Title: Neyhart v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RYAN L. NEYHART, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 491, 2011      
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 1011021484   
 
 
 
§ 
 
             
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  March 28, 2012 
 
 
Decided:     May 16, 2012 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 16th day of May 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Ryan Neyhart, the defendant-below (“Neyhart”), appeals from his 
conviction of Second Degree Robbery in the Superior Court.  Neyhart claims that 
there was legally insufficient evidence to justify his conviction after a jury trial.   
We disagree, and affirm. 
2. 
The facts are described in greater detail in this Court’s order, entered 
this date, affirming the conviction of Neyhart’s co-defendant, Heather Turner 
 
2
(“Turner”).1  Neyhart and Turner were convicted of robbing Joseph “Chubby Joe” 
Harrold (“Harrold”) in Seaford on November 30, 2010.  Neyhart struck Harrold’s 
truck with a pipe and demanded money from Harrold while he was in the driver’s 
seat.  To obtain Harrold’s money, Turner then moved Harrold’s legs, which 
Harrold (a paraplegic) had minimal ability to use.  That movement caused Harrold 
to slide out of the driver’s seat and lean against his truck.  Turner took Harrold’s 
wallet from his pants, she and Neyhart then pocketed $80 in cash, and they 
returned the wallet to Harrold.  
3. 
Turner and Neyhart were indicted on charges of Second Degree 
Robbery and Conspiracy, and were tried together in the Superior Court.2  After the 
State rested its case-in-chief, Neyhart moved for judgment of acquittal on the 
charge of Robbery Second Degree.  The Superior Court denied the motion.  The 
Superior Court instructed the jury that the applicable statute (11 Del. C. 
§ 831(a)(2)) requires a showing that the defendant used force during a theft with 
the intent to “[c]ompel the owner of . . . property . . . to deliver up the property.”  
The court also instructed the jury on accomplice liability.3  During its deliberations, 
                                                 
1 Turner v. State, __ A.3d __ (Del. 2012). 
 
2 Neyhart was also tried on, and convicted of, other charges not implicated by this appeal. 
 
3 The trial court instructed the jury that “in order to find a person guilty of an offense as an 
accomplice for Robbery in the Second Degree committed by another person, you must find that 
all of the following elements have been proven” beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 
3
the jury asked in a note whether “[i]n [the] robbery in the second degree definition 
[the term] ‘to deliver up the property’ mean[s] he [Harrold] had to physically hand 
it to [the defendant]?”  The trial judge answered “no,” and explained that only “a 
causal connection between the use of force and the theft is necessary” so long as 
the force is “applied upon or toward Mr. Harrold with the intent to compel him to 
deliver the property up.”  Neyhart and Turner were each convicted of Second 
Degree Robbery, but acquitted of Conspiracy. 
 4. On appeal, Neyhart claims that the proof adduced at trial was legally 
insufficient to convict him of Second Degree Robbery.  Specifically, he argues that 
there was insufficient evidence that “the force that was used against [Harrold] was 
intended to compel [Harrold] to [d]eliver up his wallet and further that his wallet 
was never delivered up in accordance with [the] statute.”  We review de novo a 
claim that a conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence.4  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Another person committed the elements of the offense charged, or another 
person and the person [charged], together, committed the elements of the offense 
charged;  
 
(2) The person intended to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.  
“Intentionally” means it was the person’s conscious object or purpose to further 
assist the commission of the offense; 
 
(3) The person aided, counseled, or agreed to aid another person in planning or 
committing the offense; [and] 
 
(4) You [the jury] must make an individualized determination of the person’s own 
culpable mental state. . . . . 
 
4 Lemons v. State, 32 A.3d 358, 361 (Del. 2011). 
 
4
inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational juror could find that the offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.5 
5. 
Neyhart’s claim misstates the requirements of 11 Del. C. § 831(a)(2).  
As the jury was told, that statute does not require that the stolen “property” actually 
be “delivered up” by the owner-victim.  Rather, all the statute requires is that the 
robber use force for the purpose of “compel[ling] the owner of the property . . . to 
deliver up the property.”  The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that both Neyhart and Turner acted with the requisite intent.  The 
testimony established that Neyhart and Turner first accosted Harrold’s nephew, 
Joseph Everage (“Everage”), in Harrold’s presence, with the intent to take money 
from Everage.  A reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that: (a) Neyhart, acting as Turner’s accomplice, intended to compel Harrold to 
“deliver up” money when he (Neyhart) smashed Harrold’s truck with a pipe and 
demanded money from Harrold; and (b) Turner (aided and encouraged by 
Neyhart’s threatening display of force and demand for money6) later used force on 
Harrold (by moving his legs) to further the same goal.  Because a reasonable juror 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Neyhart acted with the intent to 
                                                 
5 Id. 
 
6 Specifically, the evidence showed that Neyhart and Turner sought out Everage together in order 
to take money (by force) from him, then turned to Harrold (Everage’s only known associate at 
the scene) after Everage fled.  Turner went into Harrold’s truck in search of money after Neyhart 
first approached and threatened Harrold. 
 
5
“compel” Harrold to “deliver up” money when he aided Turner in robbing Harrold, 
Neyhart’s claim lacks merit.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice