Title: State v. Anderson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1104-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Roy S. Anderson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 414,921 N.W.2d 528 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 15, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Piontek 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
HAGEDORN, J. concurs, joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
(opinion filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jay R. Pucek, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Jay R. Pucek 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Sarah L. Burgundy. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 97
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1104-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF1281) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Roy S. Anderson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 15, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Roy 
S. 
Anderson ("Anderson"), seeks review of an unpublished, per 
curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming both his 
judgment of conviction and the denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence.1  He asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
                                                 
1 State v. Anderson, No. 2017AP1104-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018) (per curiam) (affirming the 
judgment of the circuit court for Racine County, Michael J. 
Piontek, Judge). 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
2 
 
determining that law enforcement's search of his person pursuant 
to 2013 Wisconsin Act 79 ("Act 79") was valid. 
¶2 
Act 79 allows law enforcement to search a person on a 
specified probation, parole, or extended supervision status2 
without consent or a warrant if the officer reasonably suspects 
that the person is committing, is about to commit, or has 
committed a crime.  Generally, a full search cannot be 
accomplished absent probable cause.3  However, if a person is 
subject to Act 79, a full search may be conducted on the lesser 
showing of reasonable suspicion. 
¶3 
Anderson specifically contends that the arresting 
officer who searched him did not know that he was on 
supervision.  Absent such knowledge, the officer could not have 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. §§ 302.043(4) (2015-16) (released inmates 
serving 
risk 
reduction 
sentences), 
302.045(3m)(e) 
(inmates 
participating 
in 
the 
challenge 
incarceration 
program), 
302.05(3)(c)4. (those participating in the substance abuse 
program), 302.11(6m) (inmates on mandatory release to parole), 
302.113(7r) (those released to extended supervision for felony 
offenses not serving life sentences), 302.114(8g) (felony 
offenders 
serving 
life 
sentences 
released 
to 
extended 
supervision after a successful petition for release), 304.02(2m) 
(inmates subject to special action parole release), 304.06(1r) 
(those 
granted 
parole 
from 
state 
prisons 
and 
houses 
of 
correction), 973.09(1d) (offenders placed on probation). 
All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2015-16 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, ¶37, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 
N.W.2d 878.   
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
3 
 
appreciated that Anderson was subject to search based on Act 
79's reduced protections before conducting a warrantless search.4   
¶4 
He argues next that even if the officer had knowledge 
of his supervision status, the search was still illegal.  
Anderson contends that under the totality of the circumstances, 
the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion that Anderson 
was committing, was about to commit, or had committed a crime.  
As part of this argument, he asserts that tips received from an 
unnamed informant lacked any indicia of reliability and should 
be discarded completely from our analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances.   
¶5 
We conclude that the circuit court's finding of fact 
that the officer in this case had knowledge of Anderson's 
supervision status prior to conducting the warrantless search at 
issue is not clearly erroneous.  Next, we determine that the 
corroborated tips of the unnamed informant in this case may be 
considered in our analysis of the totality of the circumstances, 
giving them such weight as they are due.  Finally, we conclude 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer in 
this case had reasonable suspicion that Anderson was committing, 
was about to commit, or had committed a crime. 
                                                 
4 In Anderson's brief before this court, he presents the 
first issue for our review as:  "Did the arresting officer know 
that Mr. Anderson was subject to the reduced search provisions 
of Act 79 at the time he conducted a warrantless search of Mr. 
Anderson's person?" 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I  
¶7 
On August 25, 2015, Officer Michael Seeger of the 
Racine police department was driving an unmarked police car in 
the City of Racine.  He testified that within the two-and-a-
half-week period prior, he had received "two separate tips from 
a reliable and credible informant about Mr. Anderson selling 
illegal narcotics" in an alley behind a particular address where 
Anderson was purported to have been living.  No additional 
information regarding this unnamed informant is provided in the 
record.  
¶8 
Officer Seeger observed Anderson riding a bicycle on a 
sidewalk in violation of a city ordinance.5  After seeing 
Anderson, Officer Seeger performed a U-turn and sought to make 
contact with him.  Officer Seeger testified that "[u]pon 
Anderson seeing us, he immediately looked over his left shoulder 
and identified us.  He also knows me from prior police 
contacts."  After seeing and identifying Officer Seeger, 
Anderson made a right turn down a nearby alley, looked over his 
shoulder several times, and removed one of his hands from the 
bicycle's handlebars and placed it into his pocket, leading 
Officer Seeger to believe that "he was concealing an item within 
his pocket."   
                                                 
5 See Racine, Wis., Mun. Code § 66-707 (2015). 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Anderson's movements concerned Officer Seeger.  The 
officer 
testified 
that 
"[b]ased 
on 
my 
training 
and 
experience . . . people 
involved 
in 
criminal 
activity 
will 
attempt to hide or destroy or conceal illegal narcotics when 
they have police interaction or being approached by police."  He 
also observed that Anderson was located in a "high drug 
trafficking area within the City of Racine."   
¶10 Officer Seeger pursued Anderson and ordered him to 
stop, and Anderson complied.  Anderson subsequently stepped off 
of his bicycle and Officer Seeger performed a search of 
Anderson's person.  In his testimony before the circuit court, 
Officer Seeger indicated that he performed this search pursuant 
to his authority under Act 79. 
¶11 The search of Anderson turned up two individual bags 
of crack cocaine, over $200 in cash, and two cell phones.  No 
drug paraphernalia was located on Anderson, indicating to 
Officer Seeger that Anderson was engaged in selling the crack 
cocaine. 
¶12 This contact on August 25, 2015, was not Officer 
Seeger's first experience with Anderson.  Specifically, the 
officer was familiar with Anderson because he had previously 
arrested Anderson for possession with intent to deliver cocaine 
in 2012.  Officer Seeger further testified that even prior to 
that, Anderson's name had come to his attention "through other 
cooperative citizens in 2012."   
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
6 
 
¶13 Additionally, Officer Seeger testified that he knew 
Anderson had been released on "probation" on March 17, 2015.6  
His testimony further indicated that "[o]nce [Anderson] was 
released on probation, I ran him out.  I did a record check of 
him and knew that he felony under Act 79 [sic]."  However, 
Officer Seeger did not know how long Anderson's "probation" 
period extended. 
¶14 As a result of Officer Seeger's search of Anderson, 
the State charged Anderson with possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver as a second and subsequent offense.7  Anderson 
moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the search, 
arguing that Officer Seeger lacked reasonable suspicion that he 
was committing, was about to commit, or had committed a crime.  
Accordingly, in Anderson's view, Officer Seeger lacked a legal 
basis to search him pursuant to Act 79. 
¶15 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Anderson's 
motion 
to 
suppress.  Initially, it found as a fact that Officer Seeger 
knew that Anderson was on supervision from the previous time he 
arrested Anderson for possession with intent to deliver.   
                                                 
6 We observe that Officer Seeger used the word "probation" 
in his testimony to describe Anderson's supervision status.  
Although 
Anderson 
was 
on 
"extended 
supervision" 
and 
not 
"probation," this discrepancy does not affect our analysis.  See 
G.G.D. v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 1, 3 n.2, 292 N.W.2d 853 (1980) 
(acknowledging that the terms "probation" and "supervision" are 
sometimes used interchangeably). 
7 See Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1g., 961.48(1)(b). 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
7 
 
¶16 Further, it concluded that Officer Seeger had the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the search.  It 
reached this determination based on its findings of the 
"properly proven facts" that Anderson rode his bicycle away from 
police, looked back at Officer Seeger, and placed his hand in 
his pocket.  The circuit court also observed that "it's a high 
drug area in terms of drug sales and purchases" and that Officer 
Seeger "had prior information that the defendant was still 
involved in sales." 
¶17 Anderson appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.  
The court of appeals concluded that "Seeger had sufficient basis 
to believe that Anderson was subject to Act 79."  State v. 
Anderson, No. 2017AP1104-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 12, 2018) (per curiam).  As support for this 
conclusion, the court of appeals observed facts indicating that 
"Seeger was familiar with Anderson, having arrested him before 
for possession of cocaine."  Id.  Further, Officer Seeger "knew 
that Anderson had been convicted of a felony and released on 
community supervision on March 17, 2015.  Although Seeger did 
not know the length of Anderson's supervision, it was reasonable 
to presume that it lasted for a period beyond the date of the 
search . . . ."  Id. 
¶18 The court of appeals also determined that "Seeger had 
the requisite reasonable suspicion to trigger a lawful Act 79 
search."  Id., ¶10.  In reaching this conclusion the court of 
appeals pointed to the following facts:  (1) the tips Officer 
Seeger received from a confidential informant advising that 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
8 
 
Anderson was selling drugs; (2) Anderson's history of possessing 
drugs; (3) Anderson's presence in a high drug trafficking area; 
and (4) Anderson's behavior, "which included turning down a 
nearby alley, repeatedly glancing backwards, and taking his left 
hand off the bicycle's handlebars and placing it into his front 
jacket 
pocket, 
as 
though 
he 
was 
attempting 
to 
conceal 
something."  Id. 
II 
¶19 This case requires us to review the court of appeals' 
determination that the circuit court correctly denied Anderson's 
motion to suppress.  In reviewing a ruling on a motion to 
suppress, this court applies a two step standard of review.  
State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.   
¶20 First, we will uphold the circuit court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  A finding of fact 
is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence.  Metro. Assocs. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶62, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784.  
Second, we review the application of constitutional principles 
to those facts independently of the decisions rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶9. 
III 
¶21 We begin by addressing the threshold inquiry of 
whether Officer Seeger had knowledge of Anderson's supervision 
status so as to justify an Act 79 search.  Subsequently we 
address whether under the totality of the circumstances Officer 
Seeger had reasonable suspicion that Anderson was committing, 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
9 
 
was about to commit, or had committed a crime.  In our review of 
this second issue, we consider the extent to which the unnamed 
informant's tips factor into our analysis.   
¶22 Act 79 created several statutes authorizing law 
enforcement officers to search individuals on certain community 
supervision statuses, including those on probation and parole, 
as well as those recently released from prison on extended 
supervision.  As relevant here, Act 79 provides that a person 
released on extended supervision for a felony offense is subject 
to search under the following conditions: 
A person released under this section, his or her 
residence, and any property under his or her control 
may be searched by a law enforcement officer at any 
time during his or her period of supervision if the 
officer 
reasonably 
suspects 
that 
the 
person 
is 
committing, is about to commit, or has committed a 
crime or a violation of a condition of release to 
extended supervision.  Any search conducted pursuant 
to this subsection shall be conducted in a reasonable 
manner and may not be arbitrary, capricious, or 
harassing.  A law enforcement officer who conducts a 
search pursuant to this subsection shall, as soon as 
practicable after the search, notify the department. 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7r). 
¶23 In essence, this statute lowers the legal standard 
required for a law enforcement officer to perform a search of a 
suspect if that suspect is on one of Act 79's specified 
supervision statuses.  Generally, a full search cannot be 
accomplished without a determination of probable cause.  State 
v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, ¶37, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878.   
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
10 
 
¶24 On the other hand, an investigatory or Terry stop,8 
which typically involves only temporary questioning and a 
limited search9 and constitutes but a minor infringement on 
personal liberty, can be utilized if law enforcement has 
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being 
committed, or is about to be committed.  State v. Young, 2006 WI 
98, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.  Thus, Act 79 allows for 
a full search of those subject to its provisions where 
reasonable suspicion is present, while a person not subject to 
Act 79 would be subject to only a Terry stop under the same 
circumstances. 
                                                 
8 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
9 Terry permits a limited "protective search" in certain 
circumstances. 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and 
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed 
and presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a 
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves 
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' 
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself 
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an 
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him.  
State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, ¶27, 312 Wis. 2d 174, 751 
N.W.2d 877 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.25. 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
11 
 
¶25 Anderson asserts that Officer Seeger lacked knowledge 
that he was on supervision so as to subject him to Act 79's 
provisions.  Specifically, he contends that Officer Seeger's 
knowledge that he had been arrested in 2012 for possession with 
intent to deliver coupled with the knowledge gleaned from 
Officer Seeger's record check of Anderson that he had been 
released on "probation" on March 17, 2015, fails to support a 
conclusion that Anderson was subject to Act 79 on August 25, 
2015, the date of the search. 
¶26 We disagree with Anderson.  The circuit court found as 
a fact that Officer Seeger "had personal information in that he 
had arrested the defendant in the past for possession with 
intent to deliver.  He knew that [Anderson] was on parole or 
probation . . . or extended supervision from that arrest."   
¶27 The circuit court's finding of fact in this regard is 
supported by the evidence presented at the hearing on Anderson's 
motion to suppress.  First and foremost in our determination is 
Officer Seeger's testimony that he performed a record check of 
Anderson to determine his supervision status.  The testimony 
reflects the following exchange: 
[THE COURT]:  And when you say Act 79, were you aware 
was he on probation on August 25th, 2015? 
[OFFICER SEEGER]:  Yeah.  Once he was released on 
probation, I ran him out.  I did a record check of him 
and knew that he felony under Act 79 [sic]. 
[THE COURT]:  Do you know what period his probation 
was, when it ended or anything like that?  Or did you 
just know in August that he was on probation? 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
12 
 
[OFFICER SEEGER]:  No.  I believe I put in my report 
the date he was released on supervision  . . . . 
I knew Mr. Anderson was released on probation on March 
17, 2015 which is after the date that Act 79 went into 
effect. 
[THE COURT]:  Do you know how long his probation was? 
[OFFICER SEEGER]:  That I do not know. 
¶28 This testimony strongly supports the circuit court's 
finding 
that 
Officer 
Seeger 
knew 
that 
Anderson 
was 
on 
supervision so as to subject him to Act 79.  Although the 
grammar of Officer Seeger's testimony could be clearer, the 
thrust of the sentence, "I did a record check of him and knew 
that he felony under Act 79," is apparent——the officer conducted 
a record check and ascertained Anderson's supervision status 
from that check.   
¶29 Officer Seeger further testified that he had on a 
prior occasion in 2012 arrested Anderson for possession with 
intent to deliver crack cocaine, which is a felony offense.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm).  This personal knowledge provides 
further information to bolster the determination made from the 
record check that Anderson had been convicted of a felony and 
was subject to Act 79. 
¶30 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court's 
finding of fact that the officer in this case had knowledge of 
Anderson's 
supervision 
status 
prior 
to 
conducting 
the 
warrantless search at issue is not clearly erroneous.   
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
13 
 
IV 
¶31 We turn next to the determination of whether under the 
totality of the circumstances Officer Seeger had reasonable 
suspicion that Anderson was committing, was about to commit, or 
had committed a crime.10 
¶32 "The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative 
stops . . . when a law enforcement officer has 'a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped 
of criminal activity.'"  Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 
396 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-
18 (1981)).  In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists 
to justify such a stop, we ask "whether the facts of the case 
would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or 
her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has 
committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime."  
State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶13, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. 
¶33 Reasonable suspicion is a fairly low standard to meet.  
Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶19.  "Although it is not possible to 
state precisely what the term reasonable suspicion means, it is 
a 'commonsense nontechnical conception . . . that deal[s] with 
                                                 
10 Although Anderson phrases his argument in terms of the 
constitutional standard for reasonable suspicion, we observe 
that the reasonable suspicion standard is also part and parcel 
of an analysis of whether Act 79 applies.  To explain, Act 79 
applies to allow a search of those on a specified supervision 
status "if the officer reasonably suspects that the person is 
committing, is about to commit, or has committed a crime or a 
violation 
of 
a 
condition" 
of 
supervision. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 302.113(7r) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
14 
 
'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'"  
Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 
(1996)).  "Such reasonable suspicion must be based on 'specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences 
from 
those 
facts, 
reasonably 
warrant 
that 
intrusion.'"  State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139, 456 
N.W.2d 830 (1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968)).  A determination of reasonable suspicion is made based 
on the totality of the circumstances.  Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶14.  
¶34 The totality of the circumstances here consists of the 
following facts as found by the circuit court.11  First, Officer 
Seeger received two tips from an unnamed informant indicating 
that Anderson was selling cocaine in the alleyway behind the 
specific address where he was found and purported to be living.  
Second, Officer Seeger had arrested Anderson in the past for 
possession with intent to deliver.  Third, Anderson was located 
in a high drug trafficking area.  Fourth and finally, Anderson's 
behavior consisted of riding his bicycle down an alley away from 
police, turning around to look at Officer Seeger, and removing 
one of his hands from the bicycle's handlebars and placing it in 
his pocket. 
                                                 
11 Anderson does not contend that any of these factual 
findings are clearly erroneous.  Instead, he asserts that the 
legal conclusion that the facts as found constitute reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity is in error. 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
15 
 
A 
¶35 We consider initially the extent to which the unnamed 
informant's tips factor into our analysis.  Anderson asserts 
that the unnamed informant's tips must not be included at all in 
the calculus of reasonable suspicion under the totality of the 
circumstances because "the record is devoid of any evidence as 
to the alleged informant's veracity or basis of knowledge."  We 
have not squarely addressed such an argument in our prior cases. 
¶36 Information gleaned from an informant's tip may 
justify 
police 
action 
in 
some 
circumstances. 
 
State 
v. 
Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶17, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516.  
Such tips vary greatly in reliability.  Before police act on a 
tip, they must consider its reliability and content.  Id.  To 
justify 
police 
action, 
a 
tip 
should 
exhibit 
indicia 
of 
reliability, and due weight must be given to (1) the informant's 
veracity and (2) the informant's basis of knowledge.  Id., ¶18 
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)). 
¶37 This court has recognized that different factors may 
inform a determination of an informant's veracity.  See State v. 
Miller, 2012 WI 61, ¶31 n.18, 341 Wis. 2d 307, 815 N.W.2d 349.  
Accordingly, we have observed three categories into which 
informants generally fall:  citizen informants, confidential 
informants, and anonymous informants.  Id.   
¶38 Citizen informants are generally considered among the 
most reliable.  Id. (citing State v. Kolk, 2006 WI App 261, ¶12, 
298 Wis. 2d 99, 726 N.W.2d 337).  These are informants who 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
16 
 
happen upon a crime or suspicious activity and report it to 
police.  Id. 
¶39 A confidential informant is often a person with a 
criminal past who assists police in identifying and catching 
criminals.  Such an informant may be more reliable if he or she 
has provided truthful information in the past.  Id.   
¶40 Finally, an anonymous informant is one whose identity 
is unknown even to the police.  This type of informant is 
considered reliable if police are able to corroborate details in 
the informant's tip.  Id. 
¶41 Here, the record provides very little information 
regarding the informant on whose information Officer Seeger 
relied.  Officer Seeger testified that he "received two separate 
tips from a reliable and credible confidential informant about 
Mr. Anderson selling illegal narcotics.  Both tips were received 
within a two and a half week period from the date of the 
incident."  The record contains no other information indicating 
the informant's identity or whether the informant had provided 
reliable information to police in the past. 
¶42 Officer Seeger's description of the tipster as a 
"reliable and credible confidential informant" indicates that 
the officer had some familiarity with the informant.  However, 
the extent of any familiarity or previous assistance to police 
is not in the record.  Additionally, the record is devoid of any 
information regarding the nature and extent of the informant's 
knowledge, 
whether 
direct 
or 
indirect. 
 
Without 
this 
information, the court cannot determine the tips' reliability.  
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
17 
 
Officer Seeger's bare assertion that the tipster was "reliable 
and credible" is not enough. 
¶43 Therefore, the tips standing alone do not provide the 
requisite reasonable suspicion for Officer Seeger to conduct a 
search pursuant to Act 79.  This does not mean, however, that we 
may not consider the tips at all in our analysis.   
¶44 Indeed, the tips were corroborated by multiple facts 
in the record.  The tipster provided an address where Anderson 
was alleged to be conducting drug sales in a back alley, and 
Anderson was found in the back alley behind that address——where 
he was purported to have been living and which was in an area 
known to be used for drug trafficking.   
¶45 Further corroborating the tips was Anderson's behavior 
upon seeing Officer Seeger.  Officer Seeger testified that 
"[u]pon Anderson seeing us, he immediately looked over his left 
shoulder and identified us.  He also knows me from prior police 
contacts."  When Anderson noticed Officer Seeger's presence, he 
turned down an alley, glanced back at the officer several times, 
and put his hand in his pocket, appearing to the officer that 
"he was concealing an item within his pocket."  Such movements 
were significant to Officer Seeger because, in his words, 
"[b]ased on my training and experience, I know individuals 
involved in criminal activity such as possession of illegal 
narcotics will be overly curious about police's position and 
will also attempt to evade them as they attempt to approach." 
¶46 Because the tips were corroborated, we do not discount 
them entirely in our analysis.  See State v. Sherry, 2004 WI App 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
18 
 
207, ¶19, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 690 N.W.2d 435 (explaining that 
police 
corroboration 
of 
an 
anonymous 
tip 
gives 
the 
tip 
recognized "indicia of reliability").  Our lack of knowledge 
about the tips' source is a question of the weight we give them 
in our analysis, not of whether we exclude them from our 
analysis completely. 
¶47 Accordingly, we determine that the corroborated tips 
of the unnamed informant in this case may be considered in our 
analysis of the totality of the circumstances, giving them such 
weight as they are due.   
B 
¶48 Anderson 
argues 
next 
that 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances does not constitute reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.   His argument is unpersuasive. 
¶49 Again, the totality of the circumstances here consists 
of (1) the informant's tips that Anderson was selling drugs in 
the alleyway behind a particular address at which Anderson was 
purported to be living; (2) Officer Seeger's past arrest of 
Anderson; (3) Anderson's presence in the alleyway behind the 
address given by the informant, which was in a high drug 
trafficking area; and (4) Anderson's behavior, consisting of 
riding down an alley away from Officer Seeger, looking back at 
the officer several times, and placing his hand in his pocket.  
Although under the particular facts of this case none of these 
factors standing alone would support reasonable suspicion, when 
viewed in combination, Officer Seeger's suspicion that Anderson 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
19 
 
had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime 
was reasonable. 
¶50 When combined with the information known to Officer 
Seeger about Anderson's history, Anderson's behavior creates 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
criminal 
activity 
was 
afoot.  
Anderson's movements after he noticed Officer Seeger give rise 
to a reasonable inference that Anderson was trying to conceal 
something from the officer. 
¶51 Further, Officer Seeger had information from the tips 
he received indicating that Anderson was selling drugs in the 
alley behind the address where he was observed.  Officer Seeger 
knew that Anderson had engaged in selling drugs in the past, 
because he personally had arrested Anderson for just such an 
offense.  Although insufficient to support reasonable suspicion 
on its own, consideration of this information in the totality of 
the circumstances is consistent with case law indicating that 
evidence of prior convictions or arrests can be taken into 
account in our analysis.  See State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶33, 
317 
Wis. 2d 383, 
766 
N.W.2d 551 
(citing 
2 
Wayne 
R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d), at 58–59 & nn.134–35 (4th 
ed. 2004) (collecting cases holding that "a suspect's prior 
convictions and prior arrests are not barred from consideration 
on the issue of probable cause")). 
¶52 We acknowledge that none of Anderson's observed 
behaviors was illegal.  However, in State v. Waldner, 206 
Wis. 2d 51, 57, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996), this court determined 
that "[t]he law allows a police officer to make an investigatory 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
20 
 
stop based on observations of lawful conduct so long as the 
reasonable inferences drawn from the lawful conduct are that 
criminal activity is afoot."12  Even if officers observe no 
unlawful conduct, it may be "poor police work" to fail to 
investigate.  Id. at 61.  In this case, the totality of the 
circumstances gave Officer Seeger reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity despite the fact that none of Anderson's 
observed behaviors alone was illegal. 
                                                 
12 The Waldner court illustrated its point using the facts 
at issue in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme 
Court's seminal case on investigatory stops.  State v. Waldner, 
206 Wis. 2d 51, 59-60, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).  It observed: 
The 
Terry 
court 
upheld 
the 
legality 
of 
an 
investigative stop by a police officer who observed 
the defendants repeatedly walk back and forth in front 
of a store window at 2:30 in the afternoon, and then 
confer with each other.  The officer suspected the two 
of contemplating a robbery and stopped them to 
investigate further.   
Walking back and forth in front of a store on a public 
sidewalk is perfectly legal behavior.  Nonetheless, 
reasonable inferences of criminal activity can be 
drawn from such behavior.  As this court noted in 
Jackson, "the suspects in Terry 'might have been 
casing the store for a robbery, or they might have 
been window-shopping or impatiently waiting for a 
friend in the store.'"  Nonetheless, the Court 
concluded that the investigative stop of the Terry 
defendants was permissible because, based on the 
police officer's training and experience, their lawful 
conduct gave rise to a reasonable inference that 
criminal activity was afoot.  In short, Terry's 
conduct though lawful was suspicious. 
Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 835, 434 
N.W.2d 386 (1989)). 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
21 
 
¶53 Anderson's reliance on State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 
44, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483, does not change the result.  
In Gordon, the arresting officer testified that he was on patrol 
in a high crime area where one of his duties was to "ferret out 
'[i]nstances where individuals are carrying guns illegally.'"  
Id., ¶¶3-4.   
¶54 After Gordon recognized the officer's presence and 
reached his hand toward his front pants pocket in what the 
officer characterized as a "security adjustment,"13 the officer 
stopped Gordon.  Id., ¶9.  Upon a frisk of Gordon, the officer 
located a concealed weapon and several individually packaged 
baggies of drugs.  Id., ¶6.  
¶55 The court of appeals determined that the arresting 
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Gordon.  Id., ¶18.  
It determined that although Gordon's security adjustment could, 
"given additional facts (such as, for example, flight or 
attempted flight), support an objective 'reasonable suspicion,' 
the additional facts here——high crime area and recognizing the 
police car as a police car——are far too common to support the 
requisite individualized suspicion here."  Id., ¶17.   
                                                 
13 A "security adjustment" is "basically a conscious or 
unconscious movement that an individual does when they're 
confronted 
by 
law 
enforcement 
when 
they're 
typically 
carrying . . . a weapon, and it's done either by the individual 
placing a hand over the pocket or a waistband where the gun 
might be, just to make sure that the weapon is still there and 
that it's secure."  State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, ¶9, 353 
Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483. 
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
22 
 
¶56 Anderson contends that his reaching into his pocket is 
analogous 
to 
Gordon's 
security 
adjustment 
and 
is 
thus 
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion in concert with 
the other factors present:  high crime area and recognition of a 
police car.  But the Gordon court was careful to observe that 
the result may have been different if other factors were present 
in the totality of the circumstances.  Specifically, it wrote: 
Without more (such as, for example and not by way of 
limitation, the officers being aware that the person 
they wanted to stop was either wanted on a warrant or 
was known to have committed gun crimes), these 
findings, either taken separately or added together, 
do not equal the requisite objective "reasonable 
suspicion" that "criminal activity" by Gordon was 
"afoot."   
Id., ¶14. 
¶57 In this case, the "more" referenced by the Gordon 
court is present.  Officer Seeger was aware that Anderson was 
known to have committed drug crimes——the officer had, after all, 
previously arrested Anderson for such a crime.  Additionally, in 
this 
case 
we 
consider 
the 
tips 
Officer 
Seeger 
received 
indicating Anderson was selling drugs at a specific location, 
corroborated by Anderson's presence at that specific location 
and his behavior upon recognizing law enforcement.  These 
factors that were not present in Gordon tip the balance.   
¶58 We therefore conclude that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion 
that Anderson was committing, was about to commit, or had 
committed a crime.  
No. 
2017AP1104-CR   
 
23 
 
V 
¶59 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court's finding 
of fact that the officer in this case had knowledge of 
Anderson's 
supervision 
status 
prior 
to 
conducting 
the 
warrantless search at issue is not clearly erroneous.  Next, we 
determine that the corroborated tips of the unnamed informant in 
this case may be considered in our analysis of the totality of 
the circumstances, giving them such weight as they are due.  
Finally, 
we 
conclude 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion 
that Anderson was committing, was about to commit, or had 
committed a crime. 
¶60 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2017AP1104-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
join 
the 
majority opinion in full.  It answers the questions presented 
consistent with the law. 
¶62 I write separately, however, because both parties 
appeared to presume in their briefing that an officer's 
knowledge of a person's Act 79 status is a threshold question to 
the validity of any Act 79 search.  We need not and do not 
answer that question today because Officer Seeger knew of 
Anderson's Act 79 status; the circuit court made factual 
findings to this effect, and the record supports those findings.  
But this issue may come up again, and a more careful analysis of 
how 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
interacts 
with 
the 
statutory 
requirements is essential to addressing this in a sound manner. 
¶63 Wisconsin law has long granted broad authority to 
Department of Corrections employees to search offenders under 
the Department's custody and supervision.  See Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DOC 328.22(2) (Mar. 2017) (permitting searches when ordered by 
the court, with consent, and "[w]hen an employee has reasonable 
grounds to believe the offender possesses contraband or evidence 
of 
a 
rule 
violation"). 
 
Those 
under 
the 
Department's 
"supervision" include "offenders on probation, parole, extended 
supervision, or other statuses as authorized by court order or 
statute."  See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.03(10).  Our cases 
have sanctioned this broad searching authority because those on 
supervision have uniquely diminished expectations of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 131 
No.  2017AP1104-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
Wis. 2d 41, 60–62, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986) (holding warrantless 
search of probationer's residence by probation officer was 
permissible), aff'd by Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 
(1987) (affirming on narrower grounds). 
¶64 In 2013 Wisconsin Act 79, the legislature extended 
this broad searching authority to law enforcement, raising new 
questions not previously addressed in our Fourth Amendment 
canon.  Among them, to what extent do officers need to know a 
person has an Act 79 status?  Whereas probation agents and other 
similar Department employees would almost assuredly know a 
person 
they 
wish 
to 
search 
is 
under 
the 
Department's 
supervision, the same assumption does not hold with law 
enforcement officers.  The question for another day is what Act 
79 and the Fourth Amendment have to say about this.  While 
Wisconsin is not alone in granting such authority to law 
enforcement, this kind of policy is fairly new and uncommon, 
leaving us with little on-point legal authority with which to 
work, persuasive or otherwise.  I write separately to sketch out 
some principles that should govern any future analysis. 
¶65 In my view, adoption of a threshold officer-knowledge 
requirement as a precondition to the validity of an Act 79 
search should be undertaken, if at all, only with a careful 
rooting in the relevant law——namely, the text of Act 79 and 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding those on extended 
supervision-like statuses. 
¶66 Act 79 itself does not contain an officer-knowledge 
requirement.  Instead, it simply empowers law enforcement to 
No.  2017AP1104-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
search those with an Act 79 status.  But the statute is not 
without protective boundaries.  Rather than protecting those 
being searched by insisting on a certain level of officer 
knowledge regarding their status, Act 79 requires reasonable 
suspicion and mandates that all searches "be conducted in a 
reasonable manner and may not be arbitrary, capricious, or 
harassing."  Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7r) (2017-18). 
¶67 These statutory requirements implicitly suggest some 
level of advance knowledge by the searching officer.  For 
example, an officer targeting a neighborhood troublemaker who 
the officer has no reason to think is subject to Act 79 would 
seem to be acting in an arbitrary, capricious, or harassing 
manner.  Similarly, this language would likely preclude random 
searches of individuals in the hopes of catching someone with an 
Act 79 status (maybe the very definition of "arbitrary").  And 
any search of someone not subject to Act 79 would of course find 
no sanction in the text of Act 79.  But the inquiry under the 
statute's language is focused on the reasonableness and nature 
of the search itself, and again, that language does not 
prescribe 
a 
separate 
officer-knowledge 
requirement 
to 
substantiate the validity of every search. 
¶68 The follow-up question, then, is whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires more than the statute commands.  Any answer 
would surely need to grapple with an important issue the parties 
did not sufficiently address:  what level of Fourth Amendment 
protection do individuals on probation, parole, and extended 
supervision have? 
No.  2017AP1104-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
¶69 At least two cases are particularly instructive.  In 
2006, the United States Supreme Court upheld a search conducted 
pursuant to a California statute authorizing suspicionless 
searches of parolees by law enforcement.  Samson v. California, 
547 U.S. 843, 846-47 (2006).  The Court grounded its decision in 
the Fourth Amendment principle that parolees "have severely 
diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status 
alone."  Id. at 852.  It is worth noting that California's 
suspicionless search provision is far more intrusive than Act 
79, which requires reasonable suspicion as a precondition to a 
law enforcement search.  More recently, resting in part on 
Samson, this court upheld a condition of extended supervision 
that authorized a law enforcement search at any time for any 
reason.  State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60, ¶¶1, 4, 341 Wis. 2d 281, 
814 N.W.2d 854.  In reaching our conclusion, we adopted and 
applied Samson's expectations of privacy rationale to those on 
extended supervision:  "As the Samson Court made clear, persons 
in Rowan's position have diminished privacy expectations, and 
the State has greater interests in supervising them to prevent 
criminal conduct, and those two facts make searches reasonable 
that would otherwise not be . . . ."  Id., ¶14. 
¶70 Because the text of Act 79 does not contain a 
threshold officer-knowledge requirement, any judicial imposition 
of that precondition must stem from the Fourth Amendment, and 
consequently, should be rooted in proper Fourth Amendment 
doctrine rather than analogies to general principles. 
No.  2017AP1104-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
¶71 In short, Act 79 embraces a new policy that raises new 
questions——among them, whether and when the Fourth Amendment 
might demand more from law enforcement than Act 79 already 
requires.  While today's decision leaves these issues for 
another day, such questions should be analyzed by close 
reference to the text of Act 79 itself and faithful application 
of Fourth Amendment principles to those with an Act 79 status. 
¶72 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2017AP1104-CR.bh 
 
 
 
1