Title: Berkson v. LePome

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

426 Nev, Advance Oninion AH,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IMARILYN BERKSON, AN No. 49261
INDIVIDUAL; AND GERTRUDE
IMALACKY, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Appellants,

ROBERT C. LEPOME, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS HUSBAND OF BARBARA
LEPOME; BARBARA LEPOME,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS WIFE OF
ROBERT C. LEPOME; JOHN GORMAN,
ESQ; HOWARD BLOOM; AND
RICHARD DONALDSON, ESQ.,
Respondents.

      
   
   
       
       
   
   
   
 
  
  
   
  
 
   
  
   
   

FILED

DEC 16,2010

 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a probate and
{trust action and from a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees and
costs, Eighth Judicial Distriet Court, Clark County; Susan Johnson,
Judge

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Cary Colt Payne, Las Vegas; Bruce L. Gale, Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

Marquis & Aurbach and Terry A. Coffing, Micah S. Behols, and Lisa A.

McClane, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

/0-32840

 
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.’

OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

For the first time, we consider NRS 11.340, a statute enacted
by the Legislature in 1911? that provides a plaintiff whose judgment is
subsequently reversed on appeal with the right to file a new action within
one year after the reversal. We conclude that this statute violates the
separation of powers doctrine because it unconstitutionally interferes with
the judiciary’s authority to manage the judicial process and this court's
ability to finally resolve matters on appeal by precluding subsequent and
repetitive efforts to relitigate the same claims. As we strike NRS 11.340,
we necessarily examine the district court's dismissal of the underlying
action on preclusion grounds. We affirm the district court's order because
appellants relied solely on NRS 11.340 and failed to provide any
arguments to explain why claim and issue preclusion should not apply.
Finally, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in

'The Honorable Michael L. Douglas, Justice, and the Honorable
Mark Gibbons, Justice, voluntarily recused themselves from participation
in the decision of this matter.

*This

 

fatute was initially enacted as section 38 of the Civil Practice

Act of 1911. Section 38's annotation notes that the provision was drawn
from California's Code of Civil Procedure, section 355. Language virtually
identical to section 38, however, dates back to Nevada's territorial laws.
See 1861 Laws of the Territory of Nevada, ch. 12, § 25; see also 1 Nev.
Compiled Laws § 1040 (1873). ‘The question of whether section 38 of the
Civil Practice Act of 1911 was intended to draw from the California code or
preexisting Nevada authority does not affect our analysis of NRS 11,340.

 

 
oe

 

lawarding attorney fees and costs to respondents to sanction appellants for
filing a frivolous complaint, and therefore, we reverse the post-judgment
attorney fees and costs award to respondents.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2001, respondent Howard Bloom filed a petition in the

district court seeking the appointment of special administrators for the
Jestate of Rose Miller. The petition was subsequently opposed by two of
Miller's nieces, appellants Marilyn Berkson and Gertrude Malacky, on the
grounds of undue influence and a lack of testamentary capacity. Bloom
also filed a separate petition for the appointment of a trustee regarding
[the Rose Miller Living Trust, which was also opposed by appellants on the
Jsame grounds. Berkson and Malacky subsequently filed a civil complaint
in district court against respondent Barbara LePome. These three actions
[were ultimately consolidated by the district court, which later dismissed
Berkson and Malacky’s civil complaint, concluding that the causes of
Jaction raised were either not recognized in Nevada or were duplicative of
the claims raised in the estate and trust actions. In 2004, the district
court dismissed the lack-of-testamentary-capacity claims pending in the
Jestate and trust actions and concluded that the sole issue remaining for
trial was the undue influence issue. At the trial, the jury found in favor of
Berkson and Malacky, but this court reversed that judgment on appeal, in
Ja July 12, 2006, unpublished order, concluding that the jury's verdict was
not supported by substantial evidence,

Thereafter, in November 2006, Berkson and Malacky filed a

new complaint in district court asserting claims for undue influence,

 

loreach of contract, fraud, elder abuse and neglect, intentional

misstatement of facts, negligence, conspiracy and per se violation of

 

Nevada law, and misconduct, Their complaint also sought attorney fees

 
or

 

Jand costs. ‘This complaint continued the litigation against Barbara
/LePome and Bloom and added respondents Robert LePome, John Gorman,
|and Richard Donaldson as additional defendants. Respondents moved the
district court to dismiss the complaint based on, among other things, their
assertion that the complaint was barred by claim and issue preclusion.
‘The district court subsequently entered an order summarily granting the
motion to dismiss the complaint “in its entirety” over Berkson and
Malacky’s opposition, Berkson and Malacky have now appealed the
district court's dismissal order. After the notice of appeal was filed, the
district court awarded respondents attorney fees and costs to sanction
Berkson and Malacky for filing a frivolous complaint. Berkson and
/Malacky have also appealed from this post-judgment award.
DISCUSSION

We begin our discussion of the issues presented in this appeal
by addressing Berkson and Malacky’s challenge to the district court's
application of the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion to their
complaint, After concluding that the district court properly dismissed the
underlying complaint on this basis, we then turn to Berkson and
Malacky’s appellate arguments related to the post-judgment award of
attorney fees and costs to respondents, which, for the reasons set forth

below, we conclude must be reversed.®

8As our resolution of Berkson and Malacky’s NRS 11.340 arguments
lon separation-of-powers and claim- and issue-preclusion grounds controls
{the disposition of this appeal, we need not address the lengthy discussion
jin the parties’ briefing regarding Berkson and Malacky’s standing to bring
their claims.

 
Dismiss rk
On appeal, Berkson and Malacky argue that the district court
erred in dismissing their complaint because NRS 11.340 clearly and
unambiguously granted them the right to file a new complaint after this
court reversed the jury verdict in their favor. NRS 11.340 provides that

{if an action shall be commenced within the time
prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for
the plaintiff be reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or
if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action
survives, the plaintiff's heirs or representatives,
may commence a new action within 1 year after
the reversal.

[According to Berkson and Malacky, because NRS 11.340 authorizes the
filing of a new complaint after the reversal on appeal of a judgment in
their favor, that statute necessarily precludes the application of claim and
issue preclusion to their new complaint, and thus, the district court's
dismissal of their complaint on such grounds was improper. ‘This court
fhas not previously addressed NRS 11.340, which has not been
substantively amended or altered since its enactment.

Words in
such an approach would violate the spirit of the act. V & S Railway v.
White Pine County, 125 Nev. _, __, 211 P.8d 879, 882 (2009). Further,

 

statute will be given their plain meaning unless

ja statute will be construed in order to give meaning to its entirety, and
this court “will read
meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation.” Harris
|Assocs, v. Clark County Sch, Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 642, 81 P.3d 532, 534

ich sentence, phrase, and word to render it

 

‘It also appears that this court has not ever addressed any prior
versions of the NRS 11.340 statutory language.

 

 
(2003) (quoting Coast Hotels v. State, Labor Comm(‘n, 117 Nev. 835, 841,
34 P.8d 546, 560 (2001)).

As Berkson and Malacky correctly point out, the plain
language of NRS 11.340 explicitly authorized their filing of a new action
after this court reversed the judgment in their favor on appeal. And if
INRS 11.340 is to have any real effect, it necessarily follows that the
Jdoctrines of claim and issue preclusion could not be applied to bar a new
action filed based on that statute. Claim and issue preclusion essentially
bar recovery on or prevent relitigation of previously resolved issues. See
Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1054-55, 194 P.3d 709,
713 (2008) (explaining that claim preclusion acts to bar claims brought in
2 subsequent action between the same parties that either were brought or
lcould have been brought in a prior action, and issue preclusion applies,
junder certain circumstances, when issues addressed in an earlier suit
larise again in a later suit). ‘To that end, these principles would apply to
bar an action brought: under NRS 11.340 and would render the statute
meaningless, as any new action filed under the statute would
Jautomatically be subject to summary dismissal on preclusion grounds,
which is exactly what happened in the underlying case. Thus, under this
Jcourt’s established rules of statutory construction, NRS 11.340 must be
read as not only authorizing the filing of a new action after the reversal of
ja judgment in plaintiffs! favor on appeal, but as barring the application of
claim and issue preclusion to any new action filed under the statute.

This conclusion does not end our analysis, however, In
responding to Berkson and Malacky’s appellate contentions, respondents

largue that NRS 11.340 violates the separation of powers doctrine and

should be struck down as unconstitutional. Specifically, they contend that

 

 
the statute unduly hampers the judiciary’s ability to manage litigation
{through the application of the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, and
jas a result, runs afoul of separation of powers principles. Berkson and
Malacky dispute that respondents’ separation of powers arguments
provide a basis for affirming the district court's decision. For the reasons
set forth below, we agree with respondents’ contention that NRS 11.340

violates the separation of powers doctrine.

NRS 11.340 violates separation of powers
Separation of powers

‘The separation of powers doctrine is the most important
foundation for preserving and protecting liberty by preventing the
accumulation of power in any one branch of government. Secretary of
‘State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753
(2004). Nevada's separation of powers provision, contained in Article 3,
[Section 1(1) of the Nevada Constitution, provides that

[t]he powers of the Government of the State of
Nevada shall be divided into three separate
departments—the Legislative—the Executive
and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments shall exercise any functions,
appertaining to either of the others, except in the
cases expressly directed or permitted in this
constitution.
‘The Constitution further embodies this concept of limited government by
specifically delineating the powers granted to the three distinct and
coequal branches of government, as set forth in Article 4 (legislative),
[Article 5 (executive), and Article 6 Gudicial).

Hardy, 126 Nev. __, __, 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009). As coequal

 

‘ommission on Ethics v.

branches, each of the three governmental departments has “inherent

 

 
oe

 

power to administer its own affairs and perform its duties, #0 as not to
become a subordinate branch of government.” Halverson v. Hardcastle,
123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 439 (2007) (internal quotations omitted);
accord Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Mun, Ct., 116 Nev. 1213, 1218, 14
P.8d 1275, 1279 (2000)

We have been especially prudent to keep the powers of the
[judiciary separate from those of either the legislative or the executive
branches. See, .g., Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 19, 422 P.2d 237,
242 (1967). This separation is fundamentally necessary because “[wlere
and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be the

 

 

the power of judging joined with the legislative, the

legislator: Were it joined to the executive power the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor.” Id, at 19, 422 P.2d at 242 (quoting
the French Enlightenment thinker Charles de Secondat, baron de
Montesquieu, whose views had a significant following within the
Revolutionary generation); The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison)
(stating that “[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on [separation
of powers] is the celebrated Montesquieu’.

Here, the conflict is between an act of the Legislature—NRS
11.340—and the inherent ability of the judiciary to manage litigation and
finally resolve cases. Regarding such discord between the legislative and
judicial branches of government, it is well settled that the judiciary
retains the authority to “hear and determine justiciable controversies” as
 coequal power to the Legislature's broad authority to enact, amend, and
repeal legislation. Halverson, 123 Nev. at 260, 163 P.3d at 439 (quoting
Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242). And as one commentator aptly
explained this distinction, “{tJo declare what the law is or is

 
judicial power; to declare what the law shall be is legislative.” 1 Thomas

M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 191 (8th ed. 1927).
In keeping with this theory, “[t]he judiciary...has the

 

inherent power to govern its own procedures.” State _v.
[Marshall], 116 Nev. 953, 959, 11 P.3d 1209, 1212 (2000) (quoting
Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 26, 752 P.2 210, 211 (1988)); see also
NRS 2.120(2) (legislative recognition that this court regulates civil
practice in order to promote “the speedy determination of litigation upon

it

 

merits"). The judiciary is entrusted with “rule-making and other
incidental powers reasonable and necessary to carry out the duties
required for the administration of justice” and “to economically and fairly
manage litigation.” Borger v. Dist, Ct,, 120 Nev. 1021, 1029, 102 P.3d 600,
606 (2004) (quoting Goldberg v. District Court, 93 Nev. 614, 616, 572 P.2d
521, 522 (1977); see also Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213
(stating that “tJhere are regulating... powers of the Judicial
Department that are within the province of the judicial function,

ie.

 

promulgating and prescribing any and all rules necessary or
desirable to handle the business of the courts or their judicial functions”
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Galloway, 83 Nev. at 23,
422 P.2d at 244)). ‘Thus, “the legislature may not enact a procedural

statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating

the doctrine of separation of powers, and . .. such a statute is of no effect.”
Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.8d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99
Nev. 342, 345, 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983); see also Secretary of State, 120
Nev. at 465, 93 P.3d at 752 (explaining that the Legislature cannot
restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court’s
constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26, 752 P.2d at 211

 

 
0

 

(concluding that a particular statute did not encroach on judicial authority
because it did not disrupt or abrogate a court rule); but see Connery, 99
Nev. at 345, 661 P.2d at 1300 (noting that any court-created procedural
rules “may not conflict with the state constitution or abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right” (internal quotations omitted)). In addition
to the constitutionally mandated bases for keeping separate those

inherent powers of the judiciary, i

 

ving control of court rules and the
administration of justice to the judiciary, and thereby placing the

responsibility for the system's continued effectiveness with those most

 

 

familiar with the latest issues and the experience and flexibility to more
auickly bring into effect workable solutions and amendments, makes good
sense. Goldberg, 93 Nev. at 617-18, 672 P.2d at 623.

Claim and issue preclusion

‘This court's use of the concepts of claim and issue preclusion is
well established. See Whitman Mining Co. v. Baker, 3 Nev. 386, 393
(1867) (discussing preclusive effects); Five Star Capital Corp, v. Ruby, 124
Nev. 1048, 194 P.34 709 (2008) (clarifying Nevada law on claim and issue
preclusion). While claim and issue preclusion are legal doctrines rather
than procedural rules per se, we conclude that these legal doctrines are
nonetheless subject to the same constitutional separation of powers
analysis as this court's procedural rules. Other courts discussing this
issue are in apparent agreement with our conclusion that certain
legislative encroachments on the judiciary’s ability to apply claim and
issue preclusion to cases decided on their merits raise separation of
powers concerns. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Lit., 659 F.
Supp. 2d 31, 71-84 (D. D.C. 2009) (examining in extensive detail the issue
of judicial power and finality of judgments under federal precedent and
stating an inclination to conclude that because of the centrality of

10

 
oe

 

preclusion principles to the judiciary’s purpose of rendering final
judgments in civil cases, under certain circumstances, legislation negating
these doctrines violates separation of powers); McFadden v. Dryvit
Systems, Inc,, 112 P.3d 1191, 1195, 1198 Or. 2005) (suggesting that a
jatute preventing application of preclusion principles to a final judgment

 

on the merits would violate the Oregon state constitution on separation of
powers grounds).

‘The important public policy behind the application of
preclusion principles further supports our conclusion that a statute, such
as NRS 11.340, which prohibits the application of these doctrines, violates
separation of powers, Claim preclusion is necessary because “fairness to
the defendant{ ] and sound judicial administration{] require that at some
point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end.” Five Star
Capital, 124 Nev. at 1058, 194 P.3d at 715 (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 19 cmt. a (1982). As for issue preclusion, the important
policy reasons for its application include “conserving judicial
resources, ... maintaining consistency, and...avoiding oppression or
harassment of the adverse party.” In re Sandoval, 126 Nev. _, __, 282
P.3d 422, 425 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). ‘These significant

 

public policies advanced by the application of preclusion principles are
directly thwarted by NRS 11.340 because it acts to prolong previously
resolved cases, resulting in unnecessary expenses for adverse parties and
the diversion of time and scarce judicial resources away from undecided
cases,

We therefore hold that NRS 11.340 unconstitutionally
interferes with the judiciary’s authority to manage the litigation process
and this court's ability to provide finality through the resolution of a

a

 
matter on appeal. Consequently, we strike NRS 11.340 as
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.>

Because we strike the statute, Berkson and Malacky's refiled
Jcomplaint is subject to preclusion principles. Berkson and Malacky,
however, have provided no analysis or discussion in their briefs to explain
fhow their claims would survive the application of preclusion principles
jwith regard to any of the respondents, including those named as
[defendants for the first time below. It is well established that this court
Ineed not consider issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to

relevant authority. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev.
1317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). Asa result, we necessarily
affirm the district court's dismissal on preclusion grounds.*

5We note that in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 US. 211, 234
(1995), the United States Supreme Court, in addressing an issue
regarding a federal statute of limitations, indicated that laws applicable at
the time an action is filed, which permit the reopening of cases for certain
reasons, do not run afoul of separation of powers principles under the
United States Constitution. Plaut, however, dealt with a case dismissed
on statute of limitations grounds and did not address a situation when, as
here, a case resolved on the merits was resurrected by a statute that, by
its plain language, eviscerates the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion
for cases subject to that statute. In light of this key difference, and given
Jour prior precedent regarding legislative encroachments into the inheront
powers of the judiciary, see. e.g., Galloway, 83 Nev. at 19, 422 P.2d at 242,
land the fact that the Nevada Constitution embraces separation of powers
to an even greater extent than the United States Constitution, Hardy, 125
Nev. at __, 212 P.3d at 1103-04, Plaut does not alter our conclusion that,
lunder the Nevada Constitution, NRS 11.340 is unconstitutional on
separation of powers grounds,

 

“Generally, claim preclusion does not apply when the parties are not
ithe same. See Five Star Capital, 124 Nev. at 1054-55, 194 P.3d at 713.
continued on next page .

 

 
ed

 

Although concurring in the result, our dissenting colleague
would leave NRS 11.340 at peace by offering an alternative interpretation
to the statute that renders it only applying to circumstances in which a
plaintifi’s case has been reversed on appeal, unlike the situation here, on
technical” grounds. We disagree that such an approach should guide our
analysis.

First, the interpretation of NRS 11.340 advocated by the
dissent violates the plain reading of that statute by reading in language
that is not there and fundamentally altering the text when neither
lappellants nor respondents ever argue that NRS 11.340 is ambiguous.
‘Second, our esteemed colleague effectively argues for the approach taken
lby California courts that read the “on the merits” element into that state's
version of NRS 11.840, section 355 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, even though, at the time of these California decisions, section
355 contained no such language. See, e.g., Bollinger v. National Fire Ins.
|Co, of Hartford, Conn,, 154 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1944); 3 Kerr’s Cvelopedic
Codes of California, Code of Civil Procedure, at 382 (1907) (quoting

 

section 355 as providing that “[iJf an action is commenced within the time

continued
Because Berkson and Malacky make no arguments to this effect regarding
those defendants added for the first time in the underlying action,
fhowever, this issue has been waived, and thus, we do not consider
[Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38.

 

 

Additionally, having reviewed Berkson and Malacky’s remaining
Jappellate arguments, we conclude that they lack merit.

13

 
os

 

period prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be
reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or if he die and the cause of action
survive, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year
after the reversal”). While it is true that the text for NRS 11.340 appears
to be largely drawn from California's Section 355 and that the California
[courts have interpreted their provision in a manner consistent with the
approach advocated by the dissent, we conclude that such an approach is
junduly problematic. For instance, the analysis in Bollinger simply
ldeclares the outcome and relies heavily on a New York statute that is
significantly different from Section 355. In its enactment, Section 355 was
[reproduced from a section of the New York Code of Civil Procedure that
similarly lacked an “on the merits’ element. See Bollinger, 154 P.2d at
404 (noting that Section 355 was copied after Section 84 of the New York
(Code of Procedure); Gaines v. City of New York, 109 N.E. 594, 595 (N.Y.
1915) (quoting Section 84 as providing that “[iJf an action be commenced
‘within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the
plaintiff be reversed, on appeal, the plaintiff, or if he die and the cause of
faction survive, his heirs or representatives, may commence a new action
[within one year after the reversal”). Subsequently, however, by the time
the Gaines decision was published, New York had replaced Section 84.
Bollinger, 154 P.2d at 405 (noting that the Gaines decision addressed a
successor to Section 84). ‘The replacement New York statute discussed in
Gaines set forth that

[if an action is commenced within the time
limited therefor, and a judgment therein is
reversed on appeal, without awarding a new trial,
or the action is terminated in any other manner
than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of
the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action,

4

 
 

or a final judgment upon the merits; the plaintiff,
or, if he dies, and the cause of action survives, his,
representative, may commence a new action for
the same cause, after the expiration of the time s0
limited, and within one year after such a reversal
or termination.

109 N.E. at 595. In relying on Gaines, in our view, the Bollinger court did
not sufficiently account for the fact that the amended New York statute in
Gaines expressly provided the specific “upon the merits” exception missing
from the California statute. Further, we also note that the amended New
York statute does not enumerate all possible “technicalities” that could
1

 

d to a reversal, and thus, the California reading allowing new causes of
action only for reversals not “on the merits” arguably goes even further
than the amended New York statute,

Finally, while the California Legislature has subsequently
amended the Section 355 language to adopt the “on the merits” element

 

storically read in by the California courts, see 1992 Cal. Stat. 887; see
also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 355 (West 2006) (noting that the amended
section 355 provides “[iJf an action is commenced within the time
prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on
appeal other than on the merits, a new action may be commenced within

one year after the reversal"), our Legislature has, to date, not similarly

 

adopted this amendment, We should not supply judicial meaning to a

statute that is plain and unambiguous, Rather, this court should leave

this decision to the Legislature if it wants to extend statute-of-limitations
periods for judgments that have been reversed on appeal for “technical”

 

 
 

om

 

reasons

 

Further, if this court were instead to proceed to recognize the “on
the merits” element discussed in the dissent, we, and not the Legislature,

would also hereafter be called to supply, on a case-by-case basis, which

 

“technical” reversals fit within the “on the merits” exception, and which do
not.

Accordingly, for the above listed reasons, we are not
persuaded by the dissent’s suggestion that NRS 11.340 should be saved
through interpretation rather than struck down on separation of powers
grounds.

Attorney fees and costs award
Finally, Berkson and Malacky challenge the district cou:

 

post-judgment order awarding attorney fees and costs to respondents as a
sanction, arguing, among other things, that NRS 11.340 clearly authorized
the filing of their dismissed complaint and that it therefore cannot be
considered frivolous. Respondents, however, argue that the lawsuit was
frivolous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding sanctions.

‘This court reviews a district court’s award of attorney fees and
costs, as a sanction, for an abuse of discretion. See Nevada Power v, Fluor
Illinois, 108 Nev. 638, 646-47, 837 P.2d 1354, 1960 (1992). Here, the
district court summarily awarded attorney fees and costs without citation
to authority. As noted, NRS 11.340’s plain language permitted Berkson
and Malacky to refile their claims. Moreover, before this opinion, there
was no precedent addressing NRS 11.340, and thus, no reason to
anticipate that the statute would be found to be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, because appellants’ position was supported by NRS 11.340,
we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to

16

 
  
   

[sanction appellants for filing a frivolous claim. Nevada Power, 108 Nev. at
1646-47, 837 P.2d at 1360. As a result, we reverse the attorney fees and
Jcosts awarded to respondents.”

Hardesty

 

"We deny respondents’ request for attorney fees and costs on appeal.

 
PICKERING, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I would uphold the district court's dismissal of Berkson’s and
Malacky’s second suit based on claim preclusion and leave NRS 11.340 in
peace. ‘Though it does not eave Berkson and Malacky, NRS 11.340 had
useful service left a:

 

statute-of-limitations “savings” or tolling provision
and does not deserve to be invalidated on separation of powers grounds.
Ironically, the separation of powers offense is ours, in judicially repealing
a 150-year-old
say should survive judicial review.
1, Res judicata or claim preclusion

This is the third time these partic
court, Nobody (except maybe Berkson and Malacky) seriously contends

 

atute that conventional rules of statutory construction

have come before this

 

that the first appeal did not produce a final, conclusive judgment in favor
of LePome and against Berkson and Malacky. This court so held in the
parties’ second appeal, In re Estate of Miller, 125 Nev. _, 216 P.3d 239
(2009), where we noted that, on the first appeal, the court “reversed” the

 

original judgment, “ruled that because substantial evidence did not
support the verdict, LePome deserved judgment as a matter of law,” id, at
_—. 216 P.3d at 241, and held: “When this court reverses a judgment on a
jury verdict for insufficient evidence and declares the appellant entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, the reversal and remittitur comprise the
judement_by which the parties and the district court are_thereafter
bound.” Id, at __, 216 P.3d at 242 (emphasis added). Because “[a] valid
and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars
another action by the plaintiff on the same claim,” Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 19 (1982), except “[w]hen the judgment is one of dismissal

for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, for nonjoinder or misjoinder of

 

 
 

parties
approval in Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1054 n.27, 194
P.3d 709, 713 n.27 (2008), I conclude, as my colleagues do, that (1) the
reversal in the first appeal resulted in a final judgment, and (2) the prior

or for other non-claims-preclusive reasons, id, § 20, cited with

appellate judgment commands res judicata or claim-preclusive effect,
2, NRS 11.940

Where we part company is on NRS 11.340. The majority
accepts Berkson’s and Malacky’s literal, plain meaning interpretation that
NRS 11.340 means to wipe the litigation slate clean, that is: It gives the

party who loses on appeal an absolute one-

 

jar right to a do-over in a
second suit—even though the appeals court just rejected his or her claims
as meritless. I do not see that NRS 11.340 has such subversive designs on
the conclusiveness of final appellate judgments. In my view, all NRS
11.340 does is grant a one-year extension of an otherwise-expired statute
of limitations when a case that was tried to successful judgment is
reversed on appeal. If, as here, the appellate reversal finally concludes the
case so that claim or issue preclusion applies, those doctrines will defeat
the second suit on the same or related claims, wholly apart from any
statute-of-limitations defense. But what about an appellate reversal that
does not reach the merits and reverses for reasons that make remand back
to the same trial court for disposition on the merits improper—for
example, a suit tried to judgment in federal court that is reversed on
appeal for want of federal subject matter jurisdiction?" In that situation,

“The example in the text is based on Liberace v. Conway, 574 N.E.2d
1010, 1012 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), which used a statute like NRS 11,340 to
save pendent state law claims in a federal case dismissed for want of
subject matter jurisdiction after the statute of limitations had run.

 

 
 

NRS 11.340 provides relief. It gives a plaintiff who won at trial but lost on
appeal on a technical, non-merits-preclusive point a one-year grace period
to refile the suit, when otherwise, without NRS 11.340, the statute of
limitations would have run, The second suit is subject to whatever other
defenses might apply, but the statute of limitations, per NRS 11.340, isn't
one of them.

‘Text, context, and history support the more limited and
constitutionally benign reading I offer. NRS 11.340 dates back to 1861,
when Nevada, then a territory, convened the First Regular Session of its
Legislative Assembly. Using language left virtually untouched to this day,
the provision became law on November 21, 1861, enacted as section 25 of
Chapter XII, “An Act defining the Time of Commencing Civil Actions,” of
Nevada's first civil practice act. 1861 Laws of the Territory of Nevada, ch.
12, § 25, at 302 Just a single sentence, NRS 11.340 has always begun
with a reference to limitations periods—"If an action shall be commenced
within the time prescribed therefor....’—continuing with, “and a
judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal”—and ended with
a reference to limitations periods: “the plaintiff... may commence a new
action within 1 year after the reversal.” Id; 1912 Revised Laws of
Nevada, Vol. 2, § 4980; 1929 Nev. Compiled Laws § 8537; NRS 11.340.

“The scant changes between NRS 11.340’s original and current form
are shown by strike-outs (to show deletions) and bracketed italics (to show
additions): “If an action shall be commenced within the time prescribed
therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal,
the plaintiff, or if he [the plaintiff] die{s] and the cause of action survive[s,
the plaintiff's] his heirs or representatives, may commence a new action
within one [2] year after the reversal.”

 

 
‘And it has always kept company with other sections of its kind, in the
chapters comprising statutes of limitation and their tolling exceptions.
1912 Revised Laws of Nevada, Vol. 2, §§ 4974-4985 (denominated as
Chapter 5 of the Civil Practice Act); 1929 Nev. Compiled Laws §§ 8532-
8542 (denominated as Chapter 5 of the Civil Practice Act); NRS Chapter
11, From this it follows that NRS 11.340 only concerns statutes of
limitations, not other broader defenses like claim and issue preclusion.
See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 46:5, at 189-201 (7th ed. 2007) (“A statute is passed as a
whole and not in parts or sections ....each part or section should be
construed in connection with every other part or section [and] it is not
proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.”
(footnote omitted)); see 2B id, § 51:3 (7th ed. 2008) (statutes passed
together should be construed “in pari materia’

 

Nevada was not alone in making a prior-proceodings savings
provision part of its statute-of-limitations scheme. California had an
identical tolling statute, 3 Codes of California § 355 (Bender-Moss
Company 1909), enacted March 11, 1872, reprinted in Bollinger v.
National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn,, 154 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1944),
while New York had something similar, Gaines v, City of New York, 109
N.E. 594, 595 (N.Y. 1915) (tracing the New York statute back to 1788), a8
did Massachusetts, Liberace, 574 N.E.2d at 1012 (tracing the
Massachusetts statute back to 1835), Florida, City of Orlando v. Murphy,
94 F.2d 426, 429 n.2 (Sth Cir. 1938) (reprinting and applying Florida's
version of NRS 11.340), and other states, see 51 Am, Jur. 2d Limitation of
Actions §§ 287-88 (2000). Indeed, these statutes go all the way back to the
English Limitation Act of 1623. See Bollinger, 154 P.2d at 404 (“section

 

 
 

355 of the [California] Code of Civil Procedure’—containing language
identical to NRS 11.340—was “copied from section 84 of the New York
Code of Procedure, which in turn was based on section 4 of the English
Limitation Act of 1623"). Legal thinkers as profound as Cardozo and
‘Traynor have found worth in these savings statutes:

“whatever verbal differences exist, the purpose
and scope of [savings statutes like NRS 11.340)
are identical in substance with [their] prototype,
the English act of 1623....The statute is
designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right
to a hearing in court till he reaches a judgment on
the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not to
be frittered away by any narrow construction. The
important consideration is that, by invoking
judicial aid, a litigant gives timely notice to his
adversary of a present purpose to maintain his
rights before the courts.”

Bollinger, 154 P.2d at 405 (Traynor, J.) (quoting Gaines, 109 N-B. at 596
(Cardozo, J.).

If NRS 11.340 has the “plain meaning” the majority discerns,
it is surprising that over the past 400 years, no other court has read its
jurisdiction's cognate statute this way. The few courts to have considered
Berkson's and Malacky’s “plain meaning” reading have rejected it. Thus,
in City of Orlando v. Murphy, 94 F.2d 426 (Sth Cir. 1938), Murphy, who
lost on a prior appeal, invoked a Florida statute like NRS 11.340 to argue
he could start his case all over again, despite the appellate court judgment
against him. The court made short work of Murphy's argument (and
case), “[T]he statute under which [Murphy] claims the right to file does
not enlarge or affect, indeed, it has nothing whatever to do with, the right
of a person after reversal to retry his case, either in the same action or by
‘a new suit, when the law of the case, as settled by the reversing decision

 

 
ose

 

and opinion, leaves nothing to retry.” Id. at 429. Accord Liberace, 574

N.E.2d at 1013 (“As toa case adjudicated on the merits [on a prior appeal],

 

principles of res judicata apply and the renewal statute [comparable to
NRS 11.340] has no pertinence."); see 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions
§ 288 (2000) (observing that “[t]he rule that a savings statute [like NRS

 

11.340] is inapplicable if the prior action was dismissed on the merits is
essentially a corollary of the principle of res judicata that once a claim is
brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions are barred”).
3. Separation of powers/constitutional conflict

‘The majority rejects a Murphy-based reading of NRS 11.340
as adding words the statute doesn't contain, in violation of the “plain
meaning” rule. (Plain meaning may be in the eyes of the beholder—the
majority's reading applies NRS 11.340 to claim and issue preclusion when
all the statute addresses are limitations periods.) Regardless, the “plain

meaning” rule does not justify reading a statute in a way that leads to an

 

Some states have statutes that, either originally or by amendment,
specify that the reversal must be other than on the merits for tolling to
occur. See Hullv, Central Pathol. Serv, Med, Clin,, 34 Cal. Rptr. 24 175,
178 (Ct. App. 1994) (reprinting amended version of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
355). This eliminates ambiguity by making express the otherwise implicit
restriction that such statutes only apply to a_statuto-of-limitations
defense, not res judicata or claim preclusion. See Yonkers Contracting v,
Port Authority, 712 N.E.2d 678, 681 (N.Y. 1999) (New York's carve-out of
“final judgment upon the merits” from its prior-proceedings tolling statute
is “essentially a corollary of the principle of res judicata’). ‘These
amendments reinforce the argument that statutes like NRS 11.340 have
no pretensions of subverting final appellate judgments.

 
absurd result, State v. Friend, 118 Nev. 115, 120-21, 40 P.3d 436, 439

 

(2002), or that invalidates a statute on separation of powers grounds when
another, more limited reading would not. Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230,
282-39, 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952).

|In Waite, the court confronted a statute that, read literally,
could have run afoul of the Nevada Constitution’s separation of powers
clause. The court declined to read the statute aggressively, “In the light
of our constitutional division of the powers of government, it is our view
that such an invasion of the sphere of the judicial department could not
have been contemplated by the legislature.” Id, at 233, 245 P.2d at 996
(Citing Nev. Const. art. 8, § 1). Waite’s circumspect approach seems
especially appropriate here, where the statute challenged as
uncon:

  

tutional was passed in 1861, three years before the Nevada
Constitution was adopted, Debates & Proceedings of the Nevada State
Constitutional Convention of 1864, at 779 (Andrew J. Marsh off. rep.
1866), and has been reenacted many times since, gee supra note 2. See
alse Zamora_v, Price, 125 Nev, _, __, 213 P.3d 490, 492-93 (2009)
(statutes are presumed to be valid” and will be upheld unless “the
constitution is clearly violated” (citing Universal Electric v. Labor Comm’r,
109 Nev, 127, 129, 847 P.2d 1372, 1873-74 (1993)); 2A Sutherland
Statutory Construction, supra, § 45:11, at 81-83 (‘statutory provisions
should be construed to avoid unconstitutionality....If [a] law is

 

reasonably open to two constructions, one that renders it unconstitutional

and one that does not, the court must adopt the interpretation that
upholds [its] constitutionality.” (footnote omitted)).

At most, NRS 11.340 can be read two ways. Its ambiguity lies
in its unqualified use of the word “reversal.” A reversal can amount to a

 

 
final judgment on the merit

 

as with the parties’ first appeal here; it can
involve a reversal and remand for a new trial before the same trial court
for remediable error; or a reversal can lead to dismissal on grounds
unrelated to the merits, such as improper venue, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, or other defect. Because NRS 11.340 does not differentiate
among possible reversals does not mean that it strips final appellate
judgments of their claim- and issue-preclusive effect. Another, equally

plausible reading is that NRS 11.340 only applies to statutes-of-limitation

 

defenses raised in cas

 

involving reversals for reasons courts recognize as
grounds for avoiding claim and issue preclusion in a later-filed, second
suit. This leaves the claim and

 

sue preclusion issue where the majority's
separation of powers analysis says it should remain: With the courts.
This case does not test NRS 11.340’s outer limits, as occurred
Bollinger. It can and should be disposed of based on Berkson and
Malacky having sustained a judgment on the merits against them that
they now cannot avoid. But I note that because a statute is old does not
Justify its judicial repeal. See 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra,
§ 34:5, at 35-36 (7th ed. 2009) (the separation of powers doctrine places
“[t]he responsibility to clear dead wood out of the statute books... with

“Supporting this reading of NRS 11.340 is its companion statute,
NRS 11.500, which the Legislature enacted in 2003 to provide for an
additional 90 days to refile a suit dismissed for want of subject matter
Jurisdiction, even at the district court level. 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 376, § 1,
at 2134-35. NRS 11,500 and NRS 11.40 overlap, with the latter only
applying to appeals but providing a longor grace period of one year as
opposed to 90 days. Thus, NRS 11.500 does not appear to have repealed
NRS 11.340 by implication. See also State v, Thompson, 89 Nev. 320, 322-
23, 511 P.2d 1043, 1045 (1973) (repeals by implication are disfavored).

 

 
 

legislatures, even though legislative bodies are almost exclusively

 

preoccupied with passing new law:

 

Despite what to us moderns is its confusing brevity, I submit
that NRS 11.340 still has a legitimate purpose, in varied, perhaps
Cf. Arceo v, Tolliver, 19 So. 3d 67,
2009) (Mississippi's analogous savings statute, which dates back

untested and
75 (Mis
to 1848, could have saved the plaintiffs second malpractice suit after the

yet unimagined way

   

 

first was dismissed for lack of the pre-suit notice required) (dictum). For
this reason, I would not invalidate NRS 11.340 on separation of powers
grounds but leave it intact for another litigant another day. While I thus
concur in the decision to affirm the dismissal below, I respectfully dissent
from the majority's interpretation and invalidation of NRS 11.340 on
separation of powers grounds and its reversal of the district court's
decision awarding attorney fees to LePome.