Title: State v. Broxton

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 114,675 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DARRELL BROXTON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
It is not legally appropriate to instruct a jury on an uncharged crime unless it is a 
lesser included offense of a charged crime. 
 
2. 
 
When a district court permits evidence of prior crimes or bad acts under K.S.A. 
60-455, exculpatory evidence related to the same prior crime or bad act is relevant. 
 
3. 
A defendant may claim the benefit of developments in the law occurring while his 
or her case is pending on direct appeal.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed November 9, 
2017. Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed April 17, 2020. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the convictions, vacating the sentence, and remanding the 
case is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, the sentence 
is vacated, and the case is remanded with directions. 
 
2 
 
Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Ethan Zipf-Sigler, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jose V. Guerra, assistant 
district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 
briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
STEGALL, J.:  Darrell Broxton appeals from his second-degree murder, burglary, 
and felony theft convictions. Broxton claims the district court committed three reversible 
errors by (1) failing to give a felony-murder instruction; (2) excluding from evidence a 
document from a Florida homicide investigation; and (3) improperly scoring Broxton's 
prior Florida burglary conviction as a person felony. 
 
 
As discussed below, we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that a district court 
may elect to provide a felony-murder instruction when that crime was not charged. As 
such, we affirm the district court's finding that the instruction was not legally appropriate. 
We agree with Broxton, however, that the district court erred when it refused to admit the 
exculpatory document from the Florida homicide investigation into evidence on the 
ground it was not relevant. But, in light of the State's case at trial, we hold this error was 
harmless. Finally, we conclude Broxton's prior Florida burglary conviction must be 
scored as a nonperson felony. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In December 2012, Peter Belmont was found dead in his home. Belmont died as a 
result of trauma to the back of his head. Numerous items were missing from Belmont's 
home, including his van. Investigators discovered DNA evidence on a bottle of bleach  
 
 
3 
 
and a bottle of orange juice left at the scene. Later testing indicated that one of the 
samples contained a mixed DNA profile consistent with Broxton and the other sample 
contained Broxton's DNA. 
 
Several weeks after Belmont's body was found, police pulled over Belmont's van. 
One of the passengers, Clifford Harris, said he had rented the van from James Hunter and 
Brian Keatings. Harris later identified Broxton as the man he knew as Brian Keatings. 
When questioned, Hunter told police that in December, Broxton had picked him up in the 
same van filled with televisions, stereos, and laptops. According to Hunter, he and 
Broxton sold several of those items and exchanged the van for crack cocaine. 
 
Police then discovered several items from Belmont's home at Broxton's apartment, 
including Belmont's stereo, various Sony-branded sound equipment, a red and black 
Amsterdam pen, cologne, an NYU logo sweatshirt, a pair of slacks, a belt, a notebook, an 
envelope, a piece of paper, and a business card. The NYU sweatshirt was blood-stained 
in three places. DNA testing of one sample yielded a partial major profile consistent with 
Broxton's DNA. Another sample contained both Broxton's and Belmont's DNA.  
 
During an interrogation, Broxton admitted he knew Belmont and claimed that he 
and Belmont had had a consensual sexual encounter in Belmont's van. But Broxton 
denied taking Belmont's possessions and claimed the items in his apartment were left by 
a former roommate or were purchased at Goodwill.  
 
In addition, the investigation revealed that Broxton's mother's and sister's phones, 
which Broxton often used, had been used to call Belmont's number between November 1 
and December 5, 2012. After December 5, the calls ceased. The calendar hanging in 
Belmont's kitchen included an entry noting "Darrell over" on December 5, 2012. 
 
4 
 
The State charged Broxton with first-degree premeditated murder; burglary of 
Belmont's van; felony theft of the van; and misdemeanor theft of Belmont's electronic 
equipment, clothes, and a pen. At trial, the district court instructed the jury on first-degree 
premeditated murder and the lesser included offense of second-degree intentional murder. 
Ultimately, a jury convicted Broxton of second-degree murder, burglary, and felony theft. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
It was not error to refuse to give a felony-murder jury instruction.  
 
At trial, Broxton requested a felony-murder instruction. Broxton told the court he 
knew "it was not charged that way, . . . but there [was] certainly evidence that there was 
property taken." He continued that a jury could reasonably "consider this to be a robbery 
and a death occurring during a robbery, which would . . . satisfy the requirements to find 
felony murder as opposed to premeditated first[-]degree murder." 
 
The district court denied Broxton's request, ruling that a felony-murder instruction 
was inappropriate because the State only charged Broxton with first-degree premeditated 
murder. Because felony murder is not a lesser included offense of first-degree 
premeditated murder, the district court reasoned that such an instruction would not be 
appropriate. 
 
The Court of Appeals considered Broxton's claim and held that "[c]aselaw 
indicate[d] that there was no legal impediment to the trial court giving a felony murder 
instruction here." State v. Broxton, No. 114,675, 2017 WL 5184435, at *4 (Kan. App. 
2017) (unpublished opinion). It explained that "felony murder is not a lesser included 
offense of first-degree premeditated murder," but "a trial court may instruct the jury on  
 
 
5 
 
felony murder even though the State only charged the defendant with premeditated first-
degree murder." 2017 WL 5184435, at *4. The Court of Appeals explained that even 
though the district court may elect to do so, the district court is under no duty to instruct 
for felony murder under those circumstances. 2017 WL 5184435, at *5. It relied upon 
State v. Young, 277 Kan. 588, Syl. ¶ 4, 87 P.3d 308 (2004), which held that "'[t]he fact 
that felony murder is not charged in an information does not preclude an instruction when 
evidence supports the instruction and the defendant is not unfairly surprised by the 
prosecution's reliance on that theory.'" Broxton, 2017 WL 5184435, at *4. 
 
Finding that a felony-murder instruction "may be so instructed if the facts call for 
giving the instruction," the Court of Appeals examined the facts and held that such an 
instruction was not factually appropriate. 2017 WL 5184435, at *5-6. The panel 
concluded that none of the evidence indicated that Belmont's murder took place during 
the robbery. Broxton, 2017 WL 5184435, at *6. Thus, because the killing was not part of 
the res gestae of the robbery, the killing could not be felony murder. 
 
Broxton petitioned this court for review, claiming the Court of Appeals erred 
when it held that a felony-murder instruction was not factually appropriate. The State 
cross-petitioned, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that a felony-
murder instruction was legally appropriate. 
 
When analyzing jury instruction claims, we first determine whether we "'can or 
should review the issue, i.e., whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to 
preserve the issue for appeal.'" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). 
Next, we consider the claim's merits "'to determine whether error occurred below.'" 307 
Kan. at 317. Finally, if error occurred at the district court, we ask whether that "'error 
requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed harmless.'" 307 Kan. at 317. The 
error determination requires us to consider whether the instruction was legally and  
 
 
6 
 
factually appropriate. Appellate courts exercise unlimited review when determining 
whether an instruction was legally appropriate. State v. Johnson, 304 Kan. 924, 931, 376 
P.3d 70 (2016).  
 
The issue was properly preserved. Thus, we first consider whether the requested 
instruction was legally appropriate, and only if the answer is "yes" will we move on to a 
consideration of whether it was factually appropriate. A legally appropriate jury 
instruction "'fairly and accurately state[s] the applicable law, and an instruction that does 
not do so [is] legally infirm.'" State v. Murrin, 309 Kan. 385, 392, 435 P.3d 1126 (2019). 
 
The panel below held that the district court did not have a "duty" to provide a 
felony-murder instruction but suggested that if it elected to do so, such an instruction 
could have been legally appropriate. The Court of Appeals held this despite conceding 
that felony murder is not a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder. 
Broxton, 2017 WL 5184435, at *5-6. The panel cited our Young decision to support its 
conclusion that the trial court could have instructed the jury on felony murder even 
though the State only charged Broxton with first-degree premeditated murder. Broxton, 
2017 WL 5184435, at *4-5.  
 
In Young, the defendant was charged with premeditated first-degree murder. The 
district court, however, without a request from either party but also without objection, 
gave a felony-murder instruction. The jury ultimately convicted Young of felony murder. 
On appeal, Young argued the felony-murder instruction was reversible error. Young, 277 
Kan. at 593-97. 
 
The Young court began its analysis by observing that the felony-murder instruction 
"was not a correct statement of Kansas law, because felony murder is not a 'lesser 
offense' of premeditated first-degree murder." 277 Kan. at 593. But the Young court 
permitted the instruction, after concluding that "the evidence presented at trial was 
7 
 
plainly sufficient to support Young's felony-murder conviction." 277 Kan. at 596. Thus, 
even though the "misstatement was literally [erroneous]" it was not "'clearly erroneous' 
because the remainder of the instruction's content and its inclusion in the case were 
proper." 277 Kan. at 594. Thus, the court concluded it was "not error to have the jury 
consider a felony-murder theory in the alternative to a premeditation theory, even though 
felony murder had not been described in the information." 277 Kan. at 594. 
 
The decision in Young predates the more streamlined and precise framework for 
analyzing jury instructions this court adopted in 2012 in  State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 
283 P.3d 202 (2012). Prior to Plummer, appellate review of jury instruction claims was 
decidedly more scattershot. To remedy these inconsistencies, we enumerated a four-step 
analysis appellate courts still follow. 295 Kan. at 160-63 (listing the now-familiar steps of 
considering [1] reviewability; [2] legal appropriateness; [3] factual appropriateness; and 
[4] harmlessness). 
 
We often state that our caselaw considering jury instruction questions published 
prior to Plummer's recalibration is less reliable than its post-Plummer counterparts. See, 
e.g., Foster v. Klaumann, 296 Kan. 295, 301, 294 P.3d 223 (2013) ("This court recently 
held that its prior decisions applied an 'imprecise' standard of review for jury instruction 
issues and set forth an analytical framework with accompanying standards of review to 
promote greater consistency."); State v. Tague, 296 Kan. 993, 1009, 298 P.3d 273 (2013) 
("[W]e observed that our past caselaw tended to blend or conflate the determinations of 
appellate reviewability, error on the merits, and reversibility of the error."). This history 
colors our view of Young and its precedential value. 
 
It is helpful to note, though, that the Young court did analyze the legal 
appropriateness of the felony-murder instruction and concluded that "[t]he felony-murder 
instruction given in Young's case was not a correct statement of Kansas law, because  
 
 
8 
 
felony murder is not a 'lesser offense' of premeditated first-degree murder." Young, 277 
Kan. at 593. The Young court plainly held that the felony-murder instruction was not 
legally appropriate. The analysis should have stopped there. 
 
Instead, the Young court then proceeded to an analysis of the instruction's factual 
appropriateness: 
 
"Here, the evidence presented at trial was plainly sufficient to support Young's 
felony-murder conviction. At the time of the murder, Young was involved in the sale of 
cocaine, which is listed as an inherently dangerous felony. Young was carrying a gun; he 
threatened to shoot Horn if Horn turned the key in the car's ignition; and he shot into the 
car five times when the drug deal soured. [Citation omitted.]"  277 Kan. at 596-97. 
 
Finally, the Young court addressed reversibility, holding that there was "no 
reasonable possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the district 
court had not made the mistake of calling felony murder a 'lesser offense' of premeditated 
murder." 277 Kan. at 597. 
 
When considered in isolation, our decision in Young does support the notion that a 
defendant may be convicted of a crime that was never charged and is not a lesser 
included offense of any charged crime. But, when viewed through the Plummer lens, the 
misstep in Young becomes apparent. Under our current analytical framework, the district 
court was correct when it denied Broxton's request for a felony-murder instruction. This 
is because it does not matter whether such an instruction might have been factually 
appropriate. If an instruction is not legally appropriate the analysis ends there. 
 
Moreover, permitting the district court to provide jury instructions for crimes the 
State did not charge (or their lesser included offenses) would upset the basic structure of 
criminal trials. Judge Atcheson's concurring opinion below summarizes succinctly: 
 
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"[A] criminal defendant has no right to have a jury instructed on crimes the State has 
refrained from charging, save for lesser included offenses of those crimes that actually 
have been charged. The State functionally has unbridled control over what to charge 
against a given defendant—that's the essence of prosecutorial discretion. . . . Whatever 
the reasons, the call belongs to the State. A defendant has no correlative right to insist a 
jury be instructed on uncharged crimes even if the trial evidence tends to establish them. 
That would contravene prosecutorial discretion. [Citation omitted.]" Broxton, 2017 WL 
5184435, at *12 (Atcheson, J., concurring). 
 
 
We agree with Judge Atcheson. 
 
 
Because the State did not charge Broxton with felony murder—and felony murder 
is not a lesser included offense of any crime he was charged with—a felony-murder 
instruction was not legally appropriate in this case. Given this, we will not consider 
whether such an instruction would have been factually appropriate. 
 
The district court erred by excluding the Florida "No Information" document from 
evidence, but the error was harmless.  
 
 
Next, Broxton takes issue with the district court's exclusion from evidence of an 
exhibit originating in Florida referred to as a "No Information" document. At trial, the 
State had produced evidence of a 1996 Florida homicide. A Florida police detective 
testified to details in that case which closely mirrored Belmont's homicide. These facts 
included:  the Florida murder victim was an older homosexual man; the victim often had 
homosexual indigent male visitors; these visitors often were drug users; the crime scene 
showed no signs of forced entry; the victim was struck in the head with a hammer; police 
discovered blood spatter on the walls and ceiling; a TV and VCR were missing from the 
victim's house; the victim's vehicle was taken; and a water glass was left behind at the 
scene. Broxton, 2017 WL 5184435, at *3. While Florida authorities issued a warrant for 
Broxton's arrest, Broxton was never formally charged with the crime. The State also 
10 
 
admitted a taped interview of Broxton by Florida police in 1998. On the tape, Broxton 
admits to knowing the Florida victim and being at the victim's house smoking crack 
cocaine when the Florida victim died. Broxton claims in the recording that another 
individual at the house killed the Florida victim. 
 
Broxton objected to the evidence, but the district court admitted it to prove identity 
under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-455. Having lost that challenge, Broxton sought to mitigate 
its impact by introducing into evidence a "No Information" document executed by the 
Florida prosecutor in the case. The document read: 
 
"'Comes now the State of Florida, by and through its undersigned Assistant State 
Attorney, and announces that it will file no information in the above entitled cause based 
on the following grounds: 
 
'ALTHOUGH PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED WHICH JUSTIFIED THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE CIRCUIT JUDGE'S WARRANT, THERE IS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THIS TIME TO PROCEED WITH 
PROSECUTION BECAUSE THE EXCULPATORY STATEMENT MADE BY 
THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE WARRANT WAS ISSUED CANNOT BE 
DISPROVED.'" 2017 WL 5184435, at *7. 
 
 
The trial court denied the admission of the No Information document on the 
grounds that it was not probative and therefore was irrelevant. The court found "the 
allegations in Florida . . . are uncannily similar to the actions [Broxton was] accused of 
here in Kansas. What the prosecutor decides to do or has decided to do with the evidence 
in front of them in Florida is irrelevant."  
 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was relevant and that it was error to 
exclude it. 2017 WL 5184435, at *8. The panel reasoned that "evidence that Broxton did 
not commit one of the murders is evidence he did not commit either of the murders. 
11 
 
Broxton denied that he was the perpetrator of either offense. That Broxton was never 
charged because of insufficient evidence is not dispositive but certainly relevant." 2017 
WL 5184435, at *8. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found the error was harmless. 
2017 WL 5184435, at *8. These rulings are challenged by both parties. Broxton seeks to 
overturn the panel's harmlessness conclusion, while the State urges us to reverse the 
finding of error. 
 
 
"'Evidence is probative if it furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward proof. 
Probativity is reviewed for abuse of discretion.'" State v. McCormick, 305 Kan. 43, 47, 
378 P.3d 543 (2016). A district court abuses its discretion when its action is (1) arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. 
State v. Ingham, 308 Kan. 1466, 1469, 430 P.3d 931 (2018). 
 
 
The district court believed the No Information document was not probative 
because it did not decisively state that Broxton was innocent of that crime. Instead, the 
No Information document only indicated that the State of Florida lacked evidence 
sufficient to charge Broxton. The district court found this distinction dispositive. The 
Court of Appeals held the evidence was "certainly relevant," implying that the district 
court's ruling was unreasonable. Broxton, 2017 WL 5184435, at *8. We agree. The 
district court believed evidence potentially implicating Broxton in a Florida homicide 
was probative to prove the material fact of identity. It should follow that evidence tending 
to show the State of Florida's inability to charge Broxton would be probative of 
disproving that same material fact. Thus, in these circumstances, the district court abused 
its discretion when it ruled that the No Information document lacked probative value and 
ruled it inadmissible.  
 
 
Having decided the district court erred when it excluded the No Information 
document, we must consider the resulting prejudice, if any. We review any erroneous 
exclusion of evidence under the harmless error test enumerated in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-
12 
 
261 "which asks whether 'there is a reasonable probability that the error did or will affect 
the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record.'" State v. Burnett, 300 Kan. 419, 434, 
329 P.3d 1169 (2014) (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 
[2011]). 
 
 
Reviewing the record, we hold that any prejudice resulting from the document's 
exclusion was harmless. It is unlikely that the inclusion of the document would have 
swayed the jury. The No Information document did not vouch for Broxton's innocence in 
the Florida homicide—it only stated that Florida prosecutors lacked sufficient evidence to 
charge Broxton "at th[at] time." Broxton, 2017 WL 5184435, at *7. 
 
 
In light of the entire record, it is highly unlikely that this single document 
proclaiming the State of Florida's inability to charge Broxton for the homicide would 
have persuaded jurors to change their votes. This is in part because the identity evidence 
from the Florida homicide painted a convincing picture. Both the Florida homicide victim 
and Belmont associated with indigent drug users, engaged in sexual relationships with 
those drug users, and died of trauma to the head from multiple strikes leaving behind 
similar blood spatter evidence. Both crime scenes lacked signs of forced entry and had 
various types of electronic equipment, including televisions, stolen from them. Beverage 
containers recovered at each scene contained Broxton's DNA. In both cases, the victim's 
vehicle was taken from the scene and later linked to Broxton. 
 
 
More important, however, even if we were to concede the district court's 
evidentiary error tainted the entirety of the State's Florida identity evidence, the 
remaining evidence against Broxton was overwhelming. Broxton was identified as the 
individual who was driving Belmont's van while it was filled with items similar to items 
stolen from Belmont's home. Police discovered Belmont's stereo equipment, pen, 
sweatshirt, and other belongings in Broxton's apartment. Broxton admitted to police he 
had been in Belmont's van. The sweatshirt had a spot containing one partial major profile 
13 
 
consistent with Broxton's DNA, and two spots containing Broxton's DNA mixed with 
Belmont's DNA. Cell phones Broxton had access to frequently made phone calls to 
Belmont's number, but those calls ceased after December 5, 2012—the same day marked 
as "Darrell over" on Belmont's kitchen calendar. Finally, DNA evidence consistent with 
Broxton's DNA was recovered from a bleach bottle at the scene, and Broxton's DNA was 
found on the orange juice bottle left behind. 
 
The State's case at trial was significant and convincing. In light of all these 
considerations, we are confident in determining that the evidentiary error was harmless. 
 
The 1989 Florida burglary conviction must be scored as a nonperson felony. 
 
After sentencing, the State objected to Broxton's presentence investigation report 
(PSI). The State claimed that a prior 1989 Florida burglary conviction should have been 
scored as a person felony under amendments to K.S.A. 21-6810(d), 21-6811(c) and (j). 
The district court agreed and scored the conviction as a person felony. Broxton appealed 
and claims the offense has been improperly scored because it is not a "comparable 
offense" under Kansas law.  
 
It is undoubtedly the case that the law used to determine comparable offenses in 
Kansas has been in a state of flux for several years. Early on, "'[f]or purposes of 
determining criminal history, the offenses need only be comparable, not identical,'" and a 
'"comparable offense' was 'the closest approximation' to the out-of-state crime." State v. 
Weber, 309 Kan. 1203, 1206, 442 P.3d 1044 (2019) (quoting State v. Vandervort, 276 
Kan. 164, 179, 72 P.3d 925 [2003]). But we reconsidered the statutory meaning of 
"comparable" in State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552, 561-62, 412 P.3d 984 (2018). There, we 
held that "[f]or an out-of-state conviction to be comparable to an offense under the 
Kansas criminal code, the elements of the out-of-state crime cannot be broader than the  
 
 
14 
 
elements of the Kansas crime." Put another way, "the elements of the out-of-state crime 
must be identical to, or narrower than, the elements of the Kansas crime to which it is 
being referenced." (Emphasis added.) 307 Kan. at 562. 
 
Then, in Weber, 309 Kan. at 1206, we synthesized several recent developments. 
We explained that in State v. Murdock, 309 Kan. 585, 439 P.3d 307 (2019) (Murdock II), 
we held: 
 
"'[T]he legality of a sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 is controlled by the law in effect at 
the time the sentence was pronounced. The legality of a sentence is fixed at a discrete 
moment in time—the moment the sentence was pronounced. At that moment, a 
pronounced sentence is either legal or illegal according to then-existing law. Therefore, 
for purposes of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, neither party can avail itself of 
subsequent changes in the law.'" (Emphasis added.) Weber, 309 Kan. at 1209 (quoting 
Murdock II, 309 Kan. at 591). 
 
Applying this rationale, we held that "Wetrich was a change in the law as 
contemplated by Murdock II." Weber, 309 Kan. at 1209. We affirmed Weber's conviction 
on that basis: 
 
"Before Wetrich, no Kansas case construed the term 'comparable' as used in K.S.A. 2018 
Supp. 21-6811(e)(3), formerly K.S.A. 21-4711(e), to incorporate the identical-or-
narrower requirement. Vandervort rejected such a construction when it reviewed a 
defendant's claim that an out-of-state offense and a Kansas offense could not be 
comparable since the out-of-state offense was broader, i.e., did not contain a lack-of-
consent element required to commit the Kansas crime. . . . 
 
"Under the law at the time of Weber's sentencing, as he concedes, '[f]or purposes 
of determining criminal history, the offenses need only be comparable, not identical.' In 
Murdock II's wake, he cannot argue Wetrich makes his sentence, which was legal when it 
was imposed, illegal. [Citations omitted.]" 309 Kan. at 1209. 
 
15 
 
Consistent with this holding, we then made it clear that Wetrich is "inapplicable to 
sentences finalized before Wetrich was decided." State v. Bryant, 310 Kan. 920, 453 P.3d 
279, 281 (2019). 
 
After this dust had settled, Broxton—while on direct appeal—made a Wetrich 
claim before us for the first time. And on the merits, he is correct. We have already 
decided that the Florida burglary statute does not create a comparable offense and 
therefore it must be scored as a nonperson felony. State v. Buell, 307 Kan. 604, 608, 412 
P.3d 1004 (2018) (Comparing K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5807 to Fla. Stat. § 810.02 [2002] 
and concluding that "[m]any alternative means may have supported the mental state 
element for the Florida adjudications . . . that would not have been any kind of burglary 
in Kansas" and therefore "the Florida burglary adjudications were not comparable to the 
Kansas offense of burglary."). 
 
Our only obstacle to providing relief to Broxton on this claim is the fact that he 
raised it for the first time on appeal. The vehicle of a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
is unavailable to him because his sentence was legal when pronounced. See Bryant, 453 
P.3d at 281; Weber, 309 Kan. at 1209; Murdock II¸ 309 Kan. at 591; Wetrich, 307 Kan. at 
562. We recently considered this precise issue in State v. Williams, 311 Kan. __, 456 P.3d 
540 (2020).  
 
During Williams' appeal, he argued for the first time, based on and citing to 
Wetrich, that his sentence was illegal because the district court had incorrectly scored an 
out-of-state conviction as a person crime. Williams, 456 P.3d at 544. When we addressed 
the illegal sentence claim, we explained that "Murdock II and Weber preclude Williams 
from arguing that he received an illegal sentence" because:   
 
 
16 
 
 
"At the time Williams was sentenced, out-of-state convictions were classified as 
nonperson or person crimes depending on whether Kansas had a 'comparable' offense in 
effect on the date the current crime was committed. At the time of Williams' sentencing 
in July 2015, the meaning of 'comparable' was defined as the 'closest approximation.'  
 
"Under this standard of 'comparable,' Williams' Mississippi unnatural intercourse 
conviction was comparable to aggravated criminal sodomy, a person felony. According 
to our decision in Murdock II, Williams cannot argue Wetrich makes his sentence, which 
was legal when it was imposed, illegal. [Citations omitted.]" 456 P.3d at 546. 
 
 
But our analysis did not stop here. We explained that several avenues are available 
for relief. 456 P.3d at 546 ("But claiming an illegal sentence . . . is not a defendant's only 
recourse."). We noted that under Murdock II, "'a party may seek and obtain the benefit of 
a change in the law during the pendency of a direct appeal.'" Williams, 456 P.3d at 546 
(quoting Murdock II, 309 Kan. at 591-92). "And while Williams' case was pending on 
direct appeal, a change in our law occurred regarding the definition of 'comparable' as 
stated in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)." 456 P.3d at 546-47. 
 
We gave Williams the benefit of the change in law announced in Wetrich and 
described it as correcting a "sentencing error (as opposed to an illegal sentence)." 
Williams, 456 P.3d at 547. We summarized the uniqueness of the situation this way:  
"because Williams' case is pending on direct appeal, he is entitled to the benefit of a 
change in the law. Because Wetrich changed the law governing Williams' sentence, even 
though Wetrich did not render that sentence illegal, it did render Williams' sentence 
erroneous." Williams, 456 P.3d at 548. 
 
 
Because our caselaw establishes that the Florida burglary statute prohibits a 
broader range of conduct than the Kansas statute, they do not create comparable offenses.  
 
 
17 
 
As such, Broxton's sentence—though legal at the time—still constitutes error and he must 
be resentenced correctly with his Florida burglary conviction scored as a nonperson 
felony. 
 
We affirm the district court's convictions but vacate the sentence and remand 
Broxton's case to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
NUSS, C.J, not participating.1 
PATRICK D. MCANANY, Senior Judge, assigned.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss heard oral arguments but did not 
participate in the final decision in case No. 114,675. Chief Justice Nuss retired effective 
December 17, 2019.  
 
2REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge McAnany was appointed to hear case No. 
114,675 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the 
vacancy on the court by the retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson.