Title: Rochester v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES A. ROCHESTER, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 37, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1810008309 (K) 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: March 31, 2022 
   Decided: June 9, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 
Justices.  
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the opening brief, the motion to affirm, and the record 
on appeal, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
The appellant, James A. Rochester, filed this appeal from a Superior 
Court’s order adopting the Commissioner’s report and recommendation and denying 
his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  
The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground 
that it is manifest on the face of Rochester’s opening brief that his appeal is without 
merit.  We agree and affirm.   
(2) 
In December 2018, a grand jury indicted Rochester for multiple drug 
and weapon offenses.  On April 25, 2019, Rochester filed a motion to suppress 
 
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evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search and seizure.  The State filed a 
response to the motion.  The Superior Court held a hearing on the motion on June 
10, 2019.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Superior Court denied the motion to 
suppress, holding that police had probable cause to arrest Rochester and search his 
car after observing him take a firearm from the trunk of his car, rack the weapon, 
and conceal it in his waistband.   
(3) 
On June 17, 2019, Rochester pled guilty to drug dealing and possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”) in exchange for dismissal 
of the other charges.  The State agreed to recommend twenty years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended after eight years.  After conducting a guilty plea colloquy 
and accepting the guilty plea, the Superior Court sentenced Rochester, in accordance 
with the State’s recommendation, as follows: (i) for drug dealing, fifteen years of 
Level V incarceration, suspended after three years for decreasing levels of 
supervision; and (ii) for PFDCF, five years of Level V incarceration.   
(4) 
On appeal, Rochester argued that the State violated his constitutional 
rights by arresting him without probable cause.  This Court held that Rochester’s 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of the arguments raised in 
the motion to suppress.1   
 
1 Rochester v. State, 2020 WL 363678, at *1 (Del. Jan 21, 2020). 
 
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(5) 
On June 8, 2020, Rochester filed a timely motion for postconviction 
relief.  Rochester argued that his trial counsel was ineffective.  He subsequently filed 
a motion for appointment of counsel, which the Superior Court denied.  After 
obtaining the affidavit of Rochester’s counsel and the State’s response to the motion 
for postconviction relief, a Superior Court Commissioner recommended that the 
Superior Court deny Rochester’s motion.  On July 27, 2021, the Superior Court 
issued an order adopting the Commissioner’s report and recommendation and 
denying  Rochester’s motion for postconviction relief.    
(6) 
Rochester filed an untimely appeal.  After the State informed the Court 
that the prison mail log supported Rochester’s claim that he did not receive the 
Superior Court’s order in time to file a timely appeal, this Court remanded the matter 
for the Superior Court to reissue the July 2021 order.2  The Superior Court reissued 
the order, and this timely appeal followed.    
(7) 
As he did below, Rochester argues in his opening brief that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in her handling of the motion to suppress.  Specifically, he 
contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the police officers 
who testified at the suppression hearing with information he provided her, file a 
motion for reargument, and sufficiently advise him of his appeal rights.  We do not 
 
2 Rochester v. State, 2022 WL 188164 (Del. Jan. 20, 2022). 
 
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consider other ineffective assistance of counsel claims that Rochester raised below, 
but did not argue in his opening brief.3   
(8) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief 
for abuse of discretion.4  We review legal or constitutional questions, including 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.5  The Court must consider the 
procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.6   
(9) 
The procedural requirements of Rule 61 do not bar Rochester’s timely 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.7  Although the Commissioner incorrectly 
stated that Rule 61(i)(3) barred Rochester’s ineffective assistance claims, the 
Commissioner nonetheless addressed the merits of those claims.8  A successful claim 
of ineffective assistance requires a claimant to show that: (i) his counsel’s conduct 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) there was a reasonable 
 
3 Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3) (“The merits of any argument that is not raised in the body 
of the opening brief shall be deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court on 
appeal.”); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993) (recognizing that the failure 
to raise a legal issue in an opening brief generally constitutes a waiver).  In the proceedings 
below, Rochester also argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to file an interlocutory 
appeal and not using out-of-state caselaw that he provided her for the motion to suppress. 
4 Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015). 
5 Id. 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
7 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020); Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 759 (Del. 
2016). 
8 Green, 238 A.3d at 175 (rejecting the Commissioner’s conclusion that Rule 61(i)(3) 
barred the appellant’s ineffective assistance claims but concluding that reversal was 
unnecessary because the Commissioner and Superior Court had addressed the merits of 
those claims). 
 
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probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but 
would have insisted on going to trial.9  Although not insurmountable, there is a 
strong presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.10  
(10) In arguing that his trial counsel should have impeached a testifying 
police officer regarding his prior statement that Rochester ran a stop sign, Rochester 
ignores that his counsel cross-examined multiple police officers with photographs 
showing that their view of one stop sign was obstructed and played video showing 
that Rochester stopped at another stop sign.  Rochester’s counsel relied on this 
evidence to argue that there were no stop sign violations to justify the police officers’ 
actions in her closing argument.  Impeachment on this point with a prior statement 
would have been cumulative evidence Rochester’s counsel had already submitted.   
(11) Rochester also claims that his counsel did not use information he 
provided to her about the speed limit being fifteen miles per hour and his child living 
in the neighborhood where police observed him driving slowly.  But in fact she did 
ask one of the witnesses if the speed limit dropped to fifteen miles per hour and if 
he was aware that Rochester had children living in the area.   The witness testified 
that he did not believe the speed limit dropped to fifteen miles per hour, and that 
Rochester told him that he had a niece who lived there.  As to Rochester’s claim that 
 
9 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
10 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1988)). 
 
6 
he told his counsel the gun was not loaded, multiple witnesses testified that they 
observed him racking the gun before concealing it in the waistband of his pants.  
Even if the gun was not loaded as Rochester now claims, the officers could not have 
known that when they observed him rack the gun.   
(12) Rochester also fails to identify any basis for a motion for reargument.  
The proper purpose of a motion for reargument “is to request the trial court to 
reconsider whether it overlooked an applicable legal precedent or misapprehended 
the law or the facts in such a way as to affect the outcome of the case,” not raise new 
issues or rehash arguments previously raised.11  Rochester has not shown that his 
counsel’s handling of the motion to suppress was professionally unreasonable or a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome.  As the Commissioner recognized, 
Rochester faced many years of imprisonment if convicted of all of the charges.  By 
pleading guilty, Rochester obtained the benefit of the State’s sentencing 
recommendation and the dismissal of multiple weapon charges, including 
possession of a firearm by a person prohibited and carrying a concealed deadly 
weapon, exposing him to years of imprisonment.  
(13) To the extent Rochester claims his guilty plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, or voluntary, this Court previously concluded otherwise.12  Rochester has 
 
11 Chrin v. Ibrix Inc., 2012 WL 6737780, at *2 (Del. Dec. 31, 20212). 
12 Rochester, 2020 WL 363678, at *1. 
 
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not identified anything that would lead to a different conclusion.  At the time of his 
guilty plea Rochester knew his trial counsel had not litigated the motion to suppress 
as he wished her to, but still chose to plead guilty.   
(14) Finally, the record does not support Rochester’s claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for insufficiently informing him of his appeal rights.  During 
the guilty plea colloquy, Rochester responded affirmatively when the Superior Court 
judge asked if he was aware that he was relinquishing his right to appeal.  In addition, 
Rochester filed a timely notice of appeal and was represented by the Office of 
Defense Services on that appeal.  The Superior Court did not err in finding 
Rochester’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims without merit. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice