Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Donald J. Harman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 71 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2862-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Donald J. Harman, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald J. Harman,  
         Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HARMAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2001 WI 71 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Donald J. Harman, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald J. Harman,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   Attorney Donald J. Harman appealed from 
the referee's findings of fact, and conclusions of law that he 
engaged in professional misconduct and recommendation that his 
license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for six months 
as discipline for that misconduct.  The referee's findings and 
conclusions addressed eight separate counts of professional 
misconduct set forth in the Board of Attorneys Professional 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
2
Responsibility (Board) complaint in this proceeding.1  Three of 
the counts arose from Attorney Harman's handling of proceeds he 
received on behalf of a client after settling the client's 
personal injury claim.  The referee determined that Harman had 
engaged in dishonest conduct; failed to give a third party 
prompt written notification of his receipt of their funds and 
failed to promptly deliver those funds to the third party; and 
failed to continue to treat as trust property, the funds which 
were in dispute.   
¶2 
The remaining five misconduct counts involved Attorney 
Harman's conflict of interest in representing a client.  The 
referee determined that Harman had represented the client in the 
presence of a conflict of interest without obtaining written 
consent of the client on conflict; revealed information relating 
to representation of a client without consent; knowingly 
disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal; and on 
two separate occasions, used information obtained during the 
                                                 
1  Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process was substantially restructured.  The name 
of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases 
involving attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) and the Supreme Court rules applicable to the 
lawyer regulation system were also revised in part.  Because the 
conduct underlying this case arose prior to October 1, 2000, the 
complainant in this case will be referred to as the "Board" and 
all references to Supreme Court rules will be to those in effect 
prior to October 1, 2000.  
  
No. 99-2862-D 
 
3
representation of a former client to that former client's 
disadvantage.   
¶3 
We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law with respect to all eight counts of 
misconduct as alleged in the Board's complaint.  In so doing, we 
reject Attorney Harman's arguments, including his motion to 
dismiss the complaint in this disciplinary action on the ground 
of the referee's alleged conflict of interest and failure to 
recuse herself as provided in SCR 60.04(4) and (6).2  We hold 
that Attorney Harman has waived any objection to the referee's 
participation in this matter; accordingly, we now deny his 
                                                 
2  SCR 60.04(4)(d) and (6) provide in pertinent part:  
(4)  Except as provided in sub. (6) for waiver, a judge 
shall recuse himself or herself in a proceeding when the facts 
and circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should know 
establish one of the following or when reasonable, well-informed 
persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the 
justice system and aware of the facts and circumstances the 
judge knows or reasonably should know would reasonably question 
the judge's ability to be impartial: 
 
(d)  The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a 
fiduciary  . . .  has an economic interest in the subject matter 
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other 
more than de minimis interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding. 
 
(6)  A judge required to recuse himself or herself under 
sub. (4) may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's 
recusal and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, 
out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive recusal 
. . .   
 
 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
4
motion to dismiss the underlying complaint in this disciplinary 
matter which has been held in abeyance pending this court's 
consideration of this appeal.3   We determine that the license 
suspension as recommended by the referee is the appropriate 
disciplinary response to Attorney Harman's numerous acts of 
professional misconduct.  This is the fourth time Attorney 
Harman has been disciplined for professional misconduct.  We 
agree with the referee's observation that Attorney Harman's 
pattern of conduct demonstrates a disregard of the legal system 
                                                 
3  Harman's motion to dismiss was based on the allegation 
that Attorney Janet Jenkins, who was appointed to serve as 
referee in this disciplinary matter, had a conflict of interest 
because: 
(1)  Harman, a former member of the predecessor firm to 
Referee Jenkins' current law firm, retained 500 shares of stock 
in that former firm, and therefore, he and Referee Jenkins have 
a "shared pecuniary interest" as shareholders in the same law 
firm; and 
(2)  Both St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company and its 
subsidiary, Economy Fire & Casualty Company (St. Paul) the 
alleged "victims" of Harman's misconduct in counts one through 
three, are current clients of Referee Jenkins' law firm.  
We conclude that Harman has waived any objection he might 
have to Referee Jenkins' handling of this disciplinary matter. 
Despite an opportunity to do so in an earlier disciplinary 
matter in which Attorney Jenkins also served as referee, Harman 
did not object to her handling that matter nor ask for 
substitution of referee.  Furthermore, he did not raise any 
objection to Referee Jenkins in the instant disciplinary matter 
until after he filed his appeal in this court from the referee's 
report and recommendation.  Because Attorney Harman never 
objected to Referee Jenkins' participation until after this 
matter was before this court, he has waived his right to raise 
her alleged conflict of interest based on facts he has known 
about for years.  
No. 99-2862-D 
 
5
and his willingness to ignore established procedures for dispute 
resolution in favor of his perceived personal expediency. The 
seriousness 
of 
Attorney 
Harman's 
professional 
misconduct 
warrants the suspension of his license to practice law in this 
state for six months. 
¶4 
Attorney Donald J. Harman was admitted to practice law 
in Wisconsin in 1960 and currently practices in La Crosse.  He 
has been disciplined for professional misconduct on three 
previous occasions.   
¶5 
In 1998 Attorney Harman was publicly reprimanded for 
his failure to act diligently and promptly in representing his 
client, 
his 
demonstrated 
lack 
of 
understanding 
of 
his 
professional 
duties, 
and 
his 
unwillingness 
to 
take 
responsibility for his misconduct.  Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Harman, 221 Wis. 2d 238, 584 N.W.2d 537 (1998).   
¶6 
In 
1989 
Attorney 
Harman 
consented 
to 
a 
public 
reprimand 
from 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility for having acted in the presence of a conflict of 
interest, for failing to maintain complete trust account records 
and render proper accounting of funds held in trust, and failing 
to cooperate in the Board's investigation.  
¶7 
In 1987 Attorney Harman was publicly reprimanded for 
having charged one client an excessive fee and for failing to 
turn 
over 
another 
client's 
files 
upon 
termination 
of 
representation despite a court order to do so.  Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Harman, 137 Wis. 2d 148, 403 N.W.2d 459 
(1987).   
No. 99-2862-D 
 
6
¶8 
The Board filed the instant disciplinary complaint 
against Harman on November 5, 1999.  Attorney Janet Jenkins of 
La Crosse was appointed to act as a referee in this matter as 
she had also been appointed in the prior disciplinary matter 
against Harman in 1998.  In Attorney Harman's answer to this 
complaint, he admitted many of the factual allegations contained 
in the complaint but denied the conclusions to be drawn from 
those allegations.  On this appeal, Harman does not explicitly 
claim that any of the 29 specific findings of fact made by the 
referee are clearly erroneous; rather, he again disputes the 
conclusions and recommended discipline.   
¶9 
The 
Board's 
allegations 
of 
misconduct 
and 
the 
referee's findings deal with two separate matters: the St. Paul 
check, and Harman's representation of S.W.   
THE ST. PAUL CHECK 
¶10 Attorney Harman was retained to represent D.O. on a 
personal injury claim stemming from a 1995 automobile accident.  
D.O. had medical insurance through St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Company and its subsidiary, Economy Fire & Casualty 
Company (collectively, St. Paul).  After making payments to 
D.O.'s health care provider, St. Paul asserted a subrogation 
claim totaling $3671.10.  St. Paul informed Harman of its 
subrogation claim in three letters which Harman acknowledged 
receiving.  Subsequently D.O.'s personal injury action was 
settled for $69,000.  Metropolitan Insurance, as insurer of the 
other driver and vehicle, mailed Attorney Harman a check in that 
amount dated August 18, 1997.  That check was made payable to 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
7
D.O., Attorney Harman, the chiropractor who had treated D.O., 
and St. Paul Insurance.   
¶11 Attorney Harman endorsed the $69,000 settlement check 
on August 22, 1997, and deposited the proceeds in his trust 
account.  Harman's endorsement on the check stated "St. Paul 
Insurance by Donald Harman, Attorney."  Harman, however, had no 
authorization from St. Paul to endorse that settlement check on 
its behalf.  In his appellate brief, Harman acknowledges that 
his 
endorsement 
was 
"unauthorized" 
and 
made 
"without 
. . . authority."   
¶12 After depositing the funds into his trust account, 
Harman made several disbursements including to his client, the 
chiropractor, and to himself for a portion of his fees.  Then on 
September 15, 1997, Harman sent St. Paul a check in the amount 
of $750 drawn on his trust account.  Harman's accompanying 
letter stated that the check was "in compromise satisfaction of 
[St. Paul's] lien."  At that time Harman's trust account 
contained sufficient funds from the settlement to have paid the 
full amount of St. Paul's subrogation claim. 
¶13 In his September 15th letter to St. Paul, Attorney 
Harman also stated that if he did not hear from St. Paul within 
ten days, he would assume that the company agreed that the 
payment was in "full satisfaction" of its subrogation claim.  
St. Paul did not respond within the ten-day period  Harman had 
unilaterally set.  Then on October 2, 1997, Harman issued a 
check to D.O. in the amount of $2921.10 representing the 
difference between the full amount of St. Paul's subrogation 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
8
claim and the $750 check Harman had previously tendered to the 
company. 
¶14 There had been no mutual negotiations or verified 
settlement agreement between Harman and St. Paul regarding the 
subrogation claim.  In fact, the $750 check with Harman's 
accompanying letter was the only written notification Harman had 
provided to St. Paul up to that point regarding his receipt of 
the settlement monies and the disbursement of the proceeds. 
¶15 Based on those facts, the referee concluded that the 
Board had established by clear and satisfactory evidence 
Attorney Harman's misconduct on the following counts:  
 
