Title: Anthony Joseph Farina v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1 Because the codefendant brothers share the same surname, this opinion will
refer to the appellant and his codefendant by their given names to avoid confusion.
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC93050
____________
ANTHONY JOSEPH FARINA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[August 16, 2001]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Anthony Joseph Farina appeals the imposition of the death penalty upon
resentencing.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the 
Florida Constitution.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the death
sentence.
Anthony1 and his brother Jeffery Farina were convicted and sentenced to
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death for the fatal shooting of Michelle Van Ness during the robbery of a Taco Bell
restaurant in Daytona Beach in 1992.  The record shows that both brothers planned
and participated in the robbery, but that Jeffery actually fired the fatal shot, shot
two other restaurant employees, and stabbed the assistant manager in the back after
his gun misfired.
On appeal, this Court affirmed Anthony’s conviction for first-degree murder,
but vacated his death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding due
to error in the jury selection process.  See Farina (Anthony) v. State, 679 So. 2d
1151, 1157 (Fla. 1996).  We also remanded codefendant Jeffery’s case for
resentencing due to the same error.  See Farina (Jeffery) v. State, 680 So. 2d 392,
396-99 (Fla. 1996).  On remand, a joint penalty proceeding was held before a new
jury.  By a vote of twelve to zero the jury recommended the death penalty for each
defendant.  The trial court followed the jury recommendation and sentenced both
defendants to death.
In imposing the death penalty on Anthony, the trial judge found five
aggravating factors:  (1) defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence based upon the attempted
murders of the other restaurant employees; (2) the murder was committed to avoid
arrest; (3) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the murder was
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heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the murder was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification (CCP).  The judge found three statutory mitigating factors (Anthony
had no significant history of prior criminal activity; he was an accomplice in the 
capital felony committed by Jeffery and his participation was relatively minor; he
was eighteen years old at the time of the crime) and fifteen nonstatutory mitigating
factors (abused and battered childhood, history of emotional problems, cooperation
with the police, involvement in Christianity and Bible study courses while in prison,
good conduct in prison, remorse for what happened, assertion of a positive influence
on others, no history of violence, abandonment by his father, poor upbringing by his
mother, lack of education, good employment history, and amenability to
rehabilitation).  The trial judge concluded that the aggravating factors far
outweighed the mitigating factors, and imposed the death penalty.
On appeal after resentencing, this Court vacated Jeffery's death sentence
based upon our decision in Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), that the
imposition of a death sentence for a crime committed when the defendant was
sixteen years of age constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article I,
section 17 of the Florida Constitution.  See Farina (Jeffery) v. State, 763 So. 2d
302, 303 (Fla. 2000).
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On appeal, Anthony raises twelve issues, including two claims presented in a
supplemental brief which relate to the appropriateness of his death sentence now
that Jeffery has been sentenced to life imprisonment.  Anthony claims that:  (1) the
State improperly used peremptory challenges to strike two African-American
jurors; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to prohibit the
introduction of his taped conversation with his brother Jeffery; (3) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress this taped conversation; (4) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to sever his resentencing proceeding from Jeffery’s; (5)
the trial court erred in admitting victim impact evidence, in allowing the evidence to
become the main feature of the trial, and in refusing to give a requested limiting
instruction; (6) the HAC aggravating circumstance was improperly found; (7) the
CCP aggravating circumstance was improperly found; (8) the avoid arrest/witness
elimination aggravating circumstance was improperly found; (9) the death sentence
is not proportionally warranted; (10) Florida’s death penalty is unconstitutional on
numerous grounds; (11) he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding so that the
judge and jury can consider Jeffery’s life sentence under Brennan in determining the
appropriate sentence for him; and (12) death is disproportionate in light of other
cases where the triggerman received a life sentence.
