Title: Lawrence Watkins, Jr. v. Beverly Nelson and Kevin M. Nelson

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This appeal involves the standard courts are to apply to decide a custody dispute between a child's biological parent and a third party following the death of the child's custodial parent. In this appeal, the dispute is between Lawrence Watkins, Jr. (Larry), the father of Chantel Ivonne Watkins-Murphy (Chantel), and Beverly and Kevin Nelson (the Nelsons), Chantel's maternal grandparents. Chantel's mother, Megan Murphy (Megan), was killed in an automobile accident on August 27, 1996, when Chantel was twelve days old. Prior to Megan's death, Megan and Chantel had lived with the Nelsons, Megan's mother and stepfather. When Chantel was born, Megan was seventeen years old and Larry was nineteen. They were not married. Larry lived with his family about an hour's drive from the Nelsons. At Megan's funeral, the Nelsons were told that Larry wanted custody of Chantel, but the Nelsons refused to give Chantel to him and they immediately started legal proceedings, presumably under N.J.S.A. 9:2-5, to be appointed guardians of Chantel. Throughout the ensuing three-and-one-half years of legal proceedings at the trial and appellate levels, Chantel has remained with the Nelsons. She has spent most weekends with Larry and his family, initially by voluntary agreement of the parties and later pursuant to court order. Larry opposed the Nelsons' guardianship action and filed a counterclaim for permanent custody of Chantel. Temporary custody of Chantel was awarded to the Nelsons by the Chancery Division, Probate Part on October 8, 1996, and after the parties unsuccessfully engaged in mediation to resolve the custody dispute in 1997 through the Chancery Division, Family Part, a plenary trial was held. At the trial, the Nelsons did not contend that Larry was in any way unfit to raise Chantel, but simply asserted that they could do a better job parenting, and that that was in Chantel's best interests. A clinical psychologist testified on behalf of the Nelsons. In deciding the custody issue on March 11, 1998, the Family Part judge acknowledged that in a contest between a parent and a third party, custody ordinarily is awarded to the parent absent a clear showing of the parent's gross misconduct or unfitness. The court applied the best interest standard, however, finding the Nelsons to stand in Megan's shoes and concluding on that basis that their status was equal to Larry's. The court weighed the relevant factors and concluded it was in Chantel's best interests to award custody to the Nelsons. The court expressed concern about Larry's level of maturity and was persuaded that Chantel's physical and mental welfare will be better protected in the Nelson household. The court awarded custody to the Nelsons and ordered that the existing visitation schedule remain in effect. Larry appealed the custody determination and a divided Appellate Division panel affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court. The majority stressed that unfitness was not the issue; the concurring member of the court noted the statutory presumption favoring the surviving parent, which could be overcome by a best interests inquiry; and the dissenting member concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in finding the Nelsons' custody rights to be in parity with Larry's. The dissent declared that the appropriate standard is the one used in the termination of parental rights and that because the Nelsons did not prove that Larry was an unfit parent, custody should have been awarded to him. Larry's appeal to the Supreme Court is as of right because of the dissent. HELD: In a custody dispute between a child's biological parent and a third party following the death of the child's custodial parent, custody of the child should be awarded to the parent absent a showing of parental unfitness, gross misconduct, abandonment, or exceptional circumstances, such as proof that serious physical or psychological harm will result. Here, there were no such allegations or proofs, and custody should be given to the father. 1. The statute under which the guardianship complaint was filed, N.J.S.A. 9:2-5, precludes an automatic award of custody to a surviving parent, but does not specify a standard, best interests or other, to be applied when deciding a custody dispute. According to statutory and case law governing custody disputes, there is a presumption of custody in favor of the parent in an action between a parent and a third party. This is a matter of public policy in New Jersey; affording a fit parent a superior right to custody as against third parties conforms to common sense and constitutional law. The presumption in favor of a parent can be overcome only by a showing of unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct, or exceptional circumstances, the standard required for the involuntary termination of the rights of a parent. (pp. 10-15) 2. The parental right to custody occasionally must yield to the State's parens patriae duty to ensure that children will be protected from serious physical or psychological harm. The presumption in favor of the parent may be rebutted by proof that a change in custody will cause serious psychological harm to a child, even in the absence of gross misconduct, unfitness, or abandonment. A showing of serious harm of this sort will satisfy the exceptional circumstances standard. The pleadings and proofs at trial in this case do not bring it within the exceptional circumstances exception. (pp. 16-19) 3. The standard articulated by the Court has been applied, in whole or in part, by most jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Its benchmark is the welfare of the child and it also protects parental rights. Although some courts have applied a hybrid best interests/exceptional circumstances standard, courts have declined to apply simply a best interests standard because of the fear that taken to its logical conclusion, use of the standard could lead to judicial redistribution of children to worthier members of the population, a process that undoubtedly would victimize poor people. (pp. 19 26) 4. The exceptional circumstances factor may be established by showing that the third party has become a psychological parent to the child, and if that factor is established, the standard for determining custody is the same as between two fit parents: the child's best interest test found in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4c. An award of custody to a third party over the objection of a fit parent cannot be upheld without an initial court finding that the standard for termination of the rights of a non-consenting parent or the exceptional circumstances prong has been satisfied. (pp. 26-29) 5. In this case, where there was no allegation of parental unfitness, misconduct, or abandonment, or of harm to Chantel, and no claim or proof of psychological parenthood or other exceptional circumstances, the Nelsons should not have been deemed to be in parity with Larry and the best interests standard should not have been applied. The trial court should have awarded custody to Larry immediately and the Nelsons are to transfer legal and physical custody of Chantel to Larry within seven days. Because of Larry's constant contact with Chantel, the change in custody will not harm her. The Family Part is to establish a visitation schedule for the Nelsons comparable to that currently in place for Larry. (pp. 29-33) 6. To avoid delays in future cases of this sort, the Court establishes a protocol to be observed. ( pp. 33-35) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Chancery Division, Family Part for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE STEIN dissenting, is of the view that the standard adopted by the Court is too rigid a rule of law and that its inflexibility will deprive courts of sufficient discretion to avoid unnecessary harm to a child already distraught because of the death of a parent. He favors a child-centered approach by which a court would consider whether placing a child with a natural parent instead of a third party would cause actual detriment to the child. In this case, he would remand the matter to the Family Part for a new custody determination employing this approach. JUSTICE O'HERN, dissenting, perceives the standard adopted by the Court as inflexible and likely to increase a child's suffering in many circumstances. He would develop a standard that would focus on whether the child would be harmed by the loss of a continued relationship with a third-party if custody were given to the surviving parent, and would remand for a custody determination by that standard. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI, LONG and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE O'HERN joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 11 September Term 1999 LAWRENCE WATKINS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEVERLY NELSON and KEVIN M. NELSON, Defendants-Respondents. Argued January 18, 2000-- Decided April 6, 2000 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 321 N.J. Super 482 (1999). Joel C. Seltzer argued the cause for appellant. JoAnne Byrnes argued the cause for respondents. The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This is an action for custody of a three and one-half year old child who has been residing with the maternal grandparents since the sudden death of the mother twelve days after giving birth to the child. This appeal requires us to determine the appropriate standard for deciding a custody dispute between a biological parent and a third party following the death of the custodial parent. Specifically, we must determine whether it was appropriate for the lower courts to consider the best interests of the child as the appropriate standard in awarding custody of a fit biological father's child to the deceased mother's parents. Approximately nineteen months after the mother's tragic death, the Chancery Division, Family Part, determined that it was in the child's best interest to award custody to the maternal grandparents. In a published opinion, a divided appellate panel affirmed. 321 N.J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 1999). This appeal is before the Court as of right by reason of the dissent. We now reverse. We hold that the courts below applied the improper standard to this custody dispute. Upon the death of the custodial parent, in an action for guardianship of a child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-5, a presumption exists in favor of the surviving biological parent. That presumption can be rebutted by proof of gross misconduct, abandonment, unfitness, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, but never by a simple application of the best interests test. Because that presumption in favor of the biological father has not been rebutted, and because of the need for finality to these proceedings, we direct the immediate transfer of custody to the biological father, plaintiff Lawrence Watkins. Consistent with the biological father's concession to this Court that the Nelsons should have visitation with the child, we direct the trial court to establish a visitation schedule for Beverly and Kevin Nelson, the maternal grandparents. The statute does not require prior court approval for a voluntary transfer of custody by a custodial caregiver to a previously non custodial parent upon the death of the custodial parent. However, the Superior Court can order such a transfer. But before ordering such a transfer under the statutory scheme, the Superior Court must make the disputed custody determination and, if necessary, appoint a guardian until that determination can be made. Whereas N.J.S.A. 9:2-5 precludes the surviving non custodial parent's automatic accession to custody of his or her child, the statute does not concomitantly enhance the status of those who temporarily take custody upon the death of the custodial parent. Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 397-98 (App. Div. 1993). Moreover, N.J.S.A. 9:2-5 does not contain a standard to be applied when deciding a custody dispute. The second sentence in the statute confers upon the Superior Court the power, in an action brought by a guardian ad litem on behalf of the children, to appoint and remove guardians, and to make such judgments and orders, from time to time, as the circumstances of the case and the benefit of the children shall require. N.J.S.A. 9:2-5. When the statute is read in the proper context, we conclude that the quoted phrase refers to the time period between the death of the custodial parent and the ultimate transfer of custody. We also conclude that the statute does not authorize a court to use the child's best interests test as the primary standard when making the ultimate custody determination in a custody dispute between a parent and a third party. Because the statute does not provide a standard, we must look to our statutory and decisional law concerning custody to decipher the appropriate standard to be applied in this case. [In re D.T., 200 N.J. Super. 171, 176-77 (App. Div. 1985)]. Not surprisingly, the concept that a presumption of custody exists in favor of a parent, and that only a showing of unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct, or exceptional circumstances will overcome this presumption, is steeped in the history and common law of this State. See, e.g., In re D.T., supra, 200 N.J. Super. at 175-76; E.T. v. L.P., 185 N.J. Super. 77, 84 (App. Div. 1982); S. v. H.M. & E.M., 111 N.J. Super. 553, 558-59 (App. Div. 1970); Kridel v. Kridel, 85 N.J. Super. 478, 489 (App. Div. 1964); In re Mrs. M., 74 N.J. Super. 178, 183-84, 186 (App. Div. 1962); In re Adoption of B. by E. & R., 152 N.J. Super 546, 551 (Union County Ct. 1977); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 146 N.J. Super. 491, 497 (Ch. Div. 1976); Ex parte Alsdorf, 142 N.J. Eq. 246, 252-53 (Ch. 1948); Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 78 (Ch. 1942), aff'd 132 N.J. Eq. 287 (E. & A. 1943); Pope v. Brown, 3 N.J. Misc. 572, 572-73 (Ch. 1925); Hesselman v. Haas, 71 N.J. Eq. 689, 694 (Ch. 1906). The principle that a showing of gross misconduct, unfitness, neglect, or exceptional circumstances affecting the welfare of the child will overcome this presumption, is a recognition that a parent's right to custody is not absolute. That parental right must, at times, give way to the State's parens patriae obligation to ensure that children will be properly protected from serious physical or psychological harm. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). This has been our law for more than a century. As early as 1889, the highest Court in this State allowed the presumption in favor of a natural parent to be overcome by a showing of exceptional circumstances. Richards v. Collins, 45 N.J. Eq. 283 (E. & A. 1889). More recently, in Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc. of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 131-132 (1976), appeal after remand, 74 N.J. 313 (1977), the Court acknowledged that even if parental rights cannot be terminated on statutory grounds, exceptional circumstances based on the probability of serious psychological harm to the child may deprive a parent of custody. Ibid. Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 221-222 (1977), recognized the same principle. Sorentino observed that the rights and interests of third parties, such as prospective adoptive parents, are necessarily subordinate to the rights of the natural parents. 72 N.J. at 131. The Court recognized that in certain anomalous cases the presumption in favor of the parent may be rebutted, even in the absence of gross misconduct, unfitness or abandonment, if a change in custody will cause serious psychological harm to a child. Sorentino, supra, 72 N.J. at 131-32. The Sorentino exceptional circumstance[s] basis for rebutting the presumption in favor of a natural parent was grounded in the Court's power of parens patriae, to protect minor children from serious physical or psychological harm. One year later we elaborated on the Sorentino-type of exceptional circumstances. Sees, supra, 74 N.J. at 221-222. Unlike in Sorentino, the Court in Sees refused to override the presumption in favor of a parent, noting that because of the very young age of the child, proof of potential severe psychological harm from a change in custody would be impossible to establish. Ibid. Significantly, we noted that the natural parents were complete strangers to the child in Sorentino, unlike the relationships in Sees. Id. at 221. The Court concluded that absent proof of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances, there is no statutory or legal basis upon which to deny or resist plaintiff's claim qua parent to the full custody of her child. Ibid. The lesson to be learned from Sorentino and Sees is that they fall under the exceptional circumstances prong of the State's parens patriae doctrine, an alternative basis for overcoming the presumption in favor of parents. We reemphasize that the rationale for allowing parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption in favor of a parent is grounded in the Court's power of parens patriae to protect minor children from serious physical or psychological harm. The exceptional circumstances exception may rebut the presumption in favor of a parent seeking custody even if he or she is deemed to be a fit parent. A good illustration of such a case is In re Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 23-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). There, the court held that awarding custody of a deaf, learning disabled child to a fit natural father who did not know sign language rather than to the stepmother, who knew sign language, would cause substantial harm to the child, who had resided with three siblings and the stepmother for four years. Ibid. Justice Stein in his dissent has characterized our intended scope of the exceptional circumstances standard much too narrowly. We do not intend to restrict that standard solely to the Sorentino-type cases or unfit parents. Suffice it to say, exceptional circumstances mean more than a child's best interests and include, but are not limited to, the Sorentino-type of psychological parenthood. A significant difference between the child's best interests test and the parental termination or exceptional circumstances standard is that the former does not always require proof of harm to the child. In contrast, the latter always requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm. Although it appears that, to date, all successful applications of the exceptional circumstances prong in this State have been limited to the Sorentino-type of psychological parentage, the Court has not, and need not in this case, define the full scope of this exception. Given the evolving dynamics within the family structure, the scope of exceptional circumstances must await case-by-case development. Based on the pleadings and the proofs adduced at trial, this case does not fall within the exceptional circumstances exception. The standard that we articulate today has been applied, either in whole or in part, in most jurisdictions that have been confronted with the issue. Like this Court, they have created a presumption in favor of a parent that may be rebutted by proof of parental unfitness, neglect, or exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., C.G. v. C.G., 594 So. 2d 147, 149 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (quoting McLendon v. McLendon, 455 So. 2d 861, 862 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or unsuited for custody and that the best interest of the child will be served by granting custody to the third person ); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-05401, 845 P.2d 1129, 1136 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (stating parental presumption can only be overcome by stringent standard requiring showing of unfitness or neglect); In re Guardianship of D.A. McW, 460 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1984) (stating parental presumption can be rebutted only if detrimental to the welfare of the child based on an exceptional circumstances test); Carvalho v. Lewis, 274 S.E.2d 471, 472 (Ga. 1981) (applying unfitness or compelling circumstances test and noting [a] court is not allowed to terminate a parent's natural right because it has determined that the child might have better financial, educational, or even moral advantages elsewhere ); Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611, 613 (Idaho 1989) (requiring unfitness, abandonment, or that the child has been in the nonparent's custody for an appreciable period of time ); In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 334-35, 339 (Ill. 1995) (stating nonparent only has standing to petition for custody of child if parent voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody, or upon a finding of unfitness); In re Guardianship of Williams, 869 P.2d 661, 669 (Kan. 1994) (requiring unfitness, neglect, or highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances even though the trial court might feel that it would decide otherwise if free to consider only the `best interests' apart from the benefits to be derived from the love and care of the natural parent ); Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1989) (requiring unfitness or abandonment and noting that failure to provide essential care only qualifies when based on reasons other than poverty alone); Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076, 1086 (Md. 1993) (requiring unfitness or exceptional circumstances); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181, 1183-84 (Miss. 1990) (requiring abandonment, unfitness, or immorality); Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (requiring unfitness, abandonment, or extraordinary circumstances ); In re Guardianship of K.M., 929 P.2d 870, 873 (Mont. 1996) (requiring voluntary relinquishment); Henderson v. Henderson, 568 P.2d 177, 181 (Mont. 1977) (requiring unfitness, neglect, or delinquency); Locklin v. Duka, 929 P.2d 930, 933 (Nev. 1996) (requiring unfitness or extraordinary circumstances); In re Adoption of J.J.B., 894 P.2d 994, 1008 (N.M. 1995) (requiring unfitness or extraordinary circumstances); Merritt v. Way, 446 N.E.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. 1983) (requiring surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, or other extraordinary circumstances); In re Woodell, 117 S.E.2d 4, 7 (N.C. 1960) (quoting James v. Pretlow, 86 S.E.2d 759, 761 (N.C. 1955)) (stating natural parent has right to child which may only be interfered with for the most substantial and sufficient reasons and . . . only when the interests and welfare of the children clearly require it ); In re E.J.H., 546 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D. 1996) (requiring a finding of exceptional circumstances to trigger a best-interest analysis ); In re Guardianship of M.R.S., 960 P.2d 357, 361-62 (Okla. 1998) (quoting Alford v. Thomas, 316 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1955)) (requiring unfitness or circumstances of great weight and importance connected with the necessary welfare of the child ); Ryan v. DeMello, 354 A.2d 734, 735 (R.I. 1976) (stating the Family Court may award the custody of a child to a relative . . . if there has been a judicial determination that the child is delinquent, wayward, neglected, or otherwise comes within the purview of the Family Court Act ); Moore v. Moore, 386 S.E.2d 456, 458 (S.C. 1989) (requiring unfitness unless parent temporarily relinquishes custody and then extraordinary circumstances); D.G. v. D.M.K., 557 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 1996) (requiring gross misconduct, unfitness, or extraordinary circumstances beyond a simple showing of best interests); In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tenn. 1995) (stating parent cannot be deprived of custody unless there has been a finding of substantial harm to the child); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986) (quoting Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1973) (requiring unfitness, abandonment, voluntary relinquishment or `special facts and circumstances . . . constituting an extraordinary reason for taking a child from [a] parent' ); In re S.B.L., 553 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Vt. 1988) (requiring unfitness or extraordinary circumstances); Snyder v. Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299, 304 (W. Va. 1993) (requiring unfitness, neglect, abandonment or waiver). Four states rely on harm to the child, which is part of the exceptional circumstances exception. See, e.g., Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Alaska 1989) (requiring unfitness or that parental custody would be clearly detrimental to the child. ); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring a showing that award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child ); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) (requiring unfitness or that no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and welfare for the child's, and that the parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents generally ); In re Marriage of Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that something more than the best interests of the child is required to show actual detriment to the child, but not requiring unfitness). A small minority of jurisdictions apply a hybrid of the child's best interest test and the exceptional circumstances exception. See, e.g., Freshour v. West, 971 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ark. 1998) (recognizing preference for parent, but noting child's best interest is controlling); Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Minn. 1989) (noting presumption exists unless parent is unfit or grave and weighty reasons exist that custody otherwise would not be in the best welfare and interest of the child ); Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 467 A.2d 249, 251 (N.H. 1983) (recognizing parental presumption, but making ultimate determination depend on child's best interests); Charles v. Stehlik, No. 11 WD Appeal Docket 1999, 2 000 WL 36255, at *3 (Pa. Jan. 19, 2000) (same); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823 (Wyo. 1970) (requiring unfitness or best interest of child, but in proceedings involving children of tender years it is only in very exceptional circumstances that a mother should be deprived of the care and custody of her children ). One reason the overwhelming majority of states do not apply simply the child's best interests standard, or the ubiquitous, amorphous standard urged by the dissenters, is fear that if taken to its logical conclusion, application of [that] standard 'could lead to a redistribution of the entire minor population among the worthier members of the community.' Vanessa L. Warzynski, Termination of Parental Rights: The Psychological Parent Standard, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 737, 759 (1994) (quoting Helen Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parents, 39 O. Det. L. Rev. 347, 355 (1962)). We have applied the parental preference to avoid the danger of giving courts the power to award custody . . . to [nonparents] solely on the grounds of best interests. If [that] is the only criterion, then a judge may take children from their parents because the judge personally [disapproves of] the parents' limited means. Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Alaska 1975) (citing with approval In re B.G., 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Cal. 1974)). The standard we adopt today is designed to reduce or minimize judicial opportunity to engage in social engineering in custody cases involving third parties. In contrast, under the standard urged by Justice Stein, custody would be awarded to a third party if the child's growth and development would be detrimentally affected by placement with a parent. Post at (slip op. at 42-43) (Stein, J., dissenting). It appears that he is urging a camouflaged child's best interest standard. The use of such a standard to decide custody disputes between a fit parent and a third party will evolve into a fitness contest whose outcome will depend on the whims of the trial court. Application of Justice Stein's detrimentally affected standard to this case reveals only that it might be detrimental to Chantel to be raised by Larry when compared to the Nelsons. He then concludes that the Nelsons might possibly be better parents than Larry. The danger inherent in that approach is that it permits reallocation of children by the judiciary _ a system that would undoubtedly victimize poor people. See Carolyn Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Between Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs., 149, 155 (1980). The standard that we adopt has as its benchmark the welfare of the child while at the same time protecting parental rights. LAWRENCE WATKINS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEVERLY NELSON and KEVIN M. NELSON, Defendants-Respondents. O'HERN, J., dissenting. The death of a parent must be one of the hardest things that a child can ever endure. Most of us have been spared that suffering. We can only derive a sense of that loss from works of literature such as James Agee's autobiographical novel, A Death in the Family. I fear that the Court may compound the tragedy of such a loss by creating a rule of law that will only add to the child's suffering in many circumstances. In essence, the Court holds that when a custodial parent dies, absent a showing that a surviving parent is unfit, a child will almost certainly be removed from his or her home within a very short time. Expedited hearings will be required even before the process of grieving will be ended. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 34). I believe that so rigid a rule will be harmful to children and dissent from the rule of law adopted by the Court. A premise of the Court's ruling is that constitutional law gives a biological father, perhaps long separated from the child's mother, an almost automatic right to remove the child from the home where the child may long have received nurture and comfort. Realistically, the Court holds that a child must be taken from her home and placed in the custody of a parent whom she may have rarely seen unless (1) she can show that her father is so unfit a person that his parental rights would have to be curtailed under an application of the parental termination standard, ante at ___ (slip op. at 27),See footnote 11 or (2) some person other than her deceased mother was her psychological parent. This latter circumstance is the only example given for what the Court describes as exceptional circumstances. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 28). Because this second prong will never arise in the case of the death of a single custodial mother (by definition, she is the child's parent both biological and psychological), the child of a single mother will have to be immediately removed from her home setting unless she can establish the first prong of the Court's test. To force a child to make such a case against a father, with whom she might wish to maintain a strained but evolving relationship, only adds to her suffering. The requirement of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm, ante at ___ (slip op. at 19), is another way of stating the standard for termination of parental rights, In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1 (1992), not the appropriate standard for an interim award of custody of a bereaved child. I respect the constitutional rights of a parent, but I also respect the human rights of a child. Our law has tended to view the law as a process designed to meet human needs. See Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 353 (1981) (observing that the Court's decision to allow recovery in a wrongful birth case was predicated on the needs of the living ). I believe that the focus of the inquiry when a custodial parent dies should be on the needs of the child as well as the rights of the non-custodial parent. In this respect we may draw guidance from our long experience in developing a standard by which to determine whether parental rights should be terminated. We found that the concept of best interests of the child, then contained in N.J.S.A. 30:40C-15(c) and -20, was too vague and too abstract to provide guidance. We developed a four-part test that focused on the needs of a child, specifically the need to be free from harm and to a permanent plan that will ensure that the child will remain free from harm. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986). In In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., Jr., 161 N.J. 396 (1999), this Court adapted a similar test applicable in the context of contested adoption cases to determine if the physical or mental health of the child would be harmed by continuing the relationship with a biological parent. Finally, in J.C., supra, Justice Handler explained how the breaking of bonds with a custodial figure may cause a child serious psychological or emotional harm that would justify termination of parental rights. In this case the statutory standard under N.J.S.A. 9:2-5 requires a court, when a custodial parent dies, to make such judgments and orders, from time to time, as the circumstances of the case and the benefit of the children shall require. I agree that that standard is too vague to govern the disposition of the important interests involved. In this setting, however, we deal with a much lesser intrusion on a parent's rights than termination of parental rights. Because the intrusion is lesser, the justification for intrusion may be less. The standard for governing the custody of a child whose custodial parent has died should depend on the degree of harm that a child will suffer if removed from the home surroundings and family that has until then nurtured the child. In his dissenting opinion, that I join, Justice Stein has convincingly demonstrated that constitutional requirements do not dictate a standard so inconsiderate of a child's needs as that which the Court adopts. Of what kind of harm, then, should we speak? At a conference of the New Jersey Association for Children, a keynote speaker once observed: Every child deserves a childhood. At first hearing, the expression sounds trite, but it contains a profound truth. Childhood means a combination of things but surely, for most of us, it means the warmth of love and caring from the adults in our lives, our childhood friends and that unique place that is home. (It is said that no other language has a word that conveys the same meaning as does, in our language, the word home. ) Justice Handler has explained that [i]n applying these statutory standards [governing the custody of children], we are cognizant of New Jersey's strong public policy in favor of permanency. In all our guardianship and adoption cases, the child's need for permanency and stability emerges as a central factor. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 357 (1999) (citing J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 26). And in A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 610, the Court said: If one thing is clear, it is that the child deeply needs association with a nurturing adult. Since it seems generally agreed that permanence in itself is an important part of that nurture, a court must carefully weigh that aspect of the child's life. What I know or have learned of child development convinces me that the death of a custodial parent requires a balanced consideration of the needs of the child and the right of the non custodial parent. A parent who is not legally unfit in the Title 9 senseSee footnote 22 may yet not be able to help the child cope with the enormity of the death of a parent. A twelve-year-old daughter who has been witness to years of unrest between her mother and a separated father may not be able to bear the twin losses of her mother and her childhood home with all of its memories of love, laughter, and companionship. At the time the transfer of custody was sought in this case, the father was himself still a young man. He had not completed his high school education. Realistically, he was not yet ready to be a parent. Yes, he did have the support of his wonderful family, including his parents and a sister. Thus, the choice for the court was really between two sets of equally loving grandparents and extended family members. To speak of the constitutional rights of a father as though the child had no right to the continued presence of those blood relatives who had nurtured her from birth belies the significance of the child's interest. In a recent book,See footnote 33 the author explains how on the death of his parents, which he described as like being run over by a truck, he and his brother were together able to overcome their grief. He served as parent and companion to his younger brother. In this case, the child of twelve days was so young that she would not have experienced the same grief. But the rule of law governing the death of a custodial parent must not be so inflexible as to deny a child the right to be free from the unwanted additional suffering of removal from a loving home where step-brothers, step-sisters or a grandparent may best fill the void from the loss of a parent. The courts below did not have in place the rule of law that should govern a change of custody when a custodial parent dies. I would fashion a standard that would focus on whether the child would suffer physical, psychological or emotional harm from the loss of the continued relationship with those who had until then filled the child's life and home with love. That standard would serve as well to guide the Court through its evaluation of the rights of grandparents under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 to maintain a relationship with grandchildren both when there is a death of a custodial parent or other change in relationship. The inflexible standard adopted by the Court today puts in question the constitutionality of the Grandparents' Visitation Act because it elevates the parent's right of autonomy above the child's right to be free from the harm occasioned by the loss of love and nurture of those within the child's life. In a reference to the current international debate about the return to his father of a child whose mother died en route to this country, a school psychologist writes: The assumption that [such] a child . . . would best be able to grieve and heal with his surviving parent is not borne out by the experience of many young people (letter, Feb. 5). As a New York school psychologist who has worked with immigrant children and adolescents over the last 20 years, I believe that the extent to which a child can recover from the traumatic loss of a parent largely depends upon the surviving parent's capacity for emotional contact. For many of my students, the expression of anger is not tolerated at home since it is viewed as a sign of disrespect; other parents may discourage talking about the dead relative, resulting in young children's swallowing their pain and anger. [Such a] case should not simply be decided on the ties that bind parent and child but in a way that respects his emotional needs. [Toby L. Boritz, Mourning His Mother, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2000, at A30.] I favor a rule of law that respects the emotional needs of a child who has lost a custodial parent as well as the presumptive right of a separated parent to the custody of a child. The circumstances of the case will determine whether the harm to the child caused by a change in the custodial setting should outweigh that presumption. I would remand this case to the Family Part for further proceedings in accordance with such a standard. LAWRENCE WATKINS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEVERLY NELSON and KEVIN M. NELSON, Defendants-Respondents. Argued January 18, 2000-- Decided April 6, 2000 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 321 N.J. Super 482 (1999). Joel C. Seltzer argued the cause for appellant. JoAnne Byrnes argued the cause for respondents. STEIN, J. dissenting, In its attempt to resolve this difficult custody dispute between a child's maternal grandparents and its natural father, the Court adopts too rigid a rule of law. It mandates that on the death of a parent (in this case the child's mother) custody of the affected child must immediately revert to the surviving biological parent (the father) absent sufficient proof of unfitness to justify termination of the parental rights of the father. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 13). The Court elaborates by stating that the termination of parental rights standard is satisfied only by proof of unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct or 'exceptional circumstances.' Ante at __ (slip op. at 13-14). The Court defines exceptional circumstances to include the probability of serious psychological harm to the child, ante at ____ (slip op. at 17), characterized by circumstances in which a sustained and enduring relationship between the child and the third party creates a status of psychological parenthood. Sorentino v. Family & Childrens' Soc. of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 131-32 (1976), appeal after remand, 74 N.J. 313 (1977). The Court notes that the Sorentino-type case illustrates the only recognized application of the exceptional circumstances standard in our caselaw, ante at __ (slip op. at 19), but implies that other proofs might satisfy the parental termination or exceptional circumstances standard provided that such proofs demonstrate serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm. Ante at __ (slip op. at 19). Because the Court's limited description of the non Sorentino exceptional circumstances standard uses the phrase parental termination or exceptional circumstances standard and requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm, the clear implication of the Court's holding is that trial courts in similar cases must find evidence of harm analogous to that required to terminate parental rights in order to satisfy the Court's non-Sorentino test. As this Court held in New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Serives v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604 (1986), [in termination cases] [t]he primary focus of the court should be upon harm for which there is 'unambiguous and universal social condemnation.' Developments in the Law--The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1319 (1980). Paramount examples of such condemnation are evident in the context of physical and sexual abuse. Although the Court purports to establish an exceptional circumstances basis for overriding the presumption favoring custody in the natural parent, it declines to define the full scope of the exception, stating that the scope of the exception must await case by case development. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 19). In the meantime, the Court infuses the exceptional circumstances standard with a meaning almost synonymous with the level of harm required to support termination of parental rights. The Court's standard is too inflexible. In cases like this one, in which the custody dispute is triggered by the death of a natural parent, the underlying tragedy is profound and, as Justice O'Hern observes, the Court's holding creates a rule of law that will only add to the child's suffering in many circumstances. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 1). Instead of a rigid rule of law, the Court should adopt a rule that permits trial courts to exercise sufficient discretion, as reflected by the Family Part's decision below, to avoid unnecessary detriment to an already distraught child. The Court's standard, however, would treat as insufficient evidence that a transfer of custody would cause actual detriment to the child if that evidence did not demonstrate serious harm, a prerequisite to the termination of the father's parental rights. The Court's high standard of proof, analogous to the proof required to justify termination of parental rights, is so restrictive that its relevance in assisting courts to resolve difficult custody issues is sharply circumscribed, as is illustrated by the record before us. In March 1998 the Family Part, after an extensive hearing, determined that physical custody of Chantel Ivonne Watkins Murphy, born August 15, 1996, whose mother Megan Murphy, age seventeen, died twelve days after her birth, should remain with Beverly and Kevin Nelson, the maternal grandparents with whom Chantel had resided since birth. The father, Lawrence E. Watkins, Jr., nineteen years old when Chantel was born, was awarded visitation from Friday to Sunday evenings. The Family Part's disposition indicated that although Larry had a warm and loving family that was available to assist him in caring for Chantel, the court was concerned about Larry's maturity. The court noted that Larry, at age twenty, had only recently graduated from high school and attempted during trial to obscure his educational background. The court expressed concerns about his limited job experiences, noting that he recently had held four different jobs for no longer than a few months each. The court expressed concern about the testimony of Larry's parents indicating their intent to sell their home and retire to North Carolina, in the context of Larry's testimony that if they relocated he would buy another home and remain in New Jersey. The court also noted that Larry's limited child support of twenty-five dollars weekly, his unwillingness to pick-up Chantel for his weekly visitation or to visit her at the Nelson house, and his failure to notice or participate with the Nelsons in treating Chantel's hypotonia condition (overly flexible joints) and slow development, were in contrast with the Nelson's recognition of Chantel's problem and early intervention to rectify it. In short, ample evidence in the record existed to support a determination by the Family Part that an immediate transfer of custody to Larry could result in actual detriment to Chantel because that evidence caused the court to have serious doubt about Larry's competence, in the event his parents were unavailable, to provide the special level of care that Chantel required. Although the Family Part applied a different standard, I agree with Justice O'Hern's observation that [t]he standard for governing the custody of a child whose custodial parent has died should depend on the degree of harm that a child will suffer if removed from the home surroundings and family that has until then nurtured the child. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 5). In my view, under that standard, ample evidence in the record would have supported the Family Part's award of physical custody to the Nelsons. The Court's decision to now award immediate custody to Larry within seven days, ante at ___ (slip op. at 32), without any knowledge of intervening events over the past two years, does not address responsibly or comprehensively the difficult issues posed by this appeal. Nor does the Court's opinion acknowledge that under its own characterization of the exceptional circumstances standard, the Nelsons may now be able to establish a psychological parenthood status that would trigger a best interest standard for determining custody. A remand to the Family Part to make findings concerning the relevant facts and circumstances that should today control an award of custody would be a more balanced and appropriate resolution of this appeal, and would avoid prematurely uprooting the child before custody is finally resolved. I On August 27, 1996 seventeen-year-old Megan Murphy ( Megan ) was killed in a tragic automobile accident. Her twelve-day-old daughter, Chantel Ivonne Watkins-Murphy ( Chantel ), survived the accident. Lawrence Watkins, Jr. ( Larry ), Chantel's father, was nineteen when Megan was killed. Larry and Megan had been dating for less than a year and had no plans to marry or live together at the time of the accident. At the time of Megan's untimely death, Megan and Chantel were living with Megan's mother, Beverly Nelson, and her stepfather, Kevin Nelson (the Nelsons ). The Nelsons had begun making plans to care for Megan and Chantel in their home when they learned that Megan was pregnant eight months earlier. Mrs. Nelson had postponed her continuing education to stay home and care for Chantel while Megan completed high school. On September 4, 1996 the Nelsons filed a complaint for temporary guardianship of Chantel and for a determination of the paternity status of Larry. At an October 3, 1996 hearing the Chancery Division, Probate Part granted temporary guardianship to the Nelsons, primarily because Larry's paternity was in doubt. The Probate Part noted that [i]t is not in the best interests of this child to be treated like a yo-yo and allowed the Nelsons to retain temporary custody of Chantel. The Probate Part informed Larry that if he established paternity and showed that he had adequate resources to take care of [Chantel], then he would have the first obligation and right to take care of [her]. Because the Chancery Division, Family Part was the proper forum for determining custody, the Probate Part made no determination concerning whether Larry should be granted custody of Chantel. The Probate Part suggested that Larry file an application for a determination of paternity and a complaint for permanent custody with the Family Case Management Office if Larry chose to seek permanent custody of Chantel. In an October 8, 1996 letter, however, the Probate Part acknowledged that there was no basis for requiring Larry to prove his paternity because Larry already had executed a Certificate of Parentage in accordance with N.J.S.A. 9:17-41. The Probate Part reiterated in that letter its decision to award the Nelsons temporary guardianship pending the Family Part's custody determination. One week later, Larry filed an answer to the Nelsons' complaint seeking guardianship and filed a counterclaim seeking permanent custody of his daughter. A temporary custody hearing was held in April 1997. Through counsel, Larry objected to negotiating a possible compromise through mediation. Therefore, the matter was transferred from the Probate Part to the Family Part. In May 1997, the Family Part judge ordered both parties to attend Hunterdon County custody/visitation mediation program in order to address the issue of custody. Larry did not attend the mediation orientation and did not complete a questionnaire provided by the Family Case Management Office. In August 1997, the court found Larry in violation of litigant's rights for failing to attend court-ordered custody mediation and ordered both parties' counsel to provide the Family Part with briefs addressing the issue of custody under the present circumstances. The court also ordered a plenary hearing to be scheduled to address the custody issue. The plenary trial to determine which party would be granted permanent custody of Chantel was held over four days in December 1997 and January 1998. Lawrence Watkins, Sr., Larry's father, testified that he picked up Chantel almost every weekend for her visits with the Watkins family and that Chantel's visits with the Watkins' lasted from Saturday morning until Sunday evening or afternoon. Mr. Watkins said that Larry did not pick up Chantel for her weekend visits with the Watkins because there was some conflict between Larry and Mrs. Nelson. He said that Chantel was very close to her father. Mr. Watkins testified that Larry contributed twenty-five dollars per week to the Nelsons in support of Chantel. Larry's sister and mother both testified that Larry expressed a strong desire to have permanent custody of Chantel. Larry also testified in support of his claim for permanent custody of Chantel. Larry described his current employment with the Alternative Design company, where he was participating in a management training program. He had started the program two weeks prior to trial and was to be paid $250 to $300 a week until the program was completed. Larry testified that after the management training program was completed, he would earn $30,000 a year. Prior to working for Alternative Design, Larry had worked for two months in the warehouse of a computer company as an inventory clerk. Prior to that, Larry worked for about two months in a temporary position unloading trucks for Lord and Taylor. Larry's other work experience was at Lechter's department store during high school. In order to care for Chantel while he was working, Larry planned to drop off Chantel at his cousin's home because his cousin had experience baby sitting for children in the neighborhood. Larry's cousin operated her own daycare service and lived two houses away from the Watkins on the same block. Larry stated that he was agitated by disagreements between himself and Mrs. Nelson concerning the possession of some of Megan's personal items, and relating to the religious differences between the Nelsons, who are Roman Catholics, and Larry, who is a non-practicing Jehovah's Witness. Larry wanted the Nelsons to maintain a relationship with Chantel as grandparents and felt that they do have to be a part of her life, but he did not believe that Chantel should be exposed to the Nelsons' religious beliefs and holiday celebrations. Larry acknowledged that he did not notice that Chantel had special developmental needs. Larry did not participate in the bi-monthly sessions of the early intervention program designed to address her hypotonia condition and slow development. Larry's mother and aunt attended the initial evaluation session of the early intervention program, but because the sessions were held during the middle of the day no member of the Watkins family participated in the early intervention program at Hunterdon Medical Center. Larry testified that he had spoken to his parents about their plans to retire and move to North Carolina. When asked what he would do if his parents were to move to North Carolina, Larry described his plans: Q. And what would you do if they were to go to The trial court noted the presumption in favor of the natural parent's superior right to custody, but recognized that that rule should not be followed in all situations. The trial court characterized the Nelsons as psychological parents and concluded that Beverly and Kevin Nelson stand in the shoes of their deceased daughter Megan and are in parity with Lawrence Watkins Jr., thus the best interest standard should apply. The trial court determined that awarding custody to the Nelsons was in the best interest of Chantel. The court noted that the Nelsons had noticed Chantel's hypotonia and had taken immediate steps to treat her condition. The court further noted that the Nelsons' family environment was stable in comparison to Larry, a twenty-year old with limited work experience who lived with his parents. The court was concerned with the support that Larry could provide Chantel and characterized his relationship with Chantel as one of play, and not much other responsibility. The court found it was significant that Larry's parents were contemplating retiring in North Carolina and that they may not be available in the future to assist their son. The court questioned Larry's maturity level and did not believe that Larry could care for Chantel on his own. The court found that the Nelsons would make Chantel aware of her biracial and mixed religious background because they had experience dealing with those issues with one of their adopted daughters. The court noted the lack of communication between Larry and the Nelsons and was concerned with the possibility that Larry and his family would discourage contact with the Nelsons and thereby deprive Chantel access to half of her heritage. Therefore, the court concluded that Chantel's physical and mental welfare will be better protected in the Nelson household. The court ordered the current weekend visitation schedule, which had been expanded to include Friday evenings, to remain in effect and awarded legal and residential custody to the Nelsons. Larry filed a Notice of Appeal in April 1998. In July 1998 the Nelsons filed a Notice of Motion to set Larry's child support, fix a visitation schedule, and require Larry to submit to genetic testing to determine whether he is the biological father. Larry filed a certification on July 10, 1998 in response to the Nelsons' Notice of Motion, stating that he was presently unemployed because his temporary job had ended, but that he was looking for a new job and expect[ed] to have a new job in about two weeks. Larry also opposed any change in the visitation schedule unless it provided him additional time with Chantel. Larry expressed resentment at the Nelsons' continued attempt to require him to be genetically tested to determine if he was the biological father of Chantel. The Family Part denied the Nelsons' motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Part's disposition because the trial court appl[ied] the correct legal principles to fact findings that are clearly supported by substantial credible evidence. Watkins v. Nelson, 321 N.J. Super. 482, 484 (1999). The Appellate Division deferred to the trial court's conclusions that the Nelsons are Chantel's psychological parents, and . . . that as between [Larry] and the Nelsons, Chantel's best interest requires that custody remain with the Nelsons. Id. at 485. The Appellate Division quoted extensively from the trial court's letter opinion and cited the ample precedent for granting custody to a psychological parent where that is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 493. The Appellate Division noted that [u]nfitness is not the issue here. No one suggests that Watkins is an unfit parent. Rather the trial judge concluded that the The Richards Court held that in a controversy over the custody of a child, the child's welfare will be the paramount consideration in controlling the discretion of the court. The strict right of the parent will be passed by, if a judgment in observance of such right would substitute a worse for a better custodian. Id. at 287-88 (emphasis added). At the dawning of the twentieth century, child welfare became a recognized social science and the concept of parental obligations as an outgrowth of divinely conferred paternal ownership and control of children had given way to that of parental trusteeship in the child's "best interests." This transformation reflected changing ideas about the relation of the individual to the state in a democratic republic, where individual liberty was the value most highly prized. . . . longer plan to leave New Jersey, but that information was not in the record before the Family Part). In contrast, the Family Part was favorably impressed with both Beverly and Kevin Nelson and their parenting skills. The court emphasized the significance of the Nelsons' early recognition of Chantel's developmental problems and their initiative in enrolling her in an intervention program at Hunterdon Medical Center. The court also noted with approval the Nelson family's reinforcement of [Chantel's] learning processes. The court also emphasized the findings of Dr. Clyman who evaluated Chantel's interaction with the Nelsons, observing that Dr. Clyman found Chantel to be fully integrated into the Nelson family, that is, not only with Beverly and Kevin, but with Jessica, Emily and Dorothy as well. The court referred to Dr. Clyman's observation that Chantel was happily adjusted, well behaved and easily reacted with her siblings. The Family Part, relying on Zack v. Fiebert, supra, 235 N.J. Super. 424 and Hoy v. Willis, supra, 165 N.J. Super. 265, concluded that the Nelsons functioned as psychological parents to Chantel and therefore stand in the shoes of their deceased daughter Megan and are in parity with Lawrence E. Watkins Jr., thus the best interest standard should apply. Based on that standard, the court concluded that Chantel's physical and mental welfare will be better preserved in the Nelson household. They have already demonstrated an ability to discover problems and immediately deal with them. Because Chantel was only sixteen months old at the commencement of the plenary hearing, and no expert testimony was offered on the issue of whether a psychological parenting relationship existed between the Nelsons and Chantel, see Sorentino I, supra, 72 N.J. at 133, the Family Part's conclusion that a psychological parenting relationship existed is unpersuasive. Accordingly, its use of a best interests standard in making the custody award to the Nelsons undoubtedly was inappropriate. Nevertheless, that court's findings and conclusions clearly would have supported the same custody determination under the more stringent standard that I propose, based on the evidence that Chantel's growth and development would have been detrimentally affected by placement with Larry. The Family Part clearly expressed its view that Larry had not demonstrated that, without assistance from his parents, he was capable of assuming full responsibility for the care and supervision of Chantel. Accordingly, the evidence and the court's findings supported the Family Part's custody award, notwithstanding that it applied an inappropriate standard. More than two years have elapsed since the custody hearing. Chantel is now more than three and one-half years old and has resided with the Nelsons since birth. This Court is uninformed about the events that have occurred since the custody hearing with respect to the Nelsons, Larry and Chantel. Under those circumstances, a reversal of the custody award made in March 1998, combined with an immediate unsupervised transfer of custody to Larry, is manifestly inappropriate. That disposition poses a significant and unnecessary risk to Chantel's interests. In my view, the appropriate result is to remand this matter for a new custody determination by the Family Part. On remand the Nelsons would be free to offer proof through expert testimony that they presently have established a psychological parenting relationship with Chantel. If the court so finds, a best interest standard can be applied in making the award of physical custody and visitation. Absent such a finding, the court should award custody to Larry unless it determines that he is unfit or that the award of custody to him would be likely to cause actual detriment to Chantel's growth and development. Justice O'Hern joins in this opinion. NO. A-11 LAWRENCE WATKINS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEVERLY NELSON and KEVIN M. NELSON, Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED April 6 , 2000 Chief Justice Poritz