Title: Sims v. General Motors Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sims v. General Motors Corp.1988 WY 24751 P.2d 357Case Number: 87-39Decided: 03/02/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARJORIE SIMS, 
PERSONALLY, AND MARJORIE SIMS, AS THE NEXT FRIEND AND GUARDIAN OF LARA SIMS, AND 
MARJORIE SIMS, AS THE NEXT FRIEND AND GUARDIAN OF MARGO SIMS, APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

P. Richard Meyer 
of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, and Willis Geer of Willis Geer 
& Associates, Gillette, for 
appellants.

Robert W. 
Connor, Jr., Sheridan, and R.H. Bellingham and Tamara Annalora Scully of 
Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, P.C., Billings, Mont., for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Plaintiffs/appellants 
Marjorie Sims, Margo Sims, and Lara Sims brought an action against 
defendant/appellee General Motors Corporation for injuries suffered by them when 
a seat belt buckle in an automobile manufactured by General Motors allegedly 
failed to release after the vehicle caught on fire. The trial court granted 
General Motors directed verdicts on part of Marjorie's and Lara's claims and on 
both claims asserted by Margo. The jury found in favor of General Motors on all 
remaining issues of liability. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, but that motion 
was denied by the trial court.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Plaintiffs present the 
following issues on appeal:

"ISSUE 
I

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT ON THE ISSUE OF 
MANUFACTURING DEFECT.

"ISSUE 
Ia

"WHETHER THE INFERENCE OF 
DEFECT RULE APPLIES WHEN A JURY QUESTION EXISTS AS TO CAUSES NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THE DEFENDANT.

"ISSUE 
II

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INCIDENTS OF SEAT BELT BUCKLES FAILING TO 
RELEASE, WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF AN 
INHERENT RISK ON THE ISSUES OF, 1) FAILURE TO WARN, AND 2) 
NEGLIGENCE.

"ISSUE 
III

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S RELIABILITY PERFORMANCE DATA, ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
IT COULD NOT BE USED TO PROVE DEFECT.

"ISSUE 
IV

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN EXCLUDING LETTERS, CONSTITUTING ADMISSIONS, WRITTEN BY DEFENDANT IN 
RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS FROM PEOPLE WHO COULDN'T GET THEIR SEAT BELT BUCKLES 
UNFASTENED.

"ISSUE 
V

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES CONCERNING SIMILAR 
ACCIDENTS.

"ISSUE 
VI

"WHETHER IN A STRICT 
LIABILITY ACTION, AN ALLEGATION OF A SPECIFIC DESIGN DEFECT PRECLUDES 
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE MERELY BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TEND TO PROVE THE DESIGN 
DEFECT ALLEGED, WHEN THE EVIDENCE, 1) IS PROBATIVE ON NOTICE, OR 2) SUPPORTS AN 
INFERENCE OF DEFECT.

"ISSUE 
VII

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO LIMIT THE DEFINITION OF `UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS' WHICH WAS 
GIVEN AS A JURY INSTRUCTION.

"ISSUE 
VIII

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE CLAIMS BROUGHT BY MARGO 
SIMS."

[¶4.]     On July 28, 1978, 
Marjorie was driving on U.S. Highway 14 west of Sheridan, Wyoming, in a 1974 two-door Chevrolet Chevelle 
Malibu accompanied by her daughters, Margo and Lara, when she noticed flames 
coming from the left rear of the vehicle. Marjorie immediately told her 
daughters that the automobile was on fire and instructed them to exit the 
vehicle as soon as it stopped.

[¶5.]     When the automobile was 
stopped, Lara, who was seated in the front passenger seat, unlatched the 
passenger door. Margo, who was seated in the back of the vehicle, pushed her way 
out between the front passenger seat and the door frame. Marjorie attempted to 
open the door on the driver's side but was unable to do so because of the 
intensity of the fire. Lara could not exit the automobile because she could not 
get her seat belt buckle apart. Marjorie, realizing that Lara was having 
trouble, tried to open Lara's seat belt buckle. After having no success in 
getting the seat belt buckle open, Marjorie grasped Lara under her arm and groin 
and jerked upward and outward, freeing Lara. Lara and Marjorie then escaped from 
the car on the passenger's side. However, upon noticing that the vehicle was 
rolling backwards out of control, Marjorie returned to the driver's seat to put 
the car in park and again exited the car on the passenger's 
side.

[¶6.]     Tragically, as a result 
of being in the flaming automobile, Marjorie and Lara received serious burns. 
Margo received minor burns while she was helping move Lara further away from the 
vehicle.

[¶7.]     On July 26, 1983, 
plaintiffs brought an action against General Motors for injuries resulting from 
the failure of the seat belt buckle to open. Marjorie and Lara grounded their 
claims upon strict liability on the bases of manufacturing defect, design 
defect, failure to warn, and negligence as a result of negligent design, failure 
to test, failure to recall, and failure to warn. Margo founded her claims upon 
the same negligence theories as Marjorie and Lara and added negligent infliction 
of emotional distress.

[¶8.]     During discovery, 
plaintiffs obtained evidence of other incidents in which similar seat belt 
buckles in General Motors' automobiles had failed to open, data on product 
reliability monitoring tests performed by General Motors, and information about 
two other cases in which the occupants were trapped by their seat belts while 
they were in burning automobiles. However, the trial court excluded the 
introduction of all this evidence through a pretrial order in limine and at 
trial.

[¶9.]     Prior to closing 
arguments, the trial court granted General Motors directed verdicts on the issue 
of strict liability on the basis of manufacturing defect and on both claims 
asserted by Margo. Also, the trial court gave its own jury instruction defining 
"unreasonably dangerous," even though plaintiffs had offered their own 
instruction for that term. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
General Motors on all remaining issues of liability. Plaintiffs moved for a new 
trial, and that motion was denied by the trial court. This appeal 
followed.

I

[¶10.]  Plaintiffs claim the court erred in 
directing a verdict for General Motors because that improperly placed the burden 
on plaintiffs to eliminate all other possible causes for the seat belt failure. 
According to plaintiffs, an inference that there was a defect existed by virtue 
of the failure itself, and it was for the jury to decide whether or not there 
were other causes not attributable to General Motors which kept the seat belt 
buckle from opening.

[¶11.]  In Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Wyo., 
716 P.2d 334 (1986), we held that the doctrine of strict liability in tort was a 
valid cause of action in Wyoming independent from those actions against a 
manufacturer or seller for negligence or breach of warranty. In that case, we 
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), with regard to the 
doctrine of strict liability in tort. That section 
provides:

[¶12.]  "402A. Special Liability of Seller of 
Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer

"(1) One who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer 
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

"(a) the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

"(b) it is expected to 
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold.

"(2) The rule stated in 
Subsection (1) applies although

"(a) the seller has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and

"(b) the user or consumer 
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with 
the seller."

[¶13.]  As stated in comment g of section 402A, 
supra:

"The seller is not liable when he delivers 
the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make 
it harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was 
in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular 
seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which 
will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not 
sustained." (Emphasis added).

From the 
language in comment g, it is clear that section 402A, supra, applies only when 
the product is shown to have been unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the 
seller's hands. There is, however, an inference that a product was defective at 
the time it left the seller's hands if a prima facie case can be presented that 
there was no abnormal use of the product or that there were no reasonable 
secondary causes for the defect. In Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration 
Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452, 462 (1983), we quoted with approval the rule 
set out in Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 570, 2 Ill.Dec. 282, 
285, 357 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1976):

"`A prima facie case that 
a product was defective and that the defect existed when it left the 
manufacturer's control is made by proof that in the absence of abnormal use or reasonable 
secondary causes the product failed "to perform in the manner reasonably to 
be expected in light of [its] nature and intended function."'" (Emphasis 
added.)

We, therefore, 
agree with plaintiffs' contention that the "inference of defect rule" is 
applicable in Wyoming with regard to product liability 
cases. We fail, however, to see how this rule is of any aid to plaintiffs in 
supporting their contention.

[¶14.]  In this case, mere proof that the seat 
belt buckle malfunctioned was not sufficient to create an inference of a defect. 
It was plaintiffs' additional burden to present evidence that there was no 
abnormal use and no reasonable secondary causes for the malfunction. Plaintiffs 
not only failed to meet this burden but presented evidence to the jury that the 
malfunction may have been caused by a foreign particle, such as a piece of wood, 
a toothpick, a small piece of metal, a coin, a grain of sand, an interlock 
switch of the seat belt itself, or a small pebble, being introduced into the 
mouth of the buckle.

[¶15.]  When faced with a directed verdict 
question, this Court's applicable standards of review are as 
follows:

"In reviewing the grant 
of a directed verdict by a trial court, consideration must be given to all 
evidence favorable to [the] party against whom the motion is directed, as well 
as to all reasonable and legitimate inferences which might be drawn therefrom. 
Whether or not the evidence so viewed is sufficient to create an issue for the 
jury is solely a question of law to be answered by the trial court. That court 
must determine whether or not the evidence is such that, without weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise, considering the weight of the 
evidence, there is but one conclusion as to [the] verdict which men of reason 
could reach." Town of Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1977) (citations 
and footnote omitted).

"`In determining whether 
a verdict should have been directed, the appellate court applies the same 
standard as does the trial court in passing on the motion originally. * * * 
Whether a verdict should be directed is a question of law and on those questions 
litigants are entitled to full review by the appellate court without special 
deference to the views of the trial court.' 9 Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2536, p. 595, and § 2524, pp. 541-542." Carey 
v. Jackson, Wyo., 603 P.2d 868, 877 
(1979).

"[S]ince a directed 
verdict deprives the parties of a determination of the facts by a jury, such 
motion should be cautiously and sparingly granted." Cody v. Atkins, Wyo., 658 P.2d 59, 61 
(1983).

[¶16.]  Even though we give plaintiffs every 
favorable consideration and recognize the difficulty in sustaining a directed 
verdict because of our standards of review, we cannot say that the trial court 
acted improperly when it granted directed verdicts to General Motors. Simply 
stated, plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof placed upon them in this 
case, and General Motors was entitled to directed verdicts as a matter of law 
concerning the claims of manufacturing defects.

II

[¶17.]  In plaintiffs' second through sixth 
issues, they contend that the trial court erred when it excluded the use of 
particular evidence from the trial. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that it was 
improper for the trial court to eliminate General Motors' reliability 
performance (RPM) data, General Motors' letters (1241 reports) in response to 
consumer complaints, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
consumer complaints, NHTSA computer printouts of complaints concerning General 
Motors' seat belt buckles, General Motors' warranty data, comments by 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses or cross-examination of General Motors' expert 
witnesses concerning such evidence, and testimony concerning two cases in which 
individuals had been trapped by seat belt buckles in burning automobiles. We 
choose to collectively address these issues asserted by plaintiffs because of 
the similarity in their nature and argument.

[¶18.]  In the case of Jahnke v. State, 
Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1005 (1984), we summarized our long standing standard of review regarding 
the admissibility of evidence:

"The rule which this 
court has applied with respect to rulings as to admissibility of evidence is 
articulated in Taylor v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1294, 1295 
(1982), as follows:

`It has been 
held generally that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and absent a clear abuse of discretion will not be disturbed. It 
is also the general rule that the foundation, relevance, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness are within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and will be upheld on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.' (Footnotes 
omitted.)

The burden of 
establishing the clear abuse of discretion must be assumed by the party who 
attacks the ruling of the trial court. That party must establish that the ruling 
of the trial court was erroneous and that it did affect substantial rights of 
the party. The trial court in the exercise of its discretion can exclude even 
relevant evidence when there are countervailing considerations such as `if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.' Rule 403, 
W.R.E.

[¶19.]  "The definition that this court has 
espoused of an abuse of discretion is found in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980), where it is 
stated as follows:

`* * * An abuse of 
discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under 
the circumstances. * * *'

* * * * * 
*

`In the context of 
evidentiary rulings at trial, this court has long adhered to the doctrine that a 
sufficient offer of proof is necessary so that this court may be adequately 
apprised of the nature of the excluded testimony. The dual purpose of this 
requirement is to enable the trial court to be fully advised in the exercise of 
its discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and to enable the reviewing 
court to determine if prejudicial error resulted from the exclusion of the 
proffered testimony.' Garcia v. State, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1148, 1155 (1983)." (Citations 
omitted.)

[¶20.]  Turning to the issues, we begin by 
holding that, although argument regarding all these issues was had by each party 
during a pretrial motion hearing, they are properly before this Court for our 
review. Although General Motors asserts that plaintiffs did not preserve the 
exclusion of such evidence for consideration on appeal, we note that Rule 
103(a), W.R.E., specifically states:

"(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. - Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and

* * * * * 
*

"(2) Offer of Proof. - In 
case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked."

The committee 
note to this rule provides:

"Under Rule 103(a), it is 
not necessary to re-offer evidence which has been suppressed by action of the 
court on a pretrial motion, such as a motion in limine or a motion to suppress, 
or to make a further objection at the time of trial to evidence which has 
previously been ruled admissible on such a pretrial 
motion."

 

[¶21.]  At the hearing, counsel for plaintiffs 
continually mixed the discussion of these topics, failed to produce more than 
one, and in some instances none, of the separate documents contained in each of 
the voluminous files intended to be presented at trial, and sought the admission 
in bulk of such evidence.1 The trial court ruled that such 
evidence was not admissible on the basis of unreliability, hearsay, and 
relevance and because the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighed its 
probative value. At trial, plaintiffs again attempted to introduce some of the 
aforementioned evidence, but the trial court denied its 
admission.

[¶22.]  Speaking of similar evidence which also 
was excluded from trial, the case of Uitts v. General Motors Corporation, 411 F. Supp. 1380, 1382-83 (E.D.Pa. 1974), affirmed without opinion 513 F.2d 626 (3d 
Cir. 1975), states:

"The reports offered in 
the present case do not have [an] indicia of reliability. They include 
statements by owners concerning the occurrence of an accident and reports by 
General Motors personnel concerning inspection of the involved vehicle, when 
possible. In addition, some of the reports contain letters of owners and police 
reports. The 1241 reports offered by plaintiffs were not the result of a 
continued and detailed investigation, but rather served merely as a preliminary 
investigation involving only the taking of a statement from the driver and if 
possible an inspection of the vehicle in question. The persons compiling these 
reports were not required to assemble all the factual data, or determine the 
cause or extent of the damage. They were charged with merely reporting the 
statements of the owners without any duty to cross examine or investigate 
further. The purpose of these reports was to alert defendant to possible 
difficulties with its product. They were not intended to commit the defendant in 
any way and as such were not intended to be final or amount to a complete 
analysis of a particular accident or its cause * * *.

"Even if we were to 
decide that the reports did contain sufficient reliability for admission into 
evidence, we would also have to find that the reports are relevant and probative 
of the issue of causation. * * * The 1241 reports offered in the present case 
concerned accidents other than the one which is being adjudicated. Clearly, an 
investigation into the cause of the very accident being litigated * * * would be 
relevant. The same result, however, does not obtain when the reports sought to 
be introduced relate to other accidents the cause of which may or may not have 
already been litigated. A review of these reports shows that various 
malfunctions were alleged to have caused the accident. Because of the nature of 
the reports we do not believe them to be admissions by the defendant, and 
therefore to permit them to be considered by the jury would be tantamount to 
allowing the persons making the statements to testify against defendant without 
being subject to cross examination or required to take an oath. Therefore, any 
probative value these reports might have is outweighed by their prejudicial 
nature.

"Proof of prior accidents 
or occurrences [is] not easily admitted into evidence, since [it] can often 
result in unfair prejudice, consumption of time and distraction of the jury to 
collateral matters. The introduction of these reports into evidence in this case 
would have had this very result. * * * With respect to these reports plaintiff 
is attempting to introduce proof of accidents involving similar, not necessarily 
identical, vehicles. An examination of these reports reveals that some of them 
contain either highly inflammatory letters of owners or police reports relating 
to details of the accidents, which would clearly be inadmissible. Plaintiffs 
made no attempt to limit or delete the hearsay portions of these reports. 
Rather, plaintiffs insisted that each of the reports without exception be 
admitted into evidence. Defendant, in order to minimize the prejudicial effect 
of these reports, would have had to go through each one individually with the 
jury. The result would have been a minitrial on each of the thirty-five reports 
offered by plaintiffs. This would lengthen the trial considerably and the minds 
of the jurors would be diverted from the claim of the plaintiffs to the claims 
contained in these reports. Plaintiffs chose not to attempt to prove a specific 
malfunction or defect of the vehicle, but rather, to rely upon the MacDougall[2] theory to establish liability. The 
effect of MacDougall is to lessen plaintiffs' burden of proof by allowing 
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case merely by showing the occurrence of a 
malfunction in the absence of abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes. This 
lower burden of proof, however, does not result in a lower standard of 
admissibility under the rules of evidence. If plaintiffs were attempting to 
prove the existence of a specific defect or malfunction it is clear that the 
admission into evidence of the occurrence of similar accidents would require a 
showing that those accidents were caused by the same malfunction or defect. 
Simply because plaintiffs are proceeding under the MacDougall theory we do not 
believe they can introduce evidence of accidents which may involve a variety of 
causes, and then let the jury guess which of those causes was responsible for 
the accident in the present case. [W]e believe the prejudicial nature of them 
far outweighs any probative value they might have, and accordingly we do not 
think it was error to exclude them from the record." (Citations and footnotes 
omitted.)

[¶23.]  The rationale of the Uitts case is 
applicable to this case. We cannot say that the trial court erred in excluding 
the evidence of General Motors' RPM data, 1241 reports and warranty data, NHTSA 
consumer complaints or computer printouts, comments by plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses or cross-examination of General Motors' expert witnesses upon such 
evidence, and testimony concerning two cases in which individuals had been 
trapped in burning automobiles by seat belt buckles. While we recognize that the 
Uitts case deals only with the acceptance of 1241 reports into evidence, we hold 
that all the subject evidence proffered by plaintiffs in this case contained one 
or more, if not all, of the pitfalls found in the evidence sought to be admitted 
in Uitts.

[¶24.]  Further, although plaintiffs complain 
that this evidence was offered to prove that General Motors had knowledge of 
previous malfunctions of its seat belts - an essential element of the claims 
asserted by plaintiffs - such contentions are without merit. General Motors 
admitted that it was aware that its seat belts and other products malfunctioned 
on occasion.

[¶25.]  We hold that the evidence sought to be 
admitted by plaintiffs was properly excluded by the trial court and that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such 
evidence.

III

[¶26.]  Plaintiffs also assert that the trial 
court erred when it refused to give the jury their requested instruction 
pertaining to the application of the concept of "unreasonably dangerous" and 
instead gave its own instruction regarding the term. The instruction offered by 
plaintiffs read as follows:

"A product is defective 
when it is in an unreasonably dangerous condition. The term `unreasonably 
dangerous' means unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably foreseeable 
considering the nature and function of the product."

This instruction 
parallels the alternate definition found in the Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury 
Instructions, No. 11.04, which cites section 402A(i) of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, supra. The instruction given the jury by the trial court 
provided:

"A product is defective 
when it is in an unreasonably dangerous condition. The term `unreasonably 
dangerous' means unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably foreseeable 
considering the nature and function of the product and its 
uses."

This instruction 
is the same as the initial definition given in W.C.P.J.I., No. 11.04, except 
that the words "and its uses" were added at the end.

[¶27.]  Plaintiffs contend that the instruction 
given by the trial court imposed a risk-benefit theory wherein the consumer is 
required to prove that the manufacturer could have used a safer design and that 
the benefit from the alternative design outweighed the risk or cost of that 
design. Alternatively, plaintiffs conclude that their proposed instruction more 
appropriately described the consumer expectation test as enunciated by section 
402A, supra. For these reasons, plaintiffs summarily complain that the 
instruction given by the trial court did not conform with W.C.P.J.I., No. 11.04, 
that it extended beyond the definition set forth in section 402A, supra, and 
that the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" given the jury was ambiguous, 
unclear, and subject to misinterpretation. We do not 
agree.

[¶28.]  In the case of Norman v. State, Wyo., 747 P.2d 520, 523 (1987), quoting Scadden v. State, Wyo., 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (1987), we recently 
enunciated our applicable standard of review in cases involving issues 
concerning the appropriateness of instructions given a 
jury:

"`The general rule in 
reviewing questions involving instructions is that the trial judge is afforded 
latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible 
error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and 
in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the 
issues.'"

[¶29.]  After review of the instruction given by 
the trial court, all of the instructions as a whole allowed to go before the 
jury, and the facts of this case, we determine that the jury was instructed 
properly regarding the doctrine of strict liability as expressed in section 
402A, supra, adopted by this Court. We fail to recognize any merit in 
plaintiffs' contention that the instruction given by the trial court did not 
conform with W.C.P.J.I., No. 11.04. While we admit that this Court does not 
follow a risk-benefit theory, we cannot see how the instruction given by the 
trial court imposed such a burden on plaintiffs or the jury. A careful reading 
of section 402A, supra, reveals that, as a condition precedent to strict 
liability becoming operative in a particular case, the product sold must be 
"unreasonably dangerous" to the user or consumer. The instruction given by the 
trial court sufficiently apprised the jury of the relative meaning of that term 
with regard to a strict liability theory.

[¶30.]  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion or commit reversible error in refusing to give the instruction 
requested by plaintiffs and in giving its own instruction.

IV

[¶31.]  In plaintiffs' last issue, they assert in 
summary form that the trial court erred when it issued a directed verdict to 
General Motors regarding Margo Sims' claims of negligence and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.

[¶32.]  In Gates v. Richardson, Wyo., 719 P.2d 193 (1986), we recognized that the claim of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress was actionable in the state of Wyoming. We stated:

"To summarize all of our 
limitations on this tort [negligent infliction of emotional distress], we hold 
that the class of plaintiffs who may bring an action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress consists of those who could bring, at least under some set of 
circumstances, a wrongful death action for the primary victim's death. The 
primary victim must die, or suffer serious bodily injury as that term is defined 
in the Wyoming Criminal Code. The plaintiff must observe either the infliction 
of the fatal or harmful blow or observe the results of the blow after its 
occurrence without material change in the condition and location of the victim. 
Once these conditions are satisfied, the 
case can go forward under normal negligence principles. The defendant must have 
been negligent and his negligence must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
mental injuries." Id. at 200-01 (emphasis 
added).

[¶33.]  Margo failed to meet her burden of proof 
in showing that her emotional injuries were proximately caused by any negligence 
on the part of General Motors. As evidenced in the record, the jury found by 
special verdict that General Motors was negligent but did not attribute such 
negligence as a direct cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiffs. In order 
for a plaintiff to recover on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, that plaintiff must show that the emotional distress resulted from 
death or serious physical injury to persons within a specified group as a result 
of the defendant's negligence. See Versland v. Caron Transport, 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583 (1983), and Comment, Dillon 
Revisited, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 931 (1982), cited with approval in Gates v. 
Richardson.

[¶34.]  Also, in proving General Motors was 
directly negligent in proximately causing the injuries she sustained, Margo did 
not meet the requisite burden placed upon her. A plaintiff claiming direct 
negligence on the part of a defendant must prove that the defendant's action or 
inaction was negligent and that such negligence proximately caused the injury 
sustained.

[¶35.]  Applying our standards of review 
previously mentioned regarding the evaluation of the granting of a directed 
verdict by a trial court, we hold that the trial court acted properly as a 
matter of law when it granted a directed verdict to General Motors regarding 
Margo Sims' claims.

[¶36.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The attempted admittance 
of evidence in bulk without the production of each separate document for review 
by the trial court is questionable in that the presentation may lack the proper 
foundation for admittance of the evidence. Such antics place the trial court in 
the precarious position of deciding the admissibility of evidence without the 
benefit of knowing exactly what evidence is being offered. However, in its own 
discretion, the trial court in this case allowed the presentation of the offered 
evidence in such manner, and we, therefore, give deference to the trial court's 
decision in this regard.

2 MacDougall v. Ford Motor 
Company, 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969). The 
theory asserted in that case is essentially the same as in the cases of 
Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corporation and Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, 
Inc. mentioned previously.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶37.]  I dissent.

[¶38.]  Close perception of the logical kind 
suggests that this court, and perhaps segments of the American adjudicatory 
system, postulates different evidentiary standards, dependent upon utilization 
for criminal prosecution as denied to defense and now also denied to plaintiffs 
in civil cases.1 I dissent from Section II of the 
decision encompassing a denial to plaintiff of information available to document 
defendant's product failure. Weight and contendable validity should be retained 
as a jury-factfinder function. Otherwise we permit the judge to pretry matters 
of evidentiary conflict.

[¶39.]  Prejudice aside, which introductory 
disability we have regularly denied criminal defendants, evidence of similar 
problems and mechanical failures, accommodates in logic relevance a definable 
degree of probability. Discretion in the context of Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894 
(1986), and evidentiary exclusion of relevant and informative facts, are not 
synonymous within my concept of the proper operation of the justice-delivery 
system. Asbestosis, all-terain three-wheelers, and intra-uterine devices should 
have taught us that great damage is caused and many deaths occur when product 
danger or misfunction are ignored by the contamination 
spreaders.

[¶40.]  If you are socially, or as in some states 
criminally, obligated to buckle up, countervailing capacity to unbuckle should 
not be denied by product failure when emergency descends. Whether frantic 
misfunction of the user or factual nonoperation of a defective product, the 
question should be accorded factual contemplation by the community-represented 
jury for the justice decision. Based on 
relevantly informative evidence as would be afforded by similar problems, I 
would find a proper factual form for the plaintiff to 
explore.

[¶41.]  I also differ and dissent from the 
decisional approval of the directed verdict in Section IV. If a defective 
product and constituent negligence existed, reason is totally missing to ascribe 
decision justification in proximate-cause criteria. Otherwise you assume to deny 
the premise in order to derive a negative conclusion. Validity of the premise 
should be left to the fact finder, and consequent proximate cause surely then 
cannot be denied by directed-verdict legal conclusion. Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1284 (1983); Holstedt v. Neighbors, Wyo., 377 P.2d 181 (1962); In re Draper's Estate, Wyo., 374 P.2d 425 (1962). Without question, 
and after all, it was the delayed extrication from the seat belt that caused all 
damage for which claim in this case is made.

[¶42.]  A current comprehensive and 
well-considered analysis of proximate cause in products-liability cases is found 
in Fischer, Products Liability - Proximate Cause, Intervening Cause, and Duty, 
52 Mo.L.Rev. 547 (1987).

FOOTNOTES

1 "`* * * as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' (Emphasis 
added.)" Brown v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 1110, 1111 (1987), quoting Rule 
404, W.R.E.