Title: Rogers v. Parrish

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Rogers v. Parrish (2005-354)

2007 VT 35

[Filed 04-May-2007]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

         
                                 2007 VT 35

                                No. 2005-354


  Christopher Rogers                             Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Addison Family Court


  Carla Parrish                                  March Term, 2006


  Christina Reiss, J.

  Rebecca G. Olson and Brice C. Simon of Olson & Simon, PLC, Stowe, for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Benjamin W. King of King Lashman & King, PLLC, Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  BURGESS, J.   In Hawkes v. Spence we addressed the "seemingly
  irreconcilable conflict" that arises when a "custodial parent's interest in
  building a new life with the children" in a distant location is "pitted
  against the noncustodial parent's interest in maintaining a close
  relationship with the children."  2005 VT 57, ¶ 1, 178 Vt. 161, 878 A.2d 273.  While acknowledging that "there is no precise formula" for resolving
  such conflicts, we adopted a governing standard and a non-exclusive list of
  relevant factors that trial courts must apply in determining whether a
  reexamination of parental rights and responsibilities in such circumstances
  is justified.  Id. ¶ 13.  Here, we are confronted with yet another
  difficult relocation dispute between two loving, capable parents, both of
  whom are intent on maintaining their current contact with the child, yet
  only one of whom can prevail.  Such cases underscore yet again that this
  area of the law is not susceptible to precise formulas, and that we must
  permit trial courts - guided by the principles set forth in Hawkes-the
  latitude to exercise their discretion to reach reasonable decisions.  As
  explained more fully below, that is what occurred here.  Accordingly, we
  affirm the judgment.

       ¶  2.  The record evidence may be summarized as follows.  The parties
  were married in 1996 and divorced in October 2003.  They have two children
  who were approximately three years old and fourteen months old at the time
  of the parties' separation in October 2002, and six and four years old at
  the time of the proceedings below.  The divorce judgment incorporated a
  stipulation between the parties granting mother sole physical rights and
  responsibilities and providing for shared legal rights and
  responsibilities.  The judgment also accorded father substantial
  parent-child contact.  In addition to visitation every other weekend from
  Friday until Monday evening, and off-weeks from Tuesday until Wednesday
  evening, it authorized father to pick the children up from daycare on a
  daily basis and bring them to mother's home, where he cared for them until
  she arrived from work.  In addition, father testified, and the court found,
  that father made considerable efforts to see the children on other
  occasions, staying with neighbors and friends near the marital home (which
  father had conveyed to mother pursuant to the divorce stipulation), and
  spending time with the children during days off from his job as a police
  officer with the Stowe Police Department.   
   
       ¶  3.  Father testified, and the court found, that mother's job as
  the comptroller of a company in Burlington made it difficult for her to
  arrive home until after 6:00 p.m, which in turn made it impossible for
  father to pick up the children daily from daycare and arrive for his police
  shift on time.  Father advised that he could no longer do the daily
  pickups.  As a result, in June 2004, mother moved from Morrisville to
  Vergennes to shorten her commute time.  Thereafter, father's time with the
  children decreased.  According to mother, this was because father no longer
  wished to exercise all of his visitation rights, while father contended
  that mother denied him visitation.  Finding mother's excuse incredible for
  denying father's Thanksgiving visit so she could take the children to see
  her boyfriend's parents in Michigan, the court further found it was mother,
  and not father, who initiated the lapse in father's visitation. 

