Title: Kimble v. Carey

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
AVALON KIMBLE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 090947 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    April 15, 2010 
CHARLES ANTHONY CAREY  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Clarence N. Jenkins, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this rescue doctrine case, we consider whether the 
circuit court abused its discretion when it denied the rescuer’s 
motion to amend her complaint, excluded evidence of the victim’s 
intoxication, and granted the victim’s motion to strike all the 
evidence, holding that the rescuer’s conduct in attempting a 
rescue was “rash and/or reckless” as a matter of law.  The 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the 
rescuer’s motion to amend her complaint and when it excluded 
evidence of the victim’s intoxication.  However, the circuit 
court erred by granting the victim’s motion to strike, because 
the issue whether the rescuer’s conduct was rash and/or reckless 
should have been submitted to the jury. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The facts in this case are in dispute.  On review of a 
trial court’s judgment striking the plaintiff’s evidence, we 
                                                 
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 12, 
2010. 
consider the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
below, Avalon O. Kimble, and draw all fair inferences from those 
facts.2  Rascher v. Friend, 279 Va. 370, 373, 689 S.E.2d 661, 663 
(2010); Green v. Ingram, 269 Va. 281, 290, 608 S.E.2d 917, 922 
(2005). 
Evidence presented at trial established that on September 
25, 2006, Charles A. Carey struck a construction truck in the 
rear while Carey was traveling westbound on Interstate 64 in 
Henrico County on a very dark night.  As a result of the 
collision, Carey was trapped in his vehicle, “which had caught 
on fire.” 
On the night of the accident, Kimble was also driving on 
Interstate 64, but in an eastbound direction, and drove onto the 
shoulder of the highway when she saw Carey’s car on fire.  
Kimble parked her car one hundred yards past the collision site 
and on the opposite side of the highway.  Kimble observed Carey 
slumped over in his car when she crossed the highway to assist 
him.  While Kimble was in the middle of the left eastbound lane, 
with her hands in the air, she was struck by a car driven by 
Michael J. Preusser.3  Preusser was traveling on the highway at 
                                                 
2 Plaintiff became married prior to trial.  We will refer to 
her throughout this opinion using her name as of the time she 
was injured, which is the same name she used when filing her 
complaint.  
3 Kimble filed suit against Carey and Preusser, and later 
nonsuited her claims against Preusser. 
 
2
65 miles per hour, and testified that he could not see Kimble 
until immediately before his car struck her.  According to 
Master Trooper W. H. Napper of the Virginia State Police, who 
investigated Kimble’s accident, it was so dark outside “you 
[could not] see your hand in front of your face.” 
 
Kimble filed a complaint against Carey, alleging that 
“Carey’s negligence created a dangerous circumstance[] and but 
for . . . Carey’s negligence [Kimble] would not have been caused 
to render emergency assistance,” and that Carey’s negligence was 
a direct and proximate cause of Kimble’s injuries. 
At the time of the accident, Carey’s blood alcohol level 
was 0.15, which is above the legal limit in Virginia.  Code 
§ 18.2-266; Code § 46.2-341.27.  Carey was charged with driving 
while under the influence of alcohol and pled guilty to that 
offense in the general district court.  Upon learning of Carey’s 
blood alcohol level at the time of his collision with the 
construction truck, Kimble filed a motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint.  Kimble’s proposed amended complaint included 
a count alleging willful or wanton conduct by Carey and sought 
punitive damages.4 
                                                 
4 Kimble also filed a proposed second amended complaint, in 
which she reduced the compensatory and punitive damages sought.  
 
3
Following a pretrial hearing,5 the circuit court issued a 
letter opinion denying Kimble’s motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint, holding that because the parties agreed that 
the rescue doctrine was implicated, all of the facts of Carey’s 
conduct that brought him into peril before Kimble initiated a 
rescue were not material or relevant.  The circuit court also 
held that, because the parties “seem[ed] to agree” that Carey 
was negligent, the focus of the analysis shifted to whether 
Kimble was contributorily negligent under the rescue doctrine. 
Kimble filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
circuit court denied in a letter opinion.  The circuit court 
held that the degree of Carey’s negligence that put him into 
peril was immaterial and irrelevant because Carey’s negligent 
acts were not directed at Kimble and “the case is about injury 
[Kimble] is said to have received after the rescue attempt 
began.” 
 
At the outset of the jury trial, the circuit court 
reiterated its ruling that evidence relating to the 
circumstances that put Carey in a position of peril was 
immaterial, and that evidence of “Carey’s conduct prior to and 
                                                 
5 Judge Melvin R. Hughes, Jr. presided over the pretrial 
hearing and issued both the letter opinion denying Kimble’s 
motion for leave to file an amended complaint and her motion for 
reconsideration. 
 
4
about the collision” with the construction truck, including 
evidence of Carey’s intoxication, would be excluded. 
At the conclusion of Kimble’s case, Carey moved to strike 
the evidence.  Carey asserted three grounds in support of his 
motion to strike:  (1) the evidence did not support the 
application of the rescue doctrine; (2) Kimble did not establish 
a prima facie case of negligence against Carey; and (3) Kimble 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because she 
recklessly endangered her own life by crossing the highway.  The 
court took Carey’s motion to strike under advisement. 
 
Carey then presented his case in defense of Kimble’s 
claims, and Kimble presented rebuttal evidence.  After the 
conclusion of all the evidence, Carey renewed his motion to 
strike on the same grounds.  The circuit court found sufficient 
evidence for Kimble to proceed against Carey under the rescue 
doctrine.  The circuit court further determined that “there’s no 
question as to whether [Kimble] was contributorily negligent,” 
and that “[t]he only issue is does [Kimble’s conduct] rise to 
recklessness or rash[ness] based upon this [rescue] doctrine.” 
The circuit court held that Kimble was negligent as a 
matter of law, because “the attempt that [Kimble] made was done 
so recklessly and/or rashly” that reasonable minds could not 
differ.  Kimble noted her exception to the court’s rejection of 
her argument that it was a jury question whether Kimble acted in 
 
5
a rash or reckless manner.  Kimble’s appeal to this Court 
followed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
On appeal, Kimble assigns error to the circuit court’s 
rulings:  (1) denying her motion to amend her complaint to 
allege willful or wanton conduct by Carey; (2) excluding 
evidence of Carey’s intoxication at trial; and (3) sustaining 
Carey’s motion to strike Kimble’s evidence.  We will address the 
first two assignments of error together, as they relate to the 
evidence of Carey’s intoxication and Kimble’s argument that the 
degree of Carey’s intoxication and negligence was material and 
relevant. 
1. Rescue Doctrine 
In order to address the relevance of Carey’s intoxication 
as it pertains to the level of care exhibited by Kimble in her 
attempt to assist Carey, we must first consider the elements of 
the rescue doctrine.  The rescue doctrine, sometimes referred to 
as the humanitarian doctrine, rests on the premise that  
[p]ersons are held justified in assuming greater 
risks in the protection of human life than would 
be sustained under other circumstances.  
Sentiments of humanity applaud the act, the law 
commends it, and, if not extremely rash and 
reckless, awards the rescuer redress for injuries 
received, without weighing with technical 
precision the rules of contributory negligence or 
assumption of risk. 
 
 
6
Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 232 Va. 502, 504, 507, 352 S.E.2d 311, 
311-12, 313-14 (1987) (quoting Southern Ry. Co. v. Baptist, 114 
Va. 723, 727-28, 77 S.E. 477, 479 (1913)). 
We have consistently held that while it is commendable to 
attempt to rescue a fellow human being, the rescuer cannot 
recover for injuries sustained during the rescue attempt if the 
rescuer has acted rashly or recklessly in disregard of his or 
her own safety. 
[A] rescuer is justified in exposing himself [or 
herself] to danger, in a manner that would 
deprive him [or her] of a recovery for his [or 
her] injuries under other circumstances, if the 
peril threatening the victim is imminent and 
real, not merely imaginary or speculative, and 
the rescuer has not rashly or recklessly 
disregarded all consideration for his [or her] 
own safety. 
 
Lassiter, 235 Va. at 277, 368 S.E.2d at 260 (emphasis added). 
 
Most of the cases in our jurisprudence are based upon the 
branch of the rescue doctrine concerning suits brought by the 
rescuer against a third-party whose negligence placed a victim 
in a situation of imminent peril and the rescuer is injured by 
the third-party during the rescue attempt.  See, e.g., Millsaps, 
232 Va. at 505-07, 352 S.E.2d at 312-13 (Commonwealth sued 
third-party speeder for damages to state police vehicle and 
other property damage when state trooper attempted to rescue 
potential victims on interstate highway who may have been placed 
in danger by speeder’s flight from police); Roanoke Hospital 
 
7
Ass’n v. Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 704, 133 S.E.2d 559, 560 (1963) 
(private nurse sued third-party hospital for injuries she 
sustained in rescuing her patient from imminent danger caused by 
hospital’s alleged negligence); Andrews v. Appalachian Electric 
Power Co., 192 Va. 150, 152-54, 63 S.E.2d 750, 752-53 (1951) 
(suit by administrator against third-party power company on 
behalf of rescuer killed in effort to remove broken electric 
overhead wire from body of helpless victim injured through power 
company’s alleged negligence); Southern Ry. Co. v. Baptist, 114 
Va. 723, 724-27, 77 S.E. 477, 478-79 (1913) (bystander sued 
third-party railroad company for injuries he sustained in 
attempt to protect victim on an unmanageable horse from being 
injured by railroad’s allegedly negligent operation of its 
train); Wright v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 110 Va. 670, 
671-73, 66 S.E. 848, 848-49 (1910) (daughter sued third-party 
railroad company for injuries she sustained during attempt to 
rescue her mother who was in peril due to railroad’s allegedly 
negligent operation of its train).  
In Lassiter v. Warinner, 235 Va. 274, 368 S.E.2d 258 
(1988), we discussed the application of the rescue doctrine in a 
situation in which the victim may be liable to the rescuer when 
the victim’s own negligence results in injury to the rescuer.  
Id. at 276-78, 368 S.E.2d at 259-60.  We stated that the rescue 
doctrine is viewed as a limitation on the defense of 
 
8
contributory negligence.  Id.  This limitation is based upon the 
idea that it is commendable to save another from injury or 
death, and the law will not preclude the rescuer from recovery 
for his or her own injury even though the rescuer voluntarily 
exposed himself or herself to danger.  Id.  While we stated with 
approval the principle that the victim may be liable to the 
rescuer, in Lassiter the victim was not negligent in creating 
the peril that invited the rescue and resulted in injury to the 
rescuer.  Rather, the victim’s negligence occurred during the 
rescue attempt and injured the rescuer.  Id. at 280, 368 S.E.2d 
at 261-62. 
However, in this case, Kimble alleged that Carey’s 
negligence in creating his own peril was a proximate cause of 
Kimble’s injuries inflicted by a third-party during her attempt 
to rescue Carey.  Based upon the facts of this case, we apply 
the branch of the rescue doctrine in which the victim may be 
liable to the rescuer based on the negligent acts of the victim 
which placed him or her in peril if those negligent acts also 
proximately caused the rescuer’s injuries during the attempted 
rescue.6 
                                                 
6 We have not previously considered a case brought under 
this branch of the rescue doctrine.  According to the trial 
court, the parties in this case “seem to agree” that Carey was 
negligent.  While Carey argues that Kimble’s crossing the 
highway was an intervening cause of her injuries, Carey has 
raised no issue on appeal regarding whether his negligence was a 
 
9
2. Allegations and evidence of Carey’s intoxication 
 
Kimble argues that the circuit court abused its discretion 
by denying her motion to amend her complaint to include a count 
alleging willful or wanton conduct by Carey and seeking punitive 
damages, as the court must liberally grant leave to amend in 
furtherance of the ends of justice.  Kole v. City of Chesapeake, 
247 Va. 51, 57, 439 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1994); Rule 1:8.  Kimble 
asserts that she filed the motion for leave to amend after 
learning about Carey’s intoxication at the time of his collision 
with the construction truck, that she had not previously amended 
her complaint, and that Carey did not file any written 
opposition to her motion. 
Kimble further argues that the circuit court abused its 
discretion by excluding evidence of Carey’s intoxication at 
trial, because evidence of how Carey created the peril inviting 
the rescue was material and relevant.  Kimble asserts that in 
rescue doctrine analysis, the victim’s own negligence may be a 
limitation on any contributory negligence defense, and 
therefore, the more egregious the victim’s conduct in creating 
the peril, the greater the legal protection that is afforded the 
rescuer. 
                                                                                                                                                             
proximate cause of Kimble’s injuries.  Accordingly, Carey’s 
negligence as a proximate cause of Kimble’s injuries has become 
the law of the case. 
 
10
Kimble maintains that willful or wanton conduct by the 
victim is a complete bar to the contributory negligence defense, 
and a per se finding of willful or wanton conduct is mandated by 
Carey’s violation of Code § 8.01-44.5.7  Therefore, Kimble argues 
that Carey’s actions in driving while under the influence of 
alcohol bear directly on the issue whether he would be entitled 
to a contributory negligence instruction at trial. 
Kimble has not provided any authority for her argument that 
the rescuer’s conduct is measured against the level of 
negligence attributed to the victim.  We are aware of no 
authority supporting the proposition that the court should 
determine the victim’s degree of negligence in order to 
formulate its jury instructions on the issue of contributory 
negligence in a rescue doctrine case.  Kimble points us to no 
authority to support her position that a standard other than 
rash or reckless disregard for personal safety may be applied to 
the rescuer’s conduct if the victim’s conduct was willful or 
wanton, nor have we found any such authority. Within the realm 
of negligence cases, application of the rash or reckless 
disregard standard to the conduct of the plaintiff appears to be 
unique to rescue doctrine cases.  Application of this standard 
serves the meaningful purpose of rewarding a humanitarian effort 
                                                 
7 Pursuant to Code § 8.01-44.5, Carey’s conduct would be 
considered willful or wanton due to the fact that his blood 
 
11
to preserve the life of another if carried out in a manner that 
is not rash or reckless, and therefore not inconsistent with the 
protection of one’s own safety. 
It is precisely because the rash or reckless disregard 
standard is used in rescue doctrine cases that courts need not 
weigh with technical precision the rules of contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk.  Millsaps, 232 Va. at 507, 352 
S.E.2d at 313-14.  Pursuant to the rescue doctrine, the laudable 
purpose of the rescuer’s humanitarian effort precludes the 
application of any lack of due care by the rescuer to bar his or 
her recovery unless the rescuer acted in a manner that was rash 
or reckless. 
Courts are also not required to consider the degree of 
negligence on the part of the victim in circumstances such as 
those presented in this case.  It makes no difference to rescue 
doctrine analysis whether the victim was guilty of simple 
negligence, gross negligence, or willful or wanton conduct in 
creating his or her peril, because the rescuer’s right to 
recover for injuries sustained during the rescue attempt rises 
or falls with the determination whether the rescuer acted rashly 
or recklessly.  If the rescuer acted rashly or recklessly, he or 
she is barred from recovery.  However, if the rescuer did not 
act rashly or recklessly, and the victim was negligent in 
                                                                                                                                                             
alcohol concentration was 0.15 percent by weight by volume. 
 
12
placing himself or herself in “apparent immediate peril of death 
or serious bodily harm,” the rescuer may recover.  Id. at 507, 
352 S.E.2d at 313. 
With these principles in mind, we review the circuit 
court’s denial of Kimble’s motion to amend her complaint to 
allege willful or wanton conduct and seek punitive damages for 
an abuse of discretion.  The decision whether to grant leave to 
amend a complaint rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  Ogunde v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 274 Va. 55, 67, 
645 S.E.2d 520, 527 (2007).  We hold that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying Kimble’s motion to amend her 
complaint, because, as the court concluded, the allegation of 
willful or wanton conduct by Carey was irrelevant and immaterial 
under the rescue doctrine.  The degree of negligence 
attributable to Carey had no legal effect on the rash or 
reckless disregard standard of care applicable to Kimble in 
determining whether she was sufficiently at fault in her rescue 
attempt to bar her recovery through contributory negligence. 
We also review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence 
for an abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb a trial 
court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  
Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 276 Va. 
739, 743, 667 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2008); Riverside Hospital v. 
Johnson, 272 Va. 518, 529, 636 S.E.2d 416, 421 (2006).  We hold 
 
13
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
evidence of Carey’s intoxication, because it was immaterial and 
irrelevant under the rescue doctrine whether Carey’s conduct 
that put him in peril was willful or wanton.  Therefore, the 
only purpose in permitting Kimble to introduce evidence of 
Carey’s intoxication would be to inflame the jury, and it was 
not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to prohibit the 
introduction of that evidence. 
3. Motion to strike 
Kimble also assigns error to the circuit court’s grant of 
Carey’s motion to strike.  Kimble argues that the question of 
whether her actions reached the level of rash and reckless 
disregard for personal safety was for the jury to decide, and 
that the circuit court, by granting Carey’s motion to strike, 
improperly concluded that Kimble was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. 
 
Carey argues that the circuit court did not err by granting 
his motion to strike as reasonable minds could not differ that 
Kimble was contributorily negligent under the rescue doctrine.  
Carey asserts that Kimble acted rashly and recklessly when she 
positioned herself in the middle of a dark, high-speed highway 
without being sure whether anyone actually needed help, and that 
reasonable minds could not differ in reaching that conclusion. 
 
14
 
We agree with Kimble that the question whether she was 
contributorily negligent and, if so, whether her negligence rose 
to the level of rash or reckless disregard for her own safety 
was for the jury to decide.  Generally, the issue of 
contributory negligence is for a jury’s resolution and only 
becomes a question of law for the court’s determination when 
reasonable minds could not differ.  Rascher, 279 Va. at 375, 689 
S.E.2d at 664; Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 320, 315 S.E.2d 
210, 212 (1984). 
We expressed this rule’s applicability to the rescue 
doctrine context in Andrews, stating that “[a]s a general rule 
whether a person is guilty of contributory negligence in rushing 
into a place of danger to save another from imminent death or 
injury is a question for the jury.”  192 Va. at 161, 63 S.E.2d 
at 757.  In Andrews, the sole assignment of error on appeal to 
this Court was “that the issues of the negligence of the 
defendant and the contributory negligence of the [rescuer] 
should have been submitted to the jury.”  Id. at 153, 63 S.E.2d 
at 752.  Since the trial court had not considered whether the 
rescuer was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law, this Court remanded that issue and set forth the applicable 
rescue doctrine principles as guidance to the trial court.  We 
stated, in part, that 
 
15
[t]he rule is well settled that one who sees a 
person in imminent and serious peril caused by 
the negligence of another cannot be charged with 
contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in 
risking his own life or serious injury in 
attempting to effect a rescue, provided the 
attempt is not recklessly or rashly made. . . . 
Generally[,] even to save human life, one cannot 
rashly or recklessly disregard all consideration 
for his [or her] own personal safety without 
being charged with contributory negligence. 
 
Id. at 160-61, 63 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting 38 Am. Jur., Negligence 
§ 228, at 912-13) (emphasis added). 
Applying these principles and considering the record, we 
conclude that the issue whether Kimble’s conduct in attempting 
to rescue Carey rose to the level of being rash or reckless, 
thereby barring recovery under the rescue doctrine, should have 
been submitted to the jury.  We hold that under the facts of 
this case, reasonable minds could differ on the issue of 
weighing Kimble’s conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Kimble’s motion to amend her complaint and by excluding evidence 
of Carey’s intoxication, because the issue whether Carey’s 
conduct was willful or wanton was immaterial and irrelevant to 
the rescue doctrine analysis.  However, the circuit court erred 
by determining that Kimble was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law, as the issue whether her conduct was in rash or 
reckless disregard for her own safety should have been submitted 
 
16
to the jury for determination.  We will remand this case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                             and remanded. 
 
17