Title: Commonwealth v. Nick N.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12964 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NICK N., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 4, 2020. - January 26, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent child, 
Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Delinquent child, Juvenile 
Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Evidence, Evidence 
at preliminary hearing, Hearsay.  Practice, Criminal, 
Waiver, Hearsay, Discovery. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Norfolk County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on July 18, 2019. 
 
 
Questions of law were reported by Linda G. Sable, J., to 
the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Peter A. Hahn for the juvenile. 
Laura A. McLaughlin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Dennis M. Toomey, for Committee for Public Counsel Services 
& another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case involves the appropriate application 
of the rules of evidence and discovery procedures to Wallace W. 
2 
hearings, as well as further clarification of when a Wallace W. 
hearing must be used to prove that a juvenile has committed a 
first offense of a six months or less misdemeanor under G. L. 
c. 119, § 52.  See Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 
800-801 (2019).  In this case, the juvenile is alleged to have 
committed a major misdemeanor of assault and battery against 
another minor, followed by a minor misdemeanor1 of accosting and 
annoying the same victim in a separate, later incident.  The 
Commonwealth moved for a Wallace W. hearing to prove the greater 
offense, and the Juvenile Court judge reported three questions 
of law regarding waiver, evidentiary rules, and discovery 
procedures for Wallace W. hearings to the Appeals Court.  We 
thereafter allowed the juvenile's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
We conclude that (1) the Commonwealth may proceed directly 
to trial on the greater offense that preceded the first offense 
of a minor misdemeanor, but the Commonwealth may not arraign on 
the minor misdemeanor until it proves the greater offense; (2) 
the failure of a juvenile to move for a prearraignment 
Wallace W. hearing on a first offense of a minor misdemeanor 
                                                          
 
 
1 For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to all 
misdemeanors "for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment 
in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months 
or both such fine and imprisonment" as minor misdemeanors, and 
all other misdemeanors as major misdemeanors.  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 52. 
3 
does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over the first 
offense, as subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by 
waiver and can be raised by either party or the court at any 
time; (3) the evidentiary rules laid out in Commonwealth v. 
Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 114-119 (1990), apply to Wallace W. 
hearings; (4) notice of the alleged violation and some exchange 
of discovery are required prior to Wallace W. proceedings, and 
the Juvenile Court Department should promulgate appropriate 
rules surrounding discovery procedures to provide clarity and 
consistency going forward.2 
 
1.  Facts and procedural history.3  On April 23, 2019, a 
fourteen year old student, Tina,4 reported to Detective 
Christopher M. Jones, a school resource officer, that a fifteen 
year old male student, the juvenile, had been making 
inappropriate comments and gestures toward her and that she was 
uncomfortable attending class with him.  At a subsequent meeting 
in the presence of her mother on May 4, 2019, Tina elaborated on 
some of these incidents.  Starting a few months prior to the 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and Citizens for Juvenile Justice. 
 
 
3 The facts regarding the juvenile's behavior towards the 
victim are alleged in the police report and application for 
complaint. 
 
 
4 A pseudonym. 
4 
meeting, the juvenile had touched her on her arm and her back 
without permission.  About two months prior to the meeting, he 
punched her arm, causing it to bruise.  She shouted, catching 
the attention of the dean of students, who suspended the 
juvenile.  On another occasion, the juvenile made explicit 
sexual comments and gestures to the alleged victim in the school 
cafeteria.  In a separate encounter, he told her "you're my 
property," in response to her refusal to answer his question 
about where she had been. 
 
On July 18, 2019, a delinquency complaint issued against 
the juvenile, charging him with accosting or annoying another 
person (G. L. c. 272, § 53) and assault and battery (G. L. 
c. 265, § 13A).5  The former is a misdemeanor punishable by six 
months in a jail or house of correction; the latter is a 
misdemeanor punishable by not more than two and one-half years 
in a house of correction.  The juvenile has no prior record.  
                                                          
 
 
5 The complaint alleges that both crimes occurred on May 29, 
2019, but the police report stated that the incidents occurred 
in a different timeline.  The Commonwealth has indicated that 
upon remand it will move to amend the complaint to correct the 
dates of the offenses.  We have stated the facts according to 
the timeline provided in the police report.  Given the 
inconsistency between the complaint and the alleged facts, it is 
unclear which behavior gave rise to which charge.  We assume, 
for purposes of our analysis, that the assault and battery 
charge arose from either the juvenile's touching of Tina without 
her permission or his punching of her, both of which are alleged 
to have occurred prior to his explicit comments to her, which we 
will assume to have given rise to the accosting and annoying 
charge. 
5 
Defense counsel filed a motion for diversion on August 13, 2019.  
In that motion, the juvenile also raised the issue of the 
Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over the accosting and annoying 
charge based on our decision in Wallace W., arguing that the 
charge must be dismissed as a first offense under § 52 for lack 
of jurisdiction.6  On August 20, 2019, the Commonwealth moved for 
and the judge granted a prearraignment evidentiary hearing 
pursuant to Wallace W. to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the juvenile committed the assault and battery offense such that 
the Juvenile Court could exercise jurisdiction over the 
accosting or annoying offense and arraign the juvenile on that 
charge.  In preparation, the Commonwealth filed a motion for the 
juvenile's school records, which was granted.  The juvenile 
filed a motion in limine to exclude hearsay testimony regarding 
Tina's allegations. 
 
At the scheduled Wallace W. hearing, the Commonwealth was 
ready to proceed with three witnesses, intending to elicit 
hearsay statements of the alleged victim.  The parties disagreed 
as to whether hearsay should be admitted in evidence at the 
hearing.  The judge indicated she would report a question of law 
regarding whether the rules of evidence apply at a Wallace W. 
                                                          
 
 
6 Wallace W. was released on August 9, 2019, and so was not 
contemplated by the judge or parties prior to the juvenile's 
motion for diversion. 
6 
hearing, and did not hold the hearing or arraignment.  The 
juvenile filed a motion to report a question of law on October 
7, 2019.  The Juvenile Court judge reported three questions to 
the Appeals Court: 
1.  "Where the juvenile does not move for a pre-arraignment 
Wallace W. hearing, can the issue be waived?" 
 
2.  "Do the rules of evidence apply when the court conducts 
a pre-arraignment Wallace W. [h]earing?  Specifically, is 
hearsay permitted?" 
 
3.  "Should there be an exchange of discovery prior to the 
court hearing a pre-arraignment evidentiary hearing 
pursuant to Wallace W.?" 
 
 
We granted the juvenile's application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Appropriateness of a Wallace W. 
hearing in this case.  In Wallace W., 482 Mass. 789, we 
interpreted the meaning of first offense of a minor misdemeanor 
in G. L. c. 119, § 52.  This statute excludes from the 
definition of "[d]elinquent child," and therefore from the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, any child between the ages 
of twelve and eighteen years old who commits "a first offense of 
a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment 
in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months 
or both such fine and imprisonment."  We held that the 
Legislature could not have intended to create a "Catch-22" in 
which, in the absence of a record of an adjudication of 
7 
delinquency for someone whose first offense was dismissed, 
"every subsequent commission of a six months or less misdemeanor 
would seemingly have to be dismissed as a 'first offense.'"  
Wallace W., supra at 790-791.  We therefore defined "the means 
by which a first offense, even one that did not result in a 
prior delinquency adjudication, may be proved and recorded such 
that the Juvenile Court may exercise jurisdiction over 
subsequent [minor misdemeanor] offenses," a process that has 
come to be known as a Wallace W. hearing.  Id. at 791. 
 
In this case, the Commonwealth first moved for a Wallace W. 
hearing in the Juvenile Court, and then argued in its brief to 
this court that the juvenile is not entitled to a Wallace W. 
hearing because he is charged with a greater offense alongside 
his minor misdemeanor.  The juvenile argues that the greater 
offense must be proved before the Juvenile Court has 
jurisdiction over his minor misdemeanor. 
 
As we explain in Commonwealth v. Manolo M., 486 
Mass.    ,     (2021), also released today, the Legislature's 
use of "first offense of a [minor] misdemeanor" in § 52 excludes 
the first episode of minor misdemeanor misconduct from the 
Juvenile Court's jurisdiction where there has been no prior 
adjudication of delinquency.  In the case before us, however, 
the alleged facts indicate that the juvenile committed a greater 
offense (assault and battery) in a separate episode, prior to 
8 
the minor misdemeanor behavior (accosting and annoying).  The 
Commonwealth may therefore proceed to arraign and try to prove 
the greater offense without a Wallace W. hearing, as the § 52 
exclusion does not apply to greater offenses.  The Commonwealth 
need not, in this case, hold a Wallace W. hearing, as the 
greater offense can be proved at trial without a prior Wallace 
W. hearing.  There is no need for duplicative proceedings to 
arraign on major misdemeanors or felonies.7 
 
If the greater offense is proved, the Commonwealth may then 
arraign the minor misdemeanor charges, because the minor 
misdemeanor is alleged to have occurred later in time and 
therefore would not be a first offense.  Until it is proved that 
the minor misdemeanor is not a first offense, the Juvenile Court 
does not have jurisdiction over it, even though it is charged 
                                                          
 
 
7 Although the Commonwealth need not prove the greater 
offense at a Wallace W. hearing in order to arraign on the 
greater charge, it is within its discretion to do so -- for 
example, if it would like to arraign on the minor misdemeanor 
charge and address the greater and lesser offenses at the same 
trial or plea discussion.  Because the minor misdemeanor charge 
is alleged to arise from a separate, later episode of 
misconduct, proof of the earlier occurrence of the greater 
charge at a Wallace W. hearing or trial would provide the 
Juvenile Court with jurisdiction over the minor misdemeanor, as 
it would not be a "first offense" under § 52.  See Wallace W., 
482 Mass. at 796 ("The exclusion from jurisdiction under § 52 
applies only to six months or less misdemeanors that constitute 
the juvenile's 'first offense'"). 
9 
simultaneously with a greater offense.8  Manolo M., 486 Mass. 
at     ("First episodes of minor misdemeanor level conduct must 
be dismissed as a first offense, even if they are accompanied by 
more serious charges"). 
 
b.  Waiver.  The first of the reported questions, albeit 
unclearly phrased, appears to ask whether jurisdiction over the 
minor misdemeanor may be conferred by waiver when the juvenile 
does not request a Wallace W. hearing regarding the minor 
misdemeanor.  In this case, the waiver argument is particularly 
muddled.  The Commonwealth requested a Wallace W. hearing on the 
assault and battery charge, which preceded the accosting and 
annoying minor misdemeanor, rendering any request by the 
juvenile unnecessary.  On appeal, the Commonwealth relies 
primarily on its argument that no Wallace W. hearing is required 
when it brings multiple charges, an argument we rejected above.  
Nonetheless, to avoid unnecessary confusion about waiver, we 
answer the first reported question as follows:  the issue of a 
first offense of a minor misdemeanor is one of subject matter 
jurisdiction; thus, it cannot be waived and can be raised by 
either party or the court at any time. 
                                                          
 
 
8 If the greater charge proceeded to trial and was not 
proved, the minor misdemeanor charge would be a first offense, 
subject to dismissal under G. L. c. 119, § 52. 
10 
 
As we explained in Wallace W., the definition of 
"[d]elinquent child" in § 52 determines the Juvenile Court's 
subject matter jurisdiction over a child's minor misdemeanor 
where that charge may or may not be the child's "first offense 
of a [minor] misdemeanor."  G. L. c. 119, § 52.  See G. L. 
c. 218, § 60 (Juvenile Court shall have and exercise 
jurisdiction over cases of delinquent children); Lazlo L. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 325, 335 (2019) (statute amending § 52 
one of "jurisdictional nature").  Wallace W. hearings were, in 
turn, created as a mechanism to determine whether there is 
jurisdiction.  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 791.9 
 
A question of subject matter jurisdiction "'may be raised 
at any time' . . . and [is] not waived even when not argued."  
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 151 (2003), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cantres, 405 Mass. 238, 240 (1989).  Nothing in 
Wallace W. should be read to the contrary.  Although we used 
permissive language to state that "the juvenile may move to 
dismiss the complaint" (emphasis added), this language does not 
confine to the juvenile the responsibility of attentiveness to 
proper jurisdiction.  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 800-801.  Subject 
matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party or the court 
                                                          
 
 
9 Jurisdiction over a minor misdemeanor charge can, of 
course, also be proved with a prior adjudication of delinquency, 
a continuance without a finding following a trial, or a plea of 
delinquency.  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 799-800 & n.4. 
11 
at any time and cannot be conferred by waiver.  See United 
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("defects in subject-
matter jurisdiction require correction"); Lazlo L., 482 Mass. at 
335 (discussing § 52, "jurisdiction is a threshold 
requirement"); DeJesus, supra.  Indeed, the court is obligated 
to raise the issue of a potential defect in jurisdiction even if 
it is not argued by the parties.  DeJesus, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Andler, 247 Mass. 580, 582 (1924) ("'duty of the 
court to consider' lack of jurisdiction even when not raised by 
the parties").  See G. L. c. 277, § 47A (in criminal case, 
"defense or objection based upon a failure to show jurisdiction 
in the court . . . shall be noticed by the court at any time"). 
 
c.  Evidentiary standard for Wallace W. hearings.  The 
second reported question asks:  "Do the rules of evidence apply 
when the court conducts a pre-arraignment Wallace W. [h]earing?  
Specifically, is hearsay permitted?"  We conclude that reliable 
hearsay is permitted as provided for in Durling. 
 
We begin by recognizing that this question is not resolved 
by the statute.  As explained above, the Legislature did not 
explain how a first offense should be proved, nor define the 
evidentiary standards for such proceedings.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 52.  The Legislature also has declined our invitation in 
Wallace W. to fill in any gaps. 
12 
 
Nor has our decision in Wallace W. resolved this issue.  In 
Wallace W., we concluded that a first offense of a minor 
misdemeanor must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but we 
were not asked or required to determine whether the rules of 
evidence applied in whole or part to Wallace W. hearings.  More 
particularly, we were not asked or required to determine whether 
hearsay was admissible in such proceedings.  We did note, 
however, potential problems in proving first offenses, including 
"track[ing] down" witnesses and evidence from "months, or even 
years, prior."  Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 803 n.10.  We 
recognized that this might also require coordination with 
different police departments and district attorney's offices.  
Id.  Finally, we noted the difficulty of securing the 
participation of witnesses or victims of prior minor 
misdemeanors to prove first offenses "with no other legal effect 
than to establish that a first offense has occurred."  Id.  
Nonetheless, we left these issues to be decided in subsequent 
cases. 
 
The juvenile argues that, in determining whether the rules 
of evidence apply and whether hearsay is excluded at Wallace W. 
hearings, we should treat a Wallace W. hearing essentially as a 
substitute for trial.  As a trial requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the application of the rules of evidence, 
so should a Wallace W. hearing.  The juvenile further contends 
13 
that those hearings allowing relaxed evidentiary rules, 
including certain hearsay, all have lower burdens of proof.  
See, e.g., G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3), (4) (dangerousness hearing 
requires clear and convincing evidence, and rules of evidence do 
not apply); Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-17(VI)(c), (VII)(a) 
(2018) (hearsay admissible to meet preponderance of evidence at 
probation violation hearing, held pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 59). 
 
The Commonwealth's argument focuses on the different 
consequences of a decision in these different proceedings.  A 
prearraignment evidentiary hearing pursuant to Wallace W. would 
not result in any detention of the juvenile, but only in a 
ruling that the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over the 
subsequent six months or less misdemeanor.  Reliable hearsay is 
permitted at many types of hearings that, unlike Wallace W. 
hearings, do result in the detention of a juvenile or defendant.  
See, e.g., Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 308 & n.8 (2020) 
(commitment for substance abuse treatment); Commonwealth v. 
Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016) (probation revocation); 
Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 36 (2010) 
(dangerousness).  Essentially, the Commonwealth contends that 
the rules of evidence have been relaxed and reliable hearsay has 
been allowed in proceedings with much greater consequences for 
14 
juveniles and criminal defendants, and therefore reliable 
hearsay should be admissible here. 
 
We recognize that the interests protected by § 52 and the 
proceedings devised by Wallace W. are unique.  To provide the 
second chance mandated by the Legislature, we concluded in 
Wallace W. that an adjudication of a first offense was required, 
and thus the appropriate standard of proof was therefore beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Although the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt requirement requires substantial reliable evidence in 
order for a party to successfully meet the burden, it does not 
mandate that the rules of evidence apply per se, or that hearsay 
be precluded.  Indeed, the Legislature has allowed express 
exceptions to the rules of evidence for the determination of 
sexual dangerousness, which requires proof "beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (certain hearsay admissible at 
trial to determine if person is sexually dangerous beyond 
reasonable doubt).  We upheld this "very radical departure from 
ordinary evidentiary rules" in the context of confinement of a 
sexually dangerous person because the hearsay permitted had a 
"powerful independent indicator of the reliability" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Given, 441 Mass. 741, 
744, 747-748, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 948 (2004). 
 
Unlike sexually dangerous person proceedings, probation 
revocation proceedings, or dangerousness hearings, there is no 
15 
direct loss of liberty resulting from a Wallace W. proceeding.  
As a result, we are confronted with a higher burden of proof, 
but a diminished liberty interest.  We are also confronted with 
the logistical and other difficulties discussed above in proving 
first offenses, including tracking down and securing the 
cooperation of witnesses months or years later for proceedings 
that would not directly affect them.   To decide whether the 
rules of evidence should apply and, if not, whether hearsay is 
admissible, we therefore turn to our procedural due process 
decisions for more guidance.  We do so not because they 
establish a minimum constitutional standard, but because "[i]n 
determining what process is due this court must balance the 
interests of the individual affected, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of those interests and the government's interest in 
the efficient and economic administration of its affairs" 
(quotation, citation, and alteration omitted).  Querubin v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 117 (2003).  See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (due process generally 
requires consideration of private interest that will be affected 
by official action; risk of erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through procedures used, and probable value of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and government's 
interest). 
16 
 
We begin with the interests at stake.  As we have 
explained, § 52 protects the juvenile's right to a second chance 
by assuring that his or her first offense of a minor misdemeanor 
does not result in an arraignment, an adjudication of 
delinquency, a CARI record, and the stigma and collateral 
consequences that flow therefrom.  See Commonwealth v. Magnus 
M., 461 Mass. 459, 467 (2012). 
 
The Commonwealth's interest in a Wallace W. proceeding is 
somewhat different, but similarly unusual.  Until the first 
offense of a minor misdemeanor is proved, the Commonwealth 
cannot proceed on subsequent minor misdemeanor offenses.  As 
repeat minor misdemeanor offenses are intended to be prosecuted 
for both the protection of the public and the rehabilitation of 
the juvenile, it is important that such proceedings be able to 
occur in a timely and efficient manner.  Wallace W., 482 Mass. 
at 794-795. 
 
Wallace W. hearings are designed to protect both sets of 
interests identified in § 52.  They do so by assuring an 
accurate determination whether a first offense has occurred.  As 
we have emphasized, the "requirements of the due process clause 
have, at their base, the goal of providing an accurate 
determination."  Durling, 407 Mass. at 116. 
 
We therefore focus our inquiry on the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of the juvenile's interest in a second chance 
17 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.  Mathews, 424 
U.S. at 335.  To be more specific, we consider the risk of an 
erroneous decision at a Wallace W. hearing based on the 
allowance of hearsay evidence. 
 
We conclude that the best guidance in this regard is 
provided by our decision in Durling.  In that case, this court 
considered the different interests at stake and the risk posed 
by hearsay evidence to a reliable, accurate determination in a 
probation revocation proceeding.  Although the burden of proof 
is lower in a probation revocation proceeding, the court 
struggled with many of the issues before us, reasoning:  
"Normally, the best source of information for such a 
determination is the testimony of one or more persons who have 
personal knowledge of the facts which the Commonwealth alleges 
constitute a violation.  Such testimony can be tested by cross-
examination."  Durling, 407 Mass. at 116-117.  Recognizing that 
was the best practice, the court stated, however, that 
"presenting a witness with personal knowledge is not always 
possible.  Indeed, it is often unrealistic."  Id. at 117.  The 
court then discussed the logistical difficulties posed by 
requiring such testimony, and determined: 
"Unsubstantiated and unreliable hearsay cannot, consistent 
with due process, be the entire basis of a probation 
revocation.  When hearsay evidence is reliable, however, 
18 
then it can be the basis of a revocation.  In our view, a 
showing that the proffered evidence bears substantial 
indicia of reliability and is substantially trustworthy is 
a showing of good cause obviating the need for 
confrontation." 
 
Id. at 118.  Since Durling was issued, we have extended its 
evidentiary standards to juveniles in other contexts, including 
those imposing higher burdens of proof.  See Matter of a Minor, 
484 Mass. at 296, 308 n.8 (commitment of juvenile for substance 
abuse treatment, requiring clear and convincing evidence); 
Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 34-36 (pretrial detention of juvenile 
based on dangerousness, requiring clear and convincing 
evidence). 
 
We reach the same conclusion here, allowing the admission 
of reliable hearsay as defined by the Durling case and its 
successors.  We conclude that application of the Durling 
evidentiary standard in this context appropriately addresses the 
interests at stake and guards against the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of the juvenile's interests.  The high standard of 
proof for a Wallace W. hearing, beyond a reasonable doubt, is 
itself a protection against a risk of erroneous deprivation.  
The better and more reliable the evidence proffered, the greater 
the Commonwealth's ability to meet that burden.  Although 
Durling allows for the admission of hearsay, "the due process 
touchstone of an accurate and reliable determination still 
remains."  Durling, 407 Mass. at 117.  In some circumstances 
19 
there will be "simply no adequate alternative to live 
testimony."  Id. at 119, quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 782 n.5 (1973).  In others, however, hearsay may be 
unavoidable.  As we recognized in Wallace W., securing direct 
testimony to prove first offenses of minor misdemeanors may be 
particularly difficult, especially where the result of such 
proceedings has no direct effect on the victims or other 
witnesses.  Nonetheless, as in Durling, if hearsay is admitted 
at Wallace W. proceedings, it must be reliable, and "the indicia 
of reliability must be substantial" when hearsay is the only 
evidence offered.  Durling, supra at 118.  See Commonwealth v. 
Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 132–133 (2010) (discussing criteria for 
reliability of hearsay).  In allowing reliable hearsay to be 
considered, we have also taken into account that Wallace W. 
proceedings are before a judge, not a jury, therefore all 
evidence, including reliable hearsay, would be presented to and 
evaluated by a judge with experience in assessing evidence and 
its appropriate weight, further protecting a juvenile's 
interests.10  Cf. Given, 441 Mass. at 747-748 (hearsay admissible 
at jury trial pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14).11 
                                                          
 
 
10 Nothing in § 52 or our Wallace W. decision provides for a 
jury in Wallace W. proceedings to prove a first offense. 
 
 
11 The Commonwealth in Manolo M., 486 Mass. at    , 
suggested that we could instead adopt the less rigorous 
standards applicable to pretrial probation revocation hearings 
20 
 
d.  Application of Durling.  While the precise application 
of Durling to this case should be decided by the Juvenile Court 
judge on remand, the parties raise two specific issues that we 
clarify. 
 
First, contrary to the contention of the juvenile, "papers 
alone" could theoretically be sufficient to prove a prior 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, although clearing such a high 
burden with such evidence may be difficult.  In proving a case 
on "papers alone," the indicia of reliability of such hearsay 
evidence must be "substantial," which might, in some cases, 
prove a difficult burden for the Commonwealth to meet.  Durling, 
407 Mass. at 118.  Here, in any case, the Commonwealth did not 
intend to rely solely on papers -- the school records12 -- as it 
                                                          
 
in Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 771 (2020), in 
which we recently held that pretrial probation revocation can be 
assessed without regard to the "full procedural requirements set 
forth in Durling."  Pretrial probation revocation proceedings, 
however, are readily distinguishable.  First, pretrial probation 
is purely a "matter of grace," but Wallace W. hearings are not, 
as they establish jurisdiction; second, the pretrial probation 
burden of proof, probable cause, is lower than the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard in Wallace W.; and finally, the 
liberty interest, being returned to the trial list, is less 
consequential than an adjudication of first offense.  See id.; 
Durling, 407 Mass. at 115. 
 
12 "Evidence which would be admissible under standard 
evidentiary rules is presumptively reliable."  Durling, 407 
Mass. at 118.  On this basis, the Commonwealth contends that the 
school records it wishes to offer as evidence should be 
admissible under the business records exception.  However, 
"evidence based on a chain of statements is admissible only if 
each out-of-court assertion falls within an exception to the 
hearsay rule."  Commonwealth v. McDonough, 400 Mass. 639, 643 
21 
was prepared to present the testimony of three witnesses.  We 
leave to the Juvenile Court judge the assessment whether the 
testimony of these witnesses -- to the extent that it includes 
hearsay evidence -- is sufficiently reliable. 
 
Second, the Commonwealth requests that we clarify whether a 
judge may rule that a victim need not testify at a Wallace W. 
hearing.  In response, the juvenile asserts that the court may 
not bar him from calling witnesses.  We have recognized the due 
process right to present a defense in probation revocation 
proceedings as distinct from the right to confront adverse 
witnesses.  See, e.g., Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 479 (right to 
present defense is distinct from right to confront adverse 
witnesses, and two should not be conflated); Commonwealth v. 
Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 323 (2013) (right to present defense at 
probation revocation hearing).  In Wallace W. hearings, as in 
probation revocation proceedings, the accused has a "presumptive 
due process right to call witnesses in his or her defense, but 
. . . the presumption may be overcome by countervailing 
                                                          
 
n.8 (1987).  To the extent that portions of these records 
contain double hearsay, they are not presumptively admissible 
even if the judge rules that they qualify under the business 
records exception.  See Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 
535, 549 (2011) (admissibility under business records exception 
depends on whether evidence is "sufficiently reliable either 
because there was a corresponding duty [on the supplier of 
information] to give accurate information, or for some other 
recognized reason"). 
22 
interests, generally that the proposed testimony is unnecessary 
to a fair adjudication of the alleged violation or unduly 
burdensome to the witness or the resources of the court."  
Hartfield, supra at 481.  The "flexible" nature of due process 
requires that we balance this presumptive right with 
countervailing interests in the case.  Durling, 407 Mass. at 
113. 
 
Our decision in Hartfield lays out a totality of the 
circumstances test for determining whether countervailing 
interests overcome the presumption, which may also be applied to 
Wallace W. proceedings.  Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 481.  See 
Commonwealth v. Molina, 476 Mass. 388, 407-408 (2017) (applying 
same analysis to restitution hearing).  The third factor in the 
Hartfield test ("whether, based on an individualized assessment 
of the witness, there is an unacceptable risk that the witness's 
physical, psychological, or emotional health would be 
significantly jeopardized if the witness were required to 
testify") is particularly pertinent to the case before us and 
other cases where the alleged victim is a minor.  Hartfield, 
supra.  However, just as in Hartfield we rejected a general rule 
prohibiting an accused from calling an alleged sexual assault 
victim to testify, so here we reject a general rule prohibiting 
a minor from being called to testify.  Id.  The "individualized 
and evidence-based" assessment of the witness must appropriately 
23 
account for the witness's age and the type of delinquent conduct 
alleged against a victim witness in considering potential 
negative effects of testifying.13  Id. 
 
e.  Discovery procedures for Wallace W. hearings.  
Section 52 does not address what discovery procedures, if any, 
are applicable to Wallace W. hearings, and we have not addressed 
this question in Wallace W. or our previous decisions regarding 
§ 52. 
 
The juvenile argues that procedural due process requires, 
at a minimum, that the Commonwealth disclose a list of exhibits 
and witnesses prior to the hearing and that, as in probation 
violation proceedings, the Commonwealth must provide notice and 
disclose all relevant evidence at least seven days prior to a 
Wallace W. hearing.14  See Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-
                                                          
 
 
13 In balancing the need for an accurate and reliable 
determination at a Wallace W. hearing with the potential trauma 
of a necessary child witness, a Juvenile Court judge may make 
reasonable accommodations to avoid trauma to the child.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass. 325, 332 (1986) ("Judges 
have considerable latitude in devising procedures and modifying 
the usual rules of trial to accommodate child and other 
witnesses with special needs, so long as the defendant's . . . 
rights are not violated"); Adoption of Olivette, 79 Mass. App. 
Ct. 141, 152–155 (2011); Adoption of Daisy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 
768, 780 (2010), S.C., 460 Mass. 72 (2011).   These 
accommodations must be fashioned in light of the individualized 
and evidence-based assessment that Hartfield demands, keeping in 
mind the general preference for live testimony.  Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 481. 
 
 
14 Although the timing of notice and disclosures is not 
raised explicitly in the reported question, we address the 
24 
17(IV)(d).  The Commonwealth argues that we need not resolve 
this question, since Juvenile Court judges have broad discretion 
to rule on discovery issues.  See G. L. c. 119, § 55A. 
 
The Juvenile Court Department is authorized to promulgate 
specific notice and discovery rules regarding Wallace W. 
proceedings, see G. L. c. 218, § 60, and we direct it to do so 
here.  The need for clarity and consistency in Wallace W. 
hearings requires that some standard procedure be created, 
rather than an expectation that individual judges fashion an 
entire procedure every time they oversee a Wallace W. hearing, 
as the Commonwealth suggests.  However, as with the evidentiary 
standard, it is appropriate for us to address the minimum 
requirements of due process in a Wallace W. hearing.  We now 
conclude that at a minimum -- consistent with the due process 
principles elucidated in Durling and its progeny -- juveniles 
should be given notice of the charges and the evidence to be 
presented against them so that they can effectively defend 
themselves.  However, the precise timing of such notice and the 
scope of discovery are left to the discretion of Juvenile Court 
judges, and may be governed by the specific rules that the 
Juvenile Court Department should promulgate consistent with this 
opinion.  G. L. c. 218, § 60. 
                                                          
 
question because it is directly related to the due process 
analysis. 
25 
 
As we explained above, we find the due process analysis in 
Durling to be instructive to Wallace W. hearings.  In Durling, 
we recognized that due process requires, among other things, 
"written notice of the claimed violations" and "disclosure to 
the [probationer] of the evidence against him [or her]" 
(citation omitted).15  Durling, 407 Mass. at 113.  We conclude 
that notice and some disclosure are also required in the Wallace 
W. context, in order to protect the juvenile's interests in a 
fair and accurate proceeding and in avoiding improper 
prosecution.  See id. at 116.  Given the flexible nature of such 
proceedings and our recognition that Wallace W. hearings may 
"require[] multiple procedures to identify and prove first 
offenses that have no legal effect other than to establish that 
a first offense has occurred," we leave the exact parameters of 
the timing of notice to the Juvenile Court Department.16  Wallace 
                                                          
 
 
15 Note that unlike in the evidentiary context, where the 
relevant due process issue is the "right to confront adverse 
witnesses," the relevant issue in the discovery context is the 
right to prepare an adequate defense.  See Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 
327 n.12. 
 
 
16 The Juvenile, District, Boston Municipal, and Superior 
Court Departments have promulgated rules or guidelines requiring 
seven days' notice prior to probation hearings.  See, e.g., 
Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-17(III)(b)(iii); Rules 3(b)(iii) 
and 4(d) of the District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation 
Violation Proceedings (2015); Guidelines for Probation Violation 
Proceedings in the Superior Court § 6(A) (effective Feb. 1, 
2016).  These rules requiring seven days' notice of court 
proceedings satisfy due process, but we note that we have never 
stated that due process requires a minimum of seven days' 
26 
W., 482 Mass. at 803.  See Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 
759, 770 (2020) (describing greater temporal interest in 
pretrial probation context, where delay could lead to 
prosecution of stale case). 
Some exchange of discovery is necessary to protect the 
juvenile's interests by providing the juvenile with an 
opportunity to mount an effective defense.  See Durling, 407 
Mass. at 113.  Regarding the scope of disclosures and discovery, 
we have held in the probation context that a probationer must be 
aware of the "specifics of his [or her] allegedly wrongful 
conduct" and the "evidence against him [or her]."  Commonwealth 
v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 197 (1993).  See Juvenile Court 
Standing Order 1-17(III)(b)(ii); Rule 3(b)(ii) of the 
District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings (2015); Guidelines for Probation Violation 
Proceedings in the Superior Court § 3(A) (effective Feb. 1, 
2016).  We recognized that "some cases . . . will require 
disclosure to the probationer of information crucial to his [or 
                                                          
 
notice.  See Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 418 Mass. 352, 360 (1994) 
("Notice must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled 
court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will 
be afforded").  Compare id. at 364-366 (violation of 
probationer's right to due process where he received notice on 
day of hearing and judge denied his motion for continuance), 
with Commonwealth v. Morse, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 582, 586-588 
(2000) (no per se due process violation where probationer 
received only four days' notice and counsel was appointed on day 
of hearing). 
27 
her] ability to prepare a defense," but we also noted that the 
Commonwealth has "significant interests in informality, 
flexibility, and economy" (citation omitted).  Kelsey, 464 Mass. 
at 322, 327-328 (describing totality of circumstances test to 
determine whether Commonwealth was required to reveal identity 
of its informant at probation violation hearing "to effectuate 
the defendant's right to present a defense").  In the probation 
context, the balancing of a probationer's right to present a 
defense with the benefits of a flexible proceeding has taken 
many forms.  See Commonwealth v. Bain, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 724, 
727 (2018) (sufficient notice provided to probationer where 
notice did not state date of alleged incident, but probationer 
was aware of alleged violation, was readily prepared, and could 
have requested continuance); Commonwealth v. Simon, 57 Mass. 
App. Ct. 80, 84–86 (2003) (sufficient notice provided to 
probationer for conduct not included in written notice where 
such conduct was described in attached police report).  The wide 
range of disclosure processes that satisfy due process in the 
probation context is instructive for the context of Wallace W. 
hearings, which must balance similar interests in accuracy, 
efficiency, fairness, and flexibility.  Thus, Juvenile Court 
judges may order disclosures and grant discovery in their 
discretion for a Wallace W. hearing, where it is necessary for 
28 
juveniles to adequately prepare themselves.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 55A. 
This opinion is intended to provide preliminary guidance to 
Juvenile Court judges on the minimum requirements of due 
process.  For greater clarity and predictability going forward, 
the Juvenile Court Department should use its authority to 
promulgate more specific notice and discovery rules consistent 
with this opinion.  G. L. c. 218, § 60. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We conclude that a Wallace W. hearing is 
not necessary in this case, as the Commonwealth may proceed 
directly to arraignment on the major misdemeanor of assault and 
battery.  It may not, however, arraign on the minor misdemeanor 
until it proves the major misdemeanor at trial or, if it so 
chooses, at a Wallace W. hearing. 
 
We answer the reported questions as follows: 
 
1.  Where the juvenile does not move for a prearraignment 
Wallace W. hearing, can the issue be waived?  No:  the failure 
of a juvenile to move for a prearraignment Wallace W. hearing on 
a first offense of a minor misdemeanor does not provide subject 
matter jurisdiction over the first offense, as subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver and can be raised by 
either party or the court at any time. 
 
2.  Do the rules of evidence apply when the court conducts 
a prearraignment Wallace W. hearing?  Specifically, is hearsay 
29 
permitted?  The Durling evidentiary standards are applicable to 
Wallace W. hearings.  Hearsay is only permitted if it is 
reliable, and the indicia of reliability must be substantial if 
the hearsay is the only evidence offered to meet the 
Commonwealth's burden. 
 
3.  Should there be an exchange of discovery prior to a 
prearraignment evidentiary hearing pursuant to Wallace W.?  Due 
process requires that a juvenile receive notice of the alleged 
violation and some disclosure of the evidence against him or her 
prior to a Wallace W. hearing.  The exact nature and scope of 
notice and discovery procedures should be determined by rules 
promulgated by the Juvenile Court Department or, until such 
rules are promulgated, individual Juvenile Court judges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.