Title: State v. Mancino

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

714 So. 2d 429 (1998)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Joseph Sal MANCINO, Respondent.
No. 90516.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 11, 1998.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Petitioner.
*430 Joseph Sal Mancino, pro se, Sneads, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in Mancino v. State, 693 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), which the district court certified to be in conflict with the opinions in Berry v. State, 684 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Sullivan v. State, 674 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); and Chaney v. State, 678 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve Mancino. We hold that a claim of credit for jail time served is cognizable in a rule 3.800 motion to the extent that court records reflect an undisputed entitlement to credit and a sentence that fails to grant such credit.
Respondent Joseph Sal Mancino (Mancino) entered pleas of no contest and was sentenced in two cases that involved burglary, dealing in stolen property, armed burglary, possession of burglary tools, and grand theft. Mancino made a rule 3.800(a) motion requesting jail credit, alleging that court records reflected that he was entitled to credit for time spent in county jail but he had not received credit at sentencing. The trial court denied the motion on the ground it was not cognizable under rule 3.800. On appeal, the Second District reversed, holding that rule 3.800 "is a proper vehicle for raising a credit time issue where jail credit can be determined from the court records." Mancino, 693 So. 2d  at 73.
We recognize that this issue has been a troubling one to both the trial courts and the district courts. In a thorough analysis, the First District has noted that until very recently there has been little doubt that rule 3.800 could be used to resolve jail credit issues:
*431 Vanderblomen v. State, 709 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (footnote omitted). The issue has also been brought into focus by Judge Altenbernd at the Second District:
Chojnowski v. State, 705 So. 2d 915, 917-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially); see also Richardson v. State, 698 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (majority and concurring in part and dissenting in part opinions grappling with this issue).
Florida Criminal Rule of Procedure 3.800(a) provides: "A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing guideline scoresheet." In State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995), we recognized and approved the three different types of sentencing errors generally identified in Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991):
658 So. 2d  at 988. We noted in Callaway that rule 3.800(a) motions should be "limited to those sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary determination." Id. As the Second District explained in Judge:
596 So. 2d  at 76-77 n. 1.
In support of the Second District's conclusion, Mancino cites Hopping v. State, 650 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), which states that failure to grant proper jail credit for time served is an illegal sentence under rule 3.800 since section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1995) affirmatively mandates that no sentence may be imposed without crediting a defendant with jail time already served. Judge Barkdull, writing for the Third District, reasoned:
Id. at 1088. In a similar vein, we recently held, in a case involving a different Hopping, that "where it can be determined without an evidentiary hearing that a sentence has been unconstitutionally enhanced in violation of *433 the double jeopardy clause, the sentence is illegal and can be reached at any time under rule 3.800." Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla.1998). In Hopping we relied on the fact that the record reflected without dispute that the trial court had illegally increased the defendant's sentence after the defendant had already begun service of that sentence. See also Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973) (prohibiting the increase of a sentence once it has commenced being served).
The Second District in Mancino recognized that its approach represents the minority rule, noting that the First, Fourth, and Fifth districts have concluded otherwise. Id. Specifically, in Berry, the First District denied the appellant's rule 3.800(a) motion because "he did not allege that denial of the jail and prison credit caused him to be sentenced to a period in excess of the statutory maximum for his offense." 684 So. 2d  at 240. In Chaney, the Fifth District held that "[a] sentence within the statutory maximum is a legal sentence and not subject to review in a rule 3.800(a) motion but rather a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.850." 678 So. 2d  at 881. Similarly, the Fourth District, in Sullivan, relied on our opinion in Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1995), to conclude that "only if the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law would the sentence be illegal" pursuant to rule 3.800(a). 674 So. 2d  at 214-15. However, in a footnote, the court noted that "[r]elief would be available under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. If a defendant is beyond the time period for Rule 3.850 relief and the sentence has been served but for the improper jail credit time, a petition for habeas corpus would offer relief." Id. at 215 n. 1.
As is evident from our recent holding in Hopping, we have rejected the contention that our holding in Davis mandates that only those sentences that facially exceed the statutory maximums may be challenged under rule 3.800(a) as illegal. Further, we agree with the observations of Judge Barkdull in the Third District's decision in Hopping that a sentence that does not mandate credit for time served would be illegal since a trial court has no discretion to impose a sentence without crediting a defendant with time served. A sentence that patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations is by definition "illegal". As noted by the Fourth District in Sullivan, a prisoner who can demonstrate her entitlement to release when properly credited with time served would be entitled to relief by habeas corpus.
For these same reasons we agree with the holding of the Second District in Mancino. The entitlement to time served is not a disputed issue of fact in the sense that an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether there is such an entitlement. Hence, if the record reflects that a defendant has served time prior to sentencing on the charge for which he was tried and convicted, and a sentence that does not properly credit the defendant with time served, then that sentence may be challenged under rule 3.800 much in the way that the double jeopardy issue was raised in Hopping.
As noted by Judge Altenbernd in Chojnowski, since a defendant is entitled to credit for time served as a matter of law, "common fairness, if not due process, requires that the State concede its error and correct the sentence `at any time.'" 705 So. 2d  at 918 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially). For that reason, a prisoner should ordinarily first seek prompt administrative relief in the corrections system before going to the circuit court for relief under rule 3.800(a), mandamus or habeas corpus. Of course, the trial court and counsel for the State and the defendant should be alert to see that provision is always made in sentencing for a defendant to receive credit for all time already served.
Accordingly, we approve Mancino. We hold credit time issues are cognizable in a rule 3.800 motion when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.