Title: Rodriguez v. Super. Ct.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
MARIO RODRIGUEZ, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
THE PEOPLE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S272129 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H049016 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
C1647395, C1650275 
 
 
December 14, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S272129 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
A criminal defendant cannot be tried while mentally 
incompetent.  (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)1  Although such 
defendants may be involuntarily committed for the purpose of 
restoring their competency (see § 1370; Jackson v. Superior 
Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 100–101), the commitment may not 
last indefinitely (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1); Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 
406 U.S. 715, 720; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801 (Davis)).  
The statutory scheme governing competency proceedings limits 
the term of commitment.  For individuals like defendant Mario 
Rodriguez charged with offenses that carry a maximum 
sentence exceeding two years, the period of commitment due to 
incompetency is limited to two years.  (See § 1370, subd. (c)(1).)   
In this case, Rodriguez was adjudged incompetent, 
committed to a state hospital, and then returned to court when 
a medical director of the hospital filed a certificate indicating he 
was restored to competency.  (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1).)  The 
certificate was filed within the two-year time limit specified by 
section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) (section 1370(c)(1)).  By statute, 
the court was supposed to determine whether to approve the 
certificate — that is, decide “whether or not” Rodriguez has 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise specified. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
“recovered competence.”  (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1).)  However, 
primarily because of restrictions on court operations due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, Rodriguez did not receive such a hearing 
within the two-year period of section 1370(c)(1).  Claiming the 
time for commitment had run out, Rodriguez moved to dismiss 
the charges against him.  The Court of Appeal rejected his claim.  
It held that time had not run out because a commitment ends 
when a certificate of restoration is filed, not when the court 
determines whether the defendant has been restored to 
competence. 
 
(Rodriguez 
v. 
Superior 
Court 
(2021) 
70 Cal.App.5th 628, 652 (Rodriguez).) 
The parties ask us to resolve a question of statutory 
interpretation:  For purposes of calculating the maximum 
commitment 
period 
under 
section 
1370(c)(1), 
does 
an 
incompetency commitment end when the medical treatment 
provider informs the court that the defendant has regained 
competency by filing a certificate of restoration, or does the 
commitment end only when the court has determined whether 
the defendant has been restored to competency?  We resolve this 
question by determining whether the period between the filing 
of the certificate, and the court’s ruling on that certificate, is 
covered by section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit.  And we conclude 
this period is not excluded from the two-year limit. 
Because we reject the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that an 
incompetency commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of 
restoration, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  We 
remand with instructions for the Court of Appeal to consider 
issues that remain outstanding, including whether Rodriguez’s 
aggregate commitments have exceeded the limit set by section 
1370(c)(1) and what remedy he may be entitled to if the limit 
has been exceeded.  (See, e.g., Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
15 Cal.5th 354, 382–390 & fn. 5 (Camacho); Jackson v. Superior 
Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.) 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In December 2016, the Santa Clara County District 
Attorney charged Rodriguez with several felonies, each carrying 
a maximum sentence in excess of two years imprisonment.  The 
charged offenses included assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, 
subd. (a)(1) [maximum punishment of four years in state 
prison]); oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or 
fear (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A) [maximum punishment of eight years 
in state prison]); rape by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear 
(§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (a) [eight years]); and infliction 
of corporal injury on a present or former spouse, or a present or 
former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a) [four years]).  Rodriguez 
was held to answer on all charges.   
In late 2017, the court declared a doubt as to Rodriguez’s 
competency, ordered a hearing regarding his competency, and 
suspended all proceedings.  In May 2018, the court found 
Rodriguez not competent to stand trial.  On May 24, the court 
issued its commitment order, directing that Rodriguez “be 
committed to the [State] Department of State Hospitals for 
placement in a locked psychiatric facility.”  The order specified 
that “[t]he Sheriff shall redeliver the patient to the Court upon 
receiving from the state hospital a copy of the certification of 
mental competency.”  (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372, subd. 
(a)(2).)  The court also ordered the State Department of State 
Hospitals (Department) to “provide a placement for defendant 
for treatment of his mental illness and restoration of 
competency by 5:00 p.m., June 29, 2018” and that Rodriguez be 
transported to his placement by that date.  The record does not 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
indicate when Rodriguez was actually transported or admitted 
to a state hospital. 
On September 7, 2018, the medical director of Atascadero 
State Hospital certified Rodriguez as restored to competency.  
The parties stipulated that the certificate of restoration was 
filed with the superior court the same date.  On September 20, 
the court found Rodriguez had been restored to competency and 
reinstated criminal proceedings. 
In early January 2019, the court declared a new doubt as 
to Rodriguez’s competency to stand trial and again suspended 
criminal proceedings.  In April, the court found Rodriguez not 
competent. 
On May 16, 2019, the court issued a second commitment 
order, once more directing that Rodriguez be committed to the 
Department.  As before, the court specified a date by which the 
Department was to provide a placement for Rodriguez, setting 
that date as June 14, 2019.  The court further noted in its 
commitment order that it found Rodriguez did “not have the 
capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication,” 
and it ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
medication. 
On January 9, 2020, the medical director of Atascadero 
State Hospital certified that Rodriguez was restored to 
competency.  The parties stipulated the certificate of restoration 
was filed with the superior court the same date.  Among the 
documents transmitted to the court, the medical director 
included a letter stating that Rodriguez was “being returned to 
court on psychotropic medication.”  “It is important,” continued 
the director, “that [Rodriguez] remain on this medication for his 
own personal benefit and to enable him to be certified [as 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
competent] under Section 1372 of the Penal Code.”  The date 
when Rodriguez was discharged from the state hospital does not 
appear in the record.  (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 638.) 
On January 24, 2020, the court set May 21 as the date for 
a contested hearing on Rodriguez’s competency.  In March, the 
court suspended almost all its operations due to the COVID-19 
pandemic.  As a result, the competency hearing set for May 21 
did not take place. 
On July 17, 2020, the parties returned to court following 
the relaxation of certain COVID-19 restrictions.  The court 
rescheduled the competency hearing for August 24, a date later 
reset to September 21 at the request of both parties.  The 
hearing did not occur on that date either.  Instead, the court 
continued the hearing to November 2 “due to the COVID-19 
pandemic and the lack of courtrooms and court resources 
available.”  The court subsequently continued the competency 
hearing several times due to the “pandemic and the [s]uperior 
[c]ourt’s limited trial capacity.” 
In March 2021, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss.  Even 
though the Department had timely determined that he was 
competent to stand trial, Rodriguez argued that he was entitled 
to a dismissal because his commitment had lasted more than 
two years.  Rodriguez contended a commitment must be 
measured based on “dates from one judicial decision until a 
second judicial decision” — in this case, from the date when the 
court issued the commitment order to the date when it 
eventually approved or rejected the certificate of restoration.  
Rodriguez thus argued his total commitment period — counting 
days from his first and second commitments — exceeded two 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
years and was ongoing.  (See In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 
1230, 1232 (Polk) [holding that the limit on a commitment term 
“applies to the aggregate of all commitments under the same 
charges”].) 
On March 16, 2021, the trial court denied the motion to 
dismiss, reasoning that it had to first determine whether 
Rodriguez had regained competency before it could ascertain 
whether the statutory two-year limit had been reached.  The 
court explained, “the days between the restoration certificate 
and the restoration hearing [would] only count towards the two-
year maximum commitment if, in fact, it is determined that the 
defendant is not restored to competence.”  If instead “the 
defendant is [judicially determined to be] restored to 
competence,” the court continued, “then the date on the 
certificate of restoration will serve as the date of restoration for 
purposes of counting the days towards the maximum 
commitment.”  After the court announced its decision, 
Rodriguez’s counsel asked for a continuance, requesting that the 
court sign an order so that counsel could receive Rodriguez’s 
updated mental health records related to his recent placement 
on “24-hour hold” and “suicide watch” while in county jail. 
Between the date of the second commitment order and the 
court’s decision on March 16, 2021, a total of 670 days had 
elapsed.  When combined with the period between the first 
commitment order and the court’s decision on September 2, 
2018, finding Rodriguez restored to competency, 789 days — or 
more than two years — had passed.  In contrast, if a 
commitment were deemed to begin with a commitment order 
and end upon the filing of a certificate of restoration, Rodriguez 
had been committed for a total of 344 days — or less than one 
year — during the two commitments. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
Rodriguez challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion 
to dismiss by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in the Court 
of Appeal, raising the same argument he presented in the trial 
court.  The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, agreeing with 
the People that Rodriguez’s commitment ended when the 
certificate of restoration was filed.  (Rodriguez, supra, 
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 636.)  Unlike the trial court, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the filing of the certificate of restoration 
terminates a commitment regardless of whether the court 
subsequently approves or rejects the certificate.  (See id. at 
pp. 635–636.) 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal disagreed 
with People v. Carr (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1136 (Carr), which 
held that a judicial determination of competency, “not a health 
official’s certification of competency that initiates court 
proceedings to consider whether the defendant has regained 
competency, terminates the defendant’s commitment.”  (Id. at 
p. 1140; Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.) 
We granted review to resolve the split in authority.  We 
now reject the Court of Appeal’s holding that the two-year clock 
set by section 1370(c)(1) stops with the filing of a certificate of 
restoration.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
To determine whether the running of the clock set by 
section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of a certificate of 
restoration, we provide an overview of the relevant statutory 
framework, and then analyze the text of the governing statute 
and the context, history, and purpose of the competency scheme. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
A. The Competency Statutory Scheme 
1. Pre-1974 
A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if “as a 
result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, 
the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a 
rational manner.”  (§ 1367, subd. (a).)  Prior to 1974, “California 
law provided that persons charged with criminal conduct but 
found incompetent to stand trial were committed to state 
hospitals until they became ‘sane’ (i.e., competent).  Because 
attainment of competence was the sole standard for release the 
commitments were indefinite, even permanent, so long as 
incompetence persisted.”  (Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 
28 Cal.3d 161, 167 (Hofferber).) 
In 1972, however, the United States Supreme Court held 
that “indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on 
account 
of 
his 
incompetency 
to 
stand 
trial” 
offends 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.  
(Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 731.)  The court 
explained, “[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense 
who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed 
to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time 
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial 
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable 
future.”  (Id. at p. 738.)  “If it is determined that this is not the 
case” — that is, the defendant is not likely to soon regain 
competency — “then the State must either institute the 
customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required 
to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the 
defendant.”  (Ibid.) 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
The following year, our court “adopt[ed] the rule of the 
Jackson [v. Indiana] case.”  (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.)  
We further accepted that “the duration of commitments to state 
hospitals must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose 
which originally justified the commitment” (id. at p. 805), which 
is to “provide observation, care and treatment of [the committed 
individuals’] mental condition, with a view toward restoring 
their capacity to stand trial” (id. at pp. 805–806).  Accordingly, 
we instructed trial courts to direct hospital authorities to 
examine the persons committed and periodically report to the 
courts on their progress toward recovery of competency.  We 
delegated to trial courts the discretion to “decid[e] whether, in a 
particular case, sufficient progress is being made to justify 
continued commitment pending trial” but imposed no specific 
time limits on how long a person may be held in “continued 
commitment.”  (Id. at p. 807.)  Consistent with Jackson v. 
Indiana, however, we specified that if “there exists no 
reasonable likelihood that the person will recover his 
competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, then the 
court should either order him released from confinement or 
initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under 
the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et 
seq.),” California’s civil commitment scheme.  (Ibid.) 
2. 1974 to the Present 
In response to Davis, the Legislature enacted Assembly 
Bill No. 1529 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) in 1974.  (Stats. 1974, 
ch. 1511.)  Sponsored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy, the bill 
was designed to “bring California’s statutory provisions into 
accord” with the guidelines in Davis and Jackson v. Indiana.  
(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324; see also Parker, California’s 
New Scheme For The Commitment Of Individuals Found 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
Incompetent To Stand Trial (1975) 6 Pacific L.J. 484, 489 
(Parker).)  The Legislature specified that a defendant found 
incompetent to stand trial cannot be committed for more than 
three years.  (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.)  The 
Legislature also provided for the return of a defendant to court 
if “ha[ving] been committed for 18 months” — half of a 
maximum three-year commitment term — the defendant is still 
hospitalized as incompetent.  (Ibid.)  Upon returning to court, a 
hearing is held to determine the defendant’s competency.  (Ibid.) 
As part of the same enactment, the Legislature created a 
new type of conservatorship, referred to as a “Murphy” 
conservatorship after the sponsor of Assembly Bill No. 1529 
(1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) (see, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102).  This allows for a one-year, 
renewable commitment of qualifying mentally incompetent 
defendants who have reached the maximum time for a 
commitment under section 1370(c)(1).  (See Stats. 1974, 
ch. 1511, §§ 6, 12, pp. 3319, 3322; see also, e.g., Conservatorship 
of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1096–1097; Hofferber, supra, 
28 Cal.3d at pp. 169–170.)  This new civil commitment 
procedure, together with the imposition of a maximum 
commitment 
period 
and 
additional 
periodic 
reporting 
requirements, sought to “integrate and resolve the conflicting 
concerns of protecting society from dangerous individuals who 
are not subject to criminal prosecution . . . and safeguarding the 
freedom of incompetent criminal defendants who present no 
threat to the public.”  (Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at p. 485; see 
also, e.g., People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 568 
(Waterman); Hofferber, at pp. 176–177.) 
The 1974 statutory scheme has been amended numerous 
times.  Particularly relevant for our purposes are amendments 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
enacted in 1980 and 2018.  In 1980, the Legislature amended 
section 1372 to add procedures following the filing of a certificate 
of restoration of competency.  As added, section 1372, 
subdivision (a)(2) specified that “[u]pon the filing of a certificate 
of restoration, the defendant shall be returned to the committing 
court.”  (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1516.)  The Legislature also 
added subdivisions (c) and (d) to section 1372 at that time.  
Subdivision (c) requires the court to provide notice of “the date 
of any hearing on the defendant’s competence and whether or 
not the defendant was found by the court to have recovered 
competence” when a defendant is returned to court.  (Stats. 
1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1517.)  Subdivision (d) specifies the court’s 
responsibilities regarding the defendant’s custodial status if it 
approves the certificate of restoration.  (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, 
§ 14, p. 1517.) 
In 2018, the Legislature reduced the maximum term of 
commitment from three years to two years.  (Stats. 2018, 
ch. 1008, § 3.)  The author of the bill explained that the 
legislation was motivated by (1) the need to reduce “[w]ait lists 
for placements in state-operated treatment facilities,” and (2) a 
reassessment of the maximum period of time reasonably 
necessary “for restoring a person to competency, or for 
determining that he or she is not restorable” in response to 
advancements in “modern medical science.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.)  As part of the same 
bill, the Legislature eliminated the requirement that a 
defendant who remains committed for 18 months be returned to 
court for a redetermination of competency.  (Stats. 2018, 
ch. 1008, § 3.) 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
3. Current Law Governing Competency 
As it now stands, the statutory scheme governing 
competency works as follows:  When a doubt arises in the trial 
court judge’s mind regarding the mental competency of a 
criminal defendant, the judge may order a hearing to determine 
the defendant’s competency.2  (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).)  All 
criminal proceedings are suspended once the order issues.  (Id., 
subd. (c).)  At the competency hearing, the defendant is 
presumed competent and incompetence must be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  (§ 1369, subd. (f); see also 
Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446–449, 452–453.)  If 
a defendant is found incompetent, criminal proceedings remain 
“suspended until the person becomes mentally competent,” and 
the court issues a commitment order.  (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).)  
Specifically, “[t]he court shall order that the mentally 
incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a State 
Department of State Hospitals facility, as defined in Section 
4100 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as directed by the 
State Department of State Hospitals, or to any other available 
public or private treatment facility, including a community-
based residential treatment system approved by the community 
program director, or their designee, that will promote the 
 
2  
The judge must order such a hearing if defense counsel 
also declares a doubt regarding a defendant’s competency.  
(§ 1368, subd. (b).)  Even where counsel believes the defendant 
is competent, however, the court “may nevertheless order a 
hearing.”  (Ibid.; see also People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 
82 [explaining that our court has construed section 1368 “ ‘in 
conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law’ ” 
to mean that “[i]f the court is presented with substantial 
evidence of mental incompetence . . . the court must declare a 
doubt about the question and initiate an inquiry”].) 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
defendant’s speedy restoration to mental competence, or placed 
on outpatient status as specified in Section 1600.”  (§ 1370, subd. 
(a)(1)(B)(i).)  After the issuance of the commitment order, a 
defendant who is ordered “delivered . . . to a . . . State Hospitals 
facility” is to be admitted to a state hospital or a facility under 
contract with the Department.  (Ibid.) 
Whether admitted to a state hospital facility, delivered to 
a community-based residential treatment program, or placed on 
outpatient status, a defendant is returned to court when any of 
the following occurs:  (1) a medical director or comparable 
personnel certifies to the court that the defendant has been 
restored to competency;3 (2) an appointed psychiatrist or 
psychologist 
opines 
that 
the 
defendant 
has 
regained 
competency;4 (3) the court determines that “treatment for the 
defendant’s mental impairment is not being conducted” (§ 1370, 
subd. (b)(4)); (4) a medical director or comparable personnel 
reports to the court that there is no substantial likelihood the 
 
3  
Section 1372, subdivision (a). 
4  
Section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) (“If, at any time after 
the court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial 
pursuant to this section, counsel for the defendant or a jail 
medical or mental health staff provider provides the court with 
substantial evidence that the defendant’s psychiatric symptoms 
have changed to such a degree as to create a doubt in the mind 
of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental incompetence, 
the court may appoint a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist 
to opine as to whether the defendant has regained competence.  
If, in the opinion of that expert, the defendant has regained 
competence, the court shall proceed as if a certificate of 
restoration of competence has been returned pursuant to 
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1372”). 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future;5 or 
(5) the maximum commitment period set by section 1370(c)(1) 
has been reached.6  For ease of reference, we sometimes use the 
term “designated medical professional” through the remainder 
of this opinion to include the medical director of the Department 
or any relevant designee under the competency statutes.   
 
