Title: Frantz v. Campbell County Memorial Hosp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Frantz v. Campbell County Memorial Hosp.1997 WY 28932 P.2d 750Case Number: 96-160Decided: 02/21/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the Matter of the Worker's 
Compensation Claim of Merta FRANTZ

Appellant (Employee-Claimant)

v. 

CAMPBELL COUNTY MEMORIAL 
HOSPITAL

Appellee (Employer-Defendant)

v.

STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION

Appellee (Objector-Defendant).

 

Appeal from District Court, Campbell 
County

The Honorable Dan R. Price, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Dan Davis, Laramie

Representing Appellee Campbell County 
Memorial Hospital:

Thomas E. Lubnau, II, of Lubnau, Hand & 
Bailey, L.L.C., Gillette,

Representing Appellee State of 
Wyoming

William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. 
Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney 
General.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY and 
LEHMAN, JJ., and NANCY J. GUTHRIE, District Judge.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      The hearing 
examiner granted a summary judgment in favor of Appellee Campbell County 
Memorial Hospital (the hospital) and Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division (the division) on the claim for worker's 
compensation benefits submitted by Appellant Merta Frantz (the claimant). The 
claimant filed a petition for review with the district court, and that court 
certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

[¶2]      We affirm the 
hearing examiner's decision.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The claimant 
seeks our review of a single issue:

1. Wyoming Statute 
27-14-102[(a)](xi)(J) states (as applicable here) that a Worker['s] Compensation 
claimant may not recover on a claim for a mental injury where that mental injury 
is not the result of a compensable physical injury.

Does the 
application of that rule in this case violate the equal protection clauses of 
both Wyoming's constitution and the 14th amendment of the US 
constitution?

FACTS

[¶4]      The claimant 
worked for the hospital from April 29, 1991, until June 27, 1995. She filed a 
worker's compensation report of injury on July 5, 1995, alleging "[c]ontinuous 
unrelenting fear of job insecurity. Extreme & unbearable stress related to 
work environment, relationship to and treatment by senior management leading to 
emotional collapse." The division denied the claimant's request for worker's 
compensation benefits, and the claimant objected to the division's 
determination. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings 
for a hearing.

[¶5]      The claimant, the 
division, and the hospital stipulated that the claimant did not suffer a 
physical injury which was compensable under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act. The division and the hospital then filed a joint motion for a summary 
judgment. The hearing examiner granted the motion, citing WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) (Supp. 1996) which excludes any mental injury from the 
definition of injury "unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury." The 
claimant subsequently filed a petition in the district court for a review of 
that administrative action, and the district court certified the case directly 
to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶6]      We must adhere to 
various principles when we are addressing constitutional 
issues:

[S]tatutes are 
presumed to be constitutional, and one who denies the constitutionality of a 
statute must establish that unconstitutionality. Our rule is that courts have a 
duty to uphold statutes, and any doubts with respect to this issue will be 
resolved in favor of constitutionality. Expressing this in another way, we have 
said that unconstitutionality must be "clearly and exactly shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel. Workmen's Compensation 
Department, [569 P.2d 95, 97 (Wyo. 1977)]. Not only is the burden of showing the 
classification to be improper on the assailant, but if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived which will sustain the classification, [such facts] 
will be assumed to have existed when the law was passed.

Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 151, 155-56 (Wyo. 1986) (some citations 
omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      The claimant 
contends that, when the legislature amended the definition of "injury" in § 
27-14-102(a)(xi), it created two classes of workers: one class in which those 
workers who have sustained an injury as the result of a hazard in the workplace 
are fully compensated and another class in which those workers who have 
sustained a mental injury which did not result from a physical injury are not 
compensated. She claims that such classifications violate the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Wyoming and the United States constitutions because the 
classifications do not serve a legitimate state interest. The hospital argues 
that the legislature validly exercised its statutory authority when it amended § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) by adding subparagraph (J) and that this section does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Wyoming and the United States 
constitutions. The division maintains that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) does not 
violate Wyoming and federal equal protection guarantees because it applies 
equally to all persons who are similarly situated or, in the alternative, 
because the classifications bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
objective.

[¶8]      In 1994, the 
legislature amended the definition of "injury" in the worker's compensation 
statutes so that a compensable injury is defined as being one which occurs 
simultaneously with or subsequent to a physical injury:

(a) As used in this 
act:

. . .

(xi) "Injury" means 
any harmful change in the human organism . . . arising out of and in the course 
of employment. . . . "Injury" does not include:

. . . 

(J) Any mental 
injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, it occurs 
subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury and it is established 
by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a diagnosis by a licensed 
psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist meeting criteria established in 
the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association. In no event shall 
benefits for a compensable mental injury be paid for more than six (6) months 
after an injured employee's physical injury has healed to the point that it is 
not reasonably expected to substantially improve.

Section 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(J).

[¶9]      The intended 
purpose of worker's compensation is not to provide full coverage health 
insurance. Graves v. Utah Power & Light Company, 713 P.2d 187, 190 (Wyo. 
1986). Worker's compensation is designed to afford social insurance, but the 
legislature's intended goals must also be achieved. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division v. Patch, 798 P.2d 839, 841 (Wyo. 1990). This 
Court has declared that, if an ordinary interest is involved, a worker's 
compensation classification must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 
state objective. Baskin, 722 P.2d  at 155; see also Allen v. Natrona County 
School District No. One, 811 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶10]   Although a split in authority 
exists, other states have adopted restrictions to the definition of injury which 
are similar to Wyoming's exclusion of certain mental injuries. See Donald M. 
Zupanec, Annotation, Mental Disorders as Compensable under Workmen's 
Compensation Acts, 97 A.L.R.3D 161 (1980); 82 AM.JUR.2D Workers' Compensation § 
340 (1992); Patricia Pattison & Philip E. Varca, Workers' Compensation for 
Mental Stress Claims in Wyoming, XXIX LAND & WATER L.REV. 145, 158 (1994). 
Such restrictions have consistently withstood equal protection challenges in 
those jurisdictions. See Williams v. State Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99, 
104 (Alaska 1995); Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 259 Mont. 147, 855 P.2d 506, 
511, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011, 114 S. Ct. 600, 126 L. Ed. 2d 566 (1993); Hansen 
v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 18 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 
32-33 (1993); Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d 13, 15 (Colo.Ct.App. 
1992).

[¶11]   Psychological disorders have become 
one of the fastest growing occupational illnesses in recent years which has 
resulted in an increased number of mental injury claims being made. Pattison 
& Varca, supra, at 146. "The financial implications of this can be 
profound."1 Pattison & Varca, supra, at 
147. Mental injuries differ from physical injuries, and they present unique 
concerns in the worker's compensation arena. Mental injuries are difficult to 
verify because the patient's description of his condition is often the sole 
basis for a diagnosis. While the science of psychiatry has made substantial 
progress in recent years, difficulties remain because psychiatry is not an exact 
science. Sara J. Sersland, Mental Disability Caused by Mental Stress: Standards 
of Proof in Workers' Compensation Cases, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 752-53 (1983-84). 
With regard to the problems which may arise, one law review author 
observed:

With respect to 
determining whether a causal relationship exists between the mental disability 
and the claimant's employment, the problem of uncertainty reaches its most 
severe degree. The heart of the problem is an overabundance of variables. The 
condition of an individual's mental health may be the result of any number of a 
wide range of factors, such as genotype, prenatal and early postnatal 
influences, heredity, interpersonal relationships, age, sex, environment, 
marital status, pregnancy, occupation, work load, alcohol use, physical defects 
and physical illness. Moreover, mental disorders are often thought not to be 
simply the result of one or more of these factors' effect in the recent past, 
but rather their effect at various times throughout an entire lifetime. Thus, it 
is no great surprise that the etiology of most mental disorders is thought to be 
inexplicable. The impossibility of trying to determine the causal significance 
of simply one factor, such as employment, to a person's mental condition is 
apparent. Yet, the task of trying to do so is required in workers' compensation 
proceedings in order to determine whether the mental disability arose out of the 
employment.

Sersland, supra, at 756-57 (footnotes 
omitted). A Wyoming law review article sheds additional light on the problems 
which are associated with compensating for mental 
injuries:

The difficulties 
become apparent with issues of causation and responsibility for loss. From the 
outset, there is lack of clarity over the nature of stress and its causes. To 
illustrate, work stress may result from events outside the job or predisposition 
to stressors among workers. While an accurate determination of cause and effect 
would seem essential to developing a consistent body of rulings, this goal 
remains elusive. Moreover, the courts are attempting to resolve these issues 
while, as a backdrop, workers' compensation systems in several states are hard 
pressed to remain solvent and the average cost for each claim exceeds 
$19,000.

Pattison & Varca, supra, at 147 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶12]   Issues which relate to proof, 
causation, and frivolous or fraudulent claims create significant economic 
concerns with regard to the increased costs for processing and adjudicating 
mental injury claims. Economic concerns and burdens which are placed upon 
certain businesses are legitimate state interests. Baskin, 722 P.2d  at 156. The 
legislature's attempt to ensure that claimants receive quick, efficient, fair, 
and predictable medical benefits as well as its effort to prevent fraud and 
abuse, thereby reducing the employers' costs, are rationally related to those 
legitimate state interests.

[¶13]   We agree with the language in an 
Alaska opinion wherein the Supreme Court of that state upheld the restriction on 
coverage for certain mental injuries:

The distinction 
between physically injured workers and workers with stressrelated mental 
injuries is [rationally] related to the state's goal of efficiently and fairly 
distributing benefits while cutting costs for employers. The amendments 
eliminate unusually susceptible claimants and attempt to minimize fraud and 
abuse in claims for stress-related mental injuries, thereby saving employers 
money.

Williams, 895 P.2d  at 104 (footnote 
omitted).

[¶14]   The claimant in this case has 
failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that excluding a mental injury which 
is not accompanied by a physical injury is not rationally related to a 
legitimate state objective. Applying our general rules for analyzing the 
constitutionality of a statute under the rational basis test, we hold that the 
classifications at issue are rationally related to the legitimate governmental 
objectives of controlling the costs and protecting the viability of the worker's 
compensation program.

[¶15]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 "It has been estimated that the overall 
health-care costs of stressful workplaces might be as high as $300 billion 
annually, a figure that exceeds the net income of all Fortune 500 companies." 
Pattison & Varca, supra, at 147.