Count 1:  By endorsing the [D.O.] settlement check on 
behalf of St. Paul Insurance, without authorization 
from that company to endorse checks on its behalf, 
[Harman] engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c).4 
 
Count 2: By failing, upon receipt of the settlement 
check from Metropolitan, to notify St. Paul Insurance 
in writing that he was holding funds for it in trust; 
and instead, after waiting approximately 30 days, by 
sending St. Paul a check in the amount of $750, which 
was not the product of any negotiated reduction of St. 
Paul's 
claim, 
[Harman] 
failed 
to 
give 
prompt 
notification to a third person of [Harman's] receipt 
of funds in which the third person has an interest, 
and also failed to promptly deliver to a third person 
                                                 
4  SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
 
(c)  engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation.  
 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
9
funds that the third person was entitled to receive, 
in violation of SCR 20:1.15(b).5 
 
Count 3:  By holding funds in trust, portions of which 
may have belonged to himself, [D.O.] and St. Paul 
Insurance, and without having resolved any dispute as 
to the amount St. Paul was entitled to receive, by 
issuing a check to St. Paul on September 15, 1997, in 
the amount of $750, [Harman] failed to treat funds as 
trust property until there was an agreed severance of 
interest, and [Harman] failed to continue to treat as 
trust property the portion in dispute, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.15(d).6 
¶16 We reject Harman's argument on this appeal that by 
accepting the $750 check and not objecting within the ten-day 
deadline he had set, St. Paul had "ratified" what would have 
otherwise been Harman's unauthorized signature when he endorsed 
the settlement check in the name of St. Paul.  Harman's reliance 
on a provision in the Uniform Commercial Code, Wis. Stat. 
§ 403.403(1) to support that ratification argument is misplaced.  
Moreover, contrary to Harman's claim, Referee Jenkins did in 
fact address his ratification argument and found it not only 
irrelevant but without merit.  We agree.   
                                                 
5  SCR 20:1.15(b) provides: 
(b)  Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly 
notify the client or third person in writing . . .  
6  SCR 20:1.15(d) provides: 
(d)  When, in the representation, a lawyer is in possession 
of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim 
interests, the property shall be treated by the lawyer as trust 
property until there is an accounting and severance of their 
interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective 
interests, the portion in dispute shall continue to be treated 
as trust property until the dispute is resolved.  
No. 99-2862-D 
 
