Title: Carter v. Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
GARY 
LEE CARTER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; and Kirk 
A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument presented by Mr. 
Morgan.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Joshua Beau Taylor, 
Student Director; and Richard E. McKinnon, Student Intern.  Argument presented by 
McKinnon.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Gary Lee Carter 
was tried and convicted by a jury of a single felony charge of possessing, with 
intent to deliver, two grams of methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1031.  The court 
sentenced Carter to twelve to fifteen years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  On appeal, Carter 
contends that plain error occurred when the prosecutor elicited expert witness 
testimony that Carter was guilty of being a drug dealer.  Also, Carter alleges that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when arguing facts not in evidence during closing 
argument.  We 
reverse.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Carter states two 
issues for our consideration:
 
            
Plain error occurred when the prosecutor elicited expert witness 
testimony that Carter was guilty of being a drug dealer.
 
            
The prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued facts not in evidence 
in closing argument.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The Rock Springs 
Police Department’s Street Crimes Unit began investigating Carter after 
receiving tips that he was dealing drugs.  
During that investigation, “short stay traffic,” a common sign of drug 
trafficking, was observed at Carter’s residence, and officers obtained a search 
warrant based upon that information.  
On January 11, 2011 officers executed the warrant after stopping Carter 
as he approached his home.  Carter 
carried $75.00 in his hand and told the officer, “The dope is in my 
pocket.”   As indicated, the 
officer found a soft case in Carter’s pocket that contained two grams of 
methamphetamine, a digital scale disguised as an iPod, empty baggies, and a 
pipe.  Carter also divulged that 
“everything you are looking for [in the house] would be around my 
chair.”
 
[¶4]      While searching 
Carter’s home, the officers found video surveillance equipment, a portable 
police scanner, more zip lock style plastic bags, another digital scale, and 
several notebooks.  The notebooks 
contained pay/owe sheets, a “to do” list with an entry stating “sell dope.”  Another notepad listed police radio 
codes that would likely be heard on the police scanner.
 
[¶5]      After being 
originally charged with four crimes and pleading not guilty to all four, the 
State announced before trial that it would dismiss the three misdemeanor charges 
and proceed to trial only on the felony charge.
 
[¶6]      During trial, the 
State qualified Daniel Allison, a special agent for the Wyoming Division of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI), as an expert in drug trafficking 
investigations.  Agent Allison 
testified based upon his expertise.  
On redirect the State questioned Agent Allison:
 
STATE:  [Mr. 
Carter] had two grams [of methamphetamine], he had that small pipe in that kit 
with plastic bags … This is that small pipe and this was the bag that had the 
methamphetamine in it and a supply of plastic bags … That was on his 
person.  And it still has the 
methamphetamine and it has the digital scale that is concealed as an MP3 
player.  Then inside his residence 
he had additional plastic baggies, another digital scale, he had the 
surveillance set up and police scanners with a list of police radio codes.  What would you as an expert conclude 
from that as to whether or not he is simply a user or whether he might be a 
dealer?
 
AGENT 
ALLISON:  The totality of the circumstances is what I would have to 
base any decision on when I’m looking at a circumstance like this.  With pay/owe sheets and profit and loss 
statements or sheets, scales, packaging material, surveillance equipment, I 
would find that indicative of a drug dealer.
 
STATE:  . 
. .  Is there any doubt in your mind?
 
AGENT 
ALLISON:  No.
 
No 
objection was made by defense counsel, and the State also emphasized the 
testimony in closing.
 
[¶7]      The second 
alleged error was also made during closing.  To put the offending comment into 
context, before the State had rested its case and in the presence of the jury, 
the prosecutor informed the court that before the State could admit an exhibit 
into evidence, the State had to excise two pages from one of Carter’s 
notebooks.  Again, in front of the 
jury, the prosecutor questioned how the court would like to handle that, 
“because there is potentially prejudicial information.”  The court then suggested that counsel 
approach the bench, at which point a discussion was held regarding removing two 
pages from the notebook before introducing it into evidence.  After the pages were removed, the State 
presented the notebook to a witness and asked, “[n]ow, I believe you are aware 
that other than a small excision or taking out a couple pages of one of the 
notebooks, do those appear to be the same condition in which they were 
recovered?”  The notebooks, and the 
excision, were referenced as follows in closing:
 
Now, 
one of the points the defense tried to get to was, oh, these notebooks look old, 
don’t they, so maybe this was not written the day before.  Maybe this was written concerning other 
dope being sold.  I don’t know what 
they’ll argue, but remember the rest of the testimony about the notebooks.  The pages we unfortunately had to take 
out relate to a date that was only three days prior to his arrest.  So there are contemporaneous notes.  These are things that are occurring at 
that time.  These things weren’t 
just sitting there from last year, the year before or even six years 
before.  They are from right 
then.
 
[¶8]      Carter was then 
found guilty of the crime charged against him and was thereafter sentenced on 
June 28, 2011 to not less than twelve nor more than l5 years.  This appeal 
followed.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]      First, we consider Carter’s argument that plain error 
occurred when the prosecutor elicited expert testimony that Carter was guilty of 
being a drug dealer.  Because Carter 
did not object below, this Court applies a plain error standard of review when 
considering whether the province of the jury was invaded at trial.  Kramer v. State, 2012 WY 69, ¶ 7, 
277 P.3d 88, 89 (Wyo. 2012).  To 
establish plain error, Carter must show three things: 1) The record is clear 
about the incident alleged as error; 2) that there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) that he was denied a substantial right 
and was materially prejudiced.  Id.
 
[¶10]   
The first prong of our plain error analysis is clearly met as the 
record reflects the exchange between the State and its expert, which we repeat 
below:
 
STATE:  [Mr. 
Carter] had two grams [of methamphetamine], he had that small pipe in that kit 
with plastic bags … This is that small pipe and this was the bag that had the 
methamphetamine in it and a supply of plastic bags … That was on his 
person.  And it still has the 
methamphetamine and it has the digital scale that is concealed as an MP3 
player.  Then inside his residence 
he had additional plastic baggies, another digital scale, he had the 
surveillance set up and police scanners with a list of police radio codes.  What would you as an expert conclude 
from that as to whether or not he is simply a user or whether he might be a 
dealer?
 
AGENT 
ALLISON:  The totality of the circumstances is what I would have to 
base any decision on when I’m looking at a circumstance like this.  With pay/owe sheets and profit and loss 
statements or sheets, scales, packaging material, surveillance equipment, I 
would find that indicative of a drug dealer.
 
STATE:  Is 
there any doubt in your mind?
 
AGENT 
ALLISON:  No.
 
[¶11]   This Court’s rule is well 
established:  A witness, lay or 
expert, may not express an opinion as to the guilt of the accused.  Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 21, 
34 P.3d 271, 276 (Wyo. 2001); Whiteplume 
v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1338 
(Wyo. 1992); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 1990); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66 (Wyo. 1989).  Regarding 
opinion testimony, we have stated in looking at similar testimony that it is 
“the jury’s role, not the witness’s, to make this determination.”  Bennett, 
794 P.2d  at 882.  Furthermore, we have stated that “[t]estimony need not be excluded unless it contains 'an 
actual conclusion about the guilt or innocence of the accused party.’”  Ogden, ¶ 23, 34 P.3d  at 277.  Indeed, as the State points out under 
W.R.E. 702, expert witnesses may offer opinions that will assist the trier of 
fact in understanding or determining the facts at issue in a particular 
case.  This testimony is not 
improper or inadmissible simply “because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact.”  
W.R.E. 704.
 
[¶12]   To better illustrate its point, the 
State points this Court to Cureton v. 
State, 2007 WY 168, ¶ 8, 169 P.3d 549, 551 (Wyo. 2007), where an 
officer opined that several facts in the case suggested that methamphetamine was 
being sold rather than held for personal use.  There, we found the testimony did not 
convey an opinion or conclusion about whether the defendant was a drug dealer 
but merely informed the jury about the meaning and the significance of the 
evidence presented.  Id., ¶ 11, 169 P.3d  at 551.  We cannot conclude the same in the 
instant case.
 
[¶13]   When reviewing the testimony, the 
opinion given by Agent Allison was highly prejudicial.  Unlike Cureton, this case was not based upon a 
wired buy or a confidential informant.  
Instead, this case was based entirely upon the evidence found and the 
parties’ different interpretations of the same.  By asking the question during its 
redirect, the State’s error was exacerbated when it emphasized the testimony 
during closing: “… as Agent Allison said, when you look at the totality of the 
circumstances, it’s very clear.”
 
[¶14]   Rather than comparing this case to 
Cureton, we find this case to be more 
analogous to Bennett, supra.  There, we found reversible error after a 
DCI agent gave his opinion that the defendant was a drug dealer by linking facts 
from his investigation to his conclusion.  
This testimony went “well beyond simply summarizing the facts of his 
investigation by drawing the ultimate conclusion that Bennett was guilty.”  Id., 794 P.2d  at 882.  The same rings true in this case.  We have never before allowed a witness 
to testify as to a defendant’s guilt or innocence and will not begin to do so 
now.   Plain error occurred in 
this instance. 
 
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
 
[¶15]   In his second and final argument 
Carter asserts that the prosecutor here committed misconduct when he, in the 
presence of the jury, informed the court that before the State could admit an 
exhibit into evidence, two pages from a notebook had to be excised “because 
there is potentially prejudicial information.”  After the pages were removed and the 
exhibit was presented to a witness during questioning and then during closing, 
the State referenced the notebooks to the jury as follows:
 
Now, 
one of the points the defense tried to get to was, oh, these notebooks look old, 
don’t they, so maybe this was not written the day before.  Maybe this was written concerning other 
dope being sold … but remember the rest of the testimony about the 
notebooks.  The pages we 
unfortunately had to take out relate to a date that was only three days prior to 
his arrest.  So there are 
contemporaneous notes.  These are 
things that are occurring at that time.  
These things weren’t just sitting there from last year, the year before 
or even six years before.  They are 
from right then.
 
[¶16]   When reviewing claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct, we consistently focus on whether the error affected 
the accused’s substantial rights.
 
Before 
we hold that an error has affected an accused’s substantial right, thus 
requiring reversal of a conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire 
record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the 
verdict might have been more favorable to the accused.
 
Cooper 
v. State, 2008 WY 5, ¶ 18, 174 P.3d 726, 730 
(Wyo. 2008).  Because there was no objection at 
trial to the prosecutor’s statement, a plain error analysis applies once again 
as outlined above.  We further 
recognize that this Court is reluctant to find plain error in closing 
argument.  James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 (Wyo. 
1994).
 
[¶17]   Beginning with the first prong of 
the plain error analysis, the record clearly shows the alleged violation.  Second, this Court has held that while 
counsel is allowed great latitude in the argument of cases, argument must be 
kept within the evidence.  Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 
1992).  Third and finally, this 
Court must consider whether the prosecutor’s comments adversely affected 
Carter’s substantial right to a fair trial and whether the comments materially 
prejudiced him.
 
[¶18]   After looking at the record as a 
whole, we conclude that when considered in conjunction with the expert witness 
testimony discussed above, the troublesome comments made during closing present 
a reasonable probability that Carter’s right to a fair trial was affected.  The information, while subtle, came 
directly from the prosecutor and did more than insinuate.  This Court fully recognizes the 
potential prejudice to a defendant when a prosecutor refers to facts outside the 
record and “arises because the prosecutor has effectively assumed the role of an 
unsworn witness, lending the dignity and prestige of his office to the State’s 
case.”  Montoya v. State, 971 P.2d 134, 137 (Wyo. 1998) (internal 
citation omitted).  That it was 
pointed out during witness testimony and then again during closing brings 
serious doubt as to whether or not Carter received a fair trial.  We conclude that he did not and should 
be granted a new trial.  See Condra v. State, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 386, 
392 (Wyo. 2004).
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶19]   We reverse Carter’s conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial.  
Based upon an expert witness improperly testifying as to his opinion on 
Carter’s guilt and the prosecutor arguing facts not in evidence during closing, 
we cannot say with confidence that Carter received a fair 
trial.