Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Walter A. Paget

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 26 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2614-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Walter A. Paget, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
Complainant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Walter A. Paget,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PAGET 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 29, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
February 18, 2003   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS and SYKES, JJ., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe, Krohn, Pope, McCarthy & Haas, LLP, 
Edgerton. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by David A. 
Saichek and Saichek Law Offices, S.C., Milwaukee.   
 
 
2003 WI 26 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2614-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Walter A. Paget, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Walter A. Paget,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 29, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.  Proceeding dismissed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
has appealed from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommendation of the referee that Attorney Walter A. Paget did 
not engage in professional misconduct with regard to client 
funds. 
¶2 
We agree with the referee's recommendation and adopt 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and discussion in his 
report.  
No. 
01-2614-D   
 
2 
 
¶3 
Paget was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin in 
1992.  His license was administratively suspended on June 9, 
1999, for failure to comply with Continuing Legal Education 
(CLE) requirements and he has not practiced since.  Prior to 
that, on May 29, 1998, he consented to the imposition of a 
private reprimand for having knowingly engaged in the practice 
of law while his license was suspended for a period during 1997, 
again for a CLE violation.  
¶4 
The present case involves an OLR complaint against 
Paget on October 1, 2001, claiming that he (1) accepted money 
specifically intended for client restitution and failed to hold 
that money in a trust account in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a);1 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.15(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity. Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise. All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c). The trust 
account shall be maintained in a bank, savings bank, 
trust 
company, 
credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin. The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
import. No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited in such an account. Unless the client 
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
No. 
01-2614-D   
 
3 
 
and (2) failed to deliver the money for restitution in violation 
of SCR 20:1.15(b).2  Paget admitted many of the factual 
allegations of the complaint but denied any misconduct.  
¶5 
The complaint arises out of Paget's representation of 
Enrique Baez on a theft charge and an accompanying probation 
revocation that was later dropped.  There is no documentation 
concerning Paget's representation of Baez, specifically how 
attorney's fees would be paid.  However, Baez periodically paid 
Paget, by cash and money orders, an amount that Baez believes 
was approximately $2400.  Paget claims the amount was only 
approximately $1600.  Baez claims that approximately $845 of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import. Other property of 
a client or third person shall be identified as such 
and 
appropriately 
safeguarded. If 
a lawyer 
also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
2 SCR 20:1.15(b) provides: 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in 
which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 
person in writing. Except as stated in this rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 
or third person any funds or other property that the 
client or third person is entitled to receive and, 
upon request by the client or third person, shall 
render a full accounting regarding such property. 
No. 
01-2614-D   
 
4 
 
amount he paid Paget was intended to be held by Paget in trust 
for the purpose of paying the approximately $3600 restitution 
for the theft when that eventually would be ordered.  Paget 
denies this and maintains that all payments he received from 
Baez were solely for the purpose of attorney's fees.  Once 
again, there is no documentary evidence of any of this.  Paget 
did maintain a trust account but never deposited anything 
received from Baez into it.   
¶6 
Aside from Baez, who testified at the OLR hearing, the 
only documentary evidence in support of his claim consisted of 
the following. 
¶7 
First, a log kept by the Department of Corrections 
(DOC) concerning Baez contained an entry for April 15, 1997, 
(Baez had pled guilty on February 10, 1997) that stated in part: 
Contacted D's lawyer to verify D has been making 
payments toward Sears; attorney states he has $700 fm. 
D; attorney states he's attempted to contact D.A. in 
order to find out who/where the restitution needs to 
be forwarded.  
Paget testified that he did have a telephone conversation with 
the DOC probation and parole agent but denies that he said that 
he was holding money.  Rather, Paget testified that he told the 
agent that Baez had merely told him that Baez had raised the 
$700 toward restitution and it was not actually in Paget's 
hands. 
¶8 
Second, on April 22, 1997, Paget, appearing on behalf 
of Baez at sentencing, argued in Milwaukee County Circuit Court: 
[I]nsofar as the restitution, Baez has given me since 
the plea date $845 to apply toward restitution.  I 
No. 
01-2614-D   
 
5 
 
have attempted to contact the State to get those funds 
in the proper hands, but we ended up voicemailing each 
other to go nowhere.  I'm prepared today to write a 
check out of my cost account for $845 to get this 
restitution rolling.  
Paget admitted making this statement but still insisted he never 
had any money from Baez for restitution.  Rather, he claims he 
merely made the statement to "protect the interest" of his 
client.  Paget believes he easily could have obtained the funds 
from Baez had the court so ordered and therefore it was not 
"misleading" the court by suggesting that the funds were already 
in Paget's hands.  Paget noted that the court eventually refused 
the offer to pay on the spot and thereafter Paget refused Baez's 
offer to him to "save" money for him.  Paget says he told Baez 
to keep the money himself until the full amount of the 
restitution could be raised. 
¶9 
The referee, Michael Ash, found in general that 
"[v]irtually all the facts concerning Paget's representation of 
Baez, and Baez's payments to Paget, are unclear and uncertain."  
The referee considered Paget an "impressive . . . honest and 
candid" witness on direct examination with "no special axe to 
grind."  However, the referee viewed him as "defensive and 
evasive" 
on 
cross-examination. 
 
On 
balance, 
the 
referee 
characterized Baez as a "fairly strong witness" for OLR but "not 
necessarily one whose every word I would be inclined to credit."  
In particular, the referee focused on Baez's inability to 
identify any specific words Paget said back to him indicating 
that Paget——and not just Baez——intended that some of the funds 
paid over were intended to be held for restitution.   
No. 
01-2614-D   
 
6 
 
¶10 The referee did not directly comment on Paget's 
credibility.  However, the referee acknowledged that the DOC log 
"raises questions" and concluded that Paget's denial that he 
made the statement to the DOC agent "does not completely dispel" 
those questions.  But the referee indicated that the DOC agent's 
inability to recall the conversation made it "difficult to 
disbelieve Paget's version." 
¶11 The referee further acknowledged the difficulty with 
Paget's statement in court, Paget's explanation for which the 
referee did not consider "completely convincing."  Yet the 
referee 
concluded 
that 
he 
could 
not 
"discredit 
it 
with 
confidence" and drew the conclusion that there would have been 
no reason for Paget to cheat his client out of the money if 
indeed he had just admitted in open court that he was holding 
the funds for restitution. 
¶12 The referee concluded there had been no disciplinary 
violations: 
Although Baez may have believed that he had given 
Paget money for restitution, the OLR did not establish 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 
Baez provided Paget with money mutually understood to 
have been held in trust by Paget pending the use of 
such funds for restitution . . . It also did not 
establish that he "failed to deliver" such funds in 
violation of SCR 20:1.15(b) . . . [Given] the complete 
lack of any documents or other specific information 
about the amounts, timing, form, nature and purpose of 
Baez's payments to Paget, I have concluded that Paget 
has not been proven to had committed misconduct.  
The referee's findings of fact will be adopted unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
No. 
01-2614-D   
 
7 
 
Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718; 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 
562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  Where there is conflicting evidence, the 
referee, as the trier of fact, is the ultimate arbiter.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Camacho, 126 Wis. 2d 104, 
375 N.W.2d 204 (1985); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Pump, 120 Wis. 2d 422, 355 N.W.2d 248 (1984).  We will not make 
a finding that the referee could have made on the evidence 
before him but did not.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Wood, 122 Wis. 2d 610, 363 N.W.2d 220 (1984).   
¶13 The keys to this matter center on the impact of the 
DOC log entry and the court transcript, and the credibility 
battle between Baez and Paget. 
¶14 Obviously the DOC log entry and the court transcript, 
viewed in isolation, support Baez's claim.  On the other hand, 
Paget had an explanation for both pieces of evidence that the 
referee considered "difficult to disbelieve" and impossible to 
"discredit with confidence."   
¶15 The report does not clearly indicate whether the 
referee believed Paget rather than Baez or whether there was 
insufficient evidence to permit any finding in that regard.  
Either way, it is evident that the referee believed at the very 
least that there was no mutual understanding between Paget and 
Baez as to the proper disposition of funds, and therefore he 
could not conclude that the OLR had sustained its burden to 
establish by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 
Paget had committed misconduct.   
No. 
01-2614-D   
 
8 
 
¶16 It 
is 
the 
function 
of 
the 
referee 
in 
these 
disciplinary matters to hear conflicting testimony, examine 
documentary evidence and reach findings that resolve disputed 
matters.  While another trier of fact perhaps might have 
rendered  different findings and then concluded that misconduct 
had occurred, we cannot hold that the referee's findings are 
clearly erroneous in any respect.  The OLR asks us to take the 
referee's findings and after a de novo review conclude that 
misconduct occurred.  We cannot do this because the present 
findings plainly do not support that conclusion.  
¶17 Accordingly, 
we 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
conclude that no professional misconduct was committed in this 
matter.  
¶18 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary proceeding is 
dismissed without costs to either party.  
No.  01-2614.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
 
¶19 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I respect and 
appreciate the work of the court's appointed referees in the 
Lawyer Regulation System.  Their findings of fact are entitled 
to great deference and should not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  For the court to adopt a different standard 
of review would plunge us into a fact-finding role to which we 
are not well suited. 
¶20 Because it is important to honor the standard of 
review, I concur in the decision of the court.  I write 
separately, however, to emphasize that if I had a free hand, I 
would decide the case differently. 
¶21 To me, the paper record in this case is clear.  
Enrique Baez was convicted of theft in February 1997.  He was 
sentenced for the theft on April 22, 1997.  He realized early on 
that restitution would be part of his sentence.  On April 14, 
1997, Baez told his probation agent that he had given money to 
his attorney, Walter Paget, to be applied to restitution.  The 
agent recorded the following entry in her log: "The offender 
states he has been making restitution to Sears giving the 
payments to his lawyer who directs the money to the victim."  
The next day the agent contacted Attorney Paget and then 
reported her account of the conversation: 
Contacted 
[defendant's] 
lawyer 
to 
verify 
[defendant] has been making payments towards Sears; 
[Attorney] 
states 
he 
has 
$700 
from [defendant]; 
[Attorney] states he's attempted to contact [district 
attorney] 
in 
order 
to 
find 
out 
who/where 
the 
restitution needs to be forwarded.  [Defendant] stated 
No.  01-2614.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
that he also had $500 in bail that would be applied 
towards balance. 
¶22 One week later, at the sentencing hearing, Attorney 
Paget addressed Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Timothy G. 
Dugan: 
MR. PAGET: Finally, insofar as the restitution, 
Mr. Baez has given me since the plea date $845 to 
apply towards restitution.  I've attempted to contact 
the State to get these funds in the proper hands, but 
we ended up voice mailing each other to nowhere.  I'm 
prepared today to write a check out of my cost account 
for $845 to get this restitution rolling. 
¶23 There 
can 
be 
no 
dispute 
that 
Attorney 
Paget's 
statement in court acknowledges the receipt of $845 from Baez to 
be used for restitution.  There can be no dispute that Baez's 
probation agent contacted Paget a week earlier to discuss 
restitution and then summarized a statement that is entirely 
consistent with Paget's later statement in court.  In addition, 
the record shows that Baez maintained——over a period of several 
years——that he paid more than $800 in restitution to Attorney 
Paget.  He acted in conformity with that position when he filed 
a grievance against Paget and testified under oath in support of 
his grievance. 
¶24 To defend himself, Attorney Paget was forced to do 
more than dispute Baez's statements.  He had to repudiate his 
own statements affirming Baez's assertions.  I find his 
explanations unpersuasive.  If Attorney Paget never received any 
money from Baez for restitution, as he claims, he should never 
have looked a circuit judge in the eye and told him otherwise. 
No.  01-2614.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
¶25 Attorney Paget prevails in the disciplinary action for 
the reasons stated, but the cloud over his victory may be with 
him for a long time. 
¶26 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and DIANE S. SYKES join this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  01-2614.dtp 
 
 
 
 
1