Title: State v. Oscarson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Oscarson (2001-055); 176 Vt. 176; 845 A.2d 337

2004 VT 4

Filed 16-Jan-2004

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                  2004 VT 4

                                No. 2001-055

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont
                                                 Unit 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Elsie Oscarson	                         March Term, 2002

  Edward J. Cashman, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1), Johnson, Skoglund, JJ. and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   Defendant Elsie Oscarson appeals from her
  conviction of two counts of aggravated sexual assault against two of her
  children.  She argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting hearsay
  testimony of one of the putative child victims even though that child was
  not "available to testify in court" as required by Vermont's child hearsay
  statute, V.R.E. 804a(a)(3);    (2) admitting evidence concerning
  defendant's alleged abuse of a child who was not a putative victim of the
  charged crimes; and (3) allowing improper expert witness testimony.  We
  reverse the conviction for the child who was not available to testify, but
  affirm the other conviction.   
   
       ¶  2.  Defendant is the mother of three minor children, Joey, Jesse,
  and Brittany.  In late 1994, defendant enrolled the children in daycare. 
  At the time, Jesse was three years old, Joey was four, and Brittany was an
  infant.  At school, Jesse and Joey showed signs of severe neglect,
  including hunger, poor hygiene, inadequate winter clothing, socialization
  problems, and excessively foul language.  Both boys suffered frequent
  nightmares and exhibited extreme self-mutilative behavior. 

       ¶  3.  One day in February 1995, Joey had an severe temper tantrum
  after arriving at school, and, when he finally calmed down, told his
  teachers that his mother had touched him "down there" but that he was not
  allowed to tell.  Around the same time, Jesse arrived at school unable to
  sit down, and complained that "my bum-bum hurts" and that "mommy hit me
  with a hammer."  His teachers observed a deep bruise on his buttocks.

       ¶  4.  The day care staff repeatedly reported to state officials that
  they believed the children were being neglected and abused.  Finally, in
  July of 1995, the boys were removed from defendant's home and placed in
  temporary foster care, each with one of his teachers.  Shortly thereafter,
  Jesse and Joey told their foster parents that defendant had sexually abused
  them by performing oral sex on them, and forcing them to perform oral sex
  on her.  The children related similar incidents of sexual abuse to their
  doctors: Jesse to Dr. Joseph Hagan, a pediatrician, and Joey to Dr. Lee
  Rosen, a clinical psychologist. 
   
       ¶  5.  In January 1996, defendant was charged with two counts of
  aggravated sexual assault.  First, however, the State acted to terminate
  defendant's parental rights.  In that proceeding, the family court held
  that the children's hearsay statements were admissible as evidence pursuant
  to V.R.E. 804a(a) (hearsay exception for putative victims of abuse,
  neglect, or sexual assault who are under age ten). (FN2)  The family court
  terminated defendant's parental rights over all three children, and she did
  not appeal either the evidentiary rulings or the final decision.  In May
  1996, the State notified defendant that it also intended to offer the
  children's hearsay statements pursuant to V.R.E. 804a(a) in the criminal
  proceedings.  Defendant, in turn, filed a motion seeking to depose and
  cross-examine the children regarding the hearsay statements.

       ¶  6.  In December 1998, the district court scheduled a hearing to
  determine the admissibility of the children's hearsay statements under
  V.R.E. 804a(a) and 807.  At the hearing, the parties agreed to abide by the
  1996 family court decision admitting the same hearsay statements under Rule
  804a(a) "as the law of the case."  The parties also agreed that, if the
  children were compelled to testify, their testimony would be taken by
  closed-circuit television or videotape pursuant to Rule 807.  The court
  adopted the parties stipulation that the children's hearsay statements were
  admissible under Rule 804a(a), but ordered that any recorded testimony
  would have to be taken "contemporaneous with trial." 
   
       ¶  7.  In July, 1999, the parties pursued an alternate arrangement
  to videotape the children's testimony prior to trial pursuant to V.R.E.
  807(d) (recorded testimony).  Because of a disagreement as to whether
  pre-recording the children's testimony would extinguish defendant's right
  to call the children at trial for cross-examination, defense counsel
  declined to proceed on that date.  At an August 1999 status conference
  regarding the dispute, the State pointed out that the children had already
  been deposed and argued that they should not have to testify twice more -
  once before trial by videotape, and again at trial.  Defense counsel argued
  that the children should testify "contemporaneous with the trial," rather
  than on videotape before trial, because there was a chance that they would
  not need to testify at all.  The court eventually stated, "If [Rule 807]
  says it's done a certain way, we'll do it that way.  If the rule doesn't
  speak as to the way it's done, then I would say we'll do it at trial,
  unless there's a reason for doing it otherwise." 

       ¶  8.  The issue lapsed after the parties entered a tentative plea
  agreement.  But when that effort failed just days before trial, it
  resurfaced.  Then, on the Friday before trial, defense counsel filed a
  written request asking the district court to "make arrangements" to have
  the children testify by closed-circuit television.  The letter asserted
  that the previous district court judge had ordered this procedure in the
  event that the children were to testify at trial and, because his client
  definitely wanted the children to testify, "the arrangements will have to
  be made."  The State responded that it was defendant's responsibility to
  secure the children's attendance and that it would provide only information
  to assist defendant in subpoenaing the children. 

       ¶  9.  The next day, defense counsel indicated that he had located and
  subpoenaed Joey but could not find Jesse.  Jesse had been adopted and was
  living in Texas;  he was camping with his adopted mother in Arizona during
  defendant's trial.  Defense counsel objected to admission of Jesse's
  hearsay testimony on grounds that the State bore the burden of producing
  Jesse under Rule 804a(a)(3), and unless the State produced him, his hearsay
  statements should be excluded.  The court overruled the objection.  After
  the state rested, with Jesse's whereabouts still unknown, defense counsel
  asked the court to strike Jesse's hearsay statements because the State had
  not made him "available to testify in court" as required by Rule
  804a(a)(3).  The court again rejected this argument.
   
       ¶  10.  A jury convicted defendant of aggravated sexual assault upon
  each child.  She was sentenced to thirty-five years to life on each count,
  to be served consecutively, with the sentence for abuse of Jesse suspended. 
  This appeal followed.  

                              I.  Availability

       ¶  11.  Defendant first argues that it was error to admit Jesse's
  hearsay statements because the State failed to make Jesse "available to
  testify in court or under Rule 807" as required by Vermont's child hearsay
  statute, V.R.E. 804a.  Defendant maintains that under V.R.E. 804a(a)(3) the
  State bore the burden of producing Jesse for trial, and its failure to do
  so after the defense requested to cross-examine Jesse rendered his hearsay
  statements inadmissible.  To the extent that Jesse's out-of-court testimony
  is not otherwise admissible as nonhearsay or under another hearsay
  exception, we agree. 

       ¶  12.  A child's hearsay statements are admissible under Rule 804a(a)
  only if the court finds that: (1) the statements are offered in a criminal
  proceeding in which the child is a putative victim of sexual assault, and
  the statements concern the alleged crime; (2) the statements were not taken
  in preparation for a legal proceeding; (3) the child is available to
  testify in court or under Rule 807; and (4) the time, content, and
  circumstances of the statements provide substantial indicia of
  trustworthiness.  V.R.E. 804a(a)(1)?(4).  Either party may compel the
  hearsay declarant to testify by filing a motion pursuant to V.R.E. 804a(b).
   
       ¶  13.  The trial court has great discretion in admitting or
  excluding evidence under Rule 804a, and we will not reverse such decisions
  unless there has been an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice.  State
  v. LaBounty, 168 Vt. 129, 136,