Title: Ward v. Alabama

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/03/2011  
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1090132
____________________
Ex parte Carl Brad Ward
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Carl Brad Ward
v.
State of Alabama)
(Lawrence Circuit Court, CC-91-105.63;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-08-1131)
MURDOCK, Justice.
In 1991, Carl Brad Ward was convicted of the murder of
Jeanette Smith Little, and he was sentenced to life
imprisonment.  On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals
1090132
2
affirmed the conviction and sentence.  Ward v. State, 610
So. 2d 1190 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). 
In September 2008, Ward, acting pro se, filed the present
Rule 32, Ala.  R.  Crim.  P., petition, his second.  Ward's
Rule 32 petition, as amended and "refiled," alleged, among
other things, that newly discovered material facts require his
conviction to be vacated.  Ward contends that he recently
discovered reports of forensic  tests that excluded him as a
person who had handled a cigarette butt that was used at trial
to link him to the crime scene.  After the State responded,
the circuit court summarily denied Ward's amended petition by
a written order.  Ward appealed.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the circuit
court's denial of Ward's second Rule 32 petition by an
unpublished memorandum.  Ward v.  State (No.  CR-08-1131,
Sept.  25, 2009), ___ So.  3d ___ (Ala.  Crim.  App.  2009)
(table).  This Court granted certiorari review as to Ward's
claim of newly discovered material facts and denied review as
to his other claims.
I. Facts
The Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the facts of the
underlying case in its unpublished memorandum as follows:
"Ward and Kenneth Gregory Long were indicted for
the capital murder of Jeannette Smith Little, who
1090132
3
was murdered during the course of a robbery.  Ward's
case was severed from Long's, and Ward was tried
first.
"The State's evidence 
established 
that 
Ward, 
who
was a 'trusty' at the Decatur City Jail, became
acquainted with Little when she was briefly jailed
following 
an 
arrest 
for 
[driving 
under 
the
influence].  Sometime after Little was released from
jail, a witness overheard Ward and Gregory Long
talking about going to see Little, and discussing
that she might have some money.  On October 10,
1990, Little's body was found in her home. She had
been dead for several days.  Little had been stabbed
multiple times, and her rings had been removed from
her fingers after she died.
"A witness testified that Ward resembled a
person that she had seen with Little around the time
of Little's death.  Another witness testified that
Ward and Long tried to sell him Little's rings.  The
State presented additional circumstantial evidence
that tied Ward to Little's murder.  The jury found
Ward guilty of the lesser-included offense of
murder, 
and 
Ward 
was 
sentenced 
to 
life
imprisonment."
A more detailed statement of facts is set out in the opinion
disposing of Ward's direct appeal.  Ward, 610 So. 2d at 1192-
94.
The facts relating to Ward's postconviction claim of
newly discovered material facts are as follows:
Ward alleged in his Rule 32 petition that he was not
present when his codefendant, Kenneth Gregory Long, murdered
Little, that he obtained Little's rings from Long, and that he
was told that Little had gotten the rings as part of a drug
deal.  Ward alleged that Long died in prison and that Long
1090132
4
allegedly confessed to another inmate that he had acted alone,
that he had strangled Little to death in a jealous, drunken
rage, and that he had attempted to cover up his crime by
stabbing Little's body after her death and taking her rings in
order to make it appear that a robbery had occurred.
Ward alleged that he did not learn about Long's prison
statements until early 2008.  Between April 2008 and August
2008, Ward made several attempts to obtain information on
Little's death from the Alabama Department of Forensic
Sciences ("DFS").  On July 7, 2008, DFS responded that it had
never had a death-investigation report on Little.  After
additional communication from Ward, DFS informed Ward on
August 28, 2008, that a death-investigation report on Little's
death was available upon payment of a $10 fee.  Ward paid the
fee and, on September 29, 2008, he received a copy of the
report (consisting of a cover letter and 26 attached
"documents"). 
 
On 
October 
10, 
2008, 
after 
further
correspondence, Ward received an additional 20 pages of
documents relating to Little's death.  
In an affidavit submitted with his amended Rule 32
petition, Ward alleged as follows regarding the second set of
documents provided to him by DFS on October 10, 2008:
1090132
"Serology" is "the branch of medicine and biology that
1
deals with blood serum, etc., esp. the immune responses
induced in it by pathogens and other antigens."  "Serological"
means "pertaining to, detectable or distinguishable by a
specific serum immune response."  Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary 2765 (5th ed. 2003).
5
"In the second set of records provided by the
ADFS, I found the results of more evidence which had
been withheld from my defense....
"The third issue of newly discovered material
facts centers around a 'Merit' [brand] cigarette
butt from the living room, a wooden toothpick, and
human seminal stains from the victim and her
clothes.  The test results clearly state[] that all
three items -- the toothpick, the Merit cigarette
butt, and the semen came from the same person who
had A and H antigens. 
"In the [newly discovered] serological[ ]  tests
1
of April 8, 1991 [prior to Ward's trial in October
1991], ADFS results of blood analysis states that
'neither Carl Ward nor Kenneth Long are indicated as
the source of the semen.'  The test of November 30,
1990 matched the semen with the Merit cigarette butt
and the toothpick. 
"The problem here is that this evidence was
never turned over to my defense.  Not only was this
withheld from my defense, the prosecution put a
witness on the stand who testified to the Jury that
I sometimes smoked 'Merit' cigarettes, and they
presented this while knowing the Merit butt at the
crime scene did not match me.  This goes beyond just
withholding evidence; this is unequivocal proof of
prosecutorial misconduct. 
"The prosecution presented to the Jury -- Ward
claims he wasn't there, but here is this Merit
cigarette butt at the crime scene, and here is a
witness who knows Ward and says he sometimes smokes
Merit cigarettes -- they presented this false
prejudicial pretence [sic] while knowing for a
scientific fact that the Merit cigarette butt did
1090132
In addition to the claim relating to the cigarette butt,
2
Ward's Rule 32 petition raised newly-discovered-material-fact
claims relating to the cause of Little's death and to forensic
tests on hairs and other items; we denied certiorari review as
to those claims.
The State did respond with respect to forensic reports
3
on hairs found at the scene, but it did not specifically
address, or even refer to, the cigarette butt.
6
not match me, and, they withheld these test[]
results from my defense so I could not rebut their
insinuation to the Jury that the Merit could be
mine."
(Emphasis added.)2
On February 10, 2009, the State filed a response to
Ward's petition that did not specifically refute or even
address Ward's allegations relating to the Merit cigarette
butt.   Ward filed a reply to the State's response on
3
February 23, 2009. 
The circuit court did not hold an evidentiary hearing.
Instead, on March 10, 2009, it summarily  denied Ward's
Rule 32 petition by a written order that did not specifically
address the evidence relating to the Merit cigarette butt.
II.  Burden of Pleading Versus Burden of Proof 
in a Rule 32 Proceeding
"A claim may not be summarily dismissed because the
petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof at the initial
pleading stage, a stage at which the petitioner has only a
burden to plead."  Johnson v. State, 835 So. 2d 1077, 1080
1090132
7
(Ala. Crim. App. 2001).  See also Thomas v. State, 908 So. 2d
308, 310 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (to same effect).  As the
Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Ford v. State, 831
So. 2d 641, 644 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001):
"[A]t the pleading stage of Rule 32 proceedings, a
Rule 32 petitioner does not have the burden of
proving his claims by a preponderance of the
evidence. 
Rather, 
at 
the 
pleading 
stage, 
a
petitioner must provide only 'a clear and specific
statement of the grounds upon which relief is
sought.' Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P. Once a
petitioner has met his burden of pleading so as to
avoid summary disposition pursuant to Rule 32.7(d),
Ala. R. Crim. P., he is then entitled to an
opportunity to present evidence in order to satisfy
his burden of proof."
