Title: State v. Cleary

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Cleary (2001-289); 175 Vt. 142; 824 A.2d 509

2003 VT 9

[Filed 07-Feb-2003]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 06-Mar-2003]

       'NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                  2003 VT 9

                                No. 2001-289

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit

  Donald R. Cleary	                         May Term, 2002

  Alan W. Cook, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and William A. Nelson and Anna
    Saxman, Appellate Defenders, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       ¶  1.  MORSE, J.   Defendant Donald Cleary appeals following his
  guilty plea to charges of attempted sexual assault and lewd and lascivious
  conduct.  He argues that the district court erred by finding him competent
  to stand trial contingent upon his receiving the aid of a cognitive
  facilitator.  He also argues that the trial court violated V.R.Cr.P. 11
  during the plea hearing by failing to personally address him, establish his
  knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights, and elicit his acknowledgment
  of a factual basis for the charges.  We conclude that the record supports
  the district court's competency finding, and that defendant has failed to
  demonstrate that any Rule 11 deficiencies amounted to plain error. 
  Accordingly, we affirm. 
   
       ¶  2.  Defendant is a mentally retarded, thirty-six-year-old
  resident of Hyde Park with an IQ (intelligence quotient) between sixty-five
  and seventy.  While his IQ has remained constant over time, his functional
  abilities have improved.  Defendant lives independently and is employed as
  a logger.

       ¶  3.   On three occasions prior to 1991, defendant was charged with
  criminal offenses but found incompetent to stand trial.  Since then,
  however, he has twice been found competent to stand trial.  In 1991, he
  pled guilty to charges of unlawful trespass, simple assault, and attempted
  sexual assault.  In 1999, he pled guilty to a charge of unlawful trespass
  based on an incident in which he entered a woman's home.  The present
  charges stem from an alleged sexual assault against his mother.

       ¶  4.  In connection with those charges, defendant was evaluated by
  two experts, Dr. Cotton and Dr. Kinsler.  Both experts initially found
  defendant incompetent to stand trial and agreed that the determination was
  a "close call."  Dr. Cotton later changed his opinion and found defendant
  competent based on material that neither he nor Dr. Kinsler had reviewed
  before making their initial determinations, including depositions by mental
  health workers who had supervised defendant and a 1998 competency
  evaluation by another expert.  Dr. Cotton's revised opinion was based on
  information suggesting that defendant could communicate and cooperate with
  his mental health supervisors, plan and accomplish goals, and live
  independently.  Dr. Cotton also considered evidence that defendant had
  willfully manipulated his capacities over time to satisfy his needs.
   
       ¶  5.  In a lengthy decision filed on October 16, 2000, the district
  court found defendant competent to stand trial, noting, among other things,
  that (1) he had the mental capacity to communicate with counsel and make
  choices after weighing the risks and benefits of the various options; (2)
  he had considerable experience with the criminal justice system; (3) he had
  a basic understanding of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; and (4) he
  knew the roles and functions of his attorney, the prosecutor and the judge.
  ¶  6.  The court cautioned, however, that defendant did not fully
  understand the function and role of the jury because he had never gone to
  trial.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that, with careful explanation
  and accommodation, defendant could develop a sufficient understanding of
  the jury's role at trial, and that with such support he would be competent
  to stand trial.

       ¶  7.  Following the competency decision, defendant elected to plead
  guilty to the charges with the understanding that the State would propose a
  ten-to-twenty-year sentence.  At the November 20, 2000 change-of-plea
  hearing, the trial court suggested that, given defendant's limitations, the
  Rule 11 colloquy might be more effective if defense counsel asked the
  questions, with the court assuring itself that the plea was knowing and
  intelligent.  Defense counsel indicated it was a good idea and proceeded to
  ask defendant a series of questions.  The court also asked questions of its
  own.  Following the colloquy, the court expressed its satisfaction, based
  on defendant's demeanor and his periodic conferences with his counsel, that
  defendant understood the terms and consequences of his plea.

       ¶  8.  The sentencing hearing was held approximately six months later,
  on May 14, 2001.   At the hearing, the court sentenced defendant to a term
  of ten-to-twenty years for sexual assault, and four-to-five years, to be
  served concurrently, for the lewd and lascivious conduct.  Defendant filed
  an appeal within thirty days of the sentencing decision.

                                     I.
   
       ¶  9.  Defendant first argues on appeal that the district court
  erred by finding him competent to stand trial contingent upon him receiving
  the assistance of a cognitive facilitator.  The State denies that the
  district court made its finding of competency contingent upon the
  assistance of a cognitive facilitator, but contends, in any event, that
  defendant's unconditional guilty plea waived his right to any direct appeal
  of the competency determination.

       ¶  10.  We first consider the State's latter contention.  It is
  generally true, as the State notes, that a voluntary guilty plea waives all
  non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the plea. 
  State v. Armstrong, 148 Vt. 344, 346,