Title: State v. Berryman

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

106 Ariz. 290 (1970) 475 P.2d 472 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Beri BERRYMAN, Appellant. No. 2115. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 16, 1970. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Taylor, Grace & Petica, by Ronald H. Petica, Phoenix, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice. Beri Berryman, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was tried and convicted of two counts of armed robbery and for punishment therefor was sentenced to serve not less than five years nor more than five years and six months in the Arizona Penitentiary on each count to run concurrently commencing on November 15, 1968. From his conviction and sentence he appeals. On the 24th day of July, 1968, at approximately 9:23 p.m. the defendant went to Fry's Market at 1625 West Camelback, Phoenix, Arizona, along with two other suspects. The defendant walked up to Mildred Crump, a cashier, with a gun, telling her "This is a stick up. Don't get scared and start screaming." After she had given him the money in her possession he then went to an adjoining cashier, Pete Martinez, and made the same demand. Pete Martinez had witnessed the robbery of Mildred Crump. The money was then taken out of Pete Martinez' cash register. Martinez testified that the defendant had instructed him to take the money out of his register and put it in a paper bag; that another man then came and got the paper bag. *291 Count I was based on the robbery of Mildred Crump and Count II was upon the robbery of Pete Martinez. The defendant contends that he was not properly charged for the reason that the two counts of robbery arose out of a single transaction. Robbery is defined in § 13-641 A.R.S. as follows: "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." The statute does not require ownership of the property by the person from whom it is taken. The question then is whether under the facts two robberies were committed. In State v. Boag, 104 Ariz. 362, 453 P.2d 508, we held: Also see State v. Vallejos, 89 Ariz. 76, 358 P.2d 178. Appellant contends that he is being subjected to double punishment contrary to A.R.S. § 13-1641 which provides as follows: In State v. Boag, supra, quoting State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187, we said: In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, the court held: The facts of the instant case do not support the contention that the robbery of Mildred Crump and Pete Martinez was a single robbery. We accordingly hold that the defendant was properly charged with two counts of robbery. The second contention of the defendant was that the sentence of the court was improper in that it only dealt with one count or was confusing. *292 The reporter's transcript shows at the time of the sentencing of defendant he was advised: The Minute Entry of the clerk reads: The written judgment and sentence reads in part as follows: In Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281, we held: *293 In State v. Dowthard, 92 Ariz. 44, 373 P.2d 357, we again said that "a judgment is complete and valid when it is orally pronounced by the court and entered in the minutes." Rule 339, A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. provides: It was plain that the court was sentencing the defendant under the two counts for which he had been found guilty. Under Rule 339 the sentence was concurrent. In State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629, where a defendant had been found guilty of two counts and probation revoked, the court in passing upon a similar sentence found that it was adequate, but recommended that where there was more than one count that the sentence with respect to each count be separately stated. We agree with this finding and recommendation. However, in the instant case it is plain that the clerk understood the sentence and recorded it correctly. We accordingly hold that the sentence of the defendant is valid. The next contention of the defendant is that the court committed prejudicial error in stating to each of the witnesses for the state, "Thank you for being a witness for us". We do not agree with this contention. This was merely a courtesy in thanking witnesses for appearing at the trial, and not for the substance of the evidence given. The jury would understand this. The record shows that two of defendant's witnesses were also thanked by the court. This shows the court was merely being courteous. Nor do we find any merit in the contention that the evidence did not show the robbery was by force or fear. A gun was used and in response to the defendant's statement "Don't get scared and start screaming," the answer was to the effect "Well, I am not." She was also asked, "Were you in fear of your life at that time?" Her answer was "I would say yes." The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that she delivered the money under fear. The defendant also contends that the County Attorney improperly made reference to the failure of the defendant to testify; that the County Attorney in his argument to the jury improperly commented on the fact that appellant failed to appear as his own witness by several times commenting "This is the whole testimony, the whole case of the Defendant", and arguing that defendant's "whole case" consisted of bringing a felon from Arizona State Prison. State v. Acosta, 101 Ariz. 127, 416 P.2d 560, cited by defendant does not support this contention. In Acosta we held a similar argument by the County Attorney was not a comment on the failure of defendant to testify: *294 "A.R.S. § 13-163 provides in part: In the instant case the statement was made for an identical purpose. The pertinent portions are as follows: This argument did not constitute a comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify. State v. Acosta, supra. Judgment affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and HAYS, JJ., concur.