Title: Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control1986 WY 44714 P.2d 759Case Number: 85-78Decided: 02/20/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
ZEZAS RANCH, INC., AND 
LULU ZEZAS, APPELLANTS (RESPONDENTS AND PETITIONERS), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
BOARD OF CONTROL, STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT), 

 
 
LEO TASS, JOHNSON-ROGERS 
CATTLE COMPANY, INC., PRESTON AND NINA BOLINGER, JOHN W. AND EILEEN DALEY, AND 
ROY R. AND MARY E. SCHEDLOCK, APPELLEES (PETITIONERS AND 
RESPONDENTS).

 
 
Rehearing Denied April 
11, 1986.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

David F. Palmerlee, of 
Omohundro and Palmerlee, Buffalo.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., and John D. Erdmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Board of Control, 

Henry A. Burgess and Kim 
D. Cannon of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for remaining 
appellees.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY,* BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and RAPER, 
J., Retired.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a district court order affirming the action of the Board of Control which 
quantified Priority No. 2 on Crazy Woman Creek. Appellants word the issues on 
appeal as follows:

 
 
"(a) Was quantification 
of the No. Two Priority under the Crazy Woman Decree within the jurisdiction of 
the Board of Control?

 
 
"(b) Was quantification 
of the No. Two Priority under the Crazy Woman Decree res judicata?

 
 
"(c) Did Appellees have 
standing to seek quantification of the No. Two Priority under the Crazy Woman 
Decree?

 
 
"(d) Was the Crazy Woman 
Decree an ordering of vested water rights by priority and quantity in 
1889?

 
 
"(e) Is the territorial 
court presumed to have acted in conformity with the law which required it to 
quantify the No. Two Priority under the Crazy Woman 
Decree?

 
 
"(f) Was quantification 
of the No. Two Priority under the Crazy Woman Decree by the Board of Control, 
under the law of the case, supported by substantial evidence and contrary to 
law?

 
 
"(g) Are Appellants 
entitled to divert and use up to the decreed amount of the No. Two Priority for 
beneficial use in accordance with Quinn et al. v. John Whitaker Ranch Co. et 
al.?"

 
 

[¶2.]     The water rights from 
Crazy Woman Creek were adjudicated in 1889 by the territorial district court 
pursuant to the judicial adjudication statutes, Ch. 61, § 15, Session Laws of 
Wyoming Territory (1886). The Crazy Woman Decree concerning this adjudication 
was issued by that court on July 5, 1889, prior to Wyoming's statehood and 
prior to the establishment of the Board of Control.

 
 

[¶3.]     Priority No. 2 of the 
Crazy Woman Decree reads as follows:1

 
 
"PRIORITY No. 
2.

 
 
"That John R. Smith and 
Agnes D. Smith the owners of the John R. Smith Ditch, by original construction 
thereof shall be entitled through said ditch to so much water from Crazy Woman 
Creek and its several tributaries, as may be necessary and useful for the 
irrigation of 1200 acres of land lying thereunder, not to exceed 67 and 3/100 
cubic feet of water per second of time and the same shall be Priority No. 
2."

 
 

[¶4.]     On April 21, 1975, 
appropriators junior to Priority No. 2 filed a petition for a partial 
declaration of abandonment. This petition was later amended to include a prayer 
for quantification of Priority No. 2. On August 17, 1977, the Board of Control 
entered its decision that neither side had proved abandonment, and that it did 
not have jurisdiction to consider the prayer for quantification. On review, the 
district court remanded the matter to the Board of Control, holding that the 
latter did have jurisdiction to determine the amount of water "necessary and 
useful" under Priority No. 2, as that amount had not been previously 
quantified.

 
 

[¶5.]     The Board of Control, 
on March 14, 1984, issued the order being reviewed here. That order quantified 
Priority No. 2 at one cubic foot per second per 70 acres of irrigated land for 
1200 acres. The district court affirmed this order, and the present appeal was 
brought.

 
 
JURISDICTION

 
 
Issue 
(a)

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellants first 
contend that the Board of Control lacks jurisdiction to quantify a single water 
right, as opposed to having jurisdiction to conduct an entire streamwide 
adjudication. The district court clearly had jurisdiction to interpret the Crazy 
Woman Decree under the situation in this case. In so doing, the district court 
found an omission in the Crazy Woman Decree. It was, then, appropriate for the 
district court to call upon the state agency with expertise in this area, i.e., 
the Board of Control, to ascertain the facts necessary to correct the 
omission.

 
 

[¶7.]     We have approved this 
procedure before. In the case of Kearney 
Lake, Land & Reservoir Company v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Company, Wyo., 
487 P.2d 324 (1971), we discussed the relationship between the Board of Control 
and the district court in regard to jurisdiction over abandonment proceedings. 
Two relationships being proposed, that of concurrent jurisdiction in the two 
entities and that of exclusive jurisdiction in the Board of Control, we chose to 
adopt a third: that of primary jurisdiction in the Board of Control. We said 
there:

 
 
"`* * * [C]oordination 
between traditional judicial machinery and these agencies was necessary if 
consistent and coherent policy were to emerge. See Texas & P.R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil 
Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553 
(1907). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has become one of the key judicial 
switches through which this current has passed. When there is a basis for 
judicial action, independent of agency proceedings, courts may route the 
threshold decision as to certain issues to the agency charged with primary 
responsibility for governmental supervision or control of the particular 
industry or activity involved. * * *'" Id., 487 P.2d  at 328, quoting from Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. 
Rederiaktiebolaget Trans-Atlantic, 400 U.S. 62 [68], 91 S. Ct. 203, 208, 27 L. Ed. 2d 203, 208 (1970).

 
 

[¶8.]     This being said, we 
note that we will save for a later case the question of whether or not the Board 
of Control would have had jurisdiction initially to quantify a single water 
right.

 
 
STANDING

 
 
Issue 
(c)

 
 

[¶9.]     Although appellants 
word this issue as concerning standing to "seek quantification" of the water 
right here involved, their argument is directed toward standing to attack an 
already quantified water right on the basis of abandonment or condemnation. They 
refer us to recent decisions of this Court concerning abandonment: Cremer v. State Board of Control, 
Wyo., 675 P.2d 250 (1984), and Platte County Grazing Association v. State 
Board of Control, Wyo., 675 P.2d 1279 
(1984).

 
 

[¶10.]  An abandonment theory was contained in 
the pleadings in this case, but the case was processed on the quantification 
issue. Appellees hold water rights junior to Priority No. 2 which will not be 
satisfied if the water allowed to Priority No. 2 is greater than the quantity 
allocated thereto as "necessary and useful." In effect, appellees are requesting 
the determination of the amount allocated to Priority No. 2 in order that proper 
administration of the water rights can be had, rather than an abandonment or 
condemnation of an already established quantity of water - which must be 
accomplished under the specific statutes relative thereto.

 
 

[¶11.]  As holders of junior water rights in a 
stream, appellees certainly have standing to contest the administration of water 
that is not quantified by the adjudication of the water 
right.

 
 

[¶12.]  Recognizing that the original position in 
the matter was premised primarily on abandonment, standing existed even at that 
time. The cases relied upon by appellant are easily distinguished. Cremer 
involved a senior water right seeking abandonment of a junior water right - a 
different situation than in this case. Platte County Grazing Association 
involved the amount of land to which the water was being applied and not the 
quantity of water being used.

 
 

[¶13.]  In Laramie Rivers Company v. Wheatland 
Irrigation District, Wyo., 708 P.2d 20 (1985), we said that a fundamental 
aspect of the standing doctrine is that one who presses an issue must allege "a 
personal stake" in the outcome, so as to guarantee a full and complete 
adversarial presentation of the case. We went on to say:

 
 
"The standing 
requirements of § 41-3-401(b)[2] mandate that the petitioner must 
be possessed of a water right that is 
being abridged either by misuse 
(misapplication), as was the case in Platte County Grazing Association, or 
nonuse as the junior appropriator contends here. * * *" (Emphasis in original; 
footnote omitted.) 708 P.2d  at 28.

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellees in this case alleged a misuse 
of water in that they contended that either an abandonment or a quantification 
was proper. They hold junior water rights which will not be satisfied absent 
some requested relief, due to the lack of water in the stream to satisfy all 
appropriators. They had standing to request relief.

 
 
QUANTIFICATION

 
 
Issues (b), (d), (e) and 
(g)

 
 

[¶15.]  These issues are all interrelated and may 
be considered together. Basically they boil down to the question: Did the 
Priority No. 2 portion of the Crazy Woman Decree, supra, specify the amount of 
water "necessary and useful for the irrigation of 1200 acres of land lying 
thereunder"?

 
 

[¶16.]  The Priority No. 2 water right, along 
with others, was adjudicated pursuant to the judicial adjudication statutes, 
which provided for a declaration of existing water rights establishing the 
priority "with the amount of water which shall be held to have been appropriated 
by such construction and enlargement." Appellants argue that since the statutory 
duty pursuant to the territorial act was to establish the amount of each 
existing water right, we must assume that such was done. However, to so assume 
would be to ignore the plain language of the Crazy Woman Decree itself. The 
Crazy Woman Decree sets the amount of water for Priority No. 2 at that amount 
"necessary and useful for the irrigation of 1200 acres of land * * * not to 
exceed 67 and 3/100 cubic feet of water per second of time." The Crazy Woman 
Decree does not state what amount of water is "necessary and useful." Regardless 
of what the territorial court was or was not required by law to do, it is clear 
from the document itself that no definite quantity of water was set forth in the 
Crazy Woman Decree.

 
 

[¶17.]  Thus appellants' res judicata argument 
also fails.

 
 
"In this jurisdiction the 
doctrine of res judicata and the related doctrine of collateral estoppel have 
been recognized in a number of decisions over the years. Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395 (1982); Roush v. Roush, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 841 (1979); Bard Ranch 
Company v. Weber, Wyo., 557 P.2d 722 (1976); Blount v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 510 P.2d 294 (1973); Knight v. Boner, 
Wyo., 459 P.2d 205 (1969); Rubeling v. 
Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965); Lee v. Brown, Wyo., 357 P.2d 1106 
(1960); Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 
403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935), reh. denied 49 Wyo. 
296, 54 P.2d 814 (1936); and Cook v. 
Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824 (1920). See also Price v. Bonnifield, 2 Wyo. 80 (1878). 
As recognized in this state, these doctrines incorporate a universal precept of 
common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a `right, question or fact 
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same 
parties or their privies.' Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979), 
quoting from Southern Pacific R. Co. v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. Ed. 355 (1897). 
These doctrines are founded upon the interest held by society in having 
differences conclusively resolved in a single action thereby avoiding the 
vexation and expense which are associated with piecemeal litigation. The 
necessity for sustaining this social interest is the justification for the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S.  at 153-154, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74; Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, supra, 652 
P.2d at 398-399; and Rubeling v. 
Rubeling, supra, 406 P.2d  at 284. These doctrines, which inhibit the 
relitigation of claims or issues upon which there has been a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate in a court of competent jurisdiction, promote the 
reliance by citizens of the state upon courts to settle their disputes and they 
conserve judicial resources." Delgue v. 
Curutchet, Wyo., 
677 P.2d 208, 213-214 (1984).

 
 
"* * * [T]he doctrine of 
res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, 
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive 
of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties 
and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial 
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction." 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 394 
(1969).

 
 

[¶18.]  No court has previously determined the 
issue in this case. Appellants inaccurately say in their brief that the 
appellees

 
 
"* * * selected one 
appropriator, the Zezas family, hauled them before the Board by force of law and 
sought to compel them to affirmatively 
prove their water right, though the water right was judicially determined 95 
years ago in a proceeding in which their predecessors in interest participated." 
(Emphasis in original.)

 
 
Appellants' water right 
was not fully determined 95 years ago - the amount of water was never 
quantified. That which was decided by the Crazy Woman Decree, i.e., the date of 
priority, the number of acres, and the right to water "necessary and useful" for 
the irrigation of those acres, is not being relitigated here; it is the amount 
of water which is "necessary and useful" for such purpose and which was never 
before quantified that is now at issue. That issue is not res 
judicata.

 
 

[¶19.]  In issue (g), appellants argue that the 
case of Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch 
Co., 54 Wyo. 367, 92 P.2d 568 (1939), is directly on 
point and requires a reversal. Appellants' reliance on Quinn is 
misplaced.

 
 

[¶20.]  Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Co. did 
involve a water right adjudicated by the territorial district court prior to our 
present water statutes. However, a controlling difference is that in Quinn a specific amount of water was 
quantified by the 1889 decree. It specifically set forth the exact "cubic feet 
of water per second of time" allocated to the water right. Referring to the 
later statutorily imposed limit of one cubic foot per second per 70 acres, we 
said in Quinn, 92 P.2d at 
571:

 
 
"We do not find in the 
statutes any expression of legislative intention to impose any other limitation 
on the quantity of water that may be used under rights adjudicated by 
Territorial courts. * *"

 
 
However, we also said 
there that because of the nature of a water right, the limit of beneficial use 
would exist even in the absence of any statute.

 
 
"* * * The waters belong 
to the public or the state, and an appropriator cannot acquire a right that 
permits him to use more than is reasonably necessary for beneficial purposes. * 
* *" 92 P.2d  at 571.

 
 

[¶21.]  In Quinn we held that a later enacted 
statutory limit on the quantity of water would not affect a water right 
adjudicated by the territorial district court. Such is true in this case. The 
issue in the two cases is different. A definite quantity was adjudicated in the 
Quinn case by the territorial 
district court. It was not adjudicated in this case. The concept of beneficial 
use, even though styled "necessary and useful" in the decree in question, 
controls. The statutory one cubic foot per second per 70 acres does not. The 
district court recognized this when it remanded the matter to the Board of 
Control with the direction that the Board of Control quantify the amount of 
water to which appellants are entitled, based on the "necessary and useful" 
language from the Crazy Woman Decree. The district court 
directed:

 
 
"That in determining the 
amount of water that is `necessary and useful' under the particular priorities 
in the Crazy Woman Decree of July 5, 1889, the Board of Control may consider the 
standard of one cubic foot per second of time for each seventy acres as one of 
the measurements commonly accepted in the State of Wyoming as what is `necessary 
and useful', but the Board is not precluded from considering a greater 
historical beneficial use in quantifying the beneficial use under each 
priority."

 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE

 
 
Issue 
(f)

 
 

[¶22.]  Our usual standard of appellate review 
requires that we afford great deference to that done by the trial court; 
however, when the trial court sits in an appellate role, as here, we afford said 
deference to the fact finder, which in this case was the Board of Control. Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, 
Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427 (1980); Wyoming Public Service Commission v. 
Hopkins, Wyo., 602 P.2d 374 (1979).

 
 

[¶23.]  In arriving at its conclusion, the Board 
of Control heard arguments by the parties, gathered additional information on 
its own initiative, conducted detailed examinations of map exhibits and received 
a clarifying stipulation relative thereto from the parties, reviewed the entire 
administrative record of prior proceedings which included the original hearing 
transcripts and exhibits, and personally observed the ditch site during a 
one-day field trip. From all of this information, coupled with its special 
expertise, the Board of Control concluded, among other things, 
that:

 
 
"1. * * * [O]peration of 
the ranches in the Crazy Woman Creek drainage area follows the general 
irrigation practice which is common throughout the State of Wyoming. * * * The 
irrigation water is used to grow native hay, alfalfa, and other crops. * * * The 
irrigation from Crazy Woman Creek is commenced somewhat earlier than average 
because of an early snow melt, but the general pattern is similar to that 
throughout Wyoming."

 
 
Also, the Board of 
Control found that lands irrigated under the appropriations involved in this 
case are typical of much of the irrigated lands in other counties, which other 
lands are successfully irrigated on the basis of one cubic foot per second of 
water per 70 acres of land. Thus,

 
 
"* * * a maximum delivery 
rate of one c.f.s. per seventy acres during the period when water is available 
for diversion from Crazy Woman Creek is the amount of water that is necessary 
and useful for the irrigation of the lands involved in this case * * 
*."

 
 

[¶24.]  With the applicable standard of review in 
mind, we find that the whole record contains substantial evidence to support the 
findings of the Board of Control and to uphold the decision of the district 
court.

 
 

[¶25.]  Affirmed.

1 Appellants Zezas Ranch, 
Inc. and Lulu Zezas are the present owners of Priority No. 
2.

2 Section 41-3-401(b), 
W.S. 1977, provided:

 
 
"When any water user who 
might be affected by a declaration of abandonment of existing water rights, 
desires to bring about a legal declaration of abandonment, he shall present his 
case in writing to the state board of control. The board has exclusive original 
jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings. The board shall, if the 
facts so justify, refer the matter to the superintendent of the water division 
where the abandonment is claimed to have occurred. The total absence of water to 
divert during an irrigation season precludes the inclusion of any such period of 
nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of the successive five (5) year 
period."