Title: Renoit Saintelien v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1888 
____________ 
 
RENOIT SAINTELIEN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[August 28, 2008] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The district courts are in conflict regarding whether a challenge to a sexual 
predator designation imposed pursuant to section 775.21(5), Florida Statutes 
(2003), may be raised in a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to 
correct an illegal sentence filed in criminal court.  See Saintelien v. State, 937 So. 
2d 234, 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (requiring sexual predator designation challenges 
to be raised in separate civil proceedings); Boyer v. State, 946 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2006) (same); contra King v. State, 911 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) 
(permitting such challenges to be raised in criminal postconviction proceedings); 
Kidd v. State, 855 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (same).1  We resolve this 
conflict by holding that a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence may be 
used to challenge a sexual predator designation, but limit our holding to cases 
where it is apparent from the face of the record that the defendant did not meet the 
criteria for designation as a sexual predator. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On September 5, 2003, Saintelien was sentenced to two counts of attempted 
sexual battery on a child less than twelve years of age.  Subsequently, the trial 
court entered an order designating Saintelien as a sexual predator.  Saintelien later 
filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to rule 3.800(a), seeking to 
vacate his sexual predator designation.2  He alleged that the designation exceeded 
the terms of his plea agreement.  The trial court denied Saintelien’s motion.   
The Fourth District affirmed, reasoning that because a sexual predator 
designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment, it cannot be challenged by 
filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in criminal court.  Rather, it held that 
such challenges must be raised in separate civil proceedings.  Saintelien, 937 So. 
2d at 235 (citing Walker v. State, 718 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Connor v. 
State, 773 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).  In so holding, the Fourth District 
                                          
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
2.  We note that Saintelien only seeks to vacate his designation as a sexual 
predator.  He does not seek to withdraw his plea. 
 
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certified conflict with the Second District’s decision in King and the Fifth 
District’s decision in Kidd. 
DISCUSSION 
At the outset, we note that a defendant has the opportunity to appeal an order 
imposing a sexual predator designation under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.140(b)(1)(D), which grants appellate jurisdiction over criminal court orders 
“entered after final judgment or finding of guilt.”  See State v. Robinson, 873 So. 
2d 1205, 1208-09 (Fla. 2004).  However, a direct appeal does not give the trial 
court that made the designation the opportunity to correct any error it made.  
Moreover, there are various circumstances in which a defendant misses the 
window of opportunity to file a direct appeal.  The confluence of this reality, the 
nature of sexual predator designations, and the structure of our procedural rules 
have engendered confusion and conflict in the lower courts that we must resolve.   
As stated earlier, the conflict issue we must resolve is whether a challenge to 
a sexual predator designation imposed pursuant to section 775.21(5) may be raised 
in a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence filed in criminal court.  
Because this is a pure question of law, we review it de novo.  See State v. 
McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003) (reviewing de novo the question of 
whether defendant was procedurally barred from seeking rule 3.800(a) relief).   
 
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The First and Fourth Districts prohibit sexual predator designation 
challenges under the criminal postconviction rules because those rules provide 
vehicles for challenging sentences,3 and a sexual predator designation is not a 
sentence or punishment but merely a status.  See Boyer, 946 So. 2d at 75; 
Saintelien, 937 So. 2d at 235.   These two districts are correct that a sexual predator 
designation is “neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting 
from the conviction of certain crimes.”  § 775.21(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003).  
Nonetheless, the reality is that, in order to fulfill the Florida Sexual Predators Act’s 
requirement that the sexual predator designation be made “upon conviction” of a 
qualifying offense, our criminal trial courts make the designation at (or shortly 
after) sentencing on the qualifying offense(s).  See § 775.21(4)(a).  In this unique 
circumstance, we agree with the Fifth District that, “it doesn’t much matter that a 
sexual predator designation is not a sentence or a punishment.”  Nicholson v. State, 
846 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).  “When a claim of a sexual predator 
designation error is made, the trial judge who made the designation is the one in 
the best position to evaluate the claim and to correct the error.”  Id.  Moreover,  
[i]f the sexual predator designation were merely a civil proceeding 
somehow appended to a criminal case and either a declaratory 
judgment action or a Rule 1.540 motion were the only vehicles for 
relief, the time frames would expand greatly, the difficulty and cost of 
the proceedings would explode, the judge evaluating the claim of 
                                          
 
3.  See, e.g., Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)-(b), 3.850. 
 
 
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error may well have no knowledge of the law or prior proceedings, 
indigent defendants would be pro se and who knows who would 
represent the State.   
Id.   
The impracticality of requiring such challenges to be raised in separate civil 
proceedings is illustrated in Judge Altenbernd’s opinion in King.  As he explains, 
the Second District originally prohibited sexual predator designation challenges in 
criminal postconviction proceedings, see 911 So. 2d at 231 (citing Angell v. State, 
712 So. 2d 1132, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)), but this approach proved to be 
judicially inefficient.  See id. at 231-33 (citing Coblentz v. State, 775 So. 2d 359, 
360 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (remanding for Coblentz to raise his sexual predator 
designation challenge in a civil proceeding although the record strongly indicated 
that the designation was erroneous); Coblentz v. State, 855 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2003) (ultimately reversing the civil division’s order denying Coblentz’s 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) motion for relief from judgment 
challenging his sexual predator designation); Jackson v. State, 801 So. 2d 212, 213 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (affirming the trial court’s order denying Jackson’s sexual 
predator designation challenge as improperly raised in a motion for postconviction 
relief); Jackson v. State, 893 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (ultimately 
reversing the trial court’s order denying Jackson civil relief regarding his sexual 
predator designation)).  Faced with the procedural impracticalities illuminated by 
 
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Coblentz and Jackson, the Second District in King departed from its precedent and 
held that parties may challenge their sexual predator designations in postconviction 
motions under the rules of criminal procedure.  King, 911 So. 2d at 233 (citing 
Nicholson, 846 So. 2d at 1219; Cabrera v. State, 884 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004)). 
In light of the above, we hold that a defendant may seek correction of an 
allegedly erroneous sexual predator designation by filing a rule 3.800(a) motion to 
correct an illegal sentence in criminal court.  See King, 911 So. 2d at 233; Kidd, 
855 So. 2d at 1168.  However, because rule 3.800(a) is intended to correct errors 
that are apparent on the face of the record, we limit our holding to cases where it is 
apparent from the face of the record that the defendant did not meet the criteria for 
designation as a sexual predator.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) (“A court may at 
any time correct an illegal sentence . . . when it is affirmatively alleged that the 
court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief . . . .”). 4 
In this case, Saintelien’s rule 3.800(a) motion sought to vacate his sexual 
predator designation.  We agree with the trial court’s denial of his motion because 
the record shows that Saintelien met the criteria for designation as a sexual 
predator.   
                                          
 
 
4.  We will refer the issue raised in this case to the appropriate committee(s) 
to consider whether it would be appropriate or desirable to amend the procedural 
rules.   
 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we approve the result of the Fourth District’s  
decision in Saintelien affirming the trial court’s denial of Saintelien’s 3.800(a) 
motion to correct an illegal sentence.  We also approve the opinions of the Second 
and Fifth Districts in King and Kidd to the extent that a rule 3.800(a) motion may 
be used to challenge a sexual predator designation when it is apparent from the 
face of the record that the defendant did not meet the criteria for designation as a 
sexual predator.   
It is so ordered. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and BELL,  JJ., concur. 
CANTERO, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., 
concurs. 
QUINCE, C.J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANTERO, J., concurring in result only. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the defendant is not entitled to relief.  I also 
agree that civil proceedings such as declaratory judgment actions are ill-suited for 
challenging sexual predator designations and have proven unworkable.  Therefore, 
like the majority, I would also disapprove the opinion below.  Finally, I agree with 
the majority that challenges to sexual offender designations may be brought on 
 
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direct appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(d) as orders 
entered after conviction.   
I disagree with the majority, however, that Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.800(a), which permits challenges only to very limited types of 
sentencing issues, may be used to challenge sexual predator designations.  The 
majority’s resolution of this issue thrusts the law from one end of the spectrum to 
the other.  Under the majority’s reasoning, not only may sexual predator 
designations be challenged in criminal proceedings, they can now be filed, as can 
all motions filed under rule 3.800(a), “at any time.”   
To the extent the majority seeks a pragmatic approach that permits 
challenges to be resolved by the same trial court that imposed the designation, it is 
rule 3.800(b), not rule 3.800(a), that would fulfill that role.  The majority’s 
resolution not only deviates from the plain language of rule 3.800(a), but removes 
any time limit to filing such claims, creating as many problems as it solves. 
 
