Title: Attorney Grievance v. Elliott

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE: Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Walter Carroll Elliott,
Jr., Misc. Docket No. AG 36, September Term, 2009
                                                                                                                                           
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE – DISCIPLINARY ACTION – MRPC 1.2, 1.4, 1.15, 8.4(a),
(b), (c), (d); § 10-306 OF MARYLAND’S BUSINESS OCCUPATIONS &
PROFESSIONS ARTICLE:
ALTHOUGH  (1) THE ABSENCE OF A PRIOR DISCIPLINARY RECORD, (2) GOOD
FAITH EFFORTS TO MAKE RESTITUTION, AND (3) INEXPERIENCE IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW ARE “MITIGATING FACTORS,” THOSE FACTORS DO NOT
CONSTITUTE “COMPELLING EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES” THAT
WARRANT A SANCTION OTHER THAN DISBARMENT OF AN ATTORNEY FOUND
TO HAVE VIOLATED MRPC 1.2, 1.4, 1.15, 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), AND § 10-306 OF
MARYLAND’S BUSINESS OCCUPATIONS & PROFESSIONS ARTICLE.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Mic. Docket AG No. 36
September Term, 2009
                                                                            
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
    
v.
WALTER CARROLL ELLIOTT, JR.
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                              
                 Filed: January 24, 2011
1 The Hearing Judge concluded that each of the violations had been proven by
“clear and convincing evidence.”  
On September 15, 2009, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland,
Petitioner, filed a “PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY OR REMEDIAL ACTION” against
Walter Carroll Elliott, Jr., Respondent.  On that same day, this Court ordered that the
charges against Respondent “be heard and determined by Judge Vicki Ballou-Watts of the
Third  Judicial Circuit [(the Hearing Judge)], in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-
757[.]” The Hearing Judge filed “FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW” in which she  concluded that Respondent violated Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.15, 8.1,
8.4(a)(b)(c) and (d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), and Section
10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code (BO).1 
Respondent has noted thirteen exceptions to those Findings and Conclusions.  For the
reasons that follow, this Court overrules every one of Respondent’s exceptions, and
concludes that Respondent’s disbarment is required to protect the public interest.  
Background
MRPC 1.2, in pertinent part, requires that a lawyer “abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, [] consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”  MRPC 1.4(a)(1) requires that a
lawyer inform his or her client of any “circumstance” that requires the client’s “informed
consent.”  MRPC 1.15, in pertinent part, requires that a lawyer comply with the
safekeeping and record keeping requirements of Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland
Rules when the lawyer is holding funds that have been entrusted to the lawyer by a client. 
2
MRPC 8.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact
“in connection with a disciplinary matter[.]”  BO § 10-306 prohibits a lawyer from using
funds entrusted to him or her “for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust
money is entrusted to the lawyer.”  
MRPC 8.4, in pertinent part, provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another
to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice[.]
The Hearing Judge’s Findings and Conclusions included the following numbered
paragraphs:
2.
On March 12, 2008, Respondent signed an Employment
Contract with the law firm of Macey & Aleman, also
known as “Legal Helpers, P.C.,” which identified itself
as “America’s Largest Consumer Bankruptcy Firm.”
Under the terms of the contract, Respondent was hired to
serve as the managing attorney for the firm’s Maryland
consumer bankruptcy practice.  At the time Respondent
was hired, the firm had two offices with three additional
employees – an attorney, a law clerk and a receptionist.
One office was located in Greenbelt, Maryland. The
second office was located in Baltimore, Maryland. 
3
* * *
4.
Respondent’s duties included interviewing prospective
bankruptcy clients, providing legal advice regarding
consumer bankruptcy matters, preparing and filing
bankruptcy petitions, and attending hearings associated
with clients’ bankruptcy cases.  As the managing
attorney for the firm’s Maryland offices, Respondent was
also responsible for accounting for all client payments
and trustee checks received.  He was expected to forward
all payments to the firm’s office in Chicago, Illinois on
a weekly basis.
* * *
8.
At all relevant times herein, Kevin Van Hout, Esquire
was the firm’s regional managing attorney.  Shobhanna
Katsuri, Esquire was one of the firm’s four partners.  Ms.
Katsuri’s office was located in Chicago, Illinois.
Respondent reported to both attorneys.  
* * *
11.
Evangeline Arcilla attended the June 17, 2008
appointment between Gary Magsalin and Respondent.
Mr. Magsalin is Ms. Arcilla’s brother.  Ms. Arcilla did
not have a scheduled appointment.
* * *
14. 
At the time of the June 17, 2008 meeting with Mr.
Magsalin, Respondent also discussed with Ms. Arcilla
her financial concerns and advised her of her legal rights.
Mr. Magsalin encouraged Ms. Arcilla to file a Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Petition.
15.
On June 17, 2008, Evangeline Arcilla executed a “Macey
& Aleman – Chapter 7 Contract.”  Respondent signed the
contract on behalf of the firm.
16.
Under the terms of the contract, Ms. Arcilla agreed to
4
pay Macey & Aleman a “flat fee, earned upon receipt,
court costs, and optional due diligence product costs . . .
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.”  The
contract also states that before filing, Ms. Arcilla “will
provide $299.00 for the filing fee and $274.00 for the
due diligence products.”  In the contract, these amounts
were denoted as costs separate from any attorney’s fees.
17.
At the time of the June 17, 2008 meeting, Ms. Arcilla
made a $20.00 cash payment to Respondent.  The
Respondent utilized the firm’s cash receipt book to issue
a written receipt to Ms. Arcilla for her $20.00 payment.
Ms. Arcilla also gave Respondent a copy of three (3)
credit card bills.
18.
The Respondent signed the receipt, noting that the
$20.00 payment was for “Retainer Fees.”  Respondent
also noted that Ms. Arcilla’s balance was $1,454.00.
Below the balance due figure on the receipt was written:
“[tff (299”].  Ms. Arcilla’s Chapter 7 contract required
payment of $99.00 for filing fees before the bankruptcy
petition would be filed.
* * *
20.  
During the June 17, 2008 meeting, Respondent gave Ms.
Arcilla an envelope addressed to the new Macey &
Aleman office location at 809 Glen Eagle’s Court in
Towson, Maryland and instructed her to make a check
for the balance due.  Respondent also instructed Ms.
Arcilla to send a note with the check indicating that she
was referred to the firm by Mr. Magsalin so that he
(Magsalin) would receive a $50.00 credit on the balance
of his flat fee to the firm.
21.
Portia Tidwell, a Towson University student, was
employed by the law firm as a legal assistant/office
manager from July 2, 2008 through the end of October
2008.
22.
On July 2, Ms. Arcilla issued a check in the amount of
5
$1,454.00 made payable to Macey & Aleman.  She also
wrote a note stating that she was referred to Respondent
by Gary Magsalin. 
23.
Ms. Arcilla’s check and note arrived at the firm’s
Towson office between July 2, 2008 and July 15, 2008.
Ms. Tidwell opened the mail and checked the firm’s
database for an account under Ms. Arcilla’s name.
24.
When Ms. Tidwell was unable to locate Ms. Arcilla’s
name in the firm’s database , she presented the check to
Respondent.  Respondent told Ms. Tidwell that Ms.
Arcilla was his client and that he was going to represent
her after he left he law firm.
25.
Respondent applied white out to the check and changed
the payee from “Macey & Aleman” to “Walter Elliott,
Jr., Esq.”
26.
During all relevant times herein, Ms. Arcilla’s telephone
contact numbers were: (Home) [] and (Cell) [].
Telephone records reflect that there were no telephone
calls between Respondent and Ms. Arcilla during the
time period from July 2, 2008 to July 15, 2008.
27.
Respondent testified that upon receipt of the check, he
immediately placed a telephone call to Ms. Arcilla.  He
said that he used the office telephone.  According to
Respondent, he spoke with Ms. Arcilla, advised her of
the mistake and asked if she wanted him to change the
payee or return the check to her for reissue in his name.
Respondent testified that Ms. Arcilla authorized him to
substitute his name as payee.   Respondent has
acknowledged that he altered the check by using “white
out” to change payee names.
28.
Ms. Tidwell testified that she was present when
Respondent purportedly spoke with Ms. Arcilla.  She
could not hear what the present on the other end of the
call said.  However, she testified that when the telephone
call ended, she saw Respondent “scratch out” the firm
6
name and insert Respondent’s name on the check.
29.
The testimony of Respondent and Ms. Tidwell regarding
the aforementioned telephone call and Ms. Arcilla’s
authorization is not credible.  Ms. Arcilla testified that
she did not talk to respondent during the relevant time
period and did not give him permission to alter her
check.  A review of the law firm’s certified telephone
records (and Respondent’s cell phone records) for the
time period from July 2, 2008 through July 15, 2008,
show no calls to Ms. Arcilla and thus corroborate her
testimony.  In addition, Ms. Tidwell’s description of how
the check was altered contradicts the description
acknowledged by Respondent.  
          As a result, this court finds that Ms. Arcilla did not
authorize Respondent to substitute his name as payee on
the aforementioned check.
30.
In June, 2008, Respondent complained to Ms. Katsuri
and Mr. Van Hout about the high volume of cases and
the need for more attorneys, support staff and supplies.
They discussed increasing his salary and obtaining more
support.  However, the only additional employees hired
were Ms. Tidwell (July 2, 2008) and an associate
attorney who began working for the firm in the latter part
of July 2008.  Respondent’s salary was not increased.  In
June, Respondent explored the possibility of starting his
own firm or sharing office space with another attorney.
In early to mid July 2008, Respondent became “angry”
with the firm and decided that he wanted to terminate his
employment relationship with the firm.
31.
On July 15, 2008, Respondent deposited Ms. Arcilla’s
check into his personal bank account with USAA Federal
Savings Bank [].  The bank account did not identify the
accountholder as an Attorney at Law or Law Office, nor
was it designated as an Attorney Trust Account or
Attorney Escrow Account.
32.
Respondent deposited Ms. Arcilla’s check together with
7
two additional checks for a total deposit of $4,484.63.
The account balance immediately prior to the July 15,
2008 deposit was $398.26.
33.
On August 1, 2008, Respondent transferred $4,384.83
from the USAA Federal Savings Bank Account to
another personal bank account with Bank of America.
As a result of the transfer, respondent’s remaining
balance in the USAA Federal savings Bank account was
$500.00.
34.
On August 1, 2008, during a telephone conference call,
respondent advised Ms. Katsuri and Mr. Van Hout that
he intended to resign.  On August 3, 2008, respondent
gave the firm the required written sixty (60) day notice of
his resignation by email.  Respondent continued to work
full time as managing attorney for the firm’s Maryland
offices.
35.
During August 2008, Ms. Arcilla called Respondent
several times to discuss the status of her case.
Respondent told Ms. Arcilla that he had worked on her
case, but that she needed to forward documents to him
and take a credit counseling course before the Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition could be filed.
36.
On August 29, 2008, an Express Mail package from Ms.
Arcilla was addressed to Respondent and delivered to the
law firm’s Towson office.  The package contained
documents Respondent had requested in order to process
the bankruptcy petition.
37.
Ms. Arcilla called Respondent again on September 3,
2008, and the two exchanged calls on September 10,
2008 and September 17, 2008.  The last telephone
conversation between Respondent and Ms. Arcilla
occurred on September 17, 2008 for a duration of five (5)
minutes.
38.
On September 22,2008, Ms. Arcilla called the law firm’s
800 number to complain about the handling of her case.
8
She had also learned that Respondent was leaving the
firm.  She subsequently spoke to the firm’s regional
managing attorney, Kevin Van Hout, who asked her to
forward a copy of the cancelled check, executed contract
with the law firm and other papers related to her case.
39.
On or about September 23, 2008, after speaking with Ms.
Arcilla and receiving the documents she provided, Mr.
Van Hout confronted Respondent and terminated this
employment with the firm.  The termination was
effective the same day.
40.
On September 24, 2008, Respondent obtained a money
order in the amount of $1,454.00.  He delivered the
money order and Ms. Arcilla’s documents to Mr. Van
Hout.  The money order represents the total amount
Respondent collected from Ms. Arcilla in cash on June
17, 2008 and by check in July, 2008.
* * *
42.
During the Commission investigation of Mr. Van Hout’s
complaint, Respondent, through his attorney, advised Bar
Counsel that he (Respondent) was in the process of
leaving the firm when he met Mr. Magsalin and Ms.
Arcilla on June 17, 2008.  According to Respondent, he
explained to Ms. Arcilla that he would charge her the
same flat fee ($1,454.00) that the firm charged Mr.
Magsalin.  Respondent explained that he “agreed to
handle Ms. Arcilla’s matter on his own once he left
Macey & Aleman and established his own practice (or
affiliated with a new law firm).”  He also advised Bar
Counsel that after he received the $1,454.00 check in
July, he called Ms. Arcilla and received permission to
substitute his name on the check made payable to Macey
& Aleman.  In addition, Respondent told Bar Counsel
that “on July 3, 2008, prior to receiving the check, [he]
called Kevin Van Hout to inform him of his decision to
resign.” 
43.
During the hearing before this court, Respondent
9
testified, in pertinent part, that on June 27, 2008, Ms.
Arcilla retained him (not Macey & Aleman) and that he
charged her a flat “fee” of $1,454.00 for a Chapter 7
filing.  According to Respondent, the fee agreement was
better than the amount charged by the law firm before his
“fee” included the court filing fees ($299.00).  He also
testified that although the law firm utilized “Best Case”
software to prepare bankruptcy cases, he also owned the
same software and used it to prepared Ms. Arcilla’s
petition.  Respondent testified that he performed work on
her Chapter 7 case and completed everything he could by
June 25, 2008.  According to Respondent, all that
remained before filing the petition in court was for Ms.
Arcilla to forward the requested documents to his office
and complete the required credit counseling course.  In
addition, as noted, he testified that after he received the
$1,454.00 check in July, he called Ms. Arcilla and she
authorized him to substitute this name as the payee on
the aforementioned check.
44.
Respondent never sent to Ms. Arcilla any written
confirmation that would support his claim that he (as
opposed to the law firm) was retained to handle her
Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.
45.
During the hearing Respondent testified that in June he
talked with the law firm’s managing partners and
complained about the lack of additional attorneys and
support staff as noted under Paragraph 30 herein.  In
early to mid July, he became “angry” with the firm’s lack
of progress in addressing his concerns and decided to
leave the firm.  However, he did not notify the firm of his
intention to resign until August 1, 2008, which is
contrary to the representations Respondent made to Bar
Counsel during the investigation of Mr. Van Hout’s
complaint.
(Emphasis in original. Footnotes omitted).  
The Hearing Judge found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.2 in two ways: (1) “he
10
failed to abide by Ms. Arcilla’s decision to retain the law firm of Macey & Aleman to
represent her in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings[,]” and (2) “he took action on Ms.
Arcilla’s behalf that she did not authorize when he substituted his name and payee on a
check made payable to Macy & Aleman.”  
The Hearing Judge found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.4(a)(1) in two ways:
(1) “he made a unilateral decision to make Ms. Arcilla his personal client although she
had entered into a written agreement to retain the law firm of Macey & Aleman[,]” and
(2) he decided “to change the check payee from ‘Macey & Aleman’ to ‘Walter Elliott, Jr.
Esq.’ without discussing the change and obtaining Ms. Arcilla’s consent[.]”
The Hearing Judge found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15 in five ways:  (1)
failing to enter Ms. Arcilla’s name into the firm’s database, (2) failing to record her
retainer payment, (3) failing to forward that payment to the firm’s Chicago office, (4)
substituting his name as payee on the check that Ms. Arcilla issued to the firm, and
depositing that check in his personal account, and (5) failing to “relinquish the funds
[deposited in his personal account] to the firm until after he was confronted by [Mr.] Van
Hout.” 
The Hearing Judge found that Respondent violated MRPC 8.1(a) in two ways: (1)
“he represented to Bar Counsel that Ms. Arcilla had retained him personally (as opposed
to Macey & Aleman) when he knew that Ms. Arcilla had executed a written contract with
the law firm and he had signed the same contract on behalf of the law firm[,]” and (2) “he
misrepresented to Bar Counsel that Ms. Arcilla had authorized him to change the payee
11
on the check issued to the law firm.”  
The Hearing Judge found that Respondent violated BO § 10-306 when he
“intentionally breached [his fiduciary] duties and obligations [to Ms. Arcilla and to his
employer] by misappropriating funds and placing them in personal accounts for his own
use and benefit when he knew the funds belonged to the law firm.”  
The Hearing Judge found that Respondent violated Sections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of
MRPC 8.4 when he (1) “intentionally took funds belonging to the firm and placed those
funds in his personal bank account[,]” (2) “comingled the funds with his own personal
funds and later transferred a portion of the funds to another personal bank account. . . 
without the knowledge or consent of the client or the law firm to whom the funds
belonged[,]” (3) “failed to advise the law firm of either payment [made by Ms. Arcilla,]”
and (4) “did not relinquish the funds to the firm until after he as confronted by [Mr.] Van
Hout.”  
The Hearing Judge also found that, although “Respondent has failed to offer any
evidence of compelling extenuating circumstances[,]” Respondent established three
“matters of mitigation” by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.
The complaint [in the case at bar] was the only
disciplinary matter filed against Respondent since his
admission to the Maryland Bar on December 17, 2002.
2.
The Respondent paid the law firm the entire amount he
received from Mr. Arcilla ($1,474.00) the day after he
was confronted by the firm’s regional managing
attorney[.]
12
3.
The Respondent’s position with the firm was his first
full-time employment as a practicing attorney.
As stated above, the Respondent has noted thirteen exceptions to the Hearing
Judge’s findings and conclusions.  
Standard of Review
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 952 A.2d 226 (2008),
this Court stated:
“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over
attorney discipline proceedings” in Maryland.  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 93, 706 A.2d 1080,
1083 (1998).  Even though conducting an independent review of
the record, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless
they are found to be clearly erroneous.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 375 Md. 110, 126, 825 A.2d 418, 427,
(2003).  This Court gives deference to the hearing judge’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses.  Id.  Factual findings
by the hearing judge [that the Commission has satisfied its
burden of persuasion] will not be interfered with if they are
founded on clear and convincing evidence.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100
(2002).  All proposed conclusions of law made by the hearing
judge, however, are subject to de novo review by this Court.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. O’Toole, 379 Md. 595, 604, 843
A.2d 50, 55 (2004).
Id. at 368, 952 A.2d at 235-36.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Walter, 407 Md. 670, 967 A.2d 783 (2009),
this Court stated:
[I]n its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the hearing
judge was entitled to accept -- or reject -- all, part, or none of
the testimony of any witness, including testimony that was not
contradicted by any other witness.  In making the finding of fact
13
“that Respondent did not intend to cheat or deceive either his
client or his firm,” the hearing judge was entitled to draw
reasonable inferences from the facts that the judge found to be
true.  “There are few facts, including even ultimate facts, that
cannot be established by inference.”  Moore v. State, 73 Md.
App. 36, 45, 533 A.2d 1, 5 (1987).
There is nothing mysterious about the use of
inferences in the fact-finding process.   Jurors
routinely apply their common sense, powers of
logic, and accumulated experiences in life to
arrive at conclusions from demonstrated sets of
facts.
Robinson v. State, 315 Md. 309, 318, 554 A.2d 395, 399 (1989).
Hearing judges do the very same thing.  
The hearing judge’s finding . . . was not erroneous  --
clearly or otherwise -- merely because she did not find it
appropriate to draw one or more “permissible inferences which
might have been drawn from the evidence by another trier of the
facts.”  Hous. Opportunities Comm’n of Montgomery County v.
Lacey, 322 Md. 56, 61, 585 A.2d 219, 222 (1991).
Id. at 678-79, 967 A.2d at 788.  
Discussion
I.
In his first exception, Respondent argues that the finding in paragraph 28 is
“misleading and incomplete.”  There would be merit in this argument only if the Hearing
Judge were required to credit the testimony of Respondent and Ms. Tidwell.
In his second exception, Respondent argues that the finding in paragraph 29 is
“factually incorrect.”  Having applied the required standard of review to this exception,
we reject this argument.  
14
In his third exception, Respondent argues that the finding in paragraph 30
incorrectly implies that he was “angry” because his salary was not increased, when he
was in fact angry that his employer ignored his “fair criticisms.”  The Hearing Judge was
entitled to (1) accept Respondent’s testimony that he was angry, (2) reject Respondent’s
explanation for why he was angry, and (3) draw the permissible inference that Respondent
was angry about his salary.  
In his fourth exception, Respondent argues that the findings in paragraph 48 were
erroneous because Respondent had made statements prior to August 1, 2008 in which he
notified supervisors that “things were not working out,” and that he “would be out the
door” if the firm did not hire additional staff.  Neither of those statements, however, is a
declaration of intent to resign.  
In his fifth exception, Respondent argues as follows: 
Respondent excepts to the trial court’s finding that Ms.
Arcilla did not authorize Respondent to change her check’s
payee, and to the trial court’s implicit finding that Respondent
did not believe that he had authority to make himself the payee.
Having applied the required standard of review to this exception, we reject this argument.  
In his sixth exception, Respondent argues that “Rule 1.2 is simply inapplicable to
the facts at hand.”  In his seventh exception, Respondent argues that, “Rule 1.4 is
inapplicable to the facts of this case.”  There would be merit in these arguments only if
the Hearing Judge were required to credit the testimony of Respondent and reject the
testimony of Ms. Arcilla.
15
In his eighth exception, Respondent argues that he did not violate MPRC 1.15
because he was not required to place Ms. Arcilla’s fee payment “in an escrow account for
safekeeping.”  The record shows, however, that the Hearing Judge found that Respondent
violated this rule in five ways, including the violation that occurred when (in the words of
the Hearing Judge) “Respondent substituted his name as payee [on the check that Ms.
Arcilla issued to the firm] and deposited the funds in his personal account with USAA
Federal Savings Bank.”  
In his ninth exception, Respondent argues that his representation to Bar Counsel
that Ms. Arcilla had retained him “personally” did not constitute a violation of MPRC
8.1, and that the Hearing Judge was “clearly erroneous in finding that Respondent did not
believe that Ms. Arcilla had authorized him to alter the check[.]”  Having applied the
required standard of review to this exception, we reject this argument.  
In his tenth exception, Respondent argues that the Hearing Judge was “clearly
erroneous” in finding that Respondent had violated MPRC 8.4.  According to Respondent
(in the words of his exception), “it is clear that Respondent honestly believed that Ms.
Arcilla had agreed to be his personal client and had authorized him to be paid the fee, and
that he had a right to represent her on his own.”  There would be merit in this argument
only if the Hearing Judge were required to credit the testimony of Respondent and reject
the testimony of Ms. Arcilla. 
In his eleventh exception, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s evidence was
insufficient to establish that Respondent violated BO § 10-306 because Ms. Arcilla’s
16
payment was a “flat fee, earned upon receipt.”  The Hearing Judge, however, was not
clearly erroneous in finding that Respondent violated this statute when he “intentionally
breached [his fiduciary] duties and obligations [to Ms. Arcilla and to his employer] by
misappropriating funds and placing them in personal accounts for his own use and benefit
when he knew the funds belonged to the law firm.”  
Respondent’s twelfth and thirteenth exceptions are as follows:
Exception No. 12.  The Respondent excepts to the [Hearing
Judge’s] failure to find that Respondent honestly believed that
he had made it clear to Ms. Arcilla, prior to depositing her check
for legal fees, that he would be leaving the Firm and that he
personally, not Macey & Aleman, would be representing her,
and that to the extent that Ms. Arcilla disputed this, it was likely
the result of an innocent failure on her part to comprehend what
[Respondent] told her.
Exception No. 13: The Respondent excepts to the [Hearing
Judge’s] failure to find that Respondent did not change the name
of the payee of Ms. Arcilla’s check with any improper intent.
