Title: Benson v. Temple Inland Forest Prods. Corp.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Roger T. BENSON v. TEMPLE INLAND FOREST
PRODUCTS CORPORATION

96-1369                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 21, 1997


1.   Trial -- jury instructions -- trial court should have given instructions
     on concurring negligence and intervening and superseding acts of negligence
     -- parties entitled to specific instructions on causation issues. -- Where
     the factual circumstances raised questions whether there were
     concurring or intervening and superseding acts of negligence,
     the supreme court determined that the trial court should have
     given the jury such instruction as provided by AMI Civ. 3d
     502, which accurately states the law relating to concurring
     negligence, and AMI Civ. 3d 503, which correctly presents the
     law regarding intervening or superseding acts of negligence;
     it is error to refuse to give a specific instruction correctly
     and clearly applying the law to the facts of the case, even
     though the law in a general way is covered by the charge
     given, unless it appears that prejudice has not resulted;
     parties are entitled to specific jury instructions on
     causation issues.

2.   Trial -- jury instructions -- trial court's refusal of proper instruction
     will result in reversal unless no prejudice resulted. -- While a trial
     court is not required to give every correct instruction
     offered when the instructions given explicitly, clearly,
     fully, and fairly cover the matter requested, the trial
     court's refusal of a proper instruction will result in
     reversal, unless it affirmatively appears that no prejudice
     resulted.      

3.   Trial -- jury instructions -- supreme court could not determine that
     failure to give instructions did not result in prejudice -- case reversed
     and remanded for new trial. -- Where, although the circumstances of
     the case presented a jury question whether appellee's
     negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of appellant's
     injury, they also presented a jury question as to whether
     appellant's or a fellow employee's actions were a concurring,
     intervening, or superseding act causing the injury, the
     supreme court concluded that for the jury to have been
     provided with a clear understanding of the governing legal
     principles, all three instructions should have been given to
     the jury; the supreme court could not determine that the
     failure to give these requested instructions did not result in
     prejudice and, accordingly, reversed and remanded for a new
     trial.


     Appeal from Crittenden Circuit Court; Samuel Turner, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Taylor, Halliburton, Ledbetter & Caldwell, by: Mark Ledbetter;
and Thomas G. Montgomery, for appellant/cross-appellee.
     Rieves & Mayton, by: David S. Wilson, III, for appellee/cross-
appellant.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     In the early morning of June 24, 1992, appellant, Roger
Benson, was injured while helping unload his coworker's truck. 
When he released a rubber strap securing a tarpaulin that protected
the load from the weather, a gypsum board weighing about forty
pounds fell from the truck and struck him on the neck.  Mr. Benson
sued Temple Inland Forest Products, claiming that Temple's
negligence in loading the truck caused his injuries.  Temple denied
negligence, and contended that the injuries were caused by Mr.
Benson's own negligence, or the negligence of his coworker, Ed
Felks.
     Following the presentation of evidence, the trial judge
instructed the jury concerning the meaning of the term "proximate
cause," but declined to instruct the jury on the concept of
intervening cause or on the concept of concurring cause.  The jury
returned a general verdict in favor of Temple.  Mr. Benson's motion
for a new trial was denied, and he appeals, alleging error in
denying an instruction on concurring cause.  Temple cross-appeals
on the condition that if this court decides that an instruction on
concurring cause was required, the trial court should also have
given an instruction on intervening cause.  We conclude that both
instructions should have been given, and we reverse and remand the
case for a new trial.
     On June 23, 1992, Mr. Benson and Mr. Felks, employees of a
trucking company, met at Temple's facility in West Memphis to pick
up their trucks, which had been loaded with gypsum wall boards. 
The open-flatbed trailers were eight feet wide, and the four-feet-
by-eight-feet wall boards were stacked flat on the trailers.  Each
load was covered with a tarpaulin to prevent weather damage to the
wall boards.  However, a small tarp was used on Mr. Felks's
trailer, leaving some of the cargo unprotected from weather.  To
avoid weather damage, Temple placed a four-by-eight gypsum board on
its side on the edge of the trailer to protect the exposed load
from the weather; and this extra board was held in place by the
tarp, which also covered most of the extra board.  The tarp was
secured to the trailer by rubber cords, and the load straps were
then used to secure the entire load.
     Temple asserted that when the trailer was moved out of the
loading bay, all these tarp cords were attached to the rub rail on
the side of the flatbed trailer.  Before starting their trip from
West Memphis to Georgia, Mr. Benson and Mr. Felks were to inspect
their respective loads, tightening the cargo straps and adding
additional rubber cords if necessary to further secure the tarps.
     Upon arrival in Georgia at the point of delivery, the drivers
prepared for unloading by removing the load straps.  After a short
nap they were awakened by the person in charge of the facility. 
Mr. Benson began to help with the removal of the tarp from Mr.
Felks's truck, and he had to reach under the flatbed of the truck
to disconnect a rubber cord.  The four-by-eight extra gypsum board
fell and injured Mr. Benson's neck.
     At trial, Temple introduced evidence that the rubber cords
they had fastened to the tarp were attached to the rub rail on the
side of the flatbed and that it was not necessary to reach under
the trailer to disconnect those cords.  This evidence suggested
that Mr. Felks or someone else must have placed the cord ends under
the trailer bed, making it necessary for the person removing the
tarp to place his head and shoulders in an exposed position. 
Temple also suggested that Mr. Felks, who had been injured on a
previous occasion when a similar board fell on his foot, had a duty
to warn Mr. Benson that there was a protective board under the tarp
which might fall when the tarp was released.
     It is clear to us that these factual circumstances raise
questions whether there were concurring acts of negligence, or
whether there were intervening and superseding acts of negligence. 
The trial court should have given the jury such instruction as
provided by AMI Civ. 3d 502 and 503.  AMI Civ. 3d 502 accurately
states the law relating to concurring negligence as follows:
When the negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons work together as proximate causes of damage to
another, each of those persons may be found to be liable. 
This is true regardless of the relative degree of fault
between them.  If you find that negligence of the
defendant proximately caused damage to the plaintiff, it
is not a defense that some other person may also have
been to blame.
AMI Civ. 3d 503, which correctly presents the law regarding
intervening or superseding acts of negligence, provides as follows:
______ contends and has the burden of proving that
following any act or omission on his part an event
intervened which in itself caused damage completely
independent of his conduct.  If you so find, then his act
or omission was not a proximate cause of any damage
resulting from the intervening event.
Under our prior decisions, we determined that it is reversible
error for a trial judge to refuse to give a requested specific
instruction, even if his general instruction may touch on the
issue, and stated the following:
Even if the court's general instructions could be said
technically to have covered the matter in a general way,
it is error to refuse to give a specific instruction
correctly and clearly applying the law to the facts of
the case, even though the law in a general way is covered
by the charge given, unless it appears that prejudice has
not resulted.
Beevers v. Miller, 242 Ark. 541, 547,