Title: Landis v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

In this appeal from the Family Court’s adjudication of juvenile delinquency, the
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Court has assigned pseudonyms to the appellant, his co-defendant and the witnesses.  Supr.
Ct. R. 7(d).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES J. LANDIS,
§
§
No. 523, 2004
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Family Court of 
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the State of Delaware, in and 
v.
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for Sussex County in File No.  
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0408000084.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: May 13, 2005
Decided:
August 18, 2005
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 18  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief
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filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw,
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
On November 30, 2004, the appellant, seventeen-year old James
J. Landis,  was adjudged delinquent on two counts of Reckless Endangering in
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the First Degree and one count of Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  Landis
was committed to the Department of Services for Children and Families for
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin,
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486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Id.
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placement in Ferris School, a Level V youth facility, for an indeterminate
period of time.  This appeal followed.
(2)
Landis’ counsel (“defense counsel”) has filed a brief and a motion
to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of
review applicable to the consideration of a motion to withdraw and an
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold.  First, the Court must be
satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the
record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal.   Second,
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the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the
appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be
decided without an adversary presentation.3
(3)
Defense counsel asserts that he “conscientiously reviewed the
transcript and . . . the law in regard to issues raised at the trial and at
sentencing” and concluded that the appeal is “wholly without merit.”  Defense
counsel states that he informed Landis of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying
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brief.  Defense counsel also advised Landis that he had a right to supplement
the Rule 26(c) brief with any points that he wanted the Court to consider.
(4)
Landis and his father submitted letters raising points for the
Court’s consideration.  Those letters were included in the Rule 26(c) brief that
defense counsel filed on March 24, 2005.  Moreover, a week after filing the
Rule 26(c) brief, defense counsel requested, and was granted, permission to
further supplement the brief with a letter that he had received a few days earlier
from Landis’ mother.
(5)
Landis’ letter and the letters from his parents collectively raise the
following cognizable claims: (1) improper denial of trial continuance, (2)
insufficient evidence, (3) inconsistent witness testimony, and (4) witness
violation of sequestration order.  The State has responded to the position taken
by defense counsel as well as to the points raised by Landis and his parents and
has moved to affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
(6)
The charges against Landis and his co-defendant, Andrew Baker,
arose from events on the afternoon of July 27, 2004, in Milton, Delaware.  On
that date, Landis and Baker went to visit their friend, seventeen-year old Karen
Walton, at Walton’s house in Milton.  Landis and Baker drove to Walton’s
house in a car owned by Baker’s mother.  The two boys spent a couple of hours
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there visiting Walton and her friend, Wendy Roberts, and Roberts’ younger
sister, fifteen-year old Susan Smith.
(7)
When the boys were ready to leave, Walton spent a few minutes
standing in her driveway talking to Baker, who was sitting in the driver’s seat
of his mother’s car, and to Landis, who was sitting in the front passenger seat.
As Walton stood talking to Baker, leaning slightly forward with her hands
resting slightly inside Baker’s open window, Landis unexpectedly leaned over
from the passenger seat where he was sitting and grabbed Walton’s wrist.
Then, in what appeared to be a prank, Baker began driving slowly while Landis
continued gripping Walton’s wrist.  After taking a few steps beside the moving
vehicle, Walton became uneasy and concerned for her safety.  Walton yelled
at Landis several times to let her go, but Landis would not let go.
(8)
Smith heard Walton’s screams from where she was sitting on the
front steps of Walton’s house.  Smith ran to help Walton, who was trying
frantically to release herself from Landis’ grip.  After yelling at Landis to
release Walton, Smith attempted to remove Landis’ hand from Walton’s wrist.
Landis, however, grabbed Smith’s wrist with his free hand and held both girls’
wrists while Baker alternately accelerated and decelerated the vehicle, causing
Walton and Smith to trip over each other.  Finally, Landis abruptly released his
Trial Tr. at 35 (Nov. 30, 2004).
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In this decision, the Court has not distinguished Landis’ points from those raised by
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this parents.
It appears from the record that Baker and Landis were tried separately and each were
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convicted.  Baker’s trial was on November 1, 2004, preceding Landis’ trial by several weeks.
State v. Baker, Del. Fam. Ct., File No. 0408000050, Millman, J. (Nov. 1, 2004).
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grip (or the girls’ struggling broke his grip) which caused Walton, who had
been pulled a total distance of about twenty-five feet, and Smith, who had been
pulled a shorter distance, to stumble under the wheels of the moving vehicle.
Smith remained upright and was run over, sustaining an injury to her foot that
caused it to “bleed real bad.”   Walker, on the other hand, lost her balance
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completely and landed on the ground underneath the vehicle where her left leg
was pinned for a minute or more by the driver’s rear wheel.  Both girls were
transported to the hospital.  Walker sustained an injury to her left knee that left
a scar and required physical therapy.
(9)
In the first issue on appeal, Landis  complains that the Family
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Court refused to grant him a continuance to subpoena Baker as a witness.6
Landis does not state how Baker’s testimony would have benefitted his defense
except to state generally that it would have “helped this case a whole lot.”
Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Del. 1987).
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Id.
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Cf. generally Fam. Ct. Crim. R. 23(g) (governing motion for continuance upon
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ground of absence of material witness). 
See Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 66 (Del. 1996) (providing standards to assess
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motion for continuance). 
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(10)
We review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion.7
This Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance
unless the ruling was clearly unreasonable or capricious.8
(11)
It appears from the record that defense counsel requested the
continuance at the start of trial after admitting to the Family Court that he had
neglected to issue a subpoena for Baker, who he described as a “necessary
witness.”   The prosecutor objected to the continuance on the basis that Smith
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had traveled from New Castle County with her foster mother for the trial, and
that both Walton and Roberts had taken off time from work to come to court
and would not be able to take off more time.
(12)
Defense counsel did not specify the length of time that he needed
to subpoena Baker nor did he address whether the inconvenience of a
continuance was insubstantial in comparison to the prejudice that Landis would
suffer if the continuance was denied.   When denying the continuance, the
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Preston v. State, 306 A.2d 712, 715 (Del. 1973)
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Nicholson v. State, 1998 WL 112533 (Del. Supr.) (citing Morrisey v. State, 620
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A.2d 207, 213 (Del. 1992)).
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Family Court found that Baker had received notice of Landis’ trial, and that
defense counsel had had sufficient time to subpoena Baker.
(13)
Under the circumstances in this case, the Court concludes that the
Family Court did not abuse its discretion when denying defense counsel’s
motion for a continuance to subpoena Baker.  Landis has not articulated any
specific prejudice to the defense as a result of the Family Court’s denial, and
no prejudice appears from the record.   Where othere is sufficient time to
marshal witnesses before trial begins, it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial
court to refuse a continuance when a party simply seeks additional time to
procure an absent witness, especially where that party has not availed herself,
pretrial, of the opportunities to subpoena the absent witness..11
(14)
Next, Landis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented
against him at trial to prove Reckless Endangering in the First Degree.  When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must decide whether any
rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 604.
13
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 231(c).
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(15)
A conviction of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree requires
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
“reckless[ly] engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a substantial risk of death
to another person.”   “A person acts recklessly with respect to an element of
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an offense when the person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct.”14
(16)
A review of the record clearly demonstrates that a rational trier of
fact could have reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Landis
was guilty of two counts of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree.  The
evidence reflects that Landis recklessly created a substantial risk of death to
Walton and Smith when he restrained the two girls by their wrists so that they
were pulled alongside of a moving vehicle while he consciously disregarded
their cries and efforts to be released.
(17)
Landis contends that the witnesses did not tell “the whole truth,”
and that their trial testimony was inconsistent.  Questions of witness credibility
and the resolution of conflicts in witness testimony are all within the province
Richards v. State, 865 A.2d 1274, 1281 (Del. 2004) (citing Knight v. State, 690
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A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 1996); Quarles v. State, 696 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Del. 1997); Robertson
v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1095 (Del. 1993); Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del. 1982);
Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980)).
Id. at 1280 (quoting Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204
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(Del. 1979)).
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of the trier of fact, in this case the Family Court judge.   “[W]hen the
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determination of facts turns on a question of credibility and the acceptance or
rejection of the testimony of witnesses appearing before [the trial judge], those
findings of the trial judge will be approved upon review, and we will not
substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact.”16
(18)
In this case, the Family Court judge carefully explained on the
record the factual bases for his decision that Landis had committed the crimes
of which he was accused.  Our review of the record reveals no error or abuse
of discretion upon which to overrule the Family Court’s decision.
(19)
Finally, Landis contends that the witnesses talked about the case
and told each other what to say in violation of the Family Court’s sequestration
order.  Landis’ claim is belied by the record.  
(20)
The record reflects that the Family Court sequestered the witnesses
at the start of the trial.  Walton testified first, followed by Smith and then
Roberts.  Upon the conclusion of Walton’s testimony, Walton exited the
Trial Tr. at 29 (Nov. 30, 2004).
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courtroom in the direction of the lobby.  As Walton made her exit, the
prosecutor heard a voice coming from the lobby, and defense counsel heard the
bailiff instructing someone not to talk.  When defense counsel alerted the
Family Court to his concern that the witnesses were discussing their testimony
outside of the courtroom, the Family Court immediately returned Walton to the
courtroom and also brought in Smith and Roberts, who had been in the lobby.
The Family Court instructed the three witnesses not to discuss their testimony
or potential testimony with each other or with anyone else.  In response to the
Family Court’s instructions, Walton informed the Family Court that she had,
in fact, spoken to Smith, but only to tell her to “be calm.”   The record does not
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support Landis’ claim that the witnesses talked to each other about the case in
violation of the Family Court’s sequestration order.
(21)
This Court has carefully reviewed the record and has concluded
that Landis’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue.  We are satisfied that defense counsel made a conscientious
effort to examine the record and properly determined that Landis could not
raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion
to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs
Justice