Title: Burleson v. State

State: georgia

Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court

Document:

259 Ga. 498 (1989) 384 S.E.2d 659 BURLESON v. THE STATE. 46790. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided October 25, 1989. Don E. Snow, for appellant. W. Fletcher Sams, District Attorney, J. David Fowler, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. HUNT, Justice. The trial court ordered a mistrial when one of the jurors stated, during deliberations, she was conscientiously opposed to participating in any verdict. Before retrial, the defendant filed his plea of former jeopardy, which the trial court denied. He appeals. OCGA § 16-1-18 (a) (2). Accord U. S. Const., 5A; 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (89 SC 2056, 23 LE2d 707) (1969). In the midst of the jury's deliberations in Clyde Alvin Burleson's murder trial, the foreperson reported to the court: "We have one juror that is not willing to place any kind of vote on any of the verdicts that you have mentioned to us." In response, the trial court, without addressing the particular juror individually, charged the jury as to its oath and obligation to reach a verdict pursuant to what is generally referred to as the Allen charge; he then excused the jury for lunch. Following the lunch recess the jury deliberated for another hour. At that time the court was informed that no change was evident in the recalcitrant juror's attitude. She was then identified by the court and, in the presence of the parties and the other jurors, said: *499 The trial court then held the juror in contempt for violation of her oath as a juror, dismissed her, and was about to resume the trial with the remaining eleven jurors[1] when defense counsel interjected "Your Honor, I haven't agreed to that at this point." The resolution of this case depends upon whether, in declaring a mistrial, the trial court abused its discretion to the extent that a retrial would amount to double jeopardy. Stated another way, was there a manifest necessity for declaring the mistrial?[3] In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (98 SC 824, 54 LE2d 717) (1978), the United States Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of manifest necessity: Id. at pp. 505-509. This case is of the latter sort. No prosecutorial misconduct is involved. Compare Cobb v. State, 246 Ga. 619, 620 (272 SE2d 296) (1980); Chatham v. State, 247 Ga. 95, 96 (274 SE2d 473) (1981). It is apparent from the exchange between court and counsel and from the hearing on the plea in bar that the defendant was afforded an opportunity to object and to suggest alternatives to the mistrial. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487 (91 SC 547, 27 LE2d 543) (1971). Refusal to give the Allen charge was no abuse of discretion as that charge had already been given.[4] The record does not reveal an agreement by the defendant to proceed with eleven jurors, but it is obvious that some off-the-record consideration was given this alternative to a mistrial. It is likewise obvious that the trial court labored under the impression that the defendant had in fact so agreed. Burleson's equivocation, when confronted by the court as to this alternative, left the court no choice. Manifest necessity then existed for *501 a mistrial. The defendant's subsequent protestations did not alter this.[5] With respect to whether the rejection of alternatives amounts to abuse of discretion, it was stated in the case of Cherry v. Director, State Bd. of Corrections, 635 F2d 414, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1981): The declaration of mistrial, under these circumstances, will not bar a retrial. The trial court properly denied the plea of former jeopardy. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., not participating. [1] This procedure could only be followed, of course, upon the express agreement of the defendant. See Copeland v. State, 241 Ga. 370, 371 (245 SE2d 642) (1978). [2] It seems to us the better practice would be to handle this out of the presence of the other jurors. [3] In United States v. Perez, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 579 (79 SC 676, 696, 3 LE 684) (1824), Justice Story explained: [T]he law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. [Emphasis supplied.] [4] We previously mentioned that the trial court, preceding the lunch break, had charged the jury on its sworn duty to reach a verdict. Since the identified juror was unwilling, not unable, to reach a verdict the Allen charge, if not inapplicable to the circumstances, would have been of little or no effect. [5] We ascribe to Burleson's counsel no improper motive or conduct. We recognize the extent of the problem confronting counsel under these circumstances. It is, to be sure, a difficult choice.