Title: Lane v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

222 A.2d 263 (1966)
James Donald LANE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
July 12, 1966.
Henry A. Wise, Jr., of Wise & Suddard, Wilmington, for appellant.
William Swain Lee, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and WRIGHT, Judge, sitting.
*264 HERRMANN, Justice:
The defendant James Donald Lane appeals from his conviction of manslaughter after trial by jury.
The material facts are these:
The defendant, 28 years of age, was employed as a nursing assistant at a hospital and was a part-time instructor of State Police in judo. On November 11, 1964, at about 1:45 P.M., the defendant was parked in his automobile with a girl friend in a remote area of a secluded road. Clyde E. Brown, Jr. drove by slowly, turned and stared into the Lane automobile, continued a short distance down the road, then stopped. Brown reached into the back seat of his car, seemingly to get something, then got out and looked or threw something under his car. Brown then walked into the bushes, soon reappearing from the bushes behind the Lane automobile. Fearful that Brown had a gun, Lane instructed his companion to note Brown's license number, to drive away, and to call the police if she heard a shot. Lane then walked back to the bank alongside the road where Brown was hiding. The subsequent events were described as follows by Lane in a written statement, given to the police immediately afterwards, and admitted in evidence without objection:
Lane could not revive Brown. When he was unable to obtain assistance from a passing motorist, Lane, with the help of his companion who had returned, rushed Brown to the hospital. Despite their efforts, Brown could not be saved and he died soon after arrival. Death was caused by asphyxia, i. e., lack of oxygen resulting from blood obstruction of the airways. The autopsy showed that Brown had suffered dislocation of both sides of the lower jaw, fractures of the nasal bones, and injury to the brain which produced unconsciousness. There was bleeding from the nasal cavities and the blood moved to the lungs via the airways through the larynx and tracheal windpipe, resulting in asphyxia.
Lane was indicted for manslaughter and found guilty by the jury. He appeals.
The defendant's first ground of appeal is that a mistrial should have been granted, upon his application, when two photographs, not in evidence, were inadvertently included with the exhibits delivered to the jury as it retired to deliberate at the close of the case. The photographs in question showed the body of the deceased after the autopsy had been performed on the skull. The defendant objected to the admission of the photographs in evidence on the ground that they were immaterial and would unduly inflame the jury. The objection was sustained, but by inadvertence the photographs were among the other exhibits taken to the jury room.
Within a few minutes after retiring, the jury notified the trial judge that the two photographs were in its hands by mistake; and they returned all of the exhibits to the judge. After consultation with counsel, the trial judge recalled the jury to the courtroom[1] and the following exchange took place.
The defendant's motion for mistrial on this situation was denied, in the course of which the trial judge expressed doubt as to the accuracy, in the first instance, of his ruling that the photographs were inadmissible.
The question now before us is whether, under these circumstances, the situation was sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to warrant the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. See 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1369; 39 Am. Jur. "New Trial" § 84; 3 Am.Jur. "Appeal and Error" § 971; Compare Patterson v. Surpless, 107 N.J.L. 305, 151 A. 754 (1930); Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 163 Md. 401, 163 A. 702, 86 A.L.R. 922 (1933). We think not.
First, as this court held in Wisniewski v. State, 1 Storey 84, 138 A.2d 333 (1957), the admission of photographs of this character generally lies within the discretion of the trial court; and the erroneous submission to the jury of this type of photograph is not generally considered to be prejudicial error. See also Bantum v. State, 7 Terry 487, 85 A.2d 741 (1952).
Secondly, there is nothing to contradict the statement of the foreman of the jury that only he and one other juror gave the photographs "fleeting glances" before they were returned to the trial judge.
For these two reasons the possible prejudice to the defendant, arising from this inadvertence, was reduced to the point that, in our judgment, the trial court was clearly within the realm of sound judicial discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
The defendant puts misplaced reliance upon cases governed by special statutory provisions. See Anno. 20 A.L.R. 1187, et seq. Other cases cited by the defendant on this point are inapposite on their facts.
The remaining grounds of appeal advanced by the defendant are founded upon the jury instructions:
A. Addressing himself to the defense of self-defense and the related obligation to retreat, the defendant takes *267 exception to the following portion[2] of the trial court's charge to the jury:
The language adopted by the court in this portion of its charge is time-honored. The concept of a duty to retreat, if it is safe to do so, is firmly entrenched in the law of this State. The form as well as the substance of this charge was affirmed by this court in Quillen v. State, 10 Terry 114, 110 A.2d 445 (1955). Although it is recognized that the doctrine underlying our form of jury instruction in this regard has been modified elsewhere, 6 Am.Jur.2d "Assault and Battery" § 75, no reason has been advanced sufficient to justify tampering with our settled rule.
The defendant cites Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 15 S. Ct. 962, 39 L. Ed. 1086 (1895) and State v. Goldberg, 12 N.J.Super. 293, 79 A.2d 702 (1951). Cases such as these, dealing with attacks when on one's own premises, are not in point. Insofar as State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 71 S.W. 148, 59 L.R.A. 756 (1902) may be in conflict with our established rule, it must be disregarded.
B. Next, the defendant objects to the charge on reasonable doubt wherein the trial judge instructed:
The objection is to the reference to a reasonable doubt as a "substantial doubt." The argument is without merit. The form and substance of the charge as given here have the sanction of long usage in this jurisdiction. We are satisfied that it is a correct charge. Compare 20 Am.Jur. "Evidence" § 1257; 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1274. None of the cases cited by the defendant, dealing with various and sundry definitions of reasonable doubt, is persuasive in view of our own long-established definition.
C. Next, the defendant argues that the evidence did not warrant the last sentence of the following charge on excessive force:
Specifically, the defendant points to the medical testimony that a single blow by fist could have caused the brain injury; and to the following testimony regarding the fractures of the nasal bones:
On this, the defendant builds the argument that there was no basis in the evidence for the charge on excessive force; that by such charge, the jury was permitted to speculate "as to whether a single blow struck by one in fear of death or great bodily harm could be more force than was necessary under the circumstances."
We find the argument unacceptable. The defendant admitted that he kicked and "chopped" the deceased as he fell. The jury would have been warranted in finding from the evidence that the unconsciousness, the fractures of the nasal bones, and the consequent bleeding causing the asphyxia, resulted from the kicks and chopping blows. In that event, the jury would have been justified in finding, as it obviously did under the court's instruction, that the defendant exercised excessive force and became the aggressor. Clearly, there was evidence to support the charge to which objection is here made.
As an afterthought, relying upon Wiggins v. State, Del., 210 A.2d 314 (1965), the defendant asserts that this charge was too abstract and did not apply the law to the facts. The answer to this is that the defendant failed to submit a request for a more detailed charge, and failed to take exception on this ground to the charge as given. Accordingly, the argument comes too late.
D. Finally, it is argued that there was no evidence in the case to support the following charge:
Again, relying upon the possibility that a single blow could have been the cause of death, it is contended that there was no evidence to support the last sentence of this charge. In the light of all of the evidence, and for the reasons above stated, we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to warrant this instruction.
Finding no error in the judgment below, it is affirmed.
[1]  The record shows that the jury retired to deliberate at 11:26 A.M. and returned to the courtroom at 11:33 A.M.
[2]  The defendant overlooks the following supplemental charge on the duty to retreat which must be considered as part of the whole:

"If you find that the defendant had reason to believe that the deceased was armed and that he would be in danger and that the defendant was in danger if he attempted to retreat, then the defendant had no duty to retreat and had a right to stand his ground and oppose force with force, even to the extent of taking his assailant's life."