Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4309.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4309 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MCCORMACK. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4309.] 
Attorneys—Violations of Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules of Professional 
Conduct—One-year suspension, stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2011-2055—Submitted January 18, 2012—Decided September 26, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-086. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Thomas Arthur McCormack of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0015570, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1979.  McCormack served as a magistrate in the Medina County Court of 
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, until May 2009.  On October 11, 
2010, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged McCormack with multiple violations 
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of the current and former Code of Judicial Conduct1 and the Rules of Professional 
Conduct arising from his conduct as the magistrate presiding over multiple 
hearings in a postdecree domestic-relations case. 
{¶ 2} The parties waived a hearing and submitted this matter to a panel of 
the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness on their stipulations as to 
facts, mitigating factors, exhibits, and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
as well as their joint motion in support of a six-month, fully stayed suspension.  
The panel found that there was clear and convincing evidence to prove the 
stipulated violations and recommended that the board adopt the parties’ stipulated 
sanction.  The board adopted the panel report in its entirety. 
{¶ 3} We adopt the facts and violations as stipulated by the parties, but 
based upon our concerns about the current state of McCormack’s mental health, 
the absence of direct evidence from the professionals who had provided his early 
treatment, and the brief period of treatment he had received from the psychiatrist 
who testified in his behalf, we find that a one-year suspension, all stayed on 
conditions, is the appropriate sanction for McCormack’s misconduct. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} In his role as a magistrate, McCormack was assigned to hear a 
postdecree motion to modify child support filed on November 26, 2007, in the 
matter of Sejka v. Sejka, Medina C.P. No.  06 DR 0097,  and 13 additional 
motions filed by the parties through April 6, 2009, that covered various issues 
including custody, child support, visitation, and spousal support.  During that span 
of time, McCormack conducted hearings on six separate days.  At four of the six 
hearings McCormack conducted in the Sejka matter, he conducted himself in an 
                                                 
1  McCormack was charged under both the current and former versions of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct because the charged conduct occurred before and after March 1, 2009, the effective date 
of the current code. 
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3 
 
impatient, undignified, and discourteous manner that was highly prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
{¶ 5} At a July 17, 2008 hearing, which was a continuation of a hearing on 
a motion to modify child support, McCormack goaded attorney Joseph Stafford, 
Mr. Sejka’s counsel, during his opening statement.  McCormack asked whether 
Stafford would like to address contempt motions first, but when Stafford agreed 
that they could proceed with a contempt motion, McCormack responded, “You’re 
whining and taking up our time, which is part of the reason we don’t get to your 
client’s case.”  And when Stafford mentioned the prior testimony of one of Mr. 
Sejka’s witnesses, McCormack chided him for not properly subpoenaing the 
witness.  Following an exchange with Stafford about discovery matters, Stafford 
asked McCormack to recuse himself, and McCormack replied, “Absolutely not.  
Here, do you understand?  I don’t care.  I really don’t care.  You’re right.  I don’t 
care, Okay?  [Your client] thinks the whole world’s unfair.  It’s far beyond me.” 
{¶ 6} McCormack laughed and made a face at some of the questions that 
Stafford asked Ms. Sejka on cross-examination, and when Stafford stated that he 
did not find the laughter appropriate, McCormack replied, “I find it to be 
absolutely appropriate.”  McCormack answered a question that Stafford had 
directed to Ms. Sejka and then accused Stafford and his client of complaining 
when Stafford stated that McCormack’s conduct made it difficult to question the 
witness.  While Ms. Sejka was on the witness stand, McCormack questioned Mr. 
Sejka, who was seated at the counsel table, about his mortgage and his daughter’s 
activities and then engaged in a general discussion with Mr. Sejka, Stafford, and 
Stephen Bailey, Ms. Sejka’s counsel, in what Stafford described as a “free for 
all.”  At some point, Ms. Sejka asked if she could step down from the witness 
stand, and McCormack granted her request, but it is unclear whether the attorneys 
had finished questioning her.  Thereafter, McCormack stated that he wanted to 
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continue the hearing to the next day, and after a discussion with the attorneys, the 
hearing was continued to July 23, 2008. 
{¶ 7} On July 23, however, rather than continuing with the hearing on 
modification of child support, McCormack began a hearing on school placement, 
even though no motion on that issue was before the court.  McCormack overruled 
Bailey’s objections to trying that issue without notice.  After Bailey had cross-
examined Mr. Sejka, McCormack asked the guardian ad litem for the parties’ 
daughter if she had any questions.  He permitted the guardian to lecture counsel 
and the parties on their behavior, and after she had stated that counsel and the 
parties made her ill, respondent replied, “Here, you’re walking down the street.  
You run into somebody in a wheelchair, handicapped.  Do they make you sick?”  
The guardian replied, “No,” and McCormack responded, “Oh, these gentlemen 
here, this is what they’re capable of.  Obviously, this is what they’re capable of, 
okay?”  McCormack continued to explain that the parties would fight “no matter 
what.” 
{¶ 8} During this hearing, McCormack failed to rule on several of 
Stafford’s objections and admonished Bailey to shut up and accused him of being 
a liar.  When McCormack threatened to hold Bailey in contempt, Bailey simply 
replied, “Your honor.”  Respondent then found Bailey in contempt, but at the 
conclusion of the hearing, he merely admonished Bailey. 
{¶ 9} Bailey also asked McCormack to note on the record that the 
proceedings had heightened the tension between the parties.  McCormack 
responded,  
 
I’m going to tell you what, Mr. Bailey.  I’m going to tell 
you what.  I didn’t have a psychiatrist in here testifying that this 
kid’s going downhill because of some proceedings in this Court.  
Those two people sitting there did it all by themselves, and to 
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suggest otherwise is specious and nonsense, okay, and if that’s the 
way you want to go, okay. 
 
He also questioned Ms. Sejka extensively while she was on the witness stand and 
became argumentative with her, saying:  “So it’s a concern for you.  It’s not a 
concern for [your daughter]”; “Well, I really don’t get it.  Pardon me for being 
stupid”; and “If [your daughter] goes to another school she won’t be able to have 
that, nonsense.” 
{¶ 10} A hearing was scheduled for December 16, 2008, to address 
various motions of the parties, but the testimony elicited during the hearing that 
day was never tied to a particular motion.  Soon after the hearing began, 
McCormack instructed the parties to leave the room so that counsel could discuss 
settlement.  On the record, Greg Moore (attending in Stafford’s stead), Bailey, the 
guardian, and McCormack discussed the parties’ behavior, attitudes, and other 
issues, including the factors to be considered in determining child support. 
{¶ 11} When the parties reentered the courtroom, McCormack asked them 
what they wanted, and Mr. Sejka stated that he wanted shared parenting.  
McCormack engaged in a lengthy discussion with Ms. Sejka about her former 
husband’s feelings and motivations, focusing entirely on shared parenting without 
any mention of the motion to modify child support that was before the court.  
After Ms. Sejka expressed her frustration with the process and stated that custody 
had not been an issue until she asked for additional child support, McCormack 
said, “You’re empowered by being the custodian, and you intend to remain that.  
That will remain to be seen on the 9th.”  Ms. Sejka sought to explain her 
comment, but McCormack replied, “Here, stop, control your client, counsel.  You 
know, I’m not listening to anyone else in this courtroom.  She don’t want to settle 
it, okay?  I entered into this as a result of counsel talking about settlement.  She 
don’t [sic] want to settle it, fine, but I don’t want to hear about how I’m taking 
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something away from her from inquiring into settlement.  I find that offensive and 
paranoid.”   To which Bailey replied, “No, it’s not paranoid,” and the recording of 
the hearing ended abruptly. 
{¶ 12} On April 10, 2009, McCormack conducted a hearing on an 
emergency motion for custody that had been filed by Mr. Sejka.  While Ms. Sejka 
was on the witness stand, McCormack questioned Mr. Sejka, who was seated at 
counsel table and was not under oath, about drug tests that had recently been 
taken by the parties, asking whether he had revealed the results of those tests to a 
third party.  Stafford referred to someone who had complained to the court about 
earlier proceedings and how those complaints had influenced McCormack’s 
demeanor during the hearing.  McCormack became offended, and while laughing, 
said, “I like that.  I like that.  Here’s what we’re going to do.  I’m vacating the 
[April 6, 2009] order [granting Mr. Sejka’s ex parte emergency custody motion] 
and I’m shutting down this hearing and mother’s parenting time will proceed.”  
Stafford objected, noting that he had additional witnesses, but McCormack 
replied:  “Here, here, I really don’t care.  What you need to do now is take this up 
to my judge, okay, and explain to her how I did it all wrong.  Six months from 
now when you get that hearing, we’ll see how I dealt with it, and if it doesn’t go 
well, you can spend the next two years taking it up to the Court of Appeals.  You 
accuse me of something like that ever again, Mr. Stafford, and I will hold you in 
contempt and it will cost you a lot of money to get out of jail * * * allow me to 
assure you * * *.  McCormack then refused to allow Stafford to proffer 
information for the record   and terminated the hearing. 
{¶ 13} On May 29, Judge Kovack declared a mistrial in the Sejka 
postdecree matter, stating that McCormack had “failed to allow the parties 
meaningful opportunity to present testimony and evidence on the issues” and 
indicating that the record before her did not allow her to resolve the pending 
issues.  Further, the judge found that McCormack had improperly conducted a 
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hearing on school placement when there was no motion pending on that issue and 
when the parties had no notice of the nature of the hearing. 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the panel and board found that the 
conduct that occurred before March 1, 2009, violated former Canon 1 of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct (requiring a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary), Canon 2 (requiring a judge to respect and comply with the law and 
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary), Canon 3(B)(4) (requiring a judge to be patient, 
dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with 
whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and to require similar conduct of 
lawyers, staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and 
control), and Canon 3(B)(8) (requiring a judge to dispose of all judicial matters 
promptly, efficiently, and fairly and to comply with the guidelines set forth in the 
Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio). 
{¶ 15} The parties further stipulated and the panel and board found that 
McCormack’s conduct after March 1, 2009, violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a 
judge to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, 
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety), 2.2 (requiring a judge to uphold and apply the law 
and to perform all duties of the judicial office fairly and impartially), 2.5(A) 
(requiring a judge to perform judicial and administrative duties competently and 
diligently and to comply with guidelines set forth in the Rules of Superintendence 
for the Courts of Ohio), 2.6(A) (requiring a judge to accord every person who has 
a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard 
according to law), 2.6(B) (permitting a judge to encourage parties to a proceeding 
and their lawyers to settle matters in a dispute but prohibiting a judge from 
coercing any party into settlement), and 2.8(B) (requiring a judge to be patient, 
dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court 
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officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and to 
require similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject 
to the judge’s direction and control).  The parties also stipulated and the panel and 
board also found that McCormack’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
{¶ 16} The record demonstrates that McCormack conducted himself in an 
undignified and discourteous manner, treated the litigants and their counsel with 
disdain, permitted the guardian ad litem to lecture the parties on the record, 
terminated hearings before the parties had presented all their evidence and had 
made a record of their objections, acted on his own whims rather than inquiring 
into the best interests of the child, failed to resolve any of the matters pending 
before him for more than a year and a half, and failed to conduct hearings in a 
manner that would permit the judge assigned to the case to resolve those issues in 
his stead.  We therefore adopt the facts as stipulated by the parties and found by 
the panel and board. 
Sanction 
{¶ 17} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 18} The parties stipulated and the board found that the following 
mitigating factors are present:  (1) McCormack does not have a prior disciplinary 
record, (2) he provided full and free disclosure during the investigation and 
demonstrated a cooperative attitude in the disciplinary proceedings, (3) he has 
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been diagnosed with a mental disability by a qualified health-care professional 
and received treatment from Dr. Scott Martin, a psychiatrist, who has opined that 
the mental disability contributed to the cause of the misconduct and that he can 
presently practice law in a competent, ethical, and professional manner without 
restraint.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), and (g). 
{¶ 19} The parties did not stipulate to any aggravating factors, and the 
board did not find that any aggravating factors are present.  We find, however, 
that McCormack engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple 
offenses—albeit in a single case—and caused harm to vulnerable litigants who 
bore the time commitment and expense of multiple hearings for well over a year 
without movement toward the resolution of their conflict.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(c), (d), and (h). 
{¶ 20} The parties cite a number of cases in support of their 
recommendation of a six-month, fully stayed suspension.  They note that in 
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary, 93 Ohio St.3d 191, 754 N.E.2d 235 (2000), we 
imposed a six-month suspension for a judge who had offered a pregnant criminal 
defendant a quid pro quo arrangement: if the defendant agreed to complete her 
pregnancy, she would be sentenced to probation, but if she planned to have an 
abortion, she would receive a prison term.  We also imposed a six-month 
suspension on a judge who had violated multiple canons of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct when he (1) served as the judge and testified as a witness in a criminal 
contempt proceeding, (2) found a woman in civil contempt and sanctioned her 
without filing a complaint, advising her of her right to counsel, or memorializing 
the proceedings with a journal entry, (3) relied on an outdated statute book to 
sentence a juvenile offender and engaged in ex parte communications with the 
juvenile-probation department, (4) conducted a probation-revocation hearing 
without counsel for the juvenile offenders being present, and (5) failed to recuse 
himself after instructing the prosecutor to bring felony charges against the two 
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offenders.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 760 N.E.2d 412 
(2002). 
{¶ 21} The parties, however, observe that the misconduct of Cleary and 
Karto was more egregious than that of McCormack because Cleary had 
manipulated a criminal defendant’s freedom based on Cleary’s personal beliefs 
and Karto’s misconduct occurred in multiple cases involving multiple defendants 
and affected the freedom of some criminal defendants.  In contrast, they argue, 
McCormack’s impatient and discourteous demeanor made it difficult for the 
parties and counsel in a single matter to present their evidence and arguments to 
the court and delayed the resolution of that case. 
{¶ 22} The parties recognize that we have imposed even more severe 
sanctions for judges who have exhibited similar unprofessional, discourteous, and 
impatient behavior, but argue that in those cases the conduct was more egregious 
and pervasive and of longer duration than McCormack’s.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Parker, 116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007-Ohio-5635, 876 N.E.2d 556 
(imposing an 18-month suspension with six months stayed on a judge with 
narcissistic-personality disorder whose acts of bias, coercion, intemperance, and 
dishonesty included jailing a gallery spectator for contempt without cause, 
presiding over a defendant’s plea and sentencing after participating in his arrest, 
attempting to coerce plea agreements in criminal cases, humiliating a victim of 
domestic violence in court, and repeatedly mistreating participants in court 
proceedings)  and Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-
Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286 (imposing a two-year suspension with one year 
stayed on conditions on a judge who, over a period of more than five years, 
engaged in coercive tactics to improperly influence disposition of criminal cases 
and engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation and rude, undignified, and 
unprofessional conduct that included abusive verbal outbursts, unjustified, 
expulsions from the courtroom, and berating or humiliating persons in the 
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presence of others).  Furthermore, the parties argue, unlike Parker and O’Neill, 
McCormack has presented mitigating evidence that demonstrates he suffered 
from anxiety and posttraumatic-stress disorder at the time of his misconduct. 
{¶ 23} The parties suggest that McCormack’s misconduct is most 
comparable to that in Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoague, 88 Ohio St.3d 321, 725 
N.E.2d 1108 (2000), in which we imposed a six-month fully stayed suspension on 
a judge who misused the authority of his office to summon, intimidate, and 
reprimand two persons who he believed had recklessly and erratically driven an 
automobile in his presence. 
{¶ 24} While we agree that McCormack’s conduct is not as egregious as 
that of Cleary or Karto, or as extreme or pervasive as the conduct of Parker or 
O’Neill, we find that it is more serious than the single incident of misconduct at 
issue in Hoague.  And although the evidence demonstrates that McCormack was 
diagnosed with anxiety and posttraumatic-stress disorder following his treatment 
for a life-threatening medical condition in 2005 and strongly suggests that his 
diagnoses contributed to cause his misconduct, we have some reservations about 
considering McCormack’s mental-health disorders as a mitigating factor in this 
case.  Specifically, we find that neither of the treatment professionals who 
testified on McCormack’s behalf stated that his mental-health disorders 
contributed to cause his misconduct and that the only direct evidence of 
McCormack’s mental-health treatment is limited to the few short months 
immediately before the parties agreed to the stipulations in this case. 
{¶ 25} Dr. Philip Cusumano, one of McCormack’s physicians, testified 
that McCormack was diagnosed with a serious heart condition that required 
surgical intervention in August 2005.  The following month, he developed an 
infection that required additional surgery.  He was first diagnosed with anxiety in 
October 2005 and was later diagnosed with posttraumatic-stress disorder and 
depression.  Dr. Cusumano testified that McCormack’s anxiety and stress reaction 
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responded to medication and psychotherapy but that when he last saw him in 
April 2009, McCormack was still suffering from these conditions.  He believed 
that “McCormack probably had a short temper to begin with,” but that “this 
tremendous stress he was under fueled those symptoms.”  Dr. Cusumano noted a 
report that McCormack had outbursts and agitation at home, and he testified that 
McCormack would have been particularly susceptible to outbursts of temper that 
he could not control when placed in highly stressful circumstances.  He did not go 
so far as to say that McCormack’s conditions contributed to cause the misconduct 
at issue in this case. 
{¶ 26} Although Dr. Cusumano testified about McCormack’s receipt of 
and positive response to treatment for his mental-health conditions, he 
acknowledged that he had not received any direct communications from the 
treating psychologist and concluded that “no news is good news.”  He also stated 
that he and his colleagues “had to really constantly work on getting [McCormack] 
to comply and follow up with any medical regimen, whether it was seeing a 
psychologist or whether it was seeing a medical doctor.”  Though he did not know 
whether McCormack had received continuous treatment for his mental-health 
issues, he stated that he would not be surprised to hear that McCormack had 
discontinued treatment. 
{¶ 27} Dr. Martin testified that he began treating McCormack on January 
7, 2011.  McCormack presented himself as having experienced persistent anxiety 
for several weeks that caused difficulty sleeping, problems in his relationship with 
his wife, and fits of anger and rage.  Although Dr. Martin diagnosed him with an 
adjustment disorder and anxiety, his symptoms were not severe enough to require 
medication.  McCormack did, however, begin weekly psychotherapy sessions and 
as he began to gain control over his anger, frustration, and rage, the frequency of 
those sessions was reduced to every two weeks.  By April 22, 2011, Dr. Martin 
reported that McCormack was not significantly impaired at work.  And at 
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Martin’s August 11, 2011 deposition, he testified that McCormack’s anxiety, 
posttraumatic-stress disorder, and depression had fully resolved, that he no longer 
had any primary psychiatric diagnosis, and that he is capable of competently, 
professionally, and ethically practicing law without the need for any ongoing 
psychotherapy or psychopharmacological medication.  But when questioned 
about McCormack’s diagnoses and their effect on his work prior to 2011, Martin 
testified that he did not know what McCormack was experiencing at that time. 
{¶ 28} Although Dr. Martin did testify that McCormack has fully 
recovered from his mental-health disorders, we remain troubled by the relatively 
brief duration of his treatment relationship with McCormack—particularly in light 
of Dr. Cusamano’s testimony that McCormack was not the most compliant of 
patients and the absence of any testimony or other direct evidence from other 
mental-health professionals who had treated him since his initial diagnosis in late 
2005. 
{¶ 29} Therefore, we find that the proper sanction for McCormack’s 
misconduct is a one-year suspension, fully stayed on the conditions that he 
commit no further misconduct and that within 60 days of the effective date of this 
opinion he (1) submit to a mental-health evaluation conducted by the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), (2) enter into an OLAP contract, if 
OLAP determines that treatment is necessary, the duration of which shall be 
determined by OLAP, (3) complies with all OLAP treatment recommendations, 
and (4) serves a period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. 
V(9) until the expiration of his OLAP contract or 12 months from the effective 
date of this order, whichever occurs later.  If McCormack fails to comply with the 
conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and McCormack will serve the entire 
one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to McCormack. 
Judgment accordingly. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Heather H. Coglianese, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Mazanec, Raskin, Ryder & Keller Co., L.P.A., Todd M. Raskin, and 
Shawn A. Romer, for respondent. 
______________________