Title: In re Skagen

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

236	
November 19, 2020	
No. 42
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
CHRISTOPHER K. SKAGEN,  
OSB No. 911020,
Respondent.
(OSB 18149) (SC S066706)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary 
Board.
Argued and submitted September 16, 2020.
Christopher K. Skagen, Wellington, New Zealand, argued 
 
the cause and filed the brief on behalf of respondent.
Susan R. Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, 
Tigard, argued the cause and filed the briefs on behalf of 
the Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM
Respondent is disbarred.
Case Summary: Respondent was struck from New Zealand’s Roll of Barristers 
and Solicitors by the High Court of New Zealand Wellington Registry in August 
2016 based on misconduct respecting two clients and his significant disciplinary 
history. The Oregon State Bar brought a reciprocal disciplinary action against 
the respondent, alleging that his misconduct in New Zealand constituted multiple 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A trial panel of the Disciplinary 
Board found that the respondent had committed the charged violations, and it 
concluded that respondent should be disbarred. Held: On de  novo review, the 
Court concluded that respondent was afforded due process in the New Zealand 
proceeding, that the misconduct for which respondent was disciplined in New 
Zealand is conduct that should subject a lawyer to discipline in Oregon, and that 
imposing the same sanction—disbarment—would not result in a grave injustice 
or be offensive to public policy.
Respondent is disbarred.
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
237
	
PER CURIAM
	
This is a reciprocal discipline review proceed-
ing conducted under Oregon State Bar Rule of Procedure 
(BR) 3.5. Respondent, Christopher K. Skagen, was licensed 
to practice law in New Zealand and in Oregon during the 
years relevant to this proceeding. He was struck from New 
Zealand’s Roll of Barristers and Solicitors by the High 
Court of New Zealand Wellington Registry (High Court) 
in August 2016 based on misconduct respecting two clients 
and his significant disciplinary history. That action was the 
equivalent of disbarment in Oregon. The Oregon State Bar 
(the Bar) then petitioned the Bar’s Disciplinary Board for 
reciprocal disbarment, alleging that respondent’s miscon-
duct in New Zealand constituted multiple violations of the 
Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). A trial panel 
of the Disciplinary Board was convened, and the matter 
went to a hearing in January 2019. The trial panel issued 
an opinion, concluding that respondent should be recipro-
cally disbarred in Oregon as a result of his misconduct in 
New Zealand. Respondent now appeals that decision, which 
we review de novo. ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6. For the reasons 
set out below, we agree with the trial panel’s decision that 
respondent should now be disbarred in Oregon.
I.  FACTS
A.  Oregon Bar Admission and Prior Oregon Discipline
	
On de  novo review, the court finds the following 
facts. Respondent went to law school in New Zealand but 
moved to Oregon shortly after graduating. He was admitted 
to practice law in Oregon in 1991. In the years following, 
respondent was subject to disciplinary proceedings twice in 
Oregon. In 2006, he was suspended from the practice of law 
for one year for failing to maintain unearned fees in trust, 
failing to account for client funds in his possession, failing 
to maintain an interest-bearing trust account, engaging 
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and 
failing to cooperate with the Bar’s investigation into his 
conduct.1 In re Skagen, 342 Or 183, 149 P3d 1171 (2006). 
	
1  The misconduct leading to the 2006 discipline took place from 2000 to 
2002.
238	
In re Skagen
In 2008, a trial panel in Oregon found that respondent had 
committed 22 client trust fund violations in 20 different cli-
ent matters over a one-year period; the violations were based 
on his failures to deposit and maintain in trust unearned 
fees paid in advance. The trial panel suspended respondent 
from the practice of law for 18 months for that misconduct.2 
In re Skagen, 22 DB Rptr 292 (2008).
B.  Reciprocal Discipline in New Zealand
	
Respondent moved to New Zealand during the 
pendency of the second Oregon disciplinary proceeding. In 
2008, respondent was subject to reciprocal censure in New 
Zealand based on the 2006 Oregon discipline matter, and 
the New Zealand Law Society (equivalent to the Bar in the 
United States) ordered him to pay approximately NZ$8,000 
in costs. In 2010, respondent applied to renew his member-
ship in the Law Society. Because he had not paid the cost 
award, he was required to enter into an agreement to make 
payments on that obligation in the amount of NZ$150 per 
month as a condition of his license renewal. He then began 
practicing law in New Zealand. He made only one of the 
required monthly payments, but he continued to practice 
law.
C.  Licensing and Client Representation in New Zealand
	
Respondent practiced as a barrister in New Zealand 
from 2010 to 2011. In February 2011, respondent was 
retained by client E to represent him in a divorce proceeding. 
Respondent met with E and advised E that he would charge 
a lump sum for the work and that E would need to see a 
solicitor—known as an instructing solicitor—before signing 
the retainer contract.3 Following that meeting, respondent 
sent E an invoice and his terms of engagement. The invoice 
set out the scope of the work to be performed and required 
an initial payment in the amount of NZ$4,100, which was to 
be half the total fee ultimately due. E paid that amount, and 
	
2  The misconduct leading to the 2008 discipline took place in 2005, before 
this court’s decision in the earlier matter, which factored into the trial panel’s 
sanction determination.
	
3  In New Zealand, a barrister may not represent a client without an 
 
instruction—or referral—from a solicitor.
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
239
respondent deposited it in his private account. The terms 
of engagement specified that the instructing solicitor would 
be Kevin Smith. When respondent and E met with Smith, 
however, they learned that Smith had already discussed 
the matter with E’s wife and, therefore, could not act as E’s 
instructing solicitor. Respondent and E dispute what hap-
pened next. E averred that respondent did not answer his 
emails after that meeting, while respondent claimed that he 
explained to E that he would have to find a new instructing 
solicitor before respondent could perform any legal services 
for him and then did not hear from E again. In any case, E 
hired another firm to represent him in the matter and, in 
March 2011, E’s new lawyer sent respondent a letter advis-
ing respondent that E wished to terminate the representa-
tion. That letter also demanded that respondent release E’s 
file, provide an itemized bill for costs and work performed, 
and refund the unearned part of the fee that E had paid 
him. Respondent initially promised to repay the fee in full 
but ultimately informed E that he could not do so because 
of his precarious financial position. He did not refund the 
unearned fee.
	
In April 2011, the New Zealand Law Society Lawyers 
Complaint Service sent respondent a letter reminding him 
that he had not fulfilled his obligation to make monthly pay-
ments on the 2008 costs award as a condition of his license 
renewal. The letter noted that licenses must be renewed by 
July 1, and it warned respondent that, under New Zealand’s 
disciplinary rules, the Law Society may take into account 
a lawyer’s failure to pay when determining whether a law-
yer is a “fit and proper person” to hold a license. The let-
ter demanded payment of the entire amount due by May 5, 
2011. Respondent did not respond.
	
In a second letter, dated June 23, 2011, the New 
Zealand Law Society Fitness for Practice Committee 
informed respondent that it provisionally had concluded 
that his failure to respond or to pay constituted “reasonable 
grounds for declining to renew” his license; it invited him to 
submit a response.
	
On June 29, 2011, respondent submitted a response 
claiming not to have received the first letter and asserting 
240	
In re Skagen
that he had failed to pay the amount he owed because he 
had decided “to place business growth above [his] responsi-
bility to pay [the amount owed] and did not consult the Law 
Society about that decision.” He further explained that he 
did not believe that nonpayment rendered him unfit as a 
practitioner and that a finding of unfitness would devastate 
his prospects for continuing his life as a lawyer. He offered 
to begin paying NZ$300 per month beginning in July 
 
2011.
	
The Fitness Committee responded that it would 
need to be provided with further financial information, such 
as bank statements, to satisfy itself that respondent would 
be able to pay NZ$300 monthly. Respondent refused to pro-
vide that information.
	
Meanwhile, in May 2011, respondent was hired by 
client W to represent him in an ongoing divorce proceed-
ing. Respondent sent W the terms of engagement and an 
invoice for NZ$6,900, and W paid him that day. Solicitor 
Smith instructed respondent (that is, provided the referral). 
Respondent participated in a telephone conference with the 
court on W’s case on June 9, 2011. The court ordered W to 
provide and serve an affidavit in the case. Respondent sent 
W an email on June 21 advising the client that he would 
need more information for an affidavit and that W would 
need to provide “disclosure to the other side.” However, he 
did not inform W of the date for providing disclosure, nor 
did he set a time for them to discuss the matter. W pro-
vided some information to respondent by email, but he later 
averred that he did not know what was required of him or 
when the next hearing would be.
	
Respondent’s license lapsed as of July 1, 2011. The 
New Zealand Law Society gave respondent until July 19 to 
pay the amount owed on the cost award and to apply for 
renewal of the license, which required payment of a fee of 
NZ$1,426. Respondent submitted a renewal application, but 
he did not pay any of the fees or costs.4
	
4  In August 2011, the New Zealand Law Society informed respondent that it 
had declined to renew his license, stating that it found his nonpayment of costs 
“disgraceful and dishonourable,” which is grounds for discipline in New Zealand.
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
241
	
Respondent did not inform W that his license had 
lapsed. He did, however, inform Solicitor Smith of that fact 
in mid-July. Respondent also told Smith that he had pre-
pared the affidavit required by the court and due before a 
July 21 hearing. Smith refused to permit respondent to file 
the affidavit. Instead, Smith asked respondent to immedi-
ately return all outstanding client files to him, which respon-
dent did. Smith reported to the court and opposing counsel 
on July 20 that respondent’s license had lapsed and that W 
would need time to obtain alternative counsel. The court 
conducted a telephone conference on July 21, at the conclu-
sion of which the court ordered W to pay costs of NZ$800 
for the failure to timely file the affidavit. The court advised 
W to seek to recover that cost award from respondent. 
Thereafter, W spoke to respondent by telephone; respon-
dent told W that he could not pay the NZ$800 or refund 
even part of the NZ$6,900 advance fee, because he was 
 
“broke.”
D.  New Zealand Disciplinary Proceedings
1.  Investigation and charges by the New Zealand stan-
dards committee
	
Clients E and W complained to the New Zealand 
Law Society about respondent’s conduct, and the Wellington 
Branch Standards Committee (Standards Committee) 
was charged with investigating the complaints and decid-
ing whether to bring formal charges. Respondent was 
informed of and participated in the investigation. The 
Standards Committee investigator requested documents 
relevant to the complaints, including, among other things, 
various financial records. Respondent provided some of the 
requested documents, but he declined to provide his finan-
cial records. The Standards Committee invited respondent 
to submit any materials he wanted the committee to con-
sider in deciding whether the case should be forwarded to 
the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary 
Tribunal (Disciplinary Tribunal or tribunal).
	
In June 2013, the Standards Committee charged 
respondent with 12 rule violations related to the two client 
complaints and to his failure to cooperate with the Standards 
242	
In re Skagen
Committee investigation.5 The charges were accompanied 
by five affidavits, including affidavits from clients E and W 
and the investigator, as well as a “Bundle of Documents”—
documents relevant to the investigation—which included, 
among other things, correspondence between respondent 
and E and W and their new lawyers, respondent’s written 
responses to the complaints and to the investigator, notices 
of hearings before the Standards Committee, and notices of 
determinations of the Standards Committee.
	
Respondent had returned to the United States in 
February 2013 without updating his contact information. 
As a result, the authorities could not find or serve him with 
the charges and supporting documents. In October 2013, 
respondent was served by substitute electronic service (by 
email). Respondent acknowledged receiving that substitute 
service and filed a response in November 2014. The matter 
then came before the Disciplinary Tribunal.
2.  Proceedings before the New Zealand Disciplinary 
Tribunal
	
In January 2014, the Disciplinary Tribunal con-
ducted a telephone conference to discuss procedures for the 
hearing. Respondent stated that he would not be returning to 
New Zealand and, therefore, would not be able to participate in 
person at the hearing. The chair of the Disciplinary Tribunal 
informed respondent that he would be required to appear 
personally if he wished to participate in the hearing and 
that the hearing would go forward without him if he were not 
present. The Disciplinary Tribunal’s counsel then proposed 
that the parties proceed on the written record because there 
did not appear to be any material facts in dispute or credibil-
ity determinations to be made. As the tribunal’s counsel later 
testified in the Oregon disciplinary proceeding, respondent 
seemed receptive to that idea, and the chair set the matter 
for hearing on that basis. Respondent did not file a motion 
or application for permission to appear remotely, nor did he 
request to reschedule the hearing until a time when he could 
be present. Respondent and the Standards Committee each 
provided written submissions, and the Disciplinary Tribunal 
	
5  One of the charges was later dismissed.
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
243
conducted a brief hearing in November 2014. The Disciplinary 
Tribunal considered the charges against respondent and both 
parties’ submissions under a “balance of probabilities” stan-
dard of proof. New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 
(NZLCA) 2006 § 241. On December 9, 2014, it issued an opin-
ion finding that the Standards Committee had proved all the 
charged disciplinary rule violations, and it struck respondent 
from the Roll.
3.  Appeal to the New Zealand High Court
	
Respondent appealed the Disciplinary Tribunal 
decision to the High Court in January 2015. Under the 
applicable statute, the High Court hears appeals in disci-
plinary proceedings as a rehearing; parties are permitted to 
introduce new evidence and make new arguments. NZLCA 
§ 253(3). The High Court reaches its own decision on the 
merits and owes no deference to the Disciplinary Tribunal’s 
findings. It may confirm, reverse, or modify the Disciplinary 
Tribunal’s decision. NZLCA § 253(4).
	
Respondent submitted multiple pleadings to the 
High Court addressing various issues. He also submit-
ted new evidence, including affidavits concerning, among 
other things, his health, residency, and financial condition. 
During the pendency of the appeal, respondent returned to 
New Zealand.
	
In January 2016, the parties submitted briefs on 
the merits. In his written submissions, respondent chal-
lenged the Disciplinary Tribunal’s conclusion that his con-
duct violated the disciplinary rules. In addition, he claimed 
that the Disciplinary Tribunal had deprived him of “natu-
ral justice”—which, the parties agree, is essentially equiv-
alent to due process in this country—in three ways: (1) by 
denying him the opportunity to appear at the hearing by 
telephone; (2) by failing to consider his challenge to one of 
the Disciplinary Tribunal panel members; and (3) by consid-
ering the issue of the appropriate sanction notwithstanding 
that he had not briefed that matter in his written submis-
sions. At a substantive hearing on respondent’s appeal, at 
which respondent was present and participated, the High 
Court discussed respondent’s natural justice arguments 
244	
In re Skagen
and later permitted the parties to submit further affidavits. 
Both respondent and the Standards Committee availed 
themselves of that option.
	
The High Court issued its decision in August 2016. 
It considered the entire record, including the additional 
evidence that respondent had submitted on appeal, and it 
addressed respondent’s natural justice arguments. The 
High Court dismissed five of the charges against respon-
dent but found him guilty on the remaining six charges 
(the 12th having earlier been dismissed). Specifically, the 
High Court determined that respondent had violated the 
New Zealand disciplinary rules with respect to client E by 
accepting instructions directly from the client and not from 
an instructing solicitor, by failing to act in a timely and com-
petent manner, and by failing to repay monies due the client 
at the termination of representation. With respect to client 
W, the High Court determined that respondent violated the 
New Zealand disciplinary rules by failing to act in a timely 
and competent manner, and by failing to repay monies due 
the client at the termination of representation. In addi-
tion, the High Court determined that respondent violated 
the New Zealand disciplinary rules by failing to allow a 
Law Society investigator to examine his financial accounts 
during the investigation into his misconduct.6 Based on 
those violations and respondent’s disciplinary record,7 the 
High Court affirmed the sanction that respondent should be 
stricken from the Roll.
	
6  In the client E matter, the High Court found that respondent committed 
one violation of Rule 14.4 of the NZLCA (Conduct and Client Care Rules) 2008 
(prohibiting barrister sole from accepting instructions to act for another person 
other than from a person licensed to act as a barrister and solicitor) and two vio-
lations of Rule 3 of the NZLCA (Conduct and Client Care Rules) (requiring law-
yer to act competently and in a timely manner consistent with the terms of the 
retainer and the duty to take reasonable care). In the client W matter, the High 
Court found that respondent had committed two violations of Rule 3. In the ensu-
ing investigation into respondent’s misconduct, the High Court also found that 
respondent violated Regulation 34(a) of the NZLCA (Trust Account Regulations) 
2008, which requires a lawyer to permit an investigator to examine records and 
accounts.
	
7  The High Court considered the two Oregon disciplinary proceedings dis-
cussed above, as well as a third disciplinary proceeding in New Zealand in 2012. 
That matter arose out of respondent’s failure to complete discovery in a proper 
manner in a matter in 2011. For that misconduct, respondent was censured, 
required to reduce his fee, and ordered to pay compensation and costs.
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
245
	
The High Court also rejected respondent’s natural 
justice arguments. As an initial matter, it concluded that 
the parties’ written submissions did not demonstrate that 
there had been a need for the Disciplinary Tribunal to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing; they did not identify any evi-
dentiary issues that were disputed in that tribunal. And, 
in any case, respondent had not challenged the proposal to 
submit evidence on the written record and argue the law in 
written submissions.
	
Turning to the specifics of respondent’s three nat-
ural justice claims, the High Court first found that the 
Disciplinary Tribunal should have exercised its discretion 
to allow respondent to appear at the hearing telephonically, 
due to his financial condition. However, the High Court also 
found that respondent was given an opportunity to have 
that matter reviewed after filing his written submissions 
with the tribunal, but he did not raise the issue again and, 
instead, acquiesced to and participated in the process that 
the tribunal had established. For that reason, the High 
Court concluded, respondent suffered no violation of his 
right to be heard.
	
The High Court also rejected respondent’s argu-
ment that he had been denied natural justice when the 
Disciplinary Tribunal failed to consider his challenge to the 
impartiality of one of the panel members. The High Court 
noted that, while respondent had stated in an email that he 
was “uncomfortable” with one member of the panel, he had 
never filed a motion challenging that member’s participation 
or otherwise pursued that concern before the Disciplinary 
Tribunal, and he did not identify the failure to address his 
discomfort with the panel member as a ground for appeal.
	
Finally, the High Court agreed with respondent 
that the Disciplinary Tribunal should not have considered 
the issue of the appropriate sanction without permitting 
respondent to file further submissions on that subject after 
it found him guilty of misconduct. Nevertheless, the High 
Court rejected respondent’s argument that he was there-
fore deprived of natural justice, because respondent had 
had a full opportunity to present evidence and arguments 
respecting the appropriate sanction on appeal. As noted, 
246	
In re Skagen
respondent submitted to the High Court, among other 
things, detailed medical evidence and arguments relating 
to the earlier Oregon disciplinary decisions. The High Court 
observed that those were the matters that respondent had 
argued that he would have put forward to the Disciplinary 
Tribunal on the question of the appropriate sanction. And, 
the High Court continued, it had considered all of the new 
evidence and arguments that respondent had submitted 
to it and, notwithstanding that evidence, it concluded that 
“the essential concerns about [respondent’s] conduct [were] 
covered by the charges [that] were upheld * 
* 
* [and that 
the] Tribunal was correct to find that overall [respondent’s] 
conduct was dishonourable.” The High Court, therefore, 
found that it was appropriate to strike respondent from the 
 
Roll.
	
Respondent thereafter filed two separate appli-
cations for recall of the High Court’s judgment. The High 
Court dismissed the applications.
E.  Current Oregon Disciplinary Proceedings
	
As discussed, the Bar was made aware of the impo-
sition of discipline in New Zealand and initiated a reciprocal 
discipline proceeding in Oregon. Based on the High Court’s 
findings of violations of the New Zealand disciplinary rules, 
the Bar alleged that respondent’s misconduct violated the 
following Rules of Professional Conduct: RPC 1.3 (neglect 
of a legal matter); RPC 1.4(a) (failure to keep a client rea-
sonably informed about the status of a matter); RPC 1.4(b) 
(failure to explain a matter to the extent necessary to per-
mit a client to make informed decisions about the represen-
tation); RPC 1.5(a) (charging or collecting an excessive fee); 
RPC 1.15-1(d) (failure to account for or return client funds 
in his possession); RPC 1.16(d) (failure to fulfill duties upon 
termination of representation); RPC 5.5(a) (practicing law in 
violation of the regulations of the profession); RPC 8.1(a)(4) 
(failure to respond to inquiries by a disciplinary authority); 
and RPC 8.4(a)(4) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).8
	
8  The Bar also initially alleged that respondent’s misconduct in New Zealand 
violated ORS 9.160(1), but it has abandoned that argument in this court.
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
247
	
As noted, a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board 
was convened, and the matter went to a hearing in January 
2019. The trial panel issued an opinion, rejecting respon-
dent’s arguments that he was not afforded due process in 
the New Zealand proceeding and concluding that respon-
dent should be reciprocally disbarred in Oregon as a result 
of his misconduct in New Zealand. Respondent now seeks 
review of the trial panel’s decision.
II.  ANALYSIS
A.  Applicability of BR 3.5
	
As a preliminary matter, respondent contends that 
this court does not have authority under BR 3.5 to impose 
reciprocal discipline, because a foreign country is not a 
“jurisdiction” within the meaning of that word in BR 3.5(a) 
and, therefore, the New Zealand decision striking him from 
the Roll is not a “judgment, order, or determination of dis-
cipline” within the meaning of that phrase in BR 3.5(a) and 
(b). We therefore begin with that issue before turning to con-
sider respondent’s challenges to the trial panel’s decision.
	
BR 3.5 provides, in part:
	
“(a)  Petition; Notice to Answer. Upon learning that an 
attorney has been disciplined for misconduct in another 
jurisdiction not predicated upon a prior discipline of the 
attorney pursuant to these rules, Disciplinary Counsel 
shall file with the Disciplinary Board Clerk a petition seek-
ing reciprocal discipline of the attorney. The petition shall 
include a copy of the judgment, order, or determination of 
discipline in the other jurisdiction; may be supported by 
other documents or affidavits; and shall contain a recom-
mendation as to the imposition of discipline in Oregon, 
based on the discipline in the jurisdiction whose action is 
reported, and such other information as the Bar deems 
appropriate. * 
* 
*
	
“(b)  Order of Judgment; Sufficient Evidence of Mis-
conduct; Rebuttable Presumption. A copy of the judgment, 
order, or determination of discipline shall be sufficient evi-
dence for the purposes of this rule that the attorney com-
mitted the misconduct on which the other jurisdiction’s 
discipline was based. There is a rebuttable presumption 
that the sanction to be imposed shall be equivalent, to the 
248	
In re Skagen
extent reasonably practicable, to the sanction imposed in 
the other jurisdiction.”
	
In support of his argument that the New Zealand 
judgment striking him from the Roll cannot be a basis for 
discipline in Oregon, respondent points to two cases: Small 
v. United States, 544 US 385, 125 S Ct 1752, 161 L Ed 2d 651 
(2005), and In re Wilde, 68 A3d 749 (DC 2013). Respondent 
argues that, under those cases, the plain meaning of “juris-
diction” refers only to domestic state and federal jurisdic-
tions, and if the Bar Rules of Procedure were intended 
to apply to disciplinary judgments from foreign jurisdic-
tions, the rules would say so explicitly. That argument is 
unpersuasive.
	
BR 3.5 applies to discipline for misconduct in 
“another jurisdiction” and requires the Bar to provide a 
copy of the determination of discipline from the “other juris-
diction.” The Bar Rules do not define or limit the scope of 
the word “jurisdiction” in BR 3.5 to only those jurisdictions 
within the United States. Moreover, respondent points to 
nothing in the text, the context, or the history of the adop-
tion of BR 3.5 that suggests any reason to interpret that rule 
to apply only to judgments issued by American courts.
	
In addition, the cases that respondent cites are 
inapposite and do not assist him. Both cases involve under-
lying criminal convictions entered against persons outside 
the United States. In Small, the United States Supreme 
Court considered whether a conviction in a foreign country 
can be a predicate crime for a felon in possession of a fire-
arm charge under a federal criminal statute. The Court con-
sidered the meaning of the phrase “convicted in any court” 
in 18 USC § 922(g)(1), which makes it a crime for a person 
who has been “convicted in any court of a crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess 
any firearm. The Court held that, for purposes of that crim-
inal statute, the phrase “convicted in any court” encom-
passes only domestic, not foreign, convictions. Small, 544 
US at 386. Similarly, in In re Wilde, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals considered the meaning of the phrase “con-
viction of a crime” in a District of Columbia disciplinary rule 
that provided for disbarment of lawyers convicted of crimes 
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
249
of moral turpitude. The court interpreted the word “convic-
tion” to apply only to domestic convictions, because foreign 
convictions differ from domestic convictions in such import-
ant ways that it was appropriate to assume that if the rule 
were intended to apply to foreign convictions it would say so. 
68 A3d at 758.
	
Respondent argues that, notwithstanding the 
fact that neither case was concerned with the meaning 
of the word “jurisdiction” in a disciplinary rules context 
or addressed reciprocal discipline, they nonetheless are 
instructive because “disciplinary proceedings in a foreign 
country * 
* 
* bring characteristics of criminal convictions in 
the same manner that criminal convictions in Oregon can 
result in disbarment.” That argument is not well taken. 
First, as this court has stated, lawyer discipline proceed-
ings are not criminal prosecutions, In re Sanai, 360 Or 497, 
530, 383 P3d 821 (2016) (so stating); see also ORS 9.529 (bar 
proceedings are sui generis; they are within this court’s 
inherent power to control, and they are neither civil nor 
criminal in nature), and neither disbarment nor any other 
sanction is criminal punishment. In re Sassor, 299 Or 720, 
728, 705 P2d 736 (1985) (“Suspension or permanent disbar-
ment for violations of the Disciplinary Rules is not a form 
of punishment for criminal conduct or moral turpitude. Its 
purpose is to protect the public from incompetent, dishon-
est, or irresponsible professional behavior.”). Second, in both 
Small and Wilde, the decisions turned at least in part on 
the courts’ concern that foreign convictions may be based on 
conduct that our domestic laws would permit or punish less 
severely or that would be inconsistent with an American 
understanding of fairness. Small, 544 US at 389-90; Wilde, 
68 A3d at 756. No such concern exists in reciprocal disci-
pline proceedings, because BR 3.5 ensures that the conduct 
for which the lawyer was disciplined in the other jurisdic-
tion was conduct that would subject a lawyer to discipline 
in Oregon. BR 3.5(c)(2). Moreover, under BR 3.5, reciprocal 
discipline can be imposed only if the lawyer was afforded 
due process in the other jurisdiction. BR 3.5(c)(1). For those 
reasons, we conclude that the Oregon Rules of Professional 
Conduct provide for reciprocal discipline based on a deter-
mination of discipline against an Oregon lawyer who has 
250	
In re Skagen
committed professional misconduct in another jurisdiction, 
whether that other jurisdiction is foreign or domestic, so 
long as the requirements for reciprocal discipline are met.
B.  Regulatory Framework
	
We turn now to a brief description of those require-
ments and our process for determining whether to impose 
reciprocal discipline. In a reciprocal discipline proceeding, 
the order of discipline is “sufficient evidence * 
* 
* that the 
attorney committed the misconduct on which the other juris-
diction’s discipline was based.” BR 3.5(b). For that reason, the 
Oregon disciplinary proceeding may not be used to challenge 
the factual findings of the foreign jurisdiction. Sanai, 360 
Or at 500. Instead, this court’s decision whether to impose 
reciprocal discipline turns on three questions: (1) whether 
 
the procedure in the jurisdiction that disciplined the law-
yer “was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard 
as to constitute a deprivation of due process,” (2) whether 
 
the conduct for which the lawyer was disciplined in the other 
jurisdiction is conduct that should subject the lawyer to dis-
cipline here in Oregon, and (3) whether imposing the same 
sanction that the other jurisdiction imposed would result in 
“grave injustice or be offensive to public policy.” BR 3.5(c). 
It is the lawyer’s burden to prove that due process was not 
afforded him or her in the other jurisdiction. BR 3.5(e).
C.  Respondent’s Due Process Arguments
	
Respondent argues that he was denied due process 
in the New Zealand proceeding in seven ways. Several of 
those arguments pertain to events that occurred before the 
Disciplinary Tribunal. As we have discussed, respondent 
appealed the decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal to the 
High Court. Respondent participated fully in the proceed-
ings before the High Court. Further, the High Court per-
mitted the parties to submit additional evidence and argu-
ments, and it considered the matter de novo.9 Therefore, any 
	
9  The High Court also observed that certain of respondent’s “natural justice” 
arguments pertaining to events before the Disciplinary Tribunal were unpre-
served or asserted alleged violations of his clients’ rights and not his own. In 
addition, we note that one of respondent’s claimed due process violations is based 
on his contention that he was not given adequate notice that his license would 
not be renewed. We reject that contention. As recounted above, when respon-
dent renewed his license in 2010, he did so subject to the condition that he make 
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
251
deficiencies in the process before the Disciplinary Tribunal 
were cured by the subsequent proceeding before the High 
Court, and respondent does not dispute that he received a 
full rehearing, with the opportunity to present additional 
evidence and argument, in that court. For that reason, we 
reject those arguments without discussion.
	
Respondent makes two arguments that merit brief 
examination. As we shall explain, however, neither argu-
ment is well taken.
	
First, respondent argues that he was deprived of 
due process in the New Zealand proceeding because the 
New Zealand courts use a “balance of probabilities” stan-
dard of proof, whereas Oregon courts use the higher “clear 
and convincing” evidence standard of proof. At oral argu-
ment in this matter, however, respondent conceded that 
Oregon courts are under no constitutional mandate to use a 
clear and convincing evidence standard of proof as opposed 
to any lesser standard of proof. And, in fact, this court rou-
tinely imposes reciprocal discipline in cases where the other 
jurisdiction sanctioned a lawyer based on a standard less 
than clear and convincing evidence.10
	
Second, respondent argues that the New Zealand 
rules of professional responsibility are unreasonably vague, 
monthly payments on the costs assessed in 2008. Despite that condition, respon-
dent made only one payment. Then, in April and June 2011, the Law Society 
sent respondent letters reminding him that all licenses had to be renewed by 
July 1 and that it could take his failure to make the payments into account when 
determining whether to renew his license. Nevertheless, respondent still did not 
make the payments. He allowed his license to lapse on July 1. The Law Society 
told respondent that, in order to renew his license, he would need to pay the over-
due cost award and the renewal fee. Although respondent submitted a renewal 
application, he failed to pay both the cost award and the renewal fee. We conclude 
that respondent had more than sufficient notice of what he needed to do to renew 
his license.
	
10  For example, in Sanai, this court imposed reciprocal discipline on a law-
yer whom the Washington Supreme Court had disbarred. Sanai, 360 Or at 543. 
In Washington, lawyer misconduct must be proved by “a clear preponderance of 
the evidence.” Washington State Court Rules, Rule for Enforcement of Lawyer 
Conduct 10.14(b). Likewise, this court imposed a reciprocal suspension on a law-
yer who had entered into a stipulation for discipline in Washington in In re Page, 
326 Or 572, 955 P2d 239 (1998). And in In re Devers, 317 Or 261, 263, 855 P2d 
617 (1993), the court reciprocally suspended a lawyer after he was suspended for 
unethical conduct in Michigan. In Michigan, lawyer misconduct must be estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence. Michigan Court Rule 9.115(J)(3).
252	
In re Skagen
insofar as, for example, they permit discipline on a finding of 
misconduct, which is defined as conduct “that would reason-
ably be regarded by lawyers of good standing as disgrace-
ful or dishonourable.” NZLCA 2006 § 7(1)(a)(i). Respondent’s 
argument ignores the fact that the High Court found that 
respondent committed six violations of the New Zealand 
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, involving three separate 
and specific provisions of that law, which the High Court 
quoted and discussed in its opinion, and it imposed disci-
pline on that basis. Therefore, the fact that the New Zealand 
disciplinary rules include some terms that, on their face, 
may appear vague, does not persuade us that, as a whole, 
the New Zealand attorney discipline system does not pro-
vide lawyers with notice of what is expected.
	
As is evident from the foregoing, we conclude that 
respondent has not met his burden to establish that he was 
deprived of due process in the New Zealand proceedings 
leading to his disbarment.
D.  The Oregon Charges and the Appropriate Sanction
	
As we have explained, the High Court found that 
respondent violated the New Zealand rules of professional 
conduct by commencing work for client E without proper 
authority and, in both the client E and the client W mat-
ters, by failing to complete the representation and then 
refusing to return unearned fees. The High Court also 
found that respondent failed to cooperate with disciplinary 
authorities in the investigation into his misconduct. The 
Bar alleged and the trial panel found that that misconduct 
in New Zealand also violated the following Oregon Rules of 
Professional Conduct: RPC 1.3 (neglect of a legal matter); 
RPC 1.4(a) (failure to keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter); RPC 1.4(b) (failure to explain a 
matter to permit client to make informed decisions regard-
ing the representation); RPC 1.5(a) (charging an excessive 
fee); RPC 1.15-1(d) (failure to account for client funds); RPC 
1.16(d) (failure upon termination to take steps to protect cli-
ent interests, including refunding unearned portions of fees 
paid in advance); RPC 5.5(a) (practicing law in violation of 
the regulations of the profession); RPC 8.1(a)(2) (knowing 
failure to respond to lawful demand for information from a 
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
253
disciplinary authority); and RPC 8.4(a)(4) (engaging in con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
	
Respondent asserts, without elaboration, that his 
misconduct in New Zealand violated only two Oregon disci-
plinary rules, RPC 1.4(a) and RPC 8.1(a)(2), and that those 
two violations are insufficient to justify disbarring him in 
Oregon. We agree with the Bar and the trial panel that 
respondent’s conduct in New Zealand would violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct as set out above. We turn, therefore, 
to consider the appropriate sanction for respondent’s mis-
conduct. In so doing, we keep in mind the final consideration 
required by BR 3.5: whether imposing the same sanction 
that the other jurisdiction imposed would result in “grave 
injustice or be offensive to public policy.” BR 3.5(c)(3).
	
In reciprocal discipline cases, this court has an inde-
pendent obligation to determine the appropriate sanction 
based on this state’s disciplinary rules. Sanai, 360 Or at 538. 
In so doing, we refer first to the American Bar Association’s 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 
1992) (ABA Standards) for guidance. In re Walton, 352 Or 
548, 555, 287 P3d 1098 (2012). Under the framework estab-
lished by the ABA Standards, we first consider the duty vio-
lated, the accused’s mental state, and the actual or potential 
injury caused by the accused’s misconduct.  ABA Standard 
3.0. Next, we consider any aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. Sanai, 360 Or at 538. Finally, we consider the 
appropriate sanction in light of this court’s case law. Id.
	
Respondent violated his duties of diligence and com-
petence to both clients E and W. By collecting fees for work he 
did not perform, practicing law in violation of New Zealand law 
and regulations, and failing to cooperate with the Standards 
Committee investigation, respondent violated duties owed to 
the legal profession. Further, the record of the New Zealand 
proceeding demonstrates that respondent acted knowingly 
or intentionally with respect to each of the violations. And 
respondent’s conduct resulted in actual injury to both client E 
and client W, who were never refunded the advance fees they 
paid for services that respondent did not perform. Client W 
also was forced to pay a NZ$800 cost assessment arising out 
of respondent’s failure to submit a required affidavit.
254	
In re Skagen
	
Based on the disciplinary violations that we have 
found and our conclusions respecting the duties violated, 
respondent’s mental state, and the injuries caused by respon-
dent’s misconduct, the presumptive sanction under the ABA 
Standards is disbarment. That is, disbarment is generally 
appropriate when a lawyer either knowingly fails to perform 
services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury, or engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to cli-
ent matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury. 
ABA Standard 4.41(b), (c). In addition, disbarment is gener-
ally appropriate when a lawyer has been suspended for the 
same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly 
engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or 
potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or 
the profession. ABA Standard 8.1(b).
	
We next consider the existence of aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances that may affect our sanction 
determination.
	
We find several aggravating circumstances that are 
relevant to our determination. First, respondent has a signif-
icant history of similar disciplinary offenses. ABA Standard 
9.22(a). As discussed, respondent was suspended in 2006 for 
one year for failing to deposit and maintain client funds in 
trust, failing to maintain complete records of client funds 
in his possession and to render appropriate accountings of 
those funds, failing to maintain an interest-bearing trust 
account, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice, and failing to respond fully and truthfully to 
inquiries from, and comply with reasonable requests of, an 
investigatory authority. Skagen, 342 Or 183. Again in 2008, 
respondent was suspended for 18 months by a Disciplinary 
Board trial panel for failing to keep sufficient records of cli-
ent funds in his possession and failing to deposit and main-
tain in trust unearned fees paid in advance. Skagen, 22 DB 
Rptr 292. And in 2012, respondent was subject to discipline 
in New Zealand; he was censured, required to reduce his 
fee, and ordered to pay compensation and costs for failure to 
complete discovery in a proper manner in a matter.
	
In addition we find that, in failing to return 
unearned fees to clients E and W, respondent acted with 
Cite as 367 Or 236 (2020)	
255
a selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.22(b).  And we find that 
respondent has engaged in a pattern of misconduct, ABA 
Standard 9.22(c), and that he has committed multiple 
offenses, ABA Standard 9.22(d).
	
We also find that respondent has refused to acknowl-
edge the wrongfulness of his conduct. ABA Standard 
9.22(g). For one example, in the New Zealand proceeding, 
after initially admitting that he was required to repay cli-
ent E the fees he had paid in advance, he later argued to 
the Disciplinary Tribunal that E had breached the retainer 
agreement and therefore repayment was not required. The 
High Court found that taking such a position was “disin-
genuous and dishonest,” and, in the terms used in the appli-
cable statute, “disgraceful and dishonourable.” And in this 
proceeding, respondent has refused to concede that his mis-
conduct in New Zealand violated several similar Oregon 
disciplinary rules, and he continues to maintain that he is 
and always has been entitled to disobey requests from disci-
plinary authorities for his financial records.
	
Finally, respondent has substantial experience in 
the practice of law. ABA Standard 9.22(i).
	
The record reflects only one mitigating factor: 
respondent’s disbarment in New Zealand constitutes the 
imposition of another sanction for the misconduct. ABA 
Standard 9.32(k). On balance, the aggravating factors out-
weigh the sole mitigating factor and support a determina-
tion to disbar respondent.
	
Turning to Oregon case law, we observe that this 
court has disbarred lawyers whose collective misconduct 
demonstrated disregard for clients, professional obligations, 
and the disciplinary rules. It has “ordered disbarment for 
conduct that otherwise would justify a long suspension when 
the accused has a history of misconduct that has resulted 
in prior disciplinary sanctions.” In re Paulson, 346 Or 676, 
722, 216 P3d 859 (2009), adh’d to as modified on recons, 349 
Or 529, 255 P3d 41 (2010). The court has disbarred lawyers 
for engaging in a pattern of misrepresentation, neglect, 
and failure to act on behalf of clients. E.g., In re Sousa, 323 
Or 137, 146-47, 915 P2d 408 (1996). And it has disbarred 
256	
In re Skagen
lawyers who neglect clients’ cases and refuse to cooperate 
with regulatory authorities after already having been dis-
ciplined for the same or similar misconduct. In re Bourcier, 
325 Or 429, 436-37, 939 P2d 604 (1997). Those cases also 
support a determination to disbar respondent.
	
After considering the ABA Standards and our case 
law, we conclude that the misconduct for which respondent 
was struck from the Roll in New Zealand warrants dis-
barment in Oregon. We also find nothing in the record to 
suggest that disbarring respondent “would result in grave 
injustice or be offensive to public policy.” BR 3.5(c)(3). We 
therefore hold that respondent should be disbarred as a 
reciprocal sanction for his misconduct in New Zealand.
	
Respondent is disbarred.