Title: IN THE MATTER OF SAJ, A MINOR CHILD v. AFM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF SAJ, A MINOR CHILD v. AFM1989 WY 191781 P.2d 528Case Number: C-89-3Decided: 10/26/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF SAJ, A 
MINOR CHILD.

JJ, APPELLANT 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

AFM, APPELLEE 
(PETITIONER). No. C-89-3

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, 
for appellee, 
petitioner.

Michael D. 
Zwickl, Casper, 
for appellant, 
respondent.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary question 
raised in this case is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 
finding of the trial court that AFM was the father of the female child, SAJ. A 
collateral question is raised relating to the propriety of assessing against the 
Respondent, JJ, the mother of SAJ, the costs of blood tests obtained in 
connection with the paternity proceeding. We are satisfied that the evidence is 
sufficient to support the finding of the trial court with respect to paternity, 
and we affirm the judgment in that regard. We reverse the ruling charging JJ 
with the expense of the blood tests because the cost of those tests is not 
established by any evidence of record.

[¶2.]     In her Brief of 
Appellant, JJ states the issues to be:

"1. In Wyoming is a mere claim 
of `sexual relations' sufficient to prove paternity?

"A. Could such a standard 
possibly be in the best interest of the minor child?

"2. Should blood testing 
costs in a paternity action be charged against a non prevailing party, without 
proof and when the tests were inadmissible in evidence?"

In his brief, 
AFM submits this counter-statement of the issues:

"1. Whether Appellee 
sustained his burden of proof in establishing his 
paternity.

"2. Whether the District 
Court erred in assessing costs for blood tests against 
Appellant."

[¶3.]     On July 11, 1988, AFM 
presented a petition seeking to establish the relationship of father and 
daughter between himself and SAJ pursuant to the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act, 
§§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120, W.S. 1977. He also attempted to gain custody of SAJ in 
this proceeding. SAJ had always resided with her mother, JJ, from the time of 
her birth on August 4, 1985.

[¶4.]     A trial was conducted 
to the court that commenced on December 16, 1988 but was continued to, and 
concluded on, February 9, 1989. On February 15, 1989, the court issued its 
Decision Letter in which it ruled that AFM was the father of SAJ. This ruling 
was primarily attributable to the essentially uncontroverted testimony of AFM 
that he was having "sexual relations * * * [a]bout three or four times a week" 
with JJ at the time of SAJ's conception. Section 14-2-110, W.S. 1977, addresses 
that concept in this way:

"(a) Evidence relating to 
paternity may include:

"(i) Evidence of sexual 
intercourse between the mother and father at any possible time of 
conception;

* * * * * 
*

"(v) All other evidence 
relevant to the issue of paternity of the child."

While the trial 
court did not make specific reference to this statute in its Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, it is the obvious basis for the court's ruling in favor of 
the father on the issue of paternity.1

[¶5.]     The parties recognize 
the rule that paternity cases are civil actions in which the petitioner must 
assume the burden of establishing his, or her, case by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Section 14-2-112(a), W.S. 1977. JJ contends that AFM did not meet this 
burden of proof. She argues that his testimony of "sexual relations" is 
uncorroborated and inconsequential in nature. She asserts that this court should 
ignore the finding of the trial court with respect to paternity and, instead, 
conclude that, as a matter of public policy and as a matter of logic, AFM failed 
to establish his case.

[¶6.]     The manner in which JJ 
frames this issue fails to recognize this "fundamental rule of appeal" we apply 
in all cases which must be reviewed under a sufficiency of the evidence 
standard:

"[T]he evidence of the 
successful party is assumed to be true and is given every favorable inference 
which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it while leaving out of 
consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party. Also, the trial 
court is the sole determiner of the credibility of the witnesses." X v. Y, 482 P.2d 688, 690 (Wyo. 1971).

[¶7.]     The legislature set the 
policy by providing in § 14-2-110, W.S. 1977, that the evidence in a paternity 
case may include evidence of sexual intercourse at any possible time of 
conception. The trial court was entitled to believe AFM's testimony that he had 
"sexual relations" with JJ at a possible time of conception, and the trial court 
did believe that testimony. Apparently, the trial court accepted the term 
"sexual relations" as a synonym for "sexual intercourse," and that is a fair 
interpretation of the statutory language. We hold that there was sufficient 
evidence, in accordance with Wyoming statute, to support the trial court's 
finding of paternity. The record establishes that the guardian ad litem 
appointed for SAJ recommended the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence 
to establish paternity.

[¶8.]     JJ also includes in her 
contentions an argument that the finding was not in the "best interest" of SAJ. 
This argument is contrary to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem. 
Furthermore, that proposition is not relevant in an inquiry relating to 
paternity under the Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act.

[¶9.]     Turning to the issue 
relating to the costs awarded for the expense of blood tests, we hold that, in 
this instance, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the costs for 
the blood tests and reverse that aspect of its judgment. In the course of the 
paternity action, the parties did obtain blood tests after some difficulty in 
making the appropriate arrangements. In accordance with its usual practice, the 
trial court awarded AFM $408 as "costs" for those tests. Our determination that 
an abuse of discretion exists is grounded on the fact that nowhere in the record 
is there any evidence of the cost of obtaining those blood 
tests.

[¶10.]  AFM did attempt to introduce the report 
of the blood test into evidence. It was excluded by the trial court, however, 
because it had not been designated as an exhibit pursuant to the pre-trial 
order. It may be that the ruling excluding the blood tests from evidence 
resulted in AFM's conclusion that there would be no purpose in establishing the 
expense of the blood tests at trial. In any event, the decision letter of the 
trial court is silent with respect to costs for the blood tests. In the final 
order, however, the court did award the costs of the blood tests against JJ. She 
objected on the ground that AFM had not proven those costs during the trial, but 
the trial court ruled that it was its "usual practice" to impose costs for the 
blood tests against the losing party (JJ, in this instance) in a paternity 
action.

[¶11.]  We recognize that the Wyoming Uniform Parentage 
Act, specifically, § 14-2-114, W.S. 1977, furnishes broad discretion to the 
trial court with respect to the assessment of costs. In pertinent part, the 
statute states:

"The court may order 
reasonable fees of counsel, experts and the child's guardian ad litem, and other 
costs of the action and pretrial proceedings including blood tests, to be paid 
by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the court."2

The discretion 
afforded to the trial court, however, is not absolute. It must be exercised in 
accordance with our rule that "costs which are awarded to a litigant are limited 
in amount to those which the evidence shows actually have been incurred and 
shows to be reasonable." Delgado v. Delgado, 773 P.2d 446, 449 (Wyo. 1989). See Stauffer 
Chemical Company v. Robert Curry & Chuck Curry d/b/a/ Diamond Ring Farms, 
778 P.2d 1083 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶12.]  In a paternity action, the costs of 
"blood tests" or "genetic tests" presumably are reasonably necessary for trial 
preparation. See O's Gold Seed v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc., 
761 P.2d 673, 678 (Wyo. 1988). This is the thrust of the 
statutory provision. Nevertheless, the costs of blood tests cannot be awarded in 
the absence of any evidence as to the amount. In an instance such as this, the 
award either was arbitrary because the court did not know the amount, or the 
court obtained the requisite information in an ex parte contact which, of 
course, is improper vel non. In either event, JJ had no opportunity to contest 
the fact or the reasonableness of the expense.

[¶13.]  We hold that while such tests are 
presumptively necessary in a paternity action, that presumption may be rebutted. 
Awarding the expense of the tests as costs, in the absence of proof on the 
record of the actual amount charged for such tests, is arbitrary and must be 
perceived as an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

[¶14.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed with respect to the issue of the relationship of father and daughter 
between AFM and SAJ. It is reversed with respect to the award of costs, and that 
aspect of the trial court's judgment is void.

FOOTNOTES

1 The trial court also 
ruled that it would be in the "best interests" of SAJ to give custody to JJ 
while awarding AFM reasonable visitation rights.

2 Section 14-2-114, W.S. 
1977, was amended, effective June 8, 1989, to substitute "genetic tests" for 
"blood tests." The meaning and interpretation of the statute are intact despite 
this substituted language.