Title: State v. Brook

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 115,657 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
SKYLER LEE BROOK, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
 
Imposition of an underlying prison term after a probation violation is not 
equivalent to "incarceration for a supervision violation" under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-
3717(d)(3). The period of a person's postrelease supervision term may be modified while 
the person is serving his or her underlying prison sentence after probation revocation 
without running afoul of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3717(d)(3). 
 
2. 
 
 
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1)(D) applies only to persons convicted of a 
sexually violent crime on or after July 1, 1993, but before July 1, 2006. K.S.A. 2013 
Supp. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) applies to persons convicted of a sexually violent crime on or 
after July 1, 2006. There are no persons convicted of a sexually violent crime to whom 
both subparagraph K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1)(D) and subparagraph (d)(1)(G) 
apply. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 28, 2017. 
Appeal from Nemaha District Court; JOHN L. WEINGART, judge. Opinion filed May 10, 2019. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Brad M. Lippert, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  Defendant Skyler Lee Brook appeals the district court's correction of 
his postrelease supervision term after his probation was revoked and he was ordered to 
serve his original sentence. He challenges the district court judge's statutory authority to 
change the term from two years to lifetime, and he argues the lifetime postrelease term 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
We affirm the district judge's decision and our Court of Appeals' endorsement of 
it.   
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Brook pleaded no contest to sexual exploitation of a child as a result of 
interactions with C.B. between May 6 and May 20, 2013. Brook was 22 years old at the 
time. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison and 2 years of postrelease supervision. 
The district court judge suspended imposition of Brook's sentence and ordered Brook to 
serve 36 months' probation.  
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Brook committed another crime, which resulted in revocation of his probation and 
imposition of his original sentence in this case.  
 
 
The Department of Corrections notified the court that Brook should have received 
a lifetime postrelease term because of his plea to a sexually violent crime. The district 
judge agreed that this portion of Brook's sentence was illegal and corrected the two-year 
postrelease term to lifetime.  
 
 
Brook challenged the lifetime term before the Court of Appeals. The panel 
rejected his arguments, State v. Brook, No. 115,657, 2017 WL 1535138, at *6 (Kan. App. 
2017) (unpublished opinion), and this court granted review.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Whether a sentence is illegal and may be corrected at any time is a question of law 
subject to unlimited review. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3504(1); State v. Horton, 308 
Kan. 757, 759, 423 P.3d 548 (2018). To the extent resolution of Brook's claims requires 
statutory interpretation, this court also is presented with a question of law subject to 
unlimited review. 308 Kan. at 759. 
 
Statutory Arguments 
 
Brook argues that his original two-year term of postrelease could not be corrected 
as an illegal sentence based on two different statutes. 
 
The first statute is K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3717(d)(3). That section states, "Persons 
serving a period of incarceration for a supervision violation shall not have the period of 
postrelease supervision modified until such person is released and returned to postrelease 
supervision." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3717(d)(3). Brook asserts that because he "violated 
4 
 
 
 
his supervision resulting in the revocation of his probation," K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-
3717(d)(3) should prohibit modification of his postrelease supervision term. 
 
The Court of Appeals panel correctly analyzed and disposed of this argument. 
There is no support for the proposition that the imposition of an underlying prison term 
after a probation violation is equivalent to "incarceration for a supervision violation." The 
panel said: 
 
"K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3717 as a whole involves postrelease supervision. In K.S.A. 2016 
Supp. 22-3717(d)(3) the words 'supervision violation' clearly refers to a violation of 
postrelease supervision and not a probation violation. The subject of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 
22-3717 is postrelease supervision and not probation. The statutory scheme for probation 
is set out in an entirely different statute. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6604, K.S.A. 2016 
Supp. 21-6607, and K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6608 (establishing the sentencing scheme for 
probation); K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3716 (establishing procedures for probation 
violations). The plain reading of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3717 shows that the legislature 
did not intend a probation violation to prevent modification of postrelease supervision." 
Brook, 2017 WL 1535138, at *2. 
 
Moreover, the language of subsection (d)(3) itself indicates that the "supervision" 
referred to is postrelease supervision. The limitation to modifying a period of postrelease 
continues "until such person is released and returned to postrelease supervision." 
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3717(d)(3).  
 
Brook's second statutory argument is based on what he perceives to be conflicting 
subsections within K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1). That statute provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
"(d)(1) Persons sentenced for crimes, other than off-grid crimes, committed on or 
after July 1, 1993, or persons subject to subparagraph (G), will not be eligible for parole, 
5 
 
 
 
but will be released to a mandatory period of postrelease supervision upon completion of 
the prison portion of their sentence as follows: 
 
. . . . 
 
(B) Except as provided in subparagraphs (D) and (E), persons sentenced for 
nondrug severity levels 5 and 6 crimes, drug severity level 3 crimes committed on or after 
July 1, 1993, but prior to July 1, 2012, and drug severity level 4 crimes committed on or 
after July 1, 2012, must serve 24 months on postrelease supervision. 
 
. . . . 
 
(D) Persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment that includes a sentence for a 
sexually violent crime as defined in K.S.A. 22-3717, and amendments thereto, a sexually 
motivated crime in which the offender has been ordered to register pursuant to subsection 
(d)(1)(D)(vii) of K.S.A. 22-3717, and amendments thereto, electronic solicitation, K.S.A. 
21-3523, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5509, and amendments thereto, or 
unlawful sexual relations, K.S.A. 21-3520, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-
5512, and amendments thereto, shall serve the period of postrelease supervision as 
provided in subsections (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B) or (d)(1)(C) plus the amount of good time 
and program credit earned and retained pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4722, prior to its repeal, or 
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6821, and amendments thereto, on postrelease supervision. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(G) Except as provided in subsection (u), persons convicted of a sexually violent 
crime committed on or after July 1, 2006, and who are released from prison, shall be 
released to a mandatory period of postrelease supervision for the duration of the person's 
natural life." 
 
Brook argues that his original postrelease term was legal under subparagraphs 
(d)(1)(B) and (D). The Court of Appeals panel disagreed with this argument, relying on 
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State v. Herrmann, 53 Kan. App. 2d 147, 384 P.3d 1019 (2016), rev. denied 306 Kan. 
1324 (2017). In Herrmann, another Court of Appeals panel had thoroughly analyzed the 
issue Brook raised:  
 
"[Defendant Jon T.] Herrmann claims the district court erred in granting the 
State's motion to correct an illegal sentence because his original sentence of 24 months' 
postrelease supervision was legal and not subject to modification when the court granted 
the State's motion. The trial court does not have jurisdiction to modify a legal sentence 
once it is pronounced from the bench. State v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 983, 319 P.3d 506 
(2014). The court does, however, have jurisdiction to modify an illegal sentence and can 
do so at any time. K.S.A. 22-3504(1). . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
"Herrmann argues the sentence of lifetime postrelease supervision is illegal . . . 
because it does not conform to subparagraph (D) of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1), 
which he asserts is the applicable statutory provision. Herrmann contends the post-2013 
version of subparagraph (D) retroactively eliminates the statutory requirement that courts 
impose lifetime postrelease supervision for those convicted of sexually violent crimes. In 
response to Herrmann's argument, the State argues lifetime postrelease supervision 
readily conforms to the applicable statutory provision, which it asserts is subparagraph 
(G) of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1). . . . Given the dispute between the parties, we 
first must decide which statutory provision within K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1) is 
applicable to Herrmann's case for purposes of imposing postrelease supervision before 
we can decide whether the lifetime postrelease supervision ordered conformed to that 
applicable statutory provision. 
 
. . . . 
 
"Generally, the crime and penalty in existence at the time of the offense are 
controlling, except where the legislature has given retroactive effect to statutory changes 
made after the commission of the crime. State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 122, 716 
7 
 
 
 
P.2d 580 (1986). At the time of Herrmann's offense, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) 
required that persons who committed a sexually violent crime after July 1, 2006, be 
sentenced to lifetime postrelease supervision. Attempted aggravated indecent liberties 
with a child was defined as a sexually violent crime under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-
3717(d)(2)(C) and (d)(2)(K). Herrmann does not contest that under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 
22-3717(d)(1)(G), as it existed at the time of his crime, he was subject to lifetime 
postrelease supervision. 
 
"Rather, Herrmann argues that the 2013 amendments to K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1) 
changed the law regarding postrelease supervision as it applies to persons sentenced for 
sexually violent crimes and that those changes apply retroactively to his case. He 
contends that new language in subparagraph (D) expressly applies to persons convicted 
of sexually violent crimes and directs the court to impose a term of postrelease 
supervision based on the severity level of the offense. Herrmann notes that the new 
language in subparagraph (D) requires 24 months' postrelease supervision for severity 
level 6 offenders like him, plus any good-time or program credit earned and retained. 
 
"Herrmann acknowledges that the 2013 amendments to subparagraph (D) 
directing a term postrelease supervision based on severity level of the sexually violent 
crime committed did not modify subparagraph (G), which requires lifetime postrelease 
supervision for persons convicted of sexually violent crimes after July 1, 2006. 
Nevertheless, Herrmann asserts this fact is not fatal to his claim that the current 
subparagraph (D) controls his term of postrelease supervision. In support of this 
assertion, Herrmann claims the 2013 amendments to subparagraph (D) effectively created 
an option for courts to choose between when imposing postrelease supervision for 
persons convicted of sexually violent crimes:  subparagraph (D) provides a term of 
months depending on the severity level of the crime, plus any good-time or program 
credits accrued while in prison, while subparagraph (G) requires lifetime postrelease 
supervision. In light of these two options, Herrmann asserts the original 24-month term of 
postrelease supervision imposed was legal after the 2013 amendments became effective 
because it conformed to one of the two applicable statutory provision options. 
 
. . . . 
8 
 
 
 
 
"We find the plain language of the [2013 amended] statute clearly decides the 
issue presented. Subsection (d)(1) explains that persons sentenced for crimes committed 
after July 1, 1993, will not be eligible for parole; instead, they will be subject to 
mandatory postrelease supervision as provided in the subparagraphs that follow. Notably, 
however, this subsection (d)(1) expressly states that the mandatory postrelease 
supervision provided in the subparagraphs that follow do not apply to 'persons subject to 
subparagraph (G).' Subparagraph (G) provides that 'persons convicted of a sexually 
violent crime committed on or after July 1, 2006, and who are released from prison, shall 
be released to a mandatory period of postrelease supervision for the duration of the 
person's natural life.' Herrmann was convicted of attempted aggravated indecent liberties 
with a child, which is a sexually violent crime under subsection (d)(5)(C) and (d)(5)(M). 
His conviction occurred after July 1, 2006. Because Herrmann is subject to subparagraph 
(G), no other subparagraph following subsection (d)(1) applies to him—including 
subparagraph (D). 
 
"As an alternative to the 'two option' argument above, Herrmann asserts K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1) is ambiguous because the provisions of subparagraphs (D) and 
(G) directly conflict with each other on the proper term of postrelease supervision to 
impose:  one provides for a term of months based on severity level of the sexually violent 
crime and the other requires a lifetime term. Herrmann argues that the rule of lenity 
should resolve the ambiguity in his favor by imposing the lesser of the two postrelease 
supervision terms. We disagree. The provisions in each subparagraph apply to a distinct 
class of persons. K.S.A. 22-3717 as a whole applies to all persons convicted of a crime 
after July 1, 1993. See L. 1992, ch. 239, sec. 270 ('Persons sentenced for crimes 
committed on or after July 1, 1993, will not be eligible for parole, but will be released to 
a mandatory period of postrelease supervision upon completion of the prison portion of 
their sentence.'). Subparagraph (G) was added to the statute in 2006 to create an explicit 
exception applicable only for 'persons convicted of a sexually violent crime committed 
on or after July 1, 2006.' See L. 2006, ch. 212, sec. 19 (also adding language to [d][1] 
excepting 'persons subject to subparagraph [G]'). Reading subparagraph (D) in pari 
materia, it falls under subsection (d)(1) and so applies to all persons but those expressly 
excluded:  persons sentenced for off-grid crimes committed on or after July 1, 1993, and 
9 
 
 
 
persons committing a sexually violent crime on or after July 1, 2006, as stated in 
subparagraph (G). Therefore, subparagraph (D) only applies to persons convicted of a 
sexually violent crime after July 1, 1993, but before July 1, 2006. Thus, there are no 
persons convicted of a sexually violent crime to whom both subparagraph (D) and 
subparagraph (G) apply. Construing the statute as a whole and giving effect to all of the 
statutes, as this court must, there is no conflict or ambiguity in amended subsection 
(d)(1). 
 
"The legislative history of the 2013 amendments confirms that the new language 
in subparagraph (D) was not intended to create a conflict with subparagraph (G). Instead, 
the changes were actually meant to maintain the same term of postrelease supervision for 
certain offenders, including persons who committed a sexually violent offense between 
July 1, 1993, and June 30, 2006, despite changes to reduce postrelease supervision 
generally. Prior to 2013, subparagraphs (A)-(C) assigned either 36, 24, or 12 months' 
postrelease supervision, respectively, 'plus the amount of good time and program credit 
earned and retained.' See, e.g., K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1)(A)-(C). The 2013 
amendments deleted the language pertaining to good-time and program credits from 
subparagraphs (A)-(C)—in effect, reducing the length of postrelease supervision 
sentences by not requiring those credits to be added to a person's postrelease term. But 
the legislature did not want to provide that same benefit for persons convicted of certain 
crimes, including sexually violent crimes. So, the legislature also amended subparagraph 
(D) to provide an exception for persons convicted of sexually violent crimes so that 
earned good-time and program credits continued to be added to their postrelease 
supervision period. L. 2013, ch. 133, sec. 13. In a nutshell, the postrelease supervision 
calculation for persons convicted of a sexually violent crime between July 1, 1993, and 
June 30, 2006, remained the same as it was prior to the 2013 amendments. 
 
"The analysis above is a straightforward reading of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-
3717(d)(1) as a whole in which subparagraphs (D) and (G) are read in a workable 
harmony, without assuming the legislature intended to enact contradictory or meaningless 
provisions. See Keel, 302 Kan. at 574. The plain language of subsection (d)(1) provides 
an exception for persons convicted of a sexually violent crime for an offense after July 1, 
2006, in subparagraph (G). Herrmann committed his sexually violent offense after July 1, 
10 
 
 
 
2006; therefore, he is subject only to subparagraph (G). Because subparagraph (D) does 
not apply to him, there is no need to determine whether the amended provision would 
apply retroactively to his case." Herrmann, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 149-54. 
 
The Legislature confirmed the Herrmann panel's interpretation of the statute two 
years ago by amending subparagraph (d)(1)(D) to apply to "[p]ersons sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment that includes a sentence for a sexually violent crime as defined in K.S.A. 
22-3717, and amendments thereto, committed on or after July 1, 1993, but prior to July 1, 
2006." (Emphasis added.) See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 2018 22-3717(d)(1)(D).  
 
Brook's original two-year term of postrelease was imposed after his probation was 
revoked. See State v. Sandoval, 308 Kan. 960, Syl., 425 P.3d 365 (2018) (upon probation 
revocation, judge may impose original sentence or sentence anew; when original sentence 
illegal, imposed upon revocation, illegality persists). It was illegal because it did not 
conform to applicable statutory requirements; it was therefore subject to later correction 
under K.S.A. 22-3504(1). 308 Kan. at 965; State v. Roth, 308 Kan. 970, 971-72, 424 P.3d 
529 (2018).  
 
Constitutional Argument 
 
 
On petition for review, Brook also mounts a federal constitutional challenge to his 
lifetime postrelease term, arguing that it qualifies categorically as cruel and unusual 
punishment. He acknowledges that this court rejected this argument in State v. Williams, 
298 Kan. 1075, 319 P.3d 528 (2014). 
 
In Williams, this court held that "[l]ifetime postrelease supervision for a first-time 
offender over age 18 convicted of sexual exploitation of a child for crimes involving 
possession of pornographic images of children under age 18 is not categorically 
11 
 
 
 
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 298 
Kan. 1075, Syl. ¶ 8. 
 
Brook urges us to jettison Williams because of this court's more recent decision in 
State v. Dull, 302 Kan. 32, 351 P.3d 641 (2015).  
 
In Dull, we held that "[m]andatory lifetime postrelease supervision is categorically 
unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 
825 (2010), when imposed on a juvenile who committed and was later convicted of 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child." Dull, 302 Kan. 32, Syl. ¶ 8.  
 
As the Court of Appeals panel in this case noted, the Dull opinion explicitly 
distinguished juvenile offenders, such as the defendant in Dull, from adult offenders, 
such as Brook:  
 
"While we have found mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision constitutional for 
adults, the same factors that result in a diminished culpability for juveniles, i.e., 
recklessness, immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness, and ill-considered decision 
making, along with their lower risks of recidivism, all diminish the penological goals of 
lifetime supervision for juvenile sex offenders." 302 Kan. 32, Syl. ¶ 7.  
 
We still hold this distinction to be valid and dispositive. Brook's categorical 
challenge to his lifetime postrelease term fails.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The district court judge did not err in correcting Brook's two-year postrelease term 
to lifetime. We affirm his judgment and the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding 
it.