Title: In re Marriage of Bates

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97059-Agenda 16-May 2004.
In re MARRIAGE OF NORMA PEREZ DE BATES, Appellant, and 							
R. EDWARD BATES, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 28, 2004. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a lengthy hearing on the petition of Edward Bates to
modify custody, the trial court terminated Norma Bates' custody of
the minor child, awarded custody to Edward, and restricted Norma's
visitation rights pending a professional evaluation. The court also
denied Edward's petition to terminate unallocated maintenance and
support based on an alleged continuing conjugal relationship between
Norma and another man. Prior to the hearing, the court denied
Norma's constitutional challenge to section 506(a)(3) of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS
5/506(a)(3) (West 2002)) and, at trial, read and relied on the written
report of the child's representative appointed pursuant to that statute.
Norma appealed, Edward cross-appealed, and the appellate court
affirmed. 342 Ill. App. 3d 207. We granted Norma leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315. Edward seeks cross-relief. 155 Ill. 2d R. 318. We
now affirm.

BACKGROUND
	The parties were granted a judgment of dissolution, incorporating
a joint parenting agreement, on July 14, 2000. The agreement
provided that the minor child, S.B., would reside primarily with
Norma, subject to Edward's defined rights of visitation. The
agreement mandated the "involvement and cooperation of both
parents" in S.B.'s best interests, and both parents were ordered to use
their "best efforts to foster the respect, love and affection of S.B.
toward each parent" and to "cooperate fully in implementing a
relationship with S.B. that would give her the maximum feeling of
security that may be possible." The judgment further provided that
Edward would pay unallocated family support to Norma until one of
several described events, including the death of either party, the
remarriage of Norma, or the cohabitation of Norma on a resident,
continuing, conjugal basis as determined by a court after notice and a
hearing.
	On March 9, 2001, Norma filed a petition for modification of
visitation and other relief, alleging that Edward had breached the joint
parenting agreement and that S.B. was experiencing extreme anxiety
and distress following contact with her father. She also requested
appointment of a guardian ad litem pursuant to section 506(a) of the
Act (750 ILCS 5/506(a) (West 2000)). In an agreed order, attorney
John Bush was appointed as the child's representative. The record is
silent as to why a child representative was appointed, rather than a
guardian ad litem as requested by Norma.
	On March 19, 2001, Edward petitioned the court for a rule to
show cause why Norma should not be held in contempt for denying
him all contact with S.B., including by telephone, beginning around
January 1, 2001. Edward's petition claimed that Norma failed to
discuss decisions regarding S.B.'s activities with him; that she
unilaterally transferred S.B. to a different school without prior notice
to or discussion with Edward; and that she repeatedly denigrated
Edward in the presence of S.B. On May 15, 2001, Edward petitioned
to modify the judgment for dissolution, including custody, asserting
the same grounds as a willful violation of the judgment of dissolution
and the joint parenting agreement. Edward also sought termination of
the unallocated family support, alleging that Norma had cohabited on
a resident, continuing, conjugal basis with another man. The matter
was set for trial on all issues on December 19, 2001.
	 Pursuant to section 604(b) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/604(b) (West
2000)), the court appointed Dr. Gerald Blechman to evaluate the
postjudgment visitation dispute and to make a recommendation for its
resolution. After interviewing S.B., Dr. Blechman became concerned
about her emotional stability and suggested to the court that she be
referred to Dr. Roger Thatcher for therapy. Dr. Thatcher began his
involvement as a therapist in September 2001.
	On October 1, 2001, Dr. Blechman sent his evaluation to the
court and to all attorneys, including the child's representative. The
report recounted diagnostic interviews with S.B. and her parents, a
collateral interview with Kristin La Scala (a daughter of Edward), and
psychological testing administered to Norma and Edward. Dr.
Blechman concluded that Norma had induced alienation of S.B. from
her father and that this had taken a significant toll on S.B.'s mental
health. He recommended immediate intervention to restore the father-daughter relationship. He suggested family therapy two or three times
a week with Edward and S.B., and a strong admonishment to Norma
to cooperate with the program, including ceasing any form of abuse
allegations against Edward.
	At the request of Edward, the court, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 215 (166 Ill. 2d R. 215), required Norma to submit to a
psychological examination by Dr. Robert Shapiro. After conducting
three clinical interviews and psychological testing on Norma in
October and November 2001, Dr. Shapiro submitted his written
report, admitted in evidence at trial. He concluded that most of the
psychological testing was invalid because Norma's answers produced
results indicative of an individual who is purposely trying to deceive
and present herself as virtuous. He recounted that Norma reported she
was afraid of Edward caring for S.B. because he was an alcoholic who
was "always drunk."
	Norma also reported that S.B. did not enjoy her visitations with
Edward. At the time of his evaluation of Norma, S.B. had not visited
her father since January 2001. Norma acknowledged that she called
police in Florida on three occasions while S.B. was visiting Edward
there during the Christmas holiday in 2000 because she could not
reach S.B. and was worried about her safety. Dr. Shapiro concluded
that the presence of police during this vacation disrupted the quality
of the vacation and served to remind S.B. of her mother's
omnipotence. He could not confirm the existence of parent alienation
because he had not evaluated the child, the child-father relationship,
and the child-mother relationship.
	At the request of Norma, the court appointed Dr. Patrick J.
Kennelly, a licensed clinical psychologist with a practice in the
treatment of alcoholism, to conduct an examination of Edward
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 215 (166 Ill. 2d R. 215). He
conducted three interviews with Edward in October 2001 and
administered psychological testing and alcoholism screening tests. He
furnished a written report, concluding that Edward had no evidence
of psychological disorders and that the testing showed no indication
of alcoholism.
	The child's representative proceeded with an investigation and
filed a written report with the court on November 19, 2001. The
parties also conducted extensive discovery.
	On January 11, 2002, the court ordered Dr. Blechman to conduct
a reevaluation concerning whether the recommended steps were
successful in improving S.B.'s relationship with her father. He filed an
updated evaluation on January 24, 2002, concluding that Norma was
still manipulating S.B. and recommending that sole custody of S.B. be
given to Edward, with supervision of Norma's visitation by a
professional familiar with parental alienation syndrome. He also
recommended continued psychotherapy for S.B. and her father for the
foreseeable future and strongly recommended that Norma seek
psychotherapy.

Pretrial Motions
	On December 14, 2001, Norma filed a number of motions. She
moved to dismiss Edward's petition to modify custody pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 2000)), alleging the failure of Edward to present
affidavits establishing a reason to believe S.B.'s physical, mental,
moral or emotional health was seriously endangered by the present
environment, as required by section 610 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/610
(West 2000)).
	Norma next filed a motion to bar the testimony of Dr. Richard
Gardner, Edward's disclosed expert witness, on the ground that the
subject matter of his testimony, parental alienation syndrome (PAS),
did not meet the reliability requirements set out in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
	Norma then filed a "motion to order child representative to testify
or in the alternative to strike his recommendations and for declaratory
judgment regarding the constitutionality of 750 ILCS 5/506." The
motion claimed that Norma's right to due process of law would be
denied if the child's representative were allowed to present his report
with no attendant right to cross-examine him. The motion asked the
court either to strike and disregard the recommendations of Mr. Bush,
or to order him to submit to deposition and to testify in the case, or to
declare the statute unconstitutional "on its face and/or as applied to
Norma Perez."
	Finally, Norma filed a motion pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of
the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2000)) to dismiss Edward's
petition to modify custody on the ground that Edward had improperly
asserted the physician-patient privilege when his physical and mental
health were at issue.
	Edward filed written responses to those motions, asserting, inter
alia, that Norma had filed dispositive motions less than 63 days before
trial, in violation of a local rule. The motions were called for hearing
on the first day of trial and decided the following day.
	On December 20, 2001, the court denied Norma's section 2-615
motion, finding that Edward's verification of the pleading was
sufficient and noting that Norma had participated in extensive
discovery without objection. On January 15, 2002, the court allowed
Edward to file an affidavit in support of his petition to modify
custody, noting that it asserted no changes in the facts alleged in the
petition. Norma's section 2-619(a)(9) motion was stricken because of
its late filing, without prejudice to her right to raise the assertion of
privilege issue at trial.
	The court struck Norma's motion to bar the testimony of Dr.
Gardner as untimely. However, the court treated it as a motion in
limine and also ordered a Frye hearing, to commence on January 15,
2002.
	The court found that the child representative's report was "in the
nature of a prejudgment or a pretrial pleading" and "not evidence,"
but the court sealed the report. The court reasoned that the pretrial
submission of the report did not implicate the challenged provisions
of section 506 of the Act, and the court accordingly denied Norma's
request to declare the statute unconstitutional.
	On December 18, 2001, Edward filed an amended motion to bar
witnesses, including Dr. Jeffrey Johnson, a physician designated as an
expert by Norma, because of late disclosure and failure to comply with
the requirements of Supreme Court Rules 213(f) and (g) (177 Ill. 2d
Rs. 213(f), (g)). The court entered an order barring Dr. Johnson from
testifying because his report had not been identified and filed in a
timely fashion. The court also denied Norma's motion in limine to bar
Edward from testifying at trial because of his assertion of physician-patient privilege, observing that she failed to file a motion to compel
answers to the deposition questions.

The Frye Hearing
	Edward, as proponent of the PAS testimony, proffered three
expert witnesses and 136 articles from peer-reviewed publications as
exhibits. Norma proffered no witnesses and no exhibits.
	Dr. R. Christopher Barden, an attorney and a psychologist
licensed in Minnesota and Texas, testified that he is familiar with PAS
and that he believed everyone in the social sciences field is familiar
with the term. He characterized PAS as a useful and clear description
of a set of symptoms or clusters, commonly seen in child custody
proceedings, when one parent is actively involved in turning a child
against the other parent.
	Dr. Barden testified that PAS is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community. He based his opinion on his clinical experience
and on his extensive perusal of peer-review publications referencing
the syndrome. Peer-review publications are journals and other
compendiums where research articles are reviewed for accuracy and
methodology by a panel of experts in the relevant field. Dr. Barden
identified several peer-reviewed articles submitted by Dr. Richard
Gardner and other authors describing and authenticating PAS. Copies
of these articles were admitted in evidence. In Dr. Barden's opinion,
the concept of PAS is not novel, having been first referenced in 1994
by the American Psychological Association. Although PAS is not
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), published by the American
Psychiatric Association in 1994, Dr. Barden did not believe that fact
indicated rejection of the syndrome, noting that another revision of the
DSM is expected by 2010.
	Dr. Richard Gardner, a board-certified psychiatrist and a clinical
professor of child psychiatry, also testified. He referenced several
books on PAS and an index of 59 articles on PAS written by his peers.
He has written 13 published articles on PAS. He described PAS as a
disorder arising primarily, if not exclusively, in the context of child
custody disputes. It results from the combination of one parent's
programming or brainwashing a child into a campaign of denigration
against the other parent, and the undue indoctrination of the child by
the programing parent with his or her own inflated "contributions."
This combination, in his opinion, results in PAS. Dr. Gardner testified
that PAS is generally accepted in the relevant psychiatric and
psychological communities.
	Dr. Robert B. Shapiro, a clinical psychologist licensed in Illinois
and a member of the Board of Evaluators, used by the Du Page
County circuit court to evaluate families in custody disputes, also
testified that PAS was generally accepted by the relevant
psychological community, observing that "I don't know anybody who
doesn't accept it." Dr. Shapiro himself has diagnosed PAS many times
and has testified often in court on the subject.
	At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found "that the
principle of Parental Alienation Syndrome is sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field."

The Trial
	Numerous witnesses testified, either in person or by evidence
deposition, at the trial beginning on February 26, 2002, and continuing
intermittently until its conclusion on April 17, 2002. Among the
witnesses were court-appointed evaluators, retained experts, treating
practitioners, as well as the parties, family members, police officers,
and private investigators.
	Dr. Roger Hatcher, S. B.'s court-appointed therapist, was called
as a witness by Edward. He is a licensed psychologist and is the
practice director at PsychCare Associates in Aurora. He found S.B.'s
mental health to be severely compromised. She was acutely and
severely distressed with major symptoms of anxiety and panic relating
to Edward caused by Norma's influencing the child against her father.
He found no evidence that any of her distress was caused by Edward.
If not for therapeutic intervention, she was headed for an increasingly
severe psychiatric crisis. After a series of sessions with S.B. and
interviews with both parents, Dr. Hatcher set up a visitation schedule.
After the visits, S.B.'s condition improved and her relationship with
Edward was better.
	Dr. Shapiro, who conducted the Rule 215 evaluation of Norma,
identified three occurrences consistent with alienation: (1) Norma's
series of phone calls to Florida during S.B.'s visitation with Edward;
(2) Norma's registering S.B. in school under the surname "Perez," and
(3) Norma's failure to maintain S.B.'s scheduled visitation with her
father.
	Dr. Kennelly, who conducted the Rule 215 examination of
Edward, concluded that Edward showed no evidence of major
psychological disorders. He testified that Edward's test results for
alcoholism were insignificant.
	Dr. Blechman, the court's section 604(b) evaluator, testified that
S.B. fit the typical criteria for PAS. Her complaints about her father
did not appear to be valid. Although she would obsessively repeat the
same accusations against her father, she could provide no explanation
when pressed for particulars. In Dr. Blechman's opinion, S.B. had
false memories suggested or created by Norma. Although S.B. told
him that her father struck her during the Florida vacation, he chose
not to believe her. Based on his interviews with the parties, his
observations, and his conversations with Dr. Hatcher, he opined that
residential custody of S.B. should be awarded to Edward, subject to
supervised visitation by Norma with a professional present.
	Dr. Richard Gardner testified regarding PAS and the alleged
alcoholism of Edward. He did not conduct clinical interviews with
S.B. or Norma, but rendered hypothetical opinions based on his
review of documents, reports, depositions and information conveyed
to him by Edward. Among the materials reviewed were Dr.
Blechman's reports and notes, letters from Dr. Hatcher, police reports
from Florida, and the report of child representative John Bush.
	Dr. Gardner defined PAS as a psychiatric disorder arising in the
context of a child custody dispute. In this disorder, one parent
"programs" or "brainwashes" a child into a campaign of denigration
against the other parent, even though that other parent is generally
good and loving. The denigrating custodial parent inflates his or her
own contributions, and PAS arises as a result of a combination of both
the undue denigration and the inflated heightening of the custodial
parent's contributions. In Dr. Gardner's opinion, S.B. exhibited classic
signs and symptoms of PAS in the moderate category. He concluded
that therapy for the child would be useless as long as she lived with
her mother. Dr. Gardner also concluded that Edward is not an
alcoholic and that his possible consumption of some alcohol did not
interfere with his parenting.
	Edward testified that S.B. had been taken out of her previous
school without his knowledge, and he was required to go to court in
September 2000 to learn her new school, home address, and phone
number. Edward also testified concerning the Florida visitation
incident. He described the trip he took with S.B. to Florida in
December of 2000 as apparently a happy and good one for her. He
observed that on December 29, while S.B. was speaking with her
mother on the telephone, she appeared to become agitated. A sheriff's
deputy soon arrived, spoke with S.B., and also spoke with Norma on
the telephone. No official action was taken. At approximately 1 a.m.
the following morning, the same deputy arrived and said he had been
called by Norma. He conferred with Edward, who showed him to
S.B.'s room, where she was sleeping. The deputy again left, without
taking any action. At 12:15 p.m. another deputy arrived, spoke with
Edward and S.B., and left without taking any action.
	Edward's account of these events was essentially corroborated
by Richard Young, the deputy who first arrived. His testimony was in
the form of an evidence deposition taken telephonically at the instance
of Mr. Bush, the child representative. The deposition was taken during
trial, with leave of court, and over Norma's objection. Counsel for all
parties participated in the deposition. Norma objected to the testimony
because Deputy Young was not disclosed as a witness as required by
the court's pretrial order. The objection was overruled, and Deputy
Young's deposition was read into evidence. He testified that he was
dispatched as a result of a Teletype message from Illinois, requesting
a check on the child's welfare. He could discern no physical injury or
abuse to S.B., and she made no claim that Edward had harmed her,
although she seemed upset when he arrived. He returned later that
night in response to another Teletype message from Illinois,
requesting another welfare check and asking for S.B. to call her
mother. Since the child was sleeping, Edward told him he would have
her call her mother in the morning.
	Edward related that after January 1, 2001, S.B. ceased being
animated and vocal with him, instead becoming withdrawn and
difficult to engage in conversation. On numerous occasions he
telephoned Norma's residence seeking to speak with S.B., but his calls
went unanswered or unreturned.
	Norma claimed Edward was drinking and abusing S.B. during the
Florida trip, thus occasioning her telephoning the police. She
admitted, however, that police found no evidence of either
intoxication or abuse. Norma claimed that she always let S.B. speak
with Edward when he telephoned or left a message for S.B. Her
telephone records revealed, however, no return calls to Edward's
home or cell phone numbers. Further, although she claimed that
visitation between Edward and S.B. did not occur in 2001 only
because of Edward's preference, several letters were introduced
demonstrating that Edward continuously requested his scheduled
visitation during that time.
	Several witnesses, including family members and private
investigators, testified as to the frequency and amount of Edward's
alcohol consumption. Edward admitted drinking wine frequently and
rum and coke occasionally, but denied being intoxicated or drinking
in S.B.'s presence. He said that his last alcohol consumption was
about mid-February 2002, and that he had quit drinking because it had
become an issue.
	The court declined to conduct an in camera interview with S.B.
on the issue of whether she was abused by Edward in Florida because
there was a meaningful risk of putting the 10-year-old child in a
position of blaming herself for the outcome of the case. The court
noted that "I can't possibly put that child through it. I'm not going to
have her come into this courtroom."
	Norma admitted knowing Parmod Malik, an airline pilot, for 15
to16 years, and said they planned on getting married some day. She
moved into a home in St. Charles owned by Malik, and admitted that
Malik stayed overnight there with her on occasion since January 2001,
and that they had sexual relations on two of his visits. Nonetheless,
they maintained separate residences and have not vacationed together.
Neither Norma nor Malik keeps personal belongings in the home of
the other. Each is responsible for his or her own expenses and home
maintenance, and they do not commingle any funds. Although Norma
admitted writing checks to Malik, she claimed they were rental
payments on the St. Charles home. A private investigator employed
by Edward testified that he observed Malik and Norma kissing and
hugging on several occasions. He also saw Malik enter Norma's home
several times, but did not see him leave.
	At the close of the hearing, child representative Bush offered his
sealed report in evidence. The court allowed its admission over
Norma's objection that it contained hearsay and that she had been
denied the right to cross-examine Bush.
	Bush's report described his interviews with S.B., Edward, and
Norma, and various school and medical records provided by the
parties, as well as his observations of visitations between S.B. and
Edward. S.B. related to Bush that she enjoyed the Florida trip and
denied that any abuse occurred. S.B. said she did not want to visit
Edward because he gets drunk and she feared he would hurt her. She
described recollections of Edward coming home drunk and "poking
her in the eyes and stepping on her toes" when she was smaller. She
admitted she has never seen him drink alcohol and could not articulate
any reason for her fears. Additionally, Bush attached the first written
report of Dr. Blechman and the written report of Dr. Mark Goldstein,
a psychologist who had completed a court-ordered child custody
evaluation prior to the judgment of dissolution. The report concluded
with Bush's recommendation that physical custody of S.B. be
transferred to Edward.
	The trial court found that Edward had proved, by clear and
convincing evidence, that S.B.'s present environment seriously
endangered her physical, mental, moral or emotional health, and that
it was in S.B.'s best interests that Edward be awarded sole custody
immediately. The court abated visitation between S.B. and Norma
until further order of court, finding S.B. would be seriously
endangered by visitation. The court directed Edward and S.B. to
continue therapy with Dr. Hatcher and directed Edward not to
consume alcohol until further order of the court. The court denied
Edward's petition to terminate unallocated support and discharged the
rule to show cause against Norma. The court found no just cause to
delay enforcement or appeal, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).
	In announcing the ruling, the trial court said that it was based on
its review of the pleadings and orders in the file, the exhibits, the
substance and credibility of the expert testimony, the substance and
credibility of the parties' testimony, and the testimony of nonparty
witnesses, as well as its review of the child representative's report.
The court said it would "throw out the words 'parental alienation
syndrome,' " basing its findings instead on the standard set out in
section 602(a)(8) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/602(a)(8) (West 2002)),
namely, "The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the parents and
child." Norma appealed and Edward cross-appealed.
	The appellate court, in an opinion published in part (166 Ill. 2d
R. 23), affirmed both the change of custody and the denial of
Edward's petition to terminate unallocated support. 342 Ill. App. 3d
at 215. We allowed Norma's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315. Edward seeks cross-relief on the termination of support issue.
155 Ill. 2d R. 318. We also granted leave to Justice For Children, a
national child advocacy organization, and to Richard L. Ducote, a
member of the Louisiana bar, to file amicus curiae briefs in support
of Norma. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

ANALYSIS
	In her petition for leave to appeal, Norma raised four points
relied on for reversal. Those points, as described in her petition, were:
(1) the trial court committed reversible error in ruling that section 506
of the Act (750 ILCS 5/506 (West 2002)) was constitutional and in
admitting and considering the child representative's report, and in
modifying custody; (2) the trial court should not have permitted the
child representative's undisclosed witness (Deputy Young) to testify;
(3) the trial court committed reversible error in failing to interview the
minor child; and (4) the trial court committed reversible error in failing
to bar the parental alienation syndrome testimony of Dr. Gardner. In
her brief, Norma asserts additional grounds for reversal: (1) the trial
court's rulings on the section 2-615 and 2-619 motions, (2) the order
barring Dr. Johnson from testifying, and (3) the limitation of the scope
of another witness' testimony.
	Supreme Court Rule 315(b) provides that a party's petition for
leave to appeal "shall contain *** (3) a statement of the points relied
upon for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court." 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(b)(3). Failure to raise an issue in the petition for leave to
appeal may be deemed a waiver of that argument. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. O'Malley, 163 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (1994). Adherence
to Rule 315(b)(3) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of
an issue; it is a principle of administrative convenience. Dineen v. City
of Chicago, 125 Ill. 2d 248, 265 (1988). In this case, however, we
will consider only the points raised in the petition for leave to appeal.
The additional points urged as grounds for reversal in Norma's brief
were thoroughly and thoughtfully discussed in the unpublished
portions of the appellate court's opinion, and we find no sufficient
justification to overlook the administrative requirements of Rule 315
in this instance. We therefore deem those arguments to be waived.
Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 198 Ill. 2d 420, 429 (2002). We
turn now to the issues properly preserved for review.

Section 506 and Procedural Due Process
	Norma argues that section 506 of the Act is unconstitutional as
applied in her case because she was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the child representative, who functioned as both an advocate
and a fact finder and whose written report was relied on by the trial
court in its findings. The standard of review of the constitutionality of
a statute is de novo. People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305, 318 (2003).
Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the
validity of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing that it is
unconstitutional. In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 58 (2002). The strong
presumption of constitutionality requires courts to construe statutes
in order to uphold their constitutionality whenever reasonably
possible. Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (2002).
	Section 506 provides, in pertinent part:
			"(a) Duties. In any proceedings involving the support,
custody, visitation, education, parentage, property interest,
or general welfare of a minor or dependent child, the court
may, on its own motion or that of any party, and subject to
the terms or specifications the court determines, appoint an
attorney to serve in one of the following capacities:
* * *
				(3) as a child's representative whose duty shall be to
advocate what the representative finds to be in the best
interests of the child after reviewing the facts and
circumstances of the case. The child's representative shall
have the same power and authority to take part in the
conduct of the litigation as does an attorney for a party
and shall possess all the powers of investigation and
recommendation as does a guardian ad litem. The child's
representative shall consider, but not be bound by, the
expressed wishes of the child. *** The child's
representative shall not disclose confidential
communications made by the child, except as required by
law or by the Rules of Professional Conduct. The child's
representative shall not be called as a witness regarding
the issues set forth in this subsection." 750 ILCS
5/506(a)(3) (West 2002).
	In his written report, child representative Bush described his
observations of visitation between Edward and S.B., recounted S.B.'s
version of the events in Florida as well as her recollections of Edward
coming home drunk and "poking her in the eyes and stepping on her
toes" when she was smaller. The report was admitted in evidence, but
Norma was unable to cross-examine Bush on his observations and the
basis for his recommendations because of the clear statutory
prohibition against calling him as a witness. Thus, Norma argues that
she was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on a matter
implicating a fundamental liberty interest, thereby violating her right
to procedural due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
XIV) and section 2 of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
	The appellate court construed the statute to allow calling the
child's representative as a witness if the representative directly
witnesses relevant facts and circumstances used to support a
recommendation, because the representative has then "stepped out of
his attorney role." 342 Ill. App. 3d at 214. In that instance, the court
reasoned, the representative has become a witness who may be called
and questioned at trial, as any other witness, under the terms or
specifications as determined by the court. The appellate court held
that section 506(a) does not deny a party procedural due process and
is not unconstitutional because it can be interpreted to allow a party
to request disclosure by the child representative of underlying factual
matters or to cross-examine the child representative when the
representative acts as a witness. 342 Ill. App. 3d at 214. The court
further held that this interpretation may be reconciled with Rule 3.7 of
the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d R. 3.7),
prohibiting an attorney from being both a witness and an advocate for
his client, because in such circumstances the court is authorized, under
section 506(a)(3), to appoint another attorney to represent the child.
342 Ill. App. 3d at 214.
	The appellate court held that the trial court erred in denying
Norma's request to examine Bush, to the extent that the
representative's recommendation was based on his observations as a
witness. The court reasoned, however, that the error was harmless
because it did not play a significant role in the trial court's ruling. The
trial court recited that it would consider the report "for what it's
worth" along with many other factors and, therefore, any error in
considering the report was not prejudicial. 342 Ill. App. 3d at 214-15.
	Norma argues before us that the appellate court's statutory
construction is unreasonable because it disregards the express,
unambiguous language prohibiting calling the child's representative as
a witness "regarding the issues set forth" in section 506(a)(3). Edward
argues that the statute limits those issues to the expressed wishes of
the child, confidential communications made by the child, and the
training and experience of the child representative. According to
Edward, there is no express prohibition on questioning the
representative on the factual basis for his recommendations or on his
observations in coming to a particular recommendation.
	The challenged statute provides that the child representative's
duty shall be "to advocate what the representative finds to be in the
best interests of the child after reviewing the facts and circumstances
of the case," and further provides that the representative "shall possess
all the powers of investigation and recommendation as does a
guardian ad litem." 750 ILCS 5/506(a)(3) (West 2002).
	We agree with Norma that the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous. The "issues set forth" in section 506(a)(3) clearly
include the duty to advocate what the representative finds to be in the
child's best interests and the power to investigate and recommend in
the manner of a guardian ad litem. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the plain and
ordinary meaning of the language without resort to other tools of
statutory construction. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long
Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 255 (2004). The representative's observations
and conversations with the parties, witnesses, and S.B. were clearly
within the statutory ambit barring him as a witness. Thus, the appellate
court's statutory construction was error, and we must address the
issue of whether procedural due process requires allowing the
representative to be called as a witness.
	In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), the Supreme Court held that "identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S.  at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 
at 33, 96 S. Ct.  at 903.
	The private interest involved here is the right of parents to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of their children. In
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 649-50, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2159-60 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that right to be an important interest, warranting deference and
protection, absent a powerful countervailing interest. We have also
recently held that one of the fundamental rights protected under the
fourteenth amendment is the right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children without
unwarranted state intrusion. See Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309,
316 (2002). Further, in In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (2003),
a case involving termination of parental rights, this court held that
parents have a fundamental due process right to the care, custody and
control of their children.
	In Norma's case, her right to the companionship, care, custody,
and management of S.B. was seriously impacted. Custody of the child
was taken from her and, for a period of time, she was denied any
visitation. These changes seriously and unfavorably altered Norma's
previous unfettered exercise of her custodial rights. We hold,
therefore, that a fundamental liberty interest is implicated in this case.
	Next, we must consider whether the statutory prohibition against
calling the child's representative as a witness created a risk of
erroneous deprivation of Norma's custodial rights. The
representative's findings, conclusions, and recommendations were all
adverse to Norma's interests. Without the important tool of cross-examination, Norma's means of challenging his observations,
conclusions, and recommendations were impaired. We have held that
the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to inspect the
evidence offered against a party are part of guaranteeing the exercise
of due process before an administrative tribunal. Balmoral Racing
Club, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board, 151 Ill. 2d 367, 408 (1992). This
is no less so in a custody hearing in a trial court. A child's
representative is empowered by section 506(a)(3) to make a
recommendation after reviewing the facts and circumstances of the
case and to conduct his own investigation. The representative, like any
other witness, is not immune from error in observation and from
inadvertent bias. The proper weight to be given the report of a child's
representative may be influenced by many factors, including his
training and experience, the contacts between the representative, the
parties, and the child, and the existence of any bias or tendency to
favor one gender of parent over the other. Cross-examination is likely
to affect the trial court's assessment of the worth of the
representative's recommendations in many cases.
	In People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510, 526 (1950), this
court upheld a constitutional challenge to the enforcement of the
Domestic Relations Act of 1949 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, ch. 37, pars.
105.19 through 105.36). A section of that statute granted unlimited
authority to a master in chancery to investigate all matters relating to
an inquiry, but provided no means to rebut any evidence adduced in
the investigation, either by cross-examination or presentation of
contrary evidence. Noting that little, if any, protection was afforded
parties from arbitrary recommendations based on ex parte evidence
from witnesses without cross-examination, we held this to be a clear
violation of due process of law. Bernat, 405 Ill.  at 526.
	The statute in the case before us suffers from the same infirmities
as the statute in Bernat. A custodial parent challenging an adverse
recommendation is deprived of perhaps the most effective means of
doing so because the statute expressly prohibits the right to cross-examine the child representative. Clearly, this created a serious risk of
erroneous deprivation of Norma's custodial rights. Thus, the second
factor in the Mathews analysis is satisfied.
	Allowing cross-examination would impose no fiscal or
administrative burdens on the state, and it is not inimical to any
government interest we can perceive. The third Mathews factor is,
therefore, also satisfied.
	 The representative's report was received in evidence, read, and
relied on by the trial court and, thus, Norma's right to procedural due
process was denied. We therefore hold that section 506(a)(3) is
unconstitutional as applied in this case.
	Even though the application of the statute unconstitutionally
deprived Norma of her due process right to cross-examine child
representative Bush, that holding is not dispositive, for even errors of
a constitutional dimension may be harmless. See People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 61 (2000). We still must determine whether the deprivation
of her right to cross-examine Bush requires reversal of the trial court's
modification of custody.

Modification of Custody
	Section 610 of the Act allows modification of a prior custody
judgment, absent consent, only if the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, upon facts that have arisen since or were
unknown at the time of prior judgment, that modification is necessary
to serve the best interests of the child. 750 ILCS 5/610 (West 2002).
The trial court found that S.B.'s present environment seriously
endangered her physical, mental, moral or emotional health and that
a substantial change in circumstances had been proved by clear and
convincing evidence. The court expressly considered the standards for
determining best interests set out in section 602 of the Act, including
"(8) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other
parent and the child." 750 ILCS 5/602(8) (West 2002). The court
based its conclusion that a change in custody was warranted on a
review of all the testimony and evidence, including the
representative's report and its assessment of witness credibility.
	The standard of review of custody modification judgments is the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Cotton 103 Ill. 2d 346, 356 (1984). The trial court is in the best position to review the
evidence and to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Cotton, 103 Ill. 2d  at 356. In determining whether a judgment is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. In re Marriage of
Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App. 3d 198, 206 (1999). Where the evidence
permits multiple reasonable inferences, the reviewing court will accept
those inferences that support the court's order. Nemeth v. Banhalmi,
125 Ill. App. 3d 938, 963 (1984). A custody determination, in
particular, is afforded "great deference" because " the trial court is in
a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
determine the best interests of the child." In re Marriage of
Gustavson, 247 Ill. App. 3d 797, 801 (1993).
	All of the expert testimony supports the conclusion that Norma
had consistently failed to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing relationship between S.B. and Edward. Dr. Blechman, the
court-appointed clinical psychologist, testified that Norma had
engaged in a systematic pattern of undermining Edward with S.B. and
that only a change of custody to Edward was in the child's best
interests. Dr. Shapiro, the psychologist who evaluated Norma at the
court's request, found that Norma was openly distrustful and
untruthful in standardized testing and that she did not encourage a
close relationship between S.B. and Edward. Dr. Hatcher, the court-appointed therapist, described acute emotional distress in S.B. caused
by the mother's activities, requiring a change in custody. He found no
evidence that Edward had neglected or harmed the child in any way,
physically, emotionally, or psychologically. Dr. Gardner, Edward's
retained expert, testified that Norma had alienated S.B. from her
father and that a change of custody was warranted.
	Although evidence of Edward's drinking, including his own
admissions, was admitted, Dr. Kennelly, who evaluated Edward
pursuant to Norma's Rule 215 request, could find no evidence that
Edward was alcoholic or psychologically impaired in any way. The
court, in its judgment modification, nevertheless directed Edward to
abstain from the use of alcohol until further order.
	The court announced that it found Norma's testimony to be
inventive, untruthful, manipulative, and self-serving. It found that she
did not recognize or take responsibility for her actions and the
resultant damage done to the child and the child's relationship with
her father.
	Despite the clear manifest weight of the expert testimony and the
credibility assessments properly made by the trial court, Norma asserts
that the admission of the representative's report tainted the entire
proceedings. She points to no statements in the report, however, that
are inconsistent with the evidence at trial. Our review of the report
confirms that it is merely cumulative of the testimonial and
documentary evidence. Norma makes no argument before us on the
effect the denial of her right to cross-examine Bush had on the
outcome of the trial. She complains that the report is "riddled with
hearsay," yet she does not identify the purported hearsay statements
and she does not describe any prejudicial effect resulting from the
report's admission. A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly
defined with relevant authority cited. See Sterling Finance
Management, L.P. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d 442,
449 n.3 (2002). Further, Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) requires that
argument "shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the
record relied on." 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Here, Norma fails to give
this court an adequate basis to grant her relief on this issue.
	The written report was completed and furnished to the parties in
November 2001, three months before trial. Although Norma could not
cross-examine Bush, she was apprised of the persons interviewed, the
observations made, and the reports relied on as the basis for his
recommendation. She presented no evidence at trial to rebut Bush's
findings, focusing instead on evidence of Edward's drinking.
	The appellate court found that the representative's report did not
play a significant role in the trial court's ruling and, therefore, did not
affect the outcome of the trial. 342 Ill. App. 3d at 214. Our review of
the report confirms that none of Bush's observations, conclusions, and
recommendations were inconsistent with the evidence at trial. Norma
has not demonstrated that consideration of the report by the court was
prejudicial, or even that it affected the outcome. Accordingly, we
cannot say that its admission tainted the proceedings. We hold,
therefore, that the denial of due process in failing to allow cross-examination of child representative Bush was harmless error and that
the judgment changing custody is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.

Dr. Gardner's Parental Alienation Syndrome Testimony
	Norma argues that Dr. Gardner's testimony did not satisfy the
reliability requirements of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923) and, thus, should have been barred. In Frye, the court
observed:
		"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs." Frye, 293 F.  at 1014.
	The "general acceptance" standard has been adopted by this
court. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 211 (1989). We have recently
reaffirmed the applicability of that standard in Donaldson v. Central
Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 77 (2002). The trial court
will apply the Frye test only if the scientific principle, technique, or
test offered by the expert to support his or her conclusion is "new" or
"novel." People v. Basler, 193 Ill. 2d 545, 550-51 (2000). The trial
court in this case made no specific finding on the issue of whether
parental alienation syndrome is a new or novel principle. No Illinois
reviewing court has considered the question of the general acceptance
of PAS.
	Evidence at the Frye hearing established that the syndrome had
been described in peer-reviewed literature dating from the late 1980s.
Dr. Barden, the psychologist proffered as an expert on the issue of
general acceptance in the field, testified that the term "parental
alienation syndrome" is not a novel principle, being first referenced by
the American Psychological Association in 1994. He testified that
PAS is a recognized condition and generally accepted in the field of
psychology. Whether PAS remains a new or novel concept several
years after it was first described in the literature, the only evidence the
trial court heard was that it is generally accepted in the field of
psychology. Norma presented no evidence to the contrary.
	Despite Norma's failure to present any evidence in opposition to
the PAS theory, Norma and her amici argue that PAS is "junk
science" and cite cases from other jurisdictions rejecting its
admissibility. See, e.g., Wiederholt v. Fischer, 169 Wis. 2d 524, 485 N.W.2d 442 (App. 1992); Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 84 (Ind.
App. 1997) (Chezem, J., concurring); People v. Loomis, 172 Misc. 2d
265, 658 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1997). In People v. Fortin, 184 Misc. 2d 10,
14, 706 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (2000), PAS testimony was proffered by
the defendant in a rape prosecution. The trial court conducted a Frye
hearing, noting that there was no existing authority in New York for
the admission of PAS testimony and also noting a split in authority
from other jurisdictions. Fortin, 184 Misc. 2d at 13-14, 706 N.Y.S.2d 
at 613-14. The defendant presented general acceptance testimony
from Dr. Richard Gardner, described as the "leading expert in the
field." Fortin, 184 Misc. 2d at 14, 706 N.Y.S.2d  at 614. The court
noted that Dr. Gardner testified on cross-examination:
			"Although the concept of scientific proof may be of
importance in such fields as chemistry, physics and biology,
the concept is not as applicable in the field of psychology;
especially with regard to issues being dealt with in such areas
as child custody disputes, and sex abuse accusations."Fortin,
184 Misc. 2d at 12, 706 N.Y.S.2d  at 613.
	In Fortin, Dr. Gardner was the only witness who testified in
support of the general acceptance of PAS. The court held that the
defendant had not established that PAS had gained general acceptance
in the professional community. Fortin, 184 Misc. 2d at 15, 706 N.Y.S.2d  at 614.
	Dr. Gardner and PAS have been harshly criticized by scholarly
writers. See, e.g., C. Wood, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A
Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1367 (June
1994); C. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome & Parental
Alienation: Getting it Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 Fam. L.Q.
527 (2001). Critics have pointed to many flaws in the theory and have
challenged Dr. Gardner's expertise and motivation. While we
acknowledge Norma's arguments on appeal, we note that no PAS
critics testified at the Frye hearing in this case, nor was any other
testimony presented in opposition to the general acceptance of PAS.
	We observe, however, that the evidence amply supported the trial
court's conclusion that S.B. did not enjoy "a close and continuing
relationship" with her father under section 602 (750 ILCS 5/602
(West 2002)). Moreover, the evidence showed that, as a result of the
damaged relationship with her father, S.B. suffered emotional distress
requiring therapy. In its ruling, the trial court announced that it would
"throw out the words 'parental alienation syndrome.' " In expressly
disclaiming any reliance on the PAS theory, the trial court instead
specifically applied the section 602 standard of the Act (750 ILCS
5/602 (West 2002)), finding that Norma interfered with S.B.'s ability
to build a "close and continuing relationship" with her father.  
	Accordingly, even though the trial court, in its pretrial ruling,
found PAS generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, the
record clearly demonstrates that Dr. Gardner's PAS testimony was
not a basis for the trial court's judgment. Thus, we conclude that,
whatever the merits of the PAS theory, the court's ruling was not
dependent on any finding that PAS was present in this case. We
therefore need not review the trial court's general acceptance
determination and we express no opinion on the validity of that
finding.

Failure to Interview the Child in Chambers
	Norma argues that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in
camera interview with S.B. because the child's account of the Florida
incident was a key point in the case. Dr. Blechman acknowledged that
S.B. told him her father had struck her, although he chose not to
believe her. Thus, Norma contends the in camera interview could
have uncovered the truth, and it is possible that it might have changed
the outcome of the case. We note that this argument is not supported
by any citation to legal authority as required by Supreme Court Rule
341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)).
	Section 604(a) of the Act provides that the court may interview
the child in chambers to ascertain the child's wishes as to the
custodian and as to visitation. 750 ILCS 5/604(a) (West 2002). That
statute, however, provides no specific authority to conduct in camera
interviews on other subjects. Norma argues that the court should have
questioned S.B. on the Florida incident. She was not prevented,
however, from calling the child as a witness on that subject. In any
event, the standard of review on the decision to conduct an in camera
interview is abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Johnson, 245 Ill.
App. 3d 545, 554 (1993).
	The trial court declined to conduct an in camera interview of
S.B. because of its concern that she would be put in the position of
blaming herself for the outcome. In an unpublished portion of its
opinion, the appellate court agreed that risk was a meaningful one.
The court also noted:
		"Further, there was other evidence in this case related to the
issue of whether respondent struck the child and under what
circumstances. Additionally, the prejudice to petitioner in the
trial court's failing to ask the child about the alleged incident
is merely speculative as we cannot assume the child would
have answered in a manner favorable to petitioner. The
bottom line is that the trial court clearly expressed its concern
on the record in striking the balance in favor of not
conducting the interview. We cannot say the balance struck
by the trial court was an abuse of discretion."
	We agree with the appellate court on this issue and hold that the
failure to conduct an interview in chambers was not an abuse of
discretion.

Deputy Young's Testimony
	 Norma's final argument is that the trial court erred in allowing
the child's representative to call Deputy Young as a witness because
his name was not disclosed by Bush as a witness he intended to call at
trial. It is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether evidence
is relevant and admissible, and a court's determination on that issue
will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v.
Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455 (2001).
	On December 20, 2001, all parties were ordered to provide
opposing counsel a list of witnesses each intended to call at trial. Bush
did not provide a list of witnesses, but was permitted to take the
telephonic evidence deposition of Deputy Young during the trial on
April 15, 2002. Norma claims that because Deputy Young's testimony
related to the Florida visitation incident, the prejudice to her is
manifest. The appellate court held, however, that the lack of
disclosure was not prejudicial because she was aware of the
investigation by Florida authorities and had access to Deputy Young
long before he was disclosed as a witness. The appellate court did not
deem Deputy Young's testimony, limited to the issue of the Florida
incident, significant enough to have affected the outcome concerning
custody.
	We recognize the importance of compliance with discovery
orders. To prevent surprise or prejudice, and where demonstrated
harm results to a party, we will not hesitate to grant relief. Here we
agree with the appellate court that Norma has not demonstrated any
prejudice resulting from Deputy Young's testimony. She was aware
of his involvement long before trial began. Her counsel conducted an
extensive and effective cross-examination, resulting in the deputy's
admissions that he could not recall asking S.B. if her father had struck
her and that he did not examine the parts of her body covered by
clothing. We hold, therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing this witness to testify at trial.

Cross-Relief
	Edward complains that the trial court erred in failing to grant his
petition to terminate unallocated maintenance and support because the
evidence established the existence of a resident, continuing, conjugal
relationship between Norma and Parmod Malik. The standard of
review of a support order is whether it is an abuse of discretion, or
whether the factual predicate for the decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Slagel v. Wessels, 314 Ill. App. 3d 330, 332
(2000). In other words, if the court's exercise of discretion has an
evidentiary basis, then the reviewing court will consider the manifest
weight of the evidence. Each case seeking termination of maintenance
based on a recipient's conjugal cohabitation rests on its own facts,
given the unique nature of each interpersonal relationship. In re
Marriage of Sappington, 106 Ill. 2d 456, 466 (1985). It is the burden
of the party seeking termination of maintenance to demonstrate that
the former spouse is involved in a continuing, conjugal relationship.
Sappington, 106 Ill. 2d  at 467.
	The appellate court reviewed the evidence and concluded that the
trial court ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The court noted the evidence demonstrated that Norma and Malik
were involved in an intimate, dating relationship. They spent time
together, including dinner, movies, and walking. Malik admitted that
on occasion he would drive one of Norma's luxury automobiles.
Despite that evidence, the two maintained separate residences. Malik
only stayed at Norma's home on a sporadic basis. The appellate court
attributed no significance that Norma made advance rental payments
to Malik, or that he used some of these rental checks to pay for the
home.
	We agree that the trial court's determination that Norma and
Malik were not in a resident, conjugal relationship is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In Sappington, this court equated a
conjugal relationship to a husband- and-wife-like relationship, whether
or not sexual relations took place. Sappington, 106 Ill. 2d  at 467.
Norma and Malik did not live in the same residence, did not
commingle funds, and did not vacation together. Therefore, the trial
court could rationally conclude that Norma and Malik enjoyed a
dating relationship not akin to marriage. Accordingly, the trial court
has not abused its discretion in denying Edward's petition to modify
unallocated support. Hence, we will not disturb the trial court's
finding on this issue.

CONCLUSION
	Section 506(a)(3) of the Act, as applied in this case, deprived
Norma of procedural due process of law because her protected liberty
interest in the care, custody, and control of her daughter was
adversely affected by the statutory prohibition of calling the child's
representative as a witness and cross-examining him. Nevertheless, in
light of the overwhelming expert testimony supporting a modification
of custody, and because the content of the representative's report was
not inconsistent with the other evidence at trial, admission of the
report was not prejudicial, and the error in failing to allow cross-examination was harmless.
	In view of the sparse record challenging the general acceptance
of the PAS principle, allowing Dr. Gardner's parental alienation
syndrome testimony was not an abuse of discretion. We note,
however, that PAS is now the subject of legal and professional
criticism, and our holding in this case does not foreclose further
challenges to the validity or general acceptance of that concept in
future cases.
	The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to interview
the child in chambers, in light of the court's expressed concern that
the child might consider herself to blame for the outcome of the
proceeding. Further, it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the
taking and reading of the evidence deposition of Deputy Young
because Norma was aware of his involvement in the case, thus
resulting in no prejudice to her.
	Finally, the order denying Edward's petition to modify the
unallocated support judgment was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the petition.
	We therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Affirmed.