Title: Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 113 
Docket: 
Cum-11-594 
Argued: 
September 11, 2012 
Decided: 
October 4, 2012 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.* 
 
 
NANCY B. RAMSEY 
 
v. 
 
BAXTER TITLE COMPANY et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  Nancy B. Ramsey appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court 
(Cumberland County, Crowley, J.) granting the motion of Baxter Title Company 
and James R. Lemieux to dismiss Ramsey’s first amended complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Ramsey argues that her complaint 
sufficiently states claims for breach of fiduciary duty and duty of care and for 
punitive damages arising from a real estate closing transaction.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we view the facts alleged in the complaint as if they were 
admitted.  See Doe v. Graham, 2009 ME 88, ¶¶ 2-3, 977 A.2d 391.  In July 2006, 
                                         
*  Saufley, C.J., sat at oral argument but did not participate in the development of the opinion. 
 
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Nancy Ramsey considered purchasing an apartment building to supplement her 
personal income.  Ramsey sought guidance from a mortgage broker she had 
worked with in the past, Al Staples, who assured her that he would advise her as to 
what was best for her financially.  Staples encouraged Ramsey to purchase an 
apartment building because he could obtain “a great loan” for her secured by the 
equity in her primary residence. 
[¶3]  Ramsey located an apartment building and signed a purchase contract.  
Staples procured a financing package through Option One Mortgage Corporation 
for Ramsey, but she questioned the high adjustable interest rate.  Staples assured 
her that this was the best loan he could procure for her.  Unbeknownst to Ramsey, 
Option One Mortgage Corporation had an incentive program that encouraged 
mortgage brokers to place borrowers in high-priced loans even if they qualified for 
a lower-priced loan.  Staples did not disclose to Ramsey that the higher-priced 
financing packages produced additional income for the broker who handled the 
transaction. 
 
[¶4]  Attorney James Lemieux, through his title company, Baxter Title, 
conducted the closing on Ramsey’s purchase of the apartment building.  Ramsey 
did not select Baxter Title Company or Lemieux to close the loan.  At the closing, 
Lemieux provided Ramsey with “very quick, brief, alleged summaries of the 
documents” she eventually signed.  Lemieux failed “to fully and completely 
 
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explain” to Ramsey the broker’s incentive program.  Lemieux also failed to “fully 
and completely explain all [of] the documents” Ramsey signed at closing and that 
she risked losing her home as a result of the transaction. 
 
[¶5]  Ramsey filed an amended complaint on September 18, 2009, seeking 
both compensatory and punitive damages, against Al Staples, Baxter Title 
Company, and James Lemieux, among others.  Ramsey alleged that Baxter Title 
and Lemieux owed her a fiduciary duty and duty of care regarding the loan and 
mortgage transaction, even though they represented the lender.  Baxter Title and 
Lemieux filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the 
trial court granted.  Ramsey’s timely appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Fiduciary Relationship 
 
[¶6]  Ramsey argues that the facts alleged in her complaint establish a 
fiduciary relationship between her and Lemieux and Baxter Title.  We “review 
de novo the legal sufficiency of a complaint when it has been challenged by a 
motion to dismiss.”  McCormick v. Crane, 2012 ME 20, ¶ 5, 37 A.3d 295.  The 
complaint is viewed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine 
whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle 
the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted); 
Richardson v. Winthrop Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 109, ¶ 5, 983 A.2d 400 
 
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(“A complaint is properly dismissed when it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff is 
entitled to no relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of the 
claim.”) (quotation marks omitted).  To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff 
must allege facts “‘with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine 
whether, if true, such facts could give rise to a fiduciary relationship.’”  Fortin v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 30, 871 A.2d 1208 (quoting 
Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 21, 
738 A.2d 839).  Reciting the basic elements of a fiduciary relationship “cannot 
substitute for an articulation in the complaint of the specific facts of a particular 
relationship.”  Bryan R., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 22, 738 A.2d. 839; see Keybank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Sargent, 2000 ME 153, ¶ 31, 758 A.2d 528. 
 
[¶7]  The elements of a fiduciary relationship are “(1) the actual placing of 
trust and confidence in fact by one party in another, and (2) a great disparity of 
position and influence between the parties at issue.”  Bryan R., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 19, 
738 A.2d. 839 (quotation marks omitted).  Here, Ramsey’s complaint merely 
recites in conclusory fashion the elements of a fiduciary relationship.  For example, 
Ramsey alleges Baxter Title and Lemieux “had a duty” to her, “had a confidential 
and special relationship” with her, and “had certain fiduciary duties” to her. 
 
[¶8]  Ramsey’s complaint does not expressly allege that she actually placed 
trust or confidence in Lemieux and Baxter Title, and her bare allegations that she 
 
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“had inferior knowledge and experience” and “relied upon” Lemieux and Baxter 
Title are insufficient to satisfy the requirement that she actually placed trust or 
confidence in the defendants.  See Stewart v. Machias Sav. Bank, 2000 ME 207, 
¶ 11, 762 A.2d 44 (“[A]n allegation of one party’s inexperience or trust will not by 
itself warrant an adjudication of a confidential relation without a statement of the 
facts indicating the actual placing of confidence and trust, and the abuse of the 
relation.”) (quotation marks omitted).  She did not select Lemieux or Baxter Title 
as the closing agent; her entire relationship with Lemieux and Baxter Title was 
limited to their participation at the closing, at which Ramsey alleges Lemieux 
merely summarized the documents.  See Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Adam, 
661 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Me. 1995) (There is no fiduciary duty “[where debtor] did 
not have a long-term relationship of trust with the [creditor], and the scope of their 
relationship was limited to the loans . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶9]  To establish the element of disparity of position and influence, Ramsey 
“must demonstrate diminished emotional or physical capacity or . . . the letting 
down of all guards and bars.”  Stewart, 2000 ME 207, ¶ 11, 762 A.2d 44 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Although Ramsey alleges that she was motivated by her financial 
and personal situation in purchasing the apartment building, her complaint does not 
allege that Baxter Title or Lemieux knew the details of her situation.  See Fortin, 
2005 ME 57, ¶ 32, 871 A.2d 1208 (finding a fiduciary relationship between an 
 
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altar boy and parochial school student and the Catholic Diocese when the child 
claimed his “parents’ illness was known to the Diocese and limited their 
involvement in raising him.”). 
[¶10]  We will not impose fiduciary duties based on arms-length business 
relationships alone.  See Brae Asset Fund, L.P., 661 A.2d at 1140; Camden Nat’l 
Bank v. Crest Constr., Inc., 2008 ME 113, ¶¶ 15-16, 952 A.2d 213; Keybank Nat’l 
Ass’n, 2000 ME 153, ¶ 31, 758 A.2d 528; Stewart, 2000 ME 207, ¶ 11 & n.1, 
762 A.2d 44.  Ramsey’s complaint establishes only that Baxter Title and Lemieux 
played an essentially mechanical role in closing a deal negotiated by Ramsey with 
Staples and the sellers; it does not allege the kind of close, confidential relationship 
necessary for a court to find the existence of a fiduciary duty. 
B. 
Tortious Conduct 
[¶11]  Ramsey also alleges that Baxter Title and Lemieux owed her a duty of 
care to explain to her that the loan was more favorable to the lender than to her.  
Lemieux owed Ramsey no such duty.  Indeed, disclosing that the loan was more 
favorable to the lender may well have conflicted with the duties Lemieux owed to 
his client, the lender.  See Lamare v. Basbanes, 636 N.E.2d 218, 219 (Mass. 1994) 
(“[T]he court will not impose a duty of reasonable care on an attorney if such an 
independent duty would potentially conflict with the duty the attorney owes to his 
or her client.”). 
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Mark A. Kearns, Esq., and Mark L. Randall, Esq., Portland, for appellant 
Nancy B. Ramsey 
 
Taylor D. Fawns, Esq., Leete & Lemieux, P.A., Portland, for appellees 
Baxter Title Company and James R. Lemieux 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Mark. A. Kearns, Esq., for appellant Nancy B. Ramsey 
 
William H. Leete Jr., Esq., Leete & Lemieux, P.A., Portland, for appellees 
Baxter Title Company and James R. Lemieux 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2009-482 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY