Title: Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. v. Lantern 18, LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13269 
 
LE FORT ENTERPRISES, INC.  vs.  LANTERN 18, LLC, & others.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 3, 2022. - January 3, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Contract, Franchise agreement, Impossibility of performance.  
Jurisdiction, Equitable. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 21, 2020. 
 
 
The case was heard by Valerie A. Yarashus, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Seth H. Salinger (Stuti Venkat also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
Stewart A. Engel for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
1 Samuel E. Bergman and Marcia Bergman. 
2 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  Pacta sunt servanda -- promises must be kept 
-- is the fundamental premise of contract law.2  This case 
presents the question whether, during the economic disruption 
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the doctrines of 
impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose 
temporarily excused the purchaser of a cleaning services 
franchise, and the purchaser's coowners, from their obligation 
to pay the outstanding portion of the franchise purchase price.  
The purchaser and coowners contend that the franchise was unable 
to perform cleaning services because of the pandemic, triggering 
the applicability of the two equitable doctrines.  Because the 
summary judgment record does not support a rational finding that 
the pandemic caused the continued payment of the franchise 
purchase price to be impracticable or frustrated the principal 
purpose of the contract, and because the parties' contractual 
provisions showcase their intent that the obligation to pay 
would not be conditioned on the franchise's financial 
performance beyond the first six months following the 2015 sale, 
we affirm summary judgment in favor of the seller. 
1.  Background.  The material facts in the summary judgment 
record are largely undisputed.  See HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. v. 
 
2 See T. Murray, Corbin on Contracts:  Force Majeure and 
Impossibility of Performance Resulting from COVID-19 
§ 1.02[2][A], at 1-7 (2021). 
3 
 
Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 326 (2022) (HSBC Bank) ("Summary judgment 
is appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in 
dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law"). 
a.  Asset purchase agreement and initial promissory note.  
In May 2015, the defendant Lantern 18, LLC (Lantern 18), 
purchased a "Merry Maids of Boston" cleaning franchise from the 
plaintiff, Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. (Le Fort), pursuant to an 
asset purchase agreement.  The purchase price was payable in 
three parts.  First, Lantern 18 paid a nonrefundable deposit; 
second, Lantern 18 paid a lump sum at the closing of the 
agreement; and third, Lantern 18 and one of Lantern 18's 
coowners, the defendant Samuel Bergman, as co-obligors, were to 
pay the remainder through consecutive monthly payments together 
with a balloon payment in May 2018.  The remainder payment was 
evidenced by an initial promissory note, setting forth the 
parties' agreed terms.3 
In addition, the asset purchase agreement set forth that 
"in the event that six months after the closing date . . . 
[Lantern 18's] sale[s] are less than [a threshold amount] that 
[Lantern 18] will be credited with the sum of $15,000.00 which 
sum shall be deducted at that time from the principal balance of 
 
3 The initial promissory note was not provided in the record 
on appeal. 
4 
 
the [p]romissory [n]ote."4  The asset purchase agreement 
contained no other financial contingency clause conditioning, or 
otherwise altering, the obligation to pay the purchase price on 
the franchise's performance; and the agreement did not contain a 
force majeure clause.5 
b.  Amended promissory note.  In May 2018, the month that 
the initial promissory note was due and long after the six-month 
purchase price adjustment period had expired, Lantern 18 and 
Samuel Bergman apparently had not completed payment of the 
remainder amount owed to Le Fort for the purchase of the 
franchise.  They requested an extension of time to complete 
 
4 Lantern 18 brought a counterclaim in this action, 
asserting that Le Fort committed a breach of the asset purchase 
agreement by failing to credit Lantern 18 with the $15,000.  Le 
Fort denied the allegations, and the parties stipulated to a 
dismissal of the counterclaim. 
 
5 A force majeure clause is "[a] contractual provision 
allocating the risk of loss if performance becomes impossible or 
impracticable, esp[ecially] as a result of an event or effect 
that the parties could not have anticipated or controlled."  
Black's Law Dictionary 788 (11th ed. 2019).  Such clauses, which 
are common in contracts, see Annot., COVID-19 Related 
Litigation:  Effect of Pandemic on Contractual Obligations, 73 
A.L.R. 7th Art. 2 § 2 (2022), excuse a party's performance for 
"an event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor 
controlled; especially an unexpected event that prevents someone 
from doing or completing something that a person had agreed or 
officially planned to do."  30 R.A. Lord, Williston on Contracts 
§ 77:31, at 358 (4th ed. 2004).  Events often covered by a force 
majeure clause include, inter alia, acts of nature like floods 
and hurricanes, and acts of people like riots, strikes, and 
wars.  Id. 
5 
 
their repayment obligation and a modification to the initial 
promissory note.  Le Fort agreed. 
Accordingly, in August 2018, the defendants (Lantern 18, 
Samuel Bergman, individually, and Lantern 18's other coowner, 
the defendant Marcia Bergman, individually), as co-obligors, and 
Le Fort executed an amended promissory note, granting the co-
obligors an additional four years to pay the outstanding portion 
of the original franchise purchase price through monthly 
installment payments and a final balloon payment in May 2022.  
Under the amended promissory note, the co-obligors were "jointly 
and severally" liable.6  The amended promissory note made the 
occurrence of any of several listed conditions an event of 
default, including failure to make monthly payments within ten 
days of their due date and failure to timely provide the co-
obligors' financial information to Le Fort.  Under the note, an 
 
6 Specifically, the co-obligors jointly and severally 
promised to pay the outstanding purchase price 
 
"with interest thereon at 5.5% per annum, to be amortized 
over 8 years, such principal and interest to be payable in 
equal consecutive [monthly] payments . . . , which amount 
includes both principal and accrued interest, payable in 
arrears, beginning September 1, 2018 and on the same day of 
each month thereafter with a final payment of the entire 
remaining principal balance and all accrued interest and 
other charges in connection herewith on May 17, 2022." 
 
In November 2018, the parties agreed to reduce the monthly 
installment payment to $3,243, in consideration for two payments 
of $12,500 made to Le Fort in November and December. 
6 
 
event of default triggered Le Fort's option to demand immediate 
payment of all outstanding sums pursuant to an acceleration 
clause.7  The amended promissory note also required the co-
obligors to pay late payment charges after fifteen days of a 
missed monthly due date.  Other relevant provisions of the 
amended promissory note are discussed infra. 
 
c.  The COVID-19 pandemic.  Unbeknownst to the parties, 
approximately nineteen months after they executed the amended 
promissory note, the Commonwealth would be engulfed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which was "spread[ing] alarmingly, rapidly, 
and at an increasing rate, both in Massachusetts and throughout 
the world."  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 431, 433-434, S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 
(2020).  "On March 10, 2020, the Governor declared a state of 
emergency to support the Commonwealth's response to the threat 
of COVID-19."  Id. at 433.  The next day, "the World Health 
Organization formally declared the expanding spread of the 
COVID-19 virus a global pandemic."  Id. 
"The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic . . . created enormous 
challenges for every aspect of our communities."  Id.  
 
7 Section 2.2 of the amended promissory note provided that 
"[u]pon the occurrence of an [e]vent of [d]efault, or at any 
time thereafter, at the option of [Le Fort], all [o]bligations 
of the [co-obligors] [would] become immediately due and payable 
without notice or demand." 
7 
 
Communities struggled to "reduce the number of cases the 
beleaguered health care system [would] treat at any one time."  
Id.  Starting in March 2020, and until June 2020, the Governor 
issued executive orders affecting nonessential businesses that, 
in effect, shut down the co-obligors' franchise. 
 
Thereafter, when the pertinent executive orders had been 
lifted, the franchise continued to struggle because a "high 
percentage" of its customers were unwilling to allow cleaning 
crews into their homes.  The franchise also experienced 
pandemic-related interruptions because whenever one member of a 
cleaning crew tested positive for COVID-19, the remaining one to 
two crew members were required to quarantine.  As a result, the 
franchise's revenue "precipitous[ly] decline[d]." 
 
d.  Default.  The co-obligors failed to make the monthly 
installment payment due on April 1, 2020.  More than fifteen 
days later, on April 22, 2020, counsel for Le Fort notified the 
co-obligors by letter of their "continuing material breach and 
default" of payment terms of the amended promissory note.  In 
the same letter, counsel notified the co-obligors that Le Fort 
was exercising its rights under the acceleration clause, and 
further notified them that they would be liable for the 
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by Le Fort in 
connection with its enforcement efforts.  Counsel "advised" the 
co-obligors that, unless they paid the April and May payments, 
8 
 
and Le Fort's attorney's fees, by May 1, 2020, Le Fort would 
commence a civil action. 
That same day, counsel for Le Fort also sent a financial 
records demand letter to the co-obligors, seeking their 
"business, professional and personal financial records."  This 
second letter advised the co-obligors that failure to timely 
comply with the request would be an event of default under the 
parties' agreements, which would also trigger Le Fort's rights 
under the acceleration clause. 
In late May 2020, following a second missed monthly payment 
and with no apparent response from the co-obligors to counsel's 
letters, Le Fort commenced the present action, alleging that the 
co-obligors committed a breach of the amended promissory note.  
In response, the co-obligors raised, inter alia, the affirmative 
defense that the pandemic excused temporarily their obligations 
to make monthly payments under the amended promissory note.8 
In October 2020, by which time the co-obligors had failed 
to make six monthly installment payments, Le Fort moved for 
summary judgment.  Following a hearing, a Superior Court judge 
 
8 Specifically, the co-obligors stated that Le Fort "has 
used the unprecedented circumstance of the COVID-19 [p]andemic 
to take advantage of the fact that the [co-obligors'] business 
was legally shut down by the mandatory orders of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts leading to the failure to pay 
certain monthly payments which had prior thereto been paid in a 
timely manner for almost five years." 
9 
 
allowed Le Fort's motion.  The co-obligors filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the judge denied.  The co-obligors timely 
appealed, and this court transferred the case sua sponte. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Summary judgment 
is appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in 
dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law."  HSBC Bank, 490 Mass. at 326.  "Our review of a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo."  Id., 
quoting Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636 (2021).  
"We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment entered."  HSBC Bank, supra at 
326-327.  While the nonmoving party is "'not required to set 
forth [its] entire defense to the [movant's] claims to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment, . . . [the nonmovant is], of 
course, required to produce evidence sufficient to create a 
genuine dispute of material fact."  Haverty v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 437 Mass. 737, 759 n.28 (2002), S.C., 440 Mass. 1 
(2003).  Otherwise, "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against [it]."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (e), 365 Mass. 824 
(1974). 
In general, the applicability of the doctrines of 
impracticability and frustration of purposes is a jury question.  
See Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 
Mass. 122, 126 (1974) (determination of applicability of 
10 
 
doctrines of impossibility or impracticability and frustration of 
purpose "depended on the facts and circumstances which were for 
the jury to decide").  However, where the material facts are not 
in dispute and "no rational view of the evidence" permits a 
finding of impracticability or frustration of purpose, summary 
judgment is proper.  Petrell v. Shaw, 453 Mass. 377, 381 (2009), 
citing Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 56 (1983). 
b.  Equitable defenses against breach of contract due to 
the pandemic.  The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted many aspects 
of daily life and has had an impact on the economic well-being 
of many businesses.  "Thankfully, the vast majority of 
businesspersons [have sought] amicable resolutions of their 
[pandemic-related] disputes."  T. Murray, Corbin on Contracts: 
Force Majeure and Impossibility of Performance Resulting from 
COVID-19 § 1.01, at 1-5 (2021) (Corbin, COVID-19).  Regrettably, 
the parties in the present case have been unable to do so;9 
 