Below, I (A) explain why rule 3.800(a) cannot be used to challenge sexual 
predator designations; and (B) submit that if any rule should be used to permit trial 
courts to reconsider designations, it should be rule 3.800(b). 
 
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A.  Sexual Predator Designations May Not Be Challenged  
Under Rule 3.800(a)  
  
Some courts have held that challenges to sexual predator designations must 
be filed in separate civil proceedings.  See Saintelien v. State, 937 So. 2d 234, 235 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Connor v. State, 773 So. 2d 1242, 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2000); Boyer v. State, 946 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).  In this case, the 
district court relied on its previous decision in Connor, 773 So. 2d 1242.  That 
case, however, was decided before our decision in State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 
1205 (Fla. 2004).  As the majority acknowledges, Robinson held that a defendant 
may challenge a sexual predator designation on direct appeal.  Id. at 1208-09.5  
Thus, we have now clarified that a defendant need not file a civil proceeding 
because he can appeal the decision directly.  Robinson, 873 So. 2d at 1208-09. 
                                          
 
5.  We decided Robinson before the Legislature added subsections (4)(d) 
and (5)(a)(1) to section 775.21.  See Ch. 2004-371, § 1, Laws of Fla.  These 
subsections provide for designation as a sexual predator at the time a person is 
determined to be a sexually violent predator in a civil commitment proceeding 
under chapter 394.  Id.; see also §§ 394.910-.932, Fla. Stat. (2007) (“Involuntary 
Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators”).  We need not consider here the 
procedural mechanism for challenging a designation imposed in such proceedings.  
Just as rule 9.140(b)(1)(D) can be used to challenge sexual predator designations 
on direct appeal when ordered as a result of criminal convictions, I assume such 
designations would be appealable under either rule 9.030(b)(1)(A) (providing that 
the district court shall review “final orders of trial courts”) or rule 9.130(a)( 4) 
(allowing appeals of nonfinal orders entered after a final order).  See also § 
394.9155(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) (providing that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 
apply to involuntary civil commitment proceedings); § 394.917(3), Fla. Stat. 
(2007) (providing that the public defender of the circuit in which a person is 
determined to be a sexually violent predator is appointed for appeal). 
 
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Therefore, a mechanism already exists for challenging sexual predator 
designations.  I agree with the majority that the defendant may raise any error 
related to the designation on direct appeal from the order imposing it.  As I now 
explain, however, the majority’s decision to also allow such challenges under rule 
3.800(a) is flawed.  That rule allows defendants to challenge certain limited 
sentencing issues.  But we have held that a sexual predator designation is not a 
sentence.  Therefore, rule 3.800(a) cannot apply.  The majority’s interpretation 
deviates from the rule’s plain language and creates as many problems as it solves. 
 
Apparently because more than two years had expired since his sexual 
predator designation, the defendant challenged his designation under rule 3.800(a).  
That rule allows a court to correct certain egregious sentencing errors, such as 
illegal sentences, “at any time.”  The full rule states:  
A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or 
an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, or a 
sentence that does not grant proper credit for time served when it is 
affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face 
an entitlement to that relief, provided that a party may not file a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence under this subdivision during the 
time allowed for the filing of a motion under subdivision (b)(1) or 
during the pendency of a direct appeal.  All orders denying motions 
under this subdivision shall include a statement that the movant has 
the right to appeal within 30 days of rendition of the order. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) (emphasis added).  A challenge to a sexual predator 
designation clearly is not an error in the “sentencing scoresheet” or a “sentence that 
 
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does not grant proper credit for time served.”  Therefore, defendants may invoke 
rule 3.800(a) only if these designations constitute “illegal sentences.” 
Few types of sentences have been held to be “illegal.”  For purposes of the 
rule, a sentence is only illegal if it “impose[s] a kind of punishment that no judge 
under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of 
factual circumstances.”  Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Fla. 2001) 
(quoting Blakely v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).  In other 
words, because rule 3.800(a) permits claims to be raised “at any time,” it applies 
only to egregious errors involving the sentence imposed.  See Wright v. State, 911 
So. 2d 81, 83-84 (Fla. 2005) (“[W]hile the illegality contemplated by the rule may 
be invoked at any time . . . the illegality must be of a fundamental nature.” 
(footnote omitted)); Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (Fla. 2001) (“Rule 
3.800(a) is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of cases in which the 
sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law.” (quoting Judge v. 
State, 596 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992))).  In fact, not all sentencing errors 
that would be reversed on appeal as fundamental error—that is, error that can be 
corrected despite a lack of objection—constitute “illegal sentences.”  See Maddox 
v. State, 760 So. 2d 89, 100 (Fla. 2000)  
As the statute itself states, and we have acknowledged, a sexual predator 
designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment.  See, e.g., § 775.21(3)(d), 
 
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Fla. Stat. (2007) (“The designation of a person as a sexual predator is neither a 
sentence nor a punishment, but simply a status resulting from the conviction of 
certain crimes.”); State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (“[T]he 
requirement to register is not punishment at all . . . .”).  Therefore, it cannot 
constitute “a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing 
statutes could possibly inflict.”  Carter, 786 So. 2d at 1178 (quoting Blakely, 746 
So. 2d at 1187). 
 
The majority acknowledges that a sexual predator designation is not a 
sentence.  Majority op. at 4.  Therefore, our flirtation with rule 3.800(a) should end 
there.  If the majority believes that the rule should be available to contest sexual 
predator designations, it should ask a rules committee to suggest changes to the 
rule, or change the rule itself.  See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(d) (permitting 
changes in court rules on an emergency basis), 2.140(f) (providing for requests for 
consideration by rules committees); E.T. v. State, 957 So. 2d 559, 559-60 (Fla. 
2007) (discharging jurisdiction as moot, but noting that the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in termination cases would be referred to rules 
committees); State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 176 n.10 (Fla. 1993) (adopting a 
rule on a temporary emergency basis and requesting the Criminal Procedure Rules 
Committee to propose a permanent rule); see also Partlow, 840 So. 2d at 1044-45 
(Cantero, J., concurring) (agreeing that a rule allowing a defendant to withdraw a 
 
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plea before sentencing for good cause did not apply after sentencing, but calling 
for a change in the rule to permit defendants a short period of reflection when the 
plea and sentence occur successively). 
Rather than apply the rule’s plain language, the majority reasons that “it 
doesn’t much matter that a sexual predator designation is not a sentence or 
punishment” because “our criminal trial courts make the designation at (or shortly 
after) sentencing on the qualifying offense(s).”  Majority op. at 4 (quoting 
Nicholson v. State, 846 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)).  I cannot agree 
that the rule’s plain language becomes irrelevant merely because the designation is 
made at or around the time of sentencing—especially when other rules already 
allow defendants to contest such designations. 
The majority’s decision to permit the use of rule 3.800(a) for these purposes 
is based on a flawed premise.  The majority reasons that “[w]hen a claim of a 
sexual predator designation error is made, the trial judge who made the designation 
is the one in the best position to evaluate the claim and to correct the error.”  
Majority op. at 4-5 (quoting Nicholson, 846 So. 2d at 1219).  I agree with that 
statement as far as it goes.  The majority then goes on to say, however, that  
 
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[i]f the sexual predator designation were merely a civil proceeding 
somehow appended to a criminal case and either a declaratory 
judgment action or a Rule 1.540 motion were the only vehicles for 
relief, the time frames would expand greatly, the difficulty and cost of 
the proceedings would explode, the judge evaluating the claim of 
error may well have no knowledge of the law or prior proceedings, 
indigent defendants would be pro se and who knows who would 
represent the State. 
 
Majority op. at 4-5 (quoting Nicholson, 846 So. 2d at 1219).   
The majority’s quote from Nicholson is problematic.  Nicholson held that 
sexual predator designations may be challenged under rule 3.800(b), not rule 
3.800(a).  846 So. 2d at 1219.  Especially in light of the quote above, the difference 
is critical.  Unlike rule 3.800(a), rule 3.800(b) does impose deadlines—strict ones.  
It requires the defendant to raise a claim either during the time allowed for filing a 
notice of appeal or before the initial brief on appeal is filed.  Rule 3.800(b) also 
allows the same judge who imposed the designation to reconsider it before the 
appellate court rules.  Therefore, the availability of that rule resolves many of the 
problems the court identified: time frames would not “expand greatly” and the 
judge evaluating the claim will have knowledge of the law and the prior 
proceedings.  If anything, Nicholson supports a finding that such claims should be 
filed under rule 3.800(b), not rule 3.800(a). 
The problem with the majority’s application of rule 3.800(a) is that it fails to 
cure the problems it identifies.  To the contrary, it may exacerbate them.  The 
 
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majority’s application of the rule allows challenges to designations to be made “at 
any time”—even long after the designation has been made.  Therefore, many of the 
same problems the majority identifies with use of civil proceedings will remain: 
the time frames will expand greatly (in fact, infinitely), the judge evaluating the 
claim of error may well have no knowledge of the law or prior proceedings, and 
indigent defendants may represent themselves pro se.  The decision accomplishes 
little. 
Precisely because rule 3.800(a) imposes no deadlines, it was designed to 
apply only in very narrow circumstances.  The majority now elevates what is 
concededly not a sentence at all, or even a punishment, to the level of illegal 
sentences.  
 
The majority’s decision is based on another flawed premise: that sexual 
predator designations are made “at (or shortly after) sentencing on the qualifying 
offense(s).”  Majority op. at 4.  This is not always the case.  Where the trial court 
does not make the finding at sentencing, it can be made later.  See § 775.21(5)(c), 
Fla. Stat. (2007); Therrien v. State, 914 So. 2d 942, 947 (Fla. 2005) (noting that the 
statute contains a “second chance” clause applicable to persons who could have 
been but were not declared sexual predators at sentencing); Cabrera v. State, 884 
So. 2d 482, 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (Sawaya, C.J., concurring specially) (“There 
are numerous cases where the courts have upheld designation orders rendered long 
 
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after the defendant was sentenced for the underlying offense.” (citing Thomas v. 
State, 716 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Pisarri v. State, 724 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1998); Milks v. State, 848 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), approved, 
894 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005); and Walker v. State, 718 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1998))).  In fact, in this very case the trial court declared the defendant a sexual 
predator 113 days after sentencing.6 
For these reasons, I would hold that sexual predator designations cannot be 
challenged under rule 3.800(a). 
B.  Extending Rule 3.800(b) 
 
The majority’s desire to have the trial judge who made the designation 
correct any errors is understandable.  Rule 3.800(b), however, is better suited for 
that purpose.  The rule allows the filing of a “motion to correct any sentencing 
error, including an illegal sentence,” before filing an appeal or, when an appeal is 
pending, before the first brief is filed.  Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.140(e) in turn provides that “[a] sentencing error may not be raised on appeal 
                                          
 
 
6.  The majority limits its holding to errors that are “apparent on the face of 
the record.”  Majority op. at 6.  However, rule 3.800(a) is always limited to 
correcting errors apparent on the face of the record.  Fla. R. App. P. 3.800(a); 
Renaud v. State, 926 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 2006).  The practical effect of the 
majority’s opinion is that when the error is not apparent on the face of the record, 
these claims will now be cognizable under rule 3.800(b).  See, e.g., Jackson v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 562, 574 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing that rule 3.800(b) encompasses 
any claim that could be raised under 3.800(a)). 
 
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unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: 
(1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.800(b).”   
Recently, we reiterated that the goal of rule 3.800(b) is “to ensure that 
sentencing errors are brought to the trial court’s attention at the earliest 
opportunity.”  Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 573 (citing Maddox, 760 So. 2d at 95; and 
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Fla. Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140, & 9.600, 761 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 2000)).  
We explained:  
When a sentence is erroneous, it is more efficient to address the issue 
in the trial court first, where it can be quickly remedied.  In many 
circumstances, however, defendants do not have the opportunity to 
object or otherwise address the trial court before the sentencing order 
is entered. . . .  Before rule 3.800(b), however, no mechanism existed 
for the defendant to remedy the error in the trial court.  The only 
remedy was to appeal the sentence.  The rule was designed to remedy 
that institutional inefficiency. 
 
Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 573.  Rule 3.800(a) fulfills a different purpose.  That rule is 
“intended to balance the need for finality of convictions and sentences with the 
goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve sentences imposed contrary 
to the requirements of law.”  Carter, 786 So. 2d at 1176 (emphasis added).   
 
In Jackson, we dealt with the problems courts were having in applying rule 
3.800(b).  Some of them interpreted the rule broadly, allowing challenges to any 
 
- 17 -
rulings that occurred at any point of the sentencing process—such as the admission 
of evidence at the sentencing hearing.  See, e.g., Yisrael v. State, 938 So. 2d 546, 
547 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that a postsentencing motion filed under rule 
3.800(b)(2) adequately preserved a claim about the proof supporting a violent 
felony offender sentence), disapproved in part on other grounds, 33 Fla. L. Weekly 
S131 n.1 (Fla. Feb. 21, 2008) (declining to address the propriety of using rule 
3.800(b)(2)), modified, No. SC06-2211 (Fla. July 10, 2008).  We clarified that the 
scope of the rule was limited: “sentencing errors” for purposes of rule 3.800(b) are 
errors “in sentence-related orders,” “errors apparent in orders entered as a result of 
the sentencing process,” “errors related to the ultimate sanctions imposed,” and 
errors “in the sentence itself.”  Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 572-73 (emphasis added).   
Although sexual predator designations are not “sentencing errors” (because 
they are not sentences at all), at least they arguably constitute “errors related to the 
ultimate sanctions imposed.”  Therefore, to the extent the majority seeks a 
pragmatic approach that allows defendants an efficient method to challenge sexual 
predator designations, in addition to rule 9.140(b)(1)(D), rule 3.800(b) (which was 
designed to serve that exact function with respect to sentencing errors) better 
fulfills that purpose. 
 
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C.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons explained above, I agree with the majority that challenges to 
sexual predator designations cannot be brought in separate civil proceedings.  I 
also agree that these designations may be challenged on direct appeal from the 
order imposing the designation.  I disagree, however, with the majority’s extension 
of rule 3.800(a).  To the extent the majority desires to allow the trial court that 
imposed the designation to consider such claims, rule 3.800(b) best serves that 
function.  I therefore would disapprove the opinion below, but I would also 
disapprove one of the conflicting cases, King v. State, 911 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2005) (en banc).7  I note, however, that in King the court held that a sexual 
predator designation can be challenged in four different ways.  Id. at 234.  My 
approach still allows defendants to challenge designations in three ways: (1) on 
direct appeal from the final judgment adjudicating guilt (under Florida Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(A)); (2) on direct appeal under rule 
                                          
 
7.  I would not disapprove Kidd v. State, 855 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2003), which also conflicts with the decision below.  That case, relying on its prior 
decision in Nicholson, 846 So. 2d at 1219, held that a sexual predator designation 
can be challenged under rule 3.800(b), not rule 3.800(a).  Id. at 1168.  The Fifth 
District later suggested, however, that such claims could be raised under rule 
3.800(a) as well.  See Cabrera, 884 So. 2d at 484 (finding that the defendant did 
not preserve the claim for review by filing a motion under rule 3.800(b), but 
affirming “without prejudice to Cabrera to raise it in a proper motion pursuant to 
rule 3.800(a) or rule 3.850”). 
 
 
- 19 -
 
- 20 -
9.140(b)(1)(D) where the order is entered after the time to appeal the judgment and 
sentence; and (3) under rule 3.800(b).  This is a small price to pay for remaining 
faithful to a rule’s plain language. 
WELLS, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D06-2792 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Beverly A. Pohl of Broad and Cassel, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum Attorney General, and Celia Terenzio, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, Bureau Chief, and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West 
Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent