Title: BETTY JONES V ENERTEL INC

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002  
BETTY J. JONES,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 119578  
ENERTEL, INC., a Michigan 
corporation,  
Defendant,  
and  
CITY OF SOUTH LYON, a municipal 
corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant  
PER CURIAM  
In this case, plaintiff alleged that she suffered  
injuries as a result of the failure of defendant city of South  
Lyon to fulfill its statutory duty under MCL 691.1402(1) to  
maintain a sidewalk in reasonable repair. The circuit court  
denied South Lyon’s motion for summary disposition, which was  
premised on the position that it should not be held liable  
because the condition of the sidewalk was open and obvious.  
The Court of Appeals denied South Lyon’s interlocutory  
application for leave to appeal that decision.  We affirm the  
circuit court’s denial of the motion for summary disposition  
because the open and obvious doctrine of common-law premises  
liability is inapplicable to a claim that a municipality  
violated its statutory duty to maintain a sidewalk on a public  
highway in reasonable repair.  
I  
Plaintiff alleges that she fell on a sidewalk located  
along a road in South Lyon “due to the hazardous nature of  
said sidewalk, including broken cement [and] differences in  
height between the cement slabs” and that she suffered a  
fracture of her right arm and other injuries as a result.  She  
further asserts that South Lyon failed to properly maintain  
the sidewalk.  
South Lyon moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR  
2.116(C)(10) on the ground that it was not liable because the  
condition of the sidewalk was open and obvious. The circuit  
court denied that motion, ruling that it was bound to follow  
the holding in Haas v Ionia, 214 Mich App 361; 543 NW2d 21  
(1995), that the open and obvious doctrine cannot bar an  
action for violation of a municipality’s statutory obligation  
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under MCL 691.1402(1) to keep a sidewalk in reasonable repair.  
Thereafter, South Lyon filed an interlocutory application for  
leave to appeal the denial of its motion for summary  
disposition with the Court of Appeals, which denied the  
application.  
II  
We review the resolution of a summary disposition motion  
de novo.  Roberts v Mecosta Co General Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62;  
642 NW2d 663 (2002).  
III  
MCL 691.1402(1), part of the governmental tort liability  
act (GTLA), imposes a general duty on municipalities to keep  
“a highway,” including a sidewalk on the highway1, under its  
jurisdiction in reasonable repair:  
Except as otherwise provided in section 2a[2]  
each governmental agency having jurisdiction over a 
highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable  
repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient 
for public travel.  A person who sustains bodily 
injury or damage to his or her property by reason 
of failure of a governmental agency to keep a  
highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair 
and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for 
travel may recover the damages suffered by him or 
her from the governmental agency. 
[Emphasis 
added.]  
1  The applicable statutory definition of “highway” 
includes “sidewalks . . . on the highway.” MCL 691.1401(e).  
3  
 
The emphasized language places a duty on municipalities to  
maintain their sidewalks on public highways in reasonable  
repair.  This means that municipalities have an obligation, if  
necessary, to actively perform repair work to keep such  
sidewalks in reasonable repair. This is a greater duty than  
the duty a premises possessor owes to invitees under common­
law premises liability principles.  The basic duty owed to an  
invitee by a premises possessor is “to exercise reasonable  
care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm  
caused by a dangerous condition on the land.”  Lugo v  
Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).  
Accordingly, as we discussed in Lugo, this duty does not  
generally require a premises possessor to remove open and  
obvious conditions because, absent special aspects, such  
conditions are not unreasonably dangerous precisely because  
they are open and obvious.  However, such reasoning cannot be  
applied to the statutory duty of a municipality to maintain  
sidewalks on public highways because the statute requires the  
sidewalks to be kept in “reasonable repair.”  The statutory  
language does not allow a municipality to forego such repairs  
because the defective condition of a sidewalk is open and  
obvious. Accordingly, we conclude that the open and obvious  
doctrine of common-law premises liability cannot bar a claim  
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against a municipality under MCL 691.1402(1).  
Moreover, MCL 691.1403, in qualifying the general duty  
imposed on municipalities to maintain highways, provides:  
No governmental agency is liable for injuries 
or damages caused by defective highways unless the 
governmental agency knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known, of the 
existence of the defect and had a reasonable time  
to repair the defect before the injury took place. 
Knowledge of the defect and time to repair the same 
shall be conclusively presumed when the defect 
existed so as to be readily apparent to an  
ordinarily observant person for a period of 30 days 
or longer before the injury took place.  
This language contemplates that a city may, in appropriate  
circumstances, be held liable for defects in a highway that  
are 
“readily 
apparent to an ordinarily observant person”—or in  
other words are open and obvious.  Thus, MCL 691.1403 reflects  
that the Legislature did not intend to allow a municipality to  
invoke the open and obvious doctrine in this context.  
Accordingly, MCL 691.1403 reinforces our conclusion that the  
open and obvious doctrine is inapplicable to a claim that a  
municipality has violated its duty to maintain a highway  
(including a sidewalk on a highway).  
IV  
In arguing that it should be allowed to avail itself of  
the open and obvious doctrine, South Lyon, in its application  
for leave to appeal, cites MCL 691.1412, which provides:  
5  
 
  
Claims under this act are subject to all of 
the defenses available to claims sounding in tort 
brought against private persons.  
South Lyon argues that, because the open and obvious “defense”  
is available to private parties, MCL 691.1412 requires that it  
be allowed to advance that doctrine in this case.  We  
disagree.  Assuming for purposes of discussion that MCL  
691.1412 read in isolation would allow South Lyon to use the  
open and obvious doctrine as a defense in the present case, we  
conclude that MCL 691.1412 would have to yield to the more  
specific statutory duty to maintain highways in reasonable  
repair under MCL 691.1402(1). “[W]here a statute contains a  
general provision and a specific provision, the specific  
provision controls.” Gebhardt v O’Rourke, 444 Mich 535, 542­
543; 510 NW2d 900 (1994).  As discussed in the previous  
section, MCL 691.1402(1) imposes a duty on municipalities  
specific to maintaining highways (including sidewalks on  
highways) in reasonable repair.  In contrast, MCL 691.1412  
applies generally to all claims under the GTLA.  Thus, the  
specific provisions of MCL 691.1402(1) prevail over any  
arguable inconsistency with the more general rule of MCL  
691.1412.  
V  
For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court denial of  
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the motion for summary disposition.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
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