Title: People v. Wall

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 11/13/17 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S044693 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
RANDALL CLARK WALL, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR133745 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Defendant Randall Clark Wall pleaded guilty to the first degree murders of 
Katherine and John Oren.  (Pen. Code, § 187; all undesignated statutory references 
are to this code.)  Wall also pleaded guilty to four special circumstances:  that he 
committed multiple murders, and that the murders were committed while lying in 
wait, in the commission of a robbery, and in the commission of a first degree 
burglary.  (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (a)(15), (a)(17)(A), (a)(17)(G).)  In addition, he 
pleaded guilty to robbery (§§ 211; 212.5, subd. (a)), conspiracy to commit robbery 
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), burglary (§§ 459, 460), and conspiracy to commit burglary 
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).  A jury found true dangerous and deadly weapon allegations 
with respect to the robbery, burglary, and one of the murders.  (§ 12022, 
subd. (b).)  At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  This appeal 
is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the 
judgment. 
 
2 
 
I. FACTS 
A. 
Evidence of Guilt 
 
Wall was tried jointly with his codefendant John Richard Rosenquist before 
dual juries.  Before the guilt phase began, Wall pleaded guilty to first degree 
murder, burglary, robbery, and conspiracy to commit burglary and robbery, but 
denied use of a dangerous and deadly weapon.  The prosecution presented the 
following evidence during the guilt phase of Wall and Rosenquist’s joint trial.  
The defense did not present guilt phase evidence.  
1. 
Wall meets the Orens 
Wall met Katherine Oren, John Oren, and the Orens’ great-grandson J.D. in 
1990.  Wall was introduced to the family through the Orens’ granddaughter 
Tammy, whom he had met that spring.  After staying at Wall’s parents’ home, 
Tammy and Wall spent at least two weeks in a tent in the Orens’ backyard in San 
Diego.  During this time, Wall and Katherine argued frequently, and according to 
Tammy, Katherine accused Wall of stealing from her.  Tammy described the 
situation as “a bad mixture,” and Katherine eventually insisted that Wall and 
Tammy leave the Orens’ property and had John drop them off at a nearby freeway 
entrance. 
2. 
J.D. is sexually assaulted and the Orens are murdered 
On the night of March 1, 1992, Wall and Rosenquist entered the Oren 
residence.  Ten-year-old J.D. heard noises coming from John’s bedroom after he 
had gone to bed.  The parties stipulated that Rosenquist later entered J.D.’s room.  
Rosenquist took off his clothes, forcibly removed J.D.’s clothes, and covered 
J.D.’s face with a pillow.  According to the stipulation, Rosenquist then inserted 
his finger into J.D.’s anus, used his own hands and J.D.’s legs to masturbate, and 
 
3 
 
ejaculated on J.D.  Some time thereafter, Rosenquist and Wall left the house and 
J.D. went back to sleep.   
 
The following morning, J.D. found John lying motionless on the floor and 
was unable to open the door to Katherine’s room.  J.D. ran across the street to ask 
his neighbors for help.  The neighbors called the police, and an officer, Troy 
Owens, arrived at the Orens’ house.  He found John lying on the floor and 
determined that he had no vital signs.  With the help of two firefighters, Owens 
pushed Katherine’s door open and found her body.  
 
The detective investigating the crime scene found several metal bars, 
including one near John’s body.  There were blood stains splattered on the walls, 
headboard, and ceiling of John’s bedroom, as well as bloody footprints throughout 
the house.  The district attorney presented evidence at trial that the footprints 
matched the types of shoes worn by Rosenquist and Wall.  John’s room appeared 
to have been ransacked:  his dresser drawers had been emptied and stacked on his 
bed, and a can in which he kept change was found emptied in the hallway. An 
autopsy revealed seven serious blows to John’s head, stab wounds on his neck, rib 
fractures, and lacerations on his liver and one of his kidneys.  At trial, forensic 
pathologist Dr. Christopher Swalwell testified that blunt force trauma to John’s 
head, with the contributing cut and stab wounds, caused his death.  Katherine’s 
autopsy revealed stab wounds on her neck and lower arm, bruising on her arms, 
face, and back, and several rib fractures.  Swalwell testified that Katherine’s death 
was caused by a “large cut wound of the neck.”   
3. 
Wall and codefendant Rosenquist travel to San Francisco 
 
Early on the morning of March 2, 1992, a witness saw a car that looked like 
the Orens’ yellow and green Mercury traveling quickly on the highway in San 
Diego.  A few hours later, John’s credit card was used at a gas station north of Los 
 
4 
 
Angeles.  The district attorney presented evidence that the signature on the credit 
card receipt matched Wall’s handwriting. 
 
An employee with the federal Bureau of Land Management, David Kessler, 
found Wall and Rosenquist in a remote part of San Luis Obispo County later that 
day.  When asked, Wall and Rosenquist gave fake names and said their car had 
broken down and had been towed, but that they decided not to ride along with the 
tow truck.  Kessler gave them a ride to a motel, where the owners gave Wall and 
Rosenquist dinner and a room.  Kessler then reported this encounter to the San 
Luis Obispo Sheriff’s Office because “it just didn’t feel right.”  
 
Wall and Rosenquist left the motel the next morning and walked in the 
direction of San Luis Obispo.  They were stopped by a San Luis Obispo County 
deputy sheriff who asked them for identification, patted them down for weapons 
and found that they each were carrying pocket knives, searched their duffel bag 
and found a lot of change, and then let them go.  On March 4, 1992, the Orens’ 
car, along with John’s wallet, was found burned in a ditch in the same remote area 
where Kessler had picked up Wall and Rosenquist. 
 
 
4. 
Wall is interviewed and arrested 
 
On March 17, 1992, San Francisco homicide detectives approached Wall as 
he exited a social services office in San Francisco.  They brought him to the San 
Francisco Hall of Justice, where he waited in an open interview room for about 
five hours for two San Diego police officers to interview him.  
 
During the guilt phase, the district attorney played a portion of this 
interview.  In the interview, Wall at first denied knowing Rosenquist and denied 
traveling to San Francisco from Mexico.  But after some back and forth with the 
detectives, Wall explained that he met Rosenquist in Salt Lake City and traveled 
with him to San Francisco, then Mexico, and back to San Francisco in the 
beginning of March.  Wall said they took a trolley from the Mexican border to San 
 
5 
 
Diego and walked along the freeway around March 1, 1992.  Several hours into 
the walk, according to Wall, Rosenquist left to find a car and returned with one, 
although Wall said he did not know where Rosenquist had acquired it.  From 
there, Wall said they stopped for gas off the highway once and then later, at 
Rosenquist’s request, drove off the main roads; eventually, the car got stuck on a 
side road.  He said that he and Rosenquist headed north toward San Francisco with 
help from the Bureau of Land Management employee and the motel owners in San 
Luis Obispo County, and that he had not seen Rosenquist in over a week. 
 
After the interview, a search warrant was executed for the apartment where 
Wall was staying on Third Street in San Francisco.  The officers found Rosenquist 
there, along with a knife, a black bag, and a signed written agreement between 
Rosenquist and Wall concerning a share of their “partnership” if “Wall has done 
what he is supposed to do.” 
 
 
5. 
Wall discusses the crime while detained 
 
The district attorney also introduced evidence from three jailhouse 
informants.  Raynard Davis testified he was housed in the San Francisco County 
jail on charges of selling crack cocaine.  While in custody, Davis overheard Wall 
say he was “fighting some murders” that included “chopping up peoples [sic].”  
According to Davis, Wall told him over chess that the district attorney “can’t 
prove shit” because Wall wore socks over his hands as he committed the offenses.  
Wall also told him he had “chopped” his victims with a “stick” or “metal pipe.” 
 
A second informant, John Fitzgerald, testified he saw Wall get into several 
confrontations while in jail in San Diego.  During one of them, Fitzgerald stated 
that Wall said “he had already killed a couple of the people, he didn’t mind killing 
him as well.”  Later, after Wall’s preliminary hearing, Fitzgerald testified that 
Wall told him that a witness in his case who had sold crack cocaine and was 
 
6 
 
housed in San Francisco County jail “was not going to last long anyway,” which 
Fitzgerald understood to mean that Wall “was going to have him taken care of.” 
 
The third informant, Shawn Taylor, was also in custody with Wall in San 
Diego.  He testified that he became friends with Wall and that Wall told him that 
“him [sic] and his partner, Rosenquist, killed an old couple and ransacked their 
house.”  Wall specified that Rosenquist had killed the man and that Wall had 
beaten the man’s wife to death.  
B. 
Penalty Phase 
 
  Before the penalty phase, Rosenquist agreed to a sentence of life without 
parole and waived his right to appeal.  The district attorney proceeded to the 
penalty phase with Wall, and the following evidence was presented to Wall’s jury. 
 
 
1. 
Prosecution evidence 
 
 
 
a. 
Circumstances of the crime 
 
The prosecution presented testimony concerning a blood smear pattern in 
John’s bedroom from a San Diego detective who had investigated the Orens’ 
home after the murder, as well as a San Diego criminalist who had evaluated 
blood patterns in the home. 
 
 
 
b. 
Wall’s confession 
 
The district attorney played the entirety of the tape of Wall’s interview in 
San Francisco.  About an hour into the tape, beginning at the portion not played 
during the guilt phase, the interviewing detectives questioned the truth of Wall’s 
story and asked him to “start out clean again.”  They asked if something had 
happened with Rosenquist, and Wall responded, “Yeah, he kind of pressured me 
into it . . . .”  One of the detectives encouraged Wall to provide more detail:  
“you’re at a crossroad in your life. . . .  If you go this way, tell us what happened 
. . . then you can go on with your life.  You can be with your wife and your child 
 
7 
 
and start fresh.”  Shortly thereafter, Wall said, “I didn’t want to do it, but him [sic] 
and I both killed the grandma and grandpa of that household.”  
 
Wall explained he had met Tammy several years earlier and had stayed in 
the Orens’ backyard for a few months.  He said he had told Rosenquist that he had 
spent some time in San Diego on their way down to Mexico, and when they came 
back to San Diego, Rosenquist planned to break into the Orens’ home and steal 
their money and car.  When Wall told Rosenquist he did not want to, Rosenquist 
threatened to kill him.  
 
Rosenquist and Wall walked to the Orens’ house the night of March 1, 
1992 and waited in the backyard until the Orens fell asleep.  Wall said he broke 
into the house through the back door, which was not locked but had a chain on it.  
At that point, Wall and Rosenquist both carried metal bars they found in the 
backyard; according to Wall, only Rosenquist had a knife. Wall said Rosenquist 
then beat John with the metal bar.  When Katherine awoke, Rosenquist also hit her 
with the metal bar.  When J.D. came out of his room crying, Wall said he took him 
back to his room and “kept him quiet.”  After a few minutes, Rosenquist came into 
J.D.’s room and said he wanted to have sex with the boy.  Wall thought that was 
“really sick,” but Rosenquist again threatened to kill him, so he left the room.  
 
Wall said that afterward Rosenquist handed him a set of car keys and told 
him to start the Orens’ car.  He said that at the time he did not know that 
Rosenquist had stolen John’s wallet or money or that Rosenquist had stabbed 
either of the Orens.  When Rosenquist got in the car, they drove away.  Wall 
described their trip north and then said he and Rosenquist were staying at the same 
apartment in San Francisco. 
 
The district attorney also played a tape from another interview of Wall, 
conducted in San Francisco by the same detectives the next morning.  In this tape, 
Wall made statements that contradicted ones he made the night before.  Wall said 
 
8 
 
he, not Rosenquist, had “clobbered the old lady” with a metal bar.  He also said 
that Rosenquist gave Wall his knife back before they left the house and that Wall 
used it to cut the cord to the house’s telephone.  
 
 
c. 
Victim impact evidence 
 
J.D. testified that he heard Wall laughing in the hallway when Rosenquist 
was assaulting him.  He testified that his great-grandmother Katherine had a vision 
impairment.  He also said he was hospitalized for about a month after the assault; 
he received psychiatric care and continued to receive therapy after leaving the 
hospital. 
 
 
d. 
Prior conviction and unadjudicated criminal acts 
 
The parties stipulated that Wall had been convicted of felony possession of 
a “very, very small amount” of cocaine in 1991.  The district attorney introduced 
testimony from Dagmar Marie Donner, a former roommate of Wall’s.  Donner 
described a physical fight that took place between Wall and her husband after she 
told Wall to move out of the house. 
 
2. 
Defense evidence 
 
The defense called one witness, Terry Lange, who was one of the two San 
Diego detectives who had interviewed Wall, and later Rosenquist, in San 
Francisco.  According to Lange, Rosenquist said that after he had assaulted J.D., 
he covered up the victims’ bodies because he was sickened by the blood near 
them.   
 
The defense then read two stipulations.  The first concerned a statement by 
Rosenquist to a doctor in which he described the victims’ bodies:  “It was 
unbelievable.  I’ve never seen anything like that before.  He [John] was blowing 
bubbles.”  The parties also stipulated that the Orens’ neighbor found John’s body 
covered with a blanket the morning after the murder. 
 
9 
 
II. JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
A. 
Absence From Jury Selection Proceedings 
 
Due to injuries suffered in custody, Wall was absent from portions of jury 
selection, including the voir dire of six potential jurors, the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, and the swearing-in of the jury.  Wall contends that his absence 
violated his federal and state constitutional due process right to be personally 
present during the proceedings against him, as well as his statutory right to be 
present under sections 977 and 1043.  We conclude that Wall validly waived his 
constitutional right to be present at the relevant proceedings and that although the 
proceedings violated his statutory right to be present, the error was harmless. 
1. 
Background 
 
On August 5, 1994, in the midst of jury selection, Wall was attacked and 
severely beaten by another inmate in a holding cell during the noon recess.  Wall 
was visibly injured and in need of immediate medical attention.  Wall’s attorney 
told the court that he was willing to waive Wall’s presence for voir dire that 
afternoon.  In the presence of the court, counsel asked Wall:  “Randy, do you 
agree to waive your presence for the balance of this afternoon’s proceedings, 
understanding that you have a right to be here to be an active participant?”  Wall 
replied, “Yes, I do, your Honor.  I’m sorry about this.”  After Wall left, the 
prospective jurors were brought in for individual voir dire.  The court did not 
remark on Wall’s absence in the presence of the prospective jurors.  Of the six 
jurors brought in that afternoon, one was excused for hardship, two were excused 
for medical concerns, and three were asked to return. 
 
The court reconvened on August 9, 1994, and confirmed that Wall 
“understood — understand at this time and understood Friday afternoon that you 
had an absolute right to be present, but because of the nature of your injuries, we 
 
10 
 
allowed you to withdraw and receive medical attention.”  Defense counsel said 
that although he was “concerned as to what kind of shape [Wall] was in,” he 
“believed [Wall] was able to make a knowing, intelligent waiver at the time” and 
that he had recommended that Wall do so.  Defense counsel went on to explain 
that Wall’s jaw had been severely broken, requiring surgery to install a metal 
plate, and that counsel was “concerned about [Wall’s] mental condition” as well 
and wanted further testing to determine whether Wall had suffered a concussion.  
Defense counsel also requested a postponement to give Wall time to recover out of 
concern that Wall’s visible injuries would be prejudicial if the jury saw him.  After 
considering the significance of Wall’s presence for the jury and the difficulty of 
reassembling the more than 60 prospective jurors at a later date, the court 
proposed waiving Wall’s presence, advising the jury of a medical emergency, and 
conducting the remainder of jury selection in his absence.  The court sought 
assurance that Wall was mentally capable of such a waiver, and then ordered 
postponement of opening arguments until August 24, 1994. 
 
When the court reconvened on August 11, 1994, defense counsel explained 
that although Wall was still “mildly disoriented” with “some dullness,” counsel 
had discussed the right to be present and the nature of the peremptory challenge 
proceedings with him on at least three occasions.  Counsel said Wall was willing 
to waive his personal presence and observe the exercise of peremptory challenges 
from the jury room via a live audio feed.  In the presence of the trial court, defense 
counsel asked Wall if he was “willing to waive [his] presence and sit in the jury 
room listening to proceedings in that fashion instead” and if he understood he had 
“a right to be here.”  Wall said yes.  The trial court then directly addressed Wall 
and asked, “Do you understand what I have just said, Mr. Wall?”  Wall responded, 
“Yeah.”  Wall was moved to the jury room during the exercise of peremptory 
challenges and remained there throughout.  Before the procedure began, the court 
 
11 
 
advised the jury as follows:  “As you might note, Mr. Wall is not here this 
morning.  There has been a medical emergency.  He wants to be here.  He has 
agreed that his lawyers may proceed selecting a jury without him.  It is not his 
fault that he is not here.  As I indicated, he wanted to be here, wishes to be here, 
under the circumstances, he is absent this morning.”   
 
After the jury and alternates had been selected, defense counsel again raised 
the issue of Wall’s presence before the court, suggesting they “take waiver of Mr. 
Wall’s presence” for the swearing-in of the jury the next day.  Defense counsel 
said he “explained to Mr. Wall in the last couple of moments that he, of course, 
has the right, as he has had, to be present tomorrow morning when the jury is 
sworn” and that he could waive this right and listen from the jury room as he had 
that day.  Addressing Wall directly, defense counsel asked, “Randy, have you 
understood everything that I have explained to you and are you willing to waive 
your presence so that we can proceed . . . ?”  Wall answered yes.  Wall was not in 
the courtroom when the jurors were sworn in the next day.   
2. 
Analysis 
 
Voir dire of prospective jurors is “a critical stage of the criminal 
proceeding, during which the defendant has a constitutional right to be present.”  
(Gomez v. United States (1989) 490 U.S. 858, 873.)  A capital defendant may 
validly waive this right to be present under federal and state constitutional law.  
(People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1210 (Jackson).)  The waiver must be 
made personally; it cannot be made through counsel.  (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 
484 U.S. 400, 418, fn. 24.)  
 
Wall contends that the record is insufficient to support the conclusion that 
the waivers on August 5 and 11 were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that 
the waivers were improperly administered by counsel rather than the court.  Wall 
argues that his medical condition undermined his ability to intelligently waive his 
 
12 
 
right to be present, as did the alleged absence of advisement as to the existence 
and importance of the right to be present. 
 
The record shows that Wall was advised once on August 5 and twice on 
August 11 of his right to be present at voir dire, during the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, and at the swearing-in of the jury.  Wall’s counsel also discussed at 
some length the pros and cons of waiver while Wall was present in court on 
August 9.  Although the August 5 and August 11 waivers were administered by 
defense counsel, counsel’s allocution was conducted under the supervision of the 
trial court, who observed Wall personally and expressly waive his right to be 
present.  It is true that on August 9 Wall’s attorney and the trial court expressed 
some concern as to his mental capacity following the attack.  In addition, on 
August 10, defense counsel presented the results of neurological testing on Wall to 
the court and thought Wall was “at least mildly disoriented” and “very slow on the 
uptake.”  But on August 11, though counsel noted that Wall remained “mildly 
disoriented” and was “moving very slowly,” counsel told the court that he had 
repeatedly discussed the right to be present and the significance of the waiver with 
Wall and that “Wall remains of the position that he is willing to waive his 
presence.”  Defense counsel and the court were well situated to determine whether 
Wall had the requisite capacity to waive his rights and understand the nature of the 
rights he was waiving.  We have not required any higher standard for a waiver 
under similar circumstances.  (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 966–
967 (Weaver).) 
 
Although Wall validly waived his constitutional right to be present, his 
absence during the selection and empaneling of the jury violated his statutory right 
to be present under sections 977 and 1043.  “[W]hen read together, sections 977 
and 1043 permit a capital defendant to be absent from the courtroom only on two 
occasions:  (1) when he has been removed by the court for disruptive behavior 
 
13 
 
under section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), and (2) when he voluntarily waives his 
rights pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1).”  (Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 1210.)  “ ‘Section 977 requires . . . that the defendant personally execute, in 
open court, a written waiver of the right to be present.’ ”  (People v. Romero 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 418.) 
 
The Attorney General concedes that “[b]ecause Wall did not personally 
execute a written waiver, his statutory right to be present . . . was violated” during 
“the questioning of six jurors on August 5th, the exercise of peremptory 
challenges on August 11th, and the swearing of the jury on August 12th.”  
Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues, Wall is “estopped” from arguing he is 
entitled to relief because he “orally waived his right to be present” and “his 
counsel acquiesced in that procedure.”  But we have not recognized such an 
exception to the statute’s requirement of a written waiver.  (§ 977, subd. (b)(2).)  
The Attorney General relies on People v. Howze (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1380, but 
the Court of Appeal there concluded that although the defendant’s refusal to leave 
his cell constituted a waiver of his constitutional right to be present at the start of 
trial, the failure to obtain a written waiver violated section 977.  (Howze, at 
pp. 1395–1396.)   
 
Although the trial court committed statutory error by failing to obtain a 
written waiver from Wall before allowing selection and empaneling of the jury to 
proceed in his absence, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 
Wall would have been reached in the absence of the error.  (People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; cf. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211 [applying 
Watson where defendant did not execute a written waiver of right to be present at 
taking of evidence during prosecution’s presentation of its case]; Weaver, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 968 [applying Watson where defendant did not execute a written 
waiver of right to be present at the taking of evidence during sanity phase].) 
 
14 
 
 
Wall argues that the “reshuffling” of prospective jurors between voir dire 
and the exercise of peremptory challenges “undermined whatever input appellant 
previously had contributed,” so Wall was unable to effectively contribute to his 
attorney’s exercise of peremptory challenges.  But Wall offers no specific 
argument as to why or how counsel might have exercised these challenges 
differently.  Further, Wall was able to hear the proceedings and could have 
interrupted to confer with his attorney, but he did not do so. 
Wall also argues that he was prejudiced by his absence during jury 
selection and the swearing-in of the jury because his presence “was essential . . . 
so that appellant, his counsel and the court could observe and take into account the 
demeanor of the prospective jurors, as they in turn observed appellant.”  Although 
a defendant’s presence may have a psychological impact on the jury at certain 
stages of trial, separate and apart from any assistance the defendant might offer his 
counsel (see, e.g., Larson v. Tansy (10th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 392, 395–396), we 
find no reasonable probability in this case that a different jury would have been 
chosen or that the jury chosen would have reached a different verdict had Wall 
been present during the selection and empaneling of the jury.  On August 11, 
before the exercise of peremptory challenges, the trial court advised the jurors that 
Wall wished to be present but was unable to due to a medical emergency.  We can 
reasonably conclude that the jurors attributed his absence from the short swearing-
in session the next day to the same medical emergency.  It is true that the court 
gave no similar advisement to the jury on the afternoon of August 5.  But absent 
specific allegations of prejudice — and Wall has stated none — any harm arising 
from the voir dire of six prospective jurors outside of Wall’s presence that 
afternoon is merely speculative.  Moreover, Wall had been present for most of voir 
dire and was present for the remainder of trial.  We hold that the trial court’s 
 
15 
 
failure to obtain a written waiver of Wall’s right to be present does not warrant 
reversal. 
B. 
Alleged Witt Error 
 
Wall contends that the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury 
under the federal and state Constitutions by erroneously excusing Prospective 
Juror E.J. for cause because of her views on the death penalty.  (See Wainwright v. 
Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  “A prospective juror may be challenged for cause 
based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views 
would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of the juror’s duties as 
defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.”  (People v. Cunningham 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, quoting Witt, at p. 424.)  “When the prospective 
juror’s answers on voir dire are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s findings 
as to the prospective juror’s state of mind are binding on appellate courts if 
supported by substantial evidence.”  (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 10.)   
1. 
Background 
 
On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror E.J. said she would not 
automatically vote against death “no matter what evidence might be presented or 
argument made.”  She indicated that persons convicted of “mass murder for 
political or financial gain” should automatically receive the death penalty.  E.J. 
said she “adhere[d] to Methodist teachings,” but when asked if she had any 
spiritual or religious beliefs that “pertain to the issue of the death penalty vs. life in 
prison without the possibility of parole,” or if her religious beliefs “would prevent 
[her] from passing judgment in a criminal matter,” she answered no.  When asked, 
“do you feel you are able and willing to colmpletely [sic] put aside any thought or 
concern relating to penalty issues while you deliberate guilt or innocence at the 
 
16 
 
guilt phase trial on these charges?” E.J. responded, “I can only say I hope so.  
After hearing evidence I am not sure how I will react.” 
 
During voir dire, in response to questions by defense counsel, E.J. 
reiterated that she would not automatically vote for life without parole.  However, 
she also expressed hesitation about her ability to impose a death verdict:  “I’m not 
sure about how I would feel having to make a determination about whether a man 
or woman receives the death penalty.”  In response to questions from the court 
concerning whether she could vote for the death penalty in the appropriate case, 
she said, “I feel that I’m not the one to make a judgment on something like that” 
and said she had “a problem with dealing with that particular part of being a 
juror.”  In response to repeated questions by the trial court and the prosecutor as to 
whether she had the ability to impose the death penalty, E.J. said she did not know 
if she did.   
 
The prosecutor challenged E.J. for cause, citing her uncertainty as to 
whether “she has the capacity to uphold the death penalty.”  The trial court took 
the challenge under submission, noting it was a “close question.”  Eight days later, 
after the close of voir dire, the trial court dismissed E.J. for cause, stating:  “And in 
going through these transcripts, I noticed a lot of people said statements like, I 
think that I can but I don’t, this that.  That, in and of itself, is not grounds for 
cause.  It is where somebody says, ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I can’t make a decision one 
way or the other,’ and . . . I think that [E.J.] is a cause challenge on the behalf of 
the People.” 
2. 
Analysis 
 
Wall argues that Prospective Juror E.J. is analogous to Prospective Juror 
C.O. in People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 328–330.  Both prospective 
jurors, Wall contends, were merely uncertain about what they would do in a 
particular case and maintained they would be able to keep an open mind until 
 
17 
 
confronted with all of the relevant evidence.  But E.J. repeatedly expressed 
uncertainty not as to her own views on the death penalty or the appropriateness of 
the death penalty in any particular case, but as to her ability to impose a death 
sentence.  C.O., by contrast, although expressing uncertainty as to whether she 
approved of the death penalty as a policy, was consistent in asserting “her ability 
to vote for a death penalty in a factually appropriate case.”  (Pearson, at p. 330.)  
As the trial court noted, E.J. said she did not know whether she had the ability to 
impose the death penalty.  E.J.’s answers provide substantial evidence that she 
“harbored very serious doubts concerning whether, if seated on a capital jury, she 
could ever personally vote to impose the death penalty.”  (People v. Jones (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 1, 43.)  We therefore decline to find constitutional error in the trial 
court’s decision to excuse juror E.J. for cause. 
III. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A. 
Admission of Allegedly Coerced Confession 
 
Wall argues that the trial court committed constitutional error in admitting 
into evidence during the penalty phase the tape-recording and transcript of Wall’s 
confession to San Diego police officers while in custody in San Francisco.  
According to Wall, the confession was obtained through psychological coercion 
and improper inducement as a result of the detectives’ exploitation of Wall’s 
“expressed fear of codefendant Rosenquist” and their promise that Wall could “be 
with [his] wife and [his] child and start fresh” if he told them “what happened.”  
Because the confession was the “centerpiece of the prosecution’s case for death,” 
Wall contends the jury likely would not have found the aggravating evidence 
substantial enough to warrant a death sentence if the confession had been 
excluded. 
 
18 
 
1.  
Background 
 
On March 17, 1992, San Francisco homicide detectives approached Wall in 
San Francisco.  He was transported to the San Francisco Hall of Justice, where he 
waited in an open interview room for about five hours until two San Diego police 
detectives, Carl Smith and Terry Lange, arrived.  During this time, Wall was told 
he was permitted to leave, and he used the restroom unescorted, attempted to make 
two phone calls, and was provided with food and drink by San Francisco officers.  
Upon arriving, the San Diego detectives told Wall he was not under arrest but 
suggested he may be a “witness” in a “fairly serious crime” and read Wall a 
Miranda warning.  The interview began at 10:00 p.m. and lasted for almost two 
hours. 
 
Wall initially said he came straight into San Francisco from Salt Lake City, 
but the detectives quickly informed him that they knew police had stopped him 
and Rosenquist near a car belonging to a murder victim from San Diego and that 
they were seeking information about where he and Rosenquist had obtained the 
car.  After being told to “start over,” Wall then said that he had met Rosenquist in 
Salt Lake City and that they had traveled together to San Francisco, then Mexico, 
and then to San Diego via trolley.  In San Diego, Rosenquist said he would “get 
some transportation or whatever and some money,” at which point he left Wall on 
the Interstate 5 freeway and came back with a car and a black bag of change.  The 
detectives asked a series of detailed follow-up questions, primarily about Wall’s 
statement that Rosenquist had made a separate trip to obtain a car and about the 
two men’s journey back up to San Francisco.  In his responses, Wall said he was 
divorced and had a three-year-old daughter, he last saw his ex-wife about a month 
earlier, and he came to California in the hope of getting a good job so he could 
“send back for” his ex-wife, whom he hoped to remarry. 
 
19 
 
 
After almost an hour of questioning, the detectives returned to Wall’s initial 
statement about coming straight from Salt Lake City and asked why Wall “started 
to lay out a bullshit story about Salt Lake.”  Wall said he was “scared” and did not 
“want any problems . . . [and] would like to get back to Salt Lake and take care of 
my wife and kid.”  Detective Smith responded that he and Detective Lange “get 
this feeling that you’re really not telling us the whole truth,” that “[i]f you don’t 
tell everything that happened or everything you know, then what you’ve told us 
really isn’t real significant.”  The detectives suggested Wall may have been faced 
with a situation that got out of control.  The following colloquy then occurred: 
“Wall:  Yeah, he kind of pressured me into it and . . . 
“Detective:  Why don’t you tell me about the part . . .  
“Wall:  Ah . . .  
“Detective:  Tell me about what you left out, okay?  I know it’s tough 
‘cause I can see that it’s really bothering you a lot.  But why don’t you just tell me 
how it happened, what happened, and, and let’s get this, let’s put this behind us 
okay?  Because we know what happened.  We wouldn’t, we didn’t, just didn’t 
pick your name out of a hat, you know what I’m saying? . . . We’re here for a 
reason Randy.  And, and that’s what we want you to tell us.  Because you’re at a 
crossroad in your life and you’ve got two directions to go; you could go this way 
or you could go this way.  And if you go this way, you’re gonna stay stuck all your 
life.  If you go this way, tell us what happened, let’s get it out in the open, let’s put 
it behind you, then you can go on with your life.  You can be with your wife and 
your child and start fresh.  And that’s what we want to do is let’s start fresh, okay? 
“Wall:  Okay.  Can you promise me one thing? 
“Detective:  What’s that? 
 
20 
 
“Wall:  He’s told me that, ah, something like this might happen and I’d get 
pressured into it, and the pressure would come down and he’d find out then, and 
ah, that he had connections all over the place, and he will have me killed.” 
 
The detective turned over the photograph of Rosenquist on the interrogation 
table.  Reiterating that he and Lange had “just came 600 miles to talk to you so 
that you would tell us the truth,” Smith told Wall that “he [Rosenquist] sounds like 
a bullshitter to me” and that Wall should not worry about Rosenquist.  After one of 
the detectives suggested they “start from the beginning” again, Wall said they did 
not “have to go that far back” and then said:  “Um, probably when we was 
walking up the freeway, ah, or stopped beside the freeway, going up towards this 
place.  He sort of ah, pressured me into this.  Um, I didn’t want to do it, but him 
and I both killed the grandma and grandpa of that household.”  The detectives 
began questioning Wall about the killings, and he went on to describe them in 
detail. 
 
During the guilt phase of Wall’s trial, the district attorney played only a 
portion of the March 17, 1992 interview, stopping before the detectives’ 
challenged statement and Wall’s confession.  At the penalty phase, the district 
attorney played the entire tape of the interview as well as a tape from a short 
interview conducted the following morning.  Wall’s challenge relates only to the 
effect of the admission of his allegedly coerced confession on the jury’s sentence 
of death. 
2. 
Analysis 
 
“Both the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from 
introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.”  (People 
v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176 (Linton).)  A confession is involuntary if 
the “ ‘ “influences brought to bear upon the accused were ‘such as to overbear 
petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-
 
21 
 
determined.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404 (Maury).)  “A 
confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or violence, obtained 
by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence.”  
(People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 347.)  However, “no single factor is 
dispositive in determining voluntariness . . . rather[,] courts consider the totality of 
circumstances.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 661.)  
 
“[W]here a person in authority makes an express or clearly implied promise 
of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a motivating cause of the 
decision to confess, the confession is involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of 
law.”  (People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 238.)  An improper promise “must 
be causally linked” to the defendant’s confession to warrant exclusion under the 
Fifth Amendment.  (Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 405; see id at p. 404.) 
 
“The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a defendant’s confession was voluntarily made.”  (People v. 
Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 169.)  “On appeal, we conduct an independent 
review of the trial court’s legal determination” as to the voluntariness of a 
confession.  (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425.)  Although we rely 
on the trial court’s factual findings to the extent they are supported by substantial 
evidence, where, as here, “[t]he facts surrounding an admission or confession are 
undisputed to the extent the interview is tape-recorded,” those facts as well as the 
ultimate legal question are “subject to our independent review.”  (Linton, supra, 
56 Cal.4th at p. 1177.) 
 
At trial and on appeal, Wall argued that the detectives provided an improper 
promise of leniency when they told Wall he was at a crossroads and if he took one 
path — i.e., if he told the truth — he could “go on with [his] life” and “be with 
[his] wife and child and start fresh.”  According to Wall, these statements were 
more than “proper exhortations to tell the truth” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 
 
22 
 
Cal.4th 96, 115) and did not “simply indicate[] a willingness to listen to defendant 
and encourage[] him to tell what happened” (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
788, 812).  Instead, Wall contends the detectives’ statements constituted an 
implied promise that if he told the truth, he would be granted leniency — he would 
“go on” and “start fresh.”  (See Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1174 [detective’s 
promise that defendant “would not ‘get in trouble for what happened’ ” if he told 
the truth “ ‘because . . . that’s water under the bridge’ ” constituted an improper 
promise of leniency].) 
 
The Attorney General argues, however, that any promise of leniency was 
not the cause of Wall’s confession.  Under the totality of circumstances, and based 
on our review of the interview, we agree.  Before the detective began his statement 
about the “two directions” Wall could go, Wall had already begun to tell the 
detectives about the events in the Orens’ home.  Wall used almost exactly the 
same opening sentence when he began describing the events at the Orens’ house 
after the alleged promise of leniency as before:  “He kind of pressured me into it” 
and “he sort of ah, pressured me into this.” 
 
Nor did the circumstances of the interrogation or Wall’s personal 
characteristics unduly heighten the pressure on Wall to confess.  Before the 
detectives arrived, Wall was allowed to eat, smoke, make phone calls, and leave 
the room.  The interrogation was delayed until 10:00 p.m. so the detectives could 
travel from San Diego to San Francisco on short notice.  (Cf. People v. Dykes 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 753 [confession not involuntary where defendant made to 
wait so officers could travel from elsewhere in the state and defendant allowed to 
use restroom, eat, and smoke during wait].)  Wall was not under arrest at any point 
before the interrogation and told the San Diego detectives he had come to the 
station voluntarily.  The interrogation itself lasted less than two hours, not an 
inordinately long period.  Although detectives described 23-year-old Wall as 
 
23 
 
“stressed” and “scared,” his answers in the interrogation transcript appear coherent 
and deliberate.  
 
 Wall also alleges that the detectives “exploited [Wall’s] expressed fear of 
codefendant Rosenquist.”  But Wall does not articulate which of the detectives’ 
statements constituted this exploitation.  Nor does our review of the interview 
suggest any exploitation of Wall’s fear.  Before Wall confessed, the officers told 
Wall not to think about Rosenquist, said Rosenquist sounded like a “bullshitter,” 
and turned over his picture.  At the conclusion of the interview, the detectives told 
Wall they would do everything they could to protect Wall and house him 
separately from Rosenquist.  These statements came after Wall had confessed and 
thus were not conditioned on Wall’s cooperation.  The attempts to assuage Wall’s 
fear did not rely on deception, nor were they attempts to leverage that fear to 
extract information.  No exploitation is apparent. 
 
Because the detectives’ promise of leniency was not a cause of Wall’s 
confession, Wall’s confession was not involuntary.  Therefore, the trial court did 
not commit constitutional error in admitting it as aggravating evidence pursuant to 
section 190.3, subdivision (a) during the penalty phase of Wall’s trial.  
B. 
Exclusion of Conditional Plea Offer as Mitigation 
Wall contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding 
mitigating evidence of his early offer to plead guilty in exchange for life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  We conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and did not commit 
constitutional error in doing so. 
1.  
Background 
On April 20, 1992, about a month after his arrest, Wall offered through 
counsel to plead guilty to all counts, admit all special circumstances and other 
 
24 
 
allegations, and waive his appeal rights in exchange for a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The district attorney rejected the 
offer. 
During the penalty phase, Wall’s counsel sought to introduce Wall’s early 
plea offer as mitigating evidence under section 190.3, factor (k).  Counsel 
explained that Wall offered to plead guilty at an early stage of the proceedings in 
order to spare J.D. from having to testify and relive trauma, and to assuage Wall’s 
family’s fear that he would be sentenced to death; according to counsel, the offer 
was evidence of remorse.  Counsel further argued that in light of rule 4.423(b)(3) 
of the California Rules of Court (formerly rule 423(b)(3)), which applied to 
determinate sentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b) and explicitly 
identified the “voluntar[y] acknowledg[ment of] wrongdoing . . . at an early stage 
of the criminal process” as a mitigating factor, an early plea offer should be 
considered mitigating in the death penalty context as well. 
The trial court excluded the early plea offer under Evidence Code section 
352 on the ground that it would confuse the jury.  While noting it could find no 
authority on admissibility on this issue, the court expressed concern that if the 
early plea offer were admitted, the district attorney’s reasons for rejecting the plea 
offer would become relevant and, if offered, would need to be admitted as well.  
The court expressed concern that the jury would “second guess” the discretionary 
decision of the district attorney to seek the death penalty after learning that Wall 
was willing to plead guilty and accept life imprisonment without parole:  “The 
problem I have, though . . . is that the decision, the charging decision whether or 
not to seek the death penalty is left to the district attorney, and it’s not left to the 
defense, it’s not left to the lawyers.  It’s left strictly to the interest of the chief 
prosecuting officer acting in his sound discretion whether or not to seek the death 
penalty.  [¶] Once they choose to seek the death penalty, I think it’s confusing to 
 
25 
 
the jury because it allows the jury to second guess the working of the district 
attorney in seeking the death penalty.”  The trial court also worried that evidence 
of the earlier offer might open the door to rebuttal by the district attorney of 
questionable admissibility; the court explained that the district attorney “shouldn’t 
be allowed to get up in front of this jury and say, ladies and gentlemen, the only 
reason he [offered to plead guilty] is he wants to avoid the death penalty, he’s been 
trying to avoid the death penalty.” 
2.  
Analysis 
“A capital sentencing decision must be individualized, and the sentencing 
authority must be permitted to consider the defendant’s character.”  (People v. 
Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 757, citing Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 
604 (Lockett).)  “Section 190.3 requires the jury to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the mitigating factors outweigh 
the aggravating factors” (Peoples, at p. 757), and section 190.3, factor (k) makes 
admissible “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime” 
as part of this penalty determination. 
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion, and it will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial 
court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage 
of justice.  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)  Evidence Code 
section 352 gives the trial court discretion to exclude evidence if “its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will 
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”   
We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion here.  Of 
course, a penalty phase jury must make its own independent evaluation as to the 
appropriateness of the death penalty; that is what a fair weighing of aggravating 
 
26 
 
and mitigating evidence requires.  But that is different from the jury evaluating the 
district attorney’s personal perception of the aggravating and mitigating evidence, 
or the district attorney’s personal assessment of the jury’s likely verdict.  The trial 
court was concerned that introducing Wall’s plea offer would result in the latter, 
i.e., that introducing the offer would invite the jury to evaluate the district 
attorney’s plea bargaining tactics rather than evaluating the offer’s probative value 
as mitigating evidence. 
We have acknowledged that evidence concerning a party’s offer or 
rejection of a plea can require introduction of tangential rebuttal evidence that will 
mislead or confuse the jury.  (See People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 857 
[holding no abuse of discretion and no violation of constitutional guarantee in the 
trial court’s exclusion of the prosecutor’s plea offer and the defendant’s 
subsequent rejection because admission would require additional inquiry into the 
underlying reasons of the defendant’s refusal, which potentially could confuse and 
mislead the jury]; cf. People v. Manning (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 870, 879–880 
[upholding exclusion of defense expert testimony regarding plea deal because “if 
defendant’s proffered evidence had been admitted, the prosecutor would surely 
have been entitled to introduce rebuttal evidence to put that evidence in context, 
including evidence as to the thought processes of the participants in the underlying 
case”].)  Although it may not invariably be the case that a danger of confusing or 
misleading the jury substantially outweighs a plea offer’s probative value, in this 
case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit testimony about 
Wall’s plea offer. 
Wall claims that the trial court erred in concluding that no legal authority 
supported the admission of an early offer to plead guilty as mitigation, citing 
People v. (Michael) Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268 (abrogated on other grounds 
by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176) and People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 
 
27 
 
Cal.4th 641.  But neither case squarely addressed whether a trial court abuses its 
discretion when it excludes an early offer to plead guilty under Evidence Code 
section 352.  In Williams, we rejected the defendant’s claim that the death penalty 
law violates the Eighth Amendment by preventing introduction of his expressed 
willingness to plead guilty, since nothing in the death penalty law bars the 
admission of such evidence.  (Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1332.)  The trial 
court in this case excluded evidence of a prior plea offer under Evidence Code 
section 352, not under the death penalty law at issue in Williams.  And in 
Ledesma, the trial court permitted a capital defendant to introduce evidence at the 
penalty phase that he had attempted to plead guilty and accept life imprisonment 
without parole.  (Ledesma, at p. 735.)  We held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding “evidence of the circumstances surrounding the plea 
negotiations.”  (Ibid.)  We did not mention Evidence Code section 352 or address 
its application to the admission of evidence of a prior plea offer. 
Wall also claims that admission of a defendant’s early offer to plead guilty 
is “fully consistent with the language of the catch-all mitigation provision, section 
190.3, factor (k),” and is consistent with California’s sentencing guidelines for 
noncapital cases and analogous federal sentencing guidelines.  But the trial court 
did not exclude Wall’s early offer to plead guilty because it was inadmissible or 
irrelevant; rather, the trial court excluded it on the ground that the offer’s probative 
value was significantly outweighed by the probability that it would confuse the 
jury.  
Finally, Wall argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to 
present mitigating evidence under Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. 586, 604, and its 
progeny.  Wall is correct that “a State cannot bar ‘the consideration of . . . 
evidence if the sentencer could reasonably find that it warrants a sentence less than 
death.”  [Citation.]  [¶] Once this low threshold for relevance is met, the ‘Eighth 
 
28 
 
Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to’ a capital 
defendant’s mitigating evidence.  [Citations.]”  (Tennard v. Dretke (2004) 542 
U.S. 274, 285.)  But nothing in that constitutional rule “limits the traditional 
authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the 
defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.”  (Lockett, 
at p. 604, fn. 12.) 
Here, the trial court found that the plea evidence would confuse the jury by 
drawing its attention to irrelevant information concerning the circumstances of the 
plea offer and the district attorney’s decision to reject it.  Such balancing under 
Evidence Code section 352 is an essential component of a trial court’s “traditional 
authority.”  (Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 604, fn. 12; see People v. Fauber, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 856 [finding no constitutional violation in trial court’s 
exclusion of the defendant’s refusal of a plea offer under Evidence Code section 
352]; U.S. v. Fell (2d Cir. 2008) 531 F.3d 197, 219–220 [finding no error in 
district court’s exclusion of a plea offer as mitigating evidence in part because it 
“would authorize a confusing and unproductive inquiry into incomplete plea 
negotiations”]; U.S. v. Purkey (8th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 738, 756 [Federal Death 
Penalty Act contains a “more lenient standard” for the admissibility of mitigating 
evidence to comport with constitutional standards, but still “invests the judge with 
the authority to exclude probative information during the penalty phase if ‘its 
probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.’ [Citation.]”].)  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the exclusion of evidence of Wall’s plea offer did 
not violate his constitutional right to present mitigating evidence. 
Moreover, even if the trial court had committed constitutional error, any 
error would have been harmless because the jury was aware that Wall had entered 
an unconditional guilty plea to all charges except the allegations of personal use of 
 
29 
 
a deadly weapon and the molestation and rape of J.D.  The jury was informed that 
Wall had entered a plea of guilty on August 24, 1994, to two murders, robbery, 
burglary, and four special circumstances; the guilt phase addressed only whether 
Wall personally used a knife or metal stake in the commission of these offenses.  
In light of the jury’s knowledge that Wall had unconditionally pleaded guilty prior 
to trial, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a 
different penalty verdict had it known that Wall sought a conditional plea of guilty 
earlier in the proceedings. 
C. 
Alleged Cumulative Error 
 
We have determined that although the trial court erred under sections 977 
and 1043, the error was not prejudicial.  Because we have found only a single 
error and we have determined it was harmless, there is no prejudice to cumulate. 
D. 
California’s Death Penalty Statute 
 
Wall raises several challenges to California’s death penalty scheme that we 
have repeatedly rejected.  We decline to revisit our prior holdings, as follows: 
Section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad, and section 190.3, factor (a) does 
not result in arbitrary and capricious death judgments.  (People v. Jackson (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 724, 773; People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 179.) 
We have held that “once the defendant has been convicted of first degree 
murder and one or more special circumstances has been found true beyond a 
reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed statutory maximum for the 
offense,” and therefore Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi) 
does not require the facts bearing on the penalty determination to be found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589–
590, fn. 14.)  We have held that “[t]he federal Constitution does not require the 
jury to make written findings unanimously concluding beyond a reasonable doubt 
 
30 
 
that the aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh the factors in mitigation, or 
that death is the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 
106.)  We have previously rejected claims that cast the absence of such 
requirements in contrast with the requirements for the finding of an enhancement 
and determinate sentencing as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  (People 
v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590.) 
 “Choosing between the death penalty and life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole is not akin to ‘the usual fact-finding process,’ and therefore 
‘instructions associated with the usual fact-finding process — such as burden of 
proof — are not necessary.’ ”  (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136.)  
Nor do we require “the prosecution to bear the burden of proof or burden of 
persuasion at the penalty phase” (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 317) or 
the trial court to instruct jurors that there is a presumption in favor of life (People 
v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 190).  “We have consistently held that unanimity 
with respect to aggravating factors is not required by statute or as a constitutional 
procedural safeguard.”  (People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 749.)  In 
particular, the jury need not reach a unanimous finding on unadjudicated criminal 
activity under factor (b) of section 190.3, so long as the court instructs “ ‘ “that no 
juror may consider any alleged other violent crime in aggravation of penalty 
unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed it.” ’ ”  
(People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 222.) 
CALJIC No. 8.88’s use of the phrase “so substantial” is not so vague that it 
will lead to arbitrary and capricious sentencing decisions.  (People v. Lomax 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 595.)  CALJIC No. 8.88 tells the jury that “the death 
penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed mitigating.  There was no need to additionally advise the jury of the 
converse (i.e., that if mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating, then life 
 
31 
 
without parole was the appropriate penalty).”  (People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
955, 978.) 
The use of the adjective “extreme” under section 190.3, factor (d), or as 
read in CALJIC No. 8.85, in describing mitigating circumstances does not 
impermissibly hinder the jury’s meaningful consideration of mitigating factors.  
(People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 863.)  “The trial court has no 
obligation to delete from CALJIC No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors, nor 
must it identify which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating.”  (People 
v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618.)  The phrase “whether or not” in section 
190.3, factors (d)–(h) and (j) does not unconstitutionally suggest that the absence 
of a mitigating factor is to be considered as an aggravating circumstance.  (People 
v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207–1208, disapproved on another ground in 
People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391, fn. 3; Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 618 
[“CALJIC No. 8.85’s use of the phrase ‘whether or not,’ is not an invitation to 
jurors who find ‘a factor not proven’ to then ‘use that factor as a factor favoring 
imposition of the death penalty’ ”].) 
We have previously held that “[i]ntercase proportionality review is not 
constitutionally required.”  (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 268.)  We 
have also previously rejected claims that California’s death penalty statute violates 
international norms of decency.  (People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 581–
582; People v. Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1208 [“ ‘[T]he death penalty as 
applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional through operation of 
international laws and treaties.’ ”].)   
IV. RESTITUTION FINE 
 
Wall argues that we ought to strike or stay the imposition of a $10,000 
restitution fine.  Wall alleges the fine was illegally imposed in two respects:  First, 
the trial court failed to consider Wall’s ability to pay, and second, the trial court 
 
32 
 
imposed the fine in violation of Apprendi.  We conclude that Wall is correct that 
remand for reconsideration of the fine is required, but that Apprendi does not 
require that a jury make this determination.  
 
Wall committed the relevant offenses on March 1, 1992.  At that time, 
section 1202.4, subdivision (a) mandated the imposition of a restitution fine 
“regardless of the defendant’s present ability to pay” (Stats. 1990, ch. 45, § 4, 
p. 261), subject to the range identified in Government Code section 13967, 
subdivision (a) (Stats. 1991, ch. 657, § 1, p. 3020 [“[I]f the person is convicted of 
one or more felony offenses, the court shall impose a separate and additional 
restitution fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000).”]).  In September 1992, the Legislature amended 
Government Code section 13967, subdivision (a), noting that imposition of a fine 
within the range identified by that statute should be “subject to the defendant’s 
ability to pay.”  (Stats. 1992, ch. 682, § 4, p. 2922.)  This provision was later 
repealed, but the restitution provisions in section 1202.4 in effect at the time of 
Wall’s sentencing on January 30, 1995 provided that in imposing a restitution fine, 
“the court shall consider any relevant factors including, but not limited to, the 
defendant’s ability to pay.”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1106, § 3, pp. 6548–6549; § 1202.4, 
subd. (d).)  Nevertheless, in imposing the maximum $10,000 restitution fine, the 
trial court commented:  “That will be the — it’s mandatory under Government 
Code section 13967.  For whatever it’s worth, he will be ordered to pay restitution 
in the amount of ten thousand dollars forthwith or as provided in Penal Code 
section 2085.5.”  The trial court evidently assumed it had no discretion to consider 
Wall’s ability to pay and thus failed to properly make a discretionary restitution 
determination. 
 
The Attorney General contends that Wall forfeited his challenge to this 
legal error, citing People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729.  In that case, we 
 
33 
 
found the defendant’s restitution claim forfeited because when Avila was 
sentenced in 1999, “former section 1202.4 contained language regarding a trial 
court’s consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay.”  (Ibid.; see People v. 
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 409 [finding restitution claim forfeited, since the 
relevant statutes at the time of both the offense and sentencing allowed the court to 
consider the defendant’s ability to pay, and court was silent as to ability to pay]; 
People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1291 [same].)  It is true that Wall did 
not object to imposition of his restitution fine and that under People v. Scott 
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), a defendant forfeits on appeal any “claims involving 
the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing 
choices” in the absence of objection below.  (Id. at p. 353; see Avila, at p. 729 
[applying Scott’s forfeiture rule]; People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852–854 
[reviewing the Scott rule in the context of restitution and parole revocation fines]; 
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–889 [reviewing the Scott rule in the 
context of a vagueness challenge to a probation condition].) 
 
But Scott “does not apply to cases in which the sentencing hearing was held 
before [the] decision [became] final.”  (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 358.)  Before 
Scott, “the clear weight of authority had broadly held or assumed that errors in the 
court’s sentencing choices and statement of reasons could not be waived.”  (Id. at 
357.)  Wall’s sentencing hearing was conducted on January 30, 1995, before Scott 
became final on March 14, 1995.  Therefore, notwithstanding the forfeiture rule 
stated in Scott and applied in Avila, Wall’s claim that the trial court made a legal 
error in its decision to impose the maximum restitution fine was not forfeited by 
his failure to object at sentencing. 
Because the trial court applied the wrong statute in imposing Wall’s 
restitution fine, Wall is entitled to remand for reconsideration of his restitution fine 
under section 1202.4, the currently applicable statute.  (See People v. Covarrubias 
 
34 
 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 935; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1038; 
People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305–306.) 
 
Yet that reconsideration need not be undertaken by a jury.  Wall argues that 
because section 1202.4, subdivision (b) currently provides that the court “shall 
impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and 
extraordinary reasons for not doing so,” the absence or existence of “compelling 
and extraordinary circumstances” is a question of fact that potentially increases the 
penalty a defendant faces and therefore must be found by a jury under Apprendi, 
supra, 530 U.S. 466.  Apprendi defines a “sentencing factor” as a “circumstance, 
which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific 
sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s finding that the defendant is 
guilty of a particular offense,” and distinguishes it from a “sentence 
enhancement,” which it defines as “the functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict” that is “an 
increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence.”  (Apprendi, supra, 
530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19.)  Because the “compelling and extraordinary 
circumstances” provision in section 1202.4 is phrased as a possible exemption 
from the trial court’s otherwise mandatory duty to impose a restitution fine, the 
fine is properly understood as part of the maximum penalty statutorily authorized 
by a jury’s finding that the defendant is guilty of a felony.   
 
Finally, if the Attorney General chooses not to contest the question of 
restitution on remand, he should so inform the trial court in writing with notice to 
Wall.  In that event, the court shall reduce Wall’s restitution fine to $100, the 
statutory minimum at the time of his crime, and no hearing will be necessary.  
(People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 935–936 [reducing defendant’s 
restitution fine to statutory minimum if uncontested by the Attorney General]; 
People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 143 [increased restitution fine from the 
 
35 
 
minimum at the time of the defendant’s crime “constitutes punishment, and 
therefore is subject to the proscriptions of the ex post facto clause and other 
constitutional provisions”].) 
 
36 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the defendant’s 
restitution fine.  In all other respects, we affirm the judgment. 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
LAVIN, J.* 
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 
the California Constitution 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Wall 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S044693 
Date Filed: November 13, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Bernard E. Revak* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Andrea G. Asaro, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Andrea G. Asaro 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Teresa Torreblanca 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2279