Title: Estate of Gage v. State

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Estate of Gage v. State (2003-403); 178 Vt. 212; 882 A.2d 1157

2005 VT 78

[Filed 22-Jul-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT 78

                                No. 2003-403

  Estate of Nicholas P. Gage, et al.	         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Orleans Superior Court

  State of Vermont	                         November Term, 2004

  John P. Meaker, J.

  Robert A. Mello and Richard J. Holmes of Robert A. Mello & Associates, PLC,
    for  Plaintiffs-Appellees.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Eve Jacobs-Carnahan, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), (FN1)  Specially Assigned 

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   This appeal requires us to determine whether
  the discretionary function exception to the Vermont Tort Claims Act applies
  to immunize the State of Vermont from a negligence action arising out of an
  incident in which a vehicle left the roadway, flipped over a guardrail,
  rolled down an embankment, and landed in a brook, resulting in several
  drowning deaths.  The State contends  the decision whether to remove or
  guard against the drowning hazard involved policy considerations of the
  kind the discretionary function exception was designed to shield from suit.
  We agree, and therefore reverse the trial court judgment denying the
  State's motion for summary judgment. 

       ¶  2.  The tragic events underlying this appeal may be briefly
  summarized. (FN2)  Additional material facts will be adduced in the
  discussion that follows.  Early on the morning of March 2, 1998, Gregory
  Twofoot was driving south on Interstate 91. Twofoot had been drinking prior
  to operating the vehicle.  Robin LaFont, one of five passengers in the
  vehicle, asked Twofoot to pull over to the side of the interstate so that
  he could look in the trunk for beer.  When Twofoot refused, LaFont reached
  forward from the backseat and pulled the wheel to the right, causing
  Twofoot to lose control. Twofoot applied the brakes and the car skidded
  over two hundred feet, spun around, and struck the butt end of a guardrail
  at its northernmost point. The car then careened along the top of the
  guardrail an additional thirty feet with its two rear wheels over the
  guardrail and the front two tires dragging along the ground behind it.  One
  of the rear wheels then ripped off and the car became airborne and rolled
  to the bottom of an embankment where it landed upside down in Cobb Brook,
  in four feet of water, about 90 feet from the edge of the traveled roadway
  and some 500 feet from where Twofoot first lost control.  Four of the
  passengers drowned in the water. The driver and one passenger survived.
                    
       ¶  3.  The estate of Nicholas Gage (hereafter plaintiff), one of the
  four passengers who died, brought this lawsuit against the State, claiming
  that it was negligent in failing to extend the guardrail further north,
  which allegedly would have prevented the vehicle from reaching the water,
  or in failing to remove a series of beaver dams that had increased the
  depth of the water in Cobb Brook, resulting in decedent's drowning death.
  (FN3)  The State moved for summary judgment on the ground, among others,
  that it was immune from suit under the discretionary function exception to
  the Tort Claims Act, 12 V.S.A. § 5601(e)(1). (FN4)  Following a hearing, the
  court issued an entry order summarily denying the motion.  The court also
  denied the State's subsequent motion for reconsideration, or, in the
  alternative, for permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The State then
  renewed its motion for permission to appeal with this Court.  We granted
  the motion to consider the State's sovereign immunity claim.
              
       ¶  4.  The controlling law is well settled.  Lawsuits against the State
  are barred unless the State waives its sovereign immunity.  Denis Bail
  Bonds, Inc. v. State, 159 Vt. 481, 484-85, 622 A.2d 495, 497 (1993).  Under
  the Vermont Tort Claims Act, 12 V.S.A. § 5601(a), the State has waived its
  immunity for injury to persons caused by the negligent act or omission of a
  State employee while acting within the scope of employment, subject to
  certain delineated exceptions.  One of these exceptions is set forth in
  §5601(e)(1), which protects the State from any claim "based upon the
  exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
  function or duty on the part of a state agency or an employee of the state,
  whether or not the discretion involved is abused." (FN5)  The purpose of
  the discretionary function exception is to assure that courts do not invade
  the province of coordinate branches of government through "judicial second
  guessing of legislative or administrative policy judgments." Searles v.
  Agency of Transportation, 171 Vt. 562, 563,