Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: ADA and SSA, CJ V. SA

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF:  ADA and SSA, CJ V. SA2006 WY 49132 P.3d 196Case Number: C-05-12Decided: 04/20/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF:  
ADA and 
SSA,

 
 
CJ

Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
SA,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
No appearance.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      CJ is the 
stepfather of ADA and SSA (the children), and SA is their 
biological father.  Stepfather 
petitioned the district court to adopt the children without father's consent 
because father had failed to provide adequate child support for the 
children.  The district court denied 
the petition, finding stepfather failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that father willfully failed to pay child support.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Stepfather 
articulates the following appellate issues:

 
 
1.         Did 
the court err when it did not terminate the Respondent[']s parental 
rights[?]

 
 

2.                  
Did the 
court err when it did not take judicial notice of the previous court[']s 
findings[?]

 
 
Father 
did not appear on appeal.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The 
children's mother and father were divorced in 2001, and the divorce decree 
awarded custody of the children to mother and ordered father to pay $527.46 per 
month in child support.  Mother 
married stepfather in January 2003, and stepfather assumed responsibility for 
supporting the children.  Father did 
not comply with his child support obligation; consequently, on February 2, 2004, 
stepfather filed a petition to adopt the children without father's consent 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 (LexisNexis 2005).   

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court held a hearing on stepfather's petition.  Father admitted he had not paid child 
support in accordance with the order but argued his failure was not 
willful.  The district court ordered 
the parties to brief the issue of whether father's failure to pay support was 
willful.  After reviewing the 
submissions, the district court concluded father's failure to pay child support 
was not willful and, consequently, denied stepfather's petition.   Stepfather appealed.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      We review the 
district court's decision on a petition to adopt by applying the abuse of 
discretion standard.  In re Adoption of TLC, TOC v. TND, 2002 
WY 76, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 863, 867-68 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
"The 
power to grant or deny a petition for adoption is within the discretion of the 
trial court.  Matter of Adoption 
of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 377 (Wyo.1996); 
Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 988 (Wyo.1986). Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria.'  Mintle v. 
Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986)).  In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is 
whether the court could reasonably have concluded as it did.'  Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d  at 377-78 (quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 
(Wyo.1982)).   In the context 
of alleged abuse of discretion, the assessment of the circumstances in the case 

 
 
is 
tantamount to an evaluation of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the 
decision of the district court.   
In review of the evidence, we accept the successful party's submissions, 
granting them every favorable inference fairly to be drawn and leaving out of 
consideration conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party." 

 
 

Id. 
(quoting 
Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995)).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶6]      Stepfather claims 
the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition to adopt the 
children without father's consent.  
A petition for adoption without parental consent may be granted by the 
district court if the elements outlined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 are 
satisfied.  In re Adoption of CF, TF v. State of 
Wyoming, Dep't of Family Services, 2005 WY 118, ¶ 10, 120 P.3d 992 (Wyo. 
2005); In re Adoption of SMR, MVC v. MB, 
982 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Wyo. 1999).  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 states, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
            
(a) In addition to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, the 
adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of a parent or 
the putative father if the court finds * * * that the putative father or the 
nonconsenting parent or parents have:

 
 
* * 
*

(iv) 
Willfully failed to contribute to the support of the child for a period of one 
(1) year immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt and has failed 
to bring the support obligation current within sixty (60) days after service of 
the petition to adopt; or

 
 
            
* * *

(ix) 
Willfully failed to pay a total dollar amount of at least seventy percent (70%) 
of the court ordered support for a period of two (2) years or more and has 
failed to bring the support obligation one hundred percent (100%) current within 
sixty (60) days after service of the petition to adopt.

 
 
[¶7]      An adoption 
results in the termination of the familial rights of the biological parent.   SMR, 982 P.2d  at 1249; In re Adoption of CJH, SLH v. CST, 778 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1989).  Because the right to associate with 
one's children is a fundamental right protected by the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions, "adoption statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is 
against a non-consenting parent, and every reasonable intendment is made in 
favor of that parent's claims."  TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 10, 46 P.3d  at 
868.   See also, RS v. Dep't of Family Services, (In re KLS), 
2004 WY 87, ¶ 11, 94 P.3d 1025, 1027-28 (Wyo. 2004); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services of 
Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981).  "Moreover, the party 
requesting adoption bears the burden of proving the existence of at least one of 
the statutory factors by clear and convincing evidence."  TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d  at 868.  Clear 
and convincing evidence 
is defined as "that kind of 
proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is 
highly probable."  Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 
2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2002), quoting MacGuire v. 
Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 
1980).

 
 
[¶8]      The petition 
stated the adoption should be allowed without father's permission pursuant to 
subsection (ix) because father had willfully failed to pay a total dollar amount 
of at least seventy percent of the court ordered support for a period of two 
years or more.  However, the 
district court's order denying the petition focused on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-110(a)(iv), which allows adoption without the parent's consent if the 
parent has "willfully failed to contribute to the support of the child for a 
period of one (1) year immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt 
and has failed to bring the support obligation current within sixty (60) days 
after service of the petition to adopt."  
Thus, the particular subsection of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 at issue in 
this case is unclear.  However, 
father admitted he had not paid his child support and the district court's 
dispositive finding did not involve a mathematical calculation, but rather was 
based upon the finding that father's failure to pay was not willful.  The willfulness requirement must be 
satisfied in order to grant an adoption under either subsection (ix) or 
(iv).  See TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶¶ 27-29, 46 P.3d  at 
873.  Our inquiry, therefore, 
focuses on the willfulness element and not on the amount of support father did 
or did not pay.  

 
 
[¶9]      We have explained 
the importance of the willfulness requirement as follows:

 
 
Clearly, 
by inclusion of the modifying term "willfully" the statute draws a distinction, 
as it must, between the parent who though financially able to pay his 
court-ordered child support is unwilling to do so, and the parent who though 
willing to pay his court-ordered child support is financially unable to do 
so.  "A natural parent's failure to 
support his or her child does not obviate the necessity of the parent's consent 
to the child's adoption, where the parent's financial condition is such that he 
or she is unable to support the child."   2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption § 88 (1974).  

 
 
Moreover, 
this court has defined willfully in the context of  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 1-22-110 as "intentionally, 
knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, and without 
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently, 
accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly."  Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 
76 (Wyo. 
1982).  

 
 

TLC, 
2002 
WY 76, ¶¶ 27-28, 46 P.3d  at 873 (some citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶10]   Stepfather argues, under the 
principle of res judicata, father was 
precluded from claiming his failure to pay child support was not willful because 
he had previously been found in contempt of court and incarcerated for failing 
to comply with his support obligation.  
The record does not include the contempt orders;1 however, we are able to confirm 
from the transcript of the hearing that father was, indeed, intermittently 
incarcerated on various charges, including his failure to pay child 
support.      

 
 
[¶11]   We have described the preclusion 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as 
follows:

 
 
[R]es 
judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of 
action[.] . . . [F]our factors are examined to determine whether the doctrine of 
res judicata applies:  (1) identity 
in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and 
relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between 
them.  Collateral estoppel bars 
relitigation of previously litigated issues and involves an analysis of four 
similar factors:  (1) whether the 
issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented 
in the present action;  (2) whether 
the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits;  (3) whether the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
prior adjudication;  and (4) whether 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.  

 
 

Markstein 
v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 
2003 WY 122, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 389, 394-95 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   The party asserting application of 
either res judicata or collateral estoppel must analyze the 
elements of the relevant doctrine by comparing the prior adjudication with the 
present action.  Unfortunately, 
stepfather's argument for application of res judicata amounts to only a couple of 
sentences and does not include any legal analysis or citation to legal 
authority.  Since the record does 
not contain the contempt orders (see n. 1), we cannot determine whether the 
parties or the issues in the contempt proceeding are identical to those in the 
adoption proceeding or whether the time frame of the contempt proceedings was 
such that father's conduct would be relevant to the willfulness analysis under 
the adoption statute.  We, 
therefore, refuse to consider whether father is precluded by the earlier 
contempt orders from arguing his conduct was not willful.  See, e.g., Bitker v. First National Bank in Evanston, 2004 WY 114, 
¶ 15, 98 P.3d 853, 857 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶13]   We turn now to the evidence of 
father's willfulness.  Father 
acknowledged he was aware of his child support obligation and did not pay it on 
a regular basis.  He claimed he was 
unable to consistently pay child support because he had difficulty finding 
employment in Evanston and he had been incarcerated 
intermittently on a number of different charges.2      

 
 
[¶14]   Stepfather argues father's actions 
were willful because his behavior led to his incarceration which prevented him 
from earning the money to pay child support.  We have directly addressed the issue of 
whether a non-consenting parent's failure to pay child support because he is 
incarcerated is sufficient to establish willfulness.  TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 34, 46 P.3d  at 
874-75.  We said in TLC:  "Incarceration, standing alone, does not 
provide the direct intent necessary to constitute willful failure to pay under 
the pertinent statute."  TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 34, 46 P.3d  at 874-75.   Instead, "the focus must remain on 
the parent's intent and ability to pay.  
The courts should look at whether the parent has demonstrated, through 
whatever financial means available to him, that the parent has not forgotten his 
statutory obligation to his child."  
TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 36, 46 P.3d  
at 875.  When a parent is 
incarcerated, "[t]he proper inquiry to address . . .  is whether the natural parent 
intentionally incapacitated himself for the purpose of avoiding the duty imposed 
by law; if so then imprisonment may constitute justification for dispensing with 
his consent in the adoption proceeding."'  
TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 35, 46 P.3d  
at 875, quoting In Matter of Adoption of 
V.A.J., 660 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla. 1983).  There is no evidence in this record which 
indicates father willfully committed any crimes in order to have himself 
incarcerated so he could avoid his child support obligation.  Thus, his incarceration, by itself, does 
not justify a finding of willfulness.  

 
 

[¶15]   Of course, even when a parent is 
incarcerated, he must pay child support if he has the means to do so.  "A parent 
must always pay child support according to his or her financial ability."  TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 36, 46 P.3d  at 
875.  See also, Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 821 
(Wyo. 
1993).   The record indicates 
father was incarcerated off and on over a period of several years; however, neither the actual dates of his 
imprisonment nor the total amount of time he spent in jail is shown in the 
record.  Furthermore, stepfather did 
not present any evidence as to whether father earned wages while 
incarcerated.  Thus, we do not know 
if he had the ability to pay any child support while he was incarcerated.  Compare, TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 31, 46 P.3d  at 874 
(explaining the father in that case had made minimal child support payments 
while imprisoned).  

 
 
[¶16]   Father testified, when he was not 
in jail, he attempted to find work in order to earn the funds to pay child 
support, but was not able to find consistent work in UintaCounty.  He identified two construction companies 
for which he had worked as a truck driver and stated, without contradiction, his 
child support was paid while he was working.  Father also testified he had attempted 
to find work through "the union" and with "the rigs," but was unsuccessful.  After he was unable to secure other 
employment, he said he started his own business with the hopes of earning a 
living.  At the time of the hearing, 
the business apparently had not yet yielded any earnings.  Father testified he was living with friends 
because he could not afford his own residence.      

      

[¶17]   Stepfather argued the unemployment 
statistics in UintaCounty did not support father's claim that 
no work was available.  He also 
asserted father did not comply with the contempt orders which required him to 
take part in retraining programs to make him more employable.  Father disputed stepfather's allegation 
work was available and claimed he had attempted to comply with the retraining 
requirement but his efforts had been thwarted when he was incarcerated.       

 
 
[¶18]   The determination of whether 
father's failure to pay child support was willful involves disputed factual 
issues; consequently, it was within the district court's province to weigh the 
evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses.  See RS, 2004 WY 87, ¶¶ 33-34, 94 P.3d  at 
1033-34.  Although our review is 
made more difficult because the district court did not make any express 
findings, the record is sufficient to support the district court's ultimate 
conclusion that stepfather had not proven by clear and convincing evidence 
father's failure to pay was  
willful.  See, e.g., Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 20, n. 
2, 78 P.3d 671, 676, n. 2 (Wyo. 2003) 
(noting "the enumeration of the specific findings of fact, reasoning, and 
conclusions of law made by a district court in support of its ruling is most 
welcome and sometimes even critical in this court's appellate review," but 
finding there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district 
court's ultimate conclusion).  
Evidence exists in the record supporting father's contention he did not 
have the means to pay his child support because he had difficulty earning a 
living and had been incarcerated.   TLC, 2002 WY 76, ¶ 28, 46 P.3d  at 
873.  

 
 
[¶19]   Stepfather also argues the record 
shows father chose to spend his money on drugs and/or alcohol instead of paying 
his child support obligation.  The 
record does contain evidence suggesting father's use of intoxicating substances 
contributed to his difficulties.  He 
testified he lost his driver's license as a result of driving while intoxicated 
and acknowledged he was facing a charge of possession of methamphetamine at the 
time of the adoption hearing.  He 
stated, however, he had pled not guilty to the criminal charge claiming he did 
not use the drug.  There are no 
documents in the record informing us of the outcome of the charge.  

 
 

[¶20]   Obviously, if a parent has money 
with which to buy drugs or alcohol and chooses to do so rather than pay child 
support, an argument could be made that the failure to pay child support was 
willful.  In 
re Adoption of Doe, 921 P.2d 875, 880 (Mont. 1996).  However, it is important to focus on the 
proper query when evaluating such an argument.  As explained by the Montana Supreme 
Court when reviewing a lower court's termination of mother's parental 
rights:

 
 

[A 
parent's] admitted 
drug addiction alone cannot serve as clear and convincing evidence that she had 
the means to contribute to her children's support. The relevant inquiry is 
whether she obtained funds which could have been used for the support of the 
children which, instead, she chose to spend on drugs.

 

Id. 
at 880.  In 
the case at bar, there was no evidence concerning the extent of father's drug or 
alcohol use or the actual amount of money he spent on such substances.  More importantly, the record does not 
show father had funds available to him to buy drugs and/or alcohol instead of 
paying child support.     

 
 
[¶21]   As we have said before, the right 
of parents to associate with their children is fundamental, and due process 
requires we stringently guard this important right.  Stepfather was charged with proving, by clear 
and convincing evidence, father willfully disregarded his child support 
obligation.  The district court 
concluded he did not meet that onerous burden.  Although father's efforts to pay 
his child support certainly cannot be characterized as model and may have, at 
times, been willful, stepfather must prove that fact with clear and convincing 
evidence, and this record does not contain such evidence.  When there is a failure of proof, we 
cannot conclude the district court's denial of the petition for adoption was an 
abuse of discretion.

 
 
[¶22]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Stepfather 
claims the district court erred by refusing to take judicial notice of the 
contempt orders and other documents from the divorce case. Although stepfather attached those 
documents to his brief, they were not included as part of the record on 
appeal.   As we explained  in Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, 104 P.3d 756 (Wyo. 2005),  we will not address an appellant's 
contention the district court erred by failing to take judicial notice of 
certain documents when they are not included in the record on appeal.  Aragon, 2005 WY 5, ¶¶ 19-20, 104 P.3d  at 
761-62.  "An appellant bears the 
burden of bringing to the reviewing court a sufficient record on which to base 
its decision," Aragon, 2005 WY 5, ¶  20, 104 P.3d  at 761, and he cannot 
supplement the appellate record by attaching documents to his brief.  Barnes v. Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 945 
(Wyo. 2000).  We, therefore, refuse to consider 
stepfather's judicial notice argument.     

 

2At the 
hearing father also claimed he had difficulty paying his child support because 
he suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.  This argument was not developed in the 
record, the district court did not comment on it in its ruling, and it was not 
sufficiently addressed on appeal.  
Thus, although there is a body of law addressing claims that a parent is 
unable to pay child support because of mental illness, see, e.g., Annotation, The Natural Parent's Indigence Resulting 
from Unemployment or Under Employment As Precluding Finding Failure to Support 
Child Waived Requirement of Consent to Adoption, 83 A.L.R.3d 375, § 4 
(2000), we decline to address the argument.