Title: In re Appeal of Tinker

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Appeal of Tinker  (96-012); 165 Vt 621; 686 A.2d 946

[Opinion Filed 09-Oct-1996]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-012

                              JUNE TERM, 1996


In re Appeal of Wanda Tinker         }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
                                     }     Human Services Board
                                     }
                                     }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. 13,716


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The Department of Aging and Disabilities appeals an order of the Human
  Services Board reversing the Department's decision to substantiate an
  allegation of abuse against Wanda Tinker. The Department challenges the
  Board's holding that the charge of abuse of a disabled adult, see 33 V.S.A.
  § 6902(1), could not be substantiated unless Tinker knew or should have
  known of the alleged victim's disability.  We affirm.

       This case arises out of an altercation between members of a local
  rescue squad.  Both Tinker and the alleged victim, L., were members of the
  squad.  Following a verbal confrontation between Tinker and L., Tinker
  observed L. looking through the drawers of a desk for certain supplies. 
  Tinker's jacket was lying on top of the desk.  L. testified that Tinker
  grabbed her jacket off the desk and swung it around hard, striking L. in
  the side of the head.  A zipper or snap on the jacket struck L. just below
  the eye, and she yelled out in pain.  According to Tinker, she merely
  picked up the jacket to put it on, and if it hit L., it was an accident.

       The area beneath L.'s eye became swollen and discolored.  L. decided
  to call the police and press charges against Tinker.  The police
  investigated, photographing the wound and interviewing witnesses.  The
  police processed the complaint as an assault.  Because L. is disabled (she
  suffers from a degenerative disk disease and receives disability benefits),
  the police referred the matter to the Department for investigation as a
  report of abuse.  See 33 V.S.A. §§ 6902-6941 (reports of abuse of elderly
  and disabled adults).  The Department substantiated the report, see id. §
  6906(c), and Tinker applied to the Board for a fair hearing.  See id. §
  6906(d).

       The hearing officer, in his recommendation to the Board, found that
  Tinker had provoked the incident and that she intentionally and recklessly
  swung her jacket at L.'s face.  The Board agreed that the evidence
  supported those findings.  Nonetheless, the Board reversed the decision to
  substantiate the report of abuse on the ground that the evidence did not
  support a finding that Tinker was aware of L.'s status as a disabled adult. 
  In effect, the Board read into the definition of "abuse" in § 6902(1)(A) an
  "element that an alleged perpetrator knew, or should have known, that [the]
  `victim' was, in fact, a `disabled adult.'"

       The Department argues that the Board erred by interpreting "abuse" to
  include the element of knowledge.  The statute reads, in relevant part:

 


     "Abuse" means:

           (A) Any treatment of an elderly or disabled adult which
           places life, health or welfare in jeopardy or which is likely to
           result in impairment of health;

           (B) Any conduct committed with an intent or reckless
           disregard that such conduct is likely to cause unnecessary harm,
           unnecessary pain or unnecessary suffering to an elderly or disabled
           adult . . . .

  33 V.S.A. § 6902(1).  The Department maintains that these provisions impose
  strict liability for abuse of an elderly or disabled adult.  With respect
  to § 6902(1)(B), that claim is inconsistent with the language of the
  statute; the provision contains an explicit scienter requirement.  Unless a
  perpetrator knows, or should know, of a victim's age or disability, the
  perpetrator cannot act with an intent to cause harm to such a person, or
  with reckless disregard of causing such harm. On its face, however, §
  6902(1)(A) is silent as to a perpetrator's knowledge of a victim's age or
  disability status.

       "When the Legislature is silent as to the mens rea required for a
  particular offense, this Court will not simply assume that the statute
  creates a strict liability offense, but will try to determine the intent of
  the Legislature."  State v. Audette, 149 Vt. 218, 221,