10
¶17 The 
undisputed 
evidence 
established 
that 
Harman 
wrongfully endorsed the check on behalf of St. Paul without any 
authorization or prior agreement from St. Paul to do so; in 
addition he failed to provide St. Paul with prompt written 
notice of his receipt of funds and then unilaterally disbursed a 
reduced amount in purported settlement of St. Paul's subrogation 
claim without St. Paul having agreed to accept a reduced amount.  
St. Paul's retention of $750 as part payment of its subrogation 
claim cannot be viewed as a ratification or agreement by St. 
Paul to accept a reduced amount for its subrogation claim. 
¶18 We also reject, as irrelevant and without merit, 
Harman's appellate claim that he had, in fact, called St. Paul's 
toll free 800 number three times to notify the insurer that he 
had received the settlement check and therefore the referee 
should have concluded that the Board had failed to meet its 
burden with respect to count two.  We find this argument——like 
Harman's 
ratification 
argument——to 
be 
wholly 
unpersuasive.  
Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
20:1.15(b) 
mandates 
prompt 
written 
notification to a third person of receipt of funds to which the 
third person is entitled.  Harman's claim that he made telephone 
calls to St. Paul to report the receipt of the settlement check 
is not compliance with the rule.  Alleged oral notification of 
receipt of funds does not satisfy the rule.  In the instant 
case, the first written notification Harman provided to St. Paul 
indicating that he had received the settlement funds was his 
September 15th letter accompanying the $750 check.  This was 
mailed 24 days after he had endorsed and deposited the 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
11
settlement check.  Neither the alleged telephone calls nor this 
letter complied with the rule's requirement for prompt written 
notification.  
S.W. REPRESENTATION 
¶19 In February or March 1998 S.W. met with Attorney 
Harman concerning a child custody dispute she was having with 
her former husband. S.W. also consulted Harman about a potential 
legal malpractice action against an attorney who had represented 
her in a medical malpractice action in Wood County in 1993.  In 
connection with that potential legal malpractice claim, Attorney 
Harman obtained S.W.'s case files, which included her medical 
records, from her former attorney.  Those medical records had 
previously been part of the court file in the Wood County action 
but had been disposed of by the Wood County clerk in 1995 after 
that action was dismissed.7 
                                                 
7  In his brief on appeal in this court, Attorney Harman 
contends that he never "undertook" the representation of S.W. in 
her potential legal malpractice claim because she could never 
point to anything that her former attorney had done that would 
support a claim of legal malpractice against him.  Harman's 
argument on appeal is similar to his claim before the referee 
that the Board had falsely asserted that he had represented S.W. 
in February or March 1998.  The referee rejected that argument 
pointing out that Harman had admitted this factual allegation in 
his answer to the Board's complaint; moreover, Harman had 
acknowledged that he had discussed the custody situation with 
S.W. during that time period.  The referee reasoned that such 
discussion/consultation clearly constituted representation.  In 
addition, the Board has attached to its responsive brief in this 
court, a letter written by Attorney Harman dated March 18, 1998, 
to the defense attorneys in the Wood County medical malpractice 
action in which Harman asserted that he was "representing" S.W.  
Based on these facts, we agree with the referee's analysis and 
conclusion that Harman undertook the representation of S.W.  
No. 99-2862-D 
 
12
¶20 At the time S.W. consulted with Attorney Harman, she 
was living with one E.J.  On March 22, 1998, a domestic dispute 
occurred between E.J. and S.W. which resulted in criminal 
charges being filed against E.J.  E.J. then retained Attorney 
Harman to represent him on those criminal charges.  Attorney 
Harman appeared on behalf of E.J. at a hearing on March 30, 
1998, and in the course of that proceeding, cross-examined S.W. 
concerning the domestic dispute incident. 
¶21 In April of 1998 Attorney Harman wrote to the 
La Crosse County assistant district attorney who was prosecuting 
the matter against E.J.  In that letter, Attorney Harman 
referred to materials contained in S.W.'s case file in her Wood 
County medical malpractice claim including her medical records.  
In that letter, Attorney Harman wrote: 
 
