Title: Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. Richard P. Romanshek

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 67 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP0740 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard P. Romanshek,  
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin,  
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 7, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2005 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Lee S. Dreyfus   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief (in the court 
of appeals) by Charles H. Bohl, Michael R. Sarner and Whyte, 
Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Tamara 
Hayes O’Brien. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Robert J. Lauer, Patti J. Kurth, and 
Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Robert J. Lauer. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael Riley and Axley 
Brynelson, LLP, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Noreen J. Parrett, 
James A. Friedman and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance. 
 
2005 WI 67 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP740 
(L.C. No. 
03 CV 1265) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard P. Romanshek,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Blue Cross Blue Shield United of  
Wisconsin,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 7, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Lee S. Dreyfus, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on a 
motion to bypass, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.05 (2001-02)1 and 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60.  We are once again called upon to 
determine whether the phrase "hit-and-run" within the definition 
of "uninsured motor vehicle" in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 2004AP740   
 
2 
 
requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorist (UM) coverage 
when its insured is the victim of a "miss-and-run" accident.  We 
decline to overrule our long line of precedent requiring 
physical contact in an accident involving an unknown vehicle in 
order for there to be a "hit-and-run" within the meaning of 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Therefore, we affirm the order of the 
circuit court.   
I 
¶2 
On May 28, 2003, 
Progressive Northern 
Insurance 
Company (Progressive) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment 
against its insured, Richard P. Romanshek (Romanshek), seeking a 
declaration of the rights of the parties under its insurance 
policy.  The following facts were alleged in Progressive's 
complaint and admitted in Romanshek's answer.   
¶3 
Progressive is a domestic insurance company licensed 
to do business in Wisconsin.  Romanshek is an adult resident of 
Wisconsin.  Romanshek had a Progressive motorcycle liability 
insurance policy in full force and effect at all relevant times.  
The policy contained a provision providing UM coverage.  On 
December 28, 2002, Romanshek was driving his Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle in Naples, Florida, and was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident.2  The accident involved an unidentified vehicle 
that 
turned 
in 
front 
of 
Romanshek's 
motorcycle, 
causing 
Romanshek to lose control of his machine, fall to the ground, 
                                                 
2 Progressive's policy contained a clause requiring all 
disputes to be settled according to the law of the state in 
which the insured resides.   
No. 2004AP740   
 
3 
 
and suffer injuries.  Romanshek's motorcycle never came into 
physical contact with the unidentified vehicle or any part of 
said vehicle.  The unknown vehicle drove away and has never been 
identified.3   
¶4 
Romanshek subsequently made a claim with Progressive 
under the UM portion of his policy.  Progressive denied his 
claim in a letter dated February 3, 2003, on the ground that the 
unknown vehicle was not an "uninsured motor vehicle" as defined 
in the policy.  Progressive's policy provides, in pertinent 
part: 
INSURING AGREEMENT-UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
 . . . . 
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
 . . . . 
3. 
"Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land motor 
vehicle of any type or a trailer while used with 
a land motor vehicle: 
 . . . . 
c. 
that is a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator 
or owner cannot be identified and which 
strikes  
i. 
you or a relative;  
ii. a vehicle that you or a relative are 
occupying; or   
iii. a covered vehicle;  
                                                 
3 Progressive 
apparently 
does 
not 
contest 
Romanshek's 
version of events.   
No. 2004AP740   
 
4 
 
provided that the insured person, or someone 
on his or her behalf, reports the accident 
to the police or civil authority as soon as 
practicable after the accident.   
(Underscoring added.)  Progressive subsequently commenced the 
present action, seeking a declaration that no UM coverage is 
provided under the policy for a miss-and-run accident.   
¶5 
On October 22, 2003, Progressive filed a motion for 
declaratory/summary judgment, arguing that its policy did not 
provide UM coverage because the unknown vehicle did not strike 
Romanshek's motorcycle and thus was not an "uninsured motor 
vehicle" as defined in its policy.  In its brief in opposition 
to Progressive's motion for summary judgment, Romanshek did not 
contest that Progressive's policy requires physical contact in 
order for an unidentified vehicle to qualify as an "uninsured 
motor vehicle" under the "hit-and-run" definition.  Rather, 
Romanshek 
argued 
that 
by 
requiring 
physical 
contact, 
Progressive's policy impermissibly attempts to narrow the scope 
of UM coverage mandated by § 632.32(4)(a)2.b., which, according 
to Romanshek, should not be read as containing a physical 
contact requirement.  Specifically, Romanshek argued that Hayne 
v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 339 
N.W.2d 588 
(1983), 
which 
interpreted 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
to 
require physical contact, "has been eroded to the point that it 
has no meaning."   
¶6 
At the hearing on the motion, the circuit court noted 
that "it seems to me it would be appropriate to include [a miss-
and-run] in the definition for uninsured motorist coverage at 
No. 2004AP740   
 
5 
 
this point in time.  But at least right now that's not the 
definition as it exists in the State of Wisconsin."  The court 
ruled:  "The State of Wisconsin clearly requires that there be a 
physical contact component, if you will, between the vehicle or 
the injured party and what is the uninsured vehicle . . . .  
And, quite clearly, that has been the law for the past twenty 
years."   
¶7 
Thus, on January 28, 2004, the circuit court entered 
an 
order 
for 
declaratory/summary 
judgment 
in 
favor 
of 
Progressive.  Romanshek appealed, and this court granted his 
petition to bypass on October 19, 2004.   
II 
¶8 
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
mandates 
UM 
coverage 
for 
an 
accident 
involving an unidentified motor vehicle and an insured's vehicle 
when there is no physical contact.  In other words, we must 
determine whether the phrase "hit-and-run" within the definition 
of "uninsured motor vehicle" in § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires an 
insurer to provide UM coverage when its insured is the victim of 
a "miss-and-run" accident.  Statutory interpretation is an issue 
of law, reviewed de novo by this court.  State v. Waushara 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, ¶14, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679 
N.W.2d 514.  Further: 
In a declaratory judgment action, the granting or 
denying of relief is a matter within the discretion of 
the circuit court.  This court reviews such decisions 
to determine whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  If the circuit court 
No. 2004AP740   
 
6 
 
proceeds on an erroneous interpretation of the law, 
the exercise of discretion is erroneous.   
Theis v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 15, ¶8, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 
606 N.W.2d 162(citations omitted).   
¶9 
The standards for granting summary judgment are well 
known 
and 
need 
not 
be 
set 
forth 
in 
full. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  When the facts are undisputed, the 
interpretation and application of a statute to these facts 
present a question of law appropriate for summary judgment.  See 
Tri-Tech Corp. of Am. v. Americomp Servs., Inc., 2002 WI 88, 
¶19, 254 Wis. 2d 418, 646 N.W.2d 822; Fore Way Express, Inc. v. 
Bast, 178 Wis. 2d 693, 701, 505 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1993); Hake 
v. Zimmerlee, 178 Wis. 2d 417, 421, 504 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
III 
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(1) provides that every policy 
of 
insurance 
issued 
in 
Wisconsin 
must 
contain 
certain 
provisions. 
 
Among 
these 
mandatory 
provisions 
is 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4), which requires insurance policies to 
provide UM coverage and medical payments coverage.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) governs UM coverage and provides that 
insurance policies must contain a provision: 
1. 
For the protection of persons injured who 
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death 
resulting therefrom, in limits of at least $25,000 per 
person and $50,000 per accident.   
2. 
In this paragraph "uninsured motor vehicle" 
also includes: 
No. 2004AP740   
 
7 
 
a. 
An insured motor vehicle if before or after 
the accident the liability insurer of the motor 
vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
b. 
An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a 
hit-and-run accident. 
3. 
Insurers making payments under the uninsured 
motorists' coverage shall, to the extent of payment, 
be subrogated to the rights of their insureds.   
(Emphasis added.)  
¶11 Romanshek argues that Wisconsin courts have eroded the 
physical contact requirement set forth in Hayne and that this 
court should therefore abandon it.  He also argues that 
requiring 
physical 
contact 
contravenes 
the 
intent 
of 
UM 
coverage.  Finally, he asserts that a majority of other states 
have held that requiring physical contact in order for there to 
be a hit-and-run is against public policy.   
¶12 In 
contrast, 
Progressive 
argues 
that 
case 
law 
interpreting 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
has 
consistently 
required 
physical contact in order for UM coverage to be required.  It 
also argues that because the court has consistently interpreted 
the statute, any change in the statutory requirements must come 
from the legislature.  Moreover, Progressive states that because 
its policy clearly requires physical contact in order for there 
to be a hit-and-run, Romanshek could not reasonably expect 
coverage where there was no physical contact.  Progressive 
states 
that 
the 
parties 
are 
bound 
by 
their 
contractual 
agreement, and the court cannot rewrite the insurance contract 
to eliminate the physical contact requirement.   
No. 2004AP740   
 
8 
 
¶13 We begin by emphasizing that the sole issue on appeal 
is the proper construction of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Therefore, 
"[t]he question to be decided here . . . is not the construction 
of the policy, but what the law requires.  Thus, the reasonable 
expectation of the insured regarding the language of the policy 
is 
not 
relevant 
to 
our 
analysis 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b."  Smith v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 
2000 WI 127, ¶27, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882.  "[C]overages 
omitted from an insurance contract may nevertheless be compelled 
and enforced as though a part thereof where the inclusion of 
such coverage is required by a properly enacted statute."  
Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 53, 170 
N.W.2d 813 (1969). 
¶14 The first case relevant to our discussion of the 
meaning of the term "hit-and-run" is Amidzich.  Amidzich was 
decided prior to the enactment of § 632.32.  See § 171, ch. 102, 
Laws of 1979.  In Amidzich, the insurance policy at issue 
provided coverage for damages caused by a hit-and-run vehicle, 
which was defined as an automobile that "'causes bodily injury 
to an insured arising out 
of 
physical contact of 
such 
automobile . . . .'"  Amidzich, 44 Wis. 2d at 48 (emphasis 
supplied by Amidzich).   
¶15 The 
insured contended that 
the phrase 
"physical 
contact" should be interpreted so as to provide coverage where a 
vehicle forces an insured off the road without actually striking 
the insured's vehicle.  Id. at 49.  The insured also argued that 
"the only justification for the 'physical contact' requirement 
No. 2004AP740   
 
9 
 
is the prevention of fraudulent claims" and that because there 
was no evidence of fraud, the requirement was inapplicable.  Id.   
¶16 The court rejected the insured's argument, ruling: 
We are satisfied that the phrase in the policy, 
"physical contact," is intended to express no other 
meaning than that which is plainly apparent on its 
face. 
 
Despite 
the 
forceful 
arguments 
of 
the 
appellants, we conclude that there is no reasonable 
construction to this phrase that supports other than 
the requirement that there be an actual striking 
between the "hit-and-run automobile" and the insured's 
vehicle, at least in a situation where only two 
vehicles are involved.  The very term, "hit-and-run," 
contained in the policy itself supports the plain 
meaning that we attribute to the term "physical 
contact."  The word, "hit," is defined in Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary as: 
"1a:  a blow striking an object aimed at——
contrasted with miss . . . b:  an impact of one thing 
against another:  collision . . . ." 
Id. at 51 (first emphasis added).   
¶17 In 
closing, 
the 
court 
noted 
that 
"[p]ersuasive 
arguments could be made that statutory requirements to afford 
coverage to the plaintiff should be provided.  The present 
statute, however, does not require such coverage, nor does the 
policy as written provide for it."  Id. at 54.   
¶18 Subsequently, the legislature enacted § 632.32, which 
included in the definition of uninsured motor vehicle, "[a]n 
unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident."  
§ 171, ch. 102, Laws of 1979.  The Legislative Council Note to 
this section stated, in pertinent part:  "A precise definition 
of hit-and-run is not necessary for in the rare case where a 
No. 2004AP740   
 
10 
 
question arises the court can draw the line."  Legislative 
Council Note, 1979, § 632.32, Stats. 
¶19 Following the enactment of this new statute, this 
court decided Hayne.  "The sole issue on appeal" in Hayne was 
"whether 
sec. 
632.32(4)(a)2.b., 
Stats., 
requires 
uninsured 
motorist coverage for an accident involving an insured's vehicle 
and an unidentified motor vehicle when there was no physical 
contact between the two vehicles."  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 69.  
The relevant facts of Hayne were almost identical to the facts 
presented in the present case.  Id.  The precise question in 
Hayne was "whether the term 'hit-and-run' includes 'miss-and-
run' or whether it requires an actual physical striking."  Id. 
at 73.    
¶20 We examined a variety of dictionary definitions of 
"hit-and-run" 
and 
concluded 
"[t]hese 
definitions 
clearly 
indicate that the plain meaning of 'hit-and-run' consists of two 
elements:  a 'hit' or striking, and a 'run', or fleeing from the 
scene of an accident."  Id. at 73-74.  Thus, we concluded: 
[T]he statutory language of sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b., 
Stats., is unambiguous.  We therefore arrive at the 
legislature's intent by according the language its 
common and accepted meaning.  As previously noted, the 
common and accepted meaning of the term "hit-and-run" 
includes an element of physical contact.  Section 
632.32(4)(a)2.b. mandates coverage only for "hit-and-
run" 
accidents 
involving 
an 
unidentified 
motor 
vehicle.  The clear statutory language of sec. 
632.32(4)(a)2.b. reflects a legislative intent that 
the statute apply only to accidents in which there has 
been physical contact.  Because there was no physical 
contact under the circumstances of this case, sec. 
632.32(4)(a)2.b. does not support Hayne's claim for 
coverage.   
No. 2004AP740   
 
11 
 
Id. at 74 (citation omitted). 
¶21 Further, we reasoned: 
If the legislature had intended its mandated uninsured 
motorist coverage to apply to any accident involving 
an unidentified motorist, as Hayne asserts, that 
result could have been reached merely by deleting the 
term "hit-and-run" from the language in [the statute], 
and having that provision read:  "an unidentified 
motor 
vehicle 
involved 
in 
an 
accident." 
 
The 
legislature did not, however, omit the term "hit-and-
run".  Therefore, to define "hit-and-run" in sec. 
632.32(4)(a)2.b. to include the type of accident Hayne 
was involved in or any other accident involving an 
unidentified motor vehicle where there is no physical 
contact would be to render the term "hit-and-run" in 
the statute mere surplusage.  That we cannot do. 
Id. at 76.   
¶22 We also rejected Hayne's argument that we should 
interpret the phrase "hit-and-run" to include a "miss-and-run" 
because other jurisdictions had reached a similar conclusion:  
We also note that courts in other states have 
concluded 
that 
the 
term 
"hit-and-run" 
in 
their 
uninsured motorist statutes does not connote physical 
contact.  This conclusion is based, in part, on other 
statutes imposing a duty on a driver involved in an 
accident to stop, provide certain information, and 
render 
aid. . . . Wisconsin's 
version 
of 
these 
statutes, however, is entitled "Duty upon striking 
person or attended or occupied vehicle."  Section 
346.67, 
Stats. 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Section 
346.67(1)(a) provides, in part:  " . . . he shall give 
his name, address and the registration number of the 
vehicle he is driving to the person struck . . . ."  
The reference to "striking" in sec. 346.67 supports 
our conclusion that the plain meaning of "hit-and-run" 
in sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b. includes a physical contact 
element.   
Id. at 75 (footnote omitted).   
No. 2004AP740   
 
12 
 
¶23 We also rejected Hayne's argument that the legislature 
intended to overturn the result we reached in Amidzich when it 
enacted § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Id. at 76-79.  As noted previously, 
in Amidzich, we specifically stated that the legislature could 
mandate UM coverage for miss-and-run accidents by statute.  
Amidzich, 44 Wis. 2d at 54.  In Hayne, we concluded:   
If, in fact, the legislature had that statement from 
Amidzich 
in 
mind 
when 
it 
enacted 
sec. 
632.32(4)(a)2.b., then it also was aware of the 
discussion in Amidzich of the term "hit and run".  Had 
the 
legislature 
intended 
Hayne's 
assertion, 
the 
clearest way to effectuate that intent was simply to 
not include the term "hit-and-run", thereby mandating 
coverage for "miss-and-run accidents" as well.  The 
legislature did not do that, but instead deliberately 
included in sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b. the term "hit-and-
run".  The unambiguous meaning of the term includes a 
physical contact element.   
 . . . . 
The legislature presumably was aware of the discussion 
in Amidzich concerning the literal meaning of "hit-
and-run", 
and 
certain 
policy 
arguments 
favoring 
inclusion within the statutory uninsured motorists 
provision of coverage for "miss-and-run" accidents.   
Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 79, 84.   
¶24 Furthermore, we concluded that the legislative history 
of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. supported the conclusion that the term 
hit-and-run included a physical contact requirement:  "[The] 
Legislative Council report to the legislature indicate [sic] 
that those responsible for the revision adding 'hit-and-run' 
accidents as a category to be included in required uninsured 
motorist coverage were simply incorporating a category of 
coverage into the statute that most standard insurance policies 
No. 2004AP740   
 
13 
 
already contained."  Id. at 83.  We also stated that miss-and-
run accidents were not among the "rare" cases referred to in the 
Legislative Council Note to § 632.32.  Id. at 82-83 n.8.  In 
sum, we concluded: 
[T]he legislature was confronted with two distinct 
policy choices:  One, it could define uninsured motor 
vehicle to include an unidentified motor vehicle 
involved 
in 
an 
accident, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
physical contact occurred; or two, it could define 
uninsured motor vehicle to include an unidentified 
motor vehicle involved in a "hit-and-run" accident.  
The legislature chose the second alternative.  
Id. at 84.   
¶25 Then Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissented from the 
majority 
opinion, 
arguing 
that 
several 
policy 
arguments 
supported including miss-and-run accidents within UM coverage 
for hit-and-run accidents.  Id. at 85-99.  In response, the 
majority noted:  
Many of the policy arguments favoring uninsured 
motorist 
coverage 
for 
"miss-and-run" 
accidents 
involving unidentified motor vehicles are addressed in 
the dissent.  We cannot, however, change the wording 
of a statute by liberal construction to mean something 
that the legislature did not intend, or that the plain 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
will 
not 
support. 
The 
legislature can, if it so desires, amend the uninsured 
motorist statute to reflect those policy arguments. 
Id. at 85 n.11 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).   
¶26 Following our decision in Hayne, the court of appeals 
decided 
Wegner 
v. 
Heritage 
Mutual 
Insurance 
Co., 
173 
Wis. 2d 118, 496 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1992), and Dehnel v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 231 Wis. 2d 14, 604 
N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1999).  The issue in Wegner was whether 
No. 2004AP740   
 
14 
 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. mandated UM coverage in an accident involving 
three vehicles where the first car swerved into the lane of the 
second car, causing the second car to swerve into the lane of 
the insured's car, resulting in the insured's vehicle being 
forced off the road.  Wegner, 173 Wis. 2d at 121.  The court of 
appeals, relying on Hayne, concluded that "the uninsured 
motorist insurance laws do not provide coverage for a hit-and-
run driver that does not 'hit' another vehicle[.]"  Id. at 120.   
¶27 In Dehnel, the insured's vehicle was damaged as a 
result of a piece of ice that fell off of a passing semitrailer.  
Dehnel, 231 Wis. 2d at 15.  The court of appeals held that UM 
coverage was not mandated by § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. under these 
facts because a piece of ice falling from an unidentified 
vehicle was not a hit-and-run accident.  Id.  The court 
reasoned: 
The type of physical contact which is required under 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. has been described by the supreme 
court as a "touching between the vehicles."  See 
Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 78.  However, the physical 
contact that occurred here was not between any part of 
the semi and Dehnel's vehicle.  Rather, it was an 
indirect touching, in that the ice was not even an 
integral part of the unidentified vehicle, such as a 
tire that had become unattached.   
We 
also 
note 
that 
enlarging 
the 
statutory 
interpretation established by the supreme court to 
cover extraneous objects that may be carried by 
vehicles would have no reasonable ending point for 
coverage. 
Id. at 21-22.   
¶28 The 
next 
occasion 
this 
court 
had 
to 
interpret 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. was in Theis.  In Theis, the insured's 
No. 2004AP740   
 
15 
 
vehicle was struck by a leaf spring, a part of a semi-tractor, 
although it was unclear whether the object fell off a passing 
semi-tractor or came from another vehicle and merely was 
propelled by the passing semi-tractor.  Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 
¶¶4-5.   
¶29 In 
analyzing 
whether 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
mandated 
coverage for this type of accident, we noted that "[o]ur court 
and the court of appeals have 'drawn a line' on uninsured 
motorist claims . . . ."  Id., ¶19.  However, we stated:  
Although the Wisconsin cases have interpreted the hit-
and-run provision of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) to require 
physical contact between an insured's motor vehicle 
and an unidentified motor vehicle, they have not 
interpreted the statute to negate "physical contact" 
between the insured's motor vehicle and a part of an 
unidentified motor vehicle.    
Id., ¶26.  In addition, we distinguished Dehnel, noting "[i]n 
the present case, unlike in Dehnel, a piece detached from an 
unidentified motor vehicle was propelled into the plaintiff's 
motor vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle."  Id., ¶25.  
Finally, we concluded that mandating coverage for this type of 
accident would be consistent with the purposes of the UM 
statute. 
 
Id., 
¶¶28-31. 
 
Thus, 
we 
concluded:  
"Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) requires that the uninsured motorist 
clauses of an insurance policy provide coverage when a detached 
piece of an unidentified motor vehicle is propelled into the 
insured's motor vehicle by an unidentified motor vehicle."  Id., 
¶11. 
No. 2004AP740   
 
16 
 
¶30 Finally, in Smith, this court was presented with a 
variation of the facts in Wegner.  Smith involved a three-car 
accident that began when an unidentified car in the left lane of 
the interstate struck a tractor-double trailer in the center 
lane, which, in turn, struck the insured's vehicle in the right 
lane.  Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶3.  The question presented was 
"whether this chain reaction collision is a 'hit' within the 
meaning of the statute."  Id., ¶8.   
¶31 We began our analysis by noting that "[a] hit-and-run 
occurs when three elements are satisfied:  (1) there is an 
unidentified motor vehicle; (2) the unidentified vehicle is 
involved in a hit; and (3) the unidentified motor vehicle 'runs' 
from the scene of the accident."  Id., ¶10 (citing Theis, 232 
Wis. 2d 749, ¶¶14-16).  In addition, we reiterated that "[w]e 
have 
previously 
held 
that 
the 
phrase 
hit-and-run 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. unambiguously 'includes a physical 
contact element.'"  Id., ¶11 (quoting Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 79).  
We stated that the issue involved was whether the physical 
contact requirement was satisfied under the facts presented.  
Id.   
¶32 Examining the plain language of the statute, we 
reasoned:  
Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
defines 
an 
uninsured motor vehicle as "an unidentified" vehicle 
"involved in a hit and run accident."  The use of the 
word "involved" does not strike us as a word that 
should be narrowly applied only to a hit-and-run 
accident involving a direct hit to the insured 
vehicle.  Here, the unidentified vehicle was clearly 
No. 2004AP740   
 
17 
 
"involved":  it precipitated the accident through 
contact with the intermediate vehicle.   
Id., ¶12.   
¶33 Next, we examined our UM jurisprudence and stated that 
our prior cases fell within two categories:  cases involving 
miss-and-runs and cases involving flying objects.  Id., ¶14.  We 
stated that both lines of cases involved the physical contact 
requirement:  "While the miss-and-run cases establish the 
physical contact requirement, the second line of cases presents 
examples of where the court was required to consider whether 
that requirement was satisfied."  Id., ¶22.  We distinguished 
the miss-and-run cases because "in the instant case there was a 
contact; 
the 
unidentified 
vehicle 
had 
contact 
with 
the 
intermediate vehicle, which in turn had contact with the insured 
vehicle.  The miss-and-run cases do not foreclose interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) as mandating coverage in this case."  
Id., ¶21.   
¶34 Finally, we examined the policies underlying § 632.32 
and concluded that "the public policy concern of preventing 
fraudulent claims" would be satisfied by mandating coverage in 
this type of accident and that mandating such coverage would 
further the policy of providing an injured motorist the same 
compensation as if the uninsured motorist were insured.  Id., 
¶28.  Thus, we concluded that "when an unidentified driver is 
involved in a chain reaction collision, the physical contact 
requirement for a 'hit-and-run' is satisfied and coverage is 
mandated under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b."  Id.  
No. 2004AP740   
 
18 
 
¶35 Romanshek's principal argument on this appeal is that 
we should overrule Hayne because our cases subsequent to that 
decision have eroded the physical contact requirement to the 
point where it has no meaning.  We reject this argument because, 
as the above discussion demonstrates, both our cases and the 
court of appeals' decisions have consistently adhered to the 
interpretation of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. set forth in Hayne, which 
requires physical contact in accidents involving an unidentified 
vehicle in order for there to be a hit-and-run under the 
statute.  Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶11 ("We have previously held 
that the phrase hit-and-run in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
unambiguously 'includes a physical contact element.'")(quoting 
Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 79); Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 749, ¶26 (accord); 
Dehnel, 231 Wis. 2d at 21 (accord); Wegner, 173 Wis. 2d at 121 
("[T]he uninsured motorist insurance laws do not provide 
coverage for a hit-and-run driver that does not 'hit' another 
vehicle[.]").  
¶36 Further, 
the 
results 
in 
these 
cases 
have 
not 
undermined the physical contact requirement.  The "flying 
objects" cases, such as Theis and Dehnel, reaffirmed the 
physical contact requirement and simply applied that rule to 
unusual factual scenarios.  See Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶22 
("While the miss-and-run cases establish the physical contact 
requirement, the [flying objects] cases presents examples of 
where 
the 
court 
was 
required 
to 
consider 
whether 
that 
requirement was satisfied.").   
No. 2004AP740   
 
