Title: Nash v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Nash, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 83003972DI, Tease, J. (Dec. 9, 1983)
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(ORDER).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LEROY NASH,
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No. 75, 2005
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below–Superior Court of
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the State of Delaware in and for 
v.
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Sussex County in C.A. No.
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05M-02-005.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Def.  ID No. 83003972DI  
Submitted:July 19, 2005
Decided:October 17, 2005
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 17  day of October 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s
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opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In 1983, the appellant, Leroy Nash, pleaded guilty to one count  of
Rape in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree and Possession of a
Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony (PDWDCF).  Nash was
sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty years for
rape followed by ten years for assault and five years, mandatory, for
PDWDCF.1
See Hamilton v. State, 831 A.2d 881, 883 n. 5 (Del. 2003) (explaining that “short-
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term release,” also known as “conditional release,” is determined by reducing the term of
incarceration by accrued good time credits); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4348 (2001)
(providing for release from incarceration upon merit and good behavior credits).
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 6902 (1999) (providing remedy of writ of habeas
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corpus to obtain limited judicial review of court’s jurisdiction and custodian’s authority to
hold petitioner in custody).
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(2)
On February 9, 2005, Nash filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Superior Court.  Nash alleged that his short-term release date  had
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elapsed, and that he was being illegally incarcerated.   By order dated February
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10, 2005, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Nash’s habeas corpus
petition on the basis that Nash was being lawfully held pursuant to a life
sentence.  This appeal followed.
(3)
On appeal, Nash contends that he has earned the requisite number
of good time credits to entitle him to conditional release from his life sentence.
Nash also contends that his ten-year sentence for assault and his five-year
mandatory sentence for PDWDCF were both “voided” by changes in the law.
We conclude that, Nash’s claims are either without merit or are not appropriate
for habeas corpus review.
See Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 558 (Del. 2005) (clarifying that conditional
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release does not apply to a life sentence with the possibility of parole that was imposed
before 1990).
Id.
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Id.
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Nash’s claim that his five-year mandatory sentence is “void” appears to stem from
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a sentence status sheet dated November 7, 1990 which includes the cryptogram “void 103
dated 12/13/83." 
See Watson v. Burgan, 610 A.2d 1364 (Del. 1992) (affirming Superior Court
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decision upholding validity of original regulation).  
See Dorsey v. State, 2004 WL 2743579 (Del. Supr.) (citing Curran v. Woolley, 104
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A.2d 771, 773 (Del. 1954) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for
direct appeal or postconviction relief)).
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(4)
First, Nash is not entitled to conditional release.   Nash’s good
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times credits can apply only to accelerate his parole eligibility date.   Unless
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Nash is granted parole, he must remain incarcerated.6
(5)
Second, Nash’s five-year mandatory sentence was not declared
void as he claims.   Rather, the sentence was recomputed pursuant to a 1990
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administrative addendum to a  Department of Correction regulation.  The
addendum was later found by this Court to be contrary to Delaware statutory
law.8
(6)
Nash’s claim that his ten-year sentence is “void” is, at its heart, a
claim that the assault conviction underlying the sentence should be reversed.
That claim is not a matter subject to habeas corpus review.   After a judgment
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Id.
10
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of conviction and sentencing, the only issues to be decided on a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus are the existence of a judgment of conviction by a court
of competent jurisdiction and a valid commitment of the prisoner to enforce the
sentence.10
(7)
In this case, the Superior Court  had jurisdiction to accept Nash’s
guilty plea.  Thereafter, the Superior Court entered a valid order of commitment
remanding Nash to the custody of the Department of Correction to serve a
prison sentence.  Nash has not yet completed that sentence.  Therefore, the
Superior Court did not err when it denied Nash’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
(8)
It is manifest on the face of Nash’s opening brief that this appeal
is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are clearly controlled by
settled Delaware law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice