Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ADAM KEITH CORNELL

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 18, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 115833  
ADAM KEITH CORNELL,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, J.  
In the case before us, we must consider two issues: (1)  
whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the  
requested misdemeanor lesser included offense instruction of  
breaking 
and 
entering without permission, MCL 750.115, and (2)  
if the trial court did err, whether the error was harmless.  
We hold that it was error for the trial court to refuse the  
requested instruction and that the error was harmless.  
Therefore, we affirm defendant’s convictions.  
 
 
I  
Defendant Cornell was convicted by a jury in the  
Roscommon Circuit Court of breaking and entering with the  
intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110. He was sentenced, as  
an habitual offender, to eight to twenty years’ imprisonment.  
Defendant Cornell’s conviction stems from an incident  
occurring in mid-February, 1996, when a house owned by Thomas  
Becker was completely destroyed by fire.1  The fire marshal  
opined that the fire started in the living room/dining room  
area of the home and that it was not accidental. Three sets  
of footprints were found leading away from the home, down the  
hill.  Police followed the prints with a tracking dog and were  
led to a home about two miles away, where defendant and his  
cousin Christopher Cornell were present.  The owner of the  
home told police that they should be looking for Cary  
Prescott.  Some time later, the police stopped a vehicle with  
Prescott, Christopher Cornell, and defendant inside.  All  
three men gave various statements to the police regarding the  
incident.  At defendant’s trial, Christopher Cornell and  
Prescott testified against defendant pursuant to a plea  
agreement.  
1 The house, located in St. Helen, Michigan, was known in 
the community as the “Heston house” because actor Charleton 
Heston had spent time there.  
2  
Defendant 
gave 
two written statements to the police, both  
of which were admitted into evidence.  Defendant gave varying  
reasons in the statements for visiting the house.  In one  
statement, defendant claimed that Prescott wanted to show him  
and Christopher Cornell the place where he had outrun a police  
dog.  When they arrived at the house, Prescott began punching  
out windows and started the house on fire. Defendant stated  
that neither he nor Christopher Cornell did anything to the  
house.  In another statement, defendant claimed that while the  
three of them were going for a walk, Prescott told them that  
there was a house in the woods that “had a lot of stuff in  
there that they could make a lot of money.”  He stated that  
Prescott kicked in the door, but that “there was not anything  
in the house to take.”  Prescott began punching out windows  
and lit some curtains on fire. Defendant denied that he lit  
anything on fire and stated that he did not want to be there.  
Prescott 
testified 
that 
it 
was 
Christopher 
Cornell’s 
idea  
to go to the house and that they went there to look around and  
see what was inside the house.  He stated that they “hadn’t  
really planned on taking anything. It was empty.” However,  
during cross-examination, Prescott stated that, although he  
didn’t plan on stealing anything, he probably would have and  
that he thought that perhaps he “could get a little souvenir.”  
Prescott also stated that he tried to set a curtain on fire,  
3  
but it wouldn’t burn. 
He alleged that defendant and  
Christopher Cornell started the fire.  
Christopher Cornell testified that he, defendant, and  
Prescott broke into the house to see what they could find and  
that they were looking for things to steal.  However, they did  
not find anything of value to take.  He also stated that  
Prescott broke windows and set a curtain on fire and that  
defendant set some mattresses on fire. In one of his written  
statements, Christopher indicated that Prescott had asked him  
and defendant if they wanted to “see something wicked” and  
then had led them to the house.  
Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed on  
the lesser included misdemeanor of breaking and entering  
without permission, MCL 750.115. The trial court denied the  
request, stating:  
The Court would note for the record entering 
without permission is a misdemeanor.  The Court  
takes note of the record that the defendant asserts  
and it was his position that there was no intent to 
commit a larceny and I think that the issue is 
squarely framed for the jury.  Either there was a B  
and E with intent or the crime did not occur. 
I  
would not give the entering without owner’s  
permission instruction under the circumstances of 
this case.  
Defendant 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his  
conviction.2  The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s  
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 2, 1999 
(Docket No. 211215).  
4  
argument that the trial court erred when it refused to  
instruct the jury on the lesser included misdemeanor.  It  
reasoned that, in light of the evidence presented regarding  
defendant’s intent to commit larceny, “the jury could not  
rationally have found that defendant lacked the intent to  
commit larceny when he entered the house.”  Slip op at 3.  
Because the requested instruction was not supported by a  
rational view of the evidence, the Court of Appeals found that  
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to  
give the instruction.  
One judge dissented with respect to the instructional  
issue.  The dissent opined that there was evidence to support  
defendant’s theory that he lacked the intent to commit a  
larceny. The dissenting judge explained:  
Not 
only 
was 
there 
evidence 
supporting 
defendant’s theory that he had no intent to commit 
larceny, but also the only disputed factual element 
was whether defendant had an intent to commit  
larceny, which is an element not included in the 
lesser misdemeanor offense.  In other words, the 
lesser misdemeanor instruction was proper in this 
case because the greater offense required the jury 
to find that the disputed factual element, whether 
defendant had the intent to commit larceny, existed 
and this element is not required for a conviction 
of breaking and entering without permission. 
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant’s requested instruction of the 
lesser misdemeanor offense of breaking and entering 
without permission. [Slip op at 2 (citation 
omitted).]  
5  
 
 
 
The dissent also noted that the requested instruction would  
not have resulted in undue confusion or some other injustice.  
Defendant sought leave to appeal from this Court. This  
Court granted leave to appeal in this case and in People v  
Silver, 466 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2002), ordering that the  
two cases be argued and submitted together.3  
II  
Although much of our more recent case law has disregarded  
it, resolution of the first issue presented in this case is  
governed by MCL 768.32(1), which provides:  
Except as provided in subsection (2), upon an 
indictment for an offense, consisting of different 
degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, the jury, 
or the judge in a trial without a jury, may find 
the accused not guilty of the offense in the degree 
charged in the indictment and may find the accused 
person guilty of a degree of that offense inferior 
to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt 
to commit that offense.  
MCL 768.29 requires the court to “instruct the jury as to the  
3 463 Mich 958-959 (2001).  The grant order limited the 
appeal to the following issues:  
[W]hether (1) the trial court erred in  
refusing to give the requested misdemeanor lesser 
included offense instruction, and (2) if so, 
whether the error was harmless. In addressing the 
harmless error issue, the parties shall discuss the 
applicability of People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126  
(1980), People v Beach, 429 Mich 450 (1988), People  
v Mosko, 441 Mich 496 (1992), People v Lukity, 460  
Mich 484 (1999), People v Snyder, 462 Mich 38  
(2000), and People v Elston, 462 Mich 751 (2000).  
6  
 
law applicable to the case” and indicates that “[t]he failure  
of the court to instruct the jury on any point of law shall  
not be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless  
such instruction is requested by the accused.”  
A version of MCL 768.32 has been in existence since 1846.  
1846 CL 5,952 provided:  
“[U]pon 
an 
indictment 
for 
any 
offense, 
consisting of different degrees, as prescribed in 
this title, the jury may find the accused not 
guilty of the offense in the degree charged in the 
indictment, and may find such accused person guilty 
of any degree of such offense, inferior to that 
charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to 
commit such offense.” [Hanna v People, 19 Mich 316,  
320-321 (1869).]  
In Hanna, the defendant was charged with assault with  
intent to kill.  An issue before the Court was whether the  
trial court erred in instructing the jury that if it did not  
find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the  
information, it might find the defendant guilty of simple  
assault and battery, which was a misdemeanor. In addressing  
the issue, this Court first discussed the general common-law  
rule, stating:  
The general rule at common law was, that when 
an indictment charged an offense which included 
within it another less offense or one of a lower  
degree, the defendant, though acquitted of the 
higher offense, might be convicted of the less.  
This rule, however, was subject to the  
qualification, that upon an indictment for a  
felony, the defendant could not be convicted of a 
misdemeanor. [Id., 318.]  
7  
After explaining that the bases for the misdemeanor  
qualification had ceased to exist, the Court construed the  
1846 version of the statute because it believed that the  
statute governed the case before it.  The Court’s analysis of  
the statute is enlightening.  In construing the statute,  
Justice Christiancy, writing for the Court, stated:  
I do not think this provision was intended to 
be restricted in its application to offenses  
divided by the statutes contained in this title 
(which included all the provisions in reference to 
crimes), into classes expressly designated by the 
name of “degrees.” Thus confined, it would apply, 
so far as I have been able to discover, only to the 
single case of an indictment for murder in the 
first 
degree, 
and 
would 
not 
even 
include  
manslaughter as a lower degree of the offense, but 
only murder in the second degree; since murder is 
the only offense divided by the statute into 
classes expressly designated as “degrees.”  Beside, 
if thus restricted to the crime of murder, it can 
apply only to that very class of cases in which it 
was not needed, either as declaratory of, or as 
amending the common law; since, without the  
provision, 
the 
common 
law 
by 
the 
narrowest  
application 
ever 
adopted, 
had 
already 
fully 
provided for the case; as no one can doubt that 
without this provision, the common law rule would, 
under the statute, dividing murder into degrees, 
have authorized a conviction not only for murder in 
the second degree, but for manslaughter also, under 
an indictment for murder in the first degree, all 
these offenses being felonies included in the 
charge.
 But, if this is not clear enough in 
itself, the statute has put this view in the 
clearest possible light; by expressly providing in 
the next section (Sec 3, Ch 153, Rev Stat of 1846), 
after 
dividing 
murder 
into 
degrees, 
for 
a  
conviction of murder in the second degree upon a 
charge of murder in the first, though it is silent 
as to a verdict of manslaughter in such a case. 
If, therefore, section sixteen of chapter 161, 
above quoted at length, is not to be applied to any  
8  
 
 
offenses not divided into degrees eo nomine, then  
it can have no application or effect whatever, and 
must have been inserted in the statute for no  
purpose or object. 
Such a construction is  
inadmissible, if the provision will admit of any 
other.  
Whatever may have been the proper construction 
of this provision under the Revised Statutes of New 
York, where it is preceded by very different 
provisions, it must, I think, in the connection in 
which it is found in our revision, be construed as 
extending to all cases in which the statute has 
substantially, 
or 
in 
effect, 
recognized 
and  
provided 
for 
the 
punishment 
of 
offenses 
of  
different grades, or degrees of enormity, wherever 
the charge for the higher grade includes a charge 
for the less.  In this view only, can any effect be 
given to it, as declaratory of, or altering the 
common law.[4]  [Id., 321-322.]  
The Court further noted that the circuit courts had  
consistently 
construed 
the 
statute 
as 
removing 
the 
misdemeanor  
restriction of the common-law rule and authorizing a  
conviction “for any substantive offense included in the  
offense charged, without reference to the fact that one was a  
felony and the other a misdemeanor . . . .” Id., 323.  
On the basis of its analysis of the statute, the Court  
concluded that because the assault statute provided for  
“assaults of various kinds and degrees of enormity, depending  
upon the intent with which, and the circumstances under which  
4 In 1861, this Court explained, “It is a general rule of 
criminal law, that a jury may acquit of the principal charge, 
and find the prisoner guilty of an offense of lesser grade, if 
contained within it.”  People v McDonald, 9 Mich 150, 153 
(1861).  
9  
 
the assault may have been made,” an indictment for any of the  
higher grades of assault must include the inferior degree of  
simple assault, and the defendant could be convicted of the  
included offense.  Id., 322-323.  The Court rejected the  
defendant’s argument that he could not be prosecuted by  
information because he had never been examined on a charge of  
a misdemeanor; because the misdemeanor was included in the  
charge of the felony, an examination upon the higher offense  
was an examination upon the lesser offense included within it.  
Beginning with a series of cases released in 1975, this  
Court’s analysis moved away from MCL 768.32 and the  
construction that the statute had been given by the Hanna  
Court.
 The two most noteworthy cases in this series are  
People v Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), and People  
v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).  
In Jones, the defendant, upon retrial, was charged with  
second-degree murder and convicted of that offense. The trial  
court instructed the jury on second-degree murder and  
voluntary manslaughter.  However, the trial court refused  
defense counsel’s request that the jury be instructed on the  
statutory offense of killing or injuring a person by careless,  
reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm.  
In analyzing whether this was a lesser included offense  
on which the jury should have been instructed, this Court  
10  
 
 
  
first opined that the law of lesser included offenses in  
Michigan had not been clear or consistent.  It noted that the  
common law had defined lesser included offense to mean  
necessarily included lesser offenses—that is, the lesser  
offense “must be such that it is impossible to commit the  
greater without first having committed the lesser.” Id., 387.  
However, it then explained, without citation of any Michigan  
authority, that this definition was conceded to be “unduly  
restrictive” and that most jurisdictions, including Michigan,  
“have 
statutes 
that 
are broadly construed to permit conviction  
of ‘cognate’ or allied offenses of the same nature under a  
sufficient charge.”  Id.
 This Court explained that these  
“lesser offenses are related and hence ‘cognate’ in the sense  
that they share several elements, and are of the same class or  
category, but may contain some elements not found in the  
higher offense.” Id.  
Further, applying this analysis to the case before it,  
the Jones Court concluded that reckless discharge of a firearm  
causing death may be a lesser included offense of second­
degree murder. Examination of the two offenses demonstrated  
“the overlapping of certain elements and common statutory  
purpose.” 
Id., 389. 
Thus, the two offenses were cognate.  
The Court then reasoned that while, in the case of a  
necessarily 
included 
lesser 
offense, 
the 
evidence 
would 
always  
11  
 
 
 
support the lesser if it supports the greater, in the case of  
a cognate lesser offense, the evidence “must be examined to  
determine whether that evidence would support a conviction of  
the lesser offense.”  Id., 390. Because the evidence would  
have supported a guilty verdict on the offense of careless,  
reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm causing death,  
the Court concluded that the trial court should have given the  
requested instruction.  
Justice Coleman dissented from the majority opinion in  
Jones because she disagreed with the theory of lesser included  
offenses adopted by the majority.  She explained that it would  
blur the lines of responsibility in the criminal justice  
process, reasoning:  
The “cognate,” “related,” or “allied” lesser 
offense (it is not in reality “included”) theory as 
here presented conjures up visions of increased 
rather than diminished confusion.  
It 
invites 
appeals 
because 
of 
its  
formlessness.  It blurs the roles of prosecutor, 
judge and defense counsel. If not contrary to our 
statutes, it adds a new act or section to the 
existing legislation.  
It threatens due process as to defendant and 
fundamental fairness as to the people in the 
preparation and presentation of the case.  
Unless the tendencies of past history are 
altered, we can anticipate in some cases a result 
the opposite of that desired by my colleagues. 
Considering 
the 
number 
of 
offenses 
by 
our  
definition “related” or “allied” to this or other  
12  
 
major crimes, juries presented with foreseeable 
smorgasbords of possibilities conceivably will  
return unjustifiable verdicts of guilty.  
In my opinion, the theory adopted today  
neither 
promotes 
the 
efficient 
and 
careful  
operation of the criminal justice system nor is 
likely to result in a fairer trial for the  
defendant. [Id., 406.]  
In explaining the reasons for her disagreement with the  
majority’s theory, Justice Coleman noted that the decision to  
charge 
a 
person 
with 
a 
crime 
was 
the 
prosecutor’s  
responsibility and that the Court had held that courts may not  
interfere with that process.  She explained that after the  
crime was charged and a trial held, MCL 768.32 permits the  
jury to consider other offenses.  However, the statute did not  
leave the jury free to convict for any felony or misdemeanor;  
only degrees or an attempt of the offense charged could be  
considered. Thus, as Justice Coleman construed the statute,  
MCL 768.32 only permits consideration of necessarily included  
lesser offenses. Further, which necessarily included lesser  
offenses warrant jury instructions should be determined in  
reference to the offense charged and the evidence presented.  
Analyzing 
the 
case 
before the Court, Justice Coleman concluded  
that 
the 
offense 
of 
careless, reckless, or negligent discharge  
of firearms was not a degree of murder within the meaning of  
MCL 768.32.  
13  
 
 
In Chamblis, an opinion that was decided the same day as  
Jones, the defendant was charged with armed robbery.  “Over  
defense counsel’s objection, the jury was instructed on the  
lesser included offenses of unarmed robbery and larceny from  
the person.”  Chamblis, supra at 413-414. The jury convicted  
the defendant of the larceny offense.  On appeal, the  
defendant challenged the trial court’s decision to give the  
lesser included offense instructions. The Court first noted  
that 
unarmed 
robbery 
was a necessarily included lesser offense  
of armed robbery. Therefore, if there was evidence to allow  
the case to go to the jury on the armed robbery charge, there  
necessarily was evidence to support a charge of unarmed  
robbery.  The Court then considered the larceny offense. The  
Court appeared to conclude that larceny from a person was a  
necessarily included lesser offense of robbery. However, it  
also considered whether the larceny offense was supported by  
the evidence adduced at trial, concluding that it was.  
The Chamblis Court then discussed the problem of  
compromise verdicts and reinstated the common-law restriction  
on misdemeanor offenses.  Recognizing the position taken by  
the Hanna Court, the Chamblis Court stated:  
While the technical reasons that existed for  
the common law rule have disappeared, we see strong 
policy reasons which still support that common law 
qualification on the doctrine of conviction of 
lesser included offenses. “There would be a great 
difference between a conviction for manslaughter  
14  
 
 
under an indictment for second degree murder, and a 
conviction for disturbing the peace under the same 
charge.  Does not the policy against harassment and 
a continual siege of accusations and charges seem 
to have some application?”  Comment, 57 Nw U L R 
62, 73 (1962). We answer in the affirmative.  
We are convinced that the cause of justice is 
not well served by convicting of assault and 
battery a defendant charged with murder.  As a  
matter of policy people who commit serious crimes 
should be punished for those offenses, and those 
who did not commit such serious crimes should not  
be tried for those crimes only to be found guilty 
of a much lower offense. In the example cited, if 
the most serious offense for which a jury feels 
conviction is justified is assault and battery, the 
original charge of murder appears to bear no  
realistic relationship to the offense committed, 
and no good purpose would be served by allowing 
such instruction.  
* * *  
We are establishing a rule today, as a matter 
of policy, limiting the extent of compromise 
allowable to a jury in deciding whether to convict 
of a lesser included offense. In any case wherein 
the charged offense is punishable by incarceration 
for more than two years, the court, whether or not 
requested, may not instruct on the lesser included 
offenses 
for 
which 
the 
maximum 
allowable  
incarceration period is one year or less.  [Id., 
428-429.][5]  
Justice 
Lindemer dissented.  In discussing MCL 768.32 and  
MCL 768.29, he stated:  
As has been demonstrated, the informed choice 
of defense counsel to restrict attention to the  
principal charge has not been foreclosed by the  
5 People v Cazal, 412 Mich 680, 683; 316 NW2d 705 (1982),  
limited the Chamblis misdemeanor cutoff rule to jury trials. 
In contrast, we hold in the present case that MCL 768.32(1) 
applies in both bench and jury trials.  
15  
 
majority’s cases;  neither is it prohibited by  
statute.  [MCL 768.32] simply speaks to the  
possibility that the jury may find the accused not 
guilty of an offense in the degree charged in the 
indictment while still allowing a guilty verdict of 
any inferior degree of such offense.  It does not  
speak to instructions on lesser included offenses. 
[MCL 768.29] says that the court shall instruct the 
jury as to the law applicable to the case, but does 
not mandate what law is applicable to the case. 
[Id., 433.]  
Justice 
Lindemer 
also 
disagreed 
with 
the 
majority’s  
“discussion of instructions on lesser included cognate  
offenses,” its “rule cutting off lesser included offense  
instructions for which the maximum allowable incarceration  
period is one year or less when the charged offense is  
punishable by incarceration for more than two years, and to  
the policy limitation on the extent of compromise allowable.”  
Id.  
Justice Coleman concurred in part and dissented in part.  
She concurred in the reinstatement of the defendant’s  
convictions and agreed that unarmed robbery was a necessarily  
included lesser offense of armed robbery. 
However, she  
reluctantly agreed with Justice Lindemer’s analysis of the  
majority opinion concerning the cutting off of included  
offense instructions according to penalty, stating:  
I agree with him because I believe him to be 
right.  The reluctance is born of the foreseeably 
lengthened “laundry list” of offenses and jurors 
who would be required to absorb possibly dozens of  
16  
 
 
pages of instructions regarding the many offenses 
possible under the “cognate”, “related” or “allied” 
offense theory of Jones. [Id., 431.]  
In People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 255; 330 NW2d 675  
(1982), this Court overruled the misdemeanor cutoff rule  
articulated in Chamblis, holding:  
[T]he policies behind the Chamblis rule would  
be better served by a more flexible approach to 
lesser 
included 
offense 
instructions 
on  
misdemeanors. Whenever an adequate request for an 
appropriate instruction is supported by a rational 
view of the evidence adduced at trial, the trial 
judge shall give the requested instruction unless 
to do so would result in a violation of due  
process, undue confusion, or some other injustice.  
The situation in Stephens is remarkably similar to that  
presented in the case before us.  The defendant was charged  
with breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony or  
larceny.
 The defendant did not dispute the allegation of  
breaking and entering a doctor’s office.  The defendant’s  
theory was that he lacked the requisite intent to commit  
larceny.
 Defense counsel requested that the jury be  
instructed on the lesser included misdemeanor of entering  
without permission.  The trial judge felt compelled by  
Chamblis to deny the request.  
The Stephens Court reasoned that the possibility of a  
compromised verdict did not justify an arbitrary limitation  
according the maximum term of confinement.  It noted that from  
the defendant’s point of view, an instruction on a lesser  
17  
 
included misdemeanor offense might further a just result by  
precluding a felony conviction unsupported by the jury’s  
belief of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  While the goal of  
avoiding jury confusion was an important one, the Court  
believed that the restrictions it imposed on misdemeanor  
instructions would alleviate this problem by limiting the  
number 
of 
such 
lesser 
included 
offense 
instructions.  
Moreover, its requirement that all lesser included offense  
instructions be rationally supported by the evidence would  
help to alleviate juror confusion by also limiting the number  
of instructions given. Id., 260.  
The Court articulated a five-part test for determining  
when 
lesser 
included 
misdemeanor 
instructions 
should 
be 
given.  
This test was derived from United States v Whitaker, 144 US  
App DC 344; 447 F2d 314 (1971).  First, there must be a proper  
request for the instruction.  Stephens, supra at 261. Second,  
“there 
must 
be 
an 
appropriate relationship between the charged  
offense and the requested misdemeanor.” Id., 262. In other  
words, the Court explained, there must be an inherent  
relationship between the greater and lesser offense:  
“[T]hey must relate to the protection of the 
same interests, and must be so related that in the 
general 
nature 
of 
these 
crimes, 
though 
not  
necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense 
is necessarily presented as part of the showing of 
the commission of the greater offense.”  [Id.,  
18  
 
 
  
quoting Whitaker, supra at 319.][6]  
Third, the requested misdemeanor must be supported by a  
rational view of the evidence adduced at trial.  Not only must  
there be some evidence that would support a conviction on the  
lesser offense, but  
“proof on the element or elements differentiating 
the two crimes must be sufficiently in dispute so 
that the jury may consistently find the defendant 
innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser 
included offense.”  [Id., 263., quoting Whitaker,  
supra at 317.]  
Stated another way,  
“[a] lesser-included offense instruction is only 
proper where the charged greater offense requires 
the jury to find a disputed factual element which 
is not required for conviction of the lesser­
included offense.” [Id. (citations omitted).]  
In discussing this element, the Court expressly refused to  
extend the rule of Jones. 
Id., 264. 
Fourth, if the  
prosecutor requests the instruction, the defendant must have  
adequate notice of it as one of the charges against which he  
6 This Court further clarified the second element in  
People v Steele, 429 Mich 13, 19; 412 NW2d 206 (1987), 
stating:  
The 
second 
condition 
requires 
that 
an  
“appropriate 
relationship” 
exist 
between 
the  
charged offense and the requested misdemeanor. 
This “appropriate” or “inherent” relationship has a 
two-part inquiry.  First, the greater and lesser 
offenses must both relate to the protection of the 
same interests.  Second, they must be related in an 
evidentiary manner, so that, generally, proof of 
the misdemeanor is necessarily presented as part of 
the proof of the greater charged offense.  
19  
 
must defend.  Id. Fifth, the requested instructions must not  
cause undue confusion or some other injustice.  Id. The Court  
also noted that a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a  
requested lesser included misdemeanor instruction would only  
be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.  Id.,  
265.  
As 
the 
preceding discussion illustrates, many of our more  
recent decisions concerning lesser included offenses have  
disregarded the statute and much of the older case law.  
Having done so, we now must decide how to reconcile these  
divergent approaches to lesser included offense instructions.  
As this Court has recognized, matters of substantive law are  
left to the Legislature. People v Glass (After Remand), 464  
Mich 266, 281; 627 NW2d 261 (2001); McDougall v Schanz, 461  
Mich 15, 27; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).  Determining what charges a  
jury may consider does not concern merely the “judicial  
dispatch of litigation.”  Id., 30. 
Rather, the statute  
concerns a matter of substantive law.  As this Court has  
noted,  
[t]he measure of control exercised in connection 
with the prevention and detection of crime and  
prosecution and punishment of criminals is set 
forth in the statutes of the State pertaining 
thereto, particularly the penal code and the code 
of criminal procedure.  The powers of the courts 
with reference to such matters are derived from the  
statutes. [People v Piasecki, 333 Mich 122, 143; 52  
NW2d 626 (1952).]  
20  
 
 
 
 
Therefore, in our opinion, it is necessary to return to the  
statute and the construction it was given by the Hanna Court  
and by Justice Coleman in her dissent in Jones.  
In pertinent part, the statute provides that the jury  
“may find the accused person guilty of a degree of that  
offense inferior to that charged in the indictment.”  MCL  
768.32(1).  As the Hanna Court explained, the provision was  
not intended to be limited only to those expressly divided  
into “degrees,” but was intended to extend to all cases in  
which different grades of offenses or degrees of enormity had  
been recognized.  Moreover the statute  removed the common-law  
misdemeanor restriction.  Thus, application of the statute is  
neither 
limited 
to 
those crimes expressly divided into degrees  
nor to lesser included felonies.  
Moreover, Justice Coleman opined that MCL 768.32 only  
permitted consideration of necessarily included lesser  
offenses, not cognate lesser offenses.  The language of the  
statute supports this conclusion.  The statute permits the  
jury to convict a defendant of a degree of “that offense  
inferior to that charged in the indictment.” The language of  
the statute only permits consideration of a degree of those  
offenses that are inferior to the greater offense charged.7  
7 We note that MCL 768.32(1), which is quoted in its 
entirety on page 11, also permits instruction on an attempt to 
(continued...)  
21  
 
 
In People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411; 564 NW2d 149  
(1997), the Court of Appeals considered the meaning of the  
word “inferior,” as used in MCL 768.32. The Court stated:  
[W]e conclude that under MCL 768.32(1), an 
offense may be inferior to another even if the 
penalties for both offenses are identical.  We  
believe that the word “inferior” in  the statute  
does not refer to inferiority in the penalty 
associated with the offense, but, rather, to the 
absence of an element that distinguishes the  
charged offense from the lesser offense.  The  
controlling factor is whether the lesser offense 
can be proved by the same facts that are used to 
establish the charged offense.  As the Membres  
Court[8] noted, the defendant’s due process notice 
rights are not violated because all the elements of 
the lesser offense have already been alleged by 
charging the defendant with the greater offense. 
[Id., 419-420.]  
This 
would 
foreclose 
consideration 
of 
cognate 
lesser 
offenses,  
which are only “related” or of the same “class or category” as  
the greater offense and may contain some elements not found in  
the greater offense.  
Justice Coleman further explained that in determining  
whether a necessarily included lesser offense instruction or  
an attempt instruction should be given, one must also consider  
whether the evidence presented supported such an instruction.  
Before the Jones and Chamblis decisions, this had been a  
7(...continued) 
commit such offense. However, that aspect of the statute is 
not at issue in the present cases.  
8 People v Membres, 34 Mich App 224; 191 NW2d 66 (1971).  
22  
 
    
consideration.  For example, in People v Repke, 103 Mich 459,  
470-471; 61 NW 861 (1895), the Court concluded that it was  
proper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it must  
find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder or acquit him  
because there was “no evidence warranting a different  
direction, and no circumstances which would lessen the  
degree.”  In People v Onesto, 203 Mich 490, 496; 170 NW 38  
(1918), the Court held that “[u]nless the proofs showed that  
the 
jury 
would 
have 
been justified in convicting [codefendant]  
Damico of an offense of lesser grade, there was no occasion  
for the court to instruct them in regard to it.”  In People v  
Patskan, 387 Mich 701, 713; 199 NW2d 458 (1972), the Court  
concluded that “the trial court would not have committed error  
in refusing to give instructions on attempted assault with  
intent to rob being armed.”  Quoting from Gillespie’s Michigan  
Criminal Law & Procedure, the Court noted that “it is not  
error to omit an instruction on such lesser offenses, where  
the evidence tends only to prove the greater . . . .”  Id.,  
711.  See also, People v Netzel, 295 Mich 353; 294 NW 708  
(1940); People v Kolodzieski, 237 Mich 654; 212 NW 958 (1927).  
Additionally, Sansone v United States, 380 US 343; 85 S  
Ct 1004; 13 L Ed 2d 882 (1965), is instructive on this point.  
Similar to MCL 768.32, Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of  
Criminal Procedure provides that a “defendant may be found  
23  
 
guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense  
charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged  
or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is  
an offense.” 9  In explaining when instructions should be  
given under the rule, the Sansone Court stated:  
Thus, “(i)n a case where some of the elements 
of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser 
crime, the defendant, if the evidence justifie(s) 
it . . . (is) entitled to an instruction which 
would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser 
offense.”
 But a lesser-offense charge is not  
proper where, on the evidence presented, the  
factual issues to be resolved by the jury are the 
same as to both the lesser and the greater 
offenses. In other words, the lesser offense must 
be included within but not, on the facts of the 
case, be completely encompassed by the greater. A  
lesser-included offense instruction is only proper 
where the charged greater offense requires the jury 
to find a disputed factual element which is not 
required for a conviction of the lesser-included 
offense. [Id., 349-350 (citations omitted).][10]  
9 While MCL 768.32 does not use the same phrasing as F R 
Crim P 31(c), which refers to “an offense necessarily included 
in the offense charged,” as we have already explained, the 
wording of MCL 768.32 also limits consideration of lesser 
offenses to necessarily included lesser offenses.  
10 
This analysis is consistent with Sparf v United States, 
156 US 51, 63-64; 15 S Ct 273; 39 L Ed 343 (1895), in which 
the Court stated:  
The court below assumed, and correctly, that 
section 1035 of the Revised Statutes did not  
authorize a jury in a criminal case to find the 
defendant guilty of a less offense than the one 
charged, unless the evidence justified them in so 
doing.  Congress did not intend to invest juries in 
criminal cases with power to arbitrarily disregard 
the evidence and the principles of law applicable 
(continued...)  
24  
 
 
 
We believe that this analysis is consistent with our prior  
case law and equally applicable to MCL 768.32.  Therefore, we  
hold that a requested instruction on a necessarily included  
lesser offense is proper if the charged greater offense  
requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is  
not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of  
the evidence would support it.11  To permit otherwise would be  
10(...continued) 
to the case on trial.  The only object of that 
section was to enable the jury, in case the 
defendant was not shown to be guilty of the 
particular crime charged, and if the evidence 
permitted them to do so, to find him guilty of a 
lesser offense necessarily included in the one 
charged, or of the offense of attempting to commit 
the one charged.  Upon a careful scrutiny of the 
evidence, we cannot find any ground whatever upon 
which the jury could properly have reached the 
conclusion that the defendant Hanson was only 
guilty of an offense included in the one charged, 
or of a mere attempt to commit the offense charged.  
11 Justice Ryan’s dissent in People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482; 
275 NW2d 777 (1979), demonstrates this principle in action. 
In People v Cargill, one of the companion cases to Kamin, the  
defendant was charged with armed robbery.  Defense counsel  
requested that the jury be instructed on unarmed robbery, 
among 
other 
lesser 
included offenses.  The undisputed evidence 
established that the men who robbed the store were armed with  
a sawed-off shotgun and that they took the money with force or 
threat of violence. The defendant’s defense was alibi. The  
only question that the jury was required to resolve was  
whether defendant was one of the men present when the crime 
was committed.  It was not required to resolve a dispute about 
whether the men were armed. Thus, the factual issue was the 
same with respect to both the lesser and greater offenses, and 
there was “no evidence which would justify the jury in 
concluding that the greater offense was not committed and the 
lesser included offenses were committed.” 
Id., 516.  
(continued...)  
25  
 
 
  
 
inconsistent with the truth-seeking function of a trial, as  
expressed in MCL 768.29.12 
To the extent that our prior  
decisions, including Jones, Chamblis, Stephens, and People v  
Jenkins, 395 Mich 440;  236 NW2d 503 (1975)13 and their progeny  
conflict with our holding today, they are overruled.14  
11(...continued) 
Therefore, Justice Ryan would have affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction.  
12 MCL 768.29 states in pertinent part, “It shall be the 
duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial, 
and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of 
counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the  
expeditious 
and 
effective 
ascertainment 
of 
the 
truth 
regarding  
the matters involved.” (Emphasis added.)  
13 Jenkins held that in a case involving a charge of 
first-degree murder, the trial court is always required to 
instruct the jury on the necessarily lesser-included offense 
of second-degree murder, even where such an instruction is not 
requested or is objected to. In light of our holding that a 
requested instruction on a necessarily included offense must 
be supported by the evidence, an instruction on second-degree 
murder, as a necessarily included lesser included offense of 
first-degree murder, is not automatically required. Rather, 
such an instruction will be proper if the intent element 
differentiating the two offenses is disputed and the evidence 
would support a conviction of second-degree murder.  However, 
given that in many cases involving first-degree murder, the 
intent element is disputed, we suspect that more often than 
not, an instruction on second-degree murder will be proper.  
14 The doctrine of stare decisis, which furthers the 
interests 
of 
stability and continuity in the judicial process, 
does not tie us to the decisions in Jones, Chamblis, Stevens, 
and Jenkins. Stare decisis should not be invoked to prevent 
the Court from overruling wrongly decided cases or erroneous 
decisions determining the meaning of statutes. See Robinson  
v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). The  
decisions we overrule today blatantly disregarded MCL 768.32 
as well as previous case law. 
The interests in the  
(continued...)  
26  
 
 
The dissent claims that MCL 768.32(1) is consistent with  
the Stephens test and that we have merely adopted a “watered­
down” version of the Stephens test. We respectfully disagree.  
A 
proper 
interpretation of MCL 768.32(1) renders some elements  
of the Stephens test irrelevant and unnecessary. First, the  
concern regarding notice to a defendant is irrelevant because  
the principal charge contains all the elements of the  
necessarily 
lesser 
included 
offense; 
thus 
defendant 
is 
already  
on notice.  Second, the concern regarding jury confusion is  
minimized to the extent that MCL 768.32(1) precludes cognate  
lesser misdemeanors and only permits necessarily included  
lesser misdemeanors if supported by a rational view of the  
evidence.  Additionally, an “inherent relationship” between  
the charged offense and the requested misdemeanor is not a  
concern because MCL 768.32(1) does not permit cognate lesser  
instructions.  
Having 
clarified 
the 
proper 
analysis 
for 
determining 
when  
a lesser included instruction must be given, we now turn to  
14(...continued) 
“evenhanded, predictable, consistent development of legal 
principles” and the “integrity of the judicial process” 
require that we rectify the conflict our case law has created. 
[Id., 463.] The dissent is mistaken in claiming that we have 
not even given “lip-service” to the principle of stare 
decisis.  Slip op at 12. To the contrary, we have considered 
it and find that overruling the previous cases of this Court 
that ignored a statute to be warranted.  
27  
 
the case before us.15  
Defendant Cornell was charged with breaking and entering  
with intent to commit larceny. 
MCL 750.110 provides:  
A person who breaks and enters, with intent to 
commit a felony or a larceny therein, a tent, 
hotel, office, store, shop, warehouse, barn,  
15 We note that the rules regarding lesser included 
offenses are different when a defendant is charged with a 
major controlled substance offense. MCL 768.32(2) states: 
 Upon an indictment for an offense specified in 
section 
7401(2)(a)(i) 
or 
(ii) 
or 
section  
7403(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of the public health code, 
Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being 
sections 333.7401 and 333.7403 of the Michigan 
Compiled Laws, or conspiracy to commit 1 or more of 
these offenses, the jury, or judge in a trial 
without a jury, may find the accused not guilty of 
the offense in the degree charged in the indictment 
but may find the accused guilty of a degree of that  
offense inferior to that charged in the indictment  
only if the lesser included offense is a major  
controlled substance offense. A jury shall not be  
instructed as to other lesser included offenses  
involving the same controlled substance nor as to  
an attempt to commit either a major controlled  
substance offense or a lesser included offense  
involving the same controlled substance. The jury 
shall be instructed to return a verdict of not  
guilty of an offense involving the controlled 
substance at issue if it finds that the evidence  
does not establish the defendant's guilt as to the 
commission of a major controlled substance offense 
involving that controlled substance. A judge in a 
trial without a jury shall find the defendant not 
guilty of an offense involving the controlled 
substance at issue if the judge finds that the 
evidence does not establish the defendant's guilt 
as to the commission of a major controlled  
substance 
offense 
involving 
that 
controlled  
substance. [Emphasis added.]  
28  
 
granary, factory or other building, structure, 
boat, ship, or railroad car is guilty of a felony, 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 
years.  
Defendant Cornell requested that the jury also be instructed  
on the offense of breaking and entering without permission.  
MCL 750.115(1) provides in pertinent part: 
 Any person who breaks and enters or enters 
without breaking, any dwelling, house, tent, hotel, 
office, store, shop, warehouse, barn, granary, 
factory or other building, boat, ship, railroad car 
or structure used or kept for public or private 
use, or any private apartment therein, or any 
cottage, clubhouse, boat house, hunting or fishing 
lodge, garage or the out-buildings belonging 
thereto, any ice shanty with a value of $100.00 or 
more, or any other structure whether occupied or 
unoccupied, without first obtaining permission to 
enter from the owner or occupant, agent, or person 
having immediate control thereof, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.  
We hold that breaking and entering without permission is  
a 
necessarily 
included lesser offense of breaking and entering  
with the intent to commit a felony.  The elements of breaking  
and entering with intent to commit larceny are: (1) the  
defendant broke into a building, (2) the defendant entered the  
building, and (3) at the time of the breaking and entering,  
the defendant intended to commit a larceny therein.  People v  
Toole, 227 Mich App 656, 658; 576 NW2d 441 (1998). Breaking  
and entering without permission requires (1) breaking and  
entering or (2)entering the building (3) without the owner’s  
permission.  It is impossible to commit the greater offense  
29  
without first committing the lesser offense.  
Moreover, a conviction of the greater offense requires  
the jury to find a disputed factual element—the intent to  
commit larceny—which is not part of the lesser offense. The  
evidence presented at trial offered conflicting reasons about  
why defendant, Prescott, and Christopher Cornell went to the  
home and whether they intended to steal anything. There was  
testimony that Prescott wanted to show Christopher and  
defendant where he had outrun a police dog or that he wanted  
to show them “a wicked place.” There was also testimony that  
the three just went there to look around. Finally, there was  
testimony that the three went to the house hoping to find  
things of value to steal.  Thus, intent to commit larceny—the  
factual element differentiating the greater offense from the  
lesser offense—was in dispute.  Because there was evidence to  
support a finding that defendant lacked the intent to commit  
larceny, the trial court erred in refusing to give the  
requested misdemeanor lesser offense instruction of breaking  
and entering without permission.  
III  
This Court has made it clear that harmless error analysis  
is applicable to instructional errors involving necessarily  
included lesser offenses:  
Properly understood, the doctrine of harmless 
error is perfectly consonant with the purpose and  
30  
function of an appellate court. Our constitutional  
mission, as the highest branch of the one court of 
justice, is to correct errors that have deprived a 
litigant of a fair trial or have otherwise  
interfered significantly with the trial’s search 
for truth and a just verdict. With few exceptions, 
the judgment of a trial court may not be set aside 
on the ground of error unless there is a  
determination that the error was not harmless. We  
see no reason to exclude from this rule errors  
involving 
a 
failure 
to 
provide 
a 
requested 
instruction on a necessarily included offense. 
[People v Mosko, 441 Mich 496, 503; 495 NW2d 534  
(1992).]  
Therefore, having concluded that the trial court erred in  
refusing to give the requested instruction, we now must  
consider whether the error was harmless.  
MCL 769.26 provides:  
No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or 
reversed or a new trial be granted by any court of 
this state in any criminal case, on the ground of 
misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission 
or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to 
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court, after an examination of the 
entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that 
the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice. [Emphasis added.]  
Further, MCR 2.613(A) states:  
Harmless Error. An error in the admission or  
the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or 
order, or an error or defect in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by the parties is not 
ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside 
a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take this action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice.  
Application of these provisions, as developed in this Court’s  
31  
 
 
  
harmless error jurisprudence, requires error to be classified  
as constitutional or nonconstitutional and as preserved or  
unpreserved.  If the error is constitutional, it must be  
further classified as structural or nonstructural. People v  
Carines, 460 Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Lukity,  
460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).16  
We are satisfied that the present case concerns  
nonconstitutional 
error 
that 
has 
been 
preserved 
by  
defendant’s request for the lesser included misdemeanor  
instruction.17  A preserved, nonconstitutional error is not a  
16 
Constitutional 
errors 
that 
are 
structural 
in 
nature 
are  
subject to automatic reversal.  People v Anderson (After  
Remand), 446 Mich 392, 405; 521 NW2d 538 (1994). If a case 
involves nonstructural, preserved constitutional error, an 
appellate 
court 
should reverse unless the prosecution can show 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Carines, supra at 774. 
If the constitutional error is not  
preserved, it is reviewed for plain error. Id.  
In cases involving preserved, nonconstitutional errors, 
the defendant must establish that it is more probable than not 
that the error undermined reliability in the verdict.  Id.;  
Lukity, supra at 495. Unpreserved, nonconstitutional errors 
are reviewed for plain error. Carines, supra at 774.  
17 One Sixth Circuit case has characterized the failure  
to instruct on a lesser included offense as “intrinsically 
harmful structural error” requiring reversal. United States  
v Monger, 185 F3d 574, 578 (CA 6, 1999). Further, some older 
Michigan case law has suggested that the failure to instruct 
is automatically error requiring reversal.  See, e.g., People  
v Van Smith, 388 Mich 457, 461-462; 203 NW2d 94 (1972). 
However, we disagree with these assessments.  
Structural error is a concept that has typically been 
applied to errors of constitutional magnitude, not to  
(continued...)  
32  
 
 
ground for reversal, “unless ‘after an  examination of the  
entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more  
probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.”  
Id., 495-496.  Stated another way, the analysis focuses on  
whether the error undermined reliability in the verdict.  Id.,  
495; see also People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 766; 614 NW2d 595  
(2000); People v Snyder, 462 Mich 38, 45; 609 NW2d 831 (2000).  
Therefore, to prevail, defendant must demonstrate that it is  
more probable than not that the failure to give the requested  
lesser 
included 
misdemeanor 
instruction 
undermined 
reliability  
17(...continued) 
statutory errors as in this case.  See, e.g., People v  
Breverman, 19 Cal 4th 142, 165; 77 Cal Rptr 2d 870; 960 P2d 
1094 (1998) (holding that “the failure to instruct sua sponte 
on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is, at most, 
an error of California law alone, and is thus subject only to 
state standards of reversibility”) and Neder v United States, 
527 US 1; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999).  
In Neder, the Court determined that the failure to  
instruct the jury on an element of the offense for which the 
defendant was convicted, was not a “structural” error subject 
to automatic reversal.  The Court opined that the error 
differed from the limited class of cases in which it had found  
structural error, stating,  
Unlike 
such 
defects 
as 
the 
complete 
deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased 
judge, an instruction that omits an element of the 
offense does not necessarily render a criminal  
trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle 
for determining guilt or innocence. [Id., 9.]  
33  
 
 
 
 
  
 
in the verdict.  Carines, supra at 774; Lukity, supra at 495.18  
People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466; 620 NW2d 13 (2000)  
provides further guidance concerning how these principles are  
applied in cases involving instructional errors. 
In  
Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted of evading the use tax.  
The trial court refused to instruct the jury regarding a  
statutory exemption to the use tax, finding the provision  
inapplicable to the defendant. 
Id., 469. 
This Court  
concluded that the statutory exemption would apply if the  
evidence introduced by the defendant were believed by the  
jury; thus, the instruction should have been given.  Id., 474.  
We 
then 
considered 
whether 
the 
error 
was 
“outcome  
determinative” because it undermined the reliability of the  
exception to the use tax statute that was crucial 
verdict.  In concluding that the error was not harmless, we 
stated: 
The jury received no instruction on an 
to 
the 
defendant's 
defense 
and 
was 
clearly 
supported by the evidence.  There is no question 
that the error undermined the reliability of the 
verdict, and thus was “outcome determinative” under  
18 Lukity involved an evidentiary error and further 
explained that the effect of an evidentiary error “is  
evaluated by assessing it in the context of the untainted 
evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not 
that a different outcome would have resulted without the  
error.” Id., 495. However, one cannot compare the “tainted” 
with the “untainted” evidence when the only error asserted is 
an 
instructional 
error.  Nevertheless, pursuant to MCL 769.26, 
we review the “entire cause” to determine whether the error  
undermined the reliability of the verdict.  
34  
 
Lukity and Elston. [Id., 474 (emphasis added).]  
Thus, pursuant to Rodriguez, the reliability of the  
verdict 
is 
undermined when the evidence “clearly” supports the  
lesser 
included 
instruction, but the instruction is not given.  
In other words, it is only when there is substantial evidence  
to support the requested instruction that an appellate court  
should reverse the conviction.19  As we must consider the  
“entire cause” pursuant to MCL 769.26, in analyzing this  
question, we also invariably consider what evidence has been  
offered to support the greater offense.  
Also, it is important to note that this “substantial  
evidence” standard for determining whether reversal is  
required on the basis of an instructional error differs from  
the standard for determining whether the error occurred. As  
discussed, 
an 
evidentiary dispute supported by a rational view  
of the evidence regarding the element that differentiates the  
lesser from the greater offense will generally require an  
instruction on the lesser offense.  However, more than an  
evidentiary dispute regarding the element that differentiates  
the lesser from the greater offense is required to reverse a  
19 We note that no intermediate lesser instructions were  
given in this case.  If other lesser instructions had been  
given and been rejected by the jury, consideration of the 
“entire cause” would likely lead us to conclude that the error 
did not undermine the reliability of the verdict.  See, e.g., 
People v Beach, 429 Mich 450; 418 NW2d 861 (1988), NW2d 526  
(1977); People v Mosko, 441 Mich 496; 495 NW2d 534 (1992).  
35  
 
 
conviction; pursuant to MCL 769.26, the “entire cause” must be  
surveyed.20  
Applying these harmless error principles to defendant  
Cornell’s case, we conclude that the error was harmless  
because the evidence did not clearly support a conviction for  
the lesser included misdemeanor of breaking and entering  
without permission.  It was defendant’s position at trial that  
he broke into the house, but had no intent to steal or commit  
any other felony. However, in a statement that was admitted  
into evidence, defendant explained that he, Prescott, and  
Christopher Cornell went for a walk, during which Prescott  
stated that “there was a house back in the woods and they had  
a lot of stuff in there that they could make a lot of money.”  
Christopher 
Cornell 
confirmed 
that 
he, 
defendant, 
and 
Prescott  
broke into the house to see what they could find, and that  
they were “looking for things to steal.”  Prescott stated  
that, although he had not planned on taking anything, he would  
have done so and thought that he “could get a little  
souvenir.”  Conversely, there is little evidence in the record  
to support defendant’s assertion that they just went into the  
20 We note that substantial evidence in support of one 
offense does not necessarily preclude there also being 
substantial evidence in support of the other offense. While  
not true of the present case, there may be cases where both 
the lesser and the greater offenses are supported by  
substantial evidence.  Of course, each case must be evaluated  
on its own merits.  
36  
house to look around.  Thus, we cannot conclude that the  
evidence clearly supports the lesser included misdemeanor  
instruction of breaking entering without permission.  
Therefore, we conclude that defendant Cornell failed to  
satisfy his burden of showing that it was more probable than  
not that the failure to provide the requested instruction  
undermined the reliability of the verdict and that the error  
in this case was harmless.  
IV  
We conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to  
give the requested misdemeanor lesser included offense  
instruction of breaking and entering without permission.  The  
offense was necessarily included in the greater offenses with  
which the defendant was charged, and conviction of the greater  
offenses required the jury to find a disputed factual element,  
namely, the intent to commit larceny, which was not part of  
the lesser included offense.  However, because the lesser  
included instruction was not clearly supported by the  
evidence, defendant failed to establish that it is more  
probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted  
had the lesser offense instruction been given.  Therefore, the  
error was harmless and defendant’s conviction is affirmed.  To  
the extent that our prior decisions, including Jones,  
Chamblis, Stephens, and Jenkins, conflict with our holding  
37  
 
 
today, they are overruled.  Our decision in this case is to be  
given limited retroactive effect, applying to those cases  
pending on appeal in which the issue has been raised and  
preserved.21  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with WEAVER, J.  
21 See, e.g., Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd, 428 Mich 439, 475; 
410 NW2d 706 (1987); Murray v Beyer Mem Hosp, 409 Mich 217,  
221-223; 293 NW2d 341 (1980).  
38  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 115833  
ADAM KEITH CORNELL,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I agree with the majority that it was an abuse of the  
trial court's discretion to refuse to deliver the lesser  
included offense instructions for breaking and entering  
without permission.  MCL 750.115.  However, I disagree with  
the majority's overruling of this Court's longstanding  
precedent in rendering its decision.  
I would retain and follow that precedent, adhering to the  
five-part test for lesser included misdemeanor instructions  
announced in People v Stephens1 and consistent with MCL  
1416 Mich 252; 330 NW2d 675 (1985).  
 
 
768.32(1).  Moreover, I would find that defendant was deprived  
of lesser included offense instructions critical to his  
defense, which was that he entered the house to look around,  
not to steal.  Because credible evidence was admitted that  
supported that defense, the failure to give the instruction  
was not harmless error.  The majority asserted as much in  
People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 474; 620 NW2d 13 (2000).  
I. Lesser-Included Misdemeanor Offenses  
Neither party to this case disputed that Stephens is  
controlling authority, and neither advocated that Stephens be  
overruled.  Under Stephens, whenever the following conditions  
are met, the trial judge must give an instruction to the jury  
on a lesser included misdemeanor: (1) the defendant makes a  
proper request, or (2) where the prosecutor requests the  
instructions, the defense has had adequate notice, and (3)  
there is an "inherent relationship" between the charged  
offense and the requested misdemeanor, (4) the misdemeanor is  
supported by a rational view of the evidence admitted at  
trial, and (5) the requested instructions do not "result in  
undue confusion or some other injustice."  Stephens, supra at  
261-264.  
The Stephens 
test is consistent with MCL 768.32(1), which  
reads:  
Except 
as 
provided 
in 
subsection 
(2) 
[regarding controlled substance offenses], upon an  
2  
 
 
 
indictment for an offense, consisting of different 
degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, the jury, 
or the judge in a trial without a jury, may find 
the accused not guilty of the offense in the degree 
charged in the indictment and may find the accused 
person guilty of a degree of that offense inferior 
to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt 
to commit that offense.  
The majority announces the rule "that a requested  
instruction 
on 
a 
necessarily included lesser offense is proper  
if the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a  
disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser  
included offense and a rational view of the evidence would  
support it." Slip op, p 26. It asserts that its rule better  
conforms to MCL 768.32(1) than does Stephens. I disagree.  
The rule that the majority articulates is merely a  
watered-down version of the Stephens test.2  Both require that  
the element distinguishing the lesser misdemeanor from the  
charged offense be at issue.  Both require that the lesser  
2The majority's holding is not limited to overruling the 
Stephens test for lesser included misdemeanor offenses. Its  
real reach is the creation of a blanket rule for all lessor  
offense instructions, including cognate lesser offenses and 
necessarily included felony offenses.  The rule imposes a high 
burden 
for 
proving 
error requiring reversal in lesser included 
felony cases and completely precludes the delivery of cognate 
lesser offense instructions.  But the majority devotes no 
direct discussion to this dramatic change in Michigan law. 
See People v Mosko, 441 Mich 496, 500-501; 495 NW2d 534 (1992) 
(failure to give a requested instruction on a necessarily 
included lesser felony is error requiring reversal); People v  
Beach, 429 Mich 450, 453, 461-465; 418 NW2d 861 (1988) 
(cognate lesser offense instructions must be delivered when 
supported by the evidence).  
3  
 
offense be supported by a rational view of the evidence.  
However, the rule articulated today omits the safeguards of  
notice to the defendant and protections against undue jury  
confusion.  Although I recognize that these safeguards are not  
explicitly required by MCL 768.32(1), neither is the  
evidentiary requirement to which the majority clings.3  
Wisely, the Stephens Court recognized that unrestricted  
misdemeanor instructions might result in compromise verdicts  
and convictions for misdemeanor offenses unsupported by the  
evidence.  It recognized, also, that the one-year cutoff rule  
established in People v Chamblis4 is overly simplistic. The  
Stephens 
Court 
unanimously 
set 
forth 
a 
well-reasoned 
framework  
for deciding what lesser included misdemeanor instructions  
must be delivered to a jury.  
When the majority discusses earlier interpretations of  
MCL 768.32(1), those more consistent with its view that lesser  
instructions always must be supported by the evidence, it  
refers to the statute's "construction."  Slip op, p 10.  It  
reverts to the decision in People v Hanna,5 which devotes much  
of its analysis to rejecting MCL 768.32(1)'s reference to  
3Neither notice nor jury confusion is at issue here, but 
the majority dismisses these basic procedural requirements 
without discussion.  
4395 Mich 408, 428-429; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).  
519 Mich 316 (1869).  
4  
 
 
  
 
 
 
"degree offenses." Hanna illustrates that MCL 768.32(1) does  
not provide a clear mandate that this Court must apply.  In  
readopting Hanna, the majority does not return to a statutory  
mandate that was disregarded by this Court in Stephens.  
Rather, it reverts to a construction of the statute long ago  
abandoned by this Court as unworkable.  
While 
recognizing 
that 
the 
law 
concerning 
lesser 
included  
offenses in Michigan has "not been clear or consistent," the  
majority has done nothing to promote consistency.  I would  
adhere to this Court's precedent in Stephens, as well as other  
precedent unnecessarily overruled by today's decision.6  
II. The Harmful Error  
Analyzing the instant case under Stephens, defendant  
satisfied requirements (1), (3), and (5). Requirement (2) is  
inapplicable.  The only question concerns requirement (4),  
whether the instructions were supported by a rational view of  
the evidence.  To satisfy that requirement, the element of  
defendant's intent to commit larceny must have been enough in  
dispute that the jury could find him innocent of breaking and  
entering with intent to commit larceny and guilty of breaking  
and entering without permission. See id. at 263.  
6In addition to Stephens, the majority overrules People  
v Jenkins, 395 Mich 440; 236 NW2d 503 (1975), People v  
Chamblis, supra, People v Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 
(1975), and their extensive progeny.  
5  
  
 
Defendant's entire defense was that he did not intend to  
steal anything from the house.  Although his position was not  
compelling, there was some evidence to support it in addition  
to his own conflicting statements to police, which the  
prosecution put in evidence. In his first written statement  
to police, defendant repeatedly emphasized that he never  
intended to steal anything from the house.  The prosecution's  
witnesses gave statements to police and testified at trial at  
least arguably consistent with the defense.  
The credibility of the evidence must be evaluated by the  
jury. 
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748  
(1992).
 The trial court usurped the jury's role when it  
refused to give instructions that were supported by a rational  
view of the evidence.  This was an abuse of the trial court's  
discretion.  
The majority agrees that the instructions should have  
been delivered.  The point of contention is whether the trial  
court's error was harmless.  The majority applies the harmless  
error test with little discussion about whether the error was  
constitutional in nature. Defendant argues that it was, and  
he makes a strong case.  An instructional error may rise to  
the level of a constitutional error by violating a defendant's  
right to due process.  See People v Carines, 460 Mich 751,  
761; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); see also United States v Gaudin, 515  
6  
 
