Title: Wirth v. Industrial Com.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

63 Ill. 2d 237 (1976)
347 N.E.2d 136
R. ADELE WIRTH, Appellant,
v.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.  (Lawlor Industries, Inc., Appellee.)
No. 47685.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed March 29, 1976.
Rehearing denied May 27, 1976.
*238 Jack Ring, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.
Wiedner & McAuliffe, of Chicago, for appellee.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner, R. Adele Wirth, wife of Frank E. Wirth, deceased, filed an application for adjustment of claim for workmen's compensation because of the death of her *239 husband while he was employed by respondent Lawlor Industries, Inc. An arbitrator for the Industrial Commission rendered a decision awarding petitioner compensation. On review the Industrial Commission set aside the arbitrator's decision and denied her compensation. On certiorari the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision. Petitioner appealed and this court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause "for the entry of a judgment based on the arbitrator's award." 57 Ill. 2d 475, 481.
On remand petitioner moved for "entry of judgment and for other relief" and argued that under the provisions of section 19(g) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.19(g)) she was entitled to interest from October 8, 1970, the date of the arbitrator's award, and attorney fees. The circuit court denied her request for attorney fees but awarded her interest from July 8, 1974, the date of this court's mandate. Petitioner appealed. Rule 302(a).
Petitioner contends that under the provisions of section 3 of the Interest Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 74, par. 3) interest accrued from the date of the arbitrator's decision, or alternatively, from the date on which it was set aside by the Industrial Commission. Respondent concedes that under Proctor Community Hospital v. Industrial Com., 50 Ill. 2d 7, interest would accrue on an award based on a decision of the Industrial Commission, but contends that the decision of the arbitrator is "merely advisory"; that in reviewing the arbitrator's decision the Industrial Commission exercised original and not appellate jurisdiction; and that, because the arbitrator's decision was set aside, no award within the contemplation of section 3 of the Interest Act existed until this court issued its mandate.
Section 3 of the Interest Act provided:
The Workmen's Compensation Act, in pertinent part, provided:
This court has held that under section 3 of the Interest Act, interest accrued on an arbitrator's award (other than in a workmen's compensation case) from the date of its filing (Darst v. Collier, 86 Ill. 96), upon the amount found to be due in the report of a master in chancery from the date of the report (Ruddy v. McDonald, 244 Ill. 494) and on a jury verdict from the date of the verdict (Commissioners of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt, 379 Ill. 130). This court has also held that interest accrued from the date of verdict (Gnat v. Richardson, 378 Ill. 626), and on an award based on the decision of the Industrial Commission from the date of the award (Proctor *241 Community Hospital v. Industrial Com., 50 Ill. 2d 7), notwithstanding that at an intermediate level of review they were overturned and on further review reinstated. Although the award of an arbitrator for the Industrial Commission is in many respects similar to the report of a master in chancery, little guidance is to be found in the cases involving the reports of masters, set aside in whole or in part by the chancellor, for the reason that "[t]he rule followed in equity is to allow interest where warranted by equitable considerations, but where such allowance does not comport with justice and equity it may be disallowed." McKey v. McCoid, 298 Ill. 566, 572.
Respondent correctly contends that in its review of the arbitrator's decision the Industrial Commission exercised original rather than appellate jurisdiction and was not bound by his findings. (Meade v. Industrial Com., 48 Ill. 2d 215.) Section 19(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, however, explicitly provides that unless reviewed, the arbitrator's decision "shall become the decision of the Commission." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b).) In view of that provision we find no basis for excluding from the term "award," contained in section 3 of the Interest Act, the award based on the decision of an arbitrator for the Industrial Commission. We hold, therefore, that interest accrued from the date of the filing of the arbitrator's decision.
We consider next the question whether the circuit court erred in denying petitioner attorney fees. The Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
It appears from the briefs that tender was made of the full amount of the award within 60 days of issuance of this court's mandate. Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that the delay resulted from the dispute concerning respondent's liability for interest and not from a refusal to pay compensation within the contemplation of section 19(g) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in denying petitioner attorney fees.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.