Title: MARTIN KRUZICH V. MARTIN-HARRIS GALLERY, LLC

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARTIN KRUZICH V. MARTIN-HARRIS GALLERY, LLC2006 WY 7126 P.3d 867Case Number: 05-49Decided: 01/11/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
MARTIN 
KRUZICH,

 
 
Appellant

 
 
(Complainant),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARTIN-HARRIS GALLERY, 
LLC,

 
 
Appellee

 
 
(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The Honorable Norman E. 
Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

David G. Lewis of 
Jackson, Wyoming

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

William P. Schwartz of 
Ranck & Schwartz, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

HILL, Chief 
Justice.

 
 
            
[¶1]      Martin Kruzich 
(Kruzich) filed a complaint with the Wyoming Department of Employment 
(Department) alleging that he was fired from his position at Martin-Harris 
Gallery, LLC (the Gallery) because of a disability in violation of the Wyoming 
Fair Employment Practices Act of 19651.  After a contested case hearing, a 
hearing examiner concluded that Kruzich was a "disabled person" under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-9-105 (LexisNexis 2005) and the Department's Rules and Regulations, 
and that he had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case 
of discrimination.  However, the 
hearing examiner found that the Gallery had established that financial problems 
it was suffering constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
terminating Kruzich's employment and that Kruzich had failed to prove that the 
legitimate reasons articulated by the Gallery were a pretext.  The district court affirmed the hearing 
examiner's decision.  We too will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Kruzich raises 
two issues:

 
 

A.      
Whether the 
Hearing Examiner incorrectly applied the law regarding the shifting burden of 
proof.

 
 

B.      
Whether the 
decision of the Hearing Examiner was unsupported by substantial evidence, and 
was arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with the 
law.

 
 
The Gallery accepts 
Kruzich's characterization of the issues on appeal.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In late 1991, 
Kruzich teamed up with Ron Harris (Harris) to open an art gallery in Jackson, Wyoming.  The Gallery was set up as a limited 
liability company with Harris and Kruzich as the only members.  Harris provided all of the initial 
working capital.  Kruzich was 
appointed the managing partner with the responsibility of running the day-to-day 
operations of the Gallery.  In 1995, 
Kruzich was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease.  Harris was made aware of the condition 
at the time.

 
 
[¶4]      The Gallery 
quickly established a national reputation for contemporary Western art and 
furniture.  Revenues increased, 
sometimes significantly, almost every year peaking in 2000 at slightly over 
$2,000,000.  Nevertheless, the 
Gallery struggled to make a profit as it posted losses in every year through 
2000 with the exception of small profits in 1994 and 1997.  Each year, Harris was forced to make 
loans to the Gallery to ensure its solvency.  By the end of 2000, the Gallery owed 
Harris over $730,000 in principal and interest.

 
 
[¶5]      The year 2001 
began inauspiciously for the Gallery with sales down significantly from the 
previous year in the first quarter.  
In January, Kruzich notified Harris that the Gallery would need an 
infusion of $65,000 to meet expenses.  
Harris became concerned that Kruzich was not managing the Gallery 
effectively given higher than expected expenses in 2000 and the low sales to 
start off 2001.  Harris consulted 
with a retired orthopedic surgeon about Kruzich's medical condition.  On March 17, 2001, Harris traveled from 
his home in Pennsylvania to Jackson and sought to 
have Kruzich meet with him and the surgeon.  Kruzich refused to meet with them and 
objected to what he characterized as an intrusion into his personal life.  Harris responded with a series of emails 
over the following week accusing Kruzich of not facing the reality of his 
disease, claiming that the treatment Kruzich had been receiving had failed, and 
suggesting that he consider checking into a clinic recommended by the 
surgeon.  While Kruzich rejected the 
allegations, he told Harris that he would check out the treatment program Harris 
had recommended.

 
 
[¶6]      Meanwhile, the 
Gallery's financial situation was coming to a head.  Harris had to loan the Gallery $120,000 
in April.  Harris determined that 
the structure and direction of the Gallery needed to be changed.  On April 20, 2001, Harris sent an email 
to Kruzich detailing proposed changes to the job descriptions for Kruzich and 
other Gallery staff.  Harris 
indicated that he wanted Kruzich to focus on sales, and he also intimated that 
he was losing confidence in Kruzich's ability to manage the Gallery.  Kruzich responded with suggestions for 
changes in the Gallery's structure and a job description for himself that 
differed from Harris' proposal.  
Harris responded by again questioning Kruzich's management and the future 
financial viability of the Gallery.  
On April 30, 2001, Kruzich decided to take a one-month leave of absence 
from the Gallery on the advice of his doctor.  The following day, Harris sent an email 
to the staff reorganizing the Gallery.

 
 
[¶7]      On May 5, Harris 
sent an email to Kruzich's wife concluding that "we have to part company with 
regard to the Gallery."  On the same 
day, Harris sent a memo to Kruzich declaring that Harris wanted to be extricated 
from the Gallery by October 15, 2001.  
While the Gallery would continue to operate through the busy summer 
season, Harris announced that the Gallery was up for sale.  To ready the business for sale, Harris 
sought to slash expenses by restructuring the Gallery, which included 
terminating some of the employees and Harris taking over as managing partner of 
the Gallery.  After further 
conflict, Harris wrote to Kruzich on June 26 informing Kruzich that he would not 
be returning to the Gallery in "any employed or managing capacity."  Kruzich never returned to work for the 
Gallery, which closed its doors permanently in October of 
2001.

 
 
[¶8]      In September of 
2001, Kruzich filed a complaint with the Department alleging 
discrimination.  Specifically, 
Kruzich claimed that he had been terminated from his position at the Gallery 
because of his Parkinson's disease.  
The Department investigated the complaint, and on August 23, 2002, issued 
a Notice of Dismissal finding that "there was no reasonable cause to conclude 
that [the Gallery] engaged in discriminatory acts detrimental to 
[Kruzich]."  Kruzich objected to the 
dismissal and a contested case hearing was held. Both parties appeared and 
presented witnesses and exhibits.  
The hearing examiner found that Kruzich qualified as a disabled person 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a)(i) and (d) (LexisNexis 2005)2 and the Rules and Regulations3 adopted by the Department pursuant 
to the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act because "although Kruzich's 
neurological condition did not substantially limit Kruzich's ability to perform 
major life activities, Harris treated Kruzich as if his medical condition 
limited Kruzich's ability to work as the Gallery manager."  The hearing examiner concluded that 
Kruzich was subject to an adverse employment action by losing his job and that 
he proved by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  However, the 
hearing examiner went on to conclude that the Gallery had articulated a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Kruzich's employment with 
the evidence of the Gallery's financial condition. The hearing examiner did not 
agree with Kruzich's contention that the financial reasons cited by the Gallery 
were a pretext concluding that the "financial problems of the Gallery were a 
reality, and Harris' action of reorganizing personnel in an effort to revive a 
previously successful business was a reasonable response to the dire conditions 
facing the Gallery."  Accordingly, 
the hearing examiner dismissed Kruzich's complaint of discriminatory or unfair 
employment practices against the Gallery. 

 
 
[¶9]      Kruzich filed a 
petition for review with the district court.  After considering the parties' briefs 
and arguments at hearing, the court affirmed the hearing examiner's finding that 
the appropriate and applicable law was applied and that the decision was 
supported by substantial evidence.  
Kruzich has appealed that decision to this Court.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]                           
Our review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
[2005]), which provides:

 
 
(c)  To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
                        
Our review is further governed by the following 
standards:

 
 
We do not afford any 
special deference to the district court's decision when we review a matter 
initiated before an administrative agency.  
Rather, this court reviews the case as if it came directly from the 
administrative agency.  Our review 
must focus on the evidence and consider the reasonableness of the agency's 
exercise of judgment while determining if the agency committed any errors of 
law.  If the agency committed any 
errors of law, this court must correct them.

 
 
Further, in appeals where 
both parties submit evidence at the administrative hearing, appellate review is 
limited to application of the substantial evidence test.  This court is required to review the 
entire record in making its ultimate determination on appeal.  The substantial evidence test to be 
applied is as follows:

 
 
"In reviewing findings of 
fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support an agency's findings.  
If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot 
properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the 
findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable 
mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions.  It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence." Newman [v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91] ¶12[, 49 P.3d 163, ¶12 (Wyo. 
2002)] (quoting State ex rel. Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2001)).

 
 
Even when the factual 
findings are found to be sufficient under the substantial evidence test,  this 
court may be required to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard as a 
"safety net" to catch other agency action which prejudiced a party's substantial 
right to the administrative proceeding or which might be contrary to the other 
WAPA review standards.

 
 

Bryant v. State ex rel. 
Department of Transportation, 2002 WY 140, ¶¶9-11, 55 P.3d 4, ¶¶9-11 
(Wyo. 2002) 
(some citations omitted).

 
 

State ex rel. Department 
of Transportation v. Legarda, 2003 WY 130, ¶¶9-10, 77 P.3d 708, 711-12 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   Initially, we consider a request by 
the Gallery to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that Kruzich's appellate brief 
did not comply with W.R.A.P. 7.01(e)(2)4. Specifically, the Gallery 
complains that Kruzich failed to provide citations to the record in support of 
his factual summary.  The Gallery 
insists that this is not a technical deficiency because many of the facts 
alleged by Kruzich are not, in fact, supported by the record. 

 
 
[¶12]   A failure by a party to comply with 
any of our Rules of Appellate Procedure is grounds for such action that this 
Court deems appropriate including, but not limited to: a refusal to consider 
that party's contentions; assessment of costs; dismissal or affirmance.  W.R.A.P. 1.03; see Conner v. Board of County Commissioners, 
Natrona County, 2002 WY 
148, ¶11, 54 P.3d 1274, 1279 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Basolo v. Gose, 994 P.2d 968, 969 (Wyo. 
2000)).  We agree that Kruzich's 
brief is deficient in providing citations to the record in support of his 
factual summary.  Nevertheless, in 
the exercise of our discretion, we decline to impose the sanction requested by 
the Gallery.  The facts in this case 
are straightforward, and the violation of our rule did not affect or detract 
from our ability to review the matter.  
Furman v. Rural Electric 
Company, 869 P.2d 136, 139 (Wyo. 1994). 

 
 
[¶13]   Kruzich asserts that the hearing 
examiner misapplied the burden of proof.  
In her order, the hearing examiner noted and applied the shifting burden 
scheme established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973):

 
 
A 1981 United States 
Supreme Court decision, Texas Department 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, contains the 
following explanation of the shifting burden scheme set forth by the Court in an 
earlier decision:  "In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation 
of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment. First, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima 
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Third, should 
the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by 
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for 
discrimination."

 
 
We have applied this same 
burden shifting scheme to cases arising under the Wyoming Fair Employment 
Practices Act of 1965.  See World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228, 1235-36 
(Wyo. 1993).  Kruzich acknowledges that the hearing 
examiner cited the proper standard for burden of proof; however, he contends 
that she mechanistically applied the standard causing her to ignore evidence 
Kruzich had supplied in his prima facie case contrary to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000).

 
 
[¶14]   We find little merit in Kruzich's 
claim.  The United States Supreme 
Court set out a framework of shifting burdens and presumptions for 
discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in a series of cases including McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993); and Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105.  For our 
purposes, it suffices to quote a summary of that jurisprudence from the Tenth 
Circuit:

 
 
Once the prima facie case 
[of discrimination] is established, a presumption of discrimination arises and 
the employer has the burden to produce a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" 
for its action.  Reeves, 530 U.S. 
at 142, 120 S. Ct. 2097.  If the 
employer proffers a legitimate reason, the employee then must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's explanation is merely a 
pretext for unlawful discrimination.  Id. 
at 143, 120 S. Ct. 2097.  At this 
point, the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, with its presumptions and burden shifting, drops out and the sole 
issue is whether unlawful discrimination occurred. Id. 
[at] 142-43, 120 S. Ct. 2097.  
However, in deciding this issue, the jury is still entitled to consider 
the evidence establishing the prima facie case and the reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom. Id. 
at 143, 120 S. Ct. 2097. 

 
 

Miller v. Eby Realty 
Group LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1111 
(10th Cir. 2005); see also James v. New York Racing Association, 233 F.3d 149, 156 (2nd Cir. 
2000).  Kruzich's argument is 
predicated on the allegation that after the Gallery had offered its 
nondiscriminatory explanation, the hearing examiner did not consider all of the 
evidence in making the determination of whether the explanation was a 
pretext.  Kruzich, however, fails to 
identify what evidence the hearing examiner failed to consider.  Simply stating an allegation is not a 
sufficient argument, and Kruzich has failed to provide us with a cogent 
argument.  Kruzich's failure to 
present us with cogent argument with appropriate citation to the record means 
that we need not consider his claim any further.  Nevertheless, we note that our review of 
the record (along with the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law) did not reveal any evidence that was overlooked or ignored.  Kruzich had to respond to the Gallery's 
articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge with evidence of 
pretext.  As we shall see, the 
Gallery's explanation is supported by substantial evidence.  The hearing examiner applied the proper 
standards, and her conclusion that Kruzich had failed to rebut the Gallery's 
evidence that there was a legitimate reason for its actions in terminating his 
employment is supported by the record. 

 
 
[¶15]   Kruzich offers several arguments in 
support of a contention that the hearing examiner's conclusion that the 
Gallery's nondiscriminatory explanation for terminating his employment was not a 
pretext was unsupported by the record.  
First, he claims that the hearing examiner made contradictory conclusions 
on ultimate facts.  Kruzich argues 
that the "hearing examiner found that Marty Kruzich was demoted and terminated 
because he was perceived by his employer to be disabled and thus incapable of 
performing his duties, and terminated contrary to Wyoming law" while also 
finding that the employer had a nondiscriminatory reason for termination.  Kruzich claims that these findings are 
mutually exclusive and derive from the hearing examiner's misunderstanding of 
the burden of proof.

 
 
[¶16]   We have already addressed and 
rejected Kruzich's claims that the hearing examiner did not apply the correct 
burden of proof, and we will not spend any more time doing so again.  The remainder of Kruzich's argument is 
not particularly persuasive.  
Kruzich mischaracterizes the hearing examiner's findings.  The hearing examiner did not find that 
Kruzich was demoted and terminated because of his disability.  The hearing examiner found that Kruzich 
had established by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case that he had been 
discriminated against by his employer.  
Under the shifting presumptions and burden of proof framework of McDonnell Douglas, that finding simply 
meant that the burden was now on the employer to rebut or contradict that 
evidence by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.  Kruzich seems to ignore the meaning of 
"prima facie:"

 
 
Prima facie evidence 
is

 
 
[e]vidence good and 
sufficient on its face.  Such 
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given 
fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense, 
and which if not rebutted or 
contradicted, will remain sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is 
sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue which it supports, but which may be contradicted by other 
evidence.

 
 

Motor Vehicle 
Administration v. Karwacki, 666 A.2d 511, 516-17 
(Md. App. 1995) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 1190 (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis added).  In the context of Title VII cases, the 
phrase "prima facie case" denotes "the establishment of a legally mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption."  Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094 n.7, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).  The hearing examiner's findings are not 
contradictory; rather, they are entirely consistent with the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 
framework and the concept of a prima facie case.  Kruzich offers no legal authority or 
analysis for his claim so, again, we need not consider his argument any 
further.

 
 
[¶17]   Next, Kruzich contends that the 
hearing examiner's conclusions about the financial condition of the Gallery were 
not supported by the record.  The 
essence of Kruzich's argument is that the financial reasons offered by the 
Gallery were a pretense with the implication that these financial problems did 
not manifest themselves until after Harris' confrontation with Kruzich over his 
Parkinson's in mid-March.  He 
insists that there was no evidence of a connection between his discharge and the 
excuse proffered by the Gallery.

 
 
[¶18]   Kruzich's contentions cannot 
withstand scrutiny of the record.  
The record clearly shows that the Gallery's financial health was 
poor.  Kruzich focuses on the 
Gallery's revenues, pointing out that they have increased over time with 2000 
constituting a "banner year."  
Revenues, of course, constitute only one part of a company's financial 
picture.  It is unsurprising that 
Kruzich stresses revenues because the remaining components of the Gallery's 
finances paint a bleak picture.  
With the exception of small profits in 1994 and 1997, the Gallery 
consistently lost money.  Harris had 
to make cash loans to the Gallery every year of its existence but one to ensure 
solvency.  In 1998 and 1999, the 
Gallery repaid a portion of the loan principle but, nevertheless, by September 
30, 2001, the Gallery owed Harris over $1,000,000 in principal and 
interest.

 
 
[¶19]   Kruzich himself recognized the 
financial problems of the Gallery.  
He even requested $65,000 in loans in January from Harris, historically a 
large amount that early in the year.  
Harris expressed his concern about the fiscal health of the Gallery and 
set out some ideas for changes to the Gallery and its operations in an email to 
Kruzich in April 2001.  In his 
response, Kruzich acknowledged the validity of Harris' concerns but disagreed 
with some of Harris' suggestions.  
By late April, the parties' dispute over the future of the Gallery had 
reached a crisis point.  In early 
May, Harris decided to pull the plug on the Gallery if he could not sell it by 
October.  He decided to keep the 
Gallery open through its busy summer season while the search for a buyer 
proceeded.  In order to cut costs, 
Harris eliminated some staff and replaced them with temporary workers.  Harris also elected to take over 
management of the Gallery himself and leave Kruzich to manage floor sales.  Their relationship deteriorated 
rapidly.  With Kruzich continuing to 
insist that he remain as managing partner, Harris terminated his 
employment.

 
 
[¶20]   These facts support a conclusion 
that the Gallery's finances were very poor.  They also show that there was a 
connection between the Gallery's financial situation and Kruzich's 
termination.  The hearing examiner 
noted these general facts in her findings.  
She concluded that the continued ill health of the Gallery's finances in 
2001 constituted a valid nondiscriminatory explanation for Kruzich's 
termination.  The record supports 
that conclusion.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The hearing examiner's findings and 
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.  The district court properly affirmed the 
hearing examiner's decision.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 27-9-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 

2The provisions cited by the hearing 
examiner state:

 
 
(a)  It is a 
discriminatory or unfair employment practice:

 
 

(i)       
For an employer to 
refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in 
matters of compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment 
against, a qualified disabled person or any person otherwise qualified, because 
of age, sex, race, creed, color, national origin or 
ancestry[.]

 
 
. . . .

 
 
(d)  As used in this 
section "qualified disabled person" means a disabled person who is capable of 
performing a particular job, or who would be capable of performing a particular 
job with reasonable accommodation to his disability.

 
 

3The hearing examiner cited the 
following subsections from the definitions section of Chapter V of the 
Disability Discrimination Rules:

 
 

(a)     
"Disabled person" means 
any person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activity, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as 
having such an impairment.

 
 

(b)     
"Physical impairment" 
means any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; cardiovascular; 
reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and 
endocrine.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
(d)  "Major life 
activities" means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning or 
working.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
(f)  "Is regarded as 
having an impairment" means: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that does 
not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by an employer 
as constituting such a limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of 
others toward such impairment; (3) has none of the impairments defined in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) [mental impairment] but is treated by an employer as 
having a substantially limiting impairment; or (4) has none of the impairments 
defined in paragraphs (b) and (c) but is subject to an adverse employment action 
by an employer because of genetic information. Genetic information is defined as 
information about an individual's genetic tests, the genetic tests of his/her 
family members, or occurrences of disease or disorder among his/her family 
members.

 
 
3 Weil's Code of Wyoming Rules, 
Department of Employment, Labor and Statistics, Disability Discrimination Rules, 
Chapter V, Section 2, 025 140 005 2 (2002).

 
 

47.01. 
Brief of appellant.

 
 
The brief of appellant shall contain 
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 

(e)     
A statement of the case 
including:

 
 

(1)     The nature of the case, the course 
of proceedings, and the disposition in the trial court; 
and

 
 

(2)     A statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review with appropriate references to documents listed 
in the index of the transmitted record.