Title: In Interest of N.M.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In Interest of N.M.1990 WY 68794 P.2d 564Case Number: C-89-7Decided: 06/26/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE INTEREST OF N.M. 
AND A.C. D.M., 

APPELLANT 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, EX 
REL., FREMONT COUNTY DPASS, 

APPELLEE (PETITIONER). 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

Sky D. Phifer, 
Lander, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard E. Dixon, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Michael Greer, Deputy Fremont County Atty., Riverton, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      After an 
adjudicatory hearing1 held on January 19 and 30, 1989, 
the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, sitting as a juvenile court, 
issued its order finding that the state had proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the mother, D.M., had neglected her children, N.M. and A.C.2 The juvenile court based the 
finding of neglect on

the period of August 14, 
1988, through October 6, 1988, [when the mother] left the Minor Children in the 
care of [another] family. During the above mentioned period of time [the mother] 
visited the children at irregular times and without notice to the [family]. Also 
during the above mentioned time, [A.C.] developed a severe ear infection and 
although [the mother] was notified of the infection, she took no steps to have 
[A.C.] treated thereby causing the * * * family to seek treatment and medication 
for [A.C.] at their own expense.

[¶2]      The children's 
mother, in her framing of the issue,3 asks us to reverse the juvenile 
court's finding of neglect:

Is the finding of neglect 
on the part of the mother of the minor children so totally unsupported by the 
evidence as to require a reversal?

[¶3]      The state 
presents two issues:

I. Were the factual 
allegations underlying the court's finding of neglect established by a 
preponderance of the evidence?

II. Did the lower court 
reach its finding of neglect in substantial compliance with requirements of the 
juvenile court act?

[¶4]      We 
affirm.

[¶5]      The juvenile 
court's finding of neglect was based upon W.S. 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B)(II) 
(Cum.Supp. 1987).4 We believe that there is sufficient 
evidence, however, to support the juvenile court's finding of neglect based upon 
W.S. 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(A),5 which contains the alternative 
definition of neglect.6

[¶6]      In reviewing 
sufficiency of the evidence we

1. Give considerable 
deference to the trial court's determination because it has the advantage to 
judge the demeanor and intelligence of the witnesses;

2. Examine the evidence 
in the light most favorable to appellee and resolve all conflicts in evidence 
for appellee;

3. Assume as true the 
evidence in appellee's favor, disregard entirely appellant's evidence in 
conflict with appellee's evidence, and give to appellee's evidence every 
favorable inference that may fairly be drawn.

Matter of RJP, 
761 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶7]      The mother of the 
family who cared for the children during the period of alleged neglect (August 
14 - October 6, 1988) testified at the adjudicatory hearing that she felt the 
obligation to feed and clothe the children. She also testified that she 
provided, without reimbursement, "food and diapers" for the children. Another 
member of the family testified that she had paid for the medication used to 
treat an ear infection one of the children had developed during the period of 
alleged neglect.

[¶8]      The state's 
burden of proof in an adjudication of neglect is set forth in W.S. 14-6-225(a) 
(July 1986 Repl.): "Allegations of conduct showing a child to be neglected must 
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In addition, under the 
appropriate standard of review, the juvenile court's finding of neglect is 
entitled to considerable deference, and the prevailing party is entitled to 
every favorable inference that may fairly be drawn from its evidence. Based upon 
the above testimony, there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to 
find that D.M.'s conduct toward her children constituted neglect.7 In other words, D.M. as the 
children's "custodian failed * * * to provide adequate care, maintenance, 
medical * * * or any other care necessary for the child[ren's] well being." W.S. 
14-6-201(a)(xvi)(A).

[¶9]      The juvenile 
court's finding of neglect is affirmed.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially, with whom URBIGKIT, Justice, joins.

[¶10]   I recognize that D.M. has chosen to 
focus her appeal in this case upon a lack of jurisdiction in the juvenile court. 
Her effort is limited to a contention that the court never did acquire 
jurisdiction because the record was not sufficient to sustain the finding of 
neglect in the court's initial order. The essential difficulty for me in 
accepting the position presented by D.M. is that, on May 27, 1988, D.M. entered 
into a Consent Decree that depended upon the existence of jurisdiction in the 
district court. This agreement on the part of D.M. was tantamount to an 
admission of child neglect sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district 
court. While I recognize the rule that parties cannot consent to jurisdiction, I 
am satisfied that it is also possible for parties, by their actions in a case, 
to foreclose themselves from asserting a lack of jurisdiction.

[¶11]   I believe that all of these matters 
then merged into the Order Following Dispositional Hearing entered on November 
2, 1989. That order encompasses these findings of fact:

"1. That the Minor 
Children have been adjudicated as neglected children and that the children are 
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

"2. That all reports 
requested by the Court have been received by the Court, submitted to the 
attorneys herein and reviewed by the parties.

"3. That the Minor 
Children's school district of residency is Fremont County School District # 1, 
Lander, Fremont County, Wyoming.

"4. That the Fremont 
County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services used reasonable 
efforts to prevent or eliminate removal of the children from the home; and that 
the mental and moral welfare of the Minor Children demands that the Minor 
Children be removed from the home.

"5. That the best 
interests of the Minor Children would be served by removing the children from 
their home and that foster home placement is the least restrictive environment 
available and proper for the said Minor Children."

[¶12]   I am convinced that matters such as 
this cannot be treated as static and frozen at any point in time. Once the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court is invoked, then the matter proceeds as a 
continuing and dynamic situation. Consequently, the court, in making its Order 
Following Dispositional Hearing, was entitled to rely upon facts that had 
developed during the entire course of the proceeding. The majority opinion does 
not consider any of this additional information in addressing the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain the findings of the district court. I am satisfied that 
the evidence supports those findings of fact and that the court properly 
considered all of that information in addressing the question of child neglect 
and in making the order that it entered. It well may be that the language chosen 
by the court with respect to the issue of neglect is not artful, but that does 
not avoid the manifestations of neglect that this record 
encompasses.

[¶13]   It is to be hoped that this family 
may at some point be reunited, but there was no error in the disposition that 
the trial court made. D.M. is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the 
court, and all aspects of the rest of the case leading to the ultimate 
disposition are justified by what occurred during the course of the proceedings 
in the trial court.

 FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 14-6-226(b) (July 
1986 Repl.) provides in pertinent part: "If the allegations of [neglect in] the 
[state's] petition are denied, [the juvenile court will set the matter] for an 
adjudicatory * * * hearing."

2 W.S. 14-6-226(c) (July 
1986 Repl.) states: "If after an adjudicatory hearing * * * the [juvenile] court 
* * * finds that a child * * * is neglected, it shall enter a decree to that 
effect stating the jurisdictional facts upon which the decree is 
based."

3 The juvenile court also 
conducted a disposition hearing, as mandated by W.S. 14-6-229(a) (July 1986 
Repl.) after children are adjudicated to be neglected, on October 17, 1989. D.M. 
does not, however, raise any issues concerning the disposition 
hearing.

4 This particular section 
involves, inter alia, neglect which results in "physical injury" to the 
child.

5 The section states that 
a "Neglected child" means a child "whose custodian has failed or refused to 
provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical 
or any other care necessary for the child's well being."

6 We can affirm the case 
on any basis found in the record. In the Matter of the Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 970 (Wyo. 1990).

7 See State in Interest of 
C, 638 P.2d 165, 172 (Wyo. 1981).