Title: Ohio Trucking Ass'n v. Charles

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ohio Trucking Assn. v. Charles, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5679.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5679 
OHIO TRUCKING ASSOCIATION ET AL., APPELLEES, V. CHARLES, DIR., ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ohio Trucking Assn. v. Charles, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-
5679.] 
(No. 2011-1757—Submitted July 11, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-673, 2011-
Ohio-4361. 
_______________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The court of appeals concluded that fees charged for the 
production of certified abstracts of driving records are related to the “registration, 
operation, or use of vehicles on public highways” within the meaning of the Ohio 
Constitution, Article XII, Section 5a.  We conclude to the contrary and reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Background 
{¶ 2} Appellees, the Ohio Trucking Association, the Ohio Newspaper 
Association, the Ohio Coalition for Open Government, the Professional Insurance 
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Agents of Ohio, and the Ohio Insurance Institute, filed a complaint for injunctive 
relief and declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 
4509.05(A).  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 2 was enacted on April 1, 2009; it amended R.C. 
4509.05, which now states: 
 
(A)  Upon request, the registrar of motor vehicles shall 
search and furnish a certified abstract of the following 
information with respect to any person: 
(1)  An enumeration of the motor vehicle accidents in 
which such person has been involved * * *; 
(2)  Such person’s record of convictions for violation of the 
motor vehicle laws. 
(B)  The registrar shall collect for each abstract a fee of five 
dollars. 
(C) * * * 
Of each five-dollar fee the registrar collects under this 
division, the registrar shall pay two dollars into the state 
treasury to the credit of the state bureau of motor vehicles fund 
* * *, sixty cents into the state treasury to the credit of the 
trauma and emergency medical services fund * * *, sixty cents 
into the state treasury to the credit of the homeland security 
fund * * *, thirty cents into the state treasury to the credit of 
the investigations fund * * *, one dollar and twenty-five cents 
into the state treasury to the credit of the emergency 
management agency service and reimbursement fund * * *, 
and twenty-five cents into the state treasury to the credit of the 
justice program services fund * * *. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
 
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{¶ 3} The plaintiffs asserted that the amended statute violates Article 
XII, Section 5a of the Ohio Constitution, which states: 
 
No moneys derived from fees, excises, or license taxes 
relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public 
highways * * * shall be expended for other than costs of 
administering such laws, statutory refunds and adjustments 
provided therein, payment of highway obligations, costs for 
construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of public 
highways and bridges and other statutory highway purposes, 
expense of state enforcement of traffic laws, and expenditures 
authorized for hospitalization of indigent persons injured in 
motor vehicle accidents on the public highways. 
 
 
{¶ 4} The trial court agreed and granted injunctive relief and declaratory 
judgment.  It concluded that “$3 or 60% of the $5 fee collected under R.C. 
4509.05 as amended in 2009 is money ‘relating to’ registration, operation, or use 
of vehicles on public highways in Ohio, but that such funds are not being 
‘expended’ consistent with the limited and specific purposes enumerated in 
Article XII, Section 5a of the Ohio Constitution.”   On appeal, the court of appeals 
affirmed sub nom. Ohio Trucking Assn. v. Stickrath. 
{¶ 5} We granted the discretionary appeal of appellants, Thomas P. 
Charles, director of public safety, and Mike Rankin, registrar of motor vehicles. 
 
 
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Analysis 
Standing 
 
In order to have standing to attack the constitutionality of a 
legislative enactment, the private litigant must generally show that 
he or she has suffered or is threatened with direct and concrete 
injury in a manner or degree different from that suffered by the 
public in general, that the law in question has caused the injury, and 
that the relief requested will redress the injury. 
 
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 
451, 469-470, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1996).  The director and registrar argue 
that the plaintiffs lack standing because they have not suffered harm and 
because any injury to them is no different from that shared by the general 
public.  The trial court and court of appeals concluded to the contrary, and 
so do we. 
{¶ 6} The plaintiffs do not lack standing merely because they are 
associations that are suing on behalf of their members.  Ohio Contractors Assn. v. 
Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994), citing Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 
L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). 
{¶ 7} The parties stipulated to many facts, among them that the plaintiffs 
purchase in excess of five million certified abstracts annually.  The amended 
statute increases the cost of a certified abstract from $2 to $5, meaning that 
collectively the plaintiffs would pay approximately $15 million more in fees per 
year than under the old statute.  Again based on the stipulations, most of the 
information provided on the certified abstract is available to the public for free 
pursuant to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  We conclude that the plaintiffs 
January Term, 2012 
 
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are threatened with an injury that is different in kind from that suffered by the 
public in general, that amended R.C. 4509.05 will cause the injury, and that the 
relief sought by their complaint would redress the injury.  Consequently, we 
conclude that the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 
4509.05.  We affirm the portion of the court of appeals’ decision that upheld the 
standing of the plaintiffs. 
Are the abstract fees related to the registration, operation, 
or use of vehicles on public highways? 
{¶ 8} Article XII, Section 5a of the Ohio Constitution states that money 
collected from fees “relating to the registration, operation, or use of vehicles on 
public highways” may be expended only for certain enumerated purposes.  See 
Knox Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Knox Cty. Engineer, 109 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-
Ohio-2576, 847 N.E.2d 1206, at ¶ 14 (“the Ohio Constitution restricts the 
expenditure of moneys derived from the registration, operation, or use of vehicles 
on public highways and from fuels used to propel such vehicles to the specific 
highway purposes listed in Section 5a, Article XII, or to purposes directly 
connected thereto”);  Grandle v. Rhodes, 169 Ohio St. 77, 157 N.E.2d 336 (1959), 
paragraph one of the syllabus. The parties stipulated that the money allocated to 
the various funds in R.C. 4509.05(B), other than the money allocated to the state 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles fund, will not be expended solely for a purpose 
permitted by Section 5a.  Accordingly, the issue in this case devolves to a single 
straightforward question:  Are the certified-abstract fees related to the registration, 
operation, or use of vehicles on public highways?   
{¶ 9} Our standard rules of constitutional construction are instructive but 
not particularly helpful.  For example, Section 5a is an exception to the General 
Assembly’s broad constitutional authority to raise and spend revenue (Article II, 
Section 1) and, as such, should be strictly construed.  State ex rel. Keller v. 
Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 N.E. 16 (1923), paragraph one of the syllabus.  But 
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what exactly does that mean in this case?  Should we narrowly construe “relating 
to” (the director and registrar argue in effect that we should read it as “directly 
related to”), or should we broadly construe it because the ordinary definition of 
“relating to” is broad?  We are, as always, constrained to “look at the language of 
the provision itself,” State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward, 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 520, 
644 N.E.2d 369 (1994), though in this case, that approach leads us right back to 
“relating to.”  We are to define words according to “their usual, normal, or 
customary meaning.”  State ex rel. Taft v. Franklin Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 81 
Ohio St.3d 480, 481, 692 N.E.2d 560 (1998).  That offers little help when 
defining a term as elastic as “relating to,” which means “connected with,” which 
is itself, not surprisingly, rather general.  Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third 
College Edition 1132 (1988). 
{¶ 10} Even the Supreme Court of the United States has essentially 
punted on defining “relate to.”   In discussing whether a state law was related to 
an employee pension plan, it stated: 
 
[O]ne might be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether 
the words of limitation * * * do much limiting.  If “relate to” 
were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its 
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption 
would never run its course, for “[r]eally, universally, relations 
stop nowhere,” H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York 
ed., World's Classics 1980). * * * That said, we have to 
recognize that our prior attempt to construe the phrase “relate 
to” does not give us much help drawing the line here. 
 
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995). 
January Term, 2012 
 
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{¶ 11} The Supreme Court considered “relate to” to be expansive and was 
concerned that a broad interpretation would “read Congress’s words of limitation 
as mere sham * * * whenever Congress speaks to the matter with generality.”  Id.  
The court concluded, with respect to “relate to,” that the court “simply must go 
beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, 
and look instead to the objectives of the * * * statute.”  Id. at 656. 
{¶ 12} Having found dictionaries and our rules of constitutional 
construction unhelpful regarding defining “relating to,” like the Supreme Court of 
the United States, we will resort to examining the objectives of R.C. 4509.05.  
First, we turn to some of the history surrounding the approval of the amendment 
that added Section 5a to our constitution.  The official publicity pamphlet 
included arguments for and against the amendment.  They were largely mirror 
images of each other.  The argument for the amendment included the following 
statement:   
 
“This Amendment simply says you want your automobile 
license and gas tax money to go for better roads and streets. * * *  
“* * * 
“Ohio originally promised that automobile license and gas 
tax funds would go for roads, streets, and related purposes.  But 
temptation was too great and millions of these special tax dollars 
have been and are being spent for other purposes.” 
 
Quoted in the court of appeals’ opinion, 2011-Ohio-4361, ¶ 31.  The argument 
against the amendment included the following: 
 
“This amendment places the Legislature in a strait-jacket and 
severely handicaps it in applying the revenue of the state to the 
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needs of the state.  The Legislature could not use highway revenues 
for emergency purposes and the revenues from such taxes will have 
to be spent for roads and streets and for no other purpose.” 
 
 
Id. ¶ 32. 
{¶ 13} Next, we look at the report of the Ohio Constitutional Revision 
Committee from 1972 as quoted by the court of appeals.  The report concluded 
that Section 5a requires that “ ‘all of the revenues derived from the registration of 
motor vehicles and from the taxes imposed on the purchase of fuels for motor 
vehicles be expended on the requirements of the state’s highway system.’  4 Ohio 
Constitutional Revision Commission Finance and Taxation Committee at 1755 
(Sept. 22, 1972).”  2011-Ohio-4361, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 14} Having reviewed these same statements, the court of appeals 
concluded that “the objective of Section 5a was and is to prevent taxes and fees 
collected from the motoring public from being diverted to non-highway purposes. 
* * * The effect of Section 5a is for those people who use the roads to bear the 
burden and expense of constructing and maintaining the roads.”  2011-Ohio-4361, 
¶ 34.  We agree with this characterization by the court of appeals of the objectives 
of the voters who approved the addition of Section 5a to the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 15} At an extreme level, at “the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy,” 
there is no doubt that fees for certified abstracts are related to the registration of 
vehicles on public highways.  We are not convinced that this extreme view of 
“relating to” is logical; we know that it is not compelled by the language of 
Section 5a or the objectives of the amendment. 
{¶ 16} The information maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles 
is largely available for free pursuant to a public records request.  Based on this, 
we are persuaded that the fee for a certified abstract is less related to the 
“registration, operation, or use of vehicles” than to the process of certification.  
January Term, 2012 
 
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The process of certification is useful, perhaps even necessary, to certain of the 
plaintiffs, but it is not necessary to the general motoring public.  The production 
of certified abstracts cannot happen without the registration information 
maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles.  But we conclude that the fees 
for certified abstracts are not related to the registration, operation, or use of 
vehicles on public highways, because the vast majority of drivers and vehicles on 
the road are registered, operated, or used without the necessity of a certified 
abstract.  Another way to think about it is that the fee for a certified abstract is not 
triggered by the registration, operation, or use of a vehicle on the public 
highways. 
{¶ 17} We decline to define “relating to.”  The term is elastic enough for 
the General Assembly to use in many different situations.  When it does, we will 
do our best to discern how loosely or strictly the term should be interpreted.  In 
this case, we are convinced that the money derived from certified abstracts is 
related to the process of certification, not to the “registration, operation, or use of 
vehicles on public highways.”  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals, which concluded otherwise. 
 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the court of appeals with 
respect to standing but we reverse the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Vorys, Sater, Syemour & Pease, L.L.P., Lisa Pierce Reisz, Kenneth J. 
Rubin, and Thomas E. Szykowny, for appellees. 
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Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Elisabeth A. Long, Stephen P. 
Carney, and Matthew P. Hampton, Deputy Solicitors, and Hilary R. Damaser, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. 
Chad A. Endsley and Leah F. Curtis, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Farm Bureau Federation. 
Maurice A. Thompson, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 1851 Center 
for Constitutional Law. 
Greg Saul, urging affirmance for amicus curiae National Federation of 
Independent Business/Ohio. 
Linda Woggon, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce. 
_________________________