Title: Williams v. Esaw

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

214 Kan. 658 (1974)
522 P.2d 950
DWAYNE WILLIAMS and DELORIS CRIST, Appellants,
v.
GLENN ESAW and SAN ORE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Appellees.
No. 47,228

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 11, 1974.
Gerald W. Scott, of Blair, Matlack, Rogg, Foote & Scott, P.A., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
*659 Raymond L. Dahlberg, of Turner, Chartered, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Lee Turner, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FONTRON, J.:
The plaintiffs bring this action to recover damages for the death of their fourteen-year old son, Monty D. Williams, who was killed in a collision between his Yamaha motorcycle and a San Ore Construction Company truck driven by Glenn Esaw. The jury brought in a verdict in favor of the defendants and the plaintiffs have appealed, alleging various trial errors.
The accident occurred in Sedgwick county about 8:30 a.m., July 30, 1970, near the intersection or junction of 85th Street North, which runs east and west, and Interstate 35, a north-south highway. There is a grade separation where the two roads intersect, with I-35 overpassing 85th Street. A short distance east of the overpass an exit ramp leads from the south side of 85th to the interstate highway. On the date of the accident the exit ramp to I-35 was closed to public traffic and was so marked.
Monty Williams was proceeding west on 85th Street. He was on his way to a farm owned by his father near Valley Center, where he was to turn on the irrigation pump. At the same time the two-unit San Ore truck, composed of a tractor and a large water tank or trailer, was also headed west, the driver intending to make a left turn onto the exit ramp and then proceed to I-35 where his job was to spray the base of that highway. It was during the course of the left-hand turn that Monty's motorcycle skidded under the rear part of the water tank and both Monty and the cycle were dragged across the pavement into the exit ramp. Monty appears to have been killed instantly. It was not a pretty death. Further facts will be noted as needed.
Six points of error, in all, are advanced by plaintiffs in their brief, but only two were argued when the appeal was heard. We shall first consider these two points in the order presented.
A number of complaints are grouped together in point number one, the principle thrust of which are that the court erred in admitting Monty's restricted driver's license, and in instructing on the Oklahoma statutes under which the same was issued. The Oklahoma license limited the operation of motor vehicles by persons under sixteen to vehicles of five horsepower, and there was evidence to the effect the horsepower of the cycle manned by *660 Monty was greater than that, being in the neighborhood of fourteen or fifteen.
A strong argument is made by the plaintiffs in the area of causation. They stoutly contend that the Oklahoma license, with its horsepower restriction, bore no causal relationship to the accident  in other words that Monty's violation of the restriction, if any, was not a proximate cause of the collision and his resulting death.
It is a well recognized tenet of the law that before liability can be predicated on the violation of a statute there must be a causal relation between the violation and the injury complained of. This viewpoint is well expressed in Zumbrun v. City of Osawatomie, 135 Kan. 26, 10 P.2d 3, in this language:
This time-honored rule has been carried over into the area of motor vehicular accidents, where the violation of a traffic law, either state or municipal, is held to give rise to liability for injury to another only where the violation bears a causal or proximate relationship to the injury. (Jones v. McCullough, 148 Kan. 561, 83 P.2d 669; Clark v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 148 Kan. 155, 79 P.2d 906; Applegate v. Home Oil Co., 182 Kan. 655, 324 P.2d 203; Oil Transport Co. v. Pash, 191 Kan. 229, 380 P.2d 341; Ripley v. Harper, 181 Kan. 32, 34, 309 P.2d 412; Rohrer v. Olson, 172 Kan. 674, 677, 242 P.2d 825; Crawford v. Miller, 163 Kan. 718, 721, 186 P.2d 116; McCoy v. Fleming, 153 Kan. 780, 783, 113 P.2d 1074.)
In Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies Co., 163 Kan. 611, 185 P.2d 158, this court, in discussing motor vehicle collisions, spoke in this fashion:
The same rule was declared in the more recent case of Lewis *661 v. Service Provision Co., Inc., 209 Kan. 378, 382, 496 P.2d 1373, where the plaintiffs, suing for the death of their son, attempted to make an issue of the fact that defendant's truck, which struck decedent's car pulling in front of it on I-35 near Guthrie, Oklahoma, was overweight under Oklahoma law. In the course of our opinion rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, we said:
On the issue of contributory negligence, the question in the present case was not whether Monty violated Oklahoma licensing statutes, but whether he was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident and his resulting death. The general law with respect to the violation of statutes regulating the licensing of drivers seems reasonably stated in 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 368, p. 915:
This court expressed the same philosophy in an era when motoring was more novel than it is today. In Anderson v. Sterrit, 95 Kan. 483, 148 Pac. 635, the plaintiff was a sixteen-year old bicyclist who was injured in a night-time collision with an automobile. It developed that the plaintiff had no license to ride his bicycle and that he carried no light, both being contrary to city ordinance. In upholding the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, this court said that the absence of a license on the part of the plaintiff was not a factor causing the collision or contributing to the injury.
