Title: Anthony Lamarca v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC92610
____________
ANTHONY LAMARCA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[March 8, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
The State charged and the jury convicted Anthony LaMarca of the first-
degree murder of Kevin Flynn.  The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to
one and the trial judge sentenced him accordingly.  We have jurisdiction.  See art.
V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
The State presented the following evidence.
 James Hughes testified that
prior to the murder appellant told him he was going to kill the victim.  Hughes asked
why and appellant replied, "I'm gonna kill him."
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On December 2, 1995, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the victim and Tonya
Flynn, his wife, went to a neighborhood bar.  Appellant, Tonya’s father, was also
at the bar and asked Tonya if he could borrow her car.  The victim offered to drive
appellant home and they left at approximately 7:45 p.m.  
Appellant returned to the bar alone at approximately 8:30 and told Tonya that
she had to drive to Hudson County to pick up the victim.  After arriving at their
destination, appellant raped Tonya in an otherwise unoccupied house.  Tonya
subsequently called the police, who began to look for appellant.  Deputy Sean
Kennedy testified that he saw appellant walking along a road, appellant dropped
objects he was carrying, and he ran away.  Detective Jeffrey Good arrived at
appellant's trailer at 2:15 a.m. on December 3.  Good looked through the bedroom
window and saw the victim’s body.  He entered and saw bullet casings on the
floor, blood in the living room, kitchen, and hall, and the body in the bedroom.
Stephanie Parker testified that on the night in question she heard a car drive
up, she looked out her window, and she saw appellant and another man walking
from the car to the front door of appellant's trailer.  They appeared to be arguing
because of their hand gestures.  Parker stated that she then fell asleep and her father
subsequently awakened her at the behest of the police.
Later that morning, appellant arrived at the home of Jeremy Smith, who
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testified that appellant said:  "I did it.  I killed him."  Smith asked who he killed and
appellant said "Kevin."  Appellant said that he killed Kevin in a trailer, that it really
"sucked," but that he had to do it. 
Appellant testified in his defense and pursued the theory that Tonya killed her
husband.  He also denied making incriminating statements. 
During the penalty phase, appellant waived his right to counsel and elected to
represent himself with the appointed public defender acting as standby counsel. 
Appellant rested his case without testifying or presenting any mitigating evidence,
although standby counsel proffered mitigating evidence she could have presented.
The trial court found one aggravating factor–prior convictions for violent
felonies based on appellant's 1984 convictions for kidnapping and attempted sexual
battery.  The trial court found that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to present mitigating evidence.  The court recognized that it had to give good
faith consideration to any mitigation in the record and specifically considered the
following factors:  (1) insufficient evidence that appellant was subject to extreme
mental or emotional disturbances; (2) appellant's age–forty–was not mitigating; (3)
appellant was drinking and angry at his daughter on the day of the offense, but the
circumstance was unestablished; (4) insufficient evidence of appellant's work
record; (5) appellant was generally well-behaved at trial–very little weight; and (6)
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appellant suffered from drug and alcohol abuse and psychological problems–very
little weight.  The court ruled that the proffered evidence could not be considered in
mitigation.
The first issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting collateral crime evidence.  The admissibility of such evidence is within the
discretion of the trial court and its determination shall not be disturbed absent an
abuse of that discretion.  See Sexton v. State, 697 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1997). 
"Discretion . . . is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where
no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court."  Huff v. State,
569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990).
The admissibility of evidence generally turns on relevance:
Our initial premise is the general canon of evidence that
any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible into
evidence unless its admissibility is precluded by some
specific rule of exclusion.  Viewing the problem at hand
from this perspective, we begin by thinking in terms of a
rule of admissibility as contrasted to a rule of exclusion.
Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. 1959).  Evidence of other crimes or
bad acts are admissible if relevant, i.e., if it is probative of a material issue other
than the bad character of the accused.  See Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 251
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(Fla. 1995).  In Hunter, this Court explained: 
Among the purposes for which a collateral crime may be
admitted is establishment of the entire context out of
which the criminal action occurred.  See also Ashley v.
State, 265 So.2d 685, 693-94 (Fla. 1972) (holding that
evidence of four other murders committed shortly after
the murder for which defendant was tried was
admissible).  Inseparable crime evidence is admitted not
under 90.404(2)(a) as similar fact evidence but under
section 90.402 because it is relevant.
Id. at 251 (citations omitted).  On the other hand, "[r]elevant evidence is
inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence."  § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1995).  All of the evidence presented
in a prosecution "prejudices" the defendant; thus, the pertinent question is whether
that prejudice is so unfair that it should be deemed unlawful.  See Wuornos v.
State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 1994). 