In issue one Anthony claims that the State improperly used peremptory
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challenges to exclude two African-American jurors (Edwards and Hilton) and that
the court failed in its duty to critically examine these challenges.  Under Melbourne
v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996), and its progeny, the following procedure must
be followed for challenging peremptory strikes of prospective jurors:  (1) the
objecting party must make a timely objection, must show that the venire person is a
member of a distinct racial group, and must request that the court ask the striking
party the reasons for the strike; (2) if the first step is met, the court must ask the
proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike; and (3) if the reason
given is facially race-neutral and the court believes that given all the circumstances
surrounding the strike, the explanation is not pretext, the strike will be sustained. 
Id. at 764.  In the third step, the court's focus is on the genuineness of the
explanation, not its reasonableness.  See id.  On appeal, reviewing courts must be
mindful of two guiding principles:  peremptory challenges are presumed to be
exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner; and the trial court's decision, which turns
primarily on an assessment of credibility, will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous.  See id.; Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 145 (2000).
In the instant case, the State peremptorily struck juror Edwards on two
grounds:  that she expressed concern over her son’s guilt for a drug conviction;
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and that she voiced hesitancy about the death penalty.  The trial judge ruled that
"prosecutors very frequently challenge jurors for those types of reasons.  So I find
it to be a race-neutral reason that is very common in our system for challenging
jurors."  The State peremptorily struck juror Hilton on the grounds that she had
been thirty minutes late in arriving for voir dire on the previous day, was tentative in
her support of the death penalty, was a member of a church that was involved in a
prison ministry program, and might allow feelings of Christian forgiveness to creep
into her decision.  The trial judge ruled that he was "supposed to just sustain the
challenge if I find that the attorney making it is making it in his or her world of good
faith, not whether I agree with it or not.  And I don't think that [the prosecutor] is
making a racial-based challenge . . . And I don't think [the prosecutor] is lying to
me."  Based upon our review of the voir dire record and the fact that the court’s
rulings turned on an assessment of the genuineness of the State’s reasons for
striking these two prospective jurors, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling was
not clearly erroneous and Anthony is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Issues two and three both involve a recorded conversation between the
brothers in the back seat of a police car, which was recorded without the brothers’
knowledge.  During this conversation, both Anthony and Jeffery made incriminating
statements about the crime.  The taped conversation was introduced during the
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original guilt phase trial and this Court found no error in its admission.  See Farina,
679 So. 2d at 1157.  After we remanded for a new sentencing proceeding, Anthony
filed a motion in limine to prohibit the use of the statement in the penalty phase on
the grounds that it was not relevant to any aggravating circumstance.  See
Kormondy v. State, 703 So. 2d 454, 463 (Fla. 1997) (explaining that evidence
presented by the State during the penalty phase must be directly related to proving
a statutory aggravating circumstance).  Anthony also filed a motion to suppress the
statement, claiming that the police intentionally violated criminal procedure statutes
and rules in obtaining the statement.  After hearing, the trial court denied the motion
in limine and struck the motion to suppress as repetitive.
The State argues that because the taped conversation was properly admitted
during the guilt phase of Anthony’s first trial and the sentencing jury would have
heard the statements had this Court not remanded the case for a new sentencing
proceeding, there is no error in admitting the taped conversation.  We do not agree
with the State that a resentencing jury is entitled to hear everything that was
introduced during the guilt phase of the trial.  Evidence presented by the State
during the penalty phase must be relevant to an issue properly being considered
during that phase, such as an aggravating circumstance.  See Kormondy.  However,
the evidence presented here is unlike the situation in Kormondy where the court
2 Kormondy allegedly stated that if he ever got out of jail he intended to kill the
murder victim’s wife because she could identify him and would also kill an
acquaintance who had given information to the police after Kormondy admitted his
involvement in the crime.
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committed reversible error by allowing testimony regarding statements made by the
defendant in jail in which he expressed his intent to kill in the future.  We concluded
that “a statement allegedly made in jail (after the relevant criminal episode) as to a
future intent to kill [cannot] shed[] any light on Kormondy’s intent at the time of the
crime” and thus was not relevant to the avoid-arrest aggravating factor.  Kormondy,
703 So. 2d at 462.2  In the instant case Anthony discussed the crime and the
measures that he took to subdue the victims.  In discussing the two employees who
were able to untie their hands and call the police, Anthony expressed regret that he
had failed to cut the phone line to the restaurant as he had planned.  He also stated
that he should have “sliced their . . . throats” and barred the “freezer doors, so they
couldn’t open them.”  This statement was relevant to the avoid-arrest aggravating
circumstance as it explains Anthony’s state of mind at time of incident -- an intent,
albeit unsuccessful, to eliminate the witnesses.  Thus, we find no error in denying
Anthony’s motion in limine and admitting the taped statement during the
resentencing proceeding.