9 The parties apparently engaged in settlement negotiations, 
which are confidential and generally inadmissible.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 408 (2022).  Nonetheless, Samuel Bergman averred that, 
after Lantern 18 sought and received a pandemic-related loan 
from the Small Business Administration, it offered to apply 
these funds "to bring [Le Fort] current in [sic] all payments 
owed" through July 2020; it is undisputed that the amounts 
tendered, at that time, comprised amounts to cover the past-due 
monthly installment payments and not any additional amounts owed 
under the amended promissory note.  The co-obligors apparently 
have placed these funds in escrow; however, no payments have 
been made to Le Fort since March 2020. 
11 
 
instead, "we are left with the resolutions that parties have 
bargained for in their contracts, or, [when] appropriate, the 
equitable remedies that [the] common law has fashioned."  AGW 
Sono Partners, LLC v. Downtown Soho, LLC, 343 Conn. 309, 323 
(2022), quoting In re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 
627 B.R. 693, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021).  See Automile 
Holdings, LLC v. McGovern, 483 Mass. 797, 817 (2020), quoting 
National Med. Care, Inc. v. Zigelbaum, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 
575-576 (1984) ("We cannot rewrite the contract to cure an 
oversight or relieve a party from the consequences of the 
failure to adhere to its plain terms"). 
In the present action, the co-obligors admit that they 
failed to keep their promise, i.e., to make payments due under 
the amended promissory note and as required by the asset purchase 
agreement.  They assert that their obligation to pay was excused, 
at least temporarily, under the doctrine of impracticability or 
the doctrine of frustration of purpose in light of the economic 
repercussions on the franchise's operations during the COVID-19 
pandemic.  Accordingly, they contend that during this period, 
their payment obligations were excused, and Le Fort was precluded 
from exercising its rights under the parties' agreements, 
including its rights under the acceleration clause. 
12 
 
To determine whether the co-obligors' payment obligations 
were in fact excused, we begin with the fundamental principle of 
contract law that 
"one who has bound himself by an absolute agreement for the 
performance of something not in itself unlawful is not 
released from his obligation by the mere fact that in 
consequence of unforeseen accidents the performance of his 
contract has become impossible; he must respond in damages 
for the breach of his agreement." 
 
Boston Plate & Window Glass Co. v. John Bowen Co., 335 Mass. 
697, 699-700 (1957) (Boston Plate).  "The theories excusing 
contractual performance are exceptions to this rule and are not 
lightly applied."  Corbin, COVID-19, supra at § 1.02[2][A]. 
Performance under a contract may be excused in limited 
situations where unanticipated supervening events require it.  
See Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 409 Mass. 371, 
373-375 (1991); Boston Plate, 335 Mass. at 700.  The doctrines 
excusing performance are "given . . . narrow construction so as 
to preserve the certainty of contracts."  17A Am. Jur. 2d 
Contracts § 641 (2022).  See Corbin, COVID-19, supra at 
§ 5.01[4], at 5-6 ("Courts have applied both commercial 
impracticability and frustration of purpose 'sparingly'"). 
The burden of establishing the "nature, extent and 
causative effect" of impracticability or frustrated purpose lies 
with the party asserting the defense.  Commonwealth v. Bautista, 
13 
 
459 Mass. 306, 313 (2011), quoting 30 R.A. Lord, Williston on 
Contracts § 77:51 (4th ed. 2004). 
i.  Impossibility of performance.  Both doctrines asserted 
by the co-obligors to discharge their obligations under the 
amended promissory note -- the doctrines of impracticability and 
frustration of purpose -- are rooted in the doctrine of 
impossibility, which in turn informs their scope.  See Mishara 
Constr. Co., 365 Mass. at 127-129 (describing evolution from 
impossibility to impracticability and noting that frustration of 
purpose is "companion rule" of impossibility).  We have "long 
recognized and applied the doctrine of impossibility as a 
defense to an action for breach of contract."  Chase Precast 
Corp., 409 Mass. at 373. 
The doctrine of impossibility harkens back to Taylor v. 
Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (1863), an English case concerning a 
license to use a music hall; after the parties executed the 
contract, and through no fault of either party, the music hall 
burned down.  The court, acknowledging the principle that one is 
bound to carry out one's contract despite unforeseen accidents, 
recognized that some contracts are subject to "implied 
condition[s]."  Corbin, COVID-19, supra at § 1.02[2][A], citing 
Taylor, supra.  Applying this principle, the court concluded 
that the parties had an implied understanding at the time the 
contract was formed that if the music hall perished prior to its 
14 
 
use, the parties would be excused from performing under the 
license.  See Corbin, COVID-19, supra, citing Taylor, supra. 
The modern impossibility doctrine provides: 
"[W]here from the nature of the contract it appears that 
the parties must from the beginning have contemplated the 
continued existence of some particular specified thing as 
the foundation of what was to be done, then, in the absence 
of any warranty that the thing shall exist, the contract is 
to be construed not as a positive contract, but as subject 
to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused 
in case before breach performance becomes impossible from 
the accidental perishing of the thing without the fault of 
either party. . . .  The misfortune which has occurred 
releases both parties from further performance of the 
contract and gives no right to either to claim damages from 
the other" (ellipses in original). 
 