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
two pieces of inextricably intertwined evidence:  (1) testimony that appellant told
the victim that he had done something to Tina LaMarca–appellant’s
stepdaughter–that caused her to cease living with him; and (2) testimony that
appellant raped Tonya.  The two pieces of evidence must be viewed together.  The
first piece of disputed testimony consisted of Tina affirming that there was an
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"incident" between appellant and herself and her testimony that what appellant "had
done" to her prompted her to stop living with him.  The appellant had allegedly
raped Tina, although that was not expressly stated to the jury.  Tina's testimony
was relevant because it puts into context the victim's statement to appellant to keep
away from Tonya.  Absent the nexus to the "incident" between appellant and Tina,
the jury would have been left wondering why the victim told appellant to stay away
from Tonya.  Thus, Tina's testimony was relevant to prove motive and
premeditation, and was focused and limited.
The second part of the contested testimony was provided by Tonya, who
stated that after appellant and the victim left the bar, appellant returned alone and
told her that she had to meet the victim at appellant's relative's house.  They drove
there and found the house unoccupied, and appellant raped her.  Afterwards,
appellant asked Tonya to leave Florida with him and told her that her feelings for
the victim would not last.
Evidence that appellant raped his daughter and did something to cause Tina
to move out puts into context appellant’s statements about his wanting Tonya to
leave Florida with him and that her feelings for her husband (the victim) would not
last.  The testimony is therefore relevant to show appellant's motive in killing the
victim–to have Tonya for himself.  If the testimony as to the rape and Tina being
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forced to move out by appellant is omitted, you simply have a father asking his
daughter to leave Florida and stating that her feelings for her husband would go
away.  Thus, absent the testimony of Tonya and Tina relative to appellant’s
actions, it would not be clear that the father desired his daughter in a way that
would exclude his son-in-law and why the son-in-law wanted to separate appellant
and Tonya and told appellant–just hours before appellant killed him–that he could
not be near his daughter because he knew of the "incident" with Tina.  Thus,
appellant's incestuous desire for his daughter and the victim’s demand that
appellant stay away are relevant to prove appellant's motive to kill his son-in-law. 
The motive contradicts the defense strategy of attempting to prove that Tonya
killed her husband and tends to prove appellant's premeditation.  Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
 The second issue for our consideration is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding defense evidence that might have shown that Tonya had a 
motive to commit the murder.  We agree that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Evidence that the victim drank excessively, that Tonya wanted a divorce, and that
she had sex with another man while she was briefly separated from the victim
arguably tends to establish that she had a motive to kill the victim.  See State v.
Savino, 567 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1990).  Moreover, the substance of the evidence
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did not seem likely to cause confusion or mislead the jury.  The trial court,
therefore, abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. See Guzman v. State, 644
So. 2d 996, 1000 (Fla. 1994) (explaining that courts “should be extremely cautious
when denying defendants the opportunity to present testimony or evidence on their
behalf, especially where a defendant is on trial for his or her life").
In the instant case, the abuse of discretion amounts to harmless error. 
Evidence of appellant's guilt includes his statement five months before the murder
that he wanted to kill the victim; he was seen several times with the firearm used to
commit the murder; just before the murder he was seen by his neighbor entering his
trailer with the victim and they seemed to be arguing; the victim was missing later
that night; the police found the victim's body in appellant's trailer early the next
morning; after departing the bar with the victim and in the victim's car, appellant
returned to the bar alone and with the victim's car; upon seeing a policeman hours
after the murder he fled; the night of the murder he told a friend that he killed his
son-in-law, that it "sucked," but that he had to do it; and that he continued his flight
to Washington State.  Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected
the verdict.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).             
Appellant’s third issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the defense's motion for mistrial based on a question by the
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prosecutor that implied that appellant was in jail a few months before the charged
murder.  Prosecutorial improprieties "must be viewed in the context of the record
as a whole to determine if a new trial is warranted."  Sireci v. State, 587 So. 2d 450,
452 (Fla. 1991).  Where the remark is "minimal," "inadvertent," and the jurors
probably could have deduced the improperly stated information by other means, a
mistrial is unwarranted.  Id. at 452-53; see Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639, 642
(Fla. 1982) (holding that state witness's misstatement that "my first time in prison,
all three of us was [sic] together"–which included the defendant–was "not so
prejudicial as to warrant reversal").  
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant's motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's misstatement.  Following
cross-examination of a state witness (who on cross-examination identified a person
named Zack as being present during a conversation between the witness and
appellant) the prosecutor queried on redirect: 
[STATE]:  This gentleman named Zack, what was he
doing time for?
THE COURT:
Excuse me?
[DEFENSE]:
Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT:
Approach.
(The following takes place at sidebar.)
THE COURT:
Shawn, do you know what you just said?
[STATE]:
Mr. Zaccarino –
THE COURT:
You said, What was he doing time for?
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[STATE]:
Oh,  . . . .
[DEFENSE]:
Your Honor, we're going to move at
this time for a mistrial . . . .  The inference is obvious
regarding the conversation and the location of the
conversation.
[STATE]:
Oh, I can't believe I said that.  I don't
know – that is unbelievable.  I don't know if a curative –
THE COURT:
No.
[STATE]:
Doggone it.
THE COURT:
I'll take the motion for mistrial under
advisement and rule on it before the State rests.
[STATE]:
Can I – maybe I can try to rehabilitate.
THE COURT:
I will let you rephrase your question. 
And let's not say anything further about it. 
The record is clear that the misstatement was inadvertent and that attention was not
drawn to it.  In context of the trial, the statement was not prejudicial since appellant
testified during the guilt stage of his trial and admitted to eleven felony convictions. 
Thus, the jury could have safely inferred from properly admitted testimony that
appellant had spent time in confinement.  Put in context, therefore, it is clear that the
above misstatement was hardly prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.  The trial
court's decision is therefore affirmed.  
Next, in appellant’s fourth issue, we examine whether the trial court erred in
denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal (JOA).  On appeal of a denial
of a motion for JOA where the State submitted direct evidence, the trial court’s
determination will be affirmed if the record contains competent and substantial
1 Our consideration of this issue in conjunction with the above-mentioned evidence of guilt
satisfies this Court’s requirement to independently review the evidence in support of appellant’s
conviction for first-degree murder and, in so doing, we find sufficient evidence to support the
conviction.  See Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144, 154 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2407
(1999).
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evidence in support of the ruling.  See Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla.
1996).  Here, the record contains competent and substantial evidence of
premeditation based on direct evidence.  Appellant's statement, five months before
the murder, that he intended to kill the victim constitutes direct evidence of his
"fully formed conscious purpose to kill."  Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 92 (Fla.
1997); see Meyers v. State, 704 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Fla. 1997) ("Because
confessions are direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence standard does not
apply. . . ."), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 958 (1998); Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d
1071, 1075 (Fla. 1988) ("We disagree that the case was circumstantial, since Hyzer
and others testified that Hardwick had confessed to the murder or told others of his
plans in advance of the killing.  A confession of committing a crime is direct, not
circumstantial, evidence of that crime.").  Because there is competent, substantial
evidence of appellant’s premeditation, the trial court properly denied his motion for
judgment of acquittal; thus, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.1
In issue five, we must determine whether the trial court erred in declining to
evaluate proffered mitigating evidence during sentencing.  Standby counsel
2 But see Hauser v. State, 701 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1997) (“In fact, the trial court bent over
backwards to give full consideration to the proffered mitigation, accepting it as proven.”).
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proffered evidence relative to three mitigating circumstances:  (1) appellant’s
substance abuse, (2) a  personality disorder, and (3) that he earned his GED in
prison and believed in God.  On appeal, appellant now claims that the trial court
should have accepted these proffers into evidence since they were undisputed.  We
disagree.  Mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when contained
"anywhere in the record, to the extent it is believable and uncontroverted." 
Robinson v. State, 684 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 1996).  This duty extends to cases
where the defendant argues in favor of the death penalty or where the defendant
asks the trial court not to consider mitigating evidence.  See Farr v. State, 621 So.
2d 1368, 1369 (Fla. 1993).  As in any case, "the trial judge must carefully analyze all
the possible statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors against the established
aggravators to ensure that death is appropriate."  Robinson, 684 So. 2d at 177.  If a
defendant elects not to submit proof of mitigating circumstances, the trial court is
not required to accept potential mitigating circumstances as proven based on
defense counsel’s proffer of evidence.  See Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186,
199-201 (Fla. 1997).2  Proffered evidence is merely a representation of what
evidence the defendant proposes to present and is not actual evidence.  See State
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v. Warner, 721 So. 2d 767, 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“[A] proffer is not
evidence.”), approved on other grounds, 726 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000).  Because
appellant waived the presentation of mitigating evidence, he cannot subsequently
complain on appeal that the trial court erred in declining to find mitigating
circumstances that might otherwise have been found; thus, we affirm the trial
court’s decision. 
Issue six presents the issue of whether the death sentence is proportionate. 
The Legislature has reserved application of the death penalty only to the most
aggravated and least mitigated of the most serious crimes.  See Jones v. State, 705
So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 1998). Here, appellant's sole aggravating factor was that
he was previously found guilty of two violent felonies.  Appellant was convicted of
attempted sexual battery and kidnapping based on his attempt, with the use of a
knife, to rape a woman in a public bathroom, which attempt was thwarted when
another woman's presence was detected and the victim screamed, which caused
appellant to flee.  See LaMarca v. State, 515 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).  The
nonstatutory mitigation found by the trial court included his good behavior at trial
(very little weight) and appellant's history of drug and alcohol abuse and that he
suffers from mental disorders (very little weight).
This Court has vacated numerous death sentences where there was only one
3 See also Jorgenson v. State, 714 So. 2d 423, 425, 428 (Fla. 1998).  In Jorgenson, this Court
found death disproportionate where the sole aggravator consisted of a prior conviction for second-
degree murder, which the Court mitigated in weight based on the circumstances of that crime, where
the mitigation consisted of two statutory and three nonstatutory circumstances, and where the Court
found it “significant that Jorgenson did not have any criminal convictions from the time he was released
from prison in 1973 until he was arrested in 1993" for the crime under review.
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aggravating factor; however, those cases generally involved substantial mitigating
circumstances.  See, e.g., Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441, 446-47 (Fla. 1995)
(finding the death sentence disproportionate where defendant’s sole aggravator was
a prior violent felony and defendant had “vast” mitigation including two statutory
and several nonstatutory factors); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fla.
1990) (vacating death sentence as disproportionate where there was one aggravator
and a “large quantum of uncontroverted mitigation”).  These cases are
distinguishable from the instant case because the mitigation found by the trial court
is less than substantial.
This Court has also vacated the death sentence where the sole aggravating
factor is not considered weighty.  In Young v. State, 579 So. 2d 721, 724 (Fla.
1991), this Court explained that in two other cases the death sentence was vacated,
in part because the sole aggravator in each case was “weak.”  Id. (citing Lloyd v.
State, 524 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1988), and Proffitt v. State, 510 So. 2d 896 (Fla.
1987)).3  The sole aggravators in Lloyd and Proffitt were that the murder was
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committed during the course of a felony.  See Lloyd, 524 So. 2d at 403; Proffitt,
510 So. 2d at 898.  In contrast, the sole aggravator here is significant.  
The instant case falls within the category described in Songer v. State, 544
So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1989), wherein the Court stated:  “We have in the past affirmed
death sentences that were supported by one aggravating factor, but those cases
involved either nothing or very little in mitigation.”  Id. at 1011 (citation omitted). 
Examples of single aggravator cases where this Court upheld the death sentence
include Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 648-49 (Fla. 1997), where one aggravating
factor (which comprised three merged factors) was opposed by two statutory
mitigating factors of reduced weight and three nonstatutory circumstances, and
Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1994), where the defendant had one
aggravator given “enormous” weight versus two statutory mitigators (one with only
little weight) and three nonstatutory factors.  See id. at 363, 365.  Moreover,
consistent with Songer, appellant’s two nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were
given only very little weight.    
In light of the seriousness of appellant’s prior convictions and the
insubstantial nature of the mitigation found by the trial court, we hold that the
instant death sentence is proportionate.  We note that proportionality is supported
by the fact that LaMarca committed the instant murder soon after being released
4Tellingly, it appears that appellant committed the kidnapping and attempted rape “soon
after” his previous release from prison.  See LaMarca, 515 So. 2d at 311. 
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from prison.  See Henry v. State, 328 So. 2d 430, 431 (Fla. 1976) (affirming death
sentence where trial court noted in the sentencing order that the defendant had
committed the murder “shortly after his release from prison”).4
Based on the foregoing, appellant’s conviction and sentence are hereby
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs as to the conviction and concurs in result only as to the
sentence with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only as to the conviction and dissents as to the
sentence.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring as to conviction, concurring in result only as to sentence.
I concur in the majority opinion as to the affirmance of the conviction. 
However, I concur in result only regarding the sentencing issues because in my
view the trial court should have considered the uncontradicted proffer of mitigating
evidence.  Nonetheless, I would find the trial court's failure to consider the
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proffered evidence to be harmless error and thus agree with the majority's
affirmance of the death sentence.  
I also write to emphasize the importance of the uniform procedure we
adopted in Muhammad v. State, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S37, S42 (Fla. Jan. 18, 2001),
that will be followed in the future in all cases where the defendant waives the
presentation of mitigating evidence so that available mitigation evidence is placed in
the record at the time of the original sentencing proceedings.  Additionally, as I
explained in greater detail in my specially concurring opinion in Muhammad, I
would require the appointment of special counsel to present mitigating evidence in
order to further increase the reliability, fairness and uniformity of the penalty phase
and to better assist the trial court and this Court in fulfilling our constitutional and
statutory obligations.  See id. at S44.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
Brandt C. Downey, Judge - Case No. CRC9520270CFANO
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Assistant Pubic
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney
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General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee