Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Ass'n of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Wyoming Ass'n of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan1990 WY 110798 P.2d 826Case Number: 90-28Decided: 10/09/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. 
THE WYOMING ASSOCIATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS AND LAND SURVEYORS, A WYOMING 
CORPORATION; THE WYOMING CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, A 
WYOMING ASSOCIATION; THE WYOMING HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION, A WYOMING CORPORATION; 
THE WYOMING HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, A WYOMING CORPORATION; THE WYOMING MEDICAL 
SOCIETY, A WYOMING CORPORATION; JOHN D. BAILEY, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY; AND THE 
WYOMING SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, A WYOMING 
CORPORATION,

 PETITIONERS,

v.

MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, 
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 RESPONDENT.

 

Richard Rideout 
of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
petitioners.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
respondent.

George Santini 
of Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Michael Bruce Rosenthal of Hathaway, 
Speight, Kunz, Trautwein & Barrett, and Robert W. Tiedeken of Wolf & 
Tiedeken, Cheyenne, for amicus curiae Wyoming Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Petitioners seek 
the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent Michael J. Sullivan, 
Governor of the State of Wyoming, to appoint a director to execute and implement 
the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act. Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-2-1801 to -1812 
(1977).

[¶2]      We hold that the 
Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is unconstitutional and deny Petitioners' 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

[¶3]      Petitioners 
present the following dispositive issues in a memorandum in support of their 
petition:

     I. Whether the 
Petitioners have standing to seek issuance of a Writ of Mandamus from this Court 
to compel the Respondent to execute and implement the Wyoming Professional 
Review Panel Act?

     II. Whether the 
Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is a violation of either the Constitution 
of the United States or of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming?

[¶4]      In 1988, this 
Court declared that the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-2-1501 
to -1511 (1977), was unconstitutional, because it violated equal protection 
rights guaranteed by the Wyoming Constitution. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 
1988). We employed the equal protection analysis utilized in Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351 (Wyo. 1978), where this Court 
stated:

"[T]here must be some 
difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation as to 
different classes, and the differences must not be arbitrary and without just 
relation to the subject of the legislation."

Hoem, 756 P.2d  
at 782 (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 578 P.2d at 1354). We first 
examined the state interest intended to be furthered by the Wyoming Medical 
Review Panel Act and declared:

[T]he legislature has a 
legitimate interest in protecting the health of the citizens of Wyoming as well 
as the economic and social stability of the state.

Hoem, 756 P.2d  
at 783. Second, we examined the issue of whether the legislation was a 
"reasonable and effective means" of effectuating the legitimate state interest. 
Id. We emphasized the principle that "`[t]he continued availability and vitality 
of * * * causes of action [against health care providers] serve an important 
public policy - the preservation of quality health care for the citizens of this 
state,'" id. (quoting Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1088 (Wyo. 1987)), 
and held that the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act was not rationally related to 
the state's interest in protecting public health or economic and social 
stability.

[¶5]      The Wyoming 
Legislature subsequently enacted legislation which was designed to establish a 
pretrial screening procedure for a broader scope of malpractice claims. 1989 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 262. Section 1 of that chapter provided for a screening 
procedure which could be established by the Wyoming Supreme Court. Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-124 (1977). Section 5(b) of that chapter stated that the Wyoming 
Professional Review Panel Act would be effective on January 1, 1990, if the 
Supreme Court did not previously promulgate rules for a screening procedure for 
malpractice claims. We declined to establish such a screening 
procedure.

[¶6]      The Wyoming 
Professional Review Panel Act mandates that the "panel shall have a director who 
shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the governor." Section 
9-2-1805(b). Because Governor Sullivan has failed to activate the provisions of 
the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act by appointing a director of the panel, 
Petitioners petitioned this Court for issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring 
Governor Sullivan to execute and implement the Wyoming Professional Review Panel 
Act or, in the alternative, to show cause why the Wyoming Professional Review 
Panel Act has not been effectuated.1

[¶7]      We must begin by 
addressing Governor Sullivan's contention that Petitioners lack standing to seek 
the issuance of a writ of mandamus. In Washakie County School District Number 
One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317 (Wyo.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), we stated:

     Standing is a concept 
used to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a 
justiciable controversy is presented to the court. It is a necessary and useful 
tool to be used by courts in ferreting out those cases which ask the courts to 
render advisory opinions or decide an artificial or academic controversy without 
there being a palpable injury to be remedied. However, it is not a rigid or 
dogmatic rule but one that must be applied with some view to realities as well 
as practicalities. Standing should not be construed narrowly or 
restrictively.

(Citation 
omitted.) We have also recognized an exception to the standing requirement when 
we are faced with a matter of great public interest or importance. Brimmer v. 
Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1974).2 Without deciding whether 
Petitioners have standing to seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus which 
requires Governor Sullivan to implement the Wyoming Professional Review Panel 
Act, we hold that the issue of whether the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act 
is constitutional is of great public importance and, therefore, merits a 
decision from this Court.3

[¶8]      The review panel 
created by the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is almost identical to the 
review panel created in the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act. The most 
significant differences are: (1) The Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act 
provides for a director appointed by the governor while the director of the 
medical review panel was the attorney general or his designee; and (2) the 
Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act applies to "professionals" and not to just 
health care providers as provided by the Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act. The 
term "professional" is defined as "a person licensed under W.S. 33-1-101 through 
33-38-110 for whom the normal qualifications for licensure include at least a 
year of specialized post secondary education, or a hospital or nursing care 
facility." Section 9-2-1803(a)(iii). The purpose of the Wyoming Professional 
Review Panel Act is to:

     (i) Reduce the costs 
of professional malpractice claims to both plaintiffs and defendants by a less 
formal professional review of claims before litigation is pursued in the courts; 
and

     (ii) Improve the ability of the 
state to regulate professions and ensure professional competence.

Section 
9-2-1802(a).

[¶9]      Similar to the 
Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act, the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act 
provides that "[n]o complaint alleging malpractice shall be filed in any court 
against a professional before a claim is made to the panel and its decision is 
rendered." Section 9-2-1806(a). Once the director receives a claim, a hearing 
must be held within 120 days unless the panel finds good cause to delay the 
hearing. Section 9-2-1809(a). The Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act states 
that the hearing shall be informal and that the Wyoming Rules of Evidence do not 
apply. Section 9-2-1809(b). The panel must determine the existence 
of:

     (i) Substantial 
evidence that the acts complained of occurred and that they constitute 
malpractice; and

     (ii) A reasonable 
probability that the claimant was injured as a result of the acts complained 
of.

Section 
9-2-1810(a). No decision by the director or the panel is subject to review by a 
court. Section 9-2-1809(b). The panel's decision "is not binding upon any 
party," § 9-2-1810(d), and the decision "is not admissible as evidence in any 
action." Section 9-2-1811(c).

[¶10]   The Wyoming Professional Review 
Panel Act violates the equal protection guarantees of the Wyoming Constitution 
in the same manner as the previously enacted Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act. 
Hoem, 756 P.2d 780. The legislature's expansion of the class of professionals to 
which the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act applies does not cure the 
constitutional defect explained in Hoem. We decline to reverse Hoem. We hold 
that the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is unconstitutional and deny 
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

THOMAS, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion, in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joined.

GOLDEN, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

CARDINE, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
concurring generally and with special concurrence.

[¶11]   I concur with the majority and join 
in the special concurrence of Justice Thomas. I write further to reflect that in 
spotlighted certainty for this bicentennial year, due process and equal 
protection, especially under the Wyoming Constitution, should not be unattained 
and the ephemeral rights not ever to be available to the average citizen. When 
faced with the inquiry "why not justice?", I become dissatisfied by assumption 
that the legislature can amend those rights out of the Constitution for this or 
another special interest proposition.

[¶12]   Current history clearly reveals 
that reduction of rights available to the injured involves losses monumentally 
higher than benefits to the wrongdoer in reduced insurance premiums. Justice may 
be priced, but surely not in constitutional terms of loss of due process and 
equal protection.

[¶13]   I would even be more incensed by 
application of the principal of insulation from responsibility for fault-caused 
injury to be provided by the newest enactment, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 262 (1989), 
W.S. 9-2-1801 through 9-2-1812, when extended from the health care practitioners 
to some or all of the practitioners of abstracting, accountancy, architecture, 
attorneys-at-law, pawnbrokers, barbers, boxing exhibitors, podiatrists, 
chiropractors, collection agencies, cosmetologists, dance hall operators, debt 
adjusters, dentists, embalmers, hotel keepers, junk dealers, 
merchants-itinerants or temporary, nursing home administrators, optometrists, 
pharmacists, physicians, psychologists, real estate brokers, surveyors and 
engineers, veterinarians, warehousemen and professional counsellors, and most 
recently augmented to include real estate appraisers. W.S. 33-1-101 through 
33-39-130, "Professions and Occupations."1

[¶14]   Strangely we omit educators, 
ministers, insurance agents and librarians by the accident of placement within 
the Wyoming statutes. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 262 (1989) is immeasurably worse than 
its predecessor, W.S. 9-2-1501 through 9-2-1511, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 92 (1986), 
which we declared unconstitutional in Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶15]   A justice system with the 
availability of effective jury inquiry is incomprehensibly preferable to 
idiomatic obstructions denying expeditious determination of fault and 
responsibility. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 33, 34, 36 and art. 10, § 
4.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially, with whom URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.

[¶16]   I concur in the disposition of this 
case according to the majority opinion. I am troubled that the Legislature of 
the State of Wyoming apparently read the opinion of the court in Hoem v. State, 
756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988), as addressing the narrowness of the class of 
defendants in the context of equal protection of the law. Read carefully, I am 
satisfied that, in the Hoem case, this court made it clear that the equal 
protection violation was found in the disparity in treatment of injured persons, 
some of whom were required to submit their cases to the medical review panel 
while others did not encounter that impediment to pursuing their claims. 
Obviously, this new legislation does not even address that same 
deficiency.

[¶17]   I also adhere to the additional 
rationale to support a conclusion of unconstitutionality set forth in the 
concurring opinion in Hoem that I authored and in which Justice Urbigkit 
joined.

GOLDEN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶18]   I concur since Hoem appears 
controlling. Were that not so, I would prefer a more searching and rigorous 
examination of the equal protection issue, as well as the other constitutional 
issues raised. In the context of constitutional analysis, I find it difficult to 
argue with some of the principles set out by the Hoem dissenters. 

[¶19]   Aside from the constitutional 
issues, I would also prefer that this court identify, explore, and try to 
resolve certain concerns about "affected party" principles and standing doctrine 
in Wyoming jurisprudence. See Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional 
Interpretation, 21 Land & Water L.Rev. 527, 538-41 (1986). This appeal 
presents a unique opportunity for such an analysis, but we do not seize 
it.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶20]   I fail to see how the Wyoming 
Professional Review Panel Act (PRPA) is constitutionally defective "in the same 
manner as the previously enacted Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act." Majority 
opin. at 4. The majority's summary dismissal of this issue does not explain that 
statement. I found no problem with the constitutionality of the Medical Review 
Panel Act and would have upheld it against the challenge. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 787-94 (Wyo. 1988) (Cardine, J., dissenting, with whom Brown, C.J., 
joined). I advocate reversing Hoem for the reasons explained in my dissent in 
that case. Yet even if this court allows Hoem to remain good law, Hoem should 
not control the outcome of this action. I dissent.

[¶21]   The majority takes the approach 
that this case is Hoem revisited.1 In doing this, it ignores the 
proper posture in which this court must review the legislation in question in 
this case. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is on the 
attacker of the statute to demonstrate its unconstitutionality beyond a 
reasonable doubt. O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶22]   Hoem held that the Medical Review 
Panel Act was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The Act's 
stated purpose was:

"to prevent where 
possible the filing in court of actions against health care providers and their 
employees for professional liability in situations where the facts do not permit 
at least a reasonable inference of malpractice and to make possible the fair and 
equitable disposition of such claims against health care providers as are, or 
reasonably may be, well founded." W.S. 9-2-1502 (Cum.Supp. 1986) (declared 
unconstitutional in Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988)).

[¶23]   The Medical Review Panel Act's 
purpose contrasts sharply with the stated purpose of the PRPA. W.S. 9-2-1802 
states:

"(a) The purpose of this 
act is to:

"(i) Reduce the costs of 
professional malpractice claims to both plaintiffs and defendants by a less 
formal professional review of claims before litigation is pursued in the courts; 
and

"(ii) Improve the ability 
of the state to regulate professions and ensure professional 
competence."

The Professional 
Review Panel Act's first purpose is to reduce the cost involved in resolving 
professional malpractice claims regardless of merit of the claim. The 
Professional Review Panel Act has a second purpose: to improve the ability of 
the State to regulate professions and ensure professional competence. W.S. 
9-2-1802(a)(ii). This latter purpose embraces a compelling state interest. 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1975).

[¶24]   The majority, through its reliance 
on Hoem, implicitly applies the rational basis test to deny the 
constitutionality of the Professional Review Panel Act. It apparently finds no 
fundamental interest involved in the PRPA. Although a short delay in access to 
the courts is involved in the act, access is not denied. The fact that under 
Wyoming Constitution Art. I, § 8 the courts are required to be open and to 
afford justice for injury does not prevent setting standards for causes of 
action or placing limitations upon them if done in the interest of justice. 
Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Wyo. 1982). Since a legitimate state 
objective surely includes a compelling state interest, as is involved here, the 
Act is constitutional if it bears a rational relationship to the objective. 
Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div., 722 P.2d 151 (Wyo. 1986). Such a 
relationship exists between the Act and its purposes. Moreover, the party 
challenging the statute has the burden to show otherwise. Id. at 155. The burden 
was not carried in this case by the challenging party.

[¶25]   In his specially concurring opinion 
in Hoem, Justice Thomas advocated the adoption of a "heightened scrutiny" test 
requiring "the statutory classification to substantially further a legitimate 
legislative purpose." 756 P.2d  at 785 (Thomas, Justice, concurring, with whom 
Urbigkit, Justice, joined). Justice Thomas found this test applicable to the 
Medical Review Panel Act because it did "not involve any political question of 
importance to the state but essentially touch[ed] upon private interests." Id. 
This Act does not contain the same infirmity but presents a compelling state 
interest. Additionally, the majority has not embraced the heightened scrutiny 
test. Justice Thomas' special concurrence also concluded that the class of 
claimants was too small - the result being unconstitutional special legislation. 
Id. at 786. That claimed infirmity likewise does not exist in the PRPA, for the 
legislature, by expanding that act to include essentially all professionals, 
also expanded by great numbers the class of claimants affected.

[¶26]   I expressed concern in my Hoem 
dissent that the Medical Review Panel Act was declared unconstitutional because 
the majority of the court simply did not like the statute. 756 P.2d  at 790. I 
question again whether the same motive prompted the majority to 
unconstitutionality in this case. We should not concern ourselves with the 
wisdom of enacting this statute, only its constitutionality. 756 P.2d  at 791; 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2780, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983). With the holding in Hoem and its unjustified 
application to the PRPA, I fear the constitutionality of any legislation 
allowing for administrative pre-hearing processing of all professional liability 
claims is presently an impossibility. Absent reversing Hoem or sustaining the 
constitutionality of this Act, this type of legislation will never satisfy this 
court as constitutional. Thus, a constitutional amendment is now required for 
the legislature to even attempt to deal with this perceived problem. If this 
court had reviewed this Act under the standards we had adopted, such a drastic 
measure would be unnecessary.

FOOTNOTES

1 This Court has original 
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus pursuant to article 5, section 3 of the 
Wyoming Constitution. See generally Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-30-101 to -118 (1977) and 
Rule 3, Rules of the Supreme Court of Wyoming.

2 We acknowledge that the 
public interest or importance exception was applied in an action brought 
pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Brimmer, 521 P.2d 574. We 
fail to perceive any reason why we should not apply that exception in this case. 
See generally Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXI 
Land & Water L.Rev. 527 (1986).

3 Both 
Petitioners and Governor Sullivan agree that this Court should not issue a writ 
of mandamus if we determine that the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is 
unconstitutional. That concurrence follows the principle that the issuance of a 
writ of mandamus is appropriate "to command the performance of a ministerial 
duty which is plainly defined and required by law." Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 324 (Wyo. 1979).

FOOTNOTES for J. Urbigkit 
Concurrence

1 The demarcation for 
access to reduced justice delineated by W.S. 9-2-1803(a)(iii) of wrongdoers who 
had one year post secondary education does not add amelioration for my concern 
for applied due process or equal protection.

 

FOOTNOTES for J. Cardine 
Dissent

1 Respondent's counsel 
provided the court at oral argument with a series of puns based on Hoem's 
pronunciation as a homonym of "home." I resist the temptation to continue the 
puns. If such occurs, it is unintentional.