Title: MARY'S BAKE SHOPPE, AND MARY K. COONTS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS OWNER OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY V. CITY OF CHEYENNE, WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARY'S BAKE SHOPPE, AND MARY K. COONTS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS OWNER OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY  V. CITY OF CHEYENNE, WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION2008 WY 116193 P.3d 252Case Number: S-07-0243Decided: 10/06/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
MARY'S 
BAKE SHOPPE, AND MARY K. COONTS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS OWNER OF CERTAIN REAL 
PROPERTY,Appellants(Defendants),v.CITY OF CHEYENNE, WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Cary 
R. Alburn III of Cary R. Alburn III, P.C., 
Ft. Collins, Colorado

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bill 
G. Hibbler of Bill G. Hibbler, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mary Coonts owned 
and operated a business known as Mary's Bake Shoppe.  She also owned the building housing her 
business.  In 2004, the building was 
severely damaged by fire.  The City 
of Cheyenne 
determined the fire-damaged building posed a hazard to people's health and 
safety and notified Coonts that it was condemning the building.  Shortly after Coonts received the first 
notice of condemnation, the City decided the building's condition had 
deteriorated to the point where it posed an immediate threat and would have to 
be demolished on an emergency basis.  
Since Coonts had not contacted the City regarding demolition, the City 
hired its own contractor.  The City 
held Coonts responsible for the costs of demolition and removal of her 
building.

 
 
[¶2]      Coonts failed to 
pay the costs of demolition, leading the City to file the instant civil 
action.  The City's action included 
a claim for repayment of demolition costs and for the foreclosure of its 
cost-of-demolition lien.  The 
district court granted summary judgment to the City on its claims.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Coonts presents 
the following three statements as her issues:

 
 

ISSUE 
I:         
It was error for the District Court to grant Summary Judgment to 
Appellee, because the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
together with the affidavits, showed that there were genuine issues as to 
material facts and that Appellee was not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 

ISSUE 
II:        It 
was error for the District Court not to grant Summary Judgment to Appellants, 
because the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with 
the affidavits, showed that Appellee could not prevail in a trial on the merits, 
so that Appellants were entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 

ISSUE 
III:       It was 
error and an abuse of discretion for the District Court not to grant Appellants' 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 
DISCOVERY in full, because by Appellee City's withholding most of the 
investigative reports sought by Appellants' MOTION and the District Court's denial 
of access to all but a very small portion of those investigative reports, 
Appellants were denied due process and were unable to effectively 
defend.

 
 
[¶4]      Issues I and II 
are too broad to be useful.  The 
language does nothing more than remind us that this appeal is from the grant of 
a summary judgment against Coonts.  
The presentation of such broad issues is exactly what Wyoming Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 7.01(d) is intended to prevent.1  The Rule exists to provide a direct 
roadmap to this Court of the coming arguments.  In the instant appeal, because there is 
no appropriate listing of the issues, this Court is put in the highly 
undesirable position of having to independently scour Coonts' brief in order to 
determine her specific allegations of error.  We will do our best to determine Coonts' 
points of error, but Coonts bears the risk that we might miss something buried 
in her brief.2

  

FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      A structural fire 
on December 27, 2004, severely damaged two adjoined buildings in the 200 block 
of West 16th Street in 
Cheyenne.  One building was owned by Mary Coonts 
and housed her business known as Mary's Bake Shoppe.  The other building housed a business 
known as Wyoming Home.  On December 
28, at the request of the City's Chief Building Officer (CBO), Bruce Wilson, a 
structural engineer, Robert Clary, inspected the damaged buildings.  Clary concluded both buildings would 
have to be demolished.  He expressly 
pointed out that the roof and certain walls of Coonts' building were unstable 
and it was probable they would collapse.  
Numerous photos, taken December 28, 2004, were attached to his written 
report.  

 
 
[¶6]      On January 6, 
2005, Coonts attended a meeting for the fire-affected property owners.  The meeting was attended by several city 
officials, including CBO Wilson and Clary.  
During the meeting, CBO Wilson confirmed that Coonts' building would have 
to be demolished.  

 
 
[¶7]      Early in January, 
the owner of the Wyoming Home building hired Spiegelberg Lumber & Building 
Co. to perform the demolition of her building.  On January 20, 2005, Coonts contacted 
Spiegelberg for a bid for the demolition of her building.  On January 21, Clary reinspected the 
buildings.  Clary wrote Speigelberg 
on January 23, confirming Coonts' building required complete demolition.  Clary stated: "The east part of the 
site, Mary's Bake Shoppe, is totally destroyed by fire and what hasn't collapsed 
will eventually." 

 
 
[¶8]      On January 26, 
Spiegelberg delivered its bid to Coonts.  
The amount of the bid was $78,750.00 to $81,575.00.  The price did not include the cost of 
the building permit or "concrete slab removal, foundations, footings, shoring or 
selective demolition that will occur at the sawcutting areas at adjacent 
buildings."  It also did not include 
ten percent overhead profit to be added to the final bill.  Finally, the bid was based on an 
anticipated ten calendar day schedule.  
The bid provided for a charge of $130.00 per day for any subsequent 
days.  Coonts immediately e-mailed 
Spiegelberg and told him she was going to procure a second bid before deciding 
on whether to accept its bid.  On 
January 28, Coonts met at the building site with a representative from S&S 
Builders, LLC, to obtain a demolition bid from it.  S&S submitted its bid later that 
afternoon for $114,426.00, for "demolition down to the existing basement 
floor."  Coonts never accepted 
either bid. 

 
 
[¶9]      On January 28, 
Spiegelberg began demolition work on the Wyoming Home building.  CBO Wilson decided that he could no 
longer wait for Coonts to arrange for the demolition of her building on her own 
accord.  Therefore, he issued a 
formal Notice and Order of condemnation.  
The Notice and Order, dated January 28, 2005, gave Coonts two days to 
obtain necessary permits to demolish and remove the structure and fourteen days 
to complete demolition.  The notice 
also informed Coonts she had the right to appeal the order to the City Board of 
Appeals within twenty days.  The 
Notice and Order was hand-delivered to Coonts' attorney the same day, and Coonts 
was immediately informed of it.  CBO 
Wilson never received any response from Coonts to the Notice and Order.  

 
 
[¶10]   On February 3, 2005, CBO Wilson 
returned to the building site.  He 
had a continuing concern about the unstable walls and roof of Coonts' 
building.  The risk of collapse of 
these structures had been increased by the freeze and thaw cycle to which the 
building had been subjected.  Given 
these conditions, and after further inspecting the building, CBO Wilson 
determined that the building condition had deteriorated to the point where it 
posed an imminent danger to public safety.  
He issued an emergency condemnation Notice and Order.  

 
 
[¶11]   This new Notice and Order informed 
Coonts that CBO Wilson had re-inspected the building and determined demolition 
had to begin immediately because of the building's dangerous condition.  Further, because of the emergent 
situation, the City would arrange for the immediate demolition and removal of 
the building and the cost therefore "shall be charged against the real estate 
upon which the structure is located and shall be secured by a lien upon such 
real estate."  The Notice and Order 
also informed Coonts she had twenty days to appeal.  

 
 
[¶12]   The City hired Spiegelberg to do 
the demolition and removal of Coonts' building.  The contract between the City and 
Spiegelberg was essentially based on the bid Spiegelberg had presented to 
Coonts.  Spiegelberg began work on 
February 3 and finished on February 28.  
Clary inspected the building on February 20, at which time he reported 
demolition and removal was complete except for some site cleanup.  CBO Wilson testified that the site was 
completely demolished and cleaned up as required by the contract.  Spiegelberg submitted an itemized bill 
to the City for $104,817.15, which amount the City paid.    

 
 
[¶13]   The City held Coonts responsible 
for the amount paid to Spiegelberg and filed a notice of lien against her 
property for that amount.  Coonts 
never paid any of the amount owed, nor did she appeal the emergency Notice and 
Order to object to the demolition of her building or the amount paid to 
Spiegelberg.  On March 31, 2006, the 
City filed the instant action for damages and foreclosure of the lien against 
her property.  After extensive 
discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on 
both counts.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶14]   As we possess the same materials as 
the district court and are bound by the same legal principles in our review of 
those materials, our review is de novo.  
Hendricks v. Hurley, 2008 WY 
57, ¶ 7, 184 P.3d 680, 682 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
Legal 
Framework

 
 
[¶15]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 
56(c).  The facts are reviewed from the vantage point 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. 
South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 8, 173 P.3d 398, 401 (Wyo. 2007); Pittard v. 
Great Lakes Aviation, 2007 WY 64, ¶ 14, 156 P.3d 964, 969 (Wyo. 2007); Cook v. 
Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006).  If upon review of the record, doubt 
exists about the presence of issues of material fact, that doubt must be 
resolved against the party seeking summary judgment.  Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 
WY 63, ¶ 7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶16]   The resolution of issues one and 
two are in large measure resolved by reference to the building ordinances of the 
City of Cheyenne.  
The City of Cheyenne has adopted the 2003 International 
Property Maintenance Code (IPMC).  
The IPMC provisions apply

 
 
to 
all existing residential and nonresidential structures and all existing premises 
and constitute minimum requirements and standards for premises, structures, 
equipment and facilities for light, ventilation, space, heating, sanitation, 
protection from the elements, life safety, safety from fire and other hazards, 
and for safe and sanitary maintenance; the responsibility of owners, operators 
and occupants; the occupancy of existing structures and premises, and for 
administration, enforcement and penalties.

 
 
IPMC 
101.2.  

 
 
[¶17]   The IPMC creates a department of 
property maintenance inspection, overseen by a "code official."  IPMC 103.1.  CBO Wilson is the code official for the 
City.  The code official is 
responsible for conducting property inspections and issuing notices and orders 
required under the IPMC.  IPMC 
104.3, 104.6.  Pursuant to the IPMC 
provisions pertinent to the instant appeal, if the code official identifies a 
building as unsafe, he may order repairs be undertaken or he may order its 
demolition if

 
 
in 
the official's judgment [the building] is so old, dilapidated or has become so 
out of repair as to be dangerous, unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise unfit for 
human habitation or occupancy, and such that it is unreasonable to repair the 
structure[.]

 
 
IPMC 
110.1.  If the code official orders 
demolition, notice shall be served upon the property owner and posted on the 
property.  IPMC 
108.3.

 
 
If 
the owner of [the] premises fails to comply with a demolition order within the 
time prescribed, the code official shall cause the structure to be demolished 
and removed, either through an available public agency or by contract or 
arrangement with private persons, and the cost of such demolition and removal 
shall be charged against the real estate upon which the structure is located and 
shall be a lien upon such real estate.  

 
 
IPMC 
110.3.  Emergency situations are 
handled differently:  

 
 
When, 
in the opinion of the code official, there is imminent danger of failure or 
collapse of a building or structure which endangers life, or when any structure 
or part of a structure has fallen and life is endangered by the occupation of 
the structure, . . . the code official is hereby authorized and empowered to 
order and require the occupants to vacate the premises forthwith. . . 
.

 
 
Notwithstanding 
other provisions of this code, whenever, in the opinion of the code official, 
there is imminent danger due to an unsafe condition, the code official shall 
order the necessary work to be done, including the boarding up of openings, to 
render such structure temporarily safe whether or not the legal procedure herein 
described has been instituted; and shall cause such other action to be taken as 
the code official deems necessary to meet such emergency.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Costs 
incurred in the performance of emergency work shall be paid by the 
jurisdiction.  The legal counsel of 
the jurisdiction shall institute appropriate action against the owner of the 
premises where the unsafe structure is or was located for the recovery of such 
costs.  

 
 
IPMC 
109.1, 109.2, 109.5.

 
 
[¶18]   Under normal circumstances, the 
IPMC gives the owner of a building subject to a demolition order the right to 
institute an administrative appeal within twenty days after service of the 
demolition order.  IPMC 111.1.  However, if the demolition order is 
issued as a result of an emergent situation, an administrative appeal, if 
requested, is afforded after the demolition of the building.  IPMC 109.6.

 
 
Propriety 
of Summary Judgment in Favor of the City of Cheyenne

 
 
[¶19]   Coonts' appellate brief lacks a 
cohesive framework.  She throws out 
points of error seemingly at random.  
We've decided the best approach is to treat her points as they arise 
chronologically.

 
 
[¶20]   The undisputed evidence is that 
Coonts' building was completely destroyed by the fire of December 27, 2004.  There was evidence from both CBO Wilson 
and Clary supporting this finding.  
Coonts herself testified that she personally did not know what condition 
the building was in structurally, nor did she ever seek an independent 
evaluation.  To the extent Coonts 
argues her building did not need to be razed, her argument is 
rejected.

 
 
[¶21]   Coonts was aware, by January 6, 
2005, at the latest, of the need to demolish her building when she was informed 
of the building's condition by CBO Wilson at a property owners meeting.  Around the same time, the owner of the 
Wyoming Home building arranged for the demolition of her building by 
Spiegelberg.  Coonts, however, did 
not contact Spiegelberg until January 20, 2005.  She received Spiegelberg's bid on 
January 26.  She did not accept 
Speigelberg's bid, but instead sought a second bid from another company.  She received the second bid from S&S 
on January 28.  Thus, on January 28, 
she had two bids in hand, but had accepted neither.  

 
 
[¶22]   CBO Wilson, obviously feeling like 
he needed to move things along, issued an official condemnation Notice and Order 
on January 28.  Coonts argues there 
were several deficiencies with this first order.  Be that as it may, the first order was 
superseded by the emergency order and is therefore irrelevant to our 
discussion.   

 
 
[¶23]   On February 3, 2005, CBO Wilson 
ordered the emergency demolition of the building and took all appropriate action 
as required by the IPMC, including sending a new Notice and Order to 
Coonts.  Coonts strongly contends 
the condition of her building did not warrant emergency demolition.  The IPMC leaves the decision solely to 
the discretion of the code official, in this case CBO Wilson.  CBO Wilson testified in his deposition 
that, between January 28 and February 3, the building condition deteriorated to 
the point that it had become an imminent danger.  Coonts submitted no evidence to the 
contrary.3 

 
 
[¶24]   Coonts takes issue with the process 
followed in hiring Spiegelberg.  She 
contends the City was required to follow the mandates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-113, "Contracts for Public Improvements."  By its very title, it does not apply to 
the instant situation.  Indeed, if 
further confirmation is needed, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-113(a) (LexisNexis 2007) 
expressly excludes contracts for emergency work from its 
coverage.

 
 
[¶25]   The IPMC, which did govern the 
situation, mandated CBO Wilson take immediate action to eliminate the imminent 
danger posed by the deteriorating condition of Coonts' building.  Spiegelberg was already mobilized on 
site because of its work on the Wyoming Home building, allowing for immediate 
response to CBO Wilson's safety concerns.  
Under the circumstances, CBO Wilson's action in hiring Spiegelberg to 
undertake the demolition and removal of Coonts' building was reasonable.  

 
 
[¶26]   Coonts next argues the City should 
never have paid Spiegelberg's invoice.  
She alleges Spiegelberg did not properly complete the job.  For support, she relies on one 
photograph taken January 5, 2006, and several other photographs, as well as a 
video, taken November 23, 2006.  
Needless to say, this photographic and video evidence is not indicative 
of the condition of the property on February 28, 2005, when Spiegelberg 
completed its work at the building site.  
There is no evidence Spiegelberg performed in anything other than a 
competent, workmanlike manner.  
Instead, the specific evidence from both Clary and CBO Wilson is that 
Spiegelberg completed its work in accordance with the conditions of the 
contract.

 
 
[¶27]   Coonts also complains the amount 
charged by Spiegelberg was excessive.  
Her point of comparison is Spiegelberg's initial bid of $78,750.00 to 
$81,575.00.  Coonts ignores, 
however, the contingencies contained in the bid.  Coonts complains Spiegelberg's invoice 
was inadequate for a meaningful decision to be made as to the appropriateness of 
the extra charges.  Spiegelberg's 
invoice, however, lists separate charges for demolition, the building permit, 
shoring, saw cutting, crane services and ten percent profit.  We find nothing untoward in 
Spiegelberg's billing.  The invoice 
is adequate to sustain Spiegelberg's final charge and justify the City's payment 
thereof.4

 
 
[¶28]   Coonts' attack moves on to the 
lien.  She claims the City never 
properly perfected a lien against her property because it did not follow the 
procedures required to perfect a mechanics lien as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 29-1-101 through 29-8-109.  Title 
29, however, defines a "lien claimant" as "any person who claims a lien under 
this title pursuant to a contract for improvement of property entered into by an 
owner of property."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
29-1-201(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2007).  
Title 29 therefore does not apply to the instant situation, where it was 
the City that entered into the contract, not the owner.  

 
 
[¶29]   We return, therefore, to the 
IPMC.  The IPMC requires the City to 
pay emergency demolition costs and creates an automatic lien against Coonts' 
property for the recovery of such costs  "the cost of such demolition and 
removal shall be charged against the real estate upon which the structure is 
located and shall be a lien upon such real estate."  IPMC 110.3.  By the terms of the IPMC, this lien came 
into existence, and was effective as between the City and Coonts, at the time 
the City paid Spiegelberg.  No 
filing was necessary to validate the lien as between the city and Coonts.  The lien existed by ordinance and was 
properly judicially foreclosed.  

