Title: Matter of Adoption of AMD

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Adoption of AMD1988 WY 162766 P.2d 550Case Number: C-88-4, C-88-5Decided: 12/30/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF AMD, A MINOR. MVF, APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

MF, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT). (TWO CASES) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ACD, A MINOR. Nos. 
C-88-4, C-88-5

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Lisa C. Sweeney 
of Schaefer & Associates, Laramie, for appellant.

Kaye Willis, 
Laramie, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In these consolidated 
appeals, appellant MVF seeks review of district court orders denying his motions 
to vacate adoptions.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellant and appellee, 
his fiancé MLD, met in 1986 and began dating in 1987. They cohabitated in her 
apartment during much of April 1987, and began living together in a shared 
apartment on April 25, 1987. During April 1987, they became engaged to marry. On 
May 1, 1987, appellant filed two separate petitions to adopt the two minor 
children of MLD. MLD is the natural mother of both children. The natural father 
of one of the two children consented to the adoption, and it was alleged that 
the father of the other child was unknown. An objection was filed by a person 
asserting that he was the natural father of the other child, but the objection 
was not pursued and the adoption proceeded on the basis that the father was 
unknown.

[¶4.]     The petitions for 
adoption were filed in district court prior to the marriage of the parties. The 
district court deferred ruling on the petitions until after the planned wedding. 
Appellant and appellee were married on July 25, 1987. Thereafter a hearing was 
held and decrees of adoption were entered on August 26, 1987. These decrees 
purported to be final orders establishing appellant as the adoptive father of 
appellee's children. Very shortly after entry of the decrees of adoption, the 
marriage became troubled and, in early October of 1987, appellee and her 
children moved from his home and began living elsewhere.

[¶5.]     On January 14, 1988, 
appellant filed motions to vacate the adoptions, asserting that the adoptions 
were finalized without compliance with the procedures set out in W.S. 1-22-111, 
that it was in the best interests of the children to vacate the adoptions, and 
that appellant's consent to adopt the children had been obtained by material 
misrepresentation. The district court found that appellant was estopped from 
challenging the validity of the adoptions because he had invoked the 
jurisdiction of the court, that he had failed to demonstrate material 
misrepresentation, and that it was in the best interests of the children that 
the adoptions be affirmed.

[¶6.]     In this appeal, 
appellant asserts that the district court's failure to ensure compliance with 
W.S. 1-22-111 is fatal to the validity of the adoptions and that he should not 
be estopped from asserting noncompliance with that statute. Appellant also 
pursues his claim that the adoptions were procured by fraud or undue influence, 
but we need not address that issue because we resolve this case on the basis of 
noncompliance with the governing statutes.

[¶7.]     Adoption was unknown at 
common law and, therefore, adoption statutes are to be strictly construed. In re 
Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo. 1982). Moreover, adoption is entirely 
statutory, and the proceedings must be conducted in substantial conformity with 
the provisions of the statute. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 
866 (1948). In the Strauser case, this court noted that consent lies at the 
foundation of statutes of adoption and that the first duty of the judge is to 
see that all necessary consents are given. The court then continued: "If they are not, the proceeding is at an 
end. There is nothing for the judge to approve." (Emphasis added.) 
Id. 196 P.2d  
at 867. The principle enunciated in Strauser applies here. We are, therefore, 
concerned with the consent of the adopting parent as well as compliance with 
W.S. 1-22-111, which provides:

"(a) After the petition 
to adopt has been filed and a hearing held the court acting in the best interest 
and welfare of the child may make any of the following 
orders:

"(i) Enter an 
interlocutory decree of adoption giving the care and custody of the child to the 
petitioners pending further order of the court;

"(ii) Defer entry of an 
interlocutory decree of adoption and order the division of public assistance and 
social services within the department of health and social services or a private 
licensed agency to investigate and report to the court the background of the 
child and of the petitioners, and the medical, social and psychological 
background and status of the consenting parent and putative father. After a 
written report of the investigation is filed, the court shall determine if the 
adoption by petitioners is in the best interest and welfare of the child and 
thereupon enter the appropriate order or decree;

"(iii) Enter a final 
decree of adoption if the child has resided in the home of the petitioner for 
six (6) months; or

"(iv) Deny the adoption 
if the court finds that the best interests and welfare of the child will be 
served by such denial.

"(b) If the court denies 
the adoption it shall make an order for proper custody consistent with the best 
interest and welfare of the child."

[¶8.]     W.S. 1-22-111(a) gives 
the district court four options. The only option the court could not have used was entry of a final 
decree of adoption as provided in (iii), for it is undisputed that at the time 
the decrees of adoption were entered on August 26, 1987, the children had not resided in the home of appellant for 
six months. Clearly, the district court did not defer entry of an interlocutory 
decree, which was option (ii), or deny the adoption, which was option (iv). We 
thus conclude that the August 26, 1987 decrees could only be interlocutory 
decrees described in option (i). Indeed, the court recognized this potential 
interpretation in his reasoning denying appellant relief. After premising its 
decision on the theory that appellant, having invoked the jurisdiction of the 
court, was estopped from challenging the validity of the adoptions, the district 
court said:

"If the Supreme Court 
were to say, you're incorrect on the estoppel issue and remanded for further 
proceedings, the Court then would be inclined, based on the findings that I have 
made here, to enter a final Decree of Adoption and treat the previous Decree as 
an interlocutory Decree." (Emphasis added.)

We agree that 
the August 26, 1987 decrees of adoption were interlocutory because it is 
undisputed that on August 26, 1987, the children had not resided in the home of 
petitioner for six months as required for entry of a final decree of adoption. A 
final decree of adoption thereafter could only be entered after the expiration 
of the six-month period in accordance with W.S. 1-22-112, which 
provides:

"(a) If an interlocutory 
decree has been entered petitioners may apply for a final decree of adoption 
after the child has resided in the home of the petitioners for six (6) months 
and a hearing on the petition may be required."

The 
interlocutory decrees give only care and custody of the children to petitioners 
pending further order of the court. It is not a decree of adoption. The adoption 
can result only upon application of appellant for final decrees of adoption as 
required by W.S. 1-22-112(a). Failing such an application, the district court 
cannot, under these statutes which are clear and unambiguous and which must be 
strictly construed, enter final decrees of adoption.

[¶9.]     The only question now 
remaining for our determination is whether an interlocutory decree can, by 
estoppel, become a final decree of adoption. As a preface to a consideration of 
what role estoppel should play in this case, we note that a fundamental 
consideration in all adoptions is the best interests and welfare of the affected 
children. This consideration is found in the statutes, and one can hardly find 
an adoption case that does not, in some place, use that phraseology. In this 
case, one of the findings of the district court in applying principles of 
estoppel was that the best interests of the children warranted entry of final 
decrees of adoption. But this puts the cart before the horse. The best interests 
and welfare of the child cannot become an issue in an adoption until the 
procedural requirements of the statutes have been met. Only then does the issue 
of whether the adoption is in the best interests of the child become the 
paramount consideration.

[¶10.]  Although somewhat speculative, it is 
highly likely that this unfortunate situation might have been avoided entirely 
if the required statutory procedures had been strictly followed, as they should 
have been. The legislature has decided that before a final decree should issue, 
a child should reside with a petitioner for six months, and if an interlocutory 
decree issues, that interlocutory decree will be supplanted by a final decree 
only upon application by that petitioner. The six-month waiting period serves a 
real and vital purpose. It provides a period of time during which the parties 
can determine if they can adjust to living together in a family setting; if they 
are compatible; if the home is likely to be suitable, a happy place, rewarding 
and of benefit to all. Thus, strict adherence to the statutory procedures for 
adoption serves the best interests and welfare of all parties to an adoption. 
Matter of Adoption of D.P., 583 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1978) (Raper, J., specially 
concurring).

[¶11.]  Because the procedural requirements for 
adoption were never satisfied, the court did not reach a point in the proceeding 
where the best interests of the children were a consideration. All that is left 
then to support the application of estoppel is that appellant petitioned the 
court through an attorney employed by appellee, and who still represents 
appellee, to adopt appellee's children. Why he is estopped to assert that the 
decree entered is not a final decree of adoption is difficult to comprehend. He 
has done nothing but refuse to proceed with the adoption after the expiration of 
the six-month period, if it did expire. To agree with appellee here might 
effectively convert every interlocutory decree into a final adoptive decree, for 
in every initial petition for adoption, the petitioner does represent to the 
court that he wishes to adopt - to be forever bound - even though the statute 
provides a six-month period for final decision.

[¶12.]  Courts have found residency requirements 
to be a restraint on a court's powers and to be mandatory, albeit under 
circumstances considerably different from those extant in this case. 2 C.J.S. 
Adoption of Persons, § 50 (nn. 83, 84) (1972). We also note that estoppel may 
play a considerably different role in circumstances where the validity of an 
adoption is challenged by collateral attack. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons, §§ 
124-129 (1972); Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 201, 33 P. 23 (1893). However, a 
petition to set aside an adoption, or as it was styled in this case, a motion to 
vacate an adoption where the decree entered can only be an interlocutory decree, 
is not a collateral attack. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons, § 124 (1972); 2 
Am.Jur.2d Adoption, § 69 (1962). This is so particularly because the statute 
requires action on the part of a petitioner to have an interlocutory decree of 
adoption made final. Clearly, the appellant's motion to vacate the adoptions 
evinced withdrawal of his consents to the adoptions and was his decision not to 
adopt.

[¶13.]  Adoption in Wyoming is a statutory 
proceeding and cannot be accomplished by private contract. It is held that: "If 
the relation of adoptive parent and child cannot be created by a private 
contract, it is equally certain that it cannot arise by estoppel." 2 Am.Jur.2d 
Adoption, § 8 (1962). Thus, we hold that appellant was not estopped from 
asserting the validity of the adoptions under the circumstances presented by 
this case. Our decision not to give effect to estoppel under these circumstances 
fully vindicates the policy goals of the adoption statutes, and we have held 
that we will not invoke estoppel to defeat the effective operation of a policy 
designed to protect the public interest. Big Piney Oil and Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557 
(Wyo. 1986). 
Our application of the principles of estoppel would likely be wholly different 
if estoppel were invoked under circumstances which tended to defeat the purposes 
of the adoption statutes rather than to sustain them.

[¶14.]  In reaching this decision, we are mindful 
of this court's holding in the case, In re Adoption of Hiatt, 69 Wyo. 373, 242 P.2d 214 (1952). In that case we found that a substantial compliance with the 
statutory requirement of six-month residency was sufficient. Id. 242 P.2d  at 218. 
However, that opinion makes clear that the child did reside with the petitioners 
in that case for six months, and the challenge was based on assertions we 
characterized as ones which would have required petitioners to have made the 
child a prisoner in order to comply with the statute as to six-month residency. 
In contrast, in this case the children had clearly not been residing with the 
petitioner for the requisite six-month period at the time the decrees of 
adoption were entered.1 Although our decision in Hiatt 
remains instructive, it has no application to the facts of this 
case.

[¶15.]  In summary, we hold that the district 
court's orders of August 26, 1987, were interlocutory decrees of adoption. 
Absent an application by appellant, pursuant to W.S. 1-22-112(a), the district 
court had no authority to enter final decrees of adoption. If the decrees were 
to be made final, that process could have been initiated only by appellant after 
having fulfilled the requirement that the children reside with him for six 
months. The only filing made by appellant after the interlocutory decrees were 
entered was his motion to vacate the interlocutory decrees. Under these 
circumstances, the only action which the district court could have taken was to 
vacate the interlocutory decrees and to dismiss the petitions to adopt. The 
governing statutes permit no other alternatives.

[¶16.]  Reversed and remanded with instructions 
to the district court to enter an order consistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The district court 
counted all time from early April 1987, until the parties' marriage on July 25, 
1987, as contributing to fulfillment of the six-month requirement. Although it 
is unnecessary to a determination of this case because the six-month requirement 
had not been met, even including all that time, we seriously question whether 
such cohabitation should have been counted for purposes of adoption under the 
circumstances of this case.