With respect to the pleading requirements imposed on a
petitioner, Rule 32.3 provides that the petitioner shall have
the burden of pleading "facts necessary to entitle the
petitioner to relief."  Rule 32.6(b) provides:
"The petition must contain a clear and specific
statement of the grounds upon which relief is
sought, including full disclosure of the factual
basis of those grounds.  A bare allegation that a
constitutional right has been violated and mere
conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to
warrant any further proceedings." 
 
Where, as here, the State does not respond to the factual
allegations in the Rule 32 petition, "'the unrefuted facts set
out in the petition must be taken as true.'"  Chaverst v.
State, 517 So. 2d 643, 644 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (quoting
1090132
8
Ex parte Floyd, 457 So.  2d 961, 962 (Ala.  1984)).  See also
Thomas, 908 So. 2d at 310. 
"[W]hen the facts are undisputed and an appellate court
is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review
in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo."  Ex parte White, 792
So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001).
III. Analysis
Ward asserts (1) that the State introduced at trial a
Merit brand cigarette butt found at the crime scene and
testimony to the effect that Ward sometimes smoked Merit brand
cigarettes; (2) that the State argued that from that evidence
the jury could infer that Ward was present at the crime scene;
and (3) that newly discovered forensic reports disclose that
the cigarette butt introduced at trial had not in fact been
handled by Ward.  Ward also asserts that the cigarette butt
was the only physical evidence introduced by the State
allegedly linking him to the crime scene.  Thus, Ward contends
that the newly discovered test results conflict with the
theory upon which the State asked the jury to find Ward
guilty.
In order to warrant relief on a claim of newly discovered
evidence, a petitioner must meet the criteria set forth in
Rule 32.1(e), Ala. R. Crim. P., which provides:
1090132
9
"(e) Newly discovered 
material 
facts 
exist 
which
require that the conviction or sentence be vacated
by the court, because:
"(1) The facts relied upon were not known by the
petitioner or the petitioner's counsel at the time
of trial or sentencing or in time to file a
posttrial motion pursuant to Rule 24, or in time to
be included in any previous collateral proceeding
and could not have been discovered by any of those
times through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
"(2) The facts are not merely cumulative to
other facts that were known:
"(3) 
The 
facts do not merely amount to
impeachment evidence;
"(4) If the facts had been known at the time of
trial or of sentencing, the result probably would
have been different; and
"(5) The facts establish that the petitioner is
innocent of the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted or should not have received the sentence
that the petitioner received."
The facts must be newly discovered.
Rule 32.1(e)(1) requires that the facts relied upon not
have been known by the petitioner or petitioner's counsel at
the time of trial (though they must have been in existence at
that time) or at the time of an earlier collateral proceeding,
and that the facts could not have been discovered earlier
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.  Ward alleges
that the test results at issue were not known by him or his
defense counsel at the time of his trial and that he did not
know of the existence of the test results until he obtained
1090132
Rule 32.2(c) requires that a Rule 32 petition asserting
4
a 
claim 
based 
on 
newly 
discovered 
material 
facts
(Rule 32.1(e)) must be filed within the applicable one-year
period under Rule 32.2(c) or within six months after the
discovery of the newly discovered material facts, whichever is
later.  In this case, Ward filed his amended Rule 32 petition
asserting this claim within six months after he received the
allegedly relevant test results from DFS.
10
the second set of documents from DFS in October 2008.  The
State does not refute these allegations.  
4
The allegations of Ward's Rule 32 petition also are
sufficient to satisfy his pleading burden with respect to the
requirement that the facts could not have been discovered
earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence.  Ward
alleged that the prosecutor withheld the test results from him
and his counsel, and he alleged in detail the efforts required
to obtain the test results from DFS.  It is clear from the
Rule 32 petition that Ward is alleging that neither he nor his
counsel had reason to know or to suspect that any forensic
tests had been performed on the cigarette butt.  We conclude
that 
Ward 
has 
sufficiently 
pleaded 
this 
element 
of
Rule 32.1(e).  Further, the State did not assert in its
response before the circuit court that Ward had failed to
sufficiently plead this element, and Ward therefore had no
1090132
In the circuit court, the State responded to Ward's
5
allegations with counter-allegations (1) asserting generally
that "all of the forensic test results were available" to Ward
and his counsel before trial and (2) asserting that "the
'facts' alleged were either known ... or could have been known
by the exercise of reasonable diligence." 
11
opportunity to respond to that objection in the circuit
court.5
In its brief to this Court, the State contends that
""[u]ndoubtedly, Ward could have taken the same investigative
step ... [before] he filed his first Rule 32 petition that he
took in 2008 when he investigated, sought, and obtained test
results relevant to the Merit cigarette butt."  This
contention fails because there appears to have been no reason
for Ward or his counsel to have suspected before 2008 that any
such test results existed or that any investigation was
warranted.
In Stamps v. State, 380 So. 2d 406, 409 (Ala. Crim. App.
1980), the Court of Criminal Appeals quoted with approval the
following passage from Westergard v. Des Moines Ry., 243 Iowa
495, 503, 52 N.W.2d 39, 44 (1952), explaining the concept of
diligence in the context of a request for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence:
"'The showing of diligence required is that a
reasonable effort was made.  The applicant is not
called upon to prove he sought evidence where he had
no reason to apprehend any existed.  He must exhaust
1090132
12
the probable sources of information concerning his
case; he must use that of which he knows, and he
must follow all clues which would fairly advise a
diligent 
man 
that 
something 
bearing 
on 
his
litigation might be discovered or developed. But he
is not placed under the burden of interviewing
persons or seeking in places where there is no
indication of any helpful evidence.'"
(Emphasis added.)  Compare Ex parte Burgess, 21 So. 3d 746
(Ala. 2008); Ex parte Robinson, 565 So. 2d 664, 668 (Ala.
1990).
Likewise, we cannot say at the pleading stage that Ward
or his counsel should have suspected at trial or when he filed
his first Rule 32 petition that any additional forensic test
results existed or that further investigation would be
anything more than a mere fishing expedition.  There is no
reason for a defendant to assume that forensic tests were
performed on every item of evidence introduced at trial or
that the prosecutor made a misleading jury argument that was
contradicted 
by 
undisclosed 
evidence 
in 
the 
State's
possession.  Further, Ward's alleged difficulties in obtaining
the information from DFS in 2008 (including DFS's initial
denial that any investigative report on Little's death
existed) imply that the test results were not reasonably
discoverable at an earlier time, regardless of whether they
1090132
The State contends in its brief to this Court that,
6
"[a]ccording to the prosecutor, Ward's counsel had access to
this forensic report; more than likely he did not consider it
to be material to Ward's defense."  This assertion was not
presented to the circuit court, and it goes to whether Ward
can prove his claim, not to the sufficiency of his pleadings.
13
might have been theoretically "available" to him or his
counsel.  
6
We cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, the forensic
test results could have been discovered earlier with the
exercise of reasonable diligence.  On remand, Ward is entitled
to an opportunity to prove his allegations.
 
The facts are not merely cumulative to other facts that
were known. 
The State argues in its brief to this Court that the
cigarette-butt evidence is cumulative to other evidence
introduced at trial concerning hairs found in Little's
automobile that did not match the sample of Ward's hair.  We
disagree.  The cigarette-butt evidence differs materially from
the hair evidence because the cigarette-butt evidence was not
merely negative evidence.  Instead, Ward alleges that the
State used the cigarette butt to create an inference that Ward
was present at the crime scene.  If Ward's allegations are
true, the test results excluding Ward as the source of the
cigarette butt would have negated the inference from the
cigarette-butt evidence that Ward was at the crime scene.
1090132
14
Thus, we cannot conclude that the forensic test results
excluding Ward as the source of the cigarette butt  are merely
cumulative.
The facts do not merely amount to impeachment evidence.
The newly discovered forensic evidence is not merely
impeachment evidence; rather, it serves to controvert what
appears from the record to be the only physical evidence
linking Ward to the crime scene.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals in Farris v. State, 890 So. 2d 188 (Ala. Crim. App.
2003), determined that evidence analogous to the cigarette-
butt evidence in the present case was not merely impeachment
evidence 
because 
that 
evidence 
directly 
contradicted 
testimony
central to the prosecution's case.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals stated:
"'Black's Law Dictionary 755 (7th ed. 1999)
defines "impeach" as "[t]o discredit the veracity of
(a witness)."  The evidence is not impeaching in
that Banks did not seek to discredit the veracity of
any witnesses.  Rather, the results of the [medical
test] served to controvert, that is, disputed the
State's witnesses's findings and opinions, not their
credibility.'"
890 So. 2d at 192 (quoting Banks v. State, 845 So. 2d 9,
(Ala. Crim. App. 2002)).  See also Rule 607, Ala. R. Evid.
("Who May Impeach"; "The credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party ....").  
1090132
15
Likewise, this Court has noted that "[w]here the newly
discovered evidence 'tends to destroy or obliterate the effect
of the evidence upon which the verdict rested it is more than
impeaching for ... its tendency would be to defeat the verdict
returned.'" Register Propane Gas Co., 688 So. 2d 225, 229
(Ala. 1996) (first emphasis added) (quoting Reynolds v. City
of Birmingham, 29 Ala. App. 505, 507, 198 So. 360, 362
(1940)). See also Ex parte Robinson, 565 So. 2d 664, 668 (Ala.
1990) (newly discovered "pistol permit issued to the deceased
tended to negate the inference that Robinson had greater
access to, and greater control of, the murder weapon").  The
evidence at issue here is not impeaching, but tends, if
proven, to "destroy or obliterate" key physical evidence upon
which the State relied.
Different result and actual innocence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals in its unpublished
memorandum cited Payne v. State, 791 So. 2d 383, 398 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2000), for the general proposition that "because of
the conjunctive 'and' between [Rule 32.1(e)](4) and (5), [a
defendant] must meet all five prerequisites of Rule 32.1(e) in
order to prevail" on a claim of newly discovered evidence.
Rule 32.1(e)(4) requires that "[i]f the facts had been known
at the time of trial or of sentencing, the result probably
1090132
16
would have been different"; Rule 32.1(e)(5) requires that
"[t]he facts establish that petitioner is innocent of the
crime for which petitioner was convicted ...."
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
cigarette-butt evidence did not establish that Ward was
innocent of the murder.  That reasoning would place an almost
impossible burden on a criminal defendant to show that any
single item of evidence would, by itself, establish his or her
innocence.  A common-sense reading of Rule 32.1(e) is one that
requires a showing that the newly discovered facts go to the
issue of the defendant's actual innocence (as opposed to a
procedural violation not directly bearing on guilt or
innocence).  Otherwise, the requirement of Rule 32.1(e)(4) --
a showing that "the result would probably been different" --
would add nothing to the formula for relief created by
Rule 32.1(e); Rule 32.1(e)(4) would be rendered meaningless in
the face of the greater requirement imputed to Rule 32.1(e)(5)
that the newly discovered facts "establish" the defendant's
innocence.
When construing rules, this Court has applied the rules
of construction applicable to statutes.  Ex parte State
ex rel.  Daw, 786 So.  2d 1134, 1137 (Ala.  2000).  Regarding
statutory construction, this Court has said:
1090132
17
  
"'It must be presumed,' however, that statutes
are enacted with a 'meaningful purpose.' Adams v.
Mathis, 350 So. 2d 381, 385-86 (Ala. 1977). 'The
Legislature will not be presumed to have done a
futile thing in enacting a statute.' Ex parte
Watley, 708 So. 2d 890, 892 (Ala. 1997). See also Ex
parte Robinson, 361 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Ala. 1978).
'"There is a presumption that every word, sentence,
or provision was intended for some useful purpose,
has some force and effect, and that some effect is
to be given to each, and also that no superfluous
words or provisions were used."' Sheffield v. State,
708 So. 2d 899, 909 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
708 So. 2d 911 (Ala. 1997); McDonald v. State, 32
Ala. App. 606, 609, 28 So. 2d 805, 807 (1947) ('A
legislature will not be presumed to use language
without any meaning or application....')."
Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So. 2d 227, 236 (Ala. 2000).
See also Ex parte State ex rel. Daw, 786 So. 2d at 1136, 1137
(stating that "rules and statutes relating to the same subject
matter must be read in pari materia, thus allowing for legal
harmony where possible," and that, "[i]n construing rules of
court, this Court has applied the rules of construction
applicable to statutes"); Darks Dairy, Inc. v. Alabama Dairy
Comm'n, 367 So. 2d 1378 (Ala. 1979) (observing that parts of
a statute dealing with the same subject matter should be
construed in pari materia).  
Clearly, the newly discovered facts at issue here relate
not to some procedural violation, but to Ward's actual guilt
or innocence.  As to the requirement in Rule 32.1(e)(4) that
the result probably would have been different had the newly
1090132
18
discovered evidence been presented to the jury, this
calculation must be made based on the probative value of the
newly discovered evidence and its relationship to the other
evidence presented to the jury.  See Ex parte Frazier, 562
So. 2d 560, 571 (Ala.  1989) ("[I]f the jury had been afforded
the opportunity to consider this new information [about the
true extent of a key prosecution witness's role in the crime]
in conjunction with all of the other evidence introduced at
trial, it would have reached a different result." (footnote
omitted)). 
The results of the forensic tests performed on the
cigarette butt are of substantial probative value in relation
to the other evidence bearing on the question of Ward's guilt
or innocence.  The evidence against Ward was largely
circumstantial; the only physical evidence in the record tying
Ward to the crime scene was the cigarette butt.  Moreover, the
State's theory of the case depended in material measure on its
argument to the jury that the cigarette butt proved that Ward
was present at the crime scene.  If, as Ward has alleged, the
newly discovered forensic test results contradict this theory,
a material part of the State's evidence against Ward would be
"destroy[ed] or obliterate[d]."  Register Propane Gas Co., 688
So.  2d at 229.
1090132
19
In considering a claim that a criminal conviction should
be vacated because of newly discovered material facts, a court
must balance the principles of fundamental fairness against
the finality of judgments.  As then Judge Shaw noted in his
concurring opinion in Dowdell v. State, 854 So. 2d 1195, 1198
(Ala. Crim. App. 2002):
"'A criminal trial is not a lottery, a spin
of the roulette wheel or a throw of the
dice.  The orderly processing of cases
through the court is an important value,
but it is not the end in itself.  It is
only the method by which we attempt to
achieve 
the 
ultimate 
purpose 
of 
the
criminal 
justice 
system 
-- 
the 
fair
conviction of the guilty and the protection
of the innocent.  That is what our
constitutional guarantees are all about.
Our system fails every time an innocent
person 
is 
convicted, 
no 
matter 
how
meticulously the procedural requirements
governing criminal trials are followed.'
"....
"'Consistent with society's "overriding
concern with the justice of the finding of
guilt," 
the 
courts, 
as 
well 
as 
the
prosecution, must be vigilant to correct a
mistake.'"
854 So. 2d at 1198 (Shaw, J., concurring in the result)
(citations omitted).
In Ex parte Frazier, supra, this Court relaxed the
requirements for obtaining a new trial where perjured
1090132
20
testimony had been used to obtain a conviction.  This Court,
quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965), noted:
"'Court proceedings are held for the
solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain
the truth which is the sine qua non of a
fair 
trial. 
Over 
the 
centuries
Anglo-American courts have devised careful
safeguards by rule and otherwise to protect
and facilitate the performance of this high
function.'" 
562 So. 2d at 565.
If the prosecutor withheld from Ward's defense counsel
exculpatory evidence or knowingly made arguments that were
contradicted by evidence in the prosecutor's files, that
conduct would bolster Ward's claim for relief.  "While [a
prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one."  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 87 (1935).
IV. Conclusion
We conclude that Ward has sufficiently pleaded a claim of
newly discovered material facts and that he is entitled to an
opportunity to prove his allegations.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
and remand the cause to that court for it to in turn remand it
1090132
21
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.
Main and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.*
*Justice Main and Justice Wise were members of the Court
of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case.