Title: Carosi v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANGELA MARIE CAROSI 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100143 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
November 4, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in finding that three convictions for child endangerment 
in violation of Code § 40.1-103(A) were supported by 
sufficient evidence that the defendant endangered the lives of 
her three children by permitting illegal drugs to be kept in 
her home in a place accessible to the children.  
BACKGROUND 
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 
appeal of a criminal conviction, we review “the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party in the circuit court, and we accord the Commonwealth the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the 
evidence.”  Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 523, 527, 685 
S.E.2d 43, 45 (2009).  When so viewed, the evidence adduced at 
trial showed that shortly after 10 P.M. on February 28, 2008, 
Virginia State Police Special Agent Richard Boyd, Jr. executed 
a search warrant at 214 Oak Grove Lane in Stafford County.  
This residence is where Angela Marie Carosi lived with her 
three children, ages 10, 5 and 3, all of whom were present in 
the home at the time of the search.  Cavell Thomas, the father 
of two of the children, also frequently stayed in the 
residence.  However, Thomas was not present at the time of the 
search, as he was being held in custody on drug charges in 
another jurisdiction. 
In the master bedroom of the home, which Carosi shared 
with Thomas, Boyd found a glass jar containing marijuana, two 
“bongs” or smoking devices, a digital scale with a powdery 
residue, and plastic bags in an upper cabinet of an unlocked 
wardrobe.  In an unlocked safe inside the wardrobe, Boyd also 
found prescription bottles containing oxycodone and 
methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as MDMA or 
ecstasy.1  On top of the safe was a plate with two razor blades 
and powdered cocaine.  Boyd further observed that there was no 
lock on the master bedroom door and that all the drugs in the 
wardrobe would be within the reach of a small child. 
Boyd subsequently testified at trial that Carosi told him 
the smoking devices were in the wardrobe, that she kept 
clothing in the drawers of the wardrobe, and that the safe 
                     
1 There is conflicting testimony in the record as to the 
precise location of the safe and whether the locking mechanism 
of the safe was functional or not; however, it is undisputed 
that the safe was not locked and in a place accessible to the 
children when Boyd conducted the search. 
 
2
belonged jointly to her and Thomas.  She denied any knowledge 
of the drugs that Boyd had found inside the safe. 
On August 4, 2008, the Stafford County Grand Jury 
indicted Carosi for three counts of child abuse in violation 
of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) and three counts of child 
endangerment in violation of Code § 40.1-103(A), both offenses 
being Class 6 felonies.2  Carosi was also indicted for 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation 
of Code § 18.2-248.1 and three counts of possession of 
cocaine, oxycodone, and MDMA in violation of Code § 18.2-250.  
The Commonwealth subsequently dismissed the felony child abuse 
charges by nolle prosequi. 
On March 4, 2009, a two-day jury trial on the child 
endangerment and drug possession charges commenced in the 
Circuit Court of Stafford County.  Boyd testified concerning 
                     
2 In its sentencing order, the circuit court used the term 
“Child Neglect” to describe the offense defined by Code 
§ 18.2-371.1(B)(1) and “Child Cruelty” to describe the offense 
defined by Code § 40.1-103(A).  Although these terms track in 
part the titles of the respective code sections, they do not 
fully convey the nature or elements of the two offenses and 
the distinction between them.  For use in this opinion, we 
have adopted the terms used by the Court of Appeals in its 
order refusing Carosi’s appeal and in King v. Commonwealth, 56 
Va. App. 133, 692 S.E.2d 249 (2010), in which the Court of 
Appeals determined that child abuse and child endangerment are 
not the same offense, nor is one a lesser-included offense of 
the other and, thus, convictions under both statutes in a 
single trial does not violate double jeopardy principles.  Id. 
at 138-39, 692 S.E.2d at 252. 
 
3
the February 28, 2008 search of Carosi’s home as described 
above.  After presenting evidence from a forensic expert, who 
identified the marijuana, cocaine, oxycodone, and MDMA, the 
Commonwealth rested its case.   
Carosi moved to strike the child endangerment charges, 
contending that “[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that the 
children knew that there were drugs in the house.  There is no 
evidence whatsoever that there was drug use going on in front 
of these children.  There [is] no evidence whatsoever that 
[the children] actually had access to the bedroom and they 
could go in there.”  Thus, Carosi contended that the jury 
would have to speculate as to whether the children had 
actually been placed in a situation endangering their lives  
through her alleged willful or negligent conduct. 
The Commonwealth responded that the children had “access 
to dangerous drugs” because there were no “locks or any 
prohibitions on the door to prohibit the [children] from 
coming into their mother’s room.”  Thus, the Commonwealth 
asserted that the elements of Code § 40.1-103(A) could be 
satisfied “solely on the children’s access to the Schedule I 
or Schedule II drugs and marijuana.” 
Carosi responded that children merely having potential 
access to drugs was different from a case where “there is drug 
dealing going on in front of the children.”  She contended 
 
4
that the possibility of access to drugs is “no different than 
having a cabinet under the sink where you keep dangerous . . . 
cleaning supplies.”  She reiterated that the evidence did not 
show that “there was anything going on in front of the 
children or that the children even knew [the drugs were] there 
and had free access into the bedroom.”  The circuit court 
denied the motion to strike the child endangerment charges. 
Thereafter, Thomas was called as a witness for the 
defense.  Thomas took full responsibility for the drugs found 
in the home, stating that the wardrobe was his “and I wanted 
to hide [the drugs] there.”  He denied that Carosi kept any 
belongings in the wardrobe and maintained that he did not use 
drugs in the home.  On cross-examination, Thomas gave 
equivocal answers to a series of questions concerning whether 
any of Carosi’s clothing was kept in the wardrobe.  
Nevertheless, he insisted that “all the drugs were mine” and 
that, other than the marijuana, he had placed the drugs in the 
wardrobe the day before the search was conducted. 
Concerning ownership of the safe, Thomas testified that 
while he purchased the safe, Carosi might have told Boyd that 
she and Thomas owned the safe jointly because “everything like 
mines [(sic)], is basically hers . . . . if she wanted to 
claim the safe, she could.”  He further testified that 
although there were two bongs in the wardrobe, both belonged 
 
5
to him.  Asked why he would keep two bongs in the home if 
Carosi did not smoke marijuana, as he maintained, Thomas 
replied that the two were “total different instruments if you 
look at them clearly” and that they were of “[d]ifferent 
styles.” 
The Commonwealth concluded its cross-examination of 
Thomas by impeaching him through prior inconsistent statements 
he had made to a probation officer for a pre-sentence report 
following his conviction on drug trafficking charges.  
Specifically, the Commonwealth established that Thomas had 
denied using marijuana, cocaine, or other drugs recently.  
Thomas responded either that he could not recall what 
statements he had made or that he did not know what had been 
stated in the pre-sentence report. 
Carosi testified on her own behalf.  She maintained that 
Thomas brought the wardrobe to the home.  Carosi denied that 
she kept any clothing or other property in the wardrobe, 
though she conceded that she sometimes would borrow a pair of 
Thomas’ socks that were kept in the wardrobe.  She further 
testified that while her children “[s]ometimes” would go into 
her bedroom, she had never seen them playing in the wardrobe. 
Carosi specifically denied having any knowledge of the 
drugs or the bongs, and denied that she smoked marijuana or 
used any type of illegal drugs.  She further maintained that 
 
6
Thomas did not use drugs in the home, though she had “seen him 
take pills” for pain after he had two teeth pulled. 
On cross-examination, Carosi denied that she had told 
Boyd that she kept clothes in the wardrobe.  She also denied 
having told Boyd that the bongs were located in the wardrobe.  
Asked whether she could offer a reason that Boyd would 
fabricate this testimony, Carosi replied that she had been 
“overcritical” of him during the search of her home and had 
“told him how to do his job better.”  Carosi also testified 
that she had purchased the safe for Thomas as a gift and did 
not “know why he said he purchased it.” 
After the Commonwealth called the probation officer who 
had prepared Thomas’ pre-sentence report as a rebuttal 
witness, Carosi renewed her motion to strike the child 
endangerment charges, asserting that there was no evidence 
that the children “were actually effected in any way and that 
they even knew about” the drugs.  The circuit court again 
denied the motion to strike. 
The case was submitted to the jury, which returned 
verdicts acquitting Carosi of the four drug possession 
offenses, but convicted her of the three child endangerment 
charges.  The jury fixed her punishment at a fine of $500 for 
each offense.  Carosi waived the preparation of a pre-sentence 
report.  After receiving testimony from Carosi and her sister, 
 
7
the circuit court confirmed the jury’s verdict and imposed 
$1500 in fines on Carosi. 
Carosi filed a petition for appeal to the Court of 
Appeals.  The sole issue asserted in her petition was that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the three convictions for 
felony child endangerment.  In a per curiam order, the Court 
of Appeals refused Carosi’s petition.  Citing Barnes v. 
Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 105, 110-11, 622 S.E.2d 278, 281 
(2005), the Court noted that proof of child endangerment 
“requires only a threshold mens rea showing of ‘criminal 
negligence.’”  Carosi v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0738-09-4, 
slip op. at 2 (October 7, 2009).  Relying upon Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692, 700, 636 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2006), 
the Court held that the jury could have reasonably found that 
the “act of leaving illegal narcotics in a place accessible to 
her children was grossly negligent” and was sufficient to 
prove the mens rea necessary to establish Carosi’s criminal 
negligence “based on common knowledge[] that there are 
inherent dangers in placing [illegal drugs] within reach of an 
unattended child.”  Carosi, slip op. at 3 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Carosi requested a review of this judgment  
by a three-judge panel, which refused the petition for the 
reasons stated in the per curiam order.  This appeal followed. 
 
8
DISCUSSION 
In relevant part, Code § 40.1-103(A) provides, “It shall 
be unlawful for any person . . . having the custody of any 
child willfully or negligently to cause or permit the life of 
such child to be endangered.”3  Although the Court of Appeals 
has reviewed many convictions under Code § 40.1-103(A), we 
last considered the application of the child endangerment 
statute in Lovisi v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 848, 188 S.E.2d 206 
(1972).  Since that time, we have considered a number of cases 
involving the felony child abuse statute, Code § 18.2-
371.1(B)(1), including most recently Jones and Morris v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 732, 636 S.E.2d 436 (2006).  Although 
the two statutes define separate offenses, it is clear that 
the mens rea for each offense can be satisfied by a showing of 
                     
3 In Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 Va. App. 150, 155, 462 
S.E.2d 582, 585 (1995), the Court of Appeals held that a 
further provision of the statute providing that the offense 
would also apply to a circumstance where the “life, health or 
morals [of the child] may be endangered” was 
unconstitutionally vague, but found that the offending 
language was severable from the statute.  (Emphasis added.)  
The statute also makes it an offense “to cause or permit such 
child to be overworked, tortured, tormented, mutilated, beaten 
or cruelly treated.”  There is no dispute, however, that the 
Commonwealth’s contention in this case was that Carosi 
actually endangered the children through her criminal 
negligence. 
 
 
9
criminal negligence on the part of the defendant.4  Cf. Ellis 
v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 548, 556-57, 513 S.E.2d 453, 457 
(1999) (child endangerment); Jones, 272 Va. at 701, 636 S.E.2d 
at 408 (child abuse). 
Carosi contends that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to show that 
she actually endangered the life of her children as proscribed 
by Code § 40.1-103(A).  Carosi advances two separate 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that 
the Commonwealth failed to prove both the necessary scienter, 
in that the evidence did not show that she had actual 
knowledge of the presence and character of the illegal drugs 
in her home, and the requisite mens rea, in that the evidence 
did not show that her acts or omissions rose to a level of 
criminal negligence.  We will address Carosi’s contentions in 
that order. 
With respect to the issue of scienter, Carosi asserts 
that “the only facts before the [jury] are that there were 
drugs and drug paraphernalia in a closed cabinet belonging to 
                     
4 The two statutes are sufficiently similar that the 
legislature has included identical provisions for an 
affirmative defense to each offense where the prosecution is 
“based solely on the accused parent having left the child at a 
hospital or rescue squad . . . within the first 14 days of the 
child’s life.”  Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(2); Code § 40.1-103(B). 
 
 
10
[Carosi’s] boyfriend.”  Because the jury acquitted Carosi of 
all the drug possession charges, she contends that there was 
no evidence that she was actually aware that the drugs were 
present in the wardrobe.  Absent that knowledge, she asserts 
the evidence that she permitted the children to occasionally 
enter and play in the master bedroom would be insufficient to 
prove that she knowingly permitted the children’s lives to be 
endangered.  We disagree. 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence on appeal “[i]t is the appellate court’s duty to 
examine the evidence that tends to support the conviction and 
to uphold the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidentiary support.”  Carter v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 100, 
104, 694 S.E.2d 590, 593 (2010) (citing Code § 8.01-680).  
Moreover, when, as in this case, “a defendant elects to 
introduce evidence in [her] own behalf after the denial of a 
motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, any further 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial or on 
appeal is to be determined from the entire record” including 
the defendant’s own testimony.  Murillo-Rodriguez v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 64, 74, 688 S.E.2d 199, 204-05 (2010).  
Applying this standard of review, we hold that Carosi’s 
contention that by failing to establish her guilt for the drug 
possession charges, the Commonwealth necessarily also failed 
 
11
to prove she had knowledge that drugs were present in the 
wardrobe is not supported by the record when viewed in its 
entirety. 
“To support a conviction based upon constructive 
possession [of illegal drugs], ‘the Commonwealth must point to 
evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the accused or 
other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the 
defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the 
substance and that it was subject to [her] dominion and 
control.’ ”  Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 
S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986) (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 
Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984)); accord McMillan v. 
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 19, 671 S.E.2d 396, 399 (2009).  
Boyd’s testimony that Carosi told him that the two bongs were 
in the wardrobe, that she kept clothing in it, and that the 
safe belonged jointly to her and Thomas would give rise to a 
reasonable inference by the trier of fact that Carosi was also 
aware of the presence and character of the marijuana and other 
drugs in the wardrobe and safe and that she jointly exercised 
dominion and control over them with Thomas.  This evidence was 
sufficient for the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie 
case for constructive possession of the drugs and overcome 
Carosi’s motion to strike those charges at the conclusion of 
the Commonwealth’s case in chief.  The evidence presented by 
 
12
the defense, specifically Carosi’s adamant denial that she 
used the wardrobe or was aware of what Thomas stored in it and 
that she had not made the statements during the search that 
Boyd attributed to her, as well as Thomas’ assertion that all 
of the drugs and drug paraphernalia were his alone, thus 
created a question of fact to be resolved by the jury based 
upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. 
A jury is not required to accept the self-serving 
testimony of the defendant or of witnesses with a potential 
bias in favor of the defendant, but may rely on such testimony 
in whole, in part, or reject it completely.  See Durham v. 
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169, 198 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1973); 
Upshur v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 649, 655, 197 S.E. 435, 437 
(1938).  Thus, the jury reasonably could have accepted Thomas’ 
assertion that the drugs were his, while rejecting Carosi’s 
assertion that she was ignorant of the fact that the drugs 
were being stored in the wardrobe.  Accordingly, while the 
jury may have found that the Commonwealth had not proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Carosi exercised dominion and 
control over the drugs, it could also have found the evidence 
was sufficient to prove that she was nonetheless aware of the 
presence and character of the drugs for purposes of 
determining whether she was guilty of the child endangerment 
charges. 
 
13
We now turn to the central question of this appeal, which 
is embodied in Carosi’s contention that the mens rea element 
of Code § 40.1-103(A) cannot be established solely upon the 
fact that a parent or other custodian knowingly permitted a 
child to be present in a home where illegal drugs were kept 
unsecured in an area accessible to the child.  Carosi contends 
that unlike in Jones, where the mens rea of criminal 
negligence was supported by evidence that the child had actual 
access to heroin as well as by the “substantial risk of 
serious injury from the dangers inherent in the illicit drug 
trade” that was ongoing in the home, 272 Va. at 701-02, 636 
S.E.2d at 408, here the evidence showed only that the illegal 
drugs were kept in a place where the children could have 
obtained access to them.  Thus, even if the jury could have 
found that Carosi was aware that drugs were being stored in 
the wardrobe, she contends that “knowledge of a dangerous 
substance closed away in a cabinet by itself should not rise 
to the level of criminal negligence.”  As she did in the 
circuit court, Carosi asserts that keeping illegal drugs in 
this manner was no more likely to endanger her children than 
would “the possession of sharp knives in the kitchen, 
chemicals under the sink, prescription drugs in the medicine 
cabinet, and a lawfully possessed unloaded gun in the closet.”  
We disagree. 
 
14
Carosi is correct that in Jones we held that “[b]y 
engaging in the routine sale of drugs from her home and 
permitting her unattended young child access to those drugs, 
Jones committed willful acts and omissions” sufficient to 
prove her criminally negligent for purposes of establishing 
the mens rea element of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1).  Id. at 702, 
636 S.E.2d at 408 (emphasis added).  Moreover, we further 
stated that our decision in that case did not establish “a per 
se rule” that a violation of the statute would occur whenever 
the evidence showed that a “child is living in the environment 
of the drug trade.”  Id.  Contrary to Carosi’s contention, 
however, neither does our decision in Jones stand for the 
proposition that the mens rea for criminal negligence could 
not be established based upon permitting a child to have 
access to illegal drugs in the absence of any evidence of drug 
trafficking. 
Criminal negligence is established by showing that the 
defendant’s acts or omissions were “of a wanton or willful 
character . . . show[ing] a reckless or indifferent disregard 
of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably 
calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable 
that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is 
charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of [her] 
acts.”  Brown, 278 Va. at 528-29, 685 S.E.2d at 46 (internal 
 
15
quotation marks omitted).  Such a determination necessarily 
will be specific to the circumstances of each case and, thus, 
whether a defendant’s conduct is criminally negligent is 
usually a question for the trier of fact, unless reasonable 
minds could not differ.  See, e.g. Noakes v. Commonwealth, 54 
Va. App. 577, 586, 681 S.E.2d 48, 52 (2009), aff’d, 280 Va. 
338, 669 S.E.2d 284 (2010); cf. Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 
317, 320, 315 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1984).  
Initially, we reject Carosi’s broad contention that a 
parent or other person having custody of a child cannot be 
held criminally liable for negligently permitting the child to 
be in an environment where illegal drugs are readily 
accessible because this circumstance is no different than 
permitting the child to be in an environment where there are 
“sharp knives in the kitchen, chemicals under the sink, 
prescription drugs in the medicine cabinet, and a lawfully 
possessed unloaded gun in the closet.”  It is self-evident 
from Carosi’s own characterization of the two circumstances 
that they differ in the important respect that the latter 
items, though unquestionably dangerous if left accessible to 
unsupervised children, are possessed by the parent or 
 
16
custodian for lawful purposes, whereas drugs that are 
illegally present in the home are not.5   
Finally, in order to accept Carosi’s argument that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish the mens rea of 
criminal negligence in this case, we would have to conclude 
that reasonable minds could not differ on whether rearing 
children in a home where illegal drugs are readily accessible 
may constitute endangering the children for purposes of Code 
§ 40.1-103(A).  The myriad factors to be considered in such 
cases – such as the ages of the children, the length of the 
exposure, the level of supervision or lack thereof, and the 
quantity and variety of the drugs – suggest that as with most 
cases where criminal negligence is at issue, this 
determination is necessarily fact-specific.  Such 
determination is best left to the jury, which is in the best 
position to assess the weight and credibility of the evidence.  
In that respect, and considering the totality of the evidence, 
we cannot say that the jury’s finding of criminal negligence 
                     
5 Moreover, Carosi provides no support for the implicit 
inference in her argument that a charge of child endangerment 
could never be supported by evidence that a parent or other 
custodian negligently permitted a child to have access to a 
legally-possessed dangerous substance.  The facts of this case 
do not require us to decide that issue. 
 
 
17
in this case was plainly wrong or without support in the 
record. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals did 
not err in refusing Carosi’s petition for appeal.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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