In McCausland v. File, 141 Kan. 120, 40 P.2d 323, the plaintiff was a nine-year old child who was struck by defendant's car when returning home after a nine o'clock show. She was not accompanied by parent or guardian, as required by city ordinance. This court said in that case:
The rationale of the foregoing cases was aptly phrased in State v. Yowell, 184 Kan. 352, 336 P.2d 841, where the defendant was faced *662 with a charge of fourth-degree manslaughter as a result of a rear-end collision which occurred during the time his driver's license was suspended. In the course of delineating various legal rules pertinent to the situation, the court pointed out:
We find no evidence in this record which warrants any conclusion that the rated horsepower of Monty's motorcycle was a proximate cause of the accident. It had little, if any, more to do with the cause of the collision than did Mr. Esaw's possessing only a driver's license instead of being licensed as a chauffeur.
The defendants argue, however, that in any event the evidence relating to the Oklahoma license and the court's instructions on the Oklahoma law could not have prejudiced the plaintiffs' case. We are unable to agree. Defense counsel bore down heavily on the horsepower limitation, both in cross-examination of the plaintiffs and in final summation to the jury. The impact of the license question on the minds of the jurors may be judged from the following question submitted during their deliberations: "What bearing does the license of deceased have on the case?" To this inquiry the trial judge, after considerable colloquy with counsel, provided this reply: "That is a fact question. That is for you to decide. The Court can't help you in any way with questions of fact." Obviously the jury was perplexed as to the relevancy of the Oklahoma restriction. Under the existing circumstances we cannot shrug off the error as being insubstantial.
The second point orally argued has to do with instruction sixteen, in which the trial court set out the provisions of original K.S.A. 8-540 (a) and (b) in their entirety. In 1968 this statute was amended and subsection (c), reading as follows, was added:
However, the contents of (a) and (b) were not materially changed, so far as the present action is concerned. The instruction, as given by the court, reads as follows:
In voicing their objections to instruction sixteen the plaintiffs contended before the trial court, as they do here on appeal, that 85th Street North was a one-way highway at the point where the collision occurred and that the provisions of 8-540 (a) and (b) were not applicable because of subparagraph (c). Pursuing this line of argument the appellants requested that the following sentence be added to the instruction:
In the event the additional sentence was not made a part of the instruction, the plaintiffs requested, in lieu thereof, that the jury be instructed as to the content of subsection (c). Neither request was granted.
So far as one-way roads or highways are concerned, the following statutes are relevant:
Judging from diagrams and pictures admitted as exhibits, it appears that 85th Street North is a two lane road for most of its length, with one lane for traffic going west, and one for eastbound travel. However, the street broadens into four lanes some distance on either side of the I-35 overpass, and an island or medial strip extends east from the crossover point where the accident happened, a distance of some 200 feet more or less. A "Keep Right" sign is located at the east end of the island. At the time of the accident, no lines had been painted on the roadway separating the two westbound lanes from each other or from the left-turn bay.
It has been the contention of the plaintiffs throughout this litigation that the place of collision was not an intersection within the contemplation of K.S.A. (now K.S.A. 1973 Supp.) 8-540 (a) or (b). The trial court, however, took the position that whether the situs of the accident was an intersection, as that term has been defined by statute, was a question for the jury to determine. We believe the court was wrong in this conclusion.
The question is not altogether free from doubt, and it obviously concerned the jury, as a second note to the court bears witness: "Was this turn where the accident happened considered an intersection?" The response was to quote the definition given in K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 8-501:
Whether this response proved helpful to the jury must be left to conjecture.
Strictly speaking, the left-hand turnoff from 85th to I-35 does not fit the statutory definition of an intersection. Neither can it be said that 85th Street, throughout its full course, meets the statutory requirements of a one-way thoroughfare; for most of its length it appears to be an ordinary two-way, two-lane road. We entertain *665 the opinion, however, that as the street widens to four full traffic lanes, with a left turn bay at the east approach to the overpass, it becomes a legal equivalent of two one-way roadways, so far as the posture of this case is concerned. For a considerable distance there are two full traffic lanes for westbound traffic and two for eastbound traffic, separated by a medial strip or island, and traffic is directed to keep to the right to deter heedless motorists from swimming upstream, so to speak.
We believe it could not have been the legislative intent to preclude motorists from passing in the inside traffic lanes in such an area as this, and that the court should have determined as a matter of law that the area was not an intersection within the purview of K.S.A. (now K.S.A. 1973 Supp.) 8-540. This, of course, would not preclude the trial court from fashioning appropriate instructions as to the function of the left-turn bay in the overall traffic scheme of this state, and as to the purpose for which it may be used by members of the traveling public.
The four additional complaints urged in plaintiffs' brief must be mentioned. First, it is said the court erred in failing to instruct on last clear chance. This argument is based on various calculations made by a so-called reconstruction expert. The elements making up the doctrine of last clear chance have frequently been stated by this court and need not be repeated at this time. Those who may be interested, will find them delineated in the recent case of Rohr v. Henderson, 207 Kan. 123, 483 P.2d 1089. Without belaboring the evidence, much of which relates to split second time sequences, we are of the opinion the overall pattern of this case does not fit within the framework of the last clear chance rule.
Plaintiffs further claim that error was committed in instructing the jury as to K.S.A. 8-543 (a):
The defense of following too closely was not within the scope of the pretrial order made by the court, and this fact formed the basis of the plaintiffs' objection. However, the trial court permitted the pretrial order to be amended by adding the appropriate allegations. Since this case must be returned for a new trial we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the court abused its discretion in permitting the amendment.
*666 An additional ground of complaint is directed toward the testimony of a defense witness touching the rated horsepower of the Yamaha motorcycle involved in the accident. It is contended that no foundation was laid. We cannot agree. The witness was shown to have been in the business of selling and servicing motorcycles for a period of six years, and was familiar with the Yamaha machine and the manuals and literature relating to the manufacturer's horsepower ratings. We cannot say from this record that the court erred in permitting the witness to testify. The weight to be given his testimony was, of course, a question for the jury.
Finally, the plaintiffs contend the court erred in failing to give a requested instruction based on PIK 4.03 relating to the degree of care required of a minor. The instruction asked for reads as follows:
In lieu of giving the requested instruction the trial court charged the jury as follows:
The PIK instruction is patterned after the language found in Harvey v. Cole, 159 Kan. 239, 153 P.2d 916, a case which plaintiffs cite in support of their position. The force of Harvey as a precedent in cases of the present nature was severely eroded by our holding in Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311, 380 P.2d 408, an action arising out of the death of a small child. The car which hit the child in the Allen case was driven by a sixteen-year old boy who had an unrestricted driver's license. The trial court instructed the jury that *667 even though the defendant had a valid and unrestricted license, such license did not of itself require the same standard of care and caution as that required of an adult license holder. On appeal, that instruction was held to be prejudicial and erroneous as a matter of law. In the opinion written by Justice Wertz, this court stated:
The Allen case was cited in Kirkendoll v. Neustrom, 379 F.2d 694, where the plaintiff, a minor, had rear-ended the defendant's truck and sought to recover personal damages resulting from the collision. Judgment was entered for the defendant in that case.
Our decision in Allen is cast in the mold accepted by a majority of the courts in this country. In 97 A.L.R.2d 872, Anno: Motor Vehicle  Minor  Negligence, the modern, and what seems to us the better and more reasonable view, is expressed in these words:
Cases from a good many jurisdictions are noted in the annotation supporting the majority rule. Among them is the Allen case. The author of the annotation acknowledges, however, a split of authority on the question, and he lists Harvey v. Cole, supra, as among the cases supporting the opposite view.
*668 The Harvey case was set in an era thirty years removed from today's traffic norms. The intervening years have witnessed a fantastic growth in the outpouring of gas-gulping vehicles of tremendous speed and power. High speed roads and trafficways have proliferated. Traffic congestion has grown apace stifling many communities and fouling the good air. Traffic deaths have become a national reproach and traffic mayhem a commonplace. Motorized travel has expanded to a peak wholly undreamed of by those of us who, in 1944, could still recall the Model T Ford.
In the interest of public safety, we believe it imperative that minors be held to the same standards of care in the operation of motor vehicles as are adults. This view is reflected in many of the cases cited in the A.L.R. annotation to which reference has previously been made. In Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859, 97 A.L.R.2d 866, the Supreme Court of that state said:
In Dawson v. Hoffmann, 43 Ill. App.2d 17, 192 N.E.2d 695, the Illinois court, after paraphrasing much of what was said by the Minnesota court, concluded with this language:
See, also, Restatement, Torts, Second, § 283 A., Comment c.
We recognize a tendency on the part of some courts to apply a lesser standard of care in cases dealing with contributory negligence on the part of a minor than where primary negligence is involved. The Minnesota court, for example, suggests such a distinction. (Dellwo v. Pearson, supra, p. 457.) However, a majority of the modern cases dealing with the contributory negligence of a minor driver have applied the adult standard of care. (See Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Supplement to Vol. 2, Comment to *669 § 16.8 nn. 11-12, p. 40; Restatement, Torts, Second, § 464, Comments e and f.) We see no good reason for drawing any distinction.
We disapprove of what was said in Harvey v. Cole, supra, as to the care required of children, insofar as the operation of motor vehicles by minors is concerned. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in refusing to give the plaintiffs' requested instruction based on PIK 4.03.
The judgment of the court below is reversed with directions to grant the plaintiffs a new trial.