Title: CITY OF ENID v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

CITY OF ENID v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD  CITY OF ENID v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD 2006 OK 16 133 P.3d 281 Case Number: 101729 Decided: 03/14/2006 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA CITY OF ENID, OKLAHOMA, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES a/k/a AFSCME OK ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, Defendants/Appellants. ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN OKLAHOMA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, THE HONORABLE DANIEL L. OWENS, DISTRICT JUDGE ¶0 The City of Enid filed this action against the Public Employees Relations Board, (PERB), and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, (AFSCME), for declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act. The district court held the Act's classification of municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 for collective bargaining purposes was arbitrary, and that the Act constituted a special law in violation of Okla. Const., art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. The court enjoined PERB from administering the Act. AFSCME and PERB both appealed and we have retained the matter. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES REALATIONS BOARD AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. Tony G. Puckett, Ronald T. Shinn, Jr., McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for appellee, City of Enid, Oklahoma. W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Sandra D. Rinehart, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for co-appellant, Public Employees Relations Board. James R. Moore, Sue Wycoff, James R. Moore & Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for appellant, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. Diane Pedicord, Sue Ann Nicely, Oklahoma Municipal League, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Amicus Curiae Oklahoma Municipal League. Larry Derryberry, Caleb J. Muckala, DERRYBERRY QUIGLEY SOLOMON & NAIFEH, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Amicus Curiae Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma. PER CURIAM: ¶1 The issue before us concerns the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act (hereinafter the Act). I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The legislature passed the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act during its 2004 session. Administered by the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) ¶3 Appellant, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, (hereinafter Union) requested certification from PERB to represent the City of Enid's qualifying employees when the Act became effective (November 1, 2004). PERB gave notice of Union's request to the City of Enid and directed the City of Enid to post the notice on November 4, 2004. PERB's emergency rules provide it must certify Union as representative of the City of Enid's municipal employees unless PERB receives a request from another union within fifteen days. On November 19, 2004, the City of Enid filed an action against PERB and Union for a temporary restraining order, temporary and permanent injunctions, and declaratory judgment that the Act was special legislation which violated Okla. Const. art. 5, §§ 46 and 59, and also violated art. 18, § 3(a). ¶4 The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 22, 2004. Subsequently, the City of Enid filed a motion for summary judgment that the court ultimately granted. The basis for summary judgment was the court's determination the Act's classification of municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 for collective bargaining purposes was arbitrary and thus constituted a special law in violation of art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. The court reasoned that it was not impossible to design a general law, and issued a permanent injunction against PERB. We retained the appeal. Oral argument was heard on May 10, 2005. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5 The issue of the Act's constitutionality is a legal determination. "An appellate court claims for itself plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to re-examine a trial court's legal rulings." Manley v. Brown, III. ISSUES ON APPEAL ¶ A. Oklahoma Const. art. 5, § 46 ¶ ¶8 Since the Act concerns the regulation of certain labor issues of larger municipalities, we determine that the Act indeed concerns one of the twenty-eight subjects set forth in § 46. We must determine whether the legislation at issue is a special or local law. See e.g., Grant v .Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ¶9 Under Reynolds, we identify the class by tests developed for each particular subject enumerated in art. 5 § 46. Reynolds, ¶10 The City of Enid asks us to interpret art. 5, § 46 in regard to the collective bargaining Act involved here, as an absolute bar, prohibiting legislative regulation of some but not all municipalities. Such an interpretation is unwarranted and is not consistent with our previous case law as to what is or is not considered a general law. ¶11 In Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, ¶12 When we analyze § 46 along with the language of art. 18, § 1 under the teaching of Edmonds, we must invoke the "except as otherwise provided" language contained in § 46 "On the other hand, size may be an important factor in any particular classification scheme based on population. This Court has long recognized that cities having a larger population may have problems much different from less populated counties, insofar as many topics of legislation are concerned." Hamilton ¶13 Our next inquiry regarding whether the Act is a general law, as distinguished from a local or special law, concerns whether there is a proper and legitimate classification, whether the classification is arbitrary or capricious, or whether it bears a reasonable relationship to the object to be accomplished. Sanchez v. Melvin, ¶14 Two years after statehood, in Burks v. Walker, "In order for a law to be general in its nature and to have a uniform operation, it is not necessary that it shall operate upon every person and every locality in the state. A law may be general and have a local application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally upon all the subjects within the class for which it was adopted. * * * But where a statute operates upon a class, the classification must not be capricious or arbitrary and must be reasonable and pertain to some peculiarity in the subject-matter calling for the legislation. As between the persons and places included within the operation of the law and those omitted, there must be some distinctive characteristic upon which a different treatment may be reasonably founded and that furnish[es] a practical and real basis for discrimination." Burkes, ¶15 Thus, in Burks, the Court created a two-part, rational-relationship test to determine whether a population-based classification was a special or general law. The Court has used this test in numerous cases involving constitutional challenges to population-based legislation under Okla. Const., art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. ¶16 The Act at issue herein concerns the class of municipalities in the state of Oklahoma with populations greater than 35,000. Before we can deem this legislation unconstitutional, we must determine that the classification of municipalities by population for purposes of municipal employees' collective bargaining rights is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and wholly unrelated to the object of the Act. As stated above, the burden was and is on the City of Enid to show that such is the case. The City of Enid has failed to make such a showing. In contrast, the evidence in this summary judgment record supports the reasonableness of the classification. This evidence includes experts' affidavits regarding the following: 1. Smaller municipalities typically have fewer layers of management. Employees thus have a greater opportunity to deal with management directly. Larger municipalities have a more intricate upper management structure, and employees seldom have contact with bosses. Employees of the larger municipalities have a greater need for an intermediary group to act on their behalf. 2. Smaller municipalities have fewer necessary resources to engage effectively in collective bargaining, whereas larger ones are more likely to have a "critical mass of employees" from which to find individuals to speak in their behalf. 3. Smaller municipalities have smaller budgets, creating special pressure to oppose collective bargaining and avoid demands for higher wages. 4. Larger municipalities are more likely to have personnel departments and legal staff at their disposal to facilitate the negotiation process, a process that requires a certain level of competence, knowledge, and time to learn about issues and options involved in collective action. Smaller municipalities often lack these personnel departments and legal staff. Accordingly, any bargaining would be less manageable and more cumbersome for smaller municipalities and their employees. ¶17 Oklahoma's first legislature contained members who knew the Constitution. ¶18 In the case at bar, we cannot say that the legislature's population classification of 35,000 is arbitrary or capricious. We determine that a municipality's population is closely related to the object sought to be obtained by the Act. The Act does not violate Oklahoma Const. art. 5, § 46. B. Oklahoma Const. art. 5, § 59 ¶ C. Oklahoma Const. art. 18, § 3(a) ¶20 Oklahoma Const. art. 18, § 3(a) allows charter cities autonomous self-governance under the home rule doctrine. The issue that the Act is unconstitutional under art. 18, § 3(a), is not included in the "Issues Raised on Appeal" filed with the Court by the appellants in their respective petitions in error. The trial court based its decision that the Act was unconstitutional on art. 5, §§ 46 and 59, and therefore the appellants addressed those issues. The appellee did, however, observe in its response to the petition in error of PERB, that the constitutionality of the Act under art. 18, §§ 1-3 was raised before the trial court, and the City of Enid asserted in its response that the Act was unconstitutional under art.18 because it violates the home rule doctrine. If this Court fails to address this issue the trial court would have to determine the constitutionality of the Act based on the home rule doctrine when this cause is remanded. ¶21 This Court is generally free to grant corrective relief on any applicable legal theory dispositive of the case and supported by the record when the issue is one of public law. State v. Torres, ¶22 Provisions of a city charter that relate to merely municipal matters, and which are adopted and approved in accordance with constitutional provision, supersede all conflicting laws of the state. Pitts v. Allen, ¶23 In Midwest City v. Cravens, ¶24 This Court cited 11 O.S.1971, § 548.2, which provided that the legislature had declared to be the public policy of this state to accord the firefighters and police officers of any city, town or municipality all the rights of labor, and then the Court cited § 548.4 that specifically referred to the right to bargain collectively. Midwest City, ¶25 This Court observed in City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Bd., IV. CONCLUSION ¶26 Under the evidence in the record before us, we determine that the Act's population classification is not arbitrary or capricious. It is rationally related to the stated purpose of the legislation. We further determine that the Act grants the same privileges to all municipalities of the same class. It manifests uniform application to all class members. Accordingly, we hold that the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act is constitutional under Okla. Const. art. 5, §§ 46 and 59, and art. 18, § 3(a). SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES REALATIONS BOARD AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, JJ., concur. WATT, C.J., OPALA, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ., dissent. FOOT