Title: Maddox v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Kristy MADDOX v. STATE of Arkansas

96-552                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 4, 1996


1.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors considered. -- Under
     Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1995), the circuit court
     must consider the following factors in determining whether to
     retain jurisdiction or transfer a case to juvenile court: (1)
     the seriousness of the offense and whether violence was
     employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense; (2)
     whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of
     adjudicated offenses that would lead to the determination that
     the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing
     rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat
     and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such
     efforts; and (3) the prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor that reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.

2.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- decision must be supported
     by clear and convincing evidence -- court not required to give
     factors equal weight. -- The decision to retain jurisdiction
     must be supported by clear and convincing evidence; in making
     its decision, the trial court need not give equal weight to
     each of the statutory factors; furthermore, the trial court's
     denial of a motion to transfer will be reversed only if its
     ruling was clearly erroneous.

3.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- use of violence --
     sufficient for circuit court to retain jurisdiction. -- The
     use of violence in the commission of a serious offense is a
     factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to
     retain jurisdiction of a juvenile's case, but the commission
     of a serious offense without the use of violence is not
     sufficient grounds to deny the transfer.

4.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- first-degree criminal
     mischief satisfies seriousness requirement. -- Criminal
     mischief in the first degree is a Class C felony, and it
     satisfies the seriousness requirement in juvenile-transfer
     cases.

5.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- violent act lay at core of
     alleged crime -- sufficient to sustain refusal to transfer. --
     In this case, the trial court noted that the underlying facts
     would likely support an aggravated assault charge as well as
     a charge of criminal mischief; the supreme court has observed
     that the crime of aggravated assault is not only serious but
     that no violence beyond that necessary to commit aggravated
     assault is necessary to meet the requirement under Ark. Code
     Ann.  9-27-318(e)(1); the supreme court concluded that a
     violent act lay at the core of the alleged crime, the willful
     throwing of a glass bottle at a moving vehicle containing
     three passengers; these facts were sufficient to sustain a
     refusal to transfer to juvenile court.

6.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- appellant's age was relevant
     to prospects for rehabilitation. -- Young people over the age
     of eighteen can no longer be committed to the Division of
     Youth Services for rehabilitation unless they are already
     committed at the time they turn eighteen; the fact that
     appellant had turned eighteen and could not be committed to
     the Division of Youth Services was highly relevant to her
     prospects for rehabilitation as a juvenile; it is a factor
     that the supreme court considers important in reviewing a
     trial court's denial of a motion to transfer; the circumstance
     lent additional support to an affirmance.


     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court; William A. Storey,
Judge; affirmed.
     Jerome J. Paddock, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     This is a juvenile-transfer case.  On October 16, 1995, an
information was filed charging appellant Kristy Maddox with
criminal mischief in the first degree, a Class C felony.  She was
accused of intentionally throwing a Mountain Dew bottle from a
moving vehicle and striking the victim's automobile, causing damage
in excess of $500.  Maddox, who was 17 years old at the time of the
alleged incident, and who turned 18 on February 4, 1996, moved to
have the charge transferred to juvenile court.  Her motion was
denied.  She now appeals that denial. 
     Only two witnesses testified at the juvenile-transfer hearing. 
Pamela Maddox, the appellant's mother, related to the court that at
the time of the hearing, Maddox was living with her and assisting
around the house by doing chores and taking care of her younger
siblings.  She testified that Maddox was not currently in high
school, but that she was working on her G.E.D. and planned to
attend college in the Fall.  She stated that she had a good
relationship with her daughter, but that she did have to call the
police on one occasion for an undisclosed "family disturbance." 
She and the prosecutor agreed that Maddox had no prior criminal
history.
     Sherry Lynn Kinnamon, the victim, was called as a witness by
the prosecution.  She testified that on April 20, 1995, she was
driving her grandparents from Huntsville to the VA Hospital in
Fayetteville when she noticed a red pick-up truck following very
closely behind her.  She stated that she tapped her brakes a few
times to get the driver's attention and slowed so that the truck
could pass, but that the driver would not do so.  Even when given
a straight stretch of road with no cars approaching, the driver of
the truck would not pass her.  She explained that the driver
instead pulled alongside her car several times, and that the driver
and two passengers would simply look at her, then drop back behind
her car, where they made obscene gestures.  She stated that she
slowed her car to two-miles-an-hour so that the truck would pass,
but that it again would not.  Finally, she accelerated, and the
truck pulled alongside her car.  Maddox hung out of the window on
the passenger's side of the truck, held by her belt loops.  She was
holding a full glass bottle of Mountain Dew, and she and the other
occupants of the truck were yelling obscenities at Kinnamon. 
Kinnamon testified that Maddox then intentionally threw the glass
bottle at her car.  It dented the front of the hood and cracked the
windshield.  Kinnamon said that after she regained her composure,
she pursued the truck and got its license plate number.  No one was
injured, but she estimated that the damage to her car was  about
$800. 
     The trial court denied the motion to transfer after
determining that Maddox's intentional throwing of the Mountain Dew
bottle at Kinnamon's car was not only a serious act but a violent
one.  The court emphasized the harassing nature of the episode and
referred to an incident in Oklahoma where a person was killed
because an object had been thrown at his vehicle.  The court noted
that Maddox had no prior criminal record and mentioned that there
had been no evidence introduced, one way or the other, with regard
to her prospects for rehabilitation.
     Maddox claims in her appeal that the trial court clearly erred
in retaining jurisdiction of this matter.  The Arkansas Juvenile
Code provides that the circuit court shall consider the following
factors in determining whether to retain jurisdiction or transfer
a case to juvenile court:
     1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether violence
     was employed by the juvenile in the commission of the
     offense;
     2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of
     adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
     determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
     under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
     past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
     the response to such efforts; and
     3) The prior history, character traits, mental maturity,
     and any other factor which reflects upon the juvenile's
     prospects for rehabilitation.
Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1995).  The decision to retain
jurisdiction must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(f) (Supp. 1995).  In making its decision,
the trial court need not give equal weight to each of the statutory
factors.  Green v. State, 323 Ark. 635, 916 S.W.2d 756 (1996); Ring
v. State, 320 Ark. 128,