Title: Attorney Griev. Comm. v. Garland

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

2
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)
No. 5 
September Term, 1995
___________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF
MARYLAND
v.
THOMAS A. GARLAND
___________________________________
     Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner,
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
___________________________________
   Filed:  April 16, 1997
     
The petition also alleged that Respondent was incompetent as defined
1
by Maryland Rule BV1(i).  This allegation was withdrawn by Bar Counsel. 
Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
RULE 8.4  MISCONDUCT
 It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
*
*
*
 (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects;
*
*
*
 (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
       Effective January 1, 1997, the Rules governing attorney discipline
2
proceedings were renumbered.  The rules are currently found in Chapter 700, Maryland
Rules 16-701 through 16-718.  In this opinion, all references to the Md. Rules will
be to Rules BV1 through BV18 that were in effect at the time these proceedings were
commenced.
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel,
filed a petition for disciplinary action against Thomas A. Garland,
Respondent, for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The petition alleged that Respondent violated Rules 8.4(b) and
8.4(d).   Bar counsel recommends an indefinite suspension.
1
Pursuant to Maryland Rule BV9(b),  we referred the matter to
2
Judge Clayton Greene, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Following
an evidentiary hearing, Judge Greene found that Respondent had
violated Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(d).  Respondent filed exceptions to
Judge Greene's findings.  
I.
2
The charges in this matter arose out of Respondent's conduct
in August, 1992, resulting in his conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol and driving on a suspended license, and his
subsequent failure to comply with the order of the circuit court
commanding him to report to the Prince George's County D.W.I.
treatment facility.  Although these convictions were reversed on
appeal, Bar Counsel proceeded with this disciplinary action.  After
an evidentiary hearing in this disciplinary matter, Judge Greene
made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
"1)  The Respondent was admitted as a member of the
Maryland Bar on October 1, 1959.  The Review Board,
pursuant to BV-7 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure,
directed Bar Counsel to file charges against the
Respondent relating to disciplinary actions stemming from
the outcome of court proceedings in Anne Arundel County
before the Honorable Lawrence H. Rushworth.
"2)  The Complainant, Joseph Murtha, Esquire, Senior
Assistant State's Attorney for Howard County, notified
Bar Counsel in a letter dated November 3, 1993 of the
Respondent's conviction and the Respondent's failure to
report to the Prince George's County D.W.I. Facility on
October 8, 1993.
"3)  Further, that on or about October 29, 1993, the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued a bench
warrant as a result of Respondent's failure to report to
3
the D.W.I. facility.
"4)  That on or about December 17, 1993, Judge
Rushworth determined that the Respondent violated the
terms of his probation and imposed a six (6) month
sentence to be served at the Howard County Detention
Center.
"5)  On or about September 21, 1993, the Respondent
was convicted during a court trial before the Honorable
Lawrence H. Rushworth of the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County on charges of driving under the influence
of alcohol and driving while suspended.  Judge Rushworth
was specially assigned to hear the charges against Mr.
Garland because the judges of the Circuit Court for
Howard County all had recused themselves.  The facts
presented at the trial on September 21, 1993 revealed
that the Respondent operated a dark sedan in a
residential community at night in an erratic manner.  The
Respondent's vehicle passed another vehicle on a curve.
The Respondent's front tire was flat and the vehicle
crossed the double yellow line.  Trial Transcript, p. 22.
The independent witness who observed the driving
described the odor emanating from the vehicle as the
smell of "burning rubber."  When the vehicle came to
rest, the witness described the driver as sitting up and
then falling back over to the right while the vehicle was
4
parked.  Trial Transcript, p. 25.  Officer Denton was
called to the scene because of a reported driver slumped
over the steering wheel of a vehicle.  Upon arriving at
the scene, the officer observed the vehicle parked at the
curb with a flat tire and the driver was slumped sideways
in the driver's seat.  Trial Transcript, p. 31.  The hood
was hot to the touch.  The officer identified the driver
of the vehicle to be the Respondent, Thomas A. Garland.
Trial Transcript, pp. 30-34.  The Respondent had a strong
odor of alcohol on his breath, his eyes were glassy and
watery, his face was red and flushed, his eyes were
bloodshot, and his speech was slurred and the Respondent
was confused.  The Respondent stumbled getting out of the
vehicle and used the car for support when getting out.
Trial Transcript, p. 34.  With regard to the field
sobriety test, the Respondent was asked to recite the
ABCs and the officer stated that the Respondent responded
as if he were singing a song ". . . all of the letters
were slurred together."  When the officer asked the
Respondent if he had had anything to drink, the
Respondent replied that he had had nothing to drink.
Trial Transcript, p. 43.  The Respondent refused to take
the breathalyzer test.  Trial Transcript, p. 44.
"After considering the motions and arguments of the
State and the defense, Judge Rushworth determined, using
5
the Reasonable Doubt Standard, that the Respondent was
guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol on
August 26, 1992 and driving while suspended on September
6, 1992 based upon another factual scenario.
"6)  On October 1, 1993, Judge Rushworth sentenced
the Respondent to six (6) months incarceration with all
but thirty-three (33) days suspended.  The Respondent was
ordered to serve the thirty-three days at the Prince
George's County D.W.I. Facility to commence on October 8,
1993.  Additionally, the Court imposed a $500.00 fine and
placed the Respondent on supervised probation for four
(4) years under the supervision of Richard Vincent,
Director of Lawyer Counseling for the Maryland State Bar
Association.  The Respondent was ordered not to operate
a motor vehicle and the Court set an appeal bond of
$25,000.00.
"7)  At sentencing, Judge Rushworth stated that
alcoholism has "misdirected Mr. Garland's ability to
pursue his profession and the conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol was his third offense."
The judge further stated at sentencing that the
Respondent should be kept off the street because, in the
judge's opinion, he was a "loose cannon."  In pronouncing
his sentence, the judge stated in open court that the
Respondent must surrender himself Friday, a week (October
6
8, 1993) to the Prince George's County D.W.I. Facility
for thirty-three (33) days.  The judge suspended the
sentence with the assurance that immediately upon
release, the Respondent would contact Richard Vincent for
supervision of his drinking problem.  Judge Rushworth
also ordered that the Respondent was not to drive.
Sentencing Transcript, p. 13.  In setting the appeal bond
at $25,000.00, the trial judge stated that he believed
that the Respondent had an alcoholism problem to address
even though the Respondent did not believe he had one.
Judge Rushworth further stated that the Assistant State's
Attorney had reported to him that he had smelled alcohol
on the Respondent's breath on occasions when the
Respondent was in court within the past year and that the
$25,000.00 appeal bond would be appropriate to protect
the interests of society.  At least twice, the trial
judge directed the Respondent to surrender to the D.W.I.
facility no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 8, 1993.
Assistant State's Attorney Murtha was directed to prepare
a written order.  The written order was signed on October
5, 1993.  The written order directed the Respondent to
appear at the D.W.I. facility at 9:00 a.m. on October 8,
1993, as opposed to 5:00 p.m.  The written order was
postmarked to the Respondent on October 7, 1993.  The
Respondent testified that he received the written order
7
late in the afternoon of October 8, 1993.  On October 8,
1993, the Respondent did not report to the D.W.I.
facility.  The Respondent admits that he never made an
effort to report to the Prince George's County D.W.I.
Facility on October 8, 1993.  He did not call Judge
Rushworth after receiving the order on October 8, 1993
and he never contacted Mr. Bennett or the director of the
Lawyer Counseling Service for Maryland State Bar
Association as directed by the Court.  The Respondent did
not report to the D.W.I. facility or call them.
"8)  On October 8, 1993, the Respondent appeared in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County engaged as counsel
in the trial of a case before the Honorable J. Norris
Byrnes.
"9)  Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on November
1, 1993.  The Respondent did not file for a stay of the
execution of the sentence of Judge Rushworth dated
October 1, 1993.
"10)  The Respondent, after having been found in
violation of his probation, was incarcerated on or about
December 17, 1993.  After incarceration,  the Respondent
was released pursuant to a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by
him.  
"11)  In August, 1994, the Court of Special Appeals
overturned the convictions rendered by Judge Rushworth on
8
the basis of the denial of the Respondent's right to a
speedy trial.  The Court of Special Appeals declined to
review any other issues.
DISCUSSION
"At the BV-10 Hearing, the Respondent contended that
by virtue of the reversal of the criminal conviction, the
Respondent is innocent of all charges and that his
alleged misconduct was before the Court of Special
Appeals and they chose not to reach the point.  Moreover,
the Respondent contends that since Judge Rushworth's
written order was mailed October 7, 1993 and received in
the late afternoon of October 8, 1993, it was impossible
for him to comply with the Court's Order to report to the
facility by 9:00 a.m. on October 8, 1993.  Accordingly,
the Respondent further contends that the written order
expired by its own terms when it reached the Respondent.
"Bar Counsel contends that the Respondent's conduct
is in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
specifically Rule 8.4 . . . . "It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: (b) commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty and
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.  Bar Counsel has abandoned any
9
contention that the Respondent is incompetent as defined
by Maryland BV-1(i).
"The Court finds that the Respondent by his actions
has violated Rule 8.4, sub-section (b) and Rule 8.4, sub-
section (d).  The reversal by the Court of Special
Appeals does not control the disciplinary proceeding.  A
criminal conviction is not required to find a violation
of Rule 8.4.  See Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Deutsch, 294 Md. 353 (1982) where the Court made
reference to former rule DR 1-102(A)(3).  The Court's
position was confirmed in Attorney Grievance Commission
v. Proctor, 309 Md. 412 (1987) when the Court stated that
all that is required is clear and convincing evidence of
conduct that constitutes the commission of the offense.
The evidence presented at the Respondent's trial is both
clear and convincing that on August 26, 1992 he operated
a motor vehicle at night,  erratically, while under the
influence of alcohol.  This was at least the Respondent's
third alcohol related driving offense.  The Respondent
violated Judge Rushworth's probation by failing and
refusing to enter into alcohol counseling, either through
the D.W.I. facility or under the supervision of Mr.
Vincent.  Not only were the Respondent's actions
criminal, 
but 
they 
likewise 
demonstrated 
conduct
10
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  In a
situation where an attorney refuses to obey the lawful
order of a court, it shows obvious contempt for the very
same court of which the Respondent is an officer.
"The Respondent's contention that he did not receive
the judge's order timely is totally void of any merit.
The judge recited in open court at the time of sentencing
his concerns about the Respondent's need for treatment
for alcoholism.  The judge directed the Respondent to
report to the D.W.I. Facility in Prince George's County
no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 8, 1993.  Further, to
ensure that the Respondent would comply with the Court's
Order, the sentencing judge set an appeal bond of
$25,000.00 with the direction that he wanted to keep the
Respondent off the street, describing the Respondent as
a "loose cannon."  Instead of complying with the Court's
Order, the Respondent flagrantly ignored the Order.
Instead of reporting to the D.W.I. facility on October 8,
1993 or seeking counseling from the director of Lawyer
Counseling for the Maryland State Bar, the Respondent
went about his normal pursuits of practicing law in
Baltimore County on the date he was required to seek
treatment.  His conduct was clearly prejudicial to the
administration of justice and in violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct.
11
"Wherefore, it is this 14th day of August, 1996,
found by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, for
the reasons set forth herein, that the Respondent, Thomas
A. Garland, has violated the following cited disciplinary
rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility; to wit:
Rule 8.4(b) and 8.4(d)."
Bar counsel took no exceptions to Judge Greene's findings.  He
states that "Respondent's conduct demonstrates that he knowingly
engaged in criminal conduct, driving under the influence of alcohol
and with a suspended license. . . .  Likewise, his total disregard
for the order of the court requiring him to report for treatment
subsequent to his conviction shows contempt for the court and
interference with the proceedings of that body."  Bar Counsel
recommends that this Court impose an indefinite suspension.
Respondent filed exceptions to Judge Greene's findings of fact
and conclusions of law.  Respondent prays that the matter be
dismissed and no sanction be imposed.
  
II.
This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over
disciplinary proceedings.  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Kent, 337 Md.
361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995).  In this regard, we make an
independent and in depth review of the entire record, with
particular attention to the evidence relating to the disputed
12
factual findings.  Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 516, 307
A.2d 677, 680-81 (1973).  A hearing court's findings of fact are
prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown
to be clearly erroneous.  Attorney Griev. Com'n v. Goldsborough,
330 Md. 342, 347, 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993).  The ultimate decision
as to whether an attorney has engaged in professional misconduct
rests with this Court.  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Joehl, 335 Md.
83, 88, 642 A.2d 194, 196 (1994).
Respondent filed the following exceptions to Judge Greene's
findings:
1.  The Hearing Judge completely failed to consider
and make findings of fact with respect to Respondent's
position that he was denied fundamental due process of
law in the proceedings of the Inquiry Panel under Rule
B.V.6, the minimum requirements of which are spelled out
in that Rule.
2.  The Hearing Judge indulged in a fact finding
expedition relative to a case which had been reversed on
Appeal in order to support the efficacy of an Order of
Court (the failure of compliance with which is the nub of
Petitioner's case) which Order was itself invalidated by
the reversal.
3.  The Hearing Judge was in error in determining as
a matter of law that the Order of Judge Rushworth
received by Respondent on October 8, 1993 was effective
to require any compliance by him.
We will address his exceptions seriatim.
1.
Respondent argues before this Court that Judge Greene failed
to consider and make findings with respect to his contention that
he was denied due process of law in the proceedings before the
13
Inquiry Panel.  Respondent claims, without providing any facts to
support his complaint, that he was denied due process because he
was not provided with notice of the charges against him prior to
the Inquiry Panel hearing.  
The short answer to this exception is that Respondent never
raised this issue before Judge Greene, and, as a result, we have no
findings of fact or conclusions of law.  We find that his exception
that Judge Greene failed to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law on this issue is without merit.
Our independent review of the record reveals that on November
15, 1993, Bar Counsel sent Garland a letter referencing BC Docket
No. 94-186-14-5, advising him that a complaint file in the name of
Bar Counsel was opened against him in connection with the sentence
he received on October 5, 1993 before Judge Rushworth and his
subsequent failure to appear at the D.W.I. facility in Prince
George's County.  In the letter, Bar Counsel stated that Garland's
conduct was in violation of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
3.4(c) and 8.4(d), as well as "other Rules of Professional Conduct
which may come to my attention."
A November 21, 1994 Memorandum from Bar Counsel to BC Docket
No. 94-186-14-5 states, in pertinent part:
Mr. Garland wanted a transcript of the
proceedings and Mr. Silkworth [the panel
chair] said that it hadn't been transcribed
and Mr. Silkworth explained what the panel was
about and he is going to send everything to
Mr. Garland and we will re-schedule the panel
hearing.  We went over my dates in December.
14
Bar Counsel took the deposition of Garland on July 26, 1997 in
connection with these proceedings.  Deposition Exhibit No. 7, a
handwritten letter from Garland to Ronald Silkworth, indicated the
following:
You called . . . and told me that the panel
was agreeable to reopening the proceedings and
that you would send me materials which would
inform me of the charge(s) and proceedings to
date.  You declined to tell me any details
over the phone but assured me that it would
all "be in the package" I was to receive.  I
have received no package from you! 
The Inquiry Panel held a second hearing on December 5, 1994;
Garland did not appear.  The record indicates that Garland received
notice of the substance of the charges against him in the November
15, 1993 letter from Bar Counsel.  See Attorney Griev. Com'n v.
Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 624 A.2d 503 (1993)(So long as lawyer is
given notice and opportunity to defend in a full and fair hearing
following the institution of disciplinary proceedings, irregularity
in proceedings before Inquiry Panel and Review Board ordinarily
will not amount to denial of due process).  We shall overrule
Respondent's first exception.
2.
Respondent's next contention is that Judge Greene improperly
engaged in a fact-finding expedition regarding the conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol which had been reversed on
15
appeal in order to support the Order of the trial court commanding
him to appear at the D.W.I. treatment facility.  Before Judge
Greene, Respondent contended that, because his alcohol related
traffic convictions were reversed on appeal, he was innocent of all
charges.  He also argued that, since he received Judge Rushworth's
written order in the late afternoon of October 8, 1993 commanding
him to appear at the D.W.I. treatment facility, it was impossible
for him to comply with the court's order to report by 9:00 a.m. on
that date.  He further maintained that the written order expired
because he received it after 9:00 a.m.   
  Judge Greene correctly noted that a reversal of a criminal
conviction does not control the disciplinary proceeding and that a
criminal conviction is not required in order to find a violation of
Rule 8.4.  All that is required is proof by clear and convincing
evidence of conduct that constitutes a commission of the offense.
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Proctor, 309 Md. 412, 418, 524 A.2d 773,
776 (1987).  If the evidence presented at the hearing is sufficient
to sustain a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the
conduct occurred, the fact that a criminal conviction did not
result from the conduct or that the judgment was reversed does not
preclude a finding of misconduct.  See Attorney Griev. Comm. v.
Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 667 A.2d 659 (1995) (holding that evidence
showed a wilful failure to pay taxes and a violation of Rule 8.4(d)
despite fact that there was no criminal prosecution); Attorney
16
Griev. Comm'n v. Proctor, 309 Md. 412, 418, 524 A.2d 773, 776
(1987); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Deutsch, 294 Md. 353, 366, 450
A.2d 1265, 1271 (1982).
At the disciplinary hearing before Judge Greene, Bar Counsel
introduced into evidence the September 21, 1993 transcript of the
criminal trial.  Respondent stipulated to the authenticity of the
document and objected to the admissibility of the transcript on the
grounds of relevancy.  Judge Greene admitted the transcript into
evidence.
An attorney may be disciplined for acts which are criminal but
do not result in a criminal conviction if Bar Counsel proves the
underlying conduct at the disciplinary hearing.  In the instant
action, Bar Counsel relied on the transcripts of the criminal
proceedings to prove the underlying conduct.  Because at the
criminal trial before Judge Rushworth Respondent relied on a legal
challenge to the entire proceedings with which the Court of Special
Appeals agreed, he may have lacked the incentive to present a full
defense on the merits to the underlying traffic charges in the
criminal case.  Under these circumstances, we shall assume that it
was impermissible to use the transcript to prove the underlying
criminal conduct and we shall not consider that conduct in our
determination of the appropriate sanction.  We therefore sustain
his exception in this regard.    Nonetheless, the transcript of the
sentencing proceeding was properly admitted to show the order of
17
the court and Garland's knowledge of it.
3.
Respondent alleges in his third exception that Judge Greene
erred in concluding that Respondent's failure to report to the
D.W.I. facility was conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Judge Greene found that Judge Rushworth, the sentencing judge,
in open court, directed Respondent to report to the D.W.I. facility
no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 8, 1993. Our review of the
record leads to the inescapable conclusion that Respondent
flagrantly ignored the order of court to appear at the treatment
facility and that he had no reasonable basis to conclude, as he now
argues, that the order of court had expired. 
On October 1, 1993, Respondent was sentenced to serve 33 days
in the Prince George's County D.W.I. Facility, to be followed by 30
days in the Howard County Detention Center.  The court recessed for
the State's Attorney to inquire whether there was available space
at the Prince George's County D.W.I. Facility.  After the court
reconvened, the State's Attorney informed the court that a bed was
available and recommended to the court that Respondent report the
following Friday.
Judge Rushworth then addressed Respondent directly and stated:
"the court orders you to surrender yourself Friday a week to the
Prince Georges County D.W.I. facility. . . ."  At the end of the
sentencing proceeding, the court established that Respondent was to
18
       Toward the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, in Garland's presence,
3
the following colloquy took place between the court and the State's Attorney:
COURT:  That's a blanket bond in both cases, twenty five
full. . .and. . .he's to report Friday.
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, if I may, I will send an order
down by the end of the day, and I'll fax him a copy so
that that order can be incorporated in the court file by
the end of the day.  And that will include. . .I think you
have to report by five o'clock.  It would be by five
o'clock.
COURT:  Let's make it by five o'clock.
[PROSECUTOR]:  That's the latest you can report down
there.  Thank you very much, Your Honor.  
report by 5:00 p.m. on Friday.   On the day of the sentencing,
3
Respondent signed an order for probation.  That order stated that
Respondent was to spend "33 days at P.G. Co. DWI Facility -- No
driving while at P.G. Co., DWI Facility -- After DWI Facility def.
enter and complete 30 day out-patient program as directed by
Richard Vincent."  Respondent signed this order for probation,
indicating that he understood these conditions, consented to them,
and agreed to follow them.
Respondent never reported to the D.W.I. facility.  On Friday,
October 8, 1993, he went about his normal business and represented
a client in a case before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
On that Friday afternoon, he received the following written
order of court:
[T]he Defendant shall be confined to the jurisdiction of
the Prince George's County DWI Facility, 5000 Rhode
Island Avenue, Hyattsville, MD 20781, for a period of
thirty-three (33) days, commencing October 8, 1993 at
9:00 a.m.
Respondent now argues that because the order states that he was to
19
report by 9:00 a.m., and that he received a copy of the order after
9:00 a.m., that the order had expired and he was therefore relieved
of his duty to report to the facility.
 Respondent knew that he was to report to the D.W.I. facility
on October 8, 1993; he made no attempt to contact the facility, the
court or the State's Attorney concerning his duty to report.  Judge
Greene found that Respondent's contention that he was not required
to report to the D.W.I. facility because he did not receive the
judge's order timely was totally devoid of merit.  We agree.  
Accordingly, Respondent's third exception is overruled.
III.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  At the
present time, Respondent is not practicing law,  He stands
decertified for failure to contribute the amount due to the
Clients' Security Trust Fund.  It is well settled, and often
stated, that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not to
punish the errant attorney, but to protect the public and preserve
the public confidence in the legal system.  Attorney Griev. Comm.
v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 601, 667 A.2d 659, 665 (1995).  In
determining whether a particular attorney's misconduct in failing
to obey a court order warranted discipline, the Supreme Court of
California held:
Disobedience of a court order, whether as a
legal 
representative 
or 
as 
a 
party,
20
demonstrates a lapse of character and a
disrespect for the legal system that directly
relate to an attorney's fitness to practice
law and serve as an officer of the court.
In re Kelley, 801 P.2d 1126, 1131 (Cal. 1990).  Respondent's
behavior evidences both an alcohol problem and a lack of respect
for the legal system.  If not addressed, it may affect his
professional practice and injure the public.  See Danny R.
Veilleux, Misconduct Involving Intoxication as Grounds For
Disciplinary Action Against Attorney, 1 A.L.R. 5th 874 (1992).  
Judge Greene found that Respondent's conduct was prejudicial
to the administration of justice.  We agree.  He wrote "where an
attorney refuses to obey the lawful order of a court, it shows
obvious contempt for the very same court of which the Respondent is
an officer."  The United States Supreme Court summarized the duty
to obey court orders in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458-59, 95
S. Ct. 584, 591, 42 L. Ed. 2d 574, 583 (1975) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293,
67 S. Ct. 677, 696, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947): 
We begin with the basic proposition that all orders and
judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.  If
a person to whom a court directs an order believes that
the order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but,
absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order
pending appeal.  Persons who make private determinations
of the law and refuse to obey an order generally risk
criminal contempt even if the order is ultimately ruled
incorrect.  The orderly and expeditious administration of
justice by the courts requires that "an order issued by
a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and
person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed
by orderly and proper proceedings."      
21
In determining the appropriate sanction, we think several
factors are important considerations.  The first is Respondent's
behavior and utter disregard for the laws of this State and valid
orders of court.  Second, Respondent fails to recognize his serious
alcohol problem and has taken no remedial steps to address his
alcohol addiction.  He has failed to enter into alcohol counseling,
either through the D.W.I. facility, the program of Mr. Richard
Vincent of the Maryland State Bar Association, or any other
suitable treatment program.  Judge Greene found that Respondent had
two prior convictions for alcohol related traffic offenses, and
concluded that Respondent suffers from a serious problem of alcohol
abuse.
In light of these circumstances, we shall order that
Respondent be forthwith suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law in this State, with the right to apply for readmission after
the expiration of six months.  In making such application, he must
understand that he will be reinstated only if he meets the
following conditions:
(1) He shall abstain from consumption of
alcoholic beverages.
(2) 
He 
shall 
participate 
in 
such
rehabilitative activities as may be prescribed
from time to time by Bar Counsel and by the
Director of the Lawyers' Counseling Program of
the Maryland State Bar Association.
(3) He shall pay the sums which he owes to the
Clients' Security Trust Fund of the Bar of
Maryland.
22
(4) He shall pay all costs incurred in
connection with this proceeding on such
schedule as Bar Counsel may specify once
Garland's obligations to the Clients' Security
Trust Fund have been liquidated.
Respondent must understand that a breach of any one of the above
conditions will be grounds for renewal of his indefinite 
suspension.  The matter of these conditions is subject to the
further order of court.  
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT,
INCLUDING COSTS OF 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO 
MARYLAND RULE 16-715, FOR WHICH 
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN 
FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
THOMAS A. GARLAND.