Title: Prime v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Prime v. State1989 WY 6767 P.2d 149Case Number: 86-203Decided: 01/06/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICK PRIME, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court, 
SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 

Wyoming Public Defender Program: Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. 
Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., and Terry L. Armitage, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In the context of its 
peculiar facts, leading to a conviction of aggravated robbery in violation of § 
6-2-401(c)(ii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.),1 this 
case presents questions previously addressed by this court. Error is asserted by 
Rick Prime because the other participant in the robbery was brought before the 
jury and, at that time, asserted his constitutional privilege not to testify by 
refusing to take the oath of a witness. Additional errors are asserted 
attributable to the failure to provide counsel in connection with voice 
exemplars and a photographic array by means of which identifications were made 
by some witnesses; the use of testimony from witnesses who arguably had been 
hypnotized for the purpose of attempting to enhance their recollections; and the 
failure to give certain proffered defense instructions. We conclude that these 
claims of error are controlled by prior cases decided by this court, and either 
no error was committed or, in the context of all the circumstances, any error 
was not prejudicial. The judgment and sentence entered in the district court is 
affirmed.

 
 

[¶2.]     The appellant, Rick 
Prime (Prime), states the following issues in his brief:

 
 
"I. Whether it was error for the trial 
court to allow the prosecution to call Darwin Haselhuhn as a witness knowing 
that he would exercise his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to 
testify.

 
 
"II. Whether it was error to allow 
evidence of unduly prejudicial voice and photographic identifications to go to 
the jury.

 
 
"III. Whether hypnotically enhanced 
testimony should be allowed in a criminal trial.

 
 
"IV. Whether the court erred in 
refusing two jury instructions and in refusing to allow trial counsel to present 
argument on those instructions."

 
 
The State of Wyoming restates the same 
issues in this way:

 
 
"I. Was there error in witness 
Haselhuhn's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to 
testify?

 
 
"II. Was there error in the procedures 
for voice and photographic identification?

 
 
"III. Is hypnotically enhanced 
testimony permissible in a criminal trial?

 
 
"IV. Did the trial court err in 
refusing appellant's proffered jury instructions?"

 
 

[¶3.]     On the night of April 
21, 1984, the assistant manager and a clerk at the Safeway Store in Green River, Wyoming were the victims of an armed robbery. 
The store was closed and locked at approximately 10:00 P.M. that night, and the 
rest of the store employees had departed. The assistant manager and the clerk 
were counting the money from the several checkout counter tills when the 
assistant manager noticed two men approaching down one of the aisles. The men 
were wearing masks and were armed, one with a sawed-off shotgun and the other 
with a large knife. The first was attired in a dark coat or jacket and a 
ski-type mask, the other wore a green coat or jacket with a Halloween style mask 
that had long black hair and a face described as orange/yellow. These two men, 
after threatening the assistant manager and the clerk, entered a booth that 
served as an office and proceeded to empty the tills into a white bag. The man 
with the shotgun forced the assistant manager to open the bottom safe by 
prodding him with the shotgun.

 
 

[¶4.]     The robbers made the 
assistant manager and the clerk accompany them into a back storeroom where they 
then tied their hands and feet and covered their eyes with duct tape. The robber 
wearing the Halloween mask removed it at this juncture, and the assistant 
manager, by tilting his head backward, was able to peer beneath the tape and see 
this individual. At trial, the assistant manager testified that he observed a 
man with long blondish-brown hair wearing a white tee shirt and gold-rim 
glasses.

 
 

[¶5.]     The robbers then left 
the store and, after freeing himself, the assistant manager promptly reported 
the robbery to the police. Both the assistant manager and the clerk furnished 
statements to investigating officers that same evening at the scene of the 
crime. The assistant manager advised the officers that he recognized the man 
whom he had seen as a member of the crew who cleaned the floors in the store. He 
did not know the man's name but, when shown a photographic array including a 
picture of Darwin Haselhuhn, he identified him as the man he had seen. Later, 
when he saw Haselhuhn in person at the preliminary examination, he positively 
identified him as the robber. Haselhuhn was convicted of this armed robbery, and 
that conviction was affirmed by this court in Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 
(Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1987).

 
 

[¶6.]     The assistant manager 
and the clerk both explained to the investigating officers that only one of the 
robbers spoke during the course of the robbery. The investigating officers then 
obtained a tape with several voice exemplars, the last of which was Prime's 
voice. The voice exemplars were then played to these witnesses, and the 
assistant manager identified Prime's voice as the voice of the other robber. The 
store clerk selected the third exemplar and the Prime exemplar as being similar 
to the voice that she had heard at the robbery.

 
 

[¶7.]     During the course of 
the investigation, the police officers arranged hypnotic sessions for the 
assistant manager and the store clerk. At trial, the assistant manager testified 
that he did not think he ever had been under hypnosis, and he said that his 
identification was not assisted by anything that occurred during the hypnotic 
session. The clerk, who had testified at Haselhuhn's trial, did not testify in 
Prime's case, but a statement that she had made to the police officers was 
received into evidence. Prime called an expert witness in his defense who 
explained the difficulties and problems with hypnosis and the possible results 
in terms of effect upon the recollection of a witness.

 
 

[¶8.]     The evidence against 
Prime, in addition to that of the two victims of the robbery, encompassed 
in-court identification of Haselhuhn by the assistant manager and other 
witnesses; Prime's association with Haselhuhn; his claim that he had spent the 
entire evening of April 21, 1984 with Haselhuhn; and incriminating allusions to 
the robbery which Prime and Haselhuhn had made to other witnesses who testified. 
In addition, Prime was identified as having entered the Safeway Store between 
9:30 and 10:00 P.M. on the night of the robbery. That witness, and others, had 
seen Haselhuhn enter the store also, but no one had seen either of them 
leave.

 
 

[¶9.]     During the course of 
the trial, the record reflects that when Darwin Haselhuhn was presented in the 
courtroom, the following occurred:

 
 
"[COUNTYATTORNEY]: State calls Darwin Haselhuhn as 
an adverse witness.

 
 
"THE COURT: Have you been 
sworn?

 
 
"MR. HASELHUHN: No, I haven't, Your 
Honor. I decline to be sworn in and I decline to answer any 
questions.

 
 
"THE COURT: You'll be sworn in, mister. 
Now raise your right hand.

 
 
"MR. HASELHUHN: (No 
response).

 
 
"THE COURT: Raise your right 
hand.

 
 
"MR. HASELHUHN: I decline to be sworn 
in, Your Honor.

 
 
"THE COURT: All right. I find you in 
direct contempt of Court. I remand you to the custody of the Sheriff to be held 
there until you answer and/or sworn or sentenced otherwise; is that 
clear?

 
 
"MR. HASELHUHN: That's clear, Your 
Honor.

 
 
"THE COURT: All right. Take him 
out."

 
 
Following this colloquy, a motion for a 
mistrial was made on behalf of Prime claiming that the circumstances were 
prejudicial. That motion was denied, and the court then gave the following 
advice to the jury:

 
 
"THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, the 
fact that I found Mr. Haselhuhn in contempt of Court and remanded him to the 
custody of the Sheriff, has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of Mr. Prime. 
You will not consider it. You may continue."

 
 
The appearance in the courtroom had 
been preceded by a conference in chambers in which the court granted immunity to 
Haselhuhn from the use of his testimony against him, and Haselhuhn affirmed his 
position that he would not testify because of possible prejudice relating to 
federal charges and other charges against him. At that conference, Prime's 
counsel also complained about the loss of any opportunity to 
cross-examine.

 
 

[¶10.]  
We address, first, the claim of error arising out of the circumstances in 
which Haselhuhn was presented before the jury and exercised his right not to 
testify by refusing to be sworn as a witness. In substance, the inverse of this 
situation occurred at Haselhuhn's trial when Prime, upon being presented for the 
administration of the oath, advised the court in front of the jury that he would 
refuse to testify. The court there addressed the claim that Haselhuhn had been 
deprived of his right of confrontation because he was not permitted to 
cross-examine Prime with respect to conduct which was perceived by Haselhuhn as 
being equivalent to testimony. We there explained that there was no violation of 
the right of confrontation under those circumstances.

 
 

[¶11.]  
In that case, like this case, Haselhuhn moved for a mistrial, but he did 
not request that a cautionary instruction be given to the jury. In this case, 
Prime moved for a mistrial, but he made no complaint with respect to the advice 
which the district court gave the jury. We reiterate our statement in Haselhuhn, 
727 P.2d  at 286, that "such incidents should be avoided in the trial of a case," 
and we remind counsel and the trial bench that the record can be made outside of 
the presence of the jury which avoids any claim of prejudice. In this instance, 
like Haselhuhn, 727 P.2d  at 280, we conclude that what occurred is not a ground 
for reversal because, in the context of the trial, this event did not prejudice 
Prime. The trial court did give a cautionary instruction which, in effect, 
advised the jury that it should not consider the appearance of Haselhuhn as 
relating to the guilt or innocence of Prime. Furthermore, Haselhuhn had been 
presented in court several times prior to this event and identified by various 
witnesses. The jury had no way of knowing that Haselhuhn already had been found 
guilty of the crime, and what occurred was what would be expected of an 
individual who had been identified by witnesses at the trial as the other 
robber. In somewhat similar circumstances, federal appellate courts have 
concluded that prejudice was avoided by cautionary instructions to the jury. 
Labbe v. Berman, 621 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Watson, 591 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2414, 
60 L. Ed. 2d 1070 (1979). We conclude that no error occurred with respect to 
Haselhuhn's presentation as a witness.

 
 

[¶12.]  
Prime argues in his next claim of error that he was entitled to the 
assistance of counsel in connection with the photographic array and the voice 
exemplars which were utilized to assist in the identification of the 
perpetrators of the robbery. Prime invites the court to extend the right to 
counsel to preindictment stages which would include the preparation of the 
photographic array and the voice exemplars. Counsel is not required, in such 
instances, by the United States Constitution, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 
92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972), because that right attaches only upon the 
commencement of adversary judicial proceedings. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 
84 A.L.R. 527 (1932). This same rule has been espoused by this court and applied 
to claims arising under the Wyoming Constitution. Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d 629 
(Wyo. 1984); Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024 
(Wyo. 1983); Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156 
(Wyo. 1983). 
We are not persuaded to overrule these authorities, and we find no error with 
respect to the claim of right to counsel in connection with the pre-indictment 
identification proceedings.

 
 

[¶13.]  
Prime argues, in addition, that these identification procedures did not 
meet the requirements of due process articulated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 2d 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 (1952). We conclude 
that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting the 
introduction of the photographic array. The photographic array was substantially 
similar to the one which was utilized in McDaniel v. State, 632 P.2d 534 
(Wyo. 1981), 
as to which we concluded:

 
 
"* * * [T]o the reasonable person it is 
just a photograph presented to support the testimony. Admission of evidence is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent a clear abuse of 
discretion will not be disturbed." McDaniel, 632 P.2d  at 
536.

 
 

[¶14.]  
We have examined the record to determine if the totality of the 
circumstances was suggestive, and we conclude that it was not. Both the 
assistant manager and the clerk fulfilled the criteria articulated in Reinholt 
v. State, 601 P.2d 1311 (Wyo. 1979), as adopted 
in Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1982), 
and also Sears v. State, 632 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1981). Both witnesses had ample 
opportunity to view and listen to the robbers. Their attention definitely was 
focused upon these individuals. They gave accurate descriptions of the robbers 
prior to the presentation of the photographic array. They both were rather 
certain of the identification at the time of personal confrontation, and the 
time between the personal confrontation and the crime was not unduly enlarged. 
With respect to the voice exemplars, only one of the robbers spoke during the 
robbery, and the witnesses were both clear on their identification of that 
exemplar. We hold that no error occurred in the admission of the photographic 
array or the voice exemplars at trial. Prime's claim of error with respect to 
the testimony of witnesses who had been hypnotized is substantially the same as 
that presented by Haselhuhn in his appeal. The only difference is that Prime had 
ample opportunity to be aware of the hypnotic session and, in fact, did produce 
expert testimony addressed to the vagaries and problems of hypnosis. The major 
development in the law since the case of Haselhuhn v. State, supra, was decided 
is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Rock v. Arkansas, 
483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987), which refused to approve a 
per se rule prohibiting testimony by a defendant who had been hypnotized. The 
Supreme Court held that such a rule infringed upon the Sixth Amendment right of 
an accused to make his defense by presenting his version of the events in his 
own words. In the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the status 
of state law generally with respect to witnesses who have been hypnotized, and 
the decision seems compatible with the position which has been espoused by this 
court in prior cases. Consequently, we adhere to the rule adopted in Haselhuhn, 
727 P.2d  at 280; Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985); Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983); and Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 
(Wyo. 1982). A 
witness who has been hypnotized is not incompetent and may testify. The 
circumstances surrounding the hypnosis can be presented to the jury, and the 
question is one of credibility.

 
 

[¶15.]  
Lastly, Prime complains of the failure to give two instructions which he 
contends set forth his theory of the case. Those requested instructions 
read:

 
 
"DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION # B

 
 
"A witness who has been hypnotized does 
not automatically become incompetent as a witness because of the hypnosis. His 
testimony, if believed by the jury, may be sufficiently convincing to persuade 
the decision; even though not corroborated or supported by other 
evidence.

 
 
"However, the jury should keep in mind 
that such testimony is always to be received with caution and weighed with great 
care. You should subject such testimony to careful examination in the light of 
all the other evidence in the case. You ought not to convict upon such testimony 
alone, unless after a careful examination of such testimony, you are satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of its reliability.

 
 
"Careful consideration must be given to 
the manner of the hypnosis in order to ascertain the testimony's reliability. 
You must assure yourselves that hypnotically enhanced testimony does not reflect 
suggested pseudo memories or fantasies that are accepted as real by the witness 
and hypnotist alike."

 
 
"DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION # H

 
 
"One of the most important issues in 
this case is the identification of the Defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. The State has the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the 
correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the Defendant before 
you convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant was the person who committed the crime, you must find the Defendant 
not guilty.

 
 
"Identification testimony is an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. Its value depends on the 
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense 
and to make a reliable identification later."

 
 
The court adequately advised the jury 
with respect to its prerogatives as to credibility and the burden of proof in 
other instructions. The proposed instructions by Prime are a skillful effort to 
induce the trial court to argue the case for the defense through its 
instructions.

 
 

[¶16.]  
Our rule is that a court may refuse a requested instruction if it has 
been covered by other instructions, Benson v. State, 571 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1977). The court 
also properly may refuse instructions which are argumentative or unduly 
emphasize one aspect of the case. Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1982). We hold that 
these criteria were satisfied in this instance.

 
 

[¶17.]  
So far as Prime's argument is concerned that these instructions set forth 
his theory of the case, we do not accept that invitation. Not every matter of 
trial strategy or tactics constitutes the theory of the defendant's case. We 
recognize that Prime's theory was that the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses 
was suspect and was not entitled to any moment in the deliberations of the jury. 
Nevertheless, that is simply Prime's theory with respect to this aspect of the 
evidence; we do not perceive that it was his theory of the case. His theory of 
the case was that someone else, not Prime, committed this robbery. We eschew a 
rule that every instruction offered by a defendant must be given if he 
characterizes it as incorporating his theory of the case.

 
 

[¶18.]  
We hold that there was no prejudicial error with respect to any of the 
matters complained of by Prime. The judgment and sentence of the district court 
is affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Section 6-2-401, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), provides, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) A person is guilty of robbery if 
in the course of committing a crime defined by W.S. 6-3-402 
he:

 
 
"(i) Inflicts bodily injury upon 
another; or

 
 
"(ii) Threatens another with or 
intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(c) Aggravated robbery is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more than 
twenty-five (25) years if in the course of committing the crime of robbery the 
person:

 
 
"(i) Intentionally inflicts or attempts 
to inflict serious bodily injury; or

 
 
"(ii) Uses or exhibits a deadly weapon 
or a simulated deadly weapon."

 
 
Section 6-3-402, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
"(a) A person who steals, takes and 
carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to deprive the 
owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny."

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶19.]  
This is the third appeal resulting from the Green 
River, Wyoming Safeway store robbery. In Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1987), (Haselhuhn I), the conviction of Darwin Haselhuhn was affirmed, in 
my opinion, in the face of most appalling trial circumstances. Next then In re 
Contempt of Haselhuhn, 740 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1987), (Haselhuhn II), he was called as a 
witness publicly before the jury under contended "use immunity" to testify 
against Rick Prime (Prime) in this case. After the grievous prejudice was 
committed in jury presentation upon his refusal to testify, he was found in 
contempt of court and thereafter sentenced for contempt, which decision was 
reversed by this court. 

 
 
1. JURY SHOW-UP FOR 
NON-TESTIMONY PRIVILEGE PLEA

 
 

[¶20.]  
Now presented as the separate trial of the alleged co-conspirator, this 
appeal presents the outrageous results demonstrated in the Engberg death penalty 
case, Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541 (Wyo.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984), pursued in Haselhuhn I, and now presented in 
full flower. These include questionable eye-witness identification and 
hypnotism, but more strikingly, trial process prejudice by presentation to the 
jury of a recalcitrant, recently convicted witness under suggestion of 
immunity.1 Like Haselhuhn I, the skunk was thrown 
into the jury box by prosecutorial conduct, but it was a different skunk by 
forcing public appearance of an individual recently convicted and frequently 
named in trial testimony. The smell was amplified by the district court 
admonition which could only serve to increase the prejudice when the court 
said:

 
 
THE COURT: All right. I find you in 
direct contempt of Court. I remand you to the custody of the Sheriff to be held 
there until you answer and/or sworn or sentenced otherwise; is that 
clear?

 
 
MR. HASELHUHN: That's clear, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE COURT: All right. Take him 
out.

 
 
And then, after mistrial was denied, 
the further emphasis afforded:

 
 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, the 
fact that I found Mr. Haselhuhn in contempt of Court and remanded him to the 
custody of the Sheriff, has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of Mr. Prime. 
You will not consider it. You may continue.

 
 

[¶21.]  
SweetwaterCounty, as a community with 
a medium-sized population and one major newspaper, belies any possibility that 
all one dozen of the sitting jurors had not been previously exposed to knowledge 
that Haselhuhn had been convicted for the Green River/Sweetwater County robbery. 
Prejudice in recalcitrant witness presentation to force privilege exercise 
publicly before the jury simply should not be acceptable and does not confine 
itself to equal protection and due process criteria of criminal prosecution. 
This constitutes the rankest character of prosecutorial prejudice and 
misconduct. Johnigan v. State, 482 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.Cr.App. 
1972).

 
 

[¶22.]  
I cannot, in repetition from Haselhuhn I, again re-emphasize sufficiently 
the disapproval I have for this tactic of engendered prejudice by procedure. I 
would repeat, as recently stated in Corson v. State, 766 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1988) by a 
historical quotation from a great American jurist, Judge Jerome 
Frank:

 
 
"A keen observer has said that `next to 
perjury, prejudice is the main cause of miscarriages of justice.' If government 
counsel in a criminal suit is allowed to inflame the jurors by irrelevantly 
arousing their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands a lethal 
weapon directed against defendants who may be innocent. He should not be 
permitted to summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice."

 
 
State v. Beuke, 30 Ohio St.3d 29, 526 N.E.2d 274, 293 (1988) (petition for certiorari filed 10/31/88) (quoting from 
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied 329 U.S. 742, 67 S. Ct. 49, 91 L. Ed. 640, reh'g denied 329 U.S. 826, 67 S. Ct. 182, 91 L. Ed. 701 (1946)). If convictions are to be obtained on facts and 
not infused prejudice, there is no place in criminal trials for this procedure, 
and alternatively, there are proper avenues for the exercise of the right not to 
testify to be recorded out of the presence of the absorbent jury for effect in 
persuasive character. See Lawrence v. State, 257 
Ga. 423, 360 S.E.2d 716 (1987) and Adkins v. 
State, 72 Md. App. 493, 531 A.2d 699 (1987), 
cert. granted 311 Md. 445, 535 A.2d 921 
(1988).

 
 
2. EYE-WITNESS 
EXAMINATION

 
 

[¶23.]  
As the expression goes, this court has now dropped the second shoe in 
blindly ignoring solutions to the pervasive eye-witness identification danger 
resulting in opportunity for false conviction. In Engberg, the majority abjured 
use of the well-established expert witness and this court now rejects the use of 
the special instruction launched by United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Clearly, in context of minority-majority rejection of the 
well-established and thoughtfully presented Telfaire instruction, as well as 
denial of the usage of the expert witness as decreed in Engberg, this state 
moves back into a century long gone as following a minority of courts who do not 
recognize either logic or volume of literature on the eye-witness identification 
quandary.

 
 
3. HYPNOTIC INFUSED 
TESTIMONY

 
 

[¶24.]  
The errors in this record do not there end. The hypnotic activity is 
still not sanitized since first involved in Engberg, although at least 
progression occurred from Haselhuhn I in that the expert witness was now 
permitted. Citations of the court to Rock v. Arkansas, 434 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987) does not strengthen the disingenuous posture compulsively continued 
for this jurisdiction. Comment, Rock v. Kansas: An Individual Inquiry Approach to the 
Admissibility of Hypnotically Induced Testimony, 37 Cath.U.L.Rev. 1171 (1988). 
Rock involved the constitutional right of a defendant to testify, as basic in 
constitutional protection to himself, and did not readjust the clearly apparent 
problems presented by possible hypnotic tampering of witnesses. At best, or at 
worst, even in the states affording a more liberal attitude in disapproval of 
possible alteration of testimony by hypnosis, the levels in Haselhuhn I and 
Prime here presented do not pass muster. Again, in finite regression, this state 
will stand far back from majority consensus in its present blindness to a 
recognized problem inflicting conviction process. People v. Zayas, 116 Ill. 2d 574, 113 Ill.Dec. 315, 515 N.E.2d 124 (1987).

 
 
4. RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL

 
 

[¶25.]  
The fourth issue presented attends to the right to counsel when 
photographic displays and voice exemplars are used for witness identification. 
This is not the pre-arraignment, pre-counsel appointment question of initiation 
of right to counsel raised in the handwriting exemplar identification case of 
Brunmeier v. State, 733 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1987).2 
This appellate issue relates to the right of the defendant to be represented 
first when he is forced to testify against himself by speaking designed words 
and then a recording is used with other samples for identification. Likewise, 
where no time expediency was involved, the opportunity of counsel to be present 
to see what actually occurred when photographic show of identification processes 
were pursued simply cannot be rejected if the supposition of a real right to 
counsel is fairly permitted. Since representation had been secured, I would not 
find the process to be constitutionally distinguishable from the most recent 
review of right to counsel by the United States Supreme Court in Satterwhite v. 
Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988), where examination 
of the charged individual by a psychiatrist was accomplished in the absence of 
his attorney.

 
 

[¶26.]  
It is apparent from examining the photographs and in listening to the 
tape that two features distinguished Prime. As to the photograph, any juror who 
has experience with criminal processes would have recognized an in-jail 
identification photograph when the name plate is hung by a chain from his neck, 
which chain can be clearly seen. The voice identification was also clearly 
identified since only this witness was given taped instructions as to what he 
was to say, while obviously such instructions as had been given to the other 
witnesses were not included on the tape excerpts. Had counsel for Prime been 
given the opportunity to be present at either incident or to examine the work 
product to be used, a clean up could simplistically have been provided so that 
the potentate of non-equivalency and unfairness would have been 
removed.

 
 

[¶27.]  
Recognizing the conviction to have been fueled and fertilized by what 
occurred: prejudice by procedure, hypnotism, denied instruction or expert 
testimony, and ignored post appointed right to effective assistance of counsel, 
I respectfully dissent from error absolving approval. I would reverse for 
retrial.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 I also have another serious concern 
from a speedy trial perspective, although not on issues argued below or 
presented here on appeal. With an offense that occurred on April 21, 1984, Prime 
was arrested on June 7, 1984, and was provided a preliminary hearing on June 25, 
1984. His date of district court arraignment is not of record but apparently 
occurred on July 5, 1984. Motion to suppress, motion for preservation of 
evidence, motion in limine and motion to reveal agreements were filed July 6, 
1984, with supporting memorandum filed December 12, 1984. A motion was filed 
December 27, 1984 by the prosecution for further time to respond up to and 
including January 10, 1985, which was apparently submitted ex parte and approved 
by order of the district court. The responsive brief was duly filed, and on 
January 22, 1985, the district court wrote counsel advising of some relief on 
the matter and that the prosecuting attorney would prepare an appropriate order 
which was never done. The prosecuting attorney filed a motion for trial setting 
on August 22, 1985, the case was then first set for trial April 8, 1986 and 
actually held on May 13, 1986, or slightly less than twenty-four months after 
the offense had occurred and slightly more than twenty-two months after 
arraignment in district court. Rule 204, Wyoming Uniform Rules for the District 
Courts provides:

 
 
(a) It is the responsibility of court 
and counsel to insure to each person charged with crime a speedy 
trial.

 
 
(b) A criminal charge shall be brought 
to trial within 120 days following the filing of information or 
indictment.

 
 
(c) The following periods shall be 
excluded in computing the time for trial:

 
 
(1) All proceedings related to the 
mental illness or deficiency of the defendant.

 
 
(2) Proceedings on another 
charge.

 
 
(3) Delay granted by the court pursuant 
to Section (d).

 
 
(4) The time between the dismissal and 
the refiling of the same charge.

 
 
(5) Delay occasioned by defendant's 
change of counsel or application therefor.

 
 
(d) Continuances may be granted as 
follows:

 
 
(1) On motion of defendant supported by 
affidavit of defendant and defendant's counsel.

 
 
(2) On motion of the prosecuting 
attorney or the court if:

 
 
(i) The defendant expressly consents; 
or

 
 
(ii) The state's evidence is 
unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

 
 
(iii) Required in the due 
administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced.

 
 
(e) Upon receiving notice of possible 
delay the defendant shall show in writing how the delay may prejudice his 
defense.

 
 
(f) If the defendant is unavailable for 
any proceeding at which his presence is required, the time period shall begin 
anew upon defendant's being available.

 
 
At least, in this case, Prime was out 
on bond during the delayed trial period.

 
 

2 In brief, the State 
contends:

 
 
In the case at bar, the photographic 
and voice identification procedures were executed before adversarial criminal 
proceedings were commenced against Appellant, therefore the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel did not attach at the time of the 
identifications.

 
 
The offense occurred April 21, 1984, 
and on June 6, a criminal warrant for aggravated robbery was issued and executed 
on June 7. On June 11, Mr. Robert J. Reese had entered an appearance as counsel, 
since the record reflects that he was given copies of documentation except 
affidavit for arrest warrant. Preliminary hearing was held June 25, and Prime 
was bound over to district court. The preliminary hearing was obviously a 
contested proceeding. The district court information was signed and filed July 
5, and motions to suppress voice identification and for preservation of evidence 
and motion in limine were served July 6. Two items of photographic 
identification were used: State's Exhibit 43, which is a collection of separate 
mug shots numbering six; and State's Exhibit 42, which is a photographic display 
including the photograph of Prime. It is simply not possible to tell from the 
record whether the photographic display was composed and then used for 
identification after Mr. Reese had been appointed to serve as counsel for Prime. 
As a matter of fact, the record does not even reflect how Mr. Reese came to be 
appointed.

 
 
A careful reading of the entire record as the 
transcripts then finally reveal that apparently the voice exemplars were played 
for the two principal witnesses on July 3, 1984, at a date substantially after 
counsel had been appointed and also after Prime had been bound over for trial to 
the district court. Clearly, no effort was made to permit defense counsel to 
either be available when the original search warrant exemplar was obtained from 
Prime, which date cannot be determined because the search warrant is not 
available, or when the identification session was conducted by presentation of 
the tape of the seven individuals to the two witnesses separately on July 3. 
Consequently, any general discussion in this context as defining an issue of the 
right to counsel prior to "commencement of adversarial criminal proceedings" 
against Prime has no factual validity in the record 
documentation.