Title: The People v. Wayne Decker

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 102  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Wayne Decker, 
            Appellant.
Ronald L. Kuby, for appellant.
Anne Grady, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
On December 3, 1987, the body of Victoria Mason was
found in her apartment.  She had been beaten to death with a
baseball bat.  Defendant Wayne Decker was the only suspect. 
Although he was questioned by police at the time, the police
found the evidence against him to be of doubtful quality and
decided not to prosecute.
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No. 102
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The case was reopened 15 years later, in 2002, when the
police attempted to get physical evidence through modern
scientific techniques.  Several items were tested for
fingerprints and the presence of DNA, but did not ultimately
yield any further evidence.  In the course of the investigation,
however, the police re-interviewed the original witnesses and
decided to prosecute defendant, using the same evidence that was
available in 1987.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on the
lengthy pre-indictment delay.  In response, the ADA provided an
affirmation stating that the District Attorney's office had
decided not to prosecute the case in 1987 because it was based
largely upon circumstantial evidence and they wanted to conduct
further investigation.  The ADA maintained that there were two
problems: (1) witnesses were afraid to assist in the
investigation or to testify because of defendant's reputation for
intimidating and threatening witnesses and, (2) the witnesses
were drug addicts and many of them had their own convictions or
pending criminal cases.  Given these factors, the prosecutors
determined that they would need additional independent evidence
in order to prosecute defendant.  By 2002, however, witnesses had
overcome their drug addictions and were willing to testify.
Supreme Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment without a hearing, finding that the 15-year pre-
indictment delay did not deprive defendant of due process of law. 
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No. 102
*  Notably, this right is somewhat more expansive than the
corresponding right under the Federal Constitution.  In order to
have an indictment dismissed for pre-indictment delay based on a
violation of Fifth Amendment due process, a defendant must show
both that the government caused the delay in order to obtain a
tactical advantage and that actual prejudice resulted (see United
States v Gouveia, 467 US 180, 192 [1984]).
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Defendant was then convicted of second-degree murder after a jury
trial.  The Appellate Division affirmed (51 AD3d 686 [2d Dept
2008]).  A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal
and we now affirm.
An unjustified delay in prosecution will deny a
defendant due process of law (see People v Staley, 41 NY2d 789,
791-792 [1977]; People v Winfrey, 20 NY2d 138, 143 [1967]). 
However, "a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution
for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process
even though there may be some prejudice to defendant" (People v
Vernace, 96 NY2d 886, 888 [2001]).*  Where there has been
extended delay, it is the People's burden to establish good cause
(see People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241, 254 [1978]).  
We have previously identified several factors to be
analyzed when determining whether there has been undue delay:
"(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3)
the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has
been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5)
whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been
impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d
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No. 102
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442, 445 [1975]).  Although the Taranovich factors specifically
applied to a defendant's right to a speedy trial, they have
likewise been employed to determine whether there has been a
violation of the due process right to prompt prosecution (see
Vernace, 96 NY2d at 887; Staley, 41 NY2d at 792).
Although not determinative, "the extent of the delay[]
is of critical importance because 'all other factors being equal,
the greater the delay the more probable it is that the accused
will be harmed thereby.'  [However, there] is no specific
temporal period by which a delay may be evaluated or considered
'presumptively prejudicial'" (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 56
[2009] [citations omitted]).  It is undisputed that the 15-year
delay in this case was indeed substantial, a fact that weighs in
favor of defendant.  On the other hand, a long delay may also
work against the prosecution as the passage of time can make it
more difficult for the People to meet their burden of proof (see
Vernace, 96 NY2d at 888).
The People decided to defer prosecution for several
reasons, including the witnesses' fear of testifying against
defendant.  The prosecution also wanted to conduct further
investigation, given the condition of the witnesses and the lack
of physical evidence against defendant.  The subsequent decision
to bring charges, albeit many years later, was not an abuse of
the significant amount of discretion that the People must of
necessity have, and there is no indication that the decision was
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No. 102
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made in anything other than good faith.
The underlying charge here is murder, inarguably a very
serious offense.  In addition, defendant remained at liberty on
the murder charge until after his indictment and, since he was
not arrested during the initial investigation, was not subject to
the anguish (see Singer, 44 NY2d at 253 n 2) or public opprobrium
often surrounding pending charges (see Vernace, 96 NY2d at 888).
Finally, there is no indication that the defense was
significantly impaired by the delay.  With a 15-year delay, it is
likely that some degree of prejudice will result -- given that
memories fade, potentially making it more difficult for a
defendant to establish an alibi or other defenses.  The
rehabilitated witnesses definitely made a better appearance at
trial than they would have in 1987, but the jury was aware of
their past conduct and the witnesses were subject to cross-
examination.
Balancing all of these factors, we conclude that
defendant was not deprived of his due process right to prompt
prosecution.  Although the delay may have caused some degree of
prejudice to defendant, the People satisfied their burden of
demonstrating that they made a good faith determination not to
proceed with the prosecution in 1987 due to, what was at the
time, insufficient evidence.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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No. 102
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided June 9, 2009