Title: The People v. Roy Martin

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 15  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Roy Martin, Also Known as
Reality Martin, 
            Appellant.
Katherine A. Levine, for appellant.
Sholom J. Twersky, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
The issue presented for our determination is whether
defendant's right to a public trial was violated when the trial
judge sua sponte closed the court room, specifically ejecting
defendant's father during voir dire without considering any
alternative accommodations.  We hold that such an action violated
- 1 -
- 2 -
No. 15
defendant's right to a public trial and warrants reversal.
Defendant was arrested on November 19, 2006.  He was
subsequently charged with criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]), criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal
Law § 220.06 [5]), two counts of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03]),
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law §
265.01 [2]), criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree
(Penal Law § 221.10) and two counts of unlawful possession of
marijuana (Penal Law § 221.05).
On March 4, 2008, after a Sandoval hearing and just
prior to the commencement of voir dire, the court engaged in the
following colloquy:
"THE COURT:  I turn to the defendant's
father.  Would you please rise for a moment. 
State your name.
MR. MARTIN SR.:  Roy Martin senior.
THE COURT:  Sir, we're going to be bringing
in a panel of jurors in just a few minutes
and we will need every seat in the courtroom. 
Do you understand that?
MR. MARTIN SR.:  Yes, your honor.
THE COURT:  I don't want you physically near
any of these people.  Consequently, I am
going to ask you to step out and go to the
far end of the hallway.  I want no form of
communication between you and any of these
jurors.  No verbal communication.  I want no
non-verbal communication.  Do you understand? 
After that we will excuse a number of jurors
as we proceed.  Consequently, there will be
- 2 -
- 3 -
No. 15
room in the courtroom.  The Sergeant will ask
one of his officers to tell you when there is
room here for you to step in. Do you
understand that?
MR. MARTIN SR.:  Yes, Your honor.
THE COURT:  Sergeant, I want nobody sitting
in the row in front of him or in the same
row.  Do you understand that?
MR. KLIMAN [defendant's counsel]:  For the
record, I object.
THE COURT:  Sir, when you step out I want you
to have no form of communication with these
people.
MR. KLIMAN:  I object to my client's father
not being allowed to observe every aspect of
the trial.  This is a public trial.  He has a
right to have his father's support and to be
in the audience for every aspect.
. . . 
THE COURT:  The Court sees no reason to
change its rule.  The Court is obligated to
observe the integrity of the proceeding and
that minor action is acceptable to do this."
The record does not reflect that the court considered
alternatives to closure, such as reserving a row of seating for
the public or allowing defendant's father to be present elsewhere
in the courtroom until a seat became available.  During the
morning of voir dire, which lasted approximately 2½ hours, ten
jurors were excused.  At no time was defendant's father informed
he was free to reenter the courtroom.  After a lunch break, the
court reconvened and defendant's attorney notified the court that
defendant's father had not been let in during the morning and had
left the building after the court broke for lunch.  The trial
- 3 -
- 4 -
No. 15
court informed defendant's attorney that "[w]hen there is room in
the courtroom he will be allowed back in and we are close
approaching that . . . point in time."  Voir dire continued that
afternoon and concluded at the end of the following day. 
Defendant's father attended the trial proceedings and defendant
was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]).  The Appellate
Division affirmed.  A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal
and we now reverse.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a . . . public trial" (US Const 6th & 14th amends;
see also, Civil Rights Law § 12; Judiciary Law § 4).  This right
"has long been regarded as a fundamental privilege of the
defendant in a criminal prosecution"  (People v Jelke, 308 NY 56,
61 [1954]) and extends to the voir dire portion of a trial (see
Presley v Georgia, __ US __, 130 S Ct 721, 723-724 [2010]). 
While trial courts have discretion to close the court room to the
public, that discretion must be exercised only "'when unusual
circumstances necessitate it'"  (People v Jones, 96 NY2d 213, 216
[2001] [quoting People v Hinton, 31 NY2d 71 (1972)]).  A party
"seeking to close [a] hearing must advance an overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and .
. . make findings adequate to support the closure"  (Waller v
- 4 -
- 5 -
No. 15
Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 [1984]).
In closing the courtroom, the court indicated two
possible reasons for the closure: first, that every seat would be
occupied by potential jurors and, second, a concern that
defendant's father might influence them.  Although these were
relevant considerations, neither of these concerns, without more,
rises to the level of "an overriding interest that is likely to
be prejudiced."  
Absent a specific threat that a spectator may influence
a prospective juror, it is improper to close the courtroom for
that reason.  
"The generic risk of jurors overhearing
prejudicial remarks, unsubstantiated by any
specific threat or incident, is inherent
whenever members of the public are present
during the selection of jurors. If broad
concerns of this sort were sufficient to
override a defendant's constitutional right
to a public trial, a court could exclude the
public from jury selection almost as a matter
of course" (Presley, _ US at _, 130 S Ct at
725).
  
It is the court's duty to make a finding on the record that
threats of "improper communications with jurors or safety
concerns are concrete enough to warrant closing voir dire" (id.). 
The court here made no such finding.   
Neither does the need for judicial efficiency and the
conservation of judicial resources trump this constitutional
right.  While the trial court does have an inherent power, at its
discretion, to "monitor admittance to the courtroom, as the
- 5 -
- 6 -
No. 15
circumstances require, in order to prevent overcrowding [or] to
accommodate limited seating capacity", such power does not extend
to excluding specific members of the public from the courtroom
(People v Colon, 71 NY2d 410, 416 [1988]).
"Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable
measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials" 
(Presley, _ US at _, 130 S Ct at 725).  Like the court in
Presley, the court in this instance did not consider any
alternatives to closing the courtroom in order to prevent
overcrowding or potential jury contamination.  There is nothing
in the record that shows that the court could not have
accommodated defendant's father.  As noted in Presley, "some
possibilities include reserving one or more rows for the public,
dividing the jury venue panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or
instructing the jury not to engage or interact with audience
members"  (id. at 725).  The court is required to consider
alternatives even if neither party suggests any (id. at 724).     
 
Consequently, pursuant to Presley, the trial court's
failure to consider any alternate accommodations violated
defendant's right to an open trial, regardless of the reasons for
closure.   "[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the trial court had
an overriding interest in closing voir dire, it was still
incumbent upon it to consider all reasonable alternatives to
closure.  It did not, and that is all this Court needs to decide"
(id. at 725).
- 6 -
- 7 -
No. 15
  A violation of the right to an open trial is not
subject to harmless error analysis and "a per se rule of reversal
irrespective of prejudice is the only realistic means to
implement this important constitutional guarantee" (People v
Jones, 47 NY2d 409, 417 [1979]).  However, the People have
proffered the argument that the closing of the courtroom in this
instance was so inconsequential that it is trivial, citing
Gibbons v Savage (555 F3d 112 [2d Cir 2009]) and People v
Peterson (81 NY2d 824 [1993]).  
While the facts in Gibbons, which predates Presley, are
remarkably similar to the instant case, the Second Circuit found
that "nothing of significance happened" while defendant's mother
was kept out of the courtroom (Gibbons v Savage, 555 F3d at 121). 
Here, there was extensive questioning of prospective jurors in
open court about such matters as their familiarity with the
neighborhood of the crime and their experiences with police
officers.  The ability of the public to observe questioning of
this sort is important, both so that the judge, the lawyers and
the prospective jurors will be conscious that they are observed,
and so that the public can evaluate the fairness of the jury
selection process.  "The process of juror selection is itself a
matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the
criminal justice system" (Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court
of California, Riverside County, 464 US 501, 505 [1984]).  
 Finally, the People's reliance on People v Peterson,
- 7 -
- 8 -
No. 15
supra, is misplaced.  Peterson stands for the proposition that a
"brief and inadvertent continuation of a proper courtroom
closing, which was not noticed by any of the participants, did
not violate defendant's right to a public trial" (id. at 825). 
However, it further held that "[a] denial of the public trial
right requires an affirmative act by the trial court excluding
persons from the courtroom, which in effect explicitly overcomes
the presumption of openness" (id.).  That is precisely what
occurred in this case.
Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and a new trial ordered.  
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and a new trial ordered.  Opinion by Judge
Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith,
Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided May 10, 2011
- 8 -