Title: P. v. Cavitt & Williams

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 6/21/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S105058 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A081492 
JAMES FREDDIE CAVITT, 
) 
 
) 
San Mateo County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SC038915B 
___________________________________ ) 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S105058 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A088117 
ROBERT NATHANIEL WILLIAMS, 
) 
 
) 
San Mateo County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SC038915C 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendants James Cavitt and Robert Williams were convicted in separate 
trials of the felony murder of 58-year-old Betty McKnight, the stepmother of 
Cavitt’s girlfriend, Mianta McKnight.  Defendants admitted plotting with Mianta 
to enter the McKnight home, to catch Betty unawares and tie her up, and to steal 
Betty’s jewelry and other property.  On the evening of December 1, 1995, with 
Mianta’s assistance, the plan went forward.  Defendants entered the house, threw a 
sheet over Betty’s head, bound this hooded sheet to her wrists and ankles with 
 
 
2
rope and duct tape, and escaped with guns, jewelry, and other valuables from the 
bedroom.  Betty was beaten and left hog-tied, face down on the bed.  Her 
breathing was labored.  Before leaving, defendants made it appear that Mianta was 
a victim by pretending to tie her up as well.  By the time Mianta untied herself and 
called her father to report the burglary-robbery, Betty had died from asphyxiation. 
The evidence at trial amply supported a finding that defendants were the 
direct perpetrators of the murder.  However, there was also evidence that tended to 
support the defense theory—namely, that Mianta deliberately suffocated Betty, for 
reasons independent of the burglary-robbery, after defendants had escaped and 
reached a place of temporary safety.  Defendants assert that the felony-murder rule 
would not apply to this scenario and that the trial court’s instructions erroneously 
denied the jury the opportunity to consider their theory.     
Because the jury could have convicted defendants without finding they 
were the direct perpetrators of the murder, we granted review to clarify a 
nonkiller’s liability for a killing “committed in the perpetration” of an inherently 
dangerous felony under Penal Code section 189’s felony-murder rule.1  (See 
People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 720-723 (Pulido).)  We hold that, in such 
circumstances, the felony-murder rule requires both a causal relationship and a 
temporal relationship between the underlying felony and the act resulting in death.  
The causal relationship is established by proof of a logical nexus, beyond mere 
coincidence of time and place, between the homicidal act and the underlying 
felony the nonkiller committed or attempted to commit.  The temporal relationship 
is established by proof the felony and the homicidal act were part of one 
                                                 
1  
The jury also found true the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special 
circumstances.  Defendants have not independently challenged the special 
circumstance findings in this proceeding, and we express no views here as to the 
scope of a nonkiller’s liability under the felony-murder special-circumstance 
provisions.    
 
 
3
continuous transaction.  Applying these rules to the facts here, we affirm the 
judgments of the Court of Appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant James Cavitt started dating Mianta McKnight in January 1995.  
Mianta’s father, Philip, and her stepmother, Betty, disapproved of the relationship.  
Concerned about Mianta’s late-night dating and her high school truancy, Philip 
insisted that Mianta move from Oakland, where she had been living with Philip’s 
niece, back to Brisbane to live with him and Betty.  He hoped this would keep her 
away from Cavitt.     
After moving back to Brisbane in November 1995, Mianta became upset 
that Philip and Betty did not allow her to go on dates with Cavitt.  Her relationship 
with Betty in particular had been rocky for some time, and she often told her 
schoolmates that she hated Betty.     
Around the end of November 1995, 17-year-old Mianta, 17-year-old Cavitt, 
and Cavitt’s friend, 16-year-old defendant Robert Williams, developed a plan to 
burglarize the McKnight house, where Mianta was then living.  The plan was to 
enter the house with Mianta’s assistance, tie up Betty, and steal what they could 
find.  The three scheduled the burglary-robbery for December 1.  On that 
afternoon, Mianta purchased rope and packing tape on the way home from school.  
Later on, she placed a bed sheet outside the house and left the side door unlocked.     
Around 6:30 p.m., Williams and Cavitt drove together to the McKnight 
house.  They were wearing black clothes, gloves, and hockey masks and were 
carrying duct tape.  Between 7:00 and 7:15 p.m., Mianta met them at the side door, 
gave them the rope she had just bought, and told them Betty was upstairs in bed.  
All three went upstairs.  Cavitt and Williams threw the sheet over Betty’s head.  
While Cavitt secured the sheet around Betty’s head with duct tape, Williams 
fastened Betty’s wrists together with plastic flex cuffs.  Then they used the rope to 
 
 
4
bind her ankles and wrists together with the sheet, creating a kind of hood for 
Betty’s head.  During the process, Cavitt and Williams also punched Betty in the 
back with their fists to get her to be quiet.  Betty sustained extensive bruising to 
her face, shoulders, arms, legs, ankles and wrists, consistent with blunt force 
trauma.     
After Betty was immobilized, Cavitt, Williams, and Mianta ransacked the 
bedroom, removing cash, cameras, Rolex watches, jewelry, and two handguns.  
Before leaving, Cavitt and Williams pretended to bind Mianta and placed her on 
the bed next to Betty.  Cavitt and Williams each claimed that Betty was still 
breathing, although with difficulty, when they left her, face down on the bed.   
After Mianta freed herself, she turned Betty over onto her back.  Mianta 
claimed she removed duct tape from Betty’s mouth.  Betty did not move and did 
not appear to be breathing.  Mianta called her father to tell him they had been 
robbed.  She also told him Betty was unconscious.  Philip immediately reported 
the incident to the Brisbane Police Department at 7:44 p.m.  When the dispatcher 
called the McKnight house at 7:45 p.m., Mianta claimed that robbers had entered 
the house while she was downstairs watching television, had put a sheet over her 
head, and had knocked her unconscious; that she was eventually able to free 
herself; that she had called her father to report the crime; and that her stepmother 
was unconscious.     
Brisbane police arrived at 7:52 p.m.  Betty was on her back on the bed.  She 
was not breathing and had no pulse.  Her hands were bound behind her, and her 
wrists and ankles were tied together with a rope.  Officers attempted 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  Paramedics obtained a heartbeat at 8:11 p.m., but 
Betty had already suffered severe and irreversible brain injury.  She was 
pronounced dead the next morning.  The cause of death was insufficient oxygen, 
 
