Title: Durham v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ALEX J. DURHAM, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant-Below,  
 
§ 
No. 231, 2019 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below: 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
I.D. No. 1805019020A & 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
    1805019020B 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  November 13, 2019 
Decided:  December 3, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
On this 3rd day of December 2019, having considered the briefs and the record 
below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On February 18, 2019, after a two-day bench trial, the Superior Court 
convicted Alex J. Durham of unlawful firearm possession, resisting arrest, and tampering 
with evidence.  On appeal, Durham contends that the court abused its discretion by 
considering prior bad act evidence, namely, a possible home invasion, that he contends was 
used to establish his identity under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b) without conducting 
an analysis under Getz v. State.1  Durham argues further that had the trial court undertaken 
a Getz analysis, it would have found the evidence inadmissible.  Although the possible 
home invasion was mentioned in testimony, we find that any error in introducing it was 
                                                          
 
1 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 
2 
harmless error given the other evidence in the record that supports Durham’s conviction.  
We also question the applicability of D.R.E. 404(b) to the testimony at issue.  
(2) 
On May 28, 2018, Detective Tim Mullaney responded to a possible home 
invasion at 317 West Division Street in Dover.  When he arrived, he made contact with 
individuals “Bird” and “Drummond,” who described the intruder as “a black male, gray 
sweatshirt, dark pants with a gun [who] had just left the property towards New Street.”2 
(3) 
Responding officers canvassed the area and spotted Durham, who matched 
the description of the intruder.  A foot chase ensued.  Patrolman Spicer testified that he saw 
Durham with a gun in his hand, but lost sight of him for three to five seconds toward the 
end of the pursuit.  The chase ended with Durham lying face down in a yard and without a 
gun.  After searching the area, Patrolman Spicer found a firearm lying in the grass on the 
other side of a fence from where Durham was apprehended.  The firearm had fresh mud 
and grass on it but no surface rust. 
(4) 
Bird and Drummond declined to identify Durham as the intruder in the 
possible home invasion. 
(5) 
Durham was charged with (1) Possession of a Firearm by a Person 
Prohibited, (2) Possession of Firearm Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, (3) Carrying a 
Concealed Deadly Weapon, (4) Tampering with Physical Evidence, (5) Resisting Arrest, 
and (6) Receiving a Stolen Firearm.  He was not charged with the possible home invasion. 
                                                          
 
2 App. to Opening Br. at A-20. 
3 
(6) 
Before trial, Durham’s counsel and the State conferred with the court about 
Detective Mullaney introducing into evidence Bird and Drummond’s description of the 
intruder.  The State said that it would be introducing this statement into evidence as an 
excited utterance under D.R.E. 803(2).  When Durham’s counsel indicated that he would 
be objecting, the State explained that it would be tailoring the testimony narrowly to avoid 
triggering D.R.E. 404(b).3  The State further described the substance of the anticipated 
testimony: 
I have spoken with Detective Mullaney about what testimony should come 
in and should not come in regarding the statements that were made at the 
scene, and I believe he will, one, discuss that the two individuals were very 
upset.  He used the term irate.  Yelling and cursing.  Visibly distraught. 
 
When they finally were spoken to by the police officer, one of them was 
Mullaney and the other one was Corporal Turner with the Dover Police, 
Drummond indicated that a black male wearing a gray sweatshirt and dark-
colored pants had a handgun. 
 
And Byrd [sic] indicated that he heard a commotion outside - - it may not 
have been outside - - he heard a commotion and he saw a black male with a 
handgun.  So I wanted to keep it tailored to just the description and not to 
uncharged events that the police believe occurred that night.4 
 
                                                          
 
3 Under D.R.E. 404(b)(1), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
with the character.”  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, “such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.”  D.R.E. 404(b)(2).  This rule “implements the philosophy that a defendant should not 
be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because of 
his guilt of the particular crime charged,” and hence “limits use of prior crimes, calling for 
exclusion where the evidence tends only to show propensity.”  1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:21, Westlaw (last updated June 2019). 
4 App. to Opening Br. at A-13. 
4 
Counsel for Durham said he “may not have an objection” if “that’s the only purpose of 
[Bird’s and Drummond’s description] coming in and it’s not coming in under 404.”5 
(7) 
Once the trial commenced, the State called Detective Mullaney as its first 
witness.  He testified that on May 28, 2018, he arrived at 317 West Division, where he 
made contact with two individuals “that were very upset, distraught, very visibly upset 
about an incident that occurred.”6  He then gave the description provided by Bird and 
Drummond.  As proffered, Detective Mullaney did not mention the possible home 
invasion. 
(8) 
However, later in the trial, Patrolman Spicer testified that that he was in the 
area on the night of the arrest because: 
We got a call for a possible home invasion in the area of 317 West Division 
street.  Officer Tim Mullaney was working that night and he responded there, 
put out over the radio that a suspect, a black male wearing a gray sweatshirt 
and black pants - - dark-colored pants, fled the area of 317 West Division 
and had a firearm in his possession and was traveling eastbound.7 
 
(9) 
Counsel for Durham did not raise a contemporaneous objection to the 
testimony of either Detective Mullaney or Patrolman Spicer. 
(10) 
After the State rested its case, counsel for Durham moved for judgment of 
acquittal, arguing that Patrolman Spicer’s testimony was not credible.  The State responded 
that in addition to Officer Spicer’s testimony, there was Detective Mullaney’s testimony 
                                                          
 
5 Id. at A-15. 
6 Id. at A-20. 
7 Id. at A-28–A-29. 
5 
“that two individuals described a black male with a firearm at their residence.”8  Counsel 
for Durham then argued that the State was using the statement as an uncharged prior bad 
act for purposes of establishing identity under D.R.E. 404(b) which “is very prejudicial to 
Mr. Durham because it insinuates to the fact-finder that he was involved” with the home 
invasion.9  The court denied the motion. 
(11) 
After a two-day bench trial on February 11–12, 2019, Durham was convicted 
on February 18, 2019 of all charges except for the Receiving a Stolen Firearm charge.  As 
to that charge, the State entered a nolle prosequi at the conclusion of the case.  Durham 
was sentenced on May 16, 2019.  Durham received a cumulative sentence of nine years of 
incarceration followed by decreasing levels of community supervision. 
(12) 
Durham appeals his conviction and sentencing, contending that the Superior 
Court abused its discretion by considering prior bad act evidence, which he contends was 
improperly used for purposes of establishing identity under D.R.E. 404(b), without 
conducting a Getz analysis.  The State argues that a D.R.E. 404(b) analysis was not required 
and that Bird’s and Drummond’s statements to Officer Mullaney qualified as excited 
utterances under D.R.E. 803(2).  “We review the Superior Court’s rulings on the admission 
of evidence for an abuse of discretion.”10 “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has 
                                                          
 
8 Id. at A-55. 
9 Id. at A-58. 
10 Baumann v. State, 891 A.2d 146, 148 (Del. 2005) (citing Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 
(Del. 1994)). 
6 
exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules 
of law or practice so as to produce injustice.”11 
(13) 
Although the Superior Court noted in its bench ruling on the motion for 
judgment of acquittal that it “does not recall any discussion of what acts had been 
committed at the address of 317 West Division Street that caused the people . . . to be 
perturbed and upset,”12 the trial transcript indicates that Patrolman Spicer did testify that 
the officers were responding to a possible home invasion at that address and that the 
description was that of the home invasion suspect. 
(14) 
Based upon our review of the record before us, we affirm the conviction and 
sentencing and hold that even if the introduction of the possible home invasion constituted 
error, it was harmless error.  The Superior Court observed that: 
[T]he Court does not believe that information to be essential in this case 
because this is not a situation which - - might have been different if those 
two individuals, their statement about someone having a gun had been the 
only evidence of the defendant possessing a firearm.  In this case, we also 
have Patrolman Spicer’s testimony to that effect.13 
 
The court found Patrolman Spicer’s testimony to be “particularly credible,” and that his 
testimony was corroborated by video evidence.14  Our review of the record shows that 
Patrolman Spicer testified that during his pursuit of Durham, Spicer “saw [Durham’s] hand 
go near his waistband area of his sweatpants and come out with a black firearm, black 
                                                          
 
11 Id.  
12 App. to Opening Br. at A-58. 
13 Id. at A-59–A-60. 
14 Opening Br. at Ex. A (Trial Tr. at 4). 
7 
handgun.”15  Spicer testified that he “saw the black slide of the handgun and I saw his palm 
wrapped around the butt of the gun,”16 and that Durham “was turned around looking at me 
and had the gun in his right hand.”17  Spicer further testified that he told Durham to stop 
and “drop the gun.”18  At that point in the chase, Spicer stated that the lighting was “good” 
given the “streetlights up and down West Division.”19  Moreover, Patrolman Spicer’s 
description of the firearm matched the gun entered into evidence, and he identified it as the 
gun he that saw Durham carrying.20  There was ample evidence to support a conviction 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(15) 
Moreover, we question the applicability of D.R.E. 404(b) to the challenged 
testimony.  Bird and Drummond’s description of the man with the gun at the site of the 
possible home invasion was not referring to a prior bad act that exhibited Durham’s 
propensity to illegally possess a firearm.  Rather, it explained what prompted the police to 
chase Durham.  In other words, Bird and Drummond’s hearsay statement described a part 
of the sequence of the very act of firearm possession for which he was prosecuted. 
                                                          
 
15 App. to Opening Br. at A-31. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at A-31–A-32. 
18 Id. at A-32. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at A-55. 
8 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is hereby AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
Justice