Title: Robinson v. Hamblin

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Robinson v. Hamblin1996 WY 49914 P.2d 152Case Number: 95-139Decided: 04/01/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

THOMAS ODELL ROBINSON,  

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

EDWIN WALLACE HAMBLIN,  

Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County 

The 
Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

William L. Combs of Combs Law Office, 
Evanston. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, 
Laramie.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Thomas Robinson 
(Robinson) filed a personal injury action against Edwin Wallace Hamblin (Hamblin 
Sr.) and Edwin Stephen Hamblin (Hamblin Jr.). The trial court found no 
negligence on the part of Hamblin Sr. Robinson appeals.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Robinson submits 
the following issues for our review:

 

I. Whether the trial [court] abused its discretion in 
permitting counsel for appellee's insurance company to maintain ostensible 
representation of Edwin Stephen Hamblin.

 

II. Whether counsel for appellee's insurance company 
improperly invited error in the trial court's decision to exclude trial evidence 
and testimony offered by appellant.

 

III. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing 
Edwin Stephen Hamblin from this action.

 

Hamblin Sr. rephrases the 
issues as:

 

I. Is any issue regarding the representation of 
defendant/appellee Edwin Stephen Hamblin by attorneys paid by Mountain West Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, the insurer for defendant/appellee Edwin 
Wallace Hamblin, appropriately before this court?

 

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
excluding evidence offered by appellant at trial because appellant had not 
abided by the trial court's order to provide certain information about that 
evidence to appellee prior to trial?

 

III. Did the trial court err in dismissing 
defendant/appellee Edwin Stephen Hamblin from this action?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Robinson worked 
in and around Hamblin Sr.'s mobile home in which Hamblin Sr. and Hamblin Jr. 
lived together. In that capacity, Robinson acted as the general maintenance 
person and looked after Hamblin Sr. Robinson and Hamblin Jr. had been friends 
for over twenty years, and Robinson lived in a separate mobile home on the same 
property.

 

[¶5]      On January 5, 
1990, Robinson was taken by ambulance to a hospital emergency room for treatment 
of a spinal condition. Robinson brought a personal injury action against the 
Hamblins, alleging his back injury was caused by a fall through the floor of the 
Hamblins' mobile home on January 4, 1990. The Hamblins, in a pro se answer, conceded negligence and 
requested Hamblin Sr.'s underwriter, Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company (Company), to pay damages to Robinson for the alleged fall. 
Notwithstanding that the Hamblins admitted negligence, the Company hired 
attorneys to defend them, and an answer was filed in which they denied 
negligence. 

 

[¶6]      The trial was 
conducted with an advisory jury. W.R.C.P. 39(c). Prior to trial, Hamblin Jr. had 
been dismissed from the action since Hamblin Sr. was the sole owner of the 
mobile home. The court also excluded two witnesses proposed by Robinson because 
Robinson had failed to comply with a court order to provide the Hamblins with 
copies of the witnesses' statements. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
advisory jury found no negligence on either side. The court adopted this 
finding. The court found that although the floor in Hamblin Sr.'s mobile home 
was in a defective and deteriorated condition, Robinson did not fall through it. 
Further, the court found that even though Robinson did hurt his back while 
employed by the Hamblins, these two events were in no way causally connected. 
Robinson timely appeals.

 

DISCUSSION

I.          
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Company to 
provide legal representation for Hamblin Jr.

 

[¶7]      Robinson asserts 
that the Company should not have been allowed to provide Hamblin Jr. with legal 
assistance in this action since Hamblin Jr. was not a named insured in the 
policy. We disagree. First, Robinson lacks standing to raise any issue 
concerning Hamblin Jr.'s legal representation. We have stated before 
that:

 

The doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of 
jurisdictional magnitude. At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine 
holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in 
which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating. * * * A 
litigant is said to have standing when he has a "personal stake in the outcome 
of the controversy." This personal stake requirement has been described in 
Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at stake.

 

Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 1992) (citations 
omitted). Since Hamblin Jr. was an opposing party in this suit, Robinson has no 
"tangible interest" in Hamblin Jr.'s right to legal representation. Second, 
Robinson is foreclosed from bringing this issue on appeal since he did not raise 
it at any time in the court below. We have consistently held that we do not 
address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Wyo. 1991); Matter of 
Estate of McCue, 776 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo. 1989). We see no reason to deviate 
from our general rule in this instance. It is true that Robinson appeared pro se in the court below and that this 
court has spoken to a certain leniency which should be afforded the pro se 
litigant. See Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 943 (Wyo. 1991). The record in this case, however, reveals that the 
trial court accorded Robinson every courtesy and consideration to which he was 
entitled. Third, Robinson fails to support his position on this issue by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority, citing only Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys at Law 4.3. This rule bears no relevance to the question at hand since 
it concerns the way counsel should deal with an opposing party appearing pro se. Inasmuch as Robinson's sole 
support is based on an irrelevant source, we decline consideration. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1347 
(Wyo. 1996); Thunder Hawk By and Through 
Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 891 P.2d 773, 778 (Wyo. 1995); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 
1994); Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 606 (Wyo. 1993); W.R.A.P. 7.01(f).

 

II. Whether 
Hamblin's counsel invited error to exclude evidence offered by 
Robinson.

 

[¶8]      This issue 
concerns a motion in limine by Hamblin to prohibit testimony by or in regard to 
actions or statements made by two witnesses whom Robinson wanted to call. The 
court granted the motion, reasoning that even though Robinson provided Hamblin 
with the names of these witnesses, he did not provide copies of their statements 
to Hamblin as ordered by the court. Robinson argues that the motion in limine 
should not have been granted since Hamblin had obtained adequate knowledge of 
the content of the witnesses' testimony through other sources, such as 
Robinson's complaint and the depositions of Hamblin Jr. and Robinson. Further, 
Robinson asserts that since these two witnesses were going to testify as to the 
deteriorated condition of the floor, exclusion of this testimony "effectively 
destroyed [Robinson's] case," especially in light of the court's finding of no 
negligence. Thus, according to Robinson, the district court judge abused his 
discretion.

 

[¶9]      We disagree with 
these contentions. A trial court has discretion to exclude evidence at trial if 
the party has not followed the court's orders regarding the discovery and 
disclosure of information prior to trial. W.R.C.P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(B). Such a 
decision will not be reversed without a showing of an abuse of discretion. Thunder Hawk, 891 P.2d  at 779. We have 
defined judicial discretion as

 

[a] composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.

 

Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986) (citations omitted). 
The burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion rests on appellant. Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 957 (Wyo. 
1996). Robinson has failed to show any such abuse. The court, at the pretrial 
conference, ordered Robinson to produce to Hamblin copies of the witnesses' 
statements. Robinson had these copies in his possession, but he did not comply 
with the court's order, or at least failed to show such compliance. For that 
reason, the court determined, in its discretion, that these two witnesses should 
not be called.

 

[¶10]   Furthermore, assuming arguendo that 
the court did abuse its discretion in this regard, it would be harmless 
error.

 

An error warrants reversal only when it is 
prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights. Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909, 913 (Wyo. 
1991) * * * W.R.A.P. 9.04. The party who is appealing bears the burden to 
establish that an error was prejudicial. Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 550 
(Wyo. 1993).

 

Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo. 1995); see also Madrid, 910 P.2d  at 1346. An 
error, to be prejudicial, must "cause a miscarriage of justice or result in 
damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process * * * 
[or possess] a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result." Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted). The court found that the floor 
was in a defective and deteriorated condition. This was exactly what the two 
excluded witnesses were going to testify about. Moreover, the court expressed 
its belief that "the testimony of those witnesses was, in all probability, 
superfluous, redundant and unnecessary." Thus, the exclusion did not harm 
Robinson's case.

 

III. 
Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Hamblin Jr. from the 
suit.

 

[¶11]   Robinson asserts that the trial 
court improperly dismissed Hamblin Jr. since nothing appears from the record 
that Hamblin Jr. was formally dismissed until the trial court entered judgment. 
Additionally, Robinson purports that Hamblin Jr. was a proper defendant in the 
action because he occupied the mobile home together with Hamblin Sr. and in that 
capacity owed certain duties of care toward Robinson.

 

[¶12]   We cannot accept these arguments. 
After careful review of the record, we find it was clear from the start of the 
trial that the court no longer considered Hamblin Jr. to be a part of the suit. 
During jury selection the judge stated that Hamblin Sr. was the defendant in the 
suit, without mentioning Hamblin Jr.'s name. Further, when the court introduced 
Hamblin Jr. to the jury, the judge stated:

 

The gentleman that walked into the courtroom and sat 
at counsel table for the defense is Stephen Hamblin, Edwin Stephen Hamblin. At 
one time, Stephen Hamblin was a defendant in this lawsuit but he no longer 
is.

 

At no time during the trial 
did Robinson object to the dismissal of Hamblin Jr. Therefore, Robinson is 
precluded from bringing this issue on appeal. As mentioned supra, a matter not 
litigated or documented in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. 
Bowen, 804 P.2d  at 1296; Matter of 
Estate of McCue, 776 P.2d  at 745. 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]   Finding no abuse of discretion in 
allowing the Company to provide representation for Hamblin Jr., no error in 
excluding the testimony of the two witnesses, and no abuse of discretion in 
dismissing Hamblin Jr. from this lawsuit, the judgment is

 

[¶14]   
Affirmed.