Title: Ingram's Estate v. Ingram

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

6 Utah 2d 149 (1957) 307 P.2d 903 MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN WILLIAM INGRAM, DECEASED, v. HUGH L. INGRAM, MAGGIE I. COULSEN, RUBY BOSWELL AND RUTH MARSHALL, APPELLANTS. No. 8542. Supreme Court of Utah. March 4, 1957. Earl D. Tanner, Salt Lake City, for appellants. Eks Ayn Anderson, Salt Lake City, Udell R. Jensen, Nephi, for respondent. HENRIOD, Justice. Appeal from an order admitting two handwritten documents to probate as a last will. Affirmed with costs to respondents. The two documents read as follows: (1) "Nephi Ut May 21, 40 Dear Neice Dear Nnese The first document was mailed to Viola Manila Brock, or "Nila," who was one of five children of one of decedent's brothers, decedent having had two brothers and three sisters. The five children were mentioned in the first document, being Earl, Bonie, Kennie, Blain and "Nila." Along with the document decedent sent an executed deed conveying to Nila certain of his realty, reserving a life estate, which deed was duly recorded and returned to him. At the same time decedent executed and delivered to Blain a deed conveying the remainder of his realty to the latter reserving a life estate, and also executed and delivered a bill of sale to certain personal property. The deed was recorded and returned to decedent. Some four years later, while decedent was in the hospital he handed Nila a bundle of papers bound by a rubber band, included in which were the second document set out above, $1,300 in savings bonds made payable to decedent and Nila, and other papers. A bank account also was in their joint names. The brothers and sisters of decedent, save the father of the five nephews and nieces mentioned in the first document, attack the documents as being nugatory, uncertain and wholly lacking in language reflecting any animus testandi, urging that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to show planatory of a plan of distribution of property in praesenti. They emphasize their own contention that at the time such document was executed decedent disposed of all his property, and that an animus testandi therefore was inconsistent with his actions. We believe such a contention to be an ipse dixit, and not an established fact, since, contrary to assertions by witnesses (who could not have known) to the effect that decedent had disposed of all of his property, the document itself indicated that there was a residuum when decedent incorporated an enjoinder therein to the effect that "whatever is left I want you to divide equill," and further asserted that he would place the deeds in a safety box "with other papers and things of value." Such language, in the light of other circumstances, certainly is interpretable as evincing the fact and an intention that some property remained and should pass on the event of death. In addition to language that reasonably would reflect an animus testandi, the document designates those intended to share in "whatever is left," and it leaves little to the imagination as to the fact that decedent definitely did not intend his brothers and sisters to become the objects of his bounty either during or after his lifetime, since he suggested that he was arranging his affairs so as to preclude the possibility that anything "would go to the Sisters and brothers * * * [who] * * * never done me any good." It would be difficult to find stronger language of an intent to disinherit. There are facts in addition to the words of the documents which, if believed by the trial court, as apparently they were, tend to strengthen the trial court's conclusion that the documents were perhaps crude but nonetheless genuine expressions of a testamentary character. Without detailing all such facts, suffice it to point out that the record reflects that decedent harbored considerable affection for his nephews and nieces and little or none for his brothers and sisters. He had lived a block away from one sister without so much as speaking to her for 11 years. He called the nephews and nieces his children, and they frequently brought him food, visited with him and did his laundry, which gestures were not shared nor duplicated by his brothers and sisters who, on the contrary, appear to have shunned him. We are satisfied that there is substantial evidence reflected in the record supporting the decision of the trial court as would preclude us, in a case like this, and under familiar rules of appellate review, from disturbing such decision. Counsel for appellants has called our attention to certain sections of Mr. Page's work on Wills, Lifetime Edition, which enunciate certain elementary principles relating to documents of the nature found here, and we believe that Sec. 46 thereof is particularly apropos under the facts here, and we quote with approval the following: McDONOUGH, C.J., and CROCKETT, WADE, and WORTHEN, JJ., concur.