Title: People v. Sharpe

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 91874-Agenda 1-November 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. 
KENNETH SHARPE, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 6, 2005.
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
This case involves the constitutionality of one of the 
"15/20/25-to-life" sentence-enhancement amendments. See Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. 
January 1, 2000. Specifically, this court is called upon to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the sentencing enhancements in the context of first degree 
murder.

BACKGROUND
Ordinarily, the baseline sentence for the crime of first 
degree murder is 20 to 60 years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a) (West 2000). 
In 2000, however, the legislature enacted Public Act 91-404, which amended the 
sentencing provisions of each of several different felonies, including first 
degree murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) through (a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 
2000)), when a firearm is involved in the commission of the felony.(1) See Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000.
These amendments add a mandatory additional term of years 
to whatever sentence would otherwise be imposed. The degree of enhancement 
depends upon the degree of involvement of the firearm. Commission of first 
degree murder while simply armed with a firearm adds a mandatory 15-year 
enhancement to the sentence (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2000)); 
personally discharging a firearm while committing first degree murder adds a 
mandatory 20-year enhancement (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2000)); 
and personally discharging a firearm while committing first degree murder and 
proximately causing a death or severe bodily injury thereby requires that the 
circuit court increase the sentence by 25 years' up to life imprisonment (see 
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000)).
In April 2001, defendant Kenneth Sharpe was indicted in 
the circuit court of Cook County on six counts of first degree murder in 
connection with the fatal shooting of Bernard Magett on March 13, 2001. The 
charges were broken down into three counts of intentional first degree murder 
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)) and three counts of first degree murder 
knowing that he was creating a strong probability of death or great bodily harm 
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2000)). One count of each type of first degree 
murder alleged that defendant committed the crime while armed with a firearm 
(see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2000)), one count alleged that defendant 
committed the crime while personally discharging a firearm (730 ILCS 
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2000)), and one count alleged that defendant 
committed the crime while personally discharging a firearm that proximately 
caused a death (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000)).(2)
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, raising several 
constitutional challenges to the sentence enhancements. The circuit court 
rejected all of defendant's challenges except for the proportionate penalties 
challenge. With respect to this challenge, the court granted defendant's motion 
in part. The court determined that the 15-year and 20-year enhancements to first 
degree murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i), (a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2000)) 
violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11), but that the 25-to-life enhancement applicable 
to the commission of first degree murder when the defendant personally 
discharged a firearm which resulted in death (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) 
(West 2000)) was not unconstitutional.
The State appealed directly to this court. Jurisdiction 
lies because the circuit court declared a statute unconstitutional. 134 Ill. 2d 
R. 603.

ANALYSIS
The issues presented to this court are fewer than those 
before the circuit court. The State argues that the circuit court erred in 
determining that the 15- and 20-year sentence enhancements were 
unconstitutionally disproportionate. Defendant argues that the circuit court was 
correct in so concluding, and argues additionally that the 25-to-life sentence 
enhancement suffers from the same defect. Defendant also argues that the 
25-to-life enhancement is unconstitutionally vague and is not reasonably 
designed to remedy the harm that the legislature sought to address.

I. PROPORTIONATE PENALTIES
The first issue is whether the sentencing amendments pass 
proportionality review. The constitutionality of a statute is purely a matter of 
law, and accordingly we review the circuit court's conclusion de novo.
People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (2004). All statutes carry a 
strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 486 (2003). To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute 
must clearly establish that it violates the constitution. People v. Malchow, 
193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). We generally defer to the legislature in the 
sentencing arena because the legislature is institutionally better equipped to 
gauge the seriousness of various offenses and to fashion sentences accordingly. 
See People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002). The legislature's 
discretion in setting criminal penalties is broad, and courts generally decline 
to overrule legislative determinations in this area unless the challenged 
penalty is clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations on this 
authority. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d  at 488.
A proportionality challenge derives from article I, 
section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides that "[a]ll 
penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense 
and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, §11. A proportionality challenge contends that the penalty 
in question was not determined according to the seriousness of the offense, and 
this court has recognized three distinct ways in which such a challenge may be 
asserted.
"First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties 
clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense 
committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. [Citations.] Second, a 
penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are 
compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and 
safety is punished more severely. [Citations.] Finally, the proportionate 
penalties clause is violated where offenses with identical elements are given 
different sentences." People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003).
In this case the circuit court determined that the 15- and 
20-year sentencing amendments of Public Act 91-404 failed the second type of 
challenge, commonly referred to as the cross-comparison test. The 
cross-comparison test is a two-step analysis. First, the court determines 
whether the statutes being compared have related purposes. People v. Davis, 
177 Ill. 2d 495, 506 (1997). If not, then the defendant's proportionate 
penalties challenge must be rejected. If the statutes have common purposes, then 
the court proceeds to step two of the analysis. In this step, the court 
determines which offense is more serious, and if the less serious offense is 
punished more harshly. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506-07. If the less 
serious offense has received a harsher penalty, then the penalty is invalid. The 
circuit court held that the 15- and 20-year enhancements were invalid under this 
analysis, but that the 25-to-life enhancement did not violate the proportionate 
penalties clause.
The circuit court's order is confusing. The court compared 
the 15- and 20-year enhancements to the armed robbery statute (720 ILCS 
5/18-2(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (b) (West 2000)) with the penalties for aggravated 
discharge of a firearm ((720 ILCS 5/24-1.2 (West 2000)) and aggravated battery 
with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2000)). The trial court concluded that 
the 15- and 20-year enhancements were invalid because they punished merely 
carrying a weapon or discharging a weapon more harshly than discharging a weapon 
at another person (aggravated discharge of a firearm) or injuring another person 
with a firearm (aggravated battery with a firearm). From this, the court 
concluded all of the 15- and 20-year enhancements of Public Act 91-404 were 
invalid. Of course, the trial court should not have ruled on the validity of any 
enhancements other than those to which defendant was potentially subjected: 
those to the murder statute. See Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d  at 482 (party has 
standing to challenge constitutionality of a statute only if he or she is within 
class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality). Likewise, the court should 
not have addressed a cross-comparison challenge involving statutes that are not 
at issue in this case. Defendant was charged with first degree murder. 
Nevertheless, the trial court utilized the 15- and 20-year enhancements to 
armed robbery as the starting point of its cross-comparison analysis. It is 
not at all clear why the trial judge chose to assess the constitutionality of 
statutes not at issue in this case when an analysis utilizing the sentencing 
enhancements under first degree murder would have yielded the same result.
That said, what the trial court did, albeit inartfully, 
was to foreshadow this court's decision in Moss two years before it was 
issued. Pursuant to Moss, all of the 15- and 20-year enhancements are 
indeed invalid. Under the approach we adopted in that case, in the second step 
of a cross-comparison challenge involving a 15/20/25-to-life enhanced offense, 
we compare only the firearm elements of the offenses. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  
at 528-30. Doing so yields the result that the 15- and 20-year enhancements are 
all invalid. This is because merely possessing or discharging a firearm will 
always be less serious than intentionally causing injury with a firearm or 
intentionally discharging a firearm in the direction of another. Thus, under the 
current state of our cross-comparison jurisprudence, murder with a firearm and 
murder in which a firearm is discharged are less serious offenses than 
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm. This 
conclusion, however, is absurd. If we are now using the proportionate penalties 
clause to strike down legislation based on our conclusion that the legislature 
erred in failing to see that murder is a less serious offense than aggravated 
battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm, then something has 
gone terribly wrong with this court's proportionate penalties jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, we have determined that it is necessary to review this 
jurisprudence to determine what has led us to this place and to reassess the 
proper application of the proportionate penalties clause. 

A. Historical Review of Cross-Comparison 
Analysis under the Proportionate Penalties Clause
1. The 1870 Constitution
Section 11 of article I of the Illinois Constitution of 
1970 is the successor section to section 11 of article II of the Illinois 
Constitution of 1870. The previous version of the proportionate penalties clause 
provided as follows:
"All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the 
offense; and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of 
estate; nor shall any person be transported out of the State for any offense 
committed within the same." Ill. Const. 1870, art. II, §11.
Early on, this court recognized that this provision placed 
very little restraint on the power of the legislature to ascribe penalties for 
offenses. Indeed, this court stated that "[t]he nature, character and extent of 
penalties are matters almost wholly legislative, and the courts have 
jurisdiction to interfere with legislation upon the subject only where the 
penalty is manifestly in excess of the very broad and general constitutional 
limitation invoked." People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 457 (1927). Thus, 
this court determined that it would not strike down a penalty determined by the 
legislature, even if this court viewed the penalty as absurd or unwise, unless 
the penalty "shock[ed] the conscience of reasonable men." Landers, 329 Ill.  at 457. In another case, this court elaborated that it would not invalidate 
a penalty under the proportionate penalties clause unless it was "a cruel or 
degrading punishment not known to the common law, or a degrading punishment 
which had become obsolete in the State prior to the adoption of its 
constitution" or was "so wholly disproportioned to the offense as to shock the 
moral sense of the community." People v. Callicott, 322 Ill. 390, 393 
(1926). For years, this restrictive test would remain the sole standard under 
which this court evaluated proportionate penalties challenges. In 1962, this 
court noted a long line of authority sustaining all legislative judgments in 
this area, with the exception of one 1873 case (Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. 
People ex rel. Koerner, 67 Ill. 11 (1873)) involving the forfeiture of a 
railroad's franchise as a penalty for price discrimination. See People v. 
Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962).

2. The 1970 Constitution
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 retained the 
proportionate penalties clause, but with different wording. The current version 
of the clause provides as follows:
"All penalties shall be determined both according to the 
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to 
useful citizenship. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture 
of estate. No person shall be transported out of the State for an offense 
committed within the State." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11.
Although the wording of the first clause was changed from 
"[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense" to "[a]ll 
penalties shall be determined *** according to the seriousness of the offense," 
the debates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention do not evince any 
intent on the part of the framers to change the meaning of the first clause. See 
3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1380-81, 
1391-96, 1413-26.

3. Wisslead
In 1983, this court gave the proportionate penalties 
clause a dramatically different reading. See People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190 (1983). In Wisslead, for the first time, this court used 
the proportionate penalties clause to strike down a statutory penalty based on a 
comparison of that penalty with a penalty for a different offense. The defendant 
was charged with unlawful restraint (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 10-3(a)) 
and armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 
38, pars. 10-3(a), 33A-2). Prior to trial, the trial court held that the penalty 
for armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint violated the due process and 
proportionate penalties clauses of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. I, §§2, 11). The State appealed directly to this court.
The defendant's argument that the penalty for armed 
violence predicated on unlawful restraint with a category I weapon (Class X 
felony) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 33A-1(b), 33A-3(a)) violated the 
due process and proportionate penalties clauses was based on a comparison of 
that penalty with the penalties for aggravated kidnaping (Class 1 felony) (Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 10-2(a)(5), (b)(2)) and forcible detention (Class 
2 felony) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 10-4(a)(1), (b)). The defendant's 
argument was similar for both challenges. He argued that armed violence 
predicated on unlawful restraint was a less serious offense than the similar 
offenses of aggravated kidnapping and forcible detention, yet these other 
offenses were punished less harshly. This court simply accepted the defendant's 
argument without a discussion of the legal standards applicable to such an 
argument and affirmed the circuit court's decision. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 195-97.
This court's conclusion drew a sharp dissent from three 
members of the court. See Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 197-200 (Simon, J., 
dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J., and Underwood, J.). The dissent pointed out 
that the State can always charge armed violence when an unenhanced felony is 
committed with a gun. Thus, the defendant's challenge to aggravated kidnapping 
was meaningless, because a prosecutor could always charge a defendant who 
commits a kidnapping with a gun with armed violence instead of aggravated 
kidnapping and, in that case, the penalty would be equal to that of armed 
violence predicated on unlawful restraint. Similarly, the dissent pointed out 
that one who committed armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint would not 
be encouraged to commit a more serious crime in order to receive a lesser 
punishment, because he could still be charged with the Class X felony of armed 
violence based on unlawful restraint. The dissent found that the sentencing 
structure comported fully with the legislature's intent to provide the maximum 
disincentive for the carrying of dangerous weapons during felonies. Wisslead, 
94 Ill. 2d  at 197-200 (Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J., and 
Underwood, J.)
Wisslead was problematic in additional ways not 
mentioned by the dissent. First, the court never mentioned the standard under 
which the court had always reviewed proportionate penalties challenges. This 
court had consistently said that it would interfere with the legislature's 
judgment only where the penalty was cruel, degrading, or so wholly 
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d  at 240. In striking down the penalty for armed 
violence predicated on unlawful restraint, this court failed to determine if the 
penalty met this standard.
Second, the court never explained from where it was 
deriving the notion that a proportionate penalties challenge could be based on 
the comparison of the penalty for one offense to the penalty for a different 
offense. The court simply addressed the defendant's due process and 
proportionate penalties arguments together and said that the policy underlying
both clauses would be violated if "the penalty prescribed for an 
offense is not as great or greater than the penalty prescribed for a less 
serious offense." Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 196. The court's citation for 
this proposition was a "Cf." cite to People v. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d 410 (1980), and People v. Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d 308 (1982). See 
Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 196. The problem with this citation is that both
Bradley and Wagner are solely due process cases. Neither one 
addressed the proportionate penalties clause.
In Bradley, this court found a violation of the 
due process clause when possession of a schedule IV controlled 
substance was punished as a Class 3 felony, subjecting the offender to a prison 
term of 1 to 10 years, while delivery of the same substance was 
punished as a Class 4 felony, with a possible sentence of 1 to 3 years. The 
court noted that the standard under which a due process challenge to a penalty 
is evaluated is whether " 'the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the 
evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, 
safety and general welfare.' " Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d  at 417, quoting 
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 159 
(1955). In other words, the test "focuses on the purposes and objectives of the 
enactment in question." Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d  at 417. The court found 
that punishing the lesser-included offense of possession of a schedule IV 
controlled substance more harshly than the delivery of the same substance 
violated the due process clause because such an outcome was contrary to the 
legislature's stated purpose in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The 
legislature codified a statement of intent in which it specifically stated that 
its intent was to punish those who traffic in controlled substances more harshly 
than the mere unlawful user. Punishing the delivery of a controlled substance 
less harshly than the lesser-included offense of possession of the same 
substance was directly contrary to the legislature's stated intent, and 
therefore violated the due process clause. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d  at 418.(3)
In Wagner, this court relied on Bradley 
to invalidate the penalty for delivery of a noncontrolled substance represented 
to be a controlled substance because it was harsher than the penalty for 
delivery of a schedule IV or V controlled substance. The court found that, as in
Bradley, the less serious crime carried a harsher punishment than a 
crime that created a greater threat. The court noted that the plain purpose of 
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act was to deter the traffic in controlled 
substances, and held that it was not logical to punish one who delivers a 
noncontrolled substance more severely than one who delivered a controlled 
substance. Accordingly, the court found that the penalty for delivery of a 
noncontrolled substance represented to be a controlled substance violated the 
due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d  at 
313.
Wagner was a 4-3 decision, and the dissenters 
persuasively argued that the majority had misunderstood and misapplied 
Bradley. The dissenters argued that the reason this court knew in 
Bradley that possession was less serious than delivery was that the 
legislature specifically stated so in a codified statement of legislative 
intent. By contrast, there was nothing in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act 
to indicate the legislature's view of the relative seriousness of delivery of a 
controlled substance and delivery of a look-alike substance. Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d  at 314-15 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, 
JJ.). Chief Justice Ryan pointed out that, in keeping with the legislature's 
expressed intent, the legislature had divided up penalties for controlled 
substances based on possession or delivery, the type of controlled substance, 
and the amount of controlled substance. With respect to look-alike substances, 
however, the legislature merely ascribed one penalty for any look-alike 
substance, no matter what it is represented to be. Chief Justice Ryan noted 
that, in doing so, the legislature was addressing a different problem than 
controlled substance offenses. Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d  at 315 (Ryan, C.J., 
dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.). Chief Justice Ryan also 
foresaw the types of problems inherent in a court trying to second-guess the 
legislature's judgment as to which of two offenses was more serious:
"It makes an appealing argument to say, as the majority 
opinion does, that the defendant here was subject to a greater penalty for the 
delivery of .4 grams of a 'harmless brown powder' than a person would be who 
actually delivered any amount of a schedule IV or V controlled substance. 
However, we do not know the magnitude of the problem or the evils associated 
with the delivery of a substance represented to be a controlled substance. In 
the space of one set of briefs filed in this case we cannot hope to be 
adequately informed as to the nature of the problems the legislature was seeking 
to resolve. The legislature has the means of informing itself, and it has seen 
fit to make this classification, which I am unwilling to arbitrarily say was not 
rational. We must presume the classification to be valid. We just are not in a 
position to say whether the evil sought to be remedied by section 404 of the 
Illinois Controlled Substances Act is not as great a threat to the public as is 
the delivery of certain controlled substances. Contrary to the assumption in the 
majority opinion, the legislature has not determined that the delivery of 
controlled substances is a greater threat to the public than is the delivery of 
a substance represented to be a controlled substance." Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d  at 316-17 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.).
Chief Justice Ryan went on to discuss the growing problem 
of look-alike drugs and how it presented a different set of problems than those 
presented by controlled substances, and argued that a majority of the court was 
improperly substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. Wagner, 
89 Ill. 2d  at 316-17 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and 
Goldenhersh, JJ.). In a separate dissent, Justice Underwood persuasively argued 
that the defendant did not even have standing to raise the due process argument 
because he was not charged with delivering a substance represented to be a 
schedule IV or V substance. Rather, he was charged with delivering a substance 
represented to be a schedule I controlled substance, and for that offense there 
was clearly no due process problem. Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d  at 317-21 
(Underwood, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J., and Goldenhersh, J.).
With the simple insertion of the two letters "Cf." 
in the Wisslead cite, and no accompanying analysis, the 
cross-comparison method of these due process cases became part of this court's 
proportionate penalties jurisprudence. The Bluebook explains the citation signal 
"Cf." as follows:
"Cited authority supports a proposition different from the 
main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support. Literally, 'cf.' 
means 'compare.' The citation's relevance will usually be clear to the reader 
only if it is explained. Parenthetical explanations ***, however brief, are 
therefore strongly recommended." The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 
1.2(a), at 47 (18th ed. 2005).
Wisslead's use of the citation signal "Cf." 
was correct in that Bradley and Wagner stood for a different 
proposition than the main one, but incorrect in that they were not sufficiently 
analogous to lend support. The only parenthetical explanation provided by the
Wisslead court was the following for Bradley: "a more serious 
penalty should not be provided for a less serious offense." Wisslead, 
94 Ill. 2d  at 196. The court never explained, however, why it was taking what 
had been solely a due process challenge and turning it into both a due process
and a proportionate penalties challenge, all without discussing this 
court's proportionate penalties jurisprudence and how a comparison between two 
statutes fit into that jurisprudence. It had never been stated before 
Wisslead that the proportionate penalties clause allowed a defendant to 
claim that the penalty for the offense for which he was charged was invalid when 
compared to the penalty for a different offense. Instead, we had stated that we 
would invalidate a penalty only if it met the "cruel or degrading" standard. 
Thus, with a questionable citation and no analysis, a century's worth of case 
law was fundamentally altered and what had been a due process challenge became 
part of this court's proportionate penalties jurisprudence.

4. Post-Wisslead/Pre-Davis
For the next 13 years after Wisslead, this court 
rejected almost all of the cross-comparison proportionate penalties arguments 
brought before the court. See People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310 
(1985); People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448 (1989); People v. Wade, 
131 Ill. 2d 370 (1989); People v. Simmons, 145 Ill. 2d 264 (1991); 
People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436 (1992); People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250 (1994); People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140 (1995); People 
v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210 (1995); People v. Miller, 171 Ill. 2d 330 (1996). In most of these cases, the defendant made his argument under both 
the due process clause and the proportionate penalties clause. See Steppan, 
105 Ill. 2d at 318-19; Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d  at 454; Wade, 131 Ill. 2d  at 376; Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d  at 258; Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  
at 144; Miller, 171 Ill. 2d  at 333-34. Another hallmark of these cases 
was that the court, although allowing a cross-comparison challenge, was still 
evaluating the constitutionality of the penalty under the "cruel or degrading" 
standard. See Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 320; Simmons, 145 Ill. 2d  at 270; Johns, 153 Ill. 2d  at 449; Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 
259-60; Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d  at 236; Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at 145;
Miller, 171 Ill. 2d  at 334. Further, this court seemed to adopt the 
position taken by the dissenters in Wagner that this court is not in a 
position to second-guess the legislature on which of two offenses is more 
serious, because we do not know what factors the legislature took into 
consideration in setting the penalties. See Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 320 
(not proper to equate seriousness of the offense with value of property taken; 
legislature could have taken other factors into account in determining 
seriousness of offense); Simmons, 145 Ill. 2d  at 271 (it is 
legislature's job to say which of several offenses is most serious); Johns, 
153 Ill. 2d  at 448-49 (error to equate seriousness with value of property taken; 
legislature may have taken other factors into account, such as a need to halt 
increase in commission of a particular crime).
A representative case from this period is Johns. 
In that case, the defendants were charged with possession of certificates of 
vehicle title without complete assignment, in violation of section 4-104(a)(2) 
of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 4-104(a)(2)). 
The penalty for this offense was a Class 4 felony. The defendants challenged the 
penalty under both the due process and proportionate penalties clauses. The 
court first rejected the due process challenge, finding that the penalty was 
rationally related to the evil the legislature was trying to prevent. Johns, 
153 Ill. 2d  at 446. Next, the court rejected the defendants' proportionate 
penalties challenge. The defendants compared the penalty for their offense with 
other offenses in the Vehicle Code that they contended were more serious. This 
court stated that it would violate the proportionate penalties clause if conduct 
that created a less serious threat to the public health and safety was punished 
more harshly than conduct that created a more serious threat. Johns, 
153 Ill. 2d  at 447. Despite this statement, however, the court still maintained 
that it would invalidate the greater penalty only if it was so disproportionate 
to the offense that it shocked the moral sense of the community or was cruel and 
degrading. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d  at 449. Moreover, this court pointed out 
that the flaw in the defendants' argument was that they were equating 
seriousness of the offense solely with the value of the property involved. This 
court pointed out that the deficiency in such an argument was that the 
legislature may have had other reasons for finding the other offense more 
serious, including wanting to halt the increase in the commission of that 
particular crime. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d  at 449.
Only two penalties were invalidated in cross-comparison 
cases between 1984 and 1996. In People v. Morris, 136 Ill. 2d 157 
(1990), the defendant was charged with possessing an altered temporary 
registration permit (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 4-104(a)(3)). The 
defendant altered the temporary registration permit (license-applied-for 
sticker) on his vehicle by changing the expiration date from February 12, 1988, 
to August 12, 1988. The Illinois Vehicle Code made it a Class 2 felony to 
possess "any manufacturers statement of origin, salvage certificate, junking 
certificate, display certificate or certificate of title, temporary registration 
permit, registration card, license plate or registration sticker knowing it to 
have been stolen, converted, altered, forged or counterfeited." Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1987, ch. 95½, pars. 4-104(a)(3), (b)(2). The defendant argued that the Class 2 
felony penalty violated the due process and proportionate penalty clauses when 
applied to someone who alters the temporary registration permit on his own 
vehicle. This court agreed with the defendant that the penalty violated both 
clauses when applied to someone in his situation. The court found that the 
penalty violated the due process clause because it was not reasonably designed 
to remedy the evils that the legislature had determined to be a threat. Section 
4-104 of the Vehicle Code was in a section entitled "ANTI-THEFT LAWS," and this 
court had stated that the purpose of such laws was " 'to protect automobile 
owners against theft and to protect the general public against the commission of 
crimes involving stolen automobiles' " (Morris, 136 Ill. 2d  at 162, 
quoting People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile, 89 Ill. 2d 506, 510 (1982)). A three- to seven-year prison term for someone who alters the 
temporary registration permit of his own vehicle in order to extend the 
expiration date would do nothing to protect the public from automobile theft.
Morris, 136 Ill. 2d  at 162. The court also held that the penalty 
violated the proportionate penalties clause. The defendant compared the penalty 
for the offense he committed with that for unauthorized possession of a 
certificate of title (Class 4 felony) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 
4-104(a)(1), (b)(1)), and display of an unauthorized registration sticker (Class 
A misdemeanor) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 4-104(a)(4), (b)(3)); theft 
under $300 (the value of the defendant's car) (Class A misdemeanor) (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 16-1(e)(1)); and possession of a stolen motor vehicle 
(Class 2 felony) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 4-103(a)(1), (b)). 
Nevertheless, although the court agreed with the defendant that the penalty 
violated the proportionate penalties clause, the court did not base its 
conclusion on the defendant's comparison with these other offenses. Rather, the 
court applied the "cruel or degrading" standard and concluded that the 
legislature's steep penalty for the relevant offense was intended to be an 
antitheft measure and that applying this penalty to one who altered the permit 
on his own vehicle was disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. 
Morris, 136 Ill. 2d  at 167-68. Thus, although the defendant brought the 
appeal as a cross-comparison proportionate penalties challenge, this court did 
not invalidate the penalty on that basis.
The one case in which this court did invalidate a penalty 
using a cross-comparison analysis during this period was People v. Hamm, 
149 Ill. 2d 201 (1992). In Hamm, the defendants were charged with 
several felony violations of the Fish Code of 1971. Section 2.4(a) of the Fish 
Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56, par. 2.4(a)) elevated knowing violations of 
the Fish Code from misdemeanors to Class 3 felonies if the fishing was 
commercial and involved over $300 worth of fish. The defendants raised numerous 
constitutional challenges. This court agreed with two of the defendants' 
arguments. First, we agreed with the defendants that it violated the due process 
clause to elevate certain minor Fish Code misdemeanors to Class 3 felonies. This 
court held that it would violate the due process clause to make violations of 
section 5.11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56, par. 5.11) and 5.20 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1989, ch. 56, par. 5.20) of the Fish Code Class 3 felonies. Section 5.11 
required that a tag be displayed on certain fishing devices, such as seines, to 
provide evidence that the device is licensed. Section 5.20 required that any 
person fishing have in his possession his fishing license for immediate 
inspection. The court noted that the purpose of section 2.4(a) was to prevent 
the illegal widespread destruction of natural resources. The court held that 
having a tag on a fishing net or having a license in one's immediate possession 
did not assist the State in eliminating the widespread destruction of natural 
resources. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d  at 218. Thus, the court held that making 
these offense Class 3 felonies when committed by commercial fishermen taking 
over $300 worth of fish violated the due process clause because such a penalty 
was not rationally related to the evil the legislature was addressing. The court 
rejected such an argument for other violations of the Fish Code, such as fishing 
in private waters without the owner's permission, using commercial fishing 
devices in restricted waters, and using a seine of illegal length and mesh size.
Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d  at 218.
The Hamm court held additionally that the Class 3 
felony penalty for the same two offenses violated the proportionate penalties 
clause. First, the court stated that it is reluctant to overturn penalties set 
by the legislature and that it would do so only when the penalty was cruel, 
degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense so as to shock the moral 
sense of the community. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d  at 219. Then, the court 
compared the Fish Code penalties with similar penalties in the Illinois Vehicle 
Code. The court noted that the Vehicle Code requires that a person operating 
motor vehicle must have his driver's license in his possession. However, a 
person will not be convicted of violating his provision if he produces the 
license in court and the license was valid at the time of the offense. Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 6-112. Similarly, the court noted that the Vehicle 
Code provides that a person who fails to display evidence of automobile 
insurance when requested by a law enforcement officer shall be deemed to be 
operating an uninsured vehicle. However, the Code also allowed that same person 
to avoid conviction by producing in court evidence that the vehicle was insured 
at the time of the arrest. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, pars. 3-707, 7-602. By 
contrast, the court noted that similar violations of the Fish Code resulted in a 
Class 3 felony when committed by a commercial fisherman taking over $300 worth 
of fish. Hamm was the first post-Wisslead case to invalidate a 
penalty using a Wisslead-type analysis.

5. Identical Elements
During this same period, a different type of proportionate 
penalties analysis emerged. What would later be designated the "identical 
elements" proportionate penalties analysis was first used in People v. 
Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172 (1990). In Christy, the defendant was 
convicted of armed violence predicated on kidnapping with a Category I weapon (a 
knife with a blade of at least three inches in length). This offense was 
classified as a Class X felony, punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison. Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33A-3(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 
1005-8-1(a)(3). The defendant pointed out that the elements of this offense were 
exactly the same as aggravated kidnapping, but that offense was classified as a 
Class 1 felony, punishable by 4 to 15 years in prison (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 
38, par. 10-2(a)(5); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(4)). This 
court held that "common sense and sound logic" would dictate identical penalties 
for these offenses. Because the identical offenses did not yield identical 
penalties, this court held that the penalties were unconstitutionally 
disproportionate and the greater penalty could not stand. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 181. Justices Miller and Ryan dissented, arguing that different 
penalties for different offenses simply gave prosecutors the discretion of which 
offense to charge, and this was not meaningfully different from allowing 
prosecutors to choose between offenses with different elements. The dissenters 
pointed out that the Supreme Court held in United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 99 S. Ct. 2198 (1979), that it did not violate 
the constitutional guarantees of equal protection or due process to allow 
prosecutors the discretion to choose between two statutes with different 
elements or even two statutes with identical elements. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 185-86 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.), citing 
Batchelder, 442 U.S.  at 125, 60 L. Ed. 2d  at 765, 99 S. Ct. at 2205).
This court again used the identical elements analysis in
People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996). In that case, the defendant 
was charged with armed violence predicated on robbery with a Category I weapon 
720 ILCS 5/18-1, 33A-1 (West 1994)). The defendant argued that the penalty for 
that offense violated the proportionate penalties clause because it was more 
severe than the penalty for armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994)), and the 
two offenses shared identical elements. This court concluded that Christy 
controlled, and thus invalidated the greater penalty. The court rejected the 
State's invitation to overrule Christy. This court also rejected the 
State's contention that the proportionate penalties clause only allows courts to 
compare the gravity of a particular offense with the severity of its assigned 
penalty. Rather, we held that comparing different offenses and their penalties 
was an accepted part of our proportionate penalties jurisprudence. Lewis, 
175 Ill. 2d  at 420-21. Further, this court stated that comparing offenses with 
identical elements was less troublesome than comparing offense with different 
elements because it did not require a subjective determination by this court as 
to which offense was more serious. The court merely considers two different 
penalties given to two identical offenses by the same legislative body. Thus, 
there is no risk of the court acting as a "superlegislature" or substituting its 
judgment for that of the legislature. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 421-22. 
Justices Miller and Nickels dissented, arguing that Christy was wrongly 
decided and that the only legitimate type of proportionate penalty review is 
determining whether the sentence for a particular offense is cruel or degrading 
or so wholly disproportionate to the offense so as to shock the moral sense of 
the community. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, 
joined by Nickels, J.).

6. Davis
The next significant cross-comparison case was People 
v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495 (1997), which established cross-comparison 
analysis in its current form. In Davis, the defendant was charged with,
inter alia, failing to have a firearm owner's card in violation of the 
Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 1994)). The 
defendant moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the penalty for that 
offense violated the due process and proportionate penalties clauses of the 
Illinois Constitution. The defendant argued that it was irrational to make the 
penalty for this registration offense more serious than that for unlawful use of 
weapons by a felon (nonprobationable Class 3 felony) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 
1994); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 1994)). The circuit court agreed with the 
defendant that the penalty violated the proportionate penalty and due process 
clauses and dismissed the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act charge. The 
State appealed, and this court affirmed. This court held that the penalty 
violated the proportionate penalties clause and thus did not address the due 
process issue. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 500.
For the first time, the Davis court separated 
review under the proportionate penalties clause into three different forms. 
First, a penalty can be compared to its particular offense, and the clause is 
violated if the penalty is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to 
the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. Second, a penalty 
for one offense can be compared to the penalty for a different offense, and the 
clause is violated if the conduct that creates a less serious threat to the 
public health and safety is punished more harshly. This analysis would come to 
be known as the cross-comparison analysis. Third, a penalty can be compared to a 
different offense that has the same elements. The clause is violated if two 
identical offenses are given different sentences. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 
503-04. Davis did not acknowledge that it was charting a new course 
here, but clearly it was. As discussed earlier, previous cases that had 
addressed cross-comparison challenges acknowledged that the clause was violated 
if less serious conduct was punished more harshly, but still stated that the 
court would invalidate the greater penalty only if it violated the "cruel and 
degrading" standard. Davis, for the first time, made these two entirely 
distinct challenges. Interestingly, in reaffirming this court's use of the 
cross-comparison proportionate penalties challenge, Davis used the same 
"Cf." cite as Wisslead. Davis stated that the 
proportionate penalties clause is violated where different offense are compared 
and conduct that is a less serious threat is punished more harshly. In support,
Davis used a Cf. cite to Bradley and Wagner, 
the same due process cases relied on by Wisslead. See Davis, 
177 Ill. 2d  at 504-05.
Davis also for the first time broke the 
cross-comparison analysis into two steps. Davis held that the first 
inquiry in a cross-comparison proportionate penalties analysis is whether the 
statues being compared have related statutory purposes. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506. Previous cases had used the lack of related purposes as a reason to 
reject a defendant's contention that one offense was more serious than another, 
but had never set this forth as an initial threshold that a defendant had to 
meet. See, e.g., Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d  at 260; Johns, 
153 Ill. 2d  at 448; Steppan,105 Ill. 2d  at 321-22.(4) 
Left unstated in Davis was how to determine statutory purpose. If the 
court determines that the statutes have related purposes, then the next step is 
to determine which offense is more serious, and if the less serious one is 
punished more harshly. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506-07. Using this 
analysis, the Davis court found that unlawful use of weapons by a felon 
and failing to have a firearm owners identification card had related statutory 
purposes, and that unlawful use of weapons by felons was more serious but 
punished less harshly. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal 
of the Firearm Owners Identification Act charge. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 
506-08.
Davis demonstrates that, as late as 1997, this 
court was still deeply divided over whether the proportionate penalties clause 
allowed courts to compare the penalties for statutes with different elements and 
determine which should be punished more harshly. Davis was a 4-3 
decision. Justices Miller and Harrison dissented, arguing that "[t]he propriety 
of the penalty for an offense should be assessed in relation to the conduct 
underlying that particular charge, and not in relation to the conduct prohibited 
by other offenses." Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 509 (Miller, J., dissenting, 
joined by Harrison, J.). Thus, these justices disagreed both with the use of the 
identical elements analysis and with the cross-comparison analysis. See 
Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 509 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, J.). 
They argued additionally that the judiciary's constitutional mandate under the 
proportionate penalties clause did not include trying to organize the entire 
body of criminal law into "one grand scheme of comparative proportionality 
review." Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 510 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by 
Harrison, J.). Justice Bilandic also dissented. Justice Bilandic agreed with 
Justices Miller and Harrison that cross- comparison proportionality review was 
invalid. However, Justice Bilandic did not believe that the identical elements 
analysis was also improper. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 510 (Bilandic, J., 
dissenting).

7. Post-Davis
With this new analysis in place, the court rejected 
proportionate penalties challenges when the offenses the defendant asked the 
court to compare had different statutory purposes. Thus, this court rejected a 
comparison between aggravated kidnapping and armed violence predicated on 
aggravated kidnapping, between aggravated criminal sexual abuse and armed 
violence predicated on aggravated criminal sexual abuse (People v. Koppa, 
184 Ill. 2d 159, 172-73 (1998)); between armed violence predicated on possession 
of a controlled substance and aggravated battery with a firearm, between armed 
violence predicated on possession of a controlled substance and aggravated 
criminal sexual assault (People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 478-79 
(1998)); and between falsely reporting a vehicle theft and disorderly conduct (People 
v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 12-15 (1999)). However, this court did conclude 
that armed violence with a Category I weapon predicated on residential burglary 
shared a statutory purpose with home invasion. See Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 483-84. After so concluding, the Lombardi court moved on to step 
two of the cross-comparison analysis and determined that home invasion was the 
more serious offense, but that armed violence with a Category I weapon 
predicated on residential burglary was punished more severely. Accordingly, this 
court determined that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the armed 
violence predicated on residential burglary charge. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 485.
These post-Davis cases highlight the difficulty 
that a court faces in defining statutory purpose. For instance, in Koppa, 
this court stated that armed violence predicated on aggravated kidnapping did 
not have a related statutory purpose with aggravated kidnapping and that armed 
violence predicated on aggravated criminal sexual assault had a different 
statutory purpose than aggravated criminal sexual assault. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d  at 172-73. Koppa made this distinction on the basis that armed 
violence always involves a weapon, while aggravated criminal sexual abuse and 
aggravated kidnapping do not necessarily involve a weapon. Contrast this with 
the analysis used two months later in Lombardi. Lombardi found 
that armed violence predicated on residential burglary with a Category I weapon 
had a related statutory purpose with home invasion. Lombardi used a 
broader focus than Koppa and stated that armed violence predicated on 
residential burglary targets "the risk that an unauthorized entry into a 
residence by an armed intruder may result in violence" (Lombardi, 184 
Ill. 2d at 484), while the purpose of home invasion is "to protect the safety of 
persons in their homes" (Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 484). Had 
Lombardi used the Koppa analysis, however, it would have reached 
the opposite result. Armed violence always involves the use of a weapon, while 
home invasion does not in all circumstances involve a weapon. The Lombardi 
court could have used this distinction to find that the offenses had different 
statutory purposes. Lombardi and Koppa demonstrate the 
difficulty in defining something like "statutory purpose." Each used a different 
approach, and each approach is reasonable. The appellate court would later note 
the difficulty in determining statutory purpose, explaining that, if courts use 
a broad definition, such as "prevention of crime," then everything qualifies for 
cross-comparison analysis. On the other hand, a court can define statutory 
purpose very narrowly, picking out one or two different elements, and then 
nothing would qualify for cross-comparison analysis. See People v Powell, 
355 Ill. App. 3d 124, 133-34 (2004).

8. 15/20/25-to-life Sentencing 
Enhancements
The next stage in the development of our cross-comparison 
jurisprudence would come when this court attempted to use the analysis with 
offenses that had been amended by the 15/20/25-to-life sentencing enhancements. 
In People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (2002), we considered for the 
first time a challenge to one of these enhanced offenses. The defendant in 
Walden was charged with armed robbery while in possession of a firearm (720 
ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)). The penalty for that offense is Class X plus a 
15-year enhancement. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2000). The defendant argued that 
this penalty violated the proportionate penalties clause because it was more 
severe than the Class X penalty for the more serious offense of armed violence 
predicated on aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-5(a), 33A-2(a) (West 2000)). To 
determine the statutory purpose of armed robbery with a firearm, this court 
looked at the codified statement of legislative intent supplied by the 
legislature. In this statement, the legislature explained that the purpose of 
the enhancements is to "deter the use of firearms in the commission of a felony 
offense." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(1) (West 2000). This court noted that this purpose 
was shared by the armed violence statute. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d  at 396. 
Accordingly, because this court concluded the offenses shared related statutory 
purposes, we moved on to step two of the cross-comparison analysis. This court 
agreed with the defendant that armed violence predicated on aggravated robbery 
was the more serious offense, and thus we held that the 15-year enhancement for 
armed robbery while in possession of a firearm was unenforceable. Walden, 
199 Ill. 2d  at 396-97.
One month after Walden was filed, this court 
filed People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440 (2002). In Hill, the 
defendant was charged with home invasion while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 
5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2000)). He filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, inter 
alia, that section 12-11(a)(3) and its accompanying 15-year add-on sentence 
violated the proportionate penalties clause. On this issue, the trial court 
agreed with the defendant. The trial court concluded that the 21- to 45-year 
sentencing range for home invasion under section 12-11(a)(3), where the 
defendant need only threaten to use force, was unconstitutionally 
disproportionate to the 6- to 30-year sentencing range for home invasion under 
section 12-11(a)(1), where the defendant must use or threaten to use force, and 
home invasion under section 12-11(a)(2), where the defendant must intentionally 
cause injury. According to the trial court, "[t]he statute creates greater 
penalties for offenses which cause less harm." See Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 
451. The State appealed directly to this court.
An initial question was whether this court would allow a 
cross-comparison analysis of different offenses within the same statute. This 
court held that it would, noting that the State had not presented a single 
persuasive reason why comparing different offenses within the same statute was 
different than comparing offenses in different statutes. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 455. However, instead of determining statutory purpose from the statute as 
a whole, this court would have to determine the purpose of the separate 
statutory subparts. In doing so, this court discussed the contours of section 
12-11 both before and after it was amended by Public Act 91-404. Hill, 
199 Ill. 2d  at 455-56. This court stated:
"By comparing section 12-11's current and previous forms, 
it becomes clear that the legislature, while not labeling it as such, 
essentially intended to break the offense of home invasion into two distinct 
categories: offenses committed without a firearm and offenses committed with a 
firearm. With respect to the former, we conclude that the purpose of subsections 
(a)(1) and (a)(2) is still to protect the safety of persons in their homes. ***
With respect to the latter, there is no question that subsection (a)(3) is 
still intended to protect people in their homes. Subsection (a)(3), 
however, has a second, more specific purpose. The legislature clearly added 
subsection (a)(3) in an effort to deter the use of firearms in conjunction with 
home invasions. Thus, subsection (a)(3) is intended to protect the safety of 
people in their homes from intruders carrying firearms and to deter such 
offenders by imposing a particularly severe penalty." (Emphases added and in 
original.) Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 457.
Significantly, when considering one of the 
15/20/25-to-life enhanced offenses, this court derived the purpose of the 
enhanced offense from the statutory language defining the offense and 
from the legislative purpose applicable to the enhancement. This was different 
from the Walden approach, in which this court looked solely to the 
codification of legislative purpose applicable to the enhancement. See 
Walden, 199 Ill. 2d  at 396. Thus, the purpose of section 12-11(a)(3), as 
one of the 15/20/25-to-life enhanced offenses, was not merely to deter the use 
of firearms in the commission of felonies, it was to protect the safety of 
people in their homes from intruders carrying firearms. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 457. Because the purpose of section 12-11(a)(3) was different from the 
purpose of sections 12-11(a)(1) and (a)(2), this court decided that comparing 
those subsections was inappropriate. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 458-59. The 
State would later argue consistently that the Hill approach was the 
correct way to define the statutory purpose of all 15/20/25-to-life enhanced 
offenses, and that this court should not use this definition solely when doing a 
cross-comparison analysis within the same statute.
We next considered a cross-comparison challenge to a 
15/20/25-to-life enhanced offense in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470 
(2003). In that case, the defendant was charged with attempted first degree 
murder. He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the 15/20/25-to-life 
enhancements for that offense violated the proportionate penalties clause. The 
trial court agreed with the defendant, finding that the enhanced sentences 
(Class X plus firearm enhancement) for attempted first degree murder shocked the 
moral sense of the community. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d  at 474. The State 
appealed, and this court affirmed. This court did not agree with the circuit 
court that the penalty was invalid under the first type of proportionate 
penalties challenge-whether the penalty is too serious for its particular 
offense. This court did find, nevertheless, that the penalty was invalid under 
the proportionate penalties clause when compared to the penalty for second 
degree murder (4 to 20 years). Two justices dissented, arguing that the first 
step of a cross-comparison analysis is determining whether the compared offenses 
share a related statutory purpose, and that the majority had not undertaken this 
analysis before concluding that second degree murder was more serious. 
Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d  at 493-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, 
J.)
Our cross-comparison approach to the 15/20/25-to-life 
enhanced offenses evolved further in Moss. In Moss, the 
defendants in 12 consolidated appeals were charged with various offenses, 
including attempted first degree murder, armed robbery, aggravated vehicular 
hijacking, and aggravated kidnapping. They each filed pretrial motions alleging 
that some of the 15/20/25-to-life provisions of Public Act 91-404 were 
unconstitutional. The trial courts hearing these motions agreed with the 
defendants and dismissed the charges against them. The courts compared the 15- 
and 20-year add-on sentences in Public Act 91-404 with the sentences for other 
offenses which require the possession or use of firearms, such as aggravated 
battery with a firearm (see 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2000)). The trial courts 
concluded that the legislative purpose behind the 15/20/25-to-life sentencing 
provisions was the same as the legislative purpose behind aggravated battery 
with a firearm: deterring the use of firearms in the commission of felonies. The 
courts held that the 21- to 45-year sentencing range created by Public Act 
91-404 for the charged felony offenses when committed with a firearm was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate to the 6- to 30-year sentencing range for 
the Class X felony of aggravated battery with a firearm. The State appealed 
directly to this court.
This court reviewed the three proportionate penalties 
clause analyses, and focused on cross-comparison. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  at 
522. This court observed that "[t]he issue regarding the first stage of a 
cross-comparison analysis has already been decided" in Walden, where 
this court looked at the purpose of the Public Act 91-404 amendments, rather 
than the purpose of the amended underlying offense. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  
at 525. In making this statement, Moss impliedly reaffirmed that this 
was the approach we would take with the 15/20/25-to-life offenses generally, and 
that Hill's approach of combining the purpose of the underlying offense 
with the purpose of the enhancement was for use solely for cross-comparison 
challenges within the same statute.
Continuing with step one of the cross-comparison analysis,
Moss held that the 15/20/25-to-life enhanced offenses shared a 
legislative purpose with aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated 
discharge of a firearm. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  at 526. Thus, this court 
proceeded to step two of the cross-comparison analysis, which is determining 
which of the two offenses is more serious. When this court compared the offenses 
at issue-aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a firearm, 
and several felonies that had been enhanced by the 15/20/25-to-life firearm 
enhancements-it considered only the firearm elements of the enhanced 
offenses rather than the complete offenses. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  at 
526-30. Thus, Moss extended Walden's approach of only looking 
at the purpose of the enhancement in step one to only considering the
elements of the enhancement in step two. Accordingly, Moss 
concluded that the enhanced offenses at issue were less serious than aggravated 
battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm because they 
required merely that a person possess a firearm (15-year enhancement) or 
discharge a firearm (20-year enhancement), while aggravated battery with a 
firearm required a person to intentionally inflict injury with a firearm and 
aggravated discharge of a firearm required a person to discharge a firearm in 
the direction of another. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d  at 530. However, when this 
court compared the penalties for the offenses to determine which was 
punished more harshly, it compared the penalties for the entire offenses; the 
court did not merely consider the enhancements. Moss concluded that the 
more serious offenses of aggravated discharge of a firearm and aggravated 
battery were punished less severely than the enhanced offenses, and thus all of 
the counts charging 15- and 20-year enhanced offenses had to be dismissed. 
Moss, 203 Ill. 2d  at 530-32.
The import of Moss was clear: if the enhancements 
in Moss were invalid, then every other 15- and 20-year 
enhancement was also invalid. For if the courts are going to compare only 
the firearm elements of the enhanced offenses, then the 15- and 20-year 
enhancements, no matter what the underlying offense, will always be less serious 
than intentionally inflicting injury with a firearm or discharging a firearm in 
the direction of another person. If every one of the 15- and 20-year 
enhancements is invalid, then the trial court in the present case was correct in 
concluding that the 15- and 20-year enhancements in the murder statute are 
invalid. Accordingly, the current state of this court's cross-comparison 
proportionate penalties jurisprudence requires us to invalidate the 15- and 
20-year enhancements in the murder statute, based on our conclusion that murder 
with a firearm is a less serious offense than aggravated battery with a firearm 
and aggravated discharge of a firearm. This conclusion is obviously wrong.

9. The End of Cross-Comparison Analysis
The above review of our case law in this area has 
convinced us that judging penalties by a comparison with penalties for offenses 
with different elements should never have been part of our proportionate 
penalties jurisprudence. This court has stated that the proportionate penalties 
clause was clearly intended by the framers to be synonymous with the eighth 
amendment to the United States Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment 
clause. See People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 455 (1995). 
Accordingly, for over 100 years this court gave the clause a restrictive 
construction, holding that we would invalidate a penalty only if it was cruel, 
degrading or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense that it 
shocked the moral sense of the community. We previously acknowledged that the 
nature of penalties was a matter "almost wholly legislative" (Landers, 
329 Ill. at 457), and that this court was reluctant to invalidate penalties 
determined by the legislature (see, e.g., Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d  
at 456; Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d at 319). We are reluctant no more. In the 
last three years we have invalidated nine penalties. See Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (armed robbery with a firearm); Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470 
(attempted first degree murder with a firearm; attempted first degree murder in 
which a firearm is discharged; attempted first degree murder in which a firearm 
is discharged and causes great bodily harm, permanent disfigurement, permanent 
disability, or death); Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503 (armed robbery in which a 
firearm is discharged, aggravated kidnapping with a firearm, aggravated 
kidnapping in which a firearm is discharged, aggravated vehicular hijacking with 
a firearm, and aggravated vehicular hijacking in which a firearm is discharged).
The whole cross-comparison branch of our proportionate 
penalties jurisprudence began with a questionable "Cf." cite rather a 
deliberate choice supported by reasoned analysis. See Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 196. Once this court started down that path, it could never find a way to 
make the analysis work. For several years after Wisslead, this court 
stated that the proportionate penalties clause was violated when conduct that 
created a less serious threat to the public health, safety, and welfare was 
punished more harshly than conduct that constituted a greater threat. 
Nevertheless, the standard this was judged under was the "cruel or degrading" 
standard. This analysis was problematic for two reasons: one, the test is 
largely subjective, and two, it is simply not a good test for judging which of 
two offenses is more serious. In Davis, this court tried to fix the 
analysis to make it less subjective and more workable. This court made it clear 
that it would compare only statutes that had similar purposes, and that if a 
less serious offense was punished more harshly than a more serious offense, then 
the greater penalty would be invalidated. This court would simply compare the 
two offenses rather than trying to judge them under the "cruel or degrading" 
standard, which became the test solely for judging a penalty in relation to its 
specific offense. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 503-04. All that Davis 
accomplished, however, was to create a whole new set of problems. The analysis 
became even more subjective, as courts now had to find a way to define 
"statutory purpose." The cases show that this was not done consistently, and the 
courts never did settle on a way to define it. The outcome of a cross-comparison 
case could always be determined by how narrowly or broadly a court chose to 
define statutory purpose, and there is simply no principled, objective way to 
define it. When the legislature gave us its own statement of statutory purpose 
for the 15/20/25-to-life offenses, a whole new set of problems was created and 
this court began invalidating penalties on a regular basis.
Also, in trying to determine which of two offenses is more 
serious, this court has long noted the problem that we do not know what factors 
the legislature took into account in setting the penalty. All that we can base 
the assessment on is the degree of harm or the value of property involved, but 
we have consistently noted that the legislature might have taken other factors 
into account, such as the need to halt an increase in the occurrence of a 
particular crime. Nevertheless, when we have invalidated penalties, we have 
never considered these other factors. Finally, in all the years after the 
questionable Wisslead cite, this court has never defended the use of 
cross-comparison analysis, except to say that we used it in several cases. See
Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 420-21.
It is clear what needs to be done. After much reflection, 
we have concluded that cross-comparison analysis has proved to be nothing but 
problematic and unworkable, and that it needs to be abandoned. Those cases that 
used such an analysis to invalidate a penalty are overruled, and this court will 
no longer use the proportionate penalties clause to judge a penalty in relation 
to the penalty for an offense with different elements.
Overruling a decision of this court, let alone an entire 
body of case law, necessarily implicates stare decisis principles. With 
regard to stare decisis, this court recently observed the following:
"The doctrine of stare decisis 'expresses the 
policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.'
Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936), overruled on other grounds 
by Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321 (1944). This doctrine 'is the 
means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, 
but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.' Chicago Bar 
Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994).
Stare decisis enables both the people and the bar of this state 'to 
rely upon [this court's] decisions with assurance that they will not be lightly 
overruled.' Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304 
(1982).
To be sure, stare decisis is not an inexorable 
command. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2d  at 510; Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 842, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 746, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (1991) (Souter, 
J., concurring). However, we have consistently held that any departure from 
stare decisis must be specially justified (Chicago Bar Ass'n, 161 
Ill. 2d at 510) and that prior decisions should not be overruled absent 'good 
cause' (Moehle, 93 Ill. 2d  at 304; Heimgaertner v. Benjamin 
Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 166-67 (1955)) or 'compelling 
reasons' (Moehle, 93 Ill. 2d  at 304; People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999)). This court also has recognized that 'it will not 
depart from precedent "merely because the court is of the opinion that it might 
decide otherwise were the question a new one."' Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d  
at 463-64, quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97 (1968). In 
sum, 'when a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute or 
constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can be shown 
that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to public 
interests.' Maki, 40 Ill. 2d  at 196; see also Heidenreich v. 
Bremner, 260 Ill. 439, 450-51 (1913)." Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81-82 (2004).
We have further noted that good cause to depart from 
stare decisis exists when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly 
reasoned. See People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 134 (2003), citing 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
For several reasons, we believe departing from stare 
decisis and abandoning cross-comparison proportionate penalties analysis is 
justified. First, it is clearly an area of the law in which the governing 
decisions are badly reasoned. As noted above, cross-comparison analysis started 
with a questionable citation and was never supported by any reasoning other than 
stating that the court has used it in several cases. Second, the governing 
decisions have proved unworkable. This court has experimented with different 
analyses in this area, and all that we have accomplished is to make the analysis 
more subjective and to put ourselves in a position in which we are improperly 
substituting our judgment for that of the legislature. The law in this area has 
never been settled for any appreciable length of time. Third, this analysis set 
this court on a collision course with separation of powers principles. Were this 
court to keep using the cross-comparison analysis as it had been, this court 
would no longer be constrained to serve as a mere check on the legislature, 
ensuring compliance with the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 
Constitution. Instead, we would be free to act as a superior legislative branch, 
substituting our judgment for the legislature whenever we disagreed with the 
penalties it set. Thus, "serious detriment *** prejudicial to public interests" 
is likely to arise from this case law. See Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196 (1968). Good cause exists to abandon the cross-comparison analysis.

10. The Future of Proportionate 
Penalties Clause Jurisprudence
A defendant may no longer challenge a penalty under the 
proportionate penalties clause by comparing it with the penalty for an offense 
with different elements. We retain the other two types of proportionate 
penalties challenges. A defendant may still argue that the penalty for a 
particular offense is too severe, and such a challenge will be judged under the 
familiar "cruel or degrading" standard. Further, a defendant may still challenge 
a penalty on the basis that it is harsher than the penalty for a different 
offense that contains identical elements. Some previous justices of this court 
have criticized the identical-elements analysis on the same basis as the 
cross-comparison analysis: that the proportionate penalties clause only allows a 
defendant to challenge a penalty as being too harsh for its particular offense. 
See Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 181-88 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by 
Ryan, J.); Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 424-26 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined 
by Nickels, J.). These justices have noted that the United States Supreme Court 
has held that providing different penalties for different offenses with 
identical elements does run afoul of the constitutional guarantees of due 
process and equal protection. See Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 185 
(discussing Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 99 S. Ct. 
2198). Batchelder, however, merely addressed the question under the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. That 
case does not answer whether different penalties for different offenses with 
identical elements offends the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 
Constitution. This clause requires the legislature to set penalties "according 
to the seriousness of the offense." If the legislature determines that the exact 
same elements merit two different penalties, then one of these penalties has not 
been set in accordance with the seriousness of the offense. The legislature has 
made two different judgments about the seriousness of one offense. Also, as we 
noted in Lewis, the identical-elements analysis is not fraught with the 
same difficulties as cross-comparison analysis: it requires no subjective 
determinations by this court, it does not require that we act as a "superlegislature," 
and it does not threaten separation of powers principles. See Lewis, 
175 Ill. 2d  at 421-22.
Additionally, we do not by this decision prevent 
defendants from raising challenges to penalties under the due process clause. A 
defendant can still challenge a penalty on the basis that the penalty is not 
reasonably designed to remedy the particular evil that the legislature was 
targeting. See, e.g., Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 319; Bradley, 
79 Ill. 2d  at 417. That said, we caution that the cross-comparison challenge 
will not simply resurface as a due process challenge along the lines of 
Wagner. We agree with the dissenters in Wagner that the majority 
in that case misapplied Bradley in striking down the penalty for 
delivery of a noncontrolled substance represented to be a controlled substance. 
The majority in Wagner made a subjective determination about the 
seriousness of delivery of a controlled substance versus delivery of a 
look-alike substance without knowing what factors the legislature took into 
account in setting the penalties. This was different from the situation in 
Bradley, where the penalty for possession was more severe than the penalty 
for delivery of the same substance, in direct contradiction to the legislature's 
stated intent to punish delivery more harshly. Thus, in Bradley it was 
clear that the harsher penalty for possession was not reasonably designed to 
remedy the particular evil the legislature was targeting. No such problem was 
apparent in Wagner. See Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d  at 314-17 (Ryan, 
C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.). Wagner was 
merely the erroneous cross-comparison analysis under a different constitutional 
provision.

B. Defendant's Proportionate Penalties 
Arguments
1. The Circuit Court's Analysis
The State argues that the circuit court reached a faulty 
conclusion with respect to the 15- and 20-year enhancements to the first degree 
murder statute. We agree. The trial court struck down the 15- and 20-year 
enhancements under the proportionate penalties clause by comparing them to an 
offense with different elements. This is not a proper application of the 
proportionate penalties clause. The trial court did not compare the enhanced 
offenses to an offense with identical elements, nor did it find that the 
enhanced penalties were cruel or degrading or so wholly disproportionate to the 
nature of the offense that they shocked the moral sense of the community. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in its application of the proportionate 
penalties clause.

2. Defendant's Additional Proportionate 
Penalties Arguments
Defendant makes an additional type of cross-comparison 
argument. Defendant compares the enhanced versions of murder to simple murder 
and argues that it violates the proportionate penalties clause to punish murder 
in which a firearm is involved more harshly than murder in which a different 
type of weapon is involved. In making this argument, defendant uses the pre-1997 
type of cross-comparison analysis in which two different offenses are compared, 
but that they are judged under the "cruel or degrading" standard. Defendant 
argues that it must shock the moral sense of the community that every murder 
committed with a gun receives a higher minimum penalty than any murder, however 
foul, committed without a firearm. Davis, however, established that 
cross-comparison challenge and the "cruel or degrading" challenge are separate 
types of proportionate penalties challenges and that the latter requires only 
that the penalty be examined in relation to the offense for which it is 
applied. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 503-04.
Defendant's argument fails under either analysis. First, 
we have held today that cross-comparison challenges are no longer valid. Second, 
we have already held in Morgan that it is neither cruel nor degrading, 
nor would it shock the moral sense of the community, to apply the 
15/20/25-to-life enhancements to attempted first degree murder. 
Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d  at 488. Logically, then, it could not possibly be cruel 
or degrading or a shock to the moral sense of the community to apply the 
enhancements to first degree murder itself. The sentence enhancements were put 
into place because of the legislature's recognition of the significant danger 
posed when a firearm is involved in a felony. As defendant recognizes in another 
section of his brief, "it is a fact that firearms have the potential to harm or 
kill more than one person without any or little extra action by the offender. It 
is this risk of harm or death to others that the legislature sought to 
punish when it enacted the enhancement." (Emphasis in original.) We conclude 
that it would not shock the conscience of the community to learn that the 
legislature has determined that an additional penalty ought to be imposed when 
murder is committed with a weapon that not only enhances the perpetrator's 
ability to kill the intended victim, but also increases the risk that grievous 
harm or death will be inflicted upon bystanders. See Morgan, 203 Ill. 
2d at 488-89; Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 452-53 (rejecting "shock the 
conscience" challenge to Public Act 91-404 enhancements to home invasion).
Defendant further argues that the enhancements to the 
murder statute violate the proportionate penalties clause because they do not 
serve the purpose of "restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §11. The proportionate penalties clause requires that penalties be 
determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the 
objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Defendant contends 
that by setting forth lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for murder involving a 
firearm, the legislature has failed to consider the objective of restoring the 
offender to useful citizenship. We disagree.
In People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 245 
(1995), this court stated the following:
"Our court has previously rejected claims that the 
legislature violates article I, section 11, when it enacts statutes imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences. Our decisions have recognized that the 
legislature's power necessarily includes the authority to establish mandatory 
minimum sentences, even though such sentences, by definition, restrict the 
inquiry and function of the judiciary in imposing sentence."
Moreover, this court has held that, in fixing a penalty 
for an offense, the possibility of rehabilitation is not given greater weight or 
consideration than the seriousness of the offense. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  
at 206. The legislature codified a statement of intent setting forth how serious 
it considers the use of firearms during the commission of felonies (720 ILCS 
5/33A-1 (West 2002)), and the enhanced sentences are in accord with the 
legislature's determination in this regard. The legislature did not make the 
enhancements applicable to all defendants who commit felonies with firearms, but 
only those who commit some of the most serious felonies (first degree murder; 
intentional homicide of an unborn child; aggravated kidnapping; aggravated 
battery of a child; home invasion; aggravated criminal sexual assault; predatory 
criminal sexual assault of a child; armed robbery; aggravated vehicular 
hijacking; and armed violence). Defendant has failed to convince us that the 
legislature did not take into account rehabilitative potential when making these 
enhancements applicable to first degree murder.
Defendant makes one final proportionate penalties 
argument. He contends that the 25-to-life enhancement must be invalidated under 
the identical-elements test. Here defendant contends that the crime of first 
degree murder is comprised of identical elements regardless of whether that 
crime is committed through the use of a firearm or otherwise, and it is 
therefore illegitimate to impose a higher sentence when a firearm is used. This 
argument assumes what it attempts to prove, however, with respect to the 
identity of the elements of the crimes. Even a casual consideration of the issue 
reveals that for the 25-to-life enhancement to apply, there are indeed 
additional facts which must be proven: that the perpetrator personally 
discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense and that he "caused 
great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to 
another person" thereby. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2002). This is not 
a case in which different sentences are imposed for crimes with identical 
elements. Accordingly, we reject defendant's proportionality challenge to the 
25-to-life enhancement.

II. DUE PROCESS
In the alternative, defendant challenges the 25-to-life 
enhancement under the due process clause. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2. 
Defendant argues that the 25-to-life enhancement is unconstitutionally vague and 
that it is not reasonably designed to remedy the harm the legislature sought to 
address. We reject these challenges as well.
The contours of a vagueness challenge are well 
established:
"A vagueness challenge is a due process challenge, 
examining whether a statute ' "give[s] [a] person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly." ' Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 442 (1998), quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972). An act is not, 
however, unconstitutionally vague simply because one can conjure up a 
hypothetical dispute over the meaning of some of the act's terms. Gem 
Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 
481 (1998).
When considering a vagueness challenge to a statute, a 
court considers not only the language used, but also the legislative objective 
and the evil the statute is designed to remedy. [In re] R.C., 
195 Ill. 2d [291, ] 299 [(2001)]. In cases such as the one at bar that do not 
involve first amendment freedoms, due process is satisfied if: (1) the statute's 
prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding 
and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what 
conduct is prohibited, and (2) the statute provides sufficiently definite 
standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact that its application 
does not depend merely on their private conceptions. People v. Falbe, 
189 Ill. 2d 635, 640 (2000)." People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 415-16 
(2003).
The 25-to-life enhancement to the crime of first degree 
murder states as follows:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining 
the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate 
sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following 
limitations:
(1) for first-degree murder,
(a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more 
than 60 years, or
* * *
(d) ***
***
(iii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person 
personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, 
permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 
years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment 
imposed by the court." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a), (a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000).
Defendant argues that the 25-to-life enhancement 
(subsection (a)(1)(d)(iii)) is vague in two ways. First, defendant argues that 
the phrase "during the commission of the offense" is vague, in that it could be 
understood to mean that the enhancement ought only to apply when the harmful 
firearm discharge occurred during the commission of some offense other than 
first degree murder. We do not find this to be a reasonable interpretation of 
the statute. Subsection (a)(1)(d)(iii) clearly is intended to specify the 
circumstances in which an additional sentence will be imposed for the offense of 
first degree murder. The extended penalty applies if a defendant personally 
discharges a firearm which causes the specified level of harm to another person 
during the commission of the crime of first degree murder. There is no question 
that first degree murder is "the offense" to which that subsection refers, and 
we find no ambiguity here.
Defendant's second vagueness challenge meets a similar 
end. Defendant argues that the term "another person" is also ambiguous, in that 
persons of reasonable intelligence could understand this to mean a person other 
than the murder victim. We again believe that this interpretation is strained. 
It is quite clear that the legislature intended the enhanced penalty to apply 
whenever the perpetrator by means of personal discharge of a firearm causes the 
requisite level of injury to someone other than himself.
Defendant argues that this interpretation of the statute 
ought to be avoided, however, because it leads to a double-enhancement problem. 
Defendant argues that the level of harm necessary to trigger the 25-to-life 
penalty is already implicit in the crime of first degree murder, and thus it 
constitutes double enhancement to increase the penalty level based on that same 
degree of harm. Defendant concedes that the enhancement also requires proof that 
the harm have been committed with a firearm but argues that, even so, there is 
in the context of first degree murder a double-enhancement problem when one 
compares the 25-to-life enhancement with the 20-year enhancement. In other 
words, defendant argues that the only difference between the 20-year enhancement 
and the 25-to-life enhancement is the degree of harm requirement in the latter, 
but that degree of harm is inherent in the crime of first degree murder. Thus, 
any defendant subject to the 20-year enhancement would automatically be subject 
to the 25-to-life enhancement because of the harm inherent in the underlying 
crime of first degree murder. And thus, there is a double enhancement.
We find no double-enhancement problem. We do agree with 
defendant that the degree of harm required to invoke the 25-to-life enhancement 
is inherent in the crime of murder, but we note that the enhancement requires 
that the harm be caused by the firearm. See People v. Bloomingburg, 
346 Ill. App. 3d 308, 325-26 (2004); People v. Sawczenko-Dub, 345 Ill. 
App. 3d 522, 537-39 (2003). Thus even in the context of the crime of first 
degree murder, the 20-year enhancement is not automatically upgraded to 
25-to-life. It is entirely possible to conceive of a situation in which a 
defendant attempts to kill a victim with a firearm but misses, then proceeds to 
complete the crime without using the firearm to do so. Such a defendant would be 
subject to the 20-year enhancement for discharging a firearm but would not be 
subject to the 25-to-life enhancement because he did not cause the murder 
thereby.
There is a more fundamental difficulty with defendant's 
invocation of the 20-year sentence enhancement in his double-enhancement 
argument, however. That is, the general rule against double enhancement is 
merely a rule of construction established by this court, which arises from the 
presumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense 
in setting the initial penalty for that offense. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). But where the legislature has made clear an intention 
to enhance the penalty for a crime, even in a way which might constitute 
double-enhancement, this court will not overrule the legislature. Rissley, 
165 Ill. 2d  at 390-91. Here, the legislature's intentions regarding the 
circumstances in which the sentence enhancements are to be applied are quite 
clear. We find no reason to construe the statute in a manner so as to defeat the 
clearly expressed legislative intent.
Finally, defendant argues that the 25-to-life enhancement 
violates due process because it punishes the threat of harm more severely than 
the harm itself. Defendant notes that the 25-to-life enhancement is a harsher 
penalty than the baseline penalty for first degree murder-20 to 60 years. He 
contends that this state of affairs violates due process because the firearm-use 
enhancement is intended to forestall the possibility of harm to others, 
whereas first degree murder punishes the actual intentional killing of 
another. He cites Bradley, Moss and Morgan.
Defendant has read into the authority upon which he relies 
a rule this court has never adopted. The reason we invalidated the sentencing 
provision at issue in Bradley was that the legislature had set a higher 
punishment for possession of a controlled substance than for delivery of that 
same substance, even though possession is a lesser-included offense of delivery 
and even though the legislature had expressly found that delivery was a more 
serious offense that should be punished more harshly. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d  at 417-18. Moss and Morgan are not even due process cases.
Nor are we inclined now to conclude that due process 
places such tight constrains on the legislature's power to set criminal 
penalties that the legislature is forbidden from taking potential harm into 
account in enhancing the punishment for conduct which additionally causes actual 
harm. The legislature has determined that firearm use is a serious problem 
because of the real danger that such weapons can cause accidental lethal injury. 
In order to combat this problem the legislature has decided to impose a 
sentencing enhancement of 25 years to life when a perpetrator discharges a 
firearm during the commission of a serious felony and causes serious harm to 
another person by doing so. To pass muster under the due process clause, a 
penalty must be reasonably designed to remedy the particular evil that the 
legislature was targeting. See Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 319; Bradley, 
79 Ill. 2d  at 417. The legislature clearly spelled out its intent in enacting 
the firearm enhancements in a codified statement of legislative intent. See 720 
ILCS 5/33A-1(a), (b) (West 2000).(5) In this 
statement, the legislature notes the serious threat to the public health, 
safety, and welfare caused by the use of firearms in felony offenses. The 
legislature states that its intent is to impose particularly severe penalties in 
order to deter the use of firearms in the commission of felonies, and that it 
believes that the use of firearms in the commission of felonies needs to be 
punished even more severely than offenses such as aggravated battery with a 
firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Unquestionably, the 
15/20/25-to-life enhancements are reasonably designed to remedy the particular 
evil the legislature was targeting. We find no due process violation in the 
legislature's determination that the social ill being addressed merits the 
penalty imposed.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that due process 
prohibits the legislature from punishing the possibility of harm more severely 
than the actual identical harm, we would not find that the legislature had 
violated that rule in this case. A single count of murder represents the death 
of a single individual. Usage of a firearm during a felony puts at risk the 
lives of any bystanders within the firearm's effective deadly range, which can 
be hundreds of feet or more. Again, as defendant admits in his brief, "it is a 
fact that firearms have the potential to harm or kill more than one person 
without any or little extra action by the offender." (Emphasis added.) 
Certainly the risk to other persons is not more serious than death, but 
defendant has not shown that the actual death of a single person is by 
definition more serious than conduct which causes serious harm or death and has 
the capacity to put at risk the lives of dozens of persons or more at once 
"without any or little extra action." The legislature did not clearly err in 
determining that engaging in conduct which represents a risk of death to 
numerous people, and which did in fact cause serious harm to one victim, merits 
the extremely serious sentencing enhancement of 25 years' to life imprisonment.

CONCLUSION
We hold today that a defendant may not challenge a penalty 
under the proportionate penalties clause by comparing it to the penalty for an 
offense with different elements. Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding 
that the 15- and 20-year firearm enhancements to first degree murder are 
unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause. Defendant's other 
proportionate penalties and due process arguments fail for the reasons set forth 
above. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand the cause 
for further proceedings.



Reversed and remanded.
1. 
Public Act 91404 amended the following offenses: intentional homicide of an 
unborn child (see 720 ILCS 5/91.2 (West 2000)); aggravated kidnapping (see 720 
ILCS 5/102 (West 2000)); aggravated battery of child (see 720 ILCS 5/124.3 
(West 2000)); home invasion (see 720 ILCS 5/1211 (West 2000)); aggravated 
criminal sexual assault (see 720 ILCS 5/1214 (West 2000)); predatory criminal 
sexual assault of a child (see 720 ILCS 5/1214.1 (West 2000)); armed robbery 
(see 720 ILCS 5/182 (West 2000)); aggravated vehicular hijacking (see 720 ILCS 
5/184 (West 2000)); and armed violence (see 720 ILCS 5/33A2 (West 2000)). 
Public Act 91404 also amended the attempt statute (see 720 ILCS 5/84 (West 
2000)) and added definitions of "armed with a firearm" (see 720 ILCS 5/23.6 
(West 2000)), "firearm" (see 720 ILCS 5/27.5 (West 2000)), and "personally 
discharged a firearm" (see 720 ILCS 5/215.5 (West 2000)). Finally, Public Act 
91404 amended the Unified Code of Corrections, adding, inter alia, 
15/20/25-to-life sentence enhancements to the sentence for first degree murder. 
See 730 ILCS 5/581(a)(1)(d)(i) through (a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000).
2. 
The page of the indictment containing this charge is absent from the record. 
However, the parties do not dispute that defendant was so charged and do not 
allege any defect in the indictment other than the unconstitutionality of the 
underlying statute. Consequently, the absence of this material presents no 
impediment to our resolution of the issue.
3. 
By the time Bradley was filed, the legislature had already remedied its 
oversight and switched the class of the two felonies at issue. See Bradley, 
79 Ill. 2d  at 418.
4. 
Setting this forth as an initial threshold called into question the court's most 
recent use of the cross-comparison analysis to invalidate a penalty. In Hamm, 
the court struck down a penalty in the Fish Code by comparing it to penalties in 
the Vehicle Code. It is difficult to imagine how these provisions had similar 
statutory purposes.
5. 
Although codified as part of the armed violence statute, these legislative 
findings were enacted as part of Public Act 91404, which enhanced the penalty 
for numerous offenses committed while in possession of a firearm. Moreover, by 
its very terms the statement applies to enhancements added to "armed violence 
and other serious felony offenses." 720 ILCS 5/33A1(b)(2) (West 2002).