Title: Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Clifford Cain, et al. v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 38, September Term, 2020; Tasha 
Gambrell v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 39, September Term, 2020, Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 5-101 – STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
– GENERAL APPLICATION.  Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations 
under Courts & Judicial Proceedings (“CJ”) § 5-101 applies to claims filed by a judgment 
debtor against a judgment creditor for unjust enrichment and money damages under the 
Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) and the Maryland Consumer Debt 
Collection Act (“MCDCA”) related to collection activities arising from the entry of a 
judgment at a time when the judgment creditor was not a licensed collection agency.   
 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – ACCRUAL – CONTINUING HARM DOCTRINE.  
The Court of Appeals declined to apply the continuing harm doctrine to extend the accrual 
period for claims for unjust enrichment and statutory money damages related to a judgment 
creditor’s collection activities, where the wrongful conduct forming the basis of the 
Petitioners’ claims was the debt collector’s licensure status at the time the judgment was 
entered, and where the collection activities occurred after the debt collector obtained its 
license. 
 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION – TOLLING – CLASS ACTION TOLLING OF 
SUCCESSIVE CLASS ACTIONS.  The Court of Appeals declined to expand the 
Maryland class action tolling rule to successive class actions, and instead adopted the 
reasoning and logic of the Supreme Court in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, ___ U.S. ___, 
138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018).   
 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION – TOLLING – CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL CLASS 
ACTION TOLLING.  Maryland recognizes American Pipe class action tolling for absent 
members of putative class actions filed in other state and federal courts.  The same factors 
that we articulated in Christensen for intra-jurisdictional tolling also apply to cross-
jurisdictional class action tolling.  Specifically, in order for the plaintiff to claim the benefit 
of class action tolling in a later-filed individual claim, the plaintiff must show that the class 
action complaint: (1) notified the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought 
against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs; and (2) 
the individual suit must concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject 
matter of the original class action suit.  Cross-jurisdictional class action tolling ends when 
there is a clear dismissal of a putative class action, including a dismissal for forum non 
conveniens, or a denial of class action for any reason. 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPELLATE JURISDICTION – JURISDICTION OVER 
A FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER.  The circuit court’s orders in Cain, which entered 
summary judgment and a declaratory judgment, constituted a final judgment under the 
procedural posture of this case.  The orders completely adjudicated all claims between the 
parties at the time that the judgment was entered.  
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 38 & 39  
September Term, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CLIFFORD CAIN, et al.  
v. 
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TASHA GAMBRELL 
 
v.  
 
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Booth, J. 
McDonald, J., dissents in part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: August 4, 2021 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No.: 24-C-13-004869 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No.: C-02-CV-15-002988  
 
Argued: March 4, 2021 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-10-08 16:42-04:00
 
In the instant cases, we must decide the applicable statute of limitations for claims 
filed by consumer debtors against a consumer debt buyer, Midland Funding, LLC 
(“Midland”), alleging improper debt collection activities in connection with money 
judgments that Midland obtained against the plaintiffs at a time when Midland was not 
licensed as a collection agency under Maryland law.   
These matters originated as two separate putative class action cases that were filed 
against Midland in Maryland circuit courts.  Petitioner Clifford Cain, Jr. filed a putative 
class action against Midland in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on July 30, 2013.  
Petitioner Tasha Gambrell filed a putative class action against Midland in the Circuit Court 
for Anne Arundel County on September 28, 2015.  In both cases, Petitioners allege that 
Midland obtained judgments against the named plaintiffs and similarly situated members 
of the putative classes for consumer debts during a time period when Midland did not have 
a collection agency license under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act 
(“MCALA”).1  Both putative class actions included counts for declaratory judgment 
(seeking a declaration that the judgments obtained by Midland were void), injunctive relief 
preventing Midland from collecting on the judgments in the future, and money damages 
arising from claims for unjust enrichment and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt 
Collection Act (“MCDCA”)2 and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”).3  In 
 
1 Maryland Code, Business Regulation Article (“BR”) §§ 7-101 through 7-502. 
 
2 Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article (“CL”) §§ 14-201 through 14-204.  
 
3 CL §§ 13-101 through 13-501.  
2 
 
both cases, the circuit courts resolved the cases by motion.  In Mr. Cain’s case, the circuit 
court entered an order granting summary judgment to each party in part, and a separate 
declaratory judgment declaring the rights of the parties.  In Ms. Gambrell’s case, the circuit 
court granted Midland’s motion to dismiss.   
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  That court issued an 
unreported opinion in each case.  With respect to Mr. Cain’s case, the Court of Special 
Appeals determined that it had jurisdiction to consider Mr. Cain’s appeal, concluding that 
the circuit court’s summary judgment order and declaratory judgment constituted a final 
judgment.  Aside from that procedural issue, which was unique to Mr. Cain’s case, the 
Court of Special Appeals resolved Mr. Cain’s and Ms. Gambrell’s claims in the same 
manner.  In each instance, the intermediate appellate court held that our decision in LVNV 
Funding LLC v. Finch, 463 Md. 586 (2019) (“Finch III”) resolved the Petitioners’ 
declaratory judgment counts and that under Finch III, the judgments obtained when 
Midland was unlicensed were not void.  The court also held that, since Petitioners’ 
judgments had been satisfied, they were not entitled to injunctive relief because Midland 
was no longer collecting on them.  With respect to the remaining claims seeking restitution 
under an unjust enrichment theory and money damages for the statutory claims, the Court 
of Special Appeals held that the claims were barred by the general three-year statute of 
limitations codified at Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 5-
101.  The court rejected Petitioners’ argument that the claims constituted “actions on a 
judgment” and were therefore subject to a 12-year statute of limitations applicable to 
specialties actions under CJ § 5-102(a)(3).  The court similarly rejected Petitioners’ 
3 
 
assertion that the continuing harm doctrine applied to change the accrual date for their 
unjust enrichment claims.  Finally, the court rejected Petitioners’ argument that the statute 
of limitations was tolled under the class action tolling doctrine based upon Mr. Cain’s 
earlier participation as a putative class member in a federal class action case, and in Ms. 
Gambrell’s case, based upon two would-be class action cases pending against Midland in 
Maryland state courts.  We granted Mr. Cain’s and Ms. Gambrell’s petitions for writ of 
certiorari.4  Because the cases involve the same questions of law, we issue one opinion to 
answer the following questions, which we have rephrased for clarity:  
1. 
Whether Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and money 
damages under the MCPA and MCDCA are subject to the three-year 
general statute of limitations under CJ § 5-101?  
 
2. 
Whether the continuing harm doctrine applies to change the accrual 
date for Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and statutory money 
 
4 The questions presented in Mr. Cain’s petition for writ of certiorari are:  
 
1.  Whether the statute of limitations for actions on judgments under [CJ] 
§ 5-102(a)(3) applied to both parties to the judgment?  
 
2. If the Petitioner’s claims here are not governed by [CJ] § 5-102(a)(3), do 
claims under Maryland’s consumer protection laws concerning the 
continuing unfair, deceptive and wrongful conduct accrue each time a 
damage occurs or a[n] ill-gotten benefit is realized by the wrongdoer?  
 
3. Whether the Federal tolling under 28 [U.S.C.] § 1367(d) or class action 
tolling from a prior Federal action applies to a subsequent Maryland state 
action?  
 
4. Whether the [Court of Special Appeals] had jurisdiction to review the 
Circuit Court’s non-final orders?   
 
Ms. Gambrell’s petition for writ of certiorari presented the identical questions to 
Mr. Cain’s questions 1 and 2.   
4 
 
damages because Midland garnished Petitioners’ wages over a period 
of time after it obtained the judgment?  
 
3. 
Whether the statute of limitations period on Mr. Cain’s individual 
claims was tolled under Maryland’s class action tolling doctrine? 
 
4. 
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations on Mr. 
Cain’s claims asserted in his state court class action based upon his 
earlier participation as a putative class member of a federal class 
action? 
 
5. 
Whether a final judgment was entered by the circuit court in Mr. 
Cain’s action that was therefore reviewable by the Court of Special 
Appeals?  
 
We answer yes to questions one, three and five, and no to question two.  Given our 
holding that Maryland recognizes cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, we determine that 
it is unnecessary to answer question four.  In Ms. Gambrell’s case, we affirm the judgment 
entered by the Court of Special Appeals in both cases in its entirety.  In Mr. Cain’s case, 
pertaining to Mr. Cain’s individual claims, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals in part, and reverse it in part.   
Before we get into the weeds of the instant cases, we start with some background 
and history for context.  This is not the first time that we have addressed debt collection 
activities by consumer debt purchasers like Midland.  It is useful to give an overview of 
the licensing laws that apply to the collection activities that spawned several class action 
cases in both the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and our state 
circuit courts.   
5 
 
I.  
Background 
A. 
Debt-Buying Industry—Unlicensed Collection Activities and Legislative 
Amendments to Regulate Industry 
 
In Finch III,5 we described the emergence of the consumer debt-buying business 
model that was developed in the late 1980s, which has become commonplace in the debt 
collection industry.  Under this new business format, creditors (such as credit card 
companies) sell consumer debt accounts that are in default to bulk purchasers for pennies 
on the dollar, thereby transferring the expense and risk of consumer debt collection efforts 
to the consumer debt purchaser. 
In Maryland, a debt collection agency is required to be licensed.  See the MCALA, 
Md. Code, Business Regulation Article (“BR”) § 7-301(a) (“a person must have a license 
whenever the person does business as a collection agency in the State[]”).  The MCALA 
was enacted by the General Assembly in 1977.6  From its enactment until some 
amendments in 2007, the license requirements focused on persons who were “directly or 
 
5 In order to distinguish between the various decisions related to the Finch litigation, 
we refer to the various cases as follows: Finch v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 212 Md. App. 748 
cert. denied, 435 Md. 266 (2013) (“Finch I”); LVNV Funding v. Finch, No. 1075, 2017 
WL 6388959 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017) (“Finch II”), vacated, LVNV Funding LLC v. 
Finch, 463 Md. 586 (2019) (“Finch III”).  
 
6 We summarized the legislative history of the MCALA in Blackstone v. Sharma, 
461 Md. 87 (2018).  
6 
 
indirectly in the business of collecting for, or soliciting from another, a consumer claim.”  
Finch III, 463 Md. at 603 (emphasis omitted).7   
By 2007, it was apparent to the state regulators, and ultimately, the General Assembly, 
that the new business model did not fit within the existing definition of “collection agency,” 
and debt bulk purchasers were engaging in debt collection activities—filing civil lawsuits, 
obtaining judgments, and engaging in post-judgment collection activities—in the State 
without a license.  Id. at 603–04.  It was estimated that, by 2007, there were approximately 
40 debt purchasers that were engaging in debt collection activities in Maryland without a 
license.8  To close this loophole, at the urging of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation, 
the General Assembly expanded the definition of “collection agency” to include a person 
“who engages directly or indirectly in the business of . . . collecting a consumer claim the 
person owns, if the claim was in default when the person acquired it[.]”  BR § 7-101(d)(1)(ii) 
(the “2007 amendment”).  The 2007 amendment took effect on October 1, 2007.  From that 
date, bulk purchasers of consumer debts “who engaged directly or indirectly in the business 
of collecting consumer debt that they owned and that was in default when they acquired it” 
were required to be licensed.  Finch III, 463 Md. at 604.  
 
7 In Finch III, we pointed out that the 2006 version of the MCALA defined 
“collection agency” in relevant part as a person who “engages directly or indirectly in the 
business of collecting for, or soliciting from another, a consumer claim.” 463 Md. at 603 
(emphasis in original). 
 
8 See Dep’t Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note, House Bill 1324, at 2 (2007) (“The 
department estimates that the bill would make 40 debt purchasers subject to State 
regulation.  Debt purchasers are not currently subject to regulation, as they purchase the 
debt directly from the creditor and are generally compensated as a percentage of their 
recovery.”).  
7 
 
Despite the legislative change that brought bulk consumer debt purchasers within 
the statutory umbrella of the state licensing scheme, some debt purchasers professed 
confusion concerning whether they were required to be licensed in certain instances.  This 
confusion purportedly arose from their reliance on a letter issued in June 2007 by an 
employee of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (“DLLR”) on behalf of 
the Chair of the Collection Agency Licensing Board.  These debt purchasers relied on the 
June 2007 letter as support for the proposition that they were not required to be licensed as 
a collection agency, provided that the collections were handled on their behalf by an 
attorney who was licensed as a Maryland collection agency.9  To address the confusion, in 
May, 2010, the Collection Agency Licensing Board (“Board” or “Licensing Board”) issued 
an advisory notice “clarify[ing] that it has been its consistent position that a consumer debt 
purchaser that collects consumer claims through civil litigation is a ‘collection agency’ 
under Maryland law and required to be licensed as such[.]”  (Some capitalization omitted).  
Notwithstanding the Board’s position on the need for licensing, the Board acknowledged 
the “claims of confusion” arising from the June 2007 letter by some consumer debt 
purchasers in deciding not to become licensed.  In order to facilitate the prompt licensing 
 
9 We summarized the circumstances surrounding the letter, and its contents in Finch 
III.  We noted that the June 2007 letter was written by Kelly Mack, an employee of the 
Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, purportedly on behalf of the Chair of the 
Collection Agency Licensing Board.  Finch III, 463 Md. 586, 604 n.9.  In Finch III, we 
rejected the debt buyer’s reliance on this letter as being inconsistent with both the plain 
language of the MCALA, and the affidavits submitted by the Commissioner of Financial 
Regulation, attesting to the fact that the DLLR and Collection Agency Licensing Board 
had consistently taken the position that consumer debt purchasers who collect debts 
through civil litigation are “collection agencies” that are subject to the licensing 
requirements of the MCALA.  Id. at 604 n.9. 
8 
 
of the unlicensed consumer debt purchasers, the advisory notice stated that the Board 
would not preclude an unlicensed consumer debt purchaser from obtaining a license where, 
prior to September 1, 2010, it engaged in civil litigation to collect a consumer debt, 
provided that: (1) the consumer debt purchaser was represented in the action by an attorney 
who was licensed as a Maryland collection agency; and (2) the consumer debt purchaser 
applied for a license on or before August 31, 2010.  The Board further proclaimed that it 
would not bring an action against a consumer debt purchaser solely for its non-licensed 
status provided it fit within the criteria set forth above.   
After October 1, 2007, the effective date of the 2007 amendment, a multitude of 
lawsuits were filed in both state and federal courts seeking to challenge judgments obtained 
by debt purchasers who were not licensed as a collection agency at the time they obtained 
the judgments, as well as post-judgment collection efforts undertaken by the debt 
purchasers.  We discuss the history of one such legal saga—“the Finch cases”—below.  
We shall explain the Finch litigation in some detail because the Finch cases were decided 
during the pendency of the instant cases, and the lower courts relied upon the various Finch 
holdings in their rulings below.  Moreover, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted, 
our holding in Finch III resolves some of the claims made by the Petitioners here.  
 
B. 
The Finch Cases 
 
Finch III originated as a class action lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City against LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) that resulted in money judgments in favor of 
two named plaintiffs, as well as a separate money judgment against LVNV in the amount of 
$25 million in favor of the class.  LVNV was a debt purchaser that began its debt collection 
9 
 
activity upon its founding in 2005 but did not obtain a collection agency license until 2010.  
During this period, LVNV obtained individual judgments against the named plaintiffs, as 
well as members of the plaintiff class, and engaged in post-judgment collection activity.  The 
plaintiffs alleged that LVNV violated three Maryland consumer protection statutes that 
govern debt collection activity—the MCALA (BR §§ 7-101 through 7-502); the MCDCA 
(CL §§ 14-201 through 14-204); and the MCPA (CL §§ 13-101 through 13-501).  Like the 
Petitioners in this case, the plaintiffs in Finch sought, among other things, a declaration that 
the judgments entered against them in the state District Court in favor of LVNV when it was 
not licensed as a collection agency were void.  Id. at 598.  On LVNV’s motion, the circuit 
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it amounted to an impermissible collateral 
attack on enrolled District Court judgments.  Id.   
In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s 
judgment, holding that the judgments obtained by LVNV when it was not licensed as a 
collection agency were void, and not merely voidable, and could be collaterally attacked 
at any time and in any court.  See Finch I, 212 Md. App. 748.  Upon that ruling, and the 
denial of certiorari by this Court, the case returned to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.  On remand, the case was submitted to a jury on the plaintiffs’ claims of unjust 
enrichment and whether LVNV violated the MCDCA.  The jury awarded damages to the 
named plaintiffs and the class, which was ultimately entered as a judgment in the amount 
of $25 million.  After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unreported 
opinion (“Finch II”), LVNV filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted to 
consider three issues: (1) whether the MCALA was intended to apply to entities such as 
10 
 
LVNV that “passively own” consumer debt but retain licensed collection agencies to 
collect it; (2) whether a judgment in favor of an unlicensed agency is void; and (3) whether 
the lower courts erred in finding a private right of action in the MCALA or MCDCA. 
As to the issue of whether the MCALA applied to LVNV, after examining the plain 
language of the 2007 amendment, as well as the legislative history, we rejected LVNV’s 
argument that the amendment did not apply where the unlicensed agency retains a law firm 
licensed as a collection agency to collect the debt.  We held that, from the date that the 
2007 amendment took effect, “debt buyers who engaged directly or indirectly in the 
business of collecting consumer debt that they owned and that was in default when they 
acquired it needed to be licensed.[]”  Finch III, 463 Md. at 604.  Accordingly, we held that 
LVNV’s collection activity from October 1, 2007 until it obtained a license in February 
2010 was unlawful under the MCALA, MCDCA, and MCPA.  Id. at 606.   
However, we disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in Finch I and 
Finch II, that a judgment obtained by an unlicensed collection agency is void.  In rejecting 
this holding, we explained that “[j]udgments, by and large, are meant to be final.”  Id. at 
607.  Repeating the words expressed by this Court 143 years ago, which have been repeated 
several times since, we pointed out that  
[i]t is most desirable of course that there should be an end to litigation, and a 
judgment is presumed to be a settlement of all matters in dispute in that 
particular case; and once entered, parties are no longer under the necessity of 
preserving the evidences upon which their claims rested. By it new rights are 
acquired, and if stricken out other claims may intervene, and the plaintiff may 
not only lose his lien, but in many cases the entire debt.   
 
11 
 
Id. (quoting Abell v. Simon, 49 Md. 318, 324 (1878)) (additional citations omitted).  We 
explained that, “[i]n furtherance of that principle, the ability to challenge a civil judgment, 
other than by appeal, is limited, even in the court that entered it.  The court that rendered the 
judgment has discretionary revisory power over it for only 30 days.”  Id.  We pointed out 
that, under Maryland Rules 2-535 and 3-535, the judgment becomes “enrolled” on the 30th 
day following its entry, “and after that time, the court may revise it only upon a finding of 
fraud, jurisdictional mistake, or irregularity, which are narrowly construed.”  Id. at 607–08 
(citations omitted).  
In addition to principles of finality, we also observed that our jurisprudence dating 
back to 1824 distinguished “between judgments that were merely voidable because of 
irregularities in the proceeding that produced them and those that were absolutely void ab 
initio.”  Id. at 608 (citing Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 182, 204 (1824)).  We stated that 
[c]ollateral attacks, whether in the court that entered the judgment or in any 
other court, are even more severely limited and are permitted only when the 
court that rendered the judgment had no jurisdiction to do so.  Indeed, there 
are few principles of law that are so firmly and consistently entrenched in our 
jurisprudence, and for good reason.   
 
Id.  (emphasis in original).  We also explained that our holding was not “a matter of blind 
adherence to an outmoded judicial policy[,]” but in recognition that “[e]nrolled judgments 
create important vested rights that not just the parties, but the entire public, have a right to 
rely upon.”  Id. at 611.  Because the District Court “clearly had fundamental jurisdiction 
over the collection actions filed by LVNV, notwithstanding that LVNV had no legal 
authority to file them,” we held that the two lower courts erred in declaring them void.  Id.   
12 
 
Although we determined that the judgments obtained when LVNV was unlicensed 
were not void or otherwise subject to collateral attack, we nonetheless held that the MCALA 
establishes a private remedy for the recovery of “any damages” arising from a violation of 
its statutory provisions, including for emotional distress.  Id. at 612.  Accordingly, we 
remanded the case for further proceedings with respect to damages.  We stated that 
“[a]lthough the District Court judgments may not be collaterally attacked, BR § 7-401, read 
in conjunction with § 7-101(c), would permit declaratory and injunctive relief precluding 
LVNV from taking any action to enforce those judgments and for any damages incurred by 
the plaintiffs as the result of LVNV’s collection efforts.”  Id.  (emphasis in original). 
To summarize our holdings in Finch III, we held that: 
•  As of October 1, 2007—the date that the 2007 amendment took effect—debt 
buyers were required to be licensed before engaging in efforts to collect consumer debt.  
•  Enrolled judgments obtained by an unlicensed debt buyer are not void or subject 
to collateral attack on any ground other than the fundamental jurisdiction of the court that 
entered the judgment to render it.   
•  Although an enrolled judgment obtained by an unlicensed debt buyer is not void, 
a judgment debtor may still have a cause of action under the Maryland consumer protection 
statutes governing debt collection (MCALA, MCDCA and MCPA) for declaratory and 
injunctive relief precluding the debt buyer who obtained the judgment while unlicensed, 
from enforcing those judgments and for any damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result 
of the collection efforts.   
13 
 
In Finch III, we did not consider the issue presented in this case—the applicable 
statute of limitations that applies to a plaintiff’s claims for unjust enrichment and statutory 
monetary damages arising from a debt buyer’s collection activities.10  That issue is 
presented in the instant case.   
C. 
Midland’s Licensing Status  
Like LVNV in the Finch saga, Midland is also an out-of-state debt-buyer11 that 
obtained judgments and pursued debt collection actions at a time when it was not licensed 
in Maryland as a debt collector.  The Board entered an administrative order on September 
16, 2009 requiring Midland and a number of its affiliates to cease and desist collection 
activities in Maryland.  On December 17, 2009, Midland, several of its affiliates, and the 
Board entered into a settlement agreement, whereby Midland agreed to stay all of its active 
collection-related actions and not to file any new collection-related actions in Maryland 
until it was issued a license by the Licensing Board.  The agreement also provided that, 
after it obtained the proper license, Midland could “file appropriate motions in the 
 
10 In Finch III, the respondents filed a cross-petition asking the Court to determine 
whether the subclass members’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  The 
purported subclass consisted of all persons who had paid amounts pursuant to the 
judgments.  Given our remand for a consideration of declaratory and injunctive relief that 
might preclude LVNV from taking prospective action to enforce the judgments, and for 
any statutory damages arising out of LVNV’s collection efforts, we did not reach the statute 
of limitations issue, stating that “[b]ecause of this remand for further proceedings with 
respect to damages, we need not address the issues raised in respondent’s cross-petition.  
If raised again in the Circuit Court, the context may be different.”  463 Md. at 612.  
 
11 Midland is a limited liability company that was organized in Delaware.  Its 
business is to purchase bulk portfolios of past-due consumer debt from lenders for purposes 
of collection.   
14 
 
Maryland state courts or take other appropriate actions in order to have the voluntary stay 
. . . lifted by the courts.”  (Capitalization omitted).  Midland also agreed to pay a penalty in 
the sum of $998,000.  On January 15, 2010, the Licensing Board issued Midland a 
collection agency license. 
 
Midland’s unlicensed debt collection activity included the collection litigation 
against Mr. Cain and Ms. Gambrell that resulted in judgments being entered against them, 
and which ultimately gave rise to the putative class actions filed by them in these cases.  
We describe the nature of the debt collection activity and the resulting putative class action 
litigation below.   
II.  
Procedural History  
A.  
Mr. Cain’s Litigation with Midland  
1. 
Midland’s 2009 Collection Action Against Mr. Cain  
The genesis of Mr. Cain’s dispute with Midland started with a debt collection action 
that was filed against him in 2009.  Midland purchased a portfolio of past-due loans from 
Citibank in January 2009.  One of those loans included an unpaid balance on a credit card 
account owed by Mr. Cain.  On March 30, 2009, Midland filed a collection action against 
Mr. Cain in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City.  Mr. Cain was served 
with the complaint and filed a notice of intention to defend in which he requested a 
postponement of the trial date so that he could obtain counsel.  When the trial was held on 
August 19, 2009, Mr. Cain did not appear.  The District Court entered judgment by affidavit 
in Midland’s favor in the amount of $4,520.54, plus costs.  On September 25, 2009, 
15 
 
Midland received a partial payment of $300 toward the judgment.  On October 29, 2010, 
Midland filed a request for writ of garnishment to collect the remaining balance.  Whether 
through garnishment or other means, the balance due was paid, and Midland filed an order 
of satisfaction on August 8, 2012.  When Midland obtained the judgment, and when Mr. 
Cain made his first payment, Midland was not licensed as a debt-collection agency under 
Maryland law.  Midland’s attempts to collect the judgment through its garnishment efforts 
occurred after it was licensed as a collection agency.   
2. 
Federal Class Action Litigation - Johnson v. Midland  
Midland’s attempts to collect consumer debts without a license spawned class 
action litigation.  On September 10, 2009, a federal civil action was filed against Midland 
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.  See Johnson v. Midland 
Funding, LLC, D. Md. Civil. No. 09-2391.  Mr. Cain was a putative class member of the 
Johnson plaintiffs’ proposed class, which was defined as “all natural persons who reside 
in Maryland and who have been the subject of consumer debt collection efforts by 
Midland within three years immediately preceding the filing of this class action that 
included the filing of an action before a Court of the State of Maryland.”  In June 2010, 
the parties agreed to a settlement of the Johnson case.  As part of the settlement, the 
plaintiff class was narrowed to exclude persons—like Mr. Cain—against whom Midland 
had obtained a judgment.  The federal district court approved the settlement on March 
10, 2011.  The claims that were not included in the settlement were dismissed with 
prejudice.   
16 
 
 
3. 
The Present Action 
Mr. Cain filed the present action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on July 30, 
2013.  The complaint alleges that Midland improperly sought to collect debts as an 
unlicensed collection agency and as a result, the judgments obtained by Midland were void.12  
Rather than filing an individual action, Mr. Cain filed the case as a putative class action, with 
the proposed class consisting of all persons sued by Midland in Maryland courts from 
October 30, 2007 to October 14, 2010, and against whom Midland had obtained judgments.  
Mr. Cain, on his own behalf, and on behalf of members of the putative class, brought three 
counts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (counts I, II and III), including: a declaration 
that Midland was not entitled to interest, attorney’s fees or court costs on his debt or the debts 
of the plaintiff class members because it was acting as an unlicensed debt collection agency; 
a declaration that Midland’s judgment against Mr. Cain (as well as any other judgments 
obtained against members of the putative class) was void; injunctive relief to enjoin Midland 
from engaging in any further collection activities on judgments obtained while it was 
unlicensed; and money damages based on theories of unjust enrichment (count IV) and 
Midland’s statutory violations of the MCALA, MCDCA and MCPA (count V).  
In June 2017,13 Midland filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary 
judgment.  Although Midland presented a number of contentions, only one is pertinent to 
 
12 Given our holding in Finch III, this claim has been adversely decided against 
Petitioners. 
 
13 Between the filing of the complaint and Midland’s filing of its motion to dismiss 
or for summary judgment, the case took a procedural detour to this Court.  As noted above, 
Midland’s original claim against Mr. Cain was based upon his failure to make payments 
17 
 
the present case—specifically, that all counts are time-barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.  Mr. Cain filed an opposition to Midland’s motion, as well as his own motion 
for partial summary judgment.  Relying upon Finch I, 212 Md. App. 748, Mr. Cain argued 
that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on his request for declaratory 
judgment, asserting that the judgment was void because Midland was not licensed in 
Maryland when it obtained its judgment against him.  Mr. Cain also argued that his 
additional claims were not time-barred because the statute of limitations was tolled under 
the class action tolling doctrine recognized by the Supreme Court in American Pipe & 
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and adopted by this Court in Philip Morris 
USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227 (2006), abrogated on other grounds, Mummert v. 
Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207 (2013).   
In July 2017, Mr. Cain filed a motion to compel discovery, asserting that Midland 
had supplied unresponsive answers to interrogatories, which caused him prejudice.  He 
requested that the court order Midland to provide complete responses to any outstanding 
discovery.  Mr. Cain also sent a letter to the court requesting that a hearing be scheduled 
on his motion for class certification, which Midland opposed. 
 
on an overdue credit card balance.  Midland asserted that it was entitled to invoke a 
mandatory arbitration clause contained in the credit card agreement between Mr. Cain and 
Citibank.  The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals agreed with Midland.  We did 
not.  See Cain v. Midland Funding, 452 Md. 141, 163 (2017) (holding that Midland waived 
its right to arbitrate the current claim when it chose to litigate the collection action that it 
initiated against Mr. Cain in 2009).  After holding that the mandatory arbitration provisions 
did not apply, we remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
18 
 
The circuit court held a hearing on September 13, 2017 on Midland’s motion and 
Mr. Cain’s motion for partial summary judgment.  On September 21, 2017, the court issued 
a memorandum opinion and order that granted each motion in part and denied each in part.  
As a result of the memorandum opinion and order, all of Mr. Cain’s individual claims 
contained in the amended complaint were adjudicated.  First, the court determined that, 
based upon the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Finch I, the judgment that Midland 
had obtained against Mr. Cain in 2009 was void, and he was entitled to a declaratory 
judgment vacating that judgment.  The court further determined that neither laches nor the 
statute of limitations applied to that claim.  Second, the court determined that Mr. Cain’s 
claim for unjust enrichment was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in 
CJ § 5-101 and rejected Mr. Cain’s argument that such claims were tolled under a theory 
of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling.  Third, the court concluded that, because the 
judgment against Mr. Cain had been paid and an order of satisfaction had been filed, there 
was no basis to grant the injunctive relief sought by him.   
Consistent with its September 21 opinion and order, the court entered a separate 
declaratory judgment in favor of Mr. Cain in the principal amount of $4,520.54 plus $60 in 
costs and post-judgment interest.  The court further ordered that the original judgment 
entered in favor of Midland and against Mr. Cain in the District Court be vacated.  The order 
was docketed the following day, on September 22, 2017.  The clerk indexed the judgment, 
entering a $4,520.54 “money judgment” against Midland on September 29, 2017. 
We pause here for a moment to discuss the purported claims that another individual, 
Cassandra Murray, attempted to raise in this proceeding.  On September 21—the same date 
19 
 
that the court signed the order and declaratory judgment—Mr. Cain filed an amended 
complaint, which sought to add Cassandra Murray as a second plaintiff.14  
 
Midland and Mr. Cain and Ms. Murray filed motions to alter or amend the court’s 
September 21 opinion and order.  Mr. Cain and Ms. Murray’s motion to alter or amend 
asserted that the court’s opinion and order failed to address: (1) Ms. Murray’s claims; (2) 
the putative class claims; or (3) that the case was to be closed.   
The court denied all the parties’ motions to alter or amend by an order entered on 
October 24, 2017.  Midland’s motion is not relevant to the issues presented here, other than 
to note that, in denying Midland’s motion, the court accepted Mr. Cain’s argument that the 
12-year limitations period set forth in CJ § 5-102(a)(3) applied to Mr. Cain’s statutory 
claim that Midland’s act in obtaining a judgment against him while it was unlicensed was 
void.  Addressing Ms. Murray’s claims, the court pointed out that the amended complaint 
was filed on September 21—the same date that the court issued its memorandum opinion 
and order.  The court further noted that Mr. Cain moved for summary judgment 
“individually and on behalf of a class and subclass of similar persons” on July 7, 2017—
several months before Ms. Murray attempted to join the case as a plaintiff.  The court also 
 
14 Ms. Murray, through Mr. Cain’s counsel, previously filed a class action lawsuit 
against Midland in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  The case was later removed 
to federal court.  The federal court decided part of the case against Ms. Murray on the same 
limitations issue presented in this case, remanded a portion of the case to state court, and 
certified questions to this Court.  See Murray v. Midland Funding, LLC, Case No. JKB-15-
0532, 2015 WL 4994212 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2015).  Ms. Murray dismissed her remaining 
federal claims, which eliminated this Court’s need to answer the certified question.  Ms. 
Murray ultimately dismissed her state court claims pending in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County on August 5, 2017.  The amended complaint purporting to add her to this 
case was filed six weeks later.   
20 
 
stated that Ms. Murray’s claims were not argued at the hearing on September 13, and 
therefore, the “court did not have the opportunity to opine on Ms. Murray’s hypothetical 
claims.”  Finally, the court stated that it “was not aware that such claims existed until after 
the [o]rder was issued.”   
 
With respect to the plaintiff’s motion to certify the class, the court noted that it 
expressly declined to rule on that motion at the September 13 hearing, and specifically stated 
at the hearing that the request would be forwarded to the judge assigned to determine class 
certification.  The court noted that, although the clerk inadvertently closed the case after the 
entry of the memorandum opinion and order, the matter was reopened and consequently, the 
plaintiff’s motion as it pertained to the improper closure of the case was moot.   
 
Midland filed a timely notice of appeal.  After a delay pending this Court’s decision 
in Finch III, the Court of Special Appeals requested supplemental briefing, followed by oral 
argument.  In an unreported opinion, after determining that the circuit court’s summary 
judgment and declaratory judgment orders constituted a final appealable judgment, the Court 
of Special Appeals held that Mr. Cain’s claims for monetary damages were time-barred; that 
Finch III resolved Mr. Cain’s requested declaration that the judgments were void; and that 
Mr. Cain’s claim for injunctive relief had no basis because Midland’s judgment against Mr. 
Cain had been satisfied before Mr. Cain filed this lawsuit.  Midland Funding, LLC v. Cain, 
No. 1805, Sept. Term, 2017, 2020 WL 4370888 at *15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 30, 2020).  
Mr. Cain petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.  
21 
 
B.  
Ms. Gambrell’s Litigation with Midland  
 
1. 
Midland’s 2008 Collection Action Against Ms. Gambrell 
On July 14, 2008, Midland, through counsel, filed a breach of contract action against 
Ms. Gambrell in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County.  Midland’s 
complaint was served on Ms. Gambrell on August 17, 2008.  The trial took place on 
October 8, 2008, and the court entered a judgment against Ms. Gambrell in the amount of 
$2,420.97, plus $141.68 in prejudgment interest and $60.00 in costs.  Ms. Gambrell 
subsequently made a partial payment in the amount of $251.32 on November 30, 2009.   
It is undisputed that Midland did not have a collection agency license when it filed 
the lawsuit against Ms. Gambrell and obtained the judgment against her.  As noted above, as 
part of the settlement agreement between Midland and the Licensing Board, the Board 
authorized Midland to collect on pre-licensure judgments after it became licensed.  On 
January 15, 2010, Midland obtained a license.  Once it was licensed, and because the 
judgment against Ms. Gambrell was not satisfied, Midland’s attorneys requested a writ of 
garnishment, which was issued on December 5, 2011.  Midland’s attorneys requested a 
second writ, which they signed on September 17, 2012.  The writ noted that, as of September 
17, 2012, the sum of $2,216.32 had been paid toward Ms. Gambrell’s judgment and that the 
remaining amount due was $437.07.  The judgment was fully paid.  Ms. Gambrell did not 
allege, nor do the docket entries reflect, any collection efforts by Midland after 2012.   
 
2. 
The Present Action 
 
On September 28, 2015, Ms. Gambrell filed a putative class action against Midland 
in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  In 2016, she filed an amended complaint, 
22 
 
which is the operative complaint.  In it, she alleged that Midland’s failure to have a debt 
collection license in 2008 rendered the judgment Midland obtained against her “void and 
unenforceable.”  She asserted the following five claims, all based on Midland’s licensure 
status: unjust enrichment (count I); a claim for disgorgement of all funds collected by 
Midland through its efforts to enforce the judgment while unlicensed in violation of the 
MCDCA, and the MCPA (count II); a similar claim based on Midland’s alleged violations 
of the MCALA and the common law action of money “had and received” (count III); a 
declaratory judgment that Midland’s judgment against her was void and unenforceable, 
together with an injunction against Midland’s attempts to enforce the judgments in the 
future (count IV); and declaratory and injunctive relief against Midland’s attempting to 
collect pre- and post-judgment interests and costs (count V).  As to each count, Ms. 
Gambrell also sought class certification to encompass “[t]hose persons sued by Midland in 
Maryland state courts from October 30, 2007 [against] whom Midland obtained a judgment 
for an alleged debt, interest or costs, including attorney’s fees[.]”15  
 
Midland filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Gambrell’s amended complaint, arguing, in 
pertinent part, that all counts are time-barred and fail to state claims upon which relief can 
be granted, that Ms. Gambrell could not attack a judgment obtained in the District Court in 
a different county, that Ms. Gambrell’s claims are not justiciable, and that its post-licensure 
collection activities were authorized by the State Licensing Board.  Ms. Gambrell filed an 
opposition to Midland’s motion.   
 
15 Ms. Gambrell also sought a subclass certification consisting of “those members 
of the [c]lass from whom Midland collected . . . any sum on the judgment.”   
23 
 
 
The court held a hearing on Midland’s motion, at the conclusion of which the court 
issued its ruling from the bench.  As to Ms. Gambrell’s unjust enrichment, statutory and 
disgorgement claims (counts I, II and III), the court concluded that the Court of Special 
Appeals’ decision in Jason v. National Loan Recoveries, 227 Md. App. 516 (2016), 
controlled and that a three-year statute of limitations applied to those claims.  The court 
determined that those claims accrued “when the defendant filed the collection action 
against the plaintiff as the defendant’s unlicensed status was a matter of public record and 
[the Licensing Board] had issued an advisory notice requiring collection agents to be 
licensed two years prior to the commencement of that action,” and therefore, that the 
limitations period had run in 2011.  Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed these counts 
with prejudice.  With respect to the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief counts 
(counts IV and V), the court determined that it lacked authority to issue the declaratory 
relief and dismissed those counts without prejudice.16   
 
Ms. Gambrell noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  After arguments, 
the case was stayed pending our decision in Finch III.  After additional briefing and oral 
argument, the Court of Special Appeals issued an unreported opinion affirming the circuit 
court’s decision.  Gambrell v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 1939 Sept. Term, 2016, 2020 
WL 4371297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 30, 2020).  The intermediate appellate court 
determined that Ms. Gambrell’s claims for money damages (counts I, II and III) were 
 
16 The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County concluded that if Ms. Gambrell 
wished to challenge a judgment entered by the District Court, sitting in Montgomery 
County, she must do so pursuant to that court’s power under Maryland Rule 3-535, and, if 
that fails, she may seek declaratory relief in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.   
24 
 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations under CJ § 5-101, and that her claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief (counts IV and V) were resolved by our decision in Finch 
III.  Ms. Gambrell petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.   
III. 
Standard of Review 
 
Under Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2), a defendant may seek dismissal of a complaint if 
the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  “A motion to 
dismiss is properly granted if the factual allegations in a complaint, if proven, would not 
provide a legally sufficient basis for the cause of action asserted in the complaint.”  Wheeling 
v. Selene Finance LP, 473 Md. 356 (2021).  Whether a motion to dismiss was properly 
granted or not is a legal question.  This Court reviews legal questions de novo, with no 
deference given to the trial court.  See Lamson v. Montgomery County, 460 Md. 349, 360 
(2018).  In doing so, the Court “must assume the truth of all relevant and material facts that 
are well pleaded and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from those pleadings.”  
Barclay v. Castruccio, 469 Md. 368, 373–74 (2020) (quoting Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
397 Md. 108, 121 (2007)).  A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations 
presented do not state a cause of action.  Id. at 374. 
 
Regarding Mr. Cain’s case, on review of a court’s grant of summary judgment, we 
must first determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.  Koste v. Town of 
Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 24–25 (2013).  If not, we determine whether the circuit court correctly 
entered summary judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 25.  The standard of review of a circuit 
court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment is de novo.  Id. 
25 
 
IV. 
Discussion 
As discussed above, the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that our 
holding in Finch III applies to the Petitioners’ claims seeking a declaratory judgment that 
Midland’s judgments against them are void.  The Court of Special Appeals also held that 
the circuit court correctly dismissed the injunctive relief claims because the judgments 
were paid and orders of satisfaction were filed, and accordingly, there was no basis upon 
which to grant injunctive relief.  The Petitioners did not seek our review of these holdings.   
The only issues before us involve whether Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment 
and for statutory damages under the MCDCA and the MCPA are time barred, and whether 
a final appealable judgment was entered in Mr. Cain’s case.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion that the blanket three-year 
statute of limitations applies to such claims.  We agree that Ms. Gambrell’s claims are time-
barred.  As set forth herein, we recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling with 
respect to Mr. Cain’s individual claims.  Based upon the application of class action tolling, 
we determine that Mr. Cain’s claims are not time-barred.  
A. 
Accrual of Claims 
Before we discuss the applicable statute of limitations, we briefly recount the circuit 
courts’ respective determinations concerning the date that Mr. Cain’s and Ms. Gambrell’s 
claims for damages accrued.  We have said that the question of when an action accrues is 
one left to judicial determination.  Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 
76, 95 (2000).  In Maryland, we apply the “discovery rule” in civil actions in determining 
26 
 
when the statute of limitations begins to accrue on a claim.  Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 
Md. 631 (1981).  Under the discovery rule, a claim accrues when the plaintiff “knew or 
reasonably should have known of the wrong.”  Id. at 636.   
Although neither party has sought review of the circuit courts’ determinations of the 
respective accrual dates, we briefly discuss the issue given that any limitations period runs 
from that date.  With respect to Mr. Cain’s claims, the circuit court concluded that his 
claims for money damages accrued for limitations purposes when Midland received its first 
payment on the judgment, which was on September 25, 2009.  The Court of Special 
Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s accrual determination, and Mr. Cain did not seek 
review of this issue.17  Mr. Cain filed suit on July 30, 2013—more than three years after 
the claim accrued.   
With respect to Ms. Gambrell’s claims, the circuit court determined that Ms. 
Gambrell’s claims accrued on July 14, 2008, which is the date Midland filed its collection 
action against her.  The circuit court concluded that Midland’s “unlicensed status was a 
matter of public record and [the Licensing Board] had issued an advisory notice requiring 
 
17 Although Mr. Cain did not seek review of the circuit court’s determination of the 
accrual date and the Court of Special Appeals’ affirmance of the same, Mr. Cain asserts in 
his brief that he has “no memory of making the alleged payment.”  Mr. Cain does not 
provide any record citation for this statement, and he never raised this issue by way of 
argument or affidavit.  By contrast, with its motion for summary judgment, Midland 
attached business records pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) establishing that Midland 
received a $300 partial payment from Mr. Cain on September 2009, along with an October 
29, 2010 writ of garnishment reflecting “total credits” of $300.00.  As the Court of Special 
Appeals aptly stated, if Mr. Cain did not make the September 25, 2009 payment, “the 
proper way for him to establish a dispute of fact would have been for him to file an affidavit 
or other evidence to that effect.  At best, he has raised a ‘metaphysical doubt,’ which is 
insufficient.”  Cain, 2020 WL 4370888, at *6.   
27 
 
collection agents to be licensed two years prior to the commencement of that action.”  
Ms. Gambrell filed her lawsuit on September 28, 2015, almost seven years after the 
District Court entered judgment against her on October 8, 2008, and nearly six years after 
Ms. Gambrell made a partial payment to Midland on November 30, 2009.  The Court of 
Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination of Ms. Gambrell’s accrual date, 
concluding that her statutory cause of action for money damages accrued when she was 
placed on inquiry notice of Midland’s wrongdoing and “[a]t the very latest, this occurred 
when Midland received its first payment on the judgment.”  Gambrell, 2020 WL 4371297, 
at *4.  Ms. Gambrell did not seek review from this Court of the circuit court’s accrual 
determination, which was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.  
Although neither party sought review of the accrual date established by the circuit 
court, like the Court of Special Appeals, we determine that Ms. Gambrell’s and Mr. Cain’s 
claims accrued at the latest when Midland received its first payments on the judgments.  
By making the payments, they were clearly on notice of the judgment that had been entered 
against them, and had the ability to determine whether Midland was licensed at the time of 
the entry of the judgments—information that was a matter of public record.18  Establishing 
the accrual date for the Petitioners’ claims as the date that they made their first payment is 
consistent with the discovery rule established by our Court in Poffenberger, 290 Md. 631.  
In Crowder v. Master Financial, Inc., 176 Md. App. 631, 657–58 (2007), aff’d in part, 
Master Financial, Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 (2009), in determining that the borrowers’ 
 
18 See http://www.dllr.state.md.us/financce/industry/licsearch.shtml.  
28 
 
claims under the MCPA were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, the Court of 
Special Appeals explained that: 
The relevant inquiry for the purpose of determining when a cause of action 
accrued under the discovery rule is when a plaintiff knew or reasonably 
should have known of the operative facts giving rise to the cause of action, 
not whether a plaintiff had knowledge of the applicable law.  Neither 
ignorance of the law nor failure to consult an attorney to inquire about one’s 
legal rights will expand the period of limitations within which suit must be 
filed.  
 
(internal citations omitted).  As of the date that they made payments on their judgments, 
the Petitioners had the ability to ascertain, through due diligence and based upon matters 
of public record, whether Midland was licensed at the time that it obtained the judgments.   
Given that Petitioners’ claims were filed more than three years after their respective 
accrual, they are barred by the three-year statute of limitations unless: (1) an alternative 
limitations period applies; (2) it was extended under a continuing harm theory; or (3) it was 
tolled.   
B. 
The Default—Three Year Statute of Limitations 
As we have made clear on several occasions, the default statute of limitations for civil 
actions at law in Maryland, codified at CJ § 5-101, is three years, unless another provision 
of the Code expressly provides for an alternative limitations period.  See, e.g., AGV Sports 
Grp., Inc. v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., 417 Md. 386, 392 (2010); Greene Tree Home Owners 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453, 459–61 (2000).  The three-year default 
statute was enacted in 1973 as part of one of the first articles of the Maryland Code that was 
adopted as a result of Governor Marvin Mandel’s Commission to Revise the Annotated Code 
that was created in 1970.  In Tipton v. Partner’s Management Co., 364 Md. 419 (2001), we 
29 
 
described the derivation of the general blanket statute.  We need not repeat that history here, 
other than to note that it “was enacted as a broad three-year limitation provision for the 
purpose of avoiding confusion and providing clarity.”  Tipton, 364 Md. at 441.   
The language of the three-year limitations statute remains unchanged from its initial 
enactment and states: “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date 
it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within 
which an action shall be commenced.”  CJ § 5-101.  In Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, 
LLC, 454 Md. 680, 691 (2017), we explained that “[s]tatutes of limitations are designed to 
balance the competing interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and the public.”  We stated that a 
statutory period of limitations 
represents a policy judgment by the Legislature that serves the interest of a 
plaintiff in having adequate time to investigate a cause of action and file suit, 
the interest of a defendant in having certainty that there will not be a need to 
respond to a potential claim that has been unreasonably delayed, and the 
general interest of society in judicial economy. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  This balance is struck “primarily to assure fairness to defendants 
on the theory that claims, asserted after evidence is gone, memories have faded, and 
witnesses disappeared, are so stale as to be unjust.”  Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 
426 Md. 185, 205 (2012) (quoting Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 367 (1966)).   
Although statutes of limitations are not sacrosanct, see Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692, 
the Court does not craft exceptions to limitations periods without compelling reasons.  We 
apply a “strict construction regarding tolling of statutes of limitations” and, therefore, 
“absent legislative creation of an exception to the statute of limitations, we will not allow 
any ‘implied and equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.’”  Anderson v. United States, 
30 
 
427 Md. 99, 120 (2012) (quoting Hecht v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 333 Md. 324, 333 (1994) 
(citations omitted)); see also Minh-Vu Hoang v. Lowery, 469 Md. 95, 126 (2020) (noting 
the “well established principle” of “narrow construction of statutes of limitations”); Garay 
v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 359 (1993) (describing narrow construction of statutes of 
limitations as a “well established principle”) (citations omitted).  
 
As noted above, Petitioners’ claims are for unjust enrichment and money damages 
for violations of the MCPA and MCDCA.  We have previously held that a claim for unjust 
enrichment that seeks the remedy of restitution of money is subject to the general three-
year statute of limitations.  See Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 379 Md. 669, 698 (2004).  We 
have also held that a claim for money damages under the MCPA is subject to the three-
year statute of limitations.  See Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 (2009); Greene 
Tree Home Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453 (2000).  
Notwithstanding our application of the three-year statute of limitations to similar claims 
for money damages, Petitioners assert that their claims fall within the 12-year statute of 
limitations applicable to specialties actions because their claims constitute an “action on a 
judgment” under CJ § 5-102(a)(3).  For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.   
C. 
12-Year Statute for Specialties Actions “On” a Judgment 
The General Assembly has legislated several exceptions to the three-year limitations 
period.  One such exception is the statute of limitations that is applicable to specialties 
actions, set forth in CJ § 5-102, which states:  
(a) An action on one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years 
after the cause of action accrues, or within 12 years from the date of the death 
of the last to die of the principal debtor or creditor, whichever is sooner: 
31 
 
 
 
(1) 
Promissory note or other instrument under seal; 
 
(2) 
Bond except a public officer’s bond;  
(3) 
Judgment; 
(4) 
Recognizance;  
(5) 
Contract under seal; or  
(6) 
Any other specialty.   
 
Petitioners rely exclusively on the specialty addressed in CJ § 5-102(a)(3), which 
provides for a 12-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action on [a] . . . judgment.”  
Petitioners assert that, because Midland’s wrongful conduct involved the entry of a 
judgment, their claims for unjust enrichment and money damages arising under the MCPA 
and MCDCA are subject to the 12-year statute of limitations applicable to specialties 
actions.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument by relying on two reported 
cases of that court which addressed this very issue.  Cain, 2020 WL 4370888, at *7 (citing 
Jason v. Nat’l Loan Recoveries, LLC, 227 Md. App. 516, 527–34 (2016); Murray v. 
Midland Funding, 233 Md. App. 254, 259–60 (2017)).  In Jason, the Court of Special 
Appeals rejected an identical argument made by a similarly situated plaintiff who filed a 
claim against a debt buyer who had obtained a judgment against him when it was not 
licensed as a collection agency.  Id. at 527–34.  The intermediate appellate court held that 
the 12-year statute of limitations for specialty actions on a judgment—CJ § 5-102(a)(3)—
did not apply to the plaintiff’s claims for unjust enrichment nor to his claims for damages 
arising out of alleged violations of the Maryland consumer protection statutes.  Id.  Instead, 
the court in Jason determined that such claims fell within the general three-year statute of 
limitations.  Id. at 531.  The Court of Special Appeals reiterated these holdings in Murray.  
233 Md. App. at 259–60.  In the case at hand, the intermediate appellate court simply 
32 
 
applied its own precedent.  Unsurprisingly, Petitioners contend that the Court of Special 
Appeals’ holding in Jason is incorrect.  This is our first opportunity to address the issue.19  
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the analysis undertaken by our colleagues 
in Jason and hold that Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and monetary damages 
arising under the MCPA and MCDCA fall within the blanket three-year statute of 
limitations under CJ § 5-101 and are not actions “on a judgment” pursuant to CJ § 5-
102(a)(3) subject to the 12-year statute of limitations for specialties actions.   
When undertaking an exercise in statutory interpretation, we start with the cardinal 
rule of statutory interpretation—to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s purpose 
and intent when it enacted the statute.  75-80 Properties, L.L.C. v. RALE, Inc., 470 Md. 598, 
623 (2020).  To discern the intent of the General Assembly, our analysis begins with the 
normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.  Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 
275 (2010).  “We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in 
the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with 
‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.”  Id.  (citations omitted).  
If the statutory language is clear and consistent with its apparent purpose, our inquiry 
ordinarily ends, and we apply the statute as written.  Id.  As we stated in Lockshin:  
We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we 
confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the 
isolated section alone.  Rather, the plain language must be viewed within 
the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the 
purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.  We 
 
19 No petition for writ of certiorari was filed following the Court of Special Appeals’ 
opinion in Jason v. Nat’l Loan Recoveries, LLC, 227 Md. App. 516 (2016) nor its opinion 
in Murray v. Midland Funding, LLC, 233 Md. App. 254 (2017).   
33 
 
presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a 
consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and 
harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the 
statute’s object and scope. 
   
Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous 
when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a 
larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching 
for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation 
or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.  
In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how 
it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and 
legal effect of various competing constructions.   
 
In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one 
that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.   
 
Id. at 275–76 (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, both parties assert that the language of the specialties statute applicable 
to “[a]n action on [a] . . . judgment” is plain and unambiguous.  Petitioners assert that the 
plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3) does not limit the actions covered to a creditor’s 
enforcement of a judgment.  Instead, they assert that the General Assembly intended to 
establish a 12-year limitations period for any action that involves the entry of a judgment.  
Because Petitioners’ claims are based upon judgments that Midland obtained when it was 
unlicensed, they assert that their claims falls within the plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3).  
Unsurprisingly, Midland contends that the only reasonable reading of the plain language 
of CJ § 5-102(a)(3) is the interpretation adopted by the Court of Special Appeals in Jason—
which is that an action “on” a judgment is an action seeking to enforce a judgment.  
Notwithstanding the parties’ assertions that the language plainly and 
unambiguously supports their respective positions, we shall conclude that the language is 
34 
 
ambiguous.  We reach this conclusion because Petitioners’ interpretation of the phrase 
“action on a judgment,” when read in isolation, might arguably be considered to be a 
reasonable interpretation, given that their claims are centered around judgments that 
Midland obtained when it was unlicensed.  See Koste, 431 Md. at 30–31 (determining that 
a statute was ambiguous notwithstanding the parties’ mutual assertion of unambiguity 
because two reasonable interpretations could be reached when the phrase in question was 
read in isolation).  However, Petitioners’ plain language interpretation becomes untenable 
when viewed in the context of the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its 
purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of the competing construction. 
We start with the plain language of the specialties statute, which is that a 12-year 
statute of limitations applies to a specialties “action on [a] judgment.”  CJ § 5-102(a)(3).  
At issue is the definition or meaning of the preposition “on” and whether it means an action 
“involving” a judgment or whether it means an action to “enforce” a judgment.  In order to 
determine the legislative intent, we must read the language of the statute—providing for a 
12-year limitations period for an “action on a judgment”—in context and in relation to all 
its provisions.  Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Adm’r, Motor Vehicle Admin., 286 Md. 104, 108 
(1979).  Looking at the structure of the statute, although the statute does not define 
“specialty,” it lists several types of specialties actions, upon which rights are granted.  The 
wording of the statute indicates that it applies to “an action on one of the following 
specialties,” which includes an action to enforce a promissory note or other instrument 
under seal, a judgment, a contract under seal, etc.  Given the nature of the specific list of 
35 
 
specialties identified, it is clear that the statute is intended to apply to an action to enforce 
rights granted by a specialty.   
This interpretation is consistent with our application of the statute in our case law.  
See, e.g., Goodwin & Boone v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 346 Md. 153 (1997) (action by a 
franchisor against a franchisee based upon an agreement under seal governed by the 12-
year statute of limitations); McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155 (1944) 
(applying the 12-year statute of limitations for initiation of an action to collect “on” a sealed 
promissory note); Johnson v. Foran, 59 Md. 460, 461–63 (1883) (noting that execution 
cannot be issued more than 12 years after the date of the judgment).  In Rentals Unlimited, 
Inc., we remarked that, “[i]n Maryland, money judgments may be enforced by various 
methods including a new action on a judgment[.]”  286 Md. at 113 (emphasis added).  In 
O’Hearn v. O’Hearn, 337 Md. 292 (1995), we held that a former wife’s action against her 
former husband for reimbursement of their children’s medical and dental expenses fell 
within the 12-year specialties statute because the parties’ separation agreement was 
incorporated into the divorce decree, and therefore, the claims were a suit “on a judgment.”  
In other words, the wife was seeking to enforce the terms of the separation agreement, the 
obligations of which had been incorporated into the divorce judgment.  Id. at 301.  By 
contrast, Petitioners are not seeking to enforce a judgment—quite the opposite—they are 
seeking a declaration that the judgments obtained against them are void (a declaration that 
is no longer available given our holding in Finch III) and money damages arising from the 
entry of the judgments against them.  
36 
 
Our interpretation of the statute as providing a 12-year statute of limitations on a 
specialties action to enforce a judgment is also confirmed by its legislative history.  The 
present statute, CJ § 5-103, is a recodification of former Md. Code (1957), Article 57, § 3, 
which provided:  
No bill, testamentary, administration or other bond (except sheriff’s and 
constables’ bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute merchant, or other staple 
or other specialty whatsoever, except as shall be taken for use of the State, 
shall be good and pleadable, or admitted in evidence against any person in 
this State after the principal debtor and creditor have both been dead twelve 
years, or the debt or thing in action is above twelve years standing . . . . 
 
(Emphasis added).  The language in the original specialties statute clearly contemplated a 
12-year statute of limitations for actions on a judgment brought against a judgment debtor.  
There is nothing in the prior version of the statute that could be construed to establish a 12-
year statute of limitations for a judgment debtor to assert a claim against a judgment 
creditor for a matter arising out of the entry of a judgment.  As we explained in detail in 
Tipton, the 1970 Code Revision process was not intended to, and did not change the 
substantive meaning of this section.  364 Md. at 437–45.   
 
Our interpretation of the plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3)—as establishing a 12-
year statute of limitations only to enforce a judgment and not establishing the same period 
to challenge a judgment—is consistent with principles of finality expressed by the Supreme 
Court and by this Court for over a century.  In Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., Justice 
Harlan Stone explained the difference between “a cause of action on a judgment” and an 
“action upon which the judgment was entered” as follows:   
A cause of action on a judgment is different from that upon which the 
judgment was entered.  In a suit upon a money judgment for a civil cause of 
37 
 
action, the validity of the claim upon which it was founded is not open to 
inquiry, whatever its genesis.  Regardless of the nature of the right which 
gave rise to it, the judgment is an obligation to pay money in the nature of a 
debt upon the specialty.  Recovery upon it can be resisted only on the grounds 
that the court which rendered it was without jurisdiction.  
 
296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935).  In Finch III, we expressed similar sentiments.  We observed 
that “[j]udgments, by and large, are meant to be final.  Even the court that rendered them 
has but a limited ability to open and revise them.”  463 Md. at 607.  Citing to our case law 
dating back 141 years, which has been repeated several times since, we noted that  
“[i]t is most desirable of course that there should be an end to litigation, and 
a judgment is presumed to be a settlement of all matters in dispute in that 
particular case; and once entered, parties are no longer under the necessity of 
preserving the evidences upon which their claims rested.”   
 