       ¶  4.  In November 2004, mother informed father that she intended to
  remarry and move with the children and her new husband, an Army sergeant
  then stationed in Vermont, to North Carolina.  Father subsequently moved to
  modify custody based on mother's move to Vergennes and the disruptions that
  this had occasioned in the children's lives, including a change of daycare
  providers and reduced contact with father and his family, as well as on
  mother's contemplated move to North Carolina.   Mother, in response, filed
  a cross-motion to modify custody and parent-child contact, seeking sole
  legal rights and responsibilities and a new visitation schedule.  In a
  supporting affidavit, mother denied she was considering a move to North
  Carolina, stating that her new husband "has no orders at present to be
  transferred to anywhere let alone North Carolina." Mother later filed an
  amended motion and supplemental affidavit, indicating that her husband's
  replacement had arrived in Vermont and it was expected that within about 30
  days her husband would receive orders to report to a new duty station
  outside Vermont, possibly in the states of North Carolina, Colorado, or
  Washington.  As to mother's earlier affidavit purporting ignorance about
  any orders requiring her husband to move, the court found that mother,
  contrary to her sworn declaration, was then aware that her husband had
  standing orders to leave Vermont and relocate within nine months at the
  latest.
   
       ¶  5.  An evidentiary hearing on the cross-motions was held in
  August 2005.  Shortly thereafter, the court issued a written decision,
  concluding that mother's proposed relocation represented a real,
  substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances justifying a
  reexamination of parental rights and responsibilities under 15 V.S.A. §
  668, and that, under the criteria set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 665,  the best
  interests of the children favored an award of sole physical and legal
  rights and responsibilities to father.  In addressing the threshold
  question of changed circumstances, the court recognized that the issue was
  governed by the principles set forth in  Hawkes v. Spence.  There, we held
  that "relocation is a substantial change of circumstances justifying a
  reexamination of parental rights and responsibilities only when the
  relocation significantly impairs either parent's ability to exercise
  responsibilities the parent has been exercising or attempting to exercise
  under the parenting plan."  Hawkes, 2005 VT 57, ¶ 13 (quotation and
  citation omitted).  

       ¶  6.  Hawkes explained that in determining whether a parent's
  exercise of responsibilities will be substantially impaired, the court may
  consider, among other factors, "[t]he amount of custodial responsibility
  each parent has been exercising and for how long, the distance of the move
  and its duration, and the availability of alternative visitation
  arrangements."  Id. (quotation and citation omitted).  Additionally, "the
  court should consider the amount of custodial responsibility that a parent
  has been actually exercising, rather than the amount allocated but not
  necessarily exercised under a court order."  Id. (quotation and citation
  omitted) (emphasis added).
   
       ¶  7.  The trial court here systematically considered each of the
  foregoing factors.  As to custodial time, the court found that, although
  mother had been granted sole physical rights and responsibilities, father
  had "maximized his contact with the children such that he had them in his
  care almost as much as [mother]."  Next, the court found that the distance
  and duration of mother's proposed move to a military posting out of state
  were extensive, and would substantially affect the children's ability to
  maintain their current relationship with father and his family in Vermont.
  Finally, the court found that mother's proposed summer and holiday
  visitation schedule with father would significantly diminish his contact
  with the children and "negatively impact their relationship." Indeed, given
  its findings that mother previously denied father's visitation rights, the
  court justifiably expressed "some concerns that a[n alternative] visitation
  order would not be adhered to by [mother]."

       ¶  8.  The court thus determined that "[e]ach of the Hawkes factors,
  as well as many others, support the court's conclusion that the proposed
  relocation is a real, substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances
  requiring the court to consider whether modification of the parties'
  parental rights and responsibilities is appropriate."  Turning to that
  question, the court remarked  that father bore "a heavy burden of proof,"
  presumably in reference to the "high hurdle" faced by a noncustodial
  parents "in justifying the violent dislocation of a change in custody from
  one parent to the other" when the change is  "based solely on the custodial
  parent's decision to relocate."  Hawkes, 2005 VT 27, ¶ 11.   "On the other
  hand," the court correctly observed from Hawkes, "when childrearing and its
  concomitant decision-making are shared, relocation to a remote location by
  one parent requires at the very least a reassessment of the custodial
  arrangement and, because of the practicalities involved in shared
  parenting, will often necessitate a change in custody."   Id.  ¶ 12.  The
  court also noted that father's motion was not based solely on the proposed
  relocation, but also on a general breakdown in the parties' relationship,
  mother's interference with father's visitation and a concern that the
  children would continue to move every three years if left in mother's
  physical custody.  
   
       ¶  9.  Proceeding to apply the factors of 15 V.S.A. § 665(b), the
  court found both parents were close to the children and were able to
  provide them with love, affection, and guidance, as well as a safe and
  nurturing environment, and that these factors were therefore evenly
  balanced.   The court placed considerable emphasis, however, on the
  criterion addressed to the children's adjustment to their home, school, and
  community-particularly in Morrisville where they had lived near father
  prior to the move, attended day care, and been surrounded by friends and
  family. The court noted father planned to live in Morrisville, where the
  children could resume their schooling and relationships with friends,
  neighbors, and family.  The court found that this factor weighed heavily in
  favor of a change of custody to father.  


       ¶  10.  The court found neither parent particularly able to foster a
  positive relationship with the other.  Nevertheless, the court expressed
  concern that mother had not been straightforward with father or the court
  about her future plans, had not cooperated with father's visitation rights
  in the past and was more likely than father to expose the children to
  disputes between the parents and alienation from the other parent.  In
  contrast, the court found that father was more likely to follow an order
  granting mother substantial visitation, and was less likely than mother to
  disparage, or alienate the children from, the other parent.  

       ¶  11.  Consistent with its finding that the children were strongly
  attached to their home and community, the court also found that they
  enjoyed "strong, beneficial relationships with family and friends in
  Vermont" that would be damaged by a relocation out of state.  While
  acknowledging the "positive force" of their new relationship with mother's
  husband and his young daughter, the court concluded that it did not
  outweigh the children's relationship with father and other family members
  and friends in Vermont, and that this factor also favored an award of sole
  custody to father.
   
       ¶  12.  As for the children's relationship with their primary care
  provider, the court recognized that mother capably fulfilled this role and
  that the children would not benefit from a disruption of this
  relationship-a circumstance which led the court to describe this as a "most
  troubling" and "difficult case."  Noting that father could also fill the
  role of primary caretaker, and had "approximated" that role in the past,
  the court explained that this factor weighed heavily in mother's favor, but
  was counterbalanced by other factors.  The court determined that, despite
  mother's status as primary caretaker, the expected repeated moves of the
  children and lost contact with father were unacceptable consequences of
  mother's decision to move only to follow her new spouse's career.  The
  dissent perceives this characterization as trivializing and devaluing
  mother's choice to support her spouse's career, post, ¶ 45, when the
  family court clearly considered this motive, not in isolation, but weighed
  against the reasonably anticipated constriction, if not foreclosure, by
  mother of the children's contact with father.  The family court found
  mother's rationale less compelling than the sacrifice of the children's
  relationship with their father. 

       ¶  13.  On balance, the court concluded that an award of sole legal
  and physical rights and responsibilities to father was "most likely to
  preserve the children's relationship with both of their parents and afford
  them the greatest amount of stability and security," and therefore served
  the  best interests of the children.  The court awarded mother substantial
  parent-child contact, including every school vacation during the school
  year in excess of three days, eight consecutive weeks during the summer,
  one weekend per month in Vermont, and unlimited telephone  contact.  The
  court denied mother's subsequent motion for reconsideration and stay.  This
  appeal followed.
   
       ¶  14.  Mother raises a number of claims, which she has grouped under
  three broad headings.  Under the first, she contends the court misapplied
  the Hawkes factors in concluding that a relocation would significantly
  impair father's exercise of custodial responsibilities.  She claims, in
  this regard, that the court impermissibly lowered the standard for a change
  of custody from the primary care provider.  The claim is premised on
  mother's assertion that, in calculating the overall amount of custodial
  responsibility exercised by father, the court mischaracterized  father's
  involvement with the children as nearly equivalent to that of mother.  She
  argues that the quantity of father's contact with the children, which the
  court found to be approximately twelve out of fourteen days prior to
  mother's move to Vergennes, was not equivalent to the quality of her daily
  involvement as the primary care provider. 

       ¶  15.  We will not disturb the family court's factual findings
  unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment
  and excluding the effect of modifying evidence, there is no credible
  evidence to support them.  Sochin v. Sochin, 2004 VT 85, ¶ 10, 177 Vt. 540,
  861 A.2d 1089 (mem.).  Father testified that he engaged in extensive
  activities with the children while they were in his care, including
  playing, coloring, going on outings, reading stories at bedtime, and
  shopping. (FN1)  He also testified without dispute that he had taken care
  of the children for consecutive periods of over a week at a time.  The
  parties' friend and former neighbor in Morrisville described father as "Mr.
  Mom" and "an exceptional father," observing that he had "spent a tremendous
  amount of time with the kids and did a lot of stuff with them and took care
  of them and nurtured them."  The evidence was sufficient to support the
  court's finding that father's care of the children nearly approximated
  mother's in the qualitative sense, and we therefore discern no basis to
  disturb its conclusion that mother's proposed relocation, combined with her
  disinclination to abide by father's interest and rights to parent-child
  contact, would likely erode or destroy the children's relationship with
  their father. 

       ¶  16.  Mother further argues that "it is of no moment as to who was
  responsible for [father's] reduced parent child contact" after she moved to
  Vergennes, relying on a comment to § 2.17(1) of the American Law Institute
  (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, which states that, where
  one parent has interfered with the other's custodial time, "a parent who
  acquiesces in the new arrangement cannot later rely on parental
  prerogatives the parent did not value highly enough to protect."  ALI
  Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.17(1) cmt. b (2002).  Here,
  as noted, the court acknowledged that father's contact with the children
  decreased since mother's move to Vergennes, but found that mother was
  partly to blame by interfering with father's visitation.  Nothing
  indicates, however, that father "acquiesced" to mother's conduct. 
  Accordingly, the claim does not undermine the court's finding that the
  proposed relocation would significantly impair father's relationship with
  the children. 
   
       ¶  17.  Mother also appears to take issue with the court's finding
  that the distance and duration of the proposed relocation would be
  substantial.  Mother asserts that the finding is "speculative at best"
  because her husband had not, as of the date of the hearing, received his
  transfer orders.  Mother stated in her supplemental affidavit, however,
  that reassignment orders were imminent, and testified at the hearing in
  August 2005 that January 2006 was the "absolute end date" for her husband's
  assignment to Vermont.  Wife's husband also testified that he could receive
  orders to relocate at any time, possibly to Washington state, Colorado,
  Georgia, or North Carolina, and that there was virtually no possibility of
  being reassigned to Vermont.  Thus, the evidence does not support mother's
  assertion that the court's findings about relocation were speculative.

       ¶  18.  Finally in this regard, mother claims the evidence refuted the
  court's finding that the alternative visitation schedule necessitated by
  mother's relocation would significantly affect father's relationship with
  the children.  In support, mother cites father's testimony that he remained
  committed to staying involved with the children even if meant he had to fly
  long distances, as well as the testimony of the children's paternal
  grandmother that, while she did not enjoy flying, she  would endeavor to
  drive to see the children if they relocated to a state not too distant from
  Vermont.  While these statements attest to the father's commitment to
  maintaining contact with the children wherever they resided, they do not
  undermine the court's finding that a relocation would significantly impair
  father's ability to exercise existing custodial responsibilities,
  particularly considering mother's past refusal of father's visitation
  rights and her continued reluctance to fully accept same as suggested by
  her lack of candor to the court in misreporting her probability for
  relocation. 
   
       ¶  19.  Mother's second general claim is that the court misapplied
  the statutory factors governing the best interests of the children.  In
  particular, mother contends the court failed to accord the quality of her
  relationship with the children the "great weight" to which she was entitled
  as their primary caretaking parent under Harris v. Harris, 149 Vt. 410,
  418,