Title: N.D. Legislative Assembly v. Burgum

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 2018 ND 189North Dakota Legislative Assembly, Senator Ray Holmberg, Representative Al Carlson, Senator Rich Wardner, Senator Joan Heckaman, and Representative Corey Mock, Petitioners and Cross-Respondentsv.North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum, Respondent and Cross-Petitioner and North Dakota Attorney General Wayne K. Stenehjem, Cross-PetitionerNo. 20170436 Petition for Declaratory Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Writ of Mandamus, and Cross-Petition for Declaratory Judgment.LEGAL STATUS DECLARED.Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.Shawn A. Grinolds (argued) and Randall J. Bakke (appeared), Bismarck, N.D., for
petitioners.Wayne K. Stenehjem (argued),
Attorney General, and James E. Nicolai (appeared),
Deputy Solicitor General, Bismarck, N.D., for respondent.N.D.
Legislative Assembly v. BurgumNo.
20170436Tufte, Justice.[¶1] The
Legislative Assembly, joined by individual legislators consisting of the leaders of the senate and
the house of representatives and of the legislative management committee, petitioned this Court
to exercise our original jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of five partial vetoes issued
by Governor Doug Burgum. Governor Burgum, joined by Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem,
cross-petitioned seeking judgment declaring unconstitutional the provisions in two bills which
condition the spending or transfer of certain appropriated funds upon approval of a legislative
committee.I.[¶2] After adjournment of the
Regular Session of the 65th Legislative Assembly, the Governor vetoed five items in four
appropriation bills by striking through certain language in the bills before signing them into law.
In an opinion requested by Senator Rich Wardner and Representative Al Carlson, the Attorney
General concluded three of the partial vetoes were ineffective: Senate Bill 2003,
§ 18, subsection 3 ("Any Portion Veto"); House Bill 1020, § 5 ("Water
Commission Veto"); and Senate Bill 2013, § 12 ("IT Project Veto"). N.D. Op. Att'y
Gen. 2017-L-04 (June 19, 2017). The Attorney General stated that these partial vetoes were
ineffective because they exceeded the Governor's constitutional authority by attempting to veto a
condition on an appropriation without vetoing the appropriation itself. The Attorney General
further stated that, although the Water Commission Veto and IT Project Veto were ineffective, a
court would conclude the vetoed language is unconstitutional under the separation of powers
doctrine.[¶3] The Legislative Assembly petitions for a declaratory
judgment voiding the five partial vetoes and declaring that the bills, without the challenged
vetoes, are the current law. Alternatively, if a declaratory judgment is not granted, the Legislative
Assembly seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor to treat the partial vetoes as a
nullity. The Governor and the Attorney General cross-petition for a declaratory judgment stating
that the budget section provisions stricken by the Water Commission Veto and the IT Project
Veto are unconstitutional in violation of the non-delegation and separation of powers
doctrines.II.[¶4] The Legislative Assembly
petitions this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to void five partial vetoes; the Governor
cross-petitions this Court to exercise our original jurisdiction to rule on his cross-petition seeking
declaratory judgment. We have "original jurisdiction with authority to issue, hear, and determine
such original and remedial writs as may be necessary to properly exercise [our] jurisdiction." N.D. Const. art. VI, § 2. It is
well-settled that we invoke our original jurisdiction "only in cases publici juris and
those affecting the sovereignty of the state, its franchises and prerogatives, or the liberties of its
people." State v. Nelson County, 1 N.D. 88, 101, 45 N.W. 33, 38 (1890); N.D. State Bd. of Higher Ed. v. Jaeger, 2012
ND 64, ¶ 11, 815 N.W.2d 215;
State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 266 (N.D. 1979). Even upon proper
showing, original jurisdiction is always discretionary, and the Court determines for itself whether
a matter is within its original jurisdiction. Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 266.[¶5] We have
exercised our original jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a partial veto and the
constitutionality of a legislative assignment of duties to the lieutenant
governor:In this case the governor contends that the legislative branch
has infringed upon the authority granted to him by the North Dakota Constitution to assign duties
to the lieutenant governor. The case also involves the extent of the power of the governor to
partially veto a bill. The constitutionality of legislative action which appears to change the scope
and function of the office of lieutenant governor is involved. These are issues of public concern
as they affect not only the elected officials who are directly involved, but also the delicate
balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government. Accordingly,
we hold this to be a proper case for this court to exercise its original
jurisdiction. Id.;
see also State ex rel. Peterson v.
Olson, 307 N.W.2d 528, 531 (N.D.
1981) (exercising original jurisdiction over "challenges relat[ing] to the very foundation upon
which the executive and legislative branches of government rest").[¶6] The Governor argues that none of the challenges to his partial vetoes involve
a justiciable controversy. A claim may be non-justiciable if a party lacks standing, Whitecalfe v. North Dakota Dep't of
Transp., 2007 ND 32, ¶ 15, 727 N.W.2d 779, the claim is
moot, Brandvold v. Lewis and Clark Pub. Sch.
Dist., 2011 ND 185, ¶¶ 9-11< /a>, 803 N.W.2d 827, or
if the answer would be advisory, Richland Cty.
Water Res. Bd. v. Pribbernow, 442 N.W.2d 916, 918-19 (N.D. 1989). The Legislative Assembly has
standing to bring otherwise justiciable claims seeking to defend against executive branch
encroachment into the legislative sphere through improper use of a partial veto. See
Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378-79 (Colo.
1985).[¶7] The Governor argues that the challenge to the partial
veto of Senate Bill 2003, § 39 ("Credit Hour Veto") does not present a justiciable
controversy because the vetoed phrase in a statement of legislative intent already lacked legal
significance. The Legislative Assembly cannot restrict a subsequent legislative assembly from
appropriating funds through a statement of intent. State v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 55, 68,
118 N.W. 141, 147 (1908) (rejecting argument that a statute binds future legislatures because
"each Legislature has plenary power when not restricted by the state or federal Constitutions, and
hence may repeal the entire primary law at any time"); Opinion of the Justices, 79 A.2d 753, 756 (Me. 1951) (stating that "one Legislature cannot impose a legal obligation to
appropriate money upon succeeding Legislatures"); Ex parte Collie, 240 P.2d 275,
276 (Cal. 1952) ("It is the general rule that one legislative body cannot limit or restrict its own
power or that of subsequent Legislatures and that the act of one Legislature does not bind its
successors."). Thus, the Governor argues, because Section 39 holds no legal significance, a
justiciable controversy does not exist. The Legislative Assembly asserts the Governor may not
alter a statement of legislative intent by using a partial veto to remove a phrase. Whatever its
practical effect here, whether a legislative statement of intent is subject to editorial revision by
the Governor through partial veto is neither moot nor advisory and raises a potential for
modification of legislative intent having a variety of effects. The Credit Hour Veto raises a
justiciable controversy.[¶8] The Governor contends that the veto
of Senate Bill 2018, § 12 ("Workplace Safety Veto") is non-justiciable because the
challenge is premised on an agency bookkeeping error that has since been corrected and an
incorrect assertion by the Legislative Assembly that the source of the funds is not ascertainable.
The Governor argues that the Workplace Safety Veto is non-justiciable because he acknowledges
the $2,250,000 appropriation must be reduced by $300,000 and the $300,000 must remain in the
research North Dakota fund subject to any other conditions placed on that fund. These arguments
are more properly considered as going to the merits of the claim rather than justiciability.
Whether the veto was effective and, if so, what was the legal effect of the veto are justiciable
matters.[¶9] The Governor argues that because he agrees with the
Attorney General's conclusion that the Any Portion Veto, Water Commission Veto, and IT
Project Veto were ineffective, no actual and justiciable controversy exists. The Governor
contends that we would merely be issuing an advisory opinion. The Legislative Assembly argues
that because an attorney general opinion is not binding law, see Sorum v. Dalrymple, 2014 ND 233, ¶ 10, 857 N.W.2d 96, it cannot
negate a gubernatorial veto. N.D. Const. art.
V, § 9 ("Portions of the bill not vetoed become law."). Under the constitution, a
veto is either effective when made or it exceeds the Governor's authority and is a legal nullity.
State ex rel. Sandaker v. Olson, 65 N.D. 561, 567, 260 N.W. 586, 588 (1935). We
hold the Governor has no power to withdraw a veto, nor may he reach that result by agreeing
with an attorney general opinion that a veto exceeded constitutional limits. To conclude
otherwise would leave the law in an indeterminate state subject to the discretion of the Governor
and Attorney General. Because an unauthorized veto has no effect, if the Governor exceeded his
constitutional authority, the bills with ineffective vetoes became law in their entirety. N.D. Const. art. V, § 9; Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 272-73.[¶10] Similar to
Olson, the issues in this case involve the
constitutionality of partial vetoes and the limits of the legislature's power as it approaches the
powers properly exercised by the executive branch. These issues concern the balance of powers
between the legislative and executive branches of government. See The Federalist
No. 48 (James Madison). Because our constitution provides for a separation of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers, actions which tend to undermine this separation are of great
public concern. The petition and cross-petition present justiciable controversies of significant
public interest that justify exercise of our original jurisdiction.III.[¶11] The Legislative Assembly seeks
declaratory judgment declaring void five partial vetoes, leaving as current law the bills without
the vetoes. The Governor concedes three of the partial vetoes were ineffective but argues two
were within his veto authority. Because these are all justiciable claims, we reach the merits on all
contested vetoes despite the Governor's concession.[¶12] The
Governor's veto authority is derived from N.D. Const. art. V, § 9, which
provides, in relevant part:Every bill passed by the legislative assembly
must be presented to the governor for the governor's signature. If the governor signs the bill, it
becomes law.The governor may veto a bill passed by the legislative assembly. The governor
may veto items in an appropriation bill. Portions of the bill not vetoed become
law. Section 9 was enacted as part of a new Article V, which became
effective July 1, 1997. 1997 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 568,
§§ 9, 14.[¶13] In Olson, we interpreted a previous
constitutional provision granting the governor veto authority. At that time, the constitution
provided:The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item
or items or part or parts of any bill making appropriations of money or property embracing
distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or
items and part or parts disapproved shall be void, unless enacted in the following
manner: . . . 286 N.W.2d   at 268 (quoting N.D. Const. § 80
(repealed eff. July 1, 1997)). The purpose of Section 80 was to prevent logrolling, "the practice of
attaching riders of objectionable legislation to general appropriation bills in order to force the
governor to veto the entire bill or approve the act with the objectionable parts intact." Id. at 269.
In interpreting Section 80, we held:that the governor, in exercising his
partial veto power, may only veto items or parts in appropriation bills that are related to the
vetoed appropriation and are so separate and distinct that, after removing them, the bill can stand
as workable legislation which comports with the fundamental purpose the legislature intended to
effect when the whole was enacted. He may not veto conditions or restrictions on appropriations
without vetoing the appropriation itself. Id. at 270-71.[¶14] Formerly,
the Governor could veto "any item or items or part or parts." Now, the Governor "may veto
items." To whatever extent a "part" was distinct from an "item," the partial veto power would be
narrowed to that extent. The parties have not provided a substantive reason for this textual
alteration, and we have found none. The available evidence suggests the voters who approved the
amended provision intended to simplify rather than narrow the provision. See N.D.
Op. Att'y Gen. 2001-F-04, at 5 fn. 5 (May 8, 2001). Accordingly, the analysis in Olson is unaffected by the amendment.
Changing the language from "item or items or part or parts," N.D. Const. § 80
(repealed eff. July 1, 1997), to "items," N.D.
Const. art. V, § 9, has not changed the plain meaning of the Constitution. Thus,
the Governor can veto "items in an appropriation bill" if what remains is workable legislation,
but cannot veto conditions on an appropriation unless the appropriation is also vetoed.
See Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 270-271.[¶15] An
"item" subject to partial veto includes a specified sum of money designated for a particular
purpose. Sandaker, 260 N.W.  at 589 (approving of "item" definition provided in
Fairfield v. Foster, 214 P. 319 (Ariz. 1923)). An "item" may be vetoed in its entirety,
but it may not be reduced or scaled. See id. If the "item" is an
appropriation included in a larger subdivision or otherwise aggregated into a larger appropriation,
the effect of an item veto is to subtract the item from the larger total. Id. at 587. "The
purpose [of the item veto] is to prevent, if possible, the adoption of omnibus appropriation bills,
logrolling, the practice of jumbling together in one act incongruous subjects in order to force a
passage by uniting minorities with different interests when the particular provisions could not
pass on their separate merits." Id. at 589. This is consistent with the requirement that
"[n]o bill may embrace more than one subject." N.D. Const. art. IV, § 13. We
apply this long-established definition of "item" to each veto below.A.
Workplace Safety Veto[¶16] Senate Bill 2018,
§ 12, provides:SECTION 12. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
GRANTS AND VOUCHER PROGRAM - EXEMPTION. Section 1 of this Act includes the sum
of $2,250,000, of which $600,000 is from the general fund and $1,650,000 is from special funds,
for an entrepreneurship grants and voucher program to be developed and administered by the
department of commerce, for the biennium beginning July 1, 2017, and ending June 30, 2019. Of
the amount appropriated, $900,000 is to be distributed equally to entrepreneurial centers located
in Bismarck, Fargo, and Grand Forks, $300,000 to an organization that provides workplace
safety, and $300,000 for biotechnology grants. The department shall establish guidelines to
provide grants to entrepreneurial centers certified by the department. The department also shall
establish guidelines to award vouchers to entrepreneurs to procure business development
assistance from certified entrepreneurial centers or to provide grants to entrepreneurs working
with an entrepreneurial center. The amount appropriated for entrepreneurship grants in section 1
of this Act is not subject to section 54-44.1-11 and any unexpended funds from this line item are
available during the biennium beginning July 1, 2019, and ending June 30,
2021. S.B. 2018, § 12, 65th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D.
2017) (emphasis added). The Governor vetoed the language "$300,000 to an organization that
provides workplace safety." 2017 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 452.[¶17]
The Legislative Assembly argues that the Workplace Safety Veto struck a condition of the
appropriation, without also striking the appropriation itself, and thus was invalid under Olson. The Governor argues the veto was of a
separate and distinct appropriation and thus was valid because it struck both the appropriation
and the related condition. The core disagreement is whether spending $300,000 on workplace
safety is a condition on the $2,250,000 appropriation or whether the $300,000 is a component
item of the larger appropriation.[¶18] "The governor may veto
items in an appropriation bill." N.D. Const.
art. V, § 9. An appropriation is the "setting apart from the public revenue of a
definite sum of money for the specified object in such a manner that the officials of the
government are authorized to use the amount so set apart, and no more, for that object." Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 268. There is no dispute that S.B. 2018 is an
appropriation bill, thus any "items" in the bill are subject to the Governor's item veto
power.[¶19] Senate Bill 2018, § 12, set apart from
the public revenue the definite sum of $300,000 for the specified object of an entrepreneurship
grant to an organization that provides workplace safety. The Legislative Assembly asserts three
arguments that this veto was of a condition. First, the Legislative Assembly argues that because
the $300,000 was not subtracted from the total appropriated funds ($2.25 million),
see S.B. 2018, §§ 1, 12, 65th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D.
2017), the Governor retained the $300,000 to use at his discretion. See
Colorado General Assembly v. Owens, 136 P.3d 262, 267 (Colo. 2006)
("Owens") ("If the Governor were able to veto an individual item contained within
the larger overall appropriation without reducing the overall appropriation by the amount of the
vetoed item, the Governor could thereby remove any legislative condition as to how that money
could be spent."). The Legislative Assembly contends that the Workplace Safety Veto had
the intent and effect of eliminating the condition on the $2.25 million total appropriation
(that $300,000 be distributed to an organization that provides workplace safety) without reducing
the total appropriation by $300,000.[¶20] For support, the
Legislative Assembly cites Owens and Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479
(Iowa 1985). In Owens, the Colorado governor vetoed definitional headnotes in
appropriation bills, such as "capital outlay," "lease space," and "operating expenses." 136 P.3d   at
264. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the headnotes were not "items" because "they are
not sums of money, and they cannot be eliminated without affecting the other purposes or
provisions of the long bill." Id. at 267. The headnote veto was beyond the scope of
the Colorado governor's item veto power because the headnotes defined terms used throughout
the bill and thus were legally interdependent with other parts of the bill. Id. Here, the
effect of the Workplace Safety Veto was to eliminate a discrete sum of money not legally
interdependent with the rest of the bill.[¶21] In
Rush, the Iowa governor vetoed provisions in appropriation bills that stated "funds
appropriated by this Act shall not be subject to transfer or expenditure for any purpose other than
the purposes specified." 362 N.W.2d   at 480. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the vetoes
were of qualifications on the appropriations, rather than separate items, and thus not subject to
the governor's veto power. Id. at 483. This too is distinguishable because the vetoes
in Rush struck a condition on appropriated funds but did not also strike the
appropriation of money. See Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 270-71 (holding that conditions can be vetoed only if the
appropriation itself is vetoed).[¶22] The Workplace Safety Veto
is in accord with the longstanding practice in North Dakota. The first partial vetoes were in 1903,
after the legislature passed S.B. 22, which appropriated $144,550 to the State Hospital in
Jamestown for the payment of expenses. Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 271; 1903 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 17, § 1.
The governor approved S.B. 22, "except the item appropriating four thousand dollars for beds,
bedding and furniture . . . ." 1903 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 17. This
item was one of several items comprising the total appropriation of $144,550. The 1903 vetoes
illustrate that from the early days of statehood it was understood that the subtraction of vetoed
items from larger totals was the legal result of an item veto. If accepted, the Legislative
Assembly's challenge to the Workplace Safety Veto would invalidate how the state's governors
have used the item veto power for more than a century.[¶23]
In Sandaker, the legislature passed a bill that contained twelve items, including the
amounts of $6,960 for the salaries of assistant dairy commissioners and $3,584 for the salary of
the dairy commissioner, among others. 260 N.W.  at 587. The governor vetoed all the items,
except for the dairy commissioner's salary. Id. We stated that the
governordid not reduce, or pare, or scale, any of these to make an item
less than what the Legislature made. He struck out the items entirely.. . . It is
true he said the total appropriation was reduced to $3,584 by his act; but this is immaterial. This
was merely his answer to a problem in subtraction. The fact is, he disapproved of each of the
items in that subdivision except the item of $3,584. The effect of this was to cut the appropriation
for that department to $3,584. Id. Here, the Governor struck out
the item of $300,000 in its entirety. The total appropriation for entrepreneurship grants and
vouchers, $2.25 million, was not modified by the Governor because the veto power does not
include the power to insert words or numbers. The veto power is an eraser, not a pencil. The
Governor may strike words or numbers in a bill, but he may not insert them. Id.;
see State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 388
(Wis. 1988). The Legislative Assembly's argument would permit its strategic drafting to protect
an individual appropriation from veto, because vetoing an individual item would not subtract the
vetoed amount from the total amount appropriated. According to the Legislative Assembly, this
amount remains appropriated and could be spent at the Governor's discretion, which it argues is a
result beyond the Governor's veto power. The balance of power would be upset if simply
bundling together items in an appropriation bill could effectively eliminate the Governor's
item veto authority. Although the Governor lacks the power to alter the mathematical
calculations that result from vetoed items, any vetoed items are as a matter of law subtracted
from any larger amount in which they are included. Sandaker, 260 N.W.  at
587.[¶24] Second, the Legislative Assembly argues that Section
1, Senate Bill 2018, provides for the appropriation and Section 12 provides for the conditions
placed on that appropriation. For support the Assembly cites the North Dakota Legislative
Drafting Manual 2017, which provides sample appropriation language similar to Section 1.
Compare S.B. 2018, § 1, with North Dakota Legislative Drafting
Manual 18 (2017). Further, the Assembly emphasizes that Section 1 is titled
"Appropriation" and incorporates appropriation language; whereas, Section 12 refers to "[t]he
amount appropriated for entrepreneurship grants in section 1 of this
Act . . . ."[¶25] Although Section 1
contains traditional appropriation language, this does not preclude a conclusion that Section 12
also contains items making an appropriation or providing necessary definition to an
appropriation. To conclude otherwise would permit sheltering certain items from a veto by
providing for them in any other section other than the traditional appropriation section, Section 1.
The Legislative Drafting Manual is a tool for structural consistency, but it does not aid us in
determining what is an item subject to veto. Whether or not documented in the Legislative
Drafting Manual, structuring an appropriation bill with one large appropriation subject to various
conditions specifying individual items on which it shall be spent will not insulate a specified sum
allocated to a specified purpose from the item veto. To reject this argument, one need only
consider the possibility of an omnibus bill making a single appropriation for the executive branch
subject to numerous conditions as to how various included amounts must be spent.
See Fairfield v. Foster, 214 P. 319, 323 (Ariz. 1923) ("If this
construction be upheld, obviously the next step for a Legislature hostile to a future Governor will
be a further consolidation of the 'items' of the appropriation bill, with a 'direction' of how the
money shall be spent, until the special veto is practically abolished.").[¶26] Third, the Legislative Assembly argues that because the source of the
funding cannot be ascertained, the $300,000 cannot be deemed an item of appropriation.
See Owens, 136 P.3d   at 267 (quotation omitted) (stating that "the source
of funding is as much a part of an item of appropriation as the amount of money appropriated and
the purpose to which it is to be devoted, and so it could not be removed through the item veto
power"). Here, Section 12 provides, "Section 1 of this Act includes the sum of $2,250,000, of
which $600,000 is from the general fund and $1,650,000 is from special funds." The Legislative
Assembly argues that the $300,000 must be a condition because the exact source (general fund or
special funds) cannot be determined, and thus the Workplace Safety Veto could not have been of
an item of appropriation. We disagree. Section 14 of the same bill, Senate Bill 2018, states that
the source of the $300,000 is the research North Dakota fund. Section 14
provides:SECTION 14. ESTIMATED INCOME - RESEARCH NORTH
DAKOTA FUND. Notwithstanding section 54-65-08, the estimated income line item in section 1
of this Act includes $3,500,000 from the research North Dakota fund to the department of
commerce for department programs. Of this amount, $500,000 is for the North Dakota tourism
program, $1,000,000 is for discretionary funds, $1,500,000 is for entrepreneurship grants
and vouchers, and $500,000 is for providing a grant to the energy and environmental
research center at the university of North Dakota. S.B. 2018,
§ 14, 65th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017) (emphasis added). Section 14
states that $1.5 million for entrepreneurship grants and vouchers is funded by the research North
Dakota fund. The $1.5 million allocated for 'entrepreneurship grants and vouchers' corresponds
directly with the five specific entrepreneurship grants and vouchers identified in Section
12:  $300,000 each to entrepreneurial centers in Bismarck, Fargo, and Grand Forks;
$300,000 to an organization that provides workplace safety; and $300,000 for biotechnology
grants. Reading the bill as a whole, the plain language of Sections 12 and 14 identifies the
funding source as the research North Dakota fund.[¶27] The
Legislative Assembly may not insulate an item from veto by including it within a larger
appropriation, funding that larger appropriation from multiple special funds, or failing to identify
the funding source for the item. Here, it is plain which funds are allocated to which expenditures,
so the itemized appropriations each satisfy the required specification of purpose, amount, and
funding source.[¶28] The Workplace Safety Veto was within the
Governor's item veto authority and the result of the veto is that the larger appropriation in which
the item was included is as a matter of law reduced by the amount of the item.B. Credit Hour Veto[¶29] Senate Bill 2003,
§ 39, provides:SECTION 39.  LEGISLATIVE
INTENT - NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY - LEASE ARRANGEMENT AND
OTHER SAVINGS. It is the intent of the sixty-fifth legislative assembly that future general fund
appropriations in support of the North Dakota state university department of nursing program in
Bismarck be adjusted for savings resulting from facility lease negotiations and for
credit-hours completed at the school. S.B. 2003, § 39,
65th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017) (emphasis added). Governor Burgum vetoed the
language "and for credit-hours completed at the school." 2017 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.
449.[¶30] The Legislative Assembly argues that the Credit Hour
Veto was unconstitutional because the Governor replaced its intent with his own intent. The title
of Section 39 states:  "SECTION 39.  LEGISLATIVE
INTENT . . . ." Further, Section 39's opening words are, "It is the
intent of the sixty-fifth legislative assembly that . . . ." This section
contains a single sentence, the entirety of which is a statement of the Legislative Assembly's
intent. The Governor altered the stated intent by vetoing the phrase "and for credit hours
completed at the school." We have not previously decided whether the item veto power is limited
to items making appropriations and any accompanying conditions. Senate Bill 2003 is an
appropriation bill. Section 39 is not a condition on an appropriation. We assume without
deciding that the Governor may veto "items in an appropriation bill," N.D. Const. art. V, § 9
(emphasis added), that are not themselves items of appropriation. Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 271 (acknowledging governors have vetoed
provisions "other than merely money items of appropriation when substantive provisions were
commingled with line items of appropriation in one bill"). The item veto power does not
authorize the Governor to veto any part of a statement of legislative intent. The Legislative
Assembly has the prerogative to state its intent in legislation without the Governor altering that
statement by selectively removing portions. Therefore, the Credit Hour Veto is ineffective and
the bill became law with Section 39 unmodified by the attempted veto.C. Any
Portion Veto[¶31] Senate Bill 2003, § 18,
provides:SECTION 18. DICKINSON STATE UNIVERSITY - USES OF
FUNDS.. . . .3. Dickinson state university may not discontinue any portion
of its department of nursing academic program during the biennium beginning July 1,
2017, and ending June 30, 2019.. . . . S.B. 2003, § 18, 65th
Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017) (emphasis added). The Governor vetoed the language
"any portion of." 2017 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 449.[¶32] The
Legislative Assembly argues that the Governor vetoed a condition of the appropriation to
Dickinson State University. The Governor now concedes the Any Portion Veto is ineffective. As
discussed above, the Governor may not withdraw a veto or otherwise concede it was ineffective.
A veto is complete and irrevocable upon return of the vetoed bill to the originating house. N.D. Const. art V, § 9. If effective,
this veto would allow portions of the nursing program to be discontinued, contrary to the
legislature's intent that the appropriation be conditioned on the entire nursing program remaining
intact. The Any Portion Veto did not strike a sum of money, but only modified a condition on
appropriated funds. The Any Portion Veto was an unauthorized veto because Section 18
conditions funds to Dickinson State University on continuing its entire nursing program, and the
Any Portion veto modified that condition. The Any Portion Veto is ineffective and the bill
became law with that section intact.D. Water Commission
Veto[¶33] House Bill 1020, § 5,
provides:SECTION 5.  STATE WATER COMMISSION
PROJECT FUNDING DESIGNATIONS - TRANSFERS - BUDGET SECTION
APPROVAL.1. Of the funds appropriated in the water and atmospheric resources line item
in section 1 of this Act from funds available in the resources trust fund and water development
trust fund, $298,875,000 is designated as follows:a. $120,125,000 for water supply;b.
$27,000,000 for rural water supply;c. $136,000,000 for flood control; andd.
$15,750,000 for general water.2. The funding designated in this section is for the specific
purposes identified; however, the state water commission may transfer funding among these
items, subject to budget section approval and upon notification to the legislative
management's water topics overview committee. H.B. 1020,
§ 5, 65th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2017) (emphasis added). The Governor
vetoed the language "subject to budget section approval and upon notification to the legislative
management's water topics overview committee." 2017 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 446.[¶34] The Legislative Assembly argues that the Governor vetoed a condition on
the appropriation of $298,875,000 to the water commission. They contend that the veto would
allow the water commission to use the entire amount of appropriated funds however it chooses,
freely transferring between the designated purposes, which would render the original allocation
by the legislature meaningless. The Governor concedes that the Water Commission Veto is
ineffective. For the reasons discussed in section III(C), the Governor's concession is of no effect.
This veto did not strike a sum of money. Because Section 5, House Bill 1020, conditions the
$298,875,000 appropriation on the approval of the budget section as to the transferring of funds
among categories, and the Governor did not veto the $298,875,000 appropriation itself, the
Water Commission Veto was unauthorized. This veto is ineffective.E. IT
Project Veto[¶35] Senate Bill 2013, § 12,
provides:SECTION 12. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECT -
BUDGET SECTION APPROVAL - LEGISLATIVE INTENT - AGENCY
EFFICIENCIES.  The capital assets line item and the total special funds line item in
section 1 of this Act include $3,600,000 from the state lands maintenance fund for an
information technology project. Of the $3,600,000, $1,800,000 may be spent only upon
approval of the budget section. It is the intent of the sixty-fifth legislative assembly that
during the 2017-18 interim, the governor and the commissioner of university and school lands
achieve efficiencies and budgetary savings within the department of trust lands through the use of
innovative ideas and through alternative solutions relating to information
technology. S.B. 2013, § 12, 65th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.D. 2017) (emphasis added). The Governor vetoed the language "Of the $3,600,000,
$1,800,000 may be spent only upon approval of the budget section." 2017 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.
450.[¶36] The Legislative Assembly argues that the Governor
vetoed a condition on the appropriation of $3.6 million for an information technology project.
The Governor concedes that the IT Project Veto is ineffective. For the reasons discussed in
section III(C), the Governor's concession is of no effect. The veto did not strike an item of
appropriation. Because Section 12, Senate Bill 2013, conditions half of the $3.6 million
appropriation on the approval of the Budget Section, and Governor Burgum did not veto the
appropriation itself, the IT Project Veto was unauthorized. The veto is ineffective.IV.[¶37] The Governor cross-petitions for a
declaratory judgment stating that the budget section provisions of House Bill 1020 and
Senate Bill 2013 are unconstitutional in violation of the non-delegation and separation of powers
doctrines. The Legislative Assembly argues that the Attorney General lacks standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the budget section provisions and that those provisions are
constitutional.A.[¶38] The Legislative
Assembly argues that the Attorney General lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
budget section provisions of House Bill 1020 and Senate Bill 2013. The Legislative Assembly
concedes that the Governor has standing to challenge these provisions. Because the issues raised
and the relief requested by the Governor and the Attorney General are identical, we need not
resolve whether the Attorney General has standing in his own right to bring the cross
petition.[¶39] The Legislative Assembly also argues that the
Attorney General has a duty to defend state statutes against constitutional challenge and thus may
not properly advocate on behalf of the Governor against the constitutionality of the budget
section provisions as a result of this apparent conflict. Among the duties of the Attorney General
is to "[a]ppear and defend all actions and proceedings against any state officer." N.D.C.C.
§ 54-12-01(3). Where state officers are opposing parties, "the attorney general
may determine which officer the attorney general will represent." Id.
Although this issue was not addressed, we have once before permitted the Attorney General to
argue against the constitutionality of a statute on behalf of a state official. Solberg v. State
Treasurer, 78 N.D. 806, 53 N.W.2d 49 (1952) (agreeing with the Attorney General's
argument on behalf of Treasurer that statute was unconstitutional). The Attorney General has
acknowledged a general duty to defend statutes against constitutional challenge. Whatever may
be the source for such a duty, where there is a conflict, the Attorney General's overriding duty is
to the Constitution he is sworn to support. N.D. Const. art. XI, § 4. We
hold that the Attorney General is not precluded from representing the Governor in challenging
the constitutionality of a statute.B.1.[¶40] The North Dakota Constitution creates three branches of government and
vests each branch with a distinct type of power. N.D. Const. art. III, § 1
("[T]he legislative power of this state shall be vested in a legislative
assembly . . . ."); N.D. Const. art. V, § 1 ("The
executive power is vested in the governor . . . ."); N.D. Const. art. VI, § 1 ("The
judicial power of the state is vested in a unified judicial system . . . .").
By vesting each branch with a distinct form of power, the Constitution keeps those powers
separate. The three branches are "coequal," N.D. Const. art. XI, § 26,
each "supreme in its own sphere." State ex rel.
Spaeth v. Meiers, 403 N.W.2d 392, 394 (N.D. 1987). Long before the express
formalization of separation of powers in Article XI, § 26, this Court
recognized that the Constitution's apportionment of power among three branches implicitly
excluded each branch from exercising the powers of the others. State v. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d 611, 614 (N.D. 1996) (citing Glaspell v. City of
Jamestown, 11 N.D. 86, 88 N.W. 1023 (1902)); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (explaining that separation of powers doctrine "prohibits one branch from
encroaching on the central prerogatives of another").[¶41] To
reinforce this structural separation of powers and further prevent concentration of unchecked
power in the individual officers or agents of the three branches, the Constitution provides that no
sitting member of the legislature may hold any full-time appointive state office, N.D. Const. art. IV, § 6, nor
may any judge or justice hold any office not judicial in nature, N.D. Const. art. VI,
§ 10.[¶42] The essential structural division of
power into three branches created by our Constitution parallels that of our sister states and also
that of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, we may find the decisions from the U.S. Supreme
Court and the highest courts of our sister states persuasive, but ultimately we are charged with
interpreting the North Dakota Constitution and its distinct provisions. We have sometimes
navigated our own path in defining the contours of separation of powers and non-delegation
doctrine, see Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, 11 N.D. 86, 88 N.W. 1023 (1902)
(disagreeing with several state supreme courts on non-delegation question).[¶43] Although the state and federal constitutions share the same structural
division, the textual expression and the legal-historical context in which each was enacted
differs. As a result, we are not bound by the separation of powers decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court when considering analogous issues presented under the state constitution. Rather, we
consider these decisions as persuasive authority on principles of separation of powers, mindful
that such principles are fundamental to the American system of government.[¶44] The Governor raises two related arguments against the budget section
provisions at issue in the Water Commission Veto and the IT Project Veto. Both arguments
implicate separation of powers concerns. What the Governor labels as a violation of
non-delegation encompasses those situations where one branch of government consents to the
exercise of its power by another body. An illustrative example is Nord v. Guy, where we held the legislative branch
had attempted to delegate its purely legislative power to the state board of higher education. 141 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1966). What the Governor labels as a separation of powers violation
encompasses those situations where one branch encroaches into the proper sphere of another
branch without the consent of the other branch. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 904-05 (2018) (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191
(1881)) ("Each branch 'exercise[s] . . . the powers appropriate to its own
department,' and no branch can 'encroach upon the powers confided to the
others.'").[¶45] Our decisions distinguish between proper and
improper delegations of power to executive branch agencies but refer to both as a "delegation."
Compare County of Stutsman v. State Historical
Soc. of North Dakota, 371 N.W.2d 321, 329 (N.D. 1985) (proper delegation), with Nord, 141 N.W.2d   at 404 (improper delegation). The ordinary meaning of
delegate is to "give part of one's power or work to someone" or "empowering another to act as an
agent or representative." Black's Law Dictionary 519 (10th ed.) (definitions of
delegate and delegation). We deem a legislative grant of power to the executive to be proper
when the executive's policy-making discretion is constrained by "reasonably clear guidelines"
and a "sufficiently objective standard," County of
Stutsman, at 327-29. The term
"delegation" may tend to confuse rather than clarify in this context. A proper grant of power to
the executive is the result of a legislative act that creates in the executive branch the power to
execute the new law. See Kelsh v.
Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 21, 641 N.W.2d 100 ("When
reasonable guidelines are given, the delegated power to ascertain facts for operation of a law is
not unconstitutional, because that power pertains to execution of the law.").2.[¶46] "Unless expressly authorized by the State
Constitution, the Legislature may not delegate its purely legislative powers to any other
body." County of Stutsman,
371 N.W.2d   at 327; see also Kelsh, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 23, 641 N.W.2d 100. The
Legislative Assembly may not delegate to another body the power to make law--to legislate--but
it may bestow authority to execute the laws it enacts.
Ralston Purina Co. v. Hagemeister, 188 N.W.2d 405, 411 (N.D. 1971). The modern view of the
non-delegation doctrine "recognizes that, in a complex area, it may be necessary and appropriate
to delegate in broad and general terms, as long as there are adequate standards and procedural
safeguards." North Dakota Council of School
Administrators v. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d 280, 285 (N.D. 1990) (rejecting non-delegation
challenge to statutory budget allotment procedure). "The power to ascertain certain facts which
will bring the provisions of a law into operation by its own terms is not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative powers." County of
Stutsman, at 327. "However, the law
must set forth reasonably clear guidelines to enable the appropriate body to ascertain the facts."
Id.[¶47] In County of
Stutsman, the state historical board decided to place Stutsman County's original
courthouse on the state historical sites registry. 371 N.W.2d   at 322-23. Stutsman County opposed this determination.
Id. at 323-24. Under N.D.C.C. § 55-10-02(4), at
the time, the board could designate sites to place on the registry if they possessed "historical
value." Id. at 324. The board promulgated rules fleshing out
criteria for historical value. Id. at 327-28. Stutsman County argued that the legislature
impermissibly delegated to the board the authority to define and determine whether a site has
historical value. Id. at 326. We upheld the legislature's delegation
because the term "historical value" provided "a sufficiently objective standard to
advise ordinary and reasonable people as to its meaning and to limit the Board's
discretionary power to place sites on the Registry." Id. at 328-29.[¶48] In
Nord, we reviewed a statute which
authorized the state board of higher education to provide facilities to be used for educational
purposes at institutions of higher education. 141 N.W.2d   at 396. The legislature attempted to delegate to the
board the power to determine which facilities were to be constructed at different institutions and
the amount to be spent at each. Id. at 404. We concluded, in part, that because the
legislature did not set forth any rule guiding the board in these determinations, it
unconstitutionally delegated its legislative authority. Id.[¶49] In Kelsh, we
reviewed a statute providing that the senior incumbent senator may stop an election when two
senators are placed in the same district upon redistricting. 2002 ND 53, ¶ 20, 641 N.W.2d 100. The statute
gave the incumbent an opportunity to run immediately in an election in his new district,
advancing the incumbent senator's private interest, rather than a public interest. Id. Because this statute gave unfettered
discretion to the senior incumbent senator, the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of the
legislative power. Id. at ¶ 23.[¶50] In State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm., the Supreme
Court of Montana reviewed a statute empowering an interim legislative committee to approve
budget amendments. 543 P.2d 1317, 1318-19 (Mont. 1975). The court struck the statute down as
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power:[T]he 1975 Montana
Legislature in its enactment of S.B. 401 and H.B. 1 (Special session) empowering the Finance
Committee to approve budget amendments delegated a power properly exercisable only by either
the entire legislature or an executive officer or agency, to one of its interim committees. Such a
hybrid delegation does not pass constitutional muster. The power in question here resides in
either the entire legislative body while in session or, if properly delegated, in an executive
agency. Clearly the action of the Finance Committee does not constitute the action of the entire
legislature. Article V, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution. Just as clear is the fact that Article
V, Section 9, 1972 Montana Constitution, would disqualify these legislators from membership on
the Finance Committee if it were an executive agency. Therefore those sections of
S.B. 401 and H.B. 1 (Special Session) empowering the Finance Committee to
approve budget amendments are declared invalid as unconstitutional delegations of legislative
power. Id. at 1321.[¶51] To
answer the questions presented under these theories of legislative encroachment and improper
legislative delegation, we must consider what are the defining characteristics of legislative and
executive power. "The power to make a law is legislative," but the power to administer or
execute the law "under the provisions of the law itself, as enacted by the Legislature," is
executive. Ralston Purina Co., 188 N.W.2d   at 410-11.[¶52] "The
power to appropriate money is purely a legislative power." Trinity Medical Center v. North Dakota Bd. of
Nursing, 399 N.W.2d 835, 841
(N.D. 1987) (quoting Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 156, 159 (1928)).
An appropriation is the "setting apart from the public revenue of a definite sum of money for the
specified object in such a manner that the officials of the government are authorized to use the
amount so set apart, and no more, for that object." Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 268. In the context of a legislative appropriation,
the Legislative Assembly must specify (1) the amount, (2) the object or purpose for
which the amount is authorized, and (3) the fund from which the amount is set apart. In
reviewing whether a legislative act meets these requirements, we determine whether it contains
"reasonably clear guidelines to enable the appropriate body to ascertain the facts." County of Stutsman, 371 N.W.2d   at 327.[¶53] House
Bill 1020, § 5, does not set forth any standard for the budget section to apply
in deciding whether to permit the water commission to transfer funds. The Legislative
Assembly does not identify a standard in its brief. Like the state board of higher education in
Nord, the budget section has no legislative
guidance to constrain it. The budget section has unfettered discretion to approve or reject
the water commission's request to transfer funding among the four specified categories. A
law that provides no safeguards against arbitrary action is a clear sign that the Legislative
Assembly has improperly attempted to delegate legislative power. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 421 (N.D. 1967) ("The Legislature
must declare the policy of the law and must definitely fix the legal principles which are to
control the action taken."). Because it lacked any guidelines, House Bill 1020,
§ 5, unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the budget section.
The budget section provision of House Bill 1020, § 5, is unconstitutional in
violation of the non-delegation doctrine.3.[¶54] The failure to adequately constrain the budget section's discretion is not
the only constitutional flaw in H.B. 1020. The Legislative Assembly could have provided
detailed standards to the budget section for approving a transfer request, and a greater flaw would
remain. The Legislative Assembly was not attempting to delegate its core legislative power to the
executive branch, but to retain control over executing a law after it is enacted by delegating
power to a committee of its own members.[¶55] After a law is
enacted, further fact finding and discretionary decision-making in administering appropriated
funds is an executive function. See State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295 S.E.2d 633,
637 (S.C. 1982) (stating that administration of appropriations is the function of the executive
branch). In McInnis, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed legislation that
provided for the creation of a joint appropriations review committee. 295 S.E.2d   at 634. The
committee, composed of twelve legislators, was granted broad authority to control expenditure of
state and federal funds.  Id. at 638. The court held that the authority granted to the
committee violated the separation of powers, concluding that the legislation would permit twelve
legislators to control expenditures by administration rather than by legislation, creating a veto
power in the committee. Id. at 638-39.[¶56] In
I.N.S. v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(c)(2), which authorized either house of Congress to invalidate a decision of
the Attorney General to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The Court struck down this one-house legislative veto as unconstitutional
because it violated the constitutional requirements of passage by a majority of both houses
(bicameralism) and presentment to the President. Id. at
957-59.The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the
President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks
on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating
certain prescribed steps. To preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the
carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what
has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the
express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action:  passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. Id. at
957-58.[¶57] In Bowsher v. Synar, the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
which sought to eliminate the federal budget deficit. 478 U.S. 714, 717 (1986). If the budget
deficit exceeded a certain amount, the Act required across-the-board cuts in federal spending.
Id. at 717-18. Deficit estimates and budget reduction calculations were submitted to
the comptroller general, who in turn submitted a report to the President. Id. at 718.
The President then mandated the spending reductions specified by the comptroller general.
Id. Thus, the comptroller general was given the "ultimate authority to determine the
budget cuts to be made." Id. at 733. The Court held that Congress acted
unconstitutionally:  "By placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal
only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has
intruded into the executive function." Id. at 734.[¶58] In Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed federal legislation authorizing the
transfer of operating control of two airports from the federal government to a local authority,
conditioned on the creation of a review board by the local authority. 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991).
The review board, composed of nine congressmen, had the ability to veto the decisions of the
local authority. Id. The Court described the review board as "an entity created at the
initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress ha[d] delineated, the purpose of which
[was] to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in which [was] restricted to
congressional officials." Id. at 269. The Court concluded that conditioning of the
transfer upon creation of the review board was an "impermissible encroachment" on the
executive branch, violating the separation of powers. Id. at 277. In reaching this
decision, the Court outlined two constraints on the legislature:  1) "It may not
invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power," and 2) "when
it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures specified in Article I." Id. at 274 (quotations
omitted).[¶59] These decisions are consistent with the separation
of powers decisions interpreting the North Dakota Constitution. "Under our constitutional
system, the Legislature may not delegate to itself, or to a subset of its members, executive or
judicial functions." Kelsh, 2002 ND
53, ¶ 21, 641 N.W.2d 100. In its
exercise of legislative power, it must follow the constitutionally mandated procedures, including
a recorded vote of a majority of the members elected to each house followed by presentment to
the governor for signature. N.D. Const. art.
IV, § 13; N.D. Const. art.
V, § 9. To do otherwise would violate the separation of powers.[¶60] The budget section provision of House Bill 1020, § 5,
requires budget section approval before any proposed transfer of funds by the water commission.
Thus, although the water commission has the power to propose a transfer from one designated
category to another, the budget section has ultimate authority to accept or reject the transfer.
Similar to the joint appropriations review committee in McInnis, the comptroller
general in Bowsher, or the review board in Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth., the budget section maintains control over an important aspect of executing the law
after the law's enactment. Here, that is the ability to transfer funds between budget categories,
which changes the specified purpose of the appropriated funds. The Legislative Assembly argues
that the budget section performs only the "limited legislative function of gathering facts to
ascertain whether certain funds may be transferred between the specified purposes established by
the Legislative Assembly." The budget section may gather facts to make an informed decision in
enacting legislation, but that is not what it does here. It retains for itself discretion over this
appropriation after enactment. Once a bill is enacted, the Legislative Assembly may control the
bill's administration only indirectly through passing new legislation. Bowsher, 478 U.S.  at 733-34. After enactment, that duty belongs to the executive branch, not a subset of the
legislative branch.[¶61] The budget section is composed of 42
members of the 141-member Legislative Assembly. Under H.B. 1020, its decision to accept or
reject the transfer of funds does not have to be passed by a majority of each house of the
legislature, nor does it have to be presented to the Governor for signature. The budget section
decides whether to approve or reject transfers. This retained control by an agent of the Legislative
Assembly to continue directing expenditures after its role of passing legislation is completed is
unconstitutional. It encroaches upon the role of the executive, and also bypasses the mandatory
legislative process.[¶62] The dissent, at ¶ 79, characterizes the separation
of powers violation as turning on giving one agency more leeway than another. The separation of
powers issue here is not how much discretion is given regarding expenditure of appropriations,
but to whom the discretion is given after a bill is enacted. In drafting legislation, the Legislative
Assembly can provide broad or narrow discretion to the executive branch. The Legislative
Assembly violates separation of powers when it retains discretion after enactment for itself or its
agent, the budget section.[¶63] The Legislative Assembly argues
that because it meets only biennially, flexibility is needed to "react to changing and unforeseen
conditions between sessions." This justification does not extinguish the restrictions placed upon
it by the Constitution. As aptly put in Chadha, "the fact that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives--or the hallmarks--of democratic government . . . ." 462 U.S.  at 944.[¶64] The budget section provision of House Bill
1020, § 5, violates the required separation of powers and is unconstitutional as
beyond the authority of the Legislative Assembly.4.[¶65] The Legislative Assembly argues that if the budget section provision of
House Bill 1020, § 5, is stricken from the bill, the language granting the water
commission authority to transfer funds among categories must also be stricken from the bill. The
Legislative Assembly argues that this would be consistent with its intent because it did not give
the water commission unfettered authority to transfer funds from one category to another. The
Governor argues that striking the language which provides the water commission authority to
transfer funds is an attempt by the Legislative Assembly to legislate through litigation. The
Governor contends that transfer authority language does not need to be stricken because what
remains after striking the budget section condition is a workable piece of
legislation.[¶66] This Court has stated that "if a legislative act be
in part unconstitutional, the valid portion shall stand, unless the result be one not contemplated or
desired by the Legislature." Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 274. While the remaining portion of
the bill would be workable legislation without the budget section condition, it would not result in
legislation that was contemplated or desired by the Legislative Assembly. H.B. 1020,
§ 5, states that "the state water commission may transfer funding among these items,
subject to budget section approval . . . ." (emphasis
added). The use of the conditional "subject to" shows that the Legislative Assembly purposefully
conditioned funding transfers from the water commission upon approval of the budget section.
This language makes clear the Legislative Assembly did not intend a transfer of funds without
the approval of its agent, the budget section. Thus, the provision granting authority to the water
commission to transfer funds is stricken. The result is that only the following portion of H.B.
1020, § 5, subsection 2 remains:  "The funding designated in this
section is for the specific purposes identified."[¶67] Striking the
water commission's ability to transfer funds is not, as the Governor suggests, legislation through
litigation. Having concluded the budget section provision unconstitutional, we ensure that the bill
functions nearly as close as the legislature intended. Here, we conclude that requires striking both
the budget section approval condition and the transfer authority. We do so with the knowledge
that should the need to transfer funds become an emergency, under Chapter 54-16, N.D.C.C., the
emergency commission may authorize the transfer of funds among the enumerated categories in
H.B. 1020, § 5.C.[¶68] Senate
Bill 2013, § 12, provides that of the $3.6 million allocated for an information
technology project, $1.8 million "may be spent only upon approval of the budget section." The
Governor argues that this is unconstitutional because it violates the non-delegation and
separation of powers doctrines. We agree.1.[¶69] The Legislative Assembly argues that the budget section performs only the
"limited legislative function of gathering facts to ascertain whether certain funds will be made
available for expenditure." Senate Bill 2013 provides the budget section with the ultimate
authority to approve or disapprove the use of half of the $3.6 million appropriation passed by the
full legislature. The fact gathering that is properly a legislative function precedes final enactment
of legislation that culminates with bicameral passage and presentment to the Governor. Here, the
asserted need for fact gathering is for the purpose of applying the enacted law, thus it is within
the executive function of administering the appropriation. See Kelsh, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 21, 641 N.W.2d 100
(ascertaining facts for application to legislative guidelines pertains to execution of the law);
see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34; McInnis, 295 S.E.2d  
at 637. Convenience is no substitute for the mandatory legislative process. By arrogating to itself,
through a committee of its members, the power to administer appropriations, the Legislature has
unconstitutionally encroached upon the executive and consolidated the power to both make and
execute the laws into its own hands. The budget section provision of Senate Bill 2013,
§ 12, violates the separation of powers.2.[¶70] The Legislative Assembly argues that this bill provides adequate standards
by which the budget section can determine whether to approve additional spending for the IT
project. Section 12 provides, "It is the intent of the sixty-fifth legislative assembly that during the
2017-18 interim, the governor and the commissioner of university and school lands achieve
efficiencies and budgetary savings within the department of trust lands through the use of
innovative ideas and through alternative solutions relating to information technology." This
statement of intent does not provide adequate standards. It provides a general goal for the
Governor and the commissioner of university and school lands to "achieve efficiencies and
budgetary savings." It does not by its terms constrain the budget section in determining whether
to approve the $1.8 million subject to its approval. The budget section cannot objectively
determine whether to approve the $1.8 million in conditional funding under such a guideline.
Stated as a broad goal of efficiency and budget savings, this guideline is implicit in every
appropriation, for it is a duty of all public officials to efficiently use public funds entrusted to
them.[¶71] Here, the budget section lacks adequate guidance,
leaving it discretion to approve or reject the use of the $1.8 million appropriated for an IT project
subject only to the budget section's subjective assessment of efficiency achieved or budget
savings. See Sinner, 458 N.W.2d   at 286-87 (VandeWalle, J., concurring) (calling for
closer review where delegation relates to appropriation rather than regulation). A broadly worded
appropriation granting discretion to the commissioner of university and school lands to spend an
additional $1.8 million on an IT project if it serves the ends of budget savings and operational
efficiency would be unremarkable. That the discretion relates to an appropriation and is given to
an agent of the Legislative Assembly is what draws particular scrutiny. See Kelsh, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 20, 641 N.W.2d 100. Thus, the
budget section provision of Senate Bill 2013, § 12, is unconstitutional as a violation of the
non-delegation doctrine.3.[¶72] The
Legislative Assembly argues that if the budget section provision of Senate Bill 2013,
§ 12, is stricken from the bill, the amount appropriated must be reduced from
$3.6 million to $1.8 million because it did not intend for the commissioner of university and
school lands to spend the entire $3.6 million. Although we agree the budget section provision is a
condition on $1.8 million of the appropriated amount, it is less clear whether appropriating the
full $3.6 million is a result that the legislature "contemplated or desired." See Olson, 286 N.W.2d   at 274. We explain below that the full appropriation
must stand.[¶73] In Section 1, S.B. 2013, the Legislative
Assembly appropriated $3.6 million for capital assets. Section 3, S.B. 2013, provided that the
$3.6 million is for an information technology project. Section 12, S.B. 2013, provides, "The
capital assets line item and the total special funds line item in section 1 of this Act include
$3,600,000 . . . for an information technology project." It is not until the
second sentence of Section 12 that the Legislative Assembly conditions half of $3.6 million on
approval of the budget section. The Legislative Assembly argues that each of these sections
needs to be altered to reflect $1.8 million being appropriated, instead of $3.6 million. We decline
to make such alterations, because the judicial branch is no more empowered to add words to a
statute than is the executive branch. The result of striking the budget section provision is that
S.B. 2013 appropriates $3.6 million to the commissioner of university and school lands. The
Legislative Assembly must have contemplated this result because the commissioner was
provided the authority to spend the entire amount on the IT project without guidelines for the
budget section to apply in halting the project after expending half of the appropriated funds.
Thus, we decline to strike any provisions of S.B. 2013, other than the budget section provision.
With the stricken language removed, S.B. 2013, § 12,
reads:SECTION 12.  INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
PROJECT - BUDGET SECTION APPROVAL - LEGISLATIVE INTENT - AGENCY
EFFICIENCIES.  The capital assets line item and the total special funds line item in
section 1 of this Act include $3,600,000 from the state lands maintenance fund for an
information technology project. It is the intent of the sixty-fifth legislative assembly that during
the 2017-18 interim, the governor and the commissioner of university and school lands achieve
efficiencies and budgetary savings within the department of trust lands through the use of
innovative ideas and through alternative solutions relating to information
technology.V.[¶74] For
the reasons stated above, we exercise our original jurisdiction by granting the petition in part,
denying it in part, and granting the cross-petition. All claims presented are justiciable
controversies. The Workplace Safety Veto is valid and effective. The Credit Hour Veto, Any
Portion Veto, Water Commission Veto, and IT Project Veto are ineffective, causing the bills to
have been enacted in their entirety. The Governor has standing to bring the cross-petition, and the
Attorney General may advocate on the Governor's behalf. The budget section provision of House
Bill 1020, § 5, is unconstitutional as an improper delegation and violation of
separation of powers, and the provision providing the water commission the authority to transfer
funds among categories is also stricken. The budget section provision of Senate Bill 2013,
§ 12, is unconstitutional as an improper delegation and violation of separation of
powers, and the budget section condition is stricken.[¶75] Jerod E. TufteJon J. Jensen
VandeWalle, Chief Justice, concurring and dissenting.[¶76] I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion in part II and much of part III of the opinion, with the understanding that not
every bill or part thereof which contains a dollar sign or refers to an amount of money is an
appropriation. While I understand the discussion relative to the Legislative Drafting Manual,
there is much to be said about the legislative branch following and the executive and judicial
branches accepting a format that clearly defines an appropriation.[¶77] With respect to part III C, labeled "Any Portion Veto" regarding SB 2003,
Governor Burgum concedes the invalidity of his veto.(1)[¶78] With respect to the
Governor's cross-petition, I agree with that portion of Part IV of the opinion holding the bills
unconstitutional as violating the non-delegation-of-legislative-authority doctrine because in
delegating its authority, the legislature did not provide adequate standards to the budget section.
However, I respectfully dissent to that portion of Part IV of the opinion and its extensive
discussion and holdings under the doctrine of separation of powers. I do so because 1) it is
unnecessary to our decision, and 2) I am not convinced the delegation to the budget
section, if proper standards were in place, would violate that doctrine.[¶79] The Governor and Attorney General do not question the legislative
authority to appropriate moneys in line items without granting the executive branch the authority
to transfer funds among those line items. Thus, most executive branch agencies have no authority
to transfer among line items. As the majority opinion notes, in case of emergency the agencies
may request that authority from the Emergency Commission. In addition, the Water Commission
is authorized to apply to the Budget Section for authority to transfer funds without an emergency
existing. While I agree that without proper guidelines established by the legislature, it is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the budget section. It seems odd to me that
giving one executive branch agency more leeway in spending appropriated funds than the other
executive branch agencies violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. It appears that the majority
opinion adopts an "all or nothing" approach, i.e., the legislature may appropriate funds with no
further oversight or it may deny expenditure authority. While some of the cases cited by the
majority may appear to support that position, they may be distinguished because they involve
legislation that would prohibit expenditures without a subset of the legislature approving such
expenditures. And, in any event, decisions from other jurisdictions, while they may be
persuasive, are not binding precedent on this Court. I am not persuaded. Here, we are not
concerned with authority in the budget section to prohibit expenditure of funds but rather the
authority to transfer funds from one line item to another.[¶80]
While we hold that unbridled authority to be an unlawful delegation of legislative powers, I am
unwilling at this time to conclude it also violates the principles of separation of
powers.[¶81] Gerald
W. VandeWalle, C.J. Crothers, Justice, concurring and
dissenting.[¶82] I concur in the result reached by the
majority and agree with much of what they have written. I respectfully dissent from Part IV(B)(3)
deciding that the portion of H.B. 1020, 65th Legislative Assembly (N.D. 2017), challenged by
the Governor violates the separation of powers doctrine.[¶83]
The Governor challenged the constitutionality of budget section provisions in H.B. 1020, 2017
N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 19, § 5, by claiming they violated the non-delegation and
separation of powers doctrines. Majority, at ¶ 44. All members of this Court
agree H.B. 1020, § 5, unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the budget
section. Id. at ¶ 53. After reaching that
conclusion, the majority proceeds to address whether H.B. 1020, § 5, also violates
the separation of powers doctrine. Id.
at ¶ 54 ("The failure to
adequately constrain the budget section's discretion is not the only constitutional flaw in H.B.
1020."). I believe the constitutional analysis should have stopped after the non-delegation
holding.[¶84] Concepts of judicial restraint and abstention
require that courts first consider whether the pending question can be resolved without
constitutional analysis. See Hosp. Servs.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69, 71-72
(N.D. 1975) (noting courts examine claims on non-constitutional grounds before approaching
any constitutional issues). Otherwise stated:"In Three Affiliated
Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138,
157 (1984), the United States Supreme Court said, 'It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint,
however, that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of
deciding them.' Seeking to avoid the necessity of deciding the constitutional question, the high
court said, 'The same prudential rule is properly employed in this case' and remanded the case to
this Court for an additional determination. Id. at 158-59. Further, in cases involving
statutes and constitutionality, the doctrine of abstention absent necessity of deciding unresolved
constitutional issues goes to the very heart of the constitutional system of separation of powers.
Parties may want courts to decide unresolved constitutional questions, but not doing so
unnecessarily is a jurisprudential rule--like the requirements of jurisdiction and finality--which
courts have a duty to apply regardless of whether they have been raised by a
party." Barrios-Flores v. Levi, 2017 ND 117, ¶ 35, 894 N.W.2d 888 (Sandstrom,
J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).[¶85] Where, as here,
the question necessarily involves constitutional analysis, deference to the work of our co-equal
branches of government requires that we proceed with great caution and circumspection. This
Court has described our restraint in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes,
stating,"As a general rule a court will inquire into the constitutionality of
a statute only to the extent required by the case before it and will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it, and will not formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied." State v.
King, 355 N.W.2d 807, 809 (N.D.
1984) (citing Tooz v. State, 76 N.D. 599, 599, 38 N.W.2d 285, 287
(1949)).[¶86] In the present case the non-delegation basis is
narrower than the separation of powers grounds because the former usually can be fixed through
more artful legislative drafting while the latter tends to implicate the structure of governance.
Thus, the narrower grounds for considering the validity of H.B. 1020, § 5, is a
determination whether the budget section provision contains a constitutionally excessive
delegation of legislative authority. We have done just that, after which we should stop further
analysis. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217 (1995)
(courts must decide the "narrower ground for adjudication of the constitutional questions in the
case" and then end their analysis); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 688 n.5 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[I]t is a proper exercise of
judicial restraint for courts . . . to decide constitutional attacks on the
narrowest possible grounds and to avoid reaching unnecessary constitutional issues.").[¶87] Daniel J. Crothers Lisa Fair McEvers Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.Footnote:1. The Governor and Attorney General do not contest the validity of the provision restricting
Dickinson State University from discontinuing "any portion" of its nursing program as being a
form of violation of separation of powers in light of Article VIII, § 6 (6)(b) of the
North Dakota Constitution which provides in part: "The said state board of higher education shall
have full authority over the institutions under its control with the right, among its other powers,
to prescribe, limit, or modify the courses offered at the several institutions."