Title: Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-5466.] 
 
 
CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 398, 
2004-Ohio-5466.] 
Public Utilities—Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-32(A)—Order of Public Utilities 
Commission for electric company to provide governmental aggregator 
with customer information—Mootness—Final orders. 
(No. 2003-2034 – Submitted May 25, 2004 – Decided October 27, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 02-2906-EL-ATA. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal as of right by the Cincinnati Gas & Electric 
Company (“CG&E”) of decisions of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. 
Background 
{¶ 2} On November 4, 2002, CG&E filed an application with the 
commission to modify its retail electric and certified supplier tariffs.1  In its 
application, CG&E sought approval of new services for governmental 
aggregators2 and new requirements for certified suppliers in its service territory. 
{¶ 3} In an entry dated September 2, 2003, the commission observed that 
a number of interested parties had filed comments regarding CG&E’s application 
and determined that a hearing on the proposed tariff modifications should be held.  
In response to comments filed by the village of Indian Hill, a certified 
                                                 
1.   In the Matter of the Application of the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company to Modify its Retail 
Electric Tariff and Certified Supplier Tariff, case No. 02-2906-EL-ATA, “In re CG&E Tariffs.” 
2.   R.C. 4928.01(A)(13) provides: “‘Governmental aggregator’ means legislative authority of a 
municipal corporation, a board of township trustees, or a board of county commissioners acting as 
an aggregator for the provision of a competitive retail electric service under authority conferred 
under section 4928.20 of the Revised Code.” 
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governmental aggregator, the commission directed CG&E to follow the 
commission rule on cooperation with governmental aggregators and provide 
customer information to the village. 
{¶ 4} The relevant rule, former Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-32(A), 
provided: “Each electric distribution company shall cooperate with governmental 
aggregators to facilitate the proper formation and functioning of governmental 
aggregations.  Upon the request of a certified governmental aggregator, the 
electric distribution company shall provide, on a best efforts basis, an updated list 
of names, account numbers, service addresses, billing addresses, rate codes, 
percentage of income payment plan codes, load data, and other related customer 
information for all customers residing within the governmental aggregator’s 
boundaries.  The information provided shall be consistent with the information 
that is provided to other competitive retail electric service providers.  This 
information shall also include like data for those customers who have opted off 
the pre-enrollment list and account numbers for all customers within the 
governmental aggregator’s boundaries.”  2001-2002 Ohio Monthly Record 2657.3 
{¶ 5} CG&E then filed an application for rehearing of that order.  The 
commission denied the application in an entry dated September 23, 2003, in 
which the commission again ordered CG&E to comply with the cooperation rule 
and to deliver the required information to the village.  Thereafter, the village filed   
testimony on October 3, 2003, indicating that CG&E had complied with the 
commission’s orders and had provided the village with the requested customer 
information.  On November 21, 2003, CG&E filed a notice of appeal with this 
court. 
                                                 
3. The current rule recognizes competitive electric service providers under contract with a 
governmental aggregator and eliminates the phrase “on a best efforts basis.” 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶ 6} Each of the asserted errors listed in the notice of appeal concerns 
the commission’s directives to CG&E to provide the village with customer 
information. 
{¶ 7} While CG&E’s tariff modification application was originally set 
for hearing on October 14, 2003, the hearing has been rescheduled and has been 
continued at the request of the parties to allow for settlement discussions.  The 
commission has rendered no decision on CG&E’s application. 
{¶ 8} This cause is before the court on the  appellee’s January 6, 2004 
motion to dismiss the appeal.  We sustain the appellee’s motion based on lack of a 
final appealable order and on mootness. 
