Title: PAMELA NADINE HAMILTON V. HARRY DWAYNE HAMILTON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAMELA NADINE HAMILTON V. HARRY DWAYNE HAMILTON2010 WY 35228 P.3d 51Case Number: S-09-0135Decided: 03/23/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
PAMELA 
NADINE HAMILTON,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
HARRY 
DWAYNE HAMILTON,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

W. 
Keith Goody, Cougar, Washington.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

John 
A. Thomas, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Pamela 
Nadine Hamilton was adjudged in contempt of court for violating a temporary 
order entered by the district court in her divorce case.  She claims that the contempt ruling is 
null and void because the district court did not follow the procedures required 
in a criminal contempt proceeding.  
For the reasons set forth below, however, we conclude that this contempt 
proceeding was not criminal in nature, and further, that the contempt order is 
not a final appealable order.  We 
will therefore dismiss her appeal.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Ms. 
Hamilton presents one issue:  "Did 
the District Court have jurisdiction to find the appellant in contempt?"  Mr. Hamilton raises three issues, one of 
which is dispositive:  "Whether the 
Findings and Order on the Motion for Order to Show Cause filed on May 27, 
2009 in the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District in and for Sublette 
County, State of Wyoming, is an appealable order?"

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
June 13, 2008, Ms. Hamilton filed for a divorce from Harry 
Dwayne Hamilton.  The district 
court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining both parties from, among 
other things: 

 
 
Transferring, 
encumbering, concealing, selling or otherwise disposing of any of the property 
of either of the parties, or any joint or common property of the parties, except 
in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life, without the 
written consent of both parties or the permission of the 
Court.

 
 
On 
December 16, 2008, Mr. Hamilton filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause for 
Contempt, alleging that Ms. Hamilton had spent "thousands of dollars" from their 
joint checking account for items that were not related to the necessities of 
life and not in the usual course of business.

 
 

[¶4]        
A 
hearing on the show cause order was held on March 10, 2009.  The hearing was not reported.  It appears that the district court 
ordered Ms. Hamilton to produce certain financial records, and she did so on 
March 20, 2009.  In due course, the 
district court issued its order, finding that Ms. Hamilton had spent "at 
least $80,225.99, to the best of the Court's ability to calculate such," 
in violation of the temporary restraining order.  (Emphasis in original.)  The district court found 
Ms. Hamilton in contempt, but provided that she could purge the contempt by 
paying the sum of $80,225.99 into a joint account requiring the signatures of 
both parties, and by paying the attorney's fees Mr. Hamilton had incurred 
in the contempt proceeding.  The 
order further provided that if Ms. Hamilton did not purge the contempt, she 
was required to appear before the district court on July 2, 2009, "to be 
sanctioned therefor."  
Ms. Hamilton filed an appeal seeking review of the district court's 
contempt order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶5]        
Pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 1.04(a), we may review only a "judgment rendered, or appealable 
order made, by a district court."  
If the district court's order finding Ms. Hamilton in contempt is 
not a final appealable order, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider an 
appeal from that order.  "Whether a 
court has jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo."  SEG v. GDK, 2007 WY 203, ¶ 4, 173 P.3d 395, 395 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]        
The 
basic question in this case is whether the contempt is civil or criminal in 
nature.  If it is criminal, the 
contempt order is void because the proceeding was not "instituted and conducted 
as a separate and independent criminal action apart from the original cause in 
which the contempt arose."  BW v. State of Wyoming, 2010 WY 18, ¶ 5, ___ P.3d ___, 
___ (Wyo. 2010).  If it is civil, 
the appeal is premature because punishment has not yet been imposed.  Madden v. Madden, 558 P.2d 669, 670 (Wyo. 1977).  

 
 

[¶7]        
We 
have said that "the type of punishment to be imposed is the factor that decides 
whether a civil or criminal contempt has been committed."  Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Wyo. 1982), 
citing Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42, 61 S. Ct. 810, 813, 85 L. Ed. 1172 (1941).

 
 
A 
contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only 
the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses 
against the public.  Horn, 647 P.2d at [1372-73].  A civil contempt is generally intended 
to compel a party to comply with a lawful court order while a criminal contempt 
is punitive in nature and is enforced so the authority of the law and the court 
will be vindicated.  Id. [at 1373.]  Stated simply, the primary purpose of 
criminal contempt is to punish while the primary purpose of civil contempt is to 
coerce.  Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660, 662 (Wyo. 1983); Horn, 647 P.2d  at 1373.  

 
 

Horn 
v. Welch, 
2002 WY 138, ¶ 12, 54 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo. 2002).  See also Honan v. Honan, 809 P.2d 783, 785-86 (Wyo. 1991); 
Tucker v. State, 35 Wyo. 430, 438-39, 
251 P. 460, 463 
(1926).

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
basic purpose of the contempt order in this case was to remedy the harm done to 
Mr. Hamilton, not to protect the public.  This indicates civil contempt rather 
than criminal.  The fact that 
Ms. Hamilton can purge her contempt also suggests that it is civil in 
nature.  Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 41 (Wyo. 1992).  The punishment for criminal contempt is 
more typically "for a definite term" from which "release is not conditioned upon 
the contemnor's compliance with any order of the court."  Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 344 (Wyo. 1989).  Further, Ms. Hamilton may purge the 
contempt by paying the amount spent in violation of the order into a joint 
account, with funds available only upon the signatures of both parties.  This requirement is clearly aimed at 
deterring Ms. Hamilton from violating the temporary restraining order in 
the future, and is remedial rather than punitive.  Based on these factors, we conclude that 
Ms. Hamilton's contempt is civil, not criminal.

 
 

[¶9]        
We 
are aware that the second requirement for Ms. Hamilton to purge her contempt is 
to pay Mr. Hamilton's attorney's fees.  In other circumstances, we have said 
that the assessment of attorney's fees "seems more punitive than remedial in 
nature, considering that a court in a civil action may not award attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party in the absence of a contract or specific statutory 
provision."  United Mine Workers, Local 1972 v. Decker 
Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 
1281 (Wyo. 1989).  The Hamiltons are 
involved in a divorce case, however, and there is a statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-111 (LexisNexis 2009), authorizing the district court to award 
attorney's fees in divorce cases.  
Marquiss, 837 P.2d  at 46.  We have previously recognized that the 
allowance of attorney's fees in divorce proceedings is an exercise of the 
district court's equitable powers, and not a penalty or punishment.  Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 
1978).

 
 

[¶10]     
Ms. 
Hamilton also claims that the contempt order imposes punishment rather than 
remediation because it requires her to reimburse Mr. Hamilton not only for 
expenses that were "arguably covered by the restraining order," but also for 
expenses that were related to necessities of life or incurred in the ordinary 
course of business.  Because there 
is no record of the hearing, we cannot tell if this claim is accurate.  We have reviewed the financial documents 
submitted by Ms. Hamilton, but lacking foundation or explanation, they 
provide no basis for us to determine whether the spending they reflect was in 
violation of or in compliance with the temporary restraining order.  "Without a transcript of the hearing to 
review, we must accept the district court's analysis and weighing of the 
evidence."  Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, ¶ 39, 199 P.3d 1072, 1083 (Wyo. 
2009).  We must therefore accept the 
district court's finding that Ms. Hamilton spent at least $80,225.99 in 
violation of the temporary restraining order.  Accordingly, the district court's order 
for reimbursement in that amount must be viewed as remedial rather than 
punitive.  Our conclusion that the 
contempt is civil remains unchanged.  

 
 

[¶11]     
Having 
concluded that Ms. Hamilton's contempt is civil in nature, we next consider 
whether the contempt order is a final appealable order.  In Madden, 558 P.2d  at 670, we recognized 
that "an order imposing punishment for contempt of court is a final order 
which is appealable."  We 
further observed, however, that:

 
 
A 
majority of courts hold that when contempt proceedings are brought any order 
short of the order which imposes punishment by fine or imprisonment is 
interlocutory in nature, and is not a final order from which an appeal can be 
taken.

 
 

Id. 
(citing cases).  

 
 

[¶12]     
In 
Madden, the mother's petition to show 
cause alleged that the father had not paid child support as ordered.  The father contended that his child 
support obligations had ended because the older child was married and the 
younger child had reached the age of majority.  After a hearing, the district court 
issued an order finding that the younger child was neither self-supporting nor 
emancipated, and ordered an accounting to establish the amount of child support 
owed by the father.  We said it was 
"of some moment, and we therefore emphasize, that the Order did not purport to 
adjudge Appellant in contempt, and of course, no effort was made to impose any 
punishment upon him."  Id.  We applied the majority rule that any 
order short of the one imposing punishment is interlocutory, and dismissed the 
appeal because "the absence of a final order in the contempt proceedings results 
in this court having no jurisdiction to hear the appeal on its merits."  Id. at 671.  

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
continuing validity of this rule in Wyoming was demonstrated in the more recent 
case of Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶ 17, 187 P.3d 868, 876 (Wyo. 2008).  There, the mother sought to hold the 
father in contempt for refusing her visitation with her children as previously 
ordered.  After the hearing, the 
district court issued its order.

 
 
The 
true thrust of the court's order is to provide therapeutic counseling to the 
parties' children so that eventually Mother's long-delayed visitation with her 
children can be determined and established. . . .  Because the order does not hold Father 
in contempt and does not fix the terms of Mother's visitation, the order does 
not determine the action.

 
 

Id.  We dismissed the appeal because, absent 
a final appealable order, we lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 
case.

 
 

[¶14]     
The 
order in Ms. Hamilton's case explicitly does not impose punishment.  It provides that she "should be 
appropriately sanctioned," but only in "the event that [she] fails or refuses to 
purge this Court's finding that [she] is in indirect contempt of this 
Court."  It further orders that 
unless Ms. Hamilton purges her contempt, she "shall appear before this Court on 
Thursday, July 2, 2009, at Noon to be sanctioned therefor."  Ms. Hamilton did not appear before 
the district court to be sanctioned on the specified date, because her contempt 
proceeding was stayed by her appeal.  
To date, no sanctions have been imposed or specified. 

 
 

[¶15]     
Ms. 
Hamilton contends that her case can be distinguished from Madden and Inman.  The district court found 
Ms. Hamilton in contempt.  In 
the other two cases, no contempt findings were made.  However, the rule we stated in Madden and followed in Inman is that "any order short of the 
order which imposes punishment by fine or imprisonment is interlocutory in 
nature, and is not a final order from which an appeal can be taken."  Madden, 558 P.2d  at 670; Inman, ¶ 14, 187 P.3d  at 876.  Under this rule, the significant 
question is whether punishment has been imposed, not whether a finding of 
contempt has been made.  The fact 
that Mr. Madden and Mr. Inman had not been found in contempt was not 
dispositive.  It was noted only 
because it emphasized the dispositive point that punishment had not yet been 
imposed.

 
 

[¶16]     
We 
will continue to follow that rule.  
No order has been issued imposing punishment on Ms. Hamilton.  There has been no final appealable order 
in her case.  Accordingly, we lack 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of her appeal, and dismiss 
it.