Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES T. FROST, Deceased: FROST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, V. SHELLEY M. DODSON, Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of James T. Frost, Deceased

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES T. FROST, Deceased: FROST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, V. SHELLEY M. DODSON, Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of James T. Frost, Deceased2007 WY 63155 P.3d 1031Case Number: 06-169Decided: 04/13/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES T. FROST, Deceased:

 
 
FROST 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
SHELLEY 
M. DODSON, Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of James T. Frost, 
Deceased,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of BigHornCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

T. 
Thomas Singer of Axilon Law Group, Billings, Montana

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Marc C. 
Thompson of Webster & Thompson, LLC, Cody, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, BURKE, JJ., and WALDRIP, 
D.J.

 
 
WALDRIP, 
District Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      This appeal 
concerns the interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-704 and 2-7-712 (LexisNexis 
2005).  In construing these 
statutes, the district court held that any claim filed against a probate estate 
must have an attached affidavit.  As 
to this case, the court concluded that, because there was no affidavit filed, 
the claim must be considered invalid and barred as if no claim had been 
filed.  For the reasons stated 
herein, we reverse and remand.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In its initial 
appeal, Frost Construction Company posits the following issues for 
review:

 
 
A.  Did the trial court err in denying a 
claim that was timely asserted against the Estate solely because no affidavit 
accompanied the claim?

 
 
B.  Did the trial court err in holding that 
the claimant had failed to plead a constructive trust 
theory?

 
 
Shelley 
M. Dodson puts forward essentially the same issues for review, but seeks 
affirmation of the district court's ruling.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Frost 
Construction Company (Company) was formed in the 1970s by James T. Frost and two 
of his four children, David M. Frost and James M. Frost.  On April 21, 1978, the Company purchased 
the Eggeman Property ("the Property") at a foreclosure sale for $67,500.00.  The foreclosure sale was later reversed 
by this Court due to jurisdictional defects.  Eggeman v. Western National Bank of Lovell, 
596 P.2d 318, 325 (Wyo. 1979).  A second foreclosure sale occurred on 
July 19, 1982.  At that sale, James 
T. Frost bid $15,300.  On November 
29, 1982, the property was deeded to James T. Frost.

 
 
[¶4]      Though the 
Property was deeded to James T. Frost, the purchase price actually was paid by 
the Company.  In addition, in 
January 1982, the Company borrowed $60,000 from Shoshone First National Bank to 
pay off other liens against the Property.  
Since its purchase, the Company has paid all expenses and taxes 
associated with the Property.  The 
Company has used the property as its main yard and shop.  Also, in the late 1980s, the Company 
erected a building on a portion of the Property and rented it to the United 
States Forest Service under a written lease between the Forest Service and the 
Company.  All of the costs 
associated with building and maintaining that building have been paid by the 
Company, and the Company has received all rents from the Forest 
Service.

 
 
[¶5]      Throughout the 
time the Company was making improvements to the Property; borrowing money to 
clear liens; paying the taxes on the Property; and collecting rents from the 
Property, James T. Frost was the president and majority shareholder of the 
Company.  During most of that time, 
he was also the only representative of the Company who knew that the Property 
was owned, not in the name of the Company but, rather, in his own name.  His two sons, who were minority 
shareholders in the Company, James M. and David M. Frost, did not learn the 
Property was not owned by the Company until the 1990s.

 
 
[¶6]      When James T. 
Frost died on March 11, 2003, his estate was admitted into probate and two of 
his four children, David M. Frost and Shelley M. Dodson, were appointed 
co-personal representatives.1  On June 18, 2003, the Company submitted 
its claim against the Estate regarding the Eggeman Property.  The Company sought to have the Property 
deeded from the Estate to it, as the rightful owner.  The claim was contingent upon the 
Company prevailing upon its equitable claims.  The creditor's claim set forth the 
factual basis of the claim, attached documents in support of the claim, and was 
signed by the president of the Company, James M. Frost.

