[¶14]  On March 9, 2006, the Wyoming Legislature 
approved $10 million for the purchase of land to expand Camp Guernsey.  It was noted in the National Guard 
newspaper that $7.7 million of the funds was to purchase the Gray Rocks 
Ranch.  General Wright testified 
that it was the WNG's intent to purchase the ranch.  He further testified that the WNG had 
become a willing purchaser at that time and that the purchase of the ranch was 
imminent.  As soon as the 
legislature approved funding, Jack Studley, WNG land agent, began preparing a 
purchase-offer contract.  All WNG 
witnesses who testified indicated that once the legislature had approved 
funding, the purchase of the ranch was essentially a "done deal."  On March 13, 2006, General Wright called 
Grommet and told him that funding had been approved.

 
 
[¶15]  The district court specifically found 
that once Grommet knew that the WNG had been appropriated $10 million, he 
decided to raise the asking price for the ranch.  Sometime in mid to late March, Grommet 
met with Bob Brockman, who is a real estate broker/appraiser.  On March 27, 2006, Grommet advised the 
WNG that Brockman would be the new listing agent/broker for the Gray Rocks 
Ranch.  On March 29, 2006, Grommet 
listed the ranch with Brockman's business, Keyhole Land Co., and Ranch Marketing 
Associates (RMA).  This agreement 
provided for a 4% real estate commission.  
Brockman and RMA entered into an agreement between themselves on March 
29, 2006, that provided that if the WNG bought the property, the two brokers 
would split the fee.  However, if a 
buyer other than the WNG bought the ranch, the selling broker (RMA or Brockman) 
would get 75% of the commission and the other would get 25%.  These circumstances motivated the 
district court to conclude that the contract between Grommet and Brockman, et 
al., clearly supposed that the WNG was already a more than just "likely" 
purchaser.  On March 30, 2006, 
Brockman advised the WNG that the purchase price of the property was now $8.5 
million.

 
 
[¶16]  The district court further found that on 
March 30, 2006, Newman received a letter from Grommet advising him that his 
services were no longer needed, but further advising him that he could still be 
a selling agent.  The district court 
found that Newman believed, and rightly so, that after his long relationship 
with Grommet that he could not be a selling agent due to a conflict of 
interest.  At about the same time, 
Brockman prepared a document identified as Exhibit 40.  He termed it a critique, but the 
district court found it was an appraisal review prepared for the WNG.  The document was a review of the 
Hastings and Pexton appraisals previously described herein.  Exhibit 40 points to errors in, or 
otherwise updates, the previous appraisals and then supports a current price of 
$8.5 million for the ranch.  
Brockman testified that Exhibit 40 was not an appraisal review.  However, the district court found that 
the expert testimony given by Mr. Hastings, Ms. Weppner, and Mr. Frascona all 
were to the effect that Exhibit 40 was an appraisal review, and that a reading 
of Exhibit 40 could lead to no other conclusion.  Exhibit 40 was provided to Pexton.  At the request of the WNG, he updated 
his appraisal and on April 11, 2006, he rendered a new opinion valuing the Gray 
Rocks Ranch at $8.62 million.  The 
WNG signed a purchase agreement on April 12, 2006, for $8.5 million less than 
two weeks after Newman was terminated.  
The sale closed on July 10, 2006.  
Brockman and RMA each received a commission of $170,000 for a total of 
$340,000.  

 
 
The 
Contract

 
 
[¶17]  With respect to the language of the 
contract that is most directly pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal, 
the district court made these findings.  
The district court first noted that there was a dispute about which of 
the contracts between Newman and Grommet was in force at the times crucial to 
the outcome of this case. Grommet contends that the August 2005 through February 
2006 listing contract was invalid because it contained no brokerage disclosure 
statement.  The listing agreement of 
$7.3 million, which was to run from December of 2003 through December of 2005, 
contained the brokerage disclosure statement as required under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 33-28-306 (LexisNexis 2009).4  That statute requires a broker to set 
forth in detail the different brokerage relationships and the duties of a broker 
with respect to such relationships.  
This must be done prior to entering into any written contract between 
broker and seller.  The failure to 
do so renders the listing agreement invalid pursuant to 
statute.

 
 
[¶18]  In August of 2005, the previous listing 
agreement was replaced with another contract raising the price for the entire 
ranch to $7.7 million.  That listing 
agreement did not contain a brokerage disclosure statement.  Grommet contended that since no 
disclosure was obtained for the August 2005 listing agreement, it was therefore 
invalid.  The district court did not 
agree with that reasoning because the December 2003 through December 2005 
agreement did have a brokerage disclosure signed by Grommet, who clearly was 
acting on behalf of all sellers.  
The evidence was overwhelming, in the district court's view, that Grommet 
was completely in charge of negotiations and was acting on behalf of his wife 
and sister.  Furthermore, the August 
2005 listing agreement interrupted the December 2003 agreement and was in fact 
an extension of the original agreement with an increased sales price of $7.7 
million.  The district court 
concluded it would place form over substance to require yet another identical 
disclosure form and thereby invalidate the August 2005 listing agreement.  This Court held in Roney v. B.B.C. Corp., 2004 WY 113, 
¶ 27, 98 P.3d 196, 204 (Wyo. 2004) that Wyoming does not favor the 
forfeiture of contract rights.  Here 
Newman made a disclosure pursuant to § 33-28-306 at the time the 2003 listing 
went into effect.  The district 
court believed, as do we, that such disclosure was sufficient enough so as to 
fully advise Grommet, and so as to comply with the statute.  Furthermore, it also concluded, without 
reservation, that Grommet understood all of the agency relationships as well as 
those other matters required to be disclosed.  Thus, the 2005 extension was 
valid.

 
 
[¶19]  The second issue the district court 
addressed was whether there was or could be an oral extension of the listing 
contract after it expired on February 12, 2006.  Clearly, a listing agreement may be 
extended orally or by conduct.  
McCartney v. Malm, 627 P.2d 1014, 1018-19 (Wyo. 1981).  Here it is evident that the listing was 
extended orally and by conduct until March 30, 2006.  Grommet directed Newman to lobby on his 
behalf for the legislative appropriation.  
Grommet, by correspondence, knew that Newman was continuing to talk to 
the WNG and the governor and other elected officials.  Finally, on March 25, 2006, the letter 
to Newman terminating his services clearly indicated Grommet's knowledge that 
Newman was still working for him.  
In early February, Grommet had apparently asked Newman to get with him to 
formally extend the listing.  All of 
the facts in this case point clearly and convincingly to the conclusion that 
Newman was working for Grommet with Grommet's knowledge and consent until 
Newman's discharge.  On the basis of 
these circumstances the district court concluded that the August 2005 listing 
agreement was orally extended until March 30, 2006, the date on which Newman 
received Grommet's termination letter.

 
 
[¶20]  Both the 2003 and 2005 agreements contain 
the following language at sections IV D 3 through IV D 4.

 
 
IV.  BROKER 
COMPENSATION.

. 
. . .

          
D.  Seller shall pay Broker the compensation provided by 
Section IV B hereof within seven (7) days of the date written demand is mailed 
by Broker to Seller upon the occurrence of any of the following 
events:

                   
. . . .

 
 
3.  If 
the subject property or any part thereof is sold, exchanged, leased or optioned, 
or if any other transaction occurs which causes an effective change of ownership 
of such property from Seller to a third party within 180 days after the 
expiration of this Contract, to or with any person, firm, corporation or other 
entity or anyone acting for such person, firm, corporation or other entity to 
whom the property was introduced by Seller, Broker or any of Broker's 
Salespeople or by any other person, and whose name was disclosed by Broker to 
Seller prior to expiration or by written notice, deposited in the U.S. Mail, 
certified mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid, before midnight of 
the seventh day following the date of the termination of this Contract, 
exclusive of the date of termination.  
A written offer to purchase this property submitted to Seller during the 
term of this Contract shall constitute the notice required by this subparagraph 
without further notice to Seller.

 
 
4.  In 
the event that a commission is earned 
for the lease, sale 
or exchange of this property by another Wyoming licensed real estate broker with 
whom Seller lists the property at any time after termination of this Contract, 
the protection stated in Section IV D 3 above shall be waived so that Seller 
is not liable for dual commissions." [Emphasis 
supplied.]

 
 
[¶21]  Newman contended that he is due the 
commission for the sale since the word "earned" in paragraph IV D 4 means 
procuring cause of the sale.  The 
district court concluded that his position was supported by his own testimony, 
that of his experts, Mr. Frascona and Ms. Weppner, as well as that of Grommet's 
witnesses, Brockman and Pearson, from their prior deposition testimony.  Newman asserted he was the procuring 
cause of this sale and that Brockman did not earn a commission.  Grommet's position is that the word 
"earned" means only that a subsequent broker did whatever he is required to do 
under his contract to earn a commission.  
The underlying purpose of Section IV D 4 is clear on its face.  It is designed to prevent the seller 
from being required to pay two commissions.  Given that purpose, the district court 
concluded "earned" does not mean procuring cause.  Rather, he determined it meant that the 
subsequent broker did what that broker must do to be entitled to a commission. 
 Here the commission was paid to 
Brockman and to RMA.  That 
commission was due pursuant to the terms of Grommet's listing agreement with 
Brockman and RMA.  To rule otherwise 
would be to invite lawsuits every time there was a subsequent broker.  That could not possibly have been the 
intention of the Wyoming Association of Realtors when they prepared the 
agreements in question.  The issue 
of procuring cause typically arises where there are not direct contracts with 
the seller on the listing side, but rather conflicts between the brokers on the 
selling side of the real estate transaction.  Where there is a contract, the contract 
must be the determining factor in most cases.  See Wanger v. Havey, 393 S.2d 874 
(Louisiana 1981).

 
 
[¶22]  The district court's discussion 
continued:  Newman contended that 
Brockman did not earn his commission as a realtor but rather acted as an 
appraiser only.  Brockman's activity 
as an appraiser, it is alleged, was a conflict of interest in his activity as a 
real estate broker, therefore precluding a fee as a broker.  The district court found that Brockman's 
work in Exhibit 40 was an appraisal review.  It comments on and criticizes the 
Hastings and Pexton appraisals.  It 
was done to justify a higher appraisal.  
Brockman was a certified appraiser.  
The intent of the document was to persuade the WNG that the existing 
appraisals were not sufficient.  
This simply is an appraisal review done by an appraiser.  This may have been a conflict of 
interest on the part of Brockman.  
It may have been a violation of his rules and guidelines as an appraiser, 
but the district court concluded that Grommet had not pointed to legal authority 
or arguments that would mandate that Brockman forfeit his real estate fee for 
that reason.

 
 

Bad 
Faith

 
 
[¶23]  Once again we track the findings of the 
district court.  Newman 
alternatively alleged that Grommet acted in bad faith and that he is therefore 
responsible to pay his commission regardless of the listing agreement.  Newman relies on the case Havens, 
supra, 157 P.2d 570.  In that 
case Havens sued Irvine, a property owner, for a commission.  Havens had introduced Irvine to a 
buyer.  After negotiations stalled 
and the passage of some several months, Irvine cancelled the listing agreement 
and the next day sold the property to that prospective buyer.  The district court found in favor of 
Havens.  The judgment was reversed 
on appeal, because the Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was no bad faith. 
While Havens had introduced Irvine to the eventual buyer, negotiations had 
stalled and Havens had really done very little in the succeeding months to earn 
a commission.  The Supreme Court 
held that:

 
 
Bad faith' in respect to the right of a broker to his commission has 
been said to arise where the owner revokes the broker's authority, or makes the 
sale through other means, when the broker has performed all he has undertaken or 
is plainly or evidently approaching success in his undertaking, or where a sale 
is made behind the broker's back. 

 
 

Havens, 
157 P.2d  at 573.  Newman asserted that 
this language entitled him to his commission based on the facts of this 
case.  On the other hand, Grommet 
contended that he did nothing more than exercise his contractual rights under a 
listing agreement that was prepared or at least provided by 
Newman.

 
 
[¶24]  In Scherer, this Court elaborated 
on the principles of good faith in a contractual situation.  That case noted that the concept of a 
breach of the covenant of good faith in both tort and contract situations had 
been recognized.  In tort cases, 
there must be a special relationship that exists between a plaintiff and a 
defendant.  Such cases are usually 
restricted to the employer/employee relationship or insurance 
relationships.  However, in 
Scherer this Court went 
on to hold that every contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
its performance and its enforcement consistent with Section 205 of the 
Restatement Second of Contracts.  Scherer, ¶¶ 16-25, 18 P.3d  at 
652-656.  Since Havens was 
decided many years before Scherer, the district court concluded that 
Scherer only amplified what had been said in 
Havens.

 
 
[¶25]  The district court also noted that in Scherer this Court approved these 
precepts:  (1) The implied covenant 
of good faith requires that neither party commit an act which would injure the 
rights of the other party to receive the benefit of their agreement; (2) 
compliance requires that a party's actions be consistent with the agreed common 
purpose and justified expectations of the other party; (3) "The purpose, 
intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined by considering 
the contract language and the course 
of dealings between and conduct of the parties." (4) The covenant of good faith 
may not, however, be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties 
not agreed upon by the parties.   In other words, the concept of 
good faith and fair dealing is not a limitless one.  "The implied obligation must arise from 
the language used or it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the 
parties.'"  In the absence of self 
dealing, breach of "community standards of decency, fairness, and 
reasonableness," the exercise of contract rights alone will not be considered a 
breach of the covenant.  Scherer, ¶ 19, 18 P.3d  at 
653-54.

 
 

[¶26]  The district court reiterated the salient 
facts based upon the principles set out above.  Newman and Grommet had a 
long-term relationship going back nearly 10 years. They had been involved in 
over 20 real estate transactions together.  
The Gray Rocks Ranch was listed on and off by Grommet since 1998.  Newman had advertised the Gray Rocks 
Ranch extensively.  He had expended 
tens of thousands of dollars on advertising and shown the ranch on multiple 
occasions to prospective buyers.  
Newman introduced the WNG to Grommet.  Newman's advertising had interested the 
WNG in the Gray Rocks Ranch.  As 
between brokers, it is clear and convincing that Newman was the procuring cause 
of the sale.  Newman found a ready, 
willing, and able buyer, and his efforts were the predominating cause of the 
sale.  All of the WNG personnel who 
testified believed that Newman put the deal together.  See McCartney, 627 P.2d  at 
1020.  The district court was 
convinced that the WNG, by mid 2005, and certainly no later than October of 
2005, had concluded that it wanted the property.  The only impediment to the purchase was 
the approval of funding by the legislature.  Newman worked diligently in an 
effort to have the legislature 
approve funding.  He talked to 
legislators, the governor, and WNG personnel.  By March 10, 2006, funding was 
approved.  At that point, the sale 
was going to happen.  The WNG was 
going to purchase the ranch and it was in the process of preparing 
contracts.  Up to the time he was 
terminated on March 30, 2006, Newman was doing all he could to facilitate the 
sale.  His efforts were ongoing 
through requests by, the knowledge of, and the acquiescence of 
Grommet.

 
 
[¶27]  The district court's reasoning 
continued.  While Newman was working 
for Grommet in March of 2006, Grommet met with Brockman no later than March 22, 
2006.  At that meeting, or before, 
Grommet decided to fire Newman and hire Brockman at a reduced fee of 4% and at 
the same time raised the price of the ranch to $8.5 million.  The district court was convinced that 
the reduced real estate fee was based on everyone's assumptions that the WNG 
would buy the ranch.  The increased 
purchase price of $8.5 million was clearly based upon the fact that the WNG had 
been appropriated $10 million to make land purchases.  At trial, Grommet testified that when he 
increased the purchase price to $8.5 million, he felt the WNG was then out of 
the picture as a buyer.  The 
district court found that testimony to be at odds with the facts.  Brockman's appraisal review was prepared 
to demonstrate to the WNG and Pexton that the new asking price was viable.  The agreement between Brockman and RMA 
anticipated a sale to the WNG.  In 
fact, the deal was done in early April.

 
 
[¶28]  The district court found the evidence to 
be clear and convincing that on both occasions when the WNG publicly indicated 
or otherwise achieved the amount they were seeking as an appropriation, Grommet 
raised the price.  The district 
court also concluded that Newman would have been able to achieve an increased 
price of $8.5 million had he not been terminated since the WNG only needed an 
increased appraisal to pay the asking price.  Continuing, the district court found 
that Brockman's participation achieved two goals for Grommet.  Brockman's experience and reputation as 
an appraiser allowed him to prepare an appraisal review justifying the $8.5 
million asking price, and he was willing to take a reduced 4% commission 
apparently in light of the likely and, in fact,  almost immediate sale to the WNG.  Grommet's firing of Newman and the 
hiring of Brockman netted him an additional $1,000.000.00 from the WNG, and 
reduced his real estate commission by some $245,000.00.  While Grommet may purport to be a good 
businessman, the question here, the district court concluded, was whether his 
activities amounted to bad faith and unfair dealing.

