Title: Commonwealth v. Vasquez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12562 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PEDRO VASQUEZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 6, 2018. - August 28, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Identification.  Due Process of Law, Identification.  
Constitutional Law, Identification, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Search and 
seizure, Probable cause.  Evidence, Identification, Bias, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  
Witness, Bias.  Fair Trial.  Cellular Telephone.  Probable 
Cause.  Search and Seizure, Fruits of illegal search, 
Affidavit, Probable cause.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Fair trial, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 30, 2015. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress statements, to suppress the 
results of an allegedly consensual search of a cellular 
telephone, to suppress statements and evidence derived from an 
incorrect statement of rights, and to suppress out-of-court 
identifications were heard by John A. Agostini, J.; and a 
pretrial motion to suppress the seizure of the defendant's 
cellular telephone and the information extracted from it was 
heard by Richard J. Carey, J. 
 
 
Applications for leave to prosecute interlocutory appeals 
were allowed by Budd and Lowy, JJ., in the Supreme Judicial 
2 
 
 
Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeals were reported 
by them to the Appeals Court.  After consolidation of the 
appeals, the Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Maximilian J. Bennett, Assistant District Attorney 
(Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, also 
present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  Following the January 2015 shooting death of the 
defendant's girlfriend, the defendant quickly became the primary 
suspect.  He was arrested after three members of the victim's 
family identified him from surveillance audio and video footage 
taken from a private house across the street from the shooting.  
After officers arrested the defendant, and sought to question 
him, they attempted to advise him of his Miranda rights.  It 
became apparent that the defendant did not have much command of 
the English language.  The detectives asked a Spanish-speaking 
officer, who was untrained in interpretation, to translate the 
Miranda warnings and the interrogation into Spanish.  Based on 
the officer's rendering of the Miranda warnings, the defendant 
ostensibly waived his rights and spoke with police.  He also 
provided officers, on their request, with the passcode to unlock 
the cellular telephone they had seized from him upon arrest, and 
gave them permission to search it.  Police later used that 
information to obtain a warrant for the cell site location 
information (CSLI) for the defendant's telephone. 
3 
 
 
 
The defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the 
first degree and two related firearms offenses.  In a series of 
motions, he moved to suppress the witnesses' identifications of 
him from the surveillance footage, his statements to police, 
evidence obtained from the search of his cellular telephone, and 
the CSLI.  A judge of the Superior Court (first motion judge) 
denied the motions as to the identifications and the search of 
the telephone.  The judge allowed the motions with respect to 
the custodial statements.  A different Superior Court judge 
(second motion judge) denied the motion to suppress the CSLI. 
 
The Commonwealth sought interlocutory review of the order 
suppressing the defendant's statements, and the defendant sought 
review of the denial of his various motions to suppress.  Single 
justices of this court allowed the petitions, and the cross 
appeals were consolidated.  We subsequently allowed the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review. 
 
We discern no error in the decision that the 
identifications do not require suppression.  We also agree that 
the translation of the Miranda warnings into Spanish was 
inadequate to apprise the defendant of his rights, and that the 
defendant's limited comprehension of English did not suffice to 
compensate for these deficiencies.  Because the search of the 
defendant's cellular telephone arose from the statements he made 
following those incomplete warnings, the evidence obtained as a 
4 
 
 
result must be suppressed.  We conclude also that, when the 
tainted information is excised from the search warrant 
application for the CSLI, the affidavit does not establish 
probable cause to access the CSLI for the defendant's device.  
Accordingly, the order on the motion to suppress the CSLI shall 
be reversed. 
1.  Background.  The following facts are drawn from the 
first motion judge's findings on the motions to suppress 
concerning the identifications, the Miranda warnings, and the 
search of the cellular telephone.  The facts are supplemented, 
as relevant, with uncontroverted testimony implicitly or 
explicitly credited by the judge, in support of his findings, 
after evidentiary hearings.1  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 
472 Mass. 429, 437 (2015).  As to the motion to suppress 
involving the CSLI, the facts are drawn from the affidavit in 
support of the application for a search warrant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 99 (2017). 
                                                 
 
1 An evidentiary hearing was conducted over four days on the 
motions to suppress the identifications, custodial 
interrogation, and initial search of the cellular telephone.  At 
that hearing, the first motion judge heard testimony from 
Abigail Martinez Melende; the victim's son, brother, and father; 
and a Springfield police officer, with respect to the 
identification procedures.  Testimony was also introduced from a 
police officer and an expert witness concerning the custodial 
interrogation and the search issues.  A nonevidentiary hearing 
was conducted by the second motion judge on the motion to 
suppress the cell site location information (CSLI). 
5 
 
 
 
a.  Identifications.  In January of 2015, police officers 
discovered the victim's body inside a parked sport utility 
vehicle (SUV); she had been shot in the head.  The investigating 
officers noted a surveillance camera on a building located 
across the street from the SUV.  The black and white footage, 
while dark, captured the shooting.  It shows the SUV stopping at 
the curb and parking.  After a few moments, the rear passenger 
door on the driver's side of the vehicle opens.  An argument, in 
Spanish, can be heard emanating from the individuals inside the 
vehicle.  A single gunshot is heard, and a man is seen getting 
out of the vehicle and running off camera. 
 
Based on this footage, police wanted to identify promptly 
the individual who could be seen and heard on the audio-video 
recording.  Officers first went to the home of the victim's 
brother, Martino Diaz.2  His girlfriend, Abigail Martinez 
Melende, also was present.  Police told the two that a vehicle 
registered to Martinez Melende had been involved in a shooting 
and that police had some questions for them.  Diaz and Martinez 
Melende drove together to the police station to be questioned.  
                                                 
 
2 A pseudonym. 
6 
 
 
They both surmised that the victim had been shot.3  They also 
speculated that the defendant had been involved.4 
 
At some point, Diaz contacted his father, who immediately 
went to collect the victim's then teenage son, Juan Mendoza,5 
from school.  As with the other members of his family, the 
victim's son was aware that a shooting had occurred and, before 
talking to police, harbored a similar suspicion that the 
defendant had harmed his mother in some way.6  The victim's son 
and his grandfather drove to the police station together; when 
they arrived, Diaz told them that he believed the defendant may 
have killed the victim. 
 
Each witness was then interviewed separately by police.  
Each witness was shown a photograph of the defendant and was 
asked whether that person was the victim's boyfriend, whom Diaz 
and Martinez Melende had mentioned to the police earlier.  The 
witnesses agreed that the photograph showed the victim's 
boyfriend. 
                                                 
 
3 Diaz's neighbor had seen a news report of the shooting, 
and told Diaz and Martinez Melende, as they were leaving for the 
police station, that a woman had been killed. 
 
 
4 Diaz and Martinez Melende also were aware that there was a 
history of domestic violence between the defendant and the 
victim over the years. 
 
 
5 A pseudonym. 
 
 
6 Mendoza also had seen a news report that the vehicle his 
mother drove had been involved in a shooting. 
7 
 
 
 
Police then had the witnesses attempt to make an 
identification from the surveillance footage.7  First, they had 
each witness listen to the audio segment of the recording, 
without displaying the video portion, to determine if anyone 
could recognize the voices of the individuals in the vehicle; 
each listened to the recording separately.  The recording was 
stopped immediately prior to the sound of a gunshot. Diaz, 
Mendoza, and Martinez Melende each identified the voices as 
belonging to the victim and the defendant.8 
 
After listening to the audio recording, each witness was 
shown the video recording, without the accompanying audio, to 
determine whether the witness could identify the individual who 
got out of the vehicle and ran down the street.9  As with the 
audio recordings, the witnesses were separated throughout this 
process.  Although the video recording is too indistinct to 
display any facial features, all three witnesses believed that 
the individual seen leaving the vehicle and running down the 
street was the defendant. 
                                                 
 
7 The victim's father did not participate in the 
identification procedure. 
 
8 Diaz was able to make a voice identification, in part, 
because the victim purportedly mentioned the defendant's name 
twice during the argument. 
 
 
9 The witnesses were shown only the portion of the video 
recording that began after the sound of the gunshot. 
8 
 
 
 
Diaz reported that he believed the individual was the 
defendant based on "his sneakers," "his voice," and "the way he 
is," and because the victim "mentioned his name two times."10  
Mendoza expressed a belief that the defendant was the individual 
depicted in the videotape based on the clothing and the way in 
which he moved.  Martinez Melende reported that she believed 
that the individual was the defendant based on his "size, body 
type, weight and height," as well as his sneakers. 
 
The police did not suggest to the witnesses that the 
defendant was a suspect, and none of the witnesses was permitted 
to speak to any of the others until after each witness had made 
an identification.11 
 
b.  Interrogation.  Shortly after the identifications, the 
defendant was arrested and brought to the Springfield police 
station.  During the subsequent interrogation, one of the 
detectives attempted to inform the defendant that he had been 
arrested for the murder of the victim and for firearms 
violations relating to her death.  The detective also attempted 
                                                 
 
10 Although Diaz did not listen to the audio portion while 
he viewed the video footage, his statements make clear that he 
understood the two segments were connected. 
 
 
11 It appears as though the witnesses spoke to each other 
before arriving at the police station and while waiting at the 
police station; at these points, none of the witnesses had made 
an identification from either the audio or video portions of the 
surveillance tape. 
9 
 
 
to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights.  Because the 
defendant was illiterate in English and Spanish, the officers 
understood that the defendant would need the Miranda warnings 
explained to him orally.  They also understood that, because the 
defendant did not appear to have much command of English, they 
had to deliver the warnings in Spanish, the defendant's native 
language.  One of the officers, who was not formally trained as 
an interpreter, translated the warnings as follows: 
"1.  You have the right to remain quiet. 
 
"2.  Any thing that you say can be against you . . . the, 
of the court. 
 
"3.  You the right to consult with a lawyer for advice 
before being and to have him present with you during the 
interrogation. 
 
"4.  If you do not have the means to pay, to pay a, and if 
you wish for it, you the right to be a law, lawyer before 
being interrogated. 
 
"5.  If you decide to be now, without the presence of a 
lawyer, you still have the right to stop the, that any 
moment until you talk with a lawyer."12 
 
Police subsequently directed the defendant to initial each of 
the warnings on a printed Miranda form written in English.  He 
did so. 
                                                 
 
12 The first motion judge "accept[ed] this transcription and 
translation as the official and accurate version of the 
conversation between and among the participants to the 
interview." 
10 
 
 
 
During the course of the interview, the defendant 
consistently denied his involvement, even as officers became 
"confrontational and accusatory" in their questioning.  As the 
interview drew to a close, the defendant told officers that they 
"could check" many of the details surrounding his account 
because they had his cellular telephone.  At that point, police 
asked, in English, if they could search the device, and 
expressed some confusion whether they or the defendant were in 
possession of the device.  The defendant gave them "verbal 
permission" to search the device.13 
 
c.  Search warrant for CSLI.  When police searched the 
defendant's cellular telephone, they "extracted" the incoming 
and outgoing telephone calls, incoming and outgoing text 
messages, incoming and outgoing multimedia messages, contact 
information, and photographs and video recordings on the device. 
 
Approximately ten days after that search, police applied 
for a warrant to obtain the CSLI data for the device.14  In 
                                                 
 
13 When the officers asked if they or the defendant were in 
possession of his cellular telephone, he responded that they had 
it.  Officers then asked if they could search the device, and 
the defendant responded, "Si."  The officer who was interpreting 
followed up in Spanish, "You understand what he say?  They can 
take your phone in order, to search the phone?"  The defendant 
responded, in Spanish, "Yes, they can search." 
 
 
14 "The term ['CSLI'] refers to a cellular telephone service 
record or records that contain information identifying the base 
station towers and sectors that receive transmissions from a 
[cellular] telephone" (quotation and citation omitted).  
11 
 
 
support of the warrant request, the affidavit described the 
evidence that police had gathered, which included the witnesses' 
identifications of the defendant from surveillance footage and a 
history of domestic violence.  The affidavit also noted that a 
cellular telephone was recovered from the defendant when he was 
arrested at his house, and described information obtained from 
the police search of that device, namely, the defendant's 
telephone number.15  Based on this evidence, police requested all 
CSLI for the thirty-two days from December 5, 2014, through 
January 5, 2015, the month immediately preceding and including 
the day on which the victim was killed.  A warrant for the 
requested information was issued. 
 
d.  Suppression hearings.  In April of 2017, the first 
motion judge held an evidentiary hearing concerning the motions 
to suppress the defendant's statements, the identifications, and 
the initial search of the cellular telephone.  The judge then 
                                                 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 472 Mass. 448, 449 n.1 (2015).  
"'Historical' CSLI refers to CSLI relating to and generated by 
cellular telephone use that has already occurred at the time of 
the order authorizing the disclosure of such data" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Id.  In essence, "[t]he data can be used 
to approximate the location of a cellular telephone handset that 
was active at a particular time."  Id. 
 
15 The warrant affidavit also noted that, on an unspecified 
date and with the same information, police sent an 
administrative subpoena to the defendant's cellular service 
provider, pursuant to G. L. c. 271, § 17B, seeking to obtain all 
the defendant's billing and call detail records for the one-
month period leading up to the victim's death. 
12 
 
 
allowed the defendant's two motions to suppress his custodial 
statements, and denied the motions to suppress the 
identifications and the search of the cellular telephone.  Both 
parties sought leave to pursue interlocutory appeals from those 
orders, and a single justice of this court allowed their 
petitions. 
 
While these proceedings were underway, the defendant also 
filed a separate motion to suppress the CSLI.  After a 
nonevidentiary hearing, the second motion judge denied the 
motion; a single justice of this court allowed the defendant's 
request to appeal from that order.  The parties' cross appeals 
were consolidated in the Appeals Court, and we subsequently 
allowed the defendant's request for direct appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear 
error, but conduct an independent review of his [or her] 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 431.  A 
reviewing court gives due deference to a motion judge's findings 
where, as here, the judge "has seen and heard the witnesses, and 
made determinations regarding the weight and credibility of 
their testimony."  See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 
655 (2018), quoting Jones-Pannell, supra at 438.  We may, 
13 
 
 
however, conduct an independent review of the documentary 
evidence.  See Tremblay, supra. 
a.  Identifications.  The defendant contends that, because 
the witnesses harbored preconceived biases against him, and 
because police had those witnesses view a photograph and listen 
to an audio recording depicting the defendant, their subsequent 
visual identifications were inherently suggestive of him and 
violated due process and common-law principles of fairness.  To 
the extent that the defendant challenges the procedures employed 
by police to obtain a visual identification, we apply a due 
process analysis under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  As to whether the witnesses' own biases and the 
unreliable nature of the video footage otherwise caused a 
suggestive confrontation with the defendant, we turn to common-
law principles of fairness. 
i.  Due process.  An out-of-court eyewitness identification 
conducted by police is inadmissible under art. 12 "if the 
defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
identification was 'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable misidentification that its admission would deprive 
the defendant of his right to due process.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 596-597 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 599 (2011).  "In considering whether 
identification testimony should be suppressed, the judge must 
14 
 
 
examine the totality of the circumstances attending the 
confrontation to determine whether it was unnecessarily 
suggestive" (quotation and citation omitted).  Johnson, supra at 
597.  Where a defendant shows that the procedure utilized by 
police to obtain an identification was unnecessarily suggestive, 
"the out-of-court identification is per se excluded as a 
violation of the defendant's right to due process under art. 
12."  Id., quoting Walker, supra at 599 n.13.  The purpose 
underlying the per se exclusionary rule in such circumstances is 
to deter any specter of police misconduct in obtaining an 
identification.  Johnson, supra at 597-598. 
Insofar as the defendant challenges police conduct in the 
identification process, we agree with the first motion judge 
that the identification protocol devised and implemented by the 
detectives in this case was not so unnecessarily suggestive as 
to mandate per se exclusion under art. 12.16  Although an 
                                                 
16 It is certainly not ideal that, prior to making an 
identification, each witness was apparently aware that the 
victim had been killed and suspected the defendant's 
involvement.  Nonetheless, we agree with the first motion 
judge's determination that the identification procedure was not 
unduly suggestive under the circumstances.  For example, police 
officers separated each witness during the identifications, 
presented the audio portion as distinct from the video portion, 
and did not allow the witnesses to see or hear the portion 
containing the gunshot.  Moreover, police themselves made no 
suggestion of the defendant's involvement, and no confirmatory 
feedback was provided to the witnesses.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 600-602 (2016) (citing social science 
evidence and noting suggestive tactics police must avoid). 
15 
 
 
identification stemming from a videotape containing only one 
individual is analogous to a one-on-one identification, it 
raises due process concerns only if it is "unnecessarily 
suggestive of the defendant . . . so as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of a mistaken identification" (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 477 (2014).  
Where there were no percipient witnesses to the shooting in this 
case, and where the victim's family members otherwise might have 
been in a position to ascertain the identity of the shooter from 
                                                 
 
Even so, where there is more than one potential identifying 
witness, and where it is feasible to do so, we caution that 
police should avoid affording those witnesses the opportunity to 
speak with other witnesses about their perceptions prior to the 
identification proceeding.  Of course, police cannot be expected 
to prevent every conceivable exposure to external information.  
Precautions should be taken, however, to guard against the risk 
that a witness may be influenced by his or her conversations 
with police, family members, or other witnesses before making an 
identification. 
 
 
Moreover, to the extent that the defendant complains of the 
photograph being shown to the witnesses before they made an 
identification, those witnesses already had suggested to police 
that the victim's boyfriend likely was involved.  Although it is 
better practice not to have shown a photograph of the defendant, 
police did so to confirm that this was the individual to whom 
the witnesses were referring when they spoke of the victim's 
boyfriend.  In these circumstances, given that the witnesses 
were familiar with the defendant and were not eyewitnesses to a 
crime, it is unlikely that the witnesses made an identification 
from the videotape based on their having viewed his photograph.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 477 (2014) 
(suppression not required where percipient eyewitnesses later 
were shown surveillance footage and then identified defendant in 
photographic array as man whom they perceived at time of crime). 
16 
 
 
the surveillance footage, the police had good reason to have 
those witnesses attempt to do so.  Cf. id. ("good reason" to 
show surveillance tape and photograph where police needed prompt 
confirmation of investigatory information from witnesses).  The 
defendant does not suggest that police had an alternate 
identification procedure that they could have employed here but, 
rather, appears to imply that police should have forgone 
attempting to establish a visual identification altogether 
because the video quality was poor, the witnesses were biased 
against him, and they already had made an audio identification 
of his voice.17  We decline to disturb the judge's determination 
that the identification protocol utilized by police here does 
not mandate suppression under art. 12. 
ii.  Common-law principles of fairness.  When an out-of-
court identification is suggestive through no fault of the 
police, "suppression cannot deter police misconduct because 
                                                 
 
17 The defendant does not appear to challenge the audio 
identifications in this appeal, but, to the extent that he may, 
we discern no abuse of discretion in the first motion judge's 
determination that those identifications need not be suppressed.  
The witnesses had significant familiarity with the defendant's 
and the victim's voices, both in person and over the telephone, 
such that the witnesses were able to identify the voices from 
the audio recording reliably.  Moreover, the police employed an 
appropriate procedure to separate the audio from the video 
segments, to ensure that the witnesses did not hear the gunshot, 
and to separate each witness while he or she attempted to make 
an identification.  See Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 86 Mass. 
App. Ct. 705, 713 (2014). 
17 
 
 
there is none."  See Johnson, 473 Mass. at 598.  Nonetheless, if 
an identification arises from suggestive circumstances, "its 
admissibility 'should not turn on whether government agents had 
a hand in causing the confrontation,'" because the evidence is 
"equally unreliable in each instance."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 109 (1996).  Applying 
common-law principles of fairness, a judge accordingly may 
suppress the out-of-court eyewitness identification if it 
"resulted from a 'highly' or 'especially' suggestive 
confrontation with the defendant."  See Johnson, supra at 598-
599, quoting Jones, supra. 
"Among our 'common law principles of fairness' is the 
evidentiary rule that a judge has discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.'"  See Johnson, 473 Mass. 
at 599, quoting Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 n.27 
(2014).  See also Johnson, supra ("A judge's authority to 
exclude severely unreliable identification testimony is closely 
related to his or her more general discretion to exclude 
evidence that is more prejudicial than probative" [quotation and 
citation omitted]).  "A motion to suppress an identification 
under Jones is similar to a motion to suppress an identification 
under art. 12," but it differs in two key respects.  See 
Johnson, supra.  "First, the standard of admissibility is 
18 
 
 
different . . . ."  Id. at 600.  As opposed to the rule of per 
se exclusion, a judge maintains the discretion, after "weighing 
the probative value of the identification against the danger of 
unfair prejudice, and determining whether the latter 
substantially outweighs the former," to allow the admission of a 
suggestive identification or to exclude it.  Id. at 600-602 
(describing factors judge should consider in making such 
determination).  Second, the standard of appellate review 
differs.  Id. at 602.  Under art. 12, we review without 
deference a motion judge's application of the law to the facts 
as found; under our common-law principles of fairness, however, 
we review for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
In this regard, the defendant contends that the out-of-
court identifications must be suppressed because the video 
footage is so inherently unreliable that no one could identify 
the defendant unless he or she were predisposed to do so.  After 
hearing testimony from the three witnesses and from police, and 
after reviewing the video footage himself, however, the first 
motion judge rejected the notion that the witnesses' prior 
suspicions of the defendant's involvement, and their ability to 
ascertain his voice from the audio recording, precluded them 
from making a reliable visual identification.18  Applying our 
                                                 
 
18 The defendant maintains that we should review the 
question de novo because the first motion judge did not apply 
19 
 
 
common-law principles of fairness, we discern no abuse of 
discretion in this determination. 
Notably, the video quality in this case is poor, and likely 
would not permit an eyewitness who is unfamiliar with the 
suspect to make a visual identification from the recording.  The 
individuals who made an identification here, however, were not 
eyewitnesses to a crime perpetrated by a stranger, who may be, 
perhaps, more susceptible to a mistaken identification given a 
"single" or "brief" exposure to a suspect in frightening 
conditions.  See Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 
705, 713 (2014).  Rather, each witness had a long and close 
relationship with the defendant, and had considerable 
familiarity with his stature, gait, appearance, clothing, and 
features.  See, e.g., id. (voice identifications rendered 
nonsuggestive given long-time association between witnesses and 
defendant); Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 328 
(2000) (video identification admissible given officer's long 
social familiarity with defendant).  When such familiarity is 
present, those witnesses may be able to discern identifying 
                                                 
common-law principles of fairness under Johnson, 473 Mass. 
at 602.  Although the judge did not explicitly reference our 
common-law principles of fairness, he impliedly engaged in the 
requisite weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect in 
concluding that the identifications were reliable, relevant, and 
admissible.  Having reviewed the video footage ourselves, we 
agree with the judge's determinations. 
20 
 
 
characteristics that others could not, rendering their visual 
identifications, in some circumstances, less unreliable.  See 
Johnson, 473 Mass. at 601-602 ("witness's prior familiarity with 
the person identified, where that person is a witness's family 
member, friend, or long-time acquaintance," is relevant factor 
in assessing probative value of identification).  Indeed, here, 
the three witnesses each immediately identified the defendant 
based on specifics such as his height, weight, and articles of 
clothing, and the way in which he moved.  Given their 
familiarity with the defendant, and because their preconceived 
suspicions should not otherwise preclude them from being able to 
make a visual identification, we conclude that our common-law 
principles of fairness do not require suppression.19 
b.  Miranda warnings.  The Commonwealth challenges the 
allowance of the motion to suppress custodial statements on the 
ground that the first motion judge erred in concluding that the 
Miranda warnings were inadequately conveyed. 
                                                 
 
19 Whether, and to what extent, the nonpercipient witnesses 
will be permitted to make an in-court identification or to 
testify as to what they could perceive in the video footage is a 
matter reserved to the trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. Vacher, 
469 Mass. 425, 441-442 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 
Mass. App. Ct. 321, 326 (2000) (witness may only testify to 
identification if witness can add information that otherwise 
would be missing from jury's knowledge; otherwise, "it is the 
province of the jury to draw their own conclusions regarding the 
identity of the person depicted without the witness's 
assistance"). 
21 
 
 
"In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that 'the 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.'"  Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 
543, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002), quoting Arizona v. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).20  These procedural safeguards 
mandate that an accused must be warned that he or she "has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he [or she] does make 
may be used as evidence against him [or her], and that he [or 
she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained 
or appointed."  Vuthy Seng, supra, quoting Miranda, supra.  A 
defendant may waive these rights, provided that the waiver is 
made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" (citation 
omitted).  Vuthy Seng, supra.  The Commonwealth bears the burden 
of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant was 
advised of his or her rights in a meaningful way, and that he or 
she waived them in deciding to make a statement to police.  Id. 
at 544.  See Commonwealth v. Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 358 (2013).  
Whether a defendant was given adequate Miranda warnings is a 
                                                 
 
20 It is undisputed that the defendant was in custody for 
Miranda purposes.  See Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 
327-328 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009). 
22 
 
 
question of law that we review de novo.21  See Vuthy Seng, supra 
at 543. 
 
The first motion judge heard expert testimony on the 
defendant's lack of English-language proficiency, and his tested 
inability to comprehend most of the words contained in the 
Miranda warnings.22  The judge also was provided a videotape of 
the interrogation and a formal transcript of the translated 
warnings prepared by a certified interpreter.  After hearing the 
expert testimony and reviewing the record, the judge made 
findings that the defendant was able to "understand 'street 
English'" and some basic words, but was unable to follow a 
conversation between two English speakers, and was unable to 
understand statements involving complex technical concepts, such 
as warrants and criminal procedure rights.  The judge concluded 
that the defendant's rights were conveyed "in such a fragmented 
and confusing manner so as to be incoherent" in his native 
language, and the defendant did not otherwise understand the 
                                                 
 
21 The first motion judge considered the transcript and 
videotape of the interrogation in light of expert testimony.  
Where a judge made credibility determinations as to a witness's 
testimony that were relevant to his or her subsidiary findings 
of fact, we adhere to the ordinary standard of review and afford 
deference to the judge's findings.  See Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655 (2018); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 
Mass. 336, 341 (2012). 
 
 
22 The expert testified that the defendant understood only 
one of nine critical words in the Miranda warnings. 
23 
 
 
English version of the warnings.  The judge accordingly 
suppressed the custodial statements that followed. 
We agree that the defendant was not adequately informed of 
his rights in Spanish in several key respects.  First, the 
defendant was not apprised that anything he said could be used 
against him in court.  "As we have stated:  'The warning of the 
right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation 
that anything said can and will be used against the individual 
in court.'"  See Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 544, quoting Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 469.  The warning is "an absolute prerequisite to 
interrogation," and is necessary in order to make the accused 
aware "not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences 
of forgoing it."  See Vuthy Seng, supra, quoting Miranda, supra 
at 469, 471. 
Here, those consequences were conveyed to the defendant as 
"[a]ny thing that you say can be against you . . . the, of the 
court," which, as the Commonwealth concedes, is problematic at 
best.23  Indeed, we do not view this translation as a minor 
variation in interpretation, see Bins, 465 Mass. at 358-359, 
but, rather, as a deficiency that wholly interfered with the 
full, accurate, and effective recitation of the defendant's 
Miranda rights.  See Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 552 
                                                 
 
23 The defendant also was not asked, either in Spanish or in 
English, whether he understood this right. 
24 
 
 
(2006) (requiring suppression where police did not advise 
defendant that anything he said could be used against him in 
court); Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 544 (same).  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 255 (1991) ("slight 
ambiguities in a few of the Spanish words on the [Miranda] 
cards, the use of one colloquial Spanish term, and the lack of 
accent marks" did not interfere with meaning of warnings). 
 
There were similar defects in the translation of other 
warnings.  For example, the defendant was informed that if he 
did not have the means to pay for an attorney, and if he 
"wish[ed] for it," that he had the right "to be a law, lawyer 
before being interrogated."  Cf. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 544-
545 (telling defendant that if he could not afford attorney, 
"they can help find one for you" was inadequate); Commonwealth 
v. Colby, 422 Mass. 414, 418 (1996) (telling defendant that "if 
he could not afford an attorney, the Commonwealth would attempt 
to provide one for him" was inadequate). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that, notwithstanding these 
deficiencies, the totality of the circumstances otherwise 
suggests that the defendant understood his rights; he "nodded" 
throughout the interview and demonstrably could understand some 
words, such as "lawyer," which he supplied in Spanish when the 
interpreting officer was struggling to find the word.  Based on 
expert testimony on the coping mechanisms of non-native 
25 
 
 
speakers, however, the first motion judge ascribed the 
defendant's nodding along as an indication that he was 
attempting to listen to the officer, and not as proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he understood the warnings.  The judge 
also determined that the defendant's ability to understand basic 
English words did not equate to an ability to comprehend them 
when used as technical concepts within complex sentences, 
particularly where the defendant did not understand other words 
in the sentence, and where they involved a fragmented recitation 
of his constitutional rights. 
 
Although we have recognized that the translation of Miranda 
warnings into a defendant's native language need not be "word 
for word," see Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran, 471 Mass. 179, 186 
(2015), the translation cannot be so "misstated to the point of 
being contradictory" or equivocal.  See Bins, 465 Mass. at 363.  
Here, the Spanish recitation of several required warnings was 
incapable of conveying "meaningful advice to the unlettered and 
unlearned in language which [a defendant] can comprehend and on 
which [a defendant] can knowingly act" (citation omitted).  See 
Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 544.  As such, we conclude that the 
defendant was unable to execute a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his rights, and the custodial statements 
obtained thereafter properly were suppressed. 
26 
 
 
 
c.  Search of the cellular telephone.  Because the request 
to search the defendant's cellular telephone directly followed 
the failure to provide him with adequate Miranda warnings, and 
was derived from statements he made during the interrogation, 
the defendant contends that the search was presumptively invalid 
and the fruits obtained from it should have been suppressed.  
The Commonwealth concedes that if the court concludes that the 
warnings were inadequate, the cellular telephone evidence must 
be suppressed.  We agree as well. 
 
Pursuant to art. 12, any physical or testimonial evidence 
that is "derived from unwarned statements where Miranda warnings 
would have been required . . . in order for them to be 
admissible, is presumptively excludable from evidence at trial 
as 'fruit' of the improper failure to provide such warnings."  
Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 215 (2005).  See 
Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 292, cert. denied, 562 
U.S. 874 (2010).24  In order for evidence obtained following an 
                                                 
 
24 Although the United States Constitution permits the 
prosecution to introduce the physical fruits of a voluntary but 
unwarned statement to police, see United States v. Patane, 542 
U.S. 630, 637-640 (2004), we have concluded that the broader 
protections of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights bar the use of physical and testimonial fruits derived 
from an unwarned statement.  See Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 
Mass. 280, 292, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010), citing 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 218-219 (2005).  Other 
States similarly have adopted broader protections under their 
State Constitutions.  See, e.g., State v. Farris, 2006-Ohio-
3255, ¶¶ 46-49, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252 (2007); State v. 
27 
 
 
unwarned statement to be admissible, the Commonwealth must show 
that it is "sufficiently attenuated" from the unwarned statement 
itself.  See Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 581, 589 
(2017).  To determine whether there was sufficient attenuation, 
a court considers such factors as the temporal proximity, 
whether there were any intervening circumstances, and the 
flagrancy of the official misconduct.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Long, 476 Mass. 526, 536-537 (2017).  In assessing those 
factors, "[w]e do not apply a 'but for' test," Long, supra at 
536, but, rather, we consider whether the evidence came about as 
a result of the "exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint."  Id. at 537, quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 488 (1963). 
 
The request to search the defendant's cellular telephone 
here was not so attenuated; the search arose directly from the 
defendant's unwarned statements, and the Commonwealth does not 
suggest that it has met its burden of proving that the taint was 
dissipated through some other intervening circumstance.  Compare 
Martin, 444 Mass. at 220.  Further, while the degree of official 
misconduct here was not egregious, the inadequate translation of 
Miranda warnings and of the interrogation itself makes plain the 
                                                 
Vondehn, 348 Or. 462, 475-476 (2010); State v. Peterson, 2007 VT 
24, ¶ 28; State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶¶ 73-83. 
28 
 
 
ongoing "need for law enforcement to use capable, trained 
translators who will report verbatim the question asked and the 
response given," as well as to use interpreters who are able 
meaningfully to convey the substance of a suspect's Miranda 
rights.  See Commonwealth v. Santana, 477 Mass. 610, 618 n.6 
(2017).  The fruits obtained from the search thus require 
suppression. 
 
d.  Search of the CSLI.  Police filed an application for a 
search warrant, supported by an affidavit, in order to obtain 
thirty-two days of the defendant's CSLI, spanning the period of 
time from December 5, 2014, to January 5, 2015.25  Following the 
issuance of the search warrant, the defendant moved to suppress 
the CSLI.  The motion was denied. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the affidavit filed in 
support of the Commonwealth's application did not establish the 
requisite probable cause to obtain a search warrant.  The 
Commonwealth concedes that if the Miranda warnings were 
inadequate, the affidavit relied on tainted information obtained 
as a result of the invalid search, including the defendant's 
telephone number.  The Commonwealth contends, however, that when 
                                                 
 
25 Police initially sent an administrative subpoena to the 
defendant's cellular service provider, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703, to obtain subscriber information and telephone call logs 
for the same period.  The subpoena did not include a request for 
CSLI. 
29 
 
 
the tainted information is excised from the affidavit, 
sufficient probable cause remained to obtain CSLI for the 
defendant's movements during the roughly month-long period. 
 
Whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause "is 
a question of law that we review de novo."  Perkins, 478 Mass. 
at 102.  Our review is limited to the four corners of the 
affidavit, and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.  Id.  
A search warrant application for CSLI must demonstrate (1) 
"probable cause to believe that a particularly described offense 
has been . . . committed" and (2) "that the CSLI sought will 
'produce evidence of such offense or will aid in the 
apprehension of a person who the applicant has probable cause to 
believe has committed . . . such offense.'"26  See Commonwealth 
v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 236 n.15 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 
837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 
454 Mass. 808, 825 (2009).  In this regard, the government must 
be able to demonstrate "a sufficient nexus between the criminal 
activity for which probable cause has been established and the 
physical location of the [cellular telephone] recorded by the 
                                                 
 
26 "This test requires a higher degree of confidence that 
the CSLI will yield evidence of criminal activity than that 
which is necessary for an order under [18 U.S.C.] § 2703(d), 
which requires only that the government show specific and 
articulable facts that the CSLI is relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  See Augustine, 472 Mass. at 455. 
30 
 
 
CSLI of the person the applicant has probable cause to believe 
has committed the offense, at least at the time and place of the 
criminal activity."  See Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 
547 (2019).  To establish the requisite nexus, the affidavit 
must set forth "a substantial basis to conclude that the items 
sought are related to the criminal activity under investigation, 
and that they reasonably may be expected to be located in the 
place to be searched at the time the search warrant issues" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 546.  See Augustine, 
472 Mass. at 455.  Such a determination is fact-intensive and 
will be resolved on a case-by-case basis.  See Commonwealth v. 
Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 522 (2017). 
 
There is no dispute here that the Commonwealth established 
probable cause to believe that a particularly described offense 
had been committed.  See Augustine, 467 Mass. at 236 n.15.  
Whether the Commonwealth demonstrated probable cause to 
establish the requisite nexus between the commission of that 
crime and the CSLI for the defendant's device, however, is 
another matter. 
 
Ordinarily, police may be able to demonstrate the requisite 
nexus by connecting the defendant to ownership of a particular 
device and by showing a substantial basis that the device will 
contain relevant evidence of the crime -- that is, the 
defendant's location at or around the time the crime was 
31 
 
 
committed.  See Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 546-549; Commonwealth v. 
Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 102 (2018).  Here, however, when we remove 
from the calculus any tainted evidence contained within the 
affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant, 
such as the defendant's disclosure of his telephone number, the 
Commonwealth has not met its burden with regard to establishing 
any such nexus.  Compare Hobbs, supra at 548-549 (that 
defendant's telephone number was known to police and 
corroborated by multiple individuals established defendant's 
association with sought-after device's CSLI). 
 
Nor has the Commonwealth demonstrated any connection 
between the commission of the crime and the thirty-two days for 
which the Commonwealth sought the CSLI.  Indeed, there is 
nothing in the affidavit that might suggest that the location of 
the defendant's telephone, beyond the night of the shooting 
itself, would produce any evidence of the crime.  Compare Hobbs, 
482 Mass. at 547-548 (affidavit must show that sought-after CSLI 
would produce evidence of crime -- namely, defendant's presence 
at or around crime scene at time of crime); Commonwealth v. 
Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 870 (2015) (affidavit must indicate 
"whether [defendant's] cellular telephone . . . was located near 
the victim's home on the night of the shooting and, therefore 
whether [defendant] was in the area of the shooting when it 
occurred" (emphasis added)).  "We once again emphasize the 
32 
 
 
significant constitutional issues raised by the collection of 
extended amounts of historical CSLI, and the importance of 
limiting the requests accordingly."  Hobbs, supra at 550 n.13, 
citing Augustine, 467 Mass. at 248-249. 
 
As such, the information contained within the four corners 
of the affidavit does not support a determination of probable 
cause, and the CSLI obtained as a result must be suppressed.27 
3.  Conclusion.  That portion of the order allowing the 
defendant's motions to suppress his custodial statements is 
affirmed.  The denial of the motion to suppress the out-of-court 
identifications is affirmed.  So much of the orders as deny the 
motions to suppress evidence obtained from a search of the 
defendant's cellular telephone and the CSLI are reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                 
 
27 "Even though the exclusionary rule generally bars from 
admission evidence 'obtained during an illegal search as fruit 
of the poisonous tree, evidence initially discovered as a 
consequence of an unlawful search may be admissible if later 
acquired independently by lawful means untainted by the initial 
illegality'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 
Mass. 852, 865 (2015).  If the Commonwealth can show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that it has an untainted source 
for the telephone number, connecting the defendant to the 
ownership of the device for which the CSLI is requested, it is 
not precluded from doing so.  Id. at 865, 870-871 (suppression 
not required where police applied for search warrant for CSLI 
based on information wholly independent of unlawfully obtained 
CSLI).