Title: State v. Montgomery

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 19–1613 
 
Submitted September 16, 2021—Filed November 19, 2021 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL D. MONTGOMERY, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Julie Schumacher, 
Judge. 
 
 
Defendant seeks further review of his conviction for sexual abuse of a 
child. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 
VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 
REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
 
 
Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, 
C.J., Mansfield, McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., joined. Appel, J., filed a special 
concurrence. McDermott, J., filed a separate special concurrence.  
 
 
Michael J. Jacobsma (argued) of Jacobsma Law Firm, P.C., Orange City, 
for appellant. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich (argued), Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
 
 
3 
 
WATERMAN, Justice.  
In this appeal, we must decide whether to overrule State v. Pearson, 514 
N.W.2d 452, 455–56 (Iowa 1994) (en banc), and separately decide whether the 
district court properly applied the “constitutional rights” exception to the rape 
shield law, Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412(b)(1)(C). The jury convicted the defendant 
of sexual abuse of a child (his granddaughter) but acquitted him of lascivious 
acts with the same child. The defendant appealed, arguing both crimes should 
require proof he sought sexual gratification, an element Pearson held is not 
required to prove sexual abuse. The defendant argues Pearson should be 
overruled, which would result in the reversal of the sexual abuse conviction as 
a result of his acquittal on the lascivious acts charges. The State responds that 
Pearson remains good law and precludes reversal on that ground. 
The defendant also argues the district court erred by excluding evidence 
that another person, a teenager who testified for the State, sexually abused his 
granddaughter, who simultaneously reported both abusers. The defendant made 
an offer of proof that the teenager admitted abusing her and that a clinical 
psychologist would testify his abuse affected her testimony. We transferred the 
case to the court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction based on Pearson and 
rule 5.412 while noting the scope of the “constitutional rights” exception to the 
rape shield law is unclear. We granted the defendant’s application for further 
review. 
On our review, we apply stare decisis and decline to overrule Pearson. The 
legislature codified a sexual gratification element for lascivious acts but not for 
 
4 
 
sexual abuse, which can be proven by sexual contact without a motive of sexual 
gratification. We reaffirm Pearson and again decline to engraft an additional 
element the legislature omitted. We therefore reject defendant’s arguments based 
on the allegedly inconsistent verdict. The evidentiary issue presents a closer 
question. The victim simultaneously reported the abuse by the defendant and 
the teenager, which involved similar acts and occurred close in time. The 
defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine his granddaughter and 
the teenager about their relationship as a source of her age-inappropriate sexual 
knowledge and their bias or motive to testify against the defendant. Excluding 
that evidence violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation and Due 
Process Clauses and the constitutional rights exception to the rape shield law. 
For the reasons explained below, we reverse his conviction and remand this case 
for a new trial. 
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 
In May 2016, when S.V. was eight years old, she confided in a friend that 
her grandfather Michael Montgomery, age sixty, had touched her inappropriately 
between her legs at his home in Hospers, Iowa. The friend urged S.V. to tell her 
mother or another adult. S.V. told her mother, who promptly confronted 
Montgomery. He became “angry and very defensive.” S.V.’s mother did not report 
the abuse to the police that year because she feared losing custody of her 
daughter to her ex-husband and because Montgomery was battling stage IV 
cancer. During the same year, S.V. watched pornography at a friend’s house, 
and her mother also caught her watching pornography at home. 
 
5 
 
From 2015 to the summer of 2018, S.V. lived with her mother in Sheldon, 
Iowa, at the home of her mother’s boyfriend and his son L.V. Although the adults 
were unmarried, S.V. regarded L.V. as a “brother.” L.V. is four and one half years 
older than S.V. In the summer of 2016, S.V. told L.V. that Montgomery had been 
licking her and touching her for a long time in Montgomery’s bedroom. In the 
ensuing months, L.V. began touching S.V. sexually, usually after L.V. let her 
play on his phone. L.V. sexually abused S.V. on about six occasions, most often 
in L.V.’s bedroom in Sheldon. The last time L.V. touched S.V. sexually was on 
May 13, 2018. A few days later, S.V. told her friend that she had been 
inappropriately touched by Montgomery and by L.V. The friend suggested S.V. 
tell their school counselor and then walked with S.V. to the guidance office, 
where S.V. revealed her abuse by both males. The guidance counselor reported 
the allegations to the Iowa Department of Human Services and called S.V.’s 
mother to let her know.  
On May 16, S.V. was physically examined by a nurse and interviewed by 
a forensic interviewer at the MercyOne Child Advocacy Center (CAC) in Sioux 
City. The CAC nurse observed that S.V.’s physical exam was normal, which is 
not uncommon for sexual abuse because vaginal tissue heals quickly. S.V. 
disclosed she had been sexually abused by L.V. and also by Montgomery. In the 
CAC interview, S.V. reported that Montgomery licked her and fingered her. He 
would make her grab his private part and sometimes she woke up to him kissing 
her. She reported that L.V. initially only kissed her. Then, L.V. began licking and 
fingering her and making her grab his private part. S.V. suggested that L.V. 
 
6 
 
started sexually touching her because she told him about what Montgomery did. 
S.V. said she felt bad for telling on her “brother” and was worried that her mom 
would be mad or L.V. would tell first and get her in trouble. L.V. admitted to his 
sexual contacts with S.V. and was charged with sexual abuse in delinquency 
proceedings. 
In a videotaped police interview, Montgomery acknowledged that S.V. 
sometimes slept in his bed with him and his wife Brenda. Montgomery admitted 
to police that on one occasion, he was taking a shower and S.V. came in, took 
her clothes off, and joined him in the shower. He told her to leave, and when she 
remained, he left the shower. He also admitted that on another occasion, S.V. 
grabbed his hand while they were in his bed and placed his hand on her groin. 
He immediately pulled his hand away and told her that was inappropriate. When 
S.V. again grabbed his hand and placed it on her groin, Montgomery kicked her 
out of his bedroom. When asked if S.V. was clothed, Montgomery responded that 
he was wearing clothes without answering with respect to S.V. When the 
detective followed up to again ask if S.V. was clothed, Montgomery said he did 
not remember whether S.V. was wearing clothes at that time. According to 
Brenda, the grandchildren only watched movies with them in their bed two or 
three times, and she remained in the bed.  
After his police interview, a friend of Montgomery’s confronted him about 
S.V.’s allegations. Montgomery responded that he “didn’t do anything that [S.V.] 
didn’t initiate first” and “why would he do anything with [S.V.] when he has 
Brenda.” 
 
7 
 
In September, the State charged Montgomery with sexual abuse in the 
second degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1, 709.3(1)(b), and 903B.1 
(2015), and lascivious acts with a child for permitting or causing a child to fondle, 
in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1, 709.8(1)(a), 709.8(1)(b), 709.8(2)(a), and 
903B.1. The State alleged Montgomery’s criminal acts occurred in 2015 or 2016.1 
Montgomery pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.  
Before trial, Montgomery timely moved to admit evidence under Iowa Rule 
of Evidence 5.412 and filed an offer of proof. Montgomery argued that under 
Iowa’s rape shield law, he should be permitted to present evidence of L.V.’s 
sexual abuse of S.V. as necessary for his “constitutional right to offer a defense 
to the charges made against him.” He contended the evidence demonstrates that 
S.V. may have made up the allegations against Montgomery to protect L.V. The 
State resisted, arguing a defendant lacks a constitutional right to present 
irrelevant information. Montgomery further argued the evidence should come in 
to refute the nurse’s testimony about an injury without physical symptoms; the 
State responded that the nurse made no finding of a physical injury. 
The district court made a preliminary ruling excluding the evidence. The 
court found that evidence of L.V.’s improper conduct did not fall within the 
exceptions in rule 5.412 to rebut physical evidence, prove consent, or protect the 
defendant’s constitutional rights, and found that the probative value of the 
evidence “does not outweigh the substantial danger of unfair prejudice, 
                                      
 
1The relevant portions of the Iowa Code are the same for 2015 and 2016. We refer to the 
2015 Iowa Code.  
 
8 
 
confusion of issues, misleading of the jury, and invasion of complainant’s privacy 
which [Iowa’s] and other rape shield laws are designed to prevent.” At trial, 
Montgomery renewed his motion to admit the evidence and made another offer 
of proof supported by an expert psychologist who opined L.V.’s abuse affected 
S.V.’s memories. The district court excluded the evidence. 
The State played for the jury Montgomery’s videotaped police interview. 
S.V. testified at trial that Montgomery kissed her back, tried to put his fingers in 
her mouth, would take off her clothes and underwear, and touched her vagina 
with his tongue or finger. She testified that she could feel the wetness from his 
tongue and that his penis felt “textured” and “muscly.” The jury never heard that 
S.V. had simultaneously reported abuse by L.V. as well as Montgomery.  
S.V.’s trial testimony omitted any mention of L.V.’s abuse. The nurse 
testified about her physical examination of S.V. without mentioning L.V. Her 
typed history and examination report, admitted into evidence, showed she 
identified Montgomery as her abuser but was redacted to remove S.V.’s 
contemporaneous identification of L.V. as another abuser. S.V.’s friend testified 
about S.V. disclosing Montgomery’s abuse to her, but without mentioning she 
also disclosed L.V.’s abuse in the same conversation. The investigating deputy 
testified without mentioning L.V.’s abuse. The State called L.V. as a witness to 
testify about S.V. telling him about her grandfather’s abuse. L.V. did not testify 
about his abuse of S.V. Montgomery’s defense counsel was prohibited from 
cross-examining L.V. or any of the other trial witnesses about L.V.’s own sexual 
abuse of S.V.  
 
9 
 
Montgomery did not testify at trial. The district court limited the testimony 
of Montgomery’s defense expert, clinical psychologist Dr. Rosanna Jones-
Thurman, barring her opinion that S.V.’s memories with Montgomery could be 
contaminated by the sexual touching she experienced with L.V. and that she has 
seen children accuse someone else to protect the real perpetrator. Dr. Jones-
Thurman was only allowed to testify that children are not very good at spatial 
timing, exposure to pornography could influence a child’s memory, and she saw 
no evidence Montgomery groomed S.V.  
During its deliberations, the jury asked the court for clarification on jury 
instruction No. 16 that used “sexual in nature” to define a “sex act” for the sexual 
abuse in the second-degree charge. Montgomery urged the district court to 
clarify that “sexual in nature” meant “for the purpose of satisfying the sexual 
desires of defendant.” The State resisted. The district court declined 
Montgomery’s proposed supplemental instruction and told the jury to “review 
the instructions as a whole.” 
After four hours of deliberations, the jury notified the district court that it 
had reached a verdict on the lascivious acts charge but could not reach a 
unanimous verdict on the sexual abuse charge. The court instructed the jury to 
continue deliberations. Thirty minutes later, the jury returned a verdict finding 
Montgomery guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree and not guilty of 
lascivious acts with a child. The district court denied Montgomery’s motion for a 
new trial. Montgomery was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison with a 
mandatory minimum of seventy percent, or seventeen and half years. 
 
10 
 
Montgomery appealed, arguing Pearson should be overruled to require 
proof of a purpose of sexual gratification for a sexual abuse conviction. He raised 
several related arguments that fail if Pearson remains good law: (1) the district 
court erred by rejecting his supplemental jury instruction requiring such proof, 
and (2) the jury verdict is inconsistent because his acquittal on the lascivious 
acts charge requiring such proof precludes his conviction for sexual abuse. 
Montgomery also argued the district court erred in excluding evidence of L.V.’s 
sexual abuse of S.V. under the rape shield law. He further argued that the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for S.V.’s credibility during his closing argument. 
Finally, Montgomery argued his conviction was not supported by sufficient 
evidence and was contrary to the great weight of the credible evidence.  
We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed 
Montgomery’s conviction. The court of appeals rejected Montgomery’s arguments 
that the evidence of guilt was insufficient or against the greater weight of the 
evidence, noting Montgomery’s own admissions supported the verdict. The court 
of appeals concluded the jury verdict is not inconsistent because lascivious acts 
is not a predicate offense of sexual abuse and separate incidents were alleged. 
The court of appeals found Montgomery failed to preserve error regarding the 
supplemental jury instruction or the prosecutor’s closing argument and 
determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion applying the rape 
shield law because the probative value of evidence of L.V.’s abuse did not 
outweigh the unfair prejudice. The court of appeals noted that it could not 
overrule Pearson and that the scope of the constitutional rights exception to rule 
 
11 
 
5.412 was unclear. Montgomery applied for further review, and we granted his 
application. 
II. Scope of Review. 
We exercise our discretion to limit our review to deciding (1) whether to 
overrule Pearson and determine if the jury was properly instructed or its verdict 
inconsistent, and (2) to review the exclusion of evidence of L.V.’s abuse under 
the rape shield law. The court of appeals decision shall stand as the final opinion 
in this appeal on the remaining issues raised in Montgomery’s appeal. See 
Papillon v. Jones, 892 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 2017). 
“[W]e review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law.” 
State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Iowa 2016)). “We also ‘review 
refusals to give a requested jury instruction for correction of errors at law.’ ” Id. 
at 242 (quoting Alcala, 880 N.W.2d at 707). “The consequence of a potentially 
inconsistent jury verdict is a question of law, and accordingly, our review is 
de novo.” State v. Merrett, 842 N.W.2d 266, 272–73 (Iowa 2014). “Questions of 
statutory interpretation are reviewed for correction of errors at law.” State v. 
Wilson, 941 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Iowa 2020). 
We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence under the rape shield 
law, Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412, for abuse of discretion. State v. Walker, 935 
N.W.2d 874, 877 (Iowa 2019). We apply a de novo standard of review to claimed 
violations of the constitutional right to present a defense, State v. Clark, 814 
N.W.2d 551, 560 (Iowa 2012), and the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, 
 
12 
 
see State v. Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Iowa 1992), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 824–26 (Iowa 2017). 
III. Analysis. 
A. State v. Pearson. We first address Montgomery’s argument to overrule 
Pearson. The State contends that Montgomery failed to preserve error on his 
claim that Pearson should be overruled because he never made that argument 
at trial. Montgomery, however, did argue during trial that the district court 
should include an element of sexual gratification to prove sexual abuse and 
sought a supplemental jury instruction to that effect—the issue decided in 
Pearson. The district court refused to give the supplemental instruction. 
“Generally, error is preserved on an issue if (1) a party raises the issue before the 
district court, (2) the district court rules upon the issue, and (3) the party again 
raises the issue on appeal.” State v. Gross, 935 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Iowa 2019). 
And Montgomery’s posttrial motion expressly called for Pearson to be overruled, 
stating that “it is time that Iowa courts follow the directive of Justice Carter in 
his partial dissent opined in Pearson and require that the [S]tate prove that the 
act be committed with an intent of sexual gratification of the defendant or victim” 
and following the statement with the citation “See Pearson at 457.” The district 
court decided the issue by denying the motion. Montgomery raised the issue 
again on appeal. We conclude he preserved the issue for our review. 
1. Pearson’s “sexual in nature” definition. In Pearson, we decided that a sex 
act for purposes of Iowa Code section 702.17 does not have to be made to arouse 
or satisfy the sexual desires of the perpetrator or the victim, so long as the act is 
 
13 
 
“sexual in nature.” 514 N.W.2d at 455. The defendant argued that because both 
he and his victim remained clothed, there was no “sexual contact” required for a 
conviction. Id. at 454. We noted the need to distinguish innocent contact and 
sexual contact and held that for contact to be a “sex act” it “must be between the 
specified body parts (or substitutes) and must be sexual in nature.” Id. at 455. 
Among the circumstances to consider is “whether the contact was made to 
arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant or the victim”; however, we 
held that purpose is not required if other circumstances exist to show that the 
contact is sexual. Id. Justice Carter dissented in part, stating,  
I believe that it is axiomatic that any time two persons are 
moving about in close proximity to one another innocent contact 
may occur between sexual parts. The majority recognizes this and 
attempts to distinguish prohibited sexual contact from innocent 
contact. The majority includes, as a criterion for determining sexual 
contact, “the purposefulness of the contact.” At the same time, it 
disavows any requirement that there be an intent to act based on 
sexual gratification of either the perpetrator or the victim. The 
circumstances that the majority would consider in determining 
whether sexual contact has occurred would also be relevant to show 
an intent to act based on sexual gratification. However, by not 
recognizing sexual gratification as an element of sexual contact, the 
majority prohibits a defendant from attempting to negate the charge 
by urging lack of such intent. I believe that this is unrealistic and 
unfair. 
Id. at 457 (Carter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Snell’s separate dissent argued that under Pearson, individuals 
can be convicted of sexual abuse without any sex involved. Id. at 460 (Snell, J., 
dissenting); see also State v. Monk, 514 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1994) (en banc) 
(Snell, J., dissenting) (“The holdings in State v. Pearson and State v. Monk have 
transformed our sex abuse statutes into general assault statutes where the 
 
14 
 
assault has some effect on the reproductive or excretory organs of the victim or 
defendant.”). 
Montgomery argues that Pearson’s reasoning is “unsound, confusing, and 
unworkable” and that we should adopt the dissenting view to require a finding 
of sexual gratification for a “sex act.” We disagree and view Pearson as correctly 
decided. We also apply stare decisis and decline to overrule it. See Book v. 
Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d 576, 594 (Iowa 2015) (“Stare decisis 
alone dictates continued adherence to our precedent absent a compelling reason 
to change the law.”). Pearson was decided twenty-seven years ago, and its 
holding has not proven unworkable. “Under the doctrine of legislative 
acquiescence, ‘we presume the legislature is aware of our cases that interpret its 
statutes. When many years pass following such a case without a legislative 
response, we assume the legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation.’ ” 
State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 902 N.W.2d 811, 818 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Ackelson v. 
Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013)). Indeed, the 
legislature recently amended section 709.3, defining sexual abuse, and section 
702.17, defining “sex act,” without overruling Pearson. See 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 
36, §§ 1–2 (to be codified at Iowa Code § 702.17 (2022)); id. ch. 37, § 3 (to be 
codified at Iowa Code § 709.3(1)(b) (2022)). 
We again decline to engraft an additional element of sexual gratification 
that the legislature chose to omit. The legislature knows how to require that 
conduct be done for “the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of 
either” party because it has codified that element in other criminal statutes. See 
 
15 
 
Iowa Code §§ 709.8 (lascivious acts with a child), .9 (indecent exposure from 
masturbation), .12 (indecent contact with a child), .14 (lascivious conduct with 
a minor), .15 (sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist). We assume the 
legislature intended to omit that element from the sexual abuse statute.  
There are valid policy reasons why the legislature might want to 
criminalize sexual abuse that is not for the purpose of sexual gratification. For 
example, some sexual abuse is performed to exert power or control over the 
victim without a motivation of sexual gratification. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 584 
N.W.2d 913, 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). We decline to modify our prior 
interpretation of section 709.3. Pearson remains good law. 
2. Allegedly inconsistent verdict. Montgomery argues that both lascivious 
acts and sexual abuse require proof of a motive of sexual gratification such that 
his acquittal on the former is inconsistent with his conviction on the latter. 
Because we decline to overrule Pearson, Montgomery’s argument fails.  
Under Pearson, the jury verdict finding Montgomery guilty of sexual abuse 
and acquitting him of lascivious acts is not inconsistent. We begin with the 
statutory language of the offenses. The statue defining lascivious acts with a 
child provides: “It is unlawful for any person sixteen years of age or older to 
perform any of the following acts with a child with or without the child’s consent 
unless married to each other, for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual 
desires of either of them . . . .” Iowa Code § 709.8(1) (emphasis added). By 
contrast, as we have just reaffirmed, a conviction for sexual abuse does not 
require a motive of sexual gratification.  
 
16 
 
“If jury verdicts are to be examined for inconsistency, the test to be applied 
is whether the verdict is so logically and legally inconsistent as to be 
irreconcilable within the context of the case.” Merrett, 842 N.W.2d at 275–76 
(quoting State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 101 (Iowa 2004)). The jury’s decision to 
acquit Montgomery of lascivious acts with a child and not sexual abuse in the 
second degree is not legally impossible. Unlike lascivious acts with a child, 
sexual abuse in the second degree does not have the requirement that the 
defendant’s conduct be “for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual 
desires of either of them.” As the court of appeals correctly noted, lascivious acts 
with a child is not a predicate offense or component of sexual abuse in the second 
degree. Said another way, lascivious acts with a child does not include only 
elements that are also elements of sexual abuse in the second degree. See State 
v. Johnson, 950 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Iowa 2020) (applying legal-elements test). 
Next, the jury’s decision to acquit Montgomery of lascivious acts with a 
child and not sexual abuse in the second degree is not logically impossible. Even 
though it appears that the jury did not credit much of S.V.’s testimony, the jury 
could have relied in part on Montgomery’s own statements that S.V. used his 
hand to explore herself and that he admittedly “didn’t do anything that [S.V.] 
didn’t initiate first.” Consistent with Pearson, the jury could find Montgomery’s 
hand made sexual contact with S.V.’s vagina twice, but without a motive of 
sexual gratification. Thus, the jury verdict is not legally or logically inconsistent.  
3. Jury instructions. Jury Instruction No. 14 stated for the sexual abuse 
charge that the State had to prove “[o]n or between February 1, 2015, and 
 
