Title: Boring v. Haynes

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

209 Kan. 413 (1972)
496 P.2d 1385
DOROTHY V. BORING, INDIVIDUALLY, and DOROTHY V. BORING, PARENT and NATURAL GUARDIAN OF GERALD H. BORING, a Minor, Appellants,
v.
STUART ALFRED DOUGLAS HAYNES, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE UNDERWRITER FOR LLOYD'S OF LONDON, Appellee.
No. 46,370

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 6, 1972.
*414 Terry O'Keefe, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Dale Kidwell and Walter C. Williamson, both of Wichita, were with him on the brief for the appellants.
Byron Brainerd, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is an action by the beneficiaries under a group policy of accident insurance for recovery of death benefits. Plaintiffs contend the insured's death was occasioned by accidental bodily injury; defendant insurer denies this assertion and says it was caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly by disease.
The trial court sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs have appealed.
Pertinent portions of the certificate of insurance are:
The trial court had before it the deposition of Dr. C.G. Leitch, taken by defendant-appellee, together with certain exhibits referred to in the deposition, plus the death certificate of the decedent. Plaintiffs had previously indicated by way of answer to defendant's interrogatory that they would rely on Dr. Leitch's deposition and the exhibits to establish their claim. From these documents the following may be gleaned:
On April 25, 1966, H.O. Boring, who was employed by Kansas Gas and Electric Company as a supervisor, obtained through his employer the policy in question in the principal sum of $25,000. His medical record begins in the year 1955 with treatment by his family doctor for stomach and other minor problems. On March 9, 1967, he was admitted to the Wesley Medical Center, Wichita, for x-rays of his gall bladder, which was found to be diseased. During this period of his medical history Mr. Boring's electrocardiograms were essentially normal. He was dismissed from the hospital March 14, 1967. That same evening he had his first myocardial infarction and he was readmitted to the hospital. He had a relatively uneventful recovery phase from his infarction and was discharged from the hospital April 4, 1967, on cumidin. His heart consultant saw him on office visits during April. Boring was suffering attacks of cholecystitis and was having occasional episodes of tightness in *415 his chest with exercise but on followup examinations in April he continued to check out well with no signs of heart failure or further infarction. In late April nitroglycerin and probanthine were prescribed. He was hospitalized again from May 12 to May 16, 1967, for gall bladder attacks. He reentered Wesley hospital June 17, 1967, for gall bladder removal, which operation was performed without difficulty and he was discharged June 20, 1967.
Although he did not return to work Mr. Boring was active around the house; he rebuilt the water pump in his back yard, poured a three foot square concrete slab, climbed up on the roof and fixed the antenna. He was seen July 5, 1967, by his heart consultant who found he had no gastrointestinal or cardiac symptoms and was doing well. July 6, 1967, his family doctor advised him he could plan to return to work July 24 if his heart consultant released him.
On July 17, 1967, Mr. Boring was driving an automobile belonging to his employer on a Wichita street. While at an intersection his automobile was struck in the rear by another vehicle. He got out of his automobile and talked to some of the people involved in the accident. When he saw that apparently no one was badly hurt he returned to look at the damage to his car and suddenly collapsed to the ground. He was taken to nearby Wesley hospital where he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The autopsy report contained the following:
"Final Anatomic Diagnosis
Primary
The death certificate indicated the immediate cause of death to be myocardial infarction due to coronary arteriosclerosis. Mr. Boring was fifty-four years of age at the time of his death.
In his deposition Dr. Leitch, who was engaged extensively in the practice of industrial medicine but who had not examined Mr. Boring, testified hypothetically as to Boring's condition and the cause of death. The following appears in his direct examination by appellee:
"A. Yes, I do.
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. Yes, except they had a dead body.
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. That is correct, yes."
On cross-examination by appellants Dr. Leitch gave the following testimony:
In response to a hypothetical question embodying the history already outlined, the doctor stated his opinion within reasonable medical certainty was that Boring's cardiac situation was dormant and stable on July 17, 1967, prior to his auto accident; that the accident precipitated an already existing cardiac disease to the extent it resulted in coronary insufficiency and cardiac arrest; it precipitated a train of symptoms superimposed upon his already existing cardiac disease which resulted in his acute coronary insufficiency and cardiac arrest or a systole.
Mr. Boring's family physician stated in a written report he believed the emotional upset from the car accident produced undue strain and precipitated Boring's death from the heart condition and that the accident was a contributing factor in the death. The heart consultant's report stated the cause of death could have been either natural or related to the excitement concerned with the accident; that there is no way of determining for sure what precipitated the final event causing death. He suggested further check into the microscopic results of the postmortem examination.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in applying the extreme remedy of summary judgment upon the showing made. Generally, under K.S.A. 60-256 (c), before a summary judgment may be granted the record before the court must show conclusively *419 that there remains no genuine issue as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We have several times elaborated on the rules governing the propriety of summary judgments and reiteration is unnecessary (see Albright v. McElroy, 207 Kan. 233, 484 P.2d 1010).
Appellants contend the decedent's heart disease was in a dormant condition at the time of the automobile collision and the emotional stress and strain precipitated the heart attack causing his death, which constituted accidental bodily injury within the meaning of the policy provisions.
Appellee asserts the evidence conclusively reveals death was caused wholly or partly by disease within the purview of the exclusionary clause and that emotional stress and strain cannot result in accidental bodily injury within the meaning of the policy.
For their position appellants rely on our decision in William v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 200 Kan. 51, 434 P.2d 765, a suit to recover accident benefits resulting from a fall down a flight of steps by one afflicted with osteoarthritis in both knees. Upon first trial of the action a motion for directed verdict was sustained at the close of plaintiff's evidence. On appeal this court held the evidence to be sufficient for submission to a jury and reversed the case for a new trial (Williams v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 195 Kan. 579, 408 P.2d 631). Upon retrial the jury found plaintiff entitled to the benefits claimed and the defendant insurer appealed. The insurance policy on which recovery was sought contained language substantially the same as that in the case at bar, both as to accidental bodily injury and the clause excluding benefits where the loss was due to disease, wholly or in part.
In the second Williams appeal this court recognized a split of authority on interpretation of this kind of policy provisos. We stated:
Our holding in second Williams on this aspect was summarized thus:
In 10 Couch on Insurance 2d (Anderson) § 41:79 we find this discussion in connection with risks covered under accident insurance:
We see no reason why the foregoing rules should not be applicable to the case at bar and we hold that they are.
Appellee contends the term accidental should be given its usual ordinary meaning, that is, the meaning which common usage conveys to the ordinary layman and, viewed in this light, no accident occurred to the decedent. In Miller v. Prudential Ins. Co., 183 Kan. 667, 331 P.2d 310, this court was concerned with the meaning of the term as used in a double indemnity insurance policy, where death of an oil field worker had resulted from a heart attack sustained *422 in the ordinary course of work. The fact finder held against the policy beneficiary. On appeal this court impliedly recognized that an unusual happening may constitute an accident when it said:
In second Williams, supra, we approved an instruction which defined an accident as an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often, but not necessarily, accompanied by a manifestation of force (p. 59).
In Rankin v. United Commercial Travelers of America, 193 Kan. 248, 392 P.2d 894, the holder of an accidental death policy died from a heart attack sustained while fighting a pasture fire. The policy provided benefits only for loss "effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, herein termed the accident, which shall be occasioned by the said accident, alone and independent of all other causes." (p. 251.)
The case was submitted to the trial court as a question of law to be decided upon certain stipulated facts including an admission that emotional strain can and does precipitate heart attacks. In reversing a judgment for the insurer this court quoted approvingly from 56 ALR 2d 816, as follows:
The record here reveals an unusual external stimulus  the automobile collision  exerting that which has been characterized as emotional stress and strain upon the decedent, so as to precipitate or cause his death. Assuming that causation is factually established, we believe this fortuitous event constitutes accidental bodily injury within the meaning of the policy provisions and we so hold.
*423 Appellee stresses the fact decedent's body bore no outwardly visible marks of trauma or injury. Although the contention is actually disposed of by that which has already been said, such indicia have never been held requisite to a showing of accidental bodily injury. In Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 303 P.2d 197, a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act, it was held that the term "personal injury" as used in the act is to be construed as meaning any lesion or change in the physical structure of the body, causing damage or harm thereto and it is not essential that the disorder be of such character as to present external or visible signs of its existence. We see no reason for the application of any different rule here.
Finally, appellee urges that our decision in Thompson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 201 Kan. 296, 440 P.2d 548, should be dispositive of this appeal in its favor. Areas of similarity in the two cases exist but the distinguishing feature is that in Thompson the trier of the fact determined as a fact, upon medical evidence held to be sufficient, that there was no causal connection between the death of the arteriosclerotic patient and the fortuitous event relied upon as the accident. In the case at bar no determination respecting causation has been made by the finder of fact. Although their evidence may be controverted upon trial, appellants are entitled, upon the showing presented, to that determination. Consequently we must hold the trial court erred in summary disposition.
The judgment is reversed and remanded with directions for further proceedings in harmony with the views herein expressed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.