Title: HEAD v. McCRACKEN

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

HEAD v. McCRACKEN  HEAD v. McCRACKEN 2004 OK 84 102 P.3d 670 Case Number: 99257 Decided: 11/09/2004 As Corrected: December 2, 2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA THEODORE D. HEAD and LORI A. HEAD, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. WALTER THOMAS McCRACKEN and REBECCA LUCILLE McCRACKEN, husband and wife, Defendants/Appellees, and JOSEPH LEE McCRACKEN and JO ELLYN McCRACKEN, husband and wife, Defendants. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CLEVELAND COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE WILLIAM C. HETHERINGTON, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants/appellees (hereafter defendants) regarding plaintiffs'/appellants' (hereafter plaintiffs) claim to damages, attorney fees and costs under the Nonjudicial Marketable Title Procedures Act (NMTPA), 12 O. S. 2001, § 1141.1 et seq., particularly § 1141.5(A) thereof. Plaintiffs challenged the summary judgment by a new trial motion, which the trial court denied. After their new trial motion was denied, plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of damages, costs and attorney fees, again placing reliance on § 1141.5(A). The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division I, reversed and remanded for trial. Defendants sought certiorari which we granted. Held: The trial judge did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants on the NMTPA claim nor in denying plaintiffs' motions for new trial and for an award of damages, costs and attorney fees, as plaintiffs were not entitled to damages, attorney fees and costs under § 1141.5(A). CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT ORDERS AFFIRMED. Philip W. Redwine, Douglas B. Cubberley and James L. Bintz of Redwine & Cubberley, Norman, Oklahoma for Plaintiffs/Appellants. Glynis C. Edgar and Marie Johnson of Glynis C. Edgar, P. C., Norman, Oklahoma and J. David Rambo, Norman, Oklahoma for Defendants/Appellees. LAVENDER, J.: ¶1 The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants/appellees, Walter Thomas and Rebecca Lucille McCracken, husband and wife (hereafter defendants), in regard to plaintiffs'/appellants', Theodore D. and Lori A. Head, husband and wife (hereafter plaintiffs), claim to damages, attorney fees and costs under the Nonjudicial Marketable Title Procedures Act (NMTPA), 12 O. S. 2001, § 1141.1-1141.5, particularly § 1141.5(A) thereof. Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial as to said claim, which the trial court denied. After their new trial motion was denied, plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of damages, costs and attorney fees, which again placed reliance on § 1141.5(A). The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appealed. PART I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. ¶2 Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court Order denying their new trial motion. The appellate review standard regarding a trial judge's denial of a new trial motion is abuse of discretion. Evers v. FSF Overlake Associates, ¶3 An appellate court tests a trial court's summary judgment grant by a de novo review standard. In re Estate of MacFarline, ¶4 In Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Glass, [A] summary judgment ruling must be made on the record actually presented by the litigants, not on a record potentially possible. If the summary judgment submissions disclose either controverted material facts, or, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions even if the material facts are undisputed, summary judgment should be denied. It must be remembered, neither this Court [n]or a trial court weighs the evidence on a motion for summary judgment and it is not the purpose of such procedure to substitute a trial by affidavit for a trial according to law. Weighing of evidence is a function for the jury and, in a non-jury case, for the trial judge after an appropriate trial of the issues. Finally, only if the movant for summary adjudication satisfies the initial burden to show entitlement to summary judgment is it incumbent on the non-movant to demonstrate by his/her own submissions the existence of a substantial dispute as to some material fact. 1998 OK 52, at ¶ 3, 959 P.2d at 588-589 (citations omitted). In re Estate of MacFarline further succinctly provides, "[f]or a party to be entitled to summary judgment in his/her favor, the record must show that party entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 2000 OK 87, ¶ 4, 14 P.3d at 555 (emphasis in original). ¶5 We also have before us a question concerning statutory interpretation because the meaning of a legislative enactment, § 1141.5(A) of the NMTPA, is central to determining defendants' entitlement to summary judgment. As with summary judgment review, "[a] legal question involving statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review . . ., i.e., a non-deferential, plenary and independent review of the trial court's legal ruling." Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶ 2, 81 P.3d 652 , 654, citing Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 8 and n. 5, 33 P.3d 302 , 305 and n. 5. The above standards guide our consideration of this cause. PART II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. ¶6 In July 2001 plaintiffs sued defendants to, in effect, obtain a judicial order establishing and defining an access road easement over land owned by defendants, the road being necessary to provide a passageway to a five acre landlocked parcel of land then owned by plaintiffs.3 In essence, plaintiffs' initial suit was one to quiet title to an access road easement. Both parcels of land are located in Cleveland County. In 1988 defendants, out of a larger parcel owned by them, conveyed the landlocked five acre tract to their son (then single) by warranty deed, granting fee title to the tract "with an access road to Etowah road."4 At the time of the 1988 conveyance no access road actually existed and the 1988 warranty deed did not specifically detail the width, length or location where the access road was to be built. The record shows that during his ownership of the property, defendants' son built or had built an access road traversing defendants' tract and that this road existed in 1998 when plaintiffs purchased the five acre tract from the son (then married) and his wife. The 1998 warranty deed from the son and his wife to plaintiffs did not describe or mention an access road easement.5 ¶8 The letter from plaintiffs' attorney to defendants, in effect, sought to have defendants execute a fifty (50) foot wide access road easement across defendants' property. A legal instrument entitled "ROAD EASEMENT" specifically describing the fifty (50) foot road easement accompanied the letter from plaintiffs' attorney, and the letter and the requested road easement instrument are attached to plaintiffs' trial court petition. The description of the sought-after easement contained in the instrument follows: The East 25.00 feet of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NW/4 NE/4 NW/4) AND the East 25.00 feet of the North Half of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (N/2 SW/4 NE/4 NW/4) AND the West 25.00 feet of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter [(]NE/4 NE/4 NW/4) AND the West 25.00 feet of the North Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (N/2 SE/4 NE/4 NW/4) ALL in Section 29, T. 8 N., R. 1 E., I.M. Cleveland County, Oklahoma (bolding in original). ¶9 In an Order filed in the trial court in November 2001, the trial judge determined that an ingress/egress road easement existed as a matter of law. The Order defined the road as being twenty (20) feet in width, ten (10) feet on either side of the midline of the existing road, i.e., the road the son built or had built. The Order also described the road easement more particularly by virtue of a survey that had been conducted, i.e., the Order specified a legal description of the existing road's location. The description as contained in the trial court Order is: A 20.00 feet Road Easement being 10' on either side of the centerline more particularly described as follows: Commencing at the Northeast Corner of the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section 29, Township 8 North, Range 1 East, I.M., Cleveland County, Oklahoma, thence West a distance of 663.19 feet along the North line of said Section 29 to the Point of Beginning, thence S0038'11"E a distance of 541.59 feet; thence S1909'20"W a distance of 124.92 feet to termination. ¶10 Subsequent to the November 2001 Order, plaintiffs filed a supplemental petition, incorporating their earlier-filed petition and amended petition. In addition, the supplemental petition sought relief for breach of deed warranty and covenant, slander of title and trespass. ¶11 "An easement is the right of one person to go onto the land of another and make a limited use thereof." Story v. Hefner, 1975 OK 115, 540 P.2d 562 , 566. "Easements may be expressly created by deed, or by necessity, or prescriptive use, or implied in a deed." Mooney v. Mooney, 2003 OK 51, ¶ 17, 70 P.3d 872 , 876.9 An easement is a right to do something on another's land, coupled with an interest or estate in the land affected. See Haas v. Brannon, 1924 OK 500, 225 P. 931, 932 Fourth Syllabus by the Court and 936.10 As applicable here, the passageway or roadway crossing defendants' land is the easement whereby the landlocked parcel initially conveyed by defendants to their son may be accessed. ¶12 The perpetual right of ingress and egress upon land of an adjoining landowner expressly granted by a warranty deed is an easement. Lindhorst v. Wright, 1980 OK CIV APP 42, 616 P.2d 450 , 452-453.11 For purposes of the issue or question confronting us in this case it is unnecessary for us to definitively determine the exact nature of the creative underpinnings of the easement involved in this matter. It is sufficient to set out that this Court has recognized that questions concerning the judicial establishment of an ingress/egress road easement under certain circumstances have been considered a proper subject of a quiet title action pursuant to 12 O. S. § 1141, the current version of which is now found at 12 O. S. 2001, § 1141. White v. Grace, 1997 OK 143, ¶ 6, 950 P.2d 837 , 839; see also Buttrill v. Stanfield, 1947 OK 90, 178 P.2d 889 , 890 (easement is a legal property right transferable with the real estate to which it is appurtenant and will support action to quiet title).12 A. If a requestor prepares a notice pursuant to [§ 1141.3], and: 1. The respondent receives the notice and fails to respond, or 2. The respondent requests clarification or additional information and then subsequently refuses to execute and deliver a curative instrument or to take the corrective action identified in the notice, or 3. The respondent refuses to claim the notice, or 4. The respondent receives the notice and refuses to take the action requested in the notice, then in the event that the requestor files an action to quiet title to the subject parcel pursuant to [12 O. S. § 1141], and the civil action results in a judgment for the plaintiff which could have been accomplished through the execution and delivery of a curative instrument or the taking of corrective action identified in a notice, the plaintiff in the quiet title action, in addition to any other requested relief, shall be entitled to recover damages equal to the actual expenses incurred by the plaintiff in identifying the relevant instrument, preparing the notice to the respondent pursuant to [§ 1141. 3], and the expenses of litigation directly related to obtaining judgment quieting title in the plaintiff with respect to the interest or apparent interest forming the basis of the action against the respondent, including costs and reasonable attorney fees. ¶14 Furthermore, Fulsom delineated the general rules concerning the recovery of attorney fees and interpretation of statutes argued to support an attorney fee allowance: This Court stated the following in State ex rel. Tal v. City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma follows the American Rule . . . . The Rule is generally that each litigant pays for their own legal representation and our courts are without authority to assess attorney fees in the absence of a specific statute or contract allowing for their recovery. Exceptions to the Rule are narrowly defined and carved out with great caution because it is understood liberality of attorney fee awards against the non-prevailing party has a chilling effect on our open access to courts guarantee. [Citations omitted.] Oklahoma jurisprudence, thus, recognizes that attorney fee statutes are strictly applied because to do otherwise holds out the real possibility of chilling access to the courts. Beard v. Richards, Fulsom ¶15 As we read the plain and salient language of § 1141.5(A)(1)-(4), for a plaintiff to show themselves entitled to damages, including attorney fees and costs, it must be shown that a plaintiff obtained "a judgment" that "could have been accomplished through the execution and delivery of a curative instrument or the taking of corrective action identified in a notice", i.e., here, the "ROAD EASEMENT" instrument that accompanied the written statutory demand that plaintiffs, through their attorney, sought to have defendants execute. To us, the meaning of this language is clear and unambiguous, to wit: that plaintiffs must win, in a real sense, through the quiet title court proceeding that which they sought through their written demand. In the present situation, the plaintiffs obtained no such relief. The legal instrument they sought to have defendants execute to cure the problem concerning lack of definitive specification of an easement was one that would have given a road easement of more than double the width of the existing road that allowed ingress and egress access to the landlocked parcel. Put in elementary terms, the result sought to be accomplished through plaintiffs' curative instrument was substantially different from the result obtained through the November 2001 trial court Order, an Order that specified a twenty (20) foot road easement following the contours of the existent road. In sum, a plaintiff relying on § 1141.5(A)(1)-(4) to support a claim to its monetary recovery, including attorney fees and costs, must present to a defendant a curative instrument that actually conforms, except as to inconsequential or insignificant matters, to the ultimate relief granted to the plaintiff in the quiet title court proceeding. As we read § 1141.5(A)(1)-(4), plaintiffs here do not fall within its scope. ¶17 The NMTPA sets forth detailed procedures to be followed where someone having an interest or claiming an interest in a parcel of real property and who believes there is some title defect or apparent cloud on the title to the real property, seeks to remedy same without having to institute a court action to quiet title. Subsection 1141.3(B) of the NMTPA expressly declares that the provisions of the NMTPA are permissive and are not required as a condition to the bringing of a quiet title action pursuant to § 1141. Two other subsections of the NMTPA are § 1141.3 (C)(4) and § 1141.3 (D), which provide: C. If making a request pursuant to this act, the requestor shall send a notice to the respondent which shall include: * * * 4. The nature of the corrective action sought by the requestor, including, but not limited to, the exact instrument or conveyance which the requestor would accept from the respondent as a curative instrument or other corrective action. D. The requestor shall prepare and send with the notice the exact instrument or conveyance which the requestor would accept from the respondent as a curative instrument or other corrective action. (emphasis added). The NMTPA defines requestor at § 1141.2(18) as "any person or entity transmitting a notice to a respondent pursuant to [§ 1141.3] or if the requestor engages the services of an agent or fiduciary to prepare the notice, the agent or fiduciary of the requestor[.]" Respondent is defined at § 1141.2(19) as "the person or entity to whom a notice is transmitted pursuant to [§ 1141.3] or, if the respondent engages the services of an agent or fiduciary to prepare a response to a requestor, the agent or fiduciary of the requestor [sic - should be respondent][.]" Here, of course, the requestors are the plaintiffs or their counsel, and respondents are the defendants. ¶18 As can be seen, both § 1141.3(C)(4) and § 1141.3(D), in clear and unmistakable language, require that the individual seeking another's execution of a curative instrument must send with the notice "the exact instrument or conveyance" that would be acceptable to cure the title problem identified and sought to be cured. We believe it is beyond question that the Legislature, by use of such specific terminology, read in conjunction with § 1141.5(A)(1)-(4), never intended the latter to support the recovery of damages, including attorney fees and costs, in a situation where the instrument sent to a respondent that is identified as acceptable to the requestor, asks for well beyond what is necessary to cure the problem and, consequently the respondent refuses to sign it, and then in a subsequent court action involving the matter the defect is cured by a judgment awarding something significantly less than requested. In our view, giving such a meaning to the legislative enactment is unwarranted and is at odds with a sensible and reasonable interpretation viewing the matter in light of the whole of the NMTPA and its general purpose, to provide a mechanism geared toward preventing unnecessary litigation in the form of a quiet title suit. ¶19 To conclude otherwise would essentially countenance the absurd possibility that, as applicable here, plaintiffs could have requested defendants to execute an ingress/egress road easement encompassing every square foot of defendants' property (which defendants would presumably have refused, as they refused to execute plaintiffs' fifty (50) foot "ROAD EASEMENT"), but via the subsequent quiet title proceeding plaintiffs would be entitled to recover damages, including the expenses incurred by them in preparing the notice to the respondent pursuant to § 1141.3 and the attorney fees and costs associated with the court action, even though the trial court rejects the curative instrument plaintiffs identified as acceptable to forego litigation. It is hard for us to envision a more absurd result, a result that we believe does not follow from any language in the NMTPA and, as applicable here, that does not comport with the real and obvious specific purpose of the pertinent language contained in § 1141.5(A)(4) as to the recovery of damages, including attorney fees and costs, which is to allow a plaintiff to recover thereunder if a defendant refuses to execute a curative instrument that is actually necessary to cure the title problem and that, thereafter, said instrument, except as to inconsequential or insignificant matters, is ultimately determined by a trial court in a quiet title suit as such necessary relief. ¶20 This cause requires determination of the meaning of a part of the NMTPA concerning the appropriateness of recovery of damages, including attorney fees and costs, in a quiet title action brought in regard to a road easement. The record in the matter shows that plaintiffs failed to bring themselves within the terms of § 1141.5(A), the controlling statutory provision. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to defendants as to plaintiffs' claim to such recovery and the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs' motions for new trial and for an award of damages, costs and attorney fees, as the record shows they are not entitled to such relief under § 1141.5(A). Consequently, the COCA erred in reversing and remanding for trial. ¶21 For the reasons specified above, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is VACATED and the trial court Orders denying plaintiffs' motions for new trial and for an award of damages, costs and attorney fees are AFFIRMED. ¶22 WATT, C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR and COLBERT, JJ., concur. FOOT