Title: KELLER v SMITH

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13382 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 ROBERT S . KETdLER, P l a i n t i f f and P e t i t i o n e r , E T H Y L SMITH, i n h e r capacity a s Clerk and Recorder of Flathead County, Montana, Defendant and Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : Robert S. Keller argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana William Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Patrick Springer, County Attorney, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Stewart Pearce, Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Ka l i s p e l l , Montana For Amicus Curiae : Daniel J. Shea argued, Missoula, Montana Filed : s n 4 r T f Submitted: August 10, 1976 Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding seeking a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment from t h i s Court on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. These s t a t u t e s provide f o r a general e l e c t i o n b a l l o t on r e t e n t i o n o r r e j e c t i o n of a l l unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t c o u r t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s seeking e l e c t i o n . P e t i t i o n e r is Robert S. K e l l e r , a v o t e r , r e s i d e n t and taxpayer of Flathead County, Montana. Defendants who have entered appearances here a r e t h e Governor, Secretary of S t a t e and Clerk and Recorder of Flathead County i n t h e i r o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t i e s . Ex p a r t e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e p e t i t i o n was made and t h i s Court s e t t h e matter f o r adversary hearing. W e granted l e a v e t o Daniel J. Shea, a r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r and taxpayer of Missoula County, Montana t o appear a s amicus c u r i a e ; ordered t h e Governor and Secretary of S t a t e joined a s a d d i t i o n a l defendants; and order- ed n o t i c e t o be given t o t h e Attorney General and t h e 56 county a t t o r n e y s i n Montana. B r i e f s were f i l e d and o r a l arguments heard. Thereafter t h i s Court accepted o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s proceeding; ordered t h e p e t i t i o n amended; ordered a l l un- opposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judges joined; ordered s e r v i c e on a l l t h e above persons; and ordered responsive pleadings t o be f i l e d by a l l defendants. Supplemental b r i e f s w e r e f i l e d and a d d i t i o n a l o r a l argument presented on behalf of t h e p a r t i e s and amicus curiae. A t t h e conclusion of t h e f i n a l hearing on August 1 0 , 1976, t h e c a s e w a s taken under advisement. The i s s u e is whether s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2 a r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s applied t o unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t c o u r t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s running i n t h e general e l e c t i o n who w e r e not o r i g i n a l l y appointed by t h e Governor t o f i l l vacancies and confirmed by t h e s t a t e senate. The crux of p e t i t i o n e r ' s argument is t h a t A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 , 1972 Montana Constitution, providing f o r r e t e n t i o n o r r e j e c t i o n of unopposed incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s by t h e v o t e r s i s c l e a r and unambiguous; t h a t it a p p l i e s only t o unopposed incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s o r i g i n a l l y s e l e c t e d by t h e Governor t o f i l l vacancies and subsequently confirmed by t h e s t a t e senate; and t h a t s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2 a r e t h e r e f o r e unconsti- t u t i o n a l . a s applied t o unopposed incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s not o r i g i n a l l y s e l e c t e d by t h e Governor and confirmed by t h e state senate t o f i l l vacancies by reason of A r t i c l e I V , Section 5, 1972 Montana Constitution, providing t h a t t h e person r e c e i v i n g t h e l a r g e s t number of v o t e s s h a l l be declared e l e c t e d . Defendants, on t h e o t h e r hand, contend t h a t t h e language of A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 , 1972 Montana Constitution, is ambig- uous; t h a t t h e meaning of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision can be ascertained from t h e proceedings a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention; t h a t t h e s e proceedings c l e a r l y show t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l m a j o r i t y of t h e d e l e g a t e s intended t o g i v e t h e v o t e r s an opportunity t o measure a l l incumbent d i s t r i c t c o u r t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s a g a i n s t e i t h e r a challenger o r t h e i r own j u d i c i a l record; t h a t t h e presumption of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2 a p p l i e s ; and t h e r e f o r e t h e s e two s t a t u t e s a r e con- s t i t u t i o n a l a s applied t o a l l incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s whether o r i g i n a l l y e l e c t e d o r appointed. Amicus supports t h e defendants' p o s i t i o n and a d d i t i o n a l l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had no d i f f i c u l t y i n determining t h e meaning of A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , as indicated by enactment of s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2; and t h a t t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between unopposed incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s i n i t i a l l y e l e c t e d and those i n i t i a l l y appointed i n s o f a r a s subsequent e l e c t i o n s a r e concerned. The relevant c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions a r e : A r t i c l e V I I , Section 81 which provides: "Selection. (1) The Governor s h a l l nominate a replacement from nominees selected i n t h e manner provided by law f o r any vacancy i n t h e o f f i c e of supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge. I f t h e governor f a i l s t o nominate within t h i r t y days a f t e r r e c e i p t of nominees, t h e chief j u s t i c e o r a c t i n g chief j u s t i c e s h a l l make t h e nomination. Each nomination s h a l l be confirmed by t h e senate, but a nomination made while t h e senate is not i n session s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e a s an appointment u n t i l t h e end of t h e next session. I f t h e nomi- nation i s not confirmed, t h e o f f i c e s h a l l be vacant and another s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l be made. " ( 2 ) I f , a t t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n a f t e r senate con- firmation, and a t t h e e l e c t i o n before each suc- ceeding term of o f f i c e , any candidate other than t h e incumbent j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t judge f i l e s f o r e l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l be placed on t h e b a l l o t . I f t h e r e is no e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t f o r t h e o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l nevertheless be placed on t h e general e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o allow v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t t o approve o r r e j e c t him. I f an incumbent is r e j e c t e d , another s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l be made. " ( 3 ) I f an incumbent does not run, t h e r e s h a l l be an e l e c t i o n f o r t h e o f f i c e . " A r t i c l e I V , Section 5, provides: "Result of e l e c t i o n s . In a l l e l e c t i o n s held by t h e people, t h e person o r persons receiving t h e l a r g e s t number of votes s h a l l be declared elected." The s t a t u t e s attacked i n t h i s c a s e were enacted by t h e 1973 Legislature and provide as follows: "23-4510.1. Form of b a l l o t on r e t e n t i o n of incumbent supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e . In t h e event t h e r e i s no candidate f o r t h e o f f i c e of supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e o r chief j u s t i c e o t h e r than t h e incumbent, t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l be placed on t h e o f f i c i a l b a l l o t f o r t h e general e l e c t i o n as follows: "Shall ( c h i e f ) j u s t i c e (here t h e name of t h e incum- bent j u s t i c e i s i n s e r t e d ) of t h e supreme c o u r t of t h e s t a t e of Montana be retained i n o f f i c e f o r another term? " / YES I' (Mark an "x" before t h e word "YES" i f you wish t h e j u s t i c e t o remain i n o f f i c e . Mark a n "xu before t h e word "NO" i f you do n o t wish t h e j u s t i c e t o remain i n o f f i c e . ) " "23-4510.2. Form of b a l l o t on r e t e n t i o n of incum- bent d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge. I n t h e event t h e r e i s no candidate f o r t h e o f f i c e of d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge i n a j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t of t h e state o t h e r than t h e incumbent, t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l be placed on t h e o f f i c i a l b a l l o t f o r t h e general e l e c t i o n a s follows: "Shall judge (here t h e name of t h e incumbent judge of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s i n s e r t e d ) of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t of t h e state of Montana be r e t a i n e d i n o f f i c e f o r another t e r m i n o f f i c e ? " / Y E S "= NO "(Mark an "x" before t h e word "YES" i f you wish t h e judge t o remain i n o f f i c e . Mark an "xu be- f o r e t h e word "NO" i f you do not wish t h e judge t o remain i n o f f i c e . ) " The crux of t h e i s s u e before u s i s t h e meaning of t h e second sentence of subdivision (2) of A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 , 1972 Montana Constitution. S p e c i f i c a l l y , does it mean t h a t a l l - incumbent d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s who a r e unopposed must run on an approval o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t i n t h e general e l e c t i o n ? O r does it mean t h a t those incumbents i n i - t i a l l y appointed by t h e Governor and subsequently confirmed by t h e s t a t e senate must run on t h i s b a s i s ? The same r u l e s of construction apply i n determining t h e meaning of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions as apply t o s t a t u t o r y con- s t r u c t i o n . S t a t e ex r e l . Cashmore v. Anderson, 160 Mont. 175, 500 P.2d 921, cert.den. 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L Ed 2d 593; Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. S t a t e Board of Equal., 109 Mont. 52, 96 P.2d 4 2 0 ; S t a t e ex rel. Dufresne v. L e s l i e , 100 Mont. 449, 50 P.2d 959; S t a t e ex r e l . Gleason v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 397, 188 P. 904. I n determining t h e meaning of a given provision, t h e i n t e n t of t h e framers is c o n t r o l l i n g . Section 93-401-16, R.C.M. 1947; S t a t e ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson, supra. Such i n t e n t s h a l l f i r s t be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, i f possible, and i f t h e i n t e n t can be s o determined, t h e c o u r t s may not go f u r t h e r and apply any o t h e r means of i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n . Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660, and cases c i t e d therein. Can t h e i n t e n t of t h e provision be determined by t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used? The second sentence of sub- d i v i s i o n (2) reads: " * * * I f t h e r e i s no e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t f o r t h e o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l nevertheless be placed on t h e general e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o allow v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t t o approve o r r e j e c t him. * * *" The key word i s "incumbent". Is it used i n t h e same sense t h a t it is used i n t h e preceding sentence of t h e subdivision t o r e f e r t o a judge o r j u s t i c e appointed by t h e Governor t o f i l l a vacancy and subsequently confirmed by t h e s t a t e senate -- " I f , a t t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n a f t e r senate confirmation, and a t t h e - e l e c t i o n before each succeeding t e r m of o f f i c e , any candidate o t h e r than t h e incumbent j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t judge f i l e s f o r e l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l be placed on t h e b a l l o t * * *" and i n t h e following sentence of t h e sub- d i v i s i o n -- " * * * I f an incumbent i s r e j e c t e d , another s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l be made." O r , on t h e o t h e r hand, i s it used t o r e f e r t o any incumbent i r r e s p e c t i v e of i n i t i a l e l e c t i o n o r - appointment? (Emphasis added.) I n common usage, t h e word "incumbent" means "a person who i s i n present possession of an o f f i c e * * *." Black's Law Dictionary 4th Ed. Rev. It i s not limited, q u a l i f i e d o r r e s t r i c t e d by t h e method by which one a t t a i n e d t h e o f f i c e . Thus, i f t h e second sentence of t h e subdivision is i s o l a t e d from t h e f i r s t and t h i r d sentences of t h e subdivision, t h e language could mean t h a t a l l incumbent d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s who a r e unopposed must run on an approval o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t i n t h e general e l e c t i o n . O n t h e other hand, i f we construe t h e language i n t h e context of t h e e n t i r e subdivision a contrary r e s u l t can be reached. The word "incumbent" i n t h e f i r s t o r preceding sentence of t h e subdivision c l e a r l y r e f e r s t o an incumbent appointed by t h e Governor t o f i l l a vacancy a s provided i n subdivision (1) because such incumbent i s t h e only incumbent subject t o con- firmation by t h e s t a t e senate. Likewise t h e t h i r d and f i n a l sentence of subdivision (2) can only r e f e r t o an incumbent ap- pointed by t h e Governor t o f i l l a vacancy a s provided i n sub- d i v i s i o n (1) because such incumbent i s t h e only r e j e c t e d incum- bent f o r which another s e l e c t i o n and nomination i s possible. Thus t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e second sentence of subdivision (2) has t h e same meaning a s t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e o t h e r two sentences of t h e subdivision, and t h e language means t h a t un- opposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s o r i g i n a l l y appointed by t h e Governor t o f i l l a vacancy a s provided i n subsection (1) must run i n t h e general e l e c t i o n on an approval o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t . Accordingly, w e hold t h a t t h e language of t h e second sentence of subdivision ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8, 1972 Montana Constitution, i s ambiguous. A s t h e language i t s e l f is not clear, we must r e s o r t t o e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of construction. Perhaps t h e b e s t indication of t h e i n t e n t of t h e framers i s found i n t h e explanatory notes a s prepared by t h e Constitutional Convention. These provide i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , following A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 , 1972 Montana Constitution: "Convention Notes "Revises 1889 c o n s t i t u t i o n * * * Contested e l e c t i o n of judges is not changed, however if a judge in office does not have an opponent in an election his name will be put on the ballot anyway and the people asked to approve or reject him * * *." This expresses the intent of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and the meaning they attached to the new constitution they framed and adopted. It plainly shows that the approval or rejection ballot was intended to apply to any unopposed judge in office. Legislative determination of constitutional intent leads us to the same construction. While such determination is not binding on this Court, it is entitled to consideration. Here the legislature had no difficulty in determining that the intent Montana of the framers of the 1972/C3onstitution was that all unopposed incumbent judges and justices were subject to approval or re- jection by the voters. The legislature subsequently enacted imple- menting legislation to that effect, sections 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. It is presumed that the legislature acted with integrity and with an honest purpose to keep within constitutional limits. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A, Sec. 45.11, p . 33, and cases cited therein. The principle of reasonableness in construction of an ambiguous constitutional provision also aids us in determining the intent of the framers here. This principle applies equally to construing constitutional provisions or statutes and has been defined and explained in these words: "It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for re- jecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result. It is said to be a 'well established principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational and sensible construction.'" Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A, Sec. 45.12, p. 37, and cases cited therein. Montana has adopted this principle by statute, section 49-134, R.C.M. 1947. While w e do not consider p e t i t i o n e r ' s contended con- s t r u c t i o n w i l l lead t o "absurd r e s u l t s " within t h e meaning of S t a t e ex r e l . Ronish v. Sch. ~ i s t . No. 1, 136 Mont. 453, 348 P.2d 797, no r a t i o n a l b a s i s nor reason has been suggested t o u s and w e perceive none f o r r e q u i r i n g unopposed incumbent appointees t o run on an approval o r r e j e c t i o n b a s i s i n each succeeding e l e c t i o n , while exempting o t h e r unopposed incumbent judges o r j u s t i c e s from t h i s requirement. I n our view, such a construction leads t o an unreasonable r e s u l t , while t h e a l t e r n a - t i v e construction simply promotes t h e d e s i r e of t h e framers t o s u b j e c t a l l d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s t o approval o r r e j e c t i o n by t h e v o t e r s whenever they run unopposed. Public Policy favors a l i k e construction. A recognized a u t h o r i t y on s t a t u t o r y construction has used t h i s language: " S t a t u t e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s t o v o t e a r e of g r e a t public i n t e r e s t and, t h e r e f o r e , a r e i n t e r p r e t e d with a view t o securing f o r c i t i z e n s t h e i r r i g h t t o v o t e and t o i n s u r e t h e e l e c t i o n of those o f f i c e r s who a r e t h e people's choice." Sutherland, S t a t u t o r y Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 71.15, p. 366, and cases t h e r e i n c i t e d . This Court has h e r e t o f o r e applied t h i s public policy i n favor of t h e c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t t o v o t e i n construing a s t a t u t e provid- ing f o r absentee b a l l o t s . Maddox v. Board of S t a t e Canvassers, 116 Mont. 217, 149 P.2d 112. This same public policy a p p l i e s with equal f o r c e i n construing subsection ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 , 1972 Montana Constitution. For t h e foregoing reasons, w e hold that t h e i n t e n t of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l e g a t e s c o l l e c t i v e l y i n using t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e second sentence of subdivision ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8, was t h a t it apply t o a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s i r r e s p e c t i v e of how they o r i g i n a l l y a t t a i n e d t h e i r j u d i c i a l o f f i c e s . W e t h e r e f o r e construe t h e meaning of t h a t subdivision t o r e q u i r e a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s running f o r e l e c t i o n o r r e - e l e c t i o n t o be placed on t h e general e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o allow v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t , as t h e case may be, t o approve o r r e j e c t him. Accordingly, we hold s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2, providing f o r r e t e n t i o n o r r e j e c t i o n of such j u s t i c e s o r judges c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . W e remark i n passing t h a t w e have not r e l i e d on t h e minutes of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention proceedings as indica- t i v e of t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e l e g a t e s . W e have purposely r e f r a i n e d from using t h i s b a s i s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a s excerpts from various p o r t i o n s of t h e s e minutes, among o t h e r t h i n g s , can be used t o support e i t h e r p o s i t i o n , o r even a t h i r d p o s i t i o n , i.e. t h a t t h e delegates simply d i d not address t h e s p e c i f i c problem involved i n t h i s case. I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h e c o l l e c t i v e i n t e n t of t h e d e l e g a t e s can b e s t be determined by a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e pre- ceding r u l e s of construction t o t h e ambiguous language used i n subsection ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8, 1972 Montana Constitution, and approved by t h e delegates. W e have considered t h e o t h e r arguments of r e l a t o r and t h e o t h e r r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n c i t e d . W e have determined t h a t none would change our d e c i s i o n herein. To set each f o r t h i n d e t a i l herein would s e r v e no u s e f u l purpose. The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s and reasons f o r our d e c i s i o n a r e set f o r t h above. This opinion c o n s t i t u t e s a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t h a t s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947, are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and apply t o every unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judge o r supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e running f o r e l e c t i o n o r re-election. J u s t i c e We concur: Edward T . Dussault, District , sitting in place of Mr. Justice James T. Harrison. Mr. Justice Wesley Castles: I concur with the majority except that I do not view the Legislative determination of constitutional intent as being persuasive. Other than to indulge in the presumption of con- stitutionality of legislation, I do not give great weight to that principle. Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissents and will file a written dissent at a later date.