Title: Zoning Board of Appeals of Milton v. HD/MW Randolph Avenue, LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13221 
 
ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF MILTON  vs.  HD/MW RANDOLPH AVENUE, 
LLC, & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2022. - July 14, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Housing.  Zoning, Housing appeals committee, Comprehensive 
permit, Low and moderate income housing, Conditions.  
Waiver.  Practice, Civil, Waiver. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
January 18, 2019. 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
M. Patrick Moore, Jr. (Donna A. Mizrahi also present) for 
the plaintiff. 
Andrew E. Goloboy for HD/HW Randolph Avenue, LLC. 
Samuel M. Furgang, Assistant Attorney General, for housing 
appeals committee. 
 
 
 
1 Housing appeals committee. 
2 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act, 
G. L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23 (act), provides qualifying developers of 
low or moderate income housing with access to a single 
comprehensive streamlined permitting process and expedited 
appeal before the housing appeals committee (HAC).  The act also 
empowers HAC to safeguard against local zoning boards of appeals 
that would constructively deny a comprehensive permit 
application by granting it subject to overly onerous conditions.  
Specifically, during its appellate review, HAC is authorized by 
statute to strike or modify any conditions that would make it 
"uneconomic" to proceed with a project.  At issue in this case 
is whether HAC also has jurisdiction over, and the power to 
reject, conditions in instances where (1) a project has been 
declared economically feasible by, and received a funding 
commitment from, a public subsidizing agency; (2) the developer 
then seeks and receives a comprehensive permit subject to 
conditions; (3) when a rate of return for the original proposal 
absent the conditions is subsequently calculated, the project as 
originally proposed is found to be "uneconomic" according to 
certain metrics established in regulatory guidelines; and (4) 
HAC determines that the conditions imposed make the project 
"significantly more uneconomic" and for those reasons rejects 
them. 
3 
 
 
We conclude that HAC has jurisdiction over such projects 
and the power to remove or modify conditions that make such 
projects significantly more uneconomic.  When public agencies 
are prepared to fund a project, and developers are prepared to 
proceed with less return on their investment from the outset 
than set forth in HAC's guidelines, HAC is authorized to 
eliminate conditions that effectively prevent such projects by 
rendering them significantly more uneconomic.  Indeed, such 
action fulfills the statutory purpose of preventing 
municipalities from hampering the construction of low income 
housing.  We also discern no error in HAC's development of its 
"significantly more uneconomic" standard through adjudication 
rather than regulation.  Finally, we conclude that the standard 
is not so vague as to be arbitrary and that its application here 
was supported by substantial evidence, as described in HAC's 
decision.  We therefore affirm. 
Background.  1.  The act and regulatory framework.  The 
purpose of the act, now into its sixth decade of operation, is 
well established.  "We have long recognized that the 
Legislature's intent in enacting [the act] is 'to provide relief 
from exclusionary zoning practices which prevented the 
construction of badly needed low and moderate income housing' in 
the Commonwealth."  Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lunenburg v. 
Housing Appeals Comm., 464 Mass. 38, 40 (2013), quoting 
4 
 
 
Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 
28-29 (2006).  A qualified developer of such housing can 
"circumvent the often arduous process of applying to multiple 
local boards for individual permits and, instead, . . . apply to 
the local board of appeals for issuance of a single 
comprehensive permit."  Lunenberg, supra, quoting Board of 
Appeals of Woburn v. Housing Appeals Comm., 451 Mass. 581, 583 
(2008) (Woburn).  If the local board of appeals denies the 
permit application, or approves it with "such conditions and 
requirements as to make the building or operation of such 
housing uneconomic," the developer can appeal from that decision 
to HAC.2  G. L. c. 40B, § 22.  In the case of an approval with 
conditions, if the developer can prove that the imposed 
conditions render the project uneconomic, then the burden shifts 
to the local board of appeals to demonstrate that the conditions 
"are consistent with local needs"; if the board cannot do so, 
then HAC may strike or modify the conditions "so as to make the 
proposal no longer uneconomic."  G. L. c. 40B, § 23.  See 760 
Code Mass. Regs. § 56.07(2) (2018) (establishing burden-shifting 
framework). 
 
2 HAC sits within the Department of Housing and Community 
Development (DHCD) and is obligated to act "in accordance with 
rules and regulations established by the [DHCD] director."  
G. L. c. 23B, § 5A. 
5 
 
 
As relevant to the developer in the case at bar, the act 
defines "uneconomic" as "any condition brought about by any 
single factor or combination of factors to the extent that it 
makes it impossible for . . . [the developer] to proceed and 
still realize a reasonable return in building or operating such 
housing."3  G. L. c. 40B, § 20.  The act itself does not define 
"reasonable return," but the Department of Housing and Community 
Development (DHCD), the agency administering the act, has 
promulgated regulations that do so in part.  See 760 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 56.02 (2018).  Those regulations provide methods for 
calculating a reasonable return in certain scenarios,4 and also 
state that "reasonable return" is "calculated according to 
guidelines issued by the [DHCD]."  Id. 
The referenced DHCD guidelines describe themselves as "a 
compilation of guidelines, generally applicable housing program 
requirements and policy document[s]."  They provide the method 
to calculate a project's return on total cost (ROTC) and also 
define the minimum ROTC "necessary to realize a reasonable 
 
3 The developer is a limited dividend organization.  The act 
provides a different definition of "uneconomic" for developers 
that are public agencies or nonprofits.  G. L. c. 40B, § 20. 
 
4 For example, part (a) of the definition of "reasonable 
return" in 760 Code Mass. Regs. § 56.02 specifies that, for a 
project that is "an ownership project or continuing care 
retirement community," a reasonable return is a profit of 
between fifteen and twenty percent of the total development 
costs. 
6 
 
 
return from the operation of a Project for purposes of 
determining whether a condition imposed by a Zoning Board in its 
approval of a Comprehensive Permit results in a Project being 
Uneconomic."5  Thus, according to the guidelines, a local zoning 
board's conditions make a project uneconomic if the ROTC of the 
project as proposed was greater than the minimum ROTC, but the 
ROTC of the project subject to the conditions falls below that 
threshold. 
The guidelines do not address the scenario where the ROTC 
of the development as originally proposed subsequently is found 
to be below the minimum ROTC economic threshold.  Rather, HAC, 
in prior adjudications, has required the developer to show in 
such cases that the local board's conditions render the project 
"significantly more uneconomic" than the project originally 
proposed in the developer's comprehensive permit application.  
This is precisely what occurred in the instant case. 
 
5 Per the guidelines, ROTC is expressed as a percentage and 
calculated as the "projected [net operating income] of a 
Project, divided by the projected total development cost 
(including development fees and overhead)."  The minimum ROTC is 
defined as "the sum of the ROTC Threshold Increment," a number 
set annually by DHCD, "and the Applicable Ten-Year U.S. Treasury 
Rate."  The definition for the latter specifies that, "on appeal 
to the [HAC]," the applicable Treasury rate is the one in effect 
on "the date of the Pre-Hearing Order."  In the instant case, 
HAC's prehearing order issued on December 6, 2016, more than two 
years after the developer first applied for a comprehensive 
permit. 
7 
 
 
2.  Facts and procedural history.  The relevant facts are 
not in dispute.  In 2014, the Massachusetts Housing Finance 
Agency (MassHousing), an independent, quasi public agency 
charged with providing financing for affordable housing in 
Massachusetts, issued HD/MW Randolph Avenue, LLC (developer), a 
project eligibility letter for a proposed two-building 
residential development of ninety rental units (project), 
twenty-three of which were to be low or moderate income housing.  
Such a letter is a prerequisite to applying for a comprehensive 
permit and may only be issued after a subsidizing agency 
determines, among other things, "that the proposed [p]roject 
appears financially feasible within the housing market in which 
it will be situated."  760 Code Mass. Regs. § 56.04(4)(d) 
(2018).  The letter did not include any explicit calculation or 
analysis of the developer's projected return on investment. 
The developer then applied to the zoning board of appeals 
of Milton (board) for a comprehensive permit.  Following eleven 
days of public hearings, in July of 2015 the board granted a 
permit for the construction of a thirty-five unit development 
that was subject to over sixty conditions.  The developer 
appealed to HAC pursuant to G. L. c. 40B, § 22, arguing that the 
conditions imposed made the project uneconomic and were not 
justified by local needs, and requesting that HAC modify or 
remove them.  Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted 
8 
 
 
prefiled testimony from experts, including an ROTC analysis (by 
the developer) and a critique of that analysis (by the board).  
In their posthearing briefs, both parties cited the 
"significantly more uneconomic" standard and argued over whether 
it had been met. 
HAC issued its sixty-seven page decision on December 20, 
2018.  Applying the guidelines, HAC calculated that the project 
had a projected ROTC of 5.88 percent as originally proposed, 
below the guidelines' minimum ROTC threshold of 6.84 percent.  
HAC further found that the imposition of the board's conditions 
lowered the expected ROTC of the project from 5.88 percent to 
4.26 percent.  This 1.62 percent decrease -- or, comparatively, 
a 27.5 percent reduction in expected return -- was substantial 
enough for HAC to conclude that the board's conditions had 
rendered the project "significantly more uneconomic" than as 
proposed.  HAC went on to find that the board had failed to show 
that many of its conditions were "consistent with local needs," 
G. L. c. 40B, § 23, and ordered them struck or modified. 
The board sought judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, 
in the Land Court, and on cross motions for judgment on the 
pleadings, the motion judge affirmed nearly the entirety of the 
9 
 
 
HAC decision.6  We granted the developer's subsequent application 
for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  Our review is governed by the familiar 
standards of G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  We may disturb HAC's decision 
if we conclude it is, as relevant to the board's arguments, 
"[i]n excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the 
agency," "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence," or 
"[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law."  Id.  In particular, "[w]hen 
determining the validity of an agency's decision, we first 
determine whether the Legislature has spoken with certainty on 
the topic in question . . . .  [If not,] we determine whether 
the agency's resolution of that issue may be reconciled with the 
governing legislation" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Woburn, 451 Mass. at 593.  Although we review questions of law 
de novo, Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control 
Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 512 (2019), we are required to "give due 
weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary 
authority conferred upon it," G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and "apply all 
rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the 
 
6 The motion judge reversed HAC's striking of two conditions 
related to long-term affordability and remanded to HAC for 
further proceedings regarding them.  That specific portion of 
the judgment is not contested in the appeal before us. 
10 
 
 
administrative action," Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury v. 
Housing Appeals Comm., 457 Mass. 748, 759 (2010) (Amesbury), 
quoting Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Wellesley v. Housing Appeals 
Comm., 385 Mass. 651, 654 (1982). 
The board challenges HAC's authority to hear cases where, 
because a project's as-proposed ROTC falls below the guidelines' 
minimum ROTC threshold, HAC applies the "significantly more 
uneconomic" standard, as well as the specifics of the standard 
itself.  Additionally, the board argues that certain of HAC's 
modifications of conditions were not accompanied by requisite 
subsidiary findings.  We consider each argument in turn, 
addressing first the threshold question of waiver. 
1.  Waiver.  HAC insists that the board's failure to 
challenge HAC's authority to apply the "significantly more 
uneconomic" standard during the underlying HAC proceedings means 
that the board's arguments on the subject are waived.7  See 
Albert v. Municipal Court of Boston, 388 Mass. 491, 493 (1983) 
("A party is not entitled to raise arguments on appeal that he 
could have raised, but did not raise, before the administrative 
agency . . .").  The board responds that the question whether a 
condition renders a project uneconomic is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to HAC hearing the case and therefore not subject 
 
7 Except where noted, HAC's arguments should be understood 
as also having been made by the developer. 
11 
 
 
to waiver.8  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3974 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 457 Mass. 53, 56 (2010) (Doe), quoting 
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 151 (2003) ("questions 
of subject matter jurisdiction 'may be raised at any time' . . . 
and are not waived even when not argued below").  More 
specifically, the board contends that where "a project is 
uneconomic as proposed," HAC has no jurisdiction whatsoever, and 
the board is free to impose whatever conditions it so desires. 
The board is incorrect on the jurisdiction issue.  "The 
question at the heart of subject matter jurisdiction is, 'Has 
the Legislature empowered the [agency] to hear cases of a 
certain genre?'"  Doe, 457 Mass. at 56, quoting Wachovia Bank, 
Nat'l Ass'n v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006).  The genre of 
cases HAC is empowered to hear is developer appeals from adverse 
comprehensive permit decisions by local zoning boards of appeals 
that will impede or prevent the development of low income 
housing.  See Middleborough v. Housing Appeals Comm., 449 Mass. 
514, 521 (2007) (warning that characterizing statutory 
requirements regarding fundability as unwaivable jurisdictional 
matters would "severely hamper[]" the "intent of the act -- to 
streamline and accelerate the permitting process for developers 
of low or moderate income housing in order to meet the pressing 
 
8 The board concedes that it "did not challenge HAC's 
jurisdiction before HAC itself." 
12 
 
 
need for affordable housing").  The question whether conditions 
render a project uneconomic or, in this case, significantly more 
uneconomic is not jurisdictional but, rather, as we have held in 
a similar context, "a necessary element of the developer's prima 
facie case for relief."  Woburn, 451 Mass. at 591, quoting 
Middleborough, 449 Mass. at 520-521 ("though department 
denominates 'fundability' as 'a "jurisdictional requirement" 
[it] is more properly viewed as a substantive aspect of the 
successful applicant's prima facie case for . . . a 
comprehensive permit'").  See Doe, 457 Mass. at 57 ("The 'nature 
of the case' assigned to the board is distinguishable from the 
elements of a prima facie case before the board").  
Although we could conclude that waiver dooms the board's 
arguments on the applicability of the significantly more 
uneconomic standard, we decide that there is nevertheless good 
cause to "address the substantive question before us:  it has 
been fully briefed and argued, and public policy would benefit 
from the elimination of any uncertainty" regarding HAC's 
application of the "significantly more uneconomic" standard.  
Middleborough, 449 Mass. at 522, citing Andrews v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 446 Mass. 611, 618 (2006).  We therefore proceed to the 
merits. 
2.  HAC's authority.  In evaluating whether HAC has the 
authority to develop and employ the "significantly more 
13 
 
 
uneconomic" standard, we begin with the statutory language 
itself.  Under the act, "uneconomic" is defined broadly to mean 
"any condition brought about by any single factor or combination 
of factors to the extent that it makes it impossible . . . for a 
limited dividend organization to proceed and still realize a 
reasonable return in building or operating [affordable] housing 
within the limitations set by the subsidizing agency."  G. L. 
c. 40B, § 20. 
In interpreting this provision, the agency responsible for 
its administration has provided more specific guidance through 
regulations, guidelines, and adjudicatory decisions, as is its 
right.  Such interpretation is also entitled to substantial 
deference, so long as it is not inconsistent with the statutory 
language or purpose.  See Alves's Case, 451 Mass. 171, 177 
(2008) ("We will not substitute our judgment for that of an 
administrative agency if its interpretation of a statute is 
reasonable"); Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 
627, 636 (2005) ("we accord special deference to an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulation"). 
To guide the inquiry into whether the imposed conditions 
have made it impossible for a developer to proceed and still 
realize a reasonable return, the agency, DHCD, has promulgated 
regulations and guidelines containing some situational rules for 
calculating a reasonable return.  Not surprisingly, although the 
14 
 
 
regulations and guidelines provide for different reasonable 
rates of return in a variety of different circumstances, they 
have not considered every possibility or eventuality. 
The regulations do in particular define as a minimum 
reasonable return lower amounts that are "determined to be 
feasible as set forth in the Project Eligibility Letter."9  760 
Code Mass. Regs. § 56.02 (part [c] of "reasonable return" 
definition).  Had such an amount been calculated in the funding 
letter commitment in the instant case, it would have established 
the minimum reasonable return, notwithstanding that it was lower 
than the returns set out elsewhere in the regulations.  See id.  
As explained in HAC's brief, however:  "Generally, as in this 
case, . . . the Project Eligibility letter does not include a 
specific figure reflecting the profit deemed to make the project 
'financially feasible.'"10 
Consequently, neither the regulations nor the guidelines 
address the specific scenario presented in this case, that is, 
 
9 Specifically, the regulations provide that "for the 
purpose of determining whether the Project is Uneconomic, . . . 
if an amount lower than the minimum set forth [in] 760 [Code 
Mass. Regs. §] 56.02:  Reasonable Return(a) or (b), as 
applicable, has been determined to be feasible as set forth in 
the Project Eligibility Letter, then such lower amount shall be 
the minimum" reasonable return.  760 Code Mass. Regs. § 56.02 
(part [c] of "reasonable return" definition). 
 
10 Why this is "generally" the case, however, is not 
explained. 
15 
 
 
where a developer has received a project eligibility letter that 
does not include a calculation of the expected return, and then 
seeks and receives a comprehensive permit subject to conditions, 
and, subsequently, when a rate of return for the original 
proposal absent the conditions is calculated, the proposal does 
not meet the minimum reasonable return set out elsewhere in the 
guidelines and regulations.11 
This scenario has, however, been specifically and 
consistently addressed in prior administrative adjudications by 
HAC.12  Woburn, 451 Mass. at 593, quoting Hastings v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 424 Mass. 46, 49 (1997) ("'It is a 
recognized principle of administrative law that an agency may 
adopt policies through adjudication as well as through 
rulemaking,' . . . and 'the choice made between proceeding by 
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that 
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative 
agency'").  In these circumstances, for over a decade, the 
 
11 We note that a developer that has decided to proceed with 
a project, and has dedicated the energy and resources to getting 
it permitted, has presumably done its own calculations and made 
its own decision that it is not impossible to proceed and 
receive, in its view, a reasonable rate of return. 
 
12 We have previously recognized that "[p]olicies announced 
in [HAC] adjudicatory proceedings may serve as precedents for 
future cases."  See Amesbury, 457 Mass. at 759 n.17, quoting 
Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Med., 383 Mass. 299, 313 
(1981). 
16 
 
 
agency responsible for interpreting the statute and its own 
regulations has applied the "significantly more uneconomic" test 
to determine whether the conditions imposed have made it 
impossible for the developer who is still willing to proceed to 
receive a reasonable return on its investment.  This 
adjudicative interpretation fills in a gap in the statutory and 
regulatory regime, and absent a clear directive from the 
Legislature to the contrary, regulatory agencies are entitled to 
fill such gaps.  See Amesbury, 457 Mass. at 759, 760-762 
(adopting HAC's interpretation, developed through adjudication, 
to address "ambiguity or a gap in the [act]"); Goldberg, 444 
Mass. at 633-634 ("That the Legislature . . . did not anticipate 
the exact factual scenario presented here does not make the 
administrative regulations and rulings that did anticipate such 
situations invalid").  Such a consistent administrative 
adjudicatory interpretation of statutory and regulatory language 
is also entitled to deference.  See, e.g., DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp 
Redev., LLC, 487 Mass. 690, 703 (2021), quoting Mullally v. 
Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 533 n.13 (2008) 
("administrative interpretation developed during, or shortly 
before, the litigation in question is entitled to less weight 
than that of a long-standing administrative interpretation of 
administrative rules"); Beverly Port Marina, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 84 Mass. App. 
17 
 
 
Ct. 612, 620-621 (2013), quoting United States Gypsum Co. v. 
Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 249 
n.16 (2007) ("our judicial deference 'may be tempered' when 
. . . the agency interpretation at issue is not one of long-
standing or consistent application"). 
 
Moreover, "'where the focus of a statutory enactment is 
reform,' as is true of the act, 'the administrative agency 
charged with its implementation should construe it broadly so as 
to further the goals of such reform'" (citation omitted).  
Middleborough, 449 Mass. at 524, quoting Massachusetts Fed'n of 
Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 774 
(2002).  HAC's application of the "significantly more 
uneconomic" standard is plainly in accord with its legislative 
mandate, as it allows developers willing to pursue less 
lucrative projects to avail themselves of the act's streamlined 
processes, paving the way for development of more affordable 
housing.  Cf. Dennis Hous. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Dennis, 439 Mass. 71, 82 (2003) (rejecting interpretation that 
"would leave in place the very form of local impediment to the 
development of affordable housing that the comprehensive permit 
act sought to eliminate"). 
 
In light of the above, we conclude that HAC's construction 
of the act and attendant regulatory scheme is "reasonable, 
consistent with the statutory language and purposes, and 
18 
 
 
appropriate."13  Amesbury, 457 Mass. at 762.  We therefore agree 
that HAC has authority to apply the "significantly more 
uneconomic" standard in cases like this one, where developers 
are willing to proceed despite lower initial rates of return as 
calculated by the guidelines' minimum ROTC. 
 
3.  Vagueness.  The board argues in the alternative that, 
even if HAC had authority to review the project, the 
"significantly more uneconomic" standard that it applied is so 
vague as to be arbitrary.  We disagree. 
 
First, we note that there is nothing inherently improper 
with the standard's use of the term "significantly."  The act 
does not forbid its use, and courts and fact finders routinely 
apply standards phrased in the same or similar terms.  See, 
e.g., Nierman v. Hyatt Corp., 441 Mass. 693, 695-696 (2004) 
(statute of limitations choice of law analysis requires 
determination of which jurisdiction has more significant 
relationship to parties and occurrence); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 
Mass. 649, 658 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) 
(grandparents must prove that failure to grant visitation will 
cause child significant harm). 
 
13 As such, this case is readily distinguishable from 
Woburn, 451 Mass. at 590, where we rejected an HAC 
interpretation that "brushed aside the language of the governing 
statute and the regulations of the department." 
19 
 
 
 
The heart of the analysis is routine ROTC calculations.  
The board engaged with the standard during the HAC proceedings 
and cited HAC decisions applying the standard in its posthearing 
brief.  HAC's determination that, by lowering the ROTC by 1.62 
percent (a 27.5 percent decrease, comparatively), the conditions 
made the project "significantly more uneconomic" is contrary to 
neither HAC precedent nor the plain meaning of the term 
"significantly."  We discern no error in HAC's use of the 
"significantly more uneconomic" standard here. 
 
Finally, there can be no suggestion in the instant case 
that the board was blindsided by a thereto-undefined rule.  See 
Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 405 Mass. 115, 120-
121 (1989) ("It is generally unacceptable for an agency to 
announce a new standard in its final decision in an adjudicatory 
proceeding and then rule, often not surprisingly, that a party 
who had no notice of that standard failed to meet it").  By the 
time of the HAC hearings, the "significantly more uneconomic" 
standard had existed for approximately a decade.14 
 
14 Because we find no error in HAC's conclusion that, 
applying the "significantly more uneconomic" standard, the 
board's conditions made the project uneconomic, we need not 
examine the developer's alternative argument that a board-
imposed condition banned three-bedroom units, and that such 
condition also was sufficient to render the project uneconomic.  
Additionally, this issue appears moot, as the board has conceded 
that it did not intend to, and did not in fact, impose a ban on 
three-bedroom units. 
20 
 
 
 
4.  Modified conditions.  Finally, the board contests HAC's 
modification of conditions requiring a looped roadway through 
the project.  As grounds, it cites G. L. c. 30A, § 11 (8), which 
mandates that an agency decision shall include "a statement of 
reasons for the decision, including determination of each issue 
of fact or law necessary to the decision."  To meet that 
requirement, an agency must make sufficient subsidiary findings 
that a reviewing court can assess whether its conclusions were 
supported by substantial evidence.  See NSTAR Elec. Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 462 Mass. 381, 387-390 (2012).  The 
board contends that HAC's decision fails to include sufficient 
subsidiary findings regarding the financial impact and 
feasibility of the looped road, on the one hand, and the HAC-
imposed replacements -- turnaround space and a new paved area 
for emergency vehicles -- on the other. 
 
HAC's decision considers the evidence from both sides at 
some length.  The board's looped roadway would necessitate 
splitting the two proposed apartment buildings up into several 
smaller structures, a fact the board does not dispute.  There is 
no question that HAC's alternative conditions would be less 
financially burdensome than such a radical redesign.  Moreover, 
HAC chose these particular substitute conditions to satisfy 
State fire safety standards.  Overall, HAC's decision is 
sufficiently robust for us to undertake a meaningful review and 
21 
 
 
conclude that it was supported by substantial evidence.  Compare 
NSTAR, 462 Mass. at 390-391 ("The department offers no 
explanation . . . [,] leav[ing] us without the tools to 
evaluate, on the record as a whole, the reasonableness of the 
department's apparent conclusion"). 
 
Conclusion.  HAC has jurisdiction over developer appeals 
from adverse comprehensive permit decisions by local zoning 
boards of appeals that impede or prevent the development of low 
or moderate income housing.  Where such projects have received 
project eligibility commitment letters, HAC also has the 
authority to review and reject local zoning board conditions 
that render such projects significantly more uneconomic, 
notwithstanding that the project's ROTC as originally proposed 
subsequently is found to fall below the minimum ROTC set out 
elsewhere in the guidelines.  Finally, the "significantly more 
uneconomic" standard is not so vague as to be arbitrary, and 
HAC's application of the standard in the instant case was 
sufficiently documented in its decision and supported by 
substantial evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.