Title: Delgado v. Delgado

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Delgado v. Delgado1989 WY 112773 P.2d 446Case Number: 88-5Decided: 05/15/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
Mark Edward 
DELGADO, Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
Christy Lynn 
DELGADO, Appellee (Plaintiff)

 
 
Ralph E. Wood, Sievers & Wood, 
Pinedale, for Appellant.

 
 
Jerry M. Murray, Rock Springs, for 
Appellee. 

 
 
Before Cardine, C.J., and Thomas, 
Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ., and Brown, J., Retired. 

 
 
Thomas, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is 
concerned exclusively with the sufficiency of the evidence to justify an award 
of attorney fees and costs to an ex-wife in connection with a contempt 
proceeding initiated to enforce the visitation rights of a divorced father. The 
district court, relying simply upon dialogue with the wife's attorney, awarded 
the wife $ 2,000 for attorney fees and $ 465 in costs. The record does not 
satisfy the evidentiary standards established by recognized precedent, and we 
reverse the award of attorney fees and costs, remanding the case for further 
consideration of those matters.

 
 

[¶2.]     The appellant, Mark 
Edward Delgado, recites these issues in his brief:

 
 
"1. Did the District Court err in 
awarding costs of $ 465.00 to the Appellee where there was insufficient 
evidentiary basis for the amount of said costs?

 
 
"2. Did the District Court err in 
awarding attorney's fees to the Appellee in the amount of $ 2,000 where there 
was insufficient proof or evidentiary basis to determine the reasonableness of 
said amount?"

 
 
As appellee, Christy Lee Delgado 
offers this statement of the issues:

 
 
"1. May Appellant raise an issue, '. 
. . . insufficient evidentiary basis for the amount of said costs' awarded 
Appellee when Appellant said nothing about the list of costs Appellee presented 
to the Judge, asked no questions on the costs, requested no hearing and failed 
to object?

 
 
"2. Likewise, may Appellant attack 
the award of attorney's fees to Appellee for the first time at the Supreme Court 
level, as no objection or other action was taken by Appellant at the District 
Court either?

 
 
"3. When no hearing is requested on 
the District Court's award of attorney's fees, may the trial judge grant fees in 
an amount based on its own experience?

 
 
"4. If the judgment is affirmed, may 
Appellee be awarded additional attorney's fees for her attorney's work on the 
appeal?"

 
 

[¶3.]     On January 3, 1986, the 
appellee was granted a divorce from the appellant. In the Divorce Decree, the 
court incorporated by reference, a separation agreement entered into by the 
parties which the court specifically approved, confirmed, and ratified. Pursuant 
to that agreement, the appellee had custody of the minor child of the parties 
and the appellant had visitation rights which were rather extensive and 
satisfactory to him. There was a provision in the separation agreement for 
recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs by the prevailing party in 
connection with any action brought to enforce its terms and, in a separate 
clause, the parties specifically provided the right to pursue an action to 
remedy any breach. In addition, § 20-2-111, W.S.1977, as interpreted by this 
court in Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265 (Wyo. 1978), and Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883 
(Wyo. 1977), 
furnishes justification for the award of attorney fees and 
costs.

 
 

[¶4.]     On September 16, 1987, 
the appellant filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause which sought relief in the 
form of a contempt citation against the appellee for denying to the appellant 
his visitation rights according to the separation agreement. The district court 
did issue an Order to Appear and Show Cause directed to the appellee to show 
cause why she should not be held in contempt of court for denying the visitation 
rights. After a hearing, an order was entered, on November 25, 1987, in which 
the court found that the appellee had not committed a breach of the separation 
agreement, and she was held to have shown cause why she should not be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. In its Order and Decree, the district court awarded attorney 
fees in the sum of $ 2,000 and costs in the sum of $ 465, a total of $ 2,465, to 
the appellee, finding that both the separation agreement and Wyoming statutes provided 
for the allowance of attorney fees and costs.

 
 

[¶5.]     With respect to the 
appropriate amount of attorney fees and costs, the record shows only the 
following:

 
 
"THE COURT: I would like to know 
what your attorney fees are.

 
 
"MR. MURRAY: Well, Your Honor, I 
spent actually about three full days on this and into the night. We went to work 
at -- I got up at 6:00 o'clock this morning and started preparing, so I think 
three days, eight hours a day at seventy-five dollars an hour. And I have some 
phone calls. We have forty dollars witness fees, or I know I wrote checks for 
witnesses but I don't know what the status of the checks on the subpoenas are 
but I know it's at least forty dollars checks.

 
 
"THE COURT: Well, the Court finds on 
the issue of the show cause that indeed the plaintiff has shown cause and she 
should not be held in contempt of Court. With reference to the visitation as set 
forth in the motion, the Court awards attorney fees in the sum of $ 2,000.00 to 
the mother and costs in the sum of $ 465.00 for a total of $ 2,465.00. That 
amount be paid to the Clerk of this Court within 30 days from 
today."

 
 

[¶6.]     The appellant contends 
that this is an insufficient record to sustain the court's award of attorney 
fees and costs. Even though counsel for the appellee had earlier served notice 
that he intended to seek an award of attorney fees and costs, counsel obviously 
was not prepared to present the evidence required by our precedent to justify 
the award of attorney fees and costs. A continuance would have been necessary, 
under the circumstances, for the appellee to satisfy our rules of proof with 
respect to attorney fees and costs. None was requested because the trial court 
had set the awards based upon the inadequate record, and it is likely that the 
judge would have been impatient with a request for an opportunity to make that 
proof. We do note that cause for granting such a continuance was present in 
these circumstances because counsel had only a brief period to prepare to defend 
the matter on the merits, and the successful effort in that regard substantially 
consumed the available time.

 
 

[¶7.]     The quoted exchange 
between the court and counsel is not evidence, and there is no evidence in this 
record with respect to fees and costs. The rule we have adopted requires that 
there must be some proof, or evidentiary basis, for the determination of 
reasonable attorney fees. Jones Land & Livestock Company v. Federal Land 
Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987); Durdahl v. Bank of Casper, 718 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1986); Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 
531 P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1975); 45 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 699 
(1986). Similarly, our rule is that costs which are awarded to a litigant are 
limited in amount to those which the evidence shows actually have been incurred 
and shows to be reasonable. Bi-Rite Package, Inc., v. Ninth Judicial District 
of FremontCounty, 735 P.2d 709 (Wyo. 1987). The informal 
exchange between the district court and counsel for the appellee does not 
satisfy the standard as to either attorney fees or costs.

 
 

[¶8.]     While in some instances 
we simply have denied relief because of the failure of a party to present 
appropriate evidence to establish the reasonableness of attorney fees and costs 
incurred in connection with litigation, in this case, the expeditious approach 
taken by the district court foreclosed the appellee from an opportunity to 
present proof. Furthermore, we are not insensitive to the fact that the 
appellant made no complaint to the trial judge and did not, in that way, offer 
either the judge, counsel, or the appellee an opportunity to complete a 
satisfactory record. Under these circumstances, while we cannot ignore the 
requirements of our prior cases, we are persuaded that justice demands that the 
appellee have an opportunity to present evidence establishing the amount and 
reasonableness of both her attorney fees and her costs. This is consistent with 
the approach articulated in UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. 
Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989). 

 
 

[¶9.]     That aspect of the 
order of the district court which awarded attorney fees and costs to the 
appellee is reversed, and the case is remanded for a hearing to permit the 
production of evidence with respect to the reasonableness of attorney fees and 
appropriate costs in the litigation.

 
 
Macy, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 

 
 
MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶10.]  The record reveals that appellee was not 
foreclosed from presenting evidence of costs and attorney's fees. She simply 
rested her case without presenting such evidence. I cannot find justification 
for giving her a second chance to do so.