Title: State ex rel. Pennington v. Gundler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Pennington, Appellant, v. Gundler, Clerk, Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Pennington v. Gundler (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d 
___.] 
Public records -- Party seeking public records entitled to award of attorney 
fees where custodian of public records fails to comply with a proper 
request under R.C. 149.43 and complies only after a mandamus action 
is filed -- Award of attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C) is mandatory. 
A court may award attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 149.43 where (1) a 
person makes a proper request for public records 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43, (2) the custodian of the public 
records fails to comply with the person’s request, (3) the 
requesting person files a mandamus action pursuant to 
R.C. 149.43 to obtain copies of the records, and (4) the 
person receives the requested public records only after 
the mandamus action is filed, thereby rendering the claim 
for a writ of mandamus moot.  (State ex rel. Toledo Blade 
Co. v. Northwood [1991], 58 Ohio St.3d 213, 569 N.E.2d 
904, overruled.) 
2 
 
(No. 94-1658 -- Submitted September 12, 1995 -- Decided March 
4, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA93-09-
0172. 
 
Appellant, Kathy Pennington, was the defendant in a case brought 
in the Hamilton Municipal Court, Small Claims Division.  In August 1993, 
Thomas N. Carroll, the owner of an independent paralegal service 
retained by Pennington’s counsel, went to the office of the Clerk of the 
Hamilton Municipal Court to collect certified copies of Pennington’s case 
file. 
 
Deputy Clerk Cloud refused to give Carroll the requested 
documents.  Carroll reminded the deputy clerk that the documents 
sought were public records, but the deputy clerk responded by stating 
that she would not give Carroll anything until she talked to Pennington’s 
counsel.  The deputy clerk then tried to place a telephone call to the 
attorney.  The deputy clerk left a message on an answering machine 
3 
stating that she could not give the attorney’s representative any 
documents until the attorney returned her earlier call. 
 
In response to Carroll’s request for a written explanation for her 
refusal to copy the public records, the deputy clerk typed out a note 
stating that she needed to discuss the status of the case with the 
attorney first.  Carroll left the clerk’s office without the requested public 
records. 
 
On September 2, 1993, Pennington filed a mandamus action in 
the First District Court of Appeals seeking an order compelling the Clerk 
of the Hamilton Municipal Court to provide her certified copies of the 
docket sheet and every other paper filed in her case and requesting 
attorney fees.  The clerk, predecessor in office of Maria Gundler, 
appellee, filed an answer attaching copies of the requested records and 
also mailed certified copies of these records to Pennington’s counsel.  
Pennington conceded in the court of appeals that the clerk’s production 
of the records rendered her claim for a writ a mandamus moot. 
4 
 
The court of appeals denied Pennington’s request for attorney 
fees based upon State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Northwood (1991), 
58 Ohio St.3d 213, 569 N.E.2d 904. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________ 
 
John J. Mueller, for appellant. 
 
Hillary G. Miller, Hamilton Assistant Director of Law, for appellee. 
__________ 
 
Moyer, C.J.     The issue presented in this appeal is whether a 
party seeking public records is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
where the custodian of the public records initially fails to comply with a 
proper request made pursuant to Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, 
then complies with the request in response to a mandamus action. 
 
Pennington concedes that the clerk’s production of the records 
rendered her prayer for mandamus moot, but contends that she is 
entitled to attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C).  It is not and cannot be 
5 
disputed that the records requested by Pennington are public records 
and should have been given to the agent of Pennington’s lawyer upon 
his request for the records.  R.C. 1901.31(E). 
 
Ohio law generally requires explicit statutory authorization or a 
finding of conduct that amounts to bad faith in order for a prevailing 
party to recover attorney fees.  See, e.g., Vance v. Roedersheimer 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 556, 597 N.E.2d 153, 156; State ex rel. 
Caspar v. Dayton (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 558 N.E.2d 49, 53.  
R.C. 149.43(C) provides the explicit statutory authorization for the award 
of attorney fees. 
 
R.C. 149.43(C) provides: 
 
“If a person allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of a governmental 
unit to promptly prepare a public record and to make it available to the 
person for inspection in accordance with division (B) of this section, or if 
a person who has requested a copy of a public record allegedly is 
aggrieved by the failure of a person responsible for it to make a copy 
6 
available to the person in accordance with division (B) of this section, 
the person allegedly aggrieved may commence a mandamus action to 
obtain a judgment that orders the governmental unit or the person 
responsible for the public record to comply with division (B) of this 
section and that awards reasonable attorney’s fees to the person that 
instituted the mandamus action. ***”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
It is well established that “‘[i]n construing a statute, a court’s 
paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.  ***  
In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in 
the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.’”  State ex rel. Carter v. 
Wilkinson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 65, 66, 637 N.E.2d 1, 2, quoting State 
v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323.  It 
is equally well settled that words used in a statute are to be taken in 
their usual, normal and customary meaning.  R.C. 1.42.  Further, absent 
ambiguity, the court must give effect to the plain meaning of a statute.  
State v. Waddell (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631, 646 N.E.2d 821, 822. 
7 
 
In State ex rel Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 529 N.E.2d 443, we settled the issue of whether the 
awarding of attorney fees to a party who files a complaint pursuant to 
R.C. 149.43 is mandatory.   Paragraph two of the syllabus states 
succinctly and clearly, “The award of attorney fees under R.C. 
149.43(C) is not mandatory.”  We are not persuaded that the statute 
should now be interpreted differently.   
 
The remaining question is whether a court may, in its discretion, 
award attorney fees to a party who has filed a complaint pursuant to 
R.C. 149.43 and has received requested documents before judgment is 
entered.  That was the issue in State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. 
Northwood (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 213, 569 N.E.2d 904.  We answered 
in a per curiam opinion that R.C. 149.43(C) “does not contemplate an 
award of attorney fees in mandamus actions rendered moot by the 
voluntary production of a record.”  Id. at 214, 569 N.E.2d at 905.  Our 
conclusion was founded on our belief that to construe R.C. 149.43(C) as 
8 
permitting an award of attorney fees even when a copy of the requested 
public record had been provided would discourage record production 
after a mandamus action has been commenced.  Since Toledo Blade,  
we have observed other instances in which custodians of public records 
have denied access to public records only to turn them over to the 
person requesting them after a mandamus action had been filed.  E.g., 
State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 452, 584 N.E.2d 662.  
In some instances, there are legitimate legal questions presented by a 
refusal to discolse records that are purportedly public.  Exceptions “may 
not be self-evident on a document’s face.”  State ex rel. Lowery v. 
Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 616 N.E.2d 233, 234.  In 
other instances, requested records are clearly public and should be 
given to the person requesting them without the necessity of filing an 
action pursuant to R.C. 149.43.  It would be difficult to imagine a case 
that demonstrates any more dramatically the latter circumstances than 
the case before us.  
9 
 
There can be no question that records sought by Pennington were 
public records and should have been given to Pennington in the form 
and within the time required by law.  Pennington should not have been 
required to expend the resources and the time required to file a 
mandamus action in order to obtain public records from the Clerk of the 
Hamilton Municipal Court.   
 
In view of the absence of an express statutory prohibition and the 
proclivity of some custodians of public records to force the filing of a 
mandamus action by a citizen to gain access to records that are 
obviously public, we hold that a court may award attorney fees pursuant 
to R.C. 149.43 where (1) a person makes a proper request for public 
records pursuant to R.C. 149.43, (2) the custodian of the public records 
fails to comply with the person’s request, (3) the requesting person files 
a mandamus action pursuant to R.C. 149.43 to obtain copies of the 
records, and (4) the person receives the requested public records only 
10 
after the mandamus action is filed, thereby rendering the claim for a writ 
of mandamus moot.  Accordingly, we overrule Toledo Blade, supra. 
 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the court 
of appeals with instructions to determine whether Pennington should 
receive attorney fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and cause remanded. 
 
WRIGHT, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
 
This court has taken great strides recently in construing the public 
records law to ensure that records which belong to the people are open to the 
people without restriction.  However, we could not have held as we did if the 
General Assembly had not provided such clear language in the law.  Our job 
has always been to interpret the law as written.  Today, we take one more step 
11 
forward in this endeavor by overruling Northwood and holding that it is not 
necessary that a judgment actually be entered in the prevailing party’s favor 
before an award of attorney fees may be entered.  I wholeheartedly agree with 
this decision.  However, I part ways with the majority for its summary 
disposition on the issue of whether attorney fees are mandatory.  I believe this 
court should revisit its decision in State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. 
Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 529 N.E.2d 443, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
In so doing, this court should decide that where the award of attorney fees is 
proper, that they are also mandatory.  I believe that this is the correct 
interpretation of R.C. 149.43 for the following reasons. 
 
R.C. 149.43(C) provides: 
 
“If a person allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of a governmental unit 
to promptly prepare a public record and to make it available to the person for 
inspection in accordance with division (B) of this section, or if a person who 
has requested a copy of a public record allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of 
a person responsible for it to make a copy available to the person in accordance 
12 
with division (B) of this section, the person allegedly aggrieved may 
commence a mandamus action to obtain a judgment that orders the 
governmental unit or the person responsible for the public record to comply 
with division (B) of this section and that awards reasonable attorney’s fees to 
the person that instituted the mandamus action.  ***”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
A simple reading of the statute reveals that R.C. 149.43(C) clearly and 
unambiguously allows a prevailing party in an action under the Ohio Public 
Records Act to recover attorney fees. 
 
However, in reaching its holding that attorney fees were not mandatory 
in Fox, the majority there likened a mandamus action pursuant to R.C. 149.43 
to a taxpayer’s suit brought pursuant to R.C. 733.61.  Then, despite the clear 
language of the statute, the majority set up a nebulous theory of public benefit 
and the creation of a fund.  Later cases, in reliance on Fox, added the elements 
of lack of reasonableness and bad faith of the custodian.  All these factors were 
to be considered, on a case-by-case basis.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Mazzaro v. 
Ferguson (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 550 N.E.2d 464; State ex rel. Warren 
13 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 640 N.E.2d 174; State 
ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Snowden (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 141, 647 N.E. 1374.  
However, it was unnecessary to develop any of these tests.  Again, the law 
must merely be interpreted as written.  Thus, in reviewing the Fox decision and 
its progeny, I think their rationale should be rejected.  Instead, I would adopt 
the position set forth in the dissenting opinion in Fox that R.C. 149.43(C) 
makes the award of attorney fees mandatory.   
 
In reaching the correct conclusion, the dissent employed well-developed 
statutory construction principles and public policy considerations.  The dissent 
considered the General Assembly’s actions in adding subsection (C) to R.C. 
149.43 and repealing R.C. 149.99, which had provided for “a civil action to 
compel compliance” with R.C. 149.43 and had specified the penalty for a 
violation of R.C. 149.43.  New subsection (C) clearly provides that a “person 
allegedly aggrieved may commence a mandamus action to obtain a judgment 
that orders the governmental unit or the person responsible for the public 
record to comply with division (B) of this section and that awards reasonable 
14 
attorney’s fees to the person that instituted the mandamus action.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Fox, 39 Ohio St.3d at 113, 529 N.E.2d at 448. 
 
The dissent also considered and rejected the Fox majority’s conclusion 
that the award of attorney fees is discretionary because of the use of the word 
“may” in the statute.  Instead, the dissent found the statutory language 
unambiguous: 
 
“The word ‘may’ in this newly revised section does not modify the 
reasonable-attorney-fees language.  The word ‘may’ only modifies the verbiage 
‘commence a mandamus action.’  It was placed in the statute so there could be 
no further question that an allegedly aggrieved party could use the speedy 
remedy of mandamus, a course of action which had been prevented by a 
majority of this court in State ex rel. Fostoria Daily Review Co. v. Fostoria 
Hosp. Assn. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 327, 512 N.E.2d 1176.”  Id. 
 
The dissenting opinion believed that the Fox majority had overlooked 
the very precise language found in Section 5 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 275, effective 
October 15, 1987, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1153, which provided: 
15 
 
“‘This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary for 
the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.  The reason 
for the necessity is that, unless the effect of the recent decision of the Ohio 
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Fostoria Daily Review Co. v. Fostoria Hosp. 
Assn. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 323, is immediately superseded and a civil action 
for a writ of mandamus available in all courts with original jurisdiction 
reestablished as the remedy to enforce the Public Records Law, members of the 
general public could be denied access to public records in violation of the 
Public Records Law, and have no recourse other than to pursue an inadequate, 
statutorily prescribed remedy in the court of common pleas of injunctive relief, 
a forfeiture of $1,000, and a reasonable attorney’s fees award.  Therefore, this 
action shall go into immediate effect.’”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 113-114, 529 
N.E.2d at 448. 
 
Aside from the statutory history and the clear language of the statute, 
policy considerations also dictate that this is the just result.  As noted by Justice 
Douglas: 
16 
 
“The theory of any public disclosure law is not that an individual is 
benefited but that the public as a whole is the beneficiary of the government’s 
business being open to the public.  When a ‘public office’ refuses a legitimate 
and reasonable request to make available, pursuant to R.C. 149.43, public 
records, some individual or organization must be the catalyst to enforce the 
law.  If we *** prevent the recovery of reasonable attorney fees for those who 
seek to enforce the law on behalf of all of us, then truly those self-appointed 
surrogates will be ‘volunteers’ in every sense of the word and will find 
themselves burdened with heavy expenses which they must personally 
underwrite.  There will be little incentive, except possibly for news-gathering 
organizations, to seek enforcement of the law which, in effect, defeats the very 
purpose of the law.”  Id. at 112-113, 529 N.E.2d at 447. 
 
By making the award of attorney fees discretionary, “the majority leaves 
an offending governmental unit with no reason to comply with the Act.  Any 
such unit will be defended at the taxpayers’ expense since its attorney fees will 
be paid out of government funds.  If the ‘public office’ loses and is not required 
17 
to pay costs and reasonable attorney fees, then no penalty at all attaches since 
the General Assembly has repealed R.C. 149.99.”  Id. at 114, 529 N.E.2d at 
448. 
 
I agree with all the concerns raised by the Fox dissenting opinion.  
Further, I recognize that one of the biggest obstacles facing the public in its 
requests for public records is that governmental agencies often refuse to turn 
over public records that should be produced.  These governmental agencies 
take the position that the records belong to them, and not the public.  Indeed, 
this is what happened here.  Deputy Clerk Cloud testified at her deposition that 
she was not aware that Carroll was entitled to these records; instead, she 
thought she would be providing them to him “as a courtesy.”  Cloud went so 
far as to testify to this view of the lawsuit:  “I thought it was a bunch of bull 
crap that I basically had done my job, that I just thought it was a legal 
technicality that’s wasting a lot of everyone’s time.  It really is unnecessary 
because I haven’t done anything wrong.”  Such an attitude or ignorance cannot 
be condoned.  In her position as a deputy clerk, she acts as a custodian of our 
18 
records, and she is charged with knowledge of the law.  If such ignorance 
results from inadequate training by a supervisor, that too cannot be condoned.  
Our government is its people and should be about serving them and not about 
serving itself. 
 
For today’s holding I would provide a “bright line” test.  If a person is 
refused public records that he has a right to obtain, that person has a statutory 
right to bring a mandamus action to enforce compliance.  The act of filing the 
mandamus action is sufficient to entitle the person to the mandatory award of 
attorney fees set forth in the statute. 
 
Because I do not believe that Northwood and Fox are in accord with the 
law of our state, as set forth in clear and unambiguous terms in R.C. 149.43(C), 
I would overrule Northwood in its entirety and the second paragraph of the 
syllabus in Fox.  Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals and remand 
the cause for the allowance of reasonable attorney fees, including fees 
attributable to this appeal and to proceedings on remand. 
19 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion.