Title: Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
STEPHEN B. MOORMAN,  
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE  
OF DORIS H. MOORMAN, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 070988 
 
   JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, 
JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          June 6, 2008 
BLACKSTOCK, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
William N. Alexander, II, Judge 
 
This appeal arises from a dispute over the sale of a 
certain tract of real property.  The principal issue we 
consider is whether the statute of frauds, Code § 11-2, 
prohibits the enforcement of the purported oral contract 
between the parties for the sale of the land.  We also consider 
whether, under the circumstances of the case, principles of 
equitable estoppel or part performance are applicable so as to 
justify granting the requested specific performance of the 
purported oral contact. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Moorman family has owned a farm consisting of 194 
acres, more or less, situated along what is now Smith Mountain 
Lake in Franklin County since the 1800s.  At the time the 
present dispute over the sale of the farm arose in 2002, the 
farm was owned by a number of the Moorman family members and a 
certain trust for a family member.  C. Riley Moorman and Sophie 
Moorman, husband and wife, owned a one-half interest in the 
 
1
property.  The other one-half interest was owned in one-tenth 
shares by Stephen B. Moorman, David V. Moorman, Susan Moorman 
Durham and Lisa D. Moorman, four of the five children of Warren 
and Doris Moorman, who had previously owned this one-half 
interest in the farm.  The remaining one-tenth interest was 
divided between a one-twentieth interest vested in fee simple 
in Mark A. Moorman, the brother of Warren and Doris Moorman’s 
other four children, and a one-twentieth interest held in the 
Mark A. Moorman Trust, which had been created by Doris Moorman 
for the benefit of Mark A. Moorman and which named David V. 
Moorman as trustee.1 
 
In 2002, the Moormans decided to sell their farm and began 
attempts to determine the interest of prospective purchasers.  
Because of their affection for the farm, and because several 
family members intended to live on adjacent property, the 
Moormans desired to find a purchaser who would agree to 
restrictive covenants in the sales contract that would allow 
the Moormans to exert a degree of control over the farm’s 
development for residential use. 
                     
1 Hereafter, we will refer to these parties in context as 
simply “the Moormans” or we will refer to them specifically by 
their individual names.  We also note that Stephen B. Moorman 
in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Doris Moorman 
is also a party defendant in the complaint filed in this case.  
The precise ownership interests of the Moormans are not at 
issue and are recited merely to clarify the actions taken by 
 
2
One of the prospective purchasers the family contacted 
regarding the sale was Dr. Joseph R. Blackstock (Blackstock), a 
part-time real estate developer and president of Blackstock, 
Inc., his construction and land development company.2  In 1999, 
Blackstock had shown an interest in purchasing the Moormans’ 
farm and developing it into a residential subdivision.  When 
contacted in 2002, Blackstock confirmed his continued interest 
in purchasing the Moormans’ property. 
On November 21, 2002, David Moorman sent a letter3 to 
Blackstock explaining that the “family [had] received competing 
purchase proposals from two prospective buyers of our property” 
and soliciting a “final” proposal from Blackstock.  This letter 
also set forth nine terms and conditions that were to be 
incorporated into Blackstock’s final proposal.  One of these 
conditions required the purchaser of the property to provide 
the family with a mutually agreeable development plan and a 
corresponding set of restrictive covenants within ninety days 
of the signing of a contract.  A second condition required the 
                                                                 
certain members of the family regarding the dispute in 
question. 
2 In the complaints filed in this case, the allegation is 
made that “Blackstock and his ultimate assignee, Blackstock, 
Inc., would purchase” the Moormans’ farm.  We are unable to 
locate evidence of that assignment in the record.  However, 
because the Moormans do not raise the issue we will simply 
refer to “Blackstock” in this opinion to include in context the 
individual or the company where appropriate. 
 
3
purchaser to pay a $10,000 deposit upon contract signing and 
the balance of the purchase price at closing. 
 
Blackstock responded with a letter “[t]o [t]he Moorman 
[f]amily,” dated November 25, 2002, that “offer[ed]” to 
purchase the farm for $1.7 million.  In this letter, Blackstock 
agreed to “abide by the [requested] restrictions,” proposed to 
sign a contract within thirty days, and promised to pay the 
Moormans in full within nine months of signing the contract.  
He also “request[ed]” that the family help him obtain a small 
tract of land located in the center of the Moormans’ farm that 
was owned by Laird R. Heatwole. 
 
