Title: Christenson v. Akin

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

183 Kan. 207 (1958)
326 P.2d 313
EVERETT CHRISTENSON and CLARA M. CHRISTENSON, Appellees,
v.
TOM O. AKIN and DOROTHY G. AKIN, his wife, Appellants.
No. 40,977

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 7, 1958.
Forrest A. Jackson, of Lawrence, argued the cause, and William L. Lemesany, of Lawrence, was with him on the brief for the appellants.
George K. Melvin, of Lawrence, argued the cause, and Charles A. Springer, of Lawrence, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JACKSON, J.:
In March, 1950, Christenson sold to Akin for the gross price of $30,000 "The Central L. & P. Gas Agency and good will, agency being described as equiptment only ..." The quoted part of the preceding sentence was taken, together with misspelling, from a so-called written contract entered into between the parties, together with their respective wives, on March 23, 1950. Akin took possession of the business and made certain payments under the contract.
On June 8, 1956, the Christensons brought suit against the Akins to collect the sum of $5,900 together with interest and to foreclose the above-mentioned contract as a chattel mortgage.
At this point, we are constrained to observe that having been informed that the above-mentioned contract was drawn for the parties *208 by a banker, it would seem that the parties would have found it much more economical to have engaged their present respective counsel at the time the contract of sale of this $30,000 worth of property was being made rather than waiting until difficulties as to their rights under the contract had arisen. Unauthorized practice of law often harms the public.
To return to the lawsuit, defendants Akin answered and also filed several cross claims. The pleadings were amended several times, and the trial from which this appeal is taken involved only one of the counterclaims of the defendants in which they sought to enjoin plaintiffs from competing with defendants in violation of their alleged covenants in the above mentioned contract.
The only part of the contract which is pertinent to the issues at the present time is as follows:
The within matter was tried to the court without a jury, and at the close of the evidence of defendants upon their counterclaim, plaintiffs entered a demurrer to the evidence. They also announced that they would offer no evidence upon their own behalf and moved the court for judgment. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court filed its memorandum decision. The findings and conclusions of the learned trial judge therein were later made a part of the journal entry and will be quoted, since they will serve both to elucidate the issues between the parties, the evidence thereon, and the rulings of the court:
The defendants have duly appealed from the above decision of the trial court.
We agree with the trial court that defendants are barred from the right of obtaining the affirmative relief of an injunction under the facts of this case. The rights of the defendants to object to the competitive actions of the plaintiffs are based upon a written contract. The evidence showed and the trial court found that the first violation of those rights occurred in the fall of 1950. The original petition of the plaintiffs was filed in this action on June 8, 1956. Therefore, more than five years had elapsed at the time of the filing of this suit since plaintiffs began to violate their alleged covenants under the written contract. Any affirmative relief would be barred to defendants by the five year statute of limitations in G.S. 1949, 60-306, First, before that date. The general rule is that a cross claim of any nature is barred as to affirmative relief, if such cross claim be barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the *213 filing of plaintiff's action. (cf. Reynolds v. Thomas, 28 Kan. 810; Oil & Gas Co. v. Wasson, 111 Kan. 124, 206 Pac. 320; 34 Am. Jur., Limitations of Actions, § 65, p. 60; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, § 285, p. 342.)
We note that the statute of limitations was pleaded in the plaintiffs' answer to the counterclaim of the defendant. Furthermore, as to the argument of defendants that the doctrine of laches must be pleaded, the trial judge in his memorandum decision pertinently directed attention to the case of Schlemeyer v. Mellencamp, 159 Kan. 544, p. 549, 156 P.2d 879, showing that the defense may be raised by demurrer.
It would appear from the record that this hearing of the counterclaim as tried in the district court, and from which this appeal was taken actually dealt only with the right of defendants to injunctive relief. But as shown from conclusion of law No. 6, supra, and from the part of the trial court's decision which we have italicized, it appears that the trial court determined that defendants' right of damages for past forbidden competition was barred as well as injunctive relief. It would seem that this is not entirely correct.
Nowhere in this record is mention made of the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-715. As that statute has been construed in the cases of Bank v. Elliott, 97 Kan. 64, 154 Pac. 255; Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551, 180 Pac. 453; McCarthy v. Sink, 152 Kan. 659, 107 P.2d 790; and Collins v. Richardson, 168 Kan. 203, 212 P.2d 302, it would seem pertinent to this case. The counterclaim here being considered grew out of the same contract and transaction which is the basis of plaintiffs' cause of action in their petition. Although defendants may be barred from affirmative relief because of limitations, they would seem to have a right to use their counterclaim as a matter of pure defense to reduce any judgment received by plaintiffs herein.
In conclusion of law No. 4, supra, the trial court concludes that the contract against competition herein, if it had not been for laches, could have been given a reasonable meaning. In view of the provisions of section 60-715, supra, we feel that the trial court should give the contract that reasonable construction, and allow the parties a further hearing upon the question of past damages suffered by defendants because of the acts of plaintiffs in violation of the contract which they are now suing on. The defendants will not be *214 permitted to recover an affirmative judgment of more than shall be found to be due plaintiffs on the indebtedness remaining due, but should be allowed to reduce the judgment of plaintiff by the amount of any damage which it may be found defendants have suffered herein.
In accord with the above, the trial court's conclusion of law No. 6, supra, and the italicized portion of the decision should be set aside. The decision as so modified should be affirmed, and the case returned to the district court for further proceedings in accord with the views expressed herein.
It is so ordered.