Title: Marathon County v. D. K.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2217 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the condition of D. K.: 
 
Marathon County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
D. K., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 272,921 N.W.2d 14 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 4, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 25, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Karen L. Seifert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I., II., III., IV.A., IV.B., and IV.C.1, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to Part V., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts 
IV.C.2., and IV.D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Catherine R. Malchow, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Catherine R. Malchow. 
 
 
 
2 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Michael J. Puerner and Scott M. Corbett, corporation counsel. 
There was an oral argument by Michael J. Puerner. 
 
 
2020 WI 8 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2217 
(L.C. No. 
2017ME132) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the condition of D. K.: 
 
MARATHON COUNTY, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
D. K., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 4, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I., II., III., IV.A., IV.B., and IV.C.1, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to Part V., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts 
IV.C.2., and IV.D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Marathon County v. 
D.K., No. 2017AP2217, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
2 
 
Aug. 7, 2018), affirming the Winnebago County circuit court's1 
Wis. Stat. ch. 51 orders for involuntary commitment and 
involuntary medication and treatment.2  D.K. argues that he 
should not have been committed because the County failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous as 
defined under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. (2015-16).3  The 
County disagrees, and also argues that D.K.'s commitment is a 
moot issue. 
¶2 
At the final hearing, the County had to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that D.K. was mentally ill, a proper 
subject 
for 
commitment, 
and 
dangerous. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a).  The circuit court concluded that Winnebago 
County met its burden of proof, ordered D.K.'s involuntary 
commitment for six months, and ordered involuntary medication 
and treatment.  The court of appeals affirmed.  It concluded 
that D.K.'s threats and plans to strangle police officers and 
kill other people established a "'reasonable fear . . . of 
serious physical harm' under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b,"  and, therefore, 
"the 
circuit 
court's 
dangerousness 
determination . . . was 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Karen L. Seifert presided.   
2 Winnebago County was the original petitioner in this case.  
But after the circuit court entered its order, venue was 
transferred to Marathon County.  On appeal, Marathon County was 
designated as the petitioner-respondent and argued before the 
court of appeals and this court.  Throughout this opinion, we 
will refer to Marathon County as "the County." 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
3 
 
supported by the evidence."  D.K., No. 2017AP2217, unpublished 
slip op., ¶11.  On review, we are asked to decide two issues: 
(1) whether D.K.'s challenge to his commitment order is moot; 
and (2) whether there was clear and convincing evidence that 
D.K. was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
¶3 
We conclude that D.K.'s commitment is not a moot issue 
because it still subjects him to a firearms ban.  We also 
conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence at the 
final hearing that D.K. was dangerous as defined under Wis. 
Stat. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On April 25, 2017, Officer Kelly Schmitz of the 
Winnebago County Sheriff's Department arrested D.K.  The next 
day, Officer Schmitz filed a Statement of Emergency Detention by 
Law Enforcement Officer in the Winnebago County circuit court.  
According to the Statement, D.K. had complained that the Oshkosh 
Police Department bugged his phone and that other people were 
"stalking him" and lying about him.  The Statement also alleged 
that D.K. had emailed the Department's human resources director 
and requested a meeting with the police chief so he could 
"strangle him to death."  It also alleged that D.K. had 
threatened to "hurt every single person" who was stalking him 
and lying about him. 
¶5 
On April 28, 2017, the circuit court commissioner 
determined that there was probable cause to believe that D.K. 
was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
4 
 
to himself or others.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(a).  The 
circuit court commissioner ordered that D.K. be detained at 
Winnebago Mental Health Institute pending a final hearing.  That 
same 
day, 
the 
circuit 
court 
issued 
an 
Order 
Appointing 
Examiners, appointing Dr. Jagdish Dave and Dr. Yogesh Pareek.  
See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(9)(a).  Both doctors examined D.K. and 
filed reports with the circuit court.  
See 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(9)(a)5. 
¶6 
On May 11, 2017, the circuit court held a final 
hearing.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(10), (13).  Winnebago County 
presented only one witness——Dr. Dave.  Winnebago County did not 
move Dr. Dave's report into evidence at the hearing, although 
the report had been filed with the circuit court.4  Winnebago 
County did not call Dr. Pareek or any fact witness such as 
Officer Kelly or the human resources director to testify.5  D.K. 
did not testify.  Thus, the only evidence at the final hearing 
was Dr. Dave's testimony. 
¶7 
Dr. Dave is a psychiatrist.  He stated that he had the 
opportunity to evaluate D.K.  Dr. Dave spoke with D.K., observed 
                                                 
4 We will not refer to the contents of Dr. Dave's report 
because the circuit court did not rely on it when it made 
factual findings and legal conclusions.  Nor did the parties 
rely on its contents in their arguments before this court.  
Thus, we need not decide whether filing Dr. Dave's report with 
the circuit court was sufficient to enter the report into 
evidence. 
5 The County attempted to call a different officer, but D.K. 
objected because the officer was not on the witness list.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a).  The circuit court sustained the 
objection and did not permit the officer to testify. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
5 
 
him, and reviewed his records.  Dr. Dave stated his conclusion 
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that D.K. suffered 
from a mental illness called delusional disorder and had 
"substantial disorder of thought and perception."  He also 
concluded that D.K.'s judgment and behavior were substantially 
impaired, he was a proper subject for treatment, and he needed 
treatment.  Corporation counsel for Winnebago County then asked 
Dr. Dave, "Based on your interview of [D.K.] were you able to 
form an opinion as to whether or not he had presented a 
substantial risk of danger to either himself or others?"  Dr. 
Dave responded, "To other people." 
¶8 
Dr. Dave then explained the basis of his opinion.  He 
stated that D.K. was "paranoid about people around him.  He had 
thoughts of harming those people who were talking about him, 
making fun of him.  He also was making some threats against 
[the] police department because he had thought that they were 
not listening to him . . . ."  Corporation counsel then asked, 
"Did he tell you what his intentions were with regard to the 
police or any of the persons in the public?"  Dr. Dave 
responded, "Yes."  "He plans on strangulating the police officer 
and also killing the people who made fun of him."  Dr. Dave also 
testified that D.K.'s threats were directly related to his 
delusional disorder. 
¶9 
On cross-examination, Dr. Dave made multiple other 
statements relevant to D.K.'s argument before this court.  Dr. 
Dave stated that D.K.: "was acting on his delusional belief and 
he could be potentially dangerous"; "can act on those thoughts 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
6 
 
and he can become potentially dangerous"; "could be still 
potentially dangerous"; "was expressing those thoughts and he 
probably 
may 
have 
acted 
on 
those 
thoughts"; 
and 
"most 
possibly . . . might act on those thoughts."  Dr. Dave also 
stated, "I don't think I can make [a] difference whether he will 
act on his thoughts or not." 
¶10 It is this final hearing evidence that we review, 
along with the circuit court's findings and conclusions, for 
clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness. 
 
