Title: Eckdahl v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN KEVIN ECKDAHL v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 152Case Number: No. S-11-0042Decided: 11/08/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
JOHN KEVIN 
ECKDAHL,
Appellant 
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County
The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:
John Kevin Eckdahl, 
pro se.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
On January 13, 2009, 
John Kevin Eckdahl was sentenced following his conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver.  On January 28, 2010, he filed a 
motion to modify his sentence.  The 
district court denied the motion as untimely pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), which 
allows a motion for sentence modification “within one year after the sentence is 
imposed.”  Mr. Eckdahl did not 
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion, but instead filed a petition 
for reconsideration, followed by another motion to reduce his sentence.  The district court entered an order 
denying both the petition for reconsideration and the pending motion for 
sentence reduction.  
Mr. Eckdahl, appearing pro 
se, challenges the district court’s order.  We will dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]        
Mr. Eckdahl’s issues, 
reworded for the sake of clarity, are as follows:
 
1.            
Did the State breach 
the plea agreement with Mr. Eckdahl, entitling him to withdraw his guilty 
plea?
 
2.            
Did defense counsel 
breach his obligations to Mr. Eckdahl? 
 
3.            
Were Mr. Eckdahl’s 
due process rights violated?
 
4.            
Did this Court’s 
failure to appoint appeal counsel for Mr. Eckdahl deny him meaningful access to 
the law and to the courts?
 
The State responds 
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Mr. Eckdahl’s claims, and 
further contends that, if we reach the merits of these claims, the district 
court committed no abuse of discretion in denying Mr. Eckdahl’s motion for 
reconsideration and his motion for sentence reduction.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
In 2008, 
Mr. Eckdahl was indicted by a federal grand jury on a charge of conspiracy 
to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute.  A warrant for his arrest was issued, and 
on May 30, 2008, officers of the Sublette County Sheriff’s Department arrested 
him.  While searching 
Mr. Eckdahl, officers found a vial of methamphetamine. They found another 
46 grams of methamphetamine in a container from Mr. Eckdahl’s 
briefcase.  Mr. Eckdahl was 
charged in state court with one count of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2007), and one count of possession of a controlled substance in an 
amount over three grams, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1031(c)(ii).
 
[¶4]        
On August 22, 2008, 
Mr. Eckdahl entered a plea of guilty in the federal district court.  In accordance with his plea agreement, 
Mr. Eckdahl was sentenced to 70 months imprisonment, but it was further agreed 
that his sentence could be reduced if he cooperated with local, state, or 
federal authorities.
 
[¶5]        
Mr. Eckdahl initially 
pleaded not guilty to the charges in state court.  He later reached a plea agreement, and 
changed his plea to guilty on the first count.  The second count was dismissed.  At the change of plea hearing, defense 
counsel explained that “the gist of the plea agreement” was that the recommended 
sentence on the state charge should “not exceed” the sentence Mr. Eckdahl 
received on the federal charge.  
Defense counsel further explained that “there may be a later modification 
of the federal sentence in the form of a downward departure, [and] if there is 
such a downward departure we would come back before this court, [with] a motion 
to modify the state sentence to match the new federal 
sentence.”
 
[¶6]        
The prosecutor then 
read the plea agreement into the record: 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Mr. Eckdahl is charged with Count I, 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver, a 
felony, in violation of Wyoming Statute 35-7-1031(a)(i).  He is also charged with Count II, 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount greater than 
three grams, a felony, in violation of Wyoming Statute 35-7-1031(c)(ii).  In consideration of these mutual terms 
and covenants and the conditions of this Statement of Agreement, with respect to 
the parties identified earlier agree with one another and hereby represent, 
submit and recommend to the Court as follows:  Defendant, John Kevin Eckdahl, will 
enter a plea of guilty to [Count I]. . . .  
The parties have agreed to make a joint recommendation to the Court 
regarding Defendant’s sentence.  
Defendant’s sentence would be for a time from two to four years in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary and that would be concurrent with Mr. Eckdahl’s 
sentence in the federal case. . . .  
Defendant has already been sentenced in that case to a term of 
imprisonment of 70 months.  In 
exchange for Defendant’s guilty plea the State will agree to dismiss [Count II]. 
. . .  Furthermore the State would 
agree not to object in the future should the Defendant become eligible for a 
sentence reduction in the federal case based upon several factors that are still 
up in the air, I think cooperation with further prosecutions would be the 
primary one, so should the federal sentence be reduced to an amount of time that 
would affect the period of time the Defendant would serve in this case, the 
State would not object to . . . Defendant bringing a motion for sentence 
reduction in this case to reduce the sentence such that Defendant would again 
serve concurrent time in the federal case.  I guess what I’m saying, your Honor, to 
make it perfectly clear is that if Defendant’s [federal] sentence is reduced to 
such amount that he would be sent to Rawlins, the state penitentiary, after he 
serves his federal sentence then the State would have no objection to sentence 
reduction, however, if the Defendant’s federal sentence were not reduced it 
would have no effect on maxing out his top number, in that case there would be 
no reason for sentence reduction and the State would object to sentence 
reduction.
 
COURT:  Under this where would the actual 
sentence be served?  In the federal 
system?
 
[Prosecutor]:  Yes, your Honor.
 
COURT:  That’s what I thought, 
okay.
 
[Prosecutor]:  [T]his is the entirety of the agreement 
that I’ve presented to the Court.  
The Defendant understands that any other promises made by anybody 
pursuant to outside of what’s been outlined here are null and void and as I 
said, that’s the entirety of the agreement, that’s everything, your 
Honor.
 
COURT:  Thank you, Mr. [Prosecutor].  Mr. [Defense Counsel], do you agree that 
what’s just been outlined on the Record by the prosecutor constitutes the 
essential and only terms of the parties’ plea agreement in this 
case?
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  It does, your 
Honor.
 
COURT:  Okay.  Any amendments, corrections, anything 
that I need to –
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  No, I just would like the 
Record to reflect that I think the purpose of the plea agreement in regard to a 
potential modification of his state [sentence] is to reflect that the parties 
agree that under no circumstances shall the Defendant serve any time on his 
state charge in excess of that which he serves on his federal charge and that 
may require a sentence modification down the road.
 
COURT:  Any problem with that, Mr. 
[Prosecutor]?
 
[Prosecutor]:  No.  I think that pretty much is what I said 
essentially, your Honor, this would be – I think what is contemplated by the 
parties is that once Mr. Eckdahl serves his federal sentence he’s done with 
both.  Would that be correct, Mr. 
[Defense Counsel]?
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  
Absolutely.
 
COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Eckdahl, is this your understanding 
of the terms of this plea agreement to dispose of these charges against you 
today?
 
[Mr. Eckdahl]:  Yes, sir.
 
After some further 
questioning, the district court announced that it would reserve ruling on the 
plea agreement, “pending completion of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and 
consideration of the recommendation for a sentence of two (2) to four (4) years 
in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.”
 
[¶7]        
Following completion 
of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, a sentencing hearing was held.  During that hearing, defense counsel 
reiterated that the plea agreement was for a recommended sentence of two to four 
years imprisonment on the state charge, but that a motion for reduction could be 
filed if Mr. Eckdahl’s federal sentence were reduced “below the two to four 
[year] sentence . . . so that this Defendant did not spend any more time 
incarcerated on his state sentence than on his federal sentence.”  The district court, while expressing 
concern that the recommended sentence could be perceived as too lenient, 
“reluctantly” accepted it:  

 
[T]he Court sentences 
you to serve a term in the Wyoming State Penitentiary of two years to four 
years.  This term in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary shall be considered concurrent to the federal sentence that 
you received. . . .  
If there is a downward departure in that federal sentence that reduces 
your sentence in that federal case below the two to four year sentence that this 
Court has imposed then this Court will permit you to come back before the Court 
for consideration of a sentence modification.
 
[¶8]        
The district court 
later confirmed its oral sentence by entering a written sentence on January 23, 
2009.  The sentencing document 
provided:
 
IT IS THE SENTENCE OF 
THE COURT [that] Defendant be sentenced to no less than two (2) no more than 
four (4) years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, to run concurrent with the 
Federal Sentence . . . with credit for ninety (90) days served off the minimum 
and maximum sentence.  If Defendant 
receives a reduced sentence in the Federal case, then Defendant may petition 
this Court for a sentence modification.
 
Mr. Eckdahl did not 
appeal his conviction or his sentence.
 
[¶9]        
On July 9, 2009, Mr. 
Eckdahl, through his defense counsel, filed a “Motion for Sentence Termination 
Hearing.”  The motion asserted that 
the United States District Court had recommended that he participate in the 
federal prison’s “500-hour Intensive Drug Treatment Program,” but that he would 
not be eligible for the program while serving a concurrent state 
sentence.
 
