Title: State of Idaho v. Darren B. Hooper Appeal from conviction of lewd conduct with six year old daughter

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33826 
 
  
STATE OF IDAHO,                         
                                        
          Plaintiff-Respondent,         
                                        
v.                                      
                                        
DARREN B. HOOPER,                       
                                        
          Defendant-Appellant.                                  
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Boise, September 2007 Term 
 
2007 Opinion No. 137 
 
Filed:  December 24, 2007 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, for Payette County.  Hon. Stephen W. Drescher, District Judge. 
 
The conviction is vacated and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.  
Paula M. Swensen argued. 
 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
Darren B. Hooper was convicted of lewd conduct with his daughter, six-year-old 
A.H.  At trial, the district court deemed A.H. unavailable and admitted a videotaped 
interview of the child.  After Hooper’s conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 126 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).  Hooper appealed.  The Court of Appeals held that 
a videotaped interview of the child victim was testimonial under Crawford and Davis, 
that the admission of the videotape was error, and that the error was not harmless.  The 
court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.  This Court granted 
the State’s petition for review.  We hold that the videotaped statements were testimonial 
 
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in nature, based on Crawford and Davis, and that admission of the statements was not 
harmless error.  We vacate the conviction and remand the case for further proceedings.   
I. 
On August 2, 2003, Crystal Hooper woke and learned Derek Hooper was in the 
bathroom with their daughter, A.H.  The door was locked.  Crystal Hooper used a 
screwdriver to open the bathroom door.  She ordered A.H. into Crystal’s bedroom and 
questioned Darren about his activities in the bathroom.  Then, after speaking with A.H., 
Crystal accused Darren of sexually molesting A.H. and called the police.   
When the police arrived, they questioned Darren and Crystal Hooper and 
attempted to question A.H.  The police did not collect evidence at this time, but Detective 
Marshall and Detective Plaza arranged a forensic examination with on-call personnel at 
the Sexual Trauma Abuse Response (“STAR”) Center in Ontario, Oregon.   
At the STAR Center, Dr. De La Paz first talked with Crystal Hooper and then 
conducted a sexual abuse examination of A.H., during which she found breaking and 
swelling in the rectal area. Jeremi Helmick, a STAR Center nurse and forensic 
interviewer, interviewed A.H. after Dr. De La Paz completed the medical examination.  
Helmick videotaped the interview while Detective Plaza observed from another room via 
a closed circuit system.  At the end of the interview, Detective Plaza talked with Helmick 
and Crystal Hooper.  Plaza collected the videotape and two swabs taken during the 
physical examination and put them into evidence storage at the Payette Police 
Department.  Following the examination and interview, the police returned to the Hooper 
home to collect evidence, including a sheet from A.H.’s bed, underwear belonging to 
A.H. and a washcloth from the bathroom.  
 
Prior to trial, the State served notice of intent to introduce the videotaped 
interview of A.H. and hearsay statements made by A.H. to the forensic examiner, based 
on Idaho Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(5).  The District Court reserved ruling on 
the matter.  At trial, the State called A.H. to testify.  After A.H. was unable to take the 
oath, the district court declared A.H. unavailable and the state sought to introduce the 
videotaped interview.  The defense objected based on the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
 
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right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.1  The court admitted the 
videotape over Defendant’s objection, based on a pre-Crawford analysis, and played the 
video for the jury.  
 
The jury found Mr. Hooper guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor 
child under the age of sixteen pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-1508.  The District Court 
sentenced Mr. Hooper to six years imprisonment, with two and one-half years fixed.  Mr. 
Hooper timely filed his Notice of Appeal from his Judgment of Conviction.  The Court of 
Appeals held that the admission of the videotaped interview violated Mr. Hooper’s right 
to cross-examine his accuser as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause:  “The 
conclusion is inescapable that the nurse was acting in tandem with law enforcement 
officers to gain evidence of past events potentially to be used in a later criminal 
prosecution.”  The court further held the error was not harmless.  As a result, the court 
vacated the Judgment of Conviction and remanded the case.  This Court granted the 
State’s Petition for Review. 
II. 
The question presented is whether videotaped statements made by a child during 
an interview by a forensic examiner at a sexual trauma abuse response center are 
testimonial when the police directed the child to the center and observed the interview 
from another room.  We hold that the videotaped statements were testimonial in nature, 
based on Crawford and Davis, and that admission of the statements was not harmless 
error.  We vacate the conviction and remand the case for further proceedings.   
A. 
When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives 
serious consideration to the Court of Appeals’ decision.  State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 
495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (quoting Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 535, 82 P.3d 
445, 447 (2003)).  This Court does not merely review the correctness of the decision.  Id.  
                                                 
1 Defense objected based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 113 S. Ct. 2510 
(1980).  One month after Hooper’s conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), which significantly altered the Confrontation Clause analysis.  When 
the U.S. Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, “that rule is the controlling 
interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct 
review.”  Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1993).  See also 
State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 387-88, 871 P.2d 801, 804-05 (1994).  Thus, we apply Crawford and Davis 
here. 
 
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Rather, the Court acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the trial 
court’s decision.  Id.  
When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, the appellate court should 
give deference to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.  Doe v. State, 133 Idaho 811, 813, 992 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(citing State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992)).  The appellate court 
exercises free review over the trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.  Id.  Hooper asserted below 
that admission of the videotaped interview violated his right to confront adverse 
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  This is a question of law 
over which the Court exercises free review.  See Doe, 133 Idaho at 813, 992 P.2d at 1213. 
B. 
This is an issue of first impression for the Idaho Supreme Court.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 126 S. Ct. 1354 
(2004), significantly altered the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause analysis.  A 
subsequent case, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), further 
clarified Crawford, but left many issues unresolved.  State courts have interpreted these 
cases in varying ways, and the parties in the present case similarly disagree on the proper 
application of the Supreme Court precedent. 
Hooper contends the videotaped statements are testimonial because the forensic 
nurse examiner was acting as an agent of the police and no emergency existed at the time 
the statements were taken.  According to Hooper, investigative interrogations are directed 
at establishing the facts of a past crime in order to identify, or provide evidence against, 
the perpetrator.  Since the purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be 
used in a criminal prosecution, and there is a clear connection between the police and the 
STAR Center, the interview was the functional equivalent of a police interrogation.  
Thus, it is testimonial under Crawford and Davis, and inadmissible unless the witness is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.   
The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in its application of Davis to this 
case.  According to the State, Davis applies only to determine whether statements to law 
enforcement personnel or their agents are testimonial.  Since Hooper has not shown the 
 
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interviewer here was an agent of the police, Davis is inapplicable and the question is 
whether the statement at issue is one of the three “core testimonial statements” listed in 
Crawford.  Pointing to the third formulation of “core testimonial statements,” the State 
contends the evidence is nontestimonial because the defendant has not shown the 
circumstances of the interview would have led a child of the victim’s age to reasonably 
believe she was making a statement for use at a later trial.  The State asserts that, at most, 
Hooper is entitled to have this case remanded so that evidence of agency may be 
presented to the district court. 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses against 
him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI, cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.  Prior to Crawford, the 
Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of an 
unavailable witness’s statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears 
“adequate indicia of reliability.”  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.  To meet that test, the declarant 
must be unavailable and evidence must either fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or “bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id.   
Crawford altered this analysis with regard to testimonial statements.  In 
Crawford, the Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial are 
admissible only where declarant is unavailable and where defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  541 U.S. at 59.  Although the Court declined 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” the Court did set forth some 
guidelines.  First, the Court looked to Webster’s dictionary definition of “testimony” 
from 1828.  Testimony is “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting 1 N. Webster, An 
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).  The Court then listed three 
formulations of “core” testimonial statements: 
 
(1) 
“ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially;” 
 
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(2) 
“extrajudicial 
statements . . . contained 
in 
formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions;” and 
 
(3) 
“statements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial.” 
 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).  This is not an exclusive list of 
“testimonial” evidence.  Rather, these formulations all share a “common nucleus” and 
then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.  Id.   
The determination of whether evidence is testimonial requires the court to 
consider the purpose behind the Confrontation Clause.  The Supreme Court based its 
holding in Crawford on the historical underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause, and 
noted that the Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this history in mind: 
First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed 
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of 
ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. . . . The Sixth 
Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in mind. 
 
541 U.S. at 50.  For example, the Court noted that statements taken by police officers in 
the course of interrogations are testimonial “under even a narrow standard” because 
police interrogations bear a “striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the 
peace in England.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  Thus, interrogations by law enforcement 
officers fall “squarely within that class” of testimonial hearsay.  Id.  In closing, the Court 
noted that “[W]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.  These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 
The Supreme Court applied this new Confrontation Clause doctrine in 
consolidated cases Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. ____, 126 S. 
Ct. 2266 (2006).  In Davis, the Supreme Court began with the clarification that “[i]t is the 
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while 
subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.”  Thus, the threshold question in a Confrontation Clause case is 
whether the statement is testimonial.  If the evidence is testimonial, the evidence may be 
 
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admitted only if the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; Davis, 547 U.S. at 
____, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.   
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when 
made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that 
the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.  They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there 
is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  Davis, 
547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.  Thus, a statement is testimonial under Crawford 
and Davis when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution, unless made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.2  547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2274. 
The circumstances surrounding the statements in Davis led the Court to conclude 
the statements were nontestimonial.  In reaching its holding, the Court articulated certain 
factors that distinguished the nontestimonial statements in Davis from the testimonial 
statements in Crawford.  First, the witness in Davis was speaking about events as they 
were actually happening, rather than describing past events.  547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2276.  Second, any reasonable listener would recognize the witness in Davis was 
facing an ongoing emergency.  Id.  Third, the nature of what was asked and answered in 
                                                 
2 In Davis, where the statements were made to a 911 operator during the course of a domestic disturbance, 
the statements met the emergency exception and were deemed nontestimonial.  See Davis, 547 U.S.___, 
126 S. Ct. 2266.  The Court referred to its statement in Crawford that interrogations by law enforcement 
officers fall “squarely within the class” of testimonial hearsay, and noted that it had in mind interrogations 
directed at establishing the facts of a past crime in order to identify the perpetrator.  547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2276.  The product of such interrogation is testimonial.  Id.  The Court assumed for the purposes of 
the decision that even if 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at least be 
agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers and therefore the court 
considered their acts to be the acts of the police for the purposes of the decision.  547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2274 n.2.  Nevertheless, the statements were nontestimonial because they were not aimed at 
establishing the facts of a past crime, but rather describe a situation as it happened to enable police 
assistance for the victim.  On the other hand, statements made to police officers who arrived on the scene 
after the disturbance had terminated, where the parties were separated and questioned individually, were 
deemed testimonial in Hammon because they were for the purpose of proving past events relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.  547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-80.   
 
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Davis, viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able 
to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn what had happened in the 
past.  Id.  Finally, the Court elaborated on the different levels of formality between the 
two interviews.  Id.  Based on these factors, the Court held that the statements in Davis 
were nontestimonial: 
We conclude from all this that the circumstances of McCottry’s 
interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  She simply was not acting as a 
witness:  she was not testifying.  What she said was not a “weaker 
substitute for live testimony.” 
 
547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.  Comparing the statements made in Davis to those in 
Crawford, the Court noted that, unlike the situation in Crawford, where the ex parte 
actors and evidentiary products of the ex parte communications aligned perfectly with 
their courtroom analogues, the statements made in Davis did not.  Id. (“No ‘witness’ goes 
to court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.”).  
The Court considered the same factors to hold the statements made in Hammon 
were testimonial.  First, there was no emergency in progress.  “It is entirely clear from the 
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal 
past conduct—as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged.”  547 U.S. at 
___, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.  “Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose 
of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime.”  Id.  In addition, the Court 
pointed to the formality of the statements, and that the statements were deliberately 
recounted in response to police questioning relating to how criminal conduct progressed:  
“Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, 
because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently 
testimonial.”  547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.  The Court distinguished the statements 
based on the purpose of the interview and the similarities between this interview and live 
testimony. 
We will employ a totality of circumstances analysis in order to determine whether 
the videotaped statements here were testimonial in nature.  In this case, the police 
detectives arranged an examination with forensically-trained personnel at the STAR 
Center. The referral by police officers, in and of itself, is not of great significance, absent 
 
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evidence of the purpose of the referral.  Similarly, the fact that an interviewer has 
forensic training does not, in and of itself, make the statements “testimonial” in nature.  
The purpose of such interviews can be two-fold – medical treatment and forensic use.  
Statements made to medical personnel have frequently been held to be nontestimonial 
when the primary purpose was treatment, even where police officers referred the child to 
the medical personnel.  See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 923-24 (Colo. 2006) 
(statements made to a physician conducting a sexual assault exam were nontestimonial 
where the police officer was not involved in the medical examination and not present in 
the room when the doctor performed the examination); Commonwealth v. DeOliviera, 
849 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Mass. 2006) (child’s statements to an emergency room physician 
were nontestimonial where police took the child to the emergency room to receive a 
medical assessment because the doctor’s purpose was to determine whether the child was 
injured and whether she needed medical treatment); State v. Krasky, No. A04-2011, 2007 
WL 2264711, at *5 (Minn. Aug. 9, 2007) (child’s statements to nurse were 
nontestimonial even though police and social services jointly referred the child to the 
hospital where no law enforcement officer was present at the assessment and the primary 
purpose of the interview was to assess and protect the child’s health and welfare).  
A review of the factors in this case indicates that the interview was geared toward 
gathering evidence, rather than providing medical treatment.  When the Officers 
questioned Darren Hooper, the accused abuser, Detective Marshall informed him that the 
child would be going to the STAR Center for an interview, and that “depending on the 
type of information [he] get[s] back from there, gonna depend on what kind of action is 
done.”  The Detective also asked Hooper whether there was any information A.H. was 
going to divulge to the counselors that Marshall should know “before [he] hear[s] it from 
them.”  See Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278.  At the STAR Center, Detective Plaza observed the 
interview via a closed circuit system.  
At the beginning of the interview, Helmick showed A.H. the camera and stated 
“That’s where my special camera is and that makes it so I don’t have to write everything 
down we talk about, cause I forget stuff sometimes, okay? . . . and my friend John 
[Detective Plaza] is watching to make sure that I remember to ask all the questions I need 
to ask, okay?”  Helmick commenced the interview by describing certain rules to A.H. 
 
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with regard to telling the truth:  “Make sure that what we talk about is only the truth in 
here, okay?”  Helmick then proceeded to ask questions regarding the event in question.  
She sought details, including questions seeking to identify the perpetrator: Who is that? 
What was his name?  Where were you when that happened? How many times did it 
happen?  Toward the end of the interview, Helmick consulted with the detective.  When 
she returned to the room, she said “I did forget just a couple things,” and continued to ask 
a few questions regarding specific details of what happened in the bathroom.   At the end 
of the interview the detective talked with Helmick and Crystal Hooper, then collected the 
videotape and two swabs taken during the physical examination and put them into 
evidence storage at the Payette Police Department.  The police also returned to the 
Hoopers’ home to collect additional evidence following the interview.  These factors 
suggest the STAR Center interviewer was working in concert with the police to establish 
or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution.   
Based on the foregoing facts, we hold the videotaped statements were testimonial 
under Crawford and Davis.  The circumstances surrounding this particular case 
objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interview was to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, as opposed to meeting the 
child’s medical needs.  Helmick did not ask any questions regarding A.H.’s medical 
condition, or whether the child was injured.   Further, this interview took place after a 
medical assessment and separately from the medical assessment.  The police officer was 
present only at the second interview, not during Dr. De La Paz’ examination.  Unlike the 
situation in Davis, there is no evidence the statements were made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the 
interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.   The parties 
clearly anticipated that the videotaped statements would provide a substitute for the 
child’s live testimony in court.  Thus, the statements are admissible only if A.H. was 
unavailable and only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.  Since Hooper had no prior opportunity to cross-examine A.H., it was error to 
admit the videotape in evidence at trial.   
 
 
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C. 
The State argues that even if the videotaped statements are testimonial in nature, 
the admission of the statements at trial was harmless error.  An error that does not affect a 
defendant's substantial rights is considered harmless and does not require reversal or a 
new trial. State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 527, 50 P.3d 1014, 1022 (2002).  Whether a 
conviction for a criminal offense should stand when a state has failed to accord a 
constitutionally guaranteed right is a federal question.  Chapman v. State of California, 
386 U.S. 18, 20-21, 87 S. Ct. 824, 826 (1967).  Before a federal constitutional error can 
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 24.  The test for harmless error is whether a reviewing court can 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without 
the admission of the challenged evidence.  Doe, 137 Idaho at 527, 50 P.3d at 1022 
(quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998)). 
Idaho courts applied the harmless error test to Confrontation Clause violations 
prior to Crawford and Davis.  See, e.g., Doe, 137 Idaho at 526-27, 50 P.3d at 1021-22; 
State v. Green, 136 Idaho 553, 557, 38 P.3d 132, 136 (Ct. App. 2001) (“A Confrontation 
Clause violation does not automatically require reversal; rather, the doctrine of harmless 
error applies.”).  In addition, courts in other states have applied the harmless error test to 
Confrontation Clause violations after Crawford and Davis.  See, e.g., State v. Blue, 717 
N.W.2d 558, 566 (N.D. 2006); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880-81, 878 (Mo. 2006).  
There is no reason to assume the harmless error test would not apply post-Crawford. 
 
Whether an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, 
including the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the 
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s 
case.  Green, 136 Idaho at 558-559, 38 P.3d at 136-37 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
457 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986)).  In this case, the child’s testimony was 
essential.  Although there was some corroborating evidence, much of the physical 
evidence was inconclusive.  We cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have reached the same result had the videotape been excluded.   
 
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III. 
We vacate the conviction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  This result renders a discussion of additional issues unnecessary 
because Hooper’s additional issues can be corrected on remand.  Specifically, in response 
to Hooper’s argument that the jury instruction created a fatal variance from the 
indictment, we note that the jury instruction should match the indictment on remand.  See 
State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 59, 951 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and Justice Pro 
Tem TROUT CONCUR.   
 
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