Title: M.R. v. Niesen

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
M.R. v. Niesen, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1130.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1130 
M.R., A CINCINNATI POLICE OFFICER, APPELLEE, v. NIESEN ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as M.R. v. Niesen, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1130.] 
Mootness—Temporary restraining orders—Civ.R. 65(A)—It is this court’s duty to 
decide only actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by 
specific facts—Because the temporary restraining order at issue was no 
longer in effect, the appeal of the order was moot—For purposes of the 
exception to the mootness doctrine for issues that are capable of repetition 
yet evading review, it is not enough for an issue to be capable of repetition 
between some parties; the issue must be capable of repetition between the 
same parties—Cause dismissed as moot. 
(No. 2020-1131—Submitted November 9, 2021—Decided April 6, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-200302, 
2020-Ohio-4368. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} A common pleas court issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 
prohibiting Julie Niesen, Terhas White, and others from publishing the personal 
identifying information of Ryan Olthaus, a Cincinnati police officer.  We are asked 
to decide whether a speech-restraining TRO is immediately appealable.  But that 
issue must be left for another day because the TRO has expired and this appeal is 
moot. 
I.  Background 
A.  Olthaus is accused of being a white supremacist and sues his accusers 
{¶ 2} Olthaus filed a civil complaint against Niesen, White, and several 
others in the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court.  The complaint alleged that in 
the summer of 2020, Olthaus was providing security and crowd control for a public 
forum at a Cincinnati City Council committee meeting.  At the meeting, a large crowd 
of citizens called for the city to defund the police.  At one point Olthaus made the 
hand signal for “okay.”  Some in the crowd interpreted this gesture as a symbol of 
white supremacy.  Among them were Niesen and White, who quickly posted on 
social media calling Olthaus a white supremacist. 
{¶ 3} After Niesen, White, and others accused Olthaus of being a white 
supremacist, Olthaus sued them for defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, and 
other claims.  Olthaus sought to proceed under a pseudonym and to file an affidavit 
under seal.  (In State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Shanahan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2022-Ohio-448, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 43, this court held that he could not proceed 
anonymously.)  Olthaus also sought a TRO and a preliminary injunction compelling 
Niesen, White, and others to refrain from posting, and to remove, social-media 
posts referring to him as a white supremacist and restraining them from publishing 
his personal identifying information. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
B.  The common pleas court grants a temporary restraining order 
{¶ 4} On July 24, 2020, the common pleas court held a hearing at which all 
the parties were present.  The court had planned to use the hearing to resolve 
Olthaus’s request for a preliminary injunction, but neither side was ready to move 
forward on that matter.  Instead, the parties asked the court to resolve Olthaus’s 
request for a TRO and to reschedule the preliminary-injunction hearing for a later 
date.  The court agreed to do so and proceeded with a hearing on the TRO.  
Following the hearing, the court declined to order the defendants to remove their 
social-media posts, but it did issue a TRO restraining Niesen, White, and another 
defendant from publicly disseminating Olthaus’s personal identifying information.  
The court then set a preliminary-injunction hearing for July 30.  However, that date 
was later moved to August 11 at the request of both sides to allow additional time 
to conduct discovery. 
{¶ 5} On August 11, 18 days after the TRO was entered, the common pleas 
court reconvened to conduct the preliminary-injunction hearing.  But before any 
witness could be called, White objected to going forward and asked for additional 
time.  The court granted that request and reset the hearing for September 1, telling 
the parties that the TRO would remain in place in the meantime.  However, the 
court did not issue an order to that effect until August 13, when it entered an order 
vacating the TRO as to a different defendant.  The court stated in that order that the 
TRO would remain in effect as to all the other defendants. 
{¶ 6} The following week, Niesen and White appealed the TRO.  They filed 
their notice of appeal on August 18, 25 days after the common pleas court had 
entered the TRO.  The First District Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the 
TRO was not a final, appealable order.  2020-Ohio-4368, ¶ 13.  Niesen and White 
appealed to this court, submitting that a court-imposed prior restraint on speech is 
immediately appealable, and this court accepted jurisdiction.  See 161 Ohio St.3d 
1406, 2021-Ohio-106, 161 N.E.3d 683. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4 
II.  Analysis 
A.  This appeal has a mootness problem 
{¶ 7} To be sure, Niesen and White advance serious arguments that a TRO 
that acts as a prior restraint on speech should be immediately appealable.  But 
before this court can address the merits of their appeal, we must be sure that there 
remains an “actual controvers[y],” Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 257 
N.E.2d 371 (1970); see also Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1 (limiting this 
court’s authority to the “judicial power”).  If the controversy has come and gone, 
then this court must dismiss the case as moot.  See Travis v. Pub. Util. Comm., 123 
Ohio St. 355, 175 N.E. 586 (1931), paragraph two of the syllabus; Miner v. Witt, 
82 Ohio St. 237, 238-239, 92 N.E. 21 (1910). 
{¶ 8} The requirements for and scope of a TRO are governed by Civ.R. 
65(A).  That rule provides that a TRO 
  
shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 
fourteen days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the 
order, for good cause shown, is extended for one like period or 
unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it 
may be extended for a longer period.  The reasons for the extension 
shall be set forth in the order of extension. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 9} The TRO in question was entered on July 24, 2020.  The common 
pleas court did not issue an order to renew the TRO until August 13, 20 days after 
the TRO was first entered.  But by that time the TRO had already expired, and under 
the plain terms of Civ.R. 65(A), the court lacked authority to extend the TRO.  A 
TRO may only be extended “within the time so fixed” by the original TRO.  
(Emphasis added.)  Id.  The TRO did not include an expiration date, but its duration 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
could not exceed 14 days from the entry.  See id.  Thus, the TRO expired on August 
8, 2020.  And even if one accepts the dubious premise that the trial court’s August 
13 order somehow extended a TRO that had already expired, the extended TRO 
would have expired on August 27, 2020. 
{¶ 10} Courts do not review cases that no longer present live controversies.  
Tschantz v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 566 N.E.2d 655 (1991).  Because 
the TRO at issue is no longer in effect, the appeal of the TRO is moot.  See State ex 
rel. Pfeiffer v. Columbus Inn & Suites, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-132, 2014-
Ohio-4358, ¶ 40 (“Once the TRO expired, the controversy surrounding the entry of 
that order became moot”); see also State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Cty. 
Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 26, 512 N.E.2d 332 (1987), fn. 2. 
B.  This appeal does not fall under any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine 
{¶ 11} None of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine save this appeal 
from dismissal.  The closest any exception comes to being applicable is the one for 
issues that are capable of repetition yet evading review, but it too does not apply.  
An issue is capable of repetition yet evading review if “ ‘(1) the challenged action 
is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, 
and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be 
subjected to the same action again.’ ”  United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, ___ U.S. 
___, ___, 138 S.Ct. 1532, 1540, 200 L.Ed.2d 792 (2018), quoting Turner v. Rogers, 
564 U.S. 431, 439-440, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011); see also State ex 
rel. Bechtel v. Cornachio, 164 Ohio St.3d 579, 2021-Ohio-1121, 174 N.E.3d 744, 
¶ 11; State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 231, 729 N.E.2d 
1182 (2000).  The first element is easily satisfied, as it is the rarest of cases that can 
be fully litigated in a matter of weeks.  The second element, however, has not been 
satisfied. 
{¶ 12} It is not enough for an issue to be capable of repetition between some 
parties; the issue must be capable of repetition between the “same” parties.  Id.  That 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
6 
means that for the exception to apply, there must be a reasonable expectation of 
repeated actions between Olthaus and Niesen and White concerning the issue.  But 
it is beyond unlikely that this issue will repeat itself between these parties.  The 
TRO has already expired and can no longer be renewed.  See Civ.R. 65(A).  And 
in Shanahan, this court determined that Olthaus may not proceed anonymously and 
must proceed under his proper name.  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-448, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 43.  So there is no real possibility that this controversy will reoccur: 
any further effort by Olthaus to prevent the defendants from identifying him would 
be futile. 
{¶ 13} It is our duty to only “decide actual controversies between parties 
legitimately affected by specific facts.”  Fortner, 22 Ohio St.2d at 14, 257 N.E.2d 
371.  Because the TRO at issue has expired, this appeal no longer concerns an actual 
controversy.  Accordingly, this court is duty bound to dismiss this appeal as moot. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 14} Because the TRO at issue expired long ago, we dismiss this matter as 
moot.  We further order that the court of appeals’ decision in this case, 2020-Ohio-
4368, not be cited as precedent, except by the parties inter se. 
Cause dismissed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Gottesman & Associates, L.L.C., and Zachary Gottesman; and Crehan & 
Thumann, L.L.C., and Robert J. Thumann, for appellee. 
Laursen & Mellott, L.L.C., and Erik W. Laursen, for appellant Julie Niesen. 
Kinsley Law Office and Jennifer M. Kinsley, for appellant Terhas White. 
Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson Co., L.P.A., and Jeffrey M. Nye, urging reversal 
for amici curiae law professors Jonathan Entin, David F. Forte, Andrew Geronimo, 
Raymond Ku, Stephen Lazarus, Kevin Francis O’Neill, Margaret Christine 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
Tarkington, Aaron H. Caplan, and Eugene Volokh; National Writers Union; 
Society of Professional Journalists; NewsGuild-CWA; Euclid Media Group; First 
Amendment Lawyers Association; and Institute for Free Speech. 
Frantz Ward, L.L.P., Thomas G. Haren, and Gregory R. Farkas, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Ohio Coalition for Open Government, Ohio News Media 
Association, and Ohio Association of Broadcasters. 
_________________