Title: Moriarity v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-PL-00296 
John E. Moriarity and Mae E. Moriarity, 
Appellants (Petitioners below), 
–v– 
Indiana Department of Natural Resources, 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
Argued: June 28, 2018 | Decided: January 3, 2019 
Appeal from the Grant Circuit Court,  
No. 27C01-1511-PL-000073 
The Honorable Mark E. Spitzer, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 27A04-1612-PL-02731 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice David concur. 
Justice Massa concurs in result. 
Justice Slaughter dissents. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jan 03 2019, 2:03 pm
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Goff, Justice. 
The Dam Safety Act gives the Indiana Department of Natural 
Resources (the “DNR”) jurisdiction over certain dams in, on, or along 
streams in Indiana to protect Hoosiers’ lives and property.  The Moriaritys 
have a large pond and related dam on their land, and, since the early 
2000s, the DNR has tried to exercise jurisdiction over the dam based on its 
determination that the dam was located in, on, or along a stream.  The 
Moriaritys have resisted the DNR’s jurisdiction and contested its findings 
without much success in the administrative tribunals and courts below.  
They now appeal to this Court, presenting us with three different 
questions.  First, did the DNR properly exercise jurisdiction over the dam?  
Within this question lie issues concerning the reasonableness of the DNR’s 
definition of the word stream and what, if any, notice the Moriaritys had 
of that definition.  Second, did the DNR present substantial evidence 
supporting its classification of the dam as a high-hazard dam?  Third, can 
the Moriaritys modify their dam to remove it from DNR’s future 
jurisdiction?  We answer each of these questions in the affirmative, largely 
based on our standard of review, and affirm the trial court. 
Factual and Procedural History 
In the late 1990s, Mae (“Becky”) and John Moriarity decided to build a 
pond on farm land they owned in Grant County.  Before excavating and 
building the necessary embankments, they contacted various local, state, 
and federal agencies and obtained what they were told were the necessary 
permits.  By 2000, after a few years of work, the Moriaritys ended up with 
a fairly large pond and related dam.  Their pond covered between thirty 
and forty acres and contained at least one hundred acre-feet of water, and 
parts of the dam holding back this water were taller than twenty feet. 
By 2002, the DNR was aware of the pond and dam.  Throughout the 
early 2000s, the DNR sought to have the Moriaritys correct what it 
considered “significant safety deficiencies” in the dam according to 
Indiana Code chapter 14-27-7.5 (the “Dam Safety Act” or the “Act”).  See 
Appellee’s App. Vol. V, pp. 237, 239.  On May 14, 2012, the DNR issued 
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Notice of Violation VTS-3933-DM (the “NOV”) to the Moriaritys, 
describing numerous violations of the Dam Safety Act.  The NOV ordered 
the Moriaritys to make certain changes to their pond and dam, imposed 
$35,000 in civil penalties for past violations, and provided daily penalties 
for any continuing violations.   
The Moriaritys petitioned for administrative review of the NOV.  Two 
administrative law judges held a multi-part fact-finding hearing over the 
course of several months at which the parties presented argument and 
evidence.  At the hearing, the parties’ disputes included whether the 
Moriaritys’ dam fell within the DNR’s jurisdiction to regulate dams built 
in, on, or along streams and, if so, whether the dam was properly 
classified as a high-hazard dam.  After the hearing, the presiding 
administrative law judge issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Nonfinal Order generally in favor of the DNR.  
The Moriaritys objected to the administrative law judge’s order, and 
the Natural Resources Commission (the “NRC”) held oral argument.  The 
NRC then issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order 
(the “Final Order”) largely along the same lines as the administrative law 
judge’s nonfinal order.1  The NRC found that the DNR’s use of the 
common meaning of the word stream was proper and constituted an 
ascertainable standard for identifying a stream, that the Moriaritys’ dam 
was in, on, or along at least one stream, and that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the conclusion that the Moriaritys’ dam was a high-
hazard dam.  The NRC ordered the Moriaritys to address the issues with 
their dam, giving them essentially two options: (1) have a professional 
engineer help safely lower the water in the pond, inspect the dam, make 
any necessary repairs to the dam, and refill the pond, or (2) have a 
professional engineer help “dewater, breach and permanently 
decommission the dam.”  See Appellants’ Corrected App. Vol. 2, pp. 56–
57, ¶¶ 1–5.  The NRC also ordered the Moriaritys to pay civil penalties 
                                                 
1 In this context, the NRC is the ultimate authority of the DNR.  Ind. Code § 14-10-2-3 (2014 
Repl.).  Thus, the Final Order represented the DNR’s last order on the matter. 
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totaling $10,000 for past violations of the Dam Safety Act without 
imposing daily penalties for continuing violations.  Id. at 57, ¶ 6. 
The Moriaritys sought judicial review of the Final Order, and the trial 
court affirmed.  It ordered the Moriaritys to take the specific action 
ordered by the DNR, quoting some paragraphs from the NRC’s final 
order and summarizing others.  The Moriaritys filed a motion to correct 
error, which was later deemed denied.     
The Moriaritys then appealed to the Court of Appeals.  Moriarity v. Ind. 
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 91 N.E.3d 642 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).  They raised many of 
the same issues as before the NRC and trial court, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 646–49.  They also challenged the Final Order to 
the extent that it did not expressly allow them to modify their pond and 
dam so that it would fall outside DNR’s jurisdiction, but the Court of 
Appeals found this argument waived.  Id. at 649. 
We granted the Moriaritys’ petition to transfer, thereby vacating the 
Court of Appeals opinion.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review 
The Moriaritys challenge the trial court’s order upholding the DNR’s 
administrative decision.  Under Indiana’s Administrative Orders and 
Procedures Act (“AOPA”), we may set aside an agency’s action if it is:  
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; 
or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (2018).  The Moriaritys bear the burden of 
showing us that the DNR’s action is invalid.  I.C. § 4-21.5-5-14(a).  
With AOPA in mind, we note that “[o]ur review of agency action is 
intentionally limited, as we recognize an agency has expertise in its field 
and the public relies on its authority to govern in that area.”  Ind. Alcohol 
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and Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371, 375 (Ind. 2017) 
(quoting West v. Office of Ind. Sec’y of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 352–53 (Ind. 
2016)).  We do “not try the facts de novo” but rather “defer to the agency’s 
findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.”  Id.  “On the other 
hand, an agency’s conclusions of law are ordinarily reviewed de novo.”  
Id.  While “[w]e are not bound by the [agency’s] conclusions of law, . . . 
‘[a]n interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with 
the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless this 
interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself.’”  Chrysler 
Grp., LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 123 
(Ind. 2012) (third alteration in original) (quoting LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 
730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind. 2000)).  See also Nat. Res. Comm’n v. Porter Cty. 
Drainage Bd., 576 N.E.2d 587, 588 (Ind. 1991) (stating that “the 
interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its 
enforcement is entitled to great weight”).  “In fact, ‘if the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable, we stop our analysis and need not move 
forward with any other proposed interpretation.’”  Jay Classroom Teachers 
Ass’n v. Jay Sch. Corp., 55 N.E.3d 813, 816 (Ind. 2016) (citation omitted).  
Like many cases involving judicial review of agency action, the outcome 
here turns on this standard of review. 
Despite the dissent’s resolute arguments to the contrary, applying this 
standard of review comports with precedent and our prior decision in 
NIPSCO Industrial Group v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 100 N.E.3d 
234, 241 (Ind. 2018).  Rather than effecting a sea change in NIPSCO, we 
applied a specific, controlling portion of the same standard we recite 
today.  Both in NIPSCO and here, we note that we ordinarily review legal 
questions addressed by an agency de novo.  Id.  In NIPSCO, that was our 
primary focus.  Id.  We did not continue our discussion of the standard of 
review to address an agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute 
because there was no need; we found the agency’s interpretation contrary 
to the statute itself and, thus, necessarily unreasonable.  Compare id. at 
237–38, 242, with Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n, 55 N.E.3d at 816 (instructing 
that we accept an agency’s interpretation only if it is reasonable), and 
Chrysler Grp., LLC, 960 N.E.2d at 123 (providing that an agency’s 
interpretation that is inconsistent with the statute itself does not receive 
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“great weight”).  Here, on the other hand, we continue our discussion and 
recite the full standard because in Part I.A. below we find the DNR’s 
interpretation reasonable and not inconsistent with the Dam Safety Act.  
