Title: Phifer v. Phifer

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Phifer v. Phifer1993 WY 5845 P.2d 384Case Number: 92-86Decided: 01/08/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

John Clarence 
PHIFER,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Kathryn A. 
PHIFER,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal from 
District 
Court 
of 
Laramie 
County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Ronald G. 
Pretty, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Robert L. Nelson 
of Robert L. Nelson & Associates, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      We must decide 
whether evidence is present in the record to support the district court's 
determination that a child was not emancipated so as to relieve the husband, 
John Clarence Phifer, of the obligation to make child support payments, whether 
the district court abused its discretion in not reducing the amount of the child 
support payments, and whether the district court erred in requiring the husband 
to pay a portion of the attorney's fees for the wife, Kathryn A. Phifer. We must 
also address a claim for costs, fees, and a penalty under W.R.A.P. 
10.05.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The husband 
states these issues:

ISSUE I: Did the court 
err by ruling that Angela Phifer was not emancipated?

ISSUE II: Did the court 
err by not reducing the [husband's] monthly child support 
obligation?

ISSUE III: Did the court 
err by ordering the [husband] to pay the [wife's] attorney's 
fees?

The wife phrases 
the issues:

I. Whether the District 
Court properly ruled that Angela Phifer is not 
emancipated.

II. Whether the District 
Court properly declined to reduce the monthly child support 
obligation.

III. Whether the District 
Court properly allowed the [wife] to present evidence at the second hearing as 
to the reasonableness of attorney fees incurred in bringing a contempt 
proceeding against the [husband] for failure to pay his child support and 
medical support benefits.

IV. Whether this Court 
can certify that there was no reasonable cause for this appeal and there should 
be taxed as part of the [husband's] costs a reasonable fee to be paid to the 
[wife] for damages and costs incurred.

[¶4]      The parties were 
divorced by a decree entered on January 
13, 1982. Custody of the parties' 
two children was placed with the wife. The decree provided that the husband 
would make child support payments until "the minor children reach the age of 
majority, marry, or become otherwise emancipated." In 1988, the wife sought an 
increase in the amount of the child support payments. After considerable 
wrangling, the parties reached an agreement, which was reduced to an order 
entered on June 19, 
1989, to increase the child 
support obligation from $225 a month per child to $275 a month per 
child.

[¶5]      In 1991, the 
husband stopped making the child support payments altogether, and the wife 
sought a finding of contempt. She also sought a judgment for past-due child 
support, issuance of an income withholding order, and an award for her 
attorney's fees. A court commissioner initially heard the matter, and he 
forwarded his recommendations to the district court on November 13, 
1991. The court commissioner 
recommended that the district court enter a judgment against the husband for 
past-due child support in the amount of $4,600 and for past-due medical support 
in the amount of $70.25; that the husband be held in contempt but that no 
penalty be imposed; that the wife have a judgment for $400 in attorney's fees; 
and that an income withholding order be issued. On November 18, 
1991, the husband filed 
objections to the court commissioner's report, calling into question each 
recommendation made by the commissioner. In particular, he contended that he 
should not have to pay past or future child support payments for the parties' 
eighteen-year-old daughter because she was "emancipated" as contemplated by the 
divorce decree. On November 20, 
1991, the husband also filed 
a motion to reduce his child support obligation, contending that his income had 
declined precipitously. The district court returned the matter to the court 
commissioner for further consideration. On January 
30, 1992, the court commissioner 
issued additional findings and recommendations after hearing additional 
evidence. The husband objected to that report.

[¶6]      After reviewing 
the entire record, the district court issued its order which denied the 
husband's motion to reduce his child support obligation; found that the older 
child, who was a minor, was not emancipated; gave a judgment to the wife for 
past-due child support in the amount of $5,425 and for past-due medical support 
in the amount of $85.80; awarded attorney's fees to the wife in the amount of 
$920.51; and issued an income withholding order. The husband appeals from that 
order.

[¶7]      The record 
demonstrates that the child, who the husband contended was emancipated, was 
eighteen years old at the time of the October 
6, 1991, hearing. She was not 
married. She had graduated from high school and was not living at home. She had 
a part-time job and paid some of her own living expenses. She had attended 
college but dropped out. She was not financially independent from her mother, 
who did her laundry, furnished her meals, drove her to and from her part-time 
job, and paid many of the child's expenses. On the basis of this evidence, the 
husband contends that the district court erred in finding that the child was not 
emancipated, though he was, at best, equivocal with regard to this question in 
his own testimony at the hearing.

[¶8]      It is readily 
evident from the record that the father took it upon himself to "interpret" the 
divorce decree's meaning. Although he stopped making child support payments 
altogether, he attempted to justify a portion of his arrears, contending that 
his daughter was emancipated. We have espoused the following 
principle:

[A] party who seeks to 
reduce an indivisible order of child support because of the fact that some of 
the children had been emancipated should petition the court for modification 
rather than unilaterally reducing his payments. "We think it a high-risk 
adventure for a party to the action to take it upon himself to interpret a 
decree of court, particularly in view of the continuing accessibility of the 
court." The same rationale pertains in this instance. If we were to permit the 
obligor to make a unilateral modification of the support requirements in the 
divorce decree, that would divest the trial court of its discretion to determine 
whether its previous order of support should be modified in accordance with the 
particular circumstances of the case.

Hinckley v. 
Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 911 
(Wyo. 1991) (quoting Redman v. 
Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 587-88 (Wyo. 
1974)).

[¶9]      When a child 
needs care, custody, and maintenance, the child is not emancipated, and the duty 
to provide support continues. Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1127 
(Wyo. 1985). In this instance, 
we perceive that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's 
conclusion that the child was not emancipated.

[¶10]   The husband contends that the 
district court erred in not reducing the amount of his child support obligation 
because his employment had been interrupted - he was unemployed and in jail for 
a time because of a driving-while-intoxicated conviction. The record readily 
supports the district court's decision to deny modification, and we detect no 
abuse of discretion. In his brief, the husband admits that he is once again 
fully employed. At the hearing, evidence established that the husband received a 
substantial income even while he was not employed and that he owned thousands of 
dollars in assets which could have been used to make the child support payments. 
See Underkofler v. Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140 
(Wyo. 
1992).

[¶11]   Finally, the husband contends that 
the district court should not have awarded attorney's fees to the wife and that 
the husband was penalized because he challenged the court commissioner's report 
and had to pay even more attorney's fees. None of the issues raised in these 
proceedings, including the attorney's fees issue, was decided until the district 
court issued its order. The fact that the wife availed herself of the 
opportunity to present evidence in contravention of the husband's objections, as 
well as to his motion to reduce his child support obligation, cannot serve as a 
launching pad for error. See Foster v. Foster, 768 P.2d 1038 
(Wyo. 1989). Under these 
circumstances, the district court's award of attorney's fees is not an abuse of 
discretion. Underkofler, 834 P.2d  at 1142.

[¶12]   The wife contends that this Court 
should award costs and penalties as provided in W.R.A.P. 10.05, because no 
reasonable cause existed for the appeal. We agree. We hereby certify that no 
reasonable cause exists for this appeal for the reason that the husband failed 
to provide this Court with cogent argument, complete citation to the record, or 
pertinent authorities to substantiate his claims of error. Edwards v. Edwards, 
732 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Wyo. 1987). The wife shall 
submit a statement of costs and attorney's fees to this Court, and, upon review, 
an appropriate award of costs, fees, and penalty will be ordered by this 
Court.

[¶13]   Affirmed.

CARDINE, Justice, partially 
dissenting and concurring in result only.

[¶14]   I dissent from that portion of the 
opinion awarding attorney fees on appeal and otherwise concur in the result 
only.