19 
 
¶37 Dehnel found that UM coverage was not mandated when a 
foreign object, a piece of ice, fell from an unidentified 
vehicle onto the insured's vehicle.  Dehnel, 231 Wis. 2d at 21.  
In contrast, Theis found that the physical contact requirement 
was satisfied because a part of an unidentified vehicle made 
physical contact with the insured's vehicle.  Theis, 232 
Wis. 2d 749, 
¶25. 
 
Both 
cases 
are 
consistent 
with 
the 
requirement set forth in Hayne that physical contact "requires a 
hit or touching between the vehicles."  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 
78.   
¶38 Cases subsequent to Hayne not involving flying objects 
have consistently adhered to the physical contact requirement.  
In Wegner, the court of appeals concluded that UM coverage was 
not mandated because a car that was forced off the road as 
another swerved into its lane was not involved in a hit-and-run 
accident due to the fact that there was no physical contact 
between the vehicles.  Wegner, 173 Wis. 2d at 120.  "[T]he 
uninsured motorist insurance laws do not provide coverage for a 
hit-and-run driver that does not 'hit' another vehicle[.]"  Id.  
In contrast, Smith found UM coverage was mandated in a chain 
reaction accident because the uninsured vehicle struck another 
vehicle, which, in turn, struck the insured's vehicle and 
because § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. explicitly covers vehicles "involved" 
in a hit-and-run accident.  Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶¶12, 28.  
Thus, Smith did not erode the holding of Hayne; it merely 
applied that holding to a new set of facts that implicated the 
additional statutory language "involved."  As such, both Wegner 
No. 2004AP740   
 
20 
 
and Smith were perfectly consistent with Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 
74, which concluded that "[t]he clear statutory language of sec. 
632.32(4)(a)2.b. reflects a legislative intent that the statute 
apply only to accidents in which there has been physical 
contact."   
¶39 Thus, for over 20 years this court has consistently 
adhered to the plain, unambiguous meaning of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b., 
as set forth in Hayne.  We have consistently ruled that UM 
coverage was not mandated under § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in miss-and-
run accidents.  The cases in which we found that UM coverage was 
mandated by § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. all involved circumstances where 
an unidentified vehicle, or part thereof, made contact with the 
insured's 
vehicle 
or 
where 
an 
unidentified 
vehicle 
was 
"involved" in an accident in which there was physical contact.  
In short, as we recognized in Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 749, ¶19, 
"[o]ur court and the court of appeals have 'drawn a line' on 
uninsured motorist claims[,]" by requiring physical contact in 
order 
to 
fall 
within 
the 
mandated 
UM 
coverage 
in 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  We simply have not deviated from that line 
when it comes to miss-and-run cases.  
¶40 Romanshek next argues that we should abandon our 
holding in Hayne because a majority of other states (27) have 
held that physical contact "is an impermissible limitation on 
uninsured or unknown motorist statutes and is against public 
policy."  Pet'r Br. at 5.  In addition, he asserts that 
requiring 
physical 
contact 
contravenes 
the 
intent 
of 
UM 
No. 2004AP740   
 
21 
 
coverage.  We are not persuaded by these arguments for several 
reasons.    
¶41 Any time this court is asked to overturn a prior case, 
we must thoroughly consider the doctrine of stare decisis.  
"This court follows the doctrine of stare decisis scrupulously 
because of our abiding respect for the rule of law."  Johnson 
Controls v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  It is a "longstanding rule that 
this court 'is bound by its own precedent.'"  State v. Hansen, 
2001 WI 53, ¶52, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195 (Wilcox, J., 
dissenting)(quoting Rose Manor Realty Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 
272 Wis. 339, 346, 75 N.W.2d 274 (1956)). 
¶42 "Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will 
not be abandoned lightly.  When existing law 'is open to 
revision in every case, "deciding cases becomes a mere exercise 
of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results."'"  
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266 (footnotes omitted).  Failing to abide by stare 
decisis raises serious concerns as to whether the court is 
"implementing 'principles . . . founded in the law rather than 
in the proclivities of individuals.'"  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 853 (1991)(Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Vasquez 
v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).   
¶43 "[F]requent and careless departure from prior case 
precedent undermines confidence in the reliability of court 
decisions."  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95.  "'Stare 
decisis is the preferred course of judicial action because it 
No. 2004AP740   
 
22 
 
promotes evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of 
legal 
principles . . . and 
contributes 
to 
the 
actual 
and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process.'"  Id., ¶95 
(quoting State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 504, 579 N.W.2d 654 
(1998)(quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827)).  Thus, "'the doctrine 
of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of 
law.'"  Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 
(1991)(quoting Welch v. Tex. Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 
483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987)).   
¶44 Additionally,  
[O]ne of the fundamental justifications for the rule 
of 
stare 
decisis 
is 
to 
provide 
a 
consistent 
predictable rule of law upon which society . . . may 
properly order [its] affairs, i.e., engage in rational 
business decision-making, without the continuous[,] 
ominous threat of the legal bases for those decisions 
being changed. 
Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶149 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).  
Thus, stare decisis is particularly controlling where the legal 
rule 
impacts 
contractual 
relationships, 
Antoniewicz 
v. 
Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 869, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975), and has 
been relied upon by industry, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
U.S. 298, 317 (1992).  As such, proper respect for the doctrine 
of stare decisis means that this court will rarely overturn 
prior decisions and only when certain criteria are met.  Johnson 
Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶98-99.  "The decision to overturn a 
prior case must not be undertaken merely because the composition 
of the court has changed."  Id., ¶95 (citing State v. Stevens, 
No. 2004AP740   
 
23 
 
181 Wis. 2d 410, 442, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994)(Abrahamson, J. 
concurring)).   
¶45 Moreover, stare decisis concerns are paramount where a 
court has authoritatively interpreted a statute because the 
legislature remains free to alter its construction.  Hilton, 502 
U.S. at 202.  When a party asks this court to overturn a prior 
interpretation of a statute, it is his "burden . . . to show not 
only that [the decision] was mistaken but also that it was 
objectively wrong, so that the court has a compelling reason to 
overrule it."  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 
Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.   
¶46 Thus, the function of this court today is not to 
interpret § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. de novo.  It is not a sufficient 
basis to overrule Hayne that this court disagrees with its 
rationale.  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶93.  Rather, we 
must determine whether Romanshek has met his burden and provided 
sufficient justification to overturn 20 years of jurisprudence 
construing a statute.  We conclude he has not done so.   
¶47 Our interpretation of § 632.32(4) in Hayne clearly 
involves contracts and implicates reliance interests.  Section 
632.32(4) 
governs 
insurance 
contracts 
and 
mandates 
that 
insurance policies provide certain types of coverage.  This 
court has consistently ruled that UM coverage is not mandated 
under § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. where there is no physical contact.  
Insurers, like Progressive, have no doubt relied on these cases 
and retained a physical contact requirement in their UM policy 
provisions.  "It is more than likely that some of the companies 
No. 2004AP740   
 
24 
 
utilizing such [a clause] have established premium rates in 
reliance upon the validity of such a clause being upheld by the 
decisions of this court."  Bauman v. Gilbertson, 7 Wis. 2d 467, 
469, 96 N.W.2d 854 (1959).  Moreover, the reliance interests of 
other parties aside, Progressive was the very insurer whose 
policy was implicated in Hayne.   
¶48 Romanshek's reliance on foreign jurisprudence is also 
not a sufficient reason to depart from our ruling in Hayne.  "It 
is not a sufficient reason for this court to overrule its 
precedent that a large majority of other jurisdictions, with no 
binding 
authority 
on 
this 
court, 
have 
reached 
opposing 
conclusions."  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶100.  As 
noted, the physical contact requirement derives from the plain 
meaning of the phrase "hit-and-run" in § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. as 
found in Hayne.  Romanshek merely cites to broad statements from 
foreign cases concerning the purpose of UM statutes generally; 
he has not offered any textually-based arguments not considered 
in Hayne that undercut the rationale of that decision.  The fact 
that some states have reached a different conclusion involving 
their statutes is not germane to the legitimacy of our 
interpretation of Wisconsin's UM statute.   
¶49 In addition, Hayne itself was cognizant that other 
states had rejected a physical contact requirement for UM 
coverage in hit-and-run accidents.  As discussed supra, Hayne 
noted that these states have statutes requiring motorists to 
stop and render aid when involved in an accident and that courts 
in these states have construed these statutes to apply to all 
No. 2004AP740   
 
25 
 
accidents, not simply those involving physical contact.  Hayne, 
115 Wis. 2d at 75.  In declining to follow these jurisdictions, 
Hayne reasoned:  "Wisconsin's version of these statutes, 
however, is entitled 'Duty upon striking person or attended or 
occupied vehicle.'  Section 346.67 Stats. . . . The reference to 
'striking' in sec. 346.67 supports our conclusion that the plain 
meaning of 'hit-and-run' in sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b. includes a 
physical contact element."  Id.4   
¶50 Further, many of the general policy statements from 
the cases upon which Romanshek relies were articulated in the 
dissent in Hayne and rejected by the majority.  Compare id. at 
95 ("[I]t is inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the 
uninsured motorist statute to permit the insurance company to 
evade coverage by using the fraud argument and erecting an 
arbitrary distinction between accidents with physical contact 
and those without.") (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) with id. at 85 
n.11 (rejecting these policy arguments).  Moreover, even if this 
court were now persuaded by those policy arguments rejected in 
Hayne, that is not a sufficient reason to overturn the decision.  
¶51 Romanshek has not demonstrated that our interpretation 
of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in Hayne has failed "to provide suitable 
direction and consistency to this area of the law."  Johnson 
Controls, 263 Wis. 2d 60, ¶106.  All he has presented is a 
                                                 
4 Hayne also noted that "[s]ection 346.67(1)(a) provides, in 
part:  
'. . . he 
shall 
give 
his 
name, address and the 
registration number of the vehicle he is driving to the person 
struck . . . '." 
Hayne 
v. 
Progressive 
N. 
Ins. 
Co., 
115 
Wis. 2d 68, 75, 339 N.W.2d 588 (1983).   
No. 2004AP740   
 
26 
 
string of foreign cases and generalized statements about the 
underlying purposes of statutes that mandate UM coverage.  He 
has not presented any new facts that undermine Hayne's analysis 
of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  See id., ¶98.  As discussed supra, 
Romanshek has not demonstrated that our cases subsequent to 
Hayne have undermined the rationale behind that decision, which 
rationale was based on the plain language of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
See id.  He has not shown that our interpretation of 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in Hayne is unworkable in practice.  See id., 
¶99.  As noted, our courts have regularly applied the physical 
contact requirement to miss-and-run accidents and other types of 
cases in a consistent manner.  In short, Romanshek has not 
presented us with a compelling reason to overrule Hayne's 
application 
of 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  
Romanshek 
simply 
disagrees 
with 
our 
interpretation 
of 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in Hayne.   
¶52 Furthermore, unlike Johnson Controls, Romanshek does 
not simply ask us to reconsider a recent interpretation of a 
contractual provision.  He does not merely ask us to abandon a 
common-law 
doctrine; 
rather, 
he 
asks 
us 
to 
change 
our 
interpretation of a particular phrase in a statute that has 
stood for over 20 years.  "This court has long been committed to 
the principle that a construction given to a statute by the 
court 
becomes 
a 
part 
thereof, 
unless 
the 
legislature 
subsequently amends the statute to effect a change."  City of 
No. 2004AP740   
 
27 
 
Sun Prairie v. PSC, 37 Wis. 2d 96, 100, 154 N.W.2d 360 (1967).5  
"Legislative inaction following judicial construction of a 
statute, while not conclusive, evinces legislative approval of 
the interpretation."  State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 566, 
455 N.W.2d 143 (1990).  Thus, generally, "[l]egislative silence 
with regard to new court-made decisions indicates legislative 
acquiescence 
in 
those 
decisions." 
 
State 
v. 
Olson, 
175 
Wis. 2d 628, 641, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993).  See also Bauman, 7 
Wis. 2d at 469-70 (holding that it was not proper to depart from 
stare decisis where court had previously ruled that policy 
exclusion did not violate omnibus insurance coverage statute and 
legislature had not amended statute in the 11 years since the 
prior decision). 
 
¶53 Romanshek 
contends 
that 
this 
doctrine 
is 
not 
applicable because, according to a Legislative Council Note, the 
legislature explicitly left it up to the court to construe 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  We disagree.  The Legislative Council Note 
to which he refers provides, in pertinent part:  "A precise 
definition of hit-and-run is not necessary for in the rare case 
where a 
question 
arises 
the court 
can draw 
the 
line."  
Legislative Council Note, 1979, § 632.32, Stats.   
¶54 However, this case is not one of the "rare" cases to 
which the Note refers.  Unlike our flying objects cases or the 
                                                 
5 See also State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 198, 560 
N.W.2d 266 (1997)("The court's construction of a statute will 
stand unless the legislature specifically changes the particular 
holding."); State ex rel. LaFollette v. Brown County Cir. Ct., 
37 Wis. 2d 329, 341, 155 N.W.2d 141 (1967)(accord).   
No. 2004AP740   
 
28 
 
chain-reaction collision in Smith, this is a run-of-the-mill 
miss-and-run case.  Unlike the aforementioned difficult cases 
where reasonable arguments can be made as to whether there may 
have been a "hit" involving an unidentified vehicle, a miss-and-
run case clearly falls within the core of what is obviously not 
a hit-and-run.  Indeed, we rejected the argument that miss-and-
run cases are of the type to which the Note refers in Hayne:   
The 
dissent 
argues . . . that 
"miss-and-run" 
cases are the kind of "rare" cases referred to in the 
above note.  Given the voluminous number of reported 
cases involving "miss-and-run" accidents cited by the 
dissent, it is difficult to see how "miss-and-run" 
cases can be considered rare. 
Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 82 n.8.   
¶55 Thus, it is incorrect to say that the legislature 
wholly 
delegated 
to 
the 
courts 
the 
power 
to 
construe 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in any manner they saw fit.  While the 
aforementioned Note clearly indicates that the legislature left 
it up to the courts to decide the difficult "rare" cases 
involving the application of the phrase "hit-and-run," the 
existence of said Note does not provide the courts with carte 
blanche to completely rewrite the phrase "hit-and-run" to 
include that which is its very antithesis.   
¶56 Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
doctrine 
of 
legislative acquiescence is applicable here.  While the doctrine 
is not an immutable rule, it is particularly relevant here 
because both the majority opinion and the dissent in Hayne 
invited the legislature to amend § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. if it 
disagreed with our interpretation of the statute.  See Hayne, 
No. 2004AP740   
 
29 
 
115 Wis. 2d at 85 n.11 ("The legislature can, if it so desires, 
amend the [UM] statute to reflect [the dissent's] policy 
arguments."); Id. at 99 ("Fortunately the Wisconsin legislature 
can amend sec. 632.32(4)(a) and disavow the interpretation set 
forth in the majority opinion.")(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  
Moreover, the majority even instructed the legislature how to 
alter 
the 
statute 
to 
mandate 
coverage 
for 
miss-and-run 
accidents:   
If the legislature had intended its mandated uninsured 
motorist coverage to apply to any accident involving 
an unidentified motorist . . . that result could have 
been reached merely by deleting the term "hit-and-run" 
from the language in sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b., Stats., 
and having that provision read:  an unidentified motor 
vehicle involved in an accident."  
Id. at 76.   
¶57 Although the legislature has amended another provision 
of the mandatory UM law since Hayne, 1995 Wis. Act 21, § 2 
(amending § 632.32(4)(a)1.), it has not seen fit to make any 
change 
to 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
and 
overturn 
this 
court's 
interpretation of the phrase "hit-and-run."  The fact that the 
legislature made changes to the same statutory subdivision at 
issue here, but chose not to amend the phrase "hit-and-run" is a 
strong indication it intended our interpretation of that phrase 
in Hayne to remain law.   
¶58 As 
the 
doctrine 
of 
legislative 
acquiescence 
is 
particularly applicable here, Romanshek must demonstrate that 
our holding in Hayne was objectively wrong, not merely mistaken.  
Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21.  This he has not done.  While 
No. 2004AP740   
 
30 
 
Romanshek 
argues 
at 
length 
about 
the 
supposed 
policies 
underlying mandatory UM coverage, he has not presented a 
compelling textual argument that indicates our interpretation of 
the phrase "hit-and-run" in Hayne was objectively wrong.  
¶59 Furthermore, 
we 
reject 
Romanshek's 
argument 
that 
requiring physical contact to meet the definition of hit-and-run 
contravenes the intent of § 632.32.  The ruling of Hayne was 
based on the clear, unambiguous statutory language contained in 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 74-76.  "The clear 
statutory 
language 
of 
sec. 
632.2(4)(a)2.b. 
reflects 
a 
legislative intent that the statute apply only to accidents in 
which there has been physical contact."  Id. at 74.  This court 
"assume[s] that the legislature's intent is expressed in the 
statutory language. . . . It is the enacted law, not the 
unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  As the physical contact requirement derives 
from 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
term 
"hit-and-run" 
in 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b., it cannot contravene the legislative intent; 
it is the legislative intent.   
¶60 Likewise, we reject Romanshek's suggestion that the 
physical contact requirement may contravene public policy.  
"Public policy on a given subject is determined either by the 
constitution itself or by statutes passed within constitutional 
limitations. . . . 
When 
acting 
within 
constitutional 
limitations, the legislature settles and declares the public 
policy of a state, and not the court."  Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 
No. 2004AP740   
 
31 
 
Wis. 327, 351, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).6  Thus, when the legislature 
has acted, "the judiciary is limited to applying the policy the 
legislature has chosen to enact, and may not impose its own 
policy choices."  Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI 
62, ¶16, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345.7  Therefore, as Hayne 
concluded that the physical contact requirement is part of the 
UM statute, it cannot contravene public policy; it is public 
policy.    
¶61 Romanshek's final argument is that we should refuse to 
follow Hayne because Progressive, he asserts, has conceded that 
he is not attempting to perpetrate a fraud.  Romanshek argues 
that the sole reason for the physical contact requirement is to 
avoid fraudulent claims and the rule should not apply here 
because Progressive does not contend his claim is fraudulent.  
We reject this argument because "no change in the law is 
justified simply by a 'case with more egregious facts.'"  
Schultz, 257 Wis. 2d 19, ¶38 (quoting Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 
442 (Abrahamson, J., concurring)).  In addition, counsel for 
Romanshek admitted during oral argument that many of our prior 
                                                 
6 See also Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 539, 576 
N.W.2d 245 (1998)("This court has long held that it is the 
province of the legislature, not the courts, to determine public 
policy.").   
7 See also Wood v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 24, ¶38, 260 
Wis. 2d 71, 659 N.W.2d 31 ("The Woods and the amici argue that 
such a conclusion is bad policy.  The remedy for change of this 
policy, however, lies with the legislature.  The courts should 
not rewrite the clear language of the statute.").   
No. 2004AP740   
 
32 
 
hit-and-run cases involved factual allegations whose veracity 
was not contested on appeal.   
¶62 Further, the fact that insurance policies may contain 
provisions excluding UM coverage when there is no physical 
contact in order to avoid fraudulent claims is no justification 
for altering our interpretation of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. when fraud 
is not present.8  Hayne set forth the physical contact 
requirement for mandatory UM coverage under § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
because that is what the plain meaning of the text dictated, not 
because the court sought to prevent fraud or because it believed 
such a requirement was "good policy" generally.  Hayne, 115 
Wis. 2d at 84-85.  
¶63 While this court may mold and develop common-law 
doctrines to best effectuate the purpose for which they were 
designed, when applying statutes we do not carve out exceptions 
to a clear, unambiguous provision anytime a party argues that a 
particular result does not comport with what they assert to be 
the subjective intentions of the legislators in enacting the 
overall statutory scheme.  See Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City 
of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶¶33-34, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633 
(refusing to carve out an exception to a tax exemption statute 
governing charitable organizations for a benevolent organization 
that did not meet the statutory requirements despite its 
                                                 
8 We also note that Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 
44 Wis. 2d 45, 49-51, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969), rejected the 
argument that the plain language of a hit-and-run policy 
provision should not govern simply because the insured contended 
that there was no evidence of fraud.   
No. 2004AP740   
 
33 
 
undisputed 
charitable 
purpose 
and 
activities). 
 
Having 
authoritatively determined the plain meaning of the statute in 
Hayne, we must simply apply that plain meaning and may not 
impose our own policy choices.  Id.   
¶64 Unlike Theis and Smith, which involved the application 
of the phrase hit-and-run to difficult facts and required 
consideration of the "purposes" of § 632.32,9 this case involves 
the very essence of the plain meaning of "hit-and-run."  "We 
cannot, however, change the wording of a statute by liberal 
construction to mean something that the legislature did not 
intend, or that the plain language of the statute will not 
support."  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 85 n.11.   
¶65 As we stated in Hayne, the legislature is free to 
change our interpretation of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. if it deems our 
interpretation to be incorrect.  It may very well be good public 
policy to mandate UM coverage for an insured injured in a miss-
and-run accident.  However, Romanshek's policy arguments are 
best addressed to the body charged with developing this state's 
public policy.   
 
 
                                                 
9 Moreover, we note that the "purposes" of the UM statute to 
which Romanshek refers are not textually manifest in the statute 
itself.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 2004 
WI 58, ¶49 & n.8, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Rather, 
these "purposes" were first constructed by the dissent in Hayne, 
which relied on statements from other courts and commentators 
addressing the rationale underlying UM statutes generally.  
Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 93-94 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).   
No. 2004AP740   
 
34 
 
IV 
¶66 In conclusion, we decline to overrule our long line of 
precedent requiring physical contact in an accident involving an 
unknown vehicle in order for there to be a "hit-and-run" within 
the meaning of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Our cases have consistently 
affirmed the physical contact requirement and held that miss-
and-runs do not qualify as hit-and-runs.  Romanshek has offered 
no compelling reason to depart from Hayne's interpretation of 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
 
He 
has 
not 
demonstrated that Hayne's interpretation of the statute was 
objectively wrong.  As such, we refuse to depart from the 
doctrine of stare decisis, particularly since the ruling in 
Hayne concerns contractual provisions and implicates reliance 
interests.  Further, the fact that the legislature has not 
amended § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in the 20 years since Hayne, despite 
our invitation to do so and its amendment of § 632.32(4)(a)1., 
is strong reason to adhere to stare decisis.  Therefore, we 
reaffirm that the phrase "hit-and-run" in § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
requires 
physical 
contact 
in 
an 
accident 
involving 
an 
unidentified 
vehicle 
and 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
miss-and-run 
accidents.  As such, we affirm the order of the circuit court.  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed.  
 
 
No.  2004AP740.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶67 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I have 
carefully read the lengthy majority opinion in the instant case 
and have reread the majority and dissenting opinions in Hayne v. 
Progressive 
Northern 
Insurance 
Co., 
115 
Wis. 2d 68, 
339 
N.W.2d 588 (1983).  I continue to believe that my dissent in 
Hayne is correct.  Indeed in the intervening years I have become 
more persuaded of its correctness.  
¶68 Many states have either adopted or reaffirmed the 
position set forth in the Hayne dissent.   
¶69 The Hayne majority opinion has been eroded since Hayne 
was decided.  This erosion has taken place because the Hayne 
majority opinion is not in keeping with the objectives of the 
statute.  In an effort to conform with the statutory objectives, 
this court has pinned the outcome of uninsured motorist cases in 
Wisconsin on such artificial distinctions as whether a plaintiff 
can show that physical contact with a third vehicle was 
indirect,10 or that a flying object from one vehicle touches the 
other.11 
¶70 That the legislature has not amended the statute does 
not dissuade me.  "Legislative acquiescence is a familiar 
argument in statutory construction cases. . . . [But it] is 
often 
vulnerable 
to 
rebuttal. . . . Numerous 
variables, 
                                                 
10 Smith 
v. 
Gen. 
Cas. 
Ins. 
Co., 
2000 
WI 
127, 
239 
Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882. 
11 Theis v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 15, 232 
Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162. 
No.  2004AP740.ssa 
 
2 
 
unrelated 
to 
conscious 
endorsement 
of 
a 
statutory 
interpretation, 
may 
explain 
or 
cause 
legislative 
inaction. . . . The doctrine of legislative acquiescence is 
merely a presumption to aid in statutory construction."12 
¶71 For the reasons explained fully in my Hayne dissent 
and because our subsequent cases have backed away from the Hayne 
majority opinion, I dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶¶32, 33, 35, 274 
Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.  See also State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 
53, ¶38, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195. 
No.  2004AP740.ssa 
 
 
 
1