Title: Renee Kimps v. Leonard M. Hill

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
No.  92-2736 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
RENEE KIMPS, 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT-CROSS  
 
APPELLANT-CROSS RESPONDENT- 
 
PETITIONER, 
 
NORTH CENTRAL HEALTH CARE 
PROTECTION PLAN, 
 
 
NOMINAL-PLAINTIFF, 
 
 
v. 
 
DR. LEONARD HILL, 
 
 
 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-CROSS  
 
RESPONDENT, 
 
JAYFRO CORPORATION, a subsidiary of 
Verified Sports, Inc., 
 
 
 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS 
 
 
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT- 
 
PETITIONER, 
 
ALLEN R. KURSEVSKI, 
 
 
 
DEFENDANT-CROSS RESPONDENT, 
 
DR. JOHN MUNSON, MARTY LOY, SISTER ROSELLA 
REINWAND, JERRY BURLING, MILWAUKEE SPORTING 
GOODS, PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
ALLEN R. KURSEVSKI, DONALD P. BURLING, 
GREGORY DIEMER, VALLEY SCHOOL SUPPLIERS, a 
division of QIII Corporation AND INA 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
 
 
DEFENDANTS. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 APRIL 10, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
2 
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  This is a review of a published decision 
of the court of appeals,
1 affirming in part and reversing in part 
the judgment of the Circuit Court for Portage County, Frederic W. 
Fleishauer, Judge.  The case arose as a negligence action brought 
by Renee Kimps (Kimps), for a foot injury she sustained during a 
class at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point (UW-SP).  The 
central issue is whether public officer immunity bars recovery 
against either or both named state employee defendants.  The 
circuit court dismissed the claim against Allen Kursevski 
(Kursevski), a former UW-SP safety officer, on grounds of 
immunity, but ruled that Leonard Hill (Hill), the instructor of 
the class in which Kimps was injured, was not entitled to such 
immunity.  The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that 
both men were entitled to public officer immunity.  We agree.  
 
FACTS 
 
Kimps was enrolled at UW-SP studying to be an elementary 
teacher.  On October 20, 1988, she attended a required laboratory 
section of Physical Education for the Classroom Teacher in which 
the student teachers were to instruct young children, who had 
                     
     
1  Kimps v. Hill, 187 Wis. 2d 508, 523 N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
3 
volunteered for the exercise, in a variety of physical education 
activities.  Kimps and her partner had chosen to present a class 
on volleyball.  As part of the course, Hill instructed his 
students on general safety matters and the use of some of the more 
dangerous gymnastics equipment, but did not give any specific 
warnings as to use of the volleyball equipment.  Approximately 60 
college students were enrolled in the course and about 100 
children between the ages of three and twelve were participating. 
 The class was simultaneously conducted in three adjacent areas of 
the gymnasium.  Hill testified that he had decided to primarily 
direct his attention on that day to supervision of the trampoline 
class, as the equipment was the most complicated and its use posed 
the greatest risk of injury in his opinion.  
 
UW-SP had purchased nine sets of portable volleyball 
standards (poles to which a volleyball net is attached) from their 
manufacturer, Jayfro Corporation, between 1969 and 1971.  The 
standards were designed to disassemble for storage and consisted 
of detachable poles which fit into sleeves or holes in the 150 
pound metal bases.  The poles were held in place by two set screws 
which passed through the sleeve and tightened against the outside 
surface of the pole.  The standard is designed to be moved by 
tipping it onto two wheels permanently mounted on the sides of the 
circular base and either pulling or pushing on the pole.  
 
In preparation for her class exercise, Kimps and another 
student were moving a volleyball standard which was kept in a 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
4 
hallway near the gym.  Kimps, who was walking behind the standard, 
was injured when the metal base separated from the pole and fell 
onto her foot as the student who was pulling it tried to dislodge 
it from a doorsill on which it had become stuck.  
 
Two years prior to this incident, in October of 1986, a 
similar accident occurred in which a pole separated from its base 
which fell onto the foot of a maintenance worker who was helping 
to move one of the standards.  At the time, Kursevski was the 
safety officer at UW-SP.
2  He investigated the incident, which had 
been reported under worker's compensation.  Another employee
3 
suggested to Kursevski the possibility of drilling holes into the 
standards and inserting a bolt through the sleeve into the 
interior of the poles.  However, Kursevski decided that altering 
the manufacturer's design potentially posed a greater risk 
management problem than leaving it as is and rejected the idea.  
 
