Title: RK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., NATRONA COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DEPARTMENT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., NATRONA COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DEPARTMENT2008 WY 1174 P.3d 166Case Number: S-07-0072Decided: 01/08/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RK,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex 
rel., NATRONA COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DEPARTMENT,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Larry R. Clapp and Scott J. 
Olheiser, Clapp & Associates, PC, Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Olheiser.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Ellen Rutledge, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Rutledge.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Appellant 
RK challenges the district court's order establishing his paternity of MJ.  We affirm.

ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
RK raises 
the following issues:

1.   Did the district court commit error 
in 1993 by failing to enter an order dismissing this case as required by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-111(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 1992) subsequent to a certified 
paternity test authenticated and filed in the record demonstrating that the 
appellant cannot be the biological father of the minor 
child?

2.   Did the district court commit error 
by allowing this matter to be reopened as an active case subsequent to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-105(a)(ii) stating that "[a]n action to establish the existence of the 
father and child relationship . . . may be brought: [n]ot later than five (5) 
years after the birth of the child"?

3.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion in failing to require the Appellee to show that the genetic test that 
excluded the Appellant from paternity was rebutted by clear and convincing 
evidence?

4.   Did the district court err in 
applying parentage statutes currently in effect as opposed to the law in effect 
at the time the action was commenced?

a.   Did the district court apply the 
incorrect statutory standard by refusing to allow evidence of another paternity 
test concerning the paternity of the minor child in this 
matter?

b.   Did the district court err in 
failing to weigh evidence in the form of testimony from a geneticist concerning 
the validity of the paternity tests and the genetic markers which were 
tested?

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
DJ gave 
birth to MJ in October 1989, in Casper, 
Wyoming, and later moved to Oregon.  After she filed the appropriate 
paperwork in the State of Oregon, that state 
requested the State of Wyoming to initiate proceedings to determine 
paternity and establish child support pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).1  The State of Wyoming filed the URESA 
petition against RK in 1991.2  The petition alleged that RK was MJ's 
father and requested an adjudication of paternity and an order of support.  RK denied paternity of 
MJ.

[¶4]           
In early 
1993, RK submitted to a genetic test to determine paternity.  The laboratory result was filed with the 
district court on June 7, 1993, and excluded RK as MJ's father.  We refer to the 1993 test as "Test 
1."  Although the test apparently 
excluded RK as the father, the paternity action remained pending.  No significant activity occurred in the 
case until August 1994 when the court received a new paternity report 
accompanied by a letter from the laboratory revealing that it had uncovered a 
"discrepancy in the conclusions" in Test 1.  A second letter from the laboratory 
explained that it had accidentally switched the genetic samples that made up the 
RK-DJ-MJ test with samples from a different trio.  When it discovered the error, the 
laboratory re-ran the genetic test and concluded that RK could not be excluded 
as MJ's father.  We refer to the 
1994 test as "Test 2."  Test 2 
revealed a 99.99% probability of paternity.

[¶5]           
In 
response to the laboratory's letter and Test 2 results, the State moved to 
require additional genetic testing.  RK filed a Motion for Protective Order and Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc.3  RK's motion asked that the district 
court "enter a Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc in compliance with the Paternity 
Evaluation Report filed with the Court on June 7, 1993, and further, that the 
Court enter a Protective Order barring the State from any further proceeding 
against the Defendant."  The 
district court denied RK's motion and ordered an additional genetic test to be 
performed at RK's option and paid for by the State.

[¶6]           
The next 
case activity occurred in February 1999, when the State filed a Petition to Establish Child Support and 
Medical Support Obligation.  RK 
responded with his claim that he had requested the additional testing, but that 
it never took place.  After a 
hearing, the district court ordered additional genetic testing pursuant to its 
1995 order.  RK was tested and the 
result was filed with the court in December 1999.  The report stated that RK could not be 
excluded as MJ's father and that the probability of paternity was 99.99%.  We refer to the 1999 test as "Test 
3."  

[¶7]           
Following 
Test 3, there was no substantive case activity in RK's paternity matter until 
March 2003, when the State requested a hearing.  After that hearing and subsequent 
discovery, RK filed a "rebuttal" to the genetic test results, with a supporting 
affidavit from "an expert in genetic testing."  In December 2003, the parties stipulated 
that RK would be allowed to arrange for yet another genetic test using the 
methodology recommended by his genetic expert, at his own expense.  If the 2003 genetic test took place, it 
is not reflected in the record.

[¶8]           
The 
district court held a final hearing on October 12, 2006.  At that hearing, RK's general strategy 
was to impeach the genetic test results by introducing the testimony of an 
expert, Ms. Kim Gorman.  The 
district court relied on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-705(b) and ruled that Ms. Gorman 
could not testify.4  At the conclusion of the hearing, RK 
presented an offer of proof by putting Ms. Gorman's proposed testimony on the 
record.5  Ms. Gorman testified that Tests 2 and 3 
did not adequately rebut the exclusionary results in Test 1.  The reason, she explained, was that 
Tests 2 and 3 did not examine the same genetic marker that had initially 
excluded RK as MJ's father in Test 1.  
Ms. Gorman posited that without testing that same genetic marker, one of 
RK's close relatives could turn out to be MJ's father, rather than RK 
himself.  Ms. Gorman did not discuss 
the laboratory's disclosure that Test 1 involved the wrong trio of 
subjects.  After the hearing, the 
district court entered an order establishing RK as MJ's father.  RK now appeals the district court's 
paternity order.

DISCUSSION

[¶9]           
RK's 
primary contention is that the genetic testing statute in effect in 1992 
required the district court, sua 
sponte, to dismiss the suit on receipt of the Test 1 results.  Further, RK claims that the paternity 
suit "should have been dismissed against [RK], by operation of mandated law and 
without any further consideration or hearing."  We disagree.

[¶10]       
RK's 
assertion presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we consider de novo.  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 
52 (Wyo. 2001).  When conducting a 
de novo evaluation, we afford no 
deference to the district court's interpretation of the statute.  Id.  In conducting our statutory analysis we 
are guided by the following standard:

The paramount consideration is to 
determine the legislature's intent, which must be ascertained initially and 
primarily from the words used in the statute.  State ex rel. State Department of 
Revenue v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2003 WY 54, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, 
1182 (Wyo. 2003). We look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
to determine if the statute is ambiguous. Id. A statute is clear and unambiguous 
if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is 
found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. 
Id. If 
we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the 
plain language of the statute. Petroleum Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 983 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo. 1999).

RME Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Rev., 2007 WY 16, ¶ 
25, 150 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 2007).

[¶11]       
RK relies 
on the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-111(f), in effect in 1992 when the 
paternity suit was commenced.  That 
statute states:

If the scientific evidence resulting 
from the genetic tests conclusively shows that the defendant could not have been 
the father, the action shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall be refunded 
all monies ordered paid by him as child support from the mother of the 
child.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-111(f) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 1992).

[¶12]       
RK 
contends that the phrase, "the action shall be dismissed," in section 
14-2-111(f) affirmatively requires the trial court to dismiss the action, even 
when no litigant moves for the action's dismissal.  Alternatively, he claims that the 
paternity action was terminated by operation of law when Test 1 was filed with 
the district court.  RK relies on 
several cases in which we have accorded mandatory effect to the word "shall" 
when it appears in a statute.  E.g., LePage v. State of Wyo., Dep't of Health, 2001 WY 26, 18 P.3d 1177, 1180 
(Wyo. 2001); Mayland v. State, 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977).  In LePage, for example, we stated that 
"[w]here a statute uses the mandatory language shall,' a court must obey the 
statute as a court has no right to make the law contrary to what is prescribed 
by the legislature."  ¶ 11, 18 P.3d  
at 1180.  

[¶13]       
The cases 
relied upon by RK do not, however, establish that the plain language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-111(f) mandates dismissal in the absence of an appropriate 
motion.  The statute does not 
establish a timeframe for dismissal, nor does the statute require the district 
court to dismiss paternity cases on its own initiative.  There was nothing to prevent RK from 
filing a motion to dismiss the paternity action, but RK did not file such a 
motion until after the court had received information undermining the 
reliability of the Test 1 results.  
Stated differently, at the time RK moved for dismissal, the genetic test 
had not "conclusively" established that RK was not the father.  We also note that there is no requirement 
in the statute that dismissal be with prejudice.  In the absence of a dismissal with 
prejudice, the State could have re-filed the action in August 1994 when the 
laboratory's error became known.  In 
sum, RK asks this Court to read far more into the statute than is justified by 
its plain text.  The court's failure 
to dismiss the action, sua sponte, 
did not violate the plain language of the statute.  Accordingly, the paternity action was 
still pending at the time the laboratory revealed its 
mistake.

[¶14]       
RK also 
contends that the case was "reopened" when the laboratory admitted its error in 
1994.  He further claims that the 
five-year statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-105(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 1994), barred the State from "reopening" the case.  His assertion relies on the proposition 
that the case against him was dismissed by operation of law when Test 1 was 
filed.  Because the case was never 
dismissed, there was no "reopening" of the case, and we need not further 
consider this claim.

[¶15]       
RK next 
asserts that the State did not properly rebut Test 1.  He reasons that the district court erred 
in relying upon the results from Test 2, and Test 3, and the laboratory's 
communications regarding the inaccuracy of Test 1 because "the district court 
inappropriately considered useless evidence."  His assertion that the evidence was 
"useless" is founded in the proposition that Test 2 and Test 3 did not retest 
the two particular genetic markers from Test 1 that excluded RK.  RK's position, when simply stated, is 
that the evidence was irrelevant.  
Whether evidence is relevant is a decision within the trial court's 
discretion.  Absent an abuse of that 
discretion, we will not disturb the district court's determination.  L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of CountyComm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶16]       
In this 
case, RK has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.  First, RK asks this Court to hold that 
two genetic tests strongly indicating paternity are irrelevant to RK's 
paternity.  Second, he asks us to 
hold that correspondence from the laboratory admitting that Test 1 was a mistake 
is also irrelevant.  We are 
unwilling to do so because all this evidence squarely fits the definition of 
relevant evidence:  it has a 
"tendency to make the existence of [RK's paternity] more probable . . . than it 
would be without the evidence."  
W.R.E. 401.

[¶17]       
For his 
final issue, RK asserts that it was reversible error for the district court to 
apply the current statute concerning genetic testing rather than the one in 
effect in 1992, when this paternity suit was commenced.  As a result, he contends, the district 
court improperly excluded testimony from RK's expert witness, Ms. Gorman.  Ms. Gorman would have testified 
generally that Test 1 excluded RK as the father based on two particular 
genetic markers that did not match.  
Because Tests 2 and 3 did not examine those two particular genetic 
markers, she asserted, Tests 2 and 3 did not effectively refute Test 1's 
exclusion of RK as MJ's father.  

[¶18]       
We 
evaluate a district court's admission of evidence under the abuse of discretion 
standard.  E.g., Ferguson v. State, 2007 WY 157, ¶ 14, 168 P.3d 476, 480 (Wyo. 2007).  Even when 
admission of evidence is at issue, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."  W.R.A.P. 9.04; Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 25, 141 P.3d 690, 698 (Wyo. 2006).  To meet 
the standard of W.R.A.P. 9.04, RK must show "that the outcome of his trial would 
have been more favorable had the error not occurred."  Gabbert, ¶ 25, 141 P.3d  at 
698.

[¶19]       
The State 
concedes that the district court should have employed the 1992 genetic testing 
statute rather than the current law.  
The difference could be significant in some situations because the 1992 
statute allows admission of a broader range of evidence.  The 1992 statute states that "[i]f the 
experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question [of paternity] 
shall be submitted upon all the evidence."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109(e)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 1992).  The current statute limits options for 
refuting genetic tests, stating that "[a] man identified . . . as the father of 
the child may rebut the genetic testing results only by other genetic 
testing."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-705 (LexisNexis 2007); compare 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-109(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 1992).  If the prior statute applies, there was 
no statutory bar to Ms. Gorman's testimony.

[¶20]       
Nevertheless, the error was harmless 
because RK's proffered evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.  As the laboratory made clear, the error 
in Test 1 was not simply a problem with the test itself.  Rather, the laboratory accidentally 
switched the samples with another trio of subjects.  Therefore, the results reflected in Test 
1 were the results of three other people, not of RK, MJ, and DJ.  Test 1and any expert opinion based on 
itis irrelevant to whether RK is MJ's genetic father.  Ms. Gorman's testimony relied solely on 
the premise that Test 1 was accurate.  
Once Test 1 is removed from consideration, the district court was left, 
as are we, only with Tests 2 and 3.  Both of these tests support the district 
court's conclusion that RK is MJ's genetic father.  Accordingly, the district court's error 
in applying the current paternity statute was harmless. 

[¶21]       
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1URESA 
has since been replaced by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-4-139 through -197 
(LexisNexis 2007).

2Though 
the URESA petition was originally filed in 1991, this action is deemed commenced 
in 1992 because service was made in 1992, more than 60 days after the petition 
was filed.  W.R.C.P. 
3(b).

3An 
action "nunc pro tunc" is one 
"[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court's inherent power."  Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (8th ed. 2004).

4Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-705(b) (LexisNexis 2007) states:

A man 
identified under subsection (a) of this section [describing genetic testing] as 
the father of the child may rebut the genetic testing results only by other 
genetic testing satisfying the requirements of this article 
which:

(i) 
Excludes the man as the genetic father of the child; or

(ii) 
Identifies another man as the possible father of the 
child.

5After 
the district court judge had concluded the hearing and left the courtroom, the 
court reporter stayed.  RK's counsel 
then conducted what was essentially a direct examination of Ms. Gorman.  The State's attorney, while present, did 
not ask Ms. Gorman any questions.