Title: People v. Bellmyer

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 92323-Agenda 9-March 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
DAVID BELLMYER, Appellee.
	Defendant, David Bellmyer, was charged with first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1998)) in the circuit court of
Rock Island County. Defendant raised the affirmative defense of
insanity. After the parties presented evidence in a stipulated bench
trial, the trial court found that the stipulated evidence was
insufficient to make a decision regarding defendant's insanity
defense. Defendant moved to dismiss the charged offense based on
double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion and
subsequently set the matter for a full trial.
	Defendant brought an interlocutory appeal to the appellate
court. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f). The court held that jeopardy had
attached at the stipulated bench trial and that double jeopardy
barred a second prosecution. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the charges. 323
Ill. App. 3d 269.
	We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a). We now reverse the appellate court and remand the
cause to the trial court for further proceedings.



BACKGROUND

	The charges at issue in this case arise from the January 24,
1999, shooting death of George Bellmyer (hereafter victim).
Defendant, the victim's son, was arrested, taken to the Rock Island
County sheriff's department and advised of his Miranda rights. He
invoked his right to counsel. On January 25, 1999, defendant was
charged in an information with two counts of first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)). In his first court
appearance, also on that date, the court advised defendant that he
had a right to an attorney and warned him of the possibility of trial
in absentia. The court also set bond and informed defendant of the
date of his preliminary hearing. Because defendant appeared not
to understand these actions, the State moved for a fitness hearing
to determine if defendant was fit to plead or stand trial. The court
granted the State's motion and appointed Dr. Eric Ritterhoff to
conduct the fitness examination.
	On February 22, 1999, Dr. Ritterhoff submitted a report to the
trial court and, on March 5, testified at a fitness hearing. Dr.
Ritterhoff concluded that defendant was not fit to plead or stand
trial at that time, but that he would be fit within one year.
	Defendant was remanded to the custody of the Illinois
Department of Human Services, which periodically submitted
written mental health evaluations of defendant. In its third report
to the court, dated August 25, 1999, the Department concluded
that defendant was fit to stand trial. At a fitness hearing on
September 1, 1999, defendant and the State stipulated that
defendant was fit to stand trial. The trial court reviewed the third
written report and, based thereon, found defendant fit to stand
trial.
	On November 8, 1999, defendant moved for a continuance so
that he could be examined to determine whether the insanity
defense was available to him at trial. Defendant and the State
agreed that Dr. Robert Chapman would examine defendant on the
issue of sanity. On November 30, defendant filed notice that he
intended to raise the affirmative defense of insanity. Attached to
his notice was Dr. Chapman's written report, in which he
concluded that defendant was insane at the time of the shooting.
	In response, on December 6, 1999, the State sought a
continuance for a second opinion on the issue of sanity from Dr.
Kirk Witherspoon. In a written report dated December 24, 1999,
Dr. Witherspoon also concluded that defendant was insane when
he shot the victim. On January 6, 2000, defendant and the State
informed the court that because both of their experts opined that
defendant was insane at the time of the offense, the parties would
proceed via a stipulated bench trial. Defendant waived his right to
a jury trial. After questioning, the trial court found that defendant's
jury waiver was knowing and voluntary.
	On February 29, 2000, the trial court heard opening
statements, received stipulated evidence, and heard closing
arguments. The parties agreed to the following facts at the
stipulated bench trial. In January 1999, defendant and his daughter,
April, lived in the home of his parents in Coal Valley. During this
time, the victim was recovering from a leg injury and was using a
wheelchair. Also, defendant had begun to carry a handgun.
	On January 22, defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct
and spent the night in the county jail. No charges were filed
against defendant with respect to the arrest, and defendant was
released the next day. When defendant returned home on January
23, he became angry because he could not find his gun, and argued
with his parents. The victim returned the handgun to defendant,
who calmed down, went to his room, and repeatedly cleaned the
gun. Also on that day, defendant complained to his brother, Gary,
of having experienced a "bad trip" from illegal narcotics he had
been taking.
	Between 1 a.m. and 3 a.m. on January 24, defendant had an
argument with his girlfriend, Katherine McCollom, who lived with
him at his parents' home. Defendant pointed a gun at McCollom
and demanded that she mop the floors. She complied, while
defendant paced back and forth.
	Later that morning, defendant again cleaned his gun and
placed it under the couch in the living room. He forgot where he
had put it and became infuriated. At approximately 1:30 p.m.,
Gary, who lived across the street from the house, went to his
parents' home. Defendant's mother and the victim were in the
living room and appeared frightened. Defendant was looking for
his gun and appeared nervous and agitated. Gary returned to his
home. When defendant found the handgun, he began to point it at
his mother, the victim, and McCollom. He did not point the gun at
his daughter, April, who was also present. He told April to go to
the basement. She complied, but returned to the living room and
saw what transpired.
	Defendant hit the victim with the gun on the head and the leg.
Defendant's mother and April escaped through a window and fled
to Gary's home. They told Gary that defendant was beating the
victim with a gun. Police were called.
	Defendant then kicked the victim's wheelchair out from under
the victim and continued to beat him with the gun. McCollom then
escaped through the window as well, leaving defendant and the
victim in the house alone.
	The first law enforcement officials to arrive at the scene saw
McCollom run from the victim's home across the street to Gary's
residence. A short time later, officials heard three shots being fired
from inside the victim's residence. For approximately the next
hour, police attempted, via a public address system, to persuade
defendant to exit the house. During this time they heard multiple
shots being fired inside the home.
	At approximately 5 p.m., law officers forced their way into
the house through the back door. They found the victim's body on
the floor inside the back porch. Defendant was siting on a couch
in his bedroom with a handgun beside him.
	An autopsy disclosed that the victim had died as a result of
three gunshot wounds to the head. Further, it was determined that
the bullets recovered during the autopsy were fired from the gun
found next to defendant.
	The parties agreed that the State could prove the charged
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the parties
disagreed as to whether defendant was sane at the time of the
shooting or should be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Accordingly, the State and defendant stipulated as to the evidence
pertaining to the issue of sanity, but not to the sufficiency of the
evidence to find defendant insane.
	The State contended that despite the reports of Drs. Chapman
and Witherspoon, the court should find defendant either guilty or
guilty but mentally ill. Pointing to the facts that defendant had
argued with his parents and McCollom the day before the shooting
and had been cleaning his gun, the State argued that defendant had
planned the incident. The State also argued that defendant, by not
pointing the gun at his daughter and ordering her to go to the
basement, knew that his actions were wrong.
	The defense, in its closing argument, emphasized that Drs.
Chapman and Witherspoon both concluded that defendant was
insane at the time of the shooting. Both found that defendant
suffered from "schizoaffective disorder, bi-polar type"; both
agreed that, due to this mental condition, defendant could not
appreciate the criminality of his conduct. The defense contended
that the trial court should find defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity.
	After hearing closing arguments, the court noted that it had
questions regarding the qualifications of Dr. Witherspoon. The
court also expressed concern regarding the lack of evidence of
how defendant acted prior and subsequent to the shooting. The
court asked the State to submit additional information regarding
these matters. Complying with this request, the parties presented
additional stipulated evidence pertaining to Dr. Witherspoon's
qualifications and defendant's behavior from the time of the
shooting until the time of his arrest and the appointment of the
public defender.
	On April 7, 2000, the court held a hearing at which it was
expected that the court would render its judgment. However, the
judge complained that, despite the additional information, the
stipulated evidence was not adequate or sufficient to determine the
issue of defendant's sanity at the time of the shooting. "Many
things the Court needs to see and hear simply do not come out
through a written stipulation." The court stated that it needed to
see the demeanor of defendant as he testified regarding his
behavior, or see the demeanor of witnesses who observed
defendant's behavior, prior and subsequent to the shooting. The
trial court explained that the credibility of witnesses was very
important in deciding this issue and that stipulated evidence did
not provide the court with an opportunity to judge credibility.
Accordingly, the court refused to enter a ruling.
	On April 12, 2000, defendant filed a motion to compel the
verdict. The State did not object to the motion and agreed with
defendant that the stipulations contained all of the available
information. Both parties agreed that they could not provide the
court with any additional evidence and that nothing would be
added by cross-examining the witnesses. The trial court stated that
much more could be brought out in a full trial and denied the
motion to compel the verdict.
	Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the charged offense
of murder based on double jeopardy. The State objected to this
motion, and the trial court denied the motion and a subsequent
motion to reconsider. The trial court thereafter allowed defendant
to withdraw his jury waiver and set the matter for a jury trial.
	Defendant brought an interlocutory appeal to the appellate
court. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f). The appellate court, with one
justice dissenting, held that jeopardy attached at the stipulated
bench trial and that double jeopardy barred a second prosecution.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's order, which had
denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charged offense based on
double jeopardy. 323 Ill. App. 3d at 275-77. The dissenting justice
opined that jeopardy had not attached at the stipulated bench trial
and, consequently, double jeopardy did not bar a second
prosecution. 323 Ill. App. 3d at 277 (Holdridge, J., dissenting).
The State appeals to this court.



DISCUSSION

	The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, provides that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV. The same protection is
afforded by the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10)
and by statute (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a) (West 1998)). The clause
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal or conviction, and it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342-43, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232, 241, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 1021
(1975), quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 665, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969). As the Court in
Wilson explained:
		"When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the
Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
make repeated attempts to convict him, 'thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.' " Wilson, 420 U.S.  at 343, 43 L. Ed. 2d  at 241, 95 S. Ct.  at 1022,
quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223 (1957).
To determine whether a retrial would violate a defendant's right
to be free from double jeopardy, the reviewing court must
determine: (1) whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy
during the first proceeding; and (2) if so, whether the defendant
can nevertheless be retried. People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill. 2d 527, 534-35 (1979). In this case, because this issue involves the
application of law to uncontested facts, our review of the decision
of the trial court is de novo. People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211,
230 (1995).
	The protections against double jeopardy are triggered only
after the accused has been subjected to the hazards of trial and
possible conviction. "In criminal proceedings-whether the trier of
fact is a jury or a judge-'courts have found it useful to define a
point *** at which the constitutional purposes and policies are
implicated by resort to the concept of "attachment of jeopardy." ' "
People v. Shields, 76 Ill. 2d 543, 546 (1979), quoting Serfass v.
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 43 L. Ed. 2d 265, 274, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1062 (1975). Indeed, the time when jeopardy attaches serves
as the lynchpin for all double jeopardy jurisprudence. Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38, 57 L. Ed. 2d 24, 33, 98 S. Ct. 2156, 2162
(1978). Thus, "[t]he starting point in any double jeopardy analysis,
of course, is determining whether or not jeopardy had attached."
Mosley, 74 Ill. 2d  at 534.
	In Illinois, jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is
empaneled and sworn. Shields, 76 Ill. 2d  at 546. In a bench trial,
jeopardy attaches " 'when the first witness is sworn and the court
begins to hear evidence.' " People v. Ortiz, 151 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10
(1992), quoting People v. Deems, 81 Ill. 2d 384, 389 (1980).
Finally, jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea when the guilty plea is
accepted by the trial court. People v. McCutcheon, 68 Ill. 2d 101,
106 (1977); see generally 5 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King,
Criminal Procedure §25.1(d), at 640-43 (2d ed. 1999).
	In the present case, the State argues that "a stipulated bench
trial is more similar to a guilty plea than to an actual bench trial."
Therefore, according to the State, jeopardy did not attach to
defendant's proceeding because the trial court ultimately rejected
the stipulations. In contrast, defendant argues that the proceeding
was a bench trial. Therefore, according to defendant, jeopardy
attached when the court received and considered the stipulated
evidence. This was the view taken by the appellate court. 323 Ill.
App. 3d at 276.
	The controlling principles are quite settled. A stipulated bench
trial is not tantamount to a guilty plea if the defendant presented
and preserved a defense. People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 20, 22
(1991); accord 2 R. Ruebner, Illinois Criminal Procedure §5.46,
at 170 (3d ed. 1999). However, when a defendant in a stipulated
bench trial stipulates not only to the evidence, but also to the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict, the proceeding is
tantamount to a guilty plea. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d  at 22.
	When a defendant raises an insanity defense, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the
charged offense. The defendant then carries the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is not guilty by
reason of insanity. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e) (West 1998); accord 2 R.
Ruebner, Illinois Criminal Procedure §5.29, at 105-06 (3d ed.
1999); 6 L. Pieczynski, Illinois Practice §24.14, at 127 (1989).
"When the defense can successfully show that the accused was
insane at the time of the offense, the accused is relieved of any
criminal responsibility even though the defense admits that the
accused is the offending actor." 2 R. Ruebner, Illinois Criminal
Procedure §5.29, at 100 (3d ed. 1999).
	The record reveals that this was the understanding at
defendant's stipulated bench trial. The State sought a finding of
guilty or guilty but mentally ill; defendant sought a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court understood its role:
			"So what is the issue the Court has to decide here?
*** [T]he defendant's *** state of mind on January 24 of
1999, which is the date that the defendant killed his
father, is at issue, and what the State and what the defense
are requesting this Court to do is decide defendant's
mental state *** based on the stipulations and the closing
arguments."
In this case, defendant obviously presented a defense, i.e., insanity.
It is true, as the appellate court dissent observed, that defendant
stipulated to the sufficiency of the evidence of the charged offense.
323 Ill. App. 3d at 277 (Holdridge, J., dissenting). Further,
defendant stipulated to the evidence pertaining to the issue of
sanity. However, the parties expressly and repeatedly stated that
they were not stipulating to the sufficiency of the evidence on the
issue of insanity. Rather, defendant sought a finding from the trial
court of not guilty by reason of insanity. When the trial court is
called upon to perform its function of determining guilt or
innocence, no guilty plea is involved. People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill.
App. 3d 533, 536 (1979).
	Defendant's stipulated bench trial was a bench trial as
opposed to a guilty plea. We agree with the appellate court that
jeopardy attached at defendant's stipulated bench trial.
	The appellate court posited that a judge in a bench trial must
make a decision. In this case, since no additional evidence was
available, the appellate court concluded that the trial court should
have rendered a decision. The appellate court further held that the
trial court's failure to do so cannot negate the attachment of
jeopardy. The appellate court assumed that original jeopardy
terminated and that double jeopardy would bar a second
prosecution. 323 Ill. App. 3d at 276-77.
	Under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that
the trial court should have rendered a judgment. Defendant and the
State did not present conflicting stipulations. On the issue of
sanity, both experts agreed that defendant was insane at the time
of the shooting. The parties agreed that cross-examination of the
experts and other witnesses would not have adduced any
additional evidence. Indeed, they agreed that they could not
produce any additional evidence. Consequently, nothing would be
gained from compelling the live testimony of the witnesses.
	Pursuant to our supervisory authority, we remand the cause to
the trial court with directions that the court decide the issue of
defendant's sanity on the record before it. See McDunn v.
Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288, 300-02 (1993).
	Our disposition of this case is not precluded by double
jeopardy. Since defendant's original jeopardy has never
terminated, he cannot be subject to double jeopardy. See
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325, 82 L. Ed. 2d 242,
251, 104 S. Ct. 3081, 3086 (1984) (recognizing that the protection
of the double jeopardy clause by its terms applies only if there has
been some event which terminates the original jeopardy); cf. Wade
v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 93 L. Ed. 974, 69 S. Ct. 834 (1949).
	Due to our disposition of this cause, we need not address the
State's alternative contention. See, e.g., People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 327 (1990).



CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed; the order of the circuit court of Rock Island County,
which denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charged offense
of murder, is affirmed; and the cause is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court order affirmed;
cause remanded.