Title: Fogerty v. Armstrong

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
MATTHEW FOGERTY, 
 ) 
      ) 
Appellant,  
      ) 
      ) 
v.    
      ) 
No. SC96030 
      ) 
RICK ARMSTRONG, 
      ) 
      ) 
            Defendant, 
      ) 
      ) 
and  
 
      ) 
      ) 
LARRY MEYER, 
      ) 
      ) 
Respondent. 
      ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Mark D. Seigel, Judge 
Matthew Fogerty (“Fogerty”) filed a personal injury suit against his co-employee, 
Larry Meyer (“Meyer”), for injuries he sustained while they were working together to 
build a fountain.  The trial court sustained Meyer’s motion for summary judgment.  
Fogerty appealed, and this Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 10, of the 
Missouri Constitution.  The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. 
Opinion issued March 6, 2018
2 
Background 
Fogerty was employed by Wright Construction Company (“Employer”).  In 
October 2011, Fogerty was assigned to work at Logan College.  When he arrived for 
work, he was assigned to work with Meyer to install a fountain.  Neither Meyer nor 
Fogerty knew how to install a fountain.  Employer provided them with blueprints but no 
detailed instructions for how to construct the fountain.  To install the fountain, Fogerty 
and Meyer were required to move large stones.  Meyer decided to use a front loader to 
move the stones even though he had never used a front loader in that manner before.  He 
suggested they use a strap to sling a stone beneath one of the front loader’s forks.  Meyer 
then asked Fogerty to walk beside the stone to keep it from swinging as Meyer drove the 
front loader up a roughly graded, muddy area of the construction site.   
While they were moving one of the stones, Fogerty stepped beneath the forks 
while steadying the stone.  As he did so, Fogerty was looking forward and had his back to 
Meyer in the cab of the front loader.  Unexpectedly, Meyer allowed the forks to drop.  He 
yelled a warning to Fogerty, but a fork hit Fogerty in the back and drove him to his knees.  
Fogerty was able to continue working that day, but he was unable to return to work the 
following day.   
Fogerty later filed and settled a workers’ compensation claim for injuries he 
sustained to his back and right knee.  Then Fogerty filed this personal injury suit against 
Meyer.1  Meyer moved for summary judgment, asserting he was entitled to judgment as a 
1   Fogerty also sued his supervisor, Rick Armstrong, but this claim was dismissed without 
prejudice. 
3 
matter of law because Fogerty failed to show Meyer breached a duty separate and distinct 
from Employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.  The circuit court 
agreed and granted summary judgment in Meyer’s favor. 
Analysis 
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.  Parr v. Breeden, 489 
S.W.3d 774, 778 (Mo. banc 2016).  “Summary judgment is proper when the moving 
party demonstrates there is no genuine dispute about material facts and, under the 
undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  When the defendant is the moving party, the defendant may 
demonstrate entitlement to judgment by showing, among other things, undisputed “facts 
negating any of the [plaintiff’s] necessary elements.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
Fogerty’s workplace accident occurred in 2011.  At that time, an employee could 
pursue a negligence action against a co-employee for an injury sustained in the course of 
work only under certain circumstances.  See Peters v. Wady Indus., Inc., 489 S.W.3d 784, 
789-90 (Mo. banc 2016).  “To maintain a negligence action against a co-employee, a
plaintiff must show that the co-employee breached a duty separate and distinct from the 
employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workspace for all employees.”  Parr, 489 
S.W.3d at 782.   
Generally, claims that a co-employee breached a duty separate and distinct from 
the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workspace fall into two categories: 
(1) allegations that a co-employee breached a duty unrelated to
co-employee’s employment, Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 794-95 (“employees are
liable at common law to third persons, including co-employees, for
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breaching a legal duty owed independently of any master-servant 
relationship”); and (2) allegations that a co-employee breached the 
employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace in a manner that 
was not reasonably foreseeable to the employer, id. at 796 (describing such 
a breach as a “transitory risk”). 
Conner v. Ogletree, __ S.W.3d __ , slip op. at 14, n.4 (Mo. banc 2018) (No. SC95995, 
decided Mar. 6, 2018).  As in Conner and McComb v. Norfus, __ S.W.3d __ (Mo. banc 
2018) (No. SC96042, decided Mar. 6, 2018), Fogerty’s claim against Meyer does not fall 
within either category. 
The scope of the employer’s nondelegable duty is broad.  “It is the duty of 
the master to exercise reasonable care, commensurate with the nature of the 
business, to protect his servant from the hazards incident to it.”  Curtis v. 
McNair, 73 S.W. 167, 168 (Mo. 1903); see also Smith v. S. Ill. & Mo. 
Bridge Co., 30 S.W.2d 1077, 1083 (Mo. 1930) (It is the duty of the master 
“to use all reasonable precautions which ordinary prudence would dictate, 
under the particular circumstances, in respect to the dangers to be 
reasonably anticipated and likely to occur to the servant in the course of the 
discharge of his duties.”) (citation omitted). 
In the course of applying this broad duty to particular factual scenarios, this 
Court has stated the employer’s nondelegable duty includes, but is not 
limited to, the duty to “provide a safe place to work,” “provide safe 
appliances, tools, and equipment for work,” and “give warnings of dangers 
of which [an] employee might reasonably be expected to remain in 
ignorance.”  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 795 (citations omitted); see also Parr, 
489 S.W.3d at 779 (citations omitted). 
Yet these merely were applications of the employer’s broad duty to 
safeguard employees from reasonably foreseeable hazards in the workplace.  
See, e.g., Beasley v. Linehan Transfer Co., 50 S.W. 87, 89 (Mo. 1899) (“If 
the catastrophe in question was one so liable to occur that a reasonably 
prudent and experienced man, in the business in which the [employer] was 
engaged, would have anticipated and could have guarded against it, but 
failed to do so, the [employer] would be liable.”).  And it bears repeating, 
the employer could not evade liability for a breach of this nondelegable 
duty merely by assigning compliance with the duty to an employee.  See, 
e.g., Combs, 104 S.W. at 80 (employer “cannot delegate [responsibility for
duty to provide a safe workplace] to any servant, high or low, so as to
5 
escape liability for a negligent act thereof”); Bender, 276 S.W. at 408 (an 
employer is “liable for the negligent performance of any act directed by it 
to be performed by an employee, whether of high or the most lowly degree, 
which affect[s] the safety of [the workplace]”); see also Peters, 489 S.W.3d 
at 800 (employer has a “nondelegable duty to provide a safe work 
environment, and it breaches that duty where it charged an employee with 
the responsibility to provide a reasonably safe work environment but the 
employee did not so provide”) (citation omitted). 
Conner, slip op. at 9-10. 
As explained in Peters, “part of an employer’s duty in providing a safe work 
environment is ‘provid[ing] a safe method of work.’”  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 799.  
Accordingly, if it is reasonably foreseeable that employees may be harmed in the absence 
of a safe manner and means for performing their work, an employer has a nondelegable 
duty to provide those manner and means to its employees.  An employer may – and, 
often, must – assign responsibility for fulfilling this nondelegable duty to an employee.  
Conner, slip op. at 7, 9-10.  Such an assignment does not alter the nondelegable nature of 
the duty, however, and a co-employee’s negligence in fulfilling that duty is not actionable 
under Parr and Peters.   
Here, Employer failed to provide Fogerty or Meyer with a safe manner and means 
for constructing the fountain and, specifically, for using a front loader to move the large 
stones that task required.  But the focus of the analysis under Parr and Peters is on the 
co-employee’s conduct, not on the employer’s conduct, and the co-employee is presumed 
to have been negligent.  Conner, slip op. at 13-14.  “[T]he only thing that matters for 
purposes of applying Parr and Peters[] is whether the duty the co-employee breached 
was part of the employer’s duty to protect employees from reasonably foreseeable risks 
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in the workplace.”  Id.  “If so, the claim is barred.  If not, the suit against the co-employee 
can proceed.”  Id. at 14. 
Meyer was negligent in deciding how to install the fountain and, specifically, in 
the way he decided to use the front loader to move the stones.  He chose to use the front 
loader in a manner with which he was both untrained and unfamiliar, and he put Fogerty 
in harm’s way by allowing him to stand beneath one of the forks to steady the stone slung 
beneath the other fork while Meyer drove the front loader across the job site.  Under 
these facts, because Employer failed to provide a safe manner and means to install the 
fountain, both Meyer’s negligence in deciding how to do so and Fogerty’s resulting 
injury were reasonably foreseeable to Employer.  Accordingly, Meyer’s negligence was a 
breach of Employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, not a breach of 
some duty “separate and distinct” from Employer’s duty.  Under Parr and Peters, 
therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in Meyer’s favor. 
Conclusion 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
___________________________ 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
Fischer, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge and Stith, JJ., concur; 
Draper, J., concurs in result in separate opinion filed. 
Powell, J., not participating. 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
MATTHEW FOGERTY, 
 ) 
      ) 
Appellant,  
      ) 
      ) 
v.    
      ) 
No. SC96030 
      ) 
RICK ARMSTRONG, 
      ) 
      ) 
            Defendant, 
      ) 
      ) 
and  
 
      ) 
      ) 
LARRY MEYER, 
      ) 
      ) 
Respondent. 
      ) 
OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY 
While recognizing this Court’s opinions regarding the application of the 
nondelegable duty doctrine in the co-employee liability cases handed down today are 
limited to actions against co-employees for injuries between 2005 and 2012, I write 
separately to preserve the right to find co-employee liability in limited circumstances.  I 
believe the principal opinion applies a new foreseeability standard announced in Conner 
v. Ogletree, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2018) (No. SC95995, decided March 6, 2018),
expanding an employer’s nondelegable duties to any foreseeable act.  I believe this new 
2 
standard is unnecessary, resulting in additional barriers for injured employees and forever 
precluding co-employee liability.  I concur in the result only.   
The principal opinion focuses its attention on the fact Wright Construction 
Company (hereinafter, “Employer”) failed to provide a safe manner and means to install 
the fountain and, as such, any resulting injury was foreseeable.  While I concur in this 
instance Employer failed to provide a safe workplace, I maintain the proper analysis 
begins with ascertaining where an employer’s nondelegable duty ends and a 
co-employee’s independent duty begins rather than if the accident is foreseeable.  Abbott 
v. Bolton, 500 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).
Missouri law provides that an employer owes specific nondelegable duties to its 
employees, and if the employer delegates those duties to an employee, the employer 
remains liable.  Peters v. Wady Indus., Inc., 489 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Mo. banc 2016).  
“Thus, when an employee’s injuries result from the tools furnished, the place of work, or 
the manner in which the work is being done, the injuries are attributable to a breach of the 
employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.”  Abbott, 500 S.W.3d at 292; 
see also Gimmarro v. Kansas City, 116 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1937) (finding the employer 
breached its nondelegable duty to provide a reasonably safe work environment by not 
providing a safe method for performing the work); Bender v. Kroger Grocery & Baking 
Co., 276 S.W. 405, 408 (Mo. 1925) (finding employee who performed work as directed 
was not liable for co-employee’s resulting injury because employer had a nondelegable 
duty to ensure its work was not performed negligently). 
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An employer is required to provide a safe place to work.  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 
795. An “employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace does not include
transitory risks arising from an employee’s negligence in carrying out his or her work.”  
Id. at 799.  While each case is factually independent, prior cases provide some guidance 
to determine when a co-employee’s actions are no longer encompassed by the employer’s 
duty to provide a safe workplace.  See Burns v. Smith, 214 S.W.3d 335, 338 (Mo. banc 
2007) (explaining the independent “duty cannot arise from a mere failure to correct an 
unsafe condition and must be separate and apart from the employer’s nondelegable duty 
to provide a safe workplace”); Tauchert v. Boatmen’s Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 849 S.W.2d 
573, 574 (Mo. banc 1993) (finding the creation of a hazardous condition may make a 
co-employee or supervisor liable for negligence); Fowler v. Phillips, 504 S.W.3d 107, 
111 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (finding co-employee liability when the co-employee violated 
the employer’s workplace rules); Carman v. Wieland, 406 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2013) (finding no independent duty under the common law to impose co-employee 
liability for merely negligently driving in the course of work duties). 
“[P]art of an employer’s duty in providing a safe work environment is ‘provid[ing] 
a safe method of work.’”  Peters, 489 S.W.3d at 799 (quoting Kelso v. W. A. Ross Const. 
Co., 85 S.W.2d 527, 535 (Mo. 1935)).  In this case, Employer failed to do so.  Larry 
Meyer (hereinafter, “Meyer”) did not deviate from a safe manner of work because 
Employer provided no guidance, instruction, or protocols for safely completing the task 
assigned to Matthew Fogerty (hereinafter, “Fogerty”) and Meyer.  Employer failed to 
provide any direction to its employees or supervisor, who had never used a front loader 
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for moving stones or built a fountain.  Fogerty, Meyer, and Rick Armstrong, a supervisor, 
all stated the construction area was a typical construction site, and they were provided 
tools to complete their task.  The only direction Employer provided was a blueprint of the 
fountain.  Employer did not provide a safe method of work to complete their work 
assignment. 
While I disagree with any foreseeability analysis, I concur the facts and 
circumstances in this case demonstrate Employer did not provide a safe method of work 
to complete the work assignment.  There was nothing in the record demonstrating Meyer 
took any action outside of Employer’s nondelegable duties.  The injuries Fogerty 
received, while regrettable, were from the tools furnished by Employer and due to the 
manner in which Employer’s work was done; hence, this was all subsumed within 
Employer’s nondelegable duties.  See Abbott, 500 S.W.3d at 292.  Accordingly, I concur 
in the result only. 
___________________________ 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE