Title: People v. Pinkonsly

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 94644-Agenda 5-May 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross- 
Appellee, v. ROBERT PINKONSLY, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Opinion filed November 20, 2003.
 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The State and the defendant, Robert Pinkonsly, both appeal a
decision of the appellate court affirming in part and vacating in part a
McHenry County circuit court order dismissing the defendant's
amended petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)). Because the appellate
court erred in vacating the defendant's unlawful delivery of a
controlled substance convictions and sentences and in not vacating the
extended-term sentence on his narcotics racketeering conviction, we
reverse.
BACKGROUND
	On December 4, 1989, the defendant sold 27.2 grams of cocaine
to an undercover police officer. Again, on December 6, 1989, the
defendant sold 53.3 grams of cocaine to the officer. Finally, on
December 12, 1989, the defendant sold 124.1 grams of cocaine to the
officer. The defendant was arrested during this last sale. He was later
indicted on one count of delivery of between 15 and 100 grams of a
controlled substance (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56½, par.
1401(a)(2)(A), currently codified as 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A)
(West 2002)), one count of delivery of between 100 and 400 grams
of a controlled substance (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56½, par.
1401(a)(2)(B), currently codified as 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(B)
(West 2002)), and one count of narcotics racketeering (see Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1989, ch. 56½, par. 1654(a), currently codified at 725 ILCS
175/4(a) (West 2002)). The unlawful delivery offenses were Class X
felonies; the narcotics racketeering offense was a Class 1 felony.
	On August 23, 1991, the defendant was convicted on all three
counts. At sentencing, the State asked the trial court to sentence the
defendant to two concurrent 60-year, extended-term sentences on the
delivery convictions and a consecutive 15-year sentence on the
narcotics racketeering conviction. Defense counsel objected that
"[t]here have been no necessary findings or evidence to indicate
extended terms." The court sentenced the defendant to two
concurrent 30-year sentences on the delivery convictions and another
concurrent 30-year, extended-term sentence on the narcotics
racketeering conviction. The defendant appealed, raising the sole issue
of a purported speedy-trial violation. The appellate court affirmed.
See People v. Pinkonsly, No. 2-91-1093 (1993) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	More than six years after his conviction, on December 17, 1997,
the defendant filed a pro se "Petition for Relief from Judgment" under
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendant
asserted that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to reduce the defendant's sentence for narcotics racketeering
and a motion to vacate the defendant's unlawful delivery convictions
as lesser-included offenses of narcotics racketeering. The trial court
appointed an attorney for the defendant, and this new attorney filed an
"AMENDED PETITION TO REDUCE SENTENCE," arguing only
that the length of the defendant's sentence was excessive in light of his
age. The State did not respond to this petition, and the trial court
dismissed it.
	The defendant appealed, and the appellate court appointed
another attorney for the defendant. On appeal, the defendant
contended that all of his prior attorneys, including his court-appointed
attorney on his section 2-1401 petition, were constitutionally
ineffective because they failed to challenge his extended-term sentence
for narcotics racketeering, and they failed to attack his unlawful
delivery convictions as lesser-included offenses of narcotics
racketeering. The appellate court ordered supplemental briefing on
two issues: (1) whether narcotics racketeering and unlawful delivery
are based on the same physical act; and (2) whether People v.
Callaway, 185 Ill. App. 3d 136 (1989), which held that Class 1, 2, and
3 felony unlawful delivery convictions were lesser-included offenses
of narcotics racketeering, a Class 1 felony, applied here.
	The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed in part
and vacated in part. 331 Ill. App. 3d 984. The court rejected the
State's argument that the defendant's section 2-1401 petition was
untimely, because the State did not present that argument to the trial
court. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 986. The court then declined to consider the
defendant's ineffective-assistance claims regarding his trial and
appellate attorneys, reasoning that such claims are not cognizable in
a section 2-1401 petition. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 986-87. The court,
however, addressed the defendant's argument that his attorney on his
section 2-1401 petition was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of
whether unlawful delivery was a lesser-included offense of narcotics
racketeering. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 987. The court recited the familiar,
two-prong Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), standard for analyzing sixth amendment
ineffective-assistance claims and reviewed Illinois law on lesser-included offenses. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 987-88. The court examined the
charges against the defendant:
			"The narcotics racketeering count contained an allegation
that defendant participated in a pattern of narcotics activity.
That allegation necessarily implied that defendant committed
two Class 2, 1, or X felonies under the Cannabis Control Act
[citation] or the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. Counts
I and II alleged that defendant committed two Class X
felonies under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.
Accordingly, the statutory elements of narcotics racketeering
were implicitly contained in the unlawful-delivery-of-cocaine
counts, a fact that renders the unlawful-delivery-of-cocaine
counts lesser-included offenses. See People v. Callaway, 185
Ill. App. 3d 136 (1989)." 331 Ill. App. 3d at 988.(1)
	The court held that the defendant's section 2-1401 attorney was
ineffective for failing to raise this issue and vacated the defendant's
convictions and sentences on both delivery counts. 331 Ill. App. 3d at
989. The court further held that the defendant's section 2-1401
attorney was not ineffective for failing to challenge the defendant's
extended-term sentence on his narcotics racketeering conviction. 331
Ill. App. 3d at 991. Though the trial court did not offer a basis for the
extended-term sentence, the State mentioned at sentencing that the
defendant had a prior Class 1 felony conviction for "possession with
intent to deliver." 331 Ill. App. 3d at 991.
	The dissent initially noted that the majority opinion did not
address the central issue in this case: whether predicate offenses are
lesser-included offenses. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 991 (O'Malley, J.,
dissenting). After reviewing Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773,
85 L. Ed. 2d 764, 105 S. Ct. 2407 (1985), where the United States
Supreme Court expressed "serious doubts" that importing marijuana
was a lesser-included offense of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise, the dissent characterized the defendant's conduct as
"multilayered and not susceptible to the 'classic relationship' of lesser-included and greater offenses." 331 Ill. App. 3d at 992. According to
the dissent, the Class X delivery counts could not be lesser-included
offenses of the Class 1 racketeering count:
		"The General Assembly has chosen to make the delivery of
between 15 and 100 grams of cocaine a Class X felony, while
it has made the later-enacted narcotics racketeering a Class
1 felony. This scheme is indicative of the legislature's intent
to make large-scale drug delivery a more serious offense than
the receipt of income from multiple, smaller drug offenses,
rather than a lesser-included offense." 331 Ill. App. 3d at
994.
	We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).
ANALYSIS
	In its appeal, the State raises three issues: (1) whether the
appellate court erred in granting relief on the defendant's section
2-1401 petition because it was untimely; (2) whether the appellate
court erred in granting relief on the defendant's petition because
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable in section
2-1401 proceedings; and (3) whether the appellate court erred in
granting relief on the defendant's petition because unlawful delivery
of a controlled substance is not a lesser-included offense of narcotics
racketeering. We review the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's
section 2-1401 petition for an abuse of discretion. See People v.
Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 461 (2000).
	Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, formerly section
72 of the Civil Practice Act, provides a comprehensive statutory
procedure by which final orders and judgments may be challenged
more than 30 days after their entry. People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444,
447 (2001) (stating that section 2-1401 provides a civil remedy,
which also applies to criminal cases). A section 2-1401 petition filed
more than two years after the challenged judgment cannot be
considered absent a clear showing that the person seeking relief was
under a legal disability or duress or the grounds for relief were
fraudulently concealed. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 210-11
(1997); see 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2002). If the party opposing
the section 2-1401 petition does not raise the limitations period as a
defense, it may be waived. See Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d  at 447.
	The defendant was convicted on August 23, 1991, but he did not
file his pro se section 2-1401 petition until October 17, 1997, well
beyond the two-year limitations period. The State did not raise the
timeliness issue before the trial court, though it did raise that issue in
answering the defendant's appeal. The State refers us to the "well-established rule" that a prevailing party may raise issues on appeal that
were not raised at trial.
	We agree with the State that, generally, an appellee may raise any
arguments in support of the trial court's judgment, even though they
were not raised before the trial court, provided they have a sufficient
factual basis before the trial court. See People v. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d 298, 300 (1987); see also People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 201
(1991). However, in People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999), we
addressed a similar argument from the State in the context of a
petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 1994)) and declined to apply this exception to the
waiver rule. In Wright, the State argued on appeal that the defendant's
postconviction petition was untimely because he filed it more than six
months after the denial of his motion to reconsider the denial of his
certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court. The defendant
responded that the State had waived its limitations period argument
by failing to raise it before the trial court. The State relied upon this
exception. We stated:
		"Here, although the facts support the conclusion that
defendant did not file his petition within the time limits found
in section 122-1, that section allows a defendant to file a
petition outside the limitations period if the late filing is not
due to the defendant's culpable negligence. [Citation.] By not
raising this issue until the cause was on appeal, the State has
effectively precluded defendant from seeking to amend his
petition to allege facts demonstrating that the late filing was
not caused by his culpable negligence. While we recognize
that section 122-1 requires the defendant to allege the facts
demonstrating a lack of culpable negligence, we do not
believe that this requirement allows the State to wait until an
appeal to raise an affirmative defense that the defendant may
be able to avoid by amending his petition. By failing to raise
this issue below, the State has waived its right to argue that
the defendant's petition is untimely." Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at
11.
	Just as the Post-Conviction Hearing Act has an exception to its
limitations period for delays not attributable to the defendant's
culpable negligence (see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2002)), section
2-1401 has an exception to its limitations period for delays
attributable to disability, duress, or fraudulent concealment (see 735
ILCS 5/2-1401(c) ("Time during which the person seeking relief is
under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently
concealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2 years")). We
conclude that our statement in Wright applies with equal force here.
If the State wished to argue that the defendant's section 2-1401
petition was untimely, it should have done so before the trial court,
where any amendments could have been made and any factual disputes
could have been resolved. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 12. The State waived
its timeliness argument. We turn to the propriety of the defendant's
section 2-1401 petition.
	In a legal memorandum supporting his pro se section 2-1401
petition, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that he was deprived of "his
Fifth Amendment Right to be protected from conviction and multiple
punishments for the same conduct" because he was convicted and
sentenced for both unlawful delivery and narcotics racketeering.
Before the appellate court, the defendant dropped this constitutional
characterization of the issue and simply argued that the delivery
convictions were lesser-included offenses of the narcotics racketeering
conviction under the so-called charging instrument approach and,
accordingly, they should be vacated. Here, the State argues that the
charging instrument approach subverts the legislature's intent that
narcotics racketeering supplement existing drug trafficking sanctions.
	This issue is still essentially a constitutional issue. The prohibition
against double jeopardy (see U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §10; see also 720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 2002)) safeguards
against multiple punishments for the same offense (see North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664-65, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969); People v. Totten, 118 Ill. 2d 124, 130-31 (1987))
and consequently bars prosecution for both an offense and a lesser-included offense (see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187,
97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977); People v. Washington, 272 Ill. App. 3d 913,
920 (1995); see generally People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977)).
However, we decline to reach this issue. Though the parties dispute
the application of the charging instrument approach, neither party has
squarely addressed double jeopardy in this appeal. Additionally, we
will not consider a constitutional issue if we can decide the case on
other grounds. See Bonaguro v. County Officers Election Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 396 (1994); In re Estate of Ersch, 29 Ill. 2d 572, 576-77
(1963) ("It is the established rule of this court that a constitutional
question will not be considered if the case can be decided without
doing so").
	To obtain relief under section 2-1401, the defendant "must
affirmatively set forth specific factual allegations supporting each of
the following elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or
claim; (2) due diligence in presenting this defense or claim to the
circuit court in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing the
section 2-1401 petition for relief." Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986); accord Kaput v. Hoey, 124 Ill. 2d 370, 378
(1988). That is, in order to obtain relief under section 2-1401, the
defendant must show both a meritorious defense to the charges
against him and due diligence in presenting it.
	A meritorious defense under section 2-1401 involves errors of
fact, not law. See Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 461; see also Burns v. People,
9 Ill. 2d 477, 480 (1956) (noting that a section 72 motion "is not
available for the purpose of correcting errors at law" such as
ineffective assistance of counsel). As we have stated:
		"A section 2-1401 petition for relief from a final judgment is
the forum in a criminal case in which to correct all errors of
fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the
petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered, which,
if then known, would have prevented its rendition.
[Citations.] A section 2-1401 petition, however, is 'not
designed to provide a general review of all trial errors nor to
substitute for direct appeal.' " Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 461,
quoting People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 314 (1978).
	For this reason, a section 2-1401 petition differs from a
postconviction petition. A postconviction petition requires the court
to decide whether the defendant's constitutional rights were violated
at trial (see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2002)); a section 2-1401
petition, on the other hand, requires the court to determine whether
facts exist that were unknown to the court at the time of trial and
would have prevented entry of the judgment. See People v. Hayden,
288 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1078 (1997). The defendant does not argue
that the trial court should have considered his section 2-1401 petition
as a postconviction petition. See People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d 479, 484 (1973); People v. Gandy, 227 Ill. App. 3d 112, 139
(1992) ("Where the section 2-1401 petition is prepared pro se and
alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights cognizable under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the trial court is to treat it as such").
Such an argument would fail because, although his initial petition was
pro se, his amended petition, which is the subject of this appeal, was
prepared by an attorney and clearly brought under section 2-1401.
See People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972) (holding that where an
amended postconviction petition filed by appointed counsel did not
include allegations from the defendant's pro se postconviction
petition, such issues were not before the court); cf. Barnett v. Zion
Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 384 (1996) ("Where an amended
pleading is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the prior
pleading, the earlier pleading ceases to be part of the record for most
purposes and is effectively abandoned and withdrawn").
	We have long held that section 2-1401 proceedings are not an
appropriate forum for ineffective-assistance claims because such
claims do not challenge the factual basis for the judgment. See People
v. Anderson, 31 Ill. 2d 262, 264 (1964); accord People v. Smith, 176
Ill. App. 3d 132, 136 (1988). The appellate court here correctly
refused to disturb the ruling of the trial court denying relief to the
defendant on his claims that his trial and appeal attorneys were
ineffective. Before the appellate court, the defendant also asserted that
his section 2-1401 attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the
lesser-included offense issue. That court agreed with the defendant.
The State now contends that the defendant was not entitled to
effective assistance of counsel in the section 2-1401 proceeding.
	The right to assistance of counsel at trial is derived from the sixth
amendment, but the right to assistance of counsel in collateral
postconviction proceedings is a matter of legislative grace. People v.
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364 (1990); People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64,
73 (1988). A defendant may not properly assert a constitutional claim
of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel (see People v.
Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 159 (1993)) because a postconviction
petitioner is guaranteed only the level of assistance provided by the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264,
276 (1992); see also People v. Wright, 149 Ill. 2d 36, 64 (1992)
(postconviction petitioners are guaranteed a "reasonable" level of
assistance); 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).
		"This distinction is rational, because trial counsel plays a
different role than counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
[Citation.] At trial, counsel acts as a shield to protect
defendants from being 'haled into court' by the State and
stripped of their presumption of innocence. [Citation.] Post-conviction petitioners, however, have already been stripped
of the presumption of innocence, and have generally failed to
obtain relief on appellate review of their convictions. ***
Counsel are appointed to represent post-conviction
petitioners, not to protect them from the prosecutorial forces
of the State, but to shape their complaints into the proper
legal form and to present those complaints to the court."
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 364-65.
	The defendant here is not a postconviction petitioner, but instead
a section 2-1401 petitioner. Section 2-1401 does not specify any level
of assistance, and the appellate court erroneously applied the
Strickland standard to the defendant's claim that his section 2-1401
attorney was ineffective. Assuming that the defendant was entitled to
the same level of assistance on his section 2-1401 petition as on a
postconviction petition, the defendant did not receive unreasonable
assistance. The defendant's attorney was not unreasonable for failing
to raise a putative legal error in a proceeding where only fact errors
are cognizable. See People v. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 475, 486 (1995)
("Whether a charged offense encompasses an included offense is a
matter of law"). The appellate court erred in vacating the defendant's
unlawful delivery convictions and sentences.
	In his cross-appeal, the defendant raises one issue: whether the
appellate court erred in refusing to grant relief on his claim that an
extended-term sentence for narcotics racketeering was improper. 
	The Unified Code of Corrections allows an extended term
sentence only "for the class of the most serious offense of which the
offender was convicted." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
1005-8-2(a), currently codified as 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2002).
At sentencing, the defendant stood convicted of two counts of
unlawful delivery, both Class X felonies, and one count of narcotics
racketeering, a Class 1 felony. Thus, the defendant could have
received an extended-term sentence only on the delivery convictions.
The State concedes that "if this Court reverses the appellate court
decision on the Class X offenses, narcotics racketeering is not the
highest statutory class of offenses for which Defendant was
convicted."
	Because the appellate court erred in vacating the defendant's
unlawful delivery convictions, it also erred in refusing to vacate the
sentence on his narcotics racketeering conviction. See People v. Arna,
168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995) ("A sentence which does not conform to
a statutory requirement is void"). In the exercise of our supervisory
authority, we impose a 15-year sentence on the defendant's narcotics
racketeering conviction (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 2002)),
to run concurrently with his 30-year sentences on the delivery
convictions. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4) ("On appeal the reviewing
court may *** reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court").
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons that we have discussed, we reverse the judgment
of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court as
modified.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed
as modified.
	The court today holds that the appellate court erred in applying
the familiar Strickland standard to defendant's claim that his section
2-1401 attorney rendered him ineffective assistance of counsel. While
I agree that the Strickland analysis is inapplicable under these
circumstances, I disagree with the court's treatment of defendant's
contention and, as a result, cannot join in that portion of its opinion.


I


	Defendant began these collateral proceedings by filing a pro se
section 2-1401 petition for relief. In the petition, defendant alleged
two distinct reasons for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant asserted that he met with his trial attorney after sentencing
and expressed "shock" over receiving a 30-year sentence and that he
inquired as to why he had received a 30-year sentence on a Class 1
felony. Defendant alleged that he asked his attorney to file a motion
to reduce sentence and that no action was ever taken on defendant's
request. Defendant further alleged that he then spoke with his
appointed appellate attorney and asked her to address the sentencing
issue. Defendant alleged that his appellate attorney erroneously replied
that his previous attorney's failure to move to reduce sentence
rendered the issue waived. Defendant further claimed that neither his
trial attorney nor his appellate attorney "ever mention[ed] that the two
unlawful deliveries were lesser included offenses of narcotic
racketeering, as such were barred by double jeopardy." Defendant
attached an affidavit to his petition and sought leave of court to
proceed as a pauper in the proceedings. In a memorandum of law filed
with the petition, defendant argued that his appellate attorney should
have recognized that defendant's sentencing scheme was erroneous on
its face: "The unlawful delivery charges are included offenses of
narcotic racketeering *** and a reviewing court may review an issue
not properly preserved if it involves an error affecting a substantial
right of the defendant."
	The transcripts reveal that the circuit court was concerned about
defendant's pro se allegations and, to that end, appointed counsel for
defendant. Counsel thereafter filed an "Amended Petition to Reduce
Sentence." The record reveals, however, that defendant was
dissatisfied with his appointed counsel and that he moved to have her
dismissed and be allowed to proceed pro se.(2) The court denied that
motion and eventually denied relief on defendant's petition.
	On appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court erred in
denying his petition.(3) He claimed that his convictions violated the
double jeopardy clause and that all of his attorneys, including the one
appointed in the collateral proceeding, had rendered constitutionally
infirm assistance by failing to raise the issue. The State raised three
arguments in support of the circuit court's judgment. The State first
argued that defendant's section 2-1401 petition was untimely. The
State further argued that, under Strickland, counsel was not
ineffective for either failing to argue the vacatur of the convictions on
the lesser-included offenses or failing to move to reduce sentence.
	The appellate court began its opinion by noting that the State's
contention, raised for the first time in its appellate brief, that
defendant's section 2-1401 petition was untimely, was waived. 331
Ill. App. 3d at 986. The appellate court then noted that defendant's
contentions concerned ineffective assistance of counsel claims at the
sentencing, appeal, and petition stages of this case because none of the
attorneys raised certain sentencing issues. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 986. The
court did not consider any of these arguments, however, because "the
ineffectiveness of counsel is not appropriate for review in a
proceeding under section 2-1401." 331 Ill. App. 3d at 986-87. The
appellate court, however, agreed with defendant that his section
2-1401 attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the lesser-included
offense issue. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 987.
	In today's opinion, this court explains that the appellate court
correctly refused to consider the claims raised in the section 2-1401
petition regarding the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel. The court points out that such claims are more properly
raised in proceedings under our Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Slip op.
at 7-8. I agree. The Act is the proper vehicle in which to raise
collateral constitutional challenges to a conviction. The court goes on
to note, however, that the appellate court erred in holding that
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel from his section
2-1401 attorney.
	As an initial matter, it must be remembered that our Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)) was
developed in response to criticisms regarding the collateral procedures
available under Illinois law to prisoners who wished to attack their
convictions. See People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). As we
explained in Slaughter, "[t]he available methods by which a judgment
of conviction could be attacked in Illinois were writ of error, habeas
corpus, and coram nobis. The Supreme Court of the United States
was troubled, because no matter which method a prisoner pursued, he
appeared always to be met by a claim that he should have pursued a
different remedy." Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d  at 284. As the court correctly
points out, under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act counsel are
appointed to represent postconviction petitioners " 'not to protect
them from the prosecutorial forces of the State, but to shape their
complaints into the proper legal form and to present those complaints
to the court.' " (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 9-10, quoting People v.
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (1990). However, this court has also
recognized that "the same lack of legal knowledge which causes a
prisoner to draft an inadequate post-conviction petition might result
in his selecting the wrong method of collaterally attacking his
conviction. A salutary result, consistent with the intent of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act *** would be achieved if the circuit court,
upon finding that a pro se petition, however labeled, and however
inartfully drawn, alleged violations of the petitioner's rights cognizable
in a post-conviction proceeding, would thereafter, for all purposes,
treat it as such." People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d 479, 484
(1973). 
	My review of the transcripts in this case reveals that the circuit
court attempted to treat defendant's section 2-1401 petition as a
postconviction pleading in conformity with this court's directive in
Twomey. My conclusion is supported by several facts which are
established by the record. First, defendant's pro se claims were
couched in terms of a constitutional violation-ineffective assistance of
both trial and appellate counsel, which would serve as the
constitutional predicate necessary for pleading an action under the
Act. Second, the trial judge appointed counsel to defendant because
she believed that defendant's claims of error were substantial enough
to warrant professional legal assistance. I note that section 2-1401
does not provide for the appointment of counsel, but the Act does.
Third, the trial judge referred to the Act on several occasions as
evinced by her comments in the transcripts, in one instance going so
far as to cite the standard necessary to survive dismissal under the
Act.(4) Taken together, these facts demonstrate to me that the circuit
court attempted to help defendant by having an appointed attorney
take over the case and shape defendant's complaints into the proper
legal form.
	In this appeal, however, the court dismisses the relevance of
Twomey by stating that any argument based on Twomey would fail
because
		"although [defendant's] initial petition was pro se, his
amended petition which is the subject of this appeal, was
prepared by an attorney and clearly brought under section
2-1401."
Thus, according to the court, because defendant received the benefit
of counsel, we need not treat the section 2-1401 petition as a
postconviction petition.
	Having concluded that the presence of counsel in this case
renders unnecessary our viewing defendant's section 2-1401 petition
as a postconviction petition, the court goes on to discuss whether the
appellate court erred in holding that defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel at the section 2-1401 proceedings. The court
notes correctly that a petitioner seeking relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is guaranteed only the level of assistance
provided under the Act, which this court has ruled is a "reasonable"
level of assistance. Slip op. at 9. The court points out that defendant
here is not proceeding under the Act, but rather is proceeding
pursuant to section 2-1401. The court states:
		"Section 2-1401does not specify any level of assistance, and
the appellate court erroneously applied the Strickland
standard to the defendant's claim that his section 2-1401
attorney was ineffective. Assuming that the defendant was
entitled to the same level of assistance on his section 2-1401
petition as on a postconviction petition, the defendant did not
receive unreasonable assistance. The defendant's attorney
was not unreasonable for failing to raise a putative legal error
in a proceeding where only fact errors are cognizable." Slip
op. at 10.
I agree that the appellate court was incorrect in applying a Strickland
analysis to defendant's claim. However, I cannot agree that defendant
received "reasonable" assistance of counsel under these facts.
	The claims asserted by defendant in his pro se petition clearly
form the basis of relief under a postconviction proceeding. The trial
court clearly recognized as much and sought to appoint counsel to aid
defendant in the presentation of his claims. Under the court's ruling
today, however, defendant would have been better off without the
appointment of counsel because then each court at every level would
have been obligated to treat his allegations as a postconviction petition
filed under the Act. Defendant's pro se petition contained claims of
ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, based on (i)
the failure to raise the lesser-included offenses issue and (ii) the failure
to seek reduction of the 30-year sentence. Today's opinion does not
address whether appointed counsel was reasonable in her
representation where she neglected to redraft these obvious
constitutional contentions into the proper legal form, i.e., a petition
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In my view, any assessment
of reasonableness must turn on whether there is any merit to either
argument.  Instead, the court states that it was not unreasonable for
counsel to not include the lesser-included offense issue in her amended
section 2-1401 petition because such an assertion of error is one of
law, and section 2-1401 constitutes a proceeding where only fact
errors are cognizable. Slip op. at 10. Such a response misses the mark
in my view. I believe counsel rendered no assistance to defendant
when she failed to recognize that defendant's initial pro se petition
contained two bases for relief. Counsel failed in "shap[ing]
[defendant's] complaints into the proper legal form and ***
present[ing] those complaints to the court" (People v. Owens, 139 Ill.
2d at 364-65) by neglecting to raise defendant's lesser-included
offense issue as a separate claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act and by neglecting to redraft the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims under the Act as well.  Ironically, had the circuit court not
appointed counsel to defendant, this court, as well as the appellate
court, would have been obligated to treat defendant's pro se section
2-1401 petition as a postconviction petition (see Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d
at 484) and, as such, would be required to examine, in the course of
determining whether defendant's trial and appellate counsel were
ineffective, the merits of defendant's lesser-included offenses
argument. Under these circumstances, I cannot join in the court's
conclusion that counsel appointed during these collateral proceedings
provided "reasonable" representation when her so-called "reasonable"
actions are what prevents this court from addressing the sum and
substance of defendant's pro se allegations.
	I am disturbed that my colleagues are content to say that
counsel's representation was not unreasonable under these facts and
that, because of this, we need not concern ourselves with the
substance of defendant's claims. I would posit that an attorney who
makes such a fundamental mistake has not provided any level of
assistance to his or her client, let alone a "reasonable" level of
assistance. In my view, appointed counsel should have recognized that
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel had to be
redrafted in the form of a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. Moreover, any determination regarding the reasonableness of
counsel's actions would require this court to review the merits of
defendant's claim, i.e., whether his contention regarding the lesser-included offenses was meritorious. If that claim is not meritorious,
then counsel could not be faulted for failing to raise redraft a
nonmeritorious claim in postconviction form. Therefore, I disagree
with the court's decision, "declin[ing] to reach" the issue regarding
whether illegal delivery is a lesser-included offense of narcotics
racketeering. Slip op. at 7.
	Today's decision is notable in that defendant is told that he chose
the wrong legal forum to raise his challenge, but that the lawyer was
reasonable for ignoring the claim because it was not cognizable under
section 2-1401. Ironically, this is the same lawyer to whom defendant,
in the circuit court, presciently characterized as having had no
understanding of this case. By its actions today, the court confirms
defendant's suspicions.
II
	The resolution of defendant's cross-appeal is necessarily
impacted by the conclusion reached on the lesser-included offenses
issue. The State concedes that if the convictions for illegal delivery are
reinstated, then defendant's extended-term sentence for narcotics
racketeering cannot stand. As I stated above, I do not join in the
court's decision as to that issue because I believe that this court must
first assess the merits of defendant's lesser-included offenses issue in
order to resolve whether appointed counsel provided "unreasonable"
representation in this collateral proceeding. The court does not do that
and, as a result of its treatment of that issue, the court reinstates
defendant's illegal delivery charges. Given that fact, I accept the
State's concession, and join only in that portion of the opinion which
reduces the sentence.
III
	In this case, defendant attempted to raise several constitutional
challenges to his sentences for illegal delivery and narcotics
racketeering. Unfortunately for defendant, he erroneously utilized the
wrong legal vehicle to raise these challenges. Notwithstanding the
circuit court's appointment of counsel, defendant's claims are still out
of our reach because his attorney failed to shape his contentions into
the proper legal form and that failure is deemed "reasonable" by my
colleagues. This conclusion is reached without first assessing whether
defendant's constitutional challenges have merit. This is troubling
since two appellate justices believe that defendant's convictions
violated the single act rule, which has its basis in the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution. See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977) (and cases cited therein). Under these circumstances,
our inquiry into whether appointed counsel rendered "reasonable"
representation to defendant in these proceedings should consist of
more than the court's single sentence, which concludes that counsel
was not ineffective for failing to raise the legal argument in the section
2-1401 petition. See slip op. at 10. The proper inquiry, in my view, is
whether counsel acted reasonably in declining to redraft defendant's
pro se contention regarding the lesser-included offenses issue into the
proper legal form. Such an inquiry is particularly apt in this case where
the record affirmatively demonstrates that defendant was so
dissatisfied with his attorney that he sought leave to proceed pro se.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this partial concurrence
and partial dissent.
1.                 
The appellate court here also cited People v. Smith, 295 Ill. App. 3d 405
(1998), parenthetically noting that "the Appellate Court, Fifth District,
vacated a Class X possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to
deliver, stating that it was a lesser-included offense of narcotics
racketeering." 331 Ill. App. 3d at 989. Our review of Smith reveals
such a holding, but only in material designated as unpublishable under Supreme
Court Rule 23. That holding, accordingly, had no precedential value and should
not have been relied upon by the appellate court. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 23(e)
("An unpublished order of the court is not precedential and may not be
cited by any party except to support contentions of double jeopardy, res
judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case"); Baker v. Hutson,
333 Ill. App.      
            


2. In his written motion for dismissal of
appointed counsel, defendant stated that it was clear to him that his appointed
counsel "did not have the time, desire, or understanding of this
cause to adequately represent" him. (Emphasis added.) Defendant
specifically took issue with the amended petition that counsel filed in his
behalf. 
        
      

3.Defendant was represented by a different
attorney on appeal.              

4.4I would
point out that counsel, in response to the court, agreed with the court on this
point.