Title: AARON FLOOD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

AARON FLOOD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 167169 P.3d 538Case Number: 06-126 & 06-127Decided: 10/23/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
AARON 
FLOOD,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry 
Rogers, Interim State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Kirk Morgan, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty 
Director, PAP; Geoff Gunnerson, Student Director, PAP; Scott L. Mullins, Student 
Intern, PAP.  Argument 
by Mr. Mullins.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After 
conditionally pleading guilty to two controlled substances offenses, Mr. Flood 
challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
discovered during a search of the vehicle he was driving.  He maintains that he was detained in 
violation of his constitutional rights.  
Concluding the highway patrol trooper did not exceed the scope of 
permissible detention while issuing traffic tickets to him and his passenger, 
who was the owner of the car, and that the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
justify detaining Mr. Flood after the original purpose of the traffic stop had 
ended, we affirm.            

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Flood states 
a single issue on appeal:

 
 
            
Did the state trooper lack reasonable suspicion to detain appellant while 
he searched the car, without consent, and therefore did the district court err 
in denying appellant's motion to suppress?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issue as:

 
 
            
Did the district court err in finding that Trooper Chatfield was 
justified in extending the investigatory stop of appellant's vehicle based on 
the totality of the circumstances, including:  appellant's and his passenger's 
inconsistent accounts of their travel plans; the strong odor of cologne on them; 
and their inconsistent accounts involving their relationship to one another and 
to the young boy in the backseat?

 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      At 
approximately 1:00 p.m. on June 1, 2005, Mr. Flood was driving a car belonging 
to one of the passengers, Carroll Janis, east on Interstate 80 outside of 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper David Chatfield was patrolling the 
interstate with his drug detection dog and clocked Mr. Flood's car traveling 78 
miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone.  
He activated his lights and stopped Mr. Flood.  Trooper Chatfield exited his patrol car 
and spoke with Mr. Flood through the driver side window, requesting his driver's 
license, registration and proof of insurance.  Mr. Flood provided his driver's license 
and Mr. Janis stated that the car belonged to him and provided the registration, 
but stated that the car was not insured.  
While gathering this information, the trooper noticed a strong smell of 
cologne or patchouli oil emanating from the car.    

 
 
[¶4]      Trooper Chatfield 
asked Mr. Flood to accompany him back to his patrol car.  As he wrote out a warning for speeding, 
the trooper noted a strong cologne smell coming from Mr. Flood.  Trooper Chatfield asked Mr. Flood about 
his travel plans, and he responded that he, Mr. Janis and a boy who was sitting 
in the back seat had left Scottsbluff, Nebraska that morning and traveled to 
Cheyenne to visit one of Mr. Flood's family members.  He stated that the family member had to 
go to work, so they were returning to Scottsbluff.  The trooper asked about Mr. Flood's 
relationship to Mr. Janis and the boy.  
Mr. Flood stated he was not related to Mr. Janis but they were good 
friends, and the boy was his twelve year old nephew.  The trooper gave Mr. Flood the warning 
and returned his documentation.  

 
 
[¶5]      Trooper Chatfield 
then approached Mr. Janis and asked him to come back to the patrol car.  While preparing a ticket for lack of 
insurance, he asked Mr. Janis about their trip.  Mr. Janis stated that the three 
occupants of the car had driven to Cheyenne the previous afternoon, spent the 
night there, and were returning to Scottsbluff.  He also stated that he was not related 
to Mr. Flood, but the boy in the backseat was his grandson.  Like Mr. Flood, Mr. Janis smelled 
strongly of cologne or patchouli oil.    

 
 
[¶6]      Trooper Chatfield 
gave Mr. Janis the citation for lack of insurance, returned the documents he had 
supplied and told him he was free to leave.  As Mr. Janis was walking back to his 
car, the trooper exited the patrol car and asked if he could ask him some more 
questions.  Mr. Janis agreed, and 
the trooper inquired whether there was anything illegal, such as guns or drugs, 
in the car.  Mr. Janis denied having 
any contraband in the car, and the trooper asked if he could search the 
car.  Mr. Janis did not respond 
verbally to the trooper's request, but leaned into the car and, apparently, told 
Mr. Flood to open the trunk.  The 
trooper could see a blanket covering a ball-shaped object in the trunk.  Trooper Chatfield again asked if he 
could search the car, to which Mr. Janis responded that they needed to "get 
going."  Taking this as a negative 
response, Trooper Chatfield stated that he intended to have his drug dog sniff 
the exterior of the car.    

 
 
[¶7]      Trooper Chatfield 
had all three occupants of the car get out and stand in the ditch next to the 
roadway.  He then turned his drug 
dog loose and the dog alerted, indicating he detected the odor of illegal 
drugs.  Trooper Chatfield searched 
the car and discovered approximately two pounds of marijuana in the trunk and 
approximately one ounce of cocaine in the glove box.  Mr. Flood was arrested and charged with 
four felony counts in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i), (ii) and 
(c)(ii), (iii) (LexisNexis 2007):  
possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, 
possession of marijuana, and possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver.  

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Flood filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the car.  He claimed that he was detained in 
violation of the constitutional prohibitions against illegal searches and 
seizures.  After a hearing, the 
district court denied Mr. Flood's motion to suppress.    

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Flood entered 
into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to the 
two marijuana charges in exchange for dismissal of the cocaine charges.  He reserved the right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress.   

  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   We apply the following standard in 
reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence:

 
 
Factual 
findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2002).  Because the 
trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness 
credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination.  Id. Whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 
(Wyo.1999).

 
 

O'Boyle 
v. State, 2005 WY 
83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  
See also, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 
(1996).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Flood asserts Trooper Chatfield 
detained him in violation of state and federal constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and, consequently, the evidence discovered 
during the ensuing search should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous 
tree.  On appeal, he presents a 
"combined analysis" under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 and the Fourth Amendment to 
the United 
States Constitution.     

 
 
A.        State 
Constitution

 
 
[¶12]   Although he cited to the Wyoming 
Constitution in his motion to suppress, Mr. Flood did not present an independent 
analysis to the district court to establish that the Wyoming Constitution 
provides different or more extensive protection than the Fourth Amendment in the 
context of this case.1  In Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶¶ 11-12, 
135 P.3d 620, 623-24 (Wyo. 2006), we 
stated:

 
 
Mr. 
Custer's only mention of the state constitution in the district court 
proceedings was a citation to Article 1, § 4 in his motion to suppress and his 
argument at the suppression hearing focused exclusively on the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  
A mere reference to a state constitutional provision in the district 
court is not adequate to justify our review of the issue on appeal.  As we explained in Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶¶ 16-17, 
108 P.3d 852, 856 (Wyo. 2005), this Court refuses to consider state 
constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal.  We stated:

 
 
[W]hen a 
defendant fails to assert a cogent independent state constitutional based 
argument before the district court, a defendant fails to preserve such issues 
for appellate review.  

 
 

Lindsay, ¶ 16, 
108 P.3d  at 856.  See also, McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074, 
n. 1 (Wyo.1999) (ruling that the defendant's reference to the state 
constitution, without further discussion of his independent state constitutional 
claim, was insufficient to justify judicial consideration of the 
issue).

 
 
A 
corollary rule also applies when a defendant has entered a conditional guilty 
plea.  Lindsay, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d  at 856.  

 
 
In the 
same vein, upon addressing the fact that W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) allows a defendant 
to plead guilty or nolo contendere while reserving the right to seek review on 
appeal of any specified pretrial motion, we set forth in Morgan [v. State, 2004 WY 95], ¶ 24, [95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004) ]:

 
 
In Bailey [v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 177 
(Wyo.2000)], we ruled that a conditional plea of guilty does not provide carte 
blanche permission for the appellant to present any and all arguments on 
appeal.  [Bailey,] 12 P.3d  at 177-78.   Instead, the appellant may only 
raise those issues on appeal which were clearly called to the attention of the 
district court.  Id.; see also, Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654, 660 
(Wyo. 
1980).  In other words, "[w]e will 
not consider non-jurisdictional issues on appeal unless they have been raised 
before the lower court with at least a minimum effort to present a cogent legal 
argument."  Bailey, 12 P.3d  at 178.  

 
 

Id. Mr. 
Custer did not properly raise the state constitutional argument in the district 
court and, consequently, we decline to consider his argument on 
appeal.

 
 
[¶13]   Given the fact that Mr. Flood did 
not present an adequate state constitutional argument, it is not surprising that 
the district court analyzed the case only under the federal constitution.  Compare, Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 
15, 119 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2005) (addressing the state constitutional issue on 
appeal even though the defendant had not presented a state constitutional 
argument in the district court because that court independently considered the 
issue).  Accordingly, we will limit 
our analysis in this decision to the appropriateness of the trooper's actions 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.   

 
 
B.        Federal 
Constitution

 
 
[¶14]   The Fourth Amendment 
states:

 
 
            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.  

 
 
For 
Fourth Amendment purposes, we recognize three tiers of interaction between 
police and citizens.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25.  See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 
(Wyo. 
1993).  The least intrusive contact 
between a citizen and police is a consensual encounter.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25.  
A consensual encounter is not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth 
Amendment protections.  The second 
tier is the investigatory or Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An 
investigatory detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25.  However, because of its limited nature, 
a law enforcement officer is only required to show "the presence of specific and 
articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" in order to 
justify the detention.  Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 
(Wyo. 
1994).  The most intrusive encounter 
between police and a citizen is an arrest.  
An arrest "requires justification by probable cause to believe that a 
person has committed or is committing a crime.'"  Id. at 625, quoting 
Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 219-20. 

 
 
[¶15]   The case at bar is concerned with a 
traffic stop, which is analogous to an "investigatory detention."  Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d 828, 831 (Wyo. 2004).  To determine 
whether the seizure was appropriate under the Fourth Amendment, we apply the 
two-step inquiry articulated in Terry:  1) Was the initial stop justified? and 
2)  Were the officer's actions 
during the detention "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first instance[?]'" O'Boyle, ¶ 46, 117 P.3d  at 414, quoting 
Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 11, 
97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  In 
this case, our focus is on the second step of the process because Mr. Flood 
concedes the validity of the initial stop for speeding.    

 
 
[¶16]   "[A]n investigative detention must 
be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its 
underlying justification."  O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d  at 414.  The State has the burden of 
demonstrating that a seizure was "sufficiently limited in scope and duration to 
satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure."  Id., ¶ 46, 117 P.3d  at 414.  The officer may expand the investigative 
detention beyond the scope of the initial stop only if the traveler consents to 
the expanded detention or if "there exists an objectively reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring" or a reasonable suspicion 
that an occupant of the vehicle is armed.  
Id., ¶ 48, 117 P.3d  at 414, 
citing  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2003) and Brown v. 
State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo. 1997).   

 
 
[¶17]   The initial question raised by Mr. 
Flood is whether Trooper Chatfield's actions while issuing the tickets exceeded 
the permissible scope of the traffic stop.   Mr. Flood claims the trooper did 
not have the right to order him and Mr. Janis to sit in his patrol car, 
separately, while he wrote their respective warning tickets.  Mr. Flood cites to Damato as authority for his 
contention.  In that case, the 
officer stopped Mr. Damato for a traffic violation and directed him to get out 
of his car and come back to the patrol car to look at the radar.  The officer patted Mr. Damato down 
before he entered his patrol car.  
Id., ¶ 4, 64 P.3d  at 702-03.  On appeal, Mr. Damato challenged the pat down search, and we 
held:

 
 
[A]lthough 
the officer could have removed Damato from the vehicle for the sake of safety, 
the officer had no objectively based suspicion that Damato was armed and 
dangerous, and the subsequent pat-down search he performed violated Damato's 
Fourth Amendment rights.  

 
 

Id., 
¶ 14, 64 P.3d  at 706-07.  

 
 
[¶18]   In this case, Mr. Flood and Mr. 
Janis had both allegedly committed traffic violationsMr. Flood was speeding and 
Mr. Janis, who was the owner of the car, did not have it properly insured.  Thus, under the clear holding of Damato, Trooper Chatfield was justified, 
"for the sake of safety," in asking each of them to step back to his car while 
he wrote their tickets.  The trooper 
in this case did not commit the Fourth Amendment violation condemned in Damato because he did not pat down the 
men before they entered his car.  

 
 
[¶19]   Moreover, the United States Supreme 
Court has unequivocally ruled that an officer may ask the driver and passengers 
to exit their car during the course of a routine traffic stop without violating 
the Fourth Amendment.  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (per curiam) (driver); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997) (passengers).  This 
case presents an even stronger argument in favor of condoning the trooper's 
request that Mr. Janis exit the car than in Wilson because Mr. Janis had allegedly 
committed an independent Wyoming 
violationfailing to insure his car, while the passenger in Wilson had not committed an infraction.  

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Flood also claims that he was 
illegally detained while Mr. Janis was sitting in the patrol car, presumably 
because he could not leave his passenger.  
The Wilson decision indicated that, as a practical 
matter, all of the occupants of a vehicle are detained during a traffic 
stop.  Wilson, 519 U.S.  at 
413-14.  The United States Supreme 
Court did not suggest there was a fundamental problem with the minimal intrusion 
into the other travelers' rights that occurs when they are required to wait for 
the officer to finish his business with the driver or other passengers.  See also generally, Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, 65 P.3d 33 
(Wyo. 2003) (describing situation where passenger was detained and questioned 
during a traffic stop occasioned by the driver's speeding violation).  Mr. Flood directs us to no express 
authority which would indicate he suffered a constitutional violation by having 
to wait while Trooper Chatfield prepared Mr. Janis' ticket.  Consequently, we conclude the trooper 
did not illegally detain Mr. Flood by asking him or his passenger to sit in the 
patrol car while he issued their respective tickets.  

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Flood next contends that the 
district court erred by ruling that the trooper had reasonable suspicion2 to continue to detain him after the 
original purpose of the traffic stop had concluded so he could conduct the 
canine sniff of the car.  The 
district court ruled:

 
 
            
The initial stop of the Defendant was justified and therefore the Court 
must determine whether specific and articulable facts were present which gave 
rise to a reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant while he ran the canine 
around the car and whether the length of that detention was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  The factors upon 
which the trooper determined it was reasonable to detain the Defendant 
were:  (1) there was a strong odor 
of cologne on the Defendant and in the car; (2) the Defendant and the passenger 
were displaying extreme nervousness at significant times during their 
conversations; (3) there were inconsistencies between the Defendant['s] and the 
passenger's stories about their travel plans; and (4) the length of time the 
Defendant said he spent in Cheyenne was a short period of time considering the 
distance of travel between [Scottsbluff] and Cheyenne.  In other words, it appeared suspicious 
that the Defendant would have traveled from [Scottsbluff] to Cheyenne for the purpose 
of visiting with family but would only spend a couple of hours with his 
family.

 
 
            
In light of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that 
Trooper Chatfield did have a reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant, 
particularly for the short period of time between the time the passenger 
expressed a preference to get going and the time it took before the dog alerted 
which quite literally was about two minutes.     

 
 
[¶22]   To justify a detention after the 
initial reason for the stop has concluded, an officer must be able to point to 
"the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be 
committing a crime.'"  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25, 
quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220.  In determining whether the officer had 
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, we look to the totality of the 
circumstances and how those circumstances developed during the officer's 
encounter with the occupants of the vehicle.  Id., ¶ 20, 135 P.3d  at 626.  

 
 
[¶23]   The first factor cited by the 
district court in concluding Trooper Chatfield had reasonable suspicion to 
detain Mr. Flood was the strong odor of cologne emanating from the car and Mr. 
Flood.  At the suppression hearing, 
Trooper Chatfield testified that, when he first approached the vehicle, he 
smelled a strong odor that he recognized as musk cologne or patchouli oil.  He also stated that, when he asked Mr. 
Flood and Mr. Janis to sit in his car, he noticed that each of the men smelled 
strongly of the cologne.  He 
testified that, in his experience, drug transporters commonly use such products 
to mask the scent of marijuana.    

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Flood argues that the cologne 
scent was not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion of drug activity.  Although we agree that a strong odor of 
cologne, alone, generally will not give rise to a reasonable suspicion, Fourth 
Amendment precedent is clear that the scent of a potential masking agent is one 
factor which may be considered in a reasonable suspicion analysis.  See, e.g., United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997) (odor of detergent supported 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 
362 (10th Cir. 1989) (odor of patchouli oil supported reasonable 
suspicion of drug offense where officer testified the oil was often used to 
cover the scent of marijuana).  
Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to consider the strong 
odor of a potential masking agent in its reasonable suspicion analysis. 

 
 
[¶25]   The second factor the district 
court relied upon in concluding the trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain 
Mr. Flood was the "extreme nervousness" displayed by Mr. Flood and Mr. Janis at 
significant points in his conversation with each of them.  Mr. Flood challenges the district 
court's finding, claiming it was a mischaracterization of the evidence because 
the trooper did not testify the men acted "extremely nervous."  

 
 
[¶26]   Trooper Chatfield testified that 
Mr. Flood's mannerisms and body language changed when he asked certain 
questions.  In particular, he stated 
that Mr. Flood would not make eye contact and seemed to have trouble formulating 
his answers when asked about his travel plans.  Mr. Flood's reaction to that topic was 
significantly different than when they discussed how fast the patrol car would 
travel, in which case Mr. Flood looked at the trooper and spoke freely.  The trooper also described Mr. Janis' 
behavior while sitting in the patrol car:

 
 

Q.    
      What else did you 
notice about Mr. Jani[s], if

anything? 
. . .

 
 
A.        He  he 
also would not make eye contact.  He 
was very fidgety in his seat.  He 
was a much larger man and very slow moving, so when he was moving around quite a 
bit in my car, fidgeting quite a bit, I took that as a strong sign of 
nervousness on his part.

 
 
Q.        Did 
that ever abate?

 
 
A.        No. That 
continued throughout  throughout my 

conversation.

         

[¶27]   We have said that generic 
nervousness is of little significance in establishing reasonable suspicion 
because "the average citizen is usually nervous when stopped by law enforcement 
for a routine traffic violation."  
Barch, ¶ 11, 92 P.3d  at 
833.  See also, Damato, ¶¶ 23-24, 64 P.3d  at 709.  However, exhibiting unusual signs of 
nervousness is a factor that may be considered in determining whether reasonable 
suspicion existed.   See Meadows, ¶¶ 19, 21, 65 P.3d  at 38, 
39.  We explained in Damato, ¶ 21, 64 P.3d at 
708:

  

            
It is generally accepted that nervousness upon the initial confrontation 
is normal and the telling information is whether the citizen calmed after the 
initial few minutes of the encounter.  
"Extreme and continued nervousness, however, is entitled to somewhat 
more weight.'"  Williams, 271 F.3d  at 1268 (quoting United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 
1179 (10th Cir. 2000)).   

 
 
[¶28]   While we may not have described 
Trooper Chatfield's testimony as indicating Mr. Flood and Mr. Janis were 
"extremely nervous," the evidence does support a finding that the men were more 
nervous than would be expected during a routine traffic stop.  Mr. Flood's reaction and level of 
nervousness changed based upon the topic being discussed.  He would not make eye contact and had 
difficulty answering when the topic of discussion was his travel plans but he 
was comfortable when they discussed the performance of the patrol car.  Mr. Janis' behavior while in the patrol 
car was also telling.  He fidgeted 
throughout the whole encounter with Trooper Chatfield and, unlike most innocent 
people, he did not calm down after a few minutes with the trooper.  The trooper described his behavior as "a 
strong sign of nervousness."  While 
the men's nervousness, alone, may not have been enough to establish reasonable 
suspicion, it was appropriate for the district court to consider their reactions 
to the trooper and his questions as one factor in its evaluation.  

 
 
[¶29]   The third factor referenced by the 
district court in concluding the trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. 
Flood after the traffic stop had concluded was the discrepancy between Mr. 
Flood's and Mr. Janis' accounts of their trip.  Trooper Chatfield testified Mr. Flood 
stated he and the passengers were returning to Scottsbluff after they had 
visited one of his family members in Cheyenne.  
Mr. Flood stated they had traveled from Scottsbluff to Cheyenne earlier in the 
day.  The trooper testified that Mr. 
Janis' story was different.  Mr. 
Janis stated that they had driven to Cheyenne the previous afternoon, spent the 
night, and were returning to Scottsbluff when they were stopped.  The video tape of the stop confirms the 
trooper's testimony and also establishes that the trooper's questions about 
their travel plans did not amount to an improper interrogation like we 
criticized in O'Boyle, ¶¶ 52-54, 117 P.3d  at 415-16.  

 
 
[¶30]   We have recognized that 
inconsistencies in the descriptions of travel plans given by the occupants of a 
vehicle stopped for a traffic violation may be a factor in determining whether a 
law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to further detain the 
travelers.  In Meadows, two travelers gave consistent 
stories about their destination but conflicting accounts of their travel 
itinerary.  Meadows, ¶ 19, 65 P.3d  at 38.  We concluded the inconsistency was one 
of several factors which supported the conclusion the trooper possessed 
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify continued detention of Ms. Meadows 
and her co-traveler.  Id.  See also, Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 808 
(Wyo. 
1996).  Consequently, we have no 
trouble concluding the inconsistency between Mr. Flood's and Mr. Janis' stories 
about their trip was a legitimate factor in establishing reasonable suspicion. 

 
 
[¶31]   Although not relied upon by the 
district court in its decision denying Mr. Flood's suppression motion, the 
record reveals another inconsistency in the men's stories.  Trooper Chatfield asked about the men's 
relationship to one another and to the boy riding in the backseat.  Mr. Flood stated that he and Mr. Janis 
were good friends but were not related, and the boy was his nephew.  Mr. Janis also stated that he was not 
related to Mr. Flood, but he stated that the boy was his grandson.  The trooper testified that he found it 
odd that both men denied they were related to one another, but each claimed a 
familial relationship to the boy.    

 
 
[¶32]   On cross examination, defense 
counsel asked the trooper if he had considered that the boy could be Mr. Flood's 
brother's son, making him Mr. Flood's nephew, and Mr. Janis could be the father 
of Mr. Flood's brother's wife, which would make him the boy's grandfather.  Under those circumstances, the men would 
both be related to the boy but they would not truly be related to one 
another.  The trooper indicated 
that, even if that were true, he thought it was odd that the men would not claim 
some sort of familial association to one another.  We agree and conclude that inconsistency 
in the men's stories was another consideration the trooper could take into 
account in a reasonable suspicion analysis.

 
 
[¶33]   The final factor identified by the 
district court was the short duration of Mr. Flood's visit with his family in 
light of the relatively long roundtrip distance between Scottsbluff and 
Cheyenne.  Although there was initially some 
confusion about the time the travelers arrived in Cheyenne, Trooper Chatfield finally clarified that, 
according to Mr. Flood, they had arrived in Cheyenne around 9:30 a.m.  The trooper stopped Mr. Flood for 
speeding at approximately 1:00 p.m., as they were returning to Scottsbluff.  The trooper testified that, based on the 
location of the stop, they would have left Cheyenne around noon.  Thus, he considered it suspicious that 
they would make the relatively long trip for such a short visit with a family 
member.  

 
 
[¶34]   The brevity of a trip, which is 
described in some cases as a short "turnaround" trip, is a proper consideration 
in a reasonable suspicion analysis.  
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 167 Fed.Appx. 
737, 2006 WL 367843 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 795 n. 11 
(4th Cir. 2004).  The district court was, therefore, 
justified in considering that factor in determining whether the trooper had 
reasonable suspicion to extend his detention of the travelers in this case.  

 
 
[¶35]   Each of the factors identified by 
the district court, when considered in isolation, could be interpreted as 
innocent behavior.  Our task, 
however, is to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
the factors, considered together, justify a reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity.  Meadows, ¶ 20, 65 P.3d  at 39.  Although we acknowledge the evidence 
here is not overwhelming, the factors, including: the strong odor of a potential 
masking agent; the nervousness of the travelers; the inconsistency in the 
travelers' accounts of their trip and their relationship to one another and the 
boy; and the short turnaround time suggested nefarious, rather than innocent, 
conduct.  We conclude, therefore, 
the totality of the circumstances established a reasonable suspicion to support 
further detention of Mr. Flood.  

 
 
[¶36]   Our conclusion that reasonable 
suspicion existed in this case is supported by other Fourth Amendment 
cases.  In Garcia, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, in 
an unreported decision, the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.  2006 WY 367843, at 1.  Garcia was a passenger in an SUV stopped 
by a Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper on Interstate 80.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit ruled that the 
trooper had reasonable suspicion to continue detaining the defendant to conduct 
a canine sniff because:  1) the 
driver of the SUV (the defendant's grandson) was unusually nervous; 2) the 
travelers' gave inconsistent accounts of their trip; and 3) they were making a 
"quick turnaround trip."  Id. at 3.  

 
 
[¶37]   Another case with similar, although 
not identical, facts further supports our conclusion that Trooper Chatfield had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Flood.  
In Foreman, the Fourth Circuit 
identified the following factors as sufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion:  1) the defendant was 
making a short turnaround trip; 2) the defendant exhibited physical signs of 
extreme nervousness during the stop, which grew worse when the trooper mentioned 
the issue of drug smuggling; 3) there were multiple air fresheners hanging from 
the rearview mirror that are often used to mask the smell of narcotics; and 4) 
the roadway the defendant was traveling was a known corridor for illegal 
narcotics.  Foreman, 369 F.3d  at 784-85.  Concluding the trooper had reasonable 
suspicion to order a dog sniff of the defendant's car, the Fourth Circuit 
stated:  "In our opinion, the 
factors cited by the United States eliminate a substantial portion of innocent 
travelers and, therefore, amount to reasonable suspicion that Foreman was 
engaged in drug trafficking."   
Id. at 785.   

 
 
[¶38]   As the Garcia and Foreman courts held on the basis of 
similar facts, we hold that Trooper Chatfield had reasonable suspicion to detain 
Mr. Flood.  In the words of the 
Fourth Circuit, the facts in this case would not have pertained to most of the 
innocent traveling public and gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Flood 
and/or his passengers were engaged in illegal activity.  Thus, the trooper properly detained them 
to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle.

 
 
[¶39]   The district court did not err by 
denying Mr. Flood's motion to suppress.  
Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Moreover, on 
appeal, Mr. Flood does not present a precise argument indicating that, under the 
circumstances of this case, the state constitutional guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures provides more protection than its federal 
counterpart.

 
 

2The factors 
cited by the district court indicate it determined that the trooper had 
reasonable suspicion by the time he issued Mr. Janis' ticket.  Thus, it is unnecessary to evaluate the 
effect of Mr. Janis' limited consent to additional questioning and opening the 
trunk and/or his subsequent refusal to consent to a further search of the car on 
the constitutionality of the trooper's action.