Differences in the respective agencies’ statutory interpretations in NIPSCO 
and here lead us to focus on different parts of the standard of review.  In 
both cases, however, the whole standard remains the same.  
Taking a step back from the details of these cases, this standard of 
review does not abdicate any of our duties, diminish the role of the 
judiciary, or cast doubt on any rules of statutory construction by 
implication.  This standard entails a fresh look at the dispute on appeal, 
including the agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute, and allows us 
to continue to say what the law is.  It retains for the judiciary the ultimate 
power to determine the outcome of the dispute based on the law and facts, 
but it also recognizes the expertise contained within a co-equal branch of 
government and the value to the public in being able to rely on reasonable 
agency interpretations.  Finally, as was the case in each prior opinion to 
apply this standard, our use of the standard here does nothing to cast 
doubt on the continued vitality of the rule of lenity. 
Discussion and Decision 
The Dam Safety Act, in relevant part, is concerned with the safety of 
certain dams2 in, on, or along streams in Indiana.  I.C. § 14-27-7.5-8(a)(1) 
(2004).  It places an affirmative obligation on the owners of such dams to 
properly maintain them, I.C. § 14-27-7.5-7(a), and it gives the DNR 
supervisory and enforcement power to ensure this happens, I.C. § 14-27-
7.5-8(a)(1)–(2).  Here, the DNR asserted jurisdiction over the Moriaritys’ 
dam after concluding it was in, on, or along a stream, it then assigned a 
hazard classification to the dam based on the assessed risk to nearby 
people and property, and it finally ordered the Moriaritys to perform 
                                                 
2 The Act speaks in terms of structures, which are defined as dams and their “appurtenant 
works.”  I.C. § 14-27-7.5-5 (2004).  For ease of discussion, references in this opinion to a dam 
are meant to include its appurtenant works. 
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certain inspection and maintenance activities.  The Moriaritys challenge 
the DNR’s jurisdiction, its hazard classification, and its ordered actions.  
We address each argument in turn. 
I. The DNR has jurisdiction over the Moriaritys’ 
dam based on its location in, on, or along a stream 
of Indiana. 
The Dam Safety Act gives the DNR jurisdiction over dams “in, on, or 
along the rivers, streams, and lakes of Indiana.”  I.C. § 14-27-7.5-8(a)(1).  
The DNR’s assertion of jurisdiction over the Moriaritys’ dam rested 
primarily on the presence of at least one stream on the property, and so 
the Moriaritys focus their jurisdictional arguments on the word stream.  
They argue that the DNR improperly defined the word and that it failed 
to provide an ascertainable standard of what constitutes a stream.3  Both 
arguments fail. 
A. The DNR’s definition of stream was reasonable. 
Neither the legislature nor the DNR have defined the word stream for 
purposes of the Dam Safety Act, and the Moriaritys argue that the DNR 
used an improper definition here.  When presented with a question of 
statutory interpretation, “our primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s 
intent[,] . . . look[ing] first to the statutory language itself.”  Suggs v. State, 
51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016).  If the legislature has not defined a word, 
we give the word its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, consulting 
                                                 
3 To the extent the Moriaritys challenge the factual basis for the finding that their dam was 
located in, on, or along a stream, their argument fails.  The DNR presented substantial 
evidence, by way of testimony of at least six witnesses along with photographs, to support its 
finding that the dam was built in, on, or along a stream.  See Appellants’ Corrected App. Vol. 
2, p. 88 (testimony of Robert Wilkinson); Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pp. 85–86, 91–92, 95–107 
(testimony of Kenneth Smith referencing photographs); id. at 222–25 (testimony of Rodney 
Neese); Appellee’s App. Vol. III, pp. 28–31 (testimony of Jon Eggen); id. at 95–96 (testimony of 
Darrin Miller); id. at 169–70 (testimony of George Crosby). 
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English language dictionaries when helpful in determining that meaning.  
State v. Hancock, 65 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2016).  But when, as happened 
here, an agency interprets a statute it is tasked with enforcing, we give the 
agency’s interpretation “great weight” and stop our analysis if that 
interpretation is reasonable.  West, 54 N.E.3d at 353 (citation omitted).  
Here, the DNR identified a stream as “flowing water through a defined 
channel” with neither size nor consistency of water flow being 
determinative of the presence of a stream.  Appellants’ Corrected App. 
Vol. 2, pp. 51–52.  This definition is consistent with dictionary definitions 
of the word.  See Stream, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2259 (2002) (defining the word as “a body of running water 
flowing in a channel on the surface of the ground . . .”).  See also Appellee’s 
App. Vol. V, pp. 6–10 (providing various definitions of the word).  And 
there is no indication that this definition is inconsistent with the Dam 
Safety Act itself.  Because the definition the DNR used is consistent with 
the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the word stream, it is 
reasonable, and we “need not move forward with any other proposed 
interpretation.”  Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n, 55 N.E.3d at 816 (citation 
omitted). 
B. The Moriaritys had adequate notice of what constitutes 
a stream for purposes of the Dam Safety Act. 
The Moriaritys contend that they lacked adequate notice that their 
property contained a stream that could bring their dam within the DNR’s 
Dam Safety Act jurisdiction.  Specifically, they claim that the “DNR, by 
failing to promulgate any regulations or guidance [defining stream under 
the Act] and relying solely on the statute, had not given any notice or fair 
warning” that their dam would fall within DNR’s jurisdiction.  Pet. to 
Transfer, pp. 7–8.  As the Moriaritys correctly point out, “[a]dministrative 
decisions must . . . be based on ascertainable standards in order to be fair 
and consistent rather than arbitrary and capricious.”  State Bd. of Tax 
Comm’rs v. New Castle Lodge #147, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 
1257, 1264 (Ind. 2002).  These standards “give fair warning as to what the 
agency will consider in making its decision.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
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However, this ascertainable standards requirement is not meant to unduly 
constrain administrative action because agencies are “entitled to 
reasonable latitude in carrying out [their] responsibilities.”  Id. at 1264 n.13 
(citing State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Garcia, 766 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. 2002)).  The 
Moriaritys fail to show that the DNR’s reliance on the language of the Act, 
rather than on explanatory regulations or other guidance, failed to 
provide an ascertainable standard for two reasons.   
As an initial matter, an agency is not required to promulgate 
regulations defining each word in a statute.  Although the Moriaritys 
seem to advocate for this rule, they cite no law foisting such a burden 
upon agencies in Indiana.  To the contrary, we have a well-established 
rule to deal with these situations: “[u]ndefined words . . . are given their 
plain, ordinary and usual meaning.”  Hancock, 65 N.E.3d at 587 (citing I.C. 
§ 1-1-4-1(1) (2016 Repl.)).  Here, the DNR based its definition of the word 
stream on the standard dictionary definition, as the legislature and this 
Court have instructed.  This reasonable definition gave the Moriaritys fair 
warning as to what the DNR would consider a stream.  It was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious. 
Additionally, the Moriaritys’ intense focus on the word stream and the 
lack of regulations defining the word loses sight of the legislature’s intent 
in enacting the Dam Safety Act and the Act’s other jurisdictional 
provisions.  As the colloquial name of the Act implies, it is all about the 
safety of dams.  See, e.g., I.C. § 14-27-7.5-7(a) (2004).  It is not a law 
regulating streams.  While the word stream is one part of the Act’s 
jurisdictional grant, see I.C. § 14-27-7.5-8(a)(1), it cannot be viewed in 
isolation without also considering the broader context of the statutory 
provision within the Dam Safety Act.  In fact, another provision provides 
specific guidance on dams that fall outside the Act.  I.C. § 14-27-7.5-1.  
Dams that are no more than twenty feet high and that do “not impound a 
volume of more than one hundred . . . acre-feet of water[,]” among other 
things, are not within the DNR’s Dam Safety Act jurisdiction.  I.C. § 14-27-
7.5-1(1).  When the word stream is viewed in light of the Act’s purpose 
and the other jurisdictional provisions, individuals have more than fair 
notice of which dams might fall within the DNR’s jurisdiction.  This 
conclusion is driven home even more forcefully in this case, where the 
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Moriaritys stipulated that parts of their dam were taller than twenty feet 
and that their dam impounded more than one hundred acre-feet of water.  
Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pp. 48–49.  The Moriaritys have failed to show 
that the DNR’s exercise of jurisdiction over their dam based on the 
statutory language of the Dam Safety Act was arbitrary or capricious. 
