Title: Lakeside Equipment Corp. v. Town of Chester

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Lakeside Equipment Corp. v. Town of Chester (2000-575); 173 Vt. 317;
795 A.2d 1174

[Filed 15-Feb-2002]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-575

Lakeside Equipment Corp.	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Windsor Superior Court

Town of Chester	                                 December Term, 2001

Alan W. Cheever, J.

Patrick M. Ankuda of Parker & Ankuda, P.C., Springfield, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Thomas S. Durkin of Kramer & Durkin, P.C., West Dover, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Town of Chester appeals the superior court's
  summary judgment  determination that plaintiff Lakeside Equipment
  Corporation is entitled to enforcement of an Illinois  judgment requiring
  the Town to pay Lakeside for equipment specially manufactured for the
  Town's  waste water treatment facility.  The Town contends that the
  Illinois judgment is unenforceable  because its plant operator was not
  authorized to order the equipment, and thus there was no basis for 
  exercising personal jurisdiction over it.  We conclude that the record is
  insufficient to determine  whether the judgment was jurisdictionally sound;
  accordingly, we reverse the superior court's  decision and remand the
  matter for further proceedings.

 

       The material facts alleged for purposes of summary judgment are
  undisputed.  Lakeside is a  Delaware corporation with a principal place of
  business in Bartlett, Illinois.  On April 15, 1996,  David Duquette, the
  plant operator for the Town's waste water treatment facility, contacted
  Lakeside  and placed a verbal order to purchase replacement clarifiers for
  the plant.  One week later, Lakeside  acknowledged the order in a letter
  that itemized the cost of the equipment, which totaled  approximately
  $40,000.  Attached to the letter were the conditions of the sale, including
  a provision  scheduling delivery of the equipment for June 1996.  In
  response to the letter, Duquette sent  Lakeside the Town's purchase order
  number.  Lakeside designed and specially manufactured the  equipment, and
  delivered it to the Town on June 24, 1996.  Duquette received and accepted
  the  equipment three days later.

       On July 24, 1996, a Lakeside employee contacted Susan Spaulding, the
  Chester Town  Manager, to determine why the Town had not paid for the
  equipment.  Spaulding told the Lakeside  employee that payment would be
  made within the week.  The Town paid nothing, however, and later  informed
  Lakeside that it would not pay for the equipment.  After making formal
  demands for  payment in September and October 1996, Lakeside submitted a
  demand for arbitration to the  American Arbitration Association pursuant to
  the contract.

       The Association acknowledged receipt of the demand for arbitration and
  informed the Town  of the requested hearing locale in Chicago, Illinois. 
  The Town neither responded to the letter nor  participated in the June 24,
  1997 hearing held before the arbitrator in Chicago, although it did pay 
  $1000 in arbitration fees.  In July 1997, the arbitrator asked the parties
  to submit briefs regarding  jurisdiction and the authority of the
  Association to conduct the arbitration.  Lakeside submitted a  brief, but
  the Town did not respond.  On August 25, 1997, the arbitrator entered an
  award in favor 

 

  of Lakeside for approximately $51,000.  Later, Lakeside petitioned for
  confirmation of the judgment  in the Illinois circuit court.  The Town
  neither responded to Lakeside's petition nor appeared in the  Illinois
  court proceedings.  On March 3, 1998, the Illinois circuit court confirmed
  the arbitration  award against the Town and entered a judgment of
  approximately $53,000.

       On March 31, 1998, Lakeside commenced the present action by filing a
  complaint in the  Windsor Superior Court to domesticate the Illinois
  judgment.  The Town appeared, filed an answer,  and asserted a counterclaim
  challenging the validity of the underlying contract and the jurisdiction of 
  the Illinois courts over the Town.  The superior court initially denied
  Lakeside's motion to dismiss  the Town's counterclaim, but later, in its
  November 3, 2000 decision, granted summary judgment to  Lakeside.  The
  court determined that it was required to give full faith and credit to the
  Illinois  judgment because the evidence demonstrated that the Town's
  contacts with Illinois were sufficient  for the courts of that state to
  assume personal jurisdiction over the Town with respect to the matter at 
  issue.  The court also concluded that, to the extent that the Town had
  valid objections concerning the  scope of Duquette's authority to enter
  into the contract with Lakeside, the Town waived those  objections by
  failing to raise them in the Illinois proceedings.

       On appeal, the Town argues that (1) Duquette was without actual or
  apparent authority to  bind the Town to the contract with Lakeside; (2)
  Lakeside had a duty to confirm the scope of  Duquette's authority to bind
  the Town to the contract; (3) Illinois lacked personal jurisdiction to
  enter  a judgment against a Vermont town based upon a contract entered into
  by an unauthorized agent; (4)  the superior court erred by granting
  Lakeside's motion for summary judgment after it had denied  Lakeside's
  motion to dismiss the Town's counterclaim; and (5) the superior court
  failed to give the  Town sufficient time to object to the judgment order
  submitted to the court by Lakeside 

 

  following the court's decision in favor of Lakeside.  We apply the same
  two-part test as that applied  by the trial court: we examine whether there
  are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and  whether the moving
  party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Northern Aircraft,
  Inc. v.  Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 44, 572 A.2d 1382, 1387 (1990). 

       A sister-state judgment is normally "entitled to full faith and credit
  in the absence of a  showing that [the] court lacked jurisdiction or acted
  to deprive defendant of a reasonable opportunity  to be heard."  Wursthaus,
  Inc. v. Cerreta, 149 Vt. 54, 58,