Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MAYCOCK

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MAYCOCK2001 WY 10333 P.3d 1114Case Number: 00-5Decided: 10/31/2001

October Term, A.D. 2001

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF                 

MICHAEL 
A. MAYCOCK, deceased:

JEFFREY 
C. MAYCOCK and

BRADLEY A. MAYCOCK, 

Petitioners,

v.

DEBORRA 
MAYCOCK, Personal

Representative 
of the Estate

of Michael A. Maycock, Deceased, 

Respondent.

from 
the District Court of Campbell County:

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

Representing 
Petitioners:

Brian 
N. Beisher of Hart & Beisher, Sheridan, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Beisher.

 Representing 
Respondent:

Dan 
B. Riggs and Jonathan A. Botten of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, WY for Deborra 
Maycock; and Thomas E. Lubnau II of Lubnau, Hand & Bailey, LLC, Gillette, WY 
for the Estate of Michael Maycock.  
Argument by Messrs. Riggs and Lubnau.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS*, GOLDEN, HILL, and 
KITE, JJ.
 
     *Concurred prior to retirement

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      Following 
their father's death, Jeffrey and Bradley Maycock entered into estate settlement 
negotiations with their mother, Deborra Maycock, who was both an heir to her 
late husband's estate and the personal representative thereof.  Settlement was achieved after several 
written offers and counter offers.  
After actions had been taken in reliance upon that settlement, the sons 
had second thoughts, and the estate's attorney sought the probate court's 
intervention.  Upon hearing, the 
court ordered performance of the agreement. Jeffrey and Bradley seek review of 
that order, insisting that the agreement is inchoate and facially violative of 
the statute of frauds.  Finding 
sufficient writings and holding the policy favoring family settlements to be 
paramount, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Jeffrey and 
Bradley articulate the following issues:

Is the alleged oral agreement unenforceable because 
it violates Wyoming Statute § 1-23-105, the Statute of 
Frauds?

1.  Is the alleged oral agreement 
unenforceable because there is no writing signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought?

2.  Did the negotiations in this matter 
result in an oral agreement, or only an agreement to 
agree?

3.  Does the policy favoring upholding 
parties' agreements outweigh the legislative mandate of the statute of 
frauds?

4.  Is there sufficient memorandum to 
satisfy the statute of frauds?

5.  Has there been sufficient complete or 
substantial performance to make the application of the statute of frauds 
inequitable?

6.  Should the Wyoming Supreme Court create 
a new special exception in this jurisdiction to the statute of 
frauds?

Deborra's statement of the issue is a bit more 
succinct:

            
Does the statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-105 (1999) render void the 
subject settlement agreement reached and substantially performed by both sides 
during this probate litigation?

FACTS

[¶3]      There is no 
dispute as to any fact material to our review.  Michael Maycock died on September 11, 
1998, leaving an estate composed of real property, title to much of which was 
imbued with mineral interests, and personal effects.  Mr. Maycock's last will and testament, 
after some specific bequests to his wife and sons, divided the residuary of his 
estate into two shares termed "Share A" and  "Share B."  Mr. Maycock devised "Share A" to his 
wife, Deborra.  Its size was to 
be predicated upon a valuation of the federal estate tax exemption.  "Share B" was composed of the balance of 
the estate and was devised to sons, Bradley and Jeffrey, in equal shares.  Additionally, the will named Deborra as 
personal representative of the estate. 

[¶4]      Deborra Maycock 
chose, in January of 1999, to exercise her privilege under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-5-101(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001) to take an elective share against her late 
husband's will.  In April of 1999, 
Jeffrey and Bradley objected to their mother's decision, as personal 
representative, to accept a proposed settlement of the estate's claim against 
their father's former law partners (hereinafter the Daly-Anderson 
agreement).  Thereafter, mother and 
sons, through counsel, entered into fairly protracted settlement negotiations 
regarding the distribution of the estate.

[¶5]      Negotiations 
manifested themselves in a writing when Jeffrey and Bradley, in a May 27, 1999 
letter to Mrs. Maycock's counsel, offered to renounce all their claims as 
beneficiaries under the will in exchange for an undivided one-half interest in 
the estate's mineral interests (¼ each), six named horses, two Rolex watches, 
their father's coin collection, "the mounted heads," a Colt pistol, $120,000 
each, and retention of the firearms then in each son's possession.  The letter stated, "[u]pon distribution 
to my clients of the above described property the balance of the estate, 
including the entire Edwards Place, would then be set over to [Deborra] as would 
the estate livestock excluding, of course, any livestock which already belongs 
to my clients."  Although the 
parties and the probate court have failed to take note of it, special attention 
should be afforded the fact that Bradley's and Jeffrey's May 27 offer letter 
recites the final settlement almost verbatim. 

[¶6]      Evidently 
disenchanted with the slow progress of the negotiations, Jeffrey and Bradley 
petitioned the probate court on July 20, 1999, seeking to remove their mother as 
personal representative of the estate.  
Three days later, however, on July 23, 1999, the attorney representing 
the estate presented a written counteroffer on behalf of Deborra Maycock1.  That counteroffer would have left the 
sons without any mineral estate.  
However, in addition to the individual items previously requested by her 
sons, Deborra offered to cede a "D-6 Dozer," a dump truck, and $112,500 dollars 
to each son in consideration for settlement and her payment of all debts of the 
estate, totaling roughly $220,000.00.  
Finally, her counteroffer called for Deborra to retain all the other 
assets of the estate, requesting that her sons withdraw their objections to the 
Daly-Anderson agreement as well as their motion to remove her as personal 
representative. 

[¶7]      On August 4, 
1999, the sons' attorney orally rejected Mrs. Maycock's July 23 offer and 
presented an oral counteroffer to the estate's attorney which called for Jeffrey 
and Bradley to retain ¼ interest, each, in their late father's mineral estate, 
sharing with their mother's ½ interest as tenants in common.  That final counteroffer, mirroring as it 
does the sons' first offer, was orally accepted on Mrs. Maycock's behalf.  That same day the sons' attorney 
withdrew their objections to the Daly-Anderson agreement and to Mrs. Maycock's 
service as personal representative.  
Mrs. Maycock, as well, took steps to implement the settlement by 
finalizing the Daly-Anderson agreement and arranging financing for her promise 
of plenary debt retirement.  On 
August 9, 1999, the estate's attorney drafted and delivered a letter confirming 
Mrs. Maycock's acceptance of the sons' counteroffer made five days 
previous.

[¶8]      In addition to 
the terms of Jeffrey's and Bradley's initial offer, the settlement agreement 
also calls for them to receive their father's silver pickup and its debt.  Each son would retain ¼ of the estate's 
mineral interests, and each son would receive his payment of $112,500 no later 
than ninety days after the date of Deborra's acceptance of the offer.  The following day, the attorney 
representing Jeffrey and Bradley informed the estate's attorney by telephone 
that his clients would not agree to the terms in the letter and "were backing 
out of the Settlement Agreement."  
On September 1, 1999, per her cash payment obligation, Deborra was 
approved for a loan in the amount of $175,000. 

[¶9]      On September 23, 
1999, the district court held a hearing on Deborra's motion to enforce the oral 
settlement agreement of August 4, 1999, as articulated in counsel's August 9, 
1999 letter.  Seven days later, the 
court entered its order with the following findings and conclusions of law: 
(1) an oral settlement agreement occurred on August 3, 1999;2 (2) the settlement agreement 
was not within the statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105; (3) even 
if the settlement agreement was within the statute of frauds, sufficient 
writings existed to satisfy the statute; and (4) both parties had 
substantially performed the oral agreement justifying its removal from the 
requirements of the statute through equity.  On March 3, 2000, the probate court 
partially distributed the estate according to the terms of the settlement 
agreement found by the district court.  
Jeffrey and Bradley filed a timely notice of appeal, which we later 
converted, sua sponte, to a petition for writ of review pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 13.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10]   
A settlement agreement is a contract and, therefore, subject to the same 
legal principles that apply to any contract. Mater of Estate of 
McCormick, 926 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo. 1996).  Whether a contract has been formed is a 
question of fact.  Shaw v. Smith, 
964 P.2d 428, 435 (Wyo. 1998).  
When, however, the terms of an oral contract are shown without conflict 
in the evidence, the interpretation thereof becomes a question of law for the 
courts. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218 
(Wyo. 1994).

[¶11]   
On appeal, a judge's findings of fact, though not entitled to the great 
deference afforded a jury's determinations, will not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous.  Hopper v. All Pet 
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993).  "A finding is clearly erroneous' when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed."  Hopper, at 538 
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 
395,  68 S. Ct. 525, 542,  92 L. Ed. 746 
(1948)).

[¶12]   
Our standard of review for any conclusion of law is de novo.  If the lower court's conclusion is in 
accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct it. Anderson 
Highway Signs & Supply, Inc. v. Close, 6 P.3d 123, 124 (Wyo. 2000); 
Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 
(Wyo. 1993).  The determination that 
a given agreement is within the statute of frauds is a question of law which we 
review de novo.  Matter of 
Estate of Jackson, 892 P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1995).

DISCUSSION

[¶13]               
The power of a trial court to enter a judgment enforcing a settlement 
agreement has its basis in the policy favoring the settlement of disputes and 
the avoidance of costly and time-consuming litigation.  To effectuate this policy, the power of 
a trial court to enforce a settlement agreement has been upheld even where the 
agreement has not been arrived at in the presence of the court nor reduced to a 
writing.

Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 779 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting with 
approval Kukla v. Nat'l Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 
(6th Cir. 1973)); see also Matter 
of Estate of McCormick, 926 P.2d  at 362-63.  Sitting as a probate court in this 
matter, the district court found the parties had orally entered into a 
settlement agreement regarding the distribution of the estate of the testator, 
Michael Maycock, and enforced that agreement.  Jeffrey and Bradley Maycock do not here 
dispute the lower court's factual finding of an agreement, nor are they 
successful in planting any seeds of doubt as to the exact contours of that 
agreement.  The dispute is whether 
the probate court erred in enforcing the agreement as it is within the statute 
of frauds, as a transfer of real property interests, and thus void absent a 
writing signed by them, as the parties to be charged.3 

Statute of Frauds

[¶14]   
The statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 2001), 
provides in pertinent part:

(a) In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, 
and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:

            

* * * 

(v) Every agreement or contract for the sale of real 
estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one (1) year. 4         

[¶15]   
This court has held "[t]he contract for the sale of real estate as 
contemplated by the statute is one for the transfer of property or real estate, 
for a fixed price in money or its equivalent." Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1123-24 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 802 
(Wyo. 1986) overruled on other grounds, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991)); 
Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976); Mecum v. Metz, 30 
Wyo. 495, 503, 222 P. 574, 576 (Wyo. 1924).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-402 (LexisNexis 
2001) provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided in this code, when a 
person dies the title to his property, real and personal, passes to the person 
to whom it is devised by his last will, or in the absence of such disposition to 
the persons who succeed to his estate as provided in this code. 

We have 
long held mineral interests of the sort envisioned in the parties' settlement to 
be interests in real property.  
Johnson v. Anderson, 768 P.2d 18, 23 (Wyo. 1989); Connaghan v. 
Eighty-Eight Oil Co., 750 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Wyo. 1988); McGinnis v. 
McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Wyo. 1964); Denver Joint Stock Land Bank 
of Denver v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 542-43, 122 P.2d 842, 849 
(1942).

[¶16]   
Petitioners are correct in contending that upon the death of Michael 
Maycock, title to his real property, including mineral interests, passed to the 
devisees of his will: Deborra, Jeffrey, and Bradley Maycock.  Subsequently, through the family 
settlement agreement of August 4, 1999, as memorialized in counsel's August 9, 
1999 letter, the Maycock sons orally agreed to surrender any interest in the 
real property of the estate, as well as some percentage of their mineral 
interests,5 to their mother in exchange for 
$225,000, payment by her of the estate's debts totaling $220,000, and other 
assorted property.

[¶17]   
Without more, it appears that the parties' agreement fits the technical 
definition of a contract falling within Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105(a)(v).  The appellants are quick to remind us of 
the great trepidation with which we have long viewed efforts to expand 
exceptions to the statute of frauds, noting that we have consistently chosen to 
err, if at all, on the side of restricting rather than enlarging those 
exceptions. Crosby v. Strahan's Estate, 78 Wyo. 302, 314, 324 P.2d 492, 
496 (1958).  The object of the 
statute has remained fixed, the "manifest" purpose being "to secure the highest 
and most satisfactory species of evidence" when determining title to property, 
inter alia. Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. (3 Metcalf) 396, 397 
(1841) (as cited with approval in Ivenson v. Caldwell, 3 Wyo. 465, 
467,  27 P. 563, 564 
(1891)).

[¶18]   
Given the near identity of the sons' first written offer and the final 
settlement agreement, we are obliged to consider whether the requirement of the 
statute of frauds that a writing be "subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith" is satisfied by the subscription of Jeffery's and Bradley's 
attorney.  Our rule has been that 
this rule "would be satisfied if the party to be charged were to authorize 
another in writing to sign.  The 
giving to another parol authority, or an oral ratification, would not be 
sufficient." Wallis v. Bosler, 70 Wyo. 129, 148, 246 P.2d 771, 778 
(1952).  Though the existence of a 
signed agreement between the sons and their counsel is likely, the record does 
not reveal as much.  Jeffrey and 
Bradley did not dispute their agency relation with counsel at trial, however, 
and do not deny that relationship here.  
What we can conclude from all of this is that the need for strict 
adherence to the statute of frauds under the facts of this case is less than 
compelling.

[¶19]   
Application of the statute of frauds to the facts of this case having 
been called into question, we look to the underlying purposes of that 
legislation.  Furthermore, however 
jealous we may be of inroads upon application of the statute of frauds, we 
remain mindful that its rote application is not automatic.  Enforcement of the statute of frauds 
subserves significant policy concerns, not unlike enforcement of the policy 
favoring settlements:

The statute of frauds was enacted to prevent fraud, 
not to aid it, and should receive a reasonable interpretation with that end in 
view.  The great majority of courts 
have always endeavored to keep that principle uppermost in rendering their 
decisions. 

Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. 313, 327,  232 P. 511, 515 
(1925).

[¶20]   
Clearly, under the unique and difficult factual situation presented by 
this case, the policy considerations supporting application of the statute of 
frauds do not occupy the field to the exclusion of other fairly compelling 
policy considerations.  If strong 
policy considerations favor enforcement of the statute of frauds and 
implementation of arm's length settlement agreements, equally venerable 
precedent urges this court to place our imprimatur upon "family settlements" 
even where the very "family" in question has been or is in the process of being 
split asunder by divorce.  
Rinehart v. Rinehart, 52 Wyo. 363, 369, 75 P.2d 390, 391 
(1938).  Mr. Chief Justice Blume 
repeatedly observed that equity favors compromises and settlements in probate 
matters:

It is said that "equity favors amicable adjustments, 
and will not disturb them unless its jurisdiction is invoked in favor of one 
without knowledge at the time, by satisfactory evidence, of deception, fraud or 
mistake."  5 R.C.L. 879.  No deceit, fraud or mistake is pleaded 
herein or shown.

Hill v. Breeden, 53 Wyo. 125, 142-43,  79 P.2d 482, 488 
(1938).

[¶21]   The rationale underlying the strong 
preference of the law for family settlements was aptly explained by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court nearly eighty years ago:

Family 
settlements . . . when fairly made, and when they do not prejudice the 
rights of creditors, are favorites of the law. . . . They are made in 
recognition of facts and circumstances known, often, only to those who have 
lived in the sacred family circle, and which a just family pride would not 
expose to those who neither understand nor appreciate them.  They proceed from a desire on the part 
of all who participate in them to adjust property rights, not upon strict legal 
principles, however just, but upon such terms as will prevent possible family 
dissensions, and will tend to strengthen the ties of family affection.  The law ought to, and does, respect such 
settlements[.]  

Tise v. 
Hicks, 132 S.E. 560, 562 (N.C. 1926).6

[¶22]   In balancing the various policy 
considerations before us, we are aided in no small fashion by the factual 
determination of the probate court.  
Exercising its inherent authority recognized by this court in Wyoming 
Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d  at 775, and Matter of Estate of 
McCormick, 926 P.2d  at 362, the probate court found, as a matter of fact, 
that the parties had orally entered into a settlement agreement regarding the 
distribution of the estate of the testator, Michael Maycock, and enforced that 
agreement.  We cannot begin to find 
a basis for holding that the probate court's factual findings in this regard are 
questionable, let alone clearly erroneous.

[¶23]   Viewing the contours of the 
settlement ordered by the probate court, we cannot help but be impressed with 
what that settlement accomplishes.  
The debts of the estate are retired and no creditor has been left 
unsatisfied.  All parties are left 
with appreciable liquid assets in addition to reasonable expectations of future 
returns from the mineral estate which they share as tenants in common.  It is significant to make note of the 
fact that the disposition of the mineral estate is such that the parties to this 
appeal, presently so at odds, will need to put aside their differences and 
cooperate to the end that their shared mineral wealth may be reduced to 
possession.

[¶24]   Perhaps the most singular attribute 
of the much maligned settlement agreement is its uncanny resemblance to the very 
first written offer advanced by Jeffrey and Bradley on May 27, 1999.  In a number of particulars, the final 
settlement is more favorable to the sons, giving over to them a D-6 Caterpillar 
bulldozer, a dump truck, and their father's late-model pickup (albeit 
accompanied by Jeffrey's and Bradley's assumption of the remaining debt 
thereon).  The only downside of the 
final settlement is that Bradley and Jeffrey will receive cash payments of only 
$112,500.00 rather than the $120,000.00 they had each requested.  Even in that instance, however, 
something was added when Deborra guaranteed to make full cash payment to each 
son within 90 days of the settlement agreement.  The congruence of the sons' May 27, 1999 
offer with the final settlement casts a long shadow over their efforts at 
disavowal of that settlement.  There 
is, indeed, a writing signed by the agent of those to be charged which describes 
the final settlement with only the most minor disparities.  That writing and the settlement 
agreement leave no doubt that the probate court had before it sufficient notes 
and memoranda' to avoid frontal offense to the statute of 
frauds:

The 
agreement, however, would be void unless there were also shown some sufficient 
note or memorandum thereof in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith.  It is certainly 
competent to show by parol testimony the attendant circumstances, in order to 
inform the court of the position and condition of the contracting 
parties.

North 
Platte Milling & Elevator Co. v. Price, 4 Wyo. 
293, 302,  33 P. 664, 665 (1893) 
(quoted with approval in Mead v. Leo Sheep Co., 32 Wyo. at 322-23,  232 P. at 513).

[¶25]   In light of the initial offer 
presented by Jeffrey and Bradley, the aforementioned consequences of the 
settlement agreement, and the actions taken in reliance thereupon, it must be 
emphasized that the sons do not, because they cannot, affirmatively allege 
fraud, deception or mistake.  

[¶26]   The primary objective of probate 
should be an expeditious adjudication of the rights to the property of the 
decedent.  In re Stevenson's 
Estate, 445 P.2d 753, 756 (Wyo. 1968).  
Such a determination should be made "to the end that those entitled to 
share [in the estate] may have the full benefit of the rights which the law 
gives them at the earliest moment consonant with due process and orderly 
procedure."  In re Mayne's 
Estate, 345 P.2d 790, 795 (Wyo. 1959) 
(quoting 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice, p. 109 (2nd ed. 1951)).

[¶27]   None should labor under the false 
belief that this decision carves out a fresh exception to the statute of 
frauds.  The probate court did not 
resort to parol evidence in order to fix the terms of the agreement with 
certainty, and neither do we.  To 
the minor extent that the final settlement diverges from Bradley's and Jeffery's 
initial written offer, we find that the policy considerations favoring family 
settlements and the swift and certain adjudication in probate matters are, under 
the unique facts of this case, paramount when juxtaposed with the policy 
considerations underlying the statute of frauds.

[¶28]   The probate court's factual 
determination that the parties have formed an enforceable contract is affirmed, 
the appellants having failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that said 
determination was clearly erroneous.  
The extent to which the statute of frauds applies in this instance is 
called into serious question by the marked similarity of the final settlement 
agreement to the first offer of settlement proffered on behalf of the 
contestants, Jeffrey and Bradley Maycock.  
In the absence of allegations of fraud, deception or trickery, let alone 
proof thereof, the desirability of intra-familial settlement, along with the 
priority given the swift and certain administration of estates, must take 
priority over questionable adherence to the statute of frauds under the facts of 
this case.  The decision of the 
probate court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1The record is unclear as to the 
reason settlement negotiations after May 27, 1999, took place with the estate's 
attorney rather than with the attorney who represented Mrs. Maycock in her 
capacity as beneficiary.

2Though the judge's order finds that 
the agreement took place on August 3, 1999, the letter evidencing the terms of 
the agreement prepared by the estate's attorney, the pleadings, and the probate 
distribution of the estate cite the date of settlement as August 4, 1999.  

3This is the same issue deemed waived 
and thus unanswered in Matter of Estate of McCormick, 926 P.2d 360 (Wyo. 
1996), a case involving the enforcement of an oral estate distribution 
settlement agreement among an intestate's heirs.

 4"In this form, and without change, 
the Wyoming Statute of Frauds has been a part of Wyoming law since 1871, insofar 
as the sale of real estate is concerned."  
Wallis v. Bosler, 70 Wyo. 129, 139, 246 P.2d 771, 774 (Wyo. 
1952).  

 5The original percentage of the sons' 
mineral interests is undetermined as it was to be based upon the size of their 
mother's share in the estate: "Share A." Likewise, the precise composition of 
Mrs. Maycock's elective share of the estate was never 
determined.

6See generally M.L. Cross, Annotation, Family 
Settlement of Testator's Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8, 27 § 4 (1970 & Supp. 
2000).