During his original trial, Anthony moved to suppress the taped conversation
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on Fourth Amendment and privacy grounds.  The trial court denied the motion and
this Court affirmed on direct appeal.  See Farina, 679 So. 2d at 1154.  On appeal,
Anthony also claimed that the admission of Jeffery's statements at their joint trial
violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, but we found no merit to this
claim. See id. at 1155-57 (finding that circumstances surrounding Jeffery’s taped
statements had sufficient indicia of reliability to rebut the presumption of
unreliability that normally attaches to such hearsay evidence).  During the
resentencing proceedings, Anthony filed another motion to suppress the taped
statements, arguing that in order to set up the circumstances in which the  brothers
could engage in this conversation the police departed from the procedural rules
relating to booking procedures and did not comply with statutory provisions
prohibiting juvenile inmates from having contact with adult inmates.  He further
argued that the police failed to obtain the statutorily required authorization prior to
recording the conversation.  The State filed a motion to strike Anthony’s motion to
suppress, arguing that these issues either were or could have been raised in the first
motion to suppress filed before the original trial and that Anthony had not
demonstrated any basis for relitigating the suppression issue mid-trial.  After
hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion to strike.
The alleged “new” grounds asserted in Anthony’s resentencing motion to
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suppress, i.e., Jeffery was a juvenile who was transported with adults and the police
departed from normal booking procedures, are in fact not new and could have been
raised in the original motion to suppress.  The other ground asserted, i.e., lack of
authorization for the recording, was raised and rejected in the original trial motion. 
See Harvard v. State, 414 So. 2d 1032, 1037 (Fla. 1982) (rejecting appellant's
attempt to seek review of issues in appeal after resentencing proceeding which
could have been raised in first appeal).  Thus, we find that the  resentencing judge
properly struck Anthony's motion to suppress.
Anthony also contends that he should have been granted a severance
because the taped conversation heard by the jury contained several statements by
Jeffery that were also considered in aggravation against him (issue 4).  Specifically,
the jury heard Jeffery's recounting of conversations with a fellow inmate in which he
explained that he shot Van Ness because he was having a "boring day" and with the
psychiatrist in which he claimed that he "felt nothing" when he shot Van Ness. 
Jeffery also expressed his belief that the employee that he had stabbed was the
victim that was going to die.  Anthony contends that the failure to sever the
resentencing proceedings denied him the right to confront Jeffery about these
statements and the right to an individualized sentencing process.
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b)(1)(A), a severance of
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defendants may be ordered when it is appropriate to promote a fair determination
of the guilt or innocence of the defendants.  A severance is not necessary when the
evidence is "presented in such a manner that the jury can distinguish the evidence
relating to each defendant's acts, conduct and statements, and can then apply the
law intelligently and without confusion to determine the individual defendant's guilt
or innocence."  Coleman v. State, 610 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 1992).  Denial of a
motion for severance is subject to review for an abuse of discretion by the judge. 
See Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232, 236 (Fla. 1998) (finding that judge did not
abuse his discretion by denying defendant's motion for severance).  In Anthony's
first appeal, this Court found no violation of his confrontation rights based upon
the admission of these statements in the guilt phase.  See Farina, 679 So. 2d at
1154-55.  As introduced in the resentencing proceeding, the jury was apprised as to
which defendant made the various statements.  Thus, because we have already
determined that the taped conversation was properly admitted during the penalty
phase (issue two above), we find that the judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying the motion to sever the proceedings here and Anthony is not entitled to
relief.
In his fifth issue, Anthony makes three claims relating to victim impact
evidence.  He contends that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting victim impact
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evidence; (2) allowing the evidence to become the main feature of the trial; and (3)
failing to give a requested limiting instruction.  Anthony filed a pretrial motion to
exclude victim impact evidence on a number of grounds.  After hearing, the trial
court denied the motion but cautioned that the victim impact evidence could not
become the main feature of the trial.  The court also ordered the State to provide
defense counsel with a list of the proposed victim impact witnesses and their
relationship with the victim, which the State provided.  At the resentencing
proceeding, twelve of Van Ness’ friends and family members testified about the
impact of her murder.
Both the Florida Constitution and the Florida Statutes instruct that victim
impact evidence is to be heard in considering capital felony sentences in our state. 
See art. I, § 16, Fla. Const.; § 921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (2000); see also Windom v.
State, 656 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 1995).  The evidence presented in the instant case
is the type of testimony that the United States Supreme Court held that a state may
choose to admit without violating a defendant’s constitutional rights.  See Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).  This evidence, accordingly, complies with our
decision in Anthony’s original direct appeal.  See Farina, 679 So. 2d at 1158
(explaining that on remand the State may present victim impact evidence as long as
it comes within the parameters of Payne).  Thus, we find no error in the admission
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of this evidence.
Further, our review of the record does not bear out Anthony’s assertion that
this evidence became the central feature of the resentencing proceeding or that it
was so unduly prejudicial that it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  See Payne,
501 U.S. at 825.  While such testimony may be inherently emotional, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that “victim impact evidence serves entirely
legitimate purposes.”  Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.  “[T]here is nothing unfair about
allowing the jury to bear in mind the harm [that the killing caused] at the same time
as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant.”  Id. at 826. 
Finally, we find no instructional error relating to the admission of the victim impact
evidence.  The jury was instructed that the evidence could not be considered as an
aggravating circumstance, but should only be considered “insofar as it
demonstrates [Van Ness’s] uniqueness as an individual human being and the result
of loss to the community and its members by her death.”  This instruction is
entirely consistent with section 921.141(7) and complies with the guidelines that we
explained in Windom.  See also Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998)
(approving following instruction regarding victim impact evidence:  "[Y]ou shall not
consider the victim impact evidence as an aggravating circumstance, but the victim
impact evidence may be considered by you in making your decision in this
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matter.").  Thus, no relief is warranted on this issue.
In his next three issues, Anthony claims that the trial court erroneously found
the aggravating circumstances of HAC (issue six), CCP (issue seven), and avoid
arrest/witness elimination (issue eight).  For the reasons expressed below, we find
that the aggravating circumstances were properly found in this case.
The HAC aggravator focuses on the means and manner in which death is
inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death.  See Brown v.
State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998).  “Fear and emotional strain may be
considered as contributing to the heinous nature of the murder, even where the
victim's death was almost instantaneous.”  Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 410
(Fla. 1992).  Additionally, this aggravator pertains more to the victim's perception
of the circumstances than to the perpetrator's.  See Hitchcock v. State, 578 So. 2d
685, 692 (Fla. 1990).
In the instant case, the trial court cited Van Ness’s “real and excruciating”
mental anguish and her acute awareness of her impending death to support its HAC
finding.  There is testimony that Van Ness was very upset throughout the crime and
had to be calmed by her co-workers.  The record also shows that she had her
hands tied behind her back  and was conscious as two of her co-workers were
shot.  Before being shot in the head, Van Ness witnessed Jeffery shoot one of her
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co-workers in the chest, shoot a second in the jaw, and attempt to shoot the
second in the chest as well, only being thwarted when the gun misfired.  Thus, the
record supports the HAC aggravating circumstance.
In order to establish the CCP aggravator, the evidence must show
that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold), and
that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit
murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and that the defendant
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted); accord Walls v.
State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994).  While "heightened premeditation" may be
inferred from the circumstances of the killing, it also requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of "premeditation over and above what is required for
unaggravated first-degree murder."  Walls, 641 So. 2d at 388.  The "plan to kill
cannot be inferred solely from a plan to commit, or the commission of, another
felony."  Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157, 1163 (Fla. 1992).  However, CCP can
be indicated by the circumstances if they point to such facts as advance
procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of
a killing carried out as a matter of course.  See Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 677
(Fla. 1997).
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In the instant case the following facts support the CCP aggravating
circumstance:  this specific Taco Bell restaurant was chosen as the target for the
robbery because Anthony was familiar with its employees and procedures;
Anthony visited the restaurant earlier in the evening to see who was working and the
brothers discussed the fact that Anthony knew three of the employees present that
night; the brothers purchased bullets for their gun before the robbery; the
employees were rounded up and confined to small area where they would be easier
to control; the brothers’ discussion just before the shooting began and Anthony’s
comment that it was “[Jeffery’s] call" shows intent to carry out plans to kill; and
none of the victims offered resistance.  Therefore, we find competent, substantial
evidence in the record supporting the finding that the murder was cold, calculated,
and premeditated without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court did not err in its finding of the CCP aggravating
circumstance.
The avoid arrest/witness elimination aggravating circumstance focuses on the
motivation for the crimes.  See Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144, 151 (Fla. 1998). 
Where the victim is not a police officer, "the evidence [supporting the avoid arrest
aggravator] must prove that the sole or dominant motive for the killing was to
eliminate a witness," and "[m]ere speculation on the part of the state that witness
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elimination was the dominant motive behind a murder cannot support the avoid
arrest aggravator."  Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 819 (Fla. 1997); accord
Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1334 (Fla. 1997).  However, this factor may be
proved by circumstantial evidence from which the motive for the murder may be
inferred, without direct evidence of the offender's thought processes.  See Preston,
607 So. 2d at 409.
In other cases, this Court has found it significant that the victims knew and
could identify their killer.  While this fact alone is insufficient to prove the avoid
arrest aggravator, see Consalvo, 697 So. 2d at 819, we have looked at any further
evidence presented, such as whether the defendant used gloves, wore a mask, or 
made any incriminating statements about witness elimination; whether the victims
offered resistance; and whether the victims were confined or were in a position to
pose a threat to the defendant.  See Jennings, 718 So. 2d at 151.
In Jennings, in which this Court concluded that the avoid arrest aggravator
was properly found, the circumstances were very similar to the instant case:  the
victims knew the defendant and could identify him; the defendant did not use a
mask, and stated that if he ever committed a robbery, he would not leave any
witnesses; the victims had their hands bound behind their back and there was no
evidence of resistance; the victims were confined to a freezer and the defendant
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could have eliminated any threat by simply closing and securing the freezer door. 
See id.  Instead, Jennings slashed the throats of all three victims consecutively, a
“manner of killing . . . that could [not] be considered reactionary or instinctive and
further supports the finding that the dominant motive for killing at least two of the
victims was to avoid identification.”  Id.
The sentencing order in the instant case cites the following facts which 
support the avoid arrest aggravator:  the brothers knew that Anthony was likely to
be recognized by some of the employees because of his former employment at the
restaurant; Anthony visited the restaurant shortly before the robbery to see who
was working and verified that some of the employees would be able identify him;
the brothers were armed with a gun, knife, and rope and wore gloves during the
crime; after receiving the money without resistance from the employees, the
brothers moved the victims to a confined area where they could be easily
controlled; just before the shootings began, the brothers discussed the need to
eliminate witnesses; and the victims were consecutively shot execution style.  As in
Jennings, there was no resistance from the victims and the brothers could have
simply locked them in the freezer and made their escape.  Instead, Jeffery shot as
many of the victims as possible and then resorted to stabbing the last victim with
the knife, when the gun misfired.  Only by luck did the other three employees
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survive, as Jeffery shot the two men in locations that could have been fatal (chest
and face) and attempted to shoot the manager in the head, but instead stabbed her
in the head and back when the gun misfired.  Additionally, Anthony’s statements
regarding the brothers’ botched attempt at eliminating the witnesses reveal his
thought processes at the time of the crime.  Under these facts, we find that the
avoid arrest aggravating circumstance was properly found.
