Title: Disciplinary Matter Involving Wiederholt

State: alaska

Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court

Document:

877 P.2d 765 (1994) In the DISCIPLINARY MATTER INVOLVING Jon E. WIEDERHOLT, Respondent. No. S-5736. Supreme Court of Alaska. July 8, 1994. *766 Mark Woelber, Asst. Bar Counsel, Stephen J. Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Anchorage, for Alaska Bar Ass'n. Robert C. Erwin, Anchorage, for respondent. Before MOORE, C.J., RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON, JJ., and BRYNER, J. Pro Tem.[*] MATTHEWS, Justice. The Disciplinary Board has recommended that attorney Jon E. Wiederholt be disbarred because, in one case, he filed a pleading and affidavit stating that his client's judgment had not been satisfied when he knew that the judgment had been satisfied, and, in another case, he forged his client's signature as an endorsement to a check. Having independently reviewed the evidence presented before the Hearing Committee, we agree with the factual findings of the Disciplinary Board, and accept the recommendation that Wiederholt be disbarred. Presented to the Hearing Committee were eight grievances. We set them out in tabular form with a brief description of the charges, the recommendation of the Hearing Committee, and the recommendation of the Disciplinary Board. This court reviews recommendations concerning attorney discipline made by the Disciplinary Board independently while giving deference to the findings of the Board. In re Frost, 863 P.2d 843, 844 (Alaska 1993); see also Alaska Bar R. 22(n), (r). On questions of law and questions concerning the appropriateness of sanctions, this court also exercises its independent judgment. Id. at 844. The first contention made by Wiederholt is that the eight grievances presented to the Hearing Committee should not have been consolidated in a single hearing. He argues that his right to procedural due process was violated because consolidation prevented the Hearing Committee from evaluating each grievance separately on the merits. We reject these arguments. Consolidation of grievances against an attorney is a routine practice in Alaska. See In re Clower, Supreme Court Case No. S-2463, Order of March 17, 1988; In re Triem, Supreme Court Case No. S-1066, Order of August 1, 1985; In re Simpson, 645 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1982); In re McNabb, 395 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1964). Consolidation has also been routinely permitted in other states. Florida Bar v. Shapiro, 413 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1982); In re Crumpacker, 269 Ind. 630, 383 N.E.2d 36 (1978); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Murphy, 570 A.2d 1212 (Me. 1990); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616 (1975). Although there is some danger that multiple grievances will unduly affect a Hearing Committee's perception of a respondent's credibility, this danger is minimized by the de novo review of the record conducted by the Disciplinary Board and by this court. Consolidated hearings, on the other hand, are often more expeditious than separate hearings on separate grievances, and the total time spent in a consolidated hearing will usually be less *768 than in separate hearings. The latter is a consideration of some importance given that the Hearing Committee and Disciplinary Board members are volunteers who are not compensated for their services. Wiederholt's second argument is that the Disciplinary Board's recommendation of disbarment in the Nesbett grievance (set out in Appendix A) is based on an error of law. Wiederholt argues that a judgment creditor who bids in the entire amount of his judgment at an execution sale and is issued a bill of sale still has an unsatisfied judgment "unless the party holding the judgment gets something of value." This position is legally wrong. To the extent that an offset bid is made and accepted at a foreclosure sale, it reduces the amount of the judgment by the amount of the bid. Fireman's Fund Mortg. Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 790, 796 (Alaska 1992); Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122, 124 (Alaska 1983). Where the offset is of the entire judgment, the judgment amount is reduced to zero and is therefore satisfied. Fireman's Fund at 795 (citations omitted). Wiederholt cites authority to the effect that an offset bid on an execution sale which is void is itself void, A.D.A. Mechanical Services, Inc. v. Goehring, 707 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Colo. App. 1985), and that satisfactions of judgment can under certain circumstances be set aside by motion of the judgment creditor. E.g., W.F. Conelly Constr. Co. v. L. Harvey Concrete Co., 162 Ariz. 574, 785 P.2d 94, 97 (App. 1989). Wiederholt does not demonstrate, however, how these rules apply to his conduct. He does not argue that the execution sale was void, only that his client received no value as a result of the sale. Further, he does not contend that he made a motion to set aside the satisfaction resulting from the execution sale. The essence of the Disciplinary Board's recommendation concerning the Nesbett complaint is that Wiederholt intentionally sought to mislead the court and the other parties of the litigation into believing that no execution sale had ever occurred. This conclusion is valid factually and is not based on an erroneous legal premise. Wiederholt's third argument is that the finding of the Disciplinary Board that Wiederholt "essentially forged" his client's, Metcalfe's, name to the check jointly made out to them was error. (This finding of the Disciplinary Board is set out in Appendix B.) Wiederholt contends that the term "forgery" is a term of art under criminal law which requires an intent to defraud which was neither charged nor proven. We conclude that fraud was both charged and proven. Paragraph 34 of the Metcalfe grievance alleged after setting forth, among other things, the unauthorized endorsement by Wiederholt of Metcalfe's name, that Wiederholt had "by his conduct toward Ray Metcalfe as set out above ... violated DR 1-102(A)(4), which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving deceit, dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation." (Emphasis supplied.) With respect to proof of fraud, Wiederholt argues that the finding of the Disciplinary Board that he endorsed Metcalfe's name in an effort to gain an advantage over Metcalfe in their fee dispute "falls far short of a finding of fraud... ." We disagree. In terms of the crime of forgery, intent to defraud is an intent to engage in deceptive conduct for the purpose of gaining a material advantage over another person. See Morrison v. State, 469 P.2d 125, 125 (Alaska 1970); see also Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 46.990(10). The Board's conclusion that Wiederholt was guilty of forgery is accurate. Wiederholt's fourth and fifth contentions relate to the Johnson and Taylor grievances respectively. Since we conclude that the remedy of disbarment is appropriate based on the Nesbett and Metcalfe grievances, considered together and in connection with the *769 Maloney and M/V CONSTRUCTOR grievances,[1] these contentions are moot. Wiederholt's final contention is that disbarment is inappropriate in this case in light of other cases having certain similarities. The cases are In re West, 805 P.2d 351, 360 (Alaska 1991) (attorney counselled client to sign her deceased husband's name on release and notarized the release knowing the signature was false 90-day suspension); In re Schuler, 818 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1991) (two-year suspension where lawyer shoplifted a number of cassette tapes); In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1986) (lawyer who embezzled $67,000 from trust accounts to cover up prior malpractice disbarred); In re Walton, 676 P.2d 1078 (Alaska 1983) (eighteen-month suspension where attorney fabricated a document which he attached to a complaint); In re Stump, 621 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1980) (five-year suspension where attorney falsified evidence and lied about it under oath). Wiederholt argues that his conduct "does not reach the type of deliberate dishonesty found in Buckalew, Walton or Stump," and therefore, disbarment is an inappropriate remedy. We do not accept this argument for a number of reasons. First, comparison with Buckalew is not useful, as Buckalew was disbarred. Second, neither Walton nor Stump involved multiple serious grievances as this case does. Third, sanctions in other cases can be no more than indicators of appropriate sanctions in a given case because of inevitable factual differences concerning not only the offense but the offender. In re Minor, 658 P.2d 781, 784 (Alaska 1983); Buckalew, 731 P.2d at 57, nn. 10 & 11 (setting out factors to be considered by a court imposing sanctions). Fourth, Walton and Stump were both decided before we instituted our present practice of using the American Bar Association Standards for Discipline as guidelines in determining appropriate sanctions. The Disciplinary Board adopted in part and modified in part the Hearing Committee's findings and recommendations on sanctions concerning the Metcalfe complaint and the Nesbett complaint. We find that the Disciplinary Board's findings and recommendations are appropriate and we adopt them as reflective of our decision in this case. They are set out in Appendix C with an explanatory note. For these reasons, the respondent is ordered disbarred. As modified by the Disciplinary Board, the findings and conclusions concerning the Nesbett grievance are as follows. Except as noted, the findings are those of the area Hearing Committee which were adopted by the Disciplinary Board. Language which is crossed out is language of the Hearing Committee which was deleted by the Disciplinary Board. Language which is capitalized is language added by the Disciplinary Board. The Disciplinary Board adopted the findings of the Committee concerning the Metcalfe grievance without change. The findings are set forth below. The Board's findings and recommendations on sanctions are set forth below. Except as noted, the findings are those of the Hearing Committee which were adopted by the Disciplinary Board. Language which is crossed out is language of the Hearing Committee which was deleted by the Disciplinary Board. Language which is capitalized is language added by the Disciplinary Board. The reference to the Taylor grievance in paragraph 11 is superfluous to our decision. We give it no weight. In deciding that disbarment is warranted by both the Metcalfe and the Nesbett grievances, considered together with the Maloney and M/V CONSTRUCTOR grievances, we do not adopt the Board's findings to the extent that they suggest that only a censure is warranted in the Metcalfe matter if disbarment is ordered in the Nesbett matter. [*] Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Alaska Constitution. [1] Wiederholt has not disputed the Board's action in the Maloney and M/V CONSTRUCTOR matters.