From our review of the record, however, we reject Respondent’s arguments that
(1) “[t]he evidence clearly supports the conclusion that, at worst, there was a
misunderstanding between Respondent and Ms. Arcilla, with Ms. Arcilla believing that
her check was supposed to be paid to the Firm and [Respondent] believing that she had
authorized him to accept the money because he personally would be handling her case
while he remained at the Firm and thereafter[,]” and (2) “the evidence clearly supports a
finding that [Respondent] did not act with any improper intent.”  
For the reasons stated above, we overrule each of Respondent’s exceptions, and
2 As this Court noted in Palmer, even if mitigating factors do not constitute
“compelling extenuating circumstances” that would warrant a sanction other than
disbarment, those factors may well become relevant “should Respondent seek to be
readmitted to the Bar.”           Md. at          , n. 16,           A.3d at          , n. 16. 
17
must determine the appropriate sanction for the violations that have been proven.
II.
This Court has repeatedly stated “that each attorney grievance case rests on its own
merits.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garcia, 410 Md. 507, 529, 979 A.2d 146, 159
(2009).  In determining the appropriate sanction, this Court has recognized as a
“mitigating factor” (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record, (2) good faith efforts to
make restitution, and (3) inexperience in the practice of law.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 63, 991 A.2d 51, 61 (2010), (quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 599, 911 A.2d 440, 448 (2006)).  Although
we are required to consider the three mitigating factors found by the Hearing Judge,2 it is
our duty to impose the appropriate sanction on an attorney who has violated MRPC 1.2,
1.4, 1.15, 8.1, 8.4(a)(b)(c) and (d), and BO 10-306.  
Misappropriation of funds by an attorney is an act infected with
deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment in
the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying
a lesser sanction....  The sanction of disbarment is so justified
because  attorneys are charged with remembering that the
entrustment to them of the money and property of others
involves a responsibility of the highest order.  They must
carefully administer and account for those funds.  Appropriating
any part of those funds to their own use and benefit without
clear authority to do so cannot be tolerated.
3 Although Palmer and Ezrine involved numerous acts of misconduct, the
mitigating factors in Ezrine included the respondent’s “stellar reputation as an attorney,
his general good character, the lack of prior disciplinary actions, the restitution made to
his law partners, and his cooperation with bar counsel.”  312 Md. at 609, 541 A.2d at 969. 
The mitigating factors in Palmer included the fact that the respondent (1) had no previous
disciplinary record, (2) was “well-regarded in both the legal and general communities,”
and (3) “cooperated fully with bar counsel in the investigation and prosecution of [that]
case.”         Md. at       ,         A.3d at       .  
18
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 166, 904 A.2d 557, 574-75 (2006)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Palmer,          Md.         ,           A.3d          , (2010) (Misc. Docket AG No. 49, September
Term 2009, filed November 30, 2010), this Court stated:
 It has long been settled that “misappropriation by an attorney of
funds of others entrusted to his care, be the amount small or
large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form of
misconduct.”  Thomas, 409 Md. at 175, 973 A.2d at 218
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599,
609, 441 A.2d 328, 333 (1982)).  Accordingly, when an attorney
of this State commits the grievous act of misappropriating funds,
“particularly when combined with dishonesty or
misrepresentation, [it] will result ‘inevitably’ in disbarment.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nwadike, 416 Md. 180[, 6 A3d
287] (2010).  
Id.  at          ,           A.3d at          .  
Under Palmer,3 and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ezrine, 312 Md. 603, 609, 541
A.2d 966, 969 (1988), the mitigating factors found by the Hearing Judge do not constitute
“compelling extenuating circumstances . . . that would warrant a sanction other than
disbarment.”  As this Court stated in Palmer, supra:
This Court has long held that “when a member of the bar is
19
shown to be willfully dishonest for personal gain by means of
fraud, cheating, or like conduct, absent the most compelling
extenuating circumstances, disbarment follow[s] as a matter of
course.”  Md. State Bar Assoc. v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 553, 318
A.2d 811, 817 (1974).  Having been presented with no sufficient
“compelling extenuating circumstances,” we hold that the
appropriate sanction is disbarment. 
Id. at           ,            A.3d at            .
For the above stated reasons, Respondent is hereby disbarred.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
WALTER
CARROLL ELLIOTT, JR.