Title: In the Matter of Lighthouse Pointe Property Associates LLC v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 3  
In the Matter of Lighthouse 
Pointe Property Associates LLC,
            Appellant,
        v.
New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation, et 
al.,
            Respondents.
Alan J. Knauf, for appellant.
Denise A. Hartman, for respondents.
READ, J.:
Petitioner Lighthouse Pointe Property Associates LLC
(Lighthouse) commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to
challenge the decision by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC or the Department) to deny its
requests for acceptance of certain real property into the
Brownfield Cleanup Program (BCP).  For the reasons that follow,
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we conclude that DEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
contrary to law when it determined that the real property
addressed in Lighthouse's requests did not fall within the
statutory definition of a brownfield site.
I.
In 2003, the Legislature enacted a new title 14 of
article 27 of the New York State Environmental Conservation Law
to promote the voluntary cleanup, reuse and redevelopment of
brownfields through the BCP, to be administered by DEC (see L
2003, ch 1, effective Oct. 7, 2003).  The Legislature found "that
there are thousands of abandoned and likely contaminated
properties that threaten the health and vitality of the
communities they burden, and that these sites, known as
brownfields, are also contributing to sprawl development and loss
of open space" (ECL 27-1403).  As the Division of the Budget put
it when endorsing the legislation,
"[b]rownfields are abandoned, idled, or under-used 
properties where redevelopment is complicated by real
or perceived environmental contamination . . . [and
they] often pose not only environmental, but legal and
financial, burdens on communities.  Left vacant,
contaminated sites can diminish the property value of
surrounding property and threaten the economic
viability of adjoining properties.  The impediments to
brownfield redevelopment are complex . . . The existing
liability scheme, which holds all owners of
contaminated property liable for cleanup costs,
regardless of when or how the property was acquired
relative to the contamination, contributes to the
reluctance of developers to purchase even minimally
contaminated sites.  So, too, does the potential cost
of cleanup, which may not be known at the time of
purchase.  In addition, lenders are often reluctant to
extend credit for the purchase and cleanup of
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brownfield sites, fearing future liability or
diminution of the value of the property held as
collateral should the site prove to require more
extensive and costly cleanup than initially thought. 
Consequently, financing such a purchase may be more
difficult than financing a purchase of a greenfield
site" (Budget Report on Bills, Bill Jacket, L 2003, ch
1, at 38).
The BCP broadly defines the term "brownfield site" as
"any real property, the redevelopment or reuse of which may be
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a
contaminant" (ECL 27-1405 [2] [emphases added]).  "Contaminant"
is defined as "hazardous waste and/or petroleum as such terms are
defined in [ECL 27-1405]" (ECL 27-1405 [7-a]); and "hazardous
waste," in turn, includes hazardous waste as defined in ECL 27-
1301 (see ECL 27-1405 [17], referencing ECL 27-1301; see also ECL
27-1301 [1], referencing ECL 27-0903 [Identification and listing
of hazardous waste] and ECL 37-0103 [Lists of substances
hazardous or acutely hazardous to public health, safety or the
environment]).  There are statutory exclusions from the
definition of the term "brownfield site," notably including
certain properties listed in the State's Registry of Inactive
Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites (the Registry), a hallmark of the
State's Superfund Program, or properties included on the National
Priorities List, comprising designated federal Superfund sites
(see ECL 27-1405 [2] [a], [b]).
  
"A person who seeks to participate in [the BCP] shall
submit a request to [DEC]" on forms devised by the Department,
and shall provide therein information "sufficient to allow [DEC]
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1An "applicant" is "a person whose request to participate in
the [BCP] has been accepted by [DEC]" (ECL 27-1405 [1]).
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to determine eligibility and the current, intended and reasonably
anticipated future land use of the site" (see ECL 27-1407 [1]). 
There are enumerated restrictions on eligibility (ECL 27-1409
[8], [9]).  Among them is the direction that DEC "shall reject"
any request that it "determines . . . is for real property which
does not meet the requirements of a brownfield site as defined in
. . . title [14]" (ECL 27-1407 [8] [a]).  
An applicant1 must enter into an agreement with DEC to
conduct an investigation to assess the nature and extent of
contamination at the brownfield site (ECL 27-1409, 27-1411), and
must devise and carry out a "remedial program" that DEC judges to
be "protective of public health and the environment" (ECL 27-1415
[1], [2]).  DEC issues a written certificate of completion to the
applicant once the site has been cleaned up in accordance with
the applicable remedial requirements (ECL 27-1419 [3]); the
certificate is transferrable to an applicant's successors or
assigns (ECL 27-1419 [5]).  Further, the certificate qualifies
the applicant to receive a liability release and covenant not to
sue from the State of New York, which "runs with the land" (ECL
27-1421 [1], [3]), as well as financial benefits (Tax Law §§ 21,
22 [b], 23 [a]).  Public notice and opportunities for citizen
participation are integral features of the BCP at every stage,
from the request to participate to issuance of the certificate
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2A track 1 remedial program generally achieves a cleanup
level and the SCOs appropriate for unrestricted residential use
(as published in the relevant generic table) without reliance on
any institutional (e.g., a deed restriction) or engineering
(e.g., a clay cap or a groundwater pump-and-treat system)
controls; a track 2 remedial program cleans up soils to meet the
SCOs for commercial or industrial use (as published in the
relevant generic tables), and may include institutional and/or
engineering controls; a track 3 remedial program takes site
conditions (such as depth to groundwater) into account to develop
site-specific SCOs to be met; and a track 4 remedial program
achieves a site-specific cleanup level protective of current,
intended or reasonably anticipated residential, commercial, or
industrial use with restrictions, and relies on institutional and
engineering controls to do this (ECL 27-1415 [4]).
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(ECL 27-1417).  
The statute directed DEC to develop tables of numeric
and contaminant-specific soil cleanup objectives (SCOs) that
protect public health and the environment and do not exceed
specified risk levels based on three types of land use -- 
unrestricted (residential), commercial, and industrial (ECL 27-
1415 [6]; see also 6 NYCRR subpart 375-6).  Further, the BCP
affords applicants the flexibility to employ the tables or site-
specific criteria to determine acceptable levels of residual
contamination, based on four different cleanup "tracks."2
  
As originally enacted, the most significant financial
incentive available to an applicant -- the brownfield
redevelopment tax credit -- ranged from 10% to 22% of covered
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3Other financial incentives include a tax credit for real
property taxes for up to 10 years, calculated according to a
formula that takes the number of employees at the site into
account (Tax Law § 22 [b]), and a one-time insurance credit (Tax
Law § 23 [a], [c]).
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costs.3  This tax credit consists of a "site preparation credit
component" (costs to get the site ready for cleanup and
redevelopment, except for the cost of acquiring the real
property) (Tax Law § 21 [a] [2], [b] [2]); a "tangible property
credit component" (the cost of erecting commercial, industrial or
recreational buildings) (Tax Law § 21 [a] [3], [b] [3]); and an
"on-site groundwater remediation credit component" (Tax Law § 21
[a] [4], [b] [4]).
Early on, DEC estimated the value of tax credits --
"[a]mong the most powerful incentives established by" the BCP --
to be "approximately $135 million when . . . fully effective"
(Desnoyers and Schnapf, Environmental Remediation Process is
Undergoing Sweeping Changes Mandated by New Brownfields Law, 76
NY State Bar Journal 10).  As it turned out, since the tangible
property credit component "potentially amount[ed] to as much as
22 percent of the total cost of development of the project,"
sites with minimal contamination but high development costs were
eligible for "very large tax credits with a relatively small
investment" in cleanup costs (Block and Curran, Brownfields
Cleanup: Case Law, Amendments May Modify Program, NYLJ, Mar. 12,
2008, at 5, col 3).
In June 2008, the State Comptroller estimated that
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"[t]he outstanding tax credit liability for all projects [then]
enrolled in the BCP . . . [was] potentially as high as $3.1
billion" (Thomas P. DiNapoli, New York State Comptroller,
Overview of the New York State Brownfields Cleanup Program, at 9
[June 2008]).  Indeed, "[s]everal projects [had] accrued tax
credits in excess of $100 million [causing] the New York State
Division of the Budget" to "express concern that the [BCP might]
pose a significant financial risk to the state" (id. at 2).
These financial misgivings caused the Legislature to
include a 90-day moratorium on the acceptance of new sites into
the BCP as part of the enacted state budget for fiscal year 2008-
2009, and subsequently to enact amendments revamping the
brownfield redevelopment tax credit for applicants accepted into
the BCP after June 23, 2008 (see L 2008, ch 390, §§ 1, 2).  The
amendments restructured the tax credits so as to encourage more
thorough cleanups while reducing the State's financial exposure. 
First, the Legislature tied the percentage of remedial costs
(i.e., the site preparation and groundwater remediation credit
components) available to the level of cleanliness achieved,
ranging from a high of 50% for soil cleanups allowing for
unrestricted use to a low of 22% for track 4 soil cleanups for
industrial use (ECL 27-1419 [3]).  Importantly, the Legislature
capped the tangible property credit component, which captures
development costs, to the lesser of $35 million or three times
remedial costs; or, for sites used primarily for manufacturing
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activities, to the lesser of $45 million or six times remedial
costs (Tax Law § 21 [3-a]).
The BCP replaced the Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP),  
an administrative initiative inaugurated by DEC in late 1994 to
accommodate "developers and landowners with contaminated but
otherwise marketable property [who] sought government review and
'sign-off' of cleanup plans so that they could access financial
backing and be freed from worry over potential legal actions
under the State's pollution and hazardous waste laws" (Testimony
of Peter Grannis, Commissioner, New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation, before the New York State Senate and
Assembly Standing Committees on Environmental Conservation, Aug.
27, 2007).  The VCP offered no financial incentives; however,
upon completion of a DEC-sanctioned cleanup, a participant in the
VCP received a waiver of liability from DEC -- i.e., the waiver
did not bind other State agencies or the State Attorney General. 
Despite its perceived shortcomings, the VCP "evolved into a well-
recognized way for property owners to obtain official sanction
for their cleanups" (Gerrard, N.Y. Brownfields Program Buffeted
by Legislature, Courts, NYLJ, July 25, 2008, at 3, col 1), which
paved the way for redevelopment and reuse of their property.
   
II.
 
 Lighthouse plans to redevelop land located along the
Genesee River in Monroe County "into a vibrant, pedestrian-
friendly and attractive $250 million mixed-use waterfront
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No. 3
4Lighthouse has entered into contingent agreements or
options to purchase the land, except for those portions owned by
the Town of Irondequoit and the City of Rochester.  
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development, including condominiums, townhouses, a marina,
restaurants, retail stores and a hotel."4  Most of the land,
situated within a 100-year flood zone, encompasses what was
historically a marsh area and is largely vacant.  The occupied
portions are used primarily for boat storage and parking. 
Lighthouse divided the land into two development parcels
(collectively referred to as the properties): the 22-acre
Riverfront Site, bordering the east side of the Genessee River in
the Town of Irondequoit and the City of Rochester, close to the
confluence of the Genessee River and Lake Ontario; and the 25.4-
acre Inland Site, near the east side of the Genessee River.   
Most of the Inland Site is located within the footprint
of a city landfill that operated from the 1930s until at least
1960 and possibly into the 1970s.  The landfill served as a
depository for residential refuse, ash, slag, construction
debris, and sewage sludge from a now demolished wastewater
treatment plant operated on a portion of the Inland Site for
approximately 60 years.  In 1980, DEC listed the landfill in the
Registry.  DEC de-listed the landfill in 1994; however, in 1998,
DEC included it in a database of hazardous substance waste
disposal sites that did not qualify for the Registry simply
because hazardous waste, as that term of art was then defined by
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No. 3
5Until enactment of the BCP in 2003, the definition of
hazardous waste in ECL 27-1301 (1), applicable in the State's
Superfund Program, was limited to listed or characteristic
hazardous waste, and so did not encompass DEC's list of hazardous
substances promulgated under article 37 of the ECL. 
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statute and regulation, was not discarded there.5
  
The Riverfront Site contains industrial waste,
construction debris, sewage sludge, and residential refuse as
fill material.  A marina currently operates on a portion of it. 
In the early 2000s, the New York State Department of
Transportation (DOT) replaced the Stutson Street Bridge across
the Genessee River, which is accessed from the Riverfront Site. 
DOT also built a new road, which runs through the location of the
former landfill on the Inland Site.  DOT's project involved
substantial excavation, and DEC permitted DOT to redeposit
excavated material (an estimated 3,400 tons) within the
Riverfront Site, properly covered.  Testing of the excavated
material for lead revealed that 6 of 93 soil samples failed the
Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure test, which is used to
determine whether a solid waste is a hazardous waste because it
exhibits the toxicity characteristic (see 6 NYCRR 371.3 [e]).  
In 2006, Lighthouse filed two requests for acceptance
into the BCP, one for the Riverfront Site and the other for the
Inland Site.  Those requests were supported by a remedial
investigation report prepared by Lighthouse's environmental
consultant.  For both sites, Lighthouse summarized the
consultant's report as follows:
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"Exceedances of the draft BCP restricted use
residential SCOs were observed across the Site[s] in
waste material and soil.  Exceedances of NYS Ambient
Water Quality Standards and guidance values were
observed at all monitoring wells for metals. 
Additional well development and sampling was
recommended.  Soil vapor levels are elevated for VOCs
[volatile organic compounds] and methane in areas of
waste disposal.  These levels will need to be addressed
prior to residential development."
The consultant recommended various remedial measures,
including site preparation by trained workers; vapor barriers and
soil gas venting to prevent exposure to methane and other soil
vapors; pavement and landscaping to address direct contact
exposures; deed restrictions on groundwater use and soil/fill
management; operation, maintenance and monitoring of the soil
vapor collection system; preloading where filling occurred so as
to reduce differential settlement; and foundation design to
ensure future structural stability for all proposed structures. 
The cost to remedy the properties was estimated to range from $4
to $8 million.  By contrast, the total assessed value of the
Riverfront Site was $1.3 million, and the total assessed value of
the Inland Site was $1.2 million.
In June 2007 -- after Lighthouse submitted a letter
demanding that DEC issue its long overdue decision -- DEC denied
the requests on the general ground that the properties were not
brownfield sites within the meaning of ECL 27-1405 (2).  DEC
explained its decision as follows: 
"The Department reviewed the data and materials
submitted with the applications . . . While there are
some exceedances of the restricted residential [SCOs]
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contained in 6 NYCRR Subpart 375-6, for the most part,
sampling results indicate levels that are well within
[them].  There is no indication that contaminants as
defined in ECL 27-1405.7 and 6 NYCRR Part 375-1.2 (g)
(i.e. hazardous waste or petroleum) are present at
levels that would complicate the redevelopment or reuse
of this property, nor is there any indication that
there is a source of such contaminants.  Rather, it is
likely that any exceedances of SCO's or other standards
are attributable to solid waste disposal.  Pursuant to
6 NYCRR 37[5]-3.3 (a) (3) (ii), the Department does not
consider material other than contaminants as defined
under ECL Article 27, Title 14 in making a
determination as to eligibility for the BCP.
"The Department recognizes that large portions of
this property were formerly used as solid waste
landfills, and that redevelopment of these properties
is complicated by such prior use, given that methane
gas is present and that odors, leachate seeps and soil
stability present engineering concerns.  However, these
complicating factors are typical of solid waste
landfills rather than specific sources of hazardous
waste or petroleum contamination.  For purposes of the
BCP applications, there is no reasonable basis to
believe that contamination or the potential presence of
contamination, as defined in ECL Article 27, Title 14
and the regulations promulgated thereunder, is
complicating the redevelopment or reuse of the
property."
On July 26, 2007, Lighthouse brought this lawsuit
against DEC, its Commissioner, and the Director of the Division
of Environmental Remediation, asking Supreme Court to annul DEC's
determination and order the agency to grant its requests for
acceptance into the BCP.  The Town of Irondequoit and the City of
Rochester, both named as necessary parties, supported Lighthouse,
as did Monroe County, which appeared amicus curiae.
     
First, Lighthouse emphasized the expansive statutory
definition of the term "brownfield site" (i.e., "any real
property the redevelopment or reuse of which may be complicated
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by the presence or potential presence of a contaminant" [emphases
added]).  With respect to the contaminants at the Riverfront
Site, Lighthouse pointed out that its consultant's report
"show[ed] exceedances of the restricted use residential SCOs . .
. for numerous hazardous wastes, including benzo(a)anthracene,
benzo(a)pyrene, benzo(b)flouranthene, lead and mercury." 
Further, "[l]ead contamination on the Riverfront Site [was] as
high as seven times the SCO standard"; and "[e]xceedances of
ambient water quality standards, guidance values and background
levels were observed at all groundwater monitoring wells," and
included elevated levels of 18 metals.  As for the Inland Site,
testing revealed exceedances of the restricted use residential
SCOs for numerous hazardous wastes, as well as exceedances of
ambient water quality standards, guidance values and background
levels at all groundwater monitoring wells.  Moreover, soil vapor
probes confirmed the presence of volatile organic compounds in
excess of the United States Environmental Protection Agency's
generic screening criteria for health risks for numerous
hazardous substances, as well as high concentrations of explosive
methane.
Second, Lighthouse stressed that contamination had
stymied redevelopment of the properties.  When the present owner
of the largest portion of the Inland Site sought to develop the
area of the former city landfill, DEC and the Monroe County
Department of Public Health (MCDPH) objected.  And in 2005, the
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MCDPH took the position that the Inland Site should never have
been delisted by DEC, and that while "it may be possible to
develop the site in a way that will be protective of human health
. . . the only acceptable way to accomplish this is for the
developer [i.e., Lighthouse] to participate in [DEC's] Brownfield
Cleanup Program."
On December 4, 2007, DEC answered, and asked Supreme
Court to dismiss Lighthouse's petition.  DEC relied principally
on the affidavit of the staff environmental engineer who
recommended denying Lighthouse's requests for acceptance into the
BCP.  He opined that the "exceedances of soil and groundwater
cleanup standards" at the properties were "limited in number
compared with the large amount of data available"; and that
"[t]he exceedances revealed by both historical and current
sampling data were few in number, limited in magnitude, and
widely dispersed."  As a result, "[t]aken as a whole, the data
[did] not indicate the presence of contamination at the
[Riverfront and Inland Sites] in quantities or concentrations
sufficient to require remediation."
Regarding exceedances of groundwater standards for
metals, the DEC engineer surmised that turbidity in the samples
might have compromised the data's reliability.  Similarly,
"[s]ince turbidity levels of all groundwater samples was high,
there is a potential that the [semi-volatile organic compounds]
detected were from sediments in the groundwater sample, and may
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not be representative of groundwater quality."  He took the
position that the levels of polyaromatic hydrocarbons in soil and
waste samples did "not indicate soil contamination that would
require remediation [but instead] reflects the level[s] . . .
that are generally found in urban areas near asphalt pavement and
railroads, as products of automobile exhaust, and as incomplete
combustion products from coal"; and that the highly contaminated
lead sample was an outlier.  Finally, he added, the "highest
values [of volatile organic compounds] in soil vapor were
encountered . . . where there are no current structures.  Whether
indoor air in a structure later constructed in that area would
pose a potential health risk cannot be determined from these
exceedances."
The DEC engineer reasoned that "[b]y far the major
factor impeding development of the property is its former use as
a municipal solid waste landfill which was sited in a former
wetland."  For example, "[p]utrescible wastes in a typical
municipal landfill have poor load bearing characteristics and
settle at differential rates because of decaying refuse."  He
summed up by explaining that he had recommended denial of
Lighthouse's requests for acceptance into the BCP because, based
on his analysis of the data,  
"the quantities and concentrations of contaminants in
soil, groundwater and soil vapor did not indicate the
need for remedial action;
 
". . . redevelopment of the property is not complicated
by the presence of contaminants; and
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"what complicates redevelopment of the property is its
status as a former solid waste landfill, which is not a
qualification for eligibility for the BCP."
In reply, Lighthouse submitted several affidavits to
dispute DEC's verdict that the presence of contaminants at the
properties did not call for remedial action, or complicate
redevelopment.  For example, its consultant's engineer claimed
that DEC's engineer's conclusion that the sampling data indicated
minimal contamination, not requiring cleanup, was "completely
inconsistent with how [DEC] normally addresses sites with similar
contamination," and gave illustrations.
A veteran real estate attorney and Lighthouse partner
acknowledged that extra costs would be incurred "due to unstable
ground [because of] the presence of solid waste in the Landfill,
and because the entire port area is a historic marsh area . . .
filled over the last two centuries"; and that Lighthouse
understood that it would "be necessary to vent off methane gas
generated by degeneration of waste in the Landfill."  He
maintained, however, that there was "no question that the Project
is feasible, would get financed, and could proceed if these were
the only issues"; and that what prevented Lighthouse from going
forward was the presence of hazardous wastes at the Riverfront
and Inland Sites.  He noted that "[n]o one will finance
[Lighthouse's project]" absent "[DEC's] approval of the
investigation and remediation of hazardous wastes at the
[properties], and a release of liability" because "[o]therwise
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the risks are too great for lenders, particularly due to the
relative low value of property in Upstate New York compared to
the rest of the country"; and that "the [MCPHD] continues to
insist that [Lighthouse] undertake remediation, but there is no
one to sanction it" since DEC "has disavowed jurisdiction" under
the BCP.
The owner of the largest portion of the Inland Site
recounted his unsuccessful attempt to develop a residential
project on his property, which failed primarily because
"government regulators, particularly the [MCPHD] . . ., which had
to approve any subdivision . . ., believed that hazardous
substances were present in the landfill, and this presented an
unacceptable risk to residents who would purchase houses." 
Further, "financing institutions were unwilling to take the risk
of placing a mortgage . . . because of the threat that residents
would be exposed to toxic chemicals that could cause cancer."
And finally, the chief executive officer of a national
brownfield redevelopment firm, which had secured a $23 million
conditional loan commitment from a California-based financier of
brownfield redevelopments to pay for remedial measures and site
preparation at the properties, averred that "the paramount issue
affecting the Project is the threat of uninsurable, open-ended
environmental liability associated with the [properties]"; and
that unless DEC "review[ed] and approve[ed] the environmental
investigations and remedial measures and grant[ed] an appropriate
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limitation of liability . . . neither brownfield redevelopers
such as [his firm] nor brownfield financiers . . . [would] be
willing to take on the multitude of other risks inherent in the
Project."
On December 20, 2007, Supreme Court granted the
petition and ordered DEC to accept the properties into the BCP,
discerning "no rational basis to conclude that the levels of
contamination . . . were 'minimal.'"  The court rejected DEC's
argument that "SCO's should have no bearing whatsoever in
determining whether a site is initially admitted into the BCP,
yet these same standards should be the ultimate factor in
determining whether an applicant receives a liability release
after completion" of cleanup.  In Supreme Court's view, the
phrases "may complicate" and "potential presence" signified that
the Legislature "intended a low threshold for admission into the
BCP."  Further, an investor's reluctance to invest absent DEC
approval "would have to be seen as a possible complication to
development," despite the Department's insistence to the
contrary.
DEC appealed.  On February 6, 2009, the Appellate
Division, with one Justice dissenting, reversed Supreme Court's
judgment, on the law, and dismissed the petition.  The majority
concluded that "DEC's well-reasoned analysis of the BCP
applications of [Lighthouse], coupled with the mandate that we
must not substitute our judgment for that of the DEC, compels the
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conclusion that the court erred in granting the petition and
directing the DEC to accept petitioner into the BCP" (Matter of
Lighthouse Pointe Prop. Assoc. LLC v New York State Dept. of
Envtl. Conservation, 66 AD3d 88, 94 [4th Dept. 2009]).  The
dissenting Justice characterized DEC's interpretation of the term
"brownfield site" as "unreasonably narrow," given the broad
statutory language and the Legislature's declaration of policy
and findings of fact, both of which signaled an "intent to
encompass a vast range of parcels that may be polluted" (id. at
96, 97).  The Appellate Division subsequently granted
Lighthouse's request for permission to appeal to us (61 AD3d 1438
[4th Dept 2009]), and we now reverse.
III.
Because the BCP is meant to restore contaminated real
property to productive use, DEC argues that the phrase "may be
complicated" in the statutory definition of the term "brownfield
site" is reasonably interpreted to mean that the property's
redevelopment or reuse may be complicated by the need for a
cleanup, an environmental decision of which it is the sole
arbiter; and here, 
"[f]rom a perspective that only an expert can have, DEC
found the exceedances on [Lighthouse's] property to be
relatively small in number and minimal in magnitude. 
Without the benefit of the agency's expertise or
perspective borne of experience, the courts lack any
basis to substitute their own judgment for that of
DEC."
Further, DEC contends, once it determined that no cleanup was
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warranted, redevelopment or reuse of the properties was, by force
of this circumstance alone, not "complicated" within the meaning
of the statutory definition.
Courts "regularly defer to the governmental agency
charged with the responsibility for administration of [a]
statute" in those cases where interpretation or application
"involves knowledge and understanding of underlying operational
practices or entails an evaluation of factual data and inferences
to be drawn therefrom," and the agency's interpretation "is not
irrational or unreasonable" (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.
(49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980]).  But where 
"the question is one of pure statutory reading and
analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of
legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on
any special competence or expertise of the
administrative agency and its interpretive regulations
are therefore to be accorded much less weight.  And, of
course, if the regulation runs counter to the clear
wording of a statutory provision, it should not be
accorded any weight" (id.).
The meaning of the term "brownfield site" presents precisely such
a "question . . . of pure statutory reading."
There are two constituents to the definition: the
presence or potential presence of a contaminant on the real
property; and this presence or potential presence must complicate
the property's redevelopment or reuse.  The term "contaminant" is
defined in the statute (see ECL-1405 [7-a]).  The word "present"
is not, but in common English usage means "being in one place and
not elsewhere: being within reach, sight, or call or within
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contemplated limits: being in view or at hand: being before,
beside, with, or in the same place as someone or something"
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged
[Merriam-Webster, 2002] [http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (7
Feb. 2010)]).  Thus, a contaminant is present or potentially
present on real property when it does or may exist or be found
within the property's limits; the statutory definition does not,
on its face, mandate the presence of any particular level or
degree of contamination.  Finally, the word "complicate,"also
undefined in the statute, in common English usage means "to make
complex, involved, or difficult" (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, Unabridged [Merriam-Webster, 2002]
[http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (31 Jan. 2010)]). 
Accordingly, real property qualifies as a "brownfield site" for
purposes of acceptance into the BCP so long as the presence or
potential presence of a contaminant within its boundaries makes
redevelopment or reuse more complex, involved, or difficult in
some way.
This low eligibility threshold is consistent with the
statute's legislative history.  The BCP legislation essentially
addresses the unforeseen consequences of the government's great
success in imposing strict, joint and several liability for
costly environmental cleanups on property owners; namely, this
caused even marginally polluted property to become virtually
unmarketable because of the chance that a cleanup of unknown
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dimension and expense might someday be required.  Since there was
great uncertainty about what remedial measures might satisfy
environmental regulators, any property owner that unilaterally
cleaned up contamination ran the risk that the government might,
at a later time, consider the remedy implemented, perhaps at
significant cost, to be inadequate.  Under these circumstances,
lenders were reluctant to finance development on property
historically used for industrial or commercial purposes, which
was or might be contaminated -- as all such property was bound to
be to some degree -- because the value of their collateral might
be threatened.  As a result, former industrial and commercial
properties languished, while development spread to unspoiled
land.
With the BCP, the Legislature sought to alleviate these
environmental and economic problems by providing a means for
owners to gain DEC's approval when they cleaned up their
property, and to encourage them to do so by offering a release
from liability and financial incentives.  Notably, the BCP
replaced and was intended to improve upon the success of the VCP,
which was apparently a program of self-nominated participants. 
This, too, is consistent with our conclusion that the Legislature
intended the definition of the term "brownfield site" to be
interpreted as broadly as its words suggest.
In this case, the properties are concededly
contaminated with multiple contaminants, often exceeding
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generally accepted cleanliness levels (the SCOs), and other
environmental standards or criteria.  And the Inland Site has for
years been included in the DEC's database of hazardous substance
waste disposal sites.  Further, Lighthouse has produced
undisputed evidence demonstrating that the presence of
contaminants at the properties has complicated redevelopment or
reuse in several ways.  First, the contamination at the Inland
Site prevented the owner of the largest portion of it from
developing a residential project; the MCPHD remains unwilling to
sign off on any development at the Inland Site unless Lighthouse
undertakes DEC-sanctioned remedial measures; and financing for
redevelopment of the properties is contingent upon DEC's approval
of Lighthouse's proposed investigatory and remedial measures and
a release of liability.  
We are mindful that DEC assures Lighthouse that the
overall profile of contamination on the properties does not call
for remedial action.  But this does not relieve Lighthouse's
plight.  The properties are contaminated.  Without a release of
liability, neither Lighthouse nor its prospective lender can be
confident that regulatory views about the necessity for or the
adequacy of any self-directed cleanup will not change sometime
down the line.  Although we might reach a different conclusion
about whether redevelopment or reuse has been complicated by the
presence of contaminants if DEC backed up its representations to
Lighthouse with a release of liability, this is apparently
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impossible absent Lighthouse's completion of a cleanup under
DEC's auspices in the BCP.
   
Finally, we do not remit this matter to the Department
for further consideration in light of our decision, the
alternative relief requested by DEC.  The record in this case was
sufficiently developed for Supreme Court to conclude, as it did,
that, as a matter of law, Lighthouse was eligible for acceptance
into the BCP (see Matter of Pantelidis v New York City Bd. of
Stds. & Appeals, 10 NY3d 846 [2008]; see also Matter of East Riv.
Realty Co., LLC v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation,
2009 NY Slip Op 09381 [2009]; Matter of Destiny USA Dev., LLC v
New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 63 AD3d 1568
[2009]).   
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the judgment of Supreme Court
reinstated.  The certified question should not be answered on the
ground that it is unnecessary.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, and judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe
County, reinstated.  Certified question not answered upon the
ground that it is unnecessary.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and
Jones concur.
Decided February 18, 2010