II. The DNR presented substantial evidence 
supporting its classification of the Moriaritys’ 
dam as a high-hazard dam. 
As part of its supervisory duties under the Dam Safety Act, the DNR 
must assign a hazard classification—high, significant, or low—to each 
dam within its jurisdiction based on the risk posed to life and property in 
the event of an uncontrolled release from the dam.  I.C. § 14-27-7.5-8(b).  
The DNR classified the Moriaritys’ dam as high-hazard, and the 
Moriaritys argue on appeal that this classification lacks substantial 
evidence.  While the Moriaritys acknowledge that two DNR witnesses 
testified that the dam was a high-hazard structure, they argue that an 
inundation study the DNR completed was so flawed that the DNR’s 
conclusion on the dam’s hazard classification was not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
When reviewing a claim that an agency’s decision lacks substantial 
evidence, “the reviewing court may vacate [the] decision only if the 
evidence, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates that the conclusions 
reached by the [agency] are clearly erroneous.”  Regester v. Ind. State Bd. of 
Nursing, 703 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. 1998) (citation omitted).  “A judgment is 
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the 
findings fail to support the judgment.”  E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 
(Ind. 2018). 
The Dam Safety Act defines a high-hazard dam as “[a] structure the 
failure of which may cause the loss of life and serious damage to homes, 
industrial and commercial buildings, public utilities, major highways, or 
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railroads.”  I.C. 14-27-7.5-8(b)(1).4  The Act’s regulations instruct the 
DNR’s Division of Water to assign its hazard classifications “based on 
[the] best information available” and expressly allow it to “consider 
observations of the dam and the vicinity of the dam, including the risk 
posed to human life and property if the dam fails.”  312 Ind. Admin. Code 
10.5-3-1(a), (c) (2012), 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/T03120/A00105.PDF?&iacv=iac2012.  To 
support its high-hazard assessment, the DNR presented testimony of two 
of its employees as well as an inundation study conducted on the dam.  
On the other hand, the Moriaritys presented testimony casting doubt on 
the accuracy of the inundation study.  Even ignoring the evidence from 
the inundation study, the DNR presented substantial evidence supporting 
the dam’s high-hazard classification.  Kenneth Smith, the Assistant 
Director of DNR’s Division of Water, testified that the presence of a 
church, a home, and a road below the dam made it “visually obvious” that 
it would likely be a high-hazard dam.  Appellants’ Corrected App. Vol. 2, 
pp. 128–29.  George Crosby, the Manager of DNR’s Dam Safety Section, 
testified that, if the dam broke above the house situated below the dam, it 
would cause “serious damage.”  Appellants’ Corrected App. Vol. 3, p. 45.  
He also testified that the dam would be classified as high-hazard even 
without the homes below because the road below the dam was heavily 
trafficked.  Appellee’s App. Vol. III, p. 187–88.  Thus, substantial evidence 
supports the DNR’s conclusion that the Moriaritys’ dam was a high-
hazard structure.  The Moriaritys’ argument to the contrary fails. 
                                                 
4 We note that the standards for classifying a dam as high-hazard are not the same in the 
Indiana Code and the Indiana Administrative Code.  Compare I.C. § 14-27-7.5-8(b)(1) (allowing 
such a classification when a dam’s failure can result in loss of life and serious damage to 
property) with 312 Ind. Admin. Code 10.5-3-1(c)(1) (2012), 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/T03120/A00105.PDF?&iacv=iac2012 (allowing such a 
classification when a dam’s failure can, among other things, result in loss of life or serious 
damage to property).  The parties do not ask us to resolve this apparent inconsistency. 
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III. The Moriaritys may, in the course of complying 
with the trial court’s order, modify their dam to 
remove it from DNR’s jurisdiction. 
The Moriaritys insist that the DNR exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing 
its Final Order that did not expressly allow them to modify their dam to 
remove it from the DNR’s jurisdiction.  They seek a modification of the 
trial court’s order enforcing the Final Order to include an express 
provision allowing them to change their dam so that it no longer falls 
within the DNR’s Dam Safety Act jurisdiction, or they ask us to remand 
with instructions that they may change their dam to remove it from the 
DNR’s jurisdiction.  Regardless of any potential waiver of this argument 
due to the Moriaritys’ failure to raise it before their motion to correct 
error, we will address it.  See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 
2015) (citation omitted) (“[W]henever possible, ‘we prefer to resolve cases 
on the merits’ instead of on procedural grounds like waiver.”). 
The trial court’s order largely adopted the portions of the DNR’s Final 
Order regarding compliance with the Dam Safety Act going forward.  
Appellants’ Corrected App. Vol. 2, pp. 25–26.  Modification of this order is 
not necessary, but the Moriaritys may choose to modify their dam in the 
course of complying with the trial court’s order in order to remove it from 
the DNR’s jurisdiction from that point forward.  As noted above, the 
Moriaritys stipulated that their dam exceeded twenty feet in height and 
impounded a volume of more than one hundred acre-feet of water, both 
of which meant their dam did not qualify for the Dam Safety Act’s 
statutory exception.  See I.C. § 14-27-7.5-1(1) (2004).  If they modify it so 
that it no longer exceeds a height of twenty feet or impounds more than 
one hundred acre-feet of water (along with the other statutory 
requirements), the DNR will no longer have jurisdiction over the dam 
under the Dam Safety Act.5  The DNR acknowledged that this option was 
                                                 
5 Since the trial court’s order affirming the Final Order contemplated actions taken under the 
supervision or direction of a professional engineer, any modification would necessarily also 
involve a professional engineer’s oversight. 
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available to the Moriaritys, Oral Argument at 20:58–22:50, and the 
Moriaritys acknowledged that they would accept this option, id. at 17:05–
17:20, 18:19–18:58.  Whether the parties ultimately act on this apparent 
agreement is up to them.6 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s order enforcing 
the Final Order.  We find, however, that the Moriaritys can, in the course 
of complying with the trial court’s order, modify their dam to remove it 
from the DNR’s jurisdiction under the Dam Safety Act.  Given the parties’ 
unsuccessful attempts at settlement despite their apparent agreement in 
principle, we anticipate disagreements may arise if the Moriaritys choose 
to modify their dam to remove it from the DNR’s jurisdiction.  Because 
those disagreements have only been hinted at and not fully litigated to 
date, we cannot offer guidance on them but instead leave that to the trial 
court, should the need arise.  See State ex rel. Brubaker v. Pritchard, 236 Ind. 
222, 226, 138 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Ind. 1956) (“It is well established that once a 
court acquires jurisdiction over parties, the jurisdiction continues until the 
final disposition of the litigation including the enforcement of the 
judgment or decree.”).  Therefore, we remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
                                                 
6 With the appeal before us resolved, we pause now to comment on a broader issue implicated 
by this dispute.  Although the DNR has largely won here, it likely could have avoided this 
protracted litigation in the first place by defining the word stream for purposes of the Dam 
Safety Act.  It clearly knows how to define words for the Act, see 312 Ind. Admin. Code 1-1-
21(a) (2018), http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/T03120/A00010.PDF?&iacv=iac2018 (defining 
lake), and, as this case demonstrates, DNR employees have a shared understanding of the 
word stream.  Defining the word would presumably reduce the complexity of enforcement 
actions and increase public confidence in the agency’s decisions.   
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Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur. 
Massa, J., concurs in result. 
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Slaughter, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision for two reasons. First, 
on the standard of review, I would give no deference to the Department’s 
interpretation of “stream” within the Dam Safety Act. The prerogative to 
interpret the law authoritatively belongs to us. And we disserve 
separation-of-powers principles when we allow agencies within the 
executive branch to usurp a core judicial function. Second, on the merits, 
the Court’s conclusion that the Department properly exercised jurisdiction 
over the Moriaritys’ property follows from the Court’s deferential 
standard of review. Its application of the wrong standard has caused it to 
reach the wrong result. 
I’ll begin with the standard of review. Just this year, we held 
unanimously that we review agencies’ legal determinations “de novo”; 
that we accord such determinations “no deference”; that plenary review of 
agency decisions is “constitutionally preserved” for the judiciary; that our 
separation-of-powers doctrine does not contemplate a “tie-goes-to-the-
agency” standard for reviewing agency decisions on questions of law; and 
that we decide the statutory interpretation that is “best” and “do not 
acquiesce in the interpretations of others.” NIPSCO Indus. Grp. v. Northern 
Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 100 N.E.3d 234, 241 (Ind. 2018). 
In contrast, the Court today applies a very different standard. It opens 
by describing the standard as “de novo” but then says the interpretation 
of a statute by the agency charged with enforcing it is entitled to “great 
weight”; and that an agency’s interpretation need only be “reasonable”, at 
which point we will “stop our analysis” and not consider “any other 
proposed interpretation.” 
I had thought this discredited standard, which the Court resurrects 
today, had been laid to rest for good in NIPSCO. What we held in NIPSCO 
cannot be reconciled with the standard the Court applies today. It is no 
answer that NIPSCO involved the Utility Regulatory Commission and 
today’s decision concerns the Department of Natural Resources. There is 
no principled reason, consistent with separation of powers, for according 
fundamentally different treatment to the statutory interpretations of 
different agencies within the executive branch of state government. An 
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Page 16 of 17 
agency interpretation that is “reasonable” but not the “best” is not good 
enough. Allowing an agency’s reasonable interpretation to prevail over 
our best interpretation ignores our unique “law-giving function”, A.A. v. 
Eskenazi Health/Midtown CHMC, 97 N.E.3d 606, 610 n.1 (Ind. 2018), which 
includes our inherent constitutional “duty to act as the final and ultimate 
authority” in pronouncing Indiana law, id. (quoting Troue v. Marker, 253 
Ind. 284, 288, 252 N.E.2d 800, 803 (1969)). 
These rival standards of review—“only the best” vs. “reasonable will 
do”—are not only irreconcilable but proceed from very different visions of 
the role of the judiciary within our constitutional scheme. NIPSCO regards 
the judiciary as a vital, co-equal branch within our tripartite system of 
government with ultimate responsibility for interpreting the law. Today’s 
decision, however, treats the judiciary as a bit player with a limited role 
vis-à-vis the other two branches. To be sure, judicial modesty has its place. 
But we should not confuse modesty with abdication. Our job is to 
interpret the law fully and faithfully—no more, no less. Today’s standard 
does much less. It is a standard where judicial review is plenary in theory, 
deferential in name, and a rubberstamp in fact. 
We do not give similar deference to other actors who wield executive 
power. For example, we afford zero deference to prosecuting attorneys, 
who exercise an essential aspect of the State’s executive power: the power 
“to enforce the criminal laws of the State of Indiana”. State ex rel. Egan v. 
Superior Ct. of Lake Cty., 211 Ind. 303, 309, 6 N.E.2d 945, 947 (1937). 
Prosecutors would seemingly have greater standing to insist on deference 
when interpreting the laws they enforce. Unlike executive-branch 
agencies, prosecutors are not creatures of statute but constitutional 
officers. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 16. As between them, one might think that if 
deference were ever appropriate on matters of legal interpretation, it 
would be constitutional officers who deserve the benefit of the doubt. But 
our caselaw holds otherwise. If a criminal statute is ambiguous, we do not 
give “great weight” to a prosecutor’s interpretation or require that the 
interpretation only be “reasonable” to withstand legal challenge. To the 
contrary, our rule of lenity holds that ambiguity in a statute defining a 
crime should be resolved in favor of the defendant. Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 
809, 813 (Ind. 2016). Make no mistake—that is how it should be. But given 
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the standard of review the Court applies today, one might fairly ask 
whether the rule of lenity’s continued validity is now in doubt. I hope the 
answer is no, but I am not confident of that. At a minimum, today’s 
standard erodes the rule’s doctrinal underpinnings. 
Turning to the merits, the conclusion that the Department properly 
exercised jurisdiction under the Dam Safety Act is premised on the 
Court’s acquiescence in the Department’s determination that the disputed 
dam was located along a “stream”. As the Court acknowledges, its lax 
standard of review ensured the Department’s jurisdictional ruling would 
be upheld: “Like many cases involving judicial review of agency action, 
the outcome here turns on this standard of review.” On this point, I agree 
with the Court. A more robust standard would have led to a different 
outcome on the threshold question of the Department’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the Moriaritys’ property. Because the Court applied the 
wrong standard, it reached the wrong result. 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N TS 
William M. Horne 
Horne Law LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
Patricia C. McMath 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana