Title: Ex Parte State

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

486 So. 2d 500 (1986)
Ex parte State of Alabama
(Re: STATE of Alabama v. Robert HOLMAN).
84-985.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 17, 1986.
*501 Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Bernard B. Carr, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
William E. Friel, II, Birmingham, for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
We granted the State of Alabama's petition for certiorari in this case to determine whether the trial judge erred in denying Robert Holman's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that he did and reversed, 486 So. 2d 497. The facts, as set out in its opinion, are as follows:
The record reveals that the following exchange occurred between Holman and the trial judge on March 20, 1984:
The Court of Criminal Appeals, relying upon the authority of Blow v. State, 49 Ala.App. 623, 274 So. 2d 652 (Ala.Crim.App. 1973), and English v. State, 56 Ala.App. *503 704, 325 So. 2d 211 (Ala.Crim.App.1975), cert. denied 295 Ala. 401, 325 So. 2d 216 (Ala.1976), determined that the trial judge refused to carry out the terms of the plea bargaining agreement and, that, as a result, Holman was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. We disagree and reverse and remand.
Whether or not a defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. His refusal to allow such a request will not be disturbed except where an abuse of that discretion is demonstrated. Tiner v. State, 421 So. 2d 1369 (Ala.Crim.App.1982) (citing Boykin v. State, 361 So. 2d 1158 (Ala.Crim.App.1978).) The mere subjective beliefs or expectations of a defendant as to the length of sentence to be imposed, unsupported by any promise from the State or indications by the court, are insufficient and unavailing to set aside a guilty plea as unknowingly or involuntarily made. Tiner v. State, supra. The fact that a defendant who has knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty later becomes dissatisfied with the sentence he received does not, alone, constitute a ground for invalidating the guilty plea. Chapman v. State, 412 So. 2d 1276 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982).
Although it is undisputed that an agreement was reached between Holman's counsel and the prosecutor, which provided for a recommendation of a sentence of 15 years in exchange for a guilty plea, it is apparent from the previously cited portion of the record that Holman's guilty plea was made without objection to, and with full knowledge of, the added conditions set out by the trial judge. Because Blow v. State, supra, and English v. State, supra, are distinguishable from the instant case, the reliance of the Court of Criminal Appeals on those cases is misplaced. In Blow, the trial judge accepted a guilty plea based upon the district attorney's recommendation that the judge sentence the defendant to three years. The sentencing hearing was continued, but the defendant failed to appear on the later date. The trial judge rejected the recommendation and sentenced the defendant to five years.
In Blow, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on the authority of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971), which held that when a prosecutor makes a promise which plays a significant part in the plea decision, the promise must be kept. In Blow, the court stated: "After advising the appellant that he could not take the recommended plea [the judge] should have afforded him an opportunity to withdraw it. Although the judge's prior concurrence may have been conditional, the plea withdrawal was necessary to correct the broken bargain." 49 Ala. at 624, 274 So. 2d  at 652.
In the present case, unlike in Blow, the plea agreement, as amended by the trial judge, specifically contemplated the defendant's further violations; therefore, the trial judge sentenced Holman pursuant to the agreement. In Blow, upon the defendant's failure to appear and his commission of further violations, the trial judge rejected the agreement, which did not specifically contemplate the defendant's failure to appear or his further violations.
Likewise, in English v. State, supra, the court held that "if the trial court decides not to carry out the agreement reached between the prosecutor and counsel for the accused, the accused must be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea on motion promptly made." 56 Ala.App. at 708, 325 So. 2d  at 215. That case is distinguishable because the trial judge, in the present case, did not refuse to carry out the amended plea agreement. To the contrary, he sentenced Holman pursuant to it.
The purpose of the rule allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when the trial judge refuses to carry out an agreement reached between the prosecutor (or the trial judge) and defense counsel is to insure that such a plea is made voluntarily, which necessarily requires that it be made with full knowledge of the attendant consequences.
*504 We hold, under the facts in this case, that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Holman's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. To hold otherwise would enable the defendant either to demand a lesser sentence that had been predicated upon a condition he failed to meet, or to withdraw a plea knowingly and voluntarily entered. This would set a dangerous precedent. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.