Title: LOUJEN KERPER, Trustee of Kerper Trust No. 1, JANEEN KERPER, JILL KERPER, RYAN LENNON, COLBY LENNON AND KARA BEREMAN v. MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO, STANA MILODRAGOVICH, INGE STANDER and TAIMI ALEXANDER ; JANEEN KERPER AND JILL KERPER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), LOUJEN KERPER, Trustee of Kerper Trust No. 1, RYAN LENNON, COLBY LENNON and KARA BEREMAN v. MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO, STANA MILODRAGOVICH, INGE STANDER and TAIMI ALEXANDER ; INGE STANDER AND TAIMI ALEXANDER, MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO and STANA MILODRAGOVICH v. LOUJEN KERPER, Trustee of Kerper Trust No. 1; JANEEN KERPER; JILL KERPER; RYAN LENNON; COLBY LENNON and KARA BEREMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LOUJEN KERPER, Trustee of Kerper Trust No. 1, JANEEN KERPER, JILL KERPER, RYAN LENNON, COLBY LENNON AND KARA BEREMAN  v. MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO, STANA MILODRAGOVICH, INGE STANDER and TAIMI ALEXANDER ; JANEEN KERPER AND JILL KERPER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), LOUJEN KERPER, Trustee of Kerper Trust No. 1, RYAN LENNON, COLBY LENNON and KARA BEREMAN v. MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO, STANA MILODRAGOVICH, INGE STANDER and TAIMI ALEXANDER ; INGE STANDER AND TAIMI ALEXANDER, MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO and STANA MILODRAGOVICH v. LOUJEN KERPER, Trustee of Kerper Trust No. 1; JANEEN KERPER; JILL KERPER; RYAN LENNON; COLBY LENNON and KARA BEREMAN1989 WY 170780 P.2d 923Case Number: 87-244, 87-245, 87-246Decided: 09/01/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
LOUJEN KERPER, TRUSTEE OF 
KERPER TRUST NO. 1, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), JANEEN KERPER, JILL KERPER, RYAN 
LENNON, COLBY LENNON AND KARA BEREMAN (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM 
DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO, STANA MILODRAGOVICH, 
INGE STANDER AND TAIMI ALEXANDER, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

JANEEN KERPER AND JILL 
KERPER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), LOUJEN KERPER, TRUSTEE OF KERPER TRUST NO. 1, 
RYAN LENNON, COLBY LENNON AND KARA BEREMAN (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM 
DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO, STANA MILODRAGOVICH, 
INGE STANDER AND TAIMI ALEXANDER, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

INGE STANDER AND TAIMI 
ALEXANDER, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), MEIKE KERPER, WILLIAM DANIEL ELSOM, TEREN 
FALK, JOHN KERPER ROMANO, TINA ROMANO AND STANA MILODRAGOVICH 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

LOUJEN KERPER, TRUSTEE OF 
KERPER TRUST NO. 1; JANEEN KERPER; JILL KERPER; RYAN LENNON; COLBY LENNON AND 
KARA BEREMAN, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, J.

Robert James 
Wyatt of Burgess & Davis, Cody, and Margaret Sommers of McCarty & 
Cranfill, Cody, for appellant Loujen 
Kerper.

Tom C. Toner of 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for 
appellants Inge Stander and Taimi Alexander.

Janeen Kerper, 
San Diego, Cal., pro se and counsel for appellant Jill Kerper.

Ross D. 
Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kahl & Kath, Powell, for appellee Meike Kerper.

Charles G. 
Kepler of Simpson & Kepler, Cody, for appellees Ryan Lennon, Colby Lennon, 
Kara Bereman, Teren Falk and John Kerper Romano. 

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J. Ret.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This lawsuit began as a 
declaratory judgment action brought by Loujen Kerper as trustee of the Kerper 
family trust after bad feelings developed between herself and her sister Meike 
Kerper about the use of a family cabin. Loujen was the designated trustee of the 
Kerper trust and was also an income beneficiary of that trust along with her 
three sisters. The trial court resolved the declaratory judgment action by 
ordering:

1. That certain 
surcharges be imposed against Loujen as the original trustee.

2. That a constructive 
trust be imposed on assets received from the estate of W.G. (Wes) Kerper and 
that the four Kerper sisters reimburse the Kerper trust for assets received from 
the Wes Kerper estate.

3. That Loujen Kerper be 
removed as designated trustee of the Kerper trust and that a corporate trustee 
be substituted.

[¶2.]     The trial court's 
orders resulted in three separate appeals. In these consolidated appeals we will 
address the following issues:

I

Did the settlors of the 
Kerper trust intend to modify the liability of the trustee in the event she 
mismanaged trust assets?

II

Did Wes and Hazel Kerper 
execute mutual wills containing an express and enforceable contract for the 
disposition of their respective estates and if such contract existed did Wes 
Kerper breach its terms after Hazel Kerper's death?

III

Did the trial court err 
in removing Loujen Kerper as trustee and replacing her with the First Wyoming 
Bank of Cody as an independent successor trustee under the terms of the 
trust?

We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Hazel and Wes Kerper 
were both attorneys who practiced law for many years in Wyoming. They had four 
daughters and ten grandchildren, three of whom were minors at the time of 
trial.

[¶4.]     Between 1965 and 1974, 
Hazel, Wes and their daughter, Loujen Kerper, executed numerous trust 
instruments incorporating supplements and amendments, apparently intending to 
dispose of the Kerper assets under the trusts. The first trust document, 
executed on September 7, 1965, provided that the corpus of the trust be 
distributed to the four daughters in equal shares. This trust was to expire by 
its terms either on September 1, 1967, or upon the death of Loujen Kerper, 
whichever occurred first. Appellants introduced unrebutted evidence that the 
original estate plan, as manifested in the 1965 trust, was later changed because 
of the alcoholism, emotional instability and troubled marriage of one of the 
daughters.

[¶5.]     Hazel and Wes Kerper 
created other trusts, supplements and amendments between 1965 and 1974.1 The last trust instrument was a 
document executed October 1, 1974, by Wes and Hazel Kerper, as settlors, and 
Loujen Kerper, as trustee. This document recited that it superseded the previous 
trust documents. It contained the same language of disposition found in the 
September 17, 1973 trust instrument, but added a spendthrift provision and 
provided that in the event of a vacancy occurring in the position of trustee, a 
successor trustee would be appointed by the surviving Kerper 
daughters.

[¶6.]     On May 25, 1974, Hazel 
and Wes Kerper executed mutual wills containing the same terms of distribution 
for their respective estates. The wills provided that the remainder of their 
estate be left in trust to the trustee under Kerper Trust No. 1 dated September 
17, 1973, to be added to and become part of the corpus of that trust. After 
October 1, 1974, Loujen Kerper managed the Kerper financial affairs through a 
single trust, that is, the October 1, 1974 trust document.

[¶7.]     Hazel Kerper died on 
January 17, 1975. On July 22, 1976, the decree of distribution of her estate 
distributed certain property to Loujen Kerper, trustee of Kerper Trust No. 
1.

[¶8.]     By the summer of 1980 
Wes Kerper had decided to remarry and called a meeting with his daughters in 
which he informed them that he desired to change his will. On July 15, 1980, an 
agreement was signed by Wes Kerper and his four daughters. The agreement 
provided that a will, executed on that date by Wes Kerper, would control the 
distribution of his property and estate and that the will was made in accordance 
with the original understanding between Wes Kerper and Hazel B. Kerper as set 
forth in their 1974 wills. The July 15, 1980 will revoked Wes's 1974 will and 
provided that upon the death of Wes Kerper, the remainder of his estate would go 
to his four daughters in equal shares.

[¶9.]     Wes Kerper died on June 
3, 1981. No contractual claims were filed against the estate by any of the 
beneficiaries of the trust or by the trustee, and there were no objections made 
to the petition for decree of distribution. Wes Kerper's estate was distributed 
in accordance with his will of July 15, 1980, with the residue and remainder of 
his estate set over to the four Kerper daughters in equal shares. The decree of 
distribution in the estate was entered on October 21, 1982.

[¶10.]  Loujen Kerper proceeded to administer the 
trust according to the terms of the October 1, 1974 trust agreement. After 
substantial family disharmony, she filed a complaint in the District Court of 
Park County, Wyoming, seeking a declaratory judgment that she had acted in 
accordance with the trust documents in making loans to herself and had otherwise 
conducted the business of the trust properly. Several beneficiaries of the 
Kerper Trust filed a counterclaim naming Loujen Kerper in her capacity as 
trustee as defendant, alleging that she had breached her duties and mismanaged 
the trust.

[¶11.]  After a motion by appellees Teren Falk, 
John Kerper Romano, Tina Romano, Stana Milodragovich and Meike Kerper, Charles 
Kepler was appointed as guardian ad litem for the minor contingent income 
beneficiaries and remaindermen of the trust. The guardian ad litem filed a 
counterclaim and crossclaim against the four Kerper daughters alleging that Wes 
Kerper had breached the contract contained in the 1974 wills by executing his 
July 15, 1980 will in which he changed the disposition of the assets of his 
estate. The guardian ad litem sought judgment against the four Kerper daughters 
requiring them to convey to the Kerper Trust No. 1 all property which they 
received from the Wes Kerper estate still owned by them, and to pay to Kerper 
Trust No. 1 an amount equal to the fair market value on October 21, 1982 (the 
date of the decree of distribution in the Wes Kerper estate) of all property 
received from the estate of Wes Kerper no longer owned by them.

[¶12.]  The guardian ad litem filed a motion for 
summary judgment on his claims on July 31, 1986. The motion was resisted by the 
trustee on several grounds including the fact that a claim against the estate 
arising from a contract to make a will had to be asserted in an independent 
action against the administrator or executor of the estate and that the 
beneficiaries had failed to challenge the distribution made in the estate of Wes 
Kerper in a timely manner.

[¶13.]  On September 22, 1986, the court granted 
the partial summary judgment filed by the guardian ad litem and imposed a 
constructive trust upon the assets received by the four Kerper daughters from 
the Wes Kerper estate. The order granting the partial summary judgment left for 
future determination the amount which the four Kerper daughters would be 
obligated to reimburse the trust.

[¶14.]  After other pretrial motions, including a 
motion for partial summary judgment by the trustee, the court issued an 
additional partial summary judgment holding that:

(1) The Declaration of 
Trust dated September 7, 1965, terminated and became distributable to the four 
Kerper daughters on September 1, 1967, and that the four Kerper daughters were 
entitled to a conveyance to them of their undivided one-fourth interest in the 
Husky oil royalty.

(2) The Amendment to 
Declaration of Trust No. 1 executed by Loujen Kerper on May 30, 1972, was not 
effective to amend the 1965 Declaration of Trust because the 1965 declaration 
had already expired by its terms and because no power to amend or modify had 
been reserved in the 1965 declaration; therefore, it was irrevocable and not 
subject to amendment or revocation.

(3) The December 15, 1967 
trust instrument was a "dry trust" because no asset or property was transferred 
to the trust at the time of its execution; therefore, the 1967 trust agreement 
was invalid for lack of a trust res at the time the trust was created. The court 
determined that a consequence of failed express trust is a resulting trust held 
by the trustee for the benefit of the settlors, Wes Kerper and Hazel Kerper. All 
assets transferred by Wes Kerper and Hazel Kerper between December 15, 1967, and 
September 17, 1973, were determined by the court to be subject to a resulting 
trust for the benefit of Wes Kerper and Hazel Kerper. These assets which were 
held by Loujen Kerper as a resulting trust became subject to and part of the 
September 17, 1973 trust instrument. The court further found that the Wyoming Principal and 
Income Act did not apply to the resulting trust or to the receipts and 
disbursements of the trust.

(4) The Supplement to 
Kerper Trust No. 1 executed by Wes Kerper and Hazel B. Kerper was ineffective as 
an attempted modification of an irrevocable trust and void ab initio because no 
power to revoke, amend or modify the September 17, 1973 trust was reserved to 
the settlors.

(5) The Wyoming Principal 
and Income Act (W.S. 2-3-601 through 2-3-614) did not apply to the September 17, 
1973 trust instrument or to the October 1, 1974 trust instrument because the 
trust granted to the trustee the power to determine the allocation of receipts 
and expenses between principal and income limited only by the standard of "good 
faith" in exercising the trustee's duties.

(6) The royalties on the 
legal treatises were held under the terms of trust whereby the Wyoming Principal and 
Income Act did not apply to the distribution of the royalties and that all 
receipts or income from the royalties on these books were to be distributed to 
the income beneficiaries.

[¶15.]  Based on the pretrial holdings, it 
appeared the court determined that instead of there being one trustee of one 
trust, as all the parties apparently assumed was the case before this lawsuit 
was filed, there were four separate trusts. Each of these trusts contained 
different assets and each was to be administered under different terms. (See 
footnote 1).

[¶16.]  The trust assets included stock in Costa 
Rican companies. In 1985-1986 the trustee incurred substantial professional and 
consultant fees in attempting to conduct a liquidation of the Costa Rican 
assets. That transaction was finalized in late September 1986.

[¶17.]  During the same time period the trustee 
signed a purchase offer on land in Hawaii and made a down payment on the deal. 
The trial court orally entered a restraining order effective October 6, 1986, 
restraining Loujen Kerper from expending, transferring or otherwise disposing of 
any trust money, property or assets until further order of the court. No bond 
was filed, no written motion was ever made requesting a restraining order and 
the parties were not given notice that a restraining order might be issued at 
that time. A written restraining order confirming all of this was entered on 
October 23, 1986. On October 21, 1986, the trustee filed a petition asking 
permission to transfer money out of trust assets to complete the land deal, but 
the court did not allow that and the down payment was forfeited.

[¶18.]  The case went to trial and the district 
court entered an order removing Loujen Kerper as trustee, appointing First 
Wyoming Bank of Cody as the successor trustee, requiring Loujen Kerper to 
deliver all of the trust property to the successor trustee, surcharging Loujen 
Kerper for $75,200 by reason of her expenditure of trust funds in connection 
with the contract for the purchase of Hawaii lands, surcharging Loujen Kerper 
for $86,300 for expenditures and property transferred to Russell Karaviotis in 
connection with his assistance in liquidating the Costa Rican assets and 
surcharging Loujen Kerper an additional $47,901 paid to other professionals in 
connection with the administration of the trust.

[¶19.]  The district court's order also required 
the four Kerper daughters to transfer that portion of the estate of Wes Kerper 
transferred to them under the 1981 decree of distribution in the W.G. Kerper 
estate to the trust, and imposed liability on them for an amount equal to 
one-fourth of $326,987.38 less the value of the property reconveyed by the 
Kerper daughters to the trustee.

I

[¶20.]  The appellants complain that "[t]he 
District Court improperly surcharged the trustee without finding that the 
trustee had failed to act in good faith."

[¶21.]  Appellants contend that the settlor of 
the trusts limited the liability of the trustee and that the trial court did not 
use the proper standard in determining the trustee's liability. Generally the 
trustee of an express trust must act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to 
trust property. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 at 6 (1959). The common law 
duty of loyalty is the fundamental duty from which each more specific trustee's 
duty is derived. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 at 364 (1959). A trustee 
is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such 
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his 
own property. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 at 379 (1959). However, the 
settlor of an express trust has the right to modify the fiduciary duties that 
ordinarily govern the administration of a trust.

"By the terms of the 
trust the trustee may be permitted to do what in the absence of such a provision 
in the trust instrument would be a violation of his duty of loyalty." A. Scott, 
The Law of Trusts, § 170.9 at 1321 (1967).

[¶22.]  Kerper Trust No. 1, dated October 1, 
1974, grants Loujen, as trustee, certain powers. That trust reads in relevant 
part as follows:

"4. The trustee shall 
have the following powers to be exercised in a fiduciary capacity and shall not 
be liable for loss if they are exercised in good faith." (Emphasis 
added.)

Paragraph 3 of Kerper 
Trust No. 1, dated September 17, 1973, makes a similar recitation as that in the 
1974 trust.

[¶23.]  In addition to the limitation on 
liability indicated above, appellants direct our attention to other provisions 
in the October 1, 1974 trust as follows:

(a) Has no obligation to 
increase the trust corpus;

(b) Has to distribute 
both ordinary income and capital gain income;

(c) Has the power to 
reinvest accumulated income of the trust;

(d) Has the express power 
to deal with herself;

(e) Has no duty for 
accounting, except upon a beneficiary's written request, and even then only upon 
an arrival basis.

[¶24.]  Appellants assert that the release from 
liability contained in the October 1, 1974 trust and the September 17, 1973 
trust together with the recitations in the October 1, 1974 trust set out above 
(a through e) expressly modified other fiduciary duties.

[¶25.]  We hold that the provision in the two 
trusts "shall not be liable for loss if they are exercised in good faith" is a 
limitation on liability. The recitations in the October 1, 1974 trust set out 
above (a through e) are a delineation of some duties and powers of the trustee. 
The limitation on liability and the delineation of powers and duties in 
combination, however, do not modify ordinary fiduciary duties of the trustee 
except as specifically provided in the trust. The district court properly 
considered the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, W.S. 2-3-201 through 2-3-211, so far as 
that Act sets out a standard of care and skill for the trustee.

[¶26.]  Although the requirements of care and 
skill may be relaxed or modified, "[a] provision in the terms of the trust 
fixing a standard of care or skill lower than that which would otherwise be 
required of a trustee is strictly construed." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
174, comment d at 380 (1959).

"It is unthinkable that a 
trustee not have the obligations of a fiduciary. See Uniform Fiduciary Act; § 
4-1-101, et seq., W.S. 1977 [now W.S. 2-3-201]. A trustee cannot by agreement 
escape the fiduciary obligations of a trustee under Wyoming statutory 
provisions." Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159, 167-168 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶27.]  There are sound reasons for strictly 
construing provisions in a trust that may appear to lower and modify the 
standard of care and skill in administering a trust. Such modifications or 
lowering of the standard is a departure from common law. If the standard of 
care, skill and honesty is to be diminished - how much? Also, how much neglect 
can be tolerated?

[¶28.]  We have carefully examined the trust 
instruments and, except for the provision allowing the trustee to deal with 
herself, cannot otherwise find a clear indication by the settlors directing that 
duties of the trustee be lowered and modified. It seems clear, however, that the 
settlors intended that the liability of the trustee be modified in the event of 
mismanagement.

[¶29.]  Apparently the district court was of the 
opinion that the trustee should be liable for mismanagement of the trust whether 
or not she acted in good faith. In its conclusions, among other things, the 
court determined:

"29. Even though the Trustee may have acted in 
good faith or under a mistake as to the extent of her duties and powers, the 
violation or neglect of her duties as Trustee does constitute a breach of trust 
for which the Trustee may be removed. "

30. The use by the 
Trustee of $68,000.00 of trust funds, together with the expenditure of an 
additional $7,200.00, all in connection with a contract for the purchase of 
Hawaiian lands, did not show and was not in accordance with the standard of judgment and care under the 
circumstances which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the 
management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard 
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as 
well as the probable safety of their capital. As a result, Loujen Kerper, as Trustee, 
may be surcharged for such investment and expenditures.

"31. The Trustee had the 
burden to prove that her contract with Mr. Karaviotis was reasonable, was of 
benefit to the trust, was in good faith, and was within the judgment and care under 
the circumstances then prevailing which men of prudence, discretion and 
intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs.

"32. Loujen Kerper, as 
Trustee, has not fulfilled her burden of proof with respect to the 
reasonableness, benefit to the trust, or prudence in executing the contract with 
Mr. Karaviotis or making payments to him or for him or in transferring stock to 
him." (Emphasis added.)

[¶30.]  It is evident from the district court's 
conclusions stated in paragraphs 29 through 32 that it did not give effect to 
the settlors' intent to limit the trustee's liability for the administration of 
the trust. Instead it incorrectly used the reasonably prudent man standard to 
find the trustee liable to the trust because she did not establish that she met 
that standard. The court in effect ruled that the trustee's good faith was 
immaterial if she did not meet the reasonably prudent man standard and 
incorrectly imposed surcharges against the trustee and disallowed expenses of 
administration without first finding that the trustee did not act in good 
faith.

[¶31.]  Although it is somewhat of a departure 
from our usual appellate review role, we are convinced that the record will 
sustain only one conclusion, i.e., that Loujen Kerper's administration of the 
trust was fully consistent with the good faith standard which must be used to 
test her management of the trust. Therefore, we reverse all provisions of the 
district court's order surcharging Loujen for mismanagement of the 
trust.

II

[¶32.]  On May 25, 1974, Hazel Kerper executed a 
will containing the following pertinent language:

"2. I give, devise and 
bequeath to my husband W.G. Kerper if he survives me all right, title and 
interest I have at the time of my death in the residence real property located 
at 2018 Avenue S, Huntsville, Texas with improvements, water rights and 
appurtenances, subject to any existing mortgage obligation against said 
property.

"3. I give, devise and 
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate of 
whatever kind and wherever situate in trust to the trustee under Kerper Trust 
No. 1 dated September 17, 1973, to be added to and become a part of the corpus 
of said trust and to be held, managed, administered and distributed according to 
the terms and conditions thereof.

* * * * * *

"5. This is one of two 
reciprocal contract wills and is executed and attested by me in consideration of 
the agreement now made with my husband that he execute and attest a contract 
will reciprocal to this one, and that neither this will nor my husband's 
reciprocal will shall be changed, altered or modified during the lifetime of 
either of us except by mutual agreement."

All of the 
parties to these appeals agree that Wes Kerper executed a will containing 
similar provisions on the same day.

[¶33.]  In its September 22, 1986 summary 
judgment order the district court found the 1974 wills to be mutual and reciprocal and found the language in 
paragraph 3 to be evidence of an express contract between Wes and Hazel Kerper 
for the disposition of their estates. Appellant Loujen Kerper challenges these 
findings, urging that the 1974 wills are not reciprocal and that the findings 
were incomplete to establish a binding contract. Since the material facts 
involved in this issue are not in dispute we review this summary judgment order, 
as incorporated into the final judgment, in terms of alleged errors of law. 
Fitch v. Buffalo Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, 751 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶34.]  This court summarized the definitions of 
joint, reciprocal and mutual wills in Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Wyo. 
1979), when we said:

"Although the courts have 
not been uniform in their use and definitions of the terms, we define `joint' 
wills, `reciprocal' wills, and `mutual' wills as follows: A `joint' will is a 
single testamentary instrument constituting or containing the wills of two or 
more persons, and jointly executed by them. `Reciprocal' wills are those in 
which each of two or more testators makes a testamentary disposition in favor of 
the other. `Mutual' wills are two or more separate instruments, each executed by 
separate testators and manifesting a common intention to dispose of their 
property in a particular manner. We do not include as part of the definition of 
a mutual will, as some courts do, the elements of execution by each testator 
pursuant to an agreement, each in consideration of the other. 1 Bowe-Parker: 
Page On Wills, §§ 11.1 and 11.3; 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1364e(1); 79 Am.Jur.2d, 
Wills, § 754."

Also quoted in 
Matter of Estate of Bell, 726 P.2d 71, 74 (Wyo. 1986). Based on these simple definitions 
we hold that the Kerper's 1974 wills were reciprocal in devising title to the 
Texas 
residence to one another, and mutual in establishing a common plan for 
disposition of the residue of their respective estates.

[¶35.]  In Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d  at 1324, we 
intimated that mutual wills, which recited a contract to dispose of spousal 
estates, might be evidence of such a contract sufficient in itself to establish 
its existence. For such a contract to be valid it must otherwise comply with the 
law of contracts in Wyoming. There must be an offer and acceptance 
along with bargained for and exchanged valuable consideration. See W. Jaeger, 
Williston On Contracts § 119B at 493-494 (3d ed. 1957). Valuable consideration 
in this context may consist of a spousal exchange of mutual promises, which 
promises impose a legal liability upon each promisor. Williston On Contracts, § 
370 at 908-913; and Schmidt v. Foster, 380 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1963).

[¶36.]  Shook also quoted Flohr v. Walker, 520 P.2d 833, 837 (Wyo. 1974), where we said:

"The general rule seems 
to be that a joint and mutual will executed pursuant to an agreement based on 
valuable consideration is contractual as well as testamentary and becomes an 
irrevocable obligation on the part of the surviving testator upon the death of 
the other party testate under a will which is in accord with the terms of the 
agreement. In re Estate of Wade, 202 Kan. 380, 449 P.2d 488, 493; Godwin v. 
Wachovia Bank & Trust Company, 259 N.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 456, 462-463; Alocco 
v. Fouche, 190 Cal. App. 2d 244, 11 Cal. Rptr. 818, 822; 57 Am.Jur. Wills, § 712; 
97 C.J.S. Wills, § 1367e(2), p. 307."

This does not 
mean that a will containing such a contract is irrevocable in and of itself 
after it is executed. A will is ambulatory and may be revoked pursuant to 
statutory requirements at any time. See W.S. 2-6-117. It does mean, however, 
that where a surviving spouse revokes the mutual contract will and makes a new 
disposition of the property in his estate he has violated the contract with his 
deceased spouse. In this regard, this court long ago quoted with approval the 
rule set forth in Brown v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949):

"Where two parties agreed 
to make mutual wills, each promising to dispose of his property to the other or, 
if the other be dead, to certain third persons, and one of the parties performs 
by leaving his property to the other, the intended devisees and legatees are 
entitled to enforce their rights as beneficiaries under the agreement. The 
contracting party who survives becomes estopped from making any other or 
different disposition of the property, and his obligations under the agreement become absolutely 
irrevocable and enforceable against him, at least where he avails himself of the 
provisions of decedent's will in his favor and accepts substantial benefits 
thereunder." (Emphasis added.) (Adopted in In re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 
389, 406, 343 P.2d 508, 514, rehearing denied and opinion modified, 80 Wyo. 389, 
345 P.2d 786 (1959); also quoted in Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d at 
1323).

We went on to 
state:

"We said in Stringer, 
supra, adopting the holding in Schomp v. Brown, 215 Or. 714, 335 P.2d 847, that 
mutual or reciprocal wills, even though revoked, will stand as evidence of the 
contract. The agreement which provides 
the underpinning for the contractual wills is irrevocable if the survivor takes 
advantage of the provisions of the will made by the other. We noted in In re 
Stringer's Estate, quoting from Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 456, 240 P. 927, 
43 A.L.R. 1010, 1014 and authorities therein contained, that agreements to make 
mutual and reciprocal wills between husband and wife should be favored. 80 
Wyo. at 407, 
343 P.2d  at 514." (Citations omitted and emphasis added.) Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d  at 
1324.

The district 
court correctly found that Wes and Hazel Kerper could execute a valid contract 
to dispose of their estates in mutual wills and that one of those wills can 
stand as evidence of such a written contract. Paragraph 3 of Hazel Kerper's 1974 
mutual will fits this description.

[¶37.]  Before we can apply the language on Shook 
v. Bell to these 
cases, we must address appellants' challenges to the terms of the 1974 will 
contract. Appellants argue that the terms of the contract are ambiguous and 
should be reinterpreted by this court in conformance with extrinsic evidence, 
reversing the conclusions of the trial court. We disagree.

[¶38.]  The contract consists of paragraph 3 of 
Hazel Kerpers' 1974 mutual will, set out above, and a document titled "Kerper 
Trust No. 1" executed September 17, 1973, incorporated by reference in the 1974 
wills. The pertinent provisions in that trust document read as 
follows:

"KERPER TRUST NO. 
1

"THIS KERPER TRUST NO. 1 
executed September 17, 1973 by and between W.G. Kerper and Hazel B. Kerper as 
grantors and Loujen Kerper as trustee WITNESSETH

"1. Grantors from time to 
time will assign, convey and deliver to the trustee properties which may include 
cash, securities, real estate and other properties to be held in trust by the 
trustee for the purpose and upon the terms herein provided.

"2. The trustee shall 
hold, manage, invest and reinvest the trust properties and shall collect the 
income thereof and dispose of the net income and principal as 
follows:

"The net income shall be paid not less often 
than semiannually in equal shares to grantors' daughters, Minabelle [Meike] 
Kerper Milodragovich, Loujen Kerper, Janeen Kerper and Jill Kerper Lennon for 
their lifetimes respectively. Upon the death of any of them except the last to 
die the payment to which such decedent would have been entitled shall go in 
equal shares per stirpes to her children surviving until the death of the last 
daughter of grantors; and if any said daughter dies without children then the 
payment to which she would have been entitled shall go to the surviving 
daughters of grantors in equal shares. Upon the death of the last of grantors' 
daughters to die all principal and accumulated income of this trust shall be 
distributed in equal shares to the grandchildren of grantors then surviving per 
capita and not per stirpes. Net income herein means both ordinary income and 
capital gain income less usual necessary expense incurred in administering the 
trust or producing such income. The trustee has no obligation to increase the 
trust corpus.

* * * * * *

"7. This Kerper Trust No. 
1 supersedes and takes the place of the following documents all of which are 
modified and merged into this Kerper Trust No. 1: "declaration of trust executed 
September 7, 1965 by Loujen Kerper Kuiva (now Loujen Kerper)

"trust agreement executed 
December 15, 1967 by and between W.G. Kerper and Hazel B. Kerper as grantors and 
Loujen Bereman (now Loujen Kerper) as trustee "amended declaration of trust no. 
1 executed May 30, 1972 by Loujen Bereman (now Loujen Kerper)

"and all properties held 
by the trustee under any of the above 
documents shall hereafter be held and administered by trustee 
hereunder.

"THIS KERPER TRUST NO. 1 
binds the heirs, devisees and personal representatives of the 
parties.

"EXECUTED the date first 
written above."

This use of a 
trust in a will is expressly authorized by statute. See W.S. 
2-6-103.

[¶39.]  Established contract law of Wyoming governs our 
review of this agreement. When an agreement is put into writing, it may consist 
of more than one document; if an extraneous document is specifically referenced 
in a contract, that reference renders the document part of the written 
agreement. Hensley v. Williams, 726 P.2d 90, 94 (Wyo. 1986); Busch Development, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 645 P.2d 65, 68 (Wyo. 1982). The intent of the parties to a 
clear and unambiguous written agreement will be derived from the entire writing 
and determined as a matter of law. State Farm and Casualty Company v. Paulson, 
756 P.2d 764, 766 (Wyo. 1988); Wangler v. 
Federer, 714 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Wyo. 1986). Extrinsic evidence will not be 
used to contradict the plain meaning of a clear and unambiguous written 
agreement. Nelson v. Nelson, 740 P.2d 939, 940 (Wyo. 1987); Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74, 78 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶40.]  We hold that the contract established by 
Wes and Hazel Kerpers' 1974 mutual wills, and the document titled "Kerper Trust 
No. 1" executed September 17, 1973, evidence a valid and binding written 
contract between Wes and Hazel Kerper that the survivor would not change his 
will, and that he would dispose of his estates according to the terms of the 
1974 wills. That contract is clear and unambiguous as written.

[¶41.]  In making this holding we reject the 
argument of some of the appellants that the existence of an extrinsic document 
titled "Supplement To Kerper Trust No. 1," executed at the same time as the 1974 
mutual wills, creates an ambiguity in the terms of the contract. The alleged 
ambiguity stems from the fact that the supplement identifies previous trust agreements 
executed by Wes, Hazel and/or Loujen Kerper, which contain terms of distribution 
for assets of the Kerper estates that are inconsistent with those expressed in 
"Kerper Trust No. 1" executed September 17, 1973. We cannot accept this argument 
because it is premised on information contained in an extrinsic document being 
used by appellants to contradict the terms of a clear and unambiguous written 
agreement. The contract in question must be ambiguous before we resort to such 
evidence. See Wangler v. Federer, 714 P.2d  at 1212. Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law. Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987). This court 
will not rewrite a clear and unambiguous written contract under the guise of 
interpretation. Arnold v. Mountain West Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 166 (Wyo. 1985). Similarly, 
our holding on the plain meaning of the Kerper's 1974 will contract preempts 
other appellants' arguments that it is in some way ambiguous.

[¶42.]  With this in mind we apply the language 
in Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d 1320 to the contract established 
in the 1974 mutual wills. To be bound by the contract, Wes Kerper must have 
"taken advantage of the provisions of the will," Shook v. Bell at 1324, thereby 
receiving consideration for his part of the contract. Appellants argue that this 
phrase means Wes Kerper must have received and accepted direct material benefit 
under the provisions of Hazel Kerper's 1974 mutual will upon her death. They 
assert that Wes Kerper did not accept this kind of benefit upon probate of his 
wife's estate in 1975 and therefore was not bound under Shook. Appellants are 
construing the word benefit too narrowly.

[¶43.]  Determining whether one of two 
testator/spouses to mutual contract wills takes advantage of such a will after 
the other spouse dies depends upon the nature of the provisions in the deceased 
spouse's will. If that will directs that the surviving spouse is to receive a 
direct material benefit under the will, the surviving spouse takes advantage of 
it when he accepts that benefit. Receipt of the benefit provides the 
consideration necessary to make the concurrent will contract binding under Shook 
v. Bell, 599 P.2d 1320. Likewise, when spouses execute mutual contract wills, which direct 
that a deceased spouse's estate is to be transferred to a trust that they both 
execute for the benefit of their children and grandchildren, the surviving 
spouse benefits when the transfer of the deceased spouse's assets to the trust 
is accomplished. In the latter situation, the surviving spouse is having his 
wishes regarding the disposition of the deceased spouse's estate fulfilled, and 
therefore, receives a benefit.

[¶44.]  A benefit is not always material, and 
appellants have not cited any authority to this court that even impliedly 
refutes this application of the "takes advantage" language in Shook v. Bell. We have found 
authority, however, applying the above interpretation of the word "benefit" in 
this context. See, e.g., Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Leaptrot, 225 
Ga. 783, 171 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1969); Schomp v. Brown, 215 Or. 714, 335 P.2d 847, 850, reh. 
denied and opinion clarified 215 Or. 714, 337 P.2d 358 (1959); Ankeny v. Lieuallen, 169 
Or. 206, 113 P.2d 1113, 1118 (1941), dismissed on rehearing 169 Or. 206, 127 P.2d 735 (1942).

[¶45.]  In these cases, Wes Kerper wanted the 
assets in Hazel Kerper's estate to become part of Kerper Trust No. 1, executed 
September 17, 1973, upon her death. He realized that desire upon probate of her 
estate under her 1974 mutual will. As a result, he took advantage of the 
provisions of her 1974 mutual contract will and is bound by the contract he made 
with her. Shook v. Bell, supra.

[¶46.]  Having affirmed the existence of a valid, 
binding, clear and unambiguous written contract between Wes and Hazel Kerper, we 
next review the trial court's findings that Wes Kerper breached that contract. 
On July 15, 1980, after remarrying to Mildred I. Franks, Wes Kerper executed a 
new will revoking the 1974 mutual contract will and directing that his estate be 
dispersed upon his death as follows:

"I, Wesley G. Kerper also 
known as W.G. Kerper a resident of Cody, Park County, Wyoming hereby make, publish and declare this 
my last will and testament.

* * * * * *

"2. I give, devise and 
bequeath to my wife Mildred I. Kerper all properties and investments in joint 
ownership with her either as joint tenants, tenants by the entireties or tenants 
in common if she survives me, and if not in equal shares to my children 
surviving. By this bequest it is my intention to bequeath to Mildred I. Kerper 
those assets acquired with the income from my separate estate received 
subsequent to the death of my wife, Hazel B. Kerper.

"3. I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, 
residue and remainder of my property and estate of whatever kind and wherever 
situate in equal shares to my daughters, Minabelle [Meike] Kerper, Loujen 
Kerper, Janeen Kerper and Jill Kerper Lennon, an undivided one fourth thereof to 
each; and if any predeceases me the share she would have taken shall go in equal 
shares to her children surviving and if none in equal shares to my other 
daughters surviving.

* * * * *

"5. This will is made 
with reference to and to carry out more specifically in accordance with the 
original agreement and contract the provisions of the reciprocal contract will 
executed by me on May 25, 1974.

* * * * * *

"7. I revoke all former 
will and testamentary papers made by me.

"I, Wesley G. Kerper also 
known as W.G. Kerper, testator, being first duly sworn sign my name to this 
instrument this day and hereby declare to the undersigned authority that I sign 
and execute this instrument as my last will; that I sign it willingly and 
execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and 
that I am an adult person of sound mind and under no constraint or undue 
influence.

"DATED July 15, 
1980."

Contemporaneous 
with this 1980 will, Wes Kerper and his four daughters entered into a written 
agreement which read:

"THIS AGREEMENT executed 
July 15, 1980 by and between Wesley G. Kerper also known as W.G. Kerper herein 
called W.G. and Minabelle [Meike] Kerper, Loujen Kerper, Janeen Kerper and Jill 
Kerper Lennon herein called Kerper children WITNESSETH

"WHEREAS on May 25, 1974 
W.G. and Hazel B. Kerper then husband and wife executed reciprocal contract 
wills leaving substantially all property owned by them to Kerper Trust No. 1 
dated October 1, 1974; and

"WHEREAS in accordance 
with the original understanding between W.G. and Hazel B. Kerper a later will 
dated July 15, 1980 has been executed and attested by W.G.

"NOW THEREFORE in 
consideration of love and affection and other valuable consideration it is 
hereby agreed as follows:

"1. The later will 
executed by W.G. on July 15, 1980 shall control in the disposition of his 
properties and estate and any provisions of his reciprocal contract will dated 
May 25, 1974 that may be contrary or inconsistent with the last will executed 
July 15, 1980 shall be modified to carry out the provisions of his last will, 
copy of which is annexed as Exhibit A.

"2. In accordance with 
the original understanding between W.G. Kerper and Hazel B. Kerper and in 
further accordance with the antenuptial agreement dated September 16, 1975 
between Mildred I. Franks and W.G. Kerper, W.G. agrees that assets owned by W.G. 
prior to his marriage to Mildred I. Franks are his separate property and that 
none of these assets shall be converted into any form of joint ownership with 
Mildred I. Kerper, nor to her individually.

"3. Kerper children and 
each of them hereby waive and relinquish all provisions in said contract will of 
May 25, 1974 executed by W.G. that may be contrary or inconsistent with the last 
will executed by him on July 15, 1980 and agree specifically to be bound by the 
terms of said last will.

"This agreement binds and 
inures to the benefit of the parties, their heirs, devises and personal 
representatives.

"EXECUTED the date first 
written above."

Wes Kerper did 
acknowledge the existence of his contract will with Hazel in these documents. 
The 1980 will revokes all prior wills, and along with the agreement with the 
four daughters, requires that the portion of Wes Kerper's estate in existence 
when he entered the 1974 contract was to be distributed in equal shares to the 
four daughters outright upon his death and the grandchildren would take only if 
their mother was deceased.

[¶47.]  We have held that the 1974 wills 
constituted a contract. The final issue we must now address is whether Wes 
Kerper's 1980 will constituted a breach of that contract. We hold that it did 
not. The remedy employed by the district court, i.e., imposition of a 
constructive trust and requiring reimbursement to the trust of the assets 
distributed to the four Kerper daughters under the 1980 will, does vindicate the 
literal language of the 1974 contract will but it does so at the price of 
imposing a burden on the daughters that is the antithesis of the spirit, as well 
as the letter, of the elder Kerpers' efforts to provide for their daughters. 
Although we declined to consider the extrinsic documents and evidence in 
construing the unambiguous language of the 1974 wills, we are constrained to 
consider it in determining whether Wes Kerper's 1980 will was a breach of that 
contract. To do otherwise would result in our condoning a remedy which ravages 
the lives of the daughters who were the primary, if not the only real, focus of 
Wes and Hazel Kerper's estate plan. We hold that Wes Kerper's 1980 will 
substantially complied with the contract he entered into with Hazel Kerper. See 
Corbin, Contracts, Chapter 36 (1963). To the extent the grandchildren had an 
expectancy under the contract, that expectancy was realized in the form of 
benefits flowing directly to their mothers and indirectly to them as dependents 
of their mothers and as the natural heirs of their mothers' estates. A 
conclusion that the grandchildren would be better off had Wes Kerper performed 
his contract more literally is speculative, counterproductive, produces an 
absurd result and cannot be sustained under the unique circumstances of this 
case.

[¶48.]  Many dissenting opinions recently issuing 
from this court are disturbing because of their sarcastic nature, ridicule of 
the majority and silly references to nursery rhymes. The dissents in this case 
continue the pattern. There is a total refusal to even acknowledge that a 
doctrine of substantial performance exists, though it is found in 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts, § 375, commencing at ; in Corpus Juris Secundum; and in thousands of 
cited cases. The dissents portray the majority opinion as having sold out the 
law to produce a result. We do not understand the use of such intemperate 
language amongst the brethren of this court. It is the sort of small-mindedness 
that says to us, "if you don't agree with me, you are not only wrong but stupid 
as well." Why is it that the disagreement must be so acerbic? It would be enough 
to disagree and state plainly the reasons why. I suspect that the need to employ 
such unfair and intemperate criticism arises mainly from lack of any substantive 
defense for the arguments presented. It seems that dissents have become an 
excuse to be cute? witty? sarcastic? appeal to base instincts? a forum for views 
that merely pollute the reporter system rather than the statement of 
disagreement, hopefully based on law, that they are intended to be.

[¶49.]  The syllogism employed by the dissent, if 
indeed it is a syllogism, mistakes the holding of the opinion. The tirade of the 
companion dissent is patently wrong. The holding of the court is 
that:

1. Wes Kerper made a 
contract with his wife.

2. He substantially 
performed the contract.

3. He acted in good 
faith, received no benefit, and took none of the property for himself that he 
and Hazel agreed should go to their children.

4. He did not, therefore, 
breach the contract.

[¶50.]  Justices Brown and Thomas would apply the 
law mechanically and without regard to any accommodation for practicality. A 
principle of justice and, perhaps of the "law" as well, is that where the reason 
for the law ends so should the law (cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex). 
The assertion that this decision is not supported by logic is at best absurd. 
How can it be illogical to conclude that Wes Kerper's actions, which do no 
violence to his children's lives and which satisfy the primary intent of Wes and 
Hazel to provide for the future security and well-being of their own children, 
are illogical? It may be argued that what Wes did was not substantial 
performance, but it can never be argued that such a principle does not exist or 
that it is inapplicable in this case, however one might come out after analyzing 
the case in the light of that principle.

[¶51.]  This court will better serve the public, 
the law, and its own credibility if an effort is made to return the dissenting 
opinions to their proper role. Until that occurs, we are compelled to observe 
that the dissents are like Mother Hubbard who went to the cupboard and found it 
bare. They likewise are bare of logic or law to support their position; thus, 
the necessity for ridicule, sarcasm and supposedly clever 
witticisms.

[¶52.]  We hold, therefore, that the provisions 
of the district court's order directing reimbursement to the trust of the 
assets, or the value thereof, received by the Kerper daughters under the 1980 
will is reversed.

III

[¶53.]  In its September 8, 1987 findings and 
conclusions the district court determined that

"[t]he hostility and 
animosity between Loujen Kerper as Trustee and Meike Kerper, a beneficiary of 
the trust, is such that it does interfere with proper administration of the 
trust and does constitute a ground for removal of Loujen Kerper as 
Trustee.

"18. The animosity and 
hostility between Loujen Kerper, Janeen Kerper and Jill Kerper, on one hand, and 
Meike Kerper on the other hand, has reached a level that future cooperation and 
proper administration of the trust is improbable unless Loujen Kerper is removed 
as Trustee and an independent Trustee is appointed as successor 
Trustee.

* * * * * *

"54. The removal or 
retention of a Trustee should be decided on what is in the best interest of the 
beneficiaries."

The trial court 
went on to order Loujen to turn over all trust property and records to the First 
Wyoming Bank of Cody as successor trustee.

[¶54.]  Appellants Janeen and Jill Kerper argue 
that the trial court should not have removed Loujen as trustee because of 
alleged familial hostility. Loujen also joins her sisters in arguing that the 
trial court did not have a sufficient factual basis to conclude that there was 
enough animosity between the four Kerper daughters to justify removing Loujen as 
trustee.

[¶55.]  Generally, social or familial hostility 
between the trustee and one or more beneficiaries of a trust is insufficient in 
and of itself to warrant removal of a trustee. The real question in these 
situations is whether or not the hostility, in combination with existing 
circumstances, materially interferes with the administration of the trust or is 
likely to cause that result. See cases cited in Annotation, Hostility Between 
Trustee and Beneficiary as Ground for Removal, 63 A.L.R.2d 523, 525-526 (1959) 
and 62-66 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service at 270-271; G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts 
and Trustees § 527 at 86-94 (Rev.2d ed. 1978). The power of a district court to 
remove a trustee for these or other reasons is rooted in equity, and the court 
has sound discretion to make a determination as to removal. W.S. 2-3-210; 63 
A.L.R.2d supra at 531 and 62-66 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service at 271-272. We will 
not disturb an exercise of district court discretion unless its actions are 
shown to have been made arbitrarily and capriciously and in disregard of the use 
of sound judgment regarding what is right under the circumstances. Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶56.]  In these cases the district court 
determined that sufficient hostility existed between Meike Kerper and the 
trustee to warrant removal of Loujen as trustee. We disagree with the appellants 
who claim that Meike's testimony was the only evidence in the record supporting 
that decision. Several of the district court's findings of fact also figure into 
the hostility equation. The court specifically found as facts that the trustee's 
activities concerning: her sister Meike's use and upkeep of the family cabin, 
the contents of letters between the trustee and the beneficiaries, the trustee's 
noncompliance with discovery orders and the trustee's removal of the Husky oil 
royalty from the jurisdiction of the court while these cases were pending, all 
evidenced animosity between Meike Kerper and the trustee. Cf. Dennis v. Rhode 
Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 901 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding 
that the course of litigation itself can demonstrate hostility sufficient to 
warrant removal of a trustee). These facts, as found by the district court, 
clearly support a legal conclusion that the hostility between Meike and Loujen 
had the potential to adversely affect the proper administration of the trust and 
therefore supports the court's order removing Loujen as trustee on that basis. 
We do not, however, see sufficient findings of fact in this record to support 
the conclusion that any hostility and animosity that exists between Meike and 
her sisters Jill and Janeen warrants appointment of an independent trustee at 
this time.

[¶57.]  With that holding in mind, we briefly 
address appellants' argument that the express language of the October 1, 1974 
trust gave the four Kerper daughters the exclusive right to determine among 
themselves which person or entity would replace Loujen as trustee if that 
situation ever occurred. This argument is based on the following language from 
the trust document executed on October 1, 1974:

"8. If the trustee or any 
successor trustee dies, resigns or fails 
to serve as trustee a successor trustee shall be appointed by the daughter or 
daughters of grantors then surviving. If a vacancy occurs in the position of 
trustee by reason of the death of the 
last of grantors' daughters to die or for other reasons, then First State 
Bank, Cody, Wyoming [now First Wyoming Bank of Cody] shall 
be the successor trustee to carry out the provisions of the trust." (Emphasis 
added.)

Appellants 
contend that the district court's reason for removing Loujen as trustee, 
animosity between the trustee and one of the beneficiaries, falls under the 
"dies, resigns or fails to serve as trustee" language quoted above. Appellees 
say that the court's reason for removing Loujen as trustee falls within the "for 
other reasons" language of the same paragraph.

[¶58.]  This disagreement over the meaning of the 
words in paragraph 8 of the 1974 trust must be resolved with the goal 
effectuating the intention of the settlors. When possible that intent is to be 
ascertained from the words in the trust instrument if they can be given meaning 
that will not defeat the general purpose for establishing the trust. First 
National Bank & Trust Company of Wyoming v. 
Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo. 1973). Also relevant to this discussion 
is Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 108 at 238 (1959), which states:

"If a trust is created 
and there is no trustee or if the trustee, or one of several trustees, ceases 
for any reason to be trustee, a new trustee can be appointed

"(a) by a proper court; 
or

"(b) by the person, if any, who by the terms of 
the trust is authorized to appoint a trustee." (Emphasis added.)

[¶59.]  Giving the words quoted in paragraph 8 
plain meaning, we hold that the district court's removal of Loujen as trustee 
falls within the "or fails to serve" language, thereby requiring that a 
replacement trustee be chosen by the Kerper daughters. We hold that the "for 
other reasons" language is too vague to apply in this situation when the "fails 
to serve" language can be applied through normal usage. That portion of the 
district court's order appointing the First Wyoming Bank of Cody successor 
trustee is reversed.

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

BROWN, J., Ret., filed an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which THOMAS, J., 
joined.

FOOTNOTES

1 In addition to the 
September 7, 1965 trust and the October 1, 1974 trust Hazel, Wes and their 
daughter, Loujen Kerper, also participated in the execution of the following 
documents:

a. A trust executed 
December 15, 1967, by Hazel and Wes as grantors, and Loujen as trustee, covering 
assets to be transferred into the trust later. It provided for semiannual 
distribution of trust income to the four Kerper daughters in equal fourths, and 
upon the death of any daughter her fourth to go to her children per stirpes. If 
a deceased daughter died without children then her fourth was to be divided 
equally among the surviving Kerper daughters. Upon the death of the last Kerper 
daughter to die the trust corpus was to be distributed to the grandchildren per 
capita.

b. A trust executed May 
30, 1972, by Loujen Bereman Kerper as trustee concerning the Husky royalty. This 
trust made that royalty subject to the same terms of distribution described in 
paragraph (a) above.

c. A trust executed May 
30, 1972, by Loujen Bereman Kerper as trustee concerning royalties accruing to 
Hazel Kerper on publication of her book titled "Introduction to the Criminal 
Justice System" (book royalties). This trust provided that Jill Kerper Lennon 
was to receive $300 per month beginning September 1, 1972, and ending September 
1, 1974. Money remaining after those payments was to be transferred to and 
distributed in conformance with the terms of distribution in paragraph (a) 
above.

d. An Amended Declaration 
of Trust No. 2 executed April 2, 1973, concerning the book royalties. This trust 
provided for semiannual payments of $1800 to daughter Jill Kerper Lennon through 
September 1, 1974. Money remaining after those payments up to $5400 annually was 
to be distributed in three equal shares to the other Kerper daughters. Excess 
remaining after payment of that $7200 annually was to be transferred to the May 
30, 1972 Amended Declaration of Trust No. 1 and distributed according to its 
terms.

e. An assignment and 
declaration of trust executed July 11, 1973, by Hazel and daughter Janeen Kerper 
concerning royalties receivable from publication of a book titled "Legal Rights 
of the Convicted" written by Hazel Kerper. Two-fifths of these royalties were to 
be held by Loujen Kerper pursuant to the terms of the May 30, 1972 Amended 
Declaration of Trust No. 1 and distributed according to its terms.

f. Kerper Trust No. 1, 
executed September 17, 1973, by Hazel and Wes Kerper as grantors and Loujen 
Kerper as trustee. Provisions of this trust relevant to these cases are quoted 
later in the text of the opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶60.]  I, too, must dissent from the resolution 
of the issues according to part II of the majority opinion. Expressed as a 
syllogism, that aspect of the majority opinion must be stated as:

·        
Wes Kerper made a 
contract with his wife, Hazel, to dispose of his property in a particular way in 
his will.

·        
Wes Kerper disposed of 
his property in a different way in his will.

·        
Therefore, Wes Kerper 
performed his contract with his wife.

Justice Brown 
has succinctly noted that this resolution is not supported by the law. It is not 
supported by logic either. Therefore, without justification in either law or 
logic, it is not supported. That's logic.

[¶61.]  I know that the statue of Justice 
normally is depicted with a blindfold on the figure. The blindfold is symbolic 
of the absence of bias. It does not justify overlooking the law or the facts, 
nor does it serve to permit Justice to ignore the scale and conclude that the 
lighter weights are heavier or vice versa.

[¶62.]  I have heard judicial figures complain of 
result-oriented decisions. Now, I more fully appreciate those complaints. 
Perhaps I was hasty in saying that the majority decision is not supported; it 
finds its support in the result that the majority chose.

[¶63.]  At one juncture, it occurred to me that 
perhaps the result could be supported because of the failure to present the 
claim of the disenfranchised trust beneficiaries in the probate proceeding for 
Wes Kerper's estate. Hawkey v. Williams, 72 Wyo. 20, 261 P.2d 48 (1953), dispels that 
notion. The only conclusion I can reach is that the trial court appropriately 
and dispassionately invoked and applied the remedies for breach of contract to 
make a will. While the result may appear to be harsh, I see no way to avoid the 
dictates of precedent.

[¶64.]  I would affirm the trial court with 
respect to its order directing reimbursement to the trust of the assets or the 
value thereof distributed to the Kerper daughters in the probate 
proceedings.

[¶65.]  I regret the fact that my efforts to 
articulate my position in this case have provoked such an impassioned response, 
but I see no need to recede from my position.

BROWN, Justice, Retired, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.

[¶66.]  The majority cast itself into the role of 
an omnipresent big brother. In this not unfamiliar personification, the majority 
arrogates to itself the mission of correcting all Kerper derelictions and 
profligacy. In order to accomplish its predetermined mission, the majority: (1) 
determined that the agreement between Wes and Hazel Kerper should be rendered of 
no effect and that it should be rewritten to reflect the wisdom of the majority; 
and (2) the majority further granted absolution to the Kerper sisters and saved 
them from themselves.

[¶67.]  It apparently is of no consequence to the 
majority that while accomplishing this remarkable feat they did violence to the 
law of contracts, trusts and future interests.

[¶68.]  In its opinion, the majority carefully 
delineates the adjudicative facts of this case and applicable law, then in the 
last paragraph of of the opinion, the majority surprises the reader by ignoring 
what it has previously said about the law.

[¶69.]  The magic paragraph on of the majority 
opinion states:

We have held that the 
1974 wills constituted a contract. The final issue we must now address is 
whether Wes Kerper's 1980 will constituted a breach of that contract. We hold 
that it did not. The remedy employed by 
the district court, i.e., imposition of a constructive trust and requiring 
reimbursement to the trust of the assets distributed to the four Kerper 
daughters under the 1980 will, does vindicate the literal language of the 1974 
contract will but it does so at the price of imposing a burden on the daughters 
that is the antithesis of the spirit, as well as the letter, of the elder 
Kerpers' efforts to provide for their daughters. Although we decline to consider 
the extrinsic documents and evidence in construing the unambiguous language of 
the 1974 wills, we are constrained to consider it in determining whether Wes 
Kerper's 1980 will was a breach of that contract. To do otherwise would result 
in our condoning a remedy which ravages the lives of the daughters who were the 
primary, if not the only real, focus of Wes and Hazel Kerper's estate plan. We hold that Wes Kerper's 1980 will 
substantially complied with the contract he entered into with Hazel Kerper. See 
Corbin, Contracts, Chapter 36 (1960). To the extent the grandchildren had an 
expectancy under the contract, that expectancy was realized in the form of 
benefits flowing directly to their mothers and indirectly to them as dependents 
of their mothers and as the natural heirs of their mothers' estates. A 
conclusion that the grandchildren would be better off had Wes Kerper performed 
his contract more literally is speculative, counterproductive, produces an 
absurd result and cannot be sustained under the unique circumstances of this case. 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶70.]  This incredible holding reminds me of the 
legend of Adami and Heva. According to this ancient epic, a raging river 
separated Adami and Heva. The river was not only deep, swift and wide, but was 
inhabited by piranha-like creatures that would consume an intruder in a single 
gulp. When confronted with the impregnable river barrier, Adami simply declared 
that the river was not there and then walked on dry land to Land Bountiful and 
the waiting arms of Heva.

[¶71.]  So it is in this case. The majority 
avoided an insoluble problem by simply declaring that there was no breach of 
contract. They made this strange ruling without the support of credible 
authority or rational analysis.

[¶72.]  I suspect that Wesley G. Kerper would be 
surprised to learn that the Wyoming Supreme Court said that he did not breach 
his 1974 contract. He thought he did. Jerry W. Housel, longtime friend and 
attorney of Wes Kerper, testified at trial with respect to the breach of 
contract:

Q. Did Mr. Kerper, who 
was an attorney, ever mention any problem with breaching his agreement with his 
first wife, Hazel Kerper, by entering into this new agreement?

A. [Mr. Housel] Well, I 
mentioned that to Wes when we first talked about it and he said, well, he recognized it was 
inconsistent with an earlier will and the reciprocal provisions, but he was just 
confident no one would ever question it, and that's why he wanted to go ahead 
with it.

* * * * * *

Q. Did you ever hear Wes 
Kerper or anyone tell Loujen that by entering into Plaintiffs exhibit 77 and by 
Mr. Kerper making a new will that he would be breaching a contract to make 
reciprocal wills with Hazel Kerper?

A. I don't recall that 
Loujen or Jill were present when I talked to him about that. I did discuss that 
with him, not in terms of necessarily breach. I told him it was inconsistent and he 
was not sure that if push came to shove whether it might be followed, but he was 
so confident that no one would question it and they would accept it, he wanted 
to go ahead with it anyway, which he did, but I don't believe Loujen was in on 
that discussion. (Emphasis added.)

[¶73.]  By making the express terms of the 1973 
trust a part of the express and unambiguous 1974 will contract, Wes and Hazel 
Kerper gave grandchildren in being when Wes Kerper died the status of intended 
third-party beneficiaries under the contract. Flohr v. Walker, 520 P.2d 833, 838 (Wyo. 1974). See also Lane Company v. Busch 
Development, Inc., 662 P.2d 419, 423 (Wyo. 1983). Their enforceable contract right 
was the right to see Wes Kerper's estate pour into the 1973 trust corpus 
creating vested remainders in them. See G. Bogert, The Law of Trust and Trustees 
§ 182 at 346-52 (1979). Contrary to the majority's unsupported conclusion in the 
suspect paragraph, the grandchildren's interest in Wes and Hazel's contract was 
not some "speculation" that they might receive scraps cast off from their 
mothers' life estates in trust income; rather, it was an enforceable contract 
right to an outright share of the trust corpus if they survived the Kerper 
daughters.

[¶74.]  Wes Kerper owed a clear contractual duty 
to the grandchildren in being at his death to pour the remainder of his estate 
into the trust and, of course, he knew that. In spite of that legal obligation, 
the will he drew in 1980 revoked his 1974 contract will with Hazel. The 1980 
will provided in pertinent part:

3. I give, devise and 
bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate of 
whatever kind and wherever situate in 
equal shares to my daughters, Minabelle [Meike] Kerper, Loujen Kerper [Trustee 
of the 1973 Trust], Janeen Kerper and Jill Kerper Lennon, an undivided one 
fourth thereof to each; and if any predeceases me the share she would have 
taken shall go in equal shares to her children surviving and if none in equal 
shares to my other daughters surviving. (Emphasis added.)

 

On its face, the 
1980 will disposed of assets that were supposed to become the corpus of the 
trust. It also purports to change the legal character of the living 
grandchildren's interests established in the will contract from vested to 
contingent remainders. By executing this 
new will, revoking his 1974 contract will, and dispersing his estate contrary to 
the 1974 will and the unambiguous terms of the trust, Wes Kerper plainly 
breached his 1974 will contract with his wife to devise and bequeath the bulk of 
his estate to the trust as corpus, thereby creating vested remainders in the 
grandchildren. The grandchildren had a solid contract right to equitable 
ownership of vested remainders in a trust corpus funded by Wes Kerper's estate 
and Wes Kerper frustrated the funding of the trust. That is the only conclusion 
one should be able to draw from the plain language of the controlling documents 
in this case.

[¶75.]  What is perhaps most disturbing about the 
majority's holding is the total lack of authority to support their desired 
result. The only citation given as support for reversing the judgments against 
the Kerper daughters is a vague reference to the entire Chapter 36 of 3A A. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 700 at 308-09 (1960), which discusses the 
contract doctrine of substantial performance. This citation is misleading. When 
I read that chapter, I find that it presents the doctrine of substantial 
performance with the following text:

When one party has failed to render a part of the 
performance as and when promised him, the following questions may 
arise:

1. Is the other party 
privileged to refuse to render reciprocally promised performance?

2. Is the other party 
wholly discharged from his contractual duty?

3. Can the other party 
maintain suit for damages, regarding the breach as "total"?

Id. (emphasis added). There is no way this doctrine can be applied 
to the facts of this case. To rely on it the majority has to take the 
position that Hazel Kerper did not perform at least a part of the obligation 
that she promised in the 1974 will contract, thereby allowing Wes Kerper to only 
partially perform his part in a similar, equitable fashion. The majority's own 
recitation of the facts states that Hazel Kerper performed her part of the 
contract in full and that Wes Kerper accepted the benefits of that complete 
performance. Wes Kerper had no legal justification to invoke the theory of 
substantial performance, but this court fashioned one for him with a little 
creative legal writing.

[¶76.]  The suspect paragraph in the majority 
opinion finally refers to the "unique circumstances of this case." I submit that 
the most unique thing about this case is the way the majority has danced around 
a clear breach of contract.

[¶77.]  The trial court's determination that Wes 
Kerper breached his 1974 contract is supported by both the law and the facts as 
recited in the majority opinion. The fact that the consequences that flow from 
such breach are harsh should be a neutral factor with an appellate court. It 
should not be necessary for me to remind the majority what it is not. The 
Supreme Court is not a court of equity. It is not a tribunal designed to 
substitute its wisdom for the foolishness of others; and it was not designed to 
save people from their own greed and folly.

[¶78.]  It seems that the majority has adopted a 
new rule in this case which is: "We are the Supreme Court. Therefore, we can do 
anything we want to do."

[¶79.]  The majority should heed the words of the 
late United States Supreme Court Justice Cardozo:

The judge, even when he 
is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not 
a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of 
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not 
to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to 
exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined 
by system, and subordinated to "the primordial necessity of order in the social 
life." Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that 
remains.

Benjamin N. 
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921).

[¶80.]  I agree with the majority in its 
resolution of the issues in Parts I and III, but dissent with respect to Part II 
and would affirm the trial court on that issue.