Title: State v. Papazoni

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-437


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Darrell L. Papazoni                          October Term, 1992



 Linda Levitt, J.

 Scot L. Kline, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson,
    Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 E. M. Allen, Defender General, and William Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
    Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      DOOLEY, J.   In 1987, defendant Darrell Papazoni was convicted of
 driving under the influence, death resulting, and was sentenced to a term of
 3 to 15 years, all suspended except one year.  The one-year prison sentence
 was stayed pending appeal.  The conviction was upheld by this Court, State
 v. Papazoni, 3 Vt. L.W. 57 (Feb. 1, 1992), and defendant unsuccessfully
 pursued habeas corpus relief in the federal court.  While the federal appeal
 was pending, defendant completed his probation and was discharged.  He
 argued below that the discharge from probation relieved him of all further
 obligations for the crime, including the one-year prison sentence, and has
 appealed from the refusal of the district court to release him.  We affirm.
      Defendant's argument is based on 28 V.S.A. { 255, which provides:
           Upon the termination of the period of probation or the
         earlier discharge of the probationer in accordance with
         section 251 of this title, the probationer shall be
         relieved of any obligations imposed by the order of the
         court and shall have satisfied his sentence for the
         crime.

 Defendant's argument relies on the plain meaning of the words of the
 statute.  Since he fulfilled his probationary obligation, he argues that he
 "shall have satisfied his sentence for the crime" and cannot be required to
 fulfill his prison sentence.  The State argues, to the contrary, that the
 statute does not apply to split sentences like that given to defendant and
 does not mandate his release.
      We ordinarily rely on the plain meaning of the words to construe
 statutes because we presume that it shows the intent of the Legislature.
 See Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93,