Title: State v. Smith

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 396A98
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
CLINTON CEBERT SMITH
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Butterfield,
J., on 13 April 1998 in Superior Court, Halifax County, upon a
jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. 
Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his
appeal of additional judgments was allowed by the Supreme Court
on 11 June 1999.  Heard in the Supreme Court 15 November 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Valérie B.
Spalding, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
Leslie Ann Laufer for defendant-appellant.
FREEMAN, Justice.
On 7 April 1998, defendant Clinton Cebert Smith was
found guilty of the January 1996 first-degree murder by poisoning
of his six-year-old daughter, Britteny, and the attempted murders
by poisoning of his ex-girlfriend, Sylvia Cotton (Cotton); his
three-year-old son, Jamal; and his four-year-old daughter,
Breanca.
The State’s evidence tended to show that defendant
dated Cotton for a number of years before they broke off their
relationship.  They had three children together, including
Britteny, Jamal, and Breanca.  Although all three children were
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born locally, defendant did not attend their births, and Cotton
did not know where defendant was when each child was born.  In
1992, when Cotton was asked to name the father of her children,
she lied at defendant’s request and gave a fictitious name
because defendant was already paying child support for another
child and could not afford to pay for Cotton’s children. 
Defendant played no role in the upbringing of Cotton’s three
children and would only, if pressed very hard, give Cotton money.
The State’s evidence revealed that defendant wanted to
resume his relationship with Cotton but that Cotton was not
interested because she had a new boyfriend whom she had met at
her job in Tarboro in 1995.  Cotton testified that on 25 December
1995, defendant asked her whether she was sleeping with her
co-worker/new boyfriend.  Cotton replied yes.  Defendant became
angry and told her if he could not have her, then her new
boyfriend could not have her either.  He also stated that he was
not going to let anyone else raise his children.  In another
conversation that month, defendant told Cotton he was going to go
to her job to pick her up and if he saw her walk out with her new
boyfriend, he would shoot them both.
The State presented evidence that defendant worked
part-time for Bruce Josey at Gallberry Farm.  In connection with
his duties at the farm, defendant handled farm chemicals and had
access to the locked chemical bins containing Di-Syston and
Temik, both lethal pesticides.  All the farm workers were
verbally warned of the dangers in handling the farm chemicals. 
The State also presented evidence that defendant worked part-time
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at an Etna gas station.  In October 1995, when defendant
discovered Cotton had a new boyfriend, he told Jimmy Brinson, an
Etna co-worker, that if he found out who the new boyfriend was,
he would “get him.”  Thurman Arrington, one of defendant’s
co-workers at Gallberry Farm, also testified that on another
occasion, defendant said he was going to Tarboro, the town where
Cotton worked, to beat up her boyfriend.
The State’s evidence further tended to show that around
Christmas 1995, defendant asked Brinson whether police would have
sufficient evidence to convict defendant if he told somebody he
was going to kill a person and then did so.  Brinson also
testified that defendant told him the Department of Social
Services (DSS) was taking over half his paycheck for child
support for the three children, and he was tired of paying.
On 16 January 1996, Arrington arrived at the Etna gas
station at 6:30 a.m. to get some refreshments.  Defendant was
inside the Etna gas station and asked Arrington what time they
were supposed to report to work at the farm.  Defendant then said
he was going to get some Temik because his father wanted to kill
some big rats at his house.  Defendant left the gas station in
his truck.  At about 7:30 a.m. or 8:30 a.m., Arrington was
sitting in his truck outside a barbecue diner, along with
co-worker Anthony Hines, when defendant drove up behind him.
Defendant got out of his truck and walked to the
driver’s side of Arrington’s truck carrying a brown paper grocery
bag.  Defendant told Arrington that he got the Temik to kill the
rats at his father’s house.  Defendant opened the bag so
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Arrington could see.  Arrington told defendant the chemical was
dangerous and to be careful with it.  Hines got out of
Arrington’s truck and walked around it to talk to defendant. 
Hines also saw the contents of defendant’s bag.  After defendant
drove away, Arrington told Hines the contents of the bag looked
like Di-Syston.  Defendant did not work at the farm that day.
On her way to work that same day, Cotton took her three
children across the street from her house to babysitter Ellen
Lassiter’s house at the usual time of about 5:30 a.m.  Cotton
dropped her children off early in the mornings because she did
not own a car; she had to catch a ride from a co-worker; and it
took about thirty minutes to get to her work.  Lassiter put Jamal
and Breanca on the school bus at 7:00 a.m.  Between 7:30 a.m. and
8:00 a.m., while Britteny was still at Lassiter’s house waiting
for her late school bus, Lassiter and Britteny saw defendant go
into Cotton’s house.  As the morning wore on, Lassiter saw the
pickup truck defendant was driving parked about four or five
houses away from Cotton’s house.  Around 10:00 a.m. or 10:30
a.m., Lassiter noticed the truck again, but this time it was
parked beside defendant’s sister Patty’s house, directly across
the street from Lassiter, and next door to Cotton’s house. 
Lassiter last noticed the truck around 4:00 p.m.
Nathaniel Williams, who lived on the same street as
Cotton and Lassiter, testified that about 10:00 a.m. he saw
defendant coming out of Cotton’s house.  A short time later, at
10:15 a.m., he again saw defendant coming out of Cotton’s house,
this time with a folded over brown grocery bag in his hand. 
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Nathaniel Williams shouted a greeting to defendant, and they both
laughed.
A few minutes after 5:00 p.m. that day, Cotton got home
from work, went inside her house, and noticed some balloons and a
box on top of her VCR in the living room.  She knew they had to
be from defendant because he was the only one who went into her
house without her permission.  Cotton testified she had never
given defendant a key to her house.  In fact, Cotton had lost her
own key to the house a while back and had to get in her house
through the front window.
Around 5:30 p.m., Cotton arrived at Lassiter’s house to
pick up her three children.  Lassiter told Cotton that defendant
had gone into her house.  Cotton replied that defendant had left
balloons and other items there in an attempt to get back together
again.  Thereafter, Cotton and her three children went to their
home, and Cotton began cooking dinner.  Cotton noticed the
kitchen had a funny smell.  Cotton later testified that it was
the same smell as the State’s exhibit of Di-Syston.
While Cotton was preparing dinner, Breanca asked for
some Kool-Aid.  Cotton got a pitcher of cherry Kool-Aid out of
the refrigerator and poured the drink into glasses for her three
children.  One of the children told Cotton the Kool-Aid did not
taste right.  Thereafter, Cotton tasted the Kool-Aid and found it
to be gritty and bitter.  Looking into the Kool-Aid pitcher, she
saw something that looked like grit and little red strings in the
liquid.  She subsequently dumped out the contents of the pitcher. 
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Cotton then prepared a fresh batch of Kool-Aid and gave it to her
children, along with their dinner.
Sometime after 11:00 p.m., Breanca awakened Cotton
because Britteny had wet the bed, she was crying, she had bubbly
spit coming from her mouth, and her stomach was hurting. 
Britteny’s stomach appeared swollen.  Shortly thereafter, Jamal
had diarrhea, and Cotton noticed that his lips were chapped. 
Cotton tended to her sick children and put them back to bed. 
Around 11:30 p.m. or 11:45 p.m., Breanca reawakened Cotton
because Britteny had wet the bed again.  Cotton called her aunt,
Carolyn Williams, who took Cotton and the children to the
hospital during the early morning hours of 17 January 1996.  A
doctor gave Britteny and Jamal an injection for vomiting and
diarrhea because he thought the problem might be a twenty-four
hour virus.
On the way home from the hospital, Breanca began
complaining that her stomach was hurting.  All three children
were sick throughout the night.  At about 4:00 a.m., Cotton
cleaned the kitchen floor because the children had vomited all
over it.  Later that morning, when Cotton went to wake her
children, she noticed that Britteny’s mouth was purplish-grey and
that she appeared to have no heartbeat.  Cotton called 911, and
the ambulance took Britteny and Jamal to the hospital.  Cotton
and Breanca followed the ambulance in a separate car, driven by
Carolyn Williams, to the Our Community Emergency Room in Scotland
Neck.  Defendant arrived at the emergency room about an hour
after Cotton and the others.
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While waiting in the emergency room, Breanca began
vomiting.  The doctors took Breanca where the other two children
were in order to monitor her condition as well.  Shortly
thereafter, Cotton began to feel sick herself.  A doctor checked
Cotton, who complained about a terrible headache and being
disoriented.  The doctor gave Cotton oxygen and a tranquilizer. 
Subsequently, a doctor told Cotton that Britteny had died, and
the other two children were being transferred to Pitt Memorial
Hospital.
Cotton was allowed to see Britteny for a few minutes. 
When she got to Britteny’s room, Cotton’s aunt, one of her
cousins, defendant, and a nurse were already there.  Defendant
asked the nurse whether Britteny had died from carbon monoxide
poisoning, and she said it looked like it, but she was not sure. 
Defendant repeatedly blurted out, without being questioned, that
Britteny died from carbon monoxide poisoning because of Cotton’s
cooking stove.  The nurse reminded him that they did not know
what caused her death.  Thereafter, defendant left the room so he
could visit his other two children at Pitt Memorial Hospital.
After a few minutes, Cotton began having a terrible
headache and became disoriented.  She was taken to Nash General
Hospital by ambulance.  After Cotton checked out of the hospital,
her aunt drove her to Cotton’s house.  Cotton was not permitted
to enter her own house, so she went to her aunt’s house.
Dr. John Meredith was working at Pitt Memorial on
17 January 1996.  Dr. Meredith testified about the steps taken to
treat Breanca and Jamal, stating tests revealed the two children
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were not suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning but had
symptoms consistent with organophosphate poisoning.  Dr. Meredith
also testified that defendant appeared, stating that he was the
father of the two children and that they had been poisoned by
their mother.
Alice Daniels, a social worker at Pitt Memorial
Hospital, testified she was on duty and saw defendant talking to
Dr. Meredith on 17 January 1996.  Her job was to give emotional
support to the family of Breanca and Jamal.  Daniels later spoke
to defendant, asked him what had happened to the children, and
what if anything he had given them to eat or drink.  Defendant
replied that he had not done anything and that Cotton must have
given the children some Kool-Aid.
Later that evening, Cotton went to Pitt Memorial to see
Breanca and Jamal.  Jamal was in intensive care hooked up to a
number of machines because he had great difficulty breathing and
had suffered several seizures.  Breanca was in a regular room. 
As Cotton went to see Breanca, she passed defendant in the
hallway.  Breanca immediately told Cotton that defendant said
Cotton was a bad person because she gave bad chicken to the
children.
Breanca was released from Pitt Memorial after about a
week.  Jamal spent two or three days in intensive care and then
was moved to a regular room.  He was released from Pitt Memorial
about two days after Breanca.  DSS then took the two children,
and Cotton returned to her aunt’s house.  Cotton was eventually
reunited with her children.
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On 19 January 1996, defendant saw co-worker Arrington
again and told him defendant’s mother and father asked that
Arrington say nothing about the “rat” poison.  While officers
were investigating the case, they found a brown paper grocery bag
with traces of Di-Syston in Cotton’s trash can.  Defendant was
arrested on 2 February 1996.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is whether the trial
court erred in excusing for cause prospective juror Alfonzia
Knight, who indicated he might have difficulty voting in favor of
a death sentence.  To determine whether a prospective juror may
be excused for cause in a capital punishment case, the trial
court must consider whether the juror’s views would “prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.”  Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 (1985). 
Prospective jurors may also be properly excused for cause if they
are unable to “‘state clearly that they are willing to
temporarily set aside their own beliefs, in deference to the rule
of law.’”  State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d 905, 908
(1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 90 L. Ed.
2d 137, 149-50 (1986)) (emphasis omitted).
This Court has previously noted that “a prospective
juror’s bias for or against the death penalty cannot always be
proven with unmistakable clarity.”  State v. Miller, 339 N.C.
663, 679, 455 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 893, 133 L.
Ed. 2d 169 (1995).  Thus, the trial court’s decision to dismiss a
juror for cause is discretionary and will not be disturbed absent
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an abuse of discretion.  State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 270, 464
S.E.2d 448, 461 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed.
2d 1080 (1996).
In the instant case, prospective juror Knight stated he
was not really “for” the death penalty.  He told the trial court
it would be possible for him to recommend death, but he did not
think he could tell the court that he would honestly, fairly, and
equally consider the death penalty.  He also stated that “[i]f
circumstances are just tremendously in favor, maybe [he could
consider a sentence of death], but [he is] ninety-nine percent
against it though.”  The trial court carefully and meticulously
considered this matter, as evidenced by the transcript concerning
the voir dire of this particular juror.  Since Knight did not
state clearly that he was willing to temporarily set aside his
own beliefs in deference to the rule of law, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excusing him for cause.  Thus, this
assignment of error is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, defendant claims the
trial court erred in denying his motion to preclude the State
from using its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner during the jury selection process.  The use of peremptory
challenges for racially discriminatory reasons violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 69 (1986).  The North Carolina Constitution, Article I,
Section 26, also prohibits the exercise of peremptory challenges
solely on the basis of race.  See State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280,
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284, 449 S.E.2d 556, 560 (1994).  Defendant contends the State’s
use of a peremptory challenge to remove prospective juror Freeman
Reynolds was race-based and is not supported by the record.  He
asserts Reynolds’ responses to questioning demonstrated he had a
good layman’s understanding of the law requiring him to weigh the
circumstances surrounding the crime.
When evaluating a claim of racial discrimination based
on the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges, (1) defendant
must establish a prima facie case that the peremptory challenge
was exercised on the basis of race, and if this showing is made;
(2) the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a racially
neutral explanation to rebut defendant’s prima facie case; and
(3) the trial court must determine whether defendant has proven
purposeful discrimination.  State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 308-
09, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 139
L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998). 
In the instant case, the trial court concluded that
defendant had not made a prima facie showing that the peremptory
challenge was exercised on the basis of race, but the trial court
permitted the State to make any comments for the record that it
chose to make.  Where the trial court rules that a defendant has
failed to make a prima facie showing, our review is limited to
whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to
make a prima facie showing, even if the State offers reasons for
its exercise of the peremptory challenges.  State v. Hoffman, 348
N.C. 548, 554, 500 S.E.2d 718, 722-23 (1998). 
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One of the factors to review in determining whether a
defendant has made a prima facie showing that the peremptory
challenge was exercised on the basis of race is whether the
prosecutor used a disproportionate number of peremptory
challenges to strike African-American jurors in a single case. 
State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 397-98, 459 S.E.2d 638, 656
(1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1996). 
Defendant notes the State exercised six of its eight peremptory
challenges to excuse blacks, and that number was disproportionate
to the fifty to sixty percent of blacks in Halifax County. 
Defendant claims the trial court also failed to undertake a
further inquiry into the other five black prospective jurors who
had previously been peremptorily excused by the State.  Not until
the State exercised a peremptory challenge against Reynolds, its
eighth, did defendant make his first Batson challenge.  Further,
defendant did not make any specific Batson challenge to the other
five peremptorily excused black prospective jurors, and
therefore, the trial court had no obligation to inquire into the
reasons for striking those jurors.
Although not dispositive, one factor tending to refute
an allegation of peremptory challenges being exercised on the
basis of race is the acceptance rate of black jurors by the
prosecution.  Id. at 398, 459 S.E.2d at 656-57.  Here, the
prosecutor had accepted the first black to enter the jury box,
and had also struck whites before striking prospective juror
Reynolds.
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Other factors to review in determining whether a
defendant has made a prima facie showing of peremptory challenges
being exercised on the basis of race include defendant’s race,
the victim’s race, the race of the State’s key witnesses, and
whether the prosecutor made racially motivated statements or
asked racially motivated questions of black prospective jurors
that raise an inference of discrimination.  Gregory, 340 N.C. at
397-98, 459 S.E.2d at 656.  In the instant case, defendant is
black; the murdered child victim, Britteny, was black; and the
surviving three victims, two of whom were the State’s key
witnesses, are black.  After carefully reviewing the record, we
also conclude that the prosecutor did not make any racially
motivated comments, nor did he ask racially motivated questions
of the black prospective jurors.
We conclude the trial court did not err in finding that
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing and, thus, the
trial court did not err in denying defendant’s challenge to the
State’s use of its peremptory challenges.  Additionally, we note
the record shows that the jury was composed of four black males,
one black female, three white males, and four white females.  The
alternates were one black female and one black male.  Thus, of
the fourteen jurors accepted by both sides, seven were black and
seven were white.  This assignment of error is overruled.
In his third assignment of error, defendant contends
the trial court erred in admitting hearsay, bad character, and
prior bad acts evidence in the State’s case.  More specifically,
defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting:  (1) alleged
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hearsay statements of DSS Program Manager, Melody Beaver;
(2) alleged hearsay statements of defendant’s daughter, Breanca;
(3) certain inadmissible statements made to defendant’s Etna
co-worker, Jimmy Brinson; and (4) statements allegedly violating
evidence Rules 403 and 404.  “The erroneous admission of hearsay,
like the erroneous admission of other evidence, is not always so
prejudicial as to require a new trial.”  State v. Ramey, 318 N.C.
457, 470, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986).  Defendant has the burden
of showing error and that there was a reasonable possibility that
a different result would have been reached at trial if such error
had not occurred.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1999).
In the instant case, DSS worker Melody Beaver testified
that beginning 8 November 1994, defendant was ordered to pay
child support for his three children.  On 13 December 1995,
approximately one month before Britteny’s death, defendant moved
to terminate child support payments, stating as a circumstance
that both parents were working and that they had been living
together for the past few years.  Cotton was not at the
courthouse when the motion came on for hearing.  Defendant
explained his story to a district court judge, who temporarily
suspended the child support order.  The judge further ordered DSS
to investigate Cotton for possible welfare fraud and continued
the case.  DSS investigated the fraud allegation, finding there
was no fraud, Cotton was not receiving welfare, and defendant was
not living in her home.  On 10 January 1996, Beaver told
defendant’s lawyer that DSS planned to put on evidence in court
showing defendant had lied because he was not living with Cotton,
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and that DSS would seek to have the child support order
reinstated.  However, this matter was not pursued because
defendant was arrested for the murder of Britteny.
Defendant contends Beaver’s testimony was hearsay
because the information was not really a personal investigation. 
Also, defendant claims Beaver’s testimony is prejudicial because
it tends to show motive and bad character, identifying defendant
as the perpetrator.  Defendant contends that although Beaver
personally checked her computer for certain information, she
talked only to her staff, who in turn talked to the people in
Scotland Neck, where Cotton and her children had lived.  Further,
defendant claims there were no notes in Beaver’s file describing
the conversations with people in Scotland Neck.
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake, entrapment, or accident.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,
Rule 404(b) (1999).  Rule 404(b) is “a general rule of inclusion
of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by a
defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion
if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the
propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of
the crime charged.”  State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389
S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).  The State contends one of defendant’s
motives for killing his child, and attempting to kill his other
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two children and ex-girlfriend Cotton, was so he would not have
to pay child support.  Contrary to defendant’s assertions, this
evidence was not admitted to show his bad character.  Instead, it
was properly used to show his motive for the murder and attempted
murders, and to show the particular circumstances leading up to
them.
Moreover, a review of the record shows that Beaver
testified several times concerning this information and that
defendant at least twice failed to object.  Therefore, even if
this evidence was deemed to be hearsay, its admission was
harmless error since it was already before the jury.
The trial court admitted several statements by
defendant’s daughter Breanca, who was four years old at the time
of the attempted murder but six years old at the time of trial,
including a statement that defendant said Cotton was a bad person
because she gave her children some bad chicken.  The prosecutor
informed the trial court he would not be calling Breanca because
she was too young.  The trial court concluded Breanca was
unavailable because of her tender age.  During Cotton’s
testimony, defendant objected to hearsay statements from Breanca
concerning the children’s physical suffering.  Defendant contends
the trial court erred by allowing Cotton to testify without
personally examining or observing Breanca before it made a
determination that Breanca was not available.  See State v.
Fearing, 315 N.C. 167, 174, 337 S.E.2d 551, 555 (1985). 
Defendant further claims this testimony was unfairly prejudicial
because it tended to show he was trying to cover up his tracks;
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he was throwing blame on Cotton; and therefore, that he was the
perpetrator.  Defendant did not assign error to the trial court’s
ruling on this issue, and therefore, he has abandoned it pursuant
to N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5).  In addition, defendant has failed
to show plain error in light of the overwhelming evidence in the
record of defendant’s guilt.
The State also presented evidence that defendant told
an Etna co-worker, Jimmy Brinson, that DSS was taking over half
his paycheck for child support, and he was tired of paying. 
Defendant contends this testimony was prejudicial because it
showed he had a motive and started to formulate a plan to poison
someone, and it therefore led to the conclusion that he was the
perpetrator.  As previously mentioned, motive and plan are proper
methods for use of this type of evidence under Rule 404(b).  In
addition, the trial court initially sustained defendant’s
objections regarding this issue and allowed his motions to
strike.  The trial court further instructed the jury to disregard
the witness’ answer.  Only after the prosecutor framed the
questions in a permissible manner did the trial court overrule
defendant’s objections.  This Court presumes that a jury follows
a trial court’s instructions.  See State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428,
455, 509 S.E.2d 178, 196 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___
L. Ed. 2d ___, 68 U.S.L.W. 3224 (1999).  These statements were
properly admitted.
Defendant told Brinson he used to take puppies and
kittens, put them in a peanut sack, and drown them.  He also told
Brinson he saw farmer Josey’s dog eat peanuts contaminated with
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Temik, it was “bad stuff,” and it did not take much to make the
dog sick.  Defendant claims this evidence was used to show only
his bad character.  However, defendant failed to object to this
testimony at trial and has failed to show plain error in light of
the overwhelming evidence.  This evidence includes defendant’s
threats to kill Cotton and their children, his trip to the farm
to obtain a pesticide he knew was extremely deadly, his showing
the pesticide to two people in a brown paper grocery bag, his
trip to Cotton’s house to put it in the Kool-Aid, and his later
refusal to say anything at the hospital about the real reason for
his children’s grave illness even while medical personnel fought
to save their lives.  Thus, this assignment of error is
overruled.
Fourth, defendant claims the trial court erred in
denying his request to instruct the jurors on the element of
malice for the charges of first-degree murder by means of poison
and attempted first-degree murder by means of poison.  See State
v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 201, 344 S.E.2d 775, 780 (1986).  The
trial court charged the jury as to the murder of Britteny that if
it found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally
administered a substance known to him to be poison to the victim,
thereby proximately causing her death, the jury should find
defendant guilty of first-degree murder by means of poison.  The
trial court repeated the above charge for the three first-degree
attempted murders as well.
This Court has previously concluded that N.C.G.S. §
14-17 “separat[es] first-degree murder into four distinct classes
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as determined by the proof:  (1) murder perpetrated by means of
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or torture;
(2) murder perpetuated by any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing; (3) murder committed in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain enumerated
felonies; and (4) murder committed in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of any other felony committed or attempted
with the use of a deadly weapon.”  Johnson, 317 N.C. at 202, 344
S.E.2d at 781.  “Any murder committed by means of poison is
automatically first-degree murder.”  Id. at 204, 344 S.E.2d at
782.  As this Court has previously stated, “premeditation and
deliberation is not an element of the crime of first-degree
murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait,
imprisonment, starving, or torture; and . . . an intent to kill
is not an element of first-degree murder where the homicide is
carried out by one of these methods.”  Id. at 203, 344 S.E.2d at
781.
“[M]alice, as it is ordinarily understood, means not
only hatred, ill will, or spite, but also that condition of mind
which prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally,
without just cause, excuse, or justification, or to wantonly act
in such a manner as to manifest depravity of mind, a heart devoid
of a sense of social duty, and a callous disregard for human
life.”  State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466, 481, 406 S.E.2d 579, 587
(1991).  This Court has already stated that murder by torture,
which is in the same class as murder by poison, “is a dangerous
activity of such reckless disregard for human life that, like
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felony murder, malice is implied by the law.  The commission of
torture implies the requisite malice, and a separate showing of
malice is not necessary.”  Id. at 481, 406 S.E.2d at 587-88.  We
hold that the same reasoning applies for the crime of first-
degree murder by poison and conclude that a separate showing of
malice is not necessary.  Thus, this assignment of error is
overruled.
Fifth, defendant claims the trial court erred in
denying his request to instruct the jurors on the lesser included
offenses of involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter
because they do not require malice.  A defendant is entitled to
have a lesser included offense submitted to the jury only when
there is evidence to support that lesser included offense.  State
v. Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 735-36, 268 S.E.2d 201, 204 (1980).  If
the State’s evidence is sufficient to fully satisfy its burden of
proving each element of the greater offense and there is no
evidence to negate those elements other than defendant’s denial
that he committed the offense, defendant is not entitled to an
instruction on the lesser offense.  Johnson, 317 N.C. at 205, 344
S.E.2d at 782.
“Involuntary manslaughter has been defined as the
unlawful and unintentional killing of another without malice
which proximately results from an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony [and not] naturally dangerous to human life, or by an act
or omission constituting culpable negligence.”  Id. at 205, 344
S.E.2d at 782-83.  In the instant case, defendant was not
entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.  The
-21-
evidence presented showed defendant had knowledge of and
experience with farm pesticides; he made a trip to the farm to
obtain the deadly pesticide used in the murder; he concocted a
story as to why he needed the poison; he showed the poison in a
brown paper grocery bag to two people; he went to Cotton’s house
to put it in the Kool-Aid; and as his children lay dying or
deathly ill, he failed to say anything at the hospital as to the
real reason his children were sick.  Since the State’s evidence
was sufficient to fully satisfy its burden of proving each
element of first-degree murder by means of poison and attempted
first-degree murder by means of poison, and there was no other
evidence to negate these elements other than defendant’s denial
that he committed the offense, defendant was not entitled to an
instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary
manslaughter.  See State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 293, 298
S.E.2d 645, 657-58 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by
Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 344 S.E.2d 775.
Defendant also appears to contend an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter should have been given.  This contention
is not raised in any assignment of error and is therefore
abandoned.  N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5).
Next, defendant claims the trial court erred in
allowing prosecutorial misconduct in the sentencing proceeding of
this trial concerning:  (1) improper “gamesmanship,” and (2) an
improper closing argument.  As a general rule, counsel is allowed
wide latitude in the jury argument during the capital sentencing
proceeding.  State v. Soyers, 332 N.C. 47, 60, 418 S.E.2d 480,
-22-
487 (1992).  Counsel is permitted to argue the facts that have
been presented as well as reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom.  State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405,
410 (1986).  Further, arguments are to be viewed in the context
in which they are made and the overall factual circumstances to
which they refer.  State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 692-93, 473
S.E.2d 291, 306 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1095, 136 L. Ed.
2d 719 (1997).
In the instant case, defendant contends the prosecutor
engaged in “abusive gamesmanship” because he put on testimony by
defendant’s cousin, Mary Ann Pittman, concerning defendant’s
prior conviction for taking indecent liberties with his cousin’s
teenage daughter.  Defendant claims this evidence was already
declared inadmissible by the trial court, but the prosecutor
introduced it in order to rebut the testimony of twelve witnesses
who testified as to defendant’s good character.  The prosecutor
also called Detective Wheeler to further testify about the
conviction for taking indecent liberties.  Defendant contends the
prosecutor flagrantly misrepresented that the detective was going
to testify about his investigation of that case.
A review of the record reveals defendant has failed to
show prejudice in light of the jury’s prior knowledge, including
the testimony of defendant’s own character witnesses during the
sentencing proceeding, concerning defendant’s guilty plea and
conviction for indecent liberties.  Moreover, the trial court
immediately instructed the jury to disregard Pittman’s answer
when the prosecutor sought to elicit hearsay testimony.  Further,
-23-
the trial court sustained defendant’s objection to any further
questioning of the detective after he was permitted to state to
the jury only that he began his investigation with the Pittman
family.  Thus, the trial court did not err.
Defendant also claims the prosecutor made an improper
closing argument because he undertook to discredit Dr. Claudia
Coleman, a clinical psychologist, through insult and unwarranted
personal attacks.  Defendant points to the prosecutor’s claims
that:  it was amazing what people would do for money, Coleman
could not possibly tell what was going on in defendant’s mind two
years ago, Coleman’s report showed nothing but that defendant was
sleep deprived, and Coleman ought to be on the Psychic Friends
Network.
Defendant failed to object during closing arguments and
“the trial court is not required to intervene ex mero motu unless
the argument strays so far from the bounds of propriety as to
impede defendant's right to a fair trial.”  State v. Atkins, 349
N.C. 62, 84, 505 S.E.2d 97, 111 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036 (1999).  “Trial counsel is allowed wide
latitude in argument to the jury and may argue all of the
evidence which has been presented as well as reasonable
inferences which arise therefrom.”  State v. Guevara, 349 N.C.
243, 257, 506 S.E.2d 711, 721 (1998), cert. denied,     U.S.    ,
143 L. Ed. 2d 1013, (1999).  “Whether counsel abuses this
privilege is a matter ordinarily left to the sound discretion of
the trial judge, and we will not review the exercise of this
discretion unless there be such gross impropriety in the argument
-24-
as would be likely to influence the verdict of the jury.”   State
v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 328, 226 S.E.2d 629, 640 (1976).
Rather than merely focusing on the fact that the
witness had been paid, the thrust and bulk of the prosecutor’s
argument was that the expert testimony did not provide a factual
basis for finding that defendant murdered while under the
influence of an emotional or mental condition.  Consequently, the
prosecutor’s argument was not so “grossly improper” as to require
the trial court to intervene ex mero motu.
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion to instruct the jury in the sentencing
proceeding about the meaning of life imprisonment.  The trial
court stated it would “adhere precisely” to the pattern jury
instructions.  For first-degree murder offenses occurring on or
after 1 October 1994, the phrase “without parole” is required
when instructing on life imprisonment.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002
(1999).  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 provides: 
If the recommendation of the jury is that the
defendant be imprisoned for life in the
State’s prison, the judge shall impose a
sentence of imprisonment for life in the
State’s prison, without parole.  
     The judge shall instruct the jury, in
words substantially equivalent to those of
this section, that a sentence of life
imprisonment means a sentence of life without
parole.
Id.
The transcript reveals the trial court instructed the
jury, verbatim from the pattern jury instruction, that “[i]f you
unanimously recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole, the Court will impose a sentence of life imprisonment
-25-
without parole.”  N.C.P.I.--Crim. 150.10 (1998).  In addition,
the verdict sheet stated the jurors could choose between “Life
Imprisonment Without Parole” or “Death.”  While we find the trial
court’s instructions are substantially equivalent to the
statutory requirement, the better practice would be to charge
precisely as the statute states:  “a sentence of life
imprisonment means a sentence of life without parole.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2002.  Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to give
the requested instruction.
Further, defendant contends the trial court erred by
failing to submit to the jury in the sentencing proceeding the
statutory mitigating circumstance that defendant had no
significant history of prior criminal activity pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1).  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) provides:
Instructions determined by the trial judge to
be warranted by the evidence shall be given
by the court in its charge to the jury prior
to its deliberation in determining sentence. 
In all cases in which the death penalty may
be authorized, the judge shall include in his
instructions to the jury that it must
consider any aggravating circumstance or
circumstances or mitigating circumstance or
circumstances from the lists provided in
subsections (e) and (f) which may be
supported by the evidence, and shall furnish
to the jury a written list of issues relating
to such aggravating or mitigating
circumstance or circumstances.
N.C.G.S. §  15A-2000(b) (1999) (emphasis added).  Although the
better practice is to request submission of a mitigator at trial,
if the evidence is sufficient, defendant’s failure to request the
submission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance does not
discharge the trial court from its duty to submit the
-26-
circumstance if the evidence is sufficient for a juror to
reasonably find that the circumstance exists.  State v. Jones,
346 N.C. 704, 715, 487 S.E.2d 714, 721 (1997).
“When the trial court is deciding whether a rational
juror could reasonably find this mitigating circumstance to
exist, the nature and age of the prior criminal activities are
important, and the mere number of criminal activities is not
dispositive.”  State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 102, 478 S.E.2d 146,
161 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997). 
Unadjudicated crimes may properly be considered in determining
the sufficiency of the evidence under (f)(1).  State v. Ingle,
336 N.C. 617, 643, 445 S.E.2d 880, 893 (1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1020, 131 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1995).  However, the length of a
defendant’s criminal history, by itself, is not determinative for
purposes of submitting the (f)(1) mitigator.  Jones, 346 N.C. at
715, 487 S.E.2d at 721.
“A significant history of prior criminal activity for
purposes of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1) is one likely to influence
the jury’s sentence recommendation.”  Atkins, 349 N.C. at 88, 505
S.E.2d at 113.  A trial court’s error in failing to submit
statutory mitigating circumstances where there is sufficient
evidence “‘is prejudicial unless the State can demonstrate on
appeal that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Jones,
346 N.C. at 717, 487 S.E.2d at 722 (quoting State v. Quick, 337
N.C. 359, 363, 446 S.E.2d 535, 538 (1994)).
In the instant case, defendant did not request that the
(f)(1) circumstance be submitted to the jury, thus implying
-27-
defendant felt his prior history of criminal activity did not
warrant its submission.  The evidence of defendant’s prior
criminal activity was a conviction for indecent liberties with a
minor approximately one year prior to this offense, previous
recent assaults on Cotton, recently communicated death threats
against Cotton, recently communicated death threats against
Cotton’s new boyfriend, and defendant’s history of drowning young
puppies and kittens.  Given the extent of this recent criminal
activity, the trial court properly could have determined that no
reasonable juror could conclude that defendant’s history of prior
criminal activity was insignificant.
This case is more similar to cases where this Court has
determined the trial courts have correctly not submitted the
(f)(1) mitigator.  See, e.g., Atkins, 349 N.C. at 88, 505 S.E.2d
at 114; State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 522, 459 S.E.2d 747, 765
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996). 
As in those cases, in the case sub judice, “defendant’s prior
history of criminal activity . . . is mainly related to
assaultive behaviors which were primarily directed toward the
ultimate victim of his violence and the ultimate cause of his
being convicted of murder.”  Atkins, 349 N.C. at 89, 505 S.E.2d
at 114.  As previously mentioned, the record reveals defendant
threatened Cotton because of her new boyfriend and defendant said
if he could not have her, then her new boyfriend could not have
her either.  Defendant also threatened Cotton when he told her he
was going to go to her job to pick her up one day, and if he saw
her walk out with her new boyfriend, he would shoot them both. 
-28-
The record reveals defendant told two separate co-workers,
Brinson and Arrington, that he was going to beat up Cotton’s new
boyfriend, and he also threatened to kill him.
Further, Cotton’s aunt, Carolyn Williams, told officers
investigating the case that defendant had threatened Cotton quite
a few times and had beaten her a couple of times.  Cotton also
told Williams that defendant had threatened her since defendant
had gone to court on 4 January 1996 concerning the child support
matter.  Cotton testified that on another occasion, defendant
came to her house and demanded to know with whom she was speaking
on the phone.  When Cotton said it was her new boyfriend,
defendant grabbed the phone and threw it against the wall,
breaking the phone.  He also threw Cotton down on the sofa and
struck her a couple of times in the face with his fists.  When
Cotton told their daughter Britteny to go across the street to
Lassiter’s house to call the police, defendant grabbed the child. 
Cotton told defendant to let go of the child, which he did, and
Lassiter came over to see if Cotton was okay.  Cotton testified
she did not tell the police about the incident because of her
shame at being beaten by defendant.
Defendant had a history of violence against Cotton, and
he had also previously harmed another child when he took indecent
liberties with a family member, his cousin’s defenseless minor
daughter.  Moreover, defendant was still on probation for the
conviction for indecent liberties with a minor when he planned
and carried out the murder and attempted murders of his
ex-girlfriend and their three children.  Defendant’s history of
-29-
significant criminal conduct is one likely to influence the jury
to recommend death, rather than life.  “Combined with the
evidence of his other prior criminal activities, these assaultive
criminal activities make defendant’s case for submission of the
(f)(1) mitigating circumstance at least as weak, if not weaker,
than the argument which we rejected [in other cases].”  Id. 
Given the nature and recency of his record of assault, we cannot
say the trial court erred in its determination to decline to
submit the (f)(1) mitigator. 
Defendant also claims the trial court erred in denying
his request for peremptory instructions on the statutory
mitigating circumstances that the capital felony was committed
while defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance, and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law was impaired, as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2)
and (f)(6), respectively.  Even though the trial court refused to
give the requested peremptory instruction on the (f)(2)
mitigating circumstance that the murder was committed while
defendant was under the influence of a mental or emotional
disturbance, one or more of the jurors still found it to exist. 
However, none of the jurors found the (f)(6) mitigator that
defendant’s ability to conform his conduct to the law was
impaired.
A trial court should, if requested, give a peremptory
instruction for any mitigating circumstance, whether statutory or
nonstatutory, if it is supported by uncontroverted evidence.  See
-30-
State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 568, 508 S.E.2d 253, 274 (1998),
cert. denied,     U.S.   , 144 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1999).  In the
instant case, defendant’s evidence supporting the (f)(2) and
(f)(6) mitigating circumstances was in fact controverted. 
Defendant’s experts both testified defendant had borderline
mental intelligence and a reading disorder.  However, the
psychologist conceded defendant worked, earned his living, had a
driver’s license, and functioned within the limits of his
intelligence.  Neither expert and no other witness testified that
defendant was in any way enraged or intoxicated at the time of
the crimes.  In contrast, the State’s evidence tended to show
defendant cold-heartedly and calmly planned to obtain a pesticide
he knew was lethal from the farm where he worked; he did so and
showed it to two people; he concocted a story for his need of the
poison; he went to Cotton’s house and put the poison in the Kool-
Aid; he was seen after he had done so and appeared to be normal;
he appeared at the hospital cunningly passing the blame to his
girlfriend for his children’s illness; and as they lay deathly
ill or dying, he remained silent as to the actual cause of his
children’s and former girlfriend’s suffering.  Because we
conclude that the evidence as to the (f)(2) and (f)(6) mitigating
circumstances was conflicting, we overrule this assignment of
error.
Defendant next raises four additional issues which he
concedes this Court has previously decided against his position,
including:  (1) the aggravating circumstance that the murder was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” as set forth in
-31-
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9), is vague and overbroad; (2) the trial
court erred in instructing the jury that it had the duty to
impose the death penalty if it found that the mitigators failed
to outweigh the aggravators; (3) the trial court erred by its use
of the word “may” in sentencing Issues Three and Four; and
(4) the trial court erred in instructing that nonstatutory
mitigators are not mitigating as a matter of law.  Defendant
raises these issues for purposes of permitting this Court to
reexamine its prior holdings and also for the purpose of
preserving them for any possible further judicial review.  We
have considered defendant’s arguments on these issues and find no
compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings.  Therefore,
these assignments of error are overruled.
Having concluded that defendant’s trial and capital
sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we must now
review the record and determine:  (1) whether the evidence
supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury and upon
which the sentencing court based its sentence of death;
(2) whether the sentence was entered under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and
(3) whether the sentence is “excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record, transcript, and
briefs in this case.  We conclude the record fully supports the
aggravating circumstances found by the jury.  As aggravating
circumstances, the jury found this crime:  (1) was especially
-32-
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9); and
(2) was part of a course of conduct in which defendant engaged
and which included the commission by defendant of other crimes of
violence against another person or persons.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(e)(11).  The evidence reveals that defendant coldly and
designedly planned and carried out the murder  of his child, and
attempted to murder his other two children and their mother, his
ex-girlfriend, because he did not want to pay child support and
because he did not want anyone else to date his former
girlfriend.  Further, we find no indication that the sentence of
death in this case was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.  We therefore turn to
our final statutory duty of proportionality review.
We begin our proportionality analysis by comparing this
case to those cases in which this Court has determined the death
penalty to be disproportionate. “One purpose of proportionality
review ‘is to eliminate the possibility that a person will be
sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury.’”  Atkins,
349 N.C. at 114, 505 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting State v. Holden, 321
N.C. 125, 164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988)).  This Court has determined
the death sentence to be disproportionate on seven occasions. 
State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v.
Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316
N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, and by State v.
Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young,
-33-
312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465,
319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309
S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703
(1983).  We conclude that this case is not substantially similar
to any case in which this Court has found the death penalty
disproportionate.
The instant case is distinguishable because this Court
has emphasized that a murder in the home “shocks the conscience,
not only because a life was senselessly taken, but because it was
taken by the surreptitious invasion of an especially private
place, one [in which] a person has a right to feel secure.’” 
State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 231, 358 S.E.2d 1, 34, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987).  In addition,
“[w]e note that none of the cases in which the death penalty has
been held disproportionate has involved the murder of a small
child.”  State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 71, 463 S.E.2d 738, 776-77
(1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1996). 
Further, “[w]e find it significant that none of the cases in
which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate
involved multiple child victims.”  State v. Billings, 348 N.C.
169, 191, 500 S.E.2d 423, 436, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 L.
Ed. 2d 431 (1998).  “This Court weighs such a factor heavily
against this adult defendant, as we have stated before that
murders of small children, as well as teenagers, ‘particularly
shock[] the conscience.’”  Walls, 342 N.C. at 72, 463 S.E.2d at
777 (quoting State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 344, 384 S.E.2d 470,
508 (1989), sentence judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S.
-34-
1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990)).  Further, the poisoning caused a
long, lingering, painful, and agonizing death of an innocent
child.  Accordingly, the facts and circumstances distinguish the
instant case from those in which this Court held the death
penalty disproportionate.
We also compare this case with the cases in which this
Court has found the death penalty to be proportionate.  While we
review all of the cases in the pool of “similar cases” when
engaging in our statutorily mandated duty, we have previously
stated that we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of these
cases each time we carry out that duty.  State v. Williams, 308
N.C. 47, 81, 301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78
L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983).  It suffices to say we conclude that this
case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the
sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have
found the sentence of death disproportionate.  Thus, the sentence
of death was neither excessive nor disproportionate.
We therefore conclude that defendant received a fair
trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial
error, and that the judgment of death recommended by the jury and
entered by the trial court for the first-degree murder
conviction, as well as the sentences imposed for the three first-
degree attempted murder convictions, must be left undisturbed.
NO ERROR.