Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1128.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-1128 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WALLACE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-1128.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Client 
trust 
account 
improprieties—Engaging 
in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation—Two-
year suspension, 12 months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2013-0573—Submitted September 10, 2013—Decided March 26, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-062. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Paul Lawrence Wallace of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0010369, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1980.  
We suspended him from the practice of law for six months in May 2000, based on 
his deliberate attempts to mislead his client to believe that the client’s civil case 
was pending for more than a year after the United States District Court for the 
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Northern District of Ohio had dismissed it.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 89 
Ohio St.3d 113, 729 N.E.2d 343 (2000) (“Wallace I”).  We denied his application 
for reinstatement in February 2001 because there were additional disciplinary 
proceedings pending against him and because it appeared that he had failed to 
comply with the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G) (requiring a suspended 
attorney to complete one credit hour of continuing legal education for each month 
of the attorney’s suspension and one hour of instruction related to professional 
conduct for each six months of the suspension).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 
91 Ohio St.3d 1434, 741 N.E.2d 896 (2001). 
{¶ 2} We dismissed the second disciplinary action against Wallace in 
March 2002, finding that his resubmission of a former client’s background 
investigation documents to the Ohio Attorney General’s Office during his 
suspension was a ministerial act that did not constitute the practice of law.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 94 Ohio St.3d 414, 763 N.E.2d 1154 (2002) 
(“Wallace II”).  We reinstated his license to practice law on March 6, 2002.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 94 Ohio St.3d 1249, 764 N.E.2d 438 (2002). 
{¶ 3} On August 16, 2012, a probable-cause panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline certified a two-count complaint 
filed by relator, disciplinary counsel, to the board.  Having considered the parties’ 
stipulated facts, evidence, and misconduct, Wallace’s hearing testimony, and 
three letters from character witnesses, a panel of the board found that Wallace had 
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law by (1) failing to hold a client’s 
insurance settlement and a separate cash payment in a separate client trust 
account, (2) failing to maintain a record of the funds he held on behalf of the 
affected client, and (3) misappropriating the client’s funds.  The panel 
recommended that Wallace be suspended from the practice of law for two years, 
January Term, 2014 
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with six months stayed on conditions, and that he be required to serve one year of 
monitored probation. 
{¶ 4} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct and 
agreed with the panel’s recommendation that Wallace be suspended for two years 
and serve one year of monitored probation on reinstatement, but it recommended 
that the stayed portion of that suspension be increased to one year.  Wallace 
objects to the board’s recommendation that he serve an actual suspension from the 
practice of law, arguing that a fully stayed suspension with monitored probation 
will adequately protect the public from future harm.  We overrule his objection 
and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and its recommended 
sanction. 
Misconduct 
Count One 
{¶ 5} In December 2008, Wallace represented Nigel Jackson in multiple 
legal and business matters, including (1) an insurance claim for the theft of 
Jackson’s BMW, (2) the incorporation of his business, Who Done It Productions, 
L.L.C., (3) his efforts to publish a book he authored, (4) some real estate matters 
involving Jackson and his cousin, (5) an unsuccessful claim for reimbursement of 
funeral expenses incurred by Jackson on behalf of Glen Jones, (6) a civil 
judgment against Jackson and his girlfriend, Aisha Towles, and (7) an insurance 
claim for the theft of property from Towles’s vehicle. 
{¶ 6} Jackson paid Wallace a $300 retainer, but it is not clear whether they 
reached an agreement regarding the fee for his services.  Wallace claims that he 
agreed to handle the insurance claim for the stolen BMW for $200 per hour, but 
Jackson maintained that they never reached an agreement, and Wallace never 
submitted an invoice for his time. 
{¶ 7} Jackson was arrested and charged with drug trafficking in March 
2009.  Although Wallace did not represent him in his criminal case, he visited 
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Jackson in the Delaware County Jail on at least two occasions to discuss his other 
legal matters.  During one of those visits, Jackson executed a limited power of 
attorney to permit Wallace to transfer the title for his BMW to his insurer, Liberty 
Mutual.  The power of attorney erroneously appointed Jackson as his own 
attorney-in-fact, but Wallace testified that he successfully transferred the BMW 
title to the insurer. 
{¶ 8} In late July 2009, Liberty Mutual issued a $32,132.80 check to 
Jackson and Towles and, pursuant to Jackson’s instructions, mailed it to 
Wallace’s office.  Wallace informed Jackson that he would deposit the check into 
his client trust account.  Before depositing the check, he endorsed Jackson’s and 
Towle’s names without obtaining their express permission to do so. 
{¶ 9} From August through October 2009, Wallace misappropriated 
Jackson’s entire $32,132.80 insurance settlement, paying $21,000 to himself and 
using the remainder for other client obligations.  In September 2009, Wallace 
spoke with Jackson and informed him that he would “net $24,000.”  Believing 
that the check was for $24,000, Jackson authorized Wallace to disburse that 
amount to others on his behalf, but Wallace did not have sufficient funds in his 
client trust account to do so.  He deposited $2,500 that he had received from 
Towles into his client trust account and made a $1,000 distribution authorized by 
Jackson.  Although Wallace did not maintain any records to substantiate the 
distributions he made on Jackson’s behalf or his fee, his bank records show that 
he distributed $20,995 from his operating account to third parties on Jackson’s 
behalf and retained $8,637.80 as his fee. 
{¶ 10} In November 2009, Towles called Liberty Mutual and learned that 
the check for the stolen BMW was $32,132.80 rather than the $24,000 that 
Wallace had divulged to Jackson.  When she confronted Wallace several days 
later, he told her that the difference between the two amounts represented his legal 
fees. 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
{¶ 11} On these facts, and in accordance with the parties’ stipulations, the 
board found that Wallace violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to 
hold the property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate 
from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a 
record for each client on whose behalf funds are held), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The board also 
found that there was insufficient evidence to establish an alleged violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) and, therefore, dismissed it. 
Count Two 
{¶ 12} During Jackson’s incarceration, he instructed Towles to deliver a 
bag containing an undisclosed amount of cash to Wallace to be held for future 
expenses associated with the publication of Jackson’s book.  Towles delivered the 
bag to Wallace at his office.  Wallace did not retain any records to document the 
receipt of this cash, but he maintains that the bag contained $7,500.  He deposited 
$2,500 of those funds into his client trust account on October 14, 2009, distributed 
$1,000 from the account to Jackson’s company, and misappropriated the 
remaining $1,500 of that deposit by issuing a check for $500 to Owen Loan 
Servicing, L.L.C., and a check for $1,000 to himself.  On November 24, 2009, he 
deposited the remaining $5,000 into his operating account, which also contained 
funds belonging to him, and issued a $10,000 check to Jackson’s company from 
the account, representing the remainder of the $7,500 cash payment he had 
received from Towles and a final disbursement of the Liberty Mutual settlement 
proceeds. 
{¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that this conduct 
resulted in additional violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(a)(2), 8.4(c), and 
8.4(h). 
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Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
{¶ 15} The panel and board adopted the parties’ stipulated aggravating 
factors, agreeing that Wallace has a prior disciplinary record, acted with a selfish 
motive, and engaged in multiple offenses.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (b), 
and (d).  With regard to mitigation, they adopted the parties’ stipulation that 
Wallace made a full and free disclosure during the disciplinary process, that he 
has a positive reputation in the legal community, and that the client was paid in 
full and suffered no financial harm as a result of Wallace’s misconduct.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d) and (e).  They also accorded some mitigating effect 
to the fact that the six-month suspension we imposed in Wallace I resulted in an 
actual suspension of over 20 months because we had denied his application for 
reinstatement during the pendency of Wallace II, which was ultimately dismissed. 
{¶ 16} Relator argued that the appropriate sanction for Wallace’s 
misconduct is a two-year suspension with one year of monitored probation on his 
reinstatement to the practice of law.  Wallace argued that a fully stayed 
suspension with monitored probation would adequately protect the public from 
future harm. 
{¶ 17} The panel acknowledged our precedent, which identifies 
disbarment as the presumptive sanction for misappropriation of client funds but 
permits the imposition of lesser sanctions in the presence of significant mitigating 
factors.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Burchinal, 133 Ohio St.3d 38, 2012-
Ohio-3882, 975 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 17 (stating that the presumptive sanction for 
January Term, 2014 
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misappropriation of client funds is disbarment, but imposing a two-year 
suspension with 18 months stayed, in recognition of significant mitigating factors, 
including the absence of a disciplinary record, full cooperation with the 
disciplinary process, letters attesting to the attorney’s diligence and good 
character, and a documented mental impairment that was being treated with good 
prognosis). 
{¶ 18} But in recommending that we suspend Wallace for two years with 
six months stayed and require him to serve one year of monitored probation upon 
reinstatement, the panel considered five cases cited by relator in which we 
imposed sanctions ranging from an indefinite suspension to a six-month 
suspension. 
{¶ 19} In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 134 Ohio St.3d 579, 2012-Ohio-
5766, 984 N.E.2d 1, we indefinitely suspended an attorney who had a prior 
disciplinary record because he had neglected several client matters, commingled 
personal and client funds, failed to maintain adequate records of the client funds 
in his possession, failed to return unearned funds, and failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary investigation.  Id. at ¶ 16, 22, 27, 33, 38, 43, 54, 
{¶ 20} We imposed a two-year suspension, followed by one year of 
monitored probation, and continuing-legal-education requirements on an attorney 
who had misappropriated client funds to pay personal and business expenses, 
failed to promptly deliver funds that clients were entitled to receive, and 
fabricated a fee dispute in an effort to defend his actions.  Columbus Bar Assn v. 
King, 132 Ohio St.3d 501, 2012-Ohio-873, 974 N.E.2d 1180, ¶ 6, 16.  Unlike 
Wallace, King did not have a prior disciplinary record in his more than 30 years 
of practice.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 21} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon-Seymour, 131 Ohio St.3d 161, 
2012-Ohio-114, 962 N.E.2d 309, ¶ 3-6, 12, we suspended an attorney for two 
years with six months stayed on conditions after she had misappropriated money 
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from a decedent’s estate, overdrew her client trust account, falsely represented to 
the probate court that she had satisfied certain estate obligations that she had not 
paid, and failed to reasonably communicate with her clients.  Mitigating factors 
included that Simon-Seymour had no prior discipline, made complete restitution 
to the affected client, and cooperated in the disciplinary process, while the only 
aggravating factor was that she had engaged in a pattern of misconduct by 
mishandling client funds over a period of several years.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 22} Likewise, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Gildee, 134 Ohio St.3d 374, 
2012-Ohio-5641, 982 N.E.2d 704, ¶ 5-14, 18, we suspended an attorney for two 
years, with the second year stayed on the conditions that she commit no further 
misconduct and make full restitution to the affected client after she had 
misappropriated more than $8,000 in client funds and made false statements to the 
relator during the course of the disciplinary investigation.  Mitigating factors in 
that case, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free 
disclosure to the board during the disciplinary process, positive character 
evidence, and Gildee’s genuine expression of remorse at the disciplinary hearing, 
were balanced against aggravating factors, including a dishonest and selfish 
motive, multiple offenses, resulting harm to the victim, and Gildee’s failure to 
make restitution.  Id. at ¶ 16-17. 
{¶ 23} At the opposite end of the spectrum, we imposed a six-month 
suspension to be served consecutively to an attorney’s ongoing suspension for 
previous misconduct, after finding that he engaged in fraud and dishonesty, failed 
to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate client trust account, failed to 
maintain complete records of client funds in his possession, and used funds 
belonging to one client to pay personal and business expenses.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Manning, 119 Ohio St.3d 52, 2008-Ohio-3319, 891 N.E.2d 743. 
{¶ 24} Based on these cases, the panel’s recommended sanction of a two-
year suspension with six months stayed, plus one year of monitored probation, 
January Term, 2014 
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falls within the range of sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct.  
The board, however, modified the panel’s recommendation to stay the entire 
second year of the suspension. 
{¶ 25} Wallace objects to the board’s recommendation and argues that any 
suspension we impose should be stayed in its entirety because he has put systems 
in place to prevent future misconduct and he has already served an additional 14 
months of actual suspension beyond the six-month suspension imposed in 
Wallace I, despite our dismissal of the alleged misconduct in Wallace II.  But the 
only case that Wallace cites in which we imposed a fully stayed suspension for 
comparable conduct is Disciplinary Counsel v. Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 
2012-Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857.  And Edwards involved significant mitigating 
factors that are not present in this case—the attorney had practiced more than 30 
years with no prior discipline and his diagnosed mental disability was found to 
have contributed to the charged misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 10, 15. 
{¶ 26} Although the misconduct, aggravating factors, and mitigating 
factors in the cases cited by the panel and board are not identical to the 
circumstances presented here, they are more analogous to the present case than 
are the factors in Edwards.  We universally impose a period of actual suspension 
for attorney misconduct involving dishonesty and the misappropriation of client 
funds.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 658 
N.E.2d 237 (1995) (holding that misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law). 
{¶ 27} Despite Wallace’s protests to the contrary, the recommended 
sanction already takes into account the mitigating factors that he urges us to 
consider.  Indeed, in its report, the panel stated that its recommendation that the 
final six months of the suspension be stayed is based solely on the fact that he had 
served an additional 14 months in excess of the six-month suspension we imposed 
in Wallace I.  The board recommended extending the stay to the entire second 
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year of the two-year suspension.  Based on the foregoing, we overrule Wallace’s 
objections, adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the board, and find 
that a two-year suspension, with the second year stayed, plus a one-year period of 
monitored probation upon Wallace’s reinstatement to the practice of law is the 
appropriate sanction in this case. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, Paul Lawrence Wallace is suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on the 
condition that he commit no further misconduct.  On reinstatement to the practice 
of law, he will serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. V(9).  Costs are taxed to Wallace. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ.,  concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent and would 
decline to stay any portion of the two-year suspension. 
____________________ 
Scott Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, Senior 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Paul Lawrence Wallace, pro se. 
_________________________