Title: People v. Santana

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/10/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S198324 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D059013 
SERAFIN SANTANA, 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIF139207  
 
____________________________________) 
 
Penal Code1 section 203, which defines the offense of simple mayhem, 
provides that “[e]very person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human 
being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts 
or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of 
mayhem.”  Though the provision makes no mention of “serious bodily injury,” the 
pattern jury instruction on mayhem (CALCRIM No. 801) requires the prosecution 
to prove that the defendant caused the victim “serious bodily injury.”  The issue 
here is whether CALCRIM No. 801 properly includes this requirement as a 
necessary clarification of section 203.   
For reasons that follow, we hold that the instruction improperly requires 
proof of a “serious bodily injury.”  
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
2 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On the evening of August 12, 2007, defendant Serafin Santana and his 
friends attended a party given by his coworker, Juan Gomez, in Moreno Valley.  
Around 2:00 a.m., Bryan Vallejo, a 15-year-old neighbor who lived three houses 
down from Gomez, was in his front yard with his friend, Andrew Ortiz.  
Defendant and several men approached Vallejo and Ortiz.  One of the men with 
defendant asked Vallejo about the possibility of getting marijuana.  Vallejo said he 
would try to get some.  When Vallejo later told the men he would not be able to 
get the drugs, they threw trash on Vallejo‟s lawn and an argument ensued.  After 
exchanging some words, the group moved up the street.   
Several men from defendant‟s group — but not defendant — began to fight 
Vallejo.  When Ortiz started to move towards Vallejo, defendant pointed a gun at 
Ortiz‟s head and said, “This bitch ain‟t gonna do nothin‟.”  Defendant struck Ortiz 
with his gun on the back of the head and on the forehead, and then ran towards 
Vallejo.  Ortiz yelled, “He has a gun.”  After being struck with an object that felt 
like metal, Vallejo fell to the ground.  The men continued to beat Vallejo and then 
ran off and got into a white Cadillac parked nearby.  Defendant walked towards 
Vallejo, who was still lying on the ground.  Standing three to four feet from 
Vallejo, defendant shot him in the leg three times with a small black revolver.  
Defendant then ran across the street and got into another car, which drove away.  
Vallejo was taken to the hospital and treated for his injuries.  He had been shot 
three times in his left leg and buttock area.  The wounds were “through and 
through,” i.e., all with exit points, and required no stitches.  Vallejo, however, felt 
pain when he changed the bandages and whenever he walked or sat.  Also, for a 
period of time, he had to walk with a cane and wear slippers.  He was unable to 
play football when he returned to school.  Both Vallejo and Ortiz identified 
defendant as the shooter.   
 
3 
Defendant was charged with one count of attempted mayhem based on a 
disabling injury as to Vallejo (§§ 203, 664, subd. (a); count 1), and two counts of 
assault with a firearm with respect to Vallejo and Ortiz (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 
2 & 3).  The amended information alleged that defendant personally and 
intentionally used a firearm resulting in great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) 
as to count 1; that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) 
as to counts 1 and 2; and that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) as 
to counts 2 and 3.  After the jury was unable to reach a verdict, the first trial ended 
in a mistrial.  A second jury found defendant guilty on all three counts and found 
true all the enhancement allegations.  The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 
years to life, plus four years four months in state prison.     
Defendant appealed.  With respect to his conviction for attempted mayhem, 
he asserted the trial court erred by instructing the jury that “a gunshot wound” may 
constitute a “serious bodily injury” for purposes of the offense.  (See CALCRIM 
No. 801.)  The Court of Appeal majority agreed with defendant that the instruction 
was unfairly argumentative and created an imbalance in the prosecution‟s favor:  
“The court‟s erroneous instruction essentially suggested to the jury that it could 
find Santana guilty of attempted mayhem if it found merely that he intended to 
inflict a gunshot wound.  The instruction thus removed from the jury‟s 
consideration the key question whether Santana intended to inflict a wound that 
would seriously impair Vallejo‟s physical condition by disabling him.”  The 
majority found the error prejudicial and reversed the attempted mayhem 
conviction.     
Acting Presiding Justice Benke dissented.  She found no instructional error, 
but also concluded any error would be harmless:  “I am at a loss to understand 
how this court can say the trial court‟s instruction, whether deficient or not, had 
any bearing on the verdict when Santana put three bullets into the same limb.”   
 
4 
We granted review to decide whether CALCRIM No. 801 correctly 
requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant caused “serious bodily injury.” 
DISCUSSION 
A. Origins of Mayhem and Section 203 
First codified in 1850, the crime of mayhem originated in the English 
common law.  (Stats. 1850, ch. 99, § 46, pp. 233-234; People v. Sekona (1994) 27 
Cal.App.4th 443, 453-456 (Sekona) [discussing origins of mayhem]; see People v. 
Keenan (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 26, 33 (Keenan) [the word “mayhem” is “older 
form of the word „maim‟ ”].)  The early common law crime of mayhem prohibited 
a person from dismembering or disabling another person, causing “an injury which 
substantially reduced the victim‟s formidability in combat.”  (Goodman v. 
Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 623 (Goodman); see LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed. 2003) Physical Harm & Apprehension, § 16.5, 
p. 598 (LaFave).)  Though not displacing the common law definition, England‟s 
Coventry Act, enacted in 1670, later expanded the crime of mayhem to include 
“mere disfigurement without an attendant reduction in fighting ability,” if the 
injury was intentionally inflicted.  (Goodman, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 624; see 
Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) Other Offenses Against the Person, 
§ 8, p. 240.) 
Following two previous statutory enactments in 1850 and 1856, the crime 
of mayhem was codified as section 203 as part of the original Penal Code enacted 
in 1872.  (Sekona, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 454-455.)  After a minor 
amendment in 1874, section 203 currently provides:  “Every person who 
unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body, or 
disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out 
an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.”  (See Code Amends. 
 
5 
1873-1874, ch. 614, § 17, p. 427 [replacing “cuts out” with “cuts”]; see also Stats. 
1989, ch. 1360, § 106, p. 5864 [no change after routine code maintenance].)  
Section 203 generally prohibits six injurious acts against a person, three that 
specify a particular body part and three that do not:  (1) dismembering or 
depriving a part of someone‟s body; (2) disabling or rendering useless a part of 
someone‟s body; (3) disfiguring someone; (4) cutting or disabling the tongue; (5) 
putting out an eye; and (6) slitting the nose, ear or lip.  (See CALCRIM No. 801 
[delineating six types of injuries].)  California remains one of only a few 
jurisdictions that have retained mayhem as a distinct crime.  (See LaFave, supra, § 
16.5(b), p. 599 & fn. 6; see, e.g., Cole v. Young (7th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 412, 417 
[“mayhem has become something of an anachronism in Wisconsin‟s criminal law, 
largely superseded by more „modern‟ crimes”].) 
Though section 203 contains “verbal vestiges” of the common law and the 
Coventry Act of 1670, “ „the modern rationale of the crime may be said to be the 
preservation of the natural completeness and normal appearance of the human face 
and body, and not, as originally, the preservation of the sovereign‟s right to the 
effective military assistance of his subjects.‟ ”  (People v. Newble (1981) 120 
Cal.App.3d 444, 451; see Keenan, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 34 [describing 
cases that “have expanded mayhem to include acts not within the original 
definition of the crime”].)  In other words, section 203 “protects the integrity of 
the victim‟s person.”  (People v. Page (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 569, 578 (Page); 
see People v. Green (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1, 3; see also Keenan, supra, 227 
Cal.App.3d at p. 34 [recognizing cases as “practical and proper applications of an 
old statute to modern-day reality”].) 
For example, although “not every visible scarring wound” may establish 
mayhem under section 203 (Goodman, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 625), the 
following disfiguring injuries have given rise to a conviction:  cigarette burns to 
 
6 
both breasts (Keenan, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 29); a breast nearly severed by 
a box cutter (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1559 (Pitts)); a three-
inch facial laceration from a fingernail file (People v. Newble, supra, 120 
Cal.App.3d at p. 448); forcible tattoos on the breast and abdomen (Page, supra, 
104 Cal.App.3d at p. 576); and a five-inch facial wound from a knife (Goodman, 
supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 623).  Other injuries constituting mayhem under 
section 203 include blinding of an eye from a kick (Sekona, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 457); severe facial trauma requiring metal plates and wires to keep the facial 
bones together (People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1570 (Hill)); a bitten-
through lower lip (People v. Caldwell (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 952); a broken 
ankle that had not completely healed after six months (People v. Thomas (1979) 
96 Cal.App.3d 507, 512 (Thomas)); and an eye “put out” by a machete (People v. 
Green, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d at p. 4). 
B. CALCRIM No. 801   
The issue here involves CALCRIM No. 801, the standard jury instruction 
defining mayhem.2  As unmodified, CALCRIM No. 801 provides in full:   
“The defendant is charged [in Count _____] with mayhem [in violation of 
Penal Code section 203].   
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of mayhem, the People must prove 
that the defendant caused serious bodily injury when (he/she) unlawfully and 
maliciously:  
“[1. Removed a part of someone‟s body(;/.)]  
                                              
2  
Because defendant was charged with attempted mayhem, the trial court also 
instructed with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 460, defining attempt with 
respect to the offense of mayhem.  The parties do not dispute the propriety of that 
instruction as given; thus, we do not discuss it here.   
 
7 
“[OR] 
“[2. Disabled or made useless a part of someone‟s body and the disability 
was more than slight or temporary(;/.)]  
“[OR] 
“[3. Permanently disfigured someone(;/.)] 
“[OR]  
“[4. Cut or disabled someone‟s tongue(;/.)] 
“[OR] 
“[5. Slit someone‟s (nose[, ]/ear[,]/ [or] lip) (;/.)] 
“[OR] 
“[6. Put out someone‟s eye or injured someone‟s eye in a way that so 
significantly reduced (his/her) ability to see that the eye was useless for the 
purpose of ordinary sight.] 
“Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful 
act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone 
else.  
“[A serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition. 
Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (protracted loss or impairment 
of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ 
[and] serious disfigurement).] 
“[_________________   is a serious bodily injury.] 
“[A disfiguring injury may be permanent even if it can be repaired by 
medical procedures.]”  (CALCRIM No. 801; see also CALJIC No. 9.30 [defining 
mayhem].)  
In this case, the Court of Appeal majority concluded the trial court erred by 
modifying the instruction as follows:  “To prove that the defendant is guilty of 
 
8 
mayhem, the People must prove that the defendant caused serious bodily injury 
when he unlawfully and maliciously disabled or made useless a part of someone‟s 
body and the disability was more than slight or temporary.  [¶]  Someone acts 
maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she 
acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.  [¶]  A serious 
bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition.  Such an injury 
may include a gunshot wound.”  (Italics added.)     
 
The majority below concluded that, by including “a gunshot wound” as an 
example — while omitting other offered examples — of what may constitute a 
serious bodily injury, the modified instruction “failed to inform the jury 
concerning the defining characteristic of the offense of attempted mayhem, i.e., 
the nature and severity of the type of injury that the defendant intended to inflict.”  
The majority also found the instruction argumentative because it invited the jury to 
focus on the prosecution‟s evidence that defendant shot Vallejo, and, based on that 
evidence, to infer that defendant had the requisite specific intent to commit the 
completed offense of mayhem.  In general, the majority found the instruction 
“offered no guidance as to the main issue with respect to what may be deemed a 
serious bodily injury for purposes of the offense of mayhem.”   
Defendant maintains that the Court of Appeal majority was correct in 
criticizing the modified instruction.  The People respond that it does not matter 
whether or how the trial court erred in instructing on the serious bodily injury 
requirement; any error was harmless because the pattern instruction should not 
have included this requirement in the first place.  Further, the People maintain that 
“requiring the proof of a „serious bodily injury‟ over and above the statutory 
language creates an increased burden on the prosecution and could lead to jury 
confusion and unintended consequences.”  Defendant, however, counters that 
except for dismembering someone or putting out someone‟s eye, the injurious acts 
 
9 
listed in section 203 are not self-explanatory; thus, any jury instruction must 
explain the requisite degree of severity for an injury to qualify as a mayhem 
injury.  In his case, he argues that the trial court added to the confusion by, among 
other things, failing to include the pattern instruction‟s offered examples of serious 
bodily injuries (“protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member 
or organ,” “a wound requiring extensive suturing,” “serious disfigurement”)  
(CALCRIM No. 801); these examples would have directed the jury to focus on the 
nature and severity of the victim‟s wounds.  Relying on People v. Ausbie (2004) 
123 Cal.App.4th 855, 861 (Ausbie), defendant adds that because a mayhem injury 
necessarily includes “a serious impairment of physical condition,” CALCRIM No. 
801 properly includes this as a definition of a serious bodily injury.   
As both parties recognize, section 203 does not mention “serious bodily 
injury” or “serious impairment of physical condition.”  Although section 203 has 
remained unchanged since 1874, cases have periodically clarified the statutory 
requirements for mayhem.  For instance, with respect to a disabling injury, the 
victim‟s disability must be more than “slight and temporary.”  (Thomas, supra, 96 
Cal.App.3d at p. 512.)  Similarly, case law has “grafted” on to section 203 the 
requirement that a disfiguring injury be permanent (People v. Newby (2008) 167 
Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347; see Hill, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574, fn. 4); in that 
regard, “an injury may be considered legally permanent for purposes of mayhem 
despite the fact that cosmetic repair may be medically feasible.”  (Hill, supra, 23 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1574-1575; see Keenan, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 36, fn. 6.)  
And finally, as used in section 203, the word “maliciously” “imports an intent to 
vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act.”  (People v. 
Bryan (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 781, 787; see People v. Lopez (1986) 176 
Cal.App.3d 545, 550.)  These clarifications have made their way into the jury 
instructions defining the mayhem offense, including the current version of 
 
10 
CALCRIM No. 801 at issue here.3  (See CALJIC No. 9.30; CALCRIM No. 801.)  
While a jury instruction should typically track the language of a statute when 
feasible under the circumstances (see People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 565), 
an “instruction that clarifies the application of statutory language in a particular 
context does not „add to the words of a statute.‟ ”  (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire 
Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003-1004.) 
Here, the “serious bodily injury” language first appeared in CALCRIM No. 
801 in August 2006.  This language — which was added months after the original 
CALCRIM instruction was approved in January 2006  — was not part of an earlier 
instruction, CALJIC No. 9.30.  The “Authority” section following CALCRIM No. 
801 indicates that the instruction‟s definition of “serious bodily injury” came from 
the 1990 Pitts decision, which held that “great bodily injury is an element of 
mayhem.”  (Pitts, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1558, italics added; see 1 Judicial 
Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2012) Authority for CALCRIM No. 801, p. 
589.)  While the definition appears drawn from Pitts, the instruction does not 
explain what authority compelled insertion of the “serious bodily injury” 
requirement in the first place.  Not surprisingly, the parties disagree on the 
requirement‟s genesis in CALCRIM No. 801.  We must determine whether the 
pattern instruction‟s addition of a “serious bodily injury” requirement properly 
clarifies section 203.  (See Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 1003-1004.)  We begin with a discussion of Pitts.  
As noted, CALCRIM No. 801 explains that the definition of “serious 
bodily injury” is drawn from Pitts, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, in which the 
                                              
3  
We do not express any view on whether these particular cases correctly 
interpret section 203.  
 
 
11 
defendant was convicted of mayhem (§ 203) for nearly severing the victim‟s left 
breast with a box cutter.  The Pitts Court of Appeal reversed the defendant‟s great 
bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (f)) because it concluded that great 
bodily injury is an element of mayhem.  (Pitts, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1558-
1559; § 12022.7, subd. (f) [defining “great bodily injury” as “a significant or 
substantial physical injury”].)  Explaining that mayhem is a “cruel and savage 
crime,” it rejected the People‟s claim that “it is possible in some cases to commit 
mayhem without inflicting great bodily injury.”  (Pitts, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 1559.)  Subsequent cases have accepted Pitts‟s holding that great bodily injury 
is an element of mayhem.  (See, e.g., People v. Brown (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 256, 
272 [“Mayhem cannot be committed without the infliction of great bodily 
injury.”]; Hill, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1575 [“Great bodily injury is 
unquestionably an element of mayhem”]; Keenan, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 36, 
fn. 7 [“We agree mayhem requires great bodily injury”].)  There is no mention in 
Pitts or its progeny of “serious bodily injury” as it applies to mayhem. 
We recognize that the terms “serious bodily injury” and “great bodily 
injury” have been described as “ „ “essential[ly] equivalent” ‟ ” (People v. Sloan 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 117) and as having “substantially the same meaning” 
(People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696).  (See, e.g., People v. Hawkins 
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 [great bodily injury is element of felony battery 
with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)].)  However, the terms in fact “have 
separate and distinct statutory definitions.”  (People v. Taylor (2004) 118 
Cal.App.4th 11, 24 [“Unlike serious bodily injury, the statutory definition of great 
bodily injury does not include a list of qualifying injuries”].)  This distinction may 
make a difference when evaluating jury instructions that provide different 
definitions for the two terms.  (See id. at p. 25 [“In these circumstances, the jury‟s 
finding of serious bodily injury cannot be deemed equivalent to a finding of great 
 
12 
bodily injury.”].)  Thus, in this context where we must consider a jury instruction‟s 
precise language, we cannot conclude that the offense of mayhem includes a 
serious bodily injury requirement simply based on cases holding that mayhem 
includes a great bodily injury component.  Defendant nonetheless maintains that 
the definition of “serious bodily injury” is required to give necessary guidance to 
the jury.      
As both parties note, the instruction‟s definition of “serious bodily injury” 
is apparently drawn from section 243, subdivision (f)(4) (§ 243(f)(4)), which 
defines “serious bodily injury” for purposes of felony battery.4  CALCRIM No. 
801 specifies that the six injurious acts giving rise to mayhem under section 203 
must also be shown to rise to the level of serious bodily injury.  Pursuant to 
section 243(f)(4), the instruction defines “serious bodily injury” as a “serious 
impairment of physical condition,” and then illustrates such injuries by a 
nonexclusive list of qualifying examples.  (See ante, at pp. 6-7 [setting out 
instruction in full].)  However, as we explain below, CALCRIM No. 801‟s 
inclusion of a “serious bodily injury” requirement is problematic and inconsistent 
with section 203. 
For instance, the instruction provides that the People must prove a 
defendant “caused serious bodily injury when (he/she) unlawfully and 
maliciously:  [¶] . . . [¶]  Permanently disfigured someone.”  (CALCRIM No. 801, 
italics added.)  Yet the instruction also adds that a “serious bodily injury” includes 
                                              
4  
This provision states:  “ „Serious bodily injury‟ means a serious impairment 
of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following:  loss of 
consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of 
function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; 
and serious disfigurement.”  (§ 243(f)(4); see also § 417.6, subd. (b) [same 
definition of “serious bodily injury”].)  Loss of consciousness, concussion, and 
bone fracture, however, are not included as examples in CALCRIM No. 801. 
 