II.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶11 The circuit court made an oral ruling at the final 
hearing.  The circuit court concluded: 
Based on the testimony that at this point is the only 
testimony and it's uncontroverted, I do find that Dr. 
Dave testified that [D.K.] suffers from a major mental 
illness. 
 . . .  
He testified that [D.K.] is mentally ill, that [D.K.] 
is a proper subject for treatment.  He testified that 
he is a danger to others, specifically that he is 
paranoid, that he has thoughts of harming people and 
has made threats to the police department that he 
wanted—-he had  thoughts that he wanted to strangle 
police and kill people.  These are homicidal thoughts 
and that's what the doctor testified to. 
On that basis I do find that it's appropriate that 
[D.K.] be committed for a period of [6] months, that 
he be under the care and custody of the department and 
that it be inpatient treatment at this time. 
When counsel for D.K. asked the circuit court to clarify under 
which statutory subsection it found dangerousness, corporation 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
7 
 
counsel suggested that the circuit court's findings fell under 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., "which would be indicating that he 
evidences a substantial probability of physical harm to others 
as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent 
behavior."  The circuit court responded, "That's what I heard 
the doctor testify to." 
¶12 The circuit court issued its Order of Commitment that 
same day.  It stated that the grounds for commitment were that 
D.K. 
was 
mentally 
ill, 
dangerous, 
a 
proper 
subject 
for 
treatment, and a resident of Winnebago County.  It also stated 
that, as a result of his commitment, D.K. was prohibited from 
possessing a firearm.  The circuit court also issued its Order 
for Involuntary Medication and Treatment.  D.K. then filed a 
Notice of Intent to Pursue Postcommitment Relief.6 
¶13 On May 17, 2017, D.K. was transferred from inpatient 
to outpatient status.  On June 12, 2017, the circuit court 
issued an Order for Transfer of Venue to Marathon County because 
D.K. had changed his residence to Marathon County.  On November 
6, 2017, D.K. filed a Notice of Appeal.  On November 11, 2017, 
D.K.'s six-month commitment expired and the County did not seek 
an extension. 
¶14 On August 7, 2018, the court of appeals issued its 
decision affirming the circuit court.  First, it declined to 
                                                 
6 The various record documents refer interchangeably to a 
Notice of Intent to Pursue "Postconviction" Relief or "Post 
Disposition" Relief.  Since this was a commitment proceeding, we 
refer to this document as a Notice of Intent to Pursue 
Postcommitment Relief. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
8 
 
address whether the issue was moot because the County did not 
argue 
mootness 
in 
its 
briefing. 
 
D.K., 
No. 
2017AP2217, 
unpublished slip op., ¶3 n.3 (citing State v. Verhagen, 2013 WI 
App 
16, 
¶38, 
346 
Wis. 2d 196, 
827 
N.W.2d 891 
(unrefuted 
arguments are deemed conceded)).  Second, the court of appeals 
concluded:  
[W]hile in Dr. Dave's presence, [D.K.] specifically 
threatened strangulation and murder of multiple people 
for specific, delusional perceptions of his ill 
treatment by those people.  We conclude those 'plans' 
and threats establish a 'reasonable fear  . . . of 
serious 
physical 
harm' 
under 
[Wis. 
Stat.] 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
 
In 
sum, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
dangerousness determination was based upon a correct 
interpretation of § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and was supported 
by the evidence. 
D.K., No. 2017AP2217, unpublished slip op., ¶3 n.3. 
¶15 On September 5, 2018, D.K. petitioned this court for 
review.  We granted the petition. 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16  We must first determine whether D.K.'s challenge to 
his six-month commitment is moot because it has expired.  
Mootness is a question of law that we review independently.  
Waukesha Cty. v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶10, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 
N.W.2d 140. 
¶17 We must also interpret Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. in 
order to determine whether the County proved dangerousness in 
D.K.'s case.  The interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law that this court "reviews de novo while 
benefiting from the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
9 
 
court."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 
N.W.2d 346 (citing State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238). 
¶18 Finally, we must review whether there was clear and 
convincing evidence of dangerousness as defined under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. at D.K.'s final hearing.  D.K. does not 
challenge any of the circuit court's factual findings as clearly 
erroneous.  "'We will not disturb a circuit court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.'"  Winnebago Cty. v. 
Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109, 
cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 2464 (2016) (quoting Outagamie Cty. v. 
Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶38, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607).  
Accordingly, our review of statutory dangerousness requires us 
to apply the facts to the statutory standard and presents a 
question of law that we review independently.  Christopher S., 
366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶50. 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Commitment is Not a Moot Issue. 
¶19 Mootness is a doctrine of judicial restraint.  "'An 
issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect 
on the underlying controversy.'"  Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., 2019 
WI 54, ¶11, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (quoting PRN Assocs. 
LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559).  
Because moot issues do not affect a live controversy, this court 
generally declines to reach them.  Id., ¶12.  But we may 
overlook mootness if the issue falls within one of five 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
10 
 
exceptions: (1) the issue is of great public importance; (2) the 
issue involves the constitutionality of a statute; (3) the issue 
arises often and a decision from this court is essential; (4) 
the issue is likely to recur and must be resolved to avoid 
uncertainty; or (5) the issue is likely of repetition and evades 
review.  Id. 
¶20 The County argues that D.K.'s challenge to his 
commitment is moot because his commitment has expired and the 
issue does not fall in any of the exceptions.  D.K. argues that 
the County forfeited its mootness argument.  D.K. also argues 
that the issue is not moot because, even though the commitment 
expired, three collateral consequences of his commitment remain.  
First, D.K., having been committed under Wis. Stat. § 51.20, is 
liable for the costs of his care to the extent that he can pay.  
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 46.10(2)-(3). 
 
Second, 
D.K.'s 
involuntary 
commitment order prohibits him from possessing a firearm, which 
would otherwise be his right.  U.S. Const. amend. II; Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 25.  Third, D.K. cites the negative stigmas 
often attached to mental commitment as a lasting consequence. 
¶21 The court of appeals addressed mootness in a footnote 
of its opinion.  It concluded, "The [C]ounty does not address 
this argument in its response brief, so we do not opine on 
mootness here but rather reach the merits of this appeal.  See 
State v. Verhagen, 2013 WI App 16, ¶38, 346 Wis. 2d 196, 827 
N.W.2d 891 (unrefuted arguments are deemed conceded)."  D.K., 
No. 2017AP2217, unpublished slip op., ¶3 n.3.  But the County 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
11 
 
did argue mootness before this court.  Accordingly, we do 
address the issue. 
¶22 We have previously concluded that an expired initial 
commitment order is moot.  Christopher S., 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶30.  
However, the issue of collateral consequences' effect on an 
otherwise moot commitment was not raised in that case.  Then in 
J.W.K., 
we 
specifically 
left 
open 
the 
question 
whether 
collateral consequences render an expired commitment not moot.  
We 
said, 
"Our 
holding 
that 
J.W.K.'s 
[challenge 
to 
his 
commitment] is moot is limited to situations where, as here, no 
collateral implications of the commitment order are raised."  
J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶28 n.11.  We said these collateral 
consequences may include a firearms ban, civil claims, and costs 
of care.  Id.  And now, in this case, D.K. has raised the issue 
of collateral consequences. 
¶23 The idea that collateral consequences can render an 
otherwise moot issue not moot is nothing new in Wisconsin.  Over 
40 years ago, in State v. Theoharopoulos, this court concluded 
that collateral consequences could render a prior criminal 
conviction not moot.  72 Wis. 2d 327, 240 N.W.2d 635 (1976).  In 
that case, a criminal defendant challenged a prior conviction 
for which he had already served his sentence in full.  Id. at 
329.  We noted that the defendant's challenge faced a mootness 
hurdle.  Id. at 332.  But the defendant argued that the issue of 
his prior conviction was not moot.  Id.  Specifically, the 
defendant argued that his prior conviction was not moot because 
he was "being held on a detainer and may be subjected to the 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
12 
 
further 
penalty 
of 
deportation 
because 
of 
the 
[prior 
conviction]."  Id. at 333.  We concluded the prior conviction 
was not moot because "on the face of the record, there [was] a 
causal relationship between the defendant's present confinement 
and the prior conviction which he wishes to attack."  Id.; see 
also State v. Larkin, Nos. 2007AP1646 through 2007AP1650, 
unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. Jul. 24, 2008) 
(concluding 
the 
defendant's 
"challenge 
to 
his 
completed 
sentences [was] not moot because he [was] still experiencing the 
collateral consequences of his convictions in the form of an 
enhanced federal sentence"); State v. Genz, No. 2016AP2475-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018) (stating 
that a "'criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is 
no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be 
imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.' . . . A 
challenge to a conviction is not moot because the relief sought 
would free a defendant from all consequences flowing from his or 
her conviction") (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 
(1968); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 630 (1982)).  
¶24 Of course, this is not a criminal case.  But the logic 
of Theoharopoulos is just as sound here.  In this case, there is 
a "causal relationship between" D.K.'s firearms ban and the 
civil commitment "which he wishes to attack."  Theoharopoulos, 
72 Wis. 2d at 333.  The circuit court's commitment order says: 
The subject is prohibited from possessing any firearm.  
Federal law provides penalties for, and you may be 
prohibited from possessing, transporting, shipping, 
receiving, or purchasing a firearm, including, but not 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
13 
 
limited to, a rifle, shotgun, pistol, revolver, or 
ammunition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3) and (4) 
and 922(g)(4).  This prohibition shall remain in 
effect until lifted by the court.  Expiration of the 
mental commitment proceeding does not terminate this 
restriction. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶25 As 
a 
result 
of 
his 
civil 
commitment, 
D.K. 
is 
"prohibited from possessing any firearm."  And the "[e]xpiration 
of the mental commitment proceeding [did] not terminate this 
restriction."  Accordingly, though his commitment has expired, 
D.K. is still subject to the lasting collateral consequence of a 
firearms ban.  Since D.K. would otherwise have a fundamental 
right to bear arms, this is no minor consequence.  See U.S. 
Const. amend II; Wis. Const. art. I, § 25; see also District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Wisconsin Carry, Inc. 
v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233.  
On appeal, a decision in D.K.'s favor would void the firearms 
ban and therefore have a "practical effect."  Thus, we conclude 
that D.K.'s commitment is not a moot issue because it still 
subjects him to the collateral consequence of a firearms ban.7  
We now proceed to the merits.     
B.  Constitutional Rights And Commitment Proceedings 
¶26 The Fifth Amendment declares that no person shall be 
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
                                                 
7 Because we conclude that the firearms ban is itself 
sufficient to render D.K.'s commitment not moot, we need not 
address whether the collateral consequences of costs of care 
under Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2)-(3) or negative stigma would render 
the same result. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
14 
 
law. . . . "  U.S. Const. amend. V.  "'[C]ommitment for any 
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection.'"  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶16 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).  
Accordingly, civil commitment cases are to be handled with the 
utmost diligence and care.  Two due process protections are 
implicated in D.K.'s case——the what, and the how of commitment 
cases. 
¶27 First, due process dictates what the petitioner must 
prove for commitment to be appropriate.  The petitioner must 
prove that the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous.  
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) ("In short, a 
State 
cannot 
constitutionally 
confine 
without 
more 
a 
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in 
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible 
family members or friends.")  It is not sufficient to show that 
the individual is mentally ill.  Id. at 575.  Nor is it 
sufficient to show "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity."  
Id. 
¶28 Second, due process dictates how the petitioner must 
prove commitment is appropriate.  The petitioner must prove that 
commitment is appropriate by clear and convincing evidence.  
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 428, 432-33 (1979).  The Supreme 
Court concluded that clear and convincing evidence is the 
appropriate burden of proof in commitment cases because the 
individual liberty at stake is of great "weight and gravity."  
Id. at 427.  But, notably, the Supreme Court declined to adopt 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
15 
 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in commitment cases 
because that standard lends itself to "specific, knowable 
facts."  Id. at 430.  Civil commitment cases do not.  "The 
subtleties 
and 
nuances 
of 
psychiatric 
diagnosis 
render 
certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations."  Id.  
The clear and convincing evidentiary standard balances the 
individual's significant liberty interest with the State's 
interests 
in 
"providing 
care 
to 
its 
citizens 
who 
are 
unable . . . to care for themselves" and "protect[ing] the 
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally 
ill."  Id. at 425. 
¶29  Accordingly, in a civil commitment case, due process 
requires the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous.  
The 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
codify 
the 
same 
and 
additional 
protections. 
C.  Statutory Interpretation 
1.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20 Commitment Proceedings Generally 
¶30 We pause a moment to discuss the general statutory 
framework for involuntary commitment proceedings in Wisconsin.  
Then we will interpret and apply the particular section at issue 
in 
D.K.'s 
case. 
 
Involuntary 
commitment 
proceedings 
are 
controlled by Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  Just last term, we described 
these proceedings: 
To initiate commitment proceedings involving a 
mentally ill individual under Wis. Stat. § 51.20, the 
County must file a petition alleging the individual is 
(1) mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment, 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
16 
 
and 
(2) 
"[t]he 
individual 
is 
dangerous."  
§ 51.20(1)(a)1-2; see also [Waukesha Cty. v. J.W.J., 
2017 WI 57, ¶18, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783].  
The statute contains five standards by which the 
County 
may 
show 
the 
individual 
is 
dangerous.  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e.  Each requires the County to 
identify recent acts or omissions demonstrating that 
the individual is a danger to himself or to others.  
See id.  During the final hearing, the County bears 
the burden of proving the allegations in the petition 
by clear and convincing evidence.  § 51.20(13)(e); 
J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, ¶19, 895 N.W.2d 783.  If the 
grounds in the petition are proven, then the court 
"shall" order commitment.  § 51.20(13)(a)3; see also 
M.J. v. Milwaukee Cty. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 122 
Wis. 2d 525, 529-30, 362 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1984).  
The initial period of commitment cannot exceed six 
months.  § 51.20(13)(g)1. 
J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶17. 
¶31 In this case, the circuit court concluded that D.K. 
was mentally ill, a proper subject for commitment, and dangerous 
as defined under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  D.K. disputes the 
circuit court's conclusion as to dangerousness only.  This court 
has never before interpreted § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  We do so now.  
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Dangerousness 
¶32 Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b., 
an 
individual is dangerous if he or she: 
Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm 
to other individuals as manifested by evidence of 
recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or by 
evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of 
violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as 
evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to 
do serious physical harm. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
¶33 In this case, the County argues there was clear and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
D.K. 
presented 
"a 
substantial 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
17 
 
probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested 
by . . . evidence that others [were] placed in reasonable fear 
of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as 
evidenced by a . . . threat to do serious physical harm."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
interpret 
that 
language, and that language only. 
¶34 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (internal 
quotations omitted).  If its meaning is plain, then our inquiry 
ends.  Id.  We give statutory language "its common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning."  Id.  We give "technical or specially-
defined 
words 
or 
phrases" 
their 
"technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  "Context is important to meaning."  
Id., ¶46.  Accordingly, we interpret statutory language "not in 
isolation but as part of a whole."  Id.  For the whole statute 
to have meaning, we must "give reasonable effect to every word" 
and "avoid surplusage."  Id. 
¶35 While this court has never before interpreted the 
entirety of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., Wisconsin courts have 
interpreted portions of the language included in this section.  
We begin with "substantial probability."  In State v. Curiel, we 
interpreted the phrase "substantial probability" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(2)(c) (1995-96) and "substantially probable" in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(7) (1995-96).  227 Wis. 2d 389, 402-03, 597 
N.W.2d 697 (1999).  We noted that both the legislature and 
courts use the two phrases interchangeably and concluded that 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
18 
 
they "share a common meaning."  Id. at 403.  We then interpreted 
the plain language and concluded that the two phrases mean "much 
more likely than not."  Id. at 406.  Importantly, we connected 
this conclusion to the "substantial probability" language in ch. 
51.  We explained: 
Both ch. 980 and ch. 51 employ a "substantial 
probability" 
standard. 
 
We 
held 
that 
the 
term 
"substantially probable" as used in ch. 980 means 
"much more likely than not."  As the terms are to be 
used in a consistent manner between the chapters, we 
can conceive of no reason why the term as used in ch. 
51 should be construed any differently than it is 
under ch. 980. 
Id. at 414.8  We also noted that the legislature had amended Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20 in 1977.  Id. at 410.  It replaced "substantial 
risk" with "substantial probability."  Id.  In this case, the 
County did not dispute that "substantial probability" means 
"much more likely than not."  We now reaffirm that "substantial 
probability" in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. means "much more 
likely than not." 
¶36 Under the plain language of the statute, evidence of a 
"substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals" 
must be "manifested by" "evidence of recent homicidal or other 
violent behavior" or "evidence that others are placed in 
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to 
them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to 
                                                 
8 Since our decision in State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 
597 N.W.2d 697 (1999), the legislature has changed the language 
of both Wis. Stat. §§ 980.01(7) and 980.02(2)(c).  Both sections 
now use the word "likely."  See §§ 980.01(7) and 980.02(2)(c) 
(2015-16).. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
19 
 
do serious physical harm."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  
Because the County argues that it presented clear and convincing 
evidence of "reasonable fear," we focus our interpretation on 
that portion of the statute. 
¶37 In R.J. v. Winnebago County, the court of appeals 
interpreted "evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear 
of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them" in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.——the same section at issue here.  146 
Wis. 2d 516, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).  In that case, R.J. 
argued that "them" meant only the individuals threatened.  Id. 
at 521.  Under R.J.'s interpretation, there was no "reasonable 
fear" unless the threatened individual was subjectively aware of 
the threat.  Id.  The court of appeals correctly concluded that 
that interpretation was too narrow.  Id. at 522.  R.J.'s 
interpretation would have rendered insufficient evidence that a 
person was placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm to 
another person.  The court of appeals rejected that narrow 
interpretation of the statute.  Id.  Instead, it concluded that 
the statute was satisfied by "a showing . . . that others are 
placed in a fearsome position by a [mentally ill] person's 
actions even if the person placed in that position has no 
subjective awareness of it."  Id. at 523.  Neither party to this 
case challenges the court of appeals' interpretation in R.J.  
Rather, 
consistent 
with 
R.J., 
both 
parties 
agreed 
that 
Dr. Dave's testimony, as a third-party witness to D.K.'s alleged 
threat to harm others, could be sufficient to satisfy the 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
20 
 
statute.  They dispute only whether Dr. Dave's testimony 
actually was sufficient. 
¶38 We conclude that the court of appeals' interpretation 
in R.J. is consistent with the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  Specifically, we conclude that a plain 
reading of the statute demonstrates that "them" in the second 
clause of that section refers back to "other individuals" in the 
first clause.  See § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. ("Evidences a substantial 
probability 
of 
physical 
harm 
to 
other 
individuals 
as 
manifested . . . by 
evidence 
that 
others 
are 
placed 
in 
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to 
them . . . ") (emphasis added).  Thus, under the plain language 
of the statute, evidence that a person was placed in reasonable 
fear of serious physical harm to that person or another person 
can be sufficient to establish a "reasonable fear" under 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
¶39 In his briefing and at oral argument, D.K. argued that 
the County could not prove dangerousness under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. without showing facts supporting an objective, 
"reasonable fear."  Specifically, D.K. argued that the County 
did not prove that he was dangerous because there was no 
testimony to facts concerning his demeanor at the time he made 
his threats.  
¶40 We agree with D.K. that Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
establishes an objective test.  But our agreement ends there, 
and 
we 
decline 
to 
adopt 
D.K.'s 
interpretation. 
 
His 
interpretation 
would 
read 
out 
the 
first 
portion 
of 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
21 
 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  Under D.K.'s interpretation, evidence of 
"reasonable fear" would be both necessary and sufficient to 
establish "a substantial probability of physical harm."  See 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  Put simply, a "reasonable fear" would equal a 
"substantial probability."  That cannot be right for two 
reasons.  First, the plain language of those two phrases 
suggests otherwise——different words require different meanings.9  
See State ex rel. DNR v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District 
IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶28, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114 ("When the 
legislature uses different terms in the same act, we generally 
do not afford them the same meaning.")  Indeed, at oral 
argument, the County agreed that "the substantial probability is 
informed by the requirement of . . . threats that would put a 
reasonable person at fear of serious physical harm"; that those 
phrases must be given separate meaning in order to "harmonize" 
the statutory language.  Second, if "reasonable fear" and 
"substantial probability" in § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. meant the same 
thing, then one or the other would be surplusage.  We must 
interpret statutory language "to give reasonable effect to every 
word" and "avoid surplusage."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; see 
also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, 174-79 (2012) ("Surplusage 
Canon"); id. at 174 ("If possible, every word and every 
                                                 
9 Common sense suggests that "reasonable" is something less 
than "substantial."  Thus, D.K.'s interpretation would likely 
provide less protection for the mentally ill than the one we 
adopt today. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
22 
 
provision is to be given effect. . . . None should needlessly be 
given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another 
provision or to have no consequence."). 
¶41 We conclude that a finding of a "reasonable fear" 
supports a separate finding of a "substantial probability."  In 
other words, evidence of a "reasonable fear" is necessary but 
not automatically sufficient alone to conclude there is a 
"substantial probability of physical harm" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  A "reasonable fear" may, and perhaps often 
will, establish a "substantial probability."  But it will not 
necessarily always end the analysis. 
¶42 In sum, we conclude that the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. requires a showing that it is much more 
likely than not that the individual will cause physical harm to 
other individuals.  Id.  This conclusion can be supported by 
evidence that at least one person was placed in "reasonable fear 
of violent behavior and serious physical harm" to that same 
person or another.10  Id.  This reasonable fear must be 
"evidenced by" a "recent overt act," an "attempt," or a "threat 
to do serious physical harm."  Id. 
¶43 We now proceed to decide the merits of D.K.'s case: 
whether there was clear and convincing evidence at the final 
hearing 
that 
D.K. 
was 
dangerous 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
                                                 
10 It can also be supported by "evidence of recent homicidal 
or other violent behavior" but that language is not at issue in 
this case.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
23 
 
D.  There Was Clear And Convincing Evidence of Dangerousness. 
¶44 At the outset, we note that D.K. does not challenge 
any 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
factual 
findings 
as 
clearly 
erroneous.  Nor does D.K. challenge the circuit court's 
conclusions that D.K. had a mental illness and was a proper 
subject for commitment.  Thus, we review the evidence presented 
at the final hearing and the circuit court's findings to decide 
whether there was clear and convincing evidence that D.K. was 
dangerous as defined under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
¶45 At the final hearing, corporation counsel asked Dr. 
Dave, "Based on your interview of [D.K.] were you able to form 
an opinion as to whether or not he had presented a substantial 
risk of danger to either himself or others?"  Dr. Dave 
responded, "To other people."  The clear meaning of Dr. Dave's 
testimony is that D.K. "presented a substantial risk of danger" 
"[t]o other people." 
¶46 Dr. Dave then explained his conclusion.  He stated 
that D.K. was "paranoid about people around him.  He had 
thoughts of harming those people who were talking about him, 
making fun of him.  He also was making some threats against 
[the] police department because he had thought that they were 
not listening to him . . . ."  Corporation counsel then asked, 
"Did he tell you what his intentions were with regard to the 
police or any of the persons in the public?"  Dr. Dave 
responded, "Yes."  "He plans on strangulating the police officer 
and also killing the people who made fun of him."  Dr. Dave also 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
24 
 
testified that D.K.'s threats were directly related to his 
delusional disorder. 
¶47 The circuit court concluded: 
[Dr. Dave] testified that [D.K.] is mentally ill, that 
[D.K.] is a proper subject for treatment.  He 
testified that he is a danger to others, specifically 
that he is paranoid, that he has thoughts of harming 
people and has made threats to the police department 
that he wanted--he had thoughts that he wanted to 
strangle police and kill people.  These are homicidal 
thoughts and that's what the doctor testified to. 
(Emphasis added.)  The circuit court then confirmed that its 
conclusions fell under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(a)(1)2.b.  D.K. does 
not challenge any of the circuit court's factual findings as 
clearly erroneous.   
¶48 When we review this record, it is uncontroverted that 
Dr. Dave witnessed D.K.'s threats to harm others and testified 
that he "plan[ned] on strangulating the police officer and also 
killing the people who made fun of him."  Dr. Dave testified 
that D.K. presented a substantial risk of danger "[t]o other 
people."  Additionally, the circuit court found that D.K. made 
threats to the police department and wanted to strangle police 
and kill people. 
¶49 We conclude that Dr. Dave's testimony and the circuit 
court's factual findings established that D.K. was dangerous 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  There was clear and 
convincing evidence that D.K. "[e]vidence[d] a substantial 
probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested 
by . . . evidence that others [were] placed in reasonable fear 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
25 
 
of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as 
evidenced by a . . . threat to do serious physical harm."  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
¶50 D.K. 
argues 
that 
this 
evidence 
is 
negated 
by 
statements Dr. Dave made during cross-examination.  See Pucci v. 
Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 187 N.W.2d 138 (1971) (stating that 
"an expert opinion expressed in terms of possibility or 
conjecture is insufficient").  Specifically, D.K. argues that 
certain 
statements 
Dr. 
Dave 
made 
failed 
to 
establish 
a 
"substantial probability."  Dr. Dave stated that D.K.: "could be 
potentially dangerous"; "can become potentially dangerous"; 
"could be still potentially dangerous"; "probably may have 
acted"; and "most possibly . . . might act."  Dr. Dave also 
stated, "I don't think I can make [a] difference whether he will 
act on his thoughts or not."   
¶51 We agree with D.K. that this equivocal testimony alone 
would 
be 
at 
least 
arguably 
insufficient 
to 
establish 
a 
"substantial probability."  We will not attempt to discern what 
the 
phrases 
"probably 
may 
have 
acted" 
or 
"most 
possibly . . . might act" mean.  We need not so attempt because 
we do not review Dr. Dave's statements in isolation.  Rather, we 
review his testimony and the circuit court's findings as a 
whole.  As we concluded above, Dr. Dave's testimony on direct-
examination established clear and convincing evidence that D.K. 
was dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  And his 
testimony as a whole supports that conclusion.  Dr. Dave 
testified that D.K. presented a substantial risk of danger "to 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
26 
 
other people."  He never negated or withdrew his conclusion that 
D.K. was dangerous. 
¶52 While 
mere 
possibility 
and 
conjecture 
are 
insufficient, we will not disregard Dr. Dave's testimony simply 
because he expressed something less than certainty.  The statute 
does 
not 
require 
certainty, 
but 
rather 
a 
"substantial 
probability."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(a)(1)2.b.  Furthermore, we 
have never required a mental illness expert to be clairvoyant 
and we decline to do so now.  See Addington, 441 U.S. at 430 
("The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render 
certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations."); see 
also D.K., No. 2017AP2217, unpublished slip op., ¶9 ("To the 
extent 
that 
[D.K.] 
criticizes 
[Dr.] 
Dave's 
testimony 
as 
'speculat[ive],' Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. did not require 
[Dr.] Dave, in providing an expert opinion, to be clairvoyant of 
[D.K.'s] future acts in order to establish a 'substantial 
probability' of harm due to [D.K.'s] recent threats and his 
medical diagnosis.") 
¶53 D.K. also argues that Dr. Dave's testimony was 
insufficient under Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 
349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.  In that case, we reversed an 
involuntary medication order under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)4.b.  
Id., ¶¶96-97.  Under that section, the county "must prove that 
the 
person 
is 
substantially 
incapable 
of 
applying 
an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of particular 
medication . . . ."  Id., ¶94.  We reversed because the expert 
in that case misstated the substance of the statutory standard.  
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
27 
 
The expert testified that Melanie was not "'capable of applying 
the benefits of the medication to her advantage' rather than 
that 
she 
was 
substantially 
incapable 
of 
applying 
an 
understanding of the advantages, [and] disadvantages" of the 
medication.  Id., ¶6.  We concluded that the county did not meet 
its burden of proof because the expert's testimony "did not 
sufficiently address and meet the statutory standard."  Id., 
¶97.  We explained: 
Medical experts must apply the standards set out in 
the competency statute.  An expert's use of different 
language to explain his or her conclusions should be 
linked back to the standards in the statute. 
Id. 
¶54 D.K. uses Melanie L. to argue that Dr. Dave was 
required to testify to the exact statutory standard and that his 
statements on cross-examination were therefore insufficient.  
But the issue in Melanie L. was that the expert's testimony 
misstated the substance of the statutory standard.  That is not 
true here.  Dr. Dave did not misstate the substance of the 
standard; he merely failed to recite it exactly.  Melanie L. 
does not stand for the proposition that we require witnesses or 
circuit courts to recite magic words.  Rather, it stands for the 
proposition that a medical expert's testimony and conclusions 
"should be linked back to the standards in the statute."  
Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶97.  Dr. Dave testified that D.K.: 
was 
paranoid 
and 
suffered 
from 
delusions; 
presented 
a 
"substantial risk of danger" "to other people"; and "plan[ned] 
on strangulating the police officer and also killing" other 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
28 
 
people.  (Emphasis added.)  This is not the exact statutory 
language, but it does "link back" to it.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
(requiring 
a 
"substantial 
probability 
of 
physical 
harm 
to 
other 
individuals 
as 
manifested 
by . . . evidence that others [were] placed in reasonable fear 
of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as 
evidenced by a . . . threat to do serious physical harm") 
(emphasis added). 
¶55 We pause once more to speak to the bench and the bar.  
We do so because finality in a commitment proceeding is very 
important to all concerned.  D.K.'s commitment expired in 
November 2017, and he will not have a final answer to the 
question whether his commitment was appropriate until 2020.  Had 
certain things happened in the circuit court below, perhaps 
D.K.'s appeal would have been unnecessary.  The record was 
sufficient in this case, but it could have been more detailed.  
The County could have further developed its medical expert's 
testimony, moved the expert's report into evidence, and properly 
provided notice of its witnesses.  Also, the circuit court could 
have made more detailed and thorough factual findings and 
clarified its legal conclusions.  A commitment is no trivial 
matter.  Taking more time at the circuit court can save years of 
uncertainty on appeal. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 We conclude that D.K.'s commitment is not a moot issue 
because it still subjects him to a firearms ban.  We also 
No. 
2017AP2217   
 
29 
 
conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence at the 
final hearing that D.K. was dangerous as defined under Wis. 
Stat. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  Thus, we affirm the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶57 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority that when a commitment order infringes the 
individual right to bear arms with a restriction that remains in 
effect even after expiration of the commitment, a challenge to 
an involuntary commitment is not moot merely because the order 
has expired.  I also agree with the majority's conclusion that 
there was clear and convincing evidence at the commitment 
hearing 
of 
D.K.'s 
dangerousness 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b (2015-16).  Majority op., ¶3.1  However, I write 
separately because I disagree with the majority's methodology of 
statutory 
analysis. 
 
Instead 
of 
relying 
exclusively 
on 
precedent, the majority should have analyzed and applied the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
statutory 
text. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully concur and I join parts I, II, III, IV.A, IV.B, and 
IV.C.1 of the majority opinion.   
I   
¶58 Resolving D.K.'s challenge requires interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  Whenever we construe a statute, we 
"begin[] with the language of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court of Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted).  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain and unambiguous, we stop the inquiry.  See id. 
(citations omitted).  While the majority recites these seminal 
principles of statutory interpretation, see majority op., ¶34, 
it only superficially applies them, opting to discuss past 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
2 
 
precedent rather than conducting a thorough textual analysis.  
See majority op., ¶¶35-37.  I begin with the text of § 51.20.   
¶59 In order for a county to involuntarily commit an 
individual under Wis. Stat. § 51.20, a court must find that the 
individual is:  (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for 
treatment; and (3) dangerous.  § 51.20(1)(a)1-2; see also 
Waukesha Cty. v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶18, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 
N.W.2d 783 
(quoted 
source 
omitted). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e provides an exclusive list of five alternate 
means 
of 
establishing 
the 
requisite 
dangerousness. 
 
An 
individual is dangerous under the statute if he:   
(a) 
"Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm 
to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of 
recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious 
bodily harm."   
(b) 
"Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm 
to other individuals as manifested by evidence of 
recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or by 
evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of 
violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as 
evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to 
do serious physical harm."   
(c) 
"Evidences 
such 
impaired 
judgment, 
manifested 
by 
evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, 
that there is a substantial probability of physical 
impairment or injury to himself or herself or other 
individuals."   
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
3 
 
(d) 
"Evidences behavior manifested by recent acts or 
omissions that, due to mental illness, he or she is 
unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical 
care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate 
treatment so that a substantial probability exists 
that death, serious physical injury, serious physical 
debilitation, 
or 
serious 
physical 
disease 
will 
imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 
and adequate treatment for this mental illness."   
(e) 
"[E]vidences either incapability of expressing an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of 
accepting 
medication 
or 
treatment 
and 
the 
alternatives, or substantial incapability of applying 
an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and 
alternatives to his or her mental illness in order to 
make an informed choice as to whether to accept or 
refuse medication or treatment; and evidences a 
substantial probability, as demonstrated by both the 
individual's treatment history and his or her recent 
acts or omissions, that the individual needs care or 
treatment 
to 
prevent 
further 
disability 
or 
deterioration and a substantial probability that he or 
she will, if left untreated, lack services necessary 
for his or her health or safety and suffer severe 
mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result 
in the loss of the individual's ability to function 
independently 
in 
the 
community 
or 
the 
loss 
of 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
4 
 
cognitive or volitional control over his or her 
thoughts or actions."   
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e. 
¶60 Both parties agree that subdivision 2.b is the only 
provision at issue in D.K.'s case and both the court of appeals 
and 
the 
circuit 
court 
analyzed 
dangerousness 
under 
that 
subdivision.  Because the text of subdivision 2.b is plain and 
unambiguous, my review of whether D.K. was dangerous begins and 
ends with the text. 
¶61 Proving dangerousness under subdivision 2.b requires 
showing a "substantial probability of physical harm to other 
individuals[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  This court has 
already determined that "substantial probability" means "much 
more likely than not."  State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 413-
14, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999).  Subdivision 2.b provides three 
exclusive ways to demonstrate a person is much more likely than 
not to physically harm other individuals:   
(1) 
"evidence of recent homicidal" . . . behavior; 
(2) 
evidence of recent "other violent behavior"; or 
(3) 
"evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of 
violent behavior and serious physical harm to them[.]"2 
                                                 
2 In R.J. v. Winnebago Cty., the court of appeals determined 
the word "them" did not refer only to the individual threatened, 
but also included any member of the "great mass of humankind" in 
the class of people denoted "others" by the statute.  146 
Wis. 2d 516, 521-23, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).  Because 
R.J. is a published court of appeals opinion, and this court has 
never overruled it, its holding stands as binding law in this 
state.  See Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2).  Neither party asks us to 
overrule it. 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
5 
 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  D.K.'s case involves the third way——"others 
[were] placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious 
physical harm to them[.]"  The statute lists three alternate 
means of evidencing a "reasonable fear of violent behavior and 
serious physical harm":   
(1) 
"[A] recent overt act"; 
(2) 
A recent "attempt"; or 
(3) 
A recent "threat to do serious physical harm." 
Id.   
¶62 The text of subdivision 2.b plainly describes what is 
necessary to find a person dangerous.  The record must evidence 
a "recent overt act," a recent "attempt," or a recent "threat to 
do serious physical harm."  Any one of these three factual 
predicates suffices to show that others were "placed in 
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical 
harm[.]"  Establishing a "reasonable fear of violent behavior 
and serious physical harm" is one way of demonstrating a 
"substantial 
probability 
of 
physical 
harm 
to 
other 
individuals[.]"  Establishing a "substantial probability of 
physical harm to other individuals" is one way of showing a 
person 
is 
dangerous 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.  The analysis is complete.  As evidence of 
"others" being "placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior 
and serious physical harm to them[]" a "threat to do serious 
physical 
harm[]" 
constitutes 
satisfactory 
evidence 
of 
dangerousness; the statutory standard is met.   
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶63 The majority asserts that "evidence of a 'reasonable 
fear' is necessary but not automatically sufficient alone to 
conclude there is a 'substantial probability of physical 
harm[.]'"  Majority op., ¶41.  The majority misunderstands the 
statute.  The legislature decided that, among other proof, 
"evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent 
behavior and serious physical harm to them[]" constitutes one of 
the manifestations that a person "evidences a substantial 
probability of physical harm to other individuals[.]"  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  In other words, the legislature 
defined, 
with 
some 
particularity, 
what 
establishes 
"a 
substantial probability of physical harm" to others and included 
"others" being "placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior 
and serious physical harm" as evidence meeting that standard.   
¶64 Puzzlingly, the majority believes this interpretation 
equates "reasonable fear" and "substantial probability" and, 
along with the dissent, invokes the surplusage canon.  Neither 
the majority nor the dissent explain their accusations of 
duplication.  In its analysis, the majority neglects to consider 
the context and structure of the statute.  While the legislature 
embedded many layers in the determination of dangerousness, the 
language it used plainly says an individual is dangerous if he 
"[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to other 
individuals" and a "substantial probability of physical harm" 
may be manifested by "evidence that others are placed in 
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to 
them," which in turn may be evidenced by three separate actions:  
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
7 
 
(1) a recent overt act; (2) an attempt to do serious physical 
harm; or (3) a threat to do serious physical harm.  This 
interpretation of the statute gives effect to every word and 
every provision, ignoring none.  In contrast, the majority 
offers no explanation for its conclusory assertion that "[a] 
'reasonable fear' may, and perhaps often will, establish a 
'substantial 
probability[]' 
[b]ut . . . not 
necessarily 
always[.]"  Majority op., ¶41.  As a result of this equivocation 
by the majority, future litigants and courts may ponder when a 
"reasonable fear" may or may not establish "a substantial 
probability of physical harm" but the legislature already told 
us——in the statutory language. 
II 
¶65 D.K. argues that Dr. Dave's testimony at the final 
hearing 
was 
insufficient 
to 
meet 
the 
legal 
standard 
of 
dangerousness 
under 
subdivision 
2.b. 
 
Because 
Dr. 
Dave 
repeatedly 
used 
phrases 
such 
as 
"could 
be 
potentially 
dangerous[,]" "can become potentially dangerous[,]" "could be 
still potentially dangerous[,]" and "I don't think I can make 
the difference whether he will act on his thoughts or not[,]" 
D.K. 
argues 
the 
evidence 
was 
insufficient 
to 
find 
him 
"substantial[ly] probab[le]" or "much more likely than not" to 
"physically 
harm 
other 
individuals[.]" 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b; Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 413-14. 
¶66 Both D.K. and the dissent would impose an obligation 
on medical experts to use particular statutory terms in 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
8 
 
expressing their opinions.3  We do not impose a "magic words" 
requirement in the law and this court has repeatedly rejected 
them.  See State v. Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, ¶36, 374 Wis. 2d 98, 892 
N.W.2d 682 (rejecting in the context of a circuit court 
inquiring about juror bias); State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶33, 
355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 N.W.2d 810 (rejecting in context of 
withdrawing consent under the Fourth Amendment); Elections Bd. 
v. Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 654, 669-70, 597 
N.W.2d 721 (1999) (rejecting in context of what is required to 
be "express advocacy"); see also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 
897, 905 (2018) (noting that the Supreme Court refrains from 
reading 
statutes 
to 
"incant 
magic 
words" 
(quoted 
source 
omitted)).  The dissent asserts that "risk" is not synonymous 
with 
"probability" 
and 
because 
Dr. 
Dave 
testified 
to 
a 
substantial risk of danger, and not a substantial probability, 
there was not clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness 
under the statute.  See dissent, ¶¶79, 81, 83, 84. 
¶67 The dissent is correct that risk and probability have 
different meanings.  See Risk, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019) ("The uncertainty of a result, happening, or loss; the 
chance of injury, damage, or loss; esp., the existence and 
extent of the possibility of harm[.]"); Probability, Black's Law 
                                                 
3 The dissent relies on Outagamie Cty. v. Melanie L., 2013 
WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, for the proposition that 
medical experts must testify to the specific words set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  See dissent, ¶¶85-87.  To the 
extent Melanie L. can be read to impose such a "magic words" 
requirement, I would clarify its holding and align it with our 
other jurisprudence.  See supra ¶66. 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
9 
 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("Something that is likely; what is 
likely[]"; "The degree to which something is likely to occur, 
often expressed mathematically; Possibility[]"; "The quality, 
state, or condition of being more likely to happen or to have 
happened than not; the character of a proposition or supposition 
that is more likely true than false.").  Contrary to the 
dissent's conclusion, this distinction is not dispositive.  The 
dissent erroneously conflates the role of the court and the role 
of the medical expert in commitment cases.  While the medical 
expert testifies to the facts, the circuit court makes an 
independent legal judgment as to whether the facts meet the 
legal standard set forth in the commitment statute.   
¶68 Contrary to the arguments of the dissent and D.K., it 
is immaterial that the medical expert used "substantial risk" or 
variants of "could be potentially dangerous[.]"  It is the 
court's responsibility to determine whether the testimony and 
other evidence support a finding of a "substantial probability 
of physical harm" as required by the statute.4  Cf. Winnebago 
Cty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 
N.W.2d 109 (discussing how courts must apply facts to the legal 
statutory standard). 
                                                 
4 Because 
circuit 
courts 
bear 
the 
responsibility 
of 
determining 
whether 
the 
evidence 
satisfies 
the 
statutory 
standard, circuit courts must expressly make independent factual 
findings on the record, separate from any legal conclusions.  
Merely reciting testimony or melding factual findings with legal 
conclusions can constrain appellate review.  Because appellate 
courts 
overturn 
only 
factual 
findings 
that 
are 
"clearly 
erroneous," there must be distinct separation of factfinding 
from legal conclusions.  Cf. Winnebago Cty. v. Christopher S., 
2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109 (discussing the 
standard of review in commitment cases). 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
10 
 
¶69 Due 
to 
the 
significant 
deprivation 
of 
liberty 
associated with an involuntary commitment, due process requires 
that the evidence be clear and convincing.  Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).  The evidence at the final hearing in 
D.K.'s case clearly and convincingly supported the circuit 
court's determination that D.K. was dangerous based on D.K. 
evidencing "a substantial probability of physical harm to other 
individuals[.]"  Most importantly, the circuit court found that 
D.K. "has thoughts of harming people and has made threats to the 
police department that he wanted——he had thoughts that he wanted 
to strangle police and kill people."  D.K. does not challenge 
this finding as clearly erroneous.  As this factual finding 
involves a recent "threat to do serious physical harm[,]" made 
to Dr. Dave, it alone is sufficient to find that "others are 
placed in a reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious 
physical harm to them," which is enough to find "a substantial 
probability of physical harm to other individuals[.]"  See Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b; supra ¶¶61-62.  
¶70 While this threat alone was sufficient for the circuit 
court to find D.K. dangerous under subdivision 2.b, it also 
found:  (1) D.K. had homicidal thoughts; (2) D.K. has a mental 
illness that causes delusional disorders; and (3) D.K.'s 
delusions affected D.K.'s ability to recognize reality.  The 
uncontroverted evidence introduced during the hearing also 
demonstrated that D.K.:  (1) posed a substantial risk of danger 
to "other people"; (2) had plans to strangle police and kill 
those individuals making fun of him; (3) "could be potentially 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
11 
 
dangerous"; (4) had feelings of persecution; and (5) was at risk 
of acting on his violent thoughts because they are a product of 
his delusions and he is unable to recognize reality.   
¶71 The circuit court's factual findings that D.K. "has 
made threats to the police department" and "that he wanted to 
strangle police and kill people[]" alone render D.K. dangerous 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  The additional factual 
findings, and uncontroverted hearing testimony in the record, 
provide additional clear and convincing evidence of D.K.'s 
dangerousness. 
III 
¶72 The majority is correct that this case is not moot.  
When a commitment order infringes the individual right to bear 
arms protected by the Second Amendment and the Wisconsin 
Constitution, a challenge to an involuntary commitment is not 
moot if the firearm prohibition survives expiration of the 
commitment.  See U.S. Const. amend. II; Wis. Const. Art. 1, 
§ 25.  
¶73 A textual analysis of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b 
shows the County established D.K.'s dangerousness.  The circuit 
court's 
finding 
that 
D.K. 
"made 
threats 
to 
the 
police 
department[,]" is not clearly erroneous.  These "threat[s] to do 
serious physical harm[,]" expressed to Dr. Dave, fulfill one of 
the factual predicates sufficient to show "that others are 
placed in a reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious 
physical harm to them[.]"  That showing, in turn, satisfies one 
of 
the 
tests 
for 
dangerousness 
under 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2——"a 
No.  2017AP2217.rgb 
 
12 
 
substantial 
probability 
of 
physical 
harm 
to 
other 
individuals[.]"  Because the majority's analysis fails to 
clearly apply the plain words of the statute, I respectfully 
concur.  
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence.  
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶75 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  There is no 
dispute that D.K. suffered from delusional disorder and that he 
made statements regarding plans to strangle a police officer and 
to kill people that he perceived to be making fun of him.  The 
issue is whether the County presented sufficient evidence that 
D.K. was dangerous as a result of his disorder.  In concluding 
that the testimony of Dr. Dave was sufficient to establish that 
D.K. was dangerous, the majority ignores the statutory standard 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and implicitly 
overrules this court's holding in Melanie L. requiring medical 
experts to apply that statutory standard.  Outagamie Cty. v. 
Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.  For 
this reason, I dissent. 
¶76 The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
involuntary commitment is "'a massive curtailment of liberty' 
and in consequence 'requires due process protection.'"  Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) (citation omitted).  Because 
of the significant liberty interest involved in civil commitment 
cases, the standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence is 
required to meet due process guarantees.  Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).  "This Court has mandated 
an intermediate 
standard 
of 
proof——'clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence'——when the individual interests at stake in a state 
proceeding 
are 
both 
'particularly important' 
and 
'more 
substantial than mere loss of money.'"  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424). 
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
2 
 
¶77 To commit an individual pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b., a county must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that an individual is dangerous because he or she: 
Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm 
to other individuals as manifested by evidence of 
recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or by 
evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of 
violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as 
evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to 
do serious physical harm.  
(Emphasis added.)  Whether the facts in the record satisfy the 
statutory standard for commitment under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. is a 
question of law which this court reviews de novo.  Waukesha Cty. 
v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783. 
¶78 I agree with the majority's statutory analysis of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., see majority op. ¶¶30-42, because it 
gives effect to every statutory term, unlike the concurrence's 
analysis which renders the standard of "substantial probability" 
surplusage.  However, I part ways with the majority as to 
whether there was clear and convincing evidence presented to the 
circuit court that D.K. "evidence[d] a substantial probability 
of physical harm."  
¶79 The majority relies solely on Dr. Dave's testimony on 
direct 
examination1 
to 
support 
its 
conclusion 
that 
D.K. 
"[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to other 
                                                 
1 As the majority correctly notes, the County did not move 
Dr. Dave's report into evidence at the hearing and therefore it 
is not part of the record.  Majority op., ¶6 & n.4.     
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
3 
 
individuals."2  Dr. Dave was asked the following question on 
direct examination regarding the likelihood of D.K.'s current 
dangerousness:  "Based on your interview of [D.K.], were you 
able to form an opinion as to whether or not [D.K.] had 
presented a substantial risk of danger to either himself or 
others?"  Dr. Dave answered:  "To other people."   
¶80 The 
majority 
opinion 
pays 
lip 
service 
to 
the 
importance of reviewing Dr. Dave's testimony "as a whole," yet 
ignores his testimony on cross-examination, which it concedes 
was "at least arguably insufficient to establish a 'substantial 
probability.'"  Majority op., ¶51.  Dr. Dave stated on cross-
examination that he was not aware of any times that D.K. had 
acted on his thoughts.  When asked about the likelihood that 
D.K. would act on his thoughts, Dr. Dave opined that:  D.K. "can 
act" on his thoughts; he "can become potentially dangerous"; he 
"could be still potentially dangerous"; and he "probably may 
have acted" on his thoughts.  When asked whether Dr. Dave could 
tell "whether or not he was saying something [D.K.] was going to 
act on or maybe [was] just speaking in anger," Dr. Dave 
responded "I don't think I can make the difference whether he 
will act on his thoughts or not."  These statements do not 
support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that D.K. was 
                                                 
2 While the circuit court's factual findings in this case 
are scant, they are not clearly erroneous.  See Outagamie Cty. 
v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶38, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 
("We will not disturb a circuit court's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous."). 
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
4 
 
dangerous 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
statutory 
mandate 
of 
"substantial probability."   
¶81 But even if, like the majority, I only consider Dr. 
Dave's testimony on direct examination, the record is still 
insufficient to support a finding that D.K. evidences a 
"substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals."  
The majority says the "clear meaning" of Dr. Dave's direct 
examination testimony "is that D.K. 'presented a substantial 
risk of danger' '[t]o other people.'"  Majority op., ¶45.  But 
what exactly is "a substantial risk of danger"?  At first blush, 
it 
looks 
similar 
to 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.:  "substantial probability of physical harm."  
However, a deeper look reveals important distinctions.   
¶82 As noted by the majority opinion, the legislature 
amended Wis. Stat. § 51.20 in 1977 to replace "'substantial 
risk'" with "'substantial probability,'" signifying that there 
is a difference in meaning between these terms.  See Richards v. 
Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 
N.W.2d 581 ("By analyzing the changes the legislature has made 
over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving 
at the meaning of a statute.").  We recognized in Curiel that 
"there is no evidence that when the legislature amended Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20 in 1977 and replaced 'risk' with 'probability,' it 
did so with a view that 
'probability' and 
'risk' were 
synonymous."  State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 410, 597 N.W.2d 
697 (1999); see § 29, ch. 428, Laws of 1977; Drafting File for 
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
5 
 
1977 Act 428, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 
1977 A.B. 898, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. 
¶83 Moreover, the term "substantial risk" has a meaning 
distinct from the term "substantial probability."  This court 
often uses dictionary definitions to ascertain the meaning of 
words and phrases not defined by statute.  Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 
at 404.  The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "risk" as a 
"possibility of loss or injury."  "Risk," Merriam Webster Online 
Dictionary 
(2020), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
risk (emphasis added).  "Possible" is defined as "being 
something that may or may not occur."  "Possible," Merriam 
Webster 
Online 
Dictionary 
(2020), 
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/possible.  The common usage of the words 
testified to by Dr. Dave is that D.K. evidences a danger to 
other people that may or may not occur.  In contrast, this court 
has defined "substantial probability," as "much more likely than 
not."  Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 406.  
¶84 Possibility and probability are not, as the majority 
opinion assumes, simply interchangeable.  This court has often 
said an expert opinion expressed in terms of possibility or 
conjecture is insufficient.  See Pucci v. Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d 
513, 519, 187 N.W.2d 138 (1971) (citing to cases dating back to 
1904 for this proposition).  The important distinction between 
possibility and probability was best described in Michalski v. 
Wagner, 9 Wis. 2d 22, 28, 100 N.W.2d 354 (1960), where we held 
that there was "no probative value" to a medical expert's 
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
6 
 
testimony 
that 
it 
was 
possible 
the 
accident 
caused 
the 
plaintiff's injury.  We stated:   
Preponderance of mere possibilities is, of course, not 
the equivalent of a preponderance of probabilities. 
Mere possibilities leave the solution of an issue of 
fact in the field of conjecture and speculation to 
such an extent as to afford no basis for inferences to 
a reasonable certainty, and in the absence of at least 
such inferences there is no sufficient basis for a 
finding of fact. 
Id.  In a commitment case which carries an even higher burden of 
proof, an opinion testifying to clear and convincing evidence of 
possibilities is likewise of no probative value.   
 
¶85 The majority concludes that a medical expert is not 
required to render an opinion to the standard set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20, and thus implicitly overrules Melanie L., 349 
Wis. 2d 148.  In Melanie L., this court determined that a 
medical expert's opinion that Melanie L. was unable to apply an 
understanding "to her advantage" did not establish clear and 
convincing evidence of the statutory requirement that she be 
"substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the 
advantages, disadvantages and alternatives" of medication.  Id., 
¶96.  We emphasized that "[m]edical experts must apply the 
standards set out in the competency statute" and that "[a]n 
expert's use of different language to explain his or her 
conclusions should be linked back to the standards in the 
statute."  Id., ¶97 (emphasis added).  We further determined 
that it is a county's burden to ensure that a medical expert 
applies the required standard:  "[w]hen [corporation counsel] 
did not receive an answer in those [statutory] terms, he should 
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
7 
 
have required his witness to expound upon his answer, so that 
the circuit court and a reviewing court did not have to 
speculate upon [the doctor's] meaning."  Id., ¶91.  While no 
medical expert is required to be clairvoyant, and certainty is 
not required, Melanie L. signifies that a medical expert must 
testify to the standard set forth in § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  
¶86 Here, as in Melanie L., Dr. Dave did not testify to 
the 
standards 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
competency 
statute 
and 
corporation counsel failed to clarify the testimony or introduce 
his report into evidence.3  The majority attempts to distinguish 
Melanie L. by claiming that Dr. Dave "did not misstate the 
substance of the standard; he merely failed to recite it 
exactly."  Majority op., ¶54.  Dr. Dave did exactly what the 
majority opinion identified as improper:  he misstated the 
substance of the standard.  The testimony of Dr. Dave using an 
alternate standard did not rise to the level of proof by clear 
and convincing evidence that D.K. evidences a "substantial 
probability of physical harm to other[s]" as mandated by Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.  As this court warned in Melanie L., 
"[Wis. Stat. ch. 51] hearings cannot be perfunctory under the 
                                                 
3 The majority opinion recognizes that the County "could 
have further developed its medical expert's testimony, moved the 
expert's report into evidence, and properly provided notice of 
its witnesses."  Majority op., ¶55.  We review only the record 
before us in a case, not the record that could have been made.  
See Covelli v. Covelli, 2006 WI App 121, ¶14, 293 Wis. 2d 707, 
718 N.W.2d 260 ("When reviewing fact finding, we search the 
record for evidence to support findings reached by the trial 
court, not for evidence to support findings the trial court did 
not but could have reached.").   
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
8 
 
law.  Attention to detail is important."  Melanie L., 349 
Wis. 2d 148, ¶94.   
¶87 Since the record before the circuit court reflects 
that the County's only witness did not render an opinion 
regarding D.K.'s likelihood of dangerousness as defined in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., and as required by Melanie L., 349 
Wis. 2d 148, I would reverse and vacate the circuit court's 
order.   
¶88 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2017AP2217.rfd 
 
 
 
1