Kursevski determined that the appropriate response to the 
accident was that maintenance personnel should check to make sure 
the set screws were tight before moving the standards.  He 
memorialized this in the required worker's compensation report in 
the following manner: "supervisors must check equipment and 
material to insure that it can be safely used and/or handled." 
                     
     
2  Kursevski was no longer working at UW-SP at the time of 
Kimps' accident. 
     
3  This employee, Larry Obiala, was the supervisor of the 
injured maintenance worker but was not in a position of authority 
in relation to Kursevski.  
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
5 
Existing UW-SP procedures did not provide for campus-wide 
distribution of these reports.  Neither the administration nor any 
of the teaching personnel in the physical education department, 
including Professor Hill, knew of the maintenance worker's 
accident.  Hill testified that, in his twenty-plus years of 
teaching (eight of them at UW-SP) and using such volleyball 
standards, he was not aware of any prior occasions on which a pole 
and base had separated.  
 
Kimps brought a negligence action against Hill, Kursevski and 
Jayfro, the manufacturer of the volleyball standard.
4  At the 
close of Kimps' case in the ensuing trial, the State (representing 
its employees, Hill and Kursevski) moved for dismissal of the 
claims against both men on the basis of public officer immunity.  
The circuit court took the motion under advisement and, after the 
jury had retired for deliberations, granted the motion as to 
Kursevski but denied it as to Hill.  The jury returned a verdict 
allocating causal negligence in the following manner: Renee Kimps 
(plaintiff) -- 10 percent; Jayfro Corp. (defendant) -- 10 percent; 
                     
     
4 
 
Kimps 
additionally 
named 
several 
other 
defendants 
including the State of Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin-
Stevens Point, the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 
System, Milwaukee Sporting Goods and Valley School Supplies 
(distributors of the equipment), Pacific Employers Insurance 
Company, INA Insurance Company and several additional individual 
UW-SP employees: Dr. John Munson, Marty Loy, Sister Rosella 
Reinwand, Jerry Burling, Donald P. Burling, and Gregory Diemer.  
Resolution of the claim against these parties is not at issue 
here. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
6 
Allen 
Kursevski 
(defendant) 
-- 
35 
percent; 
Dr. 
Len 
Hill 
(defendant) -- 45 percent.  The jury fixed damages at $59,853.  
 
Hill appealed the judgment against him, and Kimps and Jayfro 
cross-appealed concerning Kimps' rights of recovery against 
Kursevski.  The court of appeals concluded that both Hill and 
Kursevski were entitled to immunity as public officers and 
therefore affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the claim 
against Kursevski and reversed the order of judgment against Hill. 
 This court granted Kimps' and Jayfro's petitions for review. 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
 
(1) Is professor Hill entitled to the protection of public 
officer immunity? 
 
(2) Is former UW-SP safety officer Kursevski entitled to the 
protection of public officer immunity? 
 
Both issues require us to determine the proper scope of the 
common law doctrine of public officer immunity, a question of law 
which we review de novo without deference to the courts below.  
K.L. v. Hinickle, 144 Wis. 2d 102, 109, 423 N.W.2d 528 (1988).     
 
Although both the petitioners and respondents, in their 
briefs, and the court of appeals, in its opinion, addressed the 
arguments concerning immunity as they applied to Hill and then 
Kursevski sequentially, we will approach them topically.  The 
arguments raised by the petitioners can be generally divided into 
the categories of: discretionary versus ministerial duties, known 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
7 
and compelling danger, the applicability of the "sign cases" (or 
the duty to maintain), and finally, an effort to distinguish 
governmental 
versus 
non-governmental 
and 
planning 
versus 
operational conduct.  Following a short introduction, we will 
address each category in turn in an attempt to clarify overlapping 
issues and arguments. 
 
PUBLIC OFFICER IMMUNITY 
 
Immunity for public officers does not arise from the state's 
sovereign immunity (which is constitutional in nature),
5 but 
rather is grounded in the common law and based on public policy 
considerations.  Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 
240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  These considerations include:  
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of lawsuit; 
(2) the deterrent effect which the threat of personal 
liability might have on those who are considering 
entering public service; (3) the drain on valuable time 
caused by such actions; (4) the unfairness of subjecting 
officials to personal liability for the acts of their 
subordinates; and (5) the feeling that the ballot and 
removal procedures are more appropriate methods of 
dealing with misconduct in public office. 
 
C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 709, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988) 
(quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 299).   
 
 
Under the general rule as applied in Wisconsin, state 
officers and employees are immune from personal liability for 
injuries resulting from acts performed within the scope of their 
                     
     
5  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 27. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
8 
official duties.  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300.
6  This doctrine of 
immunity is not without exception, however, the most common of 
which is that a public officer or employee is not shielded from 
liability for the negligent performance of a purely ministerial 
duty.
7  Id. at 300-301.  The test for determining whether a duty 
is discretionary (and therefore within the scope of immunity) or 
ministerial (and not so protected) is that the latter is found 
"'only when [the duty] is absolute, certain and imperative, 
involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law 
imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion.'"  Olson, 143 Wis. 2d at 711-12 (quoting 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301). 
   
DISCRETIONARY v. MINISTERIAL  
                     
     
6  The general rule of immunity for state public officers 
stands in contrast to that for municipalities where, "the rule is 
liability--the exception is immunity."  Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  The common 
law immunity for municipalities was abrogated by this court in 
Holytz, however, we held that liability will not lie "on a 
governmental body in the exercise of its legislative or judicial 
or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions."  Id. at 40.  
This exception to municipal liability was codified in 1963 as Wis. 
Stat. § 331.43(3) (subsequently renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 
895.43(3), and now § 893.80(4)).  The concepts and theories 
articulated in Lister are generally applicable to both state and 
municipal officers and the tests for immunity are similar.  
Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 682 n.19, 683 n.20, 
292 N.W.2d 816 (1980). 
     
7  Further, there is no immunity for conduct that is 
malicious, willful and intentional.  Ibrahim v. Samore, 118 Wis. 
2d 720, 728, 348 N.W.2d 554 (1984). 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
9 
 
The petitioners, Kimps and Jayfro, argue that Hill is not 
entitled to immunity because he breached a ministerial duty.  They 
assert that a teacher has a duty, that is ministerial in nature, 
to provide safe equipment for his or her students.  In support of 
this contention, Jayfro cites Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 
1380: 
Negligence: Teacher: Duty to Instruct or Warn 
 
. . .  A teacher has the duty to instruct and to warn the 
pupils in his or her custody of any dangers which the 
teacher knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care ought 
to know, are present in the classroom (laboratory, 
gymnasium, etc.) and to instruct them in methods which 
will protect them from those dangers, whether the danger 
arises from equipment, devices, machines, or chemicals. 
 A failure to warn the students of such danger or 
instruct them in means of avoiding such danger is 
negligence. 
 
This argument is illustrative of a recurrent problem in the manner 
in which this case was briefed and orally argued--the petitioners 
confuse the issue of negligence with that of immunity.  Just 
because a jury can find that certain conduct was negligent does 
not transform that conduct into a breach of a ministerial duty.
8  
Hill and Kursevski do not contest the jury's findings of 
negligence and consequently that is not the subject of our review. 
 Indeed, we begin our review of this case on the assumption that 
negligence exists here; if it were otherwise, Hill and Kursevski 
would not need to seek the protection of immunity. 
                     
     
8  In order to find negligence, a jury must find that a duty 
was breached, if only the duty of ordinary care.  The existence of 
a duty of care to another does not necessarily imply that the duty 
was ministerial. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
10 
 
Jayfro argues that the existence of a teacher's duty to 
provide safe equipment, combined with the simple design of the 
Jayfro standard, equate to a ministerial duty.  "Nothing remained 
for the exercise of Dr. Hill's judgment of discretion. [sic]  If 
the set screws were loose, which they obviously were, they needed 
to be tightened immediately."  We find this reasoning not only 
circular (the pole and base of the standard separated, therefore 
the set screws must have been loose, the accident would not have 
happened if the screws had been tightened, therefore Hill had a 
ministerial duty to tighten the screws, which he violated), but 
also 
wholly 
unconvincing. 
 
Such 
an 
argument 
completely 
misconstrues the test for determining when a duty is ministerial. 
 A party cannot work backwards from a consequence to create a duty 
that is "absolute, certain and imperative." 
 
The petitioners also argue that once Hill decided to use the 
volleyball equipment he assumed a ministerial duty to assure that 
the equipment was safe.
9  Jayfro and Kimps rely on the decision of 
the court of appeals in Barillari v. City of Milwaukee, 186 
                     
     
9  In briefs, and in oral argument, petitioners took the 
position that the only way that Hill's conduct could have been 
characterized as discretionary, not ministerial, would be if Hill 
had "chosen not to allow volleyball standards to be utilized in 
the teaching program.  He could have chosen not to teach 
volleyball."  This argument compels us to respond.  Hill was 
hired by the state of Wisconsin to teach aspiring teachers how to 
conduct physical education classes.  The logical extension of the 
petitioners' argument is that UW professors would be faced with 
the option of choosing either not to teach or losing all immunity 
for doing what they've been hired to do--teach.  We reject this 
argument.  
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
11 
Wis. 2d 415, 418, 521 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 194 Wis. 
2d 247, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995), to support the proposition that 
once a public official undertakes a certain course of conduct, he 
or she thereby undertakes a ministerial duty.  Last term, 
subsequent to the filing of briefs in this case, we reversed the 
court of appeals on this very issue.  See Barillari v. City of 
Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 247, 255, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995).  That case 
involved an incident in which Shannon Barillari reported to the 
police that she had been sexually assaulted by her ex-boyfriend 
who then threatened to kill her and himself.  Milwaukee police 
detectives allegedly promised to either apprehend the suspect or 
notify her if he was not arrested.  They did neither, and five 
days later Shannon was shot to death by her ex-boyfriend who then 
committed suicide.  We held that any "promise" that was made by 
the police "did not transform the character of their discretionary 
acts during the investigation of the case to ministerial duties." 
 Barillari, 194 Wis. 2d at 255-56.
10  Similarly, we find that 
Professor Hill's decision to allow his students to teach a section 
on volleyball in a class devoted to teaching physical education 
did not transform his exercise of discretion in how to conduct 
that class into a ministerial duty.  
 
 
                     
     
10  Unlike the situation in this case, which involves state 
employees, Barillari involved a claim against a municipality for 
the acts of its employees and our holding was based upon statutory 
immunity provided under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Barillari v. City 
of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 247, 262, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995). 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
12 
 
The petitioners also assert that Kursevski should be held 
liable because he was negligent in the performance of a 
ministerial 
duty. 
 
Jayfro 
contends 
that 
"one 
source" 
of 
Kursevski's ministerial duty can be found in his job description 
as "Risk Manager/Safety Director."  Jayfro cites the following 
language as relevant: 
Investigate all incidents and take action to correct the 
condition or procedure that caused the accident.  
Incidents investigated include Worker's Compensation 
claims, . . .  
 
This language, according to Jayfro, creates a ministerial duty in 
that it is "absolute, certain and imperative" in requiring that 
Kursevski "take action to correct the condition" that caused the 
maintenance worker's accident.  Jayfro further argues that, given 
the "extremely simple design" of the volleyball standard, the 
"mode and occasion" for the corrective action was limited to only 
one possibility--that Kursevski tighten the set screws or make 
sure someone else did.  Kursevski's response to this argument was 
that application of such an analysis would effectively result in 
abandonment of the Lister discretionary/ministerial distinction 
and substitution of an after-the-fact determination to be made on 
a fact sensitive case-by-case basis.  We agree with Kursevski and 
reject Jayfro's invitation to so alter the test which we have 
employed for twenty years.   
 
To restate that test, in Lister we held that "a public 
officer's duty is ministerial only when it is absolute, certain 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
13 
and imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific 
task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode 
and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.  
We do not find that Kursevski's job description created a 
ministerial duty.  The "time, mode and occasion" for performing an 
investigation 
of 
the 
maintenance 
worker's 
accident 
and 
determination of the appropriate corrective action to be taken 
remained totally within Kursevski's judgment and discretion. 
 
