Title: Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. Self-Insuring Emp. Evaluation Bd.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. Self-Insuring Emp. Evaluation Bd., 94 Ohio St.3d 449, 2002-
Ohio-1362.] 
 
 
BALTIMORE RAVENS, INC., F.K.A. CLEVELAND BROWNS, INC., APPELLEE, v. 
SELF-INSURING EMPLOYERS EVALUATION BOARD ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. Self-Insuring Emp. Evaluation Bd. (2002), 
94 Ohio St.3d 449.] 
Workers’ compensation — Disciplinary orders issued by the Self-Insuring 
Employers Evaluation Board pursuant to R.C. 4123.352(C) are not 
subject to judicial review under R.C. 119.12 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
(No. 00-1744 — Submitted October 16, 2001 — Decided March 27, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 99AP-1262 and 
99AP-1263. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Disciplinary orders issued by the Self-Insuring Employers Evaluation Board 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.352(C) are not subject to judicial review under R.C. 
119.12 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  Appellants Ricky Bolden, Paul Farren, Mark 
Harper, Lee Jones, and Stacey Hairston were formerly employed as professional 
football players by appellee, Baltimore Ravens, Inc., and had played for appellee 
when it was doing business as the Cleveland Browns.  Each player filed a 
complaint with the Self-Insuring Division of the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation, alleging that the team had failed to pay workers’ compensation 
benefits as previously ordered by the Industrial Commission of Ohio.  The bureau 
found all five complaints valid and referred them to appellant, the Self-Insuring 
Employers Evaluation Board. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
After conducting an informal hearing, the board issued a comprehensive 
decision on March 10, 1999, addressing all five complaints.  The board found that 
the Ravens “consistently refused to pay workers’ compensation awards, acting in 
a manner inconsistent with its legal obligations.”  Based on what it described as 
the Ravens’ “blatant and defiant behavior,” the board recommended a fine of 
$10,000 on each complaint for a total fine of $50,000 to be paid to the bureau. 
 
The Ravens appealed this decision to the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12 of the Administrative Procedure Act.  
(Case No. 99CVF-03-2486.)  The Ravens alleged that the board had violated R.C. 
4123.352(C), 
which 
requires 
that 
the 
board’s 
determinations 
and 
recommendations for disciplining a self-insuring employer be made “after a 
hearing conducted pursuant to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code.” 
 
On April 29, 1999, the board filed a motion to dismiss the Ravens’ appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction.  The board argued that its March 10, 1999 decision is not 
appealable under R.C. 119.12 because the board is a part of the bureau and R.C. 
119.01(A) exempts the bureau’s adjudications from the appeal provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  Meanwhile, the board sought to correct the defect 
in its March 10 order by vacating that order and scheduling a new hearing to be 
held in compliance with R.C. 4123.352(C).  In an order dated May 27, 1999, the 
board explained that its “previous findings are being vacated and held for naught 
in order that a determination of this matter can be made at a record hearing held in 
accordance with Chapter 119 [of] the Revised Code.” 
 
On June 9, 1999, the trial court denied the board’s motion to dismiss.  
According to the trial court, “R.C. 4123.[3]52(A) specifically provides that the 
board is to be considered part of the Bureau only for administrative purposes such 
as the equipment, space, and personnel required by the board to function.”  Thus, 
the court denied the motion on the basis that the board is not part of the bureau 
“for the purposes of determining whether the provisions of R.C. 119.12 apply.” 
January Term, 2002 
3 
 
Nevertheless, the board proceeded to hold a new hearing on June 14, 
1999, and followed with a new order issued July 8, 1999, which is substantially 
the same as its March 10 order.  The Ravens then appealed the board’s July 8 
order, and the board moved to dismiss this appeal as well.  (Case No. 99CVF-07-
5896.) 
 
On September 8, 1999, the trial court, under case No. 99CVF-07-5896, 
denied the board’s motion to dismiss the Ravens’ second appeal for the same 
reasons that it denied the board’s motion to dismiss the Ravens’ first appeal.  On 
October 6, 1999, the trial court, under case No. 99CVF-03-2486, (1) held that the 
board’s actions leading to the second appeal were void, (2) found that the board 
should have conducted a hearing pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119 before issuing its 
March 10, 1999 order, and (3) remanded the cause to the board for such a hearing.  
Also on October 6, 1999, the trial court dismissed case No. 99CVF-07-5896 on 
the basis that its decision in the other case “obviates the reason for and is 
dispositive of this matter.” 
 
The board appealed both cases to the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County.  In a divided opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the judgments of the 
trial court.  In so doing, the court found as follows: 
 
“We agree with the Ravens that, although linked to the bureau of workers’ 
compensation for administrative purposes, SIEEB is an independent quasi-judicial 
agency created by statute and not under the control of the bureau of workers’ 
compensation for adjudicatory purposes.  Although the administrator refers 
complaints to SIEEB, it is SIEEB, not the administrator or the bureau, that has 
jurisdiction to investigate, make findings, and order that corrective action or 
discipline be imposed by the administrator.  Nothing in the statute permits the 
administrator to contravene any finding or determination that SIEEB makes.  
Even though discipline recommended by SIEEB is to be imposed by the 
administrator, the act of imposing such discipline is ministerial in nature because 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
R.C. 4123.35.2(C) precludes him from exercising any discretion in this regard.  
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that it had jurisdiction to hear the Ravens’ 
appeal from the March 10, 1999 order of SIEEB.” 
 
The court of appeals also found that “the actions taken by SIEEB at the 
June 14, 1999 hearing are of no effect.”  The court explained, “When a notice of 
appeal from a decision of an administrative agency has been filed, the agency is 
divested of its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider, modify, or vacate the decision.”  
Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the cause to the board “for a new 
hearing conducted in accordance with R.C. Chapter 119 as the original hearing 
was not conducted in accordance with R.C. Chapter 119 and the second hearing 
was a nullity.”  The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
Despite its disordered procedural history, this case presents two 
straightforward jurisdictional questions for our review.  The first and primary 
issue involves the trial court’s jurisdiction over the Ravens’ appeals from the 
board’s March 10 and July 8, 1999 decisions.  More precisely, we are asked to 
decide whether the board’s recommendations for disciplining a self-insured 
employer under R.C. 4123.352 are subject to judicial review under R.C. 119.12 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 
 
The second issue involves the board’s jurisdiction to revisit matters that 
are the subject of a pending appeal, that is, whether the board was divested of 
jurisdiction to vacate and attempt to remedy the alleged defect in its March 10 
decision while the Ravens’ appeal of that decision was pending before the trial 
court. 
I 
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court 
 
The asserted basis for the trial court’s jurisdiction is the residual clause in 
R.C. 119.12, which provides:  “Any party adversely affected by any order of an 
January Term, 2002 
5 
agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication may appeal to the court of 
common pleas of Franklin county * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Everyone agrees 
that the board’s March 10, 1999 decision constitutes an order issued pursuant to 
an “adjudication,” as that term is defined in R.C. 119.01(D).  The dispute in this 
case revolves around the definition of “agency” in R.C. 119.01(A). 
 
R.C. 119.01(A) provides that, as used in R.C. 119.01 to 119.13: 
 
“ ‘Agency’ means, except as limited by this division, [1] any * * * board * 
* * having authority to promulgate rules or make adjudications in * * * the bureau 
of workers’ compensation, [2] the functions of any administrative * * * board * * 
* of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 
119.13 of the Revised Code, and [3] the licensing functions of any administrative 
* * * board * * * of the government of the state having the authority or 
responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling licenses.” 
 
R.C. 119.01(A) then sets forth a series of exclusions and limitations, 
including the following: 
 
“Sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to actions of 
* * * the bureau of workers’ compensation under sections 4123.01 to 4123.94 of 
the Revised Code with respect to all matters of adjudication * * *.” 
 
Thus, the board will be deemed an agency under R.C. 119.01(A) if it is 
described by one or more of the three branches of the definition of “agency” and 
not otherwise excluded.  The courts below focused their analyses entirely on the 
exclusion for adjudications by the bureau.  They found that the board, as 
established by R.C. 4123.352, is separate and independent from the bureau and, 
therefore, beyond the purview of this exclusion.  However, they never determined 
which, if any, of the three branches of the definition in R.C. 119.01(A) applies in 
the first instance to render the board an agency.  Instead, their decisions seem to 
rest on the assumption that the board would be an agency under R.C. 119.01(A) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
so long as none of the specific exclusions was applicable.  We disagree, on two 
levels. 
 
First, we find that the board is a part of the bureau for purposes of R.C. 
119.01(A).  In so doing, we acknowledge that certain aspects of the enabling 
legislation for the board, if viewed in isolation, could appear to support the 
autonomy of the board.  Particularly, R.C. 4123.352(A) creates the board to 
consist of three members, who are appointed and/or subject to removal by the 
Governor, and R.C. 4123.352(C) requires the Administrator of Workers’ 
Compensation to promptly and fully implement the board’s recommendations for 
disciplining a self-insuring employer.  When considering the totality of the 
statutory scheme, however, it becomes apparent that these isolated indicia of 
separateness do not truly reflect the board’s essential character and function vis-à-
vis the bureau. 
 
After creating the board and establishing the terms of its members, R.C. 
4123.352 provides: 
 
“(A) * * * 
 
“For administrative purposes, the board is a part of the bureau of workers’ 
compensation, and the bureau shall furnish the board with necessary office space, 
staff, and supplies.  The board shall meet as required by the administrator of 
workers’ compensation. 
 
“(B) In addition to the grounds listed in section 4123.35 of the Revised 
Code pertaining to criteria for being granted the status as a self-insuring 
employer, the grounds upon which the administrator may revoke or refuse to 
renew the status includes [sic] failure to comply with any rules or orders of the 
administrator or to pay contributions to the self-insuring employers’ guaranty 
fund established by section 4123.351 of the Revised Code, continued failure to 
file medical reports bearing upon the injury of the claimant, and failure to pay 
compensation or benefits in accordance with law in a timely manner.  A 
January Term, 2002 
7 
deficiency in any of the grounds listed in this division is sufficient to justify the 
administrator’s revocation or refusal to renew the employer’s status as a self-
insuring employer.  The administrator need not revoke or refuse to renew an 
employer’s status as a self-insuring employer if adequate corrective action is 
taken by the employer pursuant to division (C) of this section. 
 
“(C) The administrator shall refer to the board all complaints or 
allegations of misconduct against a self-insuring employer or questions as to 
whether a self-insuring employer continues to meet minimum standards.  The 
board shall investigate and may order the employer to take corrective action in 
accordance with the schedule the board fixes.  The board’s determination in this 
regard need not be made by formal hearing but shall be issued in written form and 
contain the signature of at least two board members.  If the board determines, 
after a hearing conducted pursuant to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code and the 
rules of the bureau, that the employer has failed to correct the deficiencies within 
the time fixed by the board or is otherwise in violation of this chapter, the board 
shall recommend to the administrator revocation of an employer’s status as a self-
insuring employer or such other penalty which may include, but is not limited to, 
probation, or a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars for each failure.  A 
board recommendation to revoke an employer’s status as a self-insuring employer 
shall be by unanimous vote.  A recommendation for any other penalty shall be by 
majority vote.  Where the board makes recommendations to the administrator for 
disciplining a self-insuring employer, the administrator promptly and fully shall 
implement the recommendations.” 
 
As established under R.C. 4123.352, the board is not self-sustaining or 
self-governing.  It is not charged with administering or implementing any 
legislation, does not have its own staff or agenda, and does not promulgate any 
rules or regulations.  The board is devoid of power to execute or enforce its own 
recommendations and cannot autonomously impose a penalty, revoke or refuse to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
renew a self-insurer’s status, or otherwise take disciplinary action against a self-
insuring employer.  Only the administrator has the statutory authority to take such 
action.  Indeed, the power given to the administrator under R.C. 4123.352 is 
correlative to that given under R.C. 4123.35, which vests the administrator with 
the exclusive authority to grant or deny the privilege of self-insurance in the first 
instance.  The board meets only as required by the administrator, who makes the 
initial determination of whether a complaint is valid and should be referred to the 
board.  See Ohio Adm.Code 4123-9-06(A)(3), 4123-19-09(A), (B), and (D), and 
4123-19-13(B).  The board is dependent upon the bureau for office space, staff, 
and supplies, and is subject to those administrative rules that the bureau 
promulgates for the board pursuant to R.C. 119.03.  Rather than being a separate 
and independent agency under R.C. 4123.352, the board is inextricably entangled 
with and dependent upon the bureau. 
 
In addition, R.C. 4123.352(A) expressly provides, “For administrative 
purposes, the board is a part of the bureau of workers’ compensation.”  However, 
the Ravens contend that the reference to “administrative purposes” in this 
provision is “limiting language.”  Invoking the ancient maxim of statutory 
interpretation “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” meaning that the expression 
of one thing is the exclusion of another, the Ravens construe this language as 
implying that the board is independent from the bureau for all but administrative 
purposes.  Similarly, the trial court found that R.C. 4123.352(A) “specifically 
provides that the board is to be considered part of the Bureau only for 
administrative purposes.”  (Emphasis added.)  And amicus curiae, General 
Motors Corporation, actually inserts and italicizes the word “only” in its quotation 
of R.C. 4123.352(A). 
 
Of course, R.C. 4123.352(A) does not contain the word “only” or any 
other indication that the phrase “administrative purposes” was intended to restrict 
the board’s connection to the bureau.  In any case, this court has long recognized 
January Term, 2002 
9 
that the canon “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is not an interpretive 
singularity but merely an aid to statutory construction, which must yield whenever 
a contrary legislative intent is apparent.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Jackman v. Court 
of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cty. (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 164, 38 O.O.2d 
404, 407, 224 N.E.2d 906, 910; Smilack v. Bowers (1958), 167 Ohio St. 216, 218-
219, 4 O.O.2d 271, 273, 147 N.E.2d 499, 501; State ex rel. Curtis v. DeCorps 
(1938), 134 Ohio St. 295, 12 O.O. 96, 16 N.E.2d 459; State v. Cleveland (1910), 
83 Ohio St. 61, 67, 93 N.E. 467, 468. 
 
In Sec. & Exchange Comm. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. (1943), 320 U.S. 
344, 350-351, 64 S.Ct. 120, 123, 88 L.Ed. 88, 93, the United States Supreme 
Court declined to invoke the canon, explaining as follows: 
 
“Some rules of statutory construction come down to us from sources that 
were hostile toward the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to 
restrict the operation of an act to its narrowest permissible compass.  However 
well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they 
long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of 
an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the 
light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly 
permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative 
policy.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  See, also, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 
(1983), 459 U.S. 375, 387, 103 S.Ct. 683, 690, 74 L.Ed.2d 548, 558, fn. 23. 
 
Accordingly, we interpret the phrase “administrative purposes” in R.C. 
4123.352(A) to comport with the statute’s overriding design, which is to place the 
board under the aegis of the bureau.  In this light, the phrase “For administrative 
purposes” appears not to limit the relationship between the board and the bureau, 
but merely to designate the administrative agency to which the board belongs.  It 
is simply an indication that the board is a part of the bureau rather than a part of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
the Industrial Commission, one of whose members serves, ex officio, as chairman 
of the board. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the board is a part of the bureau for purposes 
of R.C. 119.01(A), that the exclusion for adjudications by the bureau is applicable 
to the board, and that the board’s adjudications are generally exempt from the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, including those in R.C. 119.12 
governing the right of appeal to common pleas court. 
 
On a more basic level, we find that even if the board were distinct from 
the bureau for purposes of R.C. 119.01(A), as held below, it would still lack the 
status of an agency subject to R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of judicial review. 
 
The courts below carried their analyses only so far as to conclude that the 
board is not expressly excluded from the definition of agency set forth in R.C. 
119.01(A).  But at some point, they should have determined whether and to what 
extent the board is included in the statutory definition.  If the board is not a part of 
the bureau under R.C. 119.01(A), as held below, then of course the exclusion for 
bureau adjudications is not applicable to the board.  By the same token, however, 
it can no longer be concluded that the board is an agency by virtue of being “in * 
* * the bureau” under the first branch of R.C. 119.01(A)’s definition of “agency.”  
The only remaining definition that is potentially applicable includes “the 
functions of any * * * board * * * specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 
119.13 of the Revised Code.”  The courts below should have been compelled by 
their own view of the board’s independence to consider whether and to what 
extent the board is specifically made subject to R.C. Chapter 119 in the enabling 
legislation.  Having failed to address this aspect of the issue, those courts rendered 
incomplete analyses. 
 
R.C. 4123.352(C) authorizes the board to make recommendations to the 
administrator for disciplining a self-insuring employer “after a hearing conducted 
pursuant to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  According to 
January Term, 2002 
11 
amicus curiae General Motors, “the reference in R.C. § 4123.352(C) to a 
‘Hearing’ incorporates and includes not only the board’s hearing room 
adjudicatory procedure but also the APA provided judicial review of it.”  The 
Ravens argue that any other interpretation would be inconsistent with R.C. 
119.01(E), which defines “hearing” as “a public hearing by any agency in 
compliance with procedural safeguards afforded by sections 119.01 to 119.13 of 
the Revised Code.” 
 
On the other hand, the board argues that in providing for a hearing 
conducted pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119, the General Assembly “did not likewise 
provide that an ‘appeal’ pursuant to that Chapter would follow. * * * Had our 
lawmakers intended to provide for such review of the SIEEB’s orders, they could 
easily have done so. * * * Instead, the legislature clearly expressed its intent by 
specifying that only the ‘hearing’ was subject to Chapter 119.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
We agree with the board. 
 
R.C. 4123.352(C) does not incorporate R.C. Chapter 119 for all purposes.  
In requiring the board to make its recommendations to the administrator after a 
hearing conducted pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119, R.C. 4123.352(C) establishes 
the procedure leading up to the board’s decision.  In so doing, the statute 
incorporates R.C. Chapter 119 for the purpose of delineating the guidelines that 
govern the board’s actions on a predecisional administrative level.  It does not, 
however, incorporate R.C. Chapter 119 into the process at the postadjudicatory 
level.  Instead, the statute directs the administrator to promptly and fully 
implement the board’s recommendations, without providing for any intervening 
appeal.  R.C. 4123.352(C) simply requires the board to conduct a hearing 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119 before it makes any disciplinary recommendations 
to the administrator.  It does not subject the board to R.C. Chapter 119 for all 
purposes, and certainly not for purposes of judicial review. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
This is not the first time that the court has encountered legislation that 
incorporates R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes other than judicial review.  R.C. 
Chapter 4112 is the enabling legislation for the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.  
Former R.C. 4112.05(G) provided that if the commission determines from 
evidence presented at hearing that an unlawful discriminatory practice has been 
committed, it “shall issue and, subject to the provisions of Chapter 119. of the 
Revised Code, cause to be served on such respondent an order.”  138 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, 2281. 
 
In addition, former R.C. 4112.05(I) provided: 
 
“Until a transcript of the record in a case is filed in a court as provided in 
section 4112.06 of the Revised Code, the commission may, subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 119. of the Revised Code, * * * modify or set aside in 
whole or in part, any finding or order made by it.”  138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2282. 
 
Yet despite these references to R.C. Chapter 119, this court held that the 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission is not subject to the thirty-day record-certification 
requirement of R.C. 119.12 because the enabling legislation did not specifically 
make the commission subject to R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of judicial review.  
In Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights 
Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 194, 20 O.O.3d 200, 201, 421 N.E.2d 128, 
130, the court explained: 
 
“Reading R.C. Chapters 119 and 4112 together leads to an incongruous 
result.  A literal reading of the statutory language reveals that the commission is 
an agency specifically subject to R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of R.C. 
4112.05(G) and (I).  Under R.C. 4112.06, however, the commission is not an 
agency because judicial review of commission proceedings is not specifically 
made subject to R.C. Chapter 119.  We are constrained to hold that the 
commission’s administrative split personality represents the intent of the General 
Assembly.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the 
January Term, 2002 
13 
commission is an agency subject to R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of judicial 
review.” 
 
A consideration of former R.C. 4121.44 is also instructive.  Former R.C. 
4121.44(Q) (143 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3294-3297) was effective from November 3, 
1989, until October 20, 1993, when R.C. 4121.44 was repealed and replaced by 
the provisions governing the newly established qualified health plan and health 
care partnership program, R.C. 4121.44 to 4121.443.  Former R.C. 4121.44(Q) 
required the administrator to adopt rules for excluding from the system health care 
providers who engage in certain practices as part of the treatment of workers’ 
compensation claimants.  Former R.C. 4121.44(Q) expressly provided that these 
rules “shall provide procedures for review and appeal, pursuant to Chapter 119. 
of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In In re Seltzer (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 220, 616 N.E.2d 1108, the court 
held that the administrator’s orders under former R.C. 4121.44(R) are not subject 
to judicial review under R.C. Chapter 119.  In so holding, the court explained: 
 
“Under division (Q), the General Assembly specifically included a right to 
review and appeal in compliance with R.C. Chapter 119.  The General Assembly 
did not include this appeal provision in division (R). * * * This comparison of the 
language in divisions (Q) and (R) leads us to conclude that the General Assembly 
did not intend to allow orders issued under R.C. Chapter 4121.44(R) to be 
appealed under R.C. Chapter 119.”  Id., 67 Ohio St.3d at 223, 616 N.E.2d at 1111. 
 
These principles were also recognized by the federal district court in 
Lexington Supermarket, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture (S.D.Ohio 
1999), 84 F.Supp.2d 886.  The court held that the decisions of the Ohio 
Department of Health disqualifying or suspending a vendor from the Women, 
Infants and Children’s Program are not subject to judicial review under R.C. 
119.12.  Recognizing that “a state agency could be subject to Ohio Rev.Code Ch. 
119 for some purposes but not for others,” the court explained: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
“Similar to Chapter 4112, the statute authorizing the Ohio Department of 
Health to administer the WIC program subjects the ODH to Chapter 119 for some 
purposes but not for others.  Ohio Rev.Code § 3701.132 specifies that any 
rulemaking in which ODH may engage to effectuate the WIC program must be 
conducted pursuant to Chapter 119.  There is no other reference to Chapter 119, 
and the statute does not provide a right of judicial review, pursuant to Ohio 
Rev.Code § 119.12.  The reference to the ODH as a ‘state agency,’ without a 
specific reference to Chapter 119, is insufficient to subject the ODH to that 
Chapter for every action it takes while administering the WIC program.  
Accordingly, although § 3701.132 provides that ODH is subject to Ohio 
Rev.Code Ch. 119 to the extent it engages in rulemaking for the WIC program, 
the Court concludes that § 3701.132 does not subject ODH to § 119.12 for 
purposes of a WIC vendor’s right to appeal.”  Id., 84 F.Supp.2d at 890. 
 
The dissent argues that “[n]one of the three cases the majority cites, 
however, supports its analysis because each concerned a dissimilar statutory 
scheme.”  The dissent then attempts to distinguish each statute in accordance with 
its underlying theme that R.C. 4123.352(C) incorporates the entirety of R.C. 
Chapter 119. 
 
The dissimilarities in the statutory schemes to which the dissent refers, 
however, are distinctions without a difference for purposes of the present analysis.  
The critical similarity between R.C. 4123.352(C) and the statutes under review in 
Plumbers & Steamfitters and Lexington Supermarket is that they all contain a 
qualified incorporation of R.C. Chapter 119 and, therefore, do not incorporate the 
entirety of R.C. Chapter 119.  What the dissent ignores is that R.C. 4123.352(C), 
like those other statutes, incorporates R.C. Chapter 119 for a limited purpose.  
Instead, the dissent simply overlooks the fact that R.C. 4123.352(C) incorporates 
R.C. Chapter 119 specifically for the purpose of conducting a hearing that takes 
place before an adjudication is made by an advisory board under a scheme that 
January Term, 2002 
15 
directs the administrator to implement the board’s recommendations without 
providing for any intervening judicial review. 
 
On the other hand, it appears that where the General Assembly does intend 
to make an agency’s adjudications appealable under R.C. Chapter 119, it will 
either specifically provide for such an appeal, as it did in former R.C. 4121.44(Q), 
or incorporate R.C. Chapter 119 into the enabling legislation without 
qualification.  R.C. 3301.13 is an example of an unqualified incorporation of R.C. 
Chapter 119.  It provides: 
 
“In the exercise of any of its functions or powers, including the power to 
make rules and regulations and to prescribe minimum standards the department of 
education, and any officer or agency therein, shall be subject to Chapter 119. of 
the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Based on all of the foregoing, we hold that disciplinary orders issued by 
the Self-Insuring Employers Evaluation Board pursuant to R.C. 4123.352(C) are 
not subject to judicial review under R.C. 119.12 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. 
 
Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Ravens’ appeals 
from the board’s March 10 and July 8, 1999 decisions, and the judgment of the 
court of appeals is reversed as to this issue. 
II 
Jurisdiction of the Board 
 
It is well established that in the absence of express statutory authority to 
the contrary, once a decision of an administrative board is appealed to court, the 
board is divested of its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider, vacate, or modify that 
decision.  See Lorain Edn. Assn. v. Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1989), 
46 Ohio St.3d 12, 544 N.E.2d 687; Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 28 OBR 83, 502 N.E.2d 590; State ex rel. Republic 
Steel Corp. v. Environmental Bd. of Rev. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 75, 80, 8 O.O.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
79, 82, 374 N.E.2d 1355, 1358.  Even if the court itself lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the cause, the board still has no power to relitigate the disputed 
issues during the pendency of the appeal.  State ex rel. Borsuk v. Cleveland 
(1972), 28 Ohio St.2d 224, 227-228, 57 O.O.2d 464, 466, 277 N.E.2d 419, 421; 
Diltz v. Crouch (1962), 173 Ohio St. 367, 19 O.O.2d 312, 182 N.E.2d 315. 
 
Once the Ravens filed its appeal from the board’s March 10, 1999 order, 
the board was divested of jurisdiction to vacate that order, hold a new formal 
hearing on June 14, 1999, and issue a second order on July 8, 1999.  Since these 
actions took place while the Ravens’ appeal was pending, they are of no force or 
effect.  Thus, the trial court correctly determined that the board’s postappeal 
actions are a nullity. 
 
However, the trial court did not vacate the board’s postappeal actions 
solely to render them ineffective.  Instead, the trial court found that because the 
board had no jurisdiction to take those actions, it failed to remedy the defect in its 
March 10 order.  Having found the deficiency still remaining, the court ordered 
the board to vacate its March 10 order and conduct a new hearing pursuant to 
R.C. Chapter 119.  As this order goes to the merits of the appeal, it required the 
trial court to exercise the very jurisdiction it lacks.  Thus, we find that although 
the trial court correctly nullified the board’s postappeal actions, it nevertheless 
lacked the power to remand the cause for a new hearing.  While the Ravens may 
indeed be entitled to a new hearing conducted pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119, as 
everyone seems to agree it is, the appropriate proceeding in which to obtain such 
relief would be an action in mandamus. 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the trial court to enter the appropriate dismissal. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
January Term, 2002 
17 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  The majority holds that because the board is a part 
of the bureau, and because it is not an agency, there is no right to appeal board 
disciplinary recommendations to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.  But 
by analyzing the text of the statute creating the board and the text of the 
administrative procedure statutes that are expressly incorporated into the board 
statutory scheme, I conclude that the majority’s holding is incorrect.1 
R.C. 4123.352 Incorporates R.C. Chapter 119 
 
The statute creating the board is the starting point for deciding the 
question regarding appealability of board orders.  That statute, R.C. 4123.352, 
provides that if the board opts to pursue imposition of a penalty, as the board did 
here, then the board must conduct the required formal hearing “pursuant to 
Chapter 119. of the Revised Code and the rules of the bureau.”  Notably, the 
General Assembly referred to the entirety of R.C. Chapter 119 and not just select 
provisions.  Included within that chapter is R.C. 119.01(E), which defines a 
“hearing” (as that word is used in R.C. Chapter 119, and therefore by 
incorporation in R.C. 4123.352’s “formal hearing” provision) as “a public hearing 
by any agency in compliance with procedural safeguards afforded by sections 
119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code.”  By this reading of R.C. 4123.352 and 
119.01(E), a “hearing” conducted pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119 encompasses the 
“procedural safeguard” of R.C. 119.12—the right to appeal agency adjudications. 
 
R.C. 119.12 provides a general right to appeal “any order of an agency 
issued pursuant to * * * [an] adjudication.”  Thus, assuming that the board is an 
                                                          
 
1. 
I express no opinion on whether board orders of corrective action that do not 
arise from formal hearings are appealable.  See R.C. 4123.352(C). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
“agency” and its decision can be shown to be an “adjudication,” it would seem 
that the Ravens ought to be able to appeal the board’s disciplinary 
recommendations.  But the definitions section of R.C. Chapter 119 further limits 
the applicability of this right of appeal: 
 
“Sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to actions of 
the industrial commission or the bureau of workers’ compensation under sections 
4123.01 to 4123.94 of the Revised Code with respect to all matters of 
adjudication * * *.”  R.C. 119.01(A). 
 
This case, then, turns on three interrelated questions.  The first two 
questions target whether the R.C. 119.12 right to appeal can apply here: (1) is the 
board an agency, and (2) does board action constitute an “adjudication”?  The 
third question targets whether the R.C. 119.01(A) exclusion applies to the board: 
(3) is the board distinct from the bureau so that its actions are not “actions * * * of 
the bureau,” which are removed from the purview of R.C. Chapter 119 and its 
appeal provision?  If the answer to all three questions is yes, then there is a right 
of appeal.  If the answer to any question is no, then a party may not challenge 
board decisions by way of appeal to court. 
The Board Satisfies the Statutory Definition of an Agency 
 
As the majority notes, R.C. 119.01(A) defines “agency” in three ways.  
The second—”the functions of any administrative or executive * * * board * * * 
specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code”—on 
its face encompasses the board’s disciplinary functions.  R.C. 4123.352(C) 
specifically makes the board subject to R.C. Chapter 119 in disciplinary 
proceedings.  Because R.C. Chapter 119 consists of “sections 119.01 to 119.13 of 
the Revised Code,” the board is therefore an agency within the meaning of R.C. 
119.01(A). 
 
The board’s disciplinary recommendations thus meet the first of the two 
qualifiers for R.C. 119.12’s right to appeal “any order of an agency issued 
January Term, 2002 
19 
pursuant to any other adjudication * * * to the court of common pleas of Franklin 
county.”  (Emphasis added.) 
Board Action Constitutes an Adjudication 
 
The next question is whether a board disciplinary recommendation 
constitutes an “adjudication” as contemplated in the second qualifier of R.C. 
119.12.  If it does not, then there cannot be an R.C. 119.12 right of appeal.  
Because the majority finds the agency qualifier dispositive, the majority concedes 
the adjudication issue, noting only that “[e]veryone agrees that the board’s March 
10, 1999 decision constitutes an order issued pursuant to an ‘adjudication,’ as that 
term is defined in R.C. 119.01(D).” 
 
R.C. 119.01(D) defines an “adjudication” as  “the determination by the 
highest or ultimate authority of an agency of the rights, duties, privileges, 
benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person, but does not include * * * 
acts of a ministerial nature.”  Here, the board consists of three members whom the 
statute charges with investigating “all complaints or allegations of misconduct 
against a self-insuring employer or questions as to whether a self-insuring 
employer continues to meet minimum standards.”  R.C. 4123.352(A) and (C).  
The board then may issue disciplinary recommendations to the bureau 
administrator, who “promptly and fully shall implement the recommendation.”  
R.C. 4123.352(C). 
 
Board action satisfies the three foregoing requirements to constitute an 
R.C. Chapter 119 adjudication.  First, the three board members are the “highest or 
ultimate authority” of the board, an agency.  Second, they determine the rights, 
duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person.  Because 
R.C. 119.01(D) does not define “person,” the default definition of the term 
applies: “ ‘Person’ includes an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, 
partnership, and association.”  R.C. 1.59(C) (providing definitions “used in any 
statute, unless another definition is provided in such statute or a related statute”).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Here, the board determines the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal 
relationships of the five former football players and the Ravens.  Third, the 
board’s actions are not ministerial in nature.  Although the General Assembly 
does not define “ministerial” in R.C. Chapter 119, the legislature has directed that 
courts shall construe statutory words and phrases in context and according to 
common usage, unless the words have acquired a technical or particular meaning.  
R.C. 1.42.  The common definition of “ministerial” is “[o]f or relating to an act 
that involves obedience to instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment, or 
skill.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 1011.  Cf. State ex rel. Trauger v. 
Nash (1902), 66 Ohio St. 612, 618, 64 N.E. 558.  Although the fact that the board 
recommends penalties might suggest that its determinations are not adjudications, 
the board’s penalty recommendations bind the bureau administrator in that the 
administrator lacks discretion to vary from the recommendations in implementing 
them.  R.C. 4123.352(C).  It is the board that the General Assembly charges with 
exercising decision-making and discretion. 
 
For these reasons, board disciplinary recommendations constitute agency 
adjudications within the meaning of R.C. 119.01(D) and 119.12.  This means that 
there is a right to appeal such determinations, unless board action constitutes 
bureau action that is exempted from R.C. Chapter 119 treatment. 
Board Action Is Not Bureau Action 
 
The remaining question is whether, even if the board is an agency making 
adjudications, the board is so intertwined with the bureau as to constitute a part of 
the bureau.  If the board were part of the bureau so that board actions are “actions 
of the * * * bureau,” then the majority would be correct in concluding that the 
R.C. 119.12 right of appeal does not apply to the board.  In fact, if the board is 
part of the bureau, no provision of R.C. Chapter 119 could apply to the board, 
save for the R.C. 119.01(A) exclusion. 
January Term, 2002 
21 
 
But two basic reasons establish that, despite their interrelationship, the 
board is a separate entity from the bureau. 
 
The first reason is that one cannot reconcile the statutory schemes of R.C. 
Chapter 4123 and Chapter 119 if board action constitutes bureau action.  If the 
board is part of the bureau, R.C. 4123.352’s incorporation of R.C. Chapter 119 
directly conflicts with R.C. 119.01(A)’s exclusion of R.C. Chapter 119.  That is, 
R.C. 4123.352(C) would refer parties to R.C. Chapter 119 for controlling 
authority regarding the board’s formal hearings, only to be met with the obstacle 
of R.C. 119.01(A) foreclosing that chapter’s application to R.C. 4123.352(C) 
formal hearings.  But it is presumed that, in enacting a statute, the General 
Assembly intended a result feasible of execution.  R.C. 1.47(D).  Thus, construing 
R.C. 4123.352 and 119.01 in pari materia, the only reading that supports 
cohesive, feasible operation is the one that establishes the board as separate from 
the bureau, thereby obviating the R.C. 119.01(A) obstacle to the R.C. 119.12 right 
to appeal.  Cf. Blackwell v. Bowman (1948), 150 Ohio St. 34, 43-44, 37 O.O. 323, 
80 N.E.2d 493 (“It is a fundamental rule in construing a statute that all parts of it 
must be construed together and any apparent contradictions reconciled, if 
possible”). 
 
The majority’s exegesis also runs afoul of the R.C. 1.47(B) presumption 
that “[t]he entire statute is intended to be effective,” because it nullifies R.C. 
4123.352(C)’s incorporation of the entirety of R.C. Chapter 119 despite the plain 
language calling for such  incorporation. 
 
Today’s majority concludes that R.C. 4123.352(C) “incorporates R.C. 
Chapter 119 for the purpose of delineating the guidelines that govern the board’s 
actions on a predecisional administrative level.  It does not, however, incorporate 
R.C. Chapter 119 into the process at the postadjudicatory level.”  Its holding, 
then, is that the unambiguous text “Sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code 
do not apply to actions of the industrial commission or the bureau of workers’ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
compensation under sections 4123.01 to 4123.94 of the Revised Code with 
respect to all matters of adjudication * * *” actually means that some of the 
sections nevertheless still apply to board/bureau action.  And when the General 
Assembly used inclusive language in R.C. 119.01(E) in defining a hearing as “a 
public hearing by any agency in compliance with procedural safeguards afforded 
by sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code,” it was nevertheless excluding 
R.C. 119.12 when the board is involved.  Neither proposition finds support in the 
text of the statutes or in our rules of statutory construction. 
 
As support for its construction of the statutory scheme, the majority cites a 
number of cases as standing for the proposition that “[t]his is not the first time 
that the court has encountered legislation that incorporates R.C. Chapter 119 for 
purposes other than judicial review.”  I agree with this statement.  None of the 
three cases the majority cites, however, supports its analysis because each 
concerned a dissimilar statutory scheme. 
 
The majority first cites Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship 
Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 20 O.O.3d 200, 
421 N.E.2d 128, as supporting its holding.  I agree that this case supports the 
proposition that the General Assembly can incorporate portions of R.C. Chapter 
119 without incorporating the R.C. 119.12 right to judicial review.  But the 
important distinction between R.C. Chapter 4112 and the present case is that R.C. 
4112.06 itself specifically provided for judicial review of commission orders.  
Here, R.C. Chapter 4123 contains no such provision; rather, R.C. 4123.352(C) 
incorporates the entirety of R.C. Chapter 119, including the appellate mechanism.  
Similarly, In re Seltzer (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 220, 616 N.E.2d 1108, fails to 
inform the present inquiry.  There, the court addressed whether orders issued by 
the bureau administrator under R.C. 4121.44(R) were subject to review under 
R.C. Chapter 119.  Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the case, the fact 
that R.C. 4121.44(Q) contained a specific right of appeal under R.C. Chapter 119 
January Term, 2002 
23 
that R.C. 4121.44(R) lacked is not the dispositive factor.  Rather, the court held 
that because “the administrator’s decision to suspend a provider under R.C. 
4121.44(R) is a ministerial act, * * * such a decision is not an ‘adjudication’ as 
defined in R.C. 119.01(D).”  Id. at 225, 616 N.E.2d 1108.  And because R.C. 
119.12 provides for appeals of agency orders issued pursuant to adjudications, the 
court correctly determined that there was no right to appeal.  Id.  This contrasts 
with the present case, which all parties agree involves adjudications. 
 
The majority’s reliance on Lexington Supermarket, Inc. v. United States 
Dept. of Agriculture (S.D.Ohio 1999), 84 F.Supp.2d 886, is equally unpersuasive.  
There, as the majority notes, the federal district court determined that vendors 
could not appeal decisions of the Ohio Department of Health under R.C. 119.12.  
But what the majority neglects to credit sufficiently is that the enabling statute in 
that case referred to R.C. Chapter 119 only for purposes of rulemaking; there was 
no direct or indirect incorporation of the R.C. 119.12 right to appeal 
adjudications.  See R.C. 3701.132.  In the instant case, however, R.C. 4123.352 
incorporates the entirety of R.C. Chapter 119—which includes both R.C. 119.12, 
which creates the right to appeal adjudications, and R.C. 119.01(E), which 
attaches this right to the definition of a hearing.  None of the cases cited by the 
majority therefore targets the precise statutory framework at issue here.  As such, 
they provide no substantive support for the majority’s reasoning.  The only 
reasonable construction of R.C. Chapter 119 and Chapter 4123 that supports the 
substance of the General Assembly’s enactments is one that provides for judicial 
review. 
 
The second reason compelling my dissent is that R.C. 4123.352(A) 
characterizes the board as distinct from the bureau for all but one limited purpose.  
That statute provides that “[f]or administrative purposes, the board is a part of the 
bureau of workers’ compensation, and the bureau shall furnish the board with 
necessary office space, staff, and supplies.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
4123.352(A).  The Ravens urge the court to construe this language in accordance 
with the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius—”to express or 
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other”—and find that the General 
Assembly has distinguished the board from the bureau for all purposes except for 
administrative purposes. 
 
I agree with this reasoning.  In so doing, I join the majority in appreciating 
that while this maxim may inform the court’s decision, the legal canon is not 
always controlling.  Here, however, I find the maxim applicable.  The General 
Assembly has enacted legislation in which the statutory detail—the 
“administrative purposes” provision—conforms with the dominating general 
purpose of the statutory scheme: to establish the board as an agency separate from 
the bureau. 
 
There exists further support for this position in R.C. 4123.352(A)’s 
mandate that “the bureau shall furnish the board with necessary office space, staff, 
and supplies.”  If the board were indeed a part of the bureau, the General 
Assembly would not have needed to set forth the necessity for supplying 
administrative support in R.C. 4123.352(A).  The predecessor of R.C. 
4121.121(B)(4) already required the bureau administrator to “[p]rovide offices, 
equipment, supplies, and other facilities for the bureau.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Former R.C. 4121.121(D), Sub.H.B. No. 201, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2362.  A 
court should construe a statute, if possible, so that “ ‘no clause, sentence, or word 
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ “  TRW Inc. v. Andrews (2001), 534 
U.S. 19, ___, 122 S.Ct. 441, 449, 151 L.Ed.2d 339, 350, quoting Duncan v. 
Walker (2001), 533 U.S. 167, ___, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2125, 150 L.Ed.2d 251, 259.  
See, also, Brown v. Martinelli (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 45, 50, 20 O.O.3d 38, 419 
N.E.2d 1081.  The majority’s reading of the “administrative purposes” language, 
however, renders that portion of R.C. 4123.352(A) wholly superfluous. 
January Term, 2002 
25 
 
The majority proffers an explanation for the statutory provision: that it 
serves “merely to designate the administrative agency to which the board belongs.  
It is simply an indication that the board is a part of the bureau rather than a part of 
the Industrial Commission.”  Yet the majority’s theory insufficiently addresses 
the question of why the General Assembly specified this linkage for 
administrative purposes, when it supposedly intended that the board and bureau 
were linked for all purposes.  Thus, while it is not itself dispositive, I find that the 
“administrative purposes” provision of R.C. 4123.352(A) is additional textual 
support for the view that the General Assembly intended that the board be distinct 
from the bureau for all but administrative purposes. 
Conclusion 
 
The statutory scheme set forth in R.C. Chapter 4123 and Chapter 119 
evinces legislative intent to establish the board as a separate agency from the 
bureau.  Accordingly, I would hold that Chapter 119, with its right to appeal to 
court, applies to board disciplinary recommendations.  And once a party appeals a 
board disciplinary recommendation, the board lacks jurisdiction to vacate that 
recommendation.  See Lorain Edn. Assn. v. Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 12, 544 N.E.2d 687, syllabus (“When a notice of appeal 
from a decision of an administrative agency has been filed, the agency is divested 
of its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider, vacate or modify the decision unless 
there is express statutory language to the contrary”). 
 
Because I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, I 
respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Dinn, Hochman, Potter & Levy, L.L.C., and Irwin J. Dinn, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Self-Insuring Employers Evaluation 
Board. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
Cornrich & Cornrich Co., L.P.A., and Neil Cornrich, for appellants Ricky 
Bolden, Paul Farren, Mark Harper, Lee Jones, and Stacey Hairston. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., F. Daniel Balmert and Deron A. 
Cook, urging affirmance for amicus curiae General Motors Corp. 
__________________