Title: State Water Control Board v. Crutchfield

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD,  
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 021507 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
April 17, 2003 
 
FRANCES BROADDUS CRUTCHFIELD, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
This appeal originates from a final decision of the State 
Water Control Board (the Board).  We primarily consider whether 
the petitioner landowners properly perfected their appeal in the 
circuit court and whether they have standing to challenge the 
Board's decision granting a permit for the discharge of treated 
wastewater into a river adjoining their land. 
 
In April 1999, the Board, under authority provided in Code 
§ 62.1-44.15(5) of the State Water Control Law, Code §§ 62.1-
44.2 through –44.34:28, granted Hanover County a Virginia 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit (the permit).  The 
permit allows the County to discharge up to ten million gallons 
per day of treated wastewater into the Pamunkey River (the 
river) adjacent to property owned by Frances B. Crutchfield and 
her son, Henry R. Broaddus (collectively, the petitioners). 
 
The petitioners filed a petition for appeal in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond against the Board and the 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) (collectively, the 
Board), asking that the court declare the permit invalid.  In 
response, the Board filed a demurrer asserting that the 
petitioners lacked standing to pursue their appeal.  The Board 
also asked the court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that 
the petitioners failed to name the County as a party to the 
appeal in a timely manner. 
 
The circuit court overruled the demurrer, holding that the 
petitioners alleged standing by claiming injury to the historic 
sites located on their property.  The court allowed the 
petitioners to add the County as a party to the appeal, but 
denied them leave to amend their petition regarding their 
claimed injuries. 
After hearing evidence on the question of standing, the 
circuit court dismissed the appeal with prejudice on the ground 
that the petitioners had not established standing because they 
failed to demonstrate "any actual or imminent injury."  The 
court held that the petitioners' claims of injury merely 
constituted "abstract distress." 
The petitioners appealed from the circuit court's judgment 
to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment in an 
unpublished opinion.  Crutchfield v. State Water Control Bd., 
Record No. 1095-01-2 (April 2, 2002).  The Court of Appeals 
remanded the case for a hearing on the merits of the petition, 
 
2
holding that the petitioners had standing to challenge the 
Board's issuance of the permit.  The Court of Appeals also 
concluded that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow the petitioners leave to amend the allegations 
of their petition, and held that the petitioners' failure to 
name the County in the original petition did not create a 
jurisdictional defect in the proceedings. 
The Board and the County appealed from the Court of 
Appeals' judgment.  We awarded an appeal based on our 
determination that the Court of Appeals' decision involves 
matters of significant precedential value.  See Code § 17.1-
410(B). 
 
The following facts are relevant to this appeal.  The 
petitioners own an 878-acre tract of land in Hanover County 
known as "Newcastle Farm" (the farm).  The farm is bordered for 
several miles by the Pamunkey River and contains the remains of 
the colonial-era town of Newcastle, which was founded in 1738 
and is listed as a Virginia Historic Landmark.  The farm also 
includes part of a former plantation, known as Marlbourne, which 
is listed in the National Historic Landmark Registry. 
 
The County sought the permit to facilitate its planned 
Totopotomoy Wastewater Treatment Plant.  Under the County's 
plan, treated wastewater will be transported about eight miles 
from the plant to the Pamunkey River through a buried 36-inch-
 
3
diameter pipeline, which will cross the petitioners' land.  To 
install the pipeline, the County acquired by condemnation from 
the petitioners a 50-foot-wide easement passing through the 
center of their farm.  The County also obtained by condemnation 
an additional acre near the center of the farm's river frontage 
to construct reaeration and discharge structures necessary for 
the project.  The County's plan will cause the treated 
wastewater to be discharged from an outfall pipe located on the 
river bottom about 50 yards upstream from the petitioners' boat 
ramp, irrigation pump, and "picnic-swimming area." 
 
In considering the County's permit application, the Board 
held a public hearing during which the petitioners voiced their 
objections to the proposed project.  The petitioners also 
submitted written comments in opposition to the project. 
 
In April 1999, the Board granted the County's permit 
request.  The petitioners timely filed a notice of appeal and 
petition for appeal in the circuit court.  In their petition for 
appeal, they alleged that the Board's decision would result in 
the "effective termination of existing beneficial uses of the 
Pamunkey River for recreation." 
 
The petitioners attached as an exhibit to their petition a 
letter they had submitted to the DEQ as part of the "public 
comment" process.  In the letter, the petitioners alleged that 
the proposed discharge system would interfere with existing 
 
4
recreational uses of the river.  The petitioners also stated in 
the letter that several people have used "the area immediately 
downstream from the proposed discharge [site] for swimming for 
many years.  Those using this area are not limited to the 
property owners."  Additionally, the petitioners stated that the 
farm "contains significant, documented historic resources that 
would indeed be adversely affected by construction of the 
proposed discharge pipe, reaeration structure, and outfall." 
 
The circuit court granted the Board's request to depose the 
petitioners on the issue of their standing to appeal the Board's 
decision.  In her deposition, Crutchfield testified that she was 
concerned that installation of the pipeline would adversely 
affect the historic value of the property and would destroy 
"relics" and other items of archeological importance.  
Crutchfield also testified that if the pipeline is installed, 
she will no longer swim, fish, or canoe in the river, and the 
enjoyment she derives from camping near the river will be 
impaired. 
 
In his deposition, Broaddus testified that the presence of 
the discharge structure and pipeline would hinder his enjoyment 
of the farm's historic resources and recreational amenities. He 
further testified that the proposed discharge structure would be 
within sight of the Newcastle Town ruins located on the farm.  
Broaddus also stated that operation of the discharge facility 
 
5
and pipeline system will cause him to abandon or decrease the 
frequency of his recreational activities in the river. 
 
The Board presented evidence of a "cultural resources 
investigation," which concluded that the County's project would 
not affect the farm's historic significance.  The circuit court 
also received the results of an "archeological evaluation" 
indicating that the farm's cultural resources already had been 
impaired by farming operations, and that the portions of the 
farm affected by the proposed project did "not contain 
sufficient integrity to yield any further significant 
information about the past."  After hearing this evidence, the 
circuit court dismissed the petitioners' appeal, holding that 
they failed to establish injury to the farm's historic resources 
and, thus, failed to demonstrate standing to challenge the 
Board's decision.1
 
On appeal in this Court, the Board first argues that the 
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's decision 
permitting the petitioners to add the County as a party to the 
appeal.  The Board contends that Rule 2A:4 required the 
petitioners to serve the County, a necessary party to the 
                     
 
1 In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court did not 
consider the petitioners' allegations and evidence regarding 
injury to their recreational interests based on its earlier 
holding that the original petition failed to allege injury to 
those interests. 
 
 
6
appeal, with a copy of their petition at the time it was filed, 
and that the petitioners' failure to do so created a 
jurisdictional defect in the proceedings.  We disagree with the 
conclusion urged by the Board. 
 
The petitioner's appeal to the circuit court was based on 
the Administrative Process Act (the Act), Code §§ 2.2-4000 
through –4033, which provides that an appeal of a decision by 
the Board must be brought "in the manner provided by the rules 
of the Supreme Court of Virginia."  Code § 2.2-4026.  Such 
appeals brought under the Act are governed by Part 2A of the 
Rules of this Court.  See Rule 2A:1; Virginia Ret. Sys. v. 
Avery, 262 Va. 538, 540-42, 551 S.E.2d 612, 613-14 (2001). 
 
Because the petitioners' notice of appeal and original 
petition for appeal were timely filed within the 30-day time 
periods specified in Rules 2A:2 and 2A:4, the circuit court had 
jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal.2  See id. at 542, 
551 S.E.2d at 614; see also Occoquan Land Dev. Corp. v. Cooper, 
239 Va. 363, 366-67, 389 S.E.2d 464, 466 (1990).  The 
petitioners' failure to have a copy of the petition served on 
                     
 
2 We do not address any other requirements of Rule 2A:2 
pertaining to the petitioners' notice of appeal because the 
County and the Board did not challenge the petitioners' 
compliance with this Rule either in the circuit court or in 
their brief filed with this Court. 
 
 
7
the County did not divest the court of this jurisdiction.  See 
Avery, 262 Va. at 542, 551 S.E.2d at 614. 
 
The Board incorrectly asserts that the language of Rule 
2A:4(a) precluded the circuit court from permitting the County 
to be added as a party in the case after expiration of the 30-
day time period for filing the petition.  This provision states: 
Within 30 days after the filing of the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall file his petition for 
appeal with the clerk of the circuit court named in 
the first notice of appeal to be filed.  Such filing 
shall include all steps . . . to cause a copy of the 
petition to be served (as in the case of a bill of 
complaint in equity) on the agency secretary and on 
every other party. 
 
 
Although the plain language of this provision required the 
petitioners to serve a copy of their original petition on the 
County, their failure to do so did not prevent the circuit court 
from permitting them to amend their petition at a later date to 
add the County as a party.  The contrary argument advanced by 
the Board would improperly transform the service of process 
provisions of Rule 2A:4 into a jurisdictional requirement 
mandating dismissal of the appeal in the circuit court.  See 
Avery, 262 Va. at 542, 551 S.E.2d at 614.  We decline to apply 
Rule 2A:4 in this manner in the absence of language in the Rule 
compelling such a result.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court's decision permitting the County to be added as a party to 
the appeal was a matter subject to the court's discretionary 
 
8
authority.  See Browning-Ferris Indus. of S. Atl., Inc. v. 
Residents Involved in Saving the Env't, Inc., 254 Va. 278, 282-
83, 492 S.E.2d 431, 433-34 (1997). 
The present record supports this discretionary 
determination.  The County, as the entity granted the discharge 
permit, was a necessary party in the case.  Id. at 282, 492 
S.E.2d at 433-34; see Asch v. Friends of the Cmty. of Mount 
Vernon Yacht Club, 251 Va. 89, 90-91, 465 S.E.2d 817, 818 
(1996).  Thus, the circuit court could not determine the merits 
of the appeal and render a valid judgment in the case unless the 
County was added as a party.  Atkisson v. Wexford Assocs., 254 
Va. 449, 455, 493 S.E.2d 524, 527 (1997); Asch, 251 Va. at 91, 
465 S.E.2d at 818; Schultz v. Schultz, 250 Va. 121, 124, 458 
S.E.2d 458, 460 (1995).  Moreover, we observe that the County 
did not object to being added as a party in the petitioners' 
appeal.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did 
not err in affirming the circuit court's decision permitting the 
County to be added as a party in the case. 
 
We next consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying the petitioners leave to amend the allegations of their 
original petition.  The Board asserts that because Rule 2A:4 
required that the original petition state the reasons why the 
petitioners contended the Board's decision was unlawful, the 
 
9
circuit court did not have authority to allow amendment of the 
petition to state a "new" ground of injury, namely, injury to 
the petitioners' recreational use of the farm and the river. 
We find no merit in the Board's assertion that the original 
petition and letter exhibit failed to allege injury to the 
petitioners' recreational use of the farm and the river.  In the 
letter attached to their original petition, the petitioners 
alleged that the proposed discharge of wastewater will interfere 
with existing uses of the river.  In that letter, the 
petitioners discussed the recreational use, including swimming, 
of the area immediately downstream from the proposed discharge 
site, and stated that "[t]hose using this area are not limited 
to the property owners." 
A fair inference from these statements is that the 
petitioners, who are the property owners, use the river and 
their adjacent property for recreational purposes.  Therefore, 
we are not presented with an issue whether Rule 2A:4 precludes a 
petitioner from amending a petition to add a different 
allegation of injury, and we limit our consideration to the 
issue whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying 
the petitioners leave to amend their petition regarding their 
original claims of injury. 
We observe that the provisions of Rule 2A:4 do not prevent 
a circuit court from exercising its discretion either to grant 
 
10
or deny a request to amend a timely filed petition for appeal.  
However, like any other decision submitted to a circuit court's 
discretion, the refusal to allow such amendments must be 
supported by the record. 
 
Here, the record shows that this was the petitioners' first 
request to amend the allegations of their petition, and the 
proposed amendments did not add any new claims of injury.  In 
addition, the record does not indicate that the petitioners' 
request would have caused any delay in the court's consideration 
of the merits of the appeal or would have resulted in other 
prejudice to the parties in the case.  Based on these factors, 
we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding 
that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the 
petitioners' request to amend the allegations of their original 
petition. 
 
The Board next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that the petitioners had standing to appeal the 
Board's decision, and in failing to give deference to the 
circuit court's "factual finding" that the petitioners failed to 
demonstrate an actual or imminent injury to the farm's historic 
resources.  We disagree with the Board's arguments. 
The requirements for standing to challenge a final decision 
by the Board are stated in Code § 62.1-44.29, which provides in 
relevant part: 
 
11
Any owner aggrieved by, or any person who has 
participated, in person or by submittal of written 
comments, in the public comment process related to, a 
final decision of the Board . . . is entitled to 
judicial review thereof in accordance with the 
provisions of the Administrative Process Act . . . if 
such person meets the standard for obtaining judicial 
review of a case or controversy pursuant to Article 
III of the United States Constitution.  A person shall 
be deemed to meet such standard if (i) such person has 
suffered an actual or imminent injury which is an 
invasion of a legally protected interest and which is 
concrete and particularized; (ii) such injury is 
fairly traceable to the decision of the Board and not 
the result of the independent action of some third 
party not before the court; and (iii) such injury will 
likely be redressed by a favorable decision by the 
court. 
 
The language of this statute reflects the holdings of the United 
States Supreme Court regarding the requirements of standing 
under the "case" or "controversy" provisions of Article III of 
the United States Constitution.  Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 366, 376, 541 S.E.2d 920, 925 (2001). 
The standing provisions of Code § 62.1-44.29 require 
persons challenging a final decision by the Board to establish 
that they meet all three enumerated requirements of the statute 
before a court will consider the merits of their challenge to a 
governmental action.  These components of Article III standing 
are not merely requirements of pleading, but must be supported 
by adequate evidence.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 561 (1992); see Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 467 
(4th Cir. 2001). 
 
12
 
For purposes of Article III standing, the "injury in fact" 
that must be established in a case involving a plaintiff's 
recreational and aesthetic interests is not injury to the 
environment, but injury to the plaintiff.  Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 
(2000); Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 
263 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002).  This 
requirement precludes a plaintiff from alleging a generalized 
grievance to vindicate an interest shared by the entire public.  
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 
F.3d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 2000); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; 
Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 449 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
A plaintiff must show that the alleged injury will affect 
him in a personal and individual manner.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
n.1; Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d at 156.  However, 
the claimed injury need not be a large one, and an "identifiable 
trifle" will be sufficient to meet the "injury in fact" 
requirement.  LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 270-71 (2nd Cir. 
2002); Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d at 156; Sierra 
Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996).  
Thus, in "environmental cases," it generally is sufficient if a 
plaintiff establishes that he uses the affected area, and that 
he is a person "for whom the aesthetic and recreational values 
 
13
of the area will be lessened" by the defendant's actions.  
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. at 183 (quoting 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)); accord Piney 
Run Pres. Ass'n, 268 F.3d at 263.  Scientific proof of actual 
harm to an environmental resource is not required to establish 
standing in such cases.  See Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 
F.3d at 159-60. 
 
We also note that the location of the petitioners' farm is 
relevant to the present standing inquiry, because the farm is 
contiguous to, and touches, the Pamunkey River.  So situated, 
the farm is "[r]iparian land," and the petitioners are 
"[r]iparian owners" of that land.  See Code §§ 62.1-104(5) and –
104(6).  Riparian owners have the right to make reasonable use 
of the water flowing past their land, and they have a right to 
enjoy the recreational and aesthetic advantages that are 
conferred on such land adjoining a watercourse.  Thurston v. 
City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 911-12, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 
(1965); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 773, 47 S.E. 875, 
880-81 (1904); see Carr v. Kidd, 261 Va. 81, 95, 540 S.E.2d 884, 
892-93 (2001). 
 
In accordance with these principles, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in its standing determination because the 
petitioners' allegations and evidence of injury to their 
 
14
recreational interests and use of the river established that 
they have met all three requirements of Article III standing.3
 
The petitioners have alleged and established an "actual or 
imminent injury" that is "concrete and particularized" in 
nature, rather than a mere statement of abstract concern or a 
general averment of injury.  See Code § 62.1-44.29(i).  This 
imminent injury includes injury to their recreational enjoyment 
of their property and the river's resources to which they have a 
recognized right as riparian landowners.  As stated above, in a 
letter accompanying their original petition, the petitioners 
inferentially alleged that they use the area immediately 
downstream from the proposed discharge site for recreational 
purposes, including swimming.  They also alleged that the 
proposed discharge of wastewater would interfere with existing 
recreational uses of the river. 
 
The evidence showed that the County's wastewater treatment 
project would require the use of a buried three-foot-diameter 
pipeline placed through the petitioners' land.  An outfall 
facility for treated sewage will be located on the one-acre site 
taken from the petitioners by condemnation, which is surrounded 
by the remaining acreage of the farm.  The proposed permit will 
                     
 
3 Because we reach this conclusion based solely on these 
allegations and evidence, we need not consider the sufficiency 
of the petitioners' additional allegations and evidence 
concerning injury to the farm's historic resources. 
 
15
allow the County to discharge as much as ten million gallons of 
treated wastewater daily from this outfall facility into the 
Pamunkey River only 50 yards upstream from the petitioner's boat 
ramp, irrigation pump, "swimming hole," and picnic area. 
 
The petitioners both testified that they regularly use the 
river for swimming, fishing, and boating, and that they would be 
required either to decrease or discontinue these activities 
altogether if the County is allowed to operate its discharge 
facilities under the permit.  The petitioners further stated 
that the outfall location would have an adverse impact on their 
recreational use of the river, and that their aesthetic 
enjoyment of the farm and river would be harmed by the daily 
discharge of treated wastewater into the river. 
 
We also conclude that the petitioners' injuries are "fairly 
traceable" to the Board's decision to issue the permit to the 
County and do not result from the actions of a third party not 
before the court.  See Code § 62.1-44.29(ii).  Without the permit 
allowing the discharge of treated wastewater, the injuries that 
were the subject of the petitioners' testimony would not occur.  
The County would not be able to discharge the millions of gallons 
of treated wastewater into the river adjacent to the farm, and 
would have no need to construct the pipeline through the farm or 
to build the accompanying discharge structures.  Thus, in the 
absence of the permit, the petitioners' use and enjoyment of the 
 
16
farm and the river for recreational purposes would remain 
unaffected. 
 
Finally, we observe that the petitioners' injuries would be 
"redressed" by a favorable judgment of the circuit court.  See 
Code § 62.1-44.29(iii).  The petitioners asked that the circuit 
court declare the permit "invalid, void and of no effect."  As 
stated above, the petitioners' injuries would not occur in the 
absence of a permit issued by the Board because the County would 
be unable to construct the outfall facilities, install the 
pipeline, and discharge the treated wastewater into the river 
without a permit authorizing these actions.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that 
the petitioners have established standing to bring their appeal 
under the Act in the circuit court. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the Court of Appeals' 
judgment, and will remand the case to the Court of Appeals with 
direction that the case be remanded to the circuit court for a 
trial on the merits of the petitioners' claims. 
Affirmed. 
 
17