Title: Ex parte John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for D.P., a minor child

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: October 14, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
_________________________ 
 
1210248 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for G.A., a minor 
child   
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
CIVIL APPEALS  
 
(In re: H.P.  
 
v.  
 
Jefferson County Department of Human Resources) 
 
(Jefferson Juvenile Court: JU-18-1718.02;  
Court of Civil Appeals: 2200469) 
_________________________ 
 
1210250 
_________________________ 
 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
2 
 
Ex parte John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for D.P., a minor 
child   
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
CIVIL APPEALS  
 
(In re: H.P.  
 
v.  
 
Jefferson County Department of Human Resources) 
 
(Jefferson Juvenile Court: JU-18-1716.02;  
Court of Civil Appeals: 2200467) 
_________________________ 
 
1210251 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for M.P., a minor 
child   
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
CIVIL APPEALS  
 
(In re: H.P.  
 
v.  
 
Jefferson County Department of Human Resources) 
 
(Jefferson Juvenile Court: JU-18-1717.02;  
Court of Civil Appeals: 2200468) 
 
PER CURIAM. 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
3 
 
John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for G.A., D.P., and M.P. ("the 
children"), has filed three separate petitions for the writ of certiorari, one 
on each child's behalf, regarding a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals 
reversing judgments of the Jefferson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") 
that terminated the parental rights of H.P. ("the mother") to the children.  
See H.P. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. 2200467, Oct. 8, 
2021] ____ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).  We granted the 
petitions, and, for the reasons explained below, we reverse the judgments 
of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand these cases for further 
proceedings. 
Background 
 
 
In June 2020, the Jefferson County Department of Human 
Resources ("DHR") filed separate petitions seeking the termination of the 
mother's parental rights to the children.  The Court of Civil Appeals' 
decision set out the following pertinent factual summary: 
 
"The mother herself had been adopted out of foster care 
as a result of her biological mother's drug abuse.  When the 
mother was 16 years old, she left her adoptive home and 
reunited with her biological mother; her biological mother 
introduced the mother to drugs at that time.  The mother gave 
birth to her first child at the age of 16.  The mother testified 
that DHR initially became involved with her family in October 
2018 when she and D.P. tested positive for amphetamines at 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
4 
 
his birth.  Although it had been recommended in November 
2018 that she attend intensive outpatient drug-rehabilitation 
classes, the mother admitted that she had failed to complete 
those classes.  The mother testified that she had been arrested 
in 2019 for possession of a forged instrument and had been 
ordered to complete 14 months' probation.  She testified that 
she had participated in Family Wellness Court in 2019 but 
that she had been dismissed from that program in October 
2019 for testing positive for marijuana and amphetamines; 
she was ordered to complete inpatient drug-rehabilitation 
treatment at that time but did not do so. 
 
 
"Kenya Franklin, who is a case manager for the 
comprehensive addiction and pregnancy ('CAP') program at 
the University of Alabama at Birmingham, testified that the 
mother had been referred to the CAP program in March 2020 
and that it had been recommended at that time that the 
mother complete inpatient drug-rehabilitation treatment. 
Franklin testified that the mother had decided to attend 
outpatient treatment instead and had not been compliant. 
 
 
"The mother testified that she had been arrested in the 
fall of 2020 for possession of marijuana and a pipe.  Franklin 
testified that the mother had completed a drug assessment in 
October 2020 and that it was again recommended that the 
mother attend inpatient drug-rehabilitation treatment.  In 
November 2020, the mother was admitted to an inpatient 
treatment program at Aletheia House. 
 
 
"The mother testified that, through her inpatient 
treatment at Aletheia House, she had been prescribed 
medications for her mental health and had stopped using 
illegal drugs.  She admitted that she was unable to care for 
the children at the time of the trial and testified that she 
wanted them to stay temporarily with the foster parents, 
whom she considered to be her godparents and with whom she 
and the children had a relationship even before they became 
the children's foster parents.1 Aletheia House employees 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
5 
 
transport the mother to visits with the children.  The mother 
expressed a desire to care for the children once she has 
completed her treatment and has utilized the resources at 
Aletheia House to obtain housing and employment. 
 
 
"Franklin testified that she had noticed a change in the 
mother in November 2020.  According to Franklin, the mother 
seemed to be taking responsibility for her actions and making 
better choices; she testified that the mother has matured and 
has self-control.  Franklin testified that, at the time of trial, 
the mother was 'on a right track ... and [that,] if she continues 
to make appropriate choices, good choices, and utilizes the 
resources and support that she has with CAP and Family 
Wellness and Aletheia House,' she can be successful.  She 
testified that she had no reason to think that the mother 
would not continue doing those things.  Katie Day, the 
mother's therapist at Aletheia House, testified that the 
mother had been compliant with the program and had tested 
negative on all drug screens other than on tests when she first 
entered the program.  Day testified that the mother had made 
much progress in the two months she had been in the program 
and that she considered the mother to be at a low risk for 
relapse. 
 
"___________________ 
 
 
"1The mother testified that the foster parents had been 
'hurt' by her because of her drug use but that she wanted to 
make amends to them.  She testified that she is grateful to 
them for caring for the children." 
 
H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____. 
 
 
After conducting a trial in February 2021, the juvenile court 
entered separate, but almost identical, judgments terminating the 
mother's parental rights to the children.  At the time of the trial, the 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
6 
 
children were six years old, three years old, and two years old, 
respectively.  They had been in foster care for more than two years. 
 
As quoted in the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, the juvenile 
court's judgments provided the following pertinent analysis: 
"'The mother ... testified that she is currently residing 
at Aletheia House, an inpatient substance abuse treatment 
facility and has been inpatient since November 25, 2020.  
Before this[,] she lived many other places including with her 
sister in a housing project, a van in a parking lot[,] and with 
the [children's] maternal grandmother.  The maternal 
grandmother has a long history with substance abuse[,] and 
when the mother and maternal grandmother are together it 
is very disruptive and is a trigger for the mother to use.  [The 
mother] has never had her own housing.  She has worked 
multiple jobs but [has] not work[ed] at any one job more than 
four months. 
 
 
 
 
"'[The] Mother currently has ... criminal court cases 
pending involving marijuana and a pipe that was found on or 
near her. 
 
"'The [children have] been in foster care since October 
2018.  [The] Mother was ordered to participate in Wellness 
Court (Drug Court) but was unsuccessful; [to] participate in 
mental health treatment but has not; [to] obtain stable 
housing and employment but has not; [to undergo] random 
drug screening but has not until recently; and to participate 
in a parenting skills course in which she has received a 
certificate of completion.  [The] Mother states that she has 
provided the name of relatives to [DHR] willing to take 
custody of her child[ren].  [The] Mother states that she 
participated in the CAP [comprehensive addiction and 
pregnancy] program, which is a program to assist pregnant 
women with substance use problems but [tested] positive at 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
7 
 
th[e] birth of [J.P., the mother's fourth] child[,] and custody of 
that child was removed and is in the custody of family friends. 
 
"'[The] Mother states that her last drug use was in 
November 2020.  She is currently on the medicated assisted 
treatment[,] and she states that her mind is clear today. 
 
"'Ma[rn]ika Brown was the next witness who is the 
[DHR] social worker.  She states that there is no legal father 
for [any of the children].  [The] mother has provided no 
financial support or any items for the child[ren]'s day to day 
needs.  [The] Mother has had many opportunities to complete 
services but unfortunately has not complied.  [The] mother is 
currently in inpatient treatment and is doing well but has 
only been in the program approximately three months.  
Adoption by current foster parents is the case plan. 
 
"'[Brown] did investigate the mother's sister ... as a 
possible relative resource[,] but she had no employment[,] and 
the home was not appropriate. [DHR] knows of no other 
services that can be offered to the mother. 
 
"'During the second day of trial, the Court learned that 
the [children were] placed with a foster family, who [are] also 
… friend[s] of the family.  At the close of case, the Court 
requested the [DHR] social worker, Ms. Brown, to talk to the 
foster family to determine if they desired to obtain full legal 
custody or if their intention was to adopt the child[ren].  Ms. 
Brown did talk to them, [and] their desire was to continue to 
provide foster parenting and eventually adopt if termination 
of parental rights were to occur. 
 
"'Katie Day was the next witness who is the mother's 
therapist at Aletheia[] House.  She reports that [the] mother 
has been in the program since the end of November 2020.  
[The mother's] treatment plan is working on her co-
dependency, stress management, confidence in herself, 
parenting skills and mental health. [The mother] is compliant 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
8 
 
with meeting her treatment plan and goals.  [Day] states that 
[the mother] came to Aletheia House because of her legal 
issues regarding substance abuse and [DHR] involvement 
with her child[ren].  The program is on average a ninety[-]day 
program but it is likely that [the mother] will be there four to 
five months. 
 
"'Kenya Franklin testified that she is a case worker for 
the CAP Program.  [The] mother had participated in the 
program while she was pregnant with [J.P.,] her fourth child. 
...  [U]nfortunately, [the] mother was not compliant[,] and her 
fourth child was removed due to continued substance use, but 
she has continued to work with the mother.  She states that 
[the] mother has done well at Aletheia House in that she is 
clean, she has matured, shows better self[-]control and is 
making better decisions. 
 
"'Having considered the ore tenus testimony and 
evidence offered on the hearing date, the Court finds that the 
Petition[s] to Terminate Parental Rights [are] due to be 
GRANTED. 
 
"'This Court specifically finds that there is clear and 
convincing evidence, competent, relevant, and material in 
nature that the mother, ... and/or any unknown fathers, are 
not willing or able to discharge their responsibilities to and 
for the minor child[ren]; that the conduct or condition of the 
mother and any unknown fathers renders them unable to 
properly care for the minor child[ren] and that said conduct 
or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
 
"'The Court further finds that there are no viable 
alternatives to Termination of Parental Rights and no 
potential relative resources available for the permanent 
placement of [the children].  This Court finds [a]doptive 
resources have been identified for the minor child[ren].  In 
making the foregoing finding, the Court has considered the 
factors set forth in [§] 12-15-319(a)[, Ala. Code 1975].'" 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
9 
 
 
H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____. 
 
 
The mother filed a postjudgment motion in each action, and the 
juvenile court denied each postjudgment motion.  The mother appealed 
from each of the juvenile court's judgments to the Court of Civil Appeals.  
The Court of Civil Appeals consolidated the appeals ex mero motu. 
On appeal, the mother argued that the evidence presented 
regarding her current circumstances at the time of trial did not clearly 
and convincingly prove that she was unable to care for the children and 
that it was unlikely that she would be able to do so in the foreseeable 
future.  She also argued that maintaining the status quo was a viable 
alternative to termination of her parental rights.  The Court of Civil 
Appeals agreed with the mother on both points and reversed the juvenile 
court's judgments and remanded the cases for the entry of judgments 
consistent with its opinion.  H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____.  Presiding Judge 
Thompson 
authored 
a 
dissent, 
which 
Judge Edwards joined.  
 
Bodie thereafter filed three separate petitions for the writ of 
certiorari in this Court, one on each child's behalf, and we granted the 
petitions, and consolidated these cases, to examine whether the Court of 
Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with a portion of this Court's decision in 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
10 
 
Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767 (Ala. 2008).  For the reasons explained 
below, we reverse the Court of Civil Appeals' judgments and remand 
these cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Standard of Review 
 
"In reviewing the Court of Civil Appeals' decision on a 
petition for the writ of certiorari, 'this Court "accords no 
presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the 
intermediate appellate court.  Therefore, we must apply de 
novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court 
of Civil Appeals."'  Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 
303, 308 (Ala. 2005)(quoting Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 
So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996))." 
 
Ex parte Wade, 957 So. 2d 477, 481 (Ala. 2006).   
"'"[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, its findings 
on disputed facts are presumed correct and its judgment 
based on those findings will not be reversed unless the 
judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust."'  
Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005)(quoting 
Philpot v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002))." 
 
Ex parte Butcher, 297 So. 3d 442, 447 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019).  "'"'The ore 
tenus rule is grounded upon the principle that when the trial court hears 
oral testimony it has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and 
credibility of witnesses.'  Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala. 
1986)."'"  Id. (quoting Spencer v. Spencer, 258 So. 3d 326, 327 (Ala. 2018), 
quoting in turn Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
11 
 
791, 795 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Raidt v. Crane, 342 So. 2d 358, 360 
(Ala. 1977)). 
Analysis 
 
"In order to terminate an individual's parental rights, 
the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that 
the child is dependent and that an alternative less drastic 
than the termination of parental rights is not available.  § 12-
15-319, Ala. Code 1975; Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950, 952 
(Ala. 1990)." 
 
Ex parte A.S., 73 So. 3d 1223, 1228 (Ala. 2011). 
 
 
In his certiorari petitions, Bodie argued that the Court of Civil 
Appeals' decision conflicts with a portion of this Court's decision in Ex 
parte McInish.  Specifically, Bodie argued that the Court of Civil Appeals 
did not appropriately apply the following principles pertinent to the 
appropriate standard of review: 
"'[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a 
judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in 
which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial 
court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-
finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly 
establish the fact sought to be proved.  Even if an appellate 
court in considering the evidence of record would reach its 
own conclusion that the evidence presented does not clearly 
and convincingly establish the fact sought to be proved, it is 
not for that court to act upon its own factual determination 
but to determine instead whether the fact-finder below 
reasonably could have made a different finding based on the 
same evidence.'" 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
12 
 
Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d at 776 (quoting KGS Steel, Inc. v. McInish, 
47 So. 3d 749, 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)(Murdock, J., concurring in the 
result)). 
 
On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals cited the following provisions 
of § 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975, in articulating the pertinent grounds 
for termination of the mother's parental rights: 
 
"(a) If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing 
evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that 
the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge 
their responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct 
or condition of the parents renders them unable to properly 
care for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely 
to change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the 
parental rights of the parents.  In a hearing on a petition for 
termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the 
best interests of the child.  In determining whether or not the 
parents are unable or unwilling to discharge their 
responsibilities to and for the child and to terminate the 
parental rights, the juvenile court shall consider the following 
factors including, but not limited to, the following: 
 
 
".... 
 
 
"(2) Emotional illness, mental illness, or mental 
deficiency of the parent, or excessive use of alcohol or 
controlled substances, of a duration or nature as to render the 
parent unable to care for the needs of the child. 
 
 
".... 
 
 
"(7) That reasonable efforts by the Department of 
Human Resources or licensed public or private child care 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
13 
 
agencies leading toward the rehabilitation of the parents have 
failed. 
 
 
".... 
 
 
"(12) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust his or her 
circumstances to meet the needs of the child in accordance 
with agreements reached, including agreements reached with 
local departments of human resources or licensed child-
placing agencies, in an administrative review or a judicial 
review. 
 
 
"(13) The existence of any significant emotional ties that 
have developed between the child and his or her current foster 
parent or parents, with additional consideration given to the 
following factors: 
 
 
"a. The length of time that the child has lived 
in a stable and satisfactory environment. 
 
 
"b. Whether severing the ties between the 
child and his or her current foster parent or 
parents is contrary to the best interest of the child. 
 
 
"c. Whether the juvenile court has found at 
least one other ground for termination of parental 
rights." 
 
 
In his brief before this Court, Bodie first argues that the Court of 
Civil Appeals erred by failing to consider whether the juvenile court 
"'reasonably'" could have determined that clear and convincing evidence 
had been presented demonstrating that the mother was presently unable 
to properly care for the children and that that condition was unlikely to 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
14 
 
change in the foreseeable future.  See Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d at 776 
(quoting KGS Steel, Inc., 47 So. 3d at 761 (Murdock, J., concurring in the 
result))(emphasis added).   
 
As noted above, the juvenile court made the following factual 
findings regarding the mother's conditions at the time of trial:  
"'[The mother] has never had her own housing.  She has 
worked multiple jobs but [has] not work[ed] at any one job 
more than four months. 
   
 
"'[The] Mother currently has ... criminal court cases 
pending involving marijuana and a pipe that was found on or 
near her.  
 
 
"'The [children have] been in foster care since October 
2018.  [The] Mother was ordered to participate in Wellness 
Court (Drug Court) but was unsuccessful; [to] participate in 
mental health treatment but has not; [to] obtain stable 
housing and employment but has not; [to undergo] random 
drug screening but has not until recently; and to participate 
in a parenting skills course in which she has received a 
certificate of completion. … 
 
 
"'…. 
 
 
"'… [The] mother is currently in inpatient treatment 
and is doing well but has only been in the program 
approximately three months.'" 
 
H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____. 
 
 
Thus, the juvenile court's judgments essentially identified five 
conditions demonstrating the mother's present inability to properly care 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
15 
 
for the children: (1) her failure to participate in mental-health treatment; 
(2) her failure to obtain stable housing; (3) her failure to obtain 
employment; (4) her pending criminal charges; and (5) her failure to 
adjust her circumstances to comply with all reunification goals and 
directives.  All the foregoing conditions exemplified the failure of DHR's 
efforts at rehabilitation.  As noted above, the mother admitted at trial 
that she was presently unable to care for the children.  The juvenile 
court's judgments further stated, in relevant part: "'This Court 
specifically finds that there is clear and convincing evidence … that said 
conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.'"  
H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____. 
In contrast, the Court of Civil Appeals evaluated the evidence 
presented as follows:   
 
"In the present cases, like in A.A. [v. Jefferson County 
Department of Human Resources, 278 So. 3d 1247 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2018)], DHR became involved with the mother at the 
time of D.P.'s birth because of the mother's drug use.  
Therefore, like in A.A., in these cases 'we must determine 
from the evidence in the record whether the juvenile court 
could have been clearly convinced that the mother had failed 
to cease her drug use at the time of the trial.'  278 So. 3d at 
1252.  Although in these cases the evidence is clear that the 
mother had failed to complete outpatient drug-rehabilitation 
treatment multiple times and had rejected multiple 
recommendations to enter inpatient drug-rehabilitation 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
16 
 
treatment, [Kenya] Franklin[, a caseworker for the 
comprehensive addiction and pregnancy program the mother 
participated in,] testified that she had seen a change in the 
mother beginning in November 2020 when the mother began 
inpatient treatment at Aletheia House.  By the time of trial, 
the mother had entered an inpatient drug-rehabilitation 
program, had complied with the requirements of that 
program, had tested negative for illegal drugs, and had 
obtained treatment for her mental-health issues.  The 
mother's therapist considered her a low risk for relapse.  
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that there was 
clear and convincing evidence indicating that the mother 
would be unable to parent the children in the foreseeable 
future." 
 
H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____. 
 
Bodie argues that, by focusing on only the mother's drug use, the 
Court of Civil Appeals overlooked the other issues preventing her from 
being able to properly care for the children.  He asserts: 
"Over the 27 months that these dependency cases have [been] 
open in the [juvenile] court, [the m]other has failed or refused 
to change her circumstances to meet the needs of the 
[c]hildren.  … 
 
 
"Instead of affirming the trial court, the majority of the 
Court of Civil Appeals focused only on whether [the m]other 
was currently using drugs, … disregarding the facts that [the 
m]other had no stable housing or employment, [that] she 
refused to cooperate with mental health treatment, and [that] 
she had ongoing criminal charges.  It is apparent that, by 
focusing only on [the m]other's drug use and not her housing, 
employment, mental health treatment, or pending criminal 
charges, the majority of the Court of Civil Appeals has 
reweighed the evidence and reached its own conclusion as to 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
17 
 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding by 
clear and convincing evidence that [the m]other's conduct or 
conditions were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, 
contrary to this Court's mandate in McInish: to determine 
whether the fact-finder below reasonably could have made a 
different finding based on the same evidence." 
 
Bodie's brief at 22-24.  We generally agree with Bodie's assertions.   
It is somewhat unclear from its decision how the Court of Civil 
Appeals viewed the evidence presented concerning the mother's inability 
to obtain suitable housing and employment and her pending criminal 
charges.  It appears, however, that the Court of Civil Appeals viewed 
those deficiencies as connected to the mother's participation in an 
inpatient drug-rehabilitation program.  As noted above, the Court of Civil 
Appeals stated the following regarding the mother's potential ability to 
obtain housing and employment in its summary of the pertinent factual 
history: "The mother expressed a desire to care for the children once she 
has completed her treatment and has utilized the resources at Aletheia 
House to obtain housing and employment."  H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____.  
 
At trial, the following exchange occurred between the mother and 
her attorney: 
 
"Q. I think you talked a little bit about the fact that[,] as 
we sit here today[,] you don't really have stable housing so to 
speak and you don't have employment.  Correct? 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
18 
 
 
 
"A. Correct. 
 
 
"Q. I think you said something in response to that 
question that you have to level down first in order to get a job? 
 
 
"A. Yes. 
 
 
"Q. What does that mean? 
 
 
"A. That means that I have -- I've got a couple of more 
goals to mark off.  So far I've marked off five -- three -- two or 
three.  I'm not a hundred percent sure.  I knocked off the 
codependency.  I knocked off -- I forgot the other one.  I think 
it's parenting.  I'm not a hundred percent sure.  I do know that 
I have to mark off relapse prevention.  My legal issues I put 
in my treatment plan also.  My therapist has been in touch 
with [someone] for my criminal stuff.  But I guess as long as 
that's ongoing that will remain my treatment plan.  Then I'll 
work with Ms. Marilyn -- I'll level down and get to work with 
Ms. Marilyn.  So far I've marked off dental, eye care for her.  
It's just self[-]care really with her.  I knocked off confidence 
too on Ms. Katie [Day's] I think.  With her, I'll do housing and 
getting GED. 
 
 
"Q. Now, Ms. Marilyn, is that your case manager? 
 
 
"A. Yes, ma'am. 
 
 
"Q. So, as part of these treatment plans and goals that 
you're talking about, is it your understanding that Aletheia 
House will help you to find employment once you're eligible? 
 
 
"A. Yes, through vocational rehab I think.  They have 
some other programs with housing too that they're hoping will 
open back up now, like Shelter Care Plus and things like that.  
They also have apartments too.  I don't have much 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
19 
 
information on that.  I'm kind of looking forward to finding 
out more about that when I can level down." 
 
 
Thus, according to the mother's testimony, it is possible that, 
assuming she successfully completes her remaining treatment goals, she 
will be eligible to seek additional assistance from Aletheia House in 
obtaining suitable housing, obtaining a GED certificate, completing 
vocational rehabilitation, and obtaining and maintaining suitable 
employment.  Her testimony also indicated that she intended to address 
her pending "legal issues" as a part of her treatment plan.  Consequently, 
it is clear from the evidence presented that the likelihood of the mother 
being able to properly care for the children in the foreseeable future was 
dependent upon her willingness and ability to complete a variety of goals 
in addition to abstaining from drug use. 
 
The Court of Civil Appeals' analysis indicates that it placed 
significant weight on the evidence indicating that the mother presented 
a low risk of relapse for drug abuse and how that condition affected the 
likelihood that the mother would be able to properly care for the children 
in the foreseeable future.  The Court of Civil Appeals' reasoning was 
rooted in its precedent holding that, "'[a]lthough a court may consider a 
parent's history, "the existence of evidence of current conditions or 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
20 
 
conduct relating to a parent's inability or unwillingness to care for his or 
her children is implicit in the requirement that termination of parental 
rights be based on clear and convincing evidence."'"  H.P., ____ So. 3d at 
____ (quoting A.A. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 278 So. 3d 1247, 
1252 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018), quoting in turn D.O. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't 
of Hum. Res., 859 So. 2d 439, 444 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)).   Based on the 
evidence, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: "[W]e cannot conclude that 
there was clear and convincing evidence indicating that the mother 
would be unable to parent the children in the foreseeable future."  H.P., 
____ So. 3d at ____.   
As Bodie points out, however, the applicable standard of review 
required the Court of Civil Appeals to base its decision not on its own 
evaluation of the evidence presented but, instead, to specifically consider 
whether the juvenile court could have reasonably reached the conclusion 
that it did.  In so doing, it must be acknowledged that the juvenile court's 
judgments did not disregard the mother's progress toward rehabilitation 
but specifically noted the diminished weight the juvenile court had given 
that evidence, stating: "'[The] Mother has had many opportunities to 
complete services but unfortunately has not complied.  [The] mother is 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
21 
 
currently in inpatient treatment and is doing well but has only been in 
the program approximately three months.'"  H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____  
(emphasis added).  Bodie also notes that the mother testified: "I always 
had a bad habit of not finishing what I started."  Indeed, the Court of 
Civil Appeals' decision conceded that "in these cases the evidence is clear 
that the mother had failed to complete outpatient drug-rehabilitation 
treatment multiple times and had rejected multiple recommendations to 
enter inpatient drug-rehabilitation treatment."  H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____.  
Moreover, it was undisputed that, after the children were removed from 
the mother's care because she had tested positive for drug use at the time 
of D.P.'s birth, the mother lost custody of a fourth child because she and 
that child had tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines when 
that child was born almost two years later. 
 
As noted by Presiding Judge Thompson in his dissent, the Court of 
Civil Appeals' precedent is clear regarding the discretion afforded to 
juvenile courts in considering evidence of recent attempts at 
rehabilitation by a parent:  
 
"The main opinion focuses on the mother's recent 
progress in the substance-abuse program that she had been 
participating in for only two months when the trial on the 
termination-of-parental-rights petitions began.  However, the 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
22 
 
mother began those efforts more than five months after DHR 
had filed its termination-of-parental-rights petitions and after 
the young children had been in foster care for more than two 
years.  The juvenile court was in the best position to 
determine the mother's credibility and to assess her 
demeanor.  Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631, 636 (Ala. 2001); 
D.M. v. Walker Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 919 So. 2d 1197, 
1214 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).  Accordingly, given the evidence in 
the record, the juvenile court could have determined that the 
mother's then current participation in substance-abuse 
treatment was not an adjustment of her circumstances but, 
rather, was undertaken as an attempt to prevent the 
termination of her parental rights.  See A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa 
Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 75 So. 3d 1206, 1213 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2011)('[T]he juvenile court could have determined that, 
to the extent the mother may have allegedly improved her 
condition, those efforts were merely last-minute efforts 
undertaken in anticipation of the impending termination-of-
parental-rights trial.'); and K.J. v. Pike Cnty. Dep't of Hum. 
Res., 275 So. 3d [1135,] 1145 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2018)] (same); 
H.T. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 163 So. 3d 1054, 
1070 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014); S.S. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of 
Hum. Res., 212 So. 3d 940, 949 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)." 
 
H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____ (Thompson, P.J., dissenting). 
 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that, although the Court of 
Civil Appeals' opinion cited and acknowledged this Court's decision in Ex 
parte McInish, Bodie has adequately demonstrated that the Court of 
Civil Appeals' analysis regarding the juvenile court's dependency 
determination conflicts with this Court's decision in Ex parte McInish.  
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the juvenile court could have 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
23 
 
reasonably concluded that clear and convincing evidence had been 
presented proving that it was unlikely that the mother would be able to 
properly care for the children in the foreseeable future. 
 
Bodie next argues that the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis 
regarding viable alternatives to the termination of the mother's parental 
rights is also in conflict with Ex parte McInish.  Again, we agree. 
 
The Court of Civil Appeals analyzed this issue as follows: 
"[W]e note that the children are currently placed with foster 
parents who had a relationship with the mother and the 
children before DHR became involved with the family.  The 
mother testified that she is content with the children being 
placed with the foster parents but that she would like to be 
reunited with the children once she completes her inpatient 
program and obtains housing and employment.  In Ex parte 
A.S., [73 So. 3d 1223, 1229 (Ala. 2011)], our supreme court 
held that, in that case, because the mother was 'satisfied with 
the grandmother's care of the child,' … and because the 
mother was making progress in rehabilitation despite being 
incarcerated, maintaining custody with the maternal 
grandmother was a viable alternative to termination of the 
mother's parental rights.  Id. at 1229-30.  Similarly, in the 
present cases, we cannot conclude that there was clear and 
convincing evidence indicating that maintaining the status 
quo while the mother continued her rehabilitation was not a 
viable alternative to termination of her parental rights." 
 
H.P., ____ So. 3d at ____. 
 
In Ex parte A.S., the child was dependent because the mother in 
that case was incarcerated, but the mother had no convictions involving 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
24 
 
drugs.  "The child was placed with the child's grandmother (the mother's 
adoptive mother), who [wa]s also the child's paternal great-aunt (the 
mother's paternal aunt)."  73 So. 3d at 1224.  The mother testified that 
she was a kleptomaniac and was enrolled in a counseling program that 
could allow her to be released in six months.  She also testified that, if 
she was not released early under that program, she would nevertheless 
be eligible for early release under a different probation program.  She 
testified that she would be able to obtain employment while on release as 
a part of the probation program.   
Although the 80-year-old grandmother had filed the termination-
of-parental-rights petition in Ex parte A.S., the grandmother also 
testified that, if something happened to her, she would want the mother 
to care for the child and the child's sibling if the mother was out of prison 
and doing well.  This Court held: "The grandmother's maintaining 
custody of the child and having the ability to determine and supervise 
the mother's visitation with the child is a viable alternative to 
termination of the mother's parental rights while the mother is making 
progress towards rehabilitation."  Ex parte A.S., 73 So. 3d at 1229-30. 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
25 
 
As noted above, the juvenile court in these cases could have 
reasonably determined that clear and convincing evidence had been 
presented demonstrating that the mother would not be able to properly 
care for the children in the foreseeable future.  Katie Day, the mother's 
therapist at Aletheia House, testified:  
"[W]e are an individualized program.  It's an average of about 
ninety days, but because [the mother]'s a part of Mother's 
Hope[,] it's more specialized and more individualized.  So, on 
average girls spend about four to five months there.  But it 
just depends on progress, and, you know, how determined 
they are to finish their goals and, you know, if they're 
compliant with the rules and regulations.  But each goal has 
a different target date because each one is -- it depends on how 
complex the goal is." 
 
During cross-examination by DHR's attorney, Day further testified: 
"Q. … I'm guessing that's assuming that everything goes 
smoothly and there's no setbacks or positive screens or 
anything like that? 
 
"A. Yes, sir. 
 
"Q. I guess how does it work after the four or five months 
are up.  What's the next step? 
 
"A. So, usually when somebody successfully graduates, 
I as the clinical therapist will recommend them for outpatient 
if I think that they need to continue services.  I like to 
recommend everyone to outpatient services because you could 
always use more help, you know.  So, yes, I recommend 
outpatient.  If they successfully complete, they get a year's 
worth of free mental health counseling ….  
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
26 
 
 
"…. 
 
"Q. As a therapist would it be, I guess, fair to say that 
even after that four to five month period of time that they're 
being treated at Aletheia House that that's sort of a safety 
area, sort of under the umbrella with everybody there, staff 
supporting them, therapists, et cetera? 
 
"A. Yes.  We tend to tell clients that.  You're doing real 
good in here, but you have to take the information and tools 
that we give you and apply it out there.  So, a lot of times[,] 
when I do treatment plans[, I] identify and implement 
because if they cannot learn to implement their tools and 
their, you know, coping skills or whatever, they're not going 
to be able to handle it out in the real world.  Like you said, we 
are a safety net.  It's up to each person." 
 
As noted above, the juvenile court's judgments demonstrate that, 
in addition to abstaining from drug use, the mother would have to 
address several other deficiencies, including her lack of suitable housing 
and employment, before being able to properly care for the children.  The 
evidence presented at trial indicates that, unlike in Ex parte A.S., the 
juvenile court in these cases could have reasonably concluded that any 
attempt to predict when the mother could correct those deficiencies was 
speculative, especially in light of her failed attempts at rehabilitation in 
the past.  In other words, even assuming that the mother continued to 
make progress in her personal treatment goals, the juvenile court could 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
27 
 
have reasonably determined that the time frame for adequate 
rehabilitation was indefinite. 
As Bodie notes, "maintaining a child in foster care indefinitely is 
not a viable alternative to termination of parental rights."  T.G. v. 
Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 39 So. 3d 1146, 1152-53 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2009).  "[A]t some point the [children's] need for permanency must 
outweigh repeated efforts by DHR to rehabilitate the mother."  N.A. v. 
J.H., 571 So. 2d 1130, 1134 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).  As noted above, in 
considering the grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights 
under § 12-15-319(a), the juvenile court was also obligated to consider 
the following: 
"(13) The existence of any significant emotional ties that 
have developed between the child and his or her current foster 
parent or parents, with additional consideration given to the 
following factors: 
 
 
"a. The length of time that the child has lived 
in a stable and satisfactory environment. 
 
 
"b. Whether severing the ties between the 
child and his or her current foster parent or 
parents is contrary to the best interest of the child. 
 
 
"c. Whether the juvenile court has found at 
least one other ground for termination of parental 
rights." 
 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
28 
 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the Court of Civil 
Appeals erred in rejecting the possibility that the juvenile court could 
have reasonably determined that clear and convincing evidence had 
been presented demonstrating that no viable alternative to termination 
of the mother's parental rights existed. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons explained above, the judgments of the Court of Civil 
Appeals are hereby reversed, and these cases are remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
1210248 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
1210250 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
1210251 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., 
concur. 
 
Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion. 
 
 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
29 
 
MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).  
I write separately to acknowledge my interest in Chief Justice 
Parker's proposed framework for cases involving termination of parental 
rights.  I invite parties and amici curiae in future cases to address this 
Court's current analytical approach in these cases. 
 
 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
30 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
 
Parental rights are fundamental. See Ex parte J.E., 1 So. 3d 1002, 
1006 (Ala. 2008); Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 637, 642-43, 648-49 (Ala. 
2011) (plurality opinion); id. at 650-56 (Parker, J., concurring specially); 
id. at 672 (Bolin, J., concurring in result); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment). And the State has a duty to protect children from abuse and 
neglect. See Ex parte Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 838-39 (Ala. 2019) (Parker, 
C.J., concurring specially); cf. Ex parte G.C., 924 So. 2d 651, 686 (Ala. 
2005) (Parker, J., dissenting). How to reconcile the two? In this writing, 
I hope to clarify the answer to that question by assembling a more 
coherent analytical framework for cases regarding termination of 
parental rights. Such a framework is necessary, in my view, to ensure 
that we remain a government of laws and not of men. 
 
But first, I must explain my position in this case. I concur in 
reversing the judgments, and I concur with the main opinion with the 
following exceptions. Within the opinion's analysis of the requirement 
that no viable alternative to termination exists, the opinion refers to the 
children's need for permanency "'outweigh[ing]'" rehabilitation efforts of 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
31 
 
the Department of Human Resources ("DHR"). ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting 
N.A. v. J.H., 571 So. 2d 1130, 1134 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)). In my view, the 
no-viable-alternative element is a structural protection of parental 
rights; it does not involve an ad hoc weighing or balancing of parties' 
interests. In addition, the opinion points to the possibility that the 
children have emotional ties with the foster parents. It is not clear to me 
how this possibility is relevant to the no-viable-alternative element. Ties 
with foster parents seem relevant only to the question whether 
termination is in a child's best interests, the analysis of which is separate 
from the no-viable-alternative element. 
 
Which leads me back to the purpose of this writing: a suggested 
framework. Before a court terminates a parent's fundamental rights of 
parenthood, I believe that three elements must be met: a ground for 
termination, the absence of a viable alternative to termination, and a 
showing that termination is in the best interests of the child. 
I. Constitutional elements: 
ground for termination and no viable alternative 
 
 
Parental rights are fundamental, so government interference with 
them is subject to strict scrutiny: No interference is permitted except to 
advance a compelling government interest, and any interference must be 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
32 
 
limited to the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. 
Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. N.B., 196 So. 3d 1205, 1214 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2015); see Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 642-45 (Ala. 2011) 
(plurality opinion). In close alignment with this constitutional 
framework, a decision whether to terminate parental rights requires that 
two primary elements be met: a ground for termination and the absence 
of a viable alternative to termination. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 4-
5 (Ala. 2007). The party seeking termination bears the burden of proving 
both elements. Id. at 4; M.E. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 972 So. 
2d 89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). And both elements must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence. T.V., 971 So. 2d at 4; see § 12-15-319(a), Ala. 
Code 1975 (codifying clear-and-convincing-evidence standard as to 
ground-for-termination element). 
A. Ground for termination 
 
Termination of a parent's legal relationship with his or her child is 
the most extreme form of government interference with parental rights. 
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982); M.H. v. Cleburne 
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 158 So. 3d 471, 482 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). Thus, 
termination is permissible only when the parent is legally unfit to care 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
33 
 
for and protect the child. In recognition of this requirement, the Alabama 
Juvenile Justice Act, § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, describes the 
grounds for termination: 
"that the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to 
discharge their responsibilities to and for the child, or that the 
conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable to 
properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition 
is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future ...." 
 
§ 12-15-319(a). That statute then provides a detailed, nonexclusive list of 
factors that a juvenile court must consider in determining whether one 
or more of these grounds exist. § 12-15-319(a)(1)-(13). The statute also 
provides for presumptions of unfitness in some situations. § 12-15-319(b), 
(d). 
 
The statutory grounds embody the State's compelling interest in 
"protecting children from [further] abuse and neglect." Ex parte Kelley, 
296 So. 3d 822, 838 (Ala. 2019) (Parker, C.J., concurring specially). In 
addition, when the State has taken custody of children because the 
parents are unfit, the State has an interest in promoting the "care, 
guidance, and discipline," § 12-15-101(b)(4), of those children. That 
general interest includes a compelling interest in facilitating permanent 
(rather than perpetually temporary) arrangements for those children's 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
34 
 
care. See In re N.K., 99 S.W.3d 295, 301 n.9 (Tex. App. 2003) ("The goal 
of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a compelling 
interest of the government."). 
B. No viable alternative 
 
The second constitutional requirement, limiting the government's 
interference to the least restrictive means of advancing the government's 
interest, finds embodiment in the no-viable-alternative element of 
termination analysis. See M.E. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 972 
So. 2d 89, 101-02 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (plurality opinion); D.M.P. v. State 
Dep't of Hum. Res., 871 So. 2d 77, 85-90 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (plurality 
opinion) (tracing history of no-viable-alternative element). Termination 
is the most extreme or restrictive form of interference with parental 
rights. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). Thus, if a viable 
alternative to termination exists in a particular case, then logically 
termination is not the least restrictive means. Accordingly, the party 
seeking termination must prove that there is no viable alternative. Ex 
parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). 
Logically, a viable alternative is one that satisfies the State's 
compelling interest. See In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 91 (Tex. App. 1987) 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
35 
 
(holding that strict scrutiny requires "a particularized showing ... that 
the state['s compelling] interest is promoted by terminating the 
relationship [and that] it is impossible to achieve the goal through any 
less restrictive means"); In re ARC, 258 P.3d 704, 710 (Wyo. 2011) 
(holding that state was required to use least restrictive means of 
accomplishing its goal of protecting children). Initially, removal of a child 
from an unfit parent's custody is justified by the State's interest in 
protecting children from further abuse and neglect. However, once that 
removal occurs and the child is safe in foster care or another 
arrangement, the interest in protection is satisfied. Thus, if the parent is 
later found unfit at a termination trial, at that point the primary State 
interest at stake is the interest in facilitating permanent (rather than 
perpetually 
temporary) 
arrangements 
for 
the 
child's 
care 
("permanency"). 
The Alabama Juvenile Justice Act recognizes four child-placement 
options 
as 
permanent: 
adoption, 
relative 
placement, 
kinship 
guardianship, and "another planned permanent living arrangement." § 
12-15-315(a)(2), (3), (4), (6), Ala. Code 1975. "[A]nother planned 
permanent living arrangement" generally means long-term foster care. 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
36 
 
See Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. 
& Pol'y 1, 9 n.3 (2015) (explaining that, in child-welfare jargon, "another 
planned permanent living arrangement" means long-term foster care).1  
Among these options, only adoption requires termination of 
parental rights. Thus, if adoption is not a viable option, then termination 
does not further the State's interest in permanency. See C.M. v. 
Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 81 So. 3d 391, 398 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2011); B.A.M. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 150 So. 3d 782, 784-
86 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). In such a case, termination is not only not the 
least restrictive means, it is not a means at all. 
Kinship guardianship and long-term foster care are legally 
recognized permanency options. However, the statute conditions these 
options on a determination by DHR that adoption is not in the particular 
child's best interests. § 12-15-315(a)(4)a, (e)(1), (b). Indeed, the statute 
 
1The statute also lists the option of "adult custodial care." § 12-15-
315(a)(5). However, that option relates to children who, because of their 
physical or mental disabilities, will not likely be able to function in a 
family setting even into adulthood. See Alabama Unified Judicial System 
Form JU-34 ("Permanency Hearing Order") ¶ 2 (rev. July 2016) 
(currently available at: https://eforms.alacourt.gov/media/vkultems/ 
permanency-hearing-order-adult-custodial-care.pdf); see, e.g., B.V. v. 
Davidson, 77 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). Thus, that option 
will not be relevant in most cases. 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
37 
 
describes adoption as a "more permanent" option than kinship 
guardianship, § 12-15-315(e)(5), and requires DHR to exhaust all other 
options if the court chooses long-term foster care, § 12-15-315(b). These 
prioritizing provisions imply a Legislative judgment that kinship 
guardianship and long-term foster care generally do not satisfy the 
State's interest in permanency to the same degree as adoption does. To 
the extent that that judgment is entitled to judicial deference, then, if 
adoption is a viable option, kinship guardianship and long-term foster 
care are not ordinarily options that sufficiently satisfy the State's interest 
in permanency and thus are not ordinarily viable alternatives to 
termination. 
The remaining option, relative placement, satisfies (without 
statutory qualification) the State's interest in permanency without 
requiring termination. Therefore, if relative placement is a viable option 
in a particular case, then it is a viable alternative to termination. See, 
e.g., Ex parte J.R., 896 So. 2d 416, 423-28 (Ala. 2004) (illustrating relative 
placement as possible viable alternative); Ex parte Ogle, 516 So. 2d 243 
(Ala. 1987) (same); V.M. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 710 So. 2d 915, 921 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (same). 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
38 
 
Accordingly, to meet the no-viable-alternative element, at a 
minimum DHR must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
adoption is a viable option and that relative placement is not a viable 
option. 
In my view, much of Alabama courts' discussion of the no-viable-
alternative element has focused on factors and circumstances that 
generally are not relevant to this element. For example, many decisions, 
including the present one, have examined the possibility that the parent 
will be sufficiently rehabilitated to resume custody at some future time. 
See, e.g., Ex parte A.S., 73 So. 3d 1223, 1229-30 (Ala. 2011); P.M. v. Lee 
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 335 So. 3d 1163, 1172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). 
But I believe that, ordinarily, the viability of alternatives to termination 
should be analyzed based on the circumstances that are before the 
juvenile court at the time of the termination judgment, not based on 
potential future circumstances. I reach this conclusion for two reasons.  
First, a parent does not have a constitutional right to be 
rehabilitated by the State. In many cases, DHR has a statutory obligation 
to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent. See § 12-15-
312(a)(3), (c). However, that obligation arises out of the State's interest 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
39 
 
in preserving families intact, which is generally also in children's best 
interests. See § 12-15-101(b)(1), (8) (listing goal of Alabama Juvenile 
Justice Act "[t]o preserve and strengthen the family of the child whenever 
possible" and expressing "a preference at all times for the preservation of 
the family"); H.H. v. Baldwin Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 989 So. 2d 1094, 
1101 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (opinion on return to remand) (per Moore, J., 
with two Judges concurring in the result) ("A primary goal of the 
[predecessor AJJA] is to reunite a dependent child and a parent as 
quickly and safely as possible."). To the extent that the parent stands to 
benefit from that obligation, the parent may have a corresponding 
statutory right to DHR's efforts and a defense to termination if DHR fails 
to make those efforts. But that statutory right is ultimately rooted in the 
State's interest in intact families, not the parent's own constitutional 
rights. Thus, the sufficiency of DHR's rehabilitation efforts is not 
relevant to the constitutional question whether no viable alternative 
exists. 
Second, the State's compelling interest in permanency, as applied 
to a particular child, is time-sensitive. Thus, in general, the time frame 
for the parent's completion of rehabilitation (achievement or resumption 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
40 
 
of fitness) should be objectively fixed and not left amorphous and open-
ended. In the context of a termination proceeding, normally the most 
natural fixed point in time for evaluating that fitness is the time of the 
judgment. In contrast, evaluating the present likelihood of the parent's 
future fitness necessarily involves uncertainty and weighing of 
probabilities, which would ordinarily seem to undermine satisfaction of 
the State's interest in permanency. Therefore, if a parent is presently 
unfit, the no-viable-alternative element should not generally require a 
juvenile court to take a "wait and see" approach, keeping the child in 
limbo in order to give the parent a further opportunity to become fit. 
Another issue that has received much attention, but that I believe 
is irrelevant to the no-viable-alternative element, is whether an 
emotional bond exists between the parent and child. See, e.g., T.D.K. v. 
L.A.W., 78 So. 3d 1006, 1011 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); C.M., 81 So. 3d at 397; 
B.A.M., 150 So. 3d at 785-86; Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. 
N.B., 196 So. 3d 1205, 1214-15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015); A.M. v. Colbert 
Cnty. Dep't of Hum Res., 236 So. 3d 81, 87-88 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015); C.P. 
v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 203 So. 3d 1261, 1270 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2016); S.P. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 315 So. 3d. 1126, 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
41 
 
1131 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020); P.M., 335 So. 3d at 1172. Certainly, 
preservation of emotional bonds between parents and children is an 
important consideration in determining whether to terminate parental 
rights. But it is a consideration that is based on the State's interest in 
promoting the best interests of dependent children, see D.M.P., 871 So. 
2d at 95 n.17 (plurality opinion); C.M., 81 So. 3d at 397-98; T.N. v. 
Covington Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 297 So. 3d 1200, 1219-21 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2019); it is not based on the parent's constitutional rights. That is 
because a parent whose abuse or neglect of a child has rendered him or 
her unfit does not have a constitutional right to preservation of his or her 
emotional bond with the child. Thus, the no-viable-alternative element 
asks whether there is a viable alternative to termination not of the 
parent's emotional relationship with the child, but of the parent's legal 
relationship with the child. Accordingly, although the existence of a 
parent-child bond is properly considered within the juvenile court's 
analysis under the best-interests-of-the-child element (which I will 
discuss in the next part), it has no place within the no-viable-alternative 
element. 
Finally, because these first two elements for termination of 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
42 
 
parental rights -- a ground for termination and no viable alternative -- 
are rooted in constitutional strict scrutiny, their manifest purpose is to 
limit the power of the State as it seeks to further its interests. These 
elements are ultimately expressions of strict constitutional limitation, 
not merely nice suggestions for the betterment or well-being of families, 
or even merely legislative or common-law impositions that can be 
fundamentally modified by popular will or judicial sentiment. 
II. Best interests of the child 
 
 If, and only if, both constitutional elements for termination are 
met, the juvenile court should then proceed to evaluate the best interests 
of the child. Although at this point termination is constitutionally 
authorized, nevertheless the court now determines whether it is best for 
the child. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, the court must 
ask itself whether termination will best promote the child's well-being. 
These circumstances may include myriad factors, just a few of which are 
mentioned above: the status of the parent's and DHR's attempts at 
rehabilitation, emotional bonds between the parent and the child, the 
desirability of permanency for the child, and emotional ties between the 
child and foster parents. In this way, this third element acts as a 
1210248; 1210250; 1210251 
43 
 
backstop, a final check on the government's power, to ensure that 
termination is not only permitted but also prudent. Cf. D.M.P. v. State 
Dep't of Hum. Res., 871 So. 2d 77, 95 & n.17 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) 
(plurality opinion). Whereas the first two elements exist to protect the 
parent's rights, this third element exists to protect the child's interests. 
Importantly, under this framework, there are several things that 
the best-interests-of-the-child element is not. First, it is not a substitute 
or synonym for the government's compelling interests. "Best interests of 
the child" is necessarily and properly a generalized concept; in contrast, 
government interests must be articulated with specificity and precision 
to ensure that they can be sufficiently analyzed as to whether they are 
compelling and whether the government's actions are the least restrictive 
means to achieve them. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial 
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1324 (2007) ("Surely there is a 
compelling interest in protecting children, at least from serious harm, if 
the interest is stated wholly abstractly, but this much generality may not 
be helpful for anyone who takes the compelling interest question 
seriously."). 
Second, best interests is not a "super factor" that can override the 
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first two, constitutional, elements. Put another way, best interests is not 
a license for the judiciary to ignore or loosen the first two elements to 
achieve a particular result. In application, this means that, if the first 
two elements are not met, a court cannot terminate a parent's rights, 
regardless of whether it concludes that termination would be in the 
child's best interests. This framework also implies that, whatever cases 
mean when they say that best interests is a "paramount concern," they 
cannot mean that it overrides the constitutional and statutory 
requirements for termination. Further, under this framework, if one of 
the first two elements is not met, then termination is not permitted, and 
it is unnecessary to analyze best interests. See, e.g., Ex parte J.R., 896 
So. 2d 416, 423-28 (Ala. 2004) (reversing based on no-viable-alternative 
element without discussing best interests); Ex parte A.S., 73 So. 3d 1223, 
1228-38 (Ala. 2011) (same); Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 7-10 (Ala. 2007) 
(reversing based on no-viable-alternative element without engaging in 
best-interests analysis). The best-interests element cannot be allowed to 
swallow the whole constitutional and statutory analysis. 
Third, best interests is not an overarching "consideration" that, in 
some ill-defined way, influences the analysis of the first two elements. 
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Although the three elements are applied to the same evidence, as 
explained above they each serve a different legal purpose and analyze the 
evidence through a different conceptual lens. 
III. Conclusion 
As I mentioned at the beginning, one of my concerns underlying this 
writing is to reinforce the primacy of the rule of law. A broad sampling of 
Alabama courts' termination-of-parental-rights jurisprudence leaves one 
with a clear impression that many of the decisions do not follow a 
consistent conceptual framework of analysis. As a consequence, the 
language and results of the decisions are "all over the map," with a 
paucity of unifying analytical threads to explain or reconcile them. Given 
the fundamental nature of parental rights, I believe we need a strong 
analytical framework for termination cases. In particular, we need a 
framework that moves this area of the law away from its tendency to 
allow the subjective perceptions and predilections of juvenile and 
appellate courts to determine individual case results through vague, 
amorphous, and unstructured rhetorical pathways. Of course, such a 
framework would need to maintain deferential standards of review, to 
preserve the discretion of on-the-ground juvenile-court judges on issues 
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where their function requires leeway. But such a framework would focus 
and channel that discretion, enable meaningful and disciplined appellate 
review, improve the predictability of results, and fortify the rule of law.