Title: LeRoy M. Strenke v. Levi Hogner

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 25 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-2527 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
LeRoy M. Strenke and Juanita M. Strenke,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Levi Hogner and NAU Country Insurance Company,  
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 18, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 28, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Barron   
 
JUDGE: 
Frederick A. Henderson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs by Karen J. 
Kinglsey and Kingsley Law Office, P.A., St. Paul, MN, and oral 
argument by Karen J. Kingsley. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there were briefs by Owen R. 
Williams and Owen R. Williams Trial Lawyers, Amery; and Lynn R. 
Laufenberg and Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Lynn R. Laufenberg. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Bruce R. Bachhuber and 
Hanaway Ross, S.C., Green Bay; and by William C. Gleisner, III, 
and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, III, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard G. Niess and 
Coyne, Niess, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, SC, Madison, on behalf of 
Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
 
2
 
2005 WI 25 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-2527  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 000179 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
LeRoy M. Strenke and Juanita M. Strenke,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Levi Hogner and NAU Country Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
 
          Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 18, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Barron County, Frederick A. Henderson, Judge.  Affirmed in part 
and cause remanded.   
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals.1  The defendants-
                                                 
1 Levi Hogner and NAU Country Insurance appeal from the 
punitive damages portion of a judgment entered by the circuit 
court 
for 
Barron 
County, 
Frederick 
A. 
Henderson, 
Judge.  
Alternatively, they appeal from the circuit court's denial of a 
motion for remittitur or a new trial on the issue of punitive 
damages. 
No. 
03-2527   
 
2 
 
appellants, Levi Hogner and NAU Country Insurance, assert that 
there was insufficient evidence to allow the issue of punitive 
damages to go to the jury.  Additionally, they contend that the 
jury's 
award 
of 
punitive 
damages 
was 
excessive, 
thereby 
violating Hogner's constitutional right to due process. 
¶2 
In its certification, the court of appeals states the 
issues as follows: 
(1) 
What proof is required for a plaintiff to recover 
punitive 
damages 
under 
the 
phrase 
"in 
an 
intentional 
disregard 
of 
the 
rights 
of 
the 
plaintiff" as provided in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) 
(2001-02)?2 
i. If Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Am., 
Inc., 2003 WI App 202, ¶40, 267 Wis. 2d 638, 
673 N.W.2d 303, review granted (Wis. April 20, 
2004) (Nos. 01-0724, 01-1031 & 01-2486), is 
correct, are there sufficient facts from which 
a jury could conclude Levi Hogner was aware his 
acts 
were 
"practically 
certain" 
to 
cause 
injury? 
(2) 
Must a defendant's conduct giving rise to punitive 
damages 
have 
been 
directed 
at 
the 
specific 
plaintiff seeking punitive damages? 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
03-2527   
 
3 
 
(3) 
If there was sufficient evidence to submit a 
punitive damages question to the jury, is the 
jury's punitive damage award excessive or in 
violation of Hogner's due process rights?3 
¶3 
In response to the issues presented, we conclude that 
a person acts in an intentional disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff if the person acts with a purpose to disregard the 
plaintiff's rights, or is aware that his or her acts are 
substantially certain to result in the plaintiff's rights being 
disregarded.  Furthermore, we determine that a defendant's 
conduct giving rise to punitive damages need not be directed at 
the specific plaintiff seeking punitive damages in order to 
recover under the statute. 
¶4 
However, we are equally divided on the question of 
whether the jury's punitive damage award was excessive and 
therefore 
in 
violation 
of 
Hogner's 
due 
process 
rights.4  
                                                 
3 The court of appeals also certified a fourth issue 
regarding Strenke's cross-appeal of whether the circuit court 
erred in bifurcating the compensatory damages from the punitive 
damages in this matter.  Because we granted Strenke's motion for 
voluntary dismissal of his cross-appeal, however, we do not 
address the issue here.   
4 Although the certification of the court of appeals treats 
excessiveness and due process as separate inquiries, we view 
them as intertwined.  The Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a 
tortfeasor."  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (citing Cooper Industries, Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001); BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996)).  See 
also Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 2003 
WI 46, ¶50, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789.     
No. 
03-2527   
 
4 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part 
and remand to the court of appeals to decide this remaining 
issue consistent with the principles set forth in Trinity 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, 261 
Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789. 
I 
¶5 
This case arises out of an automobile accident that 
occurred on October 16, 1998.  At the time of the accident, 
LeRoy Strenke was traveling northbound on Highway 48 near 
Cumberland, Wisconsin.  Levi Hogner was traveling southbound on 
the same road.  As Strenke approached the intersection of 
Highway 48 and Golf Course Road, Hogner's vehicle turned left 
into the path of Strenke's car, injuring Strenke. 
¶6 
Hogner was charged with operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated.  His blood alcohol content was tested to be 
.269%.  He pled no contest to operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated, fifth offense.  Hogner was sentenced to a year in 
jail, alcohol assessment, revocation of his driver's license for 
36 months, and paid $3,041 in fines. 
¶7 
LeRoy and Juanita Strenke sued Hogner for negligence, 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.  Hogner and NAU 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Hogner) stipulated to 
liability, but disputed the Strenkes' damages.  The circuit 
court granted Hogner's motion to bifurcate the punitive damages 
claim from the compensatory damages claim.  Subsequently, the 
jury awarded the Strenkes $2,000 in compensatory damages. 
No. 
03-2527   
 
5 
 
¶8 
During the punitive damages trial, Hogner admitted 
that 
he 
had 
four 
prior 
convictions 
for 
driving 
while 
intoxicated.  He further acknowledged that he consumed 16 to 18 
twelve-ounce containers of beer within a five-hour span on the 
night of the accident.5  However, Hogner testified that he had 
never injured anyone when drinking and did not intend to injure 
anyone on the date in question. 
¶9 
At the close of the testimony, Hogner moved for a 
directed 
verdict, 
asserting 
that 
the 
plaintiffs 
had 
not 
presented a prima facie case that he acted maliciously toward 
Strenke or intentionally disregarded Strenke's rights.  The 
circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that while Hogner did 
not act maliciously toward Strenke, the jury could conclude that 
Hogner intentionally disregarded Strenke's rights. 
¶10 According to the circuit court, Strenke was a member 
of a class of motorists that had rights.  It determined that a 
jury could find that Hogner's intentional acts of drinking 16-18 
twelve-ounce 
containers 
of 
beer, 
and 
then 
driving 
while 
intoxicated, coupled with the fact that he had four prior OWI 
convictions, created a practical certainty that Strenke's rights 
would be disregarded. 
¶11 The issue was submitted to the jury in two questions: 
(1) "Did Levi Hogner act maliciously toward LeRoy Strenke or in 
an intentional disregard of the rights of LeRoy Strenke?" and 
                                                 
5 Hogner, a male, weighed 400 pounds at the time of the 
accident. 
No. 
03-2527   
 
6 
 
(2) "What sum, if any, do you assess against Levi Hogner as 
punitive damages?"  The jury unanimously answered the first 
question "yes" and awarded the sum of $225,000, $200,000 more 
than the Strenkes had asked for in closing argument.   
¶12 After 
the 
verdict, 
Hogner 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial.  The circuit 
court denied the motion, and Hogner appealed.  The court of 
appeals certified the matter to this court. 
II 
¶13 The focus of our inquiry is Wis. Stat. § 895.85, the 
punitive damages statute.  Interpretation of a statute presents 
a question of law subject to independent appellate review.  
Vill. of Lannon v. Wood-Land Contractors, Inc., 2003 WI 150, 
¶12, 267 Wis. 2d 158, 672 N.W.2d 275 (citing Meyer v. School 
Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999)).  
Likewise, whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the 
question of punitive damages to the jury is also a question of 
law that is subject to independent appellate review.  Lievrouw 
v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 344, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1990). 
III 
¶14 We begin our discussion with the statute at issue.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85 was created by 1995 Wis. Act 17 and 
became effective on May 17, 1995.  Subsection (3) of the statute 
provides: 
(3) STANDARD OF CONDUCT.  The plaintiff may receive 
punitive damages if evidence is submitted showing that 
the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff 
No. 
03-2527   
 
7 
 
or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff. 
¶15 Prior to the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), the 
common law established the standard of conduct governing the 
imposition of punitive damages.  Under it, punitive damages 
could be awarded for "outrageous" conduct.  Sharp v. Case Corp., 
227 Wis. 2d 1, 21, 595 N.W.2d 380 (1999).  A person's conduct 
was "outrageous" if the person acted "either maliciously or in 
wanton, willful and in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's 
rights."  Id. 
¶16 The words of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) derive, in large 
part, from the common law.  The major difference between the two 
is that the legislature replaced the common law language of 
"wanton, willful and reckless" with the term "intentional."  We 
address the import of this change in answering the first 
certified question:  what proof is required for a plaintiff to 
recover punitive damages under the phrase "in an intentional 
disregard of the rights of the plaintiff" as provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 895.85(3)? 
¶17 In Wischer, 267 Wis. 2d 638, ¶40, the court of appeals 
concluded that to intentionally disregard the rights of the 
plaintiff, a defendant was unambiguously required to have (1) a 
general intent to perform an act, and (2) either (i) a specific 
intent to cause injury by that act or (ii) knowledge that the 
act is practically certain to result in injury.   
¶18 Relying on the Wischer decision, Hogner argues that 
the issue of punitive damages was improperly submitted to the 
No. 
03-2527   
 
8 
 
jury in this case.  He contends that no evidence exists that he 
knew that his acts were practically certain to result in Strenke 
being injured.  As a result, he asserts that his intentional 
acts of drinking a large quantity of alcohol and then driving 
were not sufficient to prove that he intentionally disregarded 
Strenke's rights.  
¶19 While we agree with Hogner's reading of Wischer, we 
disagree with the Wischer court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.85(3).  The legislature did not intend an "intentional 
disregard of the rights of the plaintiff" to require "intent to 
cause injury to the plaintiff."  Rather, it reaffirmed the 
common-law principle that punitive damages can be premised on 
conduct that is a "disregard of rights."  However, the 
legislature chose the word "intentional" to describe the 
heightened 
state 
of 
mind 
required 
of 
the 
defendant 
who 
disregards rights, instead of the common law's description of 
"wanton, willful and reckless."  Our interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.85(3) is supported by the language of the statute, 
the legislative history, and the common law meaning of the 
phrase in question.  We examine each in turn. 
¶20 When interpreting a statute, we look first to its 
language.  Vill. of Lannon, 267 Wis. 2d 158, ¶13.  Here, the 
words at issue are:  "in an intentional disregard of the rights 
of the plaintiff."  Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3).  The statute says 
nothing about "injury," or "harm," intentional or otherwise.  
Instead, it simply requires that the defendant engaged in 
No. 
03-2527   
 
9 
 
conduct that constituted a "disregard of rights" that was 
"intentional."  Id.   
¶21 If the legislature had intended to specify an "intent 
to injure" requirement, it could have easily done so.  Indeed, 
there was another statute enacted in the same legislative 
session in which Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) was enacted that 
demonstrates this point.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.525(4m) was 
created by 1995 Wis. Act 447 and allows liability of contact 
sports participants only "if the participant who caused the 
injury acted recklessly or with intent to cause injury."  
(Emphasis added.)  There is no comparable language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.85(3).  The words "intent to cause injury" appear nowhere 
in the text.  Rather, the object of the intent as set forth in 
the text is the "disregard of the rights of the plaintiff."  
This court will not insert the phrase "intent to cause injury" 
into the statute.  To do so here would alter the focus of the 
statute and jettison the legislative intent. 
¶22 Although Hogner attempts to bolster his argument 
through the use of legislative history, his effort misses the 
mark.  Both parties agree that the legislature tried to make it 
harder to recover punitive damages by passing Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.85(3).  We too subscribe to this construction.  The 
analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau indicates that the 
bill "revises the standards and procedures for awarding punitive 
damages in certain civil cases."  See Drafting Records of 1995 
Wis. Act 17.  To this end, the legislature replaced the common 
No. 
03-2527   
 
10 
 
law 
language 
of 
"wanton, 
willful 
and 
reckless" 
with 
"intentional" to modify "disregard of the plaintiff's rights."   
¶23 Thus, the question before this court is how much 
harder did the legislature make it?  There is nothing in the 
drafting records of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) to suggest that the 
legislature intended to equate "intentional disregard of rights" 
with intent to injure or cause harm, as Hogner suggests.  
Furthermore, in referencing the floor debate on Senate Bill 11, 
which later evolved into Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), Hogner ignores 
the most pointed exchange between legislators, which sheds light 
on the issue before this court.  
¶24 Responding to Rep. Robson's question of whether the 
new law would allow the imposition of punitive damages against 
an intoxicated surgeon who amputates the wrong leg, Rep. Green, 
a sponsor of the bill, answered in the affirmative, a position 
that is difficult if not impossible to reconcile with Hogner's 
interpretation of the statute.  Green stated: 
First off, I do believe that the current standard we 
are talking about in this bill would cover that 
situation.  It is not the -– you don't have to prove 
an intent that the act took place.  You have to prove 
instead, if you look at it, maliciousness which is the 
current 
standard 
or 
intentional 
disregard 
for 
plaintiff's 
rights 
-– 
not 
the 
action 
being 
intentional, but disregard for plaintiff's rights. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶25 Examining Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), it is evident that 
the legislature relied heavily on the common-law standard.  
Under the common law, punitive damages could be awarded if the 
No. 
03-2527   
 
11 
 
defendant acted (1) maliciously, or (2) in wanton, willful and 
in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.  Sharp, 227 
Wis. 2d at 21.   
¶26 The first category included conduct that was intended 
to cause the injury.  Malicious conduct was defined as follows:  
"'[a]cts are malicious when they are the result of hatred, ill 
will, a desire for revenge, or inflicted under circumstances 
where insult or injury is intended.'"  Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 
159 Wis. 2d 464, 483, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991) (quoting Wis JI——
Civil 1707 (1990)).   
¶27 The second category, however, did not require an 
intent to cause injury.  Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 
260, 267, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).  In Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 
Wis. 2d 211, 221, 291 N.W.2d 516 (1980), the court explained, 
"[t]o sustain an award for punitive damages, the law does not 
require a specific finding of an intentional and ruthless desire 
to injure, vex or annoy.  The injured party need only show a 
wanton, willful or reckless disregard of the rights of others on 
the part of the wrongdoer."  Similarly, in Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 
21, the court observed, "[a] person's conduct is wanton, 
willful, and in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights 
when it demonstrates an indifference on the person's part to the 
consequences of his or her actions, even though he or she may 
not intend insult or injury."  This second category is where the 
change occurred.  It now requires an intentional disregard of 
rights.   
No. 
03-2527   
 
12 
 
¶28 Not only did the legislature retain two categories of 
conduct, but it also used the specific common law phrase in 
question to describe the new second category-–"disregard of 
rights."  The legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge 
of existing case law when it enacts a statute.  Czapinski v. St. 
Francis Hosp., 2000 WI 80, ¶22, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120 
(citing Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 210 Wis. 2d 98, 104, 565 
N.W.2d 164 (1997)).  A statute must be interpreted in light of 
the common law and the scheme of jurisprudence existing at the 
time of its enactment.  State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶19, 243 
Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195 (citing In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 
Wis. 2d 375, 389-90, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987)).    
¶29 Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be 
strictly construed.  Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 
2001 WI 81, ¶25, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833 (citing Maxey 
v. Redev. Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 399, 288 N.W.2d 794 
(1980)).  "A statute does not change the common law unless the 
legislative purpose to do so is clearly expressed in the 
language of the statute."  Id.  "To accomplish a change in the 
common law, the language of the statute must be clear, 
unambiguous, and peremptory."  Id.  Because there is no such 
language in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) regarding the phrase 
"disregard of rights," we look to the common law to shed light 
on legislative intent.   
¶30 Under the common law punitive damage cases, the word 
"rights" was used to mean just that--rights of the plaintiffs or 
others recognized by law.  These can include, for example, such 
No. 
03-2527   
 
13 
 
rights as property rights, City of West Allis v. WEPCO, 2001 WI 
App 226, 248 Wis. 2d 10, ¶26, 635 N.W.2d 873, the right to be 
protected from an excess verdict, Allied Processors, Inc., v. 
Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 129, ¶38, 246 Wis. 2d 
579, 603, 629 N.W.2d 329, the right to be safe from physical 
injury, Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 21, or the right to a thorough 
investigation and evaluation of a claim, Majorowicz v. Allied 
Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 2d 513, 533, 569 N.W.2d 472 (1997).  In 
all of these instances, disregarding such rights resulted in 
punitive damages for the plaintiff. 
¶31 A review of our common law reveals that the phrase 
"disregard of rights" described a type of conduct that involved 
an indifference on the defendant's part to the consequences of 
his or her actions.  Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 21.  The phrase did 
not mean the harm or injury suffered.  Rather, it referred to 
conduct, which in turn resulted in the harm or injury suffered.  
See id. ("Punitive damages may be awarded in product liability 
suits if the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that the harm suffered was the result of the manufacturer's 
reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or 
others who might be harmed by the product.") 
¶32 This interpretation is reiterated in the case law.  
For example, in Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 434, 437, 369 
N.W.2d 677 (1985), a premises liability case, the court did not 
require an intent to injure in order to determine that conduct 
was a "conscious disregard of rights."  Moreover, in Majorowicz, 
212 Wis. 2d at 533, a bad faith case, the court ruled that the 
No. 
03-2527   
 
14 
 
insurer's conduct could lead the jury to find an "intentional 
disregard" of the plaintiff's rights even though there was no 
evidence of intent to cause injury.   
¶33 Having examined the language of the statute, the 
legislative history, and the common law meaning of the phrase in 
question, we turn now to our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.85(3).  As noted above, the legislature tried to make it 
harder 
for 
plaintiffs 
to 
recover 
punitive 
damages. 
 
It 
accomplished this goal by replacing the common law language of 
"wanton, willful and reckless" with the term "intentional."  In 
doing so, however, there is no indication that the legislature 
intended to alter the focus of punitive damages from the nature 
of the wrongdoer's conduct to the likelihood of an injury and 
requiring a certain probability of injury.  Such a dramatic 
change would have to be clearly expressed in the language of the 
statute.  Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis. 2d 758, ¶25.  As there is no 
clear, unambiguous, and peremptory language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.85(3), this court cannot impute such intent.  Id.     
¶34 Admittedly, part of the problem with interpreting the 
legislature's change stems from the fact that the words 
"intentional" and "disregard" do not easily combine.  Still, we 
are not persuaded by the interpretation of the Wischer court, 
which inserted words into the statute.  Accordingly, we overrule 
that decision here.  We instead conclude that the legislature 
intended to require an increased level of consciousness and 
deliberateness at which the defendant must disregard the 
plaintiff's rights in order to be subject to punitive damages. 
No. 
03-2527   
 
15 
 
¶35 Because the word "intentional" is not defined in the 
statute, we look to other sources for guidance.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §8A (1965) states that the word "intent" 
denotes "that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his 
act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially 
certain to result from it."  In Shepard v. Outagamie County 
Circuit Court, 189 Wis. 2d 279, 286-87, 525 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 
1994), the court defined "intentional" as follows: 
The legal definition of "intentional" is essentially 
the same, whether found in tort law or in criminal 
law . . . .  
A 
person 
may 
be 
said 
to 
have 
intentionally caused the result where the result is 
substantially 
certain 
to 
occur from the 
actor's 
conduct.  (Citation omitted.)  The definition of 
"intentionally" in the criminal code, § 939.23(3), 
STATS., is similar:  "Intentionally" means that the 
actor either has specified a purpose to do the thing 
or cause the result specified, or is aware that his 
conduct or her conduct is practically certain to cause 
that result. 
 
¶36 In light of these authorities, we determine that a 
result or consequence is intentional if the person acts with a 
purpose to cause the result or consequence or is aware that the 
result or consequence is substantially certain to occur from the 
person's conduct.6  The result or consequence here is the 
                                                 
6 As Shepard v. Outagamie County Circuit Court, 189 Wis. 2d 
279, 287, 525 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1994) noted, the definition 
of "intentional" found in tort is "similar" to the criminal law 
definition of "intentional."  In this opinion, we do not use the 
"practically certain" language of the criminal statute, but 
rather retain the "substantially certain" language cited above. 
This change does not affect the jury verdict in this case.  For 
use of the term "substantially certain," see Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts 
§8A 
(1965); 
Gouger 
v. 
Hardtke, 
167 
Wis. 2d 504, 512, 482 N.W.2d 84 (1992). 
No. 
03-2527   
 
16 
 
disregard of rights.  Applying this definition to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.85(3), we conclude that the statute's requirement that the 
defendant act "in an intentional disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff" necessitates that the defendant act with a purpose to 
disregard the plaintiff's rights or be aware that his or her 
conduct is substantially certain to result in the plaintiff's 
rights being disregarded. 
 
¶37 Our analysis is consistent with that of the Civil Jury 
Instructions Committee.  The Committee drafted Wis JI——Civil 
1707.1 to give the following meaning to the statutory phrase:  
"A person acts in an intentional disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff if the person acts with a purpose to disregard the 
plaintiff's rights or is aware that his or her acts are 
practically certain to result in the plaintiff's rights being 
disregarded."  Notably, there is no requirement of intent to 
injure or cause harm in the instruction.  Rather, the focus is 
on the disregard of rights. 
 
¶38 Thus, in response to the first question certified by 
the court of appeals, we conclude that a person acts in an 
intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff if the 
person acts with a purpose to disregard the plaintiff's rights, 
or is aware that his or her acts are substantially certain to 
result in the plaintiff's rights being disregarded.  This will 
require that an act or course of conduct be deliberate.  
Additionally, the act or conduct must actually disregard the 
rights of the plaintiff, whether it be a right to safety, health 
or life, a property right, or some other right.  Finally, the 
No. 
03-2527   
 
17 
 
act or conduct must be sufficiently aggravated to warrant 
punishment by punitive damages. 
 
¶39 In recognizing 
this 
heightened standard, we are 
mindful that some cases which have previously qualified for 
punitive damages under the common law will no longer qualify 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3).  Under the prior common law 
standard, it was accepted that "the vast majority of negligence 
cases do not give rise to the remedy of punitive damages."  
Brown, 124 Wis. 2d at 432.  The legislature intended with the 
heightened 
standard 
that 
now 
there 
would 
be 
even 
fewer 
negligence cases giving rise to punitive damages. 
 
¶40 Accordingly, we expect circuit courts to serve as 
gatekeepers before sending a question on punitive damages to the 
jury.  We stated this gatekeeper function in Bank of Sun Prairie 
v. Esser, 155 Wis. 2d 724, 735, 456 N.W.2d 585 (1990) (citing 
Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 70, 126 N.W. 
554 (1910)) as follows:  
The circuit court should not submit the issue of 
punitive damages to the jury in the absence of 
evidence warranting a conclusion to a reasonable 
certainty that the party against whom punitive damages 
may be awarded acted with the requisite . . . conduct. 
 
¶41 The court of appeals in Lievrouw, 157 Wis. 2d at 344, 
restated this articulation of the gatekeeper's function as 
follows: 
Stated another way, a question on punitive damages may 
not be given to the jury unless the trial court 
concludes that a reasonable jury could find from the 
evidence that entitlement to punitive damages has been 
No. 
03-2527   
 
18 
 
proven by the middle burden of proof, "clear and 
convincing evidence." 
¶42 When serving in this capacity, we remind circuit 
courts that punitive damages are not recoverable if the 
wrongdoer's conduct is merely negligent.  Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 
275.  Furthermore, not every drunk driving case will give rise 
to punitive damages.  Only when the conduct is so aggravated 
that it meets the elevated standard of an "intentional disregard 
of rights" should a circuit court send the issue to a jury. 
IV 
 
¶43 We turn next to the second question in the court of 
appeals' certification:  must a defendant's conduct giving rise 
to punitive damages have been directed at the specific plaintiff 
seeking punitive damages?   
 
¶44 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) provides: 
(3) STANDARD OF CONDUCT.  The plaintiff may receive 
punitive damages if evidence is submitted showing that 
the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff 
or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff.   
¶45 The word "plaintiff" is defined as "the party seeking 
to recover punitive damages."  Wis. Stat. § 895.85(1)(c).  From 
this definition, the federal district court in Boomsma v. Star 
Transport, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Wis. 2002) 
opined that in order for punitive damages to be available, the 
defendant must have intended to harm a particular plaintiff. 
¶46 In Boomsma, representatives of the estates of five 
decedents killed in a motor vehicle accident sued a trucking 
company and its employee driver.  The court surmised that, "the 
No. 
03-2527   
 
19 
 
thing which must be practically certain is not harm in the 
abstract, or even harm to a certain class of people (e.g., other 
drivers on the road), but harm to the plaintiff."  Id.  Relying 
on this interpretation, Hogner argues that Strenke's claim must 
fail, 
as 
no 
evidence 
exists 
that 
Hogner's 
conduct 
was 
specifically directed at Strenke.  
¶47 In its certification, the court of appeals questioned 
the soundness of the Boomsma approach.  Certification by Court 
of Appeals of Wisconsin, Strenke v. Hogner, 03-2527, filed May 
18, 2004, p. 5.  It feared that such a literal reading of the 
statute would defeat the purpose of punitive damages of 
punishing wrongdoers and deterring similar conduct in the 
future.  Id., p. 6.  The court then cited several examples to 
illustrate 
the 
dramatic 
curtailment 
that 
the 
"particular 
plaintiff" rule would have on situations where punitive damages 
were always understood to play an important role: 
Consider 
where 
a 
drug 
manufacturer 
publicly 
distributes a drug it knows is practically certain to 
cause harm.  Even though the class of people who use 
the drugs are harmed and that the manufacturer knew 
this was practically certain to occur, the drug 
manufacturer could simply use the plain language of 
§ 895.85(3)--language 
Wischer 
concluded 
was 
unambiguous--to preclude liability, arguing that it 
did not intend or know there was a practical certainty 
that those particular plaintiffs who are seeking to 
recover punitive damages would be harmed.  Also, 
consider where a person fires a gun into a crowd of 
people and injures a stranger.  How could the person 
have awareness that it is practically certain he or 
she would cause injury to someone he or she never 
knew? 
Id. (Emphasis in original.) 
No. 
03-2527   
 
20 
 
 
¶48 We share the court of appeals' concern with the 
Boomsma interpretation and reject it here.7  Laws must be 
interpreted, considering the legal and practical consequences, 
to avoid unreasonable and absurd results.  State v. Jennings, 
2003 WI 10, ¶11, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 N.W.2d 393.  It is 
doubtful the legislature intended to afford greater protection 
to a defendant who intentionally disregarded the rights of a 
great 
many 
unspecified 
individuals 
than 
a 
defendant 
who 
intentionally 
disregarded 
the 
rights 
of 
one 
particular 
individual.  Our conclusion is supported by both the common law 
and legislative history. 
 
¶49 Under the common law's "disregard of rights" standard, 
the "disregard" was "of the plaintiff's rights."  Sharp, 227 
Wis. 2d at 21.  Despite this fact, punitive damages were 
available in products liability cases where no showing was made 
that the manufacturer's conduct was specifically directed at the 
particular plaintiff.  E.g., Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d 1; Walter v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 121 Wis. 2d 221, 358 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 
1984); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 
293 N.W.2d 897 (1980).  Instead, it was enough to show "by clear 
and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of 
the manufacturer's reckless disregard for the safety of product 
                                                 
7 We note that we are not alone in rejecting the Boomsma 
approach.  At oral argument in Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy 
Indus. Am., Inc., 2005 WI 26, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d__, 
counsel for Mitsubishi characterized the interpretation as 
"extreme."  
No. 
03-2527   
 
21 
 
users, consumers or others who might be harmed by the product."  
Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 21. 
 
¶50 The silence of the legislative history on this matter 
is also significant.  If the legislature had truly intended such 
a sea change in the law, we would expect to find something in 
the history of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) to indicate that.  Yet, at 
oral argument, counsel for Hogner acknowledged that she could 
not point to anything in the drafting records to support her 
position.  Our examination of the legislative history yields the 
same result.   
 
¶51 Accordingly, 
for 
the 
reasons 
stated 
above, 
we 
determine that a defendant's conduct giving rise to punitive 
damages need not be directed at the specific plaintiff seeking 
punitive damages in order to recover under the statute.   
V 
 
¶52 Having answered the first two questions of the 
certification, we turn finally to the third question:  if there 
was sufficient evidence to submit a punitive damages question to 
the jury, is the jury's punitive damage award excessive and 
therefore in violation of Hogner's due process rights?  We begin 
by considering the sufficiency of the evidence. 
 
¶53 Under the common law standard, drunk driving was the 
type of conduct that could support an award of punitive damages 
in an appropriate case.  Lievrouw, 157 Wis. 2d at 347.  In 
Lievrouw, the court of appeals observed that, "[d]runk driving 
is a terrible scourge," and "[i]ntentionally driving while 
No. 
03-2527   
 
22 
 
alcohol-impaired is the type of outrageous conduct that punitive 
damages should punish and can deter."  Id. at 345-46. 
 
¶54 Although the standard of conduct for punitive damages 
has been heightened with Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), we are 
satisfied that there was sufficient evidence that Hogner was 
aware that his conduct was substantially certain to cause a 
disregard of Strenke's rights.  There are several reasons for 
this. 
 
¶55 First, Hogner's acts of drinking 16 to 18 twelve-ounce 
containers of beer and then driving while intoxicated were 
deliberate.  As noted by the circuit court, "nobody was holding 
him 
down 
and 
pouring 
these 
[drinks] 
down 
his 
throat 
involuntarily . . . ."  Similarly, there is no evidence in the 
record that anybody made Hogner get behind the wheel of his car 
that night. 
¶56 Second, 
Hogner's 
act 
of 
drinking 
and 
driving 
disregarded Strenke's right to safety in using the highway with 
other motorists in sober command of their vehicles.  While 
Hogner may not have targeted Strenke personally, his intentional 
disregard of the rights of all motorists on the road necessarily 
implicated Strenke's rights.  The fact that his blood alcohol 
content was tested to be .269% confirms this. 
¶57 Third, Hogner's conduct was sufficiently aggravated to 
warrant punishment by punitive damages.  Here, Hogner admitted 
that 
he 
had 
four 
prior 
convictions 
for 
driving 
while 
intoxicated.  He further acknowledged that he consumed 16 to 18 
No. 
03-2527   
 
23 
 
twelve-ounce containers of beer within a five-hour span on the 
night of the accident. 
¶58 Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence 
to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.  However, 
we are equally divided on the question of whether the jury's 
punitive damage award was excessive and therefore in violation 
of Hogner's due process rights.  Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice Patience D. 
Roggensack would answer the question in the negative; Justice 
Jon P. Wilcox, Justice N. Patrick Crooks, and Justice Louis B. 
Butler, Jr. would answer the question in the affirmative.  
Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. did not participate.  Accordingly, 
we remand this matter to the court of appeals to decide the 
issue consistent with the principles set forth in Trinity, 261 
Wis. 2d 333. 
VI 
¶59 In sum, we conclude that a person acts in an 
intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff if the 
person acts with a purpose to disregard the plaintiff's rights, 
or is aware that his or her acts are substantially certain to 
result 
in 
the 
plaintiff's 
rights 
being 
disregarded.  
Furthermore, we determine that a defendant's conduct giving rise 
to punitive damages need not be directed at the specific 
plaintiff seeking punitive damages in order to recover under the 
statute. 
¶60 However, we are equally divided on the question of 
whether the jury's punitive damage award was excessive and 
No. 
03-2527   
 
24 
 
therefore 
in 
violation 
of 
Hogner's 
due 
process 
rights.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part 
and remand to the court of appeals to decide this remaining 
issue consistent with the principles set forth in Trinity, 261 
Wis. 2d 333. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed 
in part and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals.   
¶61 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. did not participate. 
 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶62 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  While I agree with 
the ultimate result the majority reaches, the majority's 
analysis of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) (2001-02)8 ignores accepted 
canons of statutory construction, misconstrues our common law 
relating to punitive damages, and adopts an interpretation of 
§ 895.85(3) that is virtually identical to, if not lower than, 
the common-law standard for punitive damages.  In doing so, the 
majority turns on its head what the legislature clearly intended 
as a heightened standard governing the recovery of punitive 
damages.   
¶63 To answer the questions certified by the court of 
appeals, I would hold as follows:  1) Section 895.85(3) requires 
that the defendant intend the consequences of his actions——that 
is, intend to harm the plaintiff——in order to be liable for 
punitive damages; 2) Pursuant to § 895.85(1)(c), the defendant's 
conduct must be directed at the person seeking to recover 
punitive damages; and 3) There exists sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that the requirements of § 895.85 
have been met in this case.  Therefore, I respectfully concur.  
I 
¶64 Section 895.85 was enacted pursuant to 1995 Wis. Act 
17 as part of a broader, comprehensive tort reform package 
passed by the legislature.9  Section 895.85 significantly 
                                                 
8 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.   
9 See Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff, Information 
Memorandum 96-25:  Legislation Relating to Liability and 
Insurance Enacted During the 1995-96 Legislative Session (July 
26, 1996).  
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
2 
 
modified the circumstances under which punitive damages could be 
awarded.  It is widely accepted that § 895.85(3) "was clearly 
intended to be more narrow than the case law standard . . . ."  
Wis JI-Civil 1707.1 cmt. 2 (1995).  "The intent of the 
legislature to heighten the standard for recovery of punitive 
damages could not be clearer. . . . It is clear from the text of 
the statute that Section 895.85 marks a significant departure 
from the common law standard."  Boomsma v. Star Transp., Inc., 
202 F. Supp. 2d 869, 880 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 
¶65 Under the common law, punitive damages were allowed in 
two categories of tort cases.  Punitive damages were allowed if 
the defendant "acted maliciously."  Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 
Wis. 2d 260, 300, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).  However, malicious 
conduct was not required, and punitive damages were also 
available if there was "a showing of wanton, wilful, or reckless 
disregard of the plaintiff's rights."  Kink v. Combs, 28 
Wis. 2d 65, 79, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).  This court used the 
shorthand "'outrageous'" to refer to both types of conduct 
giving rise to an award of punitive damages.  Brown v. Maxey, 
124 Wis. 2d 426, 433, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985)(quoting Wangen, 97 
Wis. 2d at 300).   
¶66 In contrast to the common-law standard, § 895.85(3) 
provides:  "The plaintiff may receive punitive damages if 
evidence 
is 
submitted 
showing 
that 
the 
defendant 
acted 
maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard 
of the rights of the plaintiff."  Thus, the legislature removed 
the possibility of awarding damages in cases where the defendant 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
3 
 
"willfully, wantonly, or recklessly disregarded the plaintiff's 
rights" and instead required that there be a showing that the 
defendant acted in an "intentional disregard of the rights of 
the plaintiff."  The dispute in this case concerns the proper 
meaning of the phrase "intentional disregard of the rights of 
the plaintiff."   
¶67 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 990.01, when construing a 
statute, "technical terms or legal terms of art are given their 
accepted legal or technical definitions."  Wis. Citizens 
Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶6, 270 
Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612.  Further, "[t]he legislature is 
presumed to act with knowledge of the existing case law."  
Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶75, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866 
(citing Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 
(1980)).  As noted, the common law allowed punitive damages upon 
"a showing of wanton, wilful, or reckless disregard of the 
plaintiff's rights."  Kink, 28 Wis. 2d at 79.  The majority 
admits that the phrase "wanton, willful, or reckless disregard 
of the plaintiff's rights" had an accepted legal meaning under 
the common law, majority op., ¶¶25-28, and that the legislature 
"relied heavily" on this meaning when drafting § 895.85(3).  
Majority op., ¶25.  Thus, it is necessary to understand the 
meaning of the common-law standard before addressing the effect 
of § 895.85 on the availability of punitive damages. 
¶68 As the following discussion will demonstrate, the 
common law referred to "a disregard of the plaintiff's rights" 
as a shorthand for describing all of the various types of harm 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
4 
 
giving 
rise 
to 
punitive 
damages 
when 
coupled 
with 
the 
appropriate mental state of the defendant.  However, the common 
law required more than a showing that the defendant recklessly 
disregarded the plaintiff's "rights" in the abstract in each 
particular case.  Contra majority op., ¶30.  Rather, the phrase 
"willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of rights" meant that 
the defendant engaged in a volitional act with knowledge or 
appreciation that his conduct created an unreasonable risk of 
harm and that there was a strong probability that harm would 
result.  Thus, "a disregard of the plaintiff's rights" referred 
to the harm caused by the defendant's conduct and "willful, 
wanton, or reckless" referred to the defendant's knowledge of 
the likelihood of harm——his knowledge that such conduct created 
a "strong probability" that harm would result.  While "an intent 
to injure" was not required, the common law did specifically 
link 
the 
defendant's 
conduct 
with 
his 
knowledge 
of 
the 
likelihood of harm.   
¶69 As noted, 
punitive 
damages 
were 
available 
under 
Wisconsin common law if the plaintiff demonstrated "malicious 
conduct or willful or wanton conduct in reckless disregard of 
rights or 
interests." 
 
Wangen, 97 
Wis. 2d at 
267. 
 In 
summarizing the various common-law standards for the imposition 
of punitive damages, including Wisconsin's, Professors Ghiardi 
and Kircher, in their treatise on punitive damages, commented: 
The conduct which the varying terms describes is 
generally of two distinct types.  With the first the 
defendant desires to cause the harm sustained by the 
plaintiff, or believes that the harm is substantially 
certain to follow the conduct.  With the second the 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
5 
 
defendant knows, or should have reason to know, not 
only that the conduct creates an unreasonable risk of 
harm, but also that there is a strong probability, 
although not a substantial certainty, that the harm 
will result and, nevertheless, proceeds with the 
conduct in reckless or conscious disregard of the 
consequences.   
Neither form of conduct, therefore, involves mere 
inadvertence or what, in the traditional tort sense, 
would be called ordinary negligence.   
James D. Ghiardi & John J. Kircher, 1 Punitive Damages L. & 
Prac. § 5.01, at 8 (1996)(emphasis added).  
¶70 This passage from the Ghiardi and Kircher treatise on 
punitive damages, which was present in previous editions, was 
relied on and cited with approval numerous times by this court 
when discussing the circumstances under which punitive damages 
could be awarded under Wisconsin common law.  See, e.g., 
Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150, 188, 468 N.W.2d 146 
(1991); Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d at 433-34; Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 
Wis. 2d 175, 197 n.14, 368 N.W.2d 676 (1985).  It was also 
incorporated into the commentary of our jury instructions 
describing the requisite conduct for punitive damages in 1986 
and remained until the passage of 1995 Wis. Act 17.10      
¶71 In Wangen, when describing the type of conduct 
necessary to justify punitive damages, we stated: 
"[S]omething must be shown over and above the mere 
breach of duty for which compensatory damages can be 
given.  That is, a showing of a bad intent deserving 
punishment, or something in the nature of special ill 
will 
towards 
the 
person 
injured, 
or 
a 
wanton, 
                                                 
10 See Wis JI-Civil 1707 (1986); Wis JI-Civil 1707 (1989); 
Wis JI-Civil 1707 (1990); Wis JI-Civil 1707 (1991); Wis JI-Civil 
1707 (1992); Wis JI-Civil 1707 (1994); Wis JI-Civil 1707 (1995). 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
6 
 
deliberate disregard of the particular duty then being 
breached, 
or 
that 
which 
resembles 
gross 
as 
distinguished from ordinary negligence." 
Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 268 (quoting Meshane v. Second Street Co., 
197 Wis. 382, 387, 222 N.W. 320 (1928))(emphasis added).11  In 
addition, we noted that the requisite conduct for punitive 
damages was similar to "conduct falling within the old gross 
negligence concept," a concept that we had previously described 
as "'a willingness to harm although such harm may not have been 
intended,' or 'willingness to perpetrate injury,' or 'a purpose 
to take known chances of perpetrating an injury.'"  Id. at 274 
(quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 14-15, 114 N.W.2d 105 
(1962))(emphasis added).12 
¶72 Furthermore, relying on the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 908 cmt. b. (1977), we stated that punitive damages were 
                                                 
11 See also James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 
60 Marq. L. Rev. 753, 758 (1977)(equating the phrase "wanton, 
wilful, or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights" with 
"what was formerly categorized as gross negligence").   
12 Professor Prosser noted that under the common law, 
"wilful," "wanton," or "reckless" conduct was sufficient to 
justify punitive damages.  William L. Prosser, Handbook of The 
Law of Torts § 34, at 184 (4th ed. 1971).  He described all 
three terms as referring to the same type of conduct:   
[T]he actor has intentionally done an act of an 
unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to 
him or so obvious that he must be taken to be aware of 
it, and so great as to make it highly probable that 
harm would follow.  It usually is accompanied by a 
conscious indifference to the consequences, amounting 
almost to willingness that they shall follow . . . ."   
Id. § 34, at 185 (emphasis added).  In addition, he commented 
that "'wilful,' 'wanton' or 'reckless' conduct" was synonymous 
with "'gross' negligence."  Id.   
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
7 
 
allowed when the defendant's conduct demonstrated a "reckless 
indifference or disregard of the rights of others."  Wangen, 97 
Wis. 2d at 267.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. b 
specifically refers to § 500 of the Restatement (Second) to 
define "reckless indifference to the rights of others."  In 
turn, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965), provides 
that a person's conduct is in "reckless disregard of safety" if: 
[H]e does an act or intentionally fails to do an act 
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or 
having reason to know of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct 
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
another, but also that such risk is substantially 
greater than that which is necessary to make his 
conduct negligent.   
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500.13   
¶73 As such, our jurisprudence involving punitive damages 
focused on the nature of the defendant's conduct and the 
defendant's knowledge of the likelihood of harm that resulted 
from his conduct.  We utilized the phrase "disregard of rights" 
rather than "disregard of safety" when referring to the type of 
conduct sufficient to give rise to punitive damages generally 
                                                 
13 The Restatement also noted that conduct in reckless 
disregard of safety is equivalent to "'wanton or wilful 
misconduct.'"  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, Special 
Note.  Notably, this court in Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 
Wis. 2d 1, 21, 595 N.W.2d 380 (1999), utilized the "reckless 
disregard of safety" standard to allow for punitive damages in a 
products liability case.  Specifically, the court stated that 
the manufacturer recklessly disregarded the safety of those "who 
might 
be 
harmed 
by 
the 
product." 
 
The 
majority's 
characterization 
of 
the 
common-law 
standard 
for 
punitive 
damages, majority op., ¶31, is difficult to reconcile with the 
explanation of the phrase "reckless disregard of safety" in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500. 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
8 
 
because punitive damages were not restricted to cases involving 
physical injury.  However, in each case, our analysis focused on 
the defendant's awareness of the likelihood of some type of 
harm, rather than the likelihood of a violation of the 
plaintiff's rights in the abstract.   
¶74 For instance, in Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 263, the 
plaintiffs were severely injured when the fuel tank of their 
automobile ruptured following a collision.  We held that the 
plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to support a claim of punitive 
damages because the facts "portray[ed] conduct which is willful 
and wanton and in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights."  
Id. at 309.   
¶75 Our analysis focused on the fact that the complaint 
alleged that the vehicle manufacturer, Ford:  "knew of the 
defects in the design of the gas tank . . . and of the fire 
hazard associated with the design"; knew "that these defects 
were causing serious burn injuries to occupants of these and 
similar cars"; knew "how to correct these defects in ways that 
would have prevented the plaintiffs' burns"; "intentionally 
concealed this knowledge from the government and the public"; 
and that despite this knowledge, "deliberately chose not to 
recall" its defective vehicles.  Id. at 309 (emphasis added).  
Thus, our discussion concentrated on the defendant's knowledge 
of the risk of fire and the likelihood of physical injury to 
occupants as a result of its failure to change the fuel tank 
design.   
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
9 
 
¶76 Likewise, in Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d at 429, a tenant in an 
apartment complex was burned as a result of an apartment fire.  
In assessing whether punitive damages were appropriate, we noted 
that "we focus on the defendant's knowledge and state of mind at 
the time of the fire" to determine whether his "conduct 
evidences a reckless indifference to or disregard of the 
plaintiff's rights."  Id. at 434 (emphasis added).  Before 
analyzing 
the 
defendant's 
conduct, 
we 
set 
forth 
the 
aforementioned passage from Professors Ghiardi and Kircher's 
treatise to explain the requisite "conduct justifying punitive 
damages."  Id. at 433-34. 
¶77 Applying this standard to the facts, we noted that the 
evidence demonstrated the following:  there were numerous 
instances of fires started by vandals in the apartment complex 
in the months preceding the injury; the complex was not properly 
outfitted with locks and other safety mechanisms; there were 
numerous instances of other vandalism during the weeknights and 
weekends and that there was no security staff employed during 
these times; the fire alarm system in the complex was often 
inoperable; the fire danger was so high that tenants had formed 
their own security squad; and the defendant had knowledge of 
these facts and the risk of fire and yet did nothing.  Id. at 
434-37.   
¶78 We allowed recovery of punitive damages from the 
landlord because: 
the conduct of the defendant evidenced more than a 
lack of ordinary care.  Given [the landlord's] 
knowledge with respect to the security problems and 
the history of fires at Apollo Village and his 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
10 
 
conscious refusal to reduce the risk of fires, we do 
not hesitate to hold there is credible evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably conclude that [the 
landlord's] conduct evidences a reckless disregard of 
the rights and safety of [the plaintiff].  Based upon 
the evidence concerning [the landlord's] failure to 
take action, it is reasonable to conclude that [the 
landlord] proceeded with a reckless and conscious 
disregard of the grave consequences involved with such 
conduct.  
Id. at 437 (emphasis added).  Thus, in Maxey, our analysis again 
focused on the defendant's knowledge of the likelihood of harm 
that actually occurred.   
¶79 In Loveridge, 161 Wis. 2d at 162-63, the defendant 
passed the herpes simplex virus to the plaintiff, an underage 
co-worker, 
after 
performing 
various 
consensual 
acts 
of 
cunnilingus.  The record indicated that the defendant had a 
history of cold sores and that such sores were present during 
the time he engaged in the illicit sexual contact with the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 163.  The record also indicated that the 
defendant did not know the herpes virus could be transmitted by 
cold sores, although he knew there was a "vague connection" 
between the two.  Id.  
¶80 On appeal, the defendant's insurer argued that the 
circuit court erred in submitting the question of punitive 
damages to the jury.  Id. at 187.  This court agreed and 
concluded that the case was not appropriate for the imposition 
of punitive damages.  Id. at 192.  In so holding, we discussed 
the circumstances under which punitive damages are available in 
Wisconsin.  Id. at 188-92.   
¶81 We noted that under Maxey, a defendant's conduct 
justifies punitive damages in two circumstances.  Id. at 188.  
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
11 
 
The first is where the defendant subjectively intends to injure 
or harm the plaintiff.  Id. at 189.  The second is where "the 
defendant knew or should have known that his or her conduct 
created an unreasonable and strong probability of harm."  Id. at 
191 (emphasis added).  Thus, again focusing on the defendant's 
knowledge of the likelihood of harm, we stated that this 
standard could be met if there was evidence that "Chartier knew 
that his sexual contact with Loveridge created 'a strong 
probability, 
although 
not 
a 
substantial 
certainty,' 
that 
Loveridge would be injured or harmed."  Id. at 190 (quoting 
Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d at 433)(emphasis added).   
¶82 In concluding that this second standard was not met, 
we reasoned:  "there was unrebutted and undisputed testimony 
that Chartier did not know that the herpes virus could be spread 
from a cold sore on the mouth to the vagina during cunnilingus."  
Id. at 191.  Further, we stated that there was not sufficient 
evidence that he "should have known" that herpes could be spread 
via a cold sore on his mouth during cunnilingus.  Id. at 192.  
¶83 Thus, the majority is simply wrong when it states that 
the common law did not consider the defendant's knowledge of the 
likelihood of harm as part of the "nature of the wrongdoer's 
conduct."  Majority op., ¶33.  As demonstrated above, while our 
jurisprudence spoke of a "disregard of rights" generally in 
referring to the type of conduct necessary for punitive damages, 
in each case, we analyzed the nature of the defendant's conduct 
and the defendant's awareness of the likelihood of harm 
inflicted, rather than the likelihood of a violation of the 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
12 
 
plaintiff's rights in the abstract.  In sum, we allowed for 
punitive damages where it was evident that the defendant: 
kn[ew], or should have [had] reason to know, not only 
that the conduct create[d] an unreasonable risk of 
harm, but also that there [was at least] a strong 
probability . . . that the harm w[ould] result and 
[the defendant], nevertheless, proceed[ed] with the 
conduct in reckless or conscious disregard of the 
consequences.   
James D. Ghiardi & John J. Kircher, 1 Punitive Damages L. & 
Prac. § 5.01, at 8 (1996). 
¶84 The majority is incorrect that the common law did not 
link the wrongdoer's conduct to the likelihood of harm and his 
knowledge thereof.  See majority op., ¶¶31-33.  In Wangen, we 
analyzed the defendant's knowledge of the likelihood of fuel 
tank rupture and burn injuries as a result of its failure to 
correct a design flaw in the fuel tank.  In Maxey, we analyzed 
the defendant's knowledge of the likelihood of vandalism and 
fire as a result of his failure to provide adequate security and 
fire alarms.  Similarly, in Loveridge, we inquired into the 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
13 
 
defendant's knowledge of the likelihood that he could spread a 
sexually transmitted disease.14   
¶85 As these cases demonstrate, punitive damages were 
allowed under the common law if the defendant acted with 
knowledge 
or 
appreciation 
that 
his 
conduct 
created 
an 
unreasonable risk 
of harm 
and that 
there 
was a 
strong 
probability that harm would result.  While the phrase "rights of 
                                                 
14 The error of the majority's interpretation of our common 
law relating to punitive damages is apparent if one considers 
Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991).   
If the common law did not require a link between the nature of 
the defendant's conduct and the probability of harm, then 
punitive damages should have been allowed in Loveridge.  Yet, in 
concluding that the defendant's conduct did not rise to a level 
that justified punitive damages in that case, this court clearly 
stated that punitive damages would be warranted if "Chartier 
knew that his sexual contact with Loveridge created 'a strong 
probability, 
although 
not 
a 
substantial 
certainty,' 
that 
Loveridge would be injured or harmed."  Id. at 190 (quoting 
Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 433, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985)).  
We concluded that punitive damages were inappropriate because 
the evidence demonstrated "Chartier did not know that the herpes 
virus could be spread from a cold sore on the mouth to the 
vagina during cunnilingus."  Id. at 191.   
If the majority's interpretation of the common-law meaning 
of "willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of rights" was 
correct, then punitive damages clearly should have been allowed 
in Loveridge because the evidence showed that Chartier knew he 
had cold sores when he engaged in sexual acts with the plaintiff 
and knew there was some link between cold sores and the herpes 
virus.  Id. at 163.  Thus, were the majority correct that it was 
sufficient to merely disregard abstract rights, our analysis 
would have noted that Chartier's conduct demonstrated a reckless 
indifference to the plaintiff's "right" to be free from sexually 
transmitted diseases.  However, we instead concluded that 
punitive damages were not appropriate because the evidence did 
not demonstrate that "Chartier knew that his sexual contact with 
Loveridge 
created 
'a 
strong 
probability, 
although 
not 
a 
substantial certainty,' that Loveridge would be injured or 
harmed."  Id. at 190 (quoting Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d at 433).   
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
14 
 
others" was used in a general sense to include the various types 
of injuries that could give rise to punitive damages, in each 
case, we 
focused 
on the 
particular 
harm 
caused by the 
defendant's conduct.15  The phrase "willful, wanton, or reckless" 
referred to the defendant's knowledge of the likelihood of harm—
—his knowledge that his conduct created at least a "strong 
probability" that harm would result.   
¶86 Therefore, there was no need for the legislature to 
specify "injury" or "harm" when it enacted § 895.85(3), majority 
op., ¶20, because under the common law, it was understood that 
"disregard of the plaintiff's rights" referred to the harm 
caused by the defendant's conduct in each particular case.  As 
such, when the legislature created § 895.85(3) to allow punitive 
damages 
if 
"the 
defendant 
acted . . . in 
an 
intentional 
disregard of the rights of the plaintiff," it heightened the 
state of mind required of the actor and left intact the link 
between the actor's state of mind and the likelihood of the 
harm.   
¶87 Thus, with the enactment of § 895.85, it is no longer 
sufficient for the defendant to know or have reason to know 
"that the conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm, [and] 
                                                 
15 For instance, in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 
Wis. 2d 605, 619-20, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997), this court allowed 
an award of punitive damages where the defendant company 
committed an intentional trespass by moving a mobile home over 
the plaintiffs' property, despite the fact that the plaintiffs 
had explicitly refused permission to cross their land, because 
of 
"[t]he 
potential 
for 
harm 
resulting 
from 
intentional 
trespass" and because the defendant's intentional trespass 
"caused actual harm."   
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
15 
 
also that there is a strong probability, although not a 
substantial certainty, that the harm will result."  James D. 
Ghiardi & John J. Kircher, 1 Punitive Damages L. & Prac. § 5.01, 
at 8 (1996).  Rather, following the enactment of § 895.85, it is 
necessary that the defendant have knowledge that there is a 
"substantial certainty" that harm will result from his conduct.  
This conclusion flows naturally from the legislature's removal 
of punitive damages where the wrongdoer's mental state was 
"wanton, willful or reckless" and its restriction of punitive 
damages to where the actor's mental state was "intentional."  
¶88 "The legal definition of 'intentional' is essentially 
the same whether found in tort law or in criminal law[:] . . . . 
A person may be said to have intentionally caused the result 
where the result is substantially certain to occur from the 
actor's conduct."  Shepard v. Outagamie County Circuit Court, 
189 Wis. 2d 279, 287, 525 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1994).  In 
Shepard, the court of appeals adopted the definition of 
"intentionally" from the criminal code and applied it to the 
civil contempt statute.  Id.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23 provides:  
"'Intentionally' means that the actor has either a purpose to do 
the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or 
her conduct is practically certain to cause that result."  See 
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965)("The word 
'intent' is used to denote that the actor desires to cause the 
consequences of his act, 
or that 
he 
believes 
that the 
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.").  
Consistent with the focus of the common law on the nature of the 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
16 
 
wrongdoer's conduct and his knowledge of the risk of actual 
harm, the "consequence" that must be substantially certain, so 
as to make a wrongdoer's act "intentional" for purposes of 
§ 895.85(3), is actual harm to the plaintiff.  
¶89 Thus, while I agree with the majority that the phrase 
"wanton, willful, or reckless disregard of rights" under the 
common law referred to "an indifference on the defendant's part 
to the consequence of his or her actions[,]" majority op., ¶31, 
the "consequence" referred to was a great risk or substantial 
probability of harm.  Following the enactment of § 895.85(3), a 
mere "indifference" to a great risk of harm is not sufficient to 
justify punitive damages.  Rather, § 895.85(3) now requires, at 
a minimum, that the wrongdoer have knowledge that harm to the 
plaintiff is substantially certain to result as a consequence of 
his or her actions.   
¶90 Therefore, to answer the first question posed by the 
court of appeals, I would conclude that § 895.85(3) requires 
that the defendant act for the purpose of causing harm to the 
plaintiff or with knowledge that harm is substantially certain 
to result from his conduct in order for punitive damages to be 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
17 
 
available.16  This interpretation of § 895.85(3) does not 
"insert[] words into the statute[,]" majority op., ¶34; it 
merely recognizes the meaning and application of the phrase 
"wanton, willful or reckless disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff" under the common law.   
¶91 The majority, adopting the position set forth by the 
plaintiffs in Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, 
Inc., 2003 WI App 202, 267 Wis. 2d 638, 673 N.W.2d 303, 
concludes that the "result" that must be intended under 
§ 895.85(3) is the "disregard of [the plaintiff's] rights," not 
the ultimate injury or harm.  Majority op., ¶¶36, 38.  This 
interpretation of § 895.85 suffers from several flaws.   
¶92 First, the majority's interpretation is based on a 
misunderstanding of the common-law standard for punitive damages 
as discussed above.  See majority op., ¶¶31-33.  As emphasized 
previously, "[a] defendant's conduct [constituted a willful, 
wanton or reckless disregard of rights] only if the defendant 
knew or should have known that his or her conduct created an 
unreasonable and strong probability of harm."  Loveridge, 161 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85(3) 
also 
allows 
for 
the 
imposition 
of 
punitive 
damages 
if 
the 
"defendant 
acted 
maliciously 
toward 
the 
plaintiff." 
 
Maliciousness 
is 
a 
heightened state of intent that involves impure motives.  
"Malicious" is generally defined as "'[c]haracterized by, or 
involving, malice; having or done with, wicked, evil or 
mischievous intentions or motives[.]'"  Ervin v. City of 
Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 484, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991) (quoting, 
with approval, Black's Law Dictionary 958 (6th ed. 1990)).  
Further, "'[a]cts are malicious when they are the result of 
hatred, ill will, a desire for revenge, or inflicted under 
circumstances where insult or injury is intended.'"  Id. at 483 
(quoting, with approval, Wis JI-Civil 1707 (1990)).   
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d at 190-91 (emphasis added).  At common law, we focused 
on the nature of the defendant's conduct and his knowledge of 
the risk of "harm."  We did not ask whether the defendant knew 
or should have known that his conduct created an unreasonable 
and strong probability of a "disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff" in the abstract.   
¶93 If "disregard of rights" is to have the same meaning 
under § 895.85(3) as it did under the common law, save the 
change of the modifier "reckless" to "intentional," then the 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 895.85(3) simply 
cannot be 
squared with the common law.17  Rather than incorporating the 
common-law meaning of "disregard of the rights of the plaintiff" 
into § 895.83(3) and taking into account the change in the 
modifier from "wanton, willful, or reckless" to "intentional," 
the majority grasps at straws, relying on a "pointed exchange 
between legislators" during the floor debate of the punitive 
damages legislation to support its position.  Majority op., ¶23.   
¶94 Next, despite the wide recognition that § 895.85 was 
intended to restrict the availability of punitive damages, the 
majority adopts an interpretation of § 895.85 that is virtually 
identical to its description of the common law "wanton, willful, 
or reckless" standard for recovery of punitive damages.  The 
                                                 
17 See majority op., ¶38 ("[A] person acts in an intentional 
disregard of the rights of the plaintiff if the person acts with 
a purpose to disregard the plaintiff's rights, or is aware that 
his or her acts are substantially certain to result in the 
plaintiff's rights being disregarded."). 
 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
19 
 
majority essentially concludes that the question of punitive 
damages may be submitted to the jury if the defendant's conduct 
demonstrates a deliberate indifference to the rights of the 
plaintiff.  See majority op., ¶¶31, 34, 38.  The United States 
Supreme Court has noted, albeit in a different context, that 
"[i]t is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with 
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk . . . is the 
equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk."  Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).  It appears as if the 
majority's interpretation of "intentional disregard of the 
rights of the plaintiff" in § 895.85(3) is no different than its 
characterization of the common-law standard.  Compare majority 
op., ¶38 with majority op., ¶¶30-32.   
¶95 In addition, the court of appeals in Wischer aptly 
noted that under the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 895.85(3), 
the interpretation that the majority adopts today, the standard 
for punitive damages is arguably lower under § 895.85(3) than it 
was under the common law.  Wischer, 267 Wis. 2d 638, ¶42 
("[P]laintiffs' counsel admitted that his interpretation of the 
statute would expand rather than narrow the number of cases 
under 
which 
punitive 
damages 
could 
be 
awarded . . . . 
[P]laintiffs' counsel indicated that in his view of § 895.85(3), 
punitive 
damages 
under 
the 
Loveridge 
scenario 
could 
be 
recovered.")(emphasis in original).  "[T]his interpretation of 
the statute . . . would expand the scope of punitive damages 
awards in clear contravention to the intent of the legislature 
when it enacted § 895.85(3)."  Id. 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
20 
 
¶96 Moreover, the court of appeals in Wischer noted the 
numerous cases in which punitive damages would be available if 
the position the majority takes today were adopted: 
[A]nyone who is negligent could be considered to be 
intentionally disregarding the rights of someone.  
Examples are numerous:  someone who is drinking a cup 
of coffee while driving, or eating while driving, or 
adjusting the radio while driving, or even driving 
over the speed limit.  In each of these examples, an 
injured plaintiff could argue that the tortfeasor 
driver intentionally disregarded the rights of the 
other drivers on the road, and thus justify a punitive 
damage award. 
Id., ¶43.  While the majority states that "[t]he legislature 
intended with the heightened standard that now there would be 
even fewer negligence cases giving rise to punitive damages[,]" 
majority op., ¶39, there is no principled reason why punitive 
damages would not be allowed in the above hypotheticals under 
the majority's interpretation of the statute.   
¶97 In addition, the majority never satisfactorily defines 
the "rights" to which it is referring.  The majority states, 
"the act or conduct must actually disregard the rights of the 
plaintiff, whether it be a right to safety, health or life, a 
property right, or some other right."  Majority op., ¶38.  What 
exactly are these "other" rights?  Is the majority referring to 
constitutional rights, common-law rights, statutory rights, or 
rights yet to be recognized?   
¶98 In an attempt to assuage these concerns, the majority 
ostensibly affixes additional prerequisites to the imposition of 
punitive damages.  The majority states that in addition to 
constituting an intentional disregard of the plaintiff's rights 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
21 
 
under § 895.85(3), "the act or conduct must be sufficiently 
aggravated to warrant punishment by punitive damages."  Majority 
op., ¶38.  However, this "added requirement" is entirely 
illusory, as it is § 895.85 that describes the level of 
aggravation sufficient to warrant punitive damages in the first 
place.  The majority also cautions that "circuit courts [are] to 
serve as gatekeepers" in analyzing the conduct at issue and 
determining whether there was in fact an intentional disregard 
of rights, "before sending a question on punitive damages to the 
jury."  Majority op., ¶40.  This "gatekeeping function" was 
suggested by plaintiffs' counsel during oral argument before 
this court in the Wischer case.  Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy 
Indus. Am., Inc., 2005 WI 26, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
This "added requirement" is illusory as well.  When asked what 
standards the circuit court should follow in administering its 
"gatekeeping function" and determining when punitive damages 
would be appropriate, counsel for the Wischer plaintiffs 
responded:  "You'll know it when you see it."   
¶99 This low threshold, focusing on "rights" in the 
abstract rather than the defendant's knowledge of the harm, has 
constitutional implications.  The United States Supreme Court 
has stated:  "Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our 
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair 
notice . . . of 
the 
conduct 
that 
will 
subject 
him 
to 
punishment[.]"  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 
(1996).  Given the frequency with which individuals assert——and 
courts are apt to recognize——new "rights," one has to wonder how 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
22 
 
anyone can be put on fair notice as to what conduct subjects him 
to a punitive damage award under the majority's interpretation 
of the statute.  Certainly, a "you'll know it when you see it" 
standard does not satisfy this basic constitutional requirement.   
II 
¶100 As to the second question certified by the court of 
appeals, 
I 
would 
conclude 
that, 
in 
accordance 
with 
§ 895.85(1)(c), the defendant's conduct must be directed at the 
person seeking to recover punitive damages.  This court recently 
reaffirmed the importance of adhering to the text of a statute:  
Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into 
law 
by 
the 
legislature 
requires 
that 
statutory 
interpretation focus primarily on the language of the 
statute.  We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language. . . . It is the 
enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding 
on the public.   
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  To that extent, this 
court has stated:  "Words that are defined in the statute are 
given the definition that the legislature has provided."  
Wisconsin 
Citizens 
Concerned 
for 
Cranes 
and 
Doves, 
270 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶6 (citing Beard v. Lee Enters., 225 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 
591 N.W.2d 156 (1999)).18   
¶101 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85(3) provides:  "The plaintiff 
may receive punitive damages if evidence is submitted showing 
that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in 
                                                 
18 See also Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶23, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 
681 N.W.2d 157 (accord); State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (accord).   
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
23 
 
an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85(1)(c) defines "[p]laintiff" as:  "the 
party seeking to recover punitive damages."  Thus, when the 
statutory definition of "plaintiff" is read into § 895.85(3), 
the statute provides that punitive damages are available if 
"evidence 
is 
submitted 
showing 
that 
the 
defendant 
acted 
maliciously toward [the party seeking to recover punitive 
damages] or in an intentional disregard of the rights of [the 
party seeking to recover punitive damages]."   
¶102 The statute could not be clearer.  It plainly requires 
that the conduct giving rise to an award of punitive damages be 
directed at "the party seeking to recover punitive damages."  
The majority ignores the plain language of the statute and 
instead violates its own admonition against reading words into 
the statute by essentially concluding that it is sufficient if 
the defendant intentionally disregards the rights of a class of 
people to which the plaintiff belongs.  See majority op., ¶56 
("While Hogner may not have targeted Strenke personally, his 
intentional disregard of the rights of all motorists on the road 
necessarily 
implicated 
Strenke's 
rights.")(emphasis 
in 
original).   
¶103 The 
majority 
states 
that 
this 
result 
is 
more 
"reasonable" because there is nothing in the drafting records to 
support the contention that the defendant's actions must be 
directed at the particular plaintiff bringing the action.  
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
24 
 
Majority op., ¶¶48-50.19  However, there is no need to turn to 
the legislative history on this point; the legislature has 
unmistakably and explicitly determined what "the plaintiff" 
means 
in 
§ 895.85. 
 
See 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶51 
("legislative history need not be and is not consulted except to 
resolve an ambiguity in the statutory language").   
¶104 While the majority states that "[l]aws must be 
interpreted, considering the legal and practical consequences," 
majority op., ¶48, this is nothing more than an artfully crafted 
euphemism invoked by the court to justify its willingness to 
disregard and undermine the plain meaning of a law that the 
people of this state have enacted when it disagrees with the 
policy implications of the statute.  If the plain meaning of an 
unambiguous statute leads to undesired results, the proper 
remedy is for the legislature to amend the statute, not for this 
court to refuse its solemn obligation to apply what the 
legislature has plainly enacted.  See generally Columbus Park 
Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 
N.W.2d 633.  Rulings from this court must be based on more than 
subjective notions of practical politics for them to have any 
semblance of legitimacy as "law."   
                                                 
19 Notably, the majority states that its construction is 
"supported by . . . legislative history."  Majority op., ¶48.  
However, the majority cites no legislative history to support 
its position; instead, it cites to the lack of legislative 
history in order to discount what the statute plainly says.  
Thus, the majority has gone one step beyond the increasingly 
common practice of utilizing legislative history to undermine 
the plain meaning of what the legislature has enacted as law; 
the majority actually uses the absence of legislative history to 
ignore the plain meaning of a duly enacted statute.   
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
25 
 
¶105 Therefore, in accordance with the plain meaning of 
"plaintiff" that the legislature provided in § 895.85(1)(c), I 
would conclude the conduct referred to in § 895.85(3) must be 
directed at "the party seeking to recover punitive damages" in 
order for punitive damages to be recoverable under the statute.   
III 
¶106 Despite my strong disagreement with the majority as to 
issues one and two, I nevertheless join the mandate of the 
majority opinion because I conclude that there is sufficient 
evidence regarding the defendant's conduct to submit a punitive 
damage question to the jury under a proper interpretation of the 
heightened standard for punitive damages in § 895.85(3).   
¶107 The evidence presented to the jury during the punitive 
damages phase of the trial indicated that Mr. Hogner had 
consumed 16 to 18 beers over a five-hour period before the 
accident.  Mr. Hogner testified that he had consumed a 12 pack 
of beer at home before going to a bar.  He testified that while 
at the bar he consumed four to six more alcoholic drinks.  When 
the accident occurred, Mr. Hogner was en route to another tavern 
with a companion in his vehicle.  The jury was informed that Mr. 
Hogner had four previous convictions for drunk driving and that 
this was his fifth offense.  The jury was informed that blood 
tests taken after the accident indicated that Mr. Hogner's blood 
alcohol content was .269.   
¶108 Mr. Hogner testified that when the accident occurred 
he was attempting to make a left-hand turn at an intersection.  
He testified that he saw other vehicles approaching and that he 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
26 
 
believed Mr. Strenke's vehicle was signaling a right-hand turn.  
Mr. Hogner testified that he thought he could make a left-hand 
turn before Mr. Strenke's vehicle made its turn.  Mr. Hogner 
thus made a left-hand turn in front of Mr. Strenke's vehicle 
and, as a result, Mr. Strenke's vehicle struck Mr. Hogner's 
vehicle.  Mr. Hogner testified that he did not intend to injure 
Mr. Strenke. 
¶109 Given the evidence of the circumstances surrounding 
the accident, Mr. Hogner's state of intoxication, and Mr. 
Hogner's history of drunken driving offenses, I would conclude 
that a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Hogner knew that it 
was substantially certain that the driver of the oncoming 
vehicle would be injured as a result of his decision to make a 
left-hand turn in front of him.  While Mr. Hogner testified that 
he did not intend to harm Mr. Strenke and believed he had 
sufficient time to complete a left-hand turn, "[i]ntent may be 
inferred from conduct."  Shepard, 189 Wis. 2d at 287.  A 
reasonable jury could infer, given his past convictions for 
drunken driving, that Mr. Hogner was aware of his level of 
intoxication after consuming 16 to 18 beers in a five-hour 
period and his resulting diminished capabilities of perception 
and judgment.  A reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Hogner 
made an intentional decision to turn in front of an oncoming 
car.  A reasonable jury could further conclude that Mr. Hogner 
was aware that turning in front of an oncoming vehicle after 
consuming 16 to 18 alcoholic drinks was substantially certain to 
result in injury to the driver of the oncoming vehicle.  Thus, I 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
27 
 
would conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury 
to find an "intentional disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiff," Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), as that phrase is properly 
understood.   
¶110 While the evidence does not indicate that Mr. Hogner 
was an acquaintance of Mr. Strenke at the time of the accident, 
the evidence nonetheless satisfies the requirement that the 
wrongdoer's conduct be directed at "the party seeking to recover 
punitive damages."  Wis. Stat. § 895.85(1)(c).  Mr. Hogner was 
aware of Mr. Strenke's vehicle when he made his left-hand turn.  
He testified that he believed Mr. Strenke's vehicle was 
signaling a right-hand turn.  A reasonable jury could conclude 
that by electing to turn in front of an oncoming vehicle while 
heavily intoxicated, Mr. Hogner's conduct was directed at the 
driver of the oncoming vehicle, Mr. Strenke.  In other words, a 
jury could conclude that Mr. Hogner was aware that injury to the 
driver of the oncoming vehicle was substantially certain to 
result from his actions.   
¶111 Therefore, I concur in the mandate of the majority 
opinion but do not join in its reasoning.     
 
No.  03-2527.jpw 
 
1