13 
“serious disfigurement.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  These two modifiers, however, are 
not synonymous or interchangeable.  (See Silvers v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 2000) 538 
S.E.2d 135, 136 [“ „To constitute the crime of aggravated battery, there is no 
requirement that, in addition to being “serious,” the disfigurement of a victim be 
permanent‟ ”]; see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2901.01, subd. (A)(5)(d)  
[“ „Serious physical harm to persons‟ ” includes “[a]ny physical harm that 
involves some permanent disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious 
disfigurement”]; cf. Keenan, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 35-36 [cigarette burns 
to breasts “clearly involved a serious permanent disfigurement” under § 203 (fn. 
omitted)].)  Thus, a juror could reasonably be confused as to whether a 
disfigurement must be serious, permanent or both.   
Also, CALCRIM No. 801‟s  examples of “serious bodily injury” 
(“protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ,” “a 
wound requiring extensive suturing,” “serious disfigurement”) are inconsistent 
with section 203.  As explained above (see ante, at p. 5), section 203 includes 
among the injurious acts constituting mayhem, cutting or disabling the tongue and 
slitting the nose, ear or lip.  Nothing suggests that these injuries must involve 
protracted loss or impairment of function, require extensive suturing, or amount to 
serious disfigurement.  While these examples are merely illustrative and do not 
constitute serious bodily injuries as a matter of law (see People v. Nava (1989) 
207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1497-1498), they underscore how imprecise and ill-fitting 
the definition is for the statutory offense of mayhem. 
In sum, we see no basis — compelled either by case law or by the need to 
give jurors further guidance — to superimpose a wholesale definition of “serious 
bodily injury” from section 243(f)(4) in the instruction.  By delineating the type of 
injuries that will suffice for mayhem, the Legislature itself established an injury‟s 
requisite level of seriousness in section 203, and when needed, subsequent cases 
 
14 
have given further amplification.  (See People v. Newby, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1347 [disfiguring injury must be permanent]; Thomas, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 512 [disabling injury must more than “slight and temporary”].)  To add a 
serious bodily injury requirement to the specific injuries listed in section 203 is 
more confusing than elucidating.   
We also conclude that Ausbie, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 855, on which 
defendant relies, does not support instructing the jury on a separate “serious bodily 
injury” requirement for mayhem.  In Ausbie, which addressed what offenses were 
necessarily included in mayhem, the Court of Appeal accepted the People‟s 
concession that “battery with serious bodily injury is a necessarily included 
offense of mayhem . . . .”  (123 Cal.App.4th at p. 859; see id. at p. 860, fn. 2;  
People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227 [discussing necessarily included 
offenses].)  In rejecting the defendant‟s claim that assault by means of force likely 
to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, former subd. (a)(1), amended by Stats. 1993, 
ch. 369, § 1, p. 2168) is a necessarily included offense of mayhem, the court 
repeatedly explained that section 203 “itself does not define the nature of force 
required but focuses instead on the nature of the injuries inflicted.”  (Ausbie, 
supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.)  Defendant maintains this language compels 
inclusion of a “serious bodily injury” requirement, namely, its definition as a 
“serious impairment of physical condition,” in the mayhem instruction.  Likewise, 
although the Court of Appeal majority here did not discuss the specific elements 
of mayhem (because the issue was not before it), it repeatedly cited Ausbie and 
referred to what it considered the “defining characteristic” of the mayhem offense, 
i.e., “the nature and severity of the type of injury that the defendant intended to 
inflict,” when discussing the specific intent required to find defendant guilty of 
attempted mayhem.  
 
15 
We first note that apart from accepting the People‟s concession that battery 
with serious bodily injury is a necessarily included offense of mayhem, the Ausbie  
court did not hold that serious bodily injury is a separate element of mayhem.  
Rather than setting out a specific requirement of mayhem, the Ausbie court 
emphasized the nature and severity of the mayhem injuries because it sought to 
distinguish mayhem from assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily 
injury (§ 245, former subd. (a)(1), amended by Stats. 1993, ch. 369, § 1, p. 2168).  
(Ausbie, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 861-862.)  More to the point, even if 
Ausbie is correct that section 203 emphasizes the “nature of the injuries inflicted” 
(123 Cal.App.4th at p. 861), this does not mean that the listed injuries necessarily 
constitute serious bodily injuries as defined, or that the instruction should include 
serious bodily injury as a separate requirement in addition to instructing on the six 
specific injuries. 5  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Ausbie does not stand 
for the proposition that proof of serious bodily injury as a separate element is 
required under CALCRIM No. 801.6 
C. Instructional Error and Prejudice 
Notwithstanding the erroneous addition of a “serious bodily injury” 
requirement, the modified instruction did not prejudice defendant in that regard 
because the prosecution was held to an arguably higher burden of proof.  (See 
People v. Dayan (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 707, 717 [“Defendant cites no authority 
                                              
5  
Defendant nonetheless contends that among the cases discussing the 
severity of various mayhem injuries (see ante, at pp. 5-6), there is not “a single 
case where the injury could not be regarded as a „serious impairment of physical 
condition.”  Whether this observation is true or not, it does not answer the question 
whether such a serious impairment must be proven in a mayhem case.  
6  
We disapprove People v. Ausbie, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 855, to the extent 
it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
16 
for the startling proposition that if a court‟s instruction erroneously adds an 
element to an offense, a conviction must be reversed when there is insufficient 
evidence to support the added, but legally unnecessary, element.”].)  However, the 
instruction explained that a serious bodily injury “may include a gunshot wound,” 
which raises the question whether the instruction was argumentative.  Defendant 
maintains that it was argumentative because it improperly directed the jury to the 
prosecution‟s evidence and “direct[ed] the jury to find a mayhem injury by virtue 
of finding a firearm injury.”  The People, however, contend that because the 
instruction stated an injury “may” include a gunshot wound, the instruction did not 
thereby “direct a verdict in favor of the prosecution” or otherwise relieve the 
prosecution of the burden of proving the necessary elements for mayhem.  In 
addition, they contend that any error was harmless. 
A jury instruction is improperly argumentative if “it would invite the jury to 
draw inferences favorable to the defendant [(or the prosecution)] from specified 
items of evidence on a disputed question of fact, and therefore properly belongs 
not in instructions, but in the arguments of counsel to the jury.”  (People v. Wright 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135; see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437.)  
“In a proper instruction, „[what] is pinpointed is not specific evidence as such, but 
the theory of the defendant‟s [(or the prosecution‟s)] case.‟ ”  (People v. Wright, 
supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1137.)  We review an argumentative instruction for 
harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.  (People v. 
Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887.)  “[U]nder Watson, a defendant must show it is 
reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the 
error.”  (People v. Mena (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 162.) 
We need not decide whether the instruction was argumentative because 
even assuming error, we conclude it was harmless under People v. Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at page 836.  Because defendant was charged with attempted mayhem, 
 
17 
the issue was not whether defendant actually inflicted a disabling injury, but 
whether he intended to do so.  (See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 376 
[“An attempt to commit a crime requires a specific intent to commit the crime and 
a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.”]; see also CALCRIM No. 
460; People v. Nolan (1932) 126 Cal.App. 623, 638.) 
The record here shows that defendant stood at close range and fired three 
shots with a .38-caliber revolver into the leg and buttock area of Vallejo, who lay 
unresisting on the ground.  Defense counsel did not dispute Vallejo suffered 
gunshot wounds, telling the jury the case was about “one question:  Identity.  
Nothing else.”  Moreover, with respect to Vallejo, the jury found true the 
allegations that defendant personally and intentionally used a firearm resulting in 
great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and personally inflicted great bodily 
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).  This evidence strongly supports a finding that 
defendant intended to inflict a disabling injury.  We see no reasonable probability 
the result would have been more favorable to defendant had the court not given an 
instruction highlighting the victim‟s gunshot wound.  
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of Court of Appeal and remand the case to that 
court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Santana 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 200 Cal.App.4th 182 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S198324 
Date Filed: June 10, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Mark E. Johnson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Steven T. Oetting, 
Andrew S. Mestman, Gil Gonzalez and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carl Fabian 
3232 Fourth Avenue 
San Diego, CA  92103 
(619) 692-0440 
 
Stacy Tyler 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2458