Title: State Ex Rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. MARION CC

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

242 Ind. 145 (1961)
177 N.E.2d 397
STATE EX REL. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONER
v.
MARION CIRCUIT COURT, NIBLACK, JUDGE.
No. 30,106.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 4, 1961.
*146 Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General and Donald M. Mosiman, Deputy Attorney General, for relator.
William M. Evans, of Indianapolis, for respondent.
ACHOR, J.
This is an original action for a writ of mandate and prohibition. The facts giving rise to this action are as follows:
Thereafter, on April 10, 1961, the Railroad filed its verified complaint for restraining order and injunction in the Marion Circuit Court, which action was entered as Cause No. C61-441 in said court. Pursuant to said complaint for injunctive relief, the Marion Circuit Court issued a temporary restraining order on said date, without notice. Thereafter, on April 17, 1961, relator filed its motion to dissolve said temporary restraining order and dismiss the cause of action on the ground that the Marion Circuit Court was without jurisdiction in the cause. On May 24, 1961, the Marion Circuit Court overruled relator's motion to dissolve and dismiss and thus assumed jurisdiction of the cause.
Relator here challenges the jurisdiction in the Marion Circuit Court over the subject matter in said Cause No. C61-132. This court, on the 13th day of June, 1961, pursuant to the facts above presented, issued a temporary writ of prohibition and alternative writ of mandate.
*148 The jurisdiction of the Marion Circuit Court in this action is subject to challenge for two separate and distinct reasons. First, because of the fact that the Acts of 1957, ch. 189, §§ 1-11, p. 395 [§§ 54-443  54-453, Burns' 1961 Cum. Supp.] provided for a completely new and different procedure to be followed in the judicial review of the orders of the Public Service Commission. Because of the new and comprehensive character of this enactment it must be presumed that the legislature intended that the procedure therein provided for should be exclusive. Section 1 [§ 54-443, Burns' 1961 Cum. Supp.] provides in part as follows:
The Appellate Court of Indiana, in Boone Co. REMC et al. v. Pub. Serv. Com. (1958), 129 Ind. App. 175, 185-186, 155 N.E.2d 149, discussed the jurisdictional aspect of § 1 [§ 54-443, supra], in the following language:
Additionally, § 7 [§ 54-449, Burns', supra] provides that:
However, in support of his position, respondent asserts although the Appellate Court acquired jurisdiction to issue injunctions by the 1957 Act, supra, said act does not deprive the respondent of the power to grant injunctions and therefore that the Marion Circuit Court continues to have both inherent and statutory power to grant injunctions for the protection of property rights. In support of this position, respondent cites the cases of Vandalia R. Co. v. Schnull (1919), 188 Ind. 87, 122 N.E. 225; Department of Treasury v. Ridgely, Executrix (1936), 211 Ind. 9, 4 N.E.2d 557; State ex rel. Nicely v. Wildey et al. (1935), 209 Ind. 1, 197 N.E. 844, and Evans v. International Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.Ind. 1948).
However, each of the above cited cases is distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar. Here *150 the statute, as amended, covered the total area regarding the procedure that should be followed with respect to the proceedings of the Public Service Commission. The statute not only made provision regarding the proceedings before said body; it also made provision regarding proceedings for the judicial review of the actions of said body, whether such review was in the nature of an appeal or a proceedings in equity to enjoin the action of the Commission. In either of the latter instances the statute provided that the relief should be in the Appellate Court of the State of Indiana.
It is true that the statute does not specifically negative the pre-existing right of the respondent to grant injunctive relief with respect to the action of the Public Service Commission; however, where as here, the statute purports to cover the whole area of procedure as related to an administrative body created by statute such as the Public Service Commission, it is contemplated that such procedure shall be exclusively followed unless otherwise provided. Upon this issue this court has stated:
For the reasons above stated the Appellate Court, and not the Marion Circuit Court, had exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings in injunction against the Public Service Commission.
Secondly, and in addition to the reasons above stated, the respondent court is without jurisdiction to consider the subject matter of this particular case for the further reason that the parties had previously submitted the same issue to the Appellate Court for judicial determination and had there received a final decision upon the issue. The identical subject matter having been previously presented, considered and adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, that court retained jurisdiction of the subject matter to the exclusion of all other courts. State v. Bridwell (1960), 241 Ind. 135, 170 N.E.2d 233; State ex rel. McClure etc. v. Marion Sup. Ct. etc. (1959), 239 Ind. 472, 158 N.E.2d 264; State ex rel. St. Bk. of Greentown v. Howard C.C. (1958), 238 Ind. 448, 151 N.E.2d 515.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the writ of prohibition and alternative writ of mandate heretofore issued is made permanent.
Landis, C.J., Arterburn, Bobbitt, and Jackson, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 177 N.E.2d 397.