Title: State v. Fugate

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. FUGATE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856.] 
When a defendant is held on multiple charges and is later sentenced to concurrent 
prison terms stemming from those charges, jail-time credit pursuant to 
R.C. 2967.191 must be applied against each concurrent prison term. 
(No. 2006-2289 – Submitted October 17, 2007 – Decided March 6, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 06AP-298, 2006-Ohio-5748. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a defendant is sentenced to concurrent prison terms for multiple charges, 
jail-time credit pursuant to R.C. 2967.191 must be applied toward each 
concurrent prison term. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents us with the question whether a defendant who is 
sentenced concurrently on multiple charges is entitled to have “jail-time credit”1 
applied toward all terms.  We hold that defendants who are sentenced to 
concurrent prison terms are entitled to have jail-time credit applied toward all 
prison terms for charges on which they were held. 
Facts 
                                                 
1.  The term “jail-time credit” is used as shorthand for custody credit.  A prisoner receives credit 
for any time spent in confinement, including “confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, 
confinement for examination to determine the prisoner's competence to stand trial or sanity, and 
confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where the prisoner is to serve the prisoner's 
prison term.” R.C. 2967.191. 
 
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{¶ 2} Appellant, Daniel J. Fugate, was indicted in case No. 05CR-4367 
on one count of burglary, a second-degree felony, and one count of theft, a fifth-
degree felony.  A jury later found him guilty of theft as charged in the indictment 
and of the lesser included charge of burglary, a third-degree-felony. 
{¶ 3} Fugate had previously been convicted in case No. 05CR-1414 for 
receiving stolen property and had been placed on community control.  Following 
his indictment for burglary and theft, the probation department filed a motion to 
revoke his community control.  The trial court held a hearing on the motion 
immediately before sentencing Fugate on the new charges.  At the revocation 
hearing, Fugate admitted that his new convictions for burglary and theft violated 
the terms of his community control.  The probation officer informed the court that 
Fugate had 216 days of jail-time credit, and the prosecutor suggested that the 
credit be applied only to the sentence for violation of community control.  
Defense counsel did not object, and the court imposed a prison term of 12 months 
for the community-control violation, noting a jail-time credit of 213 days.2  The 
court also stated that the sentence was to run concurrently with the sentences to be 
imposed for the burglary and theft convictions in the new case. 
{¶ 4} The court then imposed a concurrent two-year prison term for the 
burglary conviction.  No jail-time credit was allowed, and defense counsel did not 
object. 
{¶ 5} At a later resentencing, held because the court had failed to 
sentence Fugate on the theft conviction, the court imposed a six-month prison 
term to run concurrently with the two-year term for burglary.3   
                                                 
2.  Although there is discrepancy in the transcript regarding the number of days of jail-time credit, 
the court eventually granted 213 days, to which Fugate did not object either then or now. 
 
3.  The court recognized 50 days of jail-time credit toward the theft sentence, which reflected time 
that had elapsed between Fugate’s initial sentencing and his resentencing.  
 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 6} Fugate appealed, arguing in part that he should have received jail-
time credit of 213 days toward each of his concurrent prison sentences.  The 
Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that allocating jail-time credit 
against only the prison term for community-control violation did not constitute an 
equal protection violation, or amount to plain error.  Fugate appealed, and we 
accepted the appeal to determine how to apply jail-time credit to concurrent 
prison terms. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} The practice of awarding jail-time credit, although now covered by 
state statute, has its roots in the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions.  Recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
tolerate disparate treatment of defendants based solely on their economic status, 
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down rules and practices 
that discriminate against defendants based solely on their inability to pay fines 
and fees.  See Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 
(a state cannot deny appellate review to defendants unable to afford a transcript); 
Williams v. Illinois (1970), 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (a state 
may not imprison a defendant beyond the statutory maximum based solely on his 
inability to pay a fine); Tate v. Short (1971), 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 
L.Ed.2d 130 (a state may not impose a fine as a sentence and then automatically 
convert it to jail time based upon the defendant’s inability to immediately pay the 
fine).  Relying on the principle set forth in such cases, courts have held that 
defendants who are unable to afford bail must be credited for the time they are 
confined while awaiting trial.  “The Equal Protection Clause requires that all time 
spent in any jail prior to trial and commitment by [a prisoner who is] unable to 
make bail because of indigency must be credited to his sentence.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Workman v. Cardwell (N.D.Ohio 1972), 338 F.Supp. 893, 901, vacated in part on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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other grounds (C.A.6, 1972), 471 F.2d 909. See also White v. Gilligan (S.D.Ohio 
1972), 351 F.Supp. 1012. 
{¶ 8} This principle is codified in Ohio at R.C. 2967.191, which states 
that “[t]he department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated 
prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner was 
confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was 
convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial 
* * *.” 
{¶ 9} The Ohio Administrative Code provides additional details 
regarding when a prisoner is entitled to jail-time credit and how to calculate a 
prison term, taking the credit into account.  Most relevant to the question before 
us is Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-04(F), which states that “[i]f an offender is serving 
two or more sentences, stated prison terms or combination thereof concurrently, 
the adult parole authority shall independently reduce each sentence or stated 
prison term for the number of days confined for that offense. Release of the 
offender shall be based upon the longest definite, minimum and/or maximum 
sentence or stated prison term after reduction for jail time credit.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶ 10} The Administrative Code provides a different rule for calculating 
jail-time credit for offenders serving consecutive terms.  In such cases, the code 
instructs that jail-time credit be applied only once, to the total term.  See Ohio 
Adm.Code 5120-2-04(G). 
{¶ 11} These two directives make clear that although concurrent and 
consecutive terms are to be treated differently when jail-time credit is applied, the 
overall objective is the same:  to comply with the requirements of equal protection 
by reducing the total time that offenders spend in prison after sentencing by an 
amount equal to the time that they were previously held. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 12} Thus, in order to satisfy this objective, when concurrent prison 
terms are imposed, courts do not have the discretion to select only one term from 
those that are run concurrently against which to apply jail-time credit.  R.C. 
2967.191 requires that jail-time credit be applied to all prison terms imposed for 
charges on which the offender has been held.  If courts were permitted to apply 
jail-time credit to only one of the concurrent terms, the practical result would be, 
as in this case, to deny credit for time that an offender was confined while being 
held on pending charges. So long as an offender is held on a charge while 
awaiting trial or sentencing, the offender is entitled to jail-time credit for that 
sentence; a court cannot choose one of several concurrent terms against which to 
apply the credit. 
{¶ 13} In the case before us today, Fugate was given concurrent prison 
terms on the burglary and theft convictions and on the community-control 
violation.  The only complete record that we have before us is from the burglary 
and theft case, as that was the case appealed.  At his sentencing hearing, the 
following discussion between the court and the prosecutor took place regarding 
how jail-time credit should be allocated: 
{¶ 14} “The Court: * * * Is there anything on behalf of the state of Ohio 
as far as this case is concerned? 
{¶ 15} “[Prosecutor]: The burglary or his probation case? 
{¶ 16} “The Court: The revocation case. 
{¶ 17} “[Prosecutor]: Yes, sir. We would just suggest to the court, since 
he has been held on both of those, he get his jail-time credit on [the community-
control violation] case and then start fresh with the [burglary case].” (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶ 18} As the sentencing hearing transcript indicates, Fugate was indeed 
held in custody on the burglary and theft charges and for violation of community 
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control and is therefore entitled to jail-time credit against each concurrent prison 
term. 
{¶ 19} In its brief, the state cites several cases that it claims stand for the 
proposition that when an offender is held on a community-control violation as 
