Title: State v. Bauder

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Bauder (2004-438)

2007 VT 16

[Filed 16-mar-2007]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2007 VT 16

                                No. 2004-438


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Brian E. Bauder                                April Term, 2005


  Howard Van Benthuysen, J.


  Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Colin McNeil,
    Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Henry Hinton, Appellate Defender, and
    Stephanie Pessin, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, for
    Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.),  Specially Assigned 

         
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.    The question presented in this case is whether
  law-enforcement officers may routinely search a motor vehicle without a
  warrant, after its occupant has been arrested, handcuffed, and secured in
  the back seat of a police cruiser, absent a reasonable need to protect the
  officers' safety or preserve evidence of a crime.  We hold that such
  warrantless searches offend the core values underlying the right to be free
  from unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in Chapter I, Article 11
  of the Vermont Constitution.  Accordingly, the trial court judgment to the
  contrary is reversed.  
   
       ¶  2.  During the early morning hours of September 23, 2003, South
  Burlington police officer David Solomon observed a vehicle on Shelburne
  Road that appeared to be traveling at a speed of forty-five to fifty miles
  per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone.  The officer followed the
  vehicle, which weaved several times and continued to travel in excess of
  the speed limit.  Based on these observations, the officer activated his
  blue lights.  The vehicle, in response, pulled into the lot of a service
  station on Shelburne Road.  

       ¶  3.  While speaking with the driver, later identified as defendant,
  the officer detected a faint odor of intoxicants and observed defendant's
  eyes to be watery and bloodshot.  At the officer's request, defendant
  exited the vehicle and performed a number of field sobriety tests.  Based
  on his further observations, the officer arrested defendant for driving
  under the influence (DUI), handcuffed him, and placed him in the rear of
  his police cruiser.  A woman passenger in the vehicle was identified,
  released, and left the scene.  Defendant produced an unsigned bill of sale
  that purported to vest title to the vehicle in himself, but a check of the
  vehicle registration failed to identify defendant as the vehicle's owner. 
  A further records check disclosed that defendant's Texas driver's license
  was suspended. 

       ¶  4.  After defendant was arrested and placed in the police cruiser,
  Officer Solomon and another officer who had arrived as backup searched
  defendant's car.  Officer Solomon later testified that he routinely
  searches the vehicles of drivers arrested for DUI under the
  "incident-to-arrest" doctrine, confining his search to what he described as
  the "lungeable" area of the vehicle, i.e., the area that the driver or
  passengers could potentially reach.  The officer acknowledged, however,
  that he did not feel in any danger from defendant, who was handcuffed and
  seated in the back of the police cruiser at the time of the search.  Nor
  did the officer harbor any concern that evidence in the vehicle might be
  removed or destroyed.
   
       ¶  5.  In their initial search of the vehicle, the officers discovered
  the head of a parking meter behind the driver's seat, a pipe with burnt
  residue in an open compartment attached to the  driver's door, and an empty
  beer can and a glass jar containing fragments of a green leafy substance
  under the driver's seat. The officers opened the jar and smelled the
  contents, confirming their suspicion that it had contained marijuana.
  Officer Solomon also detected a very faint odor of marijuana in the
  vehicle, although he acknowledged in his affidavit that the odor was not
  consistent with having been freshly smoked.  

       ¶  6.  Having previously concluded that they would not permit the
  vehicle to be driven from the scene absent proof of ownership and
  insurance, the officers further determined-based on their initial search-to
  impound the car, tow it to the police station, and apply for a search
  warrant.  A warrant was granted, and the subsequent search of a backpack on
  the back seat of the vehicle uncovered a clear plastic bag containing a
  white powdery substance, later determined to be 7.2 grams of the drug
  ecstasy. (FN1)     

       ¶  7.  Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana, possession
  of ecstasy, and possession of stolen property.  He moved to suppress all of
  the evidence on the ground that it had been discovered pursuant to an
  illegal search incident to arrest.  In his memorandum in support of the
  motion, defendant urged rejection of the federal Fourth Amendment standard
  set forth in New York v. Belton,