Title: Bennett v. Stanley

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Bennett v. Stanley, 92 Ohio St.3d 35, 2001-Ohio-128.] 
 
 
BENNETT, ADMR., APPELLANT, v. STANLEY ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Bennett v. Stanley (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 35.] 
Torts — Negligence — Attractive nuisance — Unused residential swimming 
pool — Level of duty property owner owes to a child trespasser — 
Possessor of land subject to liability for physical harm to children 
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land, 
when — Adult who attempts to rescue a child from an attractive nuisance 
assumes the status of the child and is owed a duty of ordinary care by the 
property owner. 
(No. 00-108 — Submitted October 18, 2000 — Decided June 13, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Washington County, No. 98CA36. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children 
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if: 
(a)  the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or 
has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and 
(b)  the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and 
which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of 
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and 
(c)  the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the 
risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made 
dangerous by it, and 
(d)  the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of 
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children 
involved, and 
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(e)  the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or to 
otherwise protect the children. (Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts [1965], 
Section 339, adopted.) 
2.  While the attractive nuisance doctrine is not ordinarily applicable to adults, it 
may be successfully invoked by an adult seeking damages for his or her 
own injury if the injury was suffered in an attempt to rescue a child from a 
danger created by the defendant’s negligence. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  In this case we are called upon to determine what level of 
duty a property owner owes to a child trespasser.  We resolve the question by 
adopting the attractive nuisance doctrine set forth in Restatement of the Law 2d, 
Torts (1965), Section 339.  We also hold that an adult who attempts to rescue a 
child from an attractive nuisance assumes the status of the child, and is owed a 
duty of ordinary care by the property owner. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
When Rickey G. Bennett, plaintiff-appellant, arrived home in the late 
afternoon of March 20, 1997, he found his two young daughters crying.  The 
three-year-old, Kyleigh, told him that “Mommy” and Chance, her five-year-old 
half-brother, were “drowning in the water.”  Bennett ran next door to his 
neighbors’ house to find mother and son unconscious in the swimming pool.  
Both died. 
 
The Bennetts had moved next door to defendants-appellees, Jeffrey and 
Stacey Stanley, in the fall of 1996.  The Stanleys had purchased their home the 
previous June.  At the time of their purchase, the Stanleys’ property included a 
swimming pool that had gone unused for three years.  At that time, the pool was 
enclosed with fencing and a brick wall.  After moving in, the Stanleys drained the 
pool once but thereafter they allowed rainwater to accumulate in the pool to a 
depth of over six feet.  They removed a tarp that had been on the pool and also 
January Term, 2001 
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removed the fencing that had been around two sides of the pool.  The pool 
became pond-like: it contained tadpoles and frogs, and Mr. Stanley had seen a 
snake swimming on the surface.  The pool contained no ladders, and its sides 
were slimy with algae. 
 
Rickey and Cher Bennett were married in 1995.  They had two daughters, 
born in 1993 and 1995.  Cher brought her son, Chance Lattea, into the marriage.  
The Bennetts rented the house next to the Stanleys. The houses were about one 
hundred feet apart.  There was some fencing with an eight-foot gap between the 
two properties. 
 
The Stanleys were aware that the Bennetts had moved next door and that 
they had young children.  They had seen the children outside unsupervised.  
Stacey Stanley had once called Chance onto her property to retrieve a dog.  The 
Stanleys testified, however, that they never had any concern about the children 
getting into the pool.  They did not post any warning or “no trespassing” signs on 
their property. 
 
Rickey Bennett testified that he had told his children to stay away from the 
pool on the Stanleys’ property.  He also stated that he had never seen the children 
playing near the pool. 
 
Kyleigh told her father that she and Chance had been playing at the pool 
on the afternoon of the tragedy.  The sheriff’s department concluded that Chance 
had gone to the pool to look at the frogs and somehow fell into the pool.  His 
mother apparently drowned trying to save him. 
 
Bennett, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Cher D. Bennett, 
as Administrator of the Estate of Chance C. Lattea, and as custodial parent of 
Kyleigh D. Bennett, filed a wrongful death and personal injury suit against the 
Stanleys.  The complaint alleged that appellees had negligently maintained an 
abandoned swimming pool on their property and that appellees’ negligence 
proximately caused the March 20, 1997 drowning of Chance and Cher.  Appellant 
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averred that appellees had created a dangerous condition by negligently 
maintaining the pool and that appellees reasonably should have known that the 
pool posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to others.  Appellant specifically 
alleged that appellees’ pool created an unreasonable risk of harm to children who, 
because of their youth, would not realize the potential danger. Appellant further 
asserted that appellees’ conduct in maintaining the pool constituted willful and 
wanton misconduct such as to justify an award of punitive damages. 
 
Appellant sought damages for the beneficiaries of the deceased, for 
Kyleigh’s mental anguish for witnessing the drownings, for mental anguish for 
Cher before her death, and for punitive damages.  Appellees denied any 
negligence and asserted affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and 
assumption of the risk. 
 
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court 
granted on September 4, 1998.  The trial court found that Chance and Cher were 
trespassers on appellees’ property and that appellees therefore owed them only a 
duty to refrain from wanton and willful misconduct.  The trial court further 
rejected appellant’s argument that appellees’ maintenance of the swimming pool 
amounted to a dangerous active operation that would create for them a duty of 
ordinary care pursuant to Coy v. Columbus, Delaware & Marion Elec. Co. (1932), 
125 Ohio St. 283, 181 N.E. 131.  As the complaint alleged that appellees had 
violated a duty of ordinary care, the court found for the Stanleys as a matter of 
law. 
 
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s granting of 
summary judgment.  It, too, held that appellees owed the decedents only a duty to 
refrain from wanton and willful misconduct, and added that there was no evidence 
of such misconduct.  The appellate court also addressed the issue of appellees’ 
duty to Cher Bennett.  The court held that even if she were on the Stanleys’ 
January Term, 2001 
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property in an attempt to rescue Chance, she would still have the status only of a 
licensee, who is owed no greater duty of care than a trespasser. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
 
Ohio has long recognized a range of duties for property owners vis-à-vis 
persons entering their property.  A recent discussion of Ohio’s classification 
system can be found in Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 662 N.E.2d 287, 291.  Currently, to an invitee the 
landowner owes a duty “to exercise ordinary care and to protect the invitee by 
maintaining the premises in a safe condition.” Light v. Ohio Univ. (1986), 28 
Ohio St.3d 66, 68, 28 OBR 165, 167, 502 N.E.2d 611, 613.  To licensees and 
trespassers, on the other hand, “a landowner owes no duty * * * except to refrain 
from willful, wanton or reckless conduct which is likely to injure [the licensee or 
trespasser].” Gladon, 75 Ohio St.3d at 317, 662 N.E.2d at 293.  Today, we face 
the issue of whether child trespassers should become another class of users who 
are owed a different duty of care. 
 
This court has consistently held that children have a special status in tort 
law and that duties of care owed to children are different from duties owed to 
adults: 
 
“[T]he amount of care required to discharge a duty owed to a child of 
tender years is necessarily greater than that required to discharge a duty owed to 
an adult under the same circumstances.  This is the approach long followed by 
this court and we see no reason to abandon it.  ‘Children of tender years, and 
youthful persons generally, are entitled to a degree of care proportioned to their 
inability to foresee and avoid the perils that they may encounter. * * * The same 
discernment and foresight in discovering defects and dangers cannot be 
reasonably expected of them, that older and experienced persons habitually 
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employ; and therefore the greater precaution should be taken, where children are 
exposed to them.’ ” Di Gildo v. Caponi (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 47 
O.O.2d 282, 283, 247 N.E.2d 732, 734, quoting Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 512 
(1959), Negligence, Section 21. 
 
Recognizing the special status of children in the law, this court has even 
accorded special protection to child trespassers by adopting the “dangerous 
instrumentality” doctrine: 
 
“The dangerous instrumentality exception [to nonliability to trespassers] 
imposes upon the owner or occupier of a premises a higher duty of care to a child 
trespasser when such owner or occupier actively and negligently operates 
hazardous machinery or other apparatus, the dangerousness of which is not 
readily apparent to children.” McKinney v. Hartz & Restle Realtors, Inc. (1987), 
31 Ohio St.3d 244, 247, 31 OBR 449, 452, 510 N.E.2d 386, 390. 
 
That doctrine was developed in Coy v. Columbus, Delaware & Marion 
Elec. Co. (1932), 125 Ohio St. 283, 181 N.E. 131, a case where a six-year-old boy 
was injured when he touched a high voltage transformer owned by the defendant 
and located in a vacant lot known to be frequented by children.  The court applied 
a negligence standard to the behavior of the company, despite the fact that the 
child had been trespassing.  This court quoted with favor the court in Haywood v. 
S. Hill Mfg. Co. (1925), 142 Va. 761, 765-766, 128 S.E. 362, 363-364: 
 
“ ‘Certainly a deadly, hidden force, as in this case, should not be left easily 
accessible to children whose frequent presence in this vicinity was known to the 
defendant, and acquiesced in by it, and this without so much as a danger sign 
anywhere thereabout. * * * The care must be commensurate with the danger.’ ” 
 
Thus, the court adopted as early as 1932 some of the hallmarks of the 
attractive nuisance doctrine.  Elements such as knowledge of children’s presence, 
the maintenance of a potentially dangerous force, and an exercise of care by the 
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owner commensurate with the danger are a part of the attractive nuisance doctrine 
in most states, as reflected in Section 339 of the Restatement of Torts. 
 
Despite the fact that in premises liability cases a landowner’s duty is 
defined by the status of the plaintiff, and that children, even child trespassers, are 
accorded special protection in Ohio tort law, this court has never adopted the 
attractive nuisance doctrine.  The doctrine as adopted by numerous states is set 
forth in Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 339: 
 
“A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children 
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon land if: 
 
“(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor 
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and 
 
“(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to 
know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of 
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and 
 
“(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or 
realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area 
made dangerous by it, and 
 
“(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the 
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children 
involved, and 
 
“(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger 
or otherwise to protect the children.” 
 
This court has never explicitly rejected the Restatement version of the 
doctrine, which was adopted in 1965.  Instead, Ohio’s tradition in this area of the 
law is based upon this court’s rejection in 1907 of the “turntable doctrine” in 
Wheeling & Lake Erie RR. Co. v. Harvey (1907), 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  In Harvey, this court held in paragraph one of the 
syllabus that “[i]t is not the duty of an occupier of land to exercise care to make it 
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safe for infant children who come upon it without invitation but merely by 
sufferance.” 
 
The “turntable doctrine” was a somewhat controversial doctrine wherein 
railroads could be liable to children for injuries suffered on unguarded railroad 
turntables.  The theory of liability was established in Sioux City & Pacific RR. Co. 
v. Stout (1873), 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 21 L.Ed. 745, and had been adopted by 
many states as of 1907.  The burning question for many years was whether to 
apply the doctrine to non-turntable cases.  Many of the states that adopted the 
turntable doctrine refused to apply it to cases not involving turntables. Id. at 245, 
83 N.E. at 69-70. 
 
However, the theory of liability has evolved since 1907.  The Restatement 
of the Law, Torts (1934) and Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) removed 
legal fictions and imposed balancing factors to consider on behalf of landowners. 
Comment, The Restatement’s Attractive Nuisance Doctrine: An Attractive 
Alternative for Ohio (1985), 46 Ohio St. L.J. 135, 138-139.  Ohio’s refusal to 
recognize the turntable doctrine in 1907 was not a serious anomaly at the time; 
today, our failure to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine is. 
 
Ohio is one of only three states that have not either created a special duty 
for trespassing children or done away with distinctions of duty based upon a 
person’s status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Kessler v. Mortenson (Utah 
2000), 16 P.3d 1225, 1228; Comment, supra, 46 Ohio St.L.J. at 147; Drumheller, 
Maryland’s Rejection of Attractive Nuisance Doctrine (1996), 55 Md.L.Rev. 807, 
810, and fn. 32. 
 
In more recent years, this court has failed to address the issue of attractive 
nuisance head-on.  In Elliott v. Nagy (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 58, 22 OBR 77, 488 
N.E.2d 853, this court avoided the opportunity to adopt the attractive nuisance 
doctrine, stating that the case at hand “present[ed] no compelling reasons meriting 
the adoption of the attractive nuisance doctrine.” Id. at 61, 22 OBR at 79, 488 
January Term, 2001 
9 
N.E.2d at 855.  Elliott was a swimming pool case.  However, in that case, the 
child who perished in the pool was visiting her grandparents, who lived one 
hundred to three hundred feet from the neighbor who owned the pool.  Rather 
than rejecting the doctrine of attractive nuisance, this court simply declined to 
apply it in Elliott, finding that the neighbors could not have foreseen that a 
nineteen-month-old child would be visiting her grandparents and wander into 
their yard.  The court held in its syllabus: 
 
“The attractive nuisance doctrine will not extend tort liability to the owner 
of a residential swimming pool where the presence of a child who was injured or 
drowned therein was not foreseeable by the property owner.” 
 
That ruling is not contradictory to the attractive nuisance doctrine as set 
forth in the Restatement of Torts.  One of the key elements of the doctrine as 
defined in the Restatement is that “the place where the condition exists is one 
upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to 
trespass.” Section 339(a).  The Elliott court quite obviously withheld from ruling 
on whether the attractive nuisance doctrine would apply where the presence of a 
child is foreseeable. 
 
The court recognized that fact later that same year in Wills v. Frank 
Hoover Supply (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 186, 191, 26 OBR 160, 164, 497 N.E.2d 
1118, 1122, holding that the “linchpin was foreseeability” in this court’s refusal to 
adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine in Elliott.  The Wills court also avoided 
adopting the attractive nuisance doctrine, concluding that that case involved a 
dangerous instrumentality. 
 
In this case, there is at least a genuine issue of fact regarding the 
foreseeability of one of the Bennett children entering onto the Stanley property.  
In Elliott, the injured child was a visitor; here, the child resided next door.  
Reasonable minds could conclude that it was foreseeable that one of the Bennett 
children would explore around the pool. 
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Thus, in this case we cannot decline to adopt the attractive nuisance 
doctrine because of a lack of foreseeability.  Any failure to adopt attractive 
nuisance would be to reject its philosophical underpinnings and would keep Ohio 
in the small minority of states that do not recognize some form of the doctrine. 
 
Adopting the attractive nuisance doctrine would be merely an incremental 
change in Ohio law, not out of line with the law that has developed over time.  It 
is an appropriate evolution of the common law.  While the present case is by no 
means a guaranteed winner for the plaintiff, it does present a factual scenario that 
would allow a jury to consider whether the elements of the cause of action have 
been fulfilled. 
 
We therefore use this case to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine 
contained in Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 339.  In doing so, 
we do not abandon the differences in duty a landowner owes to the different 
classes of users.  In this case we simply further recognize that children are entitled 
to a greater level of protection than adults are.  We remove the “distinctions 
without differences” between the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the 
attractive nuisance doctrine. See Wills, 26 Ohio St.3d at 192, 26 OBR at 165, 497 
N.E.2d at 1123, A.W. Sweeney, J., concurring.  Whether an apparatus or a 
condition of property is involved, the key element should be whether there is a 
foreseeable, “unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to * * * children.” 
Restatement, Section 339(b). 
 
The Restatement’s version of the attractive nuisance doctrine balances 
society’s interest in protecting children with the rights of landowners to enjoy 
their property.  Even when a landowner is found to have an attractive nuisance on 
his or her land, the landowner is left merely with the burden of acting with 
ordinary care.  A landowner does not automatically become liable for any injury a 
child trespasser may suffer on that land. 
January Term, 2001 
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The requirement of foreseeability is built into the doctrine.  The landowner 
must know or have reason to know that children are likely to trespass upon the 
part of the property that contains the dangerous condition. See Section 339(a).  
Moreover, the landowner’s duty “does not extend to those conditions the 
existence of which is obvious even to children and the risk of which should be 
fully realized by them.” Id. at Comment i.  Also, if the condition of the property 
that poses the risk is essential to the landowner, the doctrine would not apply: 
 
“The public interest in the possessor’s free use of his land for his own 
purposes is of great significance.  A particular condition is, therefore, regarded as 
not involving unreasonable risk to trespassing children unless it involves a grave 
risk to them which could be obviated without any serious interference with the 
possessor’s legitimate use of his land.” Id. at Comment n. 
 
We are satisfied that the Restatement view effectively harmonizes the 
competing societal interests of protecting children and preserving property rights.  
In adopting the attractive nuisance doctrine, we acknowledge that the way we live 
now is different from the way we lived in 1907, when Harvey was decided.  We 
are not a rural society any longer, our neighbors live closer, and our use of our 
own property affects others more than it once did. 
 
Despite our societal changes, children are still children.  They still learn 
through their curiosity.  They still have developing senses of judgment.  They still 
do not always appreciate danger.  They still need protection by adults.  Protecting 
children in a changing world requires the common law to adapt.  Today, we make 
that change. 
 
Finally, we add that on remand should the facts establish that the attractive 
nuisance doctrine applies in this case, that finding would also affect the duty of 
care the appellees owed to Cher Bennett if Cher entered the property to rescue her 
son.  The appellate court held that even if it is assumed that Cher entered the 
Stanleys’ property to rescue Chance, her status was still that of a licensee.  The 
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court reasoned that in that instance, Cher would possess a privilege to enter the 
property, and that a person privileged to enter the land is owed the same duties as 
a licensee. 
 
On remand, the evidence may establish that Cher’s status was that of a 
rescuer.  This court has held pertaining to rescuers that “if the rescuer does not 
rashly and unnecessarily expose himself to danger, and is injured, the injury 
should be attributed to the party that negligently, or wrongfully, exposed to 
danger, the person who required assistance.” Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendorf 
(1891), 48 Ohio St. 316, 28 N.E. 172, paragraph three of the syllabus.  See, also, 
Pittsburg[h], Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Lynch (1903), 69 Ohio 
St. 123, 68 N.E. 703.  While the attractive nuisance doctrine is not ordinarily 
applicable to adults, it “may be successfully invoked by an adult seeking damages 
for his or her own injury if the injury was suffered in an attempt to rescue a child 
from a danger created by the defendant’s negligence.” 62 American Jurisprudence 
2d (1990), Premises Liability, Section 288.  Therefore, we hold that if Cher 
Bennett entered the Stanleys’ property to rescue her son from an attractive 
nuisance, the Stanleys owed her a duty of ordinary care. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur in the 
decision of the majority in paragraph one of the syllabus.  I do not concur in the 
second paragraph of the syllabus or that portion of the opinion that supports it. 
January Term, 2001 
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__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting. The majority uses this case to adopt the attractive 
nuisance doctrine as stated in 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 
339.  I am well aware of the fact that an overwhelming majority of American 
jurisdictions have adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine in some form.  I also 
recognize the important public-policy considerations underlying the doctrine and 
that this court has been, and should be, willing to reexamine its common-law 
doctrines in appropriate cases.  See Elliott v. Nagy (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 58, 60, 
22 OBR 77, 78, 488 N.E.2d 853, 855.  But if this court is to effect a significant 
change in Ohio law, as it does today with the adoption of Section 339, it should 
do it in a case in which the issue is properly before the court.  In this case, the 
record reflects that the Bennetts waived any right to pursue the attractive nuisance 
doctrine as a theory of recovery. 
 
In the trial court, the Stanleys moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Cher Bennett and her son were “undiscovered trespassers” to whom no duty was 
owed except to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct.  The Stanleys’ 
motion also noted that this court had refused to adopt the attractive nuisance 
doctrine.  In response to the Stanleys’ motion, the Bennetts expressly disclaimed 
any reliance on the attractive nuisance doctrine, despite having pleaded the very 
elements of it in their complaint.  On appeal to the Fourth District Court of 
Appeals, the Bennetts raised eight assignments of error, none of which argued the 
applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine.  In fact, the Bennetts again 
disclaimed that theory of recovery, stating that they “do not have to rely upon the 
doctrine of attractive nuisance to prevail in this case.”  Finally, in their appeal to 
this court, the Bennetts raise four propositions of law, none of which relates to the 
attractive nuisance doctrine.  The Bennetts’ merit brief to this court states in no 
uncertain terms, just as in the court of appeals, that they “do not have to rely upon 
the doctrine of attractive nuisance to prevail in this case.” 
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The procedural history of this case shows that the Bennetts, at every stage 
of the litigation, have deliberately declined to raise the attractive nuisance 
doctrine as a theory of the Stanleys’ liability.  The Bennetts have accordingly 
waived any argument for adopting the attractive nuisance doctrine.  It is well 
settled that we will not consider issues not presented in the trial court.  State ex 
rel. Zollner v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 276, 278, 611 N.E.2d 830, 
832.  Similarly, we will not consider a claim of error that an appellant failed to 
raise in the court of appeals.  Foran v. Fisher Foods, Inc. (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 
193, 194, 17 OBR 430, 431, 478 N.E.2d 998, 999. 
 
Admittedly, the briefs submitted to this court are not entirely devoid of 
arguments concerning the attractive nuisance doctrine and, in particular, Section 
339 of the Restatement of Torts.  But these arguments appear only in the brief of 
amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, and in the Bennetts’ reply brief.  
Neither brief properly brings the issue before us.  An amicus curiae is not a party 
to the case and may not interject issues and claims not raised by the parties.  
Lakewood v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 387, 394, 584 
N.E.2d 70, 74.  And a reply brief cannot raise a new issue that the appellants 
failed to raise in their merit brief.  See Hill v. Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 
135, 679 N.E.2d 1109, 1113, fn. 2 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); State v. Murnahan (1996), 117 Ohio App.3d 71, 82, 689 
N.E.2d 1021, 1028. 
 
Although the majority offers compelling reasons for adopting the 
attractive nuisance doctrine, it is not appropriate to establish this groundbreaking 
rule in the case at bar.  The Bennetts chose to litigate avenues other than the 
attractive nuisance doctrine and successfully petitioned this court for review on 
those issues.  The majority ignores the Bennetts’ legal claims in favor of reaching 
an issue that the Bennetts waived in the lower courts.  I would address only the 
January Term, 2001 
15 
propositions of law actually raised by the Bennetts and affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals for the reasons stated in its opinion. 
 
Even if the Bennetts had properly preserved the attractive nuisance issue 
for our review, I would decline to join the majority’s second syllabus paragraph.  
The majority holds, without citation of any supporting case law, that an adult may 
successfully invoke the attractive nuisance doctrine if the adult suffered injury “in 
an attempt to rescue a child from a danger created by the defendant’s negligence.”  
Yet this extension of the doctrine is unnecessary to assure recovery for an adult 
who sustains injury in an attempt to rescue a child placed in danger by the 
tortfeasor’s negligence.  As the majority correctly observes, a person injured 
during an attempted rescue may recover from the party negligently causing the 
danger to the same extent as the person who required assistance from the rescuer.  
See Pittsburg[h], Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Lynch (1903), 69 
Ohio St. 123, 68 N.E. 703, syllabus.  This “rescue doctrine” has long been a part 
of Ohio’s common law.  Estate of Minser v. Poinsatte (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 
398, 401-402, 717 N.E.2d 1145, 1148; Reese v. Minor (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 
440, 2 OBR 534, 442 N.E.2d 782; see, also, Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendorf 
(1891), 48 Ohio St. 316, 28 N.E. 172, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Thus, a 
possessor of land who is liable to a child under the attractive nuisance doctrine is 
also liable for injuries suffered by the adult rescuer of the child.  See Blackburn v. 
Broad Street Baptist Church (1997), 305 N.J.Super. 541, 702 A.2d 1331; Brady v. 
Chicago & N.W.R. Co. (1954), 265 Wis. 618, 625-626, 62 N.W.2d 415, 419.  But 
this liability is predicated on a straightforward application of the rescue doctrine 
and not on any extension of the attractive nuisance doctrine to cover adults. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
McCauley, Webster & Emrick and James H. McCauley, for appellants. 
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Theisen, Brock, Frye, Erb & Leeper Co., L.P.A., John E. Erb and Abe 
Sellers, for appellees. 
 
A William Zavarello Co., L.P.A., A William Zavarello and Rhonda Gail 
Davis, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________