Title: 2004-SC-000199-M R 13ACTE (_s4-o OSCAR LEE DAVIS HON . LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE V. 01-C R-0469 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOTTO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURT OF THIS STATE. ,SixprsmP C~uurf of 1" OSCAR LEE DAVIS 2004-SC-000199-M R RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 13ACTE (_s4-o ; APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT V . HON . LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE 01-CR-0469 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING ; The Appellant, Oscar Lee Davis, was convicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court of first-degree assault and first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO 1 s) stemming from a shooting on January 13, 2001 . Appellant was sentenced to 15 years on the first-degree assault which was enhanced to fifty (50) years by the PFO 1 St charge . The Appellant claims the trial court committed palpable error, under RCr 10 .26, by failing to grant a directed verdict on the first-degree assault charge, notwithstanding that the Appellant failed to request such relief . We affirm . The victim, Thomas White, suffered a gunshot wound to the shoulder as he waited for a beer at the bar in the Blues Club in Jefferson County, Kentucky . The Appellant does not deny being the person who discharged the .38 caliber pistol that ultimately wounded White, though Appellant gave two conflicting accounts of the incident, both differing from each other and from White's account . Just after the shooting, Appellant told Detective Allen Wines that White had acted aggressively toward him during the course of the evening and he had been assaulted by White's "boys" over the Christmas holidays . According to Appellant, some "unidentified person" gave him the gun . He stated he stood up, pointed the gun and told White to leave him alone, and then shot White once . He then stated he dropped the gun inside the bar and left . He maintained he did not know where the gun was . Appellant's brother's former girlfriend, the bar owner, testified Appellant had the gun in his hand when he left the bar . At trial, Appellant testified that he and White were "street hustlers," meaning they dealt in stolen goods . He denied being assaulted in December, and claimed that he and White were friends . He further testified that the shooting occurred accidentially after a gun, the subject of a trade between White and Appellant's friend "Jimmy," was dropped on the floor of the Blues Club and discharged upon being picked up by Appellant . White, the victim, testified at trial that the bullet struck him in the shoulder causing nerve damage in his arm, and as of the date of trial, he continued to experience pain and/or numbness in his left hand and fingers . No other evidence, medical or otherwise, was presented at trial to support White's claimed injury. The Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to support the "serious physical injury" element of KRS 500.080 (15) . Specifically, Appellant asserts White's testimony, in and of itself, was not sufficient to sustain the first-degree assault charge and a directed verdict was not only proper, but the failure to "sua sponte" grant a directed verdict constituted palpable error by the trial court . RCr 10.26 states : A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a detemination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error . In Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991), we set forth the standard for a trial court's consideration of a motion for directed verdict . Therein we held : On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions of credibility and weight to be given to such testimony . We further held in Benham that, "[o]n appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt." Id . at 187 . As we have previously held in Commonwealth v. Hocker , 865 S .W .2d 323, 325 (Ky . 1993), "medical testimony is not an absolute requisite to establish serious physical injury or even physical injury" and, futher, the victim is competent to testify as to his own injuries . See also Ewing v . Commonwealth , 390 S.W.2d 651 (Ky . 1965), see also CR 76.12 (4)(g) . Appellant relies upon Prince v . Commonwealth , 576 S .W .2d 244, 246 (Ky .App . 1978), Luttrell v. Commonwealth , 554 S.W.2d 75 (Ky . 1977), and Souder v. Commonwealth , 719 S.W .2d 730 (Ky . 1986), in support of his position that insufficient evidence of White's injury was presented to the jury . However, these cases are distinguishable from the instant case . First, in Prince , the Court of Appeals clearly stated that "serious physical injury" can be established by medical or non-medical evidence . Further, the injuries sustained by the victims in Luttrell and Souder did not rise to the level of serious physical injury, i.e ., one "which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ."' The Lutrell and Souder injuries, though admittedly disturbing, did not satisfy any of the prongs of KRS 500.080(15) . Further, we have held in Parson v. Commonwealth , 144 S .W .3d 775, 787 (Ky . 2004), that "pain is an `impairment of health' and prolonged pain is a "serious physical injury ." Having first considered the palpable error standard along with the standard for directed verdict, and further having established (1) White's tesimony was sufficient as to his injuries and (2) prolonged pain is a "serious physical injury," we hold White's testimony to be sufficient to support a first-degree ' In Luttrell , a police officer who was shot in the chest with bird shot, was hospitalized for five days and was off work for approximately six weeks, had not, as a matter of law, sustained a serious physical injury as the injuries were superficial . In Souder , a child who sustained bruising, a swollen arm, and burns in and about the mouth from a cigarette or cigarette lighter, none of which required follow up treatment after an emergency room visit, had not sustained a serious physical injury . assault instruction . Thus, the trial court did not error, much less commit palpable error, in so instructing the jury . Therefore, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed . All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Euva D . May Assistant Public Advocate Appellate Division Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APELLEE : Gregory D. Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky William Robert Long Jr. Criminal Appellate Division Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204 Michael Harned Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204