 
 
Discovery 

 
 
[¶30]   Coonts requested the production of 
all investigative reports in the possession of the City regarding the causation 
of the fire that destroyed her building, whether originated by city employees or 
others.  The City filed a motion for 
a protective order on the grounds that the documents related to an on-going 
criminal investigation and did not contain any relevant information nor could 
they lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  The district court reviewed the 
documents in camera, released a few of the records, but granted the protective 
order as to all other documents.  

 
 
[¶31]   The record on appeal contains the 
sealed documents the district court reviewed in camera.  For the sake of brevity, we have simply 
reviewed these documents.  We agree 
with the district court that none of the protected documents contain relevant 
information or information that might lead to relevant evidence.  Thus, even if there was any error on the 
part of the district court in protecting these documents from discovery, it is 
harmless.5

Legal 
Action

 [¶32]  Finally, Coonts makes two general 
arguments regarding the underlying action.  
First, she moved to dismiss the case as to "Mary's Bake Shoppe" at the 
beginning of the action.  Coonts 
points out that Mary's Bake Shoppe is merely a trade name under which she 
conducted business.  As such, Coonts 
claims Mary's Bake Shoppe is not a proper party to this action.  Coonts is partially correct.  Mary's Bake Shoppe is not a corporation 
or other official legal entity with the capacity to be sued.  Under these specific facts, however, the 
name fairly identifies Mary Coonts and as such, there is no absolute prohibition 
against its use to identify her as a defendant.  See generally 67A CJS Parties, § 170 (2002); Brand v. Southern 
Empl. Serv., 545 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. App. 2001).  In essence, Mary's Bake Shoppe is the 
alter ego of Coonts.  As such it is 
redundant to sue both Coonts individually and Mary's Bake Shoppe.  For the sake of simplicity, the action 
should have been dismissed as to Mary's Bake Shoppe.  The judgment, however, is 
unaffected.  There is one judgment, 
and it is against Coonts, however referred to.  

 
 
[¶33]   Her second objection is that the 
City did not plead a recognized cause of action for the recovery of money.  The first count of the City's complaint 
was for the recovery of money paid for the demolition and clean-up pursuant to 
the terms of the IPMC.  Coonts 
argues the IPMC does not create a cause of action.  Her argument centers on the language of 
the IPMC that states: "legal counsel of the jurisdiction shall institute 
appropriate action against the owner of the premises where the unsafe structure 
is or was located for recovery of such costs."  IPMC 109.5.  Coonts argues an "appropriate action" 
means a recognized action in tort, contract or equity.  We disagree.  The IPMC created the debt.  It also created the authority to recover 
the debt.  The cause of action was 
properly identified as arising under the IPMC.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶34]   On December 27, 2004, a fire 
completely destroyed Coonts' building.  
Over a month later, Coonts had not yet arranged for the demolition and 
removal of the building.  On 
February 3, 2005, CBO Wilson inspected the building and determined it presented 
an imminent danger of failure or collapse, endangering life.  CBO Wilson followed the proper 
procedures for an emergency demolition as mandated by the IPMC.  

 
 
[¶35]   The City, through CBO Wilson, 
entered into a contract with Spiegelberg for the immediate demolition and 
removal of Coonts' building.  
Spiegelberg appropriately performed all its contractual duties and 
submitted a sufficiently itemized bill.  
The City justifiably paid the bill.  
The lien against Coonts' property was created by the IPMC and was 
effective as between Coonts and the City once the City paid 
Spiegelberg.

 
 
[¶36]   There was no harmful error in 
allowing the City to withhold production of certain investigatory documents as 
such documents were irrelevant to the case.  

 
 
[¶37]   Both counts in the underlying 
action were properly based on the language and authority of the IPMC.  The summary judgment in favor of the 
City and the foreclosure of the cost-of-demolition lien is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.A.P. 
7.01(d) requires an individualized statement of the specific issues presented 
for this Court's review.

 
 

2We commend to appellate court practitioners Bryan A. Garner, The Deep 
Issue: A New Approach to Framing Legal Questions, 5 Scribes J. Legal Writing 
1-39 ( 1994-1995).

 
 

3Coonts 
throws out one line to the effect that Speigelberg may have caused the emergency 
situation by "improvident actions" it took at the direction of the City.  She offers no further argument and 
absolutely no evidentiary support for this allegation.  

 
 

4It is 
especially difficult to believe Spiegelberg's final invoice was excessive when 
it was almost $10,000 less than S&S's bid.

 
 

5Coonts' 
appellate argument is presented within the framework of the Wyoming Public 
Records Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-201 through 205.   Her request for production, however, was 
made in the context of the instant civil litigation, making her arguments 
inapt.