Title: FETZER v. J.D. DAYLEY & SONS, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FETZER v. J.D. DAYLEY & SONS, INC.2004 WY 6491 P.3d 152Case Number: 03-155, 03-156Decided: 06/07/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
         

 

ROSE 
FETZER and RAYMOND P. FETZER,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

 

J.D. 
DAYLEY & SONS, INC.,

 

Appellee(Defendant) 
.

 

 

J.D. 
DAYLEY & SONS, INC.,

                                                                                                

Appellants(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

ROSE 
FETZER and RAYMOND P. FETZER,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants Rose Fetzer and Raymond P. Fetzer:

Ronald 
P. Jurovich of Thermopolis, Wyoming; and Randy L. Royal of Greybull, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Jurovich.

 

Representing 
Appellee J.D. Dayley & Sons, Inc.:

Laurence 
W. Stinson of Bonner Stinson, P.C., Powell, Wyoming; and John R. Goodell of 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Pocatello, Idaho.  Argument by Messrs. Stinson and 
Goodell.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Rose Fetzer 
(Fetzer) and her husband, Raymond, filed a claim of negligence against 
J.D. Dayley & Sons, Inc. (Dayley) seeking damages for personal injuries 
suffered by Fetzer when she stepped into a hole that had been drilled to locate 
utility lines.  In Case Number 
03-155, they appeal an order of the district court that prohibited them from 
introducing portions of their treating orthopedic surgeon's proffered expert 
testimony regarding future medical care and expenses on the grounds that Fetzer 
had failed to timely disclose the testimony.  Finding no abuse of discretion, we 
affirm.

 

[¶2]      In Case Number 
03-156, Dayley appeals the failure of the jury instructions given by the 
district court to include consideration of the conduct of a non-party actor when 
apportioning comparative fault.  
Based on our holding in Case Number 03-155, we dismiss Dayley's 
appeal.

 

ISSUES

[¶3]      In Case Number 
03-155, Fetzer sets forth the following statement of the 
issues:

1.                  
Was 
it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have excluded plaintiffs' 
testimony and exhibits relative to future medical 
expenses[?]

 

2.                  
Was 
it an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiffs the testimony of their treating 
physician relative to post-traumatic arthritis developed by the Plaintiff Rose 
Fetzer but not discovered until October 30, 2002[?]

 

3.                  
Was 
it an abuse of discretion when the trial court changed it's pretrial order on 
the second day of trial relative to certain exhibits[?]

 

4.                  
Was 
it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow defense counsel to 
solicit testimony from the plaintiffs' treating physician that Plaintiff Rose 
Fetzer had met her treatment goals and had healed remarkably 
well[?]

 

5.                  
Was 
it an abuse of discretion to have allowed defense counsel to represent to the 
jury that the plaintiff had healed completely with no after-effect, when 
plaintiffs' counsel had been precluded from addressing those 
issues[?]

 

6.                  
Was 
it an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to deny plaintiffs' 
motion for new trial[?]

 

7.                  
Did 
the defendant through its cross-examination "open the door" to the use of 
evidence relative to future medical expenses and arthritic changes in Rose 
Fetzer's knee[?]

 

Dayley 
responds with two issues:

1.                  
Whether 
the trial court's decision to exclude certain portions of the trial testimony of 
Dr. James Randolph relative to future medical care and costs for 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Rose Fetzer * * * was an abuse of discretion when the 
proffered trial testimony directly contradicted the doctor's deposition 
testimony and Fetzer failed to supplement the deposition or provide specific 
notice of the change to Appellee/Cross-Appellant J.D. Dayley & Son's, Inc. * 
* *.

 

2.                  
Whether 
the trial court's decision to exclude from evidence Dr. James Randolph's clinic 
visit note regarding treatment of Fetzer, dated November 11, 2002, which note 
was generated subsequent to the doctor's deposition, was an abuse of discretion 
and, if so, whether its exclusion was harmless 
error.

