Title: Reichert v. Court of Claims

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93319-Agenda 34-September 2002.
LARRY REICHERT, Appellant, v. THE COURT OF CLAIMS 
 								OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed February 21, 2003.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:	This case comes before us on the petition for writ of certiorari
of plaintiff Larry Reichert. He filed his petition in the circuit court
of Pope County, seeking review of a ruling on damages made by
the Court of Claims in his personal injury action against the Board
of Trustees of the University of Illinois (University). The circuit
court denied motions of the University and the Court of Claims for
transfer of venue to Sangamon County. The appellate court
reversed. 327 Ill. App. 3d 390. We granted Reichert's petition for
leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.


BACKGROUND


	In May 1998, Reichert filed an action in the Court of Claims
against the University for personal injuries allegedly suffered
when his clothing became entangled in a power take-off drive
being powered by a tractor owned and operated by the University.
Reichert's injuries occurred in Pope County. Section 8(d) of the
Court of Claims Act (Act) (705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 2000)) limits
damages in a tort case to $100,000. This limitation does not apply,
however, where the action arises out of the operation by a state
employee of a vehicle owned, leased, or controlled by the state.
Reichert claimed that operation of the tractor constituted operation
of a state vehicle and he sought damages in excess of $100,000.
The University filed a motion to strike the claim for damages. The
Court of Claims granted the motion, holding that Reichert's
injuries did not arise out of the University's operation of a vehicle
as defined in section 8(d).
	Reichert filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit
court of Pope County, naming the Court of Claims as respondent.
The petition alleged that the Court of Claims' decision that the
tractor was not a vehicle was against the manifest weight of the
evidence and deprived Reichert of a protected property right
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. The circuit court
ordered summons to issue, requiring the clerk of the Court of
Claims to prepare a certified copy of the official record of the
proceedings in Reichert's action against the University and to
return the record to the circuit court within 30 days. The Court of
Claims filed a motion in the circuit court, seeking to transfer venue
to Sangamon County. The Court of Claims argued that its
principal offices are in Sangamon County and Cook County and
that all pleadings were filed and hearings held in Sangamon
County. The Court of Claims further argued that the facts
underlying Reichert's injuries in Pope County were irrelevant to
the certiorari action, which involved a dispute over statutory
interpretation, a question of law. The Court of Claims further
noted that venue in an action against a state agency is proper only
in a county where the agency has its principal office or where the
transaction or any part thereof occurred giving rise to the cause of
action. The circuit court denied the motion. The circuit court
granted the University's petition for leave to intervene in the
certiorari action and denied the University's subsequent motion
to transfer venue to Sangamon County.
	The University filed a petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d
R. 306), which the appellate court granted. The court reversed the
decision of the circuit court and transferred venue to Sangamon
County. The court determined that, while certiorari is a review
procedure, it is also a new cause of action filed against the Court
of Claims. In a certiorari proceeding, review is limited to an
inspection of the record of the inferior tribunal and the court may
not consider any matter not appearing on that record. Thus, none
of the issues in Reichert's underlying action against the University
were involved in the certiorari action. The transaction that gave
rise to Reichert's certiorari action occurred in Sangamon County,
where all proceedings in the Court of Claims took place.
Therefore, venue was proper only in Sangamon County. 327 Ill.
App. 3d at 397-98.

ANALYSIS
	The common law writ of certiorari provides a means whereby
a party who has no avenue of appeal or direct review may obtain
limited review over action by a court or other tribunal exercising
quasi-judicial functions. Subject matter jurisdiction over certiorari
actions lies in the circuit court. The purpose of certiorari review
is to have the entire record of the inferior tribunal brought before
the court to determine, from the record alone, whether the tribunal
proceeded according to applicable law. Stratton v. Wenona
Community Unit District No. 1, 133 Ill. 2d 413, 427 (1990). Thus,
the circuit court acts as a court of review with respect to certiorari
actions. The Act provides no method of review of decisions of the
Court of Claims. This court has held that certiorari is available to
address alleged deprivations of due process by the Court of
Claims. Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill. 2d 72, 79 (1985). However, certiorari may not be used to review the
correctness of a decision by the Court of Claims based upon the
merits of the case before it. See Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286
Ill. App. 3d 499, 503 (1997). Requirements of due process are met
by conducting an orderly proceeding in which a party receives
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Reyes v. Court
of Claims, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1104 (1998). Due process is not
abridged where a tribunal misconstrues the law or otherwise
commits an error for which its judgment should be reversed. See
Reyes, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1105.
	Neither party here has raised the issue of the jurisdiction of
the circuit court to entertain Reichert's certiorari petition.
Nonetheless, it is our duty to consider this question. See Eastern
v. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 570 (1979). Generally, certiorari will not
lie until a final judgment has been entered by the tribunal whose
decision is sought to be reviewed. In People ex rel. Stead v.
Superior Court, this court stated:
		"In Hyslop v. Finch, 99 Ill. 171, it was said: 'A common
law certiorari will lie, first, whenever it is shown that the
inferior court [of] jurisdiction has exceeded its
jurisdiction; second, whenever it is shown that the inferior
court [of] jurisdiction has proceeded illegally and no
appeal or writ of error will lie.'
			'This writ was issuable at common law before the
proceedings instituted had culminated in a trial, order or
judgment, and was based on the absence or the excess or
usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal from
which the proceedings were removed.' [Citation.] Where,
as in the case at bar, the tribunal whose proceedings are
attacked acted without jurisdiction and made an order or
entered a judgment prejudic[i]al to the party complaining,
the writ may issue without awaiting a final judgment or
order in the proceeding. Where, however, the tribunal
possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause the
writ will not issue until the proceeding has terminated,
and then only if it appear that the tribunal has entered an
illegal judgment or order." People ex rel. Stead v.
Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 203-04 (1908).
	Roberts v. Romick, 146 Ill. App. 16 (1908),(1) involved a
judgment of the circuit court quashing, on certiorari, the record of
the commissioners of highways of the town of St. Marys. The
petition for the writ alleged that the commissioners had vacated a
certain road. The appellate court held that the writ of certiorari
was prematurely issued because the transcript of the record of the
commissioners did not disclose that any final order had been
entered vacating the road. By law, the commissioners were
required to make a formal order and file a copy with the town
clerk within five days following the decision to vacate the road.
Until that was accomplished, the proceedings were not final. The
appellate court, citing this court's decision in Stead, noted that
only where a tribunal usurps jurisdiction or acts in the absence or
excess of jurisdiction will certiorari lie to review the proceedings
of the tribunal prior to the entry of a final order or judgment. As no
question existed as to the jurisdiction of the highway
commissioners to vacate the road, the circuit court should not have
issued the writ. Roberts, 146 Ill. App. at 18.
	In the instant case, Reichert has not contended that the Court
of Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear his case or that it exceeded its
jurisdiction in making its ruling on his damages claim. Reichert's
underlying personal injury action is against the Board of Trustees
of the University. Section 8(d) of the Act specifically vests
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims over any claim against the
Board for damages sounding in tort if a like cause of action would
lie against a private person or corporation in a civil suit. 705 ILCS
505/8(d) (West 2000).
	The University's petition to intervene in Reichert's certiorari
action is contained in the record before us. That petition, filed in
February 2001, sets forth the procedural posture of Reichert's
action in the Court of Claims as it existed at the time of the filing
of the University's petition. The petition states that Reichert filed
his original complaint in the Court of Claims in May 1998. In
August 1999, the Court of Claims granted the University's motion
to strike Reichert's prayer for damages in excess of $100,000. In
December 1999, the Court of Claims denied Reichert's petition for
rehearing and granted Reichert leave to amend his complaint
within 30 days. In January 2000, Reichert filed his first amended
complaint, which again contained a prayer for damages in excess
of $100,000. In March 2000, the University filed a motion to
dismiss Reichert's first amended complaint or, in the alternative,
to strike the prayer for damages. According to the petition to
intervene, that motion was then pending in the Court of Claims.
We note that Reichert filed his petition for writ of certiorari on
April 18, 2000. The record demonstrates, therefore, that, as of the
time Reichert filed his petition for writ of certiorari, no final
judgment had been rendered by the Court of Claims. In fact, the
proceedings were still in the preliminary stages. Thus, Reichert's
certiorari petition was prematurely filed and the circuit court, as
a court of review, should not have considered the petition.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the
appellate court and remand to the circuit court with directions to
dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari.
Appellate court judgment vacated;
cause remanded.
 



 



1.      1We note that appellate court decisions issued prior to 1935 are
persuasive authority only.  Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc.,
174 Ill. 2d 77, 95 (1996).