17 
 
August 16, 2016, Michael Montgomery did commit a sex act with S.V.” and 
“Michael Montgomery performed the sex act while S.V. was under the age of 12 
years.” Instruction No. 16 defined “sex act”:  
Concerning Element Number 1 of Instruction No. 14, “sex act” 
means any sexual contact:  
Between the mouth of one person and the genitals of another; 
or  
Between the finger or hand of one person and the genitals or 
anus of another person.  
You may consider the type of contact and the circumstances 
surrounding it in deciding whether the contact was sexual in nature. 
Montgomery had not objected to those instructions. But during 
deliberations, the jury asked for clarification of the last sentence of Instruction 
No. 16. Montgomery’s counsel responded, “I do think that perhaps some 
clarification should be given to the jury as to what ‘sexual in nature’ means in 
that the action has to be for the purpose of satisfying the sexual desire of the 
defendant.” The court declined, stating, “The Court finds no clarification is 
necessary in regard to Instruction No. 16 and would direct the jury to review the 
instructions as a whole in reaching their verdict and follow the instructions 
previously given by the court.” Montgomery’s posttrial motion argued the court 
should have provided a list of the Pearson factors as part of the clarifying 
instruction. On appeal, Montgomery argues the Pearson factors should have 
been a part of the original jury instruction defining “sex act.” Assuming without 
deciding that he preserved error for his arguments concerning the “sex act” jury 
instruction, we conclude the district court properly instructed the jury on what 
 
18 
 
constitutes a “sex act” and correctly refused Montgomery’s proposed 
supplemental instruction. The instructions given tracked the statutory elements 
and Montgomery’s requested supplemental instruction was contrary to Pearson. 
B. Exclusion of Evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412. We must 
decide whether Montgomery’s proffered evidence that L.V. abused S.V. was 
properly excluded under the rape shield law. We begin with the text of the rule, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
a. Prohibited uses. The following evidence is not admissible in 
a criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual abuse: 
(1) Reputation or opinion evidence offered to prove that a 
victim engaged in other sexual behavior. 
(2) Evidence of a victim’s other sexual behavior other than 
reputation or opinion evidence. 
b. Exceptions. 
(1) Criminal cases. The court may admit the following evidence 
in a criminal case: 
(A) Evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, 
if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the 
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence. 
(B) Evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior 
with respect to the person accused of sexual abuse, if the defendant 
offers it to prove consent. 
(C) Evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights. 
. . . . 
c. Procedure to determine admissibility.  
. . . . 
(2) Hearing. . . . 
 
19 
 
 
(C) If the court determines that the evidence is relevant and 
that the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, 
the evidence will be admissible at trial to the extent the court 
specifies, including the evidence on which the victim may be 
examined or cross-examined. 
Iowa R. Evid. 5.412. 
The purpose of the rape shield rule “is to protect the victim’s privacy, 
encourage the reporting and prosecution of sex offenses, and prevent the parties 
from delving into distractive, irrelevant matters.” State v. Trane, 934 N.W.2d 447, 
456–57 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421, 448–49 (Iowa 
2014), overruled on other grounds by Alcala, 880 N.W.2d 669); see also State v. 
Donahue, 957 N.W.2d. 1, 8 (Iowa 2021). The rule “substantially limits the 
admission of evidence of specific instances of a complaining witness’s other 
sexual behavior.” Trane, 934 N.W.2d at 456. 
Evidence concerning L.V.’s sexual abuse of S.V. is subject to rule 5.412. 
The rule generally prohibits evidence of specific instances of a victim’s “other 
sexual behavior,” which includes previous instances of sexual abuse perpetrated 
upon the victim. Jones, 490 N.W.2d at 790 (surveying rape shield cases and 
following majority in holding “past sexual behavior” in rule 5.412 “clearly 
encompasses prior sexual abuse perpetrated upon the victim”); see also Westley 
v. State, 254 A.3d 106, 117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021) (construing “prior sexual 
conduct” in Maryland’s rape shield law to include prior sexual abuse, not just 
“prior willing sexual conduct”). 
Montgomery’s proffered evidence is inadmissible unless an exception 
applies. Montgomery relies on two exceptions: Iowa Rule of Evidence 
 
20 
 
5.412(b)(1)(A) (source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence exception) and 
rule 5.412(b)(1)(C) (constitutional rights exception). We address each exception 
in turn. 
The district court and court of appeals correctly rejected Montgomery’s 
argument under the first exception that allows evidence to rebut the State’s 
argument that the “defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical 
evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.412(b)(1)(A). We hold that under its plain meaning, 
this exception is limited to physical evidence, such as semen, or a physical 
injury. Neither is present here. Our interpretation is consistent with federal and 
state cases interpreting the injury requirement.2 See United States v. Shaw, 824 
F.2d 601, 603 n.2 (8th Cir.1987) (“Furthermore, it is clear that Rule 412’s injury 
exception does not apply to emotional injuries unaccompanied by a cognizable 
physical consequence.” (citing 124 Cong. Rec. 34,913 (1978) (subdivision 
(b)(2)(A) applies to “certain physical consequences”))), abrogated on other grounds 
by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); State v. Rolon, 777 A.2d 604, 613 n.18 
(Conn. 2001) (“The defendant also made a ‘source of injury’ argument. Because 
                                      
 
2We have looked to federal precedent as persuasive authority to interpret the same 
language in Iowa Rule of Evidence 412 (now rule 5.412). See, e.g., Jones, 490 N.W. 2d at 790. 
When, as here, our rule of evidence and its federal counterpart are worded identically in relevant 
respects, “interpretations of the federal rule are often persuasive authority for interpretation of 
our state rule.” State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 561 (Iowa 2009). “Federal case law, however, 
is not binding, and we are free to develop our own approach to legal questions under the Iowa 
rule.” Id. We have also noted that the “legislative history of federal rule 412 is instructive.” State 
v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1984); see also State v. Harrington, 800 N.W.2d 46, 49 n.1 
(Iowa 2011) (“Since many of the Iowa Rules here recommended are modeled after the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, it is contemplated that judges and lawyers will look for guidance to the United 
States Supreme Court Advisory Committee Notes.” (quoting Iowa R. Evid. official comment 
(1983))). 
 
21 
 
psychological trauma is not recognized as an ‘injury’ under [Connecticut’s rape 
shield law], the court did not consider this argument.”).3  
Montgomery has a better argument under the constitutional rights 
exception in rule 5.412(b)(1)(C). That exception codifies a safety valve to avoid an 
unconstitutional application of the rape shield rule. In addressing the 
constitutionality of rape shield laws, the Supreme Court cautioned that 
“[r]estrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses and 
to present evidence ‘may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes 
they are designed to serve.’ ” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991) 
(quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)); see also State v. Boyer, 460 
P.3d 569, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 2020) (describing the constitutional rights 
exception as a “high bar” requiring the defendant to “show that ‘the evidence in 
question is essential to the presentation of [his] defense’ ” (quoting State v. 
Thornton, 391 P.3d 1016, 1030 (Utah 2017))). 
Other courts confronted with the necessity of accommodating 
the competing interests of complaining witnesses and defendants in 
such cases have concluded that rape shield statutes should be 
construed and applied so as to uphold the constitutional rights of 
defendants, while creating the least possible interference with the 
legislative purpose reflected in the statutes.  
Summit v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Nev. 1985). We agree.  
Accordingly, we reiterate that “[t]he defendant’s constitutional rights must 
be weighed against the recognized interest that the State has ‘to (1) protect the 
                                      
 
3When State v. Rolon was decided, Connecticut’s rape shield law prohibited “evidence of 
the sexual conduct of the victim . . . unless such evidence is (1) offered by the defendant on the 
issue of whether the defendant was, with respect to the victim, the source of semen, disease, 
pregnancy or injury.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-86f (2001).  
 
22 
 
privacy of the victims; (2) [to] encourage the reporting and prosecuting of sex 
offenses; and (3) to prevent time-consuming and distracting inquiry into 
collateral matters.’ ” Jones, 490 N.W.2d at 791 (quoting State v. Gettier, 438 
N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1989)). And evidence can only be admitted if it is relevant and 
its “probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” Iowa R. Evid. 
5.412(c)(2)(C); see Thompson v. State, 492 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Iowa 1992) (holding 
that evidence within a rule 5.412 exception “still would not be admissible if its 
probative value did not outweigh the danger of substantial prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, and misleading the jury”). 
In addition to the heightened standard imposed by rule 5.412 to protect 
victims of sexual abuse, evidence can be excluded “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, 
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403; see also 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (holding that a trial court can 
reasonably limit the right to confrontation when considering “harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that 
[would be] repetitive or only marginally relevant”); Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa 
Practice Series: Evidence § 5.412:1 (2020–2021 ed. 1999) [hereinafter Doré] 
(“Iowa courts have repeatedly indicated that an accused does not have a 
constitutional right to admit evidence of a victim’s other sexual behavior that is 
irrelevant or whose probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice.”). 
 
23 
 
Montgomery relies on his due process right to a fair trial. U.S. Const. 
amends. V, VI, XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, §§ 9–10. This includes the right to present 
a defense and his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 
Clark, 814 N.W.2d at 560; State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1984). 
Cross-examination is essential to the defendant’s constitutional right of 
confrontation. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974). “[T]he exposure of 
a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Id. at 316–17.4  
Montgomery argues his constitutional right to present a defense was 
violated because he was unable to introduce evidence concerning L.V.’s sexual 
abuse of S.V. Montgomery argues the evidence was admissible under the 
constitutional rights exception to show S.V. conflated her memories of sexual 
abuse, to explain S.V.’s age-inappropriate sexual knowledge, and to cross-
examine S.V. and L.V. regarding their motive or bias given the closeness of their 
relationship. We address each argument in turn. 
First, Montgomery argues his proffered expert testimony was admissible 
to show S.V. confused her memory of abuse. According to Montgomery’s offer of 
proof, Dr. Jones-Thurman’s supplemental testimony opined that S.V. has 
“contaminated some of her memories about what was going on with [L.V.] with 
what she could have conceived happening with [Montgomery].” The court of 
appeals held Dr. Jones-Thurman’s testimony on memory contamination was 
                                      
 
4Cross-examination has been recognized as “the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for 
the discovery of truth.’ ” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 John Henry 
Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 
24 
 
inadmissible under State v. Dudley, which reaffirmed Iowa’s “law prohibiting an 
expert witness from commenting on the credibility of a victim in a criminal sex 
abuse proceeding.” 856 N.W.2d 668, 676 (Iowa 2014). The prohibition is 
designed to respect the jury’s role in determining credibility of witnesses and to 
avoid an expert “directly or indirectly . . . giving his or her scientific certainty 
stamp of approval on the testimony even though an expert cannot accurately 
opine when a witness is telling the truth.” Id. at 676–77. Yet Dudley would not 
bar Dr. Jones-Thurman’s expert testimony that child victims generally may 
conflate their memories of abuse. See id. at 676.  
The State argues that it strains credulity to suggest S.V. would confuse 
what her grandfather did with the acts of the teenaged L.V. The State relies on 
State v. Jones, where we affirmed the district court’s rule 5.412 exclusion of 
evidence because “[t]here is no likelihood” the victim confused her memories 
when the alleged prior abuse occurred five years earlier when the victim was age 
five and “involved completely different types of contact.” 490 N.W.2d at 791. By 
contrast, L.V.’s abuse began shortly after Montgomery’s ended and involved 
similar sex acts, and expert testimony was offered to suggest this influenced 
S.V.’s testimony. It is possible that some of her memories of aspects of L.V.’s 
abuse seeped into her descriptions of Montgomery’s abuse. But we likely would 
not reverse on this ground alone. 
Second, Montgomery argues evidence of L.V.’s abuse was admissible to 
show another source for S.V.’s age-inappropriate sexual knowledge that a penis 
feels “muscly” and thereby rebut the inference that her knowledge must have 
 
25 
 
come from Montgomery’s abuse. “[A] child victim’s sexual knowledge [that] 
resulted from an encounter with someone other than the defendant may be 
relevant and material to a defendant’s defense of mistaken identity or false 
accusation.” Walker, 935 N.W.2d at 877 (quoting State v. Cecil J., 913 A.2d 505, 
512 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)); see also id. at 882 (Appel, J., concurring specially) 
(collecting cases); Westley, 254 A.3d at 132 (“We join the majority of state courts 
that have considered this issue in determining that when a defendant seeks to 
admit evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct to dispel a presumption of 
sexual innocence, a court must assess on a case-by-case basis whether the 
exclusion of such evidence would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”); 
State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981) (holding evidence of prior sexual 
abuse should have been admitted under a rape shield law exception to show 
source of knowledge because “the average juror would perceive the average 
twelve-year-old girl as a sexual innocent”); State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325, 
334–35 (Wis. 1990) (holding rape shield exclusion ruling violated defendant’s 
constitutional right to cross-examine child complainant about prior sexual abuse 
to show alternative source for sexual knowledge). But see State v. Erick L., 147 
A.3d 1053, 1064 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (affirming exclusion of evidence because 
“the sexual knowledge displayed in [the twelve-year-old victim’s] allegations 
against the defendant was not unusual and was consistent with what middle 
schoolers and high schoolers are commonly taught about sex”).  
In State v. Westley, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland identified a 
threshold requirement for assessing whether excluding such evidence violates 
 
26 
 
the defendant’s constitutional rights: “a court must first determine if the facts of 
the case actually give rise to a presumption of sexual innocence.” 254 A.3d at 
132. The court elaborated: 
In doing so, a court should consider, among other relevant factors, 
the age of the child, the maturity of the sexual behavior alleged, 
whether the child’s allegations necessarily suggest sexual knowledge 
beyond what a child of that age would presumedly [sic] possess, 
whether the State has introduced evidence suggestive of sexual 
innocence, and whether there is other evidence that the victim 
possessed sexual knowledge before reporting the conduct at issue. 
Id. These factors support admissibility here: S.V. was age ten in her CAC 
interview and presumably most girls of that age would not know an erect penis 
feels muscly. The Westley court also included “the proximity in time between the 
prior sexual conduct and the complainant’s allegations” as another factor to 
consider. Id. Here, L.V.’s abuse began shortly after Montgomery’s alleged abuse. 
The 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
separately 
identified 
five 
other 
requirements in State v. Pulizzano, holding that  
to establish a constitutional right to present otherwise excluded 
evidence of a child complainant’s prior sexual conduct for the limited 
purpose of proving an alternative source for sexual knowledge, prior 
to trial the defendant must make an offer of proof showing (1) that 
the prior acts clearly occurred; (2) that the acts closely resembled 
those of the present case; (3) that the prior act is clearly relevant to 
a material issue; (4) that the evidence is necessary to the defendant’s 
case; and (5) that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect.  
456 N.W.2d at 335; see also Rolon, 777 A.2d at 623 (adopting same factors); 
State v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 869, 878 (N.M. 1997) (“We also agree with the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court that a showing sufficient under the five-pronged 
[Wisconsin] test establishes a constitutional right to present evidence otherwise 
 
27 
 
excluded by our [rape shield] statute.”). Those five factors are satisfied here.5 L.V. 
admitted to the same conduct allegedly committed by Montgomery (having S.V. 
touch his penis), satisfying the first two factors. Evidence of L.V.’s abuse rebuts 
the inference that S.V.’s knowledge could only have come from Montgomery, 
satisfying the next three factors. Particularly salient here is the temporal 
proximity of Montgomery’s alleged abuse and L.V.’s abuse that closely followed, 
together with S.V.’s ongoing relationship with L.V., a witness for the prosecution, 
at the time she simultaneously reported abuse by both of them.  
We find State v. Twardoski to be persuasive because the allegations 
against the teenager and Montgomery are similar. 491 P.3d 711, 719–21 (Mont. 
2021). In Twardoski, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court erred 
by excluding evidence of prior sexual abuse committed by another man 
criminally charged for an identical sexual game of truth or dare allegedly 
performed by the defendant less than two weeks later as relevant to show the 
same victim’s source of “detailed sexual knowledge.” Id.  
Iowa’s precedent on the constitutional rights exception is limited. In State 
v. Walker, the twenty-six-year-old defendant was convicted of sexually abusing 
                                      
 
5Our district courts should determine admissibility of such evidence under the 
constitutional rights exception in rule 5.412(b)(1)(C) case by case. We quote the factors 
considered by other courts “to suggest a possible framework” while recognizing “[t]here may be 
other showings that are equally sufficient” to meet the constitutional rights exception to the rape 
shield rule. Johnson, 944 P.2d at 878; see also State v. Townsend, 233 S.W.3d 680, 684–85 (Ark. 
2006) (concluding that Wisconsin’s “analytical approach has merit when ruling on the 
admissibility of a child’s previous sexual experiences” to “prevent the jury from assuming that 
the defendant is responsible for the child’s lack of sexual innocence”); State v. Guthrie, 
518 S.E.2d 83, 95–96 n.20 (W. Va. 1999) (stating the Wisconsin test “may be a viable analytical 
tool for constitutional analysis of an evidentiary issue brought under our rape shield statute,” 
while declining to adopt the test in that case). 
 
28 
 
his four-year-old niece. 935 N.W.2d at 876, 878. He appealed the district court’s 
rape shield ruling excluding evidence that family members were concerned the 
victim’s eight-year-old brother might have sexually abused her. Id. at 877. The 
defendant argued the evidence would show the victim’s age-inappropriate sexual 
knowledge did not come from him. Id. We affirmed, in part because Walker failed 
to show the brother had in fact abused her and also on grounds that the proffered 
evidence was unduly prejudicial because it would confuse the issues, mislead 
the jury, and create a trial within a trial. Id. at 877–78. Walker, however, is 
distinguishable because L.V. admitted abusing S.V. and was charged with sexual 
abuse in delinquency proceedings.  
The State again relies on Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787, which we find to be 
distinguishable. In Jones, Jones claimed the evidence of prior abuse by another 
person five years before Jones’ alleged abuse was relevant to explain how the 
child knew of age-inappropriate information to make the allegations against him. 
490 N.W.2d at 791. The victim was age thirteen years at trial and had attended 
sexual counseling as well as sex education classes before she testified. Id. We 
concluded those other sources of her sexual knowledge made it “unlikely that a 
jury would infer that the victim could only describe the act because Jones had, 
in fact, done it.” Id. We noted “the rather unexplicit nature” of her testimony 
about Jones kissing and touching her. Id. at 791, 791 n.1. By contrast, S.V. 
explicitly described her abuser’s penis as feeling “textured” and “muscly”—
awareness not likely attributable to S.V. viewing pornography. Furthermore, the 
“completely different” nature of the prior abuse in Jones, and the fact it occurred 
 
29 
 
five years earlier, explained our determination that the prior abuse was only 
“marginally relevant” to show the victim’s age-inappropriate knowledge related 
to what Jones did. Id. But on the record here, we conclude Montgomery should 
have been allowed to introduce evidence of L.V.’s contemporaneous, similar 
abuse to explain S.V.’s age-inappropriate knowledge, and thereby rebut the 
inference that Montgomery’s abuse was the source of her knowledge. 
Third, Montgomery argues his proffered evidence is admissible to show 
motive and bias. See Twardoski, 491 P.3d at 720–21 (holding evidence of another 
abuser favored by the victim should have been allowed to show her “motive to 
fabricate” allegations against the defendant whom she wanted “out of her 
mother’s life”). S.V. favored L.V. and didn’t want to get him in trouble. Dr. Jones-
Thurman would have testified that in her experience, children sometimes accuse 
another to protect the real perpetrator. The State called L.V. as a witness at trial, 
thereby opening the door to cross-examination about his own sexual activity with 
S.V. “[I]n a case that hinges on a victim’s credibility, evidence that impeaches 
one of the victim’s few corroborating witnesses is, without question, favorable to 
the accused.” State v. Leedom, 938 N.W.2d 177, 188 (Iowa 2020) (quoting 
DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 105 (Iowa 2011)). 
Federal precedent is compelling. In Olden v. Kentucky, the trial court 
excluded evidence that a key witness, Russell, was cohabitating with the victim. 
488 U.S. 227, 230 (1988) (per curiam). The defense theory of the case was that 
the complainant fabricated the rape allegations to protect her relationship with 
Russell. Id. Olden and Harris were charged with kidnapping, rape, and forcible 
 
30 
 
sodomy. Olden was found guilty of forcible sodomy; Harris was acquitted. Id. 
According to the complainant, she was raped twice by Olden, during one of which 
Harris held her arms down. Id. at 228. According to the defendants, the sex was 
consensual. Id. at 229. Russell testified for the state that he saw the complainant 
get out of Harris’s car and then she immediately told him that she had been 
raped. Id. By the time of trial, Russell, a Black man, was living with the 
complainant, a white woman. Id. at 230–31. The defense sought to admit 
evidence of their cohabitation, which the trial court excluded under a rape shield 
law because “its probative value [was] outweighed by its possibility for prejudice.” 
Id. at 230. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Olden’s 
“right to effective cross-examination was outweighed by the danger that revealing 
[the complainant’s] interracial relationship would prejudice the jury against her.” 
Id. at 232.  
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusion of 
the cohabitation evidence violated Olden’s Sixth Amendment right to confront 
the witnesses against him. Id. at 231. The Court reasoned that the evidence 
could alter a reasonable juror’s impression of Russell’s credibility. Id. at 232. The 
Supreme Court concluded that “[s]peculation as to the effect of jurors’ racial 
biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential 
to demonstrate the falsity of [the complainant’s] testimony.” Id. The Court 
emphasized that the State’s case hinged on the credibility of the complainant 
and Russell’s corroborating testimony. Id. at 233. 
 
31 
 
In United States v. Platero, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit applied Olden to allow “cross-examination and other evidence” of “a 
romantic or sexual relationship between” the complainant and a witness for the 
prosecution. 72 F.3d 806, 815–16 (10th Cir. 1995). Platero claimed he had 
consensual sex with the complainant moments before she rejoined the witness, 
who testified she immediately told him Platero had raped her. Id. at 808. Platero’s 
theory of defense was that she “fabricated her sexual assault allegations . . . to 
protect her relationship” with the witness. Id. The witness and complainant 
denied they were in a romantic relationship at the time of Platero’s assault but 
were living together by time of trial. Id. at 808–09. The Tenth Circuit limited use 
of the relationship evidence on remand, directing that the jury “first determine 
whether there was a romantic or sexual relationship between [the witness and 
complainant] at the time of [Platero’s] alleged assault,” and only if so, could the 
jury then consider the relationship evidence “in determining Platero’s innocence 
or guilt.” Id. at 816 (emphasis added). The Platero court’s limiting principle on 
the timing of the relationship (and accompanying motive to fabricate) is satisfied 
here. Shortly after Montgomery allegedly abused S.V., L.V. started sexually 
abusing S.V., which continued until she reported Montgomery’s abuse to her 
guidance counselor. 
Other decisions are instructive on allowing evidence of contemporaneous 
sexual relations between the victim and a witness for the prosecution. In Lewis 
v. Florida, the defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting a child. 591 So. 2d 
922, 923 (Fla. 1991). His theory of defense was that his stepdaughter fabricated 
 
32 
 
the allegations in order to prevent her mother and the defendant from discovering 
that she was sexually active with her boyfriend. Id. When the defendant sought 
to enter evidence regarding his stepdaughter’s relationship with her boyfriend, 
the trial court limited the testimony:  
Accordingly, cross-examination before the jury established 
only that [the defendant’s] accuser had a boyfriend, whom [he] and 
her mother did not want her to see, and that they placed her on 
restriction because of some letters she had written to the boyfriend. 
The jury was also allowed to learn that the victim’s mother and 
stepfather told her she could not have a car. The jury, therefore, did 
not hear any of the facts regarding the stepdaughter’s sexual 
activity, her concealing that activity when asked by her mother, or 
her attempts to prevent her mother and stepfather from confirming 
such activity through the scheduled gynecological exam. 
Id. at 924. The appellate court determined the limitation unreasonably denied 
the defendant “the opportunity to confront his accuser and present his defense.” 
Id. at 925 (quoting Lewis v. State, 750 So. 2d 412, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(Allen, J., dissenting)). The limitation prevented the defense from arguing the 
stepdaughter fabricated allegations to prevent discovery of her sexual 
relationship with her boyfriend. Id. But see Erick L., 147 A.3d at 1070 (affirming 
exclusion of evidence of victim’s sexual relations with boyfriend offered to show 
her motive for falsely accusing defendant who grounded her because trial court 
permitted sanitized cross-examination on retaliation motive). 
In People v. Peppers, defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal 
sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old girl. No. 3–13–0343, 2016 WL 285180, at *1, 
*3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). According to the complainant, Nicholas Ferreira walked in 
on the defendant having sex with her and asked them to go elsewhere. Id. at *2. 
The defendant forced the complainant downstairs to finish having sex. Id. That 
 
33 
 
night, the complainant told Ferreira that the defendant raped her. Id. The 
defendant argued the sex was consensual and he reasonably believed the 
complainant to be seventeen years old. Id. at *3. The trial court ruled that the 
complainant’s previous sexual history with the State’s witness, Ferreira, was 
inadmissible under the rape shield law. Id. at *2. The appellate court reversed, 
holding that the defendant should have been permitted to cross-examine Ferreira 
about the relationship to show his bias resulting from the lack of criminal 
charges against him, to highlight his motive to fabricate testimony for someone 
he cared about, and to support the defendant’s claim he reasonably believed that 
the complainant was seventeen years old because Ferreira had slept with her. 
Id. at *5. 
Finally, excluding evidence of L.V.’s abuse presented a misleadingly 
incomplete picture to the jury. Multiple witnesses testified about S.V. coming 
forward in May 2018 to report Montgomery’s abuse, without any mention that 
she simultaneously reported L.V.’s abuse. The jury was unaware that the nurse’s 
physical examination of S.V. was three days after L.V. last abused her. Jurors 
could reasonably believe the forensic interview and physical examination of S.V. 
were to investigate Montgomery alone. The nurse’s written report admitted into 
evidence included her identification of Montgomery as her abuser yet was 
redacted to delete S.V.’s identification of L.V. as another abuser. Most notably, 
the State called L.V. as a witness, without providing Montgomery with an 
opportunity to cross-examine him about L.V.’s own abuse of S.V. The rule of 
completeness further supports admissibility here. See Westley, 254 A.3d at 136 
 
34 
 
(applying “doctrine of verbal completeness” to determine if testimony opened the 
door to prior abuse evidence); State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 507 (Iowa 2017) 
(noting that “the rule of completeness in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.106 might be 
characterized as posing an open-the-door concept” and “is broader than the 
federal counterpart,” and concluding that “the Iowa rule allows admission of ‘any 
other . . . conversation’ that meets the rule’s requirements” (quoting Iowa R. 
Evid. 5.106(a))); Doré, § 5.106:1 (“[A]pplication of the rule prevents unfairness 
by protecting against the misleading impression which might result when all or 
part of written or oral evidence is read or heard out of context.”). 
The foregoing authorities demonstrate that the constitutional rights 
exception to the rape shield law under some circumstances allows evidence of 
the complainant’s contemporaneous sexual relationship with a witness for the 
State. We hold that the district court erred by excluding evidence of L.V.’s abuse 
of the complainant. Montgomery should have been allowed to cross-examine S.V. 
and L.V. about their relationship and to introduce Dr. Jones-Thurman’s expert 
testimony that children may testify falsely to protect an abuser they favor. 
Montgomery should have been able to argue that S.V. was reluctant to get her 
teenage “brother” L.V. in trouble and that their relationship explained how S.V. 
knew a penis is “textured” and “muscly.” We vacate the court of appeals decision 
and reverse the district court’s ruling on the rape shield law. 
We must decide whether the erroneous exclusion of this evidence was 
harmless. Reversal is required for evidentiary error when “the error affects a 
substantial right of the party.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a). “We presume the 
 
35 
 
defendant’s rights have been prejudiced unless the State can affirmatively 
establish otherwise. The State overcomes the presumption of prejudice if it can 
establish that there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” State 
v. Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32, 41–42 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). The jury 
acquitted Montgomery of lascivious acts while convicting him of sexual abuse. A 
possible conclusion is that the jury largely disbelieved S.V. and convicted 
Montgomery based on his own admissions that he let her place his hand on her 
groin area twice and “didn’t do anything that [S.V.] didn’t initiate first.” If the 
jury didn’t believe S.V. anyway, Montgomery arguably was not harmed by the 
exclusion of evidence that could have undermined her credibility.  
Our role, however, is not to read the minds of the jurors or replace them 
as fact finder. Montgomery claimed he immediately pulled his hand away both 
times after she pulled his hand to her groin. There is no DNA or other physical 
evidence that he abused S.V. He denies abusing her. No witness saw him abusing 
her. We do not find the evidence of guilt to be overwhelming. We determine the 
evidentiary errors were not harmless and require a new trial. See State v. Shaw, 
90 A.3d 936, 955 (Conn. 2014) (holding exclusion of prior abuse evidence was 
not harmless when “the state’s case was not particularly strong because there 
was no direct evidence that [the victim] was sexually assaulted by the 
defendant”); cf. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 335 (declining to apply harmless error 
rule when rape shield ruling deprived defendant of evidence necessary to her 
defense). 
 
36 
 
IV. Conclusion. 
For those reasons, we vacate the court of appeals decision on the rape 
shield issue, affirm the court of appeals decision on the remaining issues, reverse 
the district court’s judgment, and remand the case for a new trial consistent with 
this opinion. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 
VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 
REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially, and 
McDermott, J., who separately concurs specially.  
 
 
 
37 
 
#19–1613, State v. Montgomery 
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I agree with the result and most of the majority opinion. In my view, 
however, stare decisis is not at work unless the court believes that the underlying 
decision was incorrectly decided. State v. Sewell, 960 N.W.2d 640, 651 (Iowa 
2021) (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Youngblut v. 
Youngblut, 945 N.W.2d 25, 45 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J., dissenting). In my view, 
the majority offers the best interpretation of the statute and affirms prior 
authority. As a result, the doctrine of stare decisis, though cited, has no role in 
the resolution of the statutory interpretation issue in this case. 
 
I also give little weight to the doctrine of legislative acquiescence in this 
case. As a general proposition, though frequently cited, legislative acquiescence 
is a relatively weak doctrine. There are all kinds of reasons why a legislature may 
decline to act after a judicial decision interpreting a statute. Few legislators 
would want to explain a vote cast to narrow the scope of a judicial interpretation 
of a sexual abuse statute. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 547–49 (2001) (noting that the politics of 
criminal law leads to a “one-way ratchet” of ever increasing criminal penalties). 
Further, an unanticipated broad ruling of the scope of a sexual abuse statute by 
a court is likely to be viewed by legislators as more a windfall than as a problem. 
 
As a result, in my view, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence does not 
materially impact the result in this case. That is not to say that the doctrine of 
legislative acquiescence has no place in the interpretive toolkit available to the 
 
38 
 
court to assist in the resolution of disputes about statutory meaning. But it has 
little bearing here.  
 
Finally, I have no problem considering federal authority as an aid in 
interpreting Iowa rules of evidence that are parallel to similar federal rules to the 
extent the reasoning in the federal cases is persuasive. There is, of course, no 
presumption that the federal courts got it right. They are not our superiors in 
the interpretation of state law, and our authority to decide such issues cannot 
be delegated, in whole or in part, to the federal courts. I also note that state 
courts are likely to have more experience with rape shield law issues than federal 
courts, and as a result, the reasoning of decisions of other state courts may be 
more persuasive than federal caselaw. In any event, in each and every case, it is 
our obligation to independently decide the state law evidentiary questions raised 
by the parties through application of the reasoning and rationale—from whatever 
the source—that the court finds is most compelling or persuasive. Based on my 
review of the federal and state authorities and the wording of our rape shield law, 
I agree that the best approach to the interpretation of Iowa Rule of Evidence 
5.412 is embraced by the majority opinion.  
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
#19–1613, State v. Montgomery 
McDERMOTT, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I join in the court’s opinion except for those parts that rely on legislative 
acquiescence and stare decisis. I believe the court’s careful textual analysis of 
Iowa Code section 702.17 demonstrates that a sex act need not be made to 
arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the perpetrator or the victim so long as 
the act is “sexual in nature.” Having provided a full basis for its holding, the 
court’s recitation of legislative acquiescence as another basis supporting the 
holding is in my view unnecessary and, more importantly, runs counter to proper 
textual analysis. 
If we erroneously interpreted section 702.17 in State v. Pearson, 514 
N.W.2d 452 (Iowa 1994), as the defendant urges (and, for the textual reasons the 
majority provides, we did not), then we shouldn’t let the lack of any statutory 
changes to the law constrain us to inaction in fixing it. “The court is always free 
to correct its own mistakes, and legislative inaction is not a bar to doing so.” 
State ex rel. Iowa Dep’t of Health v. Van Wyk, 320 N.W.2d 599, 607 (Iowa 1982) 
(McCormick, J., dissenting). 
Justice Scalia maintained that reliance on legislative acquiescence 
“haunts” judicial opinions and urged it “should be put to rest.” Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He believed it 
was “based, to begin with, on the patently false premise that the correctness of 
statutory construction is to be measured by what the current Congress desires, 
rather than by what the law as enacted meant.” Id. “To make matters worse, it 
 
40 
 
assays the current Congress’ desires with respect to the particular provision in 
isolation,” thus ignoring the legislative process’s give-and-take required to create 
the “total legislative package” in which the isolated provision happens to reside. 
Id. The Constitution “creates an inertia” through its “complicated check on 
legislation” that, according to Scalia, “makes it impossible to assert with any 
degree of assurance” that inaction represents approval of the status quo. Id. at 
672 (quoting The Federalist No. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). “[O]ne must ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw 
any conclusions regarding [a current legislature’s] intent from the failure to enact 
legislation.” Id. at 671–72; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability 
in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 422, 426–27 (1988) (“Today’s Congress 
may leave in place an interpretation of a law simply because today’s coalitions 
are different. The failure of a different body to act hardly shows that the 
interpretation of what an earlier one did is ‘right.’ ”). 
The mere fact that a legislature could take action “is no excuse for failing 
to overrule a statutory precedent of ours that is clearly wrong, for the realities of 
the legislative process often preclude readopting the original meaning of a statute 
that we have upset.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Our interpretation should be based on what the text says and fairly 
implies—as the court otherwise did in the opinion—not on our suppositions 
about what a legislature’s inaction might mean. 
I otherwise fully join the court’s opinion on all the issues presented.