Title: Chambers v. Birmingham News Company

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

552 So. 2d 854 (1989)
Steve CHAMBERS, et al.
v.
The BIRMINGHAM NEWS COMPANY.
88-1087.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 13, 1989.
Raymond P. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Birmingham, and Frank C. Ellis, Jr. of Wallis, Ellis, Head & Fowler, Columbiana, for appellants.
Gilbert E. Johnston, Jr., Hollinger F. Barnard and Alice H. Prater of Johnston, Barton, Proctor, Swedlaw & Naff, Birmingham, for appellee.
Dennis R. Bailey of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston and Garrett, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama Press Ass'n.
JONES, Justice.
This appeal is from a judgment granting a permanent injunction ordering the members of the Shelby County Commission and the director of the Shelby County Personnel Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Commission") to make certain resumes and employment applications available to the Birmingham News Company ("the News"). We affirm.
The Commission, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 11-3-11(19), created the position of "coordinator of water and sewer services" ("coordinator"). The position was created for the purpose of marketing the water and sewer services offered by Shelby County.
Although not required by statute or local law to advertise or to follow personnel hiring procedures, the Commission placed advertisements in area newspapers soliciting applications for the newly created position. The Commission received applications from 31 persons, five of whom were interviewed by the Commission.
After the Commission appointed Greg Rushton, a former Shelby County Commissioner, as coordinator, questions were raised regarding the selection process used *855 to fill the position. The News requested access to the applications, resumes, and other related materials that the Commission had received in connection with its selection of the new coordinator.
Upon the Commission's denial of the request, the News filed suit, contending that the denial of access to the application materials violated Alabama's "Open Records Act," Ala.Code 1975, § 36-12-40 (Supp. 1988), and asked the circuit court to permanently enjoin the Commission from denying the News access to the requested materials. The Commission argued, among other things, that its personnel policy, adopted by resolution, provided that the information in the application materials sought by the News was confidential and accessible only to the Commission or to the individual applicant. Furthermore, the Commission contended that the application materials fall within three exceptions to the requirement of public disclosure as set out in Stone v. Consolidated Publishing Co., 404 So. 2d 678 (Ala.1981): 1) recorded information received by a public officer in confidence; 2) sensitive personnel records; and 3) records the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the public's best interest.
The trial court, in granting a permanent injunction in favor of the News, entered the following judgment:
The Commission appealed from this judgment; however, we find no basis for reversal.
In Stone, supra, we held that a "public writing," as encompassed by § 36-12-40, is a record "reasonably necessary to record" the required business and activities of a public officer "so that the status and condition of such business and activities can be known by our citizens," and we recognized that the news media are "clearly appropriate vehicles" through which the citizens of this state can be informed of the business and activities of the public officials. We then wrote:
Stone, 404 So. 2d  at 681. Additionally, § 36-12-40 states, in pertinent part, that "every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any public writing of this state."
We have paid particular attention to the language in Stone that seeks to prescribe exceptions to the public disclosure requirement of public writings and records, together with the language in § 36-12-40. It is clear from the wording of § 36-12-40 that the legislature intended that the statute be liberally construed. In addition, we note, statutes intended for the public benefit are to be construed in favor of the public. Gant v. Warr, 286 Ala. 387, 240 So. 2d 353 (1970).
To put the Stone "exception" language into perspective, along with the language of § 36-12-40, we offer the following guidance. There is a presumption in favor of public disclosure of public writings and records expressed in the language of § 36-12-40. Limitations to the broad language of the statute are, nevertheless, necessary, and, as stated in Stone, absent legislative action, the judiciary has to apply the "rule of reason." However, it must be noted that this "rule of reason" shall not be applied so as to hamper the liberal construction of § 36-12-40. The exceptions set forth in Stone must be strictly construed and must be applied only in those cases where it is readily apparent that disclosure will result in undue harm or embarrassment to an individual, or where the public interest will clearly be adversely affected, when weighed against the public policy considerations suggesting disclosure. These questions, of course, are factual in nature and are for the trial judge to resolve. Moreover, the Stone exceptions should not come into play merely because of some perceived necessity on the part of a public official or established office policy. Furthermore, because there is a presumption of required disclosure, the party refusing *857 disclosure shall have the burden of proving that the writings or records sought are within an exception and warrant nondisclosure of them.
Doubtless, exceptions to the broad language of § 36-12-40 are needed and should be applied under appropriate circumstances. But, we emphasize that these exceptions must be narrowly construed and their application limited to the circumstances stated herein, for it is the general rule, and has been the policy of this state for a number of years, to advocate open government. The Stone exceptions were not intended, nor shall they be used, as an avenue for public officials to pick and choose what they believe the public should be made aware of.
Therefore, the trial court's judgment is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.