Title: ESTATE OF DENNIS J HALLORAN V RAAKESH C BHAN MD

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILE JULY 20, 2004 
EILEEN HALLORAN, temporary
personal representative of the
estate of DENNIS J. HALLORAN,
DECEASED, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 121523 
RAAKESH C. BHAN, M.D., and
CRITICAL CARE PULMONARY 
MEDICINE, P.C., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
BATTLE CREEK HEALTH SYSTEMS, 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J. 
In this interlocutory appeal, we must determine the 
meaning 
of 
the 
medical 
malpractice 
expert 
witness 
qualification requirements of MCL 600.2169(1)(a). 
Here, 
plaintiff’s proffered standard-of-care witness did not 
possess the same board certification as defendant doctor, 
although both had the same subspecialty certificate in 
their respective fields. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
We hold that MCL 600.2169(1)(a) requires that the 
proposed 
expert 
witness 
must 
have 
the 
same 
board 
certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf 
the testimony is offered. 
Because plaintiff’s expert 
witness did not share the same board certification as the 
defendant doctor, we reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals that held to the contrary and reinstate the circuit 
court’s order granting defendants’ motion to strike. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Plaintiff’s 
decedent, 
Dennis 
Halloran, 
was 
experiencing renal failure and died of cardiac arrest after 
being treated by defendant physician Raakesh Bhan in the 
emergency room at defendant Battle Creek Health Systems. 
Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action, alleging 
that defendant physician Bhan=s negligent treatment of 
Halloran’s renal failure and subsequent cardiac arrest 
caused the death.1
 Bhan is board-certified in internal 
medicine by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) 
and also received a certificate of added qualification in 
1 Thus, this is not a case in which the administration
of anesthetic is at issue. 
2  
 
 
                                                 
critical care medicine2 from the ABIM. 
The parties do not 
dispute that the subspecialty certification is not a “board 
certification” for the purpose of the statute. It is not 
disputed that Bhan was practicing critical care at the time 
of the event in question. 
Plaintiff 
proposed 
Dr. 
Thomas 
Gallagher 
as 
her 
standard-of-care witness. 
Gallagher is board certified in 
anesthesiology by the American Board of Anesthesiology 
(ABA), 
and 
has 
received 
a 
certificate 
of 
added 
qualification in critical care medicine from the ABA. 
Gallagher is not board certified in internal medicine and 
has not received any training that would make him eligible 
for certification in internal medicine. 
Defendants moved to strike Dr. Gallagher on the ground 
that 
he 
failed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
requirements 
of 
MCL 
600.2169(1)(a) because he was not board certified in 
internal medicine. The circuit court granted the motion to 
strike, finding that Gallagher was not qualified to testify 
2 “Critical care medicine” is defined as “[t]he medical
knowledge that is applied to the care of patients in
critical care units.” 
Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine,
Vol 2 (2002). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
as an expert witness regarding the standard of care because 
he and Dr. Bhan did not share the same board certification. 
A split Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 
holding that because the subspecialty of critical care was 
shared by both physicians, plaintiff’s trial expert fell 
within the requirements of the statute.3  This Court granted 
leave to appeal on March 25, 2003, limited to the issue 
regarding the proper interpretation of MCL 600.2169(1)(a).4 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory 
interpretation. In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 
(1999). 
III. ANALYSIS 
When facing issues regarding statutory interpretation, 
this Court must discern and give effect to the Legislature=s 
intent as expressed in the statutory language. DiBenedetto 
v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000); 
Massey v Mandell, 462 Mich 375, 379-380; 614 NW2d 70 
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 8, 2002
(Docket No. 224548). 
4 468 Mich 868 (2003). 
We further ordered Grossman v 
Brown, 468 Mich 869 (2003), to be argued and submitted with
this case. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2000). This principle was recently explained in Roberts v 
Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2000): 
An anchoring rule of jurisprudence, and the
foremost rule of statutory construction, is that
courts 
are 
to 
effect 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature. 
People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 123,
n 7; 594 NW2d 487 (1999). 
To do so, we begin
with an examination of the language of the 
statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465
Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). 
If the 
statute's language is clear and unambiguous, then
we assume that the Legislature intended its plain
meaning and the statute is enforced as written.
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702
(2001). 
A 
necessary 
corollary 
of 
these 
principles is that a court may read nothing into
an unambiguous statute that is not within the
manifest intent of the Legislature as derived
from the words of the statute itself. 
Omne 
Financial, Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311;
596 NW2d 591 (1999). 
MCL 600.2169(1) provides: 
In an action alleging medical malpractice, a
person shall not give expert testimony on the
appropriate standard of practice or care unless
the person is licensed as a health professional
in this state or another state and meets the 
following criteria: 
(a) If the party against whom or on whose
behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist,
specializes at the time of the occurrence that is
the basis for the action in the same specialty as
the party against whom or on whose behalf the
testimony is offered. 
However, if the party
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is
offered is a specialist who is board certified,
the expert witness must be a specialist who is
board certified in that specialty. 
We must now determine whether MCL 600.2169(1)(a) 
requires that an expert witness share the same board 
5  
 
  
 
 
   
                                                 
certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf 
the testimony is offered. We hold that it does.5 
The Court of Appeals majority held that it is 
sufficient under the statute if the expert witness and the 
defendant doctor share only the same subspecialty, but not 
the same board certification. 
We disagree because this 
argument runs contrary to the plain language of the 
statute.6 
5
 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, we are not
concluding that board certificates that are not relevant to
the alleged malpractice have to match. 
There is simply no
need to address that issue in this case because it is 
uncontested that the defendant physician was practicing
internal medicine, not anesthesiology, when he allegedly
committed malpractice. 
Thus, the defendant physician’s
internal medicine board certification is a “relevant” board 
certificate. 
6 
The 
dissent 
argues 
that 
this 
straightforward
application of the plain language of MCL 600.2169(1)
renders MCL 600.2169(2) meaningless. 
MCL 600.2169(2),
however, 
deals 
with 
any 
expert 
witness, 
while 
MCL 
600.2169(1) deals only with expert witnesses regarding the
standard of care. 
Expert testimony may encompass many
subjects that do not involve the standard of care, such as
causation. 
For an expert witness to be qualified to
testify regarding the standard of care, however, the court
must apply the requirements of MCL 600.2169(1). 
It would 
be impermissible for the trial court, when dealing with a
proposed standard-of-care witness, to avoid the specific
provisions of § 2169(1) and only apply the requirements of
§ 2169(2). 
See Jones v Enertel, Inc, 467 Mich 266, 270­
271; 650 NW2d 334 (2002) (where a statute contains a
general provision and a specific provision, the specific 
provision controls). 
Rather, when dealing with a proposed
standard of care witness, the general provisions of §
2169(2) must be considered after a standard-of-care witness
is qualified under the specific provisions of § 2169(1). 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
This interpretation is supported by the use of the 
word “however” to begin the second sentence. 
Undefined 
statutory terms must be given their plain and ordinary 
meanings, and it is proper to consult a dictionary for 
definitions. 
Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 
248-249; 596 NW2d 574 (1999); Koontz v Ameritech Services, 
Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). 
Random House 
Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed) defines “however” as 
“in spite of that” and “on the other hand.” 
Applying this 
definition to the statutory language compels the conclusion 
that the second sentence imposes an additional requirement 
for expert witness testimony, not an optional one. 
In 
other words, “in spite of” the specialty requirement in the 
first sentence, the witness must also share the same board 
certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf 
the testimony is offered. 
There is no exception to the requirements of the 
statute and neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has 
any authority to impose one. As we have invariably stated, 
the 
argument 
that 
enforcing 
the 
Legislature’s 
plain 
language will lead to unwise policy implications is for the 
Legislature to review and decide, not this Court.7
 See 
7 Even if we were constitutionally empowered to 
consider our own public policy preferences in construing 
(continued…)
7 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Jones v Dep’t of Corrections, 468 Mich 646, 655; 664 NW2d 
717 (2003). 
It is not disputed that defendant Bhan is board 
certified in internal medicine, but proposed expert witness 
Gallagher is not. 
MCL 600.2169(1)(a) requires that the 
expert witness “must be” a specialist who is board 
certified in the specialty in which the defendant physician 
is also board certified. 
Because the proposed witness in 
this case is not board certified in the same specialty as 
Bhan, MCL 600.2169(1)(a) prohibits him from testifying 
regarding the standard of care. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and reinstate the circuit court’s order granting 
defendant’s motion to strike. 
We remand this case to the 
(continued…)
legislative mandates such as MCL 600.2169, the dissent’s 
contention that our reading of § 2169 leads to undesirable
results is wholly unpersuasive. Consider the facts of this 
case: there may be an enormous difference between critical
care as practiced by an internist and critical care as 
practiced by an anesthesiologist. Indeed, one would expect
that a patient requiring a medical diagnosis during 
critical care would rather be treated by an internist than
an anesthesiologist. 
Likewise, one would expect that a
patient being anesthetized during critical care would 
rather 
be 
treated 
by 
an 
individual 
trained 
in 
anesthesiology than one trained in internal medicine. 
Thus, the practice of critical care may be quite different
depending on the physician’s underlying specialization. 
8  
 
 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
EILEEN HALLORAN, temporary
personal representative of the
estate of DENNIS J. HALLORAN,
DECEASED, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 121523 
RAAKESH C. BHAN, M.D., and
CRITICAL CARE PULMONARY 
MEDICINE, P.C., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
BATTLE CREEK HEALTH SYSTEMS, 
Defendant. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I dissent from the majority’s premature conclusion 
that plaintiff’s standard-of-care expert is not qualified 
to testify under MCL 600.2169(1) regarding the appropriate 
standard of care in this case. Both plaintiff’s expert and 
defendant Bhan specialized in critical care medicine. 
The 
majority holds, however, that plaintiff’s expert must be, 
like defendant Bhan, board-certified in internal medicine 
because the majority states that Bhan was practicing 
internal medicine at the time of the alleged malpractice. 
Ante at 6 n 5. 
 
 
 
The nature of the alleged malpractice cannot be 
confirmed with such certainty from the record, because the 
trial court never ruled on whether internal medicine was 
involved. 
It is not clear that defendant Bhan was 
practicing internal medicine or critical care at the time 
of the alleged malpractice. 
Apparently, even the majority 
is unable to determine with certainty the nature of the 
malpractice at issue, because the majority asserts that it 
is undisputed that defendant was practicing not only 
internal medicine at the time of the event in question, but 
also critical care medicine. Ante at 6 n 5 and 3. 
Whether defendant Bhan was practicing critical care or 
internal medicine or a mix of both is essential to 
determining whether plaintiff’s expert is qualified to 
testify regarding the appropriate standard of care under 
MCL 600.2169(1). 
MCL 600.2169(1)(emphasis added) states 
that: 
In an action alleging medical malpractice, a
person shall not give expert testimony on the
appropriate standard of practice or care unless
the person is licensed as a health professional
in this state or another state . . . . 
“Appropriate,” used as an adjective in the context of the 
statute means, “right for the purpose; suitable; fit; 
proper.” 
Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d ed). 
On the 
basis of an ordinary understanding of the language of the 
2  
 
 
statute, the Legislature’s intent is that a standard of 
care expert must be able to testify regarding a fitting, 
suitable, and proper standard of care. 
From this, the 
significance of whether defendant Bhan was practicing 
critical care or internal medicine or both at the time of 
the alleged malpractice is obvious. 
To help ensure that expert testimony regarding the 
standard of care will be appropriate to the underlying 
alleged malpractice event, MCL 600.2169(1)(a) requires that 
the expert must be a specialist in the same specialty as 
the defendant doctor. 
Further, if the defendant doctor is 
a board-certified specialist, the statute requires that the 
expert must be board-certified in that specialty. 
MCL 
600.2169(1)(a) provides that the standard-of-care expert 
must meet the following criteria: 
If the party against whom or on whose behalf
the 
testimony 
is 
offered 
is 
a 
specialist,
specializes at the time of the occurrence that is
the basis for the action in the same specialty as
the party against whom or on whose behalf the
testimony is offered. 
However, if the party
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is
offered is a specialist who is board certified,
the expert witness must be a specialist who is
board certified in that specialty. 
The majority concludes that plaintiff’s expert witness is 
not qualified to testify under this subsection of MCL 
600.2169(1) because he is not board-certified in internal 
3  
 
 
 
 
medicine. 
This conclusion assumes that defendant Bhan’s 
board 
certification 
in 
internal 
medicine 
sets 
the 
appropriate standard of care about which plaintiff’s expert 
will testify. The majority’s assumption is premature. 
Further, 
despite 
the 
majority’s 
claims 
to 
the 
contrary, ante at 6 n 5, the majority’s assumption 
trivializes 
the 
obvious 
legislative 
intent 
that 
the 
plaintiff’s expert be able to testify about an appropriate 
standard of care, because, related or not to the underlying 
alleged 
malpractice 
event, 
the 
majority 
holds 
that 
plaintiff’s expert must match defendant Bhan’s board 
certification. The real scope of the majority’s holding is 
revealed in its insistence that it must parse the meaning 
of the conjunction “however” and conclude that there is “no 
exception” to the MCL 600.1269(1)(a) requirements that 
specialties and board certifications match. 
I would hold 
that matching is required only where the specialty or 
board-certified specialty is appropriate for (right for the 
purpose of explaining) the standard of care about which the 
expert will be testifying in the case. 
For these reasons, I would remand this matter to the 
circuit court for it to consider whether the nature of the 
underlying malpractice involved critical care medicine or 
internal medicine or both. 
This will allow the court to 
4  
 
 
 
determine whether plaintiff’s standard-of-care expert, who 
specialized in critical care, but who was not a board­
certified internist, is qualified to testify against 
defendant Bhan at trial under MCL 600.2169(1). 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
EILEEN HALLORAN, temporary
personal representative of the
estate of DENNIS J. HALLORAN,
DECEASED, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 121523 
RAAKESH C. BHAN, M.D. and
CRITICAL CARE PULMONARY 
MEDICINE, P.C., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
BATTLE CREEK HEALTH SYSTEMS, 
Defendant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
plaintiff's expert was not qualified to testify that the 
defendant doctor breached the standard of care. The 
majority's decision hinges on its assertion that the area 
of medical malpractice is uncontested and that it is 
internal medicine. This is incorrect. 
Rather, the "uncontested" area of alleged medical 
malpractice is critical care. 
Plaintiff argued that 
critical care medicine was the relevant area of inquiry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant never disputed it. 
And the trial court never 
made a determination on the issue. 
In misconstruing the record, the majority has made an 
improper factual determination. 
Once it is exposed, it 
becomes obvious that the outcome of the majority's decision 
is fatally flawed. The Court of Appeals decision should be 
affirmed and plaintiff's expert witness should be allowed 
to testify. 
A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO THE STATUTE 
MCL 600.2169(1) sets forth the requirements for 
experts who testify regarding the appropriate standard of 
care in medical malpractice cases. If the defendant doctor 
is a specialist, an expert witness must practice in the 
same specialty as the defendant. 
If the defendant is 
board-certified, the expert must be board-certified in the 
same specialty. 
However, it is the medical specialty in which the 
defendant was practicing when the malpractice allegedly 
occurred 
that 
is 
the 
touchstone 
of 
an 
expert's 
qualification 
to 
testify 
regarding 
the 
"appropriate 
standard of care." 
Logically, testimony regarding the 
appropriate standard must pertain to the defendant's 
alleged breach of a specific standard of care. The statute 
comprehends that fact. 
MCL 600.2169(2)(d) requires that, 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
when "determining the qualifications of an expert witness 
in an action alleging medical malpractice," the court 
"shall . . . evaluate . . . [t]he relevancy of the expert 
witness's testimony." 
In this case, the defendant doctor was board-certified 
in internal medicine. 
Although it is undisputed that the 
relevant standard of care involved critical care, it is not 
clear whether defendant's board certification in internal 
medicine was relevant to the malpractice claim. 
If it 
were, in order to testify under the requirements of MCL 
600.2169, the standard-of-care witness would have to be a 
board-certified internist. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to strike, the 
trial court addressed neither the area of the alleged 
malpractice 
nor 
the 
relevance 
of 
defendant's 
board 
certification to that area. 
The court merely ascertained 
what paper credentials each doctor held and whether their 
board certifications matched. 
Left unresolved was whether 
the area of alleged malpractice must be identified before 
the application of MCL 600.2169. 
At the hearing on the motion, defendants did not argue 
that internal medicine was being practiced when the alleged 
malpractice occurred. Having no interest in discussing the 
area of the alleged malpractice, defendants focused solely 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
on whether the board certifications possessed by the 
experts must match. In contrast, plaintiff argued that the 
area of medicine being practiced was the specialty of 
critical care medicine. Accordingly, plaintiff argued that 
one must consider the qualifications of the expert with 
regard to critical care medicine, not internal medicine. 
Hence, the majority correctly notes that the issue of 
relevancy was uncontested. Plaintiff asserted that critical 
care was the relevant medical area. Defendant did not 
dispute that claim. Only plaintiff alleged the appropriate 
area of medical malpractice. Defendant chose instead to 
argue that the board certification of defendant and 
plaintiff's expert must match. Thus, defendant failed to 
dispute plaintiff's contention that the area of critical 
care medicine was the proper focus. 
Plaintiff's expert planned to testify as a critical 
care doctor commenting on the care and treatment provided 
by another critical care doctor. He was prepared to testify 
that the defendant doctor breached several standards of 
care in critical care medicine. 
A conclusion that the nature of the underlying 
malpractice claim has no bearing on an expert witness's 
qualification to testify would defy the statute and its 
purpose. 
An assumption that an expert witness must hold 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the same board certification as that held by the defendant, 
even when it bears no relevance to the malpractice alleged, 
would be fallacious. 
THE STATUTE AND THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT 
The pertinent statutory language is located in MCL 
600.2169, which provides in part: 
(1) In 
an 
action 
alleging 
medical 
malpractice, a person shall not give expert 
testimony on the appropriate standard of practice
or care unless the person is licensed as a health
professional in this state or another state and
meets the following criteria: 
(a) If the party against whom or on whose
behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist,
specializes at the time of the occurrence that is
the basis for the action in the same specialty as
the party against whom or on whose behalf the
testimony is offered. 
However, if the party
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is
offered is a specialist who is board certified,
the expert witness must be a specialist who is
board certified in that specialty. 
The Legislature's true intent in writing it is revealed 
only when one reads § 2169 in its entirety. 
In setting forth the requirements that an expert 
witness must meet before qualifying to testify regarding 
the standard of care in a medical malpractice case, the 
statute begins: 
"[A] person shall not give expert 
testimony on the appropriate standard of practice or care 
unless . . . ." MCL 600.2169 (emphasis added). 
Since the 
expert must give testimony about the appropriate standard 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
of care, it follows that the expert's certification must be 
in the area of the alleged malpractice. 
Any other board 
certification would be irrelevant. 
The second sentence of MCL 600.2169(1)(a) begins with 
the adverb “[h]owever,” indicating that the meaning of the 
language that follows “[h]owever” contrasts with that which 
precedes it. 
The word "however" is less likely to suggest 
an additional requirement, as the majority concludes, than 
to suggest a different requirement in an alternative set of 
circumstances. 
Applied to this case, if the alleged malpractice were 
in internal medicine, the expert would have to be board­
certified in that area because the defendant is board­
certified in it. Alternatively, if the alleged malpractice 
involved a medical specialty in which defendant was not 
board-certified, the first sentence of the statute would 
control. If defendant specialized in that area, the expert 
witness would have to specialize in that area as well. 
Furthermore, MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i) requires that an 
expert have devoted, in the year preceding the date of the 
alleged injury, a majority of his or her professional time 
to: 
"The active clinical practice of the same health 
profession . . . and, if that party is a specialist, the 
active clinical practice of that specialty." 
"Specialty" 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in this provision refers to a specific area of medical 
practice. 
This supports the conclusion that the necessary 
and relevant qualifications of an expert who will testify 
regarding the appropriate standard of care are determined 
by the area of the alleged malpractice. 
Moreover, the statute continues: 
In determining the qualifications of an 
expert witness in an action alleging medical 
malpractice, the court shall, at a minimum,
evaluate all of the following: 
(a) 
The 
educational 
and 
professional
training of the expert witness. 
(b) The area of specialization of the expert
witness. 
(c) The length of time the expert witness 
has been engaged in the active clinical practice
or instruction of the health profession or the 
specialty. 
(d) The relevancy of the expert witness's
testimony. [MCL 600.2169(2).] 
Subsections 1 and 2 do not stand alone. 
Subsection 1 
sets forth a threshold requirement applicable only to 
standard-of-care 
witnesses. 
But 
all 
expert 
witnesses, 
including 
standard-of-care 
witnesses, 
are 
subject 
to 
subsection 
2. 
There 
is 
no 
language 
indicating 
that 
subsection 1 must be met before subsection 2 is applied to 
a standard-of-care witness. 
The qualification of any 
expert must be evaluated under subsection 2. 
Its criteria 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ensure that the testimony of the expert provides assistance 
to the trier of fact. 
The statute, read as a whole, bestows considerable 
discretion on the trial judge. 
Included is the authority 
to determine that the area in which the defendant is board­
certified is relevant to the standard of care involved in 
the suit. 
MCL 600.2169(2). 
The first section of the 
statute is merely an additional requirement placed on 
standard-of-care witnesses. 
Subsection 
2 
does 
not 
exclude 
standard-of-care 
witnesses from its purview. It reads: "In determining the 
qualifications of an expert witness in an action alleging 
medical malpractice . . . ." There is no language in this 
section to suggest that it is applicable to all but 
standard-of-care witnesses. Rather, the requirements apply 
to "an expert witness." 
AVOIDING AN ABSURD RESULT 
It is likely that cases will arise in which a doctor 
chooses to practice outside the doctor’s area of board 
certification. 
A construction of the statute that ignores 
the area of the alleged malpractice could lead to absurd 
results in these cases. 
For example, assume a doctor is 
board-certified as an obstetrician-gynecologist (OB-GYN), 
but practices some dermatology, an area in which he is not 
8  
 
 
 
 
board-certified. Assume he is sued for negligently removing 
a mole from the shoulder of a patient. 
An interpretation 
that ignores relevance would require the patient to find an 
expert who is a board-certified OB-GYN practicing some of 
the time in dermatology to testify about the standard of 
care. 
A doctor is not required by law to be board-certified 
in order to practice in a particular area of medicine. 
An 
OB-GYN can legally practice as a dermatologist without 
specialized training in dermatology. 
Even if an expert 
witness could be found to testify in the hypothetical case, 
he would have to testify that no special standard of care 
exists for an OB-GYN removing moles. His specialized 
expertise would be useless. 
A general practitioner, with 
no board certification, could testify as accurately about 
the applicable standard of care in the hypothetical case. 
If the statute were read to account for relevance, he would 
be allowed to do so. 
A blind adherence to matching paper credentials would 
demonstrate a misunderstanding of the nature of an expert 
witness's 
testimony, 
which 
is 
to 
determine 
the 
reasonableness of the defendant doctor's conduct. The 
standard of care the doctor must meet is that of a doctor 
practicing in the area of medicine involved in the 
9  
 
 
 
 
malpractice claim. "[T]he patient normally understands and 
expects that physicians, acting within the ambit of their 
professional work, will exercise the skill, knowledge, and 
care, normally possessed and exercised by other members of 
their profession, of the same school of practice in the 
relevant medical community." 
1 Dobbs, Torts, § 242, pp 
631-632. 
What is important is not the defendant physician's 
paper credentials, to the exclusion of all else. 
It is 
rather that the expert possesses the same knowledge 
regarding the applicable standard of care in the area of 
the alleged malpractice as the defendant doctor should 
possess. The Legislature recognized that a board-certified 
doctor may be held to a different standard of care than a 
doctor who is not board-certified. 
This is not relevant, 
however, if the area in which the doctor is board-certified 
is not related to the malpractice claim. 
If the alleged malpractice involves a specialty area, 
such as dermatology, it is the standard of care applicable 
to a dermatologist that must be met by the defendant 
physician. It is not the standard of care of the defendant 
physician who happens to be a board-certified OB-GYN as 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
well as a dermatologist. 
See MCL 600.2912a(1)(b).1
 The 
defendant physician could certainly claim that his separate 
OB-GYN 
training 
influenced 
his 
decisions 
during 
the 
treatment. 
However, it is for the jury to decide whether 
the defendant breached the standard of care to which he is 
held, that of a dermatologist. 
There is no special 
standard of care for a board-certified OB-GYN practicing in 
dermatology.2 
Future defendants, as well as plaintiffs, would be 
adversely affected by a decision to ignore relevance. 
The 
statutory provisions at issue refer to a defendant "against 
whom or on whose behalf" an expert offers testimony. 
MCL 
600.2169(1)(a). Future defendants practicing outside their 
area of board certification would be required to find a 
similarly board-certified standard-of-care expert who is 
doing the same. 
1 MCL 600.2912a(1)(b) states that a plaintiff must
prove that "[t]he defendant, if a specialist, failed to
provide the recognized standard of practice or care within
that specialty . . . ." 
2 I note that, just as the statute does not explicitly
use the word "relevant," it also does not explicitly limit
the board certification requirement to the medical field.
If the courts were to ignore relevance, a medical doctor
who was certified by the State Board of Law Examiners as an
attorney must bring forth an expert who is also certified
by that board. The same applies to one certified by the
State Board of Education as a teacher, and others. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like 
a 
plaintiff's 
standard-of-care 
expert, 
an 
appropriate witness would be more difficult to find. 
Once 
located, if at all, the witness could be asked to testify 
about an irrelevant standard of care. 
This would increase 
the cost and difficulty both of bringing and defending 
medical malpractice actions. 
Plaintiffs with a legitimate 
suit would be adversely affected, and the costs and 
complexity of defense for doctors and hospitals sued for 
malpractice would be increased. 
Surely, the Legislature did not intend the statute to 
be read to reach this counterproductive result. 
What it 
did intend is that experts in medical malpractice cases be 
knowledgeable in the medical areas about which they 
testify. It also intended that courts consider the area of 
the alleged malpractice in applying the statute and 
assessing what board certification experts must possess. 
The statute's legislative history confirms this belief. 
For example, the Report of the Senate Select Committee 
on Civil Justice Reform stated that the proposed statute 
was intended "to make sure that experts will have firsthand 
practical expertise in the subject matter about which they 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
are testifying."3  Judge Taylor, now Justice Taylor, cited 
that language in Schanz.  The opinion noted: 
While MRE 702 authorizes expert testimony on
the 
basis 
of 
"knowledge, 
skill, 
experience,
training, or education," the statute operates to
preclude certain witnesses from testifying solely
on the basis of the witness' lack of practice or
teaching experience in the relevant specialty. 
[Report at 24-25 (emphasis added).] 
The Legislature’s purpose in writing the expert 
witness statute is undisputed: 
it is to ensure that an 
expert is familiar with the standard of care at the level 
and in the area in which the malpractice is alleged to have 
occurred. 
Creating 
a 
rule 
that 
requires 
board 
certifications to match regardless of whether that area is 
the subject of the malpractice would not be in keeping with 
this intent. 
If the Legislature meant to illogically 
restrict some medical malpractice causes of action on such 
an arbitrary basis, it could and would have done so 
clearly. 
Because it did not, a contrary interpretation 
would fly in the face of the intent underlying the statute 
and, moreover, would produce an absurd result. 
3 McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 25 n 9; 597 NW2d 148
(1999), quoting McDougall v Eliuk, 218 Mich App 501, 509 n
2; 554 NW2d 56 (1996) (Taylor, J., dissenting)(emphasis
added). 
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CONCLUSION 
At issue in this case is the interpretation of MCL 
600.2169(1)(a). 
I would hold that where a defendant 
specializes in the area of the alleged malpractice, but is 
not board-certified in that area, the first sentence of MCL 
600.2169(1)(a) controls. 
Where a defendant is board-certified in the area of 
the alleged malpractice, the second sentence of MCL 
600.2169(1)(a) requires that an expert be board-certified 
in the same specialty. The statute does not require that a 
board certification unrelated to the occurrence that is the 
basis for the action be considered. 
In this case, the defendant doctor was board-certified 
in internal medicine. However, it is not disputed that the 
relevant standard of care involved critical care medicine. 
Thus, given the arguments at the hearing on defendant's 
motion to strike, I would affirm the decision of the Court 
of Appeals to reverse the trial court's decision to strike 
plaintiff's expert. 
Marilyn Kelly 
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