Title: MAYLAND v. FLITNER & THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF BIG HORN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MAYLAND v. FLITNER & THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF BIG HORN2001 WY 6928 P.3d 838Case Number: 00-143Decided: 08/10/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

MARTIN 
R. MAYLAND,

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

DAVID A. 
FLITNER; and THE

BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

OF THE 
COUNTY OF BIG HORN,

Appellees(Respondents).

 

 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Big Horn 
County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Joseph E. Darrah and S. Joseph Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., 
Powell, Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellee Flitner:

            
 Randy L. Royal, Greybull, 
Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Appellee Board of County Commissioners:

            
No appearance

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN and KITE, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. 
(RET.)

 

*This 
case was originally assigned to Justice Thomas on November 17, 2000, for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  
The case was reassigned to Justice Kite on February 5, 
2001.

  
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Martin R. Mayland 
seeks review of a final decision of the Big Horn Board of County Commissioners 
(County Commissioners) granting David A. Flitner a private road over Mr. 
Mayland's property and awarding damages for the taking.  The district court certified the matter 
to this court.  Mr. Mayland 
contends: (1) The final decision is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) 
the findings do not comply with the specificity requirements of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act; (3) no good faith finding was made; (4) Mr. 
Flitner failed to comply with statutory requirements including, but not limited 
to, studying alternative routes and, therefore, the County Commissioners did not 
have jurisdiction to determine the matter; (5) the decision was made in an 
executive session in violation of the Public Meetings Act; (6) the damages 
determination is defective because the appraisers failed to set out before and 
after values per Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 1995); and (7) 
interest should have been awarded to Mr. Mayland from the date Mr. Flitner 
obtained a temporary restraining order granting him full use of the road.  We affirm. 

 

 

 

[¶2]      Mr. Mayland and 
Mr. Flitner own adjacent properties in the Big Horn Mountains.  There are only two existing routes by 
which Mr. Flitner can access his property.  
One is a road that crosses Mr. Mayland's private property and connects 
with a public road known as Snowshoe Pass Road (Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road). The 
other, referred to as Black Mountain Road, crosses over private lands owned by 
Loren Good, Richard Whaley, and Stan Flitner (Mr. Flitner's brother), Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) property, and state land.

 

[¶3]      The Flitner 
family had used Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road since at least the 1930s and, prior 
to 1995, had never been denied access by the Mayland family.  In approximately June of 1994, Mr. 
Flitner commenced construction of several buildings on his property.  In connection with the construction 
project, Mr. Flitner requested and received Mr. Mayland's permission to make 
some improvements to Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road.  By November 1994, approximately sixty 
percent of the building construction was completed.  In January 1995, Mr. Mayland's 
then-legal counsel advised Mr. Flitner by letter that permission to use 
Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road was terminated and an easement would be considered 
for payment of $100,000 and transfer of a specific forty-acre parcel of land. 

 

[¶4]      Mr. Flitner 
commenced proceedings in February of 1995 for establishment of a private road 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 to -104 (LEXIS 1999) (amended 
2000).  In the summer of 1995, he 
obtained a temporary restraining order from the district court in order to 
maintain access to his property to continue construction until the county acted 
on his application.

 

[¶5]      A hearing on 
the Application for Establishment of a Private Road was held before the 
County Commissioners on April 30, 1996.  
Within approximately a month thereafter, Mr. Mayland filed a motion to 
reopen the evidence alleging new evidence had come to light that would impeach 
Mr. Flitner's April 30, 1996, hearing testimony.  Mr. Flitner filed a traverse to the 
motion to reopen but consented to the County Commissioners receiving the 
additional evidence.  A second 
hearing was held before the County Commissioners on September 4, 
1996.  The County Commissioners 
issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 17, 1997, and concluded: 
(1) Mr. Flitner had demonstrated the necessity of the private road; (2) he had 
complied with the procedural requirements and aspects of § 24-9-101; (3) he had 
established he had no legally enforceable existing outlet or connection with a 
public road; (4) the private road should be established; and (5) viewers should 
be appointed to locate and determine the value of the road as contemplated in § 
24-9-101.

 

[¶6]      Thereafter, three 
appraisers were appointed, an instructions hearing was held regarding the 
process of computing damages, the appraisers viewed the properties, and a 
damages hearing was held which concluded on September 27, 1999.  Mr. Mayland presented his appraiser who 
testified the total loss in value of Mr. Mayland's property was $231,000.  His opinion concluded the $2,800,000 
"before value" of the property incurred a diminution in value of seven percent 
or $196,000 due to the road.  He 
added $5,272 for the estimated value of acres taken by the thirty-foot 
right-of-way (computed by multiplying 6.39 acres times an estimated value of 
$825 per acre using values reflective of recreational property) and $30,000 for 
the cost to cure reservoir/water system damage which he alleged the road would 
cause.

 

[¶7]      Mr. Flitner 
presented testimony of his expert who conducted a review of Mr. Mayland's 
appraisal.  She testified the 
value of Mr. Mayland's property before the taking was $2,334,353 and the value 
after was $2,331,637 for a total loss in value due to the taking of $2,716.  She utilized a lower per acre value 
based on agricultural property for the acres taken by the right-of-way and 
concluded other damage to the property would not occur. 

 

[¶8]      The appointed 
appraisers submitted their final conclusion to the County Commissioners on 
December 1, 1999, which determined Mr. Flitner was obligated to compensate Mr. 
Mayland $5,272 (6.39 acres valued at $825 per acre) for the taking of the 
right-of-way and an additional $10,000 for other damages for a total of 
$15,272.  There was no direct 
reference in this document to values before and after the 
taking.

