Title: Genies v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Daniel Genies v. State of Maryland, No. 11, September Term 2011.
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES – SECTION 8-803 – INDECENT EXPOSURE BY AN
INMATE IN THE PRESENCE OF A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER – COMMON
LAW INDECENT EXPOSURE NOT PREEMPTED 
Section 8-803 of the Correctional Services Article, which prohibits “[a]n inmate . . . with
intent to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass a correctional officer or authorized
personnel [from] lewdly, lasciviously, and indecently expos[ing] private parts of the inmate’s
body in the presence of the correctional officer or authorized personnel,” did not preempt the
common law offense of indecent exposure.  The statutory offense did not cover the entire
subject matter of indecent exposure in a correctional facility, and its legislative history
indicated that it was enacted as a discreet, separate offense with a unique purpose distinct
from the common law offense.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 11
September Term, 2011
DANIEL GENIES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
         *Murphy, Joseph F., Jr.  
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J. 
Bell, C.J., and Greene, J., dissent
Filed:      May 1, 2012
*Murphy, J., participated in the hearing and in
the conference of the case in regard to its
decision after having been recalled pursuant to
the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, but
did not participate in the adoption of the
opinion.
1
All references to Section 8-803 of the Correctional Services Article
(“Section 8-803”) throughout are to Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.).  Section 8-
803 provides: 
(a)  Definitions. – Words or phrases in this section that describe
the common-law crime of indecent exposure shall retain their
judicially determined meanings except to the extent expressly or
implicitly changed in this section. 
(b)  Prohibited conduct. – An inmate may not, with intent to
annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass a correctional
officer or authorized personnel, lewdly, lasciviously, and
indecently expose private parts of the inmate’s body in the
presence of the correctional officer or authorized personnel.  
(c)  Penalty. – An inmate who violates this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. 
In this case, we are asked to consider whether the common law offense of indecent
exposure is preempted on the facts of this case by Section 8-803 of the Correctional Services
Article, Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.), which prohibits “[a]n inmate . . . with intent
to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass a correctional officer or authorized personnel
[from] lewdly, lasciviously, and indecently expos[ing] private parts of the inmate’s body in
the presence of the correctional officer or authorized personnel.”1
While incarcerated at the Montgomery County Correctional Facility in 2008, Daniel
Genies, Petitioner, masturbated in sight of a female correctional officer, while smiling and
making eye contact with her, in spite of her orders to stop.  Genies was subsequently charged
with committing the common law offense of indecent exposure, as well as with violating
Section 8-803.  Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Genies moved to
dismiss the common law charge, arguing that Section 8-803 was preemptive.  The motion
was denied by Judge Joseph A. Dugan, Jr., the presiding judge.  The jury subsequently
2
In making this argument, Genies relies on language in the legislative history 
in which the framers of Senate Bill 429 of 2002, from which Section 8-803 was drawn,
2
acquitted Genies of the statutory offense but convicted him of the common law offense.
Genies, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial, in which he alleged juror intimidation during
deliberations, but Judge Dugan denied the motion without a hearing and ultimately sentenced
Genies to three years’ imprisonment.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction in a reported opinion, Genies
v. State, 196 Md. App. 590, 10 A.3d 854 (2010), and Genies petitioned this Court for a writ
of certiorari, which we granted, 418 Md. 586, 16 A.3d 977 (2011), to consider the following
questions: 
1.  Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss the charge of
common law indecent exposure, where the statutory, specific
intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent
exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer?
2.  Was it error or an abuse of discretion to deny the motion for
new trial, without a hearing?  
We shall answer “no” to both questions and shall hold that Section 8-803 did not preempt the
common law offense of indecent exposure on these facts and that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion when he ruled, without a hearing, on Genies’s motion for a new trial.
We note at the outset that Genies challenges whether the common law offense of
indecent exposure was preempted by the enactment of Section 8-803 in 2002.  In his oral
argument before this Court, he averred that the common law offense does not apply in a
correctional facility,2 but he does not, however, challenge the evidentiary or legal sufficiency
reflected a concern as to whether the common law offense of indecent exposure, as
articulated in the case of Dill v. State, 24 Md. App. 695, 332 A.2d 690 (1975), applied in the
context of a correctional facility: 
Current law defines indecent exposure as the willful and
intentional exposure of the private parts of one’s body in a
public place.  However, inmates who expose themselves within
the confines of a correctional facility cannot be charged with
indecent exposure because correctional facilities are not open to
the general public and, therefore, do not fall into the definition
of public place.
Senators Jimeno, DeGrange, and Neall, Memorandum, SB 429 Correctional Services –
Inmates – Indecent Exposure, March 28, 2002; see also Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee Floor Report on Senate Bill 429, at 1 (2002), citing Dill v. State, 24 Md. App.
695, 332 A.2d 690 (1975).  We need not address the drafters’ concern as to whether a
correctional facility constitutes a “public place” under the common law based on Dill,
because that question is not before us as it would relate to the legal sufficiency of Genies’s
conviction, which was not raised.
3
of his conviction for the common law offense of indecent exposure, defined as “a public
exposure, made wilfully and intentionally, as opposed to an inadvertent or accidental one;
which was observed, or was likely to have been observed, by one or more persons, as
opposed to performed in secret, or hidden from the view of others.”  Wisneski v. State, 398
Md. 578, 593, 921 A.2d 273, 282 (2007).  We therefore review the trial court’s denial of
Genies’s motion to dismiss, the gravamen of which involved whether Section 8-803 preempts
common law indecent exposure when an inmate is the perpetrator, under a de novo standard.
See Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220, 792 A.2d 1160, 1165 (2002).
We initially consider whether Section 8-803 has preempted the common law by
application of the following tenets articulated by Judge Alan M. Wilner in State v. North, 356
4
Md. 308, 311-12, 739 A.2d 33, 34-35 (1999), when, as an active member of this Court, he
addressed the concept of preemption in the context of a common law offense and a statutory
one:
[T]he issue before us is one of legislative intent —
whether, through its enactment of § 287B, the General
Assembly intended to withdraw from the purview of the
common law offense of attempt the conduct covered by the new
statute.  In Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698
(1999), we held it to be “a generally accepted rule of law that
statutes are not presumed to repeal the common law ‘further
than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the
affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not
take away the common law,’” but we also observed that
“[w]here a statute and the common law are in conflict, or where
a statute deals with an entire subject-matter, the rule is
otherwise, and the statute is generally construed as abrogating
the common law as to that subject.”  Id. at 693, 728 A.2d at 702-
03, quoting, in part, from Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A.
354, 356 (1934), quoting, in turn, 25 R.C.L. 1054.
This view, generally disfavoring repeal of the common
law by implication, has a long history in Maryland. In Hooper
v. Mayor & C.C. of Balto., 12 Md. 464, 475 (1859), we quoted
with approval from DWARRIS ON STATUTES at 695 that “it is not
to be presumed that the legislature intended to make any
innovation upon the common law, further than the case
absolutely required,” but that “[t]he law rather infers that the act
did not intend to make any alteration other than what is
specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced.”
(Emphasis in original.)  In Anderson v. State, 61 Md. App. 436,
449, 487 A.2d 294, 300 (1985), Judge Moylan explained the
jurisprudential underpinning for that view, namely, the fact that,
by Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights, the common law is
Constitutionally guaranteed to the inhabitants of the State.
Although that common law may be altered or repealed through
statutes duly enacted by the General Assembly, given the
Constitutional underpinning, its erosion is not lightly to be
implied.
5
In the present case, the statute at issue is Section 8-803 of the Correctional
Services Article, which provides:
(a)  Definitions. – Words or phrases in this section that describe
the common-law crime of indecent exposure shall retain their
judicially determined meanings except to the extent expressly or
implicitly changed in this section. 
(b)  Prohibited conduct. – An inmate may not, with intent to
annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass a correctional
officer or authorized personnel, lewdly, lasciviously, and
indecently expose private parts of the inmate’s body in the
presence of the correctional officer or authorized personnel.
(c)  Penalty. – An inmate who violates this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both.
Clearly, the express language of Section 8-803(a) embraces, rather than preempts, the
common law crime of indecent exposure, because “words or phrases” describing the crime
retain their judicially-determined meanings, unless altered in the Section.
Repeal of the common law by implication, then, is the issue.  The presumption against
such repeal may be overcome, generally, when the statute either addresses the entire subject
matter, known as field preemption, or is inconsistent with the common law, known as
conflict preemption.  Field preemption is implicated when an entire body of law is occupied
on a comprehensive basis by a statute.  Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698
(1999).  In Robinson, we held that the assault statutes enacted in 1996, Sections 12, 12A, and
12A-1 of Article 27, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Code), preempted the common law
offenses of assault and battery entirely.  While the statutes did not expressly abrogate the
common law offenses, their legislative history included bill analyses and a floor report,
6
which stated that the statutes would consolidate and replace the common law offenses.  We
concluded that this legislative history, coupled with the statute’s expressed repeal of the
entire existing statutory scheme, indicated that “[t]he new statutes thus subsumed all previous
statutory assault provisions as well as the common law into a single scheme and established
a two-tired regimen.”  353 Md. at 694, 728 A.2d at 703. 
Conflict preemption is implicated when a statute repeals the common law “to the
extent of inconsistency.”  Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934).  We
considered conflict preemption in North, specifically whether the crime of attempted
possession of a controlled dangerous substance was “narrowed” by Section 287B of Article
27, Maryland Code (1991), which criminalized the possession or purchase of “look alike
drugs,” or non-controlled substance that the person reasonably believed to be a controlled
substance.  We observed that there was no express preemption in the language of the statute
or enacting session law and proceeded to review the statute’s legislative history, which
revealed an intent on the part of the Legislature to create a wholly separate offense, rather
than supplanting the crime of attempt at common law.
Although Genies argues that Section 8-803 preempts the field, he points to nothing
in its language or legislative history to support the notion that the statute was intended to
occupy the entire field of indecent exposure by an inmate.  In reality, field preemption could
not apply, because Section 8-803 only covers exposures in the presence of “authorized
personnel,” a term left undefined, rather than the population of individuals who could be
victims of indecent exposure, such as visitors, among others, who are regularly present in
3
The questions before the Court of Special Appeals were:
1. Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss Count One,
charging common law indecent exposure? 
2. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in denying his
7
correctional facilities.
It appears, however, that Genies’s argument embodies notions of both field and
conflict preemption in his assertion that Section 8-803 supplants the common law offense of
indecent exposure.  In his hybrid assertion, Genies contends that the statute’s specific intent
language, “with intent to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass a correctional officer
or authorized personnel,” was intended to supplant the common law’s requirement of a wilful
and intentional exposure.  Under Genies’s interpretation, the introduction of this specific
intent language altered the belief that the common law offense of indecent exposure did not
apply in a correctional facility.  He also asserts, alternatively, that the Legislature intended
that the statute’s specific intent would narrow the scope of indecent exposures with which
an inmate could be charged because the nature of the correctional facility, in which inmates
have no privacy, would allow an “unpopular inmate” to be charged under the common law
offense for a strip search ordered by a correctional officer.  He also contends because the
common law and statutory offenses share the same penalty, three years imprisonment and
$1,000 fine maximum penalty that Section 8-803 was intended to supersede the common law
offense.
In addressing the same arguments,3 the Court of Special Appeals, however, concluded
motion for new trial, without holding a hearing? 
196 Md. App. 590, 593, 10 A.3d 854, 855 (2010).
8
that Section 8-803 was not intended to supplant the common law, but to supplement it.  Our
intermediate appellate court, in determining that Section 8-803 did not preempt the common
law, was persuaded by the statute’s legislative history, including the Floor Report for Senate
Bill 429, that the Bill was intended to address specific behavior directed towards correctional
officers:
“[a]ccording to testimony, this bill is intended to address
behavioral problems in the corrections system involving inmates
(usually male inmates) who intentionally expose themselves to
corrections officers and personnel (often female), creating a
hostile working environment for the personnel.”  
196 Md. App. at 608, 10 A.3d at 865, quoting Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Floor
Report on Senate Bill 429, at 2 (2002).  Our colleagues then concluded that the presumption
against preemption was not overcome by this specific focus, so that Section 8-803
supplemented the common law offense of indecent exposure in a correctional facility.  Id.
at 611, 10 A.3d at 866-67.  We agree.
We also must consider whether the statutory offense coexists with the common law
offense or whether it supplants the common law.  Like its express language, the legislative
history of the statute does not contain any discussion of preempting the common law.
Rather, the history is replete with discussion that the statute was intended to specifically
criminalize harassment by inmates of correctional officers.  
9
In a prior unenacted iteration of the statute drafted in 2001 as Senate Bill 716, the
Legislature sought to penalize inmates for exposing themselves to members of the opposite
sex:
(b) An inmate may not willfully and intentionally expose private
parts of the inmate’s body in the presence of a member of the
opposite sex. 
The legislative purpose behind SB 716 was to address gender-based harassment by inmates
towards female correctional officers:
This bill came as a result of complaints my office received from
female corrections officers who have been victims of indecent
exposure committed by inmates. 
Senator Jimeno, Memorandum, Senate Bill 716 Correctional Services – Inmates – Indecent
Exposure.
In 2002, SB 716 was substantially revised and reintroduced as SB 429.  See Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee Floor Report on Senate Bill 429, at 2 (2002).  In the Bill,
the Legislature criminalized an inmate’s exposure with the intent to annoy, abuse, torment,
harass, or embarrass a witnessing correctional officer or authorized personnel, removing any
gender specification and leaving “authorized personnel” undefined:
(b) An inmate may not lewdly, lasciviously, and indecently
expose private parts of the inmate’s body in the presence of a
correctional officer or authorized personnel. 
While the Legislature refocused the class of protected individuals to include any
officer or authorized personnel, the motivation for SB 429 remained similar to that of SB
716, to redress harassment by inmates who would indecently expose themselves to guards
10
and create a “hostile work environment for the personnel”:
According to testimony, this bill is intended to address
behavioral problems in the corrections system involving inmates
(usually male inmates) who intentionally expose themselves to
corrections officers and personnel (often female), creating a
hostile working environment for the personnel. 
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Floor Report on Senate Bill 429, at 2.  Testimony
before the Judicial Proceedings Committee in the Senate in support of Senate Bill 429
provided a particularly graphic depiction of the exposure that precipitated the bill’s
enactment: 
We need this legislation to address inmates who, with purpose
and intent, directly expose themselves and masturbate in front
of Officers in routine performance of their duties; likewise, to
address inmates who call for the attention of an Officer so that
when she responds, she finds them naked and masturbating,
sharing in graphic and vulgar terms what they want to do to her.
SB 429: Correctional Services – Inmates – Indecent Exposure, Testimony of Richard J.
Baker, Superintendent of the Anne Arundel County Department of Detention Facilities,
before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Feb. 12, 2002, at 1.
The essence of the Legislature’s purpose, therefore, was to redress workplace
harassment by providing a new offense and deterrent for inmates who indecently exposed
themselves in an effort to abuse correctional officers.  This unique purpose separates the
statutory offense from the common law, which originated as “an offense against morality,”
Wisneski v. State, 398 Md. 578, 590, 921 A.2d 273, 280 (2007), and is a factor to consider
in any preemption equation.  See Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 16, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934)
11
(concluding that a statute, criminalizing the keeping of a bawdy house, did not preempt the
common law offense, criminalizing the keeping a disorderly house, where “they were
directed to different objects”).
The statutory specific intent,“to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass a
correctional officer or authorized personnel,” Section 8-803(b), is sufficiently different from
the common law general intent explained in Wisneski, 398 Md. at 593-94, 921 A.2d at 282.
Specific intent, unlike general criminal intent, is “not simply the intent to do an immediate
act, but the additional deliberate and conscious purpose or design of accomplishing a very
specific and more remote result.”  Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 464, 903 A.2d 388, 408
(2006), quoting Harris v. State, 353 Md. 596, 608, 728 A.2d 180, 183 (1999).  The specific
intent renders it separate and distinct from the common law and, thus, supplemental, rather
than exclusive.  See Lutz, 167 Md. at 17, 172 A. at 356 (“Since there is therefore no conflict
between the common law and the statute, both prevail.”).  As a result, the specific intent of
Section 8-803(b), coupled with a legislative history describing an intent to protect a particular
class of victims rather than preempt the common law offense, establishes that Section 8-803
was intended to serve as a discrete offense, supplementing rather than supplanting the
common law, so both prevail.
Finally, we turn to Genies’s second question inquiring whether the trial judge abused
his discretion in denying, without a hearing, Genies’s motion for a new trial.  In his motion,
filed within ten days after the trial concluded, Genies alleged that at the conclusion of the
trial, a juror had reported to the Jury Commissioner’s Office that she had changed her vote
4
Rule  4-331  was  amended  in  2010,  following Judge Dugan’s denial of
Genies’s motion for new trial.  Among the changes in the 2010 amendment were to add
“revisory power” to the Rule’s title and to redesignate the Disposition subsection as
subsection (f).  The language pertinent to this case, however, remains unchanged.
12
during jury deliberations because she had “felt threatened” by another juror who stated “If
you don’t change your vote, I will make sure we all stay here for weeks,” which undermined
his ability to have a fair and impartial trial; he requested a hearing on the motion.  In
answering Genies’s motion, the State responded that “[Defense] counsel does not include in
her motion that this one juror felt threatened to return a verdict of Not Guilty, and that
because of the behavior of the other juror, changed her vote to Not Guilty on the specific
intent charge of Indecent Exposure by Inmate[.]”  The trial judge denied Genies’s motion
without a hearing, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, based on Maryland Rule 5-
606(b)’s preclusion of jurors from testifying as to the validity of their verdict. 
In addressing whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion
without a hearing, we look at Rule 4-331, then entitled “Motions for new trial,”4 which
provided: 
(a) Within ten days of verdict. On motion of the defendant
filed within ten days after a verdict, the court, in the interest of
justice, may order a new trial. 
 
* * *
(e) Disposition. The court may hold a hearing on any motion
filed under this Rule. . . .
It is clear that the holding of a hearing is discretionary, but Genies contends that the impact
of a threat of a juror against another “cannot be shown to the satisfaction of the Court,
5
Genies  appears  to couch  his challenge  in constitutional  terms by  arguing
that his “fundamental right to a fair and impartial jury” has been abridged without any
elucidation of bases or authority, which supports our exercise of constitutional avoidance in
this case.
13
without a hearing.”5  The State responds that, “[a]s Genies was unable to present any
competent evidence in support of the alleged jury misconduct at a hearing . . . the Court of
Special Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying Genies’s motion under Rule 4-331(a) without a hearing.” 
In considering whether a hearing was necessary in this case, we must consider that
Rule 5-606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying as to a “statement occurring during the course
of jury deliberations” or to “the effect of anything upon that or any other sworn juror’s mind
or emotions as influencing the sworn  juror to assent or dissent from the verdict.”  Contrary
to Genies’s assertion, we have often held that “under no circumstances would it be
admissible to impeach the juror’s own verdict at the hearing of the motion for a new trial.”
Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 71, 102 A.2d 714, 722 (1954).  The facial allegations of the
motion and the State’s response violated these norms, to Genies’s ultimate detriment, but it
is true that the allegations could not have been the subject of a hearing.  Judge Dugan acted,
then, well-within his discretion when he reviewed and ultimately denied Genies’s motion for
new trial under Rule 4-331(a) without a hearing.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 11
September Term, 2011
DANIEL GENIES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
   *Murphy, Joseph F., Jr.               
  (Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J., which
Greene, J.,  joins.
  
Filed: May 1, 2012
*Murphy, J., participated in the hearing and in
the conference of the case after having been
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, but did not participate in the
adoption of the opinion.
1
 The petitioner, Daniel Genies, an inmate at the Montgomery County Correctional
Facility, was charged with indecent exposure, both common law, and pursuant to Maryland
Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.) § 8-803 of the Correctional Services Article.  The
“victim” or “object” of the exposure was a female correctional officer, in whose presence it
occurred.  His motion to dismiss the common law count having been denied, pre-trial, he was
acquitted of the statutory offense, but convicted of common law indecent exposure.  The
petitioner’s timely filed Motion for New Trial, alleging jury misconduct, and accompanied
by a “Request For a Hearing” and memorandum, was denied, after which he was sentenced
to three years' imprisonment.
2Section 8-803 provides:
“(a) Definitions. – Words or phrases in this section that describe
the common-law crime of indecent exposure shall retain their
judicially determined meanings except to the extent expressly or
implicitly changed in this section.
“(b) Prohibited conduct. – An inmate may not, with intent to
annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass a correctional
officer or authorized personnel, lewdly, lasciviously, and
indecently expose private parts of the inmate’s body in the
presence of the correctional officer or authorized personnel.
“(c) Penalty. – An inmate who violates this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both.” 
This Court granted certiorari1 to answer two questions:
1.
Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss the charge of
common law indecent exposure, where the statutory, specific
intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent
exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer?
2.
Was it error or an abuse of discretion to deny the motion
for new trial, without a hearing?
The majority answers both questions in the negative.  As to the first, it agrees with the trial
court and the Court of Special Appeals, Genies v. State, 196 Md. App. 590, 615, 10 A.3d
854, 858-69 (2010), that Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.) § 8-803 of the
Correctional Services Article, 2 does not preempt the common law offense of indecent
2
exposure.  Like the intermediate appellate court, id., 196 Md. App. at 615, 10 A. 3d at 869,
it also concludes that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied  the
petitioner’s Motion for New Trial without a hearing.  Genies v. State of Maryland, ___ Md.
___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2012) (slip op. at 2).  I dissent.  I believe that § 8-803 does
preempt the common law offense of indecent exposure, insofar as it proscribes such an
exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer.  Furthermore, I also believe that the trial
judge erred in deciding the petitioner's Motion for New Trial without a hearing; with the
petitioner's fundamental right to a fair trial at stake, and proffered facts that were required to
be proven to the satisfaction of the court by evidence, which could only occur at a hearing,
the trial court abused its discretion when it did not grant a hearing prior to denying the
petitioner's Motion for a New Trial.
Preemption
As he did at trial and in the Court of Special Appeals, the petitioner argues that
enactment by the General Assembly of a specific intent crime, proscribing “indecent
exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer,” as to that conduct and circumstance,
preempted the field.  Thus, he submits, the trial court erred “in failing to dismiss the charge
of common law indecent exposure.”  Resolution of the question presented and the arguments
in support are controlled by principles articulated by this Court in State v. North, 356 Md.
308, 739 A.2d 33 (1999).  There, we stated that, whether a statute preempts the common law
is a question that is answered by legislative intent, that is, by reference to whether “the
3
General Assembly intended to withdraw from the purview of the common law offense . . .
the conduct covered by the new statute.”  Id., 356 Md. at 311, 739 A.2d at 34.  We also have
explained that “statutes are not presumed to repeal the common law ‘further than is expressly
declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or
implied, does not take away the common law,’” and also, that “[w]here a statute and the
common law are in conflict, or where a statute deals with an entire subject-matter, the rule
is otherwise, and the statute is generally construed as abrogating the common law as to that
subject.”  Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702-03 (1999), quoting Lutz
v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934) (emphasis added).  
Acknowledging and consistent with the teachings of North, the majority looks, first,
to the express language of § 8-803.  Genies, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 5).
As a result, it concludes that § 8-803 “embraces, rather than preempts, the common law crime
of indecent exposure, because ‘words or phrases’ describing the crime retain their judicially-
determined meanings, unless altered in the Section.”  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(slip op. at 5).  Thus, it determines that § 8-803 did not expressly preempt the common law
crime of indecent exposure.  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 5).  The
majority then focuses on whether the common law offense is preempted by implication.  Id.,
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 5).  In that regard, it recognizes that “[a]lthough
[the] common law may be altered or repealed through statutes duly enacted by the General
Assembly, given the Constitutional underpinning, its erosion is not lightly to be implied.”
4
North, 356 Md. at 312, 739 A.2d at 35.  The majority also acknowledges that the
presumption against repeal of the common law by statute “may be overcome, generally,
when the statute either addresses the entire subject matter, known as field preemption, or is
inconsistent with the common law, known as conflict preemption.”  Genies, ___ Md. at ___,
___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 5).   Each of these prongs it addresses in turn.
 With regard to field preemption, the majority adopts the analysis we announced   in
Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698: the proper inquiry is whether the “entire
body of law is occupied on a comprehensive basis” by the statute at issue, here, § 8-803.  Id.,
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 5).  It concludes that the petitioner's field
preemption argument is unpersuasive, reasoning that “nothing in [§ 8-803’s] language or
legislative history . . . support[s] the notion that the statute was intended to occupy the entire
field of indecent exposure by an inmate.”  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at
6-7) (emphasis added).  Interestingly and more particularly, the majority concludes that “field
preemption could not apply, because Section 8-803 only covers exposures in the presence
of ‘authorized personnel,’ a term left undefined, rather than the population of individuals who
could be victims of indecent exposure, such as visitors, among others, who are regularly
present in correctional facilities.”  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 7).  
3 The petitioner argued in this Court that § 8-803’s specific intent language, requiring
that the indecent exposure be for the purpose of “annoy[ing], abus[ing], torment[ing],
harass[ing], or embarrass[ing] a correctional officer or authorized personnel,” was intended
to replace the common law requirement of willful and intentional exposure.  Id., ___ Md. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 7).  That, according to the petitioner, “altered the belief that
the common law offense of indecent exposure did not apply in a correctional facility,” and
evinces the Legislature's intent “that the statute's specific intent would narrow the scope of
indecent exposures with which an inmate could be charged because the nature of the
correctional facility, in which inmates have no privacy, would allow an 'unpopular inmate'
to be charged under the common law offense for a strip search ordered by a correctional
officer.”  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 7).  The petitioner also points to
the fact that both the common law and the statutory offenses impose an identical penalty, a
maximum of three years imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, as indicative of the intent for § 8-
803 to preempt the common law offense.  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at
7).  The majority interprets these arguments as conflict preemption arguments, to which its
pronouncements respond.  As will be made clear, infra, that is not my interpretation.
 
5
Turning to the conflict preemption prong,3 the majority looks to the legislative history
of § 8-803.  Noting that the Floor Report for Senate Bill 429 indicates  that the “bill is
intended to address behavioral problems in the corrections system involving inmates (usually
male inmates) who intentionally expose themselves to correctional officers and personnel
(often female), creating a hostile work environment for the personnel,” id., ___ Md. at ___,
___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 8), quoting the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, Genies,
196 Md. App. at 608, 10 A.3d at 865, in turn quoting Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee
Floor Report on Senate Bill 429, at 2 (2002), it reasons that “the presumption against
preemption was not overcome by this specific focus, so that Section 8-803 supplemented the
common law offense of indecent exposure in a correctional facility.”  Genies, ___ Md. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 8).  The majority, therefore, concludes that “[t]he essence
6
of the Legislature's purpose . . . was to redress workplace harassment by providing a new
offense and deterrent for inmates who indecently exposed themselves in an effort to abuse
correctional officers,” and further, that “[t]his unique purpose separates the statutory offense
from the common law, which originated as ‘an offense against morality.’” Id., ___ Md. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 10-11) (quoting Wineski v. State, 398 Md. 578, 590, 921
A.2d 273, 280 (2007)).  According to the majority, the specific intent, which the petitioner
argues establishes preemption, instead “renders [§ 8-803] separate and distinct from the
common law and, thus, supplemental.”  Genies, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op.
at 11). 
 I disagree with the majority's analysis and conclusions regarding preemption.  To be
clear, I agree with the majority’s statement of an essential principle, “[t]he rules of the
common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear
and unambiguous language.”  Lutz, 167 Md. at 15, 172 A. at 356.  I disagree, and take issue,
with the manner in which it applies that principle to the facts of this case.  In fact, in my
view, the facts of this case, and the legislative history of § 8-803 demonstrate that the statute
was intended, clearly and specifically, to preempt that category of common law indecent
exposure in which an inmate exposes him or herself, in the correctional setting, to a
correctional officer or authorized personnel.  
As a threshold matter, the majority misinterprets the question before the Court and,
as a result, misperceives, and consequently and not surprisingly, misapplies the relevant
7
preemption analysis.  The substantive question as to which we granted certiorari, is, as we
have seen:
“Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss the charge of common law
indecent exposure, where the statutory, specific intent crime preempted
the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a correctional
officer?”
(Emphasis added).  This question is a narrow question.  It does not challenge the continued
viability of common law indecent exposure as a general matter, just an aspect or category of
it.  The limited issue it raises is whether § 8-803 preempts that “field” of the common law
offense of indecent exposure that occurs in a correctional institution and involves an inmate’s
indecent exposure to a correctional officer or authorized personnel.  The majority answers
a different, broader question:  “whether the common law offense of indecent exposure was
preempted by the enactment of Section 8-803 in 2002.”  Id., ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(slip op. at 2).  As I see it, therefore, the majority's holding, that “Section 8-803 did not
preempt the common law offense of indecent exposure,” vastly exceeds the scope of the
question we are asked to address.  
Focusing on the narrow issue presented, whether § 8-803 occupies the field with
regard to indecent exposure occurring in an institution and committed by an inmate to a
correctional officer, I agree that we are guided by the principles articulated by this Court in
State v. North, 356 Md. 308, 311-12, 739 A.2d 33, 34-35.  In that case, we considered a
similar issue, whether the Legislature, by enacting Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.)
Article 27, § 287B, “implicitly repealed, at least to the extent of the overlap, the common law
8
offense of attempting to possess a controlled dangerous substance.”  Id., 356 Md. at 311, 739
A.2d at 34.  Section 287B made it unlawful for a person to possess or purchase a non-
controlled substance that the person reasonably believed to be a controlled substance.  Id.
We had previously held, in Grill v. State, 337 Md. 91, 97, 651 A.2d 856, 859 (1995), that a
person who purchases a substance that he or she believes is a controlled dangerous
substance, with the intent to purchase a controlled dangerous substance, but receives, instead,
a look-alike item that is not, in fact, a controlled dangerous substance, is guilty of the
common law crime of attempting to purchase a controlled dangerous substance. We stated:
“[T]he issue before us is one of legislative intent – whether, through its
enactment of § 278B, the General Assembly intended to withdraw from
the purview of the common law offense of attempt the conduct covered
by the new statute.  In Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698
(1999), we held it to be ‘a generally accepted rule of law that statutes are
not presumed to repeal the common law further than is expressly
declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative
expressed or implied, does not take away the common law,’ but we also
observed that ‘where a statute and the common law are in conflict, or
where a statute deals with an entire subject matter, the rule is otherwise,
and the statute is generally construed as abrogating the common law as
to that subject.’  Id. At 693, 728 A.2d at 702-02, quoting, in part, from
Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 14, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934), quoting, in turn,
25 R.C.L. 1054.” 
North, 356 Md. at 311-12, 739 A.2d at 34-35 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  There was, the Court acknowledged, in that case, no express indication, on the face
of the statute in question, that the common law was to be preempted.  Id., 356 Md. at 313,
739 A.2d at 35.  Therefore, we had to determine whether the statute impliedly preempted the
common law offense.  Id.  We looked to the legislative intent of the statute, and concluded
9
that it did not evince an objective to limit the reach of the common law by statute, and thus,
that the common law offense was not preempted.  Id., 356 Md. at 315, 739 A.2d at 36.
We agree with the majority's interpretation of North, insofar as it cautions that the
presumption against the preemption of a common law offense by statute is not to be inferred
lightly.  On the other hand, although “‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended
to make any innovation upon the common law, further than the case absolutely required,’ but
that ‘the law rather infers that the act did not intend to make any alteration other than what
is specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced,’” the presumption may be
overcome.  Id., 356 Md. at 312, 739 A.2d at 34 (quoting Hooper v. City of Baltimore, 12 Md.
464, 475 (1859)).  “‘[W]here a statute and the common law are in conflict, or where a statute
deals with an entire subject-matter, the rule is otherwise, and the statute is generally
construed as abrogating the common law as to that subject.’”  Id., 356 Md. at 312, 739 A.2d
at 34-35 (quoting Robinson, 353 Md. at 693, 728 A.2d at 702-03, quoting, in part, from
Lutz, 167 Md. at 15, 172 A. at 356, quoting, in turn, 25 R.C.L. 1054).  Thus, the rule that
statutes are not to be interpreted as abrogating the common law is not applicable where it can
be demonstrated that the statute has preempted the field, that is, when “a statute . . . deals
with an entire subject-matter.”  Lutz, 167 Md. at 15, 172 A. at 356.  Field preemption does
not require, as the majority apparently, though erroneously, believes – it defines field
preemption as occurring “when an entire body of law is occupied on a comprehensive basis
by statute,” Genies, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 5) –  that the statute deal
10
with an entire area of law, or, as is relevant to the case sub judice,  an entire category of
criminal activity.  Instead, and as we pointed out in Robinson, it is possible for a statute to
preempt the common law with regard to a specific subject matter within an area of law, or
specific conduct within a category of criminal activity.  353 Md. at 693, 728 A.2d at 702-03.
Here, the subject matter within the general area of law, the conduct within a category of
criminal activity, is indecent exposure of an inmate to a corrections officer, not indecent
exposure, in general.
It is true, as the majority points out, that neither the statute nor the legislative history
of § 8-803 contains any indication that the General Assembly, by enacting the statute,
expressly preempted the common law crime of indecent exposure.  Genies, ___ Md. at ___,
___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 6-7).  That is not the dispositive question where field preemption
is concerned, however.  Preemption may be implied; it need not always be express.
Robinson, 353 Md. at 693, 728 A.2d at 702-03.  When neither the statute nor its legislative
history demonstrates that the statute expressly preempts the common law, the critical
question is whether the statute deals with, addresses, the entire subject matter.  Id.  If it does,
the intent of the Legislature to supplant the common law, as to that subject, is implied.  The
majority recognizes that this is so – that where a statute occupies the field, the presumption
against the repeal of the common law by statute is overcome, Genies, ___ Md. at ___, ___
A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 5), and preemption has, indeed, occurred.  
The issue with which we are presented is whether “the statutory, specific intent crime
11
(§ 8-803) preempted the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a
correctional officer.”  Stated differently, we have to decide whether § 8-803 deals with and
occupies the entire field of indecent exposures occurring between those parties, within the
correctional setting.  I believe that it does.
Section 8-803 (b) provides that “[a]n inmate may not, with intent to annoy, abuse,
torment, harass, or embarrass a correctional officer or authorized personnel, lewdly,
lasciviously, and indecently expose private parts of the inmate’s body in the presence of the
correctional officer or authorized personnel.”  To be sure, it does not purport to address the
offense of indecent exposure, in general, in all of its iterations and under all possible
circumstances.  As to that, I am in total agreement with the majority.  Genies, ___ Md. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 10-11).  It deals, rather, with a discrete circumstance and
with specific parties; the language of the statute makes clear, unambiguously, that it applies
only in those situations, in a correctional setting, involving an inmate and a correctional
officer or authorized personnel.  But it applies in all such situations.  Moreover, it is
absolutely clear and unambiguous in that regard.  As a result, § 8-803, in accordance with
the definition in Lutz, occupies the field with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to
a correctional officer, in a correctional setting.  The majority, thus, answers the wrong
question.
My interpretation of § 8-803 as preempting the field of indecent exposure with respect
to indecent exposures by an inmate to a corrections officer is confirmed by its legislative
4 The majority and the Court of Special Appeals find the text of § 8-803 to be
ambiguous, precluding a definitive determination of legislative intent on that basis and, thus,
requiring resort to legislative history.  The intermediate appellate court, for example, said,
on this point, by way of explanation as to why it was necessary to consult legislative history,
“[w]hile it is arguable that the Legislature intended such specific conduct to be charged under
C.S. § 8-803, it is not clear that the Legislature also intended that other types of indecent
exposure by inmates could not be charged.”  Genies, 196 Md. App. at 607, 10 A.3d at 864.
I, on the other hand, believe that the statute is clear and unambiguous as to what it covers.
Accordingly, it is not necessary that legislative history be consulted.  Nonetheless, it may be
consulted, and I do, in order to confirm my interpretation of the statute.  See The Arundel
Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) (“If there is no ambiguity in [a
statute’s] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances
. . . , we do not then need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules
of construction, for the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it
meant,” quoting Toler v. MVA, 373 Md. 214, 220, 817 A.2d 229, 233 (2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
12
history.4  The Court of Special Appeals, in its opinion, reported the results of its examination
of the contents of the legislative bill file with respect to SB 429, the bill, which, after
enactment, was codified as § 8-803, its analysis, and the conclusions it drew from that
examination. 196 Md. App. at 607-09, 10 A.3d at 864-65.  It advised:   
“Based on our examination of [§ 8-803’s legislative] history, it appears that a
significant factor informing the legislative process was a memorandum opinion
issued by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. See
Testimony of Richard J. Baker, Superintendent of Anne Arundel County
Department of Detention Facilities on SB 429 (February 12, 2002). According
to written testimony in the history, at some point prior to consideration of the
bill that would enact C.S. § 8-803, Senate Bill 429, the Circuit Court had
reversed indecent exposure convictions of two inmates ‘on the grounds that a
correctional facility is not a public place and therefore, the law against
indecent exposure does not apply.’  Id. at 2.  Specifically, the Circuit Court had
ruled:
‘Correctional officers have a difficult enough job in keeping
themselves and the inmates safe, without having to be subjected
to conduct such as expletive-laden communications or vulgar,
13
disgusting and repulsive acts such as the Defendant has
repeatedly committed.’ [However,] ‘[a]s much as the Court
would like to penalize Defendant for his abhorrent conduct, it
may not, as such conduct does not fall within the boundary of
the common law offense of indecent exposure.’
Id. (further citation omitted).
“Apparently in response to the Circuit Court's ruling that a correctional facility
was not a ‘public place’ where the crime of common law indecent exposure
could be committed, several legislators proposed Senate Bill 429 in order to
make clear that such conduct amounted to criminal behavior. Notably, in a
letter from three senators contained within the history is the following:
‘[Senate Bill] 429 prohibits inmates from indecently exposing
themselves in the presence of correctional officers or authorized
personnel. Current law defines indecent exposure as the willful
and intentional disclosure of the private parts of one's body in a
public place. However, inmates who expose themselves within
the confines of a correctional facility cannot be charged with
indecent exposure because correctional facilities are not open to
the general public and, therefore, do not fall into the definition
of a public place.’
“Letter from Senators Jimeno, DeGrange, and Neall re: SB 429 (February 12,
2002).
‘Additionally, according to the Floor Report on SB 429,
[a]ccording to testimony, this bill is intended to address
behavioral problems in the corrections system involving inmates
(usually male inmates) who intentionally expose themselves to
corrections officers and personnel (often female), creating a
hostile working environment for the personnel.’
“Floor Report of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee for Senate Bill
429 of 2002.”
196 Md. App. at 607-08, 10 A.3d at 864-65.  
From this legislative history, the intermediate appellate court concluded:
14
“The legislative history suggests that the Legislature intended to crystallize
that specific conduct by an inmate, i.e., lewd, lascivious, and indecent
exposure with a specific intent in the presence of correctional officers or
authorized personnel, amounted to a misdemeanor. We cannot conclude,
however, that the Legislature also intended to preempt the common law in this
specific area.” 
196 Md. App. at 609, 10 A.3d at 865.   Agreeing, the majority rationalizes that “[t]he essence
of the Legislature’s purpose . . . was to redress workplace harassment by providing a new
offense and deterrent for inmates who indecently exposed themselves in an effort to abuse
correctional officers.  This unique purpose separates the statutory offense from the common
law, which originates as ‘an offense against morality.’”  Genies, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d
at ___ (slip op. at 10-11) (quoting Wineski v. State, 398 Md. 578, 590, 921 A.2d 273, 280
(2007)).  I disagree.
I have no disagreement with the legislative history on which the majority and the
Court of Special Appeals rely.  It does shed light on the intent with which § 8-803 was
enacted and, indeed, only underscores the conclusion that § 8-803 was intended to occupy
the field of indecent exposure by an inmate to a corrections officer.  That history
demonstrates that the Senate Bill that became § 8-803 was a response to a court decision
holding that the common law crime of indecent exposure did not apply in a corrections
facility, that because a corrections facility is not a public place, a necessary element of the
common law crime, an inmate who indecently exposes him- or herself to a corrections officer
was not guilty of common law indecent exposure.   The sponsors of the legislation made
clear that it was their intention to bridge that gap between the common law and unpunishable
15
“abhorrent conduct,” by “prohibit[ing] inmates from indecently exposing themselves in the
presence of correctional officers or authorized personnel.”  Their proposed legislation created
just such a crime, which specifically applies to indecent exposures, in correctional facilities,
engaged in by inmates and directed to correctional officers and authorized personnel.  That
is the precise scenario that is at issue in this case.  Thus, it is unquestionable that § 8-803 was
enacted to change, that is, preempt, the common law.  Prior to its enactment, inmates who
indecently exposed themselves to correctional officers and other authorized personnel, in
correctional facilities, would have been subject only to the common law definition of
indecent exposure, which the Circuit Court for Arundel County had ruled did not apply to
correctional facilities.  After its enactment, those inmates would be chargeable pursuant to
the statute and punished.
The majority sees it differently, as we have seen.  To be sure, it purports to give effect
to the statement of intention of the legislation’s sponsors.  By attributing to them the purpose
of “redress[ing] workplace harassment by providing a new offense and deterrent for inmates
who indecently exposed themselves in an effort to abuse correctional officers,” Genies, ___
Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 10-11), the majority is able to characterize the result
as an “unique purpose” separate from the moral purpose of the common law crime.  Id., ___
Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 11).  With all due respect, this makes no sense.  First,
the purpose of the statute and how that purpose relates to the common law offense’s purpose
have no bearing on the question of whether the statute, in fact, occupies the field and
5 The facts of this case are essentially as follows.  The petitioner, while detained in the
medical unit of the Montgomery County Correctional Facility, undertook to gain the attention
of Corporal N. Goodridge, a female correctional officer who was making her rounds in the
vicinity of his room, by knocking, repeatedly, on the window.  Though the officer ignored
him, he continued to do this, every twenty minutes, as the officer made her scheduled rounds,
until he finally got her attention while she and a nurse escorted another inmate through the
hallway near his room.  The officer saw the petitioner laying in his bed, which was placed
against a large glass window and facing the hallway, masturbating, with his penis exposed.
Despite her protests and instructions for him to stop, the petitioner continued, more
vigorously, while looking at the officer and smiling, until he ejaculated.
The majority correctly notes that who is an “authorized personnel” is undefined,
Genies, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 9).  A fair point, I can grant; however,
it is not debatable that the petitioner was in a medical unit of the correctional facility.  A
nurse in such a facility, even had she been designated a victim, surely is, common sense
would dictate, “authorized personnel.”
6 It is not at all clear that the intent element of the statute adds anything to the common
law crime except to make express and provable something – the motivation for the action –
that the common law assumed.  The purpose of indecently exposing oneself in a public place
can be assumed to have some purpose.  The intents proscribed by § 8-803, “annoy, abuse,
torment, harass, or embarrass,” are quite broad and may be broad enough to encompass any
such purpose.  
16
preempts the common law.  Indeed, requiring such an inquiry adds an additional prong to the
preemption test – determining whether the purpose of the statute in question is identical to
the purpose or spirit of the common law offense sought to be preempted.  This case, second,
is exactly the kind of case that § 8-803 was designed to reach.5  Whether the common law
would apply under other circumstances in the correctional facility is not presented and,
therefore, is beside the point; the petitioner simply was not charged with indecently exposing
himself to a visitor or other person, who was not a corrections officer or authorized
personnel.  While it may have broadened the specific culpable intent with which the inmate
must act,6 contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the moral aspect of the common law crime
7 The common law offense of indecent exposure occurs upon the “‘wilful and
intentional exposure of the private parts of one’s body in a public place in the presence of an
assembly.’”  Wineski v. State, 398 Md. 578, 591, 921 A.2d 273, 281 (quoting Dill v. State,
24 Md. App. 695, 699, 332 A.2d 690, 693 (1975)).  Accordingly, at common law, “[a]n
exposure becomes indecent, and a crime, when defendant exposes himself at such a time and
place that, as a reasonable man, he knows or should know his act will be open to the
observation of others.”  Id. (quoting Dill, 24 Md. App. at 700, 332 A.2d at 694).  Thus, the
elements of common law indecent exposure are “‘the willful exposure, the public place in
which it was performed, and the presence of persons who saw it.’”  Id. (quoting Dill, 24 Md.
App. at 699, 332 A.2d at 693).
Unlike the common law offense, § 8-803 requires that the exposure not only be
willful, but accompanied by the specific intent of “annoy[ing], abus[ing], torment[ing],
harass[ing], or embarrass[ing] a correctional officer or authorized personnel.  Additionally,
the exposure, in the presence of the correctional officer or authorized personnel, must be
“lewd[], lascivious[], and indecent[].”  These enumerated requirements are not incompatible
or inconsistent with common law indecent exposure.  Indeed, rather than establishing a crime
separate and distinct from common law indecent exposure, § 8-803 codifies the moral aspect
of the common law offense while, at the same time, requiring proof of the purpose of the
conduct and thus, in effect, subsumes it.
There is no question that the petitioner’s conduct meets the requirements of § 8-803.
He willfully exposed his penis in a place which he reasonably knew would be open to the
observation of others; in fact, he wanted it to be seen, as demonstrated by his knocking on
the window to get the attention of the officer.  Of more significance, his conduct,
masturbation in the presence of a female correctional officer, was lewd, lascivious and
indecent.  That he purposely sought to gain her attention while so conducting himself
demonstrates that he intended to annoy, abuse, torment, harass or embarrass her.
17
is retained by § 8-803; it proscribes “lewdly, lasciviously, and indecently expos[ing]” the
inmate’s private parts.7     
 It is evident, both from the language of § 8-803 and the legislative history of the
statute, which underscores it, that the Legislature intended that the statute, rather than the
common law offense of indecent exposure, apply when an inmate, in a correctional facility,
exposes him- or herself in the presence of a correctional officer or other authorized
8 In a memorandum in support of the new trial, the petitioner proffered:
“After conclusion of the defendant’s trial, a juror called the Commissioner’s
Office to report that during the deliberations she “felt threatened” by another
juror.  She said that while the jury was deliberating, the threatening juror told
her, “if you don’t change your vote, I will make sure we stay here for weeks.”
The juror subsequently changed her vote in response to this threat.  She also
said that in her opinion, there were other jurors who felt threatened and
changed their votes accordingly.”
9 Maryland Rule 5-606 (b) provides:
“(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict.
“(1) In any inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a sworn juror may not
testify as to (A) any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations, (B) the effect of anything upon that or any other
sworn juror's mind or emotions as influencing the sworn juror to assent
or dissent from the verdict, or (C) the sworn juror's mental processes in
connection with the verdict.
“(2) A sworn juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror
concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from
testifying may not be received for these purposes.
“(3) Notes made under Rule 2-521 (a) or Rule 4-326 (a) may not be
used to impeach a verdict.”
18
personnel, and that the common law offense is preempted.  It follows that, having been
acquitted of the statutory offense, the petitioner is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.
Motion for New Trial
The petitioner also asks us to determine whether the trial court erred when it denied
his Motion for New Trial, without a hearing.  In moving for new trial, the petitioner relied
on information from a juror, who, after his trial had concluded, contacted the Commissioner’s
Office to report that, during the deliberations, in response to a threat from another juror,8 she
changed her vote.  Relying on the prohibition, contained in Rule 5-606 (b),9 of a juror
testifying concerning a “statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations”
10 Maryland Rule 4-331, which governs motions for new trial, provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) Within ten days of verdict. On motion of the defendant filed within ten
days after a verdict, the court, in the interest of justice, may order a new trial.
“(b) Revisory power. The court has revisory power and control over the
judgment to set aside an unjust or improper verdict and grant a new trial:
“(1) in the District Court, on motion filed within 90 days after its
imposition of sentence if an appeal has not been perfected;
“(2) in the circuit courts, on motion filed within 90 days after its
imposition of sentence.
Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the judgment in case
of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. 
“(c) Newly discovered evidence. The court may grant a new trial or other
appropriate relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not
have been discovered by due diligence in time to move for a new trial pursuant
to section (a) of this Rule:
“(1)  on motion filed within one year after the date the court imposed
sentence or the date it received a mandate issued by the Court of
Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals, whichever is later;
“(2)  on motion filed at any time if a sentence of death was imposed and
the newly discovered evidence, if proved, would show that the
defendant is innocent of the capital crime of which the defendant was
convicted or of an aggravating circumstance or other condition of
eligibility for the death penalty actually found by the court or jury in
imposing the death sentence;
“(3)  on motion filed at any time if the motion is based on DNA
identification testing not subject to the procedures of Code, Criminal
19
or “the effect of anything upon that or any other sworn juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the sworn juror to assent or dissent from the verdict,” and noting what we said
in Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 71, 102 A.2d 714, 722 (1954), that “under no
circumstances would it be admissible to impeach the juror’s own verdict at the hearing of the
motion for a new trial,” the majority concludes that the denial was permissible.   Genies, ___
Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 13-14).   Although I agree that, pursuant to Rule 4-
33110, the decision to grant a new trial is a discretionary one for the trial court, where, as is
Procedure Article, § 8-201 or other generally accepted scientific
techniques the results of which, if proved, would show that the
defendant is innocent of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted.
“(d) DNA evidence. If the defendant seeks a new trial or other appropriate
relief under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 8-201, the defendant shall
proceed in accordance with Rules 4-701 through 4-711. On motion by the
State, the court may suspend proceedings on a motion for new trial or other
relief under this Rule until the defendant has exhausted the remedies provided
by Rules 4-701 through 4-711.
“(e) Form of motion. A motion filed under this Rule shall (1) be in writing,
(2) state in detail the grounds upon which it is based, (3) if filed under section
(c) of this Rule, describe the newly discovered evidence, and (4) contain or be
accompanied by a request for hearing if a hearing is sought.
“(f) Disposition. The court may hold a hearing on any motion filed under this
Rule. Subject to section (d) of this Rule, the court shall hold a hearing on a
motion filed under section (c) if a hearing was requested and the court finds
that: (1) if the motion was filed pursuant to subsection (c) (1) of this Rule, it
was timely filed, (2) the motion satisfies the requirements of section (e) of this
Rule, and (3) the movant has established a prima facie basis for granting a new
trial. The court may revise a judgment or set aside a verdict prior to entry of
a judgment only on the record in open court. The court shall state its reasons
for setting aside a judgment or verdict and granting a new trial.”
20
the case here, the misconduct or irregularity alleged by the moving party cannot be proven
to the satisfaction of the court in the absence of a hearing, it is error for the trial court to deny
a party the opportunity to present further evidence or information prior to dispensing with
his motion.  
Rule 4-331 (a), applicable here, provides a trial court with the authority to order a new
trial, within ten days of issuing a verdict, “in the interest of justice.”  We have interpreted that
phrase broadly.  For instance, in State v. Devers, we recognized that:
“Upon conviction, a new trial may be ordered by the court, upon its own
motion, or at the instance of the defendant, or one or more of several
21
defendants, at any time before judgment, for any matter extrinsic to the record
whereby it appears that there was a defect of substantial justice at the former
trial . . . . The matter of granting a new trial is discretionary with the trial court;
but the defendant is entitled to have the application therefor passed upon and
material evidence presented by him received.
“The principal grounds for granting a new trial are, that the verdict was
contrary to the evidence; newly discovered evidence; accident and surprise;
misconduct of jurors or the officer having them in charge; bias and
disqualification of jurors (disqualification not entitling to a new trial, however,
if there was opportunity to challenge); misconduct or error of the judge; fraud
or misconduct of the prosecution, e.g., abuse of argument.” 
260 Md. 360, 374, 272 A.2d 794, 801 cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824, 92 S. Ct. 50, 30 L. Ed. 2d
52 (1971) (quoting Hochheimer, The Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure § 184 at 209-10
(2d ed. 1904)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added), overruled on other
grounds, In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988).  Indeed,
the Court of Special Appeals has acknowledged that “[t]he list of possible grounds for the
granting of a new trial by the trial judge within ten days of the verdict is virtually open-
ended.”  Love v. State, 95 Md. App. 420, 427, 621 A.2d 910, 914 (1993).  Furthermore, the
intermediate appellate court has noted, and I agree, that “[a]lthough tightly constrained by
the time limit that it must be filed ‘within 10 days after the verdict,’ there are no limits on the
substantive content of what may be urged under subsection (a) as being ‘in the interest of
justice.’”  Isley v. State, 129 Md. App. 611, 633, 743 A.2d 772, 784 (2000), overruled on
other grounds, Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17, 785 A.2d 756 (2001).  As such, the petitioner
was working within relatively flexible parameters in seeking to establish sufficient grounds
to justify that, pursuant to subsection (a), a new trial would be in the interest of justice.
22
The issue of whether a party is entitled to a hearing, upon making such a motion, is
governed by Rule 4-331 (f).  Generally, that section permits the trial court to hold a hearing
on any motion filed under the Rule; however, it provides that, when the motion is  based on
“newly discovered evidence,” pursuant to Rule 4-331 (c), as opposed to alleging a right to
new trial in the interest of justice, pursuant to Rule 4-331 (a), the trial court must hold a
hearing if, in accordance with Rule 4-331 (e), the motion is “in writing”, “state[s] in detail
the grounds upon which it is based”, and “contain[s] or [is] accompanied by a request for
hearing if a hearing is sought.”  Thus, as long as a section (c) motion is timely filed, and
complies with the form requirements set forth in section (e), the trial court “shall hold a
hearing,” if a hearing is requested, and “the movant has established a prima facie basis for
granting a new trial.”  Rule 4-331 (f).   
The Rule, to be sure, does not contain a comparable mandatory hearing provision for
new trial motions filed pursuant to Rule 4-331 (a).  Nevertheless, I see no reason to apply,
to such motions, a different standard for the determination of whether and when a hearing
is required.  That is especially the case when, as here, the basis for the new trial request is
evidence discovered after trial, which, but for the timing of its discovery, could and
undoubtedly would be the basis for a section (c) motion.  In this case, and under these
circumstances, it is clear to me that the petitioner pled sufficient facts to establish a prima
facie basis for a new trial.  That entitled him to a hearing.
23
The intermediate appellate court has recognized, and I agree, that “[a]lthough the time
constraints are different, there is no substantive difference between what is material and
persuasive newly discovered evidence under subsection (c) and under subsection (a).
Subsection (c) exists for the exclusive purpose of providing a more extended period of one
year within which newly discovered evidence may be urged upon a trial judge as a reason
for granting a new trial.”  Isley, 129 Md. App. at 632, 743 A.2d at 783.  Indeed, the most
significant distinction between subsection (a) and subsection (c), as relevant to the case sub
judice, is the consequence of an improper denial of a hearing by a trial judge. Specifically,
when a subsection (c) motion is filed, and all the requirements of Rule 4-331 (f) are met, “in
the absence of a waiver by both sides, the court must conduct a hearing before acting on the
motion.”  Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 624, 751 A.2d 473, 479 (2000) (emphasis added);
see also Buck v. Cam's Rugs, 328 Md. 51, 58, 612 A.2d 1294, 1297 (“[A] trial judge has
virtually no ‘discretion’ to refuse to consider newly discovered evidence that bears directly
on the question of whether a new trial should be granted.”).  Failure to conduct a hearing
under those circumstances results in a violation of the rule.  
Similarly, in the case of section (a) motions, there are circumstances in which a judge
must grant a hearing: when a failure to do so would be an abuse of judicial discretion. 
Indeed, there is no substantial difference between the allegations under subsections (a) and
(c), see Isley, supra, such that movants under one, section (c), are entitled to a hearing under
prescribed circumstances, while those under the other are entitled only if the judge says they
11 As we have seen, a movant who timely files a motion under subsection (c) and complies
with the form requirements set forth in subsection (e) is entitled to a hearing if he establishes
a “prima facie basis” for a new trial. The term “prima facie,” literally translated from the
Latin, means “[a]t first sight; on first appearance but subject to further evidence or
information.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (9th Ed. 2009).  A party required to make
out a prima facie case carries that burden when he or she produces sufficient “[e]vidence that
will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced.”  Id.
at 638.  Where, as is the usual case, there is a hearing or trial, the prima facie case showing
is necessary to avoid an adverse ruling and, ordinarily, the burden is one of production, for
example, in a preliminary hearing, to avoid dismissal of charges.  See Davis v. Quille, 248
Md. 631, 633, 237 A.2d 745, 746 (1968) (“[P]reliminary hearing is . . . only for the purpose
of establishing a prima facie case against the defendant.”). On the other hand, however, when
the prima facie showing is necessary to obtain affirmative relief and is to be made
preliminary to a hearing, the showing is a pleading burden.  To be entitled to a hearing,
24
are.  Thus, an improper failure to grant a hearing for a motion filed under section (a), since
there is no express requirement for a hearing and it does not violate any specific requirement
of the rule,  is  reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard.  See Buck, 328 Md. at 57,
612 A.2d at 1297.  Indeed, we have recognized juror misconduct, in general, as grounds for
a new trial.  Denvers, supra.  It is, therefore, absurd to hold, as the majority does, Genies, ___
Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 13-14), that a defendant who, similar to the
petitioner, uncovers evidence of jury misconduct within ten days of a trial’s conclusion, is
not entitled to a hearing, subject, entirely, to a trial judge’s discretion, but would be, as
mandated by the rule, had he discovered this evidence later.  
To be sure, the allegations set forth by the petitioner in his “(a)” motion, had the facts
surrounding the jury misconduct been discovered more than ten days after the conclusion of
trial, would have been sufficient grounds to establish “a prima facie basis” for a new trial
and, thus, entitle him to a hearing.11  The allegations of juror misconduct that the petitioner
therefore, that party has to allege facts that, if true, would establish the required fact, which,
in turn, would ensure him, or her, the forum and the opportunity to establish that they are
true.  
In the former setting, the party with the burden has the forum and the opportunity to
present the supporting evidence.  Contrastingly, in the latter scenario, the question is
answered solely on the basis of the allegations proffered by the party.  The Supreme Court
of Alabama recognized this key distinction, emphasizing the importance, in post-conviction
proceedings, of not requiring a petitioner to satisfy his “ultimate evidentiary burden . . . at
the pleading stage . . . .”  Ex parte Hodges, No. 1100112, 2011 Ala. WL 3780100, at *2-*3
(Aug. 26, 2011) (citing Johnson v. State, 835 So.2d 1077, 1079–80 (Ala.Crim.App.2001))
(“A claim may not be summarily dismissed because the petitioner failed to meet his burden
of proof at the initial pleading stage, a stage at which the petitioner has only a burden to
plead.”). The issue in this case is whether, in a non-section (c) motion, a court may dispose
of a motion for new trial that states a prima facie basis for the relief sought, without allowing
the defendant the opportunity to present evidence, or whether the court must conclude, on
the basis of the allegations, “at first sight,” that the party is entitled to a favorable judgment
on the motion, “subject to further evidence or information.”  I believe the latter is the proper
approach.
25
proffered, if true, would establish that his or her right to a fair trial was infringed, entitling
him or her to a new trial.  Having pled facts that presented a prima facie basis for granting
a new trial, as he would have been had the motion been one pursuant to section (c), see Rule
4-331 (f), the petitioner was entitled to a hearing to prove those allegations; the trial court
abused its discretion in ruling otherwise.  Any other result is simply illogical.  It makes no
sense to hold that the petitioner, in this case, was not entitled to a hearing on the basis of
evidence which, had it been discovered eleven days after the conclusion of trial, rather than
within ten days, would have required the trial court to grant him a hearing.  Furthermore, and
in more direct response to the majority’s position, Genies, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(slip op. at 13-14), the petitioner need not have disclosed, and indeed may have been unable
to at the time the motion was due, all of the evidence on the proffered basis for new trial that
26
he would present. See Ex parte Hodges, No. 1100112, 2011 Ala. WL 3780100, at *2;
Johnson v. State, 835 So.2d at 1079–80.   Moreover, at the pleading stage, the trial court is
not required to, nor should it, assess, before it is offered, the quality of the evidence.  If that
is the trial court’s role, Rule 4-331 is essentially meaningless. 
Our expansive interpretation of “in the interest of justice,” as demonstrated by Devers,
supra, as well as the ends of justice, are served, and given meaning, when movants are
provided with the opportunity to be heard upon proffering allegations  sufficient to call into
question the fairness of the trial.  Indeed, in Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 625, 751 A.2d
473, 479-80 (2000), in the context of Rule 4-331, we recognized the importance of a hearing
:
“Even when afforded only by rule, and not as an incident of due process of
law, the right to a hearing is of fundamental importance.  It represents an
assessment by us of the significance of the matter under consideration, at least
to the parties, and, given that significance, of their right, if they choose to
exercise it, to present directly to the court, viva voce, the reasons why they
should prevail.  It is a recognition that personal, vocal communication with the
judge may not only itself be a more effective means of persuasion than written
documents that may be read hurriedly and not fully appreciated or understood,
but that a hearing offers at least a limited opportunity for dialogue, allowing
for clarification, for greater precision, for addressing concerns harbored and
expressed by the judge.  It is a right that, ordinarily, may be waived, but when
not waived, we are loathe, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, to
find its denial harmless.  It would often be a matter of pure speculation
whether prejudice ensued -- whether, had the party been given the opportunity
to make his or her “pitch” at a hearing, the result may have been different --
and that is much more likely the case when the decision may rest upon the
resolution of factual disputes or the exercise of discretion and judgment.”
27
Id.  I believe that the reasoning we adopted in Jackson is fully applicable to the case sub
judice.
It is true that Rule 4-331 (f) leaves the decision of whether to grant a hearing upon a
motion filed under Rule 4-331 (a) squarely within the discretion of the trial court.  Where,
however, a defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial is at stake, when
sufficiently pled, any misconduct or irregularity that may have affected the outcome of the
trial must be fully addressed.  Even a cursory review of the facts of this case demonstrates
that, had the juror truly been threatened, and had that threat, indeed, caused her to change her
vote, a great injustice would have been done to the petitioner, and his right to a fair trial
impermissibly infringed.  While it is true that the petitioner may have been limited, by Rule
5-606 (b), in the evidence he would be permitted to present at the hearing, that is not the
relevant consideration for the trial court in deciding whether to grant a hearing in the first
place.  Additionally, while it is entirely within the trial court’s discretion to determine, after
the hearing, the sufficiency of the showing that a defendant has made, that is not the test, at
the motion stage. Neither section (a) nor (f) of Rule 4-331 contemplates that the trial court
will determine, in advance of the hearing, the ability of the moving defendant to produce
sufficient evidence to support the allegations in his motion.   
Furthermore, the petitioner could not possibly demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the
court, that there was, indeed, juror misconduct, a permissible ground for granting a new trial,
without a hearing.  It was not for the court to decide, before giving the petitioner the
28
opportunity to present his evidence, and to tell his side of the story, that he would not be able
to produce enough of it or tell his story effectively.  Rule 4-331’s grant of discretion simply
does not reach that far.  
It is my position that the petitioner pled a sufficient basis for new trial and, therefore,
as contemplated by the Rule 4-331, was entitled to a hearing, at which evidence of those
allegations could be presented.  Accordingly, I dissent.
Judge Greene has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.