Title: Neuman v. Neuman

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Neuman v. Neuman1992 WY 157842 P.2d 575Case Number: 91-99Decided: 11/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Charles Richard 
NEUMAN, a/k/a Dick Neuman, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Gretchen Ann 
NEUMAN, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 David E. Erickson, Brown Erickson & 
Hiser, Rawlins, for 
appellant.

Richard G. Miller, Casper, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1.]     All of the questions 
raised in this appeal relate to the exercise of discretion by the trial court in 
effecting a division of marital property in a divorce action. The primary issue 
concerns the method adopted for determining the value of stock in a closely-held 
family corporation. Other allegations of error concern a variance between the 
decree entered by the trial court and the parties' stipulations; the failure of 
the trial court to consider tax liabilities and early withdrawal penalties in 
valuing retirement accounts; and the failure of the trial court to take into 
account a right of contribution from cotenants in determining the value of the 
wife's interest in real property held by her in joint tenancy with others. We 
hold there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court with 
respect to any valuations. We do modify the decree of divorce to increase the 
value of the residence awarded to the wife to its stipulated value and, after 
that adjustment, we further modify the decree by abolishing periodic payments 
obviously designed by the trial court to effect an equal distribution. As 
modified, we affirm the decree of divorce entered by the trial 
court.

 [¶2.]     Charles Richard Neuman 
(the husband) raises the following issues in expressing his dissatisfaction with 
the property division made by the district court:

I. Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion by making findings of fact and conclusions of law at variance with 
the parties' stipulations?

II. Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion under the particular facts and circumstances of this case by failing 
to consider tax liabilities and early withdrawal penalties when determining the 
value of the parties' individual retirement accounts?

III. Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion by failing to consider appellee's right to contribution from her 
cotenants when determining the value of her interests in a joint 
tenancy?

IV. Did the trial court properly 
determine the value of appellant's closely held stock?

Gretchen Ann Neuman (the wife) 
offers this statement of the issues in arguing to sustain the property division 
made by the trial court:

1. Was the trial court's division 
of property when viewed on an overall basis an abuse of 
discretion?

2. Was the trial court's valuation 
of appellee's joint tenancy an abuse of discretion?

3. Did the trial court err as a 
matter of law and abuse its discretion when it accepted appellee's expert's 
valuation of appellant's stock?

The husband, by his reply brief, 
summarizes the case in this way:

V. Is the trial court's property 
settlement fair and equitable when judged on an overall basis under the 
particular facts and circumstances of this case?

 [¶3.]     The Neumans were 
married on June 7, 1980, in Saratoga. By December of 1989, irreconcilable 
differences had arisen between them and, following a year of separation, the 
husband filed for a divorce on May 24, 1990. The wife filed an answer and a 
counterclaim in which she sought a decree of divorce, custody of their daughter, 
child support, and an equitable division of their properties. The trial was held 
on January 4, 1991, with the only matter in dispute before the court being the 
value, and the appropriate division, of the parties' property. Other issues 
including custody of their daughter, child support, medical expenses, and 
visitation of the daughter generally were not in dispute because they had been 
resolved by stipulations.

 [¶4.]     The husband and wife 
each brought substantial assets into the marriage. At that time, the husband 
owned a house in Rawlins, which was worth approximately $57,000, and 
approximately seventeen shares of Phelps-Dodge stock, a gift from his father in 
1979. The wife owned an 85% interest in a cabin and lot near Moran Junction; a 
Merrill Lynch cash money market account; and interests in two real estate 
investment companies known as JMB Properties. The wife's property had been 
acquired with proceeds that she received from a personal injury settlement in 
1974.

 [¶5.]     Before they were 
married, the husband and wife purchased three acres of land in the Aspen 
Highlands Development near ElkMountain. During the time they were 
married, the Neumans purchased an additional home with the proceeds of the sale 
of the home owned by the husband prior to the marriage, and they acquired 
certificates of deposit (CDs), individual retirement accounts (IRAs), life 
insurance, a vehicle, household furnishings, and a significant amount of cash. 
The husband worked in his family's trucking business, as service manager, during 
the ten years of the marriage. The wife was employed as a teacher at CarbonCountyChildDevelopmentCenter for the first two years of the 
marriage, but she was not employed after their daughter was 
born.

 [¶6.]     The Neumans had an 
outstanding mortgage on their home of $14,000 but, otherwise, they were free of 
debt. The husband held eighty-four shares of stock in Neuman Transit Company, 
Inc. (Neuman Transit), a closely-held corporation owned entirely by the Neuman 
family. He received sixty of those shares as gifts from his father in 1981, 
1982, and 1983, and the other twenty-four shares were distributed to him in 
settlement of his grandmother's estate in 1988. The trial court found that the 
value of the husband's shares in Neuman Transit was 
$188,943.

 [¶7.]     The decree of divorce 
in this case was filed on March 7, 1991. The district court found a just and 
equitable division of the property to be as follows:

ASSETS

MR. 
      NEUMAN

 
 
MRS. 
      NEUMAN

Family home in Rawlins 
      

 
 
 
 
$ 76,000.00 
      

3 acres on ElkMountain

$ 9,000.00 
      

 
 
 
 
Household furnishings 
      

 
 
 
 
8,790.00 
      

1984 Wagoneer 
      

 
 
 
 
4,425.00 
      

IRAs 

28,600.00

 
 
2,597.21 
      

Hungry 5 

4,463.60 
      

 
 
 
 
JMB 

 
 
 
 
5,270.00 
      

Cash value of life insurance 
      

11,608.44 
      

 
 
 
 
Ginnie Mae account 
      

 
 
 
 
5,400.00 
      

Savings 

 
 
 
 
1,900.00 
      

CDs 

 
 
 
 
14,520.58 
      

Neuman Transit stock 
      

188,943.00 
      

 
 
 
 
Phelps-Dodge stock 
      

1,000.00 
      

 
 
 
 
Merrill Lynch 
      

 
 
 
 
44,430.00 
      

3 horses 

2,200.00 
      

 
 
 
 
Loan to Kevin 
      

2,000.00 
      

 
 
 
 

Teton County home 

 
 
 
 
61,666.00 
      

 
 
$247,815.04

 
 
$224,998.79

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIABILITIES

MR. 
      NEUMAN

 
 
MRS. 
      NEUMAN

Appraisals for trial 
      

620.00 
      

 
 
620.00 
      

Mortgage on family home 
      

14,000.00 
      

 
 
 
 
 
 
$233,195.04

 
 
$224,378.79

As an additional settlement of 
their property, the husband was ordered to pay the wife the sum of $367.34 per 
month for twenty-four months. That amount comes within pennies of the disparity 
between the value of the property according to the decree. Each party was to 
bear their own attorney fees and costs.

 [¶8.]     The major issue in this 
case with respect to the property division is over the valuation of the stock in 
Neuman Transit. In addressing the husband's claim that the property division was 
not just and equitable and, therefore, must be held to be an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion, we look both to the statute and prior cases. The controlling 
statute in this case, Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1987), provides, in pertinent 
part:

In granting a divorce, the court 
shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and 
equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the 
condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the 
property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit 
of either party and children.

 [¶9.]     In prior cases, we have 
held repeatedly that the division of marital property is within the discretion 
of the trial court and, in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion, 
we will not disturb the result. Mair v. Mair, 823 P.2d 538 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Williams v. Williams, 817 P.2d 884 
(Wyo. 1991), and Blanchard v. Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 
1989)). An abuse of discretion is to be found in a result that shocks the 
conscience of the court and appears so unfair and inequitable that reasonable 
persons could not abide it. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984) (citing Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980), and Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1978)). In 
evaluating the question of whether a property division by the trial court is, in 
fact, just and equitable, we must analyze the situation from the perspective of 
the overall distribution of the marital assets and liabilities, rather than 
focusing narrowly on the effects of disposition of any one particular asset. 
Overcast v. Overcast, 780 P.2d 1371 (Wyo. 1989) 
(citing Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1982), and Paul)). We also apply the 
usual rule that, on appeal, we view the evidence favorably to the successful 
party in the trial court, ignoring the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and 
affording to the successful party every reasonable inference that can be drawn 
from the evidence in the record. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 761 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1988) (citing 
Grosskopf).

 [¶10.]  
The major dispute in this case is over the method adopted by the trial 
court for valuing stock in Neuman Transit. Each of the parties presented an 
expert witness at trial to testify as to the value of the husband's stock. 
Pursuant to a stipulation of counsel, the trial court took the testimony of the 
experts in narrative form. Each of the experts offered an opinion; explained the 
approach utilized to arrive at his opinion; articulated the reason for selecting 
the approach utilized; and elaborated generally upon the reasons for the offered 
opinion.

 [¶11.]  
The chairman of the accounting department of the University of Wyoming was called by the husband to 
provide an academic and theoretical guide. That witness agreed that the three 
primary methods of valuation of closely-held stock are book value, 
capitalization of earnings, and historical earnings. Later, he testified that 
the comparable sales approach was a fourth method by which stock of this type 
commonly is valued. This witness furnished an explanation of each of the various 
methods of valuation.

 [¶12.]  
Book value is arrived at by taking the aggregate equity of the 
stockholders in the company and dividing it by the number of outstanding shares. 
In the capitalization of earnings method, the appraiser uses the average of an 
accumulation of earnings, normally at least two years, and then discounts the 
average earnings and multiplies that by an appropriate capitalization factor. 
IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60 suggests the appropriate capitalization factor be 
somewhere between twenty and thirty. The historic earnings method represents an 
attempt to adjust, by price level adjustment, the historical cost statements for 
earnings power over the life of the entity. When asked about the comparable 
sales approach used by another expert witness, the Chairman of the Accounting 
Department said:

Well, comparable sales is probably 
most difficult with a closely-held corporation, you understand. Because there 
might not be a comparable sale of a closely-held entity.

So what we normally - and let me 
broach the subject in this fashion - normally we talk about comparable sales 
when we are talking about the sales of stock that are on an exchange, and we can 
look at those kinds of comparable companies.

This witness also said that, in 
valuing a closed-corporation interest in a transportation company, it sometimes 
is proper to compare assets, liabilities, and interests to a publicly-traded 
transportation company. This approach is known as common sizing. The witness 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each of the methods of valuation, 
concluding that to discount an average earnings figure and then capitalize that 
rate would most consistently achieve the most accurate 
results.

 [¶13.]  
The valuation expert for the husband, a certified public accountant, 
testified utilizing a comparable sales approach and then taking a 35% discount 
for lack of marketability of the Neuman Transit stock, ending with an opinion of 
a net value of $69,058. This witness also used, as a second approach, the 
common-sizing approach pursuant to which he compared Neuman Transit with 
Consolidated Freightways and Yellow Freight Company, both publicly traded stocks 
and, after a discount of 35% plus an additional 39% discount for a loss of 
business within the last two weeks, he arrived at a net value of $73,904. The 
husband's witness also testified that the book value of the husband's interest 
in the stock minus the minority discount was $45,136. The trial court found that 
the testimony relating to a comparable sale was not reflective of the actual 
value of the stock in Neuman Transit. Similarly, the trial court ruled that the 
evidence of book value did not accurately reflect actual or market value because 
of the practice of maintaining its equipment rather than replacing it. The trial 
court also noted that using the husband's expert witness' computation for the 
price earnings ratio after netting out a 39% reduction for an anticipated loss 
of gross earnings and a 35% reduction for a minority interest resulted in a 
value of $189,908.43, a value slightly higher than the one the court adopted 
from the testimony of the wife's expert witness.

 [¶14.]  
The wife called as her expert a witness who also was a certified public 
accountant and testified utilizing the capitalization of earnings approach. The 
wife's expert computed the capitalization of earnings based on Neuman Transit's 
own records for the past ten years. He then adjusted the value of the rolling 
stock which was almost totally depreciated and arrived at a net value of 
$188,943. This witness offered a second valuation pursuant to a modified book 
value approach. The wife, in her brief, referred to this as a "liquidation 
value," and the opinion of the expert, based on this latter method, resulted in 
a net value of $247,330. The wife's witness did not apply a discount for the 
lack of marketability, nor did he adjust for the very recent loss of business in 
reaching either of his proposed figures. Neuman Transit was dealing with a $2 
million loss of revenue which, according to the wife's witness, would cause the 
company to not reach a break-even profit. The witness testified that, if the 
company were to reach a break-even point, then it would either liquidate or it 
would go out and find new sources of revenue to offset the loss of revenue. It 
followed, in the opinion of the wife's expert, that the 39% reduction for loss 
of business proposed by the husband's expert was inappropriate. The wife's 
expert also testified that the 35% minority discount for the lack of 
marketability the husband's expert proposed was not applicable in this instance, 
since it was a divorce case, and the husband was not going to sell his shares of 
stock.

 [¶15.]  
The trial court adopted the capitalization of earnings approach used by 
the wife's expert witness and then valued the husband's stock at $188,943. The 
husband challenges the adoption by the court of the approach of the wife's 
expert claiming that the witness' methods are not in accordance with general 
accounting principles. Specifically, the husband states in his 
brief:

As will be shown, the trial court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the valuation of the stock are 
so at variance with accepted accounting procedures and the law as it exists in 
our sister states that this court simply will not be able to abide them. As a 
result, this appeal offers this court the opportunity to decide how stock in a 
closely held corporation should be properly valued in divorce 
actions.

 [¶16.]  
While forcefully stated, we are not in accord with the husband's 
argument. As we have noted above, the trial court is afforded substantial 
deference in the determination of a just and equitable disposition of the 
properties of the parties in a divorce case. In addition, the precedent and 
theories offered by both the husband and the wife, in their briefs and arguments 
together with the literature that has been developed by independent research, 
reveal numerous methods and factors courts may consider in arriving at a 
determination of the value of corporate stock.

 [¶17.]  
The challenge by the husband is to both the methodology and certain 
assumptions relied upon by the wife's expert and later adopted by the district 
court to calculate the earnings of Neuman Transit. We have selected a relatively 
recent article as a lucid and concise summary of this problem and the various 
solutions. Alan S. Zipp, Divorce Valuation of Business Interests: A 
Capitalization of Earnings Approach, XXIII Fam.L.Q. 89 (1989). Mr. Zipp 
recognizes that the valuation of a closely-held business is among the more 
difficult problems in divorce cases, and courts can only expect a reasonable 
estimate of business value based upon expert testimony. The author then makes 
the distinction between the valuation of a business for divorce purposes and its 
value to a willing buyer, primarily because there is no willing buyer in the 
divorce, and the business will not be sold. In addition, a willing buyer is 
contemplating future profitability and earnings in the future when making a 
valuation decision while, in the divorce case, the post-divorce earnings are 
considered property outside the scope of the rules for distribution of marital 
property. The legal concept of marital property recognizes the business value as 
it exists at the date of divorce or separation, and income to be earned after 
the divorce is not part of that marital property. The capitalization of earnings 
approach to the valuation of stock in such cases is supported by the Zipp 
article.

 [¶18.]  
In this case, we are persuaded that the capitalization of earnings 
approach utilized by the wife's expert witness, and its adoption by the district 
court, does not result in an abuse of discretion as the husband argues. The 
wife's expert expressed his preferential method for valuing a company like 
Neuman Transit, which has a significant investment. That preferred method is to 
value the underlying assets, and then apply a calculation to account for 
goodwill if there is any goodwill. For our purposes, goodwill appropriately is 
defined as:

Business goodwill for marital 
property valuation purposes is the reasonable value, in the hands of the current 
business owner, of the average excess earnings of the business, at the valuation 
date, based exclusively on the historical earnings of the business and without 
reference to projected future earnings.

Zipp, supra, at 
108.

The wife's expert applied a 15% 
capitalization rate, which is generally one way of valuing goodwill. The 
capitalization rate of 15% that the witness used is not challenged by the 
husband on appeal.

 [¶19.]  
Before the wife's expert applied the 15% capitalization rate, he 
determined the value of the company's equipment by examining ten years of Neuman 
Transit's records. He next estimated the actual depreciation of the equipment 
during the ten-year period and applied this to taxable income and reached a 
result denominated "Adjusted Net Cash Flow" for each of the ten years. An 
average for the ten years then was obtained by giving more weight to the net 
cash flow that was generated in the last five years as opposed to the first five 
years. The expert witness then subtracted the actual depreciation from the net 
cash flow and arrived at the profit from operations, from which he subtracted 
30% for income taxes, arriving at the average annual after-tax earnings. He then 
applied the 15% capitalization rate to reach his final valuation of the 
husband's shares of stock in the amount of $188,943.

 [¶20.]  
A method of valuation that capitalizes the historical past earnings of a 
business at an appropriate capitalization rate, in order to identify the value 
of any goodwill possessed by the business at the date of divorce or separation, 
is appropriate in the context of divorce proceedings because it avoids the 
problem of valuing a business on the basis of post-divorce earnings and profits. 
Zipp, supra. This method essentially is the approach that the wife's expert took 
in reaching his opinion as to value of the Neuman Transit stock, and his 
approach ultimately was adopted by the trial court. The court considered and 
evaluated the opinions of both experts. The deliberate nature of this 
consideration by the trial court is manifest by the nearly five pages of 
explanation contained in the findings of fact in the decree of 
divorce.

A trial court is free to assess 
expert opinion and determine fair market value in light of testimony regarding: 
the nature of the business, the corporation's fixed and liquid assets at the 
actual or book value, the corporation's net worth, the marketability of the 
shares, past earnings or losses and future earning 
potential.

Bryan v. Bryan, 222 Neb. 180, 382 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1986) (citing 
Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis.2d 854, 275         
N.W.2d 902, 912 (1979)).

We accept and agree with the 
reasoning of the Nebraska and Wisconsin Supreme Courts. The 
trial court is not required to accept any one accounting method of stock 
valuation as more accurate than another.

 [¶21.]  
The husband agrees that the capitalization of earnings method is a 
recognized and accepted valuation technique and even that it perhaps is the most 
widely-used technique for appraising and evaluating on-going businesses. This 
acknowledgement is in accord with the decision of the trial court as well as 
recent accounting literature and case law. The husband insists, however, that 
the trial court cannot ignore the recent 35% reduction in Neuman Transit's gross 
revenue. The trial court considered that factor in its findings of fact in the 
divorce decree and said:

     While there was 
testimony that the Company was going to suffer a 39% reduction in gross revenue 
as a result of events which had occurred two weeks prior to trial, the Court 
finds that any such reduction in value based thereon would be speculative and 
inequitable, considering the age of the Company, the past history of the 
earnings and the undisputed testimony that the Company was not going out of 
business, would continue to be in business at least until 2014. Further, a 39% 
reduction of gross revenue would not be a direct proportional reduction of net 
income as proposed by plaintiff's expert; but, instead, would cause the Company 
to not reach break-even point, and liquidation value, or the adjusted net book 
value, would be more appropriate.

This comment demonstrates that the 
trial court did not ignore the reduction in gross revenue. The court considered 
that factor, with all of the circumstances surrounding the case, and concluded 
that it would be speculative and inequitable to reduce the value accordingly. 
The approach taken is within the wide discretion afforded the trial court in the 
area of disposition of marital property, and we hold there was no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in the valuation it made of the husband's shares 
of stock in Neuman Transit.

 [¶22.]  
We emphasize that we do not adopt the capitalization of earnings approach 
as the only method to value corporate stock. Trial courts should continue to 
adjudicate marital property dispositions on a case-by-case basis. If we were to 
adopt a single brightline method for evaluation of closely-held corporate stock, 
we would unnecessarily inhibit the invocation by trial courts of methods 
developed in the future for valuation of stock in a closely-held corporation. 
Furthermore, we would inhibit other methods that might be appropriate in a 
particular case. An examination of the literature in this area discloses that 
the choice of methods for valuing closely-held corporate stock has changed 
greatly in the past fifteen years,1 and the capitalization of earnings 
approach that is the most commonly used method at this time will not necessarily 
be the method of choice in the future. Certainly, valuation of closely-held 
corporate stock will remain a battle of the experts, but those witnesses are 
probably in the best position to keep both counsel for the litigants and the 
courts current with respect to this troublesome topic.

 [¶23.]  
Other allegations of error presented by the husband include a variance 
between the decree of divorce entered by the trial court and the stipulations of 
the parties; the failure of the trial court to consider tax liabilities and 
early withdrawal penalties in connection with certain retirement accounts; and 
the failure of the trial court to consider a right of the wife to contribution 
from cotenants in its determination of the value of the wife's interest in 
certain property held by her in joint tenancy with others. This court has 
remained steadfast in holding that property awards must be viewed in their 
entirety and not considered on the basis of individual items. Ebeling v. 
Ebeling, 782 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989) (citing 
Barney v. Barney, 705 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1985)). In light of that rule, little 
purpose would be served in this case by analyzing the individual assets in any 
attempt to calculate the precise financial effect of the divorce decree. 
Financial equality is not a prerequisite of a just and equitable distribution. 
Ebeling (citing Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227). The district court has great 
discretion under § 20-2-114 in making disposition of marital property to 
determine what is a just and equitable division. We hold that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in making the division of property in this case. In 
a reply brief, the husband asks this court to limit its review to a 
determination of whether substantial equality actually has been achieved by the 
trial court's division of marital estate. We are of the opinion that substantial 
equality was achieved.

 [¶24.]  
We turn now to an area that we believe does demand further consideration. 
The decree of divorce must be modified because of an error that occurred in the 
valuation of the Rawlins home. As noted previously, it was valued at $76,000, 
and there was a mortgage of $14,000 on the home chargeable to the husband. The 
husband, in his reply brief, asserts that, even though the trial court's 
judgment is entitled to great deference, the appellate court should not defer to 
valuation errors that affect the essence of the property settlement. We are in 
accord. The correct value that should be attributable to the wife with respect 
to the family home should be the stipulated fair market value of 
$90,000.

 [¶25.]  
The husband gains support for his argument from the Supreme Court of 
South Dakota in Warne v. Warne, 360 N.W.2d 510 (S.D. 1984). In Warne, the trial 
court allocated a mortgage on a house to the wife as an asset and to the husband 
as a debt. The purchase price of the house was $40,000 with $36,000 remaining 
unpaid. The trial court valued the home at $40,000 and awarded it to the wife 
debt-free, which required allocation of the $36,000 debt to the husband. Upon 
appeal by the husband, the South 
Dakota court held that the court did not overlook the 
mortgage nor fail to properly account for it. In the context of this case, the 
point of Warne is that the court did not award the wife only the equity in the 
house which was $4,000, but the full value of the house which was $40,000. The 
rationale articulated by the South 
Dakota court is persuasive:

     This Court limits its 
review to determine whether there was an equitable division of property. The 
trial court has broad discretion in dividing property. Error does occur, 
however, when the trial court fails to properly value assets and thereby 
establishes a false net worth.

Warne, 360 N.W.2d  at 512 (citations 
omitted).

 [¶26.]  
While it would appear from the record that, subsequent to the decree of 
divorce, the mortgage on the home was paid by the husband, if the scheduled 
payments were met, that does not impact the division which occurred in the 
decree. Correction of this error results in attributing an additional $14,000 to 
the wife and increases the total assets distributed to her to 
$238,998.79.

 [¶27.]  
We are satisfied that the court awarded an additional property settlement 
to the wife in the amount of $367.34 for 24 months in order to balance as 
perfectly as possible the disparity in the total property awarded to each. That 
disparity has been abrogated by crediting the wife with an additional $14,000 
and, in fact, she now would have some $5,000 more than the husband received 
according to the decree of divorce. It is our conclusion, in light of the 
circumstances, that the decree of divorce should be further modified to delete 
the requirement for the 24 monthly payments by the husband to the 
wife.

 [¶28.]  
We conclude that the decree should be modified to correct the technical 
error and to delete the periodic payments awarded to balance the division of the 
marital property. Except for this correction, we conclude that there was no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. We hold that, as modified, the decree of 
divorce entered by the district court should be affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 1 E.g., W. Terrance 
Schreier & O. Maurice Joy, Judicial Valuation of "Close" Corporation Stock: 
Alice in 
Wonderland Revisited, 31 Okla.L.Rev. 853 (1978); MARJORIE A. O'CONNELL, GUIDE TO 
DIVORCE TAXATION § 12,104 (1987).