[¶10]     
At the hearing on 
this motion, defense counsel clarified that Mr. Eckdahl was not yet eligible to 
participate in the drug treatment program, and would not be until he had served 
more time on his federal sentence.  
Mr. Eckdahl was concerned that if he did become eligible for the drug 
treatment program, he could not participate if he was still serving his 
concurrent state sentence.  
Accordingly, Mr. Eckdahl sought to reduce his state sentence “in 
advance.”  Defense counsel also 
indicated his understanding that Mr. Eckdahl was required to file his 
motion for sentence reduction within “a year from the date of the judgment and 
sentence, so that’s the reason why we’re here early.”  Based on this argument, the State 
responded that the motion was “premature” because Mr. Eckdahl’s federal 
sentence had not yet been reduced.  
The district court agreed with the State.  It denied Mr. Eckdahl’s motion, but 
stated that it was “without prejudice.”
 
[¶11]     
On October 26, 2009, 
Mr. Eckdahl’s federal sentence was reduced from seventy months to sixty 
months.  However, Mr. Eckdahl did 
not file his second motion for sentence reduction until January 28, 2010.  Acting pro se, he asserted that his federal 
sentence had been reduced, and so he sought a reduction of his state 
sentence.  The State replied that 
the reduced federal sentence, 60 months, was still longer than his state 
sentence of two to four years.  On 
that basis, the State asserted that there was no reason to reduce the state 
sentence, and asked the district court to deny Mr. Eckdahl’s 
motion.
 
[¶12]     
The district court 
denied this second motion, but on other grounds.  It cited W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), which 
allows a motion for sentence reduction “within one year after the sentence is 
imposed.”  It noted that Mr. Eckdahl 
had been sentenced orally on January 13, 2009, with the written sentencing order 
filed on January 23, 2009.  Mr. 
Eckdahl’s motion was dated January 25, 2010, and filed on January 28, 2010.  The district court therefore denied the 
motion as untimely.
 
[¶13]     
Mr. Eckdahl did not 
appeal from the district court’s decision, but on April 6, 2010, filed a 
petition for reconsideration.  The 
State responded that, pursuant to this Court’s decision in Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, 
¶ 5, 125 P.3d 1022, 1024 (Wyo. 2006), motions for reconsideration are not 
allowed, and are considered “nullities.”  
The State argued that Mr. Eckdahl’s petition for reconsideration was a 
nullity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it.  The district court did not immediately 
rule on the petition for reconsideration.
 
[¶14]     
On August 2, 2010, 
Mr. Eckdahl filed a third motion for sentence reduction, again acting pro se.  He reasserted that his concurrent state 
sentence prevented him from participating in a drug rehabilitation program 
offered through the federal prison, and asked the district court to reduce or 
terminate his state sentence “in order that he may be able to participate and 
reap the benefit of the Federally Mandated Drug Awareness Program for which he 
had been judicially recommended.”  
The State responded that Mr. Eckdahl had been sentenced on January 
13, 2009.  The motion, filed on 
August 2, 2010, was more than a year after the sentencing, and pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), was untimely, and should be denied.  
 
[¶15]     
On December 2, 2010, 
the district court entered its order denying Mr. Eckdahl’s third motion for 
sentence modification, and also denying his petition for reconsideration.  The district court pointed out that Mr. 
Eckdahl’s second motion for sentence reduction had been untimely, and that his 
“further requests for Sentence Modification and reconsideration of the earlier 
denial must, likewise, be denied because the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to act.”  Mr. Eckdahl 
appealed the district court’s decision to deny his petition for reconsideration 
and his third motion for sentence reduction.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶16]     
The 
denial of a motion for sentence reduction is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  LeGarda-Cornelio v. State, 2009 WY 136, 
¶ 6, 218 P.3d 968, 969 (Wyo. 2009).  
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, 
reviewed de novo.  Hoffman v. Darnell, 2011 WY 65, 
¶ 7, 252 P.3d 936, 938 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶17]     
Although 
Mr. Eckdahl’s first motion for sentence reduction was not appealed and is 
not at issue, we note that it was within the district court’s discretion to deny 
the motion as premature.  Mr. 
Eckdahl’s second motion for sentence reduction was filed more than one year 
after his sentencing.  Pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), the motion was untimely.  The district court correctly ruled that 
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion.  Mr. Eckdahl’s petition for 
reconsideration was not authorized under Wyoming law, and the district court did 
not err in denying it.  Plymale, ¶ 7, 125 P.3d  at 
1024.  Mr. Eckdahl’s third 
motion for sentence reduction was also filed more than one year after his 
sentencing, and the district court properly concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the untimely motion.  Tomlin v. State, 2001 WY 121, ¶ 6, 
35 P.3d 1255, 1256 (Wyo. 2001).
 
[¶18]     
Perhaps tacitly 
conceding the soundness of these decisions, Mr. Eckdahl does not directly 
challenge them on appeal.  Instead, 
in his first issue, he claims that he is entitled to relief because the State 
breached its plea agreement with him.  
According to Mr. Eckdahl, “[i]n a nutshell, the plea agreement and 
the sentence imposed . . . stated:  
'If Defendant receives a reduced sentence in the Federal case, then 
Defendant may petition this Court for a sentence modification.’”  Because his federal sentence was 
reduced, he insists that he was entitled to seek a reduction of his state 
sentence.  The State breached the 
plea agreement, he maintains, because it opposed his motions for sentence 
reduction.
 
[¶19]     
Mr. Eckdahl 
misunderstands or misrepresents his plea agreement and sentence.  They provided that he would receive a 
state sentence of two to four years, but could seek a reduction of that sentence 
if his federal sentence was reduced to less 
than two to four years.  
This term of the agreement was set forth plainly by both the prosecution 
and the defense when the plea agreement was explained to the district court, as 
quoted in paragraph six above.  In 
addition, it was stated clearly by the district court when it sentenced 
Mr. Eckdahl:
 
If there is a 
downward departure in that federal sentence that 
reduces your sentence in that federal case below the two to four year sentence 
that this Court has imposed then this Court will permit you to come back 
before the Court for consideration of a sentence 
modification.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶20]     
Mr. Eckdahl’s federal 
sentence was reduced from seventy months to sixty months.  It was never reduced below the two to 
four year state sentence.  Thus, 
under the terms of his plea agreement and sentence, Mr. Eckdahl was not entitled 
to seek a reduction of his state sentence.  
The State did not breach the plea agreement by opposing the motion for 
sentence reduction.  Further, 
because he was not entitled to seek a sentence reduction, there is no merit to 
Mr. Eckdahl’s complaints against his defense counsel, or to his claim of due 
process violations.  

 
[¶21]     
As his final issue, 
Mr. Eckdahl argues that he was denied meaningful access to the law and to the 
courts by this Court’s denial of his motion for appointment of appellate 
counsel.  There is, however, no 
requirement that a defendant be appointed counsel for motions seeking 
post-conviction relief.
 
“The Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel accrues at the time adversary judicial proceedings are 
initiated against the defendant. Counsel is required not just at trial, but at 
'critical stages’ both before and after trial in which the substantial rights of 
the accused may be affected.”  Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688, 689 (Wyo. 
2000).  Additionally, under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(vi) (LexisNexis 2003), a needy person who is entitled to 
be represented is “to be represented by counsel at every stage of the 
proceedings, from the time of the initial appointment by the court until the 
entry of final judgment, at which time the representation shall end, unless the 
court appoints 
counsel for purposes of appeal, correction or modification of 
sentence.”
 
. 
. . As can be seen by § 7-6-104, there is no statutory requirement for 
appointment of counsel at every post-trial motion. . . .  Likewise, the United States Constitution 
does not require counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction 
relief.  Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987); 
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2769, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).
 
Patrick v. 
State, 2005 WY 32, ¶¶ 
16-17, 108 P.3d 838, 843-44 (Wyo. 2005).  
See also Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157, ¶ 32, 
151 P.3d 261, 269 (Wyo. 2006).
 
[¶22]     
To summarize our 
decision in this case, we agree with the district court that Mr. Eckdahl’s 
second and third motions for sentence reduction were untimely.  On that basis, the district court 
correctly ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
motions.  Further, the district 
court correctly ruled that petitions for reconsideration are not authorized 
under Wyoming law, so that it also lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider Mr. Eckdahl’s petition for reconsideration.  Because “the 
district court had no jurisdiction, this court is without jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal.”  Stewart v. State, 654 P.2d 727, 727 
(Wyo. 1982).  Mr. Eckdahl’s 
appeal is therefore dismissed.