Title: Diaz v. Palmetto Gen. Hosp.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1916 
____________ 
 
HENRY DIAZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
PALMETTO GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[April 28, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This complex workers’ compensation case is before this Court for review of 
the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Diaz v. Palmetto General 
Hospital/Sedgwick CMS, 146 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), concerning a 
$13.28 hourly fee award for 120 hours of work deemed to be necessarily and 
reasonably expended by the claimant’s attorney.  The judge of compensation 
claims found the $13.28 hourly fee—over twenty-five times less than the $350 
hourly rate found to be a reasonable fee—“patently unreasonable” and stated that 
the claimant would not have recovered the $8,956.44 in total benefits that were 
awarded to him without the aid and assistance of counsel.  The attorney for the 
 
 
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employer/carrier, on the other hand, spent 175 hours litigating this case—55 hours 
more than the claimant’s attorney—which was found by the judge of compensation 
claims to be “a reasonable amount of time given the nature of the case.”   
 
Forced to calculate the fee for the claimant’s attorney in strict compliance 
with the conclusive fee schedule in section 440.34, Florida Statutes, the judge of 
compensation claims could not deviate from the statutory requirements regardless 
of how unreasonable the ultimate fee award.  And, constrained by its prior 
jurisprudence, the First District was compelled to affirm the fee “[b]ased on” its 
decision in Castellanos v. Next Door Co./Amerisure Ins. Co., 124 So. 3d 392, 393 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2013).  Diaz, 146 So. 3d at 1288. 
 
However, this Court has now held on review of Castellanos that the 
conclusive statutory fee schedule is unconstitutional as a denial of due process 
under the Florida and United States Constitutions.  Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 
No. SC13-2082, slip op. at 1-2 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016).  Here, the First District 
certified that its disposition passed upon the same question certified in Castellanos, 
124 So. 3d at 394, which this Court has now resolved.1  For the reasons explained 
in our opinion in Castellanos, we therefore quash the First District’s decision in 
Diaz and remand for further proceedings consistent with Castellanos.  See also 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §§ 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const.   
 
 
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Richardson v. Aramark/Sedgwick CMS, No. SC14-738, slip op. at 2-3 (Fla. Apr. 
28, 2016); Pfeffer v. Labor Ready Se., Inc., No. SC14-1325, slip op. at 1-2 (Fla. 
Apr. 28, 2016). 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D14-1676 
 
Kimberly Ann Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Russell Hurley Young of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman & Waters, 
LLC, Sarasota, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents