Title: Johnson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Jarmal Johnson v. State of Maryland, No. 84, September Term, 2011
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—ILLEGAL SENTENCE: A sentence is inherently illegal, within the
meaning of Maryland Rule 4-345(a), if the trial court was not authorized to impose it.  One situation
in which a trial court is not authorized to impose a sentence is when the crime that served as the
basis of the conviction was not included in the indictment and was not a lesser included offense of
any crime in the indictment.  A motion to correct such an illegal sentence may be filed at any time,
and is not subject to waiver.  When an illegal sentence is premised on an illegal conviction, both
shall be vacated.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—AMENDMENT OF AN INDICTMENT: Maryland Rule 4-204 details
the exclusive means to amend an indictment.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—DOCTRINE OF LACHES: Laches shall not apply when the moving
party has not alleged prejudice arising from the delay.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECORD: The record is sufficient to review
an appellant’s contention when it contains all parts of the record that are reasonably necessary
for the determination of the questions presented by the appeal and any cross-appeal.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case Nos. 192099061, 62, 63 and 71
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 84
September Term, 2011
                                                                             
JARMAL JOHNSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene      
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   July 10, 2012
1We have edited Petitioner’s questions presented for clarity.  As originally presented,
the questions were: 
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in dismissing
Petitioner’s appeal and holding that Petitioner’s conviction was
not void for lack of jurisdiction, ignoring case law and the plain
language of Rule 4-252(d), where Petitioner was convicted of
a crime that was not charged in the indictment and where the
crime was not a lesser included offense of any charge contained
within the indictment?
2. Should the concept of “constructive amendment” of an
(continued...)
In this case, we consider the remedies available to a defendant 16 years after his
conviction and sentence for a crime not charged in the indictment.  Following his arrest in
1992, Petitioner Jarmal Johnson was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other
crimes, even though the indictment returned by the Grand Jury did not charge assault with
intent to murder.  Petitioner did not raise this issue at trial, at sentencing, or on direct appeal.
Not until 16 years after his conviction did Petitioner file a motion to correct an illegal
sentence, claiming that the trial court lacked the power to convict and sentence him for
assault with intent to murder because that charge was not contained in the indictment.  The
Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied Petitioner’s motion, and he appealed.  The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed in a reported opinion, Johnson v. State, 199 Md. App. 331, 22
A.3d 909 (2011), and Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, asking:
1. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to convict Petitioner of a
crime that was not contained in the indictment and was not a
lesser included offense of any charge contained in the
indictment?
2. Is the “constructive amendment” of an indictment recognized
in Maryland and did the Court of Special Appeals properly
apply it in this case?1
1(...continued)
indictment be recognized in Maryland and did the Court of
Special Appeals properly apply it in this case?
2We have edited the State’s questions presented for clarity.  As originally presented,
the questions were: 
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals correctly dismiss Johnson’s
appeal from the denial of Johnson’s motion to correct an illegal
sentence as untimely?
2. If addressed, did the Court of Special Appeals correctly
indicate in dicta that Johnson’s indictment was constructively
amended and that Johnson was aware of and consented to that
amendment?
3. Did the Court of Special Appeals improperly fail to dismiss
Johnson’s appeal where Johnson did not provide a record
sufficient for review of his appellate contention?
4. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in failing to dismiss
Johnson’s appeal on grounds of laches?
2
The State filed a conditional cross-petition for certiorari, asking:
1. Was Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his motion to
correct an illegal sentence untimely?
2. Did Petitioner knowingly consent to the constructive
amendment of the indictment?
3. Did Petitioner provide a record sufficient for review of his
appellate contention?
4. Should Petitioner’s appeal be dismissed on grounds of
laches?2
We granted certiorari on both petitions, Johnson v. State, 423 Md. 450, 31 A.3d 919
(2011), and shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  Petitioner’s sentence
for assault with intent to murder was illegal because that crime was not contained in the
indictment returned by the Grand Jury.  Petitioner’s motion to correct an illegal sentence was
timely because Maryland Rule 4-345(a) allows the trial court to correct an illegal sentence
3Petitioner was tried under other indictments as well, which we shall describe in more
detail when we discuss the issues.
3
“at any time.”  Such a motion is not waived by the defendant’s acquiescence at trial or
sentencing, and we shall not apply the doctrine of laches because the State has failed to
allege any prejudice arising from Petitioner’s delay.  Therefore, we shall vacate Petitioner’s
conviction and sentence for assault with intent to murder.  We need not decide whether the
“constructive amendment” of an indictment may be valid in some circumstances, as it is
clear that no proper amendment occurred in this case.  Moreover, because Rule 4-345(a)
resolves the case, we need not decide whether Petitioner’s claim is “jurisdictional” in any
sense of that word.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
On March 6, 1992, police officers executed a search warrant at 630 Baker Street in
Baltimore City.  When the officers entered the apartment, gunfire erupted, and they saw
Petitioner firing an automatic weapon in the direction of the officers.  They also found large
amounts of cocaine and heroin.  Petitioner was arrested, and the arresting officer prepared
a “statement of charges” that listed assault with intent to murder along with approximately
ten other charges.  That charge was not included in the indictment returned by the Grand
Jury, however.  Rather, the indictment charged four crimes: (1) attempted murder, (2)
common law assault, (3) unlawful wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun, and (4)
unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence.3
Before hearing Petitioner’s plea, the trial court asked the attorneys to “go over what
4The verdict sheet is not included in the record, but the trial court read the charges it
contained into the record, including attempted murder in the first degree; attempted murder
in the second degree; assault with intent to murder; assault; wearing, carrying, and
transporting a handgun; use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence;
and several other crimes charged in other indictments.
4
the offenses are and what the maximum penalties are[.]”  In the discussion that followed, the
attorneys did not mention assault with intent to murder.  Similarly, in opening statements,
the attorneys mentioned attempted murder and other crimes, but did not mention assault with
intent to murder.  The verdict sheet prepared for the jury at the close of evidence, however,
included assault with intent to murder.4  The trial court also instructed the jury about the
crimes on the verdict sheet, including assault with intent to murder.
On September 22, 1992, the jury acquitted Petitioner of attempted murder, but found
him guilty of (1) assault with intent to murder, (2) common law assault, (3) unlawful use of
a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, and (4) unlawful wearing,
carrying, or transporting of a handgun.  Petitioner admits that he did not object, at trial, to
the jury instructions or guilty verdict for assault with intent to murder.
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a 30-year prison sentence for assault with intent
to murder, merging common law assault into that conviction.  The court also imposed a 20-
year consecutive sentence for the use of a handgun in a felony or crime of violence, merging
unlawful wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun into that conviction.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal but did not argue that his conviction or sentence for
assault with intent to murder was illegal.  In January 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to
5
correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence for assault with intent to murder was
illegal because the indictment did not charge that crime.  The Circuit Court denied
Petitioner’s motion, and he appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that
Petitioner’s claim was not jurisdictional, and therefore could not be raised after the time for
direct appeal.  Johnson, 199 Md. App. at 344, 351, 22 A.3d at 917, 920–21.
Sufficiency of the Record
As a preliminary matter, we address the State’s contention that the record is
insufficient for appellate review of Petitioner’s motion because Petitioner failed to include
a transcript of his arraignment.  The State argues that the transcript is necessary to show that
Petitioner did not learn at the arraignment that the State intended to charge him with assault
with intent to murder.  Without such a showing, the State contends, Petitioner cannot rebut
the “presumption of regularity” that attaches to criminal cases.  See Skok v. State, 361 Md.
52, 78–80, 760 A.2d 647, 661–62 (2000).  Petitioner responds that the transcript is not
necessary because, regardless of what may have occurred at the arraignment, his sentence
for assault with intent to murder is illegal given that the indictment did not charge that crime.
Maryland Rule 8-501 provides, in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court or provided by
this Rule, the appellant shall prepare and file a record extract in
every case in the Court of Appeals . . . .  The record extract shall
contain all parts of the record that are reasonably necessary for
the determination of the questions presented by the appeal and
any cross-appeal.
Maryland Rule 8-501(a), (c).  See also Mora v. State, 355 Md. 639, 650, 735 A.2d 1122,
6
1128 (1999) (“It is incumbent upon the appellant claiming error to produce a sufficient
factual record for the appellate court to determine whether error was committed[.]”).
Whatever may have occurred at the arraignment is irrelevant to Petitioner’s argument,
which is that his sentence was illegal simply because assault with intent to murder was not
included in the indictment.  Therefore, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that
Petitioner’s failure to include a transcript of the arraignment does not prevent us from
reviewing his contention.  The record is “sufficient . . . to determine whether error was
committed[.]” See Mora, 355 Md. at 650, 735 A.2d at 1128.
Timeliness of a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence
The Court of Special Appeals held that Petitioner’s motion was untimely because it
was made after the time for direct appeal.  Johnson, 199 Md. App. at 348, 31 A.3d at 919.
The court explained that, although a defendant may assert a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction at any time, Petitioner’s motion did not properly put forth such an assertion.  Id.
at 345–46, 31 A.3d at 917–18.  Rather, the court opined, Petitioner’s motion challenged the
trial court’s “exercise of jurisdiction,” i.e., “the authority of the court to decide a particular
case within the class of cases that is encompassed by the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”
Id. at 345, 31 A.3d at 917.  Thus, the court held that Petitioner’s motion was untimely
because, unlike a motion asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Petitioner’s “remedy
for an improper exercise of jurisdiction was a direct and timely appeal[,]” which he failed
to make.  Id. at 346, 31 A.3d at 917–18.
7
Petitioner contends that his motion did show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and
thus could be brought at any time.  Under Maryland Rule 4-252(d), he argues, “a claim that
a charging document fails to charge or characterize an offense is jurisdictional and may be
raised at any time[.]”  Additionally, Petitioner argues that, under Rule 4-345(a), “[t]he court
may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”
The State responds that the Court of Special Appeals was correct to hold that
Petitioner’s motion did not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction, but rather the exercise of
that jurisdiction, and therefore was untimely.  The State also argues that the doctrine of
laches should prevent us from addressing Petitioner’s claim.
Concerning laches, the State has failed to assert a necessary prong of that doctrine.
The State quotes Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 244, 919 A.2d 1276, 1283 (2007), which
held that laches “applies when there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one’s rights
and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party.”  Yet the State fails to assert any
prejudice resulting from Petitioner’s delay.  Thus, the State has failed to show that laches
should apply.  See Howell v. Brummell, 293 Md. 646, 649–50, 446 A.2d 1149, 1151 (1982)
(“[M]ere delay is not sufficient to constitute laches, if the delay has not worked a
disadvantage to another. . . .  Prejudice or injury to the party raising laches is an essential
element.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
We must decide, therefore, whether convicting and sentencing a defendant on a
charge not contained in the indictment is the type of error that may be “raised and
8
determined at any time” under Maryland Rule 4-252(d) or corrected “at any time” under
Rule 4-345(a).  We begin with Rule 4-252(d), which provides:
A motion asserting failure of the charging document to show
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised
and determined at any time.  Any other defense, objection, or
request capable of determination before trial without trial of the
general issue, shall be raised by motion filed at any time before
trial.
Petitioner cites Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 792, 490 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1985),
which held that, under Rule 4-252(d), “[a] claim that a charging document fails to charge or
characterize an offense is jurisdictional and may be raised, as here, for the first time on
appeal.”  Yet Williams and the other cases Petitioner cites dealt with claims that the
indictment did not charge any offense, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction.  See id. at
790, 490 A.2d at 1279 (appellant “contended that the information failed to state an offense
and hence was fatally defective for lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court”); see also Charles
E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure (13th ed. 1990), § 236 (explaining that an
indictment “must be legally sufficient, i.e., it must contain facts which in law amount to an
offense, and which, if proved, would establish prima facie the accused’s guilt of such
offense”).  We are uncertain whether these cases should apply in Petitioner’s situation, where
the indictment charged several cognizable offenses.  In any event, we need not decide this
issue, because Rule 4-345(a) resolves the case.
Rule 4-345(a) provides: “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”  As
we explained in Chaney v. State, Rule 4-345(a) is designed to accommodate postconviction
5See Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 322–23, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989).
6See State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 185, 742 A.2d 508, 516–17 (1999).
9
motions filed after the time for direct appeal has expired:
If a sentence is “illegal” within the meaning of [Rule 4-345(a)],
the defendant may file a motion in the trial correct to “correct”
it, notwithstanding that . . . the sentence was not challenged in
a timely-filed direct appeal. . . .  The sentence may be attacked
on direct appeal, but it also may be challenged collaterally and
belatedly, and, if the trial court denies relief in response to such
a challenge, the defendant may appeal from that denial and
obtain relief in an appellate court.  (Citations and quotation
marks omitted.)
Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466, 918 A.2d 506, 509 (2007); see also State v. Griffiths,
338 Md. 485, 496, 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995) (“This Rule creates a limited exception to the
general rule of finality, and sanctions a method of opening a judgment otherwise final and
beyond the reach of the court.”).
The “scope of this privilege . . . is narrow, however.”  Chaney, 397 Md. at 466–67,
918 A.2d at 509.  To constitute an illegal sentence under Rule 4-345(a), “the illegality must
inhere in the sentence itself, rather than stem from trial court error during the sentencing
proceeding.”  Matthews v. State, 424 Md. 503, 512, 36 A.3d 499, 505 (2012).  Accordingly,
“we have denied relief pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) because the sentences imposed were not
inherently illegal, despite some form of error or alleged injustice.”  Id. at 513, 36 A.3d at
505.  For example, a motion alleging consideration of improper factors by the sentencing
court5 or illegal conduct by the Parole Commission,6 without more, is not cognizable under
10
Rule 4-345(a).  See Montgomery v. State, 405 Md. 67, 74–75, 950 A.2d 77, 82 (2008) (“[A]
trial court error during the sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-
345(a) where the resulting sentence or sanction is itself lawful.” (citations and quotation
marks omitted)). 
There is no simple formula to determine which sentences are “inherently illegal”
within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a), but as we recently explained in Alston v. State:
There is one type of illegal sentence which this Court has
consistently held should be corrected under Rule 4-345(a).
Where the trial court imposes a sentence or other sanction upon
a criminal defendant, and where no sentence or sanction
should have been imposed, the criminal defendant is entitled
to relief under Rule 4-345(a).  (Emphasis added.)
Alston v. State, 425 Md. 326, 339, 40 A.3d 1028, 1036 (2012).  In Alston, we provided
several examples of sentences that fell within this category:
Several cases in this Court have involved situations
where no sentence or sanction should have been imposed, and
this Court has held that relief under Rule 4-345(a) was
appropriate.  Judge Harrell for the Court in Hoile v. State, [404
Md. 591, 621, 948 A.2d 30, 48 (2008),] described three of these
cases as follows:
See Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 171, 797
A.2d 1287, 1290 (2002) (no sentence should have
been imposed on the defendant for certain assault
charges because the defendant was acquitted of
those charges); Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190,
195–96, 763 A.2d 737, 740 (2000) (sentence of
probation with home detention as a condition of
probation was illegal because the trial court
lacked statutory authority to impose such a
condition); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651, 662,
11
736 A.2d 285, 291 (1999) (sentence was illegal
because the defendant was convicted under an
inapplicable statute).
(Quotation marks omitted.)
Id. at 340, 40 A.3d at 1036–37.  We also discussed two other cases in which Rule 4-345(a)
relief was appropriate because the trial court had not been authorized to impose the sentences
in question:
A seminal case with regard to Rule 4-345(a) is Walczak
v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985).  In that case, the
trial court ordered the defendant Walczak, as a condition of
probation, to pay restitution to a victim of a crime (armed
robbery) of which Walczak had not been convicted.  Walczak
failed to object in the trial court to the restitution, and the Court
of Special Appeals held that Walczak had waived the issue.
This Court, however, held that the restitution order was not
authorized by statute and that it should not have been imposed.
The Court further held that it was an illegal sentence, and, under
Rule 4-345(a), it should be corrected despite the failure to object
in the trial court.  See also Jones v. State, 384 Md. 669, 866
A.2d 151 (2005) (holding that, when the jury’s verdict of guilty
on a count was not orally announced in open court, and the jury
was not polled and harkened to the verdict on that count, no
sentence should have been imposed on that count, and the
sentence on the count was illegal within the meaning of Rule
4-345(a)).  (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 340–41, 40 A.3d at 1037.
Following this line of cases, we held that Alston’s sentence never should have been
imposed because the trial court handed it down only after “unlawfully reopen[ing] the
postconviction proceeding that had terminated[.]”  Id. at 341–42, 40 A.3d at 1037–38.  We
therefore granted relief under Rule 4-345(a).  Id. at 342, 40 A.3d at 1038; see also Baker v.
7Even if some of the defendant’s sentences are proper, a motion under Rule 4-345(a)
is proper if one of the sentences is illegal.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 384 Md. 669, 676–78,
866 A.2d 151, 155–56 (2005) (holding that, although three of the defendant’s convictions
and sentences were proper, the sentence on one charge was illegal under Rule 4-345(a));
Oken v. State, 367 Md. 191, 193–95, 786 A.2d 691, 691–93 (2001) (allowing a Rule 4-
345(a) motion claiming an illegal death sentence for a murder conviction, even though
sentences of imprisonment on other charges were proper); see also Arthur W. Blakemore,
Joyce on Indictments (2d ed. 1924), § 349 (“Where one of two or more counts only is
good[,] a general verdict of guilty will be sustained and referred to the good count.”).
12
State, 389 Md. 127, 133–34, 883 A.2d 916, 919–20 (2005) (holding that a Rule 4-345(a)
motion is proper if “the sentence never should have been imposed”).7
In each of these cases, the movants did not merely allege “a trial court error,” see
Montgomery, 405 Md. at 74–75, 950 A.2d at 82, but instead asserted that the trial court, for
various reasons, lacked the power or authority to impose the contested sentence.  See Alston,
425 Md. at 331–32, 40 A.3d at 1032 (petitioner contended that the resolution of a
postconviction proceeding in his favor removed the court’s power to reopen it to convict and
sentence him); Jones v. State, 384 Md. 669, 679, 866 A.2d 151, 157 (2005) (petitioner
argued that the failure to orally announce the verdict or hearken the jury removed the court’s
power to convict and sentence him on that count); Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190, 192, 196,
763 A.2d 737, 738, 740 (2000) (movant contended that the relevant statutes stripped the trial
court of the “authority to order home detention”); Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488
A.2d 949, 951 (1985) (movant contended that the trial court lacked the power to “order
restitution to a victim of a crime of which he was not convicted”); Ridgeway v. State, 369
Md. 165, 170–71, 797 A.2d 1287, 1290 (2002) (petitioner contended that the trial court was
13
“prohibited” from increasing his sentence after he had left the courtroom following his initial
sentencing proceeding); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651, 666–67, 736 A.2d 285, 293 (1999)
(petitioner contended that the trial court convicted him under a statute that the Legislature
specifically declined to apply to his situation).
Here, Petitioner’s contention is in the same mold, as he argues that the trial court “did
not have the power to render a verdict and impose a sentence on the uncharged offense of
assault with intent to murder.”  As in the cases above, Petitioner’s claim goes to the trial
court’s power or authority, and thus may be raised “at any time” under Rule 4-345(a).
Waiver by Consent
The Court of Special Appeals held that Petitioner’s “silence, acquiescence, and
perhaps even request for [a] jury instruction” on assault with intent to murder constituted
consent to the addition of that charge, by constructive amendment, to the indictment.
Johnson, 199 Md. App. at 347, 22 A.3d at 918.  Thus, the court held:
Given his failure to object at trial, his only recourse would have
been to argue plain error in his direct appeal.  This claim is not
preserved for our review. 
* * *
[A]ny complaint appellant has to the amendment has been
waived by his failure to raise it on direct appeal.
Id. at 348–49, 22 A.3d at 919–20.
The State agrees with the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that Petitioner waived
any objection to the insufficiency of the indictment by his “acquiescence, at trial and
14
afterward, in the propriety of his conviction for assault with intent to murder[.]”  Thus, the
State contends that “both fairness and judicial efficiency” support finding Petitioner’s motion
untimely, as he failed to object at trial, at sentencing, or on direct appeal.
Petitioner responds that his claim is not subject to any preservation requirement.  As
stated above, he argues that his claim is not waived because it may be raised “at any time”
under Rules 4-252(d) and 4-345(a).
Because Petitioner’s claim is cognizable under Rule 4-345(a), it is not subject to
waiver.  As we said in Chaney, a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 4-345(a)
is not waived even if “no objection was made when the sentence was imposed” or “the
defendant purported to consent to it[.]”  Chaney, 397 Md. at 466, 918 A.2d at 509; see also
Walczak, 302 Md. at 427, 488 A.2d at 951 (“[A] defendant who fails to object to the
imposition of an illegal sentence does not waive forever his right to challenge that
sentence.”); Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 303, 429 A.2d 1029, 1032 (1981) (allowing the
defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence even though “he took no appeal from the
final judgment embodying that sentence [and,] at sentencing, both [he] and his counsel urged
the court to order restitution in lieu of incarceration”).  Thus, although Petitioner may have
acquiesced to his conviction and sentence at trial, his claim is not waived, and we shall
consider it on the merits.
Legality of Petitioner’s Conviction and Sentence
The Court of Special Appeals observed that “the circuit court may have erred” in
8The State cites no authority for this proposition.
15
convicting and sentencing Petitioner on assault with intent to murder.  Johnson, 199 Md.
App. at 344, 349, 22 A.3d at 917, 919–20.  The court did not address that issue, however,
because it held that Petitioner’s motion was waived and untimely.  Id.  Because we hold that
Petitioner’s motion was not waived and could be raised “at any time” under Rule 4-345(a),
we shall address the legality of his conviction and sentence for assault with intent to murder.
The State contends that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence for assault with intent
to murder were proper because the indictment was “constructively amended” to include that
charge.  According to the State, the circumstances of this case caused the indictment to be
constructively amended:
Under the circumstance[s] of [Petitioner’s] case, in which the
instructions, verdict sheet, arguments of counsel and sentence
all addressed the charge of assault with intent to murder, the
intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that there had been a
constructive amendment of the indictment was appropriate.8
Petitioner counters that “the ‘constructive amendment’ of an indictment is not allowed
in Maryland[,] and even if it were[,] it could not be applied to add new charges to an
indictment.”  Thus, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by rendering a verdict and
imposing a sentence on assault with intent to murder, because that charge was not contained
in the indictment, whether explicitly or through constructive amendment.
As Petitioner points out, the Maryland Rules prescribe the exclusive procedure for
amending an indictment.  See Brown v. State, 285 Md. 105, 108, 400 A.2d 1133, 1135
9The Court of Special Appeals did not hold that the constructive amendment was
proper, but rather that, because the indictment was constructively amended, the error alleged
by Petitioner did not show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus Petitioner would
have needed to object at trial and raise the issue on direct appeal to preserve it.  See Johnson
v. State, 199 Md. App 331, 345, 348–49, 22 A.3d 909, 917–20.
16
(1979) (“Charging documents in this State now may be amended . . . only in accord with
Maryland Rule 713[.]” (emphasis added)).  Brown refers to former Rule 713, which was
replaced in 1984 with Rule 4-204.  See Johnson v. State, 358 Md. 384, 387–88 n.1, 749 A.2d
769, 771 n.1 (2000) (unrelated case).  Thus, Rule 4-204 now details the exclusive means to
amend an indictment.  Rule 4-204 provides:
On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court at any
time before verdict may permit a charging document to be
amended except that if the amendment changes the character of
the offense charged, the consent of the parties is required.  If
amendment of a charging document reasonably so requires, the
court shall grant the defendant an extension of time or
continuance.
Instead of addressing Rule 4-204, the State points to the Court of Special Appeals’
opinion, which held that the rule is inapplicable because the amendment occurred outside
the confines of the rule.  See Johnson, 199 Md. App. at 349, 22 A.3d at 920 (holding that
“this is a case of constructive amendment, one not contemplated by the Rule” (emphasis
added)).9  If we were to allow an indictment to be amended outside the confines of Rule 4-
204, however, we would not only contradict our precedents providing that the rule is the
exclusive means to amend an indictment, but would also undermine the purpose that the rule
is meant to serve.  As we said in Johnson:
10Article 21 provides, in pertinent part: “[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every man hath
a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or
charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence[.]”
17
The purpose of Maryland Rule 4-204, governing the
amendment of charging documents, is to prevent any unfair
surprise to the defendant and his counsel. . . .  If the State’s
proposed amendment changes the character of the offense, and
the defendant does not consent, then the amendment is deemed
prejudicial to the defendant.
Johnson, 358 Md. at 392, 749 A.2d at 773.
Indeed, Rule 4-204’s prevention of “unfair surprise” fulfills a constitutional
requirement.  As we explained in State v. Morton, the rule that the indictment must inform
the defendant of the charges that he will have to defend
fulfill[s] the constitutional requirement contained in Art. 21 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights that each person charged
with a crime must be informed of the accusation against him.[10]
. . .  Otherwise stated in the leading case of State v.
Lassotovitch, 162 Md. 147, 156, 159 A. 362 (1932), every
charge or accusation must include at least two elements, i.e.:
First, the characterization of the crime; and,
second, such description of the particular act
alleged to have been committed by the accused as
will enable him to properly defend against the
accusation. . . . [T]he second requires such
definite and specific allegations as reasonably to
put the accused on notice of the particular act
charged, to enable him to prepare a defense and
plead the judgment in any subsequent attempted
prosecution.
(Quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Morton, 295 Md. 487, 490–91, 456 A.2d 909, 911 (1983); see also De Jonge v.
11We do not decide whether Maryland Rule 4-204 permits any sort of “constructive”
amendment within its confines.
18
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S. Ct. 255, 259 (1937) (“Conviction upon a charge not made
would be sheer denial of due process.”); Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 163–64, 433 A.2d 1150,
1155–56 (1981) (observing that the purpose of an indictment is “to place an accused on
adequate notice” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).  Because Rule 4-204 protects the
defendant’s constitutional right to have “due time . . . to prepare for his defence[,]” Md.
Const. Art. 21, we shall not allow any amendment, constructive or otherwise, outside the
confines of the rule.11
We must decide, therefore, whether the indictment in this case was validly amended
under Rule 4-204 to add the charge of assault with intent to murder.  As Petitioner points out,
Rule 4-204 does not permit the State to add new charges to an existing indictment.  Rather,
the “‘[a]mendments’ contemplated by Rule 4-204 are changes, alterations, or modifications
to an existing charge in an existing charging document.”  Tracy v. State, 319 Md. 452,
456–57, 573 A.2d 38, 40 (1990) (emphasis added).  If the State desires to charge a defendant
with additional crimes, it must “file additional charging documents charging new offenses.”
Id. at 457, 573 A.2d at 40; see also Torcia, § 269 (“[A]n amendment will be allowed, in an
appropriate case, only if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced[.]” (emphasis added) (citations and quotation
marks omitted)).  As Tracy makes clear, the amendment in this case was not allowable,
under Rule 4-204, because it added a new charge to an existing indictment. 
12An exception to this rule, not applicable here, exists for lesser included offenses of
(continued...)
19
We are left, then, with a conviction on a charge not contained in the indictment.  The
State does not assert that the indictment, without a charge of assault with intent to murder,
was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for that crime—and for good reason.  As we
said in Turner v. State, 242 Md. 408, 414, 219 A.2d 39, 42 (1966), “it is elementary that a
defendant may not be found guilty of a crime of which he was not charged in the
indictment.”  As explained in Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, this rule preserves the
defendant’s right to be informed of the charges against him:
Occasionally, the evidence at trial proves facts that are
materially different from those alleged in the indictment or a
judge gives jury instructions that broaden the basis for a
defendant’s conviction beyond acts charged in the indictment.
When this difference impacts the defendant’s right to be
informed of the nature of the charges against him or her, it . . .
warrants reversal of a conviction. (Footnotes omitted.)
Nancy Hollander et al., Wharton’s Criminal Procedure (14th ed. 2010), § 5:17; see also
Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 107, 99 S. Ct. 2190, 2194 (1979) (“[I]t is . . . a
violation of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction . . . upon a charge
that was never made.”); Turner v. New York, 386 U.S. 773, 775, 87 S. Ct. 1417, 1418 (1967)
(“[A] conviction upon a charge not made is not consistent with due process.” (citations and
quotation marks omitted)); Landaker v. State, 327 Md. 138, 140, 607 A.2d 1253, 1254
(1992) (“[C]onviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process.”
(citations and quotation marks omitted)).12  Thus, the trial court erred in convicting Petitioner
12(...continued)
crimes charged in the indictment.  See Hagans v. State, 316 Md. 429, 450, 559 A.2d 792,
802 (1989); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure (13th ed. 1990), § 267.
20
of assault with intent to murder, because that crime was not contained in the indictment.
In Jones, we held that a similar error caused a sentence to be illegal under Rule 4-
345(a).  See Jones, 384 Md. at 685–86, 866 A.2d at 160–61.  In that case, the trial court
failed to have the jury orally announce its verdict on one of the defendant’s four convictions.
Id. at 677, 866 A.2d at 156.  That error made the sentence illegal because it did not
sufficiently put the defendant on notice of the verdict.  Id. at 684–86, 866 A.2d at 160–61.
As we explained:
“Returning” the verdict in open court mandates an oral
announcement of the verdict upon the conclusion of the jury’s
deliberations to enable the defendant to exercise the right to poll
the jury as to the verdicts.  Furthermore, orally announcing each
count of the verdict prevents possible confusion during polling
and hearkening where there are multiple counts considered by
the jury[.] . . .  [B]ecause the jury was not polled and hearkened
to that Count in absence of its oral announcement, the verdict of
guilt cannot stand and any sentence apportioned thereto must be
vacated. We hold that Jones’s sentence [on the unannounced
charge] is an illegal sentence.
Id.
As in Jones, Petitioner was prejudiced here by not having proper notice of how to
prepare his defense.  He was not properly on notice of the charge of assault with intent to
murder, which prevented him from properly defending against it, just as Jones was not
properly on notice of the verdict, which prevented him from polling the jury or otherwise
21
addressing it.  Id.  Even if Petitioner or his attorney mentioned assault with intent to murder
at some point during trial, without a formal charge on that offense, Petitioner would not have
had the proper motivation to defend against it, and in any event should not have devoted
time and resources to defending a charge not contained in the indictment.  Indeed,
Petitioner’s closing argument did not address assault with intent to murder, focusing
instead—properly, we think—on the crimes actually charged in the indictment.
The indictment has always served to inform the defendant of exactly what he needs
to defend.  See, e.g., Arthur W. Blakemore, Joyce on Indictments (2d ed. 1924), §§ 277, 284
(explaining that an “[i]ndictment must specify the exact charge made . . . to enable the
accused to determine on the line of his defense, and prepare for it both as the law and facts”).
To allow a charge to be implied by the conduct of the parties and the trial court, though
absent from the indictment, would create an unfair guessing game for defendants, in which
they would be required to defend not only the charges in the indictment, but also any other
crimes discussed on the record or argued to the jury.  Such a procedure would eviscerate the
constitutional and prudential reasons for indicting defendants.  Therefore, we think the
procedural error in this case is as grave, if not more so, than the error in Jones, and clearly
caused the sentence to be illegal under Rule 4-345(a).
Vacating Convictions
When the illegality of a sentence stems from the illegality of the conviction itself,
Rule 4-345(a) dictates that both the conviction and the sentence be vacated.  In Griffiths, we
22
held that the defendant’s sentence on possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, after a
conviction for “simple possession of the same cocaine,” was illegal because “the imposition
of [the] sentence on the greater offense had the effect of rendering the sentence on the lesser
offense illegal as a cumulative sentence prohibited by double jeopardy protections.”
Griffiths, 338 Md. at 489, 496–97, 659 A.2d at 878, 882.  Thus, we held that “[v]acating the
sentence imposed on the lesser offense also operates to vacate the judgment of
conviction.”  Id. at 497, 659 A.2d at 882 (emphasis added); see also Alston, 425 Md. at 342,
40 A.3d at 1038 (remanding to the trial court to “correct the imposition of illegal convictions
and sentences” under Rule 4-345(a) (emphasis added)).  Petitioner’s sentence on assault
with intent to murder was illegal because the conviction itself was illegal.  Therefore, in
accord with Griffiths and Alston, we shall vacate both the sentence and the conviction.
Petitioner argues that if we vacate his conviction for assault with intent to murder, we
must also vacate his conviction for use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime
of violence, because the former conviction was a necessary predicate of the latter.  This is
because, he says, “at the time of trial, simple assault, the only remaining relevant conviction
in this indictment, was not considered a crime of violence.”
At the time Petitioner was convicted, the crime of unlawful use of a handgun in the
commission of a felony or crime of violence was defined in Maryland Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol.), Article 27, Section 36B(d), which provided, in relevant part:
Any person who shall use a handgun or an antique firearm
capable of being concealed on the person in the commission of
13See Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 441(e) (listing the crimes of
violence that support a conviction under Section 36B(d)).
14See Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, §§ 286(a)(1), (b)(1), 281A(b).
Wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking is a
“separate felony” from any other crime, see § 281A(b), and is distinct from using a firearm
during the commission of a felony or crime of violence.  As we said in Wynn v. State:
[T]he [L]egislature specifically distinguished between the
wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns and the use of
handguns in criminal activity. In particular, in § 36B(a)(ii) the
[L]egislature emphasized that the increase in the number of
persons killed or injured by handguns was directly related to the
carrying of handguns by persons inclined to use them in
criminal activity.  This comment clearly indicates that the
[L]egislature considered the use of a handgun to be
something more than mere illegal possession of a handgun
and that the [L]egislature contemplated use of a handgun in an
active as opposed to a passive manner.  Death and injury do not
arise from a handgun which remains holstered.  (Emphasis
added.)
(continued...)
23
any felony or any crime of violence as defined in § 441 of this
article shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor[.]
We do not agree that this conviction must be vacated, because three felonies remain
to support it.  To be sure, after vacating Petitioner’s conviction for assault with intent to
murder, no “crime of violence,” as defined in the statute, stands to support this conviction.13
Yet the jury found Petitioner guilty, under a separate indictment, of three other felonies not
affected by our holding: (1) possession with intent to manufacture and distribute heroin, (2)
possession with intent to manufacture and distribute cocaine, and (3) wearing, carrying, or
transporting a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.14  Thus, the record
14(...continued)
Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 541, 546 A.2d 465, 469 (1988); see also Md. Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 36B(d) (listing use of a firearm during the commission of a felony or
crime of violence as a “separate misdemeanor”); Moore v. State, 424 Md. 118, 157, 34 A.3d
513, 536 (2011) (listing the two crimes separately among Maryland’s “handgun statutes”).
24
shows the factual and legal predicate for Petitioner’s conviction for “use of a handgun during
the commission of a felony or crime of violence[,]” and we shall not disturb it.
Conclusion
Petitioner was not charged with assault with intent to murder, nor was the indictment
properly amended to include that charge.  Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction and sentence
for that crime were illegal.  Under Rule 4-345(a), such an error may be raised and corrected
“at any time” and cannot be waived by the defendant’s acquiescence.  We shall grant
Petitioner’s request and vacate his conviction and sentence on assault with intent to murder.
His other convictions shall stand.  In particular, we shall deny his request to vacate his
conviction for use of a firearm during the commission of a felony or crime of violence, as
the record supports that conviction.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO 
THE 
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR
BALTIMORE CITY WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO VACATE THE CONVICTION AND
SENTENCE ON ASSAULT WITH INTENT
TO MURDER AND FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE.