Title: The People v. Peter Rivera

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 71  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Peter Rivera,
            Respondent.
Hae Jin Liu, for appellant.
Janet A. Gandolfo, for respondent.
SMITH, J.:
We hold that a driver whose license has been revoked,
but who has received a conditional license and failed to comply
with its conditions, may be prosecuted only for the traffic
infraction of driving for a use not authorized by his license,
not for the crime of driving while his license is revoked.
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No. 71
I
On November 14, 2007, defendant was convicted of
driving while intoxicated.  The conviction carried with it the
revocation of his license for a minimum of six months (Vehicle
and Traffic Law §§ 1192 [2], 1193 [2] [b] [2]).  However, as a
first-time offender, defendant was eligible to participate in a
rehabilitation program offered by the Department of Motor
Vehicles (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196) and, as a
participant in the program, to receive a conditional license
(Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196 [7] [a]).  Defendant entered the
program and received a conditional license, which permitted him
to drive to and from his place of work; as required by his job;
to and from the rehabilitation program and related activities; to
and from a school; and between noon and 3 P.M. on Saturdays.
On February 10, 2008, while his conditional license was
in effect, defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated
at 1:04 A.M.  He was with a woman he identified as his
girlfriend, and told the arresting officer he was coming from
"the bars."  He was indicted for several offenses, but the only
count of the indictment that now concerns us charged him with
aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first
degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3]).  On defendant's
motion, Supreme Court dismissed this count before trial, and the
Appellate Division affirmed.  A Judge of this Court granted the
People leave to appeal, and we now affirm.
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No. 71
II
At issue is the relationship between two offenses
defined in separate sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. 
Defendant's alleged conduct clearly violated Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1196 (7) (f), which says: "It shall be a traffic infraction
for the holder of a conditional license . . . to operate a motor
vehicle upon a public highway for any use other than those
authorized."  A violation of section 1196 (7) (f) is punishable
by a fine of up to $500, 15 days of imprisonment and revocation
of the conditional license.
The People argue, however, that defendant also violated
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511, which prohibits "aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle."  That crime is
committed when a person "operates a motor vehicle upon a public
highway while knowing or having reason to know that such person's
license or privilege of operating such motor vehicle . . . is . .
. revoked" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]).  Simply
driving with a revoked license constitutes third degree
aggravated unlicensed operation, a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine, a jail term of up to 30 days, or both (id.).  Doing so when
the license was revoked for driving while intoxicated is second
degree aggravated unlicensed operation, a more serious
misdemeanor that can bring a jail term of up to 180 days (Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 511 [2] [a] [ii]).  And committing the second
degree crime while under the influence of alcohol constitutes the
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No. 71
first degree crime, with which defendant was charged; it is a
class E felony punishable by up to four years of imprisonment
(Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3] [a] [i]; Penal Law § 70.00 [2]
[e]).
Defendant points out that, at the time in question, he
had a valid, unrevoked driver's license, though a conditional
one.  Thus he cannot, he says, be prosecuted for driving while
his license was revoked.  The People argue in substance that
defendant should be viewed as having two licenses: the
conditional one, good only at certain times and for certain
purposes; and the revoked license, in existence at all other
times.  When defendant was arrested, on the People's theory, only
his revoked license existed.
Defendant's reading of the statutory language is the
more natural and straightforward one.  It also finds strong
support in the legislative history of Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1196 (7) (f).
Until section 1196 (7) (f) was enacted in 1989, the
only Vehicle and Traffic Law provision that addressed violations
of conditions stated in a driver's license was section 509 (3):
"Whenever a permit or license is required to operate a motor
vehicle, no person shall operate any motor vehicle in violation
of any restriction contained on, or applicable to, the permit or
license."  Before 1989, a violation of section 509 (3) was a
traffic infraction for which the fine could not exceed $100, and
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for which imprisonment for a first offense could not exceed 15
days (see former Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1800).  In two pre-
1989 cases, trial level courts considered whether someone in the
position of defendant here -- someone whose license had been
revoked, who had received a conditional license as part of a
rehabilitation program, and who had then violated the conditions
on the license -- should be prosecuted under Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 509 (3) or Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511.  The court in
People v Tousley (86 Misc 2d 1059 [Yates County Ct 1976]) held
that section 509 (3) was applicable and section 511 was not.  The
court in People v Sabin (139 Misc 2d 641 [Westchester County Ct
1988]) disagreed, concluding that the driver could be prosecuted
under section 511.
In March 1989, a bill was introduced in the Senate at
the request of the State Police that would have rejected Tousley
and enacted the Sabin court's view of the law.  As introduced, it
would have amended Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (a) to add:
"The suspension or revocation of the license
or operating privilege of a person convicted
of a violation of section eleven hundred
ninety-two of this chapter, and who has been
issued a conditional license or privilege
pursuant to subdivision seven of section
eleven hundred ninety-six of this chapter,
shall continue to be effective any time such
person operates a motor vehicle in violation
of the terms of such conditional license or
privilege."
(1989 NY Senate-Assembly Bill S 3103, A6482-A, § 1[a]).
This proposal -- which states the position the People
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advance in this case -- was not adopted.  It was replaced during
the legislative process by a bill that left section 511 unchanged
in substance and instead created a new subdivision (f) of section
1196 (7).  That subdivision, quoted above, created a new and more
serious traffic infraction to deal with cases like this one -- an
infraction resulting in a larger fine than a violation of section
509 (3), and revocation of the conditional license.  A letter
from the Assembly sponsor of this measure to the Governor's
Counsel described the existing law that the bill would change as
being in accord with the Tousley, not the Sabin, case -- in other
words, with defendant's position here, not the People's: 
"a person who operates outside the terms of a
conditional license granted after conviction
for an alcohol-related offense is subject
only to the standard traffic infraction
involving a fine of up to $100 and/or 15 days
in jail." 
(Letter of Michael J. Bragman to Hon. Evan A. Davis, July 7,
1989, Bill Jacket, L 1989 ch 420 at 7 [emphasis added]).  The
letter went on to explain that the bill the Legislature enacted
"addresses the disparity by making the
penalty for operating outside the terms of a
conditional license subject to a fine of not
less [than] $200 nor more than $500 and/or a
term of imprisonment of up to 15 days.  The
measure also calls for the revocation of the
conditional license"
(id.). 
In sum, the Legislature decided not to amend section
511 to make what this defendant did a crime, but instead to make
it a more serious traffic infraction; and the Assembly sponsor
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said plainly that he thought such offenders could be prosecuted
only for traffic infractions.  Comments from the Department of
Motor Vehicles (Bill Jacket, L 1989 ch 420 at 10-11), the
Division of Criminal Justice Services (id. at 14-15) and the
Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse (id. at 19) expressed a
similar opinion, though the Division of Parole thought otherwise
(id. at 20). 
Thus the legislative history as a whole powerfully
reinforces what is in any event the most plausible reading of the
statutory language: Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 does not reach
cases like this one.  Every court to have considered the question
since Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196 (7) (f) was enacted -- the
courts in People v Greco (151 Misc 2d 859 [App Term 1992]) and
People v Buckley (13 Misc 3d 910 [Sullivan County Ct 2006]), and
the lower courts in this case -- have reached that conclusion,
and so do we.
The People argue that this reading of the statute dis-
serves our State's strong public policy to combat drunken driving
with serious penalties.  They suggest that a maximum punishment
of a $500 fine and 15 days in jail, coupled with revocation of
the conditional license, is simply not an adequate sanction for
someone who, having been given a limited right to drive after
violating the law, has violated it again by ignoring the
limitations.  Admittedly, there is a large disparity between the
punishments available under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196 (7)
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(f) for a driver who fails to meet the conditions on a
conditional license and those available under Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 511 for one who has only a revoked or suspended license. 
But that is exactly the problem that the Legislature addressed
when it enacted section 1196 (7) (f).  If its way of dealing with
the problem was not adequate, it should be asked to take up the
issue again.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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People v Peter Rivera
No. 71
GRAFFEO, J. (dissenting):
When conduct falls under two or more penal provisions,
this Court has consistently held that it is within the realm of a
District Attorney's exercise of prosecutorial discretion to
determine what offense to charge.  Because the conduct at issue
in this case -- defendant's operation of a motor vehicle at a
time when he was not privileged to do so and while under the
influence of alcohol -- could be prosecuted either as a violation
of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196(7)(f) or Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 511(3)(a)(i), the People's decision to charge the latter
offense should not have been disturbed.  Since, under the
majority analysis, a driver like defendant who not only
disregards the limitations in the conditional license but also
drives drunk will receive the same penalty as a person who
engages in a minor violation of the terms of a conditional
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No. 71
license, I respectfully dissent.
In November 2007, when defendant was convicted of
misdemeanor driving while intoxicated (DWI), his driver's license
was revoked for six months by the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV).  The day after the license revocation order was issued,
the Department granted defendant a conditional license permitting
him to drive to and from a drinking driver rehabilitation
program, his employment, his classes at a local broadcasting
school and during a three-hour period on Saturday afternoons.  In
February 2008, at 1:04 AM, defendant was stopped by police after
he drove through a red light.  His slurred speech, the odor of
alcohol and his performance on field sobriety tests led police to
conclude he was intoxicated.  Defendant admitted to police that
he and his girlfriend, a passenger in the car, were coming from
"the bars" nearby.  After refusing to take a chemical test,
defendant was charged with a variety of offenses, including
aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (AUO) in the
first degree under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(3)(a)(i), a
class E felony.  Pursuant to this provision, the People alleged
that defendant's conduct met the following three elements: (1)
defendant drove under the influence of alcohol; (2) at a time
when his license was suspended, revoked or withdrawn by DMV; and
(3) the suspension/revocation was based on a prior DWI
conviction.  
Before trial, defendant moved to dismiss the AUO count,
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arguing that a person who drives outside the terms of a
conditional license can be charged only with a traffic infraction
under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196(7)(f).  In opposition, the
People argued that, although defendant's violation of the
conditional license could give rise to a traffic violation, that
did not prevent them from instead charging him with AUO.  Supreme
Court dismissed the AUO count on the rationale that, by creating
a statute that permitted defendant to be charged with a traffic
infraction for violating the terms of his conditional license
(see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196[7][f]), the Legislature
created an exclusive penalty for such conduct.  The Appellate
Division affirmed on a different basis, reasoning that, "upon the
issuance of the conditional license, the defendant's status as a
person with a revoked license was superceded by his status as a
person with a conditional license," which negated the second
element of AUO (People v Rivera, 71 AD3d 700, 701 [2d Dept
2010]).  A majority of this Court also now affirms the dismissal
of the AUO count of the indictment.
In my view, the majority and the courts below err in
precluding the People from prosecuting defendant for first-degree
AUO.  The threshold question -- the issue the Appellate Division
found to be dispositive -- is whether a defendant with a
conditional license continues to hold the status of a person with
a revoked or suspended license, thereby satisfying the second
element of the AUO offense.  Defendant maintains that, once he
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No. 71
was issued a conditional license, he no longer could be
characterized as having a revoked license.  The People counter
that the license revocation order remained in effect after the
conditional license was issued and, when driving outside the
limited, permissible conditions specified in the conditional
license, defendant was operating his vehicle while his license
was revoked.  
This issue has been addressed in three other cases: two
courts have concluded that a person who possesses a conditional
license does not have the status of a person with a revoked or
suspended license (see People v Buckley, 13 Misc3d 910 [Co Ct
2006]; People v Tounsley, 86 Misc2d 1059 [Co Ct 1976]), and one
determined that a person who drives in violation of the
parameters of a conditional license is operating with a revoked
or suspended license (see People v Sabin, 139 Misc2d 641 [Co Ct
1988]).1  Our court has not previously been presented with this
question.
Resolution of this issue requires an understanding of
the history and purpose of the conditional license program. 
Since 1975, New York has offered an alcohol and drug
rehabilitation program to individuals convicted of DWI and
1 Another court has addressed the related -- but distinct --
issue of whether a person who is operating outside the
limitations in a restricted use license is operating with a
revoked or suspended license and has concluded that the
restricted use license superceded the revocation or suspension
(see People v Greco, 151 Misc2d 859 [App Term 1992]). 
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related offenses (see L 1975, ch 291).  Upon conviction of an
alcohol driving offense, an offender's driver's license is
typically suspended or revoked.   As an incentive to
participation in the rehabilitation program, those offenders who
enroll are eligible to apply for a conditional license.  Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1196(7)(a) authorizes the Commissioner of DMV
to grant a program participant a conditional driver's license
"valid only for use by the holder thereof" while driving to or
from a variety of specified destinations, including program
activities and the person's school or employment.  Under the
statute, the license may also permit the participant to drive
during a "three hour consecutive daytime period" on a day when he
or she is not engaged at work or school.2  Of critical relevance
to this case, subsection 7(a) further provides:
"Such license or privilege shall remain in
effect during the term of the suspension or
revocation of the participant's license or
privilege unless earlier revoked by the
Commissioner." 
2  The DMV, in its discretion, encourages voluntary
participation in the drinking driver rehabilitation program by
permitting the conditional license holder to drive not only to
and from the rehabilitation program but also to and from work,
school and a limited number of other venues, thereby
accommodating the participant's basic transportation needs.  But,
that being said, the DMV may authorize operation of a motor
vehicle only for the personal purposes listed in the statute. 
Consistent with the ongoing suspension or revocation order, a
program participant cannot obtain a commercial license and may
not use the conditional license for commercial purposes, such as
to operate a taxicab (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196[7][g]).
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This language indicates that the conditional license does not
supercede the suspension or revocation order but instead is
coterminous with that order since the conditional license
"remain[s] in effect during the term of the suspension or
revocation" (emphasis added).  Put another way, the suspension or
revocation does not end when a conditional license is issued,
otherwise there would be no "term of the suspension or
revocation" for the conditional license to track.  
Vehicle and Traffic Law 1196(5) also provides: 
"upon successful completion of the [alcohol
and drug rehabilitation program], a
participant may apply to the commissioner . .
. for the termination of the suspension or
revocation order issued as a result of the
participant's conviction which caused the
participation in such course.  In the
exercise of discretion *** the commissioner
is authorized to terminate such order or
orders and return the participant's license
or reinstate the privilege of operating a
motor vehicle in this state."
This clause is further evidence that the suspension or revocation
continues in effect while a participant attends the drinking
driver program, even if a conditional license has been issued,
since, at the successful conclusion of the program, the
participant must apply to the Commissioner "for termination of
the suspension or revocation" when requesting restoration of full
license privileges -- restoration is not automatic.  Rather, in
order to obtain reinstatement of full license status, the
participant must seek termination of the revocation or suspension
-- which, again, demonstrates that the revocation or suspension
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No. 71
remains in effect, even after a conditional license has been
issued. 
Based on this statutory language, I disagree with the
majority's conclusion that defendant's status as a person with a
revoked license was "superceded" when the DMV issued him a
conditional license.  To the contrary, when the DMV revokes or
suspends a person's license for a six-month period but then
provides a conditional license to a program participant, it has
not vitiated the original revocation or suspension order.  The
conditional license merely grants its holder a limited privilege
to drive for particular purposes as specified in the license. 
When the DMV revoked defendant's license, it took away all his
driving privileges.  When it issued the conditional license the
next day, it allowed a narrow range of permissible driving
activities, but all remaining privileges continued to be revoked. 
Thus, when defendant drove outside the bounds of the limited
privilege, he could not rely on the conditional license but
instead had the status of a person with a revoked license.  More
particularly, his privilege to drive himself and a passenger home
from a bar at 1:00 AM had not been restored; it remained revoked
pursuant to the revocation order.  
Several of the courts that have reached the contrary
conclusion have relied on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(5), which
states that "[n]o person shall hold more than one unexpired
license issued by the commissioner at any one time," reasoning
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No. 71
that if a conditional license has been issued, this is the only
license defendant holds, nullifying the prior revocation or
suspension.  For example, in Buckley (13 Misc3d 910, 913), the
court determined that in order to find that a person retained the
status of a person with a revoked or suspended license after a
conditional license had issued, it would have to conclude "that a
person may hold two licenses at the same time, a conditional
license and a revoked license."  The majority similarly adopts
this reasoning, suggesting that the People are essentially
arguing that defendant has two licenses: a conditional license
and a revoked license.  
I believe this misapprehends the People's argument. 
Consistent with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(5), the only
license a person with a conditional license holds is the
conditional license -- the prior full license has been revoked. 
The revocation or suspension of the full license is, in fact, a
condition precedent to issuance of a conditional license -- and
the latter is valid during the term of the revocation or
suspension order.  While a conditional license restores a handful
of driving privileges, permitting its holder to operate a vehicle
only during the limited periods and for the narrow purposes
detailed in the license, most have been withdrawn.  This is
precisely why -- when he drove outside the conditions in the
conditional license during the term of the revocation order --
defendant may accurately be characterized as a person who
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No. 71
operated a motor vehicle while his "license or privilege of
operating such motor vehicle in this state . . .[was] suspended,
revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the Commissioner" (Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 511[1][a]).  Defendant could not rely on the
conditional license to privilege his conduct at that time and it
therefore fell within the category of driving privileges still
covered exclusively by the revocation order.  Thus, the People
have alleged facts that, if proved, fulfill the second element of
the first-degree AUO statute.
Since defendant's conduct fell within the purview of
the AUO statute, the next issue is whether the People were
precluded from charging defendant with AUO because there is
another penal provision that also covered his conduct -- the
traffic infraction defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law 
§ 1196(7)(f).  When a defendant engages in behavior that falls
within more than one penal provision, it is generally left to the
People to decide which statute to charge -- and this rule holds
true even if one offense is of a higher level of seriousness than
the other.  "[T]he existence of a statutory prohibition against a
particular type of conduct . . . will not be deemed to constitute
the exclusive vehicle for prosecuting that conduct unless the
Legislature clearly intended that result" (People v Mattocks, 12
NY3d 326, 333 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted, citation
omitted]).  "[O]verlapping in criminal statutes, and the
opportunity for prosecutorial choice they represent, is no bar to
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No. 71
prosecution.  Unless there is evidence of legislative intent to
the contrary, . . . the existence of a specific statute
prohibiting the conduct involved does not prevent prosecution
under a more general statute" (People v Eboli, 34 NY2d 281, 287
[1974] [internal citation omitted]; see People v Duffy, 79 NY2d
611 [1992]). 
For example, in Mattocks, we held that a defendant who
defrauded the Metropolitan Transit Authority by strategically
creasing subway fare cards to facilitate their improper use for a
free ride could be prosecuted for the class D offense of second-
degree forgery, a provision generally criminalizing the
possession and use of a false or altered written instrument.  We
reached this conclusion even though there were several other
provisions covering the same conduct, including a class B
misdemeanor offense that the Legislature had enacted in 2005
specifically addressing the use of a "doctored farecard" (see
Penal Law § 165.16).  We rejected the notion that, by creating a
specific crime covering the fraudulent use of altered fare cards,
the Legislature had evinced an intent to make that offense the
exclusive vehicle of prosecution, noting the absence of a
"legislative direction to eliminate the applicability of forgery
statutes" (12 NY3d at 333).  Although the criminal conduct at
issue there was "subject to varying degrees of prosecution"
ranging from a noncriminal violation defined in a regulation to
the D felony forgery charge for which defendant had been
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No. 71
indicted, the Court recognized that "prosecutors have
considerable discretion in choosing among these classifications,"
depending on the circumstances presented in the particular case,
including defendant's criminal history (id. at 334).
The same analysis should govern in this case.  Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1196(f)(7) specifically penalizes driving
outside the conditions in a conditional license, making such
conduct punishable as a traffic infraction.  But nothing in the
statutory language evinces a legislative intent for this to be
the exclusive means of prosecuting that conduct, particularly in
a situation like the one presented here.  In this case,
defendant, who obtained his conditional license by virtue of his
participation in a drunk driver rehabilitation program, not only
drove outside the terms of the conditional license but was also
operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition --
the precise illegal conduct that lead to his prior conviction and
enrollment in the rehabilitation program.  I do not believe that
the Legislature had this scenario in mind when it created the
traffic infraction.  
Nor is an intent to treat this type of conduct
exclusively as a traffic infraction clear from the legislative
history of section 1196(7)(f).  When conditional licenses were
first permitted in 1975, the conditional licensing statute did
not contain a penalty for driving outside the terms of the
license and there was some controversy as to how to prosecute a
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No. 71
person who operated a vehicle during unprivileged periods or for
unprivileged purposes.  The majority suggests that, at that time,
the only Vehicle and Traffic Law statute that covered this
conduct was section 509(3), which dealt with driving in violation
of a restriction on a permit or license (see majority op at 4). 
But this observation assumes the answer to the question that this
Court is charged with deciding in this case -- which is whether a
person who violated the terms of a conditional license could be
charged with AUO, an offense that predated the conditional
licensing scheme.
In 1976, in People v Tousley (86 Misc2d 1059), county
court considered whether a person who had violated a conditional
license should be charged with the 509(3) traffic infraction or
misdemeanor AUO.  There, defendant had been charged with the
traffic infraction and, analogizing a conditional license to a
restricted use license, the court concluded that this was
appropriate.  It went on to indicate in dicta that a defendant
who drove outside the terms of a conditional license could not be
charged with AUO.  Twelve years later, a different county court
reached the opposite conclusion in People v Sabin (139 Misc2d
641), a case with facts similar to this case.  There, a defendant
was charged with first-degree AUO when he was caught driving
outside the terms of his conditional license while in an
intoxicated condition.  Noting the significant differences
between a conditional license and a restricted license, and
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citing the language in the conditional licensing statute that I
have highlighted earlier, the Sabin court concluded that a person
who drives outside the conditions of a conditional license during
the term of a license revocation order is driving with a revoked
license and may be prosecuted for AUO.
This was the state of the law when, in 1989, the
Legislature added a new subsection (7)(f) to Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1196, creating a specific provision covering violations of
conditional licenses.  The Legislature categorized the new
offense as a traffic infraction but imposed a penalty more severe
than the penalty for a violation of section 509, the provision
the Tousley court had applied.  In fact, at the time of the
amendment, the penalty for violating subsection 1196(7)(f) (a
fine of $200 to $500 and/or up to 15 days in jail) was identical
to the penalty a person convicted of third-degree AUO would
receive.  Although aware of the controversy concerning the
applicability of the AUO statute, the Legislature did not
indicate in adopting 1196(7)(f) that a person who violated the
terms of a conditional license could be prosecuted only under
that provision.  There is no exclusivity language in the statute.
The majority points out that a prior version of the
legislation would have amended the AUO statute to specifically
declare that a person driving outside the conditions of a
conditional license could be prosecuted for AUO -- but the
Legislature instead amended the conditional licensing statute to
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create a separate traffic infraction covering that conduct.  From
this development the majority infers that the Legislature did not
intend the AUO statute to reach cases like this one (see majority
op at 7).  
But such an inference is unwarranted.  Certainly, had
the Legislature adopted the earlier version of the legislation,
it would have confirmed the applicability of the AUO statute --
but its failure to do so is no substitute for a clear expression
of contrary intent.  This Court has previously declined to place
this type of significance on omitted language found in prior
versions of a bill not ultimately adopted by the Legislature (see
Tzolis v Wolff, 10 NY3d 100 [2008] [although Legislature did not
enact prior version of bill that would have expressly permitted
derivative suits on behalf of LLCs, this did not evince
legislative intent to preclude such suits]).  The fact that the
Legislature did not amend the AUO statute to explicitly clarify
that driving outside the conditions of a conditional license
could constitute AUO does not establish that the Legislature
intended to categorically preclude such prosecutions.  If the AUO
statute already encompassed that conduct (as the Sabin court had
concluded, correctly in my view), than the addition of a new
provision elsewhere in the statutory scheme specifically directed
at conditional license violations did nothing to alter that fact. 
To remove a category of conduct from the purview of the AOU
statute, lawmakers would have had to either amend that statute or
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include language in the newly enacted 1196(7)(f) stating that the
latter was the exclusive vehicle for prosecuting such behavior. 
The Legislature did neither.
To be sure, we can infer from the legislative history
of section 1196(7)(f) that the Legislature intended that conduct
consisting of nothing more than driving outside the limitations
of a conditional license should generally be treated as a traffic
infraction.  Certainly, prosecution for a traffic infraction
would be appropriate for an individual found operating a vehicle
at 4:00 P.M. on a Saturday when the conditional license permitted
operation only between the hours of noon and 3:00 P.M.  No doubt
the People would agree.  
But nothing in the legislative history of section
1196(7)(f) suggests that the Legislature determined that a person
who engaged in that type of infraction should receive precisely
the same penalty as an offender who not only drove outside the
temporal conditions of his license but was also in an intoxicated
state -- much more egregious behavior.  A conditional license is
a significant privilege granted to participants in DWI
rehabilitation programs.  When an individual who already has a
history of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and who is
supposed to be learning responsible driving behaviors nonetheless
decides to disregard the terms of a conditional license and
endanger himself and others by once again driving drunk, it is
reasonable for the District Attorney to conclude that the
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No. 71
behavior invites a more serious response.  Where such aggravating
conduct is present, I see no evidence that the Legislature
divested the People of the discretion to prosecute it as first-
degree AUO, a class E felony, rather than as a traffic
infraction.  
Moreover, defendant's participation in the conditional
license program -- a privilege that he severely abused -- should
not entitle him to more lenient treatment than he would have
received had he engaged in the same conduct without ever having
received that benefit.  Yet, under the majority's view of the
statutory scheme, defendant has committed only a traffic
infraction while a similarly situated driver who never received a
conditional license has committed first-degree AUO.  This is one
"benefit" of the limited license the Legislature surely never
expected to confer.  Because I find the majority's holding to be
inconsistent with the statutory scheme and the policies
underlying conditional licensing, I would reinstate the first-
degree AUO count.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Smith.  Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Read and Jones concur.  Judge Graffeo dissents
in an opinion in which Judge Pigott concurs.
Decided May 3, 2011
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