Title: Wehr v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wehr v. State1992 WY 147841 P.2d 104Case Number: 90-185Decided: 11/13/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Paul C. 
WEHR, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, FremontCounty, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

 
 
Wyoming 
Public Defender Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. 
Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Mary Frances Cadez, Student 
Intern, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The most troublesome 
issue in this case is whether the record discloses sufficient evidence to 
establish a criminal conspiracy to deliver controlled substances. Closely 
related to that difficult issue is the issue of whether the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence of prior purchases of controlled substances by Paul C. Wehr 
(Wehr) from a co-conspirator. In addition, Wehr strenuously argues he was 
deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We hold the evidence of 
prior purchases of controlled substances from the co-conspirator was relevant 
and admissible in this case and all of the evidence was sufficient to establish 
a criminal conspiracy to deliver controlled substances. We further hold there 
was no violation of Wehr's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The judgment 
and sentence are affirmed.

 
 

[¶2.]     Wehr sets forth the 
issues in this case, in his Brief of Appellant, as 
follows:

 
 
I. Whether 
the testimony of Pamela Thompson concerning Appellant's alleged prior drug 
purchases was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence and any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect under 
Rule 403.

 
 
II. Whether 
the evidence was insufficient to establish that Appellant conspired to deliver a 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1042 
(1977).

 
 
III. 
Whether Appellant was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of the 
United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions and Rule 204 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the 
State of Wyoming.

 
 
In its 
Brief of Appellee, the State of Wyoming restates the issues in this 
way:

 
 
I. Whether 
the trial court properly admitted Pamela Thompson's 
testimony.

 
 
II. Whether 
the evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for conspiracy to 
deliver a controlled substance.

 
 
III. 
Whether Appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial.

 
 

[¶3.]     In a two-count 
Information, Wehr was charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-7-1042 and -1031(a)(ii) (1988), and the 
delivery of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii).1 After a trial to a jury, Wehr was 
convicted on both counts.

 
 

[¶4.]     These charges arose out 
of events that occurred in Riverton on December 23, 1988. An undercover police 
officer (officer) and a confidential informant met with Perry Greenhalgh to 
attempt to purchase drugs. Greenhalgh was the target of a criminal investigation 
being conducted by the Northwest Wyoming Drug Enforcement Team, a unit of the 
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). Three DCI agents provided 
audio and visual surveillance of the meeting with 
Greenhalgh.

 
 

[¶5.]     Initially, Greenhalgh 
agreed to sell, and the officer agreed to buy, an unspecified amount of cocaine. 
When efforts to procure the cocaine proved unsuccessful, Greenhalgh asked the 
officer if he would be interested in "crank," a street name for methamphetamine. 
The officer responded he would, and Greenhalgh then called someone he referred 
to as "Paul" to see if he could obtain that drug. After talking with Paul, 
Greenhalgh informed the officer he had a source and the price would be $60 per 
one-half gram. The officer agreed to purchase one gram.

 
 

[¶6.]     The officer, the 
confidential informant, and Greenhalgh left Greenhalgh's residence and went to 
Wehr's home at Park 
AvenueTrailer 
Park, Space 234. Greenhalgh entered the trailer 
alone and returned shortly thereafter without having obtained the 
methamphetamine. Greenhalgh stated they would have to come back forty-five 
minutes later. The officer, the confidential informant, and Greenhalgh then 
returned to Greenhalgh's residence.

 
 

[¶7.]     After the officer and 
the others had left Wehr's home to return to Greenhalgh's residence, one of the 
surveillance agents observed Wehr leave his trailer and get into his Dodge 
pickup. That agent and another DCI agent followed Wehr in separate vehicles to 
1103 Westwood 
Drive. At that address, Wehr parked his pickup and 
got into a Ford Bronco driven by Pamela Thompson (Thompson). While they drove 
around Riverton in the Ford Bronco, Thompson sold Wehr three grams of 
methamphetamine. After making the purchase from Thompson, Wehr returned to his 
trailer home.

 
 

[¶8.]     The officer, the 
confidential informant, and Greenhalgh arrived within a short time. Greenhalgh 
again entered Wehr's trailer alone and, after a few moments, he returned with a 
baggie of drugs that he gave to the officer. Upon testing, the drugs turned out 
to be methamphetamine.

 
 

[¶9.]     On March 2, 1989, the 
officer and two DCI agents returned to Wehr's trailer to discuss the December 
drug transaction with him. Wehr initially denied any involvement, but then he 
admitted he had bought methamphetamine from Thompson and had later sold it to 
Greenhalgh.

 
 

[¶10.]  On May 26, 1989, a criminal complaint was 
filed in which Wehr was charged in two counts with conspiracy to deliver and the 
delivery of a controlled substance in violation of §§ 35-7-1042 and 
-1031(a)(ii). A preliminary hearing was conducted, and Wehr was bound over for 
trial in the district court. On June 20, 1989, an information was filed charging 
Wehr with the same crimes that had been alleged in the complaint. At his 
arraignment, Wehr entered pleas of not guilty, and the case was set for trial on 
September 18, 1989, as the fifth case in a stacked setting. The record discloses 
no formal continuance of the trial but, on October 3, 1989, the State filed a 
motion to dismiss the Information against Wehr, stating that a principal witness 
was unavailable for trial. The district court granted that motion on October 4, 
1989.

 
 

[¶11.]  On October 10, 1989, the State refiled a 
criminal complaint identical to the one previously filed against Wehr. The 
process was repeated, and Wehr eventually was brought to trial on April 16, 
1990. On April 18, 1990, the jury found Wehr guilty of both counts alleged in 
the information. By the judgment and sentence entered on June 28, 1990, Wehr was 
sentenced on each count to a term of not less than one and one-half years nor 
more than three years to be served at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with those 
sentences to run concurrently. In addition, he was fined the sum of $2,500 on 
Count II. Wehr has appealed from the judgment and 
sentence.

 
 

[¶12.]  While it is not the primary issue in the 
case, we turn first to the issue concerning the evidence of prior drug purchases 
which was submitted through Thompson's testimony. Wehr contends this evidence 
was inadmissible character evidence, foreclosed by Wyo.R.Evid. 4042 or, in the alternative, it should 
have been excluded because of the provisions of Wyo.R.Evid. 
403.

 
 

[¶13.]  In pertinent part, Wyo.R.Evid. 404 
provides: 

 
 
     (a) Character evidence generally. - Evidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except:

 
 
* * 
*.

 
 
     (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. - 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.

 
 
Wyo.R.Evid. 
404, identical to the parallel federal rule, finds its antecedents in the common 
law, and the policy for excluding evidence of character or a trait of character 
was said to be "the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent 
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice." Michelson v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S. Ct. 213, 218-19, 
93 L. Ed. 168 (1948). Its intent is to avoid a demand that an accused defend acts 
of misconduct other than those charged in the indictment or information and to 
avoid potential confusion by members of the jury in addressing the issues of the 
case. The rule demands convictions are to be founded in those facts relevant to 
the crime or crimes charged. If the thrust of evidence of prior bad acts is only 
to demonstrate the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes, the evidence 
should be excluded.

 
 

[¶14.]  We have summarized the application of 
Wyo.R.Evid. 404(b) in this way:

 
 
This rule 
operates to ban the use of evidence of a person's character in order to 
establish that the person's behavior on a particular occasion was in conformity 
with his character. Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 943 (Wyo. 1983). Such evidence 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes. Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Wyo. 1988); Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 103 (Wyo. 1987); Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1112-14 
(Wyo. 1987); 
Ortega, 669 P.2d  at 943. This court has adopted a rather liberal attitude toward 
admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts if it constitutes proof of 
one of the purposes in accord with Rule 404(b). Marker v. State, 748 P.2d 295, 
297 (Wyo. 1988); Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244, 
248 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 
Pena v. 
State, 780 P.2d 316, 318 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 
Our 
application of the provisions of Wyo. R.Evid. 404(b) is consistent with the view 
of a leading authority:

 
 
     So frequent is the use 
of evidence of other acts and crimes for such purposes that it would be both 
fair and clearer to state the operative principle as one of inclusion, as many 
courts do. These words capture the substance of the principle: "Evidence of 
prior acts and crimes by the accused may be admitted in criminal cases on any 
issue to which it may be relevant, unless probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, except that it may not be received 
if its only relevance is to show a propensity on the part of the accused." 2 
DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140, at 172 
(rev. 1985) (footnote omitted.).

 
 

[¶15.]  Our cases afford deference to the 
determination by the trial court that evidence is admissible pursuant to Wyo. 
R.Evid. 404(b) Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 848 (Wyo. 1990). As long as 
there is a legitimate basis for a trial judge's ruling, we will not say there 
has been an abuse of discretion. Longfellow. Although our application of this 
rule affords broad discretion to the trial judge, it is not unlimited. 
Longfellow.

 
 

[¶16.]  We examine claims of error pursuant to 
Wyo.R.Evid. 404(b) under the fivepart analysis articulated in Bishop v. State, 
687 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985); Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1987). The factors 
addressed in that analysis are: (1) clarity of proof; (2) remoteness in time; 
(3) purpose for introduction; (4) materiality; and (5) need for the prior bad 
act evidence. In applying this analysis, we do recognize that the exceptions 
articulated in Wyo.R.Evid. 404(b) are illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
Longfellow. Application of the Bishop and Coleman factors to the evidence in 
this case leads us to conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
admitting Thompson's testimony.

 
 

[¶17.]  Thompson was a direct participant in the 
conspiracy alleged in the information, and she was the only witness called by 
the State who had personal knowledge of prior drug transactions. The clear 
inference from her testimony was that the transactions she was involved in 
occurred within five years of trial.3 Thompson's testimony was evidence 
of a "course of conduct" that was relevant to the charge of conspiracy. Her 
testimony related to the issue of whether she and Wehr were partners in the 
criminal activity and also addressed the question of whether Wehr obtained the 
methamphetamine for resale. In Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049 (Wyo. 1989), we recognized 
the proposition that course of conduct testimony is an important item of 
circumstantial evidence in conspiracy cases.

 
 

[¶18.]  There are other reasons for affirming the 
admission of Thompson's testimony pursuant to Wyo.R.Evid. 404(b). The defense 
theory, maintained throughout the trial, was that no witness could actually 
identify Wehr as the person who delivered methamphetamine to Greenhalgh on 
December 23, 1988. Thompson's testimony was relevant to the issue of identity 
because it served to place in Wehr's possession methamphetamine that ultimately 
was turned over to the investigating officers by Greenhalgh. It established, on 
the part of Wehr, an intent, a plan, and a motive to purchase the drugs for 
resale on the date in question.4

 
 

[¶19.]  With respect to Wehr's claim that the 
testimony of Thompson should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under 
Wyo.R.Evid. 403, we hold there was no error. The potential for prejudice inheres 
in almost every instance in which evidence is offered pursuant to Wyo.R.Evid. 
404(b), but we can find no basis to conclude the trial court abused its 
discretion in this case. Thompson's testimony carried significant probative 
value with respect to the existence of the charged conspiracy and also with 
respect to the crime of delivery of a controlled 
substance.

 
 

[¶20.]  We next turn to Wehr's contention that 
there was not sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on the conspiracy 
charge. The essence of his argument is that he and Thompson did not specifically 
conspire or agree to sell controlled substances to Greenhalgh on December 23, 
1988. Wehr argues the transaction on December 23, 1988 was only a single sale 
and Thompson's interest in the transaction extended no further than being 
assured he was satisfied with the product.

 
 

[¶21.]  Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, 
and it commonly is defined as an agreement between two or more people to commit 
an unlawful act. Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 (Wyo. 1992); Bigelow v. State, 768 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1989); Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327 (Wyo. 1977). Under 
widely-adopted statutory concepts, a conspiracy is completed when an agreement 
has been made and some overt act is performed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1042 (1988); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. 
SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.5 (1986). The agreement that must be 
shown to support a conviction of a conspiracy to commit a crime is not the same 
as the "meeting of the minds" demanded for a contract. In Bigelow, 768 P.2d  at 
562, we said:

 
 
One might 
suppose that the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like the 
agreement or "meeting of the minds" which is critical to a contract, but this is 
not the case. Although there 
continues to exist some uncertainty as to the precise meaning of [the] word in 
the context of conspiracy, it is clear that the definition in this setting is 
somewhat more lax than elsewhere. A mere tacit understanding will suffice, and 
there need not be any written statement or even a speaking of words which 
expressly communicates agreement.

 
 

[¶22.]  In Wyoming, a special statute has been adopted by 
the legislature to govern conspiracies involving controlled substances. Section 
35-7-1042 justifies law enforcement personnel in prosecuting, at the earliest 
possible stage, criminal partnerships that are designed to violate Wyoming's Controlled 
Substances Act. See Dorador, 768 P.2d 1049. The statute provides, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
Any person 
who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within the 
state of Wyoming * * * shall be punished by 
imprisonment or fine or both * * *.

 
 
Any 
requirement that an overt act be accomplished in furtherance of the conspiracy 
so a complete conspiracy may be prosecuted is absent from § 35-7-1042. In 
Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023 (Wyo. 1981), we recognized no demonstration of 
an overt act is required under this statute.

 
 

[¶23.]  The State satisfies its burden of proof 
in a conspiracy case involving controlled substances by proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that: (1) there existed at least a tacit understanding between 
the defendant and a co-conspirator to commit an act violative of Wyoming's 
Controlled Substances Act; and (2) the defendant intended to commit the elements 
of the offense which was the object of the understanding. Circumstantial 
evidence may be relied upon to establish a conspiracy due to the covert nature 
of the crime. See, e.g., Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1989); 
Dorador.

 
 

[¶24.]  We recently have reiterated our 
summarization of the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence in a 
criminal case:

 
 
[T]his 
court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence and appropriate 
inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Munson v. 
State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo. 1989)).

 
 
Dreiman v. 
State, 825 P.2d 758, 760 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 

[¶25.]  An analysis of the evidence of the 
conspiracy in this case persuades us the State produced ample evidence at trial 
from which a jury rationally might conclude Wehr and Thompson were 
co-conspirators in a drug distribution chain. First, the State introduced 
evidence Thompson and Wehr were engaged in an ongoing source-to-middleman for 
resale relationship that was mutually beneficial. Thompson testified she was a 
drug addict and she supported her habit by selling drugs to others. She said she 
had known Wehr for a number of years and she had sold drugs to him repeatedly 
for his personal use and for resale. Her testimony was that Wehr would buy only 
a quarter gram or half gram for his personal use but, when reselling drugs to 
others, he would buy substantially larger quantities. Thompson told the jury 
Wehr had admitted to her in the past that he resold drugs obtained from her to 
support his own habit.

 
 

[¶26.]  The State also established by Thompson's 
testimony that Wehr and Thompson knowingly engaged in the source-to-middleman 
resale transaction on the date at issue. Thompson testified she sold three grams 
of methamphetamine to Wehr on December 23, 1988 and she had "no doubt" Wehr then 
would deliver the drugs to someone else. Furthermore, one of the DCI agents 
testified Wehr admitted, in the course of the March 2, 1989 interview, he had 
purchased methamphetamine from Thompson on December 23, 1988 which he later sold 
to Greenhalgh.

 
 

[¶27.]  Finally, the State presented evidence 
that Thompson's interest in drug transactions extended well beyond simply 
satisfying the immediate customer. Thompson testified at trial that, after she 
had made the sale to Wehr, she was advised her name and that of Greenhalgh were 
being discussed over the police radio. Thompson immediately telephoned Wehr and 
told him someone was "wired" and he should not sell the methamphetamine to 
Greenhalgh. Thompson earlier had testified she would not sell controlled 
substances to Greenhalgh because he resold the drugs to "youngsters." When she 
was asked at trial why she phoned Wehr, Thompson responded, "[s]o he would not 
sell to Perry [Greenhalgh] because Perry's name had come over the scanner too, 
and Paul knows if he was going to sell to Perry I would never sell to him 
again."

 
 

[¶28.]  We hold, given the admissibility of 
Thompson's testimony relative to the prior transactions with Wehr, the jury 
rationally could infer from all of this evidence, along with all of the other 
evidence introduced at the trial, that Wehr and Thompson had an ongoing 
conspiratorial relationship to distribute drugs in violation of Wyoming's Controlled 
Substances Act. The jury further could infer the transaction on December 23, 
1988 was a product of the ongoing conspiracy and simply an example of the method 
Wehr and Thompson used to distribute controlled substances in violation of the 
Wyoming Controlled Substances Act.

 
 

[¶29.]  We turn finally to Wehr's contention he 
was denied his right to a speedy trial in violation of the Constitutions of the 
United States of America and 
the State of Wyoming and Unif.R.Dist.Ct.Wyo. 204.5 At the outset, we acknowledge the 
right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, and it applies to the 
states by virtue of the due process clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1967)). We also acknowledge the proposition that Article 1, Section 10 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming insures the right to a speedy trial.6 Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 
(Wyo. 1989). 
We consistently have refused, however, to adopt the 120-day period set forth in 
Unif. R.Dist.Ct.Wyo. 204 as the absolute definition of the constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. See, e.g., Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272 (Wyo. 1991); Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260 (Wyo. 1985); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1981) (discussing 
Rule 22 which was later renumbered as Rule 204). Instead, we have stated a 
number of times that no precise length of delay automatically will constitute a 
violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., Harvey; 
Phillips; Caton.

 
 

[¶30.]  In accord with this articulation, we have 
applied the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).7 Under the analysis promulgated in 
Barker, we look at: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) the 
defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice 
resulting from delay. We consider these four factors together and balance them 
in light of all other relevant circumstances. Osborne. The determinative dynamic 
in our inquiry is whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was 
unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the 
accused to a fair trial. See Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134 (Wyo. 1989); Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464 (Wyo. 1979); Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1973). Attached as Appendix A is a 
chronology of the significant steps occurring in the prosecution of Wehr's case 
which we perceive to be helpful in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
delay.

 
 

[¶31.]  While we have declined to assign to Unif. 
R.Dist.Ct.Wyo. 204 controlling significance in determining whether the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, we have recognized it 
as a factor that must have been considered in the context of the Barker 
analysis. Osborne. Rule 204 provided generally that all accused persons should 
have been brought to trial within 120 days of the filing of an information or 
indictment against them. Within the rule were found specific exclusions of time 
periods which may be taken into account in calculating whether the 120-day rule 
was violated. Of those particular exclusions, only the dismissal exclusion is 
relevant in this case. Unif.R.Dist.Ct.Wyo. 204(c)(4). Pursuant to that 
provision, the period from October 4, 1989 to December 5, 1989, a total of 62 
days, would be excluded from the calculation of the time from the filing of the 
information to trial.

 
 

[¶32.]  The information in this case was 
initially filed on June 20, 1989. It was dismissed on October 4, 1989, a period 
that encompasses 106 days. After the information was refiled on December 5, 
1989, Wehr was brought to trial on April 16, 1990, a period of 132 days. The 
total time Wehr was charged by information prior to trial was 238 
days.

 
 

[¶33.]  In the context of a constitutional 
analysis, the time for a speedy trial begins to run with the filing of a 
criminal complaint or the arrest of a defendant. Estrada v. State, 611 P.2d 850 
(Wyo. 1980). 
The criminal complaint was filed in this case on May 26, 1989, and the appellant 
was brought to trial on April 16, 1990. The total elapsed time, excluding the 
period between the dismissal and refiling of the complaint was 320 days. The 
238-day period that must be counted for purposes of Unif. R.Dist.Ct.Wyo. 204, 
and the 320-day period that must be used in connection with the constitutional 
standard are time periods that match closely the delays found to exist in our 
recent case of Osborne, 806 P.2d  at 277 (244 and 301 days, respectively). We 
recognized in Osborne that delays such as this are not presumptively 
prejudicial, but that they are significant enough to warrant further analysis. 
Osborne; but cf. Harvey and Phillips (cases find delay exceeding 
500 days to be presumptively prejudicial).

 
 

[¶34.]  We then turn to an analysis of the 
reasons for the delay in trial. In Barker, the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States provided guidelines to be invoked in 
determining the weight to be given to causes of delay which are attributable to 
the prosecution. The court there said:

 
 
A 
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be 
weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as 
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but 
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. 
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify 
appropriate delay.

 
 
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192 
(footnote omitted).

 
 
We have 
recalled and applied the standards on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Osborne 
(neutral reason standard); Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986) (valid reason 
standard); Estrada (deliberate, neutral, and valid reason 
standards).

 
 

[¶35.]  The chronology of this case, as reflected 
in Appendix A, does not readily disclose any specific, or significant, lapses in 
the prosecution of Wehr. Wehr's case was proceeding at all times at a deliberate 
pace. Harvey and Phillips clearly are distinguishable as is the case of Stuebgen 
v. State, 548 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1976), in which the court found long 
periods of inactivity not adequately accounted for by the 
State.

 
 

[¶36.]  It is clear the overall delay occurring 
in this case did not stem from prosecutorial neglect or ill will. The trial, 
initially set for September 18, 1989, would have occurred within ninety days 
from the filing of the information. The State was preparing for trial on that 
date even though the case was stacked number five for trial. On August 29, 1989, 
a subpoena was issued at the request of the State for Greenhalgh to appear and 
testify on the trial date. When the sheriff was unable to locate Greenhalgh to 
serve the subpoena, the State was faced with the decision of proceeding to trial 
without a key witness, thereby jeopardizing the prosecution, or of asking for a 
dismissal, with the possibility of refiling the case if Greenhalgh could be 
found. The State chose the latter course. The result was that the prosecutorial 
process was started over again upon the refiling of a new complaint, and the 
duplication of the process led to a delay from the time the original complaint 
was filed.

 
 

[¶37.]  When the principles outlined above are 
applied to the facts of this case, the delay attributable to the State arguably 
was justified because it was the result of a missing witness and should not be 
weighed against the State. At the very worst, and in the alternative, the reason 
for the delay was neutral and should not weigh heavily against the State. There 
is no evidence in the record to support any inference that the State requested 
the dismissal in bad faith or with a sinister motive.

 
 

[¶38.]  The formula suggests we also examine 
delay attributable to the accused. In doing so, we weigh any delay properly 
attributable to the defendant against the delay chargeable to the State. We have 
frequently acknowledged a defendant may defeat his claim to a speedy trial by 
his own dilatory practices. See, e.g., Harvey; Phillips; Cherniwchan. In this 
case, a forty-day delay occurred between the filing of the second complaint and 
Wehr's appearance in court. This delay is fairly attributable to Wehr, who was 
working out of state when the second complaint was filed, and it took some time 
for him to get back to Wyoming to face the charges. Wehr's change of 
counsel also may explain in part this forty-day delay.

 
 

[¶39.]  We have held it is not necessary for a 
defendant to assert his right to a speedy trial in order to identify a speedy 
trial violation. Osborne. However, we can, and do, consider whether the right 
was asserted, and how vigorously, in determining the reasonableness of any 
delay. Osborne. The action or inaction of the defendant in this regard is a 
reflection of the actual amount of prejudice being experienced. Barker. We 
recognize pretrial delay may be either prejudicial or beneficial to a defendant. 
See Barker. We also distinguish those cases of representation by counsel, as 
compared to those in which there was no representation, and there was a failure 
to assert the right to a speedy trial, giving less weight to a defendant's claim 
of deprivation when he failed to assert the speedy trial right while being 
advised by an attorney. Estrada (citing Barker). 

 
 

[¶40.]  In Wehr's case, the record discloses only 
one occasion on which it might be claimed that Wehr was asserting his right to a 
speedy trial. On August 16, 1989, the trial court held a suppression hearing 
that was going to be continued on a subsequent date. On that occasion, counsel 
for Wehr stated, "Your Honor, by not objecting to continuing this, I don't want 
to waive Mr. Wehr's right to a speedy trial." Neither Wehr nor his attorney made 
any other reference to the right to a speedy trial during the balance of the 
proceedings in the trial court.

 
 

[¶41.]  We have recognized, with respect to the 
factor of prejudice, that, although an affirmative showing of prejudice is not 
absolutely required to demonstrate a violation of the right to a speedy trial, 
prejudice is a "very important factor," in fact a "key element," in the Barker 
speedy trial analysis. Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1266. We held in Caton that "until 
delay exceeds a point where there is a `probability of substantial prejudice,' 
the burden of proving prejudice should remain with the accused." Caton, 709 P.2d  
at 1266. In Harvey and Phillips, we concluded an eighteen-month delay was 
excessive and gave rise to a probability of substantial prejudice warranting a 
presumption of prejudice. Harvey; Phillips. We have not, however, ruled a delay 
like that occasioned in this case - ten and one-half months - gives vitality to 
a presumption of prejudice. Osborne, 806 P.2d 272; Binger v. State, 712 P.2d 349 
(Wyo. 1986); 
Estrada, 611 P.2d 850. The obligation of demonstrating prejudice, therefore, is 
assigned to Wehr in this case.

 
 

[¶42.]  In Barker, the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States observed prejudice may consist of: (1) 
lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of 
defense. Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182. Of these 
three styles of prejudice, Wehr argues only that he suffered pretrial anxiety. 
Specifically, Wehr asserts he experienced difficulty maintaining employment; he 
had to obtain new counsel; and his reputation in the community was tarnished. We 
already have noted Wehr's failure to object to the length of the prosecution 
below is indicative of the actual anxiety and prejudice he was experiencing. 
Wehr was employed during virtually the entire time he was being prosecuted - a 
better employment record than he had prior to the filing of these charges. Wehr 
did point out in this court the fact that he had to file a motion for a change 
of bond condition in order to continue his employment as a roughneck. That was 
not a source of unusual pretrial anxiety in this instance, however. As to the 
claim of new counsel being required, Wehr simply states the fact that he had to 
obtain a different attorney. Wehr cited no support from the record, and he made 
no argument on appeal concerning how this enhanced his anxiety level. Wehr, 
likewise, simply baldly asserted his reputation had been damaged without any 
sort of factual basis for that claim. It is true that a certain amount of 
inconvenience, anxiety, and societal disrepute accompanies the filing of any 
criminal charge. See Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1982). In this case, 
Wehr has failed to demonstrate in any way that he suffered prejudice in any 
extraordinary or unusual manner.

 
 

[¶43.]  When we balance the several factors in 
this case, we conclude that, although there was a delay in bringing Wehr to 
trial, the delay was not so great it was not effectively balanced by the other 
factors. The reason for the delay - the witness who could not be served with 
process - arguably justifies an extension in the time of prosecution. At its 
very worst, that delay was attributable to a neutral reason and does not weigh 
heavily against the State. The State prosecuted the case in a continuing manner 
at a deliberate pace, and there is nothing in this record that would serve to 
demonstrate bad faith or ill will. Wehr, having the benefit of counsel, failed 
to make any appreciable attempt to assert his right to a speedy trial. In 
addition, Wehr has made no showing that he suffered unusual prejudice by the 
pretrial delay, nor do we find any indication of that in the record. In light of 
this foregoing analysis, we cannot conclude the pretrial delay occasioned in 
this case substantially impaired Wehr's right to a fair trial so as to warrant 
reversal and dismissal of all the charges. We hold there was no violation of the 
right to a speedy trial.

 
 

[¶44.]  Persuaded, as we are, that there was no 
reversible error in the proceedings in the trial court, we hold the jury 
conviction and the judgment and sentence of the trial court must be affirmed. 
The judgment and sentence in this case is affirmed.

 
 
APPENDIX 
A

 
 
The record 
in this case reflects the following events on the dates 
indicated:

 
 
May 
      26, 1989

Complaint 
      filed.

May 
      30, 1989

Appellant 
      arrested.

June 
      15, 1989

Preliminary 
      hearing.

June 
      20, 1989

Information 
      filed.

July 
      5, 1989 

Arraignment 
      - trial date set for Sept. 18, 1989.

July 
      20, 1989 

Motion 
      to suppress.

August 
      3, 1989 

State's 
      designation of witnesses and exhibits.

August 
      16 & 25, 1989 

Suppression 
      hearing.

August 
      25, 1989

State's 
      proposed jury instructions.

 August 29, 1989 
      

Subpoena 
      issued for Perry Greenhalgh.

September 
      6, 1989

Subpoena 
      returned for failure to locate Greenhalgh.

October 
      3, 1989 

Motion 
      to dismiss filed.

October 
      4, 1989 

Motion 
      granted.

October 
      10, 1989 

Complaint 
      refiled.

November 
      20, 1989 

Defendant 
      appears in court.

December 
      5, 1989 

Information 
      filed.

December 
      12, 1989 

Case 
      assigned to judge.

January 
      10, 1990 

Arraignment.

January 
      22, 1990 

Motion 
      to suppress.

February 
      8, 1990 

Arraignment 
      order.

February 
      26, 1990

Defendant's 
      witness and exhibit list.

February 
      27, 1990 

State's 
      witness and exhibit list.

March 
      1, 1990 

Order 
      denying motion to suppress.

March 
      7, 1990

Pretrial 
      conference.

March 
      12, 1990

Pretrial 
      report and order.

March 
      29, 1990

Motion 
      to change bond conditions.

April 
      11, 1990

Motions 
      in limine.

April 
      16, 1990

Trial 
      begins.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1042 
(1988) provides:

 
 
Any person 
who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within the 
state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming 
which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, 
shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the 
maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the 
object of the attempt or conspiracy.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. 
§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (1988) provides:

 
 
(a) Except 
as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

 
 
     (ii) Any other 
controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime 
and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both; * * 
*.

 
 

2 Counsel 
for Wehr made only one objection, invoking Wyo.R.Evid. 404(b), and it was 
overruled during the course of Thompson's testimony. The colloquy from the 
record is:

 
 
[COUNSEL 
FOR WEHR]: Your Honor, I'm going to object as beyond the basis of Rule 404(b) 
evidence of other bad acts as they are styled in the 
rules.

 
 
[COURT]: 
Your objection's noted and is overruled.

 
 
[COUNSEL 
FOR WEHR]: Thank you, Your Honor.

 
 
[COUNSELFORSTATE]: Have you ever been with him at any 
times when he's passed on methamphetamine to other people that you've delivered 
to him?

 
 
[THOMPSON]: 
No, I have not.

 
 
[COUNSELFORSTATE]: Have you talked to him about 
it?

 
 
[THOMPSON]: 
Yes, I've talked to him about it.

 
 
[COUNSELFORSTATE]: And has he at any time admitted to 
you he had done that?

 
 
[THOMPSON]: 
He has admitted to me that he has sold to other people.

 
 

3 Thompson 
testified she got a job with the WyomingStateHospital on November 30, 
1989 and, prior to that, she had worked for the Holiday Inn for approximately 
six months. Ms. Thompson also testified she was unemployed prior to working at 
the Holiday Inn and she then had a $250.00 a month drug habit which she 
supported by dealing drugs. She testified to selling drugs for approximately 
three years.

 
 

4 In its 
Traverse to Defendant's Motions in Limine directed at Thompson's testimony, the 
State stated that the testimony would be used at trial as proof of "motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of 
mistake or accident."

 
 

5 
Unif.R.Dist.Ct.Wyo. 204 provides:

 
 
Rule 204. 
Speedy trial.

 
 
     (a) It is the 
responsibility of court and counsel to insure to each person charged with crime 
a speedy trial.

 
 
     (b) A criminal charge 
shall be brought to trial within 120 days following the filing of information or 
indictment.

 
 
     (c) The following 
periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:

 
 
(1) All 
proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the 
defendant.

 
 
(2) 
Proceedings on another charge.

 
 
(3) Delay 
granted by the court pursuant to subdivision (d).

 
 
(4) The 
time between the dismissal and the refiling of the same 
charge.

 
 
(5) Delay 
occasioned by defendant's change of counsel or application 
therefor.

 
 
     (d) Continuances may 
be granted as follows:

 
 
(1) On 
motion of defendant supported by affidavit of defendant and defendants's 
counsel.

 
 
(2) On 
motion of the prosecuting attorney or the court if:

 
 
(i) The 
defendant expressly consents; or

 
 
(ii) he 
state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

 
 
(iii) 
Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be 
substantially prejudiced.

 
 
(e) Upon 
receiving notice of possible delay the defendant shall show in writing how the 
delay may prejudice his defense.

 
 
(f) If the 
defendant is unavailable for any proceeding at which his presence is required, 
the time period shall begin anew upon defendant's being 
available.

 
 
Since this 
case was decided, Rule 204 has been superseded by Wyo.R.Crim.P. 
48.

 
 

6 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 
states, in pertinent part:

 
 
In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to a speedy trial * 
* *.

 
 

7 We 
initially adopted the Barker approach in Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403 
(Wyo. 1972), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1973). Since Cosco, 
we have applied the Barker analysis to almost twenty cases raising the speedy 
trial issue, the most recent of which is Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 
(Wyo. 
1992).

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶45.]  I remain convinced that a conviction for 
a criminal offense should result from evidence relevant to facts of the actual 
commission of the crime. My continued belief and support for a nearly 500-year 
history of English-American law denying conviction based upon disassociated 
conduct or the accused's bad reputation remains unaltered. Virgilio v. State, 
834 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 1992), Urbigkit, C.J. 
dissenting; Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987), Urbigkit, J. dissenting. Contrary, 
however, to my history-based persuasion, this court continues to approve the 
expanding use of bad acts evidence to obtain conviction. It is a truism to 
recognize that a prosecution relies less on evidence of guilt when disassociated 
events/bad acts evidence can be substituted for real 
proof.

 
 

[¶46.]  In my opinion, the motion in limine was 
unjustifiably denied. Proof that Paul C. Wehr purchased controlled substances 
for personal use and without actual evidence of resale provides no proof that he 
did purchase and thereafter resell. 
The purchases were completely separate in time and circumstance. How this court 
extends that prior occurrence to the charged offense of December 23, 1988 is not 
persuasively shown in this decision. The explanation that a previous personal 
use purchase provided evidence of a Christmas-time 1988 resale skips through a 
whole series of assumed and unproven events.

 
 

[¶47.]  The bad acts evidence is actually used to 
define character, which then provides non-logical justification for the jury 
decision about contested identity. The motion in limine should have been 
sustained.

 
 

[¶48.]  The major justification for the 
conspiracy conviction within the evidence fares no better in logical fact 
analysis. We need not look for some agreement, defined by the majority as a 
"meeting of the minds," to fail miserably to be provided evidence of "tacit 
understanding." A tacit understanding - for this case it would be that Pamela 
Thompson was selling to appellant for appellant to sell to Perry Greenhalgh - is 
totally unproven. In failing to find any concert in purpose, I lack 
understanding where the conspiracy is demonstrable by any construction of the 
presented evidence except the shoehorn factor of earlier occurrence evidence, 
which did not demonstrate a resale intent. Appellant correctly tells us that the 
originator in sale, Thompson (non-indicted co-conspirator), had no real idea 
that appellant was going to sell and certainly not to sell to the alleged final 
buyer, Greenhalgh. Actually, the testimony of Thompson, if believable, was that 
she telephoned appellant after her sale to him and warned against any sale to 
Greenhalgh, if that might have been intended.

 
 

[¶49.]  We play games with words and reconstruct 
conspiracy into a happenstance joint involvement if a common purpose is not 
somehow required. Conspiracy, in plain meaning, of its own definition 
is:

 
 

Conspiracy. A 
combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for the purpose of 
committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act, or some act 
which is lawful in itself, but becomes unlawful when done by the concerted 
action of the conspirators, or for the purpose of using criminal or unlawful 
means to the commission of an act not in itself unlawful.

 
 
     A person is guilty of 
conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose 
of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with such other 
person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which 
constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or 
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of 
such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. Model Penal 
Code, § 5.03.

 
 
Black's Law 
Dictionary 309-10 (6th ed. 1990).

 
 
     That combination or 
confederacy was not established in this evidence except by innuendo of bad acts 
evidence of a purchase at a different time and for a different purpose by 
appellant. This was not a "I want to sell to Greenhalgh. Will you get me the 
goods?" conspiratorial factual occurrence. Proof of any conspiracy between 
appellant and Thompson to peddle to Greenhalgh (or anyone else) is totally 
lacking here. United 
States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd 
Cir.), cert. granted, 310 U.S. 620, 60 S. Ct. 1075, 84 L. Ed. 1393, aff'd, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S. Ct. 204, 85 L. Ed. 128 
(1940); United 
States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 
1938).

 
 
     I would also agree 
with appellant that Wharton's Rule applies, in that, the case lacks proof of a 
third party intent to be involved in the conspiratorial plan. Rollin M. Perkins 
& Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 691 (3rd ed. 1982). The extensive case law 
on that subject, in consonance with the briefing argument of appellant, 
certainly justified this court's scholastic attention, although not provided in 
the majority opinion. Additionally, the majority applies at least a double 
inference to find evidence to justify the affirming decision. This is an 
inference conviction case based upon the bad acts of a prior purchase with no 
specifically known resale intent.

 
 
     This court comes one 
more time to the speedy trial topic of constitutional and rule disposition of 
rights. Rules and principles, where justification for affirming conviction is 
applied, apparently mean little. We could justifiably step back and recognize 
what is approved is surely not speedy trial in any way. Balancing tests, in 
euphemistically used English, define harmless error justification for affirming 
a decision whether or not there is a denial of any realistic constitutional 
protection.

 
 
     A look at the record 
is informative. This court is challenged to justify a procedure so haphazard in 
constitutional effectiveness to cause grave concern about what meaning we really 
give to constitutional protections. The alleged sale occurred December 23, 1988, 
involving a $120 transaction - one gram of methamphetamine. Five months later, a 
complaint was filed in May 1989. On October 3, 1989, the charges were dismissed 
to avoid speedy trial questions since the unreliable third person had apparently 
disappeared. On October 10, 1989, the charges were refiled after Greenhalgh had 
apparently been located. Trial then commenced in April 1990, or about sixteen 
months after the occurrence and eleven months after the first 
arrest.

 
 
     It is now November 
1992, approximately four years after an alleged one gram sale in a case where 
the sentence was a concurrent one and a half to three year term. This character 
of delay cannot benefit prosecution, defense, society, or even the concerns of 
purists like this writer who believe that constitutions should be given a plain 
meaning. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. WyomingState Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 
(Wyo. 
1991).

 
 
     I am sustained in this 
conclusion to dissent by the current decision of the United States Supreme 
Court, which recognizes that a right to a speedy trial does exist. Doggett v. 
United States, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992) should dispositively apply here in 
both moral persuasion and legal precedence.1

 
 
     The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy . . . trial. . . ." On its face, the Speedy Trial Clause is 
written with such breadth that, taken literally, it would forbid the government 
to delay the trial of an "accused" for any reason at all. Our cases, however, 
have qualified the literal sweep of the provision by specifically recognizing 
the relevance of four separate enquiries: whether delay before trial was 
uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to 
blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right 
to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result. * * 
*

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     Our speedy trial 
standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly 
justifiable. The government may need time to collect witnesses against the 
accused, oppose his pretrial motions, or, if he goes into hiding, track him 
down. * * * Thus, in this case, if the Government had pursued Doggett with 
reasonable diligence from his indictment to his arrest, his speedy trial claim 
would fail. * * *

 
 
     The Government 
concedes, on the other hand, that Doggett would prevail if he could show that 
the Government had intentionally held back in its prosecution of him to gain 
some impermissible advantage at trial. * * *

 
 
     Between diligent 
prosecution and bad faith delay, official negligence in bringing an accused to 
trial occupies the middle ground. While not compelling relief in every case 
where bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is 
negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate 
exactly how it has prejudiced him.

 
 

Id., ___ 
U.S. at ___, 112 S. Ct.  at 
2690-93.

 
 

[¶50.]  I respectfully 
dissent.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Hopefully, this 
court's revision of a speedy trial protocol, which vests finite responsibility 
in the Wyoming Supreme Court itself after six months has passed, should at 
least, to some degree, end argument that a preclusive 120-day limitation 
provided by the prior Uniform District Court rule does not mean anything if the 
trial takes one to three years thereafter. See W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) (effective March 
24, 1992).