 
 
[¶29]  The district court went on to note that 
the plain language of Havens can be 
employed to make out a case for bad faith.  
But bad faith, according to Scherer, cannot exist in a contractual 
situation where one party is simply asserting its contractual rights absent some 
special circumstances indicating a departure from reasonable and fair community 
standards.  Grommet reiterated many 
times during the trial that he was simply invoking his rights under a contract 
prepared by Newman.  However, the 
contract did not represent unequal bargaining positions.  Grommet specified the term and whether 
the contract would exist at all.  
Grommet could not have had a contract on his terms with any other real 
estate broker.  Thus, the district 
court did not believe that Grommet should be accorded any deference simply 
because the contract was on a form prepared by the Wyoming Association of 
Realtors.

 
 
[¶30]  In light of its summary of the evidence 
that the district court found to be credible, it found that bad faith did exist 
in this matter on the part of Grommet.  
The relationship between Newman and Grommet was longstanding.  It had been beneficial to both.  There was certainly trust involved.  Grommet entrusted Newman with 
advertising and selling a large asset, as well as lobbying the legislature and 
the governor to assist in that regard.  
Newman so trusted Grommet that he worked diligently between mid-February 
and mid-March of 2006, without a written listing contract.  This trust was well-founded since 
Grommet had invited Newman to meet in order to extend the listing 
agreement.  Apparently, Newman just 
had not had the opportunity to do so.

 
 
[¶31]  It was clear that the WNG was going to 
buy the property once the funding was appropriated.  Before Newman was terminated, it was 
evident that the deal was going to happen.  
Only the paperwork and Grommet's last-minute efforts to raise the price 
remained.  On the day Grommet was 
meeting with Brockman, Newman -- with Grommet's knowledge -- was still working 
to finalize the deal.  Finally, the 
letter of termination was sent to Newman itemizing his deficiencies as a 
realtor.  The district court 
expressed his conviction that the termination letter was an after-the-fact 
document prepared by Grommet to serve as a paper trail for dismissing 
Newman.  The district court did not 
believe that the reasons set forth in the letter were the reasons Newman was 
terminated.  Rather, it believed 
that the termination was designed solely to lower the real estate commission and 
get Brockman's assistance in raising the price.  The district court iterated its virtual 
certainty that the same deal could have been reached with Newman as the real 
estate broker, except that the commission would have been considerably 
higher.

 
 
[¶32]  Finally, Brockman's assistance here was 
primarily that of appraiser.  He did 
not show the property, did not advertise the property, (the only advertisements 
that were sent out occurred after Grommet and the WNG signed the agreement to 
sell), and in fact, the deal was done only a couple of weeks after Brockman was 
involved.  The district court based 
its ultimate decision on these unique circumstances of this 
case:

 
 
1.  The 
long-term relationship,

2.  The 
many hours invested by Newman,

3.  The 
large amount of money invested by Newman,

4.  Newman's 
being the procuring cause of the deal,

5.  The 
funding for the deal having been appropriated,

6.  Grommet's 
allowing Newman to continue working while he was negotiating with 
Brockman,

7.  Grommet's 
stated reasons for terminating Newman were not true, and

8.  Grommet's 
actual reason for terminating Newman was to save some portion of the real estate 
commission that truly had been earned.

 
 
[¶33]  When the closing on this real estate 
transaction took place on July 10, 2006, Brockman and Ranch Marketing Associates 
split a $340,000.00 commission for having sold the Gray Rocks 
Ranch.

 
 
[¶34]  The district court concluded that, based 
upon clear and convincing evidence, Grommet, acting on behalf of his wife and 
sister, began a process of self-dealing that was contrary to the prevailing 
community standards of fairness and reasonableness.  The district court underscored that 
point by noting that all of the WNG witnesses were surprised by Newman's 
termination after the efforts he put in on the deal.  The district court concluded that all 
the equities were on Newman's side and that Grommet's actions were motivated, 
not by any dissatisfaction with Newman, but rather by his desire to make more 
money.  Furthermore, Grommet's bad 
faith became transparent when he testified that when he raised the price of his 
ranch to $8.5 million, he had thought the WNG was out of the deal.  The district court found such a 
statement was not believable.  In 
fact, the district court noted, it could only conclude that such a statement was 
made because Grommet knew that he needed to inject some uncertainty into the 
deal with the WNG.  Without raising 
uncertainty, the district court continued, Grommet's treatment of Newman, even 
to Grommet himself, must have appeared blatantly unreasonable and 
unfair.

 
 
[¶35]  The district court also addressed other 
arguments raised by Grommet.  The 
first was that Newman breached his duties by telling other buyers that they were 
in a back-up position to the WNG and that he failed to follow up with other 
prospective purchasers or give Grommet messages regarding other potential 
buyers' interest in the ranch.  The 
district court concluded from the trial testimony that those issues were within 
the ambit of a real estate agent in his dealings with potential interested 
buyers.  There is nothing whatsoever 
to indicate from the evidence that Newman did anything, or failed to do 
anything, that would have resulted in a sale to another prospective 
buyer.

 
 
[¶36]  Much ado was made of Newman filing a lis pendens prior to closing.  While the legality of such a legal 
maneuver can be questioned, the sale to the WNG was not interrupted.  Rather, the parties agreed that Grommet 
would place monies in escrow pending the outcome of this case.  Therefore, given that the district court 
found in favor of Newman, it further decided that Grommet had suffered no 
damage.  Much ado was also made of 
Grommet acting on behalf of his wife and sister without their apparent 
authority.  The district court 
concluded that the record was plain in demonstrating that Grommet did act on 
their behalf and as their agent in all of the business dealing associated with 
this case and that he acted with their authorization either impliedly, or 
apparently, or both.

 
 
[¶37]  The district court granted judgment for 
Newman in the amount of $537,000.00.  
Grommet appeals that portion of the judgment.  The district court denied Newman his 
claim for attorney's fees and Newman appeals from that portion of the 
judgment.  The district court 
concluded that attorney's fees were not warranted because Grommet did not 
violate a written provision of the contract; rather, Grommet violated only the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Case No. S-08-0148

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶38]  We review a district court's decision 
following a bench trial according to the following 
standards:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.

Further, 
with regard to the trial court's findings of fact,[W]e assume that the evidence 
of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every reasonable 
inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  We do not substitute ourselves for the 
trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless 
they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law.

The 
district court's conclusions of law however are subject to our de novo standard of 
review.

 
 

In 
re Estate of Thomas, 
2009 WY 10, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1090, 1093-94 (Wyo. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶39]  We address each of the issues raised by 
Grommet below:

 
 
Special 
Contract of Employment

 
 
[¶40]  Grommet posits that the contract between 
him and Newman is a "special contract," and that that circumstance is central to 
the resolution of this case.  In the 
course of his discussion, Grommet makes general reference to 23 Richard A. Lord, 
Williston on Contracts, § 62:19 
(4th ed. 2002).  That 
section, and the ones that precede and follow it, cover much ground and 
Grommet's argument does not appear to take into account the full import of those 
sections.  Moreover, the discussion 
does not appear to be directly tied to the circumstances of this case.  We have carefully perused the materials 
found in Williston, and we are unable 
to agree that the argument Grommet propounds is supported by the material 
contained therein.  Of significance, 
we also note that Grommet does not direct our attention to where in the record 
this specific argument was made to the district court or where in the district 
court's findings this matter is discussed or relied upon, or rejected by, the 
district court in reaching its decision.

 
 
[¶41]  Grommet also relies upon this Court's 
decision in McCartney, 627 P.2d  at 
1021, for this proposition.  Once 
again, we are unable to discern from Grommet's brief exactly how the proposition 
argued in this appeal was directed to the attention of the district court or how 
the McCartney decision supports the 
point argued for in this section of his brief.  However, we do discern two parts of that 
opinion which appear to have relevance here and those we set out 
below:

 
 
Whether 
or not the meaning that appellants desire to give to the agreement was conveyed 
to appellee Kent Malm was a question of fact for the trial court.  Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1108 
(1979).  The trial court did not 
make specific findings in this regard, but it did find that there was no 
evidence of any collusion between appellees and others designed to deprive 
appellants of their commission, and it found that there was no evidence of bad 
faith on the part of appellees "at any time in this transaction."  Implicit in the finding of no bad faith 
is the conclusion that appellees did not understand that the agreement provided 
for payment of a commission upon sale of the property after expiration of the 
listing period.

 
 
" 
* * * Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any 
unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities 
of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the 
transaction unconscientious.' * * * "  
Cone v. Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 
33 P. 31, 34 (1893) quoting from Gress v. 
Evans, 1 Dak. 387, 46 N.W. 1132 (1877); Wendling v. Cundall, Wyo., 568 P.2d 888, 
890 (1977); see 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers §§ 100 and 167.

 
 

McCartney, 
627 P.2d  at 1019-20.

 
 
The 
application of this limitation to appellants' rights under this agreement is 
supported by this description of an exclusive right to 
sell:

 
 
As 
a general rule, a broker who has been granted either an exclusive agency or an 
exclusive right to sell or lease property is entitled to a commission, at least 
by way of damages, on a sale or lease by or through another broker during the 
existence of the first broker's exclusive agency or right.  Also, a broker who has been given an 
exclusive right to sell or lease property is entitled to a commission, at least 
by way of damages, on a sale or lease by the owner himself, without the aid or 
intervention of any broker, within the time specified in the contract of 
employment.

 
 
To 
entitle a broker who has an exclusive agency or exclusive right to sell to a 
commission, a transaction effected by the principal himself or through another 
broker must be of the nature contemplated by the agreement.  The sale or other transaction must occur 
within the time when the exclusive agency or right to sell exists, but the 
conclusion within that time of a contract is sufficient, even though a formal 
transfer of the property does not occur until later. * * * "  (Emphasis supplied.) 12 C.J.S. Brokers s 
175, pp. 555, 559.  See also, 12 
Am.Jur.2d Brokers s 220.  
Annotation: Brokers right to 
commission on sales consummated after termination of employment, 27 A.L.R.2d 
1348 (1953); Diehl & Associates, Inc. 
v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977).

 
 
Under 
the listing agreement the commission would be earned only if a sale were made 
during its term.  Such was not here 
done.  But even if the listing 
agreement were the more usual type and provided for payment of the commission 
upon the finding of a ready, able and willing buyer, it would have been 
difficult in this case for the trial court to have found appellants to have been 
the procuring cause of the sale to the extent necessary to entitle them to a 
commission.  The evidence was 
substantial that appellees had concluded that appellants were not able to bring 
about an exchange with the Kelly property, and that the final exchange 
arrangement was accomplished by other real estate brokers.  Where several brokers are involved, 
the commission is to be paid to the one who can show that his efforts were the 
efficient, predominating and procuring cause of the sale.  There cannot be multiple procuring 
causes.  The broker bringing about 
the meeting of minds and making it possible for the transaction to be 
consummated is entitled to the commission.  See 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers s 230; 12 
C.J.S. Brokers s 171; Reed v. Taylor, 
78 Wyo. 216, 322 P.2d 147 (1958).  
Viewing the evidence under the following standard, as we must, it does 
not reflect that appellants were the efficient, predominating and procuring 
cause of the sale:

 
 
" 
* * * (W)e must assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is 
true, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful 
party that conflicts with it, and giving to the evidence of the successful party 
every favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. * * 
* "  Jelly v. Dabney, Wyo., 581 P.2d 622, 624 
(1978); Madrid v. Norton, 
supra.

 
 
          
Further, the evidence viewed under this standard supports the finding by 
the trial court of good faith on the part of appellees.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 

McCartney, 
627 P.2d  at 1022.  It is our 
conclusion that the McCartney case 
supports the district court's findings and conclusions, rather than the theory 
propounded by Grommet in this argument.

 
 
[¶42]  Grommet also cites Owens v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 63 P.2d 1006, 1009, 1015-16 (Wyo. 1936) for the proposition 
that the contract at issue here was a "special" contract.  We were unable to discern such a holding 
in that case.  That opinion contains 
a lot of interesting information on 
the subject, much of which could be said to support the district court's 
decision herein, but as to special contracts it really only holds that the 
existence of a special contract need not be pled in order to get that issue 
before a jury (fact finder).  Id. at 1016.  On Page 40 of his brief, Grommet 
includes a snippet from the Owens 
case.  We set out the snippet here 
in its full context (with the sentence Grommet draws our attention to 
highlighted immediately below):

 
 
It 
is argued that the evidence in the case is not sufficient to warrant any 
judgment for the plaintiff.  We have 
found this question to be an exceedingly difficult one.  No cases involving facts exactly like 
those in the case at bar have been cited, and we have found none.  Whether or not a commission is due to a 
broker depends largely upon the contract entered into between him and the 
owner.  Kimmell v. Skelly, 130 Cal. 555, 62 P. 1067, 1068.  If he has not complied with his 
contract, if he has not accomplished or done what he has undertaken to do, while 
his authority exists, he is not, in the absence of some fault of the owner, 
entitled to a commission.  
He must fulfill, if not prevented by the owner, the duty undertaken by 
him, and within the time given him, or he is not entitled to any compensation. 9 
C.J. 587, 588; note, 139 Am.St.Rep. 241; note, 26 A.L.R. 784.  If, on the other hand, a broker has done 
that which he was employed to do, he becomes entitled to his commission.  Westlund v. Smith (Mass.) 196 N.E. 147; 
Schneider v. Stewart, 173 Okl. 596, 
49 P.  (2d) 186; Hugill v. Weekley, 64 W.Va. 210, 61 S.E. 360, 15 L.R.A.  (N.S.) 1262.  Courts, and the parties herein, speak of 
an ordinary contract of a broker (without special terms) and a special contract; 
that is to say, a contract with special terms.  They do not agree what the contract 
herein actually was.  Counsel for 
the defendant have argued the case solely from the standpoint that the contract 
herein was a special one, namely, that the plaintiff should make a sale or find 
a purchaser at the price of $25,000 and no less, and that within a definite 
period of time.  There can be no 
doubt that if the parties make a special contract, one, for example, to the 
effect that no commission will be due unless the property in question shall be 
sold for a definite price, and on definite terms, or that a definite result 
shall be reached, no commission will be due if these terms are not complied 
with, unless they are waived by the owner.  
Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 447, and comment thereon; note, 43 
A.L.R. 1111, under subd. IV; Knoechelma's 
Adm'r v. Knoechelmann, 242 Ky. 662, 47 S.W.  (2d) 534; Kirby L. Co. v. West (Tex.Com.App.) 236 S.W. 449; Murphy v. W. & W. Live 
Stock Co., 26 Wyo. 455, 187 P. 187, 189 P. 857; Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah, 276, 198 P. 772.  But it must be observed 
that a material distinction must be drawn--applicable throughout--between cases 
in which no sale is made, and those in which one is actually made by the owner 
to the customer produced by the broker.  Harris v. Owenby, 58 Okl. 667, 160 P. 596.  And a waiver of the 
condition as to terms is readily and generally implied, where the owner proceeds 
to negotiate with the customer furnished by the broker and concludes a sale 
satisfactory to him.  Note, 43 
A.L.R. 1104; note, 15 L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
273; 44 L.R.A. 350, note g. "If this were not so," states 4 R.C.L. 322, "it 
would be very easy for an unscrupulous person having property for sale to get 
all the benefits of the broker's services in bringing the property under the 
notice of buyers and introducing them, by the simple method of fixing the price 
at a figure which he knows no person would give, and the reduction of which he 
is prepared to accept."  The rule is 
stated somewhat differently, but to the same effect, in 4 R.C.L. 313, where it 
is said: "Where a broker instead of procuring a person who is ready, able and 
willing to accept the terms his principal authorized him to offer at the time of 
his employment, procures one who makes a counter offer more or less at variance 
with that of his employer, the latter is at perfect liberty either to accept the 
proposed party upon the altered terms or to decline to do so.  If he accepts, he is legally obligated 
to compensate the broker for the services rendered."

 
 
          
Hence, as stated in other cases, a broker is entitled to his commission 
when he produces a purchaser who buys at a price satisfactory to the owner 
(unless the price has been made a condition of the payment of a 
commission).  Wareham v. Atkinson, 215 Iowa, 1096, 247 N.W. 534; Home Banking & Realty Co. 
v. Baum, 85 Conn. 383, 82 A. 970; Weiss v. Gaines (Tex.Civ.App.) 51 
S.W.  (2d) 428; Clements v. Stapleton, 136 Iowa, 137, 
113 N.W. 546.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Owens, 
631 P.2d 1006 at 1008-9.  The Owens case also supports the district 
court's decisions.

 
 
[¶43]  Grommet refers us to our decision in Havens v. Irvine, 157 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 
1945) in conjunction with this particular argument and so we address the 
opinion, or rather the opinions, issued in that case here, although it 
also figures in other arguments we will address later.  In that case the real estate broker won 
his case in the trial court.  
District Judge Tidball wrote the principal opinion.  In it he set out the facts in detail and 
concluded:

 
 
The 
cases on this latter point are collected in notes in 43 A.L.R. 1104, and 44 
A.L.R. 350(g) [sale to buyer who was produced by broker, but sale consummated by 
seller/owner].  An examination of 
these cases will, we believe, disclose that no court has held that a broker is 
entitled to his commission where the sale is made after his agency is terminated 
either by the express terms of the contract or by the act of the principal after 
the lapse of a reasonable time, where no time is specified in the contract, 
unless it was further found that the principal did not act in good faith or 
acted fraudulently, as is sometimes stated, in terminating the contract or in 
postponing the sale until the agency was terminated by the lapse of time 
specified in the contract.  Bad 
faith' in respect to the right of a broker to his commission has been said to 
arise where the owner revokes the broker's authority, or makes the sale through 
other means, when the broker has performed all he has undertaken or is plainly 
or evidently approaching success in his undertaking, or where a sale is made 
behind the broker's back.  In 
another case it is said that bad faith' means a purpose to obtain profits from 
the broker's exertions without payment, and exists where the employer revokes 
the broker's authority and makes the sale through other means when the broker 
has performed all he has undertaken or is plainly or evidently approaching 
success.  Sherman v. Briggs Realty Co., 310 Mass. 
408, 38 N.E.2d 637, 640, and Kacavas v. 
Diamond, 303 Mass. 88, 20 N.E.2d 936, 938.  In Kellogg v. Rhodes, 231 Iowa 1340, 4 N.W.2d 412, 415, it is said:

 
 
     If the principal acts 
in bad faith in a fraudulent attempt to avoid paying a commission to the broker 
who is the moving cause of the sale, the principal is held liable.  * * *  It cannot be said as a matter of law, 
however, that appellee so acted.'

 
 
          
For other cases holding that where the broker is to receive his 
commission only when he sells on certain terms fixed by the principal, he cannot 
recover his commission even though the principal sells to someone introduced by 
the broker on different terms, unless the owner acts in bad faith, see cases 
cited on page 1112 of 43 A.L.R., and on page 857 of 44 A.L.R., and especially 
the cases of Patton, Temple & 
Williamson v. Garnett, 147 Va. 1009, 133 S.E. 495; Walsh v. Grant, 256 Mass. 555, 152 N.E. 884, 47 A.L.R. 852; Kellogg v. 
Rhodes, supra; and Hodgin v. 
Palmer, 72 Colo. 331, 211 P. 373.

 
 
.

 
 
          
The outstanding fact is that here we have always non-success on the 
broker's part to comply with the listing contract which had been agreed 
upon.  The owner had waited five 
months for the broker to fulfill that contract.  Yet at the time the termination of the 
authority took place, the entire business of selling the ranch was at a complete 
standstill.  There is, we think, not 
a scintilla of evidence or any circumstances whatsoever in the case that 
disclose that the broker would have earned a commission if Irvine, the 
defendant, had refrained from doing what he did in terminating the former's 
authority.

 
 
          
The rule in such a situation has been concisely stated by Mr. Justice 
Campbell in Hodgin v. Palmer, 72 
Colo. 331, 211 P. 373, 376, thus:

 
 
     The plaintiffs never 
succeeded in bringing the minds of the buyer and seller to an agreement of sale 
at the price and terms upon which sale was authorized by the owner, and there is 
no proof that they probably could or would have succeeded, within a reasonable 
time, in doing so.  In the absence 
of such proof, the right to a commission does not accrue.  That has been often decided by this 
court.'

 
 

Havens, 
157 P.2d  at 573-74.  We conclude 
that this portion of the Havens 
opinion does not aid Grommet in his arguments to this 
Court.

 
 
[¶44]  Justice Riner authored a lengthy 
concurring opinion in which he fully agreed with Judge Tidball but cited a 
number of other cases at length, all of which are readily distinguishable from 
the case at bar.  Justice Riner 
concluded:

 
 
It 
would seem clear, as pointed out in the main opinion herein, that the proof 
utterly fails to establish a performance of the terms of the original 
listing.  The condition to earning a 
commission herein was that the sale should be entirely for all or a large part 
in cash to be paid to Irvine.  The 
compensation was to be earned when a customer should be obtained who would pay 
this price.  There is no pretense 
that such a purchaser was found or that such a sale was made.  Irvine finally entered into an 
altogether different sale agreement.  
The performance relied on by the plaintiff does not meet the requirements 
of the rule announced by the decisions hereinabove reviewed and cited, and 
succinctly declared by Mr. Justice Nelson in McGavock v. Woodlief, 61 U.S. 221, 227, 
20 How. 221, 15 L. Ed. 884, where he said:

 
 
     The broker must 
complete the sale; that is, he must find a purchaser in a situation and ready 
and willing to complete the purchase on the terms agreed on, before he is 
entitled to his commissions.  Then 
he will be entitled to them.'

 
 

Havens, 
157 P.2d  at 578-79.

 
 
[¶45]  Justice Blume penned a spirited 
dissent.  It begins with a 
restatement of the operative facts:

 
 
I 
dissent.  And I consider the main 
principle involved herein of such vital importance that I feel that I must not 
refrain from discussing this case, including the moral elements that appear 
herein, with an utmost candor and frankness, but I shall do so, I hope, with due 
deference to the legal ability and learning of my associates herein.  Some of the facts are not adequately 
stated in the majority opinion, and I shall state them.  The property involved herein was listed 
for sale with plaintiff, as agent or broker, in March, 1941.  Defendant, the owner, wanted $20,000 
cash, net to him.  Upon suggestion 
of the agent, the price to the purchaser was fixed at $22,000, so that the agent 
could receive his commission of 5% out of the price over and above $20,000.  Von Forell was found by the agent as a 
possible purchaser, and was introduced by him to the defendant.  The price of $22,000 was satisfactory to 
Von Forell, but the terms of payment were not.  Negotiations were continued between the 
agent and Von Forell, and a subagent of plaintiff at Torrington and Von Forell, 
during the spring and summer months.  
At least, the trial court had the right to so find.  And the trial court had the further 
right to find that the plaintiff was the predominating cause of the sale 
ultimately effected.  It is very 
doubtful that the defendant would ever have found Von Forell as a purchaser, for 
he was found near Torrington, far from defendant's land, by a subagent of 
plaintiff.  On August 26, 1941, the 
defendant, through his friend Neeley, sent for Von Forell to continue the 
negotiations for the sale of the land.  
At least the court had the right to infer that defendant, before he 
attempted to revoke the agency, knew of the fact that Von Forell had been asked 
to come on his behalf and that he ratified Neeley's act.  The effect would be the same, and so, 
for brevity's sake, I shall hereafter consider it as though defendant himself 
sent for Von Forell.  On August 27, 
1941, defendant served notice of termination of agency on the plaintiff.  On August 28, 1941, defendant sold the 
property to Von Forell for the sum of $22,000 on easy 
terms.

 
 
          
The cases on the right of a broker to recover a commission are very 
numerous, and seemingly confusing, even in cases from the same state.  Statements may be found in the 
authorities which seem to sustain almost any kind of contention which the owner, 
who seeks to evade the payment of a commission, might see fit to make.  Hence, the facts in a particular case 
are important.  Assuming that the 
rule of Owens v. Mountain States T. & 
T. Co., hereinafter quoted, is not broad enough to permit the plaintiff to 
recover herein by reason of the fact that the element of revocation is in this 
case, then I think the controlling question in this case is as to whether or not 
the agency here involved was, under the circumstances of this case, revoked in 
good faith.  It is a universal rule 
that, 'in order that a revocation of a broker's authority may defeat his right 
to commissions or other compensation it must be made in good faith and not as a 
mere device to appropriate the benefit of his services and efforts and at the 
same time escape the payment of commissions earned or about to be earned.'  12 C.J.S., Brokers, § 66, p. 151.  If the agency was not revoked in good 
faith in this case, the revocation was void, and will be treated as though in 
force on August 28, 1941, just as plaintiff pleaded it was.  12 C.J.S., Brokers, § 66, p. 152.  I shall not enter into the discussion of 
any collateral questions, except as bearing on the controlling one herein.  The trial court evidently held that the 
agency was not terminated in good faith.  
The judgment in favor of plaintiff implies that.  The majority opinion herein holds that 
there was not sufficient evidence in this case to so hold.  It is mentioned that the agency was 
revoked 'for the present time,' as though that might indicate good faith.  But that is a strange conclusion.  If it shows anything, it points directly 
at the intended negotiations with Von Forell, then in progress or about to occur 
soon, and to the intended evasion of payment of any commission if sale to Von 
Forell were made, and that is the very subject matter involved herein.  The opinion cites Kellogg v. Rhodes, 231 Iowa 1340, 4 N.W.2d 412, 415, as holding that bad faith could not be inferred as a matter of 
law.  I agree with that.  The court also refers to Brown v. Wintermute, 59 Wyo. 254, 139 P.2d 435, that fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  I do not disagree with that rule.  Fraud must be shown.  But it would not be possible in one 
case out of a thousand to show bad faith in a case of this kind except by the 
circumstances themselves, and if the circumstances in this case are not 
sufficient from which the trial court could infer bad faith, then we might as 
well quit talking about such a rule.  
What possible inference could be drawn in this case, when defendant sent 
for Von Forell on August 26, 1941, terminated the agency the next day, and, on 
the day subsequent, made the sale to the purchaser found by the agent, except 
the fact that the agency was terminated to evade the payment of a 
commission?  It seems to me that the 
conclusion of bad faith is irresistible.  
In any event the trial court had the right to draw that inference, and we 
are not justified to reverse its holding when the facts warrant it, which they 
clearly did in this case.  In fact, 
the circumstances in this case are much stronger than any which I have found to 
lead the trial court to the result which it reached.  I have made as exhaustive investigation 
on this point as the short time in which to write this dissenting opinion 
permitted, and I think that I can say with a great deal of confidence that there 
is not a single case on record which sustains the holding of the majority herein 
in its holding on that point, under circumstances anywhere near to those in this 
case, and there are a number of cases which squarely hold, or indicate, the 
direct contrary.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Havens, 
157 P.2d  at 579-80.  We take into 
account that Justice Blume's writings are a dissent, but given the facts at 
large in the instant case, it speaks more directly to the decision we must make 
here, than did the majority decisions. 

 
 
[¶46]  To bring an already too long story to a 
conclusion, we hold that whether the contract at issue was a "special" or 
"general" contract was simply not an issue of significance in this case, and we 
decline to embrace the reasoning offered to us by Grommet.

 
 
Application 
of "Procuring Cause of Sale"

 
 
[¶47]  Grommet contends that a discussion of 
"procuring cause" and or the meaning of "earn" in the context of this case is 
not applicable because the contract here was a "special" as opposed to a 
"general" contract.  Grommet does 
not associate this discussion with any particular portion of the district 
court's findings, and it is our conclusion that we need not further address that 
issue here, although "procuring cause" and "earn" will come up in other portions 
of this opinion.

 
 
New 
Broker Extinguishes Newman's Claims 

 
 
[¶48]  Grommet contends that his hiring of 
Brockman extinguished any right Newman had to earn a commission because Section 
IV D 4 of their contract protected Grommet from paying "dual commissions."  Continuing, he contends that because he 
paid Brockman a commission he cannot be held to owe a commission to Newman as 
well.  Furthering this argument, 
Grommet contends we must limit our analysis of this issue to what this Court had 
to say in the Havens case and may not 
apply law that enlarges upon or changes in any way the law set out by the 
majority in Havens.  This applies in particular, Grommet 
claims, to our holding in Sherer, 
¶¶ 19-24, 18 P.3d  at 653-55.  
Grommet asserts, citing, Whitlock 
Construction, Inc. v. JPB, 2002 WY 36, 41 P.3d 1261 (Wyo. 2002), that "[t]he 
implied covenant is never breached where the parties' actions are in conformity 
with the clear language of the contract.'"  
However, that opinion says much more than that:

 
 
Whitlock 
claims that the JPB breached an implied duty which existed in the contract to 
use good faith efforts to obtain the concurrence of the funding agencies.  In Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist Constr., 
Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 24, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2001), we adopted § 205 of 
the Restatement, Second, Contracts and held that parties to a commercial 
contract may bring a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing based upon a contract theory.  
Because we have said that a valid contract existed between Whitlock and 
the JPB, it follows that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in 
the contract.

 
 
          
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that a 
party's actions be consistent with the agreed common purpose and justified 
expectations of the other party....  
The purpose, intentions and expectations of the parties should be 
determined by considering the contract language and the course of dealings 
between and conduct of the parties.  
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not, however, be 
construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the 
parties.  In other words, the 
concept of good faith and fair dealing is not a limitless one.  The implied obligation must arise from 
the language used or it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the 
parties.  In the absence of evidence of self-dealing 
or breach of community standards of decency, fairness and reasonableness, the 
exercise of contractual rights alone will not be considered a breach of the 
covenant.

 
 
          
Scherer, at 653-54 (internal 
quotes and citations omitted).  
Although many claims for breach of good faith involve questions of fact 
making summary judgment inappropriate, summary judgment may be appropriate 
where, under the facts in the record, the party's actions were in conformity 
with the clear language of the contract.  Scherer, at 654, fn. 2.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 

Whitlock 
Const., ¶¶ 23-24, 41 P.3d  at 
1267.

 
 
[¶49]  Our examination of the record on appeal, 
and of the district court's findings based upon that record, leads us to the 
conclusion that the district court's findings in this regard are not clearly 
erroneous.  Indeed, its findings 
that Grommet breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are roundly 
supported by the record.   

 
 
Oral 
Extension of Contract 

 
 
[¶50]  Grommet contends that the district court 
erred in finding that the agreement between Newman and Grommet was extended 
orally and by their conduct.  
Grommet's contentions in this regard fly in the face of the district 
court's findings as to credibility of witnesses.  The district court made it quite clear 
that Grommet's testimony, as well as that of the witnesses he called in support 
of his contentions, was not believable.  
By the same token, the district court fully credited the testimony of 
Newman and the witnesses called in support of his contentions, including all the 
WNG witnesses.  When we consider all 
the testimony offered by Newman on this issue, and disregard the contradictory 
testimony offered by Grommet, we can only conclude that the district court's 
fact findings were not clearly erroneous and that its application of the 
applicable law was sound.

 
 
Denial 
of Due Process 

 
 
[¶51]  This matter was thoroughly discussed and 
resolved during the trial.  The 
trial in this case was conducted in two sittings.  The first sitting was on October 22-25, 
2007, and the second on December 3-4, 2007.  When the district court made its 
decision to reverse its initial grant of partial summary judgment, to the effect 
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not at issue in this case, 
it was made clear that Grommet could recall witnesses that had already testified 
and been excused, as well as to call any additional witnesses he might need to 
call in order to further his concerns about "new" law being brought to bear on 
the case.  Likewise, the district 
court's decision to consult more recent cases that enlarged upon previous 
precedents pertinent to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did 
not unfairly "surprise" Grommet or alter the landscape of this case.  In sum, the proceedings conducted by the 
district court in this case did not deprive Grommet of due process of law.  

 
 
Grommet 
Did Not Breach the Implied Covenant

 
 
[¶52]  Grommet contends that his conduct did not 
violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The district court ably set out its 
reasons for finding that the covenant had been breached and we conclude that the 
evidence adduced at trial fully supports that conclusion.  Once again, we need to stress that the 
argument propounded by Grommet in this regard depends almost entirely on the 
testimony (and actions) of Grommet and his witnesses, in order that it be 
accorded any persuasiveness.  The 
district court accorded no credibility to them and we will not second guess that 
aspect of the district court's decision.  
There are a number of secondary undercurrents in this case that the 
district court did not broach, but which we think need some brief mention.  First, the WNG and the State of Wyoming 
generally, must, by law, operate transparently.  The record strongly suggests that the 
price of the ranch was raised to $8.5 million only because the WNG had 
$10 million appropriated for the purchase of lands to enlarge the military 
training area located around Guernsey.  
Newman had a buyer locked in to pay $7.7 million, but that buyer was not 
able to prepare its offer in final form or sign on the dotted line until the 
legislative appropriation process was complete and the budgeted funds actually 
available at the outset of the 2006-7 biennium (July 1, 2006).  So far as the record shows, there were 
no authentic competing buyers, period.    In addition, it is difficult 
to ignore that Guernsey is a major regional/national, conventional warfare 
exercise and drill area.  Grommet's 
conduct smacked of unconscionable wartime profiteering that he attempted to 
disguise as "good business."  Affectio tua nomen imponit operi tuo 
(Your motive gives a name to your act).  
Black's Law Dictionary 1817 
(9th ed. 2009).  The 
district court was not fooled by Grommet's protestations to the contrary, and 
neither is this Court.  Continuing, 
Grommet contends that he did nothing more than sell his property for its "fair 
market value."  That phrase 
means:  "The price that a seller is 
willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an 
arm's-length transaction; the point at which supply and demand intersect."  Black's Law Dictionary 1691 
(9th ed. 2009).  The WNG 
paid $8.5 million under the circumstances presented here because the second 
broker/appraiser was able to "recalculate" prior appraisals to satisfy the WNG's 
strict requirement that the price paid not exceed the property's appraised 
value.  We note that an "appraisal" 
is:  "The determination of what 
constitutes a fair price; valuation; estimation of worth."  Black's Law Dictionary 117 
(9th ed. 2009).  An 
"appraiser" is:  "An impartial 
person who estimates the value of something, such as real estate[.]"  Id.

 
 
[¶53]  In summary, we are satisfied that the 
district court's findings that Grommet breached the implied covenant faithfully 
reflected the evidence adduced at trial.

 
 
Filing 
of Lis Pendens by Newman 

 
 
[¶54]  Grommet contends that the filing of a lis pendens by Newman, with the intent 
of blocking the sale of the ranch to the WNG, was a tort.  Newman filed the lis pendens upon the advice of his 
attorney.  See generally Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-6-106 through 1-6-109 (LexisNexis 2009) and 51 Am.Jur.2d Lis Pendens §§ 1-6 (2000 and Supp. 
2009).   That filing did not 
delay the sale of the ranch.  In 
order that it not delay the sale, Grommet agreed to place a sum of money in 
escrow that was approximately equal to the commission that Newman contended was 
due him.  For the purposes of this 
litigation, we deem the matter of the lis 
pendens to have been resolved by the parties.  Beyond that, it plays no role in the 
resolution of the issues raised in the pleadings filed in this 
case.

 
 
Extension 
Void under Brokerage Disclosure Statute

 
 
[¶55]  Grommet claims that the listing agreement 
and any extension thereof was void under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-306 (LexisNexis 
2007) (amended 2009) because his broker's disclosure had not been acknowledged 
by all sellers (Grommet, his wife and sister).  Newman and Grommet had many years of 
dealing with each other, with Newman acting as a real estate broker and Grommet 
acting as a buyer, seller or swapper of real property.  We agree with the district court that 
the extension of the listing agreement was valid because the agreement that was 
extended was valid.  Under the 
circumstances of this case we also take note of what we had to say in Roney v. B.B.C. Corporation, 2004 WY 
113, ¶ 27, 98 P.3d 196, 204 (Wyo. 2004):

 
 
We 
have expressed on many occasions that public policy does not favor the 
forfeiture of contract rights.  In 
Wyoming Realty Co. v. Cook, 872 P.2d 551, 554 (Wyo.1994) (quoting Battlefield, 
Inc. v. Neely, 656 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Wyo.1983)), we 
reiterated:

 
 
Courts 
do not like to aid litigants in avoiding their contractual obligations by 
joining in their games of hide-and-seek behind statutory 
technicalities--especially is this so where the other party has performed and 
the party looking to avoid the contract has reaped all the benefits of the 
performance.  We will not aid and 
abet such efforts if we can possibly avoid it.  

 
 
See 
also Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 
2001 WY 125, ¶¶ 9-10, 36 P.3d 1127 (Wyo.2001).  As in the above-cited cases, we decline 
to allow Roney to avoid her contractual obligations.

 
 
The 
extended contract between Newman and Grommet was enforceable. 

 
 
Newman's 
Fraud on the Wyoming Real Estate Commission 

 
 
[¶56]  Within the context of this case, Grommet 
claims that Newman defrauded the Wyoming Real Estate Commission when he 
submitted evidence to that Commission in connection with Grommet's assertion 
that Newman had violated Wyoming Statutes and the ethics of his profession 
because he did not obtain Grommet's (or his wife's, or his sister's) signatures 
on a broker's disclosure form.  
Grommet claims to have been damaged because Newman's "fraud" on the 
Commission damaged him when the Commission dismissed Grommet's complaint.  Grommet claims the district court 
furthered that fraud by its findings and he asks that we re-examine the evidence 
produced at trial and finally do him justice.  We have done so and we do justice by 
holding that Grommet's claims in this regard are not supported by the 
evidence.

 
 
Newman's 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Grommet 

 
 
[¶57]  Grommet contends that Newman was first to 
breach the contract between them by failing to tell Grommet of offers made on 
the ranch by other buyers.  Grommet 
asks that these failings be remedied by a forfeiture of any commission due him, 
as well as paying Grommet's attorney's fees.  We have carefully examined the record on 
appeal and we find no credible evidence in the record to support Grommet's 
assertions in this regard. 

 
 
Attorney's 
Fees for Grommet

 
 
[¶58]  Grommet contends that he is the party 
entitled to attorney's fees under the listing agreement.  However, as set out more fully herein, 
we have determined that the district court's findings of fact are fully 
supported by the evidence adduced at trial and that the district court 
faithfully applied the correct rules of law to those facts.  For these reasons we cannot consider an 
award of attorney's fees for Grommet.

 
 

Case 
No. S-08-0149

 
 
[¶59]  In case No. S-08-0149, Newman raises 
these issues:

 
 
A.  Should 
[Newman] have been awarded attorney's fees and costs by the district 
court?

 
 
B.  Should 
[Newman's] sales commission have been based on the actual sales price instead of 
the basic listing price?

 
 
C.  Should 
the word "earn" in a standard listing agreement be synonymous with the terms 
"procuring cause?"

 
 
Grommet 
restates those issues like this:

 
 
A.  Did 
the district court correctly rule that  Newman was not entitled to recover his 
attorney's fees?

          
1.  Did the district court correctly rule that attorney's fees 
were not awardable for [Grommet's] breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in their implied contract?

          
2.  Is the parties' fee-shifting provision more narrow and 
restrictive than the typical "prevailing party" provision?

 
 
B.  Did 
the district court err when it failed to award attorney's fees to [Grommet] for 
[Newman's] breach of his "Exclusive Right to Sell Listing 
Contract?"

          
1.  Did [Newman] breach his "Exclusive Right to Sell Listing 
Contract," and the fiduciary duties incorporated into that contract, when he 
wrongfully filed a Lis Pendens 
against [Grommet's] property to collect his asserted commission and to stop the 
sale to the [WNG]?

          
2.  [Is Grommet] entitled to an award of attorney's fees under 
the common law for [Newman's] fraud and/or willful wrong? 

 
 
C.  Did 
the district court disregard the parties' contract rights and liabilities when 
it awarded any damages to Newman, let alone 
$537,500?

 
 
D.  If 
this Court chooses to issue an advisory opinion that "earn" is synonymous with 
"procuring cause," was Bob Brockman the primary, proximate, and procuring cause 
of the $8.5 [million] sale to the [WNG]?

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶60]  The district court clarified its initial 
decision in several ways, including amending the judgment from $585,000.00 to 
$537,000.00, basing the judgment on the contract's original $7.7 million selling 
price, rather than the ultimate selling price of $8.5 million.  In addition, the district court amended 
its original decision that "[b]oth parties should bear its own costs and 
attorneys' fees[,]" to this:

 
 
          
[W]ith respect to the attorney fees, the Court's previous order will 
remain in effect.  An award of 
attorney fees for a default would be appropriate for failure to comply with any 
of the written terms of the contract.  
However, the Court has found that the defendants breached an implied 
covenant of good faith as opposed to a written term in the contract.  Furthermore, the Court would note that 
the Defendants placed money in escrow subsequent to the Plaintiff filing a lis pendens.  Thus, as to any default, the parties 
agreed as to a procedure for resolving the same.  Under those circumstances, the Court 
does not believe that an award of attorney fees is appropriate in this 
matter.

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶61]  We review a district court's decision 
regarding the award of attorney's fees and costs for abuse of discretion.  A court abuses its discretion only when 
it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.  The burden is placed 
upon the party who is attacking the trial court's ruling to establish an abuse 
of discretion.  Shepard v. Beck, 2007 WY 53, ¶ 14, 
154 P.3d 982, 988 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
          
In Wyoming, we apply the American rule which holds that each party 
generally is responsible for his own fees and costs.  See, e.g., Rock Springs Land and Timber, 
Inc. v. Lore, 2003 WY 100, ¶ 37, 75 P.3d 614, 628 (Wyo.2003).  A prevailing party, however, is generally 
entitled to be reimbursed for his attorney's fees and costs when an express 
contractual authorization exists for such an award.  Morrison v. Clay, 2006 WY 161, 
¶ 16, 149 P.3d 696, 702 (Wyo.2006); Ahearn v. Tri-County Fed. Sav. Bank, 954 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo.1998); DeWitt v. 
Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 863 (Wyo.1986).  
There is a proviso:

 
 
While 
the general rule is that a valid provision for attorney's fees in a [contract] 
is as much an obligation of the contract as any part of it, the trial court 
still has discretion in exercising its equitable control to allow only such sum 
as it thinks reasonable.  A trial 
court in its discretion may properly disallow attorney's fees altogether on the 
basis that such recovery would be inequitable.

 
 

Combs 
v. Walters, 
518 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Wyo.1974) (citing Graves v. Burch, 26 Wyo. 192, 200-01, 
181 P. 354, 357 (1919)); Dewey v. 
Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶ 50, 38 P.3d 402, 420 (Wyo.2002); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 533-34 
(Wyo.2000).  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Meyer 
v. Hatto, 
2008 WY 153, ¶ 26, 198 P.3d 552, 557-58 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶62]  Newman argues that he is contractually 
entitled to such an award on the basis of language in his agreement with Grommet 
and that it is clearly a disservice to equitable considerations to disallow him 
a reasonable attorney's fee under the circumstances of this case.  The agreement provides this in that 
regard:

 
 
          
A.  TIME IS OF THE 
ESSENCE hereof, and any party who fails to tender any payment, or perform 
any other condition hereof as herein provided, shall be in default of this 
Contract.  In the event of default, 
the non-defaulting party may elect to either treat this Contract as breached and 
recover such damages as may be proper, or may treat this Contract as being in 
full force and effect and require specific performance of the items hereof.  In lieu of the remedy provided above to 
Seller if Buyer is the defaulting party, Seller may elect to terminate the 
Contract and retain all payments made hereunder as liquidated damages, such 
among being agreed by the parties hereto to constitute compensation for the loss 
of opportunity suffered by Seller due to such breach.

          
B.  In 
the event that any party shall become in default or breach of any of the terms 
of this Contract, such defaulting or breaching party shall pay all reasonable 
attorney's fees and other expenses which the non-breaching or non-defaulting 
party may incur in enforcing this Contract with or without formal 
proceedings.  This provision shall 
not limit any other remedies to which the parties may be otherwise be 
entitled.

 
 
[¶63]  In Shephard we held 
that:

 
 
Therefore, 
as the prevailing party on the breach of contract claim, the appellant may 
collect her attorney's fees as provided for by the contract.  That fact is not, however, fully 
dispositive of this issue.  The 
district court order in the instant case merely said that each party should pay 
his or her own attorney fees.  It 
did not specify whether it did so under the default "American Rule" regarding 
attorney's fees, (FN4) or whether it recognized that appellant was entitled to 
fees under the contract, but determined under its equitable powers that each 
party should pay his or her own.  
(FN5)  On remand, the 
district court is instructed that the appellant is contractually entitled to 
attorney fees, but such may be adjusted as appropriate under the federal 
lodestar test.  "The two factors 
which are examined under the lodestar test are:  '(1) whether the fee charged represents 
the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate; and (2) whether other 
factors of discretionary application should be considered to adjust the fee 
either upward or downward.'"  Cline, 998 P.2d  at 951 (quoting Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 
862-63 (Wyo.1997)).

 
 
(FN4.)  Wyoming subscribes to the American rule 
regarding recovery of attorneys' fees.  
Board of County Commissioners of 
County of Platte v. State ex rel. Yeadon, 971 P.2d 129, 132 (Wyo.1998).  Under the American rule, each party is 
generally responsible for his own attorneys' fees.  971 P.2d  at 132-33.  A prevailing party may, however, be 
reimbursed for his attorneys' fees when express statutory or contractual 
authorization exists for such an award.  
Id. Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo.2000).

 
 
(FN5.) 
In Castleberry v. Phelan, 2004 WY 
151, n. 2, 101 P.3d 460, 464 n. 2 (Wyo.2004), we noted 
that

 [o]ur holding in this case does not 
depart from prior cases in which we have stated that, "[e]ven in the face of a 
valid contractual provision for attorney's fees ... a trial court has the 
discretion to exercise its equitable control to allow only such sum as is 
reasonable or the court may properly disallow attorney's fees altogether on the 
basis that such recovery would be inequitable."  Dewey [v. Wentland, 2002 WY 2], 
¶ 50 [, 38 P.3d 402, 420 (Wyo.2002)].  
The district court's decision indicates that its decision was based upon 
a legal conclusion that attorneys' fees were not available.  There is nothing in the decision to 
indicate that it was denying Castleberry attorneys' fees on the basis of 
equity.  Id.

 
 

Shepard, 
¶ 17, 154 P.3d  at 990.

 
 
[¶64]  We conclude that it is unnecessary to 
substantively address the differences, nuances, or similarities of the terms 
"earn," "sell or sold," and "procuring cause" in order to resolve this 
issue.  But see generally D. Barlow 
Burke, Jr., Law of Real Estate 
Brokers, Chapter 5, at 5-1 through 5-82, "The Broker's Commission:  The Majority Rule" (3rd ed. 2009).  We are comfortable in sustaining the 
district court's explicit and implicit findings that Newman was the "procuring 
cause" of the sale of Grommet's ranch.  
We are also comfortable in concluding that Newman "sold" the ranch and 
that he "earned" the commission provided for in the governing contract.  Furthermore, we are comfortable in 
concluding that Brockman was not the "procuring cause" of the sale, did not 
"sell" the ranch, and did not "earn" a commission.  Any dispute between Grommet and Brockman 
over the commission Brockman received is not a matter of concern in this 
case.

 
 
[¶65]  We disagree with the district court's 
finding/conclusion that Grommet only violated the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, and not the contract itself.  Grommet agreed to pay Newman a 
commission if he sold the ranch, and sell the ranch he did.  Grommet violated the explicit terms of 
the contract when he refused to pay Newman his commission once Newman had "sold" 
the ranch and "earned" the commission.  
For these reasons we reverse that portion of the judgment which refused 
to award Newman reasonable attorney's fees.  By the terms of the contract, Newman is 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fees award.  Therefore, we remand the case to the 
district court for the purpose of assessing what Newman's reasonable attorney's 
fees award should be.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶66]  The judgment of the district court 
awarding Newman his commission is affirmed.  That part of the district court's 
judgment which determined that an attorney's fee award would be inequitable 
under the circumstances of this case is reversed and this matter is remanded to 
the district court for the purpose of ascertaining what reasonable attorney's 
fees Newman should be awarded.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In both of these cases "Grommet" will be used to refer to Dean Grommet, 
Malinda Grommet (Dean Grommet's wife), and Michelle Costi (Dean Grommet's 
sister) collectively.  In a few 
instances, for purposes of clarity, we will refer to "Dean Grommet" as an 
individual where circumstances necessitate it.  These parties owned the ranch, the sale 
of which is at the heart of this controversy, in a form of joint ownership.  However, Dean Grommet was at all times 
the only person who appears to have exercised authority over the sales process 
and it simplifies the discussion of the facts and issues to refer to this group 
of parties simply as "Grommet."

 
 

2Havens 
v. Irvine, 
61 Wyo. 309, 157 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1945); rehearing denied, 61 Wyo. 309, 159 P.2d 366 (Wyo. 1945).

 
 

3Scherer 
Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, 
2001 WY 23, 18 P.3d 645 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

4§ 
33-28-306.  Broker disclosures.  [This statute was substantively amended 
effective July 1, 2009.]

 
 
            
(a)  Prior to engaging in any discussion or arrangement 
incidental to a sale, purchase, exchange or lease, and prior to entering into 
any written agreement, with a buyer or seller, a broker shall make a written 
disclosure of applicable brokerage relationships which must contain at a minimum 
the following:

(i)  A description of all the different brokerage relationships 
allowed by this article and a statement that the commission for different 
relationships is negotiable;

                        
(ii)  An explanation of the duties and obligations owed under 
each such relationship;

                        
(iii)  A conspicuous statement of duties and obligations owed 
by an agent but which are not owed by an 
intermediary;

(iv)  A statement that any established relationship cannot be 
modified without the written consent of the buyer or seller and that the buyer 
or seller may, but is not required to, negotiate different commission fees as a 
condition of consenting to a change in relationship;  and

                        
(v)  A statement that an intermediary is not an agent or 
advocate for any party and has only the obligations set forth in W.S. 
33-28-305.

            
(b)  The written disclosure shall contain a signature line for 
the buyer or seller to acknowledge receipt of the disclosure.  The disclosure and acknowledgment, by 
itself, shall not constitute a contract or agreement with the broker.  Until the buyer or seller executes such 
acknowledgment, no representation agreement shall be executed or 
valid.

            
(c)  A broker who has established an agency relationship, a 
subagency relationship or an intermediary relationship with a seller or buyer 
shall provide notice of that relationship to any other party to the transaction 
at the earliest reasonable opportunity.

            
(d)  Disclosures made in accordance with this article shall be 
sufficient to disclose brokerage relationships to the parties to the transaction 
and to the public.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-306 (LexisNexis 
2007).