Title: State v. Cruz

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

 

Wo. 27242

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

RUSSELL KELA CRUZ, Defendant-Appellee.

 

 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CR. NO. 04-1-1169)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.,
‘and Acoba, J., dissenting)

 

‘The plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i (hereinafter
the prosecution) appeals from the April 11, 2008 judgment and
sentence of the circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable
Virginia Lea Crandall presiding, convicting the defendant-
appellee Russell Kela Cruz of promoting @ dangerous drug in the
third degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 712-1243 (Supp. 2004), see infra note 1, and unlawful use of
drug paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993) and
sentencing him, inter alia, to a five-year term of probation.

on appeal, the prosecution asserts that the circuit
court erred in sentencing Cruz to probation under HRS § 712-1243

(Supp. 2004) rather than @ mandatory minimum term of imprisonment

 

of thirty days to two-and~
§ 712-1243 (Supp. 2002).

half years, pursuant to HRS

oats
   

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For the reasons discussed infra in section I11, we hold
that the circuit court erred in sentencing Cruz pursuant to the
2004 version of HRS § 712-1243 and, therefore, vacate his
sentence and renané for resentencing pursuant to HRS § 712-1243
(Supp. 2002).

1. BACKGROUND
In connection with events occurring on June 9, 2004,
Cruz was charged on June 16, 2004 by complaint with promoting a
dangerous drug in the third degree, in violation of HRS
§ 712-1243 (Count I), see infra note 1, and with unlawful use of
drug paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (Count II).
During its 2004 session, the legislature amended HRS
§ 712-1243 through the passage of Act 44, which went into effect
on July 1, 2004. See 2004 Haw. Sess. L. Act 44, $§ 7 and 33 at
211, 227. As part of its amendments, the legislature removed the
provision from HRS § 712-1243 (Supp. 2002) that required a
mandatory minimum sentence of at least thirty days and not more

than two-and:

 

half years,

 

turning discretion to the sentencing

court to impose probation.*

 

‘effective July 3, 1996, the legislature anended HRS § 712-1243 by
‘aeding subsection (3), infra. Sae'1996 Haw. Sess. L. Act 308, $§ 4 and 7 at
521-12." Effective July 1, 2002, the legislature further amended HRS

§ 712-1243 by adding the underscored language, infra

(2). A person conits the offense of promoting = dangerous

 

 

drug in the third degree Lf the person knowingly possesses any
dangerous drug in any amount.
(2) Fronoting s dangerous drug in the third degree is 2

class € felony.
(3). Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, except for
Lirstetine offeners sentenced under IHRE $1 J06-62205, if the
Commission of the offense of pronoting a dangerous drug in the
third degree under this section involved the possession oF
(continued...)

 
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on Janvary 21, 2005, Cruz filed a motion for a
determination by the cizcuit court that Act 44"s amendments
applied to the proceedings against him. ‘The prosecution filed a
memorandum in opposition, arguing that HRS § 712-1243 (Supp.
2002) =~ in effect at the time of the commission of the offense
and at the time the prosecution filed its complaint against cruz

 

=~ governed Cruz's proceeding and required that he be sentenced
to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of thirty days to

two-and-a-half years.?

\(.. seontinued
distribution of methamphetamine, the person convicted shall be
Sentenced to en indecerminave term of imprisonment of five years
with s mandstery minimum tern of imprisonment, the length of which
Ghali be fot lese than thirty days and not greater than two-and:

f years, at the discretion of the sentencing court. The person
Convicted shall net be eligible for parole during the mandstory
period of inprisonsent

fee 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 161, $6 6 and 12 at 875, Effective July 2, 2008,
the legielavare again enendes HRS § 712-1243 by stiiking subsection (3) in its
entirety, returning the law to ite 1999 form. gaa 2004 Maw. Seas. L. Act 4,
fe't'and! 25 at 21], 227. "The legiclature also included 2 savings clause in
Ret (4 that read in Sts entirety: “This Act does not affect rights and duties
Chat matured, penalties that were incurred, and proceedings that were begun,
before its effective date.” See dd § 29 at 227,

 

 

 

 

+ unlike previous cages before this court concerning Act 44,
Ancluding state v. Beis, No. 27171 (haw. August 21, 2007), and State
Halker, 106 Hawas'l 1, 100 P.3¢ 595 (2008), the present matter does not
Thvelve the question whether the amendments to HRS § 706-6225 (Supp. 2002) -~
provided fervin Act 44, section 1l and allowing probation for first-time drug
Sffenders =~ are applicsble to the defendant. Cruz's eligibility for
prebation as a first-tine drug offender was not at issue in this matter, in
Tight of 2 1988 conviction of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree,
in'vlolation of SRE § 712-1243" (1965). The present appeal instead focuses on
whether the circuit court, in sentencing Cruz, could spply the amendments to
ARE § 712-1243 (Supp. 2002) provided for in Act 4, section 7, gee supra
Rote 1, which excised subsection (3) and thereby returned discretion to the
Court to impose @ sentence of probation rather than a mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment.

Te is also worth noting that, regardless of the version of HRS
§ 112-1043 applicable to Crus, he could not be sentenced asa repeat offender
Pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5.. ‘The Aet 11 version of HRS § 712-1243 sete forth
S'nandatory minimum tern of thirty days to two-and-achalf years,

(continued...)

 

 

 

 

      

 

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On January 26, 2005, Cruz pled no contest to both
charges. following arguments by the parties on Cruz’s Act 44
motion, the circuit court orally ruled that “{w]ith respect to
sentencing, the court adopts the arguments set forth by the
defense in its memorandum filed January 21, 2005, and the court
finds and concludes that it has the discretion with respect to
this case to sentence the defendant to probation.” The circuit
court then sentenced Cruz to a five-year term of probation,
relying on Act 44"s amendments to HRS § 712-1243, see supra note
1, to do s0.

‘The prosecution filed a timely notice of appeal on
Aprit 20, 2005.

#1. continues)
snotwithstanding any law to the contrary, except for first-time offenders
sentenced under [HRS §]” 706-622.5,” thereby, by its plain language, excluding
application of HRS § 706-606.5. Sea guna note 1. The Act 44 version, by
Fenoving subsection (3) fron HRS § T12-12¢3, reinstates the applicability of
HRS $ 706-€06.5 to Cruz's sentencing: but, insofar as he was previously
convicted of a class c felony in 1980 -~ sixteen years before the present
offense ~~ HRS § 706-606.5(2} (e) (Supp. 1999) exenpted Cruz from repeat
Offender sentencing in 2004 by providing that:

 

 

 

 

(2) Except as in subsection (3)( pertaining to prior felony
convictions resulting ins specisl term onder HRS § 306-667], 2
Person shail not be sentenced to a mandatory minimun period of
inprisonsent under this section unless the instant felony offense
was committed during such period a8 follows?

 

le)” Within tive years after 2 prior felony conviction
where the prior felery conviction was for aclase © felony offense
Gnunerated above.

(Emphasis added.)
 

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TI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Sentencing
“the authority of a trial court to select and

determine the severity of a penalty is normally undisturbed on

review in the absence of an apparent abuse of discretion or
unless applicable statutory or constitutional commands have not
been cbserved.’" State v, Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3d

792, 797 (2001) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 100,

997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000).

8 staws
“[t)he interpretation of @ statute
of law reviewable de novo." state
Mawai's 1, 10, 926 P.2d 843, 852 (1996) (citations
onitted).” See alse State v.Tovonura, €0 Hewai't @,
16, 904 P,2¢ 693, 903 (1995); Stabe t. Hsaa, 79
Rewei's 2," , 097 P24 926, 930 (199817 State

Nakata, 76 Hawai'i 360, 365, 878 P.20 693, 70
(os.

Grave! Adtihl.) Dizi.) of the court, 66 Haass 138,
144, 957 P.2d 560, 586 (1997). Furthermore, our

statutory construction is guided by established rules:

  

 

Wen construing # statute, our foremost
Sbligation i to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the legislature, which

to be ebtained prinarily from th
inguage contained in the statute iteeif.
And we must ead statutory language in the
Content of the entire seatute and conetrue
Se'in'a manner consistent with its
parpose.

 

   

 

Gray, 64 Nawat"i at 148, 931 F.2d at 590 (footnote
omitted).

ate v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1, 7-8, 72 P.3d 473, 479-80 (2003)
(some internal citations omitted) (some brackets and ellipses
added and sone in original), quoted in State v. Koch, 107 Hawai"t
215, 220, 112 P.3d 69, 74 (2005). Nonetheless, absent an absurd
or unjust result, see State v. Haugen, 104 Hawai'i 71, 77, 65

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P.3d 178, 184 (2004), this court is bound to give effect to the
plain meaning of unambiguous statutory language and may only
resort to the use of legislative history when interpreting an
embiguous statute. State v. Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i 465, 472, 24
P.3d 661, 668 (2001). Finally,

 

Wwe construe penal statutes narrowly, considering
then in the light of precedent, legislative history,
land common sense." [Whatever may be said of the rule
of strict construction, it cannot provide 2 substitute
for common sense, precedent, ond Legislative history.
We cannot construe (a statute. <]- ina vacuum. Nor
Gan we read it as Baron Parke would read a pleading.”
Stare vs Zavlar, 49 Hau. €24, 634, 425 8.20 1034, 021
(367). ana], where possible, we will read a penal
statute... in'such & manner az to preserve its
Const stutsonality,

State v. Kanal, 8€ Hawai'i 292, 294, 966 P.2d 604, 606 (1998)

(some internal quotation marks omitted) (some bracketed material

 

 

  

 

in original) (some paragraph structure altered).

TIT. DISCUSSION

 

Cruz's Arounents
1. Cruz alleces that the phrases “proceedinas that
and “i haw
Act 44, section 22 support the prospective
application of Act 44, section 7 to his case.

Cruz argues that the language of Act 44, section 29,

ase supra note 1, is ambiguous, particularly the phrase

 

 

dings that were begun.” He insists that “proceedings” may
refer not only to @ criminal prosecution initiated by a charging
instrument, but also “'to a mere procedural step that is part of
@ larger action or special proceeding.’ (Quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 629 (Sth ed. 1983).) He asserts that the alleged

ambiguity of “proceedings” justifies a review of the legislative

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history, which, he contends, reflects an intent to provide
greater discretion to the lower courts in sentencing decisions.
He essentially argues that the circuit court, by implication,
correctly concluded: (1) that “proceedings” was ambiguous; (2)
that interpreting “proceedings” as including sentencing
proceedings comported with the legislature's intent, reflected in
Act 44, to return greater discretion to the sentencing court; and
(3) that his sentencing proceeding was excluded from Act 44's
savings clause, insofar as it was conducted on April 11, 2005,
nore than nine months after Act 44s effective date, thereby
allowing the court to sentence Cruz to probation.

Cruz also asserts that the phrase “penalties that were
incurred” unambiguously refers to a sentence imposed upon
judgment and that, because his sentence was imposed after July 1,
2004, the circuit court properly applied the amended version of
HRS § 712-1243 (Supp. 2004) to his sentence.

2. Grup argues in the alternative that Act 44 should
apply retroactively,

cruz maintains that even if his sentencing hearing were
part of a unitary criminal prosecution initiated prior to July 1,
2004 ~~ which would require retroactive application of Act 44 for
him to benefit from its amendments -- he challenges this court's
conclusion in State v, Walker, 106 Hawai'i 1, 9, 100 P.3d 595,

603 (2004) that Act 44 does not apply retroactively, arguing that

 

precedent requires this court to apply ameliorative amendnents

retroactively regardless of the presence or absence of a savings

clause. (Citing Koch; State v. Feliciano, 103 Hawai'i 269, 61

P.3d 1164 (2003); State v, Van den Berg, 101 Hawai'i 167, 65 P.3d
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134 (2003); State v. Avilla, 69 Haw. 509, 750 P.2d 78 (1988);

State v. Von Geldern, 64 Haw. 210, 638 P.2d 319 (1981).) Me
disagree. .
B. The Circuit Court Erred In Applying The Provisions of
Act 44, Section 7 To Cruz's Case,

In Walkex, this court concluded that, by the plain
language of Act 44, section 29, the legislature did not intend
the anelicrative provisions of Act 44 to apply retroactively to
proceedings that were begun prior to July 1, 2004. See Walker,
106 Hawai'i at 9, 100 P.3d at 603.

More recently, in State v. Reis, No. 27171 (Haw. August
21, 2007), this court considered, at great length, the question
whether the provisions of Act 44 applied to a defendant who
committed the charged offense and against whom a prosecution was
commenced prior to July 1, 2004, We held that, because of the
Presence and wording of the specific savings clause contained in
Act 44, section 28, the provisions of Act 44 -- including its

ameliorative amendments -- were unavailable to such defendants,

 

regardless of whether the application was characterized as
retroactive or prospective. Reis, slip op. at 29, 34, 41
(holding (2) “that the term ‘proceedings,’ as employed in Act 44,
section 29, unambiguously means the initiation of a criminal
prosecution against a defendant through a charging instrument and
subsumes within its scope hearings and other procedural events
that arise as a direct result of the initial charging instrument”
and (2) “that a defendant incurs, at the moment he or she conmits
the offense, liability for the criminal penalty in effect at the

time of the commission of the offense,” and concluding that the

e
 

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inclusion of the specific savings clause in Act 44 evinced
legislative intent that the Act's provisions apply only
prospectively). (Emphasis in original.)

Wie, therefore, reiterate our conclusion that the
provisions of Act 44, in their entirety, do not apply to any
defendant who conmitted the charged offense and whose prosecution
was conmenced prior to July 1, 2004, regardless of the date of
the defendant’s subsequent conviction or sentence. See Walker,
106 Hawai'i at 9, 100 P.3d at 603; Reis, slip op. at 29, 34, 42.

Accordingly, insofar as Cruz vas indicted on June 16,
2004 ~~ two weeks before the effective date of Act 44's
amendments -- the 2002 version of HRS § 712-1243, see supra
note 1, applied to his case, and the circuit court therefore
erred by sentencing him to probation pursuant to HRS § 712-1243
(supp. 2008).

IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we vacate the circuit
court's April 11, 2005 sentence based upon HRS § 712-1243 (Supp.
2004) and renand for resentencing pursuant to HRS § 712-1243
(supp. 2002).
DATED:

 

Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 7, 2007.

 

on the brief:

James M, Anderson,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the plaintiff-appellant
State of Hawai'i

Pea O%r
Phyllis J. Hironaka, ON redanjare.
Deputy Public Defender, Gen €, Duly. th

for the defendant-appellee
Russell Kela Cruz