KNOWN DANGER 
 
Next Kimps argues that a ministerial duty arose when 
Kursevski failed to respond to a compelling and known danger.  
This argument is based on our decision in Cords v. Anderson, 80 
Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).  We found that the facts in 
that case warranted a special exception be made to the general 
rule of public employee immunity.  The manager of a state-owned 
park was held subject to liability for negligence by failing to 
take steps to warn of the dangerous condition posed by a path open 
for night hiking that ran within inches of a precipitous drop into 
a 90-foot gorge.  Id.  We concluded that because the park manager 
knew of the dangerous terrain, was in a position to do something 
about it, yet did nothing, he was not immune to liability.  Id. at 
541.  Our holding in that case was based on facts that presented a 
"duty so clear and so absolute that it falls within the definition 
of a ministerial duty."  Id. at 542. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
14 
 
In Olson, we clarified that a public officer's duty becomes 
ministerial only "where, as in Cords, the nature of the danger is 
compelling and known to the officer and is of such force that the 
public officer has no discretion not to act."  Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 
at 715.  The facts here show that Kursevski did investigate and 
take action he deemed appropriate to address the problem.  
Further, a single incident involving a piece of athletic equipment 
that the University had owned and safely used for between 15 and 
17 years cannot reasonably be compared with the "compelling and 
known" danger posed by a path passing within inches of a 90-foot 
cliff.  We conclude that the nature of the danger posed here 
cannot be equated with that in Cords and did not create a duty so 
"clear and absolute" that it became ministerial on Kursevski's 
part.  Kursevski acted within his discretion as safety officer and 
is therefore entitled to immunity. 
 
APPLICABILITY OF THE "SIGN" CASES 
 
Kimps draws an analogy between the situation in this case and 
the case law that holds that once a municipality makes a 
discretionary decision to place a sign or light pole, the actual 
placement of the object and its maintenance are ministerial in 
nature and thus not entitled to immunity.  She argues that, in 
this manner, Hill lost his discretionary immunity once he decided 
to allow the volleyball standards to be used in his class.  Kimps 
bases this argument on a line of "sign" cases which include: 
Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis. 2d 352, 130 N.W.2d 835 (1964) (town 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
15 
had no initial duty to erect sign but, having done so, had duty to 
properly maintain); Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 203 N.W.2d 673 
(1973) (state highway officials held amenable to suit for sign 
placement inconsistent with the Uniform Manual); and Foss v. Town 
of Kronenwetter, 87 Wis. 2d 91, 273 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1978) 
(town immune from suit for non-placement of sign but amenable to 
liability for lack of maintenance of barriers at dead-end).   
 
Hill counters that the cases Kimps relies on are inapplicable 
because each involved failure to obey a specific order or 
legislative directive: Firkus, 25 Wis. 2d at 357 (new stop sign to 
replace one removed by vandals had been ordered but not yet 
received or replaced); Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100 (Uniform Manual 
adopted by State Highway Commission under its statutory authority 
directed that warning sign be placed 750 feet in advance of hazard 
warned of); Foss, 87 Wis. 2d at 104 (failure to replace barricade 
at Town-approved fill site for future road extension).   
 
We agree with Hill that the entire line of "sign" cases is 
inapplicable to our analysis in this instance.  This is not a case 
where a specific task had been undertaken such that certainty 
attached to the "time, mode and occasion" for its completed 
performance.  Not only was Hill under no order or directive to use 
particular equipment or teach his class in a particular manner, 
but we do not find the placement or maintenance of highway 
warnings in any way analogous to the discretionary activities that 
Professor Hill engaged in on a day-to-day basis. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
16 
 
GOVERNMENTAL v. NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
 
In the alternative, the petitioners argue that even if Hill's 
activities are characterized as discretionary, he is excepted from 
immunity because that discretion was non-governmental.  The 
petitioners offer three definitions of non-governmental discretion 
which they claim apply equally well to Hill.  First, they assert 
that, as a "professional," Hill's activities are necessarily non-
governmental.  In support of this position, they quote the 
following language from the court of appeals' decision in C.L. v. 
Olson, 140 Wis. 2d 224, 231, 409 N.W.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1987), 
aff'd, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988): 
[g]overnmental immunity does not attach to a parole agent's 
decision merely because it involves discretion.  The 
question is whether the decision involved the type of 
judgment and discretion which rises to governmental 
discretion, as opposed to professional or technical 
judgment and discretion. 
 
Jayfro and Kimps advance the theory that a "professional" like 
Hill (whom the petitioners remind the court has a doctorate in 
education and 23 years of teaching experience), by definition, 
cannot exercise governmental discretion in the performance of his 
job because he "was not advising his students regarding purely 
governmental functions."  
 
We do not read the appellate court's decision in Olson as 
holding that "professional judgment" and "governmental discretion" 
are mutually exclusive.  In fact, in reviewing the lower court's 
opinion, this court commented that the decision in question there 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
17 
(that of a parole agent granting driving privileges to a paroled 
sex-offender) 
involved 
the 
exercise 
of 
both 
governmental 
discretion and professional judgment.  We held that the parole 
officer was entitled to immunity.  Olson, 143 Wis. 2d at 725.  
Here, the fact that Hill's profession requires that he exercise 
his discretion in the performance of his governmental duties as a 
teacher for the state does not strip him of the protective cloak 
of immunity. 
 
Secondly, Kimps claims that this court must find that Hill's 
conduct was non-governmental because Hill failed to demonstrate 
that his discretion involved the application of statutes to facts. 
 Initially, it should be noted that Hill does not carry a burden 
to demonstrate that he is entitled to immunity; on the contrary, 
the general rule for state employees is immunity and an exception 
must be demonstrated in order for this rule not to apply.   
 
As noted earlier in this opinion, there are many public 
policy reasons underlying public officer immunity.  Hill correctly 
argues that  government employees must be free to make judgment 
calls on difficult choices regarding the allocation of public 
resources such as money and time, including their own.  Professor 
Hill was faced with just such a resource allocation dilemma in 
determining what was the safest way to supervise his students and 
a large number of youngsters from the community engaged in a 
variety of activities.  He decided to focus his attention on the 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
18 
activity posing the greatest potential risk--the trampoline.  That 
discretionary call is entitled to immunity. 
 
The court of appeals responded to the petitioners' "non-
governmental" argument by citing Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 
Wis. 2d 808, 818, 468 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1991), which held that 
the non-governmental exception to discretionary immunity was 
applicable only in situations involving medical decisions.
11  The 
appellate court concluded, therefore, that such an argument was 
foreclosed in this case under the rule of stare decisis.  Kimps, 
187 Wis. 2d at 516.  We do not take this opportunity to comment on 
the conclusion reached by the appellate court in Stann nor do we 
accept the petitioners' invitation to extend the Scarpaci 
governmental/ 
non-governmental exception to a state-employed teacher.
12   
The 
distinction between governmental and non-governmental conduct was 
                     
     
11  The following quote from Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 
Wis. 2d 808, 818, 468 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1991), refers to 
Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 292 N.W.2d 816 
(1980); Protic v. Castle Co., 132 Wis. 2d 364, 392 N.W.2d 119 (Ct. 
App. 1986); and Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 125 Wis. 2d 62, 370 
N.W.2d 803 (Ct. App. 1985): 
First, the authorities upon which the Stanns rely for their 
"discretion but still not governmental discretion" 
argument are not applicable to the case at bar.  Only 
three Wisconsin decisions have recognized such a 
distinction.  However, each of these cases involved 
allegations of negligence regarding medical decisions.  
These cases are restricted to their facts, as no 
Wisconsin decision applies this exception in any other 
setting. 
     
12  In tort jurisprudence in Wisconsin and other states, the 
governmental/proprietary 
dichotomy 
arose 
in 
the 
context of 
immunity for municipal corporate entities and is uniquely 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
19 
first utilized by this court in Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 
Wis. 2d 663, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980), where we found that the manner 
in which a county coroner performed an autopsy involved an 
exercise of medical non-governmental discretion and therefore did 
not fall under the statutory exception to liability for "quasi-
judicial acts" expressed in § 895.43(4).  Scarpaci, 96 Wis. 2d at 
686-88.  It is notable that Scarpaci involved a municipal claim 
(..continued) 
applicable to claims against municipalities.  "Governmental" 
functions have alternately been defined as those involving the 
kind of power expected of government, those of the essence of 
governing, public, mandatory or essential, while "proprietary" 
functions are associated with actions of a municipality that are 
akin to those of a private corporation or private enterprise that 
are somewhat commercial in nature.  See generally W. Page Keeton 
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 131 (5th ed. 
1984); 5 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 29.6 (2nd ed. 
1986); 2 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 6:9 
(1985).  According to one commentator, this dichotomy has led to 
"an endless proliferation of decisions teeming with subtle and 
tortured distinctions . . ."  Speiser et al., supra, at 49.   
 
In 1962, this court stated that "[i]n determining the tort 
liability of a municipality it is no longer necessary to divide 
its operations into those which are proprietary and those which 
are governmental."  Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39.  We reject the 
petitioners' attempt to resurrect this test in the context of a 
claim against a public officer.  When reviewing the common law 
rule of immunity for state officers or employees, the inquiry has 
been and remains primarily one of determining whether the alleged 
negligent conduct involved a discretionary or ministerial duty.  
As we summarized in Olson, the shield of immunity will fall with 
the latter when a duty is: 
absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task and (1) the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains 
for the exercise of discretion; or (2) there exists a 
known present danger of such force that the time, mode 
and occasion for performance is evident with such 
certainty that nothing remains for the exercise of 
judgment and discretion. 
Olson, 142 Wis. 2d at 717 (citations omitted). 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
20 
(where the general rule is liability not immunity) which we 
decided on the grounds that the statutory exception to liability 
was inapplicable in the given situation.  Here, we deal with the 
common law rule that state officials and employees are generally 
immune from liability for their discretionary acts.  In Olson, we 
found the presence of no circumstances that warranted exception to 
the general rule of public officer immunity.  Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 
at 725.  We concluded that the professional judgment involved in a 
parole officer's decision regarding rules and conditions of parole 
constituted governmental discretion and was not similar to the 
type of judgment exercised in performing an autopsy that had been 
excepted from immunity in Scarpaci.  Id. at 724-25.   
 
We find the Scarpaci non-governmental exception equally 
inapplicable to the circumstances here.  We conclude that any 
negligent omissions or commissions by Hill were clearly made in 
the 
course 
of 
performing 
governmental 
functions 
as 
a 
state-employed teacher.  The critical inquiry when determining 
public officer immunity, in all but the very rare case, remains 
the discretionary versus ministerial analysis.  Hill exercised his 
discretion on how best to teach the class while acting within the 
scope of his employment and, therefore, is entitled to immunity.   
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
21 
 
PLANNING v. OPERATIONAL 
 
Finally, Kimps argues that even should this court view 
Kursevski's duty as discretionary, he is still excepted from 
immunity because that discretion was operational.  Kimps maintains 
that only discretionary decisions that are on the planning level, 
i.e. those that involve evaluation or determination of fundamental 
governmental policy, should be entitled to immunity.
13  
 
Kimps supports this position by again citing the "sign" cases 
(Foss and its progeny) and Domino v. Walworth County, 118 Wis. 2d 
488, 347 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1984).  According to Kimps, these 
cases delineate a zone of protected discretion which encompasses 
only planning decisions, whereas those decisions which are merely 
operational in nature extend beyond the zone and are therefore not 
covered by immunity.  Kimps acknowledges that the words "planning" 
or "operational" are not used in these cases and yet she contends 
"it is clear that the same [planning/operational] rationale was 
being employed."   
 
Jayfro makes this same argument relying primarily on Gordon 
v. Milwaukee County, 125 Wis. 2d 62, 370 N.W.2d 803 (Ct. App. 
1985), which in turn is based on a series of federal circuit court 
cases interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.  The Gordon court found persuasive the reasoning of federal 
                     
     
13  Jayfro also contends that Hill's discretion was planning 
rather than operational in nature and therefore not entitled to 
immunity.  The applicability (or inapplicability) of this analysis 
to both Hill and Kursevski is the same. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
22 
courts drawing a distinction between planning functions which 
involve policy choices and operational acts involving details of 
day-to-day management, with the former entitled to immunity and 
the latter not.  Id. at 68-69.  Jayfro argued that further 
evidence that Wisconsin has "essentially adopted the operational 
level exception to public officer immunity" could be found in the 
"sign" cases and Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, 253 
N.W.2d 240 (1977).  In the latter case, this court found that the 
municipality might be held subject to liability for negligence in 
the maintenance and operation of a dam it had acquired.  Id. at 
322.   
 
