Title: Kidd v. Gunter

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: All the Justices 
 
MARGARET R. KIDD, ET AL. 
 
v. Record No. 002420  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 September 14, 2001 
LOUISE RAGLAND GUNTER, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 
 
The plaintiffs, Margaret R. Kidd, Bernard G. Ragland, 
Sr., and Graham K. Ragland, the surviving whole blood 
siblings of Frances R. Fore (Fore), who died in March 2000, 
instituted suit in the circuit court, offering for probate 
as the holographic will of the decedent a handwritten 
journal prepared by Fore during her lifetime.  The named 
defendants in the suit are the children of Fore’s two 
deceased whole blood siblings, Fore’s surviving half blood 
sibling, and the children of Fore’s deceased half blood 
sibling.  Those defendants denied that the decedent’s 
handwritten journal satisfies the requirements of Code 
§ 64.1-49 and asked the court to enter an order declaring 
that Fore died intestate. 
The court concluded that the journal proffered by the 
plaintiffs was wholly in the handwriting of the decedent 
and that Fore made the journal with testamentary intent.  
However, the court determined that the decedent’s name, 
which appears only at the beginning of the journal, was not 
intended as a signature in accordance with the requirements 
of Code § 64.1-49.  Therefore, the circuit court held that 
the journal is not a valid holographic will of the decedent 
and refused to probate it.  The plaintiffs appeal from that 
decree.  We agree with the circuit court and will, 
therefore, affirm the court’s judgment. 
The journal at issue is bound and contains many pages, 
most of which are blank.  On the inside cover in a pre-
printed box, the decedent wrote her name, “Frances R. 
Fore,” and her address, “6602 Rollingridge Lane[,] 
Chesterfield, Va 23832.”  After the pre-printed word 
“Date,” which appears in the box, Fore wrote the words 
“Started July 1994.”  On the first few pages of the 
journal, Fore listed some of her assets and then 
consecutively numbered the next twelve pages of the 
journal.  On the page numbered 1, Fore wrote: “This journal 
has been set up to eliminate problems for my family at the 
time of my death.”  After then setting out specific funeral 
and burial instructions, Fore stated: “The next few pages 
will instruct you as to what happens to a lot of my 
personal belongings.  All my money & other assets should be 
divided equally among Jimmy, Henry, Margaret, Bernard, & 
Graham, [Fore’s whole blood siblings] if they are living at 
the time of my death.”  On the pages numbered 2 through 12, 
 
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Fore made specific bequests of personal property to various 
individuals.  Nothing appears on page 12 after the bequest 
listed there.  Extraneous information is found on the next 
two unnumbered pages, which are then followed by many blank 
pages.  Finally, several pages at the end of the journal 
contain a list of Fore’s insurance policies and bonds. 
 
At a hearing before the circuit court, two witnesses 
testified that the handwriting appearing on the inside 
cover of the journal and on the pages numbered 1 through 12 
is that of the decedent.  A witness who qualified as an 
expert in document examination agreed.  However, the expert 
explained that Fore wrote some of the passages in different 
inks and that she did not write all the pages of the 
journal offered as her last will and testament at the same 
time. 
On appeal, the sole issue is whether Fore signed the 
journal in such a manner as to make it manifest that her 
name on the inside cover of the journal was intended as a 
signature in accordance with the requirements of Code 
§ 64.1-49.  In pertinent part, that statutory provision 
provides that “[n]o will shall be valid unless it be in 
writing and signed by the testator . . . in such manner as 
to make it manifest that the name is intended as a 
signature . . . .” 
 
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Although Code § 64.1-49 requires that a testator sign 
a will, the statute does not specify where the signature is 
to appear in a writing intended as a will.  Slate v. 
Titmus, 238 Va. 557, 559, 385 S.E.2d 590, 591 (1989); 
McElroy v. Rolston, 184 Va. 77, 83, 34 S.E.2d 241, 243, 
(1945).  A testator’s signature at the conclusion of the 
instrument may be the best method of executing a will in 
accordance with Code § 64.1-49, but this Court has 
repeatedly held that the signature need not appear at the 
foot or end of the instrument.  See, e.g. Slate, 238 Va. at 
559, 385 S.E.2d at 591; Payne v. Rice, 210 Va. 514, 517, 
171 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1970); Hall v. Brigstocke, 190 Va. 
459, 466, 58 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1950); McElroy, 184 Va. at 
83, 34 S.E.2d at 243; Hamlet v. Hamlet, 183 Va. 453, 461, 
32 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1945); Dinning v. Dinning, 102 Va. 467, 
469, 46 S.E. 473, 473-74 (1904); Warwick v. Warwick, 86 Va. 
596, 602-03, 10 S.E. 843, 845 (1890); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 54 
Va. (13 Gratt.) 664, 670 (1857).  “[H]owever, it must 
appear unequivocally from the face of the writing” that the 
person’s name therein is intended as a signature.  Slate, 
238 Va. at 560, 385 S.E.2d at 591 (citing Payne, 210 Va. at 
517, 171 S.E.2d at 828).  And, when a testator’s name is in 
the opening clause or at the beginning of the writing, 
“such insertion of the name [is] ‘an equivocal act’, and in 
 
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the absence of any affirmative evidence on the face of the 
paper, it [is] not manifest that the name was intended as a 
signature to the paper.”  McElroy, 184 Va. at 82, 34 S.E.2d 
at 243; accord Warwick, 86 Va. at 602, 10 S.E. at 845; 
Ramsey, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) at 670.  In other words, “there 
must be a concurrence of the animus testandi and the animus 
signandi — that is, the intention to make a will and the 
intention to sign the instrument as and for a will.”  
Hamlet, 183 Va. at 462, 32 S.E.2d at 732 (citing Forrest v. 
Turner, 146 Va. 734, 745, 133 S.E. 69, 72 (1926)). 
Although the circuit court found that Fore prepared 
the journal with testamentary intent, such intent alone is 
not sufficient to satisfy the signature requirement.  This 
Court held in Meany v. Priddy, 127 Va. 84, 85, 102 S.E. 
470, 470 (1920) that 
[no] mere intention or effort to dispose of property 
by will, however clearly and definitely expressed in 
writing, is sufficient; such purpose must be executed 
in the only manner authorized by the statute, that is, 
the writing itself must be authenticated by the 
signature of the decedent.  It is not sufficient to 
raise a doubt as to whether his name is intended to 
authenticate the paper which is propounded as a will, 
for, to use the explicit language of the statute, it 
must be signed “in such manner as to make it manifest 
that the name is intended as his signature,” and 
unless so signed it is not valid. 
 
 
The plaintiffs do not dispute these principles but 
contend that Fore’s signature on the inside cover of the 
 
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journal satisfies the provisions of Code § 64.1-49.  
Relying primarily on this Court’s decisions in Slate and 
Hall, the plaintiffs argue that Fore’s signature at the 
beginning of the journal combined with the language 
evidencing her intent, the specific bequests of personal 
property, and the inclusion of a residuary clause 
sufficiently connect the signature to the writing and 
authenticate the document.  We do not agree. 
In Hall, the document in question, written wholly in 
the handwriting of the alleged testatrix, began within the 
phrase:  “Roberta Leckie Rittenhouse 
Written by myself October 13th 1946 
My Will[.]” 
190 Va. at 463, 58 S.E.2d at 531.  After making specific 
monetary bequests and including two residuary clauses, one 
regarding the remainder of her money and the other 
disposing of any remaining property, the testatrix 
concluded the writing by stating: “This is My last Will and 
Testament.”  Id. at 464, 58 S.E.2d at 531.  This Court 
concluded that 
[t]he will itself is sufficient to show that the 
name was manifestly intended as a signature.  It 
shows upon its face the finality of the 
instrument and the intent of the testatrix to 
make a will, and . . . to sign as required by the 
statute.  It is a complete document which 
disposes of all of the testatrix’s property and 
 
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contains no blanks or anything that would 
indicate that it was not her last will and 
testament. . . .  When the last sentence of the 
will . . . is considered with the first 
paragraph, it is manifest that she intended her 
name as a signature to her will. 
Id. at 466-67, 58 S.E.2d at 533. 
Similarly, in Slate, the writing showed the finality 
of the instrument and the testator’s intent to make a will.  
The document, entirely in the decedent’s handwriting, 
began: “I, Garland B. Slate, . . . do hereby declare this 
to be my last will and testament.”  238 Va. at 561, 385 
S.E.2d at 592.  After disposing of his entire estate, Slate 
then wrote: “Given under my hand this 25th day of October 
1986.”  Id.  This Court concluded that Slate, by including 
this final statement, “adopted his name in the exordium 
clause as his signature, thereby authenticating all that 
followed it.”  Id.  That final phrase was the “other 
evidence” on the face of the writing that demonstrated that 
the signature was for the purpose of ratifying and 
authenticating the contents of the instrument.  Ramsey, 54 
Va. (13 Gratt.) at 670. 
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, the Hall and 
Slate cases are distinguishable from the present case.  
Unlike the writings at issue in those cases, Fore’s journal 
does not contain any statement or clause to denote finality 
 
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to the document, i.e., there is nothing after the specific 
bequest on page 12 to indicate that Fore had finished her 
“will” and wished to adopt and authenticate the writing as 
her complete testamentary act.  With regard to the lack of 
finality, it is also significant that there was undisputed 
evidence that Fore wrote the passages in different inks and 
at different times. 
In McElroy, a case factually similar to the present 
one, the alleged testatrix included her name at the 
beginning of the writing, and ended the document with a 
residuary clause and statement naming a person to settle 
the estate.  184 Va. at 79, 34 S.E.2d at 241-42.  
Concluding that there was nothing on the face of the 
instrument to indicate that the testatrix intended her name 
at the top of the page to be her signature to the will or 
to denote that she had finished the act of disposing of her 
property after her death, this Court stated that 
[t]he name of a person at the top of a written 
instrument, without any reference whatever to it 
in the body of the instrument, manifests no 
clearer intention of the signer that it is 
intended as his signature to the instrument than 
his name appearing in the opening clause thereof, 
or elsewhere in its body, without evidence or 
explanation on the face of the paper showing that 
such name was signed there for the purpose of 
ratifying and authenticating its contents.  It 
connects the writer with the paper, but it does 
not show a finality and completion of 
testamentary intent. 
 
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Id. at 83-84, 34 S.E.2d at 243-44. 
 
In the present case, Fore placed her signature in a 
pre-printed box on the inside cover of the journal.  That 
space is typically used to denote ownership of a journal 
rather than to ratify and authenticate the contents of the 
journal.  As we said in McElroy, insertion of the 
decedent’s name at the beginning of a writing is an 
“equivocal act.”  Id. at 82, 34 S.E.2d at 243.  No 
affirmative evidence on the face of the journal 
demonstrates that Fore intended her signature in that box 
to be her signature to the will.  Nor, as we said 
previously, is there evidence that she had completed the 
testamentary disposition of her property.  Therefore, even 
though Fore clearly had testamentary intent, we conclude 
that she did not sign her journal “in such manner as to 
make it manifest” that her name on the inside cover was 
intended as a signature to the writing.  Code § 64.1-49. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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