 

In 
Case Number 03-156, Dayley frames the issue as:

 

Whether 
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that it should consider the 
comparative fault, if any, of non-party actor Mid-States Consultants, Inc., 
pursuant to W.S. § 1-1-109 (Lexis Nexis 2003), was prejudicial 
error.

 

Fetzer 
concurs with Dayley's statement of the issue.

 

FACTS

[¶4]      Dayley was 
contracted by TCT West, Inc., a telecommunications company, to work on a 
construction project that included the installation of underground telephone 
lines in Basin, Wyoming.  Mid-States 
Consultants, Inc. (Mid-States) was hired by TCT West to supervise the 
installation of the lines to ensure compliance with job specifications.  In order to locate existing utility 
lines, holes were drilled using pressurized jets of water.  In early July 2001, several of these 
locator holes were drilled in an alley adjacent to Fetzer's residence.  On July 9, 2001, Fetzer accidentally 
stepped into one of the locator holes causing a tibial plateau 
fracture.

 

[¶5]      On August 24, 
2001, Fetzer filed a Complaint alleging that Dayley had negligently failed to 
mark the locator hole or erect some sort of guard or protector to warn the 
public.  Fetzer requested damages 
for bodily injury, loss of enjoyment of life, and pain and suffering.  Fetzer's husband, Raymond, joined the 
suit and sought to recover damages for loss of consortium.

 

[¶6]      On May 30, 2002, 
Fetzer filed a Plaintiffs' Designation of Expert Witnesses.  Among the experts designated was 
Fetzer's orthopedic surgeon:

 

Dr. 
James G. Randolph, [address and phone number].  Dr. Randolph is expected to testify and 
offer his opinion concerning diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of the Plaintiff 
Rose Fetzer following her injury on July 9, 2001.  Dr. Randolph is expected to testify 
utilizing his medical records as well as the medical records from the Washakie 
Medical Center in Worland, Wyoming.  
He is expected to testify as an orthopedic surgeon, concerning his 
communications with the patient, his observations, and he will testify 
consistent with any deposition that he may give.  No deposition has yet been taken.  He will testify and offer his opinion 
regarding the severity of the injury and damage sustained by Rose 
Fetzer.

 

Dr. 
Randolph will be designated as a fact witness, but he is herein designated as an 
expert witness.  As an expert in 
orthopedic surgery, he will testify concerning the transfer of the patient from 
Midway Clinic in Basin, his initial examination of Rose Fetzer, his impression 
and opinion of the injury together with its severity, the surgical procedure 
that he utilized, his consultations with Rose Fetzer, and her prognosis.  He will testify concerning future 
medical expenses which Rose Fetzer may incur including joint replacement and the 
estimated cost of that joint replacement of approximately $27,000.00.  He will also testify that Rose Fetzer 
will have arthritis at the point of injury.

 

Dr. 
Randolph's deposition was taken on July 11, 2002. To the surprise of Dayley, the 
doctor stated that at that time there was no indication that Fetzer would need 
to incur any future medical expenses:

 

Q:  Okay.  And at that time, just so I am clear, it 
was January 24th, 2002, you had your last office visit with Rose 
Fetzer?

A:  Yes.

Q:  And 
the purpose of that visit; was it to complain about anything relevant to the 
surgery, or was it just a routine checkup?

A:  Routine 
follow-up visit.

Q:  And 
as part of that routine follow-up visit on January 24th, 2002, was 
there anything that caused you concern about the surgical procedure and her 
recovery from it?

A:  Not 
specifically.  I think that she was 
doing well at that time.  My 
concern, as I had stated previously, would have to do with any patient that has 
had a severe intra-articular fracture involving a weight-bearing joint, would be 
the potential for that joint to go on and develop post traumatic 
arthritis.

Q:  But 
at the time of the January 24th, 2002, visit there was no indication 
of any problem, including the arthritis that you 
described?

A:  That's 
correct.

. 
. . .

Q:  Doctor, 
I know [co-counsel] touched on this but I am just curious, can you tell us, does 
Mrs. Fetzer suffer from any percentage of disability, either permanent or 
partial, as a result of the injury of July 9th, 
2001?

A:  According 
to the information that I have, again she was last seen in this office on 
January 24th, and she was possibly having some occasional discomfort 
in the knee, but the range of motion looked good.  Her strength looked good.  I would say there was not a significant 
physical impairment of her extremity at that time. 

Q:  Is 
it safe to say, and once again I apologize, I know these are lawmen's terms, but 
as you know Mrs. Fetzer today, based upon your last visit in late January of 
2002, she is in good physical shape and not suffering from any permanent or 
partial disability, and she should be able to lead a life just as she had prior 
to July 9th, 2001?

 
A:  I 
think that is correct.  I still 
would indicate to you that the development of post traumatic arthritis is 
something that can occur several months to even two years or more following an 
injury.  And my concerns would still 
lie along those lines, that even though in January she appeared to be doing 
well, I don't know that she  She is still at some risk for developing post 
traumatic arthritis in that knee.

Q:  But 
as we sit here today in your deposition, you are not aware of any such 
condition, nor has anything been brought to your 
attention?

A:  That 
is correct.

Q:  Doctor, 
if I could  Let me ask you this and phrase it this way.  You have indicated, apparently, that 
right now there is no indication that she would suffer from any arthritic 
condition as a result of this incident of July 9th of 
2001?

A:  What 
I indicated to you was that her knee was doing well the last time she was seen 
in this office.  I do think she is 
at some risk of developing post traumatic arthritis in that knee in the 
future.

Q:  I 
know it is difficult, but you can't tell us with any reasonable degree of 
specificity or medical probability that she will, in fact, suffer such a 
condition in the future?

A:  That 
is correct.

 

[¶7]      Subsequently, 
Fetzer filed a Designation of Fact Witnesses on September 16, 2002.  Dr. Randolph is identified as a fact 
witness who will testify about his examination and treatment of Fetzer.  The designation also states that the 
doctor will give an opinion concerning "future expenses, and future disability, 
if any, of Rose Fetzer."

 

[¶8]      On November 11, 
2002, three weeks before the trial was scheduled to commence, Fetzer met with 
Dr. Randolph for the first time since January of that year.  After examining Fetzer, Dr. Randolph 
noted "posttraumatic arthritis involving the lateral compartment of the left 
knee" and that this condition was causing Fetzer pain.  He concluded, "if the patient has failed 
more conservative treatment and continues to have severe pain in the left knee, 
total knee arthroplasty may be necessary at some point in the future."  Fetzer notified Dayley of the visit and 
provided them with a copy of Dr. Randolph's note summarizing his examination and 
conclusions on November 14, 2002, as part of the filing of her pretrial 
memorandum.  The memorandum also 
included a description of the testimony each of Fetzer's witnesses was expected 
to provide at trial.  For Dr. 
Randolph, the pretrial memorandum stated that he would "testify concerning 
future medical expenses including those for treatment, surgery and 
rehabilitation."  A subsequent 
statement was more conditional in nature: "He will testify concerning future 
medical expenses which Rose Fetzer may incur including joint replacement and the 
estimated cost of that joint replacement.  
He will also testify that Rose Fetzer has arthritis at the point of 
injury."  Fetzer also provided to 
Dayley an x-ray of her knee taken during the November 11 
examination.

 

[¶9]      The case 
proceeded to trial on December 4, 2002.  
During voir dire, Fetzer's counsel mentioned that a doctor would testify, 
and that "we will ask him if he can testify to a degree of reasonable medical 
probability, which is the preponderance test" when asking the potential jurors 
if any of them had a "problem with that approach to the proof on the 
medical?"  During his opening 
statement, Fetzer's counsel went into more depth on what was expected from Dr. 
Randolph during the trial:

 

Dr. 
Randolph will go through and tell you of his visits with Rose Fetzer.  He will tell you of the subsequent 
x-rays and what he found significant about those.  And he will tell you that she has 
arthritis in that knee now, that it was not there before  and he'll point that 
out to you  and that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, she's 
going to have to have a knee replacement.

. 
. . .

Dr. 
Randolph will testify to his portion of the future medical bills and what costs 
will be done in his clinic, surgery fee and the  the outpatient 
rehabilitation.  We will call the 
chief financial officer from the Washakie Memorial Hospital  or Medical Center, 
they call it now  who will testify to what the hospital costs are for the knee 
replacement and for the Home Health therapy that is done as you go 
along.

 

After 
opening statements were completed, Dayley objected to the doctor's proffered 
testimony.  Dayley argued that it 
had not been provided timely notice that the doctor's testimony had changed 
since his deposition, in which he had stated that he could not determine with a 
reasonable degree of specificity or medical probability that Fetzer would 
develop arthritis in her knee or would require knee replacement surgery.  Dayley also contended that since Dr. 
Randolph's deposition testimony was favorable to them on the issue of future 
medical damages, they decided not to designate their own expert for 
rebuttal.  Dayley moved for the 
exclusion of the undisclosed testimony or, in the alternative, for a continuance 
of the trial.

 

[¶10]   The next day before the trial 
resumed, the court heard additional argument from counsel before concluding that 
it was obviously a surprise to the defense that Dr. Randolph would be testifying 
to future medical care requirements with a reasonable degree of medical 
probability and that testimony was inconsistent with his deposition.  The court held that Dayley was entitled 
to sufficient notice to prepare to respond to the testimony and that Fetzer had 
failed to provide that timely notice. Accordingly, the court ruled that all 
testimony and exhibits relating to future medical care and its cost were 
excluded. The exclusion applied to testimony from Dr. Randolph relating to the 
presence of arthritis in the knee, testimony on the cost of knee replacement 
surgery, and proposed exhibits consisting of Dr. Randolph's note from Fetzer's 
November 11th examination and the x-rays of 
her knee taken at that time. The court also instructed the jury that it could 
not award future medical costs. 

 

[¶11]   After trial, the jury returned a 
verdict finding Fetzer 25 percent negligent, Dayley 70 percent negligent, and 
unknown persons 5 percent negligent.  
The jury awarded Fetzer $38,895.00 in medical expenses, $25,000.00 in 
pain and suffering, and $15,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life.  They awarded no damages for physical 
disability nor on Fetzer's husband's claim for loss of consortium.  After taking her percentage of fault 
into account, the district court entered a judgment in her favor for 
$55,226.91.

 

[¶12]   After the judgment was entered, 
Fetzer filed a motion for a new trial citing the prejudicial effect of the 
court's ruling excluding her evidence on future medical expenses.  The court denied the motion.  Fetzer has appealed the jury's verdict, 
the judgment, and the denial of her motion for a new trial in Case Number 
03-155.

 

[¶13]   At trial there was evidence 
presented that Mid-States was responsible for inspecting the project and 
ensuring compliance with safety requirements set out in the contract between 
Dayley and TCT West.  Dayley's 
position was that Mid-States bore some responsibility for the accident because 
it negligently failed to perform its duties.  Dayley submitted two jury instructions 
that placed Mid-States, a non-party actor, on the jury verdict form for the 
assessment of comparative fault.  The district court rejected the proposed 
jury instructions, and Mid-States was not included on the instructions given to 
the jury.  In Case Number 03-156, 
Dayley appeals the court's failure to include Mid-States on the jury verdict 
form.  Dayley states that its appeal 
is conditional on this Court's decision in Case Number 03-155:  If the jury's verdict is affirmed, 
Dayley requests that its appeal be dismissed.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶14]   We review rulings excluding 
proffered expert testimony based upon either a violation of a pre-trial order 
under W.R.C.P. 16(f)1 or as unfairly prejudicial under 
W.R.E. 4032 because of surprise for an abuse of 
discretion.  Winterholler v. 
Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621, 624-25 & 628 (Wyo. 1999).

 

"'Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. 
Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).'"  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).

 

Winterholler, 
989 P.2d  at 624-25 (quoting Rogers v. State, 971 P.2d 599, 601 (Wyo. 
1999)); see also Smith v. Paiz, 2004 WY 14, ¶15, 84 P.3d 1272, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2004).  In either situation, we have 
held that the following factors are relevant to the trial court's 
determination:

 

(1)       
whether 
allowing the evidence would incurably surprise or prejudice the opposing 
party;

 

(2)       
whether 
excluding the evidence would incurably prejudice the party seeking to introduce 
it;

 

(3)       
whether 
the party seeking to introduce the testimony failed to comply with the 
evidentiary rules inadvertently or willfully;

 

(4)       
the 
impact of allowing the proposed testimony on the orderliness and efficiency of 
the trial; and

 

(5)       
the 
impact of excluding the proposed testimony on the completeness of the 
information before the court or jury.

 

Winterholler, 
989 P.2d  at 628 (citing Dada v. Children's National Medical Center, 715 A.2d 904, 909 (D.C. 1998)).  The 
totality of the circumstances is considered when weighing these factors.  Smith, ¶15 (quoting Dada, 
715 A.2d at 909-10)).

 

DISCUSSION

[¶15]   In her appeal Fetzer contends that 
the district court erred when it excluded Dr. Randolph's expert testimony and 
the accompanying exhibits.  Her 
argument is two-pronged.  First, she 
claims that Dayley had sufficient notice that Dr. Randolph would testify at 
trial about future medical expenses and the development of arthritis in Fetzer's 
knee that would eventually necessitate knee replacement surgery.  Fetzer insists that notice was provided 
to Dayley through various court filings, including her pretrial memorandum, and 
the submittal of various exhibits before trial, including Dr. Randolph's note of 
the November 11 examination of Fetzer.  
Fetzer notes that Dayley did not object to these exhibits.  Accordingly, Fetzer concludes that 
Dayley was not surprised, and the district court erred when it found 
otherwise.  Second, she contends 
that the district court's remedy  the total exclusion of any evidence on future 
medical expenses  was too harsh.  
Fetzer argues that she was totally deprived of any opportunity to present 
her theory of the case, resulting in unfair prejudice to her and, consequently, 
an unfair trial.

 

[¶16]   The record does not support 
Fetzer's contention on the question of notice.  When Fetzer designated Dr. Randolph as 
an expert witness, she stated that he would testify "consistent with any 
deposition that he may give."  
Fetzer's designation of Dr. Randolph also stated that the doctor would 
testify as to future medical expenses, including joint replacement, and that 
Fetzer would have arthritis at the point of injury.  However, in his deposition given on July 
11, 2002, Dr. Randolph testified that Fetzer did not have arthritis at the point 
of injury at that time and that he could not "with any reasonable degree of 
specificity or medical probability" state that she would, in fact, develop such 
a condition in the future.  Dayley 
reasonably relied upon Dr. Randolph's deposition testimony to conclude that it 
did not have to retain a medical expert for trial.  Thereafter, Dr. Randolph changed this 
opinion after examining Fetzer on November 11, 2002.  The only possible source of notice to 
Dayley of this change was Fetzer's pretrial memorandum, filed on November 14, 
2002 along with Dr. Randolph's note of the November 11 examination.  In that filing, Fetzer described Dr. 
Randolph's anticipated testimony at trial:

 

Dr. 
Randolph is expected to testify and offer his opinion concerning diagnosis, 
treatment and prognosis of the Plaintiff Rose Fetzer following her injury on 
July 9, 2001.  Dr. Randolph is 
expected to testify utilizing his medical records as well as the medical records 
from the Washakie Medical Center in Worland, Wyoming.  He is expected to testify as an 
orthopedic surgeon, concerning his communications with the patient and his 
observations of her.  He will 
testify and offer his opinion regarding the severity of the injury and damage 
sustained by Rose Fetzer.  He will 
also testify concerning future medical expenses including those for treatment, 
surgery and rehabilitation.

            
Dr. Randolph has been designated as a fact witness, but he is herein 
designated as an expert witness.  As 
an expert in orthopedic surgery, he will testify concerning the transfer of the 
patient from Midway Clinic in Basin, his initial examination of Rose Fetzer, his 
impression and opinion of the injury together with its severity, the surgical 
procedure that he utilized, his consultations with Rose Fetzer, and her 
prognosis.  He will testify 
concerning future medical expenses which Rose Fetzer may incur including joint 
replacement and the estimated cost of that joint replacement.  He will also testify that Rose Fetzer 
has arthritis at the point of injury.

 

In 
the note, Dr. Randolph stated that there was evidence of post-traumatic 
arthritis and that Fetzer "may ultimately require total knee 
arthroplasty."

 

[¶17]   Compare that language with that 
used in Fetzer's designation of fact witnesses, which was filed on September 16, 
2002 after Dr. Randolph's deposition but before the examination that resulted in 
a change of his expert medical opinion:

 

  
Dr. 
Randolph will testify as the treating physician of Rose Fetzer.  He has also been designated as an expert 
witness.  He will testify concerning 
his examination, treatment, diagnosis and prognosis for Rose Fetzer.  To all elements of damage including the 
extent of the injury, what treatment he undertook, and his opinion concerning 
future expenses, and future disability, if any, of Rose Fetzer.  He will also testify concerning the 
records from his office and he will also testify concerning the balance of, 
reasonableness and necessity of expenses incurred in his office.  Dr. Randolph will testify concerning his 
examination, treatment, diagnosis and prognosis for Rose Fetzer.  He will testify as to all elements of 
damage including the extent of injury, what he did to undertake treatment and 
his opinion concerning future permanent disability, if any.  He will further testify to the necessity 
for the prescribed treatment.

 

There 
is no appreciable difference in the language between the two filings.  The most that could be said is that the 
designation of fact witnesses used the qualifier "if any" while the pretrial 
memorandum contained declaratory statements with the exception of the reference 
to knee replacement, which was qualified by the use of the word "may."  The point is, however, there is no 
specific language in the pretrial memorandum that would alert Dayley to the fact 
that the doctor's expert medical opinion had changed since the deposition was 
taken or since the designation of fact witnesses was filed.  The burden of timely disclosing her 
evidence was on Fetzer.  Dayley 
should not be expected to parse the language of court filings to determine 
whether Fetzer's expert witness had changed his medical opinion regarding knee 
replacement surgery and the development of arthritis in her knee.  It was Fetzer's duty to explicitly and 
clearly convey that information to Dayley in as timely a manner as possible to 
allow for trial preparation.  Fetzer 
did not do so until her opening statement at trial.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
that was clearly a surprise to Dayley.

 

[¶18]   Fetzer also challenges the district 
court's remedy.  We conclude that 
the court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded all testimony and 
evidence related to future medical expenses for Fetzer's failure to timely 
disclose the change in her expert's medical opinion.

 

[¶19]   We address this issue with the 
factors set out in the Standard of Review section of this opinion in mind.  There is no question that the ruling 
excluding Fetzer's evidence relating to future medical expenses was incurably 
prejudicial to her:  Fetzer was 
prevented from presenting her claim for damages to the jury and to that extent, 
the impact of excluding the proposed testimony on the completeness of the 
information before the jury was total.  
There is no indication in the record that Fetzer's failure to provide 
timely notice was willful.  However, 
the effect of the court's ruling on Fetzer must be balanced by consideration of 
the impact of her failure to timely disclose the change in her medical expert's 
opinion on the opposing party and the court.  As the district court noted in making 
it's ruling, Dayley had relied on Dr. Randolph's deposition testimony and had, 
therefore, not investigated the need to retain a medical expert.  Since the change in Dr. Randolph's 
opinion was not disclosed until after trial had commenced, Dayley was placed in 
an impossible position.  Their 
ability to respond to Fetzer's evidence was incurably prejudiced because they 
could not effectively respond to it once trial had 
started.

 

[¶20]   Similarly, the district court noted 
that a continuance was impractical given the status of the proceedings.  Obviously, once trial had commenced, the 
impact on the orderliness and efficiency of the trial of allowing the testimony 
coupled with the need to give Dayley a reasonable opportunity to respond would 
have been significant.  We have 
noted before that, "the trial court [may] accord greater weight than previously 
allowed for prejudice caused by delay to the overall administration of 
justice."  Smith, ¶15.  Obviously, the closer to trial before 
evidence is disclosed, the greater the impact on the trial court's 
administration of its docket.

 

[¶21]   Compare the situation confronted by 
the district court in this case with that in our decision in 
Winterholler.  In that case, 
the plaintiffs retained a new medical expert witness after their original expert 
had to withdraw for health reasons.  
The plaintiffs inadvertently failed to give the defendant notice of the 
change in expert witnesses.  The 
defendant learned of the substitution eight weeks before trial and moved to 
exclude his testimony.  The district 
court granted the defendant's motion.  
On appeal, we reversed holding that the total exclusion of the expert's 
testimony created greater prejudice to the plaintiff than that incurred by the 
defendant despite the surprise inherent in the failure to disclose because the 
defendant still had eight weeks before trial to prepare when he learned of the 
change of experts.  989 P.2d  at 
628.  Here, Dayley had no 
opportunity to prepare for trial because the disclosure occurred after trial had 
commenced.  When all of these 
factors are weighed together, we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion by concluding that the balance required the exclusion of Fetzer's 
expert medical testimony.3

 

[¶22]   In its appeal in Case Number 
03-156, Dayley requested that if the verdict and judgment were affirmed in Case 
Number 03-155, its appeal on the district court's jury instructions be 
dismissed.  We hereby grant that 
request and dismiss the appeal in Case Number 03-156.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶23]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it excluded evidence and testimony related to Fetzer's claim 
for future medical expenses because of her failure to timely disclose her 
medical expert's opinion testimony.  
Case Number 03-155 is affirmed, and Case Number 03-156 is 
dismissed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1W.R.C.P. 
16(f):

 

If 
a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or 
if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial 
conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to 
participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to 
participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative, 
may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of 
the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D).  In lieu of or in addition to any other 
sanction, the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing the 
party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any 
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds 
that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust.

 

The 
sanctions found at W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D) include: an order refusing 
to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose a particular claim or 
defense or prohibiting that party from introducing designated matters into 
evidence; an order striking out pleadings or parts of them, staying the 
proceedings until the disobedience is corrected, dismissal of the action or any 
part of it or the entry of a judgment by default; and/or an order of contempt 
against the offending party.

 

  2W.R.E. 
403:

            
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.

 

  3Briefly, we note 
that Fetzer also claims that while she was prohibited from addressing future 
medical expenses, Dayley was allowed to elicit testimony from Dr. Randolph 
showing that her arthritis was not related to her injury.  A review of the record shows that Dayley 
was allowed to question Dr. Randolph on the issue of whether a preexisting 
condition  rheumatoid arthritis  of Fetzer's was unrelated to her injury.  Dayley notes that the questioning was 
necessary to prevent any confusion with the jury regarding the nature of 
Fetzer's injuries.  We fail to see 
how this line of inquiry was prejudicial to Fetzer.  It was not related to the question of 
future medical expenses; rather, it went to issues before the jury including the 
question of Fetzer's pain and suffering and what damages were appropriately 
attributable to her injury versus her preexisting condition.  There was no error in Dayley's 
questioning of Dr. Randolph on this issue.