Boston Plate, 335 Mass. at 700, quoting Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 
Mass. 419, 423-424 (1907).  See Baetjer v. New England Alcohol 
Co., 319 Mass. 592, 600 (1946), quoting Canadian Indus. Alcohol 
Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 198 (1932) ("The 
inquiry is merely this, whether the continuance of a special 
group of circumstances appears from the terms of the contract, 
interpreted in the setting of the occasion, to have been a tacit 
or implied presupposition in the minds of the contracting 
parties, conditioning their belief in a continued obligation" 
[citations omitted]).10 
 
10 See, e.g., Boston Plate, 335 Mass. at 700-701 
(impossibility excused general contractor from subcontract for 
labor to be employed in building municipal hospital when 
underlying contract to construct hospital was deemed invalid 
because "there [was] no indication that the parties even 
contemplated the possibility that the [hospital] contract was 
15 
 
ii.  Impracticability of performance.  We have expanded, 
albeit narrowly, the doctrine of impossibility to excuse 
performance that is not strictly impossible but has become 
impracticable due to the unanticipated occurrence of an extreme 
event.  See Mishara Constr. Co., 365 Mass. at 127-128, quoting 
Williston on Contracts § 1931 (Rev. ed. 1938).  Because it is 
rooted in the narrow impossibility doctrine, impracticability 
applies only to risks that "are so unusual and have such severe 
consequences that they must have been beyond the scope of the 
assignment of risks inherent in the contract."  Mishara Constr. 
Co., supra at 129.  "The important question is whether an 
unanticipated circumstance has made performance of the promise 
vitally different from what should reasonably have been within 
the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the 
contract.  If so, the risk should not fairly be thrown upon the 
 
invalid," validity of hospital contract was essential to 
performance of subcontract, and invalidation occurred through no 
fault of subcontracting parties).  Compare Baetjer, 319 Mass. at 
600-601 (where United States had been engaged in World War II 
for four months when Puerto Rican molasses seller and 
Massachusetts buyer signed contract, buyer was not excused from 
paying for molasses that seller made available but buyer could 
not ship due to shortage of tankers, because parties did not 
condition contract on sea transportation in Caribbean remaining 
uninterrupted), with Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 520 
(1891) (destruction of nearly-completed house by fire discharged 
contractor from contributing "labor and materials towards the 
erection of a house" because "undertaking and duty to go on and 
finish the work was upon an implied condition that the house 
. . . should remain in existence"). 
16 
 
[party seeking to be excused]."  Id., quoting Williston on 
Contracts, supra. 
Consistent with its narrow underpinnings, where the 
impracticability of performance is only temporary, it suspends 
the promisor's obligation to perform only temporarily.  The 
party's performance is excused only "while the impracticability 
. . . exists but does not discharge his duty or prevent it from 
arising unless his performance after the cessation of the 
impracticability . . . would be materially more burdensome than 
had there been no impracticability."  Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 269 (1981).  See Fauci v. Denehy, 332 Mass. 691, 
696-697 (1955) (temporary impossibility of performance "would 
not discharge a promisor's duty to perform unless his 
performance, after the impossibility had ceased, would have 
subjected him to a substantially greater burden than would have 
been imposed had there been no impossibility"); Corbin, COVID-
19, supra at § 5.06 ("temporary impracticability or 
impossibility does not discharge a duty; it suspends the 
duty").11 
 
11 See, e.g., Center Garment Co. v. United Refrigerator Co., 
369 Mass. 633, 636 (1976) ("general shortage of plastics 
including acetate at the time" excused performance temporarily 
because "the materials would not have reached the plaintiff 
until more than two months after it had submitted its order"). 
17 
 
To warrant application of impracticability, the party 
seeking to be excused must establish three elements.  14 J.P. 
Nehf, Corbin on Contracts § 74.1, at 2 n.3 (J.M. Perillo ed., 
rev. ed. 2001), citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261.  
First, a supervening, extreme event caused the party's 
performance to become impracticable.  See 14 Corbin on 
Contracts, supra, citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
supra ("the event made the performance impracticable"); Corbin, 
COVID-19, supra at § 1.03[2] ("Performance is excused only to 
the extent that the supervening event caused it").  "Performance 
may be impracticable because extreme and unreasonable 
difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties will 
be involved."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 comment 
d. 
Second, "the nonoccurrence of the event was a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made," 14 Corbin on 
Contracts, supra at § 74.1, at 2 n.3, citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 261, and the occurrence of the event was 
not a risk that the parties were tacitly assigning to the 
promisor by their failure to provide for it explicitly, Mishara 
Constr. Co., 365 Mass. at 129.  The element requires 
consideration of the following: 
"[G]iven the commercial circumstances in which the parties 
dealt:  Was the contingency which developed one which the 
parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as a 
18 
 
real possibility which could affect performance?  Was it 
one of that variety of risks which the parties were tacitly 
assigning to the promisor by their failure to provide for 
it explicitly?  If it was, performance will be required.  
If it could not be so considered, performance is excused.  
The contract cannot be reasonably thought to govern in 
these circumstances, and the parties are both thrown upon 
the resources of the open market without the benefit of 
their contract."12 
 
Id. 
Third, "the impracticability resulted without the fault of 
the party seeking to be excused."  14 Corbin on Contracts, supra 
at § 74.1, at 2 n.3, citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 261. 
To determine whether any rational view of the summary 
judgment record in the present action permits a finding of 
impracticability, see Petrell, 453 Mass. at 381, we need focus 
only on the first two elements of impracticability, as it is 
beyond dispute that the co-obligors are not at fault for the 
financial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and government-ordered 
 
12 See, e.g., Mishara Constr. Co., 365 Mass. at 130-131 
(recognizing that impracticability doctrine would not excuse 
performance in industry with long history of labor difficulties, 
but might apply to industry where probability of labor dispute 
was "practically nil," or presented "unusual difficulty"); 
Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (impracticability defense unavailable to 
shipping company where closure of Suez Canal due to 
international invasion, while unexpected, was not unforeseen in 
view of tenuous nature of canal at time of contracting, and 
where safe alternative route was available even if more 
expensive). 
19 
 
shutdown of nonessential businesses on the franchise's 
operations. 
Thus, we consider whether the summary judgment record could 
sustain the co-obligors' burden to show that their performance 
was rendered impracticable because of the financial impact of 
the pandemic and government orders on the franchise's 
operations, see Mishara Constr. Co., 365 Mass. at 127-128.  To 
support their burden, the co-obligors rely on Samuel Bergman's 
affidavit, averring that the franchise's revenue declined 
precipitously in the pandemic because the franchise was forced 
to close in March 2020, in compliance with the Governor's 
executive order, and that even when it could open in June 2020, 
customers were not willing to permit the cleaning crews into 
their homes and establishments.  In addition, he averred that 
when a cleaning crew member tested positive for COVID-19, the 
entire crew was required to quarantine. 
Such a record is insufficient to meet the co-obligors' 
burden.  See, e.g., Bautista, 459 Mass. at 313, quoting 30 
Williston on Contracts, supra at § 77:50 ("the burden of 
establishing the nature, extent and causative effect of the 
alleged impracticability is invariably held to be upon the party 
asserting it").  At best, the record supports a rational finding 
that, in light of the financial impact on the franchise of the 
pandemic and government-ordered shutdown, the co-obligors could 
20 
 
not draw upon the franchise's revenue to fund the payments 
required under the amended promissory note.  The co-obligors 
have marshalled no evidence regarding their own ability to make 
the payments required; nothing in the record shows the effect on 
the co-obligors' financial condition of the pandemic, the 
government-ordered shutdown, or the franchise's decline in 
revenue.  In other words, the record is devoid of any evidence 
from which a fact finder could conclude rationally that the 
pandemic caused the co-obligors to be unable to perform under 
the amended promissory note.  See 14 Corbin on Contracts, supra 
at § 74.1, at 2 n.3, citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 261 (extreme event must have caused performance to become 
impracticable). 
The absence of a causal link is fatal to the co-obligors' 
claim of impracticability.  Accord United States Sec. & Exch. 
Comm'n vs. Equitybuild, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 18 C 5587, 
slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2021) (impracticability 
defense did not excuse buyer from payment terms of purchase and 
sale where buyer "has not presented any evidence that it was 
objectively impossible for it to marshal its existing assets to 
pay the contract price"); Palm Springs Mile Assocs. vs. 
Kirkland's Stores, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 20-21724-Civ-Scola, 
slip op. at 2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2020) ("The restrictions on 
non-essential activities and business operations must directly 
21 
 
affect [promisor's] ability to pay rent"); Premier Valet, LLC 
vs. Premier Valet Servs., LLC, Mo. Ct. App., No. ED110242, slip 
op. at 2 (August 9, 2022) (despite COVID-19 pandemic's effect on 
nonessential businesses, impossibility defense did not excuse 
valet services business's repayment obligations under promissory 
note where, inter alia, it "did not specify any efforts to pay 
the [n]ote . . . from sources other than the revenues from valet 
services business").  The contract promised repayment -- not 
repayment from franchise revenue specifically -- and even if 
payment from the franchise revenue was made impracticable by the 
pandemic, the promise to repay was not. 
We recognize, of course, that the pandemic possibly also 
affected the financial condition of the co-obligors themselves.  
Generally, however, "[p]erformance of a contractual duty is not 
impracticable merely because it has become inconvenient or more 
expensive; mere difficulty of performance is not enough."  30 
Williston on Contracts, supra at § 77:40.  "The fact that one is 
unable to perform a contract because of the inability to obtain 
money . . . will not ordinarily excuse nonperformance in the 
absence of a contract provision in that regard."  Id.  Reviewing 
the disposition of similar claims of impracticability during the 
COVID-19 pandemic in other jurisdictions, a leading treatise has 
concluded, "[s]imply positing two facts -- that the pandemic has 
occurred, and that a party finds it very difficult or even 
22 
 
impossible to perform its contractual obligations -- is not 
enough."13  Corbin, COVID-19, supra § 1.03[2]. 
Even if the co-obligors could marshal the evidence to meet 
their burden under the first element of impracticability, the 
record does not support a rational finding in their favor under 
the second -- that, at the time of the contracting, the 
nonoccurrence of the event was a basic, essential assumption of 
the contract and that the co-obligors did not assume the risk of 
occurrence, either expressly or impliedly, see Mishara Constr. 
Co., 365 Mass. at 127.  To the contrary, the record shows that, 
at the time of the contracting, the franchise's financial 
condition was not an essential assumption and the parties' 
 
13 None of the cases on which the co-obligors rely supports 
the proposition that the inability to pay due to changed market 
conditions caused by unanticipated events, such as war, excuses 
an obligation to make timely payments due on a promissory note.  
See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
532 F.2d 957, 988, 998 (5th Cir. 1976) (where airline sued 
manufacturer for breach of contract after manufacturer delivered 
planes long after agreed deadline, delay was excused because 
government's Vietnam War policies that delayed manufacturer's 
performance fell within contract's excusable delay clause which 
exempted manufacturer from liability for delays "due to causes 
beyond [manufacturer's] control and not occasioned by its fault 
or negligence"); United States ex rel. Caldwell Foundry & Mach. 
Co. v. Texas Constr. Co., 224 F.2d 289, 290-293 (5th Cir. 1955) 
(impossibility shown where Korean War made critical materials 
unavailable); Bush v. ProTravel Int'l, Inc., 192 Misc. 2d 743, 
748-754 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002) (impossibility could be shown where 
communications disruptions related to September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks interfered with ability to timely cancel 
planned safari). 
23 
 
contractual provisions place the risk of changing financial 
conditions squarely on the co-obligors. 
The only evidence tying the co-obligors' obligations to pay 
the remaining amount of the purchase price to the franchise's 
revenue is the provision of the asset purchase agreement 
pursuant to which the parties agreed that the purchase price 
would be reduced by $15,000 if the franchise failed to meet 
certain revenue thresholds in the first six months following the 
sale.  Thereafter, the record shows, the co-obligors' payment 
obligations would not be affected by the franchise's financial 
performance.  Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that it was 
an essential assumption of the amended promissory note that the 
franchise's revenue was intended by the parties to be the 
source, let alone the sole source, of funds from which the co-
obligors would draw to pay the outstanding balance of the 
franchise purchase price.14 
To the contrary, at the time they executed the amended 
promissory note, the parties expressly considered a change in 
the parties' financial conditions and provided that such a 
 
14 T. Butera Auburn, LLC v. Williams, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 496 
(2013), a case upon which the co-obligors rely, is inapposite.  
There, the court explained that the borrower "could demonstrate 
that the damaged business itself was supposed to generate the 
income from which the debt to [the seller] was to be repaid."  
Id. at 506.  Here, the co-obligors did not put forth any facts 
suggesting that the promissory note was to be paid from the 
business's revenue. 
24 
 
change would enhance Le Fort's rights, not those of the co-
obligors.  Specifically, the amended promissory note provided 
that a "change in the [co-obligors'] condition or affairs 
(financial or otherwise)" that would impair Le Fort's security 
or increase its risk, if it remained uncured for thirty days, 
would cause an "[e]vent of [d]efault,"15 which would permit Le 
Fort to trigger the acceleration clause, see note 7, supra.  To 
police this right, the amended promissory note required the co-
obligors to permit Le Fort access to each of the co-obligors' 
financial books and records, and made the failure to provide 
such access an additional "[e]vent of [d]efault," which would 
itself permit Le Fort to trigger acceleration.16 
 
15 Section 2.1(g) of the amended promissory note provided 
that the "change in the condition or affairs (financial or 
otherwise) of any [o]bligor or in the value or condition of any 
collateral securing th[e] [n]ote, which in the opinion of [Le 
Fort] w[ould] impair its security or increase its risk and not 
cured within thirty (30 days) after written notice of the same 
from [Le Fort] to [the o]bligor" would constitute an "[e]vent of 
[d]efault." 
 
16 Section 2.1(d) of the amended promissory note provided 
that "failure to furnish [Le Fort] within thirty (30) days upon 
request by [Le Fort] with financial information about, or to 
permit inspection by [Le Fort] of any books, records and 
properties of the [co-obligors]" would constitute an "[e]vent of 
[d]efault." 
 
 
Section 4.5 of the amended promissory note required the co-
obligors to "furnish [Le Fort] from time to time with such 
financial statements and other information relating to any 
[o]bligor or any collateral securing th[e] [n]ote as [Le Fort] 
may require." 
25 
 
Additional provisions of the amended promissory note belie 
the co-obligors' position that the franchise's stable financial 
condition was a basic assumption of the contract, without which 
they were excused from their obligation to pay the remaining 
purchase price of the franchise, confirming instead that the 
parties placed the risk of changing market conditions on the co-
obligors.  For example, the note provided that each of the co-
obligors "jointly and severally promise[d]" to pay the 
outstanding amounts of the franchise purchase price; Samuel and 
Marcia Bergman signed in their individual capacities, evincing 
an intent that the risk of decreasing revenue would fall on the 
co-obligors.  Similarly, the note provided that the co-obligors 
had ten days to cure any missed payments;17 that any late 
payments were subject to additional interest;18 that any missed 
 
17 Section 2.1(a) of the amended promissory note provided 
that "failure to pay regularly schedule periodic installments of 
principal and interest in or within ten (10) days of the date 
when due under th[e] [n]ote" constituted an "[e]vent of 
[d]efault." 
 
Section 2.1(e) of the amended promissory note provided that 
"any [o]bligor generally not paying its debts as they become due 
and curing the same with such period of time as required to 
avoid an event of default in connection with such debt(s)" also 
constituted an "[e]vent of [d]efault." 
 
18 Section 1.3 of the amended promissory note provided: 
 
"To the extent permitted by applicable law, upon and after 
the occurrence of an [e]vent of [d]efault (whether or not 
[Le Fort] has accelerated payment of th[e] [n]ote), or in 
the event of a failure to pay the entire balance due 
26 
 
payments together with any additional interest not paid within 
fifteen days were subject to additional late payment charges;19 
and that the co-obligors would be responsible for any expenses, 
including attorney's fees, incurred by Le Fort in connection 
with its efforts to enforce the payment obligations.20  And, as 
set forth supra, any "[e]vent of [d]efault" (including missed 
monthly payments not cured within ten days and failure to timely 
provide the co-obligors' financial information, see note 17, 
supra) triggered the ability of Le Fort to accelerate all 
remaining payments.  These provisions confirm that the 
obligation to pay the purchase price was not contingent on 
 
hereunder at the [m]aturity [d]ate, interest on principal 
and overdue interest [would], at the option of [Le Fort], 
be payable on demand at a rate per annum (the '[d]efault 
[r]ate') equal to 5.00% per annum above the rate of 
interest otherwise payable hereunder." 
 
19 Section 1.4 of the amended promissory note provided: 
 
"Without limitation of the foregoing [s]ection 1.3, if a 
payment of principal or interest hereunder is not made in 
or within fifteen (15) days of its due date, the [co-
obligors] w[ould] pay on demand a late payment charge equal 
to 3.00% of the amount of such payment.  Nothing in the 
preceding sentence [would] affect [Le Fort's] right to 
accelerate the maturity of th[e] [n]ote in the event of any 
default in the payment of th[e] [n]ote." 
 
20 Section 4.3 of the amended promissory note provided that 
the co-obligors would "pay on demand all expenses of [Le Fort] 
in connection with the preparation, administration, default, 
collection or enforcement of th[e] [n]ote . . . including, 
without limitation, attorneys' fees of outside legal counsel." 
27 
 
market conditions, regardless of the cause of any upset of those 
conditions. 
Finally, the parties did not include a force majeure 
clause, further suggesting that the co-obligors' payment 
obligations were not conditioned on the financial success of the 
franchise.  See, e.g., AGW Sono Partners, LLC, 343 Conn. at 331-
333 (failure to include force majeure clause supported conclusion 
that restaurant owners were not excused by impossibility defense 
from rental payments owed to landlord despite closures required 
during COVID-19 pandemic). 
In sum, Le Fort completed its performance under the 
parties' agreements in 2015 when it delivered a cleaning services 
franchise to Lantern 18.  The agreements are not neutral in their 
risk allocation; to the contrary, the contractual provisions, 
which, inter alia, strictly required the co-obligors to make 
payments in a timely fashion and provided severe consequences 
when payments were not so made, evince the parties' tacit intent 
to place that risk squarely on the co-obligors.  Thus, although 
the pandemic itself was not contemplated by the parties, they 
clearly provided that any lapse in the franchise's financial 
condition, regardless of its source, would not affect the co-
28 
 
obligors' obligation to make payments when due as part of the 
consideration for the franchise Lantern 18 received in 2015.21 
ii.  Frustrated purpose due to the pandemic.  The co-
obligors' attempt to invoke the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose fares no better.  The doctrine of frustration of purpose 
is a "'companion rule' to the doctrine of impossibility."  Chase 
Precast Corp., 409 Mass. at 374, citing Mishara Constr. Co., 365 
Mass. at 129.  It provides: 
"Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal 
purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by 
the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was 
a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his 
remaining duties to render performance are discharged, 
 
21 In general, "[b]ecause the continuation of existing 
market conditions and of the financial situation of the parties 
ordinarily are not basic assumptions, these contingencies do not 
effect a discharge" under the impracticability rule.  30 
Williston on Contracts, supra at § 77:26.  Accord 407 E. 61st 
Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275, 281 
(1968) ("where impossibility or difficulty of performance is 
occasioned only by financial difficulty or economic hardship, 
even to the extent of insolvency or bankruptcy, performance of a 
contract is not excused").  Even during the pandemic, other 
jurisdictions have not applied the doctrine to excuse payments 
due on a promissory note or similar financial instrument.  See, 
e.g., Lantino vs. Clay LLC, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:18-cv-12247 
(SDA), slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020) ("At best, 
Defendants have established financial difficulties arising out 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the PAUSE Executive Order that 
adversely affected their ability to make the payments called for 
under the Settlement Agreement.  As such, Defendants' 
performance under the Settlement Agreement is not excused"); 
City Nat'l Bank v. Baby Blue Distribs., 199 A.D.3d 559, 560 
(N.Y. 2021) (clothing store could not avoid payment obligation 
under promissory note despite economic impact of COVID-19 
regulations where "repayment obligation was not conditioned upon 
the store remaining a viable concern"). 
29 
 
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the 
contrary." 
 
Chase Precast Corp., supra at 375, quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 265.22  The purpose relevant to the analysis is 
the "party's principal purpose as understood by both parties at 
the time the contract is made."  Corbin, COVID-19, supra at 
§ 5.01[4].  Further, "the purpose that is frustrated must have 
been a principal purpose of that party in making the contract.  
It is not enough that [the party seeking to be excused] had in 
mind some specific object without which he would not have made 
the contract.  The object must be so completely the basis of the 
contract that, as both parties understand, without it the 
transaction would make little sense."  Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 265 comment a. 
Under the frustration of purpose defense, "[i]nstead of 
performance becoming impracticable, the supervening event 
requires a party's principal purpose as understood by both 
parties at the time of the contract is made to be substantially 
frustrated."  Corbin, COVID-19, supra at § 5.01[4].  The 
 
22 Other jurisdictions define the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose as follows:  "when an event neither anticipated nor 
caused by either party, the risk of which was not allocated by 
the contract, destroys the object or purpose of the contract, 
thus destroying the value of performance, the parties are 
excused from further performance."  Chase Precast Corp., 409 
Mass. at 374, citing Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 53 (1944); 
Perry v. Champlain Oil Co., 101 N.H. 97, 98-99 (1957); Howard v. 
Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). 
30 
 
doctrine "focuses on the parties' purpose in making their 
contract and has nothing to do with a party's inability to 
perform."  Id. at § 1.02[2][B].  Like impracticability, the 
frustration of purpose defense can be temporary; the defense 
will suspend, rather than discharge, a duty to perform unless 
the party's "performance after the cessation of the . . . 
frustration would be materially more burdensome than had there 
been no . . . frustration."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 269. 
The English "coronation cases" showcase the difference 
between impossibility and impracticability, on the one hand, and 
frustration of purpose, on the other.  In Krell v. Henry [1903] 
2 KB 740 (AC), the defendant rented an apartment, at a steep 
cost, from which he planned to watch the king's coronation.  Id. 
at 740.  When the king-to-be fell ill, the defendant argued that 
his principal purpose in entering the rental contract -- namely, 
to gain access to a vantage point from which to watch the 
coronation -- was "frustrated" when the procession was canceled; 
accordingly, he maintained that he should be refunded his 
deposit and excused from paying the balance of the rent.  Id. at 
740, 745. 
The court noted that, in contrast to the Taylor decision, 
the music hall case discussed supra, where performance was 
impossible because of the "physical extinction or the not coming 
31 
 
into existence of the subject-matter of the contract," Krell, 
supra at 742, in the Krell case, performance was "quite 
possible" -- that is, the defendant could rent the apartment, 
id. at 743.  Nevertheless, the defendant's performance was 
excused because "the taking place of those processions on the 
days proclaimed along the proclaimed route . . . was regarded by 
both contracting parties as the foundation of the contract."  
Id. at 750.23 
 
23 Our decision in Chase Precast Corp., 409 Mass. at 374, 
also is illustrative of the frustration of purpose doctrine.  
There, we affirmed the trial judge's determination, following a 
bench trial, that the doctrine applied to excuse a general 
contractor from continued performance on a subcontract to 
purchase concrete barriers.  Id. at 372.  As both parties 
understood, the general contractor's principal purpose in 
entering the subcontract was to obtain concrete barriers 
required under the general contractor's contract with the 
Department of Public Works (department) for highway resurfacing 
projects.  Id.  After the parties executed the subcontract, the 
department entered into a settlement agreement with a citizens' 
group, pursuant to which it agreed to cease installation of 
concrete barriers on the subject highways.  Id. at 373.  
Acknowledging that the general contractor's performance under 
the subcontract -- acceptance of and payment for concrete 
barriers -- was not rendered strictly impossible because of the 
department's settlement, id. at 374 n.3, we nevertheless upheld 
the judge's application of the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose because the general contractor bore no responsibility 
for the elimination of the concrete barriers from the underlying 
public works projects, the general contractor's principal 
purpose in entering into the subcontract -- to obtain the 
concrete barriers it needed to perform the underlying public 
works projects -- was frustrated, and, while elimination of 
items by the department was not entirely unanticipated, as a 
general matter, the judge could reasonably conclude that the 
parties did not anticipate the elimination of such widely used 
items like concrete barriers, which comprised a major portion of 
the department's projects.  Id. at 377.  Cf. Karaa v. Yim, 86 
32 
 
To determine whether any rational view of the summary 
judgment record would permit a finding of frustration of 
purpose, see Petrell, 453 Mass. at 381, we consider whether the 
record suggests that the pandemic substantially frustrated the 
co-obligors' principal purpose in entering into the asset 
purchase agreement and amended promissory note, see Chase 
Precast Corp., 409 Mass. at 375.  It would not. 
Just as nothing in the record would suggest that the 
contracts were made with a basic assumption that the co-obligors 
would pay the note with the proceeds from the franchise, as 
discussed supra, nothing in the record would permit a fact finder 
to rationally conclude that the principal purpose of either the 
asset purchase agreement or the amended promissory note was to 
pay the franchise purchase price exclusively from the franchise's 
subsequent revenue.24  Indeed, the parties had contemplated and 
provided that financial performance of the franchise only 
affected the purchase price if the franchise failed to meet 
certain sales milestones in the first six months. 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 714, 718 (2014) (tenant voluntarily undertook 
risk of renting apartment knowing her visa status might change, 
so purpose was not frustrated). 
 
24 Cf. Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete, 
Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 558, 562-565 (1981) (party's undisputed 
primary purpose, to obtain aggregates by strip mining leased 
premises, was frustrated when it was unable to obtain necessary 
permits). 
33 
 
The only rational view of the record as it regards the 
principal purpose was that the parties intended for the co-
obligors to purchase the franchise, and to permit the co-obligors 
to spread the purchase price payment over a predefined time.  The 
parties did not provide that the franchise was to be the source 
of those payments; to the contrary, the Bergmans were "jointly 
and severally" liable, in their individual capacities, for 
payments due.  The provisions of the note, appearing supra, each 
confirm that the purpose was not to tie repayment to the 
financial performance of the franchise.  The repayment of the 
outstanding portion of the purchase price was the parties' 
driving purpose, irrespective of the source of the repayment. 
Our decision does not foreclose parties from raising the 
impracticability or frustration of purpose defenses to breach of 
contract claims arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, which, we 
acknowledge, "created enormous challenges for every aspect of our 
communities," see Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 484 Mass. at 
433.  In this case, the co-obligors failed to meet their burden 
to marshal evidence needed to show their performance was excused. 
c.  Court's equitable power.  The co-obligors alternatively 
ask this court to use its equitable power pursuant to G. L. 
c. 214, § 1, to amend the amended promissory note to permit the 
co-obligors to cure their breach lest the co-obligors be 
34 
 
"grossly prejudiced" and Le Fort receive a "windfall."25  This 
court generally reserves its equitable powers to intervene in 
parties' contractual obligations to circumstances involving 
"fraud, mistake, accident, or illegality," none of which are at 
issue in this case.  Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 392 
(1975). 
The claim by the co-obligors that they are being grossly 
prejudiced and that Le Fort is receiving a windfall is 
unsupported.  Le Fort sold the franchise to Lantern 18 in 2015 
for an agreed sum; at that time, Le Fort's obligations under the 
asset purchase agreement were complete.  In 2015, Lantern 18 
received the business and commenced operation of the franchise, 
having paid only a partial amount of the full purchase price and 
having agreed to pay the remainder over time.  There is no 
evidence –- or even a suggestion –- that the price or attendant 
interest rates were predatory,26 a windfall, or otherwise a 
 
25 General Laws c. 214, § 1, provides: 
"The supreme judicial and superior courts shall have 
original and concurrent jurisdiction of all cases and 
matters of equity cognizable under the general principles 
of equity jurisprudence and, with reference thereto, shall 
be courts of general equity jurisdiction . . . ." 
 
26 Accordingly, the co-obligors' reliance on HSBC Bank, 490 
Mass. 322; Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. 733 
(2008); and Commonwealth vs. Fremont Inv. & Loan, Mass. Super. 
Ct., No. 07-4373 BLS1 (Suffolk County February 25, 2008), 
concerning home mortgage loans alleged to be predatory, is 
misplaced. 
35 
 
product of duress.  Neither was the acceleration clause, which 
merely required the co-obligors to pay the agreed-upon remaining 
amount of the purchase price for the business they received in 
2015, otherwise inequitable.  Once the co-obligors committed a 
material breach of the amended promissory note by failing to pay 
the monthly instalments, failing to cure within the cure period, 
and failing to provide their financial records, the acceleration 
clause was triggered just as the parties anticipated it would be 
when then entered into their contractual arrangement.  Contrast 
Neuro-Rehab Assocs., Inc. vs. AMRESCO Commercial Fin., L.L.C., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. CIVA 05-12338-GAO, slip op. at 2, 4 (D. 
Mass. June 19, 2006) (applying Idaho law to conclude that 
enforcement of acceleration clause likely violated covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing where breach was of technical, not 
material, aspect of parties' contract, and breaching party 
promptly offered to cure).  On this record, we conclude that 
equity does not demand that this court modify the parties' 
negotiated contractual promises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.