Title: Darrow v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Darrow v. State1992 WY 10824 P.2d 1269Case Number: 91-165Decided: 01/29/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Mark Anthony DARROW, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court of Lincoln County, John D. Troughton, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, David Gosar, Appellate Counsel, Deborah Baumer, 
Asst. Public Defender, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael D. Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Nancy C. Larned, Student 
Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Mark 
Anthony Darrow appeals a judgment and sentence entered against him on May 13, 
1991, and an order denying motion to correct sentence in his conviction for 
violation of W.S. 6-3-301(a), (c)(i) (June 1988 Repl.), aggravated burglary; 
W.S. 6-2-401 (June 1988 Repl.), aggravated robbery; and W.S. 6-2-201(a)(i), 
(ii), (c) (June 1988 Repl.), kidnapping.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      In his issue 
statement appellant asks whether Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1991), 
requires that appellant's kidnapping conviction be reversed because a person may 
not be convicted of kidnapping in connection with an aggravated robbery unless 
the victim is removed from the residence.

FACTS

[¶4]      In the early 
morning of January 26, 1991, following a night of heavy cocaine use, appellant, 
armed with a loaded revolver, entered the home of Lynn and Valerie Christensen 
in Kemmerer, Wyoming. Appellant confronted Mrs. Christensen in her bedroom and, 
at gun point, demanded money. Mrs. Christensen complied with his request and was 
then instructed to stay in the bedroom with her four year old child. Appellant 
intended to facilitate his getaway by locking the family in the bedroom. Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Christensen arrived home and confronted appellant. A struggle 
ensued, shots were fired and Mrs. Christensen and her daughter escaped from the 
house. Appellant left in pursuit of Mrs. Christensen, was unsuccessful in 
catching her and returned to the Christensen home. As appellant tried to 
re-enter the house, Mr. Christensen caught him off guard, hitting him with the 
door. Mr. Christensen then grabbed appellant's hand, threw him into the house 
and escaped. Appellant fled and was later apprehended in Diamondville, 
Wyoming.

[¶5]      Appellant pled 
guilty to aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and kidnapping. He received 
two, ten to twenty year concurrent sentences for aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary, and a consecutive ten to fifteen years for 
kidnapping.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      Appellant 
contends the kidnapping conviction should be dismissed or its sentence run 
concurrently with the other convictions, based on this court's decision in 
Keene. In that case, Keene, in the commission of a robbery, moved two employees 
at gun point from a back office to an adjacent area within a business 
establishment. Keene was convicted of robbery and two counts of kidnapping in 
violation of W.S. 6-2-201(a)(ii) which states,

(a)       A person is 
guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of 
residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the 
removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with the intent 
to:

(ii) Facilitate 
commission of a felony.

[¶7]      Employing 
statutory construction principles, we interpreted the disjunctive "or" to make 
separate and distinct the alternatives of "removal from a business" (or 
residence) from "removal from the vicinity," under the statute. Keene, 812 P.2d  
at 150. Keene did not remove his victims from the business, but moved them 
within it. Movement of a victim within a business or residence does not 
comprise "removal from the vicinity" under the statute. Therefore, we held that 
under the facts in Keene movement of the employees within the business was 
incidental to the robbery and did not constitute kidnapping. Keene at 
151.

[¶8]      Though appellant 
would have us believe that the facts here warrant the application of Keene to 
this case, this is not Keene. This is Darrow.

[¶9]      Appellant is 
charged with violating subsections (a)(i) and (ii) of W.S. 6-2-201 which states 
in part, "or if he unlawfully confines another person, with intent to: (ii) 
Facilitate commission of a felony." This particular section is preceded by the 
disjunctive "or" as was the section at issue in Keene. As in Keene, this phrase 
becomes another alternative under the statute, requiring separate treatment, and 
is inapplicable to the subject matter preceding it. Matter of Adoption of Voss, 
550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976). At this juncture, any similarity to analysis in 
Keene ends.

[¶10]   Essentially, three arguments are 
presented. Appellant first contends that kidnapping under the statute as applied 
in Keene requires the removal of Mrs. Christensen from her residence. We have 
previously held that asportation is but an alternative means of committing the 
crime of kidnapping. Edge v. State, 647 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1982). Support for 
this premise is found in comments to the Model Penal Code's comparative 
provision which addresses unlawful confinement as an alternative statement of 
the offense, requiring no asportation at all. Model Penal Code § 212.1 cmt. 3 at 
224 (1980). Confinement alone is sufficient to constitute kidnapping. Edge at 
560; Driskill v. State, 761 P.2d 980, 982 (Wyo. 1988). Our discussion here must 
concern not removal but appellant's unlawful confinement with intent to 
facilitate commission of a felony.

[¶11]   Secondly, appellant interprets our 
statutory analysis in Keene to mean that "unlawful confinement" as a separate 
and distinct alternative cannot incorporate the statute's preceding sections and 
therefore cannot apply to confinement within the victim's residence. But the 
essence of confinement is not its location. Rather, it is whether the victim, by 
his confinement, is effectively isolated from the "usual protections of 
society." Thus, a victim may be confined in his own home if discovery or rescue 
is made unlikely. Model Penal Code, supra, at 224.

[¶12]   Finally, appellant argues that the 
confinement is both incident and integral to the robbery and thus not a separate 
crime. But it is the intent and effect of the confinement that make it 
reprehensible. By his own admission, appellant, at gun point, confined Mrs. 
Christensen in the bedroom to facilitate escape from commission of the robbery. 
Appellant's act diminished Mrs. Christensen's likelihood of rescue and exposed 
her to greater risk. Because confinement to facilitate a serious crime or to 
escape after its completion is likely to impose risk on the victim, it is 
specifically proscribed in this context. Model Penal Code, supra, at 
227.

[¶13]   Appellant's act was not incidental 
or inconsequential to the robbery, nor was it inherent in the nature of the 
crime. Rodriguez v. State, 558 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1990). The robbery was 
facilitated by Mrs. Christensen's confinement; it prevented her from summoning 
assistance and lessened appellant's risk of detection. Appellant could simply 
have departed with the money but the unlawful confinement gave aid to his 
escape.

CONCLUSION

[¶14]   The gravamen of the crime of 
kidnapping is removal or unlawful confinement of the victim. Appellant intended 
to facilitate his escape and thus commission of the robbery by confining Mrs. 
Christensen in her bedroom. This behavior is clearly prohibited under W.S. 
6-2-201, and we must affirm.