Title: DeLuna v. Treister

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

DeLuna v. Treister (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 83119, 83171 
cons.-Agenda 12-March 1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the 
court:
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff 
Oscar DeLuna, as administrator of the estate of Alicia DeLuna, filed a 
single-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants 
Michael Treister, M.D., and St. Elizabeth's Hospital. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. 
Treister negligently caused decedent's death and that St. Elizabeth's, as Dr. 
Treister's employer, shared vicarious liability for decedent's death. The 
circuit court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata barred 
plaintiff's claim against Dr. Treister, and granted Dr. Treister's motion to 
dismiss. The circuit court ruled further that the dismissal of Dr. Treister 
necessitated the dismissal of plaintiff's respondeat superior action 
against St. Elizabeth's.
The appellate court reversed, with one justice 
dissenting. We granted defendants' petitions for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 
315) and now must decide whether: (1) an involuntary dismissal for failure to 
comply with section 2-622 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 
5/2-622 (West 1994)) constitutes an "adjudication upon the merits," as defined 
in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273 (134 Ill. 2d R. 273); (2) an allegedly 
vicariously liable principal must be dismissed from a lawsuit when the 
principal's agent is dismissed for reasons unrelated to the merits of 
plaintiff's claim(s); and (3) plaintiff's claim against the hospital is barred 
by the statute of limitations.
BACKGROUND
This is the second time this matter is before 
this court. The present appeal, which we may refer to as DeLuna II, 
cannot be understood absent a recitation of pertinent events occurring in the 
first appeal, which we identify as DeLuna I. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's 
Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57 (1992).
DeLuna I
On April 16, 1986, plaintiff Guadalupe DeLuna,(1) 
as administrator of the estate of decedent Alicia DeLuna, filed a six-count 
complaint, alleging that during an operation to perform a lumbar laminectomy, 
defendant Michael Treister, M.D., negligently cut decedent's left common iliac 
artery, and failed to timely discover and correct his negligent error. Plaintiff 
further alleged that Dr. Treister's negligence caused decedent to exsanguinate 
and eventually die. Plaintiff also asserted that St. Elizabeth's Hospital, as 
Dr. Treister's employer, was vicariously liable for decedent's injuries and 
death.
Citing section 2-619 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1994)), St. Elizabeth's moved to dismiss 
plaintiff's claims against the hospital. Plaintiff failed to file an affidavit, 
required by section 2-622 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 1994)), attesting 
to a review of plaintiff's claims by a health professional, and failed to file a 
report from the health professional stating that plaintiff alleged a reasonable 
and meritorious cause of action. The circuit court granted the motion and 
dismissed St. Elizabeth's without prejudice on October 23, 1986.
On February 25, 1987, the circuit court 
dismissed all counts against Dr. Treister on identical grounds. The order 
dismissing Dr. Treister was entered with prejudice.
Plaintiff chose not to file the section 2-622 
affidavit and report, but instead appealed the orders dismissing the defendants, 
in order to challenge the constitutionality of section 2-622. The appellate 
court reversed, and held section 2-622 unconstitutional. DeLuna v. St. 
Elizabeth's Hospital, 184 Ill. App. 3d 802 (1989).
On appeal, this court found the affidavit and 
report requirements of section 2-622 constitutional, and affirmed the circuit 
court's decision to dismiss with prejudice the negligence counts asserted 
against Dr. Treister. DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d  at 75-76. To this end, the 
court expressly rejected plaintiff's request that the "action *** be remanded so 
that the necessary affidavit and report [could] be filed." DeLuna I, 
147 Ill. 2d  at 76. We were precluded from granting plaintiff's request because 
plaintiff elected, at the time of dismissal, to challenge the constitutionality 
of section 2-622 (DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d at 76), instead of exercising 
his option to seek leave to refile the action with the required documentation 
(134 Ill. 2d R. 273). Accordingly, we "decline[d] to order further proceedings." 
DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d  at 76.
Also, this court dismissed plaintiff's appeal 
from the circuit court's order dismissing St. Elizabeth's without prejudice. 
