Title: State v. Minor

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
Opinion issued June 14, 2022 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC99469 
) 
DAVIUNE C. MINOR, 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Patrick W. Campbell, Judge 
Following a jury trial, Daviune C. Minor (hereinafter, “Defendant”) was found 
guilty of three counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and three counts of incest.  The 
circuit court sentenced him to a total of eighty-seven years’ imprisonment. 
Defendant claims the circuit court erred in admitting evidence pursuant to article I, 
section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution, overruling objections to the state’s closing 
argument, admitting expert testimony, admitting two exhibits, and finding sufficient 
evidence to support one count of statutory sodomy and one count of incest.  This Court 
finds no error.  The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.1 
1 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 10 of the Missouri 
Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
Child was born in June 2006.  In August 2013, Child lived in her paternal 
grandmother’s home with Defendant, her mother (hereinafter, “Mother”), siblings, and 
grandmother.  Child was seven years old.  Defendant is Child’s biological father.  
Child shared a bedroom with her parents and siblings.  One night, Child fell asleep 
while watching television in the bed.  Child awoke in the bed with Defendant’s fingers 
touching her vagina.  Later that night, Child awoke on the floor with Defendant 
attempting to “stick [his penis] in [her] vagina” and “stick [his penis] in [her] butt.”  
Child also testified Defendant touched his penis to her mouth. 
In March 2014, Child’s school presented information to her class about the 
differences between “good touches” and “bad touches.”  Following this presentation, 
Child revealed to her teacher she received a “bad touch.”  Child’s teacher reported this 
information to the school counselor, who made a child abuse hotline call.  An investigator 
from the Children’s Division went to the school and met with Child and her siblings.  
After meeting with the children, the investigator referred Child to the Child Protection 
Center (“CPC”) for a forensic interview.  Mother testified Child disclosed to her later that 
day that Defendant touched her inappropriately and threatened to kill Child if she said 
anything. 
Child’s younger brother later informed Mother he saw Defendant touching Child’s 
vagina. He noticed Child was crying and Defendant was covering her mouth with his 
hand. 
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Child began participating in individual therapy. In the meantime, Mother became 
aware of allegations Defendant sexually abused another girl.  Mother and Child’s 
therapist agreed it could be beneficial for Child to know she was not the only victim of 
Defendant’s sexual abuse.  
At trial and pursuant to article I, section 18(c), the state introduced propensity 
evidence, detailing acts for which Defendant was not on trial but had the purpose of 
demonstrating he had a propensity to commit the acts charged against Child.  The state 
introduced evidence surrounding Defendant’s alleged abuse of two other minor females, 
L.W. and D.J.  
The jury found Defendant guilty of three counts of first-degree statutory sodomy 
and three counts of incest.  Defendant appeals. To avoid repetition, additional facts will 
be set forth in the analysis of Defendant’s points on appeal. 
Point One:  Propensity Evidence 
Defendant asserts the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 
pursuant to article I, section 18(c), demonstrating he had deviate sexual intercourse with 
L.W. and D.J.  Defendant challenges the admission of three witnesses’ testimony and five 
exhibits. Defendant also challenges the use of this evidence in the state’s closing 
argument.  Defendant believes this evidence was more prejudicial than probative, 
resulting in reversible error. 
Rule 84.04 
This Court independently examines the propriety of Defendant’s first point on 
appeal. The briefing requirements set forth in Rule 84.04 are mandatory. Fowler v. Mo. 
3 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sheriffs’ Ret. Sys., 623 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Mo. banc 2021).  Any appellant who does not 
comply with Rule 84.04’s mandates for a point relied on fails to preserve the argument 
for this Court’s review. Id. 
“Rule 84.04 is not merely an exhortation from a judicial catechism nor is it a 
suggestion of legal etiquette.”  Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 917 n.9 (Mo. banc 
2019). “The function of [points relied on] is to give notice to the opposing party of the 
precise matters which must be contended with and to inform the court of the issues 
presented for review.”  Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 
1997)). “Deficient briefing runs the risk of forcing this Court to assume the role of 
advocate by requiring [the Court] to sift through the legal record, reconstruct the 
statement of facts, and craft a legal argument on the appellant’s behalf.”  Murphree v. 
Lakeshore Ests., LLC, 636 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021).  These actions waste 
judicial resources and “create[] the danger that appellate courts interpret the appellant’s 
arguments differently than the appellant intended or the opponent understood.”  Scott v. 
King, 510 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). 
To guarantee advocates are able to comply with these standards, Rule 84.04(d)(1) 
sets forth not only clear dictates on how to comply with its requirements, but it also sets 
forth an easy to understand, fill-in-the-blank template for drafting a proper point relied 
on. Rule 84.01(d)(1) requires each point on appeal to identify a claim of reversible error, 
state the legal reason for that claim concisely, and summarily explain why the stated legal 
4 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
reasons support the claim of reversible error. Keeping these requirements in mind, 
Defendant’s point relied on states: 
The [circuit] court abused its discretion in overruling [Defendant’s] 
objections and allowing evidence under Mo. Const. Art. I, section 18(c) that 
[Defendant] had deviate sexual intercourse (a) as an adult with L.W. in the 
spring of 2012, and (b) as a juvenile with D.J. in September 2000. The 
evidence, presented through the testimony of L.W., M.W., and T.F., and 
State Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 15 and 16, was substantially more prejudicial than 
probative, violating [Defendant’s] right to due process and a fair trial as 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution 
and was inadmissible under Art. I, [section] 18(c), in that (a) as to L.W., the 
testimony had little probative value, the testimony was lengthy, detailed, not 
impassionate, and graphic, and the jury was left to speculate that [Defendant] 
was not punished for the alleged crime; (b) as to D.J., the 2000 act was remote 
in time and not sufficiently similar to the charged crime to show a current 
propensity to commit the charged crime; and (c) the [s]tate repeatedly used 
the evidence in closing for an improper purpose, to argue that [Defendant] 
was a sex predator and a serial child sodomizer who preyed on his victims 
and had a reign of terror in the jurors’ community since 2000. 
Defendant’s point on appeal fails to comply with the clear standards set forth in 
Rule 84.04.  “Rule 84.04(d) prohibits a point relied on that groups together multiple 
contentions not related to a single issue and such a point is subject to dismissal.” State v. 
S.F., 483 S.W.3d 388, 389 n.5 (Mo. banc 2016).  Defendant’s single point on appeal 
challenges the circuit court’s admission of the testimony of three witness and five 
exhibits. Further, the point on appeal claims not only was the admission of this plethora 
of evidence improper, it also asserts the state erroneously used the evidence in its closing 
argument.2 “This Court recognizes there is a tension between being a[] zealous advocate 
2 While Defendant’s point relied on claims the state repeatedly used improper evidence in 
its closing, he fails to develop this contention in the argument portion of his brief.  
“Arguments raised in the points relied on portion of an appellate brief that are not 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
for one’s client” and culling through the record to present potential reversible errors.  
State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 745 n.3 (Mo. banc 2012).  Yet, a client’s best 
interests are not served by including every potential error in one point on appeal.  
The appellate courts’ continued reiteration of the importance of the briefing rules 
without enforcing any consequence “implicitly condones continued violations and 
undermines the mandatory nature of the rules.”  Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589, 601 
(Mo. banc 2018) (Fischer, J., dissenting).  The appellate courts may exercise their 
discretion, ex gratia, to address what they believe are the merits of a case.  However, to 
be clear, this Rule 84.04 violation is more than a technical violation. 
Preservation of Error 
The parties dispute whether Defendant’s objections to the state’s propensity 
evidence and closing argument comments are preserved.  This Court must resolve 
whether Defendant’s multifarious claims have been preserved for appeal to determine the 
appropriate standard of review to apply.  Defendant claims all of his objections regarding 
the admissibility of the state’s propensity evidence were preserved for appeal.  
First, Defendant asserts he raised this issue in a pretrial propensity hearing on 
January 2, 2018.  Defendant also asserts these issues were raised in pretrial documents 
submitted to the circuit court.  Pretrial orders regarding the admissibility of evidence are 
“interlocutory, unreviewable, and subject to change.”  State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, 506 
supported in the argument portion of the brief are deemed abandoned and preserve 
nothing for appellate review.”  State v. Nunley, 341 S.W.3d 611, 623 (Mo. banc 2011). 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
S.W.3d 922, 928 (Mo. banc 2017); see also State v. Blurton, 484 S.W.3d 758, 775 (Mo. 
banc 2016).  Because a pretrial ruling is interlocutory, evidence “produced at trial may 
prompt the [circuit] court to alter its pretrial ruling ….”  Elliott v. State, 215 S.W.3d 88, 
92 (Mo. banc 2007).  Merely objecting to the admission of evidence in a pretrial motion 
is insufficient to preserve any trial error for appeal.  State v. Hughes, 563 S.W.3d 119, 
124 (Mo. banc 2018).  
To preserve a pretrial objection, a “party must renew the objection in court and 
make a record that identifies not only the action to which the party is objecting but also 
the legal basis for the objection.”  Wilson v. City of Kan. City, 598 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Mo. 
banc 2020).  Only an objection made timely at trial will preserve an issue for appeal.  
Tipler, 506 S.W.3d at 924; State v. Schuster, 92 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).  
Second, Defendant states he was granted a continuing objection “before voir dire.” 
Further, Defendant states his counsel noted the objection before L.W. testified and 
objected to the state’s exhibits 1 and 2.  At trial, the “objection ‘must be specific and 
made contemporaneously with the purported error.’”  State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 
513 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015)). 
A claim of constitutional error must be raised at the first opportunity and with citation to 
specific constitutional objections.  Driskill, 459 S.W.3d at 426 .  “For an allegation of 
error to be considered preserved and to receive more than plain error review, it must be 
objected to during the trial and presented to the [circuit] court in a motion for new trial.” 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
State v. Loper, 609 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Mo. banc 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State 
v. Walter, 479 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. banc 2016)).3 
Finally, Defendant states he also included these claims of error in his motion for 
new trial. In Defendant’s new trial motion, he asserts there were errors committed, 
entitling him to a new trial.  Defendant separated these errors under three subheadings:  
“Error in Pretrial Litigation;” “Errors committed in trial;” and “ERRORS IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT.”  In the pretrial litigation section, Defendant asserted he was prejudiced 
by the introduction of propensity evidence pursuant to article I, section 18(c) “in the form 
of the introduction of evidence pertaining to a severed count regarding L.W. and the 
introduction of a juvenile admission for statutory sodomy.”  Defendant did not raise the 
issue of the admission of any propensity evidence as an error that was committed at trial. 
3 Defendant cites State v. Gates, 635 S.W.3d 854, 857 n.4 (Mo. banc 2021), asserting that 
this Court should not apply preservation standards in an unreasonably technical manner.  
In Gates, the defendant was prevented from explaining to the jury the reasons he shot the 
victim.  Id. at 860.  The specificity the Court referred to was not that the defendant failed 
to object at trial; rather, it was that the defendant’s explanation of his objection was not 
specific enough.  Id. at 857 n.4.  This Court reviewed the defendant’s claims because it 
was clear the circuit court understood his argument as the circuit “court complained it had 
‘ruled 33 times’ on the issue and it was ‘the 13th time’ [the defendant’s] counsel had 
requested clarification.” Id. Further, it is clear from the opinion there were objections 
and discussions held between counsel and the circuit court during the trial.  Id. at 858-59. 
Gates does not stand for the proposition that a party does not need to make an objection 
at trial or that a party does not need to follow the standards to preserve an issue for 
appeal. This Court will not condone a party’s failure to follow basic standards of error 
preservation. 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
Witness Testimony 
Defendant asserts the testimony of L.W., M.W., and T.F.4 was inadmissible.  
Defendant’s arguments regarding the admissibility of these witnesses’ testimony are not 
preserved. While Defendant made references to objecting to propensity evidence pretrial, 
he fails to point this Court to any specific objection he made regarding these witnesses.  
During those pretrial proceedings, the circuit court specifically stated it entered “orders as 
a preliminary matter” and it “doesn’t prevent the defense from objecting.”  Defendant 
never objected to the admission of their testimony at trial. Further, Defendant’s motion 
for new trial asserts only a pretrial error by the circuit court in making a preliminary 
decision to allow the introduction of evidence relating to L.W.’s abuse.  There was no 
specific objection mentioning either M.W. or T.F.’s testimony.  Defendant’s references to 
his pretrial objections are not preserved for appeal.  Hughes, 563 S.W.3d at 124.  
State Exhibits 3, 15, and 16 
Defendant asserts the circuit court erred in admitting state’s exhibits 3, 15, and 16.  
Defendant’s arguments regarding these exhibits are not preserved.  Defendant objected to 
the admission of exhibit 3 at trial as he believed it was an inadmissible demonstrative 
exhibit. Defendant never objected to the admission of exhibit 15 and 16 at trial. Further, 
while Defendant’s motion for new trial references several exhibits, he did not include 
these exhibits in the motion.  Defendant’s failure to include these exhibits in his motion 
for new trial renders these arguments unpreserved.  Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 732. 
4 M.W. is L.W.’s brother, and T.F. is her mother. 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
State Exhibits 1 and 2 
Defendant cites two instances wherein he raised his continuing objection at trial 
and both of these objections focused on exhibits 1 and 2.  First, prior to L.W.’s testimony, 
Defendant raised an objection to exhibits 1 and 2, but noted his objection was not in 
regard to the propensity issue.  Rather, Defendant sought to have those exhibits redacted. 
The circuit court sustained this objection and ordered the exhibits to be redacted.  
Second, Defendant objected to the introduction of exhibits 1 and 2.  Defense 
counsel stated: 
I’m just renewing my objection to the propensity evidence.  I think you’ve 
already given me a continuing objection.  I always worry about this stuff with 
the Court of Appeals if there’s a conviction.  So we would object to this 
evidence based on the propensity hearing, arguments made in the propensity 
hearing.  And I will say for the record that they did redact out the portions 
that I asked them to do and I have reviewed those documents. 
Defendant made a timely objection to the introduction of exhibits 1 and 2 at trial. 
Defendant, however, did not refer to the specific constitutional provision he now argues 
was violated by their admission. 
Further, Defendant states he preserved his objections by including them in his 
motion for new trial. Defendant’s motion for new trial asserts only a pretrial error by the 
circuit court in making a preliminary decision to allow the introduction of these exhibits.5 
Here, this minimum amount of competency was enough to garner plain error review. 
5 Defendant did not specifically reference “exhibits 1 and 2” in the motion for new trial; 
rather, Defendant stated he objected to the exhibits’ contents. 
10 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plain Error Review 
“Rule 30.20 is the exclusive means by which an appellant can seek review of any 
unpreserved claim of error and said claim--no matter if it is statutory, constitutional, 
structural, or of some other origin--is evaluated by this Court’s plain error framework 
without exception.” State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 530 (Mo. banc 2020) 
(emphasis omitted).  “Plain error review is discretionary.”  Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 733 
(quoting State v. Michaud, 600 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Mo. banc 2019)). 
Plain error review is a two-step process:  
The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error facially 
establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or 
miscarriage of justice has resulted.  All prejudicial error, however, is not 
plain error, and plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, and clear. 
If plain error is found, the court then must proceed to the second step and 
determine whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a 
miscarriage of justice. 
Grado v. State, 559 S.W.3d 888, 899-900 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting State v. Baumruk, 
280 S.W.3d 600, 607-08 (Mo. banc 2009)).  “To obtain a new trial on direct appeal based 
on a claim of plain error, the appellant must show ‘the error was outcome 
determinative.’”  State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting State v. 
Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. banc 2006)). 
Here, Defendant cannot establish manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice 
resulted from the admission of the witnesses’ testimony and the exhibits.  The jury found 
Defendant committed the offenses against Child beyond a reasonable doubt.  The state 
and defense counsel repeatedly reminded the jury Defendant was only on trial for his 
actions against Child—not any of his actions against any other person.  Further, the 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
circuit court specifically instructed the jury that Defendant was on trial only for the 
offenses against Child.  The jury was admonished that it “may not find [Defendant] guilty 
only because [it] believe[s] he may have been involved in or committed other offenses or 
bad acts in the past.”  A jury is presumed to follow the circuit court’s instructions.  
Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 527 n.7; State v. Naylor, 510 S.W.3d 855, 863 (Mo. banc 
2017); see also State v. Banks, 582 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (finding a 
jury is presumed to follow the circuit court’s instructions when considering the prejudice 
of propensity evidence in a child molestation case pursuant to article I, section 18(c)).  
This point is denied. 
Point Two:  Closing Argument 
Defendant claims the circuit court abused its discretion in overruling his 
continuing objection to the state’s closing argument.  Defendant believes the state’s 
argument was an impermissible ad hominem attack not supported by the record.  
Defendant asserts the state’s argument intended to secure a conviction based on character 
as a “bad man” rather than on his guilt of the charged crimes.  
A circuit court’s rulings during closing arguments are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Rice, 573 S.W.3d 53, 75 (Mo. banc 2019).  “This Court will find an 
abuse of discretion if the circuit court’s ruling is clearly against the logic of the 
circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration.”  Id. 
“An abuse of discretion occurs when a defendant is prejudiced such that ‘there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome at trial would have been different if the error had 
not been committed.’” State v. Holmsley, 554 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Mo. banc 2018) 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(quoting State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 540 (Mo. banc 2010)).  The state is granted wide 
latitude in closing arguments, provided its closing argument does not go beyond the 
evidence presented at trial.  Id. “Closing arguments must be examined in the context of 
the entire record.”  Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 540. 
“A prosecutor is allowed to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from 
the evidence during closing arguments.”  State v. Brown, 337 S.W.3d 12, 14 (Mo. banc 
2011). The state may not make “ad hominem attacks designed to inflame the jury.”  
Walter, 479 S.W.3d at 125.  “While [the state] goes too far when [it] strays beyond the 
evidence or makes ad hominem attacks in order to inflame the jury, not every 
impermissible remark will result in prejudice requiring reversal.”  State v. Whitby, 365 
S.W.3d 609, 613 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
Defendant identifies three instances wherein he believes the state erroneously 
made ad hominem attacks against him.  The first two were at the beginning of the state’s 
closing argument.  The state argued Defendant “is a sexual predator who has been 
preying on little girls in your community since the year 2000.  Let me take you back to 
when the defendant first started his reign of terror.”  The state then recounted the first 
instance of Defendant’s sexual acts against D.J.  Then, as a means of continuing 
Defendant’s history, it stated, “But [Defendant’s] reign of terror didn’t just stop in 2001 
once he pled guilty as a juvenile to an offense that would have been criminal if he were 
charged as an adult, because …” there was another sexual encounter with L.W.  The final 
comment occurred during the state’s rebuttal closing argument when it referred to 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant as “a serial child sodomizer.”  Defendant believes these were improper 
characterizations of him based upon the propensity evidence. 
When prosecuting a sexual offense against a minor child, article I, section 18(c) 
allows the admission of prior criminal acts to demonstrate a defendant’s propensity to 
commit the crime for which he or she currently is charged.  The state’s comments were 
made within the larger context of Defendant’s history as brought to light by the evidence 
presented at trial.  The three brief references to him and his past conduct were fleeting, 
brief, and isolated comments.  The state reminded the jury it was to evaluate Defendant’s 
actions toward Child rather than any other minor in his past.  Further, the state’s 
comments were based upon the evidence presented and not merely gratuitous comments 
meant to inflame the jury. Cf. State v. Banks, 215 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Mo. banc 2007) 
(finding reversible error when the state referred to the defendant as “the devil and the 
crime scene was hell”). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion is overruling 
Defendant’s objection.  This point is denied.  
Point Three:  Admission of Expert Testimony 
Defendant claims the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the expert 
testimony of Brandy Williams (hereinafter, “Williams”), a CPC forensic interviewer.  
Defendant asserts Williams did not meet the criteria in section 490.065, RSMo Supp. 
2017, to be qualified as an expert.  Defendant also asserts Williams’ testimony was not 
reliable. 
A circuit court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial.  Wood, 
580 S.W.3d at 574.  “A [circuit] court abuses its discretion only if its decision to admit or 
14 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
exclude evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court 
and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack 
of careful, deliberate consideration.”  Blurton, 484 S.W.3d at 769  (internal quotation 
omitted). On direct appeal, review is “for prejudice, not mere error.” State v. Zink, 181 
S.W.3d 66, 73 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotation omitted).  “[T]he admission of 
evidence is prejudicial if the error so influenced the jury that, when considered with and 
balanced against all of the evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability 
that the jury would have reached a different conclusion without the error.”  State v. 
Gibbons, 629 S.W.3d 60, 83 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Suttles, 581 S.W.3d 
137, 145 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). 
Expert Witness Qualification 
Defendant challenges Williams’ designation as an expert witness regarding the 
disclosure process, including delayed disclosure.  Defendant relies upon Williams’ 
testimony at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, claiming her formal training was insufficient 
and one author of the studies she read has been disgraced for unethical and dishonest 
conduct. 
Section 490.065.2(1) allows testimony by an expert witness “who is qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education ….” (Emphasis added). 
“[A] qualified expert can offer testimony based on sufficient facts and reliable principles 
that have been reliably applied whenever such testimony will help the jury understand the 
evidence and decide the disputed issues.” State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Mo. 
banc 2020). 
15 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Williams detailed her education, experience, and training. Williams has a 
bachelor’s degree in psychology and a master’s degree in social work.  She is licensed in 
Missouri and Kansas.  In her ten years’ experience as a forensic interviewer, Williams 
conducted more than 2,000 forensic interviews.  Throughout her career, Williams 
participated in specialized and on-the-job training, including training regarding delayed 
disclosures.6 Williams read peer-reviewed publications regarding forensic interviewing. 
Section 490.065.2(1)’s plain language states an expert may be qualified based 
solely on training or experience.  See Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 736. Williams’ experience 
qualified her to testify as an expert regarding the disclosure process, including delayed 
disclosure. Williams’ specialized knowledge would assist the jury to understand the 
evidence presented.  Section 490.065.2(1)(a). Williams was qualified to testify as an 
expert witness. 
Reliable Testimony 
Defendant asserts that, even if Williams had sufficient qualifications to be 
designated an expert, her testimony still was inadmissible.  Defendant claims Williams’ 
testimony regarding the process of sexual abuse disclosures by children was not based on 
6 Defendant also argued Williams had only scant training regarding delayed disclosures.  
However, Defendant never questioned Williams regarding the extent of her training at 
trial. “The extent of an expert’s experience or training in a particular field goes to the 
weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.”  State v. Mosley, 526 S.W.3d 361, 365 
(Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (quoting State v. Partridge, 122 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Mo. App. E.D. 
2003)). Had Defendant wished to challenge the extent of her training, and accordingly, 
her knowledge base, he should have cross-examined her on this basis to allow the jury to 
make a more informed determination regarding the weight to give her testimony. 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
  
 
 
 
 
sufficient facts or data, reliable principles, and methods.  Hence, he believes the circuit 
court abused its discretion in allowing her testimony. 
“Although the delayed-disclosures theory is not easily subject to peer review 
and/or publication under the Daubert7 factors, scientists generally accept the theory to 
explain a common behavior seen in child-victims of sexual abuse.”  Suttles, 581 S.W.3d 
at 151. When a witness provides non-scientific, generalized testimony, based upon 
expert specialized knowledge, a different reliability analysis is appropriate.  State v. 
Marshall, 596 S.W.3d 156, 161 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020).  “As long as an expert’s 
testimony rests upon good grounds, based on what is known[,] it should be tested by the 
adversary process with competing expert testimony and cross-examination, rather than 
excluded by the court at the outset.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Suttles, 581 
S.W.3d at 150). 
Defendant’s assertion that Williams’ testimony is not reliable because it was not 
supported by sufficient facts or data, reliable principles, and methods is not persuasive.  
Williams testified as to her experience as a forensic interviewer and the number of 
interviews she conducted over the past ten years.  Defendant never questioned Williams 
at trial about the allegedly faulty literature. While Defendant believed that literature’s 
author had been “disgraced and discredited,” this literature was never discussed at trial.  
Defendant never challenged this literature or explained how Williams’ reliance on it 
impacted her testimony.  
7 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798, 125 
L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant also states Williams’ testimony indicating what was normal for 
sexually abused children was improper.  On cross-examination, Williams acknowledged 
every child does not go through every stage of disclosure and a denial of abuse could be 
truthful.  Defendant does not demonstrate how Williams’ testimony about the generalized 
process of disclosing sexual abuse was so prejudicial that the circuit court should have 
intervened based upon Defendant’s continuing objection “based on the previously filed 
documents.” 
While a continuing objection may seem to be an effective tool at trial, there are 
trade-offs that may impact an appeal. Merely receiving a continuing objection does not 
shift the onus onto the circuit court to become an advocate for the party who receives the 
continuing objection.  “The [circuit] court’s role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as 
a replacement for the adversary system:  ‘Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’”  State ex rel. Gardner v. 
Wright, 562 S.W.3d 311, 317-18 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
595).  Continuing objections based upon considerable pretrial hearings may not fully 
convey a party’s exact concerns at the time testimony is offered.  
Appellate courts repeatedly have found evidence regarding delayed-disclosure 
evidence is relevant and admissible in child sexual abuse cases.  See Gibbons, 629 
S.W.3d at 82-87; State v. Woolard, 604 S.W.3d 913, 920 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020); 
Marshall, 596 S.W.3d at 159-62 ; Suttles, 581 S.W.3d at 149 ; State v. Tillitt, 552 S.W.3d 
571, 580-81 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018); State v. Walker, 549 S.W.3d 7, 13-14 (Mo. App. 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W.D. 2018).  “There is nothing per se unreliable about testimony based on personal 
observations made in the course of an expert’s professional experiences.”  Gardner, 562 
S.W.3d at 321.  The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Williams to 
provide generalized testimony concerning children’s disclosure of sexual abuse based 
upon her extensive experience and training.  This point is denied. 
Point Four:  Probative Value of Demonstrative Evidence 
Defendant asserts the circuit court erred in admitting exhibits 31 and 32, claiming 
the prejudicial nature of these exhibits outweighed their probative value.  Defendant 
believes these exhibits could have mislead the jury to believe the drawings depicted the 
actual events in the case.  
A “circuit court ‘has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence during a 
criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion.’”  
Loper, 609 S.W.3d at 731 (quoting State v. Hartman, 488 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Mo. banc 
2016)). “Demonstrative evidence … is admissible if the evidence is both legally and 
logically relevant.”  State v. Brown, 337 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo. banc 2011).  “Logical 
relevance refers to the tendency ‘to make the existence of a material fact more or less 
probable.’ Legal relevance refers to the assessment of probative value relative to the risk 
of ‘unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of 
time, or cumulativeness.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Mo. 
banc 2010)).  In evaluating the relevance of the demonstrative evidence, the circuit court 
needs to ensure “the evidence fairly represents what is being demonstrated and that it is 
19 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
not inflammatory, deceptive[,] or misleading.” State v. Salmon, 563 S.W.3d 725, 739 
(Mo. App. E.D. 2018). 
The state offered exhibits 31 and 32 in conjunction with the testimony of Dr. Terra 
Frazier (hereinafter, “Dr. Frazier”), a child abuse pediatrician.  Exhibits 31 and 32 were 
black-and-white diagrams, which were clinical in nature and textbook-like in appearance. 
Exhibit 31 depicted a hand and female genitals.  Exhibit 32 depicted two ways in which a 
penis and buttock could be in contact.  
Dr. Frazier testified she performed a Sexual Assault Forensic Examination on 
Child that produced normal findings.  Dr. Frazier referred to the exhibits to clarify her 
explanation regarding the reasons she did not expect to find any physical evidence of 
Child’s trauma.  Dr. Frazier testified regarding the anatomy of a prepubescent girl’s 
genitalia and anus.  She explained an examination of the hymen generally will not reveal 
penetration because there should always be an opening to the hymen and it is composed 
of mucosal tissue, which heals quickly.  Similarly, Dr. Frazier explained an examination 
of the anus generally will not reveal penetration because just past the opening, it also is 
comprised of mucosal tissue and is designed to stretch to allow things to pass through. 
“When for the limited purpose of demonstration, [evidence] may be properly 
admitted even if is not connected with the defendant or offense charged so long as it is 
relevant, it is a fair representation of what it is demonstrating, and it is not inflammatory, 
deceptive, or misleading.”  State v. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d 422, 427 (Mo. banc 2008).  
Dr. Frazier referred to both exhibits as visual representations to assist in explaining why 
Child’s examination would not reveal any physical manifestation of abuse.  Exhibit 31 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
was an accurate diagram demonstrating how a hand could penetrate a vagina.  Exhibit 32 
was an accurate diagram demonstrating a way a penis could contact or penetrate an anus.  
Neither exhibit was inflammatory and could be considered “shocking” only in that the 
exhibits depicted acts of a sexual nature.  Further, Defendant cross-examined Dr. Frazier 
but did not question her regarding these exhibits. 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting exhibits 31 and 32 into 
evidence and permitting them to be used as demonstrative evidence.  This point is denied. 
Point Five:  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Defendant claims the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the close of all the evidence because there was insufficient evidence to 
support count V, first-degree statutory sodomy, section 566.062, RSMo Supp. 2006, and 
count VI, incest, section 568.020, RSMo Supp. 2006.  Defendant argues there was 
insufficient evidence to establish penetration due to the discrepancy between the original 
indictment language and the information in lieu of indictment the state was granted leave 
to file but was never filed in the electronic case record.  Defendant also asserts the state 
was required to prove penetration in both instances and failed to do so. 
This Court’s “review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal 
conviction is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State 
v. Knox, 604 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 
211 (Mo. banc 2014)).  “The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contrary to the verdict.”  State v. Stewart, 560 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting 
State v. Wright, 382 S.W.3d 902, 903 (Mo. banc 2012)). 
Amended Information  
Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence to establish penetration due to 
the discrepancy between the original indictment language and the information in lieu of 
indictment the state was granted leave to file but was never filed in the electronic case 
record.  Defendant claims that, due to the state’s failure to file the amended information 
in the electronic case record, it was bound by the language of the original indictment, 
which alleged Defendant engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with Child by penetrating 
her anus with his penis. 
During trial, the state requested leave to file an information in lieu of indictment, 
modifying the language of the charges from penetration to touching.  The circuit court 
allowed the state to amend the information because it did not allege an additional or 
different offense than the original indictment. Defendant had notice of the circuit court’s 
ruling allowing the state to amend its information.  The circuit court also found allowing 
the amendment would not prejudice Defendant.  See Rule 23.08 (allowing an amendment 
at any time prior to the verdict if “(a) [n]o additional or different offense is charged, and 
(b) [a] defendant’s substantial rights are not thereby prejudiced”).  During trial, both the 
state and Defendant proceeded as if the amended information were filed.  The jury was 
instructed based upon the amendment.  Defendant did not object to the verdict directors 
using the language of “touching” rather than “penetration.”  Further, Defendant submitted 
converse instructions using the same amended language.  Under these facts and 
22 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
circumstances in this case, the state was not bound by the language in the original 
indictment. See Wilkinson v. State, 461 S.W.2d 283, 284-85 (Mo. 1970); State v. Hicks, 
221 S.W.3d 497, 503-04 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007); State v. Allen, 756 S.W.2d 167, 170 
(Mo. App. W.D. 1987); State v. Cooper, 744 S.W.2d 447, 449-50 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987). 
Deviate Sexual Intercourse 
Defendant further posits there was insufficient evidence to establish he engaged in 
deviate sexual intercourse with Child.8 As defined, “deviate sexual intercourse” does not 
require penetration.  Soto v. State, 226 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Mo. banc 2007).  Yet, 
Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence proving his penis touched Child’s anus. 
Generally, “[e]vidence that a defendant touched a victim’s ‘butt’ or ‘buttocks’ is 
insufficient to show the defendant touched the victim’s ‘anus’” because they are separate 
body parts. State v. Ray, 407 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).  Yet, children 
often use unsophisticated language when describing body parts because they may lack the 
technical language for an accurate description.  Id. Testimony using unsophisticated 
language does not preclude an inference of contact.  Id.  Courts have allowed an 
inference of contact when a child is able to describe specific circumstances indicating 
8 At the time of Defendant’s acts, “deviate sexual intercourse” was defined as: 
[A]ny act involving the genitals of one person and the hand, mouth, tongue, 
or anus of another person or a sexual act involving the penetration, however 
slight, of the male or female sex organ or the anus by a finger, instrument or 
object done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any 
person or for the purpose of terrorizing the victim …. 
Section 566.010(1), RSMo Supp. 2006. 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
there was contact with his or her anus.  See State v. Wilson, 489 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 2016) (finding sufficient evidence when the child testified the defendant “tried 
to put his penis in [my] butt”); Ray, 407 S.W.3d at 166 (finding sufficient evidence when 
child testified defendant put his penis on the “inside of her booty on the inside and then 
rocked”); State v. Copeland, 95 S.W.3d 196, 199-200 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003) (finding 
sufficient evident to infer the defendant had contact with the child’s anus when the child 
testified the defendant’s rubbing his “butt” stung, the defendant struck “drugs” up his 
“butt,” and a physical examination revealed medical abnormalities of his anus); State v. 
White, 873 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994) (finding sufficient evidence when the 
child testified the defendant put his penis “up his butt” and did “push-ups” on him, and 
the child had difficulties controlling his bowels immediately after returning from the 
defendant’s home); State v. Moore, 721 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (finding 
sufficient evidence to infer the defendant had contact with the child’s anus because the 
child testified the defendant tried to force his penis up the child’s “behind” and medical 
examination revealed abnormal redness around the child’s anus); State v. O’Neal, 651 
S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. App. S.D. 1983) (finding sufficient evidence to infer the defendant 
had contact with the child’s “anus” when he placed the child on his lap, touched her 
“bottom” with his “thing … [w]hat he went to the bathroom with” and child “tried not to 
cry” because it “hurt ‘[p]retty bad’” (alterations in original)). 
Here, Child testified Defendant “tried to stick [his penis] in [her] butt.”  In a 
forensic interview, which was recorded and played for the jury, Child stated she felt 
Defendant’s penis in her “butt” and her “butt” was hurting when Defendant tried to put 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
his penis in it.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer Defendant’s penis touched Child’s 
anus, despite the lack of anatomical specificity.  Hence, there was sufficient evidence to 
support a count of statutory sodomy and one count of incest.  This point is denied. 
Conclusion 
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge 
Wilson, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge and Ransom, JJ., concur; 
Powell, J., concurs in separate opinion filed; Fischer, J., 
concurs in separate opinion filed; Wilson, C.J., Russell, 
Breckenridge and Ransom, JJ., concur in separate opinion of Powell, J. 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC99469 
) 
DAVIUNE C. MINOR, 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
CONCURRING OPINION 
I concur with the well-written and reasoned principal opinion.  I write separately 
only to address the grave risks inherent in admitting allegations of unadjudicated 
propensity evidence in child sexual abuse cases and the futility of using continuing 
objections to preclude the admission of propensity evidence when the underlying objection 
involves balancing the probative value of accumulating evidence against its prejudicial 
effect. 
I. 
The Inherent Risks of Unadjudicated Propensity Evidence 
The root of the issues raised in this case arises from the nature of the propensity 
evidence presented. It was the evidence of uncharged accusations of child abuse suffered 
by L.W., a victim not named in the underlying charges, that infected Daviune C. Minor’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trial with unfair prejudice.  The State sought to demonstrate Minor had the propensity to 
sexually abuse children by presenting evidence of an unadjudicated allegation that Minor 
had deviate sexual intercourse with L.W. 
The unfair prejudice generated by the 
presentation of this evidence should forewarn trial courts from admitting mere allegations 
of unadjudicated prior bad acts in future cases. 
Our legal system has a long history of ensuring those accused of crimes are tried 
only for the criminal offenses charged and not for the sins of their past. State v. Reese, 274 
S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo. banc 1954); State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. banc 1992); 
State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275, 281 (Mo. banc 2018) (“[I]t is safe to say a general 
prohibition against the use of propensity evidence in criminal cases has been firmly 
engrained in American jurisprudence throughout much of the nation’s history.”); Old Chief 
v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 
63 (1st Cir. 1982) (“Although ... ‘propensity evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will 
convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict 
anyway because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that 
outweighs ordinary relevance.” (alteration in original)); Michelson v. United States, 335 
U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (“The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its 
admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent 
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”). One may agree or disagree 
with this legal tradition, but clearly the people of this State thought it necessary to carve 
out an exception to this intrinsic value, given the compelling and unique nature of child sex 
offenses. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2014, the citizens of this State amended the constitution to permit the admission 
of evidence of prior criminal acts, charged or uncharged, to demonstrate a defendant’s 
propensity to commit sexual offenses involving a victim younger than 18 years of age. 
Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(c).  But article I, section 18(c) provides an important limitation to 
the use of such evidence.  If the probative value of the propensity evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence may be excluded.  Id. This 
probative-versus-prejudicial balancing test is fundamental to article I, section 18(c). See 
Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 284-85. In a due process challenge to the legality of this 
constitutional provision, our Court emphatically proclaimed the probative value of 
propensity evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. Id. at 283-86 (reviewing several federal circuit court cases that found the 
admission of certain propensity evidence in cases concerning sexual assault is not 
unconstitutional because it is tempered by the probative-versus-prejudicial balancing test). 
This Court’s prior cases addressing article I, section 18(c) dealt with evidence of 
prior adjudicated convictions. See, e.g., Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 288; see also State v. 
Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 820 (Mo. banc 2017). This evidence manifested as exhibits and 
testimony reciting the existence of a prior conviction or an admission of guilt involving a 
criminal offense that would demonstrate the defendant’s propensity or tendency to commit 
the charged crime or crimes and did not involve the testimony of victims or witnesses of 
these horrendous crimes. Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 279; Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817. This 
Court held such prior convictions or admissions of guilt may be admissible evidence under 
article I, section 18(c).  See Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 285-86; see also Prince, 534 S.W.3d 
3 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
at 819. These previous cases, however, did not wrestle with the additional risks posed by 
presenting evidence of unadjudicated prior criminal acts. 
Evidence of unadjudicated prior bad acts poses at least two risks not present in 
evidence of past criminal convictions and admissions of guilt.  First, instead of the stoic 
and emotionless presentation of an exhibit evincing the existence of a prior conviction, we 
have a living, breathing person recounting unfathomable details of traumatic events and 
abuse.  Second, on top of the increased emotional effect of such evidence lies the 
fundamental problem of establishing the defendant engaged in the unadjudicated criminal 
act. “Before propensity evidence can be said to have any probative value, it must be 
sufficient for the jury to conclude the defendant actually committed the prior criminal act.” 
Williams, 548 S.W.3d at 288; see also Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(c). The presentation of 
evidence necessary to demonstrate the defendant committed an unadjudicated act 
effectively creates a trial within the trial. Unlike an exhibit of one or more prior criminal 
convictions that speaks for itself, allegations of unadjudicated, prior criminal acts 
inescapably will be accompanied and supported by evidence demonstrating the allegations 
occurred.  This evidence may include eye witnesses, forensic medical examiners, 
psychologists or psychiatrists, and other witnesses who are allowed to testify regarding the 
alleged child victim’s prior statements under section 491.075, RSMo Supp. 2012; the list 
goes on and on. In addition to the emotional testimony from an alleged victim of sexual 
abuse, therefore, a mountain of other evidence, extrinsic to the underlying criminal charges, 
is often necessary to establish the defendant committed the alleged, unadjudicated sexual 
abuse. 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his reply brief, Minor contends such extrinsic evidence—evidence that merely 
supports the alleged victim’s testimony—is not propensity evidence under article I, section 
18(c). Minor maintains this evidence would not itself tend to show the defendant had the 
propensity to commit the charged criminal act, making it inadmissible.  But Minor’s 
arguments are unavailing because they fail to appreciate the role of this extrinsic evidence. 
To be legally admissible under article I, section 18(c), the probative value of the 
unadjudicated allegation of criminal activity must not be substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. The supporting collateral and extrinsic evidence directly 
impacts the unadjudicated allegation’s probativeness and may be necessary to assess the 
allegation’s probative-versus-prejudicial effect and determine its admissibility under 
article I, section 18(c).1 In such a situation, extrinsic evidence may be admissible because 
its purpose for admission is to establish the alleged unadjudicated act more likely occurred, 
“demonstrating the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime with which he or she is 
presently charged.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(c). 
But even if the State could not introduce such extrinsic evidence directly under 
article I, section 18(c), as Minor contends, the evidence would become admissible once the 
alleged victim’s testimony is called into question.  Once the State calls the alleged victim 
to testify regarding the unadjudicated prior offense, the defense inevitably will challenge 
the veracity and credibility of this testimony on cross-examination.  The defendant may 
1 If extrinsic evidence is not relevant and admissible for this purpose, then any extrinsic 
evidence the defendant offers to challenge and contradict the alleged victim’s testimony 
likewise would be inadmissible.  
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
also attempt to contest the relevance and probative value of this propensity evidence with 
extrinsic evidence contradicting the alleged victim’s testimony.2 In response, the State will 
inevitably attempt to support, bolster, and corroborate the credibility of the alleged victim’s 
testimony with additional collateral and extrinsic evidence. See State v. McFadden, 391 
S.W.3d 408, 430 (Mo. banc 2013) (“Prior consistent statements are admissible to 
rehabilitate the witness.”). 
Once the trial court ventures into allegations of unadjudicated prior criminal acts, 
Pandora’s box is opened, and highly relevant and probative evidence related to the 
circumstances surrounding these allegations mounts like snow in a blizzard. The confusion 
and unfair prejudice from this mounting extrinsic and collateral evidence weighs heavily 
against the probative value of the originating unadjudicated allegation. Left unchecked, 
one could easily imagine a trial court conducting numerous mini-trials over the legitimacy 
of the defendant’s uncharged prior criminal acts while also adjudicating the guilt of one 
discrete criminal offense allegedly perpetrated against a different victim. 
This case presents this very issue. Minor was charged with sexually abusing a single 
child. In addition to the direct evidence supporting these charges, the circuit court admitted 
propensity evidence under article I, section 18(c) regarding L.W. and D.J., two additional 
2 The defense is permitted “to admit highly probative and relevant evidence for the jury’s 
consideration in determining whether to credit a witness’s testimony.”  Mitchell v. 
Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 681 (Mo. banc 2010).  Consequently, the defense can introduce 
extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness because of interest or bias and to suggest the 
witness lacked the ability to accurately perceive the events underlying the allegations. Id. 
at 679. The defense can do so “regardless of whether the subject of the extrinsic evidence 
is independently material to the case.”  Id. 
6 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
children Minor allegedly abused. The evidence involving D.J. was limited to an exhibit 
attesting to a prior juvenile adjudication in which Minor admitted he sexually abused D.J.  
The evidence regarding L.W. involved unadjudicated allegations of sodomy.  L.W. 
testified about the abuse she suffered. To support and corroborate L.W.’s allegations, the 
State also called L.W.’s mother and L.W.’s brother to testify.3 
Direct and 
cross-examination of L.W., L.W.’s mother, and L.W.’s brother spanned two of the four 
days of trial devoted to the State’s case-in-chief and took up 228 pages of transcript. 
Defense counsel’s cross-examination of L.W.’s mother alone spanned 59 pages of the 
transcript. The circuit court noted, “We’re trying the [charged offense] case, and I am 
concerned that we’re heading way to [sic] far down the rabbit hole of the other case.”  The 
jury was equally concerned and confused.  During jury deliberations, the jury’s first 
question was, “Are there charges against defendant regarding [L.W.][?]” 
The 
compounding testimony from L.W., L.W.’s mother, and L.W.’s brother clearly presented 
a danger of unfair prejudice warranting exclusion under article I, section 18(c). 
To avoid this inevitable unfair prejudice, circuit courts rarely should admit 
allegations of unadjudicated prior criminal offenses.  The emotional characteristics of 
personal testimony increase the already inherently prejudicial nature of this type of 
propensity evidence.  In addition, the inevitable mountain of evidence necessary to 
demonstrate and challenge whether the prior, uncharged allegations actually occurred— 
3 The State additionally attempted to call a detective who investigated L.W.’s allegations 
and referred L.W.’s case to the prosecutor’s office. The circuit court excluded this 
evidence. 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
and the confusion this evidence creates—will always pose a danger of unfair prejudice that 
is likely to far exceed its probative value. Consequently, evidence of unadjudicated 
allegations, both the alleged victim’s testimony and any accompanying extrinsic evidence, 
will rarely survive the probative-versus-prejudicial balancing test in article I, section 18(c). 
If courts choose to admit such evidence, the emotional characteristics of this evidence must 
somehow be contained.  In addition, the extrinsic and collateral evidence surrounding the 
alleged victim’s testimony must, in some manner, be fairly limited, so the resulting 
confusion and unfair prejudice does not spin out of control and grow exponentially greater 
than the probative value.  As the trial judge from this case noted, “I will say that [article I, 
section 18(c)] has led us down a rabbit hole that there may be no looking back.” Take this 
sage trial judge’s advice: Do not take the proverbial rabbit hole.  The Wonderland on the 
other side consists of an endless spiral of extrinsic, collateral, and unfairly prejudicial 
evidence that undoubtedly will result in confusion and unfair prejudice, requiring a 
maddening retrial of a child sex case.4 
II. 
The Pitfalls of Continuing Objections in the Probative-Versus-Prejudicial 
Balancing Test of Propensity Evidence 
As the principal opinion and Judge Fischer’s concurring opinion aptly note, this 
Court need not travel down the unadjudicated propensity evidence rabbit hole in this case.  
4 “[S]aid the [Cheshire] Cat: ‘we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad.’ 
‘How do you know I’m mad?’ said Alice. 
‘You must be,’ said the Cat, ‘or you wouldn’t have come here.’” Carroll, Lewis, Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland (1920). 
8 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This issue is not properly preserved. I nevertheless write separately on this topic to warn 
trial attorneys of the pitfalls of relying on continuing objections to challenge propensity 
evidence. 
Crucially, as the principal opinion notes, Minor never objected to L.W., L.W.’s 
brother, or L.W.’s mother at trial, either at the outset of their testimony or during their 
testimony. In pretrial hearings addressing propensity evidence, Minor broadly objected to 
the use of propensity evidence and, specifically, any witness testifying in support of L.W. 
But Minor never lodged a specific objection at trial to the testimony provided by L.W., 
L.W.’s mother, or L.W.’s brother.  Instead, Minor lodged a continuing objection during the 
pretrial stages as to this propensity evidence, but, as the principal opinion concludes, this 
did not suffice.  
The circuit court’s rulings during the pretrial stages were interlocutory and subject 
to change.  It is not uncommon for a trial court to make a pretrial evidentiary ruling based 
on assumptions as to the nature of the evidence or how it will be presented, but the evidence 
may come in at trial very differently than anticipated.5 This is why pretrial rulings are 
interlocutory, and the objecting party must renew the objection when the disputed evidence 
is sought to be introduced at trial.  State v. Walter, 479 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. banc 2016) 
(noting allegations of error are not preserved unless to objected to during the trial). 
5 Homicide photographs, for example, may be deemed relevant and admissible without 
being reviewed in a pretrial ruling, but the number and the nature of the photographs 
offered during the trial may end up posing a significant threat of unfair prejudice.  The 
defense consequently would need to object at trial to the number of photographs admitted 
or to the manner in which the State displays them to the jury. 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is especially true when a trial court makes a pretrial ruling as to propensity 
evidence, as it did here.  Compounding the already interlocutory nature of a pretrial ruling 
is the propensity evidence probative-versus-prejudicial balancing test, which further 
renders admissibility subject to change at any point during proceedings in the circuit court. 
Consequently, it is futile to use a continuing objection to preclude the admission of 
propensity evidence because the underlying objection involves balancing the probative 
value of accumulating evidence against its prejudicial effect.  
This case demonstrates exactly why this is true. The propensity evidence introduced 
at trial included testimony from L.W.’s brother and L.W.’s mother, but this testimony was 
never discussed or contemplated when the circuit court made its original pretrial ruling 
allowing propensity evidence regarding L.W.’s allegations.  At trial, it was necessary to 
continuously weigh and balance the probative value of each person’s testimony against its 
prejudicial effect, to ensure any unfair prejudice did not mount to a point that it invalidated 
the court’s original pretrial ruling admitting evidence of L.W.’s unadjudicated allegations.  
I do not suggest Minor had to raise an objection with every question or piece of evidence 
when a continuing objection was granted, but a separate, particularized objection must be 
lodged when significant new evidence is introduced or a new witness is called to testify 
when the granting of a continuing objection was not based on such evidence and the court 
may not have initially realized such evidence would be introduced. 
It is the responsibility of the party seeking to exclude this evidence to advise and 
notify the court that the quantum of propensity evidence—not merely its inherently 
prejudicial nature—has shifted the scales, making the continued onslaught of the evidence 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
inadmissible.  “Missouri courts reject invitations to criticize trial courts for declining to sua 
sponte take action on behalf of a party during witness examination.” State v. D.W.N., 290 
S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo. App. 2009); see also State v. Roper, 136 S.W.3d 891, 902 (Mo. 
App. 2004) (“Uninvited interference by the trial judge … risks injecting the judge into the 
role of participant and invites trial error.”). While a trial court may be concerned the danger 
of unfair prejudice from the mounting evidence regarding the allegations of unadjudicated 
prior bad acts has overcome its probative value, this Court should refrain from finding the 
trial court erred by not sua sponte raising the issue.  The defendant may have strategic and 
tactical reasons for not contesting the evidence’s admission once the court has made a 
preliminary ruling indicating it will allow this particular topic of evidence. Here, for 
example, after the circuit court ruled in pretrial proceedings that it would allow L.W. to 
testify, Minor indicated he was considering having L.W.’s brother and L.W.’s mother 
testify on his behalf, and Minor used testimony elicited from L.W.’s mother in his closing 
argument to assert he was not guilty of the charged offenses. 
For this reason, defendants must be required to lodge appropriate objections during 
trial when the scales tip and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the offered propensity evidence, as it did in this case, when the witnesses 
supporting L.W.’s unadjudicated allegations of abuse testified.  It was Minor’s 
responsibility to defend himself in a manner he saw fit, and it is inappropriate to shift this 
trial strategy decision to the circuit court. If the circuit court did not respond accordingly 
to a properly raised objection, then this Court’s role is to correct this error.  But, in the 
absence of an objection, this Court should not find the circuit court erred.  
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
___________________ 
For these reasons, I concur with the principal opinion but caution against the use of 
propensity evidence involving allegations of prior unadjudicated criminal acts and the use 
of continuing objections to preclude the admission of propensity evidence. 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
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SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC99469 
) 
DAVIUNE C. MINOR, 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
CONCURRING OPINION 
I concur with the analysis of points relied on two, three, four, and five and the 
result of the principal opinion.  I would not provide ex gratia review of point relied on 
one because it fails to comply with Rule 84.04 and preserves nothing for appellate 
review. 
Rule 84.04's briefing requirements are mandatory.  Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 
116, 126 (Mo. banc 2005). 
"Rule 84.04 is not merely an exhortation from a judicial catechism nor is it 
a suggestion of legal etiquette." Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 917 n.9 
(Mo. banc 2019). "The function of [points relied on] is to give notice to the 
opposing party of the precise matters which must be contended with and to 
inform the court of the issues presented for review." Lexow v. Boeing Co., 
643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 1997)). 
Slip Op. at 4.1 
1 "The requirement that the point relied on clearly state the contention on appeal is not simply a 
judicial word game or a matter of hypertechnicality on the part of appellate courts.  It is rooted in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Rule 84.04(d) requires each point relied on to identify a single claim of reversible 
error, concisely state the legal reasons for that claim of error, and summarily explain why 
the stated legal reasons support the claim of error. "A point relied on violates Rule 
84.04(d) when it groups together multiple contentions not related to a single issue and is 
subject to dismissal." Mo. Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Louis Cnty., 448 S.W.3d 267, 271 
n.5 (Mo. banc 2014).  "Multifarious points relied on are noncompliant with Rule 84.04(d) 
and preserve nothing for review." Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 615 n.9 (Mo. banc 
2018). 
Minor's first point relied on is as follows: 
The [circuit] court abused its discretion in overruling Minor’s objections 
and allowing evidence under Mo. Const. Art. I, section 18(c) that Minor 
had deviate sexual intercourse (a) as an adult with L.W. in the spring of 
2012, and (b) as a juvenile with D.J. in September 2000. The evidence, 
presented through the testimony of L.W., M.W., and T.F., and State 
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 15 and 16, was substantially more prejudicial than 
probative, violating Minor’s right to due process and a fair trial as 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 22(a) of the Missouri 
Constitution and was inadmissible under Art. I, § 18(c), in that (a) as to 
L.W., the testimony had little probative value, the testimony was lengthy, 
detailed, not impassionate, and graphic, and the jury was left to speculate 
that Minor was not punished for the alleged crime; (b) as to D.J., the 2000 
act was remote in time and not sufficiently similar to the charged crime to 
show a current propensity to commit the charged crime; and (c) the State 
repeatedly used the evidence in closing for an improper purpose, to argue 
that Minor was a sex predator and a serial child sodomizer who preyed on 
his victims and had a reign of terror in the jurors’ community since 2000. 
Minor's point is clearly multifarious in violation of Rule 84.04(d). 
sound policy. . . . It is not the function of the appellate court to serve as advocate for any party to 
an appeal." Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. banc 1978). 
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_______________________ 
The principal opinion concludes Minor's point relied on violates Rule 84.04(d) in 
more than a technical way but, nonetheless, addresses the arguments ex gratia.2 As this 
Court's more recent jurisprudence provides: "this Court's preference to reach the merits of 
a case when presented with a deficient brief must be balanced with the implication of 
such consideration." Lexow, 643 S.W.3d at 505. I agree with the statement in the 
principal opinion that "[t]he appellate courts' continued reiteration of the importance of 
the briefing rules without enforcing any consequence implicitly condones continued 
violations and undermines the mandatory nature of the rules." Slip Op. at 6 (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).  
Based on these considerations, I would not review the first point relied on.  
However, I concur with the principal opinion’s analysis of the remaining points relied on 
and the result in this case to affirm.  
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
2 "Rather than gratuitously excusing violations of this Court's briefing rules, this Court should 
consistently enforce its rules as written and decline to review points relied on that violate 
briefing rules." Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589, 601 (Mo. banc 2018) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
3