Issue ten claims that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional on a
number of grounds.  This Court has repeatedly rejected the various challenges to
the death penalty statute raised by Anthony.  See, e.g., Provenzano v. Moore, 744
So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1182 (2000); Jones v. State, 701 So.
2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997); Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Fla. 1997). 
Additionally, the Florida Legislature recently amended the death penalty statute to
provide that execution shall be by lethal injection unless the sentenced person
affirmatively elects to be executed by electrocution.  See § 922.105, Fla. Stat.
(2000).  Therefore, we find no merit to this claim.
Finally, Anthony raises three issues relating to the proportionality of his death
sentence (issues nine, eleven, and twelve).  He claims that death is not the
appropriate sentence in his case because he was not the shooter and was a minor
participant in the homicide and because the actual triggerman received a life
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sentence.  While the trial court recognized that Anthony did not fire the shot that
killed the victim, it also found that “his participation in the crime was major.” 
Additionally, the court concluded that “[Anthony’s] involvement was so complete
that he was a full partner with his brother who did kill, and that without his full
participation, the death would not have occurred.”
Under Florida law, when a codefendant is equally culpable or more culpable
than the defendant, disparate treatment of the codefendant may render the
defendant's punishment disproportionate.  See Downs v. State, 572 So. 2d 895
(Fla. 1990); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975).  Thus, an equally or more
culpable codefendant's sentence is relevant to a proportionality analysis.  See
Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1994).
Like Anthony, Jeffery was tried on the same charges and convicted, but he is
not subject to the death penalty because his age of sixteen at the time of the offense
prevents him from receiving the death penalty as a matter of law.  See  Brennan,
754 So. 2d at 5-6 (ruling that imposition of death sentence on a sixteen-year-old
defendant constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Florida Constitution). 
Rather, Jeffery received the maximum sentence possible for his crimes–a life
sentence, without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.  See Farina, 763
So. 2d at 303.
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Under Brennan, when a defendant is sixteen years of age, his or her youth is
such a substantial mitigating factor that it cannot be outweighed by any set of
aggravating circumstances as a matter of law.  In this context, then, Jeffery’s less
severe sentence is irrelevant to Anthony’s proportionality review because the
aggravation and mitigation in their cases are per se incomparable.  Under Brennan,
death was never a valid punishment option for Jeffery, and Anthony's death
sentence is not disproportionate to the sentence received by his codefendant.  See
Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 254-55 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that defendant’s
death sentence was not disproportionate to fourteen-year-old codefendant’s life
sentence); cf. Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394 (Fla.1996) (holding that
codefendant's acquittal was irrelevant to proportionality review of defendant's death
sentence because codefendant was exonerated from culpability as a matter of law). 
Thus, we conclude that Anthony’s death sentence is not disparate when compared
with Jeffery’s life sentence and find no merit to issues eleven and twelve.
Finally, we consider Anthony’s remaining proportionality claim that death is
not the appropriate sentence in comparison to other capital cases (issue nine).  In
deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty, this Court considers the totality
of the circumstances of the case and compares the case with other capital cases. 
See Johnson, 720 So. 2d at 238; Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla.
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1998).  Proportionality review requires a discrete analysis of the facts, entailing a
qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and
mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.  See Urbin, 714 So.2d at 416.  It is not
a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
See Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990).
Based upon our review of all the aggravating and mitigating factors, including
their nature and quality according to the specific facts of this case, we find that the
totality of the circumstances justifies the imposition of the death sentence here. 
Anthony was a major participant in an armed robbery which included a cold,
calculated, and premeditated plan to eliminate any witnesses.  The four witnesses
were shot in either the head or chest in quick succession.  The last witness was
stabbed only because the gun misfired while pointed at her head.  This case is
proportionate to other cases where we have upheld the imposition of a death
sentence.  See, e.g., Jennings, 718 So. 2d at 154 (finding death sentence
proportionate where murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated and
committed during armed robbery to avoid arrest, and defendant had no significant
history of prior criminal activity); Stein v. State, 632 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1994)
(same); LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1988) (affirming death sentence
where murder was committed during course of armed robbery to avoid arrest, and
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defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity).
