Title: Commonwealth v. Morin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-11591 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AARON MORIN. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     May 5, 2017. - November 21, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  Practice, Criminal, 
Required finding, New trial, Assistance of counsel, 
Instructions to jury, Warrant, Capital case.  
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Search and 
seizure, Probable cause.  Due Process of Law, Assistance of 
counsel.  Search and Seizure, Warrant, Probable cause.  
Probable Cause.  Cellular Telephone. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 9, 2010. 
 
 
The case tried before Robert J. Kane, J., and a motion for 
a new trial, filed on August 4, 2014, was heard by him. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Mary E. O'Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, K. Neil Austin, Christopher E. Hart, & 
Kelly S. Caiazzo, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                 
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-
murder, with unarmed robbery as the predicate felony, in the 
death of Chad Fleming on November 3, 2009.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth's theory was that the defendant, along with his 
codefendant, Nelson Melo, and two unknown accomplices, robbed 
the victim of drugs and money, and that the killing occurred in 
connection with the robbery.2  The defendant argues in this 
appeal, as he did in his motion for a new trial, that trial 
counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the search of the 
defendant's cellular telephone constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In addition, the defendant raises the 
following claims of error at trial:  (1) the evidence was 
insufficient for a jury to find that the victim's death was 
connected to the robbery or that the unarmed robbery was 
committed with conscious disregard for the risk to human life; 
(2) the instruction on felony-murder was erroneous; and (3) the 
judge abused his discretion in excluding testimony concerning a 
statement made by the victim.  Finally, the defendant contends 
that this court should abolish the common-law felony-murder 
rule. 
                                                 
 
2 Nelson Melo was tried separately, and convicted of felony-
murder.  We affirmed his conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Melo, 
472 Mass. 278, 279 (2015). 
3 
 
 
 
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support his 
conviction, but that the defendant is entitled to a new trial 
because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have 
filed a motion to suppress the search of his cellular telephone; 
and the improperly seized evidence from that device, which was 
introduced at trial, likely influenced the jury's verdict.  
Because several other issues raised by the defendant may arise 
upon retrial, we also address these arguments.3   
 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
677 (1979), and reserving some facts for our discussion of 
specific issues. 
The defendant sold large quantities of Percocet pills in 
areas of southeastern Massachusetts.  His codefendant was his 
source of supply.  The codefendant, in turn, obtained his supply 
of thirty-milligram Percocet pills from the victim, most often 
through express mail packages shipped from Florida, where the 
victim lived, to Massachusetts. 
 
Sometime in October, 2009, the defendant became 
dissatisfied with this arrangement, after the codefendant began 
shortchanging the victim by paying him less than the full amount 
                                                 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers addressing 
the abolition of felony-murder. 
4 
 
 
had been arranged for the pills, and the victim, angered at not 
receiving the agreed price, began selling pills directly to 
customers in Massachusetts, undercutting the defendant's sales.  
The defendant related his frustration to the codefendant and to 
a friend, Maurice Butler.  He told Butler, who was also a friend 
of the victim, that he was "getting mad that now [the pills] 
were going other places." 
 
A few days before November 3, 2009, the defendant attempted 
to recruit some people to help him rob the victim.  He contacted 
Butler and offered him "a chance for you to make some money 
. . . if you want to get in on this."  Butler had need of the 
money, but was wary because he thought that the money-making 
opportunity involved robbing the victim.  He told the defendant 
that the victim trusted him and that he would never rob the 
victim.  After this remark, the defendant ended the 
conversation. 
 
On November 2, 2009, the defendant called another friend, 
Michael Matteson.  They met at a restaurant, and the defendant 
asked Matteson if he "wanted to make some extra money" by 
helping him rob his "connect's connect" for "a bunch of Percs."  
In exchange for Matteson's assistance, the defendant offered to 
forgive a $2,000 debt Matteson owed him, and to pay Matteson an 
additional $5,000.  Matteson did not know the drug supplier's 
5 
 
 
identity, but learned that he was traveling from Florida, and 
would be arriving the following day. 
 
The defendant told Matteson that the robbery would take 
place at an apartment owned by the codefendant.  The codefendant 
would use the promise of a drug deal to lure his "connect" to 
the apartment.  The codefendant would bring with him 
approximately $40,000 in cash, which he purportedly would use to 
purchase a "few thousand Perc 30's" from the victim.  The 
codefendant would leave the back door open, so that the 
defendant, Matteson, and others could enter.  They would "run 
in, grab the stuff, and leave."  Matteson's role would be to 
grab the "money and drugs" from the table, and to get out of the 
house.  The defendant would "take care" of the codefendant 
during the robbery, e.g., would make it appear to the victim as 
though the codefendant were not involved.  The defendant 
summarized the plan by saying that "[i]t was just supposed to be 
a quick rip" and "[i]t would be easy," because the victim was 
young and would be easily intimidated.  Matteson did not agree 
to participate at that point, and the defendant told him to 
think about it.4 
                                                 
 
4 On November 3, 2009, the defendant telephoned Michael 
Matteson and also sent him several text messages in an effort to 
confirm his participation in the robbery.  Matteson answered the 
text messages vaguely and did not respond to the calls. 
6 
 
 
 
On the same day, the defendant visited the codefendant at 
his house.  The codefendant's wife, Kendra Melo,5 overheard the 
defendant whispering to her husband that he, or they, would 
"take care of it" and also whispering "something about wearing a 
black hat." 
 
On the day of the robbery, November 3, 2009, the 
codefendant told Michael Stenstream, the second-floor tenant in 
the building where the robbery was to take place,6 not to be in 
the apartment that evening.  At some point during the day, 
Kendra saw the codefendant holding a box full of $58,000 in 
cash, and talking to someone on the telephone; she heard him 
say, "[a]m I going to get it back?"  Sometime between 7:30 and 
8 P.M., the codefendant left his house, wearing a black hat. 
 
When the codefendant arrived at his rental property, he 
spoke with his sister, Lucia (Lucy) Rodriguez, who lived in the 
first floor apartment with her husband, Gabriel Rodriguez, and 
their three children.7  The codefendant then went upstairs.  At 
approximately 8:30 P.M., he called Kendra.  While they were 
talking, she received a call from the victim.  When Kendra told 
the codefendant the name of the caller, the codefendant 
                                                 
 
5 Because Kendra Melo shares a last name with the 
codefendant, her husband, we refer to her by her first name. 
 
 
6 The codefendant owned the building. 
 
 
7  Because they share a last name, we refer to Lucy and 
Gabriel Rodriguez by their first names. 
7 
 
 
instructed her to tell the victim that they would meet at the 
apartment, rather than at the house where the codefendant and 
Kendra lived.  At approximately 8:45 P.M., Stenstream and his 
girl friend left their apartment and went to dinner at a nearby 
restaurant.  
 
Approximately forty-five minutes later, several other 
individuals arrived at the house and went upstairs.  After a few 
minutes, Lucy and Gabriel Rodriguez heard loud banging coming 
from the upstairs apartment.  It sounded like people running 
around.  The noise lasted a few minutes and caused the 
chandelier in the Rodriguez's apartment to shake.  About a 
minute later, the codefendant came downstairs.  Lucy heard more 
loud noises from upstairs.  They sounded like "a fight going on" 
and "stuff breaking."  The codefendant ran out of the apartment, 
heading for the stairs.  Before he could run up the stairs, what 
sounded like three sets of footsteps ran down the stairs; Lucy 
then saw an automobile carrying what looked like three people 
pull out of her driveway and drive away.  The codefendant came 
downstairs looking "a little scared," and grabbed some bags of 
frozen peas from the freezer.  Shortly after these individuals 
left, Lucy heard a voice she did not recognize coming from 
upstairs.8  A little while later, Lucy went upstairs, and saw the 
                                                 
 
8 As discussed during a sidebar hearing, Lucy had testified 
at the codefendant's trial that she had heard the person say, 
8 
 
 
codefendant bending over the victim, who was unconscious and 
laying on a bed.  She did not see anyone else in the apartment.  
She attempted to determine whether the victim had a pulse, but 
was unable to locate one.  At the codefendant's request, she 
left to go down the street and get his wife, Kendra, to help him 
take the victim to the hospital. 
 
At some point that evening, the defendant called Kendra; he 
sounded out of breath and said, "[t]hat kid was tough." 
 
A few minutes before 10 P.M., Stenstream and his girl 
friend returned to their apartment.  There was blood on the 
carpeting, the walls, and the sofa in the living room.  Some 
decorations had been knocked over and were broken.  Stenstream 
found the codefendant in one of the bedrooms, standing over the 
victim, who was lying face up on the bed.  The codefendant 
looked panicked, and was imploring the victim to wake up.  
 
After some discussion, the codefendant agreed to take the 
victim to the hospital.  Stenstream helped carry the lifeless 
victim downstairs to the victim's vehicle.  Gabriel opened the 
door, and Stenstream and the codefendant placed the victim 
inside the vehicle.  Stenstream then cleaned up his apartment by 
removing blood stains from the floor and walls.  He found two 
large plastic "zip ties," one in the living room and one in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
"I'm okay.  I'm okay."  The judge at the defendant's trial 
permitted her to testify that she heard a voice speaking, but 
precluded all testimony about the content of the statement. 
9 
 
 
kitchen.  The one in the living room had been cut, and one had 
blood on it.  He put both zip ties in the trash.9  Stenstream 
also found a wallet on the floor near the bed in the spare 
bedroom; it contained the victim's driver's license. 
 
The codefendant arrived at the hospital with the victim at 
approximately 11 P.M.   An emergency department physician 
determined immediately that the victim, who was in the beginning 
stages of rigor mortis, was dead.  The physician noted a cut on 
the victim's head, blood on his face and nose, and dried blood 
around his mouth.  The medical examiner determined that the 
victim had been severely beaten; he had deep lacerations and 
abrasions on his head, internal injuries to his torso, bruises 
and abrasions on arms and legs, and two broken ribs; none of 
those injuries would have been sufficient to cause death.  The 
cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation. 
 
On November 5, 2009, two days after the victim's death, the 
defendant met with Matteson.  He told Matteson to "get the 
battery out of [Matteson's cellular telephone], so that no one 
can hear the conversation."  The defendant said that if the 
police asked Matteson where he had been in the evening of 
November 3, 2009, he was to say that he had been with the 
defendant at a restaurant. 
                                                 
 
9 In a search of Stenstream's apartment later that night, 
police found two "extremely large" zip ties in the trash. 
10 
 
 
 
A few days after the victim's death, when the codefendant 
had been arrested, the defendant called Kendra and told her he 
would give her some money.  Kendra went to the defendant's 
house, and he gave her $5,000.  The defendant told Kendra that 
he "hop[ed] that [the codefendant] wouldn't rat him out." 
 
2.  Trial proceedings.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
proceeded on all three theories of murder in the first degree:  
deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
felony-murder, with the predicate felony of unarmed robbery.  
The jury convicted the defendant of first degree felony-murder.  
His motion to set aside the verdict was denied by the trial 
judge.  The defendant filed a motion for a new trial in the 
Superior Court, arguing that he had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and also filed a notice of appeal to this 
court.  The matter was remanded to the Superior Court for 
consideration of the motion for a new trial.  After that motion 
was denied, the defendant's appeal from the denial was 
consolidated with his direct appeal. 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
defendant contends that he was not present "when [the 
codefendant] unilaterally strangled the victim for reasons 
contrary to any established intention or plan" of the 
conspirators, after the unarmed robbery had been completed and 
he and two others had left the scene of the robbery.  Therefore, 
11 
 
 
he argues, the strangulation did not occur during the course of 
the robbery, and he could not have committed the predicate 
felony of unarmed robbery with a conscious disregard for human 
life. 
We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction of felony-murder.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. at 677.  "The felony-murder rule 'imposes criminal 
liability for homicide on all participants in a certain common 
criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that 
enterprise.'"  Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 307 
(2013), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Brown, 
477 Mass. 805 (2017),  quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 
Mass. 492, 502 (1982).  Once a defendant participates in the 
underlying felony, with the intent or shared intent to commit 
that felony, he or she becomes liable for a death that "followed 
naturally and probably from the carrying out of the joint 
enterprise" (citation and emphasis omitted).  Hanright, supra.  
See Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 272 (2015) (felony-
murder rule imposes "vicarious criminal liability for every act 
resulting in death committed by a joint venturer in furtherance 
of the joint venture, that is, the act of one is treated as the 
act of all"); Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 256 Mass. 387, 392 
(1926) ("it is no defen[s]e for the associates engaged with 
12 
 
 
others in the commission of a robbery, that they did not intend 
to take life in its perpetration, or that they forbade their 
companions to kill"). 
The Commonwealth did not contend that there had been any 
plan to kill or injure the victim during the course of the 
unarmed robbery, and, indeed, conceded that there had been no 
plan to do so.  The Commonwealth also conceded that the evidence 
could have supported the conclusion that the victim was alive 
and had not suffered any life threatening injuries when the 
defendant left the apartment and drove away, and that the victim 
had been strangled by the codefendant. Contrary to the 
defendant's argument, however, the Commonwealth is not required 
to prove that the killing occurred during the course of the 
predicate felony.  Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 466 
(1990).  For purposes of felony-murder, the homicide and the 
predicate felony "need only to have occurred as part of one 
continuous transaction"; and the connection is sufficient as 
long as the predicate felony and the homicide "took place at 
substantially the same time and place."  Id.  The killing may 
occur after the completion of the predicate felony as long as 
the killing is "within the res gestae of the felonious conduct" 
(quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 
565 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 422 Mass. 294, 
300 n.2 (1996).  See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 Mass. 249, 251, 
13 
 
 
255-256, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011) (killing is part of 
robbery where shoplifter fled store after stealing item and 
fatally stabbed employee while resisting efforts to take him 
back to store). 
Here, the evidence would have allowed a reasonable juror to 
find that the codefendant's act of strangling the victim was 
part of a single continuous transaction, begun with the 
defendant's plan to rob the victim of his large supply of 
Percocet pills, and to retain the purported "buy" money that the 
codefendant brought to the scene.  The robbery and the 
strangulation occurred inside Stenstream's apartment, within a 
thirty-minute time frame, between 9:30 P.M. and 10 P.M.10  
Moreover, the jury could have found that the killing was 
causally related to the robbery.  As we stated in Commonwealth 
v. Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. at 566, and Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 
                                                 
10 Stenstream and his girl friend left his second floor 
apartment at "roughly" 8:45 P.M.  At 9 P.M., the codefendant 
arrived at the house and spoke to his sister, Lucy, in her first 
floor apartment.  At approximately 9:19 P.M., Kendra spoke to 
the victim and told him to go to Stenstream's apartment rather 
than to the house were the codefendant lived.  The victim 
arrived at approximately 9:30 P.M. Stenstream returned to the 
house at approximately 9:45 P.M., sent a text message to Nelson 
while waiting in the driveway, and entered his apartment at 
approximately 9:50 P.M.  There, he found the unconscious victim 
laying on the bed with the codefendant hunched over him.  At 
9:55 P.M., while the codefendant was upstairs and Lucy was in 
her first-floor kitchen, she sent the codefendant a text message 
asking "who those three guys are that just left," whether they 
would be coming back, and if anyone had been hurt.  He did not 
respond to the text message, but came back downstairs to the 
kitchen "a few minutes" later. 
14 
 
 
Mass. 816, 851 (1996), "were it not for the underlying felony, 
it is probable that [the victim] would not have been . . . 
[strangled]."  See Commonwealth v. Dellelo, 349 Mass. 525, 529-
530 (1965) (if killing occurred after robbery was complete, but 
during defendant's escape or flight, "the killing is referable 
to the robbery"). 
In addition, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence also supported a reasonable inference 
that the defendant committed the unarmed robbery with conscious 
disregard for the risk to human life.  The defendant's plan, as 
he reported it to Matteson, involved luring the victim to an 
apartment to participate in a $40,000 drug transaction, then 
having multiple assailants rush into the apartment while the 
purported drug deal was taking place.  The multiple individuals 
were necessary to overpower and restrain the victim and to 
pretend to overpower the codefendant, while grabbing the money 
and drugs from the table and running from the apartment. 
Although the defendant assured Matteson that "[i]t would be 
an easy rip," because of the victim's youth and likely level of 
fear when confronted with multiple attackers, a reasonable juror 
could have inferred that the victim resisted and the robbery 
turned violent.  The defendant indicated that the victim put up 
a fight, telling Kendra, "[t]hat kid was tough."  The victim 
sustained multiple blunt force injuries, including a laceration 
15 
 
 
on his scalp penetrating almost to the bone; multiple contusions 
and abrasions to the head and face; abrasions on the forearms, 
wrists, hands, and legs; soft tissue damage to the torso; and 
two fractured ribs which punctured a lung.  See Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 428 Mass. 362, 365 (1998) (conscious disregard for risk 
to human life where defendant chased down victim after drug deal 
went awry, hit victim in face, kept striking victim as he 
attempted to flee, and continued assault as two acquaintances 
joined in, knowing that one was armed with knife); Commonwealth 
v. Lopez, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 393 (2011) (grand jury heard 
sufficient evidence of conscious disregard for human life where 
defendant "sucker punched" delivery driver, causing victim to 
fall backward down flight of stairs). 
b.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  Where a defendant 
has been convicted of murder in the first degree, we review a 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the more 
favorable standard of a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice standard, in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 358 (2016).  "We 
consider whether there was an error in the course of the trial 
(by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there 
was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury’s 
conclusion."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 472 
Mass. 317, 327, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 418 (2015). 
16 
 
 
The defendant argued in his motion for a new trial that 
counsel's failure to challenge his unlawful detention, and the 
subsequent improper interrogation, constituted ineffective 
assistance.  He maintained also that, as a result of having been 
subject to an illegal custodial interrogation, police improperly 
seized his cellular telephone without probable cause.  In 
addition, the defendant argued that the subsequently-issued 
warrant authorizing the search of the telephone was invalid.  To 
prevail on this claim, the defendant was required to establish, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that trial counsel 
overlooked a meritorious motion to suppress, see Commonwealth v. 
Chatman, 466 Mass. 327, 335 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 840 (2016), 
citing Commonwealth v. Banville, 457 Mass. 530, 534, 539 (2010), 
and that trial counsel's failure to file such a motion created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Banville, supra at 534. 
In denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, the 
trial judge determined that, because the Commonwealth did not 
introduce the statements the defendant made to police, the only 
"fruit" of the asserted police misconduct was the search and 
seizure of the defendant’s cellular telephone.  The judge 
concluded that the search and seizure of the cellular telephone 
could not be the "fruit of the poisonous tree" because police 
had obtained a search warrant after seizing the telephone, and 
17 
 
 
the warrant "was obtained without exploitation of the assumed 
illegal seizure."  The judge also determined that the search 
warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe that the 
cellular telephone would contain evidence of the crime under 
investigation. 
We review a judge's denial of a motion for a new trial to 
determine whether there was "a significant error of law or other 
abuse of discretion," Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 
(1986), according "special deference to the action of a motion 
judge who was also the trial judge."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 625 (2011), citing Grace, supra.  Having 
examined the four corners of the warrant affidavit, we conclude 
that the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable 
cause to search the defendant's cellular telephone, and the 
judge's decision to deny the defendant's motion for new trial on 
this basis was error. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, require that 
a search warrant may issue only upon a showing of probable 
cause.  Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 566 (2007).  To 
establish probable cause to search, the facts contained in the 
warrant affidavit, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, must be sufficient for the issuing judge to conclude 
that "a crime had been committed . . . and that items described 
18 
 
 
in the warrant were related to the criminal activity and 
probably in the place to be searched" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 298 (2003). 
In reviewing a determination that probable cause existed to 
issue a search warrant, we consider the facts contained within 
the "four corners of the [warrant] affidavit" (citation 
omitted), O'Day, supra at 297, and the reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from them.  Id. at 298.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
476 Mass. 410, 415 (2017).  A warrant affidavit must be 
considered in "an ordinary, commonsense manner without 
hypertechnical analysis" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Perez-Baez, 410 Mass. 43, 46 (1991). 
The affidavit in this case stated:   
 
"[On] November 4, 2009, I seized three [cellular 
telephones] pursuant to Search Warrant . . .  That two of 
these telephones belonged to the victim of a homicide, Chad 
Fleming, and a third belonged to the person who transported 
Fleming to the hospital.  That [Nelson Melo] was being 
interviewed and during his interview at the police station 
he had a second telephone that he was using and he 
voluntarily provided this telephone to the police officers 
present.  That a review of this telephone showed that 
[Melo] made several telephone calls to a subject later 
identified as Aaron Morin before and after the suspected 
murder time of Fleming.  That later in the day Morin was in 
the police station and voluntarily surrendered his cellular 
telephone.  That specifically these telephones contain or 
may contain information which shows the activities of the 
individuals involved prior and after the death of Chad 
Fleming by pinpointing who was spoken to and when."11 
                                                 
 
11 The affidavit erroneously identified the victim as "the 
person who transported Fleming to the hospital", and incorrectly 
19 
 
 
 
Whether there is probable cause to believe that a cellular 
telephone contains evidence of a crime is a fact-intensive 
inquiry, and must be resolved based on the particular facts of 
each case.  See Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 594 
(2016).  Nonetheless, some guidance may be drawn from our recent 
jurisprudence on the search of cellular telephones.  To begin, 
police may not rely on the general ubiquitous presence of 
cellular telephones in daily life, or an inference that friends 
or associates most often communicate by cellular telephone, as a 
substitute for particularized information that a specific device 
contains evidence of a crime.  See White, supra, at 590-591 
("even where there is probable cause to suspect the defendant of 
a crime, police may not seize or search his or her cellular 
telephone to look for evidence unless they have information 
establishing the existence of particularized evidence likely to 
be found there"). 
In addition, information that an individual communicated 
with another person, who may have been linked to a crime, 
without more, is insufficient to establish probable cause to 
search either individual's cellular telephone.  See Commonwealth 
v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 34, cert. 
                                                                                                                                                             
identified the victim as the individual who made calls to the 
defendant shortly before and after the victim was strangled. 
 
20 
 
 
denied,        S. Ct.        (2017).  In that case, we 
considered whether an application for disclosure of stored wire 
and electronic communications, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (d), 
established probable cause to obtain the contents of the text 
messages on a defendant's cellular telephone.  Id. at 30, 34.   
We noted that the application "established a personal 
relationship" between the homicide victim and the defendant, 
that the defendant had sent text messages to the victim and his 
alleged accomplice on the day of the murder, and that "the 
circumstances of the murders suggested a connection to drugs."  
Id.  These facts suggested that the text messages were a “matter 
of importance in the investigation," but were not sufficient to 
establish probable cause.  Id. at 34-35.  We concluded that, 
"Other than the cellular telephone communication between [the 
victim] and [the defendant], the application failed to recite 
any facts that might have implicated [the defendant] in the 
crimes or suggested that the content of his text messages would 
aid in the apprehension of a suspect in the murders."  Id. 
at 35. 
By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 
502-503 (2016), we considered whether a warrant affidavit 
established probable cause to search a cellular telephone for 
evidence of communications that would link the defendant to a 
shooting.  According to the affidavit, witnesses had reported 
21 
 
 
that the defendant had been receiving threats on his cellular 
telephone, and was seen using his telephone while arguing with 
someone immediately prior to the shooting.  Id. at 503.  We 
determined that this was "sufficient to establish probable cause 
to believe that the defendant's iPhone [cellular telephone] 
likely contained evidence of multiple contentious communications 
between himself and other persons in the days leading up to the 
shooting . . . ."  Id.  Compare Commonwealth v. Broom, 474 
Mass. 486, 496 (2016) (affidavit failed to point to 
"particularized evidence" suggesting that contents of cellular 
telephone were likely to contain information linking defendant 
to victim or relating to death of victim); Commonwealth v. 
Jordan, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 750-751 (2017) (no probable cause 
to search for text messages where affidavit merely established 
that defendant used cellular telephone four hours before killing 
and used it to contact family members near time of killing). 
Here, the affidavit stated that the codefendant "made 
several telephone calls to [the defendant] before and after" the 
time of the homicide.12   At best, it established a personal 
                                                 
 
12 The affidavit identifies the codefendant as the person 
who transported a "homicide victim" to the hospital.  It does 
not mention the unusual circumstances of this trip to the 
emergency department, such as the victim being in rigor mortis 
on arrival and the codefendant's conflicting statements to 
hospital staff and police about what had happened to the victim.  
Thus, based on the four corners of the affidavit, a magistrate 
would be unable to determine whether the codefendant was a good 
22 
 
 
relationship between the individual who brought the victim to 
the hospital and the defendant, and that they had communicated 
by cellular telephone before and after the killing.  Nothing in 
the affidavit indicated the defendant's cellular telephone would 
contain particular evidence related to the crime under 
investigation.  See Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 501-502.  That the 
defendant used his cellular telephone at unspecified times to 
communicate with someone implicated in the crime "elevated their 
relationship to a matter of importance in the investigation[;], 
it did not, without more, justify intrusion into the content of 
that communication" (emphasis omitted).  Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 
at 34.  Based on the limited information presented, the 
affiant's statement that the defendant's telephone would lead to 
evidence of "the individuals involved" in the victim's death is 
merely conclusory and cannot support a determination of probable 
cause. 
 
Having determined that the judge erred in finding that the 
warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the 
defendant's cellular telephone, and that trial counsel 
overlooked a meritorious argument that should have been raised 
in a motion to suppress, we turn to a consideration whether this 
                                                                                                                                                             
Samaritan, who sought medical treatment for a mortally injured 
friend, or whether his conduct suggested some involvement in the 
victim's death. 
 
23 
 
 
error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice and likely would have influenced the jury’s verdict.  
See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  After a careful review of the trial record, 
we conclude that the evidence obtained from the defendant's 
cellular telephone likely would have had an impact on the jury's 
thinking and the verdict. 
 
One of the police officers who interviewed the defendant  
testified at trial that he seized the defendant's cellular 
telephone during the course of the interrogation by asking the 
defendant to hand it over, and that the defendant did so 
voluntarily.13  The Commonwealth introduced it in evidence, 
displayed the content of some of the text messages to the jury, 
and introduced a report detailing all of the data recovered from 
the device.  Among the items recovered were a number of text 
messages between the defendant and Matteson on November 2, 2009 
(the day of their meeting), and November 3, 2009 (the day of the 
robbery and the victim's death).  Most damaging to the defendant 
was a series of text messages he sent to Matteson on November 3, 
                                                 
 
13 Because of the result we reach, we do not address the 
defendant's arguments about the conduct of the interrogation or 
the seizure of the cellular telephone.  But see Commonwealth v. 
Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 252-262 (2012). 
 
24 
 
 
2009.14  The messages began at 3:47:08 with, "Aight makin sure u 
still in be ready 1 hour."  A few minutes later, at 3:50:50, the 
defendant texted to Matteson, "Do not say anything to noone."  
Less than a minute later, the defendant sent a reply text 
referring to his "crew": "No go 4 him old school cr[e]w he was 
an extra."  Within another few minutes, he texted, "be ready 
like 45."  At 3:57:46, the defendant texted again, "where u 
wanna meet me?" 
 
The text messages were central to the Commonwealth's case, 
and were emphasized at multiple stages during the course of the 
trial.  The Commonwealth relied on the text messages to 
corroborate15 Matteson's testimony implicating the defendant in a 
plan to rob the victim, and emphasized the messages from the 
beginning of the trial through its closing argument.  In her 
opening statement, the prosecutor summarized the Commonwealth's 
case, and foreshadowed the central role of the text messages in 
the prosecution: 
 
"[N]ot only are you going to hear from Mr. Matteson 
about his contact and conversations with the defendant, 
you're going to see text messages between the two of them 
on November 3, 2009, from one of the phones that was seized 
from the defendant.  They are still on his phone today.  
And you're going to see that they were text messages 
between Mr. Matteson and this defendant.  The defendant 
                                                 
 
14 Matteson had deleted the text messages from his cellular 
telephone. 
 
 
15  With respect to evidence that is corroborative of other 
evidence, see Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 621 (2017). 
25 
 
 
wanted to know, 'Are you still in?'  Mr. Mattson asking, 
'Who else is going to be involved?'  The defendant 
responds, 'We're going with the old school crew.'  Mr. 
Matteson asks about a couple of names.  The defendant tells 
him, 'It's going to be 45 minutes or an hour, I have got to 
run an errand first, are you in?'" 
 
In pointing out the potential impact of the text messages, the 
prosecutor told the jury, "[v]ery important, ladies and 
gentlemen.  So not only are you going to hear from Mr. Matteson, 
but you're actually going to see it in writing coming from this 
defendant's phone to Mr. Matteson's phone." 
 
In his closing,16 the prosecutor returned to the topic of 
the text messaging, referring to the evidence seized from the 
cellular telephone as "very compelling" and "critical."  He 
urged the jury to consider the messages in the same light:  "The 
phones are very compelling evidence, ladies and gentlemen, 
against the defendants in this case, against [the codefendant] 
as a suspect when he was arrested, and against [the defendant] 
as well."  At another point, he argued that "[t]hose phones are 
critical evidence because, if you take the witnesses here and 
you could say, geez, there's some question about the witness.  
But if we look at the witnesses and you look at the statements 
that [the defendant] made, and you look at the text messages, 
look at the use of zip ties, you look at the phone records, I'd 
                                                 
 
16 There were two prosecutors at trial.  One presented the 
opening statement and the other conducted the closing argument. 
26 
 
 
suggest to you that the evidence in this case is very 
compelling." 
 
The evidence of the text messages seized from the 
defendant's cellular telephone was central to the Commonwealth's 
case, and the Commonwealth emphasized it throughout the trial. 
Therefore we conclude that the improperly-admitted evidence 
likely influenced the jury's verdict, see Commonwealth v. Gray, 
463 Mass. 731, 750 (2012), and the defendant's conviction must 
be vacated. 
 
c.  Other issues.  We briefly discuss several issues that 
arose at trial that might recur at any new trial. 
 
i.  Instruction on merger.  The defendant contends that the 
judge abused his discretion in declining to instruct the jury on  
merger.  He argues that the jury did not find two independent 
assaults, one sufficient to satisfy the elements of robbery and 
a separate one that caused the victim's death.  See Commonwealth 
v. Kilburn, 438 Mass. 356, 359 (2003).  The defendant did not 
request an instruction on merger at trial, nor did he object to 
the absence of such an instruction.  Because the judge was not 
required to provide the jury, sua sponte, with a merger 
instruction, there was no error.  Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 
Mass. 552, 556 (2000), overruled on another ground by 
Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002).  See discussion, 
infra. 
27 
 
 
 
The merger doctrine functions as a limitation on the 
application of the felony-murder rule.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 272 (1998), S.C., 459 Mass. 480, cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).  It requires the Commonwealth to 
establish that a defendant committed or attempted to commit a 
felony independent of the act of personal violence which caused 
the victim's death.  Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 153 
(1998), S.C., 467 Mass. 496 (2014) and 475 Mass. 54 (2016). 
Commonwealth v. Quigley, 391 Mass. 461, 465 (1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).  The rationale for the merger 
doctrine is that absent this requirement, "the distinctions 
among homicides would be rendered meaningless:  all murders in 
the second degree and manslaughters could be enhanced to murder 
in the first degree based on the felony-murder theory with 
assault as the underlying felony."  Gunter, 427 Mass. at 272.  
See Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 
Harv. J. L. & Pub Pol'y 359, 377 (1985) (merger doctrine 
prevents prosecution from bootstrapping lesser-included homicide 
offenses into murder). 
 
We have relied upon the merger doctrine to ensure that "not 
every assault that results in death will serve as a basis for 
murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder."  
Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 819 (2015).  The 
Commonwealth therefore is required to prove that "the conduct 
28 
 
 
which constitutes the felony be 'separate from the acts of 
personal violence which constitute a necessary part of the 
homicide itself.'"  Gunter, 427 Mass. at 272, quoting Quigley, 
391 Mass. at 466.  See Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 301 
(2011) (no merger between homicide and predicate felony of armed 
assault in dwelling where defendant assaulted multiple occupants 
in dwelling in addition to homicide victim); Kilburn, 438 Mass. 
at 362 (no merger between fatal shooting and predicate felony of 
armed assault in dwelling based on evidence of earlier assault 
on victim).  See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, at 53 
n.121 (2013). 
 
Notwithstanding the defendant's argument to the contrary, 
the merger doctrine does not apply in cases such as this one, 
where the predicate felony has an intent or purpose separate and 
distinct from the act causing physical injury or death.  "[T]he 
conduct which constitutes the felony must be separate from the 
acts of personal violence which constitutes a necessary part of 
the homicide itself.  Thus, although rape, arson, robbery and 
burglary are sufficiently independent of the homicide, . . . 
aggravated battery toward the deceased will not do for felony 
murder . . ." (quotations and citation omitted).  Quigley, 391 
Mass. at 466.  As particularly relevant here, the merger 
doctrine does not apply where the predicate felony is a robbery.  
See Christian, 430 Mass. at 556.  "It is the first element of 
29 
 
 
the crimes of robbery and armed robbery, namely the stealing or 
taking of property, that qualifies them for application of the 
felony-murder rule.  It is the intent to do that conduct (here 
stealing from [the victim]) that serves as the substitute for 
the malice requirement of murder."  Id.  See also Commonwealth 
v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305, 315 (2001) (element of intent to steal 
or to take property makes felony-murder rule applicable to 
offense of armed robbery).  Accordingly, the judge was not 
required to instruct the jury on merger.17 
 
ii.  Hearsay exception.  The defendant sought to introduce 
testimony by Lucy concerning the content of a statement she 
heard being made by the voice issuing from the second floor 
after the three individuals had fled the upstairs apartment and 
drove away.  The judge conducted a voir dire hearing to 
determine whether Lucy would be permitted to testify that, after 
the footsteps had run down the stairs out the front door, she 
heard an unfamiliar voice from the upstairs apartment say, "I'm 
okay, I'm okay."  The judge considered two grounds for admission 
of the content of the statement:  the hearsay exception for a 
then-existing mental, emotional or physical condition, see Mass. 
G. Evid. § 803(3)(A) (2016), and the exception for third party 
                                                 
 
17 For the same reasons, we reject the defendant's 
additional claims that the jury heard insufficient evidence of 
an independent assault, and that the judge was required to 
provide the jury with a special verdict form in order to 
indicate the separate assault. 
30 
 
 
culprit evidence.  See Mass. Guide Evid. § 1105 (2016).  
Ultimately, he decided that Lucy could testify that she heard a 
voice she did not recognize, but that she could not testify to 
the content of the statement. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the content of the 
victim's statement should have been admitted for any one of 
three reasons:  (1) it was an excited utterance; (2) it was a 
statement of the declarant's then-existing physical condition; 
or (3) it was third-party culprit evidence.  The defendant also 
argues that trial counsel's failure to object to its exclusion 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
finding that there was an inadequate foundation to permit the 
introduction of this evidence.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) (abuse of discretion standard).  Lucy 
was able only to testify that she overheard a "vague" voice from 
the upstairs apartment saying "I’m okay, I’m okay."  She could 
not tell the speaker's gender or the speaker's tone of voice.  
The judge concluded the statement was ambiguous and potentially 
misleading.  He noted, in the context of discussing third-party 
culprit evidence, "I'm okay could be a statement of I don't want 
the police here, and don't call the police.  And I'm okay means 
what from a layperson?  What does it mean?  How much service 
does it provide this jury in understanding to what degree he 
31 
 
 
[the victim] was functioning?  We know from alternative 
evidence, which is within the hearsay rule, that we can prove he 
was alive because he was speaking and articulating words, and 
I'm going to permit that." 
 
iii.  Felony-murder.  Finally, the defendant urges this 
court to adopt the direction taken by several other countries 
and some other States and abolish the common-law doctrine of 
felony-murder.  We declined to abolish felony-murder in  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017).  Instead, we 
narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule to eliminate 
felony-murder as an independent theory of liability.  Id. at 
807.  As a result, a defendant no longer may be convicted of 
murder absent proof of one of the three prongs of malice.  Id.  
Accordingly, felony-murder is limited to its statutory role 
under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of murder.  
Id.  Any new trial in this case, therefore, would be subject to 
the rule announced in Brown, which “appl[ies] only to cases that 
go to trial after our adoption of the change."  Id. at 834 
(Gants, C.J., concurring). 
4.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction is vacated and 
set aside.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.