Title: City of Gulf Shores v. D. Kay Meador

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: October 18, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180257
____________________
City of Gulf Shores
v.
D. Kay Meador
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-13-901533)
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.
Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
1180257
Murdock, Special Justice,1 concurs specially.
Parker, C.J., and Sellers and Mitchell, JJ., dissent.
Wise, J., recuses herself.
1Retired Associate Justice Glenn Murdock was appointed on
August 29, 2019, to serve as a Special Justice in regard to
this appeal.  When Justice Murdock was appointed, there was
equal division among the eight members of the Court then
sitting on this case on a question material to the
determination of the case.  See § 12-2-14, Ala. Code 1975.
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MURDOCK, Special Justice (concurring specially).
D. Kay Meador sued the City of Gulf Shores ("the City")
and two City employees seeking to hold the defendants liable
after she was forced to stop construction of a residence on
land she believed she owned in a subdivision known as Lagoon
Estates.  Meador began construction of the residence in
reliance upon certain acts and omissions on the part of the
City.  She subsequently was informed by the City that the City
itself actually owned the land in question and, for that
reason, was forced by the City to stop construction of the
residence.
The land in question at one time constituted a right-of-
way that, as reflected in the Baldwin County probate records,
the City purported to vacate in 1956.  Had this vacation been
effective, the predecessors to Meador in title would have
become owners of the land.  A judgment entered in 1986 by the
Baldwin Circuit Court, however, held that the attempted
vacation had been ineffective.  Evidence of the 1986 judgment
was never recorded in the probate records.  Unaware of the
1986 judgment, Meador accepted delivery of a deed in 2010
purporting to convey title to the property to her.  
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Following the entry of a summary judgment on other claims
asserted by Meador, she proceeded to trial only on a claim
against the City for negligence. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of Meador in the amount of $133,000, a little less
than the construction costs Meador had incurred.  The trial
court denied the City's renewed motion for a judgment as a
matter of law and entered a judgment based on the jury’s
verdict.  
A majority of the Court votes today to affirm the trial
court’s judgment.  I join that vote and write to explain my
reason for doing so.
It strikes me that this is a somewhat unique case.  It is
not a case where title to the land is in some third party and,
thus, as between the City and the plaintiff, the plaintiff
ought to have had superior knowledge of this fact.  The City
itself owns the land.  If superior knowledge as to ownership
of the land is to be charged to the owner of that land, then
that charge in this case is to the City.  
Despite "winning" ownership of the land in the 1986 case,
the City chose for some reason not to record any evidence of
its ownership in the probate records so as to give
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constructive notice of that fact to the world.2  Although this
choice in and of itself breached no duty to Meador or her
predecessors in title, it is against the backdrop of this
omission that notice is taken of the maintenance in the
probate records of a plat of Lagoon Estates that contained a
handwritten 
notation 
referencing "the 
vacation 
of 
this 
street"
and the location within the probate records of the City's 1956
vacation resolution.  Furthermore, the City maintained for
public viewing, and provided to Meador, zoning and street maps
indicating that the property was privately owned and suitable
for residential construction, made oral representations to
Meador to similar effect, gave Meador and her architect
information regarding setback requirements, and, ultimately,
issued a building permit to Meador authorizing her to
construct a residence on the property.  In addition,
representatives of the City visited the site on multiple
occasions, 
initially 
halting 
construction 
over 
an
2The fact that the 1986 judgment could be found in the
circuit-court files by someone who knew to look for it, and
where to look, makes no difference in my view.   It was not
recorded in the probate records, the "record of record" for
land transactions. 
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environmental concern, then giving Meador approval to resume
construction.  
Despite this history, the City subsequently chose to
invoke its own title to the property and thereby to deprive
Meador of the benefit of the construction costs she had
incurred in reliance on the City's acts and omissions. 
I believe there was enough in the unique facts of this
case to allow the jury to find, under Alabama law, that the
City had assumed a duty to Meador, that the City breached that
duty, and that the City should compensate Meador for the
moneys she expended in reasonable reliance on the City's acts
and omissions and then lost when the City reasserted its own
title to the land. 
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
Introduction
D. Kay Meador sued the City of Gulf Shores ("the City"). 
Also named as defendants in Meador's action were the City's
planning and zoning director, Andy Bauer, and the City's
building official, Brandon Franklin.  Meador sought to hold
the defendants liable after she was forced by the City to stop
construction of a residence on property she erroneously
believed she owned.  After Meador began construction of the
residence, she was informed by the City that she was actually
building on a public right-of-way held by the City.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
Bauer and Franklin and granted the City's summary-judgment
motion on all counts except the count asserting negligence. 
The negligence claim proceeded to trial, and a jury returned
a verdict in favor of Meador in the amount of $133,000.  The
trial court denied the City's renewed motion for a judgment as
a matter of law, and the City appealed.  Because I do not
believe that Meador established that the City owed her a duty,
I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to affirm the
trial court's judgment in her favor.
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Factual Background
The Lagoon Estates subdivision was created in Baldwin
County in 1954.  In 1956, the Baldwin County Commission
adopted a resolution purporting to vacate part of Lagoon
Drive, a public right-of-way located in Lagoon Estates.  The
record indicates that, at that time, Lagoon Drive was not
within the limits of any municipality.
The resolution reflecting the purported vacation was
recorded in the Baldwin County probate records.  In addition,
a plat of Lagoon Estates that was, at the time of the trial in
this case, kept in the Baldwin County probate records
contained a handwritten notation acknowledging "the vacation
of this street" and referencing the location of the 1956
resolution in the probate records.
In 1986, Walter Hammond, an owner of property in Lagoon
Estates, wanted to build a condominium complex on the property
over which the allegedly vacated portion of Lagoon Drive ran. 
The record indicates that Lagoon Drive was, at that time,
located within the limits of what was then the Town of Gulf
Shores ("the Town").  Accordingly, Hammond requested a
building permit from the Town.  His request, however, was
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denied because, according to the Town, the portion of Lagoon
Drive on which Hammond proposed to build had not been validly
vacated.  
Hammond filed an action in the Baldwin Circuit Court
seeking a judgment determining the validity of the 1956
vacation.  One of the defendants in Hammond's suit was George
Phillips, the coordinator of community development for the
Town and the official to whom applications for building
permits were submitted.3  The trial court entered a judgment
declaring that the 1956 resolution had not effectively vacated
the relevant portion of 
Lagoon Drive ("the Hammond judgment"). 
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Hammond
judgment.  Hammond v. Phillips, 516 So. 2d 707 (Ala. Civ. App.
1987).  The parties in the present case agree that, because of
the Hammond judgment, all of Lagoon Drive remained an existing
public right-of-way.  
Nothing evidencing the Hammond judgment was ever recorded
in the Baldwin County probate records.  Thus, there was
apparently no express indication in those records that the
1956 resolution purporting to vacate a portion of Lagoon Drive
3The record suggests that George Phillips is deceased.
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was, in fact, ineffective.  That said, there is nothing before
this Court indicating that the Hammond judgment was not, like
any other civil judgment in an open proceeding, part of the
public record available for inspection in the circuit clerk’s
office.  Likewise, the decision by the Court of Civil Appeals
affirming the Hammond judgment was 
a readily accessible public
record.  
Notwithstanding 
the 
ineffectiveness 
of 
the 
1956
resolution, in July 2010, a family limited partnership with
which Meador was associated purported to convey the property
at issue to Meador.4  The parties agree that, because of the
Hammond judgment and the 
invalidity of the purported vacation,
the deed to Meador was a nullity, because the partnership had
no right, title, or interest to convey.5
4Meador testified that she did not pay any consideration
for the deed from the limited partnership.
5The record suggests that, in 1989, two "business
partners" of Meador's father, one of whom was Walter Hammond,
whose lawsuit had resulted in the Hammond judgment in 1986,
gave Meador's mother a quitclaim deed to the relevant
property.  That deed referred to "any and all interest which
may have accrued to the grantor's benefit as a result of the
vacation" of the relevant portion of Lagoon Drive.  The record
also suggests that Meador herself was aware of the 1989 deed,
because she notarized its signatures in her capacity as a
notary public.  Later, Meador's mother gave a quitclaim deed
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The portion of Lagoon Drive at issue is currently
unimproved, and there is no indication that a passable street
has ever existed upon it.  Apparently unaware that the deed
from the limited partnership did not convey any interest in
the property, Meador planned to build a residence on it.  
Meador and her architect met with Bauer and another
representative of the City's planning and zoning department,
Jennifer Watkins.  Bauer showed Meador the City's zoning map
and told her that the property was located in a zone in which
residential construction was allowed.  Bauer also gave Meador
and her architect information regarding setback requirements.
After Meador's architect created plans for construction
of the residence, Meador attempted to obtain a building
permit. Tabitha Norman, a representative of the City's
building department, told Meador that a structural engineer
would need to approve the architect's plans.  After Meador got
the approval of an engineer and took other necessary steps,
to the family limited partnership, which eventually purported
to convey the property to Meador in 2010.  Meador, however,
flatly denied during the trial that she was ever aware of the
Hammond judgment and the invalidity of the 1956 resolution
purporting to vacate the relevant portion of Lagoon Drive.
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Norman informed Meador that the building permit had been
issued.  Meador began construction at some point thereafter.6 
While Meador was in the process of building the
residence, City building official Franklin temporarily halted
construction after he discovered that Meador's builder had
pushed sand into a wetland.  He later authorized the
recommencement of construction after the problem had been
remedied.  Meador testified that other City inspectors visited
the property at various times.  It is undisputed that, during
the permitting and construction-inspection process, no City
representative informed Meador that she did not own the
property.
In September 2012, the City's attorney discovered that
Meador was building the residence and notified the City that
the construction was taking place on a public right-of-way. 
Accordingly, the City issued a stop-work order directing
6Apparently, in 2007, well before Meador received a deed
purporting to convey the property to her, Meador inquired
whether she could build a pier on the property extending into
a body of water adjoining it.  She testified that Norman "gave
[her] a list of things to do" in order to get a City permit to
build the pier.  It is not clear that she actually applied for
and received the permit.  It is clear that she never built the
pier. 
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Meador to cease construction and to demolish the partially
completed structure.  Meador claimed that, before the stop-
work order was issued, she had incurred nearly $150,000 in
construction expenses.
Discussion
Meador's negligence claim against the City was based on
the 
City's 
failure, 
specifically George 
Phillips's 
failure, 
to
record evidence of the Hammond judgment in the Baldwin County
probate records, the failure of the City's zoning and street
maps to show a public right-of-way running over the property,
and the failure of various City representatives to inform
Meador during the permitting and construction-inspection
process that she did not own the property.  Meador claims
that, in failing in those alleged duties, the City was
negligent and is liable for Meador's damages resulting from
constructing a house on property she did not own.  The City,
on the other hand, argues that Meador did not establish that
the City owed her the duties she alleged it breached and that
the trial court therefore should have granted the City's
motion for a judgment as a matter of law.
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"The determination whether a duty exists is generally a
question of law for the court to decide."  Aliant Bank v. Four
Star Invs., Inc., 244 So. 3d 896, 908 (Ala. 2017).  In the
present case, however, it appears the trial court allowed the
jury to decide whether the City owed the duties alleged. 
Meador asserts in her brief that, "where the facts that would
determine the existence of a duty are in dispute, the task of
resolving whether those facts exist is for the jury."  In
Jones v. Blount County, 681 So. 2d 202 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995),
upon which Meador relies, the Court of Civil Appeals held that
a trial court had erred in entering a summary judgment because
a jury question existed regarding whether Blount County had
voluntarily assumed a duty to repair or replace a downed stop
sign located at an intersection in Jefferson County.  The
plaintiff, who was injured when a car entered the intersection
without stopping and struck the car being driven by the
plaintiff, presented evidence indicating that Blount County
had replaced the stop sign in the past, that Blount County had
placed "stop ahead" signs and painted "stop ahead" legends on
the road leading to the intersection, and that the Blount
County sheriff's office had reported the downed stop sign to
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the Blount County assistant engineer.  The Court of Civil
Appeals pointed to precedent providing that "'it is not error
to submit the question [of duty] to the jury if the factual
basis for the question is in sufficient dispute'" and that,
"'[w]here the facts, upon which the existence of a duty
depends, are disputed, the factual dispute is for resolution
by the jury.'" 681 So. 2d at 205 (quoting Garner v. Covington
Cty., 624 So. 2d 1346, 1350 (Ala. 1993), and Alabama Power Co.
v. Alexander, 370 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. 1979) (emphasis
added)).  The Court of Civil Appeals concluded: "Viewing these
facts [supporting an inference that Blount County had assumed
a duty to repair or replace the stop sign] in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant ... the summary judgment was not
proper with regard to the question of duty ...."  681 So. 2d
at 206.  Although it certainly is not entirely clear from the
opinion in Jones that the "facts" supporting the inference
that a duty existed were in dispute, the Court of Civil
Appeals' citation to precedent arguably suggests that there
was such a factual dispute.  Moreover, in 2013, this Court
decided Ex parte BASF Construction Chemicals, LLC, 153 So. 3d
793 (Ala. 2013).  In that case, this Court clearly held that,
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if the facts supporting an argument that a defendant
voluntarily assumed a duty are not disputed, then the question
whether the alleged duty exists is one for the court.  In the
present case, it does not appear that any of the facts upon
which Meador relies in alleging that the City assumed various
duties are disputed.  Thus, the question is one for the court.
In pertinent part, § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"No city or town shall be liable for damages for
injury done to or wrong suffered by any person ...,
unless such injury or wrong was done or suffered
through the neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness
of some agent, officer, or employee of the
municipality engaged in work therefor and while
acting in the line of his or her duty ...."
Thus, a city can be held liable for the negligence of its
agents, officers, and employees.  See Aliant Bank, 244 So. 3d
at 909 ("[Section] 11–47–190 provides that a municipality can
be sued for the negligent acts of its agents ...."); Morrow v.
Caldwell, 153 So. 3d 764, 770 (Ala. 2014) ("[T]he first
sentence [of § 11-47-190] provides that a municipality may be
liable for the negligent acts of its agents or employees
....").
While recognizing the applicability of § 11-47-190, both
the City and Meador cite precedent discussing the common-law
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requirement that, in order for a negligence claim to stand,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed the
plaintiff an affirmative duty.  See generally Hilliard v. City
of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889, 890 (Ala. 1991) ("[W]e
recognize that before liability for negligence can be imposed
upon a governmental entity, there must first be a breach of a
legal duty owed by that entity.  In determining whether a
claim is valid, the initial focus is upon the nature of the
duty.  There must be either an underlying common law duty or
a statutory duty of care with respect to the alleged tortious
conduct." (citations omitted)); Chatman v. City of Prichard,
431 So. 2d 532, 533 (Ala. 1983) (applying § 11-47-190 to a
personal-injury claim against a municipality and indicating
that the "'four well-known elements'" necessary to support a
traditional negligence claim, including the existence of a
duty, had to be established).
This Court has said:
"'"In determining whether a duty exists in a
given situation ... courts should consider a number
of 
factors, 
including 
public 
policy, 
social
considerations, and foreseeability. The key factor
is whether the injury was foreseeable by the
defendant."' Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d
1364, 1368 (Ala. 1996) (quoting Smitherman v.
McCafferty, 622 So. 2d 322, 324 (Ala. 1993)). In
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addition to foreseeability, Alabama courts look to
a number of factors to determine whether a duty
exists, 
including 
'"(1) 
the 
nature 
of 
the
defendant's activity; (2) the relationship between
the parties; and (3) the type of injury or harm
threatened."' Taylor [v. Smith], 892 So. 2d [887,]
892 [(Ala. 2004)] (quoting Morgan v. South Cent.
Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107, 114 (Ala. 1985))."
DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 988 So. 2d 454,
461 (Ala. 2008).
Meador has not pointed to any specific law that would,
for purposes of supporting her negligence claim, impose an
affirmative duty on a municipality to record in the records of
the probate court evidence of a civil judgment declaring the
ineffectiveness 
of 
a 
previously 
recorded 
instrument 
purporting
to vacate a portion of a public right-of-way.  And,
considering the factors courts traditionally consider in
determining whether a duty exists for purposes of supporting
a negligence claim, I would hold that the City did not owe
Meador such a duty.
As for the City's zoning map, although that map
identifies some public rights-of-way, zoning maps are meant to
broadly identify the types of structures that may be
constructed in particular areas of a municipality.  They do
not constitute an undertaking by a municipality to guarantee
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accurate identification of every right-of-way or other
impediment on private property, nor are they intended to
accurately identify the owners of real property.  Meador did
not demonstrate that, by creating zoning maps, the City
assumed a duty to her to accurately identify all rights-of-
way.7  Likewise, street maps are intended to aid the public in
navigating city streets; they are not intended to be
conclusive guarantees as to every public road in a city or to
conclusively identify the private or public owners of real
property.  I would hold that the City did not owe Meador a
duty to ensure the accuracy of its street maps.
7City of Mobile v. Sullivan, 667 So. 2d 122 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995), upon which Meador relies, is distinguishable.  In
that case, the Court of Civil Appeals suggested that, by
adopting zoning ordinances, creating zoning maps, and making
multiple 
representations 
to 
two 
specific 
individuals 
regarding
the zoning of a particular piece of property, a city assumed
a duty to those individuals to take care that its
representations regarding the zoning of the property were
accurate.  The individuals began building a structure in
reliance on the representations that the structure was proper
under zoning regulations, representations that turned out to
be false.  The Court of Civil Appeals held that the city was
liable for its "repeated erroneous representations made ...
regarding the zoning of [the] property."  667 So. 2d at 127. 
The same circumstances are not present in the instant case,
which does not involve multiple misrepresentations that a
particular piece of property was zoned for a particular use.
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As for the failure of City representatives to inform
Meador during the permitting and construction-inspection
process that she did not own the property, municipalities
issue building permits and inspect construction sites in an
effort to enforce zoning regulations and other laws and to
make structures within municipal limits safer for the public
as a whole.  In my opinion, Meador did not establish that, by
issuing building permits and inspecting construction sites,
the City assumed a duty to purported owners of property to
ensure that they actually own the property on which the
construction is occurring.  Purchasers and owners of real
property are in a better position than is a municipality to
investigate and confirm good and marketable title to real
property.  A municipality's actions related to zoning,
mapping, licensing, permitting, and inspecting do not create
a duty to confirm that a person proposing to improve real
property owns that property.
Conclusion
In my opinion, Meador did not establish that the City
owed the duties she alleged the City breached.  Thus, I
believe the trial court should have granted the City's renewed
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motion for a judgment as a matter of law.  Accordingly, I
would reverse the trial court's judgment.8
8The City also argues that Meador's action is barred by
§ 11-47-23, Ala. Code 1975, which is the notice-of-claim
statute applicable to claims against municipalities.  In
addition, the City argues that, because the trial court
entered a summary judgment in favor of Bauer and Franklin, the
trial court had no choice but to grant the City's motion for
a judgment as a matter of law.  Like the majority, however, I
am not persuaded by those two arguments.
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