Title: Gary J. Howell v. Orrin Denomie

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 81 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP979-FT 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Gary J. Howell,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Orrin Denomie and Helen Denomie,  
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 28, 2005 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Damon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Robert E. Haney, Alvin R. Ugent and Podell, Ugent & Haney, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert E. Haney. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Robert C. Longwell, Jr., Galesville. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by G. Michael Halfenger 
and Foley & Lardner, LLP, Milwaukee; and Jeffery O. Davis, and 
Quarles & Brady, LLP, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Appellate 
Practice Section, State Bar of Wisconsin, and there was oral 
argument by G. Michael Halfenger. 
 
 
2005 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP979-FT  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV56) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gary J. Howell, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Orrin Denomie and Helen Denomie, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   Orrin 
and 
Helen 
Denomie seek review of an unpublished court of appeals summary 
order1 affirming a circuit court judgment finding the Denomies' 
answer and counterclaim frivolous and awarding Gary Howell 
attorney fees.  The Denomies also seek review of the court of 
appeals conclusion that their appeal was frivolous.  We conclude 
that the circuit court correctly determined that the Denomies' 
answer and counterclaim were frivolous, but that the court of 
appeals should not have concluded that the appeal was frivolous 
                                                 
1 See Howell v. Denomie, No. 2003AP979-FT, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2003). 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
2 
 
without first giving the parties and counsel a chance to be 
heard on that issue.  However, because the Denomies had an 
opportunity to be heard regarding the frivolousness of the 
appeal in their briefs and at oral argument before this court, 
we reach the merits of their argument.  In so doing, we agree 
with the court of appeals conclusion that the appeal was 
frivolous.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶2 
This dispute arises over the sale of a parcel of land 
and house in Trempealeau, Wisconsin.  The plaintiff, Howell, and 
defendants, Denomies, present different versions of the facts.  
Howell's version is as follows:  he negotiated a price of 
$68,000 with the owners, Gregg and Cynthia Sikora, for the home.  
Howell then contacted the Denomies for financing.  Glenn E. 
Brommerich, senior vice president of Citizens State Bank, 
conducted the closing on April 17, 2000 with Gregg Sikora, 
Howell and the Denomies present.  The deed filed for the sale of 
the property listed Howell as the purchaser, and the mortgage 
listed Howell as the mortgagor and the Denomies as the 
mortgagees.  The Denomies gave a cashier's check for $67,500 to 
the bank, and Howell signed a promissory note and real estate 
mortgage to the Denomies.  Howell agreed to make monthly 
payments on the note and the Denomies received an amortization 
schedule for the amount of the promissory note. 
¶3 
In late 2001, the Denomies heard from Howell's father 
that Howell was going to make $20,000 on the sale of the house.  
In early December 2001, the Denomies retained an attorney, Allan 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
3 
 
Ohm, who sent Howell a Notice to Quit or Pay Rent for the month 
of November 2001 because the Denomies had not received a payment 
from Howell in November.  Howell gave this notice to Brommerich, 
who contacted Ohm and explained Howell's ownership of the 
property.  On December 18, 2001, Howell refinanced the property 
with Citizens State Bank.  Brommerich sent the Denomies a 
cashier's check for $63,291.34, the remaining amount due based 
on the amortization schedule, as well as a Satisfaction of 
Mortgage form for the Denomies to sign.  Ohm contacted 
Brommerich and told him that the Denomies questioned the final 
payoff amount, and that there was still $687.40 due on the note 
as a result of the missed November payment.  Brommerich sent the 
Denomies a check for the underpaid amount.  The Denomies cashed 
both checks.  On February 6, 2001, Citizens State Bank sent 
another letter to the Denomies urging them to sign the 
Satisfaction of Mortgage.  The Denomies did not satisfy the 
mortgage, and Howell brought an action against them seeking a 
judgment 
satisfying 
and 
discharging 
the mortgage, penalty 
damages under Wis. Stat. § 706.05 (2001-02),2 actual damages, 
attorney fees and costs. 
¶4 
The Denomies presented a different view of the facts 
in their answer and counterclaim.  They stated as follows:  they 
agreed to purchase the house for Howell, rent it to him and sell 
it to him when he could afford to purchase it.  Howell instead 
                                                 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
4 
 
took their money, bought the property himself and fabricated the 
mortgage, thus fraudulently depriving them of ownership.  Not 
knowing that this fraud had taken place, they reported the 
monthly payments from Howell as rent on their income tax 
filings.  They refused to accept the final payments as 
satisfaction of Howell's debt because they claim they had never 
agreed to be a mortgage holder. 
¶5 
The matter was tried before the circuit court for 
Trempealeau County, Judge John A. Damon presiding.  The court 
heard testimony from Brommerich, Howell and the Denomies.  The 
court found the testimony of Brommerich and Howell relating 
Howell's version of the facts to be "entirely credible" and the 
testimony of Orrin Denomie to "be confused and not credible."  
The court also found that the unambiguous written documents 
showed that Howell had purchased the property and his agreement 
with the Denomies was a mortgage agreement.  The court concluded 
that there was no basis for the counterclaim or the Denomies' 
assertion that they owned the property, as the deed indicated 
Howell was the purchaser and the credible testimony backed 
Howell's position.  The court also found that the mortgage had 
not been satisfied by the Denomies, as was required by Wis. 
Stat. § 706.05.  The court concluded that as a result of the 
Denomies' failure to satisfy the mortgage, Howell was entitled 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
5 
 
to statutory penalties3 totaling $2,000 and consequential damages 
totaling $2,267.  The court also concluded that the Denomies' 
answer 
and 
counterclaim 
were 
frivolous 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.025, as they were "used and continued in bad faith and 
defendants and their attorney knew, or should have known, t[h]at 
the Counterclaim and defense were without any reasonable basis 
in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith 
argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law."  The court entered judgment of $4,744.60 in attorney fees 
and taxable costs of $601.14. 
¶6 
The Denomies appealed the circuit court's judgment, 
arguing that they never agreed to the mortgage and that their 
defense was not frivolous.  In a summary disposition, the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment and also 
concluded that the Denomies' appeal was frivolous, stating "we 
conclude that the Denomies' attorney should have known that his 
appellate argument is without any reasonable basis in law or in 
equity and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law."  The court 
awarded appellate attorney fees to Howell against Alvin Ugent, 
                                                 
3 Under Wis. Stat. § 706.05(10)(b), "[a] mortgage-holder 
shall execute and record a mortgage satisfaction . . . within 7 
days after both the mortgagor completes full performance and the 
mortgage-holder receives by certified mail a written request 
from 
the 
mortgagor 
for 
a 
full 
satisfaction." 
 
Section 
706.05(10)(c) provides that the holder is "liable to the 
mortgagor for penalty damages of $100 for each day that the 
violation remains uncorrected, up to a total of $2,000, plus 
actual damages resulting from the violation." 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
6 
 
the Denomies' appellate attorney, and remanded to the circuit 
court for a determination of the amount of those fees.   
¶7 
The Denomies petitioned for review, which we granted.  
We specifically directed the parties to "address the procedure 
by which the court of appeals may determine an appeal is 
frivolous pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3)(c)." 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
"A 
claim 
is 
frivolous 
under 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.025(3)(b)]4 if the party or attorney 'knew or should have 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.025 states:  
(1) If an action or special proceeding commenced 
or continued by a plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense 
or cross complaint commenced, used or continued by a 
defendant is found, at any time during the proceedings 
or upon judgment, to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs 
determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
(2) The costs and fees awarded under sub. (1) may 
be assessed fully against either the party bringing 
the 
action, 
special 
proceeding, 
cross 
complaint, 
defense or counterclaim or the attorney representing 
the party or may be assessed so that the party and the 
attorney each pay a portion of the costs and fees. 
(3) 
In 
order 
to 
find 
an 
action, 
special 
proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint 
to be frivolous under sub. (1), the court must find 
one or more of the following: 
(a) The action, special proceeding, counterclaim, 
defense or cross complaint was commenced, used or 
continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of 
harassing or maliciously injuring another. 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
7 
 
known' that the claim was 'without any reasonable basis in law 
or equity.'"  Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 
240-41, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994).  The standard is objective:  
"whether the [party or] attorney knew or should have known that 
the position taken was frivolous as determined by what a 
reasonable [party or] attorney would have known or should have 
known under the same or similar circumstances."  Id. at 241 
(quoting Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 799, 299 N.W.2d 856 
(1981)).  This inquiry involves a mixed question of law and 
fact.  Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 241.  "Determining what was known 
or should have been known involves questions of fact.  Such 
findings of fact will not be upset unless they are against the 
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence."  Id.; 
Sommer, 99 Wis. 2d at 792.  "However, . . . the ultimate 
conclusion about whether what was known or should have been 
known supports a [determination] of frivolousness under [Section 
814.025(3)(b)] is a question of law we review independently of 
the . . . circuit and appellate courts."  Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 
241.  "All doubts on this issue are resolved in favor of the 
party or attorney" whom it is claimed commenced or continued a 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) The party or the party's attorney knew, or 
should 
have 
known, 
that 
the 
action, 
special 
proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint 
was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and 
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
(4) To the extent s. 802.05 is applicable and 
differs from this section, s. 802.05 applies. 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
8 
 
frivolous action.  Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57, ¶46, 
243 Wis. 2d 486, 627 N.W.2d 795. 
¶9 
In regard to whether an appeal is frivolous, the 
standard is somewhat different because an appellate court 
decides whether an appeal is frivolous solely as a question of 
law.  See J.J. Andrews, Inc. v. Midland, 164 Wis. 2d 215, 225, 
474 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1991); Vierck v. Richardson, 119 
Wis. 2d 394, 399, 351 N.W.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1984).  To award 
costs and attorney fees, an appellate court must conclude that 
the entire appeal is frivolous.  State ex rel. Robinson v. Town 
of Bristol, 2003 WI App 97, ¶54, 264 Wis. 2d 318, 667 N.W.2d 14.  
Sanctions for a frivolous appeal will be imposed if the court 
concludes that the "party or party's attorney knew, or should 
have known, that the appeal . . . [had no] reasonable basis in 
law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3)(c)2.5  Since the standard is 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3) states: 
(3) Frivolous appeals. (a) If an appeal or cross-
appeal is found to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs, fees, 
and reasonable attorney fees under this section.  A 
motion for costs, fees, and attorney fees under this 
subsection shall be filed no later than the filing of 
the respondent's brief or, if a cross-appeal is filed, 
no later than the filing of the cross-respondent's 
brief. This subsection does not apply to appeals or 
cross-appeals under s. 809.107, 809.30, or 974.05. 
(b) The costs, fees and attorney fees awarded 
under par. (a) may be assessed fully against the 
appellant 
or 
cross-appellant 
or 
the 
attorney 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
9 
 
objective, an appellate court looks to what a reasonable party 
or attorney knew or should have known under the same or similar 
circumstances.  See J.J. Andrews, 164 Wis. 2d at 226. 
B. 
Frivolous Answer and Counterclaim 
¶10 The 
Denomies 
first 
challenge 
the 
circuit 
court 
judgment concluding that their answer and counterclaim were 
frivolous.  They argue that while the circuit court based its 
determination of frivolousness on the lack of evidence tending 
to show that the Denomies were the owners of the property, they 
were not arguing that they were the owners.  Rather, their 
position was that there was evidence in the record found by the 
circuit court to be "entirely credible" or stipulated to by 
counsel that supports their contention that there was no 
"meeting of the minds" between Howell and the Denomies to create 
a mortgage.  The Denomies point to several pieces of evidence:  
                                                                                                                                                             
representing the appellant or cross-appellant or may 
be assessed so that the appellant or cross-appellant 
and the attorney each pay a portion of the costs, fees 
and attorney fees. 
(c) In order to find an appeal or cross-appeal to 
be frivolous under par. (a), the court must find one 
or more of the following: 
1. The appeal or cross-appeal was filed, used or 
continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of 
harassing or maliciously injuring another. 
2. The party or the party's attorney knew, or 
should have known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was 
without any reasonable basis in law or equity and 
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
10 
 
(1) the stipulation that the Denomies did not sign the note, 
mortgage 
or 
amortization 
schedule 
at 
the 
closing; 
(2) 
Brommerich's testimony that he did not believe the Denomies 
received any paperwork following Howell's closing on the 
property; (3) the circuit court's finding that the Denomies had 
reported the payments they received from Howell as rent on their 
income tax returns; and (4) the finding that Orrin Denomie's 
testimony was "confused," rather than finding that either 
defendant was intentionally making misrepresentations.  The 
Denomies argue that because this evidence supports their 
position, their answer and counterclaim cannot be found to be 
frivolous. 
¶11 We reject the Denomies' argument.  While they cite to 
language by the circuit court that it found "there's no basis 
. . . that [the Denomies] had any ownership in this house" for 
the proposition that the circuit court erroneously focused on 
the idea that the Denomies did not own the property rather than 
the theory put forth by the Denomies that there was no meeting 
of the minds regarding a mortgage agreement, examination of the 
circuit court's statements at trial and its final judgment show 
that the circuit court explicitly found there was indeed a 
mortgage agreement between Howell and the Denomies.  In its oral 
ruling, 
the 
circuit 
court 
stated, 
"It 
appears 
from 
Mr. 
Brommerich's credible testimony that a check was given, a 
mortgage note and mortgage was filed, indicating what the 
agreement was.  . . . [Orrin Denomie was] present at everything 
. . . [s]o he knew exactly what was going on."  The findings of 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
11 
 
fact stated, "Defendants, jointly and severally, made a mortgage 
loan to plaintiff for the purchase of the residence."  Further 
support for the frivolous nature of the Denomies' argument is 
apparent when one asks the question:  If the Denomies claim not 
to be owners and they claim not to be mortgagees, what did they 
get for the money they paid at closing?  Additionally, if they 
were not claiming that they owned the property, how could they 
claim that what Howell paid them was rent?  
¶12 Next, we address the Denomies' argument that there was 
evidence in the record found by the circuit court to be 
"entirely credible" or stipulated to by counsel that supports 
their argument that there was no "meeting of the minds," 
therefore making it impossible as a matter of law for the answer 
and counterclaim to be frivolous.  They rely on Stern for the 
proposition that a determination of frivolousness cannot be 
based on a "failure of proof," which they argue is the case 
here, but rather requires that there be "no set of facts which 
could satisfy the elements of the claim," Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 
243-44. 
¶13 The Denomies misconstrue the language in Stern.  While 
we agree with Stern that one way a claim could be frivolous is 
if a party "knows or should reasonably know that the facts 
necessary to meet the required elements of an allegation are not 
present and cannot be produced," id. at 244, that does not mean 
that presenting some evidence that is wholly insufficient to 
support a claim causes the claim to become nonfrivolous.  As we 
have previously stated, a claim is frivolous if the party or 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
12 
 
attorney knew or should have known that the claim was without 
any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported 
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law. 
¶14 Our de novo evaluation of the facts found by the 
circuit court show that there is a mountain of evidence 
demonstrating that Howell was the owner of the property, that he 
and the Denomies entered into a mortgage agreement, and that the 
Denomies were aware of this, yet proceeded with their answer and 
counterclaim.  Given what the circuit court found the Denomies 
knew or should have known regarding the transaction, the 
Denomies' initial position that Howell defrauded them out of 
ownership in the property and fabricated the mortgage was 
without any reasonable basis in law or equity.   
¶15 The record overwhelmingly shows that the Denomies were 
aware of the transactions taking place.  They were present at 
the closing and Brommerich testified that they witnessed the 
documents 
being 
signed. 
 
The 
Denomies 
incorrectly 
cite 
Brommerich's testimony to state that the Denomies never received 
any paperwork from the closing, as he stated that while he could 
not "positively say" whether the Denomies received a copy of the 
promissory note, it was the bank's policy to give copies, and in 
any case, Orrin Denomie testified that Howell gave them the 
documents "a day or two" after the closing.  Howell testified 
that he paid the real estate taxes, flood insurance and property 
insurance on the property, and that even though he made numerous 
improvements to the property that the Denomies were aware of, 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
13 
 
including the addition of a deck, he never sought approval to 
make these improvements.  The Denomies accepted the payments of 
$63,291.34 and $687.40 that were inconsistent with the rental 
relationship that the Denomies claimed existed.  Given all of 
this evidence that was known to the Denomies, we agree with the 
circuit court and the court of appeals that the Denomies' answer 
and counterclaim were frivolous.6 
C. 
Frivolous Appeal 
¶16 The Denomies raise the issue of whether the court of 
appeals, on its own motion and without a hearing, can declare an 
appeal frivolous, as it did here.  We also ordered the parties 
to "address the procedure by which the court of appeals may 
determine an appeal is frivolous pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.25(3)(c)."  We received briefing and heard oral argument 
from the parties and from a nonparty, the Appellate Practice 
Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin, on this issue.   
¶17 The Denomies argue that the court of appeals should 
determine that an appeal is frivolous only if a separate motion 
on that issue is made by one of the parties, and because that 
did not happen here, the court of appeals erred in concluding 
the appeal was frivolous.  Howell argues the court of appeals 
correctly determined the appeal was frivolous and it properly 
                                                 
6 The Denomies also raise the issue of whether the court of 
appeals erred in characterizing their appellate arguments as 
resting upon the "weight and credibility of the testimony" in 
the circuit court rather than the sufficiency of the evidence.  
Because 
we 
affirm 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
of 
frivolousness above, we do not need to address this issue. 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
14 
 
summarily made this determination.  The Appellate Practice 
Section of the State Bar in its amicus brief opined that there 
should be notice and an opportunity to respond whenever the 
court of appeals is considering ruling that an appeal is 
frivolous.  We agree with the Appellate Practice Section of the 
State Bar's position and conclude that in order to determine 
that an appeal is frivolous, the court of appeals is required to 
give notice that it is considering the issue.  It must also give 
an opportunity to respond to the issue before a determination is 
made. 
¶18 We have previously considered the issue of the court 
of appeals concluding an appeal is frivolous without a motion by 
a party in Weiland v. Paulin, 2003 WI 27, 260 Wis. 2d 277, 659 
N.W.2d 875.  In that case, the court of appeals, on its own 
motion, concluded that the appeal from a summary judgment was 
frivolous, and ordered that fees and costs be assessed solely 
against appellate counsel.  Weiland v. Paulin, 2002 WI App 311, 
¶29, 259 Wis. 2d 139, 655 N.W.2d 204.  Unlike the summary order 
in the present case, the court of appeals detailed the various 
transgressions committed by appellate counsel.  Id., ¶¶22-27.  
We responded to counsel's petition for review by issuing a 
summary order reversing the court of appeals conclusion that the 
appeal was frivolous and remanding the matter to the court of 
appeals with directions that:  (1) the court of appeals must 
give the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether 
the appeal is frivolous; and (2) the court of appeals must 
specify the reasons why it has concluded that the appeal is or 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
15 
 
is not frivolous under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(3)(c)2.  
Weiland, 260 Wis. 2d at 278. 
 ¶19 In order for parties before the court of appeals to 
have the proper notice and opportunity to be heard, parties 
wishing to raise frivolousness must do so by making a separate 
motion to the court, whereafter the court will give the parties 
and counsel a chance to be heard.  We caution that a statement 
in a brief that asks that an appeal be held frivolous is 
insufficient notice to raise this issue.  The court of appeals 
may also raise the issue of a frivolous appeal on its own 
motion, but it must give notice that it is considering the issue 
and grant an opportunity for the parties and counsel to be heard 
before it makes a determination. 
¶20 In the present case, Howell did not move the court of 
appeals to conclude that the appeal was frivolous, yet the court 
of appeals concluded that it was and awarded attorney fees 
against Attorney Ugent.7  It appears this was done without giving 
Ugent a chance to be heard.  However, even though the Denomies 
did not have a proper opportunity to be heard at the court of 
appeals, we can determine the frivolousness of the appeal in 
this case because the Denomies did have an opportunity to be 
                                                 
7 We also note that the briefs filed in the court of appeals 
did not assert that the appeal was frivolous.  Although, as we 
set out below, in order to act on a party's request to hold an 
appeal frivolous, a motion is required, we note the lack of any 
argument in the briefs as further evidence that the court of 
appeals holding was not made at the request of a party. 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
16 
 
heard before this court.8  In both their briefs and at oral 
argument, the Denomies argued that the court of appeals 
incorrectly applied Riley v. Isaacson, 156 Wis. 2d 249, 456 
N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1990), which stated: 
[W]e hold that upon an appeal from a ruling of 
frivolousness, the reviewing court need not determine 
whether the appeal itself is frivolous before it can 
award appellate costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
Rather, if the claim was correctly adjudged to be 
frivolous in the trial court, it is frivolous per se 
on appeal. 
Id. at 262.   
¶21 This argument fails because not only did the court of 
appeals summary order not mention Riley or its analysis, but 
contrary to Riley, it specifically determined that the appeal 
itself was frivolous, stating "we conclude that the Denomies' 
attorney should have known that his appellate argument is 
without any reasonable basis in law or equity and cannot be 
supported 
by 
a 
good 
faith 
argument 
for 
an 
extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law."  After considering 
the Denomies' arguments concerning the appeal in their briefs as 
well as on oral argument, we agree with the court of appeals.  
The appeal was frivolous.  We therefore affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
                                                 
8 We note that the facts here are unique in that the 
Denomies had the opportunity to argue whether their appeal was 
frivolous before this court in their briefs and at oral 
argument.  We reiterate that the proper course of action for the 
court of appeals in future cases is to give notice and grant an 
opportunity for the parties and counsel to be heard before it 
makes a determination about whether an appeal is frivolous. 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
17 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶22 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
determined that the Denomies' answer and counterclaim were 
frivolous, but that the court of appeals should not have 
concluded that the appeal was frivolous without first giving the 
parties and counsel a chance to be heard on that issue.  
However, because the Denomies had an opportunity to be heard 
regarding the frivolousness of the appeal in their briefs and at 
oral argument before this court, we reach the merits of their 
argument.  In so doing, we agree with the court of appeals 
conclusion that the appeal was frivolous.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No. 
2003AP979-FT   
 
 
 
1