Title: Caylor v. Atchison, T. & SF Rly. Co.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

190 Kan. 261 (1962)
374 P.2d 53
VERNON D. CAYLOR, Appellee,
v.
ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, and WILLIAM E. GENTRY, Appellants.
No. 42,469

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion on rehearing filed August 14, 1962.
W.E. Treadway, of Topeka, argued the cause, C.J. Putt, J.B. Reeves and William A. Walton, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
John A. Bausch, of Topeka, argued the cause, L.M. Ascough, E. Edward Johnson and Wayne T. Stratton, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
*262 Harry W. Colmery, James E. Smith, Robert E. Russell, O.R. Stites, Jr., and Lawrence D. Munns, all of Topeka, John F. Eberhardt, C.H. Morris, John C. Frank, Henry V. Gott, Richard C. Hite, H.E. Jones, Donald R. Newkirk, William Tinker and Lawrence Weigand, all of Wichita, Charles S. Schnider and Marion C. Miller, both of Kansas City, Joe L. Henbest, of Columbus, Don C. Smith, of Dodge City, George Allred, of Emporia, W. Luke Chapin, of Medicine Lodge, Arthur C. Hodgson, of Lyons, Tom Crosson, of Independence, Kirke W. Dale, of Arkansas City, H.G. Engleman, of Salina, and D.B. Lang, of Scott City, Evart Mills, of McPherson, D.C. Martindell, W.D.P. Carey, J. Richards Hunter, Harry H. Dunn, Edwin B. Brabets, R.C. Martindell, W.B. Swearer, E.F. Cabbage and John W. Feist, all of Hutchinson, H. Lee Turner and J. Eugene Balloun, both of Great Bend, filed briefs amici curiae.
The opinion of the court was delivered by SCHROEDER, J.:
This case involves trial errors in a damage action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile accident.
The questions presented are (1) whether the trial court erred in its failure to declare a mistrial after the plaintiff (appellee) in his own testimony injected the subject of appellants' insurance, and in failing to admonish the jury by instruction or otherwise to disregard such testimony, and (2) whether the trial court erred in permitting the appellee's counsel, in closing argument, to display a chart itemizing damages for future pain and suffering, and permanent disability on a mathematical formula basis.
The appeal was first heard in December, 1961, and on January 20, 1962, our opinion affirming the judgment of the lower court was filed. (Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Rly. Co., 189 Kan. 210, 368 P.2d 281.)
A rehearing was granted and the case was reargued at the June, 1962, session.
Upon further consideration of the case, the court is convinced that the former decision is incorrect as to the mathematical formula argument (question No. 2 above). As to that portion of the opinion filed it should be and is hereby withdrawn, vacated and set aside. The decision of the court on the insurance feature (question No. 1 above) and the opinion thereon is in all respects affirmed.
Reference is made to the former opinion for the facts and general discussion on the use of the "per diem" argument to the jury concerning the allowance of damages for future pain and suffering and permanent disability. (189 Kan., pp. 215 to 221.) This has been referred to as the mathematical formula argument or "formula technique."
The most recent decisions from other jurisdictions on this point are also divided.
*263 The Supreme Court of Illinois on March 23, 1962, in Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206, reversed the Appellate Division (Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App.2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209) holding the portions of a prepared chart reflecting a mathematical formula for pain and suffering to be improper. On the same date the Supreme Court of Illinois in Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company, 24 Ill. 2d 383, 182 N.E.2d 211, on the authority of Caley v. Manicke, supra, held it to be reversible error for counsel to use a mathematical formula in his argument to the jury.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina on the 7th day of February, 1962, in Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 124 S.E.2d 54, 59, held it reversible error to permit counsel to endorse on a blackboard his own personal opinion as to the per diem value of pain and suffering in final argument to the jury. The court adopted the reasoning in Appliance Company v. Harrington, [1959] 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126. In the opinion the South Carolina court said:
On January 24, 1962, the Appellate Court of Indiana in Evansville City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Atherton, 133 Ind. App. 304, 179 N.E.2d 293, held the mathematical formula argument to be proper. (See, also, Kindler, etc. v. Edwards, [1956] 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N.E.2d 491.)
The Supreme Court of Montana on February 13, 1962, in Wyant v. Dunn, ____ Mont. ____, 368 P.2d 917, held a mathematical argument for damages for the loss of love, affection and companionship in a wrongful death case on a per diem basis should be left within the sound discretion of the trial court.
In Evening Star Newspaper Company v. Gray, [Mun. C.A., D.C.] 179 A.2d 377, it was held that the per diem argument and the use of a chart were permissible by plaintiff's counsel.
Actually, it serves no purpose to enumerate the decisions in the various jurisdictions to determine what may be the numerical weight of authority. The scales of justice are not tipped by numerical balances.
In this jurisdiction there is no valid objection to counsel, in argument, *264 telling the jury what, under the evidence, counsel considers a fair compensation for the injuries received. It is customary for counsel in argument to suggest a total monetary award for pain and suffering. This, however, is far less misleading than the mathematical computation of the value of pain and suffering  the display in argument of a formula  in which time units of life multiplied by price of pain per unit equals value. In mathematical terms it is a supposition multiplied by a variable which equals an unknown.
The rationale of the supporters of the per diem argument is that the jury must arrive at a total monetary value of the plaintiff's pain and suffering, and since this is inexact, counsel should be allowed to suggest the parts which make up the whole for the guidance of the jury. The procedure starts with a supposition that the plaintiff will not only live to the expectancy shown on the mortality tables, but that the pain will prevail throughout life. Then follows an assumption that the pain may be valued in dollars per unit of life, be it the year, the month, the day, hour or minute. Next, that the value of each unit is equal  that is, the pain is constant, uniform and continuous. And presto, the mathematical magic and we arrive at the whole sum. Admitting the ingenuity, it is beyond credence that accuracy can be increased or the truth served by such alchemy. This is not supported by the weight of human experience. It is a clever syllogism from an erroneous premise. No credit whatever is given for the gradual elimination of pain, the accommodation to it and the distraction from it by the events, change in circumstances and by other unconnected illnesses and injuries to which in the normal course a person is subjected. And no credit is given for the variations in pain between different individuals or the impossibility of recognizing or of isolating fixed levels or plateaus of suffering.
The purpose of this technique is blatantly to achieve "the more adequate award," a synonym to all but the naive for "the more than adequate award."
The reasoning assigned by courts which disapprove the "formula technique" in arguing damages to a jury has been summarized in the former opinion. (189 Kan., pp. 218 and 219.) It is incorporated herein by reference and adopted as sound.
Pain and suffering is recognized in this state as a material element of damages on which recovery may be based. Damages for *265 pain and suffering are unliquidated and indeterminate in character, and the assessment of unliquidated damages must rest in the sound discretion of the jury. In Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 135, 325 P.2d 321, the subject was discussed in the following language:
In view of the above quoted language we think the discussion of the "per diem" argument in Caley v. Manicke, supra, by the Supreme Court of Illinois is particularly illuminating. It was there said:
Upon a premise similar to that above quoted from Domann v. Pence, supra, the Virginia Supreme Court in Appliance Company v. Harrington, supra, when confronted with the use of a mathematical formula to determine damages for pain and suffering set forth on a blackboard in argument to a jury, said:
In Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18, the Supreme Court of West Virginia said:
In Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394, the Supreme Court of Delaware said:
The point was considered by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Faught v. Washam, [1959], 329 S.W.2d 588, and in rejecting the "formula technique," it said:
The foregoing considerations advanced by the authorities disapproving the mathematical formula argument are, to us, persuasive.
In our opinion the use by appellee's counsel of a mathematical formula, setting forth on a blackboard the claim of future pain and suffering and permanent disability on a per diem or other fixed basis, in argument to the jury was speculation of counsel unsupported by evidence. It amounted to the giving of testimony by counsel in his summation argument. We therefore hold such argument was improper and constituted reversible error  prejudice is conclusively presumed as a matter of law and a new trial must be granted.
The facts in the instant case are a graphic example of the impact of the "per diem" argument made upon the jury. During their deliberation the jury requested that they be permitted to have and see in their jury room the chart used and referred to by counsel for the appellee in argument. It is readily apparent they viewed the chart as evidence.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed with directions to grant a new trial.
SCHROEDER, J., dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion affirming the court's decision on the insurance issue, and adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in the former opinion on this point. (Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Rly. Co., 189 Kan. 210, 368 P.2d 281.)
PARKER, C.J. (Concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the syllabus and corresponding portions of the opinion and dissent from the court's decision on the insurance phase of the appeal.
*269 WERTZ, J., (dissenting):
I am unable to agree with the majority of the court, and I will attempt to set forth my views on the question concerning which I differ.
The cataclysmic import of the majority opinion is to require of jurors fairness without thought and decision without discussion. The majority of this court has now decided that the only way to obtain a fair verdict  in personal injury cases  is to compel jurors to ponder pain and suffering in a vacuum within the jury room waiting until lightning strikes and something is hatched from nothing.
Defendants (appellants) contend it is reversible error for an attorney to use a mathematical or per diem approach in his argument to the jury regarding the value of pain and suffering. While this type of argument has been used in this state for many years, this appears to be the first time it has been raised as error in this court in cases involving unliquidated damages. However, the question raised is not novel in this country. The same contentions and arguments have been presented to thirty-two jurisdictions in this country within recent years. Only seven states have accepted the argument made by defendants. They are: Stassun v. Chapin, Appellant, 324 Pa. 125, 188 Atl. 111; Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713; Appliance Company v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126; Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18; Henne v. Balick, 1 Storey 369, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394; Affett v. Milwaukee & S.T. Corp., 11 Wis.2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274; Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206.
In Stassun v. Chapin, supra, the Pennsylvania court held that in cases where the damages are unliquidated and incapable of measurement by a mathematical standard, statements by plaintiffs' counsel as to the amount claimed or expected are not to be sanctioned. This is the basis upon which Pennsylvania denies the use of per diem formula argument. For many years it has been the rule in Pennsylvania that statements by plaintiffs' counsel as to the amount sued for, claimed or expected are not permissible either by the court or by counsel.
In Botta v. Brunner, supra, the New Jersey court adopted the Pennsylvania rule of prohibiting counsel or the court from advising the jury as to the amount of unliquidated damages prayed for or mentioning any amount to the jury. In this state we have never had such a rule of law, and to now establish one here would change the *270 entire rule of trial procedure and leave the bench and bar in a dilemma.
Only Pennsylvania and New Jersey have clearly adopted the ad damnum rule. The other five states adhering to defendants' contention have adopted only a part of the New Jersey-Pennsylvania rule. These states recognize that counsel may refer to the amount claimed as unliquidated damages but may not use the questioned formula, as to pain and suffering only. A review of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey authorities indicate that these states would not allow counsel to give to the jury any figure for pain and suffering, since the total of the amount claimed as unliquidated damages cannot be given. This would seem to be an undesirable practice, one which is entirely foreign to our jurisdiction, and not completely accepted within their own jurisdiction. In commenting on the wisdom of this rule it was stated in 12 Rutgers Law Review 522:
The Botta rule requires juries to convert pain to dollars; allows judges to review the result as too much or too little; and yet tells the lawyers, who are the only representatives of their clients, that they must not discuss the matter. In Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515, 155 A.2d 111 (Oct. 1959), after commenting on their Botta case, supra, the New Jersey court permitted a mathematical formula to be argued to the jury in a wrongful death action.
The twenty-five jurisdictions in which defendants' arguments have been presented and rejected are: Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wn.2d 23, 351 P.2d 153; Hill v. C. & E. Constr. Co., 59 Wn.2d 743, 370 P.2d 255; Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828; Hernandez v. Baucum (Texas Civil Appeals), 344 S.W.2d 498; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mattingly (Kentucky), 339 S.W.2d 155; Evansville City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Atherton, ____ Ind. App. ____, 179 N.E.2d 293; Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661; Little v. Hughes (La.), 136 So. 2d 448; Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337; Arnold, et al. v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744; McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315; King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. (North Dakota), 107 N.W.2d 509; Miller v. Loy, 101 O.A. 405, 140 N.E.2d 38; Ratner v. Arrington (Florida), 111 So. 2d 82; Johnson *271 v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754; Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company, 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575; Johnson v. Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co., 234 S.C. 448, 108 S.E.2d 777; Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Jones (Okla.), 354 P.2d 415; Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30; Corkery v. Greenberg, 253 Ia. 846, 114 N.W.2d 327; Wyant v. Dunn, ____ Mont. ____, 368 P.2d 917; Evening Star Newspaper Company v. Gray (D.C.), 179 A.2d 377; Imperial Oil, Limited v. Drlik, (Sixth Circuit) 234 F.2d 4, cert. denied 352 U.S. 941, 77 S. Ct. 261, 1 L. Ed. 2d 236; Bowers v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 182 F. Supp. 756, affirmed (Third Circuit) 281 F.2d 953.
Defendants' counsel base their entire case on the rule as laid down in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the recent Illinois decision of Caley v. Manicke, supra, decided by the supreme court of Illinois on the 12th day of March, 1962. They furnish us with a copy of the Illinois case and base the theory of their argument on these cases. Attention should be invited at this point to the fact that defendants' counsel have failed to cite to this court the very recent cases of six other sister states holding to the contrary, two of which were decided since the Illinois case.
In Corkery v. Greenberg (Supreme Court of Iowa, Apr. 3, 1962) 253 Ia. 846, 114 N.W.2d 327, the Iowa court, after analyzing the Pennsylvania and New Jersey opinions  the states relied on by defendents  stated:
In Eastern Shore Public Service Company v. Corbett (Court of Appeals of Maryland, January, 1962), 177 A.2d 701, it is stated, with reference to the per diem formula of argument, that they did not deem it necessary to labor the question, and:
In Evansville City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Atherton (Jan. 1962) 179 N.E.2d 293, the Indiana appellate court, after review of the cases, said, with reference to the mathematical formula:
In Wyant v. Dunn (Feb. 1962) 368 P.2d 917, the Montana court, after reviewing the authorities, including the New Jersey-Pennsylvania rule, stated:
In Little v. Hughes (Dec. 1961) 136 So. 2d 448, the Louisiana court stated:
In Evening Star Newspaper Company v. Gray (D.C., Jan. 1962), 179 A.2d 377, the Municipal Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, after reviewing authorities, stated:
It is apparent that the overwhelming weight of authority in this country has refused to accept the limitation on argument asserted by defendants. The appellate courts of seven jurisdictions have rendered decisions in the first five months of this year; six jurisdictions, Louisiana, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Court of Appeals D.C. and Maryland, held that the per diem argument was proper, and only one, Illinois, held to the contrary. Thus the trend of authority seems to continue against defendants' position and marks it as an illogical, inequitable and the minority rule in this country.
Defendant contends that the per diem argument is, in effect, testimony or evidence, and, if not, at least the jury is apt to mistake the argument for evidence. It is obvious that counsel, in arguing the case to a jury, is not testifying but merely expressing his individual views on the evidence presented and attempting to aid the jury under the instructions of the court in using some method to arrive at a verdict and sum based upon an action for unliquidated damages.
In the instant case the jurors were instructed prior to argument by counsel as follows:
This court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that the instruction given was a stock instruction which has been used and approved in this state for a great many years. As was stated by President Frank C. Haymond of the West Virginia court in an excellent expression in Crum v. Ward, supra, "Surely it cannot be successfully asserted that the average jury is so stupid as to believe that counsel as a partisan advocate, in arguing the cause of his client, is giving testimony or acting in the capacity of a sworn witness. Jurors observe and know how a person becomes a witness and how he presents sworn evidence in the trial of a case. To say that the *274 statements of counsel are considered as evidence by the jury is a manifest misstatement which distorts the facts."
The Washington supreme court put it this way in Jones v. Hogan, supra: "Argument is not evidence, and we cannot attribute to any jury in this state of lack of sufficient mentality to distinguish between the two. This is especially true after the court has instructed that any remark of counsel not sustained by the evidence should be disregarded."
In my opinion Kansas jurors are equally as intelligent as jurors in our sister states.
The contention raised most strongly as that the argument by counsel is not based on the evidence, since no witness is allowed to testify as to the amount of compensation which should be recovered for pain and suffering. This argument seems particularly unconvincing. The jury must observe, weigh, and then finally equate the evidence of pain with a money judgment, but the defendant contends that this same evidence does not contain a basis for counsel to argue a per diem worth. Since the verdict must be consistent with the evidence, in other words, inferrable from it, it should follow that counsel's estimate of the value should also be inferrable from the evidence.
In the course of trial testimony is given as to pain and suffering, and this is the foundation for the argument. Of course, no witness can express an opinion as to the amount which should be awarded for pain and suffering; but the absence of testimony of that character has nothing to do with the right of counsel to discuss the evidence of pain and suffering and draw and present to the jury his inferences from such evidence. It is just as certain that no witness can testify that in his opinion a defendant is negligent; all he can do is to testify to the facts within his knowledge. Whether a defendant is guilty of negligence is a question to be determined by the court or the jury as a trier of fact. I cannot, however, believe that even the authorities which condemn the use in the argument of counsel of a mathematical or per diem formula for ascertaining damages for pain and suffering would consider improper and disapprove argument of counsel in which he gives expression to his inferences from the evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence. (Crum v. Ward, supra.)
In Kansas counsel have always been allowed and permitted to express their opinions based upon the evidence and inferences *275 therefrom as to the sum of money to which they feel the plaintiff is entitled in a personal injury action. How can one now argue that the expression of the opinion or conclusion of counsel, when expressed in terms of a per diem or other time-segment basis, becomes evidence when the expression as to a lump sum amount is perfectly permissible and has never been nor is it now regarded as evidence?
In determining what is "fair and reasonable compensation," the jury must convert the pain and suffering into dollars. The court gives the jury little or no help in performing this difficult task. Therefore, it would seem that counsel should have wide latitude in argument.
It is asserted that the amount requested in the mathematical formula is purely speculative, and, therefore, should be rejected. Certainly the amount of counsel's estimate of money value for a day's or year's pain is speculative, just as the ad damnum clause in his petition is speculative, and as the jury's allowance for pain and suffering or for permanent injury is speculative. In Kansas we allow the plaintiff to state to the jury the amount for which he prays, and the court instructs the jury as to the amount of plaintiff's claim and that its verdict, if for the plaintiff, may not exceed that amount. It would be illogical, therefore, to forbid counsel to explain the components which make up the whole amount claimed.
In Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company v. Flowers (Texas), 336 S.W.2d 907, the Texas court expressed it this way:
It is argued that each individual has a different threshold of pain and so the formula approach will not work; but, again, this same argument applies to any method of computing an award for pain and suffering or for any damage to personal injury, and, therefore, an attorney should be able to suggest a figure based upon the evidence and facts of the particular case. The Sixth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals said in Imperial Oil, Limited v. Drlik, supra:
..............
A strong argument in allowing counsel to use the mentioned technique is the very absence of any fixed rule or standard for monetary measurements of pain and suffering. Great latitude should therefore be allowed counsel in his argument to comment on the evidence, its nature and effect, and to allow proper inference which reasonably may spring from the evidence. Counsel in this state have always been granted the right to argue from the evidence any conclusion which the jury is free to reach, and a lack of objective preciseness in an area of uncertainty should not prohibit or limit such argument.
The few courts which prohibit the mentioned type of argument permit the use as evidence in argument the mortality tables or life expectancy of the injured party as a basis of computation of various elements of damages. I can see nothing more speculative than the life expectancy of a particular individual; yet the Pennsylvania-New Jersey courts permit the life expectancy of the plaintiff to be introduced in evidence and to be used in connection with ascertaining the total amount of the award of damages, and then, because speculative, refuse to permit the use of the mathematical or per diem formula in assisting the jury to arrive at a proper award of damages for pain and suffering except in wrongful death actions. (Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515, 155 A.2d 111.)
It is difficult to conceive of any realistic basis upon which it would be contended that an argument about money could appeal to the sympathy of a jury more than the testimony of the witnesses as to the extent and duration of the pain and suffering actually endured or to be endured.
It appears to me that this court, along with the Florida court in Ratner v. Arrington, supra, should take judicial notice of the practice which has existed among the bar of this state since its statehood to use the per diem argument or other argument from the evidence which might assist the jury in arriving at a just sum of unliquidated damages in any case where such damages are involved.
The question presented here is whether this court will follow the seven states adopting the age-old Pennsylvania rule that does not permit a party or a court to make any reference to the jury *277 of the amount claimed as unliquidated damages, or whether we should follow the twenty-five jurisdictions throughout our land that permit the parties to argue to the jury the mathematical formula in assisting the jury, under the instructions of the court, to arrive at a just verdict. I see nothing improper in arguing a mathematical calculation on the matter of the amount of damages to be awarded for pain and suffering; otherwise, the jury might be compelled to resort to the "by guess and by golly" method. Nevertheless, some formula would seem to be the most reasonable and accurate approach and more likely to result in a just and proper allowance. With the Texas court in Hernandez v. Baucum, supra, I consider it a fair argument and rational approach to treat damages for pain the way it is endured  month by month  year by year.
The concept of totality pronounced by the majority opinion has no counterpart in the world of human affairs. Society recognizes "the day" as a basic unit of humanity. We rise in the morning and go to bed at night, and our institutions function accordingly. No judge's salary is computed or paid in a lifetime lump and there are no lifetime meals, no lifetime drinks, no lifetime haircuts, nor anything else; nor has any living human being ever lived a lifetime of pain in the whole. Pain is lived by the hour and the day and is ticked off by the same clock that sends one to work in the morning and home at night.
Although the jurors will eat their daily meals and live their daily lives, they must now think of pain and suffering as a lifetime lump. Such a coerced concept will have no more meaning than lifetime rent, lifetime shoes, or lifetime meals. This court's logic would now force jurors to value steak by the herd, cars by the fleet, and pain by the life. Forcing jurors to think in a language they never heard of cannot be designed or expected to produce just results.
There is absolutely no justification for a rule which singles out one type of damage in one type of case and says that it alone is not the proper subject of adversary argument. Logic declares that stifling of discussion and analysis will not lead to intelligent verdicts. It is to be doubted whether a proper verdict can be expected to break through an atmosphere of judicially imposed ignorance; and equal justice to all will not be obtained by muzzling the advocates. This rule cannot help but lead us and the trial courts into either totally inconsistent decisions or into the most unjust results.
*278 I adhere to the conclusion reached in our former opinion, Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Rly. Co., 189 Kan. 210, 368 P.2d 281.
ROBB and JACKSON, JJ., join in the dissent written by WERTZ, J.