Title: Commonwealth v. Lowery

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13050 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROWEN LOWERY. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 3, 2021. - July 13, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Trafficking.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  Search 
and Seizure, Affidavit, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  
Cellular Telephone.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint 
venturer, Hearsay, Verbal conduct, Prior misconduct, Expert 
opinion.  Witness, Expert.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 18, 2016. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Helene 
Kazanjian, J., and the cases were tried before Elizabeth M. 
Fahey, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
James E. Methe for the defendant. 
Chia Chi Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  The defendant, Rowen Lowery, was convicted of 
trafficking of persons for sexual servitude, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 50 (a) (sex trafficking); and unlawful possession of 
marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, § 34.  On appeal, the defendant raises 
six issues with respect to his sex trafficking conviction, 
arguing that (1) a Superior Court judge (motion judge) 
improperly denied his motion to suppress because the search 
warrants were not supported by probable cause; (2) the trial 
judge improperly admitted the victim's out-of-court statements 
under the coventurer exemption to the hearsay rule; (3) the 
judge abused her discretion in admitting prior text message 
evidence, which contained evidence of his prior bad acts; (4) 
the judge abused her discretion in permitting a police officer 
to testify as both an expert witness and a percipient witness; 
(5) the Commonwealth's witnesses' limited references to "FBI 
Child Exploitation Task Force" and "victim" were prejudicial; 
and (6) the Commonwealth drew an unreasonable inference from the 
evidence in its closing argument. 
We affirm the order denying the defendant's motion to 
suppress.  We also conclude that there were no errors 
necessitating a new trial, and thus we affirm the defendant's 
convictions. 
3 
 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We recite the facts as the jury 
could have found them, reserving certain details for discussion 
of specific issues. 
 
In July 2015, the Southern Middlesex regional drug task 
force (task force), in coordination with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), launched a human trafficking investigation 
in Woburn to identify and assist victims of human trafficking.  
Detective Brian McManus of the Woburn police department was the 
commander of the task force; he also worked as an undercover 
officer in the operation.  The task force began its 
investigation from a website titled "Backpage.com" (Backpage),1 
where McManus searched for commercial sexual services being 
offered in the Woburn area.  McManus found one such 
advertisement containing photographs and a telephone number for 
a woman to whom we will refer as Jane.2  Working undercover, 
McManus called the listed number and arranged for an hour-long 
session of sexual services with an individual he understood to 
be Jane.  McManus and Jane agreed to meet at a hotel in Woburn 
later that evening. 
 
1 According to Woburn police Detective Angelo Piazza's 
testimony, Backpage.com (Backpage)is a website that allows 
individuals to advertise a variety of products and services 
through user-generated posts. 
 
2 Because the victim's identity is impounded pursuant to 
G. L. c. 265, § 24C, we refer to the victim by a pseudonym. 
4 
 
 
At around 6 P.M., police surveillance units posted outside 
that hotel observed the defendant and Jane arrive in a gray 
Dodge Charger.  Jane got out of the vehicle and walked into the 
hotel while using a cell phone.  The defendant stayed in the 
parking lot for a short time before driving away.  McManus met 
Jane alone in a hotel room.  Several other undercover officers, 
however, were waiting in an adjacent room accessible by an 
adjoining door. 
McManus and Jane immediately discussed the nature of the 
sexual acts to be performed, and mutually agreed on a price of 
$260 for oral sex.  McManus gave Jane cash he had obtained from 
Woburn police undercover funds.  Jane then appeared to start 
exchanging text messages with someone on her cell phone.  After 
she appeared to have received a response, Jane put down her cell 
phone and was ready to perform the sexual act.  When McManus 
told Jane that he did not have a condom, she produced a wrapped 
one from her back pocket and began to open the package.  At that 
point, McManus gave a predetermined signal to the undercover 
officers waiting in the adjacent room, and they entered through 
the adjoining door.  They identified themselves to Jane and 
began speaking with her, while McManus left the room.  The 
officers read her the Miranda warnings and searched her.  In 
Jane's possession was a cell phone, the $260 from McManus, and a 
Lifestyles brand condom in sealed packaging. 
5 
 
 
Meanwhile, one of the police surveillance units followed 
the Dodge Charger as the defendant drove away from the hotel.  
The officers maintained uninterrupted visual contact, and 
stopped the vehicle after a few minutes; the defendant was the 
only occupant.  When an officer approached the driver's window, 
the defendant was holding an identification card belonging to an 
unidentified woman.3  The defendant was arrested, and his vehicle 
was towed to Woburn police headquarters. 
An inventory search of the vehicle produced, among other 
things, (1) a temporary Massachusetts identification card 
belonging to Jane in the "passenger area";4 (2) five cell phones, 
also found in the passenger area; (3) an empty box of condoms, 
loose condoms, and personal lubricating gel, all of which were 
recovered from a purse that was on the front passenger's seat; 
(4) two different types of business cards for "Independent 
 
3 The record is unclear as to whose identification card the 
defendant was holding. 
 
4 The record is unclear as to where exactly McManus was 
referring by the phrase "passenger area."  Jane testified that 
she had left her belongings in a "purse" in the defendant's 
vehicle, and she was seen sitting in the front passenger's seat 
on her arrival at the hotel.  McManus testified that he 
recovered "Lifestyles" condoms and lubricating gel in a "brown 
purse on the front passenger's seat," and that Jane's 
identification was found in "a black travel bag" in the same 
"passenger area" where the additional condoms and lubricating 
gel were recovered.  Taken together, the jury reasonably could 
have concluded that the "passenger area" referred to the front 
passenger's seat and its immediate surroundings. 
6 
 
Entertainment Services"; (5) business cards for a number of 
men's entertainment clubs; (6) Massachusetts identification 
cards in the trunk and passenger area for two different women; 
and (7) packages of marijuana that were recovered from a 
backpack in the trunk. 
 
Subsequently, McManus applied for and obtained six search 
warrants to search Jane's cell phone and the five cell phones 
recovered from the defendant's vehicle.  Among the cell phones 
recovered from the defendant's vehicle were a Kyocera brand cell 
phone and an Alcatel brand cell phone.  The records for the 
Kyocera cell phone showed that it had received several text 
messages starting, "Yo Roe"; Jane testified at trial that the 
defendant was known as "Roe" or "Ro."  The records for the 
Alcatel cell phone showed that the defendant had engaged in 
sexually explicit conversations with someone using the cell 
phone recovered from Jane.5  As with the Kyocera cell phone, the 
user of the Alcatel cell phone responded affirmatively to 
messages addressed to "Ro." 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In March 2016, a grand jury 
returned indictments charging the defendant with sex 
trafficking, G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a); and possession with intent 
 
5 McManus testified, based on his training and experience, 
that the messages contained terms commonly used in the 
commercial sex trade to refer to specific sexual acts. 
7 
 
to distribute marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a).  In October 
2017, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the text messages 
seized from the six cell phones.  After a nonevidentiary 
hearing, the motion judge concluded that the search warrant 
affidavit supported probable cause to "search the cell phones 
for evidence of the crime" of sex trafficking, and denied the 
motion. 
The Commonwealth subsequently moved in limine to introduce 
statements made by Jane in certain text messages as statements 
of a coconspirator or coventurer, and text messages from the 
defendant as statements of a party opponent.  The trial judge, a 
different judge from the one who ruled on the motion to 
suppress, allowed both motions.  The defendant's motion to 
preclude use of the phrase "FBI Child Exploitation Task Force" 
was allowed. 
 
Trial commenced in April 2019, and the jury convicted the 
defendant of sex trafficking and the lesser included offense of 
possession of marijuana.  The defendant timely appealed to the 
Appeals Court, and we transferred the matter to this court on 
our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant challenges the denial of his 
motion to suppress; the admission of Jane's statements under the 
coventurer exemption to the hearsay rule; the introduction of 
8 
 
prior bad act evidence;6 and testimony by McManus as both an 
expert and percipient witness.7  We address each issue in turn. 
 
1.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant argues that the 
motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 
obtained from the six cell phones because the affidavit in 
support of the search warrants did not establish probable cause.  
Specifically, the defendant contends that even if there were 
 
 
6 The defendant also challenges the use of certain words by 
police witnesses:  a single reference to the term "FBI Child 
Exploitation Task Force" by one officer, and several uses of the 
word "victim" by another officer.  The defendant timely objected 
in each instance, and his objections were overruled.  After 
careful review, we conclude that the few, scattered uses of 
these words do not warrant reversal of the defendant's 
convictions, as the terms were used only to describe the 
officers' professional training backgrounds.  See Commonwealth 
v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 376 (2017) ("An error is not 
prejudicial if it did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect" [citation omitted]). 
 
 
7 The defendant also argues that one of the prosecutor's 
statements in closing improperly referenced facts not in 
evidence, and the judge's failure to strike the remark and 
instruct the jury to disregard it constituted prejudicial error.  
The challenged statement was an objected-to assertion that "[the 
defendant] knew [Jane] was vulnerable.  He preyed on her, and 
put her to work."  In overruling the objection, the judge found 
that it was "inferable reasonably from the text messages that 
[the defendant] put [Jane] to work for him."  Testimony at 
trial, including by Jane herself, also described her difficult 
circumstances, including that, while still in high school, she 
was living in a hotel because of issues with her family.  We 
discern no error requiring reversal in the single challenged 
remark.  See Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 45 (2017), 
citing Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 32 (2016) ("Closing 
argument must be limited to discussion of the evidence presented 
and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that 
evidence. . . .  Counsel may, however, zealously argue in favor 
of those inferences favorable to his or her case"). 
9 
 
probable cause to search the cell phone that was in Jane's 
possession when she was detained by police, the affidavit 
insufficiently linked her cell phone to any of the other five 
cell phones recovered from the defendant's vehicle to support a 
search of their contents.8  We disagree. 
a.  Standard of review.  "The facts contained in the 
affidavit, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, must 
'demonstrate probable cause to believe that evidence of the 
crime will be found in the place to be searched.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 725 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jean–Charles, 398 Mass. 752, 757 (1986).  As with any question 
of law, "we review the motion judge's probable cause 
determination de novo."  Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 
555 (2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 526 (2017), citing United States v. 
Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 1104 (2008). 
In determining whether probable cause exists such that a 
search warrant may issue, "[o]ur inquiry . . . always begins and 
ends with the four corners of the affidavit."  Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 485 Mass. 172, 183 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
1111 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 
 
8 McManus applied for six separate search warrants; each 
warrant application was supported by an affidavit containing the 
same information. 
10 
 
(2003).  In considering the existence of probable cause, "we 
deal with [practical] probabilities," Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 
Mass. 169, 174 (1982), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175 (1949), and we consider the search warrant 
affidavit "as a whole and in a commonsense and realistic 
fashion," Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 586 (2021), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 501 (2016).  A 
reviewing court gives considerable deference to the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause.  See Commonwealth v. Clagon, 
465 Mass. 1004, 1004 (2013). 
To determine whether a search warrant establishes probable 
cause, "[t]he basic question . . . is whether there is a 
substantial basis on which to conclude that the articles or 
activity described are probably present or occurring at the 
place to be searched."  Commonwealth v. Spano, 414 Mass. 178, 
184 (1993).  In other words, "the government must demonstrate[] 
. . . a 'nexus' between the crime alleged and the article to be 
searched or seized" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 (2016).  "The 
requisite nexus between the criminal article or activity 
described in the affidavit and the place to be searched need not 
be based on direct observation."  Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 
Mass. 59, 70 (2008). 
11 
 
b.  Jane's cell phone.9  McManus's affidavit stated that the 
cell phone taken from Jane upon her detention by police was 
associated with the telephone number listed in the Backpage 
advertisement, which contained sexually suggestive photographs.  
The telephone number also was used to communicate with McManus 
to set up the appointment for sexual activity that was to take 
place at the hotel, and according to Jane, she generally used 
that cell phone to "respond to clients."  Furthermore, the 
warrant affidavit stated that police surveilling the hotel saw 
the defendant drive up and drop off Jane there, and she was 
observed speaking with McManus on the cell phone while entering 
the hotel. 
Jane again used this cell phone in McManus's presence in 
the hotel room to send a text message to someone after McManus 
had paid her, and immediately prior to her initiating the sexual 
encounter.  Jane also said that she had used global positioning 
system (GPS) technology to find the hotel, and to provide 
McManus with arrival estimates; because no separate GPS units 
were recovered from Jane or from the vehicle, the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that Jane had used the GPS 
capabilities of the cell phone.  Taken together, these facts 
 
9 The Commonwealth did not raise the issue of the 
defendant's standing to challenge the search of Jane's cell 
phone.  Accordingly, we do not address the issue. 
12 
 
establish both a substantial basis and a clear nexus between the 
cell phone that was in Jane's possession at the time of her 
detention and the suspected offense of sex trafficking. 
c.  Cell phones found in defendant's vehicle.  The search 
warrant affidavit also established probable cause to search the 
five cell phones found in the defendant's vehicle.  In his 
affidavit in support of the search warrants, McManus averred 
that after Jane took possession of the money from him, she 
"immediately began to type on her cell phone" and "appeared to 
receive a message, which prompted her to begin the session."  
McManus explained that this conduct was consistent with sex 
workers, who must check in with their "pimps" to ensure that the 
pimp receives full payment for the services rendered.  Moreover, 
Jane had informed McManus that she paid the defendant "to drive 
her to these commercial sexual activity appointments," and her 
personal cell phone and driver's license were in the defendant's 
vehicle at the time. 
The search warrant affidavit also averred that as part of 
the inventory search of the defendant's vehicle, police 
recovered a business card for "Independent Entertainment 
Services," which stated that the company was "[h]iring new 
talent escort/strippers" and that "MAKING MONEY SHOULD BE FUN & 
EASY."  The card listed the name of the business manager as 
"RO," and a database search of the telephone number printed on 
13 
 
the card showed that it was registered in the defendant's name.  
In addition, the warrant affidavit stated that Massachusetts 
identification cards belonging to three women were recovered 
from the vehicle, as well as condoms of the same brand that Jane 
had had in her possession in the hotel room, personal 
lubricants, and women's undergarments. 
This is not a case where police relied upon the "general 
ubiquitous presence of cellular telephones in daily life."  
Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 426 (2017).  The facts set 
forth in the warrant affidavit stand in contrast with cases 
where we have concluded that there was not a sufficient nexus to 
support probable cause to search a cell phone seized incident to 
a suspect's arrest.  Contrast White, 475 Mass. at 590 
(insufficient nexus between defendant's cell phone and joint 
venture offense where detectives lacked evidence that cell phone 
was used during commission of crime and officers did not assert 
that particular evidence was likely to be found on defendant's 
cell phone); Commonwealth v. Broom, 474 Mass. 486, 494–496 
(2016) (insufficient nexus where only connections between fatal 
aggravated rape and defendant's cell phone were conclusory 
statements in search warrant affidavit that "cellular telephones 
contain multiple modes used to store vast amounts of electronic 
data" and that there was "probable cause to believe that the 
14 
 
[defendant's] cell phone and its associated accounts . . . will 
likely contain information pertinent to this investigation"). 
Taken together, the averments in the warrant affidavit 
support the inference that Jane was communicating with the 
defendant while she was in the hotel room with McManus, which in 
turn supports a finding of probable cause to search the cell 
phones for evidence of sex trafficking.  Accordingly, the motion 
judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 
2.  Statements by coventurer.  Prior to trial, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce, as 
statements by a coventurer, text messages between Jane and the 
defendant in June and July of 2015 regarding the alleged 
commercial sexual enterprise; the Backpage advertisement; and 
statements by Jane to McManus soliciting fees for sexual 
services.  The judge allowed the motion over the defendant's 
objection. 
The defendant contends that the judge erred in allowing the 
introduction of Jane's statements under the coventurer exemption 
to the hearsay rule because the judge did not make a preliminary 
finding that a joint venture existed, and such a finding was not 
possible given that there was no evidence of a joint venture 
between him and Jane.10  In addition, the judge did not instruct 
 
10 In ruling on the Commonwealth's motion to admit Jane's 
statements, the judge stated, "I'm allowing this motion to admit 
15 
 
the jury that they could consider Jane's statements only if they 
first found, by a preponderance of the nonhearsay evidence, that 
a joint venture existed.  Given these errors, the defendant 
argues, the jury should not have considered any of Jane's out-
of-court statements. 
We agree that the judge should have hewed more closely to 
the evidentiary safeguards of the coventurer exemption to the 
hearsay rule; specifically, she should have made a preliminary 
finding regarding the admissibility of the contested statements, 
and then, if allowing the statements' introduction, should have 
instructed the jury that they could consider the statements only 
if they first found independent, nonhearsay evidence of a joint 
venture and concluded that a joint venture existed.  
 
statements of the joint venturer."  At a sidebar conference, the 
judge again remarked that she considered Jane to be "sort of a 
joint venturer, maybe not [an] overly willing [one]."  The 
Commonwealth argues that these statements amount to an implied 
preliminary finding of a joint venture. 
 
We disagree.  While the Commonwealth argued at the motion 
hearing that "[seventeen] or [eighteen] conversations" between 
the defendant and Jane constituted communications "in 
furtherance of a conspiracy to solicit sexual conduct for a 
fee," the record is not clear as to which conversations the 
Commonwealth was referencing, and the judge did not explain the 
evidentiary basis for her finding that Jane was a coventurer.  
Accordingly, the judge's musings in allowing the introduction of 
Jane's statements did not sufficiently demonstrate that the 
judge first found, by a preponderance of the nonhearsay 
evidence, that a joint venture existed.  See Commonwealth v. 
Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 534 (2017).  Nonetheless, as we discuss 
infra, this error did not prejudice the defendant. 
16 
 
Nevertheless, the judge's failure to do so in these 
circumstances does not constitute reversible error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 535 (2017). 
 
a.  Coventurer statements.  "It is well established that 
'[o]ut-of-court statements by joint venturers are admissible 
against the others if the statements are made during the 
pendency of the criminal enterprise and in furtherance of it.'"  
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 485 Mass. 471, 474–475 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 520-521 (2016).  
"Before admitting such evidence, a judge 'must find, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a joint venture 
independent of the statement being offered.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 874 (2021), quoting Holley, 478 Mass. at 
534.  Once a judge has made such a preliminary finding, the 
statements may be admitted, "but the judge must instruct the 
jury that they may only consider the statement as evidence of 
guilt if the jury make 'their own independent determination, 
again based on a preponderance of the evidence other than the 
statement itself, that a joint venture existed and that the 
statement was made in furtherance thereof.'"  Lopez, supra at 
475, quoting Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 37 (2017). 
Participation in the criminal enterprise "need not 'be made 
through a formal or explicit written or oral advance plan or 
agreement; it is enough consciously to act together before or 
17 
 
during the crime with the intent of making the crime succeed.'"  
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 435 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 (2009) (Appendix).  
The proponent of the evidence can satisfy the burden of 
demonstrating the existence of a joint criminal venture by 
establishing "by a preponderance of the evidence that a criminal 
joint venture took place between the declarant and the 
defendant."  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 844 (2000).  
In determining whether there has been an adequate showing that a 
joint venture existed, "we view the evidence presented to 
support the existence of a joint venture in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, recognizing also that the venture 
may be proved by circumstantial evidence."  Lopez, 485 Mass. at 
475, quoting Bright, supra.  "We review the judge's decision to 
place a joint venturer's statement before the jury for abuse of 
discretion."  Rakes, 478 Mass. at 37. 
b.  Existence of joint venture.  The Commonwealth 
introduced independent, nonhearsay evidence establishing the 
existence of a joint venture between Jane and the defendant to 
engage in commercial sexual activity.  This evidence included 
text messages between Jane and the defendant, verbal acts by 
Jane, and physical evidence.  We discuss each category in turn. 
18 
 
 
i.  Defendant's text messages.11  The Commonwealth 
introduced numerous text messages from the defendant's cell 
phone that he sent to Jane in the weeks prior to his arrest, 
from which the jury could have found a joint venture existed 
between the two to operate a business selling sexual services.  
In these messages, for example, the defendant gave detailed 
instructions to Jane on how to interact with customers.12  The 
jury also were presented with text message conversations between 
Jane and the defendant in which the two discussed various sexual 
acts in which Jane was to engage with customers, as well as the 
defendant's instructions to her on how much money to collect 
 
11 The defendant does not dispute the introduction of his 
text messages under the party opponent exemption to the hearsay 
rule.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2021).  Rather, his 
challenge is with respect to the admissibility of the text 
messages that Jane sent to him. 
 
12 The transcripts of the text messages indicate that during 
one exchange in June 2015, the defendant instructed Jane, "U got 
5min unless he gave u more money," followed a few hours later by 
a message explaining, "We will give him 40min tops if necessary 
and say your driver is rushing u to come out."  A few minutes 
later, the defendant sent Jane a text message saying, "Tell him 
u usually charge 250 for the hr . . . [a]nd u doing him a huge 
favor."  Regarding a different encounter several weeks 
afterward, the defendant sent a message to Jane saying, "Well we 
not giving money back," instructing her to "[g]et lube and give 
him a hand job [then] put condom on," and telling her that "[i]f 
it don't work still say u will come see him [tomorrow] for 200 
or another time." 
19 
 
from the customers, seemingly as those appointments were 
unfolding.13 
Furthermore, McManus testified that after he had arranged 
for commercial sexual services with Jane, the defendant drove 
her to the hotel.  Although Jane testified that she did not tell 
the defendant why she was going to the hotel or with whom she 
was meeting, the jury could have found from the defendant's cell 
phone records that he had exchanged text messages with Jane 
while she was in the hotel room with McManus, and thus could 
have inferred that Jane and the defendant were communicating 
with each other as the appointment with McManus was unfolding. 
ii.  Jane's verbal acts.  The jury also heard evidence of 
Jane's negotiations with McManus over their proposed sexual 
encounter.  When these negotiations are viewed in the context of 
the defendant's text message exchanges with Jane in the weeks 
preceding their arrests, the jury reasonably could have 
concluded that a criminal joint venture existed.  We have long 
held that "[s]tatements that comprise a solicitation of a sexual 
act, including any negotiations regarding the price or services, 
 
13 During one such exchange, the jury could have found, the 
defendant sent Jane a "10min" warning and then said, "Start 
getting ready to come out."  In another exchange, Jane sent the 
defendant a message that a customer "[g]ave me 149" and that 
"[h]e's aggressive."  The defendant instructed Jane to "[t]ell 
him your not into aggressive stuff ull leave," and then inquired 
whether the customer wanted "full service."  McManus testified 
that "full service" meant a paid hour-long session for sex. 
20 
 
are 'verbal acts' that have legal significance either by 
themselves or together with the nonverbal conduct that they 
accompany and explain" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 452 (2011).  Where a defendant is charged 
with the trafficking of a person for sexual servitude, the offer 
of sexual services for a fee by the person being trafficked "may 
establish an element of [that] offense," id., specifically that 
the defendant caused "a person to engage in commercial sexual 
activity," G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a).  A sexual solicitation or 
related negotiation that is admitted as a verbal act is properly 
considered in the determination whether a joint venture existed.  
See Purdy, supra at 453. 
Jane's verbal negotiations with McManus, when viewed in the 
context of the defendant's prior text messages to her, would 
have permitted the jury to conclude that she was acting in 
furtherance of a joint venture to engage in commercial sexual 
activity.  McManus testified that he called the telephone number 
listed in the Backpage advertisement and agreed to pay for an 
"hour-long full service" with the woman on the other end of the 
call.  McManus explained that, in his understanding, "full 
service" meant an hour of paid sexual activity.  The jury 
reasonably could have inferred that the individual on the cell 
phone was Jane, as she testified that she had authored the 
Backpage advertisement and had agreed to meet someone at the 
21 
 
same hotel on that day for "comfort" in exchange for payment.  
Furthermore, McManus testified that upon Jane's arrival at the 
hotel room, the two immediately began discussing the specific 
sexual acts Jane was to perform, and they quickly agreed upon 
"$260 for oral sex."  McManus testified that the entire 
exchange, from the time that Jane entered the room until he 
tendered payment, lasted "under five minutes." 
Taken together, the jury reasonably could have found that 
Jane's verbal acts in arranging the appointment with McManus and 
agreeing to perform sexual services for payment were those of a 
coventurer acting in furtherance of a joint venture to engage in 
commercial sexual activity. 
iii.  Physical evidence.  The jury also were presented with 
the items that police had seized from the defendant's vehicle 
after his arrest.  Several of those items, which were found in 
the front passenger's seat, clearly were associated with sexual 
activity, including personal lubricating gel and a box of 
condoms of the same brand that Jane had had in her possession in 
the hotel room.  Police also found a brown purse belonging to 
Jane in the same area of the vehicle. 
These items of physical evidence, together with the 
defendant's text messages and Jane's negotiations with McManus, 
would have allowed the jury to find, by a preponderance of the 
22 
 
evidence, that the defendant ran a commercial sexual enterprise, 
and that Jane was a knowing participant in that enterprise. 
iv.  Victim status under coventurer exemption.  The 
defendant also contends that there was no joint venture because 
Jane could not have been both a coventurer and a victim of sex 
trafficking.  He points to the prosecutor's argument in closing 
that Jane was under the defendant's "control" as his "product" 
for sale, which, he asserts, is incongruous with knowingly 
participating in the defendant's commercial enterprise.  This 
argument is inapposite. 
As in many cases of sexual exploitation, sex trafficking 
often involves complex dynamics between the sex trafficker and 
the exploited individual that belie neatly defined categories of 
"victim" or "coconspirator."  See Boggiani, When Is a 
Trafficking Victim a Trafficking Victim?  Anti-Prostitution 
Statutes and Victim Protection, 64 Clev. St. L. Rev. 915, 923-
924 (2016) ("trafficked individuals in general, and victims of 
trafficking into the sex market in particular, do not 
necessarily fit the mold of the 'iconic' [or passive] victim" 
due to physical and nonphysical pressures exerted on victim by 
trafficker and life circumstances).  Such is often the case in 
situations of sex trafficking, where the coventurer in the 
23 
 
crimes of conviction (in the legal sense) is nevertheless a 
"victim" in the practical sense.14 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the coventurer 
hearsay exemption does not turn on whether the coventurer also 
was a victim.  Rather, the dispositive question is whether the 
declarant's statements were made in furtherance of an ongoing 
conspiracy or joint venture.  This is because the coventurer 
exemption is premised "on the belief that the shared acts and 
interests of coventurers engaging in a criminal enterprise tend 
to some degree to assure that statements made between them will 
be at least minimally reliable."  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) 
note (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326, 
340 (1983).  See Winquist, 474 Mass. at 521 ("The admissibility 
of such statements is premised on a belief that common interests 
and activities among coventurers during a criminal enterprise 
tend to ensure the reliability of their statements to one 
another"). 
For this reason, courts in other States have concluded that 
a declarant's status as a victim -- even of human trafficking or 
a similar crime -- does not preclude the admission of his or her 
statements under the coventurer or coconspirator exemption to 
 
14 Individuals who are exploited by perpetrators of sex 
trafficking are undoubtedly "harmed by a crime, tort, or other 
wrong."  Black's Law Dictionary 1878 (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
meaning of "victim"). 
24 
 
the hearsay rule, where the statements were made in furtherance 
of a criminal conspiracy.  See People v. Brown, 14 Cal. App. 5th 
320, 335 (2017) (human trafficking victim "was properly treated 
as an uncharged coconspirator for purposes of the coconspirator 
exemption to the hearsay rule, and evidence of her statements 
was admissible to show defendant's liability as to both human 
trafficking counts"); State vs. Hopwood, Wash. Ct. App., No. 
50427-8-II (June 11, 2019) (statements by minor victim 
admissible against defendant because victim was "a coconspirator 
to prostitution and her statements were made to the undercover 
detective in furtherance of that conspiracy"). 
Here, the jury could have found that Jane, in close 
coordination with the defendant, knowingly participated in the 
defendant's commercial sexual enterprise and shared a common 
interest with the defendant in profiting from the enterprise.  
Indeed, this money-making aspect was a selling point on the 
business cards that the jury could have found the defendant used 
in his efforts to recruit women to participate in his scheme.  
Moreover, as discussed supra, there was clear evidence for the 
jury to conclude that Jane's text messages to the defendant, as 
well as her sexual solicitations to McManus, were made for the 
purpose of profiting from the commercial sexual activity that 
the defendant directly oversaw.  Given Jane's shared interest 
with the defendant in furthering the commercial sexual 
25 
 
enterprise, and notwithstanding her status as a victim of sex 
trafficking, the jury could have found that Jane's statements 
were reliable as those of a coventurer and "equivalent to a 
statement by the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 
527, 535 (2009). 
In sum, although the judge erred in not making an explicit 
preliminary finding that a joint venture existed between the 
defendant and Jane, her decision to permit the introduction of 
Jane's statements under the coventurer exemption to the hearsay 
rule did not constitute reversible error.15 
c.  Jury instruction.  The defendant maintains that the 
judge committed reversible error in not instructing the jury 
that they could consider Jane's statements only if they first 
made their own independent determination that there had been a 
 
15 The defendant also contends there was not enough evidence 
to find the existence of a joint venture because Jane was not 
charged with any crime.  This argument is unavailing.  "The 
general rule that declarations by joint venturers are admissible 
against fellow venturers applies where a conspiracy or common 
enterprise is shown to exist even though it is not charged."  
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 544 n.4 (1990), 
citing Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass. 455, 477 (1972).  
Accordingly, the fact that Jane was granted immunity in exchange 
for her testimony has no bearing on whether a joint venture 
existed.  See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 
1073, 1081 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The co-conspirator hearsay 
[exemption] contains no requirement that the declarant be a 
defendant, only that she be a member of the conspiracy"). 
 
26 
 
joint venture.16  We agree that, after allowing the introduction 
of Jane's statements in evidence, the judge should have 
"instructed the jury that they could consider those statements 
only if they first found independent, nonhearsay evidence of a 
joint venture."  See Holley, 478 Mass. at 534–535.  The 
defendant concedes that he neither requested such an instruction 
nor objected to its absence from the judge's final charge.  
Because the defendant did not object to the absence of the joint 
venture jury instruction, "we review for a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 
476, 488 (2007). 
For the reasons previously discussed, we conclude that 
there was no such risk here because "[t]he Commonwealth 
introduced overwhelming independent, nonhearsay evidence 
establishing the existence of a joint venture [to engage in 
commercial sexual activity] by, at the very least, a 
preponderance of the evidence."  Holley, 478 Mass. at 535.  
 
16 The judge instructed:  "During your deliberations, you 
will have an opportunity to examine all of the exhibits which 
were introduced during the trial."  The judge also instructed 
that the jury could "draw reasonable and fair conclusions from 
the evidence so long as the conclusions [they] draw are solidly 
based on the evidence and based on the jury's fair reasoning."  
The judge, however, did not instruct the jury that they could 
consider Jane's statements only after they made an independent 
determination that a joint venture existed.  The judge should 
have given this instruction.  See Holley, 478 Mass. at 534-535. 
27 
 
Accordingly, the judge's failure to provide the limiting 
instruction, while in error, did not prejudice the defendant. 
3.  Prior bad acts.  As previously detailed, the 
Commonwealth sought to enter in evidence text messages between 
the defendant and Jane spanning the six weeks prior to the 
defendant's arrest.  These text messages contained vulgar sexual 
references by the defendant, which the Commonwealth sought to 
introduce as evidence of the defendant's knowledge of Jane's 
commercial sexual activities and the ways in which he 
"entice[d], harbor[ed], [or] transport[ed]" her "to engage in 
commercial sexual activity."  G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a).  The 
defendant objected unsuccessfully to the introduction in 
evidence of these messages, arguing that they were evidence of 
prior bad acts that would prejudice him in the eyes of the jury 
because the sex trafficking charge pertained only to conduct on 
the day of his arrest. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in 
allowing the introduction of the prior text messages because 
their probative value was "overwhelmed" by their prejudicial 
nature.  Specifically, the defendant contends that the prejudice 
stemmed from the volume of text messages that were admitted, and 
that the excessive number of text messages primarily served to 
emphasize to the jury the defendant's bad character. 
28 
 
"Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible 
to prove a person's character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character."  Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1).  See Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  Such evidence, however, 
"may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2).  See Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 403-
404 (2017).  The probative value of the evidence may not be 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  Commonwealth v. 
Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 385 (2020).  "To be sufficiently probative 
the evidence must be connected with the facts of the case [and] 
not be too remote in time" (citation omitted).  Id. at 386.  In 
evaluating this temporal connection, we look to "the 'logical 
relationship' between the [prior bad act] evidence and the crime 
charged."  Id., quoting Facella, supra at 405. 
"Where the error is properly preserved, as here, we review 
a judge's decision to allow the introduction of prior bad act 
evidence for abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 
486 Mass. 617, 627 (2021).  "Determinations of the relevance, 
probative value, and prejudice of such evidence are left to the 
sound discretion of the judge, whose decision to admit such 
evidence will be upheld absent clear error."  Commonwealth v. 
29 
 
Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 735 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Dung 
Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 14-15 (2012).  In addition, "[t]he 
effectiveness of limiting instructions in minimizing the risk of 
unfair prejudice should be considered in balancing prejudice and 
probative value."  Bryant, supra. 
At the outset of the trial, the judge expressly limited 
introduction of the prior text messages between the defendant 
and Jane to the six-week period before their arrest in July of 
2015.  This time period had a "logical relationship" to the 
charge of sex trafficking because Jane testified that she first 
met the defendant in the "summer of 2015."  The text messages 
were introduced to show the defendant's relationship with Jane 
and his knowledge and facilitation of her commercial sexual 
activities.  They also showed the way in which the defendant's 
conduct on the day of his arrest fit within an ongoing 
commercial sexual enterprise that he oversaw, in which he and 
Jane actively worked together to increase revenues, and from 
which the two of them profited.17 
 
17 In one exchange, for example, Jane sent a text message to 
the defendant asking, "You still thinking about taking [(female 
name)] back till you get more girls[?]  I think it's a good idea 
. . . just to make the money come in faster."  The defendant 
appeared open to the idea and seemed to suggest that he would 
hire the person in question "[i]f I don't find someone by July 
1st." 
30 
 
We previously have explained that G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), 
the sex trafficking statute, "forbids . . . individuals or 
entities from knowingly undertaking specified activities that 
will enable or cause another person to engage in commercial 
sexual activity."  Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 418 
(2015).  Taking into account the business cards, condoms, and 
other items seized from the defendant's vehicle, the jury could 
have found that the text messages demonstrated that the 
defendant knowingly transported Jane to the hotel to meet with 
McManus to perform sexual services for payment, and that her 
interactions with McManus were in furtherance of the illicit 
sex-as-service scheme that the defendant directly oversaw and 
from which he benefited financially.  Thus, the jury could have 
relied upon the text messages as part of a chain of evidence 
supporting the conclusion that the defendant was actively 
engaged in sex trafficking.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 
Mass. 122, 129 (2006) (prior bad act evidence overwhelmed 
evidence of two rape charges where complainant testified "in 
detail about each of seven uncharged incidents" spanning "years 
of abuse"). 
Furthermore, any risk of prejudice from the introduction of 
the earlier text messages was mitigated by the multiple limiting 
instructions, which the judge gave at the defendant's request, 
at multiple points during the trial where the text messages were 
31 
 
introduced.18  See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 480-481 
(2014) (no error in admission of prior bad acts evidence where, 
among other things, numerous contemporaneous jury instructions 
minimized potential for prejudicial effect).  Thereafter, the 
judge repeated her instruction on the prior bad act evidence 
during her final charge .  "We presume that the jury followed 
the judge's instructions."  Bryant, 482 Mass. at 737.  See 
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 (2000) (proper jury 
instructions can render potentially prejudicial evidence 
harmless).  Accordingly, the judge did not abuse her discretion 
in permitting the introduction of the six weeks of earlier text 
messages. 
4.  Expert witness testimony.  The defendant objected to 
McManus's testifying as an expert witness in part because the 
Commonwealth had not provided prior notice that it intended to 
call any expert witnesses.  The judge agreed that the 
 
18 Specifically, the judge instructed the jury that they 
could only consider the text messages on the limited issue of 
"the defendant's motive, intent, or proof of a pattern of 
conduct or a common scheme, or whether the defendant acted 
intentionally and not because of some mistake or accident or 
other innocent reason."  The judge emphasized that the jury 
could not "consider this evidence for any other purpose, 
specifically, you may not use it to conclude that if the 
defendant received these [text message] responses, that he 
committed the act contained in the indictment . . . [or] that if 
the defendant committed the acts alleged in [the prior text 
messages], that he must also have committed the indictment 
charged." 
32 
 
Commonwealth did not provide notice that an expert witness would 
be called, and that it was improper for the Commonwealth not to 
have disclosed its intent to have McManus tender expert 
testimony.  Nonetheless, after reviewing the police reports that 
had been introduced as exhibits, the judge permitted McManus to 
provide some explanatory expert testimony based on his training 
and experience.  Thereafter, the defendant objected numerous 
times to McManus's expert testimony, and most of the defendant's 
objections were overruled. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge committed 
prejudicial error in allowing McManus to offer expert testimony 
because the Commonwealth did not provide proper notice, and that 
McManus impermissibly blurred the line between his testimony as 
an expert witness and that as a percipient witness. 
a.  Discovery violation.  The Commonwealth is required to 
disclose to a defendant its intended expert opinion evidence, 
including the witness's identity and any reports prepared by the 
witness.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (vi), as amended, 444 
Mass. 1501 (2005).  When a violation of the discovery rules 
occurs, judges have "wide discretion to determine the severity 
of a sanction" in accordance with the severity of the discovery 
violation.  Commonwealth v. Carney, 458 Mass. 418, 429 (2010), 
citing Commonwealth v. Giontzis, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 450, 459 
(1999).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c) (2), as appearing in 442 
33 
 
Mass. 1518 (2004).  In determining whether to exclude evidence 
from a witness whose name was not disclosed during discovery, a 
judge considers "(1) the prevention of surprise; (2) the 
effectiveness of sanctions less severe than exclusion; (3) 
evidence of bad faith; (4) prejudice to the other party caused 
by the testimony; and (5) the materiality of the testimony to 
the outcome of the case."  Giontzis, supra at 459-460, citing 
Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 518 (1986).  "Although 
the court may exercise its general sanction power under [Mass R. 
Crim. P. 14 (c) (2)] to exclude evidence, it is generally better 
to grant each party the freedom to present all relevant evidence 
at trial."  Reporters' Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 14 (c), 
Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(LexisNexis 2021). 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing McManus 
to provide limited expert testimony.  First, the defendant was 
not surprised by the substance of McManus's testimony, which 
largely repeated the same information contained in his affidavit 
in support of the cell phone search warrants.  In his affidavit, 
McManus explained, generally, the coercive relationships between 
pimps and sex workers, as well as various methods pimps use to 
control sex workers, such as by maintaining physical possession 
of the sex workers' identification cards and money.  Indeed, 
defense counsel noted at a sidebar conference that he was not 
34 
 
"surprised" by the substance of McManus's testimony, because, as 
the judge noted, the defendant had had access to McManus's 
affidavit for "years" prior to trial. 
Second, the judge expressly limited the scope of McManus's 
expert testimony.  From the outset, the judge advised the 
prosecutor that the Commonwealth could elicit some explanatory 
expert testimony from McManus, such as how pimps generally 
operate, but that it could not ask McManus about specific 
nondisclosed topics, such as the significance of the hotel keys 
that were seized from the defendant's vehicle.  The judge also 
cautioned the prosecutor that while McManus could testify to 
what he knew was "routine or common" in the sex trade, based on 
his training and experience, he could not use that expertise to 
opine on whether he thought the defendant indeed was a pimp. 
Third, in light of defense counsel's lack of surprise 
concerning the substance of McManus's expert testimony, we 
discern no evidence of bad faith on the part of the 
Commonwealth.19  The judge's decision to permit the defendant a 
day to prepare to cross-examine McManus further minimized any 
 
19 At a sidebar conference, the prosecutor argued that 
McManus was not asked "to render any kind of opinion" based on 
"scientific testing or analysis" and thus that McManus was not 
tendering expert testimony.  It may be that the Commonwealth 
misconstrued what may constitute expert testimony, see Mass G. 
Evid. § 702, but nothing in the record suggests that the 
Commonwealth intended to mislead either the defendant or the 
judge as to the nature of the testimony McManus was to present. 
35 
 
prejudice to the defendant.  Finally, McManus's expert testimony 
was not substantively material to the case.  The lion's share of 
his expert testimony was given in an effort to aid the jury's 
understanding of terms used in the sex trade.  The focus of the 
Commonwealth's case, however, was the physical evidence and 
transcripts of the text messages, and not on McManus's 
explanations of terms generally used in the sex trade. 
b.  Testimony as both expert and percipient witness.  "A 
percipient police witness may also testify as an expert witness, 
though care should be taken in presenting such expert testimony 
. . . ."  Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 306–307 
(2000).  The "risk of prejudice is great where a percipient 
witness comments on a defendant's guilt because the line between 
'specific observations and expert generalizations [becomes] 
blurred,'" and "[i]t may result in improper vouching by the 
Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 459 Mass. 148, 163 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 
579 (1998).  In determining whether an expert witness's 
testimony was permissible, "the better practice is to focus the 
analysis on whether the evidence is explanatory," as opposed to 
"conclusory" or "couched simply in terms of whether a defendant 
did or did not commit a particular offense" (emphasis in 
original).  Tanner, supra at 581. 
36 
 
As discussed, McManus's expert testimony here essentially 
was confined to explaining technical terms.  When the prosecutor 
asked McManus the "significance" of the women's identification 
cards that were seized from the defendant's vehicle, McManus 
answered in general terms that "a person in control will 
maintain possession of these items so that it's a control 
tactic."  Although this particular answer is a close call, 
McManus did not opine as to whether the defendant was a pimp, 
whether his conduct amounted to the control tactics that were 
commonly used by pimps, or whether the defendant had engaged in 
sex trafficking on the day of his arrest.  Contrast Ortiz, 50 
Mass. App. Ct. at 307 ("While it was certainly permissible for 
Williams to explain what function a runner performed in the 
street level sale of drugs, his testimony that he believe[d] the 
defendant was a runner amount[ed] to a personal assurance by the 
witness that the crime charged had occurred, and thereby 
constitute[d] an improper intrusion into the fact-finding 
function of the jury" [quotations and citation omitted]); 
Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 580 (officer impermissibly blurred 
line between expert and percipient testimony by opining, "[F]rom 
my experience, I believed a drug transaction had taken place"). 
Moreover, the judge properly instructed the jury on the 
differences between expert and lay witness testimony.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mason, 485 Mass. 520, 538 (2020) (sua sponte 
37 
 
instruction explaining differences between expert and lay 
opinion testimony "likely would have helped the jury 
differentiate between the two types of testimony provided by the 
same witness").  Accordingly, there was no impermissible 
blurring of lines here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  suppress affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.