Title: Alabama State University et al. v. Stacy Danley

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 04/08/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1140907
____________________
Alabama State University et al.
v.
Stacy Danley
____________________
1141241
____________________
Stacy Danley
v.
Alabama State University et al.
Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-13-900181)
1140907, 1141241
BRYAN, Justice.
Alabama State University ("ASU"), along with individual
members of the ASU Board of Trustees; John F. Knight, former
executive vice president and former chief operating officer 
of
ASU; William H. Harris, former interim president of ASU; and
Gwendolyn Boyd, president of ASU (all individual defendants
are hereinafter collectively referred to as "the ASU
officials"), appeal from a judgment entered against them by
the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial court").  In that
judgment, the trial court awarded Stacy Danley, former
athletic director of ASU, separate awards of $118,096.87 and
$22,120 and also ruled in Danley's favor on ASU's counterclaim
against Danley for recoupment.  Danley cross-appeals from the
judgment, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to
order ASU to reinstate him to his former position as athletic
director and by failing to award him attorney fees.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2010, ASU and Danley entered into a contract pursuant
to which Danley would serve as athletic director of ASU from
July 26, 2010, through September 30, 2013, at an annual salary
of $125,000.  In conjunction with his employment, Danley
2
1140907, 1141241
received a university-issued purchasing card to be used for
expenses incurred while performing his responsibilities as
athletic director.  Upon receipt of the purchasing card,
Danley signed a "purchasing-card-acknowledgment form," which
includes the following statement: "I understand that any
unallowable 
charges will 
be 
refunded 
through 
payroll
deduction."  
On August 28, 2012, on the recommendation of Knight, then
the executive vice president and chief operating officer of
ASU, Danley was placed on administrative leave with pay.  On
October 15, 2012, Knight informed Danley in writing that
Danley was being recommended for termination of 
his 
employment
and listed 10 allegations in support of that recommendation. 
The notice of allegations also indicated that a pre-
termination hearing would be held in front of a hearing
officer on October 20, 2012.  On Danley's motion, the pre-
termination hearing was continued to November 15, 2012.
The pre-termination hearing occurred over three days
between November 15, 2012, and November 18, 2012.  On December
6, 2012, the hearing officer issued his findings and
recommendations.  The hearing officer found Danley "not
3
1140907, 1141241
guilty" on six of the allegations listed in the notice of
allegations but found that ASU had met its burden of proof on
the remaining four allegations and that those four charges
were sufficient in and of themselves to support the
termination of Danley's employment.  Thus, the 
hearing 
officer
recommended that Danley's employment be terminated effective
December 31, 2012.  On December 31, 2012, Carmen Douglas, vice
president of ASU's Office of Human Resources, informed Danley
in writing that then President Harris concurred with the
hearing officer's findings and that Danley's employment was
being terminated effective immediately. 
On January 30, 2013, Danley filed in the trial court a
lengthy "petition for writ of certiorari, declaratory
judgment, petition for writ of mandamus and 
injunctive 
relief"
against ASU; the members of the Board of Trustees,
individually and in their official capacities; Harris,
individually and in his official capacity as 
interim 
president
of ASU; and Knight, individually and in his official capacity
as executive vice president and chief operating officer of
ASU.  Danley's complaint is lengthy and, at times, unduly
1
Boyd was not president of ASU when Danley filed his
1
complaint and thus was not named in Danley's complaint. 
4
1140907, 1141241
repetitive.  For purposes of resolving these appeals, it is
sufficient to note that Danley asserted, in addition to other
claims, a claim pursuant to both the Alabama Constitution of
1901 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he alleged that the manner
in which the pre-termination hearing was conducted violated
his due-process rights.  Among other relief, Danley sought to
be restored to his position as athletic 
director; compensatory
damages, including backpay; and attorney fees.
On March 6, 2013, ASU and the ASU officials filed an
answer and a motion to dismiss some of Danley's claims.  In
their answer, ASU and the ASU officials denied those counts in
Danley's complaint that generally sought injunctive relief
and, as to those claims that sought monetary relief, raised
defenses of sovereign immunity, State-agent immunity, and
qualified immunity.  ASU and the ASU officials' answer also
included a counterclaim against Danley for the recoupment of
$67,242.61 in allegedly unauthorized and/or undocumented
However, as Harris's successor, Boyd, in her official
capacity, upon her appointment as president of ASU, was
automatically substituted for Harris, in his official
capacity.  Rule 25(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Harris remains a
defendant in his individual capacity.
5
1140907, 1141241
charges made to Danley's purchasing card.  Danley filed a
reply to the counterclaim. 
On April 21, 2013, Danley filed a response to the motion
to dismiss in which he argued that the ASU officials, both in
their individual and official capacities, were not 
entitled to
immunity from either Danley's state-law or federal-law claims
for damages.  Following a hearing, the trial court, then under
the direction of Judge Truman M. Hobbs, entered an order on
May 14, 2013, that stated, in pertinent part: "[T]he Court is
convinced that sovereign immunity prohibits an award of back
pay or money damages against the State or any official
thereof."    
2
On July 28, 2013, Danley filed an amended complaint in
which he added, among others, claims alleging that ASU and the
ASU officials had further violated his due-process rights by
failing to provide a post-termination hearing; that, pursuant
to § 16-50-23, Ala. Code 1975, only the Board of Trustees had
the power to terminate his employment and thus that his
employment had not been properly terminated; that ASU and the
Judge Hobbs later recused himself from the case and thus
2
was not the judge who entered the judgment from which the
parties appeal.
6
1140907, 1141241
ASU officials had violated his due-process rights by
withdrawing his pay for December 2012 from his bank account;
and that ASU and the ASU officials had converted his December
2012 pay.  It is undisputed that, shortly before the
termination of Danley's employment on December 31, 2012,
Danley's December 2012 pay, which had been deposited into his
bank account via direct deposit, was withdrawn from his bank
account at the initiation of the comptroller's office of ASU
so that ASU could deduct money Danley allegedly owed ASU from
that payroll deposit.  It is also undisputed that Danley's
December 2012 pay was redeposited in full into his bank
account in February 2013, approximately two months after it
had been withdrawn.  Danley requested, in addition to the
relief requested in his original complaint, damages for the
withdrawal of his December 2012 pay.   
On October 21, 2013, ASU and the ASU officials filed a
motion for a summary judgment.  On May 2, 2014, Chief Justice
Roy S. Moore appointed Judge James H. Reid, Jr., to the case
after Judge Hobbs and other subsequently appointed judges
recused themselves.  On October 24, 2014, after numerous
filings and continuances, Judge Reid entered an order denying
7
1140907, 1141241
ASU and the ASU officials' motion for a summary judgment. 
Judge Reid also entered an order dismissing Danley's claims
against the members of the Board of Trustees in their
individual capacities.  The trial court held a trial between
February 23 and February 27, 2015.  Following the trial and
the submission of the parties' posttrial briefs, the trial
court on May 16, 2015, entered a judgment stating, in
pertinent part:
"Based upon these facts and the evidence presented
in this case, the court hereby finds as follows:
"A. That Danley was not properly terminated and that
he remained an employee of ASU through the end of
his contract on 9/30/13 and that he is entitled to
his contracted payment amount of $11,060.66 per
month for 9 months for a total of $99,450.00 for
which he is granted a judgment against ASU plus
interest in the amount of $18,646.87 for a total
judgement in favor of Danley and against ASU in the
sum of $118,096.87;
"B. That ASU wrongfully caused to be withdrawn from
Danley's bank account the sum of $11,060.00, less
deductibles, in December 2012, and retained that sum
for approximately 2 months and that an appropriate
remedy for such wrong is payment to Danley of the
sum withheld each month for 2 months or $22,120.00
for which sum Danley is granted an additional
judgment against ASU;
"C. That the evidence on the counterclaim is
conflicting and confusing; however, the burden is on
ASU to prove this claim by a preponderance of the
evidence, which it has failed to do;
8
1140907, 1141241
"Therefore, the court finds for Danley on ASU's
counterclaim;
"....
"That all claims not specifically granted herein are
hereby denied."
On May 19, 2015, ASU filed a notice of appeal.  On June
2, 2015, Danley timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the May 16, 2015, judgment.  In that motion, Danley
moved the trial court to amend the May 16, 2015, judgment to
reflect, among other things, that the judgment was entered
against not only ASU but also against the ASU officials in
either, or both, their individual and official capacities and
that the judgment was based on Danley's state-law and federal-
law claims.  Danley also moved the trial court to amend the
judgment to order that he be reinstated to his former position
as athletic director and to award him attorney fees.
On July 21, 2015, the trial court entered an amended
judgment that stated, in pertinent part:
"The issues presented included [Danley's] federal
and state claims, including [§] 1983, based on: due
process violations associated with defendants' acts
and omissions regarding their effort to terminate
his employment; waiver and estoppel by defendants
based on their conduct; defendants' non-compliance
with 
[§] 
16-50-23; 
defendants' 
actions 
being
arbitrary and capricious; the hearing officer's
9
1140907, 1141241
findings and legal conclusions not being supported
by the evidence or the law; the wrongful conversion
of [Danley's] personal funds by defendants; [and] an
additional due process claim based on the wrongful
taking of [Danley's] personal funds; and First
Amendment retaliation.  In addition, the court was
presented with a counterclaim by the defendant
[ASU].
"The parties at trial included ... Danley, and the
defendants: [ASU]; the Board of Trustee members in
their official capacities; ... Knight, in his
individual and official capacity; and ... Harris, in
his individual capacity; and ... Boyd in her
official 
capacity 
as 
president 
(collectively
referred to herein as 'defendants').
"....
"The court, having considered [Danley's] motion ...
and being of the opinion that such should be
granted, hereby enters the following revised and
amended findings and order:
"....
"6. The defendants did not properly terminate
[Danley] in the following respects, any one of which
would justify a judgment in his favor: the
defendants did not comply with procedural due
process; the defendants, under principles of waiver
and estoppel, should have provided Danley with a
post-termination hearing but did not; the defendants
did not comply with ... [§] 16-50-23;
"7. That Danley's December pay check in the amount
of $11,016.67 ... was reversed and removed from
Danley's personal bank account on orders by officers
of ASU, initiated by ... Knight, under supervision,
direction, and control by the remaining defendants,
and was subsequently returned to Danley's account
approximately 2 months later.  This action by
10
1140907, 1141241
defendants was a wrongful taking of property without
advance notice or any due process procedure as to
such taking."
The amended judgment retained paragraphs A and B, quoted
supra, of the original judgment -– the paragraphs awarding
Danley damages -- except that both paragraphs were amended to
reflect that the damages were entered against "defendants"
instead of "ASU."
On July 23, 2015, ASU, in response to the amended
judgment, filed with this Court a motion seeking to amend its
notice of appeal to reflect that the ASU officials were also
appealing; this Court granted that motion, and on July 30,
2015, ASU and the ASU officials filed an amended notice of
appeal.   On August 18, 2015, Danley, seeking reinstatement to
3
The amended notice of appeal filed by ASU still lists ASU
3
as the only appellant.  However, the amended docketing
statement lists as appellants each of the defendants that are
subject to the trial court's judgment.  It is obvious from a
careful review of the record that all parties involved in this
action, including Danley, commonly referred to all defendants
as "ASU" during the course of this action.  In light of ASU's
motion to amend filed with this Court, the amended docketing
statement, and the fact that each party unquestionably had
notice that every defendant subject to the trial court's
judgment intended to appeal the judgment, we construe ASU's
amended notice of appeal as properly naming each of the
defendants below as the parties filing the appeal.
11
1140907, 1141241
his position as athletic director and attorney fees, filed a
cross-appeal from the amended judgment.
Standards of Review
"'"[W]here 
the 
evidence 
has 
been
[presented] ore tenus, a presumption of
correctness attends the trial court's
conclusion on issues of fact, and this
Court will not disturb the trial court's
conclusion unless it is clearly erroneous
and against the great weight of the
evidence, but will affirm the judgment if,
under 
any 
reasonable 
aspect, 
it 
is
supported by credible evidence."'
"Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778
So. 2d 791, 795 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Raidt v. Crane,
342 So. 2d 358, 360 (Ala. 1977))."
Kennedy v. Boles Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 68 (Ala. 2010).
"'However, the ore tenus standard of review has
no application to a trial court's conclusions of law
or its application of law to the facts; a trial
court's ruling on a question of law carries no
presumption of correctness on appeal.'  Ex parte
J.E., 1 So. 3d [1002,] 1008 [(Ala. 2008)] (citing
[Ex parte] Perkins, 646 So. 2d [46,] 47 [(Ala.
1994)]), and Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So. 2d 1113,
1144–45 (Ala. 1999)).  This Court '"review[s] the
trial court's conclusions of law and its application
of law to the facts under the de novo standard of
review."'  Id. (quoting Washington v. State, 922 So.
2d 145, 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005))."
Espinoza v. Rudolph, 46 So. 3d 403, 412 (Ala. 2010).
Case No. 1140907
12
1140907, 1141241
We first address ASU's and the ASU officials' arguments
that they are entitled to immunity from the judgment because,
if that issue is decided in their favor, the other issues they
raise are moot.  ASU and the ASU officials in their official
capacities argue that they are immune from liability for the
claims resulting in the awards of $118,096.87 ("the contract
award") and of $22,120 ("the wrongful-withdrawal award") by
virtue of Art. I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901,
and the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.  Knight and Harris argue that, in their individual
capacities, they are immune from the contract award and the
wrongful-withdrawal award by virtue of the doctrines of 
State-
agent immunity and qualified immunity.  As noted above, the
trial court entered the judgment against the following
defendants on both Danley's state-law and federal-law claims:
ASU; the members of the Board of Trustees, Knight, and Boyd in
their official capacities; and Knight and Harris in their
individual 
capacities. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether
ASU; those ASU officials named in their official capacities;
and Knight and Harris, in their individual capacities, are
13
1140907, 1141241
entitled to state and federal immunity from both the contract
award and the wrongful-withdrawal award.
I. Immunity from Liability Based on State-Law Claims
A. ASU and the ASU Officials Named in Their Official
Capacities
"Under Article 1, § 14, Alabama Constitution of
1901, 'the State and its agencies have absolute
immunity from suit in any court.'  Phillips v.
Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989); see also
Taylor v. Troy State University, 437 So. 2d 472, 474
(Ala. 1983).  'This immunity extends to the state's
institutions of higher learning.'  Taylor, 437 So.
2d at 474; see Breazeale v. Board of Trustees of the
University of South Alabama, 575 So. 2d 1126, 1128
(Ala. Civ. App. 1991).  'State officers and
employees, 
in 
their 
official 
capacities 
and
individually, are also absolutely immune from suit
when the action is, in effect, one against the
state.'  Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d at 83; see
Taylor v. Troy State University, 437 So. 2d at 474." 
Williams v. John C. Calhoun Cmty. Coll., 646 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala.
1994).
"'The wall of immunity erected by § 14
is nearly impregnable.  Sanders Lead Co. v.
Levine, 370 F. Supp. 1115, 1117 (M.D. Ala.
1973); Taylor v. Troy State Univ., 437 So.
2d 472, 474 (Ala. 1983); Hutchinson v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 288
Ala. 20, 24, 256 So. 2d 281, 284 (1971).
This immunity may not be waived.  Larkins
v. Department of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 363 (Ala.
2001) ("The State is immune from suit, and
its immunity cannot be waived by the
Legislature 
or 
by 
any 
other 
State
14
1140907, 1141241
authority."); Druid City Hosp. Bd. v.
Epperson, 378 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1979)
(same); Opinion of the Justices No. 69, 247
Ala. 195, 23 So. 2d 505 (1945) (same); see
also Dunn Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of
Adjustment, 234 Ala. 372, 175 So. 383
(1937).  "This means not only that the
state itself may not be sued, but that this
cannot be indirectly accomplished by suing
its officers or agents in their official
capacity, when a result favorable to
plaintiff would be directly to affect the
financial status of the state treasury."
State Docks Comm'n v. Barnes, 225 Ala. 403,
405, 143 So. 581, 582 (1932) (emphasis
added); see also Southall v. Stricos Corp.,
275 Ala. 156, 153 So. 2d 234 (1963).'
"Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142
(Ala. 2002)."
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 872-73
(Ala. 2004).
"Section 14 immunity is not absolute; there are
actions that are not barred by the general rule of
immunity.
"'[C]ertain actions are not barred by § 14.
There are six general categories 
of actions
that do not come within the prohibition of
§ 14: (1) actions brought to compel State
officials to perform their legal duties;
(2) actions brought to enjoin State
officials 
from 
enforcing 
an
unconstitutional 
law; 
(3) 
actions 
to 
compel
State officials to perform ministerial
acts; (4) actions brought against State
officials under the Declaratory Judgments
Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6–6–220 et seq.,
seeking construction of a statute and its
15
1140907, 1141241
application in a given situation; (5) valid
inverse 
condemnation 
actions 
brought
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative capacity; and (6) actions
for injunction or damages brought against
State officials in their representative
capacity and individually where it was
alleged that they had acted fraudulently,
in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in
a mistaken interpretation of law. See
Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp.,
937 So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Ex
parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 68 (Ala.
1980)); Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert
Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2008)
(holding 
that 
the 
exception 
for
declaratory-judgment actions applies only
to actions against State officials).  As we
confirmed 
in 
Harbert, 
these 
"exceptions" 
to
sovereign immunity apply only to actions
brought against State officials; they do
not apply to actions against the State or
against State agencies.  See Alabama Dep't
of Transp., 990 So. 2d at 840–41.'
"Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Fin., 991 So. 2d 1254,
1256–57 (Ala. 2008).  The sixth 'exception' to § 14
immunity was restated in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.
3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013), as follows:
"'(6)(a) actions for injunction brought
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative 
capacity 
where 
it 
is 
alleged
that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a
mistaken interpretation of law, Wallace v.
Board of Education of Montgomery County,
280 Ala. 635, 197 So. 2d 428 (1967), and
(b) actions for damages brought against
State 
officials 
in 
their 
individual
capacity where it is alleged that they had
acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
16
1140907, 1141241
their 
authority, 
or 
in 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of law, subject to the
limitation that the action not be, in
effect, one against the State. Phillips v.
Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989).'"
Ex parte Hampton, [Ms. 1140341, Sept. 30, 2015] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. 2015).
"'These actions are sometimes referred to
as "exceptions" to § 14; however, in
actuality these actions are simply not
considered to be actions "'against the
State' for § 14 purposes.'"  Patterson v.
Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala.
2002). This Court has qualified those
"exceptions," noting that "'[a]n action is
one against the [S]tate when a favorable
result for the plaintiff would directly
affect a contract or property right of the
State, or would result in the plaintiff's
recovery of money from the [S]tate.'" 
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895
So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Shoals
Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311,
1314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)) (emphasis added
in Jones).'  
"Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc.,
990 So. 2d 831, 840 (Ala. 2008)." 
Vandenberg v. Aramark Educ. Servs., Inc., 81 So. 3d 326, 332
(Ala. 2011).
"'To determine whether an action against a State
officer is, in fact, one against the State, this
Court considers
"'"whether 'a result favorable to the
plaintiff would directly affect a contract
17
1140907, 1141241
or property right of the State,' Mitchell
[v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 806 (Ala.
1992)], whether the defendant is simply a
'conduit' 
through 
which 
the 
plaintiff 
seeks
recovery of damages from the State, Barnes
v. Dale, 530 So. 2d 770, 784 (Ala. 1988),
and whether 'a judgment against the officer
would directly affect the financial status
of the State treasury,' Lyons [v. River
Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So. 2d [257] at
261 [(Ala. 2003)]."
"'Haley [v. Barbour County], 885 So. 2d [783] at 788
[(Ala. 2004)].  Additionally, "[i]n determining
whether an action against a state officer is barred
by § 14, the Court considers the nature of the suit
or the relief demanded, not the character of the
office of the person against whom the suit is
brought."  Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 67–68
(Ala. 1980).'"
Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1130-31 (Ala. 2013)
(quoting Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990
So. 2d 831, 839-40 (Ala. 2008)). 
As our caselaw demonstrates, § 14 provides absolute
immunity from suit –- and thus liability –- for monetary
damages based on state-law claims, not only for the State but
also for State officials acting in their official capacities. 
Ex parte Trawick, 959 So. 2d 51, 55 (Ala. 2006) (holding that
"'[a] complaint seeking 
money 
damages against a State employee
in his or her official capacity is considered a complaint
against the State, and such a complaint is barred by ... § 14"
18
1140907, 1141241
(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala. 2000))). 
Danley concedes that § 14 provides ASU with absolute immunity
from state-law claims for monetary damages.  However, despite
the 
aforementioned 
authority, 
Danley 
argues, 
citing 
the 
first,
third, and sixth "exceptions" to § 14 immunity, that § 14 does
not bar his state-law claims against those ASU officials named
in their official capacities.
We agree that § 14 does not bar Danley's state-law claims
for injunctive relief against those ASU officials named in
their official capacities.  See Stark v. Troy Univ., 514 So.
2d 46, 50 (Ala. 1987) (holding that "if the individual
defendants have not acted toward the plaintiff in accordance
with the rules and regulations set by the university, their
acts are arbitrary and an action seeking to compel them to
perform their legal duties will not be barred by the sovereign
immunity clause of the Alabama Constitution of 1901; however,
the action for compensatory damages cannot be maintained"). 
However, Danley's state-law claims seeking damages against
those ASU officials named in their official capacities are
absolutely barred by § 14.  See Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1141
(restating the sixth "exception" to § 14 immunity to clarify
19
1140907, 1141241
that actions for damages against State officials may be
asserted, if at all, only against State officials in their
individual capacities); Trawick, supra.  Despite the well
established authority regarding § 14 immunity from liability
for damages for State officials sued in their official
capacities, Danley cites caselaw that, 
he argues, 
supports 
the
affirmance of the contract award against those ASU officials
sued in their official capacities to the extent that it is
based on Danley's state-law claims.   
4
It is undisputed, and the amended judgment makes it
clear, that the contract award is an award of the salary
Danley would have received under his employment contract had
his employment not been terminated, i.e., backpay.  Danley
cites Bessemer Board of Education v. Tucker, 999 So. 2d 957
(Ala. Civ. App. 2008); Ex parte Bessemer Board of Education,
68 So. 3d 782 (Ala. 2011); State of Alabama Highway Department
v. Milton Construction Co., 586 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1991); and
Although Danley makes a passing argument that the
4
wrongful-withdrawal award was proper as to those 
ASU 
officials
sued in their official capacities, he neither cites authority
to support that argument nor develops that argument in any
meaningful way.  Rather, as to the wrongful-withdrawal award,
Danley focuses his argument on Knight's and 
Harris's 
liability
in their individual capacities, an argument addressed infra.
20
1140907, 1141241
Marous 
Brothers 
Construction, 
LLC 
v. 
Alabama 
State 
University,
533 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (M.D. Ala. 2008), in support of his
argument that "[p]aying a liquidated, certain amount under a
contract with the [S]tate is a ministerial act and the
carrying out of a legal duty" and that State agencies and
State officials "must stand by monetary obligations, despite
claims of immunity."  Danley's brief, at 64.  That is, Danley
argues that this Court should affirm the contract award
against those ASU officials sued in their official capacities
under the first and third "exceptions" to § 14 immunity.  The
cases Danley cites, however, are distinguishable.
 
In Tucker, the Court of Civil Appeals, relying on this
Court's decision in Sims v. Etowah County Board of Education,
337 So. 2d 1310 (Ala. 1976), affirmed the Jefferson Circuit
Court's judgment issuing a writ of mandamus directing the
Bessemer Board of Education to pay a previously entered
judgment awarding Tucker $49,747 in damages on his breach-of-
contract claim against the Board.  In affirming the judgment
issuing the writ, the Court of Civil Appeals noted that, in
Sims, this Court held that, pursuant to § 16-8-40, Ala. Code
1975, county boards of education have the rights to sue and to
21
1140907, 1141241
contract and that those rights carry the implied right to be
sued on their contracts.  Tucker, 999 So. 2d at 961.  However,
Sims was overruled in Ex parte Hale County Board of Education,
14 So. 3d 844 (Ala. 2009), a case in which this Court
unequivocally declared that county boards of education are
local agencies of the State and, thus, are "clothed in
constitutional immunity from suit."  Id. at 848.5
At issue in Ex parte Bessemer Board was § 16-22-13.1,
Ala. Code 1975, which provides the method of calculating
percentage pay increases for public-education employees based
on their years of experience.  68 So. 3d at 786.  Jean Minor,
a teacher in the Bessemer School System, sued, among others,
the members of the Bessemer Board of Education in their
official capacities, alleging that her statutory pay increase
had been miscalculated.  68 So. 3d at 785.  Minor sought
backpay for the 2000-2001 fiscal year and sought to have her
pay calculated correctly for the ensuing years pursuant to the
guidelines in § 16-22-13.1.  68 So. 3d at 786.  The board
Hale necessarily calls into question the validity of
5
Barger v. Jefferson, 372 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 1979), and
Lauderdale County Board of Education v. Moore, 574 So. 2d 811
(Ala. Civ. App. 1990), cases cited by Danley as support for
this argument that also affirmed awards of backpay for
teachers whose employment had been illegally terminated.
22
1140907, 1141241
members, claiming immunity, moved for either a dismissal of
the complaint or a summary judgment.  The trial court entered
a judgment dismissing all claims against the board members on
the basis of sovereign immunity, but after Minor filed a
motion to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court vacated
its earlier judgment and entered a new judgment in favor of
Minor.  In doing so, the trial court found that the board
members were not entitled to immunity because they had no
discretion in paying Minor the correct salary increase
provided in § 16-22-13.1.  The board members sought a writ of
mandamus from this Court directing the trial court to dismiss
Minor's claims against them on the basis of immunity.   68 So.
6
3d at 788.  
In denying the petition, this Court noted that Minor was
entitled to bring an action to compel the board members to
perform a legal duty or ministerial act and that Minor's
salary increase involved "obedience to the statute; it does
not involve any discretion."  68 So. 3d at 790.  The issue in
The board members actually appealed from the adverse
6
judgment, but because that judgment did not resolve all issues
and, thus, was not final but challenged an order denying a
claim of immunity, this Court treated the appeal as a petition
for a writ of mandamus.  68 So. 3d at 788.
23
1140907, 1141241
Ex parte Bessemer Board was not whether Minor was entitled to
a salary increase; rather, the issue was simply whether the
salary increase had been calculated correctly.  Thus, Minor's
action seeking the pay increase to which she was statutorily
entitled was not an action seeking damages from the State but,
rather, was an action to compel the performance of a
ministerial act.
Those facts distinguish Ex parte Bessemer Board from this
case.  Minor sought payment of salary she had already earned,
but had not received because of an error in calculation, and
sought to have her future salary calculated correctly; her
action essentially was nothing more than a plea to the trial
court to order the board to perform correct mathematical
computations.  Danley, on the other hand, seeks that portion
of his salary he had yet to earn but that, he says, he was
entitled to receive because of ASU's allegedly wrongful
termination of his employment.  Danley attempts to expand this
Court's holding in Ex parte Bessemer Board to state that
paying a judgment that awards a State employee that portion of
his or her salary from the date of termination of employment
through the end date of the employee's contract after a trial
24
1140907, 1141241
court finds that the employee's employment has 
been wrongfully
terminated is merely a ministerial act.  That, however, is an
inaccurate interpretation of this Court's holding in Ex parte
Bessemer Board.  Furthermore, to expand Ex parte Bessemer
Board in the manner Danley suggests would puncture the nearly
"impregnable 
barrier," 
Jones, 
supra, 
of 
sovereign 
immunity 
and
would allow for the very recovery that § 14 prohibits -– the
recovery of monetary damages against the State.
In Milton Construction, the plaintiff contracted with the
State Highway Department to perform work on two interstate
highways.  586 So. 2d at 875.  It was undisputed that the
plaintiff had provided the services it contracted to provide. 
Nevertheless, the State Highway Department withheld $534,000
it owed the plaintiff under the terms of the contract.  The
trial court entered a judgment against the State Highway
Department for $534,000.  On appeal, the State Highway
Department argued that, on the basis of sovereign immunity, it
could not be made to pay the judgment.  586 So. 2d at 875.  In
affirming the judgment, this Court stated:
"Once the Highway Department has legally contracted
under state law for goods or services and accepts
such goods or services, the Highway Department also
becomes legally obligated to pay for the goods or
25
1140907, 1141241
services accepted in accordance with the terms of
the contract.  It follows that this obligation is
not subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and is enforceable in the courts."
586 So. 2d at 875 (emphasis added).  Thus, because the State
Highway Department had already received the benefits of its
contract with the plaintiff, an action seeking to compel
payment for the services was an action seeking to compel State
officers to perform their legal duty, i.e., an action under
the first "exception" to § 14 immunity.
In Marous Brothers, the District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama reached the same conclusion as did this
Court in Milton Construction.  In Marous Brothers, the
plaintiffs had contracted with ASU to provide preconstruction
services.  The plaintiffs provided the services and submitted
invoices to ASU for payment, but ASU refused payment.  The
plaintiffs sued, alleging breach of contract, and ASU,
claiming sovereign immunity, filed a motion to dismiss.  In
denying ASU's motion, the federal district court referenced
Milton Construction and held that § 14 did not bar the
plaintiffs' 
claims 
because 
"the 
allegations 
establish 
that 
ASU
legally contracted under state law for services and accepted
such services and, thus, is legally obligated to pay for the
26
1140907, 1141241
services accepted under the terms of the agreement."  33 F.
Supp. 2d at 1201 (emphasis added).  Thus, the takeaway from
Milton Construction and Marous Brothers is that once the State
has contracted for services and has accepted those services,
it is legally obligated to pay for those services, and a claim
seeking to enforce that legal obligation falls within the
parameters of the first "exception" to § 14 immunity.  In this
case, Danley did not sue ASU seeking payment for services he
had provided.  Rather, he sought –- and the trial court
awarded -- backpay from the date of the termination of his
employment through the contract-end date, i.e., that period 
in
which Danley was not providing services to ASU.  Accordingly,
Milton Construction and Marous Brothers offer no support for
Danley's argument.  
Finally, Danley argues that § 14 does not immunize those 
ASU officials sued in their official capacities from either
the contract award or the wrongful-withdrawal award because,
he contends, those ASU officials, both in terminating his
employment and in withdrawing the December 2012 pay from his
bank account, acted "fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law."  Danley's
27
1140907, 1141241
brief, at 62.  That is, Danley argues that the actions
resulting in the damages awards fall within the parameters of
the sixth "exception" to § 14 immunity.  However, as Danley
concedes, the sixth "exception" to § 14 immunity allows a
plaintiff to bring claims for injunctive relief against State
officials in their official capacities.  Hampton, supra.  The
sixth "exception" provides for monetary damages only against
State officials in their individual capacities.  Id.
Thus, 
Tucker, 
Ex 
parte 
Bessemer 
Board, 
Milton
Construction, and Marous Brothers are distinguishable,
rendering Danley's attempts to analogize them unpersuasive. 
Accordingly, ASU and those ASU officials sued in their
official capacities met their burden of showing that § 14
entitles them to immunity from the contract award and the
wrongful-withdrawal award to the extent that those awards are
based on Danley's state-law claims.  Section 14 immunity is
more than a defense; when applicable, it divests the trial
courts of this State of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Colbert
Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. James, 83 So. 3d 473, 479-80 (Ala. 2011)
(quoting Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142-43
(Ala. 2002)).  Thus, as to ASU and those ASU officials sued in
28
1140907, 1141241
their official capacities, the trial court was without
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
Danley's 
state-law 
claims 
for
damages and, therefore, could not award damages based on those
claims.  In the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction over
claims, a trial court's only action is to dismiss the claims;
any other action by the trial court is void.  Harris v. Owens,
105 So. 3d 430, 435 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Ex parte Blankenship,
893 So. 2d 303, 307 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn other cases). 
Accordingly, to the extent that the contract award and the
wrongful-withdrawal award are based on Danley's state-law
claims and were entered against ASU and those ASU officials in
their official capacities, those awards are void and must be
vacated.
B. Knight and Harris in Their Individual Capacities
Knight and Harris are the only defendants against whom a
judgment was entered in their individual capacities.  As noted
above, § 14 does not bar 
"actions for damages brought against State officials
in their individual capacity where it is alleged
that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond 
their 
authority, 
or 
in 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of law, subject to the limitation
that the action not be, in effect, one against the
State."
29
1140907, 1141241
Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1141 (emphasis added).  Danley argues
that Knight and Harris, in their individual capacities, are
not immune from either the contract award or the wrongful-
withdrawal award because, he says, in terminating his
employment and in withdrawing from his bank account his
December 2012 pay, they acted "willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond [their] authority, 
or 
under
a mistaken interpretation of law."  Danley's brief, at 72.
Those allegations, however, are essentially irrelevant if the
awards are, in effect, awards against the State.  Accordingly,
we must first determine whether the contract award and the
wrongful-withdrawal 
award 
constitute 
awards 
against 
the 
State. 
If they do, the absolute immunity provided by § 14 extends to
Knight and Harris in their individual capacities.  
As noted above, "[a]n action is one against the [S]tate
when a favorable result for the plaintiff would directly
affect a contract or property right of the State, or would
result in the plaintiff's recovery of money from the [S]tate."
Jones, 895 So. 2d at 873 (quoting Shoals Cmty. Coll. v.
Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995))
(emphasis added in Jones).  Again, the judgment makes it clear
30
1140907, 1141241
that the contract award is an award of backpay.  Awards of
backpay are awards of compensatory damages that directly
affect a contract right of the State or that result in the
recovery of money from the State and, therefore, are barred by
§ 14.  Ex parte Thomas, 110 So. 3d 363, 368 (Ala. 2012). 
Thus, regardless of the allegations concerning Knight's and
Harris's conduct, the contract award is an award against the
State; as a result, the trial court had no subject-matter
jurisdiction to enter the contract award against 
any 
defendant
based 
on 
Danley's 
state-law 
claims. 
 
James, 
supra. 
Accordingly, the contract award must also be vacated to the
extent it is based on Danley's state-law claims and was
entered against Knight and Harris in their individual
capacities.7
A plaintiff who has an action against the State arising
7
from his or her contract with the State may pursue those
claims with the Board of Adjustment.  Section 41-9-62, Ala.
Code 1975, provides:
"(a) The Board of Adjustment shall have the
power and jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to
hear and consider:
" ....
"(4) All claims against the State of Alabama or
any 
of 
its 
agencies, 
commissions, 
boards,
institutions or departments arising out of any
31
1140907, 1141241
As we did with the contract award, we must also determine
whether the wrongful-withdrawal award constitutes an action
against the State.  The judgment indicates that the trial
court calculated the wrongful-withdrawal award by doubling
Danley's December 2012 pay.   However, the mere use of
8
Danley's monthly salary as a basis on which to calculate the
wrongful-withdrawal award does not, in these circumstances,
affect a contract right of the State.  As noted earlier, it is
undisputed that the December 2012 pay withdrawn from Danley's
bank account was redeposited into his account in February
contract, express or implied, to which the State of
Alabama or any of its agencies, commissions, boards,
institutions or departments are parties, where there
is claimed a legal or moral obligation resting on
the state ...."
(Emphasis added.)  See also Ex parte Board of Dental Exam'rs
of Alabama, 102 So. 3d 368, 387 (Ala. 2012) ("'The Board of
Adjustment has jurisdiction over claims against the 
state 
that
are not justiciable in the courts because of the state's
constitutional immunity from being made a defendant.'"
(quoting Vaughan v. Sibley, 709 So. 2d 482, 486 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1997))).
The amended judgment indicates that, "on orders by
8
officers of ASU," $11,060, "less deductibles," was withdrawn
from Danley's bank account.  Danley's account statement
indicates that $8,015.48 was the amount deposited into and
subsequently withdrawn from Danley's account.  Thus, it
appears as though the trial court arrived at a sum of $11,060
based on Danley's gross pay for December ($11,016.67), rather
than the net amount actually deposited into his account.
32
1140907, 1141241
2013.  As a result, the wrongful-withdrawal award is not a
recovery of Danley's December 2012 pay, i.e., a recovery of
backpay that would affect a contract right of the State. 
Thomas, supra.  Danley had already received his December 2012
pay, albeit two months late.  Rather, the wrongful-withdrawal
award is an award in addition to Danley's December 2012 pay
for the allegedly wrongful withdrawal of that pay.  Thus, that
award neither affects a contract right of the State nor does
it, if entered against Knight and Harris in their individual
capacities, result in the recovery of money from the State. 
Therefore,  as to the wrongful-withdrawal award, Knight and
Harris in their individual capacities are not entitled to the
absolute immunity provided by § 14.  In the alternative,
Knight and Harris argue that they are entitled to State-agent
immunity from the wrongful-withdrawal award.  
This Court set forth the test for State-agent immunity in
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), a plurality
opinion.  A majority of this Court subsequently adopted the
Cranman test in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala.
2000).  The Cranman test provides:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
33
1140907, 1141241
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) 
formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
34
1140907, 1141241
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a 
"burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.'  Ex parte Estate of Reynolds,
946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to
immunity.'  946 So. 2d at 452.  Should the State
agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to
the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories
of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in
Cranman is applicable."
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (Ala. 2008). 
"Prior decisions of this Court state that
'"'[t]he 
applicability 
of 
the 
doctrine 
of
discretionary function [now called State-agent
immunity] must be determined on a case-by-case
basis, and it is a question of law to be decided by
the trial court.'"'  Ex parte Sawyer, 984 So. 2d
1100, 1106–07 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ryan v. Hayes,
831 So. 2d 21, 28 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Ex
parte Davis, 721 So .2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998))."
Suttles v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 99 (Ala. 2010).  Knight and
Harris, as the State officials asserting a defense of State-
35
1140907, 1141241
agent immunity, carried the burden of showing that Danley's
claims arise from conduct that would entitle them to State-
agent immunity.  The evidence indicates the following
pertinent 
facts 
concerning 
the 
withdrawal 
of 
Danley's 
December
2012 pay from his bank account. 
 Alondrea Pritchett, "assistant vice president for
business and financial and comptroller" at ASU, testified that
ASU employees are paid monthly on the final working day of
each month.  Two or three days before each monthly pay date,
Pritchett sends a "transmission file" to Regions Bank, the
bank ASU uses to conduct its financial business.  Each monthly
transmission file contains the amount of pay to deposit into
the bank account of each ASU employee who chooses to receive
his or her pay via direct deposit. Pritchett testified that,
if she ever transmits a file to Regions Bank in error, she
telephones Regions Bank and asks that the transmission be
"reversed," that is, that the money be returned to ASU's
account so that any errors can be corrected before that
month's pay date and the transmission file can be resubmitted. 
Pritchett testified that there have been occasions where she
has had to request that Regions Bank reverse a transmission so
36
1140907, 1141241
that payroll deductions that should have been made before
transmission –- but were not –- could be made before the
transmission file is resubmitted.
Pritchett testified that, after she made the December
2012 transmission to Regions Bank, her supervisor, Freddie
Gallot, former vice president for finance and former chief
financial officer of ASU, instructed her to reverse the
transmission 
because 
there 
were 
charges 
to 
Danley's 
purchasing
card for which ASU would need to be reimbursed and deductions
from Danley's pay would need to be made pursuant to the
purchasing-card-acknowledgment 
form. 
 
Pritchett 
testified 
that
she had had no conversations with either Knight or Harris
regarding the reversal of the December 2012 transmission.
Gallot testified that it was his responsibility, once he
learned Danley had been placed on administrative leave, to
recover any money Danley owed ASU.  Concerning Knight's role
in the reversal of the December 2012 transmission, Gallot
testified:
"Q. Who told you to withdraw the money out of Mr.
Danley's account?
"A. I did that on my own.  I instructed Ms.
Pritchett to do that.
37
1140907, 1141241
"Q. Okay.  So if Ms. Pritchett would -– perhaps said
in the course of her deposition, that you told her
that Dr. Knight advised you to do it, that would be
inaccurate, wouldn't it?
"A. It would be inaccurate.  Because Dr. Knight
doesn't have to tell me to do an audit of any
situation.  And very definitely, he would not have
to tell me that I have a responsibility to make
certain that if there were outstanding issues
involved with an employee, that I don't -– I don't
have to follow through on it.
"Q. Right.
"A. We may have had some conversations, some
indirect conversations, but he never directed me to
do that."
Knight testified that he had no daily supervision of the
comptroller's office; that he had "absolutely nothing to do
with" ASU's general process of reversing transmissions; and
that he had played "[a]bsolutely no role at all" in the
reversal of the transmission regarding Danley's December 2012
pay.  Knight testified that the only conversation he
remembered having with Gallot 
about the money Danley allegedly
owed ASU was that Knight told Gallot to do "whatever [he]
need[ed] to do to collect the money."  Knight further
testified that he gave Gallot no specific instructions on how
to collect the money and stated that that "would be a business
office decision."  
38
1140907, 1141241
Harris testified that Gallot did not discuss with him the
reversal of the transmission that included Danley's December
2012 pay and that Gallot was not required to do so.  Harris
further testified that, like Knight, he had no knowledge of
the reversal of that transmission and that he "[did not] know
anything 
about 
the 
government 
... 
taking 
[Danley's] 
property." 
Harris testified that he had heard the prior testimony
regarding Danley's December 2012 pay but that he "[did not]
know what that means" and that he "[did] not have any
individual knowledge that there was any raiding of any
account."  
From the trial court's finding in the amended judgment
that the withdrawal of Danley's December 2012 pay was
"initiated by ... Knight, under supervision, direction, and
control by the remaining defendants," it appears as though -–
and the evidence supports the conclusion that -- the trial
court 
entered 
the 
wrongful-withdrawal 
award 
against 
Knight 
and
Harris in their individual capacities 
based upon Knight's 
role
as Gallot's immediate supervisor and Harris's role as 
Knight's
immediate supervisor.  This Court has held that the exercise
of judgment in supervising personnel falls within the
39
1140907, 1141241
parameters of State-agent immunity.  See Ex parte Spivey, 846
So. 2d 322, 331-32 (Ala. 2002) (noting that "[a] State agent
is also immune from civil liability for exercising judgment in
supervising personnel" and that a superior's supervision of
personnel is a category "specifically included within the
Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent
immunity"); and Gowens v. Tys. S., 948 So. 2d 513, 532 (Ala.
2006) ("'[B]ecause supervisory ... functions require constant
decision-making, 
they 
are, 
for 
the 
most 
part, 
discretionary.'"
(quoting Love v. Davis, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1278 (M.D. Ala.
1998))).  Because any conduct on the part of Knight and Harris
as to the withdrawal of Danley's December 2012 pay from
Danley's bank account was in a merely supervisory capacity,
Knight and Harris demonstrated that Danley's claims 
arose 
from
conduct that entitles them to State-agent immunity.  Thus, the
burden then shifted to Danley to show that an exception to
State-agent immunity applies.  Kennedy, supra. 
In that regard, Danley argues that Knight's and Harris's
conduct in connection with the withdrawal from his bank
account of his December 2012 pay falls within the parameters
of the second exception to State-agent immunity, that is, that
40
1140907, 1141241
their conduct was willful, malicious, fraudulent, in bad
faith, 
beyond 
their 
authority, 
or 
under 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of law.  However, the only "conduct" of Knight
or Harris that could conceivably be connected to the
withdrawal of Danley's December 2012 pay is 
Knight's 
statement
to Gallot to do  "whatever [he] need[ed] to do to collect the
money" necessary to reimburse ASU for charges on Danley's
purchasing card. 
As to whether Knight's statement to Gallot was made in a
manner or for a purpose that would defeat his claim of State-
agent immunity, Pritchett and Gallot both testified that, at
the time Gallot instructed Pritchett to reverse the December
2012 transmission, Danley had unallowable charges on his
purchasing card.  Danley does not argue that there is any
impropriety in ASU's policy of using payroll deduction to
deduct unallowable charges, nor does he dispute that he
voluntarily 
signed 
the 
purchasing-card-acknowledgment 
form 
and
that, in doing so, he submitted to that policy.  Pritchett
testified that, in the past, she has asked Regions Bank to
reverse transmissions before the monthly pay date so that she
could deduct from an employee's pay any money the employee
41
1140907, 1141241
owed ASU.  However, there is no evidence indicating that those
reversals actually resulted in the withdrawal of salary from
the bank accounts of other ASU employees.  Thus, it appears
that Knight, in instructing Gallot to do "whatever [he]
need[ed] to do to collect the money," was operating under the
assumption that ASU had a valid claim against Danley and that
the comptroller's office had valid procedures by which to
attempt to collect that money.  Therefore, the evidence does
not support the conclusion that Knight's lone statement to
Gallot concerning the money Danley allegedly owed ASU was made
with any willful or malicious intent, in bad faith, for
fraudulent purposes, beyond his authority, or in a mistaken
interpretation of the law, despite the fact that the
withdrawal was ultimately in violation of the law. 
To be sure, this Court does not look favorably upon an
employer's seizure of money from its employee's bank account
without providing the employee due process.  An individual's
right to be secure in his or her property is one of the most
sacred rights afforded the citizens of this country by the
Constitution of the United States, a right the importance of
which can be traced back through this country's history and to
42
1140907, 1141241
Magna Carta in the 13th century.  See James W. Ely, Jr., The
Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of
Property Rights 13 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008)
("[C]olonial laws drew on the principles of Magna Carta to
protect liberty and property rights.  In words closely
resembling those of Magna Carta, the Laws and Liberties of
Massachusetts (1648) stated that 'no mans [sic] goods or
estate shall be taken away from him ... unless it be by the
vertue [sic] or equity of some expresse [sic] law of the
Country.'"); Smith v. Smith, 254 Ala. 404, 409, 48 So. 2d 546,
549 (1950) ("Of course it should never be forgotten that the
right to control one's property is a sacred right which should
not be taken away without urgent reason.").  Nevertheless, the
evidence indicates that Knight's and Harris's conduct in
connection to the withdrawal from his bank account of Danley's
December 2012 pay entitles them to State-agent immunity, and
the evidence does not support a conclusion that any limited
conduct on Knight's part falls within any one of the
exceptions to State-agent immunity.  Thus, Knight and Harris
are entitled to State-agent immunity from liability for the
43
1140907, 1141241
wrongful-withdrawal award to the extent that award is based on
Danley's state-law claims.
Claims of State-agent immunity do not challenge a trial
court's subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Ex parte Coleman,
145 So. 3d 751, 753 (Ala. 2013) (noting that State-agent
immunity is an affirmative defense); Moseley v. Commercial
State Bank, 457 So. 2d 967, 969 (Ala. 1984) (noting that
"[f]ailure to raise an affirmative defense prior to a judgment
generally constitutes a waiver"); and Ex parte Siderius, 144
So. 3d 319, 323 (Ala. 2013) (noting that subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived).  Thus, the trial court had
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the wrongful-withdrawal
award against Knight and Harris in their individual
capacities.  However, because we have determined that Knight
and Harris, in their individual capacities, are entitled to
State-agent immunity from the claim on which that award was
based, the judgment entering that award must be reversed to
the extent that it is based on Danley's state-law claims and
was entered against Knight and Harris in their individual
capacities.
II. Immunity from Liability Based on Federal-Law Claims
44
1140907, 1141241
A. ASU and the ASU Officials in Their Official Capacities
Despite providing ASU and those ASU officials sued in
their official capacities immunity from Danley's state-law
claims, § 14 provides those defendants no immunity from
Danley's federal-law claims.  James, 83 So. 3d at 481 (quoting
Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d
1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005)).  Rather, for ASU and those ASU
officials sued in their official capacities, immunity for
liability as to Danley's federal-law claims derives from the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
"'It is clear ... that in the absence of
consent a suit in which the State or one of
its agencies or departments is named as the
defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. 
 
This 
jurisdictional 
bar 
applies
regardless of the nature of the relief
sought.
"'When the suit is brought only
against state officials, a question arises
as to whether that suit is a suit against
the State itself ....  The Eleventh
Amendment bars a suit against state
officials when "the state is the real,
substantial party in interest."'
"Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 101, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984)
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S. Ct. 347, 89 L. Ed. 389
(1945) (citations omitted)).
45
1140907, 1141241
"'To ensure the enforcement of federal law, the
Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective
injunctive relief against state officials acting in
violation of federal law.  This standard allows
courts to order prospective relief, as well as
measures 
ancillary 
to 
appropriate 
prospective
relief.'  Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.
Ct. 899, 157 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2004) (citations
omitted).  Claims for monetary relief against State
officials in their official capacities are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.  See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974)
('"[W]hen the action is in essence one for the
recovery of money from the state, the state is the
real, substantial party in interest and is entitled
to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even
though 
individual 
officials 
are 
nominal
defendants."' (quoting Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at
464, 65 S. Ct. 347, overruled on other grounds by
Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of
Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d
806 (2002)))."
Ex parte Retirement Sys. of Alabama, 182 So. 3d 527, 537-38
(Ala. 2015).  Once again, Danley concedes that the Eleventh
Amendment provides ASU with sovereign immunity for liability
from his federal-law claims.  However, Ex parte Retirement
Systems makes it clear that the Eleventh Amendment also
provides State officials sued in their official capacities
with immunity from liability for damages based on federal-law
claims.  Accordingly, to the extent that the contract award
and the wrongful-withdrawal award are based on Danley's
46
1140907, 1141241
federal-law claims, those awards are due to be reversed as to
ASU and those ASU officials sued in their official capacities.
B. Knight and Harris in Their Individual Capacities
Knight and Harris do not argue that they are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity for liability from Danley's
federal-law claims in their individual capacities; rather,
they argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from
those claims.  However, as to the contract award, we need not
consider whether Knight and Harris are entitled to qualified
immunity because, as discussed above, the contract award
constitutes an award against the State, regardless of against
whom that award is nominally entered. 
   
"The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against
state officials when 'the state is the real,
substantial party in interest.'  Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct.
347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945). See, e.g., In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487–492, 8 S.Ct. 164, 173–176,
31 L.Ed. 216 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S.
711, 720–723, 727–728, 2 S.Ct. 128, 135–137,
141–142, 27 L.Ed. 448 (1882).  Thus, '[t]he general
rule is that relief sought nominally against an
officer is in fact against the sovereign if the
decree would operate against the latter.'  Hawaii v.
Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 1053, 10
L.Ed. 2d 191 (1963) (per curiam ).  And, as when the
State itself is named as the defendant, a suit
against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it
seeks damages or injunctive relief.  See Cory v.
47
1140907, 1141241
White, 457 U.S. 85, 91, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 2329, 72
L.Ed. 2d 694 (1982)." 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02
(1984) (footnote omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a State is
"the real, substantial 
party 
in interest" "when the '"judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain,
or interfere with public administration,"' [Pennhurst,] 465
U.S., at 101, n. 11 (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620
(1963))."  Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart,
563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011).  "[T]he 'general criterion for
determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is
the effect of the relief sought,' Pennhurst, supra, at 107
...."  563 U.S. at 256.
The nature of the contract award lends itself to the
conclusion that as to that award the State is the real,
substantial party in interest because satisfaction of the
contract award will result in the payment of the remainder of
Danley's salary pursuant to his employment contract with ASU. 
Although both Knight and Harris signed Danley's employment
contract in their capacities as vice president and interim
president, respectively, they were "merely the conduit[s],"
48
1140907, 1141241
Milton v. Espey, 356 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Ala. 1978), through
which Danley contracted with ASU.   In Danley's complaint,
9
Knight and Harris were also conduits -- this time the conduits
"'"through which [Danley] seeks recovery of damages from the
State."'"  Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1131 (quoting Haley v.
Barbour Cty., 885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004)).  ASU, as the
entity that contracted with Danley, was responsible for the
payment of Danley's salary.  As a result, although the
contract award, to the extent it is entered against Knight and
Harris in their individual capacities, is not nominally an
award against the State, "the decree would operate against the
[State]," Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, and would "expend itself
In Milton v. Espey, both Milton and Espey were employees
9
of the University of Alabama.  356 So. 2d at 1202.  Milton,
seeking damages on multiple claims, filed a complaint against
Espey in which he alleged that he and Espey had entered into
an employment contract.  Espey filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that Milton 
was employed by the University
of Alabama; that his salary was paid by the University; and
that there was no agreement that Espey would be responsible
for Milton's salary.  The trial court entered a summary
judgment in Espey's favor as to all claims.  In affirming the
summary judgment as to Milton's contract and negligent-
supervision claims –- but not Milton's fraud claim -- this
Court noted that Espey was "merely the conduit through which
the University contracted with Milton" and that "Milton's
contract was in fact with the University ...."  356 So. 2d at
1202-03.  Thus, we determined that Milton's contract and
negligent-supervision claims, though nominally against Espey,
came within the prohibition of § 14.  356 So. 2d at 1203.
49
1140907, 1141241
upon the public treasury."  Stewart, 563 U.S. at 255.  For
those reasons, the contract award, regardless of against whom
it is nominally entered, circumvents the Eleventh Amendment's
prohibition of suits against the State and, thus, must be
vacated.  To hold otherwise would violate "an integral part of
the basic constitutional framework of our nation and a
fundamental 
bulwark 
protecting 
the 
states' 
sovereign 
dignity." 
Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 438
(Ala. 2001). 
However, as noted above, the wrongful-withdrawal award
does not constitute an award against the State; thus, the
Eleventh Amendment does not provide Knight and Harris in their
individual capacities immunity from liability on the claim
that resulted in that award.  As to that claim, we must
consider Knight and Harris's argument that they are entitled
to qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity is a question of
law for this Court to decide.  Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d
1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1991).  As discussed above, the evidence
does not indicate that Knight and Harris engaged in any
conduct related to the withdrawal of Danley's December 2012
pay from his bank account, and it appears as though the trial
50
1140907, 1141241
court 
entered 
the 
wrongful-withdrawal 
award 
against 
Knight 
and
Harris in their individual capacities based on their
respective supervisory roles. 
"'It is well established in this Circuit that
supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983
for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates
on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability.'  Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360
(11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Instead, to hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff
must show that the supervisor either directly
participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that
a causal connection exists between the supervisor's
actions and the alleged constitutional violation. 
Id.
"'The necessary causal connection can be
established when a history of widespread
abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.
Alternatively, 
the 
causal 
connection 
may 
be
established when a supervisor's custom or
policy 
... 
result[s] 
in 
deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights or
when facts support an inference that the
supervisor 
directed 
the 
subordinates 
to 
act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates
would act unlawfully and failed to stop
them from doing so.'
"Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted). 
 
'The 
deprivations 
that 
constitute
widespread 
abuse 
sufficient 
to 
notify 
the
supervising official must be obvious, flagrant,
rampant and of continued duration, rather than
isolated occurrences.'  Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d
1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation mark
omitted).  In short, 'the standard by which a
51
1140907, 1141241
supervisor is held liable in [his] individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is
extremely rigorous.'  Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)."
Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1947-48 (11th
Cir. 2014). 
In this case, there is no evidence indicating, and Danley
did not allege, that either Knight or Harris directly
participated in the withdrawal of Danley's December 2012 pay
from his bank account.  Thus, in order to deny Knight and
Harris qualified immunity as to this claim, there must exist
a causal connection between Knight's and Harris's actions and
the withdrawal of Danley's December 2012 pay.  One manner of
establishing a causal connection is "'when a history of
widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of
the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to
do so.'"  Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Cottone v. Jenne,
326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003)).  In this case, there is
no evidence indicating, and Danley did not allege that there
is, a history of widespread abuse in the comptroller's
reversal of transmission files to Regions Bank.  Rather, the
evidence supports the conclusion that the withdrawal of
52
1140907, 1141241
Danley's December 2012 pay from his bank account, though
unfortunate, was nothing more than the type of "'isolated
occurrence[],'" Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Hartley v.
Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)), that is
insufficient to hold a supervisor liable under a plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim.
A causal connection may also be established by showing
that "'a supervisor's custom or policy ... result[s] in
deliberate 
indifference 
to 
constitutional 
rights 
or 
when 
facts
support an inference that the supervisor directed the
subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates
would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.'" 
Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Cottone).  However, the
evidence does not indicate that Knight's statement to Gallot
was made in connection with a custom or policy of Knight's
that would constitute a deliberate indifference to Danley's
constitutional rights or that the statement was made in
connection with a custom or policy of Knight's in any regard. 
In addition, the facts do not support an inference that Knight
was directing Gallot to act unlawfully or that Knight knew
that Gallot would act unlawfully.  Because the submission of
53
1140907, 1141241
a transmission file to Regions Bank occurs two or three days
before a monthly pay date, the reversal of a transmission file
does not constitute a seizure of an employee's property
without affording due process if the reversal is made before
the employee's pay is deposited into his or her account.  Of
course, in this case, Danley's December 2012 pay had been
deposited into his account.  However, the fact that Danley's
December 
2012 
pay 
was 
withdrawn 
under 
questionable
circumstances does not necessarily support a conclusion that
Knight's statement to Gallot was made with deliberate
indifference to Danley's constitutional rights, nor do we
interpret Knight's statement to Gallot to be an instruction to
act unlawfully.  ASU has lawful procedures for collecting
money ASU employees owe ASU.  Knight's statement can be
interpreted as an instruction to Gallot to follow those lawful
procedures just as logically as Danley interprets it as an
instruction to Gallot to withdraw Danley's December 2012 pay
from his bank account.  Accordingly, Knight's statement, in
and of itself, is simply not enough to meet the "'extremely
rigorous,'" Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Cottone),
54
1140907, 1141241
standard required to hold a supervisor liable for a
subordinate's questionable conduct.
Moreover, to hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate's
conduct requires a causal, not a casual, connection.  Gallot's
testimony indicates that, even had he not discussed with
Knight the money Danley allegedly owed ASU, he would have
followed the same course of action because it was his
responsibility to ensure that ASU recover any money its
employees owe the university.  Thus, it does not appear that
Knight's statement to Gallot had any bearing on Gallot's
decision to institute the reversal of the December 2012
transmission and, thus, did not have a causal effect on
Gallot's conduct.
In this case, there is no evidence indicating that Knight
and Harris participated directly in the withdrawal 
of 
Danley's
December 2012 pay from his bank account, nor is there evidence
indicating a causal connection between Knight's actions and
the withdrawal of that pay.  Accordingly, Knight and Harris
are entitled to qualified immunity for liability as to
wrongful-withdrawal award.  Thus, to the extent that that
55
1140907, 1141241
award is based on Danley's federal-law claims, it must be
vacated.
III. ASU's Counterclaim
ASU argues that the trial court erred in denying its
counterclaim seeking the recoupment of $5,390.17 for charges
made on Danley's purchasing card -- charges that, ASU says,
were not made in accordance with ASU's purchasing-card
policies and procedures.  The trial court, in denying ASU's
counterclaim, 
found 
that 
the 
evidence 
regarding 
the
counterclaim was "conflicting and confusing" and that ASU had
failed to carry its burden of proving that it was entitled to
recoupment.  The evidence regarding the charges on which the
counterclaim is based indicates the following.
Although it is unclear from the testimony, it appears as
though most of, if not all, the charges on which the
counterclaim is based were charges made for Danley's travel-
related expenses.  Pritchett testified that when an ASU
employee must travel for university-related business, he or
she 
will 
submit, 
before 
traveling, 
a 
travel-authorization 
form
to his or her supervisor -- who, for Danley, was Knight.  Upon
approval 
from 
the 
supervisor, 
the 
travel-authorization 
form 
is
56
1140907, 1141241
then submitted to the comptroller's office for approval and is
then forwarded to the vice president for business and finance
or to the president of the university for approval, depending
on whether the travel is in-state or out-of-state.  Pritchett
testified that, 
before March 2012, employees submitted a 
paper
version 
of 
their 
travel-authorization 
forms; 
however, 
in 
March
2012, ASU began using PeopleSoft, a software program through
which ASU employees submit electronic travel-authorization
forms.
Upon returning from travel, an ASU employee who has been
issued a purchasing card submits to the comptroller's office
receipts for charges made to the purchasing card while
traveling.  Generally, if the employee makes charges while
traveling without an approved travel-authorization form, does
not have receipts for charges made while traveling, or makes
unauthorized charges while traveling, the amounts of those
charges are payroll-deducted from the employee's pay to
reimburse ASU.  Although Pritchett testified that all travel-
authorization 
forms 
should 
be 
pre-approved, 
she 
testified 
that
there are occasions when an employee will travel before
receiving 
full 
approval 
and 
that 
the 
travel-authorization 
form
57
1140907, 1141241
will be approved after the travel has occurred.  Although that
process does not appear to have been problematic when ASU used
paper copies of the travel-authorization form, Pritchett's
testimony indicates that traveling before obtaining approval
can cause problems with a travel-authorization form submitted
through PeopleSoft because, Pritchett testified, once the
dates on the travel-authorization form have passed, the
travel-authorization 
form 
becomes 
"stale-dated" 
in 
PeopleSoft. 
Once 
a 
travel-authorization 
form 
becomes 
"stale-dated," 
it 
can
no longer be approved; thus, according to Pritchett, the
employee must resubmit the travel-authorization form for
approval. 
William James Walker, a certified public accountant,
testified that ASU had employed Carr, Riggs, and Ingram,
L.L.C., the accounting firm where Walker is employed, to
perform auditing services for ASU.  Walker testified that in
August or September 2012 -- shortly after Danley was placed on
administrative leave -- Pritchett asked Walker to undertake,
in addition to the auditing services Carr, Riggs, and Ingram
was then performing, a "project" whereby Walker would
summarize certain charges made to Danley's purchasing card,
58
1140907, 1141241
charges for which Pritchett claimed to have either no approved
travel-authorization 
forms 
or 
no 
receipts. 
 
Pritchett 
provided
Walker with monthly credit-card statements from ASU's Regions
Bank account for the months of September 2010 through August
2012 as well as the travel-authorization forms and receipts
she had received from Danley.  Walker testified that the
project essentially required Walker to attempt to 
"match" 
each
charge made to Danley's purchasing card to an approved travel-
authorization form and receipt.  Walker testified that, at
times, it was difficult to match charges to an approved
travel-authorization form because the dates of the charges on
the purchasing-card statements did not always match the dates
the charges were actually made.  Pritchett corroborated
Walker's testimony that matching charges to an approved
travel-authorization form could be difficult.  If 
Walker 
could
not match a charge to an approved travel-authorization form,
he noted that charge and included it in a report to Pritchett. 
However, the fact that Walker included a charge in his report
to Pritchett was not an indication that the charge had not
been approved.  Walker testified that the project "was just
summary-type work" and was "only as good as the information
59
1140907, 1141241
that was provided to [him]."  In other words, Walker's report
was not to be interpreted as a conclusion that Danley had
unapproved charges on his purchasing card.  Rather, Walker's
and Pritchett's testimony indicates that the report Walker
prepared was nothing more than a list of those charges Walker
could not match to an approved travel-authorization form.
Based on Walker's report, ASU initially sought the
recoupment 
of 
$67,242.61 
from 
Danley 
for 
allegedly
unauthorized or unapproved charges.  However, Pritchett
testified that, in January 2013, she, Gallot, Danley, and the
parties' attorneys met to discuss Walker's report.  As a
result of that meeting, Danley was to provide proof that the
charges on Walker's report had been approved, and, as he did,
Pritchett would amend the report accordingly.  Eventually, as
Danley provided the necessary documentation, ASU reduced its
counterclaim to $5,390.17.  Pritchett testified that, of the
charges constituting the amended counterclaim, most appeared
to be from 2012 after ASU began using PeopleSoft for its
travel-approval process.  Although it is unclear, it appears
from Pritchett's testimony that, for the period covering the
charges in Walker's report, Pritchett either had paper copies
60
1140907, 1141241
of Danley's travel-authorization forms or had electronic
travel-authorization forms in PeopleSoft that had not been
"fully approved."  Pritchett also testified that some of
Danley's electronic travel-authorization forms, though in the
PeopleSoft system, had been denied after Danley was placed on
administrative leave because they had become stale-dated. 
Although Pritchett testified that employees may resubmit
travel-authorization forms that have become stale-dated, she
testified that Danley would not have been able to resubmit any
denied travel-authorization forms after he was placed on
administrative leave because he was no longer in the
PeopleSoft system.
Danley testified that he always received Knight's
approval before travel and was told that as long as the
travel-authorization 
form 
had 
Knight's 
signature, 
Harris 
would
approve it.  That is, Danley could travel without being "fully
approved," and Harris would approve the travel-authorization
form after the travel.  Danley further testified that he
submitted receipts for the charges forming the basis of ASU's
counterclaim, sometimes more than once, and that the
comptroller's office "apparently" lost them.  Marilyn Wade,
61
1140907, 1141241
who worked as Danley's assistant during his employment,
testified that one of her duties as Danley's assistant was to
submit 
Danley's 
travel-authorization 
forms 
and 
receipts 
to 
the
comptroller's office.  Wade testified that there were
occasions when someone from the comptroller's office would
call and inform her that Danley had not submitted travel-
authorization forms or receipts for certain charges, despite
the fact that Wade had submitted the documentation on Danley's
behalf.  Wade testified that there were "numerous" times she
had 
to 
resubmit 
travel-authorization 
forms 
or 
receipts 
because
the comptroller's office had lost or misplaced those
documents.  Wade testified that during the time she worked for
Danley, she never failed to provide the comptroller's office
with Danley's travel-authorization forms and receipts.  When
asked if the comptroller's office had ever lost the receipts
an employee had submitted after traveling, Gallot testified
that "probably over a period of time ... there [were] receipts
or documents that were lost in the comptroller's office." 
Despite Wade's and Gallot's testimony to the contrary,
Pritchett adamantly testified that the comptroller's office
62
1140907, 1141241
does not lose or misplace travel-authorization forms and
receipts.  
As noted above, the trial court found that the evidence
regarding ASU's counterclaim was "conflicting and confusing"
and that ASU had failed to carry its burden of showing that
Danley had made unapproved charges on his purchasing card.  We
agree.  ASU's system for approving travel is not a model of
efficiency or organization.  From the evidence presented, the
trial court could have determined that Danley submitted
travel-authorization forms before he traveled each time but
that some of those travel-authorization forms had not been
approved.  ASU provided no rationale for why some of Danley's
travel-authorization forms were not approved in a timely
manner or why they had been allowed to become stale-dated,
and, although Pritchett's testimony indicates that it is not
uncommon for ASU employees to need to resubmit travel-
authorization 
forms 
because 
they 
have 
become 
stale-dated, 
that
was not an option for Danley once he was placed on
administrative leave and removed from the PeopleSoft system. 
Thus, the trial court could have determined that Danley did
what he was required to do in order to obtain approval for
63
1140907, 1141241
university-related travel but that ASU had inadvertently
failed to approve the travel-authorization forms before
Danley's travel and, by placing Danley on 
administrative leave
and removing him from the PeopleSoft system, had prevented
Danley from resubmitting the travel-authorization forms.
In addition, the trial court could have determined that
Danley submitted all of his travel receipts but that the
comptroller's office either lost the receipts or was unable to
match the receipts to an approved travel-authorization form. 
Given Walker's and Pritchett's testimony that matching travel
receipts to an approved travel-authorization form can be
difficult, the trial court could have determined that the
charges on Walker's report were not necessarily unauthorized
but that the complexity of matching the charges to an approved
travel-authorization form left room for doubt as to whether
Danley had actually made unauthorized charges on his
purchasing card.
When a trial court has made findings of fact based upon
ore tenus evidence, it is not within this Court's province to
reweigh that evidence.  Ex parte J.W.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1087
(Ala. 2005).  Rather, we will affirm the judgment based on
64
1140907, 1141241
those findings if they are reasonable and are supported by
credible evidence.  Kennedy, supra.  There is credible
evidence to support the trial court's findings 
regarding ASU's
counterclaim.  Given that evidence and the presumption of
correctness afforded the trial court's findings, we 
cannot 
say
that the trial court's determination that ASU failed to carry
its burden of proof on its counterclaim is "'clearly
erroneous, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of
the evidence.'"  Butler v. Butler, [Ms. 1140683, Sept. 18,
2015] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2015) (quoting Hart v.
Jackson, 607 So. 2d 161, 162 (Ala. 1992)).  Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment insofar as it denied ASU's counterclaim.
Case No. 1141241
On cross-appeal, Danley argues that because the trial
court ruled in his favor on his § 1983 claims, he was entitled
to reinstatement to his position as athletic director and,
thus, that the trial court erred in refusing to order his
reinstatement.  In support of his argument, Danley cites Allen
v. Autauga County Board of Education, 685 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir.
1982); Reeves v. Claiborne County Board of Education, 828 F.2d
1096 (5th Cir. 1987); and Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634
65
1140907, 1141241
(11th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that federal law
provides for an employee's reinstatement to his or her
position where the facts indicate that the employee has been
wrongfully discharged.  However, Danley fails to 
recognize the
distinction between those cases and his circumstances.
Danley correctly notes that in Allen and Reeves the
Eleventh Circuit vacated and the Fifth Circuit reversed,
respectively, judgments denying reinstatement to a wrongfully
discharged employee and that in Williams the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed a judgment awarding reinstatement to a wrongfully
discharged employee.  Allen, 685 F.2d at 1306; Reeves, 828
F.2d at 1103; and Williams, 904 F.2d at 639.  However, in
Allen, Reeves, and Williams, the evidence indicated that the
employees had been wrongfully discharged because they had
exercised their constitutional rights.  That is, they were
discharged for an improper reason.  See Black's Law Dictionary
561 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "wrongful discharge" as "[a]
discharge for reasons that are illegal or that violate public
policy" (emphasis added)).  Here, the trial court found that
ASU's termination of Danley's employment did not comply with
procedural due process or with § 16-50-23.  Those findings
66
1140907, 1141241
reflect that ASU terminated Danley in an improper manner, not
for an improper reason or purpose.   The distinction is
10
significant.  
The rationale behind reinstatement as a form of relief to
a wrongfully discharged employee is that once the employee
"'establishes 
that 
his 
discharge 
resulted 
from
constitutionally impermissible motives,'" Reeves, 828 F.2d at
1101 (quoting P.A.C.E. v. El Paso Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 730
F.2d 258, 268 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added)), he may be
entitled to reinstatement as a means of deterring his employer
from future retaliatory firings.  Although we see the value in
reinstatement as a deterrent against retaliatory firings, the
trial court did not find, and neither the evidence nor the
facts of this case indicate, that Danley's employment was
terminated for retaliatory purposes.  Thus, if he was not
Danley's complaint includes claims alleging that ASU
10
terminated 
his 
employment 
in 
retaliation 
for 
Danley's 
exercise
of his First Amendment rights.  However, the trial court
denied all of Danley's claims on which relief was not
specifically granted in the judgment.  Because Danley's First
Amendment claims were not granted in the judgment, they were
denied.  Danley does not argue on appeal that the trial court
erred in refusing to grant him relief on his First Amendment
retaliation claims.  Thus, the alleged wrongful discharge of
Danley concerns only the manner in which he was terminated
from employment, not the reasons.
67
1140907, 1141241
terminated for retaliatory purposes, we fail to see how his
reinstatement will operate as a deterrent against possible
future retaliatory firings.  Accordingly, we find Danley's
reliance on Allen, Reeves, and Williams unpersuasive, and we
affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it refused to
order Danley reinstated to his position as athletic director.
Danley also argues that because he prevailed on his §
1983 claims, he is entitled to attorney fees and expenses.  42
U.S.C. § 1988 provides, in pertinent part: "In any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] ... 1983 ...,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs ...." 
In Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987), the United
States Supreme Court addressed whether a party can lose on all
claims and nevertheless be a "prevailing party" for purposes
of an award of attorney fees pursuant to § 1988:  
"In order to be eligible for attorney's fees
under § 1988, a litigant must be a 'prevailing party
....'  Respect for ordinary language requires that
a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the
merits of his claim before he can be said to
prevail.  See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757
(1980). [The plaintiff] obtained no relief.  Because
of the defendants' official immunity he received no
68
1140907, 1141241
damages award.  No injunction or declaratory
judgment was entered in his favor.  Nor did [he]
obtain relief without benefit of a formal judgment
–- for example, through a consent decree or
settlement.  See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129
(1980) ....  That is not the stuff of which legal
victories are made.  Cf.  Hanrahan, supra, 446 U.S.,
at 758-759.
"....
"...  As a consequence of the present lawsuit,
[the 
plaintiff] 
obtained 
nothing 
from 
the
defendants.  The only 'relief' he received was the
moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court
concluded that his rights had been violated .... 
There would be no conceivable claim that the
plaintiff had 'prevailed,' for instance, if the
District Court in this case had first decided the
question of immunity, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed in a published opinion which said: 'The
defendants are immune from suit for damages ....'"
Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 759-62.
In this case, Danley prevailed in the trial court on his
§ 1983 claims.  However, because we now reverse the trial
court's judgment insofar as it awards damages and because the
trial court did not award Danley any additional relief he
sought, Danley has not prevailed on any of his claims.  "A
plaintiff 'prevails' ... 'when actual relief on the merits of
his claim materially 
alters 
the legal relationship between the
parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that
directly benefits the plaintiff.'" Lefemine v. Wideman, ___
69
1140907, 1141241
U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (quoting Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992)).  As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Hewitt, if the trial court had, in
addition to denying Danley injunctive relief, determined that
ASU and the ASU officials were entitled to immunity from
claims for damages and, thus, had not entered the damages
awards, Danley would certainly have no logical argument that
he was a prevailing party.  It would border on the absurd to
reach a different conclusion simply because Danley prevailed
at the trial level but subsequently did not prevail at the
appellate level. 
At most, what is left of the trial court's judgment is a
declaration 
that 
Danley's 
constitutional 
rights 
were 
violated. 
However, even if we were to interpret that finding as an award
of declaratory relief, "[a] declaratory judgment ... is no
different from any other judgment.  It will constitute relief,
for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it affects the
behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff."  Rhodes v.
Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).  Because the judgment provides
Danley with no injunctive relief, and because we now remand
the case for the entry of a judgment vacating the damages
70
1140907, 1141241
awards, the judgment will not modify the ASU officials'
behavior in a manner that will benefit Danley.  Thus, Danley
is not a "prevailing party" for purposes of § 1988 and is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees or expenses.
Conclusion
In case no. 1140907, we reverse that portion of the
judgment awarding damages to Danley and remand the case with
instructions for the trial court to vacate those awards. 
Because we reverse that portion of the judgment awarding
damages, ASU and the ASU officials' remaining issues as to the
propriety of the damages awards are pretermitted.  We affirm
that portion of the judgment that denied ASU's counterclaim. 
In case no. 1141241, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.
1140907 -– AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Parker and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock and Wise, JJ., concur specially.
Stuart, Bolin, and Main, JJ., concur in the result.
Moore, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
1141241 -- AFFIRMED.
71
1140907, 1141241
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur in the result.
72
1140907, 1141241
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially in case no. 
1140907 
and
concurring in the result in case no. 1141241).
I concur specially in case no. 1140907.  As to the cross-
appeal, case no. 1141241, I concur in the result.  
Case No. 1140907
Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 says that
"the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any
court of law or equity."  Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901.  As
a result, the courts of this State have no authority to
consider any claim that names the "the State of Alabama"
per se as the defendant.  Further, we quite naturally treat
the naming of an organizational unit of the State of Alabama
(e.g., an agency) as a defendant as one and the same as naming
"the State of Alabama."  See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 23 (Ala. 2007) (noting that "a State
agency is absolutely immune from suit").
We do not, however, for purposes of § 14, treat the
naming of a State officer or employee per se as one and the
same as naming the State of Alabama as a defendant, even when
the officer or employee is named in his or her official
capacity.  If we did, we could not allow for the several
73
1140907, 1141241
"exceptions" we have recognized to the naming of such
officials as defendants  because § 14 admits of no
11
"exceptions."   Instead, we examine whether the suit against
12
See, e.g., Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Fin., 991 So. 2d
11
1254, 1256-57 (Ala. 2008) (noting that "[t]here are six
general categories of actions that do not come within the
prohibition of § 14" and that, among them, are "(1) actions
brought to compel State officials to perform their legal
duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from
enforcing an unconstitutional law; (3) actions to 
compel 
State
officials to perform ministerial acts; (4) actions brought
against State officials under the Declaratory Judgments Act,
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., seeking construction of a
statute and its application in a given situation; (5) valid
inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials
in their representative capacity").  The sixth category
referenced in Ex parte Alabama Department of Finance was
recently restated as follows: 
"(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State
officials in their representative capacity where it
is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken
interpretation of law, ... and (b) actions for
damages brought against State officials in their
individual capacity where it is alleged that they
had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their
authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law,
subject to the limitation that the action not be, in
effect, one against the State. ..."
Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013) (citations
omitted).
In light of this fact, query whether the immunity we
12
afford State officials logically must find its source
somewhere other than § 14, e.g., the common law.  I do not see
how naming a State official as a defendant in an action
seeking an injunction to require the official to perform a
74
1140907, 1141241
an official is one that in effect is a suit against the State
of Alabama, primarily examining whether the claim, if
successful, would adversely affect a contract or property
right of the State. 
Even in reference to this latter standard, we do not
consider that a suit is one that adversely affects a contract
or property right of the State when the State's payment
obligation arises from the particular terms of a contract (the
"private law," if you will, created between the State and
another party) that obligates the State to pay for goods and
services accepted by the State.  We reason that the moneys
owed the plaintiff under that circumstance are no longer, of
right, those of the State. See Alabama Dep't of Transp. v.
Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831, 845-46 (Ala. 2008)
("[A]lthough the payment of the funds 'may ultimately touch
the State treasury,' Horn v. Dunn Bros., 262 Ala. 404, 410, 79
So. 2d 11, 17 (1955), the payment does not 'affect the
financial status of the State treasury,' Lyons [v. River Rd.
Constr., Inc.,] 858 So. 2d [257,] 261 [(Ala. 2003)], because
legal duty of the State of Alabama is somehow less a naming of
the State as the defendant than naming that official as a
defendant in an action seeking money damages.  
75
1140907, 1141241
the funds 'do not belong to the State,' Alabama Dep't of
Envtl. Mgmt. v. Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1180, 1190 n.6 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005) (two-judge opinion), and the State treasury
'suffers no more than it would' had the State officers
originally performed their duties and paid the debts. Horn,
262 Ala. at 410, 79 So. 2d at 17."), abrogated on other
grounds by Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119 (Ala. 2013); see
generally State of Alabama Highway Dep't v. Milton Constr.
Co., 586 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1991); State Bd. of Admin. v.
Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 117 So. 757 (1928).
The manner in which this case is presented does not
require us to reexamine the precedent relating to immunity
appropriately relied upon by the main opinion in regard to
state-law 
contract 
claims 
by 
State 
employees. 
 
My
consideration of the issues presented here, however, has
raised for me the question whether, in an appropriate case,
this Court should consider the following: Whether, when the
State has by the particular terms of a specific contract
between it and another party agreed to pay for a good or
service and the other party to that contract prepares and
tenders the same in conformity with the particular terms of
76
1140907, 1141241
that contract, such moneys should no longer be considered, of
right, to be moneys of the State for purposes of whatever
immunity analysis is to be applied.  Put differently, would an
award of such moneys to the other party to the contract under
such circumstances, in truth, adversely affect a contract or
property right of the State?  A negative answer to this latter
question would put Alabama in line with most of the other
states of the union.  
13
Although some states start with a constitutional
13
provision 
expressly 
allowing 
the 
legislature 
to 
waive 
immunity
as it sees fit and others recognize that the immunity at issue
derives from the common law and is waivable for that reason,
virtually all other states achieve on some ground a
differentiation between specific contractual obligations
voluntarily undertaken in a given case between the State and
another party (the "private law" between those parties) and
claims against the state for breach of general obligations
imposed by law.  The latter of course includes primarily tort
actions, i.e., claims based on a breach of duty imposed
generally by the common law or by statute.  See, e.g., 81A
C.J.S. States § 554 (2015) (noting that, "generally, when a
state makes a contract, it is liable for a breach of its
agreement, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not
apply").  Query whether the obligations imposed upon the State
by a statute governing procedures for personnel actions would
fall in this latter category, even though those procedures
(like other generalized legal obligations) can be said to be
read into employment contracts.
77
1140907, 1141241
Case No. 1141241
As to the cross-appeal, I agree with the main opinion
that Stacy Danley is not entitled to outright reinstatement
pursuant to his § 1983 claim.  The federal courts have
explained that such reinstatement is available in § 1983 cases
in which the plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of a
substantive constitutional right.  See, e.g., Allen 
v. 
Autauga
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding
that public-school teachers discharged for exercising their
First 
Amendment 
free-speech 
rights 
were 
entitled 
to
reinstatement); Reeves v. Claiborne Cty. Bd. of Educ., 828
F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that county school
administrator transferred to another position because she
exercised her First Amendment right to free expression was
entitled to reinstatement); and Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d
634, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that county tax
commissioner's office employee who was transferred and then
fired for exercising his First Amendment free-speech rights
was entitled to reinstatement).
The aforesaid cases are distinguishable from cases in
which an employee invokes § 1983 in an effort to vindicate
78
1140907, 1141241
procedural constitutional rights.  In the latter category of
cases, 
an 
employee 
may 
be 
entitled 
to 
a 
"limited"
reinstatement to allow the employee to receive "process" to
which he or she is entitled but that previously was denied.
See, e.g., McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1561 (11th Cir.
1994) (concluding that the plaintiff's action asserted claims
alleging violations of procedural due process and that "the
appropriate remedy in this case is not lost wages and benefits
calculated on the basis of McKinney's remaining working life;
rather proper remedies 
include 
reinstatement 
and 
the
correction of any procedural defects in the means by which
McKinney was terminated"); Florida Educ. Dev. Corp. v.
Woodham, 942 F. Supp. 542, 550 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (observing
that "the McKinney court made it clear that the appropriate
remedy for a procedural due process deprivation 
'is 
equitable:
for instance, in an employment case, the claimant typically
seeks reinstatement and a properly conducted pre-termination
hearing'" (quoting McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557)); 
and 
Poindexter
v. Department of Human Res., 946 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (M.D.
Ala. 2013) (noting "the limitations to reinstatement should
Plaintiff succeed" on her claim of violations of her
79
1140907, 1141241
procedural due-process rights:  "A ruling in her favor would
not prevent Plaintiff's termination based on the same
allegations set out in charge letter. ...  It would only
require that Plaintiff receive notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to her termination. ...  Reinstatement would
return Plaintiff to the status quo that existed the morning of
April 9, 2010, and leave Defendants to conduct a hearing if
the agency still desired Plaintiff's termination.").  We are
not presented here with an issue for decision in this regard.
Wise, J., concurs.
80
1140907, 1141241
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in
part in case no. 1140907).
I concur with affirming that part of the trial court's
judgment denying the counterclaim of Alabama State University
("ASU") and its officials  against Stacey Danley. However, I
14
respectfully dissent from reversing the part of the trial
court's judgment that awarded damages to Danley. I dissent
primarily because I disagree with the main opinion that Art.
I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, bars Danley's action alleging
breach of contact. 
In State of Alabama Highway Department v. Milton
Construction Co., 586 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1991), Milton
Construction Company, Inc. ("Milton Construction"), entered
into a contract with the State Highway Department ("the
Highway Department"). After Milton Construction had rendered
the services promised in the contract, the Highway Department
refused to pay. Milton Construction sued the Highway
As noted in the main opinion, these officials include
14
John F. Knight, former executive vice president and former
chief operating officer of ASU; William H. Harris, former
interim president of ASU; Gwendolyn Boyd, president of ASU;
and members of ASU's Board of Trustees. As does the main
opinion, I will also refer to these defendants collectively as
"the ASU officials." 
81
1140907, 1141241
Department alleging breach of contract, but the Highway
Department argued that the suit was barred by § 14 on the
ground of immunity. This Court disagreed, reasoning as
follows: 
"It is true that § 14 of the Constitution
prevents a suit against the state as well as suits
against its agencies. See Phillips v. Thomas, 555
So. 2d 81 (Ala. 1989); Rutledge v. Baldwin County
Comm'n, 495 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1986). However, this
Court has also recognized that there are certain
established exceptions to the protection afforded
the state or its agencies by sovereign immunity. See
Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65, 68 (Ala. 1981).
Among those recognized exceptions are actions
brought to force state employees or agencies to
perform their legal duties. Id. ..."
586 So. 2d at 875 (emphasis added). This Court reasoned that
"[o]nce the Highway Department has legally contracted under
state law for goods or services and accepts such goods or
services, the Highway Department also becomes legally
obligated to pay for the goods or services accepted in
accordance with the terms of the contract." Id. We therefore
concluded that Milton Construction's claim was not barred by
§ 14. 
Following our decision in Milton Construction, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama in
Marous 
Brothers 
Construction, 
LLC 
v. 
Alabama 
State 
University,
82
1140907, 1141241
533 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (M.D. Ala. 2008), denied ASU's motion to
dismiss 
a 
breach-of-contract 
action 
on 
State-immunity 
grounds.
In 
that case, ASU sought to renovate student-housing 
buildings
on its campus. Before the renovations started, ASU hired two
companies to do preconstruction work. After the work was
complete, the companies submitted their invoices to ASU,
seeking $651,362.68 for the work they did. ASU refused to pay,
and the companies sued ASU for damages arising from breach of
contract. ASU moved to dismiss, alleging immunity under § 14. 
The court recognized that § 14 immunity applies to state
agencies, including "the 'state's institutions of higher
learning.'" Marous Bros., 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (quoting
Taylor v. Troy State Univ., 437 So. 2d 472, 474 (Ala. 1983)).
However, applying Milton Construction, the court recognized
that § 14 immunity does not apply to actions "'brought to
force state employees or agencies to perform their legal
duties.'" Marous Bros., 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (quoting
Milton Constr., 586 So. 2d at 875). The court then reasoned:
"Here, Plaintiffs allege that ASU entered into
an agreement with them whereby ASU would pay
Plaintiffs for certain preconstruction services
related to the Student Residence Project. Plaintiffs
allege that they performed this work, provided their
work product to ASU, and submitted invoices to ASU
83
1140907, 1141241
totaling $651,362.68. Plaintiffs further allege that
ASU accepted Plaintiffs' work product and used that
work product to secure bond financing for the
Student Residence Project and for other purposes,
but that ASU has not paid Plaintiffs. Accepting
these facts as true, which the court must do at this
stage of the litigation, the court finds that the
allegations establish that ASU legally contracted
under state law for services and accepted such
services and, thus, is legally obligated to pay for
the services accepted under the terms of the
agreement. See Milton, 586 So. 2d at 875 .... It
follows, as it did in Milton, that 'this obligation
is not subject to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity' because 'it is in the nature of an action
to compel [a state agency] to perform [its] legal
duties and pay [Plaintiffs] for services contracted 
for and rendered.' 586 So. 2d at 875. Because
Plaintiffs have alleged facts which fall within an
exception to sovereign immunity, the court finds
that ASU's motion to dismiss is due to be denied."
Marous Bros., 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1201-02 (alterations in
original). 
Thus, Milton Construction and Marous Brothers recognized
that a breach-of-contract claim against the State or its
officials is not barred by § 14 immunity when it is "brought
to force state employees or agencies to perform their legal
duties."  Milton Constr., 586 So. 2d at 875. In this case, ASU
entered into a contract with Danley pursuant to which Danley
agreed to serve as ASU's athletic director from July 26, 2010,
through September 30, 2013, for a salary of $125,000 per year.
84
1140907, 1141241
Thus, by voluntarily entering into a contract with Danley, ASU
and its officials were legally obligated to perform the duties
specified in the contract. I therefore see no reason why
Danley's claim against ASU and the ASU officials would be
barred by § 14 immunity.
The main opinion holds that Milton Construction and
Marous Brothers are distinguishable, reasoning that "the
takeaway from Milton Construction and Marous Brothers is that
once the State has contracted for services and has accepted
those services, it is legally obligated to pay for those
services." ___ So. 3d at ___. I respectfully disagree. I
believe that it is the contract, not the acceptance of
services, that creates the legal obligation to pay. See 81A
C.J.S. States § 554 (2015) ("[G]enerally, when a state makes
a contract, it is liable for a breach of its agreement, and
the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply, or the
action 
falls within the States' constructive or express 
waiver
of immunity for that purpose." (footnotes omitted)). Under
ordinary contract law, a party's obligation to pay arises from
the terms of the contract itself; the duty to pay does not
depend on whether the breaching party has fully accepted the
85
1140907, 1141241
services of the non-breaching party. See 17B C.J.S. Contracts
§ 823 (2011) ("Failure by one party to perform a valid and
subsisting contract, in accordance with its terms, confers on
the other party a cause of action for an appropriate form of
relief for its breach." (footnote omitted)). I therefore see
no reason to hold that the State's obligation to pay arises
only when it has breached a contract and has fully accepted
the services of the non-breaching party.
Moreover, if we hold that breach-of-contract claims
against the State generally are barred by § 14, Ala. Const.
1901, then what reason would people have to contract with the
State? If the State can breach a contract any time before it
has fully accepted the non-breaching party's services, then
could the University of Alabama and Auburn University breach
their contracts with their football coaches before their
contracts expire? If the State can breach its contracts before
it has fully accepted the services rendered by the non-
breaching parties and claim immunity under § 14, then,
although an aggrieved party may have a remedy with the Board
of Adjustment, he or she will find no justice in a court of
law.
86