Id. (citing Abell v. Simon, 49 Md. 318, 324 (1878)).  To interpret the specialties statute as 
providing a 12-year statute of limitation for a debtor to challenge a judgment, or activities 
related to the entry of the judgment, runs contrary to the very principles we recently 
expressed in Finch III concerning the finality of judgments.   
By contrast, the competing construction—that the General Assembly would 
establish a longer limitations period only to enforce a judgment—is consistent with the 
general purpose of collection laws, which enable judgments to be paid over a longer time 
period thereby ensuring that payment is not unduly burdensome to a judgment debtor.  A 
money judgment is valid for 12 years from the date of entry or its most recent renewal.  See 
Maryland Rule 2-625.  Once a money judgment is entered, the law provides several 
collection tools at the judgment creditor’s disposal, such as discovery in aid of enforcement 
(see Maryland Rule 2-633) and a garnishment of the judgment debtor’s wages (see CL §§ 
38 
 
15-601 through 15-606).  These laws also protect a debtor’s rights during the post-
judgment collection process.  Our societal standards have evolved from the colonial 
practice of imprisoning debtors for nonpayment of debts20 to the enactment of laws that 
limit a judgment creditor’s ability to attach a judgment debtor’s wages over a statutorily 
established amount per pay period.21  These protections give a judgment debtor some 
breathing room to pay debts over time (of course, at a cost in the form of post-judgment 
interest), and correspondingly, the specialties statute gives a judgment creditor a longer 
time period for the collection of payment on the judgment.  
Finally, we conclude that Petitioners’ interpretation would also create illogical 
results.  In other contexts, we have rejected arguments that statutory claims for money 
damages fall within other categories of the 12-year specialties statute instead of the three-
year default statute.  For example, as noted above, in Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n v. 
Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453 (2000), we held that a claim based on the MCPA did 
not constitute a specialty action within the purview of CJ § 5-106(a)(6) (which includes 
“[a]ny other specialty”) and were therefore subject to the three-year period of limitations 
provided for in CJ § 5-101.  In Master Financial, Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 (2009), we 
held that the three-year statute of limitations governed claims brought by borrowers against 
their lenders for deceptive trade practices under the MCPA where the alleged underlying 
 
20 See Md. Const., art. III § 38, which establishes a constitutional ban against 
imprisonment of debtors.  
 
21 See CL §§ 15-601–606.   
39 
 
conduct involved lack of licensure in violation of the Secondary Mortgage Loan Law.22  
See also NVR Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen, 439 Md. 427 (2014) (holding that a violation 
of a provision of the Maryland Finder’s Fee Act, CL § 12-805(d) is subject to the default 
three-year statute of limitations and is not an “other specialty” under CJ § 5-102(a)(6)); 
AGV Sports Group, 417 Md. 386 (holding that a private cause of action under the State 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act did not fall within the “any other specialty” category 
for statute of limitations purposes and that such claims were subject to the three-year 
 
22 In Greene Tree and Crowder, the plaintiffs alleged that their claims for money 
damages under the MCPA fell within CJ § 5-102(a)(6), which establishes a 12-year statute 
of limitations for an action on “[a]ny other specialty.”  Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n 
v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453 (2000); Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 
(2009).  We rejected these arguments and determined that the three-year default statute of 
limitations applied.  In Crowder, we offered a “workable general principle” for determining 
when a statutory action falls within the “any other specialty” category under CJ § 5-
102(a)(6).  The framework has the following criteria:  
 
(1) the duty, obligation, prohibition, or right sought to be enforced is created 
or imposed solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not otherwise 
exist as a matter of common law; (2) the remedy pursued in the action is 
authorized solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not otherwise 
exist under the common law; and (3) if the action is one for civil damages or 
recompense in the nature of civil damages, those damages are liquidated, 
fixed, or, by applying statutory criteria, are readily ascertainable.  
 
Crowder, 409 Md. at 70.  Applying this framework to the plaintiff’s claims for violations of 
the Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (“SMLL”) and the MCPA, we determined that the 
applicable statutory provisions of the SMLL provided for civil penalties for violations of its 
provisions, and that the damages were for a fixed determinable amount.  Accordingly, we 
concluded that SMLL-based claims fell within the “narrow catchall” that is the “[a]ny other 
specialty” provision.  Id. at 72.  By contrast, we determined that an action for unliquidated 
damages under the MCPA did not constitute a statutory specialty and was therefore subject 
to the three-year default statute of limitations.  In this case, Petitioners do not allege that their 
statutory claims for money damages under the MCPA and MCDCA fall within the “other 
specialty” exception under CJ § 5-106(a)(6), presumably because of our holding in those 
cases.   
40 
 
blanket limitations statute).  It would be illogical to apply a strained interpretation to the 
specialties statute and hold that a 12-year limitations period applies to claims under the 
MCPA for unlicensed collection activities that result in the entry of a judgment, but only 
apply a three-year limitations period to claims for similar conduct that by happenstance, 
does not result in the entry of a judgment.  
 
In summary, we hold that the 12-year statute of limitations under CJ § 5-102(a)(3) 
is intended to apply to an action to enforce a judgment.  Because the Petitioners are not 
seeking to enforce a judgment, but rather, are seeking money damages resulting from 
Midland’s efforts to collect the judgment, CJ § 5-102(a)(3) does not apply and such claims 
are subject to the default three-year statute of limitations under CJ § 5-101.   
D. 
Continuing Harm Doctrine 
To avoid the three-year limitations bar to their claims, the Petitioners also contend 
that the continuing harm doctrine applies to change the accrual date for their claims since 
they made multiple payments to Midland over a period of time.  To support their argument, 
Petitioners rely upon this Court’s application of the continuing harm doctrine in Litz v. 
Maryland Department of Environment, 434 Md. 623 (2013).  Midland argues that this 
Court should not apply the continuing harm doctrine in these cases, pointing out that the 
Court has not applied the doctrine outside of the context of claims for nuisance and trespass 
where the conduct was continuing in nature.  Midland also asserts that the application of 
the doctrine is particularly inappropriate under the facts of these cases—noting that neither 
41 
 
Petitioner alleges that Midland’s post-judgment collection activities occurred during a 
period when it was not licensed.   
The continuing harm doctrine permits recovery by an injured party caused by a 
tortfeasor’s sequential breaches of an ongoing duty by imposing a new limitations period 
for each breach.  Litz, 434 Md. at 649.  As the Court of Special Appeals explained in 
rejecting its application here, the doctrine is usually applied in nuisance, trespass, and other 
tort cases.  We examine the Maryland cases where the doctrine has been discussed, and the 
limited contexts in which it has been applied.  
In Shell Oil Company v. Parker, 265 Md. 631 (1972), the owner of an independently 
owned and operated Shell Oil service station filed suit against Shell Oil Company (“Shell”) 
after Shell constructed a billboard that falsely stated that another service station was the 
last Shell station on a highway.  The independently owned station was in fact the last station 
on the highway.  The owners alleged that the false message on the billboard forced them 
out of business.  They filed an action in the circuit court claiming that Shell had erected the 
false sign “for the specific purpose of diverting business from the independently owned 
service station . . . to the company owned service station of Shell and that the action was 
part of an intentional and malicious plan to divert such business[,]” which they asserted 
was “illegal, deceitful and fraudulent[.]”  Id. at 635–36 (cleaned up).  Shell erected the sign 
in 1962 or 1963.  Id. at 634.  The owners of the independently owned station filed suit in 
November 1968.  Id. at 635.  With no discussion or analysis, we determined that the station 
owner’s “rights were continuing in nature and were not barred by the three year [s]tatute 
42 
 
of [l]imitations for the continuing violation during the three year period prior to the filing 
of the action.”  Id. at 636.   
In MacBride v. Pishvaian, 402 Md. 572 (2007), we discussed the continuing harm 
doctrine in the context of a suit brought by a tenant against a landlord alleging claims for 
unfair and deceptive trade practices, fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and unjust 
enrichment.  In that case, the tenant argued that the continuing harm theory should apply 
to extend the accrual date for limitations purposes, where the condition of her apartment 
continued to deteriorate over time.  Id. at 576.  At the commencement of the lease in 1998, 
the apartment was “nice and clean,” although the tenant “noticed water spots on the ceiling 
and a suspicious odor.”  Id.  Subsequently, during heavy rains, water would soak the 
ceiling, walls and carpet.  The tenant also discovered a mold problem, and eventually 
moved out in November 2004.   
In seeking to avoid the limitations bar, the tenant argued that her claims involved 
“an ongoing harm, in particular, the deteriorating condition of her apartment.”  Id. at 585.  
We noted that this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have recognized the “continuing 
harm” doctrine, “which tolls the statute of limitations in cases where there are continuous 
violations.”  Id. at 584 (citing Shell Oil, 265 Md. at 636; Edwards v. Demedis, 118 Md. App. 
541, 562 (1997); Duke St. Ltd. P’ship v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Calvert Cty., 112 Md. App. 
37, 50 (1996)).  Although we pointed out that the Maryland appellate courts had previously 
recognized the doctrine, we also observed that we had “not [] found a reported opinion, in 
either this Court or the intermediate appellate court, involving an application of the doctrine 
of continuing harm.”  MacBride, 402 Md. at 584 n.7 (cleaned up).  We were unpersuaded 
43 
 
by the tenant’s argument that the doctrine should apply to the facts presented in her case, 
concluding that her “complaints are merely the continuing ill effects from the original 
alleged violation,” and not a “series of acts or course of conduct . . . that would delay the 
accrual of a cause of action to a later date.”  Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations 
omitted).23   
In contrast to MacBride, we applied the doctrine in Litz, which involved a property 
owner’s complaint for negligence, nuisance, trespass and inverse condemnation.  The 
plaintiff alleged that the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE), a county health 
department, and a municipality, by their inactions, failed to enforce state regulations and a 
consent order to address failing individual septic systems within the vicinity of the 
plaintiff’s property.  Over time, the effluent from the failing septic systems leached into 
the ground water and caused plaintiff’s private lake to become contaminated to the point 
that she was unable to operate her private campground and pay her mortgage and, as a 
result, caused her property to be sold in a foreclosure sale.  We applied the continuing harm 
doctrine and held that the plaintiff had pleaded a sufficient injury to withstand dismissal of 
her claims because the complaint alleged that the defendants, by their inactions, caused a 
continuous physical invasion of polluted effluent onto the plaintiff’s property, which was 
allegedly causing a continuous injury over an extended period of time.  Id.  We explained 
 
23 As the Dissent correctly notes at Slip Op. 6, in Litz, we disavowed part of the dicta 
in the MacBride opinion that stated that the continuing harm doctrine would not toll the 
statute of limitations if the plaintiff “sooner knew or should have known of the injury or 
harm.” Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 647–48 n.9 (2013); Id. at 586 
(internal quotations omitted).  
44 
 
that the doctrine is premised on the notion that, where the violation or the wrongful act is 
ongoing or continuing in nature (as opposed to the continued ill effects from the original 
alleged violation), the ongoing violations will not be barred by the statute of limitations 
merely because one or more of them occurred earlier in time.  Id. at 646.  
In Duke Street v. Board of Commissioners of Calvert County, the Court of Special 
Appeals rejected the argument that the continuing harm doctrine should apply to a 
constitutional takings claim arising from an allegation that the plaintiff was coerced into 
deeding land for a public street, explaining that, “[w]hile there may have been continuing 
ill effects from the original alleged violation, there was not a series of acts or course of 
conduct by [the defendant] that would delay the accrual of a cause of action to a later date.” 
112 Md. App. 37, 52 (1996) (emphasis in original).  
We are not persuaded to apply the continuing harm doctrine under the facts of this 
case to extend the accrual date for Petitioners’ claims based upon payments that they made 
to Midland during the period after which Midland became licensed.  As discussed above, 
we have only applied the doctrine in limited contexts involving ongoing wrongful 
conduct—in the case of Shell Oil, which involved an ongoing fraud arising from a false 
statement erected on a billboard, and in the case of Liz, involving an ongoing trespass and 
nuisance.   
Here, the wrongful conduct that forms the basis of Petitioners’ claims is Midland’s 
unlicensed status when it filed the collection actions and obtained the judgments against 
the Petitioners.  Although Midland was unlicensed at the time that it obtained judgments 
against Mr. Cain and Ms. Gambrell, Midland subsequently entered into the settlement 
45 
 
agreement with the Licensing Board on December 17, 2009, whereby Midland agreed to stay 
all collection-related actions until it was issued a license.  The Licensing Board issued Midland 
a collection agency license on January 15, 2010.  The collection activities upon which 
Petitioners seek to extend their accrual date for limitations purposes occurred after Midland 
became licensed.  We decline to apply the continuing harm doctrine where the alleged 
continuing harm is Midland’s attempts to collect on the judgments after it became licensed.  
See Finch III, 463 Md. at 606 (observing that LVNV’s collection activities were unlawful 
under MCALA, MCDCA and MCPA “until it obtained its license in February 2010 . . .”) 
(emphasis added).24  
 
E.  
Class Action Tolling 
Mr. Cain’s next argument25 requires that we decide whether the limitations period 
was tolled during the pendency of class action cases that were filed prior to the cases that are 
 
24 The Dissent contends that our refusal to apply the continuing harm doctrine to 
extend the accrual date for limitations purposes is inconsistent with our holding in Finch 
III.  Dissent Slip Op. at 2–3.  It is not.  Although we stated in Finch III that a judgment 
creditor could be barred by injunction from engaging in prospective enforcement action 
and could liable for damages under the MCDCA and MCALA, as explained in note 10, 
supra, we specifically declined to address the statute of limitations defense presented in 
that case, and left the issue open for the circuit court to consider on remand.  See Finch III, 
463 Md. at 612 (“Because of this remand for further proceedings with respect to damages, 
we need not address the issues raised in respondent’s cross petition.  If raised again in the 
Circuit Court, the context may be different.”).  In addition to declining to address the 
limitations issue, we observed that LVNV’s collection activity was unlawful under the 
MCALA, MCDCA and MCPA “until it obtained its license in February 2010[.]” 463 Md. 
at 606 (emphasis added).  
 
25 Ms. Gambrell did not raise class action tolling in her petition for writ of certiorari.  
Accordingly, we shall only consider the application of the doctrine to Mr. Cain’s claims.  
See Robinson v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 424 Md. 41, 49 (2011).  Even if we were to 
consider the application of the doctrine where it was not raised in her petition for writ of 
46 
 
the subject of this appeal.  Mr. Cain contends that we should apply our class action tolling 
rule, described below, to toll the applicable statute of limitations on his claims filed in the 
instant case for a time period equal in duration to the pendency of the federal Johnson case 
(wherein he was a putative class member).  Midland asserts that our class action tolling 
doctrine does not apply to toll claims filed by a former member of a putative class action 
who files a successive class action, as opposed to an action for individual claims.  Midland 
also points out that this Court has not adopted cross-jurisdictional class action tolling—in 
other words, the tolling of individual claims that are filed in a Maryland court by a former 
putative member of a class action that was pending in federal court or another state court.  
Before we address the specifics of the parties’ class action tolling contentions, it is 
useful to briefly discuss our general limitations on judicial expansion of statutes of 
limitations established by the Legislature.  We have previously explained that:  
Statutes of limitation are intended simultaneously to provide adequate time 
for diligent plaintiffs to file suit, to grant repose to defendants when plaintiffs 
have tarried for an unreasonable period of time, and to serve societal 
purposes, including judicial economy.  There is no magic to a three-year 
limit.  It simply represents the legislature’s judgment about the reasonable 
time needed to institute suit.   
 
certiorari, Ms. Gambrell has not made clear onto which class actions she should be 
permitted to piggyback.  In her brief, Ms. Gambrell appears to assert that she was a putative 
member of Mr. Cain’s class action.  In her appeal before the Court of Special Appeals, Ms. 
Gambrell asserted that the running of the statute of limitations on her claims for money 
damages was tolled by two pending class actions—the Cain case that is the subject of this 
matter, as well as the case of Murray v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 02-C-14-187207, filed 
in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on April 24, 2014, which we briefly 
discussed in note 14, supra.  As noted, Ms. Murray voluntarily dismissed her state court 
case on August 5, 2017.  In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Gambrell only alleged that she 
should have the benefit of tolling from the Murray Action “and other related actions against 
Midland.”  We will not consider these vague assertions where she did not raise them in her 
petition for writ of certiorari.   
47 
 
 
Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 209 (2012) (cleaned up) (quoting 
Bragunier Masonry Contractors v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 368 Md. 608, 627 (2002)).  Such 
statutes “are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the 
just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable delay.”  Walko Corp. v. Burger 
Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207, 210 (1977) (quoting Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 
U.S. 304, 314 (1945)).   
Recognizing that the Legislature has exercised its judgment in determining the 
reasonable time needed to institute suit, we have adopted few judicial tolling exceptions.  
See Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 359 (1993) (noting the general rule that “where 
the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the 
court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it”) (citation 
and quotation omitted).   
In Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361 (1966), we recognized a judicial tolling 
exception where a case was filed timely, but in the incorrect forum (based upon the 
plaintiff’s mistaken belief that the defendant lived in Baltimore County rather than 
Baltimore City).  In a later case, Walko Corp., we further explained the rationale behind 
the narrow exception to the general rule against implying exceptions to the statute by 
explaining that, at the time, Maryland was one of few states to have neither a saving statute 
nor a venue transfer statute—“a fact which, absent the Court’s limited holding, might well 
have wrought great injustice on unwitting plaintiffs in particular cases.”  281 Md. at 214.   
48 
 
In this case, Mr. Cain contends that this Court should apply a judicial tolling 
exception based upon class action tolling.  The concept of “class action tolling” is rooted 
in two decisions of the Supreme Court, which this Court adopted in Philip Morris USA, 
Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 238 (2006), abrogated on other grounds, Mummert v. 
Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207 (2013).  Accepting Mr. Cain’s application of the doctrine would 
require that we expand the Maryland class action tolling rule that we pronounced in 
Christensen in two ways: first, we would apply the rule not just to individual claims filed 
by a putative class member after class action certification was denied, but also to successive 
class action suits; and second, we would expand the rule to include cross-jurisdictional 
claims (in order words, where the initial putative class action was filed in federal court or 
in another state court).  As explained below, we are unwilling to expand our class action 
tolling doctrine to include successive class actions and instead adopt the approach taken by 
the Supreme Court in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, ___ U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018).  
In order to explain our unwillingness to expand the class action tolling doctrine to 
successive class actions, it is useful to briefly discuss its origin and purpose. 
1. 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence Establishing Class Action Tolling for 
Intervenor Claims and Individual Claims 
 
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), the Supreme 
Court first set forth the conceptual basis for class action tolling.  That case originated as a 
class action, but eventually the federal district court ruled that the number of possible 
plaintiffs who could assert meritorious claims was not large enough to warrant class action 
status.  Id. at 543.  After the court’s order denying class action certification, more than sixty 
49 
 
local government entities in the State of Utah moved to timely intervene as individual 
plaintiffs in the still-pending action, shorn of its class character.  All of them had been 
identified in the class action complaint as members of the proposed class.  The federal 
district court denied the motions on the ground that the relevant statute of limitations had 
expired for the would-be intervenors.   
The Supreme Court determined that the district court erred and set forth the 
conceptual basis for class action tolling in the context of federal class action litigation.  The 
Court observed that the federal rule governing class actions, Rule 23, was intended to 
promote efficiency and economy of litigation.  Id. at 553.  The Court concluded that tolling 
was necessary because, without a rule that tolls the statute of limitations, members of the 
putative class would be forced to file protective motions to join or intervene in the action 
in order to ensure that they would not be barred from bringing suit individually in the event 
the court determined that the action could not be maintained as a class action.  Id. at 553–
54.  Thus, the Court concluded as follows:  
We are convinced that the rule most consistent with federal class action 
procedure must be that the commencement of a class action suspends the 
applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who 
would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class 
action.[]   
 
Id. at 554.  Despite its adoption of the tolling rule, the Court narrowly expressed its holding 
as follows:  
We hold that in this posture, at least where class action status has been denied 
solely because of failure to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable,’ the commencement of the original 
class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class 
50 
 
who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit 
inappropriate for class action status.  
 
Id. at 552–53.  The issue in American Pipe was whether putative members of the proposed 
plaintiffs’ class could intervene in the case once the class certification was denied.  In 
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), the Court considered whether 
the filing of a putative class action tolled the statute of limitations for putative class 
members who filed individual claims after class certification was denied rather than timely 
intervened in the original action.  The Court held that American Pipe applied to toll the 
statute of limitations for the individual claims of putative class members filed after denial 
of class certification in the same manner as claims for intervenors.  Id. at 350–51.  The 
Court explained that the extension of American Pipe to later-filed individual claims was 
necessary for the same reasoning articulated for intervenors’ claims—to avoid 
inefficiencies that would arise if individual putative class members were required to file 
individual protective claims in the class action litigation.  Id.  The Court articulated many 
reasons that a plaintiff may prefer filing an individual claim over intervention: the putative 
class member may choose to file in a more convenient forum than the forum of the original 
putative class action, the putative class member may not wish to share control of the 
litigation with the other plaintiffs in the original action, and if intervention is not available 
as a matter of right, the plaintiff runs a risk of the denial of its motion to intervene under 
Federal Rule 24(b).  Id. 
51 
 
 
 
2. 
Maryland’s Adoption of the American Pipe Class Action Tolling Rule  
 
Both American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal involved the application of Federal 
Rule 23, which allowed for the tolling of the statute of limitations for federal claims filed 
in federal court following the denial of class certification.  In Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 
we addressed whether Maryland would adopt the class action tolling rule articulated by the 
Supreme Court in American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal for intra-jurisdictional claims—
that is, individual claims filed in Maryland state court by a former member of a putative 
class after the denial of class action certification by another Maryland state court.  (For 
simplicity’s sake, we shall refer to the Supreme Court rule as articulated in American Pipe 
and extended by Crown, Cork & Seal, as the “American Pipe class action tolling rule.”).   
In Christensen, Mr. Christensen had been a participant in a putative class action that 
was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against defendant manufacturers of tobacco 
and their Maryland distributors.  Although Mr. Christensen was not a named plaintiff nor an 
intervenor in the class action suit, he participated in the litigation, including testifying at a 
de bene esse deposition.  Id. at 234.  After the circuit court issued a class certification order, 
we granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus in the class action and issued a 
writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate the class certification order.   
 
After Mr. Christensen died, his wife brought a survival and wrongful death action 
against the defendants who had also been defendants in the putative class action litigation.  
The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that 
the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  We granted certiorari to determine 
whether, and under what circumstances, the pendency of a putative class action tolls the 
52 
 
statute of limitations for the members of a putative plaintiff class that were not the named 
plaintiffs in the action.  Id. at 231.   
 
In ultimately holding that we would adopt the American Pipe class action tolling rule, 
we made several observations and conclusions.  First, we noted that our “precedents 
generally have been less than hospitable to the concept of judicially created tolling 
exceptions[.]”  Id. at 237.  Citing to Bertonazzi, we observed that we had been willing to 
judicially establish a tolling exception when doing so would be consistent with the purposes 
of statutes of limitations.  We identified, for the first time, two factors which guide our 
consideration of whether to apply judicial tolling in a particular case.  Specifically, we stated 
that  
we will recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations if, and only if, 
the following two conditions are met: (1) there is persuasive authority or 
persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling 
exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the 
generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations. 
 
Id. at 238.  We noted the several instances in which we declined to recognize a tolling 
exception to a statute of limitations where the exception in question failed to meet one or 
more of the Bertonazzi requirements.26  Id. at 240–41. 
 
26 See, e.g., Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207 (1977) (declining 
to recognize a tolling exception to the three-year statute of limitations on tolling actions 
where the appellant argued that the statute was tolled during the pendency of its motion to 
intervene in another suit involving the appellee in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia); Booth Glass Co., Inc. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615 (1985) 
(declining to recognize a tolling exception to suspend the running of a statute of limitations 
applicable to a claim based upon the negligent installation of a product during the installer’s 
attempted repair where the defendant installer did not hold out an inducement not to file 
suit or indicate that limitations would not be pleaded); Burket v. Aldridge, 241 Md. 423, 
428 (1966) (declining to recognize a tolling exception that would toll the general three-
53 
 
 
We concluded that in this instance, our adoption of the American Pipe class action 
tolling rule met both the Bertonazzi requirements.  First, we noted that the Supreme Court’s 
principal justification for the American Pipe class action tolling rule was its necessity for the 
preservation of the class action procedures set forth in Federal Rule 23.  We observed that 
our class action rule—Maryland Rule 2-231—was modeled after Federal Rule 23, and that 
the aspects of the federal rule that were principally relied upon by the Supreme Court in 
reaching its holding in American Pipe are virtually identical to subsections (a) and (b) of 
Maryland Rule 2-231.  We observed that the majority of states with class action rules similar 
to Federal Rule 23 have followed the American Pipe class action tolling rule.  Id. at 250–51.   
 
Ultimately, we found the principal rationale offered by the Supreme Court in 
American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal to be persuasive—that one of the main reasons for 
having a class action procedure in the first place is to promote judicial economy and 
efficiency.  Id. at 253 (citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553).  We observed that “[c]lass 
action procedures are designed to promote these ends by preventing duplication, permitting 
when possible the claims of large classes of persons to be litigated at once[,]” as opposed 
to individual claims “or as a joint action in order to avoid unnecessary repeated litigation 
 
year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions upon the alleged tortfeasor’s death 
because the absence of an express statute provision providing for such tolling was 
understandable in “light of the purposes of [the] Statute of Limitations”); McMahan v. 
Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 159–60 (1944) (declining to recognize a tolling 
exception to a 12-year statute of limitations for initiation of an action to collect on a note 
that would suspend the running of the statute upon a payment of principal on the grounds 
that the statute expressly provided for a three-year suspension upon each payment of 
interest, observing that the Legislature had expressly indicated when and how payments on 
a note should suspend the running of the limitations period).   
54 
 
of substantially similar issues, and to avoid the procedural inefficiencies involved with the 
joinder of large numbers of parties and with the litigation of joint actions involving large 
numbers of parties.”  Id. at 253–54.  We noted that the “ends of efficiency and economy” 
are undermined where members of a putative plaintiff class “have a genuine incentive to 
file prophylactic motions to intervene or individual complaints in order to prevent their 
claims being barred by the statute of limitations.”  Id. at 254.  With principles of judicial 
economy and efficiency in mind, we agreed with the American Pipe Court that, “in the 
absence of a class action tolling rule, putative class members will . . . have a sufficiently 
strong incentive to file protective claims to justify adoption of a class action tolling rule.”  
Id.  We also agreed with the Crown, Cork & Seal Court’s conclusion that the same 
principles of judicial economy and efficiency compelled the application of the tolling rule 
to putative class members who chose to pursue later-filed individual claims in the event 
that class action certification is denied.  Id.  
 
In order to ensure that our adoption of the American Pipe class action tolling rule was 
consistent with the Bertonazzi factors outlined for judicial recognition of tolling exceptions 
in Maryland, we added some additional notice restrictions.  Specifically, we held that, in 
addition to the requirements outlined in American Pipe, in order for the plaintiff to claim the 
benefit of class action tolling in a later-filed individual claim, the plaintiff must show that 
the class action complaint: (1) “notified the defendants of not only . . . the substantive claims 
being brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential 
plaintiffs[;]” and (2) “the individual suit must concern the same evidence, memories, and 
witnesses as the subject matter of the original class suit[.]”  Id. at 255–56 (internal quotations 
55 
 
omitted).27  We stated that “[c]laims as to which the defendant was not fairly placed on notice 
by the class suit are not protected under American Pipe[.]”  Id. at 250.  We added these 
additional requirements in observance of our “long recognized . . . policy considerations in 
favor of strict application of statutes of limitations” and our adoption of tolling exceptions 
only where they are consistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations.  Id. at 256.  
Finally, in Christensen, we pointed out that we were expressing “no opinion as to whether 
we would recognize the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, under which the 
filing of a putative class action in a different jurisdiction tolls the statute of limitations for 
putative class members to file individual claims” in Maryland.  Id. at 256 n.9.  We further 
observed that “the supreme courts of states that recognize class action tolling have split on 
the issue of whether to adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling.”  Id.  With this case, we pick up our 
discussion on cross-jurisdictional class action tolling where we left off in Christensen.  But 
first, we address Mr. Cain’s argument that we should extend American Pipe class action 
tolling to successive class action cases.   
 
 
3. 
We Decline to Adopt Successive Class Action Tolling  
 
As previously noted, Mr. Cain’s claims are different from the claims that were tolled 
in Christensen, which involved the application of the American Pipe class action tolling 
rule to individual claims asserted by the personal representative of a former putative 
 
27 The additional requirements that we identified in connection with our adoption of 
the American Pipe class action tolling rule were the views expressed by Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence in American Pipe (as to our additional requirement (1)) and by Justice 
Powell’s concurrence in Crown, Cork & Seal (as to our additional requirement (2)).  See 
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 255–56 (2006).   
56 
 
member of a class after an unsuccessful class certification.  Here, Mr. Cain seeks the 
application of class action tolling to successive class action suits.  In China Agritech, the 
Supreme Court declined to extend the American Pipe class action tolling rule to seriatim 
class action suits.  Just as we find the Supreme Court’s logic persuasive in its application 
of class action tolling to later-filed individual claims under the American Pipe class action 
tolling rule, so too are we equally informed by the Court’s logic in refusing to extend the 
doctrine to claims involving successive class action suits.  Because these matters involve 
questions of state law, we are not bound by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this 
topic.  However, we find the Court’s reasoning to be persuasive and shall follow it.   
 
In China Agritech, the Supreme Court addressed the following question: “Upon 
denial of class certification, may a putative class member, in lieu of promptly joining an 
existing suit or promptly filing an individual action, commence a class action anew beyond 
the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations?”  ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. at 1804.  
The Court’s answer was no, and it concluded that:  
American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of a 
putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action 
individually or file individual claims if the class fails.  But American Pipe 
does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration 
of the statute of limitations.   
 
Id.   
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that the principles of “efficiency 
and economy of litigation” that support tolling of individual claims “do not support [the] 
maintenance of untimely successive class actions[.]”  Id. at 1806.  The Court noted that 
successive class action suits “would allow the statute of limitations to be extended time 
57 
 
and again; as each class is denied certification, a new named plaintiff could file a class 
complaint that resuscitates the litigation.”  Id. at 1808.  The Court observed that  
[t]he time to file individual actions once a class action ends is finite, extended 
only by the time the class suit was pending; the time for filing successive 
class suits, if tolling were allowed, could be limitless. . . . Endless tolling of 
a statute of limitations is not a result envisioned by American Pipe.[]   
 
Id. at 1809.  The Court concluded by stating that:  
The watchwords of American Pipe are efficiency and economy of litigation, a 
principal purpose of Rule 23 as well.  Extending American Pipe tolling to 
successive class actions does not serve that purpose.  The contrary rule, 
allowing no tolling for out-of-time class actions, will propel putative class 
representatives to file suit well within the limitation period and seek 
certification promptly.  For all the above-stated reasons, it is the rule we adopt 
today: Time to file a class action falls outside the bounds of American Pipe. 
 
Id. at 1811.  We can express these sentiments no better than Justice Ginsburg and adopt the 
China Agritech Court’s logic and reasoning.  Applying these principles within the context 
of our Maryland tolling jurisprudence, we determine that adopting successive class action 
tolling would be inconsistent with the Bertonazzi factors.  There is no persuasive authority 
or policy considerations that would support the recognition of tolling of successive class 
action suits—such an exception is inconsistent with notions of judicial economy and 
efficiency that form the basis of our Rule 2-231 class certification process.28  Additionally, 
 
28 The Supreme Court’s concerns that multiple class action lawsuits may attempt to 
piggyback off each other for tolling purposes appears to be prophetic here.  As Midland 
noted in its brief, after the settlement of Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, D. Md. Civil. 
No. 09-2391, which is discussed in Part II.A.2 of this opinion, three class action suits were 
filed by the same counsel—Mr. Cain’s putative class action, filed in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City; Ms. Gambrell’s putative class action, filed in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County; and Cassandra A. Murray v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 02-C-14-
187207, filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (the “Murray Action”).  In her 
Amended Complaint, Ms. Gambrell alleges that she should have the benefit of the tolling 
58 
 
adopting such a rule would be antithetical to the generally recognized purposes of the 
statute of limitations—“to encourage prompt resolution of claims, to suppress stale claims, 
and to avoid the problems associated with extended delays in bringing a cause of action, 
including missing witnesses, faded memories, and the loss of evidence.”  Anderson, 427 
Md. at 118.  To permit tolling based upon successive class action suits could result in a 
“rolling tolling” approach to class action suits, whereby a putative class member could toll 
his or her statute of limitations after the denial of one class action certification in one circuit 
court by filing a successive class action in one of the other 23 state circuit courts.  Such an 
approach would be anathema to the notions of judicial economy and efficiency that the 
class certification process envisioned by Maryland Rule 2-231.  Accordingly, we hold that 
American Pipe class action tolling does not apply to permit a putative class member, upon 
denial of class certification, to file a successive class action past the expiration of the statute 
of limitations.  
4. 
We Adopt Cross-Jurisdictional Class Action Tolling for Later Filed 
Individual Claims 
 
 
At this stage of the pleadings, Mr. Cain’s complaint involved his individual claims, 
as well as those brought on behalf of the putative class that has not yet been certified.  Our 
above holding causes the putative class claims to fall to the wayside.  This leaves Mr. 
Cain’s individual claims.  His individual claims only survive if we recognize cross-
 
from the Murray Action “and other related cases against Midland.”  We decline to extend 
class action tolling to successive class action cases, which would encourage this rolling 
approach to the tolling of claims and would defeat the very purpose behind Maryland Rule 
2-231—the efficient and timely resolution of class action claims.  
59 
 
jurisdictional class action tolling for later filed individual claims—in other words, whether 
a class action filed in another jurisdiction tolls the applicable Maryland statute of limitations 
for later-filed individual claims after the denial or dismissal of the putative class members’ 
claims in another jurisdiction.   
As previously noted, our opinion in Christensen expressed no opinion on whether 
we would recognize the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling.  394 Md. at 
254 n.9.  We pointed out that our sister states that have considered the issue are split on its 
recognition.  Id.29  In the years since our 2006 decision in Christensen, we note that several 
of the supreme courts in our sister states have adopted cross-jurisdictional tolling.  See, 
e.g., Bermudez Chavez v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 158 N.E.3d 93, 104 (2020) (“In sum, 
New York recognizes American Pipe tolling for absent class members of putative class 
actions filed in other state and federal courts.”); Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 368 
P.3d 959, 960 (Haw. 2015) (“We hold that the filing of a putative class action in another 
 
29 In Adedje v. Westat, Inc., 214 Md. App. 1 (2013), the Court of Special Appeals 
considered the issue and declined to apply cross-jurisdictional class action tolling to an 
employees’ individual claim for overtime wages under the Maryland Wage Payment and 
Collection Law after she had participated in a class action case in federal court where her 
claim was dismissed.  After discussing the split in authority in other states concerning 
adoption of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, and acknowledging the lack of 
Maryland precedent addressing the issue, the intermediate appellate court declined to adopt 
it and held that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  Id. at 31.  
We consider the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in Adedje to be influenced in large part 
by the procedural history and the facts of that case—specifically, that appellant’s later-filed 
state claims did not concern the same claims that had been raised in the federal case (and 
therefore, the employer was not on notice of the later filed claims), and also that the federal 
court had given the appellant the opportunity to continue her action by dismissing her claim 
with leave to amend, but “for reasons not apparent” to the court, she elected to file a new 
complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  Id. at 33.   
60 
 
jurisdiction does toll the statute of limitations in this state, as such ‘cross-jurisdictional 
tolling’ supports a primary purpose of class action litigation, which is to avoid a 
multiplicity of suits.”); Dow Chem. Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392, 395 (Del. 2013) (“We 
are persuaded by the reasoning of other state supreme courts that have recognized the 
doctrine of cross jurisdictional class action tolling.”); Stevens v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 
247 P.3d 244, 253 (Mont. 2010) (adopting cross-jurisdictional tolling, but noting that a 
considerable number of jurisdictions have not squarely addressed the issue, and noting that 
the “outlines [of the doctrine] are still in the process of developing[]”).   
Some states have refused to adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling.  See, e.g., Casey v. 
Merck & Co., Inc., 722 S.E.2d 842 (Va. 2012); Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc., 33 
S.W.3d 805 (Tenn. 2000); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Ill. 1998).  
Although their reasons vary, most of the jurisdictions that have refused to adopt cross-
jurisdictional class action tolling have done so based upon concerns over judicial economy.  
See, e.g., Portwood, 701 N.E.2d at 1104 (stating that “[u]nless all states simultaneously 
adopt the rule of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, any state which independently 
does so will invite into its courts a disproportionate share of suits which the federal courts 
have refused to certify as class actions after the statute of limitations has run[]”).  Other 
states, such as Virginia, have declined to judicially expand exceptions to statutes of 
limitations because the limitations are based upon statutes.  See Casey, 722 S.E.2d at 845 
(observing that under Virginia law, “[a] statute of limitations may not be tolled, or an 
exception applied, in the absence of a clear statutory enactment to such effect. . . . Given 
these principles, there is no authority in Virginia jurisprudence for the equitable tolling of 
61 
 
a statute of limitations based upon the pendency of a putative class action in another 
jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Applying the Bertonazzi factors, we determine that adopting cross-jurisdictional 
class action tolling is consistent with our Maryland tolling jurisprudence.  Specifically, we 
conclude that the same principles that support intra-jurisdictional class action tolling also 
support cross-jurisdictional class action tolling.  As noted in Part IV.E.2., supra, the class 
action certification process promotes judicial economy and efficiency.  Permitting the 
tolling of potential individual claims of a putative class member during the pendency of 
the class action promotes these objectives.  Tolling negates any need that a putative class 
member would have to file individual claims during the pendency of the putative class 
action suit.  Our sister states that have adopted cross-jurisdictional class action tolling have 
relied upon the same principles.  See Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 
N.E.2d 160, 163 (Ohio 2002) (observing that cross-jurisdictional class action tolling would 
simply prevent Ohio plaintiffs from filing protective claims in Ohio courts during the 
pendency of a putative class action in federal court); Blanco, 67 A.3d at 397 (The Delaware 
Supreme Court observing that, “[i]f we do not recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling, 
putative class members will still be incentivized to file placeholder actions in Delaware to 
protect their interests in the event that the putative class is not certified[]”).  
Once the trial court, in any jurisdiction, determines that the case cannot proceed as 
a class, the putative members should be permitted to file their individual claims without 
regard to whether the class action was pending in a Maryland state court, federal court, or 
another jurisdiction.  Like our sister states who have adopted cross-jurisdictional class 
62 
 
action tolling, we see no sound reason to limit the application of American Pipe class action 
tolling only to class action cases pending in our state courts.  See, e.g., Stevens, 247 P.3d 
at 256 (Montana Supreme Court stating that “[w]e see no reason why jurisdictional 
boundaries should operate as a bar to the application of [class action tolling]”).   
In conclusion, we hold that Maryland recognizes American Pipe class action tolling 
for absent members of putative class actions filed in other state and federal courts.  We 
further hold that the same factors that we articulated in Christensen for intra-jurisdictional 
tolling also apply to cross-jurisdictional class action tolling.  Specifically, in order for the 
plaintiff to claim the benefit of class action tolling in a later-filed individual claim, the 
plaintiff must show that the class action complaint: (1) “notified the defendants of not only 
. . . the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic 
identities of the potential plaintiffs[;]” and (2) “the individual suit must concern the same 
evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the original class suit[.]”  
Christensen, 394 Md. at 255–56 (internal quotations omitted).   
And because all things must come to an end, we must determine when the tolling 
concludes.  We agree with the rationale expressed by our sister Court of Appeals in New 
York that: “Because recognition of cross-jurisdictional tolling implicates our statutes of 
limitations, a bright-line rule is necessary to provide clarity to all parties in understanding 
their rights and obligations and . . .  to balance the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.”  
Bermudez Chavez, 158 N.E.3d 93, 104 (emphasis in original).  We therefore hold that tolling 
ends when there is a clear dismissal of a putative class action, including a dismissal for forum 
non conveniens, or a denial of class action for any reason.   
63 
 
Applying these principles to Mr. Cain’s individual claims, we determine that the 
three-year statute of limitations was tolled from the filing of the Johnson case on September 
10, 2009 until March 10, 2011—the date that the federal district court approved the 
settlement of the limited class and entered an order dismissing the claims that were not part 
of the settlement.  Mr. Cain’s individual claims were tolled during the pendency of the 
Johnson action, or for 546 days.  The circuit court determined that Mr. Cain’s claim started 
to accrue when Midland received its first payment on the judgment on September 25, 2009.  
Mr. Cain filed the present action 1,404 days later—on July 30, 2013—which is beyond the 
three-year statute of limitations.  However, if the three-year statute is tolled during the 
pendency of the Johnson action for a period of 546 days, Mr. Cain’s individual claims are 
not barred by the three-year limitations period (1,404 days – 546 days = 858 days).  Applying 
cross-jurisdictional tolling to Mr. Cain’s individual claims, we determine that the claims 
were timely filed.   
F. 
Given Our Holding on Cross-Jurisdictional Class Action Tolling, We Do 
Not Determine Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) Applies in the Context of the 
Dismissal of a Class Action Certification 
 
 
Finally, Mr. Cain argues that under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Artis v. District of Columbia, ____ U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018) and 
Maryland Rule 2-101, his limitations period was tolled during the pendency of the Johnson 
action plus 30 days for his putative class action.  In Turner v. Kight, 406 Md. 167 (2008), 
we discussed the legislative history and our interpretation of the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Our interpretation was recently confirmed in Artis.  The statute 
“enables federal district courts to entertain claims not otherwise within their adjudicatory 
64 
 
authority when those claims are so related to claims within federal-court competence that 
they form part of the same case or controversy.”  Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 597 (cleaned up) (citing 
§ 1367(a)).  Section 1367(d) provides:  
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a),[30] and 
for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the 
same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be 
tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is 
dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period. 
 
Although the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute includes “claims that involve 
the joinder or intervention of additional parties[]”, see § 1367(a), it is silent as to its 
application to putative class action claims.  Given our holding that Maryland recognizes 
cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, we do not need to determine whether the federal 
supplemental jurisdiction statute, § 1367(d), applies to later filed individual claims after a 
non-merits dismissal of class action certification.31  
 
30 Section 1367(a) states: 
 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided by 
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original 
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 
III of the United States Constitution.  Such supplemental jurisdiction shall 
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
 
31 Artis v. District of Columbia, ___ U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018) does not 
address the applicability of the supplemental jurisdiction statute to a non-merits dismissal 
of class action certification.  Artis involved individual claims filed in federal district court 
alleging violations of federal law and state law.  After the federal district court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s sole federal claim, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a state law claim.  The plaintiff then filed the state law claim in D.C. Superior Court.  
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari to “resolve the division of opinion among State 
Supreme Courts on the proper construction of § 1367(d)”—namely whether the word 
65 
 
 
G. The Finality of the Circuit Court Judgment  
 
In his last argument, Mr. Cain alleges that the Court of Special Appeals did not have 
jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s decision because the September 21 opinion and 
order and the associated declaratory judgment (the “September 21 orders”) did not 
constitute a “final judgment.”  A “judgment” is defined under Maryland Rule 1-202(o) as 
an “order of court final in nature entered pursuant to these rules.”  A judgment is “rendered” 
when a court has “clearly indicate[d] that the issue submitted has been adjudicated 
completely and it has reached a final decision on the matter.”  Hiob v. Progressive Am. Ins. 
Co., 440 Md. 466, 485 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  The circuit court in 
this case rendered a final judgment on September 21, 2017.  The orders issued on that date 
disposed of Midland’s motion to dismiss and granted Mr. Cain’s motion for summary 
judgment—constituting an unqualified decision as to all claims in Mr. Cain’s complaint.  
As of September 21, 2017, there were no issues remaining between Mr. Cain and Midland 
for adjudication and Mr. Cain had no active complaint that could be amended.  We 
conclude that the September 21 orders were an unqualified final disposition of all claims 
 
“tolled” means the state limitations period is suspended entirely during the pendency of a 
federal suit or whether the limitations period continues to run, but a plaintiff has 30 days 
to refile in state court if the federal case is dismissed.  Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 601.  The Supreme 
Court determined that the former reading was most appropriate, and held that if a plaintiff 
files a mix of federal and state claims in federal court and that court dismisses the state law 
claims, § 1367(d) suspends the statute of limitations for bringing those claims in state court 
for the period that federal case was pending plus 30 days.  Id. at 608.  The Court’s holding 
in Artis has no application here as that case did not involve a non-merits dismissal of class 
certification.   
66 
 
in the complaint and had the effect of putting Mr. Cain—the only named plaintiff at that 
time—out of court.32   
 
We similarly reject Mr. Cain’s assertion that the September 21 orders did not 
constitute a final judgment because this lawsuit was filed as a putative class action, and 
motions for class certification and to compel discovery were outstanding.  As the Court of 
Special Appeals observed in Murray v. Midland Funding, LLC, 233 Md. App. at 264 n.7, 
Maryland Rule 2-231(c) “states the hearing [on a motion for class certification] must be 
held soon, but it does not say the hearing must be held before a ruling on a motion to 
dismiss.”  (Emphasis in original).  Federal courts that have interpreted Federal Rule 23(c)—
the federal counterpart to Maryland Rule 2-231—have similarly held that a trial court is 
 
32 We reject Mr. Cain’s argument that the September 21 orders lack finality because 
Ms. Murray’s claims were pending.  The trial court specifically noted that Ms. Murray’s 
claims were not addressed by the Court because “she was not a party” until she filed an 
Amended Complaint on September 21—the same day that the court issued its final orders.  
The trial court also pointed out that Mr. Cain moved for summary judgment prior to the 
belated attempt to add Ms. Murray to the case and that Mr. Cain’s counsel did not argue 
(or even mention) Ms. Murray at the September 13 hearing.  The trial court also pointed 
out that, not only did the court not have the opportunity to opine on “Ms. Murray’s 
hypothetical claims,” the court was not aware such clams existed until after the final orders 
were issued.  Based upon this record, we determine that the September 21 orders fully 
adjudicated and disposed of all of Mr. Cain’s claims—the only claims then pending before 
the court—and therefore, the orders constituted a final judgment, thereby precluding Mr. 
Cain from amending the complaint.  See Md. Rule 2-322(c) (if a court dismisses a 
complaint for failure to state a claim, “an amended complaint may be filed only if the court 
expressly grants leave to amend”); Davis v. DiPino, 337 Md. 642, 648–49 (1995) (a circuit 
court has “no . . . discretionary authority to permit the amendment of the complaint 
subsequent to the grant of summary judgment”).  Moreover, Mr. Cain clearly believed that 
the September 21 orders constituted a final judgment because he filed a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment pursuant to Md. Rule 2-534—a procedure that applies only after a 
final judgment disposing of all issues is rendered.  To the extent that Ms. Murray’s 
individual claims are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, she is free to file a 
complaint consistent with the holdings expressed herein.   
67 
 
not required to resolve a plaintiff’s class certification motion before ruling on a dispositive 
challenge to the class representative’s claims.  See, e.g., Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001).  Similarly, we are not aware of 
any authority to support the notion that an outstanding discovery motion can prevent a 
dispositive ruling from becoming a final, appealable judgment.   
V. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold as follows:  
 
(A) 
Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and statutory claims for money 
damages are subject to the three-year statute of limitations established by CJ § 5-101.   
(B) 
The statute of limitations governing specialties actions “on a judgment” 
established under CJ § 5-102(a)(3) applies to actions to enforce a judgment and has no 
application here.  
(C) 
We decline to apply the continuing harm theory to extend the accrual date 
for Petitioners’ claims.   
(D) 
We decline to expand the American Pipe class action tolling rule to 
successive class action cases.   
(E) 
Maryland recognizes the American Pipe class action tolling rule for absent 
members of putative class actions filed in other state and federal courts.  The same factors 
that we articulated in Christensen for intra-jurisdictional tolling also apply to cross-
jurisdictional class action tolling.  Specifically, in order for the plaintiff to claim the benefit 
of class action tolling in a later-filed individual claim, the plaintiff must show that the class 
68 
 
action complaint: (1) notified the defendants of not only of the substantive claims being 
brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs; 
and (2) the individual suit must concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the 
subject matter of the original class suit.   
(F) 
Cross-jurisdictional class action tolling ends when there is a clear dismissal of 
a putative class action, including a dismissal for forum non conveniens, or a denial of class 
action for any reason. 
(G) 
Applying the American Pipe class action tolling rule to Mr. Cain’s individual 
claims, we determine that the claims were timely filed.   
(H) 
A final, appealable judgment was entered in Mr. Cain’s case and that the 
Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the appeal.   
We, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in part, and reverse 
it in part, in the case of Cain.  We affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in the 
case of Gambrell in its entirety.   
IN CASE NO. 38, JUDGMENT OF THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN 
PART.  CASE REMANDED TO THE 
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE 
TO 
THE 
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
BALTIMORE CITY WITH FURTHER 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
DISMISS 
THE 
PUTATIVE CLASS ACTION CLAIMS, 
AND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON 
MR. 
CAIN’S 
INDIVIDUAL 
CLAIMS 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY 
RESPONDENT. 
69 
 
 
IN CASE NO. 39, JUDGMENT OF THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  COSTS IN THIS COURT TO 
BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 38 & 39  
September Term, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CLIFFORD CAIN, et al.  
v. 
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TASHA GAMBRELL 
 
v.  
 
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
    JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J., 
dissenting in part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: August 4, 2021 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No.: 24-C-13-004869 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No.: C-02-CV-15-002988  
 
Argued: March 4, 2021 
 
 
The Majority Opinion is well-researched, well-written, and, in many respects, an 
important contribution to our case law.  However, I disagree with its treatment of a key 
element of the limitations issue – when and how a cause of action accrues. 
Limitations and Accrual 
Any limitations rule can be divided into three parts:  (1) the time at which it begins 
to run, usually referred to as the time of accrual of the cause of action; (2) a duration, 
generally set by statute (the “statute of limitations”); and (3) any applicable tolling 
principle, common law or statutory, that either stops the clock or extends the duration in 
some way.1 
My disagreement with the Majority Opinion on the limitations issue in these cases 
relates to the first element – accrual.  Accrual is often the critical element in deciding 
whether limitations has run.  The continuing harm doctrine – which might more 
appropriately be labeled the continuing accrual doctrine – plays an important role in 
situations in which a defendant’s wrongdoing consists of discrete actions over a period 
of time that result in the damages or other harm suffered by the plaintiff. 
Different theories abound as to how to define accrual of a cause of action:  “Some 
courts have held the cause of action accrues when the defendant commits his wrong, 
others when the plaintiff discovers the wrong, and still others have held that it does not 
accrue until the maturation of harm.”  Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 92-93 (1969).  
 
1 See, e.g., Swam v. Upper Chesapeake Medical Center, 397 Md. 528 (2007) 
(judicial tolling of limitations on plaintiff’s claim in light of statutory “ambiguity regarding 
the appropriate forum”); Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §5-205 
(tolling related to defendant’s absence from State). 
2 
 
The Majority Opinion applies a discovery rule.  The continuing harm doctrine relates 
accrual to the maturation of harm. 
The Majority Opinion’s Theory of Accrual  
In the Gambrell case, the date of accrual was identified by the circuit court as the 
date when Midland “filed the collection action” against Ms. Gambrell – on the theory 
that she was constructively on notice as to its unlicensed status.2  Majority slip op. at 23, 
26-27.  In the Cain case, the date of accrual was identified by the circuit court as the date 
when “Midland received its first payment on the judgment” against Mr. Cain – a very 
different start date for limitations that is well after Midland’s filing of the complaint.  
Majority slip op. at 26.  The Majority opts for the date chosen by the circuit court in Cain.  
It states that their claims accrued “at the latest” at the time that Midland received its first 
payment – on the theory that plaintiffs should have been aware of the judgments against 
them at that time and could have learned of Midland’s unlicensed status if they had 
checked an agency website.  Majority slip op. at 27 & n.18.  This is an application of a 
discovery rule that does not take into account later discrete acts of Midland that caused 
the harm. 
Is the Majority Opinion’s Theory Consistent with Finch III? 
In any event, neither theory of accrual set out in the Majority Opinion appears to 
be consistent with this Court’s decision in Finch III.  LVNV Funding LLC v. Finch, 463 
 
2 This conception of accrual is puzzling.  Even if Ms. Gambrell could be charged 
with somehow knowing that Midland was not listed as a licensee on a relatively obscure 
agency website, she presumably was not aware that Midland had filed a complaint against 
her until she was served with it.   
3 
 
Md. 586 (2019).  In that case, the Court held that judgments obtained by the unlicensed 
debt collector were not void.  However, the debt collector could be barred by injunction 
from taking “any action” to enforce those judgments.  463 Md. at 612.  Moreover, the 
debt collector could be held liable for damages relating to any collection efforts, pursuant 
to MCDCA3 and MCALA4 – two of the statutes on which the cases before us are also 
based.  Id.  Such collection efforts occur through discrete acts, such as applications for 
writs of garnishment based on such a judgment.  The Court remanded the case in Finch 
III for further proceedings in the circuit court to compute damages incurred by the 
plaintiffs as a result of the debt collector’s collection efforts.  Id.   
In light of that holding in Finch III, it makes no sense to say that all such violations 
are complete and all such claims accrue when the original debt collection action was filed 
or when the debt collector first succeeded in obtaining payment on the judgment.  Any 
such theory potentially gives the debt collector advance immunity from the liability 
recognized in Finch III for later discrete efforts to enforce such a judgment. 
The Continuing Harm Doctrine 
The Majority Opinion asserts that no one raised the issue of accrual in these 
appeals.  Majority slip op. at 26, 27.  But the concept of accrual is inherent in the 
continuing harm doctrine that the Petitioners argued on appeal and is clearly articulated 
 
3 Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (“MCDCA”), Maryland Code, 
Commercial Law Article, §14-201 et seq. 
 
4 Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (“MCALA”), Maryland Code, 
Business Regulation Article §7-101 et seq. 
4 
 
in their brief.  For example, they argue that the failure to apply the continuing harm 
doctrine in these circumstances effectively requires plaintiffs to file a complaint before 
“all the elements of their claims ha[ve] accrued.”  Petitioners’ Brief at 31.   
The continuing harm doctrine is appropriately applied when a defendant’s 
wrongdoing consists of discrete acts that are part of an overall scheme that causes harm 
to another.  In Mattingly, the Court noted that, under the “continuation of events theory” 
(i.e., a continuing harm theory), “only the last [event] starts the running of the statute [of 
limitations].”  254 Md. at 94.  See also Muffoletto v. Towers, 244 Md. App. 510, 528, 
cert. denied, 469 Md. 276 (2020) (“the continuing harm doctrine rests on a new 
affirmative act”).  It is a cousin to similar doctrines in other areas of the law.  For example, 
in the criminal law context, it is well understood that the statute of limitations for a 
conspiracy charge “runs from the last overt act during the existence of the conspiracy,” 
not the first.  Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946). 
The Majority Opinion acknowledges that the continuing harm doctrine relates to 
accrual, but believes that the doctrine applies only “in limited contexts.”  Majority slip 
op. at 41, 44.  Midland asserts that the doctrine applies only to nuisance and trespass 
cases, and the Majority Opinion seemingly takes little issue with that characterization of 
the law.  Majority slip op. at 40-41 (stating that continuing harm doctrine “is applied in 
nuisance, trespass, and other tort cases”).  There is no obvious reason to limit the doctrine 
to such claims.  Further, a review of this Court’s case law demonstrates that this Court 
has not done so to date.  For example, in Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 636 (1972), 
this Court applied the continuing harm doctrine in holding that plaintiffs’ fraud claim 
5 
 
against the defendant was not barred by limitations.  No claim of nuisance or trespass 
was made in that case.  See also Duke Street Limited Partnership v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 112 Md. App. 37, 50 (1996) (recognizing that continuing harm doctrine 
can apply to civil rights claims, claims of unconstitutional takings, and nuisance claims, 
although it did not apply the doctrine in the case before the court).  
The Court’s two most recent considerations of the continuing harm doctrine are 
instructive.  In MacBride v. Pishvaian, 402 Md. 572 (2007), a jury awarded a tenant 
$100,000 in damages against a landlord for the landlord’s unfair and deceptive trade 
practices, but the circuit court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of 
the landlord on the ground that the claim was barred by limitations.  The tenant appealed, 
asserting, among other things, that the action was timely under the continuing harm 
theory of accrual.   
Although the Court ultimately ruled for the landlord, the Court considered 
application of the continuing harm doctrine to the claim in that case.  The Court noted 
that the continuing harm doctrine applied when “there are ongoing violations of a 
potential plaintiff’s rights.”  402 Md. at 575-76 n.2.  The claim of unfair and deceptive 
trade practices was based upon “misstatements made directly to a consumer, or by 
advertisement, or phone solicitation concerning the quality and availability of goods or 
services….”  Id. at 585 (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted).  In the case 
before it, the jury had not only returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but had 
also returned a special verdict in which it found that the plaintiff was aware of the 
landlord’s unfair and deceptive trade practices on a date six years before suit was filed.  
6 
 
As the only misstatements found by the jury had occurred six years before the suit was 
filed, the grant of JNOV was affirmed.  Id. at 585-86. 
Thus, in MacBride, the Court recognized that the continuing harm doctrine could 
apply to a landlord-tenant claim under the Consumer Protection Act, but held that the 
essence of the claim in that case was the alleged misrepresentation by the landlord and 
incorporated a discovery rule in its analysis to find the claim untimely. 
Subsequently, in Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment, 434 Md. 623 
(2013), this Court observed that the MacBride decision had improperly limited the 
continuing harm doctrine on the ground that the plaintiff had become aware of a 
continuing violation at an early date.  Disavowing that part of the MacBride opinion, the 
Court explained:  “The purpose of the continuing harm doctrine is to avoid punishing a 
plaintiff because one or more violations occurred earlier in time when such violations are 
continuing in nature.  A potential plaintiff’s knowledge of the harm, therefore, is 
inconsequential.”  434 Md. at 647-48 n.9 (citations, internal quotations and punctuation 
deleted).5  In Litz, the Court held that the continuing harm doctrine saved the plaintiff’s 
negligence and trespass claims from dismissal on limitations grounds.  Id. at 645-50.  
Nothing in the Court’s opinion limited that doctrine to negligence and trespass claims – 
or any other cause of action – so long as the violation was continuing or ongoing in 
 
5 Midland and the Majority Opinion rely precisely on the notion that this Court 
rejected in Litz.  See Majority slip op. at 27 (relating its holding on accrual to the date that 
Mr. Cain and Ms. Gambrell “were clearly on notice of the judgment” and could have 
known of Midland’s unlicensed status). 
 
7 
 
nature.6  Moreover, whether the plaintiff knew – or should have known – of an early event 
in an ongoing series of events causing the harm did not matter. 
Conclusion 
In the two cases before us, the alleged wrongful conduct of Midland was 
continuing and consisted of a series of discrete acts to obtain judgments against Mr. Cain 
and Ms. Gambrell in violation of MCALA and MCDCA and then to enforce those 
judgments through subsequent collection activity.  There is no question that these discrete 
acts were related and part of an ongoing effort to collect on actions brought in violation 
of several State statutes.  The Majority Opinion essentially holds that one of the earliest 
of those actions (that resulted in a “first payment”), coupled with imputed knowledge of 
Midland’s unlicensed status, was the date of accrual of any cause of action Mr. Cain and 
Ms. Gambrell had for all the later discrete actions by Midland to collect on those 
judgments.  For the reasons explained above, this narrow view of the accrual of these 
claims is inconsistent with our case law under the continuing harm doctrine. 
 
6 In Walton v. Network Solutions, 221 Md. App. 656, 676-77 (2015), the Court of 
Special Appeals suggested that the holding in Litz might be so limited.  However, the Litz 
opinion itself does not state such a limitation and in fact applied the continuing harm 
doctrine in computing the period of limitations applicable to a negligence claim.  Moreover, 
the Walton court explicitly left open the possibility that reliance on a second later incident 
between the plaintiff and one of the defendant’s employees, apparently not preserved for 
the appeal, would have made the plaintiff’s claim timely.  221 Md. App. 675 n.3.
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/38a20cn.pdf