As the respondents correctly point out, this court has never 
articulated 
an 
"operational" 
exception 
to 
the 
rule 
of 
discretionary public officer immunity and we decline to do so 
now.
14  We find the federal cases upon which Gordon relied to be 
inapposite because they involve statutory construction of a 
specific section of the United States Code.  We are not faced with 
an analogous situation in our examination of the scope of 
Wisconsin's common law rule of public officer immunity.  Further, 
in United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 326 (1991), the Supreme 
Court has decried the perpetuation of the "nonexistent dichotomy 
between discretionary functions and operational activities."   
                     
     
14  We find Jayfro's suggestion that the Lange reference to 
the Town's duty to "properly operate" the dam's floodgate 
constitutes an adoption of the planning/operational distinction to 
be unpersuasive.  Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, 320, 
253 N.W.2d 240 (1977). 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
23 
A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; 
there is nothing in that description that refers 
exclusively to policy-making or planning functions.  
Day-to-day management of banking affairs, like the 
management of other businesses, regularly requires 
judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses 
is the wisest.  Discretionary conduct is not confined to 
the policy or planning level.   
 
Id. at 325.  We agree with this statement and believe it is 
equally applicable to the wide range of permissible choices that 
public officers like Kursevski and Hill are called upon to make in 
the daily exercise of their discretionary judgment.  
 
We decline the invitation to create a planning/operational 
distinction to be utilized in the analysis of state employee 
immunity.  The cases interpreting the common law rule of public 
officer immunity are already complicated enough and we do not 
endorse the addition of yet another test which is ill-defined and 
difficult to apply.  The critical distinction remains whether or 
not a public officer's acts are discretionary or ministerial.  We 
conclude that both Hill and Kursevski's actions were discretionary 
in nature and fall squarely within the general rule that "a public 
officer is not personally liable to one injured as a result of an 
act performed within the scope of his official authority and in 
the line of his official duty."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300.   
 
For the reasons articulated above, we conclude that both Hill 
and Kursevski are entitled to public officer immunity.  Therefore, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
24 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. and WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. did not 
participate. 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
92-2736 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Renee Kimps, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant- 
 
 
 
 
Cross Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
North Central Health Care Protection 
 
 
 
Plan, 
 
 
 
 
Nominal-Plaintiff, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Dr. Leonard M. Hill, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
 
 
 
Jayfro Corporation, 
 
 
 
a Subsidiary of Verified Sports, Inc., 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
Cross Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
Allen R. Kursevski, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Cross Respondent, 
 
 
 
Dr. 
John 
Munson, 
Marty 
Loy, 
Sister 
Rosella 
Reinwand, 
 
 
 
Jerry Burling, Milwaukee Sporting Goods, 
 
 
 
Pacific Employers Insurance Company, 
 
 
 
Allen R. Kursevski, Donald P. Burling, 
 
 
 
Gregory Diemer, Valley School Suppliers, a Division 
 
 
 
of QIII Corporation and INA Insurance Company, 
 
 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  187 Wis. 2d 508, 523 N.W.2d 281  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
April 10, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 28, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Portage 
 
JUDGE: 
FREDERIC FLEISHAUER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
No. 92-2736 
 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. and BABLITCH, J., did 
 
 
 
 
not participate 
                                                              
 
92-2736   Kimps v. Hill 
 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross appellant-cross 
respondent-petitioner there were briefs by Keith F. Ellison, Paul 
E. David and Patterson, Richards, Hessert, Wendorff & Ellison, 
Wausau and oral argument by Keith F. Ellison. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross respondent there were 
briefs by David A. Ray and Terwilliger, Wakeen, Piehler & Conway, 
S.C., Stevens Point and Frank A. Scherkenbach, Susan R. Tyndall 
and Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee, of counsel and oral argument 
by David A. Ray. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross respondent the cause was 
argued by Robert D. Repasky, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.