 
 
[¶7]      On June 24, 2004, 
Dodson signed a Rejection of the Claim in which she noted that no affidavit in 
support of the claim had been filed.  
In the subsequent dispute over the validity of the claim, the district 
court granted Dodson's motion to dismiss for failure to file an affidavit as 
required by Wyoming Statute.

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court also ruled against the Company with respect to its equitable claim of 
constructive trust.  The court 
observed that "[c]onstructive trust was not alleged in any pleading by 
Claimant," and, therefore, ordered that, "[s]hould this matter come to trial 
Claimant may continue with a resulting trust theory but not under a constructive 
trust theory."  Later, the district 
court certified its order on those motions as final pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b), 
and the Company filed this appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      The determinative 
issue here is a question of law concerning the construction of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-704.

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given 
law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.  
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's 
intent.  We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  We must not give a 
statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.  Moreover, 
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions.

 
 

Muller 
v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 2006 WY 100, ¶ 9, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 
2006) (quoting Sponsel v. Park County, 
2006 WY 6, ¶ 9, 126 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 2006)).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
I.          
Failure To File An Attached 
Affidavit

 
 
[¶10]   The creditor's claim submitted 
against the Estate on behalf of the Company was dismissed for failure to file an 
attached affidavit.  Such a result 
requires a strict interpretation of  § 2-7-704(a), which 
states:

 
 

Every 
claim which is due, when 
filed with the clerk shall be supported 
by the affidavit of the claimant or someone in his behalf, that the account 
is justly due, that no payments have been made thereon which are not credited 
and there are no offsets to the same to the knowledge of the affiant.  If the claim is not due when filed or is 
contingent the particulars of the claim shall be stated.  The personal representative may also 
require satisfactory vouchers or proofs to be produced in support of the 
claim.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-704(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶11]   Dodson relies on the first sentence 
in this subsection.  However, Dodson 
fails to incorporate the second sentence of subsection (a) into her 
discussion.  In fact, the second 
sentence of subsection (a) governs this case.  The claim filed by the Company is 
contingent on the Company establishing its equitable claims, and thus is not a 
"claim which is due."  The claim, 
therefore, is not the sort of claim contemplated by the first 
sentence.

 
 
[¶12]   In Park County ex rel. Park County Welfare 
Dep't v. Blackburn, 394 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1964), we construed the current statute's 
predecessor, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-222 (1957), which stated:

 
 

Every claim which is due, 
when presented to the executor or administrator, must be supported by the affidavit of 
the claimant, or some one in his behalf, that the account is justly due, that no 
payments have been made thereon which are not credited, and that there are no 
offsets to the same, to the knowledge of the affiant.  If the claim be not due when presented, or be 
contingent, the particulars of such claim must be stated.  When the affidavit is made by a person 
other than the claimant, he must set forth in the affidavit the reason why it is 
not made by the claimant.  The oath 
may be taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths.  The executor or administrator may also 
require satisfactory vouchers or proofs to be produced in support of the claim.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶13]   In addressing this previous version 
of § 2-7-704, we recognized that it was "somewhat ambiguous when applied to a 
claim which is contingent[.]"  
Park County, 394 P.2d  at 796.  More specifically, we noted:

 
 
            
[I]f the claim be not due when presented, or be contingent, the 
particulars of such claim must be stated.  
Whether the particulars may be 
stated in the claim itself or must be stated in an affidavit, the statute does 
not expressly say.  It does, 
however, provide that the executor or administrator may require satisfactory 
vouchers or proofs to be produced in support of the claim.

 
 
            
In the absence of a more cogent defect in the claim with which we are now 
concerned, and in the absence of a demand by the executor or court for the 
claimant to supply a corrected affidavit or to furnish further proof of its 
claim, we are inclined to say there was a substantial compliance with the law 
and sufficient to challenge the attention of the district judge and to enable 
him to act advisedly in the exercise of his discretion, subject of course to the 
right to require a corrected affidavit or additional proof of the 
claim.

 
 

Id. 
(emphasis added).

 
 
[¶14]   Current § 2-7-704 is substantively 
similar to predecessor § 2-222.  
However, our conclusion that the particulars may be set forth within the 
claim, as opposed to an affidavit, is consistent with the long-time policy 
behind such claim requirements:

 
 
We find 
ample authority for the statement, as a rule to go by, that the requirements for an affidavit supporting a 
claim against an estate are not intended to make it easier to avoid payment but 
are intended to make a claimant set forth his claim with such particularity that 
the person passing upon it will be fully advised as to just what is claimed; and 
all that is required is substantial compliance.  Tangren v. Snyder, 13 Utah 2d 95, 368 P.2d 711, 712; United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. 
v. Keck, 75 Cal. App. 2d 828, 171 P.2d 731, 732.  See also Annotation 74 A.L.R. 368, 393; 
34 C.J.S. Executors and 
Administrators § 418, p. 205; and 21 Am. Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 375, p. 
594.

 
 

Id. at 
796-97.

 
 
[¶15]   Here, the particulars of the 
Company's claim are clearly set forth in the Claim Against Estate filed on June 18, 
2003.  Not only did the Company 
allocate $60,000.00 in funds for the purchase of the Property, there is evidence 
showing that the Company used the Property; paid the taxes on the Property; and 
in all respects treated the Property as if it was owned by the Company.  It appears from the claim the Property 
was only inadvertently placed in the name of James T. Frost.  Enough information is provided in the 
Company's claim to sufficiently challenge the attention of the personal 
representative and enable him to act advisedly in the exercise of his 
discretion, subject of course to the right to require additional proof of the 
claim.

 
 

II.         
Failure to State a Proper Theory for Recovery

 
 
[¶16]   
With respect to the district court's dismissal of the Company's 
constructive trust theory, the court found fault in the Company's failure to 
plead that theory with specificity.  
In support of the district court's conclusion, Dodson relies on W.R.C.P. 
8(a), which states in pertinent part:  
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . 
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief . . . and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks."  However, Dodson cites no authority 
suggesting the civil procedure pleading requirements apply to a claim against an 
estate.  Certainly nothing in the 
Wyoming Probate Code, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-101 et seq., or Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703 or 
704 in particular, requires a claimant to state the particular legal theories 
upon which the claim is based or to specify the evidence upon which the claim 
rests.  We find no reason to deviate 
from the requirements set forth by the Wyoming Legislature.  Neither the statutes at issue nor 
Wyoming law 
requires dismissal of the Company's constructive trust 
theory.

 
 
[¶17]   Finally, as this Court has noted, 
the executor has the ability, if not the burden, to request further information 
to clarify the claim.  Edmonds v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona , 518 P.2d 7, 10 (Wyo. 1974).  Section 2-7-704(a) clarifies 
that:  "The personal representative 
may also require satisfactory vouchers or proofs to be produced in support of 
the claim." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-704(a) (LexisNexis 
2005). The statute "clearly places this burden not upon the creditor but upon 
the executor by virtue of the provision that the representative may also 
require vouchers and proof.'"  
Edmonds, 518 P.2d  at 10.

 
 
[¶18]   The executor in this case made no 
such requests.  If the executor was 
not satisfied with or was confused by the facts laid out in the Company's claim, 
it was her burden to request additional particulars.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   The district court erred in 
rejecting the Company's claim due solely to its failure to file an attached 
affidavit, which was not required under these circumstances.  The district court also erred by 
rejecting the Company's constructive trust theory.  We reverse the order of the district 
court and remand for appropriate action.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Court 
removed them as co-personal representatives and appointed a local attorney after 
the motions at issue in this appeal were submitted.  David M. Frost was a co-personal 
representative and also is vice-president of the Company.  As an officer of the Company making the 
claim, he took no action for the Estate concerning the 
claim.