 
US 506, 510; 115 S Ct 2310; 132 L Ed 2d 444 (1995).  An  
example is where the trial court omits from the instructions  
an element of the charged offense. Carines, supra; People v  
Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 52; 610 NW2d 551 (2000).  
Here, the judge denied the jury an opportunity to  
consider defendant's theory of the case.  This deprived  
defendant 
of 
his right 
to 
a 
fair 
trial, 
an 
error  
constitutional in nature.  Hence, it is the burden of the  
prosecution to prove that the error was harmless. Carines,  
supra at 774.  
I believe that the instructional error in this case was  
not harmless, even when analyzed as nonconstitutional error.  
It is well established that, where a court fails to give  
lesser 
included 
offense instructions, the error is harmless if  
the jury rejects an option to convict of another reduced  
offense.  In People v Beach,7 the Court endorsed this test,  
which is found in People v Ross, 73 Mich App 588; 252 NW2d 526  
(1977).8  However, where the trial court failed to instruct  
7429 Mich 450; 418 NW2d 861 (1988).  
8The Beach Court modified the holding in People v  
Richardson, 409 Mich 126; 293 NW2d 332 (1980), to the extent 
that it was inconsistent with Ross. The Richardson Court had  
held that it is not harmless error to refuse to instruct on a  
lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter and 
reckless use of a firearm.  It reasoned that "[t]he jury 
was . . . denied the freedom to act according to the evidence, 
and moreover was deprived of any option to convict  
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
the jury regarding the only requested lesser included  
misdemeanor offense, the Ross test cannot be applied.  
In Mosko, this Court extended the harmless error test  
articulated in Beach, first considering whether the jury had  
rejected an instructed lesser included offense to convict the  
defendant of the charged offense. Id. at 501-502. However,  
the Mosko Court could not apply the "intermediate charge"  
analysis on the facts of that case.9  Instead, it concluded  
that the error was harmless because the distinguishing factor  
between the charged offense and the uninstructed offense was  
not disputed at trial.  Id. at 505-506. 
Thus, when a jury  
does not reject a lesser offense, the failure to deliver  
requested 
instructions 
is 
not 
harmless 
when 
the 
distinguishing  
element is at issue.  
This Court's regular application of harmless error  
8(...continued) 
consistently with the defendant's testimony . . . ." Id. at  
141.  It reached that conclusion even though the jury was 
instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder and 
voluntary manslaughter, and returned a guilty verdict on 
first-degree murder. Id. at 134-135.  
9The defendant in Mosko was convicted of first-degree  
criminal sexual conduct although the jury was given 
instructions for second-degree criminal sexual conduct.  
However, 
first-degree 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct 
is 
a 
penetration 
offense, whereas second-degree criminal sexual conduct is a 
contact offense.  The jury was not instructed on third-degree 
criminal sexual conduct, a penetration offense.  Thus, its 
rejection of second-degree criminal sexual conduct shed no 
light on whether it would have convicted the defendant of 
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. See id. at 497, 505.  
8  
 
 
analysis to evidentiary issues is also instructive.  In People  
v Lukity,10 a majority held that, in cases of preserved  
nonconstitutional error, the defendant bears the burden of  
proof.  The defendant must show that the outcome of the trial  
would more probably than not have been different, but for the  
evidentiary error.  Id. at 496-497. This Court applied the  
Lukity standard to evidentiary error in People v Elston, 462  
Mich 751; 614 NW2d 595 (2000), and People v Snyder, 462 Mich  
38; 609 NW2d 831 (2000).  There, whether the error was outcome  
determinative was held to depend on whether it undermined the  
reliability of the verdict. 
Elston, supra at 766; Snyder,  
supra at 45.  
The 
majority 
recently 
addressed 
an 
instructional 
error 
in  
Rodriguez, although not in the context of lesser included  
offenses.11
 It concluded that the error was not harmless  
because "[t]here was no question that [it] undermined the  
reliability 
of 
the 
verdict, 
and 
thus 
was 
'outcome  
determinative' under Lukity and Elston." 
Rodriguez, supra  
474.
 It was significant that the jury had received no  
instruction on law that was "crucial to the defendant's  
defense and [the instruction] was clearly supported by the  
10460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  
11The instruction under review in Rodriguez concerned a  
statutory exception to culpability for failing to pay taxes. 
Id. at 468-469.  
9  
 
evidence." Id.  
After applying the rule of harmless error that has  
emerged from this Court's precedent, I conclude that the error  
in this case was not harmless.  The fact that substantial  
evidence supported defendant's conviction must be regarded as  
irrelevant under the circumstances of this case, where there  
was evidence to support the lesser offense. 
Moreover,  
defendant admitted to the lesser offense in this case.  The  
jury was put in the position either of convicting on the  
higher charge or seeing the admitted crime go unpunished.  By  
being denied jury instructions on the lesser included  
misdemeanor, defendant was denied the opportunity to present  
his defense to the jury. The error was crucial in this case  
and cannot be considered harmless.  
The jury here, like the jury in Richardson, was unable to  
match defendant's statements and theory of defense with a  
verdict option.  Unlike Richardson and Beach, there was no  
indication that it would have rejected the lesser included  
offense, 
had 
it 
been given the opportunity.12  Moreover, unlike  
in Mosko, the distinguishing element between defendant's  
12In fact, the circumstances suggest the opposite.  When  
it acquitted defendant of the arson charge, the jury rejected 
the prosecution's claim that defendant intended to burn the 
house.
 Defendant admitted being in the house, but denied 
either setting the fire or intending to steal anything.  It is  
possible that the jury would have believed him on both counts.  
10  
charged offense and the requested lesser included offense was  
very much in dispute.13  Therefore, the reliability of the  
verdict was undermined and the error was not harmless.  
Defendant is entitled to a new trial.  
The majority takes the word "clearly" from the Rodriguez  
requirement that the lesser offense be "clearly supported by  
the 
evidence,"14 
and 
applies 
it 
to 
require 
substantial 
evidence  
supporting the lesser offense.  Slip op, pp 35-36.  In so  
doing, it expands Rodriguez to impose an unduly harsh burden  
on a defendant.  
When a criminal defendant is denied the opportunity to  
present his defense to the jury, it should not matter that the  
evidence supporting the defense is not substantial.  The error  
is significant if the lesser offense is supported by any  
credible evidence.  It must clearly support the lesser offense  
in that it must be more than a bare trace of evidence; it must  
be something concrete on which a jury could base its verdict.  
The majority's expansion of Rodriguez takes the power to  
13In many if not most cases of breaking and entering, a 
defendant's 
claim 
that he entered without any malicious intent 
is suspect.  However, the house in this case is the "Heston 
house," the one-time home of famed actor Charlton Heston. 
Certainly, one could conclude that such a house would be an 
attractive local curiosity.  Defendant's testimony that he 
went to the house only to look around was both corroborated 
and contradicted by his companions.  
14Id. at 474.  
11  
decide a defendant's guilt or innocence, consistent with the  
evidence before it, out of the hands of the jury.  
III. Other Lesser Offenses  
The majority strays beyond the matter at hand, lesser  
included misdemeanor offenses, to overrule precedent not even  
controlling in the instant case. 
It devotes pages of  
discussion 
to 
cognate lesser offenses, and its holding clearly  
applies to necessarily included felony offenses.  
Not only do I disagree with the reasoning and the result,  
I also oppose the majority's wholesale overruling of the  
precedent of this Court.  In defiance of stare decisis, the  
majority contributes to a constant state of flux in Michigan  
law.  Here, the majority fails even to give lip service to the  
principle of stare decisis, instead dismissing this Court's  
precedent as "wrongly decided."  
IV. Conclusion  
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to  
deliver the lesser included misdemeanor instructions for  
breaking and entering without permission.  Those instructions  
should be given in every case where a defendant has offered  
some credible evidence to support a lesser included  
misdemeanor offense.  Moreover, I would not stray from the  
well established and long recognized precedent of this Court  
that conforms with the legislative mandate of MCL 768.32(1).  
12  
 
Applying that precedent, I would find the error in this case  
was not harmless, and I would grant defendant a new trial.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
13