Title: In re Isaiah W.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

~ SEE DISSENTING OPINION ~ 
Filed 7/7/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re ISAIAH W., A Person Coming  
) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
____________________________________) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT) 
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY  
) 
SERVICES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S221263 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B250231 
ASHLEE R., 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CK91018 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) provides:  ―In any 
involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to 
know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement 
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or 
Indian custodian and the Indian child‘s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt 
requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.‖  (25 
U.S.C. § 1912(a).)  This notice requirement, which is also codified in California 
law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2; all undesignated statutory references are to this 
code), enables a tribe to determine whether the child is an Indian child and, if so, 
whether to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.  No foster 
care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding may be held until at 
2 
 
least 10 days after the tribe receives the required notice.  (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); see 
§ 224.2, subd. (d).) 
In this case, a juvenile court removed newborn Isaiah W. from his parents‘ 
care and placed him in foster care.  In that proceeding, the court concluded there 
was no reason to know Isaiah was an Indian child.  The court thus found ICWA 
inapplicable and did not order the Los Angeles County Department of Children 
and Family Services (the Department) to notify any tribe or the federal Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA).  Isaiah‘s mother, defendant Ashlee R., did not appeal from 
this order placing Isaiah in foster care.  More than a year later, the juvenile court 
terminated Ashlee‘s parental rights.  Ashlee appealed from that order, citing the 
court‘s failure to order the Department to comply with ICWA‘s notice 
requirements.  We granted review to decide whether a parent who does not bring a 
timely appeal from a juvenile court order that subsumes a finding of ICWA‘s 
inapplicability may challenge such a finding in the course of appealing from a 
subsequent order terminating parental rights.  Because ICWA imposes on the 
juvenile court a continuing duty to inquire whether the child is an Indian child, we 
hold that the parent may a challenge a finding of ICWA‘s inapplicability in an 
appeal from the subsequent order, even if she did not raise such a challenge in an 
appeal from the initial order. 
I. 
Isaiah was born in November 2011, with a positive toxicology for 
marijuana, and he showed signs of withdrawal.  The Department filed a petition in 
juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that parental drug 
use placed Isaiah at risk of harm.  At a hearing on December 8, 2011, the court 
removed Isaiah from his parents‘ care and granted temporary custody to the 
Department.  The court also ordered reunification services, drug rehabilitation, and 
counseling for Isaiah‘s parents.  During the hearing, Ashlee told the court she may 
3 
 
have American Indian ancestry.  The court concluded it had no reason to know 
that Isaiah was an Indian child but ordered the Department to investigate Ashlee‘s 
claims. 
On January 20, 2012, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional and 
dispositional hearing.  The court placed Isaiah in foster care and again ordered the 
Department to offer reunification services to Isaiah‘s parents, including monitored 
visitation and substance abuse treatment.  At this hearing, the court reviewed an 
ICWA report prepared by the Department indicating that Isaiah‘s grandfather may 
have had Blackfeet ancestry and his great-great-grandmother may have been a 
member of a Cherokee tribe.  The court concluded that ―any possibility [that Isaiah 
is an Indian child] is really too attenuated and remote for it to suggest to this court 
or . . . for this court to know that the child would fall under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act.‖  Accordingly, the court did not order the Department to provide 
notice to any tribe or to the BIA.  Ashlee did not appeal from this order placing 
Isaiah in foster care or otherwise object to the court‘s finding that ICWA was 
inapplicable. 
Over the next several months, Ashlee visited Isaiah weekly.  But she did 
not complete her drug treatment program or attend her scheduled drug tests.  As a 
result, the juvenile court terminated reunification services in September 2012 and 
set a hearing on the termination of parental rights.  The court ordered a permanent 
placement plan according to which Isaiah would be adopted by his foster mother. 
On April 10, 2013, the juvenile court terminated Ashlee‘s parental rights 
and again said it had no reason to know that Isaiah was an Indian child.  The court 
cleared Isaiah for permanent and final adoption. 
On June 5, 2013, Ashlee appealed from the order terminating her parental 
rights on the ground that the juvenile court had reason to know Isaiah was an 
Indian child yet failed to order the Department to comply with ICWA‘s notice 
4 
 
requirements.  The Court of Appeal denied relief, explaining:  ―Mother had the 
right to appeal the juvenile court‘s order at the dispositional hearing.  She did not 
do so, and only challenged the court‘s failure to provide notice under the ICWA 
approximately one and a half years later which was after the court terminated 
parental rights.  However, the juvenile court‘s dispositional findings and orders 
had become final 60 days after the court‘s announcement of the order.  (Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)  ‗Appellate jurisdiction to review an appealable order 
is dependent upon a timely notice of appeal.  [Citation.]‘  (In re Elizabeth G. 
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1331.)  ‗An appeal from the most recent order 
entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the 
statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.‘  (In re Pedro N. (1995) 35 
Cal.App.4th 183, 189 [(Pedro N.)].)  Here, because mother failed to timely appeal 
from the ICWA finding in the juvenile court‘s dispositional order, ‗she is 
foreclosed from raising the issue now on appeal from the order terminating her 
parental rights.‘  (Ibid.; see In re Elizabeth G., supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1331.)‖  
In relying on Pedro N., the Court of Appeal took an approach contrary to In re 
B.R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 773, 779, Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2003) 103 
Cal.App.4th 247 (Dwayne P.), and In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731 
(Marinna J.).  We granted review to resolve this conflict among the Courts of 
Appeal. 
II. 
Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ―rising concern in the mid-
1970‘s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes 
of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers 
of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care 
placement, usually in non-Indian homes.‖  (Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 32 (Holyfield).)  ICWA declared that ―it is the 
5 
 
policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote 
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of 
minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families 
and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect 
the unique values of Indian culture . . . .‖  (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) 
The minimum standards established by ICWA include the requirement of 
notice to Indian tribes in any involuntary proceeding in state court to place a child 
in foster care or to terminate parental rights ―where the court knows or has reason 
to know that an Indian child is involved.‖  (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)  ―If the identity 
or location of the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe cannot be determined, 
such notice shall be given to the Secretary in like manner, who shall have fifteen 
days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to the parent or Indian custodian 
and the tribe.‖  (Ibid.)  The ―Secretary‖ refers to the United States Secretary of the 
Interior (25 U.S.C. § 1903(11)), whose department includes the BIA. 
ICWA‘s notice requirements serve two purposes.  First, they facilitate a 
determination of whether the child is an Indian child under ICWA.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 1903(4) [defining Indian child as ―any unmarried person who is under age 
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe‖].)  BIA guidelines in effect at the time of Isaiah‘s placement in foster care 
―ma[de] clear that the best source of information on whether a particular child is 
Indian is the tribe itself.‖  (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, BIA, Guidelines for State 
Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67584, 67586 (Nov. 26, 
1979); see U.S. Dept. of the Interior, BIA, Guidelines for State Courts and 
Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 80 Fed.Reg. 10146, 10153 (Feb. 
25, 2015) [―Only the Indian tribe(s) . . . may make the determination whether the 
child‖ is an Indian child under ICWA].) 
6 
 
Second, ICWA notice ensures that an Indian tribe is aware of its right to 
intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a child custody 
proceeding involving an Indian child.  (See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) [―In any State 
court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights 
to, an Indian child, . . . the Indian child‘s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any 
point in the proceeding.‖]; 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) [―An Indian tribe shall have 
jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving 
an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, 
except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal 
law.‖].)  ―No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding 
shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian 
custodian and the tribe . . . .‖  (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)  In enacting these provisions, 
―Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and 
families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers 
of Indian children adopted by non-Indians.‖  (Holyfield, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 49; 
see id. at p. 52 [ICWA ― ‗recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child 
which is distinct from but on a parity with the interest of the parents‘ ‖].) 
In 2006, our Legislature enacted provisions that affirm ICWA‘s purposes 
(§ 224, subd. (a)) and mandate compliance with ICWA ―[i]n all Indian child 
custody proceedings‖ (id., subd. (b)).  Section 224.2 codifies and elaborates on 
ICWA‘s requirements of notice to a child‘s parents or legal guardian, Indian 
custodian, and Indian tribe, and to the BIA.  In addition to requiring notice to the 
BIA ―to the extent required by federal law,‖ the statute requires any notice sent to 
a child‘s parents, Indian custodians, or tribe to ―also be sent directly to the 
Secretary of the Interior‖ unless the Secretary has waived notice in writing.  
(§ 224.2, subd. (a)(4).)  Section 224.3, subdivision (e)(1) provides that an Indian 
tribe‘s determination of a child‘s membership or eligibility for membership in the 
7 
 
tribe ―shall be conclusive,‖ and subdivision (e)(2) says that a determination by the 
BIA of tribal membership or eligibility for membership ―is conclusive‖ in the 
absence of a contrary determination by the tribe.  Section 224.4 affirms that ―[t]he 
Indian child‘s tribe and Indian custodian have the right to intervene at any point in 
an Indian child custody proceeding.‖  And importantly for our purposes, section 
224.3, subdivision (a) (section 224.3(a)) provides that courts and county welfare 
departments ―have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child 
for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . is to be, or has been, filed is or may be 
an Indian child in all dependency proceedings and in any judicial wardship 
proceedings if the child is at risk of entering foster care or is in foster care.‖ 
The question before us is not whether the juvenile court erroneously 
concluded from the record that it had no reason to know Isaiah was an Indian 
child.  We express no view on that determination.  Moreover, the Department does 
not contend that Ashlee‘s failure to object to the juvenile court‘s finding of 
ICWA‘s inapplicability at the April 2013 proceeding to terminate her parental 
rights precludes her from raising the issue for the first time in this appeal.  (See In 
re Samuel P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1267–1268 (Samuel P.) [failure to raise 
ICWA notice error at juvenile court hearing does not waive the claim for purposes 
of appeal from an order issued at that hearing]; Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 733 [same].)  The issue presented here is whether Ashlee — having brought 
no timely challenge to the January 2012 foster care placement order, which 
subsumed a finding by the juvenile court that ICWA notice was unnecessary — 
may now challenge the April 2013 order terminating her parental rights on the 
ground that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA notice unnecessary.  This 
question requires us to interpret the federal and California statutes governing 
ICWA‘s applicability to dependency proceedings, and we apply independent 
review.  (Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833, 840.) 
8 
 
The Court of Appeal was correct to observe that under rule 8.406(a)(1) of 
the California Rules of Court, the juvenile court‘s January 2012 order became 
final 60 days after it was announced.  Ashlee did not appeal from that order during 
the 60-day period.  Section 395 provides in relevant part:  ―A judgment in a 
proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final 
judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.‖  
In Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998 (Sara M.), we said that ― ‗[a] 
consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition 
order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later 
appealable order.‘  [Citation.]  An appeal from the most recent order in a 
dependency matter may not challenge earlier orders for which the time for filing 
an appeal has passed.‖  (Id. at p. 1018.)  Under section 395 and Sara M., Ashlee 
may not challenge the January 2012 dispositional order through an appeal from the 
April 2013 order terminating her parental rights. 
But it does not follow, as the Court of Appeal believed, that ―because 
[Ashlee] failed to timely appeal from the ICWA finding in the juvenile court‘s 
dispositional order, ‗she is foreclosed from raising the issue now on appeal from 
the order terminating her parental rights.‘ ‖  The reason is that the juvenile court 
had a continuing duty to inquire whether Isaiah was an Indian child in all 
dependency proceedings, including a proceeding to terminate parental rights.  In 
light of this continuing duty, the April 2013 order terminating Ashlee‘s parental 
rights was necessarily premised on a current finding by the juvenile court that it 
had no reason to know Isaiah was an Indian child and thus ICWA notice was not 
required.  Here, the juvenile court made that finding explicit in the course of the 
April 2013 hearing when it said, ―the Court is once again making a finding [that] I 
have no reason to know the child would fall under the Indian Child Welfare Act.‖   
Properly understood, Ashlee‘s present appeal does not seek to challenge the 
9 
 
juvenile court‘s finding of ICWA‘s inapplicability underlying the January 2012 
dispositional order.  It instead seeks to challenge the juvenile court‘s finding of 
ICWA‘s inapplicability underlying the April 2013 order terminating her parental 
rights.  Ashlee‘s inaction in the face of the earlier order does not preclude her from 
now claiming in this appeal that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA notice 
unnecessary. 
The continuing nature of a juvenile court‘s duty to inquire into a child‘s 
Indian status appears on the face of section 224.3(a).  As noted, that provision 
reads:  ―The court . . . ha[s] an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether 
a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . has been . . . filed is or may be 
an Indian child in all dependency proceedings and in any juvenile wardship 
proceedings if the child is at risk of entering foster care or is in foster care.‖  
(§ 224.3(a).)  The plain language of this provision — declaring an ―affirmative 
and continuing duty‖ that applies to ―all dependency proceedings‖ — means that 
the juvenile court in this case had a present duty to inquire whether Isaiah was an 
Indian child at the April 2013 proceeding to terminate Ashlee‘s parental rights, 
even though the court had previously found no reason to know Isaiah was an 
Indian child at the January 2012 proceeding to place Isaiah in foster care.  Because 
the validity of the April 2013 order is necessarily premised on the juvenile court‘s 
fulfillment of that duty, there is nothing improper or untimely about Ashlee‘s 
contention in this appeal that the juvenile court erred in discharging that duty. 
Reading section 224.3(a) together with section 224.3, subdivision (e)(3) 
(section 224.3(e)(3)) underscores the continuing nature of the juvenile court‘s 
duty.  The latter provision says:  ―If proper and adequate notice has been provided 
pursuant to Section 224.2, and neither a tribe nor the Bureau of Indian Affairs has 
provided a determinative response within 60 days after receiving that notice, the 
court may determine that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. Sec. 1901 et 
10 
 
seq.) does not apply to the proceedings, provided that the court shall reverse its 
determination of the inapplicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act and apply the 
act prospectively if a tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs subsequently confirms 
that the child is an Indian child.‖  (§ 224.3(e)(3).) 
Section 224.3(e)(3) implicitly recognizes that any finding of ICWA‘s 
inapplicability before proper and adequate ICWA notice has been given is not 
conclusive and does not relieve the court of its continuing duty under section 
224.3(a) to inquire into a child‘s Indian status in all dependency proceedings.  (See 
Dwayne P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 261 [―Because the court‘s duty continues 
until proper notice is given, an error in not giving notice is also of a continuing 
nature and may be challenged at any time during the dependency proceedings.‖].)  
Only after proper and adequate notice has been given and neither a tribe nor the 
BIA has provided a determinative response within 60 days does section 
224.3(e)(3) authorize the court to determine that ICWA does not apply.  The effect 
of that determination is to relieve the court of the duty it would otherwise have 
under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to provide ICWA notice ―whenever it is 
known or there is reason to know that an Indian child is involved, and for every 
hearing thereafter.‖  Nevertheless, ―the court shall reverse its determination of 
[ICWA‘s] inapplicability . . . if a tribe or the [BIA] subsequently confirms that the 
child is an Indian child.‖  (§ 224.3(e)(3); see § 224.3, subd. (f) [notwithstanding a 
finding of ICWA‘s inapplicability under § 224.3(e), any information subsequently 
received by the court, social worker, or probation officer that would be subject to 
ICWA notice must be provided to any tribes entitled to notice and to the BIA].) 
The Court of Appeal observed that at the January 2012 dispositional 
hearing, ―all of the information provided by [Ashlee] and her relatives about their 
American Indian heritage was before the juvenile court, and the court considered 
the Department‘s report on its investigation into mother‘s heritage.‖  It does not 
11 
 
appear that Ashlee submitted any additional information bearing on Isaiah‘s status 
between January 2012 and April 2013.  But section 224.3(a), which establishes a 
juvenile court‘s ―affirmative and continuing duty‖ to inquire into a child‘s Indian 
status, does not contain an exception for situations where no new information is 
submitted between one proceeding and the next.  Unlike a determination of 
ICWA‘s inapplicability that is made after ―proper and adequate notice has been 
provided‖ and ―neither a tribe nor the [BIA] has provided a determinative response 
within 60 days‖ (§ 224.3(e)(3)), the juvenile court‘s determination of ICWA‘s 
inapplicability at the January 2012 hearing had no effect on its ongoing inquiry 
and notice obligations under sections 224.2 and 224.3(a).  That is true even though 
Ashlee did not submit any new information between January 2012 and the April 
2013 hearing to terminate her parental rights. 
The Department, echoing concerns expressed by the Court of Appeal, 
contends that ICWA notice issues are best resolved ―at the beginning of any 
dependency proceeding‖ and that ―allowing ICWA issues to be determined in an 
appeal from a hearing to terminate parental rights encourages the practice of 
ignoring ICWA violations for years while a dependency case creeps through the 
proceedings.‖  Amicus curiae California State Association of Counties similarly 
contends that ―it is in the best interests of the all [sic] children to have a child‘s 
Indian status determined early in the child proceedings rather than waiting to raise 
the issue after parental rights have been terminated.‖  We are mindful of the 
child‘s need for a permanent and stable home, and we agree that swift and early 
resolution of ICWA notice issues is ideal.  But the federal and state statutes were 
clearly written to protect the integrity and stability of Indian tribes despite the 
potential for delay in placing a child.  The provisions of the California statute just 
discussed, as well as others, recognize the importance of properly determining a 
child‘s Indian status, even when a dependency proceeding has progressed beyond 
12 
 
the initial stages.  (See ante, at pp. 9–11 [discussing §§ 224.2, subd. (b), 224.3, 
subds. (a), (e)(3), (f)]; see also § 224.4 [―The Indian child‘s tribe and Indian 
custodian have the right to intervene at any point in an Indian child custody 
proceeding.‖]; § 224, subd. (b) [requiring judicial compliance with ICWA ―[i]n all 
Indian child custody proceedings‖].)  The federal statute similarly provides:  ―In 
any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of 
parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian 
child‘s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.‖  (25 
U.S.C. § 1911(c).)  ICWA also provides:  ―Any Indian child who is the subject of 
any action for foster care placement or termination of parental rights under State 
law, any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, 
and the Indian child‘s tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to 
invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of 
sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.‖  (25 U.S.C. § 1914.)  This latter 
provision contemplates that ICWA‘s notice requirements may be enforced after 
the issuance of an order terminating parental rights.  Allowing ICWA notice error 
to be raised for the first time in a direct appeal from an order terminating parental 
rights seems unlikely to cause greater delay than allowing the parent to litigate the 
same issue in a separate and collateral proceeding.   
In construing statutes, we consider ― ‗the context of the statute as a whole 
and the overall statutory scheme . . . .‘  [Citation.]  In other words, ‗ ―we do not 
construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute ‗with reference to the 
entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and 
retain effectiveness.‘  [Citation.]‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 77, 83.)  The provisions above, considered as a whole, make clear that 
Indian tribes have interests protected by ICWA that are separate and distinct from 
the interests of parents of Indian children.  (See Holyfield, supra, 490 U.S. at 
13 
 
pp. 49, 52.)  ICWA‘s notice requirements are ―intended to protect the interests of 
Indian children and tribes despite the parents‘ inaction.‖  (Dwayne P., supra, 103 
Cal.App.4th at p. 261; see Samuel P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267 [―The 
notice requirements serve the interests of the Indian tribes ‗irrespective of the 
position of the parents‘ and cannot be waived by the parent.‖].)  We agree with the 
majority view among the Courts of Appeal that ―given the court‘s continuing duty 
throughout the dependency proceedings to ensure the requisite notice is given 
[citation], and the protections the ICWA affords Indian children and tribes, the 
parents‘ inaction does not constitute a waiver or otherwise preclude appellate 
review.‖  (Dwayne P., at p. 251; accord, In re B.R., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 779; Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 737.) 
In reaching a contrary holding, the Court of Appeal, relying on Pedro N., 
said, ―we are only addressing the rights of [Ashlee], not the rights of a tribe under 
the ICWA.‖  Pedro N. reasoned that whereas ICWA authorizes a tribe to intervene 
in a dependency action ―at any point in the proceeding‖ (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)), it 
authorizes parents to ―petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate‖ a 
dependency action (25 U.S.C. § 1914) but does not expressly permit a parent to 
allege an ICWA violation at any point in the proceeding.  (Pedro N., supra, 35 
Cal.App.4th at p. 190.)  As other authorities have observed, however, ―the tribe‘s 
right to assert jurisdiction over the proceeding or to intervene in it is meaningless 
if the tribe has no notice that the action is pending.‖  (In re Junious M. (1983) 144 
Cal.App.3d 786, 790–791; see Samuel P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267 [―If a 
tribe which may have an interest in a proceeding does not have notice of that 
proceeding, the tribe will be unable to assert its rights under the ICWA.‖]; 
Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 739 [―As a result [of lack of notice to 
relevant tribes], it is unlikely that those tribes had notice of the dependency 
proceeding, and thus virtually certain that they were unable to assert their rights 
14 
 
under [ICWA].‖].)  As a practical matter, the approach taken by Pedro N. makes 
the statutory right of Indian tribes to intervene ―at any point in the proceeding‖ (25 
U.S.C. § 1911(c); see § 224.4) largely contingent upon a parent‘s alleging ICWA 
notice error at the earliest possible opportunity in a dependency action.  Such an 
approach cannot be reconciled with the statutory scheme, and we hereby 
disapprove In re Pedro N., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 183. 
The Court of Appeal also said, ―The principles enunciated in [In re X.V. 
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794] support our conclusion that a dependent child‘s 
interest in permanency and stability requires that there be a time limit to a parent‘s 
right to raise the issue of ICWA compliance.‖  But In re X.V. is distinguishable.  
There the Court of Appeal, relying on Dwayne P., granted the parents‘ first appeal 
challenging ICWA notice violations and ordered the juvenile court to 
conditionally reverse its order terminating parental rights and to provide ICWA 
notice.  (In re X.V., at p. 798.)  The juvenile court gave notice to several tribes and, 
after receiving responses, concluded at a special hearing that ICWA did not apply.  
The parents did not attend the special hearing, and their counsel raised no 
objection to the court‘s ICWA findings.  (In re X.V., at pp. 799–800.)  The parents 
then appealed again, citing ICWA notice irregularities.  Dismissing the appeal, the 
Court of Appeal said:  ―We do not believe Congress anticipated or intended to 
require successive or serial appeals challenging ICWA notices for the first time on 
appeal.‖  (Id. at p. 804.)  Because the case before us does not involve a second or 
successive appeal, we have no occasion here to decide whether a parent would be 
precluded from raising an ICWA notice violation in a second or successive appeal. 
In sum, a juvenile court has an affirmative and continuing duty in all 
dependency proceedings to inquire into a child‘s Indian status.  (§ 224.3(a).)  If a 
court determines it has reason to know a child is an Indian child, the court must 
notify the BIA and any relevant tribe so that the tribe may determine the child‘s 
15 
 
status and decide whether to intervene.  (§ 224.2.)  If adequate and proper notice 
has been given, and if neither the BIA nor any tribe provides a determinative 
response within 60 days, then the court may determine that ICWA does not apply 
to the proceedings.  (§ 224.3(e)(3).)  At that point, the court is relieved of its duties 
of inquiry and notice (§ 224.2, subd. (b)), unless the BIA or a tribe subsequently 
confirms that the child is an Indian child (§ 224.3(e)(3)).  Although the juvenile 
court in this case found ICWA inapplicable at the January 2012 dispositional 
hearing, the court had an affirmative and continuing duty to determine ICWA‘s 
applicability at the April 2013 hearing to terminate Ashlee‘s parental rights.  The 
court‘s April 2013 termination order necessarily subsumed a present determination 
of ICWA‘s inapplicability, and Ashlee brought a timely appeal from the April 
2013 order challenging that determination.  The fact that Ashlee did not allege 
ICWA notice error in an appeal from the January 2012 dispositional order does 
not preclude her from raising the claim in this appeal. 
Notwithstanding our holding today, we emphasize that social services 
departments and juvenile courts should inquire about a child‘s Indian status early 
in the proceedings and should provide notice at the soonest possible opportunity.   
Notice must be provided ―where the court knows or has reason to know that an 
Indian child is involved‖ (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)), and section 224.3, subdivision (b) 
sets forth a nonexhaustive list of ―circumstances that may provide reason to know 
the child is an Indian child.‖  Importantly, ―[t]he relevant question is not whether 
the evidence . . . supports a finding that the minor[] [is an] Indian child[]; it is 
whether the evidence triggers the notice requirement of ICWA so that the tribes 
themselves may make that determination.‖  (In re D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 
41, 63.)  After proper notice has been given, if the tribes respond that the minor is 
not a member or not eligible for membership, or if neither the BIA nor any tribe  
16 
 
provides a determinative response within 60 days, then the court may find that 
ICWA does not apply to the proceedings.  At that point, the court is relieved of its 
duties of inquiry and notice unless the BIA or a tribe subsequently confirms that 
the child is an Indian child.  ― ‗To maintain stability in placements of children in 
juvenile proceedings, it is preferable to err on the side of giving notice and 
examining thoroughly whether the juvenile is an Indian child.‘  [Citations.]‖  (In 
re D.C., at p. 63.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
LIU, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I agree with the Court of Appeal in this case and In re Pedro N. (1995) 35 
Cal.App.4th 183.  As with all child dependency matters, issues concerning the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) should be resolved as 
early in the process as possible.  Permitting a party to delay an appeal that could 
have been taken earlier does not further the purposes behind the ICWA and can 
substantially harm the child.  Accordingly, and unlike the majority, I would not 
carve out an exception for ICWA issues to the general California rule in 
dependency matters requiring an issue to be raised on appeal at the first 
opportunity. 
Mother Ashlee R. could have, and should have, raised the issue under the 
ICWA by appeal after the January 2012 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, 
but she did not do so.  In child dependency cases, it is settled in California that a 
parent must appeal an issue at the earliest opportunity or forfeit the right to raise 
the issue later.  (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018.)  The 
reason for this rule is compelling.  It is necessary to fulfill the state‘s role as 
parens patriae to protect and care for children who cannot protect and care for 
themselves.  ―Childhood is fleeting and ‗[i]t is axiomatic, of course, that the longer 
children remain in foster homes, the more difficult it is to find families willing to 
adopt them.‘ ‖  (In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535, 558, quoting In re 
Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 837, fn. 10.)  ― ‗Permitting a parent to raise issues 
2 
 
going to the validity of a final earlier appealable order would directly undermine 
dominant concerns of finality and reasonable expedition,‘ including ‗the 
predominant interest of the child and state . . . .‘ ‖  (Sara M., at p. 1018, quoting In 
re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 207.) 
In various contexts, this court has explained and emphasized the critical 
importance of reasonably prompt resolution of a child‘s placement, especially 
after reunification efforts have failed, as they have in this case.  ―After 
reunification efforts have failed, it is not only important to seek an appropriate 
permanent solution — usually adoption when possible — it is also important to 
implement that solution reasonably promptly to minimize the time during which 
the child is in legal limbo.  A child has a compelling right to a stable, permanent 
placement that allows a caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the 
child.  [Citation.]  Courts should strive to give the child this stable, permanent 
placement, and this full emotional commitment, as promptly as reasonably 
possible consistent with protecting the parties‘ rights and making a reasoned 
decision.‖  (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59.)  After reunification efforts 
have failed, ― ‗ ―[t]he overriding concern . . . is to provide a stable, permanent 
home in which a child can develop a lasting emotional attachment to his or her 
caretakers.‖ ‘ ‖  (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 421.)  ―Because these 
proceedings involve the well-being of children, considerations such as 
permanency and stability are of paramount importance.‖  (In re S.B. (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)  ―[L]engthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency 
for children [is] the very evil the Legislature intended to correct.‖  (In re Marilyn 
H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.)  Once reunification efforts have failed, ―it becomes 
inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in 
a permanent alternative home.‖  (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
242, 256.) 
3 
 
This is not just the courts‘ view.  It is the Legislature‘s.  ―In considering the 
minor‘s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor‘s need for 
prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with 
stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary 
placements.‖  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 352, subd. (a); see In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 308.) 
These abstract policy concerns become concrete in this case.  If mother had 
appealed the ICWA issue in January 2102, as she should have, the appeal could 
have been resolved before the April 2013 hearing at which the court terminated 
mother‘s parental rights and cleared Isaiah W. for final adoption.  In that event, the 
court could have considered any questions under the ICWA, including any tribe‘s 
position, and considered all of the alternatives at that time.  If there were no 
ICWA issue, Isaiah could have been finally adopted when he was a year and a half 
old, and he could then have received and given a full, permanent emotional 
commitment.  Instead, mother waited another year and a half.  Isaiah is now four 
and a half years old, and he is still in legal limbo and still awaiting final adoption 
and the full emotional commitment that goes with it.  Under the majority‘s 
holding, the wait for Isaiah and many other dependent children will be much 
longer than if we require the ICWA issue to be appealed at the earliest 
opportunity. 
Isaiah is paying a high price, and other children will continue to pay a high 
price, due to the majority‘s permitting mother to make this delayed ICWA claim.  
The delay ―may not seem a long period of time to an adult, [but] it can be a 
lifetime to a young child.  Childhood does not wait for the parent to become 
adequate.‖  (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.)  Nor does childhood 
wait for the appellate process. 
4 
 
California law provides ample opportunity to raise and litigate issues under 
the ICWA.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-7; see In re Shane G. (2008) 166 
Cal.App.4th 1532, 1538-1539.)  The trial court here investigated and made a 
prompt ruling, and, as noted, mother could have appealed that ruling when it was 
made.  The majority cites nothing in the ICWA suggesting Congress wanted to 
prohibit a state from imposing reasonable time limits within which a parent may 
appeal ICWA issues.  Rather, as the Court of Appeal here noted, ― ‗Congress‘s 
intent to not cause unnecessary delay in dependency proceedings is evidenced by 
the [ICWA] provision allowing a hearing on the termination of parental rights 
within a relatively short time, 10 days, after the [Secretary of the Interior] or tribe 
receives ICWA notice.  (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)‘ ‖  (Quoting In re X.V. (2005) 132 
Cal.App.4th 794, 804.)  Another provision of the ICWA allows an aggrieved 
party, including an Indian tribe, to ―petition any court of competent jurisdiction‖ to 
invalidate an action that violated specified parts of the ICWA.  (25 U.S.C. § 1914, 
italics added.)  The reference to competent jurisdiction shows Congress meant the 
ICWA to fit in with state procedures. 
Additionally, as the Pedro N. court noted, ―[h]ad the Congress intended to 
permit a parent to allege an ICWA violation at any point in the proceedings, it 
could well have so stated.  Indeed, in another portion of the ICWA (25 U.S.C. 
§ 1911(c)), the Congress conferred the right to intervene in any dependency or 
termination action ‗at any point in the proceeding.‘  [Citation.]  We assume from 
the absence of such language in 25 United States Code section 1914, that the 
Congress did not intend to preempt, in the case of appellate review, state law 
requiring timely notices of appeal from a parent who appeared in the underlying 
proceedings and who had knowledge of the applicability of the ICWA.‖  (In re 
Pedro N., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.)  Requiring the appeal to be made in a 
timely fashion violates nothing in the language or spirit of the ICWA. 
5 
 
Indeed, prompt resolution of ICWA issues furthers the act‘s purposes and 
the interests of the tribe involved.  The purpose behind requiring notice and 
permitting the tribe to intervene is to allow the court to consider a placement 
consistent with the ICWA such as, potentially, a placement within the tribe.  This 
purpose is important.  But, to fully effectuate this purpose, the juvenile court 
should consider such an alternative placement as soon as possible, not belatedly.  
Requiring the parent to appeal the ruling when made would generally permit the 
court to consider the tribe‘s interests at the same time it considers other possible 
placements. 
Here, if mother had appealed the ICWA issue in January 2012, and if it was 
then determined that Isaiah was an Indian child and the tribe was notified, the tribe 
could have urged its interests at the April 2013 hearing, and the court could have 
decided what to do at that time, when Isaiah was merely a year and a half old.  
Instead, permitting mother to belatedly raise the issue much later will mean that 
Isaiah will be at least five or six years old when any tribe is notified.  In that event, 
the tribe would be placed in the difficult position of having to urge that a child be 
removed from a long-standing foster care relationship — often a relationship that 
promises to become permanent through adoption — and placed within a tribe with 
individuals with whom the child has no emotional connection.  A tribe should not 
be placed in that position. 
We have noted ―evidence that the child will suffer long-term, serious 
emotional damage if a bond with foster parents is severed.‖  (In re Jasmon O., 
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 421.)  As the Court of Appeal here emphasized, ―in 
California, the courts have held that‖ a child‘s constitutional interest in stability 
―includes the ‗right to a reasonably directed early life, unmarred by unnecessary 
and excessive shifts in custody.‘ ‖  (Quoting In re Arturo A. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 
229, 241, fn. 6.)  As the Court of Appeal also stated, we should not adopt a rule 
6 
 
―that there is no time limit on a parent‘s right to raise the issue of  ICWA 
compliance.  To allow a parent unlimited time within which to raise this challenge 
would violate the child‘s constitutional right to a stable and permanent home.‖ 
The majority stresses that the court‘s duty under the ICWA is a continuing 
one.  I agree.  Whenever the court receives reason to believe the child is, or might 
be, an Indian child, it must act accordingly.  But the continuing duty does not 
mean the court must continually investigate, week after week, year after year, 
whether the child might be an Indian child.  Here, the court investigated the 
question at the outset, and made its ruling in January 2012.  Mother could have 
challenged the ruling at that time.  No one suggests anything new occurred after 
that date to trigger a duty of further investigation or notification.  If, after the 
January 2012 hearing, something had happened to necessitate action under the 
ICWA, I agree that mother could have challenged any subsequent ruling or failure 
to act after that something had occurred.  In that situation, mother could not have 
challenged in January 2012 the court‘s later action or inaction.  But here, all of 
mother‘s arguments are based on the information and record as it existed in 
January 2012.  Mother could have made those arguments at that time. 
I agree with the majority that parents may not waive a tribe‘s rights.  We 
have no occasion to decide a tribe‘s rights if and when it receives notice belatedly 
and had no previous opportunity to intervene.  But parents may waive their own 
rights to appeal an ICWA issue.  Mother had no obligation ever to appeal on this 
ground.  Certainly, if a tribe is not given notification, and a parent does not raise 
this issue on appeal, the tribe is not likely to learn that a potential Indian child is 
involved in the dependency proceeding.  But this circumstance is not due to 
California‘s appellate time limits.  Neither the ICWA nor our state statutes require 
notification of all possible tribes of all dependency matters, and the tribes no doubt 
would not want to be inundated by such notifications.  Because nothing compels a 
7 
 
parent ever to raise an ICWA issue, condoning the belated raising of such an 
issue — thus depriving a tribe of the ability to intervene in a timely fashion — will 
not itself guarantee the tribe will receive the notice to which it is entitled.  It will 
merely encourage unnecessary delay — delay that can harm the child. 
The majority appropriately — but toothlessly — emphasizes that tribes 
should receive notice under the ICWA ―at the soonest possible opportunity.‖  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  Requiring a parent to appeal an ICWA issue at the 
soonest possible opportunity furthers this policy.  Allowing a parent to delay the 
appeal harms this policy.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Isaiah W. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 228 Cal.App.4th 981 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S221263 
Date Filed: July 7, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Jacquie H. Lewis, Commissioner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Pattie L. Dikes, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mark Radoff, Delia Parr and Mark Vezzola for California Indian Legal Services as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, Amber Blaha, Joann Kintz and Christine E. Ennis for The 
United States as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
John F. Krattli and Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, James M. Owens and Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant 
County Counsel, Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy 
County Counsel, Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning; Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel (San Diego), John E. Phillips, Chief 
Deputy County Counsel, and L. David Casey, Deputy County Counsel, for California State Association of 
Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Pattie L. Dikes 
9116 E. Sprague Avenue, #473 
Spokane Valley, WN  99206 
(619) 559-2557 
 
Mark Radoff 
California Indian Legal Services 
609 South Escondido Boulevard 
Escondido, CA  92025 
(760) 746-8941 
 
Tracey F. Dodds 
Principal Deputy County Counsel 
201 Centre Plaza Drive, Suite 1 
Monterey Park, CA  91754-2142 
(323) 526-6273 
 
L. David Casey 
Deputy County Counsel 
4955 Mercury Street 
San Diego, CA  92111-1703 
(858) 492-2500