Title: ALPINE LUMBER COMPANY and ALPINE INSTALLATIONS, LLC V. CAPITAL WEST NATIONAL BANK

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALPINE LUMBER COMPANY and ALPINE INSTALLATIONS, LLC V. CAPITAL WEST NATIONAL BANK2010 WY 62231 P.3d 869Case Number: S-09-0057Decided: 05/18/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

ALPINE 
LUMBER COMPANY and ALPINE INSTALLATIONS, 
LLC,Appellants(Defendants),v.CAPITAL WEST NATIONAL 
BANK,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Patrick 
Dixon, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

John 
C. Patton, Terry W. Connolly of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*This 
case was reassigned to Justice Kite on April 15, 2010.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Alpine Lumber Co. 
and Alpine Installations, LLC ("Alpine") supplied materials to a residential 
construction project in Casper, Wyoming, and did not receive payment.  Alpine filed liens within 120 days of 
providing materials and contends the liens were timely because Alpine was a 
"contractor" under Wyoming's lien statutes.  The district court granted partial 
summary judgment against Alpine holding Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Walters, 707 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1985) controlled, Alpine was a materialman and the applicable statutes 
required the liens to be filed within 90 days of providing the materials.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Alpine presents 
one issue for this Court's determination:

 
 
I. 
Whether the District Court was in error in concluding that the Appellants were 
"materialmen" (and thus required to file their liens within 90 days) and not 
contractors (and thus required to file their liens within 120 days) as those 
terms are defined by Wyoming Statute § 29-2-201 (LexisNexis 
2007).

 
 
Capital 
West National Bank ("Capital West") phrases the issue as 
follows:

 
 
            
Issue 1:  If an entity 
provides only materials to a builder/contractor who is also the property owner, 
is that entity a materialman or a contractor?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      McDonald Homes, 
LLC (McDonald) was a Wyoming limited liability company with principal offices in 
Loveland, Colorado.  McDonald was in 
the business of residential development, i.e., building and selling residential 
homes.  In the spring of 2006, 
McDonald commenced a project of developing and constructing some thirty 
residential homes on properties it owned in Casper.  Capital West National Bank (Capital 
West), provided the financing for these projects and received mortgages on the 
homes and property.  Alpine Lumber 
Company is a Colorado corporation, and is in the business of commercial and 
retail sale of lumber and other building supplies for construction 
projects.  Alpine Installation, LLC 
is a subsidiary of Alpine Construction and supplies window and door 
assemblies.  

 
 

[¶4]      Alpine entered 
into contracts with McDonald to provide materials for the construction of the 
residences on McDonald's property.  
Between 
May and September 2006, they shipped materials to Casper which were incorporated 
into McDonald building projects.  
Midway through, McDonald began having financial difficulties and stopped 
paying its creditors.  A number of 
homes were completed, others were simply abandoned.  In the end, McDonald was indebted to 
Alpine for sums in excess of $200,000.  
Ultimately, Alpine filed some thirty liens on twenty-two separate 
properties.  There are twelve liens 
on seven separate properties involved in this appeal.  Eventually, various entities began to 
foreclose on the properties.  In 
particular, Capital West filed its Complaint for Judgment and Foreclosure on May 
10, 2007.  It is undisputed that 
none of Alpine's liens were filed within 90 days of the last day of providing 
material and that all of their liens were filed within 120 days of that 
date.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      When reviewing a 
district court's order granting summary judgment, we consider the record de novo.  Stone v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 
2009 WY 114, ¶ 10, 216 P.3d 489, 492 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  

 
 

Wyoming 
Medical Center 
v. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2010 WY 
21, ¶ 11, 225 P.3d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 2010), quoting McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt. LLC, 2009 WY 
84, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 503, 506 (Wyo. 2009).  
 See also, W.R.C.P. 56(c).     

 
 
[¶6]      There are no 
disputes of fact in this case.  
Instead, resolution of the issue presented here depends on interpretation 
of the lien statutes.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law, 
reviewed de novo without any 
deference to the district court's determinations.  Wyoming Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 2007 WY 112, ¶ 15, 162 P.3d 515, 522 (Wyo. 2007).  See also, Powder River Coal Co. v. 
Wyoming Dep't of Revenue, 2006 WY 137, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 442, 446 (Wyo. 
2006).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Contractor's or 
materialmen's liens are authorized pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-2-101 
through 29-2-111 (LexisNexis 2009).  
Alpine recorded contractors/materialmen liens pursuant to § 29-2-101(a) 
which provides, "[E]very person performing any work on or furnishing any 
materials or plans for any building or any improvement upon land shall have for 
his work done or plans or materials furnished a lien upon the building or 
improvements, and upon the land of the owner on which they are situated . . . 
."  Every contractor must file his 
lien statement within 120 days and "every other person" must file within 90 days 
after the last day when work was performed or materials furnished under contract 
or from the date the work was substantially completed or substantial completion 
of the contract to furnish materials.  Section 29-2-106(a)(i) and (ii).  If Alpine is considered a contractor, it 
had 120 days from the last date it provided work, services, or materials to file 
the liens; if Alpine is a materialman, the 90 day time limitation applies. 

 
 
[¶8]      Our rules of 
statutory interpretation are well established:

 
 
[W]e 
begin by inquiring into the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
by the legislature according to the manner in which those words are arranged. If 
more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we resort to general principles 
of statutory construction. When the legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms, 
however, we are bound to the results so expressed.

 
 

Wyodak 
Res. Dev. Corp. v. Wyoming Dep't of Revenue, 
2002 WY 181, ¶ 18, 60 P.3d 129, 137 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶9]      The statute 
contains the following definitions: 

 
 
§ 
29-1-201. Definitions; agency relationships presumed.

 
 
(a) 
Except as otherwise provided, as used in this title:

     (i) "Contractor" 
means:

            
(A) A person employed by and contracting with an owner to improve an 
owner's property . . . .

            
. . . .

     (iii) "Improve or 
improvement" means:

            
. . . .

            
(B) Any work performed or material furnished for the permanent change of 
any real property; and

            
. . . .

  (v) "Owner" as used in this act 
means:

            
(A) With respect to construction liens:  any person with a legal or equitable 
interest in the property to be changed, altered or improved, for whose use or 
benefit any improvement shall be made or any materials 
furnished;

            
. . . .

  (vi) "Subcontractor" or "materialman" 
means a person other than a contractor performing work or furnishing materials 
to an owner or a contractor under contract;

 
 
[¶10]   Alpine contends that because it 
contracted directly with the owner of the property on which the materials were 
utilized, it fit the definition of "contractor" under the statute.  This Court considered a similar argument 
twenty-five years ago in the face of very similar facts, applied the rules of 
statutory construction, and held that the supplier of materials to an owner was 
not a contractor.  We 
reasoned:

 
 
            
Appellant contends that a lien claimant who furnishes materials to the 
owner of the property being improved, pursuant to a contract, is a contractor 
and entitled to 120 days from the last date of delivery of materials in which to 
file a lien.

 
 
            
Appellant fashions its own definition of contractor as a "person employed 
by and contracting with an owner to improve an owner's property, by performing work or furnishing 
materials."   Appellant, in 
effect, paraphrases the statutory definition of improvement, § 
29-1-201(a)(iii)(B), underlined above, and adds it to the statutory definition 
of contractors.  § 
29-1-201(a)(i).  Appellant's 
definition is misleading and improper.  
The fact that "improvement" is defined in the disjunctive, to include 
"work performed or material furnished" for the improvement of real property, 
does not relate to or affect the definitions of "contractor," "subcontractor," 
or "materialman."

 
 
            
The statutory language is plain and unambiguous.  A "contractor" is a person "employed by 
and contracting with" an owner.  § 
29-1-201(a)(i)(A).  A "materialman" 
is a person "other than a contractor * * * furnishing materials to an owner or 
contractor under contract."   
Appellant does not fit the statutory definition of a contractor here in 
that it was not "employed by" the owner, even if we assume it contracted with 
the owner.

 
 
            
In American Buildings Company v. 
Wheelers Stores, Wyo., 585 P.2d 845, 847 (1978), we 
said:

 
 
"* 
* * [W]hen a contract concerns the construction of improvements to real 
property, contractor' has a specialized meaning related to the building 
trades;  and it is in this sense 
that contractor' is connected to the law of mechanics' liens, as is a 
subcontractor' and one who supplied materials.  The latter has come to be known as a 
materialman'.  Statutory terms must 
be construed in connection with the subject matter with which they are 
used.  Morrison-Knudson Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 1943, 58 Wyo. 500, 135 P.2d 927.

            
* * * *

            
"The authority is overwhelming that one who merely furnishes materials to 
the owner or a contractor is a materialman, and not a contractor or 
subcontractor, within the meaning of the mechanics' lien laws.  Anno., short-titled Mechanic's LienWho 
Is Materialman,' 141 A.L.R. 321.   
See also, A.L.R. Bluebooks of Later Decisions.  As concluded by the same annotation, one 
who not only furnishes materials, but installs them, is a contractor or a 
subcontractor, and not a materialman, within the meaning of mechanics' lien 
laws.  * * *"

 
 
            
Appellant distinguishes the case before us from the American Buildings 
Company case because the lien statute applicable in the case here included 
definitions while the lien statute applicable in that case did not.  We do not believe the amendment 
overruled the American Buildings case.  
A supplier of materials cannot be converted into a contractor, as 
appellant has tried to do, by expanding the statutory definition of 
contractor.

 
 
            
We hold that appellant was a materialman and did not file its lien 
statement within the time provided by statute.

 
 

Weyerhaeuser, 
707 P.2d  at 736.  

 
 
[¶11]   Despite this holding and the fact 
that the legislature has not acted in the intervening twenty-five years to alter 
this interpretation, Alpine suggests the dissenting opinion should be 
adopted.  However, the only 
authorities provided in support of such an about-face by this Court are from 
other states with different statutes and different 
jurisprudence.

 
 
[¶12]   We are guided in our effort by the 
doctrine of stare decisis which is 
defined as "the doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier 
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation."  Blacks Law Dictionary 1537 (9th ed. 2009).  While the Court has acknowledged that 
there are times it must steer away from the doctrine, SLB v. JEO (In re ANO), 2006 WY 74, ¶ 6, 136 P.3d 797, 799 (Wyo. 2006), those circumstances are not present here.  This is not an issue where the Court has 
created some right under the common law that it now seeks to change or evolve. 
 This concerns the Court's 
interpretation of a statute.  As 
strong as the doctrine of stare 
decisis is, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "stare decisis in respect to statutory 
interpretation has "special force" . . . ."  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139, 128 S. Ct. 750, 756, 169 L. Ed. 2d 591 
(2008).  It deserves such 
"special force" because overturning a long established statutory interpretation 
has the effect of changing that statute, something the legislature has not 
chosen to do over many years since we decided the Weyerhaeuser case.  We see no reason to alter this 
authority.

 
 
[¶13]   Affirmed.