 

[¶9]      The County 
Commissioners held a hearing on January 18, 2000, to receive the parties' 
objections to (1) the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (2) the 
appraisers' report, and (3) the private road application procedure in 
general.  The Order Adopting Report 
of Appraisers and Establishing Private Road was issued by the Country 
Commissioners on February 1, 2000.  
The order adopted the appraisers' determination of damages but awarded 
Mr. Mayland no interest on the damages and no litigation costs.  The order also required Mr. Flitner to 
pay Big Horn County $17,446.21 for the costs incurred by the county in "locating 
this road."  It was further provided 
the order would be filed with the Big Horn County Clerk and Recorder upon 
payment of the sums found due, thereby legally establishing the private 
road.  Mr. Flitner made payment, and 
the order was duly recorded.  Mr. Mayland then filed a Petition for 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, which the district court certified to 
this court on its own motion. 

 

[¶10]   

            
In reviewing appeals from agency action, we are in the same position as 
the district court; we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency as 
long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence.  Gold v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Teton County, 658 P.2d 690, 695 (Wyo. 1983).  Our task is to examine the entire record 
to determine whether substantial evidence supported the agency's findings of 
facts.  Dunning v. Ankney, 
936 P.2d 61, 63 (Wyo. 1997).  No 
deference is given to an agency's conclusions of law.  Martens v. Johnson County 
Board of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 379 (Wyo. 1998).  If the agency has not invoked and 
properly applied the correct rule of law, we are obligated to correct the 
error.  

 

Miller 
v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 886 (Wyo. 2000).

 

 

 

[¶11]   The first three issues posed by Mr. 
Mayland principally contest the adequacy of the County Commissioners' Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law.  In 
order to address the contentions in an efficient and cohesive manner, we reframe 
the core question for review as follows: Were the County Commissioners' Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with the requirements of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, 
adequate to support the grant of a private road?

 

[¶12]   Mr. Flitner brought his application 
for establishment of a private road pursuant to § 24-9-101 which provided 
in part:

 

            
Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public 
road, may apply in writing to the board of county commissioners of his county 
for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient public 
road.  At least sixty (60) days 
prior to applying to the board, the applicant shall give notice in writing to 
the owner, resident agent or occupant of all lands over which the private road 
is applied for, of his intent to apply for a private 
road. . . . At the hearing, all parties interested may 
appear and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road and all matters 
pertaining thereto.  Upon the 
hearing of the application, whether the owner or others interested appear or 
not, if the board finds that the applicant has complied with the law and that 
the private road is necessary, the board shall appoint three (3) disinterested 
freeholders and electors of the county, as viewers and appraisers, and shall 
cause an order to be issued directing them to meet on a day named in the order 
on the proposed road, and view and locate a private road according to the 
application therefor, and to assess damages to be sustained 
thereby.

 

[¶13]   This court has found good faith in 
bringing the application is an essential prerequisite. See Martens v. Johnson 
County Board of Commissioners, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998) (citing 
Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 64-65 (Wyo. 1997); Lindt, 895 P.2d 
at 462).  In addition, we have found 
"it was the legislature's intent that convenience and reason should prevail in 
the establishment of roads, but that the route chosen does not have to be the 
most convenient and reasonable route possible." Id.  Furthermore, in McGuire v. 
McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1289 (Wyo. 1980), we recognized that proceedings 
before a county commission under § 24-9-101 are governed by the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act.  In 
this regard, it has been acknowledged:

 

An 
administrative agency is charged with the duty of supporting its action with 
adequate findings of fact.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (Michie 1997).  
Section 16-3-110 states in pertinent part:

 

            
A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be 
in writing or dictated into the record.  
The final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated.  Findings of fact 
if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and 
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the 
findings.

 

            
In discharging its duty under § 16-3-110, the agency must "make findings 
of basic facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding and upon which 
its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are based."  Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 555 (Wyo. 
1968).  This Court needs to know 
"why" an agency decided the way it did.  
When an agency does not make adequate findings of basic fact, we do not 
have a rational basis upon which to review its ultimate findings and 
conclusions.  In cases where the 
findings do not adequately explain the rationale for the agency's decision, we 
remand the matter to the agency so that it can make additional 
findings.

 

Scott v. 
McTiernan, 974 P.2d 966, 969-70 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted).

[¶14]   Based on a somewhat confused 
presentation by the parties, the contested findings of fact and conclusions of 
law appear to be as follows:

 

Findings 
of Fact

 

7.  [Mr. Flitner] has chosen as his proposed 
access, a reasonable and convenient means of traversing from his property to a 
convenient public road which is the road at the Snowshoe Pass in the National 
Forest.

 

8.  The 
Black Mountain Road is not a public road in its entirety.  The Black Mountain Road traverses 
property owned by the State of Wyoming, the Whaley family, Stan and Mary 
Flitner, Loren Good, all of which is subject to closure at the will and control 
of the private property owners.

 

9.  The 
records of the Big Horn County Clerk and Recorder in Basin, Wyoming, do not 
reflect any easements, rights of passage, or other methods by which [Mr. 
Flitner] has any legally enforceable access upon, over and across the Black 
Mountain Road at the will of [Mr. Flitner].  In the past, private landowners have 
closed or obstructed the Black Mountain Road and those landowners have also 
indicated in the future that they reserve the right to close or restrict passage 
over private property which comprises parts of the Black Mountain 
Road.

 

10.  Although 
the Black Mountain Road has been used by [Mr. Flitner] and some members of the 
public for many years, those portions of the Black Mountain Road which traverse 
private property do not constitute a public road and neither [Mr. Flitner] nor 
members of the public have unlimited access to the Black Mountain Road insofar 
as it crosses that private property.  
That the road proposed and described by [Mr. Flitner] in his application 
is a convenient road to allow [him] access to a convenient public road which is 
the road at Snowshoe Pass in the National Forest.

 

11.  The Black Mountain Road is not a public 
road.

 

12.  [Mr. Flitner] has demonstrated that the 
private road for which this application is filed is 
necessary.

 

 

 

 

Conclusions 
of Law

 

1.  [Mr. Flitner] has demonstrated that the 
private road which he seeks to establish pursuant to W.S. 24-9-101 is 
necessary.

 

            
. . . .

 

3.  [Mr. Flitner] has no legally enforceable 
existing outlet to nor connection with a public road.

 

4.  The private road as per the application 
of [Mr. Flitner] should be established and the Board of County Commissioners 
should appoint viewers to locate that road and determine the value of the road 
as contemplated by W.S. 24-9-101.

 

[¶15]   Mr. Mayland contends the County 
Commissioners' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are defective because 
they fail to find that Mr. Flitner brought his application in good faith.  He asserts Mr. Flitner lacked the 
requisite "good faith" because he intentionally landlocked his property by 
obstructing an existing access.  As 
the application must be brought in good faith, we address this issue 
first.

 

[¶16]   This court has noted various ways 
the concept of good faith has been defined:

 

[W]e see 
definitions that match what most people probably think of when they hear the 
term [good faith].  In a chattel 
mortgage case over a century ago, we adopted this definition of good faith:  "Good faith consists in an honest 
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even 
through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all 
information or belief of facts which would render the transaction 
unconscientious."  Cone v. 
Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 216, 33 P. 31, 34 (Wyo. 1893).  Many years later, we defined good faith 
as: 

 

being honest, lawful intent, and the 
condition of acting without knowledge of fraud and without interest to assist in 
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme, together with the definition set out in 
[Cone].

 

Blake v. 
Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1110 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 1199, 
75 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1983).  In a more 
recent case examining the conduct of police officers we said, "Our definition of 
good faith is that it encompasses an honest, lawful intent, and actions taken 
without knowledge of fraud and without any intent to assist in any fraudulent or 
otherwise unlawful scheme."  
Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 617 (Wyo. 1993) (Thomas, J., 
specially concurring). 

 

Williston 
Basin Interstate Pipeline Company v. Wyoming Public Service 
Commission, 996 P.2d 663, 668 (Wyo. 2000) (footnote omitted).

 

[¶17]   On May 28, 1996, Mr. Mayland filed a 
motion to reopen the evidence alleging certain evidence which would impeach Mr. 
Flitner's testimony had come to his attention subsequent to the hearing.  He claimed the new 
evidence would establish that Mr. Flitner had considered Black Mountain Road a 
direct public road to his premises prior to his intentional obstruction of that 
roadway.  On 
September 4, 1996, the County Commissioners held a second hearing in order to 
receive testimony relating to these contentions.  Mr. Mayland claimed sometime in November of 
1990, well prior to the private road application, Mr. Flitner directed an 
employee to drive a D-8 Caterpillar (D-8 Cat) and other equipment off the 
mountain via Black Mountain Road and, in that process, to obstruct the road and 
make it impassable.  
Mr. Mayland specifically asserted that a large rock had been purposefully 
placed by the D-8 Cat operator in the middle of White Creek where Black Mountain 
Road crossed the creek bed in order to render the road impassable.

 

[¶18]   At the hearing, Terry Mueller, Mr. 
Flitner's former employee, testified that in November of 1990 he overheard Mr. 
Flitner give another employee, John Mefford, the D-8 Cat operator, instructions 
to obstruct Black Mountain Road in the process of bringing the D-8 Cat and other 
equipment off the mountain.  It is relevant that Mr. Mueller was, at the 
time of this hearing, employed by Mr. Mayland and was paid based on a percentage 
of profits less expenses recognized by Mr. Mayland's ranch operations.  The deposition of 
another former Flitner employee, Yancy Flora, was read into the record and was 
similar to Mr. Mueller's testimony to the effect that he had overheard an 
instruction being given to Mr. Mefford to obstruct access on Black Mountain 
Road.  However, 
Mr. Mefford also testified at this hearing and denied that Mr. Flitner had ever 
instructed him to obstruct the Black Mountain Road access.  On 
cross-examination, Mr. Mefford testified he had been fired by Mr. Flitner. He 
also testified at length as to the arduous process entailed in removing the D-8 
Cat and other equipment from the mountain on that date in November of 1990.  The snow and 
condition of the road made removal difficult and required that he build dirt 
ramps on the banks of White Creek in an endeavor to cross over the creek bed and 
up the opposing bank.  
He acknowledged it was possible as a result of the removal process that a 
rock could have ended up in the middle of the creek but denied purposefully 
placing a rock there to obstruct the path of Black Mountain Road.

 

[¶19]   Although the County Commissioners did 
not make a specific finding of good faith, we conclude, based on the record and 
the language of the findings, they weighed the evidence and rejected Mr. 
Mayland's claim.  
An entire hearing was devoted to Mr. Mayland's allegations of bad faith 
and Mr. Flitner's response.  Substantial and persuasive evidence supported 
the conclusion Mr. Flitner did not purposefully secure the obstruction of Black 
Mountain Road prior to filing his private road application.  Although the County 
Commissioners did not specifically find "good faith," they likewise did not find 
"bad faith."  
The requisite "good faith" is apparent and incorporated in the statutory 
language referenced in Finding No. 12, "[Mr. Flitner] has demonstrated that the 
private road for which this application is filed is necessary."  Had Mr. Mayland 
sufficiently established his claim of bad faith, this finding could not have 
been made because it would not have been supported by the record.  We conclude the 
record sufficiently demonstrates the "good faith" of the applicant as 
anticipated in Dunning.  Although this 
analysis would be unnecessary had the County Commissioners made an explicit 
finding of good faith, its absence does not render the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law defective.

 

[¶20]   Mr. Mayland also contends Mr. Flitner 
showed a lack of good faith by failing to evaluate alternate routes, including 
the Molly Cropsey livestock trail, thereby depriving the County Commissioners of 
jurisdiction to proceed with his application.  Mr. Mayland is correct that this court has 
held:

 

[An a]pplicant may not leave on the doorstep of the viewers 
a request that they map out a convenient private road for the applicant.  The applicant has 
the responsibility for studying alternative routes and asking in good faith for 
one that is reasonable and convenient.  Only then may the applicant be said to have 
complied with the law so that the county commissioners have jurisdiction to 
proceed.

 

McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286.  However, this holding has been qualified as 
follows:

 

Under the McGuire case, a 
petitioner is required to study alternative routes.  At the hearing, 
Dunning testified that he had studied alternative routes before he chose and 
applied for a road but that he did not document the information until shortly 
before the hearing was held.  The evidence at the hearing did not 
contradict Dunning's testimony that he had studied the alternative routes, and 
an applicant is not required to document his study before making his 
application.  

 

Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 66 (citation omitted).

 

[¶21]   Mr. Flitner provided a land description 
and detailed map showing the location of the requested road as Mayland/Snowshoe 
Pass Road.  At 
the initial "necessity" hearing held on April 30, 1996, Mr. Flitner provided 
detailed testimony regarding the two existing routes to his 
propertyMayland/Snowshoe Pass Road and Black Mountain Road.  He testified these 
two routes are the only existing roads available to access his property.  
He further explained Black Mountain Road crosses private property 
over which access had been denied and he believed that road was in 
unsatisfactory condition to provide consistent and practical access to his 
property.  Mr. 
Mayland testified regarding the existing routes and which was preferable, as the 
following transcript excerpt reveals:

Q         
Okay.  
You would agree, would you not, that [Mr. Flitner] has access, at least 
physical access, over the road across your property [Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road] 
and that's one way into his place?

 

A         
That's one way.

 

Q         And 
the other way is the Black Mountain road, is that correct?

 

A         
That's right.

 

Q         Do 
you maintain that he has any other way in?

 

A         
No.

 

Q         
Okay.  
Now which of those two roads would you prefer to travel over -- the Black 
Mountain road --

 

A         It 
depends.  Right 
now the only choice that I would have would be the Black Mountain road.

 

Q         
Okay.  
During the summer which one would you prefer to travel over?

 

A         I 
would prefer the Snow Shoe road.

 

Q         
Okay.  
It's a whole lot better road, isn't it?

 

A         For 
the most part, yes. 

 

This testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Floyd 
Collingwood, a witness appearing on behalf of Mr. Mayland:

 

Q         
[Black Mountain Road] is not suitable for a car, is it?

 

A         
It'd be pretty tough right now.  The lower end, this top end's nothing.

 

Q         
Okay.  
Now which end is suitable?

 

A         
From Snow Shoe Pass down to the middle Saw Set.

 

Q         
Okay.  
But --

 

A         Ten 
Springs and in that area.

 

Q         
From Dave Flitner's property down to Shell, it's not suitable for a car, 
is it?

 

A         No, 
I wouldn't want to take a car on it.

 

 [¶22]  In Walton v. 
Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 463 (Wyo. 1980) (emphasis added), this court interpreted 
the language of "§ 24-9-101, (W.S. 1977), that [a]ny person whose land 
. . . has no 
outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may [apply] for a private 
road,'" as referring to existing outlets.  At the time Mr. 
Flitner made application, there were only two existing outletsMayland/Snowshoe Pass Road and Black 
Mountain Road.  
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to meet the requirement 
established by McGuire and qualified by Dunning that a petitioner study any alternative 
routes.  
Therefore, the County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the 
application.  
Further, we reject the suggestion the County Commissioners erred in not 
considering the Molly Cropsey livestock trail as an alternative.  It was not an existing road, and the County Commissioners were under 
no compulsion to seriously consider the suggestion that an entirely new road be 
built when two routes already exist.  As we stated in Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 
1991), a landlocked property owner cannot be forced to choose a wholly 
illogical, uneconomical, and unproductive road.

 

[¶23]   Further, Mr. Mayland maintains there 
was insufficient evidence to support the County Commissioners' finding that 
private ownership rights on portions of Black Mountain Road precluded it from 
being considered a public road.  It is Mr. Mayland's position that Black 
Mountain Road existed prior to the property along its course being conveyed from 
the United States government to private owners.  Due to wording in the conveyance documents, 
he argues the public road continued to exist despite the transfer of the lands 
along its course to private ownership.  On this basis, Mr. Mayland contends the 
County Commissioners' finding that the private landowners could prevent access 
was not supported by substantial evidence.  

 

[¶24]   Mr. Flitner introduced an August 1995 
letter from the BLM Bighorn Basin Assistant Area Manager responsive to an 
inquiry regarding the legal status of Black Mountain Road, including public use 
and maintenance of the road.  This letter provided, in relevant part, as 
follows:

 

We have reviewed the file for the [Black Mountain] road, 
and it appears the road was constructed in 1939, by the CCC.  The BLM apparently never acquired 
easements across private lands crossed by the road.  In 1970, we were 
notified by Big Horn County that the lower portion of road crossing Section 1, 
T. 52N., R. 91 W. had been a county road since 1921.  The county 
indicated they maintained the portion of the road in Section 1.

 

After crossing the private land in Section 1, the road 
travels over approximately eight miles of public land prior to entering private 
land.  We have no records indicating that 
the BLM ever acquired easements on the road above this point.  As such, we 
consider the road a public road to the point in Section 36, T. 53N., R. 90 W., 
where the road enters private land.  We consider most roads crossing public land 
to be public roads, open to use by the public.  This assumes that the involved piece of 
public land is accessible to the public and not land locked by private land or 
physical barrier. . . .

 

There is no institutional knowledge of any significant road 
maintenance being accomplished on the road, although if funds permitted, we would certainly maintain 
the road as necessary.  The road is identified by the BLM as Black Mountain 
Road, #1115.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶25]   This letter strongly corroborated other 
evidence that only a portion of Black Mountain Road was open to the public and 
even the federal government recognized and respected the rights of the private 
owners along the remainder of the road.  Ownership of property implies the right of 
possession and control and includes the right to exclude others; that is, a true 
owner of land exercises full dominion and control over the land and possesses 
the right to expel trespassers.  Sammons v. American 
Automobile Association, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996) (citing PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82, 
100 S. Ct. 2035, 2041, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980)).

 

[¶26]   The logical result of Mr. Mayland's 
argument is, an applicant could be required to accomplish detailed title 
searches, legal analyses of ownership interests, and even, possibly, quiet title 
actions to prove alternative public access exists.  We have noted "that 
the legislature intended the procedure under the statute [§ 24-9-101] to provide 
in a local forum a readily available, economically affordable, and time 
efficient method to obtain a means of access to property."  Martens, 954 P.2d  at 380.  We have further 
held "that there is no requirement in § 24-9-101 that a petitioner for a private 
road must overcome every obstacle standing in his way, regardless of the expense 
and impracticability." Miller, 4 P.3d  at 887.  Mr. Mayland's 
proposition is inapposite to our jurisprudence and advocates the adoption of an 
economically prohibitive and logistically maladroit standard of proof.  We decline to adopt 
such a standard.

 

[¶27]   Mr. Mayland takes particular issue with 
the portion of Finding No. 9 which states:

 

9.  The records of the Big Horn County Clerk and 
Recorder in Basin, Wyoming, do not reflect any easements, rights of passage, or 
other methods by which [Mr. Flitner] has any legally enforceable access upon, 
over and across the Black Mountain Road at the will of [Mr. Flitner].

 

It is unclear from a review of the record if Finding No. 9 
was based on administrative notice of judicially cognizable facts or a 
compilation of the testimony and evidence.  If it was based on administrative notice, 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-108(d) (LexisNexis 2001), the parties should 
have been noticed and provided an opportunity to contest.  Regardless, this 
portion of Finding No. 9 can be disregarded without impairing the integrity of 
the rest of the finding.  

 

[¶28]   The County Commissioners and parties 
together traveled both Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road and Black Mountain Road.  The County 
Commissioners had an ability to personally view the two currently existing 
routes.  
Substantial evidence elicited during the hearings established Black 
Mountain Road was not a consistently viable route of access to Mr. Flitner's 
property.  It 
was in poor condition and, as reflected in the BLM letter, had not been 
consistently maintained.  Furthermore, intervening private property 
interests limited accessibility.  For these reasons, we conclude substantial 
evidence supported the County Commissioners' Findings Nos. 7 through 12 
(disregarding that portion of Finding No. 9 as discussed above) and specifically 
the finding that the requested access over Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road was 
"necessary."  
Likewise, Conclusions of Law Nos. 1, 3, and 4, based upon the findings, 
are supported by substantial evidence.

 

 

[¶29]   Mr. Mayland also objects the County 
Commissioners went into "executive session" on March 4, 1997, with the county 
attorney to discuss the private road application and, as reflected in the 
minutes, instructed the county attorney to prepare findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prior to the County Commissioners making a final 
decision.  He 
asserts such action violates the Public Meetings Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
16-4-401 to -407 (LexisNexis 2001), and denied him due process by preventing him 
from being present during the County Commissioners' deliberations.

 

[¶30]   Pursuant to § 16-4-403(a):

 

(a)  All meetings of the governing body of an 
agency are public meetings, open to the public at all times, except as otherwise 
provided.  No 
action of a governing body of an agency shall be taken except during a public 
meeting following notice of the meeting in accordance with this act.  Action taken at a 
meeting not in conformity with this act is null and void and not merely 
voidable.

 

It goes without saying the meeting of the County 
Commissioners was that of a governing body.  Also, the stated purpose of the executive 
session was the discussion of the private road application and is not covered by 
any of the § 16-4-405 exceptions.  Thus, we are confronted with the 
question:  What 
action, if any, taken at that meeting is void as provided in § 16-4-403(a)?  Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County School District 
No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 621 (Wyo. 1993).  We have held that "agencies may hold informal 
meetings for informational purposes so long as no action is taken at them."  865 P.2d  at 621-22 
(citing Emery v. City of Rawlins, 596 P.2d 675, 679 
(Wyo. 1979)).

 

[¶31]   The record contains no evidence a vote 
was taken during the March 4, 1997, "executive session" or any specific decision 
resulted.  The 
only outcome of the meeting appears to be that the county attorney was 
instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law prior to the County Commissioners making an order.  So, although it was 
inappropriate for an executive session to be called regarding the private road 
application, the County Commissioners took no action that can be considered 
void.  Also, it 
is worth noting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were later signed by 
all the commissioners at a June 17, 1997, public meeting.  They were also 
officially adopted at a public meeting on February 1, 2000, as reflected in the 
Order Adopting Report of Appraisers and Establishing Private Road which the 
January 18, 2000, hearing transcript indicates was based on the proposed order 
prepared by Mr. Mayland's counsel.  We conclude the Public Meetings Act 
requirements were met when the County Commissioners took action.

 

 

[¶32]   The appraisers/viewers (appraisers) 
received legal instructions on the manner in which they were to determine the 
damages.  These 
instructions were "a blend of the law from the private taking and eminent domain 
cases."  Mr. 
Mayland specifically requested an instruction be given that included the eminent 
domain compensation standard of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-702(b) (LexisNexis 
2001):

 

(b)  If there is a partial taking of property, 
the measure of compensation is the greater of the value of the property rights 
taken or the amount by which the fair market value of the entire property 
immediately before the taking exceeds the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after the taking.[1]
 

The instruction was given to the appraisers on two separate 
occasions.2  Mr. Mayland now contends the appraisers' 
final conclusion was invalid because it failed to properly set out the before 
and after values as required by Lindt for private 
road applications.  
To resolve this issue, we must determine whether the appraisers applied 
the proper compensation formula and whether there actually is a difference 
between the compensation formulas of the private road and the eminent domain 
statutes.

 

[¶33]   The private road and eminent domain 
statutes find a common genesis in Article 1, Sections 32 and 33 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  
Sections 24-9-101 to -104; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-26-501 to -815 (LexisNexis 2001).  Article 1, Section 32 (emphasis added) 
mandates that "Private property shall not be taken . . . without 
due compensation."3 Article 1, Section 
33 (emphasis added) provides that "Private property shall not be taken 
. . . without just 
compensation."4  This court has previously determined the 
concepts of due and just 
compensation mean:

 

"[A]n equivalent in money for all property taken."  Wyoming State Highway Commission v. Scrivner, [641 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1982)]; Wyoming Railway Company v. Leiter, 
25 Wyo. 286, 290, 169 P. 1, 2 (1917).  It is the value of property at the time 
acquired and that means full value; regardless of how such value is reached, it 
must be fair to the condemnor as well as the owner of the property taken.  This has been 
expressed in judicial declarations that the compensation paid should be the 
"market value," or sometimes stated, the "fair market value," "cash market 
value," "fair cash market value," or "reasonable cash market value."  Regardless of the 
label, embellished one way or the other, market value seems to be the most 
frequently applied tool to reach just compensation. 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
§ 12.1 3rd ed. 1981. 

 

Coronado Oil Company v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982).  No difference in 
meaning exists between the terms "due compensation" and "just compensation." 

 

[¶34]   Despite their common genesis, we have 
held private road applications and eminent domain condemnations are completely 
separate procedural remedies arising under distinct and unrelated statutes.  Coronado Oil Company v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406, 412 
(Wyo. 1979).  
The question remains whether these two discrete yet "consistent 
cumulative remedies" result in the same formula for computation of just 
compensation.  
Id.  We conclude the answer must be in the 
affirmative.

 

[¶35] 
In 1995 when the Flitner private road application was filed, § 24-9-101 
(emphasis added) provided for damages in relevant part as follows:

 

Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with 
a public road, may apply in writing to the board of county commissioners of his 
county for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient public 
road. . . . [I]f the board finds that the applicant has complied 
with the law and that the private road is necessary, the board shall appoint 
three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as viewers and 
appraisers, and shall cause an order to be issued directing them to meet on a 
day named in the order on the proposed road, and view and locate a private road 
according to the application therefor, and to assess damages to be sustained 
thereby. . . . The viewers shall then proceed to locate 
and mark out a private road in accordance with the application or in such other 
manner and location they deem appropriate . . . .  The proposed road 
. . . shall be located so as to do the least possible damage to the 
lands through which the private road is located.

 

The extent of the "damages" authorized by § 24-9-101 is 
controlled by the constitutional mandate of Article 1, Sections 32 and 33 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  
Therefore, in the context of this specific statute, the word "damages" 
must be synonymous with the concept of just compensation.  This provision was 
interpreted in Lindt and reemphasized in Miller, 4 P.3d  at 888-89, approximately three months 
after the County Commissioners' decision in this matter to require:

 

[A]ny damages must be assessed in accordance with Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 463 (Wyo. 1995).  That is, the 
viewers and appraisers must:  first, determine the value of the property 
over which the road crosses before the private road is established; second, 
determine the value of the property over which the road crosses after the 
private road is established; and third, subtract the "after" value from the 
"before" value, which equals the damages due the owners of land over which the 
road crosses.  
In applying this formula, the viewers and appraisers are to determine the 
"before" and "after" value only of those lands over which the private road 
crosses; not, as the Burkhalters argue, the "before" and "after" value of all 
surrounding lands affected by the proposed road.

 

[¶36]   During the 2000 legislative session, § 
24-9-101 was amended to incorporate the before and after test:

 

            
(j) In determining any damages to be suffered by the owner or owners of 
the lands through which the access shall be provided, the viewers and appraisers 
shall appraise the value of the property before and after the road is in 
place.  Damages 
also may include reasonable compensation for any improvements on the lands over 
which any private road is to be granted which were not paid for and will be used 
by the applicant.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101(j) (LEXIS 2000).  In contrast, the 
eminent domain statute applicable to compensation for a partial taking reads as 
follows:

 

(b)  If there is a partial taking of property, 
the measure of compensation is 
the greater of the value of the property rights taken or the amount by which the fair market 
value of the entire property immediately before the taking exceeds the fair 
market value of the remainder immediately after the taking.

 

Section 1-26-702(b) (emphasis added).  At first glance, it 
would appear the statutory provisions supply different formulas for computation 
of just compensation.  
However, on closer examination, we conclude the valuation factors and 
ultimate computations are the same.  Both statutes contemplate partial takings of 
propertynot entire takings.  Both also provide the "before and after" 
test.  The only 
distinction is that § 1-26-702(b) also provides the damages are either "the 
greater of the value of the property rights taken or" the result of the "before 
and after" test.  

 

[¶37]   The phrase "the greater of the value of 
the property rights taken" is a codification of the "severance damage rule."

 

The severance damage rule is stated as measuring the value 
of the part taken (recognizing its value as a part of a whole) plus those 
damages occasioned to the remainder (measuring its pre-taking value as a part of 
a whole).  
Under this attempt to evaluate compensation, the trier seeks to value the 
number of acres in fact taken, including such improvements as they existed in 
the pre-taking condition as part of an entire tract and then adding to that, 
those specific, provable damages occasioned to the remainder by the taking, 
again treating the remainder as it existed prior to the taking, i.e., as part of an entire tract.  

 

4A Julius L. Sackman & Patrick J. Rohan, Nichols' The 
Law of Eminent Domain § 14.02[1][c] (3d ed. 1994).5

 

[¶38]   If properly done, the before and after 
valuation appraisals should capture and reflect any severance damages.  For this reason, 
the severance damage clause of the eminent domain compensation formula is, at 
best, superfluous.  At worst, it raises constitutional questions 
if it purports to provide more "just compensation" to the eminent domain 
condemnee than § 24-9-101 provides to a similarly situated person in the private 
road context.  
In this regard, we find the following reasoning exceedingly 
persuasive:

 

"It is incorrect to think of severance damage' as a 
separate and distinct item of just compensation apart from the difference 
between the market value of the entire tract immediately before the taking and 
the market value of the remainder immediately after the taking.  In the case of a 
partial taking, if the before and after' measure of compensation is properly 
submitted to the jury [or in the present case, considered by the commission], 
there is no occasion for the lawyers or the trial court to talk about severance 
damage' as such, and indeed it may be confusing to do 
so.  The matter 
is taken care of automatically in the before and after' submission."

 

United States v. 9.20 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate 
in Polk County, State of Iowa, 638 F.2d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. 91.90 Acres of Land, 586 F.2d 79, 86 
(8th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted)).

 

[¶39]   The relationships between the concepts 
of "just compensation," "fair market value," the "before and after test," and 
"severance damages" were considered by this court in State Highway Commission v. Scrivner, 641 P.2d 735, 
737-38 (Wyo. 1982) (some citations omitted), as follows:

 

The taking of private property by the State is permitted by 
the Wyoming Constitution so long as "just compensation" is paid.  Article 1, § 33, 
Wyoming Constitution. . . .

 

In Wyoming [just compensation] has been described as "an 
equivalent in money for all property taken."  Wyoming Railway 
Company v. Leiter, 25 Wyo. 286, 169 P. 1, 2 (1917).  Elsewhere it has 
been similarly described; where property is taken, the State must pay the fair 
market value of that property. 

 

Thus the conclusion which follows is that "just 
compensation" is only for the fair market value of the property or property 
right lost or taken.  
Compensation for the owner's personal loss is not allowable.  

 

            
However, the question remains as to what are the proper considerations in 
determining the fair market value when only a portion of an owner's property is 
taken.  In 
Wyoming the law is that the proper measure of damages in such instances is the 
difference between the fair market value of the owner's land before the taking 
and the value of the remainder after the taking.  It consists of two elements: The value of the 
land actually taken and the amount in money by which the remainder is reduced in 
value as a result of the partial taking (severance damage).

 

In Scrivner, this court found before and after appraisals 
necessarily incorporate severance damages.  In other words, just compensation equals the 
fair market value of all property rights lost or taken, measured by the 
difference between the fair market value of the property before the taking and 
of the remainder after the taking.  On this authority, we conclude the language 
of § 1-26-702(b) establishes the same standard as the "before and after test" 
enunciated in Lindt, emphasized in Miller, and codified in § 24-9-101 by the 2000 
legislature.  
So long as it is clear from the record the County Commissioners fully 
compensated Mr. Mayland for the difference in the values of his land before and 
after the taking, their action must be sustained.

 

[¶40]   The appraisers 
made an on-site inspection and attended two days of evidentiary hearings.  The evidence 
included lengthy testimony from Mr. Mayland's expert appraiser regarding the 
appraisal he conducted which formed the basis of his before and after 
valuations.  He 
concluded the property sustained a $231,000 total loss in value.  This figure 
included a seven percent value reduction,6 
monies to compensate for the cost of a reservoir/water system allegedly made 
necessary by the road, and a per acre sum for the actual road itself.  Mr. Flitner's 
expert appraiser also testified extensively regarding the review appraisal she 
conducted, her criticisms of the Mayland appraisal, and her calculation of the 
before and after difference in value of $2,716.  She testified the seven percent value 
reduction and the per acre sum for the road resulted in duplicative damages for 
the 6.39 acres taken by the thirty-foot right-of-way.

 

[¶41]   On December 1, 1999, the appraisers 
submitted notice of their decision to the County Commissioners.  It reflected in 
relevant part:

 

Consideration was given to instruction 1, 1a, 2, 3, 4, 4a, 
5 and 6 in determining the final appraisal of damages as claimed by 
Mayland.  
Further consideration was given to the testimony of Martin R. Mayland, 
David A[.] Flitner, [Mr. Mayland's expert appraiser] and [Mr. Flitner's expert 
appraiser].

 

. . . .

 

Any necessary access improvements and road maintenance, to 
include, but not limited to, water bars, ditching, grading, pot hole filling 
become the obligation of petitioner, David A. Flitner, both physically and 
monetarily.  
All gates, locks and or cattle guards become the obligation of the 
petitioner along with maintenance.  Those said improvements shall become the 
property of the respondent, Martin R. Mayland.  

 

In conclusion, it is the determination of the appraisers 
that the petitioner, David A. Flitner, is obligated to the respondent, Martin R. 
Mayland, in the amount of $15,272.00 which includes $5,272.00 remuneration for 
perpetual taking which is 6.39 acres valued at $825.00 per acre and to include 
$10,000.00 damages.

[¶42]   The excerpt reveals the appraisers 
adopted Mr. Mayland's per acre value of $825 reflecting the highest and best use 
of the property was recreation as opposed to agriculture.  They also 
determined the property incurred an additional $10,000 in damage.  We conclude the 
appraisers made a reasonable inference from the evidence that Mr. Mayland's 
"before" property value was diminished by the taking in the amount of the actual 
value of the road acreage and the additional $10,000.  An inference is a 
deduction of fact which may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact 
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.  Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 
229 (Wyo. 2000); Whipple v. Northern Wyoming Community 
College Foundation of Sheridan (Estate of 
Roosa), 753 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wyo. 1988).

 

[¶43]   It would serve no valid purpose to 
remand this matter and require the appraisers to provide "before and after" 
values which would simply reflect the value difference in the amount of the 
damages already determined.  The decision was sufficient under the 
instruction the appraisers were given.  No place in the record does it reflect that 
the appraisers were informed they were required to show the before and after 
values in their decision in any particular form.  Instead, they were instructed to make a 
determination and assess the damages accordingly.  We believe they followed the instructions 
they were given to the best of their ability.

 

[¶44]   As a general rule, parties are bound by 
the theories they advanced below.  Ricci v. New 
Hampshire Insurance Company, 721 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wyo. 1986).  The "invited error" 
doctrine provides, if a party requests or moves the court to make a ruling which 
is actually erroneous and the court does so, that party cannot take advantage of 
the error on appeal or review.  Blumhagen v. 
State, 11 P.3d 889, 895 (Wyo. 2000); Schott v. 
State, 864 P.2d 38, 39 (Wyo. 1993).  On this basis, we hold Mr. Mayland to the 
infirmities of his instruction to the extent it failed to advise the appraisers 
to specifically set out the before and after values separately.  For these reasons, 
we affirm the appraisers' damages determination as adopted by the County 
Commissioners.  
In the interest of clarity, instructions to appraisers in these matters 
should provide direction to set out the before and after values of the impacted 
property as well as the factors affecting those values.7  

 

[¶45]   Mr. Mayland claims he is entitled to 
interest on the damages awarded from the date of entry of the temporary 
restraining order by the district court.  That order essentially granted Mr. Flitner 
continued access to Mayland/Snowshoe Pass Road from the summer of 1995 through 
the conclusion of the private road application process.  At the January 18, 
2000, objection hearing, Mr. Mayland specifically requested the County 
Commissioners award interest on the damages and incorporated such language in 
his proposed Order Adopting Report of Appraisers and Establishing Private 
Road.  The 
County Commissioners rejected this proposal and struck the interest provision 
from the order as executed on February 1, 2000.8

 

[¶46]   Mr. Mayland argues interest is 
appropriate pursuant to the law of eminent domain and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102 
(LexisNexis 2001) as post-judgment interest.  The eminent domain statutes provide a 
separate and distinct remedy from the private road application process.  Coronado Oil Company, 603 P.2d  at 412.  Section 1-16-102 is 
inapplicable because it applies to final judgments by the courts and, even if it 
arguably applies to county action, Mr. Flitner immediately paid upon issuance of 
the County Commissioners' final order.  If Mr. Mayland's argument is that the statute 
should apply upon issuance of the temporary restraining order, such an order is 
not a "final determination of the rights of the parties in [an] action."  W.R.C.P. 54(a).

 

[¶47]   Further, the County Commissioners only 
have authority to award damages caused by their creation of a private road.  Sections 24-9-101 
to -104.  The 
statute provides no authority for the county to include in its "damages" 
calculation alleged additional damages caused by a preceding temporary 
restraining order issued by the district court.

 

As a creature of the legislature, an administrative agency 
has only the powers granted to it by statute, and the justification for the 
exercise of any authority by the agency must be found within the applicable 
statute.  Montana Dakota Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission 
of Wyoming, 847 P.2d 978, 983 (Wyo. 1993).  A statute will be strictly construed when 
determining the authority granted to an agency.  Id. "Any agency 
decision that falls outside the confines of the statutory guidelines articulated 
by the legislature is contrary to law and cannot stand."  Tri County Telephone Association, Inc. v. Wyoming Public 
Service Commission, 910 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo. 1996).  In other words, 
reasonable doubt of the existence of a power must be resolved against the 
exercise thereof.  
A doubtful power does not exist.  French v. Amax Coal 
West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1998).  

 

LePage v. State, Department of Health, 2001 WY 26, ¶13, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶13 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶48]   The record contains no information 
concerning whether Mr. Mayland sought interest from the district court as an 
element of damage caused by the temporary restraining order proceeding.  "Interest is 
allowed in some cases by courts of equity when it would not be recoverable at 
law, and in such cases it is allowed or refused by the court in the exercise of 
a sound discretion."  
25 C.J.S. Damages § 54 at 806 (1966).  Any action or inaction by the district 
court was not raised as an issue on appeal.

 

[¶49]   We conclude the County Commissioners 
acted within the scope of their statutory authority in denying the request for 
interest.

 

[¶50]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Respondent's Memorandum 
Regarding Standards and Recommendations for Appraisal and Appraisal Instructions 
dated September 10, 1998, states in pertinent part:

 

Pursuant to provisions of Wyoming Statutes applying 
to eminent domain, the landowner, Mayland, whose property is subject to a 
partial taking is entitled to prove not only the difference between the fair 
market value of the property prior to the taking and the fair market value of 
the remainder after the taking, the before and after rule, but he is also 
entitled to prove the value of the property rights taken.  The measure of 
compensation is the greater of those alternative amounts.

 

We note Mr. Flitner also took the position the 
eminent domain damage formula was applicable.

2The instruction was given 
the first time at a September 14, 1998, instruction hearing and again at the 
conclusion of the damages hearing on September 27, 1999.

 

3

§ 32. Eminent 
domain.

 

            
Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of 
the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, 
flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, mining, 
milling, domestic or sanitary purposes, nor in any case without due 
compensation.

 

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 32.

 

4

§ 33. Compensation for 
property taken.

 

            
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use 
without just compensation.

 

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 33.

 

5Much has been written 
about severance damages allowing for duplication of damages and overpayment to 
the condemnee as well as concern that certain aspects of damages are missed by 
the "before and after" standard.  State Highway 
Commission v. Scrivner, 641 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1982), contemplates that before 
and after appraisals necessarily incorporate severance damages.  4A Sackman & 
Rohan, supra; Randall T. Cox, Easements, Access 
& Eminent Domain at 45-54, 144-150 (2d ed. 2001).  Under our eminent 
domain statute, the "greater than" language prevents any duplication.  Further, a properly 
done appraisal should consider the value of all property rights taken allowing 
the owners of land over which a private road is sought to argue that the value 
of any damage to their property should be considered in the "before and after" 
values.

 

6Computed on Mr. Mayland's 
expert's property appraisal "before value" of $2,800,000.

 

7In Miller, 4 P.3d  at 888, the Millers alleged § 24-9-101 
notice must be given to all surrounding property owners affected by the grant of 
a private road and damages should be assessed for all affected properties 
regardless of whether the road crosses over such properties.  This court held 
that the statute only requires notice to owners of land over which the private 
road is applied for, not to all surrounding landowners who might be 
affected.  
Therefore, the court clarified that damages should be assessed only for 
the lands over which the road crosses, not for all surrounding affected 
properties.  
This does not, however, alter computation of damage for the property or 
properties over which the road crosses.  The before and after valuations should 
consider the entire property, not just the segregated acreage consumed by the 
road.

 

8The order reflects the 
County Commissioners struck the interest provision by hand-delineation and 
initialed the change.