Title: Christopher King v. Sonia G. King

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0994 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Christopher King,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Sonia G. King,  
 
Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  218 Wis. 2d 830, 581 N.W.2d 594 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 3, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick C. Haughney 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Kristina L. Felber and Dowling & Felber, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Kristin L. Felber. 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by 
J. Steven Tikalsky, Andrew J. Zbaracki and Tikalsky, Raasch & 
Tikalsky, Waukesha and oral argument by J. Steven Tikalsky. 
 
No. 
97-0994 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0994 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Christopher King,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Sonia G. King,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent- 
          Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
MAR 03, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  Sonia King filed a petition for 
review of that portion of an unpublished court of appeals 
decision1 which reversed an order of the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court.  In the order, the circuit court awarded maintenance to 
Sonia King in conjunction with her divorce from Christopher 
King.  Because the circuit court incorrectly assumed that a 
spouse has a legal entitlement to maintenance and neglected to 
base its award on its findings with respect to the factors 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (1997-98),2 we conclude that the 
                     
1 King v. King, No. 97-0994, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 1, 1998).  
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Wisconsin 
Statutes refer to the 1997-98 version.  
No. 
97-0994 
 
2 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in making the 
maintenance award.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
¶2 
Although we affirm the court of appeals, we do not 
agree with its decision to determine independently whether Sonia 
King is deserving of maintenance.  The correct course of action 
is to remand the case to the circuit court for an exercise of 
its discretion.  Accordingly, we remand the case so that the 
circuit court can determine maintenance under the proper legal 
standards.  In light of our decision to remand the case, we 
decline to address the question of attorneys' fees.  The circuit 
court is free to consider the issue of attorneys' fees upon 
remand.  
I. 
¶3 
Christopher King and Sonia King were married in 1988. 
 Although the Kings did not have children together, Sonia King 
has four children from a previous marriage.  The children ranged 
in age from three to nine years when the Kings were married.  
Throughout the marriage, the children lived with the Kings.  
¶4 
Neither Christopher 
King 
nor 
Sonia 
King brought 
property of any significant value to the marriage.  During the 
marriage, Christopher King worked full time as a neurosurgeon 
and Sonia King did not work outside of the home.  Dr. King was 
completing his medical residency when he married Sonia King and 
was earning $40,000 per year.  By the final year of the 
marriage, his annual income had increased to $533,000.  
No. 
97-0994 
 
3 
¶5 
Sonia King was unemployed from 1982 to November 1994. 
 She was supporting her family on AFDC when she met Christopher 
King.  She did not have her high school diploma and had no 
education or employment plans at the time of the marriage.  
Previously, Mrs. King had held various jobs, including a 
position at a collection agency where she earned $5.00 an hour 
plus commissions.  
¶6 
On September 12, 1995, Christopher King filed a 
petition for divorce in Waukesha County Circuit Court.  A 
hearing was held on January 12, 1996, before a family court 
commissioner.  The commissioner entered a temporary order in 
which he instructed Mrs. King to "make all reasonable efforts to 
obtain full time employment."  Temporary Order, Jan. 12, 1996 at 
2.         
¶7 
The three-day trial began on June 11, 1996.  The 
circuit court, Judge Patrick C. Haughney presiding, issued its 
oral decision on October 22, 1996.  First, the court divided the 
parties' marital estate and debt obligations.3  The court awarded 
                     
3 The court did not find all of Sonia King's testimony 
regarding the marital property to be credible.  Specifically, in 
regard to certain items of personal property which could not be 
located, the court stated:  
[I]n terms of when Mrs. King testified, what emanated 
from the witness stand was the putrid stench of 
perjury.  And the court finds that based upon her 
testimony, I believe she did commit perjury.  I do not 
accept what she has to say.  What the court finds is 
that she intentionally destroyed some of Dr. King's 
property. 
  
Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 9.    
No. 
97-0994 
 
4 
the Kings' most valuable asset, a Winnebago Way residence and 
adjoining lot, to Sonia King.4  
¶8 
Next, the circuit court considered the issue of 
attorneys' fees.  The court indicated that although it seemed 
that Sonia King should receive some attorneys' fees, "some of 
this trial was taken up by . . . her wrongdoing in regards to 
disposing of property."  Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 18.  
Ultimately, the circuit court determined that each of the Kings 
should be responsible for his or her own attorneys' fees. 
¶9 
Finally, the circuit court considered whether Sonia 
King should be awarded maintenance.  The court noted the dual 
objectives of maintenance set forth by this court in LaRocque v. 
LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 32-33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987), and made 
findings regarding each factor listed by Wis. Stat. § 767.26 
(reprinted in full below).5   
                     
4 The Winnebago Way residence and lot were valued at a total 
of $253,000 and coupled with a $113,387.54 mortgage.  The Kings 
also had a second residence on Cambridge Avenue.  The Cambridge 
Avenue residence, valued at $135,000 and subject to a mortgage 
of $38,565.92, was awarded to Christopher King.   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.26 provides: 
767.26 
Maintenance payments.  Upon every judgment 
of annulment, divorce or legal separation, or in 
rendering 
a 
judgment 
in 
an 
action 
under 
s. 
767.02(1)(g) or (j), the court may grant an order 
requiring maintenance payments to either party for a 
limited 
or 
indefinite 
length 
of 
time 
after 
considering: 
 
(1) The length of the marriage. 
 
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of the 
parties. 
No. 
97-0994 
 
5 
¶10 More specifically, the court found that the Kings' 
marriage was a short-term marriage.  Although the court found 
                                                                  
 
(3) The division of property made under s. 767.255. 
 
(4) The educational level of each party at the time 
of the marriage and at the time the action is 
commenced. 
 
(5) The 
earning 
capacity 
of 
the 
party 
seeking 
maintenance, 
including 
educational 
background, 
training, employment skills, work experience, length 
of 
absence 
from 
the 
job 
market, 
custodial 
responsibility for children and the time and expense 
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training 
to enable the party to find appropriate employment. 
 
(6) The 
feasibility 
that 
the 
party 
seeking 
maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard 
of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during 
the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary 
to achieve this goal. 
 
(7) The tax consequences to each party. 
 
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before 
or during the marriage, according to the terms of 
which 
one 
party 
has 
made 
financial 
or 
service 
contributions to the other with the expectation of 
reciprocation or other compensation in the future, 
where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual 
agreement made by the parties before or during the 
marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial 
support of the parties. 
 
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, 
training or increased earning power of the other. 
 
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant.  
 
We note that the last legislative change to this statute 
took place in 1979.  See  §§ 32-33, ch. 196, Laws of 1979. 
 
 
No. 
97-0994 
 
6 
Christopher's physical and emotional health to be good, the 
court stated that Sonia King had "done her best to detract from 
that." Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 25.  The court determined 
that Christopher King's income was $533,000 per year. 
¶11 "[E]xtremely street[-]wise" and "very manipulative" 
were phrases the court used to describe Sonia King.  Hearing 
Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 25.  The court found that Mrs. King did 
not have her high school diploma or GED.  "[I]nstead of working 
towards that goal, she chose to appear on the Oprah Winfrey 
show.  That's her choice and she can live her life-style how she 
wants, but she can't argue out of both sides of her mouth and 
then expect Dr. King to support her in the life-style that she 
chooses to live," the court stated.  Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 
at 24.  The court also said of Mrs. King, "She's chosen to do 
nothing about obtaining her GED all these years, and I think the 
lot in life that she finds herself in is one that she willingly 
chooses and Dr. King should not have to support."  Hearing Tr., 
Oct. 22, 1996 at 25. 
¶12 The court determined Sonia King's earning capacity to 
be $6.60 per hour, or $13,738.00 per year.  In addition, the 
court noted that Mrs. King should be receiving $6,000 in child 
support per year.  Based on Sonia King's earning capacity, the 
court found that Sonia King would not be able to maintain the 
No. 
97-0994 
 
7 
lifestyle she had kept up during the marriage.6  Nevertheless, 
the court did not find Sonia King's inability to support her 
pre-divorce lifestyle to be controlling in light of its findings 
regarding the other factors of Wis. Stat. § 767.26. 
¶13 Likewise, the court did not find the tax consequences 
 to each party to be a major consideration.  The court 
determined that the Kings had not made any agreements between 
them as to services rendered by one spouse to the other with the 
expectation of compensation or reciprocation.   
¶14 The circuit court spent a fair amount of time 
discussing the ninth factor listed in Wis. Stat. § 767.26, which 
is the contribution of one party to the education or increased 
earning power of the other.  See § 767.26(9).  The court found 
that the Kings' levels of education and training had not changed 
since the date of their marriage.  The court determined that 
"Mrs. King's role was primarily that of being allowed to raise 
her children. . . . I do not find [the] other contributions she 
made to be extremely significant."  Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 
at 28.  The court rejected Sonia King's argument that she 
advanced Christopher King's career by playing "the appropriate 
social hostess," finding that Mrs. King in fact had not 
                     
6 Earlier in its decision, the circuit court commented on 
Sonia King's asserted monthly budget of $10,275.61.  See Trial 
Tr., June 20, 1996 at 302.  The court stated, "Mrs. King has a 
lot of items in her budget that most working people would not 
consider not only not necessities, but wouldn't even consider 
spending the money on. . . . [T]his court, in reviewing the 
budget of Mrs. King, does not find it helpful. . . ."  Hearing 
Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 23. 
No. 
97-0994 
 
8 
contributed in any significant way to Christopher King's career.7 
 Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 21. 
¶15 After setting forth these findings regarding the 
statutory factors, the court awarded Sonia King maintenance for 
three years, in the amounts of $200,000 the first year, $150,000 
the second year, and $100,000 the third year.  The court 
explained its award as follows: 
 
What the court finds here, reiterates again, is based 
upon the dividing up of this marriage, the disparity 
in income, that this very high amount of maintenance 
is appropriate.  And despite everything else that I've 
put on the record, which includes the fact that Mrs. 
King's life-style is one in which she seems to choose 
to 
exercise 
irresponsibility 
rather 
than 
responsibility, does not change the fact that when two 
people choose to marry each other that their incomes 
become divided up and that she legally has the right 
to expect maintenance, to demand it, and is entitled 
to it. 
Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 30.  On November 12, 1996, the 
court filed its written findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and judgment of divorce.8 
                     
7 The court specifically found that testimony given by Sonia 
King and two of her friends regarding Mrs. King's volunteer work 
and social activities was not credible.  See Hearing Tr., Oct. 
22, 1996 at 22. 
8 The court restated its rationale for the maintenance award 
in its written judgment of November 12, 1996, which states: 
The Court again notes that this is a high maintenance 
award, but is appropriate, even though Mrs. King's 
life-style is one in which she seems to choose to 
exercise irresponsibility rather than responsibility, 
but that does not change the fact that when two people 
choose to marry each other that their incomes become 
divided up and that she legally has the right to 
No. 
97-0994 
 
9 
¶16 On November 27, 1996, Christopher King filed a motion 
for reconsideration of the maintenance award and the division of 
debts.  Dr. King argued that the maintenance award was excessive 
in light of the circuit court's findings that the marriage was a 
short-term marriage and that Sonia King had not contributed to 
Dr. King's earning capacity or education or to raising any 
children of Dr. King's.  Sonia King moved to dismiss the motion 
and sought attorneys' fees.    
¶17 In a hearing on February 25, 1997, the circuit court, 
again presided over by Judge Haughney, heard and denied the 
motion for reconsideration.  The court pointed out the short 
term of the maintenance award and stated that when a marriage 
ends, "the spouse without any earning capacity has a right to 
expect that there will be some continuation of the type of life-
style."  Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 25, 1997 at 13.  The court 
found that because it was dealing with a high-income marriage, 
it was fair to give Sonia King "a high income level for a short 
period of time" so that she could "plot[] out her future."  
Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 25, 1997 at 13.  The court stated: 
 
I think that the amount of maintenance that was 
awarded in this particular case was appropriate, took 
into account all the factors.  What made this case 
especially difficult was what I found to be the 
irresponsibility of Mrs. King in some of her life-
style choices.  But nonetheless, that was a life-style 
                                                                  
expect maintenance, to demand it, and it [sic] 
entitled to it. 
 
Judgment, Nov. 12, 1996 at 13. 
No. 
97-0994 
 
10
choice that was made.  This court has to figure out 
how to divide up the income. 
 
Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 25, 1997 at 14.  The court also 
declined to disturb the debt division and denied Sonia King's 
request for attorneys' fees, finding that Christopher King's 
motion for reconsideration was appropriately raised.  
¶18 Christopher King appealed from the part of the circuit 
court's November 12, 1996, judgment which dealt with maintenance 
and debt division.  In an unpublished April 1, 1998, decision, 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court on the issue of 
debt division and reversed the circuit court on the issue of 
maintenance.  King v. King, No. 97-0994, unpublished slip op. at 
4 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1998). 
¶19 At the outset, the court of appeals noted that the 
circuit court's award of maintenance would not be disturbed in 
the absence of a "misuse of discretion."  Id. at 2.  According 
to the court of appeals, the circuit court's award must be 
reversed because the circuit court "ignored that its findings as 
to 
the 
statutory 
factors 
all 
negate 
an 
entitlement 
to 
maintenance."  Id. at 3.  The court pointed out that none of the 
relevant statutory factors show that Sonia King contributed in 
any way to the marriage.  Id.  The court stated:  
 
There is no law that a spouse is entitled to take and 
take from the marriage without making a contribution 
to the marriage, and then continue to share in a payor 
spouse's high earnings when the marriage ends.  That 
this is not justified is particularly true when there 
is a short-term marriage and the property division 
leaves the spouse in a far better position than when 
he or she entered the marriage. 
No. 
97-0994 
 
11
 
Id.  
¶20 The court of appeals then went on to determine that 
Sonia King was not entitled to maintenance.  Id.  Referring to 
the circuit court's finding that Sonia King had not attempted to 
improve her education, the court of appeals stated that "[i]n 
light of her minimal efforts, Sonia should not be rewarded with 
the substantial maintenance award made here, particularly when 
Christopher's 
income 
is 
not 
attributable 
to 
her 
marital 
efforts."  Id. at 4.  Because Sonia King "received a substantial 
amount of property and was better off than when she entered the 
marriage," the court of appeals held that the circuit court had 
"no basis to conclude that Sonia had a need for maintenance."  
Id.  
¶21 Sonia King petitioned this court for review of the 
court of appeals' reversal of the maintenance award.  Mrs. King 
also requested that this court consider whether she should be 
awarded attorneys' fees in light of the court of appeals' 
decision.  We granted review of both issues.   
II.  
¶22 Circuit courts have discretion in determining the 
amount and duration of maintenance.  Olski v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 
237, 243 n.2, 540 N.W.2d 412 (1995); Hefty v. Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d 
124, 133, 493 N.W.2d 33 (1992); LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 27; 
Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 386, 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985). 
 This court will not disturb the circuit court's award of 
maintenance unless the award constitutes an erroneous exercise 
No. 
97-0994 
 
12
of discretion.9  Olski, 197 Wis. 2d at 243 n.2; Hefty, 172 
Wis. 2d at 128 n.1, 133.   
¶23 A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion 
if it makes an error of law or neglects to base its decision 
upon facts in the record.  See Olski, 197 Wis. 2d at 243 n.2; 
Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).  
Further, "a discretionary determination must be the product of a 
rational mental process by which the facts of record and law 
relied upon are stated and are considered together for the 
purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination."  
Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d at 66.  See also LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 
27.  This court decides any questions of law which may arise 
during our review of an exercise of discretion independently of 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  See Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 243 n.2.  As always, the analyses of the circuit court and 
the court of appeals benefit us in our independent review.  See 
Clark v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 169, 173, 
                     
9 After the issuance of many of the cases cited in this 
opinion, this court held that the term "erroneous exercise of 
discretion" should be used instead of the term "abuse of 
discretion" to refer to an error by the circuit court in making 
a discretionary decision.  See Hefty v. Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d 124, 
128 n.1, 493 N.W.2d 33 (1992) (citing City of Brookfield v. 
Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 171 Wis. 2d 400, 491 N.W.2d 484 
(1992)).  The standards for assessing whether a circuit court 
"erroneously exercised" its discretion are the same as those for 
assessing whether the circuit court "abused" its discretion.  
See Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d at 128 n.1.  Accordingly, we will use the 
term "erroneous exercise of discretion" in place of "abuse of 
discretion" throughout this opinion.   
No. 
97-0994 
 
13
577 N.W.2d 790 (1998); Aiello v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 
206 Wis. 2d 68, 70, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996).     
A. 
¶24 The starting point in determining maintenance is Wis. 
Stat. § 767.26.  LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 32.  Section 767.26 
sets forth a list of factors aimed at furthering the two 
objectives of maintenance:  "the support objective," which is 
"to support the recipient spouse in accordance with the needs 
and earning capacities of the parties"; and "the fairness 
objective," which is "to ensure a fair and equitable financial 
arrangement between the parties in each individual case."  Id. 
at 32-33.  In setting awards of maintenance, a circuit court 
must apply the § 767.26 factors to the facts of the case and 
must convert the factors into appropriate dollar amounts and 
time periods.  Id. at 33.  At the same time, the court must 
No. 
97-0994 
 
14
ensure that its award will further the dual objectives of 
maintenance.10  See id.  
¶25 In this case, the circuit court awarded $450,000 in 
maintenance to Sonia King, to be paid over a period of three 
years.  For the two reasons which follow, we hold that the 
circuit court's award constituted an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.   
¶26 First, 
the 
circuit 
court 
based 
its 
award 
of 
maintenance on an error of law.  In its decision, the circuit 
court 
stated 
that 
despite 
its 
findings, 
maintenance 
was 
justified because a spouse "legally has the right to expect 
maintenance, to demand it, and is entitled to it."  Hearing Tr., 
Oct. 22, 1996 at 30.  See also Judgment, Nov. 12, 1996 at 13.11  
                     
10 In discussing the fairness objective of maintenance, this 
court has stated that "[i]t would seem reasonable for the trial 
court to begin the maintenance evaluation with the proposition 
that the dependent partner may be entitled to 50 percent of the 
total earnings of both parties."  Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 
84-85, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982).  The practice in the circuit 
courts of Wisconsin has been to use the suggested starting point 
and then to make adjustments to the 50 percent approach based on 
the statutory factors including the length of the marriage at 
issue.  See the State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books' publication on 
family law, which, in summarizing maintenance law in Wisconsin, 
states, "In determining maintenance, the court may reasonably 
begin by calculating one-half of the total income of both 
parties.  However, this is merely the starting point of the 
maintenance evaluation; equity of result is the determinative 
factor controlling the ultimate award."  Leonard L. Loeb, et 
al., System Book for Family Law at 1-12 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 
1998). 
11 The court made a similar statement in denying Christopher 
King's motion for reconsideration.  See Motion Hearing Tr., Feb. 
25, 1997 at 13.    
No. 
97-0994 
 
15
As there is no law in Wisconsin which would support this 
assumption, the circuit court's reliance upon it constitutes an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  
¶27 As we have already explained, circuit courts are to 
determine the amount and duration of maintenance through 
analysis of the factors enumerated by Wis. Stat. § 767.26 and 
consideration of the twin goals of support and fairness.  
Nowhere in § 767.26 or any other statute has the legislature 
made a statement to the effect that a spouse is entitled to 
maintenance.  Likewise, the case law discussing maintenance 
fails to support the circuit court's assumption that a spouse 
has some entitlement to maintenance.  See, e.g., Gerth v. Gerth, 
159 Wis. 2d 678, 682-84, 465 N.W.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1990)(holding 
that 
circuit 
courts 
are 
not 
legally 
required 
to 
award 
maintenance 
in 
cases 
involving 
long-term 
marriages 
with 
disparate earning capacities between spouses).  Since "the trial 
court's discretion must, of course, be exercised within the 
guidelines set forth in the statutes and cases," Haugan v. 
Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 215, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984), the circuit 
court's reliance on the theory that Sonia King had a "legal 
entitlement" to maintenance constitutes an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  The circuit court based its maintenance award on an 
error of law. 
 ¶28 Second, in awarding maintenance, the circuit court 
disregarded its findings as to the Wis. Stat. § 767.26 factors. 
A failure to apply or a misapplication of the statutory factors 
is an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Olski, 197 Wis. 2d at 
No. 
97-0994 
 
16
243 n.2; LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 33.  A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it: 
 
fail[s] to exhibit a reasoned, illuminative mental 
process with which to logically connect its decision, 
findings and conclusions to the maintenance award.  
The trial court must not stop at reciting its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and its decision; it 
must also set forth the factors on which it relied in 
reaching the maintenance award. 
 
Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d at 389.  
¶29 In this case, the circuit court made detailed findings 
as to all of the factors in Wis. Stat. § 767.26.12  However, the 
court neglected to provide a rational explanation of how its 
findings as to the statutory factors squared with its award of 
maintenance to Sonia King.  It is not at all clear how the 
circuit court's findings, most of which would seem to argue 
against awarding maintenance to Sonia King, support its $450,000 
award of maintenance to Mrs. King.  The court appears to have 
made its decision to award maintenance in spite of its findings 
as to the factors, rather than in accordance with those 
                     
12 The circuit court did not make an explicit finding about 
the third factor in Wis. Stat. § 767.26, the property division, 
in the part of its decision in which it made its findings with 
respect to the other statutory factors.  See § 767.26(3).  The 
court did indicate earlier in its decision, however, that it had 
considered 
the 
property 
division 
and 
maintenance 
issues 
together.  Namely, the court, in awarding the parties' Winnebago 
Way residence to Sonia King, stated that "based upon what the 
court will do later in terms of maintenance payments, the court 
feels that Mrs. King will be financially able to pay off the 
mortgage" on the residence.  Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 3. 
No. 
97-0994 
 
17
findings.13  Circuit courts are not permitted to acknowledge the 
statutory factors in form but disregard them in substance.  Bahr 
v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 82, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982).  Because the 
circuit court failed to articulate how its findings as to the 
statutory factors provide a basis for its award of maintenance, 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.   
¶30 We emphasize that our decision in this case does not 
alter the law applicable to the determination of maintenance.  
We hold only that for the two reasons we have discussed, the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in awarding 
maintenance to Sonia King.  On that basis, we affirm the court 
of 
appeals' 
reversal 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
award 
of 
maintenance. 
B. 
¶31 Next, we consider the opinion of the court of appeals. 
 We agree with the court of appeals' bottom line that the 
circuit court's maintenance award should be reversed.  Likewise, 
as we have indicated, we agree with much of the court's 
                     
13 In its decision, the circuit court effectively admitted 
that its maintenance award ran counter to its findings with 
respect to the Wis. Stat. § 767.26 factors.  The court itself 
stated that it was awarding maintenance "despite everything else 
that I've put on the record, which includes the fact that Mrs. 
King's life-style is one in which she seems to choose to 
exercise irresponsibility rather than responsibility. . . . "  
Hearing Tr., Oct. 22, 1996 at 30.     
No. 
97-0994 
 
18
reasoning in reaching that conclusion.14  We disagree, however, 
with the court of appeals' decision to determine independently 
that no maintenance would be appropriate in this case.    
¶32 In past maintenance cases involving an erroneous 
exercise of discretion by the circuit court, this court has 
declined to invade the province of the circuit court by fixing 
the amount and duration of the maintenance ourselves.  See 
LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 43; Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d at 389; 
Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 220-221; Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d at 60.  In 
LaRocque, we explicitly rejected the recipient spouse's request 
that 
we 
direct the circuit 
court 
to 
make 
a 
particular 
maintenance award.  See LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 43.  We 
explained that this court "cannot and should not exercise the 
discretion which is properly the circuit court's."  Id.  
¶33 In spite of the fact that this court has been hesitant 
to substitute our determination for that of the circuit court, 
the court of appeals chose in this case to draw its own 
conclusions from the factors in Wis. Stat. § 767.26 and to 
                     
14 We note that the court of appeals never expressly stated 
that the circuit court had erroneously exercised its discretion. 
 Since the court of appeals recognized that the standard of 
review was "misuse of discretion," slip op. at 2, it likely can 
be inferred that the court of appeals found an erroneous 
exercise of discretion from the court of appeals' statement that 
the circuit court "ignored that its findings as to the statutory 
factors all negate an entitlement to maintenance."  Slip op. at 
3.  See LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 33 (holding that the circuit 
court erroneously exercises its discretion if it fails to apply 
or 
misapplies 
the 
statutory 
factors 
when 
determining 
maintenance).  Nevertheless, it would have been better for the 
court of appeals to have explicitly found that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  
No. 
97-0994 
 
19
determine 
itself 
that 
Sonia 
King 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
maintenance.15  Based on our prior case law, we do not endorse 
the court of appeals' approach in this regard.  In our view, 
when a reviewing court finds that a circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in determining maintenance, the correct 
course of action is to reverse the award and remand the case to 
the circuit court so that it may properly exercise its 
discretion.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's award 
of maintenance to Sonia King and remand the case to the circuit 
court for a proper determination of maintenance in accordance 
with Wis. Stat. § 767.26. 
III. 
¶34 Finally, we consider the issue of attorneys' fees.  In 
its original decision, the circuit court held that each party 
was to pay his or her own attorneys' fees.  However, as Sonia 
King pointed out in her brief and as this court recognized in 
LaRocque, the determination of who will pay attorneys' fees is 
closely intertwined with the determination of maintenance.  See 
LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 42-43.  If the circuit court, upon 
remand, should decide to alter its original maintenance award, 
the parties' new financial situation may cause the circuit court 
                     
15 For example, the court of appeals made determinations 
such as:  "In light of her minimal efforts, Sonia should not be 
rewarded with the substantial maintenance award made here"; 
"Sonia received a substantial amount of property and was better 
off than when she entered the marriage"; and "Not one of the 
statutory factors indicates that Sonia made any contribution to 
the partnership. . . . "  Slip op at 4.    
No. 
97-0994 
 
20
to conclude that an award of attorneys' fees to Sonia King would 
be appropriate.  Consequently, we decline to address further the 
issue of attorneys' fees.  We hold only that upon remand, the 
circuit court is free to consider attorneys' fees along with the 
maintenance award.16   
IV. 
¶35 In sum, we hold that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in awarding maintenance to Sonia King 
because (1) it based the award on the invalid assumption that a 
spouse has a legal entitlement to maintenance; and (2) it 
                     
16 We note that Christopher King, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.14(1), filed a motion to bar review of pages 65 to 
127 of the appendix to Sonia King's brief.  The pages in 
question contain bills for attorneys' fees which Mrs. King 
incurred in 1997 and 1998.  It is clear that these pages do not 
appear in the record because the divorce trial in this case 
occurred in 1996 and Mrs. King has made no claim that the pages 
are in the record.     
In our June 19, 1998, order, we held Dr. King's motion in 
abeyance pending our final decision in this case.  We now grant 
the motion, consistent with precedent in which this court has 
repeatedly held that our review of a case is limited to the 
record.  State ex rel. Wolf v. Town of Lisbon, 75 Wis. 2d 152, 
155, 248 N.W.2d 450 (1977); State v. Jackson, 69 Wis. 2d 266, 
274, 230 N.W.2d 832 (1975); Schimke v. Milwaukee & Suburban 
Transp. Corp., 34 Wis. 2d 317, 320, 149 N.W.2d 659 (1967).  As 
we stated in Wolf, "This court is bound by the record, and the 
record is not to be enlarged by material which neither the trial 
court 
nor 
this 
court, 
acting 
within 
their 
respective 
jurisdictions, have ordered incorporated in it."  Wolf, 75 
Wis. 2d at 155-56.  We emphasize, however, that our decision to 
grant this motion does not in any way prevent Mrs. King from 
introducing, or the circuit court from considering, this 
particular evidence upon remand.  
         
No. 
97-0994 
 
21
disregarded its findings as to the Wis. Stat. § 767.26 factors 
in making the award.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals reversing the circuit court's award of 
maintenance.   
¶36 Although we agree with the court of appeals' reversal 
of the circuit court, we do not agree with the court of appeals' 
decision to evaluate independently whether Sonia King should 
receive maintenance.  We conclude that the correct approach is 
to remand the case to the circuit court so that it may exercise 
its discretion in determining maintenance. 
¶37 In light of our decision to remand the case, we 
decline to address the issue of attorneys' fees.  The circuit 
court is free to revisit the question upon remand.17 
                     
17 We note that the circuit court may also have based its 
decision to award the Kings' Winnebago Way residence to Sonia 
King in part on its maintenance award.  In its oral decision, 
the court stated, "based upon what the court will do later in 
terms of maintenance payments, the court feels that Mrs. King 
will be financially able to pay off the mortgage" on the 
residence. 
Hearing 
Tr., 
Oct. 
22, 
1996 
at 
3. 
 
As 
the 
appropriateness of the property division was not before us, we 
do not address the issue.   
No. 
97-0994 
 
22
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 97-0994 
 
1