Title: People v. Graham

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86382-Agenda 1-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								EDWARD GRAHAM, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 19, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the Cook County circuit court, the
defendant, Edward Graham, was convicted on three counts of first
degree murder. The defendant waived his right to a sentencing-phase jury, and the trial court found him eligible for the death
penalty. The court then found no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to preclude the death penalty and sentenced the
defendant to death. That sentence has been stayed pending direct
review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs.
603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the defendant's
convictions.

BACKGROUND
	In the mid-1980s, the defendant met Johnny Jones, Sr.
(Jones), a major Chicago cocaine distributor, while doing
carpentry work for him. Eventually, the defendant began doing
more lucrative work for Jones. For approximately five years, the
defendant delivered cocaine to street dealers affiliated with Jones,
collected drug-sale proceeds from them, and returned the money
to Jones. In return, the defendant received $10,000 per month for
his courier services.
	Jones lived in a house on Chicago's south side with Marshall
Mason and Erica Chotoosingh. Occasionally, Jones' eldest son,
Johnny Jones, Jr. (Johnny), and his friend, Cory Williams, spent
the night at Jones' house in second-floor bedrooms. On September
28, 1996, Johnny and Williams went upstairs to sleep around 1
a.m. An hour later, Johnny awoke to a loud thump and then heard
the sound of gunfire. Johnny determined that Williams was unhurt,
and together they crept downstairs. Johnny saw the defendant
shooting a handgun into Mason's bedroom. Johnny and Williams
scrambled back upstairs to find a cellular telephone and call the
police. According to Williams, Johnny said, "[T]hat's Ed." As
they discovered that the telephone was not functioning, they heard
a woman scream and more gunfire. When Johnny returned to the
stairs, he saw the defendant in his father's bedroom with a
handgun. The defendant fired several shots into Jones' bedroom
and then crouched down and fired several more shots. The
defendant fired another shot into Mason's room, grabbed a white
box, and fled out the back door of the house. Johnny then locked
the back door. Again, according to Williams, Johnny repeated,
"[T]hat was Ed, man, that was Ed, I saw him, that was Ed." They
discovered that Jones, Mason, and Chotoosingh had been shot to
death, and they called the police around 3 a.m.
	After leaving Jones' house, the defendant drove to a Chicago-area municipal airport, flew in a private plane to Indianapolis,
Indiana, and, using an alias, flew in a commercial plane to Las
Vegas, Nevada. He was arrested more than a month later by Las
Vegas police officers and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
assigned to the fugitive task force. While incarcerated in Las
Vegas, the defendant encountered Carl Torrence, who was being
held on drug charges. Torrence asked the defendant why he had
been arrested. According to Torrence, the defendant answered that
he was "involved in a murder in Chicago." The defendant
explained that he had visited Jones' house early one morning to
drop off money. Inside the house, he smelled and saw gun smoke;
Jones was dead. The defendant went home to shuttle drugs to
another location, but returned to Jones' house a short time later.
When he noticed Johnny standing on the stairs, he left
immediately.
	Torrence had a second conversation with the defendant the
next evening. The defendant stated that he wanted to enter a
witness protection program; Torrence advised him against that
strategy. At Torrence's request, the defendant described the layout
of Jones' house. Torrence dismissed the defendant's suggestion
that Johnny did not see who shot his father and encouraged the
defendant to "come clean." According to Torrence, the defendant
admitted, "Well, I did it." The defendant detailed his relationship
with Jones and stated that he had been stealing money from Jones.
Two days before his murder, Jones had ordered the defendant to
bring him boxes containing $750,000. On the night of the murder,
the defendant placed a handgun in a box and went to Jones' house.
According to Torrence, the defendant stated that he shot Jones
twice, shot Mason twice, and shot Chotoosingh five times as she
hid under a bed. Autopsies later revealed that Chotoosingh had
been shot five times, but that Jones was shot seven times and
Mason three times.
	Torrence had a third conversation with the defendant the
following morning. The defendant asked Torrence whether the
police could trace a .380 handgun to him. The gun used to shoot
the victims was a .380. The defendant waived extradition and was
returned to Chicago. Torrence then contacted the authorities,
offering to exchange his information on the defendant for "a deal."
Based on grand jury testimony from Johnny and Torrence, the
State obtained an indictment against the defendant.
	At trial, Johnny, Williams, and Torrence testified for the
State. The defendant testified on his own behalf and told a story
consistent with the story he told in his first conversation with
Torrence. A jury found the defendant guilty on three first degree
murder counts. The defendant waived a sentencing-phase jury. The
trial court found the defendant eligible for the death penalty. After
hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the court
sentenced the defendant to death. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS
	The defendant raises 11 issues: three guilt-phase issues and
eight sentencing-phase issues.
	An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or presents no
controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). An
issue can become moot if circumstances change during the
pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from being
able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286,
294 (2002). While this appeal was pending, and more than two
years after oral arguments, then-governor Ryan commuted the
defendant's death sentence to natural life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release.
Commutation removes the judicially imposed sentence and
replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed sentence. People ex
rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566 (1913); Black's Law
Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, the commutation rendered
the defendant's sentencing-phase issues moot. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State
v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964). We
therefore, address only his guilt-phase issues.
	The defendant first contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney, George Howard,
labored under a per se conflict of interest. The defendant claims
that Howard previously represented Johnny, a key prosecution
witness and the son of one of the murder victims, when Howard
went to the police station on the night of the murders at the request
of Johnny's uncle after Johnny had been taken there for
questioning. We review this issue de novo. See People v. Miller,
199 Ill. 2d 541, 544 (2002).
	On June 2, 1998, before jury selection began, Howard
addressed an issue about which the State had concerns. Howard
stated:
			"[I]n this case, when this incident first happened, the
uncle of the dead man or one of the deceased individuals
called me and asked me if I would go to the station and
see about his nephew. *** The son of one of the deceased
was being questioned by the police.
			So I drove to the police station pursuant to that request
to see what was going on. I did not speak to the witness.
I was told by the investigating officer that he was not a
suspect and I said then I don't have any business here and
I left."
	Howard noted that, though the police initially thought Johnny
may have been involved in the murders, Johnny was not a suspect
by the time Howard arrived at the station. Howard continued:
			"I never talked to him, I've never seen him in my life,
not to know him and I never spoke to him about this case.
I had, just for the record, I mentioned that to [the
defendant] immediately upon being retained in this case.
I said it's funny that the [brother] of the [sic] one of the
deceased had called me and asked me to go see about his
nephew at the police station at the time, so that matter was
made known to [the defendant] and I wanted to-I knew
myself there was no conflict because I was not involved
but I did want to let [the defendant] know at least I had
been in contact with the case to that extent."
	The State asked Howard to confirm that he was not paid by
the Jones family. Howard stated that he was "[n]ot given one dime
and no contract, nothing. I went there with a view if they-if he had
been a suspect I would have been retained but because I didn't see
him, didn't do anything, I didn't charge him for going down there.
I just said good luck and I'm gone."
	The court questioned the defendant about his knowledge of
Howard's contact with the Jones family. The defendant
acknowledged that Howard had discussed this matter with him.
The defendant stated that he had no problem with Howard
continuing his representation and that he was satisfied that no
conflict of interest existed "as far as Jones."
	Just as no servant can serve two masters, no attorney can
represent conflicting interests. See People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1988); see also Miller, 199 Ill. 2d  at 544-45. A criminal
defendant's sixth amendment right to effective representation
includes the correlative right to conflict-free representation. See
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 67 L. Ed. 2d 220, 230, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1103 (1981); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942); People v. Washington, 101 Ill. 2d 104, 109-10 (1984). Because a defendant is entitled to
undivided loyalty from defense counsel, this court has adopted a
per se conflict-of-interest rule. See People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109,
112-13 (1968). Under this rule, the defendant's conviction must be
reversed if (1) defense counsel has an actual or potential conflict
of interest stemming from a previous or current commitment to a
party with interests adverse to the defendant, and (2) the defendant
does not waive the conflict. See People v. Franklin, 75 Ill. 2d 173,
176 (1979); People v. Coslet, 67 Ill. 2d 127, 133 (1977)
("allegations and proof of prejudice are unnecessary in cases
where a defense counsel, without the knowledgeable assent of the
defendant, might be restrained in fully representing the
defendant's interests due to his or her commitments to others").
	A threshold inquiry in any conflict-of-interest case is whether,
in fact, defense counsel represented or represents a party with
conflicting interests to those of the defendant. That is, where we
have found that the defendant received ineffective assistance
because of a conflict of interest, the parties did not dispute that
defense counsel had a prior or current professional connection
with another party. See, e.g., Washington, 101 Ill. 2d 104 (defense
counsel simultaneously represented the defendant and the
municipality where he was prosecuted); Coslet, 67 Ill. 2d 127
(defense counsel simultaneously represented the defendant and the
administrator of the murder victim's estate); People v. Kester, 66 Ill. 2d 162 (1977) (defense counsel previously represented the
State in its case against the defendant); Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109
(defense counsel simultaneously represented the defendant and the
corporate burglary victim).
	The State contends that Howard had no conflict of interest
because he never represented Johnny. The defendant relies on
People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994), as support for his
argument that Howard and Johnny shared an attorney-client
relationship. In McCauley, an attorney received a telephone call
from the defendant's family and proceeded to police headquarters,
where he identified himself as the defendant's representative and
asked to speak to the defendant. After a police officer declined this
request, the attorney asked the officer whether the defendant had
been arrested; the officer responded that the defendant was
voluntarily at the station and was not the target of any
investigation. The attorney then left police headquarters. The issue
in McCauley, however, was whether the defendant's waiver of his
fifth amendment privilege was valid where he was not informed
that an attorney had been retained to represent him. The issue was
not whether an attorney-client relationship existed; we assumed
one did. Accordingly, McCauley does not aid our analysis.
	Though we need not wade through the vagaries of contract
law to determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed
(see People v. Palmer, 141 Ill. App. 3d 234, 241 (1986), citing
People v. Grigsby, 47 Ill. App. 3d 812, 817 (1977)), we still begin
with the fundamental understanding that such a relationship is
voluntary and requires the consent of both the attorney and the
client (People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 382 (2000)). Because this
relationship is consensual, the client must authorize the attorney
to act on his behalf, and the attorney must accept this power.
Simms, 192 Ill. 2d  at 382.
	Here, Howard simply had no relationship-attorney-client or
otherwise-with Johnny. The record is devoid of any evidence that
Johnny, a 22-year-old adult on the night of the murders, agreed to
let Howard represent him, and we find no indication that Johnny's
uncle summoned Howard at Johnny's behest. Further, the record
is devoid of any evidence that Howard agreed to represent Johnny.
At best, Howard conditionally assented to be Johnny's attorney if
Johnny was a suspect. When Howard learned that Johnny was not
a suspect, he left the police station. He "didn't do anything" and
never charged Johnny for his time. Because Howard and Johnny
had no attorney-client relationship, Howard had neither a per se
nor an actual conflict of interest. The defendant's argument fails,
and we do not reach the issue of whether the defendant waived the
purported conflict.
	The defendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial
because, on direct examination by the State, an assistant State's
Attorney testified about the defendant's invocation of his right to
remain silent and, in closing arguments, the State again mentioned
the defendant's post-arrest silence. We review this legal issue de
novo. People v. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999).
	Assistant State's Attorney Mike Rogers testified for the State
about a custodial interview that he conducted with the defendant.
Rogers summarized the defendant's description of his conduct on
the night of the murders. According to Rogers, the defendant
stated that he entered Jones' house, smelled gun smoke, saw the
victims, and left. Rogers asked the defendant why Johnny insisted
that he saw the defendant shooting a handgun inside Jones' house.
The defendant responded by stating that he "didn't want to talk"
to Rogers. Rogers terminated the interview.
	In its closing argument, the State revisited Rogers' testimony:
"Boy, it's really hard to understand why Assistant State's Attorney
Rogers had trouble believing you [the defendant] when you came
up with this baloney story that you told him. He's just a fool, he's
just a fool. But wait, he was smart enough to ask for his lawyer."
	In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held
that the prosecution generally cannot use a defendant's post-Miranda-warning silence for impeachment purposes without
violating due process. People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 163
(2001). The Doyle rule also applies to a defendant's post-Miranda-warning request for an attorney. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d  at 163. The
State correctly asserts, however, that the defendant forfeited
review of this issue because he never objected to Rogers'
testimony and the State's argument at trial and in a post-trial
motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). The
defendant claims that review of this issue is warranted because
admitting this testimony and argument was plain error.
Alternatively, the defendant charges that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when Howard failed to object to this
testimony and argument .
	"Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial
court." 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); see People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10 (1995). The plain error rule bypasses normal forfeiture
principles and allows a reviewing court to consider a putative trial
error when either (1) the evidence is closely balanced or (2) the
error is "so substantial that it affected the fundamental fairness of
the proceeding, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process." People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 335 (2000). Here, the State presented strong evidence of the
defendant's guilt, and the first prong of the plain error rule does
not apply. Further, "a comment upon a defendant's post-arrest
silence, while improper, is not an error of such magnitude as to
clearly deprive the defendant of a fair trial." People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 215 (1990); accord People v. Lucas, 88 Ill. 2d 245, 252
(1981). Thus, the second prong also does not apply, and the
defendant's plain error argument fails. We turn to his ineffective-assistance argument.
	Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the
test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must prove that
defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that this substandard performance created a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 293 (1996). A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the result at trial. People v.
Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376 (2000). Unless the defendant makes both
showings, we cannot conclude that he received ineffective
assistance. See People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 184 (1996).
That is, if an ineffective-assistance claim can be disposed of
because the defendant suffered no prejudice, we need not
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. See
People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 74 (1997).
	 Here, as we have noted, the State presented strong evidence
of the defendant's guilt, including eyewitness testimony from
Johnny. Further, Rogers' comment that the defendant "didn't want
to talk" was a minor part of his testimony on direct examination.
Similarly, the State's passing, though erroneous, comment that the
defendant requested an attorney while speaking with Rogers was
a minor part of its closing argument-one line in 31 pages of
rebuttal. Because we cannot say that the result of the defendant's
trial would have been different if Howard would have objected to
these comments , the defendant's argument fails.
	The defendant finally contends that the State elicited, at trial,
an improper prior consistent statement from Johnny during its
redirect examination of Rogers. To borrow the defendant's phrase,
this issue contains an "odd twist." The so-called improper prior
consistent statement from Johnny was not elicited during his
testimony, but during Rogers' testimony.
	At trial, Johnny testified that he saw the defendant shooting
a handgun into the rooms where the victims were found. On direct
examination by the State, Rogers testified that he told the
defendant that Johnny informed the police that he had seen the
defendant "shooting people, or shooting in the house." On cross-examination, Rogers repeated that he asked the defendant, "Why
is it that Johnny Jones Junior is telling me that you're shooting
people in a bedroom." The following exchange then occurred
between defense counsel and Rogers:
			"Q. Johnny Jones Junior didn't tell you that he saw [the
defendant] shoot anybody, did he?
			A. He said-well when I first talked to your client-
			Q. No, no, excuse me counsel. My question is did
Johnny Jones Junior tell you that he saw [the defendant]
shoot anybody, yes or no?
			A. He told me that he saw the defendant shoot into the
room where his father and where an older gentleman was
and at a bed and under a bed.
			Q. My question is did he tell you that he saw [the
defendant] shoot anybody, yes or no?
			A. You mean actually see the person get hit with the
bullet when your client pulled the trigger, no, sir.
			Q. That's what it is if you see somebody shoot
somebody that's what you see?
			A. No, he didn't say that.
			Q. Did he say that?
			A. No."
	On redirect examination, the State asked Rogers to repeat
what Johnny had said, and Rogers replied:
			"He told me that when he came down the stairs for the
first time, he saw the defendant shooting into the room.
*** He sees the defendant shooting I believe into the
middle bedroom. That he then runs upstairs and tries to
use a cell phone ***. He comes back downstairs with his
friend, Cory, that he now moves down the hallway, he
sees the defendant shooting over the bed and then leaning
down and shooting under the bed. He loses sight of the
defendant, the defendant comes back out and he's got a
box in his hands. And at that point, the defendant shoots
into the room where [Johnny's] father and [Mason] were
found ***."
	Generally, "a witness may not testify regarding an out-of-court statement made by the witness or a third person which
corroborates the witness' or third person's testimony at trial."
People v. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (1994); accord People v.
Jones, 293 Ill. App. 3d 119, 124 (1997); see M. Graham, Cleary &
Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §611.14, at 527 (7th ed.
1999) ("Where admissible, the prior consistent statement may be
testified to by either the witness herself or any other person with
personal knowledge of the statement"). Rogers testimony on
redirect examination about what Johnny told him corroborated
Johnny's trial testimony and was therefore inadmissible. Howard,
however, made no objection. Accordingly, the defendant again
charges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
Howard failed to object.
	As we have noted, we cannot conclude that the defendant
received ineffective assistance unless he shows both substandard
performance by defense counsel and resulting prejudice. See
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 184. Defense counsel's failure to object to
trial testimony may be a matter of strategy and does not necessarily
establish substandard performance. People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1991).
	In this case, as the State correctly observes, Howard's
decision not to object to Rogers' testimony was a strategic choice.
Johnny's testimony that he saw the defendant shooting into the
rooms where the victims were found and Rogers' testimony
corroborating Johnny's testimony comported with the defense
theory that Johnny did not see the defendant actually shooting the
victims. In fact, Howard elicited similar testimony from Rogers on
cross-examination in a successful effort to impeach him. Once
Rogers had been impeached, the State simply attempted to
rehabilitate him by asking him to repeat what Johnny had said.
Rogers' answer on redirect was in substance identical with his
answer on cross. Cf. People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 50 (1983) (a
defendant who invites or acquiesces to the admission of improper
evidence cannot complain). Indeed, if anyone was bolstered, it was
Rogers. Because we cannot say that Howard's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant's
argument fails.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we affirm the defendant's
convictions.
Convictions affirmed.