Title: HOVEY v DEPT OF REVENUE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N O . 82-194 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 3 R . PEYTON HOVEY, p e t i t i o n e r a n d A p p e l l a n t , V S . DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, LIQUOR DIVISION, o f t h e S t a t e o f M o n t a n a , a n d LEE WILLIAMS, e t a l . , R e s p o n d e n t s . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e C o u n t y o f L e w i s a n d C l a r k H o n o r a b l e Gordon B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f R e c o r d : F o r A p p e l l a n t : J o h n W . Mahan a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana C a r t e r P i c o t t e a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t s : Mike G a r r i t y a r g u e d , D e p t . o f R e v e n u e , H e l e n a , Montana s u b m i t t e d : January 1 4 , 1 9 8 3 Decides: February 2 4 , 1 9 8 3 p- .-. - I- t 8 2 4 1983 F i l e d : C l e r k -- - M r . J u s t i c e L . C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s case comes t o t h i s Court from t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L e w i s and C l a r k County. The District C o u r t d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandate, r e q u i r i n g t h e Department of Revenue (DOR) to allow him to a p p l y f o r one of s i x new l i q u o r l i c e n s e s to be i s s u e d i n t h e B i l l i n g s a r e a . From t h a t d e n i a l t h i s appeal was t a k e n . I n September 1981, s i x new f l o a t e r a l l beverage l i q u o r l i c e n - ses became a v a i l a b l e i n B i l l i n g s based on t h e s t a t i s t i c s compiled i n t h e 1980 c e n s u s . On October 5 , 1981, a p p e l l a n t , Hovey, a p p l i e d f o r one of t h e s e l i c e n s e s to use i n h i s downtown B i l l i n g s r e s t a u r a n t . A p p e l l a n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n was r e j e c t e d by t h e DOR o n O c t o b e r 21, 1981. T h i s r e j e c t i o n was on the grounds t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s p l a c e of b u s i n e s s was i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, which p r o h i b i t s l i q u o r d i s p e n s i n g p r e m i s e s ( h e r e i n a f t e r p r e m i s e s ) w i t h i n 600 f e e t of churches or s c h o o l s when on t h e same s t r e e t , and t h e DORIS i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h a t s e c t i o n , set o u t i n s e c t i o n 42.12.129, ARM. On November 2, 1981, Hovey f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r an alter- n a t i v e w r i t of mandate i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L e w i s and C l a r k County. On t h a t d a t e an o r d e r was s e c u r e d d i r e c t i n g t h e DOR t o revoke its r u l i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t was i n e l i g i b l e to a p p l y f o r one of t h e s i x new l i c e n s e s o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o show cause why t h a t r u l i n g had n o t been revoked. An i n i t i a l h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h e o r d e r to show cause on November 9 , 1981. A subsequent h e a r i n g was ordered to be h e l d F e b r u a r y 4 , 1982, f o l l o w i n g a r u l i n g i s s u e d by t h e Honorable Arnold O l s e n i n t h e case of F l e t c h e r v. DOR, N o . 47319, ( d e c i d e d March 8, 1982, L e w i s and C l a r k County), which p r e s e n t e d a similar i s s u e . I n t h e i n t e r i m between t h e second h e a r i n g and t h e District C o u r t I s f i n a l d e c i s i o n , t h e a p p e l l a n t was allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e DOR a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g w i t h o t h e r a p p l i c a n t s . T h i s was o n l y to e x p e d i t e matters i n case of an a d v e r s e r u l i n g by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . The C o u r t ' s f i n a l o r d e r came down i n s u p p o r t of t h e D O R ' s p o s i t i o n and a p p e l l a n t was denied a l i c e n s e . The a p p e l l a n t is t h e owner of Cellar 301, a r e s t a u r a n t l o c a t e d i n t h e o l d chamber b u i l d i n g on t h e c o r n e r of Third Avenue North and North 27th S t r e e t i n downtown B i l l i n g s . The r e s t a u r a n t was opened i n 1977 w i t h its b u s i n e s s a d d r e s s being 2615 Third Avenue N o r t h . There are no doors on North 27th S t r e e t because when t h e b u i l d i n g was r e n o v a t e d , t h e a p p e l l a n t placed t h e e n t r a n c e on T h i r d Avenue. The church b u i l d i n g i n q u e s t i o n is t h e F i r s t Congregational Church of C h r i s t and is l o c a t e d a t 310 North 2 7 t h S t r e e t . The church owns a l a r g e tract of land which e x t e n d s to t h e i n t e r s e c - t i o n where t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r e s t a u r a n t is l o c a t e d . They have g r a n t e d t h e C i t y of B i l l i n g s a bus s t o p a t t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n , and t h e C i t y h a s e r e c t e d and m a i n t a i n s s h e l t e r s on t h e p r o p e r t y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e bus s t o p . The i s s u e t o be determined by t h i s Court is whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of a p p e l l a n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandate, on t h e grounds t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g i n which a p p e l l a n t ' s r e s t a u r a n t is l o c a t e d , v i o l a t e s s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, and sec- t i o n 42.12.129, ARM, t h e D O R ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e , c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r ? The a c t u a l t h r u s t of t h i s c a s e c e n t e r s around a q u e s t i o n of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and whether it was p r o p e r f o r t h e DOR to deny t h e a p p e l l a n t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to a p p l y f o r one of t h e new f l o a t e r a l l beverage l i q u o r l i c e n s e s to be i s s u e d i n B i l l i n g s , on t h e grounds t h a t he is i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e "on t h e same s t r e e t " r e q u i r e m e n t of s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, as i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e DOR i n s e c t i o n 42.12.129, ARM. T h a t r e g u l a t i o n states: "(1) I n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 16-3-306, MCA, are a p p l i c a b l e , t h e d e p a r t - ment u t i l i z e s a t w o s t e p test: ( a ) d e t e r - m i n a t i o n of street of l o c a t i o n ; and ( b ) d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d i s t a n c e between e n t r a n c e d o o r s . ( 2 ) ( a ) A b u i l d i n g is c o n s i d e r e d to b e on each street t h a t a b u t s t h e b u i l d i n g and a p p u r t e n a n t l a n d . An a l l e y is g e n e r a l l y not c o n s i d e r e d to be a s t r e e t u n l e s s it is used by t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c as a p u b l i c t h o r o u g h f a r e f o r v e h i c u l a r t r a v e l . ( b ) I f t h e proposed p r e m i s e s f o r l i q u o r sales are not l o c a t e d on t h e same street as a p l a c e of worship o r s c h o o l , t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 16-3-306, MCA, are n o t a p p l i c a b l e . I f t h e proposed premises a r e on t h e same s t r e e t , t h e n t h e second s t e p of t h e tests, provided f o r i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) r is u t i l i z e d . ( 3 ) ( a ) I f t h e proposed premises are on t h e same street, t h e d i s t a n c e between e n t r a n c e d o o r s is measured by a g e o m e t r i c s t r a i g h t l i n e , r e g a r d l e s s of i n t e r v e n i n g pro- p e r t y and b u i l d i n g s . An e n t r a n c e is con- s i d e r e d to be a means of i n g r e s s to t h e p r e m i s e s g e n e r a l l y used by t h e p u b l i c . ( b ) I f t h e d i s t a n c e is more t h a n 600 f e e t , t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 16-3-306, MCA, are n o t a p p l i - c a b l e . I f t h e d i s t a n c e is less t h a n or e q u a l t o 600 f e e t , S e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA a p p l i e s . " T h i s p a r t i c u l a r r e g u l a t i o n p l a c e s a c o r n e r b u i l d i n g on b o t h streets on which it a b u t s r a t h e r t h a n o n l y on t h e street where its e n t r a n c e and a d d r e s s are l o c a t e d . I n such matters of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e c o u r t must f i r s t l o o k f o r t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e words used, and may go no f u r t h e r when t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e can be made from its words. Dunphy v . Anaconda Company ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660; S t a t e v. Hubbard ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 649 P.2d 1331, 39 St.Rep. 1608. The s t a t u t e involved i n t h e p r e s e n t case is s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, and r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : " ( 1 ) Except as provided i n s u b s e c t i o n s ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) , no r e t a i l l i c e n s e may be i s s u e d pur- s u a n t t o t h i s code to any b u s i n e s s o r e n t e r p r i s e whose premises are w i t h i n 600 f e e t o f and on t h e same s t r e e t as a b u i l d i n g used e x c l u s i v e l y a s a church, synagogue, o r o t h e r p l a c e of worship or as a s c h o o l o t h e r t h a n a commercially o p e r a t e d or p o s t s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l . T h i s d i s t a n c e s h a l l be measured i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e from t h e c e n t e r of t h e n e a r e s t e n t r a n c e o f t h e p l a c e of worship o r s c h o o l to t h e n e a r e s t e n t r a n c e of t h e l i c e n s e e ' s p r e m i s e s . T h i s s e c t i o n is a l i m i t a t i o n upon t h e d e p a r t m e n t s l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y . " ( 2 ) However, t h e department may renew a l i c e n s e f o r any e s t a b l i s h m e n t l o c a t e d i n v i o l a t i o n of t h i s s e c t i o n i f t h e l i c e n s e e does n o t relocate h i s e n t r a n c e s any closer t h a n t h e e x i s t i n g e n t r a n c e s and i f t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t : " ( a ) was l o c a t e d on t h e s i t e b e f o r e t h e p l a c e o f worship or s c h o o l opened; o r " ( b ) was l o c a t e d i n a bona f i d e h o t e l , r e s t a u r a n t , or f r a t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n b u i l d i n g a t t h e s i t e s i n c e J a n u a r y 1, 1937. " ( 3 ) S u b s e c t i o n (1) does not a p p l y to l i c e n - ses f o r t h e sale of b e e r , t a b l e wine, or both i n t h e o r i g i n a l package f o r o f f - p r e m i s e s con- sumption." S e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA. W e a r e concerned h e r e w i t h s u b s e c t i o n one of t h e s t a t u t e . The p h r a s e o l o g y of t h a t s u b s e c t i o n shows t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Where t h e p h r a s e "on t h e same s t r e e t " is viewed i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e second s e n t e n c e of s u b s e c t i o n o n e , which r e q u i r e s t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e premises and a church or s c h o o l t o be measured i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e from e n t r a n c e t o e n t r a n c e , it is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o n l y intended t h i s s e c t i o n to a p p l y where t h e e n t r a n c e s were on t h e same street. There is no r e f e r e n c e to t h e a b u t t i n g p r i n c i p a l set o u t i n t h e D O R 1 s r e g u l a t i o n . Thus, t h e import of t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e is p l a i n and it can o n l y be a p p l i e d where t h e e n t r a n c e s to t h e b u i l d i n g s used as c h u r c h e s and t h e p r e m i s e s are "on t h e same s t r e e t . " F u r t h e r s u p p o r t is l e n t t o o u r c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h i s s t a t u t e by t h e reenactment d o c t r i n e , as t h e D O R 1 s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e is a p p a r e n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e way t h e s t a t u t e h a s been a d m i n i s t e r e d s i n c e its i n c e p t i o n i n 1937. The a p p e l l a n t , d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g s , b r o u g h t i n examples of how e s t a b l i s h m e n t s i n similar s i t u a t i o n s to h i s had l i c e n s e s and were o p e r a t i n g . A l s o , t h e c a s e of F l e t c h e r v. DOR, s u p r a , which p r e s e n t e d a l m o s t t h e i d e n t i c a l i s s u e was being l i t i g a t e d a t t h e same t i m e as t h i s pro- c e e d i n g . The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n s t i p u l a t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a l l t h e e x h i b i t s i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e F l e t c h e r c a s e . Contained i n t h o s e e x h i b i t s w a s a l e t t e r d a t e d J u l y 6, 1971, from J o s e p h T. Shea, a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e o l d l i q u o r c o n t r o l b o a r d , to t h e c i t y manager of Bozeman e x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e "on t h e same s t r e e t " r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e n s e c t i o n 4-415, RCM, 1947, (now 16-3-306, MCA) was i n t e r p r e t e d so t h a t it o n l y came i n t o p l a y when both t h e pre- mises and church had t h e i r a d d r e s s e s on t h e same street. T h i s is e x a c t l y how t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s h o u l d be a p p l i e d . The reenactment d o c t r i n e has been recognized i n Montana i n t h e cases of S t a t e ex rel. Lewis and C l a r k County v. S t a t e Board o f P u b l i c Welfare ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 1 Mont. 209, 376 P.2d 1002; Vgntura 9 v . Montana Liquor C o n t r o l Board ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 1 3 Mont. 265, 124 P.2d 569. The s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y enacted i n 1937. I t h a s been amended twice, f i r s t i n 1975, a t which t i m e its number was a l s o changed from s e c t i o n 4-415, RCM, 1947, to s e c t i o n 4-4-107, RCM, 1947, and most r e c e n t l y i n 1981 t o its p r e s e n t ver- s i o n , s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA. Each v e r s i o n of t h e s t a t u t e main- t a i n e d t h e o p e r a t i v e language t h a t no l i c e n s e be i s s u e d "on t h e same s t r e e t " and w i t h i n 600 f e e t of a p l a c e of worship o r s c h o o l , and k e p t t h e same method of performing t h e measurement of t h e d i s t a n c e . Based on t h e l e t t e r from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e o l d l i q u o r c o n t r o l board and t h e examples of o t h e r premises l o c a t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to c h u r c h e s and s c h o o l s , i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l , it is a p p a r e n t t h a t p r i o r t o t h e D O R 1 s a t t e m p t to change t h e meaning of "on t h e same s t r e e t " it was i n t e r p r e t e d and a p p l i e d so t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o n l y came i n t o p l a y when t h e p r e m i s e s ' and t h e c h u r c h e s ' o r s c h o o l s ' street a d d r e s s e s were on t h e same street. It d i d n o t a p p l y where, as i n t h e p r e s e n t case, t h e r e s t a u r a n t is on T h i r d Avenue North and t h e church is on t h e cross street, North 2 7 t h S t r e e t . T h i s C o u r t , i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e r e e n a c t m e n t d o c t r i n e i n t h e past, h a s s t a t e d : "The r u l e is t h a t i n a d o p t i n g a s t a t u t e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e is presumed to have a c t e d w i t h knowledge of t h e p r e v i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n of similar s t a t u t e s (United S t a t e s v. A l b r i g h t , D . C . , 234 Fed. 202) and t o have adopted such c o n s t r u c t i o n (United S t a t e s v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167, 52 Sup. C t . 65, 76 L. Ed. 244.) T h i s r u l e a p p l i e s n o t o n l y to A c t s p r e v i o u s l y c o n s t r u e d by t h e c o u r t s , b u t h a s e q u a l a p p l i - c a t i o n to s t a t u t e s p r e v i o u s l y c o n s t r u e d by t h e e x e c u t i v e o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e p a r t m e a t of t h e government. ( 5 9 C. J. 1064.)'' V&ntura v. Montana Liquor C o n t r o l Board, 1 1 3 Mont. a t 270-271. T h i s p o s i t i o n is s t r e n g t h e n e d f u r t h e r by t h e h o l d i n g s of t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s as evidenced by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court c a s e of Commissioner of I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e v. Noel I s E s t a t e ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 380 U.S. 678, 85 S.Ct. 1238, \4 L.Ed.2d 159, where t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : " [A] long-standing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n , a p p l y i n g to a s u b s t a n t i a l l y re-enacted s t a t u t e , is deemed t o have r e c e i v e d c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l and h a s t h e e f f e c t of l a w . S e e , e.g. N a t i o n a l Lead Co. v . United S t a t e s , 252 U.S. 140, 146, 40 S e c t . 237, 239, 64 L.Ed. 496; United S t a t e s v. Dakota-Montana O i l C o . , 288 U.S. 459, 466, 53 S.Ct. 435, 438, 77 L.Ed. 893." 380 U.S. a t 682. The o p i n i o n of t h e United S t a t e s District Court i n Newman v. V e s s e l Lady A r n n e t t e ( D S.C. 1979) 470 F.Supp. 520, f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e s and c o n c i s e l y states t h e r u l e s governing t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n where it states: "The U.S. Supreme Court h a s s t a t e d as a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t a long-standing ad- m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a p p l y i n g to a s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e e n a c t e d s t a t u t e is deemed to have C o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l and hence t h e f o r c e and e f f e c t of law, C. I. R. v . Noel's E s t a t e , 380 U.S. 678, 8 5 S.Ct. 1238, 14 L.Ed .2d 159 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Although t h i s p r i n c i p l e is more p e r s u a s i v e when it can be demonstrated t h a t Congress was aware of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e reenactment, M i t c h e l l v. C. I. R., 300 F.2d 533 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 6 2 ) , C o n g r e s s i o n a l awareness may be presumed where, as h e r e , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e cons t r u c - t i o n is c o n s i s t e n t and l o n g - s t a n d i n g , L o r i l l a r d v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 ( 1 9 7 8 ) r p a r t i c u l a r l y when Congress h a s shown s p e c i f i c and r e p e a t e d i n t e r e s t i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y cons t r u e d s e c t i o n s p r i o r to t h e r e e n a c t m e n t . " 470 F.Supp. a t 527. Based on t h e above-cited p r i n c i p l e s , it is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e long-standing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s "on t h e same s t r e e t " h a s t h e f o r c e and e f f e c t of l a w due t o t h e r e p e a t e d r e e n a c t m e n t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , of t h e o p e r a t i v e p a r t s , w i t h o u t change. Thus, it cannot be changed by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e i n - t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e s e c t i o n 42.12.129, ARM, is i n v a l i d . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t a w r i t of mandate should have been i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a l l o w i n g M r . Hovey to a p p l y f o r one o f t h e s i x new l i q u o r l i c e n s e s , because under t h e p l a i n language o f s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, and its l e g i s l a t i v e l y - a p p r o v e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , through r e p e a t e d r e e n a c t m e n t , he had m e t a l l t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s imposed by it. Where such r e q u i r e m e n t s are m e t t h e r e is a c l e a r l e g a l d u t y on t h e p a r t of t h e DOR to allow a p p e l l a n t t o a p p l y , and where such a d u t y e x i s t s , mandamus is p r o p e r . Cain v. Department of H e a l t h and Environmental S c i e n c e s , ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 448, 451, 582 P.2d 332. It is t r u e t h a t t h e g r a n t i n g of a w r i t of mandate is a d i s c r e t i o n a r y act which w i l l b e upheld u n l e s s t h e r e is a showing t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n . Cain v. Department of H e a l t h and Environmental S c i e n c e s , s u p r a . But, based on t h e p l a i n import of t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e and t h e long-standing l e g i s l a t i v e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n placed on it, we b e l i e v e such a showing of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n was made as t h e DOR had a l e g a l d u t y due t o t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to a l l o w Hovey to a p p l y . T h e r e f o r e , t h e judgment of t h e District Court is r e v e r s e d and ,-/ t h i s cause remanded f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of an.,,:%propriate w r i t . / / Justice, % ~ A d l * &!ii WLQ Chief Justice Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring: I agree with the result of the majority opinion but not in all that is said. I further emphasize that the handling of the case of Fletcher v . DOR, supra, which case was being processed through the District Court almost simultaneously with this case, is hardly an example of even-handed treatment by the agency. In Fletcher v. DOR, a Bozeman liquor license applicant was faced with virtually the same problem as exists in this case. However, on March 8, 1982, the District Court for the same First Judicial District (Judge Arnold Olsen presiding) held the regulation involved here to be invalid. The agency did not appeal from this ruling, the result being that the applicant received the liquor license. In arguing this appeal, counsel for the agency acknowledged this inconsistency, but properly argued that he, as one of the attorneys, is not responsible for the agency's decisions. Nonetheless, someone in that agency, in deciding not to appeal the Fletcher case, permitted a license to issue by the simple expedient of ordering that the agency not appeal from the District Court's ruling. Yet, in this case, after obtaining a result 180 degrees from the decision in Fletcher, the agency argues that the applicant should not be permitted to apply for a license because of the proximity of his establishment to a church. The agency surely didn't think much of its regulation in the Fletcher case if it decided not to take an appeal. It is now more than a little inconsistent and more than a little unfair for the agency to argue here that the agency regulation should be given full force and effect. How can the agency claim to be effectively enforcing statutes and regulations under the police power of the State when it took -- such a diametrically opposed position in the Fletcher case? - -- This Court and most courts have been most reluctant to apply equitable estoppel to a governmental agency, but perhaps the time has come to rigorously apply this doctrine. It may well be time for this Court to breathe more life into this doctrine by rigorously applying it to governmental agencies when grossly inequitable results may be the result of not applying it. I would apply a form of collateral estoppel or waiver in m * this case. In the Fletcher case, the agency 42.12.129 A.R.M., the sa.me rule on which the District Court in this case relied, on in refusing relief to the petitioner here. And now, ' of course, the agency relies on this rule in defending the appeal. I would not permit the agency to do so. Once the 60 days expired for the agency to take its appeal -in the Fletcher case, the agency effectively acquiesced in a ruling that the rule was invalid. The petitioner here had a right to hold the agency to its acquiescence in the Fletcher case that the rule was invalid. If invalid as to the Fletcher application, the rule was also invalid as to the license application in this case.