Title: Norman v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALLISON LAMONT NORMAN, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 531 & 565, 2007 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
CONSOLIDATED 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§ 
 
 
§ 
ID No. 0504005647  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: March 9, 2009 
 
Decided: June 16, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 
PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire (argued), Nicole M. Walker, Esquire (argued), and 
Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, of the Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Abby L. Adams, Esquire, Paul R. Wallace, Esquire (argued), and John R. 
Williams, Esquire  of the Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Before us are Defendant-Appellant Allison Lamont Norman’s consolidated 
direct and automatic appeals1 from his Superior Court conviction of murder in the 
first degree and related offenses, which resulted in a sentence of death and 145 
years in prison.2  Norman raises four arguments.  First, he claims that the court 
improperly allowed the expert psychiatric testimony of Dr. Stephen Mechanick to 
be considered in the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.  Second, he contends that 
a death sentence cannot be based on the single statutory aggravating circumstance 
that his conduct resulted in the death of two or more persons,3 where one of the 
deaths occurred outside of Delaware and beyond its jurisdiction.  Third, he argues 
that even if an out-of-state death can be used to establish an aggravating 
circumstance, his lack of criminal responsibility for that death under the law of that 
state must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.  Fourth, he urges that 
executing a person who lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution. 
                                          
 
1 Pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4209(g), this Court automatically reviews the Superior Court’s 
recommendation and imposition of the death penalty to ensure it is supported by proof of a 
statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, is not arbitrary and capricious, and is 
proportionate to the penalty in similar capital cases.  This automatic appeal does not affect the 
defendant’s right to raise any error in the guilt phase of the trial.  11 Del. C. § 4209(h). 
2 Norman was convicted of ten separate charges: one count of murder in the first degree, two 
counts of attempted murder in the first degree; one count of felony theft, three counts of 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and three counts of wearing body 
armor during the commission of a felony. 
3 See 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)k. 
 
3
In this Opinion, we affirm the judgments of conviction by the Superior 
Court.  We conclude that Dr. Mechanick’s initial interview of Norman in Maryland 
on behalf of Delaware prosecutors violated Norman’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel on the Delaware charges, but that Dr. Mechanick’s testimony was 
nonetheless admissible under the independent source and inevitable discovery 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.  We also conclude that the State may use 
evidence of criminal conduct in another state to establish the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance under the Delaware statute. 
However, we find merit to Norman’s third argument and, therefore, remand 
for a new penalty hearing.  The sentencer in a capital case must consider, in 
mitigation, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any mitigating 
circumstance that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.  
Lack of criminal responsibility under the law of the state where an act occurs is a 
mitigating circumstance.  By relying upon the aggravating circumstance that 
Norman caused the death of two persons, the prosecution put in issue a second 
homicide in Maryland.  Norman presented evidence in mitigation of his lack of 
criminal responsibility for his conduct in Maryland.  Neither the jury nor the trial 
judge decided Norman’s claim in mitigation under Maryland law.  This was 
because the Superior Court determined—at the State’s request—that Norman’s 
conduct in Maryland would be “screened” under Delaware law, notwithstanding 
 
4
evidence of his lack of any criminal responsibility under Maryland law.  This 
ruling—and the absence of any instruction to guide the jury on the issue of 
Norman’s alleged lack of criminal responsibility under Maryland law—requires a 
new penalty hearing.  Without guidance from the trial judge on Maryland law, the 
jury could not properly determine the existence of the alleged mitigating 
circumstance that Norman was “not criminally responsible” for the crimes he 
committed in Maryland or weigh that circumstance in its determination of 
sentence.  Delaware law and the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution require the jury and the judge to consider any mitigating circumstance 
that may be raised by the evidence.4  The absence of an instruction on how to 
determine the existence of the alleged mitigating circumstance jeopardized the 
fairness and integrity of the penalty hearing in this case.  Accordingly, we must 
reverse the death sentence imposed and remand for a new penalty hearing that will 
include an instruction to the jury on the applicable Maryland law.5 
                                          
 
4 See 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(4) (“In the instructions to the jury the Court shall include instructions 
for [the jury] to consider any mitigating circumstances…which may be raised by the evidence.”); 
see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not 
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or 
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.”); cf. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982) (Lockett 
adopted by majority of the Court); White v. State, 395 A.2d 1082, 1088 (Del. 1978) (finding 
Section 4029 satisfies the constitutional standards laid down in Lockett and its progeny). 
5 As a result, issues pertaining to our proportionality review and Norman’s claim that executing a 
person who lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct violates the 
United States and Delaware constitutions are not yet ripe for review. 
 
5
I. Facts and Procedural History. 
In a tragic shooting spree that unfolded across fifteen miles and two states on 
April 7, 2005, Norman shot at numerous people while delirious, killing two and 
wounding several others, including one woman who became paralyzed.  Norman 
fatally wounded Jamell Weston and wounded Marcus Cannon near a school bus 
stop at the entrance to the Carvel Gardens apartment complex in Laurel, Delaware.  
Afterward, Norman stole a parked car from the apartment complex and drove to 
Salisbury, Maryland.  Along the way, Anthony White attempted to ask Norman for 
a ride home, but as White approached the vehicle, Norman shot and wounded him.  
When Norman reached Delmar, Maryland, he shot at a garbage truck and crew, but 
none of the workers sustained injuries.  While continuing to drive to Salisbury, 
Norman shot at several people and vehicles, wounding Marsha Hankerson.  When 
he arrived at his friend Tobias Cannon’s home in Salisbury, Norman took one of 
his dogs and shot two others.  He then shot and killed Davondale Peters after 
Peters gave him a ride.  Norman also shot Carla Green, who was driving with her 
daughter, leaving Green paralyzed.  After shooting Peters and Green, Norman 
chased after witnesses and went from house to house in Salisbury, eventually 
breaking into the home of Mary and Watson Dutton, an elderly couple.  He left 
their home without harming them and was arrested a short time later by Wicomico 
County Sheriff’s officers. 
 
6
The defense presented evidence that Norman was acting in the throes of a 
psychotic episode driven by bizarre delusions that were the culmination of a 
lifetime of exposure to abuse, violence, and criminal conduct.  As related by 
psychiatrists at trial, Norman experienced a concurrence of factors which 
contributed to this mental state.  On April 17, 2003, his older brother, Shane 
DeShields, and a friend killed a man in a botched attempt to steal the drugs the 
man was selling.  Norman, who deeply admired DeShields, was crushed by his 
brother’s imprisonment.  He attended DeShields’s capital murder trial and 
witnessed his conviction.  At his brother’s penalty hearing, evidence was presented 
that DeShields and Norman, when young children, were sexually assaulted by a 
babysitter, Ben Green.  Norman, as a child, had begged his mother not to leave 
them with Green.  He was furious at her for having kept the abuse quiet and for 
denying him the support of family and friends.  His anger toward his mother was 
renewed by the cavalier attitude he felt she displayed about the assaults at the 
hearing.  On October 8, 2004, DeShields was sentenced to life in prison.6 
On October 16, 2004, Norman was parked at a convenience store in Delmar, 
Maryland when two men approached his vehicle and opened fire.  Norman 
returned fire, but was shot in the abdomen and leg.  His wounds required surgery to 
his colon and he was hospitalized for several weeks.  Norman was charged with a 
                                          
 
6 See State v. DeShields, Del. Super., No. 0304012359A (Oct. 8, 2004), aff’d, 879 A.2d 591 (Del. 
2005). 
 
7
weapons offense in connection with the shooting and faced a potential ten year 
prison sentence in Maryland upon his release from the hospital. 
After his discharge from the hospital, Norman moved in with his mother in 
Seaford.  Although still in pain from the surgery, he stopped taking his prescribed 
medications; instead, he consumed marijuana and ecstasy.  For the next few 
months, Norman took two to four ecstasy tablets per day and regularly smoked 
marijuana.  He was terrified that his life was in danger because he did not know the 
identity of at least one of the men who shot him, and he suspected that his own 
friends were involved. 
In January 2005, Norman moved to Carvel Gardens in Laurel to live with his 
girlfriend, Kisha DeShields, and her five children.  He was the father of one of 
Kisha’s children, five-year-old Donesha.  On January 10, Ronshelle Harmon gave 
birth to Norman’s son, Ny’Kael.  Norman did not sign the birth certificate, but he 
visited Harmon in the hospital and occasionally visited Ny’Kael in early Spring 
2005, sometimes bringing Donesha along. 
On April 6, knowing he faced up to ten years in jail on the weapons charge, 
Norman failed to appear for his scheduled Maryland court appearance.  A warrant 
was issued for his arrest.  Norman spent a few hours with his friend Devon 
Cannon, during which time they smoked marijuana.  He also took ecstasy.  He then 
discussed potentially killing his mother, even scouting a gravesite in the wooded 
 
8
area to which he and Devon had traveled.  Norman then began to fear Devon might 
kill him, and told him so, but later apologized. 
Later that night, Norman started to believe he had special powers of vision.  
He thought he could see things in the dark and that things turned white for him in 
the darkness.  He believed he was blessed with this special gift.  When Kisha 
seemed to ignore or neglect him, Norman became angry, pointed a gun at her, and 
told her not to “disrespect” him.  He then danced around the apartment, 
announcing that he was the Messiah who ruled the world. 
After Norman calmed down, he watched an episode of the television show, 
The X-Files.  He formed the belief that aliens or demons were trying to get into the 
children’s bedrooms to kidnap and rape them.  Norman went into their rooms and, 
thinking his enhanced vision allowed him to see the creatures outside in the 
darkness, he yelled at them and chased them.  Thinking that this was a test to see if 
he could protect his family, Norman “guarded” the children that night by pinching 
and pulling the little girls’ hair in the belief that their screams would cause the 
aliens or demons to retreat. 
By the next morning, Norman appeared to Kisha to be better, though he still 
expressed concern for the children’s safety.  Norman later explained that, based on 
recent experiences, he also had formed the belief that black people had been taken 
over by the demonic forces he was fighting.  According to Norman, even though 
 
9
some of the people he shot at were white, he believed them to be black, and 
therefore evil, when he shot at them. 
Norman’s delusions continued.  After helping Kisha get the children ready 
for school, Norman donned a bulletproof vest and, armed with a gun, took 
Donesha to the bus stop at about 8 a.m.  On their way, they encountered Jamell 
Weston and Marcus Cannon, who were returning from dropping off Weston’s 
nephew and Cannon’s girlfriend’s children.  Believing that Weston and Cannon 
were alien or demon creatures who were about to kidnap and molest Donesha, 
Norman drew his gun and shot Weston at point blank range, once in the face and 
once in the chest.  Weston fell to the sidewalk and died.  Cannon fled and Norman 
fired after him, hitting him in the arm.  Norman then walked back to the apartment, 
with Donesha running ahead to tell her mother what had occurred. 
Apparently misunderstanding Donesha’s account, Kisha thought Norman 
had only fired his gun into the air.  She told him to leave because the police would 
probably be called.  Norman left, taking his keys, cell phone, holster, $1,681 in 
cash, the 9mm pistol he had used to kill Weston and shoot Cannon, and three 
magazines of ammunition.  He was still wearing a bulletproof vest.  Continuing to 
believe that his battle against the “bad people” was ongoing, Norman proceeded 
south on Route 13 to Salisbury, Maryland, shooting at several people and vehicles 
 
10
along the way.  In his shooting spree he narrowly missed numerous innocent 
bystanders, but did seriously injure Anthony White and Marsha Hankerson. 
After Norman arrived in Salisbury, he went to the home of Tobias Cannon.  
He took a pit bull that belonged to Cannon, but shot his two other dogs, believing 
that they were demons.  When the dog ran into the street, an SUV stopped to avoid 
hitting it.  Norman took this as a sign that the driver of the SUV had come to aid 
him in his war against the demons.  He asked the driver, Davondale Peters, for a 
ride and got in the vehicle with the dog.  When Peters failed to follow all of 
Norman’s rambling directions and started to drive slowly, Norman became 
suspicious.  Thinking Peters also was associated with the demons he believed he 
was fighting, Norman jumped out of the SUV and ran around to the driver’s side.  
He said: “No, you hold up motherfucker”; and then fired his gun several times into 
the SUV.  Peters was mortally wounded, but was able to drive away.  He drove 
over a curb, a mailbox, and through a fence, with the vehicle coming to rest against 
a house.  Peters died at the scene. 
After shooting Peters, Norman approached a white van that had stopped at 
the same intersection.  Carla Green was driving the van with her daughter in the 
car seat behind her.  Norman threw open the door and said: “This is a carjacking, 
bitch.”  Fearing for her daughter, Green slammed the door shut and stomped on the 
accelerator.  As she drove away, Norman shot at her several times, barely missing 
 
11
the child safety seat, but hitting Green three times and rendering her a paraplegic.  
Norman then turned on Natalie Reddick, who had witnessed both of the prior 
shootings.  Norman chased after her, but had run out of ammunition.  Reddick 
retreated to her mother’s house and refused to let Norman in.  Norman then 
proceeded from house to house, banging on doors.  As he did so, he spotted 
Sabrina Gilmore and her grandniece, who were also able to reach the safety of 
Gilmore’s parents’ house before Norman could descend upon them. 
Norman then broke into the home of an elderly couple, Mary and Watson 
Dutton.  He told them that someone was after him, and he needed a car to escape.  
Mr. Dutton refused to give Norman a car.  Norman then demanded money from 
Mrs. Dutton, who was crying.  Norman pushed her to the floor with both hands.  
He then threw some glass items from the table and shelves, but after Mr. Dutton hit 
him with a broom, Norman left.  
Deputies from the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office arrived on the scene.  
Norman saw the officers and hid behind parked cars.  Reddick came out of her 
mother’s house, shouted to the officers, and pointed at Norman.  When the 
deputies shouted: “Police! Stop!,” Norman fled.  Norman was captured after a 
short chase.  When he was taken into custody, the officers noted that Norman was 
wearing body armor and had in his possession a 9mm handgun, a holster, three 
magazines, $1,681 in cash, a cell phone, and keys. 
 
12
After Norman was placed in a police vehicle, he shouted out of the window 
of the vehicle, yelled for help, and claimed he was the Messiah.  Several days after 
Norman’s arrest, he was transferred from the Wicomico County Detention Center 
to the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital (“Perkins”) in Jessup, Maryland due to concern 
that Norman was a danger to himself or others.7  He was kept at Perkins, where he 
was restrained and treated by psychiatrists with anti-psychotic medications.  On 
May 17, 2005, Norman was indicted in Maryland for murder and related offenses.  
On June 27, 2005, Norman was also indicted in Delaware for murder in the first 
degree and related offenses. 
The Maryland Public Defender’s Office represented Norman on the 
Maryland charges.  It hired Joanna Brandt, M.D., a psychiatrist specializing in 
forensic psychiatry, to perform a psychological evaluation of Norman.  Dr. Brandt 
concluded that Norman suffered from a Psychotic Disorder, NOS (not otherwise 
specified) at the time of the offenses, and therefore, lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his offenses on April 7, 2005.8  The Maryland Circuit 
Court ordered that a second evaluation of Norman be performed by Saadia Alizai-
                                          
 
7 Norman’s unusual behavior continued even after he was placed in a jail cell.  Additionally, 
several days later, Norman attempted to put his head into the toilet, threw feces, wrapped his 
head in sheets, and held his breath, asking the prison staff to let him die. 
8 See generally JOANNA D. BRANDT, PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION (Dec. 7, 2006) [hereinafter 
BRANDT REPORT].  Dr. Brandt testified that Norman “was grossly, floridly psychotic on April 
7th, 2005” and, while Norman “had used drugs prior to the time of the offense, that by 8:00 in 
the morning, he was no longer intoxicated with drugs.”  She also explained that “as time went on 
and it became four months, five months, it was clear that the drugs were no longer affecting him, 
and the appropriate diagnosis was psychotic disorder NOS, or a primary psychotic illness.” 
 
13
Cowan, M.D., the Director of the Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship Program at 
Perkins.  Dr. Alizai-Cowan also concluded that “to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, at the time of the offense, due to his Psychotic Disorder, NOS, Norman 
lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”9  The opinions of these two 
experts supported a “not criminally responsible” defense under Maryland law.10 
In December 2005, after receiving Dr. Alizai-Cowan’s report, the State’s 
Attorney for Wicomico County, Maryland contacted a Deputy Attorney General in 
Sussex County, Delaware to discuss having a third psychiatric examination of 
Norman for the Maryland case.  Together, the Maryland and Delaware prosecutors 
decided to retain Stephen Mechanick, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist, with each state 
paying one-half of his fee.  The Delaware Attorney General’s office initiated 
contact with Dr. Mechanick and, along with the Maryland prosecutors, retained 
him to evaluate Norman under both Maryland and Delaware law. 
The Maryland prosecutors applied to the Maryland Circuit Court for an 
order permitting Dr. Mechanick to examine Norman, which was granted.  Dr. 
                                          
 
9 See generally SAADIA ALIZAI-COWAN, PRETRIAL EVALUATION (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter 
ALIZAI-COWAN REPORT].  In ruling out a substance-induced psychosis, Dr. Alizai-Cowan 
explained at trial that Norman’s “symptoms lasted well over 30 days[,]” and “[w]hatever might 
have been the drug causing this effect, when you stop this, the symptoms should resolve.  His 
symptoms went on for months, not just a night or a week.” 
10 MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 3-109.  The statute provides that “A defendant is not criminally 
responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a 
mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality 
of that conduct; or (2) conform that conduct to the requirements of law.” 
 
14
Mechanick evaluated Norman on January 28, 2006 and issued lengthy reports on 
March 17.  He wrote two psychiatric evaluations, one for Maryland authorities and 
one for Delaware authorities.  The first sixty-two pages and the psychiatric 
diagnoses of the two reports were identical.  In the last two pages of each report 
Dr. Mechanick tailored his opinion to the differing criminal responsibility laws in 
Maryland and Delaware.  He concluded that Norman did not appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct and was not able to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law, but opined that Norman’s actions were the result of 
intoxication and substance-induced delirium.  As a result, Dr. Mechanick 
concluded that Norman did not meet Delaware’s more narrow standard for “not 
guilty by reason of insanity” (“NGRI”) or “guilty but mentally ill” (“GBMI”), 
because his mental state was caused by voluntary intoxication.11 
The Maryland prosecutors dismissed all of the charges against Norman in 
Maryland, including the murder of Peters, on April 6, 2006.  That was done with 
knowledge of the opinion of Dr. Alizai-Cowan that Norman met the standard for 
“not criminally responsible” under Maryland law.  In his Findings after Penalty 
Hearing, the Delaware trial judge recognized that the Maryland charges were most 
                                          
 
11 See STEPHEN MECHANICK, PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION OF ALLISON LAMONT NORMAN (Mar. 
17, 2006) [hereinafter MECHANICK FIRST REPORT] (“It is my opinion that Mr. Norman lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct related to his criminal charges 
that occurred in Delaware.  It is also my opinion that Mr. Norman’s intoxication(s) and delirium 
substantially disturbed his thinking, feeling, and behavior.  However, to the extent that this was 
due to voluntary intoxication (e.g., with marijuana) Mr. Norman would not meet Delaware’s 
definition of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity or Guilty But Mentally Ill.”) 
 
15
likely dropped because of Norman’s mental condition.  The court noted: “The laws 
governing accountability and culpability for one’s conduct while voluntarily 
intoxicated and the interaction between intoxication and mental illness differ 
between Maryland and Delaware.  Apparently, for that reason, the Wicomico 
County State’s Attorney dismissed the Maryland charges and Norman was 
returned to Delaware in April 2006.”12  After Norman’s extradition to Delaware, 
the Public Defender was appointed to represent him. 
Prior to his trial in Delaware, Norman’s Delaware defense counsel filed a 
notice of an insanity defense pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 12.2.  They 
also moved to preclude the State’s use of Dr. Mechanick’s expert testimony, 
arguing that the State had deliberately violated Norman’s Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel when it obtained the psychiatric evaluation in Maryland.  The Superior 
Court found there was a Sixth Amendment violation, but concluded that it was 
harmless error.  Additionally, the court imposed a restriction that Dr. Mechanick 
could “only be used as a rebuttal witness assuming the Defendant pursues the 
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.”13 
                                          
 
12 State v. Norman, 2007 WL 3105759, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter 
Findings After Penalty Hearing]. 
13 State v. Norman, Del. Super., No. 0504005647, at 10 (Feb. 1, 2007) (Letter to counsel denying 
defense motion to preclude use of Dr. Mechanick’s testimony or evaluation for any purpose) 
[hereinafter Order re: Expert Testimony]. 
 
16
The State then moved for a second psychiatric examination of Norman by 
Dr. Mechanick.  The motion was granted and, on March 5, 2007, Dr. Mechanick 
reevaluated Norman in the Special Housing Unit of the Delaware Correctional 
Center to address information elicited by Dr. Brandt regarding prior instances of 
psychotic episodes.14  Norman denied experiencing any psychotic symptoms prior 
to using ecstasy in late February and early March 2005, claimed he had no odd 
thoughts or experiences since August 2005, and corroborated his prior statements 
on drug use.  Dr. Mechanick’s conclusion remained unchanged. 
The State notified the court and defense counsel that it would seek the death 
penalty against Norman based on one statutory aggravator—that Norman caused 
the death of two or more persons: Weston in Delaware and Peters in Maryland.15  
Prior to trial, Norman filed a motion to preclude the State from using an out-of-
state death as an aggravating factor, arguing, in part, that Norman was not 
criminally responsible for the death of Peters under Maryland law.  Following a 
hearing on the defense motion, the State filed a motion requesting that “all 
references, conclusions and opinions as to the standard of insanity in Maryland 
should be excluded.”  In support of its motion, the State asserted the following: 
                                          
 
14 See STEPHEN MECHANICK, PSYCHIATRIC REEVALUATION OF ALLISON LAMONT NORMAN (Mar. 
14, 2007) [hereinafter MECHANICK SECOND REPORT].  Dr. Brandt’s evaluation was issued nine 
months after Dr. Mechanick’s first report.  In one interview, Norman told Dr. Brandt that he had 
experienced hallucinations or “signs” as early as 15.  As Norman’s prior medical history was 
important to Dr. Mechanick’s diagnosis, the re-evaluation was meant to clarify the inconsistency. 
15 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)k. 
 
17
1. 
On or about December 8, 2005, Dr. Alizai-Cowan, M.D. 
completed a report in which he generated an opinion of Alison 
[sic] Lamont Norman’s mental state at the time of the Maryland 
offenses under Maryland’s insanity law. 
2. 
On or about July 6, 2005, Dr. Joanna D. Brandt, M.D. 
completed a report in which she generated an opinion of Alison 
[sic] Lamont Norman’s mental state at the time of the Maryland 
offenses under Maryland’s insanity law. 
3. 
In the case sub judice, the issues surrounding mental state and 
[sic] will be controlled by Delaware’s insanity law. 
4. 
Pursuant to Delaware Criminal Rule of Evidence 402 & 403 
opinions, references and qualifications under Maryland’s laws 
are not relevant and should therefore be inadmissible. 
The court denied the defense motion to preclude and, in the same order, 
addressed the issues raised in the State’s motion in limine, stating that: 
If the Defendant is found guilty and the State seeks the death 
penalty, then the jury may consider all of the events which occurred 
that day including the acts occurring in Maryland.  Issues of the 
Defendant’s legal competency for his actions in Maryland will need to 
be addressed but these decisions will be filtered through the Delaware 
standards.  The State of Delaware shall not be bound by Maryland’s 
determination of criminal responsibility.  Mr. Norman’s conduct will 
be judged by law of Delaware as to his criminal responsibility.16 
At trial, Norman did not testify.  Defense counsel acknowledged in opening 
statements that Norman had committed the acts and conceded in closing argument 
that the State had proven the facts of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Defense counsel sought a verdict of NGRI and offered the testimony of Dr. Brandt 
                                          
 
16 State v. Norman, Del. Super., No. 0504005647, at 2 (Dec. 28, 2006) (Letter to counsel denying 
defense motion to preclude State from using second death in Maryland as aggravator) 
[hereinafter Order re: Out-of-State Death]. 
 
18
and Dr. Alizai-Cowan.17  After the defense raised the insanity defense, the State 
presented Dr. Mechanick’s evaluation and testimony in rebuttal.  The jury rejected 
the verdicts of NGRI and GBMI and found Norman guilty as charged.  It did so 
after the prosecution argued, and the trial court instructed, that, under Delaware 
law, a defendant may not rely upon the defense of NGRI, nor may a jury return a 
verdict of GBMI, if a mental illness or psychiatric disorder was proximately caused 
by the use of alcohol or illegal drugs.18 
                                          
 
17 The court also instructed the jury on the verdict of “guilty but mentally ill.” 
18 The court instructed the jury: 
The fact, if it is a fact, that the criminal acts were committed while the 
defendant was in a state of intoxication, or was committed because of such 
intoxication, is no defense to any criminal charge if the intoxication was 
voluntary. 
Intoxication means the inability, resulting from the introduction of substances 
into the body, to exercise control over one’s mental faculties. 
Voluntary intoxication means intoxication caused by substances which the 
actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause 
intoxication he knows or should have known, unless he introduces them pursuant 
to medical advice or under such duress as would afford a defense to a prosecution 
for a criminal offense. 
*    *    * 
[The court then instructed the jury on mental illness and the verdicts of not 
guilty by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill.] 
*    *    * 
Another statute that is pertinent, 11 Delaware Code 401(c), states as follows: 
It shall not be a defense under this section if the alleged insanity or mental illness 
was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of 
intoxicating liquor, any drug or other mentally debilitating substance, or any 
combination thereof, unless such substance was prescribed for the defendant by a 
licensed health care practitioner and was used in accordance with the directions of 
the prescription. 
There is another Delaware law, Title 11, Section 422, which states as follows: 
Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admissible for the purpose of 
proving the existence of mental illness, mental defect or psychiatric disorder as 
those terms have been defined in 401 of this title. 
 
19
At the close of the guilt phase, counsel and the court again discussed 
whether Norman’s criminal responsibility for Peters’s death should be determined 
under Maryland law.  The court reserved judgment until the start of the penalty 
phase, at which time it reiterated its earlier ruling that “[i]t is the State’s obligation 
to prove its aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt with the applicable law 
of Delaware.  Therefore, it will be screened through the applicable Delaware law.”  
The State then introduced evidence that Norman caused the death of Davondale 
Peters in Maryland.  In addition, the State offered evidence that Norman engaged 
in other uncharged criminal conduct in Maryland in order to prove a non-statutory 
aggravating circumstance.  In response, the defense presented mitigation evidence, 
including a stipulation on the psychiatrists’ differing opinions about Norman’s lack 
of criminal responsibility under the law of Maryland (the “Stipulation”).19  
                                                                                                                                        
Several of these terms are defined by the Code.  I have already defined 
intoxication for you.  That means the inability, resulting from the introduction of 
substances into the body, to exercise control over one’s mental faculties. 
Voluntary intoxication has previously been defined.  It means intoxication 
caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the 
tendency of which to cause intoxication the actor knows or should know unless 
the actor introduces them pursuant to medical advice.  You should also be aware 
that addiction to an intoxicating substance does not make the consumption of that 
substance involuntary. 
With the above in mind, I shall paraphrase 11 Delaware Code 401(c): 
A defendant may not rely upon the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, 
and the jury may not return a verdict of guilty, but mentally ill, if the alleged 
insanity, mental illness or psychiatric disorder was proximately caused by the use 
of alcohol or any non-prescribed or illegal drugs. 
19 The Stipulation provides, in its entirety: 
The parties stipulate as follows: 
Dr. Mechanick’s opinion is as follows: 
 
20
Consistent with his prior ruling that the evidence would be “screened through the 
applicable Delaware law,” the trial judge provided no instruction to the jury on 
how to determine under Maryland law whether Norman lacked criminal 
responsibility for his conduct in that state. 
                                                                                                                                        
Mr. Norman’s lack of appreciation of the criminality of his actions due to 
voluntary intoxication (i.e. with marijuana), would not meet the criteria for not 
criminally responsible in Maryland. 
The delirium that Mr. Norman experienced at the time of the charges was 
caused by his substance abuse.  If the delirium is considered the product of a 
voluntary intoxication, then Mr. Norman’s behavior at the time of the conduct 
charged would not meet the definition of not criminally responsible in Maryland. 
The Maryland Legal Code states the following: 
Where temporary insanity results from present consumption of intoxicants and 
persists only so long as the individual is under the direct influence of the 
intoxicant, such insanity is not a defense, but where the temporary insanity is a 
settled condition of insanity, whether or not permanent, which, although created 
by the voluntary use of intoxicants, persists even after the direct influence of an 
intoxicant has ceased, even after the chemical agent is no longer present in the 
individual’s bloodstream, and which is the result of continued or persistent use, 
rather than ingestion on a particular occasion, such temporary insanity is a valid 
defense to a criminal act. 
It is a matter for the court to determine whether Mr. Norman’s delirium at the 
time of the current charges is allowed under this definition as an insanity defense.  
It is clear that Mr. Norman had substances in his bloodstream at the time of the 
conduct charged.  Blood and urine samples later that day showed evidence of 
marijuana, Ecstasy, and cocaine, albeit at relatively low levels.  Mr. Norman’s 
delirium continued into his hospitalization at the Perkins Hospital, where his toxin 
screen showed no evidence of substances. 
The Maryland Legal Code also states the following: 
If an accused is insane whether or not he is directly under influence of 
intoxicant, even though that insanity was caused by voluntary drinking, such 
insanity may excuse responsibility for a criminal act. 
The use of the word “may” in this sentence does not provide guidance about 
whether Mr. Norman’s psychiatric condition at the time of the conduct charge, 
while under the influence of substances, meets the Maryland standard for not 
criminally responsible. 
In addition, the parties stipulate as follows: 
In Dr. Alizai-Cowan’s opinion, Mr. Norman did meet the standard for not 
criminally responsible under Maryland law. 
 
21
The jury found unanimously that the State had established the statutory 
aggravating circumstance that Norman’s course of conduct resulted in the death of 
at least two persons whose death was the probable consequence of Norman’s 
actions.  The jury also found unanimously that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and recommended a sentence of death.20   
After weighing the evidence, the trial judge concurred that the State had 
established the statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.  He 
also found the existence of twelve non-statutory aggravating circumstances and 
thirty-two mitigating circumstances.21  After balancing them, he agreed with the 
                                          
 
20 Findings After Penalty Hearing, supra note 12, at *2. 
21 See id. at *9-16.  The non-statutory aggravating circumstances were: (1) the other conduct for 
which Norman was found guilty in Counts 2 through 10; (2) evidence of other uncharged 
misconduct that occurred in Maryland and Delaware on April 7, 2005; (3) victim impact as to 
Jamell Weston; (4) Norman was on probation at the time of the offense; (5) Norman had pending 
firearm charges in Maryland at the time of the offense and was wanted for failing to appear in 
connection with the case; (6) Norman used illicit drugs; (7) in the past, Norman participated in 
and/or successfully completed the Key/Crest program(s) and/or Boot Camp; (8) Norman’s prior 
criminal history, including any juvenile and adult arrests and any treatment, rehabilitation and 
sentence he may have received in connection with the crimes, including but not limited to his 
prison records, juvenile detention records and/or probation records; (9) Norman’s inability to 
comply with rules and regulations while in custody; (10) Norman was wearing body armor at the 
time of the offenses; (11) Norman was prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm at the 
time of the offense; (12) Norman was an admitted drug dealer.  Id. at *6-7. 
The mitigating circumstances were: (1) Norman was raised in a negative home environment 
of dependency, neglect, and emotional abandonment that went undetected by State authorities; 
(2) Norman had a grossly dysfunctional childhood and was deprived of positive family structure 
and appropriate supervision; (3) Norman and his family were poor and lived for extended periods 
in impoverished conditions; (4) Norman never had a stable childhood home, moving numerous 
times before age 18; (5) Norman was raised by a substance-dependent mother who exposed him 
as a very young child to drugs and criminal behaviors; (6) Norman’s mother’s substance abuse 
affected her ability to adequately parent him and provide him with necessary nurturing; (7) as a 
child, Norman was directly exposed to a significant number of family members and friends who 
were involved with illegal drugs; (8) Norman was sexually abused by a male babysitter at age 4; 
 
22
jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances 
and imposed a death sentence which was stayed pending the outcome of this 
appeal.22  To date, neither a jury nor a judge has decided whether Norman lacked 
criminal responsibility under Maryland law for the Peters homicide or any other 
uncharged misconduct that occurred in Maryland on April 7, 2005.  Thus, this 
central mitigating circumstance relied upon by Norman remains decided only by 
the Maryland prosecutors who dismissed the charges in that state. 
                                                                                                                                        
(9) Norman’s need for treatment for sexual abuse went unrecognized and untreated; (10) 
throughout his childhood, Norman was exposed to negative comments by his mother and others 
about his father and his father’s family that affected his emotional and moral development; (11) 
Norman moved frequently as a teenager after his family was evicted when their trailer was 
condemned; (12) Norman lacked a stable and loving father-figure to provide for him financially 
or emotionally; (13) Norman had no appropriate male role models during crucial developmental 
stages of his life; (14) due to the lack of appropriate male role models, Norman was influenced 
by his mother’s boyfriends and others, who were often negative influences; (15) Norman earned 
his GED while in the Ferris School; (16) due to emotional neglect as a child, Norman sought out 
love and acceptance from women, including former girlfriends’ mothers, often calling them 
“mom”; (17) when charged with crimes in the past, Norman has pled guilty or delinquent instead 
of taking those cases to trial; (18) Norman was 22 years old at the time of the crimes; (19) since 
Norman was shot in October 2004, his father has established a loving relationship with him; (20) 
Norman was genuinely in pain and suffered from his gunshot wounds from October 2004 
through April 2005; (21) Norman encountered Ben Green, who had sexually abused Norman and 
his brother as children, just before April 7, 2005; (22) at the time of the crimes, Norman was in 
the throes of a psychotic episode; (23) Norman’s actions, behavior, and statements leading up to 
the crimes, were cries for help that something was wrong; (24) at the time Norman shot Jamell 
Weston, he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; (25) 
Norman has expressed remorse for his actions; (26) Norman has positive relations with non-
family members and there are many people who love him; (27) Norman not only loves his own 
biological children, but has relationships with his former girlfriends’ children and others’ 
children and genuinely loves them; (28) Norman developed a loving relationship with Donesha 
Sturgis when he learned that he was her father; (29) Norman has the ability and desire to 
continue to support and parent his children from prison to the best of his ability; (30) executing 
Norman will cause emotional pain and suffering to his family, children, and friends; (31) the 
testimony of Drs. Alizai-Cowan and Mechanick (per stipulation) as to his culpability as to the 
Maryland charges; (32) a life sentence, if imposed, will never allow Norman to return to society.  
He will remain in prison without parole or any other reduction of sentence.  Id. at *7-8. 
22 See id. at *16. 
 
23
II. The Sixth Amendment Violation. 
Norman first contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it 
refused to exclude Dr. Mechanick’s psychiatric evaluation and testimony from the 
guilt and penalty phases of the trial.  Specifically, Norman claims that evidence of 
Dr. Mechanick’s opinion must be excluded because of the State’s deliberate 
violation of Norman’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the Delaware charges.  
We review a claim alleging the denial of a constitutional right de novo.23 
A. 
Dr. Mechanick’s psychiatric examination in Maryland. 
The Sixth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall … 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”24  The accused’s right to counsel 
attaches when the adversarial judicial proceedings are commenced and continues 
throughout all “critical stages” of the proceedings,25 including the deliberate 
elicitation by law enforcement officers (and their agents) of statements pertaining 
to the charge.26  Therefore, the examination of an accused by a psychiatrist 
arranged by the State is considered a “critical stage” which implicates the Sixth 
                                          
 
23 See Harris v. State, 956 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Del. 2008); Carrigan v. State, 945 A.2d 1073, 1075 
(Del. 2008); Bentley v. State, 930 A.2d 866, 871 (Del. 2007). 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (6th Amendment 
right to counsel in criminal proceedings applies in federal courts); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (6th Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings applies to states 
through 14th Amendment). 
25 Fellers v. U.S., 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); accord 
Brown, 947 A.2d 1062, 1068 (Del. 2007); Alston v. State, 554 A.3d 304, 308 (Del. 1989). 
26 Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009); Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964). 
 
24
Amendment.27  Although there is no constitutional right to have counsel present 
during such an examination, counsel must be given advance notice of its nature 
and scope, as well as an opportunity to consult with the accused.28 
At the time the State sent Dr. Mechanick to examine Norman, Norman had 
been indicted in Delaware.  Consequently, the judicial proceedings against Norman 
in Delaware had commenced and Norman’s right to counsel had attached.  
Although Norman had not yet been appointed counsel, we agree with the Superior 
Court’s conclusion that “the State should have put the Court on notice of its desire 
to participate in the evaluation [of Norman] with Maryland.”  Because it did not do 
so, the court properly found “that the State did violate [Norman’s] Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel [when it] jumped the gun in its participation with the 
Maryland prosecutor in obtaining [Dr. Mechanick’s] report.”29 
B. 
Dr. Mechanick’s evaluation and testimony were admissible under exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule. 
Once the right to counsel has attached with respect to a particular charge, 
law enforcement officials may not use as evidence at trial incriminating statements 
“deliberately elicited” from the accused without the presence or waiver of 
counsel.30  Any statements obtained in violation of the accused’s right to counsel 
                                          
 
27 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-72 (1981). 
28 See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424-25 (1987); Estelle, 451 U.S. at 470-71; accord 
Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 685 (1989); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 254 (1988). 
29 Order re: Expert Testimony, supra note 13, at 7; see also DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 12.2(c). 
30 See Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977). 
 
25
are inadmissible as evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.31  The purpose of 
this exclusionary rule is to preserve society’s interest in deterring police from 
violations of constitutional and statutory protections.32  The rule, however, is not a 
blanket prohibition on admissibility: statements obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment are nonetheless admissible if certain exceptions apply.33 
Two closely-related exceptions to the exclusionary rule flow from the 
premise that, although the government ought not profit from its own misconduct, it 
also should not be made worse off than it would have been had the misconduct not 
occurred.34  First, where the challenged evidence has an independent source, 
exclusion would put the police in a worse position than they would have been 
absent any error or violation.  Thus, under the “independent source doctrine,” even 
if police engage in illegal investigatory activity, evidence will be admissible if it is 
discovered through a source independent of the illegality.35  Second, exclusion of 
evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would similarly put the 
                                          
 
31 See, e.g., Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1990) (excluding statement obtained in 
violation of 6th Amendment right to counsel); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206-07 (same). 
32 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984). 
33 See Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1845 (explaining that evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment is not per se inadmissible, but, like evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, should be subjected to “an exclusionary-rule balancing test”). 
34 Murray v. U.S., 487 U.S. 533, 537, 539 (1988); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
35 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Murray, 487 U.S. at 537; accord 
U.S. v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100-01 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying independent source doctrine and 
declining to suppress evidence from the search of the trunk of a vehicle because, even assuming 
defendant’s arrest was unlawful, police had a lawful independent source under the automobile 
exception because they had probable cause to conclude the vehicle was involved in an illegality). 
 
26
government in a worse position, because the police would have obtained that 
evidence even if no misconduct had occurred.  Thus, under the “inevitable 
discovery doctrine,” a court may admit illegally obtained evidence if the evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered through independent, lawful means.36 
The United States Supreme Court adopted the independent source doctrine 
in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.37  In that case, the Court held that 
knowledge garnered from copies of illegally seized documents could not be used to 
frame an indictment or secure a subpoena for the originals.38  The Court added, 
however, that facts “thus obtained [do not] become sacred and inaccessible.  If 
knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like 
any others ….”39  More recently, the Court applied the doctrine in Murray v. 
United States.40  In that case, the police unlawfully entered a warehouse without a 
warrant and observed numerous burlap-wrapped bales later found to contain 
marijuana.  They left without disturbing the bales, kept the warehouse under 
surveillance, and did not reenter until they had a search warrant.41  The police did 
not disclose the prior entry or rely on any observations made during the illegal 
                                          
 
36 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444; accord U.S. v. Vazquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 194-96 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(applying the inevitable discovery doctrine, but suppressing the defendant’s statement because 
the government failed to carry its burden of proof that the government agents, following routine 
procedures, would inevitably have uncovered the evidence). 
37 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
38 See id. at 391. 
39 Id. at 392. 
40 487 U.S. 533, 535 (1988). 
41 See id. 
 
27
entry in their warrant application.42  The Court allowed admission of the evidence 
because the evidence had been obtained independently of the initial illegality.43 
The United States Supreme Court adopted another exception, the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, in Nix v. Williams.44  In that case, the defendant was arrested 
for the kidnapping and murder of a ten-year-old.  While transporting the defendant, 
a police officer violated the defendant’s right to counsel by interrogating him, 
thereby discovering the location of the body.  By that time, the police had 
independently begun an exhaustive search that (subsequent testimony revealed) 
would have discovered the body within hours of the defendant’s disclosure of the 
location.45  Thus, the Court held that the improperly acquired information could be 
admitted because the body would have inevitably been discovered during the 
course of the lawful search already underway.46 
1. 
Dr. Mechanick’s opinion as to Maryland law was admissible under 
the Independent Source Doctrine. 
Although the Superior Court analyzed the admissibility of Dr. Mechanick’s 
evaluation using a harmless error standard, the court’s finding comports with an 
analysis under the independent source and inevitable discovery exceptions to the 
                                          
 
42 See id. at 536. 
43 See id. at 537; see also Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984) (evidence admissible because 
search warrant was issued solely on basis of information known before previous illegal entry and 
items not seen by officers during prior illegal search). 
44 467 U.S. 431, 446-47 (1984). 
45 Id. at 434-36, 439. 
46 Id. at 448-50. 
 
28
exclusionary rule.  Dr. Mechanick examined Norman on January 28, 2006, 
pursuant to an order from the Maryland Circuit Court, and issued two psychiatric 
evaluations, one for Maryland authorities and one for Delaware authorities.  Dr. 
Mechanick’s opinion as to whether Norman satisfied the Maryland definition of 
“not criminally responsible” did not violate Norman’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Norman’s Maryland defense counsel was given advance notice of Dr. 
Mechanick’s examination and had an opportunity to consult with Norman 
regarding it.  Thus, Dr. Mechanick’s opinion regarding whether Norman was “not 
criminally responsible” under Maryland law was discovered through a source 
independent of the illegality and was admissible in his Delaware trial pursuant to 
the Independent Source Doctrine. 
Moreover, the Maryland evaluation was neither confidential nor privileged, 
and its use was not limited to the proceedings in Maryland.47  Each expert that 
examined Norman in Maryland likewise became a potential expert witness in the 
Delaware case.  Even if Delaware prosecutors had not been involved in Dr. 
Mechanick’s evaluation, they could have later asked him to apply Delaware law to 
the information he gathered in his evaluation. 
 
                                          
 
47 DEL. R. EVID. 503(3) (“There is no privilege under this rule for a communication relevant to an 
issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which 
the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the patient’s claim or defense….”). 
 
29
2. 
Dr. Mechanick’s opinion was admissible under the Inevitable 
Discovery and the Independent Source Doctrines. 
Dr. Mechanick’s opinion as to whether Norman satisfied the Delaware 
definition of NGRI or GBMI was also admissible under the Inevitable Discovery 
Doctrine.  To the extent Dr. Mechanick based his opinion on his review of the 
history given by Norman to his own psychiatric experts and his interviews with 
Norman in Delaware, Norman’s statements would inevitably have been discovered 
during the course of a lawful investigation.  Because the defense placed Norman’s 
sanity in issue, the outcome in this case would have been no different even if 
Norman had the benefit of Delaware counsel at Dr. Mechanick’s evaluation in 
Maryland.  A mental health defense was the only reasonable defense strategy 
available in either Maryland or Delaware, given the overwhelming evidence 
against Norman.  Consequently, Delaware counsel would likely have advised 
Norman to participate in the Maryland court-ordered evaluation by Dr. Mechanick, 
or else risk sabotaging his Maryland defense.  Assuming counsel followed this 
course, nothing in the Delaware case would be different. 
At oral argument before this Court, defense counsel urged that Norman had 
the right to make the strategic, if foolhardy, choice to refuse to submit to the 
evaluation or refrain from answering certain questions.  But, even if counsel gave 
such guidance, it would not have changed the outcome of Norman’s Delaware 
trial.  Assuming counsel could have threaded the eye of the needle and achieved an 
 
30
evaluation admissible in Maryland without any information regarding Norman’s 
drug use, that finesse would have been short-lived.  Under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 12.2, in order to assert the mental illness defense in Delaware, a defendant 
must submit to an evaluation of the State’s chosen expert.48  Thus, even if Norman 
had evaded questions regarding drug use during the Maryland evaluation, he would 
have been required either to answer them in Delaware, or else abandon his mental 
health defense completely, making Dr. Mechanick’s evaluation irrelevant.  Under 
either scenario, the end result of the Delaware trial would be the same guilty 
verdict.49 
Furthermore, Dr. Mechanick could have based his expert opinion upon other 
admissible evidence, specifically, the same history gathered in the evaluations of 
Dr. Brandt and/or Dr. Alizai-Cowan.50  The Maryland court-ordered evaluations of 
Norman by Drs. Brandt and Alizai-Cowan were not confidential, privileged, or 
limited in use to the Maryland proceedings.51  Both Maryland doctors presented 
                                          
 
48 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 12.2(c). 
49 On one hand, if Norman delayed the evaluation by Dr. Mechanick, the State would have hired 
him later and, in the hypothetical trial, the jury would have been presented with the same 
evidence as in the actual trial, from which it reached a general verdict of guilty.  If Norman had 
refused the evaluation by the State’s expert, he would have been prevented from pleading NGRI 
or GBMI and the jury’s only options would have been a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. 
50 See DEL. R. EVID. 703 (“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing”).  
The reports submitted in this matter indicate that forensic psychiatrists rely on data recorded by 
other evaluators.  Dr. Brandt, for example, analyzed the reports of Drs. Alizai-Cowan and 
Mechanick.  Also, all three evaluators relied on the report of Dr. Donohue at the Perkins facility. 
51 See DEL. R. EVID. 503(3). 
 
31
their evaluation and testimony in the Delaware case on behalf of Norman, and Dr. 
Mechanick testified in rebuttal.  There is substantial similarity in the information 
found in each report, including the evidence regarding Norman’s drug use, medical 
history, and symptoms of psychosis.52  Norman’s answers to drug-use questions 
are consistent among all three doctors.53  Thus, based on the information lawfully 
obtained by the Maryland experts, Dr. Mechanick had an independent evidentiary 
basis to evaluate whether Norman met Delaware’s definition of “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” or “guilty but mentally ill.”  Finally, Dr. Mechanick’s 
                                          
 
52 Dr. Mechanick based his conclusion that Norman suffered from a drug-induced delirium 
primarily on Norman’s medical history and drug use.  MECHANICK FIRST REPORT, supra note 11, 
at 62-64.  Based, in part upon Dr. Donohue’s evaluation while Norman was at Perkins, Dr. 
Mechanick noted that Norman had no prior history of psychotic episodes.  Id. at 35-39, 57-60.  
Dr. Alizai-Cowan included the same data in her report, ALIZAI-COWAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 
21, 24-26, as did Dr. Brandt, BRANDT REPORT, supra note 8, at 19-21.  Dr. Mechanick also noted 
that Norman had a history of drug abuse and reports indicated that Norman consumed cocaine, 
ecstasy and marijuana prior to his arrest.  MECHANICK FIRST REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 40-42.  
Dr. Alizai-Cowan included the same data in her report, ALIZAI-COWAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 
2, 18-19, as did Dr. Brandt, BRANDT REPORT, supra note 8, at 35-36, 39.   
Further, Dr. Mechanick considered Dr. Alizai-Cowen’s evaluation, but determined that the 
facts on which both reports were based were more supportive of his conclusion.  MECHANICK 
FIRST REPORT, supra note 11, at 26-31, 60.  When asked to review Dr. Brandt’s findings, he 
found that her reports “underscore my previous opinions about the unreliability of Mr. Norman’s 
statements, particularly regarding his past drug use and his substance use up to the time of the 
charges…. It remains my opinion that … [Mr. Norman’s] voluntary use of substance was the 
proximate cause of his psychiatric condition at the time of the conduct charged.”  STEPHEN 
MECHANICK, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT RE: ALLISON LAMONT NORMAN, 2-4, 7-9 (Jan. 26, 2007). 
Finally, in order to address the contrary information elicited by Dr. Brandt regarding 
Norman’s prior instances of psychotic episodes, Dr. Mechanick reevaluated Norman.  At that 
time, Norman denied having had any psychotic symptoms prior to using ecstasy and claimed he 
had experienced no odd thoughts or experiences since August 2005.  He also corroborated his 
prior statements on drug use.  Therefore, Dr. Mechanick’s conclusion remained unchanged.  
MECHANICK SECOND REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-5. 
53 Compare MECHANICK FIRST REPORT, supra note 11, at 49, with ALIZAI-COWAN REPORT, 
supra note 9, at 18-19, 28-31, and BRANDT REPORT, supra note 8, at 35-36. 
 
32
subsequent examinations of Norman performed in Delaware did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment; thus, he could render an identical opinion based upon other 
admissible evidence.  Accordingly, the Superior Court correctly admitted Dr. 
Mechanick’s opinion notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment violation.54 
III. The Application of 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)k. 
Norman next contends that the aggravating factor used to elevate his life 
sentence to a sentence of death was improperly applied to his conduct.  The sole 
statutory aggravator pursued by the State in this case was: “The defendant’s course 
of conduct resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths are a 
probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.”55  Norman argues that 
Delaware lacked jurisdiction to impose a death sentence based on a Maryland 
homicide.  Next, he argues that the “course of conduct” statutory aggravator is 
vague and overbroad as applied to him.  He also argues that the State is collaterally 
estopped from punishing him for a death that Maryland did not consider 
punishable.  We review questions of law, including the interpretation of the 
statutory aggravating factors, de novo.56 
                                          
 
54 Dr. Mechanick’s testimony, having been properly admitted during the guilt phase, could also 
be considered by the jury during the penalty phase of the trial.  Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 
600 (Del. 1985); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 125 (Del. 1983). 
55 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)k. 
56 See Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1280-81 (Del. 2008); Burrell v. State, 953 A.2d 957, 960 
(Del. 2008); Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 909 (Del. 2002). 
 
33
A. 
Unadjudicated criminal conduct in other states may be used to establish the 
“course of conduct” statutory aggravator. 
Norman asserts that under 11 Del. C. § 204(a)(1), Delaware may punish only 
where “[e]ither the conduct or the result which is an element of the offense occurs 
within Delaware….”57  He argues that because Peters’s death neither occurred in 
nor was caused by conduct in Delaware, by using that homicide to elevate his life 
sentence for the murder of Weston to a sentence of death, the State is punishing 
him for conduct it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate. 
Delaware has historically admitted evidence of criminal conduct in other 
states for purposes of criminal sentencing proceedings.  For example, in Stewart v. 
State,58 the defendant was sentenced as a repeat offender after being convicted of 
driving under the influence (“DUI”) in Delaware because of his prior DUI 
conviction in Florida.  On appeal, we noted that the sentencing statute expressly 
allowed convictions or findings of guilt from “a similar statute of any state or local 
jurisdiction” within five years to constitute a prior offense, enabling [the 
defendant] to be correctly sentenced as a repeat offender.59  Similarly, Delaware’s 
habitual offender statute expressly permits the consideration of a conviction from 
another state in tallying felonies for purposes of sentencing:  
                                          
 
57 11 Del. C. § 204(a)(1). 
58 930 A.2d 923, 925 (Del. 2007). 
59 Id. at 926; 21 Del. C. §§ 4177B(e)(1)a., (2)a. 
 
34
Any person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony or an attempt 
to commit a felony hereinafter specifically named, under the laws of 
this State, and/or any other state, United States or any territory of the 
United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent 
felony hereinafter specifically named, or an attempt to commit such 
specific felony, is declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court in 
which such third or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing 
sentence, shall impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted 
unless the subsequent felony conviction requires or allows and results 
in the imposition of capital punishment.60 
Another example directly relating to the death penalty statute is Delaware’s 
“prior felony” statutory aggravator, which allows a convicted murderer to be 
sentenced to death if the defendant “was previously convicted of another murder or 
manslaughter or of a felony involving the use of, or threat of, force or violence 
upon another person.”61  In Red Dog v. State,62 the defendant had previously been 
convicted of robbery in Montana in 1973, and two counts of murder in the second 
degree in California in 1978.  We found that these out-of-state convictions— 
which were evidenced by testimony of eyewitnesses and investigating officers, 
certified copies of court records, and admission by the defendant—were sufficient 
to establish the statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.63 
                                          
 
60 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) (emphasis added).  Use of convictions from other states are limited to 
those crimes that “would support a conviction for one of the felonies enumerated” in Delaware’s 
statute.  Fletcher v. State, 409 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Del. 1979). 
61 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)i. 
62 Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298, 303 (Del. 1992). 
63 Id. at 307. 
 
35
Many other jurisdictions have statutory aggravators that are substantially 
similar to Delaware’s “prior felony” aggravator.64  Like Delaware, they have 
allowed the use of prior convictions in other states to support their own state’s use 
of that aggravator in sentencing.  Some states do so pursuant to express language in 
the statute itself.65  One such state is Illinois, where a defendant becomes eligible 
for the death penalty if “the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or 
more individuals under [Illinois law] or under any law of the United States or of 
any state which is substantially similar to [Illinois law] regardless of whether the 
deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated 
acts…”66  Other states, including Delaware, do so without such express language in 
the statute.67  For example, the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld the death 
                                          
 
64 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s 
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 417 
n.374 (1998). 
65 See id. reciting the statutes of numerous states, including those which expressly identify prior 
convictions in other states.  E.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(1) (“The defendant has been 
convicted of another offense in the United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life 
imprisonment or death was imposable.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(b) (“The defendant 
was previously convicted in this state of a class 1 or 2 felony involving violence… or was 
previously convicted by another state of the United States of an offense which would constitute a 
class 1 or 2 felony involving violence….”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(3) (“The defendant 
has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under [Illinois law] or under any law of 
the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to [Illinois law] regardless of 
whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated 
acts….”); PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(12) (“The defendant has been convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter … or a substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction….”). 
66 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(3) (emphasis added); see also People v. Johnson, 695 N.E.2d 
435, 442 (Ill. 1998) (“[A]fter committing a murder, the commission of additional murders in 
Illinois or another jurisdiction would make [a defendant] eligible for the death penalty.”). 
67 See Kirchmeier, supra note 63, at 417 n.374 reciting the statutes of numerous states, including 
those which do not expressly identify prior convictions in other states.  E.g. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-
 
36
sentence for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder based on a sixteen-year-
old conviction for manslaughter in Iowa.68  The conviction was used as evidence to 
support the use of the “prior felony” statutory aggravator.69  
Other states have even allowed a guilty plea from another state proceeding 
(as opposed to a jury conviction) to be admitted in the sentencing phase of a 
criminal trial.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the death sentence for a 
defendant who was convicted of capital murder, where the jury based the “prior 
felony” statutory aggravator (among other statutory aggravators) upon the 
defendant’s guilty plea to a murder in Tennessee that had occurred just hours after 
the murder for which the defendant was charged.70  Although the Mississippi court 
found that the defendant’s claim that the jury was improperly instructed was 
procedurally barred, it agreed that the statutory language permitted the use of an 
out-of-state guilty plea to a felony involving the use or threat of violence satisfied 
the statutory aggravator.71  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the 
                                                                                                                                        
49(2) (“The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony involving 
the use of threat or violence to the person.”); N.J. STAT. § 2C:11-3(4)(a) (“The defendant has 
been convicted, at any time, or another murder.”); TENN. CODE § 39-13-204(i)(2) (“The 
defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, 
whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person.”). 
68 Hogan v. State, 732 P.2d 422. 423-24 (Nev. 1987)  (per curiam).  
69 Id.  Nevada’s “prior felony” aggravating statute provides: “The murder was committed by a 
person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder … is or has been 
convicted of: (a) another murder … or (b) a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the 
person of another….” NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(2). 
70 Doss v. State, 709 So.2d 369, 373 n.1, 401 (Miss. 1996). 
71 Id. at 392-93. 
 
37
death sentence for a defendant who was convicted of two counts of murder.72  It 
affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of the defendant’s guilty plea 
to an assault charge in Montana as an aggravation consideration (not a statutory 
aggravator).  The Washington court reasoned that despite case law prohibiting the 
evidence of alleged criminal behavior other than convictions, the defendant’s 
guilty plea was “sufficiently reliable to warrant admission.”73  
Finally, other jurisdictions have used evidence of unadjudicated criminal 
conduct in states outside of their own to support either aggravation in general or 
specific statutory aggravators.  For example, California has allowed unadjudicated 
criminal conduct to be presented in the sentencing phase of a criminal trial to 
support aggravation (and not a specific statutory aggravator).  The Supreme Court 
of California allowed evidence of six murders in Oregon and two murders in 
Michigan to be admitted in the sentencing of a criminal defendant who had been 
convicted of sixteen murders, representing victims from over the course of more 
than a ten year span, in one trial.74  The Supreme Court of Louisiana has also 
allowed evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct that is relevant and reliable.75  
                                          
 
72 State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1995). 
73 Id. at 268.  
74 People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 100-02 (Cal. 2000). 
75 State v. Comeaux, 699 So.2d 16, 19-23 (La. 1997); see also State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198 
(La. 1993) overruled on other grounds by Comeaux, 699 So.2d 16. 
 
38
For example, in State v. Comeaux,76 the court allowed evidence of an 
unadjudicated rape and murder in Arkansas to support Louisiana’s “prior felony” 
statutory aggravator for the rape and two murder charges for which he was 
prosecuted in Louisiana.77 
Unadjudicated criminal conduct has also been used to support the use of the 
“course of conduct / multiple-killing” statutory aggravator.  In two Texas cases, the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the use of evidence of a murder in 
Kansas to show that the defendants had engaged in a course of conduct that 
elevated a murder in Texas to a capital offense.78  Addressing the challenge to the 
use of a murder outside of Texas to elevate a charged murder to capital murder in 
Texas, the court held: “this state has the authority to prosecute the offense even 
though some of the elements of the aggravating offense [i.e., the murder of another 
person in the same course of conduct79] occurred outside the state’s boundaries.”80  
                                          
 
76 State v. Comeaux, 699 So.2d 16, 19, 23-24 (La. 1997).  The court discussed the need to ensure 
that the presentation of unadjudicated conduct does not “inject an arbitrary factor” into the 
sentencing proceeding, but did not comment on the fact that the unadjudicated crimes in this case 
were outside the state.  Id. at 19-23. 
77 The jury, however, also found four other statutory aggravators on which to base the death 
sentence.  Id. at 19 (“that the offense was committed during the perpetration … of an aggravated 
burglary; that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than 
one person; that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
manner…. That the offense was committed during the perpetration … of an aggravated rape.”). 
78 Galloway v. State, 2003 WL 1712559 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2003); Bayless v. State, 2003 
WL 21006915 (Tex. App. May 6, 2003). 
79 Texas’s course of conduct statutory aggravator provides that a murder will be prosecuted as 
capital murder if “the person murders more than one person . . . during different criminal 
transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct.” 
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7)(B). 
 
39
The court also found no geographical or time restrictions in the statutory 
aggravator itself that would have precluded it from using the Kansas murder.81   
An Ohio case provides yet another example.  There, the defendant admitted 
to killing five people in four states within two years.  After pleading guilty and 
being convicted of one of the murders in Alaska, he was prosecuted for another 
murder in Ohio.82  A statutory aggravator that the prosecution relied on in seeking 
the death penalty was the “course of conduct” aggravator.  Although the Supreme 
Court of Ohio did not specifically address the fact that the other murders had 
occurred in other states, it declared that “the evidence established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the murder . . . was part of a course of conduct involving the 
purposeful killing of five people.”83 
In this case, the State relied on a second, unadjudicated homicide in 
Maryland as the evidence of Delaware’s “course of conduct / multiple-killing” 
statutory aggravator, a position supported by Delaware’s jurisprudence.  First, as 
discussed above, Delaware has a history of considering criminal conduct outside of 
the state in its procedures for sentencing criminal defendants.  Additionally, case 
law throughout the country demonstrates that criminal conduct occurring outside 
the state of prosecution has been used in criminal sentencing proceedings.  Second, 
                                                                                                                                        
80 Galloway, 2003 WL 1712559, at *5. 
81 Id. 
82 State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878, 880-81 (Ohio 1995). 
83 Id. at 885. 
 
40
although the conduct was unadjudicated, the jury was required to find the existence 
of the killing of Peters beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury instructions provided 
by the lower court adequately instructed the jurors of this requirement, which 
stems from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona.84  
Therefore, Norman received the procedural protections of the jury having to find 
that he caused the death of the second victim in Maryland beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Norman’s claim that Delaware lacks jurisdiction to impose a death sentence 
in this case based upon a second death in Maryland is meritless. 
B. 
Section 4209(e)(1)k is not vague and overbroad as applied to Norman. 
Norman asserts that Section 4209(e)(1)k is vague and overbroad as applied 
to him because the meaning of “course of conduct” and causation are too elastic to 
confine state discretion and provide meaningful guidance in imposing a sentence of 
death.  The Eighth Amendment requires that a statutory aggravating circumstance 
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for death.85  The policy driving this 
requirement is to ensure that only “the worst criminals or the criminals who 
commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment.”86  Furthermore, steps 
must be taken to ensure the death penalty is not imposed in a “wanton or freakish 
                                          
 
84 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
85 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-78 (1983). 
86 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring). 
 
41
manner….”87  In this context, we have explained that “[t]he language of an 
aggravating circumstance must provide ‘clear and objective’ standards by which 
the sentencing authority’s discretion may be guided and channeled so as to avoid 
an arbitrary or capricious infliction of the death sentence.”88  If a substantial risk 
exists for an arbitrary or capricious application, the statute that defined the 
aggravating circumstances is unconstitutional.89 
In Tuilaepa v. California,90 the United States Supreme Court set forth two 
requirements for an aggravating circumstance to be found constitutional.  First, the 
circumstance may not be overbroad—meaning that rather than being applicable to 
every defendant convicted of a murder, it must apply only to a subclass of 
defendants convicted of murder.  Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be 
unconstitutionally vague.91 
Section 4209(e)(1)k is not overbroad.  An aggravating circumstance is 
overbroad “[i]f the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating 
circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty….”92  In 
State v. Chaplin,93 the Delaware Superior Court examined the constitutionality of 
                                          
 
87 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976); see Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990). 
88 Petition of State for Writ of Mandamus, 433 A.2d 325, 326 (Del. 1981); White v. State, 395 
A.2d 1082, 1091 (Del. 1978). 
89 See Petition of State, 433 A.2d at 326 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188; Furman, 408 U.S. 238). 
90 512 U.S. 967 (1994). 
91 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972 (citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471, 474 (1993)). 
92 Arave, 507 U.S. at 474. 
93 433 A.2d 327 (1981) mandamus denied, Petition of State, 433 A.2d 325 (1981). 
 
42
former Section 4209(e)(1)n, which provided that “the murder was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.”94  Relying on the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Godfrey v. Georgia,95 the court found the language of this 
factor unconstitutional, because “there is nothing in these few words standing 
alone that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of 
the death sentence…. There is no principled way to distinguish this case in which 
the death penalty was imposed from the many cases in which it was not.”96  Here, 
even by allowing evidence of an unadjudicated homicide from another state to 
establish the aggravating factor, Section 4209(e)(1)k still applies only where the 
defendant convicted of murder has caused the death of at least two people.  No 
sentencer could fairly conclude that that provision applies to every defendant 
eligible for the death penalty. 
Nor is Section 4209(e)(1)k vague.  In Tuilaepa, the United States Supreme 
Court noted that it is necessary only that the narrowing factors have some 
“common-sense core of meaning … that criminal juries should be capable of 
                                          
 
94 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)n. (1972), invalidated by Chapin, 433 A.2d 327.  Former section 
(e)(1)n. was later amended to correct the infirmity by adding more specific language to the Code.  
The current version reads as follows: “The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, 
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, use of an explosive device or poison or 
the defendant used such means on the victim prior to murdering the victim.”  11 Del. C. 
§ 4209(e)(1)l. 
95 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
96 Chaplin, 433 A.2d at 329 (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29). 
 
43
understanding.”97  We applied a similar standard in State v. White,98 although it 
was decided sixteen years before Tuilaepa, when determining the validity of two 
statutory aggravating circumstances described solely as the victim being “elderly” 
or “defenseless”99  We explained that “the constitutionality of a death penalty 
statute rests upon the premise that the sentencing authority’s discretion in imposing 
the death penalty is guided and channeled by clear and objective statutory 
standards.”100  In finding that the two aggravating circumstances were 
unconstitutionally vague, we noted that “[i]t cannot be said that the words have a 
common and ordinary meaning sufficiently definite to meet their usage in the 
context of the Statute,” and that “[m]anifestly, words such as ‘elderly’ and 
‘defenseless’, without legislative definition of scope and meaning, are susceptible 
of widely differing interpretations.”101  Thus, we concluded that “by the use of such 
vague terminology, there is substantial risk that sentencing authorities will inflict 
the death penalty in an arbitrary and diversified manner.  Such vague terms have 
particular constitutional shortcomings and are particularly unacceptable when they 
are applied to the imposition of the death penalty.”102 
                                          
 
97 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 975 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J. 
concurring in judgment). 
98 395 A.2d 1082 (1978). 
99 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)r., s. (1972), invalidated by White, 395 A.2d 1082. 
100 White, 395 A.2d at 1090. 
101 Id. at 1090, 1091. 
102 Id. at 1091. 
 
44
Such vague terms are not present in Section 4209(e)(1)k.  Unlike the terms 
at issue in White, the “course of conduct” factor applied in this case conveys the 
common-sense core meaning that those whose actions result in multiple deaths 
should be punished more harshly.  The use of the phrase “course of conduct” 
implicates a broad, fact-based analysis to determine whether any circumstances tie 
the multiple deaths together.  Additionally, the second death need only be “a 
probable consequence of defendant’s conduct,” meaning the defendant need not 
have intended to kill the second victim or that the defendant be convicted of that 
second homicide.  This language is sufficiently clear and objective to provide 
guidance to Delaware juries. 
C. 
Delaware is not collaterally estopped from using a homicide in Maryland. 
Norman asserts that the State is collaterally estopped from using the 
homicide of Peters to impose a death sentence because Maryland found Norman 
not criminally culpable for the homicide under its own law.  The doctrine of 
collateral estoppel states that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been 
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated 
between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”103  To trigger collateral estoppel, 
each of the following four factors must be present: “(1) the issue previously 
decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior 
                                          
 
103 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). 
 
45
action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the 
doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, 
and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue in the prior action.”104  In this case, where a dismissal was 
entered by Maryland prosecutors, none of the factors are present and Norman’s 
collateral estoppel challenge must fail. 
D. 
The aggravating circumstance is supported by the evidence. 
The evidence supports the jury’s finding of the existence of the sole 
aggravating circumstance that Norman’s course of conduct resulted in the deaths of 
two or more persons and that those deaths were a probable consequence of his 
conduct.  By convicting Norman of murder in the first degree for the death of 
Weston, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Norman caused one 
death.  The State also proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Norman caused a 
second death.  Several witnesses testified, and ample forensic data was introduced, 
to establish that after asking Peters for a ride, Norman got out and ran to the 
driver’s side of Peters’s SUV, said “No, you hold up motherfucker,” and shot 
Peters.  The evidence supports the jury’s finding that Peters’s death was caused by, 
and was the probable consequence of, Norman’s conduct. 
                                          
 
104 Capano v. State, 889 A.2d 968, 986 (Del. 2006) (Steele, C.J. dissenting); Betts v. Townsends, 
Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 535 (Del. 2000); see also 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE §§ 132-1, 132.04[1][a][ii] (3d ed. 1997). 
 
46
IV. Criminal Responsibility under Maryland Law 
Norman next contends, in the alternative, that even if the homicide in 
Maryland can be used as an aggravating circumstance, his lack of criminal 
responsibility for that conduct, if established, is a relevant mitigating circumstance.  
Here, the defense neither requested an instruction on Maryland law relating to lack 
of criminal responsibility nor objected to the instructions given by the court at the 
penalty phase of Norman’s trial.  In context, the defense did not do so after the trial 
court ruled that the evidence would be “screened” through Delaware law. 
In the exercise of its appellate authority, this Court will generally decline to 
review contentions not raised below and not fairly presented to the trial court for 
decision.105  But, we may excuse a waiver if we find that “the trial court committed 
plain error requiring review in the interests of justice.”106  “Under the plain error 
standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”107  
“Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are 
apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in 
                                          
 
105 SUP. CT. R. 8; see also Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986); Jenkins v. 
State, 305 A.2d 610 (Del. 1973). 
106 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995); Mathis v. State, 950 A.2d 659 (Del. 2008). 
107 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100; Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982). 
 
47
their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or 
which clearly show manifest injustice.”108 
Proof of the Delaware statutory aggravator is an issue separate from whether 
there is legal mitigation in Maryland for the conduct which occurred there. 
Section 4209 allows the defendant to present evidence of any mitigating 
circumstance109 and requires the jury and judge to weigh “all relevant evidence in 
… mitigation which bear upon the particular circumstances or details of the 
commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender….”110  
This procedure is required in capital cases by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.111  Pursuant to this mandate, when 
the State uses the defendant’s unadjudicated conduct in another jurisdiction to 
establish an aggravating factor, the defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility 
under the law of that jurisdiction is a relevant mitigating circumstance which, if 
                                          
 
108 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100; Bromwell v. State, 427 A.2d 884, 893 n.12 (Del. 1981). 
109 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(1) (providing that the defendant may present evidence “relating to any 
mitigating circumstance”), (c)(4) (providing that jury instructions shall include directions “to 
weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances), (g)(2)a. (providing that, on appellate review 
of the penalty of death, this Court will consider “the totality of evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender…”). 
110 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(3)a.2., (d)(1) (emphasis added). 
111 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding “the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer … not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of 
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”) (emphasis in 
original); cf. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982) (Lockett adopted by majority of 
the Court); White, 395 A.2d at 1088 (finding Section 4029 satisfies the constitutional standards 
explained in Lockett and its progeny). 
 
48
offered by the defendant, must be considered by the jury and judge.112  Just as the 
jury must be properly instructed on Delaware law applicable to the aggravating 
factor, it must also be properly instructed on the non-Delaware law applicable to 
any legal mitigation of conduct in another state. 
Here, the trial court ruled before trial and, again, before the start of the 
penalty phase, that “[i]ssues of the Defendant’s legal competency for his actions in 
Maryland will need to be addressed but these decisions will be filtered through the 
Delaware standards.”113  The State placed Norman’s mental state in Maryland in 
issue at the penalty phase by relying upon his conduct there to prove both statutory 
and non-statutory aggravating circumstances.  Norman responded with mitigation 
                                          
 
112 See Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 134 (Del. 1990) (holding that a verdict of guilty but 
mentally ill establishes mitigation as a matter of law at the penalty phase of a capital trial). 
113 Order re: Out-of-State Death, supra  note 16, at 2.  Prior to trial, the question was raised 
whether the case would proceed to a penalty phase.  At the close of the pre-trial hearing on the 
defense’s motion to suppress Dr. Mechanick’s testimony, the following colloquy occurred: 
[The Court]: He cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and conform. 
[Prosecutor]: Because of something he did of his own volition. 
[The Court]: Correct.  Correct.  But you still want to execute somebody who 
could not conform their conduct because of their mental illness regardless because 
they did the voluntary intoxication.  That is something I am having difficulty with 
because regardless of how bad he may be in the sense that he allegedly killed two 
people and wounded several others … everybody that has examined him, 
including your own doctor, says he didn’t know what he was doing.  But he is 
criminally responsible. 
That is much different, being criminally responsible and seeking the death penalty 
against somebody who didn’t know what they were doing at the time. 
Due to the trial court’s concerns, it requested briefing on the defense motion to preclude the 
death penalty based on the Eighth Amendment and its impact on executing Norman due to the 
unanimous opinion that he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct at the time of the offenses.  At the conclusion of the briefing, the trial court inquired of 
the State if it still intended to seek the death penalty. The prosecutors responded in the 
affirmative. 
 
49
evidence that he lacked criminal responsibility in that jurisdiction.  Evidence 
relevant to Norman’s criminal responsibility under Maryland law was presented to 
the jury by stipulation.114  The Stipulation included Dr. Mechanick’s opinion that 
Norman would not meet the criteria for “not criminally responsible” under 
Maryland law, and also Dr. Alizai-Cowan’s contrary opinion that “Mr. Norman 
met the standard for not criminally responsible under Maryland law.” 
Although the Stipulation purported to quote Maryland law, it did not explain 
how that law should be applied to determine Norman’s mental state at the time of 
the Peters homicide or his other criminal conduct in Maryland.115  Indeed, the 
Stipulation itself explicitly states that the quoted Maryland law “does not provide 
guidance about whether Mr. Norman’s psychiatric condition at the time of the 
conduct charged, while under the influence of substances, meets the Maryland 
standard for not criminally responsible.”  Moreover, the Stipulation contained the 
                                          
 
114 See supra note 19 for a copy of the Stipulation. 
115 Although the portions of Dr. Mechanick’s report read into evidence as part of the Stipulation 
purported to quote from the “Maryland Legal Code,” that description of the text is inaccurate.  
The Maryland statute on the test for criminal responsibility provides: 
(a) A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of 
that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, 
lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) 
conform that conduct to the requirements of law. 
(b) For purposes of this section, “mental disorder” does not include an abnormality 
that is manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct 
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 3-109.  This statute was not explained to the jury or cited by the 
trial judge in his sentencing decision.  However, the language in the Stipulation relating to 
voluntary intoxication, which the parties agree is a correct statement of Maryland law, appears to 
be taken from two Maryland Court of Special Appeals cases: Parker v. State, 254 A.2d 381 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1969) and Porreca v. State, 433 A.2d 1204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). 
 
50
statement by Dr. Mechanick that “[i]t is a matter for the court to determine whether 
Mr. Norman’s delirium at the time of the current charges is allowed under this 
definition as an insanity defense.”  As a result, the Stipulation failed to provide any 
clear statement of Maryland law which the jury could apply to its determination of 
whether Norman was criminally responsible for his conduct in that state.  It is 
undisputed that the trial judge also provided no guidance to the jury on the 
Maryland standard for “not criminally responsible.” 
In his Findings after Penalty Hearing, the trial judge noted the opinions of 
Dr. Alizai-Cowan and Dr. Mechanick, and said: “If their opinions were found 
credible by a Maryland jury, under Maryland law, the defendant may possibly have 
been found to be not criminally responsible.”116  This issue of mitigation for 
Norman’s conduct in Maryland remained relevant notwithstanding the dismissal of 
the charges there by Maryland prosecutors.117  The jury at Norman’s penalty 
hearing was unable to provide an advisory verdict on this proffered mitigation, 
because it was not provided guidance on the applicable Maryland law.  That is a 
material defect which deprived Norman of a substantial right and jeopardized the 
fairness and integrity of the penalty hearing. 
                                          
 
116 Findings After Penalty Hearing, supra note 12, at *29. 
117 The State has conceded that, but for the homicide in Maryland, this would not be a capital 
case.  At oral argument before this Court, the following colloquy occurred: 
Justice Holland: Do you agree that if the only homicide that had occurred was the 
Delaware homicide, that this is not a capital case? 
Mr. Wallace: Yes. 
 
51
We recognize that this capital case presents issues of first impression 
involving lack of criminal responsibility for conduct outside of Delaware.  
Nonetheless, Delaware law and the Eighth Amendment require that the jury 
consider matters relating to any mitigating circumstance.118  This includes lack of 
criminal responsibility for an alleged aggravating circumstance.  The absence of 
any guidance on Maryland law relating to Norman’s lack of criminal responsibility 
for his conduct in Maryland made it impossible for the jury either to decide the 
existence of a critical mitigating circumstance relied upon by the defense or to 
weigh that circumstance in the determination of sentence.   
Where the sentencer in a capital case is prevented from giving independent 
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to 
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation, there is a “risk that the death 
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.  
When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and 
incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”119  
Accordingly, we must reverse the death sentence imposed and remand this matter 
to the Superior Court for a new penalty hearing.120 
                                          
 
118 See 11 Del. C. § 4209(c); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05; White, 395 A.2d at 1088. 
119 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. 
120 Because we remand for a new penalty hearing, other issues raised by Norman relating to the 
Eighth Amendment and our mandatory proportionality review pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4209(g) 
are not ripe for review. 
 
52
VI. Conclusion 
We AFFIRM the judgments of the Superior Court with the exception of the 
death sentence imposed.  We REVERSE the death sentence and REMAND this 
matter for a new penalty hearing.