Title: State v. Robert J. Stynes

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 65 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1143-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Robert J. Stynes,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  258 Wis. 2d 302, 653 N.W.2d 773 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Shirley S. Abrahamson, C.J.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Shunette T. Campbell, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Patrick 
M. 
Donnelly, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
 
2003 WI 65 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1143-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CM 199) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert J. Stynes,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals 
decision that modified and affirmed a judgment of conviction 
against Robert J. Stynes and reversed the circuit court's order 
denying postconviction relief.1  The court of appeals concluded 
that the repeater allegation in the State's complaint failed to 
provide Stynes with notice of the predicate convictions on which 
his repeater status was based, as required by Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 State v. Stynes, No. 02-1143-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2002) (modifying and affirming judgment, 
and reversing order of the circuit court for Walworth County, 
Michael S. Gibbs, Judge). 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 973.12(1) (1999-2000) and due process.2  In referring to those 
convictions, the complaint misstated the date of the convictions 
by one calendar day. 
¶2 
We conclude that the complaint provided Stynes with 
the required notice of the predicate convictions.  Because the 
complaint, in referring to those convictions, described the 
offenses, stated the correct county where the convictions 
occurred, cited the case number, and misstated the date of the 
convictions by only one calendar day, we determine that the 
misstatement did not meaningfully change the basis on which 
Stynes entered his plea.  We therefore reverse the court of 
appeals decision. 
I 
¶3 
In March 2000, the State filed a criminal complaint 
against Stynes, charging him with two counts of disorderly 
conduct and two counts of resisting a police officer.  According 
to the complaint, a police officer observed an apparently 
intoxicated Stynes lying in the grass in front of a private 
residence.  The officer identified himself as a police officer 
and asked Stynes if he was okay.  Stynes did not reply. 
¶4 
After the officer requested an ambulance, he continued 
to try to talk to Stynes, noticing a strong odor of intoxicants 
coming from him.  Stynes eventually opened his eyes, swore at 
the officer, and refused to provide his name.  Shortly after the 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
3 
 
ambulance arrived, Stynes got up and began to walk away.  When 
the officer attempted to follow Stynes, he turned around and 
approached the officer, swearing at him, and threatening to kill 
him.  By this time, another police officer arrived.  The 
officers ordered Stynes to the ground but he refused.  He was 
eventually forced to the ground by the officers, all the while 
struggling, pushing, kicking, and swearing. 
¶5 
Stynes was then taken to Lakeland Medical Center where 
he was abusive to the hospital personnel.  He continued to 
struggle and spit on the officers, threatening them and using 
obscene language. 
¶6 
The complaint alleged that Stynes was a repeater 
within the meaning of the penalty enhancement provisions in Wis. 
Stat. § 939.62.3  As the basis for his repeater status, the 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 939.62 allows for increased penalties for 
repeat offenders and provides in relevant part: 
939.62 Increased penalty for habitual criminality. 
(1) If the actor is a repeater, as that term is 
defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for 
any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, 
except for an escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to 
report 
under 
s. 
946.425, 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be 
increased as follows: 
(a)  A maximum term of imprisonment of one year or 
less may be increased to not more than 2 years. 
(b)  A maximum term of imprisonment of more than one 
year but not more than 10 years may be increased by 
not more than 2 years if the prior convictions were 
for misdemeanors and by not more than 4 years if the 
prior conviction was for a felony. 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
4 
 
complaint alleged that Stynes was "convicted of damage to 
property and disorderly conduct on 3/18/98 in Walworth County 
case 98CM118; and bail jumping on 4/21/97 in Walworth County 
case 97CM83."  The repeater allegation potentially increased the 
maximum term of imprisonment for the four offenses alleged in 
the complaint from two years to twelve years. 
¶7 
A jury found Stynes guilty of all the charged 
offenses.  The circuit court ordered a presentence investigation 
which provided Stynes' criminal history and noted that he had 
been convicted of criminal damage to property and disorderly 
conduct in Walworth County on March 17, 1998.  The circuit court 
sentenced Stynes to the maximum term of imprisonment of twelve 
years.  This sentence reflected the imposition of enhanced 
penalties imposed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c)  A maximum term of imprisonment of more than 10 
years may be increased by not more than 2 years if the 
prior convictions were for misdemeanors and by not 
more than 6 years if the prior conviction was for a 
felony. 
(2) The actor is a repeater if the actor was convicted 
of a felony during the 5-year period immediately 
preceding the commission of the crime for which the 
actor presently is being sentenced, or if the actor 
was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions 
during that same period, which convictions remain of 
record and unreversed.  It is immaterial that sentence 
was stayed, withheld or suspended, or that the actor 
was pardoned, unless such pardon was granted on the 
ground of innocence.  In computing the preceding 5-
year period, time which the actor spent in actual 
confinement serving a criminal sentence shall be 
excluded. 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Stynes 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
seeking 
commutation of the penalties imposed because the State failed to 
comply with the notice provision in Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) which 
requires that the charging document set forth the predicate 
convictions on which the alleged repeater status of the 
defendant is based.4  He argued that although the presentence 
report identified convictions dated March 17, 1998, there was no 
evidence for any convictions dated March 18, 1998, as alleged in 
the complaint.  Stynes contended that this error resulted in the 
                                                 
4  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) provides: 
Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a 
repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if 
convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be 
alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea.  The 
court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant 
a reasonable 
time to 
investigate 
possible 
prior 
convictions before accepting a plea.  If the prior 
convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by 
the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence 
under s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he 
or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any 
crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or 
a persistent repeater.  An official report of the 
F.B.I. or any other governmental agency of the United 
States or of this or any other state shall be prima 
facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein 
reported.  Any sentence so reported shall be deemed 
prima facie to have been fully served in actual 
confinement or to have been served for such period of 
time as is shown or is consistent with the report.  
The court shall take judicial notice of the statutes 
of the United States and foreign states in determining 
whether the prior conviction was for a felony or a 
misdemeanor. 
 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
6 
 
State's failure to satisfy the notice requirement mandated by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.12(1). 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
postconviction motion. 
¶9 
Stynes appealed.  The court of appeals agreed with 
Stynes that the State failed to comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12(1) and due process.  It therefore modified the judgment 
of conviction by commuting Stynes' sentence to the maximum 
allowed by law without the repeater penalty enhancement.  It 
determined that "the State had failed in its burden to plead the 
repeater allegation with relative clarity and precision, thus 
denying Stynes notice of the proper basis of the repeater."  
State v. Stynes, No. 02-1143-CR, unpublished slip op. at ¶15 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2002). 
II 
¶10 This case presents us with an opportunity to review 
the State's obligation to provide a defendant with notice of the 
predicate convictions on which the State intends to base 
repeater penalty enhancements.  Specifically, we must address 
here whether the State satisfied Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) and due 
process when the complaint misstated the date of the convictions 
as March 18, 1998 rather than March 17, 1998. 
¶11 Whether the notice complied with § 973.12(1) presents 
a matter of statutory interpretation which is a question of law 
subject 
to 
independent 
appellate 
review. 
 
State 
v. 
Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 891-892, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).  
Compliance 
with 
the 
notice 
requirement 
also 
raises 
constitutional due process concerns.  State v. Gerard, 189 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
7 
 
Wis. 2d 505, 512 n. 6, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995).  The application 
of constitutional principles to the facts of a case is subject 
to independent appellate review.  State ex rel. McMillan v. 
Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 280, 392 N.W.2d 453 (1986). 
III 
¶12 We begin our discussion by examining the repeater 
penalty enhancement provisions in Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  These 
provisions allow for an increase in the maximum term of 
imprisonment that can be imposed as the result of a criminal 
conviction.  For example, in this case, each of the two 
disorderly conduct charges carried a maximum prison term of 
90 days and each of the two resisting a police officer charges 
carried a maximum prison term of nine months.  However, by 
operation of the penalty enhancement provisions, the maximum 
term for each charge was increased to three years. 
 
¶13 A person is a repeater if he or she was convicted of 
one felony or three misdemeanors during the five-year period 
immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which he 
or she is now being sentenced.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).  When 
seeking repeater penalty enhancements, Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) 
requires that the State allege the predicate convictions within 
the applicable charging document "before or at arraignment, and 
before acceptance of any plea."  Accordingly, the State cannot 
add 
a 
repeater 
allegation 
after 
arraignment 
and 
plea.  
Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d at 896.  The reason for requiring the 
repeater allegation early in the process is to ensure that when 
the defendant is asked to plead, he or she has notice of the 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
8 
 
extent of the potential punishment.  State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 
102, 110, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) does not specifically 
identify the information the State is to include in a repeater 
allegation.  However, our case law establishes the minimum level 
of specificity required of a repeater allegation.   
¶15 A repeater allegation should identify the repeater 
offense, the date of conviction for that offense, and the nature 
of the offense——whether for a felony or misdemeanor conviction.  
Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 515-516.  The date of conviction is 
important because the ability to use the conviction to establish 
repeater status depends on whether the conviction falls within 
the five-year period identified in Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).  The 
State bears the burden of pleading a repeater allegation "with 
relative clarity and precision."  Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d at 111. 
IV 
¶16 The repeater allegation in the complaint against 
Stynes misstated the date of the convictions by one calendar 
day.  Stynes does not assert that there was any error in the 
description of the offenses, the identification of the county 
where the convictions occurred, or the case number cited. 
 
¶17 In analyzing the error in the date, the court of 
appeals determined that the convictions cited in the repeater 
allegation did not exist.  Based on this determination, it 
concluded that "Stynes's assessment of the possible punishment 
at the time of sentencing is meaningfully changed due to another 
conviction being substituted for the one set forth in the 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
9 
 
charging documents."  Stynes, slip op. at ¶15.  Thus, the court 
of appeals concluded that the State failed to comply with the 
statutorily mandated notice requirement and that Stynes' due 
process rights were violated.  It therefore modified the 
judgment of conviction by commuting Stynes' sentence to the 
maximum allowed by law without the repeater enhancements. 
¶18 The State argues that the court of appeals did not 
properly distinguish between the State's duty to give the 
defendant notice at the pleading stage of his alleged status as 
a repeater, and the State's burden to prove the defendant's 
repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing 
stage.  It asserts that the notice requirement articulated in 
§ 973.12(1) and the requirements of due process do not mandate 
perfection in pleading prior convictions in the charging 
document. 
¶19 The State also asserts that the court of appeals erred 
when it concluded that the repeater allegation used prior 
convictions that did not exist.  According to the State, it did 
not rely on nonexistent convictions, but rather, it relied on 
existing 
convictions 
and 
merely 
committed 
an 
error 
when 
transcribing the date onto the complaint.  The State seeks 
reversal of the court of appeals' decision and a reinstatement 
of the enhanced sentence originally imposed by the circuit 
court. 
¶20 Stynes, on the other hand, relying primarily on Wilks 
and Gerard, embraces a bright-line rule.  He argues that any 
charging document that contains a repeater allegation must 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
10 
 
contain an accurate and precise recitation of the date of the 
predicate convictions on which the repeater status is based.  
According to Stynes, if the proof of the alleged prior 
convictions offered at sentencing differs from the date used in 
the complaint, even if by only one calendar day, the State has 
failed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
statutory 
and 
due 
process 
notice 
requirements. 
¶21 We agree with the State that the error in this case 
did not render the repeater allegation ineffective.  Here, the 
repeater allegation set forth in the complaint asserted that 
Stynes was "convicted of damage to property and disorderly 
conduct on 3/18/98 in Walworth County case 98CM118."  We are 
unpersuaded by Stynes' assertion that Wisconsin case law 
supports a conclusion that the complaint failed to comply with 
the statutory and due process notice requirements. 
¶22 In Wilks, the State filed a criminal complaint 
charging Wilks with misdemeanor retail theft.  The complaint 
also contained a repeater allegation that listed a conviction 
for forgery on May 24, 1986.  As it turned out, the May 24, 1986 
conviction did not exist.  After Wilks pled no contest to the 
retail theft charge, the circuit court permitted the State to 
use a July 3, 1985 forgery conviction to establish Wilks' 
repeater status at sentencing.  The July 3, 1985 conviction had 
not been listed in the complaint. 
¶23 The court of appeals reversed concluding that while 
the original complaint against Wilks provided notice of a 
May 24, 1986 forgery conviction, it did not provide notice of a 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
11 
 
July 3, 1985 forgery conviction.  It determined that the 
amendment meaningfully changed the basis upon which Wilks 
assessed the extent of possible punishment at the time of the 
plea.  Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d at 111. 
¶24 Stynes argues for a bright-line rule pursuant to 
Wilks.  But the Wilks court did not endorse such a rule.  Citing 
to Martin/Robles, it embraced a standard which bars post-plea 
amendments that meaningfully change the basis upon which the 
defendant assessed the extent of possible punishment at the time 
of the plea.  Id. (citing Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d 883). 
¶25 The Wilks court observed that "the burden lies with 
the State to plead a repeater allegation with relative clarity 
and precision."  Id.  Nevertheless, the court noted that an 
absolute bar to post-plea amendments may lead to an absurd 
result.  Acknowledging the need for some leeway, the court 
reiterated its standard: whether the amendment meaningfully 
changed the basis on which the defendant entered his plea.   
¶26 While this case is similar to Wilks in that both cases 
involve the proper date of conviction, the cases are dissimilar 
in two key respects.  First, the difference between the two 
dates in Wilks was over ten months which made the month, day, 
and year all incorrect, and the county of conviction was 
unknown.  In contrast, the difference between the two dates in 
this case was one calendar day. 
¶27 Second, there was some confusion in Wilks regarding 
whether the State, when it listed a conviction that occurred on 
May 24, 1986, was attempting to refer to the conviction that 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
12 
 
occurred on July 3, 1985.  The State may have been alleging a 
wholly different offense, or even a nonexistent offense.  
Because of the confusion, the court concluded that Wilks was not 
fairly put on notice of the actual conviction.   
¶28 In the case at bar, however, there is no question that 
the State was intending to refer to Stynes' convictions that 
occurred on March 17, 1998, convictions that actually existed.  
The fact that the convictions existed is apparent because the 
complaint described the offenses, stated the correct county of 
conviction, cited the case number, and included a date of the 
convictions that was misstated by only one calendar day. 
¶29 Gerard also does not require the standard proposed by 
Stynes.  In Gerard, this court concluded that an information may 
be amended after the plea to correct a clerical error in the 
sentence portion of a repeater allegation if the amendment does 
not prejudice the defendant.  Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 509.  It 
determined that the misstatement did not affect the sufficiency 
of the notice given to the defendant. 
¶30 Central to the Gerard court's analysis was its 
determination that the inclusion of the sentence portion was 
nonessential to the repeater allegation.  It noted that there 
was no statutory requirement that the sentence portion of the 
penalty enhancement be specified in the charging document.  
According to the court, § 973.12(1) requires that the prior 
conviction must be alleged before the defendant pleads to the 
charges, but "neither statutory law nor case law requires the 
State to allege the sentence portion of the penalty enhancement 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
13 
 
in the information."  Id. at 514.  In contrast to Gerard, which 
involved an error in a nonessential sentence description 
contained in a repeater allegation, the case before us involves 
an error in a date of conviction, which is essential in 
describing the predicate convictions. 
¶31 Wilks and Gerard also address the due process concerns 
that arise in connection with providing a defendant with notice 
of the predicate convictions.  Wilks identified that the 
underlying 
policy 
of 
the 
notice 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.12(1) is to satisfy due process by assuring that the 
defendant knows the extent of the potential punishment at the 
time of the plea.  Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d at 110.  Gerard reiterated 
that "[d]ue process requires the defendant to be informed of his 
or her repeater status before pleading to the charges."  Gerard, 
189 Wis. 2d at 512, n.6. 
¶32 This case involves an error that did not affect 
Stynes' ability to assess meaningfully the extent of the 
punishment at the time he pleaded to the charges.  The error of 
one calendar day did not mislead or confuse Stynes.  The 
complaint provided him with a description of the offenses, the 
county where the convictions occurred, the case number, and a 
date of the convictions that was off by one calendar day.  In 
these circumstances, the complaint provided Stynes with the 
information necessary to identify which of his prior convictions 
would be used to establish his repeater status.   
¶33 Although we disagree with the ultimate conclusion of 
the court of appeals, we certainly agree with its sentiments and 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
14 
 
its urging of prosecutors and trial courts to adopt practices 
which, if followed, would have obviated the need for this 
appeal.  As the court of appeals noted in State v. Goldstein, 
182 Wis. 2d 251, 261, 513 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1994), correctly 
pleading and proving an enhanced sentence is not a particularly 
onerous or complicated prosecutorial task: 
 
We are aware of the heavy burdens and caseloads 
confronting prosecutors.  However, correctly pleading 
and proving a prior conviction for purposes of 
obtaining an enhanced sentence does not strike us as a 
particularly 
onerous 
or 
complicated 
prosecutorial 
task. 
 
One simple and direct question to the defendant from 
either the prosecutor or the trial judge asking 
whether 
the 
defendant 
admits 
to 
the 
repeater 
allegation will, in most cases, resolve the issue.  We 
suggest that trial judges include this question in 
their colloquy with the defendants at the plea hearing 
(if there is one) or, otherwise, at the time of 
sentencing.  If the defendant denies the allegation or 
stands mute, the State should provide evidence of the 
prior conviction via any of the alternative forms of 
proof contemplated under § 973.12(1), Stats. 
 
. . . [W]e again in this case urge the adoption of 
these practices by trial courts and prosecutors.  
These 
procedures 
will 
reduce 
the 
number 
of 
postconviction 
challenges, 
including 
appeals, 
to 
enhanced 
sentences. 
 
More 
importantly, 
these 
procedures will assure that enhanced sentences are 
based on convictions that actually exist and which 
otherwise qualify under the repeater statute. 
¶34 In sum, because the complaint, in referring to the 
predicate 
convictions, 
described the 
offenses, 
stated the 
correct county where the convictions occurred, cited the case 
number, and misstated the date of the convictions by only one 
calendar day, we determine that the misstatement did not 
No. 
02-1143-CR   
 
15 
 
meaningfully change the basis on which Stynes entered his plea.  
We therefore conclude that the complaint provided Stynes with 
the required notice of the predicate convictions on which his 
repeater status was based. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  02-1143-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring). 
It is difficult to conclude that the defendant here was not 
provided with sufficient notice of the predicate convictions on 
which his repeater status was based when the complaint misstated 
the date of one of the convictions by a single day.  Thus I feel 
compelled to join the mandate. 
¶36 I write separately because I believe the majority here 
misses the forest for a single tree to the detriment of the 
citizens of Wisconsin. 
¶37 First, this court should adopt for future cases a 
bright-line 
rule 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) 
requires 
any 
charging document containing a repeater allegation to accurately 
and precisely recite all predicate convictions, including the 
offense of conviction, whether the offense was a felony or 
misdemeanor, and the date of the conviction.  Failure to do so 
defeats the State's ability to convict someone as a repeater 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Such a rule would cut down on 
useless litigation and ensure that enhanced repeater sentences 
are based only on qualifying convictions. 
¶38 For nearly a decade Wisconsin courts have made it 
clear that pleading and proving the repeater allegation is 
neither onerous nor complicated and have urged the State to 
adopt practices that will result in the accurate recitation of 
predicate convictions.5  For more than a decade, however, cases 
have arisen in which the facts of predicate convictions are not 
                                                 
5 See 
State v. Goldstein, 182 
Wis. 2d 251, 
261, 513 
N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No.  02-1143-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
accurately recited.6  Merely urging the State to do better is 
futile without a sanction for failure.   
¶39 Instead of holding the State accountable by adopting a 
bright-line 
rule, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) and due process are satisfied if the 
State comes close enough.  The majority opinion does not define 
close enough, leaving future courts to grapple with the question 
of how close is close enough under the "relative clarity and 
precision" standard.7   
¶40 Under the majority opinion's standard, a defendant is 
encouraged to bring a post-conviction challenge every time the 
State fails to recite accurately a predicate offense, to 
determine whether the State's recitation of a predicate offense 
was close enough.  The circuit court's determination will likely 
then be appealed at least once as the only parameters set by 
this court are that one calendar day is close enough while 10 
months and three weeks is not close enough.8  The majority 
opinion's failure to adopt a bright-line rule is thus expensive, 
for defense counsel, for district attorneys' offices, for the 
department of justice, and for the courts.  The costs to the 
legal system of hearing and deciding these appeals clearly 
exceeds the cost to the State to adopt procedures ensuring that 
                                                 
6 See, 
e.g., 
State 
v. 
Gerard, 
189 
Wis. 2d 505, 
525 
N.W.2d 718 (1995); State v. Martin/Robles, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 470 
N.W.2d 900 
(1991); 
State 
v. 
Wilks, 
165 
Wis. 2d 102, 
477 
N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1991). 
7 Majority op., ¶25 (emphasis added). 
8 Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d at 111. 
No.  02-1143-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
it correctly pleads a prior conviction for purposes of obtaining 
an enhanced sentence.  Why not staple a certified copy (or even 
a non-certified copy) of all prior judgments of conviction to 
the 
criminal 
complaint 
or 
at 
least 
proofread 
criminal 
complaints?  
¶41 Second, the majority opinion's failure to adopt a 
bright-line rule is yet another example of the lower burden this 
court places on the State when depriving a person of his or her 
liberty than it places on private litigants in civil actions.9  A 
plaintiff's error in serving a summons and complaint on the 
wrong city agency office after apparently being misdirected by 
the correct city agency, and despite the fact that the correct 
city agency subsequently received the summons and complaint, 
terminates his cause of action.10  The State's repeated inability 
to accurately inform a defendant of the convictions on which his 
repeater status was based, however, is forgiven as close enough 
for government work.   
¶42 According 
to 
this 
court, 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4), 
governing service of process in civil actions against bodies 
politic, demands strict adherence but Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), 
governing the requisite notice for criminal defendants being 
charged as repeat offenders, permits leniency.  This court's 
jurisprudence 
thus 
upsets 
a 
bedrock 
principle 
in 
our 
                                                 
9 See State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶38, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 
657 N.W.2d 393 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
10 Hagen v. City of Milwaukee Employee's Ret. Sys. Annuity  
Pension Bd., 2003 WI 56, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No.  02-1143-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
Constitution that because "the accused during a criminal 
prosecution has at stake an interest of immense importance" the 
burden on the State in a criminal prosecution is the highest 
burden required of any litigant and the margin of error allowed 
is the lowest.11 
¶43 Finally, I cannot let pass what appears to me an 
additional waste of resources: charging the defendant in this 
case as a repeater so that his sentence for four misdemeanors is 
increased from two years to 12 years. 
¶44 I do not condone the defendant's actions here or in 
any of his prior convictions.  All citizens must abide by the 
law and the failure to do so must result in punishment.  The 
four misdemeanors alleged in the complaint here, however, are 
"minor" when compared to the broad spectrum of criminal 
offenses.  The misdemeanors included damage to property, 
disorderly conduct, bail jumping, and resisting a police 
officer, and the four misdemeanors collectively carry a maximum 
total penalty of 24 months——well short of the 12-year maximum 
sentence the defendant received.   
¶45 What is apparent in the present case is that the 
defendant's behavior is directly linked to drug and alcohol 
abuse.  It appears to me that the State is using an extended 
prison term to mask the symptoms of substance abuse instead of 
facing up to the role that alcohol and drug abuse plays in the 
defendant's criminal conduct.  Not all people are amenable to 
treatment and not all treatment programs prove successful.  
                                                 
11 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). 
No.  02-1143-CR.ssa 
 
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Prison, however, is expensive, costing the State approximately 
$25,000 per year per inmate.  Is it wise public policy to impose 
an extra 10-year prison sentence at a cost to the taxpayers of 
about $250,000 as a substitute to providing him treatment in the 
community he so desperately needs?12 
¶46 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately.  
  
 
                                                 
12 The nationwide average cost of imprisoning an addict is 
$25,900 per year, while treatment costs only $4,400-$6,800 per 
year.  Physician Leadership on Nat'l Drug Policy, Addiction & 
Addiction 
Treatment 
(March 
1998), 
at 
http://center.butler.brown.edu/plndp/Resources/Research_Reports/
Mar__98_Report/mar__98_report.html.  
 
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