Title: Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v. Thompson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1496 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Federal National Mortgage Association, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Cory Thompson, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Unknown Spouse of Cory Thompson, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATOIN FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 24, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 19, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Amy Smith 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs and an oral 
argument by Christopher Stroebel and Stroebel Law, LLC, Madison. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief and an oral 
argument by Thomas C. Dill and BP Peterman Law Group, LLC, 
Brookfield. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1496 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV3377) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Federal National Mortgage Association, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Cory Thompson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Unknown Spouse of Cory Thompson, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 24, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County.  
Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This appeal comes before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals.1  Cory 
Thompson, the debtor defendant, appeals an order of the Dane 
County Circuit Court, Amy Smith, Judge, granting Federal 
                                                 
1 Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Thompson, No. 2016AP1496, 
unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. App. June 29, 2017).  
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
2 
 
National Mortgage Association a foreclosure judgment and a 
monetary judgment of $152,355.98, plus any amounts held in 
escrow, interest after August 16, 2012, and costs incurred by 
Federal National Mortgage Association.2   
¶2 
The 
issue 
certified 
is 
as 
follows: 
 
Where 
a 
foreclosure action brought on a borrower's default on a note has 
been dismissed, is the lender barred by claim preclusion from 
bringing 
a 
second 
foreclosure 
action 
on 
the 
borrower's 
continuing default on the same note?  
¶3 
Essentially, we must answer the following question:  
When a foreclosure action brought on the borrower's default on 
the note has been dismissed with prejudice,3 and the lender had 
not validly accelerated payment of the amount due under the 
note, does claim preclusion bar the lender from bringing a 
second foreclosure action based upon the borrower's continuing 
default on the same note? 
¶4 
We conclude that when a lender does not validly 
accelerate payment of the amount due under the note and a 
foreclosure action brought on the borrower's default on an 
installment payment under the note has been dismissed with 
prejudice, claim preclusion does not bar the lender from 
                                                 
2 Federal National Mortgage Association replaced Bank of 
America as the plaintiff in the instant case in December 2015. 
3 For a summary of the facts and decision in the previous  
action in 2010, see BAC Home Loans Servicing LP v. Thompson, No. 
2013AP210, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2013).  
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
3 
 
bringing 
a 
subsequent 
foreclosure 
action 
based 
upon 
the 
borrower's continuing default on the same note.     
¶5 
For an earlier action to bar a subsequent action under 
the doctrine of claim preclusion, there must be, among other 
elements, "an identity of causes of action in the two suits[.]"  
N. States Power Co. v Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 551, 525 
N.W.2d 723 (1995).  
¶6 
There is no identity of causes of action in the 
instant case and in the earlier lawsuit.  The matters that were 
litigated or might have been litigated in the earlier lawsuit 
are not the same as those in the instant case.  A different set 
of operative facts predicated upon separate and distinct 
defaults on the note is alleged in each lawsuit.   
¶7 
Upon dismissal of the first lawsuit, the parties 
continued the same contractual relationship with the same 
continuing obligations they had before the commencement of the 
first lawsuit.  The borrower's default resulting from the 
borrower's failure to make an installment payment due after 
dismissal of the first lawsuit was not and could not have been 
litigated in the first lawsuit.  Thus, the failure of the 
borrower to pay an installment after the termination of the 
first lawsuit created a new set of operative facts upon which 
the lender could base a subsequent foreclosure action. 
¶8 
After the first lawsuit, the lender gave new notice of 
intent to accelerate payment.  The second lawsuit alleged a 
different date of default than was alleged in the first lawsuit.  
These constitute new facts giving rise to a new and subsequent 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
4 
 
default and a different transaction from that presented in the 
first foreclosure action. 
¶9 
Additionally, the parties raised and addressed the 
issues of whether the circuit court erred at trial by admitting 
a copy of the promissory note into evidence and whether Federal 
National Mortgage Association proved that it had possession of 
the original wet-ink promissory note.4  
¶10 We conclude that these additional issues are governed 
by our decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Wuensch, 
2018 WI 35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
¶11 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 
I 
¶12 The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review.   
¶13 In November 2004, Cory Thompson executed a promissory 
note payable to America's Wholesale Lender for $162,800.00, 
secured by a mortgage on real property.  The note was endorsed 
in blank by America's Wholesale Lender.  The note contained an 
acceleration clause stating that the holder of the note may 
require Thompson to pay the full amount of unpaid principal plus 
interest immediately under the following conditions:   
                                                 
4 When this court grants direct review upon certification, 
it acquires jurisdiction over all issues, not merely the issues 
certified or the issue for which the court accepts the 
certification.  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(3); Wis. Stat. 
§§ 808.05(2), 809.61; State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 
N.W.2d 177 (1986).  
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
5 
 
(1) Thompson must have defaulted by failing to make a 
monthly payment on the date that it was due;  
(2) the holder of the note must have sent written notice 
to Thompson stating that it may accelerate the 
payments under the note if Thompson fails to cure the 
default by a given date; and  
(3) the amount of time in which Thompson is afforded the 
opportunity to cure his default must not be less than 
30 days after the date on which the notice is mailed 
or otherwise delivered to Thompson. 
¶14 In November 2010, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 
(formerly Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP) filed a lawsuit 
against Thompson.  The complaint alleged that Thompson failed to 
make required payments on the note as of April 2009.  In its 
complaint, BAC Home Loans purported to accelerate the debt, 
which made the principal balance of $153,202.53 immediately 
payable in full.  BAC Home Loans sought a money judgment in the 
full amount owed under the note and sought to foreclose on the 
property securing the note. 
¶15 At a court trial held on August 16, 2012, the circuit 
court 
determined 
that 
BAC 
Home 
Loans 
failed 
to 
present 
sufficient evidence to prevail in its foreclosure action and 
dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  The circuit court 
reasoned that BAC Home Loans failed to present evidence of the 
original notice of intent to accelerate full payment and failed 
to present evidence that BAC Home Loans was in possession of the 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
6 
 
original wet-ink note (i.e., that BAC Home Loans was the holder 
of the note with the right to enforce the note).   
¶16 In March 2014, Bank of America, N.A., (the entity 
servicing Thompson's loan beginning in 2011), sent Thompson a 
notice of intent to accelerate payment of the note.  The notice 
of intent to accelerate payment informed Thompson of the amount 
due to cure his default ($89,586.63), when payment was due (on 
or before May 4, 2014), and where to remit payment.  Thompson 
did not cure his default on or before May 4, 2014.  
¶17 In December 2014, Bank of America filed a complaint 
initiating the instant lawsuit.  The complaint alleged that 
Thompson had failed to make payments on the note as of September 
2009 and that because Bank of America had accelerated the debt, 
the principal balance of $152,355.98 was immediately payable in 
full. 
¶18 Thompson moved to dismiss the December 2014 lawsuit, 
arguing that it was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
¶19 The circuit court reasoned that the 2010 lawsuit and 
the instant 2014 lawsuit involved the same parties, the same 
note and mortgage, the same "essential" allegations of default, 
and the same remedy.  According to the circuit court, the only 
difference between the 2010 and 2014 lawsuits was the different 
default period.  The 2010 lawsuit was based on a default as of 
April 2009, and the 2014 lawsuit was based on a default as of 
September 2009.     
¶20 The circuit court concluded that claim preclusion 
barred the portion of Bank of America's default claim that was 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
7 
 
alleged to have occurred between April 2009 and August 16, 2012, 
the date of the trial in the 2010 lawsuit.  The circuit court 
further concluded that any default claim alleged to have 
occurred after August 16, 2012, "remain[ed] viable."   
¶21 The circuit court explained that applying claim 
preclusion to any default alleged to have occurred after 
judgment was entered in the 2010 lawsuit would "be analogous to 
parties in a contract litigating to conclusion one contract 
violation, and then being forever barred from litigating 
subsequent contract violations.  Surely, the policies behind 
claim or issue preclusion do not contemplate such a result." 
¶22 Accordingly, Bank of America amended its complaint to 
allege a date of default occurring after the trial in the 2010 
lawsuit.  The amended complaint alleged that Thompson had failed 
to make payments on the note as of September 2012 and that on 
acceleration of the debt due, Thompson owed a principal balance 
of $152,141.69.   
¶23 A court trial was held on May 12, 2016.  Prior to 
calling any witnesses, Federal National moved to admit into 
evidence a purported copy of the note.  Counsel for Federal 
National presented the copy of the note, along with a document 
purporting to be the original wet-ink note.  Thompson objected, 
stating that he was unable to tell whether the purported 
original wet-ink note was in fact the original wet-ink note or 
whether either document was identical to the original document 
that he signed in November 2004.   
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
8 
 
¶24 The circuit court visually compared the copy of the 
note with the document that Federal National's counsel presented 
to the court as the original wet-ink note.  The circuit court 
observed that the document presented by counsel as the original 
note appeared to be the original wet-ink note.  The circuit 
court admitted the copy of the original wet-ink note based on 
the court's visual comparison of the original and copy and 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
viewed 
the 
copy 
as 
self-
authenticating. 
¶25 The circuit court granted Federal National a monetary 
judgment of $152,355.98——plus any amounts held in escrow, costs, 
and interest after August 16, 2012——along with a judgment of 
foreclosure 
to 
satisfy 
the 
monetary 
judgment. 
 
Thompson 
appealed. 
¶26 The court of appeals certified the issue as follows: 
Where a foreclosure action brought on a borrower's default on a 
note has been dismissed, is the lender barred by claim 
preclusion from bringing a second foreclosure action on the 
borrower's continuing default on the same note?   
II 
¶27 We begin by setting forth the standard of review 
applicable to the certified issue.   
¶28 The certified issue involves the application of the 
doctrine of claim preclusion to undisputed facts.  "The question 
of whether claim preclusion applies under a given factual 
scenario is a question of law that this court reviews de novo."  
N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 551 (citing DePratt v. West 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
9 
 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306, 310, 334 N.W.2d 883 
(1983)).   
III 
¶29 We address whether the doctrine of claim preclusion 
applies to the undisputed facts in the instant action. 
¶30 Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "a final 
judgment is conclusive in all subsequent actions between the 
same parties [or their privies] as to all matters which were 
litigated or which might have been litigated in the former 
proceedings."  N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 550 (brackets 
in original); Lindas v. Oday, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 558, 515 
N.W.2d 458 (1994); DePratt, 113 Wis. 2d at 310.  "Claim 
preclusion thus provides an effective and useful means to 
establish and fix the rights of individuals, to relieve parties 
of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, to conserve 
judicial resources, to prevent inconsistent decisions, and to 
encourage reliance on adjudication."  Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 
2005 WI 43, ¶20, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879.5 
¶31 Three elements must be present for an earlier action 
to bar a subsequent action:  "(1) an identity between the 
parties or their privies in the prior and present suits; (2) an 
identity between the causes of action in the two suits; and, (3) 
a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent 
                                                 
5 For further discussion of the public policies underlying 
the doctrine of claim preclusion, see Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 
2005 WI 43, ¶¶19-22, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879, and 
accompanying footnotes. 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
10 
 
jurisdiction."  N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 551; 
DePratt, 113 Wis. 2d at 311.   
¶32 The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that only 
the second factor of claim preclusion, that is, identity between 
causes of action in the two lawsuits, is at issue in the present 
case. 
¶33 In determining whether there is identity between 
causes of action for purposes of applying claim preclusion, 
Wisconsin courts apply the "transactional approach" as described 
in Restatement (Second) of Judgements.  Kruckenberg, 279 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶25; N. States Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 553-54; 
DePratt, 113 Wis. 2d at 311-12.   
¶34 The 
Restatement 
explains 
that 
the 
transactional 
approach views a claim in factual terms and coterminous with the 
transaction, rather than in terms of legal theories:  
The present trend is to see a claim in factual terms 
and to make it coterminous with the transaction 
regardless of the number of substantive theories, or 
variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, 
that may be available to the plaintiff; regardless of 
the number of primary rights that may have been 
invaded; and regardless of the variations in the 
evidence needed to support the theories or rights.  
The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or 
entity which may not be split. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. a (1982); DePratt, 
113 Wis. 2d at 311. 
 
¶35 Section 24(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
describes the "transactional approach" in terms of the facts as 
follows: 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
11 
 
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and 
what groupings constitute a "series", are to be 
determined 
pragmatically, 
giving 
weight 
to 
such 
considerations as whether the facts are related in 
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form 
a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment 
as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or 
business understanding or usage. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982); N. States 
Power Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 553-54. 
 
¶36 "The 
transactional 
approach 
to 
claim 
preclusion 
reflects 'the expectation that parties who are given the 
capacity to present their "entire controversies" shall in fact 
do so.'"  Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, ¶27 (quoting the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. a (1982)).  In other 
words, "[t]he concept of a transaction connotes a common nucleus 
of operative facts."  Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, ¶26.   
¶37 Whether a common nucleus of operative facts is 
involved in the two actions at issue is determined pragmatically 
by "look[ing] to see if the claim asserted in the second action 
should have been presented for decision in the earlier action, 
taking into account practical considerations relating mainly to 
trial convenience and fairness."  Kruckenberg, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 
¶27 (quoting Robert C. Casad & Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata:  
A Handbook on its Theory, Doctrine, and Practice 66 (2001)). 
¶38 The 2010 lawsuit and the instant case do not share "a 
common nucleus of operative facts."  Each lawsuit relates to a 
set of operative facts that occurred at a different time.   In 
the 2010 lawsuit, the claim asserted was that Thompson had 
defaulted on the note as of April 2009.  In the instant case, 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
12 
 
the amended complaint6 asserts that Thompson defaulted on the 
note as of September 2012 (i.e., after judgment was entered in 
the 2010 lawsuit). 
¶39 Thompson's brief assumes that an identity of claims 
exists between the 2010 lawsuit and the claims in the instant 
case because the same total amount, namely the entire balance on 
the note, was the remedy sought in both lawsuits.  This 
assumption rests on another assumption, namely that an effective 
acceleration of payments occurred in the 2010 lawsuit.  Thompson 
conceded at oral argument, however, that payment of the note was 
not effectively accelerated in the 2010 lawsuit.     
¶40 Nevertheless, Thompson continues to assert that the 
instant case is barred by claim preclusion.  In support of his 
claim preclusion argument, Thompson relies on Johnson v. Samson 
Construction Corp., 704 A.2d 866 (Me. 1997), and U.S. Bank 
National Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987 (Ohio 2008).7  
¶41 In each of these cases, in ruling that the lender was 
forever barred from placing the entire balance of the note at 
issue once again in a second proceeding, the state supreme court 
assumed that full payment of the note had been validly 
                                                 
6 The operative allegations in the instant case are in the 
amended complaint filed by Bank of America on August 14, 2015. 
7 The certification memorandum filed by the court of appeals 
explains that state courts have taken varied approaches to the 
question of the application of the doctrine of claim preclusion 
to a subsequent foreclosure action after a prior foreclosure 
action is dismissed.   
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
13 
 
accelerated and the entire balance of the note was the subject 
of the first lawsuit, which was dismissed with prejudice. 
¶42 The Maine Supreme Court summarized its reasoning in 
Johnson that a lawsuit based on default of an accelerated debt 
barred a second lawsuit on the debt as follows: 
The 
promissory 
note 
between 
Johnson 
and 
Samson 
required 240 equal monthly payments of principal and 
interest.  However, the note's acceleration clause 
provided that "[i]f any default be made in any payment 
under this Note, and if such default is not made good 
within thirty (30) days after written notice of same, 
the entire unpaid principal and accrued interest shall 
become immediately due and payable without further 
demand."  Johnson's first cause of action alleged that 
Samson "defaulted on its obligations to the Plaintiff 
under the Note" and demanded payment of the entire 
unpaid principal balance.  This suit was an action for 
the accelerated debt.  Once Johnson triggered the 
acceleration clause of the note and the entire debt 
became due, the contract became indivisible.  The 
obligations to pay each installment merged into one 
obligation to pay the entire balance on the note. 
Johnson, 704 A.2d 866, ¶8.   
 
¶43 The Ohio Supreme Court also relied on a purportedly 
valid acceleration of the balance due on default in reaching its 
decision that a subsequent lawsuit on the note was barred.  It 
explained in Gullotta the distinction between the consequences 
for a second lawsuit of an initial action for recovery of an 
installment payment and of an initial action for recovery of the 
entire debt as follows:  
The key here is that the whole note became due upon 
Gullotta's breach, not just the installment he missed.  
There is a distinction between an action for recovery 
of installment payments under an installment note 
where the entire principal is accelerated, and an 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
14 
 
action to recover for nonpayment under an installment 
note where only the amount of the principal to date, 
and no future amount, is sought.  The general rule 
that each missed payment in an installment loan gives 
rise to a separate cause of action does not hold true 
when there is an acceleration clause in the loan 
agreement[.] 
Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, ¶29. 
¶44 Neither Thompson's arguments nor these cases upon 
which Thompson relies are persuasive in deciding the instant 
case in Thompson's favor.  Why?  Because in the instant case, 
unlike in the cases described above, no valid acceleration of 
the debt occurred in the 2010 lawsuit.   
¶45 Generally, and in the instant case, there cannot be a 
valid acceleration of the debt without a default by the 
borrower.  That is, the borrower's default is a condition 
precedent to the lender's right to accelerate the debt. 
¶46 After a lawsuit based on the debtor's failure to make 
one or more payments is dismissed with prejudice but payment of 
the note was not validly accelerated because it was never proved 
that the borrower was actually in default, the parties are 
simply placed back into the position they held before the 
commencement 
of 
the 
lawsuit, 
with 
the 
same 
continuing 
obligations.  See, e.g., Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 
So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004); Afolabi v. Atlantic Mortg. & Invest. 
Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. App. 2006). 
¶47 In the instant case, when the 2010 lawsuit against 
Thompson was dismissed with prejudice, it had the legal effect 
of conclusively establishing that Thompson was not in default 
for having missed installment payments due on the note up until 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
15 
 
the date of trial in the 2010 lawsuit (i.e., August 16, 2012).  
Thus, because it was never proved in the 2010 lawsuit that 
Thompson was in default, the entire balance of the note was 
never validly accelerated.  In such circumstances, the parties 
are placed back into the position they held before the 
commencement of the lawsuit.  Thompson was obligated to continue 
making installment payments after the dismissal of the 2010 
lawsuit, and claim preclusion does not prevent Federal National 
from suing Thompson for failing to make those payments.8 
¶48 Accordingly, we conclude that the instant lawsuit 
alleging a default as of September 2012 is not barred by the 
doctrine of claim preclusion.  
¶49 In the instant case, the debt was not validly 
accelerated in the 2010 lawsuit.  Claim preclusion should not 
bar the mortgagee from challenging a subsequent default payment 
solely because the mortgagee failed to prove in a prior action 
an earlier alleged default.  Preventing a mortgagee from suing 
to collect a subsequent default even after the earlier claimed 
default could not be established would essentially insulate the 
mortgagor from future mortgage foreclosure actions on the note 
merely because the mortgagor prevailed in the first action.   
                                                 
8 We note that the 2010 lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice 
based on insufficient evidence.  We do not address the 
application of claim preclusion to a situation in which the 
prior lawsuit was dismissed due to a defect in substantive 
enforceability of the note. 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
16 
 
¶50 The subject of the instant case is an alleged default 
in September 2012.  In the prior lawsuit between the parties, 
the default was alleged to have occurred in April 2009.  The 
instant lawsuit arises out of a different set of operative facts 
than those addressed in the prior lawsuit.  The default alleged 
in the instant case could not have been litigated in the prior 
lawsuit.  There is no identity of claims between the instant 
lawsuit and the prior lawsuit.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the instant lawsuit alleging a default as of September 2012 is 
not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
IV 
¶51 Before we end this opinion, we briefly address the 
following two additional issues the parties raised:  
(1) whether the circuit court erred at trial by admitting 
a copy of the note into evidence; and  
(2) whether Federal National proved that it had possession 
of the original wet-ink note. 
¶52 These two issues are presented in and are governed by 
our decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Wuensch, 
2018 WI 35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  With respect to 
these 
two 
issues, 
the 
facts 
of 
the 
instant 
case 
are 
substantially the same in all material respects to the facts 
presented in Deutsche Bank.     
¶53 In Deutsche Bank, we concluded that a promissory note 
endorsed in blank constitutes self-authenticating commercial 
paper that may be enforced by the holder of the note.  Deutsche 
Bank, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶23-24.  We further concluded that the 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
17 
 
circuit court did not err by admitting into evidence a copy of 
the promissory note that was endorsed in blank, noting that the 
copy of the note was compared side-by-side to the original and 
that generally speaking, a duplicate of a document is admissible 
to the same extent as the original.  Deutsche Bank, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶23.   
¶54 We also concluded that because Deutsche Bank's counsel 
physically possessed the original note on his client's behalf at 
trial, Deutsche Bank proved that it had possession of the 
original promissory note and could bring the lawsuit.  Deutsche 
Bank, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶24. 
¶55 In the instant case, counsel presented the original 
wet-ink note to the circuit court along with a copy of the note.  
The circuit court in the instant case, sitting as the finder of 
fact, determined that the purported original appeared to be the 
original wet-ink note.  Upon comparing the original wet-ink note 
to the copy of the note, the circuit court admitted the copy 
into evidence. 
¶56 Consistent with our decision in Deutsche Bank, we 
conclude that Federal National proved that it possessed the 
original wet-ink note, that it could bring the lawsuit, and that 
the circuit court did not err in admitting a copy of the 
original wet-ink note at trial. 
V 
¶57 As to the certified issue, we conclude that when a 
lender does not validly accelerate payment of the amount due 
under the note and a foreclosure action brought on the 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
18 
 
borrower's default on an installment payment under the note has 
been dismissed with prejudice, claim preclusion does not bar the 
lender from bringing a subsequent foreclosure action based upon 
the borrower's continuing default on the same note.     
¶58 As to the additional issues raised by the parties, we 
conclude that Federal National proved that it possessed the 
original wet-ink note, that it could bring the lawsuit, and that 
the circuit court did not err in admitting a copy of the 
original wet-ink note at trial. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP1496   
 
 
 
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