Title: Archuleta v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Archuleta v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 11990 WY 19787 P.2d 91Case Number: 89-164Decided: 02/16/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSE 
ARCHULETA,

 APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE),

v.

CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1, 

APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYER).

Petition for review from 
the District Court, Carbon County, Larry L. Lehman, J.

Frederick J. 
Harrison, Rawlins, for appellant.

Catherine 
MacPherson of MacPherson Law Offices, Rawlins, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      A worker's 
compensation hearing officer denied benefits to the surviving dependents of Jose 
Archuleta on the ground that Archuleta's fatal injury occurred while he was 
outside the scope of his employment. The district court affirmed that decision 
upon the petition for review.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

[¶3]      Jose Archuleta 
was employed as a custodian at Rawlins High School by Carbon County School 
District No. 1. On December 23, 1987, he completed his shift at 3:30 p.m., 
punched his time card, and proceeded to his pickup truck in the school parking 
lot. Four to six inches of snow covered the lot. Archuleta's vehicle became 
stuck in wind-drifted snow as he approached the nearest exit from the lot. After 
breaking free, he backed away from the exit, leaning out the truck's open door, 
presumably to better see where he was driving. Notwithstanding that precaution, 
he drove into a light pole in the school parking lot. The pole struck the left 
side of Archuleta's head and forced it into the door jamb. He fell from the 
vehicle and was pronounced dead in the emergency room of Carbon County Memorial 
Hospital.

[¶4]      Archuleta's 
employer objected to appellant's worker's compensation claim on the ground that 
the fatal accident occurred outside the scope of Archuleta's employment. A 
hearing was conducted on May 3, 1988. The decision of the hearing officer noted 
the general rule that injuries incurred while travelling to and from work are 
not within the course of employment and that claimants had failed to establish 
that Archuleta's case fell within any of the recognized exceptions to that rule. 
The claim was denied. The claimants then petitioned the district court for 
judicial review. Although the district court approved of the rule cited by the 
hearing officer, it found the hearing officer's analysis incomplete and remanded 
for a determination of whether any causal nexus existed between employment which 
would render the injury compensable. On remand, the hearing officer determined 
there was no evidence, beyond the fact that he was in the process of leaving his 
employer's premises at the end of his work day, that would tie Archuleta's 
activities at the time of the accident to his employment. Citing the opinion of 
this court in Matter of Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1986), the hearing 
officer concluded that fact was insufficient to create a compensable nexus 
between injury and employment and once again denied compensation. The amended 
decision was affirmed by order of the district court on June 19, 
1989.

[¶5]      The parties to 
this appeal agree that Archuleta's death is compensable if it is an "injury" as 
that term is defined by our Worker's Compensation Act:

"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage 
to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used 
or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where 
the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. `Injury' does not 
include:

"(A) Any illness or 
communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the illness or disease is 
increased by the nature of the employment;

"(B) Injury caused 
by:

"(I) The fact the 
employee is intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance, or 
both, except any prescribed drug taken as directed by an authorized health care 
provider; or

"(II) The employee's 
willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.

"(C) Injury due solely to 
the culpable negligence of the injured employee;

"(D) Any injury sustained 
during travel to or from employment unless the employee is 
reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the 
employer;

"(E) Any injury sustained 
by the prisoner during or any harm resulting from any illegal activity engaged 
in by prisoners held under custody; or

"(F) Any injury or 
condition preexisting at the time of employment with the employer against whom a 
claim is made." (emphasis added) W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi) (June 1987 
Repl.).

In applying that 
definition of "injury," we are guided by the oft-stated principle that the act 
should be liberally construed to afford coverage wherever that may be 
accomplished without unreasonably extending the clear language of the statutes. 
Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 750 P.2d 1329, 
1331 (Wyo. 1988); Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 671 P.2d 303, 309 (Wyo. 1983). Consistent with that 
principle, we have construed the introductory paragraph of W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
to require that, for an injury to be compensable, there must exist some causal 
nexus between that injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 
892 (Wyo. 1984); Cottonwood Steel Corporation v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226, 1232-33 
(Wyo. 1982); Matter of Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 250 (Wyo. 1977). Subsections (A) 
through (F) of W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi) contain a number of statutory exceptions to 
the definition of the term "injury."

[¶6]      The hearing 
officer, in the present case, relied upon the exception contained in W.S. 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) to deny Archuleta's claim for benefits. That subsection 
codified a long-standing common law rule that injuries incurred while either 
going to or coming from work are not compensable unless the employer has in some 
fashion provided the employee with transportation or has reimbursed him for the 
costs of those travels. Matter of Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815, 816 (Wyo. 1983); 
Cottonwood Steel Corp., 655 P.2d at 1232-33; Willey, 571 P.2d  at 250-51. Thus, 
in terms of our "nexus test," that provision constitutes a legislative 
determination that, while no compensable nexus with the employment is generally 
present when an employee is travelling between home and work, such a nexus is 
created where the employer has assumed the cost of that travel. Archuleta now 
asks us to adopt a rule making injuries compensable in such "going and coming" 
cases where the employee's travels, though not subsidized, occurred on the 
employer's premises. This "premises rule," adopted by a majority of our sister 
states, has been articulated by one notable commentator in the following 
manner:

"As to employees having 
fixed hours and place of work, injuries occurring on the premises while they are 
going to and from work before or after working hours or at lunchtime are 
compensable, but if the injury occurs off the premises, it is not compensable, 
subject to several exceptions. Underlying some of these exceptions is the 
principle that course of employment should extend to any injury which occurred 
at a point where the employee was within range of dangers associated with the 
employment." 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 15.00 at p. 4-3 
(1989). See also §§ 15.10-.12(a).

Appellee argues 
that the adoption of this rule has been foreclosed by our decision in Matter of 
Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1986). We disagree.

[¶7]      In Corean, the 
claimant was injured on his employer's ranch (on the premises) while driving to 
his work site. We were urged in that case, but declined, to adopt a rule that 
would conclusively establish a causal nexus between an employee's injury and his 
employment if the injury occurred on the employer's premises. Citing the 
examples of employee suicide, an employee shot by a jilted lover, and an 
employee injured while repairing his personal automobile on the employer's 
premises, we determined that creating such a conclusive presumption from the 
mere fact that an injury occurred on the premises would "extend worker's 
compensation coverage beyond the bounds intended by the legislature." 723 P.2d  
at 61. We additionally noted that the application of such a presumption would be 
particularly inappropriate where, as was the case in Corean, the actual situs of 
the employee's work consisted of a relatively small portion of an extensive 
ranch. 723 P.2d  at 59-61, 63. Because we applied the proven and uniformly 
appropriate nexus test to determine the case, we found it unnecessary to further 
elucidate our position concerning the potential applicability of a proffered 
premises rule.

[¶8]      We noted in 
Corean that on-premises accidents are, indeed, most often causally connected to 
employment, thereby suggesting that a presumption created by rule might have 
considerable validity, albeit not the conclusive validity argued for in Corean. 
A trend toward adoption of a premises rule, insofar as it creates a rebuttable 
presumption of causal connection, has been foreshadowed by a number of our prior 
decisions. We have held, for instance, that "acts necessary to the life, 
comfort, or convenience of an employee while at work are incidental to the 
service, and an injury occurring while in the performance of such acts may be 
compensable." Rocky Mountain Tank & Steel Co. v. Rager, 423 P.2d 645, 648 
(Wyo. 1967). We have implicitly accepted the proposition that a causal relation 
exists between an injury and the employment where an employee is hurt during 
such diverse activities as using a bathroom on his employer's premises or while 
taking lunch or coffee breaks in an area provided by the employer. It is a 
logical progression now to extend that proposition to such necessary incidents 
of the employee's service as punching a time clock or entering and leaving the 
employer's premises during those periods immediately before and after work. 
Indeed, we have previously upheld a worker's compensation claim for an injury 
arising from a dangerous condition on the employer's premises even though the 
claimant, at the time of the injury, had completed his daily shift and had 
finished filling out his time card. Claim of Carey, 74 Wyo. 37, 283 P.2d 1005 
(1955). We have also recognized that injuries occurring after an employee has 
quit or has been fired are compensable if they occur while he is in the process 
of winding up his affairs and leaving the premises if they occur within a 
reasonable time after his termination. Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1241-42 
(Wyo. 1986).

[¶9]      We cannot see how 
the circumstances surrounding Archuleta's death differ significantly from the 
facts of these cases. To conclude otherwise and deny compensation to his 
survivors would be an obvious injustice. Accordingly, we hold that where the 
elements of the premises rule, as set forth above, have been established, a 
rebuttable presumption arises that the employee's injury is causally connected 
to his employment. The claimants in the present case established that, roughly 
fifteen minutes after finishing his regular hours of employment, Archuleta 
suffered a fatal injury while attempting to leave his employer's parking lot for 
home. No one else was involved in the accident, and it is uncontested that his 
only actions after leaving work were to scrape snow off his truck and to 
extricate the truck from deep snow. He was, at all times, at his regular place 
of employment on the premises of his employer. He was entitled to a presumption 
that the injury resulting in his death arose out of the course of his 
employment. To defeat his claim, the burden shifted to his employer to establish 
that his activity resulted in an injury not included under W.S. 
27-14-102(a)(xi).

[¶10]   The decision of the district court, 
affirming the administrative hearing officer's determination to the contrary, 
is, accordingly, reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

[¶11]   MACY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which GOLDEN, J., joined.

MACY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

[¶12]   I dissent. Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1977) clearly states that, before either the employer or the 
employee can invoke the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, the 
employee's injury must arise "out of and in the course of employment while at 
work" and that an injury sustained while an employee is "travel[ing] to or from 
employment" is not compensable "unless the employee is reimbursed for travel 
expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the employer."

[¶13]   Archuleta was not "in the course of 
employment while at work" when his injury occurred. He had completed his daily 
hazardous task as a custodian before he was injured. There is no nexus between 
the injury and a condition, activity, environment, or requirement of 
employment.

[¶14]   It is for the legislature to 
determine whether it wants a "premises" exception to the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act, not for this Court under the guise of liberal construction.