Title: Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., Inc

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 422PA99
FILED: 5 MAY 2000
CARL L. PERKINS,
Employee
v.
ARKANSAS TRUCKING SERVICES, INC.,
Employer;
SELF-INSURED (GUARDIAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY)
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 134 N.C. App. 490,
518 S.E.2d 36 (1999), affirming an opinion and award entered by
the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 9 June 1998.  Heard
in the Supreme Court 14 February 2000.
Jonathan S. Williams, P.C., by Jonathan S. Williams, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Teague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, by Dayle A. Flammia and
Tracey L. Jones, for defendant-appellants.
MARTIN, Justice.
On 8 March 1994 plaintiff Carl L. Perkins was injured in the
course and scope of his employment with Arkansas Trucking
Services, Inc. (Arkansas Trucking).  The accident occurred while
plaintiff was operating a tractor-trailer in Florence, South
Carolina.  Thereafter, Arkansas Trucking commenced payment of
workers’ compensation benefits under Arkansas law.  See generally
Ark. Code Ann. ch. 9 (1996 & Supp. 1999).  On 4 October 1994
plaintiff filed a Form 18 notice of accident with his employer
and the North Carolina Industrial Commission (Commission or full
Commission).  Plaintiff also filed a Form 33 request for hearing
to determine whether the Commission had jurisdiction over his
workers’ compensation claim.
On 8 May 1996, after a hearing limited to the jurisdictional
question, the deputy commissioner entered an interlocutory
opinion and order concluding that plaintiff’s principal place of
employment was within North Carolina and, therefore, that the
Commission had jurisdiction over his claim under N.C.G.S. §
97-36.
On 30 October 1996 the deputy commissioner held a second
hearing to determine the amount of plaintiff’s award.  On
30 April 1997 the deputy commissioner filed an opinion and award
in which he concluded that plaintiff was totally disabled and
was, therefore, entitled to compensation at a rate of $417.75 per
week from the date of the accident.  Defendants Arkansas Trucking
and Guardian National Insurance Company appealed.  
On 9 June 1998 the full Commission affirmed and adopted,
with minor modifications, the deputy commissioner’s 8 May 1996
interlocutory opinion and order and 30 April 1997 opinion and
award.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion and
award of the full Commission.  Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking
Servs., Inc., 134 N.C. App. 490, 518 S.E.2d 36 (1999).  On
4 November 1999 we allowed defendants’ petition for discretionary
review.
Prior to 1991 the Commission exercised jurisdiction over
work-related accidents occurring outside of North Carolina only
if the contract of employment was made in this State or if the
employer’s principal place of business was in this State.  See
N.C.G.S. § 97-36 (1985) (amended 1991); Thomas v. Overland
Express, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 90, 96, 398 S.E.2d 921, 925 (1990),
disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 576, 403 S.E.2d 522 (1991).  In 1991,
however, the General Assembly ratified “An Act to Assure that the
North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act Extends to Injuries
Outside the State for Employees Whose Principal Place of
Employment is in North Carolina.”  Ch. 284, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws
528.
The statute, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
Where an accident happens while the employee is
employed elsewhere than in this State and the accident
is one which would entitle him or his dependents or
next of kin to compensation if it had happened in this
State, then the employee or his dependents or next of
kin shall be entitled to compensation (i) if the
contract of employment was made in this State, (ii) if
the employer’s principal place of business is in this
State, or (iii) if the employee’s principal place of
employment is within this State . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 97-36 (1999) (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s determination
that plaintiff’s principal place of employment was within North
Carolina and, therefore, upheld the Commission’s exercise of
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim under section 97-36(iii). 
Perkins, 134 N.C. App. at 493, 518 S.E.2d at 38.
Defendants first contend the Court of Appeals applied an
erroneous standard of review to the Commission’s jurisdictional
determination under section 97-36(iii).  We agree.
As a general rule, the Commission’s findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.  See
N.C.G.S. § 97-86 (1999); Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681,
509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998); Gallimore v. Marilyn’s Shoes, 292
N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977).  It is well settled,
however, that the Commission’s findings of jurisdictional fact
are not conclusive on appeal, even if supported by competent
evidence.  See Lucas v. Li’l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221
S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976); Askew v. Leonard Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168,
174, 141 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1965); Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500,
505, 163 S.E. 569, 571 (1932).  “The reviewing court has the
right, and the duty, to make its own independent findings of such
jurisdictional facts from its consideration of all the evidence
in the record.”  Lucas, 289 N.C. at 218, 221 S.E.2d at 261.
In the present case the Court of Appeals characterized the
question for review as “whether there [was] any competent
evidence supporting the Commission’s finding that plaintiff’s
principal place of employment [was] within North Carolina.” 
Perkins, 134 N.C. App. at 492, 518 S.E.2d at 37.  When, as here,
the appellate court reviews findings of jurisdictional fact
entered by the Commission, our decision in Lucas requires the
reviewing court “to make its own independent findings of . . .
jurisdictional fact[] from its consideration of all the evidence
in the record.”  Lucas, 289 N.C. at 218, 221 S.E.2d at 261. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the “any
competent evidence” standard of review to the jurisdictional
question raised by the present case.
Defendants next contend the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the Commission’s determination that plaintiff’s
principal place of employment was within North Carolina.  We
disagree.
At the outset, we note that section 97-36 does not define
“principal place of employment.”  “Nothing else appearing, the
Legislature is presumed to have used the words of a statute to
convey their natural and ordinary meaning.”  In re McLean
Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 252, 188 S.E.2d 452, 458 (1972).  In
the absence of a contextual definition, courts may look to
dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of words within a
statute.  See Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 638, 325 S.E.2d
469, 478 (1985); State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 533, 173
S.E.2d 47, 48 (1970).  “Principal” has been defined as “most
important, consequential, or influential.”  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 926 (10th ed. 1993).  Therefore, we consider
all the evidence of record to determine whether North Carolina
was plaintiff’s “principal” place of employment as “principal” is
used in its natural and ordinary meaning.
In the instant case, plaintiff was assigned to operate a
tractor-trailer in Arkansas Trucking’s southeastern territory, an
area consisting of twelve to thirteen southern states, including
North Carolina.  Arkansas Trucking employs more than three, but
less than ten, truck drivers in North Carolina.  Because Arkansas
Trucking does not maintain a terminal in this State, plaintiff
was dispatched from his residence in Dudley, North Carolina, by a
dispatcher in the employer’s Doraville, Georgia, terminal. 
Plaintiff’s first pick-ups and last deliveries, including stops
in Durham, Charlotte, Kinston, Raleigh, and Roseboro, were
scheduled as close to his residence in Dudley as possible to
prevent plaintiff from driving with an empty truck. 
Approximately eighteen to twenty percent of plaintiff’s stops
were in North Carolina.  When he was off the road, plaintiff kept
his employer’s vehicle at his residence in Dudley.  Finally,
plaintiff received his paychecks at his residence in Dudley.
After careful review of the evidence of record, we hold that
North Carolina constituted plaintiff’s principal place of
employment under section 97-36(iii).  Not surprisingly, as a
truck driver, plaintiff did not perform the majority of his job
duties in any one state.  The record reflects, however, that no
state, standing alone, had the same degree of significant
contacts to plaintiff’s employment as North Carolina.  We believe
our construction of section 97-36, as amended, best promotes the
legislative intent behind addition of subsection (iii).  See
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388
S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990) (“The primary rule of construction of a
statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to
carry out such intention to the fullest extent.”).  Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the
Commission had jurisdiction over the instant workers’
compensation claim.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the
“Policies, Procedures and Agreement” form signed by plaintiff
upon being hired is an invalid attempt to limit plaintiff’s
rights to those enumerated under Arkansas workers’ compensation
law.  This agreement conflicts with N.C.G.S. § 97-36 and
specifically violates N.C.G.S. § 97-6, which invalidates
agreements that operate to relieve an employer of any obligation
under the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed as modified.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.