Title: People v. Valenzuela

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LUIS DONICIO VALENZUELA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S239122 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B269027 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
2013025724 
 
 
June 3, 2019 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the court, 
in which Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar and Groban concurred.    
 
Justice Corrigan filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice 
Corrigan concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
S239122 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
 
In 
November 
2014, 
California 
voters 
approved 
Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act 
(Proposition 47).  This initiative reclassified as misdemeanors 
certain narcotics and theft offenses previously cast as felonies.  
We granted review in this matter to determine what effect the 
reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor under 
Proposition 47 has on a related conviction, subsumed within the 
same judgment, for the crime of “street terrorism.” This gang 
crime occurs when a “person who actively participates in any 
criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage 
in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity . . . 
willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal 
conduct by members of that gang.”  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. 
(a).)1   
Here, defendant stole a bicycle and on that basis was 
convicted of both felony grand theft (§ 487, subd. (c)) and street 
terrorism.  After Proposition 47 came into effect, defendant 
successfully petitioned to have the grand theft conviction 
reduced to a misdemeanor.  (See § 1170.18, subds. (a), (b), as 
added by Prop. 47, § 14, approved by voters Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 
2014).)  The resentencing court refused to dismiss defendant’s 
conviction for street terrorism, even though the theft of the 
bicycle supplied the “felonious criminal conduct” necessary for 
                                        
1  
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 
the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
2 
the commission of this offense.  (§ 186.22, subd. (a).)  The Court 
of Appeal affirmed.   
We conclude that defendant is entitled to have his street 
terrorism conviction dismissed.  The reduction of defendant’s 
grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor through Proposition 47 
resentencing established the absence of an essential element of 
the street terrorism offense — felonious criminal conduct.  With 
this element now absent, in the full resentencing that is to occur 
under the initiative the court cannot lawfully impose sentence 
on the street terrorism conviction.  We therefore reverse the 
judgment below. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2013, Manny Ramirez was riding his bicycle in Oxnard 
when defendant Luis Valenzuela and his friend Timothy 
Medina waved at him to stop.  Ramirez complied.  Defendant 
asked Ramirez where he was from.  Defendant also warned 
Ramirez that he did not like “homies from East Side,” a street 
gang in Santa Barbara.   
Ramirez replied that he was not a member of any gang.  
Defendant nevertheless tried to punch Ramirez.  After Ramirez 
dodged his punch, defendant grabbed Ramirez’s bicycle and said 
it was now his.  Defendant gave Ramirez his address and told 
him he could come to his house and get the bike back, but 
Ramirez would need to bring an “older homie from the 
neighborhood to vouch for him.”  Medina added, “If you want 
your bike back, you’ll have to throw down or fight for it.”   
Ramirez left.  He reported the incident to police and gave 
them defendant’s address.  Police recovered the bicycle from 
that address and arrested defendant.  The bicycle was worth 
approximately $200.   
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
3 
In 2014, a jury found defendant guilty of felony grand theft 
(§ 487, subd. (c) [recognizing the crime of grand theft as having 
occurred “when the [stolen] property is taken from the person of 
another”]) as a lesser offense of the charged crime of robbery 
(§ 211).  The jury also found defendant guilty of street terrorism.  
(§ 186.22, subd. (a).)  Enhancements alleging that defendant 
committed the felony grand theft offense for the benefit of a 
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and had suffered a 
prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior 
strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) 
were found true.  The trial court subsequently sentenced 
defendant to nine years eight months in prison in connection 
with these crimes and enhancements.2 
The electorate approved Proposition 47 while defendant’s 
appeal was pending.  Among its various provisions, this 
initiative redefined grand theft.  At the time of defendant’s 
crimes, taking property from the person of another was grand 
theft, a felony offense, regardless of the property’s value.  (See 
§ 487, subd. (c).)  Section 490.2, subdivision (a), added by 
Proposition 47, altered this rule.  In general, “Notwithstanding 
Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, 
obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, 
labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine 
hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and 
shall be punished as a misdemeanor.”  (§ 490.2, subd. (a).) 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on direct 
appeal, and this court denied defendant’s petition for review.  
                                        
2  
Defendant also pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), for which he 
received an additional eight-month term. 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
4 
Defendant then filed a petition with the trial court seeking the 
reclassification and resentencing of his grand theft felony 
conviction as misdemeanor petty theft.  (See § 1170.18, subd. 
(a).)  In his petition, defendant also asserted that if this 
conviction was reclassified as a misdemeanor, his conviction for 
street terrorism must be dismissed because the specific criminal 
conduct underlying that offense — again, theft of a bike valued 
at $200 — could no longer be regarded as felonious.   
The trial court resentenced the theft conviction as a 
misdemeanor.  (See §§ 490.2, subd. (a), 1170.18, subd. (b).)  This 
reduction required the dismissal of the gang enhancement, 
which adheres only upon conviction of a felony.  (§ 186.22, subd. 
(b)(1).)3  The trial court declined to dismiss the street terrorism 
conviction, however.  The trial court resentenced defendant to 
seven years eight months in prison.  This sentence consisted of 
the lower term of 16 months on the street terrorism count, 
doubled to two years eight months because of the prior strike, 
plus another five-year term for the serious felony enhancement.  
(See §§ 186.22, subd. (a), 667, subds. (a)(1), (e)(1).)  
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s refusal to 
dismiss the street terrorism conviction.  (People v. Valenzuela 
                                        
3  
Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) provides, in pertinent 
part, that “any person who is convicted of a felony committed for 
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any 
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, 
shall, upon conviction of that felony,” be subject to a custodial 
term in addition to the one associated with the underlying felony 
offense.  This enhancement “punishes gang-related conduct, i.e., 
felonies committed with the specific intent to benefit, further, or 
promote the gang.”  (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 
1138 (lead opn. of Corrigan, J.) (Rodriguez).) 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
5 
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 449, 453.)  According to the appellate court, 
the fact that Proposition 47 required defendant’s theft 
conviction to be regarded as “a misdemeanor for all purposes” 
(§ 1170.18, subd. (k)) upon resentencing was of no consequence 
to the street terrorism crime, because the gang offense was 
focused “on the commission rather than the conviction of a 
felony.”  (Valenzuela, at p. 452, italics added.)  The court 
summarized, “When Valenzuela stole the bicycle, he engaged in 
felonious criminal conduct.  That is true regardless of his 
conviction for grand theft and its subsequent reduction to a 
misdemeanor.  The trial court properly declined to set aside his 
conviction for street terrorism.”  (Id., at p. 453.) 
We granted defendant’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
Our analysis begins with a review of the pertinent statutes 
and how they have been construed.  We then consider their 
application to this case.  We conclude that defendant’s street 
terrorism conviction should have been dismissed in the full 
resentencing that defendant must receive under Proposition 47.   
A. Relevant Statutes and Case Law  
1.  The Crime of Street Terrorism under Section 
186.22, Subdivision (a) 
The Legislature originally enacted section 186.22 in 1988 
as part of the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act, also known as the “STEP Act.”  (§ 186.20 et seq.)  
The STEP Act declares that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature 
in enacting this [measure] to seek the eradication of criminal 
activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns of criminal 
gang activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs, 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
6 
which together, are the chief source of terror created by street 
gangs.”  (§ 186.21, 2d par.) 
Although defendant was charged under two different 
provisions of the STEP Act, only one of these allegations is 
presently at issue.  The relevant crime is set forth in section 
186.22, subdivision (a), which provides:  “Any person who 
actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge 
that its members engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of 
criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that 
gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a 
period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state 
prison for 16 months, or two or three years.”   
“The gravamen of the substantive offense set forth in 
section 186.22[, subdivision] (a) is active participation in a 
criminal street gang.”  (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 
55.)  “[W]ith section 186.22[, subdivision] (a), the Legislature 
sought to punish gang members who acted in concert with other 
gang members in committing a felony regardless of whether 
such felony was gang-related.”  (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 
p. 1138 (lead opn. of Corrigan, J.), italics omitted.)  The essential 
elements for a conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a) 
are:  “(1) active participation in a criminal street gang, in the 
sense of participation that is more than nominal or passive; (2) 
knowledge that the gang’s members engage in or have engaged 
in a pattern of criminal gang activity; and (3) the willful 
promotion, furtherance, or assistance in any felonious criminal 
conduct by members of that gang.”  (Albillar, at p. 56.)   
The third element of the street terrorism crime is most 
squarely at issue here.  In analyzing this component of the 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
7 
crime, our prior case law has articulated several principles 
relevant to the present case.  “[M]isdemeanor conduct . . . cannot 
constitute ‘felonious criminal conduct’ within the meaning of” 
this element.  (People v. Lamas (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 524 
(Lamas).)  Furthermore, liability under this provision is limited 
“to those who promote, further, or assist a specific felony 
committed by gang members and who know of the gang’s 
pattern of criminal gang activity.”  (People v. Castenada (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 743, 749, italics added.)  In other words, the provision 
“requir[es] the promotion or furtherance of specific conduct of 
gang members and not inchoate future conduct.”  (Rodriguez, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1137 (lead opn. of Corrigan, J.).)   
2. Relevant Provisions of Proposition 47 
Proposition 47 altered prior law in several important 
respects.  Among these changes, the initiative amended various 
provisions of the Health and Safety Code and the Penal Code to 
reclassify as misdemeanors certain narcotics and theft offenses 
that had been denominated either felonies or “wobblers” (i.e., 
crimes capable of being charged as either felonies or 
misdemeanors).  The initiative created a procedure through 
which persons serving a sentence for a qualifying felony may 
petition to have the conviction reclassified as a misdemeanor.  
(§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (b).)  Persons convicted of certain offenses 
are ineligible for resentencing.  (Id., subd. (i).)  An eligible 
petitioner shall have his or her sentence recalled and be 
resentenced to a misdemeanor, “unless the court, in its 
discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would 
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”  (Id., subd. 
(b).)  Through a separate procedure, a person who already has 
completed his or her sentence for a qualifying felony also may 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
8 
have the underlying conviction redesignated as a misdemeanor.  
(Id., subds. (f)-(h).)   
Section 1170.18 further provides that “[a] felony 
conviction that is recalled and resentenced . . . or designated as 
a misdemeanor . . . shall be considered a misdemeanor for all 
purposes, except that resentencing shall not permit that person 
to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control a firearm 
or prevent his or her conviction under [various statutes 
prohibiting 
possession 
of 
a 
firearm 
under 
certain 
circumstances].”  (§ 1170.18,  subd. (k).)  An uncodified provision 
of the measure provides that Proposition 47 “shall be liberally 
construed to effectuate its purposes.”  (Voter Information Guide, 
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 18, p. 74; see also id., 
§ 15, p. 74 [providing that the initiative “shall be broadly 
construed to accomplish its purposes”].) 
3. Prior Interpretation of Proposition 47 
Proposition 47 has generated many interpretive issues for 
this court.  (See, e.g., People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128; 
People v. Franco (2018) 6 Cal.5th 433; In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 
118; People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44; People v. Buycks 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks); People v. Martinez (2018) 
4 Cal.5th 647; People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594; People v. 
Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
347; People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903.)  In construing 
the initiative, “we apply the same principles that govern 
statutory construction.”  (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 
685.)  As a law adopted by the voters, “their intent governs.”  
(People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1146.)  In ascertaining 
that intent, “we turn first to the language of the statute, giving 
the words their ordinary meaning.”  (People v. Birkett (1999) 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
9 
21 Cal.4th 226, 231.)  This language is interpreted in the context 
of the statute as a whole, as well as the overall statutory scheme.  
(Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276.)  
A recent decision by this court, Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 
857, addressed issues similar to the one presented in this case.  
In Buycks, we considered the validity of three sentence 
enhancements or criminal convictions after the defendants to 
whom they pertained had secured the reduction of related felony 
convictions to misdemeanors through the Proposition 47 
petition process.  One defendant, Buycks, sought (in connection 
with a Proposition 47 resentencing) the dismissal of an “on-bail” 
enhancement imposed under section 12022.1, subdivision (b), 
which provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person arrested for 
a secondary [felony] offense that was alleged to have been 
committed while that person was released from custody on a 
primary [felony] offense shall be subject to a penalty 
enhancement . . . .”  (Buycks, at pp. 872-873.)  A second 
defendant in Buycks, Laura Valenzuela, pursued similar relief 
on direct appeal for a one-year term enhancement imposed 
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), applicable “for each prior 
separate prison term or county jail term imposed under 
subdivision (h) of Section 1170 or when the sentence is not 
suspended for any felony.”  (Buycks, at pp. 873-874.)  This 
enhancement, which derived from an earlier conviction for 
receiving stolen property (§ 496), was imposed in a case in which 
Valenzuela had been convicted of several other felonies, 
including one (a violation of Health & Saf. Code § 11377) that 
was among the narcotics crimes reclassified as misdemeanors 
by Proposition 47, and which Valenzuela had successfully 
petitioned to have reclassified as a misdemeanor.  (Buycks, at 
pp. 873-874.)  The third defendant, Guiomar, had failed to 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
10 
appear in court on a felony charge of possessing a controlled 
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350), leading to another 
criminal charge.  (Buycks, at pp. 874-875.)  The statute under 
which Guiomar was charged with failing to appear provides, 
“Every person who is charged with or convicted of the 
commission of a felony, who is released from custody on bail, and 
who in order to evade the process of the court willfully fails to 
appear as required, is guilty of a felony.”  (Pen. Code, § 1320.5.)  
Guiomar later had his felony drug conviction reduced to a 
misdemeanor through the Proposition 47 petition process, and 
on that basis sought to have his conviction for failing to appear 
set aside.  (Buycks, at p. 875.)   
In Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at page 883, we concluded that 
Proposition 47’s directive that a resentenced or redesignated 
offense “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes” 
(§ 1170.18, subd. (k)) applied both prospectively and in cases in 
which the judgment was not yet final at the time the initiative 
was approved by the electorate.  The latter determination 
involved application of the limited retroactivity rule we 
articulated in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 (Estrada).  
(Buycks, at p. 883.)  Through application of this rule, a 
defendant 
who 
successfully 
invokes 
the 
Proposition 47 
resentencing process may secure the dismissal or other 
appropriate treatment of an enhancement or crime subsumed 
within a judgment that was not yet final on November 5, 2014 
(the effective date of Prop. 47), when that allegation is premised 
on the existence of a felony conviction that has been reduced to 
a misdemeanor.  (See Buycks, at pp. 889-891.)   
We also determined in Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 857, that 
the “full resentencing rule” (id., at p. 893) applies to defendants 
who qualify for resentencing under the initiative (id., at pp. 893-
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
11 
895).  As more commonly applied, the full resentencing rule 
allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when 
resentencing a defendant.  (Id., at p. 893; People v. Navarro 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681 [noting that the rule allows the trial 
court to “exercise its sentencing discretion in light of . . . 
changed circumstances”].)  For example, when a felony 
conviction supplying a principal sentence term is reversed on 
appeal and the case returns to the trial court for resentencing, 
that court must select another conviction, if it exists, to supply 
the new principal term.  (See People v. Roach (2014) 247 
Cal.App.4th 178, 184-187.)  A court conducting a full 
resentencing also may, as appropriate, revisit sentencing 
choices such as a decision to stay a sentence (see People v. 
Calderon (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 82, 87-88), to impose an upper 
term instead of a middle term (see People v. Burbine (2003) 106 
Cal.App.4th 1250, 1256-1259), or to impose concurrent instead 
of consecutive sentences (see People v. Cortez (2016) 3 
Cal.App.5th 308, 311-317).   
In Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 857, we determined that in a 
Proposition 47 resentencing conducted under section 1170.18, 
subdivisions (a) and (b), the trial court, “when it resentences on 
the eligible felony conviction, must also resentence the 
defendant generally and must therefore reevaluate the continued 
applicability of any enhancement based on a prior felony 
conviction.”  (Buycks, at p. 894, italics added; cf. People v. 
Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1419-1420, disapproved 
on another ground in People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 304, 
fn. 6.)  In other words, in a Proposition 47 resentencing, the trial 
court not only must revisit its prior sentencing decisions; it also 
must decide whether the factual basis for an enhancement has 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
12 
been abrogated by the redesignation of a felony conviction as a 
misdemeanor.  (See Buycks, at pp. 893-895.)   
Applying these principles, we concluded in Buycks, supra, 
5 Cal.5th 857 that Buycks and Laura Valenzuela — but not 
Guiomar — were entitled to relief.  (Id., at pp. 896-897.)  
Relevant to Buycks, whose judgment of conviction had already 
become final at the time Proposition 47 came into effect, we 
observed that imposition of the on-bail enhancement under 
section 12022.1, subdivision (b) requires convictions for two 
felonies: the felony offense for which the defendant was on bail 
or released on his or her own recognizance (i.e., the primary 
offense) as well as the felony offense committed while the 
defendant was free on bail or his or her own recognizance (the 
secondary offense).  (Buycks, at p. 890; but cf. In re Jovan B. 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 814 [regarding the enhancement as 
applicable in juvenile wardship proceedings, even though 
juvenile adjudications are not “ ‘convictions’ ”].)  Reduction of 
Buycks’s primary felony conviction to a misdemeanor through 
Proposition 47 therefore negated a necessary premise for the on-
bail enhancement.  This development meant that in a full 
resentencing, no sentence associated with the allegation could 
properly be imposed upon him.  (Buycks, at pp. 890-891, 893-
895.) 
A somewhat similar analysis applied to Laura Valenzuela 
in Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 857.  We observed there that 
although the enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) 
does not expressly demand a felony conviction, its terms imply 
that such a conviction is necessary for the enhancement to 
attach.  (Buycks, at p. 889.)  Therefore, we determined that “the 
resentencing of [Valenzuela’s] prior underlying felony conviction 
to a misdemeanor conviction negates an element required to 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
13 
support [the] section 667.5 one-year enhancement.”  (Ibid.)  
Unlike the judgment affecting Buycks, the judgment involving 
Valenzuela’s narcotics offense and related enhancement was not 
yet final when Proposition 47 came into effect.  (Buycks, at 
pp. 893-894.)  This difference in timing meant that the limited 
retroactivity principle of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 inured 
to Valenzuela’s benefit; she did not have to rely exclusively on 
the full resentencing rule in pursuing relief.  (Buycks, at pp. 894-
895, 896.)   
We concluded that the third defendant, Guiomar, was not 
entitled to dismissal of his conviction for failing to appear.  
(Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 891-892, 896-897.)  Although 
Guiomar had successfully petitioned for reduction of his drug-
offense conviction to a misdemeanor, this did not alter the fact 
that he had failed to appear on a felony charge.  (Id., at p. 892.)  
We emphasized that liability under section 1320.5 does not 
depend on the defendant having been convicted on the charge 
for which he or she had failed to appear.  To the contrary, “the 
primary purpose of section 1320.5 is to deter the act of jumping 
bail and [the statute] requires punishment ‘whether or not the 
defendant ultimately is convicted of the charge for which he or 
she was out on bail when failing to appear in court as ordered.’ ”  
(Buycks, at p. 891, quoting People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
577, 583.)  Hence, reduction of Guiomar’s felony narcotics 
conviction 
to 
a 
misdemeanor 
through 
Proposition 47 
resentencing did not remove any element of the failure to appear 
conviction that he sought to have dismissed.4   
                                        
4  
A broad analogy might be drawn to a defendant who 
escapes while incarcerated for a crime later found to be 
 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
14 
B. Defendant Is Entitled To Dismissal of His Street 
Terrorism Conviction in a Full Resentencing  
There is no dispute that, in accordance with section 
1170.18, subdivision (a), the resentencing court appropriately 
reclassified defendant’s grand theft conviction (§ 487, subd. (c)) 
as misdemeanor petty theft.  Nor is there any question that 
defendant was entitled to be resentenced consistently with that 
redesignation.  The issue before us is whether, in light of this 
adjustment, defendant’s conviction for street terrorism can still 
stand.  We conclude that it cannot.   
As previously described, an essential element of the street 
terrorism offense is that the defendant must have “promote[d], 
further[ed], or assist[ed] in any felonious criminal conduct” by 
gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).)  This element “requir[es] 
the promotion or furtherance of specific conduct of gang 
members” (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1137 (lead opn. of 
Corrigan, J.)), and the conduct involved must constitute a felony 
— as opposed to a misdemeanor, or no crime at all (Lamas, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 524).  Consistent with these 
interpretations of the statute, the jury instruction for the street 
terrorism offense requires the finder of fact to determine, as an 
element of the crime, that a specific felony was in fact committed 
by gang members.  (CALCRIM No. 1400.)   
In this case, there is no dispute that the theft of Ramirez’s 
$200 bicycle — the same conduct that gave rise to defendant’s 
conviction for grand theft — constituted the felonious criminal 
                                        
unconstitutional.  We made clear in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 
740 that the subsequent invalidation of the underlying offense 
would not bar such a defendant from being convicted for escape.  
(Id., at p. 750.)    
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
15 
conduct involved with his conviction for street terrorism.  In 
light of defendant’s Proposition 47 resentencing, that theft can 
no longer be regarded as felonious.  (§§ 490.2, 1170.18, subd. (b).)  
The People do not explain how defendant’s underlying conduct 
could be regarded as felonious under a different theory, at least 
in a way not already rejected by the jury (which declined to 
convict defendant of robbery).  The reduction of defendant’s 
felony grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor therefore 
established the absence of an essential element of the street 
terrorism crime.  (See Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 889-890.)  
It follows that the street terrorism charge should have been 
dismissed at defendant’s full resentencing.  (See id., at pp. 888 
[determining that, except for firearm possession offenses 
expressly excluded under § 1170.18, subd. (k), Prop. 47’s 
“mandate to reduce penalties for a distinct class of narcotics and 
larceny-related 
offenses 
otherwise 
fully 
extends 
to 
enhancements and subsequent offenses alleged with those 
offenses”], 894-895.)  
The People contend that even if defendant’s conviction for 
grand theft became a “misdemeanor for all purposes” upon 
reclassification and resentencing (§ 1170.18, subd. (k)), this 
adjustment has no effect on his conviction for street terrorism.  
The People stress that a conviction for street terrorism requires 
“felonious criminal conduct” (§ 186.22, subd. (a)), not necessarily 
a conviction for the underlying felony.5  We do not disagree with 
                                        
5  
Thus, for example, a gang member who promotes, 
furthers, or assists a felony committed by other gang members 
might be convicted of street terrorism without also being 
charged with, let alone convicted of, the offense he or she 
facilitated.  In such a case, however, the finder of fact still must 
 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
16 
the latter point, but do not regard it as decisive here.  Given the 
facts of this case, the reduction of defendant’s theft conviction to 
a misdemeanor establishes that he cannot be regarded as 
having engaged in felonious criminal conduct.  This essential 
element not being present, defendant cannot properly be 
resentenced for the street terrorism offense.   
The People further contend that the reduction of 
defendant’s grand theft conviction to misdemeanor petty theft 
does not alter the fact that he committed felonious criminal 
conduct as it was denominated in 2013.  They take the position 
that the classification of defendant’s conduct at that time 
controls.  But neither the gravamen of the street terrorism crime 
nor any indicia of legislative intent associated with it convey 
that the felonious nature of the criminal conduct necessary for 
commission of this offense is fixed for all time when the crime 
takes place.  It is more reasonable, in light of the limited 
retroactivity rule of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, which 
presumes that ameliorative changes in the criminal laws were 
intended to be applied to cases with nonfinal judgments, to 
conclude that the felonious character of this conduct is 
susceptible to reassessment as may be appropriate in light of 
pertinent developments affecting the criminal codes, so long as 
the judgment is nonfinal or validly reopened.  
In this respect, the felonious character of the criminal 
conduct involved with street terrorism is little different from the 
erstwhile felonious nature of the prior convictions involved with 
the enhancements we addressed in Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 857.  
There, we emphasized that we were required to reassess the 
                                        
determine that the defendant promoted, furthered, or assisted 
the commission of a specific felony.   
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
17 
continued applicability of these enhancements at the time of 
resentencing.  (Id., at p. 894.)  Similarly here, the reclassification 
of defendant’s conviction for grand theft as misdemeanor petty 
theft pursuant to the Proposition 47 petition process imparts 
that an essential element to defendant’s conviction for street 
terrorism is now absent.  Defendant is therefore no longer 
susceptible to being resentenced for the street terrorism offense.    
Lastly, the People liken the facts of this case to those 
associated with defendant Guiomar in Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 
857, to whom we denied relief.  But section 1320.5, the “failure 
to appear” statute under which Guiomar was convicted, is 
materially different from the street terrorism crime involved 
here.  A felonious failure to appear — involving a willful evasion 
of the court’s process in what had been denominated, if not yet 
proved to be, a felony matter — is not, as a matter of logic or 
gravity, affected by the reduction of a subsequent felony 
conviction in the matter in which defendant absented himself or 
herself.  Critically, reclassification of a felony conviction 
associated with a crime for which a defendant failed to appear 
does not function to negate an essential element of section 
1320.5 offense.  (See Buycks, at p. 891.)  In this case, as 
previously described, the reduction of defendant’s grand theft 
conviction to misdemeanor petty theft establishes the absence of 
an essential element of defendant’s conviction for street 
terrorism, to wit, that defendant promoted, furthered, or 
assisted specific felonious criminal conduct.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
Given the circumstances before us, defendant cannot 
properly be resentenced for the street terrorism offense.  
Instead, this conviction must be dismissed in his Proposition 47 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
18 
resentencing.6  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  
We remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with 
our opinion. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J.
                                        
6  
Our determination that defendant is entitled to a full 
resentencing at which the reduction of his grand theft conviction 
to misdemeanor petty theft will lead to the dismissal of his 
street terrorism conviction should not be read to imply a 
separate, negative holding: that a different defendant, convicted 
only of street terrorism before Proposition 47 came into effect, 
cannot obtain relief under the initiative even though the 
criminal conduct he or she promoted, furthered, or assisted is no 
longer felonious.  We have no occasion here to address those 
circumstances, and leave for another day what remedies, if any, 
are available to a defendant in that position. 
1 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
S239122 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Corrigan 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In enacting Proposition 47, the 
electorate expressed its intent to reduce punishment for 
nonserious theft and drug offenses.  Defendant’s crime of 
participating in a criminal street gang under Penal Code1 
section 186.22, subdivision (a) does not constitute a nonserious 
theft offense falling within the ambit of that provision.   
“Enacted in 2014, Proposition 47, known as the Safe 
Neighborhoods and Schools Act . . . , ‘reduc[ed] penalties for 
certain theft and drug offenses by amending existing statutes.’  
[Citation.]  ‘One of Proposition 47’s primary purposes is to 
reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, 
thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders 
considered more serious under the terms of the initiative.’ ”  
(People v. Adelmann (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1071, 1075.)  The Voter 
Information Guide explained that Proposition 47 “reduces 
penalties for certain offenders convicted of nonserious and 
nonviolent property and drug crimes.  The measure also allows 
certain offenders who have been previously convicted of such 
crimes to apply for reduced sentences.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. 
Analyst, p. 35, italics added.)   
                                        
1  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise noted.   
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
2 
The resentencing statute, section 1170.18, subdivision (a), 
provides:  “A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a 
sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or 
felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the 
act that added this section (‘this act’) had this act been in effect 
at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence 
before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in 
his or her case to request resentencing in accordance with 
Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, 
or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, 
as those sections have been amended or added by this act.”   
Defendant’s offense, street terrorism under section 186.22, 
subdivision (a), is not listed in section 1170.18, subdivision (a).  
Nevertheless, he argues he is entitled to resentencing “in 
accordance with” section 490.2, which defines as misdemeanor 
petty theft “obtaining any property by theft where the value of 
the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not 
exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) . . . .”  (§ 490.2, subd. 
(a).)  The majority agrees:  “In this case, there is no dispute that 
the theft of Ramirez’s $200 bicycle — the same conduct that gave 
rise to defendant’s conviction for grand theft — constituted the 
felonious criminal conduct involved with his conviction for street 
terrorism.  In light of defendant’s Proposition 47 resentencing, 
that theft can no longer be regarded as felonious.  (§§ 490.2, 
1170.18, subd. (b).)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.)   
Although we have reasoned that offenses not listed in 
section 1170.18 may be resentenced in accordance with section 
490.2, we have been careful to note that such offenses are, in 
fact, theft offenses.  For example, People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
1175 concluded a defendant convicted under Vehicle Code 
section 10851, subdivision (a), which criminalizes the unlawful 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
3 
taking or driving of a vehicle, would be entitled to Proposition 
47 resentencing if his conviction was based upon vehicle theft.  
“[W]hile Vehicle Code section 10851 does not expressly 
designate the offense as theft, the conduct it criminalizes 
includes theft of a vehicle . . . .  And to the extent vehicle theft is 
punished as a felony under section 10851, it is, in effect, a form 
of grand, rather than petty, theft.”  (Page, at p. 1186.)  Thus, 
“obtaining an automobile worth $950 or less by theft constitutes 
petty theft under section 490.2 and is punishable only as a 
misdemeanor, regardless of the statutory section under which 
the theft was charged.”  (Id. at p. 1187.)  Similarly, People v. 
Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 concluded that theft of access 
card information (Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (d)) was subject to 
resentencing under Proposition 47 because it was a form of theft:  
“[W]e must presume that voters were at least aware that the 
Penal Code sets out ‘grand theft’ crimes that included theft of 
access card account information.  (§ 484e.)  The text and 
structure of Proposition 47 convey that section 490.2’s clear 
purpose was to reduce punishment for crimes of ‘obtaining any 
property by theft’ that were previously punished as ‘grand theft’ 
when the stolen property was worth less than $950.  And section 
484e confirms that theft of access card information is one of 
those crimes.”  (Romanowski, at p. 909.)   
The majority here equates street terrorism with a 
nonserious theft offense subject to section 490.2.  Section 186.22, 
subdivision (a) applies to “[a]ny person who actively participates 
in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members 
engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang 
activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any 
felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang . . . .”  First, 
the Penal Code specifically lists a violation of section 186.22 as 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
4 
a serious felony.  (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(28).)  Proposition 47 was 
represented to the voters as applying only to “nonserious and 
nonviolent property and drug crimes.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, 
p. 35.)  Applying its ameliorative provisions to a serious felony 
would seem contrary to the electorate’s intent.   
Second, a violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a) is not 
a theft offense.  “The gravamen of the substantive offense set 
forth in section 186.22[, subdivision] (a) is active participation 
in a criminal street gang.”  (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 
47, 55.)  Section 186.22, subdivision (a) “reflects the 
Legislature’s carefully structured endeavor to punish active 
participants for commission of criminal acts done collectively 
with gang members.”  (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 
1125, 1139 (lead opn. of Corrigan, J.) (Rodriguez).)  Thus, unlike 
vehicle theft in Page or theft of access card information in 
Romanowski, street terrorism encompasses concerted criminal 
conduct beyond mere theft, even if theft is part of the underlying 
conduct.   
On this point, two Court of Appeal cases are instructive.  
People v. Martin (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 825 (Martin) concluded 
that conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) to commit petty theft was 
not subject to Proposition 47 resentencing.  Martin noted that 
“[t]he courts have long recognized the enhanced dangers of a 
conspiracy” (Martin, at p. 836), and reasoned the defendant’s 
offense went beyond a mere theft:  “The conspiracy in which 
respondent was involved was not an ordinary shoplifting 
scheme; it involved criminal teamwork.”  (Id. at p. 839.)  The 
defendant conspired to “commit as many petty thefts as she 
could get away with” and sell the stolen property overseas.  (Id. 
at p. 828.)  Martin observed, “The potential harm to the public 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
5 
from such a conspiracy was far greater than the harm posed by 
ordinary shoplifting.”  (Id. at p. 839.)  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeal reversed her resentencing under Proposition 47.  (See 
also People v. Segura (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1284.)   
Similarly, People v. Soto (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 813 
concluded Proposition 47 did not ameliorate a felony conviction 
for theft from an elder (§ 368, subd. (d)).  Soto observed that 
neither Page nor Romanowski “had occasion to consider 
Proposition 47 eligibility for what we will call a pure ‘theft-plus’ 
offense, i.e., one that is not identified as grand theft and requires 
additional necessary elements beyond the theft itself.  Nothing 
in Romanowski or Page suggests that section 490.2 extends to 
any course of conduct that happens to include obtaining 
property by theft worth less than $950.”  (Soto, at p. 822.)  Soto 
reasoned a contrary conclusion would lead to absurd results, 
noting that theft was an included offense of robbery (§ 211), a 
violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9)), and “[a] robber might take 
property by larceny worth less than $950” (Soto, at p. 822).  “An 
overexpansive reading of Romanowski and Page might construe 
that ‘theft-plus’ offense as petty theft under section 490.2.  Such 
a construction would thwart Proposition 47’s objective to reduce 
sentences for nonviolent crimes while shifting spending toward 
more serious offenses.”  (Id. at pp. 822-823.)  Soto concluded:  
“Soto was charged with an aggravated form of theft—theft from 
an elder victim.  We see no way to interpret section 490.2 to 
cover Soto’s conviction without converting every ‘theft-plus’ 
offense involving less than $950 into petty theft.”  (Id. at p. 824, 
fn. omitted.)   
The reasoning of Martin and Soto applies here.  
Defendant’s street terrorism offense went beyond the mere 
commission of theft.  The jury necessarily found that defendant 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
6 
acted with a fellow gang member and committed their offense to 
promote their gang.  Just as a conspiracy to commit theft poses 
a danger to society beyond the underlying theft, defendant’s 
active gang participation likewise posed a danger to society 
beyond the underlying theft.  As Soto reasoned, nothing in 
Proposition 47 suggested an electoral intent to reduce to a 
misdemeanor any and all felonies that may include some aspect 
of theft.   
In passing the California Street Terrorism Enforcement 
and Prevention Act (§ 186.20 et seq.), the Legislature declared 
“that the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been 
caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, 
terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful 
citizens of their neighborhoods.  These activities, both 
individually and collectively, present a clear and present danger 
to public order and safety and are not constitutionally 
protected.”  (§ 186.21.)  The majority’s treatment of defendant’s 
street terrorism offense as nothing but a form of theft is at odds 
with the important purposes behind both section 186.22, 
“enacted in 1988 to combat a dramatic increase in gang-related 
crimes and violence” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 67), 
and with Proposition 47, which was enacted to grant relief to 
those convicted of nonserious theft and drug offenses.   
The majority’s reliance on the so-called “ ‘full resentencing 
rule’ ” of People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks) is 
misplaced.  (Id. at p. 893.)  As articulated in In re Estrada (1965) 
63 Cal.2d 740, unless otherwise indicated, an “ ‘amendatory 
statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases 
not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s 
effective date.’ ” (People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600; 
see In re Estrada, at p. 744.)  We applied this rule in Buycks to 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
7 
two enhancements for having served a prior prison term (§ 
667.5, subd. (b)) and committing an offense while released on 
bail or his own recognizance (§ 12022.1), both of which required 
underlying felony convictions.  (See Buycks, at pp. 889-891.)  
Buycks reasoned that, once those underlying felony convictions 
were resentenced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47, 
section 1170.18, subdivision (k), which states that “[a] felony 
conviction that is recalled and resentenced under subdivision 
(b) . . . shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes,” 
applied:  “Therefore, at the time of resentencing of a Proposition 
47 eligible felony conviction, the trial court must reevaluate the 
applicability of any enhancement within the same judgment at 
that time, so long as that enhancement was predicated on a 
felony conviction now reduced to a misdemeanor.  Such an 
enhancement cannot be imposed because at that point the 
reduced conviction ‘shall be considered a misdemeanor for all 
purposes.’  (§ 1170.18, subd. (k).)”  (Buycks, at pp. 894-895.)   
It is unclear from the majority opinion what specific 
statutory amendment is being given retroactive effect within the 
meaning of Estrada and Buycks under the full resentencing 
rule.  The majority states, “The reduction of defendant’s felony 
grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor therefore established 
the absence of an essential element of the street terrorism 
crime” (maj opn., ante, at p. 15), suggesting it is applying section 
1170.18, subdivision (k).  Indeed, the majority cites Buycks’s 
application of that provision.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15; see also 
ibid. [“In light of defendant’s Proposition 47 resentencing, that 
theft can no longer be regarded as felonious”].)  However, the 
enhancements in Buycks required underlying felony convictions 
in order to be imposed, and the Proposition 47 reduction of those 
felonies to misdemeanors took away a necessary component of 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
8 
the enhancements.  (Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 888-891.)  
By contrast, as the majority acknowledges, a street terrorism 
conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a) does not require 
a conviction of any other felony offense.  (See maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 15-16, fn. 5.)  As such, the fact that a felony conviction 
unnecessary to the street terrorism conviction was reduced to a 
misdemeanor should have no bearing on the continued validity 
of defendant’s section 186.22, subdivision (a) conviction.  Buycks 
is thus distinguishable.   
The majority’s application of the full resentencing rule 
here essentially sanctions an end run around the Proposition 47 
resentencing scheme.  As described ante, defendant cannot 
establish entitlement to relief under the resentencing procedure 
of section 1170.18, subdivision (a).  Buycks recognized 
alternative procedures for relief “because Proposition 47 does 
not provide a specific mechanism for recalling and resentencing 
a judgment solely because a felony-based enhancement has been 
collaterally affected by the reduction of a conviction to a 
misdemeanor in a separate judgment . . . .”  (Buycks, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 892.)  It is one thing to recognize such a procedure 
in Buycks, where reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor under 
Proposition 47 eliminated the felony convictions required for the 
enhancements there, thus implementing the electoral intent 
manifested in section 1170.18, subdivision (k).  It is quite 
another to apply such a procedure here.  The majority 
contemplates the trial court will strike entirely the street 
terrorism conviction, even though that offense was nowhere 
mentioned in Proposition 47 and section 186.22 was not 
amended by the act, due to the happenstance that defendant 
was also concurrently convicted of grand theft, a conviction not 
required for a street terrorism conviction, and that theft 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
9 
conviction was later reduced to a misdemeanor.  Indeed, the only 
difference between this case and Martin is that Martin did not 
have the good fortune to be convicted of theft in addition to 
conspiracy to commit theft.2  Nothing in the language of 
Proposition 47 suggests the electorate contemplated such a 
random and haphazard scheme.   
We are, of course, bound by the voters’ lawful enactments, 
and properly so.  But we are bound to enforce those enactments 
in accordance with the voters’ lawful intent.  As Justice Yegan 
observed in Martin, “The fabric of the law will stretch only so far 
before it will unravel.”  (Martin, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 
828.)  To conclude that, in providing more lenient treatment for 
those convicted of nonviolent theft offenses, the voters intended 
to reduce culpability for those guilty of the separate, serious 
felony of street terrorism stretches credulity, and the fabric of 
the law, too far.  I would affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
affirming the trial court’s denial of resentencing under 
Proposition 47.   
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
                                        
2  
Martin was convicted of shoplifting (§ 459.5) for an 
incident unrelated to the charged conspiracy.  (See Martin, 
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 829.)   
1 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
S239122 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
In 2013, in an apparent gang-related incident, defendant 
Luis Donicio Valenzuela took a bicycle worth around $200 
dollars from another young man.  He was convicted of two 
felonies:  grand theft from the person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. 
(c)) and active participation in a street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. 
(a)).  The latter offense applies to a person who actively 
participates in a criminal street gang with knowledge of the 
gang’s pattern of criminal activity, and who “willfully promotes, 
furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by 
members of that gang.”  (Ibid.)   
In 2014, while these convictions were on appeal, voters 
passed Proposition 47, which reclassified many drug possession 
and theft offense felonies as misdemeanors.  Among the 
measure’s new provisions was Penal Code section 490.2, which 
generally reduced felony punishment for theft of property worth 
$950 or less to the misdemeanor level.  (Id., subd. (a).)  Invoking 
this provision, defendant successfully petitioned the superior 
court to reduce his grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor.  
(Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subds. (a), (b), as added by Prop. 47, § 14, 
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014).)  He now argues 
that the superior court should also have dismissed his felony 
gang participation conviction altogether.  He reasons that once 
the grand theft conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor, grand 
theft could no longer be used to satisfy the “felonious criminal 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Kruger, J., dissenting 
 
2 
conduct” element of the gang participation crime under Penal 
Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). 
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument.  It explained 
that because liability under Penal Code section 186.22, 
subdivision (a) does not depend on having sustained any 
underlying felony conviction, the fact that defendant’s grand 
theft conviction was later reduced to a misdemeanor had no 
bearing on the continued validity of defendant’s gang 
participation conviction.  (People v. Valenzuela (2016) 
5 Cal.App.5th 449, 452–453, review granted Mar. 1, 2017, 
S239122.) 
The 
majority 
now 
reverses, 
reasoning 
that 
the 
resentencing court’s reduction of defendant’s theft conviction to 
a misdemeanor “established the absence of an essential element 
of the street terrorism offense—felonious criminal conduct.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  “In light of defendant’s Proposition 47 
resentencing,” defendant’s theft of the bicycle “can no longer be 
regarded as felonious” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 15); put another 
way, “the reduction of defendant’s theft conviction to a 
misdemeanor establishes that he cannot be regarded as having 
engaged in felonious criminal conduct” (id. at p. 16) as required 
for a conviction under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision 
(a). 
Much as I sympathize with the majority’s efforts to give 
appropriate effect to Proposition 47’s ameliorative purposes, I 
cannot join in this reasoning.  As the Court of Appeal rightly 
noted, the argument conflates the grand theft conviction with 
the conduct underlying it.  Defendant’s gang participation 
conviction did not depend on the existence of a separate 
conviction for grand theft (or any other felony, for that matter); 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Kruger, J., dissenting 
 
3 
it depended only on his having committed or assisted in 
felonious conduct to promote the activities of a criminal street 
gang.  It follows that the reduction of defendant’s grand theft 
conviction does not entitle defendant to dismissal of his gang 
participation conviction. 
This case is not like People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 
871.  In Buycks, we held that reduction of a felony conviction to 
a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 invalidated sentence 
enhancements based on the prior felony conviction because 
under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (k), the reduced 
conviction “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.”  
There, the validity of each of the enhancements at issue 
depended on the existence of a felony conviction, not simply the 
commission of felonious conduct.  (See Buycks, at pp. 888–890 
[enhancement under Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)], 890–891 
[enhancement under Pen. Code, § 12022.1].)  In contrast, the 
gang participation offense defined in Penal Code section 186.22, 
subdivision (a), does not refer—even implicitly—to a predicate 
prior felony conviction. It instead applies to a gang participant 
who has assisted other gang members in felonious conduct.  The 
majority opinion does not explain how the reduction of 
defendant’s grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor could 
possibly have altered the nature of the conduct underlying the 
gang participation offense. 
The majority opinion does gesture to a possible alternative 
rationale for reaching the same conclusion:  that setting aside 
the fate of defendant’s separate theft conviction, Proposition 47 
itself retroactively operated on Penal Code section 186.22, 
subdivision (a), to preclude reliance on conduct involving theft 
of property worth less than $950.  Although the majority opinion 
does not clearly say so, this is an entirely different argument for 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Kruger, J., dissenting 
 
4 
granting relief.  It does not depend in any way on the 
reclassification of defendant’s grand theft conviction; it depends, 
rather, on our usual presumption that legislation lessening 
punishment is intended to apply retroactively to all cases that 
have not yet become final on appeal.  (In re Estrada (1965) 63 
Cal.2d 740, 745.)  The majority touches on this argument when 
it reasons that because defendant’s gang participation 
conviction was not yet final when Proposition 47 took effect, “the 
limited retroactivity rule of Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, 
which presumes that ameliorative changes in the criminal laws 
were intended to be applied to cases with nonfinal judgments,” 
makes the underlying conduct “susceptible to reassessment” 
under the measure’s new provisions.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.) 
There are, however, several difficulties with relying on 
this argument here, beginning with the fact it has not been 
properly presented to us.  Defendant never made the Estrada 
argument in the Court of Appeal, and that court did not address 
it.  Nor did defendant rely on Estrada in his briefing in this 
court.  Even when we specifically asked the parties to brief that 
decision’s significance, defendant affirmatively disclaimed 
reliance on this theory, conceding that he was not entitled to 
retroactive relief under Estrada.  Counsel partly withdrew that 
concession in a letter submitted to the court before oral 
argument, but he still did not invoke Estrada as a standalone 
basis for relief; his arguments have instead relied on some 
amalgam of Estrada and his original, and incorrect, theory that 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Kruger, J., dissenting 
 
5 
the reduction of his grand theft conviction necessarily implies 
the invalidity of his gang participation conviction.1 
As a consequence, neither the parties nor the courts have 
ever grappled with the implications of adopting a rule that 
would regard Proposition 47 as retroactively invalidating 
convictions for offenses that, like Penal Code section 186.22, 
subdivision (a), depend in some way on a showing that the 
defendant committed conduct punishable as a felony.  The first, 
threshold question is whether this theory can be squared with 
People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 600–603, in which we 
held that defendants who were serving felony sentences on 
Proposition 47’s effective date—and who therefore could seek 
resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18—could not 
instead claim the direct benefit of retroactive amelioration 
under Estrada. 
Even if we were to answer that question in the affirmative, 
we would then have to confront an arguably anomalous 
consequence of the theory.  Proposition 47 was designed to 
reduce certain felonies to misdemeanors.  But retroactive 
application of Proposition 47 in this context could instead result 
in a defendant being relieved of all criminal liability for his or 
                                        
1  
Defendant did brief and argue an alternative theory for 
relief independent of Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision 
(k):  that defendant was entitled to resentencing under 
subdivision (a) of the statute.  But that theory relied not on 
Estrada but on People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 and People 
v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903.  The theory fails for 
reasons given in Justice Corrigan’s dissent:  Unlike the crimes 
involved in Page and Romanowski, the gang participation 
offense in Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a), neither is 
a grand theft offense nor has grand theft as one of its statutory 
variants. 
PEOPLE v. VALENZUELA 
Kruger, J., dissenting 
 
6 
her formerly felonious conduct.  In this case, of course, 
defendant was convicted of grand theft as well as gang 
participation, and that theft conviction has now been reduced to 
a misdemeanor.  Dismissing or vacating defendant’s gang 
participation conviction, as this court’s disposition directs, will 
leave him with a misdemeanor conviction for his theft, just as a 
person who committed the same conduct after Proposition 47 
would face prosecution for misdemeanor theft.  But a defendant 
who, by contrast, had been charged with and convicted only of 
gang participation under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision 
(a), would, under the Estrada theory, be retroactively relieved of 
all liability.  This is a result that the voters who approved 
Proposition 47  did not likely anticipate. 
Whether that consequence is one that should preclude 
retroactive relief is a significant question.  But it is a question 
that is not properly before us, and it is therefore not one we can 
or should answer here. 
On the only question properly presented to us, I think the 
Court of Appeal got it right:  The reduction of defendant’s grand 
theft conviction to a misdemeanor did not retroactively 
invalidate 
defendant’s 
separate 
conviction 
for 
gang 
participation.  In the absence of briefing and argument to 
support any other viable theory of relief, I would affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
I Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Valenzuela 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 5 Cal.App.5th 449 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S239122 
Date Filed: June 3, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Ventura 
Judge: Nancy L. Ayers 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Stephen P. Lipson and Todd W. Howeth, Public Defenders, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy Public 
Defender, and William Quest, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Louis W. Karlin, Susan 
Sullivan Pithey, Mary Sanchez and Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William Quest 
Deputy Public Defender 
Hall of Justice 
800 South Victoria Avenue, Room 207 
Ventura, CA  93009 
(805) 654-3032 
 
Wyatt E. Bloomfield 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6145