Title: Bennett v. Adm'r, Bureau of Workers Comp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Bennett v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5639.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5639 
BENNETT, APPELLANT, v. ADMR., OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Bennett v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5639.] 
(No. 2011-0902—Submitted April 4, 2012—Decided December 5, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, 
No. L-10-1185, 2011-Ohio-1264. 
________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal presents issues regarding the scope of a workers’ 
compensation appeal in common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 4123.512.  
Specifically, we must resolve whether, in that proceeding to determine a 
claimant’s right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund, the court is 
limited to considering those issues that were specifically determined by the 
Industrial Commission below, or whether the de novo nature of the proceeding 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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obligates the claimant to present and the court to consider all the evidence 
necessary for determining the claimant’s right to participate. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that the de novo nature of an 
R.C. 4123.512 appeal proceeding puts in issue all elements of a claimant’s right to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund.  We accordingly affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} On February 28, 2006, appellant, Mark A. Bennett, was involved in 
an automobile accident while en route to the central office of his employer, 
Goodremont’s, Inc., in Toledo.  About a month later, Bennett filed a claim with 
the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) for injuries to his head, neck, 
and back that he claimed to have suffered in the accident, along with his statement 
that he had been treated for a concussion and multiple disk herniation.1  Bennett 
claimed that his main office was in his home and that therefore, he was on 
company business when he was injured en route to his employer’s office.  
Goodremont’s denied certification of the claim, asserting that the accident 
occurred while Bennett was commuting to work, and therefore, “his workday had 
not yet begun.” 
{¶ 4} The BWC issued an initial order disallowing the claim, stating, “The 
employee did not sustain an injury in the course of and arising out of 
employment.  The employee was going to or coming from work.”  Upon 
Bennett’s administrative appeal of that order, a district hearing officer for the 
Industrial Commission held a hearing and affirmed the order of the BWC 
                                                          
 
1 Bennett has filed in this court a supplement to his merit brief that contains several documents 
pertaining to the proceedings before the BWC and the Industrial Commission, including filed 
forms and administrative decisions.  Many of the items in the supplement are not contained in the 
trial court record and normally would not be considered by this court for that reason.  See 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.1(A) (a supplement is to contain portions of the “record”).  However, the brief of 
the administrator of the BWC accepts the validity of these documents, and we therefore recognize 
their authenticity. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
disallowing the claim.  Bennett appealed that order also, but a staff hearing officer 
for the Industrial Commission upheld the disallowance of the claim.  Under R.C. 
4123.511(E), the Industrial Commission declined to hear Bennett’s further appeal.  
Its order informed Bennett of the opportunity to appeal to common pleas court 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, adding that decisions as to the extent of disability are 
not appealable. 
{¶ 5} Bennett then filed an R.C. 4123.512 petition in the Lucas County 
Court of Common Pleas, seeking a determination of his right to participate in the 
workers’ compensation fund.  Goodremont’s and the administrator of the BWC 
filed separate motions for summary judgment, both asserting that Bennett’s 
participation in the fund was foreclosed by the “coming-and-going rule” and that 
any injuries Bennett suffered while commuting to the office did not occur “in the 
course of, and arising out of” his employment pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C).  See 
Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 119, 689 N.E. 2d 917 
(1998), paragraph one of the syllabus.  The trial court accepted those arguments 
and granted the motions for summary judgment, determining that the coming-and-
going rule barred Bennett’s participation in the workers’ compensation fund. 
{¶ 6} Bennett appealed that ruling to the Sixth District Court of Appeals.  
The appellate court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate, because 
viewed in a light most favorable to Bennett, the facts could support Bennett’s 
claim that he had no fixed place of work and therefore had not been commuting 
on the day of the accident.  The court reversed and remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings.  Bennett v. Goodremont’s, Inc., 6th Dist. No. L-08-1193, 
2009-Ohio-2920, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 7} Upon remand, the trial court held a bench trial, at which the BWC 
administrator asserted in his opening statement that Bennett had to show both an 
injury proximately caused by the accident and that he had been on company 
business at the time of the injury.  But Bennett presented his case only on his 
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contention that his worker’s compensation claim was not barred by the coming-
and-going rule.  The BWC administrator then immediately moved for a directed 
verdict, arguing that because Bennett had failed to provide any evidence of a 
compensable medical condition or injury and failed to establish through expert 
medical evidence a causal connection between the accident and the injury, 
Bennett had not sustained his burden to establish every element of his workers’ 
compensation claim. 
{¶ 8} Bennett opposed the motion by arguing that the nature of the injuries 
was not ripe for litigation and that the sole question before the court was whether 
the injury occurred in the course of Bennett’s employment.  The trial court took 
the directed-verdict motion under advisement.  The administrator then presented 
evidence that Bennett had been commuting to work when the accident occurred 
and therefore could not participate in the workers’ compensation fund.  At the 
close of trial, the court ordered briefing on the issue of the scope of its review in 
the R.C. 4123.512 appeal. 
{¶ 9} The trial court later granted the administrator’s motion for a directed 
verdict.  The trial court first concluded that Bennett had not been commuting at 
the time of the accident and therefore, he was not precluded from participating in 
the workers’ compensation fund.  But the court then held, “Bennett did not 
present medical evidence to establish a compensable injury nor a causal 
relationship between such an injury and his accident” and so “failed to establish 
he is entitled to participate in the workers’ compensation fund.” 
{¶ 10} The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  Bennett v. 
Goodremont’s, Inc., 6th Dist. No. L-10-1185, 2011-Ohio-1264, ¶ 1.  That court 
first reviewed precedent establishing that (1) a trial court in an R.C. 4123.512 
appeal from the Industrial Commission’s denial of a workers’ compensation claim 
has a duty to determine the claimant’s right to participate in the workers’ 
compensation fund in a trial de novo, citing Ward v. Kroger Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
35, 2005-Ohio-3560, 830 N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 8-9; (2) a trial court has no discretion to 
remand the case to the Industrial Commission because “de novo” by definition 
precludes remand; (3) a trial court‘s decision pursuant to R.C. 4123.512 is based 
on the evidence presented to the court, not the evidence that was presented to the 
Industrial Commission; and (4) the claimant’s right to participate in the fund is 
predicated on showing by a preponderance of the evidence both that the injury 
arose out of and in the course of employment and that a causal relationship 
existed between the injury and the harm or disability.  Id. at ¶ 11-12. 
{¶ 11} The appellate court then applied that precedent to reject Bennett’s 
claim that the trial court erred in placing the burden on him to establish any 
injury-relatedness or causation in his R.C. 4123.512 appeal because those issues 
were not considered in the administrative rulings.  The court accordingly rejected 
Bennett’s accompanying contention that the court should have remanded the 
cause to the Industrial Commission after ruling that the accident occurred in the 
course of his employment.  The appellate court reiterated that a de novo 
proceeding precludes remand and held that Bennett’s failure to establish a causal 
relationship between the accident and the claimed injury justified the trial court’s 
grant of the administrator’s directed-verdict motion.  Id. at ¶ 13-14. 
{¶ 12} Bennett’s alternative argument, that he did present and/or the court 
could infer, sufficient evidence of injury and its causation to create a question of 
fact on the issues, was also rejected by the appellate court.  Id. at ¶ 20.  It held that 
Bennett had “failed to claim a specific injury for which he was seeking a right to 
participate in the fund, or provide any expert medical testimony showing a 
proximate causal relationship between any alleged injuries and his automobile 
accident.”  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 13} We accepted Bennett’s appeal under our discretionary jurisdiction 
for review of a single proposition of law.  Bennett v. Goodremont’s, Inc., 129 
Ohio St.3d 1487, 2011-Ohio-5129, 954 N.E.2d 661.  That proposition asserts, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“The only issue(s) to be considered in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal are those which 
were determined in the administrative order appealed.” 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 14} Under Civ.R. 50(A)(4), a motion for a directed verdict should be 
granted if “the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of 
the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative 
issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence 
submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party * * *.”  Because a motion 
for a directed verdict presents a question of law, appellate review of a trial court’s 
decision on the motion is de novo.  White v. Leimbach, 131 Ohio St.3d 21, 2011-
Ohio-6238, 959 N.E.2d 1033, ¶ 22; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 15} Bennett’s essential argument is that the trial and appellate courts 
erred in their view of the scope of his R.C. 4123.512 appeal, and that once the 
trial court had determined that the accident occurred in the course of his 
employment, it should have remanded the case for further administrative 
proceedings.  Bennett asserts that the trial court should not have placed an 
obligation on him to also establish any injury-related and causation aspects of his 
claim because the previous administrative consideration went solely to what he 
refers to as the basic “validity” of his claim, and therefore did not address the 
“injury” aspects in any way. 
{¶ 16} Bennett’s arguments in this regard, however, fail to take into 
account the unique features of an R.C. 4123.512 appeal that differentiate it from 
other types of administrative appeals, and they ignore the extensive body of 
authoritative case law on the scope of an R.C. 4123.512 appeal that the lower 
courts here correctly applied. 
{¶ 17} The starting points for our analysis are the long-established 
principles that an R.C. 4123.512 appeal is de novo, in which a claimant bears the 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
burden of proving his or her right to participate in the workers’ compensation 
fund regardless of an Industrial Commission decision.  R.C. 4123.512(D), the 
controlling law, provides:  “The court * * * shall determine the right of the 
claimant to participate in the fund upon the evidence adduced at the hearing of the 
action.”  See also Benton v. Hamilton Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr., 123 Ohio St.3d 
347, 2009-Ohio-4969, 916 N.E.2d 778, ¶ 14 (“appeal under R.C. 4123.512(D) 
involves a de novo review in which the claimant has the burden of proof” as to 
whether a claimant can participate in the fund); Fowee v. Wesley Hall, Inc., 108 
Ohio St.3d 533, 2006-Ohio-1712, 844 N.E.2d 1193, ¶ 22 (in an R.C. 4123.512 
appeal “[o]ur opinions have consistently held” that a claimant “continues to carry 
the burden of initially filing the petition and proving her cause of action in what is 
essentially a trial de novo”); Afrates v. Lorain, 63 Ohio St.3d 22, 26, 584 N.E.2d 
1175 (1992) (recognizing that appeals pursuant to former R.C. 4123.519 (now 
4123.512)2 are “subject to de novo review” while holding that the only decisions 
reviewable pursuant to the statute “are those decisions involving a claimant’s 
right to participate or to continue to participate in the fund”); Youghiogheny & 
Ohio Coal Co. v. Mayfield, 11 Ohio St.3d. 70, 71, 464 N.E.2d 133 (1984) (“The 
appeal authorized by [former] R.C. 4123.519 [now 4123.512] is unique in that it 
is considered a trial de novo”). 
{¶ 18} Furthermore, to establish the right to participate in the fund, a 
claimant has always had to show by a preponderance of the evidence both that the 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment and that a proximate causal 
relationship existed between the injury and the harm or disability.  White Motor 
Corp. v. Moore, 48 Ohio St.2d 156, 357 N.E.2d 1069 (1976), paragraph one of the 
syllabus; Oswald v. Connor, 16 Ohio St.3d 38, 41-42, 476 N.E.2d 658 (1985).  
                                                          
 
2 Former R.C. 4123.519 was amended and renumbered as R.C. 4123.512, effective October 20, 
1993.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3153-3156.  For purposes here, the 
relevant statutory provisions are essentially the same. 
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See Fox v. Indus. Comm., 162 Ohio St. 569, 125 N.E.2d 1 (1955), paragraph one 
of the syllabus. 
{¶ 19} In Robinson v. B.O.C. Group, Gen. Motors Corp., 81 Ohio St.3d 
361, 368, 691 N.E.2d 667 (1998),3 this court explained that an R.C. 4123.512 
appeal “necessitates a new trial, without reference to the administrative claim file 
or consideration of the results of the administrative hearings” and “is not a record 
review or an error proceeding.”  Rather, pursuant to the key final sentence of R.C. 
4123.512(D), “[t]he court, or the jury under the instructions of the court, if a jury 
is demanded, shall determine the right of the clamant to participate or to continue 
to participate in the fund upon the evidence adduced at the hearing of the action.” 
{¶ 20} As especially significant to our inquiry, Robinson fully endorsed 
the following reasoning from Marcum v. Barry, 76 Ohio App.3d 536, 539-540, 
602 N.E.2d 419 (10th Dist.1991), calling that analysis “particularly poignant”: 
 
“Although labeled an appeal and commenced initially by 
the filing of a notice of appeal, the action in the common pleas 
court under R.C. 4123.519 [now 4123.512] seeking a 
redetermination of a decision of the Industrial Commission is not 
a traditional error proceeding[ ] * * *.  R.C. 4123.519 [now 
4123.512] contemplates not only a full and complete de novo 
                                                          
 
3 The syllabus of Robinson held, “When an employer has appealed a decision of the Industrial 
Commission to a court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512, the court of common pleas may 
subsequently grant a motion to voluntarily dismiss the employer’s complaint without prejudice 
under Civ.R. 41(A)(2).”  This holding, along with the holding in Kaiser v. Ameritemps, Inc., 84 
Ohio St.3d 411, 704 N.E.2d 1212 (1999), regarding a claimant’s ability to voluntarily dismiss an 
employer’s R.C. 4123.512 appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a), has since been superseded by 
statute.  See Thorton v. Montville Plastics & Rubber, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-360, 
902 N.E.2d 482, ¶ 5 (R.C. 4123.512(D), as amended in 2006, now requires that in an employer 
appeal under R.C. 4123.512, “the claimant may not dismiss the complaint without the employer’s 
consent”).  This provision does not apply to claims that arose before August 25, 2006, the 
effective date of the amendment.  Id. at ¶ 20.  Discussion in Robinson regarding the nature of an 
R.C. 4123.512 appeal is not affected by this statutory amendment. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
determination of both facts and law but also contemplates that 
such determination shall be predicated not upon the evidence 
adduced before the Industrial Commission but, instead, upon 
evidence adduced before the common pleas court as in any civil 
action, which may involve a jury trial if demanded.  The 
proceedings are de novo both in the sense of receipt of evidence 
and determination.  The common pleas court, or the jury if it be 
the factual determiner, makes the determination de novo without 
consideration of, and without deference to, the decision of the 
Industrial Commission.  R.C. 4123.519 [now 4123.512] 
contemplates a full de novo hearing and determination. * * * 
“* * * With respect to an R.C. 4123.519 [now 4123.512] 
appeal, there are no words such as ‘review, affirm, modify, or 
reverse’ as are contained in R.C. 2505.02, nor even the word 
‘affirm’ or the words ‘reverse, vacate, or modify’ as set forth in 
R.C. 119.12 with respect to administrative appeals generally.  
Rather, the express language of R.C. 4123.519 is that contained in 
division (C) [now section (D) of R.C. 4123.512] that the court or 
jury shall ‘determine the right of the claimant to participate or to 
continue to participate in the fund upon the evidence adduced at 
the hearing of the action.’  (Emphasis added.)”  (Citations 
omitted.) 
 
Robinson at 368. 
{¶ 21} The specific issue before the Tenth District in Marcum was 
whether the entire case in an R.C. 4123.519 (now 4123.512) proceeding “is before 
the court of common pleas de novo so that all factual and legal issues are to be 
resolved by that court” or whether the appeal is an error proceeding in which the 
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common pleas court, if it determines that a legal error is present, may remand the 
matter to the Industrial Commission.  Id., 76 Ohio App.3d at 537, 602 N.E.2d 
419. 
{¶ 22} After setting forth the analysis quoted above in Robinson, the court 
in Marcum further concluded that the full and complete de novo nature of the 
appeal precludes a remand to the Industrial Commission in this situation: 
 
[A] court of common pleas in an appeal from a decision of 
the Industrial Commission has no power to remand the cause to the 
Industrial Commission for further proceedings—the equivalent of a 
new trial before the Industrial Commission.  Nor is such power 
somehow conferred because the Industrial Commission applied the 
wrong rule of law in determining the matter upon its facts.  There is 
a mandatory duty upon a court of common pleas to proceed to a 
final determination of the appealed issues, especially the right to 
participate in the Workers’ Compensation Fund upon the law and 
the evidence adduced before that court.  Such duty cannot be 
avoided by remand to the Industrial Commission. 
 
Id. at 540-541. 
{¶ 23} Other appellate courts have consistently held that a remand to the 
Industrial Commission is not an option generally available to the trial court in an 
R.C. 4123.512 appeal concerning a claimant’s right to participate in the fund.  
See, e.g., Green v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 85 Ohio App.3d 223, 226, 619 N.E.2d 497 
(9th Dist.1993) (“the duty imposed upon the court by R.C. 4123.519(C) [now 
4123.512(D)] is mandatory.  By [the statute’s] use of the word ‘shall’ the court is 
given no discretion to remand the case to the Industrial Commission for further 
proceedings, but must determine the claimant’s right to participate in the fund”); 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
Aldridge v. LTV Steel Co., 5th Dist. No. 95-CA-0158, 1996 WL 74697, (Jan. 29, 
1996), *1 (R.C. 4123.512 “does not authorize a court to remand an action back to 
the commission”); Wagner v. Fulton Industries, Inc., 116 Ohio App.3d 51, 54, 
686 N.E.2d 559 (6th Dist.1997) (once an appeal from the Industrial Commission 
is taken pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, it is the trial court’s “mandatory responsibility 
to determine whether the claimant has a right to participate in the State Insurance 
Fund and the court has no discretion to remand the case to the commission”).  See 
also Broyles v. Conrad, 2d Dist No. 20670, 2005-Ohio-2233, ¶ 15 (because R.C. 
4123.512 prohibits remand to the Industrial Commission when the Industrial 
Commission made no determination on the merits of the claim, the trial court 
must determine the claim’s merits, except as to the extent of disability, in the de 
novo trial required by R.C. 4123.512; if the court finds in favor of the claimant’s 
right to participate, only then does the case return to the Industrial Commission 
for an administrative determination of the extent of the claimant’s disability). 
{¶ 24} Several treatises on Ohio law have recognized the force of these 
precedents.  See 1 Philip Fulton, Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 12.6 
(Rev.Ed.2012) (extensively quoting the decision in Marcum and describing it as 
“an informative and extensive discussion concerning the status of [a] de novo 
trial” to explain Marcum’s holding “that the court of common pleas had no power 
to remand for a claim to produce the equivalent of a new trial before the Industrial 
Commission despite the Industrial Commission’s application of the wrong rule of 
law in determining the matter upon its facts”); Jo Ann F. Wasil and Mark E. 
Mastrangelo, Baldwin’s Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 14:118 
(2009), (citing Marcum and other precedent in recognizing that as a general rule, 
a common pleas court in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal “has no power to remand a 
cause to the Commission for further proceedings”). 
{¶ 25} Bennett bases much of his argument on Ward, 106 Ohio St.3d 35, 
2005-Ohio-3560, 830 N.E.2d 1155.  In Ward, we considered whether “the scope 
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12 
 
of an R.C. 4123.512 appeal is limited to the medical conditions addressed in the 
order from which the appeal is taken.”  Id. at ¶ 6.  We resolved that issue by 
holding that a “claimant in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal may seek to participate in the 
Workers’ Compensation Fund only for those conditions that were addressed in the 
administrative order from which the appeal is taken.”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 26} Ward involved a discrete situation in which a specific medical 
condition was administratively considered and the claimant then attempted to add 
new conditions in his R.C. 4123.512 appeal.  See id. at ¶ 1-3.  The instant case 
does not involve that situation and is fundamentally distinguishable. 
{¶ 27} Ward, which specifically recognized that “an R.C. 4123.512 appeal 
is a de novo determination of fact, and law,” id. at ¶ 7, see also id. at ¶ 8, does not 
call into question the extensive authorities relied on by the trial court and the court 
of appeals here.  As the appellate court in this case stated when it denied 
Bennett’s motion for reconsideration and rejected his arguments based on Ward:  
“Ward pertained to alleging new medical conditions.  Such was not the scenario 
involved in the instant case.  In addition, Ward reflects that a claimant must state 
a specific medical injury or condition as the basis of seeking compensation from 
the fund.  The record clearly reflects that appellant failed to do so.” 
{¶ 28} If Bennett had prevailed at some level in the administrative 
proceedings on the question of his accident’s occurring in the course of his 
employment, in order to establish his right to participate in the fund, he would 
have been required to administratively prove the injury-related and causation 
aspects of his claim at whatever stage in the administrative proceedings he 
received a ruling in his favor on the course-of-employment question.  See Starkey 
v. Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley, L.L.C., 130 Ohio St.3d 114, 2011-Ohio-
3278, 956 N.E.2d 267, ¶ 15 (claimants “must submit a medical diagnosis of an 
injury at the administrative level to prevail” and must “establish a causal 
connection between the documented physical harm and the industrial injury for it 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
to be compensable”).  R.C. 4123.512, with the requirement that a trial court 
conduct a de-novo consideration upon the evidence presented at the hearing 
before it in order to determine a claimant’s right to participate in the fund, 
supports the conclusion that a claimant continues to bear the obligation to 
establish all aspects of the right to participate through the appeal to common pleas 
court.  A trial court’s consideration in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal does not involve 
weighing evidence regarding the extent of a claimant’s disability.  Instead, the 
right to participate is a separate matter that the claimant must establish in the de 
novo proceeding conducted under R.C. 4123.512. 
{¶ 29} Bennett’s arguments are based to a considerable degree on the 
contention that an R.C. 4123.512 appeal is similar to administrative appeals in 
other contexts taken pursuant to different statutory authority.  However, these 
arguments are conclusively rebutted by a comparison of the provisions of R.C. 
4123.512 to the provisions of a typical administrative-appeal statute such as R.C. 
119.12, as explained in Marcum in the analysis adopted by this court in Robinson.  
See Robinson, 81 Ohio St.3d at 368, 691 N.E.2d 667, quoting Marcum, 76 Ohio 
App.3d at 539, 602 N.E.2d 419 (words such as “ ‘affirm, * * * reverse, vacate, or 
modify,’ ” which appear in R.C. 119.12, are absent from R.C. 4123.512). 
{¶ 30} An R.C. 4123.512 appeal is by no means a “typical” administrative 
appeal, but is a distinctive appeal with unique characteristics.  The legal analysis 
employed by the court of appeals in this case was in accord with the provisions of 
R.C. 4123.512 and with the relevant precedent, which properly delineates the 
scope of an R.C. 4123.512 appeal.  The lower courts correctly determined that a 
remand for additional administrative proceedings upon the trial court’s conclusion 
that the coming-and-going rule did not bar participation in the fund was not an 
option under the controlling law.  The fundamentals of the de novo appeal under 
R.C. 4123.512 required Bennett to establish his right to participate in the fund, 
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including the injury-related and causation aspects of his claim relevant to that 
question, in the common pleas court. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 31} For all the above reasons, we determine that the trial court and 
court of appeals were correct in their analysis of the specifics of a claimant’s 
burden in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal proceeding.  We affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FISCHER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., 
concur. 
LANZINGER, J., not participating. 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
PATRICK F. FISCHER, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for 
LANZINGER, J. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 32} This case had been fought for years through every level of the 
worker’s compensation system, through the trial court on appeal, to the court of 
appeals, and back to the trial court over one issue: whether appellant, Mark 
Bennett, was in the course of his employment when his car was rear-ended and he 
was injured on his way to his employer’s place of business.  At every level, this 
case had been about the “coming and going rule” and its application to Bennett.  It 
had been about that rule to such an extent that Bennett’s employer and the 
Industrial Commission had never disputed that Bennett was, in fact, injured in the 
car accident. 
{¶ 33} Finally, more than four years after Bennett’s accident, the factual 
issue of whether the accident occurred when Bennett was working—or was 
merely on his way to work—was to be settled by the trial judge.  But then came a 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
“Gotcha” moment: after Bennett presented his evidence, counsel for appellee 
Administrator, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) moved for a directed 
verdict.  He argued that Bennett had not proven an injury or that the accident was 
a direct and proximate cause of his injury.  What had never been an issue 
suddenly became the deciding issue in the case.  The trial court did not rule on the 
motion immediately, but after posttrial briefing, ruled in the favor of the 
administrator. 
{¶ 34} I would hold that the issue of Bennett’s injury was conceded by his 
employer and the administrator and that based upon the trial court’s holding that 
Bennett was indeed injured in the course of his employment, would order this 
case back to the BWC for a determination of the extent of Bennett’s injury. 
{¶ 35} From the beginning and throughout this entire case, Bennett’s 
injury has been conceded.  In its answer to Bennett’s petition/complaint, 
Goodremont’s admitted that Bennett had been injured in the accident at issue.  
Paragraph four of Bennett’s complaint reads: “As a result of the collision, Mr. 
Bennett suffered bodily injuries, required and requires medical treatment, has had 
a loss of income and has been disabled.” 
{¶ 36} The answer of Goodremont’s reads 
at 
paragraph four: 
“Goodremont’s states that Mr. Bennett was injured on February 28, 2006, but 
otherwise denies the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint for want of 
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.” (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 37} In a motion for summary judgment filed on July 20, 2007, the 
appellees admitted that Bennett had been injured.  Whether Bennett was injured 
played no part at all in their motion for summary judgment.  And they made a 
statement that would be repeated over and over again throughout the life of the 
case, acknowledging Bennett’s injury: 
{¶ 38} “At approximately 7:42 a.m. on February 28, 2006, Bennett was 
injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by another driver while Bennett was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
stopped at an on-ramp yield sign off of Central Ave. waiting to enter the on-ramp 
to Northbound I-475.” 
{¶ 39} On September 12, 2007, appellees made a further admission of 
Bennett’s injury.  In a motion in limine (attached as an appendix), the appellees 
requested the trial court to “exclude the admission and presentation of any 
evidence, including witness testimony and any and all documents, at trial * * * 
concerning the extent of Plaintiff's injuries and the cost of related medical 
services resulting from the motor vehicle accident in which Plaintiff, Mark 
Bennett * * * was involved on February 28, 2006 on the grounds that such 
evidence is irrelevant to the sole issue in this case—whether Plaintiff is entitled to 
participate in the Ohio Workers' Compensation Fund, such evidence is barred by 
the Civil Rules, and such evidence would be needlessly time-consuming at trial.” 
{¶ 40} The appellees framed the issue as solely about the “coming and 
going” rule.  “[T]he extent of Bennett’s injuries is not at issue in this case * * *. 
Therefore, [those witnesses] cannot possibly have any relevant information 
concerning the purely legal issue in this case—whether the motor vehicle accident 
at issue * * * occurred in the course of and arose from Bennett’s employment at 
Goodremont’s.” 
{¶ 41} The respondents also made a familiar admission in that motion: 
“On February 28, 2006, Bennett was involved in a motor vehicle accident while 
driving his personal vehicle on his way from his home to Goodremont's Toledo 
office for a customer demonstration scheduled to take place that morning.  (Mark 
Bennett Deposition Transcript, filed in this case on July 18, 2007, pp. 20-21.)  
Bennett was injured at 7:42 a.m. on February 28, 2006, when his vehicle was rear-
ended by another driver while Bennett was stopped at an on-ramp yield sign off of 
Central Ave. waiting to enter the on-ramp to Northbound I-475. (id. pp. 19-20).” 
{¶ 42} The appellees wrote that Bennett had already provided evidence of 
his injuries: “Bennett’s responses to discovery requests served by undersigned 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
counsel for Goodremont’s, Inc. and by undersigned counsel for the Administrator 
of the BWC included detailed information and medical records concerning the 
extent of Bennett’s injuries and the cost of related medical services allegedly 
resulting from those injuries.” 
{¶ 43} The appellees asked for other documents and witnesses to be 
excluded: “Therefore, because medical records, medical expenses incurred, and 
the testimony of Bennett’s relatives and former co-workers at a previous job are 
not relevant to the sole issue before this Court, all such testimony and documents 
should be excluded from trial under Ohio Rule of Evidence 402 [relevant 
evidence is generally admissible].” Does not requesting a ban on evidence of the 
extent of the injury constitute an admission that there is, in fact, an injury? 
{¶ 44} The trial court never ruled on the motion in limine, and it was 
never withdrawn.  But the trial court did grant appellees’ motion for summary 
judgment, deciding the issue entirely on the “coming and going” rule.  But the 
court did note that Bennett had suffered an injury, writing, “At 7:42 a.m. on that 
day, February 28, 2006, Mr. Bennett sustained injuries while in his automobile on 
his way to the office when another driver rear-ended him. (Bennett depo. 19-20).” 
{¶ 45} Bennett sought reversal of that summary judgment at the court of 
appeals and won.  The court held: 
 
On the basis of these facts, a reasonable factfinder might 
well conclude that Bennett's employment situs was non-fixed, in 
which case the coming-and-going rule would not apply to preclude 
recovery for Bennett. Because there remains a genuine issue of fact 
with respect to this issue, the trial court's granting of summary 
judgment on the basis of the coming-and-going rule was clearly 
inappropriate. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Bennett v. Goodremont's, Inc., 6th Dist. No. L-08-1193, 2009-Ohio-2920, ¶ 20.  
The case was remanded to the trial court. 
{¶ 46} In interrogatories filed with the court on February 18, 2010, 
appellees asked Bennett: “State with specificity the injury(ies) and/or medical 
conditions that are alleged as being compensable and are the subject of this 
appeal.”  Bennett responded, “I received back and neck injuries resulting in 
surgery.  I am presently totally disabled.” 
{¶ 47} Finally, during the trial on April 16, 2010, the shocked counsel for 
the administrator realized that Bennett was never injured at all and moved for a 
directed verdict.  Four good years of litigation wasted over a fellow who was 
never even hurt! 
{¶ 48} What followed was a second trip to the appellate court and a trip to 
this court to battle over an elemental fact that everyone involved in this case 
actually agrees on: Bennett was hurt.  The appellees should be irretrievably bound 
to the admissions they consistently made throughout this case, and this case 
should be over. 
{¶ 49} In arriving at its conclusion that the judgment of the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals should be affirmed, the majority engages in a discussion of this 
court’s decision in Robinson v. B.O.C. Group, Gen. Motors Corp., 81 Ohio St.3d 
361, 368, 691 N.E.2d 667 (1998), and instruction it finds in the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals case of Marcum v. Barry, 76 Ohio App.3d 536, 539-540, 602 
N.E.2d 419 (10th Dist.1991).  Informative, but not useful in this matter.  Neither 
party disputes that if Bennett had prevailed, this matter would necessarily be 
returned to the Industrial Commission and ultimately to the Bureau of Workers 
Compensation (“BWC”) for an administrative determination of the level of 
benefits and compensation appropriate for Bennett’s injuries.  See R.C. 
4123.512(G).  That would be the case no matter what evidence Bennett could 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
have presented at trial regarding his specific medical injuries.  The real decision 
about the compensation due Bennett would come from the BWC. 
{¶ 50} The supposed de novo nature of the trial—“de novo” does not 
appear in R.C. 4123.512— in this case is vastly overstated.  The injuries a 
claimant can allege at trial are controlled by what he alleged at the BWC, and the 
verdict in the trial has no real meaning until it becomes the holding of the BWC 
and it makes its decision regarding compensation.  The de novo trial is bookended 
and controlled by what happens at the BWC.  Only the barest proof of injury is 
necessary at trial. 
{¶ 51} This matter has been twice to a trial court and twice to the Sixth 
District Court of Appeals and now to this court, without any BWC administrative 
determination on the injuries—which still remains a prerequisite to any 
compensation award to Bennett.  That was the exact argument advanced by the 
defendants to preclude injury and medical testimony on the R.C. 4123.512 appeal 
by Bennett.  After losing their “coming and going” arguments in this case, the 
defendants ask this court to convert the sword they wielded in their motion in 
limine into a shield from liability when Bennett accepted their position and did 
not offer his medical evidence at trial. 
{¶ 52} The cases discussed in the majority opinion bear no relationship to 
the facts and procedural posture of Bennett's claim for compensation.  It allows 
the defendants here to set a “bear trap” for Bennett by ignoring the admissions 
contained throughout the litigation and in their motion in limine.  Perhaps one 
should not be surprised that there are employers and attorneys in this state that are 
comfortable with the legal subterfuge present in this case.  It is quite a surprise 
that the attorney general and the BWC/Industrial Commission would not just go 
along for the ride, but actively participate.  This is not just a case of justice 
delayed; it is most certainly a case of justice denied.  I dissent. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
_________________ 
 
Kennedy, Purdy, Hoeffel & Gernert, L.L.C., and Paul E. Hoeffel, for 
appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, Elisabeth A. Long and Matthew P. Hampton, Deputy Solicitors, and 
Joshua W. Lanzinger, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Administrator, 
Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 
________________________ 
 
 
 
THE APPENDIX TO JUSTICE PFEIFER’S DISSENTING OPINION 
APPEARS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES 
 
 
 
 
 
January Term, 2012

FILED
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Defends, Goodremoa', nnd the Administ ofthe Buren of Wore
Compeneion by and theagh thir mapaine etna cn hb abi hs Maton in
‘Limi exch te nisin and essa of any evden, ining wits teinony
nd ny and al oie wl (haul fo September 19,2007 concen te extent af
Pini injures an the cost of related mia sve reeig fom the moter whe
eciet in which Plain, Mark Been bear, “Benet, was involved os Fbmy 28,

a
‘SUPREME CouRT OF O10

2006 on te rounds tht such idence is leva othe sles ath cae wheter

Phin seal opr inthe Oo Works Compensation Fund, sch evidence

are byte Cv Rules, and sch evidence would ened ine onsuning al
acs

(Om Febery 8, 2006, Ban wine motor eb ecient wile
living his personal vb o his way fom it mee Gonement« Tole oie fora
‘stor demonsation scheduled tak place tat mming. (Mark Benet Deposition
‘Trae ln this cai on aly 1, 2007p. 20-21) Beet was inj at 7-2 am. oo
Febuary 28,2006, wc i vie wat een by aot driver hile Benet ws
opp tan ccanp eld sig of Catal Ave. wang ner he n-pt Noond
[47S dp. 1920), The rote Bennet ok tat ming ws the somal ate ok fom
histome in Swain to Godkemon's Teed ocean the 900m custamerdononttion
Sebald that orig mas Bement ppeitment of te dy, (lp. 202,23)

(On March 29,2006, Bennet flea were’ compensation ein hae on the
oa vehi aiden injuries sustain etry 28,208 wl oni way to wok, and
by shane decisions of Dis Hearing Oc, a Stuff Hewing Ofer, and he India
Commision of io, Benet’ wore’ compensation chim was dened init ete. (See
Bemet' Petion and Defendants” Anew or LC 412312 fd in ite)

Ini peal, psu RC. 412512, Benet sek pact nthe Oo
Works’ Compensation Fd fren e stained inthe Febuary 28, 2006 motor

 
January Term, 2012

‘BENNETT'S WITNESS LIST AND DISCOVERY RESPONSES,

‘Bennet’ wines is, le in hi ae on July 27,2007, isthe lowing
ese, among ots, who Bee ined 1 ltt the ial shad for
Sete 18,207

ick Haan Ro Sales Manne)

ave Neme coh Genera Manage)
‘Astin Toi) Benet Bene’ wil)
Kathy Benet (Beets sept)
Keith Benet Beane’ the)

‘Comic Babs (Benes mother,
‘Vc ncria (Benet straw)
Josep ozo (eames tenn)
Mic! orn Bemet' tram)
Priscila Beets ote)
‘Adam Pos (Benes eter is)
Kin Pots Bena’ tpi)

Beats respon dicovery ees served by unde cone for
(ootrenans In and by deine coun fr the Admini of te BWC includ
ae information nd mesial cons cnc the ext Bee’ ini and hc
fala aia evs legs rung fen inn

‘ARGUMENT
Defendants eee tit Benet’ aly memes fie hove esi

othe extent of Benes ines. However, he eet of Bennie ase in
‘SUPREME CouRT OF O10

(tis cae, ad oe of Bese above ised eaves ae fomer employes of Gooden
‘Thar, hey cana poshy have any eleva information concen he pry eal ete
‘ni case wheter the moar vei sid tee, wherein Bonet wa thle cepa
bis persona atomobil on his wy wot, occured in the couse of and aoe om
‘Bemet’s employment wih Godrmot

nition, wo oft wits iste above ae apace employee of oof
Bennets oer employers, Rico oper ompary and they to cot posibly have any
‘leva information coneng he pal ise inthis case

‘Cours ave road dscrsion ning onthe ais of evidence, nd he
_wetng fon in imine ests within the Sound dscretion of he il our. “Aart
‘aa tion in inno i areca reqs, detd oh inert retin of he il
ninth examination of wines by opposing oun na specie ut
ibys ermine bythe cout ouside the presence ofthe ry" Reside Mathodse
Hop As of Olio. Guhrie (1982, 5 Obi App. 38.308, 310. Mosonsin imine serve the
intest ofjuiialeconomy, he ite of oss nthe inert of he prey being
toda the pont of injecting errr peje int the proceiings. Ste. Grab (1986,
28 bi Se. 3419, 201,

(Ohio Rue of viene 401 deine “lean evidence” a “viene having sy
end to make the existence of ny ft ht if consequence othe dtminatio ofthe
etn more probable ores robb than wou be witout the evince” Therefor it
wins testimony asthe dey oengtien or weaken a pat’ soe onan sue efre

‘te Cour tsa be amit
January Term, 2012

‘omeve, RC 4123512 whichis the sole bass orth proceting, provides
ta [7he lima. yap an oder fhe nda commision made ur vison
(© of econ 412311 ofthe Revised Coen any injury or eeuption cna ct, ther than
decision atthe exe of sabi te out of oman ples (Engi ado)

“Tern the pp prea o RC, 433412, ny adel eine of be
tet of Bent’ ina an alge resign io relerant wher Benet's
Injury is compensable nde hi nw. The pin language of RC 123.512 makes lets
‘he compesabity of Bennet mao vhice side ith lei inthis, wile he
tet of itil, ven if Benet previa apes an ei separe ae an
‘alybe bested and sed by the BWC Commision. Thi mean that vei
‘eso prev inthis pea (wich wold be leper he esl wou fe bing mere
‘tanh allowanc of his BWC cm. This Court, however, could nat decide which tis
<eodons alow, wheter eval Benet any temporary ttl ait (TTD) or ther pe
ofeompensatn, of thereto which Bennet's aimed ma expenses for eave
snd ecstry to teat the alonedconias All ach sues wold ave oe dase inthe
{i instnce bythe BWCindstal Commision even if Beant preva in this ape

‘Theres, beaae medical cod, malic expenses inced, nd he tenon
oft eltives nd onmer co-worker previous jo ent relevant othe sls
‘fe his Court, al ach tinny an documents salle exe oe i dr Ohio
Raleof idence 2

Im aon, Obi Ral of viene 403 provide for mandatary excsion of
releva evidence its probe value stun outweighed by he ange of wi
nie, fconfsion ofthe seo of eating the jy”
‘SUPREME CouRT OF O10

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