 
5
or anoxia, caused by asphyxiation.  The injuries she sustained were a contributing 
cause.     
During conversations with police and a neighbor, Mianta reiterated her 
claim that unidentified robbers had somehow entered the house, that they had 
wrapped her in a sheet and knocked her unconscious, and that she had been unable 
to untie herself until after the robbers left, at which point she discovered that her 
stepmother was unconscious.  When police secured Philip’s consent to conduct a 
polygraph of his daughter, however, Mianta eventually confessed to her 
involvement in the burglary-robbery.  Cavitt and Williams were arrested on 
December 2 and also confessed.  While being transported to juvenile hall, Cavitt 
said to Williams, “Man, we fucked up.  We should have just shot her.”           
Police found the stolen jewelry, cameras, and handguns at Cavitt’s home, as 
well as black clothing, gloves, and hockey masks.   
Cavitt and Williams, who were tried separately, contended that Mianta 
must have killed Betty after they had left and for reasons unrelated to the burglary-
robbery.  To that end, they offered evidence tending to show that Mianta hated her 
stepmother, that Mianta had expressed to her schoolmates a desire to kill her 
stepmother, and that Betty could have been suffocated after Cavitt and Williams 
had returned to Cavitt’s home with the loot.   
Cavitt and Williams were convicted of first degree murder with the special 
circumstances of robbery murder and burglary murder, as well as certain lesser 
offenses.  Cavitt was also convicted of personally inflicting great bodily injury in 
the commission of the murder.  Each was sentenced to an unstayed term of 25 
years to life.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.5, subd. (b).)  The Court of Appeal, having 
ordered the cases consolidated for purposes of oral argument and decision, 
affirmed in an unpublished decision.     
 
 
 
6
DISCUSSION 
This case involves the “ ‘complicity aspect’ ” of the felony-murder rule.  
(Pulido, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 720.)  As in Pulido, we are not concerned with that 
part of the felony-murder rule making a killer liable for first degree murder if the 
homicide is committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary.  Rather, the 
question here involves “a nonkiller’s liability for the felony murder committed by 
another.”  (Id. at p. 720.)   
Defendants contend that a nonkiller can be liable for the felony murder 
committed by another only if the act resulting in death facilitated the commission 
of the underlying felony.  Since (in their view) the evidence here would have 
supported the inference that Mianta killed her stepmother out of a private animus, 
and not to advance the burglary-robbery, they claim that the trial court’s failure to 
instruct the jury on the requirement that the killing facilitate the burglary-robbery 
mandates reversal of their felony-murder convictions.  The Attorney General, on 
the other hand, asserts that no causal relationship need exist between the 
underlying felony and the killing.  In his view, it is enough that the act resulting in 
death occurred at the same time as the burglary and robbery.     
After reviewing our case law, we find that neither formulation satisfactorily 
describes the complicity aspect of California’s felony-murder rule.  We hold 
instead that the felony-murder rule does not apply to nonkillers where the act 
resulting in death is completely unrelated to the underlying felony other than 
occurring at the same time and place.  Under California law, there must be a 
logical nexus—i.e., more than mere coincidence of time and place—between the 
felony and the act resulting in death before the felony-murder rule may be applied 
to a nonkiller.  Evidence that the killing facilitated or aided the underlying felony 
is relevant but is not essential.     
 
 
7
We also hold that the requisite temporal relationship between the felony 
and the homicidal act exists even if the nonkiller is not physically present at the 
time of the homicide, as long as the felony that the nonkiller committed or 
attempted to commit and the homicidal act are part of one continuous transaction. 
A 
“All murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate [certain enumerated felonies including robbery and burglary] . . . is 
murder of the first degree.”  (Pen. Code, § 189.)  The mental state required is 
simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony (People v. Gutierrez 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1140), since only those felonies that are inherently 
dangerous to life or pose a significant prospect of violence are enumerated in the 
statute.  (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 316 [“the consequences of the 
evil act are so natural or probable that liability is established as a matter of 
policy”]; People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 780; 2 La Fave, Substantive 
Criminal Law (2d ed. 2003) § 14.5(b), p. 449.)  “Once a person has embarked 
upon a course of conduct for one of the enumerated felonious purposes, he comes 
directly within a clear legislative warning—if a death results from his commission 
of that felony it will be first degree murder, regardless of the circumstances.”  
(People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387-388 (Burton).)     
The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter those who commit the 
enumerated felonies from killing by holding them strictly responsible for any 
killing committed by a cofelon, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental, 
during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the felony.  (Burton, supra, 6 
Cal.3d at p. 388.)  “The Legislature has said in effect that this deterrent purpose 
outweighs the normal legislative policy of examining the individual state of mind 
of each person causing an unlawful killing to determine whether the killing was 
with or without malice, deliberate or accidental, and calibrating our treatment of 
 
 
8
the person accordingly.  Once a person perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate one of 
the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the Legislature, he is no longer 
entitled to such fine judicial calibration, but will be deemed guilty of first degree 
murder for any homicide committed in the course thereof.”  (Ibid.)   
1 
Defendants contend that a nonkiller’s liability for the felony murder 
committed by a cofelon depends on proof of a very specific causal relationship 
between the homicidal act and the underlying felony—namely, that the killer 
intended thereby to advance or facilitate the felony.  Yet, defendants cite no case 
in which we have relieved a nonkiller of felony-murder liability because of 
insufficient proof that the killer actually intended to advance or facilitate the 
underlying felony.  Indeed, the felony-murder rule is intended to eliminate the 
need to plumb the parties’ peculiar intent with respect to a killing committed 
during the perpetration of the felony.  (Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 388.)2  
Defendants’ formulation, which finds no support in the statutory text, would 
thwart that goal.  
Moreover, defendants’ formulation is at odds with a fundamental purpose 
of the felony-murder rule, which is “ ‘to deter felons from killing negligently or 
accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.’ ”  
(People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1069.)  It is difficult to imagine how 
homicidal acts that are unintentional, negligent, or accidental could be said to have 
advanced or facilitated the underlying felony when those acts are, by their nature, 
unintended. 
                                                 
2  
As we have previously explained, it is no defense to felony murder that the 
nonkiller did not intend to kill, forbade his associates to kill, or was himself 
unarmed.  (People v. Boss (1930) 210 Cal. 245, 249; People v. Floyd (1970) 1 
Cal.3d 694, 707, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 258, 287, fn. 36.)    
 
