Title: Talmage v. Smith

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Montgomery, J.
The plaintiff recovered in an action of trespass. The case made by plaintiff’s proofs was substantially as follows: On the evening of September 17, 1891, some limekilns were burning a short distance from defendant’s premises, in Portland, Ionia
            county. Defendant had on his premises certain sheds. He came up to *372the' vicinity of the sheds, and saw six or eight hoys on the roof of one of them.
            He claims that he ordered the boys to get down, and they at once did so. He then passed around to where he had a view of the roof of another shed, and saw two boys on. the roof. The defendant claims that he did not see the plaintiff, and the
            proof is not very clear that he did, although there was some testimony from which it might have been found that plaintiff was within his view. Defendant ordered the boys in sight to get down, and there was testimony tending to show that the
            two boys in defendant’s view started to get down at once. Before they succeeded in doing so, however, defendant took a stick, which is described as being two inches in width and of about the same thickness and about 16 inches long, and threw
            it in the direction of the boys; and there was testimony tending to show that it was thrown at one of the boys in view of the defendant. The stick missed him, and hit the plaintiff just above the eye with such force as to inflict an injury
            which resulted in the total loss of the sight of the eye.
Counsel for the defendant contends that the undisputed testimony shows that defendant threw the stick without intending to hit anybody, and that under the circumstances, if it in fact hit the plaintiff, — defendant not knowing that he was on the
            shed, — he was not liable. We cannot understand why these statements should find a place in the brief of defendant’s counsel. George Talmage, the plaintiff’s father, testifies that defendant said to him that he threw the stick, intending it
            for Byron Smith,— one of the boys on the roof, — and this is fully supported by the circumstances of the case. It is hardly conceivable that this testimony escaped the attention of defendant’s counsel.
The circuit judge charged the jury as follows:
We think the charge a very fair statement of the law of the case. The doctrine of contributory negligence could have no place in the case. The plaintiff, in climbing upon the shed, could not have anticipated the throwing of the missile, and the
            fact that he was a trespasser did not place him beyond the pale of the law. The right of the plaintiff to recover was made to depend upon an intention on the part of the defendant to hit somebody, and to inflict an unwarranted injury upon
            some one. Under these circumstances, the fact that the injury resulted to another than was intended does not relieve the defendant from *374responsibility.
            Tbe cases cited in defendant’s brief, we think, support this rule. Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 2 W. Bl. 892; Railroad Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568. The case is to be distinguished from a case of negligence on the part of defendant. The act is found by the jury to have been a willful act.
Plaintiff’s counsel, in opening the case, referred to a conversation between the plaintiff’s father and the defendant, and stated that they submitted the matter to arbitration, and that a certain compensation was agreed upon between the parties,
            and this proposition was repeated in the offer of testimony. This the circuit judge ruled out,, and held that it was not competent to go to the jury, and cautioned the jury that the proposition should have no weight with them.- The ruling
            of the circuit judge was proper, but we are not prepared to say that the statement of counsel was intended by him to influence the jury improperly, nor do we think, under the circumstances of' this case, that it had that result. The circuit
            judge not only specially cautioned the jury not to take the matter into account, but further defined the issues with exceptional clearness in his charge. Under these circumstances, we think the case falls within the rulings of this Court in
            Kirchner v. Railway Co., 91 Mich. 400, Prentis v. Bates, 93 Id. 234; Daniels v. Weeks, 90 Id. 190.
The judgment will be affirmed, with costs.
McGrath, O. J., Long and Hooker, JJ., concurred. Grant, J., concurred in the result.