Title: Clark v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
 
GENEV DENISE CLARK, 
s/k/a GENEVA DENISE CLARK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 091305 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
          
 
   April 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA  
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether a defendant’s actions 
constitute an overt act intended to place a victim in fear or 
apprehension of bodily harm, and thus whether there was 
sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of assault. 
Background 
Genev Denise Clark (Clark) was convicted in a bench trial 
in the Circuit Court of Henrico County of assaulting Carolyn M. 
Coleman (Coleman) in violation of Code § 18.2-57.  In a 
published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the circuit court.  Clark v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 120, 
676 S.E.2d 332 (2009) (en banc).  Clark appeals. 
Coleman was, at the time of these events, a school bus 
driver for Lakeside Elementary School.  On May 7, 2007, Clark’s 
son caused a problem while riding on Coleman’s bus.  As a 
result, Coleman asked the school administrators to prohibit 
                     
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 
12, 2010. 
Clark’s son from riding the school bus for a period of time and 
they did so.   
The next day, at approximately 7 a.m., Coleman arrived at 
Lakeside Elementary School to “drop off” children at the 
school.  As on other mornings, Coleman’s school bus was the 
first to arrive.  Coleman drove the school bus into the bus 
circle and, seeing a brown automobile parked in the circle, 
Coleman stopped directly behind it.  Other school buses came in 
behind her bus.  Susan Bernstein, who also serves as a bus 
driver for Lakeside Elementary School, testified that the 
parked vehicle, which was later identified as Clark’s vehicle, 
“was blocking all of us from moving.”  The bus circle is posted 
with signs indicating that the circle is reserved exclusively 
for buses.  
As Coleman waited in the bus circle for someone from the 
school to meet the children she was “dropping off,” she saw 
Clark and her son standing in the vicinity of the parked 
vehicle.  Coleman opened the bus door to let in a student who 
was waiting for the school to open and, while the bus door was 
still open, Clark approached the bus.  Bernstein testified that 
Clark came within two feet of the bus.  Clark said to Coleman, 
“I told you I’m going to get you, bitch, don’t care, I don’t 
care where you at, if you’re on the school ground, if you’re in 
the school, or you’re in the grocery store [I’m going to] 
 
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[f]uck you up.”  Clark had her arms crossed and her lips 
pursed.  Coleman shut the bus door and ”called” for a 
supervisor and a police officer.  Clark continued to stand 
outside the school bus and to curse, but left when the 
principal arrived. 
Late in the afternoon of that same day, at approximately 
4:20 p.m., Coleman drove her bus into the bus circle to pick up 
children participating in after-school activities at the 
elementary school.  As Coleman opened the bus door, preparing 
to disembark, Clark approached the bus door and said, “Bitch, 
like I say, I’m going to get you.”  Coleman immediately shut 
the bus door, instead of exiting as planned.  After Coleman 
shut the bus door, Clark stood outside the bus. 
Clark was charged with assaulting Coleman in violation of 
Code § 18.2-57.  At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence at 
trial, and again at the close of the defense’s evidence, Clark 
moved to strike, contending that Clark’s words were 
insufficient to constitute an assault and there was “no real 
physical action” by Clark.  The circuit court overruled the 
motions, finding Clark guilty of assault.  Clark appealed to 
the Court of Appeals.  
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed 
the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that the evidence 
was not sufficient to find Clark guilty of assault because her 
 
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behavior did not constitute an overt act in furtherance of an 
assault.  Clark v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2656-07-2 (Dec. 23, 
2008).  Upon rehearing en banc, however, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.  The Court of Appeals 
stated that Clark’s behavior, when viewed in its totality, 
“constituted an overt act which was committed with the 
requisite intent and put Coleman in reasonable fear or 
apprehension of bodily harm,” and held that the evidence was 
therefore sufficient to find Clark guilty of assault.  Clark, 
54 Va. App. at 134-35 & n.5, 676 S.E.2d at 339-40 & n.5. 
Analysis 
Clark argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that the evidence was sufficient to find her guilty of assault.  
She argues that her actions in approaching Coleman’s school 
bus, verbally threatening Coleman and returning to the bus 
later that day to deliver another threat did not constitute an 
overt act in furtherance of an assault.  Clark argues that this 
Court has consistently held that words alone are insufficient 
to constitute an assault.  Contending that her sole physical 
action was walking towards the school bus, Clark relies on 
Bennett v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 442, 546 S.E.2d 209 
(2001), to argue that threatening words coupled with the act of 
 
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walking towards the school bus do not support the holding that 
Clark engaged in an overt act for purposes of an assault.2  
Responding, the Commonwealth contends that Clark, in 
relying on Bennett, fails to distinguish the conditional 
threats asserted in Bennett from Clark’s unconditional threat 
and “the totality of the acts in which she engaged in this 
case.”  The Commonwealth urges this Court to view Clark’s 
verbal threats in the context in which they were uttered and 
the actions associated with them.  The Commonwealth claims that 
Clark’s reappearance outside of Coleman’s bus demonstrated 
Clark’s intent to act on her earlier threat, and that there was 
sufficient evidence to find her guilty of assault.  
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction, this Court reviews “the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at 
trial and consider[s] all inferences fairly deducible from that 
evidence.”  Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 
412, 414 (2008).  This Court will only reverse the judgment of 
the trial court if the judgment “ ‘is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.’ ”  Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 
27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680).  “If 
                     
2 Clark has not challenged whether the evidence 
sufficiently proved that she created a “reasonable fear or 
apprehension in the victim.”  Carter v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
 
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there is evidence to support the convictions, the reviewing 
court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if 
its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the 
finder of fact at the trial.”  Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 
516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998). 
The penalty for assault is set forth in Code § 18.2-57, 
but because the elements of assault are not statutorily 
defined, this Court must apply the common law definition.  “At 
common law, assault was both a crime and a tort.”  Carter v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 44, 46, 606 S.E.2d 839, 841 (2005).  
Specifically,  
[t]he common law crime of assault required an attempt 
or offer committed with an intent to inflict bodily 
harm coupled with the present ability to inflict such 
harm.  The common law tort of assault could be 
completed if the tortfeasor engaged in actions 
intended to place the victim in fear of bodily harm 
and created a well-founded fear in the victim. 
 
Id. (citation omitted).  
Like many jurisdictions, Virginia has merged the common 
law crime with the common law tort of assault.  Id. at 47, 606 
S.E.2d at 841.  Combining the criminal and tort elements, this 
Court has held that a common law assault “occurs when an 
assailant engages in an overt act intended to inflict bodily 
harm and has the present ability to inflict such harm or 
                                                                 
44, 47, 606 S.E.2d 839, 841 (2005).  Therefore, this Court will 
not consider this issue on appeal.  Rule 5:17; Rule 5:25. 
 
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engages in an overt act intended to place the victim in fear or 
apprehension of bodily harm and creates such reasonable fear or 
apprehension in the victim.”  Id.  Regarding the common law 
crime of assault, this Court has stated that because assault 
requires an overt act, words alone are never sufficient to 
constitute an assault.  Harper v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 723, 
733, 85 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1955); see also Merritt v. 
Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 658, 180 S.E. 395, 397 (1935).   
Clark relies heavily on the Court of Appeals’ rationale in 
Bennett to support her position that she did not commit an 
assault.  In Bennett, the police officers entered the 
defendant’s home to investigate a “criminal complaint.”  35 Va. 
App. at 446, 546 S.E.2d at 211.  Upon seeing the officers, the 
defendant approached within inches of them, shouted profanities 
and stated that if they did not leave “it would be an ‘F’ing 
blood bath.”  Id. at 446-47, 546 S.E.2d at 211.  The defendant 
gestured with his hands while speaking, but did not physically 
threaten the officers.  Id. at 447, 546 S.E.2d at 211.  The 
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction for assault because the defendant, 
although he approached from 20 feet to within inches of two 
police officers, shouting profanities and insisting that they 
leave his house, “made no overt act or attempt to physically 
harm either officer.”  Id. at 449, 546 S.E.2d at 212. 
 
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The holding by the Court of Appeals in Bennett is not 
applicable to the factual circumstances in the instant case and 
it does not deal with the alternative recognized in Carter, 
that an assault may be proven by a defendant’s actions that 
were intended to place the victim in fear of bodily harm and 
which created a well-founded fear in the victim.  As stated by 
the Court of Appeals in its opinion in this case, in Bennett 
the Court of Appeals made no distinction between the criminal 
and tort law definitions of assault and it analyzed the 
evidence only under the definition of assault requiring proof 
of an overt act “‘accompanied with circumstances denoting an 
intention coupled with a present ability of using actual 
violence.’”  Clark, 54 Va. App. at 131, 676 S.E.2d at 338 
(quoting Bennett, 35 Va. App. at 449, 546 S.E.2d at 212) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court of Appeals also 
noted in its opinion in this case that the evidence in the 
Bennett case proved that the threat Bennett made was a 
conditional one, and that the circumstances failed to support a 
finding that Bennett had either an actual intention to batter 
or a present ability to do so in the fashion he threatened.  
Id. at 131-32, 676 S.E.2d at 338.  We agree with the Court of 
Appeals that the circumstances in this case are legally and 
factually distinguishable from those present in the Bennett 
case. 
 
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The relevant question in this case is whether Clark 
committed an overt act with the intent to place Coleman in fear 
or apprehension of bodily harm.  See Carter, 269 Va. at 46-47, 
606 S.E.2d at 841.   Words and prior conduct are highly 
relevant in shedding light on intent and the context within 
which certain actions transpired.  A perpetrator’s intent may 
be inferred from the nature of the overt act and the 
surrounding circumstances. 
We must interpret Clark’s reappearance outside of 
Coleman’s school bus and her renewed threat, on the afternoon 
of May 8, in the context of Clark’s previous statements and 
actions.  Clark threatened to harm Coleman anywhere she could 
be found.  Later, that same day, as Coleman was about to exit 
the school bus, Clark appeared outside of Coleman’s opened bus 
door, saying, “I’m going to get you.”  Given Clark’s previous 
threat to inflict bodily harm upon Coleman, her reappearance at 
a place where she had no explained reason for being, and her 
blocking Coleman’s path of exit and her unconditional threat to 
“get” Coleman, Clark’s act of approaching the bus could be 
understood as indicating a purpose to inflict bodily contact or 
injury upon Coleman.  Therefore, there is sufficient evidence 
that Clark engaged in an overt act intended to place Coleman in 
fear or apprehension of bodily harm by approaching Coleman’s 
bus that afternoon.   
 
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Viewing Clark’s words and actions in the context of her 
earlier threat to Coleman, Clark’s approach to the door of 
Coleman’s bus on the afternoon of May 8 was an act sufficient 
to create a reasonable apprehension on the part of Coleman that 
she was about to be attacked.  The verbal threat made by Clark 
at that time was not an assault, but it is evidence of Clark’s 
intent, by approaching her bus, to place Coleman in fear of 
bodily harm.   
Thus, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err when 
it held that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
circuit court’s conviction of Clark for the crime of assault. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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