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, we find no merit to the issues
raised in this appeal and affirm Anthony Farina’s sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with almost all of the majority’s analysis, I cannot agree that the
defendant here is not entitled to have a new sentencing before a judge and jury that,
unlike the judge and jury here, are informed and able to fully consider the critical
fact that the codefendant and actual killer has received a life sentence for the same
murder.  
The majority fails to consider that both brothers received a death
recommendation by the same jury and were sentenced to death by the same judge,
before our decision in Brennan.  Hence, the sentencing jury and judge were
operating under the misconception and false assumption that both Jeffery and
Anthony would be put to death for their participation in this crime, while in reality it
3Although we acted to reduce Scott’s sentence to life, we held that a defendant
is entitled to raise a codefendant’s subsequent life sentence as a ground for collateral
review under rule 3.850.  See id. at 469.
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turns out that the more culpable of the two, the actual killer, will not be put to death. 
Such patent disparity has consistently resulted in this Court either reducing a
codefendant’s sentence to life or directing a new sentencing proceeding where the
sentencing jury and judge are properly informed of this critical factor.  We should
do no less here.  
While we have held in Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992), that the
subsequent reduction of a codefendant’s sentence to life may be asserted in
postconviction proceedings as grounds for a new sentencing proceeding, we have
also acted to grant such relief ourselves.  We acted in Scott to actually set aside the
defendant’s death sentence after we had reduced an equally culpable codefendant’s
sentence to life.  We should not delay by forcing Anthony to raise this issue in
postconviction proceedings.
In Scott we dealt with a virtually identical situation and held that the
subsequently imposed life sentence of a codefendant required the vacating of
defendant’s death sentence where the record showed that the defendant and
codefendant were equally culpable parties in the murder and had similar
backgrounds.3  In fact in Scott we expressly noted that the sentencing judge, upon
4We noted: “This is in sharp contrast to the instant case where Judge Schaeffer
stated ‘I will have to go on record at the time of my sentence if the co-defendant [had]
already been sentenced to life, I would have sentenced Mr. Scott to life despite the
jury’s recommendation.’”  Id.
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being apprized of the fact that the codefendant had his death sentence reduced to
life by this Court, indicated that she would not have sentenced Scott to death if she
had known the codefendant would receive a life sentence.4  Hence, we should
acknowledge that Anthony’s sentencing jury did not know that Jeffery would
receive a life sentence and, in fact, assumed the opposite, and now provide for a
sentencing by a jury that will be properly informed as to what actually happened to
Jeffery.  As we emphatically declared in Scott, the codefendant’s life sentence is
obviously a critically important factor to be considered by those charged with
determining another defendant’s fate.  See id. at 468.  The relevancy and materiality
of such information is only heightened when the actual killer is later sentenced to
life.  
It is, of course, undisputed in this case that Anthony’s sixteen-year-old
brother, Jeffery, was the actual killer of the victim.  Furthermore, Jeffery was not
only the actual killer, but took the lead in the attacks on the other victims.  Under
our case law, Anthony’s sentence must now be re-evaluated and Jeffery’s life
sentence specifically considered in any re-evaluation.  Obviously the imposition of
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a life sentence for the actual killer, Jeffery, should be considered in determining an
appropriate sentence for Anthony.  Thus, at the least, Anthony should receive a
new penalty phase.  
As in Scott, this Court itself has acted many times to reduce the death
sentence of a codefendant where the actual killer has received a life sentence.  See,
e.g., Hazen v. State, 700 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1997) (holding that nontriggerman
accomplice to murder could not be sentenced to death, when more culpable
nontriggerman accomplice received sentence of life imprisonment in a plea bargain);
Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1996) (finding that death sentence for crime
of first-degree murder was disproportionate where defendant was not actual killer
and actual killer was sentenced to life imprisonment); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d
539 (Fla. 1975) (holding that imposition of death penalty against accused, who was
convicted of first-degree murder occurring during a robbery, denied equal justice
where accused had been an accomplice and where the "triggerman," who entered a
plea of nolo contendere to charge of first-degree murder, was only sentenced to life
imprisonment).  These cases mandate a reconsideration of Anthony’s death
sentence by a judge and jury who may properly consider the life sentence
subsequently ordered by this Court for Jeffery.
The case for reconsideration here is even more compelling because of the
5As noted by the majority opinion, the judge found three statutory mitigating
factors (no significant history of criminal activity, Anthony was an accomplice in
capital felony committed by Jeffery and his participation was relatively minor, age of
eighteen at the time of the crime) and fifteen nonstatutory mitigating factors (abused
and battered childhood, history of emotional problems, cooperation with the police,
involvement in Christianity and Bible study courses while in prison, good conduct in
prison, remorse for what happened, assertion of a positive influence on others, no
history of violence, abandonment by his father, poor upbringing by his mother, lack
of education, good employment history, and amenability to rehabilitation). 
-27-
extensive evidence of mitigation presented in Anthony’s case.  The trial court, in a
detailed evaluation, considered three statutory mitigators and some fifteen separate
nonstatutory mitigators.5  In addition to Anthony not being the actual killer, it is
important to note that, save Jeffery being two years younger than Anthony, the trial
court found that Anthony had actually demonstrated more mitigation than Jeffery. 
For example, the record reflects without dispute that Anthony was sexually and
physically abused repeatedly as a child.  
The record reveals a horrendous childhood for both the Farina brothers. 
Their father was approximately forty years older than their mother and when he left
the mother when the boys were still preschool age, he also abandoned the boys
completely and had no contact with them.  The mother was an alcoholic who
would move on a whim (over twenty moves in Anthony's eighteen years; from
Wisconsin to Illinois to Florida to Illinois to California to Florida, etc.), took up
with a series of men who did nothing to support the family, and offered no
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guidance to the boys.  From a young age the boys were often supporting the family
and various adults and young children who were living with them by whatever jobs
they could get, by scavenging for recyclable materials to sell, or by shoplifting at
the mother's request (actually, the testimony was that the mother forced the boys
into shoplifting by telling them that they would do it if they loved her and their
young sister).  Various relatives, social workers, and law enforcement officers also
reported that the boys lived in deplorable conditions (dog feces on the floors of the
living quarters, filth and squalor, no decent food).  Sometimes they shared a one-
room hotel room or trailer with as many as ten to fifteen people.  
Anthony was physically abused by one of his stepfathers and placed in a
state facility for eighteen months because of the abuse.  His mother never visited or
called him during that time.  Anthony was also sexually abused as a young boy and
as a result developed an inability to control his bowels.  While Anthony has no
formal record of criminal activity, he has committed a number of petty crimes
including shoplifting and using illegal drugs (marijuana and crack).  Despite all of
this, it appears that Anthony had a good employment history, albeit at low-paying
jobs.  Both boys received an erratic education and Anthony never finished one year
of school in the same school.  
We should not allow this case to become another instance where “hard facts
-29-
make bad law.”  The “hard facts” here are the exceptionally egregious
circumstances in which an innocent victim’s life was taken and several other
innocent victims were seriously injured.  And, if that was not enough, we essentially
have a case of children killing children.  Notwithstanding these admittedly “hard
facts,” however, we must adhere to our legal precedents, or explain why not.  In
this instance I fear the majority has failed to properly apply the important legal
principle, long established and consistently upheld in death penalty jurisprudence,
mandating that the sentence imposed upon a codefendant, especially a codefendant
who is the actual killer, be considered by the jury, the trial court, and this Court,
when determining or reviewing the defendant’s sentence.  
As this Court stated in Slater: "We pride ourselves in a system of justice that
requires equality before the law.  Defendants should not be treated differently upon
the same or similar facts.  When the facts are the same, the law should be the
same."  316 So. 2d at 542.  Thus, at a minimum, this case should be remanded for
a new penalty phase proceeding so that a sentencing judge and jury may consider
the life sentence imposed upon Jeffery in determining an appropriate sentence for
Anthony.
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,
C. McFerrin Smith, III, Judge - Case No. 92-32105CFAES
Jeffrey L. Dees, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee