Title: Draper v. Pauley

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JOHN W. DRAPER, ET AL. 
 
v.   Record No. 960761 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                    January 10, 1997 
PATRICIA PAULEY 
 
 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
 
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the signatures of the 
testator and subscribing witnesses to a testamentary document 
comply with the requirements of Code § 64.1-49. 
 
Irene Draper and her brother lived with their niece 
Patricia Pauley and her family for a number of years.  In March 
1995, Draper was a patient at Martha Jefferson Hospital in 
Charlottesville.  On March 1, Pauley, Alice Butler, Darlene 
Butler, and two children visited Draper at the hospital.  
During this visit, Draper indicated she wanted to execute a 
will.  Tracy Collier, a hospital employee who was a notary 
public, was called to Draper's room.  When she arrived, Collier 
wrote the following at the top of each of two blank pieces of 
paper: 
 
This is to verify that the signature below is the 
true signature of Irene Draper. 
 
This statement was followed by Draper's signature and Collier's 
attestation as notary public.  
 
Draper then began to dictate her testamentary disposition 
of a house she owned.  Pauley took the first piece of paper 
and, below Draper's notarized signature, transcribed Draper's 
statement that, if anything should happen to her, she wanted 
Pauley to have the house.  When Pauley finished writing, she 
read the document back to Draper, who stated that the document 
was exactly as she wanted it.  Then Darlene Butler signed the 
document beside Collier's name.  
 
Draper died on September 4, 1995.  The clerk of the 
Albemarle County Circuit Court admitted the March 1, 1995 
document to probate as a valid will.  Draper's two sons, John 
W. and Charles E. Draper, appealed the clerk's order, alleging 
that the will was not valid.  The trial court held that the 
clerk properly admitted the will to probate because the 
signatures of Draper, Butler, and Pauley met the attestation 
requirements of Code § 64.1-49.  The trial court also held, 
however, that the signature of Collier did not qualify as that 
of a witness under the statute.  Draper's sons filed an appeal. 
 Pauley assigned cross-error challenging the trial court's 
determination that Collier did not qualify as a subscribing 
witness.  Because we conclude that the March 1, 1995 document 
complied with the requirements of § 64.1-49 for a valid will, 
we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Section 64.1-49 provides in relevant part: 
 
No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and 
signed by the testator . . . in such manner as to 
make it manifest that the name is intended as a 
signature; and moreover, unless it be wholly in the 
handwriting of the testator, the signature shall be 
made or the will acknowledged by him in the presence 
of at least two competent witnesses, present at the 
same time; and such witnesses shall subscribe the 
will in the presence of the testator, but no form of 
attestation shall be necessary. 
 
The purpose of this statute is to prevent fraud, mistake, or 
the substitution of documents.  It is not intended to place 
restraints on the power to execute a will but to guard and 
protect that power.  It should not be interpreted in a manner 
which imposes unnecessary difficulties that adversely affect 
the ability to exercise the power.  Therefore, the statute 
should be given a fair and sound construction with "rigid 
insistence" on substantial compliance with its requirements.  
Robinson v. Ward, 239 Va. 36, 42, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1990). 
 
Draper's signature on the will in question satisfies the 
requirements of the statute, notwithstanding the fact that 
Draper signed it before the document contained the disposition 
of her property.  There is no dispute that the signature is 
Draper's and that, following the transcription of the statement 
and its recitation back to her, Draper stated that the document 
was exactly as she wanted it.  Under these circumstances, the 
signature was "intended as a signature" and the "will 
acknowledged" by Draper in the presence of "at least two 
competent witnesses" in satisfaction of the requirements for a 
valid will contained in § 64.1-49.  
 
Likewise, at least two competent witnesses subscribed the 
will in the presence of the testator.  All parties agreed that 
Darlene Butler's signature satisfied the statutory 
requirements.  Pauley's signature was contained in the body of 
the document and was made when she was transcribing Draper's 
instruction that Pauley was to receive the house.  The 
contestants' argument that subscription by a witness to the 
will in this manner is insufficient was addressed and answered 
in Robinson.  In that case, the scrivener of the will wrote her 
name as one of the legatees under the terms of the will; there 
was no separate signature of the scrivener.  Writing one's name 
in the body of the will was held to substantially comply with 
the statutory requirements for a subscribing witness because 
the scrivener/witness acted as a witness to the execution of 
the will by the testator, was present when a second witness 
subscribed to the will, and the transaction was free of fraud. 
 Id. at 44, 387 S.E.2d at 740.  
 
The facts in Robinson and this case are virtually 
identical, and the holding in Robinson is applicable here.  
There are no suggestions of fraud or duress.  Pauley wrote her 
name in the body of the will, witnessed the execution and 
preparation of the will by the testator and, in the presence of 
the testator, witnessed the subscription of the will by the 
other witness, Butler.  Under these circumstances, Pauley, like 
the witness/scrivener in Robinson, was a subscribing witness to 
Draper's will within the meaning of § 64.1-49.  Therefore, the 
trial court was correct in holding that the will was properly 
admitted to probate.
*
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
 
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the facts of this case 
                                                 
     
*In light of this holding, we need not reach the issue 
presented in the assignment of cross-error. 
give rise to the same concerns for the application of Code 
§ 64.1-49 that were expressed by the dissent in Robinson v. Ward, 
239 Va. 36, 45, 387 S.E.2d 735, 740 (1990).  For the reasons 
stated more fully there, I would reverse the judgment of the 
trial court.