Title: State v. Brown

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

699 P.2d 1122 (1985)
299 Or. 143
STATE of Oregon, Respondent On Review,
v.
Curtis Alan BROWN, Petitioner On Review.
TC 10-83-01576; CA A28931; SC S30767.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc[*].
Argued and Submitted September 4, 1984.
Decided May 9, 1985.
Reassigned May 1, 1985.
J. Marvin Kuhn, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on *1123 review. On the briefs were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.
JONES, Justice.
Defendant appealed his conviction of robbery, assigning as error that the trial court ruled evidence that he was on probation for a previous crime admissible to impeach his testimony for interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, 68 Or. App. 53, 680 P.2d 21, and we allowed review. We affirm.
The issue involves three provisions of the Oregon Evidence Code: OEC 404(2), which prohibits evidence of a defendant's criminal character; OEC 609(1), dealing with impeaching a defendant in a criminal case with evidence of a prior criminal conviction; and OEC 609-1, dealing with impeaching a defendant in a criminal case with evidence of bias, prejudice or interest.
OEC 404(2) provides:
OEC 609(1) provides:
OEC 609-1(1) provides:
Before trial, following procedures since approved in State v. McClure, 298 Or. 336, 692 P.2d 579 (1985), and State v. Foster, 296 Or. 174, 674 P.2d 587 (1983), in a May 25, 1983 hearing, defendant moved to exclude evidence of defendant's prior criminal conviction as follows:
The defense attorney then discussed four factors a trial court should consider in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence of a prior crime under OEC 609(1):
The fact that the defendant was still under supervision by the state as a probationer came up immediately thereafter:
The court then posed the rhetorical question:
The prosecutor replied:
The court then correctly summed up the essence of OEC 404 and 609(1):
The trial judge then commented that he felt that bias, prejudice and interest can be admitted independent of OEC 609-1:
The prosecutor responded:
Defense counsel added:
After additional colloquy, the court concluded:
Defense counsel then protected his record in accordance with procedures set forth in State v. Foster, supra, as follows
During direct examination of defendant, in an effort to neutralize the sting of the anticipated impeachment testimony, defense counsel asked:
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned defendant as follows:
At the outset, we note that OEC 609-1 (bias, interest, etc.) does not literally allow admission of the evidence in this case. It authorizes attacks on the credibility of a witness by evidence that the witness "engaged in conduct or made statements" showing either bias or interest. The rule says nothing about showing bias or interest by evidence other than conduct or statements of the witness.
The language of OEC 609-1 may create some uncertainty about the applicability of OEC 609-1 to evidence of bias or interest other than conduct or statements. OEC 609-1 was written by the legislature to codify this court's holding in State v. Dowell, 274 Or. 547, 547 P.2d 619 (1976). In Dowell, we held that the typical "Queen Caroline" foundation[1] of establishing time, place and persons present at the time of prior inconsistent statements should also be required for evidence of conduct or *1126 statements demonstrating bias or interest. At the time OEC 609-1 was drafted, OEC 613 required such a foundation. However, in the transition from the Oregon Evidence Revision Commission through the Joint Interim Committee to the final passage, OEC 613's "Queen Caroline" foundation requirement was dropped. OEC 613 now provides that the prior inconsistent statement of the witness need not be shown or its contents disclosed to the witness at the time of cross-examination nor need the witness be told of the time, place and persons present at the time of the alleged statement. OEC 609-1 is therefore "out-of-sync" with OEC 613. OEC 609-1 was never intended to restrict other forms of impeachment for bias or interest. Completely aside from OEC 609-1, bias due to friendship, family relationship, etc., and interest in the form of amount of expert witness fees, etc., continue to be viable forms of impeachment even though no conduct or statement is involved. See, e.g., State v. Sheeler, 15 Or. App. 96, 514 P.2d 1370 (1973); State v. Guerrero, 11 Or. App. 284, 501 P.2d 998 (1972). As Professor Kirkpatrick states:
Both OEC 609(1) and 609-1 deal with evidence casting doubt on the credibility of witnesses generally, including defendants in criminal trials. But the situation of a defendant differs from that of other witnesses in important respects. First, the interest of the defendant in avoiding conviction ordinarily is self-evident, whereas evidence may be required to show that another witness has an interest in the case.
Second, evidence that a witness has previously been convicted of a crime ordinarily has no significance in the trial other than to cast doubt upon the testimony of that witness. Unless that crime somehow implicates the defendant, its disclosure is not necessarily prejudicial to the defendant. It may help him, if the witness testifies for the prosecution. Indeed, the denial of cross-examination by a defendant of a prosecution witness to demonstrate the witness was on probation and therefore by implication under the control of the state, has been held to be a violation of the constitutional confrontation rights of a defendant under the United States Constitution. See, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974).
Evidence that the defendant himself previously has been convicted of a crime, on the other hand, usually is very prejudicial to the defendant because such a fact is often interpreted by the jury as evidence of a bad criminal character. That is why prior criminal convictions may be shown only when admissible under the limited conditions of OEC 609 for the purposes of attacking the credibility of the defendant's testimony and only under specified exceptions under OEC 404.[2]
*1127 We believe evidence of the probationary status of a defendant necessarily reveals the fact that the defendant had committed a prior crime. The essence of such evidence is that the jury would infer the defendant was a person of bad character and ignore the credibility aspects of such evidence. In criminal cases the defendant's interest in avoiding conviction is sufficiently obvious that it does not justify additional demonstration by evidence that he is on probation for another conviction.
In this case, the trial judge did not have the benefit of our opinion in State v. McClure, supra. In McClure, we held that in cases of "similar crime," e.g., robbery trial, prior robbery conviction offered under OEC 609, and "low credibility crime," e.g., assault conviction, the prosecutor should be limited merely to asking the defendant if he has been convicted of a felony without specifying the type of crime so as to reduce the chances of the jury interpreting the cross-examination as an attack on character as opposed to its proper limitation as an attack on credibility.[3] We stated: "We assume * * * that the fact that a witness has been convicted of any felony within the prescribed time limits has some relevancy." The trial judge in this present case reflected that he could well admit the fact of the prior convictions under OEC 609(1), including the name of the assault conviction but opted for the evidence that the defendant was on probation for an unnamed crime. In doing so he erred. However, we find the error was harmless.
The defendant in this case testified and in his defense tried to mitigate the fact that he was found in possession of a weapon which witnesses said was used in the robbery. He claimed he was trying to get rid of the gun and had attempted to sell it to others. On cross-examination, he was asked, "Well, why did you want to get rid of the gun?" The defendant then responded, independent of any impeachment issue, "Because I was on probation, and a probation officer said I cannot have a gun no more." Since the defendant injected an independent reason for mentioning his probationary status, he cannot claim now that he was hurt by the original offer of such evidence by the state for impeachment purposes. There was substantial and convincing evidence of defendant's guilt. See, State v. Mains, 295 Or. 640, 669 P.2d 1112 (1983); State v. Naylor, 291 Or. 191, 629 P.2d 1308 (1981); State v. Van Hooser, 266 Or. 19, 511 P.2d 359 (1973). The fact that the defendant in this case was on probation for an unspecified crime did not affect a substantial right of the defendant and there was little, if any, likelihood that the error changed the result of the trial. OEC 103(1); Or. Const. Art. VII (Amended), § 3.[4]
The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
[*]  Linde, J., did not participate in this decision.
[1]  The legislative commentary to OEC 613 reads:

"The Queen's Case, 2 Br. & B. 284, 129 Eng Rep 976 (1820), laid down the requirement that a cross-examiner, prior to questioning a witness about the witness' prior statement in writing, must show it to the witness. Abolished by statute in the country of its origin, the requirement nevertheless gained currency in the United States * * *."
[2]  OEC 404 provides:

"(1) Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is admissible when it is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense.
"(2) Evidence of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(b) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(c) Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in [OEC 607 to 609]; or
(d) Evidence of the character of a party for violent behavior offered in a civil assault and battery case when self-defense is pleaded and there is evidence to support such defense.
"(3) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
[3]  Under State v. McClure, 298 Or. 336, 692 P.2d 579 (1985), when prior convictions are not "similar crimes" or "low credibility" crimes, the trial court decides whether to admit the name of the prior crime by utilizing the balancing test set forth in OEC 609(1).
[4]  OEC 103(1) provides in pertinent part:

"Effect of erroneous ruling. Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected * * *."
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"* * * If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial * * *."