Title: Jackman Constr., Inc. v. Town of Baggs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JACKMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming Corporation v. TOWN OF BAGGS, WYOMING2012 WY 80Case Number: S-11-0252Decided: 06/12/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
JACKMAN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming 
corporation,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.TOWN OF BAGGS, 
WYOMING,Appellee(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County
The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Clark 
Stith, Rock Springs, WY.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Thomas 
A. Thompson and Matthew E. Riehl of MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, 
Rawlins, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Riehl.
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Jackman 
Construction, Inc. (Jackman), was awarded a contract to improve the Town of 
Baggs’ (the Town) water treatment plant.  
After the project suffered significant delays, payments were submitted 
and accepted, and a dispute ensued as to whether or not the last payment 
constituted “final payment.”  
Jackman filed a governmental claim as well as a complaint for breach of 
contract, both seeking damages from the Town.  The Town filed its “Motion for Summary 
Judgment,” which the district court granted.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Jackman presents 
three issues for our consideration:
 
A.   Whether 
the district court erred in finding no genuine issues of material fact and that 
the last payment by the Town to Jackman was “Final Payment” under the contract 
between the parties;
 
B.   Whether 
the district court erred in finding no genuine issues of material fact and that 
the Town did not expressly acknowledge in writing that the issue of liquidated 
damages was still unsettled when it made its last payment to Jackman; 
and
 
C.   Whether 
the district court erred in finding no genuine issues of material fact and that 
Jackman was required to submit, but had not submitted, a written “claim” in 
connection with the Town’s imposition of liquidated 
damages.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In September of 
2006, the Town sought bids to upgrade its water treatment plant.  The Town awarded one general contract to 
Jackman and one general contract to Westech Construction.  On December 20, 2006, the Town and 
Jackman entered a contract detailing the work to be performed by Jackman as well 
as the price to be paid by the Town.
 
[¶4]      Originally, the 
contract required Jackman to be substantially finished with its construction 
within 120 days.  An additional 30 
days was given for finalization, including payment, for a total projected time 
of 150 days.  A “Notice to Proceed” 
was sent to Jackman on March 15, 2007, effective as of March 22, 
2007.
 
[¶5]      The dates of the 
project were affected by change orders filed by the Town.  Also, the cost of the project 
increased.  Change Order No. 3, 
effective July 11, 2007, altered the date of completion to 36 calendar days 
later, making the date for “final payment” September 26, 2007.  Change Order No. 5 increased the contract 
price by $4,670.00, increased the contract time by 3 days, making the date for 
“final payment” September 29, 2007.  
Change Order No. 7 again increased the contract price, this time by 
$3,488.00 and changed the contract time as well, making the date for “final 
payment” April 26, 2008.  Change 
Order No. 7 added 208 days for “approved delays.”  All of these change orders were 
submitted by Jackman.  As it 
happened, due to project delays, the Certificate of Substantial Completion was 
dated September 12, 2008, and final completion occurred on October 13, 
2008.
 
[¶6]      After the project 
was substantially completed, Jackman sought “final payment” from the Town in the 
amount of $187,944.08.  However, the 
Town approved “final payment” to Jackman for a smaller amount, $154,968.08.  Correspondence from the Town to Jackman 
incorporated Change Order Nos. 1-7 into the ultimate approval of paying the 
smaller amount to Jackman.  The 
correspondence also explained that the Town purposefully would withhold 
$100,000.00 in liquidated damages, at the rate of $500.00 per day, for 200 days 
of delay by Jackman Construction, pursuant to the 
contract.
 
[¶7]      On June 18, 2009, 
Jackman approved Change Order No. 7, which recognized a time delay grant of 208 
days.  On June 20, 2009, Jackman 
deposited the “final payment” check from the Town, in the amount of $154,968.08, 
which reflected the “final payment” approved by the Town, not the amount 
requested by Jackman of $187,944.08.  
One year later, Jackman filed its “Notice of Governmental Claim under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 and Itemized Statement of Claim” against the 
Town.  In its claim, Jackman sought 
damages in the amount of $221,600,00, claiming $100,000.00 in “unjustified 
assessment of liquidated damages” and $121,600.00 in “other damages” due to 
additional expenses incurred by Jackman as a result of delay caused by the 
Town.  Subsequent to its 
governmental claim, Jackman filed its complaint for breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment in which it sought 
$221,600.00 from the Town.
 
[¶8]      On July 11, 2011, 
the Town responded with its motion for summary judgment seeking final disposition on the 
grounds  that: 1) Jackman failed to 
submit timely written notice of claims as required by the parties’ contract and 
failed to comply with the contract regarding changes in contract price in that 
Jackman did not make any claim for any adjustment in the contract price; 2) 
pursuant to the contract, Jackman waived all claims against the Town when it 
accepted “final payment” from the Town; and 3) “unjust enrichment” is 
unavailable as a remedy because these parties have an express 
contract.
 
[¶9]      The district 
court granted the Town’s summary judgment as to both the $100,000.00 in 
liquidated damages, and the $121,600.00 in other damages.  The court stated that pursuant to the 
clear and unambiguous contractual terms, “Jackman Construction failed to make a 
written request of its claim and also waived any further claim against the . . . 
Town after . . . accept[ing] final payment.”  Also, Jackman’s failure to notify the 
Town of any claim, during any time, falls far beyond the parameters 
of any waiver argument and cannot absolve it of its failure to abide by the 
clear contractual terms.  This 
appeal followed.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]   When reviewing an order 
granting summary judgment, 
we consider the record de novo.  
Stone v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 2009 WY 114, ¶ 10, 216 P.3d 489, 492 (Wyo. 2009).
 
[W]e 
have exactly the same duty as the district judge; and, if there is a complete 
record before us, we have exactly the same material as did [the district judge]. 
 We must follow the same standards. 
 The propriety of granting a motion 
for summary judgment depends 
upon the correctness of a court’s dual findings that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  This court looks 
at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts 
contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing in the 
record.
 
Wyo. 
Med. Ctr. v. Wyo. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 
2010 WY 21, ¶ 11, 225 P.3d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting McGarvey v. 
Key Prop. Mgmt. LLC, 2009 WY 84, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 503, 506 (Wyo. 
2009)).
 
[¶11]   The summary judgment ruling challenged in 
this case arose out of the district court’s determination that the parties’ 
agreement was clear and unambiguous.  We review that determination by applying 
the following standards:
 
The 
initial question of whether the contract is capable of being understood in only 
one way is a question of law for the court.  If the court determines that the contract 
is capable of being understood in only one way, then the language used in the 
contract expresses and controls the intent of the parties.  In such case, the next question, what is 
that understanding or meaning, is also a question of law.  When we review the district court’s summary judgment decisions that a 
contract is capable of being understood in only one way and what that 
understanding is, we accord no deference to those decisions.  As we have said, “[w]e are . . . at 
liberty to make a determination as to the existence of ambiguity whether or not 
the parties here agree thereto one way or the other, and whether or not the 
trial court has reached a conclusion thereon one way or the 
other.”
 
Examination 
Mgmt. Servs. v. Kirschbaum, 
927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
 
DISCUSSION
 
Final 
Payment
 
[¶12]   Although Jackman’s issue before us 
is generally whether summary judgment was appropriate, it is specific in 
clarifying each issue.  First, 
Jackman argues that the district court erred in finding no genuine issues of 
material fact that the last payment from the Town to Jackman was “final 
payment,” as defined by the contract.
 
[¶13]   After a de novo review of the record, we 
conclude that the last payment from the Town to Jackman was indeed “final 
payment” as we will explain.  
Although it would be dispositive here if the check stated “final 
payment,”  that does not mean a 
genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether or not check no. 1050 
was “final payment.”  The record and 
timeline of events reveal sufficient evidence to support that conclusion.  On April 3, 2009, the Town Engineer 
received Pay Request No. 3 from Jackman, as required by Article 14.07 of the 
contract.  Pay Request No. 3 makes 
no reference to “final payment,” which the contract did not require. Notably, 
however, a corresponding “Notice of Acceptance and Final Payment” was published 
for three days in the Rawlins Daily Times in accordance with Wyoming law.  The final publication indicated that the 
contractor would be paid the “final payment” and the “full amount due him” on 
May 26, 2009.
 
[¶14]   On May 26, 2009, the Mayor of Baggs 
executed Change Order No. 7, and signed Pay Request No. 3.  Also, a “Supplement to Pay Request No. 3” 
was executed, entitled “Explanation for difference in payment from Contractor 
requested amount.”  On June 18, 
2009, Jackman agreed to Change Order No. 7, and on June 30, 2009, check no. 1050 
was endorsed and cashed by Jackman.
 
[¶15]   Jackman concedes that it submitted 
to the project engineer two written requests for extensions of time over the 
course of the project.  The parties 
memorialized the need for a 208-day increase in contract time in Change Order 
No. 7, executed by the project engineer on April 7, 2009, the Town on May 26, 
2009, and Jackman on June 18, 2009.  
No record exists showing that Jackman sought or the Town gave express written acknowledgement of 
an unsettled claim regarding liquidated damages.  Although Jackman points this Court to 
the Town Council minutes, the Town’s letter entitled “Supplement to Pay Request 
No. 3,” and even a written objection to the Town’s assessment of liquidated 
damages prior to May 26, 2009, we cannot conclude any are sufficient under the 
clear terms of the contract to preserve Jackman’s claim after it accepted “final 
payment.”  We will address those 
points, but conclude here that no issue of material fact exists to show any 
other scenario than that “final payment” was submitted by the Town, and accepted and cashed by 
Jackman.
 
Waiver
 
[¶16]   Jackman also argues that summary 
judgment was 
inappropriate because Section 14.09 of the General Conditions of the contract 
was ambiguous.  Jackman points to the following 
language:
 
A.   The 
making and acceptance of final payment will constitute: 
….
2. 
a waiver of all Claims by Contractor against Owner other than those previously 
made in accordance with the requirements herein and expressly acknowledged by Owner in 
writing as still unsettled.  
[Emphasis added.]
 
[¶17]   Jackman argues first that the 
payment received was not final.  
Jackman submits that it received express acknowledgement in writing from 
the Town acknowledging unsettled claims in the form of a letter, the 
Town Council minutes, the Town’s letter entitled “Supplement to Pay Request No. 
3,” and a written objection to the Town’s assessment of liquidated damages prior 
to May 26, 2009.
 
[¶18]   In our estimation, Jackman has a 
less fixed definition of “express acknowledgment in writing” than does the 
Town.  Jackman points to three 
choices that ostensibly show the Town’s acknowledgement of unsettled claims, 
while the Town says there are none.  
Whether or not that difference precludes summary judgment, we discuss 
below.
 
[¶19]   Having determined that Jackman 
accepted “final payment,” we are now asked to determine if Jackman thus waived 
its right to object to liquidated damages being withheld.  Jackman asserts that the Town’s 
explanation letter accompanying “final payment” recognized a difference between 
the amount requested, and the amount paid, and thus impliedly recognized an 
unsettled claim between these parties.  
Also, Jackman asserts that by orally objecting to the liquidated damage 
amount ($100,000.00) at a Baggs Town Council meeting, the minutes from that Town 
Council meeting suffice as a “written acknowledgement of an unsettled 
claim.”
 
[¶20]   The clear terms of the contract 
required Jackman to have submitted written notice of its claims.  The contract also provided that, without 
express acknowledgement by the Town of the “unsettled” nature of any claims, the 
“acceptance of final payment” constituted a waiver of all claims by 
Jackman.  By the unambiguous terms 
of the contract, Jackman was required to secure in writing the Town’s express 
acknowledgement that liquidated damages were still unsettled as a condition 
precedent to the present suit, if Jackman intended on depositing the check as 
“final payment.”  Our review of the 
record shows that Jackman never requested such an acknowledgement nor did the 
Town give one.  Instead, Jackman 
signed Change Order No. 7 and acknowledged that it was entitled to 208 
additional contract days.  When 
check no. 1050 arrived, Jackman deposited it.  Under the express language of the 
contract, Jackman waived all claims against the Town.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶21]   We affirm the district court’s 
decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Town.  Under the clear and unambiguous terms of 
the contract, Jackman agreed to waive all claims by accepting “final payment,” 
which it did.  Affirmed.