Title: State v. McCray

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

561 So. 2d 257 (1990)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Alphonso McCRAY, Respondent.
No. 73249.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 3, 1990.
*258 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Walter M. Meginniss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Barbara Linthicum, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review McCray v. State, 531 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), to answer the following certified question:
Id. at 409. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the negative as qualified below and approve the decision of the district court.
On two occasions in 1986, McCray sold an undercover police officer a "twenty cent piece," i.e., twenty dollars' worth of powdered cocaine in a plastic baggie. He was convicted of two counts of sale of cocaine, two counts of possession of cocaine, two counts of delivery of drug paraphernalia, and one count of conspiracy to deliver cocaine. The district court affirmed, with the exception of the convictions for delivery of drug paraphernalia, which it reversed. It determined that the baggies containing the cocaine constituted drug paraphernalia but that the legislature did not intend to punish as two separate crimes the single act of sale of a drug in a package. The court then certified the above question.
The sale or delivery of drugs is proscribed by section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1985), which provides in part:
Section 893.147, Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part:
(Emphasis added.) Section 893.145, Florida Statutes (1985), in turn, defines "drug paraphernalia":
(Emphasis added.)
Because the instant criminal act took place prior to July 1, 1988, we must apply the analysis set out in Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987), to determine whether the legislature intended to punish as two separate crimes the sale or delivery of a drug in a container. See State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989). Under this reasoning, although the offenses set out in sections 893.13(1)(a) and 893.147(1) contain different statutory elements, they unquestionably address the same evil in those cases where the paraphernalia is used to facilitate the sale or delivery of drugs. Each addresses the evil embodied in the transfer of drugs. Accordingly, under Carawan, a single act cannot give rise to multiple convictions and sentences under the two sections. We note, however, that such would not be the case under other provisions of the paraphernalia statute.
We answer the certified question in the negative as qualified above and approve the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs in result only.
EHRLICH, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs.
EHRLICH, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I find it difficult to agree with the reasoning of the majority.
There is nothing ambiguous about the language of the statute in question. As stated by the court below:
McCray v. State, 531 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Very shortly after Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987), was issued, the legislature spoke loud and clear when it amended section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1985). The amended statute reads:
Ch. 88-131, § 7, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 775.021(4)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988)).
*260 The majority seems to have forgotten what the Court said in Lowry v. Parole & Probation Commission, 473 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1985):
(Citations omitted.)
In light of the unambiguous language in the statute in question and the amendment to section 775.021(4) cited above, it seems to me crystal clear that the legislature intended to endeavor to impede the flow of drugs in this state by punishing as a separate crime the delivery of containers used for packaging drugs, as spelled out in the statute under consideration.
Therefore, I dissent.
SHAW, J., concurs.