Title: Duckett v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-719 
____________ 
 
 
JAMES AREN DUCKETT, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[June 26, 2014] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
James Aren Duckett, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit 
court’s order summarily denying his successive motion for postconviction relief, 
which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Because the 
order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Duckett was a police officer in the City of Mascotte when he murdered 
eleven-year-old Teresa McAbee.  Duckett v. State (Duckett I), 568 So. 2d 891, 892 
 
 
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(Fla. 1990).  Although we more fully detailed the facts of the case in our prior 
decision in Duckett I, id. at 892-94, we briefly review them here.  On the morning 
of May 13, 1987, the victim’s body was found in a lake less than one mile from the 
convenience store from which she disappeared between 10 and 11 p.m. on the 
evening before.  Id. at 892-93.  During that time period, Duckett, the only officer 
on duty that night, was at the convenience store, and he inquired about the victim’s 
name and age from the convenience store clerk.  Id. at 892.  Upon exiting the store, 
he spoke to the victim and put her in the front passenger side of his patrol car.  Id.  
He then got into the driver’s seat.  In a pre-arrest statement, Duckett stated that the 
victim had not been on the hood of his patrol car and denied being at the lake on 
the evening of the murder.  Id. at 893.  However, “[b]oth Duckett’s and Teresa’s 
fingerprints were discovered on the hood of Duckett’s patrol car.”  Id.  In addition, 
a crime scene technician from the sheriff’s department and an expert witness both 
testified that the “very unusual” tire tracks at the lake matched the tracks of 
Duckett’s patrol car.  Id.  The medical examiner testified that the victim had been 
sexually assaulted while still alive, strangled, and then drowned.  After a jury trial 
at which Duckett testified in his own defense, he was convicted of sexual battery 
and first-degree murder.  Id. at 893-94. 
 
 
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This was a circumstantial evidence case, and we summarized the evidence 
presented that was inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence as 
follows: 
(1) [T]he victim was last seen in Duckett’s patrol car; (2) the tire 
tracks at the murder scene were consistent with those from Duckett’s 
car; (3) no one saw Duckett, the only policeman on duty in Mascotte, 
from the time he was last seen with the victim until the time he met 
the victim’s mother at the police station; (4) numerous prints of the 
victim were found on the hood of Duckett’s patrol car, although he 
denied seeing her on the hood; (5) a pubic hair found in the victim’s 
underpants was consistent with Duckett’s pubic hair and inconsistent 
with the others in contact with the victim that evening; and, (6) during 
a five-month period, Duckett, contrary to department policy, had 
picked up three young women in his patrol car while on duty and 
engaged in sexual activity with one and made sexual advances toward 
the other two. 
Id. at 894-95.  By an eight-to-four vote, the jury recommended a sentence of death 
for the murder, and the trial court so sentenced him after finding two aggravating 
factors (the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel and was committed during the 
course of a sexual battery), one statutory mitigator (Duckett lacked a significant 
criminal history), and nonstatutory mitigation (Duckett had a strong and supportive 
family and had attempted to improve his education).  Id. at 894.  The trial court 
also sentenced Duckett to life in prison with a twenty-five-year mandatory 
minimum for the sexual battery.  Id. 
Duckett appealed his convictions and sentences, and we affirmed.  Id. at 
896.  Subsequently, we also affirmed the denial of his initial postconviction motion 
 
 
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and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Duckett v. State (Duckett II), 
918 So. 2d 224, 239-40 (Fla. 2005).  In addition, the federal district court denied 
Duckett’s federal habeas petition, in which he alleged a number of constitutional 
violations.  Duckett v. McDonough, 701 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1256-1300 (M.D. Fla. 
2010). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In this appeal, Duckett argues that (A) the circuit court erred in summarily 
denying his claim that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that a Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) analyst’s testimony at trial regarding hair evidence 
was erroneous and this Court should remand his case to the postconviction court 
for an evidentiary hearing on this claim; (B) the failure to apply the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009), 
retroactively to his claims violates his constitutional rights to due process and 
equal protection; (C) newly discovered evidence that a trial witness recanted her 
testimony requires that Duckett be granted a new trial; and (D) section 837.021, 
Florida Statutes (1997), relating to perjury by contradictory statement, is invalid.  
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of 
relief of Duckett’s successive postconviction motion. 
A.  Hair Analysis Expert 
 
 
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Michael Malone, an FBI hair and fiber analyst, testified at Duckett’s trial 
regarding the pubic hair found in the victim’s underpants.  In this first issue, 
Duckett contends that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his 
claim that a 2011 independent analysis of Malone’s 1987-88 lab work and trial 
testimony in this case constitutes newly discovered evidence that Malone’s trial 
testimony was false and misleading. 
1.  Related Facts 
At the time of trial, Malone was a well-qualified and recognized FBI expert 
in the area of hair and fiber analysis.  Duckett I, 568 So. 2d at 893.  On direct 
appeal, we summarized Malone’s trial testimony in this case as follows: 
A pubic hair was found in the victim’s underpants.  While other 
experts could not reach a conclusion by comparing that hair with 
Duckett’s pubic hair, Michael Malone, an FBI special agent who had 
been qualified as an expert in hairs and fibers in forty-two states, 
examined the hair sample, concluding that there was a high degree of 
probability that the pubic hair found in her underpants was Duckett’s 
pubic hair.  Malone also testified that the pubic hair did not match the 
hairs of the sixteen-year-old boy, the uncle, or the others who were in 
contact with the victim that evening. 
Id.  We rejected Duckett’s challenge to Malone’s qualifications as an expert, 
noting that defense counsel declined to object to Malone’s testimony at trial.  Id. at 
895.  Moreover, we pointed out that the expert’s credibility was “extensively 
challenged . . . during the cross-examination of Malone and during the testimony 
of a Florida Department of Law Enforcement expert on hair analysis.”  Id. 
 
 
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We subsequently rejected claims related to Malone’s testimony at trial that 
were raised on appeal from the denial of Duckett’s initial postconviction motion.  
Duckett II, 918 So. 2d at 234-35.  Duckett argued here that (1) the prosecution 
engaged in “expert shopping” in obtaining Malone’s testimony; and (2) Malone’s 
expert testimony was not credible.  Id. at 234.  In addition, Duckett contended that 
the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to 
disclose (3) a second, unknown hair that was found on the victim and (4) 
impeachment evidence against Malone.  Id. at 234-35.  We held that the first claim 
was procedurally barred and affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of the 
second claim, noting Malone’s established proficiency and credentials in the field 
of hair analysis.  Id. at 234.  As for the third argument regarding the unknown hair, 
we held that the claim was conclusory and insufficiently pleaded.  Finally, the 
fourth claim was based on a 1997 report issued by the Department of Justice that 
was critical of the FBI laboratories and some of the forensic examinations of the 
agency’s analysts, including Malone.  The report “indicat[ed] that Malone testified 
falsely in a[n] [unrelated] court proceeding in 1985.”  Id. at 235.  Duckett alleged 
that the State failed to timely disclose this evidence that could have been used to 
impeach Malone’s credibility at trial.  In affirming denial of this Brady claim, we 
noted that the “report did not exist” at the time of Duckett’s 1988 trial or his 1990 
direct appeal.  Id. 
 
 
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After the 1997 Department of Justice report was issued, the FBI hired 
independent experts to examine the prior work and testimony of various agent 
analysts, including Malone.  One independent analyst reviewed many cases—
particularly death penalty cases—in which Malone offered expert testimony.  
Subsequently, in August 2011, the same independent analyst reviewed Malone’s 
hair-analysis work and testimony in Duckett’s trial and issued a report (2011 
Report). 
In the 2011 Report, the independent analyst addressed the same areas that he 
had examined in his prior reviews of Malone’s work in other cases.  In sum, the 
analyst concluded that no written protocols prescribing the scientifically acceptable 
examination and testing procedures for hair analysis existed until a decade after 
Malone’s work in this case was done.  Accordingly, the independent analyst could 
not determine whether Malone’s work conformed to the standards or analytic 
techniques applicable at the time Malone worked on this case.  Second, Malone’s 
laboratory reports were not adequately documented in the laboratory bench notes, 
as there was no abbreviation key, small portions of notes were illegible, and some 
notes were undated.  Finally, Malone’s testimony at trial was not consistent with 
the laboratory reports, the bench notes, or Malone’s area of expertise. 
In reaching the conclusion that Malone’s trial testimony was inconsistent 
with his reports, notes, and area of expertise, the independent analyst explained 
 
 
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that at trial, Malone sometimes overstated or exaggerated the accuracy of hair 
analysis.  For example, the independent analyst opined that some of Malone’s 
testimony conveyed the idea that no person other than Duckett could be the source 
for the pubic hair found in the victim’s underpants.  Similarly, Malone testified that 
there was a “high degree of probability” the pubic hair found in the victim’s 
underpants was Duckett’s.  Duckett I, 568 So. 2d at 893.  The independent analyst 
explained that hair analysis does not support this degree of analytical certainty.  
That is, microscopic hair analysis can show consistency but not absolute identity. 
Nevertheless, the independent analyst also found that in other instances, 
Malone properly stated the correct standard in his trial testimony.  For example, 
Malone correctly testified that the pubic hair found in the victim’s underpants was 
“consistent with Duckett’s pubic hair” but was not consistent with the pubic hairs 
of others who had been in contact with the victim that evening.  Id. at 895.  Malone 
also explained that hair analysis is not as precise as fingerprints for identifying 
someone.  Malone expressly stated that he could not say that a particular hair came 
from a specific person to the exclusion of anyone else. 
The postconviction court concluded that the findings of the 2011 Report did 
not provide a basis for relief because Duckett’s successive motion constituted mere 
relitigation of the same hair-analysis issues that were previously decided adversely 
 
 
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to Duckett.  As we explain below, we agree that Duckett is not entitled to any 
relief. 
2.  Discussion 
Duckett contends that the 2011 Report constitutes newly discovered 
evidence that—at a minimum—requires remand for an evidentiary hearing.  We 
have defined the requirements for newly discovered evidence claims as follows: 
First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the 
party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the 
defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of 
due diligence.  Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of 
such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  See 
Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  Newly discovered 
evidence satisfies the second prong of this test if it “weakens the case 
against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to 
his culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 
315 (Fla. 1996)). 
Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1008 (Fla. 2009).  As noted by Duckett, the State 
does not dispute that the 2011 Report and evidence of other FBI reports critiquing 
Malone’s work and testimony meet the first prong.  Because the review of 
Malone’s work in the instant case was written during these successive 
postconviction proceedings, the 2011 Report could not previously have been 
discovered by due diligence because it did not exist. 
The question before us is not whether the new evidence warrants a new trial 
but whether this case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing regarding the 
 
 
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2011 Report.  When, as in this case, the postconviction court summarily denies a 
postconviction motion, we apply the following standard of review: 
A successive rule 3.851 motion may be denied without an 
evidentiary hearing if the records of the case conclusively show that 
the movant is entitled to no relief.  This Court reviews the circuit 
court’s decision to summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion de 
novo, accepting the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent 
they are not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the 
record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief. 
Id. at 1005 (citation omitted).  “The burden is on the defendant to establish a 
legally sufficient claim.”  Nixon v. State, 932 So. 2d 1009, 1018 (Fla. 2006). 
As outlined above, the thrust of the 2011 Report by the independent analyst 
was that Malone’s testimony at trial was not consistent with his lab work because 
some of his testimony at trial exceeded Malone’s area of expertise.  Specifically, 
the science of hair analysis could not support a conclusion of absolute identity.  As 
a result, any suggestion that it was highly unlikely that the pubic hair found in the 
victim’s underpants belonged to anyone other than Duckett—as Malone testified in 
at least one instance—overstated or exaggerated the degree of accuracy of hair 
analysis.  On the other hand, the independent analyst recognized that at trial 
Malone also accurately represented the reliability of hair analysis by testifying that 
hair analysis is not on a par with fingerprints for purposes of identification.  In fact, 
Malone expressly and correctly stated that hair analysis cannot support a 
conclusion that a hair came from a single person to the exclusion of anyone else 
 
 
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and accurately testified that the pubic hair from the victim’s underpants was 
consistent with having come from Duckett.  Thus, although some of Malone’s 
testimony overstated the significance of the hair comparison, Duckett did not 
establish that Malone’s testimony—when considered in its full context—was false.  
Moreover, as we noted in our decision affirming Duckett’s convictions and 
sentences, Malone’s testimony was “extensively challenged” at trial, first on cross-
examination and then “during the testimony of a Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement expert on hair analysis.”  Duckett I, 568 So. 2d at 895.  
Appellant seeks remand for an evidentiary hearing, likening his case to those 
of the defendants in Smith v. State, 75 So. 3d 205 (Fla. 2011), and Wyatt v. State, 
78 So. 3d 512 (Fla. 2011).  However, these cases, in which the defendants’ 
convictions rested at least in part on comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA), 
provide Duckett no support.  In 2004, a report from the National Research Council 
discredited the reliability of CBLA evidence.  See Wyatt, 78 So. 3d at 525-26.  The 
next year, the FBI abandoned the forensic science of CBLA entirely and contacted 
states regarding this decision.  Id.  In Smith, we reversed the denial of relief on the 
defendant’s successive postconviction motion and remanded the claim for further 
proceedings based in part on the FBI’s letters regarding the CBLA expert 
testimony offered at Smith’s 1990 retrial.  75 So. 3d at 205-206.  In Wyatt, this 
Court also relinquished jurisdiction for a hearing but ultimately denied relief on the 
 
 
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defendant’s newly discovered evidence claim where, although the FBI admitted 
that the expert’s CBLA trial testimony “exceed[ed] the limits of the science,” 78 
So. 3d at 526, the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented and the relative 
unimportance of the CBLA evidence would not probably result in an acquittal on 
retrial.  Id. at 527. 
Unlike CBLA, the field of forensic hair analysis has not been discredited, 
and the FBI has not discontinued the use of such analysis.  Moreover, Malone’s 
expert testimony in this case was not without basis.  Although some of his 
testimony overstated the degree of accuracy of his analysis, other statements were 
well within the bounds of the field.  Nothing has been presented that undermines 
Malone’s testimony that the pubic hair from the victim’s underpants was consistent 
with Duckett’s and inconsistent with the pubic hair of others who had been in 
contact with the victim on the night she disappeared.  In addition, as previously 
noted, his testimony was challenged extensively at trial.  See Duckett I, 568 So. 2d 
at 895. 
Moreover, as recounted more specifically in our prior opinions, the hair 
evidence was by no means the only evidence supporting the conviction in this case.  
Significantly, the victim was last seen at the convenience store in Duckett’s patrol 
car, and the unusual tire tracks at the lake where the victim’s body was found 
matched those of Duckett’s patrol car.  Duckett II, 918 So. 2d at 228-29.  In 
 
 
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addition, although Duckett had stated that the victim never sat on the hood of his 
car, “[b]oth Duckett’s and Teresa’s fingerprints were discovered on the hood of 
Duckett’s patrol car.”  Id. at 229.  In fact, “Duckett’s prints were commingled with 
the victim’s, whose prints indicated that she had been sitting backwards on the 
hood and had scooted up the car.”  Id. 
Given this context, we conclude that the newly discovered evidence does not 
give rise to a reasonable doubt as to Duckett’s culpability.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the postconviction court’s summary denial of this claim. 
B.  Retroactivity of Porter 
Duckett next contends that the postconviction court erred in denying his 
claim that the Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 
(2009), is retroactive under this Court’s analysis in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 
(Fla. 1980), and must be applied to his claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  In Walton v. State, 77 So. 3d 639, 644 (Fla. 2011), we addressed this 
same issue and concluded that “the decision in Porter does not constitute a 
fundamental change in the law that mandates retroactive application under Witt.”  
Accord Reed v. State, 116 So. 3d 260, 266 (Fla.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 643 
(2013).  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim. 
C.  Witness Recantation 
 
 
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In his third claim, Duckett contends that the postconviction court erred by 
summarily denying his claim that newly discovered evidence shows that trial 
witness Gwendolyn Gurley later recanted her testimony.  We disagree. 
 
Gurley’s trial testimony is set out in more detail in our opinion in Duckett II, 
918 So. 2d at 232.  In sum, she testified that she went to the convenience store on 
the night of the crime.  She saw a police cruiser parked near the store’s dumpster 
and the victim standing outside the store.  Gurley heard Duckett call to the victim, 
who walked to the police car, and then she heard a car door shut.  When Gurley 
looked up again, she “could not see the victim.”  Id.  As the police car drove away, 
Gurley “saw two people inside the car, ‘[o]ne was the driver, was the big man, and 
a small person.’ ”  Id. 
 
In his initial postconviction motion, Duckett alleged that Gurley lied at trial, 
and at the evidentiary hearing on the claim, he presented evidence of Gurley’s 
subsequent recantations of her trial testimony.  Id.  “In various interviews with 
counsel and investigators after trial, Gurley recanted her [trial] testimony, saying 
that she was not at the [convenience store] on the night of the murder. . . .”  Id.  
Gurley took the stand at the evidentiary hearing but declined to answer any 
questions relating to the night of the murder.  Instead, she invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Id.  On review, we held that the 
recantation evidence did not merit a new trial and confidence in the verdict was not 
 
 
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undermined.  Id. at 233 (quoting Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 735 (Fla. 
1994) (“Only when it appears that, on a new trial, the witness’s testimony will 
change to such an extent as to render probable a different verdict will a new trial be 
granted.”)).  We reach the same conclusion here. 
 
In his successive postconviction motion, Duckett offered as newly 
discovered evidence the 2010 affidavits of two of Gurley’s adult children, in which 
each claimed to have had conversations with Gurley during which she revealed 
that she lied at trial in order to obtain favorable treatment from law enforcement 
regarding certain offenses.  The circuit court summarily denied the claim, and we 
affirm.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 specifies the pleading 
requirements for a newly discovered evidence claim in a successive postconviction 
motion.  In this case, Duckett failed to plead the reason that these affidavits were 
not previously available, an essential element of a newly discovered evidence 
claim.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)(C)(iv).  Moreover, as recounted above, this 
Court in Duckett II considered substantially similar recantation evidence regarding 
Gurley that the affidavits of Gurley’s children now offer, and we affirmed the 
denial of relief.  918 So. 2d at 232.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s summary denial of relief on this successive claim. 
D.  Validity of Perjury Statute 
 
 
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In his final claim, Duckett contends that section 837.021, Florida Statutes 
(1997), which proscribes perjury by contradictory statement, is invalid.  As stated 
above, Gurley, who testified at trial, invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege at the 
evidentiary hearing on Duckett’s initial postconviction motion.  See Duckett II, 
918 So. 2d at 232.  Duckett argues that the fear of a felony perjury conviction 
caused Gurley to invoke the privilege, which in turn violated his right to due 
process.  Therefore, he argues that section 837.021 is invalid.  The postconviction 
court denied the claim, noting that the issue was untimely raised and improperly 
pleaded because Duckett failed to explain why it was not raised previously.  See 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)(C)(iv).  We agree that the claim was not timely raised 
and is procedurally barred and affirm the postconviction court’s denial of the 
claim. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of 
appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lake County,  
William Gray Law, Jr., Judge - Case No. 87-1347CF 
 
 
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Mary Elizabeth Wells of the Law Office of M. E. Wells, Atlanta, Georgia; and 
Michael C. Meyer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – South, Ft. Lauderdale, 
Florida,     
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Mitchell D. Bishop, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,   
 
 
for Appellee