Title: Alewine v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Alewine v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Services, Div. of Public Assistance and Social Services1991 WY 1803 P.2d 1372Case Number: 89-217Decided: 01/04/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Thomas A. 
ALEWINE and Jeffrey A. Alewine, a Minor Child, by and through his next friend, 
Thomas A. Alewine,

 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

STATE of 
Wyoming, 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND 
SOCIAL SERVICES,

 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal from 
the District Court, Campbell 
County,William A. 
Taylor, J.

 

Fred R. 
Dollison and J. John Sampson, Sheridan, for appellants.

 

Jeffrey A. 
Donnell of Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, for appellee.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]  Jeffrey Alewine, a minor, and Thomas 
Alewine, individually and as Jeffrey's next friend, appeal from summary judgment 
granted to the State of Wyoming Division of Public Assistance and Social 
Services (D-PASS) on their claims which arose from D-PASS' de facto guardianship 
of Jeffrey between June 16, 1985, and March 23, 1988. The Alewines sought to 
recover for alleged violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for 
intentional interference with child custody, and for intentional and negligent 
failure and refusal to reunify a family. Claims were also asserted on Jeffrey's 
behalf for institutional neglect and abuse, unlawful detention, and unlawful 
conversion of social security monies.

 

[¶2]  The trial court determined that the 
Alewines' complaint failed to state a cause of action for the alleged civil 
rights violation and that the remaining claims were barred by the Governmental 
Claims Act, W.S. 1-39-101, et seq. (June 1988 Repl.) sovereign immunity, and the 
W.S. 1-39-113(a) (June 1988 Repl.) statute of limitations. In their appeal the 
Alewines do not dispute summary judgment as to Thomas Alewine's claims, but 
argue that Jeffrey's negligence claims were improperly dismissed. Although 
stating the § 1983 claim, they proceed to waive it in light of Will v. Michigan 
Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989). 
We affirm summary judgment as to the § 1983 claim, but reverse and remand on 
Jeffrey's negligence claims.

 

[¶3]  The Alewines present two issues for 
consideration:

 

I. This 
court should carve out an exception to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
Wyoming Statute, Sections 1-39-101 et seq, for claims against the state, its 
agencies, departments and officials which otherwise would have been cognizable 
under 42 United States Code, Section 1983, prior to the decision of Will v. 
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 
(1989).

II. Did the 
court err in granting summary judgment on Jeffrey A. Alewine's negligent (sic) 
claims?

 

[¶4]  D-PASS responds by framing these issues 
as:

 

I. The 
district court was correct in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment 
with respect to Appellants' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. The 
district court was correct in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment 
with respect to the negligence claims of Jeffrey A. Alewine.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]  Jeffrey Alewine is the son of Thomas 
Alewine; his mother, Linda Alewine, is now deceased. He was born on 
April 8, 
1977, in 
Missouri. His 
parents were separated at the time of his birth and were subsequently divorced 
on July 15, 
1977. Thomas 
Alewine gave up his efforts to see his son after his first attempts to exercise 
his visitation rights were thwarted by Linda Alewine and her family. In March, 
1979, after an order amended the divorce decree to let Linda leave 
Missouri and 
require that Thomas make support payments directly to her, Linda and Jeffrey 
Alewine moved to Gillette, 
Wyoming. She did 
not inform Thomas Alewine of their new location and he was unable to locate them 
and lost all contact with his ex-wife and child.

 

[¶6]  In 1982 Linda Alewine learned that she 
had a degenerative and terminal illness and sought assistance from D-PASS. 
D-PASS initially tried to arrange a heart-lung transplant for Linda and provided 
public assistance and legal services for her. In 1984 it became apparent to 
Linda and the D-PASS personnel who assisted her that she would not live much 
longer and that alternative arrangements needed to be made for Jeffrey. To 
ensure continuing care for Jeffrey, Linda Alewine executed an "Agreement and 
Consent of Parent for Adoption" on June 4, 1984, which stated that Jeffrey was 
born out of wedlock and relinquished custody of Jeffrey to D-PASS in the event 
of her death. On June 20, 
1984, she also 
signed an affidavit that identified Thomas Alewine as Jeffrey's natural father. 
On January 23, 
1985, Linda 
executed a will, paid for by D-PASS, that named the agency as Jeffrey's guardian 
on her death.

 

[¶7]  D-PASS made a brief effort to locate 
Thomas Alewine in 1984. It was unsuccessful and the matter was dropped. Linda 
Alewine died on June 16, 
1985. She had 
already placed Jeffrey with a Gillette couple, and D-PASS continued that 
arrangement on a supervised foster care basis. Another attempt was made to 
locate Thomas Alewine, including a search by the state parent locator service, 
but D-PASS did not find him. This attempt was also dropped. Jeffrey remained 
with his foster parents, who were approved for adoption although no formal 
action was taken on either the adoption or the termination of Thomas Alewine's 
parental rights. D-PASS paid the foster care costs and collected social security 
survivor benefits for Jeffrey, which were forwarded to the state as partial 
reimbursement for the foster care expenses.

 

[¶8]  Thomas Alewine, who was still in 
Missouri, learned 
of Linda Alewine's death during a chance discussion on October 27, 
1987. He 
immediately began a search for Jeffrey. He received the phone number of Gillette 
attorney Douglas Lesley from his father, and on October 29, 
1987, learned 
from Lesley that his son was in Gillette. He travelled to Gillette and requested 
custody of his son from D-PASS personnel on November 9, 
1987. His 
request was refused, and he then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
on which a hearing was held on November 
13, 1987. On the 
same date Jeffrey's foster parents filed an adoption petition.

 

[¶9]  The district court concluded that the 
relinquishment was misleading, that D-PASS had not made any effort to legitimate 
its continuing custody of Jeffrey, and that the child had a right to know his 
father and have a relationship with him. It issued an interim order permitting 
visitation between Jeffrey and Thomas Alewine and ordering an investigation into 
the background and circumstances of Thomas Alewine before entering its final 
order. On March 23, 
1988, the 
district court awarded custody of Jeffrey to Thomas Alewine. Thomas and Jeffrey 
Alewine then returned to Missouri. They 
filed their notice of claim as required by the Governmental Claims Act on 
September 
21, 1988, and this 
action followed on November 1, 
1988.

 

42 U.S.C. § 
1983 CLAIM

42 U.S.C. § 
1983 provides that

[e]very 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage 
of any State or Territory * * * subjects * * * any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law * * *.

 

[¶10]  The Alewines concede that their § 1983 
claim is without merit because of the United States Supreme Court pronouncement 
in Will that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official 
capacities are `persons' under § 1983." Will, 491 
U.S. at ___, 
109 S. Ct.  at 2312, 105 L. Ed. 2d  at 58. However, they have attempted to craft an 
argument for a judicially created exception to the Governmental Claims Act that 
would preserve their suit. This court has clearly expressed its recognition of 
the directive of art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution that "[s]uits may be 
brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature 
may by law direct." White v. State of Wyoming, 784 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Wyo. 1989) (and 
cases cited therein). We will not deviate from the view that the power to 
determine whether, and to what extent, the state is liable to suit is vested in 
the legislature. As we recently said, "to hold otherwise would be tantamount to 
holding the constitution unconstitutional." Id. We decline 
the invitation to usurp the legislative function and affirm the trial court's 
disposition of the Alewines' § 1983 claim.

 

JEFFREY 
ALEWINE'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS

 

[¶11]  We find that the trial court erred 
regarding Jeffrey Alewine's claims. The court concluded, and Thomas Alewine does 
not dispute, that the period for giving the state notice of his claim expired 
through his lack of diligence. Jeffrey's claims were not specifically addressed 
in the decision letter. However, the district court apparently granted summary 
judgment against Jeffrey because of his father's lack of diligence.

 

[¶12]  Although no reason was given for 
rejecting Jeffrey's claims, D-PASS argues that summary judgment was appropriate 
because Jeffrey did not prove that the state had insurance coverage for the 
alleged injuries; he failed to notify the state of his claim within the two-year 
period prescribed by W.S. 1-39-113; and, because Jeffrey is a minor, the failure 
of his father to act on his behalf within that two-year notice period bars the 
claim. D-PASS rests the latter contentions on this court's holding in Awe v. 
University of 
Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1975) and 
its analysis of the discovery rule, which looks to the parents' knowledge to 
establish the time that the injury is discovered. We do not find that our 
holding in Awe forecloses Jeffrey's suit and believe that the facts in this case 
prevent application of the discovery rule advocated by D-PASS and entitle 
Jeffrey to a trial on his negligence claims. We note that the cases cited by 
D-PASS to bolster its reading of the discovery rule as applied to minors do not 
involve similar situations, and one, Banda By and Through Banda v. Danner, 87 
Or. App. 69, 741 P.2d 514 (1987), actually rejects the proposition it is cited 
for.

 

[¶13]  D-PASS' first argument that Jeffrey 
failed to establish the existence of state insurance coverage is meritless. The 
district court recognized in its decision letter the existence of a "brief 
interlude when Defendant was insured." Additionally, application of our standard 
for review of appeals from summary judgment makes clear that summary judgment 
for this reason would be inappropriate.

 

[¶14]  The Alewines averred in their second 
amended complaint that the state had purchased insurance for the acts complained 
of. It was the initial responsibility of D-PASS, as the moving party, to show 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed. Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578, 582 (Wyo. 1989). 
D-PASS responded to the averment with the affidavit of Monty Lauer, insurance 
manager for the State Department of Administration and Fiscal Control, in which 
he stated that the state had no comprehensive general liability insurance 
coverage for liability accruing after November 1, 
1985. We then 
examine the record in the light most favorable to Jeffrey, the nonmoving party, 
and accord him all favorable inferences. Id. The 
inference then derived from Lauer's affidavit is that the state did have 
comprehensive insurance coverage before November 1, 
1985.

 

[¶15]  If the moving party does not refute the 
averment of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may rely on its averment 
and has no obligation to present any factual support. Id. D-PASS' evidence does 
not refute Jeffrey's averment of insurance coverage. An unrefuted averment is 
sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
Id. On this 
basis Jeffrey is clearly entitled to proceed to trial on his claim for alleged 
negligence occurring before November 1, 
1985.

 

[¶16]  It is true that Jeffrey did not notify 
the state of his claim within two years of when it accrued. However, it is also 
true that W.S. 1-39-113(a), provides for notification within two years of 
discovery. It would be an unduly harsh result to hold that a minor must somehow 
independently discover a legal injury of this nature. We agree with D-PASS' 
interpretation of the discovery rule to the extent that it recognizes that a 
minor is not expected to discover his own injury. To safeguard a minor's rights, 
a parent or guardian must have reasonable opportunity to know of the injury 
before any applicable statute of limitations begins to run against the minor. 

 

[¶17]  Having argued that it is the parents' 
knowledge that is crucial, D-PASS then relies on this court's holding in Awe. 
However, in that case we applied W.S. 9-71 (1957) (now W.S. 9-1-404 (June 1987 
Repl.)), which made no provision for discovery, to a claim for an injury that 
occurred in the parents' presence. Jeffrey's case presents us with a decidedly 
different situation. Here the injury arose after the death of Jeffrey's mother, 
who had not let Jeffrey's father know of Jeffrey's whereabouts. Before her 
death, D-PASS sought to become Jeffrey's guardian, and after her death acted in 
fact as his guardian for over two years, while apparently making little effort 
to locate Thomas Alewine, but instead attempting to arrange Jeffrey's adoption 
by others. Given the circumstances of this case it would be inequitable to hold 
that Jeffrey's claims are barred by his father's failure to discover them before 
he located his son. Awe does not stand for the proposition that a child's claim 
may be precluded when the parent did not have a reasonable opportunity to 
discover the injury.

 

[¶18]  In Awe we said, "minority does not per 
se bestow immunity upon an infant or his guardian without a legislative saving 
in his favor, and a statute of limitations will ordinarily run against the 
claims of infants in the absence of a contrary statute or provision." Awe, 534 P.2d  at 105 (quoting 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 182 at 750 (1970)) 
(emphasis added). The corollary of this holding is that minority may bestow 
immunity in unusual circumstances. To risk understatement, these facts are out 
of the "ordinary." It is not apparent that Thomas Alewine had reasonable 
opportunity to discover Jeffrey's injury on Jeffrey's behalf and thus trigger 
the W.S. 1-39-113(a) two-year time limit for giving notice of the 
claim.

 

[¶19]  While an absent parent may be held 
responsible for discovering his own injury, it may be unreasonable and unjust to 
the minor child to penalize the child for the parent's failure to discover his 
child's injury during the parent's absence. In Jeffrey's case it is D-PASS' 
intentional assumption of responsibility as his de facto guardian that is the 
very basis of his claim. The state's status as de facto guardian may affect not 
only the time of discovery for purposes of the notice of claim requirement, but 
may also serve to waive the notice of claim requirement altogether, as the state 
arguably had constructive notice of this minor's injury.

 

[¶20]  We note that other courts have reached a 
range of results when confronted with this type of problem, though the trend is 
towards protection of minors from the harsh result of strict application of 
notice of claim requirements. Annotation, Local Government Tort Liability: 
Minority as Affecting Notice of Claim Requirement, 58 A.L.R.4th 402 (1987). Some 
of the rationales employed to preserve the claims of minors are innovative. We 
do not find it necessary, however, to break new ground in this instance. Based 
both on the W.S. 1-39-113(a) provision for opportunity to discover the injury 
and on the peculiar circumstances of Jeffrey's custody from June 16, 1985, to 
March 23, 1988, there is a material question of fact as to whether Jeffrey 
timely notified the State of Wyoming of his claim within two years, or whether 
he is even required to formally notify the state of alleged injuries that 
occurred while D-PASS acted as his guardian in fact. Consequently, summary 
judgment is not appropriate on Jeffrey's claims.

 

[¶21]  Summary judgment on the Alewines' § 1983 
claims is affirmed. It is reversed on Jeffrey Alewine's negligence claims, and 
those claims are remanded for trial.

 

THOMAS, J., filed 
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring and dissenting.

 

[¶22]  I am in complete accord with the 
majority ruling in this case with respect to that portion affirming the summary 
judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the defendant on the claims 
asserted by the Alewines under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986). I cannot agree, 
however, that the district court erred in entering summary judgment for the 
defendant on Jeffrey Alewine's claims for negligence. I would affirm the 
district court with respect to that ruling.

 

[¶23]  As to those claims, the district judge 
said in his decision letter, without differentiation:

"The Court 
finds that Plaintiff's 1st through 5th claims are barred by the Governmental 
Claims Act Sec. 1-39-101, et seq., the doctrine of sovereign immunity and by the 
statute of limitations, W.S. Sec. 1-39-113(a)."1

The 
majority says about this ruling:

"* * * The 
court concluded, and Thomas Alewine does not dispute, that the period for giving 
the state notice of his claim expired through his lack of diligence. Jeffrey's 
claims were not specifically addressed in the decision letter. However, the district court apparently granted 
summary judgment against Jeffrey because of his father's lack of diligence." 
At 1376. (Emphasis added.)

I cannot 
acquiesce in the emphasized language since I am satisfied that the trial court 
treated both Thomas and Jeffrey quite alike, and it did not grant summary 
judgment against Jeffrey because of his father's lack of diligence. The 
gratuitous conclusion by the majority assigning that analysis to the trial court 
is conjectural.

 

[¶24]  Section 1-39-113(a), W.S. 1977 (June 
1988 Repl.), provides:

 

"(a) No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

"(i) Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

"(ii) The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence."

There is no 
savings clause exempting infants. The effect of the absence of such a savings 
clause was resolved in Awe v. University of 
Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1975), 
which is a controlling precedent. The majority endeavors to distinguish Awe by 
invoking a discussion of the "discovery" rule in the quoted statute. That effort 
does not withstand analysis, and it becomes clear that the court really has 
reasoned from a conclusion that is perceived as equitable.

 

[¶25]  In Awe, this court aligned itself with 
those courts, said to constitute a majority view, which have held that claims 
statutes such as § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977 (1988 Repl.), are applied equally to 
minors and adults in the absence of a savings clause or an express exception in 
favor of minors. See Annotation, Local Government Tort Liability: Minority as 
Affecting Notice of Claim Requirement, 58 A.L.R. 4th 402 § 3 at 425 (1987) 
[hereinafter Annotation]. In Awe, this court addressed a claim that the savings 
provision in favor of minors found in § 1-3-114, W.S. 1977 (1988 Repl.), was 
applicable to the claims statute and said:

 

"Section 
9-71 is not a statute of limitation in the same sense as those enumerated in §§ 
1-15 to 1-22, W.S. 1957. Section 1-22, while it is a savings clause with respect 
to those statutes of the chapter of which they are a part pertaining to the 
filing of actions, bears no relationship to § 9-71 which is not a limitation on 
filing an action. It is a limitation on filing a claim; it makes no exception as 
to minors and so a minor is not excused from filing a claim within one year. As 
said in 51 Am.Jur.2d (Limitation of Actions) § 138, p. 
708:

"`While 
most courts give recognition to certain implied exceptions arising from 
necessity, it is now conceded that they will not, as a general rule, read into 
statutes of limitation an exception which has not been embodied therein, however 
reasonable such exception may seem and even though the exception would be an 
equitable one. The modern rule of construction in this respect is that unless 
some ground can be found in the statute for restraining or enlarging the meaning 
of its general words, it must receive a general construction and the courts 
cannot arbitrarily subtract therefrom or add thereto. Undoubtedly, a hardship 
will result in many cases under this rule, but the court may construe only the 
clear words of the statute, and if its scope is to be enlarged, the remedy 
should be legislative rather than judicial.'" Awe, 534 P.2d 97 at 
105.

 

[¶26]  In this instance, the court is quite 
willing to foreclose Thomas Alewine's remedy because of his failure to file a 
claim, but the failure to file the claim is excused when he dons his hat as 
natural guardian of Jeffrey Alewine. How can the failure to file a claim bar a 
person from relief, but not bar that same individual when he presents a 
different mien? If the statute indeed does treat adults and minors alike, then 
this court has not followed the statute in this instance but instead has invoked 
a legislative remedy. It has moved Wyoming from the 
majority of jurisdictions described in Annotation, § 3 at 425, and has assigned 
our state to the other category of courts that hold that minority excuses strict 
compliance with the claims statute. See Annotation, § 19 at 447. In the process, 
it is clear that Awe has been overruled, not distinguished.2

 
[¶27]  If Awe were to be directly overruled, 
then it would be quite clear that the majority is adopting a savings clause or 
minority exception for the claims statute. Such an augmentation of a statutory 
provision is judicial legislation. The effort to reach the same end by 
distinguishing Awe not only fails of persuasion but must be recognized for what 
it is, judicial legislation. It, indeed, is as innovative as any other rationale 
to preserve the claims of minors.

 

[¶28]  Since, in this instance, I eschew 
judicial legislation, and the correct rule appears to be that there is no 
prospect for declaring the claims statute unconstitutional as applied to minors, 
see Annotation, §§ 8-10 at 434-438, I would affirm the summary judgment entered 
by the trial court in its entirety. In taking this stance, I concede that it 
would represent appropriate public policy if the legislature should at some time 
choose to adopt a savings clause or an exception for minors as an amendment to 
the claims statute. The court should not, however, usurp the legislative 
power.

 

Footnotes

 

1 I say that this occurred without differentiation even though the 
singular "Plaintiff's" was used because the court did that consistently in its 
decision letter, while also referring to "Plaintiffs" in the plural at another 
point. I am satisfied that the court intended to, and did, treat with the claims 
of both the father and son in its decision letter.

2 I confess an aversion to overruling prior authorities sub silentio. If a 
case, in fact, is overruled, then it should be done in a clear and forthright 
manner. Covert jurisprudence simply results in confusion, rather than clarity, 
in the law.