Title: Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia VII) v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S249923 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B272170 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BS149995 
 
 
April 2, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII 
v. CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
S249923 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
The parties here, sophisticated business entities, entered 
into a contract wherein they agreed to submit to the jurisdiction 
of California courts and to resolve disputes between them 
through California arbitration.  They also agreed to provide 
notice and “service of process” to each other through Federal 
Express or similar courier.  The narrow question we address is 
whether the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (Hague 
Service Convention or “the Convention”) preempts such notice 
provision if the Convention provides for a different method of 
service.  Consistent with United States Supreme Court 
authority, we conclude that the Convention applies only when 
the law of the forum state requires formal service of process to 
be sent abroad.  We further conclude that, because the parties’ 
agreement constituted a waiver of formal service of process 
under California law in favor of an alternative form of 
notification, the Convention does not apply.  We reverse the 
Court of Appeal’s contrary decision.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (SinoType) is 
based in China and specializes in developing Chinese graphical 
fonts.  During 2007 and 2008, its chairman, Kejian “Curt” 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
Huang, discussed forming a new company with Faye Huang, 
president of Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII 
(Rockefeller).1  In February 2008, they signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU).  The MOU reflected an intent to form 
the new company, allocate interests and responsibilities 
between the two existing companies and transfer assets to the 
new entity.  The MOU provided that the parties would, “with all 
deliberate speed, within 90 days if possible,” attempt to draft 
“long form agreements carrying forth the agreements made” in 
the MOU.  The MOU also stated, “this Agreement shall be in 
full force and effect and shall constitute the full understanding 
of the Parties that shall not be modified by any other 
agreements, oral or written.”  The MOU provided:   
“6.  The Parties shall provide notice in the English 
language to each other at the addresses set forth in the 
Agreement via Federal Express or similar courier, with copies 
via facsimile or email, and shall be deemed received 3 business 
days after deposit with the courier.   
“7.  The Parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal and State Courts in California and consent to service of 
process in accord with the notice provisions above.   
“8.  In the event of any disputes arising between the 
Parties to this Agreement, either Party may submit the dispute 
to the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Service in Los Angeles 
for exclusive and final resolution pursuant to according to [sic] 
its streamlined procedures before a single arbitrator who shall 
have ten years judicial service at the appellate level, pursuant 
                                       
1  
Because Curt Huang and Faye Huang have the same 
surname, we refer to them by their first names.   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
to California law, and who shall issue a written, reasoned 
award.  The Parties shall share equally the cost of the 
arbitration.  Disputes shall include failure of the Parties to come 
to Agreement as required by this Agreement in a timely 
fashion.”   
Eventually, negotiations broke down and the “long form 
agreements” were never finalized.  In February 2012, 
Rockefeller sought arbitration.  The arbitrator2 found that 
SinoType received notice on numerous occasions and “all 
materials were sent both by email and Federal Express” to the 
Chinese address listed for it in the MOU.3  SinoType neither 
responded nor appeared.  In November 2013, the arbitrator 
concluded Rockefeller was entitled to an award of $414,601,200.  
His written decision was sent to SinoType by Federal Express 
and e-mail.   
                                       
2  
Richard C. Neal, former justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District, Division Seven, served as arbitrator.   
3  
Specifically, the arbitrator found:  “Written proofs of 
service in the JAMS [Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 
Service] file, prepared and signed by JAMS Case Managers, 
confirm that Respondent was given due written notice of all of 
the events mentioned above, including submission of the 
demand for arbitration, commencement of the arbitration, 
appointment of the Arbitrator, the preliminary telephone 
conference, the hearing scheduled for September 14, 2012, 
continuance of the hearing to February 4, 2013, and the Interim 
Order requiring additional submissions.  Notices and copies of 
all materials were sent both by email and Federal Express to 
Respondent’s Chairman Kejiang ‘Curt’ Huang, Changzhou 
Sinotype [sic] Technology Co.[,] Ltd[.], Niutang Town, 
Changzhou, Jiangsu 213168, China.”   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
Rockefeller petitioned to confirm the award (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1285), and transmitted the petition and summons to 
SinoType through Federal Express and e-mail.  SinoType did 
not appear and the award was confirmed in October 2014.  In 
November 2015, Rockefeller sought assignment of various 
future royalty payments that several companies owed to 
SinoType.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 708.510.)  SinoType specially 
appeared and moved “to quash and to set aside default judgment 
for insufficiency of service of process.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 473, subd. (b).)  SinoType asserted that it did not receive actual 
notice of any proceedings until March 2015 and argued that 
Rockefeller’s failure to comply with the Hague Service 
Convention rendered the judgment confirming the arbitration 
award void.  In a declaration supporting the motion, chairman 
Curt acknowledged that, in January 2012, he had received a 
letter from Faye that “mentioned arbitration.”  He further 
declared that “[s]ince Faye Huang and others had harassed me 
previously, and because I did not believe there was any binding 
agreement between SinoType and [Rockefeller], I decided to 
ignore the letter and subsequent FedEx packages and emails.  I 
did not open them.”  Curt claimed that he only opened the 
Federal Express packages in March 2015 after a client told him 
Rockefeller claimed SinoType owed it money.  The motion to set 
aside the judgment was denied,4 but the Court of Appeal 
reversed.  (See Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. 
Changzhou 
SinoType 
Technology 
Co., 
Ltd. 
(2018) 
                                       
4  
Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Randolph M. 
Hammock ruled on the motion.   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
24 Cal.App.5th 115, review granted Sept. 26, 2018, S249923 
(Rockefeller Technology Investments).)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Hague Service Convention 
As to the superior court proceeding to confirm the 
arbitration award, SinoType argues the Hague Service 
Convention applies because notice of the proceeding was sent 
abroad to China, where defendant is based.  Mirroring the Court 
of Appeal’s reasoning below, SinoType contends that China’s 
objection to Article 10 of the Convention precludes service in 
China through Federal Express.  SinoType was never properly 
served, and the judgment confirming the arbitration award is 
void for lack of personal jurisdiction.  (See Rockefeller 
Technology Investments, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 133-135.)  
To address this contention, we examine the language of the 
Hague Service Convention and pertinent United States 
Supreme Court authority.   
The Convention is “a multilateral treaty that was 
formulated in 1964 by the Tenth Session of the Hague 
Conference of Private International Law . . . [and] was intended 
to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to assure that 
defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual 
and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service 
abroad.”  (Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk (1988) 
486 U.S. 694, 698 (Volkswagenwerk).)  The United States was 
an original signatory, and China adopted it in 1992.  (Kott v. 
Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134-1135 (Kott); 
Hyundai Merchant Marine v. Grand China Shipping (S.D.Ala. 
2012) 878 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1262, fn. 5; see also Volkswagenwerk, 
at p. 698.)   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
Article 1 of the Convention states it “shall apply in all 
cases, in civil and commercial matters, where there is occasion 
to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service 
abroad.”  (Hague Service Convention, supra, 20 U.S.T. at p. 362.)  
The Convention requires each member state to “designate a 
Central Authority which will undertake to receive requests for 
service coming from other contracting States and to proceed in 
conformity with the provisions of articles 3 to 6.”  (Ibid.)  “The 
Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the 
document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate 
agency, either— [¶] (a) by a method prescribed by its internal 
law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon 
persons who are within its territory, or [¶] (b) by a particular 
method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is 
incompatible with the law of the State addressed.”  (Ibid.)  “The 
primary innovation of the Convention is that it requires each 
state to establish a central authority to receive requests for 
service of documents from other countries.  [Citation.]  Once a 
central authority receives a request in the proper form, it must 
serve the documents by a method prescribed by the internal law 
of the receiving state or by a method designated by the requester 
and compatible with that law.  [Citation.]  The central authority 
must then provide a certificate of service that conforms to a 
specified model.”5  (Volkswagenwerk, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 698-
699.)   
                                       
5  
“Submitting a request to a central authority is not, 
however, the only method of service approved by the 
Convention.  For example, Article 8 permits service through 
diplomatic and consular agents; Article 11 provides that any two 
 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
As relevant here, article 10 of the Convention states:  
“Provided the State of destination does not object, the present 
Convention shall not interfere with— [¶] (a) the freedom to send 
judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons 
abroad, [¶] (b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other 
competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of 
judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials 
or other competent persons of the State of destination, [¶] (c) the 
freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to 
effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial 
officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of 
destination.”  (Hague Service Convention, supra, 20 U.S.T. at 
p. 363, italics added.)  “Each signatory nation may ratify, or 
object to, each of the articles” of the Convention.  (Honda Motor 
Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1045 (Honda 
Motor).)  When it adopted the Convention, China objected to 
article 10.6  (See Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 932 
                                       
states can agree to methods of service not otherwise specified in 
the Convention; and Article 19 clarifies that the Convention 
does not preempt any internal laws of its signatories that permit 
service from abroad via methods not otherwise allowed by the 
Convention.”  (Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon (2017) 581 U.S.__, __ 
[137 S.Ct. 1504, 1508] (Water Splash).)   
6  
The objection has been noted by the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, which administers the Convention.  
(Hague 
Conference 
on 
Private 
International 
Law, 
Declaration/Reservation/Notification 
 [as of April 2, 2020]; 
the Internet citation in this opinion is archived by year, docket 
number, and case name at .)   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
F.Supp.2d 561, 567.)  By its objection, the nation of China 
declined to embrace article 10’s alternative service methods.   
The question here is whether China’s objection estops its 
citizens from agreeing to notification arguably covered by 
article 10.  Two United States Supreme Court cases inform the 
application of the Convention.  In Volkswagenwerk, the high 
court addressed whether a foreign corporation could properly be 
served through a wholly-owned domestic subsidiary.  The court 
acknowledged that article 1 of the Convention stated it “ ‘shall 
apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is 
occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for 
service abroad.’ ”  (Volkswagenwerk, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 699.)  
However, the high court observed that “[t]he Convention does 
not specify the circumstances in which there is ‘occasion to 
transmit’ a complaint ‘for service abroad.’  But at least the term 
‘service of process’ has a well-established technical meaning.  
Service of process refers to a formal delivery of documents that 
is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a 
pending action.  [Citations.]  The legal sufficiency of a formal 
delivery of documents must be measured against some 
standard.  The Convention does not prescribe a standard, so we 
almost necessarily must refer to the internal law of the forum 
state.  If the internal law of the forum state defines the 
applicable method of serving process as requiring the 
transmittal of documents abroad, then the Hague Service 
Convention applies.”  (Id. at p. 700.)  Volkswagenwerk relied 
upon the negotiating history of the Convention to support its 
view that “Article 1 refers to service of process in the technical 
sense” (ibid.), and “whether there is service abroad must be 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
determined by reference to the law of the forum state” (id. at p. 
701).   
While noting that “compliance with the Convention is 
mandatory in all cases to which it applies” (Volkswagenwerk, 
supra, 486 U.S. at p. 705), and “the Convention pre-empts 
inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all 
cases to which it applies” (id. at p. 699), the high court concluded 
the Illinois long-arm statute at issue authorized service of a 
foreign corporation through a domestic subsidiary.  (Id. at p. 
706.)  As such, under the law of the forum state, “this case does 
not present an occasion to transmit a judicial document for 
service abroad within the meaning of Article 1.  Therefore the 
Hague Service Convention does not apply, and service was 
proper.”  (Id. at pp. 707-708.)   
Water Splash resolved “a broader conflict among courts as 
to whether the Convention permits service through postal 
channels.”  (Water Splash, supra, 581 U.S. at p. __ [137 S.Ct. at 
p. 1508].)  The court concluded that article 10(a) does not 
preclude service by mail but warned:  “To be clear, this does not 
mean that the Convention affirmatively authorizes service by 
mail.  Article 10(a) simply provides that, as long as the receiving 
state does not object, the Convention does not ‘interfere with . . . 
the freedom’ to serve documents through postal channels.  In 
other words, in cases governed by the Hague Service 
Convention, service by mail is permissible if two conditions are 
met:  first, the receiving state has not objected to service by mail; 
and second, service by mail is authorized under otherwise-
applicable law.”  (Id. at p. __ [137 S.Ct. at p. 1513], second italics 
added.)   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
We discern three relevant principles.  First, the Hague 
Service Convention applies only to “service of process in the 
technical sense” involving “a formal delivery of documents.”  
(Volkswagenwerk, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 700.)  The distinction 
between formal service and mere notice appears consistent with 
the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service 
Convention, published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law for guidance regarding 
the Convention’s application.  “[T]he Convention cannot—and 
does not—determine which documents need to be served.  It is a 
matter for the lex fori to decide if a document needs to be served 
and which document needs to be served.  Thus, if the law of the 
forum states that a notice is to be somehow directed to one or 
several addressee(s), without requiring service, the Convention 
does not have to be applied.”  (Practical Handbook on the 
Operation of the Service Convention (4th ed. 2016) par. 54, p. 
23, fn. omitted; see Denlinger v. Chinadotcom Corp. (2003) 110 
Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402 [the Convention involves “the concept of 
formal service of process”].)   
Second, whether “there is occasion to transmit a judicial or 
extrajudicial document for service abroad” (Hague Service 
Convention, supra, 20 U.S.T. at p. 362) is determined by 
reference to the law of the sending forum, in this case California.  
(Volkswagenwerk, 
supra, 
486 
U.S. 
at 
pp. 
700-701.)  
Volkswagenwerk concluded there that the sending forum, 
Illinois, did not require service abroad because its long-arm 
statute authorized domestic service through a subsidiary.  (Id. 
at pp. 706-708.)  Thus, because international service was not 
required, the Hague Service Convention did not apply.   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
Third, if formal service of process is required under the 
law of the sending forum, international transmission of service 
documents must comply with the Convention.  “[T]he 
preemptive effect of the Hague Convention as to service on 
foreign nationals is beyond dispute.”  (Honda Motor, supra, 10 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.)  Thus, if the Convention applied here, 
and assuming service by Federal Express constitutes a species 
of service by mail,7 China’s objection to foreign mail service 
under article 10(a) would preclude direct service via Federal 
Express, regardless of whether California law authorized such 
service.8  (See Water Splash, supra, 581 U.S. at p. __ [137 S.Ct. 
at p. 1513].)  “Failure to comply with the Hague Service 
Convention procedures voids the service even though it was 
made in compliance with California law.  [Citation.]  This is true 
even in cases where the defendant had actual notice of the 
lawsuit.”  (Kott, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.)   
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the 
parties’ agreement constituted a waiver of formal service of 
process under California law.  The parties waived formal service 
                                       
7  
Many of the cases refer to postal or mail service, while the 
agreement here provided for service through Federal Express, a 
private courier company.  The parties do not argue that there is 
any relevant difference between a governmental postal service 
or private courier company.  For purposes of this dispute, we 
assume the Convention’s mail service provisions would apply in 
the same manner to both.   
8  
At least one case has suggested that service via Federal 
Express does not comport with California law because it does 
not require a signed return receipt.  (See Inversiones Papaluchi 
S.A.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066-
1067.)   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
in favor of informal notification through Federal Express or 
similar courier.  Accordingly, the Convention does not apply in 
this case. 
B.  Jurisdiction, Service of Process and Waiver 
As we recognized over 160 years ago:  “To sustain a 
personal judgment the Court must have jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter, and of the person.  [Citation.]  Where the 
jurisdiction of the Court as to the subject-matter has been 
limited by the Constitution or the statute, the consent of parties 
cannot confer jurisdiction.  But when the limit regards certain 
persons, they may, if competent, waive their privilege, and this 
will give the Court jurisdiction.”  (Gray v. Hawes (1857) 8 Cal. 
562, 568.)  “Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be given, 
enlarged or waived by the parties. . . .  However, if the court has 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the rule is otherwise, and a 
party may voluntarily submit himself to the jurisdiction of the 
court, or may, by failing to seasonably object thereto, waive his 
right to question jurisdiction over him.  Process is waived by a 
general appearance, in person or by attorney, entered in the 
action, or by some act equivalent thereto, such as the filing of a 
pleading in the case or by otherwise recognizing the authority of 
the court to proceed in the action.”  (Harrington v. Superior Court 
(1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188-189, italics added.) 
“ ‘Process’ signifies a writ or summons issued in the course 
of a judicial proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 17, subd. (b)(7).)  
“ ‘Service of process is the means by which a court having 
jurisdiction over the subject matter asserts its jurisdiction over 
the party and brings home to him reasonable notice of the 
action.’ ”  (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1464, 
quoting Judicial Council of Cal., com., reprinted at 14 West’s 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
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13 
Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1973 ed.) foll. § 413.10, p. 541; cf. Meza v. 
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 854.)   
Thus, formal service of process performs two important 
functions.  From the court’s perspective, service of process 
asserts jurisdiction over the person.  “Unless a named defendant 
agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as 
the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate 
in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”  
(Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (1999) 
526 U.S. 344, 351.)  “The consistent constitutional rule has been 
that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or 
obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the 
defendant.”  (Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine (1969) 395 U.S. 100, 110.)  
From the defendant’s perspective, “[d]ue notice to the defendant 
is essential to the jurisdiction of all courts, as sufficiently 
appears from the well-known legal maxim, that no one shall be 
condemned in his person or property without notice, and an 
opportunity to be heard in his defence.”  (Earle et al. v. McVeigh 
(1875) 91 U.S. 503, 503-504.)  Service of process thus protects a 
defendant’s due process right to defend against an action by 
providing constitutionally adequate notice of the court 
proceeding.   
Cases have recognized that one may waive both personal 
jurisdiction and notice aspects of service.  “[I]t is settled . . . that 
parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the 
jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the 
opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.”  (National 
Rental v. Szukhent (1964) 375 U.S. 311, 315-316.)   
With respect to personal jurisdiction, “ ‘ “[d]ue process 
permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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defendant . . . ,” ’ inter alia, when the defendant consents to 
jurisdiction.  [Citations.]  ‘A party, even one who has no 
minimum contacts with this state, may consent to jurisdiction 
in a particular case.’  [Citations.]  . . . [¶]  Agreeing to resolve a 
particular dispute in a specific jurisdiction, for example, is one 
means of expressing consent to personal jurisdiction of courts in 
the forum state for purposes of that dispute.”  (Szynalski v. 
Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1, 7-8.)  “While subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, personal 
jurisdiction can be so conferred, and consent may be given by a 
contract provision.”  (Berard Construction Co. v. Municipal 
Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 710, 721.)  As the high court has 
recognized:  “Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction 
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such 
rights, be waived. . . .  A variety of legal arrangements have been 
taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court.  In National [] Rental[] v. Szukhent, 
[supra,] 375 U.S. [at p.] 316 [], we stated that ‘parties to a 
contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a 
given court,’ and in Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Co., 350 U.S. 
495 (1956), the Court upheld the personal jurisdiction of a 
District Court on the basis of a stipulation entered into by the 
defendant.  In addition, lower federal courts have found such 
consent implicit in agreements to arbitrate.  [Citations.]  
Furthermore, the Court has upheld state procedures which find 
constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state 
court in the voluntary use of certain state procedures.”  
(Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites (1982) 456 U.S. 
694, 703-704; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 
471 U.S. 462, 472, fn. 14.)   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
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Similarly with respect to notice, it has long been settled 
that “[t]he due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a 
civil judgment are subject to waiver.”  (D. H. Overmyer Co. v. 
Frick Co. (1972) 405 U.S. 174, 185.)  The high court in Overmyer 
affirmed the constitutionality of cognovit clauses, “the ancient 
legal device by which the debtor consents in advance to the 
holder’s obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing” (id. at 
p. 176).  Overmyer reasoned that, “[e]ven if, for present 
purposes, we assume that the standard for waiver in a 
corporate-property-right case of this kind is the same standard 
applicable to waiver in a criminal proceeding, that is, that it be 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made, [citations], or ‘an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege,’ [citations], and even if, as the Court has said in the 
civil area, ‘[w]e do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights,’ [citation], that standard was fully satisfied 
here.”  (Id. at pp. 185-186.)  California courts have since applied 
the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard to similar 
waiver provisions.  (See Isbell v. County of Sonoma (1978) 21 
Cal.3d 61, 70; Capital Trust, Inc. v. Tri-National Development 
Corp. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 824, 829-831; Commercial Nat. 
Bank of Peoria v. Kermeen (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 396, 401.)   
C.  California Statutes Regarding Service of Process 
“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis 
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the 
United States.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10; see Cal. Const., art. 
VI, § 10; Donaldson v. National Marine, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
503, 512.)  Generally, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, 
the court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a 
party from the time summons is served on him as provided by 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
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16 
Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 413.10).”  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 410.50, subd. (a).)  Code of Civil Procedure9 section 413.10 
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a 
summons shall be served on a person:  [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Outside the 
United States, as provided in this chapter or as directed by the 
court in which the action is pending, or, if the court before or 
after service finds that the service is reasonably calculated to 
give actual notice, as prescribed by the law of the place where 
the person is served or as directed by the foreign authority in 
response to a letter rogatory.  These rules are subject to the 
provisions of the Convention on the ‘Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents’ in Civil or Commercial Matters 
(Hague Service Convention).”  (§ 413.10, subd. (c).)  “A summons 
may be served on a person outside this state in any manner 
provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and 
of the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt.”  (§ 415.40; see 
§ 415.30 [service by mail].)  Other prescribed statutory methods 
of service include personal service (§ 415.10) and leaving 
documents at an office, dwelling, or mailing address (combined 
with a subsequent mailing) (§ 415.20).  A corporation may be 
served by presenting documents to its president or chief 
executive officer, among others.  (§ 416.10, subd. (b).)   
The present case arises out of Rockefeller’s attempt to 
confirm an arbitration award.  “Any party to an arbitration in 
which an award has been made may petition the court to 
confirm, correct or vacate the award.  The petition shall name 
                                       
9  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure unless otherwise noted.   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may name as 
respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration award.”  
(§ 1285; see §§ 1288 [time limits for serving and filing petitions], 
1290 [“A proceeding under this title in the courts of this State is 
commenced by filing a petition”].)  “If a petition or response 
under this chapter is duly served and filed, the court shall 
confirm the award as made, whether rendered in this state or 
another state, unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects 
the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or 
dismisses the proceeding.”  (§ 1286.)  “A petition under this title 
shall be heard in a summary way in the manner and upon the 
notice provided by law for the making and hearing of 
motions . . . .”  (§ 1290.2; see § 1005, subd. (b) [service of 
motions].)   
Of particular relevance here are sections 1290.4 and 1293.  
Section 1290.4, subdivision (a) requires that “[a] copy of the 
petition and a written notice of the time and place of the hearing 
thereof and any other papers upon which the petition is based 
shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration 
agreement for the service of such petition and notice.”  (Italics 
added.)  Subdivision (b) provides that if an arbitration 
agreement “does not provide the manner in which such service 
shall be made and the person upon whom service is to be made 
has not previously appeared in the proceeding,” a person in 
California shall be served “in the manner provided by law for 
the service of summons in an action,” or upon a person outside 
the state “by mailing the copy of the petition and notice and 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
other papers by registered or certified mail.”10  (§ 1290.4, subd. 
(b).)   
Under section 1293, “[t]he making of an agreement in this 
State providing for arbitration to be had within this State shall 
be deemed a consent of the parties thereto to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this State to enforce such agreement by the making 
of any orders provided for in this title and by entering of 
judgment on an award under the agreement.”  This statute 
codified our decision in Frey & Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court 
(1936) 5 Cal.2d 401, which involved a California corporation’s 
attempt to enforce a contractual arbitration agreement against 
an out-of-state corporation.  Frey reasoned:  “The contracts 
having been made with direct affirmative reference to the right 
of arbitration, and particularly with reference to the laws of 
California, the provisions of [former] section 1282 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure [pertaining to petitions to compel arbitration] 
should be read into the contracts as part thereof.  The agreement 
to submit the dispute to the arbitration committee is an 
agreement to cooperate in that proceeding.  It is presumed that 
the contract was made in good faith.  Therefore it was an 
agreement to submit to the jurisdiction within which the 
arbitration must operate in order to give it the effect 
contemplated by the contract and by the law.”  (Frey & Horgan 
Corp., at pp. 404-405.)  A later case clarified that Frey’s 
reasoning applied to proceedings to confirm an arbitration 
award:  “That ‘effect’ [noted in Frey], we are satisfied, includes 
                                       
10  
Section 1290.4, subdivision (c) concerns service where an 
arbitration agreement does not specify a method of service but 
the person has previously made an appearance or been served.   
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
not only the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the 
conduct of arbitration proceedings, but the enforcement of the 
award resulting from such arbitration in the manner provided 
by California law.  To hold otherwise would be tantamount to a 
refutation of the principle of the Frey & Horgan case, and would 
amount to an emasculation and frustration of the purpose and 
objectives of the arbitration laws of this state.”  (Atkins, Kroll & 
Co. v. Broadway Lbr. Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 646, 653.)   
D.  The Parties Waived Formal Service of Process Under 
California Law 
As discussed ante, formal service of process involves two 
aspects:  service as a method of obtaining personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant and formalized notification of court 
proceedings to allow a party to appear and defend against the 
action.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the parties 
here, by agreeing to the MOU, waived both aspects.   
With respect to personal jurisdiction, paragraph 7 of the 
MOU expressly stated “[t]he Parties hereby submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal and State Courts in California . . . .”  
Further, in paragraph 8, the parties agreed to submit all 
disputes “to the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Service in Los 
Angeles for exclusive and final resolution . . . pursuant to 
California law . . . .”  “Code of Civil Procedure section 1293 . . . 
gives California courts personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
to enforce arbitration agreements formed in California.”  
(Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 495, 504.)  The parties’ agreement to exclusively 
arbitrate any disputes in California constituted consent to 
submit to the jurisdiction of California courts to enforce that 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
agreement, including “by entering of judgment on an award 
under the agreement.”  (§ 1293.)   
With respect to notice, paragraph 6 of the MOU stated the 
parties “shall provide notice in the English language to each 
other at the addresses set forth in the Agreement via Federal 
Express or similar courier,” while paragraph 7 clarified the 
parties “consent to service of process in accord with the notice 
provisions above.”  Construed in tandem, these provisions leave 
little doubt the parties intended to supplant any statutory 
service procedures with their own agreement for notification via 
Federal Express.  Section 1290.4, subdivision (a) gives effect to 
such an agreement by requiring that documents “be served in 
the manner provided in the arbitration agreement for the 
service of such petition and notice.”  That is, section 1290.4, 
subdivision (a) authorizes parties to an arbitration agreement 
to waive otherwise applicable statutory requirements for service 
of summons in connection with a petition to confirm an 
arbitration award and agree instead to an alternative form of 
notification, which is exactly what the parties did in paragraph 
6 of the MOU.  
The MOU’s language confirms the parties’ intent to 
replace “service of process” with the alternate notification 
method specified in the agreement.  This circumstance 
distinguishes Abers v. Rohrs (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1199, 
which construed section 1290.4, subdivision (a).  Abers involved 
leases with arbitration clauses that included a provision stating 
notices could be sent by mail.  The homeowners in that case filed 
a petition to vacate an arbitration award and mailed it to the 
opposing party.  Abers rejected the homeowners’ claim that the 
mailing satisfied section 1290.4, subdivision (a):  “Their 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
argument fails because it conflates the concept of providing 
notice with the concept of serving process.”  (Abers, at p. 1206.)  
“Because paragraph 16 of the parties’ leases governs only notice, 
and not service, it does not qualify as a provision which specifies 
the manner in which a petition to vacate an arbitration award 
may be served.  Consequently, the homeowners’ reliance on 
those notice provisions as a means of demonstrating proper 
service of the petition necessarily fails.”  (Id. at pp. 1206-1207.)  
By contrast here, the MOU not only contemplated that 
notifications be sent via Federal Express, but also that such 
notifications would take the place of formal service of process. 
It is true that section 1290.4, subdivision (a) refers to 
“service,” but we do not agree the mere use of that word controls 
whether the statute is referencing formal service of process.  In 
re Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 539 (Jennifer O.), which 
involved a juvenile dependency proceeding, faced an analogous 
issue.  The father, who lived in Mexico, was mailed a notice of a 
hearing.  Noting that Welfare and Institutions Code section 293, 
subdivision (e) required “[s]ervice of the notice,” the father 
argued compliance with the Hague Service Convention was 
required.  Jennifer O. rejected the claim, observing that the high 
court in Volkswagenwerk “held that despite the provision’s 
broad language, the Convention applied only to service of 
process in the technical sense . . . .”  (Jennifer O., at p. 549.)  
Noting that the father had already made a general appearance 
in the case, Jennifer O. concluded that, notwithstanding the 
statutory language, “[s]ervice of notice on appellant of the six-
month review hearing by first-class mail fully complied with 
California law . . . .”  (Id. at p. 550; see Kern County Dept. of 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
Human Services v. Superior Court (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 302, 
308-311 (Kern County).)   
Our conclusions as to California law are narrow.  When 
parties agree to California arbitration, they consent to submit to 
the personal jurisdiction of California courts to enforce the 
agreement and any judgment under section 1293.  When the 
agreement also specifies the manner in which the parties “shall 
be served,” consistent with section 1290.4, subdivision (a), that 
agreement supplants statutory service requirements and 
constitutes a waiver of formal service in favor of the agreed-upon 
method of notification.  If an arbitration agreement fails to 
specify a method of service, the statutory service requirements 
of section 1290.4, subdivisions (b) or (c) would apply, and those 
statutory requirements would constitute formal service of 
process.  We express no view with respect to service of process 
in other contexts.   
E.  The Hague Service Convention Does Not Apply 
As the high court clarified, “[t]he only transmittal to which 
the Convention applies is a transmittal abroad that is required 
as a necessary part of service.”  (Volkswagenwerk, supra, 486 
U.S. at p. 707.)  Whether transmittal abroad is required as a 
necessary part of service depends on state law.  Because the 
parties agreed to waive formal service of process under 
California law in favor of informal notification, “this case does 
not present an occasion to transmit a judicial document for 
service abroad within the meaning of Article 1” of the Hague 
Service Convention.  (Id. at pp. 707-708; see Kern County, supra, 
187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 308-311; Jennifer O., supra, 184 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 549-550.)  
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
Contrary to SinoType’s arguments, this conclusion does 
not authorize circumventing the Hague Convention where the 
Convention would otherwise apply.  We merely recognize that 
this case falls “outside the scope of its mandatory application,” 
as the Convention has been interpreted in Volkswagenwerk.  
(Volkswagenwerk, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 706.)  SinoType’s 
arguments are similar to the arguments for broader mandatory 
application of the Convention made in Volkswagenwerk.  The 
high court rejected those arguments, as do we.  (See id. at pp. 
702–705.) 
Holding that the Convention does not apply when parties 
have agreed to waive formal service of process in favor of a 
specified type of notification serves to promote certainty and 
give effect to the parties’ express intentions.  Conversely, to 
apply the Convention under such circumstances would sow 
confusion and encourage gamesmanship and sharp practices.  
As one court observed, “precluding a contractual waiver of the 
service provisions of the Hague Convention would allow people 
to unilaterally negate their clear and unambiguous written 
waivers of service by the simple expedient of leaving the 
country.”  (Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation 
S.A.R.L. (N.Y.App.Div. 2010) 78 A.D.3d 137, 141; see Masimo 
Corp. v. Mindray DS USA Inc. (C.D.Cal. Mar. 18, 2013, No. 
SACV 12-02206- CJC(JPRx)) 2013 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 197706, at 
pp. *13-14.)  Nothing in the language or history of the 
Convention suggests any intent for the treaty to be abused in 
such a manner.   
Likewise, our conclusion promotes California’s “long-
established and well-settled policy favoring arbitration as a 
speedy and inexpensive means of settling disputes.  [Citation.]  
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
This policy is reflected in the comprehensive statutory scheme 
set out in the California Arbitration Act.  (§ 1280 et seq.)  The 
purpose of the act is to promote contractual arbitration, in 
accordance with this policy, as a more expeditious and less 
expensive means of resolving disputes than by litigation in 
court.  [Citation.]  ‘Typically, those who enter into arbitration 
agreements expect that their dispute will be resolved without 
necessity for any contact with the courts.’ ”  (Hightower v. 
Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1431; see Mercury 
Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 342.)  
Requiring formal service abroad under California law where 
sophisticated business entities have agreed to arbitration and a 
specified method of notification and document delivery would 
undermine the benefits arbitration provides.  Uncertainty with 
respect to service would require court intervention to resolve, 
increase the time and cost of dispute resolution, and potentially 
call into question long-final arbitration awards.  Such a result 
appears contrary to the Legislature’s attempts to position 
California as a center for international commercial arbitration.  
(See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Manatt, Phelps, 
Rothenberg & Tunney (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1424, 1434.)   
 
 
ROCKEFELLER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (ASIA) VII v. 
CHANGZHOU SINOTYPE TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  The 
matter is remanded for the resolution of unadjudicated issues. 
 
CORRIGAN, J.   
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Technology 
Co., Ltd. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 24 Cal.App.5th 115  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S249923 
Date Filed: April 2, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Randolph M. Hammock 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Offices of Steve Qi and Associates, Steve Qi, May T. To; Law Offices of Steven L. Sugars and Steven 
L. Sugars for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Paul Hastings, Thomas P. O'Brien, Katherine F. Murray, Nicole D. Lueddeke; Blum Collins, Steve A. 
Blum and Chia Heng Ho for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Daniel M. Kolkey for California International Arbitration Council as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Benson K. Lau and Adam M. Satnick for Pacific Rim Cultural Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Covington & Burling, David B. Goodwin and Peter Trooboff for Professors of International Litigation as 
Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Chia Heng (Gary) Ho 
Blum Collins, LLP 
707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 4880 
Los Angeles, CA, 90017 
(213) 572-0400 
 
Steven L. Sugars 
Law Offices of Steven L. Sugars 
388 E. Valley Blvd., Suite 200 
Alhambra, CA 91801 
(626) 243-3343