Title: Blake v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE K. BLAKE, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 206, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. No. 0709000310  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§      
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  June 2, 2010 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  July 22, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and 
REMANDED. 
 
 
Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire (argued), and James T. Wakley, Esquire, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Andre Blake (“Blake”), was arrested and 
subsequently charged with Murder in the First Degree, Attempted Murder in 
the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, eight 
counts of First Degree Reckless Endangerment, and ten counts of Possession 
of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  After a ten-day 
jury trial held in January 2009, Blake was convicted of all charges.  Blake 
was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for the conviction of 
Murder in the First Degree and to various periods of incarceration for the 
other convictions. 
This appeal is part of a trilogy of cases that were consolidated for oral 
argument en Banc because they all involved recurring problems with regard 
to the admission of evidence under title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware 
Code.1  The first issue in Blake’s appeal relates to the proper foundational 
requirements that must be established before the prior statement of a witness 
can be admitted into evidence under section 3507, and how those 
requirements relate to the Sixth Amendment.  The second issue relates to the 
proper redaction of third-party statements from a witness interview or 
interrogation before it can be admitted into evidence under section 3507.  
The first issue was examined in our decision issued today in Woodlin v. 
                                          
 
1 See Stevens v. State, ___ A.2d ___ (Del. 2010); Woodlin v. State, ___ A.2d ___ (Del. 
2010). 
 
3
State, and the second was addressed in our decision issued today in Stevens 
v. State. 
 
In Blake’s appeal we hold that the Superior Court committed 
reversible error by admitting the prior statements of five witnesses into 
evidence under section 3507, because the proper foundational requirements 
were not established.  Since this matter will be remanded for a new trial, we 
do not decide whether the comments of third parties were properly redacted 
from those five otherwise inadmissible statements.  Those redaction issues 
should be addressed upon remand in accordance with our opinion issued 
today in Stevens.   
Facts2 
A series of fights occurred between numerous females on the evening 
of August 31, 2007, and into the early morning hours of September 1, in the 
vicinity of 23 N. New Street in Dover, Delaware.  The combatants included 
Sareatha Majors (“Majors”); Stephanie Fisher (“Fisher”) and several other 
persons.  One of the alleged instigators of the fights, who denied being a 
participant, was Renee Land (“Land”). 
At approximately 12:45 a.m. on September 1, Dover Police Officer 
Jeff Matthews (“Officer Matthews”) followed four motor vehicles that were, 
                                          
 
2 This factual recitation is taken primarily from the appellant’s opening brief. 
 
4
apparently, “traveling with a purpose” to N. New Street.  The lead vehicle 
was a Ford Expedition driven by Jacqueline Douglas, a/k/a Jackie Riddick.  
The other passengers in the vehicle were Kimberly Riddick (right front seat), 
Kenneth Riddick (left middle seat), Donta Durham (“Durham”) (right 
middle seat) and Tymir Riddick and Kiyersha Riddick, both third row 
passengers.  Land flagged down Jackie Riddick, who stopped the Ford in the 
vicinity of a vacant lot.  Land walked up to the Ford and began speaking 
with one or more of the occupants.   
Shortly thereafter, a series of gunshots were discharged from the 
vacant lot.  One bullet was found inside the Ford Expedition after it 
shattered that vehicle’s window.  Kenneth Riddick was shot by another 
bullet.  Jackie Riddick drove Kenneth to Kent General Hospital where he 
was pronounced dead at 1:18 a.m. 
At approximately 7:45 a.m. on September 1, the Dover Police 
returned to the scene and found four spent shell casings in the vacant lot at 
21 N. New Street.  The police also located a 9mm Ruger semi-automatic 
pistol that was partially protruding from underneath a trash can located at the 
rear of 23 N. New Street.  No fingerprints were recovered from the Ruger.  
Dover Police Detective Marc Gray (“Detective Gray”) testified that he did 
not even attempt to obtain fingerprints from the shell casings or the bullets.  
 
5
Similarly, Detective Gray did not attempt to recover fingerprints from live 
rounds of ammunition that were found at the scene.  Ballistics tests indicated 
the bullet recovered from the body of Kenneth Riddick during the autopsy, 
as well as the four shell casings and bullets, were all fired from the Ruger 
located under the trash can. 
The Dover Police interviewed, and recorded the statements of, Land, 
Majors, Alexis Tilghman (“Tilghman”), Leia Tolson (“Tolson”) and Fisher.3  
The State introduced all five of the witnesses’ out-of-court statements from 
their recorded interviews with the police, pursuant to title 11, section 3507 
of the Delaware Code.  Each of those out-of-court statements implicated 
Blake as the shooter.  The jury was shown videotapes of the interrogations 
between the police and each of the five witnesses.  The State presented no 
physical evidence that connected Blake to the shooting.   
Blake was charged with Attempted Murder in the First Degree of 
Land, and with First Degree Murder of Kenneth Riddick, under a theory of 
Transferred Intent.  Blake was also charged with eight counts of Reckless 
Endangering in the First Degree (one count for each person in the Ford 
Expedition:  Jackie Riddick, Kimberly Riddick, Durham, Tymir Riddick and 
Kiyersha Riddick; one count for John Wyatte who was standing near the 
                                          
 
3 The Dover Police also interviewed Donta Durham, Jackie Riddick and Kimberly 
Riddick.  None of those three individuals could identify the person who fired the shots. 
 
6
Ford; plus two counts for the people sleeping across the street, Shirley Heath 
and Shawn Heath).  Blake was also charged with ten counts of Possession of 
a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  He was convicted by the 
jury on all counts.   
Inadequate Section 3507 Foundation 
Title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code provides:  
(a) 
In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior 
statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-
examination may be used as affirmative evidence with 
substantive independent testimonial value. 
 
(b) 
The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply 
regardless of whether the witness’ in-court testimony is 
consistent with the prior statement or not.  The rule shall 
likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the 
introducing party. 
 
(c) 
This section shall not be construed to affect the rules 
concerning the admission of statements of defendants or of 
those who are codefendants in the same trial.   This section 
shall also not apply to the statements of those whom to cross-
examine would be to subject to possible self-incrimination.4   
 
Today’s opinion by this Court in Woodlin sets forth a comprehensive 
review and analysis of the section 3507 foundational requirements that must 
be established by the State during the direct examination of a witness, as a 
condition precedent to admissibility of the witness’ prior statement.  The 
                                          
 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507 (2007). 
 
7
foundational requirements applicable to Blake’s appeal were summarized by 
this Court two decades ago in Ray v. State:   
In Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18, 20 n.1 (Del. 1975), this Court 
stated that: “In order to offer the out-of-court statement of a 
witness, the statute requires the direct examination of the 
declarant by the party offering the statement, as to both the 
events perceived or heard and the out-of-court statement itself.”  
Thus, a witness’ statement may be introduced only if the two-
part foundation is first established: the witness testifies about 
both the events and whether or not they are true.  Finally, in 
order to conform to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an 
accused’s right to confront witnesses against him, the victim 
must also be subject to cross-examination on the content of the 
statement as well as its truthfulness.  Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 
124, 127 (Del. 1975). 5 
 
The trial judge permitted the State to introduce into evidence the out-
of-court statements of Land, Majors, Tilghman, Tolson and Fisher from their 
video and audio taped interviews with police.  Each of those prior statements 
implicated Blake in the crimes and was introduced by the State under section 
3507.  The extent of the State’s direct examination of each of the five 
witnesses was laconic.  The State’s direct examination of Tolson is 
illustrative: 
Q: 
Your name is Leia Tolson? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q. 
And how old are you? 
A: 
I’m 19. 
Q: 
And what town and state do you live in? 
A. 
Magnolia, Delaware. 
                                          
 
5 Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439, 443 (Del. 1991) (emphasis added). 
 
8
Q: 
You recall the alleged events that occurred on or about 
September 1, 2007 in the vicinity of North New Street, 
Dover, Delaware? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
You spoke to the Dover Police Department about that? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
You did so voluntarily? 
A: 
Yes. 
 
The State’s direct examination of Tilghman and Fisher was similar.   
 
A two-part foundation must be established by the State during its 
direct examination before a witness’ prior statement can be admitted under 
section 3507.  First, the witness must testify about the events.  Second, the 
witness must indicate whether or not the events are true.6 
 
Blake argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 
recorded police interviews of Land, Majors, Tilghman, Tolson and Fisher to 
be presented to the jury, pursuant to section 3507, without a proper 
foundation.  In this appeal, a supplemental filing by the State concedes: 
“With respect to Tilghman, Tolson and Fisher, the State agrees with Blake 
that the direct examination of each witness was insufficient to meet the 
foundational requirements of title 11, section 3507.”  We commend the State 
                                          
 
6 Ray v. State, 587 A.2d at 444.  See Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18, 24 (Del. 1975) (holding 
State required to question witness on direct examination regarding events perceived and 
out-of-court statement made before out-of-court statement could be admitted as 
affirmative evidence.). 
 
9
for its professionalism and candor in confessing error with regard to the 
inadmissibility of those three witnesses’ prior statements.  
The State acknowledges that none of the five section 3507 witnesses 
was asked, on direct examination, whether or not the statements they made 
to police were truthful.  The State also acknowledges that this Court, in Ray 
v. State, held that such a question was foundational.  Nevertheless, the State 
argues that the prior statements of Land and Majors did touch upon the 
events7 and, therefore, were properly admitted into evidence “absent their 
specific testimony that their prior statements were truthful or false.” 
The State contends that certain of this Court’s decisions after Ray 
“have caused some confusion as to the necessity of asking the truthfulness 
question on direct examination in every instance.”  As an example, the State 
notes that this Court has, since Ray, also held that “there is no requirement 
that the witness either affirm the truthfulness of the out-of-court statement, 
or offer consistent trial testimony.”8  As a result, the State submits, there 
appears to be some inconsistency in the trial court decisions regarding the 
truthfulness aspect of section 3507 practice.  In support of that assertion, the 
State summarized the trial judge’s ruling in Blake’s case as follows: 
                                          
 
7 We need not decide if those prior statements did touch upon the events because the 
absence of the second foundational requirement is case dispositive. 
8 Moore v. State, 1995 WL 67104, at *2 (Del. Feb. 17, 1995). 
 
10
After the State finished its direct examination on voir dire, 
Blake argued that the State, under Ray and Acosta [v. State]9, 
was required to ask Land whether her statement was truthful.  
The Superior Court, recognizing that the statement could be 
played for the jury whether Land said that her prior statements 
were truthful or not, ruled that the statement could be played for 
the jury without such an inquiry. 
 
That ruling is contrary to this Court’s holdings in both Ray v. State and 
Moore v. State. 
After Ray and Moore were decided, there was no reason for 
confusion, because our holding in Moore was completely consistent with 
Ray, where we construed Johnson v. State10 as standing for the proposition 
that the witness must testify about “whether or not” the prior statement is 
true.  In Johnson we specifically recognized that the drafters of section 3507 
“expressly contemplated that the in-court testimony [of a witness] might be 
inconsistent with the prior out-of-court statement.  One of the problems to 
which [section 3507] is obviously directed is the turncoat witness. . . .”11  
Accordingly, our 1995 decision in Moore clearly explained, “[u]nder section 
3507, there is no requirement that the witness either affirm the truthfulness 
of the out-of-court statement, or offer consistent trial testimony.”12  
Moreover, the foregoing sentence that is quoted from Moore is followed by 
                                          
 
9 Acosta v. State, 417 A.2d 373 (Del. 1980). 
10 Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124 (Del. 1975). 
11 Id. at 127.   
12 Moore v. State, 1995 WL 67104, at *2 (emphasis added).   
 
11
“See Ray v. State, Del. Supr., 587 A.2d 439, 443 (1991) (“[A] witness’ 
statement may be introduced only if ... the witness testifies about both the 
events and whether or not they are true.”).” 
Sixth Amendment Considerations 
The foundational requirement that the witness indicate whether or not 
the prior statement is true is one reason why the substantive operation of 
section 3507 does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  In Ray, we held that 
the declarant must testify about whether or not the prior statement is truthful 
because, as Johnson recognized, cross-examination plays an essential role in 
an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him.13  
Therefore, in Johnson we held that the jury or trier of fact must assess the 
declarant’s credibility on the witness stand “in the light of all the 
circumstances presented, including any claim by the witness denying the 
prior statement, or denying memory of the prior statement or operating 
events, or changing his [or her] report of the facts.”14  In Johnson, we 
adopted—and have since followed—a case-by-case approach in determining 
whether a prior statement has been admitted into evidence under section 
3507 in violation of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.   
                                          
 
13 Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439, 443 (Del. 1991); Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 127 (Del. 
1975).   
14 Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d at 128 (citations omitted). 
 
12
The Sixth Amendment requires an entirely proper foundation, if the 
prior statement of a witness is to be admitted under section 3507 as 
independent substantive evidence against an accused.  This Court has 
consistently and unequivocally held “a witness’ statement may be introduced 
only if the two-part foundation is first established: the witness testifies about 
both the events and whether or not they are true.”15  Accordingly, in Ray we 
held that “in order to conform to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an 
accused’s right to confront witnesses against him, the [witness] must also be 
subject to cross-examination on the content of the statement as well as its 
truthfulness.”16 
In Blake’s case, the State concedes that none of the five 3507 
witnesses was asked whether or not their prior statements were true.  
Therefore, the trial judge erroneously permitted the State to rely upon 
section 3507 to introduce the prior out-of-court statements from five crucial 
witnesses even though the State did not lay the proper foundation.  The 
erroneous admission of the five witnesses’ statements under section 3507 
without a proper foundation requires Blake’s convictions to be reversed 
unless those errors were harmless. 
                                          
 
15 Ray v. State, 587 A.2d at 443 (emphasis added). 
16 Id.  
 
13
No Harmless Error 
During oral argument before a panel of this Court, the State 
acknowledged that the prior statements of three witnesses were erroneously 
admitted under section 3507.  Prior to oral argument en Banc, we directed 
the parties to file supplemental memoranda on the issue of harmless error.  
The State argued that admittedly erroneous admission of three prior 
statements was harmless because the other two statements were properly 
admitted.  In this opinion we have determined that the prior statements of all 
five witnesses were inadmissible under section 3507. 
The State offered no physical evidence connecting Blake to the 
charged crimes.  The only evidence that linked Blake to the shooting was 
presented by the prior statements of five witnesses that were all erroneously 
admitted under section 3507.  In fact, the trial judge noted that the only 
evidence that “puts the gun in Blake’s hand” came from three of those prior 
statements.  Accordingly, the record reflects that the erroneous admission of 
the five witnesses’ statements under section 3507 without a proper 
foundation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are reversed.  This matter is 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.