Title: Spruance v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARK A. SPRUANCE,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 407, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 92S00269DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 24, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 13, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 13th day of October 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Mark A. Spruance, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s June 26, 2009 order denying his sixth motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  Spruance 
also appeals from the Superior Court’s August 13, 2009 order denying his 
motion for transcripts at State expense.  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of 
Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground 
 
2 
that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In December 1992, Spruance was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree and Unlawful Sexual 
Intercourse in the First Degree.  He was sentenced to a total of 28 years of 
Level V incarceration, to be followed by probation.  This Court affirmed 
Spruance’s convictions on direct appeal.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Spruance claims that there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial to support his convictions and that the jury 
ignored evidence of his innocence.  Spruance further claims that the 
Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for transcripts 
at State expense.    
 
(4) 
When considering a postconviction motion under Rule 61, the 
Superior Court must first apply the procedural requirements of the Rule 
before reaching the merits of the petitioner’s claims.3  Here, Spruance’s 
motion is clearly time-barred.4  Moreover, the motion is procedurally barred 
because the evidentiary claim asserted therein has been asserted in previous 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Spruance v. State, Del. Supr., No. 56, 1993, Moore, J. (Mar. 25, 1994). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 745 (Del. 1990). 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
 
3 
postconviction motions5 and Spruance has failed to demonstrate that the 
procedural bar should not be applied in the interest of justice.6   We, 
therefore, conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when 
it denied Spruance’s postconviction motion and when it denied his motion 
for transcripts at State expense.   
 
(5) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there is no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State of Delaware’s 
motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
  
                                                 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) and (5).