Title: Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2016-32)

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
 
Docket No. 44408 
 
In the Interest of the DOE CHILDREN, 
Children Under the Age of Eighteen (18) 
Years. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, 
  
           Petitioner-Respondent, 
v. 
 
JANE DOE (2016-32), 
  
           Respondent-Appellant, 
and 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
 
           Intervenor-Respondent. 
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Boise, January 2017 Term 
 
2017 Opinion No. 27 
 
Filed:  March 10, 2017 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bonneville County.  Hon. Michael B. Kennedy, Magistrate Judge.   
Magistrate court judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.   
Wixom Law Offices, Idaho Falls, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  
Carey Perkins, LLP, Boise, for intervenor-respondent. 
_______________________________________ 
ON THE BRIEFS 
BURDICK, Chief Justice. 
Jane Doe (Mother) appeals the Bonneville County magistrate court’s termination of her 
parental rights to her two minor children, K.J.M. and K.M.M. (Children). The Idaho Department 
of Health and Welfare (IDHW) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children 
on November 10, 2015. An eight-day trial was held, where over forty witnesses testified and 
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one-hundred-eighty exhibits were admitted. The magistrate found termination proper on several 
bases and entered a judgment to that effect. On appeal, Mother asserts that the magistrate’s 
judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence and that the magistrate committed several 
errors. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case concerns the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her two minor children, 
K.J.M. (born August 2012) and K.M.M. (born August 2013).1 IDHW became involved in this 
case in November 2012, when it learned Mother and her boyfriend, who was also K.J.M.’s 
father, were blowing marijuana smoke in K.R.C.’s and K.J.M.’s faces. IDHW visited Mother’s 
home and noted it was “filthy with pills and drug paraphernalia scattered throughout the 
home[.]” Further investigation revealed that Mother’s boyfriend was physically abusing Mother. 
Mother’s boyfriend was arrested for felony strangulation of Mother. Apparently, Mother dropped 
the charges “due to him being the sole caretaker of the children and needing his help . . . .”  
In addition, Mother’s boyfriend was physically abusing K.R.C. and K.J.M. Mother 
reported she had witnessed her boyfriend “shake 4 month old [K.J.M.] . . . and hit[] 1 year old 
[K.R.C.], leaving bruises on her legs and bottom.” Even so, Mother routinely placed them in the 
care of her boyfriend while she went to work, not “fully comprehend[ing] the danger she [was] 
placing her children in . . . .” IDHW concluded Mother lacked “capacity to protect her children 
from harm” and became concerned about their safety. IDHW filed motions for appointment of a 
guardian ad litem and for protective supervision under the Child Protective Act, both of which 
were granted. IDHW maintained protective supervision until July 2014.  
A case plan was entered during protective supervision, requiring Mother to do several 
things, including: (1) complete parenting and home organization classes; (2) complete domestic 
violence safety classes; (3) provide a plan stating how she would ensure Children’s safety; (4) 
ensure her home was clean; (5) clear her home’s floor of small objects, due to Children’s ages; 
(6) wash dishes and vacuum daily; (7) submit to random drug testing; and (8) acquire IDHW’s 
approval before allowing others to visit or reside in her home. Nevertheless, IDHW observed 
“the dishes were not done, the floor needed to be vacuumed, food was smeared into [the] carpet, 
                                                          
 
1 Mother has one other child, K.R.C. (born March 2012). K.R.C. is in the custody of her paternal grandparents, 
which is not at issue on appeal. K.R.C., however, is discussed in our opinion where relevant. 
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and there were clothes on the floor.” Thus, IDHW concluded Mother “was either not wanting to 
change the way she lived or wasn’t taking this seriously.”  
During protective supervision, Mother’s drug problem became evident. For instance, 
Mother was arrested in spring 2013 for failure to appear, and during the arrest, police found a 
urine-filled condom stashed in her underwear. That arrest occurred while Mother was traveling 
to a drug testing center, “indicating that Mother planned on falsifying her drug test.” Then, in 
spring 2014, Mother tested positive for “Methamphetamine and Amphetamine.” Mother testified 
she had used methamphetamine off-and-on during her pregnancies, further conceding she had 
used methamphetamine “during at least a portion of the pregnancy.” By 2014, Mother was using 
methamphetamine “pretty regularly” on a daily basis. In a mental health assessment performed 
on November 30, 2015, Mother stated that she “rel[ied] on drugs to feel normal.”  
Mother was incarcerated several times during protective supervision. She was arrested 
and incarcerated in spring 2013 for failure to appear. After failing a drug test in spring 2014, 
Mother was incarcerated until the week of June 23, 2014. Mother was again arrested and 
incarcerated on July 21, 2014, evidently for repeatedly violating a court order preventing non-
approved persons from residing with her. IDHW concluded Children were at a high level of 
threat, due to Mother’s incarcerations and “concerns of ongoing substance abuse and chronic 
neglect of children.”  
IDHW made an unannounced visit to Mother’s apartment on July 21, 2014. Mother was 
home, but asleep. K.J.M. was seen playing in the dirt with no clothes or shoes, supervised by a 
man who indicated he had recently been released from jail and was using methamphetamine. 
K.M.M. was seen in her play pen, with a diaper “that was unchanged and bulging and almost 
overflowing with feces.” The IDHW “worker woke up [Mother] and told her that she needed to 
change [K.M.M.’s] diaper and that [Children] were being supervised by a man . . . [who] the 
worker never met. [Mother] then ran out from her bedroom looking for her children.” Thereafter, 
IDHW concluded Mother was unable to meet the needs of Children and filed a motion for legal 
custody. The motion was granted, and Children have been in IDHW’s legal custody since July 
22, 2014.  
Another case plan was entered on August 11, 2014, requiring Mother to do several 
things, including: (1) stay sober; (2) find stable housing; (3) acquire IDHW’s approval before 
allowing others to reside in her home; and (4) submit monthly budgets to IDHW. A similar case 
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plan was entered on March 16, 2015. Mother failed to meet these requirements. As IDHW found 
in March 2015: 
[Mother] has been discharged from Family Drug [C]ourt and treatment. 
She completed a Nelson’s Truth Verification Testing and Investigation on 
February 7, 2015. Results indicated that she recently relapsed by smoking meth 
for a period of 3-4 days, having unapproved associations, she had also been on 5-
7 ride alongs where she knows people were dealing meth, as well as delivered it 
once by person. She admitted to facilitating a drug transaction by connecting a 
dealer to a person, having sex with 5 different individuals, as well as [being] in 
contact with 2 boy friends in jail while relationships or contact with these persons 
were not permitted.  
Thus, IDHW concluded Mother had shown no improvement despite IDHW’s involvement but, in 
fact, had regressed.  
IDHW filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children on November 10, 
2015.2 An eight-day trial was held in May 2016. Forty-three witnesses testified, twelve more 
witnesses submitted stipulated offers of proof, and over one-hundred-eighty exhibits were 
admitted. The magistrate found termination proper on several bases and entered a judgment to 
that effect. This appeal timely followed.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under “Idaho Code section 16-2005(1), a court may terminate parental rights if it finds 
that doing so is in the best interests of the child and that at least one of five grounds for 
termination is satisfied.” In re Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho 920, 923, 342 P.3d 632, 635 (2015). 
“The grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence.” In re Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho 103, 105–06, 320 P.3d 1262, 1264–65 (2014); see 
also I.C. § 16-2009. “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that indicates the thing to be 
proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” In re Doe (2014-17), 157 Idaho 694, 699, 339 
P.3d 755, 760 (2014). “This Court must ‘conduct an independent review of the magistrate court 
record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgment, as 
the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their 
credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the parties.’ ” In re Doe 
(2014-23), 157 Idaho at 923, 342 P.3d at 635 (quoting Doe I v. Doe II, 150 Idaho 46, 49, 244 
P.3d 190, 193 (2010)). “[T]his Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s decision to terminate 
parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the decision.” 
                                                          
 
2 By that time, Children’s fathers’ parental rights had already been terminated.  
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Doe I, 150 Idaho at 49, 244 P.3d at 193. “Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). Even if conflicting evidence is in the record, the judgment must be upheld so 
long as it is supported by substantial, competent evidence. Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 905–06, 
71 P.3d 1040, 1052–53 (2003) (citation omitted). 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate’s judgment. 
Under Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(b), termination is proper where clear and 
convincing evidence shows that the “[t]he parent has neglected . . . the child” and termination is 
in the best interests of the child. Idaho Code defines several bases of neglect. One basis of 
neglect arises where: 
 
The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan 
in a child protective act case and: 
(i) The department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen 
(15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and 
(ii) Reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth 
month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the 
department. 
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).3 
Another basis of neglect includes a child: 
 
Whose parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their 
responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child 
lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being[.] 
I.C. § 16-1602(28)(b).  
 
The magistrate found neglect satisfied under the above definitions. In relevant part, the 
magistrate’s order provides: 
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 16-2009, that the termination of the parent-child relationship between the 
Mother and the children, (a) is in the best interests of said children and that (b) the 
Mother has neglected the children as defined in Idaho Code § 16-1602(31), and 
that (c) the Mother has substantially failed to comply with the court’s orders and 
case plan in this child protective act case (after repeated warnings by the court and 
employees of the IDHW that failure to comply could result in the filing of a 
petition to terminate her parental rights), and (d) the IDHW has had temporary or 
                                                          
 
3 The trial occurred in May 2016. Several relevant rules and statutes were amended and took effect July 1, 2016. 
Where relevant, we cite to the pre-amended rules and statutes. 
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legal custody (with placement in foster care) of the said children for fifteen (15) 
of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and (e) reunification of the Mother 
and the children had not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month 
in which the children had been in foster care, and (f) the Mother has been unable 
to discharge her parental responsibilities and there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period of 
time and will be injurious to the children’s health and well-being, and that the 
above findings of this paragraph justify termination, pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-
2005(1). 
Thus, even though only one basis of neglect need be found, the magistrate found at least two 
bases of neglect: (1) non-compliance with case plans and failure to timely reunify under Idaho 
Code section 16-2002(3)(b); and (2) parental unfitness under Idaho Code section 16-1602(28)(b). 
The magistrate further found termination was in the best interests of Children. As shown below, 
substantial, competent evidence supports those findings. 
 
1. 
Neglect under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b). 
 
As noted, one basis of neglect was that:  
(c) [T]he Mother has substantially failed to comply with the court’s orders and 
case plan in this child protective act case (after repeated warnings by the court and 
employees of the IDHW that failure to comply could result in the filing of a 
petition to terminate her parental rights), and (d) the IDHW has had temporary or 
legal custody (with placement in foster care) of the said children for fifteen (15) 
of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and (e) reunification of the Mother 
and the children had not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month 
in which the children had been in foster care[.] 
That finding tracks the plain language of Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b).  
Mother, however, argues the case plans are invalid and she should not be punished for 
not complying with them. She points to Idaho Code section 16-1621(3), which requires the case 
plans to set forth reasonable efforts that will be made toward reunification. Mother contends the 
case plans do not set forth any such reasonable efforts and, thus, are invalid. Mother made this 
argument below, but the magistrate found the case plans substantially complied with section 16-
1621(3) and were entered by the child protection court without objection.  
 
We reject Mother’s argument. For one, Mother never objected when the case plans were 
entered by the child protection court. Moreover, the case plans do in fact set forth reasonable 
efforts toward reunification. All case plans state that IDHW will assist Mother in obtaining 
parent coaching. In addition, the second and third case plans state that IDHW will: (1) refer 
Mother to substance abuse help; (2) attend family drug court with Mother; (3) assist Mother in 
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finding housing; (4) approve those who Mother can allow to reside in her home; (5) assist 
Mother in formulating a budget; and (6) provide agencies to assist Mother in obtaining a mental 
health assessment. Contrary to Mother’s argument, the case plans do set forth reasonable efforts 
toward reunification. Thus, we reject Mother’s argument, which attempts to shift the analysis 
from its proper focus. Cf. In re Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 91, 244 P.3d 232, 235 (2010) (“Not 
infrequently, this Court is presented with arguments that the Department did not do enough when 
the analysis should primarily focus on what the putative parent did or did not do.”). 
 
Having concluded that the case plans are valid, we are satisfied with the magistrate’s 
finding that Mother failed to comply with them. At trial, Mother unequivocally testified she 
violated the case plans by: (1) failing to stay sober; (2) not obtaining stable housing; (3) failing to 
submit budgets to IDHW; (4) exhibiting instability as a result of incarcerations, probation 
violations, and drug use; and (5) failing to ensure the safety and well-being of Children.  
 
In addition, the magistrate was correct that IDHW had legal custody for fifteen of the 
most recent twenty-two months and reunification was not accomplished by the last day of the 
fifteenth month. IDHW obtained legal custody on July 22, 2014. The trial was held in May 2016, 
and the termination judgment was entered on August 1, 2016. Over twenty-four months lapsed 
from when IDHW obtained legal custody until the termination of Mother’s parental rights, 
during which reunification was never accomplished, much less by the last day of the fifteenth 
month. Thus, neglect is satisfied under section 16-2002(3)(b). 
 
We acknowledge our recent case of In re Doe (2016-14), slip op. 44092 (Sept. 9, 2016). 
There, parental rights were terminated under section 16-2002(3)(b). Id. at 3. The parent appealed 
and argued termination was improper because, although she had failed to comply with her case 
plan, compliance was impossible due to the fact that she was incarcerated when the case plan 
was entered. Id. at 3–4. IDHW argued the parent was responsible for failing to comply with the 
case plan because she could have done so had she not been incarcerated. Id. Noting that 
argument “ha[d] no small measure of appeal,” we held “that impossibility may be asserted as a 
defense to a claim of neglect founded upon failure to comply with the requirements of a case 
plan.” Id. at 4. We instructed that “the trial court must find that the parent is responsible, whether 
directly or indirectly, for non-compliance with the requirements of a case plan.” Id. at 5. Willful 
non-compliance, however, need not be shown. Id. We concluded by emphasizing that: 
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Earlier in this opinion, we stated that the Department’s arguments in 
defense of the magistrate’s decision had “no small measure of appeal.” However, 
it is the role of the trial court, not this Court, to make the factual finding whether 
Doe bears responsibility for her failure to comply with the case plan. The 
magistrate court made no findings as to whether Doe was responsible for the 
circumstances which led to her failure to complete the case plan. 
Id. at 7. 
 
Mother’s compliance with the case plans was not impossible, nor even unreasonable. 
Based on Mother’s unequivocal testimony set forth above, Mother was responsible, either 
directly or indirectly, for not complying with her case plan. Unlike the situation in In re Doe 
(2016-14), Mother was not incarcerated when the case plans were entered. While Mother was 
incarcerated for some of the time during her case plans, she conceded fault for failing to: (1) stay 
sober; (2) find stable housing; (3) submit budgets to IDHW; and (4) ensure the safety and well-
being of Children. As Mother testified, “[she] can’t blame anyone . . . because it was all [her] 
choice. It was all [her] decision. [She] can’t blame anyone else but [her]self.”  
 
The magistrate correctly found neglect under section 16-2002(3)(b) is satisfied. 
 
2. 
Neglect under Idaho Code section 16-1602(28)(b). 
 
Although only one basis of neglect is sufficient to terminate parental rights, the 
magistrate found as a second basis of neglect: 
Mother has been unable to discharge her parental responsibilities and there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged 
indeterminate period of time and will be injurious to the children’s health and 
well-being[.] 
As noted, neglect includes a child “[w]hose parents, guardian or other custodian are 
unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the 
child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being[.]” I.C. § 16-
1602(28)(b).  
 
The magistrate’s finding was correct. In its initial investigation, IDHW concluded Mother 
lacked capacity to protect Children from harm and was endangering Children by routinely 
placing them with her abusive boyfriend. As a result, IDHW obtained protective supervision 
over Children. Several issues became clear during protective supervision. One issue was 
Mother’s drug problem. For instance, when Mother was arrested in spring 2013 for failure to 
appear, police found a urine-filled condom stashed in her underwear. That arrest occurred while 
Mother was on her way to a drug testing center, “indicating that Mother planned on falsifying 
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her drug test.” Then, in spring 2014, Mother tested positive for “Methamphetamine and 
Amphetamine.” Mother testified she had used methamphetamine off-and-on during her 
pregnancies, further conceding she had used methamphetamine “during at least a portion of the 
pregnancy.” By 2014, Mother was using methamphetamine “pretty regularly” on a daily basis. In 
a mental health assessment performed on November 30, 2015, Mother stated that she “rel[ied] on 
drugs to feel normal.” Mother testified that her drug problem interfered with her ability to parent 
Children, as it made her put her own interests first. It also resulted in her frequent incarcerations. 
This Court has recognized that a drug problem, which interferes with parental abilities, supports 
a finding of neglect. In re Doe (2014-15), 157 Idaho 765, 771, 339 P.3d 1169, 1175 (2014).  
Protective supervision also revealed that Mother showed a disregard for Children’s needs. 
A parent coach assigned to Mother observed Mother’s residence “was cluttered, with dirty dishes 
on the table, cigarettes within reach of the children, and an overall disorganized home.” The 
parent coach also noted that Mother often “failed to attend the session,” “cancelled the session,” 
“fell asleep 3 times,” and “appeared very tired and lacked attentiveness.” At one point, on April 
5, 2013, Mother told the parent coach “that she wanted to give up custody of her children.” Then, 
in July 2014, IDHW made an unannounced visit to Mother’s apartment, witnessing K.J.M. 
playing in the dirt with no clothes or shoes, supervised by a man who indicated he had recently 
been released from jail and was using methamphetamine, and K.M.M. in her play pen, with a 
diaper that “was unchanged and bulging and almost overflowing with feces.” All the while, 
Mother was home, but asleep. Mother’s disregard for Children’s needs continued after she lost 
custody. During visitations with Children in October 2015, Mother (1) used “foul language in 
front of the children”; (2) failed to bring “any lunch items for the children, notwithstanding her 
having been told to do so”; and (3) had to be reminded to “change the children’s diapers . . . .”  
 
At the time of trial, Mother’s financial and housing situations were unstable. Mother 
testified that she had worked for periods of time at various jobs, but she eventually lost those 
jobs because of her frequent incarcerations. Before trial, Mother had recently obtained a new job, 
but she conceded that she was “still not in a position to provide for the children[.]” She further 
testified that, although she was making efforts to pay child support, she was still “behind 
thousands of dollars in child support[.]” As to housing at the time of the trial, Mother resided at a 
transitional house, which was a location where Children would not be permitted to live. This 
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Court has recognized that unstable employment or housing supports a finding of neglect. In re 
Doe (2011-03), 151 Idaho 498, 501–02, 260 P.3d 1169, 1172–73 (2011).  
 
Finally, as noted, Mother was repeatedly incarcerated. This Court has noted that 
“evidence of incarceration is competent evidence” establishing neglect. In re Doe (2015-01), 158 
Idaho 764, 768, 351 P.3d 1222, 1226 (2015). 
 
Mother acknowledges the above, but she argues her improvement by the time of trial 
proves she is able to discharge her parental responsibilities. Mother states that, at the time of 
trial, she (1) was sober; (2) had a job; (3) was engaging in mental health court; (4) had completed 
in-patient treatment; (5) had paid “substantial amounts” of child support; and (6) had maintained 
“positive visitation with [Children] until the Court ended that.” The magistrate recognized 
Mother’s recent improvements but found they were “too little, too late.” Based on the evidence 
at trial, the magistrate concluded “there clearly is no guarantee that Mother . . . will not relapse or 
fall into the downside of her ‘cycle’ (again) or . . . achieve enough stability to provide [Children] 
with a safe, stable, and healthy home and environment.” We find no error in the magistrate’s 
conclusion that Mother’s recent and modest improvements were insufficient to overcome her 
history of demonstrated unfitness. Cf. In re Doe (2011-18), 152 Idaho 644, 649–50, 273 P.3d 
685, 690–91 (2012) (finding no error in magistrate’s conclusion that father’s improvements were 
“too little, too late”). Indeed, even at trial, Mother conceded her ability to discharge her parental 
responsibilities required “the Court to put more weight on [Mother’s] promises for the future 
than on [her] conduct in the past[.]” 
The magistrate correctly found Mother was unable to discharge her parental 
responsibilities, which establishes neglect under section 16-1602(28)(b).4  
3. 
Best interests. 
Even if neglect is found, termination is proper only if in the best interests of the child. 
I.C. § 16-2005(1).  
When determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests the trial 
court may consider [1] the stability and permanency of the home, [2] 
unemployment of the parent, [3] the financial contribution of the parent to the 
child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody, [4] improvement of 
                                                          
 
4 We note that termination is proper where “[t]he parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such 
inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being 
of the child” if termination is in the child’s best interests. I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). That basis of termination 
substantially overlaps with neglect under section 16-1602(28)(b) and, consequently, is satisfied for the same reasons 
neglect under section 16-1602(28)(b) is satisfied. 
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child while in foster care, [5] the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, 
and [6] the parent’s continuing problems with the law. 
In re Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014) (citation omitted).  
These factors show that the magistrate’s conclusion that termination was in Children’s 
best interests is supported by substantial, competent evidence. First, Mother testified she lacked 
stable housing and, at the time of trial, was not living at a place where Children could live. 
Second, Mother testified that she had worked for periods of time at various jobs, but she 
eventually lost those jobs because of her frequent incarcerations. Before trial, Mother had 
recently obtained a new job, but she testified that she was “still not in a position to provide for 
the children[.]” Third, although Mother was making efforts to pay child support, she testified that 
she was still “behind thousands of dollars in child support[.]”  
Fourth, Children improved while in IDHW’s legal custody. When they entered foster 
care, Children were “unclean.” And, K.J.M. had some “flatting on the left side of his head,” 
which, according to IDHW, is an indicator of neglect. Similarly, K.J.M. also had a “flat spot on 
the back of his head . . . .” K.M.M., who was one-year old, “did not say any words at all[.]” Both 
Children, “mostly because of their age, were not potty trained [sic], they were both in diapers.” 
Mother conceded that she had “traumatized” Children. Since being placed in foster care, 
Children have been living in a “very clean and well kept” home. They are “having all their needs 
met.” They have been potty-trained. As IDHW summarized on January 20, 2016, Children “are 
doing well and [are] very attached to the current foster placement.”  
Fifth, Mother did little to improve her situation. Throughout protective supervision, 
Mother continuously violated her case plan. She continued violating her case plans after losing 
legal custody. She was given approximately two years to get sober, but she failed to do so. As 
she testified at trial: 
Q. Do you agree that during the period of time the children were in 
protective supervision, living with you, up until July, 2014, that you were using 
some of the money that probably should have been used for the kids for your 
meth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that, when using the meth, you were not the kind of parent you 
should have been? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you were putting yourself above the needs of the children? 
A. Yes, I was. 
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Q. Do you agree that during most of the 22 months that the children have 
been in foster care, as you would use meth and as you would not go to meetings 
with CLUB, Inc., or as you would not comply with probation, that you were 
putting your own needs ahead of the children’s needs? 
A. Yes, I was. 
 
Sixth, Mother had continuing problems with the law, as demonstrated by her frequent 
incarcerations discussed above. Accordingly, substantial, competent evidence supports the 
magistrate’s termination of Mother’s parental rights.  
B. 
We decline to reach the additional issues Mother raises. 
 
Although Mother raises several other issues on appeal, we decline to reach those issues 
because substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate’s judgment. Therefore, we 
uphold the magistrate’s judgment. Doe I v. Doe II, 150 Idaho 46, 49, 244 P.3d 190, 193 (2010) 
(“On appeal, this Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s decision to terminate parental 
rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the decision.” (citation 
omitted)). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Because substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate’s judgment, the 
termination of Mother’s parental rights is affirmed. We award costs on appeal to IDHW. 
Justices EISMANN, W. JONES, HORTON and BRODY, CONCUR.