Title: City of Birmingham v. Horn

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

810 So. 2d 667 (2001)
CITY OF BIRMINGHAM
v.
William Fred HORN et al.
William Fred Horn et al.
v.
City of Birmingham et al.
1991455 and 1991558.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 17, 2001.
*670 Joe R. Whatley, Jr., and Peter H. Burke of Whatley Drake, L.L.C., Birmingham; Kenneth L. Thomas and Valerie L. Acoff of Thomas, Means & Gillis, Birmingham; and Tamara Harris Johnson and Michael Melton, city attys., for appellant/cross appellee City of Birmingham.
W.L. Williams, Jr., Birmingham; and David A. Sullivan, Birmingham, for appellees/cross appellants William Fred Horn et al.
Kenneth Smith, director of legal services, and Erin Smith, assoc. gen. counsel, Alabama League of Municipalities for amicus curiae Alabama League of Municipalities.
BROWN, Justice.
The question presented in these appeals, collectively stated, is whether the Jefferson Circuit Court erred by holding that a group of citizens (sometimes referred to herein as "the plaintiffs") who sued the City of Birmingham ("the City") are entitled to an award of attorney fees totaling $1,785,939, an amount computed by the socalled "lodestar method." The court awarded these fees to the plaintiffs for their role in litigation involving the placement of a waste transfer station and recycling center in a Birmingham neighborhood by Browning Ferris Industries of Alabama, Inc. ("BFI"). See generally Horn v. City of Birmingham, 648 So. 2d 607 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) ("Horn I"); Horn v. City of Birmingham, 718 So. 2d 691 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) ("Horn II"); and Battle v. City of Birmingham, 656 So. 2d 344 (Ala.1995). The City appeals, contending that the trial court, in awarding attorney *671 fees, incorrectly applied the method it used to compute the fees; the plaintiffs cross-appeal from the order awarding attorney fees, contending that the trial court used an inappropriate method to compute the fees. As to the City's appeal, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a judgment; as to the plaintiffs' cross-appeal, we affirm.
To facilitate an understanding of this complex case and the stakes involved, we set out its factual background, in pertinent part, as it was previously presented by this Court in Ex parte Horn, 718 So. 2d 694 (Ala.1998):
Ex parte Horn, 718 So. 2d  at 695-701 (footnotes omitted).
The Horn plaintiffs appealed the trial court's order denying their motion for an award of attorney fees to the Court of Civil Appeals. That court, in Horn v. City of Birmingham, 648 So. 2d 607 (Ala.Civ. App.1994), stated that it appeared the trial court's ruling had been based on "an apparent belief that a common fund had to exist in order for it to award attorney fees." Horn I, 648 So. 2d  at 609. The court then held that "the mere fact that the plaintiffs' action did not create a fund from which a fee could be paid should not bar the trial court from awarding attorney fees," and it remanded the case for the trial court to determine "whether the efforts of the plaintiffs' attorneys produced a common benefit [to the general public] and to consider the award of attorney fees." Id. at 610.
The trial court, on remand, determined that there was no common benefit to the general public and again denied the plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees. On return from remand, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Horn v. City of Birmingham, 718 So. 2d 691, 694 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). This Court then granted certiorari review to consider "whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that the plaintiffs are not due an award of attorney fees under the `common benefit' exception to the `American Rule.'" Ex parte Horn, 718 So. 2d 694, 695 (Ala. 1998) (sometimes referred to herein as "Horn III"). We reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees *678 because they had conferred a substantial benefit upon the residents of Birmingham, including those residents living outside the plaintiffs' own neighborhood. Horn III, 718 So. 2d  at 706. In so holding, we reasoned that the benefit conferred included "a new [city] ordinance specifically regulating and licensing solid waste facilities, such as the garbage transfer station at issue... [and] an increased level of due process protection to all residents of Birmingham." Id. Consequently, the case eventually returned to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings.
In those proceedings, both parties initiated discovery relating to the question of attorney fees. While discovery continued, the plaintiffs filed a motion with the trial court seeking, among other things, interim attorney fees. The trial court granted the motion and eventually awarded the plaintiffs a $250,000 interim fee, prompting the City to petition this Court for a writ of mandamus. See Ex parte City of Birmingham, 757 So. 2d 389 (Ala.1999). In that petition, the City requested that this Court (1) direct the trial court to vacate its order awarding the plaintiffs the $250,000 interim attorney fee and (2) overrule Horn III, supra. We denied the petition and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the interim attorney fee. Ex parte City of Birmingham, 757 So. 2d  at 392. We also refused to overrule our prior decision holding that attorney fees should be awarded in the case; we stated:
Id.
In December 1998, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the issue of determining an award of attorney fees. The court heard from numerous witnesses, including the support staff for the plaintiffs' counsel; expert witnesses; the Honorable Richard Arrington, Jr. (who was mayor of Birmingham during the time in question); and plaintiff and defense counsel. The court received into evidence billing records; time sheets; invoices; expense reports; examples of work product; newspaper articles concerning the case; correspondence; and documents concerning the qualifications and professional achievements of plaintiffs' counsel.
After considering this evidence, the trial court issued an order on March 2, 2000, stating its findings and conclusions. In that order, the court deducted 84 hours from plaintiffs' counsel's billable-hour submission, finding those hours redundant or unnecessary; this yielded a total of 5,326 compensable hours. The court then considered and added hours claimed in the plaintiffs' counsel's supplemental submission, which raised the total compensable hours to 5,816.95. The court also determined a market rate of $175 per hour of work done, a figure it based on its considering evidence of rates charged in the area for similar work by attorneys with similar experience. Further, the court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to a multiplier of 2, which, the court said, reflected the difficulty of the case and the fact that the plaintiffs had prevailed under arduous circumstances. The final attorney-fee award was $1,785,939, which reflected a deduction of $250,000 for the previously awarded interim attorney fees.
Neither side was content with this award. The plaintiffs moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its judgment, contending that the court had erred by using the lodestar method in calculating *679 the fees. After the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion, both sides appealed.
Resolution of the general issue in this case, as we stated it above, requires us to answer three questions: (1) Was the trial court correct in using the lodestar method for its calculation of attorney fees? (2) Did the trial court correctly determine that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees totaling $1,785,939 and that those fees were necessary and reasonable? and (3) Does § 11-93-2, Ala.Code 1975, limit the City's obligation to pay attorney fees exceeding $300,000?
The first question we consider is whether the trial court used the correct method for its calculation of attorney fees. The plaintiffs contend that under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the trial court should have used the "percentage method," which, the plaintiffs argue, would have been in accordance with our holding in Horn III.
In Gray v. Reynolds, 553 So. 2d 79 (Ala.1989), we summarized the law-of-the-case doctrine:
553 So. 2d  at 81. The application of this doctrine here rests upon a construction of our holding in Horn III, for only those statements of law directly pertaining to the issues decided in Horn III can bind subsequent proceedings in this case. See Gray, 553 So. 2d  at 81.
The plaintiffs contend that Horn III is dispositive of the question regarding the appropriate method to be employed in calculating the award of attorney fees in this case. In Horn III, the issue before us was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees. 718 So. 2d  at 695. We observed that, under the American rule, parties to a lawsuit generally bear the responsibility of paying their own attorney fees, subject to certain exceptions created by statute, contract, or "special equity." Id. at 702. We then held that the special-equity exception applied to this case. Id.
The special-equity exception invokes principles common to an action seeking a recovery under the theory of quantum meruit, in that it involves one party's seeking compensation for engaging in efforts that benefited another party. Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir.1982) (quoting Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir.1973)). We acknowledged those principles in Horn III, where we stated:
718 So. 2d  at 702; see also City of Ozark v. Trawick, 604 So. 2d 360, 364 (Ala.1992); Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 585, 591 (Ala. 1990); and Bell v. Birmingham News Co., 576 So. 2d 669, 670 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). In Horn III, we found that the plaintiffs' efforts had principally resulted in a new City ordinance regulating solid-waste facilities; this fact, we said, resulted in an *680 increase in due-process protection for all residents of Birmingham. Horn III, 718 So. 2d  at 706. We then held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney fees under the special-equity exception. Id. The plaintiffs, noting that this exception is premised upon the common-benefit doctrine, argue in their brief that our holding in Horn III issued an implied mandate to the trial court to employ the so-called "common-fund" approach in calculating the award of attorney fees in this case. We disagree.
Under Alabama law, there are currently two methods available for the determination of fee awards for attorneys who have litigated successfully on behalf of a class: (1) the common-fund approach and (2) the lodestar approach. See Union Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. McCurdy, 781 So. 2d 186, 189-90 (Ala.2000) (discussing the discretion of the trial court in determining which approach is appropriate in any given case). Under the lodestar approach, the trial court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel on the matter, and then multiply those hours by an hourly rate of compensation set by the court. Union Fid., 781 So. 2d  at 191-92. The court may then adjust that figure by using a multiplier determined by considering a variety of factors, including the complexity of the case and counsel's experience. Id. Under the common-fund approach, the trial court decides upon a percentage and then applies that figure to the fund obtained as a recovery. Although we have held that the existence of a separate fund is unnecessary, Union Fid., 781 So. 2d  at 190, we have employed the common-fund approach only when there has been a defined monetary recovery. See Edelman & Combs v. Law, 663 So. 2d 957, 961 (Ala. 1995); Ex parte Brown, 562 So. 2d 485, 496 (Ala.1990); Reynolds v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A, 471 So. 2d 1238, 1245 (Ala.1985); and Eagerton v. Williams, 433 So. 2d 436, 450-51 (Ala. 1983); cf. Union Fid., 781 So. 2d  at 189-90 (stating that recovery under the common-fund approach is possible when the defendant has admitted to being liable for a sum certain in damages even though no separate fund, such as an escrow account, has been created).
The common-fund approach becomes unworkable when the recovery does not involve a quantifiable monetary settlement or damages award. This is often the case where, as here, the litigation has been undertaken solely to effect a societal change. Generally, such a case involves the declaration or enforcement of rights where a statute authorizing the lawsuit has likewise authorized the award of attorney fees. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 255 (1985). Because of the intangible nature of the relief granted, courts have steadfastly employed the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees in such cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.1995), explained the judicial loyalty to the lodestar method in this kind of case:
55 F.3d  at 821 (citation omitted). With regard to cases (like the present one) where the right to an attorney fee is non-statutory and the relief involves intangible remedies, the Court of Appeals in General Motors opined:
Id.
The Third Circuit's reasoning in General Motors illustrates the principle that the method used to calculate an attorney-fee award in a particular case is not necessarily determined by which of the exceptions (i.e., statutory, contractual, or special equity) justified that award. Consequently, attorney fees awarded pursuant to the "special-equity" common-benefit doctrine may, at times, be computed using the lodestar method where circumstances warrant. See Charles v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 976 F. Supp. 321, 325 (D.N.J. 1997) (applying the lodestar method after noting the difficulty in valuing a settlement that included equitable relief); and Cooperstock v. Pennwalt Corp., 820 F. Supp. 921, 926 (E.D.Pa.1993) (applying the lodestar method after finding that the benefit conferred upon the class plaintiffs was "unquantifiable"). In Horn III, this Court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees, but, by its silence on the question of method, left open the method by which those fees were to be calculated. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not violate the law of the case established in Horn III by employing the lodestar method.[1]
We now turn to the question regarding the amount of attorney fees awarded. "The determination of whether an attorney fee is reasonable is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion." Ex parte Edwards, 601 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala.1992). Our *682 deference to the trial court in attorney-fee cases is based upon our recognition that the trial court, which has presided over the entire litigation, has a superior understanding of the factual questions that must be resolved in fee determinations. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). Nevertheless, the trial court's order regarding an attorney fee must allow for meaningful review by articulating the decisions made, the reasons supporting those decisions, and the performance of the attorney-fee calculation. American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir.1999); see also Hensley, 461 U.S.  at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933.
The attorney-fee calculation under the lodestar method involves several steps. First, the trial court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel and a reasonable hourly rate of compensation for counsel's representation. The number of reasonable hours is then multiplied by that reasonable rate, yielding an initial estimate called the "lodestar amount." Edwards, 601 So. 2d  at 85. The lodestar amount is then adjusted upward or downward depending on certain factors attendant to, among other things, the nature and difficulty of counsel's representation. See id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986)); see also Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 585, 592 (Ala. 1990) (listing 13 factors for the trial court to consider when determining a reasonable attorney fee).
The City has challenged the trial court's decision as to each facet of this calculation, contending (1) that many of the hours claimed by plaintiffs' counsel were excessive or redundant; (2) that the hourly rate determined by the court did not reflect the true value of services rendered, as judged by local standards; and (3) that the trial court's application of a multiplier of 2 was unreasonable.
Applicants for an attorney fee bear the burden of proving their entitlement to an award and documenting their appropriately expended hours. Edwards, 601 So. 2d  at 85; see also Hensley, 461 U.S.  at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (citing the importance of documenting in fee applications the hours expended). "The applicant should exercise `billing judgment' with respect to hours worked, and should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims." Hensley, 461 U.S.  at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (citation omitted). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated in American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, supra:
168 F.3d  at 428.
In opposition to the hours claimed by plaintiffs' counsel, the City enumerated several instances where it contended that the hours claimed by opposing counsel were duplicative. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court made no detailed findings with respect to these claims. In fact, it appears that the trial court reviewed the time sheet submitted by plaintiffs' counsel only for multiple entries for the same work rather than for instances where attorneys Sullivan and *683 Williams might have duplicated one another's work. As to the latter question, the trial court simply added to its order a general statement declaring those hours to be reasonable and necessary. Therefore, our deference with respect to the trial court's order as to these questions is limited. As we said in Ex parte Edwards, supra, "[a] general statement that the number of hours spent was reasonable or unreasonable is not very helpful and, accordingly, should not be given much weight." 601 So. 2d  at 86.
The City contends that the trial court overlooked what the City calls redundant billing by plaintiffs' counsel with respect to work preparing briefs, court memoranda, and various responses to the City's submissions. Because of the trial court's silence with respect to these contentions, we are left to examine the record in order to fulfill our duty of meaningful review. Our review of the record discloses billing statements that nebulously describe general tasks but, unfortunately, do not provide sufficient detail. While this situation, by itself, is problematic, see American Civil Liberties Union of Ga., 168 F.3d  at 429, testimony presented during the evidentiary hearing provides adequate elucidation supporting the trial court's conclusion of reasonableness.[2] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that there was no redundant billing with respect to work jointly performed.
We now turn to the City's allegations that some of the hours expended by plaintiffs' counsel were unreasonable.[3] Our review of the record indicates that there was conflicting and credible testimony by both sides as to nearly all of the specific claims of unreasonableness.[4] Because this testimony was oral, we defer to the trial court's resolution of the pertinent factual disputes in favor of the plaintiffs. After considering the trial court's observation, made in its order, regarding the complexity of this case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion with respect to its findings on these matters.
One matter, however, concerns us. The record reveals that plaintiffs' counsel included in their fee application 27 hours spent by Sullivan trying to convince Williams to assist him with the case. We believe that these hours were not essential to the plaintiffs' representation; therefore, we reduce by 27 the number of hours the trial court accepted as reasonablethis reduction yields a total of 5,789.95 hours reasonably expended.
The City contends that the trial court also abused its discretion with respect *684 to the adjudged hourly rate of compensation. We agree.
The trial court's order is silent as to any justifications for the determined rate of $175 per hour, except for a general statement declaring that the trial court had conducted "numerous fee-award cases over the years" and, therefore, was "familiar with the hourly market rate in the area." We acknowledge that the trial court may indeed have its finger on the pulse of the Birmingham legal community, but, without evidence in the record regarding the area's market rate, we are unable to defer to its conclusions.
The record reflects that Sullivan typically charged clients somewhere between $80 and $150 per hour for his representation. The record contains no other evidence as to rates of compensation. While the complexity of this case generally supports a higher rate, we note that the record is replete with testimony indicating that Sullivan and Williams were unfamiliar with the law applicable in this case and, therefore, had to expend numerous hours acquainting themselves with that law. This degree of unfamiliarity often reflects a lack of experience, which leads us to conclude that Sullivan and Williams had little experience in the area of law involved in this case. Therefore, based on the typical rate usually charged by plaintiffs' counsel, their level of experience in this area of the law, and the complexity of this case, we conclude that $150 per hour is a reasonable rate of compensation.
The City argues next that the multiplier established by the trial court was excessive. Such a determination is, once again, a matter we generally leave to the trial court's discretion, see, e.g., Ex parte Edwards, 601 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1992), especially where, as here, the trial court has fully explained its reasoning in its order.
In our review of the trial court's order, we are mindful of the 12 factors set forth in previous cases in which we have been confronted with the question of attorney fees. See Union Fid., 781 So.2d at 192(quoting Edelman & Combs, 663 So. 2d  at 960 (summarizing 12 factors first enunciated by this Court in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137, 140-41 (Ala.1983))). The factor that concerns us most is the benefit to the client received from the hours expended.
The City contends that the multiplier of 2 should be reduced because, it says, a substantial portion of counsel's hours were expended pursuing fee litigation rather than the litigation that provided the substantive benefits of the original case. The history of this case indicates that the attorney-fee litigation began immediately after the Jefferson Circuit Court approved a settlement between the parties regarding the placement of the solid-waste facility. While the law clearly allows for a fee award with respect to those hours, see note 3, supra, we do not consider this time to be vital to the true purpose of the litigation, which was to enhance the due-process rights of Birmingham residents and to prevent the placement of a solid-waste transportation facility in a particular location. Many of the factors set forth in previous decisions by this Court with respect to attorney-fee awards are intended primarily to be applied to the circumstances attendant to the nature of the representation, not attorney-fee litigation. We recognize, however, that some of the factors, such as those pertaining to questions of local compensatory customs, are proper for a court to consider in fee-litigation cases. Nevertheless, the number of hours in this case expended only on fee litigation is so great that we believe the *685 trial court abused its discretion by determining a multiplier of 2. Considering the benefits conferred on the plaintiffs, the time expended on the entire litigation (including the attorney-fee litigation), and the trial court's finding regarding the complexity of this case and counsel's performance, we conclude that a multiplier of 1.5 is warranted. We apply this figure, however, only to those hours expended by plaintiffs' counsel in succeeding in the primary purpose of the litigation, which was to win the enaction of a new city ordinance and to increase due-process protection for Birmingham residents. As best we can discern, the hours expended in those efforts total 2,024. In calculating this portion of counsel's fee, using a 1.5 multiplier, we conclude that plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to a fee of $455,400 for this part of their services.[5] As for their work on matters not essential to the result obtained as a part of their representation, we find that plaintiffs' counsel expended 3,765.95 hours. Because these hours did not directly pertain to the benefit obtained in the Horn litigation, we believe that as to those hours the application of a multiplier is unwarranted. Therefore, in calculating the fee as to these hours, we conclude that, for this portion of their work, plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to a fee of $564,892this figure is arrived at by multiplying the number of hours devoted to this aspect of the case (3,765.95) by the $150 hourly rate. Thus, the total unadjusted fee to which plaintiffs' counsel are entitled equals $1,020,290.50, the sum of the two separately determined fee awards. When we subtract the $250,000 interim attorney fee awarded in this case, we determine that plaintiffs' counsel are fairly and reasonably entitled to a fee award of $770,292.50.
The final issue presented is whether §§ 11-93-2 and XX-XX-XXX, Ala. Code 1975, limit the City's obligation to pay an attorney fee exceeding $300,000. After carefully reviewing these statutes, we conclude that they do not.
We are unable to read either statute as pertaining to attorney-fee awards. The legislative history of § 11-93-2 soundly suggests that this statute and related enactments apply only to tort liability. The title to Act No. 673, Ala. Acts 1977, part of which is codified at § 11-93-2, Ala.Code 1975, reads:
See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nowlin, 542 So. 2d 1190, 1192-93 (Ala. 1988). Section 11-47-190 also applies only to torts, see Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385, 387 (Ala.1982), albeit torts founded upon negligence. Compare § 11-47-190 with § 11-93-2, Ala.Code 1975.
An award of attorney fees is merely an award of costs; thus, we conclude that § 11-93-2 and § 11-47-190 do not apply to attorney-fee awards.
1991455REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
1991558AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and LYONS, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., concurs specially.
*686 JOHNSTONE, J., concurs in part, concurs in the result in part, and dissents in part.
HOUSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
In Alabama, a party may recover attorney fees only when an award is authorized by statute, is provided for by contract, or is justified by a "special equity." Horn v. City of Birmingham, 718 So. 2d 691, 692 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), rev'd, Ex parte Horn, 718 So. 2d 694 (Ala.1998); see also Blankenship v. City of Hoover, 590 So. 2d 245 (Ala.1991). A court may award an attorney fee on the basis that it is justified by a special equity "where the plaintiff's efforts are successful in creating a fund out of which the fees may be paid, or when the efforts of the plaintiff's attorneys render a public service or result in a benefit to the general public in addition to serving the interest of the plaintiff." Ex parte Horn, 718 So. 2d 694, 702 (Ala.1998). These circumstances have been termed the "common-fund" and "common-benefit" exceptions. Id.
This Court discussed the common-fund and common-benefit exceptions in Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 585, 592 (Ala.1990), where a class of plaintiffs, each of whom had been convicted of a traffic offense based upon an improperly verified Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint ("UTTC"),[6] sued the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, and others, seeking to have all convictions based upon improperly verified UTTCs expunged from their records and to have all fines and costs paid as a result of the convictions refunded. 565 So. 2d  at 586. Although this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which denied the relief sought by the plaintiffs, this Court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney fees:
565 So. 2d  at 591-92 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Bell v. Birmingham News Co., 576 So. 2d 669 (Ala.Civ.App.1991), the Birmingham News Company sought to enjoin the Birmingham City Council from conducting closed sessions to elect the council's president and president pro tempore. The circuit court issued the injunction and awarded attorney fees, reasoning that the citizens of Birmingham "derive a common benefit `by an action which enforces *687 the requirements of the statute that the business of the City Council be conducted in open and public meetings and, specifically, that the election of Council officers be conducted openly and not in secret.'" 576 So. 2d  at 670. The Court of Civil Appeals, relying on our decision in Brown, supra, determined that the record contained ample evidence supporting the circuit court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' actions "resulted in a benefit to the general public." Id. Therefore, it held, the circuit court's award of fees pursuant to the common-benefit exception was proper.
In this case, the plaintiffs' efforts to prevent the construction of a waste facility in their neighborhood did not produce "a benefit to the general public" like that produced in Brown and Bell. The plaintiffs in Brown and Bell conferred benefits that were state-wide and city-wide, respectively; the plaintiffs' efforts here to have the waste station located in another area have not conferred a similar benefit. Instead, it appears that the plaintiffs' efforts benefited only those in the plaintiffs' immediate neighborhood, to the apparent detriment of those who would use the facility and those who are close to its ultimate location.
This is the third time these parties have come before this Court. In Ex parte Horn, 718 So. 2d 694 (Ala.1998), a majority of this Court determined that the common-benefit exception to the American rule applied in this case and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees paid by the City of Birmingham. I dissented, because I read Brown and Bell to require a benefit to society broader than that provided to a particular neighborhood or group.
The parties came before this Court again in Ex parte City of Birmingham, 757 So. 2d 389 (Ala.1999). Following this Court's decision in Ex parte Horn, the trial court had ordered the City to pay an interim attorney-fee award of $250,000, and the City sought mandamus relief in the form of a writ from this Court directing the trial court to vacate its order awarding an interim attorney fee. The City asked this Court to revisit its decision in Ex parte Horn holding the common-benefit exception applicable. This Court denied the City's petition for mandamus relief, and, in doing so, declined to reconsider its holding that the common-benefit exception applied, noting that its prior decision in Ex parte Horn established the law of the case. "Under the `law of the case' doctrine, the `findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal.'" Heathcoat v. Potts, 905 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Westbrook v. Zant, 743 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir.1984)). Thus, the Court's conclusion that the common-benefit exception applies in this case was binding in the mandamus proceeding.
I dissented in Ex parte Horn because I did not believe our prior decisions supported the conclusion that the common-benefit exception applies in this case. While I adhere to that view, the majority's decision in Ex parte Horn established the law of the case. For that reason alone, I concurred in City of Birmingham, and for that reason alone I concur today.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part).
I concur in Part I (the facts and the procedural history), in Part II (the rationale and holding approving the lodestar method for calculating the attorney's fees in this case), and the introductory explanation preceding Part I. I concur in the result of the introductory portion of Part III about the method of calculating an *688 attorney's fee under the lodestar method. While the explanation of the method itself is clear and helpful, I question the threat to the ore tenus rule posed by the statement in the main opinion that, "[n]evertheless, the trial court's order regarding an attorney fee must allow for meaningful review by articulating the decisions made, the reasons supporting those decisions, and the performance of the attorney-fee calculation." 810 So. 2d  at 682. I respectfully dissent from Part III.A. insofar as it infringes the ore tenus rule and tweaks the computation of the compensable hours.
The main opinion says, "Because of the trial court's silence with respect to these contentions, we are left to examine the record in order to fulfill our duty of meaningful review." 810 So. 2d  at 683. This statement, too, seems to be an incursion on the ore tenus rule. Our general rule of appellate review is that a trial court is deemed to have found all of the facts necessary to its decision, unless such fact findings would be clearly erroneous. Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1996) ("It is also well established that in the absence of specific findings of fact, appellate courts will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous"); Lemon v. Golf Terrace Owners Ass'n, 611 So. 2d 263, 265 (Ala.1992) ("[W]here a trial court does not make specific findings of fact concerning an issue, this Court will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous").
I respectfully dissent from Part III.B. insofar as it tweaks the finding of the trial court on the reasonable hourly rate. The trial judge is entitled to apply common knowledge in the legal community where he presides.
I respectfully dissent from Part III.C. insofar as it reduces the multiplier from 2 to 1.5. The main opinion bases the reduction on a negative analysis of one of the 13 factors. We do not know that the trial judge has not already considered this same negative analysis as to this particular factor but has found the multiplier of 2 appropriate on the basis of one or more of the other 12 factors. The plaintiffs sought a multiplier of 4.5. Mashburn v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679 (M.D.Ala.1988), applied a multiplier greater than 3.
The trial judge's order explains his decision to apply the multiplier of 2:
Our tweaking this multiplier is another violation of the ore tenus rule.
I concur in Part IV of the main opinion. I agree with the rationale and holding "that § 11-93-2 and § 11-47-190[, Ala. Code 1975,] do not apply to attorney-fee awards." 810 So. 2d  at 685.
In summary, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in case number 1991455, City of Birmingham v. William Fred Horn. I do concur in the main opinion insofar as it affirms the judgment of the trial court in case number 1991558, William Fred Horn et al. v. City of Birmingham et al.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur to reverse and render a judgment in case number 1991455; however, I dissent as to the amount of the attorney fees awarded.
I concur to affirm in case number 1991558.
Reviewing the briefs and the record, and purposefully not being specific, I am convinced that a lack of billing judgment permeates the attorneys' fee petition. I cannot sanction an award of $150 per hour for most of the hours billed, and I cannot sanction applying a multiplier of 1.5 to an already excessive lodestar award. I am the only Justice remaining on the Court who voted with the majority in Ex parte Horn, 718 So. 2d 694 (Ala.1998), to require the City to pay a legal fee to Horn's attorneys. In my opinion, it is an abuse of discretion to award a fee in excess of $581,695 (which includes the $250,000 previously paid) to Horn's attorneys.
[1]  In Ex parte City of Birmingham, supra, where the City petitioned for a writ of mandamus, we characterized the City's argument in the following manner:

"The City requests further that we overturn our decision in Ex parte Horn, supra, in which we held that the residents are entitled to an attorney fee under the `common-fund' exception."
Ex parte City of Birmingham, 757 So. 2d  at 392 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs contend in addition to their arguments stated abovethat this restatement of our holding in Horn III was, itself, a holding. That restatement, however, merely described a holding in Horn III, which was another case, and did not directly pertain to our resolution of the issues presented in City of Birmingham. Therefore, we are not bound by that statement in the present case, under the law-of-the-case doctrine. See Gray v. Reynolds, 553 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala.1989) (stating that the Court was not bound by dicta appearing in an opinion in a prior appeal).
[2]  Williams testified that he and Sullivan worked together on briefs by performing different tasks. He explained that, at times, he researched a particular area of the law while Sullivan wrote, using research already done. He also testified that they often discussed arguments and strategy as to the preparation of court documents and matters raised by the City.
[3]  The City's argument includes an assertion that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover attorney fees for hours expended for fee litigation. It is hornbook law, however, that such time is compensable. See Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards § 4.21 (2d ed.1993), and the footnotes contained therein.
[4]  At the evidentiary hearing, Williams testified that he and Sullivan often collaborated on their filing of, or responses to, briefs and court memoranda. They also testified as to the complexity of the case. The City countered with expert testimony by John Falkenberry, an attorney, who concluded that the hours expended by Williams and Sullivan were excessive.
[5]  We arrive at this amount by multiplying 2024 (the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation essential to the result obtained) by the hourly compensation rate of $150 and then multiplying that amount by a 1.5 multiplier.
[6]  This Court wrote in Brown:

"The defect in the procedure that we are dealing with in this case is not the stamping of the clerk's name by one authorized to do so. The defect is in putting a citizen to trial on a criminal charge, albeit a misdemeanor, when no one has sworn on oath ... that the citizen has committed an offense."
565 So. 2d  at 589.