well as on new charges, jail-time credit may be applied only toward the sentence 
imposed for the community-control violation.  See State v. Chafin, 10th Dist. No. 
06AP-1108, 2007-Ohio-1840; State v. Washington, 1st Dist. Nos. C-050462 and 
B-0500722, 2006-Ohio-4790; State v. Brooks, 9th Dist. No. 05CA008786, 2006-
Ohio-1485; State v. Maag, 3d Dist. Nos. 5-03-32 and 5-03-33, 2005-Ohio-3761; 
State v. Mitchell, 6th Dist. Nos. L-05-1122 and L-05-1123, 2005-Ohio-6138.  
However, those cases are distinguishable from the present case on their facts and 
procedural histories, and even though jail-time credit may have been denied in 
some cases, it was not denied for the reasons asserted by the state. 
{¶ 20} Some courts, in refusing to apply jail-time credit against all 
concurrent prison terms, have relied on the following statement from a Tenth 
District Court of Appeals decision in which consecutive terms were imposed: 
“We do not believe that the legislature intended to entitle a defendant held and 
later sentenced on multiple offenses the right to multiply his single period of 
pretrial confinement by the number of convictions entered against him.” State v. 
Callender (Feb. 4, 1992), 10th Dist. No. 91AP-713, 1992 WL 21247.  See, e.g., 
State v. Eble, 10th Dist. Nos. 04AP-334 and 04AP-335, 2004-Ohio-6721, ¶ 3 and 
9-11.  While Callender accurately reflects the proper approach to applying jail-
time credit to consecutive prison terms, as we have indicated, different rules apply 
when the terms are concurrent.  To the extent that courts have relied on Callender 
or similar cases in applying jail-time credit toward concurrent prison terms, such 
reliance was misplaced.  Courts that extended Callender in that way overlooked 
the distinction between sentences that impose consecutive terms and sentences 
that impose concurrent terms of imprisonment. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 21} Applying jail-time credit toward all concurrent prison terms 
imposed for charges on which an offender was held does not have the effect of 
“multiply[ing] his single period of pretrial confinement by the number of 
convictions entered against him.”  Id.  Instead, applying the credit toward all 
concurrent terms simply ensures that the offender actually receives credit for that 
single period of confinement. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} When a defendant is sentenced to consecutive terms, the terms of 
imprisonment are served one after another.  Jail-time credit applied to one prison 
term gives full credit that is due, because the credit reduces the entire length of the 
prison sentence.  However, when a defendant is sentenced to concurrent terms, 
credit must be applied against all terms, because the sentences are served 
simultaneously.  If an offender is sentenced to concurrent terms, applying credit to 
one term only would, in effect, negate the credit for time that the offender has 
been held.  To deny such credit would constitute a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Therefore we hold that when a defendant is sentenced to 
concurrent prison terms for multiple charges, jail-time credit pursuant to R.C. 
2967.191 must be applied toward each concurrent prison term. 
{¶ 23} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand this cause to the trial court for an adjustment in Daniel J. Fugate’s 
sentence in accordance with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 24} While I concur with the majority’s decision to hold that defendants 
who are sentenced to concurrent prison terms are entitled to have jail-time credit 
applied toward all prison terms for charges on which they were held and 
convicted, I write separately to underscore the unconstitutionality of treating 
similarly situated defendants differently based solely on their economic status, 
which underlies our conclusion in this case. 
{¶ 25} The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons be treated in a 
manner similar to others in like circumstances.  In Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 
U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, Justice Black wrote that “[t]here can be 
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of 
money he has.”  Moreover, Judge Grey described the inequity in not giving jail-
time credit in his dissent in State v. Thorpe (June 30, 2000), Franklin App. Nos. 
99AP-1180 through 99AP-1187, 2000 WL 966702:  “The rationale for [giving 
jail-time credit] is quite simple.  A person with money will make bail while a 
person without money will not.  If both persons are given identical sentences, the 
reality is that unless the person who did not make bail is given credit for his 
pretrial time, the poorer person will have served more time than the other.  
Unequal treatment based on personal wealth is anathema to the Constitution as a 
denial of equal protection.” 
{¶ 26} With consecutive jail sentences, the inequity does not occur 
because the terms of imprisonment are served one after another.  Credit applied to 
one term of imprisonment gives full credit because the credit reduces the entire 
length of the sentence.  However, with concurrent sentences, credit must be 
applied against all terms, because the sentences are served simultaneously.  If the 
offender is sentenced to concurrent terms, applying credit to only one term would 
cancel out the credit for time that the offender had been held.  For example, here 
the court applied 213 days of jail-time credit to the shorter term of concurrent 
imprisonment.  This rendered the jail-time credit meaningless because it left the 
January Term, 2008 
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greater sentence undiminished.  Under the court of appeals’ holding, if two 
equally culpable codefendants are found guilty of multiple offenses and receive 
identical concurrent sentences, they would serve very different actual periods of 
incarceration if one had been able to post bond and the other had not. 
{¶ 27} A poor criminal defendant should not spend more time in prison 
than his wealthier counterpart simply because he has less money.  For the reasons 
stated above, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand the cause. 
__________________ 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kimberly Bond, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Paul Skendelas, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
Charles B. Clovis, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae, Ohio 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
______________________