Title: Brown County v. Brown County Taxpayers Ass'n

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP940 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Brown County, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Brown County Taxpayers Association and Frank 
Bennett, 
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Peter Barca, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, 
          Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 4, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 16, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
John Zakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-third-party-plaintiffs-appellants, there 
were briefs filed by Richard M. Esenberg, Anthony F. LoCoco, Lucas 
T. Vebber and Wisconsin Institute of Law & Liberty, Milwaukee. 
There was an oral argument by Anthony F. LoCoco. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Andrew T. Phillips, Steven L. Nelson, Douglas M. Raines, 
 
 
2 
Christopher E. Avallone and von BRIESEN & ROPER, S.C., Milwaukee.  
There was oral argument by Andrew T. Phillips. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Counties Association by Joseph L. Olson and Michael Best & 
Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 13 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP940 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV640) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Brown County, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brown County Taxpayers Association and Frank 
Bennett, 
 
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Peter Barca, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, 
 
          Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 4, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Brown County, 
John P. Zakowski, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court on 
certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (2017-18) after the circuit court granted summary 
judgment to Brown County.1  The circuit court determined that the 
County's sales and use tax ordinance was lawful.   
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the following issue 
regarding how counties may utilize the proceeds of enacted sales 
and use taxes: 
Does the sales and use tax Brown County enacted in 2017 
and implemented as part of its 2018 budget process 
"directly reduce the property tax levy," as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 77.70 (2015-16),[2] if the proceeds are 
designated 
to 
fund 
new 
capital 
projects 
that 
collectively would otherwise exceed the levy limits 
established by Wis. Stat. § 66.0602, but the County 
could otherwise fund the projects by borrowing? 
¶3 
The appellant, Brown County Taxpayers Association 
(BCTA), contends that Brown County's sales and use tax is invalid 
because it does not dollar-for-dollar directly reduce the County's 
property tax levy in violation of Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  Rather, 
BCTA contends that the sales and use tax is impermissibly used to 
fund new capital projects. 
¶4 
In contrast, the County asserts that its sales and use 
tax complies with Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  It argues, in accordance 
                                                 
1 This case arose in the circuit court for Brown County, John 
P. Zakowski, Judge. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.  This is the 
version of the statutes in effect at the time the sales and use 
tax at issue was passed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 77.70 was amended in 
2017, but these amendments do not impact our analysis.  
No. 
2020AP940   
 
3 
 
with a longstanding Attorney General's opinion, that pursuant to 
§ 77.70 a sales and use tax may be used by a county to fund any 
project that could otherwise be paid for with property taxes. 
¶5 
We conclude that Brown County's sales and use tax 
ordinance is consistent with Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  Section 77.70 
does not require a dollar-for-dollar offset to the property tax 
levy.  Instead, it authorizes counties to impose a sales and use 
tax for the specific purpose of directly reducing the property tax 
levy, while leaving the means to accomplish that purpose up to the 
county.  Because the County's ordinance does in fact directly 
reduce the property tax levy by funding projects that would 
otherwise have been paid for through additional debt obligations, 
we determine that the ordinance is permissible.  
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 
I 
¶7 
On May 17, 2017, the Brown County Board of Supervisors 
enacted an ordinance relating to a temporary sales and use tax 
within the County.  The ordinance provided for a 0.5 percent sales 
and use tax that would be in effect for a period of 72 months. 
¶8 
Within the ordinance itself is a specification regarding 
how the money collected from the sales and use tax is to be used.  
Namely, the ordinance provides that revenue from the tax "[s]hall 
not be utilized to fund any operating expenses other than lease 
payments associated with" specified capital projects.  It further 
indicates that the sales and use tax revenue "[s]hall be utilized 
only to reduce the property tax levy by funding the below listed 
specific capital projects, as well as funding said specific capital 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
4 
 
projects' associated costs as deemed appropriate by Brown County 
administration." 
¶9 
The expenses for specific capital projects intended to 
be funded from the sales and use tax revenue include:  (1) $15 
million for the Expo Hall project; (2) $60 million for 
infrastructure, roads, and facilities projects; (3) $20 million 
for jail and mental health projects; (4) $20 million for a library 
project; (5) $10 million for maintenance at the Resch Expo Center; 
(6) $10 million for medical examiner and public safety projects; 
(7) $1 million for a museum project; (8) $6 million for parks and 
fairgrounds; and (9) $5 million for a STEM research center project.   
¶10 Totaling $147 million, these expenses were determined by 
members of the County Board to fund "necessary projects" for the 
"long-term viability of the County."  Without the sales and use 
tax, the County stated that these capital improvements would have 
been funded through new borrowing and the accompanying issuance of 
debt obligations. 
¶11 Additionally, the ordinance contained a mill rate3 
freeze.  This provision states:  "While this temporary sales and 
use tax Ordinance is in effect, the Brown County Mill Rate shall 
not exceed the 2018 Brown County Mill Rate."  It further provides 
that if the mill rate does exceed the 2018 rate during the life of 
the ordinance, that the sales and use tax "shall sunset on December 
                                                 
3 The mill rate "is a figure representing the amount per 
$1,000 of the assessed value of property, which is used to 
calculate the amount of property tax."  Milewski v. Town of Dover, 
2017 WI 79, ¶47 n.18, 377 Wis. 2d 38, 899 N.W.2d 303 (quoted source 
omitted). 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
5 
 
31 of the year the Brown County Mill Rate exceeds the 2018 Brown 
County Mill Rate."  A sunset provision is also included in the 
ordinance in the event the County issues any general obligation 
debt, excluding refunding bonds. 
¶12 Brown County relied on the sales and use tax revenue in 
crafting its 2018 budget.  For that year, the County's finance 
director estimated the sales and use tax proceeds to be 
$22,458,333.  This amount was incorporated in the 2018 budget, 
which was adopted by the County Board and signed by the County 
Executive. 
¶13 Shortly after the budget was enacted, BCTA filed suit 
against the County, arguing that the sales and use tax ordinance 
violates Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  Specifically, BCTA argued that the 
ordinance does not "directly reduc[e] the property tax levy" as 
§ 77.70 mandates.  It sought a declaratory judgment that the 
ordinance is invalid and an accompanying injunction against the 
ordinance's enforcement.  BCTA's lawsuit was ultimately dismissed 
without prejudice due to BCTA's failure to comply with statutory 
notice of claim procedures.4 
                                                 
4 The notice of claim statute contains requirements for 
providing notice to a governmental subdivision prior to filing 
suit against that subdivision.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  Such 
requirements allow governmental entities to investigate and 
evaluate potential claims and afford them the opportunity to 
compromise and settle a claim, thereby avoiding costly and time-
consuming litigation.  Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condo. Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Village of Sister Bay, 2019 WI 4, ¶20, 385 Wis. 2d 158, 922 
N.W.2d 95. 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
6 
 
¶14 After dismissal of its lawsuit, BCTA served a notice of 
claim on the County.  The County disallowed the claim and 
subsequently filed this lawsuit in the circuit court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of the sales and use tax 
ordinance.  BCTA filed a counterclaim, asserting that the ordinance 
is void as a matter of law. 
¶15 Both parties moved for summary judgment.  BCTA renewed 
its argument that the ordinance does not "directly reduc[e] the 
property tax levy" as Wis. Stat. § 77.70 requires and that such 
direct reduction can only be accomplished by a dollar-for-dollar 
offset.  In contrast, the County asserted that the ordinance is 
valid, suggesting that § 77.70 is an enabling statute that allows 
a county to impose a sales and use tax but is silent on how sales 
and use tax proceeds are to be used. 
¶16 The circuit court granted Brown County's motion for 
summary judgment and denied that of BCTA.  It concluded that a 
dollar-for-dollar reduction of the property tax levy with sales 
and use tax revenue "is not the solely lawful operation required 
by the plain language of the statute."  Further, it determined 
that "[i]f Wisconsin Statute section 77.70 were to require a 
dollar-for-dollar reduction of a county's property tax levy, then 
the Wisconsin Legislature would have said so in the body of the 
statute, and it would have spelled out the process for Wisconsin 
counties to follow." 
¶17 BCTA moved for reconsideration, which the circuit court 
denied.  Subsequently, BCTA appealed, and the court of appeals 
certified the appeal to this court. 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
7 
 
II 
¶18 We are called upon to review the circuit court's 
determination on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.  
This court reviews a summary judgment decision independently of 
the decisions rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  MacLeish v. 
Boardman & Clark LLP, 2019 WI 31, ¶22, 386 Wis. 2d 50, 924 
N.W.2d 799.  Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
¶19 In our review, we interpret several statutes.  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law we likewise review 
independently of the determinations of the circuit court and court 
of appeals.  Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶16, 397 
Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384. 
III 
¶20 We begin by setting forth necessary background regarding 
the 
statutes 
at 
issue 
and 
county 
property 
tax 
levies.  
Subsequently, we present and analyze the parties' arguments 
concerning the validity of the Brown County ordinance at issue. 
A 
¶21 All counties in Wisconsin, including Brown County, are 
required by statute to adopt an annual budget.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 59.60, 65.90.  As part of the budgeting process, Brown County 
is required to "list all existing indebtedness and all anticipated 
revenue from all sources during the ensuing year and shall likewise 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
8 
 
list all proposed appropriations for each department, activity and 
reserve account during the said ensuing year."  § 65.90(2). 
¶22 From this data, a county calculates its property tax 
levy.  To do so, it adds the operating levy (the revenue necessary 
to fund county operations) with the debt levy (the amount necessary 
to pay debt service on county borrowing).  The types of 
expenditures that make up the operating levy include, among other 
things, necessary expenses for the operation of the county library 
system, the county jail, and facility management.  
¶23 How the property tax levy is set is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0602, which was enacted in 2005.  See 2005 Wis. Act 25, 
§ 1251c.  Section 66.0602, among other provisions, includes a limit 
on the amount a governmental subdivision may increase its property 
tax levy in a given year.  
¶24 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(2), and subject to 
certain exceptions, a county cannot increase its property tax levy 
in any year "by a percentage that exceeds the [county's] valuation 
factor."5  The "valuation factor" is defined as "a percentage equal 
                                                 
5 In full, Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(2) provides: 
Levy limit.  Except as provided in subs. (3), (4), and 
(5), no political subdivision may increase its levy in 
any year by a percentage that exceeds the political 
subdivision's valuation factor.  The base amount in any 
year, to which the limit under this section applies, 
shall be the actual levy for the immediately preceding 
year.  In determining its levy in any year, a city, 
village, or town shall subtract any tax increment that 
is calculated under s. 59.57(3)(a), 60.85(1)(L), or 
66.1105(2)(i).  The base amount in any year, to which 
the limit under this section applies, may not include 
any amount to which sub. (3)(e)8. applies. 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
9 
 
to the greater of either the percentage change in the political 
subdivision's January 1 equalized value due to new construction 
less improvements removed between the previous year and the 
current" or zero percent.  § 66.0602(1)(d).  In other words, the 
amount a county may raise its property tax levy in a given year is 
tied to the percentage change in net new construction in the 
county.  See Steven Deller & Judith I. Stallmann, Tax and 
Expenditure Limitations and Economic Growth, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 497, 
519 (2007). 
¶25 As stated, there are several statutory exceptions to the 
levy limit.  Relevant here is the exception set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0602(3)(d) 
regarding 
debt 
service. 
 
Pursuant 
to 
§ 66.0602(3)(d)2.: 
The limit otherwise applicable under this section does 
not apply to amounts levied by a political subdivision 
for the payment of any general obligation debt service, 
including debt service on debt issued or reissued to 
fund or refund outstanding obligations of the political 
subdivision, interest on outstanding obligations of the 
political subdivision, or the payment of related 
issuance costs or redemption premiums, authorized on or 
after July 1, 2005, and secured by the full faith and 
credit of the political subdivision. 
Stated differently, the levy limit applies to the operating levy, 
but not the debt levy.  An additional exception to the levy limit 
applies if a political subdivision's governing body adopts a 
resolution to raise the levy beyond the statutory limit that is 
then approved by the electorate in a referendum.  § 66.0602(4). 
¶26 Levy limits are enforced by the Department of Revenue.  
Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(6).  To aid the Department in enforcing the 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
10 
 
limits, it uses a Levy Limit Worksheet to ensure that a county has 
complied with the dictates of § 66.0602.  Echoing the statutory 
exceptions, the Levy Limit Worksheet excludes all sums paid for 
debt service from the levy limit calculation.  In an affidavit 
filed in the circuit court, the County's finance director described 
the consequence of this:  "In other words, if a county borrows 
money for a capital project, the principal and interest payments 
that the county pays on the loan are excluded from the definition 
of revenues subject to the levy limit." 
B 
¶27 We move next to address the parties' competing 
interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 77.70, which provides in relevant 
part:  "The county sales and use taxes may be imposed only for the 
purpose of directly reducing the property tax levy . . . ." 
¶28 When interpreting statutes, we begin with the language 
of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning 
of the statute is plain, we need not inquire further.  Id. 
¶29 "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words 
or phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id.  We also interpret statutory language "in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id., ¶46. 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
11 
 
¶30 BCTA contends that there is only one way to occasion a 
"direct" reduction in the property tax levy——a dollar-for-dollar 
offset of the levy corresponding to the revenue collected through 
the sales and use tax.  Preventing a hypothetical increase in the 
property tax levy, BCTA argues, is not the same as "directly 
reducing" it as the statute requires. 
¶31 On the other hand, Brown County contends that the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 77.70 allows for sales and use taxes to 
fund any project that could otherwise be funded with property 
taxes.6  In the County's view, the sales and use tax at issue was 
enacted to avoid raising the property tax levy to pay for the 
capital projects identified in the ordinance.  Accordingly, the 
County argues that it was enacted "for the purpose of" funding 
projects that otherwise would have been funded through property 
tax revenue.  It asserts that, without the sales and use tax, the 
subject capital projects would have been funded by borrowing money, 
thereby increasing the County's debt burden, which in turn would 
be passed on to taxpayers via the property tax levy. 
¶32 For further support, the County points the court to an 
attorney general's opinion on the proper interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 77.70.  Our precedent indicates that a well-reasoned 
                                                 
6 Peter Barca, the secretary of the Department of Revenue, is 
also party to this case, but he does not take a position on the 
issue of whether Brown County's sales and use tax complies with 
state law.  Instead, Secretary Barca's brief focuses only on the 
remedy in the event the tax is unlawful.  Because we conclude that 
the sales and use tax is lawful, we need not address this remedy 
issue.  
No. 
2020AP940   
 
12 
 
attorney general's opinion is of at least some persuasive value 
when a court later addresses the meaning of the same statute.  Town 
of Vernon v. Waukesha County, 102 Wis. 2d 686, 692, 307 N.W.2d 227 
(1981). 
¶33 In 1998, the attorney general opined on the same issue 
we face in this case.  See Opinion of Wis. Att'y Gen. to Dennis E. 
Kenealy, Ozaukee County Corp. Counsel, OAG 1-98 (May 5, 1998).  
The attorney general was asked, "in effect, how funds received 
from a county sales and use tax imposed under section 77.70, 
Stats., may be budgeted by the county board."  Id. at 1.  He 
concluded that "such funds may be budgeted to reduce the amount of 
the overall countywide property tax levy or to defray the cost of 
any item which can be funded by a countywide property tax."  Id. 
¶34 The attorney general's analysis began with a brief 
history of Wis. Stat. § 77.70:  "Prior to 1985, counties had the 
authority to impose sales and use taxes, but the Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue was required to distribute all of the net 
proceeds of such taxes to towns, cities and villages within the 
county imposing the tax."  Id.  Presumably because they could not 
keep the revenue collected, few, if any, counties imposed a sales 
and use tax.  Id.  In 1985, § 77.70 was amended "to allow county 
governments to retain the net proceeds of the sales and use tax," 
as long as those proceeds are used for the purpose of directly 
reducing the property tax levy.  Id. at 2 (citing 1985 Wis. Act 
41). 
¶35 Next, the attorney general discussed how after this 
amendment, counties utilized one of two ways to demonstrate direct 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
13 
 
property tax reductions.  Id. at 2.  Some counties illustrated a 
property tax reduction "by showing the receipt of sales and use 
tax revenues on individual property tax bills."  Id.  Other 
counties "budgeted the net proceeds of the sales and use tax as a 
revenue source used to offset the cost of individual items 
contained in the county budget."  Id. 
¶36 In comparing these approaches, the attorney general 
noted the fundamental fungibility of money, explaining:   
The same amount of countywide property tax reduction 
occurs whether the county board chooses to budget 
revenues from net proceeds of the sales and use tax as 
a reduction in the overall countywide property tax levy 
or as an offset against a portion of the costs of 
specific items which can be funded by the countywide 
property tax. 
Id.  Accordingly, in the attorney general's view, "Counties may 
therefore also budget the net proceeds of the sales and use tax as 
an offset against the cost of any individual budgetary item which 
can be funded by the countywide property tax."  Id. at 3. 
¶37 We find the County's reading of the statute, echoed by 
the attorney general's opinion, to be the correct one.  Nothing in 
Wis. Stat. § 77.70 requires the dollar-for-dollar offset that BCTA 
seeks. 
¶38 On its face, Wis. Stat. § 77.70 requires that a sales 
and use tax be enacted for the "purpose of directly reducing the 
property tax levy."  "Purpose" is defined as "the reason why 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
14 
 
something is done or used" or "the aim or intention of something."7  
Taking this common definition into account, § 77.70 broadly sets 
out what the goal or aim of a county sales and use tax must be, 
i.e. direct reduction of the property tax levy. 
¶39 The statute does not, however, contain any mechanism by 
which a county must accomplish such a reduction.  Its enabling 
language allows a county to impose a sales and use tax for the 
purpose of directly reducing the property tax levy, but it does 
not mandate that the county use or spend revenue generated by the 
tax on a dollar-for-dollar offset.   
¶40 As the attorney general concluded in 1998, money is 
fungible.  Due to this essential fungibility, there is not one 
sole way to attain the "purpose" of reducing the property tax levy.  
Indeed, an identical reduction in the property tax levy can be 
accomplished from a dollar-for-dollar offset as can be attained by 
budgeting specific items, which otherwise would have been paid for 
from property tax revenue, to be funded with a sales and use tax.  
Either way, the purpose of directly reducing the property tax levy 
is accomplished.  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 77.70 allows revenue generated 
from county sales and use tax to be used to fund any project that 
could otherwise have been paid for from property tax revenue. 
                                                 
7 Purpose, 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/purpose (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2022); see also State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 
573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) ("For purposes of statutory interpretation 
or construction, the common and approved usage of words may be 
established by consulting dictionary definitions."). 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
15 
 
¶41 Contrary to BCTA's argument, such a conclusion does not 
read the word "directly" out of the statute.  "Direct" means "to 
cause to turn, move, or point undeviatingly or to follow a straight 
course."8  It is just as straightforward for a specifically-funded 
project to cause a reduction in the property tax levy as it is for 
an offset to do the same.  Stated differently, using the proceeds 
from a sales and use tax to fund a specific project that would 
otherwise have been funded with property tax revenue accomplishes 
a "direct reduction" of the property tax levy the same way a 
dollar-for-dollar offset would. 
¶42 A comparison with surrounding statutes is additionally 
instructive in reaching our conclusion.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Specifically, the legislature enacted two 
nearby statutes for the purpose of funding sports stadiums and in 
those statutes it explicitly directed the stadium districts on how 
to utilize proceeds of sales and use taxes.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 77.705, passed in 1995 to fund construction of Miller Park (now 
American Family Field),9 authorizes a "local professional baseball 
park district" to "impose a sales and a use tax . . . at a rate of 
no more than 0.1 percent of the sales price or purchase price."  
Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 77.706, enacted in 1999 for improvements 
to Lambeau Field, authorizes a "local professional football 
                                                 
8 Direct, 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/direct (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2022). 
9 For further background on Wis. Stat. § 77.705, see 
Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 796-800, 
546 N.W.2d 424 (1996). 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
16 
 
stadium district" to "impose a sales and a use tax . . . at a rate 
of 0.5 percent of the sales price or purchase price." 
¶43 Unlike Wis. Stat. § 77.70, both of these statutes 
explicitly provide that the proceeds from the sales and use taxes 
are to be spent to pay down the stadium districts' debt in a 
dollar-for-dollar manner.  Both Wis. Stat. §§ 77.705 and 77.706 
contain identical language indicating that any money received 
"shall be used exclusively to retire the district's debt."  
§§ 77.705, 77.706.   
¶44 In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 77.70, while setting forth 
that the "purpose" of the sales and use tax must be to "directly 
reduc[e] the property tax levy," is silent on how this is to be 
accomplished.  If the legislature wanted to mandate a dollar-for-
dollar offset of property taxes, it could have done so in a manner 
similar to the language of Wis. Stat. §§ 77.705 and 77.706.  See 
also Wis. Stat. §§ 229.685(1) and 229.825 (further restricting how 
stadium tax revenues must be spent); Southport Commons, LLC v. 
DOT, 2021 WI 52, ¶32, 397 Wis. 2d 362, 960 N.W.2d 17 ("The 
legislature is presumed to carefully and precisely choose 
statutory language to express a desired meaning." (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
¶45 Our interpretation is also supported by the analysis 
employed by the attorney general in the 1998 opinion on Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.70.  See OAG 1-98.  The attorney general correctly based his 
opinion on the essential fungibility of money and the principle 
that the same reduction in the property tax levy occurs regardless 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
17 
 
of whether the proceeds are budgeted as an offset on the bills of 
taxpayers or used to fund a specific item. 
¶46 Although the parties in this case argue over the proper 
weight to give an attorney general's opinion in our analysis, we 
need not and do not resolve that question because the attorney 
general's analysis was substantively correct.  In other words, we 
do not rely on any presumption or deference to the opinion of the 
attorney general,10 but conclude that the analysis itself is 
persuasive 
and 
faithful 
to 
our 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation. 
¶47 We therefore determine that Wis. Stat. § 77.70 does not 
require a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the property tax levy.  
Instead, it authorizes counties to impose a sales and use tax for 
the specific purpose of directly reducing the property tax levy, 
while leaving the means to accomplish that purpose up to the 
county.   
¶48 BCTA asserts next that Wis. Stat. § 66.0602, which was 
passed subsequent to the issuance of the 1998 attorney general's 
opinion, changes this result.  It focuses on the levy limit 
contained in that statute, which provides in relevant part:  
"Except as provided in subs. (3), (4), and (5), no political 
subdivision may increase its levy in any year by a percentage that 
exceeds 
the 
political 
subdivision's 
valuation 
factor."  
                                                 
10 See Staples for Staples v. Glienke, 142 Wis. 2d 19, 28, 416 
N.W.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1987) (treating an attorney general's opinion 
"as presumptively correct, when the legislature later amends the 
statute but makes no changes in response to the attorney general's 
opinion"). 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
18 
 
§ 66.0602(2).  Due to this levy limit, BCTA argues that the County 
could not have raised its property taxes by the amount needed to 
cover the capital expenditures intended to be funded by the sales 
and use tax. 
¶49 Putting a finer point on it, BCTA argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0602(2) indicates that the County's property tax levy may be 
increased only by a percentage that does not exceed the County's 
valuation factor.  By funding new projects to the tune of 
$147,000,000 over six years, BCTA asserts that the County vastly 
exceeds the statute's restriction on property tax levy increases.  
Stated otherwise, the projects could not have been paid for from 
property tax revenue because property taxes could not have been 
legally raised to such a level.  For example, the County sought to 
use almost $18,000,000 collected from sales and use tax to fund 
new capital projects in 2018.  However, the County's 2017 property 
tax levy was $86,661,972, and its 2018 levy limit was $87,584,261, 
a difference of just under one million dollars.11 
¶50 We disagree with BCTA's argument on this point.  BCTA 
focuses on Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(2) at the expense of the exception 
to subsec. (2) noted in § 66.0602(3)(d).  Pursuant to subdivision 
(3)(d)2., "The limit otherwise applicable under this section does 
not apply to amounts levied by a political subdivision for the 
payment of any general obligation debt service."  In other words, 
                                                 
11 The record contains a reference to a higher number, 
$91,115,007, as the allowable 2018 debt levy limit.  We use here 
the lower number provided in the 2017 Levy Limit Worksheet provided 
to the Department of Revenue, but the number chosen does not affect 
the analysis. 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
19 
 
any debt levy is not taken into account in determining the levy 
limit under subsec. (2). 
¶51 Here, the record reflects that the County would have, in 
the absence of the sales and use tax, issued general obligation 
debt to pay for the projects identified in the ordinance at issue.  
Payments on such debt service are exempt from the levy limits, 
meaning that contrary to BCTA's argument the property tax levy 
could have been raised to pay for the subject capital projects. 
¶52 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 77.70 describes what 
must be done with county sales and use tax proceeds but not how to 
accomplish that, we address next whether the Brown County sales 
and use tax ordinance at issue does in fact "directly reduc[e] the 
property tax levy."  In examining the record, it is apparent that 
the answer is yes.   
¶53 The County's finance director detailed the effect of the 
sales and use tax on property taxes vis-à-vis borrowing that would 
have taken place absent the implementation of the sales and use 
tax.  Specifically, the finance director averred that the subject 
projects would have otherwise been funded through the issuance of 
additional debt obligations.  Such debt obligations would cause 
County property taxpayers to pay extra costs associated with the 
borrowing, including over $13 million in interest over the lifetime 
of the ordinance and $47 million in total interest, assuming a 20-
year term on the loan and thus a 20-year life of the debt service. 
¶54 Absent the sales and use tax, property taxes would have 
to increase to cover the increased debt burden (and as indicated 
above, debt service is excluded from the levy limit).  The 
No. 
2020AP940   
 
20 
 
operation of this principle can be illustrated with a micro-level 
example.  In this case, Brown County's finance director stated 
that if the sales and use tax remains in place, property taxes on 
the median home value in the County would decrease by $140.20 
between 2018 and 2023.  If there were no sales and use tax, and 
the County instead borrowed money for the subject projects, the 
issuance of general debt obligations would cause taxes on that 
same median property to increase by $356.48 in the same time 
period.  Thus, the sales and use tax saves the median Brown County 
property owner $496.68——a direct reduction. 
¶55 In sum, we conclude that Brown County's sales and use 
tax ordinance is consistent with Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  Section 77.70 
does not require a dollar-for-dollar offset to the property tax 
levy.  Instead, it authorizes counties to impose a sales and use 
tax for the specific purpose of directly reducing the property tax 
levy, while leaving the means to accomplish that purpose up to the 
county.  Because the County's ordinance does in fact directly 
reduce the property tax levy by funding projects that would 
otherwise have been paid for through additional debt obligations, 
we determine that the ordinance is permissible.    
¶56 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—
——neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make 
words mean so many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be 
master——that's all." 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice 
Found There 124 (London, Macmillan & Co. 1899).  
¶58 The Wisconsin Legislature enacted a statute providing 
"county sales and use taxes may be imposed only for the purpose of 
directly reducing the property tax levy[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 77.70 
(2015–16) (emphasis added).1  Brown County enacted an ordinance 
imposing a sales and use tax for the purpose of avoiding an 
increase in the property tax levy.  The majority declares the 
County's ordinance lawful by equating the avoidance of an increase 
with a reduction.  The average American who faces the realities of 
daily budgeting knows the majority's math does not compute:  
Although he may prefer to drive a Maserati, he can only afford a 
Honda, and "avoiding" the loan payment for a Maserati does not 
mean he "reduces" his budget outlay by purchasing a Mercedes 
instead of a Honda.   
¶59 Defying basic logic, the majority chooses a different 
meaning for "reducing" than the plain one the legislature gave it.  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
2 
 
In order to reduce a property tax levy, it must actually go down.  
In this case, it didn't.   
¶60 The Brown County Board of Supervisors (the Board) 
decided to spend $147,000,000 on new projects.  The property taxes 
paid by property owners in Brown County were insufficient to fund 
these projects, so the Board enacted an ordinance imposing a sales 
and use tax in order to make up the difference.  The sales and use 
tax did not reduce the property tax levy (it actually went up).  
Nevertheless, the Board maintains the property tax levy otherwise 
would have had to increase in order to pay for all of the new 
projects.  The Board decided to avoid an increase in the property 
tax levy by instead imposing a sales and use tax to directly pay 
for the projects.  The majority permits this, contorting a statute 
designed for property tax relief into a blank check for 
unaffordable spending.  The majority may do so as the masters of 
law-declaring in Wisconsin, but the statute does not mean what the 
majority says. 
¶61 The majority roots its analysis in a fallacious 
presumption rather than the statutory text, a foundational error 
contaminating its entire opinion.  The majority relies entirely on 
an affidavit of the Brown County Finance Director (the Director) 
insisting the projects "would otherwise have been" funded through 
issuing debt, which in turn would have required increasing the 
property tax levy to pay for it.2  Of course, the County cannot 
guarantee it could have accomplished the political feat of 
borrowing $147,000,000 and then increasing the property tax levy 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶5. 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
3 
 
accordingly, which would have required the approval of either a 
super majority (three-fourths) of the Board, or the County voters 
via referendum.  The majority sidesteps these political hurdles 
altogether in order to contrive a "reduction" in the property tax 
levy that never occurred.  In accepting the County's baseless 
presumptions, the majority rewrites Wis. Stat. § 77.70 into a blank 
check for spending rather than the tax relief for property owners 
the legislature enacted.   
¶62 Chief Justice John Marshall once cautioned "[i]t would 
be dangerous in the extreme, to infer from extrinsic circumstances, 
that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, 
shall be exempted from its operation."  Sturges v. Crowninshield, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).  In this case, the majority 
exempts "directly reducing" from any operative effect, thereby 
gutting the express and unambiguous statutory requirement that a 
county sales and use tax be imposed "only for the purpose of 
directly reducing the property tax levy[.]"  Our judicial duty is 
to give effect to the legislature's duly enacted statutes by 
declaring what they plainly mean.  See Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 
76, ¶54, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., concurring)(citing Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Rev., 
2018 
WI 
75, 
¶3, 
382 
Wis. 2d 496, 
914 
N.W.2d 21 
(lead 
opinion))(explaining "the judiciary's constitutionally-vested 
authority to say what the law is").  Because the majority chooses 
a different meaning for Wis. Stat. § 77.70 than the legislature 
gave it, I respectfully dissent.   
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
4 
 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶63 In 2017, Brown County enacted a sales and use tax 
ordinance (the Ordinance) pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  
Section 77.70 authorizes counties to impose a 0.5 percent sales 
and use tax by adopting an ordinance, provided the tax "may be 
imposed only for the purpose of directly reducing the property tax 
levy[.]"  The Ordinance: 
enacts a temporary 72 month, 0.5 percent Brown County 
sales and use tax, revenues from which:  1) Shall not be 
utilized to fund any operating expenses other than lease 
payments associated with the below mentioned specific 
capital projects; and 2) Shall be utilized only to reduce 
the property tax levy by funding the below listed 
specific capital projects, as well as funding said 
specific capital projects' associated costs as deemed 
appropriate by Brown County administration, in [the 
provided] amounts[.] 
Introduced as part of the County's "Debt Reduction, Infrastructure 
& Property Tax Relief Plan," the Ordinance funded nine new capital 
projects, with total costs of $147 million over six years.3   
¶64 The Brown County Taxpayers Association and Frank Bennett 
(BCTA) challenged the Ordinance, claiming it violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.70, and the County sought a declaration that the Ordinance 
was lawful.  The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
County and denied BCTA's motion for reconsideration.  After BCTA 
                                                 
3 The capital projects and their associated costs included:  
(1) "Expo Hall Project" ($15 million); (2) "Infrastructure, Roads 
and Facilities Projects" ($60 million); (3) "Jail and Mental Health 
Projects" 
($20 
million); 
"Library 
Project" 
($20 million); 
"Maintenance at Resch Expo Center Project" ($10 million); "Medical 
Examiner and Public Safety Projects" ($10 million); "Museum 
Project" ($1 million); "Parks and Fairgrounds Project" ($6 
million); and "Stem Research Center Project" ($5 million). 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
5 
 
appealed, the court of appeals certified the following issue, which 
we accepted: 
Does the sales and use tax Brown County enacted in 2017 
and implemented as part of its 2018 budget process 
"directly reduce the property tax levy," as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 77.70 (2015–16), if the proceeds are 
designated 
to 
fund 
new 
capital 
projects 
that 
collectively would otherwise exceed the levy limits 
established by Wis. Stat. § 66.0602, but the County 
could otherwise fund the projects by borrowing?  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶65 "On appeal, '[w]e independently review a grant of 
summary judgment.'"  Skindzelewski v. Smith, 2020 WI 57, ¶7, 392 
Wis. 2d 117, 944 N.W.2d 575 (quoting West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Ixthus Med. Supply, Inc., 2019 WI 19, ¶9, 385 Wis. 2d 580, 923 
N.W.2d 550).  "The interpretation and the application of [Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.70] 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently."  Jefferson v. Dane County, 2020 WI 90, ¶13, 394 
Wis. 2d 602, 951 N.W.2d 556 (citing Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 
2011 WI 77, ¶17, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316).   
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Plain Meaning of Wis. Stat. § 77.70 
¶66 This case turns on the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  
Accordingly, the analysis begins "with the language of the statute.  
If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "We give statutory 
language 'its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning.'"  Milwaukee Dist. 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
6 
 
Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2019 WI 24, ¶11, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 
924 N.W.2d 153 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45).  We interpret 
statutory language "in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results."  Id. (quoting Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  "In construing or interpreting a statute the 
court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the 
statute."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (quoting State v. Pratt, 36 
Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967)).   
¶67 The plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 77.70 permits counties 
to impose a sales and use tax "only for the purpose of directly 
reducing the property tax levy[.]"  The County acknowledges this 
statutory requirement but argues it "does not require counties to 
'use' or 'spend' sales and use tax proceeds only for that purpose."  
The majority agrees, concluding the statute does not specify the 
means by which counties must accomplish the direct reduction.4   
¶68 The majority errs by allowing "for the purpose of" to 
swallow "directly reducing" altogether.5  The statutory "purpose" 
language, however, does not alter (much less eviscerate) the 
meaning of the "directly reducing" clause.  Instead, it merely 
indicates to what end the tax may be imposed:  "directly reducing 
the property tax levy."   
¶69 Even if the statute gives counties some latitude to 
determine the mechanism by which to "directly reduc[e] the property 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶5. 
5 Id., ¶¶38–39.  
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
7 
 
tax levy," the County did not reduce the property tax levy at all, 
much less "directly."  The adverb "directly" means "[i]n a direct 
line or manner" or "[w]ithout anyone or anything intervening."6  
It is derived from the adjective "direct," which means "[e]ffected 
or existing without intermediation or intervening agency; 
immediate."7  The County's multi-step procedure was anything but 
direct.8  Any purported reduction in the property tax levy stemming 
from avoiding unapproved debt (and any corresponding increase in 
the levy) by means of a sales and use tax does not "directly 
reduc[e] the property tax levy"; in fact, the County increased 
both the property tax levy and the sales and use tax, raising far 
more revenue than it could have generated through property taxes 
alone under normal budgeting constraints.  Nevertheless, the 
majority maintains the Ordinance directly reduces the property tax 
levy "by funding projects that would otherwise have been paid for 
through additional debt obligations[.]"9  The majority insists it 
does not read "directly" out of the statute because "[i]t is just 
as straightforward for a specifically-funded project to cause a 
reduction in the property tax levy as it is for an offset to do 
                                                 
6 Directly, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 527 (3d ed. 1992). 
7 Direct, The Oxford English Dictionary 702 (2d ed. 1989); 
see also Direct, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 527 (3d ed. 1992) ("Having no intervening persons, 
conditions, or agencies[.]"). 
8 See Indirect, The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 919 (3d ed. 1992) ("Diverging from a direct 
course; roundabout. . . .  [S]econdary[.]"). 
9 Majority op., ¶5. 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
8 
 
the same."10  No matter how straightforward the method, neither of 
those scenarios reflects what actually happened.  The County is 
not directly (or even indirectly) defraying any property tax 
increase necessitated by its spending choices; instead, it is 
funding new projects in the first instance with sales and use tax 
revenues, which the property tax levy could not have otherwise 
sustained. 
¶70 By sanctioning the County's misuse of the statute, the 
majority's 
interpretation 
renders 
the 
term, 
"directly," 
meaningless.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language 
is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) ("These 
words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used." 
(quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).  In order 
for the property tax levy to be "directly" reduced, the reduction 
must occur by the shortest path and "[w]ithout anyone or anything 
intervening[.]"11  In order to lawfully use the sales and use tax 
revenue to fund new spending, the County must first authorize and 
issue general obligation bonds through statutory procedures under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 67, then increase the debt levy, necessitating an 
increase in the property tax levy in the corresponding amount to 
pay for the debt service.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0602(3), 67.045, 
                                                 
10 Id., ¶41. 
11 See Directly, The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 527 (3d ed. 1992). 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
9 
 
67.05.  The sales and use tax revenue could then be applied to 
directly reduce the property tax levy. 
¶71 The County's purported "reduction" is not in fact any 
reduction at all.  The County's ability to authorize and issue 
general obligation bonds is dependent upon the satisfaction of 
several statutory prerequisites, in addition to following its own 
debt issuance policies.12  Because the Ordinance funds new projects 
that have not been approved for bonding——and therefore have not 
produced any actual increase in the debt levy or property tax levy—
—there is nothing to reduce.13  Calculating savings based on a 
theoretical increase in debt and property taxes that would have 
resulted if an alternative funding mechanism had been approved 
produces nothing but a chimera of a "reduc[tion]" and certainly 
not a direct one. 
¶72 The affidavit of the Director upon which the majority 
relies, claiming the projects would have otherwise been funded by 
debt, assumes the County would have satisfied the statutory 
prerequisites to authorize and issue debt; however, until the debt 
is actually issued and the property tax levy increased, any 
purported "reduction" is purely conjectural.  "Affidavits in 
support of a motion for summary judgment must contain evidentiary 
facts, of which the affiant has personal knowledge."  Hopper v. 
                                                 
12 For example, the County's debt service policy limits 
bonding to projects that cost at least $250,000 or have a project 
life of at least five years, and spells out additional requirements 
depending on the type and length of the project.   
13 See Reduce, The Oxford English Dictionary 433 (2d ed. 1989) 
("To lower, diminish, lessen."). 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
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City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 130, 256 N.W.2d 139 (1977) (citing 
Kroske v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 70 Wis. 2d 632, 641, 235 
N.W.2d 283 (1975)); see also Wis. Stat. § 802.08(3)(2019–20).  
"Portions of affidavits which are made by persons who do not have 
personal knowledge or which contain allegations of ultimate facts, 
conclusions of law or anything other than evidentiary facts do not 
meet the statutory requirements and will be disregarded."  Hopper, 
79 Wis. 2d at 130 (citing Kroske, 70 Wis. 2d at 641; Walter 
Kassuba, Inc. v. Bauch, 38 Wis. 2d 648, 652, 158 N.W.2d 387 
(1968)).  The Director's speculation regarding what might have 
happened but for the imposition of the sales and use tax is "not 
proper in support of a motion for summary judgment and is 
ineffectual to establish evidentiary facts."  Id. at 131.  
¶73 The Director's assumption that the County would have 
pursued bonding for these projects falls far short of fact; because 
he is not the sole decisionmaker nor can he foresee the future, he 
could not possibly know whether the statutory requirements would 
have been met.  The County Board must issue debt according to the 
terms of Wis. Stat. ch. 67 as well as its own debt issuance 
policies.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 67.045 prohibits the governing 
body of a county from issuing bonds unless the county holds a 
referendum by which its citizens approve the debt issuance or the 
governing body adopts a resolution to issue the debt by a vote of 
three-fourths of the members.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 67.05(3),14 
67.045(1)(a), (f).  The Director could not possibly possess any 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 67.05 governs the procedures for issuing 
bonds, including requirements for adopting initial resolutions or 
holding a referendum.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 67.05(1)-(3). 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
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personal knowledge that the debt would have issued, given the 
political hurdles to be surmounted.15 
¶74 The majority contends the surrounding statutes support 
its interpretation.16  They don't.  While context is important, the 
statutes cited do not alter the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.70; if anything, they mirror its mandatory language.  See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 77.705 and 77.706 
were enacted to provide an additional funding source for former 
Miller Park and Lambeau Field, respectively.  Section 77.705 
authorizes a "local professional baseball park district" to impose 
a sales and use tax, requiring that any moneys transferred from or 
to the relevant appropriation accounts "shall be used exclusively 
to 
retire 
the 
district's 
debt." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.705.  
Section 77.706 authorizes a "local professional football stadium 
district" to impose a sales tax and use tax, similarly requiring 
that any moneys transferred from or to the relevant appropriation 
                                                 
15 For example, ¶5 of the affidavit states the Director was 
"made aware that the [Board] discussed options for borrowing and 
funding in relation to county infrastructure and capital needs in 
early 2017"; ¶¶11–16 address steps in the County's budget process; 
and ¶¶23–38 speak to the County's financial status after the 
adoption of the sales and use tax.  None of these paragraphs 
support the Director's assertion that the debt would actually have 
been approved.  Further, ¶¶29–30 and 33, addressing the impact on 
taxpayers if the County "was forced to borrow"——including the extra 
costs of borrowing and the increase in taxes——cut against the 
assertion that the County would have successfully pursued 
borrowing.  In light of these considerable expenses, the County 
may have chosen to fund only some or ultimately none of the 
projects to mitigate these costs.  
16 Majority op., ¶¶42–43. 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
12 
 
accounts "shall be used exclusively to retire the district's debt."  
Wis. Stat. § 77.706.   
¶75 The majority manufactures a distinction between the 
language of these stadium statutes and Wis. Stat. § 77.70, 
concluding the legislature is "silent" on how the direct reduction 
of the property tax levy should be accomplished, and that it could 
have mandated——as it did in Wis. Stat. §§ 77.705 and 77.706——how 
to do so.17  This is a distinction without a difference.  While 
they use different terms because they apply to different funding 
sources, §§ 77.705 and 77.706 are structurally equivalent to 
§ 77.70.  Just as §§ 77.705 and 77.706 require a sales and use tax 
be "used exclusively to retire the district's debt," § 77.70 
requires that a sales and use tax under that section be imposed 
"only for the purpose of directly reducing the property tax 
levy[.]"  Whatever "contrast" the majority sees in these 
statutes,18 each mandates a particular end for which the tax is to 
be used:  to retire the districts' debt and to directly reduce a 
county's property tax levy.  The Ordinance neither operates 
directly nor actually reduces the property tax levy——regardless of 
the breadth the majority attaches to "purpose."19   
B. 
The 1998 Attorney General's Opinion and the Impact of Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0602 
¶76 To the extent the 1998 attorney general's opinion 
suggests a county sales and use tax may fund projects not already 
                                                 
17 Id., ¶44. 
18 Id. 
19 Id., ¶38. 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
13 
 
funded by the property tax levy, the opinion——and the majority's 
reliance on it——is wrong.  The opinion responded to a simple 
allocation question regarding how funds received from a county 
sales and use tax may be budgeted by a county board.  See Opinion 
of Wis. Att'y Gen. to Dennis E. Kenealy, Ozaukee County Corp. 
Counsel, OAG 1-98 (May 5, 1998).  The attorney general answered, 
"such funds may be budgeted to reduce the amount of the overall 
countywide property tax levy or to defray the cost of any item 
which can be funded by a countywide property tax."  Id. at 1. 
¶77 The attorney general's opinion compared two budgeting 
methods used by counties in determining property tax levy 
reductions:  The first involved subtracting the net proceeds of 
the sales and use tax directly from the total property tax——both 
shown as single line revenue items in the budget——to determine the 
net property tax that must be levied.20  Id. at 2.  The second 
                                                 
20 The attorney general referenced the practice of some 
counties to reflect sales and use tax revenues on individual 
property tax bills only as a passing remark, not as one of the two 
identified methods counties used to demonstrate direct property 
tax reductions, as the majority claims.  See majority op., ¶¶35, 
45; Opinion of Wis. Att'y Gen. to Dennis E. Kenealy, Ozaukee County 
Corp. Counsel, OAG 1-98 (May 5, 1998).  It is not clear Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.70 even authorizes this method; the attorney general 
clarified that counties cannot "implement a direct system of tax 
credits to individual property owners through distribution of 
property tax bills[.]"  OAG 1-98 at 2.  Instead, Section 77.70 
requires that the "property tax levy" be reduced.   
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
14 
 
involved offsetting the cost of individual property-tax-funded 
budget items by the net proceeds of the sales and use tax.  Id.  
With regard to offsetting the cost of new as opposed to existing 
projects, the attorney general opined: 
It would be unreasonable to construe the statutory 
restriction so that counties which had already started 
certain projects could use sales and use tax revenues to 
complete them while other counties contemplating the 
initiation of similar projects could not use sales and 
use tax revenues to fund them at all. . . .  Counties 
may therefore also budget the net proceeds of the sales 
and use tax as an offset against the cost of any 
individual budgetary item which can be funded by the 
countywide property tax. 
Id. at 2–3.  The majority claims the attorney general's opinion 
relied on the "essential fungibility of money and the principle 
that the same reduction in the property tax levy occurs regardless 
of whether the proceeds are budgeted as an offset on the bills of 
taxpayers or used to fund a specific item."21  The majority errs 
by assuming away the statutory and democratic prerequisites for 
issuing debt.  It is unknowable whether the County's voters or a 
                                                 
Legislative history confirms this conclusion.  1985 Senate 
Bill 376, later enacted as 1985 Wisconsin Act 41, included an early 
amendment limiting the sales tax revenue "only for the purpose of 
property tax relief."  Drafting File, 1985 Wis. Act 41, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  The bill was later amended to 
include 
the 
pertinent 
language 
as 
it 
currently 
exists, 
substituting "property tax relief" with "directly reducing the 
property tax levy."  Id.  Senator Feingold explained his amendment 
requiring the tax provide "property tax relief" "should ensure 
that the revenue [the sales tax] raises goes directly toward 
lowering property tax bills."  See Measure links property tax 
relief to county sales tax, Waunakee Tribune, Oct. 17, 1985 at 7.  
The change in language to directly reduce the levy indicates 
§ 77.70 does not encompass the tax-bill-offset method. 
21 Majority op., ¶45. 
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
15 
 
super majority of the County Board would have approved bonding for 
the County's proposed new projects.  Because no debt was issued to 
fund the projects, no corresponding property tax increase actually 
occurred.  Consequently, there was nothing to reduce.   
¶78 Even if the attorney general's analysis was correct at 
the time, it no longer accurately reflects the state of property 
tax "fungibility."22  The attorney general released his opinion in 
1998, before the legislature enacted the levy limits in 2005.  See 
2005 Wis. Act 25, § 1251c.  This statute fundamentally altered the 
fungibility principle on which the opinion relied because it 
limited the extent to which counties can increase the property tax 
levy at will.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(2).   
¶79 The majority does not dispute that the County could not 
raise the property tax levy under Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(2) to pay 
for all of its new projects except under § 66.0602(3)(d)2.  That 
statutory exception allows the County to increase the property tax 
levy in an amount its new projects would require only by issuing 
general obligation debt.23  Quite conveniently, the County asserts 
and the majority agrees it would have issued general obligation 
                                                 
22 The attorney general's opinion does not come close to 
contemplating the "careful budgeting process" that the County 
asserts will be upended by concluding the Ordinance is unlawful.  
The County emphasized that the circuit court found its budget 
decisions "were made by 'intelligent and talented people' who 
conducted 'ample research and put considerable thought and effort 
into determining how the sales and use tax revenue would reduce 
the property tax levy' and fund new projects."  This might be true, 
but it is hardly the type of situation the attorney general's 
opinion considered in distinguishing an indirect reduction from a 
direct reduction. 
23 See majority op., ¶¶50–51. 
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debt to pay for the projects.  No one, however, submits any proof 
of the political will to do so.  
¶80 The County's bare assertion flies in the face of Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0602(2), which prohibits the County from increasing the 
property tax levy to pay for the projects.  Under that statute, 
the County could not have increased its 2018 property tax levy by 
more than approximately $1 million dollars, but it sought to spend 
approximately $18 million in sales and use tax revenues that year 
to pay for its projects.  Undeterred, the majority dismisses this 
concern by citing the exception under § 66.0602(3)(d)2. for debt 
service payments.24  That exception only exacerbates the majority's 
analytical problems.  Instead of providing the County the loophole 
it seeks, § 66.0602(3)(d)2. introduces an intervening step in the 
analysis of what "can be funded by a countywide property tax."  
See OAG 1-98 at 4.   
¶81 Applying the attorney general's analysis under the 
current statutory scheme, the project funding generated by the 
Ordinance constitutes at best only "indirect . . . property tax 
relief" because § 66.0602(2) prevents the County from directly 
increasing the property tax levy to pay for the projects.  See OAG 
1-98 at 3 ("The term 'directly' has meaning in those instances 
where budgetary items cannot be funded through a countywide 
                                                 
24 The attorney general's opinion in no way endorsed or even 
contemplated the use of debt to evade property tax restrictions; 
rather, that opinion addressed whether new spending funded by sales 
and use tax revenue could have been "funded by a countywide 
property tax," not whether a county could have obtained funds 
through debt financing or some other funding option.  See OAG 1-
98 at 3. 
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property tax.").  The County's plan requires an "intermediate step" 
to reduce the property tax levy:  issuing debt.  See id. (defining 
"directly" as "without any intermediate step").  Because issuing 
debt requires the approval of County voters or a super majority of 
the County Board, that intermediate step cannot be taken as a 
foregone conclusion.  While money may be fungible, political will 
is not. 
¶82 The County cannot sidestep Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(2) by 
simply asserting it would have issued the debt.  At a minimum, 
§ 66.0602(2) and (3) demonstrate the indirectness of the County's 
purported reduction in the property tax levy.  Issuing debt for 
the entire suite of projects may not have been politically or 
practically feasible under the levy limit statute.  The majority 
and the County conclude that because the County legally could have 
raised the levy under § 66.0602(3)(d)2., it would have actually 
done so.  Setting aside the statutory hurdles, the County itself 
warned of "adverse consequences" from taking on "enormous debt," 
including "significant risk" of a decreased credit rating, 
additional interest payments, and "passing the interest costs on 
to county property-taxpayers for many years[.]"  It cannot have it 
both ways.  Increasing the property tax levy beyond the levy limit 
requires multiple steps, including issuing debt only after 
obtaining the political approvals mandated under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 67.045 and 67.05, among other constraints.  Merely assuming the 
County could have satisfied these prerequisites circumvents the 
express language of Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  
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¶83 As a final note regarding the attorney general's 
opinion, the County's argument that the legislature has acquiesced 
to the attorney general's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 77.70 
because it has not amended the statute in response to the opinion 
should be rejected.25  Although the majority declines to address 
the issue because it erroneously endorses the opinion, this court 
has explained that legislative acquiescence is a flimsy basis on 
which to support a prior construction of a statute because 
"[n]umerous variables, unrelated to conscious endorsement of a 
statutory interpretation, may explain or cause legislative 
inaction."  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶33, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 
682 N.W.2d 405; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 
672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t [is] impossible to 
assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to 
act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) 
inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) 
unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, 
or even (5) political cowardice.").  "Our judicial duty is to say 
                                                 
25 The legislature did amend Wis. Stat. § 77.70 in 2017 to 
create an exception to the requirement that the sales and use tax 
be imposed "only for the purpose of directly reducing the property 
tax levy" for a county that has an electronics and information 
technology manufacturing zone under Wis. Stat. § 66.0621(3m).  See 
2017 Wis. Act 58, § 34e.  Section 66.0621(3m) provides that a 
county "may issue bonds under this section whose principal and 
interest are paid only through sales and use tax revenues imposed 
by the county under s. 77.70."  See 2017 Wis. Act 58, § 18k.  The 
legislature's specific carve-out for § 66.0621(3m) within § 77.70 
reinforces the conclusion that the relationship between debt 
service payments under § 66.0602(3)(d)2. and sales and use taxes 
under § 77.70 is indirect; the majority's interpretation renders 
this amendment superfluous. 
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what the law is, not to surmise meaning from legislative 
quiescence.  Legislative inaction cannot support an interpretation 
of the statute that is contrary to the plain meaning of the 
language used in the statute."  Winebow, Inc. v. Capitol-Husting 
Co., 2018 WI 60, ¶53, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 N.W.2d 631 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). 
¶84 The attorney general's opinion does not account for the 
current statutory constraints on a county's ability to increase 
the property tax levy.  Its reasoning rests on the attorney 
general's personal assessment of the reasonableness of the 
statute, prompting him to choose a construction that avoids the 
actual and unambiguous meaning of the language, which the attorney 
general deemed "unreasonable."  For that reason alone the majority 
should have rejected the opinion.  The absurd or unreasonable 
results canon of statutory construction applies only "when an 
interpretation would render the relevant statute contextually 
inconsistent or would be contrary to the clearly stated purpose of 
the statute."  State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶31, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 
752 N.W.2d 769; see also Scalia & Garner, supra at 237 ("[E]rror-
correction for absurdity can be a slippery slope.  It can lead to 
judicial revision of public and private texts to make them (in the 
judges' view) more reasonable.").  It is a misuse of the canon to 
invoke it as a tool for discarding the plain meaning of an 
unambiguous statute in favor of an interpretation the attorney 
general (or a court) prefers.  "The oddity or anomaly of certain 
consequences may be a perfectly valid reason for choosing one 
textually permissible interpretation over another, but it is no 
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basis for disregarding or changing the text."  See Scalia & Garner, 
supra at 237.  The clearly stated purpose of Wis. Stat. § 77.70 is 
"directly reducing the property tax levy[.]"  The County admits it 
instead enacted the Ordinance "for the purpose of funding capital 
projects[.]"  Regardless of whether the majority feels the 
legislature's chosen restriction on sales and use tax revenue is 
"unreasonable," the County was compelled to abide by it but it 
failed to do so. 
C. 
County Budgeting  
¶85 Brown County's budgeting procedures show the Ordinance 
is unlawful.  The County defines "capital project" as "an 
investment in a capital improvement that has a project cost of at 
least $250,000, is generally non-recurring, and has a service life 
of five years or more."  These projects "are proposed and adopted 
as part of the annual County budget process."  Further, "[f]inal 
approval of bonding projects [is] subject to: 1) inclusion in the 
Project Authorization Resolution and 2) financing being secured if 
funded by bonds or notes.  Both steps in this process are subject 
to final approval by the County Board." 
¶86 The County's 2018 budget listed the nine capital 
projects funded by the Ordinance——subdivided into seventeen 
"Projects"——under the "Proposed" category, defined as "Projects 
that are being submitted to the County Board for its consideration 
and action."  In contrast, projects categorized as "Bonded" are 
those "that have been through the Project Resolution Approval 
process and for which financing has been secured and approved."  
Consequently, the capital projects at issue had not been approved 
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for financing——they represented new spending projects not already 
funded by the property tax levy.26 
¶87 In his affidavit, the Director stated: 
I am familiar with Brown County's May 17, 2017 Ordinance 
enacting a Sales and Use Tax for the purpose of funding 
capital projects which it is my understanding and belief 
would otherwise have been funded through the issuance of 
additional debt obligations. 
It is my belief that revenues to Brown County from the 
Sales and Use Tax will benefit Brown County taxpayers by 
lowering the property tax rate, reducing interest 
expenses on financing projects, and having non-County 
residents assist with financing through purchases 
subject to the sales and use tax. 
The Director admitted the tax was enacted "for the purpose of 
funding capital projects which . . . would otherwise have been 
funded through the issuance of additional debt obligations"——not 
for the purpose of directly reducing the property tax levy as Wis. 
                                                 
26 The County argues BCTA "would rather have counties plan 
capital projects, borrow millions of dollars to pay for those 
projects, take on the costly interest expense associated with the 
debt, increase property tax levies to pay for the debt, absorb all 
of the professional costs and fees associated with debt issuance, 
and then impose a sales and use tax to decrease the debt burden."  
If the County cannot pay for its projects by increasing its 
property tax levy under Wis. Stat. § 66.0602(2), then this is what 
Wis. Stat. § 77.70 requires to directly reduce the property tax 
levy using sales and use tax revenue.  Alternatively, the County 
could keep its spending within the limits of its property tax 
revenue and use the sales and use tax revenue to reduce the 
property tax levy as the statute says.  While skirting the 
statutory requirements may enable the County to circumvent the 
political hurdles associated with saddling its citizens with 
costly debt, the County's complaints about the practicalities of 
statutory compliance are properly addressed to the policymakers in 
the legislature rather than this court.  See United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("For the 
removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies, not to 
the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic 
government.").   
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Stat. § 77.70 requires.  Tellingly, in the 2018 Brown County 
Executive Budget Message, the County Executive extolled the 
benefits of the new sales and use tax without any mention of 
reducing the property tax levy:   
Through the use of a temporary 72-month sales tax, we 
will cut the county's debt in half, eliminate bonding 
for six years, avoid mountains of interest by paying 
cash for projects, and make over $147 million in needed 
investments to county infrastructure and facilities 
which have been put off for far too long. 
 
¶88 Unless the property tax levy had already accounted for 
these projects——for example, if the debt had been issued and the 
property tax levy increased——the purpose of the Ordinance is not 
to reduce the levy at all.  Rather, the purpose is to avoid 
increasing the levy through additional debt obligations.  While 
this purpose might be fiscally sound and politically attractive, 
it does not satisfy Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  Avoiding an increase is 
not equivalent to a direct reduction.  While the Director could 
know the County would have sought to fund the projects through 
issuing debt, it is simply not the case that he——or anyone——could 
know the debt would actually have been approved and issued.   
¶89 The Director also claimed the Ordinance "will result in 
direct property tax savings every year from 2019 through 2023."  
Any "savings" are illusory.  The Director explained: 
If the Sales Tax remains in place, taxes on a property 
assessed at $163,200 (the median value of a home in Brown 
County) would decrease by $140.20 between 2018 and 2023.  
However, if there was no Sales Tax, the issuance of 
general obligation debt would result in taxes on that 
same median property increasing by $356.48 between 2018 
and 2023. 
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The difference is a savings of $496.68 for the typical 
Brown County homeowner of a median property as a direct 
result of the sales and use tax. 
While this calculation is useful for the County to compare the 
fiscal impact of alternative funding mechanisms, it does not show 
an actual reduction in the property tax levy.  The County 
calculates the property tax savings based on a comparison between 
two alternatives——imposing the sales and use tax and increasing 
the debt levy.  Because bonding represented an alternative method 
rather than the status quo, its avoidance does not produce a 
reduction in the tax levy under Wis. Stat. § 77.70.  The proper 
baseline for determining whether the sales and use tax "directly 
reduc[es] the property tax levy" is the existing property tax levy.   
 
¶90 The County is using its sales and use tax to "pay[] cash" 
for new capital projects.27  Wisconsin Stat. § 77.70, however, 
allows the sales and use tax to be used only to reduce the property 
tax levy.  By paying for the projects up front with sales and use 
tax revenues instead of bonding, the County decided the costs of 
those projects should be borne by sales and use taxpayers instead 
of property taxpayers.  This was not the County's decision to make.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 77.70 limits the purpose of the sales and use 
tax to "directly reducing the property tax levy"; the legislature 
accordingly reserved for itself the policy choice of allocating 
tax burdens among different payors.  For example, the County 
                                                 
27 At a County Executive Committee meeting, the County 
Executive stated the Ordinance "would contain the specific numbers 
for each of the buckets, but not the specific projects because in 
the end, the projects are approved through the budget process.  
What is changing is that the County would be paying cash for 
projects that we know are coming forward instead of increasing 
debt and increasing the property tax levy to pay for the projects."   
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Executive "oppose[d] county property taxpayer funding of the new 
arena."  The County Executive's desire to prematurely offload new 
project funding from property taxpayers to sales and use taxpayers 
is inconsistent with the statutory limitation on the imposition of 
sales and use taxes:  to directly reduce the property tax levy.  
Under the statutory scheme, property taxpayers must assume the 
initial burden of debt to fund new projects, provided the County 
Board musters the political capital to pursue issuing debt.  Only 
then may the increased property tax levy be reduced by the sales 
and use tax.  By skipping this step, the County surely avoids the 
burden of obtaining its citizens' consent to bearing the expense 
of the Board's preferred projects, but it violates the law in doing 
so, not to mention hiding from property taxpayers the future fiscal 
impact of the Board's spending.28 
¶91 The sales and use tax and the property tax impact 
different groups in different ways, and it is the prerogative of 
the legislature to determine how those burdens should fall.  For 
example, "[t]he sales tax has generally been thought to be 
inherently regressive because the proportion of an individual's or 
family's income devoted to consumption declines as income 
increases.  Persons at lower income levels, therefore, tend to pay 
a larger share of their income in sales tax."  See Sydney Emmerich, 
Sales and Use Tax, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Informational Paper 
                                                 
28 For example, one new sales and use tax-funded project in 
the proposed 2019 Executive Budget——the "Community Treatment 
Center Crisis Assessment Center"——was estimated to result in a 
"significant" 
increase 
in 
salary 
and 
fringe 
benefits, 
necessitating a levy of $1,442,024.   
No.  2020AP940.rgb 
 
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#5, 3 (Jan. 2021); see also Measure links property tax relief to 
county sales tax, Waunakee Tribune, Oct. 17, 1985 at 7 (quoting 
Senator Feingold as stating, "The sales tax involves some 
fundamental inequities which make it basically an unattractive 
tax").  
¶92 Historically, Wisconsin has relied heavily on property 
taxes.  See Noga Ardon, Property Tax Level in Wisconsin, 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Informational Paper #15, 3 (Jan. 2021) 
("Wisconsin local governments' heavy reliance on the property tax 
has contributed to the state's above-average property tax 
levels.").  At the time the legislature enacted 1985 Wisconsin Act 
41, it was particularly concerned with high property tax levels.  
See, e.g., Measure links property tax relief to county sales tax, 
at 7 (quoting Senator Feingold as stating, "The property tax is 
still the biggest tax problem facing this state").  "[R]esidential 
and commercial property have borne increasing shares of the tax 
burden, while decreasing shares have been borne by manufacturing 
and other property."  See Property Tax Level in Wisconsin, at 4.   
¶93 Against the backdrop of these documented concerns, Wis. 
Stat. § 77.70 reflects the legislature's deliberate policy choice 
to restrict counties to imposing sales and use taxes "only for the 
purpose of directly reducing the property tax levy[.]"  The 
County's unlawful imposition of the sales and use tax to avoid 
issuing debt for financing its increased spending shifts tax 
burdens in a manner not contemplated by § 77.70.  The statute 
promotes fiscal restraint; it does not provide a blank check for 
the County to pursue otherwise unfunded projects.  In sanctioning 
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the County's budgeting method, the majority upends the policy 
choices the legislature enacted in § 77.70.   
D. 
CONCLUSION 
¶94  Wisconsin Stat. § 77.70 expressly provides that "county 
sales and use taxes may be imposed only for the purpose of directly 
reducing the property tax levy[.]"  The Ordinance instead avoids 
a levy increase associated with issuing debt.  While the County 
attempts to obfuscate the issue by pointing to its "careful 
budgeting process" and the "adverse consequences" of concluding 
the Ordinance is unlawful, the legal conclusion is simple:  The 
County could not increase its property tax levy under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0602(2) to pay for its proposed new projects, so it would 
have to rely on the exception to pay debt service under 
§ 66.0602(3)(d)2.  Because the County never sought the requisite 
approval for debt issuance under Wis. Stat. ch. 67, the debt levy 
has not been increased.  The sales and use tax instead paid 
directly for the new projects rather than being used to directly 
reduce the property tax levy, which actually increased after the 
County enacted the Ordinance.  Instead of reducing the property 
tax levy, the County misused § 77.70 to avoid an increase in 
property taxes to pay for the County's preferred projects.  Because 
the County's sales and use tax avoided an increase in the property 
tax levy rather than reducing it, the Ordinance violates § 77.70 
and should be void.  The majority instead upholds it, in derogation 
of § 77.70; therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
¶95 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
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