David Moorman responded to Blackstock’s proposal in a 
memorandum to Blackstock dated December 3, 2002.  In that 
memorandum, David Moorman noted that Blackstock proposed to pay 
the purchase price within nine months of contract signing and 
expressed concern regarding the family’s ability to protect 
itself and ensure their receipt of final payment of the 
purchase price if ownership were to be transferred at closing 
without final payment at that time.  He asked for clarification 
from Blackstock regarding this issue and also indicated to 
Blackstock that the family would meet to discuss the matter and 
choose between the competing purchasers’ proposals.  Blackstock 
                                                                 
3 All correspondence between Blackstock and the Moorman 
family was sent via e-mail or facsimile. 
 
4
responded, stating that he was willing for the transfer of 
ownership to be delayed until final payment of the purchase 
price was made and suggested that “[w]e can have your attorney 
draft the language to protect you.”  Following the family 
meeting, the Moormans were in agreement to accept Blackstock’s 
proposed purchase price of $1.7 million for the farm. 
 
Subsequently, on January 2, 2003, David Moorman 
transmitted a “draft” purchase agreement for Blackstock’s 
review and comment.  In the cover letter, he wrote that, 
although he had not discussed the draft with the family’s 
attorney, William P. Davis (Davis), he wanted to avoid delay by 
providing the draft for Blackstock to review at that time.  The 
cover letter indicated that the draft agreement was “based on 
[the parties’] earlier agreement and [Blackstock’s] proposal,” 
and included provisions requiring the Moorman family to help 
Blackstock to acquire the Heatwole property and permitting 
Blackstock to make site improvements prior to settlement.  
Settlement was to occur within nine months of the date of the 
agreement, and the purchase price of $1.7 million, less a 
deposit of $10,000, was to be paid at settlement.  The draft 
was not signed by the Moormans. 
On January 16, 2003, David Moorman notified Blackstock of 
four additional terms suggested by Davis, and requested that 
Blackstock’s attorney, Bruce E. Welch (Welch), prepare a 
 
5
revised draft agreement incorporating the additional terms.  
Welch complied and on February 4, 2003 David Moorman forwarded 
the new draft to Davis for his review.  On February 26, 2003, 
David Moorman advised Blackstock that, after reviewing the 
earlier “draft agreement,” Davis wanted to discuss “several 
provisions” with Welch, but that he saw no “showstoppers or 
major concerns.”  One month later, on March 24, 2003, Welch 
provided Davis with another draft agreement, and acknowledged 
the parties’ continuing dispute regarding the nine-month payoff 
for the balance of the purchase price.  Thereafter, on April 9, 
2003, David Moorman provided Blackstock with a draft of 
suggested restrictive covenants desired by the Moorman family.  
Blackstock did not respond directly to David Moorman regarding 
those covenants, but provided the draft to Welch.  Blackstock 
subsequently had restrictive covenants prepared, but they were 
not incorporated in subsequent draft agreements prepared by 
Welch. 
 
Communications between Blackstock and the Moorman family 
continued for the next six months without resolution of the 
parties’ negotiations.  According to Welch, by October 2003, 
there were “[n]o substantial disagreements” between the parties 
and that the parties had agreed that closing would take place 
six months, rather than nine months, after the date of 
 
6
acquisition of a right-of-way from Jewel Moorman.4  However, 
according to the Moormans, they continued to be concerned by 
the clause in the draft agreement giving Blackstock nine months 
to pay the full purchase price, the fact that Blackstock still 
had not provided development plans to confirm that the property 
would be an upscale development, and the fact that Blackstock 
had avoided discussion on the family’s tendered covenants. 
 
On October 17, 2003, Davis sent Welch another copy of the 
contract Welch had prepared containing “suggested changes” and 
two additions.  In an accompanying letter, Davis asked Welch to 
telephone him in order to “finalize this agreement.” 
 
Unbeknownst to the Moorman family, on November 18, 2003, 
Blackstock individually in the asserted capacity as “sole owner 
by contract” entered into a contract to sell the farm to 
another developer for $3 million.  In the course of 
negotiations leading to the signing of that contract, 
Blackstock cautioned the developer that the required signatures 
were not yet on his purported contract with the Moormans. 
 
On January 21, 2004, Welch contacted Davis to inquire 
whether the Moormans had a signed contract that they were ready 
to present to Blackstock, as Blackstock was “anxious to get a 
                     
4 The family farm had no public road frontage, and the 
Moormans accessed the farm through a private road over the land 
of Jewel Moorman, a distant relative.  Blackstock was 
ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining this right-of-way. 
 
7
signed contract.”  Welch wanted the Moormans to be the first to 
sign a contract because “every time [the parties] agreed on a 
term, there would be also something different that would come 
up.” 
Ultimately, on June 16, 2004, Welch sent Davis a draft 
contract for his review and modification, noting that it had 
not been signed, nor reviewed, by Blackstock.  On July 2, 2004, 
David Moorman advised Davis that this draft had been circulated 
among the Moorman family members and that they had various 
questions and complaints regarding its provisions.  He noted 
that the family had yet to see development plans and 
“protective covenants,” that the draft contract failed to 
include provisions regarding the tax consequences arising from 
delayed payment of the purchase price, and that the draft 
contract failed to include a closing date.  David Moorman also 
expressed concern as to whether he, as the trustee of the Mark 
A. Moorman Trust, could sign a contract on behalf of Mark 
Moorman, who had now refused to sign any contract for the sale 
of the farm to Blackstock. 
 
On July 8, 2004, David Moorman notified Davis that the 
attorney for his mother’s estate had advised David that he 
could not sign any sales contract on behalf of Mark Moorman.  
He also wrote that “[t]he rest of [the family] feel that we 
already have a contract with Blackstock, though not in 
 
8
writing,” and sought Davis’ opinion whether the family has “an 
oral contract with Blackstock that he can [successfully] 
litigate.”  On July 12, 2004, David Moorman advised Davis that 
all family members, except Mark Moorman, had agreed to sell the 
property to Blackstock. 
 
On July 16, 2004, Welch sent a letter to Davis containing 
a revised contract, and threatening litigation.  The revised 
contract reflected Mark Moorman’s refusal to participate in the 
sale of the farm by deleting him as a signatory and decreasing 
the purchase price by his “pro-rata share.”  However, the 
revised contract was still unsigned by Blackstock, and 
contained no provision regarding a closing date. 
 
Shortly thereafter and based upon his belief that he could 
not represent both Mark Moorman and the remaining family 
members with regard to the sale, Davis withdrew from his 
representation of the family.  The Moormans consulted other 
counsel and concluded that they were not legally bound to sell 
their farm to Blackstock.  On September 6, 2004, the Moormans 
entered into a contract to sell the farm to another developer 
for $2.6 million. 
 
In an amended bill of complaint filed against the Moormans 
in the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Blackstock sought 
specific performance of the purported contract for the sale of 
the Moormans’ farm.  Blackstock asserted in the complaint that 
 
9
the parties “entered into a purchase and sales agreement as of 
January 2, 2003, for the purchase of [the Moormans’] farm.”  
Blackstock further asserted therein that “[a]lthough not 
memorialized by a signed written contract, the memorandum of 
January 2, 2003, satisfies [the statute of frauds], as it is 
signed by David Moorman on behalf of the Moormans with a typed 
signature.” 
Following a bench trial, the circuit court concluded that 
the parties reached an oral agreement to sell the Moormans’ 
farm on July 2, 2004, and that the several e-mails and faxes 
circulated between Blackstock and David Moorman satisfied the 
statute of frauds.  The circuit court further concluded that, 
in any event, equitable estoppel and part performance justified 
granting Blackstock specific performance of the oral agreement.  
Accordingly, on February 12, 2007, the circuit court entered a 
final decree dismissing Mark Moorman from the suit and granting 
the requested specific performance of the purported contract. 
 
This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our analysis in this appeal is guided by well-established 
principles which subsequently we will reference and apply.  
When applying those principles we will consider the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to Blackstock, the prevailing party in the circuit 
 
10
court, and we will not disturb the judgment of the circuit 
court unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it.  Code § 8.01-680; Reid v. Boyle, 259 Va. 356, 361, 527 
S.E.2d 137, 140 (2000).  Initially, however, we think it 
helpful and necessary to note certain undisputed factual and 
procedural aspects of the case that focus our analysis. 
There is no written and signed contract between the 
parties for the sale of the land involved in this case.  There 
is also no dispute that by early January 2003 Blackstock 
desired to purchase this land for $1.7 million and that the 
Moormans desired to sell the land to Blackstock for that 
purchase price.  While Blackstock maintains that the parties 
reached an agreement on January 2, 2003, the circuit court 
found that the parties reached an agreement on July 2, 2004.  
The Moormans maintain that there never was an oral contract 
because the parties never mutually agreed upon the same 
contract terms.  Thus, the focus of our analysis is not upon 
the disparity of these dates, but rather upon the central issue 
of the applicability of the statute of frauds which the circuit 
court was called upon to resolve. 
In relevant part, Code § 11-2(6), provides that: 
Unless a promise, contract, agreement, 
representation, assurance, or ratification, or some 
memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed 
by the party to be charged or his agent, no action 
 
11
shall be brought . . . [u]pon any contract for the 
sale of real estate. 
 
This statute, commonly known as the statute of frauds, is 
“founded in wisdom and sound policy” and requires “contracts of 
so important a nature as the sale and purchase of real estate 
to be reduced to writing since otherwise . . . it often happens 
either that the specific contract is incapable of exact proof 
or that it is unintentionally varied from its original terms.”  
Reynolds v. Dixon, 187 Va. 101, 106, 46 S.E.2d 6, 8 (1948); 
accord Lindsay v. McEnearney Assocs., 260 Va. 48, 54-55, 531 
S.E.2d 573, 576 (2000).  Thus, “[i]n a suit for specific 
performance, a written agreement insures that a court enforces 
the agreement made by the parties and reduces the likelihood 
that a court will create an agreement where none existed.”  
Gibbens v. Hardin, 239 Va. 425, 430, 389 S.E.2d 478, 480 
(1990). 
 
With regard to a contract for the sale of real estate, we 
have previously held that although a legally sufficient, signed 
writing “may consist of any kind of writing, from a solemn deed 
down to mere hasty notes or memorandum in books or papers,” the 
writing must nonetheless contain all the essential terms of the 
agreement.  Reynolds, 187 Va. at 107, 46 S.E.2d at 9; see also 
Janus v. Sproul, 250 Va. 90, 91, 458 S.E.2d 300, 301 (1995). 
 
12
The essential terms to a contract for the sale of real 
estate include “the names of the parties, the terms and 
conditions of the contract, and a description of the property 
sufficient to render it capable of identification.”  Reynolds, 
187 Va. at 108, 46 S.E.2d at 9.  Perhaps most importantly, 
“mutuality of assent – the meeting of the minds of the parties 
– is an essential element of all contracts. Until the parties 
have a distinct intention common to both . . . there is a lack 
of mutual assent and, therefore, no contract.” Phillips v. 
Mazyck, 273 Va. 630, 636, 643 S.E.2d 172, 175 (2007) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Mutual assent is 
determined “exclusively from those expressions of [the 
parties’] intentions which are communicated between them.”  
Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 503, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 
(1954)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)(emphasis 
added); accord Phillips, 273 Va. at 636, 643 S.E.2d at 175. 
In reviewing a claim for specific performance of an oral 
contract for the purchase and sale of real property, “the 
evidence relied upon to establish the contract and its part 
performance by the party seeking to enforce it must be clear 
and convincing.”  Taylor v. Hopkins, 196 Va. 571, 575, 845 
S.E.2d 430, 432 (1954).  Accord Frizzell v. Frizzell, 149 Va. 
815, 822-24, 141 S.E. 868, 870 (1928); Burruss v. Nelson, 132 
Va. 17, 21, 110 S.E. 254, 255 (1922); Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 
 
13
391, 393, 12 S.E. 610, 611 (1891).  Thus, if the court cannot 
ascertain, using this standard of proof, from the memoranda, or 
from other writings therein referred to, the essential terms of 
the contract, such writings do not take the case out of the 
statute of frauds.  Rahm v. Klerner & Sons, 99 Va. 10, 13-14, 
37 S.E.2d 292, 293 (1900); see also Reynolds, 187 Va. at 107, 
46 S.E.2d at 8-9. 
In Gibbens, this Court addressed whether the statute of 
frauds prohibited the enforcement of an oral agreement to 
divide real property.  An attorney who represented both Gibbens 
and Hardin had prepared a memorandum of understanding, and 
mailed it to the parties.  239 Va. at 426-28, 389 S.E.2d at 
478-79.  After reading through the memorandum, Gibbens 
expressed concern that “the memorandum did not delineate how 
the boundary adjustment would be made;” Hardin “was 
dissatisfied with the language in the memorandum which referred 
to the boundary adjustment.”  Id. at 428, 389 S.E.2d at 479.  
Hardin “placed four marks across paragraph 3(C) of the 
memorandum [providing for the adjustment of boundaries] and 
signed the document.”  Id. 
On appeal, we observed that “[t]here is no evidence which 
suggests that [the attorney] had the authority to bind Gibbens 
or Hardin to the . . . memorandum.  The memorandum was merely a 
draft which [the attorney] prepared for his clients.  Neither 
 
14
Gibbens nor Hardin was satisfied with its content.”  Id. at 
430, 389 S.E.2d at 480.  We noted that the memorandum also 
failed to identify essential elements of the agreement, 
including certain structures that were to be conveyed to 
Gibbens, and the terms of an easement on which the parties had 
previously agreed.  As such, this Court held that the 
memorandum did not satisfy the statute of frauds, and that the 
“alleged oral boundary agreement” was therefore unenforceable.  
Id. at 429, 389 S.E.2d at 479. 
 
As in Gibbens, here there is a lack of clear and 
convincing evidence that the Moormans and Blackstock ever 
mutually agreed to all the essential terms of a contract for 
the sale of the Moormans’ farm to Blackstock.  The trial court 
found that “[a]s of July 2, 2004, evidenced by David Moorman’s 
[facsimile] to Will Davis, the Moorman family was in agreement 
on the material terms of the last Blackstock draft contract.”  
However, this letter was not a communication of mutual 
agreement between the parties, but rather, a communication 
reflecting the disagreement with the draft contract among the 
members of one party.  See Phillips, 273 Va. at 636, 643 S.E.2d 
at 175.  The letter expressly indicates that the parties had 
yet to agree upon numerous essential terms and conditions for 
the sale of the farm.  Specifically, David Moorman noted that 
the family still had not seen any development plans for the 
 
15
property, that the agreement still failed to address the tax 
consequences of the transaction, and that Blackstock had not 
included the desired restrictive covenants in the June 16 
draft.  Moreover, the June 16 draft failed to include an exact 
date for closing and final payment. 
 
Additionally, where parties intend to culminate their 
agreement with a signed contract, there is a strong presumption 
that no contract exists until a contract is formally signed and 
in writing. Atlantic Coast Realty Co. v. Robertson, 135 Va. 
247, 253-54, 116 S.E. 476, 478 (1923).  Overcoming such a 
presumption requires “strong evidence.”  Andrews v. Sams, 233 
Va. 55, 58, 353 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1987).  Here, the testimony of 
the parties and their attorneys corroborated that a signed 
agreement would be executed before the Moormans would be bound 
in the sale of their property.  The parties exchanged numerous 
“draft” agreements, and Davis specifically invited Welch to 
“finalize” one of the drafts.  Likewise, Welch repeatedly 
requested that a contract be formalized by a signed writing.  
Even Blackstock himself advised his prospective purchaser that 
the required signatures were not yet on his purported contract 
with the Moormans.  Clearly, the Moormans and Blackstock never 
formalized their negotiations with a signed contract for the 
sale of the Moormans’ farm. 
 
16
 
Finally, we are of opinion that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish that David Moorman had the authority 
to bind the whole Moorman family by his e-mail and facsimile 
exchanges.  In Drake v. Livesay, this Court held that “[a]gency 
may be inferred from the conduct of the parties and from the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.”  231 Va. 117, 122, 341 
S.E.2d 186, 189 (1986) (citing Royal Indemnity Co. v. Hook, 155 
Va. 956, 157 S.E. 414 (1931)).  Although the circuit court 
found it “clear that David Moorman was acting on behalf of and 
with the consent of the Moorman family,” the conduct of the 
parties in this case does not support a finding that David 
Moorman acted as the agent of the Moorman family members.  As 
Lisa Moorman testified, David Moorman was no more than a 
“spokesperson” for the family, as “[i]t was much easier to have 
one person serve as the liaison . . . than have all five of us 
be involved.”  Clearly, Blackstock was aware that the Moormans 
were represented by Davis.  And perhaps most importantly, 
Blackstock’s own formalized draft agreements required the 
signatures of the entire Moorman family, rather than the 
signature of David, acting as the agent of the Moorman family. 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
finding that the various notes and memoranda between the 
Moormans and Blackstock regarding the purported oral contract 
for the sale of the Moormans’ farm were sufficient to satisfy 
 
17
the statute of frauds.  In so holding, we find no reason to 
address whether David Moorman “signed” any of the 
correspondence between the parties by the act of typing his 
name in an e-mail or facsimile message. 
We turn now to consider the equitable estoppel issue 
raised in this appeal.  In Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. 
Weldon Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 86, 266 
S.E.2d 887, 890 (1980), this Court held that: 
[A] party seeking to invoke the doctrine of estoppel 
must prove by clear, precise, and unequivocal 
evidence the following elements: (1) A material fact 
was falsely represented or concealed; (2) The 
representation or concealment was made with knowledge 
of the facts; (3) The party to whom the 
representation was made was ignorant of the truth of 
the matter; (4) The representation was made with the 
intention that the other party should act upon it; 
(5) The other party was induced to act upon it; and 
(6) The party claiming estoppel was misled to his 
injury. 
 
Furthermore, we have observed that “with respect to the 
estoppel . . . which affects the title to real estate, there 
must be the express intention to deceive, or such careless and 
culpable negligence as amounts to constructive fraud.”  
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 94, 40 S.E. 
633, 642 (1902); accord Hyson v. Dodge, 198 Va. 792, 799, 96 
S.E.2d 792, 797 (1957). 
 
The circuit court ruled that the Moormans were equitably 
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds.  The court 
 
18
reasoned that “Blackstock relied on the representations of the 
Moormans and . . . purchased the tract of land [from Laird 
Heatwole] for $260,000.00 [and Blackstock] would have no use 
[for that tract] without the Moorman tract.”  The record does 
not support the circuit court’s ruling with regard to equitable 
estoppel in this case.  There is no evidence that the Moormans 
either falsely represented or concealed a material fact from 
Blackstock.  Furthermore, because the purchase of the Heatwole 
tract was never a condition of any purported contract between 
the parties, and Blackstock had never informed the Moormans of 
his intentions to sell the Moormans’ farm to a third party, he 
cannot assert detrimental reliance.  We thus hold that the 
circuit court erred in ruling that the Moormans were equitably 
estopped from asserting a defense of the statute of frauds. 
 
Finally, we turn to consider the issue of part performance 
raised in this appeal.  “[O]ne of the most important objects of 
the statute of frauds [is] to prevent the introduction of loose 
and indeterminate proofs of what ought to be established by 
solemn written contracts.”  Henley v. Cottrell Real Estate Co., 
101 Va. 70, 73, 43 S.E. 191, 192 (1903).  Therefore, in 
invoking the defense of part performance to overcome the 
statute of frauds, a party must show that: (1) the parol 
agreement relied on is “certain and definite in its terms,” (2) 
the acts proved in part performance “refer to, result from, or 
 
19
[were] made in pursuance of the agreement,” and (3) the 
agreement was “so far executed that a refusal of full execution 
would operate a fraud upon the party, and place him in a 
situation which does not lie in compensation.”  Runion v. 
Helvestine, 256 Va. 1, 6, 501 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998). 
 
In the present case, the circuit court found that “[i]f 
the writings in this case were insufficient to establish a 
contract for the sale of the land, part performance is 
sufficient to overcome the Statute [of Frauds],” based upon 
Blackstock’s “actions in conducting the surveying, engineering, 
and soil studies and his purchase of the Heatwole [tract] made 
in pursuance of the agreement.” 
 
Yet, Blackstock’s testimony at trial demonstrates that he 
did not actually engage in the acts of surveying, engineering, 
performing soil studies, and purchasing the Heatwole property, 
in pursuance of the purported agreement.  Rather, Blackstock 
testified that he merely “did [] engineering work to obtain the 
right-of-way” from Jewel Moorman.  These acts and the purchase 
of the Heatwole tract were not, he admitted, part of the 
purported contract with the Moormans.  We therefore disagree 
with the circuit court’s findings, and hold that the evidence 
is insufficient to establish that Blackstock undertook any 
actions in furtherance of the purported contract so as to 
remove this case from the bar of the statute of frauds. 
 
20
 
21
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
finding that various notes, memoranda, and draft agreements 
circulated between the Moormans and Blackstock were sufficient 
to satisfy the statute of frauds.  We also hold that the 
circuit court erred in finding that David Moorman acted as the 
agent of the Moorman family.  We further hold that the circuit 
court erred in granting specific performance based upon 
equitable estoppel and part performance of the purported oral 
contract.  In so holding, we find no need to address any other 
assignment of error.  Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit 
court will be reversed and final judgment will be entered in 
favor of the Moormans. 
Reversed and final judgment.