Title: State ex rel. Jorza v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Jorza v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-119.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-119 
THE STATE EX REL. JORZA, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLEE; DELPHI PACKARD ELECTRIC SYSTEMS-WARREN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Jorza v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-119.] 
Workers’ compensation — Temporary total disability compensation as it relates 
to employer buyout — Judgment reversed and cause remanded for 
clarification and amended order. 
(No. 2009-0760 — Submitted December 1, 2009 — Decided January 21, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-393,  
2009-Ohio-1183. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} At issue is appellee Charlotte A. Jorza’s eligibility for temporary 
total disability compensation after accepting a buyout from her employer, 
appellant Delphi Packard Electric Systems -Warren.  Jorza was injured at work in 
2005, and a workers’ compensation claim was allowed. In two motions filed in 
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June 2006, Jorza requested, among other things, temporary total disability 
compensation, alleging that her allowed conditions prevented her from returning 
to her former position of employment at Delphi.  Neither the motions themselves 
nor the medical evidence that accompanied them are contained in the record. 
{¶ 2} Three days after Jorza filed her second motion, she submitted 
paperwork to Delphi to pursue an employment buyout incentive. On a “Special 
Attrition Program Conditions of Participation Release Form” dated July 3, 2006, 
Jorza certified, “I am able to work and suffer from no disability that would 
preclude me from doing my regularly assigned job.” Jorza then accepted the 
$140,000 buyout, to which her years of service entitled her. 
{¶ 3} A district hearing officer (“DHO”) for appellee Industrial 
Commission of Ohio granted Jorza’s motions for temporary total disability 
compensation on August 1, 2006, but that order is not in the record.  On August 
14, 2006, Jorza’s buyout became effective, and her employment with Delphi 
ended. 
{¶ 4} Delphi appealed the DHO order and also filed a motion to 
terminate temporary total disability compensation, alleging that Jorza’s 
acceptance of the buyout constituted a voluntary abandonment of employment. 
The appeal was heard on September 5, 2006. A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) 
affirmed the DHO’s order and awarded temporary total disability compensation 
from June 8, 2006, through July 17, 2006, to continue upon submission of 
medical proof. Delphi’s motion to terminate was heard on October 6, 2006.  A 
DHO denied that motion. On appeal, an SHO vacated the award of temporary 
total disability compensation, finding that Jorza’s acceptance of the employment 
buyout constituted a voluntary abandonment of her former position of 
employment. That order was administratively affirmed. 
{¶ 5} Jorza filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
January Term, 2010 
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terminating temporary total disability compensation.  The court of appeals agreed, 
citing a line of cases that upheld the temporary total disability compensation 
eligibility of claimants who were already disabled when they were fired from their 
former positions of employment. State ex rel. Jorza v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. 
No. 08AP-393, 2009-Ohio-1183, ¶ 4-5.  The court ruled that this reasoning was 
not limited to employment dismissals, but instead applied to any departure from 
employment.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
{¶ 6} Delphi now appeals to this court as of right. 
{¶ 7} The parties debate Jorza’s eligibility for temporary total disability 
compensation after she accepted Delphi’s buyout.  The court of appeals relied on 
employment-discharge cases that upheld the compensation eligibility of claimants 
who were already disabled when fired.  Delphi argues that a buyout is more akin 
to a retirement and should not be governed by principles applicable to 
employment dismissal. 
{¶ 8} We find that we cannot address this issue without further 
clarification from the commission on Jorza’s disability status at the time that she 
left Delphi. The litigants’ arguments proceed from the premise that Jorza was 
temporarily and totally disabled when her buyout became effective.  Jorza, 
however, certified on her July 3, 2006 “Special Attrition Program Conditions of 
Participation Release Form” that she was “able to work and suffer[s] from no 
disability that would preclude [her] from doing [her] regularly assigned job.”  
This certification is not only inconsistent with her assertion of disability, but  also 
contradicts the only medical evidence in the record — an October 2, 2006 C-84 
disability form that references a “constant severe” pain so debilitating that it 
prevented Jorza from doing her regular job as of June 2006. 
{¶ 9} These contradictory statements, coupled with an incomplete 
record, foreclose further analysis.  It is pointless to address arguments premised 
on the existence of a temporary total disability if the disability did not exist during 
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the relevant period.  For this reason, we return the cause to the commission for an 
amended order that clarifies whether or not Jorza was temporarily and totally 
disabled when she left Delphi. 
{¶ 10} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is 
returned to the commission for an amended order that clarifies whether Jorza was 
temporarily and totally disabled when her employment with Delphi ended. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
___________________ 
Rush E. Elliott, for appellee Charlotte Jorza. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Colleen C. Erdman, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Letson, Griffith, Woodall, Lavelle & Rosenberg Co., L.P.A., Mark E. 
Bumstead, and Lynn B. Griffith III, for appellant. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office and Philip J. Fulton, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Association for Justice. 
______________________