Title: Commonwealth v. Correia

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13223 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANILDO LOPES CORREIA. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 7, 2022. - June 12, 2023. 
 
Present (Sitting at Plymouth):  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, 
Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Relevancy and 
materiality, Prior misconduct, Inflammatory evidence, Self-
defense.  Self-Defense.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, 
Criminal, Discovery, Disclosure of evidence, Cross-
examination by prosecutor, Jury and jurors, Instructions to 
jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 16, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Eva G. Jellison (Melissa Ramos also present) for the 
defendant. 
Johanna S. Black, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Leon 
Smith, Joshua M. Daniels, & Katharine Naples-Mitchell, for 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice & others, amici curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The defendant, Anildo Lopes Correia, was 
charged with murder in the first degree in connection with the 
stabbing death of Ywron Martins.  After a jury trial, the 
defendant was convicted of the lesser charge of voluntary 
manslaughter, and was sentenced to from ten to twelve years in 
State prison on June 17, 2019.  We granted the defendant's 
application for direct appellate review, and for the reasons 
discussed infra, we affirm.1 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found 
at trial, reserving certain details for later discussion.  On 
the late afternoon of April 22, 2015, in a Brockton park 
multiple fights broke out amongst a large group of individuals 
between fourteen and twenty years of age.  The defendant, who 
went to the park to look for his cousin, began fist fighting 
with the victim soon after he arrived.  Although there was 
conflicting testimony regarding how the fight began, at some 
point the defendant gained the upper hand, landing a punch that 
caused the victim to stumble backward.  The defendant then 
lifted the victim's shirt, pulled out a knife, and began 
thrusting it into the victim's body.  The defendant continued to 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Citizens for 
Juvenile Justice, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, New 
England Innocence Project, Charis E. Kubrin, and Jack Lerner. 
3 
 
attack the victim with the knife after police had arrived, 
announced their presence, and engaged their sirens. 
At trial, the defendant testified that the victim and he 
once were friendly and remained "friends" on social media 
platforms until the day of the fight.  The defendant admitted 
that he stabbed the victim but that he did so believing that the 
victim was reaching for a gun. 
The defendant further testified that after he punched the 
victim, causing him to stumble back, the defendant laughed and 
asked the victim if "that's all he ha[d], that's all he got."  
The victim then looked at the defendant and said, "[N---a], do 
you know how the hot shit feel?"  The defendant understood the 
question to be a lyric from a rap song known to him at the time, 
meaning "[do] you know how to burn from the bullets?"  According 
to the defendant, the victim then took off his backpack and 
reached inside.  The combination of the victim's words and 
reaching into his backpack caused the defendant to believe that 
the victim was about to pull out a gun to shoot him.  Fearing 
this, the defendant testified that he lunged at and stabbed the 
victim with a pocketknife.  He continued to do so in an attempt 
to get the victim to drop the bag.  When the defendant heard 
police announce themselves, he began to run, but as he did so, 
the victim grabbed his shirt, so he continued punching the 
victim "trying to get out of there."  The defendant eventually 
4 
 
ran from the park, in the process dropping the jacket that 
contained the knife he had used in the fight. 
The victim was not breathing and had no pulse when 
emergency personnel arrived.  He was pronounced dead at a 
hospital.  An autopsy revealed that the victim had twelve wounds 
created by a sharp instrument, two of which were fatal:  one 
that penetrated the victim's heart, and another that struck the 
victim's liver.  Police located the defendant four days later in 
Fall River. 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant argues that a number 
of errors entitle him to a new trial:  (1) rap lyrics written by 
the defendant erroneously were admitted both because the 
Commonwealth violated its discovery obligations and because they 
were unduly prejudicial; (2) the Commonwealth improperly 
commented on the defendant's prearrest silence, suggesting that 
it indicated his culpability; (3) one of the deliberating jurors 
was not fair and impartial; and (4) the instructions provided to 
the jury misstated the law on self-defense.  The defendant also 
argues that the cumulative effect of the errors requires 
reversal. 
1.  Defendant's rap lyrics.  As part of his self-defense 
strategy, the defendant testified about and offered in evidence 
posts he had seen on the victim's Facebook social media account.  
The posts included images of the victim seated with a pistol, 
5 
 
the victim covering his face with a rifle behind him, the victim 
seated in a car with a knife in his hand, and the victim seated 
in front of a motorcycle with a pistol across his lap.  The 
defendant testified that he saw this last photograph on the day 
of the fight, along with another image of the victim posted with 
the caption:  "Don't Let a Sneak Dissin to a Murder," which the 
defendant said he understood to mean, "Don't get killed over 
talking behind somebody's back."  The defendant testified that 
the posts, together with the victim's statement during the 
fight, prompted his belief that the victim possessed, and was 
prepared to use, a gun. 
During cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked the 
defendant about his own social media posts, including four rap 
songs the defendant wrote and posted to his "channel" on the 
video sharing Web site YouTube.  The Commonwealth questioned the 
defendant on select lyrics from these songs that included 
"[l]iving this [l]ife of [c]rime," "being at war with the 
north," "[e]nemies [t]urn[ing] to [m]emories," and "I love my 
Glock, pop, now you're dead."  The Commonwealth also asked about 
another song, the cover image of which depicted an unidentified 
person in a T-shirt with an AK-47.  Trial counsel objected to 
the prosecution's references to the defendant's lyrics and cover 
image as prior bad acts of which the Commonwealth had not given 
notice.  That objection was overruled.  The following day 
6 
 
counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the defendant never 
received notice of the Commonwealth's intention to use them and 
that, had notice been given, counsel would have made different 
decisions, including advising the defendant not to testify.2  The 
motion was denied. 
a.  Rule 14 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  The Commonwealth is required to "disclose to the 
defense . . . [a]ny written or recorded statements, and the 
substance of any oral statements, made by the defendant" 
"provided [they are] relevant to the case and [are] in the 
possession, custody or control of the prosecutor."  Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (i), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005).  
The Commonwealth contends that, because the defendant's rap 
lyrics were publicly available online, the prosecution never 
possessed, controlled, or had custody of them within the meaning 
of Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004) 
(rule 14).  We take a broader view of what it means for 
 
2 According to the Commonwealth, it discharged its discovery 
obligations when it turned over a police report, which stated 
that a witness told police "she knows [the defendant] to have 
rap music on YouTube under the name AC$TACK$."  This argument 
hinges on the Commonwealth's assertion that because it did not 
have possession, custody, or control of the defendant's lyrics, 
it only was required to "notify the defendant of the existence" 
of his lyrics.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (E), as appearing 
in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004). 
7 
 
something to be "in the possession, custody or control of the 
prosecutor" than does the Commonwealth. 
The operative terms at issue, "possession," "custody," and 
"control," are not defined in rule 14.  Moreover, their ordinary 
meanings may be broad or narrow depending on the context of 
their use.  For example, "possession" may be "actual" or 
"constructive," "exclusive" or "joint."  Black's Law Dictionary 
1408-1409 (11th ed. 2019).3  Similarly, "control" can be the 
"direct or indirect power to govern the management and policies 
of a person or entity" or, more generally, "the power or 
authority to manage, direct, or oversee."  Id. at 416. 
In considering the phrase "possession, custody or control," 
we note that our discovery rules "were created to permit defense 
counsel to learn, through discovery of the government's 
evidence, what the defendant faces in standing trial, and to 
assist in preventing trial by ambush."  Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
491 Mass. 1, 8 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Eneh, 76 Mass. 
 
3 Black's Law Dictionary 1408 (11th ed. 2019) defines 
"possession" as: 
 
"1.  The fact of having or holding property in one's power; 
the exercise of dominion over property.  2.  The right 
under which one may exercise control over something to the 
exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim 
to the exclusive use of a material object.  3.  Civil law.  
The detention or use of a physical thing with the intent to 
hold it as one's own. . . .  4.  (usu. pl.) Something that 
a person owns or controls. . . .  5.  A territorial 
dominion of a state or country." 
8 
 
App. Ct. 672, 677 (2010).  See Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 
434, 439 (2010) ("The purpose of mandatory discovery is to 
encourage full pretrial discovery, increase what will be 
discovered by both sides, and promote judicial efficiency" 
[citation omitted]).  Given the purpose of the rule, it is 
appropriate to take a comprehensive view of the phrase.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Hanright, 465 Mass. 639, 641-643 (2013) 
("examination" interpreted broadly under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 
[b] [2] [B]).4 
The Commonwealth argues that because the statements at 
issue here were on a third-pary website, it did not control 
them.  However, "[o]nce a third-party record is obtained by the 
Commonwealth . . . it becomes part of the prosecutor's case 
file, triggering discovery obligations."  Commonwealth v. 
Kostka, 489 Mass. 399, 412 (2022).  Although the record is 
silent as to the form the lyrics took,5 the prosecutor obviously 
had access to the statements because she quoted from them during 
her cross-examination of the defendant.  She also showed the 
defendant a photograph of the image that was displayed alongside 
 
4 We have done the same in the civil context.  For example, 
we have interpreted the term "control" broadly under the 
analogous civil discovery rule.  See Strom v. American Honda 
Motor Co., 423 Mass. 330, 341 (1996). 
 
5 At trial, the prosecutor indicated that she never 
downloaded the lyrics; however, during the cross-examination of 
the defendant she nevertheless quoted them verbatim. 
9 
 
one of his rap songs, mentioned supra.  In these circumstances, 
we consider the lyrics to have been in the prosecutor's files, 
in electronic form or otherwise; thus, the Commonwealth was 
obligated to disclose them under rule 14.6 
Nevertheless, we further conclude that the judge did not 
err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on 
the Commonwealth's discovery violation.  "When the issue of the 
timeliness of disclosure is presented, we inquire whether 'the 
defendant is able to make effective use of the evidence in 
preparing and presenting the case.'"  Commonwealth v. Felder, 
455 Mass. 359, 367 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 
Mass. 194, 200 (1985).  Where, as here, the defendant does not 
allege bad faith on the part of the prosecutor, we consider 
whether the discovery violation prejudiced the defendant.  
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 224 (2007).  "In measuring 
prejudice, it is the consequences of the delay that matter, not 
the likely impact of the nondisclosed evidence, and we ask 
 