5  
Section 1370, 
subdivision 
(b)(1)(A) 
(specifying 
the 
reporting obligations of medical personnel and stating “[i]f the 
report [filed by the medical director of the State Department of 
State Hospitals, the person in charge of a treatment facility, or 
outpatient treatment staff] indicates that there is no substantial 
likelihood that the defendant will regain mental competence in 
the foreseeable future, custody of the defendant shall be 
transferred without delay to the committing county and shall 
remain with the county until further order of the court.  The 
defendant shall be returned to the court for proceedings 
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) no later than 
10 days following receipt of the report.  The court shall not order 
the defendant returned to the custody of the State Department 
of State Hospitals under the same commitment”). 
6  
Section 1370(c)(1) (“At the end of two years from the date 
of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the 
maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most 
serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or 
complaint, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by 
law for a violation of probation or mandatory supervision, 
whichever is shorter, but no later than 90 days prior to the 
expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a defendant 
who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to 
the committing court, and custody of the defendant shall be 
transferred without delay to the committing county and shall 
remain with the county until further order of the court.  The 
court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of 
the State Department of State Hospitals under the same 
commitment.  The court shall notify the community program 
director or a designee of the return and of any resulting court 
orders”). 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
Regarding the first path back to court, under section 1372, 
if the designated medical professional “determines that the 
defendant has regained mental competence,” that person “shall 
immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate 
of restoration.”  (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).)  Within 10 days of the 
filing of the certificate of restoration, the defendant “shall be 
returned to the committing court.”  (§ 1372, subd. (a)(3)(C).)  
“When a defendant is returned to court with a certification that 
competence has been regained,” the court shall notify the 
appropriate personnel “of the date of any hearing on the 
defendant’s competence and whether or not the defendant was 
found by the court to have recovered competence.”  (§ 1372, 
subd. (c)(1).) 
Although section 1372 refers to a “hearing on the 
defendant’s competence” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1)), it does not “set 
forth any . . . procedures” for such a hearing.  (People v. 
Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 867 (Rells).)  We have held, 
however, that “section 1372 allows its gaps to be filled by Penal 
Code section 1369,” which establishes the procedures for the 
initial hearing on the issue of a defendant’s mental competence.  
(Id. at p. 868.)  Thus, when a defendant returns to court after a 
certificate of restoration has been filed, the defendant is 
presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise 
at a hearing.  (See id. at pp. 867–868.)  “If the committing court 
approves the certificate of restoration” (§ 1372, subd. (d)) — thus 
finding the defendant has recovered competency — criminal 
proceedings resume (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and the court “shall 
hold a hearing to determine whether the person is entitled to be 
admitted to bail or released on own recognizance status pending 
conclusion of the proceedings” (§ 1372, subd. (d)).  The court 
may, however, “reject[] a certificate of restoration” based on a 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
medical evaluation (§ 1372, subd. (c)(2)), at which point a 
defendant may be returned to a treatment facility if the 
maximum commitment period has not yet been reached.  (See 
§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B); Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 106.) 
Different procedures apply if the maximum commitment 
term has been reached.  As mentioned, section 1370(c)(1) 
prohibits commitments lasting more than two years.  If the 
defendant has not regained competency, the statute does not 
provide for a hearing to redetermine a defendant’s competency 
at this point.  (Accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 
239, 246 (Taitano) [holding that trial courts are not authorized 
to hold competency hearings after the maximum statutory 
commitment period has expired where the court “had not 
received a certification that [the defendant] has been restored to 
competence by certain mental health officials (including the 
county medical health director) or the conservator”]; People v. 
Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375 (Quiroz) [holding that 
a trial judge has no power “to convene a competency hearing 
after a state hospital certifies that a defendant, who has been 
involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to 
stand trial, is not likely to regain competency”].)  Instead, 
section 1370 
directs 
the 
committing 
court 
to 
“initiate 
conservatorship proceedings for the defendant” if “it appears to 
the court that the defendant is gravely disabled.”  (§ 1370, 
subd. (c)(3).) 
A defendant is gravely disabled if, “as a result of a mental 
health disorder,” the defendant “is unable to provide for his or 
her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.”  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)  Alternatively, a defendant 
is 
gravely 
disabled — 
and 
subject 
to 
a 
Murphy 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
conservatorship — if the defendant “has been found mentally 
incompetent” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)) and certain facts obtain, 
including that “[t]he person represents a substantial danger of 
physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or 
disorder” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv)).  If the defendant is deemed 
gravely disabled under either definition, the defendant may be 
confined as long as “conservatorship is still required.”  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b).)  On the other hand, “If the 
defendant is not gravely disabled, the defendant must be 
released [citation], and the trial court may dismiss the action in 
the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 [citations].  Such 
a dismissal is ‘without prejudice to the initiation of any 
proceedings that may be appropriate’ under the [Lanterman-
Petris-Short] Act.”  (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at p. 102.) 
To summarize the steps in the commitment process most 
relevant to the issue before us:  A defendant found mentally 
incompetent to stand trial shall be committed by court order.  
(See § 1370.)  If the designated medical professional finds that 
the defendant’s competency has been restored, the person files 
a certificate of restoration, triggering the defendant’s return to 
court.  (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372.)  Following the 
defendant’s return, the court holds a hearing to determine 
whether to approve or reject the certificate.  (See § 1372.)  If a 
defendant has not regained competency within two years of the 
date of commitment, the defendant is either released or subject 
to civil conservatorship proceedings.  (See § 1370, subd. (c); 
Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102.) 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
B. Determining Whether a Commitment Continues 
Past the Filing of a Certificate of Restoration 
Because it involves a pure question of law, we review de 
novo the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the filing of a 
certificate 
of 
restoration 
terminates 
an 
incompetency 
commitment.  (See, e.g., Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 870.)  In 
interpreting the competency statutory scheme, “ ‘[O]ur task is to 
ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the 
purpose of the enactment.  [Citation.]  We look first to the words 
of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the 
Legislature’s intent.  [Citation.]  We construe the words of a 
statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an 
enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context 
of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ”  (Kim v. Reins 
International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83 (Kim).)  If 
“ ‘the [statutory] language supports more than one reasonable 
construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the 
ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ”  
(Ibid.) 
1. The Statutory Text Is More Consistent with 
Rodriguez’s Position than the People’s  
“The relevant statutes do not explicitly state the point at 
which an incompetency commitment ends” when a certificate of 
restoration has been timely filed.  (Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1144.)  That is, section 1370(c)(1) does not expressly specify 
when a commitment ends for a defendant who has been certified 
as restored to competence.  Likewise, section 1372 — the 
provision 
pertaining 
to 
certificates 
of 
restoration 
of 
competence — is silent regarding how the issuance of the 
certificate affects the running of the two-year maximum period 
of commitment.   
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
Nonetheless, as we explain below, the crucial competency 
assessments before and after the filing of the certificate of 
restoration require judicial action and approval.  The “legal 
force and effect” of the “filing of the certificate” is simply to 
“cause[] the defendant to be returned to court for further 
proceedings” (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 868; see also § 1372, 
subd. (a)), and even that return occurs pursuant to a court order.  
(See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); § 1372, subd. (a)(2).)  When the 
court’s central role in competency proceedings is juxtaposed 
against the limited significance of a certificate of restoration, we 
conclude the Legislature did not intend for the filing of a 
certificate to “fix[] . . . the end date for calculation of the 
commitment treatment period under section 1370(c)(1),” as the 
court below concluded.  (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 652.) 
a. The statutory text suggests that the two-year 
clock of section 1370(c)(1) does not stop with the 
filing of a certificate of restoration 
We begin, “as always, with the text” of the relevant 
statutes.  (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2021) 
11 Cal.5th 104, 114.)   
Section 1370(c)(1) provides that “[a]t the end of two years 
from the date of commitment . . . but no later than 90 days prior 
to the expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a 
defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be 
returned to the committing court.”  Even when a certificate of 
restoration of competency has been filed, it is the court’s decision 
whether to accept a certificate that determines whether criminal 
proceedings may resume, or whether — if the two-year 
timeframe has not elapsed — further treatment is required 
instead.  A finding that a defendant has recovered mental 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
competency requires a court order, and the court must act to 
approve the certificate of restoration even when not contested 
by the parties.  (See § 1372, subds. (c), (d).)  Moreover, before the 
court adjudicates a defendant competent, the defendant cannot 
seek bail or otherwise challenge the underlying charges because 
criminal proceedings remain suspended.  (See §§ 1372, subd. (d), 
1370, subd. (a)(1).)  This array of procedures suggests that until 
the court decides whether to accept a certificate, the two-year 
clock on an incompetency commitment (§ 1370(c)(1)) has not 
stopped. 
Section 1370(c)(1) also requires the defendant’s return to 
court 90 days before the expiration of the maximum two-year 
commitment period.  The reservation of a 90-day period cannot 
be wholly explained by the time it should take to transport the 
defendant.  Section 1370 makes clear that the defendant must 
be transported “without delay” (§ 1370(c)(1)), “immediate[ly]” 
(id., subd. (c)(2)(A)), and most concretely, “within 10 calendar 
days” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)).  The statute thus allows time for 
necessary subsequent judicial proceedings to be completed 
before reaching the maximum period of commitment. 
It is true the Legislature did not appear to have the issue 
before us specifically in mind when it amended section 
1370(c)(1) in 2014, effective January 1, 2015, to include this 
90-day period.  (See Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 2625 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Apr. 24, 2014, p. 1 [indicating that the language was added with 
the aim “to reduce the backlog of patients awaiting a state 
hospital placement in county jails by ensuring defendants found 
incompetent to stand trial (IST) who cannot be restored to trial 
competency are returned to their original county of commitment 
in a timely manner”].)  Nonetheless, the 90-day window is 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
consistent with Rodriguez’s general position that some judicial 
action is necessary to end a commitment period.   
b. The People’s interpretation of the statutory text 
is unpersuasive 
The People’s arguments do not persuade us that “the plain 
language of the statutory scheme” requires courts to exclude the 
period following the filing of a certificate of restoration from the 
two-year maximum commitment period.   
i. Section 1372 
First, the People rely heavily on section 1372’s provisions 
regarding the certification of restoration to competence.  Yet it 
is not 
clear 
how 
this section supports 
the 
People’s 
interpretation.  As previously summarized, section 1372 
specifies that “[i]f the medical director of a state hospital [or 
other appropriate personnel] determines that the defendant has 
regained mental competence, the director or designee shall 
immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate 
of restoration with the court.”  (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).)  Because 
the court’s initial commitment order must have directed the 
sheriff to “redeliver the patient to the court . . . upon receiving 
from the state hospital or treatment facility a copy of the 
certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(2)), “the patient shall be 
returned to the committing court no later than 10 days following 
the filing of a certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)).  
Upon a defendant’s return to court, all further proceedings occur 
at the court’s discretion.  (See § 1372, subds. (c)–(e).)  In short, 
section 1372 specifies what the filing of a certificate of 
restoration accomplishes:  It causes the sheriff to “redeliver the 
patient to the court” pursuant to the court order.  (§ 1372, 
subd. (a)(2).)  Section 1372 contains no hint that the time 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a court’s 
ruling on the certificate is excluded from the commitment 
period. 
The People maintain that “[n]othing in the plain language 
of the statutory scheme suggests that the discretionary hearing 
contemplated by section 1372 falls within the commitment time 
enumerated in section 1370, subd. (c)(1).”  The Court of Appeal 
reached the same conclusion.  (See Rodriguez, supra, 
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 650 [“Section 1372 does not explicitly state 
any timeframe within which the restoration hearing must be 
held and does not reference section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year 
maximum for an incompetency commitment”].) 
As we have recognized, however, section 1372 “does not set 
forth any . . . procedures whatsoever” to govern the hearing on a 
defendant’s recovery of mental competency.  (Rells, supra, 
22 Cal.4th at p. 867; see also People v. Murrell (1987) 
196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826 [observing that “section 1372 does not 
directly provide for a hearing where the defendant may 
challenge the medical director’s certification of competence” and 
the legislative intent to provide for such a hearing must be 
inferred].)  Thus, the fact that section 1372 does not mention 
section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit is neither surprising nor 
illuminating.7 
 
7  
We also note that section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii) 
specifies that “[i]f a certificate of restoration of competency was 
filed with the court pursuant to Section 1372 and the court 
subsequently rejected the certification,” the court shall provide 
“a new computation or statement setting forth the amount of 
credit for time served, if any, to be deducted from the 
defendant’s maximum term of commitment based on the court’s 
 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
ii. The statutory presumption of competence 
Second, the People rely upon the presumption of 
competence (see § 1369, subd. (f)), which applies at a section 
1372 hearing at which a judge determines whether to approve 
or reject a certificate of restoration.  (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th 
at p. 862.)  The court below likewise relied on this presumption, 
reasoning that the absence of further treatment together with 
the presumption of competence meant that a defendant could no 
longer be regarded as subject to a commitment after the 
certificate’s filing.  (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 653, 
655–656.)  But there is reason to question this analysis.8 
The presumption of competence applies at every trial and 
retrial of a defendant’s competency, even where there is reason 
to doubt a defendant is competent.  As we have previously noted, 
“[t]he presumption that the defendant is mentally competent . . . 
 
rejection of the certification.”  (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii), italics 
added.)  This language appears to contemplate that when “a 
certificate of restoration of competency was filed with the court 
pursuant to Section 1372 and the court subsequently rejected 
the certification,” the period in between the filing of the 
certificate and the court’s rejection thereof is relevant for 
purposes of computing the maximum period of commitment 
allowed by section 1370(c)(1).  (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).) 
8  
The Court of Appeal relied on Rells in concluding that “the 
filing of the certificate triggers a presumption of mental 
competency 
under 
section 
1372.” 
 
(Rodriguez, 
supra, 
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.)  But Rells merely stated that the 
filing of the certificate of restoration “trigger[s] a hearing on a 
defendant’s recovery of mental competence.”  (Rells, supra, 
22 Cal.4th at p. 868, italics added.)  At this hearing, as 
explained post, the presumption of competence operates as a 
principle of law as in any competency proceeding.  It is a 
misreading of Rells to conclude that a restoration certificate 
itself creates the presumption of competence. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
is applicable at a trial of the defendant’s mental competence” 
when a court first declares doubt as to the mental competence of 
the defendant.  (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867.)  The 
presumption therefore applies “in spite of the fact that it may 
run counter to any doubt expressed by the court and supported 
by the opinion of [the defendant’s] own counsel.”  (Ibid.)  When 
the statute provided for a defendant’s return to court if the 
defendant was still incompetent after an 18-month commitment 
(see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; former § 1370, subd. 
(b)(2)), the presumption of competence was likewise applicable 
at the retrial of the defendant’s competence “in spite of the fact 
that it is inconsistent with his apparent nonrecovery of mental 
competence.”  (Rells, at p. 867.) 
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the Legislature 
simply intended for the presumption of competence to operate 
as a principle of law that a court applies in making a competency 
determination at any stage.  (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
p. 862 [stating that the presumption of competence “operates to 
impose the burden of proof on the party, if any, who claims that 
the defendant is mentally incompetent, and fixes the weight 
thereof at preponderance of the evidence”]; Medina v. 
California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 449 [explaining that the 
presumption of competence has limited legal effect, “affect[ing] 
competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases 
where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence 
that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence 
that he is incompetent”].)  It goes too far to conclude that the 
presumption reflects the Legislature’s understanding that a 
commitment ends upon the filing of a certificate of restoration. 
Furthermore, even when the presumption of competence 
does not run counter to doubts regarding the defendant’s 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
competency — and instead “conforms in fact with the certificate 
of restoration filed by the specified mental health official” (Rells, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867, italics omitted) — the court has the 
statutory authority to reject the certification and find a 
defendant incompetent (see § 1372, subd. (c)(2)).9  Yet, under the 
People’s interpretation, even an erroneous certificate of 
restoration terminates an incompetency commitment.  The 
People offer no persuasive explanation why the Legislature 
would intend that an incompetent defendant — who like 
Rodriguez may be moved between a state hospital and the 
county jail, all the while remaining confined and involuntarily 
medicated — should not have such time counted toward the 
maximum term of commitment merely because his doctor 
mistakenly concluded that he has regained competency. 
iii. The asserted primacy of location 
The People’s third textual argument is based on section 
1370.  The People assert that section 1370 uses the words 
“delivered” and “committed” synonymously in arguing that a 
commitment consists only of that period “wherein the defendant 
is physically placed in the care and custody of the state hospital 
for restoration treatment.”  (See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i) 
[specifying that once a defendant is found incompetent, “[t]he 
 
9  
This contrasts with previous versions of the law, in which 
a designated medical professional’s certification that a 
defendant has recovered mental competency served to render a 
person competent as a matter of law.  (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, 
§ 7, p. 3320; People v. Ashley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 339, 359 (Ashley) 
[after a superintendent of a state hospital certifies that a 
defendant has regained competence, “[t]he defendant is then to 
be tried”]; In re Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838, 843–844 (Phyle); 
People v. Superior Court (Contra Costa County) (1935) 4 Cal.2d 
136, 145 (Contra Costa County).) 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
court shall order that the mentally incompetent defendant be 
delivered by the sheriff to a State Department of State Hospitals 
facility . . . or to any other available public or private treatment 
facility . . . or placed on outpatient status”]; id., subd. (a)(2) 
[referring to the order made under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) as 
“the order directing that the defendant be committed to the 
State Department of State Hospitals or other treatment facility 
or placed on outpatient status”].)  Because a defendant is 
“committed” only upon being “delivered” to a treatment facility, 
the People maintain, “the definition of the ‘commitment’ . . . 
should not be conflated with the period of court-adjudged 
incompetency.”  Instead, according to the People, this language 
signifies that it is a defendant’s presence at a treatment facility 
that constitutes a commitment.  And because a defendant is 
transferred back to county custody after being certified as 
having been restored to competency, the People contend, the 
defendant is no longer committed for purposes of calculating the 
two-year time limit.   
There are significant problems with the People’s argument 
that commitment only occurs when the defendant is physically 
present at a treatment facility.  First, if location is 
determinative of whether a defendant is committed, then a 
commitment should end with a defendant’s actual transport 
from the treatment facility back to county custody — not with 
the filing of a certificate of restoration, as the People claim.  
Section 1372 makes clear that such transport may take as long 
as 10 days from the filing of the certificate.  (§ 1372, 
subd. (a)(3)(C) [“In all cases, the patient shall be returned to the 
committing court no later than 10 days following the filing of a 
certificate of restoration”].)  The People’s position that a 
commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of restoration is 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
therefore inconsistent with their own assertion that a 
commitment consists of the period when a defendant is 
physically in a treatment facility.10 
Second, the People’s position is inconsistent with various 
statutory provisions relating to competency determinations and 
proceedings that treat “commitment” as distinct from events 
such as “admission,” “transfer,” or “confinement.”  For example, 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 “establish[es] a 
program for the [D]epartment to perform reevaluations 
primarily through telehealth evaluations for felony incompetent 
to stand trial (IST) individuals in jail who have been waiting for 
admission to the [D]epartment.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4335.2, 
subd. (b).)  Among the stated goals of allowing for such 
telehealth evaluations is “[t]o permit the [D]epartment to 
conduct reevaluations of IST defendants committed to the 
[D]epartment 
and 
awaiting 
admission 
to 
[D]epartment 
facilities.”  (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics added; see also id., subd. (c) 
 
10  
In this case, the dates of the trial court’s orders of 
commitment are not the dates of Rodriguez’s transport to a state 
hospital or the dates of his admission to such a facility — i.e., 
they are not when Rodriguez was “physically placed in the care 
and custody of the state hospital for restoration treatment.”  The 
record does not reflect when Rodriguez was transported to or 
from a state hospital for either of his two commitments (see 
Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 636–638), making it 
impossible to evaluate how long Rodriguez has been committed 
under the People’s reading of the statutes.  This gap in the 
record may be explained by the fact that the parties below 
agreed that the dates of the transports were not legally 
significant.  Before the Court of Appeal, the People “apparently 
concede[d] that Rodriguez’s ‘commitment’ under section 
1370(c)(1) began on the date of the trial court’s order of 
commitment.”  (Id. at p. 650, fn. 14.)   
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
[“The [D]epartment, or its designee, have the authority and sole 
discretion to consider and conduct reevaluations for IST 
defendants committed to and awaiting admission to the 
[D]epartment”], italics added.)  This provision suggests that a 
defendant is deemed committed upon having his or her place of 
treatment judicially determined, not when the defendant 
actually enters a treatment facility. 
Along the same lines, section 1370 requires the 
Department to “make a written report to the court . . . 
concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of mental 
competence” “[w]ithin 90 days after a commitment made 
pursuant 
to 
subdivision 
(a).” 
 
(§ 1370, 
subd. 
(b)(1).)  
“Commitment,” as used in this provision — i.e., “a commitment 
made pursuant to subdivision (a)” — refers to the court’s 
commitment order, and not admission to or physical placement 
in a state hospital.  (Ibid.)  Similarly, other subdivisions of 
section 1370 refer to “commit[ment]” and “confine[ment]” or 
“commit[ment]” and “transfer” to a facility as separate events.  
(See, e.g., § 1370, subd. (a)(5) [“When directing that the 
defendant be confined in a State Department of State Hospitals 
facility pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall commit the 
defendant to the State Department of State Hospitals”]; id., 
subd. (a)(6)(A) [specifying appropriate actions a court may take 
in the event “the defendant is committed or transferred to the 
State Department of State Hospitals pursuant to this section”].)  
A commitment thus does not necessarily coincide with actual 
presence in a state treatment facility.11 
 
11  
We need not decide in this case whether defendants placed 
on outpatient status (see § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(A)(ii)) are, 
 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
iv. Other textual arguments 
The People also rely on section 1370(c)(1), which specifies 
that “a defendant who has not recovered mental competence 
shall be returned to the committing court” at the end of a two-
year commitment period.  The People argue that the two-year 
time limit in section 1370(c)(1) cannot “apply to court hearings 
after the defendant has been returned to court pursuant to 
section 1372, given that the remedy [under section 1370(c)(1)] is 
to return the defendant to the committing court — an event that 
has already occurred.”   
The People’s interpretation fails to recognize section 
1370(c)(1)’s multiple functions.  This statute not only compels 
the transport of a defendant from one place to another, but also 
limits the amount of time that a defendant may be committed 
due to incompetency.  (See § 1370(c)(1) [specifying that “[t]he 
court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of 
the State Department of State Hospitals under the same 
commitment” if a defendant has reached his maximum term of 
commitment].)  Rodriguez seeks the application of this limit and 
a declaration that as a defendant whose commitment has 
reached the statutorily allowed maximum, “the court should 
either order him released from confinement or initiate 
appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 
 
in fact, committed for purposes of the two-year limit.  Under the 
People’s reading of the statutes, however, defendants who are 
on outpatient status are never committed because they are never 
physically in the custody of a treatment facility.  It is unclear 
what meaning, if any, section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit would 
have under the People’s reading. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
p. 807) — neither of which is “an event that has already 
occurred.”12   
The People also contend that if we were to “conclud[e] that 
a court’s competency finding is necessary to terminate [a] 
commitment,” commitments would last “indefinitely” for certain 
defendants.  Specifically, the People point to defendants 
returned to court when a designated medical professional 
reports that “there is no substantial likelihood that the 
defendant[s] will regain mental competence in the foreseeable 
future” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1)(A)) and those returned to court after 
 
12  
The People’s argument also ignores the possibility that an 
incompetent defendant may be treated at the county jail.  
Welfare and Institutions Code section 4100 enumerates the 
types of facilities over which the Department has jurisdiction.  
Among these are “county jail treatment facilit[ies] under 
contract with the State Department of State Hospitals to 
provide competency restoration services.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 4100, subd. (g).)  A defendant committed to a Department 
facility could be at the county jail treatment facility for the 
entire commitment period. 
Section 1370(c)(1) therefore requires that defendants 
treated at the county jails “be returned to the committing court” 
and their “custody . . . be transferred without delay to the 
committing county” at the end of their maximum terms of 
commitment and “shall remain with the county until further 
order of the court.”  (Ibid.)  This means that section 1370(c)(1) 
requires defendants already in county custody be returned to 
county custody until the court takes action regarding their 
commitment status.  (Ibid.)  Yet, the People do not argue that 
section 1370(c)(1) is inapplicable to defendants receiving 
treatment at a county jail facility despite their county custody 
constituting “an event that has already occurred.”  For such 
defendants, 
like 
those 
in 
Rodriguez’s 
situation, 
section 1370(c)(1) is applicable regardless of the defendant’s 
physical location. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
their maximum commitment term has expired (§ 1370(c)(1)).  
The People maintain that because the statutes do not provide 
for a court hearing to redetermine defendants’ competency when 
they are returned via these two paths, such hearings would 
never occur and the defendants “would remain indefinitely 
committed.”  (See Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 239; 
Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.)  But we are 
addressing only the limited issue of whether the interval 
between the filing of a certificate of restoration and the court’s 
ruling on it is excluded from the maximum commitment time set 
by section 1370(c)(1).  Our holding does not mean that 
defendants returned without such certificates will be committed 
“indefinitely.” 
Finally, in their amicus curiae brief submitted in support 
of the People, the State Department of State Hospitals and the 
State Department of Developmental Services make an 
argument that relies on the timing of when a commitment 
begins.  According to amici curiae, “[i]t is undisputed that the 
maximum commitment period does not include the time before 
a court conducts an initial competency hearing,” i.e., a hearing 
under section 1370.  According to amici curiae, “[t]he time 
between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a 
section 1372 hearing should be treated the same way” and 
excluded from the maximum competency period. 
But a defendant awaiting a competency hearing under 
section 1370 differs in important ways from a defendant 
awaiting a competency determination under section 1372.  
Before a court conducts an initial competency hearing under 
section 1370, the defendant has not been legally adjudicated as 
incompetent.  In contrast, a defendant who has been certified by 
medical personnel as restored to competency necessarily has 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
been previously determined to be incompetent, and until a court 
makes a competency finding pursuant to section 1372, the 
defendant cannot be treated as legally competent.  In addition, 
a defendant who has not been adjudicated as incompetent may 
still be released on bail.  (See § 1371.)  A defendant who has been 
certified as competent, on the other hand, is ineligible for bail 
consideration until the court determines the defendant has 
regained competency.  (See § 1372, subd. (d).) 
In short, the period prior to a competency hearing under 
section 1370 occurs before the period of commitment and thus 
tells us very little about the period of commitment itself.  The 
fact that “the time before a court conducts an initial competency 
hearing” under section 1370 is not counted toward the term of 
commitment does not persuade us to likewise exclude from a 
maximum period of commitment the interval before a court 
conducts a competency hearing under section 1372. 
2. Rodriguez’s Interpretation Furthers the Purposes 
of the Statute 
The statutory text read in context is consistent with the 
understanding that the filing of a certificate of restoration does 
not stop the two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1).  But 
because the language of these statutes “ ‘supports more than one 
reasonable construction,’ ” we look for an interpretation of the 
statute that will best “ ‘effectuate the purpose’ ” of the 
competency statutory scheme.  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.)  
We conclude Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation furthers the 
purpose of the relevant competency statutes. 
We have explained that “[t]he incompetence program . . . 
is a special form of pretrial detention” whose “purpose is 
restoration of a specific mental state without which the criminal 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
process cannot proceed.”  (Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 569, 
italics omitted.)  In adopting the “incompetence program” in 
1974, the Legislature clearly intended to limit a defendant’s 
time in “pretrial detention” and to suspend “the criminal 
process” so that the defendant can be restored to “a specific 
mental state.”  (Ibid., italics omitted; see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, 
§ 16, pp. 3323–3324.)  The Legislature also intended to 
“eliminate uncertainty among all persons concerned regarding 
court procedures.”  (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324.)  This 
latter goal of providing certainty is evident in the Legislature’s 
decision to limit the maximum term of commitment to three 
years (and later two), rather than the “reasonable period of 
time” mandated under Davis and Jackson v. Indiana.  (Davis, 
supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at 
p. 738.)  As we explained in Jackson v. Superior Court, “the 
Legislature established the [then] three-year maximum in 
section 1370(c) to protect defendants’ due process and equal 
protection rights not to be committed solely because of 
incompetence for longer than is reasonable.”  (Jackson v. 
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.)   
Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation — specifically, not 
excluding the period between the filing of a certificate of 
competence, and the court’s ruling on the certificate — is 
consistent with the Legislature’s intent to limit the period of 
detention due to incompetency and provide certainty regarding 
the length of that detention period.  Under this interpretation, 
incompetent defendants are assured that they cannot be 
confined simply on account of their inability to proceed to trial 
for more than a specified two-year period.   
By contrast, the People’s proposed interpretation runs 
counter to the legislative goal of limiting a defendant’s 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
confinement “solely because of incompetence.”  (Jackson v. 
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.)  If we were to adopt 
the People’s interpretation, a defendant could be held 
indefinitely while awaiting a competency hearing, subject only 
to the limits imposed by the due process clause.  As explained 
previously, after the filing of a certificate of restoration but 
before the court adjudicates the defendant competent, the 
defendant cannot seek bail or otherwise challenge the 
underlying charges because the criminal proceedings remain 
suspended.  (See §§ 1372, subd. (d), 1370, subd. (a)(1).)  Allowing 
defendants to remain in this state of limbo is contrary to the 
entire statutory scheme. 
The People’s construction would also eliminate any 
urgency in reaching a determination of competency.  This again 
runs counter to the Legislature’s intent, in imposing the two-
year limit under section 1370(c)(1), to eliminate the uncertainty 
inherent in the “reasonable period of time” standard under 
Davis and Jackson v. Indiana and ensure that individuals who 
may never regain competence are not indefinitely detained with 
the criminal process suspended.   
Furthermore, the fact that a defendant may continue to 
receive treatment even post-certification means that some of the 
period following the filing of the certificate is reasonably seen as 
a part of the process of treatment to determine whether 
competence can be, and ultimately is, regained — which is what 
the statute generally aims to expedite.  (See Stats. 1974, 
ch. 1511, § 16, pp. 3323–3324; see also, e.g., Davis, supra, 
8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at p. 105.)  Including this period within the limit of section 
1370(c)(1) furthers the legislative intent underlying the 
competency statutes for this reason as well. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
3. The Statutory Background Cuts Against the 
People’s Position 
Our interpretation of the relevant statutes is bolstered by 
the evolution of the competency scheme, which since 1974 has 
progressively moved control of incompetent defendants away 
from designated medical professionals at facilities providing 
competency restoration services, and toward supervision by the 
courts.   
a. The evolution of the competency statutory 
scheme 
In ending the indefinite commitment of mentally 
incompetent defendants in 1974, the Legislature imposed on the 
Department (and other facilities) the obligation to provide 
periodic reports to the court.  Specifically, the Legislature 
mandated that “[w]ithin 90 days of a commitment . . . , the 
superintendent of the state hospital or other facility to which the 
defendant is committed shall make a written report to the court 
concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of his 
mental competence.”  (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, pp. 3318–3319.)  
Only if “the report discloses a substantial likelihood the 
defendant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable 
future” will the defendant “remain in the state hospital or other 
facility.”  (Id. at p. 3319.)  After the initial report, “at six-month 
intervals or until the defendant becomes mentally competent, 
the superintendent of the hospital or person in charge of the 
facility shall report to the court regarding the defendant’s 
progress.”  (Ibid.)  Should a report at any point indicate that 
“there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
his mental competence in the foreseeable future, the committing 
court shall order him to be returned to the court.”13  (Ibid.) 
In 1980, the Legislature extended the courts’ role in 
overseeing competency procedures by making them responsible 
for determining whether a defendant has regained competency 
when the defendant is returned to court following the filing of a 
certificate of restoration.  (See Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, 
p. 1517.)  Before this amendment, once the designated medical 
professional certified a defendant as restored to competency, 
“[t]he defendant [was] then to be tried.”  (Ashley, supra, 
59 Cal.2d at p. 359; see also Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.)  
 
13  
These 
reporting 
requirements 
have 
remained 
substantially unchanged since 1974, although the statutory 
language has been amended to take into account placement 
options not previously available.  (See § 1370, subd. (b).) 
 
Relying on passages from various Court of Appeal 
decisions, the People argue that “[t]he evil remedied by In re 
Davis and later addressed by the Legislature in enacting section 
1370, subd. (c)(1) [in 1974], was the languishing of incompetent 
defendants in treatment facilities, not delays in judicial 
determinations of competency or other court business when 
defendants are within the court’s direct control.”  Davis makes 
clear, however, that we were also concerned with the lack of 
court supervision over defendants “confined in state hospitals.”  
(Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 806.)  It was with an eye toward 
imposing more judicial oversight that we directed “the hospitals’ 
authorities [to] report [to the superior courts] . . . regarding 
the . . . progress toward competence” of “all persons . . . 
committed as incompetent to stand trial.”  (Ibid.)  These 
reporting requirements, designed to help courts determine 
whether progress was made in restoring competency, were then 
enacted into law when the Legislature overhauled the 
competency statutory scheme in 1974.  In other words, our court 
in Davis and the Legislature in 1974 both sought to put 
incompetent defendants more “within the court’s direct control.” 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
That is, “the final determination” of a defendant’s restoration of 
competency rested with the designated medical professional.  
(Phyle, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 849.)  The Legislature took away 
the power to make this “final determination” when it required a 
court to approve or reject a certificate of restoration.  (Ibid.)  
Now, a court may accept a certificate of restoration, finding the 
defendant competent and allowing criminal proceedings to 
resume.  (See §§ 1372, subd. (c), 1370, subd. (a)(1).)  Or, a court 
may reject a certificate of restoration, finding that the defendant 
remains incompetent.  (See § 1372, subd. (c)(2).)  In other words, 
the court may disagree with the designated medical 
professional, and it is the court’s judgment that carries legal 
significance.14 
 
14  
The courts in Carr and Rodriguez touched on this point as 
it relates to the question before us.  The Carr court reasoned 
that “if the commitment terminates when a health official files 
a certification of competence, [no] plausible purpose [would be] 
served in requiring [a] court to approve the certification as 
expressly contemplated in section 1372, subdivision (d).”  (Carr, 
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.)  The court below responded to 
Carr by positing that “[t]he issuance of the restoration 
certificate and the subsequent court hearing have distinct 
statutory objectives.”  (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 652.)  According to Rodriguez, “[t]he certificate of restoration 
to competence by the designated health official and prompt 
return to the trial court vindicates the defendant’s right not to 
remain longer than two years in the treatment facility,” whereas 
“[t]he judicial determination of restoration of competency 
ensures that the defendant is not tried if incompetent.”  (Id. at 
p. 655.)  The fact remains, however, that the designated medical 
professional 
and 
the 
court 
are 
making 
the 
same 
determination — whether the defendant is competent — and 
the court’s decision controls. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
In addition, courts are empowered to remove defendants 
from their commitment placement without input from the 
designated medical professional.  In the 1974 enactment, the 
Legislature declared that a defendant “shall be returned to the 
committing court” if the court determines that “treatment for 
the defendant’s mental impairment is [not] being conducted.”  
(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; see also § 1370, subd. (b)(4).)  
In 2018, the Legislature specified that “[i]f, at any time after the 
court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial,” the 
court receives “substantial evidence . . . as to create a doubt in 
the mind of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental 
incompetence,” the court may appoint an expert to examine the 
defendant.  (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(G), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 34, 
§ 25.)  If the expert opines that the defendant has regained 
competency, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of 
restoration of competence has been returned,” although no such 
certificate has been filed by the designated medical professional.  
(Ibid.)15  Neither of these procedures requires the state 
hospital’s involvement.  
 
15  
Likewise, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of 
restoration of competence has been returned” if the Department 
elects to conduct a telehealth reevaluation of a defendant 
adjudicated mentally incompetent when the defendant is still in 
county custody and “in the opinion of the department’s expert, 
the defendant has regained competence.”  (§ 1370, subd. 
(a)(1)(H)(ii).)  If the filing of a certificate ends a commitment as 
the People argue, it follows that an opinion of restored 
competency rendered under section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) 
and (a)(1)(H) should also automatically end a commitment.  It 
seems unlikely the Legislature would have intended for multiple 
events, potentially happening on different dates, to mark the 
end of a commitment, as that would sow conflict and confusion. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
To summarize:  Through a series of enactments 
concerning competency proceedings, the Legislature has vested 
courts with responsibility for overseeing the progress of 
defendants committed for the purpose of restoring their 
competency.  Much of this responsibility previously rested with 
the Department and related entities.  The Legislature, however, 
has shifted this authority to the courts to ensure that “a person 
charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed 
solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be 
held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to 
determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will 
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.”  (Jackson v. 
Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738.)  This sequence of 
amendments cuts against the People’s argument and suggests 
that the Legislature did not intend a certificate of restoration 
filed by a designated medical professional to unilaterally stop 
the two-year clock. 
b. The People’s reliance on the 2018 amendment 
As mentioned, in 2018, the Legislature shortened the 
maximum commitment term from three years to two years.  
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 3.)  The People point to a summary 
provided by the Legislative Counsel, which stated that the 2018 
bill “would reduce the term for commitment to a treatment 
facility when a felony [is] committed to the shorter of 2 years or 
the period of commitment equal to the maximum term of 
imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense 
charged.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.).)  Relying on the phrase “to a treatment facility” 
within this summary, the People argue that the Legislature did 
not intend “the maximum commitment to include court hearings 
that occur when the defendant is no longer receiving restoration 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
treatment and is no longer in the care and custody of the state 
hospital.” 
To the extent the People are focused on a defendant being 
in a “treatment facility” or in the “custody of the state hospital,” 
the People are again arguing that physical presence in a facility 
is determinative of commitment.  The legislative history of the 
2018 amendment does not support this claim.  For example, the 
Senate Committee on Public Safety’s analysis of the measure 
simply stated, “The bill changes the maximum commitment 
term for a felony from three years to two years.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as 
introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 5.)  The analysis thus repeated the 
Legislative Counsel’s Digest statement regarding the reduction 
in the maximum term, but omitted the phrase “to a treatment 
facility.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra.)  
Similarly, another analysis explained that the bill “reduces the 
maximum term of commitment to a treatment facility to restore 
a defendant’s competency from three years to two years.”  (Sen. 
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 
2018, p. 1.)  Yet the same analysis also stated that the bill 
“[r]educes the maximum term of commitment for purposes of 
restoring a defendant’s mental competency from three years to 
two years,” again without mentioning treatment facilities.  (Id. 
at p. 3.)  The varying language found in the legislative materials 
does not establish that the legislators understood that only time 
at treatment facilities would be impacted by the bill.  The 
Legislature instead could have referred to time spent in a 
facility as a shorthand for the entire time of commitment, 
without intending to exclude other time intervals from counting 
toward the maximum commitment period. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
c. The People’s argument that treatment is 
determinative 
Based largely on their reading of the legislative history, 
the People argue that the provision and termination of 
treatment for incompetency marks the beginning and end of an 
incompetency commitment.16   
Underlying the People’s equation of treatment with 
commitment 
are 
the 
assumptions 
that 
(1) incompetent 
defendants always receive treatment while committed to 
facilities like a state hospital, and (2) incompetent defendants 
never receive treatment when they leave the facilities.  Both 
assumptions are unsupported.   
First, the statutory scheme allows for the possibility that 
even after a judge or jury finds a defendant incompetent to stand 
trial and the court orders the defendant committed to the 
Department, the Department can certify the defendant as 
restored to competency — without providing any treatment.  
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2, the 
Department has the “authority and sole discretion to consider 
and conduct reevaluations for IST defendants committed to and 
awaiting admission to the department.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 4335.2, subd. (c).)  Such reevaluations are done “primarily 
through telehealth evaluations.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  If “the 
 
16  
As various amicus curiae point out, the People’s position 
would mean that commitment does not encompass “the period 
of time while an individual is awaiting treatment even where 
the current average wait time for placement in a state hospital 
competency restoration program” is significant.  As discussed 
ante, such an interpretation runs counter to the legislative 
intent to limit the period of detention due to incompetency and 
provide certainty regarding the length of the detention period. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
department clinician or contracted clinician” (see id., subd. (d)) 
conducting the evaluation concludes that the defendant has 
regained competency (id., subd. (d)(1)), the clinician’s opinion 
obligates the court to “proceed as if a certificate of restoration of 
competence has been returned” (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. 
(a)(1)(H)(ii)).  In other words, defendants may be returned to 
court as if they have been certified as restored to competency 
without any restoration treatment being extended.  (See also 
Medina v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1225 
(Medina) [“it was not necessary for Medina to have first been 
provided care and treatment for a certificate of restoration to be 
filed”]; Carr v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 264, 272 
[similar]; Contra Costa County, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 146 [“The 
medical superintendent of the Stockton state hospital [informed 
the court] that he believed from the first that the defendant was 
simulating insanity” and so requested that the defendant be 
returned to court].) 
Second, also contrary to the People’s assertion, treatment 
may continue even after a defendant has been certified as 
restored to competency.  Section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(iii), 
permits continued “involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
medication to the defendant . . . when the defendant returns to 
county custody” after a certificate of restoration has been filed.  
This is precisely what happened in this case.  When Rodriguez 
was certified as competent, the medical director of the state 
hospital informed the court that Rodriguez was “being returned 
to court on psychotropic medication.”  The director stressed that 
Rodriguez needed to “remain on this medication . . . to enable 
him to be certified” as competent.  The record therefore 
demonstrates it was contemplated that Rodriguez’s treatment 
would continue even after he left the state hospital. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
There are also practical problems with the People’s 
approach.  It would be difficult to calculate exactly how long a 
defendant has been committed if the provision of treatment 
determined the length of a commitment.  The provision of 
treatment does not necessarily coincide with where the 
defendant is located (e.g., in or outside a treatment facility) or 
what part of the competency proceedings the defendant is in 
(e.g., after a commitment order issues but before transport, or 
after a certificate is filed but before transport).  Given these 
circumstances, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended for 
the provision or cessation of treatment to delineate whether the 
two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1) is running. 
4. The Decisions Cited by the People Do Not Support 
Their Interpretation of the Statutory Text  
We are unconvinced that the decisions cited by the People 
support their position that only time spent at a treatment 
facility counts as part of a commitment period.   
The court in Medina stated in dicta that “[i]n the usual 
case, only days actually spent in commitment at a mental 
institution or treatment facility are applied to the maximum 
commitment period.”  (Medina, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1203.)  The statement, however, was made without any 
support or elaboration, and the court emphasized it found the 
case before it “unusual.”  (Ibid.)  Specifically, the defendant in 
Medina had not received required treatment due to what the 
Court of Appeal characterized as a “standoff” between the trial 
court that issued a commitment order and the authorities 
responsible for providing treatment, who refused to accept him.  
(Id. at p. 1201.)  The Court of Appeal resolved this impasse, and 
the defendant’s resulting claim of a due process violation, by 
including “all days since the date of the commitment order in 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
which [the defendant] has been in jail, prison, or treatment” (id. 
at p. 1203; see id. at p. 1230) as part of the commitment period.  
The Medina court was not asked to decide whether a certificate 
of restoration or a court’s subsequent order finding the 
defendant restored to competency marks the end of a 
commitment period, because no certificate of restoration was 
ever filed in that case.  (Id. at p. 1229.)  Furthermore, that 
court’s assessment of the “usual” calculations regarding the time 
of commitment (id. at p. 1203) was inconsequential in light of 
the remedy the court ultimately adopted. 
Similarly distinguishable are People v. G.H. (2014) 
230 Cal.App.4th 1548 (G.H.) and People v. Reynolds (2011) 
196 Cal.App.4th 801 (Reynolds).  Those courts held a 
defendant’s precommitment custody credits did not apply when 
calculating the then-applicable three-year maximum statutory 
limit for a commitment.  (See G.H., at p. 1553; Reynolds, at 
pp. 803–804, 808–809.)17  The People and the Court of Appeal 
 
17  
In doing so, G.H. and Reynolds distinguished In re Banks 
(1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 864.  Banks held equal protection and due 
process principles mandated application of precommitment 
custody credits when the maximum commitment period is 
measured by the maximum term of imprisonment for the most 
serious offense charged because “the denial of credit[s] 
necessarily results in longer confinement for indigents unable to 
post 
bail 
bonds. 
 
This 
discriminatory 
treatment 
is 
constitutionally forbidden.”  (Id. at p. 869, fn. omitted.)  
However, when the maximum commitment period is set to the 
statutory maximum limit, G.H. and Reynolds held that there are 
no potential equal protection or due process violations and the 
statute controls because similarly situated defendants are not 
deprived of the benefit of the precommitment jail time if 
convicted.  (See G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1557–1558; 
Reynolds, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 808–809.) 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
relied on G.H. and Reynolds in support of the notion “that a 
defendant’s days in custody in which he or she is not being 
treated for restoration to competence do not count toward the 
maximum 
commitment 
period.” 
(Rodriguez, 
supra, 
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.)  But here again, G.H. and Reynolds 
were focused on an issue different from the one before us.  The 
analysis in G.H. and Reynolds centered on how to treat a 
defendant’s time in custody prior to the issuance of a 
commitment order when calculating the maximum commitment 
period under section 1370(c)(1).  By contrast, the court is here 
asked to address the treatment of custodial time after a trial 
court has ruled a defendant incompetent but before ruling on a 
certificate of restoration.  As we have explained, this distinction 
is significant and counsels against relying on G.H.’s 
characterization of the commitment period.18 
5. We Are Not Persuaded by the People’s Remaining 
Arguments  
The People contend that “absurd and unintended 
consequences” would result if we were to adopt Rodriguez’s 
interpretation.  (See, e.g., Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. 
 
18  
In the course of its decision, G.H. stated that “[s]ection 
1370, subdivision (c)(1)’s three-year statutory limit applies to 
the total period actually spent in commitment at a mental 
institution.  ([Polk, supra,] 71 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1238 . . . .)”  
(G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1558–1559, italics added.)  
As amicus curiae have observed, Polk in fact makes no mention 
of any distinction between time spent postcommitment at a 
treatment facility versus time spent postcommitment in county 
custody awaiting judicial proceedings following submission of a 
certificate of restoration.  Polk held that the maximum statutory 
period under section 1370(c)(1) applies to “the aggregate of all 
commitments on the same charges.”  (Polk, at p. 1238.)  Nothing 
in our decision contradicts this holding. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
46 
Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27 [“we may reject a literal 
construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent 
in the statute or that would lead to absurd results”].)  We 
address each of the People’s arguments in turn. 
a. “Arbitrarily truncated” time for treatment 
The People contend that if a commitment does not 
terminate with a filing of a certificate of restoration, time “to 
provide necessary restoration treatment would . . . be arbitrarily 
truncated” because medical personnel would need to “predict[] 
whether the defendant will contest the hospital’s certification in 
the future” and “how much time the defense will require to 
prepare for such a hearing.” 
The People’s argument implies that medical personnel 
would take into account the time available until the maximum 
term of commitment is reached in deciding when and how to 
provide treatment, instead of expeditiously restoring defendants 
to competency.  But the Department denies it considers such 
factors when providing treatment, and the People offer no 
evidence to the contrary.   
According to the Department, “[t]he focus of [the 
Department’s] treatment is on restoration of competence in the 
most expeditious manner possible.”  (See § 1370, subd. 
(a)(1)(B)(i) [specifying that the defendant shall receive 
treatment “that will promote the defendant’s speedy restoration 
to mental competence”].)  If the Department is providing 
services to restore competency “in the most expeditious manner 
possible,” then it should not matter for purposes of treatment if 
a defendant may be committed for a maximum of two years or a 
maximum of two years minus the time it takes to conduct the 
competency hearing under section 1372.  In either case, the 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
47 
Department is extending the treatment necessary to restore 
competency as soon as possible; it is not basing its treatment on 
“predict[ions]” of whether the defendant will contest the 
certification of competency or how much preparation time will 
be needed if the matter is contested. 
b. “Delays predicated on defense counsel’s needs” 
The People further contend that contested competency 
hearings following the filing of a certificate of restoration are 
often delayed by defense counsel’s need to prepare for the 
hearings.  According to the People, “[i]f this court adopted 
[Rodriguez’s] position, the trial court would have no . . . 
discretion or control in balancing the needs of defense attorneys 
to adequately prepare on behalf of their clients with concerns of 
delay.”   
An important premise underlying the People’s argument 
is that the time defense counsel need to “adequately prepare” 
would often push the competency hearings past the time limit 
set by section 1370(c)(1).  The People, however, have not 
provided any persuasive evidence that a two-year maximum 
term is likely to be routinely exhausted even when 
postcertification judicial proceedings are taken into account.  
Indeed, the available evidence suggests the contrary is true.  
When the Legislature reduced the maximum period of 
commitment permitted under section 1370(c)(1) from three 
years to two years, it noted that “the vast majority (80–90%) [of 
persons committed as mentally incompetent] becomes trial-
competent within six months of starting treatment, and nearly 
all who attain competency do so within a year.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as 
introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.)  The Department likewise 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
48 
acknowledges that average “treatment time in a state hospital 
operated by [the Department is] 270 days before return to 
court” — well below the two-year limit.19 
The Department states that “[i]n [its] experience, 
competency hearings under section 1372 following a certificate 
of restoration are often delayed, sometimes for a significant 
length of time.”  The only examples of delays that the 
Department offers are those occurring in this case and in Carr.  
But the proceeding here and in Carr demonstrate how unusual 
these delays were. 
This case involved extraordinary circumstances relating 
to the COVID-19 pandemic.  As the People themselves 
acknowledge, “the continuances in th[is] case [including] the 
final continuance past the two-year mark from the date of 
commitment, were not due to gamesmanship by either party, or 
institutional negligence like in Carr . . . but rather because of an 
unprecedented national emergency and the consequences on 
court capacity that resulted therefrom.” 
 
19  
To the extent the Department is concerned about running 
out of time to provide treatment, its concerns appear to be based 
on defendants who have been certified as competent and yet are 
“returned to the hospitals for additional competency services.”  
Defendants “returned to the hospital for additional competency 
services” are 
those defendants whose 
certifications 
of 
competency have been rejected by a court, or who had again 
become incompetent in short succession.  Although we do not 
lightly dismiss the Department’s concerns that for these 
defendants the Department will not have a full two-year period 
in which to provide treatment, ultimately, in setting a maximum 
term of commitment, the Legislature has accepted that there 
will be some individuals for whom the allotted time is not 
enough to restore competency.  It is not the role of the courts to 
second-guess these legislative choices. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
49 
As for Carr, the defendant there (Carr) spent almost a 
year in jail waiting to be transported to a state hospital.  (See 
Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.)  Then without 
ever being transported or receiving any treatment, Carr was 
certified as competent by a Department psychiatrist.  (Id. at 
p. 1141.)  Carr petitioned for a writ of mandate, claiming that 
“ ‘the certification of his competency was employed as a 
subterfuge to circumvent the state’s obligation to place him in a 
state hospital.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal rejected the claim.  
(Ibid.)  More than a year later, the trial court concluded that 
Carr remained incompetent.  (Ibid.)  The court again committed 
Carr to the Department, and he once more waited for transport 
to a facility.  (Ibid.)  Three months later, while still waiting for 
transport, “Carr moved for release on the ground he had 
completed the maximum three-year commitment [then] 
authorized by law.”  (Ibid.)  This procedural history makes it 
difficult to infer that delays in holding competency hearings are 
often so lengthy that the two-year limit is likely to be exceeded 
in the normal course. 
More generally, neither the facts of this case nor those in 
Carr support the assertion that defendants have the incentive 
to, and routinely, engage in dilatory tactics.  As mentioned, the 
People acknowledge that the delays that occurred in this case 
were not attributable to “gamesmanship” by Rodriguez.  The 
court in Carr likewise noted that “there is no basis in this case 
to infer Carr’s efforts to oppose the certification contributed to 
his commitment exceeding the three-year maximum.”  (Carr, 
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.)  If a trial court is concerned 
that a defendant is requesting continuances for the sole purpose 
of exhausting the two-year period, the court may take that into 
consideration 
when 
determining 
whether 
to 
grant 
a 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
50 
continuance.  (Cf. Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368 
[“underscor[ing] the vital role of trial courts in safeguarding the 
timely trial right of alleged [sexually violent predators]”].) 
Finally, the People’s argument assumes that litigation 
delays attributable to the defense cannot be excluded when 
determining whether the two-year period has run out.  We do 
not decide whether that assumption is correct.  (See pt. II.C., 
post.) 
c. “Competent defendants evading prosecution” 
The 
People 
contend 
that 
adopting 
Rodriguez’s 
interpretation would “result in presumptively competent 
defendants 
evading 
prosecution” 
because 
once 
section 
1370(c)(1)’s limit has been reached, a defendant must be 
conserved or released.  In its amicus curiae brief, the San Diego 
County District Attorney goes further, arguing that “dangerous 
criminals” will be released “to the streets.”  The statutory 
scheme, however, provides safeguards against these results. 
Individuals whose commitment terms have expired need 
not be released to the community.  Instead, they may be civilly 
committed, including to long-term conservatorships.  (See 
§ 1370, subds. (c)(3), (e); Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 568 
& fn. 1.)  Specifically, a Murphy conservatorship is available to 
keep in custody a criminal defendant who is incompetent to 
stand trial and who may not be further committed under 
section 1370.  (See § 1370, subd. (c)(3).)  An incompetent 
defendant may be conserved under a Murphy conservatorship 
if, among other criteria, the defendant “represents a substantial 
danger of physical harm to others.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008, 
subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv).)  The conservatorship may last as long as the 
conditions supporting conservatorship persist.  (See Welf. & 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
51 
Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b); Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 
p. 170; 
Parker, supra, 
6 Pacific 
L.J. 
at 
pp. 485, 
497.)  
Accordingly, it is not the case that “dangerous persons” are 
simply released “to the streets” if they are not committed under 
section 1370.  Even when an incompetent criminal defendant is 
not conserved and felony charges are dismissed, the People may 
refile charges if they believe the defendant has regained 
competency.  (See Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested, and a trial 
court may order a new competency hearing, following the 
prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges pursuant 
to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously committed 
for three years”].) 
Finally, the People’s argument assumes that when the 
two-year period runs out, even a defendant who has been 
certified as restored to competence must be released.  We do not 
decide whether that assumption is correct either.  (See pt. II.C., 
post.) 
C. Issues to Address on Remand 
As previously noted, Rodriguez was initially returned to 
the trial court pursuant to a timely-filed certificate of 
restoration to competency.  (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1), (3).) 
We have decided the issue of statutory interpretation 
presented, 
concluding 
that 
section 1370(c)(1)’s 
two-year 
maximum commitment period continues past the filing of the 
certificate, through the court’s decision whether to accept the 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
52 
certificate.20  We are not deciding, however, whether the two-
year maximum commitment period was reached here as a result 
of Rodriguez’s aggregate periods of commitment.  We instead 
leave that question for the Court of Appeal to address on 
remand.   
Because the Court of Appeal concluded that section 
1370(c)(1)’s two-year period had not run out, it did not need to 
reach whether Rodriguez was otherwise entitled to his 
requested remedy.  It did not need to decide whether Rodriguez 
would have been entitled to dismissal if the period had run out.  
It did not need to decide whether expiration of the maximum 
commitment period under section 1370(c)(1) mandates release 
where the defendant is competent to stand trial.  The issue of 
what remedy is available when section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year 
period 
has 
run 
out — 
including 
whether 
release 
or 
conservatorship are the only appropriate remedies — was not 
briefed here. 
We therefore conclude these issues merit consideration on 
remand to the Court of Appeal.  The appellate court may decide 
in the first instance what remedy exists if the two-year time 
limit has been reached — either as a matter of statutory 
interpretation or as a constitutional matter.  (Cf. Jackson v. 
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106; Camacho, supra, 
15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379, 382 & fn. 5 [noting that courts in 
other contexts have suggested there may be other possible 
 
20  
Because we reach this conclusion based on a reading of the 
statutes, we do not address Rodriguez’s argument that a holding 
for the People here would violate constitutional principles of 
“due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, 
and proscriptions on cruel and unusual punishment.” 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
53 
remedies for unconstitutional delay, such as an order that 
proceedings commence forthwith].) 
Similarly, we remand to the Court of Appeal to address 
whether section 1372 hearings may be continued upon good 
cause such that the period between continuances is tolled for 
purposes of calculating whether the maximum commitment 
term under section 1370(c)(1) has been reached.  Stated 
differently, we do not address here whether the two-year clock 
of section 1370(c)(1) can be paused by good cause continuances 
that may arise during the period between a defendant’s return 
to court and the trial court’s determination of competence.  
Although the issue is mentioned in the parties’ briefing before 
us, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal ruled on it.21  
This issue is best addressed in the context of the other issues 
that remain to be decided in the first instance by the Court of 
Appeal.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).)   
We express no view on whether Rodriguez has reached the 
maximum two-year commitment period; whether Rodriguez is 
entitled to the remedy of dismissal he seeks; or whether and how 
 
21  
We briefly acknowledge the arguments the parties have 
made for and against the availability of such tolling in this 
context.  Rodriguez argues that “[c]ontinuances and waivers are 
not authorized by sections 1370 and 1372, so the courts cannot 
read into the statutes what has ‘been omitted.’ ”  The People, on 
the other hand, counter that tolling, like many of the procedures 
governing a section 1372 hearing, may be considered “implied” 
by the statutes.   
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
54 
the issue of tolling may affect Rodriguez’s entitlement to any 
relief.22   
III.  CONCLUSION 
We hold that an incompetency commitment does not end 
with the filing of a certificate of restoration.  Instead, the two-
year maximum commitment period set by Penal Code 
section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of the certificate and 
includes the time between such filing and the court’s decision 
whether to accept the certificate.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Upon remand, the court shall consider whether the two-
year limit of section 1370(c)(1) was exceeded in this case.  To 
answer that question, the court may consider whether good 
cause continuances can toll the limit of section 1370(c)(1).  (Cf. 
Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379.)  If the court finds 
that the two-year statutory period has indeed been exceeded, it 
shall further consider the nature of the remedy Rodriguez is 
entitled to at this point.  In particular, the court should examine 
whether Rodriguez is entitled to dismissal of the charges 
pending against him or whether other relief is appropriate.  (Cf. 
Camacho, at p. 382, fn. 5; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested, 
and a trial court may order a new competency hearing, following 
the prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges 
pursuant to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously 
 
22  
This court’s decision to issue a stay in connection with 
granting Rodriguez’s petition for review should not be 
understood to resolve the question whether Rodriguez is entitled 
to the relief he seeks. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
55 
committed for [the statutory maximum period permitted by 
section 1370(c)(1)]”].) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Rodriguez v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 70 Cal.App.5th 628 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S272129 
Date Filed:  December 14, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Eric S. Geffon 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Brian C. McComas, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Petitioner. 
 
Ellen McDonnell, Public Defender (Contra Costa), and Diana Garrido, 
Deputy Public Defender, for Contra Costa County Public Defender 
Office and California Public Defenders Association as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Emi MacLean and Kim Pederson for American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation of Northern California and Disability Rights California as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
DLA Piper and Justin R. Sarno for Silicon Valley De-Bug as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney, Alexandra W. Gadeberg, Crystal 
Tindell Seiler and Barbara A. Cathcart, Deputy District Attorneys, for 
Real Party in Interest.  
 
Summer Stephan, District Attorney (San Diego), Linh Lam and 
Jennifer Kaplan, Deputy District Attorneys, for the San Diego County 
District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney 
General, Gregory D. Brown and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for State Department of State Hospitals and State 
Department of Developmental Services as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Real Party in Interest.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Brian C. McComas 
The Law Office of B.C. McComas, LLP 
PMB 1605, 77 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 101  
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 814-2465 
 
Emilou MacLean 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California 
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111-4805 
(929) 375-1575 
 
Alexandra W. Gadeberg 
Deputy District Attorney 
70 West Hedding, West Wing 
San Jose, CA 95110 
(408) 792-2757