Title: State Ex Rel. Demers v. Miami Circuit Court

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

249 Ind. 616 (1968)
233 N.E.2d 777
STATE OF INDIANA EX REL. DEMERS
v.
MIAMI CIRCUIT COURT.
No. 1167S125.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed February 19, 1968.
R.M. Rhodes, of Peru, for relator.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, Rex Phillip Killian, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
The relator filed a petition for a writ of mandate requesting that the Miami Circuit Court, Miami County, Indiana, and the Judge thereof discharge the relator for delay in her trial under Rule 1-4D of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of State of Indiana v. Eleanor Demers, No. CR-16-67.
*617 The chronological order of events prior to the filing of the petition are as follows.
It is the relator's contention that she was denied her right for a "speedy" trial pursuant to Indiana Supreme Court Rule 1-4D, and Article 1, § 12 of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides that:
This constitutional guarantee is implemented by Supreme Court Rule 1-4D which provides in pertinent part that:
This court has heretofore stated that a defendant who is charging delay in a petition for discharge under Burns' Ind. *620 Stat. §§ 9-1402 and 9-1403 has the burden to show that the delay complained of was caused by the state and not by the defendant. Epps v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 515, 524, 192 N.E.2d 459; Durrett v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 692, 219 N.E.2d 814. The same burden is upon the defendant in the application of Supreme Court Rule 1-4D.
The defendant was given her opportunity to sustain this burden on October 14, 1967 at which time the court heard the evidence which was submitted on her behalf, and the trial court found that she had not sustained this burden.
In the case of State of Indiana ex rel. Milan Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court (1965), 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21 it is stated that the Supreme Court by its Rule 1-4D supra, did not create the substantive right of a speedy and prompt trial; that right was given by the Constitution. The rule merely prescribed the procedure and method under which that right may be obtained in a judicial proceeding.
In the case on appeal, the rule is certainly applicable. The defendant, however, has not sustained her burden of showing the delay was not her fault. The relator filed an answer of temporary insanity on May 26, 1967 necessarily resulting in delay which was not caused by the state.
Defendant's petition for funds with which to employ a psychiatrist to determine her present sanity made operative the sanity hearing provision, Burns' § 9-1706a, supra, since it placed the defendant's sanity in issue. The court became bound at that juncture to appoint two physicians to examine the defendant to testify as to their findings. Burns' § 9-1706a, supra, states the following:
This was instituted by relator's petition and therefore she can not thereafter claim her right to a speedy trial has been *621 violated for delays caused by the proceedings which she had requested.
Relator contends that a review of the calendar of the Miami Circuit Court for the months of July and August, 1967, indicates that very few cases were disposed of during this period and that the case at bar could have been tried within the prescribed time even though Judge Dice informed both counsel at arraignment that the jury trial calendar was solidly set until the week beginning November 27, 1967.
This had been previously settled in a case heretofore handed down by this court, Epps v. State, supra. The court stated: "The old adage that hindsight is better than foresight applies to trial courts insofar as their business is concerned." The court concluded that evidence pertinent to the number of days the court was actually trying cases "... cannot be material due to the settlement, postponement and dismissal of cases ... Thus, the allegation by appellant that there was sufficient time to try the case must fail."
Relator's petition for a permanent writ of mandate is denied and the petition dismissed.
Mote, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 233 N.E.2d 777.