6 The Commonwealth's additional arguments against disclosure 
similarly are unavailing.  The claim that by requiring such 
disclosure, the prosecution would be "required to track down and 
copy items of social media not already in its possession" is 
obviously incorrect based on the plain language of the rule.  
See Commonwealth v. Torres, 479 Mass. 641, 648 (2018) (if "[t]he 
district attorney does not have access to the [third-party's] 
files[,] . . . the practical indicia of the prosecutor's 
'possession, custody, or control' are absent").  Moreover, 
disclosure of the defendant's statements alone cannot be 
considered protected work product, nor does such disclosure 
implicate the "best evidence" rule. 
10 
 
whether the prosecution's disclosure was sufficiently timely to 
allow the defendant to make effective use of the evidence in 
preparing and presenting his case" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 20 
(2011). 
Once the motion for a mistrial was denied, on redirect 
examination trial counsel elicited testimony from the defendant 
that he had been writing rap lyrics since junior high school, 
they were a form of art, and they were based on observations he 
has made but were not about him personally.  In doing so, the 
defendant effectively mitigated the negative effect of the 
Commonwealth's late disclosure.7  See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 
385 Mass. 165, 176 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 
137, 151 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 973 (1981).  Moreover, 
the defendant obviously already was familiar with his own 
lyrics, making the timing of their disclosure unlikely to affect 
his ability to respond.  See Frith, 458 Mass. at 443, citing 
Commonwealth v. Schand, 420 Mass. 783, 789-790 (1995).  Finally, 
 
7 We note that trial counsel did not request additional time 
either to investigate or to prepare for redirect examination 
after the defendant's rap lyrics were raised by the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Emerson, 430 Mass. 378, 382 
(1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1030 (2000); Commonwealth v. 
Gilbert, 377 Mass. 887, 895-896 (1979).  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Vaughn, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 441-443 (1992) (abuse of 
discretion in denial of mistrial where defendant demonstrated 
that more time was needed to develop defense fully after late 
disclosure of evidence). 
11 
 
the defendant's claim that he might have decided not to testify 
had he known that the Commonwealth was going to cross-examine 
him with his rap lyrics is belied by his acknowledgement that 
his testimony -- the only evidence at trial supporting his 
theory of self-defense -- "was the single most important 
evidence" in his case.8  We conclude, therefore, that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the Commonwealth's delayed 
disclosure.  See Cundriff, supra at 150 ("There is no showing 
that the defendant was significantly prejudiced at trial by the 
late disclosure of the statement or how a new trial would 
substantially cure any error"). 
b.  Admissibility of the lyrics.  As noted, when the 
prosecution questioned the defendant about several rap songs he 
had posted online, trial counsel objected.  The following day, 
counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the lyrics were 
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.  On appeal, the defendant 
renews this claim, arguing that his rap lyrics were inadmissible 
because they were not relevant to the case or, alternatively, if 
they were relevant, any possible probative value of the evidence 
was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
 
8 The defendant also argues that had the prosecutor 
disclosed that he planned to use the defendant's lyrics, the 
defendant might have argued more effectively to exclude them.  
Because, as discussed in further detail infra, we conclude that 
the admission of the lyrics was not unduly prejudicial, this 
argument fails as well. 
12 
 
As discussed in more detail infra, we conclude that the 
defendant's rap lyrics were relevant for the purpose of 
rebutting the defendant's theory of self-defense.  However, they 
should have been analyzed as prior bad act evidence potentially 
admissible for a nonpropensity purpose.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2) (2023); Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 
n.27 (2014).  See also Mass. G. Evid § 403 note.  To the extent 
that any of the lyrics were found to be admissible, they should 
have been considered by the jury for the narrow purpose of 
determining whether the defendant truly believed the victim was 
carrying a firearm.  Although the foregoing is not the way the 
trial unfolded, we nonetheless conclude that the defendant was 
not prejudiced by the admission of his lyrics. 
i.  Relevance.  In denying the defendant's request for a 
mistrial, the judge ruled that the defendant's rap lyrics were 
relevant to rebut the defendant's theory of self-defense.  The 
defendant argued that it was reasonable for him to assume that 
the victim had a gun at the park because the defendant had seen 
the victim's social media posts that depicted the victim with a 
gun.  In response, the Commonwealth offered the defendant's own 
posts, consisting of rap lyrics posted to YouTube, that also 
contained references to guns, to shed light on the sincerity of 
the defendant's concern that the victim possessed a gun.  The 
judge agreed that the lyrics were admissible in this limited 
13 
 
context.  See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 654 
(2005). 
The defendant argues on appeal that the judge erred in 
finding the lyrics to be relevant because it was only in the 
context of their fight and the victim's threat that the 
defendant found the posts threatening, not the victim's posts in 
and of themselves.9  In other words, because he did not "react[] 
solely to violence-themed posts on social media," the defendant 
maintains that his own posts were irrelevant.  We do not agree. 
We review a judge's determination of relevance for an abuse 
of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 
(2020).  The threshold for determining whether evidence is 
relevant is a low one.  Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. 775, 
782 (2017).  The evidence "need not establish directly the 
proposition sought; it must only provide a link in the chain of 
proof."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 750 
(2001).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 401.  The defendant maintained 
that he was convinced the victim had a gun in part because he 
saw the victim's posts featuring guns.  However, the defendant 
himself also posted (lyrics) about guns and testified that they 
 
9 The defendant's theory was that it was reasonable for him 
to believe that the victim was likely to use a gun based on the 
victim's statement, just prior to the physical altercation, in 
one of the victim's posts referencing what it feels like to get 
shot. 
14 
 
were not meant to be taken literally.  Thus, the defendant's own 
posts were probative of whether the victim's posts gave rise to 
an actual and reasonable fear that the victim had a gun.  The 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the 
defendant's own rap lyrics were relevant.10  See Commonwealth v. 
Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 627 (2021). 
ii.  "Bad act" evidence.  Generally, relevant evidence is 
subject to exclusion "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of," among other things, "unfair 
prejudice."  Mass. G. Evid. § 403.11   However, when the relevant 
evidence in question is so-called "bad act" evidence, the test 
 
10 On appeal, the Commonwealth appears to argue for the 
first time that the defendant's lyrics were admissible because 
they were "likely literal."  However, there was no suggestion at 
trial that the defendant's lyrics had anything to do with the 
victim or that any of the acts mentioned in the lyrics had taken 
place (nor were they admitted on that basis).  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 243 (2017) (admitting evidence of 
defendant's computer username based on "fictional criminal 
mastermind" for "limited purpose," i.e., not to show that 
defendant was, in fact, criminal mastermind).  Of course, 
"[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to 
prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character."  
Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1).  See Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 
Mass. 655, 665 (2012), quoting Commmonwealth v. Helfant, 398 
Mass. 214, 224-225 (1986). 
 
