Title: Commonwealth v. Sanchez

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
           OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 032242 
           JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
           June 10, 2004 
HUGO SANCHEZ 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in finding a defendant charged with felony hit-and-run 
made a proffer sufficient to establish a particularized need for 
public funds to permit an expert’s testimony at trial regarding 
DNA testing. 
I.  FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
Hugo Sanchez (“Sanchez”) was convicted in the Circuit Court 
of Fairfax County of felony failure to stop after an accident, 
in violation of Code § 46.2-894.  The primary dispute at trial 
was the identification of the driver of the vehicle involved in 
the accident.  The Commonwealth offered three items of evidence 
implicating Sanchez: eyewitness testimony that Sanchez was 
driving the car at the time of the accident, Sanchez’ 
identification as the individual who had forcibly stolen the car 
from its true owner several days prior to the accident, and DNA 
evidence taken from a blood sample from the interior of the 
driver’s door at the scene of the accident. 
 
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Several months prior to trial, Sanchez moved the trial 
court for funds to employ a DNA expert witness and a DNA expert 
investigator in order to evaluate the Commonwealth's DNA 
evidence and the process by which it was developed.∗  Sanchez 
represented to the trial court: “I’m not asking for expert fees 
to testify . . . I’m not asking for that because I haven’t 
determined that that’s appropriate.  I’m asking for pretrial 
work . . . .”  The trial court granted Sanchez’ motion and 
allocated $3,000.00 to engage DNA consultants as he saw fit. 
Ten days prior to trial, Sanchez filed a written motion 
with the trial court for additional funds for his DNA expert 
witness to testify.  The written motion gave no description of 
the DNA expert’s proposed testimony and did not contain 
allegations that the lack of that witness would be prejudicial 
to Sanchez.  At the hearing on Sanchez’ motion, Sanchez stated 
that his DNA expert’s pretrial work had depleted the funds 
previously allotted and that additional funds were needed to 
secure the expert’s testimony at trial. 
The Commonwealth responded that Sanchez should specify why 
his expert’s testimony was necessary and how it differed from 
that of the Commonwealth’s DNA expert.  Sanchez offered to 
provide information ex parte about his DNA expert’s expected 
                     
 
∗ The Commonwealth did not contest that Sanchez was indigent 
and without funds to obtain the services of an expert witness. 
 
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testimony, but the trial court refused to conduct an ex parte 
hearing.  The trial court then told Sanchez that, without more, 
his motion for additional funds would be denied.  Sanchez then 
proffered that 
we [had the expert] go over the [DNA] documents 
from the state laboratory.  There are 
approximately − about four or five inches worth of 
documents that he has reviewed.  In that 
documentation, he has noticed that there were 
errors in the way that the DNA procedures were 
followed, that there were errors in the way the 
examination was done, which could have had a 
significant impact in the results of the DNA. 
So therefore the DNA results that the 
Commonwealth is going to put forward as being 
scientifically valid could be questioned, will be 
questioned, to an extent by our expert witness 
and therefore the Commonwealth's only other 
evidence, other than the DNA, which we submit 
would not be evidence that is credible, would be 
testimony of one witness who had admittedly [been 
using] cocaine and drinking alcohol. 
So it is certainly material for the defense 
as to whether Mr. Sanchez was in that car for 
those reasons.  His testimony is material to the 
defense. 
 
The trial court denied Sanchez’ motion for additional funds.  
After a four-day jury trial, Sanchez was convicted and sentenced 
to four years in prison. 
On appeal, Sanchez made multiple claims of error to the 
Court of Appeals, including the trial court’s denial of his 
motion for additional funds so his DNA expert could testify.  
Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 319, 328, 585 S.E.2d 327, 
331 (2003).  The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge 
 
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abused his discretion in denying the request for additional 
funds but denied Sanchez relief on the other assignments of 
error.  The Court of Appeals determined that Sanchez’ proffer 
established a particularized need for the expert’s services and 
that “failure to allot him the funds adversely affected his 
ability to rebut and challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence.”  
Id. at 339, 585 S.E.2d at 337.  Finding that the error was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals 
remanded the case to the trial court.  Id.  We awarded the 
Commonwealth this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 476 S.E.2d 920 
(1996), this Court noted that an indigent defendant is not 
constitutionally entitled, at the state’s expense, to all the 
experts that a non-indigent defendant might afford.  Id. at 211, 
476 S.E.2d at 925.  All that is required is that an indigent 
defendant have “ ‘an adequate opportunity to present [his] 
claims fairly within the adversary system.’ ”  Id. (quoting Ross 
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)). 
In Husske we held that 
an indigent defendant who seeks the appointment 
of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth’s 
expense, must demonstrate that the subject which 
necessitates the assistance of the expert is 
“likely to be a significant factor in his 
defense,” and that he will be prejudiced by the 
lack of expert assistance. 
 
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Id. at 211-12, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citation omitted).  In that 
context, we specified that a defendant seeking the assistance of 
an expert witness “must show a particularized need” for that 
assistance.  Id. 
It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate this 
“particularized need” by establishing that an expert’s services 
would materially assist him in preparing his defense and that 
the lack of such assistance would result in a fundamentally 
unfair trial.  Id.; accord Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 
92, 580 S.E.2d 834, 840 (2003).  We made clear in Husske and 
subsequent cases that “mere hope or suspicion that favorable 
evidence is available is not enough to require that such help be 
provided.”  252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Whether a defendant has made the 
required showing of particularized need is a determination that 
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Id., 476 
S.E.2d at 926; Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 462, 544 
S.E.2d 299, 305, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001); Bailey v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 737, 529 S.E.2d 570, 578 (2000). 
 
The Court of Appeals found that the DNA evidence of 
Sanchez’ expert was material to his defense, as evidenced by the 
trial court’s initial appointment of a DNA expert, and that his 
“ability to challenge the validity of the Commonwealth’s DNA 
 
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results was truncated by the trial court’s denial of the 
additional funds.”  41 Va. App. at 332, 585 S.E.2d at 333.  The 
Court of Appeals then held that Sanchez’ proffer “articulated a 
particularized need for additional funds to permit his expert to 
testify at trial and that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying his motion.”  Id. at 331, 585 S.E.2d at 333.  We 
disagree. 
 
A review of Sanchez’ proffer reflects that it rests only on 
conclusory assertions; nothing in his proffer is particularized.  
He represented to the trial court “that there were errors in the 
way that the DNA procedures were followed . . . which could have 
had a significant impact in the results of the DNA.”  (Emphasis 
added).  Sanchez’ counsel then stated, again in conclusory 
fashion, “therefore the DNA results that the Commonwealth is 
going to put forth as being scientifically valid could be 
questioned, will be questioned, to an extent.”  (Emphasis 
added).  These statements are not “particularized” because they 
indicate nothing more than Sanchez’ “hope or suspicion” 
regarding the availability of evidence favorable to him with 
respect to the DNA test results and procedures. 
 
As a result, the trial court was left only to guess whether 
the unknown, unexplained potential testimony of Sanchez’ expert 
would be a significant or material factor in his defense and, 
consequently, whether the lack of that testimony would prejudice 
 
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Sanchez.  His proffer makes no attempt to explain what 
particular procedural defects Sanchez’ expert’s review uncovered 
or in what particular respect the Commonwealth’s expert was in 
error.  The trial court could not have known, nor can we discern 
from the record, whether the alleged errors pertained to the use 
of PCR analysis or simply whether the calculation of the 
probability of finding a DNA match should have been one in 2.7 
billion instead of 2.8 billion.  When viewed in this light it is 
clear the proffer was unspecific and speculative and therefore 
not a showing of particularized need.  The conclusory statements 
of trial counsel, although made by an officer of the court, are 
insufficient to meet the Husske standard. 
 
Furthermore, having expended the allotted funds on his DNA 
expert’s review of the documentary evidence from the state 
laboratory, Sanchez was in a far better position to advise the 
trial court of that expert’s proposed testimony than a defendant 
seeking an expert in the first instance.  The information needed 
to show with particularity why his DNA expert’s testimony was 
required, if it existed, lay solely within Sanchez’ purview and 
was not communicated to the trial court.  As a consequence, 
Sanchez failed to carry his burden of persuasion with respect to 
a particularized need for an expert witness on behalf of an 
indigent defendant.  We have previously rejected other 
defendants’ proffers.  See e.g., Green, 266 Va. at 91-92, 580 
 
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S.E.2d at 840 (2003) (trial court did not abuse discretion in 
denying an investigator to a capital murder defendant to “locate 
essential witnesses and data, [and] examine and evaluate 
testimony and documents . . . likely to be significant at a 
capital murder trial."); Bailey, 259 Va. at 737, 529 S.E.2d at 
578; George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 271, 411 S.E.2d 12, 16 
(1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992). 
 
Sanchez’ failure to articulate a “particularized need” for 
his defense expert is, in and of itself, fatal to his claim on 
appeal.  As a direct consequence, the trial court had no basis, 
other than pure speculation, to determine if Sanchez was 
prejudiced by the failure of the expert to testify.  The trial 
court is not required to provide additional funds in such a 
circumstance. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we find the Court of 
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment.  The 
conclusory proffer in support of additional funds to secure 
expert testimony did not constitute a showing of “particularized 
need” and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Sanchez’ motion.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
will be reversed and the defendant’s conviction will be 
reinstated. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The principles of fundamental 
fairness and due process pertaining to an indigent defendant's 
opportunity to present an adequate defense at his trial ought 
never to be forfeited by placing form over substance in 
considering that defendant's request for expert assistance.  In 
my view, the majority's critical analysis of the sufficiency of 
Hugo Alexander Sanchez' proffer to establish a "particularized 
need" for additional funds to secure expert testimony at his 
trial invokes a concern that such a forfeiture will be permitted 
to occur here under the particular circumstances of this case.  
Moreover, our decision in Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 
476 S.E.2d 920 (1996), upon which the majority principally 
relies, does not mandate or suggest the conclusion reached by 
the majority that Sanchez' proffer was insufficient. 
 
The issue presented is narrow in scope, but of considerable 
significance.  Consistent with the requirements of Husske, the 
trial court had previously granted Sanchez' request for funds to 
employ a DNA expert in order to evaluate the Commonwealth's DNA 
evidence against him.  The expert evaluated that evidence and 
concluded, according to Sanchez, "that there were errors in the 
way that the DNA procedures were followed [by the Commonwealth's 
experts] . . . which could have had a significant impact in the 
results of the DNA [tests]."  The expert, however, had depleted 
 
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the funds previously allotted for his services.  Sanchez then 
filed a motion with the trial court for additional funds for his 
expert to testify at his trial.  The trial court denied that 
motion.  The narrow issue to be resolved on appeal is whether 
Sanchez' proffer in support of his motion was sufficient under 
those circumstances to inform the trial court of his need for 
additional funds so that he could present his defense at trial. 
 
No mystery surrounds the substance of Sanchez' proffer in 
support of his motion for additional funds.  The language of the 
proffer adequately advised the trial court that, in the opinion 
of Sanchez' expert, the Commonwealth's DNA evidence was faulty 
and Sanchez needed additional funds in order for this expert to 
testify in that regard at Sanchez' trial.  In short, it strains 
common sense that there could be any doubt that the trial court 
would not have understood that Sanchez needed additional funds 
to produce evidence in his defense which had been obtained as a 
result of the trial court's prior order. 
 
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that Sanchez' proffer 
did not articulate a "particularized need" for his defense 
expert because it "rests only on conclusory assertions."  In 
support of this conclusion, the majority undertakes a critical 
analysis of the language of the proffer and notes that as 
formulated the assertions made by Sanchez are "unspecific and 
speculative" with regard to the errors in the Commonwealth's DNA 
 
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evidence.  Indeed, the majority suggests that Husske requires 
that Sanchez' proffer expressly detail the asserted error in the 
Commonwealth's DNA evidence. 
 
Sanchez' motion and supporting proffer were made ten days 
prior to the trial.  Whether Sanchez' expert's allegations of 
error in the Commonwealth's analysis of the DNA evidence would 
ultimately be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of 
Sanchez' guilt was not an issue.  Moreover, the trial court was 
not required "to guess" whether the testimony of Sanchez' expert 
would be "a significant or material factor in his defense and, 
consequently, whether the lack of that testimony would prejudice 
Sanchez."  Sanchez simply sought his day in court armed with his 
expert's testimony so that the trier of fact, either judge or 
jury, could resolve the issues surrounding the accuracy of the 
Commonwealth's DNA evidence. 
 
While a constitutional issue invoking the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not expressly raised in 
this case, the right of an indigent defendant, such as Sanchez, 
to the reasonable assistance of an expert at the state's expense 
arises from that constitutional provision as established in Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).  Our decision in Husske is 
premised upon the holding in Ake.  Husske, 252 Va. at 211-12, 
476 S.E.2d at 925.  Accordingly, whatever lack of specificity 
the majority may properly fault in the form in which Sanchez 
 
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asserted his need for funds in order to have his expert testify 
at his trial should be considered in the light that fundamental 
fairness and due process principles are more significant. 
 
For these reasons and for the reasons more fully expressed 
by the Court of Appeals in Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 
319, 329-34, 585 S.E.2d 327, 331-34 (2003), I would affirm that 
Court's decision and remand this case to the trial court.