Title: State v. Whitney

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Whitney (2004-293); 178 Vt. 435; 885 A.2d 1200

2005 VT 102

[Filed 19-Aug-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT 102

                                No. 2004-293

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit

  Edgar Whitney	                                 April Term, 2005 

       	
  Edward J. Cashman, J.

  Joel Page, Lamoille County State's Attorney, Hyde Park, for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Robert B. Hemley and Heather Rider Hammond of Gravel and Shea, Burlington,
    for Intervenors/Appellees The Burlington Free Press and The Stowe Reporter.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Henry Hinton, Appellate Defender, and
    Dominador Pascual, Law Clerk, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

       PRESENT: 	Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and
  Allen, C.J. (Ret.), 
  Specially Assigned 

       ¶  1.  ALLEN, C.J. (RET.), specially assigned.   In this
  interlocutory appeal, defendant argues that the district court erred by
  denying his motion to seal a competency report that he claims was not
  formally admitted into evidence during the competency hearing.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  Defendant was arraigned on a charge of first-degree murder in
  June 2004.  After learning at the arraignment that defendant had attempted
  suicide, the district court ordered that he undergo a competency
  evaluation.  An evaluation was conducted, and a report was filed with the
  court on June 23, 2004.  A competency hearing was held on July 7, 2004.  At
  the hearing, defense counsel and the state's attorney presented the court
  with a written stipulation stating that defendant was competent to stand
  trial.  The state's attorney emphasized that the stipulation was based on
  the competency report's findings and conclusions.  The court stated that it
  would accept the stipulation because the report supported it.   Concerned
  that the court may have "accepted" the report, defense counsel stated that
  he wanted the report to be part of the record, but he was not offering it
  into evidence because he did not want the press to have access to it. 
  Defendant argued that § 6(b)(19) of the Rules for Public Access to Court
  Records denied public access to the competency report because the report
  had not been admitted into evidence.  When the court reiterated that it had
  relied upon the report, and that the report was part of the record,
  defendant moved to seal the report, relying primarily on his interpretation
  of § 6(b)(19).

       ¶  3.  The court concluded that while it respected the parties'
  stipulation, it had a duty to make an independent evaluation of competency
  based on the record, and that the record included the report, which
  provided an adequate factual basis for a finding of competency.  The court
  also concluded that defendant had failed to demonstrate that releasing the
  report would prejudice him.  On appeal, defendant argues that there is no
  presumptive First Amendment right of access to competency reports not
  admitted into evidence, and that the trial court erred by denying
  defendant's motion to seal the instant competency report because it had not
  been admitted into evidence.
   
       ¶  4.  As a preliminary matter, we reiterate that defendant's motion
  to seal before the trial court was based primarily, if not exclusively, on
  his claim that court rules did not allow public access to the competency
  report because the report had not been admitted into evidence at the
  competency hearing.  Defendant only vaguely argued that releasing the
  report could prejudice him, and on appeal he merely repeats in a single
  sentence that the report is likely to prejudice him in a pending civil suit
  and his criminal trial.

       ¶  5.  The dissent disagrees with our assessment that defendant's
  focus in challenging release of the competency report was based almost
  exclusively on the public access rules, and criticizes the trial court for
  not approaching defendant's vague claims of prejudice with more "judicial
  vigor."  We find no support, however, for the dissent's view that the trial
  court gave "short shrift" to balancing defendant's right to a fair trial
  against the public's right to access court records.  Defendant's desire not
  to see some unspecified information in the report reach the public was
  hardly sufficient to require the court to find a substantial probability
  that a compelling interest of defendant's would be harmed if the public
  gained access to the report.  At the hearings below, apart from the
  parties' extended debate over whether the competency report had been
  admitted into evidence, defendant's attorney merely noted, by way of
  explanation for why his client wanted the report sealed, that he had
  "gotten wind of the potential for a civil suit," and that he had "some
  concerns . . . that some of the contents of this report would prejudice"
  defendant.  We find nothing in the record, however, specifying what those
  concerns were or which contents of the report might have been prejudicial
  to defendant if released to the public.
   
       ¶  6.  In response to defendant's vague claim of prejudice, the
  trial court balanced the limited information presented to it and concluded
  that defendant would not be harmed if the public gained access to the
  report.  The court stated that information concerning defendant's medical
  background in the report was not particularly distressing in nature, and
  expressed doubt that defendant's right to a fair trial would be affected by
  the release of any information in the report.  See State v. Tallman, 148
  Vt. 465, 474,