11 Rule 403 of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence states, 
"The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following:  unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence." 
15 
 
for admissibility is more rigorous.  As an initial matter, 
although such evidence is not admissible to demonstrate the 
defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the crimes 
charged, see Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1), it may be admissible 
for other purposes, including, as relevant here, the defendant's 
state of mind.  See Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 26 
(2016); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2).  However, even if offered 
for a permissible purpose, bad act evidence nevertheless is 
inadmissible where "its probative value is outweighed by the 
risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, even if not 
substantially outweighed by that risk."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2).  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249 n.27. 
The defendant argues that the lyrics should have been 
analyzed under the bad act evidence standard for admissibility.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2).  The judge rejected this view on 
the basis that a song does not "qualif[y] as a bad act."  This 
is not necessarily so. 
"The nature of so-called prior bad act . . . evidence . . . 
is that it reflects badly on the character of the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 481 (2017).  "[O]ur 
focus is on whether the . . . evidence 'creates a risk that the 
jury will use the evidence impermissibly to infer that the 
defendant has a bad character or a propensity to commit the 
crime charged."  Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 308 
16 
 
(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 
(2014).  To this end, bad acts are not limited to unlawful acts.  
Id. at 307.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lowery, 487 Mass. 851, 
866 (2021) (analyzing "text messages contain[ing] vulgar sexual 
references" as bad act evidence); Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 
Mass. 847, 866, 870 (2021) (analyzing membership in Aryan 
Brotherhood, drawings of human dissections, and photographs of 
weapons as bad act evidence). 
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey aptly put it: 
 
To be sure, writing rap lyrics -- even disturbingly graphic 
lyrics . . . -- is not a crime.  Nor is it a bad act or a 
wrong to engage in the act of writing about unpalatable 
subjects, including inflammatory subjects such as depicting 
events or lifestyles that may be condemned as anti-social, 
mean-spirited, or amoral.  However, the very purpose of 
Rule 404(b) is simply to keep from the jury evidence that 
the defendant is prone to commit crimes or is otherwise a 
bad person, implying that the jury needn't worry overmuch 
about the strength of the government's evidence" 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
 
State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 517 (2014).  In short, "[r]ule 
404(b) serves as a safeguard against propensity evidence that 
may poison the jury against a defendant."  Id. 
Although rap lyrics do not qualify as bad act evidence,12 
here, the defendant's lyrics conveyed ideas or acts that 
 
12 We have considered rap lyrics to be bad act evidence on 
at least one other occasion.  See Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 
Mass. 731, 743-744, 752-753 (2012) (music appearing to 
demonstrate evidence of gang membership treated as bad act 
evidence). 
17 
 
themselves could be considered bad acts and therefore could 
reflect poorly on his character.  Some of the lyrics at issue 
here arguably describe committing crimes, including:  "[l]iving 
this [l]ife of [c]rime"; "being at war with the north"; 
"[f]riends [t]urn to [e]nemies, [e]nemies [t]urn to [m]emories"; 
and "I love my Glock, pop, now you're dead."  Other lyrics were 
less explicit, but equally likely to "paint the defendant as a 
violent person of bad character," Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 
Mass. 273, 296 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 
788, 793 (1994), including:  "the [p]olice [c]an't [s]top [u]s"; 
and "I keep my weapons everywhere in the field."  Because the 
defendant was on trial for murder, the rap lyrics he wrote 
referencing violence, possible gang affiliation, and killing 
enemies with guns should have been analyzed as bad act evidence 
under Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) to determine admissibility. 
Indeed, each of the lyrics sought to be admitted should 
have been scrutinized separately to weigh prejudicial impact 
against probative value.  See Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 
378, 393-394 (2020).  If the probative value of a particular 
lyric was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice (even if 
not substantially so), the lyric should have been excluded from 
evidence.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2). 
There is unique potential for prejudice when using "the 
inflammatory contents of a person's form of artistic self-
18 
 
expression" "without a strong connection to the" facts of a 
given case.  Skinner, 218 N.J. at 524-525.13  That is true 
especially when such thematic art is used as evidence in a 
criminal trial where violence is alleged, but where there is no 
factual link between the art and the alleged conduct.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 Mass. 731, 754 & n.23 (2012). 
This risk is exacerbated by realities that we cannot 
ignore, namely, that rap historically has been used, by Black 
Americans especially, to give voice to observations of violence, 
poverty, and crime -- frequently irrespective of the rapper's 
own involvement -- as "a form of political expression."  Gray, 
463 Mass. at 755 n.24, citing Dennis, Poetic (In)justice?  Rap 
Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and Criminal Evidence, 31 Colum. J.L. 
& Arts 1 (2007).  See Dennis, supra at 20-21.  Moreover, in the 
context of criminal prosecution, it is difficult to separate the 
fact that Black Americans and other people of color 
disproportionately are overrepresented in the criminal legal 
 
13 See United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 493 (11th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011) (lyrics that 
"contained violence" and "could reasonably be understood as 
promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle" were "heavily 
prejudicial"); State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 550 (2001), 
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 933 (2002) ("general references 
glorifying violence" were "far outweighed by . . . unfair 
prejudicial impact as evidence of appellant's bad character, 
i.e., his propensity for violence in general"). 
19 
 
system14 at the same time that rap music and its practitioners 
more likely are to be viewed negatively and as inherently 
violent or dangerous.15 
Courts in some jurisdictions have suggested that to be 
admitted in evidence, rap lyrics must have "a strong nexus" to 
the issues to be decided in the case.  See Montague v. State, 
471 Md. 657, 679 (2020) (both "nexus to the details" of alleged 
crime and "temporal nexus" are necessary); Skinner, 218 N.J. at 
500 (artistic "self-expression" must have "a strong nexus 
between the specific details of the artistic composition and the 
circumstances of the underlying offense" to be admissible).  
This "nexus" can be direct -- where rap music or lyrics recount 
key details of the events in a case -- or indirect -- where a 
defendant expresses through music evidence of knowledge, a 
motive, or another relevant fact in dispute, even though the 
music is not a literal account of events that took place.16  We 
 
14 See generally E.T. Bishop, B. Hopkins, C. Obiofuma, & F. 
Owusu, Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law School, 
Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System (Sept. 
2020); Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741, 757-758 
(2021) (Wendlandt, J., concurring), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 135 
(2022); id. at 770 & n.9 (Budd, C.J., dissenting); Commonwealth 
v. Long, 485 Mass. 711, 716-717 (2020), and cases cited. 
 
15 See generally Dunbar, Kubrin, & Scurich, The Threatening 
Nature of "Rap" Music, 22 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 280, 288-
290 (2016). 
 
16 See United States v. Moore, 639 F.3d 443, 447-448 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (admitting rap lyrics as evidence of knowledge of 
20 
 
adopt this individualized approach to determining the 
admissibility of rap lyrics. 
Once bad act evidence is determined to be admissible, 
however, it is important for the jury to understand how it may 
be used in determining the facts of the case by way of limiting 
instructions.17  See McGee, 467 Mass. at 158 ("Often a limiting 
instruction is required as to the proper use of such evidence to 
ensure that its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair 
prejudice").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 480-481 
(2014) (bad act evidence "served a limited and probative purpose 
of illustrating the defendant's angry state of mind" and "the 
jury were instructed on numerous occasions regarding the limited 
purpose"). 
Here, because the judge did not consider the lyrics to be 
bad act evidence, the statements were not analyzed under 
§ 404(b)(2).  Some of the lyrics that the jury heard, including 
 
drug "prices" and "code words"); United States v. Foster, 939 
F.2d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 1991) (rap containing "drug code words" 
admissible to show knowledge of drug trade, not to show that 
defendant "was the character portrayed in the lyrics"). 
 
17 Although there generally is "no requirement that the 
judge give limiting instructions sua sponte," Commonwealth v. 
Cruzado, 480 Mass. 275, 279 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sullivan, 436 Mass. 799, 809 (2002), we have said that where 
"the risk of unfair prejudice is apparent . . . contemporaneous 
limiting instructions are much to be preferred," even "if a 
defendant does not request them" (citations omitted).  Peno, 485 
Mass. at 395-396. 
21 
 
those hightlighting living a life of crime, neighborhood wars, 
and disliking the police, hardly were probative of the 
defendant's self-defense claim.  Given their inflammatory 
themes, these lyrics could serve only to create an impression 
that the defendant was of poor character.  See Santos, 463 Mass. 
at 296, citing Barrett, 418 Mass. at 793. 
Other lyrics penned by the defendant, including "I love my 
Glock, pop, now you're dead," properly may have been admitted to 
help the jury determine whether the defendant actually believed 
that the victim had a gun in his backpack.  However, without 
limiting instructions, the risk was too great that the jury may 
have considered it (improperly) as propensity evidence as well.  
See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249, citing Commonwealth v. Anestal, 
463 Mass. 655, 665 (2012).  See also Peno, 485 Mass. at 398.  In 
the absence of an instruction as to how the jury could consider 
the lyrics, their probative value was outweighed by their 
prejudicial effect.  See Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 
407 (2017). 
iii.  Prejudice.  As the defendant timely objected to the 
introduction of the rap lyrics, we review the ruling for 
prejudice.  Anestal, 463 Mass. at 672.  "An error is 
nonprejudicial only if we are convinced that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" (quotations 
and citations omitted).  Peno, 485 Mass. at 399-400.  A number 
22 
 
of factors may be taken into consideration in making this 
determination, including, but not limited to, the frequency of 
the improper references; whether the error was central to the 
trial; the strength of the Commonwealth's case; whether limiting 
instructions mitigated the error; and whether the jury were able 
to sort between the permissible and impermissible evidence such 
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the error.  See 
Anestal, supra at 672-673; Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 
491, 500-501 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998), and cases cited. 
Here, we conclude that the error did not prejudice the 
defendant.  Although the prosecutor questioned the defendant 
extensively on his lyrics during cross-examination, she did not 
mention them in her opening statement or closing argument.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 649 (2017), citing 
Commonwealth v. LeBeau, 451 Mass. 244, 261 (2008).  Unlike in 
other cases, the lyrics did not pervade the trial.  See, e.g., 
Anestal, 463 Mass. at 672-673 (reversal where bad acts were 
"repeatedly introduced, through three separate witnesses, in 
significant detail"). 
Further, the defendant's self-defense claim only partially 
hinged on his perception of the victim's posts.  Indeed, he 
still was able to testify in full to his basis for fearing the 
victim; that is, his defense was still viable after his own rap 
23 
 
lyrics were admitted.18  Contrast Commonwealth v. Santos, 460 
Mass. 128, 129, 136-138 (2011) (prejudicial error where judge 
erroneously excluded most compelling evidence of self-defense).  
Moreover, on redirect, the defendant's testimony may have 
blunted the prejudicial effect of the lyrics when he explained 
that his lyrics and music were a "form of art" and his way "to 
express the community around me" and "not me, personally."  See 
Commonwealth v. Mason, 485 Mass. 520, 535 (2020) (risk of 
prejudice effectively mitigated on cross-examination). 
In addition, the Commonwealth's case was strong.  See 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 Mass. 168, 174 (2000) (although 
witness's testimony regarding defendant's inculpatory statements 
and behavior "was important to the Commonwealth's case, it was 
not indispensable").  There was no question that the defendant 
killed the victim; instead, the prosecution needed only to prove 
that he did so without justification.  Although the defendant 
claimed to have acted in self-defense, his version of the fight 
was inconsistent with the accounts provided by other 
eyewitnesses who testified.  For example, the defendant 
testified that when police arrived, he started to run away and 
the victim grabed him.  However, one of the responding officers 
 
18 As discussed infra, the jury were persuaded, at least in 
part, by the defendant's testimony that he acted in self-
defense. 
24 
 
testified that when the police arrived, the sirens had no effect 
on the defendant, who had the victim "bent over, [with his] 
shirt[] completely over his head, so that he can't see or move, 
and [the defendant] was . . . giving him uppercuts to the body."  
Another witness stated that when the victim was "dazed," the 
defendant pulled the victim's shirt over his head and stabbed 
his chest, throat, and arm.  The medical examiner testified that 
the victim was stabbed twelve times.  The defendant, on the 
other hand, sustained only a cut on his thumb as a result of the 
attack. 
Additionally, although the judge did not give limiting 
instructions when the lyrics were admitted, prior to 
deliberations he instructed the jury to "act without bias or 
prejudice" and cautioned twice that they were not to be swayed 
by emotions or sympathy for either side. 
Finally, the jury's nuanced verdict suggests that they did 
not consider the defendant's rap lyrics as evidence of his 
character or propensity to commit crime.  That is, the jury did 
not adopt the Commonwealth's theory of the case and instead 
apparently credited much of the defendant's testimony, including 
that he acted in self-defense (but that he used excessive force 
in doing so).  See Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 35 (2016) 
(in acquitting on two charges and returning lesser verdict on 
another "the jury did not blindly accept the prosecutor's 
25 
 
arguments").  Given all of the above, we conclude that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the references to his rap 
lyrics. 
 
2.  References to the defendant's prearrest silence.  At 
trial, the prosecutor made a number of references to the fact 
that the defendant failed to inform police that he had stabbed 
the victim in self-defense.  The defendant now contends that 
these references amounted to reversible error.  As discussed 
infra, a defendant's prearrest silence is admissible in very 
limited circumstances; substantive evidence of consciousness of 
guilt is not one of them.  Commonwealth v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 
418, 433 (2020). 
As we have observed on more than one occasion, "there may 
be many reasons why a defendant does not wish to come forward 
and speak to the police that have no bearing on his [or her] 
guilt or innocence."  Commonwealth v. Gardner, 479 Mass. 764, 
769 (2018).  In the event that a defendant takes the stand, 
however, prearrest silence may be used to impeach his or her 
credibility.  See Pierre, 486 Mass. at 433; Gardner, supra at 
768-769.  That is, the Commonwealth may raise the defendant's 
prearrest silence to show that, if the circumstances were as the 
defendant described them to be, it would be "natural" for the 
defendant to have said something at or near the time of the 
26 
 
event.19  Gardner, supra at 769-770, citing Commonwealth v. 
Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 62 (1982). 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 523, 
534 (1994), where the defendant claimed to have witnessed his 
friend get shot, we concluded that the Commonwealth was 
permitted to question the defendant as to why he did not attempt 
to contact authorities to get help for his friend.  In that 
case, "there was . . . immediate danger to another that could 
have created an incentive to contact the police to get help."  
Pierre, 486 Mass. at 434, citing Barnoski, supra at 534. 
Here, the prosecutor asked a series of questions about the 
defendant's failure to contact police regarding the fight.  In 
particular, the prosecutor asked the defendant why, if he had 
acted in self-defense, he had not (1) called police as he fled 
the park, (2) reported to police that a gun was at the park, (3) 
called police as he fled to a friend's house and later to Fall 
River, or (4) answered the door when police arrived at his 
location four days later.  The prosecutor also called to the 
stand four officers who had responded to the scene and asked 
 
19 As a general matter, evidence of prearrest silence is of 
limited probative value as it pertains to a defendant's 
credibility.  See Gardner, 479 Mass. at 769.  Moreover, because 
jurors may "construe [prearrest] silence as an admission and, as 
a consequence, may draw an unwarranted inference of guilt," the 
admission of such evidence can be highly prejudicial.  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 61 n.6 (1982). 
27 
 
whether the defendant sought to speak with any of them.20  The 
Commonwealth argues that the questions appropriately countered 
the defendant's claims that he went to the park because he 
believed his cousin was in danger, and that he stabbed the 
victim because he believed the victim had a gun in his backpack.  
We are not convinced. 
The defendant had no obvious incentive to speak to police 
at the time of the incident or thereafter, as there was no 
immediate danger to his cousin or others and doing so "would 
have implicated him in the victim's death."  Gardner, 479 Mass. 
at 772.  Thus, referencing the defendant's prearrest silence was 
error. 
Because trial counsel did not object to the questions asked 
of the defendant on cross-examination, we review the error there 
to determine whether there is a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice, i.e., "a serious doubt whether the 
result of the trial might have been different had the error not 
been made."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 610 (2018), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 474 Mass. 1012, 1016 (2016).  
Trial counsel did object to a question put to one of the 
 
20 Although the defendant claims that the prosecutor also 
referenced the defendant's prearrest silence in her closing 
argument, the comment of which he complains referred to his 
flight from the area, not his silence, and was based on a 
statement he made on direct examination. 
28 
 
responding officers.  The objection was overruled.  We therefore 
review that question for prejudicial error; that is, whether the 
error "did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect."  Peno, 485 Mass. at 399, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163 (1998).  See Commonwealth v. 
Griffith, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 785 n.2 (1998).  Under either 
standard, we ask whether the references to the defendant's 
prearrest silence improperly led the jury to ascribe 
"consciousness of guilt" to the defendant.  Pierre, 486 Mass. at 
433.  See Gardner, 479 Mass. at 769, quoting Nickerson, 386 
Mass. at 61 n.6 (jurors "may draw an unwarranted inference of 
guilt"). 
Where there is other, properly admitted evidence of 
consciousness of guilt, e.g., flight, or where the improper 
references to prearrest silence are duplicative of proper 
evidence, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is 
unlikely.  See Pierre, 486 Mass. at 434-435 (because of other 
evidence of flight, no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of 
justice); Gardner, 479 Mass. at 775, citing Commonwealth v. 
Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 217 (2014) (because of "his flight, 
[and] efforts to hide," no substantial likelihood of miscarriage 
of justice in references to defendant's prearrest silence); 
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 673 (2015), S.C., 483 
Mass. 571 (2019) (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of 
29 
 
justice where improper questions about absence of self-defense 
explanation in prearrest statements "added little, if anything" 
to other, properly admitted statements). 
Here, during direct examination the defendant testified 
that he left the area for Fall River for several days and, when 
police arrived at his location, he hid in a bathroom.  In 
addition, trial counsel asked the defendant twice why he did not 
contact police.  Thus, the questions the prosecutor subsequently 
asked the defendant on cross-examination regarding his prearrest 
silence, although improper, elicited testimony that was somewhat 
duplicative of that which the defendant had provided on direct. 
Finally, the fact that the defendant was convicted of 
manslaughter, rather than murder in the first degree, was an 
indication that the jury accepted that the defendant's testimony 
that he, in fact, did act in self-defense.  There was no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice as a result of the 
prosecution's references to, or unobjected-to questions about, 
the defendant's prearrest silence.  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Irwin, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 643, 654-655 (2008) (substantial risk 
of miscarriage of justice where "there was no corroborating 
evidence or eyewitness testimony," Commonwealth focused on 
prearrest silence in closing, and defense had not offered 
similar evidence).  Nor did the one question to which trial 
counsel did object, regarding the defendant's prearrest silence, 
30 
 
amount to prejudicial error on its own.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 631-632 (2007) (no prejudice 
where "the jury's attention had been drawn to the defendant's . 
. . prearrest behavior by the defense" and where "[t]he 
reference to the issue was brief" and "evidence of guilt . . . 
was strong"); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 
330-331 (2001). 
3.  Juror issue.  The defendant contends that a juror made 
comments indicating that she was no longer impartial and that 
the judge abused his discretion by allowing her to remain on the 
jury.  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 168 (2019), and 
cases cited.  This argument is unavailing. 
 
On the seventh day of trial, a court officer informed the 
judge that a juror had reported that individuals in the court 
room gallery were "staring" in "what may have been an 
intimidating manner," and that after court proceedings, a court 
spectator who had been sitting across from the jury box "pulled 
up alongside [another juror's] vehicle," "made eye contact with 
[her], pointed at [her], and then drove off."21  As a result of 
these reports, the judge conducted an individual voir dire of 
each juror to determine whether they had experienced, heard 
about, or been affected by any of these events. 
 
21 The court room in which the trial was held had some 
gallery seating directly across from and facing the jury box. 
31 
 
During questioning, thirteen of the sixteen jurors reported 
members of the audience "staring" or "looking intently" at 
jurors during the trial.  Most did not personally observe this 
behavior, but stated they learned of it through other jurors.  
The judge asked each juror whether he or she could continue to 
serve as a juror in a fair and impartial manner.  Based on their 
answers, the judge found fourteen of the sixteen jurors to be 
"indifferent" with no objection from either party.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 447 (2019).  One juror, 
who indicated that she could remain impartial despite the 
incidents, nevertheless was excused "out of an abundance of 
caution" because she expressed safety concerns. 
Juror no. 16, who reported observing more than one 
spectator "looking intently" at herself and at other members of 
the jury, indicated that she could remain fair and impartial, 
and denied fearing for her safety.  As a result of concerns that 
trial counsel expressed about the juror believing that the 
staring spectators were affiliated with the defendant, the judge 
asked the juror additional questions to probe her impartiality: 
The judge:  "[D]o you think consciously or subconsciously 
the fact that somebody is sitting across from the jury box 
and staring at the jury who may be affiliated with the 
defendant would again affect in any way, creep into any of 
your thinking as to whether this defendant is guilty of the 
crimes in which he is charged?" 
 
32 
 
The juror:  "I am waiting until I have all the evidence put 
in front of me, basically.  I'm not going to worry about, I 
can't worry about that." 
 
The judge:  "You can't worry about that meaning you can't 
worry about someone in the spectators' gallery." 
 
The juror:  "I am assuming that anything, if anything ever 
did happen people here would be taking care of it, because 
I would be telling you.  I would say I feel uncomfortable." 
 
The judge:  "And do you feel uncomfortable?" 
 
The juror:  "I'm fine." 
 
The judge:  "You're fine?" 
 
The juror:  "Yeah." 
 
The judge:  "So it doesn't cause you any discomfort?" 
 
The juror:  "Not at the moment.  I will tell you if it 
does." 
 
. . . 
 
The judge:  "Again, you're comfortable that you can and 
will be fair and impartial --" 
 
The juror:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "-- irrespective of the fact that you think 
maybe somebody --" 
 
The juror:  "I don't think he's going to be out there.  I 
don't know if he's trying to intimidate me but I'm not 
going to be intimidated." 
 
The judge:  "I'm going to ask you to step back for a 
moment." 
 
The juror:  "All right." 
Although trial counsel expressed no concerns along these 
lines at trial, the defendant now claims that the judge abused 
33 
 
his discretion in refusing to remove juror no. 16 because the 
juror expressed antagonism and bias toward the defendant during 
the voir dire.  More specifically, the defendant contends that 
the juror was referring to the defendant when she said:  "I 
don't think he's going to be out there.  I don't know if he's 
trying to intimidate me but I'm not going to be intimidated."  
The defendant contends that the statement showed that the juror 
felt safe because the defendant would be found guilty and 
therefore would be incarcerated. 
This argument is based on an obvious misreading of the 
transcript.  It is clear from the context of the exchange that 
when the juror said "he," she was referring not to the defendant 
but instead to the spectator in the courtroom gallery who had 
been was staring at her and other jurors. 
After questioning the juror extensively, the judge 
determined that the juror would follow his instructions not to 
draw any inferences with regard to any of the spectators, and 
that she would base her verdict solely on the evidence presented 
at trial.  See Philbrook, 475 Mass. at 31, citing Commonwealth 
v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 254 (2001), S.C., 449 Mass. 1018 
(2007).  There was no abuse of discretion.  See Colon, 482 Mass. 
at 168, citing Philbrook, supra at 31 ("Where a judge conducts 
individual voir dire of each juror, excuses all influenced 
jurors, and determines that the remaining jurors are impartial, 
34 
 
a defendant's right to an impartial jury has not been 
violated"). 
4.  Jury instructions on excessive force in self-defense. 
Reciting the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 80-82 (2018) 
almost word-for-word, the judge instructed the jury that 
"'excessive force' in self-defense means that considering all of 
the circumstances, the defendant used more force than . . . was 
reasonably necessary to defend himself."  The defendant argues 
that Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203 (1966), the case 
from which the model instruction is derived, has been 
misinterpreted, and that, in fact, "excessive force" instead 
should be defined as "substantially more force than was 
reasonably necessary" (emphasis added).  Not so. 
In Kendrick, 351 Mass. at 211, "excessive force" is 
described as "unreasonable and clearly excessive in light of the 
existing circumstances" or "manifestly disproportionate."  The 
court makes clear in Kendrick that where a defendant claims 
self-defense, the question to be decided by the jury is whether 
the amount of force used was reasonable.  Id. at 211-212.  This 
concept has remained unchanged since Kendrick was decided.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 773 (2009); 
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 663 (1989); Commonwealth 
v. Harris, 376 Mass. 201, 208-209 (1978), S.C., 487 Mass. 1016 
(2021).  Indeed, we have noted that "a single punch in response 
35 
 
to a single punch" may be "unreasonable in the circumstances."  
Commonwealth v. King, 460 Mass. 80, 85-86, 89 (2011). 
Adding "substantially" to the phrase "more force than was 
reasonably necessary" would change the meaning of "excessive 
force" as we have defined it in our case law.  We decline to do 
so. 
5.  Cumulative effect of errors.  Finally, the defendant 
argues that in the absence of individual reversible error, the 
cumulative effect of the errors at trial created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice because nearly all of them22 
concerned his credibility and the question whether he used 
excessive force in self-defense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 138-139 (2006); Commonwealth v. Yang, 98 
Mass. App. Ct. 446, 454 (2020).  We disagree. 
The trial errors we detected, i.e., a discovery violation 
relating to, and the admission of, the defendant's lyrics, and 
the admission of the defendant's prearrest silence, did not in 
combination create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  As discussed supra, the jury apparently believed that 
the defendant acted in self-defense.  The question whether he 
used excessive force is a separate one that did not hinge solely 
 
22 The defendant does not count the so-called biased juror 
claim as affecting the excessive use of force issue.  In any 
event, as indicated supra, we conclude that the juror claim is 
without merit. 
36 
 
on the defendant's credibility.  Contrary to other cumulative 
error cases, the Commonwealth's case was not "word against 
word," Commonwealth v. Mazzone, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 353 
(2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Dion, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 406, 415 
(1991), but relied on, among other things, the extent of the 
victim's injuries, the fact that the defendant was not injured 
when found, and numerous eyewitness accounts contradicting the 
defendant's account of the fight.  That the defendant's account 
was still credited in large part demonstrates that, in the 
context of the entire trial, there was no substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Russell, 439 Mass. 
340, 351 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.