Title: Ohio Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 121 Ohio St.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-604.] 
 
 
OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL, APPELLANT, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES  
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm.,  
121 Ohio St.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-604.] 
Public Utilities — Trade secrets — Commission’s determinations were 
appropriate — Decision affirmed. 
(No. 2008-0367 — Submitted November 18, 2008 — Decided  
February 19, 2009.) 
APPEAL from Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Nos. 03-93-EL-ATA,  
03-2079-EL-AAM, 03-2081-EL-AAM, and 03-2080-EL-ATA. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
Introduction 
{¶ 1} This appeal arises from Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3, 148 Ohio Laws, Part 
IV, 7962 (“S.B. 3”), the electric restructuring legislation passed by the General 
Assembly in 1999.  We remanded an earlier appeal to the commission in Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-5789, 
856 N.E.2d 213, (“CG&E Remand Opinion”) for further discovery of side 
agreements made in connection with a stipulation to establish a standard market-
based service offer.  The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”) asserts 
that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s (“PUCO’s”) order following its 
hearing on remand is unlawful and unreasonable due to the commission’s alleged 
(1) failure to prohibit unreasonable and unlawful price elements from side 
agreements, (2) failure to base its order on adequate evidence in the record in 
violation of R.C. 4903.09, and (3) erroneous designation of portions of the record 
as trade secrets. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 2} On January 2, 2009, the commission moved the court to dismiss 
this case on the grounds that (1) the rate stabilization plan (“RSP”) established by 
the appealed orders has lapsed by its own terms, rendering the appeal of the RSP 
moot, and (2) the commission’s determination regarding the confidentiality of 
certain information in the record below has been modified by subsequent orders to 
redact and release information rendering moot the confidentiality aspect of the 
order appealed.  Because our review of the record and relevant statutes reveals 
that the rates charged through the RSP under consideration in this matter expired 
on December 31, 2008, and because even if this court were to reject the rates 
charged under the RSP, there would be no effective remedy available to OCC, we 
conclude that OCC’s appeal regarding the RSP is moot.  However, because the 
commission’s subsequent orders are not part of the record, we cannot ascertain 
whether they render moot the trade secrets portion of the order appealed.  
Accordingly, we deny the commission’s motion to dismiss with regard to the 
trade secrets issue and grant the motions to seal documents filed with this court 
that contain information regarding trade secrets. 
Background 
{¶ 3} On January 10, 2003, Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. (“Duke,” formerly 
named “CG&E”) filed an application to provide a market-based standard service 
offer and to establish a competitive bidding process as required under R.C. 
4928.14.  Duke filed a supplemental application on January 26, 2004.  Ultimately, 
the commission approved a stipulation in the case establishing a market-based 
standard service offer and competitive bidding process. 
{¶ 4} OCC appealed the commission’s approval of the stipulation to this 
court, and we remanded the case to the commission, instructing it to permit 
discovery of side agreements in order to evaluate the seriousness of the bargaining 
that had led to the stipulation and to justify charges instituted and changes made 
January Term, 2009 
3 
from its original order to its entry on rehearing.  CG&E Remand Opinion, 111 
Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-5789, 856 N.E.2d 213, ¶ 94. 
Discovery and Trade Secrets 
{¶ 5} On November 29, 2006, the commission directed Duke to provide 
OCC with the discovery it had requested.  OCC also requested the disclosure of 
additional agreements between Duke Energy Retail Services (“DERS”), a Duke-
affiliated competitive retail electric supplier (“CRES”), and Duke’s customers.  
The commission ordered Duke and DERS to produce the documents over their 
objections. 
{¶ 6} On March 2, 2007, Duke, DERS, Cinergy, Kroger, and the Ohio 
Hospital Association1 moved the commission for protection orders after OCC 
informed them of its intention to publicly release the discovery documents.  On 
March 19, 2007, the commission conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued 
orders protecting the information for 18 months, on the condition that the 
commission could modify the order.  The commission then admitted the side 
agreements into evidence. 
{¶ 7} On July 26, 2007, the chairman of the commission received a 
public records request for some of the information subject to the protection 
orders.  The attorney examiners on the case sought input from the parties 
regarding the nature of the requested information.  The issue became whether the 
documents contained trade secrets. 
{¶ 8} After conducting an in camera review of the side agreements, the 
commission determined that portions of those documents constituted trade secrets 
pursuant to R.C. 1333.61(D) and Ohio Adm.Code 4901-1-24.  The commission 
found that certain aspects of the agreements contained independent economic 
value and that the parties to the agreements had consistently sought confidential 
                                                 
1.  Cinergy, DERS’s parent company, Kroger, and the Ohio Hospital Association intervened in the 
proceedings before the commission, but are not parties to this appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
treatment of the documents.  Accordingly, the commission ordered Duke to work 
with the parties to prepare and file a redacted version of the information under its 
control and for all other parties to do the same. 
Rejection of the Stipulation 
{¶ 9} On October 24, 2007, the commission issued its remand order.  
After reviewing the record, including the side agreements, the commission 
concluded that Duke had failed to submit sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that the parties had engaged in serious bargaining.  Therefore, the commission 
determined that the stipulation was not reasonable and rejected it, thereby 
returning the focus of the proceeding to the consideration of Duke’s rate-
stabilization application.  See Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 123, 126, 592 N.E.2d 1370. 
R.C. 4928.14 Standard Service Offer on Remand 
{¶ 10} Because the commission rejected the parties’ stipulation, it used 
Duke’s application and the resulting record to establish Duke’s market-based 
standard service offer in accordance with R.C. 4928.14.  The commission’s 
remand order streamlined the annual adjustment component charge, maintained 
the previous fuel and purchased power charge, and specified that those charges, as 
well as 100 percent of “little g,” which was the generation charge prior to the 
unbundling of electric services, were avoidable charges for all shopping 
customers.  The order also removed the rate-stabilization charge, maintained the 
cost-based system-reliability tracker as an unavoidable charge, and established the 
unavoidable infrastructure-maintenance fund (“IMF”) at a percentage of “little g.” 
{¶ 11} OCC appeals the commission’s remand order to this court as of 
right.  Duke and DERS have intervened as appellees.  Ohio Partners for 
Affordable Energy (“OPAE”) filed an amicus brief in support of OCC. 
Standard of Review 
January Term, 2009 
5 
{¶ 12} R.C. 4903.13 provides that a PUCO order shall be reversed, 
vacated, or modified by this court only when, upon consideration of the record, 
the court finds the order to be unlawful or unreasonable. Constellation 
NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 530, 2004-Ohio-6767, 820 
N.E.2d 885, ¶ 50. This court will not reverse or modify a PUCO decision as to 
questions of fact when the record contains sufficient probative evidence to show 
that the commission’s decision was not manifestly against the weight of the 
evidence and was not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show 
misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty.  Monongahela Power Co. 
v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 571, 2004-Ohio-6896, 820 N.E.2d 921, ¶ 29, 
quoting AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (2000), 88 
Ohio St.3d 549, 555, 728 N.E.2d 371.  The appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the PUCO’s decision is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence or is clearly unsupported by the record. Id.  Furthermore, this court will 
not reverse a commission order absent a showing by the appellant that it has been 
or will be harmed or prejudiced by the order. Myers v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 299, 302, 595 N.E.2d 873. 
 
{¶ 13} The court has “complete and independent power of review as to all 
questions of law” in appeals from the commission. Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 466, 469, 678 N.E.2d 922. The court has explained 
that it may rely on the expertise of a state agency in interpreting a law where 
“highly specialized issues” are involved and “where agency expertise would, 
therefore, be of assistance in discerning the presumed intent of our General 
Assembly.” Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 108, 
110, 12 O.O.3d 115, 388 N.E.2d 1370. 
Allegations of Discrimination, Corporate Separation Violations, and 
Unlawful Discounting of Charges 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 14} In its first proposition of law, OCC contends that the commission’s 
order is unreasonable and unlawful because it improperly limits the commission’s 
consideration of evidence contained in Duke’s side agreements.  Specifically, 
OCC asserts that the commission limited the use of the side agreements to 
whether the signatory parties engaged in serious bargaining when entering into 
the 2004 stipulation and ignored OCC’s allegations of discrimination, corporate 
separation violations, and unlawful discounting of charges. 
{¶ 15} The commission states that pursuant to this court’s CG&E Remand 
Opinion, it thoroughly examined and considered the side agreements offered by 
OCC as evidence relevant to the issue of the integrity and openness of the parties’ 
bargaining in reaching the stipulation.  Based upon this examination, the 
commission asserts that it found that “the existence of side agreements, in which 
several of the signatory parties agreed to support the stipulation, raised serious 
doubts about the integrity and openness of the negotiation process related to that 
stipulation.”  Therefore, the commission rejected the stipulation.  Having rejected 
the stipulation, the commission asserts that it proceeded with its statutory duty to 
establish a market-based standard service offer supported by the record in this 
case.  While the commission found that the side agreements might support a 
number of issues, those issues were not relevant to the sole task at hand — 
consideration of Duke’s application to establish a market-based standard service 
offer. 
{¶ 16} Duke asserts that OCC’s appeal challenges the commission’s 
interpretation and assessment of the weight of record evidence.  Duke notes that 
while OCC obtained broad discovery, at hearing, it asked only that the 
commission conduct further investigation into the terms of the side agreements.  
Moreover, it asserts that the commission did not have to resolve OCC’s 
allegations of wrongdoing in order to resolve the sole issue before it – Duke’s 
rate-stabilization application. 
January Term, 2009 
7 
{¶ 17} Pursuant to our remand, the side agreements were relevant to the 
commission’s evaluation of the serious bargaining aspect of the reasonableness 
review for stipulations before the commission.  Because the side agreements 
included agreements that the signatory parties would support the stipulation, they 
raised serious doubts about the integrity and openness of the stipulation-
negotiation process.  Therefore, the commission rejected the stipulation.  But in 
the absence of the stipulation, the commission was still required to consider 
Duke’s rate-stabilization application and set the market-based standard service 
offer.  The side agreements are not relevant to this task. 
{¶ 18} OCC may still raise additional issues arising from the side 
agreements, including its allegations of discrimination, inadequate corporate 
separation, and unlawful discounting of charges.  Specifically, the OCC can use 
the complaint process set forth in R.C. 4928.16 or 4928.18, should any of the 
issues negatively affect its clients.  Therefore, the commission’s decision 
declining to address these arguments is not unlawful or unreasonable.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commission and hold that the 
commission did not unlawfully or unreasonably limit the use of new evidence 
discovered in the side agreements during the remand proceeding. 
Adequacy of the Commission Hearing and Record 
{¶ 19} In its second proposition of law, OCC asserts that the 
commission’s remand order is unreasonable and unlawful because the record does 
not support it.  OCC contends that the IMF is an unauthorized and unsupported 
surcharge that the commission approved in violation of R.C. 4903.09.  
Specifically, OCC argues that the IMF charge is an improper surcharge that 
duplicates existing charges and is not cost-based.  OPAE also argues that the IMF 
charge is duplicative and should be eliminated. 
{¶ 20} Additionally, OCC challenges the commission’s determination 
regarding the unavoidability of certain charges associated with Duke’s provider-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
of-last-resort duty.  OCC argues that even a small unavoidable charge can 
endanger the profit margins of a large percentage of competitive retailers, thereby 
creating a barrier to the competitive supply of generation service.  It states that the 
record evidence of this case demonstrates that permitting customers to purchase 
generation services from a competitive provider without having to make 
redundant payments to the electric-distribution utility would provide desperately 
needed encouragement for the competitive marketplace. 
{¶ 21} Initially, the commission countered OCC’s arguments on the basis 
that the record supports its determinations regarding the avoidability or 
unavoidability of the various charges under R.C. 4928.14.  However, on January 
2, 2009, the commission filed a motion to dismiss in which it alleges that as of 
January 1, 2009, the rates charged to consumers are based on a new commission 
order adopted pursuant to 2008 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 221 (effective July 31, 2008).  
See In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., (Dec. 17, 2008), PUCO Nos. 08-920-EL-SSO, 
08-921-EL-AAM, 08-922-EL-UNC, and 08-923-EL-ATA.  Therefore, the court 
could not remand the case in order to implement lower prospective RSP rates 
because that rate structure is no longer in effect.  Nor could the court order a 
refund of excessive rates because OCC did not preserve the refund issue for 
appeal, and any refund order would be contrary to our precedent declining to 
engage in retroactive ratemaking.  See Keco Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati & 
Suburban Bell Tel. Co. (1957), 166 Ohio St. 254, 259, 2 O.O.2d 85, 141 N.E.2d 
465, and Lucas Cty. Commrs. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 344, 
348, 686 N.E.2d 501. 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, we grant the commission’s motion to dismiss with 
respect to that portion of the commission’s remand order establishing Duke 
Energy’s RSP. 
Trade Secrets 
January Term, 2009 
9 
{¶ 23} OCC’s third proposition of law addresses the portion of the 
commission’s remand order designating certain information contained in the side 
agreements as trade secrets.  Although the commission addressed the merits of the 
proposition both in its brief and at oral argument, the commission now asserts that 
its subsequent orders, issued on May 28, 2008; June 4, 2008; July 31, 2008; 
October 1, 2008; and November 5, 2008, implementing the trade-secrets portion 
of the commission’s remand order render review of the remand order moot.  
Specifically, the commission asserts that this court cannot meaningfully review 
the trade-secrets ruling without considering the final determination of 
confidentiality contained in the subsequent orders, which identify the specific 
information to be redacted from each document.  However, permitting the 
commission to issue subsequent orders that supersede orders that are on appeal to 
this court would circumvent this court’s constitutional and statutory power to 
review the commission’s orders.  It would also run counter to this court’s repeated 
pronouncements against piecemeal litigation.  See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 366, 368, 588 N.E.2d 775, and Senior Citizens 
Coalition v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 329, 332, 533 N.E.2d 353.  
Furthermore, it is impossible for this court to conclusively determine whether the 
trade secrets issue is moot without reviewing the commission’s subsequent orders, 
which are not part of the record.  For these reasons, we overrule the commission’s 
motion to dismiss with respect to the trade-secrets issue and address the merits of 
OCC’s third proposition of law. 
{¶ 24} OCC contends that the commission’s order is unreasonable and 
unlawful because it designates certain information contained in the side 
agreements as trade secrets without legal justification, thereby improperly 
shielding it from public scrutiny.  OCC also contends that the commission did not 
follow precedent and violated R.C. 149.43 when it shielded significant portions of 
the side agreements from entering the public domain. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶ 25} OCC maintains that by purging the agreements of customer names, 
termination provisions, financial considerations, the price of generation specified 
in each contract, the volume of generation covered by each contract, and terms 
under which options may be exercised, the commission rendered the documents 
incomprehensible.  It asserts that disclosure of this information would not reveal 
the “marketing strategies” of any CRES provider that would be helpful to 
competitors and claims that the only strategy that disclosure would reveal is that 
of the Duke-affiliated companies in reaching side agreements with a few large 
customers.  Additionally, OCC asserts that the commission’s “inevitable 
conclusion” that there was not serious bargaining in reaching the now rejected 
stipulation is proof that the documents are not normal competitive agreements, but 
settlement agreements subject to public inspection. 
{¶ 26} On the other hand, the commission argues that it lawfully and 
reasonably protected the confidentiality of documents containing trade secrets in 
this instance.  The commission received a public records request for those 
documents on July 26, 2007.  Upon receipt of that request, the commission 
conducted an in camera inspection of the documents and ordered some of the 
information redacted as trade secrets.  It contends that an in camera inspection is 
the best procedure to determine whether information is exempt from disclosure.  
The commission also notes that R.C. 4928.06(F) obligates it to protect the 
confidentiality of protected industry information.  Balancing the public policy of 
providing public access to public records with its duty to protect information for 
the market, the commission determined that it was possible to redact the trade-
secret information without rendering the documents incomprehensible.  
Moreover, because OCC itself had complete access to the unredacted documents 
and because the commission admitted them at the hearing and permitted OCC 
witnesses to testify regarding their content, the commission asserts that its trade 
secret ruling did not prejudice OCC’s appeal. 
January Term, 2009 
11 
{¶ 27} Duke raises a concern about the ramifications on the competitive 
market if the commission is unable to protect agreements between competitive 
suppliers and customers.  Duke argues that utility affiliates, unaffiliated 
competitive retail electric suppliers, and customers will avoid the competitive 
market if the commission is unable to keep their trade-secret information 
confidential.  Duke asserts that such a scenario would essentially transition the 
industry back to regulation with no marketers and no customers seeking 
competitive options.  R.C. 1333.61(D)(1) and (2) define “trade secret” as 
information that (1) “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use” and (2) “is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy.” 
{¶ 28} Here, the commission found that certain aspects of the agreements 
have an independent economic value, as required by the first test for determining 
whether information is a trade secret. In particular, the commission relied upon 
Cinergy’s evidence showing the economic significance of these contracts and 
OHA’s representation that the material allows the contracting parties to run their 
businesses more economically and to compete more effectively.  Ultimately, the 
commission found that the side agreements contained the following trade secret 
information:  (1) customer names, (2) account numbers, (3) customer Social 
Security numbers or employer identification numbers, (4) contract termination 
dates or other termination provisions, (5) financial consideration in each contract, 
(6) price of generation specified in each contract, (7) volume of generation 
covered by each contract, and (8) terms under which any options may be 
exercisable.  Based on the record in this case, the commission’s declaration that 
these categories of information have an independent economic value is 
reasonable. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
{¶ 29} The commission’s finding under the second test in R.C. 
1333.61(D)(2), that the parties to the agreements consistently sought confidential 
treatment of the documents, is also reasonable.  As the commission notes in its 
opinion and order, the parties filed numerous memoranda advocating confidential 
treatment of the documents in question and have treated the documents as 
proprietary, confidential business information at all junctures of the proceeding.  
A review of the record demonstrates that the parties sought confidential treatment 
at the beginning of the commission proceeding and continued to request such 
treatment after the attorney examiner notified the parties that the commission had 
received a public records request for the information.  Therefore, the commission 
reasonably determined that the parties exercised reasonable efforts under the 
circumstances to maintain the secrecy of this information and that these categories 
of information constituted trade secrets. 
{¶ 30} The determination that certain information constitutes a trade 
secret, however, is not the end of the commission’s analysis.  The commission 
must also balance that determination with its duty under Ohio Adm.Code 4901-1-
24(D)(1), which requires it to redact confidential information when reasonable 
without rendering the remaining document incomprehensible or of little meaning.  
The commission conducted an in camera review of the document in question to 
identify and order the eligible areas of redaction.  We have previously held that an 
in camera inspection is the “best procedure” to determine whether information is 
exempt from disclosure.  State ex rel. Allright Parking of Cleveland, Inc. v. 
Cleveland (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 772, 776, 591 N.E.2d 708.  We conclude that the 
commission took the appropriate steps in this proceeding to appropriately redact 
the trade-secret information and make the document available to the public. 
{¶ 31} Furthermore, the commission has the statutory authority to protect 
competitive agreements from disclosure, and as we have noted, the commission 
also has a duty to encourage competitive providers of electric generation.  All of 
January Term, 2009 
13 
the parties agree that the market is weak, and anything could affect the future 
growth of competitive providers.  Exposing a competitor’s business strategies and 
pricing points would likely have a negative impact on that provider’s viability.  
Absent any showing of harm from the commission’s order, and recognizing the 
volatility and competitiveness of the electric industry, we conclude that the order 
to redact information is not unreasonable.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
commission’s orders regarding trade secrets. 
Motions to Seal Documents 
{¶ 32} OCC, Duke, and DERS all filed motions to seal portions of their 
briefs and supplements in this proceeding.  The requests dealt with the material 
that the commission determined to be trade secrets in the decision under appeal.  
Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R XIV(1)(B), a document filed with the court shall be 
public unless sealed by the court or subject to a pending motion to seal.  As 
previously discussed, we affirmed the commission’s orders.  Accordingly, we also 
grant the motions to seal portions of the pleadings. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 33} The commission appropriately directed OCC to file a complaint 
pursuant to R.C. 4928.18 to raise ancillary issues not at issue in the commission’s 
proceeding.  The commission appropriately determined that certain information in 
the record constituted trade secrets and took appropriate steps to redact that 
information before making the documents available to the public.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the commission’s order. 
Order affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶ 34} Ohio is moving toward a deregulated electricity market, but isn’t 
there yet.  Most customers, therefore, don’t have the option of negotiating for 
better electricity prices.  But big customers do, and when they negotiate a better 
deal for themselves and stipulate to higher prices for everyone else, this court 
should carefully consider the circumstances before approving decisions of the 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”).  We did just that when we 
initially remanded this case "[b]ecause the side agreements included agreements 
that the signatory parties would support the stipulation, [which] raised serious 
doubts about the integrity and openness of the stipulation-negotiation process."  
See Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-
Ohio-5789, 856 N.E.2d 213, at ¶ 86 (the commission “must determine whether 
there exists sufficient evidence that the stipulation was the product of serious 
bargaining.  Any such concessions or inducements [side agreements] apart from 
the terms agreed to in the stipulation might be relevant to deciding whether 
negotiations were fairly conducted.  The existence of concessions or inducements 
would seem particularly relevant in the context of open settlement discussions 
involving multiple parties, such as those that purportedly occurred here.  If there 
were special considerations, in the form of side agreements among the signatory 
parties, one or more parties may have gained an unfair advantage in the 
bargaining process”). 
{¶ 35} The problem here is that even though we rejected the stipulation 
and remanded the case, nothing has changed.  The PUCO agreed to essentially the 
same deal that had been the product of the flawed stipulations.  That isn’t the way 
the process is supposed to play out.  Part of the problem revolves around the 
PUCO and a majority of this court stamping their imprimatur on the concept that 
pricing and related issues, which should be public, are trade secrets.  But see R.C. 
4901.12 (“all proceedings of the public utilities commission and all documents 
and records in its possession are public records”).  See also State ex rel. Cleveland 
January Term, 2009 
15 
v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 1207, 653 N.E.2d 389 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  This policy allows public utilities to hide the lower prices they 
charge some users, thereby shielding themselves from public scrutiny.  This 
policy also contravenes the purpose of the PUCO, which is to protect the 
customers of public utilities. See http://www.puco.ohio.gov/PUCO/About/ 
index.cfm (the PUCO "[r]egulates your rates for utility services where you do not 
have choices. Even with competition growing in the gas and electric industries, 
for example, the PUCO still sets the rates for delivery of those services since that 
part is still controlled by one company"). 
{¶ 36} Public utilities should not be able to hide their pricing.  They are, 
after all, public utilities.  Furthermore, R.C. 4905.07 requires that all “facts and 
information in the possession of the public utilities commission shall be public, 
and all reports, records, files, books, accounts, papers, and memorandums of 
every nature in its possession shall be open to inspection by interested parties or 
their attorneys.”  Providing a lower price to a high-volume user is a legitimate 
business decision; hiding that lower price is not.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
Janine L. Migden-Ostrander, Consumers’ Counsel, and Jeffrey L. Small 
and Ann M. Hotz, Assistant Consumers’ Counsel, for appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Thomas W. McNamee and Sarah 
J. Parrot, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Paul A. Colbert and Rocco O. D’Ascenzo, for intervening appellee, Duke 
Energy of Ohio, Inc. 
 
Michael D. Dortch, for intervening appellee, Duke Energy Retail Sales, 
L.L.C. 
Colleen L. Mooney and David C. Rinebolt, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy. 
______________________