Title: STATE v ISOM

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 81-18 I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, HOWARD MICHAEL ISOM, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lewis and Clark Honorable P e t e r Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Leo Gallagher argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Maynard argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Graveley, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Steve Garrison argued, Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana Filed: JAN 2 1 1982 Submitted: September 17, 1981 Decided : 21 U)BZ Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendant was charged by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous d r u g s w i t h i n t e n t t o s e l l , a s provided i n s e c t i o n 49-9-103(1), MCA. H e pleaded n o t g u i l t y . H i s motion t o s u p p r e s s was denied by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L e w i s and Clark County. A f t e r a j u r y t r i a l d e f e n d a n t was found g u i l t y of f e l o n y p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous d r u g s , a l e s s e r included o f f e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n w i t h i n t e n t t o s e l l . On October 1 5 , 1980, t h e d e f e n d a n t was sentenced t o f i v e y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , w i t h two y e a r s suspended. Defendant a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n . Based on i n f o r m a t i o n from an informant, t h e L e w i s and C l a r k County S h e r i f f ' s Department p l a c e d under s u r v e i l l . a n c e t h e r e s i d e n c e l o c a t e d a t 1014 E l m S t r e e t , Helena, Montana. About noon on January 11, 1980, two deputy s h e r i f f s observed a man l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s John Stemple, a s u s p e c t e d drug d e a l e r , l e a v e t h e E l m S t r e e t r e s i d e n c e . H e was c a r r y i n g a l a r g e g r e e n garbage bag which he p u t i n t o a t o o l box i n t h e back o f h i s pickup t r u c k parked i n f r o n t of t h e r e s i d e n c e . Stemple went back i n t o t h e r e s i d e n c e . A brown Ford s t a t i o n wagon p u l l e d up. A man l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e d e f e n d a n t g o t o u t of t h e s t a t i o n wagon and went i n t o t h e r e s i d e n c e . Stemple t h e n l e f t t h e r e s i d e n c e and drove away i n h i s pickup, followed by t h e two d e p u t i e s i n an unmarked c a r . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e p u t i e s , S t e m p l e made e v a s i v e maneuvers by t u r n i n g s e v e r a l c o r n e r s s h a r p l y . They l o s t s i g h t of Stemple and c a l l e d f o r t h e a i d o f a t h i r d o f f i c e r . The t h i r d o f f i c e r s t o p p e d S t e m p l e w i t h i n a m a t t e r o f minutes. The o f f i c e r s searched S t e m p l e ' s t r u c k b u t cou1.d n o t f i n d t h e g r e e n garbage bag t h a t Stemple had placed i n t h e t o o l box. Because of a r e c e n t s n o w f a l l t h e o f f i c e r s were a b l e t o r e t r a c e t h e t r a c k s of t h e pickup. The t r a c k s l e d t o an a l l e y behind a g a s s t a t i o n where t h e y found a l a r g e g r e e n garbage bag which a p p a r e n t l y had been pl.aced t h e r e r e c e n t l y s i n c e it was n o t covered w i t h snow. The d e p u t i e s looked i n s i d e t h e bag and found it f u l l of m a r i j u a n a c o n t a i n e d i n s m a l l p l a s t i c bags. An o f f i c e r went t o g e t a s e a r c h w a r r a n t f o r t h e E l m S t r e e t r e s i d e n c e and f o r a maroon C h r y s l e r Cordoba parked i n f r o n t of t h e r e s i d e n c e which t h e o f f i c e r s b e l i e v e d had been used t o t r a n s p o r t n a r c o t i c s . A s e a r c h w a r r a n t f o r both t h e r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r was i s s u e d by a j u s t i c e of t h e peace. The w a r r a n t a p p l i c a t i o n c o n t a i n e d t h e above i n f o r m a t i o n , e x c e p t t h e r e was no mention of t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e being based on an i n f o r m a n t ' s t i p and no mention t h a t John Stemple was a s u s p e c t e d drug d e a l e r . A t l e a s t e i g h t o f f i c e r s and t h e county a t t o r n e y executed t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t . When t h e o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a t t h e E l m S t r e e t r e s i d e n c e , t h e y n o t i c e d t h a t t h e motor was running on t h e C h r y s l e r . A couple of o f f i c e r s s t a y e d w i t h t h e c a r , w h i l e t h e o t h e r s went t o s e a r c h t h e r e s i d e n c e . Defendant answered t h e door of t h e r e s i d e n c e . The o f f i c e r s handed him t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t a s t h e y e n t e r e d . Defendant was o n l y wearing a p a i r of b l u e j e a n s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was h a l f - d r e s s e d because he was g e t t i n g ready t o t a k e a shower. Defendant was o r d e r e d t o sit on t h e couch and n o t t o l e a v e t h e room. Defendant was t h e o n l y occupant of t h e r e s i d e n c e when t h e o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d . He was a g u e s t of h i s u n c l e who r e n t e d t h e r e s i d e n c e . He had been s l e e p i n g on t h e couch i n t h e l i v i n g room and had s t o r e d h i s belongings i n t h e l i v i n g room and i n a bedroom. The o f f i c e r s s e a r c h e d t h e e n t i r e h o u s e , f i n d i n g marijuana r e s i d u e and drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a i n n e a r l y e v e r y room, i n c l u d i n g t h e l i v i n g room, bathroom and k i t c h e n . A s m a l l p l a s t i c bag of marijuana was found i n t h e bedroom of d e f e n d a n t ' s u n c l e . One uniformed o f f i c e r was t o l d t o s t a y w i t h d e f e n d a n t and watch him w h i l e t h e o t h e r s completed t h e s e a r c h . He asked d e f e n d a n t i f he owned t h e c a r parked i n f r o n t of t h e r e s i d e n c e . Defendant s a i d he d i d n o t own t h e c a r . I n response t o f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n i n g , d e f e n d a n t s a i d he d i d n o t know who d i d own t h e c a r and d i d n o t know where t h e keys t o t h e c a r ' s t r u n k were l o c a t e d . Defendant was n o t a r r e s t e d p r i o r t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and had n o t been g i v e n a Miranda warning. The o f f i c e r s searched t h e c a r . Upon f i n d i n g t h e glove compartment and t h e trunk locked, t h e y f o r c e d t h e g l o v e compartment open, and i n s i d e it t h e y found a key t o open t h e t r u n k . I n s i d e t h e trunk t h e o f f i c e r s found s e v e r a l l a r g e g r e e n g a r b a g e b a g s which c o n t a i n e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y e i g h t y t o n i n e t y pounds of marijuana. A f t e r t h e s e a r c h of t h e r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r , d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d . A t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g , d e f e n d a n t i n t r o d u c e d evidence t o show t h a t he owned t h e c a r i n which t h e m a r i j u a n a was found . T h i s c a s e may be r e s o l v e d by l o o k i n g a t t h e t h r e e primary i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d : 1. Whether t h e defendant h a s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e s e a r c h of t h e r e s i d e n c e where he was an o v e r n i g h t g u e s t ; 2. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of . h i s c a r and t h e garbage bags found i n i t s t r u n k when he denied ownership of t h e c a r a t t h e time of t h e s e a r c h ; and 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n its d e n i a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s evidence s e i z e d from t h e r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r . With r e s p e c t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of t h e house, t h e S t a t e would have t h i s Court adopt t h e p e r s p e c t i v e and r e a s o n i n g of t h e most r e c e n t United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s which have o v e r r u l e d t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a n d i n g r u l e of J o n e s v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697. See, United S t a t e s v. S a l v u c c i ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619, and Rawlings v. Kentucky ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633. J o n e s had s e t down two a l t e r n a t i v e holdings: (1) when t h e f r u i t s of a s e a r c h a r e proposed t o be used a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t r i a l , he h a s " a u t o m a t i c s t a n d i n g " t o c o n t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e s e a r c h ; and ( 2 ) anyone " l e g i t i - mately on t h e premises where a s e a r c h o c c u r s may c h a l l e n g e its l e g a l i t y by way of a motion t o s u p p r e s s " . J o n e s , 362 U.S. a t 267. The purpose of t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a n d i n g r u l e was t o quash t h e " v i c e of p r o s e c u t o r i a l s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n " i n which t h e S t a t e could charge a person w i t h p o s s e s s i o n a s a crime, and a t t h e same time c l a i m t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o g i v e t h e person s t a n d i n g t o c h a l l e n g e t h e legality of the search or seizure. See, Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208. In overruling the automatic standing rule in Jones, both Salvucci and Rawlings relied heavily upon the earlier case of Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387. In Rakas, the Court stated that the Jones test of "legitimately on the premises" cannot be taken in its full sweep beyond the facts of that one case. Rather, said the Court, the true test of whether a Fourth Amendment right has been violated is found in Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, in which the Supreme Court said that the capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Fourth Amendment --- has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Notwithstanding the limitations placed on Jones, the Court in Rakas, and again in Salvucci, emphasized that ownership is not a key element in determining standing. The test for standing is not to be based on distinctions out of property and tort law: "In defining the scope of that interest, we adhere to the view expressed in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like ought not to control." See Jones, 362 U.S. at 266; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91; and Rawlinqs, 448 U.S. at 105. The controlling view, then, seems to be that expressed in Mancusi v. DeForte (1968), 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1.154, i n which t h e Court s a i d t h a t t h e Katz t e s t of " ' l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n of p r i v a c y ' makes it c l e a r t h a t c a p a c i t y t o c l a i m t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e Fourth Amendment depends n o t upon a p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n t h e invaded p l a c e , b u t upon whether t h e a r e a was o n e i n which t h e r e was a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n of --- freedom from governmental i n t r u s i o n . " See Mancusi, 392 U.S. a t 368. (Emphasis added.) Following t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t ownership is n o t t h e c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t o r i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f s t a n d i n g , a l t h o u g h it is one f a c t o r t o c o n s i d e r , t h e Supreme Court h a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e a c t u a l h o l d i n g i n J o n e s was n o t o v e r r u l e d . I n Rawlings, t h e Court r e f e r r e d t o p a r t s of Rakas which e x p l a i n e d why t h e d e f e n d a n t i n J o n e s would s t i l l have s t a n d i n g under t h e r e c e n t narrow tests f o r s t a n d i n g . The Court i n Rakas reasoned t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n J o n e s , who was u s i n g an apartment w i t h t h e t e n a n t ' s p e r m i s s i o n , would c o n t i n u e t o have s t a n d i n g under t h e r e c e n t tests because t h e d e f e n d a n t " h a d c o m p l e t e d o m i n i o n and c o n t r o l o v e r t h e apartment and could e x c l u d e o t h e r s from it." Rakas, 439 U.S. a t 149. The Court i n Rakas a l s o reasoned t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n Katz, who was i n a phone booth, had s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t a s e a r c h of t h e booth because he had an e x p e c t a t i o n of p r i v a c y when he " s h u t t h e door behind him t o e x c l u d e a l l o t h e r s and p a i d t h e t o l l . " Rakas, 439 U.S. a t 149. I n S t a t e v. A l l e n ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. - , 612 P.2d 199, 37 St.Rep. 919, t h i s Court quoted e x t e n s i v e l y from Rakas, acknowledging t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s between Rakas, J o n e s and Katz. See, A l l e n , 612 P.2d a t 201-202. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court made two f i n d i n g s of f a c t t h a t r e l a t e t o d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of t h e r e s i d e n c e : (1) t h a t defendant was an o v e r n i g h t g u e s t a t t h e r e s i d e n c e which was r e n t e d by h i s u n c l e ; and ( 2 ) t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s t o r e d c l o t h i n g , luggage and o t h e r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n l i m i t e d a r e a s of t h e r e s i d e n c e , none of which included t h e a r e a s where t h e c o n f i s c a t e d evidence was found. Based on t h e above f i n d i n g s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court concluded a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t " t h e d e f e n d a n t , being an o v e r n i g h t g u e s t i n t h e r e s i d e n c e w i t h items s t o r e d o n l y i n a l i m i t e d a r e a t h e r e i n , had no r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n of p r i v a c y i n t h e a r e a s where t h e i t e m s were found, t h e r e f o r e , h a s no s t a n d i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e i r admission." The f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was an o v e r n i g h t g u e s t should n o t c o n t r o l t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of s t a n d i n g , a l t h o u g h it is one f a c t o r t o c o n s i d e r . A s was noted i n t h e above d i s c u s s i o n , p r o t e c t i o n f r o m u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s d o e s n o t depend upon a p r o p e r t y r i g h t i n t h e invaded p l a c e , b u t r a t h e r upon whether t h e a r e a was one i n which t h e r e was a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n of freedom from governmental i n t r u s i o n . See, A l l e n , 612 P.2d a t 202. Moreover, a l t h o u g h t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court must be presumed c o r r e c t upon a p p e a l , S t a t e v . D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 257, 577 P.2d 849, t h e r e c o r d c l e a r l y d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g t h a t c o n f i s c a t e d e v i d e n c e was n o t found i n t h e a r e a s where d e f e n d a n t had s t o r e d h i s p e r s o n a l belongings. Uncontradicted testimony a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t s l e p t on t h e l i v i n g room couch w h i l e he was t h e g u e s t of h i s u n c l e and t h a t he s t o r e d h i s b e l o n g i n g s i n t h e l i v i n g room and i n h i s nephew's bedroom. Although evidence a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g showed t h a t h i s u n c l e ' s bedroom was t h e o n l y a r e a where a s m a l l bag of marijuana was s e i z e d , it was made c l e a r a t t h e t r i a l t h a t evidence was s e i z e d from t h e l i v i n g room t a b l e , from t h e l i v i n g room f i r e p l a c e , b e s i d e a w a l l i n t h e l i v i n g room, and from t h e l i v i n g room c l o s e t . Defendant was t h e s o l e occupant of t h e house a t t h e time t h e s e a r c h was made. Like t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n J o n e s and Katz, d e f e n d a n t could exclude a l l o t h e r s e x c e p t h i s u n c l e and f a m i l y and had dominion and c o n t r o l over t h e premises a t t h e t i m e t h e o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d t h e r e s i d e n c e . I n summary, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t lacked s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of t h e premises must be r e v e r s e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g grounds: (1) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was an o v e r n i g h t g u e s t should n o t c o n t r o l a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y of a s e a r c h of t h e r e s i d e n c e ; ( 2 ) t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t c o n f i s c a t e d evidence was found i n a r e a s where t h e d e f e n d a n t s l e p t and where he s t o r e d h i s belongings; and ( 3 ) t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t s a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was t h e s o l e occupant of t h e r e s i d e n c e a t t h e t i m e of t h e s e a r c h and had c o n t r o l and dominion over it t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of o t h e r s . The S t a t e urges t h i s Court t h a t t h e n e x t i s s u e which must be d i s c u s s e d i s whether d e f e n d a n t had s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of h i s c a r . The S t a t e c l a i m s t h a t because d e f e n d a n t denied h i s ownership of t h e c a r , he waived h i s Fourth Amendment r i g h t s i n it and i n t h e garbage bags found i n i t s t r u n k . The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 4 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 ( 1 ) , MCA, d e p r i v e s t h e d e f e n d a n t of s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of h i s c a r and t h e s e a r c h of t h e garbage bags found i n its t r u n k . S e c t i o n 46-5-103(1), MCA, p r o v i d e s : "No s e a r c h and s e i z u r e , w h e t h e r w i t h o r w i t h o u t w a r r a n t , s h a l l be h e l d i l l e g a l a s t o a d e f e n d a n t i f : " ( 1 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s d i s c l a i m e d any r i g h t t o o r i n t e r e s t i n t h e p l a c e o r o b j e c t s e a r c h e d o r t h e i n s t r u m e n t s , a r t i c l e s , o r t h i n g s s e i z e d ; " The S t a t e ' s argument f a i l s f o r two r e a s o n s : t h e d i s c l a i m e r s t a t u t e must be i n t e r p r e t e d i n l i g h t of t h e F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n ; a n d , a d i s c l a i m e r of a c a r does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y o p e r a t e a s a d i s c l a i m e r of t h e c l o s e d c o n t a i n e r s i n t h e c a r . Although it h a s been held t h a t t h e owner of a c a r o r a c o n t a i n e r w i l l l o s e h i s s t a n d i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e s e a r c h of it i f he abandons it p r i o r t o t h e time of t h e s e a r c h , United S t a t e s v. Anderson ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 4 ) , 500 F.2d 1311; United S t a t e s v. C o l b e r t ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 3 ) , 474 F.2d 174; and United S t a t e s v. M i l l e r (1st C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 589 F.2d 1117, a mere d i s c l a i m e r of ownership i n an e f f o r t t o avoid making an i n c r i m i n a t i n g s t a t e m e n t i n response t o p o l i c e q u e s t i o n i n g should n o t a l o n e be deemed t o c o n s t i t u t e abandonment. See, LaFave, Search and S e i z u r e , Vol. 3 a t 581. Given t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t a d e f e n d a n t d o e s n o t o t h e r w i s e h a v e t o i n c r i m i n a t e himself t o p r e s e r v e h i s Fourth Amendment r i g h t s , a s i n Simmons v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, it is d i f f i c u l t t o understand how a r e f u s a l t o make i n c r i m i n a t i n g admissions i n response t o p o l i c e i n t e r r o g a t i o n can be h e l d t o d e p r i v e a person o f Fourth Amendment s t a n d i n g . To s a y t h a t t h e r e is no F i f t h Amendment v i o l a t i o n because t h e defendznt could have simply chosen t o be s i l e n t is t o i g n o r e t h e whole l i n e of p r i n c i p l e s set down i n Miranda and its progeny. irliranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The point of the Miranda warning was to provide a safeguard against the coercive pressures of in-custody interrogation by police, when those pressures are so great as to undermine an individual's will, compelling him to speak when he would not otherwise do so. 384 U.S. at 467. "Custodial interrogation" was found to be inherently coercive. The Miranda Court defined "custodial interroga- tion" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. Clearly, the Miranda limitations should apply to disclaimers when the State uses them to deprive a person of Fourth Amendment standing. Here, the totality of the circumstances suggests that the disclaimer resulted from "custodial interrogation." The defendant was told to sit on the couch and not leave. A uniformed officer was ordered to watch the defendant and stay with him while five other officers searched the house. The defendant was not free to walk around the house. The disclaimer was elicited from defendant by direct police questioning. Given this coercive atmosphere and the questioning, the State cannot be allowed to use such statements to deprive defendant of his Fourth Amendment rights. Notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment limitations on section 46-5-103(1), MCA, and assuming that the disclaimer could be construed to deprive the defendant of standing to contest the search of the car, in light of Kobbins v. California ( 1981) , U.S. - , 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744, the disclaimer could not be construed to deprive the defendant of standing to contest the search of the garbage bags found in the trunk of the car. In Robbins, the Court held that while police may have conducted a lawful search of an automobile under the auto- mobile exception, they must nevertheless secure a warrant for any container found in the trunk of the car. The Court recognized that the expectation of privacy in a closed container taken from a car is not necessarily less than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of luggage found elsewhere. Following a similar reasoning, it cannot be said that the defendant lost his expectation of privacy in the opaque garbage bags when he disclaimed ownership of the car. While it is arguable that the disclaimer weakened the defendant's expectation of privacy in the car, it cannot be said to have affected his expectation of privacy in the garbage bags. The disclaimer, therefore, in no way affected defendant's standing to contest the search of the garbage bags. The next issue which must be discussed is whether the District Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. As many cases in Montana have held, when a search warrant has been issued, the determination of probable cause must be made solely from the information given to the impartial magistrate and from the four corners of the search warrant application. See, Art. 11, Sec. 11, 1972 Mont. Const.; Thomson v. Onstad (1979), 182 Mont. 119, 594 P.2d 1137, 36 St.Rep. 910; State v. Olson (1979), 181 Mont. 323, 589 P.2d 663, 36 St.Rep. 146; State v. Leistiko (1978), 176 Mont. 434, 578 P.2d 1161; State ex rel. Townsend v. District Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193; Application of Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. Here the evidence is uncontradicted that the only information given to the justice of the peace was the information contained in the search warrant and the search warrant application. Nevertheless, the District Court, in its order denying the motion to suppress, did not 1-ook to the validity of the search warrant and the sufficiency of the information before the neutral magistrate. Rather, the District Court looked to whether the officers had probable cause to search the residence and the vehicle parked in front of the residence. The District Court made the following conclusions of law: "The officer's observation of John Stemple leaving the duplex with a garbage bag later found to contain marijuana,- when joined with the with ~ r i o r knowledae of his drua sale - 4 - - - - - . d . - - - - - involvement, and the information that the ------------ -- officers had received regarding the incoming marijuana shipment, gave the officers probable cause to believe that danqerous drugs or evidence of its possession woild be found in the premises searched and in the vehicle searched." Conclusion of Law No. 3. (Emphasis added.) "The search of the automobile was also justi- fiable under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirements since there was both probable cause and exigent circum- stances. The fact that evidence of dangerous drugs were found in the residence added to and enhanced the probable cause had by the officers for the subsequent Carroll search of the automobile." Conclusion of Law No. 4. From these conclusions of law, it is clear the District Court, in making its determination of probable cause for the searches of the residence and the car, looked beyond the four corners of the search warrant application and was thereby in error. In the above conclusions, the District Court looked to evidence that John Stemple was a known drug dealer and evidence of an informant's tip, neither of which were contained in the search warrant or the warrant's application. Moreover, the District Court's reliance upon the information received from the informant was error since there was nothing in the record to satisfy the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, and Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. There was nothing in the record which showed "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were," and there was nothing in the record showing "the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his information was 'reliable'." Aquilar, 378 U.S. at 114. See also, Leistiko, 578 P.2d at 1163. The District Court's determination of probable cause must, therefore, be vacated, and a new determination of probable cause must be made by looking to the four corners of the search warrant application itself. It is well established in this state what type of facts must be contained in a search warrant application: I1 1 . . . Affidavits relied upon for the issu- ance of search warrants in both federal and state prosecutions must contain sufficient facts to enable an impartial commissioner or magistrate to determine whether probable cause exists under the Fourth Amendment . . . 1 11 State ex rel. Garris v. Wilson (1973), 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d 15, 17, quoting Application of Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. Probable cause exists when the facts and circum- s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e would w a r r a n t an h o n e s t b e l i e f i n t h e mind of a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t man t h a t t h e o f f e n s e h a s been, or is being, committed and " t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y sought e x i s t s a t t h e p l a c e d e s i q n a t e d . " See, S t a t e v. R o b i n e t t e (S.D. 1 9 7 8 ) , 270 N.W.2d 573, 577. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t a p p l i c a t i o n m u s t r e c i t e t h e u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s from which t h e m a g i s t r a t e can determine t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a f f i a n t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c e r t a i n evidence e x i s t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r premises. Nathanson v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159; s e e a l s o , A g u i l a r , s u p r a ; United S t a t e s v. Ventresca ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 1 3 L.Ed.2d 684; and G i o r d e n e l l o v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503. Were t h e f a c t s g i v e n t o t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace s u f f i c i e n t t o i n d i c a t e t h a t marijuana was l o c a t e d a t t h e r e s i d e n c e o r i n t h e c a r parked i n f r o n t of t h e r e s i d e n c e ? W e t h i n k n o t . S t e m p l e ' s mere t a k i n g of an opaque g r e e n garbage bag o u t of a r e s i d e n c e and t h e f i n d i n g of a s i m i l a r g r e e n garbage bag i n an a l l e y near t h e s p o t where t h e d e p u t i e s l o s t s i g h t of S t e m p l e ' s t r u c k were t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace. Such f a c t s do n o t e s t a b l i s h probable c a u s e f o r t h e s e a r c h of t h e r e s i d e n c e . The c o n n e c t i o n between t h e bag found i n t h e a l l e y and t h e r e s i d e n c e is tenuous a t b e s t . Likewise, t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t a p p l i c a t i o n f a i l s t o s e t o u t any underlying f a c t s or c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t e s t a b l i s h p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o s e a r c h t h e c a r parked i n f r o n t of t h e r e s i d e n c e . The o n l y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e c a r i n t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t is: ". . . t h a t t h e r e s i d e n t o f t h e a b o v e d e s c r i b e d duplex u n i t is t h e owner and was t h e d r i v e r of t h e d e s c r i b e d c a r when it a r r i v e d a t t h e d e s c r i b e d r e s i d e n c e e a r l y i n t h e morning of J a n u a r y 11, 1980 and your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t s a i d v e h i c l e was used t o convey t h e m a r i j u a n a and o t h e r d a n g e r o u s d r u g s t o t h e r e s i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d . I 1 - (Emphasis added.) A mere a f f i r m a n c e of b e l i e f o r s u s p i c i o n by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , a b s e n t any underlying f a c t s o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of a s e a r c h w a r r a n t . See, A p p l i c a t i o n of Gray, s u p r a , 473 P.2d a t 536; Nathanson, s u p r a . Absent probable c a u s e , t h e s e a r c h e s of t h e house and c a r were i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e Fourth Amendment, and t h e evidence r e s u l t i n g from t h e s e s e a r c h e s is n o t a d m i s s i b l e a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . Mapp v. Ohio ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 367 U.S. 643, 8 1 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. C l e a r l y , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e o f t h e m a r i j u a n a s e i z e d from t h e h o u s e and c a r c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r s i n c e such evidence c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t . S t a t e v. Langan ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 151 Mont. 558, 445 P.2d 565; S t a t e v. West ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 617 P.2d 1298, 37 St.Rep. 1772. S i n c e no o t h e r evidence i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l would s u p p o r t a c o n v i c t i o n , a new t r i a l cannot be g r a n t e d . The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court is r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e dismissed. We concur: Chief Justice Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell concurring: I concur in the result. 7 A - a 4 . w - 4 Chief Justice Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring: I concur in the result. M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d i s s e n t s : I would hold t h a t t h e defendant does n o t have standing t o c o n t e s t t h e search of h i s c a r and t h e o b j e c t s i n s i d e t h e c a r . A review of t h e search and s e i z u r e provisions of our code i s enlightening. Section 46-5-101, MCA, describes t h e b a s i s f o r a search and s e i z u r e and a p p l i e s where a search i s made i n c i d e n t t o a lawful a r r e s t , by t h e a u t h o r i t y of a v a l i d search warrant, under t h e a u t h o r i t y of a r i g h t of lawful inspection, and of p a r t i c u l a r import here, "with t h e consent of t h e accused . . ." H e r e , s e c t i o n 46-5-101 i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e i n any way. Note t h a t i f t h e defendant had consented t o t h e search of h i s automobile, t h e code s e c t i o n would have been applicable. Section 46-5-102, MCA, d e s c r i b e s t h e manner i n which a peace o f f i c e r may search following a lawful a r r e s t , and again, t h i s s e c t i o n i s n o t d i r e c t l y applicable. Next, s e c t i o n 46-5-103, MCA, t h e s e c t i o n quoted i n t h e majority opinion, provides i n p a r t : "No search and s e i z u r e , whether with --- o r with- o u t warrant, s h a l l be held t o be i l l e s a l a s t o a defendant i f : " ( 1 ) t h e defendant has disclaimed any r i g h t t o o r i n t e r e s t i n t h e . . . o b j e c t searched o r t h e instruments, a r t i c l e s , o r t h i n g s seized." (Underscoring added.) Section 46-5-103, MCA, is a c o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Nelson (1956), 130 Mont. 466, 304 P.2d 1 1 1 0 . The Court affirmed t h e r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o suppress evidence seized i n a search of an automobile without a search warrant, where t h e defendant Nelson had disclaimed any ownership o r r i g h t t o possession of t h e c a r o r of any property taken therefrom. This Court quoted from an e a r l i e r Montana case and s t a t e d : "What w a s s a i d by t h i s c o u r t i n S t a t e ex r e l . Teague v. D i s t r i c t Court [1925], 73 Mont. 438, 4 4 1 , 236 [P.] page 257, 258, r u l e s t h i s case s o f a r a s t h e motion t o suppress is concerned. There t h i s c o u r t s a i d : "'Although t h e a c t s of t h e o f f i c e r s i n search- i n g t h i s tunnel and s e i z i n g t h e s t i l l and mash found i n it may have been unlawful a s t o t h e possessors of t h e tunnel, s i n c e r e l a t o r d i s - claimed t h e r i g h t of possession of both t h e tunnel and i t s contents, he i s n o t i n a posi- t i o n t o complain, a s according t o h i s own s t a t e - ments, he had no r i g h t i n them and t h e acts of t h e o f f i c e r s t h e r e f o r e were n o t unlawful a s t o him. I t i s hardly necessary t o c i t e authori- t i e s t o s u s t a i n t h i s determination, but r e f e r - ence i s made t o D r i s k i l l v. United S t a t e s , 8 C i r . , 281 F. 146, and Keith v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 362, 247 S.W. 42. I n each of which a l i k e r e s u l t was reached under analogous f a c t s . ' "This i s t h e r u l e throughout t h e country, see annotations i n 24 A.L.R., page 1425; 32 A.L.R., page 415; 4 1 A.L.R., page 1151; 52 A.L.R., page 487; 88 A.L.R., page 365; e t seq.; 134 A.L.R., page 831; 150 A.L.R., page 577." S t a t e v. Nelson, 130 Mont. a t 471, 304 P.2d a t 1113. This d e c i s i o n has not been overruled o r modified. E l ledy- The same view i s expressed in- YL v. United S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r . 1966), 359 F2d. 4 0 4 , i n which t h e Court of Appeals denied t h e motion t o suppress evidence, where, i n response t o an o f f i c e r ' s question a s t o what was i n a package, t h e defendant had s a i d , " I d o n ' t know. I t ' s n o t mine." The c o u r t s t a t e d i n p a r t : "Such disclaimer of ownership by t h e a p p e l l a n t i s analogous t o abandonment. Cf. Abel v. United S t a t e s , 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). I n both cases t h e same message, by a c t o r word, is d e l i v e r e d t o t h e o f f i c e r : t h a t a s t o t h e a c t o r o r speaker t h e r e is no i n t e r e s t which would be invaded by search o r s e i z u r e . Lack of warrant does n o t under t h e s e circumstances render search o r s e i z u r e unreasonable a s t o t h e a c t o r o r speaker." Gelledge v. United S t a t e s , 359 F.2d a t 405. I n a s i m i l a r manner, i n Rakas v. I l l i n o i s (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S.Ct. 4 2 1 , 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 395, t h e Court s t a t e d : "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a - - third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment riqhts in- - fringed." (Underscoring added.) An extended discussion of cases with similar holdings does not appear appropriate. We do note that Wayne LaFave, a leading authority on search and seizure, distinguishes between abandonment and disclaimer of ownership. LaFave takes the position that disclaimer of ownership should not be held tantamount to a waiver of Fourth Amendment protecc' ~ l o n , but notes that a number of courts have so held. W. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure 511.3 (1978, Supp. 1981). Recent United States Supreme Court cases involving the question of standing to challenge the legality of searches, have emphasized the importance of a defendant's legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises or objects searched. Rakas, supra; United States v. Salvucci (1980, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619; Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980), 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed. 2d 633. I am unable to see how the defendant could have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in opaque bags in the trunk of a car, when he had stated he did not own the car, he did not know who did own the car, and he did not know where the keys to the car's trunk were located. The unfortunate result of the majority opinion is that, once again, reliable evidence establishing a clear basis for conviction is suppressed. The majority's broad application of the exclusionary rule has again exacted a substantial social cost. As stated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137, 99 S.Ct. at 427, 58 L.Ed.2d at 397: "Each time t h e exclusionary r u l e is applied it e x a c t s a s u b s t a n t i a l s o c i a l c o s t f o r t h e v i n d i c a t i o n of Fourth Amendment r i g h t s . R e l e - vant and r e l i a b l e evidence i s kept from t h e t r i e r of f a c t and t h e search f o r t r u t h a t t r i a l is d e f l e c t e d . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . " I would hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly denied t h e defendant's motion t o suppress t h e evidence obtained from t h e search of t h e c a r .