Title: People v. Tisdel

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90480-Agenda 10-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								MELVIN TISDEL, Appellee.
Opinion filed March 15, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial, defendant, Melvin Tisdel, was
convicted of the first degree murder of Julio Lagunas. Defendant
was sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment. The appellate court
reversed defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court
should not have allowed the State's witnesses to testify concerning
a nonidentification lineup. 316 Ill. App. 3d 1143. The appellate
court concluded that the error was not harmless, because the
evidence was closely balanced and it was possible that the jury
would have reached a different verdict had the nonidentification
testimony been excluded. This court thereafter granted the State's
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant's conviction was based upon the drive-by shooting
of Julio Lagunas on September 3, 1995. The facts detailing the
crime and the investigation leading to defendant's arrest are set out
in the appellate court's opinion (316 Ill. App. 3d 1143), and will
be recited here only as necessary to an understanding of the issue
before this court.
	On September 3, 1995, around 5:50 p.m., 18-year-old Julio
Lagunas was shot to death as he stood on the corner of Clark
Street and Jarvis Avenue in Chicago. Lagunas was shot by the
passenger in a passing black IROC Chevrolet Camaro. Although
the driver of the Camaro was identified and arrested shortly after
the shooting, defendant was not identified until almost one year
later, in lineups conducted on August 16, 1996, and September 12,
1997. Ultimately there were four eyewitnesses that identified
defendant as the shooter. Those eyewitnesses included Gerardo
Quiroz (Gerardo), Osvaldo Quiroz (Osvaldo), Francisco Curonel
(Francisco) and Jose Ramos (Jose).
	Gerardo testified at trial that on September 3, 1995, he,
Osvaldo and Jose were standing on the sidewalk outside the Clark
Mall in Chicago when he saw a black IROC Camaro with tinted
windows, chrome wheels and two tailpipes pull into the entrance
to the mall parking lot. The two men inside the car tried to talk to
some girls going into the mall, then drove toward the back of the
mall parking lot, turned right, and came through the middle of the
lot. The Camaro then stopped on the sidewalk before turning left
onto Clark Street. The passenger side of the car was facing
Gerardo and the others, and the window was down. At that point,
the passenger pulled out a gun and pointed it at Gerardo, Osvaldo
and Jose. The car then drove north onto Clark Street.
	As the car drove along Clark Street, Gerardo saw Francisco
across the street from the Clark Mall, in Touhy Park. Gerardo saw
the passenger take out his gun and point it at Francisco. Francisco
tried to hit the car with something, then ducked. The car kept
driving north on Clark Street, then stopped as Julio Lagunas and
Ulysses Renteria were trying to cross Clark Street at the
intersection of Jarvis and Rogers Avenue. Gerardo again saw a
hand holding a gun sticking out of the passenger side window
pointing at Julio and Ulysses. Gerardo heard a gunshot as the car
sped up and "took off." Gerardo ran toward Julio, who was lying
on the ground bleeding. Osvaldo went home before the police
arrived.
	Gerardo described the passenger to the police as a skinny 23-year-old black male with a light complexion and braided hair with
beads on the ends. The police took Gerardo, Jose, Francisco and
Ulysses (who was deceased at the time of trial) to the police
station. At the station, Gerardo recognized the black Camaro
involved in the shooting. Gerardo also looked at a lineup that day
but did not identify anyone. Approximately one week later,
Gerardo told the officers that his brother Osvaldo also had
witnessed the shooting. Almost one year later, on August 16,
1996, Gerardo, Osvaldo and Francisco separately viewed a lineup
at the police station. Gerardo identified defendant in the lineup as
the passenger in the Camaro. Gerardo identified defendant in court
as the person he recognized as the shooter in the August 16, 1996,
lineup. A photo of the August 16, 1996, lineup reveals that
defendant had a braided hairstyle at the time of the lineup.
	Osvaldo's testimony concerning the events leading to the
shooting was similar to Gerardo's testimony. Osvaldo described
the passenger as a dark male who had long braided hair with black,
white and blue beads at the ends. Osvaldo testified that he did not
talk to the police on the day of the shooting because his mother
came to the scene and told him to go home because he was too
young to get involved. The next day, Osvaldo and his mother were
walking on Ashland Avenue in Chicago when Osvaldo saw a
green Nissan Maxima drive past. Osvaldo recognized defendant as
a passenger in the Maxima. Defendant stared at Osvaldo for
awhile and Osvaldo stared back.