 
9
Defendants make little effort to grapple with the policies underlying the 
felony-murder rule and rely instead almost entirely on our oft-repeated observation 
in People v. Vasquez (1875) 49 Cal. 560 (Vasquez) that “ ‘[i]f the homicide in 
question was committed by one of [the nonkiller’s] associates engaged in the 
robbery, in furtherance of their common purpose to rob, he is as accountable as 
though his own hand had intentionally given the fatal blow, and is guilty of 
murder in the first degree.’ ”  (Id. at p. 563, italics added.)  Relying on Vasquez, 
defendants claim the felony-murder rule requires proof that the homicidal act have 
advanced or facilitated the underlying felony.  Defendants misread Vasquez.   
In the century and a quarter since Vasquez was decided, we have never 
construed it to require a killing to advance or facilitate the felony, so long as some 
logical nexus existed between the two.  To the contrary, in People v. Olsen (1889) 
80 Cal. 122, 125 (Olsen), overruled on other grounds in People v. Green (1956) 47 
Cal.2d 209, 227, 232, we upheld an instruction that based a nonkiller’s complicity 
on a killing that was committed merely “in the prosecution of the common 
design”—and, in Pulido, we observed that this instruction was “similar” to the 
Vasquez formulation.  (Pulido, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 720.)  The similarity, of 
course, is that both require a logical nexus between the homicidal act and the 
underlying felony.  Although evidence that the fatal act facilitated or promoted the 
felony is unquestionably relevant to establishing that nexus, California case law 
has not yet required that such evidence be presented in every case.   
Such a requirement finds no support in the statutory text, either.  Penal 
Code section 189 states only that “[a]ll murder . . . which is committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate” the enumerated felonies “is murder of the 
first degree.”  (Pen. Code, § 189.)  Nowhere has the Legislature imposed a 
requirement that the killer intended the act causing death to further the felony.  We 
are therefore reluctant to derive such a requirement from the “in furtherance” 
 
 
10
discussion in our case law, which is itself only a court-created gloss on section 
189.     
Indeed, even jurisdictions whose felony-murder statutes require the 
homicidal act be “in furtherance” of an enumerated felony do not require proof 
that the act furthered or aided the felony.  People v. Lewis (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1981) 111 
Misc.2d 682, 686 [444 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1006], which construed a New York 
felony-murder statute that included this language, is instructive:  “This equation of 
‘in furtherance’ with ‘in aid of’ or ‘in advancement of’ has the virtue of linguistic 
accuracy, but is at odds with both the history and purpose of the ‘in furtherance’ 
requirement.  The phrase can best be understood as the third logical link in the 
triad which must be present to connect a felony with a consequent homicide.  Just 
as ‘in the course of’ imposes a duration requirement, [and] ‘causes the death’ a 
causation requirement, ‘in furtherance’ places a relation requirement between the 
felony and the homicide.  More than the mere coincidence to time and place 
[citation], the nexus must be one of logic or plan.  Excluded are those deaths 
which are so far outside the ambit of the plan of the felony and its execution as to 
be unrelated to them.”  In sum, it is “a misinterpretation of the phrase to require 
that the murder bring success to the felonious purpose.”  (Id. at p. 687 [444 
N.Y.S.2d at pp. 1006-1007]; State v. Young (Conn. 1983) 469 A.2d 1189, 1193 
[“New York courts have construed the phrase to impose the requirement of a 
logical nexus between the felony and the homicide”]; see also State v. 
Montgomery (Conn. 2000) 759 A.2d 995, 1020 [“ ‘ “The phrase ‘in furtherance of’ 
was intended to impose the requirement of a relationship between the underlying 
felony and the homicide beyond that of mere causation in fact” ’ ”].)  We likewise 
construe Penal Code section 189 to require only a logical nexus between the 
felony and the homicide.   
 
 
11
Defendants’ proffered interpretation would also lead to absurd results.  
Consider the situation in which a fire is set and the defendant departs by the time a 
firefighter arrives and dies in the course of combating the fire.  A Washington 
appellate court, embracing defendants’ approach, interpreted the “in furtherance” 
requirement in its felony-murder statute to relieve a defendant-arsonist from 
liability in those circumstances:  “Here, there is no evidence from which any 
reasonable juror could conclude that in acting to advance or promote the arson, 
[defendant] caused [the victim’s] death.”  (State v. Leech (Wash.Ct.App. 1989) 
775 P.2d 463, 466.)  The Washington Supreme Court rejected this approach and 
upheld the felony-murder conviction, finding it sufficient that there was a temporal 
and causal connection between the arson and the death.  (State v. Leech (Wash. 
1990) 790 P.2d 160, 163-165 & fn. 21, revg. State v. Leech, supra, 775 P.2d 463; 
accord, Morris, The Felon’s Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others (1956) 
105 U.Pa. L.Rev. 50, 79-80 (Morris).) 
The Attorney General, on the other hand, contends that the requisite intent, 
combined with a killing by a cofelon that occurs while the felony is ongoing, is 
sufficient to establish the nonkiller’s liability for felony murder.  His formulation, 
in other words, would require only a temporal connection between the homicidal 
act and the underlying felony.  This description of the relationship between the 
killing and the felony is incomplete.  We have often required more than mere 
coincidence in time and place between the felony and the act resulting in death to 
establish a nonkiller’s liability for felony murder.  In People v. Washington, supra, 
62 Cal.2d 777, for example, we reversed a conviction of felony murder where the 
accomplice was killed during the robbery by the victim.  We held that Penal Code 
section 189 requires “that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing, for if he 
does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate the felony.”  (Washington, 
supra, at p. 781.)  In Pulido, supra, 15 Cal.4th 713, we held that section 189 does 
 
 
12
not apply even where a cofelon committed the killing during a robbery, if the 
nonkiller did not join the felony until after the killing occurred.  (Pulido, supra, at 
p. 716.)    
The Attorney General correctly points out that we have approved 
instructions imposing felony-murder liability on a nonkiller “if a human being is 
killed by any one of several persons jointly engaged at the time of such killing in 
the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery, whether such 
killing is intentional, or unintentional, or accidental.”  (People v. Perry (1925) 195 
Cal. 623, 637; People v. Martin (1938) 12 Cal.2d 466, 472.)  But this “well-
settled” formulation (Martin, supra, at p. 472) does not suggest that no causal 
connection need exist between the felony and the act resulting in death.  By its 
terms, the Martin-Perry formulation requires the parties to have been jointly 
engaged in the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate the felony at the time of 
the act resulting in death.  A confederate who performs a homicidal act that is 
completely unrelated to the felony for which the parties have combined cannot be 
said to have been “jointly engaged” in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the 
felony at the time of the killing.  Otherwise, “if one of two burglars ransacking a 
home glances out of a window, sees his enemy for whom he has long been 
searching and shoots him, the unarmed accomplice, party only to the burglary, will 
be guilty of murder in the first degree.”  (Morris, supra, 105 U.Pa. L.Rev. at p. 
73.)   
California law thus has long required some logical connection between the 
felony and the act resulting in death, and rightly so.  Yet the requisite connection 
has not depended on proof that the homicidal act furthered or facilitated the 
underlying felony.  Instead, for a nonkiller to be responsible for a homicide 
committed by a cofelon under the felony-murder rule, there must be a logical 
 
 
13
nexus, beyond mere coincidence of time and place, between the felony the parties 
were committing or attempting to commit and the act resulting in death.   
We therefore reject the assumption—shared by both parties—that the “ ‘in 
furtherance’ ” (e.g., Vasquez, supra, 49 Cal. at p. 563) and “jointly engaged” (e.g., 
People v. Martin, supra, 12 Cal.2d at p. 472) formulations articulate opposing 
standards of felony-murder liability.  The latter does not mean—as the Attorney 
General suggests—that mere coincidence of time and place between the felony 
and the homicide is sufficient.  And the former does not require—as defendants 
suggest—that the killer intended the homicidal act to aid or promote the felony.  
Rather, Vasquez and Martin have merely used different words to convey the same 
concept:  to exclude homicidal acts that are completely unrelated to the felony for 
which the parties have combined, and to require instead a logical nexus between 
the felony and the homicide beyond a mere coincidence of time or place. 
2 
One of the most discussed cases in this area—People v. Cabaltero (1939) 
31 Cal.App.2d 52 (Cabaltero)3—merits additional analysis.   
In Cabaltero, six defendants were convicted of felony murder, based on the 
killing of an accomplice (Ancheta) during the perpetration of the robbery of a rural 
landowner (Nishida).  The conspirators plotted to rob Nishida on payday by 
creating an altercation that would divert attention from the robbery.  One of the 
conspirators was to create the distraction; two others were to rob Nishida; two 
more were to stand guard outside the building where the robbery was to take 
place; and Cabaltero was to drive the getaway car.  (Id. at pp. 55-56.)  The robbery 
proceeded as planned, and the loot was obtained at gunpoint without anyone firing 
                                                 
3  
See, e.g., Pulido, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 722 and footnote 2, and 
citations therein. 
 
 
14
a shot.  Meanwhile, Ancheta, who was standing guard outside, fired shots at two 
people who had just driven up.  Immediately after the shots were fired, one of the 
robbers emerged from the building, exclaimed, “Damn you, what did you shoot 
for,” and shot Ancheta fatally.  (Id. at p. 56.)    
Some courts and commentators have criticized Cabaltero, charging that it 
sustained felony-murder liability for nonkillers based merely on “the deliberate 
acts of one accomplice, outside the conspiracy, ‘outside the risk’ of the 
conspiracy, and serving only his personal animus.”  (Morris, supra, 105 U.Pa. 
L.Rev. at p. 73.)  As we have explained above, we agree that a nonkiller cannot be 
liable under the felony-murder rule where the killing has no relation to the felony 
other than mere coincidence of time and place.  Cabaltero does not appear to be 
such a case, however.  Viewing the situation objectively, it seems plain that 
Ancheta was shot as punishment for the greatly increased risk of detection caused 
by his decision to fire at two people who were approaching the building.  To the 
extent the Ancheta shooting was intended to aid in the escape from the robbery 
(Cabaltero, supra, 31 Cal.App.2d at pp. 61-62), the homicide would satisfy even 
the strict causal connection demanded by defendants.  Accordingly, a logical 
nexus between the homicide and the felony existed in that case.   
3 
Substantial evidence of a logical nexus between the burglary-robbery and 
the murder exists in this case as well.  The record supports a finding that 
defendants and/or Mianta killed Betty to eliminate the sole witness to the burglary-
robbery or that Betty died accidentally as a result of being bound and gagged 
during the burglary-robbery.  Either theory is sufficient to support the judgment.  
(E.g., People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 502 (Kimble).)  Even if the jury 
believed that defendants did not want to kill Betty or that they conditioned their 
participation in the burglary-robbery on the understanding that Betty not get hurt, 
 
 
15
it would not be a defense to felony murder.  (People v. Boss, supra, 210 Cal. at p. 
249; Vasquez, supra, 49 Cal. at pp. 562-563.)   
As defendants point out, however, the record might also have supported a 
finding that Mianta killed Betty out of a private animus and not to aid or promote 
the burglary-robbery.  Defendants contend that the jury instructions, by omitting 
any requirement that the homicidal act be “in furtherance of” the burglary-robbery, 
failed to apprise the jury of this latter possibility and therefore mandate reversal of 
their convictions. 
We disagree.  Although we have used the “in furtherance” phrase with 
some frequency in our opinions, we also recognize that this wording has the 
potential to sow confusion if used in the instructions to the jury.  (See Francis v. 
City & County of San Francisco (1955) 44 Cal.2d 335, 341 [“The admonition has 
been frequently stated that it is dangerous to frame an instruction upon isolated 
extracts from the opinions of the court”]; Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co. (1973) 34 
Cal.App.3d 858, 876, fn. 5.)  Indeed, as we have explained above, the felony-
murder rule does not require proof that the homicidal act furthered or facilitated 
the felony, only that a logical nexus exist between the two.  We therefore do not 
find the jury instructions deficient merely because the “in furtherance” phrasing 
was omitted.  We must instead measure the instructions against the applicable law 
as set forth in part A.1, ante.   
The instructions in Cavitt’s case tracked CALJIC No. 8.27 and provided in 
relevant part:  “If a human being is killed by one of several persons engaged in the 
commission of the crimes of robbery or burglary, all persons, who either directly 
and actively commit the act constituting that crime, or who with knowledge of the 
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and with the intent or purpose of 
committing, encouraging or facilitating the commission of the offense, aid, 
promote, encourage or instigate by act or advice its commission, are guilty of 
 
 
16
murder in the first degree, whether the killing is intentional, unintentional or 
accidental.”  Williams’s jury received a substantively similar instruction.4   
The instructions adequately apprised the jury of the need for a logical nexus 
between the felonies and the homicide in this case.  To convict, the jury 
necessarily found that “the killing occurred during the commission or attempted 
commission of robbery or burglary” by “one of several persons engaged in the 
commission” of those crimes.”  The first of these described a temporal connection 
between the crimes; the second described the logical nexus.  A burglar who 
happens to spy a lifelong enemy through the window of the house and fires a fatal 
shot, as in Professor Morris’s example (Morris, supra, 105 U.Pa. L.Rev. at p. 73), 
may have committed a killing while the robbery and burglary were taking place 
but cannot be said to have been “engaged in the commission” of those crimes at 
the time the shot was fired. 
We further find that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to clarify the 
logical-nexus requirement.  The existence of a logical nexus between the felony 
and the murder in the felony-murder context, like the relationship between the 
robbery and the murder in the context of the felony-murder special circumstance 
(People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 59-62), is not a separate element of the 
charged crime but, rather, a clarification of the scope of an element.  (Kimble, 
supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 501.)  “[T]he mere act of ‘clarifying’ the scope of an 
                                                 
4  
“If a human being is killed by any one of several persons engaged in the 
commission or attempted commission of the crime[s] of burglary or robbery, all 
persons, who either directly and actively commit the act constituting that crime, or 
who with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and 
with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the 
commission of the offense, aid, promote, encourage, or instigate by act or advice 
its commission, are guilty of murder in the first degree, whether the killing is 
intentional, unintentional, or accidental.”      
 
 
17
element of a crime or a special circumstance does not create a new and separate 
element of that crime or special circumstance.”  (Ibid.)   
Hence, if the requisite nexus between the felony and the homicidal act is 
not at issue and the trial court has otherwise adequately explained the general 
principles of law requiring a determination whether the killing was committed in 
the perpetration of the felony, “it is the defendant’s obligation to request any 
clarifying or amplifying instructions on the subject.”  (People v. Garrison (1989) 
47 Cal.3d 746, 791.)  “Sua sponte instructions are required only ‘ “ ‘on the general 
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.  [Citations.]  The 
general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and 
openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the 
jury’s understanding of the case.’ ” ’ ”  (Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 503; 
People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 952 [no sua sponte duty to define the 
meaning of the phrase “ ‘while [defendant] was engaged in . . . the commission of’ 
rape”], overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
1046, 1069, fn. 13.)  In sum, there is no sua sponte duty to clarify the principles of 
the requisite relationship between the felony and the homicide without regard to 
whether the evidence supports such an instruction.  (Garrison, 47 Cal.3d at p. 
791.)   
Because the evidence here did not raise an issue as to the existence of a 
logical nexus between the burglary-robbery and the homicide, the trial court had 
no sua sponte duty to clarify this requirement.  This is not a situation in which 
Mianta just happened to have shot and killed her lifelong enemy, whom she 
coincidentally spied through the window of the house during the burglary-robbery.  
(Cf. Morris, supra, 105 U.Pa. L.Rev. at p. 73.)  Betty, the murder victim, was the 
intended target of the burglary-robbery.  As part of those felonies, Betty was 
covered in a sheet, beaten, hog-tied with rope and tape, and left face down on the 
 
 
18
bed.  Her breathing was labored at the time defendants left.  These acts either 
asphyxiated Betty in themselves or left her unable to resist Mianta’s murderous 
impulses.  Thus, on this record, one could not say that the homicide was 
completely unrelated, other than the mere coincidence of time and place, to the 
burglary-robbery.5      
Defendants apparently assume that Mianta’s personal animus towards the 
victim of the felony, if credited, should somehow absolve the other participants of 
their responsibility for the victim’s death.  They are mistaken.  Liability for felony 
murder does not depend on an examination of “the individual state of mind of each 
person causing an unlawful killing to determine whether the killing was with or 
without malice, deliberate or accidental . . . .  Once a person perpetrates or 
attempts to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the 
Legislature, he is no longer entitled to such fine judicial calibration . . . .”  (Burton, 
supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 388.)  “The felony-murder rule generally acts as a substitute 
for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder.”  (People v. 
Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626.)  Accordingly, a nonkiller’s liability for 
felony murder does not depend on the killer’s subjective motivation but on the 
existence of objective facts that connect the act resulting in death to the felony the 
nonkiller committed or attempted to commit.  Otherwise, defendants’ 
responsibility would vary based merely on whether the trier of fact believed that 
                                                 
5  
As Cavitt concedes, cases that raise a genuine issue as to the existence of a 
logical nexus between the felony and the homicide “are few indeed.”  It is difficult 
to imagine how such an issue could ever arise when the target of the felony was 
intentionally murdered by one of the perpetrators of the felony.  Nor, other than in 
circumstances akin to Professor Morris’s hypothetical, does it seem likely that a 
genuine dispute could arise when the victim was killed during the escape from the 
felony or was killed negligently or accidentally during the perpetration of the 
felony.       
 
 
19
Mianta killed Betty by accident, because of a personal grudge, to eliminate a 
witness, or simply to find out what killing was like.6   
One would hardly be surprised to discover that targets of inherently 
dangerous felonies are selected precisely because one or more of the participants 
in the felony harbors a personal animus towards the victim.  But it would be novel 
indeed if that commonplace fact could be used to exculpate the parties to a 
felonious enterprise of a murder committed in the perpetration of that felony, 
where a logical nexus between the felony and the murder exists.  (Cf. People v. 
Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1141 [“concurrent intent to kill and to commit 
the target felony or felonies does not undermine the basis for a felony-murder 
conviction”].)  Defendants’ focus on the killer’s subjective motivation thus is not 
merely contrary to the felony-murder rule but would in practice swallow it up.  
Under the circumstances here, we reject the defense contention that the trial court 
erred in failing to give, sua sponte, a clarifying instruction to explain more fully 
the requisite connection between the felonies and the homicide.  (People v. 
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 222-223; Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 503.) 
 
 
                                                 
6  
We also reject Cavitt’s summary assertion that Olsen, supra, 80 Cal. 122, 
excluded killings that are a “ ‘fresh and independent product’ of the killer’s mind” 
from the ambit of the felony-murder rule.  Cavitt misreads Olsen, which explicitly 
did not address “the supposed case of counsel where the greater crime was, or 
might have been, ‘a fresh and independent product of the mind of one of the 
conspirators . . . .’ ”  (Olsen, supra, 80 Cal. at p. 125.)      
 
Moreover, as stated above, the felony-murder rule renders it unnecessary to 
examine the individual state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing—
which is precisely what the “fresh and independent product” limitation would 
require courts to do.  Here, for example, the defense theory was that Mianta 
decided to kill Betty for reasons independent of the felony.  As we explain in the 
text, however, this theory even if credited would not relieve defendants of liability 
for felony murder in this case. 
 
 
20
B 
Defendants challenge next the instructions concerning the temporal 
relationship between the homicide and the felonies.  The defense theory was that 
Mianta killed Betty in the five or ten minutes after defendants had left the house 
and, along with the stolen property, had reached a place of temporary safety but 
before Mianta reported the crime.  Thus, in their view, the burglary and robbery 
had ended before Betty was killed, relieving them of liability for felony murder.   
The People contended that Betty was killed—or the acts resulting in her 
death were performed—while defendants were present or, at the least, before 
defendants reached a place of temporary safety.  They also argued that defendants 
were guilty of felony murder, even if the homicide occurred after they had reached 
a place of temporary safety, as long as the felonies and the homicide constituted 
part of one continuous transaction.  The trial court in both cases agreed, and 
instructed each jury that a killing “is committed in the commission of a felony if 
the killing and the felony are parts of one continuous transaction.  There is no 
requirement that the homicide occur while committing or while engaged in the 
felony or that the killing be part of the felony, so long as the two acts are part of 
one continuous transaction.”7     
                                                 
7  
Cavitt’s jury was further instructed as follows:  “When a killing occurs after 
the elements of the felony have been committed, the felony-murder rule applies if 
the killing and the felony were part of ‘one continuous transaction.’  Some factors 
that you may consider in determining whether the killing and the felony were part 
of, ‘one continuous transaction’ might include, but are not limited to, the 
following considerations:   
 
“(1) whether or not any aider and abettor exercised continuous control over 
the victim. [¶]  (2) whether or not the killing occurs in pursuance of a felony.  [¶]  
(3) the distance between the location of the perpetration of the felony and the 
location of the killing.  [¶]  (4) the time lapse between the perpetration of the 
felony and the killing.  [¶]  (5) whether the killing is a direct causal result of the 
felony.  [¶]  (6) whether the killing occurs while the perpetrators are attempting to 
 
 
21
We find no error.  Our case law has consistently rejected a “ ‘strict 
construction of the temporal relationship’ between felony and killing as to both 
first degree murder and [the] felony-murder special circumstance.”  (People v. 
Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 624.)  Instead, we have said that “a killing is 
committed in the perpetration of an enumerated felony if the killing and the felony 
‘are parts of one continuous transaction.’ ”  (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 
577, 631.)  Indeed, we have invoked the continuous-transaction doctrine not only 
to aggravate a killer’s culpability, but also to make complicit a nonkiller, where 
                                                                                                                                                 
protect themselves against discovery of the felony or reporting of the crime.  [¶]  
(7) whether the killing is a natural and probable consequence of the felony. 
 
“No one of these factors, or any combination of factors is to be considered 
by you to be determinative of the phrase ‘one continuous transaction.’  There is no 
requirement that the defendant be present at the scene of the killing so long as the 
defendant’s participation in the felony sets in motion a chain of events which 
resulted in the killing.”     
 
In addition to the instruction quoted in the text, Williams’s jury was 
instructed in accordance with CALJIC Nos. 8.21.1 and 8.21.2, which define, 
respectively, the duration of a robbery and a burglary.  The burglary instruction 
closely tracked, with appropriate modifications, the robbery instruction, which 
provided:  “For the purposes of determining whether an unlawful killing has 
occurred during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, the 
commission of the crime of robbery is not confined to a fixed place or a limited 
period of time.  [¶]  A robbery is still in progress after the original taking of 
physical possession of the stolen property while the perpetrators are in possession 
of the stolen property and fleeing in an attempt to escape.  Likewise, it is still in 
progress so long as immediate pursuers are attempting to capture the perpetrators 
or to regain the stolen property.  [¶]  A robbery is complete when the perpetrators 
have eluded any pursuers, have reached a place of temporary safety, and are in 
unchallenged possession of stolen property after having effected an escape with 
such property.”  The trial court then modified each instruction by adding a 
concluding paragraph:  “The perpetrators have not reached a place of temporary 
safety if, having committed the robbery [or burglary] with other perpetrators, any 
one of the perpetrators continues to exercise control over the victim.  Only when 
all perpetrators have relinquished control over the victim[,] are in unchallenged 
possession of the stolen property[,] and have effected an escape can it be said that 
any one of them has reached a place of temporary safety.”        
 
 
22
the felony and the homicide are parts of one continuous transaction.  (E.g., People 
v. Whitehorn (1963) 60 Cal.2d 256, 260, 264 [defendant, who had raped the 
victim, was guilty of felony murder when accomplice strangled the victim after the 
rape]; see also People v. Ross (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 402; People v. Manson 
(1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 208-209; People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 438, 
452; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) § 139, p. 
754.)   
Our reliance on the continuous-transaction doctrine is consistent with the 
purpose of the felony-murder statute, which “was adopted for the protection of the 
community and its residents, not for the benefit of the lawbreaker, and this court 
has viewed it as obviating the necessity for, rather than requiring, any technical 
inquiry concerning whether there has been a completion, abandonment, or 
desistence of the [felony] before the homicide was completed.”  (People v. Chavez 
(1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 669-670.)  In particular, the rule “ ‘was not intended to 
relieve the wrongdoer from any probable consequence of his act by placing a 
limitation upon the res gestae which is unreasonable or unnatural.’  The homicide 
is committed in the perpetration of the felony if the killing and felony are parts of 
one continuous transaction” (id. at p. 670), with the proviso “that felony-murder 
liability attaches only to those engaged in the felonious scheme before or during 
the killing.”  (Pulido, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 729.)  
This is not to say that Mianta, by remaining in the house with Betty, could 
have prolonged defendants’ liability indefinitely.  For example, if Mianta had 
untied Betty, revived her, and two weeks later poisoned her in retaliation for some 
perceived slight, the burglary-robbery and the murder would not be part of “one 
continuous transaction.”  Cavitt’s fear that, because Mianta lived with the victim, 
the felonies “could be deemed to continue indefinitely” is therefore unfounded.  
Hence, no error appears in the Cavitt instructions.       
 
 
23
The jury in Williams’s trial, however, received not only the instruction 
concerning the continuous-transaction rule, but also CALJIC Nos. 8.21.1 and 
8.21.2.  (See fn. 7, ante.)  Those instructions provided that the burglary and 
robbery continued while the “perpetrators” were in flight and that those crimes 
were “complete” when the “perpetrators” had reached a place of temporary safety.  
The court then added the following paragraph:  “The perpetrators have not reached 
a place of temporary safety if, having committed the robbery [or burglary] with 
other perpetrators, any one of the perpetrators continues to exercise control over 
the victim.  Only when all perpetrators have relinquished control over the victim[,] 
are in unchallenged possession of the stolen property[,] and have effected an 
escape can it be said that any one of them has reached a place of temporary 
safety.”  In Williams’s view, the requirement that all perpetrators must reach a 
place of temporary safety before any of them can be said to have done so—and 
thus, before the underlying felony can be said to be completed—is a misstatement 
of law. 
To resolve this claim, we first recognize that we are presented with two 
related, but distinct, doctrines:  the continuous-transaction doctrine and the escape 
rule.  The “escape rule” defines the duration of the underlying felony, in the 
context of certain ancillary consequences of the felony (People v. Cooper (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 1158, 1167), by deeming the felony to continue until the felon has 
reached a place of temporary safety.  (E.g., People v. Bodely (1995) 32 
Cal.App.4th 311, 313.)  The continuous-transaction doctrine, on the other hand, 
defines the duration of felony-murder liability, which may extend beyond the 
termination of the felony itself, provided that the felony and the act resulting in 
death constitute one continuous transaction.  (Ibid. [“the duration of felony-murder 
liability is not determined by considering whether the felony itself has been 
completed”]; People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 585 [“it is settled that a 
 
 
24
murder is deemed to occur in the commission of rape even after the rape is 
completed so long as the rape and murder are part of a continuous transaction”]; 
People v. Taylor (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 348, 358.)  It thus would have been 
sufficient to have instructed the Williams jury on the continuous-transaction 
doctrine alone, as the Cavitt jury was instructed.  (See generally People v. 
Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1045, fn. 9 [“the duration of the offense of 
burglary, as defined for the purpose of assigning aider and abettor liability, need 
not and should not be identical to the definition pertinent to felony-murder 
liability”].)  Williams, however, asked for and received CALJIC Nos. 8.21.1 and 
8.21.2.   
There is case support for the proposition that, under the escape rule, a 
felony continues as long as any one of the perpetrators retains control over the 
victim or is in flight from the crime scene.  (E.g., People v. Auman (Colo.Ct.App. 
2002) 67 P.3d 741, 751-752, cert. granted (Colo. 2003) 2003 Colo. LEXIS 262; 
White v. State (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2001) 781 A.2d 902, 911; see Morris, supra, 105 
U.Pa. L.Rev. at pp. 75-77.)  We need not decide whether this instruction 
accurately states the law in California, however, because we find that any error 
could not have prejudiced Williams.  As stated, his jury was correctly instructed 
on the continuous-transaction doctrine.  Moreover, the only “control” Mianta had 
over Betty was attributable to the fact that defendants had bound and gagged Betty 
during the burglary-robbery.  Even if Mianta had decided to kill Betty for personal 
reasons, there was no evidence that she formed this private intent after defendants 
had left and reached a place of temporary safety.  Inasmuch as concurrent intent to 
kill and to commit the target felonies “does not undermine the basis for a felony-
murder conviction” (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1141), a finding 
that Betty remained under Mianta’s control at the time of the homicide was, in this 
particular situation, equivalent to a finding that the homicide was part of a 
 
 
25
continuous transaction with the burglary-robbery.  (People v. Castro, supra, 27 
Cal.App.4th  at p. 585; see People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109-110; People 
v. Portillo (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 834, 846.)  Thus, under the facts of this case, 
the additional paragraph did not supply an impermissible route to conviction.  We 
therefore find that even if the additional paragraph misstated California law, it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 
625-626.) 
C 
At both trials, Mianta’s schoolmates testified that Mianta hated her 
stepmother and had said she wanted to kill her.  In Cavitt’s trial, however, the 
court informed the jury that this testimony could not be used in evaluating the 
charge of felony murder but could be used only for the robbery-murder and 
burglary-murder special circumstances.  Cavitt argues that the limiting instruction 
was error and requires reversal of his felony-murder conviction.  We find that any 
error was harmless.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)   
Evidence that Mianta wanted to kill Betty, even if credited, would not have 
affected the undisputed logical nexus between the burglary-robbery and the 
homicide.  That connection was based on the fact that the crimes involved the 
same victim, occurred at the same time and place, and were each facilitated by 
binding and gagging Betty.  Evidence that Betty was intentionally murdered by 
Mianta because of a private grudge, instead of killed accidentally or killed 
intentionally to facilitate the burglary-robbery, would not have undermined that 
connection.  Hence, the exclusion of this evidence from the jury’s consideration, 
even if error, could not have been prejudicial.   
On the other hand, evidence that Mianta had a private motive was relevant 
to the jury’s determination that the homicide and the burglary-robbery were part of 
a single continuous transaction.  Nonetheless, it is not reasonably probable that the 
 
 
26
result would have been different had the testimony of Mianta’s schoolmates been 
admitted without the limiting instruction.  As stated, the jury was permitted to use 
this testimony in considering the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special 
circumstances.  In order to find the special circumstances true, the jury necessarily 
found that the murder was committed “during the commission of or in order to 
carry out or advance the commission of the crimes of robbery or burglary or to 
facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection.”  Accordingly, the jury, 
despite this testimony, found either that the homicide was committed “during the 
commission” of the burglary-robbery or that it was designed to facilitate those 
crimes or the escape therefrom.  Either finding demonstrates that the homicide was 
part of a continuous transaction with the burglary-robbery.  Moreover, despite the 
admission of this same testimony for all purposes, Williams’s jury convicted him 
of felony murder.   
The likelihood of prejudice was further diminished by the fact the jury did 
hear from other witnesses that Mianta’s relationship with Betty was poor, that she 
was angry with Betty, and (from Cavitt himself) that Mianta wanted to kill Betty.  
None of this testimony was subject to the limiting instruction concerning the 
testimony of Mianta’s schoolmates.  In sum, Cavitt cannot show prejudice. 
 
 
27
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s result and in most of its reasoning, but I cannot agree 
that CALJIC No. 8.27, the standard instruction outlining complicity in felony murder, 
“adequately apprised the jury of the need for a logical nexus between the felonies and the 
homicide.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.)  That instruction tells the jury that when a killing 
is perpetrated by “one of several persons engaged in the commission of” the predicate 
felony (CALJIC No. 8.27, italics added), all those complicit in the felony are also 
complicit in murder.  In my view, the italicized language is calculated only to inform the 
jury of the necessary temporal connection between the predicate felony and the murder, 
not of the necessary causal or logical connection.  Like the so-called Martin-Perry 
formulation1 from which the standard instruction apparently derives, CALJIC No. 8.27 
“appear[s] to state a broader rule of felony-murder complicity, under which the killing 
need have no particular causal or logical relationship to the common [felonious] scheme.”  
(People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 722.) 
The majority (ante, at p. 16) suggests that a felon who kills during the 
commission of the felony but for reasons or in a manner logically and causally unrelated 
to the felony is not “engaged in the commission of” the felony when he or she kills; the 
killing, therefore, would not create cofelon liability under CALJIC No. 8.27.  (See also 
                                                 
1  
See People v. Perry (1925) 195 Cal. 623, 637 (all those are complicit in 
murder who were, with the killer, “jointly engaged at the time of such killing” in 
the underlying felony); People v. Martin (1938) 12 Cal.2d 466, 472 (same). 
 
