Title: In re Children of James B.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 14 
Docket: 
Ken-19-382 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 23, 2020 
 
Decided: 
January 30, 2020 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF JAMES B. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother and father of two children appeal from a judgment of 
the District Court (Waterville, Stanfill, J.) terminating their parental rights to 
the children.1  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i) (2018).  Both parents 
argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings of 
parental unfitness and that the court erred by determining that the 
termination of their parental rights is in the children’s best interests.  The 
father also asserts that the Department of Health and Human Services did not 
make reasonable efforts to reunify and rehabilitate his family because it failed 
to create a written reunification and rehabilitation plan.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4041(1-A)(A)(1) (2018).  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
                                         
1  Both parents have other children but those children are not the subject of this child protection 
action.  References in this opinion to “the children” mean the children as to whom the parents’ 
rights have been terminated.  
 
2 
 
[¶2]  In November of 2017, two days after the birth of the younger child, 
the Department filed a child protection petition and a request for a 
preliminary protection order for the children.  The petition alleged that the 
parents were using illicit substances and were unable to protect the children 
from “threats of harm.”  The court (E. Walker, J.) issued a preliminary 
protection order at that time, granting custody of the children to the 
Department, which placed them with a foster parent.  After each parent 
waived the opportunity for a summary preliminary hearing,2 the court 
entered an order maintaining the Department’s custody of both children.  
[¶3]  On March 12, 2018, the court (Benson, J.) issued a jeopardy order 
as to the father.3  The father’s jeopardy findings included his “history of 
substance []use,” his “extensive criminal history” and his “lack of protective 
capacity regarding his children.”  On March 28, 2018, the court (Stanfill, J.) 
issued a jeopardy order as to the mother.  Jeopardy was based on her “history 
of chronic substance use” and “high severity [of] neglect.”   
 
[¶4]  In November of 2018, the Department filed a petition to terminate 
the parental rights of both parents.  The court (Stanfill, J.) held a two-day 
                                         
2  The court found that the father was not properly notified of the date for the summary 
preliminary hearing and that the father could request a new hearing.  He elected not to do so.   
3  The father’s jeopardy order was amended on March 28, 2018, to correct a clerical error.  
 
3 
hearing on the petition in January of 2019.  After both parties rested, the court 
ordered that the record be held open to allow more time for the parents to 
demonstrate that they could meet the children’s needs.  An additional 
evidentiary hearing was held in March of 2019.  While the matter was under 
advisement, the court re-opened the evidence at the Department’s request.  
The final evidentiary hearing was held in August of 2019.   
[¶5]  The court entered a judgment that terminated the parental rights 
of both parents in August of 2019.  In support of those determinations, the 
court made the following findings of fact, all of which are supported by 
competent record evidence.  See In re Children of Danielle M., 2019 ME 174, 
¶ 6, --- A.3d ---.   
[T]he children have been in foster care since November 22, 2017.  
For [the younger child], this means his whole life.  [The older 
child], who is almost 3 1/2 years old, was also the subject of a 
prior case which was dismissed. . . .  Thus, [the older child] has 
also been in care for all but about 7 months of her life.   
 
[The parents] both have long histories of substance abuse.  
[The father] also has a history of domestic violence.   
 
 . . . . 
 
As the children grew, it became apparent that both of them 
have high needs. Both are developmentally delayed. . . .  As a 
result, both children have had a host of medical appointments 
with various specialists as well as regular therapies, occupation 
and speech.   
 
4 
 
The parents were visiting with the children once a week, 
but had not been attending any of their appointments. . . The 
evidence was conflicting as to when they were informed that they 
could do so, and when they were informed that they should do so.  
Although it did not appear in any written reunification 
plan- indeed, [the father] did not even have a written plan- by the 
family team meeting in October, there is no question that the 
parents knew that attending the appointments were important for 
reunification.  At the October family team meeting, the parents 
were clearly told that they should attend all of the children’s 
appointments in the next 30 days, and that if they did so the visits 
would be increased.  They were informed at that meeting of all 
upcoming appointments.   
 
Despite the clear emphasis on what they needed to do, the 
parents failed to attend all the appointments for the next 30 days.  
To make matters worse, [the mother] had a brief relapse in 
November.  As a result, the Department filed the petition to 
terminate . . . .   
 
 
[¶6]  Following the evidentiary hearings that took place in January and 
March of 2019, the court noted an improvement in the parents’ ability to 
verbalize their children’s medical needs, but also noted that the parents still 
did not fully appreciate the severity of the children’s medical conditions.   
[The parents] demonstrated a better understanding, albeit not 
perfect, of their children’s medical needs.  One remaining issue 
they had not addressed was “third hand” smoke.  Specifically, the 
pulmonologist had made it clear that [the younger child] could not 
be around even the slightest amount of cigarette smoke.  Despite 
that, the parents sometimes smelled so strongly of cigarette 
smoke at some visits that the supervisor was choking from it and 
it made the social worker’s eyes water.   
 
 
5 
 
[¶7]  In August of 2019, following the Department’s motion to re-open 
the evidence, the court found that the parents were still unable to fully 
appreciate the children’s medical and emotional needs.  
Based on the evidence presented . . . it is clear to this court that 
the parents were unable to maintain all their commitments.  
Although there were often reasonable explanations for the missed 
obligations, the court finds that the parents failed to attend . . . 
obligations between the March and August court dates.   
 
In addition to struggling to maintain their obligations and 
schedules, it is also clear to the court that the parents do not fully 
understand what caring for their children entails. . . .  The 
pulmonologist testified that the parents had an incomplete 
understanding of [the younger child’s] treatment regimen.  In 
addition, they have been told many times that [the younger child] 
cannot be exposed to even the smell of cigarette (and probably 
marijuana) smoke- i.e., third- hand smoke . . . yet the parents 
continue to smoke to the point that they smelled strongly of it to 
the doctor, and the occupational therapist testified that she got 
nauseous from the smell.  While they can verbalize that [the 
younger child] has breathing problems and shouldn’t be around 
smoke, they continue to smoke and expose him to irritants during 
visits.  They say they wouldn’t smoke in the house or around the 
children.  Nonetheless, [the mother] said more than once that they 
[]can’t help it[] if smoke gets on their clothes, indicating a lack of 
appreciation for the risks to [the younger child].   
 
. . . Based on the reports of supervisors and others present 
during the [supervised] visits, there is a real question whether 
there is a real bond or attachment between either parent and the 
children. . . .  There is also a question of whether the parents can 
read or understand the children’s cues or signs during visits- e.g., 
when a child has had enough.   
 
 
6 
. . . [T]he children have high needs and unique medical 
issues that are essential for their caregivers to understand.  Both 
children are anxious and cannot tolerate any further trauma.   
 
[¶8]  Based on these findings, the court found that both parents are 
unable to protect the children from jeopardy and these circumstances are 
unlikely to change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the 
children’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i).  In addition, the court 
found that termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best 
interests.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).   
[¶9]  The parents timely appealed from the court’s judgment.  See 22 
M.R.S. § 4006 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Termination of the Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights 
[¶10]  Both parents assert that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the court’s judgment terminating their parental rights.4  “In order to 
terminate parental rights, the court must find, by clear and convincing 
                                         
4  The father also argues that the court erred in referencing the guardian ad litem’s (GAL) 
opinion during the final hearing because the GAL did not abide by the statutory requirements, 
which mandates “face-to-face contact with the child[ren] . . . at least once every 3 months” and a 
“report to the court and all parties in writing at 6-month intervals.”   See 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1)(B) 
(2018).  This issue was not raised in the trial court.  Therefore, this argument requires no further 
discussion.  See In re Mathew H., 2017 ME 151, ¶ 8, 167 A.3d 561; In re Kaleb C., 2002 ME 65, ¶ 4 n.2, 
795 A.2d 71 (holding that although the GAL did not meet with the children after the court’s initial 
decision or file a subsequent report, “the deficiencies in the guardian’s performance did not affect 
the result [of the] case”).  
 
7 
evidence, at least one of the four statutory grounds of parental unfitness.”  
In re Child of Katherine C., 2019 ME 146, ¶ 2, 217 A.3d 68 (alterations omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted).  “We will set aside a finding of parental unfitness 
only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it, if the 
fact-finder clearly misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the 
finding is so contrary to the credible evidence that it does not represent the 
truth and right of the case.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “We review the 
court’s factual findings related to the child’s best interest for clear error, and 
its ultimate conclusion regarding the child’s best interest for an abuse of 
discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the 
trial court’s lens.”  In re Children of Christopher S., 2019 ME 31, ¶ 7, 203 A.3d 
808 (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶11]  Viewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that 
(1) competent evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that both 
parents are parentally unfit, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), and (2) the 
court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion in determining that 
termination of both parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interests, 
see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  See In re Children of Danielle M., 2019 ME 
174, ¶ 14, --- A.3d ---.   
 
8 
B. 
Rehabilitation and Reunification Plan 
[¶12]  Finally, the father contends that the court erred in finding that 
the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify and rehabilitate his 
family, in part because it did not create a written plan for him.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4041(1-A)(A)(1).   
[¶13]  “The Department’s compliance with its rehabilitation and 
reunification duties as outlined in section 4041 does not constitute a discrete 
element requiring proof in termination proceedings, nor does the failure of 
the Department to comply with section 4041 preclude findings of parental 
unfitness.”  In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 17, 912 A.2d 572.  “Only when the 
Department failed to develop a formal reunification plan, and the parent’s 
rights were nevertheless terminated for failure to comply with specific 
reunification obligations never communicated to that parent, have we vacated 
a judgment terminating parental rights.”  Id.; see In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 
104, ¶ 42, 854 A.2d 195.  
[¶14]  Here, despite the lack of a written plan, the record demonstrates 
that the reunification requirements were sufficiently communicated to the 
father.  He was provided with specific reunification obligations in his jeopardy 
order and his judicial review order from August of 2019.  His parental 
 
9 
obligations, especially attending all his children’s appointments, were also 
reviewed at two family team meetings.  Finally, the court held open the record 
following the termination hearing in January of 2019 to allow the parents 
more time to meet the needs of their children, clearly outlining in the record 
the importance of abstaining from use of illicit substances and attending all 
medical appointments and supervised visits.  Therefore, despite the absence 
of a written plan, the father’s responsibilities regarding rehabilitation and 
reunification were clearly communicated to him.  His rights were terminated 
because he failed to adequately meet his children’s needs.  See In re Dakota K., 
2016 ME 30, ¶ 6, 133 A.3d 257; In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 15, 912 A.2d 
572; cf. In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 42, 854 A.2d 195.  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kristina Dougherty, Esq., Chester & Vestal, P.A., Portland, for appellant father 
 
Wendy D. Hatch, Esq., Waterville, for appellant mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
 
Waterville District Court docket number PC-2017-46 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY