Title: State v. Eafford

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Eafford, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2224.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-Ohio-2224 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. EAFFORD, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Eafford, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2224.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2925.11—Possession of cocaine—Jury-verdict form omits 
degree of offense. 
(No. 2011-0599—Submitted January 17, 2012—Decided May 22, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 94718,  
2011-Ohio-927. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals vacating Donald Eafford’s felony sentence for possession of 
cocaine and holding that Eafford was convicted only of misdemeanor possession 
of drugs because the jury-verdict form did not state the degree of the offense or 
specify that Eafford had possessed cocaine. 
{¶ 2} Unless a jury verdict states the degree of the offense of which the 
offender is found guilty or finds an additional element elevating the degree of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
offense, the verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least degree of the 
offense charged.  Here, the indictment charged Eafford with possession of 
cocaine, and the least degree of that offense is a felony of the fifth degree.  
Further, the evidence presented at trial proved Eafford possessed cocaine, and the 
trial court instructed the jury that it could find Eafford guilty only if it found the 
drug involved to be cocaine.  The jury, which found Eafford guilty as charged in 
the indictment, thus found him guilty of possession of cocaine as a felony of the 
fifth degree, and the trial court did not plainly err in imposing sentence.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the sentence is 
reinstated. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} On May 8, 2009, Cleveland police officers executed a search 
warrant at 12216 Rexford Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio, after an informant 
purchased a controlled substance there.  Upon entering the house, SWAT team 
members found several people with crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia in plain 
view, and they found Eafford, the lessee, upstairs.  A subsequent search of the 
premises revealed drug paraphernalia in Eafford’s bedside table and a glass and 
rubber pipe with cocaine residue in his bathroom medicine cabinet. 
{¶ 4} A grand jury indicted Eafford on charges of permitting drug abuse 
in violation of R.C. 2925.13(B); possession of “cocaine or a compound, mixture, 
preparation, or substance containing cocaine in an amount of less than 5 grams” in 
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); and possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C. 
2923.24(A).  The matter proceeded to a jury trial, where Cynthia Lewis, a 
scientific examiner with the Cleveland Police forensic laboratory, testified that 
she determined “the material contained in the glass and rubber pipe to be positive 
for cocaine.”  At the close of the state’s case in chief, the trial court directed a 
verdict of acquittal on the charge of possession of criminal tools because the state 
failed to identify residue on the paraphernalia found in the bedside table and did 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
not identify the paraphernalia as used for drugs.  The defense rested without 
presenting any evidence. 
{¶ 5} Our focus in this appeal concerns only the verdict in connection 
with the second count of the indictment.  Regarding this count, the trial court 
instructed the jury as follows:  
 
The defendant, Donald Eafford, is charged in Count 2 of the 
indictment with possession of drugs, in violation of Ohio Revised 
Code Section 2925.11.  Before you can find the defendant guilty, 
you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 8th 
day of May, 2009, and in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the defendant 
did knowingly obtain, possess or use a controlled substance, and 
the drug involved was cocaine or a compound, mixture, 
preparation or substance containing cocaine in an amount less than 
five grams. 
 
The court also submitted a written copy of this instruction to the jury for its use 
during deliberations. 
{¶ 6} The jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts One and Two.  The 
verdict form for Count Two stated: “We, the Jury in this case being duly 
impaneled and sworn, do find the Defendant, Donald Eafford, guilty of 
Possession of Drugs in violation of §2925.11(A) of the Ohio Revised Code, as 
charged in Count Two of the indictment.” (Emphasis added.)  Neither the 
prosecutor nor defense counsel objected to the language of the forms either prior 
to submission to the jury or at the time the jury returned the verdicts.  At 
sentencing, all parties agreed that “Counts 1 and 2 are felonies of the fifth 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
degree.”1  The court therefore sentenced Eafford to an eight-month term of 
incarceration for permitting drug abuse to be served concurrently with an eight-
month term for possession of cocaine. 
{¶ 7} The Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated the sentence for 
possession of cocaine and remanded the case for resentencing, explaining: 
 
[T]he verdict form [for Count Two] does not include a statement 
indicating either the degree of the offense charged or that an 
aggravating circumstance existed to justify a conviction on the 
greater offense, specifically that the drug involved was cocaine or 
a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing cocaine 
in an amount less than five grams. 
* * *  
* * * As this case stands, without a statement of the degree 
of the offense for which he was convicted, or a statement of the 
aggravating element demonstrating that defendant was convicted 
of a greater degree of the offense, he stands convicted of only a 
misdemeanor. 
 
State v. Eafford, 8th Dist. No. 94718, 2011-Ohio-927, ¶ 40, 45. 
{¶ 8} The state appealed to this court and contends that when a verdict 
form contains a finding of guilty as to possession of drugs but omits the name of 
the specific drug at issue, a sentencing court must look to the totality of the 
record, including the indictment, the evidence at trial, the argument of counsel, 
and the jury instructions, to determine the level of the offense. It further maintains 
the appellate court erred by relying on State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-
                                                          
 
1 We note that the judgment of conviction indicates that the possession charge is a felony of the 
fourth degree.   
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
Ohio-256, 860 N.E.2d 735, syllabus, which held that “a verdict form signed by a 
jury must include either the degree of the offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or a statement that an aggravating element has been found to justify 
convicting a defendant of a greater degree of a criminal offense,” because the 
identity of the drug is an essential, not an aggravating, element of a possession 
offense, and the lowest degree of possession of cocaine in R.C. 2925.11 is a 
felony of the fifth degree.  According to the state, “to convict [Eafford] of a 
misdemeanor would conflict with the charging document, not to mention the 
entire trial.  The indictment, evidence, and jury instruction referred exclusively to 
cocaine, no other drug.” 
{¶ 9} Eafford emphasizes that a violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(2), 
“possession of drugs,” is different from a violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(4), 
“possession of cocaine.”  The offense of possession of drugs involves possession 
of a Schedule III, IV, or V controlled substance, and those schedules do not 
include cocaine.  Eafford asserts that the jury found him guilty of the offense of 
possession of drugs and because the verdict did not specify either the degree of 
the offense or a particular quantity of drugs to elevate the offense to a higher 
degree, he can be sentenced only for a misdemeanor.  He maintains that this 
appeal does not require the court to revisit Pelfrey, because it does not involve “a 
difference between the level of the offense charged in the indictment and a lesser 
version of the same offense reflected in the verdict form.  To the contrary, the 
problem in this case is that there is a different offense charged in the indictment 
than that reflected in the verdict form.”  According to Eafford, overriding the 
jury’s verdict of guilty for possession of drugs and sentencing him for possession 
of cocaine based on the court’s independent review of the record would amount to 
judicial fact-finding in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we are asked to decide whether a jury-verdict form 
finding an accused guilty of possession of drugs as charged in the indictment 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
supports a conviction for possession of cocaine, when the indictment, the 
evidence produced at trial, and the jury instructions all refer only to one drug, 
cocaine. 
Law and Analysis 
Plain Error 
{¶ 11} Initially, we observe that Eafford failed to object to the verdict 
form at trial and therefore he has forfeited all but plain error.  Crim.R. 52(B) 
provides, “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”  In State v. Payne, 
114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, we discussed the standard 
for noticing plain error:  
 
“First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from the legal rule. 
* * * Second, the error must be plain. To be ‘plain’ within the 
meaning of Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in 
the trial proceedings. * * * Third, the error must have affected 
‘substantial rights.’  We have interpreted this aspect of the rule to 
mean that the trial court's error must have affected the outcome of 
the trial.” 
 
Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 
(2002). 
{¶ 12} Nonetheless, we have cautioned that “[e]ven if a forfeited error 
satisfies these three prongs, * * * Crim.R. 52(B) does not demand that an 
appellate court correct it.”  Barnes at 27.  Rather, as the court observed in State v. 
Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), “Notice of plain error under 
Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
Possession of Controlled Substances 
{¶ 13} R.C. 2925.11(A) states, “No person shall knowingly obtain, 
possess, or use a controlled substance,” and the statute establishes separate 
offenses based on the identity of the controlled substance involved. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2925.11(C)(2) defines the offense of “possession of drugs”:  
 
If the drug involved in the violation is a compound, 
mixture, preparation, or substance included in schedule III, IV, or 
V, whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of 
possession of drugs.  The penalty for the offense shall be 
determined as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(2)(b), (c), 
or (d) of this section, possession of drugs is a misdemeanor of the 
first degree or, if the offender previously has been convicted of a 
drug abuse offense, a felony of the fifth degree. 
 
Divisions (C)(2)(b) through (d) elevate the offense of possession of drugs based 
on the bulk amount of the drug involved.  The least degree of that offense is a 
misdemeanor of the first degree. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2925.11(C)(4) defines the separate offense of “possession of 
cocaine”:  
 
If the drug involved in the violation is cocaine or a 
compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing cocaine, 
whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of possession 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
of cocaine. The penalty for the offense shall be determined as 
follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(4)(b), (c), 
(d), (e), or (f) of this section, possession of cocaine is a felony of 
the fifth degree * * *. 
 
Divisions (C)(4)(b) through (f) elevate the degree of the offense based on the 
amount of cocaine involved, and thus the least degree of the offense of possession 
of cocaine is a felony of the fifth degree. 
Degree of Offense 
{¶ 16} R.C. 2945.75(A) mandates that the charge and verdict specify the 
degree of the offense: 
 
When the presence of one or more additional elements 
makes an offense one of more serious degree: 
(1) The affidavit, complaint, indictment, or information 
either shall state the degree of the offense which the accused is 
alleged to have committed, or shall allege such additional element 
or elements. Otherwise, such affidavit, complaint, indictment, or 
information is effective to charge only the least degree of the 
offense. 
(2) A guilty verdict shall state either the degree of the 
offense of which the offender is found guilty, or that such 
additional element or elements are present. Otherwise, a guilty 
verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least degree of the 
offense charged. 
 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 17} Count Two of the indictment alleged that Eafford possessed 
cocaine, expert testimony confirmed that the substance at issue tested positive for 
cocaine, and throughout the trial the parties and the court treated the phrase 
“possession of drugs” as synonymous with possession of cocaine.  Further, in its 
jury instructions—a copy of which the court submitted to jurors who had it in the 
deliberating room during deliberations—the trial court explained to the jury that it 
could not find Eafford guilty of possession of drugs as charged in Count Two 
unless it found the drug involved to be cocaine or a compound, mixture, 
preparation, or substance containing cocaine.  And, as we observed in State v. 
Johnson, 71 Ohio St.3d 332, 340, 643 N.E.2d 1098 (1994), “[j]uries are presumed 
to follow the court's instructions.”  Thus, when the jury found Eafford guilty as 
charged in Count Two of the indictment, its finding necessarily related to 
possession of cocaine. 
{¶ 18} Eafford therefore failed to demonstrate that the trial court 
committed plain error in these circumstances.  The verdict form used the phrase 
“possession of drugs” but did not ask jurors to specify whether the drug involved 
in this case was or was not cocaine.  The jurors found Eafford “guilty of 
Possession of Drugs in violation of §2925.11(A) of the Ohio Revised Code, as 
charged in Count Two of the indictment.”  The finding in the verdict cannot be 
described as error, let alone an obvious defect in the trial proceedings, and it did 
not affect Eafford’s substantial rights.  He knew from the outset that the state 
intended to prove his guilt of possession of cocaine.  And it did.  The form of the 
jury verdict did not affect the outcome of the trial.  The state intended to prove the 
accused guilty of possession of cocaine, it did so, and the jury in accordance with 
its findings rendered a verdict in conformity with the evidence presented by the 
state that Eafford possessed cocaine. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
Conclusion 
{¶ 19} Count Two of the indictment charged Eafford with possession of 
cocaine, the state provided testimony that he possessed cocaine, and the jury 
returned its verdict on the only verdict form the court submitted to it.  That verdict 
form reflected a finding of guilty as charged in Count Two of the indictment, 
referring to possession of cocaine.  Thus, Eafford has not shown that but for the 
use of this verdict form, the outcome of the trial would have been different.  Had 
he made a timely objection, the court could have modified the verdict form, but 
Eafford still would have been found guilty of possession of cocaine, because the 
only evidence in the case demonstrated his possession of cocaine, as he did not 
offer any defense in this case.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals and reinstate the sentence imposed by the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
and sentence reinstated. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} Because this case at most involves an error correction,2 I believe 
that this discretionary appeal was improvidently allowed, and I dissent on grounds 
that a reversal of the court of appeals’ judgment is a violation of defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that a court 
may not usurp the fact-finding of a jury through judicial findings.  Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Blakely v. 
                                                          
 
2  The only error appears to be that the court of appeals did not hold that the conviction on Count 
Two was for a misdemeanor of the first, rather than third, degree.  See R.C. 2925.11(C)(2)(a).  
Otherwise, the court of appeals’ judgment should be affirmed. 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).  We have 
also acknowledged that principle.  See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-
Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470.  Yet by holding that a verdict form can be modified 
by the indictment, the evidence at trial, the argument of counsel, and the jury 
instructions, the majority allows a judge to supplant the language of the jury 
verdict and the jury’s findings. 
{¶ 21} The problem in this case is that the verdict form contains neither 
the degree of the offense nor the fact that the controlled substance is cocaine: 
 
We, the Jury in this case, being duly impaneled and sworn, do 
find the Defendant, Donald Eafford, guilty of Possession of Drugs 
in violation of §2925.11(A) of the Ohio Revised Code, as charged 
in Count Two of the indictment. 
 
Count Two of the indictment states more specifically, “The grand jurors, on their 
oaths, further find that the Defendant(s) unlawfully did knowingly obtain, 
possess, or use a controlled substance and the drug involved was cocaine or a 
compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing cocaine in an amount of 
less than 5 grams.”  (Emphasis added.)  But the verdict did not include this 
language. 
{¶ 22} We have held that “[p]ursuant to the clear language of R.C. 
2945.75, a verdict form signed by a jury must include either the degree of the 
offense of which the defendant is convicted or a statement that an aggravating 
element has been found to justify convicting a defendant of a greater degree of a 
criminal offense.”  State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 860 
N.E.2d 735, syllabus. 
{¶ 23} Here, the jury found Eafford guilty of a violation of R.C. 
2925.11(A), which states, “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
controlled substance.”  But the verdict did not name either the controlled 
substance involved or the degree of the offense to allow the judge to sentence in 
accordance with the jury’s finding. 
{¶ 24} Although the indictment names the offense under Count Two, 
“possession of drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),” the violation is more 
accurately “possession of a controlled substance.”  The offense, “possession of 
drugs,” involves the possession of Schedule III, IV, or V controlled substances.  
R.C. 2925.11(C)(2).  For an amount less than the bulk amount, the offense is a 
misdemeanor of the first degree.  R.C. 2925.11(C)(2)(a).  Possession of cocaine, a 
Schedule II controlled substance, is an offense that differs from possession of 
drugs.  The grand jury indicted Eafford for possession of cocaine under R.C. 
2925.11(C)(4).  “If the drug involved in the violation is cocaine or a compound, 
mixture, preparation, or substance containing cocaine, whoever violates division 
(A) of this section is guilty of possession of cocaine.”  (Emphasis added.)  For 
substances less than five grams, the offense is a felony of the fifth degree.  R.C. 
2925.11(C)(4)(a). 
{¶ 25} The court of appeals appropriately held that the missing facts could 
not be supplied by the indictment nor cured by the trial court’s instructions.  
When  the trial judge ignored the verdict form reflecting misdemeanor possession 
of drugs and sentenced Eafford for felony possession of cocaine, the court 
substituted its own findings for that of the jury.  This situation could have been 
avoided by the prosecutor’s careful review of the verdict form before it was 
submitted to the jury.  This case should be dismissed as improvidently allowed. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan 
Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and David M. King 
and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellee. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Laura R. 
Swisher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney. 
______________________