Title: State v. Batchelder

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Batchelder  (96-125); 165 Vt 326; 683 A.2d 1002

[Opinion Filed 05-Jul-1996]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 26-Jul-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                            No. 96-125


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       District Court of Vermont
                                             Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Bruce Batchelder, Jr.                        May Term, 1996


Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

       Robert Appel, Defender General, Montpelier, for appellant Office of
  the Defender General

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.  This interlocutory appeal brought by the Office of the
  Defender General raises an issue of first impression involving the trial
  court's authority to control discovery in a criminal case.  After the State
  objected to defense counsel's plan to record a series of depositions on
  audiotape, the court ordered that the depositions be recorded by
  stenographic means. Although not a party to the case below, the Office of
  the Defender General intervened to appeal the order.  As defendant is
  represented by a contract public defender, the Office of Defender General
  bears financial responsibility for discovery costs in this case and has a
  substantial interest in challenging the court's action.  We conclude that
  the court lacked authority to require stenographic recording of the
  depositions, and accordingly, vacate the order.

       The procedural posture of this case is rather unusual.  Defendant does
  not join this appeal; although defense counsel originally noticed the
  taking of the depositions by tape recorder, defendant later filed a
  memorandum with the trial court stating that he "agree[d] entirely with the
  State's position pertaining to the inadequacy of tape recording deposition

 

  testimony."  Defendant "reluctantly oppose[d]" the State's request for
  stenographic recording of the depositions only because the Office of the
  Defender General refused to authorize the expense.  The court held a
  telephone hearing to review the matter, and during the hearing defense
  counsel apparently agreed with the state's attorney that problems caused by
  tape-recorded depositions often result in delays and confusion.(FN1)
  Defendant also filed a motion to strike the notice of appeal filed by the
  Office of the Defender General.

       Unlike the typical criminal appeal, therefore, here the Office of the
  Defender General represents its own interests, not those of defendant. 
  There is, in fact, no dispute between the parties (the State and defendant)
  as to the stenographic recording of the depositions.   As both the State
  and defendant urge us to dismiss the appeal, we must first decide whether
  this issue is properly before us.

       The State views this appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief
  pursuant to V.R.A.P. 21, and contends that the appeal should be dismissed
  because the Defender General did not first seek relief in  superior court. 
  See V.R.A.P. 21(b) (complaint seeking extraordinary relief must set forth
  "the reasons why  there is no adequate remedy . . . by appeal or
  proceedings for extraordinary relief in the superior courts"); In re
  Vermont  Supreme Court Admin. Directive No. 17, 154 Vt. 392, 397, 579 A.2d 1036, 1039 (1990) (noting that V.R.A.P. 21 specifically requires that
  petitioners demonstrate exhaustion of remedies in superior court).  We
  agree that this appeal does not meet the requirements of V.R.A.P. 21.  We
  have the authority, however, to waive the requirements of the rules in a
  particular case, see V.R.A.P. 2, and have been urged to do so here by the
  Defender General.   The issue presented involves no factual dispute and is
  entirely separate from the merits of the prosecution.  Dismissing the
  appeal and requiring the Defender General to file a petition in superior
  court would serve little purpose and further delay a final decision of this
  important issue.  We therefore exercise our discretion under V.R.A.P. 

 

  2 to hear this appeal.  See State v. Saari, 152 Vt. 510, 514-15, 568 A.2d 344, 347 (1989) (suspending requirements of V.R.A.P. 21 to hear State's
  appeal of  criminal sentence "because of the importance of the issue and 
  because no further facts are necessary in order to consider the merits of
  the issues raised"); cf. Sanchez v. District Court,