Title: Vermont v. Stolte

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Stolte (2011-407)
 
2012 VT 12
 
[Filed 10-Feb-2012]
 
ENTRY
  ORDER
 
2012 VT 12
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-407
 
DECEMBER TERM, 2011
 
State of Vermont
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Orange Unit, 
 
}
Criminal Division
 
}
 
Alexander Stolte
}
DOCKET NO. 148-3-10 Oecr
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Harold E. Eaton, Jr. 
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Defendant Alexander Stolte appeals the
decision of the Orange Criminal Division denying his motion for bail
review.  Defendant, charged with second-degree murder and held without
bail, requested that the court review bail based on evidence developed after his
initial bail hearing in March 2010.  The criminal division refused to
consider the new evidence and to reopen the question of whether the evidence of
defendant's guilt is "great," as required to deny bail under the Vermont
Constitution and 13 V.S.A. § 7553, on the ground that it is "modifying
evidence."  We reverse and remand.
¶ 2.            
The history of this case may be summarized as follows.  In the
early morning of March 18, 2010, one-year-old Kyleigh
McDaniel died at Gifford Medical Center of head injuries resulting from an
apparent homicide.  At the time of the child's death, defendant was the
boyfriend of the child's mother, MacKenzie
McDaniel.  Defendant was babysitting the child on the night of March 17 at
the home of his mother in Chelsea, where he was staying with the child's
mother, his own mother, and his younger sister.  The Vermont State Police
began an investigation into the child's death and interviewed defendant five
times on March 18three times at Gifford Medical Center during the early
morning, once on the South Royalton green that evening, and finally at the
Royalton state police barracks.  
¶ 3.            
During the course of these interviews, defendant recounted the details
of his previous day caring for the child.  Defendant did not leave the
house all day, but the child's mother had left for work at around 3:00 p.m. and
defendant's mother, after stopping in during the early evening, had left for
the night at around 6:30 pm.  Defendant's mother had checked on the child
prior to her departure and reported nothing unusual.  Defendant recalled
putting the child to bed and giving her a bottle at around 9:30 p.m., when he
noticed that one of her eyes was "drooping."  Concerned, he called the
child's mother, who thought the droopy eye was caused by the child's
cold.  Defendant maintained that he periodically checked on the child
until 11:20 p.m., when he found her bottle in the same position it had been in
when he had put her to bed and that she was barely breathing.  Defendant
then called 911, and an ambulance took the child to the hospital, where she
died shortly after arrival.
¶ 4.            
Based on the foregoing information and the results of a preliminary
autopsy conducted on March 18, defendant was arrested after his interview at
the Royalton barracks.  On March 19, he was charged with second-degree
murder under 13 V.S.A. § 2301 and held without bail.  After a bail review
hearing on March 30, the criminal division ordered that defendant be held
without bail pending trial under Chapter II, § 40(1) of the Vermont
Constitution and § 7553, which permit the denial of bail in cases where the
defendant is charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment and "the
evidence of guilt is great."
¶ 5.            
In its written decision, the court characterized the evidence against
defendant as "circumstantial, but . . . substantial nevertheless." 
Referring to the autopsy findings concerning the child's head injuriesand
noting other injuries to her neck, face, chest, right arm, and right legit
reasoned that "[t]he evidence . . . strongly supports a finding that the
child's injuries occurred . . . during a
period of time in which the child was in defendant's exclusive care" and that
"[t]here is strong evidence that defendant was the only possible source of the
injuries."  The court's decision did not reference that the autopsy also
found pubic hairs "in and around [the child's] vagina," as well as cuts in her
vaginal area and "biological fluid on [her] body." 
¶ 6.            
In October 2011, defendant filed a motion to review bail based on
evidence discovered since his March 30, 2010 bail hearing.  Defendant
argued that the result of a mitochondrial DNA test conducted on one of the
hairs found on the child, which was reported in June 2011 and which excluded
defendant as the source of the hair, substantially undermines the State's
original theory that defendant was the only person who could have committed the
murder.[1] 
Based on the DNA evidence, as well as other evidence developed in the course of
discovery, defendant argued that the evidence of his guilt was no longer
"great" as required to hold him without bail.[2]  Accordingly, he requested that the
court set conditions of release.  See 13 V.S.A. § 7554 (outlining factors
to consider in setting bail and providing for certain conditions of release).
¶ 7.            
The criminal division denied defendant's motion.  At a hearing held
on October 26, the court explained on the record that under State v. Turnbaugh, 174 Vt. 532, 811 A.2d 662 (2002) (mem.), the evidence emphasized by defendant was "modifying
evidence" that the court could not use to reconsider its initial bail
decision.  Citing State v. Duff, 151 Vt. 433, 563 A.2d 258 (1989),
which adopted the standard applied in Turnbaugh,
it reiterated in its written order that "[t]he evidence proffered by defendant
. . . was modifying evidence that did not change the determination as to whether
the state has established a prima facie case by showing substantial, admissible
evidence as to each element of the offense."  Defendant appealed.
¶ 8.            
Defendant argues that the court erred in classifying the DNA evidence as
"modifying evidence," not to be taken into consideration under Duff, for
two reasons.  First, defendant argues that the DNA test is the State's
evidence, as opposed to evidence developed by the defense, because the State
itself collected hair samples and arranged for their analyses by the FBI. 
Second, he argues that modifying evidence is evidence requiring a credibility
determination, such as conflicting expert testimony, and that he is not seeking
to use the evidence to counter the State's evidence or impeach its witnesses,
but rather to challenge the trial court's rationale for holding him without
bail.  Our review of the court's decision thus turns on the definition of
"modifying evidence," a question we undertake de novo. State v. Eldredge, 2006
VT 80, ¶ 7, 180 Vt. 278, 910 A.2d 816.  
¶ 9.            
Duff established that evidence of guilt is "great" when the State
can make out a prima facie case; that is, when "the evidence, taken in the
light most favorable to the State and excluding modifying evidence, can
fairly and reasonably show [the] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt."  State v. Duff, 151 Vt. at 439-40, 563 A.2d 262-63
(emphasis added) (quotation omitted).  This standard was borrowed from,
and is coextensive with, the State's burden to prevail against a motion to
dismiss for lack of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.  See V.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(2) (providing that
a prima facie case lies when there is "substantial, admissible evidence as to
the elements of the offense challenged . . . sufficient to prevent
the grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal at trial").  For the
reasons explained below, we hold that the court erred in classifying the DNA
evidence in this case as "modifying evidence" akin to the testimonial evidence
excluded from consideration in Duff and Turnbaugh.
¶ 10.         State
v. Gibney offers this Court's fullest discussion
of the meaning of modifying evidence.  2003 VT 26, 175
Vt. 180, 825 A.2d 32.  In Gibney,
reviewing the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for
acquittaldecided under the same standard as a motion for dismissal for lack of
a prima facie casewe defined "modifying evidence" as "exculpatory evidence
introduced by the defendant, such as countervailing testimony."  Id.
¶ 14 (emphasis added).  The evidence thus excluded from the trial court's
analysis in Gibney was testimony from an alibi
witness and from a witness who had heard gunshots involved in a murder.  Id.
¶¶ 15-16.
¶ 11.         Gibney drew its definition from two federal cases, United
States v. Kelley, 152 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971).  In Kelley,
the Eighth Circuit explained that "[a] motion for a judgment of acquittal
should be denied when there is substantial evidence justifying an inference of
guilt irrespective of any countervailing testimony that may be introduced." 
152 F.3d  at 886 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).  In Wolfson, the court stated that in deciding a motion
for judgment of acquittal, the court should not consider "evidence adduced by
the defendant."  332 F. Supp.  at 806. 
Though laconic and indirect, Gibney and its
supporting sources nevertheless reflect that "modifying evidence," as
characterized in Duff, is testimonial evidence introduced by the defense
in contravention to the state's evidence, the credibility or weight of which is
ultimately for the factfinder's determination.  
¶ 12.         Treating
modifying evidence as testimonial evidence offered by the defense is consistent
with the rationale for its exclusion from prima facie evidence
determinations.  As noted by the criminal division in this case, Turnbaugh emphasized that the inquiry under § 7553
is limited to whether the State has a prima facie case, and that
 "credibility determinations based on conflicting evidence" are not at
issue.  174 Vt. at 534, 811 A.2d  at 665. 
The Turnbaugh Court explained that "[d]irect conflicts between inculpatory
[and] exculpatory facts cannot be resolved at this stage" because "[s]uch matters must await jury determination at trial."  Id;
see also Gibney, 2003 VT 26, ¶¶ 14-16
(refusing to resolve credibility questions posed by conflicting state and
defense testimony).  Turnbaugh thus
affirmed the court's refusal to consider affidavits introduced by the defendant
that contradicted the State's evidence of the defendant's alleged incriminating
statements.  174 Vt. at 533-35, 811 A.2d  at 664-66. 
In Gibney, we noted the same rationale for
excluding the testimony of defense witnesses in considering a motion for
judgment of acquittal.  2003 VT 26, ¶¶ 14-16 (reasoning
that a credibility determination raised by conflicting testimony was reserved
exclusively for jury).  That the exclusion of modifying evidence is
meant to avoid judicial decisions on credibility only when live witnesses or
affidavits are presented confirms the definition of modifying evidence in our
prior cases as defense testimony introduced to meet and dispute the State's
evidence.
¶ 13.         While
testimonial evidence raises inherent credibility questions not properly
resolved by judges at bail hearings, non-testimonial evidence does not. 
Non-testimonial evidence is any evidence which does not derive and depend on
the observation, recollection, reliability, or veracity of witnesses, whether
in the form of live testimony or a sworn statement, and which therefore does
not implicate a credibility determination.  Examples of non-testimonial
evidence can include DNA analysis, photographs, or other physical evidence, the
provenance of which is not contested.  Where the validity of such
non-testimonial evidence is undisputed, there is no question of
credibility.  For example, in the case of an undisputedly valid DNA
result, the jury would not be required to decide whether it believed the
test result, but only what it proved.  
¶ 14.         In
other cases, however, the underlying validity of non-testimonial evidence may
be disputed.  For example, a photograph may purport to show a defendant in
another state at the time of an alleged crime, but other evidence may support
that the photo was doctored, or its quality may be so poor that the State could
reasonably argue that it did not show the defendant at all.  In such a
case, the evidence would properly be considered modifying evidence because it
raises a factual questionsuch as whether a photograph really showed the
defendantthat must be left for the jury at trial. 
¶ 15.         Here,
it was error to necessarily equate defendant's new DNA evidence, purportedly
undisputed as to its foundation, with disputed, testimonial "modifying
evidence."  Accordingly, the court's decision is reversed and the matter
remanded.  On remand, the court must first ascertain whether the proffered
evidence, if relevant, is undisputed as to its origin and result as a matter of
fact.  If a genuine dispute as to either arises, then the evidence is
modifying evidence.  But if no such conflict exists, the court must
determine whether, if admissible, the evidence would have made a difference to
its initial determination on whether the state's prima facie evidence of guilt was
"great" for purposes of holding defendant without bail.  
Reversed
and remanded.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

[1]  Defendant's motion also explained that
because "mitochondrial DNA is maternally inherited, and all maternally related
individuals are expected to have the same [DNA] profile," the test result also
excluded defendant's mother and sister as the source of the hair.  
 
[2]  Defendant's motion also cited the
apparently new factsince the first bail hearingthat the child's crib was
located close to an unlocked outside door to suggest that, contrary to the
court's initial determination, someone besides defendant could have been in the
house when the child was killed