Title: Ohio v. Damron

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Damron, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2268.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2268 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DAMRON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Damron, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2268.] 
Criminal law — Allied offenses — Correction of sentencing errors. 
(No. 2010-0937 — Submitted March 22, 2011 — Decided May 18, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 09AP-807, 
2010-Ohio-1821. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Because the judgment entry of the sentencing court shows that the 
court applied erroneous legal reasoning, we remand this case to the trial court for 
resentencing, as required by State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 
922 N.E.2d 182, and application of our recent decision State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061. 
Factual Background 
{¶ 2} On June 27, 2008, a grand jury returned an indictment against 
Jeremy Damron that charged one count of felonious assault, two counts of 
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domestic violence, and one count of rape.  The state alleged that Damron 
committed the offenses on or about June 21, 2008, against the mother of two of 
his children. 
{¶ 3} On May 5, 2009, Damron entered a guilty plea to felonious assault 
and to one count of domestic violence.  In exchange, the state requested that the 
trial court enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining two counts.  During the plea 
hearing, Damron was informed of the applicable statutory maximum penalties:  
eight years’ imprisonment for felonious assault and five years’ imprisonment for 
domestic violence. 
{¶ 4} Before the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a sentencing 
memorandum.  In its sentencing memorandum, the state cited State v. Rance 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699, which has since been overruled by 
Johnson, and argued for the imposition of consecutive sentences.  In so doing, the 
state argued that the elements of the two offenses do not correspond to such a 
degree that the commission of one offense would necessarily result in the 
commission of the other offense.  It further argued that Damron committed the 
offenses with a separate animus.  It argued that in one incident, Damron beat the 
victim with his fists and dragged her around the room and, in another incident, 
broke off the blades of the ceiling fan and beat the victim with the blades.  The 
state further argued that the beating with the fan blades also represented an 
escalation in the violence that contributed to the serious physical harm suffered by 
the victim. 
{¶ 5} In his sentencing memorandum, Damron cited State v. Harris, 122 
Ohio St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323, 911 N.E.2d 882, which relied on Rance, and 
argued that the offenses must be merged as allied offenses.  Damron conceded 
that the elements of the offenses are not the same but argued that the offenses 
were allied offenses because he could not have committed felonious assault on 
this particular victim (who was a family or household member) without also 
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committing domestic violence.  He further argued, without elaborating, that the 
offenses were committed with one animus against one victim. 
{¶ 6} On July 27, 2009, the trial court held a sentencing hearing.  At the 
hearing, the state addressed Damron’s sentencing memorandum and urged the 
court to hold that as a matter of law, felonious assault and domestic violence are 
not allied offenses.  In so arguing, the state pointed out that felonious assault as 
charged requires proof of serious physical harm but domestic violence does not, 
that domestic violence requires that the victim be a household or family member 
but felonious assault does not, and that domestic violence as charged requires 
proof of two prior domestic-violence convictions but felonious assault does not.  
The state did not argue the animus issue at the hearing, as it did in its 
memorandum. 
{¶ 7} At the hearing, Damron reiterated his position that under Harris, 
the offenses must merge.  Specifically, he argued that his commission of felonious 
assault necessarily resulted in his commission of domestic violence.  He further 
argued that the attack involved “one date, one place,” as well as “one animus, one 
victim.” 
{¶ 8} After informing Damron that this was the worst instance of 
domestic violence and felonious assault he had ever seen, the sentencing judge 
imposed the statutory maximum sentences of eight years’ imprisonment for 
felonious assault and five years’ imprisonment for domestic violence.  The judge 
then explained that pursuant to Harris, the counts “need[ed]” to merge.  He 
further stated, “I feel I have no alternative but to run them concurrent.  That’s 
pursuant to the State v. Harris,” and “I would have found, if I did not think that 
Harris dictated that, that those would run consecutive to each other.” 
{¶ 9} The judgment entry in this case reflected that Damron was found 
guilty on both charges and sentenced to eight years and five years to be served 
concurrently, “pursuant to State v. Harris.” 
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{¶ 10} The state appealed to the Tenth District and asserted one 
assignment of error: “The trial court erred by purporting to merge the defendant’s 
convictions for felonious assault and domestic violence.”  The Tenth District 
refused to reach the issue because, although the trial court concluded that it was 
required to merge the convictions, it did not do so.  2010-Ohio-1821 at ¶ 10.  The 
court of appeals overruled the state’s assignment of error.  It noted that rather than 
merge the convictions, the trial court imposed separate sentences on each count 
but ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.  Id.  The court of appeals 
further noted, “Even if we were to conclude that the court’s decision to impose 
concurrent sentences had been based on faulty reasoning, the fact remains that the 
court’s order that the sentences be served concurrently resulted in a sentence 
authorized by the statutes governing sentencing.”  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 11} We granted discretionary review over the state’s appeal to address 
two propositions of law: (1) “Even when the sentence falls within the permitted 
statutory range, the sentence is contrary to law if the court fails to consider the 
mandatory provisions in R.C. Chapter 2929, or if the court relies on an erroneous 
legal determination that removes a sentencing option from its consideration”; and 
(2) “When a court imposes concurrent prison terms under the mistaken belief that 
it is merging two allied offenses of similar import, sentencing error occurs, and 
that error can be corrected on appeal.”  This court declined to review a third 
proposition of law on the substantive issue of whether felonious assault and 
domestic violence are allied offenses. 
{¶ 12} Because the sentencing entry itself reflects the court’s error in 
reasoning, the sentences must be vacated and this case remanded to the trial court 
for resentencing. 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} By imposing the sentences concurrently “pursuant to State v. 
Harris,” the judgment entry reflected the sentencing judge’s misapprehension of 
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the law on allied offenses.  “Where the same conduct by [the] defendant can be 
construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the 
defendant may be convicted of only one.”  R.C. 2941.25(A). 
{¶ 14} In its judgment entry, the trial court relied on Harris, presuming 
that the case necessarily required merger of the felonious-assault and domestic-
violence counts.  In Harris, we addressed two issues: first, whether robbery under 
R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) are allied 
offenses of similar import; and, second, whether felonious assault under R.C. 
2903.11(A)(1) and felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) are allied offenses 
of similar import.  Harris, 122 Ohio St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323, 911 N.E.2d 882, 
at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  We held that robbery and aggravated 
robbery are allied offenses and that felonious assault under (A)(1) and felonious 
assault under (A)(2) are allied offenses when those offenses are committed with 
the same animus against the same victim.  Id. 
{¶ 15} In so holding, we surveyed the allied-offenses case law.  Id. at ¶ 7-
14.  We recognized that historically we had interpreted Ohio’s multiple-count 
statute, R.C. 2941.25, as involving a two-step analysis.  Id. at ¶ 10, quoting State 
v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816.  “ ‘In the first 
step, the elements of the two crimes are compared. * * * In the second step, the 
defendant’s conduct is reviewed * * *.’ ”  Id.  We then acknowledged that in 
Rance, we modified the test by holding that courts should examine the elements in 
the abstract to determine whether the offenses are allied offenses.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 16} We next explained that at one time, our holding in Rance was 
interpreted by some courts as requiring a strict textual comparison of the 
elements.  Harris, 122 Ohio St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323, 911 N.E.2d 882, at ¶ 12.  
We noted that that interpretation conflicted with legislative intent and caused 
inconsistent and, at times, absurd results.  Id.  Accordingly, we had refined the 
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allied-offenses test in State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 
N.E.2d 181, and held that “ ‘in determining whether offenses are allied offenses 
of similar import under R.C. 2941.25(A), Rance requires courts to compare the 
elements of the offenses in the abstract, i.e., without considering the evidence in 
the case, but does not require an exact alignment of elements.’ ”  Harris at ¶ 12, 
quoting Cabrales at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 17} In Damron’s case, the sentencing court relied on Harris, which 
relied on Rance.  Harris at ¶ 14.  Even so, Harris never stood for the proposition 
that the offenses of felonious assault and domestic violence must merge as a 
matter of law.  In addition, in the sentencing entry, the trial court failed to 
properly merge the convictions.  When a defendant has been found guilty of 
offenses that are allied offenses, R.C. 2941.25 prohibits the imposition of multiple 
sentences.  Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, at ¶ 12.  
Therefore, a trial court must merge the crimes into a single conviction and impose 
a sentence that is appropriate for the offense chosen for sentencing.  State v. 
Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 41-43.  In this 
case, the sentencing court found Damron guilty of both offenses and sentenced 
him on both. The imposition of concurrent sentences is not the equivalent of 
merging allied offenses.  As we explained in Whitfield, for purposes of R.C. 
2941.25, a “conviction” is the combination of a guilt determination and a sentence 
or penalty.  Whitfield at ¶ 12.  As the record stands, Damron has been convicted of 
both felonious assault and domestic violence. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} In this case, the trial court issued a sentencing entry that 
erroneously relied upon Harris.  Because of this and other significant procedural 
defects unique to this case, we vacate the sentence and remand for proper 
sentencing, including  application of State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-
Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, syllabus. 
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Judgment vacated  
and cause remanded. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and John H. Cousins 
IV, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Keith O’Korn, for appellee. 
______________________