Title: Fashion Valley Mall v. NLRB

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 12/24/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
FASHION VALLEY MALL, LLC, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S144753 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
D.C. Cir.Ct.App. No. 04-1411 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS  
) 
BOARD, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS 
) 
INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
) 
LOCAL 432-M, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit to decide whether, under California law, a shopping 
mall may enforce a rule prohibiting persons from urging customers to boycott a 
store in the mall.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the right to free speech 
granted by article I, section 2 of the California Constitution includes the right to 
urge customers in a shopping mall to boycott one of the stores in the mall. 
FACTS 
On October 15, 1998, Graphic Communications International Union Local 
432-M (Union) filed a charge before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
 
2
alleging that the owners of the Fashion Valley Mall (Mall) in San Diego had 
“refused to permit employees of the Union-Tribune Publishing Company to leaflet 
in front of Robinsons-May” department store in the Mall.  The NLRB issued a 
complaint and noticed a hearing, after which an administrative law judge ruled 
that the Mall had violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)) by barring the employees from distributing leaflets.1   
The administrative law judge found that the Union “represents a unit of the 
pressroom employees at the San Diego Union-Tribune (Union-Tribune), a major 
general circulation newspaper in San Diego.”  The collective bargaining 
agreement between the employees and the newspaper had expired in 1992 and the 
parties had been unable to reach a new agreement.  The administrative law judge 
thus found that a “primary labor dispute” existed between the newspaper and its 
employees at the time of the disputed labor activities in 1998. 
On October 4, 1998, 30 to 40 Union members had distributed leaflets to 
customers entering and leaving the Robinsons-May store at the Mall.2  The leaflets 
stated that Robinsons-May advertises in the Union-Tribune, described several 
ways that the newspaper allegedly treated its employees unfairly, and urged 
customers who believed “that employers should treat employees fairly” to call the 
                                              
1  
The National Labor Relations Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice 
for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees” in the exercise 
of certain rights, including “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining . . . .”  (29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) [barring interference 
with rights in § 157 (§ 7 of act)].) 
2  
In addition to Robinsons-May, the Fashion Valley Mall includes 
Nordstrom, Neiman Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue, Macy’s, and JC Penny 
department stores, as well as an 18-theater movie complex.  The mall is 
surrounded by parking structures and lots.  
 
3
newspaper’s “CEO,” listing his name and telephone number.  The administrative 
law judge concluded:  “From all indications, the leafleters conducted their activity 
in a courteous and peaceful manner without a disruption of any kind and without 
hindrance to customers entering or leaving” the store. 
Within 15 or 20 minutes, Mall officials “arrived on the scene to stop the 
leafleting,” notifying the Union members that they were trespassing because they 
had not obtained a permit from the Mall “to engage in expressive activity,” and 
warning them that they “would be subject to civil litigation and/or arrest if they 
did not leave.”  A police officer appeared and, following a brief argument, the 
Union members moved to public property near the entrance to the Mall and 
continued distributing leaflets briefly before leaving the area. 
The Mall has adopted rules requiring persons who desire to engage in 
expressive activity at the Mall to apply for a permit five business days in advance.  
The applicant “must agree to abide by” the Mall’s rules, including rule 5.6, which 
prohibits “impeding, competing or interfering with the business of one or more of 
the stores or merchants in the shopping center by:  [¶] . . . [¶] 5.6.2 Urging, or 
encouraging in any manner, customers not to purchase the merchandise or services 
offered by any one or more of the stores or merchants in the shopping center.”  
The administrative law judge found that the Union “was attempting to 
engage in a lawful consumer boycott of Robinsons-May because Robinsons-May 
advertised in the Union-Tribune newspaper” and further found “that it would have 
been utterly futile for the Union to have followed [the Mall]’s enormously 
burdensome application-permit process because its rules contained express 
provisions barring the very kind of lawful conduct the Union sought to undertake 
at the Mall.”  The administrative law judge thus ordered the Mall to cease and 
 
4
desist prohibiting access to the Union’s “leafleters for the purpose of engaging in 
peaceful consumer boycott handbilling.” 
On September 26, 2001, the matter was transferred to the NLRB in 
Washington, D.C.  On October 29, 2004, the NLRB issued an opinion affirming as 
modified the administrative law judge’s decision.  Citing our decision in Robins v. 
Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, affirmed sub nomine 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) 447 U.S. 74, the NLRB stated:  
“California law permits the exercise of speech and petitioning in private shopping 
centers, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner rules adopted by the 
property owner. [Citations.] Rule 5.6.2, however, is essentially a content-based 
restriction and not a time, place, and manner restriction permitted under California 
law.  That is, the rule prohibits speech ‘urging or encouraging in any manner’ 
customers to boycott one of the shopping center stores. . . . [I]t appears that the 
purpose and effect of this rule was to shield [the Mall]’s tenants, such as the 
Robinsons-May department store, from otherwise lawful consumer boycott 
handbilling.  Accordingly, we find that [the Mall] violated Section 8(a)(1) by 
maintaining Rule 5.6.2. [Citation.]”  (Fn. omitted.) 
The Mall petitioned for review before the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which issued an opinion on June 16, 2006.  
The court of appeals stated it had to resolve two issues:  “(1) State law aside, did 
[the Mall]’s requirement of a permit for expressive activity, conditioned as it was 
upon the Union’s agreement not to urge a boycott of any Mall tenant, violate 
§ 8(a)(1) of the Act? (2) If so, was [the Mall] acting within its rights under 
California law?”  The court answered the first question in the affirmative, which 
meant that the case turned on the resolution of the second question.  The court 
addressed this question of California law as follows:  “Although [the Mall] is 
 
5
correct that there is not substantial evidence the Union intended to boycott any of 
the Mall’s tenants, nothing in the Act prohibits the Union from carrying out a 
secondary boycott[3] by means of peaceful handbilling. [Citation.] In subjecting 
the Union to a permit process that required it to forswear use of this lawful tactic, 
therefore, [the Mall] interfered with the employees’ rights under § 7 of the Act. . . . 
Enforcement of Rule 5.6.2 therefore violated § 8(a)(1) — unless, that is, the 
Company had the right under California constitutional law to exclude the 
employees altogether.”  The court of appeals observed that “no California court 
has squarely decided whether a shopping center may lawfully ban from its 
premises speech urging the public to boycott a tenant,” and concluded that 
“whether [the Mall] violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act depends upon whether it could 
lawfully maintain and enforce an anti-boycott rule — a question no California 
court has resolved.”  Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit filed in this court a request,4 which we granted, to 
decide the following question:  “Under California law may Fashion Valley 
maintain and enforce against the Union its Rule 5.6.2?” 
DISCUSSION 
Article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution declares:  
“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all 
                                              
3  
A “secondary boycott” is “union activity directed against a neutral 
employer.”  (NLRB v. Pipefitters (1977) 429 U.S. 507, 534.) 
4  
Rule 8.548(a) of the California Rules of Court, which replaced former rule 
29.8(a), states:  “On request of the United States Supreme Court, a United States 
Court of Appeals, or the court of last resort of any state, territory, or 
commonwealth, the Supreme Court may decide a question of California law if: [¶] 
(1) The decision could determine the outcome of a matter pending in the 
requesting court; and [¶] (2) There is no controlling precedent.” 
 
6
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.  A law may not restrain or 
abridge liberty of speech or press.”  Nearly 30 years ago, in Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 910 (Pruneyard), we held that this 
provision of our state Constitution grants broader rights to free expression than 
does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by holding that a 
shopping mall is a public forum in which persons may exercise their right to free 
speech under the California Constitution.  We stated that a shopping center “to 
which the public is invited can provide an essential and invaluable forum for 
exercising [free speech] rights.”  (Ibid.)  We noted that in many cities the public 
areas of the shopping mall are replacing the streets and sidewalks of the central 
business district which, “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”  
(Hague v. C.I.O (1939) 307 U.S. 496, 515.)  Because of the “growing importance 
of the shopping center[,] . . . to prohibit expressive activity in the centers would 
impinge on constitutional rights beyond speech rights,” particularly the right to 
petition for redress of grievances.  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 907.)  
Accordingly, we held that the California Constitution “protect[s] speech and 
petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are 
privately owned.”  (Id. at p. 910.)  We added the caveat in Pruneyard that “[b]y no 
means do we imply that those who wish to disseminate ideas have free rein,” 
noting our previous “endorsement of time, place, and manner rules.”  (Ibid.) 
The Mall in the present case generally allows expressive activity, as 
mandated by the California Constitution, but requires persons wishing to engage 
in free speech in the Mall to obtain a permit.  Under rule 5.6.2, the Mall will not 
issue a permit to engage in expressive activity unless the applicant promises to 
 
7
refrain from conduct “Urging, or encouraging in any manner, customers not to 
purchase the merchandise or services offered by any one or more of the stores or 
merchants in the shopping center.”  We must determine, therefore, whether a 
shopping center violates California law by banning from its premises speech 
urging the public to boycott one or more of the shopping center’s businesses. 
The idea that private property can constitute a public forum for free speech 
if it is open to the public in a manner similar to that of public streets and sidewalks 
long predates our decision in Pruneyard.  The United States Supreme Court 
recognized more than half a century ago that the right to free speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution can apply even on privately 
owned land.  In Marsh v. Alabama (1946) 326 U.S. 501, 502, the high court held 
that a Jehovah’s Witness had the right to distribute religious literature on the 
sidewalk near the post office of a town owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding 
Corporation, because the town had “all the characteristics of any other American 
town. . . . In short, the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely 
used by the public in general, and there is nothing to distinguish them from any 
other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property 
belongs to a private corporation.”  (Id. at pp. 502-503.)  The high court stated:  
“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the 
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory 
and constitutional rights of those who use it.”  (Id. at p. 506.) 
This court followed the high court’s decision in Marsh to hold that a 
shopping center could not prohibit a union’s peaceful picketing of one of the 
shopping center’s stores.  (Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & 
Confectionery Workers’ Union (1964) 61 Cal.2d 766 (Schwartz-Torrance).)  We 
recognized that peaceful picketing by a labor union “involves an exercise of the 
 
8
constitutionally protected right of freedom of speech.”  (Id. at p. 769.)  We 
rejected the shopping center’s argument that its right to “the exclusive possession 
and enjoyment of private property” outweighed the union’s right to picket:  
“Because of the public character of the shopping center, however, the impairment 
of plaintiff’s interest must be largely theoretical.  Plaintiff has fully opened his 
property to the public.”  (Id. at p. 771.) 
In In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845, we reiterated that private property 
that was open to the public in the same manner as public streets or parks could 
constitute a public forum for free expression, holding that protesters had the right 
to express their opposition to the war in Vietnam by distributing leaflets in Union 
Station in Los Angeles, “a spacious area open to the community as a center for rail 
transportation” that was owned by three railroad companies.  (Id. at p. 847.)  This 
court reasoned that, with regard to distributing leaflets, “a railway station is like a 
public street or park.  Noise and commotion are characteristic of the normal 
operation of a railway station.  The railroads seek neither privacy within nor 
exclusive possession of their station.  They therefore cannot invoke the law of 
trespass against petitioners to protect those interests. [¶] Nor was there any other 
interest that would justify prohibiting petitioners’ activities.  Those activities in no 
way interfered with the use of the station.  They did not impede the movement of 
passengers or trains, distract or interfere with the railroad employees’ conduct of 
their business, block access to ticket windows, transportation facilities or other 
business legitimately on the premises.  Petitioners were not noisy, they created no 
disturbance, and did not harass patrons who did not wish to hear what they had to 
say. [¶] Had petitioners in any way interfered with the conduct of the railroad 
business, they could legitimately have been asked to leave.”  (Id. at pp. 851-852, 
fn. omitted.) 
 
9
In In re Lane (1969) 71 Cal.2d 872, we applied our earlier holding in 
Schwartz-Torrance to conclude that a union had a right to distribute handbills on a 
privately owned sidewalk outside a business.  We held that the sidewalk “is not 
private in the sense of not being open to the public.  The public is openly invited 
to use it in gaining access to the store and in leaving the premises.”  (Id. at p. 878.)  
We held, therefore, that the privately owned sidewalk was “a public area in which 
members of the public may exercise First Amendment rights,” including 
peacefully distributing handbills:  “[W]hen a business establishment invites the 
public generally to patronize its store and in doing so to traverse a sidewalk 
opened for access by the public the fact of private ownership of the sidewalk does 
not operate to strip the members of the public of their rights to exercise First 
Amendment privileges on the sidewalk at or near the place of entry to the 
establishment.  In utilizing the sidewalk for such purposes those seeking to 
exercise such rights may not do so in a manner to obstruct or unreasonably 
interfere with free ingress or egress to or from the premises.”  (Ibid.) 
During the interim between our decisions in Schwartz-Torrance and Lane, 
the United States Supreme Court adopted a similar position, holding in Food 
Employees v. Logan Plaza (1968) 391 U.S. 308 (disapproved in Hudgens v. NLRB 
(1976) 424 U.S. 507, 518) that peaceful picketing by union members of a business 
in a shopping center that employed nonunion workers was protected by the First 
Amendment.  The high court observed that that the shopping center in Logan 
Plaza “is clearly the functional equivalent of the business district” in Marsh.  
(Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 318.)  The high court 
emphasized the importance of recognizing a union’s right to peacefully picket in a 
shopping center:  “Business enterprises located in downtown areas would be 
subject to on-the-spot public criticism for their practices, but businesses situated in 
 
10
the suburbs could largely immunize themselves from similar criticism by creating 
a cordon sanitaire of parking lots around their stores.  Neither precedent nor 
policy compels a result so at variance with the goal of free expression and 
communication that is the heart of the First Amendment.”  (Id. at pp. 324-325.) 
In Diamond v. Bland (1970) 3 Cal.3d 653 (Diamond I), we went one step 
further than the decision in Logan Plaza.  Logan Plaza held that a shopping center 
could not prohibit a union from peacefully picketing one of the stores in the 
center, but the issue in Diamond I was whether a privately owned shopping center 
could prohibit free speech activity that was unrelated to the business of the center.  
In Diamond I, a large privately owned shopping center refused to allow a group 
called the People’s Lobby to solicit signatures on two antipollution initiative 
petitions.  We noted that the United States Supreme Court had held in Logan 
Plaza that “a shopping center could not absolutely prohibit union picketing of a 
business located within the Center,” but had “expressly declined to decide whether 
‘respondents’ property rights could, consistently with the First Amendment, justify 
a bar on picketing which was not thus directly related in its purpose to the use to 
which the shopping center property was being put.’ [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 661.)  
We observed that, prior to the decision in Logan Plaza, we had “reached an 
identical result” in Schwartz-Torrance, holding that a shopping center could not 
prohibit peaceful union picketing of a business in the center and, in Lane, had 
extended that holding to apply to a privately owned sidewalk in front of a 
business.  (Ibid.)  We concluded that it was settled that a shopping center could not 
prohibit free speech activity, such as union picketing, that was related to the 
business of the shopping center:  “This series of cases involving union picketing in 
shopping centers establishes constitutional protection for picketing and other First 
 
11
Amendment activities which are related in their purpose to the normal use to 
which the shopping center property is devoted.”  (Ibid.) 
The issue presented in Diamond I was whether a privately owned shopping 
center could prohibit free speech activity that was unrelated to the business of the 
shopping center.  We acknowledged that it was relevant that in both Schwartz-
Torrance and Logan Plaza “the unions involved were picketing businesses located 
within the shopping centers,” because that fact “strengthened the interest of the 
petitioners in their exercise of the First Amendment activities inside the shopping 
centers.”  (Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d 653, 662.)  We explained:  “When the 
activity to be protected is the right to picket an employer, the location of the 
employer’s business is often the only effective locus; alternative locations do not 
call attention to the problem which is the subject of the picketing and may fail to 
apply the desired economic pressure.”  (Ibid.)  But even though the interest in 
conducting free speech activity that is unrelated to the business of the shopping 
center is significantly less than the interest of a union to picket a business, it 
remained sufficiently substantial to outweigh the owner’s interest in prohibiting 
such activity:  “Therefore, although there is arguable merit to defendants’ position 
that plaintiffs’ interest in the exercise of their First Amendment rights at the 
Center may be less compelling than the First Amendment interests involved in 
Schwartz-Torrance, Logan Plaza, and Lane, their contention does not justify 
striking the balance in favor of defendants’ property rights.  As we have explained, 
plaintiffs’ interest is of significant constitutional dimension, while defendants’ 
concern is no stronger than the interests of the property owners in Schwartz-
Torrance, Logan, and Lane.”  (Id. at p. 663.)  Thus, a privately owned shopping 
center must permit not only peaceful picketing of businesses in the center, but 
 
12
further must permit free speech activity that is unrelated to the business of the 
shopping center. 
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 
(1972) 407 U.S. 551, took a different course and disagreed with our decision in 
Diamond I, holding to the contrary that a privately owned shopping center could 
prohibit First Amendment activity that was unrelated to the business of the center. 
In light of the high court’s decision in Lloyd, we reconsidered our decision 
in Diamond I and, in Diamond v. Bland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 331, 332 (Diamond II), 
held that a privately owned shopping center could prohibit free speech activity that 
was unrelated to the operation of the shopping center.  Justice Mosk, joined by 
Justice Tobriner and, in part, by Justice Sullivan, filed a lengthy and impassioned 
dissent, urging the court to adhere to its decision in Diamond I on the basis of the 
California Constitution.  He wrote:  “For a number of years cases in this state even 
prior to the federal decision in [Logan Plaza] have held that union members enjoy 
the right to picket an employer on the property of a privately owned shopping 
center.  These decisions emphasized that an employee who sought to bring his 
grievance to the attention of the public and apply economic sanctions against his 
employer could effectively do so only at the place where the business was located, 
and that any incidental impairment of the shopping center owner’s property rights 
was largely theoretical since he had opened his premises to the public and his right 
in the property was ‘worn thin by public usage.’ [Citations.] . . . [¶] The Diamond 
[I] opinion recognized that although Schwartz-Torrance and Lane were factually 
distinguishable in some respects, the distinction did not justify striking a new 
balance to limit plaintiff’s freedom of expression.”  (Diamond II, supra, 11 Cal.3d 
331, 341 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) 
 
13
The United States Supreme Court then abandoned its holding in Logan 
Plaza that a shopping center could not prohibit a union from peacefully picketing 
one of the stores in the center by holding in Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 
507, 518, that “the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Lloyd cannot be squared 
with the reasoning of the Court’s opinion in Logan [Plaza].”  The United States 
Supreme Court thus held that the First Amendment did not guarantee the right to 
free speech in a shopping mall.  This court, however, did not follow the lead of the 
high court.  Rather, we heeded the wisdom of Justice Mosk’s dissent in Diamond 
II and held in Pruneyard that the California Constitution granted a right to free 
speech in a privately owned shopping center.  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 
899, 902.) 
Our decision that the California Constitution protects the right to free 
speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not, stems 
from the differences between the First Amendment to the federal Constitution and 
article I, section 2 of the California Constitution.  We observed in Gerawan 
Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 486, that the free speech clause in 
article I of the California Constitution differs from its counterpart in the federal 
Constitution both in its language and its scope.  “It is beyond peradventure that 
article I’s free speech clause enjoys existence and force independent of the First 
Amendment’s.  In section 24, article I states, in these very terms, that ‘[r]ights 
guaranteed by [the California] Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution.’  This statement extends to all such rights, 
including article I’s right to freedom of speech. For the California Constitution is 
now, and has always been, a ‘document of independent force and effect 
particularly in the area of individual liberties.’  [Citations.]”  (Gerawan Farming, 
Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 489-490.)  “As a general rule, . . . article I’s 
 
14
free speech clause and its right to freedom of speech are not only as broad and as 
great as the First Amendment’s, they are even ‘broader’ and ‘greater.’ [Citations.]”  
(Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th 468, 491.) 
In Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 902, high school students in the mall 
were prohibited from soliciting support for their opposition to a United Nations 
resolution against Zionism.  We held  that the mall could not prohibit the students’ 
efforts despite the fact that this free speech activity was unrelated to the business 
of the center.  (Ibid.)  In so holding, we relied upon our earlier decision in 
Schwartz-Torrance, which, we noted, “held that a labor union has the right to 
picket a bakery located in a shopping center.”  (Id. at p. 909.)  We cautioned, 
however, that we did not “imply that those who wish to disseminate ideas have 
free rein,” noting our previous “endorsement of time, place, and manner rules.”  
(Id. at p. 910.)  We also repeated Justice Mosk’s observation in his dissent in 
Diamond II that compelling a shopping center to permit “ ‘[a] handful of 
additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in 
connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure 
that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations [citation] 
would not markedly dilute defendant’s property rights.’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at 
p. 911, quoting Diamond II, supra, 11 Cal.3d 331, 345, dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)5 
                                              
5  
The shopping center in Pruneyard appealed our decision to the United 
States Supreme Court, arguing that it violated the shopping center’s constitutional 
right to control the use of its private property.  (Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, supra, 447 U.S. 74, 79.)  The high court disagreed, noting that its decision 
in Lloyd did not “limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its 
sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more 
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”  (Id. at p. 81.)  The 
court rejected the argument that compelling the shopping mall to permit 
expressive activity amounted to a taking of its private property, observing that it 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
15
The Mall argues that its rule banning speech that advocates a boycott is a 
“reasonable regulation” designed to assure that free expression activities “do not 
interfere with normal business operations” within the meaning of our decision in 
Pruneyard.  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 911.)  According to the Mall, it 
“has the right to prohibit speech that interferes with the intended purpose of the 
Mall,” which is to promote “the sale of merchandise and services to the shopping 
public.”  We disagree. 
It has been the law since we decided Schwartz-Torrance in 1964, and 
remains the law, that a privately owned shopping center must permit peaceful 
picketing of businesses in shopping centers, even though such picketing may harm 
the shopping center’s business interests.6  Our decision in Diamond I recognized 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
would not “unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping 
center.  The PruneYard is a large commercial complex that covers several city 
blocks, contains numerous separate business establishments, and is open to the 
public at large.  The decision of the California Supreme Court makes it clear that 
the PruneYard may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and 
manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial 
functions.”  (Id. at p. 83.) 
6  
The Mall argues that we cannot rely upon the decisions in Schwartz-
Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766, and In re Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d 872, because 
they were based upon the First Amendment, but we have held that the “fact that 
those opinions cited federal law that subsequently took a divergent course does not 
diminish their usefulness as precedent.”  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 908.)  
As the plurality in Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013 later observed:  “Although all of these cases relied on the 
First Amendment and the pre-Lloyd decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
. . . Robins [v. Pruneyard Shopping Center] found many of the principles 
enunciated in these cases persuasive in interpreting California’s free speech 
clause. [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 1032 (plur. opn. of Brown, J.), fn. omitted.) 
 
16
that citizens have a strengthened interest, not a diminished interest, in speech that 
presents a grievance against a particular business in a privately owned shopping 
center, including speech that advocates a boycott. 
In so holding in Diamond I, we added the caveats to which Justice Mosk 
referred in his dissent in Diamond II (11 Cal.3d 331, 345), which we discussed in 
Pruneyard (23 Cal.3d 899, 911) and upon which the Mall in the present case 
relies: that a shopping center may prohibit conduct “calculated to disrupt normal 
business operations” or that would result in “obstruction of or undue interference 
with normal business operations.”  (Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d 653, 665-666.)  
But this does not mean that shopping centers can prohibit speech that advocates a 
boycott.  In adding these caveats recognizing a shopping center’s right to impose 
reasonable regulations upon expressive activity, we used as examples our 
decisions in Schwartz-Torrance and Lane, both of which recognized the right of a 
union to picket a business and advocate a boycott.  We expressly noted that we 
were approving regulations that would impose “reasonable limitation[s] as to time, 
place, or manner.”  (Diamond I, at p. 665.)7  In light of the fact that we expressly 
relied upon, and extended, our decisions in Schwartz-Torrance and Lane, which 
approved union activity advocating a boycott, it would make no sense to interpret 
                                              
7  
We provided examples of such regulations: “Moreover, the trial court 
findings in the instant action demonstrate the ability of Inland Center to regulate 
the various sales promotions and displays that are permitted in the common 
aisleways: ‘In every instance where a promotion is held, it is closely regulated as 
to time, date, location, number of people or exhibits involved, manner of 
presentation and security factors.’  Similar regulations, if not repressive in scope, 
can be devised to protect Inland Center from actual or potential danger of First 
Amendment activities being conducted on its premises in a manner calculated to 
disrupt normal business operations and to interfere with the convenience of 
customers.”  (Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d 653, 665.) 
 
17
this language in Diamond I (and its subsequent references in the dissent in 
Diamond II and the decision in Pruneyard) to suggest that shopping centers may 
prohibit speech that advocates a boycott.8 
The level of scrutiny with which we review a restriction of free speech 
activity depends upon whether it is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, 
or manner of speech or restricts speech based upon its content.  A content-neutral 
regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech is subjected to intermediate 
scrutiny to determine if it is “(i) narrowly tailored, (ii) serves a significant 
government interest, and (iii) leaves open ample alternative avenues of 
                                              
8  
The United States Supreme Court recognized that, under the First 
Amendment, speech that does no more than attempt to peacefully persuade 
customers not to patronize a business cannot be banned on the ground that it 
interferes with normal business operations.  The high court held that the fact that 
customers might be persuaded not to patronize a business did not justify restricting 
speech advocating a boycott:  “It may be that effective exercise of the means of 
advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from 
entering into advantageous relations with the business establishment which is the 
scene of the dispute.  Every expression of opinion on matters that are important 
has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather than another 
group in society.  But the group in power at any moment may not impose penal 
sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely 
on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent 
with its interests. . . . We hold that the danger of injury to an industrial concern is 
neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of 
freedom of discussion . . . .”  (Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 104-105, 
italics added, fn. omitted.) 
 
This important distinction between urging customers to boycott a business 
and physically impeding access to that business was recognized in People v. Poe 
(1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, which affirmed convictions for trespass of 
protesters who blocked the entrance to a bank, while recognizing the right of the 
protesters to peacefully picket, observing that the protesters “may call the bank to 
task for its wrongs, real or not, but they may not themselves interfere with 
anything but the minds of their audience.”  (Id. at p. Supp. 937.) 
 
18
communication. [Citation.]”  (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los 
Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 364 (Alliance).)  A content-based restriction is 
subjected to strict scrutiny.  “[D]ecisions applying the liberty of speech clause [of 
the California Constitution], like those applying the First Amendment, long have 
recognized that in order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny (i.e., time, place, and 
manner) review, a regulation must be ‘content neutral’ [citation], and that if a 
regulation is content based, it is subject to the more stringent strict scrutiny 
standard.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 364-365, fn. omitted.)9 
Prohibiting speech that advocates a boycott is not a time, place, or manner 
restriction because it is not content neutral.  The Mall’s rule prohibiting persons 
from urging a boycott is improper because it does not regulate the time, place, or 
manner of speech, but rather bans speech urging a boycott because of its content.  
Restrictions upon speech “ ‘that by their terms distinguish favored speech from 
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.’ 
[Citation.]”  (DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 
877.) 
The Mall argues that its rule prohibiting speech that urges a boycott is “a 
‘content-neutral’ restriction under California law because it applies to any and all 
requests for a consumer boycott of the Mall’s merchants . . . regardless of the 
subject matter or viewpoint of the speaker advocating the boycott . . . .”  The Mall 
is mistaken.  The Mall’s rule prohibiting all boycotts may be viewpoint neutral, 
                                              
9  
“Clearly, government has no power to restrict [expressive] activity because 
of its message. Our cases make equally clear, however, that reasonable ‘time, 
place and manner’ regulations may be necessary to further significant 
governmental interests, and are permitted.”  (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 
408 U.S. 104, 115, fns. omitted.) 
 
19
because it treats all requests for a boycott the same way,10 but it is not content 
neutral, because it prohibits speech that urges a boycott while permitting speech 
that does not. 
In Boos v. Barry (1987) 485 U.S. 312, 315, the high court considered a 
provision that prohibited “the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign 
embassy if that sign tends to bring that foreign government into ‘public odium’ or 
‘public disrepute.’ ”  This provision was content based, because whether a sign 
was permitted depended upon whether it was “critical of the foreign government 
or not.  One category of speech has been completely prohibited . . . .”  (Id. at 
pp. 318-319.)11  The high court rejected the argument that the provision was 
content neutral because the government did not select between viewpoints, but 
rather prohibited all signs adverse to a foreign government’s policies:  “While this 
prevents the display clause from being directly viewpoint-based, . . . it does not 
render the statute content-neutral. . . . [A] regulation that ‘does not favor either 
side of a political controversy’ is nonetheless impermissible because the ‘First 
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends . . . to prohibition of 
public discussion of an entire topic.’ [Citation.] Here the government has 
determined that an entire category of speech — signs or displays critical of foreign 
governments — is not to be permitted.”  (Id. at p. 319.)  We find this reasoning 
                                              
10  
The parties dispute whether the rule is viewpoint neutral.  We express no 
view on this question. 
11  
This portion of Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by only two other 
justices: Justices Stevens and Scalia.  But Justice Brennan made clear in his 
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Marshall, that he agreed the 
provision was content based and wrote separately to distance himself from other 
language discussing the secondary effects of the speech.  (Boos v. Barry, supra, 
485 U.S. 312, 334 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.).) 
 
20
persuasive; the Mall has prohibited an entire category of speech — speech that 
advocates a boycott.  Thus, the Mall’s rule is content based and must be given 
strict scrutiny.  (Alliance, supra, 22 Cal.4th 352, 365; U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs 
Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 
1157, 1170.)  
The Mall asserts that our decision in Alliance, supra, 22 Cal.4th 352, 
supports its position that its rule is not content based, but the Mall’s reliance is 
misplaced.  In that case, we held that “an ordinance . . . that is directed at activity 
involving public solicitation for the immediate donation or payment of funds 
should not be considered content based . . . and should be evaluated under the 
intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to time, place, and manner regulations, 
rather than under the strict scrutiny standard.”  (Id. at p. 357.)  The ordinance at 
issue in Alliance made it unlawful to solicit or beg “ ‘with the purpose of obtaining 
an immediate donation of money or other thing of value’ ” in certain areas, such as 
near a bank or automated teller machine, or in any public place if the solicitation 
was done in an “ ‘aggressive manner.’ ”  (Id. at p. 363, italics omitted.) 
The Mall argues that “boycotts can be prohibited for the same reason that 
the solicitation of funds can be prohibited,” but this argument does not withstand 
analysis.  In holding that the ordinance in Alliance banning solicitation for 
immediate donation or exchange of funds was content neutral, we explained that 
the United States Supreme Court used the rule “that a restriction is content neutral 
if it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’ 
[Citations.]”  (Alliance, supra, 22 Cal.4th 352, 367.)  This rule does “not require 
literal or absolute content neutrality, but instead require[s] only that the regulation 
be ‘justified’ by legitimate concerns that are unrelated to any ‘disagreement with 
the message’ conveyed by the speech. [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 368.)  We then 
 
21
focused on the manner in which a face-to-face solicitation asking for an immediate 
donation is conducted.  By its very nature, this type of solicitation “may create 
distinct problems and risks that warrant different treatment and regulation” than 
other forms of speech-related activity.  (Id. at p. 357.)  Such a solicitation was 
“ ‘disruptive of business’ ” because it “ ‘impedes the normal flow of traffic.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 369, quoting United States v. Kokinda (1990) 497 U.S. 720, 733-734.)  
Additionally, “ ‘[i]n-person solicitation of funds, when combined with immediate 
receipt of that money, creates a risk of fraud and duress.’ ”  (Alliance, at p. 371, 
quoting International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 
672, 705 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  The ordinance in Alliance was directed at 
the conduct and intrusiveness that face-to-face solicitation for immediate donation 
or exchange of funds inherently promotes.  We therefore found the ban on certain 
solicitations to be content neutral because it was justified by legitimate concerns 
that were unrelated to content. 
The rule at issue here prohibiting speech that advocates a boycott cannot 
similarly be justified by legitimate concerns that are unrelated to content.  
Peacefully urging a boycott in a mall does not by its nature cause congestion, nor 
does it promote fraud or duress.  “[T]he boycott is a form of speech or conduct 
that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”  (NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 907, 
fn. omitted.)  Our California Constitution provides greater, not lesser, protection 
for this traditional form of free speech.  (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 
supra, 24 Cal.4th 468, 491.)  Unlike the ordinance in Alliance, the Mall’s rule in 
the instant case is not concerned with the inherently intrusive nature of such 
speech, but rather with the impact such speech may have on its listeners.  
“Handbills . . . ‘depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea.’  [Citation.]”  
 
22
(DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568, 580.)  
“The loss of customers because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a 
business . . . is the result of mere persuasion . . . .”  (Ibid.)  The Mall is concerned 
that the speech may be effective and persuade customers not to patronize a store.  
But “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”  
(Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992) 505 U.S. 123, 134 [basing the 
amount of a permit fee on the degree of hostility the message would create is a 
content-based regulation of speech].)  The Mall seeks to prohibit speech 
advocating a boycott solely because it disagrees with the message of such speech, 
which might persuade some potential customers not to patronize the stores in the 
Mall. 
The Mall relies heavily on a Court of Appeal decision that also involved a 
solicitation of funds and predates our decision in Alliance.  H-CHH Associates v. 
Citizens for Representative Government (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1203 (H-
CHH), held that a shopping mall properly could prohibit the solicitation of 
“ ‘contributions or donations from anyone on center property.’ ”  Citing as 
authority only a decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Intern. Soc. for 
Krishna v. New Jersey Sports, etc. (3d Cir. 1982) 691 F.2d 155), the Court of 
Appeal in H-CHH concluded that “the solicitation of political funds is entirely 
incompatible with the normal character and function of the Plaza.  The Plaza exists 
as a center of commerce . . . . Any activity seeking to solicit political contributions 
necessarily interferes with that function by competing with the merchant tenants 
for the funds of Plaza patrons.”  (H-CHH, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1221.) 
Although as noted above, solicitations for immediate donations may be 
restricted based upon “the inherently intrusive and potentially coercive nature of 
that kind of speech” (Alliance, supra, 22 Cal.4th 352, 373), the decision in H-CHH 
 
23
was incorrect that solicitations of funds may be prohibited simply because they 
compete with the shopping center’s merchants.  Relying upon the fact that a 
solicitation of funds competes with the shopping center merchants, as did the court 
in H-CHH and as does the Mall in this case, would lead to the conclusion that all 
solicitations of funds may be prohibited, even those that are not inherently 
intrusive or potentially coercive.  Such a restriction would be too broad.12 
We conclude, therefore, that the Mall’s rule prohibiting all speech that 
advocates a boycott is content based and thus is subject to strict scrutiny.  
(Alliance, supra, 22 Cal.4th 352, 365.)  Strict scrutiny for purposes of the federal 
Constitution means that a content-based speech restriction must be “necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest, and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”  
(Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland (1987) 481 U.S. 221, 231.)  The right 
to free speech in shopping centers that constitute public fora under the California 
Constitution deserves no less protection.  In order to ensure that regulations of 
speech are not “based on hostility ― or favoritism ― towards the underlying 
message expressed’ ” (Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994) 512 U.S. 
622, 642), a content-based rule limiting expression in a shopping center that 
constitutes a public forum must be necessary to serve a compelling interest and be 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  
The Mall’s rule prohibiting speech that advocates a boycott cannot 
withstand strict scrutiny.  The Mall’s purpose to maximize the profits of its 
merchants is not compelling compared to the Union’s right to free expression.  
                                              
12  
We disapprove the decision in H-CHH Associates v. Citizens for 
Representative Government, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, to the extent it states a 
contrary view. 
 
24
Urging customers to boycott a store lies at the core of the right to free speech.  
(NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., supra, 458 U.S. 886, 911 [“boycott clearly 
involved constitutionally protected activity”].)  “The safeguarding of these rights 
to the ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that 
falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion is 
essential to free government.  Those who won our independence had confidence in 
the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover 
and spread political and economic truth.”  (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. 
88, 95.)  The fact that speech may be convincing is not a proper basis for 
prohibiting it.  The right to free speech “extends to more than abstract discussion, 
unrelated to action.  The First Amendment is a charter for government, not for an 
institution of learning.  ‘Free trade in ideas’ means free trade in the opportunity to 
persuade to action, not merely to describe facts. [Citations.]”  (Thomas v. Collins 
(1945) 323 U.S. 516, 537.)  The Mall cites no authority, and we are aware of none, 
that holds that a store has a compelling interest in prohibiting this traditional form 
of free speech. 
A shopping mall is a public forum in which persons may reasonably 
exercise their right to free speech guaranteed by article I, section 2 of the 
California Constitution.  Shopping malls may enact and enforce reasonable 
regulations of the time, place and manner of such free expression to assure that 
these activities do not interfere with the normal business operations of the mall, 
but they may not prohibit certain types of speech based upon its content, such as 
prohibiting speech that urges a boycott of one or more of the stores in the mall. 
 
25
CONCLUSION 
We hold that, under California law, Fashion Valley Mall may not maintain 
and enforce against the Union its rule 5.6.2, which prohibits “[u]rging, or 
encouraging in any manner, customers not to purchase the merchandise or services 
offered by any one or more of the stores or merchants in the shopping center.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
I dissent. 
By a bare four-to-three majority, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center 
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 899 (Pruneyard)1 overruled a decision then only five years old 
and held that public free speech rights exist on private property under the 
California Constitution.  Pruneyard was wrong when decided.  In the nearly three 
decades that have since elapsed, jurisdictions throughout the nation have 
overwhelmingly rejected it.  We should no longer ignore this tide of history.  The 
time has come for us to forthrightly overrule Pruneyard and rejoin the rest of the 
nation in this important area of the law.  Private property should be treated as 
private property, not as a public free speech zone. 
Even if we do not overrule Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, we should at 
least not carry it to the extreme that the majority does.  Pruneyard is easily 
distinguished.  The free speech activity that Pruneyard sanctioned was compatible 
with normal use of the property.  The opposite is true here.  Fashion Valley Mall is 
a privately owned shopping center.  A shopping center exists for the individual 
                                              
1  
Courts have not been consistent in giving this case a shorthand name.  For 
example, the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Golden Gateway 
Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013 (Golden 
Gateway) called it Robins for short.  But because the majority here calls it 
Pruneyard, I will do so also. 
 
2 
businesses on the premises to do business.  Urging a boycott of those businesses 
contradicts the very purpose of the shopping center’s existence.  It is wrong to 
compel a private property owner to allow an activity that contravenes the 
property’s purpose. 
I.  THE FACTS 
Fashion Valley Mall, LLC (Fashion Valley), owns a large shopping mall in 
San Diego (the mall).  Fashion Valley permits expressive activities inside the mall 
by those who apply for a permit and agree to abide by its regulations.  An 
applicant for a permit must state the purpose of the proposed expressive activity, 
submit a copy or a description of any materials and signs to be used, list the 
participants, provide a $50 refundable cleaning deposit, and purchase insurance as 
necessary.  Additionally, pursuant to Fashion Valley’s rule 5.6.2 (rule 5.6.2), the 
applicant must agree to abstain from “Urging, or encouraging in any manner, 
customers not to purchase the merchandise or services offered by any one or more 
of the stores or merchants in the shopping center.” 
In October 1998, approximately 30 members and supporters of the Graphic 
Communications International Union (Union) gathered outside the Robinsons-
May department store at the mall to protest actions taken by The San Diego 
Union-Tribune newspaper.  The Union decided to stage the protest there because 
the store advertises in the newspaper and is located not far from the newspaper’s 
premises.  The protestors distributed a handbill addressed, “Dear customer of 
Robinsons-May,” that outlined the Union’s grievances against the newspaper.  
The handbill made clear “[t]o the employees of Robinsons-May . . . [the] dispute 
is with The San Diego Union-Tribune. We are not asking you to cease working for 
your employer.”  The Union encouraged patrons and employees to call the 
newspaper’s chief executive officer.  The handbill stated that “Robinsons-May 
 
3 
advertises with the Union-Tribune.”  After about 15 minutes, a representative of 
Fashion Valley approached the protestors, explained that a permit was required for 
expressive activity, and told them to leave the premises, which they did. 
Later, instead of applying for a permit, the Union filed a charge with the 
National Labor Relations Board (Board) alleging that Fashion Valley had violated 
section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)), which 
makes it an unfair labor practice to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees 
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7” of the act.  That section 
guarantees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  (29 U.S.C. § 157.)  An 
administrative law judge, and later the Board, held that Fashion Valley did violate 
section 8(a)(1).  The Board ordered Fashion Valley to rescind rule 5.6.2. 
Fashion Valley petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit to review the 
Board’s decision.  The court “h[e]ld that whether Fashion Valley violated the 
[National Labor Relations Act] depends upon whether it had the right, under 
California law, to maintain and enforce its anti-boycott rule.”  (Fashion Valley 
Mall, LLC. v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 2006) 451 F.3d 241, 242 (Fashion Valley).)  
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, former rule 29.8 (now rule 8.548), it 
requested us to answer the following question:  “Under California law may 
Fashion Valley maintain and enforce against the Union its Rule 5.6.2?”  (Fashion 
Valley, supra, at p. 246.)  We granted the request.  Later, we permitted the Union 
to intervene in the action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (a).) 
 
4 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The issue here is straightforward:  Does the California Constitution compel 
the owner of a private shopping center to allow persons on its property to urge 
potential customers to boycott businesses within the center?  Saying yes, the 
majority relies primarily on Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899.  To place this issue 
in perspective, I first provide a historical review.  Then I will explain why we 
should overrule Pruneyard.  Finally, I will show that Pruneyard, even if still 
considered the law in California, is entirely distinguishable. 
A.  Historical Review 
At one time, both this court and the United States Supreme Court held that, 
in some situations, constitutional free speech rights existed on private property.  
(E.g., Food Employees v. Logan Plaza (1968) 391 U.S. 308 (Logan) [private 
shopping center]; Marsh v. Alabama (1946) 326 U.S. 501 (Marsh) [company 
town]; Diamond v. Bland (1970) 3 Cal.3d 653 (Diamond I) [private shopping 
center]; In re Lane (1969) 71 Cal.2d 872 (Lane) [stand-alone grocery store]; 
Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union 
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 766 (Schwartz-Torrance) [private shopping center].)  Because 
both the United States and the California Constitutions seemed to be the same in 
this regard, this court did not clearly establish which Constitution it relied on in 
finding free speech rights.  We treated the two Constitutions as essentially 
interchangeable.  For example, our opinion in Schwartz-Torrance, supra, at pages 
771-773, relied in part on Marsh, as well as cases from other states, and our 
opinions in Lane, supra, at pages 874-877, and Diamond I, supra, at pages 658-
660, relied heavily on Marsh and Logan.  As of 1970, our jurisprudence was 
consistent with high court jurisprudence in this area. 
 
5 
All this changed in the decade of the 1970’s regarding private shopping 
centers.  In two decisions, the United States Supreme Court reversed Logan, 
supra, 391 U.S. 308, and held that no free speech rights exist in private shopping 
centers under the United States Constitution.  (Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 
507 (Hudgens); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972) 407 U.S. 551 (Lloyd Corp.).)  As 
we recently explained, the Hudgens court “held that a union had no federal 
constitutional right to picket in a shopping center because the actions of the private 
owner of the shopping center did not constitute state action.”  (Golden Gateway, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1019 (plur. opn.).) 
The question whether the new high court decisions affected California law 
arose promptly.  Even before the second of these decisions, we reconsidered our 
decision in Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d 653, in a second case of the same name.  In 
Diamond v. Bland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 331 (Diamond II), we followed the high court 
and held that “defendants’ private property interests outweigh plaintiffs’ own 
interests in exercising First Amendment rights in the manner sought herein.”  (Id. 
at p. 335.)  We noted that “[o]ur prior holding in [Diamond I]  was based primarily 
upon our interpretation of the rationale of two cases of the United States Supreme 
court, namely, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, and Food Employees v. Logan 
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308.”  (Id. at pp. 333-334.)  Diamond II was decided by a vote of 
four to three.  Justice Burke authored the majority opinion and was joined by 
Chief Justice Wright and Justices McComb and Clark.  Justice Mosk, the author of 
Diamond I, dissented in Diamond II and was joined by Justice Tobriner and, in 
part, Justice Sullivan.  Justice Mosk would have reaffirmed the holding of 
Diamond I but grounded it solely on California constitutional law. 
Our adherence to high court jurisprudence in this area did not last long.  
Shortly after our 1974 decision in Diamond II, supra, 11 Cal.3d 331, the 
 
6 
composition of this court changed.  This change led, in 1979, to another four-to-
three decision.  In Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, we overruled Diamond II, 
supra, 11 Cal.3d 331, and effectively reinstated Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d 653.  
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Newman and joined by Chief Justice 
Bird and Justices Tobriner and Mosk, relied heavily on Justice Mosk’s dissenting 
opinion in Diamond II.  It noted that the California Constitution uses different 
language than does the United States Constitution in guaranteeing free speech 
rights.  California Constitution, article I, section 2, subdivision (a) provides:  
“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.  A law may not restrain or 
abridge liberty of speech or press.”  The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution more concisely protects “the freedom of speech.” 
Pruneyard held “that the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a 
petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution.”  
(Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 902.)  More generally, it stated that the 
California Constitution “protect[s] speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in 
shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.”  (Id. at p. 910.)  
Justice Richardson, joined by Justices Clark and Manuel dissented.  (Id. at pp. 
911-916.)  The United States Supreme Court later affirmed Pruneyard (sub nom. 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) 447 U.S. 74), but only to the extent 
of holding that federal law did not prevent California from providing greater 
speech rights on private shopping centers than the federal Constitution provides. 
As I show in the next section, history has not been kind to the majority 
opinion in Pruneyard. 
 
7 
B.  Pruneyard Revisited 
Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, was controversial when decided.  In the 
three decades since then, it has received scant support and overwhelming rejection 
around the country.  As the 2001 plurality opinion in Golden Gateway noted, 
“most of our sister courts interpreting state constitutional provisions similar in 
wording to California’s free speech provision have declined to follow 
[Pruneyard].  [Fn. omitted.]  Indeed, some of these courts have been less than kind 
in their criticism of [Pruneyard].”  (Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 
1020-1021.)2  The opinion fully supported these statements with citations to 
decisions from the many jurisdictions that have considered but rejected 
Pruneyard, and the few that have followed its lead to a limited extent.  I need not 
repeat those citations.  (Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1021-1022, fn. 
5.) 
As of the time we decided Golden Gateway, the following states, many 
with constitutional free speech language essentially identical to California’s, had 
rejected any form of a Pruneyard approach regarding shopping centers and free 
speech rights:  Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.  
                                              
2  
For example, the New York Court of Appeal, in an opinion that found no 
right to free speech in a privately owned shopping center under a state 
constitutional free speech provision that is essentially identical to California’s, 
described this court’s “4-3 decision” in Pruneyard as “hardly persuasive authority.  
That court, in overruling its own contrary precedent only five years old [citing 
Diamond II, supra, 11 Cal.3d 331], simply said that the California Constitution 
protected speech and petitioning at private shopping centers.  There is not much 
analysis and only tangential discussion, if it can be called that, of the State action 
question.  It is evident that the result in [Pruneyard] was dictated by ‘the accident 
of a change of personalities in the Judges of [the] court’ . . . .”  (SHAD Alliance v. 
Smith Haven Mall (N.Y. 1985) 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1215, fn. 5.) 
 
8 
(See Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1020-1021 & fn. 5; United Food v. 
Crystal Mall Associates (Conn. 2004) 852 A.2d 659, 667-668 (United Food); 
Annot., Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private Shopping Center’s 
Prohibition or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or Activity 
(1997) 52 A.L.R.5th 195.)  Nevertheless, the Golden Gateway court followed 
Pruneyard as the law of California.  The plurality, which I joined, did so 
reluctantly, and only due to principles of stare decisis.  (Golden Gateway, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 1022.) 
In the six years since we decided Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1013, 
we have become yet more isolated.  No new state has followed our lead.  Two 
more states have refused to follow the Pruneyard approach:  Hawaii and Iowa.  
(State v. Viglielmo (Hawaii 2004) 95 P.3d 952; City of West Des Moines v. Engler 
(Iowa 2002) 641 N.W.2d 803.)  Moreover, as I explain, the few states that 
previously adopted an approach like Pruneyard are generally retreating.3 
I need not review all of the cases because three years ago the Connecticut 
Supreme Court did so.  (United Food, supra, 852 A.2d 659, 667-668.)  In United 
Food, the court unanimously refused to reconsider its earlier decision of Cologne 
v. Westfarms Associates (Conn. 1984) 469 A.2d 1201 (Cologne), which had 
rejected Pruneyard even though Connecticut’s constitutional free speech 
provisions are essentially identical to California’s.  (United Food, supra, 852 A.2d 
                                              
3  
Additionally, the Supreme Courts of Illinois, Nebraska, and Nevada have 
cited but declined to follow the Pruneyard approach in various free speech 
contexts.  (People v. DiGuida (Ill. 1992) 604 N.E.2d 336, 340, 342-347; Dossett v. 
First State Bank, Loomis (Neb. 2001) 627 N.W.2d 131, 138-139; S.O.C., Inc. v. 
Mirage Casino-Hotel (Nev. 2001) 23 P.3d 243, 250.) 
 
9 
659.)4  It explained that “[s]ince the decision in Cologne, courts in other 
jurisdictions that have considered this issue overwhelmingly have chosen not to 
interpret their state constitutions as requiring private property owners, such as 
those who own large shopping malls, to permit certain types of speech, even 
political speech, on their premises.”  (United Food, at p. 667.)  It summarized the 
law that most of the country has adopted:  “Under Cologne, as in the 
overwhelming majority of our sister jurisdictions, the size of the mall, the number 
of patrons it serves, and the fact that the general public is invited to enter the mall 
free of charge do not, even when considered together, advance the plaintiff’s cause 
in converting private action into government action.”  (Id. at p. 673.) 
As explained in United Food, supra, 852 A.2d at pages 668-670, only four 
other states (Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington) retain any 
form of independent state grounds in this area.  Washington has very narrowly 
confined its original independent state ground decision.  (Southcenter Joint 
Venture v. National Democratic Policy Com. (Wn. 1989) 780 P.2d 1282; see the 
discussions in Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1021, fn. 5; United Food, 
supra, 852 A.2d at pp. 668, 669 & fns. 13, 16; and State v. Viglielmo, supra, 95 
P.3d at pp. 964-965.)  Regarding Massachusetts, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
explained, “ ‘The Massachusetts decision was expressly limited to the solicitation 
of signatures needed by political candidates for access to the ballot and relied, not 
upon its freedom of speech provision, but upon a state constitutional guarant[ee] 
                                              
4  
Article I, section 4, of the Connecticut Constitution provides:  “Every 
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”  Article I, section 5, of that Constitution 
provides:  “No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of 
speech . . . .”  (See United Food, supra, 852 A.2d at p. 660, fns. 3, 4.) 
 
10 
of an equal right to elect officers and to be elected, for public employments.  
[Citation.]’ ”  (United Food, supra, 852 A.2d at p. 669, quoting the court’s earlier 
decision in Cologne, supra, 469 A.2d 1201.)  Colorado recently permitted a 
shopping center to adopt substantial restraints on the exercise of free speech on its 
property despite its earlier Pruneyard-like stance.  (Robertson v. Westminster Mall 
Co. (Colo.Ct.App. 2001) 43 P.3d 622.)  That leaves New Jersey; and even that 
state has not, to my knowledge, carried its jurisprudence to the extreme the 
majority is leading California. 
The time has come to recognize that we are virtually alone, and that 
Pruneyard was ill-conceived.  Oregon originally had its own version of 
Pruneyard, albeit one based on a different constitutional provision.  (Lloyd 
Corporation v. Whiffen (Or. 1993) 849 P.2d 446.)  That decision, also by a four-
to-three vote, relied in part on “the decision by the California Supreme Court in 
[Pruneyard] . . . .”  (Id. at p. 454.)  Later the Oregon Supreme Court concluded 
that Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, supra, 849 P.2d 446, was erroneous and 
“disavowed” it.  (Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc. (Or. 2000) 11 P.3d 228, 243; see 
Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1021, fn. 5.)  It also refused to find free 
speech rights on private property under the Oregon Constitution’s free speech 
provision, which, like Connecticut’s, is essentially identical to California’s.  
(Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., supra, at pp. 243-244, fn. 19.)5   We should do 
what Oregon did and disavow Pruneyard. 
                                              
5  
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution provides:  “No law shall be 
passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, 
write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be 
responsible for the abuse of this right.”  (See Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 
supra, 11 P.3d at p. 231, fn. 3.) 
 
11 
In Lloyd Corp., the high court distinguished its earlier decision of Marsh, 
supra, 326 U.S. 501, which involved a company town.  It explained that Marsh 
“involved the assumption by a private enterprise of all of the attributes of a state-
created municipality and the exercise by that enterprise of semi-official municipal 
functions as a delegate of the State.  In effect, the owner of the company town was 
performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the 
State.”  (Lloyd Corp., supra, 407 U.S. at p. 569, fn. omitted.)  But a shopping 
center is different from a company town.  “[P]roperty [does not] lose its private 
character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes.  Few would argue that a free-standing store, with abutting parking space 
for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely because the public is 
invited to shop there.  Nor is size alone the controlling factor.  The essentially 
private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not 
change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern 
shopping center.”  (Ibid.)  I, along with the many jurisdictions that have followed 
the high court, agree. 
As the plurality opinion in Golden Gateway explained, principles of stare 
decisis should make us cautious before we overrule a previous case.  There should 
be a special justification for doing so.  (Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 
1022.)  But we do sometimes overrule our prior decisions, and appropriately so.  
In this case it would be entirely proper to do so, especially in light of our 
increasing isolation in the six years since Golden Gateway was decided.  The 
Pruneyard court itself ignored stare decisis.  It overruled a decision of this court 
that was only five years old at the time.  Why should a decision that overruled a 
recent decision, and that identified nothing that occurred in the intervening years 
to justify the action, be sheltered from reconsideration?  In essence, there were two 
 
12 
four-to-three decisions in the 1970’s that reached opposite results.  Indeed, of the 
11 justices who participated in Diamond II, supra, 11 Cal.3d 331, or Pruneyard, 
supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, or both, a majority of six followed or would have followed 
the high court (Chief Justice Wright and Justices McComb, Burke, Clark, 
Richardson, and Manuel), and only five urged or joined what would become the 
Pruneyard approach (Chief Justice Bird, and Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Sullivan, 
and Newman).  I would join the majority of six, as have most of the jurisdictions 
that have considered the question. 
Moreover, the Pruneyard court made no effort to find anything in the text 
of article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution, its historical 
sources, or the process that led to its adoption, that suggests any intent to extend 
its terms to private property.  Instead, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed 
in a case that rejected Pruneyard even though Wisconsin’s constitutional free 
speech provision is essentially identical to California’s, “the majority [in 
Pruneyard] did not analyze the constitutional sections, but rather summarily stated 
the protections granted by those sections.  It appears to be more a decision of 
desire rather than analytical conviction.”  (Jacobs v. Major (Wis. 1987) 407 
N.W.2d 832, 841.)6 
I do not denigrate free speech rights.  As the New York Court of Appeal 
stated in its opinion rejecting Pruneyard, “the right to free expression is one of this 
Nation’s most cherished civil liberties.”  (SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 
                                              
6  
Article I, section 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  “Every person 
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that right, and  no laws shall be passed to restrain or 
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”  (See Jacobs v. Major, supra, 407 
N.W.2d at p. 833, fn. 1.) 
 
13 
supra, 488 N.E.2d at p. 1212; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 
970-977 (dis. opn. of Chin, J.).)  But free speech rights and private property rights 
can and should coexist.  The last 30 years have not seen a significant diminution 
of free speech opportunities in the many jurisdictions that have followed the high 
court’s lead regarding private property.  The Union here is not without recourse if 
it wants to urge a lawful boycott of any business or engage in any other protected 
freedom of expression.  It has plenty of outlets to exercise its free speech rights.  If 
it wants to picket, it simply has to do so on public property or seek permission 
from private property owners.  The Union can exercise its free speech rights, for 
example, just outside the shopping center, including near the entrances.  
Additionally, and especially today with the advent of the Internet and other forms 
of mass communication, “other public forums [are available] for the distribution 
and dissemination of . . . ideas.”  (Diamond II, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 334.)  But I 
would find no right to engage in speech activity on private property over the 
owner’s objection.
 
14 
C.  Pruneyard Distinguished 
Even if we stubbornly maintain our position of “magnificent isolation”7 in 
the face of this tide of history, we should not carry Pruneyard to the extreme of 
forbidding private property owners from controlling expressive activity on their 
property — urging a boycott of its tenants — that is inimical to the purpose for 
which the property is being used.  Pruneyard is readily distinguishable. 
Assuming free speech rights exist in shopping centers, the fact remains that 
they are not Hyde Park in London, Central Park in New York, or the National 
Mall in Washington, D.C., areas that are quintessential public free speech zones.  
Shopping centers are private property dedicated to doing business.  Their owners 
should not have to permit all expressive activity that the California and United 
States Constitutions protect in public places.  A shopping center owner should be 
allowed to enforce reasonable restrictions to protect its business activities even if 
the government could not impose similar restrictions.  Rule 5.6.2 is such a 
restriction. 
In Pruneyard, the activity the majority compelled a shopping center owner 
to permit on its property was the soliciting of signatures for a petition to the 
government.  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 902.)  Likewise, in Diamond I, 
the activity was “securing signatures on two anti-pollution initiative petitions.”  
(Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 655.)  Soliciting petition signatures, and much 
other free speech activity, although perhaps not furthering the shopping center’s 
business, is fully compatible with that business.  The same is not true here.  The 
                                              
7  
The court in Andersen v. United States (9th Cir. 1956) 237 F.2d 118, 127, 
so described the position of the two jurisdictions that adopted or followed the 
infamous “product rule” for insanity stated in Durham v. United States (D.C. Cir. 
1954) 214 F.2d 862. 
 
15 
purpose of a shopping center is to provide a place where the tenants, i.e., the 
individual businesses, may do business.  Urging a boycott of a tenant’s business is 
antithetical to that purpose.  We should not compel shopping center owners to 
permit activity that interferes with the purpose for the center’s existence. 
Pruneyard’s own analysis permits this conclusion.  “By no means do we 
imply that those who wish to disseminate ideas have free rein. . . .  [A]s Justice 
Mosk stated in Diamond II, ‘ . . .  A handful of additional orderly persons 
soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection [with the shopping 
center], under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these 
activities do not interfere with normal business operations (see Diamond [I] at p. 
665) would not markedly dilute defendant’s property rights.’  (11 Cal.3d at p. 345 
(dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)”  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 910-911, italics 
added.) 
Diamond I was also limited in its reach.  We stressed that “[i]t bears 
repeating that no evidence was presented to the trial court that plaintiffs’ activities 
actually interfered with the normal business operations of the [shopping center].  
Plaintiffs do not contend that they are entitled to use private property for the 
dissemination of ideas without limitations imposed by reasonable regulations 
designed to protect the business activities of the Center. . . .  [¶]  We impose no 
unrealistic burden on the operators of shopping centers in insisting that their 
control over First Amendment rights [obviously, now limited to free speech rights 
under the California Constitution] be exercised, if at all, through reasonable 
regulations calculated to protect their business interests rather than through 
absolute bans on all nonbusiness-related activities.  Shopping centers . . . are not 
incapable of regulating permissible activities.”  (Diamond I, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 
665, fn. omitted, italics added.) 
 
16 
A reasonable interpretation of these decisions, and one that would at least 
nudge this court toward the judicial mainstream, is that shopping center owners 
may impose reasonable regulations to protect their business interests, and that rule 
5.6.2 is such a reasonable regulation.  Compelling property owners to permit use 
of their property that would hinder business success would markedly dilute their 
property rights.  Fashion Valley should at least be able to protect its business 
interests by enforcing rule 5.6.2. 
It is true that two old cases that predate Hudgens, supra, 424 U.S. 507, 
Lloyd Corp., supra, 407 U.S. 551, and Diamond II, supra, 11 Cal.3d 331, involved 
boycotts.  (Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d 872; Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766.)  
It is also true that the majority opinion in Pruneyard cited those cases with 
approval.  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 908-909.)  But the fact remains that 
they were based in large part on federal law that has since been discredited, and 
the belief that federal and state constitutional law coincided in this area.  
Pruneyard should at least be interpreted on its facts and its holding.  It cannot 
somehow have revalidated old cases that had different facts and were decided 
under a legal landscape that is now obsolete. 
Lane involved “an individual grocery store.”  (Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 
873.)  But recent Court of Appeal decisions have definitively held that Pruneyard 
does not extend to stand-alone stores like the one in Lane.  (Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Young (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 106 [grocery store]; Trader Joe’s Co. v. 
Progressive Campaigns, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 425 [retail store]; see also 
Waremart Foods v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 2004) 354 F.3d 870 [grocery store].)  
These cases found Pruneyard’s citation of Lane and Schwartz-Torrance not 
dispositive.  As the Alberston’s, Inc. court noted in refusing to follow Lane, “we 
are not aware of any legal principle by which a court, years after rendering a 
 
17 
decision, can retroactively alter its ratio decidendi.”  (Albertson’s, Inc., supra, at p. 
123; see also Trader Joe’s Co., supra, at p. 436 [Pruneyard’s reference “to Lane 
was brief and collateral”].) 
Today’s majority opinion carefully says nothing casting doubt on the recent 
cases involving stand-alone stores, and they are surely correct.  But if the older 
cases cited in Pruneyard are no longer authoritative in that respect, why should 
they be any more authoritative in this respect?  In fact, they are no longer 
authoritative at all.  If we are to preserve Pruneyard, we should at least interpret it 
on its own, and not be bound by ancient cases based on law that has long since 
disappeared. 
The majority is also inconsistent in its treatment of First Amendment law.  
It rejects First Amendment law entirely as it relates to private property — law that 
is directly on point here — but then it relies heavily on First Amendment cases 
that involve restrictions the government has placed on speech.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 19-24.)  It cites the federal strict scrutiny test that applies to governmental 
restrictions and that requires the government to show the restriction serves a 
compelling state interest.  (Id. at p. 23.)  It relies on, and quotes selectively from, 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994) 512 U.S. 622, 642, which says, 
“ ‘The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility — or 
favoritism — towards the underlying message expressed.’ ”  (Italics added; see 
maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  It then asserts, with no apparent awareness of the 
distinction — vital under the First Amendment — between governmental action 
and actions by private property owners, that the same rules apply here.  (Ibid.) 
The strict scrutiny test that applies to the government has no application to 
action by private landowners involving their own property.  Even if it did, it would 
have to be adapted to recognize the fact that no governmental action is involved.  
 
18 
The compelling state interest test would have to yield to some kind of “compelling 
landowner interest” test.  A property owner can assert its own interests only, not 
the state’s.  If that test applied here, it would be met.  Furthering business on its 
private property is not only a compelling interest, it is the property owner’s 
primary concern; doing business is the reason the shopping center exists.  In 
implementing rule 5.6.2, Fashion Valley is merely preventing persons from using 
its property to urge potential patrons not to do business with its tenants.  The 
Union may urge a boycott if it wishes, just not on private property without 
permission. 
In finding no compelling interest, the majority merely asserts that the right 
of persons to use property they do not own is more compelling than the 
landowner’s right to use its own property for the very purpose it exists.  (See maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 23.)  I would instead give some priority to the property’s owner.  
The bankruptcy of the majority’s position is shown by its further assertion that 
“[t]he Mall cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that holds that a store has 
a compelling interest in prohibiting this traditional form of free speech.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 24.)  Good reason exists for this lack of authority.  Because most 
of the country, including the United States Supreme Court, rejects the very notion 
of free speech rights on private property, the issue never arises.  Only in California 
is the issue relevant.  The only tradition that is relevant to this case is the tradition, 
followed in most of the country, of finding no free speech rights on private 
property.  The majority is trampling on tradition, not following it. 
I would find rule 5.6.2 valid even under Pruneyard. 
 
19 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
I would answer the certified question the District of Columbia Circuit 
posed as follows:  Under California law, Fashion Valley may maintain and enforce 
against the Union its rule 5.6.2.  Additionally, I would overrule Pruneyard, supra, 
23 Cal.3d 899.  The time has come for this court to join the judicial mainstream. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX (on certification pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court) 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S144753 
Date Filed: December 24, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of W. McLin Lines, W. M. Lines; Luce, Forward, Hamitlon & Scripps, Littler Mendelson and 
Theodore R. Scott for Petitioner. 
 
Katten Muchin Rosenman, Thomas J. Leanse, Stacey McKee Knight; Law Offices of Jo Anne M. Bernhard 
and Jo Anne M. Bernhard for International Council of Shopping Centers and California Business 
Properties Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Alan Schlosser; Peter Eliasberg; and David Blair-Loy for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern 
California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and American Civil Liberties Union of 
San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
David A. Habenstreit, Anne Marie Lofaso, Arthur F. Rosenfeld, John E. Higgins, Jr., Margery E. Lieber 
and Aileen A. Armstrong for Respondent. 
 
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, David A. Rosenfeld, Caren P. Spencer, Richard D. Prochazka & Associates 
and Richard D. Prochazka for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Law Offices of Carroll & Scully, Donald C. Carroll and Charles P. Scully II for California Labor 
Federation, AFL-CIO, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
W. M. Lines 
Law Offices of W. McLin Lines 
3838 Carson Street, Suite 102 
Torrance, CA  90503 
(310) 316-4749 
 
Thomas J. Leanse 
Katten Muchin Rosenman 
2029 Century Park East, Suite 2600 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 788-4400 
 
David A. Rosenfeld 
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld 
1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200 
Alameda, CA  94501 
(510) 337-1001