Title: State ex rel. Schlosser v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Schlosser v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 82, 2002-Ohio-5443.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SCHLOSSER, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Schlosser v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 82, 2002-Ohio-
5443.] 
Workers’ compensation — Application for temporary total disability 
compensation denied by Industrial Commission — Writ of mandamus 
denied by court of appeals — Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and 
writ of mandamus granted ordering temporary total disability 
compensation to commence as of January 20, 1998, when. 
(No. 2001-1942 — Submitted August 27, 2002 — Decided October 23, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-47. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On February 8, 1996, appellant-claimant Terry S. Schlosser 
crushed his left fingertips in a machine at work.  In the autumn of 1997, claimant 
began to see a psychologist, Dr. William P. McFarren.  Dr. McFarren’s primary 
diagnosis was that of major depression related to claimant’s industrial injury and 
the narcotic medications prescribed as a result.  Dr. McFarren repeated that 
diagnosis eight months later.  He also commented that “considering the 
seriousness of his depression and suicidal ideations, I feel that a psychiatric 
consultation is critical to the successful treatment of Mr. Schlosser.”  He also 
stated that short-term intervention was unlikely to succeed. 
{¶2} 
Dr. McFarren continued to urge authorization for a psychiatric 
consultation in a September 23, 1999 letter.  Suicidal ideas and depressive 
symptomatology still predominated in his discussion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
On October 26, 1999, the claim was finally allowed for “major 
depression.”  Two C84 reports from McFarren followed, which requested 
temporary total disability compensation.  Identical in content, they repeated 
claimant’s prior symptoms and stated that “improvement can be expected.” 
{¶4} 
On March 1, 2000, claimant was finally seen by a psychiatrist, Dr. 
Linda Cole.  The next day, claimant was examined by another psychologist, Dr. 
James P. Reardon.  Dr. Reardon issued an extensive report.  Several points were 
significant: 
{¶5} 
(1) 
Claimant’s report of symptoms (flashbacks and nightmares) 
that had not been related to Dr. McFarren at any prior time; 
{¶6} 
(2) 
Claimant’s negative response to the question whether he 
believed Dr. McFarren’s visits were helpful; 
{¶7} 
(3) 
Elevated test scores on three profiles that suggested that 
claimant was “very likely” malingering and that claimant had a “significant 
tendency to exaggerate his psychological symptoms and distresses.” 
{¶8} 
In response to the question whether claimant continued to have 
major depression, Dr. Reardon wrote: 
{¶9} 
“Based on the results of my examination I am unable to confirm 
that the patient presently suffers from Major Depression or infact [sic] that he has 
ever suffered from Major Depression either related to the industrial injury or 
separate and apart from it.  Because of the invalidity of the psychological testing 
and therefore by extrapolation a questionable report of symptoms provided by Mr. 
Schlosser during the course of the evaluation it is not possible to render an 
opinion regarding a possible Major Depression. 
{¶10} “* * * 
{¶11} “I have not diagnosed Mr. Schlosser with a psychological 
condition or a Major Depression.  Therefore I can not offer an opinion with regard 
to whether it is work prohibitive.  What I can say is that based on my observations 
January Term, 2002 
3 
the only condition that may in all likelihood be diagnosed would be a Personality 
Disorder NOS [not otherwise specified] that in all likelihood would have pre-
dated the accident of the 2-8-96.” 
{¶12} In responding to the question whether the allowed condition was 
permanent, Dr. Reardon stated: 
{¶13} “I believe that it is likely that Mr. Schlosser’s present condition is 
permanent.  I am referring primarily to the Axis II disorder of R/O Personality 
Disorder NOS.  I have not made the diagnosis of Major Depression or any other 
Axis I diagnosis.  The Personality Disorder NOS, should one exist, definitely 
would have pre-dated the accident of 2-8-96.  However, having said that, it does 
appear that Mr. Schlosser’s condition has been stable for over four years now, and 
I believe that it is reasonable to conclude that it ‘will continue for an indefinite 
period of time without any present indication of recovery therefrom.’  In that 
respect I believe that it is likely that he has reached maximum medical 
improvement with regard to his current psychological state. * * * 
{¶14} “* * * 
{¶15} “Again, I can not offer any opinions with regard to any 
recommended course of treatment in the future because I have not been able to 
identify to reasonable psychological certainty the presence of a diagnosable 
psychological condition.  A primary reason is the reliability of Mr. Schlosser’s 
report of symptoms, and the strong likelihood of significant exaggeration of 
whatever symptoms or psychological distress he may actually experience.”  
(Emphasis sic.) 
{¶16} On March 29, 2000, a district hearing officer for appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio granted TTC as of January 20, 1998, based on Dr. 
McFarren’s March 27, 2000 C84.  Dr. Reardon’s report “was not found 
persuasive as the District Hearing Officer found that it was not clear from the 
report that Dr. Reardon accepted the allowed condition of ‘Major Depression.’ ” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶17} On April 10, 2000, Dr. Reardon responded to a request for 
clarification by appellee-employer Famous Enterprises, Inc.  He stated: 
{¶18} “1.  I do acknowledge that the above captioned claim for Mr. 
Schlosser, Claim No. 96-341384 has been allowed for the psychological condition 
of Major Depression.  I fully understand and accept that the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation has allowed Mr. Schlosser’s claim for the condition of a Major 
Depression.  In arriving at the opinions offered in the previous report I did not 
reject the psychological allowance that had been previously recognized.  I hope 
that this statement will clarify that I do infact [sic] acknowledge and understand 
that his claim has been allowed for the condition of Major Depression. 
{¶19} “2.  Having acknowledged that the Bureau has allowed the claim 
for the condition of Major Depression, I nevertheless have to arrive at conclusions 
about Mr. Schlosser’s current condition based on my own independent 
examination of him.  These conclusions are based on his psychological state at the 
present time, as well as taking into account the various records from prior 
treatment and assessments that have been examined in this case.  The fact that I 
am acknowledging an understanding of Mr. Schlosser’s case having been allowed 
for the condition of Major Depression does not in any way change the opinions 
which I offered in my previous report.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶20} He again discussed at length claimant’s elevated test scores and, 
turning to permanency, offered: 
{¶21} “Acknowledging that Mr. Schlosser’s case has been allowed for 
the condition of Major Depression, it is almost certain that his condition would 
not remain unchanged either in terms of its intensity or frequency of symptoms 
over a four year period whether he were treated or not.  It is likely that because of 
circumstances and other contributing factors his situation would change be it for 
better or worse.  In my opinion, based on my examination of Mr. Schlosser, I 
believe that the provisional diagnosis of Rule Out Personality Disorder NOS is the 
January Term, 2002 
5 
more likely contributing factor to the current psychological difficulties that Mr. 
Schlosser is experiencing.  I believe that that condition which has been stable 
throughout the duration of his ‘disability’ will continue for an indefinite period of 
time without any present indication of recovery therefrom.  I believe in that 
respect Mr. Schlosser has reached maximum medical improvement.”  (Emphasis 
sic.) 
{¶22} Dr. Reardon’s two reports prompted a response from Dr. 
McFarren: 
{¶23} “Dr. Reardon has not had the opportunity to observe Mr. Schlosser 
over an extended period of time, so it is understandable that he would have 
difficulty addressing issues such as his depressive disorder. 
{¶24} “At this time, I do not feel he has reached maximum medical 
improvement.  It has taken an extended period of time to even obtain Mr. 
Schlosser a psychiatric consultation which has just recently been initiated, since 
his psychological condition has been recently recognized.  I do not feel it is 
appropriate to say he has reached maximum medical improvement when he has 
not even had this important treatment modality available to him until just recently.  
Dr. Cole is continuing to see Terry and at the last appointment had made 
significant changes in his pharmacological regime. 
{¶25} “In Dr. Reardon’s report he felt that Terry was malingering.  Once 
again I have had an opportunity to observe Terry over an extended period of time.  
Having done this for over 20 years, it is generally fairly easy to spot a malingerer 
over a period of four years.  Rarely, would someone who is malingering follow 
through with care consistently, driving extended distances to appointments.  
When Terry presented, no psychological condition had been recognized, and there 
was no guarantee it ever would.  Mr. Schlosser has faithfully attended all 
appointments.  In summary, malingerers generally do not follow through with 
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care over extended periods of time, driving great distances (over 100 miles round 
trip) to each appointment.” 
{¶26} On May 2, 2000, a staff hearing officer reversed the district 
hearing officer, writing: 
{¶27} “[T]emporary total compensation is denied for the requested period 
07/04/97 to 05/02/00 date of this hearing. 
{¶28} “The reports of Dr. McFarren are not persuasive to establish that 
the allowed psychological condition has rendered the claimant temporary totally 
disabled for a three year period. 
{¶29} “All of Dr. McFarren’s reports indicate that the claimant’s 
symptoms, treatment, and complaints have remained the same for the entire 
requested period. 
{¶30} “This finding is supported by the 04/10/00 report; and the 
testimony at today’s hearing; of Dr. Reardon.  Dr. Reardon testified at length as to 
his conclusion that the claimant’s complaints and treatment results have been at 
maximum medical improvement since the claimant started with Dr. McFarren. 
{¶31} “The claimant reported to Dr. Reardon that Dr. McFarren’s 
treatments had not helped. 
{¶32} “Finally, the claimant did not appear at hearing to dispute Dr. 
Reardon’s opinions and testimony. 
{¶33} “All evidence was considered.” 
{¶34} Further consideration was denied. 
{¶35} Claimant turned to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  
Affirming the staff hearing officer’s reasoning, the appeals court denied the writ.  
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶36} Claimant’s alleged inability to return to the former position of 
employment is not in dispute.  At issue is the permanency of the psychiatric 
condition underlying it, and the presence of some evidence supporting the 
January Term, 2002 
7 
commission’s determination of MMI. For the reasons to follow, we find that the 
commission abused its discretion in relying on Dr. Reardon. 
{¶37} In the evidence before us, an immediately disquieting component 
is one of timing.  MMI was declared just two months and a day after claimant’s 
first visit to a psychiatrist—a referral Dr. McFarren had been seeking from the 
commission for two years as critical to claimant’s chances for improvement.  The 
proximity of the hearing to the initiation of psychiatric treatment foreclosed any 
input from Dr. Cole.  We know only—through McFarren and Reardon’s final 
reports—that Dr. Cole immediately and radically changed claimant’s medications.  
Since no one had the benefit of Cole’s potentially determinative prognosis, we 
question whether the MMI assessment was premature. 
{¶38} As to the evidence itself, we are faced with vigorously conflicting 
doctors’ opinions, as McFarren and Reardon alternately accuse each other and 
defend their reports from the other’s most recent missive.  McFarren prepared six 
relevant documents.  Three specifically denied MMI—the reading claimant urges 
as controlling.  Dr. Reardon, on the other hand, expressly determined MMI.  The 
flaw is that the condition he labeled as MMI was a personality disorder that is not 
an allowed part of the claim.  Reardon made no durational assessment for major 
depression—the allowed condition—because he did not believe it existed.  His 
reports, consequently, cannot be some evidence of MMI of claimant’s depression. 
{¶39} Accordingly, we find that the commission abused its discretion in 
(1) relying on Dr. Reardon’s reports as some evidence of MMI of claimant’s 
major depression and (2) discounting Dr. McFarren’s reports as evidence that 
claimant’s condition was subject to improvement. 
{¶40} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and a writ of 
mandamus is granted that orders temporary total disability compensation to 
commence as of January 20, 1998—two years prior to claimant’s motion for 
renewed compensation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Judgment reversed 
and writ allowed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Butkovich, Schimpf, Schimpf & Ginocchio Co., L.P.A., and Lisa M. 
Clark, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis H. Behm. Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Randall W. Mikes, for 
appellee Famous Enterprises, Inc. 
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