 
2
maj. opn., ante, at p. 12 [same argument as to Martin-Perry formulation].)  This reading 
of the instruction, I fear, is too subtle to be apprehended by the ordinary juror, especially 
when CALJIC No. 8.27 is coupled with standard instructions designed to be given in 
felony-murder cases on duration of the predicate felony.  (See, e.g., CALJIC Nos. 8.21.1 
(7th ed. 2004) [robbery still in progress while perpetrator is fleeing with the loot, until 
perpetrator reaches place of temporary safety], 8.21.2 (7th ed. 2004) [burglary still in 
progress while perpetrator is fleeing in an attempt to escape, until perpetrator reaches 
place of temporary safety].)  Without further instruction, a reasonable layperson would 
assume that the law considers a burglar, for example, to be engaged in the commission of 
the crime from the moment of entering the building at least until leaving it, despite any 
momentary diversion from the felonious enterprise the burglar may experience during 
that period. 
As the majority explains, an accomplice in the predicate felony is liable for a 
killing committed by another of the felons only if the killing is logically or causally 
related to the contemplated felony; complicity depends on “the existence of objective 
facts that connect the act resulting in death to the felony the nonkiller committed or 
attempted to commit.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  The rule is similar, though not 
identical, to that governing complicity in crimes committed by a fellow conspirator or 
accomplice generally.  When two or more persons set out to commit a robbery, for 
example, and one of them not only robs but tries to kill a victim, the other robbers are 
held complicit in attempted murder if and only if that attempt was a natural and probable 
outgrowth of the target robbery.  (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261-263; 
People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5.)  Analogously, a robber is liable for a 
murder committed by his or her confederate if and only if the murder, objectively 
 
 
3
viewed, proceeded logically or causally from the commission of the target crime, the 
robbery.2  
CALJIC No. 8.27 simply fails to inform a jury of this principle.  Any error in 
failing to give a clearer instruction on the point was, as the majority explains, harmless 
here, for there was no substantial evidence to support the theory that Mrs. McKnight’s 
killing was logically or causally unrelated to the conspirators’ commission of burglary 
and robbery, in which defendants Cavitt and Williams were full participants.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 17-18.)  In future cases, nevertheless, it would be appropriate for trial courts 
                                                 
2 
Commentators have observed that the two complicity rules (that governing 
felony murder and that governing aiding and abetting generally) involve similar 
imputations of conduct and culpability (Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability (1984) 
93 Yale L.J. 609, 617-618) and may be seen as general and specific aspects of the 
same problem—“the problem of the responsibility of one criminal . . . for the 
conduct of a fellow-criminal . . . who, in the process of committing or attempting 
the agreed-upon crime, commits another crime” (2 La Fave, Substantive Criminal 
Law (2d ed. 2003) § 14.5(c), p. 452).  The language used to define the scope of the 
two rules also is linked historically in California law.  (See People v. Olsen (1889) 
80 Cal. 122, 124-125 [instruction that nonkiller was complicit in felony murder 
committed “in the prosecution of the common design” necessarily excluded 
killings that were “outside of and foreign to the common design” and hence not 
the “ ‘ordinary and probable effect’ ” of the agreed-upon felony], overruled on other 
grounds in People v. Green (1956) 47 Cal.2d 209, 227; People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 
Cal. 331, 334 [seminal decision on natural and probable consequences rule:  
conspirator not liable for crimes committed by another conspirator unless they 
were done “in execution” or “in furtherance” of the common design]; People v. 
Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 401-402 & fn. 18, disapproved on another point in 
People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [approving, in felony-murder 
case, instruction that nonkiller was not responsible for murder if it was neither “in 
furtherance of” nor a “natural and probable consequence of” the planned 
robbery].)  Nevertheless, complicity appears broader under the felony-murder rule 
than under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which we have 
described as resting on foreseeability (People v. Croy, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 12, 
fn. 5), in that a felon may be held responsible for a killing by his or her cofelon, 
under the felony-murder rule, even if the killing was not foreseeable to the 
nonkiller because “the plan as conceived did not contemplate the use or even the 
carrying of a weapon or other dangerous instrument.”  (2 La Fave, Substantive 
Criminal Law, supra, § 14.5(c), p. 452.) 
 
 
4
to clearly explain that murder complicity under the felony-murder rule requires not only a 
temporal relationship between commission of the felony and the killer’s fatal act, but also 
a logical or causal one.  I suggest this principle, however phrased, be included in standard 
instructions on felony-murder complicity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
I CONCUR: 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I agree fully with the majority opinion, which I have signed.  I write separately 
only to comment on the standard jury instructions, and in particular on CALJIC No. 8.27.  
I agree with the majority that that instruction is generally adequate.  But it can be 
improved. 
As the majority holds, a nonkiller is not liable for all killings during the course of 
a felony the nonkiller is perpetrating.  There must be a causal relationship between the 
felony and the death, i.e., there must be some logical nexus, beyond mere coincidence of 
time and place, between the killing and the underlying felony.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  
This requirement will rarely be significantly at issue in a felony-murder case.  Rarely will 
a killing during a felony have no connection to that felony, but merely be coincidental.  
Indeed, it may be only in law-school-type hypotheticals such as the one suggested in the 
article the majority cites (maj. opn., ante, at p. 12)—hypothesizing one of two burglars 
who, while committing the burglary, just happens to spot a long-sought enemy and shoots 
him for reasons completely unrelated to the burglary—that the required causal 
relationship might be missing.  Such scenarios are exceedingly unlikely in real life.  And 
certainly if, as is usually the case (and was here), the felony’s target was killed, it is hard 
even to hypothesize a factual scenario in which there would be no connection between 
the felony and the killing. 
But the fact that the causal relationship requirement will rarely be truly at issue 
does not mean the instructions should not be the best and clearest possible.  Accordingly, 
 
 
2
I suggest that in the future, courts might more clearly inform the jury that the felony-
murder rule requires both a causal and a temporal relationship between the underlying 
felony and the act resulting in death.  The causal relationship requires some logical 
connection between the killing and the underlying felony beyond mere coincidence of 
time and place.  The temporal relationship requires that the felony and the killing be part 
of one continuous transaction. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cavitt & Williams 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 2/5/02 - 1st Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S105058 
Date Filed: June 21, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Mateo 
Judge: Craig L. Parsons and Rosemary Pfeiffer 
 
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Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Neil Rosenbaum, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant James Freddie 
Cavitt. 
 
Paul V. Carroll, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Robert Nathaniel 
Williams. 
 
 
 
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Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, Christina V. Kuo, Catherine 
A. Rivlin and Jeffrey M. Bryant, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Neil Rosenbaum 
247 Hartford Street, Suite 200 
San Francisco, CA  94114 
(415) 626-4111 
 
Paul V. Carroll 
5 Manor Place 
Menlo Park, CA  94025 
(650) 322-5652 
 
Jeffrey M. Bryant 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5852