Plaintiff had appealed the order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a), which 
permits appeals from certain orders, so long as the orders are "final and 
appealable," and the circuit court finds that there is no just reason to delay 
enforcement or appeal of the orders. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Because the circuit 
court dismissed St. Elizabeth's without prejudice, we held that the order of 
dismissal lacked the finality necessary to appeal the order under Rule 304(a). 
DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d  at 76. Therefore, it was not a "final and 
appealable order" subject to review by either this or the appellate court. 
DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d  at 76.
DeLuna II
On November 10, 1993, plaintiff refiled his 
medical malpractice action against St. Elizabeth's and Dr. Treister. Plaintiff's 
single-count complaint also named a third defendant, Dr. T. Kolather, who was 
subsequently voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit.
The allegations set forth in the DeLuna 
II complaint were virtually identical to those asserted in the DeLuna I 
complaint. The parties in both suits were identical, except for the 
replacement of Guadalupe DeLuna with Oscar DeLuna as administrator of the 
estate.
Dr. Treister filed a motion to dismiss the 1993 
complaint. Dr. Treister argued that his prior dismissal with prejudice in 
DeLuna I was a dismissal "on the merits" under Supreme Court Rule 273. 
134 Ill. 2d R. 273. Continuing, Dr. Treister maintained that when, as here, a 
court has addressed the merits of a prior, identical claim involving identical 
parties, the doctrine of res judicata bars further litigation of the 
claim. Dr. Treister therefore insisted that plaintiff's claims in DeLuna 
II were res judicata as to him. The circuit court granted Dr. 
Treister's motion to dismiss with prejudice.
St. Elizabeth's filed a separate motion to 
dismiss the complaint, arguing that the res judicata doctrine also 
barred plaintiff's renewed action against the hospital. In denying this motion, 
the circuit court held that the dismissal entered in favor of St. Elizabeth's in 
DeLuna I had been without prejudice and thus did not reach the merits 
of the plaintiff's claim.
However, the circuit court granted St. 
Elizabeth's subsequent motion to dismiss, which challenged the hospital's 
purported derivative liability to plaintiff. Where respondeat superior 
is the sole theory of liability asserted against a principal, the hospital 
insisted, the dismissal with prejudice of the principal's agent from the lawsuit 
compels dismissal of the principal, as well. Stated differently, the hospital 
argued that the derivative liability of the principal depends on a finding of 
liability against the principal's agent; if the agent will never be found 
liable, then, logically, the principal may not be found liable, 
either.
Plaintiff appealed the orders dismissing St. 
Elizabeth's and Dr. Treister. A divided appellate court reversed the circuit 
court. 286 Ill. App. 3d 25. Regarding plaintiff's lawsuit against Dr. Treister, 
the appellate majority ruled that plaintiff's failure to comply with section 
2-622 in DeLuna I was a purely procedural fault that did not require 
the circuit court to reach the merits of the case. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 33-35. 
The appellate court likened dismissals for failure to comply with section 2-622 
with dismissals for "lack of jurisdiction," which are explicitly excepted from 
the operation of Rule 273. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 38. Thus, the court reasoned, the 
dismissal was not on the merits and the doctrine of res judicata did 
not apply. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 38. The appellate court found that the dismissal 
of St. Elizabeth's was also in error, since the hospital's agent, Dr. Treister, 
had been improperly dismissed from DeLuna II. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 
38.
We granted petitions for leave to appeal filed 
by Dr. Treister and by St. Elizabeth's. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). The Illinois 
Trial Lawyers Association was granted leave to file an amicus curiae 
brief in support of plaintiff's position. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345(a). For the reasons 
stated below, we reverse the decision of the appellate court as to Dr. Treister, 
and affirm the appellate court's conclusion that plaintiff's case against St. 
Elizabeth's may proceed.
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the Circuit Court Erred 
in Dismissing Plaintiff's Cause of Action Against Dr. Treister
Dr. Treister argues that the appellate majority 
erred in finding that the dismissal of Dr. Treister in DeLuna I was not 
"on the merits," as that phrase is employed in Rule 273. 134 Ill. 2d R. 273. We 
agree. Rule 273 and prior decisions of this court applying the rule lead us to 
conclude that the circuit court's dismissal of Dr. Treister in DeLuna I 
was a dismissal on the merits. Therefore, plaintiff was precluded by res 
judicata principles from renewing his claim against Dr. Treister in 
DeLuna II.
The doctrine of res judicata bars the 
refiling of an action previously adjudicated on the merits when the action is 
directed against the same parties and involves the same claims. Rein v. 
David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (1996). The doctrine applies 
if three conditions are satisfied: (1) a final judgment on the merits has been 
entered in the first lawsuit by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an 
identity of causes of action exists; (3) the parties or their privies are 
identical in both lawsuits. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d  at 335.
At bar, the parties concur that the second and 
third conditions have been satisfied. The instant dispute centers only on the 
first condition, namely, whether the dismissal of plaintiff's claims again Dr. 
Treister in DeLuna I constituted a disposition on the 
merits.
Relying on Rule 273, Dr. Treister maintains that 
it was. The Rule states:
The straightforward application of Rule 273 to 
the present matter indicates that the dismissal of Dr. Treister in DeLuna 
I was "an adjudication upon the merits." The circuit court involuntarily 
dismissed, with prejudice, all counts pleaded by plaintiff against Dr. Treister. 
The basis of the dismissal neither was lack of jurisdiction or venue, nor did 
plaintiff fail to join an indispensable party. On the day the order was entered, 
plaintiff did not seek, and the circuit court did not include in the order, a 
statement allowing plaintiff to amend his action, or to file the documents 
required by section 2-622. In addition, no statute automatically guaranteed 
plaintiff these opportunities. Under the plain language of Rule 273, therefore, 
the dismissal of the claims against Dr. Treister was an adjudication on the 
merits.
The result urged by Dr. Treister is also 
compatible with precedents established by this court. In Rein v. David A. 
Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 335, 336 (1996), the plaintiffs filed 
suit against the defendant securities dealers, alleging that the defendants 
fraudulently misled plaintiffs as to the nature of securities sold by the 
defendants to the plaintiffs. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice the 
rescission counts filed by the plaintiffs, finding those counts barred by the 
statute of limitations set forth in the Illinois Securities Law. Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1989, ch. 121½, par. 137.13(D). Three years later, the plaintiffs sued the same 
parties, again seeking rescission of the purchase of securities. The trial court 
dismissed the second action as res judicata and we affirmed the circuit 
court order.
Like the present appeal, the identity of claims 
and parties was not at issue before this court in Rein. The sole 
question was whether the dismissal of the rescission counts in the first lawsuit 
constituted a judgment on the merits. We held that it did, because "Rule 273 
applies only to an involuntary dismissal of an action, such as that which 
occurs when a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code is 
granted." (Emphasis added.) Rein, 172 Ill. 2d  at 335-36. Thus, in 
Rein, "the trial judge's decision to grant defendants' motion to 
dismiss the rescission counts in Rein I based on the applicable statute 
of limitations is a final adjudication on the merits and operates as a final 
judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata." Rein, 
172 Ill. 2d  at 335-36. See also Downing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
162 Ill. 2d 70, 75 (1994) (with certain exceptions, involuntary dismissal 
operates as a judgment on the merits).
In the instant matter, Dr. Treister relied on 
section 2-619 of the Code to obtain dismissal of plaintiff's claims against him. 
735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1994). The dismissal was by definition involuntary, and 
absent the conditions and exceptions set forth in Rule 273, a dismissal on the 
merits. Indeed, we reached this conclusion once before in this very same case. 
See DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d  at 76.
Despite this precedent and the clear language of 
Rule 273, a majority of the appellate court ruled in DeLuna II that no 
adjudication on the merits occurred. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 33. The majority 
declared that a dismissal could be deemed a final judgment on the merits only if 
the circuit court actually reached the merits of the case. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 
33. The appellate court reasoned further that a dismissal "with prejudice" did 
not necessarily mean that the dismissal was on the merits. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 
32. The appellate majority's rationale is incorrect.
First, by insisting that the circuit court must 
give the plaintiff his "day in court" to air the merits of plaintiff's claims 
(286 Ill. App. 3d at 33), the appellate court misstated the plaintiff's rights 
and misconstrued the intent animating Rule 273. The courts and the legislature 
have never hesitated to truncate a litigant's "day in court" where facts 
indicate that the merits need not, or as a matter of fairness should not, be 
reached. Consequently, some of the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure 
restrict access to our courts, such as statutes of limitation and repose, 
minimal jurisdictional requirements and discovery requirements. A failure to 
satisfy these and like provisions can justifiably arrest a plaintiff's progress 
in the court system, long before plaintiff has ever enjoyed his so-called day in 
court.
Similarly, Rule 273 is intended to curb the 
number of times a plaintiff can resurrect a dismissed action. Leow v. 
A&B Freight Line, Inc., 175 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1997). If a plaintiff's 
action is involuntarily dismissed for a reason not expressly excepted by the 
rule, and if plaintiff does not procure leave of court to refile the complaint, 
or if a statute does not guaranty that opportunity to the plaintiff, then the 
rule deems the dismissal a dismissal on the merits. That is the purpose 
of the rule.
In this case, Rule 273 fulfilled its intended 
purpose. Plaintiff knowingly defied a statutory pleading requirement, in order 
to challenge the constitutionality of the requirement. Plaintiff could have 
requested leave to satisfy section 2-622, and/or refile his complaint. 
McCastle v. Sheinkop, 121 Ill. 2d 188, 191 (1987). He chose not to do 
so. Had Rule 273 not operated in precisely the manner intended, plaintiff could 
have refiled the action yet again. The rule therefore preempted potentially 
needless litigation.
Additionally, we need not address the appellate 
majority's assertion that a dismissal with prejudice is not synonymous with a 
dismissal on the merits. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 32. The appellate majority's 
assertion unnecessarily embellishes the plain terms of Rule 273. The inclusion 
of "with prejudice" in the order dismissing Dr. Treister is not dispositive of 
whether the dismissal was an adjudication upon the merits. Rule 273 is triggered 
by an involuntary dismissal for a reason other than those specifically excepted. 
134 Ill. 2d R. 273; Downing, 162 Ill. 2d  at 75. While the inclusion of 
"without prejudice" in an order signals the circuit court's intent to 
allow a plaintiff to refile an action (see Bond v. Dunmire, 129 Ill. 
App. 3d 796, 802 (1984)), the inclusion of "with prejudice" in an order does 
not, alone, trigger Rule 273.
The appellate majority next concluded that the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)), from which we derived Rule 273 (Towns v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 125 (1978)), should control interpretation 
of our Rule 273. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 35. Specifically, the appellate court cited 
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 5 L. Ed. 2d 551, 81 S. Ct. 534 
(1961), for the proposition that a dismissal for failure to file a section 2-622 
affidavit and report constituted a dismissal for "lack of jurisdiction" and thus 
was not an adjudication on the merits. Consequently, the doctrine of res 
judicata would not bar plaintiff's second action against Dr. Treister and 
the hospital. 286 Ill. App. 3d at 35.
In Costello, 365 U.S. 265, 5 L. Ed. 2d 551, 81 S. Ct. 534, the federal government initiated a denaturalization 
proceeding against the defendant. The federal district court dismissed the 
action, because the government failed to file a statutorily mandated affidavit 
of good cause with the complaint. The government filed a new action, with the 
proper affidavit, and succeeded in winning revocation of defendant's 
citizenship.
On appeal, the defendant argued, inter 
alia, that the second denaturalization proceeding was barred by operation 
of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
That rule deems all but a few, excepted dismissals to be dismissals on the 
merits:
The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of the government, however. The Court equated the failure to file the necessary 
affidavit with a failure of jurisdiction. Costello, 365 U.S.  at 285, 5 L. Ed. 2d  at 564, 81 S. Ct.  at 544-45. According to the Costello Court, 
"dismissals for lack of jurisdiction" encompass more than dismissals for lack of 
authority over the subject matter or the parties: they include any failure of 
the plaintiff to satisfy a "precondition of suit," such as neglecting to file a 
statutorily mandated affidavit. Costello, 365 U.S.  at 285-86, 5 L. Ed. 2d  at 565, 81 S. Ct.  at 545.
The Court also compared Rule 41(b) dismissals 
with traditional common law practice, where only dismissals that reached the 
merits of a case could later form the basis of a motion to bar relitigation of 
that action. Whether a dismissal reached the merits of a claim, moreover, was 
judged by whether the defendant was compelled to mount a defense to the 
dispositive allegations of the plaintiff's lawsuit.
In Costello, the United States Supreme 
Court found that the defendant never presented a defense in response to the 
substantive allegations of the government's claim. Further, the failure to file 
the affidavit of good cause was no more than a failure to satisfy a precondition 
of suit. The Court thus held that Rule 41(b) did not preclude pursuit of the 
second denaturalization proceeding. Costello, 365 U.S.  at 287-88, 5 L. Ed. 2d  at 566, 81 S. Ct.  at 546.
Subsequent to the appellate court's issuance of 
its DeLuna II opinion in 1996, we have had an opportunity to consider 
whether, and to what extent, the federal courts' interpretation of Rule 41(b) 
should influence application of our own Rule 273. In 1997, this court issued its 
opinion in Leow v. A&B Freight Lines, Inc., 175 Ill. 2d 176 
(1997). There, the plaintiff filed a personal injury action against 
A&B Freight, under a theory of respondeat superior, for injuries 
allegedly caused by an employee of A&B. In an amended pleading, the 
plaintiff sued the A&B employee, as well as A&B. The employee 
successfully moved to dismiss the claim against him, charging that it violated 
the applicable statute of limitations.
Invoking the doctrine of res judicata, 
A&B moved to dismiss the claim against it. A&B asserted that the 
involuntary dismissal of its employee constituted an adjudication on the merits 
and, because A&B's employee was no longer liable to plaintiff, A&B's 
derivative liability was erased, as well. The circuit court granted A&B's 
motion.
A majority of this court reversed the circuit 
court's ruling. Leow, 175 Ill. 2d  at 188. In relevant part, the 
majority adopted the Costello interpretation of Rule 41(b) as a proper 
interpretation of Rule 273. Leow, 175 Ill. 2d  at 186. However, the 
court specifically limited the applicability of the Costello test 
-whether the basis for dismissal forced the defendant to prepare to meet the 
merits of plaintiff's claim-to instances where "separate defendants are 
involved." Leow, 175 Ill. 2d  at 186. Where the party that procures an 
involuntary dismissal in a case is the same party that later asserts that the 
dismissal was a "final adjudication on the merits," then whether an adjudication 
on the merits actually occurred is determined by applying Rule 273 according to 
its plain terms. Leow, 175 Ill. 2d  at 184. But where the party seeking 
to invoke the doctrine of res judicata is relying on the prior 
dismissal of a claim against a different party, then, Leow 
concluded, the prior dismissal must have caused the defendant to prepare to 
address the actual merits of plaintiff's claim before the dismissal will be 
deemed "on the merits." Leow, 175 Ill. 2d  at 184-86.
Therefore, as to Dr. Treister, Leow 
merely reaffirmed the holdings of Rein, Downing and DeLuna 
I, that Rule 273 should be applied according to its unambiguous terms. The 
involuntary dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Dr. Treister in DeLuna 
I falls squarely within the operation of Rule 273 and constitutes an 
adjudication on the merits. The circuit court correctly dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint against Dr. Treister in DeLuna II as res 
judicata.
Additionally, the section 2-622 affidavit and 
report requirement cannot be analogized to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
As we stated in DeLuna I, the affidavit and report demanded by section 
2-622 are intended to discourage frivolous claims. DeLuna I, 147 Ill. 2d  at 70-71. This pleading requirement has no bearing on the authority or 
jurisdiction of a circuit court to decide a personal injury action or to grant 
the relief sought by a plaintiff. The failure to comply with section 2-622 will 
not make plaintiff's complaint vulnerable to collateral attack on the basis that 
the court lacks jurisdiction at any point in the litigation. Further, a 
defendant may waive the affidavit requirement. Nikolic v. Seidenberg, 
242 Ill. App. 3d 96, 102 (1993).
In In re Custody of Sexton, 84 Ill. 2d 312 (1981), this court squarely addressed the question of whether technical 
pleading requirements, like those of section 2-622, are "jurisdictional," and 
held that they were not. In Sexton, the plaintiff neglected to file an 
affidavit, as required by statute, with his petition to modify a child custody 
order. The defendant did not object to plaintiff's failure to file the required 
affidavit, and raised the fact of plaintiff's oversight only on appeal. The 
defendant argued that, in the absence of adherence to the statute's pleading 
requirements based on plaintiff's failure to file the affidavit, the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiff's petition. This court disagreed. A 
statutory pleading requirement that is mandatory is not necessarily 
jurisdictional. Under the then-governing Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of 
Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 610), which contained the 
affidavit requirement, it was held that the requirement was not jurisdictional 
in nature: the failure to file the affidavit could be waived and was not 
intended as a limitation on the court's jurisdiction to decide matters of child 
custody. Clearly, a dismissal for failure to comply with the mandatory affidavit 
and report filing requirements of section 2-622 is a dismissal for deficiencies 
in a pleading. The failure to comply with filing requirements does not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the lawsuit because of the 
omission.
II. Whether the Circuit Court Erred 
by Dismissing Plaintiff's Cause of Action Against St. Elizabeth's 
Hospital
Having concluded that the circuit court properly 
dismissed the claim against Dr. Treister under the doctrine of res 
judicata, we now turn to the disposition of plaintiff's claim against the 
hospital in DeLuna II. This issue must be decided separately, since the 
circuit court dismissed the counts asserted against St. Elizabeth's in 
DeLuna I without prejudice. According to plaintiff, the 
dismissal without prejudice precludes a Rule 273 finding that the dismissal was 
on the merits, and thereby further precludes an application of the res 
judicata doctrine.
However, the circuit court accepted St. 
Elizabeth's argument that, because the hospital's purported liability derived 
solely from its employment of Dr. Treister, a dismissal of Dr. Treister with 
prejudice required that the hospital be dismissed, as well. For this result, the 
circuit court presumably relied on cases such as Towns v. Yellow 
Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 124 (1978), where this court noted that an 
employer's derivative liability depends entirely on the liability of its 
employee, so that for litigation purposes, they are considered one and the same 
tortfeasor. If the employee is adjudged not liable, the employer must 
necessarily be found not liable, as well. See Towns, 73 Ill. 2d  at 
122-23.
A.. The Dismissal Was Final 
Only As to Dr. Treister
The proper disposition of the plaintiff's claim 
against the hospital lies in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. The 
Restatement observes that, while the dismissal of an agent generally compels 
dismissal of any vicarious liability claim against the principal, a judgment 
against a plaintiff based on a defense "personal" to one defendant does not have 
a res judicata effect in subsequent litigation against a different 
defendant who might be vicariously liable. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §51 
(1982).
In this case, both Dr. Treister and the hospital 
relied on plaintiff's refusal to comply with section 2-622 to move for dismissal 
of DeLuna I. Yet only one defendant, Dr. Treister, was dismissed in a 
manner that precluded plaintiff from amending his complaint or resubmitting it 
with a section 2-622 affidavit and report. Therefore, the defenses articulated 
by Dr. Treister and St. Elizabeth's in DeLuna II were substantively 
different. By virtue of Rule 273, only Dr. Treister could assert a prior 
adjudication upon the merits that prevented plaintiff from further pursuing his 
medical malpractice action against the physician. That defense, unavailable to 
the hospital, was "personal" to Dr. Treister. Consequently, the hospital was not 
entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's respondeat superior action on the 
basis that Dr. Treister had been dismissed.
This court finds as well that allowing the case 
to proceed against St. Elizabeth's best comports with our obligation to do 
justice. Had plaintiff chosen to do so, plaintiff could have sued St. 
Elizabeth's alone for decedent's injuries and death. Dr. Treister was not a 
necessary party. We believe it would be particularly unfair to permit St. 
Elizabeth's to avoid liability merely because of its employee's fortuity in 
obtaining an involuntary dismissal from plaintiff's lawsuit, where that 
dismissal did not otherwise absolve the employee of fault.
B. The Statute of Limitations 
for Medical Malpractice Actions Does Not Bar Plaintiff's Cause of Action Against 
the Hospital
Nevertheless, St. Elizabeth's argues that even 
if plaintiff's claim against the hospital is not barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata, the allegations asserted against the hospital in 
DeLuna II are precluded by the controlling statute of limitations, 
citing 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1994). St. Elizabeth's maintains that the 
dismissal of the hospital in DeLuna I was as "final" as the dismissal 
of Dr. Treister, even though the dismissal of the hospital in DeLuna I 
was made "without prejudice." St. Elizabeth's reasons as follows: when the 
circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint against the hospital in DeLuna 
I without prejudice, the proper action for plaintiff to take would have 
been to refile the action against the hospital immediately, with the 
documentation required by section 2-622. Instead, plaintiff chose to appeal the 
nonfinal order dismissing the hospital. By the time this court dismissed 
plaintiff's appeal in 1992, the four-year limitations period governing medical 
malpractice claims (735 ILCS 13-212(a) (West 1994)) had expired, and thus, the 
DeLuna II complaint, with respect to the hospital, was barred by the 
statute of limitations at the time plaintiff refiled the complaint in 
1993.
Although the basis for the hospital's argument 
is not entirely clear, the hospital then urges that, by operation of the statute 
of limitations, the dismissal of the hospital in DeLuna I eventually 
acquired the same degree of finality as the dismissal of Dr. Treister. Following 
this reasoning to its conclusion, the hospital would have us find that the 
dismissals of the hospital and Dr. Treister in DeLuna I were both "with 
prejudice" and that the res judicata doctrine applies equally to both 
defendants. As best we can discern, the linchpin of St. Elizabeth's argument is 
the four-year statute of limitations(2) 
governing medical malpractice actions. 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1994). If we 
determine that the statute expired in 1990, four years after decedent's death, 
then we must decide whether the expiration of that limitations period barred 
plaintiff's cause of action against the hospital in DeLuna II. If, 
however, we find that plaintiff's cause of action is not barred by the statute 
of limitations, then, as to St. Elizabeth's, DeLuna II may 
proceed.
Plaintiff's complaint in DeLuna II 
alleges that defendants' medical negligence, occurring on April 7, 1986, caused 
the death of decedent Alicia DeLuna on April 8, 1986. The complaint seeks 
damages pursuant to Illinois' Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et 
seq. (West 1992)). All of the named beneficiaries to the instant lawsuit, 
including administrator Oscar DeLuna, were under 18 years of age on April 8, 
1986. The minority limitations set forth in the wrongful death statute provide 
that a wrongful death beneficiary under age 18 at the time the cause of action 
accrues "may [file a wrongful death action] within 2 years after attainment of 
the age of 18." 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1992). The limitations statute governing 
medical malpractice actions states, in pertinent part, that where the person 
entitled to bring the action was under 18 at the time the cause of action 
accrued, the claim shall be filed no later than eight years after the act or 
omission causing injury or death, and in no event may a claim be filed after the 
claimant's 22nd birthday. 735 ILCS 5/13-212(b) (West 1992). The time for filing 
a cause of action had not yet expired for these beneficiaries as of November 10, 
1993, the date plaintiff filed DeLuna II. Therefore, we hold that 
plaintiff's lawsuit against St. Elizabeth's is not time-barred and, on remand, 
may proceed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse in part 
and affirm in part the decision of the appellate court. Accordingly, we also 
reverse the decision of the circuit court as to the dismissal of St. Elizabeth's 
Hospital. As to Dr. Treister, we affirm the dismissal entered by the circuit 
court. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.
Appellate court judgment 
affirmed
in part and reversed in 
part;
circuit court judgment 
affirmed
in part and reversed in 
part;
cause 
remanded.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
Footnotes:
1. Oscar DeLuna is the eldest child of Alicia and Guadalupe 
DeLuna. Guadalupe filed the DeLuna I action individually and as special 
administrator of Alicia's estate. During the pendency of the DeLuna I 
appeal, Guadalupe died. Oscar succeeded as special administrator of his late 
mother's estate. For ease of understanding, we refer to both Guadalupe and Oscar 
as "plaintiff." 
2. Section 13-212(a) actually prescribes a 
two-year limitation period and a four-year period of repose. However, for the 
sake of clarity, we will use the terminology adopted by the hospital, and refer 
to section 13-212(a) solely as a statute of limitation.