Title: State ex rel. Harsch v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. HARSCH, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Harsch v. Indus. Comm. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Denial of wage loss compensation by Industrial 
Commission — Adequate job search is prerequisite to eligibility — Cause 
returned to commission for further consideration and an amended order 
when specificity requirements of State ex rel. Noll not complied with. 
(No. 95-2131 — Submitted June 24, 1998 — Decided September 30, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD09-1382. 
__________________ 
 
Raymond J. Tisone and E. Gary Seigerst, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Michael A. Vanderhorst, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Manchester, Bennett, Powers & Ullman, C. Scott Lanz and Joseph R. 
Young, Jr., for appellee LTV Steel Co. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, AFL-CIO. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant, Lorenzo Harsch, seeks a writ of mandamus 
compelling appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”) to vacate its 
order denying his application for R.C. 4123.56(B) wage loss compensation and to 
grant this relief.  The commission denied this compensation after determining that 
Harsch had not pursued employment within his medical capabilities in good faith 
and, thus, did not qualify.  The Court of Appeals for Franklin County refused the 
writ, holding that the commission’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.  The 
cause is now before this court upon appeal as of right. 
 
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Harsch injured his back in 1988 while working for appellee LTV Steel 
Company (“LTV Steel”).  His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for 
“[a]cute right dorsal, lumbar strain; herniated nucleus pulposis L-5-S1, right.”  On 
March 16, 1993, he applied for wage loss compensation for a period he would 
later change to January 4, 1993 through August 2, 1993.  Harsch was unemployed 
during this period.  The commission denied Harsch’s application based on the 
findings of its district hearing officer, mainly: 
 
“It is the finding of the District Hearing Officer that wage loss 
compensation is specifically denied from 1/4/93 through 8/2/93.  Claimant has not 
demonstrated a good faith job search consistent with his physical capabilities.  
Claimant only averaged five or less job searches per week during this period.” 
 
Harsch asserts his eligibility for wage loss compensation under R.C. 
4123.56(B), which provides: 
 
“Where an employee in a claim allowed under this chapter suffers a wage 
loss as a result of returning to employment other than his former position of 
employment or as a result of being unable to find employment consistent with the 
claimant’s physical capabilities, he shall receive compensation at sixty-six and 
two-thirds per cent of his weekly wage loss not to exceed the statewide average 
weekly wage for a period not to exceed two hundred weeks.” 
 
Corresponding former Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(D) provided, in part: 
 
“ * * * [T]he payment of compensation or wage loss pursuant to division 
(B) of section 4123.56 of the Revised Code shall commence upon application with 
a finding of any of the following: 
 
“(1)  The employee, as a direct result of the allowed conditions in the claim, 
returns to employment other than his former position of employment and suffers a 
wage loss; 
 
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“(2)  The employee returns to his former position of employment but suffers 
a wage loss; 
 
“(3)  The employee, as a direct result of the allowed conditions of his claim, 
is unable to find work consistent with the employee’s physical capabilities and 
suffers a wage loss.” 
 
In his first arguments for reversal, Harsch maintains that a good-faith search 
for employment within his medical capabilities is not necessary to qualify for 
wage loss compensation under these laws.  We, however, recently confirmed that 
an adequate job search is a prerequisite to eligibility for this compensation.  In 
State ex rel. Vanover v. Emery Worldwide (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 367, 369, 686 
N.E.2d 518, 520, we held: 
 
“The job search required by Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(D)(3) has an 
inherent qualitative component — it must be an adequate job search.  [State ex 
rel.] Consolidated Freightways [v. Engerer (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 241, 658 N.E.2d 
278].  The adequacy of a job search must be resolved on a case-by-case basis and 
can encompass many factors.  Two of those factors * * * [are] the number and 
character of job contacts.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
In Vanover, we specifically observed that “[i]t was within the commission’s 
discretion to find that these contacts did not go toward a good-faith [job] search.”  
Id. at 369, 686 N.E.2d at 521.  Accordingly, we reject Harsch’s arguments to the 
contrary. 
 
But in his last argument for reversal, Harsch alternatively contends that the 
commission did not comply with the specificity requirements of State ex rel. Noll 
v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245.  The commission 
found Harsch’s job search inadequate because he consistently contacted only five 
employers per week, ordinarily only one each day, during the period for which he 
 
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purportedly could find no work commensurate with his physical condition.  We 
agree that this explanation is too brief to justify the denial of wage loss 
compensation.  A denial of a claim without some explanation as to why the 
claimant’s persistent job search is insufficient provides a reviewing court no basis 
upon which to determine why the commission decided to withhold benefits.  
Indeed, absent evidence and an explanation as to whether the commission 
considered the claimant incredible, or a malingerer, or had another reason for 
discounting his efforts, his daily inquiries for employment can hardly represent a 
lack of good faith. 
 
Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment denying the requested writ of 
mandamus is reversed and a writ returning this cause to the commission for further 
consideration and an amended order is granted. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  The majority holds that the commission’s 
explanation for denying wage loss compensation is insufficiently explicit because 
it did not specify why Harsch’s “persistent” job search constituted an inadequate 
job search.  I am not so confounded by the commission’s order.  The evidence 
indicates that Harsch turned in an application or resume for five or so jobs per 
week, only one on any given day, from January 4, 1993 through August 2, 1993.  
Almost exclusively, he contacted employers that could offer him unskilled or 
minimally skilled work — fast food restaurants, furniture, clothing, and carpeting 
stores, gas stations, etc.  Plainly, the commission was dissatisfied with Harsch’s 
 
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lack of industriousness because it lamented that he contacted, on average, “only * 
* * five or [fewer]” of these employers per week.  This statement represents the 
conclusion that Harsch failed to diligently seek employment in good faith or, 
stated differently, that the commission considered Harsch a malingerer — 
precisely the explanation for which the court today returns this cause for the 
commission to reproduce. 
 
We have routinely proclaimed the commission the exclusive evaluator of 
evidentiary weight and disability.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 
31 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21, 31 OBR 70, 72, 508 N.E.2d 936, 938; State ex rel. Pass 
v. C.S.T. Extraction Co. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376, 658 N.E.2d 1055, 1058; 
State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 266, 268, 680 N.E.2d 
1233, 1235; and State ex rel. Chrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 158, 166, 689 N.E.2d 951, 957.  We have routinely pledged to sustain the 
commission’s decisions when based on “some evidence” of record, and we have 
similarly promised to resist any temptation to second-guess or micromanage the 
commission.  Burley, id.; Pass, id.; State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 579, 584, 679 N.E.2d 300, 305; Chrysler, id.  Yet in ruling as the 
majority does today, this court perpetuates the myth that it is not a “super” 
commission, surreptitiously demanding that the commission either grant 
compensation or justify the denial to its satisfaction.  See State ex rel. 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 176, 177, 677 
N.E.2d 338, 341. 
 
Evidence exists in this record to substantiate the commission’s stated reason 
for denying wage loss compensation.  The order thus manifests no abuse of 
discretion and cannot be disturbed in mandamus.  Accordingly, I dissent and 
would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment denying the writ. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion.