Title: RUBY DRILLING CO., INC. v. DUNCAN OIL COMPANY, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RUBY DRILLING CO., INC. v. DUNCAN OIL COMPANY, INC.2002 WY 8547 P.3d 964Case Number: 01-72Decided: 06/05/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

RUBY 
DRILLING CO., INC., 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

DUNCAN 
OIL COMPANY, INC., 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Carol Seeger of Carter Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee:

            
Tom C. Toner of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Duncan Oil 
Company, Inc. (Duncan) paid Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. (Ruby) $23 per foot in 
advance to drill a 6,000-foot oil well consistent with the contract Ruby 
drafted.  Ruby drilled the hole in 
such a manner that it deviated from vertical so much it was unusable.  Duncan hired specialized contractors to 
correct the deviation and complete the well.  Thereafter, Ruby sued Duncan for breach 
of contract claiming additional money was owed because the contract terms 
changed from per foot to per day cost when Duncan hired the other 
contractors.  Duncan counterclaimed 
for the costs to complete the well.  
After a bench trial, the trial court held Ruby breached the contract and 
Duncan was entitled damages.  We 
affirm.

 

 

 

[¶2]      We rearticulate 
the issues in the following manner: 

 

1.  Did 
the trial court properly construe the written drilling agreement to be a footage 
contract with the specifications based on the customary industry usage of the 
terms?  

 

2.  Did the trial court improperly limit 
Ruby's expert witness from testifying regarding changes to the Ruby drilling 
contract?

 

3.  Was the trial court's decision contrary 
to the clear weight of the evidence?

 

 

 

 

[¶3]      Ruby had been 
drilling water and oil wells for fifty-six years.  Duncan had used Ruby's services in the 
past to drill several shallow coalbed methane water wells.  In the fall of 1997, Duncan asked Ruby 
whether, in the event the company had the proper equipment, it would be 
interested in bidding on a 6,000-foot oil well to be drilled in the Kaycee 
area.  Ruby advised Duncan that it 
had a suitable rig and would like to bid the contract.  
Ruby also represented it had drilled a number of water wells around 
Kaycee and was familiar with the area but failed to tell Duncan it had never 
before drilled a well as deep as 6,000 feet. 

 

[¶4]      Ruby proposed to 
drill the well for $23 per foot on a footage contract with additional 
miscellaneous costs including per diem for mobilization/demobilization and 
hourly rates for specified service work.  
Duncan accepted the proposal and requested Ruby send a contract with an 
invoice to expedite the project and allow the cost to fall within Duncan's 1997 
budget.  On December 29, 1997, 
Duncan signed the contract and sent Ruby a check for  $141,200 as an advance payment. 

 

[¶5]      On January 1, 
1998, Ruby moved a drilling rig to the well location and commenced work.  On January 14, 1998, at approximately 
510 feet, a straight hole survey showed five degrees deviation from 
vertical.  A straight hole survey 
relates the degree of deviation from vertical but does not reflect the direction 
of the deviation.  The industry 
standard provides deviation should not exceed one degree per thousand feet with 
a maximum deviation at total depth of not more than five to six degrees.  Ruby advised Duncan that the reading was 
probably a mistake and continued to 
drill. Ruby conducted three more surveys as the well was drilled deeper which 
indicated increased deviation.  By 
January 16, 1998, the well reached 1,780 feet, and the survey reflected eight 
degrees' deviation.  Had drilling 
continued in this manner, the bottom hole would have been nearly 1,078 feet from 
the surface location and on another lease.  
Duncan told Ruby to stop drilling until Baker Hughes Inteq, a directional 
survey company, could evaluate the deviation. Ruby did not stop drilling until 
it reached 2,200 feet.  In order to 
correct the severe deviation, Baker Hughes recommended the well be plugged back 
to the surface pipe, the well bore be filled with cement, and directional 
equipment be used to drill vertically into the formation. 

 

[¶6]      Duncan offered 
Ruby an opportunity to correct the deviation, but Ruby said all it could do was 
drill in the same manner that had led to the deviation in the first 
instance.  Duncan hired Baker Hughes to correct the deviation, 
and Ruby remained on site and assisted.  
The project continued to experience difficulties and delays caused by 
Ruby's inadequate equipment and equipment failures.  Baker Hughes left the site when the well 
reached approximately 5,081 feet because the deviation had been resolved, and 
Ruby completed the well by conventional drilling to 5,950 feet.  Ruby had anticipated the project would 
take ten to twelve days, but, due to the various problems, it took forty-five 
days. 

 

[¶7]      After 
completion in February of 1998, the parties had no additional contact until 
April of 1998 when Ruby sent two invoices to Duncan.  One invoice was computed on a straight 
day work basis for forty-five days, totaling $114,290 ($255,490 less the 
original $141,200 advance payment), and one was computed on a combined 
footage/day work basis for thirty-seven days, totaling $119,003 ($260,203 less 
the original $141,200 advance payment) to provide Duncan the option of paying 
for either straight day work or combined footage/day work.  Duncan refused to pay and advised Ruby 
the latter owed Duncan for the expenses incurred to correct the well 
deviation.  

 

[¶8]      In July 1999, 
Ruby filed suit against Duncan for breach of contract and damages of $119,003 
plus interest at eighteen percent per annum.  Duncan answered and counterclaimed for 
breach of contract and damages of $181,311.01.  Subsequent to a bench trial, the court 
found Ruby had breached the footage contract by failing to drill the well in a 
workmanlike manner, the footage contract was not converted by the parties' 
actions into a day work contract, and Duncan was entitled to a judgment of 
$155,211 for the costs it incurred to correct and complete the well.  Ruby appealed. 

 

 

 

[¶9]      We are required 
to review the trial court's construction of the drilling contract and its 
factual determination that Ruby breached the terms of that contract. 

 

 

Schlesinger 
v. Woodcock, 2001 
WY 120, ¶13, 35 P.3d 1232, ¶13 (Wyo. 2001) (some citations omitted); see also Polo Ranch Company v. City of Cheyenne, 
969 P.2d 132, 136 (Wyo. 1998).  

 

Normally, 
the construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a matter for 
the court to address as a question of law.  
Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit 
Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 1996); Feather v. State Farm Fire and Cas., 872 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 1994); Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 
1985).

 

Ormsby 
v. Dana Kepner Co. of Wyo. Inc., 997 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo. 2000).  Further, 
we must assume the evidence in favor of the successful party is true.  We exclude any consideration of the 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the successful 
party's evidence, and we afford to the successful party's evidence every 
favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.  Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶24, 30 P.3d 547, ¶24 (Wyo. 2001); Turcq v. 
Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51-52 (Wyo. 1997); Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 
1309-10 (Wyo. 1990).

 

 

 

[¶10]   The contact language at the heart 
of this dispute provides:

 

We 
hereby submit specifications and estimates for the drilling of a well at $23.00 
per ft. for drilling and/or $200.00 per hour for service 
work.  Casing will be ____ in. diameter for 
surface, all the way, and ____ in. diameter for other if necessary.  
___________________________________________________We hereby submit 
specifications and estimates for the drilling [in] accordance with the above 
specifications, for the estimated footage or to ample amount of water.  Payment to be made after completion of 
job and due upon receipt of our billing.  
If payment is not made within a reasonable time and the account  be placed in collector's or attorney's 
hands for collection, all costs of collection including reasonable attorney fees 
will be added to our total bill, plus 18% on past due accounts.  

 

Mobilization 
& Demobilization                     
$3,000.00

Per 
Diem                                                       
$300.00 per day

 

Hour 
Time will include:          
Rig time running straight hole

                                                
Logging

                                                
Running casing

                                                
Drill stem tests

                                                
Plug & abandon

 

All 
material is guaranteed to be as specified.  
All work to be completed in a workmanlike 
manner according to standard practices.  
Any alteration or deviation from 
above specifications involving extra costs, will be executed only upon written 
orders, and will become an extra charge over and above the 
estimate.  All agreements 
contingent upon strikes, accidents or delays beyond our control.  Our workers are fully covered by 
Workmen's Compensation Insurance.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  

 

[¶11]   The parties agree Ruby drafted the 
agreement as a footage contract.  A 
significant difference exists in 
responsibilities and risk apportioned between the operator and the drilling 
contractor under a day work contract as opposed to a footage 
contract.

 

(2)  Day 
work contract.

 

Under 
the day work contract, an operator engages a contractor to drill a well at a 
specified location to a specified depth and agrees to pay the contractor at a 
specified rate per day.  
Accordingly, the operator and not the contractor, takes the risk of added 
expense because of delays and difficulties encountered in 
drilling. . . .

 

            
(3)  Footage contract.

 

Under 
the footage contract, the specifications of the well would remain the same, but 
the operator agrees to pay the contractor at a specified rate per foot 
drilled.  Accordingly, the 
contractor and not the operator, takes the risk of added expense because of 
delays and difficulties in drilling.

 

2 Eugene 
Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 19A.5(b) at 95 (1989).  In this footage contract, Ruby, the 
contractor, and not Duncan, the operator, took the risk of added expense because 
of delays and difficulties in drilling.  
Despite the lack of a written order as the contract required, Ruby argues 
the original footage contract was modified into a day work contract because 
Duncan failed to include well specifications in the original 
agreementparticularly a straight hole/minimal deviation requirementand took 
control of the project when it hired Baker Hughes.

 

This 
court has previously acknowledged that the parties to a written agreement may 
orally waive or modify their rights under the agreement.  We have further indicated that an oral 
modification of a written agreement may be possible even when the agreement 
contains a no-unwritten-modification clause.  The party asserting that a written 
agreement was modified by the subsequent expressions or conduct of the parties 
must prove so by clear and convincing evidence.  The question of whether the alleged 
modification of the written agreement has been proved by the required quantum of 
evidence is one to be decided by the trier of fact.  We will not reverse the decision of the 
trier of fact unless that decision is clearly erroneous or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence.  

 

Wolin v. 
Walker, 830 P.2d 429, 431-32 (Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted).  Clear and convincing evidence is the 
"kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable."  MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 
612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 1980); see also Dorr v. Wyoming Board of Certified Public 
Accountants, 2001 WY 37, ¶8, 21 P.3d 735, ¶8 (Wyo. 2001); Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 291 (Wyo. 
1989).

 

[¶12]   The trial court made the following 
findings and conclusions relevant to this issue:

 

4.  Exhibit A is a "footage" contract 
that specifies primary compensation to Ruby was to be determined at the rate of 
$23.00 per foot of well bore.  (The 
contract also allows other miscellaneous compensation.)  There was no agreement by words, writings or 
actions to change the method of compensation;        

 

5.  Duncan 
paid Ruby, in advance, the invoice total which listed the per foot charge and 
some other estimated charges; 

 

6.  Ruby 
did not have sufficient equipment under industry custom and standard practice to 
drill a 6,000 foot well during the drilling project at issue. This deficiency 
was a breach of contract.  Items 
Ruby lacked include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) a blowout 
preventer; (b) about 1,300 feet of drill pipe (it is dangerous and against 
industry custom/usage to drill with tubing at these depths);  (c) bottleneck elevators to use on 
bottleneck drill pipe (also the elevators were not rated to carry the drill 
string weight required); 

 

7.  Ruby 
did not otherwise perform in a workmanlike manner.  The main example was the failure to 
drill as close to vertical as possible.  
This failure was a breach of contract;

 

8.  The 
drilling contract herein required a well bore that was as close to vertical as 
possible;

 

9.  Duncan 
notified Ruby of deficiencies described above prior to renting equipment and 
prior to hiring subcontractors.  
Ruby's breach of contract; failure to correct deficiencies; and failure 
to suggest alternatives required Duncan to rent equipment and hire 
subcontractors in order to complete the well under industry 
standards;

 

10.  Any 
"supervision and/or control" exercised by Duncan over the drilling process was 
by tacit agreement with Ruby.  Ruby 
voiced no contemporaneous objections to Duncan decisions; 

 

                                    
. . . .

 

12.  When 
Duncan realized Ruby did not begin this well as close to vertical as was 
possible, it gave Ruby an opportunity to correct.  Ruby could not make necessary 
corrections without additional equipment and personnel.  When Ruby failed or refused to correct, 
arguably Duncan could have declared a breach and dismissed Ruby from the 
site.  However, by remaining on 
location and using some of its equipment, Ruby was given opportunities to 
mitigate damages[.]

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The trial court determined 
the contract was not ambiguous and Ruby failed to prove an unwritten 
modification of the contract by clear and convincing evidence.  We are persuaded this is the correct 
result.  

 

[¶13]   Ruby drafted this agreement, which 
was a footage contract with additional miscellaneous expenses.  The terms also dictated the well would 
be completed in a workmanlike manner according to standard practices and any 
change of the specifications required written agreement.  
The parties agree no written agreement to modify existed.  

 

[¶14]   Ruby claims the contract did not 
require the drilling of a straight hole, and all the proper equipment was 
available to drill the hole correctly in the conventional manner.  The trial transcript discloses Jesse 
Dale Ruby, owner, operator, and driller for Ruby, testified in an implausible 
and often internally inconsistent manner.  
He denied knowing the standard practices in the oil well drilling 
industry stating he was not a part of that industry despite previously 
testifying he had fifty-six years of drilling experience.  He denied he was required to drill a 
straight hole but acknowledged, by the contract terms, his crew was to 
periodically run straight hole surveys to determine the amount of 
deviation.  He testified Ruby 
intended to drill the hole as straight as possible but also claimed it had no 
contractual obligation to do so.  
Mr. Ruby denied any knowledge of or requirement to abide by the Wyoming 
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission's rules and regulations with regard to 
maintaining a practical minimum deviation in all oil and gas wells drilled.  See Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission Rules & Regulations ch. 3, § 24 (Sept. 3, 
1996).  He contended that Ruby was 
not bound to observe any requirement or standard not explicitly spelled out in 
the contract. 

 

[¶15]   This argument belies both the 
contract language and the applicable case law.  The contract specifically provided all 
work was to be completed according to standard practices.  It is reasonable to infer that, when one 
is drilling an oil well and the contract specifies standard practices, the 
standard practices referred to are those of the oil well drilling industry. When 
a usage is common to an industry, failure to negate the application of such 
usage engenders an assumption it was intended to apply, and, if the person 
contracting wishes to escape the force thereof, he should except such custom 
from the contract. Valentine v. Ormsbee 
Exploration Corporation, 665 P.2d 452, 458 (Wyo. 1983).  "It is well settled that parties who 
contract on a subject matter concerning which known usages prevail, incorporate 
such usages by implication into their agreements, if nothing is said to the 
contrary.'"  Id. (quoting Hostetter v. Park, 137 U.S. 30, 40 
(1890)).  In this case, Ruby made 
the "standard practices" of the industry an express term of the contract.  

 
[¶16]   The evidence clearly established 
drilling a straight hole was the standard industry practice.  Mr. Ruby equivocated saying he did not 
even know what the word "straight" meant.  
However, his own expert witness conceded the industry standard calls for 
the contractor to drill the well as close to vertical as possible.  Mr. Ruby advised the expert he did 
nothing to control the deviation because he had done his job as long as he 
drilled the well to 6,000 feet even if the bottom hole was a quarter of a mile 
away from the surface location.  

            

[¶17]   Viewed in the light most favorable 
to Duncan, the evidence established Duncan offered Ruby an opportunity to 
correct the problem when the deviation was determined to be serious.  Mr. Ruby initially testified he was 
denied this option but later stated he told Duncan that all his company could do 
was continue drilling in the same manner holding weight off the drill bit in an 
effort to minimize further deviation.  
Additionally, Mr. Ruby acknowledged he never communicated with Duncan 
about modification of the footage contract to a day work contract until he sent 
the two invoices over a month after the well was 
completed.

 

[¶18]   "We have . . .  
indicated the necessity for parties to follow the terms and conditions of 
contracts entered into by them." State 
Surety Company v. Lamb Construction Company, 625 P.2d 184, 194 (Wyo. 
1981).  We conclude Ruby failed to 
prove modification of the contract to a day work contract by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The trial 
court properly found the contract was a footage contract because the terms were 
unambiguous, no modification existed, the contract specified standard practices 
of the industry should be followed thereby requiring the drilling of a straight 
hole, and Ruby rejected the opportunity to correct the deviation problems.  

 

B.        
Expert Witness

[¶19]   Ruby argues that the trial court 
improperly precluded its expert witness from testifying regarding industry 
custom as it pertains to changes from footage to day work contracts.  On the contrary, the court did receive 
approximately five pages of testimony on this topic.  It did not, however, permit the expert 
to opine as to whether the Ruby footage contract changed to a day work contract 
concluding that was a question of law.  
In this regard, the court advised Ruby's attorney:  "Counsel, it is something I'm sure 
you're aware of; but the witness offered an opinion as to whether or not 
this 
footage contract switched to a day contract; 
and that's objectionable.  That is an opinion that the Court would 
not consider as a ruling on the law."  
(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶20]   During the course of the 
discussion, Ruby's counsel clarified his intent stating, "I guess I'm not 
calling on [the expert] to tell you what the contract is, just that this sort of 
an arrangement between the parties is customary."  The trial court ultimately responded: 
"You've mentioned to me the limited purpose for which you've elicited that 
opinion, and I'm satisfied with that.  
And I just wanted us to be on the same page in terms of the law before 
the witness sat down."  Contrary to 
Ruby's arguments, the trial court did allow the expert's testimony for the 
limited purposes for which its counsel offered it.  "Rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion."  English 
v. State, 
982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999).  We 
conclude no abuse of discretion has been established.  

 

[¶21]   Ruby also asserts the court 
improperly limited the expert's opinion as to inclusion of deviation 
requirements in drilling contracts.  
Our review indicates the attorney was actually asking the expert to give 
his opinion as to which party should have included a deviation clause in the 
contract.  The court expressed its 
concern the information was speculative and of questionable relevance as there 
was no deviation clause in the contract.  

 

"[I]n 
the absence of statutory authority mandating admission of the expert testimony, 
the district court's decision to admit or reject such testimony is an 
evidentiary ruling committed to its discretion."  Witt 
[v. 
State], 
892 P.2d [132,] 137 [(Wyo. 1995)] (citing Price 
v. State, 
807 P.2d 909, 913 (Wyo. 1991)).  We 
do not disturb a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.

 

Duran 
v. State, 990 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Wyo. 1999).  Ruby 
has not advised this court of any statutory authority mandating admission of 
this particular type of expert testimony. 

 

[¶22]   Ruby relies on Samson 
Resources Company v. Quarles Drilling Company, 
783 P.2d 974, 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).  
The Samson 
Resources 
case involved a drilling contract with an explicit modification clause governing 
conditions which would trigger a change from a footage to a day work 
contract.  The Samson 
Resources 
trial court excluded expert testimony on the industry custom and usage regarding 
notice of such a change intended to apprise the contracting parties of a 
modification of the contract from footage to day work.  The Samson 
Resources 
appellate court found the industry evidence was relevant to proper construction 
of the contract.  We agree with this 
result and point out the trial court in the appeal before us permitted testimony 
regarding industry custom and usage.  
However, the Samson 
Resources 
case does not support Ruby's position that its expert should have been permitted 
to testify as to the proper contract construction or which party he believed was 
obligated to ensure inclusion of specific clauses in the contract.  Here, the trial court was absolutely 
correct and fully within its broad discretion when it precluded the attempt to 
have Ruby's expert witness construe the contract.  Contract construction is a question of 
law and solely within the court's province.  

 

C.        Clear 
Weight of the Evidence 

 

[¶23]   Ruby contends the trial court's 
decision is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.  We do not agree.  Duncan presented overwhelming evidence 
through its witnesses, including its expert witness, establishing Ruby's breach 
of contract.  However, it is most 
telling that the evidence presented by Ruby supported the trial court's 
conclusions.  As noted above, Mr. 
Ruby testified in a less than convincing fashion denying knowledge of industry 
practices, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission's rules and 
regulations, and even the duty to drill a straight hole.  He denied knowing deviation could be a 
problem in this location despite having drilled a number of wells near Kaycee 
and knowing it is "crooked hole" country.  
Mr. Ruby also testified (a) retipped, used drill bits were employed but 
there was no real difference between them and new bits although there is 
approximately a $7,500 price differential; (b) the elevators were malfunctioning 
because they were the wrong type for the drill pipe and should have been 
exchanged before Duncan had to rent replacements; (c) Ruby had only 4,700 feet 
of drill pipe, the rest being tubing, although he originally testified it had 
6,000 feet of pipe on site; (d) he was unfamiliar with stabilizers and did not 
know it was equipment used to minimize deviation; (e) although Ruby usually took 
deviation surveys every 100 feet, on this well it did not make the first check 
until the depth was over 500 feet; and (f) despite having drafted the contract 
and used it more than 100 times, he did not know the terms and specifically did 
not know any modification required a written order.

 

[¶24]   Ruby's own expert witness 
acknowledged (1) a driller must abide by the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission's rules and regulations in order to drill in a workmanlike manner; 
(2) Mr. Ruby advised him nothing had been done to prevent the well from 
deviating; (3) it is customary in the industry, even if there is no deviation 
clause in the contract, that the contractor agrees to drill the well as close to 
vertical as possible; (4) the drilling records did not support Mr. Ruby's 
contention that weight was taken off the drill bit to control deviation and the 
records actually indicated the weight was increased; and (5) a stabilizer is 
commonly used in the industry to minimize deviation.

 

[¶25]   Clint Ruby, Mr. Ruby's nephew and a 
driller on the well project, also testified the crew tried to drill the well 
straight "[b]ecause you always try to drill a straight hole"; however, the only 
technique he knew to control deviation was lifting weight off the drill 
bit.  He also acknowledged that ten 
hours of work on a pump were required because his crew had crossed the lines; 
other significant repairs or replacements were required due to the failure of 
Ruby's equipment such as the drill line, clutch, duplex mud pump, and light 
plant; and the loss of a core in the well hole required five days to remove 
it.  We "accept the evidence of the 
prevailing party as true.  We will 
not disturb the trier of fact's findings unless the findings are so totally in 
conflict with the great weight of the evidence that they may be properly 
categorized as irrational."  
Agar 
v. Kysar, 
628 P.2d 1350, 1353 (Wyo. 1981) (citation omitted); see 
also Valentine, 
665 P.2d  at 456; Sagebrush 
Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 
604 P.2d 198, 200 (Wyo. 1979).  In 
light of this standard, we have compared the trial court's findings with the 
evidence and conclude the decision is completely reflective of and supported by 
the record.

 

D.        
Damages

 

[¶26]   Ruby asserts the trial court erred 
as a matter of law in computing the damages and the evidence did not support the 
damages.  The relevant findings and 
conclusions are:

 

11.  The 
measure of damages for breach of an obligation to drill an oil/gas well is the 
cost of completion;

 

            
. . .

 

13.  Actual 
expenditures of completing this well were:

 

a.  Ex. 
Y                                              
$181,311.00

 

b.  Ex. 
C  Duncan pd to Ruby           
  141,200.00

 

    TOTAL                                            
$322,511.00

 

14.  Pursuant 
to the contract Duncan owes Ruby the following:

 

a.  $23.00 
x 6,000 feet                     
$138,000.00

 

b.  $300.00 
x 45 days           
            
13,500.00

 

c.  Mobilization                                  
      
3,000.00

 

d.  $200.00 
x 64 hours (misc)          
    
12,800.00*

 

     TOTAL                                           
$167,300.00

 

*Ruby 
did not present testimony claiming a precise number of hours under this contract 
provision (example: time re casing).  
However, Clint Ruby testimony provided proof by a preponderance that at 
least 64 hours of work was expended and deserves compensation under this line 
item (43 hrs on rental pump #1; 31 hrs on rental pump #2; minus 10 hrs 
attributed to Ruby crossing lines).

 

15.  Duncan 
is entitled to Judgment against Ruby in the sum of  $155,211.00.

 

The 
general measure of damages for breach of contract is the amount that is 
sufficient to compensate the injured party for the loss which full performance 
of the contract would have prevented or the breach of it has entailed.  Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, 546 P.2d 436, 
438 (Wyo. 1976).  

 

[¶27]   Ruby's whole damages argument rests 
on the presumption it did not breach the footage contract.  All the costs Ruby seeks compensation 
for are directly attributable to the company's failure in the first place to 
drill the well in a workmanlike manner with adequate and proper equipment 
pursuant to standard practices.  As 
an example, Ruby maintains the original estimate of sixteen hours of service 
time was grossly understated given the length of the project.  It was, of course, a gross underestimate 
because Ruby's failure to perform in a workmanlike manner made an additional 
month necessary to repair and complete the well.  Ruby also contends it waited fifty-one 
hours for the directional drillers to complete surveys.  However, but for Ruby's breach of 
contract, directional drillers would not have been required. 

 

[¶28]   In fact, the trial court afforded 
Ruby significant credit in calculating Duncan's damages. It permitted $23 for 
6,000 feet when at best Ruby drilled 3,150 feet, and perhaps it more accurately 
drilled only 1,550 feet once Baker Hughes filled the bore with concrete and 
redrilled it.  In addition, the 
trial court credited Ruby with forty-five days of per diem at $300 per day.  This certainly appears to be a generous 
computation as Ruby's actions necessitated the extension of the project.  

 

[¶29]   Damages are factual findings which 
we do not reverse unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Cross v. Berg Lumber Company, 7 P.3d 922, 928 (Wyo. 2000).  The record supports the trial court's 
damages award, and we cannot conclude the award was clearly erroneous.  

 

[¶30]   Affirmed.