	On September 12, 1995, Osvaldo spoke with police officers
for the first time. On that date, Osvaldo viewed five photographs
at the police station and identified the driver of the car in one of
the photographs. Osvaldo told the officers he was pretty certain the
person in the picture was the driver, but said he would have to see
him in person. On September 21, 1995, Osvaldo went back to the
police station to view a lineup. Osvaldo identified the driver of the
car in the lineup. Although another individual in the lineup had his
hair in braids, Osvaldo did not identify him as the shooter. On
August 16, 1996, Osvaldo viewed a lineup and identified
defendant as the shooter. Osvaldo also identified defendant in
court as the shooter.
	Francisco also testified at trial that he saw the car turn into the
Clark Mall, then later pull out from the middle of the parking lot
and turn north on Clark Street. Francisco heard someone yell
"watch out with the car, they've got a gun." The passenger in the
car threw his arm out and pointed a gun at Francisco. Francisco
then threw a bag at the car then fell to the ground. Francisco
started running toward Julio and Ulysses. The car slowed down
when the occupants saw Julio and Ulysses. The passenger put his
arm out the window with the gun in his hand. Francisco heard a
shot and the car sped off. When Francisco reached Julio, Julio was
lying on the ground bleeding.
	That same day, Francisco went to the police station and
identified a car as the Camaro involved in the shooting. Francisco
also viewed a lineup around 1 a.m. and identified the driver of the
car. Francisco described the passenger as a black male, 25 to 28
years old, with a skinny face and braided hair close to his head. On
August 16, 1996, Francisco viewed another lineup and identified
defendant as the shooter. Francisco identified defendant in court
as the person he picked out of the lineup as the shooter.
	Jose testified that he was on a pay phone in front of the Clark
Mall with Gerardo and Osvaldo standing nearby when a black
IROC Camaro stopped in front of him on the sidewalk. The
windows of the Camaro were down, so that Jose could see two
males in the car. The passenger was smoking marijuana and there
was a gun on the seat between the driver and passenger. The
passenger grabbed the gun and put it between his legs. Jose
identified defendant in court as the passenger. The car went around
the mall parking lot, then came out the middle. Before the car
turned left onto Clark Street, the passenger pointed a gun at Jose,
Gerardo and Osvaldo. Jose described the passenger as 21 to 25
years old, dark skinned, with braids.
	Jose's description of the events leading to the shooting
paralleled that of Gerardo, Osvaldo and Francisco. Jose also went
to the police station immediately after the shooting and identified
the Camaro used in the shooting. Jose viewed a lineup that night,
but did not identify anyone in the lineup. Jose viewed a second
lineup on September 12, 1997, approximately one month prior to
trial. Jose identified defendant in the lineup as the shooter. A
photo of this lineup reveals that defendant had a different hairstyle
at this lineup, with his hair short and not braided. On cross-examination, Jose testified that he did not see any beads in the
shooter's hair on September 3, 1995.
	As noted, following his conviction for first degree murder,
defendant appealed his conviction to the appellate court claiming,
inter alia, that he was deprived of a fair trial when the State's
witnesses testified that they had viewed lineups containing persons
other than defendant and had made no identification. Defendant
claimed that the State was attempting to bolster its case with the
nonidentification testimony. Defendant conceded that he had not
objected to the testimony at trial or in his post-trial motion, but
asked the court to apply the plain error rule.
	The appellate court agreed that the issue should be considered
under the plain error rule. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1154. Citing this
court's opinion in People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89 (1990), the
appellate court noted that a witness' identification of a defendant
may not be bolstered by introducing evidence that the witness
failed to identify anyone else during pretrial identification
procedures. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1154. The appellate court held that
the nonidentification testimony should not have been allowed
because it was presented simply to corroborate the witnesses'
subsequent identification of defendant. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1154.
The appellate court also held that because it was possible that the
jury might have returned a different verdict had the
nonidentification testimony been excluded, the error in admitting
the testimony required reversal of defendant's conviction. 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 1154-55. One justice wrote a special concurrence to
express his "strong disagreement" with this court's position that
nonidentification testimony is inadmissible. 316 Ill. App. 3d at
1158-59 (Quinn, P.J., specially concurring). This court thereafter
granted the State's petition for leave to appeal that decision. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315.
ANALYSIS
	In People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 138 (1990), this court
found error in the admission of witness testimony stating that the
witnesses had viewed pictures of persons other than defendant and
had made no identification. This court held that the testimony
violated the general rule that a witness may not testify in court as
to statements made out of court for the purpose of corroborating
his trial testimony concerning the same subject. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 
at 138.
	We recognized, however, that there were two exceptions to
the general rule. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138. One exception is where
a prior consistent statement is introduced to rebut a charge or an
inference that the witness is motivated to testify falsely or that his
in-court testimony is of recent fabrication. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at
138. That exception did not apply in Hayes because the defendant
had not expressly or impliedly charged that the State's witnesses
were motivated to falsely identify him, but instead simply
attempted to show that the witnesses may have been mistaken in
their identification of him. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138.
	The second exception to the general rule is where the out-of-court statement is one of identification. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138.
That exception did not apply because the witnesses' out-of-court
statements were not statements of identification. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 
at 138. Rather, the statements were that the witnesses did not
identify the defendant from police photo books and photo arrays.
Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138. In fact, the State introduced the out-of-court statements to bolster the reliability of the witnesses'
subsequent lineup and in-court identifications of the defendant.
Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138-39. This court concluded that such
evidence was improperly introduced, although the evidence was
not so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 139.
	In this case, the State asks this court to depart from the
precedent set forth in Hayes. The State argues that negative
identification testimony is both relevant and admissible. The State
observes that in Hayes, this court was not presented with evidence
that a witness had viewed photographs or multiple lineups
containing individuals similar in appearance to the defendant.
Thus, the court did not consider that a witness' failure to identify
individuals similar to the defendant demonstrates the witness'
reliability and also refutes the possibility that the prior pretrial
identification was based upon the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
	Defendant responds that Hayes is controlling authority
concerning the use of pretrial nonidentification evidence.
Defendant further contends that neither of the exceptions to the
prior consistent statement rule apply, because there was no charge
that the witnesses in this case were fabricating their testimony, nor
were the statements of the witnesses statements of identification.
Defendant therefore maintains that this court must affirm the
decision of the appellate court.
	Upon review, we find this court's determination in Hayes
concerning nonidentification testimony to be flawed. The Hayes
court acknowledged that there was an exception to the general rule
where an out-of-court statement is one of identification. Hayes,
139 Ill. 2d  at 138. The court then held that the nonidentification
testimony was not admissible under this exception because the
statements were not statements of identification. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 
at 138. We believe the Hayes court construed the term "statements
of identification" too narrowly.
	At the outset we note that nonidentification evidence is
inherent in most "statements of identification." As Justice Quinn
observed in his special concurrence to the appellate court opinion
in this case, when identifying a defendant from a lineup or photo
array, a witness necessarily does not identify the remaining
individuals in the lineup or photo array. See 316 Ill. App. 3d at
1163 (Quinn, P.J., specially concurring). This type of
nonidentification is crucial to the accuracy of the witness'
identification because, in the typical case, a witness is shown a
group of similar looking individuals and asked to pick out only the
one who committed the crime. Consequently, the fact that the
witness did not pick the other individuals in the lineup becomes as
important as the fact that the witness did pick the defendant. Given
the crucial role that nonidentification plays with regard to a lineup
or photo array where a defendant is positively identified, it follows
that the same considerations apply with regard to those lineups or
photo arrays where a defendant is not identified. Indeed, it is
logical to presume that the more lineups and photo arrays a
witness views, the more likely that witness' identification is
reliable and is not based upon suggestiveness.
	With the foregoing in mind, we find that the Hayes court erred
in limiting "statements of identification" to a witness' actual
identification of a defendant. This interpretation mistakenly
focuses on the result rather than the process. As a consequence, a
trier of fact may be deprived of information necessary to an
informed decision concerning a witness' reliability. In contrast,
construing "statements of identification" to include the entire
identification process would ensure that a trier of fact is fully
informed concerning the reliability of a witness' identification, as
well as the suggestiveness or lack thereof in that identification.
	Justice Quinn, in his special concurrence, pointed out this
potential problem with limiting "statements of identification" to
only positive identifications. Justice Quinn noted that the court's
holding would:
		"require the State on retrial to confine its evidence on the
subject of identification of the defendant to the date of the
first identification-one year (or two) after the shooting.
What is the jury to make of this delay? The defense will
attack the investigation and the State will be precluded
from explaining what investigatory steps were taken from
the time of the shooting to the first lineup identification."
316 Ill. App. 3d at 1162 (Quinn, P.J., specially
concurring).
	That the entire identification process includes both
identification and nonidentification evidence has been given tacit
approval by the United States Supreme Court. In Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972), the Court
held that although a showup procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive, there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification
requiring evidence of the identification to be excluded. The Court
noted various factors weighing in favor of the admission of the
identification. Among those factors was that the victim had looked
at numerous photographs, lineups and showups in the seven-month time period between the crime and her identification of the
defendant as the perpetrator. Biggers, 409 U.S.  at 201, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 412, 93 S. Ct.  at 383. Specifically, the Court stated that:
			"There was, to be sure, a lapse of seven months
between the rape and the confrontation. This would be a
seriously negative factor in most cases. Here, however,
the testimony is undisputed that the victim made no
previous identification at any of the showups, lineups, or
photographic showings. Her record for reliability was
thus a good one, as she had previously resisted whatever
suggestiveness inheres in a showup." (Emphasis added.)
Biggers, 409 U.S.  at 201, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 412, 93 S. Ct.  at
383.
	Obviously, the admissibility of nonidentification evidence is
limited by considerations of relevance. If nonidentification
evidence is not relevant, it should be excluded from evidence. For
example, evidence that a witness viewed a lineup containing red-haired, blue-eyed men would not be relevant or admissible if the
witness described the perpetrator as a blond-haired, brown-eyed
man. However, evidence that a witness viewed a lineup containing
individuals similar in appearance to the defendant but did not
identify anyone would be relevant to the identification process.
	In this case, the trial court properly allowed the witnesses to
testify concerning the nonidentification lineups. As in Biggers,
there was a significant lapse of time between the shooting of Julio
and the witnesses' identification of defendant. Consequently, the
fact that some of the witnesses had viewed prior lineups and did
not identify anyone was relevant in demonstrating the reliability of
the subsequent identifications. This is especially true with regard
to the lineup viewed by Osvaldo, which contained not only the
driver of the Camaro, but also an individual similar in appearance
to defendant, including defendant's distinctive hairstyle-braids or
cornrows.
	We further note that the gravamen of the defense was that the
witnesses were mistaken in their identification of defendant as the
shooter. Defense counsel extensively cross-examined the
witnesses concerning their ability to observe the shooter, their
level of attention to the occupants in the Camaro, and the almost
one-year length of time between the shooting and the lineup
identification of defendant. Under the circumstances, the process
leading to the lineup identification, including nonidentification
lineups, was relevant to the witnesses' ultimate identification of
defendant as the shooter.
	Because we find that this court in Hayes erred in finding that
nonidentification evidence was not admissible under the
"statement of identification" exception to the general rule, and
therefore depart from that holding, it follows that the appellate
court in this case erred in reversing defendant's conviction based
upon our holding in Hayes. We therefore reverse the decision of
the appellate court and affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
 circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
	At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in
allowing witnesses for the State in a murder prosecution to testify
concerning a nonidentification lineup. In answering this question
in the negative, the majority neither discusses nor makes citation
to this court's decision in People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155 (1992),
a unanimous ruling less than 10 years old which addresses the
precise issue at bar, and which compels a result opposite to the
majority's ruling. The majority also overrules, without cogent
reason, this court's decision in People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89
(1990). Because the majority's conclusion represents an
unwarranted departure from this court's holdings in Jones and
Hayes, I respectfully dissent.
	This appeal has its genesis in the conviction of defendant, by
a jury, of the first degree murder of Julio Lagunas, who was killed
in a drive-by shooting on September 3, 1995. During defendant's
trial, the State called four eyewitnesses who identified defendant
as the passenger who shot Lagunas. Three of the four eyewitnesses
stated that they identified defendant as the gunman from a lineup
conducted on August 16, 1996, and the fourth eyewitness stated
that he had picked defendant out of a lineup on September 12,
1997. The State elicited from all four witnesses that, prior to
viewing the lineup from which they identified defendant, they
viewed another lineup (which did not include defendant) from
which they did not identify anyone as being the gunman.
	On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in
allowing the State to impermissibly bolster its case by introducing
the witnesses' nonidentification testimony. According to
defendant, the State improperly relied upon the nonidentifications
to show how careful the witnesses were in their ultimate
identification of defendant. A majority of the appellate court panel
agreed with the defendant's contentions. Relying upon this court's
1990 decision in Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, the majority of the panel
concluded that the State may not bolster a witness' identification
of a defendant by introducing evidence that the witness failed to
identify anyone else during pretrial identification procedures. The
appellate court determined that the nonidentification testimony
should not have been allowed because "it was presented simply to
corroborate the witnesses' subsequent identification of defendant."
316 Ill. App. 3d at 1154. Furthermore, the panel determined that
this error could not be considered harmless, since the evidence in
the case was closely balanced. The appellate court majority noted
that "none of the eyewitnesses knew defendant or viewed him for
a considerable length of time," that there was "no physical
evidence linking defendant to the crime," that "defendant was not
arrested near the scene," and that "[d]efendant did not confess."
316 Ill. App. 3d at 1153-54. Further, the appellate court majority
observed that a "substantial amount of time [had] elapsed between
the offense and the lineup identifications," with three of the
witnesses identifying defendant almost a year after the shooting,
and another witness identifying defendant two years after the
shooting. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1154. The appellate court majority
concluded that, under these facts, it was "quite possible that the
jury would have returned a different verdict had the
nonidentification testimony been excluded." 316 Ill. App. 3d at
1154.
	The majority now reverses the judgment of the appellate
court, and holds that this court "erred" in its Hayes decision. For
the reasons fully set forth below, I disagree with the majority's
conclusion.
	In People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89 (1990), the defendant was
convicted of murder and armed robbery. On appeal, the defendant
alleged that the trial court committed reversible error when four
prosecution witnesses were allowed to testify that, prior to
identifying the defendant, they viewed photographs of individuals
other than the defendant and made no identification. Defendant
argued that such nonidentification evidence was "irrelevant and
highly prejudicial" because "testimony that the witnesses viewed
pictures of persons other than the defendant and made no
identification was no more relevant than evidence that the
witnesses did not view the defendant at an athletic event or
shopping mall." Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 137. This court unanimously
agreed with the defendant's assertion that the nonidentification
testimony should not have been admitted, holding that it "violated
the general rule that a witness, although present in court and
subject to cross-examination, may not testify as to statements he
made out of court for the purpose of corroborating his testimony
given at trial relative to the same subject." Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at
138. Indeed, the general rule of evidence cited in Hayes barring,
as hearsay, the admission of prior out-of-court statements to
bolster in-court testimony on the same subject has long been a part
of this court's jurisprudence. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 389 (1972); People v. Wesley, 18 Ill. 2d 138, 153-54 (1959);
Lyon v. Oliver, 316 Ill. 292, 303 (1925); People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 323 (1915); Gates v. People, 14 Ill. 433, 438 (1853). Hayes,
however, was the first case in which this court applied this well-settled rule of evidence to bar a witness' nonidentification
testimony.
 	As is noted in Hayes, this court has traditionally recognized
two exceptions to the general rule that a witness may not testify as
to out-of-court statements for the purpose of bolstering in-court
testimony relative to the same subject. First, it is well settled that
a prior consistent statement is not barred by the hearsay rule, and
is therefore admissible, if the statement is offered to rebut a charge
or inference that the witness is motivated to testify falsely or that
the witness' in-court testimony is of recent fabrication. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138, citing Clark, 52 Ill. 2d at 388-90; see also Lyon, 316 Ill.  at 303; Gates, 14 Ill.  at 438. The Hayes court determined that
this exception did not apply to the facts before it because the
defendant had simply attempted to show that the witnesses may
have mistakenly identified him, and did not expressly or impliedly
allege that the State's witnesses were motivated to falsely identify
him. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138.
	Further, as Hayes made clear, it is well settled that the bar
against hearsay does not apply where a prior out-of-court
statement is one of identification. Accordingly, statements with
respect to a prior identification of the defendant are admissible.
Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138, citing People v. Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d 571,
578-79 (1980); see also 725 ILCS 5/115-12 (West 2000). The
court in Hayes relied upon this court's prior decision in Rogers,
wherein the rationale for this exception was explained: "[B]y the
time of trial, the witness' mind has become so conditioned that
there is little likelihood that he would not identify the person
[defendant] in court *** '*** therefore, it is entirely proper *** to
prove that at a former time, when the suggestions of others could
not have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness'
mind, he recognized and declared the present accused to be the
person.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d  at 578-79,
quoting 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1130, at 277 (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1972). The Hayes court determined that the witnesses'
statements that they viewed photographs of persons other than the
defendant and made no identification were inadmissible under the
"identification" exception to the hearsay bar. The court held that
the statements at issue were not statements of identification;
rather, they were statements of nonidentification. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138.
	Accordingly, because the challenged testimony in Hayes did
not fall within either exception to the general rule barring
admission of prior consistent statements, this court held that the
State "improperly introduced these prior consistent statements to
bolster the reliability of the witnesses' subsequent lineup and in-court identifications of the defendant." Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 138-39. However, although the Hayes court determined that the
nonidentification evidence was improperly admitted, the court
concluded that, under the facts before it, the evidence was not so
prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial, as there
was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 139.
	According to the majority opinion in the matter at bar, the
"State asks this court to depart from the precedent set forth in
Hayes *** [because] in Hayes, this court was not presented with
evidence that a witness had viewed photographs or multiple
lineups containing individuals similar in appearance to the
defendant." Slip op. at 6. The State therefore asserts, and the
majority agrees, that this court has not previously been afforded
the opportunity to consider whether a witness' failure to identify
individuals similar to defendant demonstrates the witness'
reliability, and whether such nonidentification refutes the
possibility that the prior pretrial identification was premised upon
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Slip op. at 6.
	Contrary to the argument advanced by the State and accepted
by the majority, this court has, in fact, previously considered and
rejected an argument identical to that raised by the State at bar.
Two years after this court decided Hayes, the principles of Hayes
were unanimously reaffirmed in People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155
(1992), a decision which is conspicuously absent from the
majority's opinion. In Jones, the defendant was found guilty of
armed robbery and aggravated unlawful restraint. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the trial court erred when it allowed the
victim of the crime to testify concerning her nonidentification of
the defendant. Specifically, the victim stated that prior to
identifying the defendant in a lineup, she had viewed another
lineup (which did not include the defendant) and failed to identify
anyone. Relying upon the decision in Hayes, this court determined
in Jones that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce
evidence of the victim's failure to identify the defendant in a prior
lineup. The Jones court explicitly rejected the argument advanced
by the State that the victim's nonidentification testimony "was
necessary to counter the defense's allegation that the lineup was
overly suggestive and that the identification was therefore not
trustworthy." Jones, 153 Ill. 2d  at 162. Significantly, this court
concluded that the State's argument was "simply a fancy way to
argue that it was necessary to corroborate [the victim's] testimony,
which is precisely what Hayes disallows." Jones, 153 Ill. 2d  at
162.
	Despite the fact that Jones previously presented this court
with the question of the admissibility of nonidentification evidence
in the context of multiple lineups, and despite the fact that this
court in Jones unanimously upheld the principles of Hayes and
rejected arguments substantially similar to those proffered by the
State in the case at bar, the majority nevertheless concludes that
the argument now advanced by the State has merit, and finds "this
court's determination in Hayes concerning nonidentification
testimony to be flawed." Slip op. at 6.
	Specifically, the majority holds that "this court in Hayes erred
in finding that nonidentification evidence was not admissible
under the 'statement of identification' exception to the general
rule," causing the majority to "depart from that holding." Slip op.
at 9. In arriving at this conclusion, the majority necessarily violates
the doctrine of stare decisis by omitting any discussion of, or
citation to, the controlling precedent of Jones. Indeed, the majority
opinion is notable for its complete silence with respect to the
application of the principle of stare decisis while overturning two
recent and unanimous decisions of this court. In addition, the
majority fails to make citation to any authority subsequent to
Hayes and Jones which would warrant or compel this court to
stray from the principles of stare decisis and reevaluate the well-settled evidentiary rules set forth in those decisions.
	The doctrine of stare decisis "proceeds from the first principle
of justice, that, absent powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike." 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review
§599 (1995); see also Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936)
(stare decisis requires this court to follow and apply its own
precedent and not disturb settled points of law). The doctrine of
stare decisis "is the means by which courts ensure that the law will
not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and
intelligible fashion *** [apart from] the proclivities of
individuals." Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of
Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). Indeed, prior to the
majority's opinion at bar, the law in this area had in fact been
developing in a "principled and intelligible fashion," as evidenced
by our reaffirmation of Hayes in Jones, as well as by our appellate
court's consistent application of the principles of Hayes and Jones
in determining that the State's presentation of negative
identification evidence improperly bolsters a witness' subsequent
identification of a defendant and constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
See, e.g., People v. Jones, 293 Ill. App. 3d 119 (1997); People v.
Davis, 285 Ill. App. 3d 1039 (1996); People v. Biggers, 273 Ill.
App. 3d 116 (1995); People v. Berry, 264 Ill. App. 3d 773 (1994);
People v. Berry, 241 Ill. App. 3d 993 (1993).
 	It is well settled that prior precedent should be overturned
"only on the showing of good cause" (Heimgaertner v. Benjamin
Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 167 (1955)), only where
there is " 'special justification' " for the departure (Chicago Bar
Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2d  at 510, quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984)),
and only where the reasons for departure are "compelling" (People
v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999)). Accordingly, this
court has recognized that it will not depart from precedent
" 'merely because the court is of the opinion that it might decide
otherwise were the question a new one.' " Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d  at
464, quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97 (1968); see also
Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 41 (1921) (it is "indispensable to
the due administration of justice, especially by a court of last
resort, that a question once deliberately examined and decided
should be considered as settled and closed to further argument, and
the courts are slow to interfere with the principle announced by the
decision and it may be upheld even though they would decide
otherwise were the question a new one"). Indeed, "[i]f the law
were to change with each change in the makeup of the court, then
the concept that ours is a government of law and not of men would
be nothing more than a pious cliche." People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 167 (1981) (Ryan, J., concurring).
	The majority has advanced no principled basis, let alone
"good cause," "compelling reason," or "special justification," for
departing from the holding in Hayes and Jones that statements of
nonidentification do not fall within the hearsay exception allowing
the admission of prior statements of identification. The majority,
tracking the analysis of Justice Quinn's special concurrence below,
concludes that by excluding nonidentification testimony from the
"statements of identification" hearsay exception, the Hayes court
erred by construing that term "too narrowly." Slip op. at 7.
Specifically, the majority holds that the decision in Hayes erred by
"limiting 'statements of identification' to a witness' actual
identification of a defendant," because, in the majority's view, this
interpretation "mistakenly focuses on the result," i.e., the ultimate
identification of the defendant, rather than on "the process" which
preceded the identification. According to the majority, "the
process" of identification includes the viewing of any prior lineups
and/or photo arrays where no identification of a suspect was made.
Slip op. at 7. It is the majority, however, which has erred in
attempting to unreasonably stretch the scope of the identification
exception not only beyond its plain language, but also beyond its
intended purpose.
	Generally, the bar against admission of hearsay evidence
prevents a witness from testifying to statements he or she made out
of court for the purpose of corroborating that witness' testimony
given at trial relative to the same subject. An exception to this
general rule of inadmissibility is made, however, when the
extrajudicial statements concern the witness' pretrial identification
of the defendant. It is self-evident that a witness' statement that he
or she was unable to identify a suspect is not a "statement of
identification." In holding that the hearsay exception applies not
only to actual statements of identification, but also to the "process"
of identification encompassing lineups and photo arrays where the
witness is unable to make an identification, the majority has
performed a judicial sleight of hand. The majority has transformed
a witness' statement that he or she did not identify a suspect
during prior lineups and/or photo arrays into a "statement of
identification."
	In addition to unduly stretching the hearsay exception for
evidence of identification beyond its plain meaning, the majority
also expands the scope of this exception beyond its intended
purpose. As stated, this court in Rogers held that the general rule
that a witness may not testify as to statements he or she made out
of court for the purpose of corroborating in-court testimony
relative to the same subject does not apply to statements of
identification. The Rogers court explained that the justification for
holding that evidence of a witness' pretrial identification of a
defendant does not constitute impermissible hearsay is premised
on the notion that " 'it is entirely proper *** to prove that at a
former time, when the suggestions of others could not have
intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind, he
recognized and declared the present accused to be the person.' "
(Emphasis omitted.) Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d  at 579, quoting 4 J.
Wigmore, Evidence §1130, at 277 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972).
Indeed, as the Rogers court observed, because "by the time of trial,
the witness' mind has become so conditioned that there is little
likelihood that he would not identify the person [defendant] in
court," it is entirely appropriate to admit evidence of the witness'
prior out of court identification of the defendant to corroborate the
witness' in-court identification. Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d  at 578-79.(1) The
rationale for admitting pretrial identification evidence has no
application to the admission of statements of nonidentification.
Accordingly, this court's decisions in Hayes and Jones, exercising
sound reasoning and logic, were correct in holding that evidence
of nonidentification did not fall within the "statements of
identification" hearsay exception.
	Advancing past the plain language and purpose of the
identification exception to the hearsay rule, the majority concludes
that a witness' pretrial identification of a defendant should be
viewed as a "process" rather than as a "result." According to the
majority, the identification exception to the hearsay rule should
allow the admission of statements that the witness failed to make
an identification from a lineup or photo array, if those statements
are relevant to the ultimate out of court identification made by the
witness. This result is desirable, the majority reasons, because
allowing evidence with respect to a witness' nonidentification of
a defendant would ensure that a trier of fact is not only "fully
informed concerning the reliability" of the witness' out-of-court
identification, but is also fully informed with respect to the fact of
"the suggestiveness or lack thereof in that identification." Slip op.
at 7. In other words, the majority has determined that hearsay
statements of nonidentification may be used to bolster the
reliability of another hearsay statement-the actual out-of-court
identification of the defendant. A close analysis of the majority's
reasoning confirms that it does not provide a principled basis for
reaching this result.
	First, the majority notes that "when identifying a defendant
from a lineup or photo array, a witness necessarily does not
identify the remaining individuals in the lineup or photo array."
Slip op. at 7. The majority finds that this nonidentification is
"crucial to the accuracy of the witness' identification" because the
fact that the witness did not select other individuals in a lineup
becomes as important as the fact that the witness did select the
defendant. Slip op. at 7. The majority further submits that "it is
logical to presume that the more lineups and photo arrays a
witness views, the more likely that witness' identification is
reliable and is not based upon suggestiveness." Slip op. at 7.
	I disagree. Evidence that a witness failed to identify a suspect
prior to the identification of the defendant is nonprobative hearsay.
When assessing the reliability of an identification made during a
lineup or after viewing a photo array, the crucial question is
whether the witness accurately identified the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime. The fact that the witness viewed several
lineups or photo arrays in which the witness did not identify the
defendant says nothing about the accuracy of the identification at
issue. In addition, what occurred during other pretrial
identification procedures reveals no information with respect to
the influences which may have been present on the witness at the
time of the actual identification of the defendant. For example, the
nonidentification evidence offers no information with respect to
whether the witness' actual identification of the defendant was
animated by suggestive practices on the part of the police, whether
the witness' identification was motivated by malice against the
defendant, or whether simple fatigue factored into the witness'
identification. Finally, the admission of nonidentification evidence
in the State's case in chief creates a problem of circular reasoning,
as the only means to measure the accuracy of the witness'
"nonidentification" is the identification itself, the very fact at issue
in the case.
	 Although the majority also suggests that the introduction of
nonidentification evidence will assist the State in explaining
delays in identification, the nonidentification evidence does not
mitigate the fact that a specific amount of time has elapsed after
the witness observed the perpetrator of the crime and the time
when the identification of a defendant is ultimately made.
Admission of nonidentification evidence may have little, if any,
effect in countering the logical inference that an identification
made one or two years after the commission of a crime is to be
viewed with a degree of skepticism.
	The only citation to authority made by the majority in its
opinion in support of overruling Hayes and Jones is to the 1972
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972). However,
the High Court's decision in Biggers is inapposite to the matter at
bar. At issue in Biggers was whether the procedure leading to the
victim's pretrial identification of the defendant was " 'so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification' " that it violated the defendant's right to due
process, and thereby rendered the identification inadmissible.
Biggers, 409 U.S.  at 196, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 409, 93 S. Ct.  at 380,
quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 1206, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972 (1967). The Justices held that in
ruling upon a challenge to the type of procedure used to secure a
pretrial identification, a court must engage in a two-part inquiry:
first, whether the process was impermissibly suggestive; and,
second, assuming suggestion, whether under the totality of the
circumstances the identification was nevertheless reliable and,
therefore, admissible. Biggers, 409 U.S.  at 199, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at
411, 93 S. Ct.  at 382.
	In Biggers, the victim had identified the defendant after the
police had conducted a "showup," which consisted of two
detectives walking the defendant past the victim. Although the
Court held that the showup procedure was suggestive, it declined
to hold that it amounted to a per se violation of due process. The
Court determined that the pertinent question is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the victim's identification of the
defendant was reliable even though the confrontation procedure
was suggestive. The Court then listed the factors to be considered
in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification, including the
opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the
crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the perpetrator, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of
time between the crime and confrontation. Biggers, 409 U.S.  at
199-200, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 411, 93 S. Ct.  at 382.
	Applying these factors to the case before it, the High Court
found that because there was no substantial likelihood that the
victim had misidentified the defendant, the victim's pretrial
identification was properly admitted. In the course of their
analysis, the Justices observed that there was a seven-month lapse
between the crime and the showup, and that this passage of time
"would be a seriously negative factor in most cases." The Court,
however, noted that under the totality of the circumstances, the
victim made "no previous identification," that "she had previously
resisted whatever suggestiveness inheres in a showup," and that
her "record for reliability was thus a good one." Biggers, 409 U.S. 
at 201, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 412, 93 S. Ct.  at 383.
	Perhaps recognizing that the Biggers decision is inapposite to
the matter before us, the majority acknowledges that Biggers
provides only "tacit" approval (slip op. at 8) for the majority's
conclusion that nonidentification evidence is admissible under the
identification exception to the hearsay rule. As stated, the question
addressed in Biggers was whether the pretrial identification of the
defendant was so suggestive as to increase the likelihood of
misidentification to such a level that it would violate defendant's
right to due process and thereby be inadmissible. The question of
the admissibility of nonidentification evidence was not raised in
Biggers, and no mention of "nonidentification" was made when
the Court set forth the specific factors to be considered in
evaluating the admissibility of the pretrial identification. In sum,
Biggers neither holds nor suggests that nonidentification evidence
is admissible under the "statements of identification" exception to
the hearsay rule. As a final point, I further note that the Biggers
decision had been established law for almost two decades by the
time this court decided Hayes in 1990.
	In sum, the majority has advanced no principled basis for
overruling this court's unanimous and well-reasoned decisions in
Jones, a ruling which the majority neither cites nor discusses in its
opinion, and in Hayes. In an effort to achieve a desired result, the
majority has unreasonably stretched the identification exception to
the hearsay bar to hold that statements of nonidentification also
constitute "statements of identification." The exception for
"statements of identification" means just that-the plain language
and purpose of the exception requires that the statement be of
"identification," and not the opposite. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
	JUSTICES FREEMAN and KILBRIDE join in this dissent.
1.      1In response to this court's decision in Rogers, the Illinois General
Assembly enacted Public Act 83-367 (Pub. Act 83-367, eff. January 1,
1984), which added section 115-12 to the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-12 (West 2000)). Section 115-12 codified our
ruling in Rogers by creating a statutory exception to the hearsay rule
that allows for the admissibility of prior identification evidence. The
statute's mandate that the statement must be "one of identification of a
person made after perceiving him," further supports the argument that
evidence of nonidentification does not fall within this hearsay
exception.