Title: State v. State Canvassing Board

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

437 P.2d 143 (1968) 78 N.M. 682 STATE of New Mexico ex rel. Boston E. WITT, Attorney General, Petitioner, v. The STATE CANVASSING BOARD, Hon. David F. Cargo, Hon. David Chavez, Jr., and Hon. Ernestine Evans, Constituting the members of the Board, Respondents. No. 8554. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 5, 1968. *144 Boston E. Witt, Atty. Gen., David Sierra, Asst. Atty. Gen., John D. Donnell, James E. Thomson, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner. Allen C. Dewey, Jr., William A. Sloan, Albuquerque, for respondents. MOISE, Justice. Pursuant to authority of an Enabling Act of Congress,[1] during fifty days in the year 1910 commencing on October 3rd, one hundred duly elected delegates to a constitutional convention composed and adopted a draft constitution for submission to the qualified voters of New Mexico. As adopted by the convention the following provisions pertinent to this litigation were contained therein: After a heated campaign, during which one of the most severe criticisms of the proposed constitution was that it was too difficult to amend[2], a sizeable majority voted in favor of its adoption at an election held January 12, 1911. Upon presentation of the constitution as adopted to the Congress, the provisions of Art. XIX, Sec. 1, were looked upon with disfavor and accordingly, by resolution[3], the Congress directed that before the President of the United States should announce the results of the election therein provided for, an amended Article XIX should be submitted and voted upon. The method for conducting the election on the amendment was set forth in detail, including a provision that the ballot be printed "on paper of a blue tint" to distinguish it from the white ballots provided for voting on candidates for office. *146 The amendment, as submitted, read as follows: At the regular election wherein officers were elected, held November 7, 1911, the "blue ballot" amendment, as it came to be known, was adopted. A comparison of the original Art. XIX, Section 1, with the "blue ballot" amendment discloses a number of differences, to-wit: (1) whereas, except as to Sections 1 and 3 of Art. VII and Section 10 of Art. XII where three-fourths vote was required, the original provision required that a favorable vote of two-thirds of all members of each house of the legislature was needed to propose an amendment at all times other than at the first regular session of the legislature held after two years from the date the constitution became effective, and at the session held each eight years thereafter when only a majority vote was required, the "blue ballot" amendment reduced the number to a simple majority as to all provisions except Sections 1 and 3 of Art. VII and Section 8 (which was added) and Section 10 of Art. XII, where three-fourths was still required; (2) the "blue ballot" amendment removed the requirement that ratification be by a vote equal to forty percent of all votes cast at the election and in at least one-half of the counties, and substituted a simple majority vote, except as to the same two sections in each of two articles; (3) the limitation of not more than three amendments to be submitted at any one election was eliminated; (4) whereas, the original provision had no limitation on the vote required to ratify, the "blue ballot" amendment included the limitation already provided in Art. VII Sections 1 and 3, applicable to them, and to Art. XII, Section 10, and extended it to also include Art. XII, Section 8. In 1935, more than thirty-two years ago, only New Mexico and Kentucky had no provision for absentee voting.[4] We are advised New Mexico today stands alone without such a provision. *147 Since adoption of the constitution, and admission into the union, no less than ten unsuccessful attempts were made prior to 1967 to amend the constitution so as to make absentee voting possible. The hopelessness of the situation gave rise to the description of Art. VII, Section 1, as "the unamendable section."[5] Every proposed amendment received more than a majority of favorable votes at the election wherein it was submitted, and in 1958 the proposed amendment was approved by 78% and in 1964 by 81.8% of those voting on it.[6] However, because of the requirement of the two-thirds majority in every county, the amendment failed. In 1964 only one county[7] did not give a favorable majority and only six[8] gave less than the required two-thirds. The total vote was 106,579 in favor and 23,694 opposed.[9] An eleventh effort to amend was made in 1967. Respondents admit that at a special election held November 7, 1967, there were 42,101 votes in favor of amending the section and 9,757 opposed, or a percentage of 81.1851 favorable votes. Again, however, in one county[10] less than a majority voting on the amendment favored it, and in twelve[11] less than two-thirds approved it.[12] Thus it is seen that a change of 634 votes in twelve counties was needed to meet the requirement of Art. VII, Sec. 3, and Art. XIX, Sec. 1. But, more serious and important, the votes changed had to be not less than the number indicated in each of the named counties. As a matter of fact, it is apparent that if all the counties, except Rio Arriba, had voted the two-thirds majority, and the vote remained unchanged in that one county, the amendment would have been lost, notwithstanding a vote of over 81%, and more than 3308 votes in excess of the required three-fourths favorable statewide vote. Also, it is apparent that the failure to receive two-thirds vote in Harding County where the total vote was 135 could successfully frustrate the wishes of 90.3 percent of the 13,659 voting in Bernalillo County, thereby giving a Harding County vote more than 100 times the weight of a Bernalillo County vote. It should also be mentioned that over the years several attempts have been made by the legislature to enact an absentee voting law. Because of the interpretation placed by this court on Art. VII, Section 1, N.M. Const., these efforts have been uniformly held unconstitutional.[13] This brief review should serve to demonstrate the effect of the requirement of a two-thirds majority in each and every county to adopt an amendment to Art. VII, Section 1. It also serves as a basis for the discussion to follow. In the light of the decisions cited above, it is eminently clear that no statute authorizing absentee voting could be expected to be upheld unless and until Art. VII, Sec. 1, is amended. It is no less clear, as already noted, that amendment is impossible until some new approach to the problem is made. In the Reapportionment cases decided from 1962 to 1964, hereinafter cited, is found a group of decisions supporting a line of reasoning *148 hitherto never advanced. Petitioner's principal reliance is placed on these authorities. The instant original proceeding was brought by the attorney general and asks that the state canvassing board, whose duty it is to canvass the vote on constitutional amendments and declare the result, § 3-6-19, N.M.S.A. 1953, be mandamused to certify Proposition 7, amending Art. VII, Sec. 1, as passed, and asserts that Art. VII, Sec. 3, insofar as it requires a favorable vote of not less than two-thirds of those voting in each county to amend Art. VII, Sec. 1, is unconstitutional. We issued our alternative writ directed to the canvassing board who thereupon held in abeyance their canvass of the vote on Proposition 7, pending our ruling. The canvassing board requested this court to appoint counsel to represent them and we accordingly appointed Wm. A. Sloan, Esq., and Allen Dewey, Esq., (both of Albuquerque) to appear herein as amici curiae on their behalf. We take this opportunity to express appreciation to counsel for the very excellent briefs filed by them, and for their contribution to the solution of the very important and intriguing problems presented. They have been most helpful. Proposition 7, as it appeared on the ballot at the November 7, 1967 special election, proposed that Art. VII. Sec. 1, be amended to read as follows: The position of Petitioner, generally concurred in by counsel for Respondents, that the requirement of Art. VII, Sec. 3, of a two-thirds favorable vote in each county of the state in order to amend Art. VII, Sec. 1, denies equal protection of the laws to certain citizens of the state, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Amici, in their argument, also discuss the effect of Art. XIX, Sec. 1, under the decisions relied upon. Support for the argument is found principally in the so-called Reapportionment Cases, starting with Baker v. Carr[14], followed by Gray v. Sanders[15], and then by Reynolds v. Sims[16]; WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo[17]; Maryland Committee v. Tawes[18]; Davis v. Mann[19]; Roman v. Sincock[20]; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of State of Colorado[21], all decided June 15, 1964. *149 All of these cases deal with legislative reapportionment, not with voting rights relating to amendment of a constitution. However we perceive of no real distinction which can or should be drawn. As already pointed out, a vote in Harding County actually off-set or counted for more than 100 votes in Bernalillo County. This is exactly what was said in Gray v. Sanders, supra, could not be sustained in elections for legislators. We quote: Concerning the right to give to votes of residents of geographical areas of widely varying population equivalently disproportionate weight, the United States Supreme Court had the following to say, in Reynolds v. Sims, supra: We see no escape from the conclusion that a requirement of a two-thirds favorable vote in every county, when there is a wide disparity in population among counties, must result in greatly disproportionate values to votes in the different counties. Where, as here, a vote in Harding County outweighs a hundred votes in Bernalillo County, the "one person, one vote" concept announced in Gray v. Sanders, supra, certainly is not met. Although *150 this example provides the extremes that are present, Bernalillo County having more than four times the population of Dona Ana County, the next most populous county in 1960, no situation could be projected where the Bernalillo County voter would not be substantially discriminated against merely by virtue of the fact that artificial geographical lines of counties determine the value of a vote. As stated in Reynolds v. Sims, supra: The following additional quotations from Reynolds v. Sims, supra, are equally illuminating, and although used in discussing elections of legislative representatives, are nevertheless particularly applicable here: The only case of which we are aware in which a constitutional limitation at all comparable to that here being discussed was involved is Holt v. Richardson[22], wherein a three-judge court considered a section of the constitution of Hawaii providing in effect that representation in the state senate could not be changed unless "approved by a majority of the votes tallied upon the question in each of a majority of the counties." The case is not very helpful because the court there noted that the senatorial apportionment in the Hawaii constitution was unquestionably invalid under Reynolds v. Sims, supra, and that the provisions concerning approval by more than one-half of those voting in each of a majority of the counties was likewise unconstitutional by virtue of its close ties to apportionment. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court merely noted that all parties conceded the unconstitutionality and accordingly did not discuss the provision. Burns v. Richardson[23]. We see no rational basis to distinguish between voting on representatives in the legislature, and voting on constitutional amendments. One is no more a necessary ingredient of our democratic *151 process than the other. Nor can it be said that an equal voice in selection of the legislature is of greater importance to a citizen than equality of weight in expression of views on changes in our basic charter, the constitution. As a matter of fact, it is amply evident that the constitutional provision here being considered was quite definitely placed in the constitution to preserve certain rights in a minority group. It has now been made clear that when this is done there is no political equality under the Fourteenth Amendment as that term applies to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments to our United States Constitution. Gray v. Sanders, supra. Neither can there be political equality under the Fourteenth Amendment to exercise the right of elective franchise provided for in Art. VII of the New Mexico Constitution, so long as Art. VII, Sec. 3, and Art. XIX, Sec. 1, contain the restriction here under attack. The application of the rule of the reapportionment cases to constitutional conventions has been considered in West v. Carr[24] and in State ex rel. Smith v. Gore[25]. Although in West v. Carr, supra, it was held that the decision in Baker v. Carr, supra, had no application to apportionment of a constitutional convention authorized by a vote of the people, in the course of the opinion we find the following stated by the court in West v. Carr, supra: It is clear from this language that the court relied on the effect of the vote of the people at elections where the vote of every elector had equal weight to overcome the inequality of representation found in the constitutional convention. In State v. Gore, supra, the court held equal representation in a constitutional convention a requisite of the state constitution and expressed disagreement with the conclusion of the Tennessee court in West v. Carr, supra, concerning the applicability of the decision in Baker v. Carr, supra. Having disposed of the problem of the requirement of a two-thirds vote in every county we next note the question of whether there was compliance with the requirement of ratification by at least "three-fourths of the electors voting in the whole state." No serious attack is made on the constitutionality of this provision. However, *152 our attention is directed to the fact which appears in the record that whereas a total of 51,858 votes were cast on Proposition 7, of which 42,101, or 81%, favored it, the total number who voted at the election was 56,152, and three-fourths of that number is 42,114. It has been suggested that the amendment thus failed by 13 votes to receive the vote of "three-fourths of the electors voting in the whole state" if the words "electors voting in the whole state" mean those voting on all propositions submitted at the election. Quite obviously some ambiguity is present in the language used. Do the quoted words refer to the total number voting at the election so as to require approval by at least three-fourths of the largest number voting on any proposition submitted in the election, or do they merely refer to votes on the particular proposition? Some complication presents itself when it is noted that the three-fourths requirement appearing in Art. VII, Sec. 3; Art. XII, Sec. 10, and in Art. XIX, Sec. 1, relates to "electors voting in the whole state," whereas Art. XIX, Sec. 1, requires only a majority of the "electors voting thereon" to ratify amendments generally. We are bound by long established principles of constitutional interpretation. In Todd v. Tierney[26] the court made the following pronouncements: In State ex rel. Ward v. Romero[27], the court had the following to say: From the foregoing we recognize it as our responsibility to attempt to arrive at the meaning of the framers of the constitution and to give to their work an interpretation that is reasonable not one that is illogical or incongruous. While aware, as already noted, that the use of different words within the same provision might lead to a conclusion that different meanings were thereby intended, we should not lose sight of the fact that to construe "electors voting in the whole state" to in effect mean "all electors voting at the election" as distinguished from those voting on the particular amendment, would have the effect of making the "unamendable section" even more unamendable than would otherwise be true. To so hold would in effect attribute to the membership, of the convention, the Congress of the United States and the electorate who *153 ratified the constitution and the amendment to Art. XIX, the intention of incorporating provisions which ostensibly provide for amendment while in fact making it impossible. Notwithstanding that the restrictions were intended to make the particular provisions difficult of amendment, we cannot believe that it was the purpose to make it utterly impossible. As has been seen, the difficulties have been great, but we believe that to multiply the problems beyond those which naturally flow from the necessary meaning of language would amount to unreasonable interpretation and one not to be attributed to the drafters of the provision. Also, when it is remembered that Art. XIX, Sec. 1, was adopted as an amendment intended to generally make amendment less difficult, and that the three-fourths and two-thirds provisions were lifted bodily from Art. VII, Sec. 3, and Art. XII, Sec. 10, we do not believe that the argument favoring an interpretation which would make amendment more difficult is indicated or required. We find support for this approach in Board of County Comr's of Bernalillo County v. McCulloh[28]. In this connection, we would take note that, the last two times prior to 1967 when amendments to Art. VII, Sec. 1, to permit absentee voting, were submitted were in 1958 and 1964 at general elections. Whereas in 1958, there were 69,567 votes cast in favor and 19,061 against, being over 78% of those voting on the proposition, only 43.2% of those voting for governor at the election voted on the proposed amendment. Similarly, in 1964, also a general election, over 81% of those voting on the amendment favored it, although only 41% of those voting for governor expressed an opinion on the amendment.[29] It is thus quite evident that to hold that three-fourths of those voting at any given election is required to amend Art. VII, Sec. 1, would give effect as having cast negative votes to those voters at the election who because of negligence, lack of interest, or some other unexplained reason failed to register their votes on the particular proposition. No logical reason for counting as opposed those who do not express their preference has been suggested. Nevertheless, this is the effect of requiring a three-fourths majority of those voting at an election whether or not they voted on the particular proposition. It would have been just as reasonable if a three-fourths vote of all registered voters had been required, whether voting or not. Such a provision, we submit, would be unsound in any view, but more reasonable only in degree than the present contention here held to be without merit. Compare Davy v. McNeill[30], where we find the following language quoted: See also Fabro v. Town of Gallup.[31] Taking this view of the provisions, can the language be read so as to support a conclusion that nothing more was required than a favorable vote of three-fourths of those voting on Proposition 7? Although the question is one of first impression in New Mexico, other courts have had occasion to consider it. Also, it should be noted that in Baca v. Ortiz, supra, the court in determining that an insufficient number of votes had been cast to adopt the proposed amendment, the number of votes used to establish this fact were those cast on the particular amendment, and no consideration was given to whether the number to which *154 the vote should be related was the total vote at the election. While we have found no case involving a provision identical with our own, there are many which are similarly ambiguous and have accordingly required interpretation.[32] Generally speaking, the cases there cited pass upon the question of whether a constitutional provision or statute should be interpreted to require a majority of those voting on a proposition or a majority of those qualified to vote, whether voting or not, and support a conclusion that unless the constitution or law declares or clearly implies the contrary, qualified electors who do not present themselves to vote, or who do not vote on a proposition, are presumed to assent to the will of those who actually cast their ballots. Falls Church Taxpayers League v. City of Falls Church[33] is such a case. It held a bond issue to have been approved by "a majority of the qualified voters who are freeholders voting in such election" even though not favored by sufficient voters to equal a majority of the votes cast on other propositions at the same election. Ladd v. Yett[34] also holds that only those votes cast on a given proposition shall be considered in determining if a "majority of the qualified voters voting at said election" had voted in favor of each of several amendments to a city charter submitted at one election. See also, King v. City of McAlester[35]; Wilson v. Wasco County[36]; Harris v. Walker[37]. From Tinkel v. Griffin[38] we quote the following which we consider pertinent: We are not unmindful that contrary conclusions have been reached by some courts. Of this character, to cite a few, are People v. Stevenson[39]; State ex rel. Cope v. Foraker[40]; State ex rel. Stevenson v. *155 Babcock[41]. There are others, but to cite them would add little to the opinion. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the requirement of "at least three-fourths of the electors voting in the whole state" was met when that percentage voting on the particular proposition favored it, notwithstanding the fact that this constituted less than three-fourths of all those voting at the election on some other propositions. The requirement of a two-thirds vote in each county being unconstitutional, and the demand of ratification by "at least three-fourths of the electors voting in the whole state" having been met, the adoption of constitutional amendment submitted as Amendment No. 7 at the election held November 7, 1967 was accomplished. It follows that it should be certified by respondents as having been ratified, to accomplish which the alternative writ heretofore issued is made permanent. It is so ordered. NOBLE, COMPTON and CARMODY, JJ., and LaFEL E. OMAN, J., Ct.App., concur. [1] 36 Stats. at Lge. 557, ch. 310, 1910. [2] Donnelly, The Government of New Mexico, 48 (1947). [3] Joint Resolution of August 21, 1911, No. 8, 37 Stats. at Lge., p. 39. [4] Donnelly, The Absentee Voter Problem in New Mexico, 7 N.M.Bus.Rev. 91 (1938). [5] New Mexico Legislative Council Service, The Unamendable Section (1965). [6] Folmar, New Mexico Legislative Council Service, Piecemeal Amendment of the New Mexico Constitution, 1911 to 1967 (4th Rev. 1968). [7] Guadalupe [8] Guadalupe, Harding, Mora, Quay, Torrance and Union [9] Id. Footnote 5. [10] Sandoval [11] Catron [12]; Grant [57]; Guadalupe [18]; Harding [12]; Hidalgo [16]; Mora [35]; Rio Arriba [1]; Sandoval [111]; San Miguel [206]; Taos [30]; Union [17] and Valencia [109]. The numbers set forth in brackets following each county name indicate how many votes short of a two-thirds vote in favor was given by those voting thereon. [12] Id. Footnote 6. [13] Thompson v. Scheier, 40 N.M. 199, 57 P.2d 293 (1936); Baca v. Ortiz, 40 N.M. 435, 61 P.2d 320 (1936); Chase v. Lujan, 48 N.M. 261, 149 P.2d 1003 (1944); State ex rel. West v. Thomas, 62 N.M. 103, 305 P.2d 376 (1956). [14] 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). [15] 372 U.S. 368, 83 S. Ct. 801, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963). [16] 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506. [17] 377 U.S. 633, 84 S. Ct. 1418, 12 L. Ed. 2d 568. [18] 377 U.S. 656, 84 S. Ct. 1429, 12 L. Ed. 2d 595. [19] 377 U.S. 678, 84 S. Ct. 1441, 12 L. Ed. 2d 609. [20] 377 U.S. 695, 84 S. Ct. 1449, 12 L. Ed. 2d 620. [21] 377 U.S. 713, 84 S. Ct. 1459, 12 L. Ed. 2d 632. [22] 238 F. Supp. 468 (D.Hawaii, 1965). [23] 384 U.S. 73, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 16 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1966). [24] 212 Tenn. 367, 370 S.W.2d 469 (1963), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 378 U.S. 557, 84 S. Ct. 1908, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1034. [25] 150 W. Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965). [26] 38 N.M. 15, 27 P.2d 991 (1933). [27] 17 N.M. 88, 125 P. 617 (1912). [28] 52 N.M. 210, 195 P.2d 1005 (1948). [29] Id. Footnote 6. [30] 31 N.M. 7, 240 P. 482 (1925). [31] 15 N.M. 108, 103 P. 271 (1909). [32] In 131 A.L.R. 1382 (1941) there is an annotation on the subject. [33] 203 Va. 604, 125 S.E.2d 817 (1962). [34] 273 S.W. 1006 (Tex.Civ.App. 1925). [35] 273 P.2d 139 (Okl. 1954). [36] 83 Or. 147, 163 P. 317 (1917). [37] 199 Ala. 51, 74 So. 40 (1917). [38] 26 Mont. 426, 68 P. 859 (1902). [39] 281 Ill. 17, 117 N.E. 747 (1917). [40] 46 Ohio St. 677, 23 N.E. 491 (1890). [41] 17 Neb. 188, 22 N.W. 372 (1885).