The records I have (which were part of the public 
record in Wood County) show [S.W.] to have drug and 
alcohol dependence and a history of self-abusive 
behavior.  I will bring these records with me when we 
visit about this file. 
¶22 Attorney Harman then forwarded some of S.W.'s medical 
records to the La Crosse County prosecutor.  S.W. had not 
authorized him to disclose any of those records. 
¶23 Subsequently on August 31, 1998, Attorney Harman, on 
S.W.'s behalf, filed a motion seeking a change of physical 
placement of S.W.'s children.  That motion was accompanied by 
S.W.'s affidavit that Attorney Harman had drafted for her 
signature.  At the time that motion and affidavit were filed, 
S.W. and E.J. were still living together. 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
13
¶24 On September 9, 1998, S.W. and E.J. had another 
domestic altercation in their home, which resulted in criminal 
charges being filed against both of them.  Attorney Harman again 
represented E.J.  S.W. was represented by an assistant state 
public defender.  Under the terms of their respective bonds, 
S.W. and E.J. were prohibited from having contact with each 
other. 
¶25 Despite his knowledge that S.W. and E.J. were subject 
to the court ordered no contact provision in their bail bonds, 
Attorney Harman arranged for the two of them to meet in his 
office on September 23 or 24, 1998, in order to resolve various 
issues between them.  Attorney Harman prepared a statement which 
both S.W. and E.J. signed; in that statement they agreed that 
they would not consider that meeting to be a violation of the 
"no contact" provision of their respective bail bonds in their 
pending disorderly conduct cases.   
¶26 On October 13, 1998, S.W. filed a petition seeking a 
temporary injunction and restraining order against E.J.  At the 
subsequent October 16, 1998, hearing on that petition, Attorney 
Harman again appeared on behalf of E.J.  In the course of that 
hearing, Attorney Harman cross-examined S.W.  At the same time, 
Attorney Harman filed an affidavit asserting that S.W. had a 
"medical history of self-abusive, self-destructive behavior and 
Tylenol Codeine abuse . . . ." 
¶27 The La Crosse County district attorney subsequently 
filed a motion in E.J.'s criminal case seeking an order to 
recuse Attorney Harman from representing E.J. on the ground of 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
14
conflict of interest.  That motion was accompanied by an 
affidavit from S.W. in which she averred that Attorney Harman 
had requested her cooperation in his criminal defense of E.J. 
and that Attorney Harman had threatened that if she did not 
cooperate, she would lose her children and be referred to 
authorities for possible criminal prosecution on unrelated 
charges.  S.W. further stated in her affidavit that as a result 
of these threats, she wrote letters to the La Crosse County 
district attorney accepting full responsibility for the couple's 
September 9, 1998, altercation which had resulted in disorderly 
conduct charges being filed against S.W. and E.J.  
¶28 The day after the district attorney filed the recusal 
motion, Attorney Harman withdrew as E.J.'s defense counsel.  
Harman then notified the guardian ad litem in the child custody 
matter that S.W. had discharged Harman as her counsel; Attorney 
Harman, however, did not notify the court in which the custody 
dispute was pending that he was no longer S.W.'s counsel in the 
custody matter.   
¶29 A few weeks later, Attorney Harman sent copies of 
S.W.'s medical records to the district attorney's office, the 
clerk of court, the public defender's office, the guardian ad 
litem, and a women's shelter.  Harman acknowledged that he 
released S.W.'s medical records for the specific purpose of 
undermining her credibility and to keep " . . . [S.W.] from 
continuing to make false claims against [E.J.]."  In releasing 
these records, Attorney Harman referred to S.W. as being "a liar 
of world class magnitude" and asserted that she had committed 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
15
perjury and that she had been a drug and alcohol addict since 
age nine.  S.W. never authorized release of these medical 
records by Attorney Harman.  
¶30 Based on those facts, Referee Jenkins concluded that 
the Board had established by clear and satisfactory evidence the 
following additional five counts of misconduct by Attorney 
Harman: 
 
Count 4:  By representing [E.J.] in a criminal case 
stemming from the March 22, 1998, incident during the 
timeframe 
he 
was 
representing 
[S.W.], 
[Harman] 
represented a client when representation of that 
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client, without obtaining 
written consent from his client, in violation of SCR 
20:1.7(b).8 
 
Count 5:  By his April 1, 1998, disclosure of the 
content of [S.W.'s] medical records to a prosecutor, 
[Harman] 
revealed 
information 
relating 
to 
representation of a client . . . without her consent, 
in violation of SCR 20:1.6(a).9 
                                                 
8  SCR 20:1.7(b) provides: 
(b)  A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
represent 
a 
client 
if 
the 
representation of that client may be materially limited by the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: 
 
(1)  the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected; and  
 
(2)  the client consents in writing after consultation. 
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the advantages and 
risks involved.  
 
9  SCR 20:1.6(a) provides: 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
16
 
Count 6:  While knowing that the terms of their 
respective bonds prohibited contact with the other 
[Harman] facilitated a meeting between [S.W.] and 
[E.J.] 
in 
[Harman's] 
office 
such 
that 
[Harman] 
knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal, in violation of SCR 20:3.4(c).10 
 
Count 7:  In his October 16, 1998, cross-examination 
of [S.W.] at the hearing on a petition for a temporary 
injunction 
and 
restraining 
order 
against 
[E.J.], 
[Harman] used information obtained from [S.W.] during 
his prior representation of her, to her disadvantage, 
in violation of SCR 20:1.9(b).11 
 
Count 
8:  By 
his December 1998 
distributions of 
[S.W.'s] medical records, [Harman] used information 
obtained from a former client during his prior 
representation 
of 
her, 
to 
her 
disadvantage, 
in 
violation of SCR 20:1.9(b). 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a)  A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
representation of a client unless the client consents after 
consultation, 
except 
for 
disclosures 
that 
are 
impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation . . .  
 
10  SCR 20:3.4(c) provides: 
A lawyer shall not:  
 
(c) 
knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of 
a tribunal . . .   
(d) 
 
11  SCR 20:1.9(b) provides: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not:  
 
(b)  use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would 
permit with respect to a client or when the information has 
become generally known.  
  
No. 99-2862-D 
 
17
¶31 On appeal, Attorney Harman contends that the referee 
erred in refusing to allow into evidence two documents he claims 
would have established that S.W.'s medical records that he 
released were, in fact, public records and therefore S.W. could 
not claim any privilege with respect to their release.  Harman 
maintains that S.W.'s medical records became public records when 
filed as part of S.W.'s Wood County medical malpractice action; 
thus, because the records were not privileged, Harman asserts he 
could disclose them to others.  Furthermore, according to 
Harman, the referee should have received into this record, the 
two exhibits he proffered reflecting the docket entries in the 
Wood County medical malpractice action which Harman asserts 
would 
have 
established 
that 
S.W.'s 
medical 
records 
had 
previously been made public in that action. 
¶32 We 
reject 
this 
argument 
because, 
as 
the 
Board 
correctly argues in its response, it is irrelevant whether 
S.W.'s medical records were 
confidential medical records.  
Supreme Court Rule 20.1.6(a), the disciplinary rule Attorney 
Harman was charged with violating in Count 5, prohibits 
revealing 
or 
using 
information 
relating 
to 
a 
former 
representation of a client.  Moreover, the comment to that rule 
notes that it is a "fundamental principle" in the client-lawyer 
relationship 
that 
the 
lawyer 
maintain 
confidentiality 
of 
"information relating to the representation."  The comment 
explains that the rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies 
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client, 
" . . . but 
also 
to 
all 
information 
relating 
to 
the 
No. 99-2862-D 
 
18
representation whatever its source."  S.W. did not authorize 
Attorney Harman to release her medical records to anyone.  His 
disclosure of information that he obtained while representing 
S.W. violated client-lawyer confidentiality. 
¶33 We agree with Referee Jenkins' interpretation of this 
rule and her conclusion that the information obtained by 
Attorney Harman from his client, S.W., even if not protected or 
deemed confidential because it had previously been filed in the 
Wood County case, could not be disclosed without S.W.'s 
permission because that information was obtained as a result of 
the lawyer-client relationship he had with S.W. 
¶34 Attorney Harman does not dispute that he revealed and 
used information to S.W.'s disadvantage that he had obtained 
during the course of his representation of her.  Regardless of 
whether S.W.'s medical records lost their "confidentiality" 
because they had been made part of the Wood County medical 
malpractice action, the fact remains that Attorney Harman 
obtained those records while he was representing S.W. and he 
then disseminated those records without her consent.   
¶35 The 
referee's 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Harman's 
actions violated several provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, found in chapter 20 of SCR, was based on 
findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous.  The referee's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Attorney 
Harman's professional misconduct established in this proceeding 
are proper, and we adopt them.  
No. 99-2862-D 
 
19
¶36 The referee recommended a six-month license suspension 
as discipline for Attorney Harman's misconduct.  We agree that 
under the totality of the circumstances, a six-month suspension 
is appropriate discipline for Attorney Harman's misconduct.  
That six-month suspension will require Attorney Harman to 
petition this court for reinstatement under SCR 22.28(3). 
¶37 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Donald J. Harman to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for six months commencing 
August 1, 2001, as discipline for his professional misconduct. 
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Donald J. Harman pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs are not 
paid within the time specified and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Donald J. Harman to practice in Wisconsin shall 
remain suspended until further order of the court. 
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Donald J. Harman comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
 
 
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