Title: STEVEN JUSTIN BINGHAM V. JESSICA J. BINGHAM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEVEN JUSTIN BINGHAM V. JESSICA J. BINGHAM2007 WY 145167 P.3d 14Case Number: S-07-0028Decided: 09/17/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
STEVEN 
JUSTIN BINGHAM,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JESSICA J. 
BINGHAM,Appellee(Defendant).

            

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Pro 
se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Devon 
O'Connell Coleman of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.     

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Steven Justin 
Bingham (Father) appeals the district court's order awarding Jessica J. Bingham 
(Mother) custody of the child born during their marriage, claiming an abuse of 
discretion.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Father raises 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 
            
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that 
[Mother] should have care, control, and custody of the parties' minor 
child?

 
 
            
2. Whether the court abused its discretion in not ruling on perjury by 
[Mother] under oath on the stand and by [Mother] not listing her bank accounts 
and Jeep Liberty vehicle on her pretrial statement?

 
 
Mother 
also presents two issues:

 
 
            
1. Is it proper for this Court to dismiss appellant's appeal for failure 
to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure by failing to designate 
any portion of the record?

 
 
            
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding custody of the 
parties' minor child to appellee?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother and Father 
were married in Casper, 
Wyoming on December 28, 2002.  One child was born of the marriage on 
May 11, 2004.  On September 26, 
2005, Father filed a complaint for judicial separation and sought primary 
physical custody of the child.  
Mother counterclaimed for divorce and for custody of the child.  After a hearing, the district court 
awarded Mother temporary primary custody of the child and granted Father 
visitation with the child four evenings per week and on Saturdays.  The parties stipulated to a restraining 
order that prevented them from communicating with each other about anything 
except the child.  

 
 
[¶4]      At the trial, the 
district court heard testimony from several witnesses including Father, Mother, 
Father's and the child's counselor, and Mother's boyfriend.  The parties also introduced into evidence 
Father's journal and the counselor's notes of her sessions with Father and the 
child.  Father introduced testimony, 
primarily through the counselor, indicating the child was acting out in 
disturbing ways, such as biting or hitting herself without provocation, and that 
the child's behavior could not be attributed to Father.  Father testified that the child often 
resisted leaving his care for that of Mother.  He further attempted to prove Mother 
lied on several occasions, including regarding whether she had ever left the 
child alone with her boyfriend and whether she had a sexual relationship with 
the boyfriend before the couple separated.  
Mother, meanwhile, presented evidence that Father had emotionally and, on 
at least one occasion, physically abused her.  She also demonstrated, through the 
counselor's testimony, that the child's behavior could simply be a result of the 
divorce and generalized separation anxiety.  Mother also testified that while she 
intended to foster a strong relationship between the child and Father, she 
worried that Father would not reciprocate if he was awarded primary custody. 

 
 
[¶5]      At the close of 
the evidence, the district court commented on which party would be more likely 
to involve the other in the child's life.  
The court questioned Father's decision to begin counseling with the child 
without involving Mother. 

 
 
            
I haven't seen any indication that he has asked her participation, sought 
her advice, requested her input.  
This is a big step.  This is 
not something that one should do lightly, and yet I don't see that Mr. Bingham 
has done anything at all to involve the mother of [the child] in this 
process.  And that, frankly, is a 
little bit disturbing.

 
 
The 
district court noted that even at the trial Father failed to unconditionally 
commit to co-parenting.  "[H]e's 
placed conditions on it today on the stand under oath.  And that is bothersome because this has 
to be unconditional.  It should have 
happened a long time ago, but I'm not hearing him say he's willing for it to 
happen at any time in the foreseeable future." 

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court granted custody to Mother and offered the following reasoning in support 
of its decision:

 
 
Custody 
was the primary issue at trial.  It 
is clear that both [Mother] and [Father] love [the child] very much, and the 
Court is of the opinion that [the child] would have a good home with either 
parent.  Both parties have 
demonstrated a willingness to accept the responsibilities of parenting and to 
take those responsibilities seriously for the benefit of [the child].  However, even though the relationship 
between each parent and [the child] is a good one, it is clear that the parents' 
relationship to each other is much less so.  In fact, it is clear that the 
relationship has involved physical confrontation on at least one 
occasion.

 
 
The 
evidence at trial indicated, and the Court concludes, that [Mother] is very much 
interested in promoting and encouraging [the child's] ongoing relationship with 
her father.  She has done so in the 
past and has, on occasion, allowed more visitation [than] was previously ordered 
by the Court.  [Father], on the 
other hand, does not appear to share that sentiment.  It is clear from his testimony and the 
evidence presented at trial, specifically the journal entries entered as Exhibit 
C, that [Father] is still suffering the traumatic emotional effects of a bitter 
separation and that he is far less willing to facilitate a cooperative parenting 
relationship between [the child] and [Mother].  The Court will order, therefore, that 
[Mother] shall have the care, custody, and control of [the child], subject to 
visitation by [Father] . . . .

 
 
The 
court granted Father visitation every other weekend, on alternating holidays, 
and for a period during the summer set to increase incrementally from two weeks 
in the summer of 2007 to roughly six weeks in the summer of 2011 and thereafter. 

 
 
[¶7]      Father appeals 
the custody award, asserting that the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to consider factors that merit significant weight and by not basing its 
decision on the evidence presented.  
In particular, Father argues the district court ignored the stability his 
more regular work schedule would provide for the child, Mother's alleged 
perjury, and the best interests of the child.  Father also contends the district 
court's conclusion that Mother was more willing to co-parent than he was ran 
counter to the evidence.  Finally, 
Father attacks the court's articulation of its reasoning for its decision as 
inadequate.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
A.        
Designation of Record

 
 
[¶8]      Before addressing 
the merits of this appeal, we address Mother's contention that we should dismiss 
this appeal because Father failed to designate a record as required by the 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
W.R.A.P. 3.05(b) provides, "Appellant shall, contemporaneously with the 
filing of its brief in the appellate court and service of that brief upon 
appellee, serve on appellee, file with the clerk of the district court a 
designation for transmission to the appellate court of all parts of the record, 
without unnecessary duplication, to which appellant intends to direct the 
particular attention of the appellate court in its brief."  However, this Court retains broad 
discretion over how to treat a violation of this rule.  "The failure to comply . . . does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the 
appellate court deems appropriate . . . ."  
W.R.A.P. 1.03.

 
 
[¶9]      Father did not 
designate a record when he filed his brief on February 21, 2007; however, he did 
file a designation of record on April 6, 2007, one day after Mother filed her 
designation of record.  Thus, this 
Court has a record to review when considering Father's claims, making this case 
distinguishable from those in which an appellant completely neglected to provide 
a record.  See Smith v. Smith, 2003 WY 87 ¶ 15, 72 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Wyo. 2003) (holding the absence of any record to refute the district 
court's findings left the Court with no choice but to sustain them); Orcutt v. Shober Invs. Inc., 2003 WY 60, ¶ 10, 69 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo. 2003) (similarly holding 
trial court decisions will be assumed to be in accord with the law when no 
record is designated to show otherwise).  
Because Father ultimately designated a record for the Court's review, 
albeit late, we decline Mother's invitation to dismiss the appeal based upon a 
violation of W.R.A.P. 3.05(b).

 
 
            
B.        
Standard of Review

 
 
[¶10]   Our standard of review in child 
custody cases is well established.

 
 
Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court. Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Wyo. 1997); Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996); Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 352 (Wyo. 1995).  It has been our consistent principle 
that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to be given 
paramount consideration. Scherer, 931 P.2d  at 254; Rowan v. 
Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 
(Wyo. 1990); see also Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995); and Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1984).  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  "We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle." Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36. 

 
 
A court 
does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances.  
Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993)).  Our review entails evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision, and we 
afford the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any 
consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. 
Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657; 
Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo. 1994).  Findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence 
cannot be sustained. Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993). 
Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present "when a material factor deserving 
significant weight is ignored.'" Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657 (quoting Vanasse 
v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 
(Wyo. 
1993)).

 
 

Pahl v. 
Pahl, 2004 
WY 40, ¶ 6, 87 P.3d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 2004).  "We have additionally explained that judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which 
are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment 
exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously.'"  
Id. at 1253 
(quoting Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 
123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
            
C.        Child 
Custody

 
 
[¶11]   Father claims the district court 
abused its discretion by ignoring several material factors when it awarded 
Mother custody of the child.  When 
exercising its discretion in arriving at a custodial arrangement that is in the 
best interest of the child, a district court shall consider, but is not limited 
to, the following factors:

 
 
            
(i) The quality of the relationship each child has with each parent; 

            
(ii) The ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each 
child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for each 
child's care by others as needed;

            
(iii) The relative competency and fitness of each 
parent;

            
(iv) Each parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of 
parenting, including a willingness to accept care for each child at specified 
times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified 
times;

            
(v) How the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen 
a relationship with each other;

            
(vi) How the parents and each child interact and communicate with 
each other and how such interaction and communication may be improved;            

(vii) The 
ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care 
without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, 
including the right to privacy;

            
(viii) Geographic distance between the parents' 
residences;

            
(ix) The current physical and mental ability of each parent to care 
for each child;

            
(x) Any other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Further, "[t]he 
court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child abuse as being contrary 
to the best interest of the children."  Section 20-2-201(c). 

 
 
[¶12]   Father first asserts the district 
court improperly failed to consider the greater stability his more regular hours 
of employment would afford the child.  
While it is true that the court did not specifically address the parties' 
respective work schedules in its decision letter, establishing that a court 
ignored a material factor requires more than merely showing that the court did 
not mention the factor in its decision.  
Groenstein v. Groenstein, 2005 
WY 6, ¶ 16, 104 P.3d 765, 770 (Wyo. 2005).  
To establish the importance of stability in custody determinations, 
Father relies on Gurney v. Gurney, 
899 P.2d 52, 54 (Wyo. 1995).   Gurney, however, did not address 
stability based on parental employment.  
Instead, we emphasized the importance of stability once a primary custody 
order is made by the district court.  
Id.  "Once such an order is entered, 
considerations of stability in child placement become of central 
importance.  In our case law, we 
have shown a strong bias against reopening the order because a child is almost 
always harmed by a transfer from one parent to the other."  Id.   Further, in Groenstein, this Court specifically 
rejected a father's claim that his ex-wife should not have been granted primary 
custody because she would be forced to use daycare while he would not.  Groenstein, 104 P.3d  at 770.  Thus, although the parents' work 
schedules may be relevant to the child custody issue in some cases, we have not 
held that regularity of work schedules is determinative in child custody 
matters. 

 
 
[¶13]   We likewise are not persuaded by 
Father's claim that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring the 
evidence of Mother's perjury.  An 
appellant has an uphill battle when seeking to impugn before this Court the 
credibility of a party who prevailed at trial.  Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶ 22, 
35 P.3d 1240, 1246 (Wyo. 2001).  
"The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and weigh their testimony."  
Id.  Although Father presented evidence of 
inconsistencies in Mother's testimony, the district court made clear it was 
aware of the difficulty of assessing the veracity of the parties' testimony, 
commenting near the end of the trial, "Forget what happened in the past.  I don't know what's happened in the 
past."   Because there was 
evidence to support its decision, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding for Mother while also acknowledging some inconsistencies 
in her testimony.  

 
 
[¶14]   Father also contends that the 
district court abused its discretion because it did not consider the well being 
of the child.  His contention is not 
supported by the record.  The 
district court's decision letter specifically stated, "The Court's primary 
consideration in determining custody of a child must, of course, be [his or her] 
best interests."  Although Father 
presented testimony from the counselor indicating the child was behaving 
abnormally and that her behavior likely was not attributable to him, Mother 
presented testimony indicating that the child's behavior could stem from the 
general emotional trauma of the divorce.  
Accepting Mother's evidence as true, as we must, the district court's 
decision is consistent with a consideration of the child's well 
being.

 
 
[¶15]   Father next argues the district 
court's determination that Mother would be more likely to co-parent 
cooperatively was in conflict with the evidence.  Findings contrary to the evidence cannot 
be sustained and constitute an abuse of discretion.  Pahl, ¶ 6, 87 P.3d  at 1252.  While the record contains evidence that 
Father was willing to co-parent, the district court's finding that Mother's 
efforts in that regard were superior is also well supported.  As the district court noted in its 
decision letter, Father's testimony and his journal indicate "[Father] is still 
suffering the traumatic emotional effects of a bitter separation and that he is 
far less willing [than Mother] to facilitate a cooperative parenting 
relationship."  Father questions the 
district court's reliance on his journal and argues that his feelings are 
"normal for anyone going through a divorce."  Regardless, the journal is part of the 
record, and Father expressed similar, if much more muted, sentiments in his 
testimony.  The task of assessing 
the evidence belonged to the district court, and, given the testimony and the 
journal, the record contains adequate evidence to support its conclusion.  

 
 
[¶16]   Finally, Father's claim that the 
district court failed to adequately articulate its reasoning is likewise without 
merit.  In a conventional custody 
determination such as this one, we have "consistently and strongly urged" but 
not required that the district court reveal its reasoning.  Produit, 35 P.3d  at 1243.  "When a trial court is exercising its 
discretionary power in custody matters, it should place on the record the 
circumstances and factors which were crucial to the determination. The court 
should further spell out its reasons so counsel and the reviewing court can 
understand and evaluate the soundness of the decision."  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 15, 22 P.3d 861, 866 (Wyo. 2001).  Consistent 
with these principles, the district court in this case set out the factors it 
considered in concluding that while either parent would provide a "good home" 
for the child, Mother should be the primary caregiver because of her greater 
willingness to "facilitate a cooperative parenting relationship."  

 
 
[¶17]   The district court provided a more 
than adequate articulation of its reasoning, and neither ignored material 
factors deserving significant weight nor made findings contrary to the evidence. 
 We conclude the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by awarding Mother custody of the 
child.

 
 
[¶18]   Affirmed.