No Final Appealable Order 
{¶ 9} R.C. 4903.13 provides that “[a] final order made by the public 
utilities commission shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by the supreme court 
on appeal, if, upon consideration of the record, such court is of the opinion that 
such order was unlawful or unreasonable.”  (Emphasis added.)  An interim order 
on appeal in a pending commission proceeding will not be considered by this 
court.  Cincinnati v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 366, 369, 588 
N.E.2d 775.  “Timeliness, as well as an effect on substantial rights, is necessary 
for a valid appeal.”  Senior Citizens Coalition v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1988), 40 
Ohio St.3d 329, 332, 533 N.E.2d 353.  Accordingly, this court has consistently 
dismissed premature appeals.  E.g.,  AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. 
Util. 
Comm. 
(2000), 
90 
Ohio 
St.3d 
1447, 
737 
N.E.2d 
52; 
MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 1436, 676 
N.E.2d 1184; Ohio Domestic Violence Network v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1992), 65 
Ohio St.3d 438, 605 N.E.2d 13. 
{¶ 10} The commission proceeding on appeal was initiated by CG&E’s 
application for approval of proposed modifications of two of its tariffs.  As earlier 
noted, the commission ordered a hearing on CG&E’s tariff proposals, which has 
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been continued.  The commission has yet to issue an order of approval (or 
disapproval) of CG&E’s application.  Until it does so, there is no final order from 
which appeal can be taken. 
{¶ 11} CG&E disputes the commission’s characterization of its orders as 
interim and CG&E’s appeal as premature.  Rather, argues CG&E, the orders 
appealed from are final and appealable because they have prejudiced CG&E and 
caused it substantial harm. 
{¶ 12} However, CG&E’s claim of prejudice and harm is illusory.  If 
CG&E has been prejudiced or harmed, it is not because of the commission orders 
that are the subjects of its appeal.  The orders merely direct CG&E to comply with 
an administrative rule that exists and is applicable to CG&E independently of the 
commission’s orders.  The commission’s orders are simply of no consequence to 
CG&E other than to serve as a reminder for CG&E to take certain actions already 
required of it by the administrative rule.  Any prejudice or harm to CG&E results 
from the existence of the administrative rule, not from the orders of the 
commission to comply with the rule.  Thus, CG&E should direct its complaint 
against the administrative rule, which CG&E is free to do in the ongoing 
commission proceedings. 
{¶ 13} CG&E’s appeal is directed at interim commission orders producing 
no prejudice or harm to CG&E.  Therefore, the commission’s orders are not final 
appealable orders. 
Mootness 
{¶ 14} The commission argues that there is nothing to be decided in this 
case.  The commission directed CG&E to comply with the requirements of Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901:1-10-32(A) and, consequently, to provide certain customer 
information to the village.  CG&E has provided the village with the required 
information.  The information having been supplied to the village, no purpose 
would be served by reversing the commission and requiring the village to return 
January Term, 2004 
5 
the information to CG&E.  The commission having directed CG&E to do 
something that CG&E was otherwise required to do, and CG&E having done so, 
the commission cannot now undo the directive given to CG&E.  The commission 
metaphorically argues that it cannot now unring the bell. 
{¶ 15} CG&E having complied with the commission’s directives 
contained in its September 2 and 23, 2003 entries, the issue of the reasonableness 
and lawfulness of those directives has become moot.  That an appellate court need 
not consider an issue, and will dismiss the appeal, when the court becomes aware 
of an event that has rendered the issue moot is a proposition of law that harks 
back almost a century.  Miner v. Witt (1910), 82 Ohio St. 237, 238, 92 N.E. 21 
(involving a completed annexation), followed by Hagerman v. Dayton (1947), 
147 Ohio St. 313, 325-326, 34 O.O. 238, 71 N.E.2d 246 (involving payroll 
deductions). 
{¶ 16} This proposition of law has long been applied to appeals from 
commission orders.  In 1916 the court held that when a commission order had 
been carried out, no stay had been granted, and there was nothing left upon which 
the court’s decision could operate, the appeal was moot and should be dismissed.  
Pollitz v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1916), 93 Ohio St. 483, 113 N.E. 1071.  A later case 
involved an appeal of a commission order allowing a railroad to cease operation.  
Travis v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1931), 123 Ohio St. 355, 175 N.E. 586.  After the 
commission’s order was entered, the railroad’s assets were dismantled and sold, 
and its employees were discharged.  This court dismissed the appeal because any 
order the court could have issued would have been a vain act; no order of the 
court could have reconstituted the railroad.  Id. at 359, 175 N.E. 586. 
{¶ 17} In the absence of the possibility of an effective remedy, this appeal 
constitutes only a request for an advisory ruling from the court.  The court should 
decline the invitation to undertake such an abstract inquiry.  That is not the proper 
function of the judiciary, as this court has previously observed: “It has been long 
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and well established that it is the duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual 
controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts and render 
judgments which can be carried into effect.  It has become settled judicial 
responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions 
and to avoid the imposition by judgment of premature declarations or advice upon 
potential controversies.”  Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 51 
O.O.2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 371. 
{¶ 18} The court will not perform a vain act when there is no real issue 
presented in the appeal.  Verizon N., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 91, 
2004-Ohio-44, 801 N.E.2d 456. 
{¶ 19} CG&E does not dispute that the foregoing is an accurate statement 
of controlling law.  Rather, it contends that the commission has misapplied the 
law and contrasts Travis with this appeal. 
{¶ 20} In Travis, the court dismissed the appeal because it could not 
fashion a remedy to satisfy the appellant.  However, CG&E argues that in this 
appeal the court has remedies available that would satisfy it.  While CG&E admits 
that it has acted on the commission’s directives, having provided the required 
information to the village, and that the village has used that information in its role 
as a governmental aggregator, it asserts that “there remain numerous remedies 
that could avail CG&E.”  CG&E then enumerates three proposed remedies:  
ordering the commission to “(1) require Indian Hill to pay CG&E for the list 
pursuant to CG&E’s application before the commission; (2) direct Indian Hill to 
sign a supplier agreement with CG&E, to return consumers to CG&E and pay 
CG&E for lost revenues associated with the prior improper transfer; and/or (3) to 
provide CG&E due process concerning the disposition of the issues raised by 
Indian Hill’s complaint that CG&E had not provided it consumer account 
information.” 
January Term, 2004 
7 
{¶ 21} While the proposed remedies apparently would satisfy CG&E, 
none is within the power of this court.  CG&E’s notice of appeal and its 
complaints of alleged commission error delimit the issues for this court’s 
consideration in this appeal.  Nowhere in its notice of appeal does CG&E raise the 
issue of requiring the village to pay for the information list it supplied the village. 
{¶ 22} Moreover, implicit in CG&E’s requested court order is that this 
court would determine the amount that should be paid to CG&E for the provided 
data.  This court is without jurisdiction to make such a determination without the 
commission’s prior determination of the amount.  Moreover, there is no evidence 
to support any such determination. 
{¶ 23} CG&E’s second proposed remedy is for this court to order the 
commission to “direct Indian Hill to sign a supplier agreement with CG&E * * * 
and pay CG&E lost revenues associated with the prior improper transfer.”  While 
CG&E’s notice of appeal raises the issues of execution of a supplier agreement, it 
in no way can support an order of this court to the commission to direct the 
village to take actions based on determination of ultimate fact not yet made by the 
commission in the proceedings on appeal. 
{¶ 24} CG&E’s third requested remedy is for this court to order the 
commission to provide CG&E due process concerning the village’s complaints 
against it.  However, there has been no showing that the commission has deprived 
CG&E of due process, and, in any event, the commission proceedings on appeal 
are ongoing. 
{¶ 25} CG&E’s argument that the issue presented in this appeal is not 
moot because there are satisfactory remedies available must fail.  As CG&E 
concedes, “[n]one of these remedies is available to CG&E absent a Court order.”  
But the court is powerless to issue any of the requested orders.  Therefore, the 
remedies simply are unavailable.  Thus, the court in this appeal is faced with a 
situation no different from that faced by the court in Travis. 
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{¶ 26} Additionally, CG&E argues that the issue presented in this appeal 
is not moot because it is capable of repetition yet evading review.  As authority 
for its argument, CG&E cites State ex rel. Wadd v. Cleveland (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 50, 52, 689 N.E.2d 25.  State ex rel. Wadd and the other Ohio Supreme 
Court decisions cited in that case on the question of mootness4 were all 
mandamus actions brought under the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  
They all involved requests for public records that were, in fact, produced by the 
respondents.  This court ruled in all three cases that the production of the 
requested records did not render the mandamus actions moot because all three 
involved issues beyond production of the requested record that were “capable of 
repetition yet evading review.” 
{¶ 27} While CG&E has or may raise issues in the ongoing proceedings 
below that will be capable of repetition, declaring the issue of the reasonableness 
and lawfulness of the commission’s order to be moot does not prevent later 
review of those issues.  The question faced by the court in the three mandamus 
actions was whether the mandamus actions themselves were moot.  If the court 
had answered in the affirmative, the issues surrounding the production of the 
public records would have evaded review.  The court in this appeal is not being 
asked to declare the ongoing proceedings before the commission to be moot.  
Issues surrounding CG&E’s compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-32(A), 
as ordered by the commission, can still be raised by CG&E in the ongoing 
commission proceedings, resulting in a final, appealable order subject to review 
by this court. 
Conclusion 
                                                 
4.  State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 401-402, 678 
N.E.2d 557, and State ex rel. Margolius v. Cleveland (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 456, 457, 584 N.E.2d 
665, fn. 1. 
January Term, 2004 
9 
{¶ 28} The commission’s orders on appeal are not final appealable orders.  
Moreover, the question of the reasonableness and lawfulness of those orders has 
been rendered moot.  Therefore, we sustain the appellee’s motion and dismiss this 
appeal. 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} The majority holds that there is no final appealable order in this 
case and that even if there were a final order, the issue presented by Cincinnati 
Gas & Electric (“CG&E”) is moot.  I disagree with both of those holdings, 
especially in regard to mootness. 
{¶ 30} I would hold that Indian Hill’s request that the commission order 
CG&E to provide the village with its customer information was separate from the 
application that CG&E had pending before the commission at that time.  In 
essence, the village’s request constituted a separate complaint.  In no way did the 
commission rely upon any issue pending in CG&E’s application in reaching its 
decision.  The commission held no hearing.  The village got all that it asked for, 
without having to wait until the resolution of CG&E’s underlying action to 
receive the full measure of the relief it sought.  The village got more than a 
judgment – it also got its remedy.  The commission’s order was final, and CG&E 
should have had the opportunity to appeal it. 
{¶ 31} Especially disturbing is this court’s finding that the issue is moot 
because CG&E has already provided the customer information to the village.  
This holding feeds into what increasingly appears to be the commission’s belief 
that its decisions are not reviewable. See State ex rel. Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. 
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Util. Comm, 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894, 809 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 24 
(Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Herein, the commission dismisses the idea that it has 
accountability for its orders, right or wrong, by arguing that it cannot “unring the 
bell.”  I view the institutional arrogance of the commission to be a continuing 
problem and one that could be dealt with by addressing the legitimate issues 
raised by parties in cases like these.  The bell needs to be answered, not unrung. 
_______________________ 
 
Paul A. Colbert and John J. Finnigan Jr., for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Duane W. Luckey, Thomas G. Lindgren, and 
Thomas W. McNamee, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Janine L. Migden-Ostrander, Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, Kimberly W. 
Bojko, Jeffrey L. Small, and Larry S. Sauer, Assistant Consumers’ Counsel, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Consumers’ Counsel. 
__________________