Title: THE STATE OF WYOMING V. COLIN MCAULIFFE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF WYOMING V. COLIN MCAULIFFE2005 WY 165125 P.3d 276Decided: 12/29/2005.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,)

Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
COLIN 
MCAULIFFE,

Respondent.

                                                                                                

Petition 
for Writ of Review/Certiorari

 
 

Representing 
Petitioner:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rehurek.

 
 

Representing 
Respondent:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Thomas L. 
Lee, Special Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Mr. Lee.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT,  JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion, in which KITE, J., joins; and STEBNER, D.J., Retired, files a 
dissenting opinion

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This case comes 
before this Court on the State's "Petition for Writ of Review/Certiorari."  The State seeks review of the district 
court's order granting Colin McAuliffe's (McAuliffe) motion to suppress evidence 
of his commission of several drug related crimes which was seized when law 
enforcement personnel were booking him on his arrest that had occurred earlier 
that day at the scene of a traffic stop.  
The district court suppressed the evidence because it found that the 
arrest leading to the discovery of the drug evidence violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  Finding that the 
district court erred in its ruling, we reverse and remand for further 
proceedings.

 
 
ISSUE1

 
 
[¶2]      The question 
presented is:

 
 
Did the 
district court err in holding that Jones 
v. State, 2002 WY 35, 41 P.3d 1247 (Wyo. 2002), does not permit random 
searches of the person, vehicle or residence for drugs as a condition of 
probation for convicted drug defendants?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On May 1, 2003, 
McAuliffe entered a guilty plea to misdemeanor possession of a controlled 
substance in the Laramie County Circuit Court and was sentenced to a suspended 
jail term and one year of unsupervised probation.  The circuit court imposed the following 
conditions as part of McAuliffe's probation (emphasis in 
original):

 
 
The 
defendant is not to use or possess any alcohol or controlled substances or be 
around anyone who does.  The 
defendant is to submit to searches of his person, vehicle or residence at the 
request of law enforcement for controlled substances or any drug paraphernalia, 
or alcohol.

 
 
Effective 
6-16-03 [defendant] is allowed to move out of state.  If [defendant] is in Laramie Co. 
for any reason, he must do chemical testing.  If law enforcement makes contact with 
[defendant] in Laramie Co.[,] the [defendant] will be required to immediately 
provide a UA sample.  Failure to do 
so will result in [defendant's] immediate arrest.  

 
 
[¶4]      On December 30, 
2003, while on routine patrol, Detectives Moon and Murray of the Cheyenne Police 
Department saw McAuliffe's vehicle exit the Walgreen's parking lot on East Lincolnway.  
After observing McAuliffe make two turns without using turn signals, the 
detectives stopped McAuliffe for the traffic violations.  During the traffic stop, the detectives 
spoke with the clerk of the circuit court and confirmed that McAuliffe was still 
on probation and subject to the search conditions contained in the probation 
order.  The detectives asked 
McAuliffe about his probation status and requested that he submit to a search of 
his person and vehicle.  McAuliffe 
denied that he was still on probation and refused to consent to the search.  The detectives arrested McAuliffe for 
interference2 for refusing to consent to the 
search.  

 
 
[¶5]      McAuliffe was 
then transported to jail.  Before 
entering the facility, and after being warned about bringing contraband into the 
jail, McAuliffe produced a large amount of cash and a loaded methamphetamine 
pipe from his clothing.  Later, 
while in the booking area, McAuliffe attempted to pass a small bag of 
methamphetamine to a female who was leaving the facility.  She refused to take it and notified jail 
personnel of the incident.  A 
subsequent search of McAuliffe's person revealed the bag of 
methamphetamine.

 
 
[¶6]      McAuliffe was 
charged with attempted delivery of methamphetamine, a felony, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-301(a) (LexisNexis 2005), taking a controlled substance into a jail, a 
felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-208 (LexisNexis 2005), and 
misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) (LexisNexis 2005).  
McAuliffe filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence, claiming the 
probation condition authorizing random searches of his person and vehicle and 
his arrest for refusing to comply with that probation condition violated his 
federal and state constitutional rights.  
The State opposed the motion, alleging that a probation condition 
providing for random searches is constitutionally permissible pursuant to Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, 41 P.3d 1247 
(Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶7]      Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court granted McAuliffe's motion to 
suppress.  The district court ruled 
McAuliffe's probation condition allowing random, suspicionless searches for 
drugs violated the Fourth Amendment, and the detectives had no authority to 
arrest McAuliffe for interference based on his violation of that probation 
condition.  The State seeks review 
of the district court's ruling.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      This Court 
recently reiterated the standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to suppress:

 
 
In 
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 
(Wyo. 
1998).  We view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court 
has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess "the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions."  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search or seizure is, however, a question of law that we review de novo.  Id.; Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 
(Wyo. 
1995).

 
 

Lindsay 
v. State, 2005 
WY 34, ¶ 12, 108 P.3d 852, 855 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Martindale v. State, 2001 WY 52, ¶ 9, 24 P.3d 1138, 1140-41 (Wyo. 2001); Putnam v. 
State, 995 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 2000)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court ultimately found that McAuliffe's arrest was unlawful and suppressed the 
drug evidence discovered incident to that arrest.  The pivotal underlying issue is whether 
appropriate legal grounds existed to support McAuliffe's arrest.  Under the facts of this case, the 
legality of the arrest depends on whether the probation condition requiring 
McAuliffe to submit to random searches was permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 If the probation condition is 
constitutional, then McAuliffe, by refusing to consent to the search, arguably 
knowingly obstructed, impeded or interfered with the detectives in the lawful 
performance of their official duties  enforcing the probation provision 
contained in the circuit court's judgment and sentence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 
2005).4

 
 
[¶10]   The probation conditions to which 
McAuliffe was subject expressly provided he was "to submit to searches of his 
person, vehicle or residence at the request of law enforcement for controlled 
substances" and "[i]f law enforcement makes contact with [him] in Laramie 
County, [he] will be required to immediately provide a UA sample.  Failure to do so will result in [his] 
immediate arrest."  With these 
probation conditions, the circuit court gave law enforcement (the detectives) 
the legal authority to randomly search McAuliffe for drugs as part of their 
official duties.  The State and 
McAuliffe argue over whether the legal authority  the probation conditions  
violates the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  At the heart of this argument are this 
Court's decisions in Jones v. State, 
2002 WY 35, 41 P.3d 1247 (Wyo. 2002), Nixon v. State, 2001 WY 15, 18 P.3d 631 
(Wyo. 2001), and Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1990).

 
 
[¶11]   In Pena, one of the issues raised was 
whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence that parole agents had seized 
without a search warrant.  Pena, 792 P.2d  at 1354.  Pena was on parole for a previous drug 
conviction and had signed a parole agreement providing he was to abstain from 
drug use and to submit to warrantless searches of his residence.  Id. 
at 1357.  Acting on an anonymous tip 
that Pena possessed cocaine, four parole officers went to Pena's residence and 
told him they were going to search it.  
Pena said, "Okay.  Sure.  Come on in."  Id. 
at 1356.  During a search of the 
residence, one of the parole officers found a packet of cocaine in the floor 
vent.  Id.  After his arrest for several drug 
crimes, Pena moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing the search was conducted 
without a warrant and without his consent.  
Id.  Coupling Pena's invitation, "Okay.  Sure.  Come on in," with Pena's having signed 
the parole agreement, the trial court ruled Pena had consented to the 
search.  Id. at 
1357.  

 
 
[¶12]   On appeal of that ruling, this 
Court reviewed both the consent issue and the issue whether a warrantless search 
is subject to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement.  It is true that in our "reasonableness 
requirement" discussion we said we adopted the view of the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 
1260 (Utah 1983), that before a parole officer searches a parolee he or she must 
have a reasonable suspicion that the parolee has committed a parole violation or 
crime, and that the search must be reasonably related to the parole officer's 
duty.  Pena, 792 P.2d  at 1357-58.  However, we stated that we did not need 
to resolve the reasonableness of the parole officers' search of Pena's residence 
because we held that Pena's statement, "Okay. Sure. Come on in," evinced his 
voluntary consent to the search of his residence.  Id. 
at 1358.  Because the affirmance in 
Pena was on the sole ground of 
consent, the discussion of the "reasonableness requirement" was purely 
dictum.

 
 
[¶13]   In Nixon, this Court reviewed warrantless 
searches of a probationer's residence and of his person.  Nixon, a Colorado probationer under the supervision of 
the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole, was subject to a probation 
condition that he submit his person and residence to search and seizure at any 
time, with or without a search warrant, whenever reasonable cause is determined 
by a probation officer.  Nixon, ¶ 3, 18 P.3d  at 633.  In a routine visit to Nixon's residence, 
two probation officers saw in plain view items indicating possible drug or 
alcohol use in violation of Nixon's probation conditions.  Id. 
at ¶ 4, 18 P.3d  at 633.  After the 
probation officers left Nixon's residence, they obtained their supervisor's 
permission to search it, arranged for two sheriff's deputies to accompany them 
to Nixon's residence, and returned to that residence, where a search revealed 
items indicative of possible illegal drug activity.  Id.  After leaving Nixon's residence upon 
completion of their search, the probation officers decided to conduct a second 
search of the residence.  The 
probation officers and several agents of the Wyoming Division of Criminal 
Investigation (DCI) returned to Nixon's residence.  Outside the residence, the probation 
officers told Nixon they were going to search his residence again with the 
assistance of the DCI agents.  
Id. at ¶¶ 5-6, 
18 P.3d  at 633-34.  Nixon consented 
to a search of his residence and to a search of his person by the DCI agents. 
 Id. 
at ¶ 6, 18 P.3d  at 634.  The search 
of Nixon's person uncovered twenty-two grams of cocaine.  Id.

 
 
[¶14]   In response to the drug charge 
based on the cocaine seized from his person, Nixon moved to suppress that 
evidence.  Id. at ¶ 7, 18 P.3d  at 634.  Denying Nixon's 
motion, the trial court ruled that his consent to the search of his person was 
voluntary and that the probation officers had reasonable suspicion to search 
Nixon's person based on the previous discovery of items in his residence 
indicative of drug and alcohol use in violation of his probation 
conditions.  Id.  On appeal, Nixon raised not only the 
voluntary consent issue, but also the propriety of the second search of his 
residence, which had not been raised in the trial court.  Id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 18 P.3d  at 
634.

 
 
[¶15]   This Court easily affirmed the 
voluntary consent issue.  Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, 
18 P.3d  at 636-37.  As for the 
propriety of the second search of Nixon's residence, in light of the probation 
condition requirement of reasonable cause of a probation violation, this Court 
easily found that the probation officers' plain view discovery of items during 
the routine residence visit indicating a possible probation violation and the 
officers' observation of drug-related items during the first search of the 
residence provided reasonable cause for the probation officers to conduct the 
second search of the residence.  
Id. at ¶ 13, 18 P.3d  at 636.  Clearly, Nixon offers no guidance in the 
resolution of the issue presented in the instant case.

 
 
[¶16]   We now turn to Jones.  Having been convicted of driving while 
under the influence causing serious bodily injury (DWUI), Jones received a 
sentence that included, among other things, three years of supervised probation 
which specified numerous conditions, one of which was that he submit to a search 
of his person, vehicle or residence at any time, day or night, upon the request 
of his probation agent.  Jones, ¶ 6, 41 P.3d  at 1251. This Court 
granted a writ of review to answer several questions raised by his petition, 
including the constitutionality of a probation condition that allows searches at 
any time upon a probation officer's request.  Id. 
at ¶ 32, 41 P.3d  at 1257.  

 
 
[¶17]   In its analysis of this question, 
this Court recognized that the "[d]etermination of the reasonableness of such a 
provision requires a balancing of the interests of the state and the privacy 
interests of the probationer."  
Id. at ¶ 36, 41 P.3d  at 1258.  Moreover, this Court 
recognized that the sentencing judge must, when imposing reasonable probation 
conditions, take into consideration on a case-by-case basis the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the probationer's history and 
characteristics.  Id. at ¶ 37, 41 P.3d  at 1258.  This Court determined 
that a probation condition unlimited as to time and scope was unreasonable.  Id. 
at ¶ 38, 41 P.3d  at 1258.  However, 
this Court said that, because Jones had been convicted of DWUI causing serious 
bodily injury, a crime involving alcohol consumption, a probation condition 
would be reasonable that required the probationer to submit to random searches 
for the presence of alcohol.  
Id.  This Court stated its holding to 
include:

 
 
[I]n 
cases where the unlawful possession, consumption or abuse of alcohol or a 
controlled substance was an element or contributing factor in the underlying 
crime, .  .  .  
reasonable grounds exist to include as a probationary condition random 
searches of the defendant, his residence, and his vehicle for the presence of 
the offending substance.

 
 

Id. at ¶ 
39, 41 P.3d  at 1258.  

 
 
[¶18]   Obviously, that holding went 
"beyond the reach of Nixon and Pena," as this Court declared on the way 
to arriving at that holding.  
Id. at ¶ 35, 41 P.3d  at 1257.  Nixon and Pena, as noted earlier in this opinion, 
did not involve random searches and are clearly distinguishable from Jones, which did.  In Pena, this Court's narrow holding was 
that Pena's consent to a search was voluntary; in Nixon, this Court's narrow holdings were 
simply that Nixon voluntarily consented to a search of his person and that 
reasonable cause existed to conduct the second search of Nixon's 
residence.

 
 
[¶19]   This Court's order granting the 
writ of review in this case referred to United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 
120 n.6, 122 S. Ct. 587, 592 n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001).  In that case, the Supreme Court had 
before it a California probation condition requiring a 
probationer to submit his person, property, residence, vehicle and personal 
effects to search at any time, with or without a search warrant, warrant of 
arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement 
officer.  Id. at 114, 122 S. Ct.  at 589.  Knights, the 
probationer, conceded that the law enforcement officer's search of his 
apartment, which uncovered incriminating evidence, was supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  Id. at 122, 122 S. Ct.  at 593.  Knights' challenge to 
the search was simply whether the Fourth Amendment limits searches pursuant to 
that California probation condition to those 
searches with a "probationary" purpose, because the search of his apartment was 
for "investigatory" purposes.  
Id. at 116, 122 S. Ct.  at 590.  Employing its general 
Fourth Amendment analysis of examining the totality of the circumstances in 
order to determine "reasonableness," the Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
did not limit searches pursuant to that probation condition to those with a 
"probationary" purpose; therefore, law enforcement searches for "investigatory" 
purposes pursuant to that probation condition were reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 118-22, 
122 S. Ct.  at 591-93.

 
 
[¶20]   Two aspects of Knights are important for purposes of 
deciding the issue before us today.  
One is that the Supreme Court, while recognizing that the language of the 
probation condition before it permitted a search by a law enforcement officer 
without any individualized suspicion, expressly stated it did not need to 
address the question whether such a probation condition "so diminished or 
completely eliminated" a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy that a 
law enforcement officer's suspicionless search would have satisfied the Fourth 
Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement.  
Id. at 120 n.6, 
122 S. Ct.  at 592 n.6.  Knight's 
concession that the investigatory search was supported by reasonable suspicion 
eliminated that need.  That 
unaddressed question is before us today.  
The other aspect of Knights 
that is important for purposes of deciding the issue before us is the Court's 
employment of its general Fourth Amendment analysis of examining the totality of 
the circumstances "with the probation search condition being a salient 
circumstance."  Id. at 118, 122 S. Ct.  at 591.

 
 
[¶21]   Comparing the features of the 
general Fourth Amendment analysis employed in Knights with the features of the Fourth 
Amendment analysis this Court employed in Jones, one is struck by the similarity 
of those features: (1) courts determine "reasonableness" by examining the 
totality of the circumstances with the probation search being a salient 
circumstance and by balancing, on the one hand, the degree to which the search 
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other hand, the degree to 
which the search is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests; (2) courts recognize that probation is a form of criminal sanction 
and a probationer does not enjoy the liberty to which law-abiding citizens are 
entitled; and a sentencing court granting probation may impose reasonable 
conditions that deprive the probationer of some privacy expectations; (3) courts 
recognize that it is reasonable for a sentencing court to conclude that a 
probation search condition would further the two primary goals of probation  
the probationer's rehabilitation and society's protection from future criminal 
violations; and (4) the sentencing court must consider, on a case-by-case basis, 
the nature and circumstances of the probationer's crime and the probationer's 
history and characteristics as those factors will inform the selection of 
reasonable probation conditions.

 
 
[¶22]   These same features of general 
Fourth Amendment analysis were employed by the Utah Supreme Court when it 
affirmed a juvenile court's ruling that, in light of the express terms of his 
probation, a juvenile had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his backpack 
and contraband found therein.  State ex rel. ACC, 2002 UT 22, ¶ 21, 44 P.3d 708, 712 (Utah 2002).  In that 
case, the juvenile was on probation for marijuana possession and subject to 
conditions that he submit to law enforcement searches for detection of drugs and 
to chemical testing for controlled substances.  Id. 
at ¶¶ 1, 3, 44 P.3d  at 709.  A 
probation officer searched the juvenile's backpack, seized a device used to 
inhale marijuana, and filed a delinquency charge against the juvenile.  Id. 
at ¶¶ 1, 8-9, 44 P.3d  at 709-10.  It 
is noteworthy that in 1983 the Utah court decided State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, which 
this Court discussed in Pena.  It is also noteworthy that the 
Utah court in 
ACC limited its holding to the facts 
in that case and made "no pronouncement regarding whether a police officer could have relied upon 
the terms of ACC's probation to conduct a warrantless search in the absence of a 
reasonable suspicion.'"  ACC, ¶ 21 n.5, 44 P.3d  at 713 n.5 
(emphasis in original).

 
 
[¶23]   The Fourth Amendment analyses in Jones, Knights and ACC can be usefully applied in 
McAuliffe's case.  The circuit court 
that sentenced McAuliffe to probation was familiar with the nature and 
circumstances of the drug crime committed by him and his drug history and 
characteristics.  It knew of the 
permissible punishment it could impose on him, ranging from confinement to 
probation.  Had the court placed him 
in confinement, McAuliffe's freedom and civil liberties would have been 
constitutionally severely restricted and he would not have possessed any 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
The circuit court knew that if it placed him on probation, it could 
impose reasonable conditions that would deprive him of some expectations of 
privacy and freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.  Considering that drugs were a factor in 
McAuliffe's crime and previous criminal history, the court could reasonably 
conclude that probation conditions requiring McAuliffe to submit to random 
searches and chemical testing for drugs were reasonable to further McAuliffe's 
rehabilitation, on the one hand, and society's protections from future criminal 
drug violations on the other.  
McAuliffe's probation order clearly expressed the search and chemical 
testing conditions and McAuliffe knew of those conditions.  Because the circuit court could have 
constitutionally deprived McAuliffe of any reasonable expectation of privacy had 
it ordered confinement, common sense demands that the court is constitutionally 
permitted to impose that same deprivation while ordering a lesser punishment 
like probation as long as that deprivation bears a reasonable relationship to 
the probationer's criminal activity, the probationer's rehabilitation, and 
society's protection from future criminal drug violations.  Thus, we find that the probation search 
conditions permitting random drug searches of probationer McAuliffe by law 
enforcement officers pass Fourth Amendment muster.

 
 
[¶24]   In light of the foregoing analysis, 
we hold that the district court erred in ruling that, given McAuliffe's 
probation search conditions, Jones 
did not permit law enforcement detectives to conduct a random search for drugs 
of McAuliffe's person and vehicle at the scene of the traffic stop.  We further hold that the circuit court's 
probation order, with the attendant reasonable search conditions, authorized the 
detectives as part of their official duties to question McAuliffe about his 
probation status and to conduct a random search for drugs on his person and in 
his vehicle; that the detectives were lawfully performing their official duties 
when they contacted McAuliffe at the scene of the traffic stop and questioned 
him; and that McAuliffe's statement to the detectives that he was not consenting 
to the random search, as well as his false statement to the detectives that he 
was not on probation, gave the detectives probable cause to arrest him for 
knowingly obstructing, impeding or interfering with peace officers while engaged 
in the lawful performance of their official duties in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-102(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2005) (peace officer may 
arrest person without a warrant when any criminal offense is being committed in 
the officer's presence by the person to be arrested); Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶¶ 19-21, 
109 P.3d 52, 57-58 (Wyo. 2005); Newton v. 
State, 698 P.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Wyo. 1985); Tillett v. State, 637 P.2d 261, 264-65 
(Wyo. 1981); and see Jandro v. State, 
781 P.2d 512, 517-19 (Wyo. 1989) (the facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge need not rise to the level of proving guilt or even to the 
level of prima facie evidence of guilt for probable cause for an arrest to 
arise).

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   The order of the district court 
granting McAuliffe's motion to suppress is reversed and this matter is remanded 
for such further proceedings as may be 
appropriate.

VOIGT, 
Justice, specially concurring, in which KITE, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶26]   I write separately because, 
although I agree with the majority that the district court's order must be 
reversed, and I agree with the majority's Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, 41 P.3d 1247 
(Wyo. 2002), rationale, I am not 
convinced that the appellee's conduct constituted interference with a peace 
officer.  It is true that the 
appellee first told the officers that he was not on probation.  Nevertheless, they proceeded to search 
him pursuant to the probation condition that allowed random searches for 
controlled substances.  It is also 
true that, during the search, the appellee said, in effect, "I don't consent to 
this search."  Those two statements 
did not constitute interference with a peace officer because they did not hinder 
for one second the officers' pursuit of their duties.  However, had the officers not arrested 
him, but continued the search instead, which they had every right to do, they 
would have found the drugs on his person and he then would have been arrested 
for that offense.  Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 102, ¶ 24, 
96 P.3d 1046, 1053 (Wyo. 2004); Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
449-50, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2512, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1138 
(1985).

 
 

STEBNER, 
District Judge, Retired, dissenting.

 
 
[¶27]   I respectfully dissent.  In United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6, 122 S. Ct. 587, 592 
n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001), the Supreme Court stated:

 
 
We do 
not decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely 
eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a 
law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have 
satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  The terms of the probation condition 
permit such a search, but we need not address the constitutionality of a 
suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by reasonable 
suspicion.

 
 
Although 
I agree with the majority that this unaddressed question is before us today, I 
disagree with the conclusions the majority draws from Knights.  See majority opinion, ¶¶ 19-21.  Indeed, the Supreme Court also 
stated:

 
 
We hold 
that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a search of this probationer's house.  The degree of individualized suspicion required of a 
search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that 
criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual's privacy 
interest reasonable.  Although the 
Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the 
term "probable cause," a lesser 
degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and 
private interests makes such a standard reasonable.  Those interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard 
here.

 
 

Knights, 534 U.S.  at 121, 122 S. Ct.  at 592-93 
(emphasis added, internal citations omitted).  The Supreme Court's references to a 
lesser standard and its repeated notation that the search in Knights was supported by reasonable 
suspicion leads me to conclude that although probable cause is not required, 
some quantum of individualized suspicion is nevertheless still necessary.  See Knights, 534 U.S.  at 121-22, 
122 S. Ct.  at 592-93.

 
 
[¶28]   Additionally, I would mention that 
I agree with Justice 
Voigt that 
McAuliffe's conduct did not constitute interference with a peace officer.  However, I do not agree that the 
officers would have eventually found the drugs on his person.  The officers did not have a warrant or 
probable cause to search McAuliffe.  
Instead, they were relying on the probation condition which required 
McAuliffe to consent to the search.  
Thus, when he refused to consent to the search, the officers should have 
initiated the process for revoking McAuliffe's probation by informing the 
attorney for the state of the facts that establish a probation violation as 
provided by W.R.Cr.P. 39.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This is the 
"controlling question of law" we agreed to answer when we granted the State's 
Petition for Writ of Review/Certiorari.

 
 

2While there 
seemed to be some confusion on the issue, the district court found, as a matter 
of fact, that McAuliffe was arrested for interference.  Neither party argues that this finding 
is clearly erroneous.

 
 

3Neither 
party challenged the propriety of the search and McAuliffe's arrest on 
independent state constitutional grounds.  
Therefore, our analysis is limited to federal constitutional 
principles.  See Mackrill v. State, 2004 WY 129, ¶ 13, 
100 P.3d 361, 364-65 (Wyo. 2004); Vassar 
v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

4Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) 
provides:

 
 
A person 
commits a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, 
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he 
knowingly obstructs, impedes or interferes with or resists arrest by a peace 
officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.