Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Fortado

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Fortado, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-517.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-517 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. FORTADO. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Akron Bar Assn. v. Fortado, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-517.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, namely, 
engaging in sexual activity with a client in absence of preexisting 
consensual sexual relationship—One-year suspension, fully stayed on 
condition. 
(No. 2019-0805—Submitted September 10, 2019—Decided February 18, 2020.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2018-061. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Matthew Fortado, of Akron, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0010597, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1977.  On February 
28, 1996, we suspended him from the practice of law for two years for engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law and failing to 
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cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Fortado, 74 Ohio St.3d 604, 660 N.E.2d 1154 (1996). 
{¶ 2} In a November 29, 2018 complaint, relator, Akron Bar Association, 
alleged that Fortado violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual 
relationship existed prior to the client-lawyer relationship) by commencing an 
intimate sexual relationship with a client during his legal representation. 
{¶ 3} In a consent-to-discipline agreement filed in March 2019, Fortado 
admitted the charged misconduct and the parties agreed that the appropriate 
sanction for that misconduct is a conditionally stayed one-year suspension.  
However, the panel of the Board of Professional Conduct assigned to hear the case 
rejected the agreement, and the matter proceeded to a hearing.  The parties 
submitted stipulations that were nearly identical to those of their rejected consent-
to-discipline agreement and once again stipulated that the appropriate sanction for 
Fortado’s misconduct is a conditionally stayed one-year suspension. 
{¶ 4} After considering the parties’ stipulations, seven stipulated exhibits, 
the testimony of Fortado and two character witnesses, and our precedent, the panel 
recommended that Fortado be suspended from the practice of law for one year with 
six months stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct.  The 
board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended 
sanction.  Fortado objected and argues that the board erred in rejecting the parties’ 
consent-to-discipline agreement and in recommending that this court impose a one-
year suspension with six months conditionally stayed. 
{¶ 5} Although we find that the panel had the discretion to reject the 
consent-to-discipline agreement and set the matter for a hearing, we sustain 
Fortado’s objection to the recommended sanction and suspend him from the 
practice of law for one year, fully stayed on the condition that he engage in no 
further misconduct. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Misconduct 
{¶ 6} In February 2011, M.S. retained Fortado to represent her in a civil 
matter.  Approximately six months later, Fortado commenced an intimate sexual 
relationship with M.S.  Fortado’s legal representation of M.S. concluded in 
February 2012, with the settlement and dismissal of the action filed against M.S.  
After their intimate relationship concluded in the fall of 2014, Fortado represented 
M.S. in two other civil matters.  Their relationship remained friendly until 2016, 
when M.S. discharged Fortado as her attorney in a personal-injury case.  Fortado 
testified that M.S. initiated the intimate relationship by making repeated friendly 
overtures toward him and that he truly cared—and continues to care—for her.  But 
he also admitted without qualification that it was wrong for him to have entered 
into the intimate relationship while he represented M.S. 
{¶ 7} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that Fortado’s 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j). 
Sanction 
{¶ 8} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the board found that just one aggravating 
factor is present—Fortado has previously been disciplined for misconduct that 
bears no relation to the conduct at issue in this case.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1). 
{¶ 10} In mitigation, the parties and the board agreed that Fortado had not 
acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and that he has acknowledged his 
wrongdoing and fully cooperated in the resulting disciplinary proceedings.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2) and (4).  Fortado also presented 11 letters from attorneys, 
friends, and current and former judges who attested to his competence as an 
attorney and his favorable reputation in the community.  Judge Elinore Marsh 
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Stormer and former judge Michael T. Callahan both testified at the panel hearing 
that they had known Fortado for many years, both personally and professionally, 
and that they were aware of the facts at issue in his current and past disciplinary 
proceedings.  Judge Stormer described Fortado as “an excellent attorney” and 
explained that she appoints him to represent vulnerable parties in proceedings 
before the Summit County Probate Court.  Callahan testified that Fortado’s 
reputation for truthfulness and honesty is “beyond reproach.” 
{¶ 11} In determining the appropriate sanction for Fortado’s misconduct, 
the board considered 11 cases in which we imposed sanctions, ranging from 
conditionally stayed six-month suspensions to partially stayed two-year 
suspensions, on attorneys for violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j).  See, e.g., Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Assn. v. Sleibi, 144 Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-2724, 42 N.E.3d 699 
(imposing a two-year suspension, with six months stayed on conditions, on an 
attorney who engaged in sexual activity with four clients and sent lewd and sexually 
explicit text messages to at least three of them); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hubbell, 
144 Ohio St.3d 334, 2015-Ohio-3426, 43 N.E.3d 397 (imposing a fully stayed six-
month suspension on an attorney who attempted to initiate a romantic relationship 
with a client he was representing pro bono in a custody dispute).  In three of those 
cases, we imposed one-year suspensions with six months conditionally stayed.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mason, 156 Ohio St.3d 398, 2019-Ohio-1269, 128 N.E.3d 
183; Disciplinary Counsel v. Leon, 155 Ohio St.3d 582, 2018-Ohio-5090, 122 
N.E.3d 1242; Disciplinary Counsel v. Bartels, 151 Ohio St.3d 144, 2016-Ohio-
3333, 87 N.E.3d 155. 
{¶ 12} Finding that this court has “fairly consistently imposed an actual 
suspension on attorneys who engage in sexual relations with a client,” the board 
recommends that we suspend Fortado from the practice of law for one year with six 
months stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Fortado’s Objection 
{¶ 13} In a single objection, Fortado argues that the board erred by rejecting 
the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement and by recommending that we suspend 
him from the practice of law for one year with just six months stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 14} Fortado’s argument that the panel erred to his prejudice by rejecting 
the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement is without merit.  Gov.Bar R. V(16)(A) 
permits the relator in an attorney-discipline case “to enter into a written agreement 
wherein the respondent admits to alleged misconduct and the relator and respondent 
agree upon a sanction, other than an indefinite suspension or disbarment, to be 
imposed for that misconduct.”  But Gov.Bar R. V(16)(B) and (C) also grant the 
hearing panel and the board discretion either to recommend acceptance of that 
agreement or to reject it and set the matter for a hearing—which is precisely what 
the panel did here. 
{¶ 15} It is true that Gov.Bar R. V(16)(D) provides that a consent-to-
discipline agreement that has been rejected by the panel, the board, or this court 
“shall not be admissible or otherwise used in subsequent disciplinary proceedings.”  
Yet nothing prevented the parties here from reaffirming their stipulations and 
continuing to advocate in favor of a conditionally stayed one-year suspension after 
the panel rejected their consent-to-discipline agreement or after the board 
recommended that we impose a harsher sanction.  We therefore overrule Fortado’s 
objection as it relates to the panel’s rejection of the consent-to-discipline 
agreement. 
{¶ 16} Fortado also argues that the board’s recommendation that he serve 
actual time out from the practice of law is inconsistent with our precedent.  
Specifically, he argues that this case is factually distinguishable from Mason, 156 
Ohio St.3d 398, 2019-Ohio-1269, 128 N.E.3d 183, and most comparable to cases 
in which this court imposed fully stayed suspensions on attorneys who engaged in 
an improper sexual relationship with a client.  Relator agrees and asserts that we 
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have typically required attorneys who engaged in inappropriate sexual relationships 
with their clients to serve actual time away from the practice of law only when they 
engaged in additional rule violations or when other aggravating factors that do not 
exist here were present. 
{¶ 17} Like Fortado, Mason engaged in a sexual relationship with a client 
during his representation.  But Mason also had entered an Alford plea to a 
misdemeanor charge of engaging in sexual activity for hire and admitted that his 
conduct adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.1  Mason at ¶ 6, 8.  Despite 
strong evidence of his guilt, Mason had failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature 
of his criminal conduct, attempted to minimize his misconduct by blaming others, 
and expressed remorse only for his own embarrassment and public humiliation.  Id. 
at ¶ 9.  Although Mason had no prior disciplinary record, had exhibited a 
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and had submitted 
evidence of his good character and reputation, he also had acted with a selfish or 
dishonest motive, committed multiple offenses, and caused harm to a vulnerable 
client.  Fortado, in contrast, has accepted full responsibility and acknowledged the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.  Moreover, there is no evidence that Fortado has 
committed multiple offenses, that he has acted with a selfish or dishonest motive, 
or that his intimate relationship with M.S. caused her any harm.  On the contrary, 
Fortado testified that their committed relationship outlasted his initial legal 
representation of her by approximately two and a half years and developed into a 
friendship that continued for another two years. 
{¶ 18} Like Mason, the remaining cases cited by the board warranted the 
imposition of actual time away from the practice of law because they involved 
either acts of misconduct in addition to soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with 
                                                          
 
1. An Alford plea is “[a] guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a plea bargain without admitting 
guilt.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 86 (10th Ed.2014); see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 
S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). 
January Term, 2020 
 
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a client or other significant aggravating factors that are not present here.  For 
example, in Leon, 155 Ohio St.3d 582, 2018-Ohio-5090, 122 N.E.3d 1242, the 
attorney accepted a retainer and filing fee from a husband and wife and failed to 
deposit those funds into his client trust account, failed to perform the contracted 
legal work, failed to refund their unearned fees, and engaged in a sexual relationship 
with the wife during his legal representation of the couple.  We suspended him from 
the practice of law for one year with six months stayed on conditions.  In Bartels, 
151 Ohio St.3d 144, 2016-Ohio-3333, 87 N.E.3d 155, we imposed the same 
sanction on an attorney who exchanged multiple sexually oriented text messages 
with a client—after having been publicly reprimanded for engaging in a sexual 
relationship with another client—and failed to appreciate the wrongfulness of her 
conduct. 
{¶ 19} On the other hand, we have occasionally imposed fully stayed 
suspensions on attorneys who engaged in misconduct that, in some respects, was 
more egregious than Fortado’s conduct here.  For example, in Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Assn. v. Paris, 148 Ohio St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5581, 68 N.E.3d 775, we 
disciplined an attorney who not only had made unwelcome sexual advances toward 
a client but also had failed to attend the client’s sentencing hearing, id. at ¶ 7.  
Although we found that Paris had acted with a selfish motive, engaged in multiple 
offenses, and harmed a vulnerable client, we imposed a fully stayed six-month 
suspension for his misconduct. 
{¶ 20} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Siewert, 130 Ohio St.3d 402, 2011-Ohio-
5935, 958 N.E.2d 946, we also imposed a fully stayed six-month suspension on an 
attorney who engaged in an improper sexual relationship with a chemically 
dependent client who had retained him to represent her in her divorce, a domestic-
violence matter, and a related civil-protection-order proceeding.  Siewert stipulated 
that his misconduct adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law and materially 
limited his ability to represent his client.  Id. at ¶ 5.  Like Fortado, he had a prior 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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unrelated disciplinary record but had fully cooperated in the proceedings and 
presented evidence of his good character and reputation. 
{¶ 21} Based on the unique facts of this case—including the absence of any 
evidence of coercion, Fortado’s acceptance of responsibility for his wrongdoing, 
his full cooperation in these proceedings, and his strong character and reputation 
evidence—and having carefully considered the sanctions we have imposed in other 
cases involving similar misconduct, we sustain Fortado’s objection to the board’s 
recommended sanction.  Moreover, we agree that a conditionally stayed one-year 
suspension is the appropriate sanction for Fortado’s misconduct. 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, Matthew Fortado is suspended from the practice of law 
for one year, fully stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct.  
If Fortado fails to comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and 
he will serve the entire one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Fortado. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} Because it is per se professional misconduct when an attorney abuses 
the attorney-client relationship by commencing a sexual relationship with a client 
and our caselaw establishes that an actual suspension from the practice of law is the 
appropriate sanction for that misconduct, I would adopt the recommendation of the 
Board of Professional Conduct and suspend respondent, Matthew Fortado, from the 
practice of law for one year, with six months stayed on the condition that he engage 
in no further misconduct.  Therefore, I dissent. 
{¶ 24} Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) prohibits a lawyer from soliciting or engaging in 
sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship between them 
January Term, 2020 
 
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predates the client-lawyer relationship.  “In the absence of a preexisting, consensual 
sexual relationship, seeking or having sex with a client is a per se violation.  The 
fact that a client appears to have consented does not mitigate the attorney’s 
misconduct or provide a defense against a violation.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Sarver, 155 Ohio St.3d 100, 2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405, ¶ 16.  As Comment 
17 to Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) explains, “this rule prohibits the lawyer from engaging in 
sexual activity with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual 
and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client, unless the sexual 
relationship predates the client-lawyer relationship.”  (Emphasis added.)  Compare 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 (allowing a client to consent to representation of another client 
that will be directly adverse to the client in certain circumstances); Prof.Cond.R. 
1.8(a) (allowing a client to consent to an attorney’s transacting business with the 
client when certain conditions are met).  And Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C) does not 
identify the client’s consent as a mitigating factor that may be considered in favor 
of a less severe sanction. 
{¶ 25} A client’s apparent consent and the absence of overt coercion are 
both irrelevant facts because “ ‘the client’s reliance on the ability of her counsel in 
a crisis situation has the effect of putting the lawyer in a position of dominance and 
the client in a position of dependence and vulnerability.”  Sarver at ¶ 24, quoting 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Booher, 75 Ohio St.3d 509, 510, 664 N.E.2d 522 (1996).  
“This power imbalance ‘ “enables the lawyer to dominate and take unfair 
advantage” ’ of the client.”  Id., quoting Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Professional 
Ethics & Conduct v. Hill, 540 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Iowa 1995), quoting former Iowa 
Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-25.  The power imbalance also “renders 
it impossible for the vulnerable layperson to be considered ‘consenting.’ ”  Hill at 
44. 
{¶ 26} Nor is a lack of any apparent prejudice to the client relevant.  We 
have recognized that “ ‘a sexual relationship between lawyer and client during the 
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course of the professional relationship is inherently and insidiously harmful.’ * * * 
The client may be psychologically and emotionally harmed by an exploitative 
sexual relationship regardless of the outcome of the legal case.”  Sarver at ¶ 28, 
quoting People v. Boyer, 934 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Colo.1997).  And “[t]he abuse of 
the attorney-client relationship not only harms the dignity of the client, whose body 
and trust in her lawyer have been violated, but it also impugns the legal system as 
a whole” when a client turns to the legal profession for help protecting or enforcing 
her rights only to be exploited for the lawyer’s sexual gratification.  Id. at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 27} Therefore, “the professional-conduct rules do not indicate that a 
lesser sanction should be imposed on the attorney when the relationship ‘appears’ 
to be consensual or when the client’s case does not seem to have been prejudiced.”  
Id., 155 Ohio St.3d 100, 2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405, at ¶ 30.  Rather, “[w]e 
have admonished lawyers and sanctioned them with an actual suspension from the 
practice of law for engaging in sexual conduct with clients with whom they had no 
sexual relationship prior to the representation.”  Id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 28} In this case, the record contains the bare stipulations that “during the 
course of the representation, [Fortado and the client] began an intimate sexual 
relationship” and that “[Fortado] acknowledges that it was wrong to begin a 
consensual sexual relationship while representing a client.”  It also includes 
Fortado’s testimony that he had a romantic, monogamous, consensual sexual 
relationship with the client.  But there is little to nothing in the record that 
corroborates his side of the story. 
{¶ 29} This is especially problematic given Fortado’s admissions that at the 
time he commenced the sexual relationship with the client, “she was going through 
a difficult divorce and so she was vulnerable.”  He knew that she had been denied 
visitation with her children because she suffered from mental-health issues.  And 
in his representation of the client, Fortado learned other intimate details about the 
client’s life suggesting that she may have just left a sexually exploitative 
January Term, 2020 
 
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relationship with the plaintiff in the lawsuit Fortado was defending her against—
she had worked as the plaintiff’s housekeeper, she had had a sexual relationship 
with him, and the plaintiff had given her loans and access to his credit card.  The 
sexual relationship had become an issue in the client’s divorce proceeding during 
that time, and she had asked the plaintiff to falsely deny in that proceeding that he 
had had sex with her.  And the client had filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, 
alleging that he had sexually assaulted her. 
{¶ 30} Fortado also had recognized that the client “was in financial distress 
at that time,” and he therefore waived the “substantial fees” she owed him and 
persuaded another attorney to agree to waive her “substantial fees” as well.  He 
testified that he had “financed her to travel to Kentucky where the kids were, 
[given] her money for their Christmas presents, [and given] her money for their 
birthday presents.”  He also admitted that he had given her “financial help” in 
connection with her health problems during the representation and that he had taken 
her on vacations.  Their sexual relationship ended after he gave the client money to 
bring her mother to Ohio from North Carolina; although Fortado had expected to 
spend time with both women, the client did not contact him during the visit but 
instead called afterwards to ask for more money. 
{¶ 31} The record contains few specific details about the client such as her 
age, education, and sophistication with the law, how the sexual relationship began 
and ended, or whether she agreed with Fortado’s characterization of the facts.  She 
was not called to testify, and not even the grievance appears in the record.  But from 
Fortado’s own admissions, it is apparent that he commenced a sexual relationship 
with the client at a time when she was financially, emotionally, and psychologically 
vulnerable and dependent on him.  He held a superior position of power and trust, 
and he therefore abused that power and trust for his own sexual gratification when 
he commenced the sexual relationship.  Not only that, we have explained that an 
attorney’s giving a client financial support and free legal representation during an 
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improper sexual relationship “in effect paid [the client] to continue their 
relationship.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Krieger, 108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006-Ohio-
1062, 843 N.E.2d 765, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 32} The inherently unequal power dynamic between Fortado and his 
client is apparent on the record, but the majority nonetheless credits his testimony 
that he and the client shared a “committed relationship” without ever having heard 
the client’s side of the story.  And although the majority points to the lack of 
evidence of coercion and harm to the client, the existence of consent and the lack 
of harm do not mitigate Fortado’s misconduct.  See Sarver, 155 Ohio St.3d 100, 
2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405, at ¶ 16; Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), Comment 17.  
Rather, Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) is an absolute bar against an attorney commencing a 
sexual relationship with a client.  And in any case, there is little in the record 
corroborating Fortado’s characterization of the relationship as committed and 
consensual during the representation.  As we explained in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bartels, “ ‘the burden is on the lawyer to ensure that all attorney-client dealings 
remain on a professional level.’ ”  151 Ohio St.3d 144, 2016-Ohio-3333, 87 N.E.3d 
155, ¶ 15, quoting Booher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 510, 664 N.E.2d 522.  Fortado failed 
to carry that burden. 
{¶ 33} I see little justification in this record to depart from our caselaw 
holding that an actual suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate 
sanction for a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j).  See Sarver at ¶ 17-22 (citing cases).  
For this reason, I would impose the board’s recommended sanction and suspend 
Fortado for one year, with six months stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 34} Therefore, I dissent. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Sara E. Strattan; and Wayne M. Rice, Bar Counsel, for relator. 
McNamara, Demczyk Co., L.P.A., and Sidney N. Freeman, for respondent. 
January Term, 2020