Title: Patterson v. Patterson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PAUL PATTERSON 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 981185 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
April 16, 1999 
DANA BRUCE PATTERSON, EXECUTOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF ERNESTINE 
PATTERSON, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
Arthur W. Sinclair, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
properly determined that a certificate of deposit registered in 
the joint names of a husband and wife with right of survivorship 
was the sole property of the wife and, upon her death, became 
part of her estate. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 1, 1995, nineteen days before her death, Ernestine 
J. Patterson was informed by her husband, Paul Patterson, that 
he had found a bank in Richmond that was paying a higher 
interest rate than she was currently receiving on money she had 
on deposit with Crestar Bank in Charlottesville.  Ernestine 
Patterson, accompanied by her daughter Carolyn Dale Patterson, 
went to Crestar Bank and endorsed for payment a $100,000 
certificate of deposit (the Crestar certificate) registered in 
her name alone.  Crestar Bank issued a cashier’s check payable 
to Ernestine Patterson in the face amount of the certificate.  
Ernestine Patterson endorsed this check and permitted Paul 
Patterson to take the check to Citizens Federal Bank in 
Richmond. 
On that same day, Paul Patterson deposited the funds in 
Citizens Federal Bank and obtained a $100,000 certificate of 
deposit (the Citizens Federal certificate) titled “*PAUL 
PATTERSON OR ERNESTINE PATTERSON JTWROS*.”  Ernestine Patterson 
never signed a signature card or otherwise ratified the creation 
of a joint interest in the Citizens Federal certificate. 
Ernestine Patterson died testate on May 20, 1995.  By her 
will, she devised her separate real property to Carolyn 
Patterson and Dana Bruce Patterson, her son.  The residue of her 
estate was divided and distributed two-thirds to Janet P. 
Steppe, another daughter, and one-third to Paul Patterson.  Dana 
Patterson qualified as executor of his mother’s estate on May 
23, 1995. 
This suit originated as a bill of complaint filed by Paul 
Patterson on November 27, 1995, seeking an accounting of his 
deceased wife’s augmented estate in order to determine his 
elective spousal share of that estate.  Code § 64.1-16.1.  The 
bill of complaint named Paul and Ernestine Patterson’s three 
children as respondents; however, only Dana Patterson and Janet 
Steppe (hereafter, the respondents) entered appearances.  In 
addition to their answer, the respondents filed a cross-bill on 
behalf of the estate seeking return of the $100,000 proceeds 
 
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from the Crestar certificate plus the accrued interest, 
asserting that the transfer of these funds to the Citizens 
Federal certificate was the result of undue influence and 
coercion by their father.  In the alternative, they contended 
that the transfer did not constitute a valid gift. 
On May 14, 1997, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss 
the bill of complaint asserting that a prior order extending the 
time in which Paul Patterson could make an election to take a 
spousal share had not been timely entered.  The trial court 
sustained the motion and dismissed the bill of complaint with 
prejudice.1  The cross-bill remained pending on the trial court’s 
docket. 
On August 11, 1997, the trial court held a hearing on the 
cross-bill.  At that hearing, Carolyn Patterson testified about 
the extended estrangement between Paul Patterson and the 
Pattersons’ children.  She further testified that her mother had 
been in poor health and had suffered from Parkinson’s disease, 
cancer, and glaucoma.  These infirmities interfered with 
Ernestine Patterson’s ability to transact her affairs, so that 
Carolyn Patterson had to assist her mother in paying bills and 
writing letters. 
                     
1Paul Patterson has not assigned error to this aspect of the 
trial court’s judgment. 
 
 
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Carolyn Patterson further testified that on May 1, 1995, 
her father told her to drive her mother to a branch of Crestar 
Bank where they would meet him to transact some business.  On 
the way to the bank, Ernestine Patterson told her daughter “to 
‘watch and see what [I] sign[].’”  When they arrived at Crestar 
Bank, Paul Patterson met them in the parking lot and had 
Ernestine Patterson endorse the Crestar certificate, which he 
then took into the bank.  A short time later he returned with 
the cashier’s check for the proceeds, which Ernestine Patterson 
also endorsed.  Paul Patterson then left in his own vehicle, and 
Carolyn Patterson drove her mother home. 
Dana Patterson testified that his mother’s parents had 
transferred real property to his mother during their lifetimes 
as her separate estate.  He further testified that she had 
received monetary inheritances from her parents upon their 
deaths.  Neither Dana Patterson nor Paul Patterson was able to 
testify about the amount of these inheritances. 
Mary Catherine Wheeler, a friend and former co-worker of 
Ernestine Patterson’s, testified that “Ernestine was afraid of 
Paul.  She also loved him very much.”  Shortly before her death, 
Ernestine Patterson told Wheeler “that she wanted her property 
to go to her children and that she had a certificate and she 
wanted her children to have that.”  Wheeler further testified 
 
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that Ernestine Patterson told Wheeler that “Paul had forced her 
to go to the bank and sign the certificate over to him.” 
Paul Patterson testified that he and his wife maintained 
separate checking accounts and divided responsibility for their 
living expenses.  He further testified that he controlled the 
couple’s investments and that he would “invest a hundred 
thousand dollars ($100,000) in my name and then I would put 
money in Ernestine’s name in the same institution . . . [s]o 
that they would be insured” up to the maximum FDIC insurance on 
each account.  He conceded that Ernestine Patterson had 
inherited money, in addition to real estate, from her parents 
and testified that “I have no idea” of the amount involved. 
Regarding the May 1, 1995 transactions, Paul Patterson 
testified that on the prior evening when the couple was alone 
Ernestine Patterson “told me [that] I might as well get [the 
Crestar certificate] and put it in my own name.”  He further 
testified that he “would not take Ernestine’s name off” a new 
certificate of deposit, so he used the proceeds of the Crestar 
certificate to obtain the Citizens Federal certificate in their 
names jointly with right of survivorship. 
In an opinion letter dated February 3, 1998, the trial 
court reiterated a prior ruling, which had not to that point 
been incorporated into the record, that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that Paul Patterson had obtained the Citizens 
 
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Federal certificate from Ernestine Patterson through undue 
influence, coercion, or duress.  The trial court further found, 
however, that Paul Patterson’s own evidence established that the 
Crestar certificate was his wife’s sole property.  That being 
so, the trial court concluded that “Mrs. Patterson endorsed the 
[Crestar] certificate for the sole purpose of permitting her 
husband to reinvest the proceeds for a better yield and that no 
gift was involved.”  Accordingly, in the final order, 
incorporating by reference the reasoning of its opinion letter, 
the trial court entered judgment for the respondents and awarded 
$100,000 plus the accrued interest from the Citizens Federal 
certificate to the estate.  We awarded Paul Patterson this 
appeal. 
DISCUSSION
Paul Patterson first maintains that the trial court erred 
in finding that the Crestar certificate of deposit was Ernestine 
Patterson’s sole property.  Rather, he asserts that the evidence 
supports his contention that the certificate was a marital asset 
and that Ernestine Patterson was merely a “nominal holder.”  
Swan v. Swan’s Ex’r, 136 Va. 496, 519, 117 S.E. 858, 865 (1923).  
We disagree. 
Although the burden was on the respondents to show that the 
funds originally deposited in Ernestine Patterson’s name in 
Crestar Bank were her sole property, the trial court looked 
 
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principally to Paul Patterson’s own testimony to establish that 
fact.  Specifically, the trial court found his testimony that 
his wife told him that she wanted him to have the money on 
deposit at Crestar Bank “leaves no doubt as to the ownership of 
the Crestar certificate.”  “No litigant can successfully ask a 
court or jury to believe that he has not told the truth.  His 
statements of fact and the necessary inferences therefrom are 
binding upon him.”  Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 462, 114 
S.E. 652, 656 (1922).  Thus, while Paul Patterson may have 
sought to establish that his wife was merely a nominal holder of 
a marital asset, his case cannot rise above his own testimony 
that the Crestar certificate was solely subject to the control 
and wishes of his wife.  This evidence, in conjunction with the 
evidence presented by the respondents, supports the trial 
court’s determination that the Crestar certificate was Ernestine 
Patterson’s sole property. 
Paul Patterson next contends that Code § 6.1-125.5 mandates 
reversal of the trial court’s decision because under that 
statute “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to 
a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as 
against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and 
convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the 
 
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account is created.”2  He further cites Code § 6.1-125.3 which 
provides that “a joint account between persons married to each 
other shall belong to them equally . . . unless . . . there is 
clear and convincing evidence of a different intent.”  Relying 
on these statutory provisions, he argues that in the absence of 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary he is entitled to 
a presumption that his wife intended the Citizens Federal 
certificate to belong to him at her death.  He argues that 
because the trial court found no undue influence, coercion, or 
duress, there necessarily was no clear and convincing evidence 
that his wife did not intend for the certificate to belong 
solely to him at her death.  
Paul Patterson’s reliance upon these statutes is misplaced.  
These statutes, and particularly the presumption they provide 
which he seeks to assert here, are not applicable under the 
facts of this case because there is no evidence in the record 
that Ernestine Patterson was ever aware of the nature of the 
Citizens Federal certificate.  She did not sign a signature card 
or otherwise ratify the creation of a joint interest in this 
certificate.  Moreover, there is simply no evidence in the 
record that Ernestine Patterson was aware of the existence of 
                     
2Code § 6.1-125.1(1) provides that “‘Account’ means a 
contract of deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial 
institution, and includes a . . . certificate of deposit.” 
 
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this certificate even though the proceeds of her Crestar 
certificate were used to create it.  Thus, the dispositive issue 
before the trial court was whether Ernestine Patterson made a 
gift of all or part of her Crestar certificate to her husband.  
Absent such a gift, Paul Patterson has no right to the Citizens 
Federal certificate. 
The elements necessary to make a gift inter vivos of 
personal property are well established.  See generally Taylor v. 
Smith, 199 Va. 871, 874, 102 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1958).  Here, the 
critical issue in dispute, whether Ernestine Patterson intended 
to make a gift to her husband, was one of fact to be determined 
by the trial court.  In such instances, great deference is 
accorded a trial court’s factual findings.  This is so because 
the judge, as fact finder, sees and hears the witnesses and, 
therefore, is better able to determine their credibility and 
weigh their testimony.  Tuomala v. Regent University, 252 Va. 
368, 375, 477 S.E.2d 501, 505-06 (1996). Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court’s determination that Ernestine Patterson 
did not intend to make a gift to her husband when she endorsed 
for payment the check representing the proceeds from her Crestar 
certificate is not plainly wrong or without adequate evidence to 
support it and, thus, will not be disturbed on appeal.  Code 
§ 8.01-680; Tauber v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 445, 452, 499 S.E.2d 
839, 843 (1998). 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court awarding $100,000 plus accrued interest to the estate. 
Affirmed. 
 
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