Title: State ex rel Carlile v. Frost

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  March 31, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE ex rel JASON CARLILE,
Linn County District Attorney,

	Plaintiff-Relator,

	v.

JACKSON L. FROST, Circuit Court
Judge, Linn County,

	Defendant,

	and

DALLAS RAY STEVENS,

	Intervenor.

STATE OF OREGON,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

DALLAS RAY STEVENS,

	Respondent on Review.

(SC S43707;* CA A94916, SC S44065)
(consolidated)

	An original proceeding in mandamus; on review from an order
of dismissal by the Court of Appeals dated January 17, 1997,.**

	Argued and submitted January 6, 1998.

	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for relator and petitioner on review.  With her on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Virginia L.
Linder, Solicitor General.

	Diane L. Alessi, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for intervenor and respondent on review.  With her on
the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Graber, and Durham, Justices.***

	GRABER, J.

	On mandamus, the alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed. 
On the appeal, the order of dismissal of the Court of Appeals is
vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.	

    *Relating to Linn County Circuit Court Case No. 8802-0368.

   **Appeal from Linn County Circuit Court,

	Jackson L. Frost, Judge.

  ***Fadeley J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Kulongoski, J., did not participate
in the consideration or decision of this case.	

		GRABER, J.

		In these consolidated cases, the state challenges
rulings that the trial court made before the start of a penalty-phase proceeding on remand of a death penalty case.  We hold
that: (1) the state may appeal the trial court's order excluding
evidence from defendant's(1) third penalty-phase proceeding; (2)
the trial court erred in issuing the order excluding evidence;
and (3) the state is barred from seeking a writ of mandamus
ordering the trial court to reverse its decision to instruct the
penalty phase jury that it may sentence defendant to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Accordingly, we
vacate the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the state's appeal on
the evidentiary issue, dismiss the alternative writ of mandamus,
and deny the peremptory writ of mandamus.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

		In 1988, defendant was sentenced to death after being
convicted of aggravated murder and other crimes in connection
with the death of a five-year-old girl.  State v. Stevens, 311 Or
119, 806 P2d 92 (1991).  On direct review, this court affirmed
defendant's convictions but vacated the sentence and remanded the
case for a new penalty-phase proceeding, because "the trial court
gave instructions that unconstitutionally limited the way in
which the jury could consider mitigating evidence about
[defendant]."  311 Or at 148.  At the second penalty-phase
proceeding, defendant again was sentenced to death.  This court
again vacated the sentence and remanded the case for another
penalty-phase proceeding, because relevant mitigating evidence
had been excluded during the second penalty-phase proceeding. 
State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 585, 879 P2d 162 (1994).

		Before the start of the third penalty-phase proceeding,
defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to suppress 53 items
of evidence that the court had admitted in the earlier guilt-phase and penalty-phase proceedings.  The trial court conducted
an omnibus hearing and entered an order granting that motion in
part.  The state appealed the order, challenging the suppression
of some of the items of evidence.  The state then filed a motion
for a summary determination of appealability.  See former ORS
19.034(3) (renumbered in 1997 as ORS 19.235(3)); ORAP 2.35
(providing procedures).  Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal, arguing that the state has no right to appeal the
suppression order, because it was not made "prior to trial," ORS
138.060(3).

		The Court of Appeals granted the state's motion for
summary determination of appealability.  The court also granted
defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal, agreeing with defendant
that the suppression order was not made "prior to trial" and that
the state therefore could not appeal it.  The state petitioned
for review of the Court of Appeals' order of dismissal, and we
allowed the petition.

		In addition, the state filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus, challenging two of the trial court's orders: the order
granting in part defendant's evidentiary motion in limine and an
order allowing a jury instruction on the sentencing option of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  This court
issued an alternative writ of mandamus with respect to those two
issues and consolidated the mandamus action and the appeal.

AVAILABILITY OF APPEAL

		We begin by determining whether mandamus or appeal is
the proper route for the state to challenge the trial court's
suppression order.  In general, this court issues a writ of
mandamus only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel Keisling v.
Norblad, 317 Or 615, 623, 860 P2d 241 (1993); ORS 34.110.  Thus,
this court ordinarily would not entertain a mandamus proceeding
if the trial court's suppression order were appealable.  It thus
becomes pertinent whether the state may appeal an order
suppressing evidence made by the trial court before the
commencement on remand of the penalty phase of a death penalty
case.  If the state may do so, the need for this court to
exercise its constitutional power to intervene may be lessened or
eliminated.

		ORS 138.020 limits appeals by the state in criminal
cases to those allowed by ORS 138.060.  ORS 138.060 lists the
circumstances in which the state may appeal in a criminal case. 
ORS 138.060(3), the section that is relevant here, provides:

		"The state may take an appeal from the circuit
court to the Court of Appeals from:

		"* * * * *

		"(3)  An order made prior to trial suppressing
evidence[.]"

		In interpreting a statute, this court's task is to
discern the intent of the legislature.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  We begin
by looking at the statute's text and context to determine whether
an order made before the beginning of a penalty-phase retrial is
"[a]n order made prior to trial."  See ibid. (examination of the
text and context of a statute occurs at the first level of
analysis).  This court's prior interpretations of a statute are
part of the first-level textual analysis.  Holcomb v. Sunderland,
321 Or 99, 105, 894 P2d 457 (1995).  Context includes other
related statutes.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.

		The legislature has not defined the phrase "prior to
trial" as used in ORS 138.060.  "Prior" means "earlier in time or
order:  preceding temporally * * *:  ANTECEDENT, PREVIOUS." 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1804 (unabridged ed 1993). 
With respect to the term "trial," this court has recognized that
the term "can have a different meaning in different settings, and
under different statutory provisions."  State v. Hattersley, 294
Or 592, 595, 660 P2d 674 (1983).  See also Pfleeger v. Swanson et
al, 229 Or 254, 257, 367 P2d 406 (1961) ("[t]he word 'trial' is
used, both in legal parlance and in statutes, to mean different
things"); Warm Springs Irr. Dist. v. Pacific L. Co., 89 Or 19,
22, 173 P 265 (1918) (in interpreting statutory provision, the
court noted that the word "trial" can mean different things).

		Moving to a contextual analysis, we examine the meaning
of the term "trial" in two contexts: the operation of the
statutes governing aggravated murder cases, and the operation of
the statutes governing omnibus hearings and the state's appeals
from rulings that result from such hearings.  We turn first to a
consideration of how aggravated murder cases proceed.

		"Aggravated murder trials are divided into two phases,
the guilt phase and the penalty phase."  State v. Pratt, 309 Or
205, 210, 785 P2d 350 (1990), on remand 316 Or 561, 853 P2d 827
(1993).  In most cases, those phases are merely separate phases
of the same trial in which the same jury decides, first, whether
the defendant is guilty and, second -- if the defendant is guilty
-- whether the defendant should receive the death penalty.  State
v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 348-49, 927 P2d 64 (1996), cert den 117 S
Ct 1830 (1997).

		However, when this court upholds a conviction but finds
reversible error in the sentencing phase, a new jury may be
impaneled and sworn for the penalty phase on remand.  See ORS
163.150(5)(a) (if a reviewing court finds prejudicial error in
the sentencing proceeding only and remands the case, the trial
court may "[i]mpanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose of
conducting a new sentencing proceeding" to determine whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or life in prison, with or
without the possibility of parole).

		The court interpreted a materially identical version of
ORS 163.150(5)(a) in State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93
(1990).  The court was considering what disposition to order when
it had upheld the defendant's conviction but had concluded that
there was a reversible error in the sentencing phase.  ORS
163.150(5)(a) (1989) provided in part that, "[i]f a reviewing
court finds prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only,
the court may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case
to the trial court."  The trial court could "[i]mpanel a new
sentencing jury for the purpose of conducting a new sentencing
proceeding."  309 Or at 17 (quoting ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1989)).

		The defendant in Wagner argued that the foregoing
section conflicted with ORS 163.150(1)(a), which requires that,
in an aggravated murder case in which a jury finds the defendant
guilty, "[t]he [sentencing] proceeding shall be conducted in the
trial court before the trial jury as soon as practicable." 
(Emphasis added.)  A new sentencing jury, the defendant
contended, could not be a "trial jury" without an entire new
trial.  Id. at 17-18.  This court rejected that argument,
affirming the conviction and remanding the case for a new
sentencing proceeding only.  The court held that ORS
163.150(1)(a) "is nothing more than the procedural directive to
the trial court in the ordinary course of events.  * * * If the
state elects to pursue the death penalty [on remand], the new
sentencing jury shall be selected in the same manner that the
trial jury in a capital case is selected."  309 Or at 17-18.

		The statutory provision that a jury other than the one
that determined the defendant's guilt or innocence may be
impaneled for the penalty phase on a penalty-phase-only remand
suggests that the legislature considered the two phases of an
aggravated murder case to be separate proceedings in that
circumstance.  Additionally, this court's holding in Wagner
suggests that a sentencing jury on remand is considered for
procedural purposes to be a trial jury within the meaning of ORS
163.150.  Contextually, therefore, the statutory scheme governing
aggravated murder cases suggests that the phrase "prior to trial"
in ORS 138.060(3), at least in the context of such cases,
encompasses penalty-phase-only remand proceedings.

		We next consider statutes pertaining to pretrial
rulings and the state's appeals therefrom.  ORS 135.037(1)
permits a trial court to hold an omnibus hearing "[a]t any time
after the filing of the accusatory instrument in circuit court
and before the commencement of trial."  At such a hearing, the
trial court may rule on all pretrial motions, including motions
pertaining to suppression of evidence.  ORS 135.037(2).  The
court "may also consider any matters which will facilitate trial
by avoiding unnecessary proof or by simplifying the issues to be
tried, or which are otherwise appropriate under the circumstances
to facilitate disposition of the proceeding."  ORS 135.037(3). 
ORS 135.037(4) requires the trial court to rule on the issues
raised in an omnibus hearing "[a]t the conclusion of the hearing
and prior to trial."  (Emphasis added.)  For that statute to
apply in the context of a penalty-phase-only retrial, the phrase
"prior to trial" can mean only a time before a new jury is
impaneled and sworn at the beginning of the penalty phase.

		ORS 138.060(3) provides for the state to appeal from,
among other things, "[a]n order made prior to trial suppressing 
evidence" (emphasis added), including such an order resulting
from an omnibus hearing.  To understand the use of the term
"prior to trial" in ORS 138.060(3), we consider this court's
interpretation in Hattersley.  The issue there was whether a
trial court's order suppressing evidence, coming after jury
selection had begun but before the jury had been impaneled and
sworn, was one made "prior to trial" and therefore was appealable
by the state under ORS 138.060(3).  294 Or at 594.  Although that
case differs factually from the present one, the court's
discussion is instructive.  In Hattersley, this court determined
that the legislature intended to correlate the state's
opportunity to appeal in a criminal case with a defendant's right
to avoid "double jeopardy."  Id. at 598.  Referring to the
interlocutory orders that the state may appeal pursuant to ORS
138.060(3) and (4),(2) the court stated:

	"Because the state cannot appeal from an adverse
judgment after jeopardy attaches, * * * the legislature
has allowed special provision for these particular
interlocutory orders which affect evidence the state
considers necessary for its case.  We conclude that the
legislature intended that these interlocutory appeal
opportunities * * * correlate with a defendant's double
jeopardy protections."  Id. at 597-98 (citations
omitted).

		The concept of protection against former jeopardy
applies, in a separate fashion, to the penalty phase itself. 
Even if a defendant is found guilty (so that the defendant can be
subjected to a hearing on the appropriate penalty without being
subjected to "double jeopardy" thereby), if a sentencing jury
says "no" to any of the four penalty-phase questions,(3) then the
defendant cannot be subjected to jeopardy of the death penalty
again.  That is so as a matter of federal constitutional law. 
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 US 430, 444-46, 101 S Ct 1852, 68 L
Ed 2d 270 (1981).  Thus, in law, the penalty phase is a type of
"trial" to which the concept of "jeopardy" attaches.  Moreover,
when a defendant faces a penalty-phase-only retrial, the only way
to assure that the state's "interlocutory appeal opportunities *
* * correlate with [the] defendant's double jeopardy protections"
is to hold that jeopardy attaches and the state's opportunity to
appeal ceases "when the [penalty-phase] jury is 'impaneled and
sworn.'"  Hattersley, 294 Or at 598 (quoting ORS 131.505(5)(b)).

		In summary, the legislature has stated that the purpose
of an omnibus hearing is to provide an early, coordinated
resolution of legal issues in criminal cases.  ORS 135.037(3). 
This court has stated that the purpose of ORS 138.060 is to give
the state an opportunity to obtain an answer to legal rulings
limiting what it may offer in evidence, including but not limited
to such rulings that result from an omnibus hearing, before
presenting its case.  Hattersley, 294 Or at 597-98.  The
legislature has provided for a separate, sentencing-only
proceeding when there is reversible error only in the penalty
phase of an aggravated murder case.  ORS 163.150(5)(a).  This
court has held that the new sentencing jury so impaneled on
remand is a "trial" jury for some procedural purposes.  Wagner,
309 Or at 17-18.

		Pulling together all those threads, we conclude at the
first level of analysis that the phrase "an order made prior to
trial suppressing evidence" in ORS 138.060(3) includes an order
suppressing evidence before the beginning of a penalty-phase-only
retrial.  That being so, the state was entitled to appeal the
trial court's ruling on defendant's motion in limine, and the
Court of Appeals erred in dismissing that appeal.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

		When this court concludes that the Court of Appeals has
erred in not deciding an issue on the merits, it usually remands
the case to that court to consider the issue in the first
instance.  Here, we instead exercise our discretion to consider
the issue immediately, because the case is old and because cases
involving the death penalty have a high priority.  See ORS
163.150(1)(g) (automatic review of judgment of conviction and
sentence of death has priority over all other cases in the
Supreme Court).  Accordingly, we turn now to the merits of the
evidentiary issue.

		The question is whether the trial court properly ruled
that certain items of evidence pertaining to "future
dangerousness" are inadmissible at the third penalty-phase
proceeding.  The answer to that question is governed by statute. 
ORS 163.150(5)(d) provides in part:

	"A transcript of all testimony and all exhibits and
other evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and
sentencing proceeding shall be admissible in the new
sentencing proceeding."

		Once again, we begin our analysis of the statute with
an examination of its text and context, in an effort to ascertain
the legislature's intent.  The text of ORS 163.150(5)(d) is
clear.  It provides that evidence properly admitted at the prior
proceedings "shall" be admissible at a penalty-phase retrial. 
Because of the use of the word "shall" in the statute, the court
has no discretion whether to admit evidence at the resentencing,
if that evidence was properly admitted during the previous
proceedings.  See Scovill v. City of Astoria, 324 Or 159, 167 n
7, 921 P2d 1312 (1996) ("'Shall' in a statute ordinarily is
mandatory.").  The statute thus directs the court at the penalty-phase retrial to admit all previously admitted evidence, so long
as the earlier court committed no legal error in admitting that
evidence.

		Defendant argues that the statute instead requires the
court at the penalty-phase retrial to engage in an analysis of
relevance and a process of "balancing" under OEC 403(4) to
determine anew whether to admit evidence that was introduced
during a prior proceeding.(5)  Defendant's construction of the
statute is inconsistent with the mandatory wording of the
statute, which this court has held in similar statutes precludes
such considerations of relevance and prejudice.

		For example, in State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 828 P2d
1006 (1992), on remand 322 Or 620, 912 P2d 364, cert den 117 S Ct
149 (1996), this court upheld ORS 41.415 against a constitutional
challenge.  ORS 41.415 directs the trial court to admit
photographs of a victim of a homicide, if the photographs are
offered, during the prosecution for a criminal homicide, to show
the general appearance and condition of the victim while alive. 
This court concluded:  "Defendant's argument that the trial court
should not have admitted the photographs, because they were
irrelevant or unduly prejudicial, is not well taken.  ORS 41.415
directs the trial court to admit such photographs * * *.  The
statute, in effect, declares the photographs to be relevant and
not subject to balancing under OEC 403."  Id. at 28.  See also
State v. King, 307 Or 332, 334-37, 768 P2d 391 (1989) (OEC 609(1)
requires a trial court to admit evidence of prior convictions for
the purpose of impeaching a criminal defendant without engaging
in OEC 403 balancing).

		Nothing in the context of ORS 163.150(5)(d) detracts
from its clear textual message.  The legislature's intention is
clear from an examination of text and context, so we need not
advance beyond the first level of analysis.  In summary, the
trial court erred in granting defendant's motion in limine.  All
evidence that was properly admitted in the earlier guilt- and
penalty-phase proceedings also is admissible in the new penalty-phase proceeding.

"TRUE-LIFE" SENTENCING OPTION

		The final issue(6) is whether the trial court erred in
accepting defendant's "waiver" of an ex post facto challenge to
the application of a 1989 amendment to ORS 163.150(5) that added
the sentencing option of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole (a "true-life" sentence).(7)  The 1989 statutory amendment
allows a jury to consider the true-life sentencing option in a
penalty-phase retrial of a defendant sentenced to death after
December 6, 1984.  ORS 163.150(5) (1989).  In State v. Wille, 317
Or 487, 505, 858 P2d 128 (1993), this court held that the
retroactive application of a true-life sentence to a defendant
who committed aggravated murder before July 19, 1989, the
effective date of the 1989 amendment, violated the ex post facto
clauses of the state and federal constitutions.(8)

		Defendant argues that he can waive an ex post facto
violation, as he could most other constitutional rights.  He also
asserts that the state is not entitled to mandamus, because it
filed its petition too late.  The state counters (1) that the
prohibition against the legislature's enactment of ex post facto
laws is not a "personal" right that can be waived unilaterally
and (2) that its petition is timely.

		At defendant's initial trial in 1988, the option of a
true-life sentence did not exist.  The legislature amended ORS
163.150 in 1989 to add the true-life option to penalty-phase
retrials.  Or Laws 1989, ch 720, § 2; Or Laws 1989, ch 790, §
135b.  Before defendant's second penalty-phase trial, which
occurred in 1992, defendant asked that the jury be instructed on
the true-life option.  Relator, the district attorney for Linn
County, initially asserted that he had no objection.  The next
court day, however, relator stated that he had changed his mind
and thought that "ethically" he had to object, because "the law
does not sustain" true life.  Following further colloquy, the
trial court decided to grant defendant's request.  The court
ruled that defendant understood that he was waiving any ex post
facto objection, that it was in defendant's best interest to do
so, and that ORS 163.150(5) stated that the true-life option
applied.  The state did not petition this court for a writ of
mandamus concerning that pretrial ruling, which was issued in
January 1992.

		A writ of mandamus is awarded, not as a matter of
right, but on equitable principles.  That being so, we must
determine whether that extraordinary remedy is appropriate now in
this case, in the light of the procedural history that we have
recited.  See State ex rel Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or 711, 717,
688 P2d 1303 (1984) (stating that standard).

		In making that determination, the concept of laches is
relevant.  In Fidanque, this court stated:

		"This court has long recognized that the concept
of laches applies to writs of mandamus:

		"'Laches is a bar to mandamus, and a
petitioner desiring to avail himself of the
benefits of such a writ must act promptly:
[citation omitted].  * * *.'

	"Paine v. Wells, 89 Or 695, 703, 175 P 430 (1918);
Buell [v. Jefferson County Court], 175 Or [402,] 410[,
152 P2d 578, 154 P2d 188 (1944)].

	"* * * * *

	"* * *.  The Paine court stated very clearly the
requirement for speedy action on the part of the
relator:

		"'It is well settled that the application for
a writ of mandamus must be made within a
reasonable time after the alleged default or
neglect of duty, and that laches or delay in
making an application unless satisfactorily
explained may afford sufficient cause for its
denial, particularly when the delay has been
prejudicial to the rights of the respondent.'

	"89 Or at 703."  Fidanque, 297 Or at 717-18 (emphasis
in original).

		In our view, the state has not "satisfactorily
explained" its reason for not having sought a writ of mandamus in
1992, after the trial court first ruled, over the state's
objection, that it would give a jury instruction on the true-life
option.  The state's delay of several years in seeking a writ of
mandamus concerning this legal issue is "sufficient cause for 

* * * denial" of its petition.

		On mandamus, the alternative writ of mandamus is
dismissed.  On the appeal, the order of dismissal of the Court of
Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.

1. 	We use the term "defendant" to refer to Stevens, the
defendant in State v. Stevens, which is the case that is before
us on appeal and is the underlying criminal case in the present
mandamus proceeding.

2. 	The interlocutory orders referred to in ORS 138.060(3)
and (4) are orders suppressing evidence and orders returning or
restoring things seized.

3. 	ORS 163.150(1)(b) provides:

		"Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the
evidence, the court shall submit the following issues
to the jury:

		"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;

		"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;

		"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and

		"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."

4. 	OEC 403 provides:

		"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

5. 	Defendant does not contend that the earlier courts
committed legal error when they admitted the evidence that the
state now seeks to introduce again.

6. 	This issue arises only in the mandamus context, and not
in the appeal.

7. 	ORS 163.150(5) provides:

		"Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a) of this
section, the following shall apply:

		"(a) If a reviewing court finds prejudicial error
in the sentencing proceeding only, the court may set
aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the
trial court.  No error in the sentencing proceeding
shall result in reversal of the defendant's conviction
for aggravated murder.  Upon remand and at the election
of the state, the trial court shall either:

		"(A) Sentence the defendant to imprisonment for
life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as
provided in ORS 163.105(1)(c); or

		"(B) Impanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose
of conducting a new sentencing proceeding to determine
if the defendant should be sentenced to:

		"(i) Death;

		"(ii) Imprisonment for life without the
possibility of release or parole as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(b); or

		"(iii) Imprisonment for life in the custody of the
Department of Corrections as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(c)."

8. 	Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides in part:

		"No ex post facto law * * * shall ever be passed 

	* * *."

Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution,
provides in part:

		"No State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto
Law * * *."