Title: State v. Egan

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

287 So. 2d 1 (1973)
STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
William C. EGAN, Appellee.
No. 43364.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 12, 1973.
*2 Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
J. Leonard Fleet, Hollywood, for appellee.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on appeal from the County Court, Broward County. The trial court (Broward County Circuit Judge McCauley, sitting by designation), in its order, passed upon the validity of Section 775.01, Florida Statutes, 1971, F.S.A., giving this Court jurisdiction of the direct appeal under Article V, Section 3(b)(1), of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A.
*3 The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 29, 1972, the grand jury, in and for Broward County, Florida, returned an indictment charging appellee in three counts with what can be characterized generally as the common-law offense of nonfeasance. A motion to dismiss was filed challenging the constitutionality of Section 775.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., "... for reason of the vagueness and ambiguity... ." On January 23, 1973, nunc pro tunc, the 16th day of January, 1973, the lower court entered its order striking down Section 775.01 on the ground that it was "... in violation of Sections 9 and 16 of the Constitution of the State of Florida... ." In its order, the court stated that "... for the first time in the one-hundred forty-four (144) year history of the Statute the Court is faced squarely with the constitutional question." The controlling issue, as stated by the lower court, was whether Section 775.01 is too vague and indefinite to sufficiently inform a defendant of the charge placed against him. One of the "numerous reasons" which influenced the lower court to declare the statute unconstitutional was the following:
It appears that the order appealed from has a two-fold bottom, to-wit: vagueness and obsolescence. Before embarking upon a discussion of the theories advanced by the lower court in support of its order, some preliminary remarks are deemed appropriate. The legislative antecedents of Section 2.01, Florida Statutes, expressly made the common law of England a part of the law of this jurisdiction. And for more than 100 years, this common law has been in effect in this jurisdiction, except insofar as it has been modified or superseded by statute. Wester v. Rigdon.[1] In Coleman v. State,[2] this Court noted:
We know of no better place to start than with the statute. Accordingly, Section 775.01 provides:
What is there, then, about the above quoted statute that is vague? The statute simply makes the common law of England in relation to crimes, with certain exceptions, the law of this state. Surely, the purpose of all rules relating to the construction of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law. But such rules are useful only in case of doubt and should never be used to create doubt, only to remove it. Where the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute, and the courts need only give effect to the plain meaning of its terms. Alligood v. Florida Real Estate Commission.[4] This Court, in Van Pelt v. Hilliard,[5] held:
As to the validity of the indictment in the case sub judice which charged appellee with three counts of a common law offense, appellant relies on LaTour v. Stone,[7] and Sullivan v. Leatherman.[8]LaTour was an original proceeding in habeas corpus, in which this Court held that an information could not be upheld, under a statute providing for punishment of any state officer guilty of malpractice in office, *5 because the information, on its face, showed that the persons charged were not state officers. Of course, the petitioner attacked the information as being void and charging no offense against the laws of the State of Florida. However, this Court pointed out that the common law of England in relation to crimes was in full force in this jurisdiction, absent a statutory provision on the subject. The Court then reasoned:
In concluding, the Court pointed out that the information did not wholly fail to charge the defendant with a criminal offense. This was so because, although the information was defective for failure to allege an essential statutory allegation, it did charge a crime under the common law of England, which, by virtue of Section 5024, R.G.S., Section 7126, C.G.L., was the law of this jurisdiction. Accordingly, the motion to quash the return was denied and the petitioner was remanded.
In Sullivan, the common law indictment was challenged in a habeas proceeding on the ground that the indictment failed to sufficiently charge petitioner with a crime. This Court emphasized that a common law indictment must be in such positive and direct terms as to put the defendant on notice of what he is charged with and enable him to prepare his defense. We once again affirm this reasoning. The indictment in Sullivan was struck down because, as this Court pointed out:
It is here emphasized that the indictment in the case sub judice is not open to this attack.
On page 4 of the order appealed from, the lower court indicated that a search was made of the common law of *6 England in an effort to find where the offense of nonfeasance was discussed. We emphasize, however, that American courts, particularly Florida appellate courts, do not look solely to English cases to determine what the common law is. The words used in our statute, "common law of England" refer to such common law, not only as declared by the English courts but also as declared by the courts of the American states. Coleman v. Davis.[11] Appellee was given specific direction in the indictment as to where the common law could be found which described the offense with which he was charged. The pertinent part of each count of the indictment reads:
We think, however, that the lower court's main objection to Section 775.01 is that the statute does not set forth in express verbiage the common law which is made a part of the law of this jurisdiction. To put it another way, the statute imposes the duty upon the reader thereof to ascertain for himself what the common law is. The opinion of the lower court notwithstanding, there are some things so well known that the legislature may justly assume that the courts will take judicial notice thereof.
The contention of the lower court that the statute does not afford notice of what common law acts are prohibited is not well taken. A similar argument was rejected by this court in Delaney v. State.[12] We quote:
Surely, no legislative adoption is necessary to affirm the existence of the common law. Just as surely, however, it is urged that a statutory enactment is essential to repeal, abrogate, or change the rules or doctrine of the common law. It requires no citation of authority to support the rule that the common law is not to be changed by doubtful implication. Of course, where the implication is obvious, it cannot be ignored. But no statute is to be construed as altering the common law farther than its words and circumstances import. While, admittedly, a court can and should strike down any common law crime that fails to pass constitutional muster, it is emphasized that it is the province of the legislature and not of the court to modify the rules of the common law. The court has no more right to abrogate the common law than it has to repeal the statutory law. In other words, courts may properly extend old principles to new conditions, determine new or novel questions by analogy, *7 and even develop and announce new principles made necessary by changes wrought by time and circumstance. Under our constitutional system of government, however, courts cannot legislate. They cannot abrogate, modify, repeal, or amend rules long established and recognized as parts of the law of the land.
The common law has not become petrified; it does not stand still. It continues in a state of flux. And, its ever present fluidity enables it to meet and adjust itself to shifting conditions and new demands. It has been described as a leisurely stream that has not ceased to flow gently and continuously in its proper channel, at times gradually and imperceptibly eroding a bit of the soil from one of its banks and at other times getting rid of and depositing a bit of silt. In view of our English heritage, it is unthinkable that judicial limbo should be its destiny.
Another basic argument in support of the lower court's action in striking down Section 775.01 is that there is no longer any necessity for the statute and that it should be discarded. This argument seems strange. This is so because the instant case affords an excellent example of the necessity of resorting to the common law for the proper crime with which to charge a defendant. It appears the court below is of the opinion that due process has eliminated the common law, particularly that part which relates to crime. Thus, so argues the court below, "the tail is now wagging the dog, common law eliminates common law: and such should be the living nature of our law." The lower court is apparently of the opinion that because of the allegedly little use made of the common law that there is now no need and reason to retain common law crimes and so same has passed and ceased to exist. Our answer to this line of argument is that a legislative enactment may be repealed only by further legislation and not by time or changed conditions. The repeal of an act cannot be implied from the mere fact that some of the evils provided against it are removed by a subsequent act. Simply stated, the general rule is that a statute is not repealed by nonuse. The argument set forth in the order of the lower court may be a cogent one when addressed to the legislature, yet courts of justice cannot and do not recognize such a policy as a basis for their decision. Whenever a principle of the common law has been once clearly established, the courts of this country must enforce it until repealed by the legislature, as long as there is a subject matter for the principle to operate on, and although the reason, in the opinion of the court, which induced its original establishment may have ceased to exist. Of course, when the rules of the common law are in doubt, or when a factual situation is presented which is not within the established precedents, courts are called upon to determine what general principles are to be applied, and, in so doing, of necessity, must exercise a broad judicial discretion. The courts of this jurisdiction do, and properly so, take into account the changes in our social and economic customs and present day conceptions of right and justice. But the fact remains, as this Court said in Ripley v. Ewell,[14] "When the common law is clear we have no power to change it."[15]
In Ducksworth v. Boyer,[16] this Court had occasion to resort to the common law in holding that a person lawfully confined for civil contempt, who escaped from confinement, could be punished for the common law offense of prison break, even though he was not confined for a misdemeanor or a felony. Clearly, if this Court had not had the right to rely on the common law, then the offender would have been able to violate the law with impunity.
Recently, in Parkin v. State,[17] this Court had occasion, in the determination of a *8 sanity issue, to resort to the common law. We quote:
The foregoing cases we have discussed are representative of those instances wherein appellate courts have had occasion to rely upon the common law as adopted and made a part of the law of this jurisdiction by Sections 2.01 and 775.01. Suffice it to say that the common law has been adopted by legislative act. It has been modified to some extent by subsequent legislation. Surely, if further changes are desirable in the public interest, those changes should come from the legislature.
As we today uphold the validity of Section 775.01, we also, by way of caveat, re-emphasize its proper application in cases such as that sub judice. In LaTour v. Stone, supra, we differentiated between conduct on the part of public officials which was indictable as common law nonfeasance, and conduct which was not:
We emphasize that this statute cannot be used against public officials who exercise their powers of office in ways displeasing to certain segments of the public, unless such conduct directly conflicts with written laws prescribing the obligations of the offices which they hold.[20]
Lastly, we point out that, upon remand of this cause, and subsequent trial, appellee, should he be convicted as charged, would be subject to the penalty provisions of Section 775.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., pertaining to punishment of common law offenses:
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is quashed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
[1]  110 So. 2d 470 (Fla.App.1st 1959). See also Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Croft v. Culbreath, 150 Fla. 60, 6 So. 2d 638 (1942); Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So. 2d 251 (1941); State ex rel. Williams v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892, 180 So. 357 (1938); Lewis v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937); Corlett v. Oliver, 107 Fla. 403, 144 So. 877, reh. denied, 107 Fla. 403, 145 So. 886 (1932); Waller v. First Savings & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931); State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 106 So. 576 (1925); Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921).
[2]  118 Fla. 201, 159 So. 504 (1935).
[3]  159 So.  at 507.
[4]  156 So. 2d 705 (Fla.App.2nd 1963). See also State ex rel. Green v. City of Pensacola, 126 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1961); State ex rel. Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. State Racing Commission, 112 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1959); Ervin v. Capital Weekly Post, Inc., 97 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1957); Gough v. State ex rel. Sauls, 55 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1951); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950); Smith v. Ryan, 39 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1949); Miami Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commission, 155 Fla. 366, 20 So. 2d 356, cert. denied 325 U.S. 867, 65 S. Ct. 1405, 89 L. Ed. 1987 (1945); Clark v. Kreidt, 145 Fla. 1, 199 So. 333 (1940); State ex rel. Southern Roller Derbies v. Woods, 145 Fla. 296, 199 So. 262 (1940); Richardson v. City of Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sutherland, 125 Fla. 282, 169 So. 679 (1936); Taylor v. State, 117 Fla. 706, 158 So. 437 (1934); A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157 (1931); Osborne v. Simpson, 94 Fla. 793, 114 So. 543 (1927); State v. Beardsley, 84 Fla. 109, 94 So. 660 (1922); State v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61 (1920); Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533 (1917); Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 47 So. 18 (1908); Adams v. Dickinson, 264 So. 2d 17 (Fla.App.1st 1972); Owen v. Cheney, 238 So. 2d 650 (Fla.App.2nd 1970); City of Sarasota v. Burch, 192 So. 2d 9 (Fla.App.2nd 1966), cert. quashed 200 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1967); Biddle v. State Beverage Dept., 187 So. 2d 65 (Fla.App.4th 1966); Platt v. Lanier, 127 So. 2d 912 (Fla.App.2nd 1961).
[5]  75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918).
[6]  78 So.  at 694-695.
[7]  139 Fla. 681, 190 So. 704 (1939).
[8]  48 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1950).
[9]  190 So.  at 707-708. (Citations omitted.)
[10]  48 So. 2d  at 838.
[11]  120 So. 2d 56 (Fla.App.1st 1960).
[12]  190 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1966).
[13]  Id. at 582. (Emphasis supplied.)
[14]  61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
[15]  Id. at 423.
[16]  125 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1960).
[17]  238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970).
[18]  Id. at 819-820.
[19]  190 So.  at 709 (Emphasis supplied.)
[20]  See generally 63 Am.Jur.2d Public Officers & Employees § 349 (1972).