Title: State v. Margaret H.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1441 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Darryl T-H. and Durrell T-H.,  
Persons Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner, 
Darryl T-H. and Durrell T-H.,  
 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
Margaret H.,  
 
Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  229 Wis. 2d 737 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Martin J. Donald 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Jennifer L. Abbott, Jeffrey A. Kingsley and Abbott & Kingsley, 
Shorewood, and oral argument by Jennifer L. Abbott. 
 
 
For the appellants there was a brief by Michael 
 
J. Vruno, Jr., and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Michael J. Vruno, Jr.. 
 
 
For the petitioner there was a brief and oral 
argument by Janet C. Protasiewicz, assistant district attorney. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1441 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Darryl T.-H. and Durrell T.-H.,  
Persons Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
Darryl T-H. and Durrell T-H.,  
 
          Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Margaret H.,  
 
          Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Margaret H., the maternal 
grandmother of twin boys, seeks review of an unpublished court 
of appeals decision that reversed a circuit court order 
dismissing the petition to terminate the parental rights of the 
twins' mother.1  The court of appeals determined that the circuit 
                     
1 In re the Termination of Parental Rights to Darryl T.-H. 
and Durrell T.-H., No. 99-1441, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. 
July 27, 1999) (reversing order of Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, M. Joseph Donald, J., and remanding cause for further 
proceedings).    
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
2 
court erred in its assumption that the twins' relationship with 
their birth family would be severed upon the termination of 
parental rights followed by adoption. 
¶2 
Margaret H. contends that the court of appeals' 
determination not only contradicts well-established law, but 
also upon remand unnecessarily limits the circuit court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion. 
 
We 
agree 
with 
Margaret 
H.'s 
contentions.  However, because we conclude that the case must be 
remanded for further consideration of all of the relevant 
factors in determining the best interests of the twins, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
 
¶3 
Darryl and Durrell T.-H., born in February 1993,  
lived with their mother, Carol H., for approximately one month 
before 
she 
abandoned 
them. 
 
Margaret 
H., 
the 
maternal 
grandmother, then assumed primary responsibility for the twins, 
who resided with her for a period of three months.  In May 1993, 
Darryl and Durrell were adjudged children in need of protection 
or services (CHIPS), and a dispositional order was filed placing 
the twins outside their mother's home.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§  48.13(10) and 48.355 (1997-98).2  
 
¶4 
At the age of four months, the twins were removed from 
their grandmother's home and placed with a maternal aunt.  
                     
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
3 
Darryl and Durrell lived with their aunt until early 1994, when 
they were transferred to a foster home.  This placement lasted 
for a total of four months and was the first in a series of 
placements in foster care.  The second placement lasted a week. 
The twins then spent a significant portion of their young lives, 
approximately four years, with their third foster mother. 
Because Thelma D., the foster mother, was unwilling to adopt the 
twins, they were uprooted yet again and placed with Debra G. in 
March 1998.  Debra G. is the current foster mother and has 
expressed a desire to adopt Darryl and Durrell.   
 
¶5 
Margaret H. was originally designated as the twins' 
guardian and primary caregiver in early 1995.  The permanent 
placement 
plan 
contemplated 
relative 
placement 
with 
her.  
However, the social service agency informed Margaret H. that her 
apartment was not adequately sized to accommodate the twins, as 
well as the five other grandchildren for whom she cared.  While 
the twins remained in foster care, Margaret H. began saving 
money and searching for suitable housing.  
 
¶6 
In April 1996, the agency announced its intention of 
finding the twins a permanent home and possibly altering the 
relative placement plan to a termination of parental rights. 
Margaret H. had been unable to find housing at the time, but 
finally saved enough money to purchase a home in April 1998.  A 
social worker informed her, however, that an "adoptive resource" 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
4 
for the twins had been located.  During the period in which 
Darryl and Durrell remained in foster care, they nevertheless 
continued contact with Margaret H. and their other siblings. 
 
¶7 
The State filed a petition for the termination of 
parental rights on May 11, 1998.  Subsequently, in the first 
phase 
of 
the 
termination 
proceeding, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined that grounds existed to terminate the rights of Carol 
H.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415(1)(a)2 and 48.415(6).  Upon the 
finding of grounds to terminate parental rights, the court 
proceeded to the second phase of the proceeding.  The court held 
a dispositional hearing under Wis. Stat. § 48.427 to determine 
whether the termination of parental rights would be in the best 
interests of the twins.  During the hearing, the circuit court 
accepted testimony from two psychologists, two social workers, a 
maternal aunt, Debra G., and Margaret H. 
 
¶8 
The psychologists and the social workers expressed a 
preference for placement of the twins with Debra G., followed by 
adoption.  They opined that she would provide both stability and 
attention to the particularized needs of Darryl and Durrell, who 
were diagnosed with Reactive-Attachment and Attention-Deficit 
disorders.  However, one of the psychologists stated his concern 
that the twins would suffer harm if contacts with Margaret H. 
and their other siblings were discontinued.   
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
5 
 
¶9 
Debra G. testified that she intended to foster the 
twins' relationship with their birth family and that she 
envisioned continued visitation even upon adoption.  Evidence 
revealed that Debra G. had initiated visits with the twins' 
former foster family and that she had encouraged and maintained 
the twins' contact with Margaret H. and their other siblings. 
 
¶10 At the close of testimony in the dispositional 
hearing, the circuit court issued its oral decision, which was 
later memorialized in a April 6, 1999 written order including 
the findings of facts and conclusions of law.  After thanking 
Debra G. for being a "godsend" for the twins, the court 
continued: 
 
 
I want you to realize that your efforts, the 
efforts of your family do not go unrecognized by this 
Court.  And I am certain that you will have a lasting 
and lifelong imprint on the lives of these children. 
 
 
But when I weigh that against the efforts of 
[Margaret H.], the fact that she is the grandmother 
and guardian of these children, and although the 
record is – evidence on both sides of the issue on 
whether or not the relationship is substantial, this 
Court finds that it is a substantial relationship, and 
I also find it would be harmful to these boys to sever 
that relationship.  [Margaret H.] has never wavered in 
her desire or her love for her grandchildren.  She has 
had many difficulties to overcome. . . . 
 
 
 
Although the mother clearly has abandoned or 
failed to assume parental responsibility for these 
boys . . . Margaret [H.] has been trying. 
 
 
 
She has made every attempt to put herself in a 
position and at this time I just can't take that away 
from her. 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
6 
 
 
¶11 The court of appeals reversed and remanded.  First, 
the court set forth the appropriate legal standard governing the 
disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights: the best 
interests of the child.  Then, it delineated the factors a 
circuit court must examine in determining whether a termination 
lies in the best interests of the child.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(3). 
¶12 After noting that the circuit court had failed to 
consider the entire range of factors enumerated under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(3), and had also failed to apply the appropriate legal 
standard, the court of appeals specifically stated: 
Significantly, the [circuit] court's focus on what we 
have denominated as point one in its expressed 
rationale is, on its face, wrong; no one – not Debra 
G., not any of the psychologists, not any of the 
social workers, and not even the grandmother opined 
that either termination or continued placement with 
Debra G. would sever the twins' relationships with 
their blood relatives.  Thus, absent some support in 
the record, and we perceive none, the [circuit] 
court's 
apparent 
assumption 
that 
the 
twins' 
relationships with their blood relatives would be 
severed is "clearly erroneous." (emphasis supplied).   
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to Darryl T.-H. and 
Durrell T.-H., No. 99-1441, unpublished slip op., 7-8 (Ct. App. 
July 27, 1999).  The court of appeals then reversed and remanded 
the case for a consideration of all of the relevant factors and 
an application of the appropriate legal standard under its 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3). 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
7 
 
¶13 This case presents essentially one issue for review: 
whether 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
misinterpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(3)(c) in rejecting the circuit court's assumption that 
the twins' relationship with Margaret H. would be severed upon 
the termination of parental rights.  The resolution of this 
issue initially entails statutory interpretation, which is a 
question of law that we decide independently of the decisions 
rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals.  In re 
the Termination of Parental Rights of Brittany H., 2000 WI 28, 
¶16, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607. 
 
¶14 Our goal in statutory interpretation is to discern the 
intent of the legislature.  State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 
724, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999).  We look first to the language of 
the statute.  Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 
548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  If the language is clear, we need not 
look further to determine the meaning of the statute.  State v. 
Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 676, 563 N.W.2d 528 (1997). 
 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.426(3) sets forth the factors a 
circuit 
court 
must 
examine 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 
child.  The statute provides: 
 
 
FACTORS. In considering the best interests of the 
child under this section the court shall consider but 
not be limited to the following: 
 
 
 
 
(a) The likelihood of the child’s adoption after 
termination. 
 
 
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the 
time of the disposition and, if applicable, at the 
time the child was removed from the home. 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
8 
 
(c)  Whether 
the 
child 
has 
substantial 
relationships with the parent or other family members, 
and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever 
these relationships. 
(d)  The wishes of the child. 
(e)  The duration of the separation of the parent 
from the child. 
(f)  Whether the child will be able to enter into 
a more stable and permanent family relationship as a 
result of the termination, taking into account the 
conditions of the child’s current placement, the 
likelihood of future placements and the results of 
prior placements. 
¶16 Subsection (c) represents the focal point of our 
review.  Under this subsection, the circuit court must evaluate 
the existence of “substantial relationships” between a child and 
the child's family, and then gauge whether the child will suffer 
harm from a severance of those relationships.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(3)(c).  The question posed by Margaret H. is whether 
the 
statute 
contemplates 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
legal 
relationship between a child and the child's family or the 
emotional connections existing between them.    
¶17 The term "substantial," which modifies "relationships" 
in the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(c), underscores 
that the court's initial examination centers on the emotional 
connections between a child and the child's birth family.  A 
legal relationship either exists or does not exist.  It cannot 
be quantified or measured as "substantial," because a legal 
relationship does not vary in degrees or increments.   
 
¶18 Approached 
from 
another 
angle, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(3)(c) requires courts to consider "whether" there are 
substantial relationships between a child and the child's 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
9 
family.  If we construe these relationships strictly as legal 
relationships, there is no need for the circuit court to assess 
whether such a relationship exists between a child and the 
family.  A legal relationship is created by virtue of the 
child's birth.    
 
¶19 Therefore, the substantial relationships referenced in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(c) include the child's emotional and 
psychological connections to the child's birth family.  These 
emotional and psychological connections might be severed upon 
the termination of parental rights.   
¶20 We have consistently recognized that adoption severs 
the legal rights, connections, and duties between the birth 
family and the child.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Soergel, 154 
Wis. 2d 564, 573-74, 453 N.W.2d 624 (1990); In re Estate of 
Topel, 32 Wis. 2d 223, 227, 145 N.W.2d 162 (1966).  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 48.92.3  The termination of parental rights, which 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.92 provides in relevant part: 
Effect of Adoption.  (1) After the order of adoption 
is entered the relation of parent and child and all the 
rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural 
relation of child and parent thereafter exists between the 
adopted person and the adoptive parents. 
(2) After the order of adoption is entered the 
relationship of parent and child between the adopted person 
and the adopted person's birth parents, unless the birth 
parent is the spouse of the adoptive parent, shall be 
completely altered and all the rights, duties and legal 
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.  
Notwithstanding the extinction of all parental rights under 
this subsection, a court may order reasonable visitation 
under s. 48.925.    
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
10
generally precedes an adoption, likewise yields the same 
outcome.  In re Brandon S.S., 179 Wis. 2d 114, 147, 507 N.W.2d 
94 (1993); In re the Custody of Jeffrey A.W., 221 Wis. 2d 36, 
47, 584 N.W.2d 195 (Ct. App. 1998).  
 
¶21 Neither the State nor the guardian ad litem denies the 
legal severance stemming from a termination of parental rights. 
 We thus interpret Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(c) to unambiguously 
require that a circuit court evaluate the effect of a legal 
severance on the broader relationships existing between a child 
and the child's birth family.  These relationships encompass 
emotional and psychological bonds fostered between the child and 
the family. 
 
¶22 We turn next to the court of appeals decision in this 
case, particularly the disputed language that has generated the 
present review.  In discussing the circuit court's examination 
of Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(c), the court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court's finding of a severance under the 
statute was clearly erroneous.  In re Darryl T.-H. and Durrell 
T.-H., unpublished slip op. at 8. 
¶23 The court of appeals' expressed rationale was rooted 
in the record, including Debra G.’s stated intent to continue 
contact between the twins and their birth family, as well as 
evidence of her previous efforts at encouraging the twins' 
visits with their family.  Reasoning that the record offered no 
support to a circuit court finding that the relationship between 
the twins and their family "would be severed," the court of 
appeals rejected as clearly erroneous the circuit court's 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
11
conclusion that the termination of parental rights would sever 
the relationship.  Id. (emphasis in original).      
¶24 This determination by the court of appeals presents a 
source of confusion and concern for Margaret H.  She contends 
that the court of appeals' declaration of circuit court error 
not 
only 
contradicts 
well-established 
law, 
but 
also 
unnecessarily 
forecloses 
the 
circuit 
court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  We share Margaret H.'s concern. 
¶25 As a matter of law, the termination of parental rights 
results in a legal severance of the relationship between a child 
and the child's family.  Brandon S.S., 179 Wis. 2d at 147; 
Jeffrey A.W., 221 Wis. 2d at 47.  However, the court of appeals 
approached the issue as a question of fact and concluded that 
because the evidence contained in the record did not reveal an 
actual severance, the circuit court's conclusion was "on its 
face, wrong."  In re Darryl T.-H. and Durrell T.-H., unpublished 
slip op. at 8.  In vocal defense of the court of appeals, the 
State and the guardian ad litem assert that the court of appeals 
was justified in focusing on whether the termination of parental 
rights would lead to an actual severance of ties between the 
twins and their family.    
¶26 This approach, however, conflicts with precedent and 
is 
based 
on 
an 
erroneous 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(3)(c).  The statute directs focus on the legal 
severance resulting from a termination of parental rights and 
requires courts to assess the harmful effect of this legal 
severance on the emotional and psychological attachments the 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
12
child has formed with his or her birth family.  There remains no 
doubt under the law that a termination of parental rights works 
a legal severance.  
¶27 The ultimate determination of whether to terminate 
parental rights is discretionary with the circuit court.  In re 
the Termination of Parental Rights of Michael I.O., 203 Wis. 2d 
148, 150, 551 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1996).  As Margaret H. 
asserts, the court of appeals' statutory interpretation severely 
limits the circuit court's discretionary authority to determine 
whether the termination of parental rights lies in the best 
interest 
of 
the 
child. 
Under 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation, the circuit court will be precluded from 
considering the adverse effects stemming from the dissolution of 
the legal rights and duties of the birth family. 
¶28 Moreover, the circuit court will apparently no longer 
be afforded the flexibility to discount informal visitation 
arrangements.  Instead, the court must allow the strength of 
promises and past efforts to guide its decision-making process, 
without consideration that a promise made today may be broken in 
the future.  This complete reliance on an adoptive parent's 
promises to continue the child’s visits with the birth family, 
as well as past efforts to do so, unnecessarily forecloses the 
circuit court's discretion and frustrates the court's evaluative 
role in determining whether to terminate parental rights. 
 
¶29 To the extent that the court of appeals’ statement may 
be interpreted as insisting that the circuit court at least 
consider Debra G.'s promise to continue contact between the 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
13
twins and 
their birth 
family, we 
note that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(3)(c) requires only that the circuit court examine the 
impact of a legal severance on the broader relationships 
existing between a child and his or her family.  In its 
discretion, the court may afford due weight to an adoptive 
parent's stated intent to continue visitation with family 
members, although we cannot mandate the relative weight to be 
placed on this factor.   
¶30 In this case, the court may certainly choose to 
examine the probability that Debra G. will be faithful to her 
promise, at the same time bearing in mind that such promises are 
legally unenforceable once 
the termination 
and 
subsequent 
adoption are complete.  See Patricia A. Hintz, Comment, 
Grandparents' Visitation Rights Following Adoption: Expanding 
Traditional Boundaries in Wisconsin, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 483, 503 
(1994).  The circuit court may within its discretion consider 
her good faith promise, but it should not be bound to hinge its 
determination on that legally unenforceable promise.  
 
¶31 Notwithstanding 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
erroneous 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(c), we agree with its 
decision to remand this case for further proceedings.  The 
record indicates that the circuit court failed to consider all 
of the relevant statutory factors enumerated under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(3) in its dismissal of the petition to terminate 
parental rights.  Margaret H. does not contest that the circuit 
court failed to articulate all of the applicable factors.  She 
agrees that the case should be remanded. 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
14
¶32 An appellate court will sustain the circuit court's 
ultimate determination in a proceeding to terminate parental 
rights if there is a proper exercise of discretion.  Brandon 
S.S., 179 Wis. 2d at 150.  A proper exercise of discretion 
requires the circuit court to apply the correct standard of law 
to the facts at hand.  In the Interest of Nadia S., 219 Wis. 2d 
296, 305, 581 N.W.2d 182 (1998).   
¶33 The best interests of the child is the polestar of all 
determinations under ch. 48, the Children's Code.  Brandon S.S., 
179 Wis. 2d at 149.  See also In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 
2d 540, 546-47, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01 
expresses this sentiment by stating that the best interests of 
the child is the paramount consideration in proceedings under 
the chapter. 
¶34 Accordingly, the proper legal standard governing a 
proceeding to terminate parental rights is the best interests of 
the child.  Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).  The factors that give 
contour 
to 
the 
standard 
are 
codified 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(3) and serve to guide courts in gauging whether 
termination is the appropriate disposition.4  
¶35 While it is within the province of the circuit court 
to determine where the best interests of the child lie, the 
record should reflect adequate consideration of and weight to 
each factor.  The record here reveals that the circuit court 
                     
4 See also Judith Sperling Newton, Voluntary Termination of 
Parental Rights and Adoption: A Practical Handbook for Judges, 
Lawyers, and Human Service Providers, §§ 2.15-2.21 (1990). 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
15
failed to apply the best interests of the child standard and did 
not 
consider 
other 
pertinent 
factors 
besides 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
48.426(3)(c). 
 
Although 
an 
evaluation 
of 
substantial 
relationships and the harm of a legal severance is indeed 
critical to the court's determination, exclusive focus on any 
one factor is inconsistent with the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(3).   
¶36 As the court of appeals observed, the record indicates 
that the circuit court apparently gave paramount consideration 
to Margaret H.'s interests rather than to the interests of 
Darryl and Durrell.  Failure to apply the appropriate legal 
standard constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion, and 
the court of appeals properly remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of the relevant legal standard.  The 
circuit court on remand must evaluate all of the applicable 
factors enumerated under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3), while focusing 
on the best interests of Darryl and Durrell.  
 
¶37 The State urges us to decide the termination issue as 
a matter of law and order the termination of parental rights in 
this case.5  We have on prior occasion noted the various 
approaches an appellate court may pursue when faced with 
inadequate findings.  An appellate court may: 1) look to an 
available memorandum for findings and conclusions; 2) review the 
                     
5 Additionally, the State insists we determine that the 
circuit court's finding of a "substantial relationship" between 
the twins and Margaret H. is clearly erroneous.  The State has 
waived the argument, however, by failing to raise it before the 
court of appeals.  Hence, we need not address this argument. 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
16
record anew and affirm if a preponderance of evidence clearly 
supports the judgment; 3) reverse if the judgment is not so 
supported; or 4) remand for further findings and conclusions.  
In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights to T.R.M., 
100 Wis. 2d 681, 688, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981).   
¶38 However, we have expressed a preference for remanding 
to the circuit court when confronted with inadequate findings, 
particularly in family law or domestic relations actions.  Id.  
Notwithstanding the sparse findings and conclusions in this 
case, we will not curtail the circuit court's discretion in this 
matter and substitute our judgment.  An examination of the 
record is seldom adequate to render factual determinations that 
lie squarely within the province of the circuit court.  Id. at 
689.  We thus decline to follow the State's recommended course 
of action. 
¶39 On remand, the circuit court should conduct further 
proceedings to determine the best interests of the twins in 
light of the present circumstances.6  We recognize that the 
consideration of present circumstances may delay the permanent 
placement of Darryl and Durrell, and we are mindful of the need 
                     
6 We note that on a remand to address the appropriate 
grounds for the termination of parental rights, the relevant 
time period remains the time of the original hearing.  See In 
the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights to Kegel, 85 
Wis. 2d 574, 582, 271 N.W.2d 114 (1978); State ex rel. Lewis v. 
Lutheran Soc. Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).  
However, on a remand of the disposition to address whether 
termination would be in the best interests of the child, the 
circuit court should examine the present circumstances.   
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
17
for finality and stability in their lives.  Yet, the twins have 
not remained frozen in time.  During the course of these 
proceedings, 
they 
have 
had 
the 
opportunity 
to 
develop 
relationships with both their birth family and Debra G.  It 
would defy the best interests of Darryl and Durrell to ignore 
these developments.   The circuit court, however, should hasten 
to conduct a new hearing within 60 days.  
 
¶40 In sum, we determine that the court of appeals 
misinterpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.426(3)(c) in 
rejecting the 
circuit court's conclusion that the termination of parental 
rights would sever the relationship between Margaret H. and her 
grandsons.  Although the court of appeals erroneously determined 
that there would be no severance based on the facts of the 
record, it nevertheless properly remanded this case to the 
circuit court for a consideration of all of the applicable 
factors under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3).  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.- The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
  
 
 
No. 
99-1441 
 
 
1