Title: State v. Dibble

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Dibble, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4630.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4630 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DIBBLE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Dibble, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4630.] 
A determination whether information in a search-warrant affidavit is false must 
take into account the nontechnical language used by nonlawyers. 
(No. 2011-1569—Submitted June 20, 2012—Decided October 10, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 10AP-648, 195 Ohio App.3d 189, 2011-Ohio-3817. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A determination whether information in a search-warrant affidavit is false must 
take into account the nontechnical language used by nonlawyers. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of appeals affirming 
a trial court’s judgment granting a motion to suppress.  Today we must decide 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to suppress 
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after it determined that an officer knowingly and intentionally made false 
statements in his search-warrant affidavit.  Because we determine that the trial 
court did abuse its discretion, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, 
which upheld the trial court’s ruling, and remand the cause to the trial court to 
conduct a new suppression hearing consistent with our holding. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On February 3, 2010, Upper Arlington Police Detective Andrew 
Wuertz asked a Franklin County municipal court judge to issue a warrant to 
search defendant-appellee Lawrence A. Dibble’s home.  Detective Wuertz sought 
the warrant after speaking with two young women, E.S. and E.K., who reported 
their experiences with Dibble, who was then a theater instructor at a private 
school for kindergarten through 12th grade. 
{¶ 3} The search-warrant affidavit states:  
 
On February 2, 2010 Victim #1 [E.S.] reported to the 
Upper Arlington Police Department that while a student at The 
Wellington School, one of her teacher’s [sic], Lawrence A. 
Dibble[,] touched her inappropriately.  Victim #1 stated that she 
was rehearsing line[s] for a play with Dibble in the school when he 
asked for a reward for getting his lines correct.  He asked to touch 
Victim #1’s stocking on her leg.  Upon touching the stocking 
Dibble then proceeded to run his hand up under Victim #1’s skirt 
brushing his fingers across her vaginal area.  Victim #1 stated she 
was shocked and froze as Dibble then ran his hands over her 
buttocks, and lower abdomen area.  Victim #2 [E.K.] was with 
Victim #1 while she made the report.  Victim #2 stated she also 
had inappropriate contact with Dibble.  Victim #2 stated it was 
after she had graduated high school where Dibble had also been 
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her teacher.  Victim #2 stated that Dibble had taken photo’s [sic] of 
her nude vaginal area during one of their meetings where 
inappropriate touching was involved.  Victim #2 told investigators 
that Dibble used a digital camera to take the photo’s [sic], and 
made her wear a pillow case over her head while he took them. 
 
On February 2, 2010 Victim #1 went to The Wellington 
School at the direction of the Upper Arlington Police wearing a 
recording device.  She had a conversation with Dibble about the 
inappropriate touching where he stated “I just wasn’t thinking.” 
Investigators from Upper Arlington believe Dibble’s 
computers, cameras, media storage devices, etc. may contain 
correspondence, and photos to substantiate Victim #1 and Victim 
#2’s claims. 
 
{¶ 4} The warrant was issued on February 3, 2010, and it authorized the 
seizure of computers, cameras, and data-storage media.  The warrant was 
executed the same day, and the search resulted in the seizure of several items, 
including a laptop computer, a camera, and several videotapes and DVDs. 
{¶ 5} Based in part on the evidence seized, Dibble was arrested and 
charged with 17 felony counts of voyeurism, four misdemeanor counts of 
voyeurism, and one misdemeanor count of sexual imposition.  None of the 
charges related to E.K. 
{¶ 6} Dibble filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
search of his home, arguing that Detective Wuertz had deliberately included false 
and misleading information in his search-warrant affidavit in that his references to 
E.K. as a “victim” were false because, as Wuertz knew, E.K. was an adult when 
the sexual acts described in the affidavit occurred and the acts had been 
consensual.  The trial court held a hearing on the motion on June 29, 2010. 
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{¶ 7} Detective Wuertz testified that E.S. came to the police station with 
her mother and E.K. on February 2 to report what had happened to E.S.  E.S. told 
Wuertz that during her senior year, she was Dibble’s aide, which she described as 
a person who would do whatever Dibble needed done.  Wuertz testified that E.S. 
had told him that she had known Dibble since she was in the seventh grade.  
Through the years, she had become close to Dibble, and she looked at him as a 
father figure. 
{¶ 8} Detective Wuertz testified that E.S. had relayed to him that one of 
her duties in being an aide to Dibble was giving him back massages.  They would 
go into his office, he would close the door and remove his shirt, and she would 
rub his back.  In addition, E.S. reported that Dibble had taken pictures of her in 
see-through or nearly see-through unitards and that Dibble had told her to wear 
nothing underneath. 
{¶ 9} Detective Wuertz testified that the groping incident described in 
the search-warrant affidavit had taken place nearly a year before E.S. reported it, 
but he added that in talking to E.S., he felt that Dibble had manipulated her so that 
he could “get her to do whatever he asked her to do,” and he had asked her not to 
tell anyone.  E.S. told Wuertz that after the groping incident, she went to her next 
class but was upset, so she left that class and wrote Dibble a letter about the 
incident and took it to him.  Before he finished reading it, he tore it up and threw 
it away and told E.S. that she could not tell anyone about the incident or it would 
ruin his life.  Wuertz reported that E.S. had felt conflicted but had not told 
anyone.  The incident continued to weigh on her to the point that she had trouble 
sleeping and she knew she had to report it. 
{¶ 10} Detective Wuertz also testified that E.K., too, had been Dibble’s 
theater aide when she was a senior and that Dibble had taken pictures of her in a 
unitard.  She had taught E.S. how to give Dibble massages.  E.K. also had looked 
January Term, 2012 
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at Dibble as a father figure, and in fact, Dibble had referred to himself as her 
stepdad. 
{¶ 11} Detective Wuertz conceded that the information in the affidavit 
regarding E.S. would not have led him to believe that there was any evidence of 
the alleged inappropriate relationship in Dibble’s home.  He thus acknowledged 
that the information in the affidavit related to E.S. did not provide probable cause 
to search Dibble’s home.  When pressed about his using the term “victim” with 
regard to E.K., who was 18 years of age and no longer a student of Dibble’s when 
the sexual contact described in the affidavit began, Wuertz refused to agree that 
she was not a victim.  Wuertz acknowledged that he had never filed a report, 
beyond the search-warrant affidavit, indicating that she was a victim. 
{¶ 12} Detective Wuertz testified that when he appeared before the judge 
and presented her with the application for the search warrant and the supporting 
affidavit, she asked him some questions and he gave her some additional 
information verbally, under oath, that was not contained in the affidavit or 
application.  Wuertz stated that he gave her more background information about 
Dibble’s relationships with the young women, explaining that they had known 
him as a teacher since they were in seventh grade and that they had been 
manipulated over time by Dibble.  In addition, Wuertz told the judge about the 
photographs in the unitards that Dibble had taken of E.S. and E.K. when they 
were students and that he was concerned about where those photographs were and 
how they were being used. 
{¶ 13} Detective Wuertz again explained that he had referred to E.K. as a 
victim even though she was an adult when the incident described in the affidavit 
occurred because he believed that she had been manipulated by Dibble.  To 
demonstrate how easily Dibble manipulated E.K., Wuertz relayed E.K.’s 
explanation for allowing Dibble to take naked pictures of her.  Dibble had told 
E.K. that he wanted to teach her about internal power and that the only way to see 
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the ultimate energy was to look at her vaginal area.  But he said that because the 
power was so strong, he could not look at it directly for very long and that he 
needed photos so he could look at the photos longer and study them to see her 
internal energy.  Wuertz explained that E.K. had trusted Dibble and did not 
believe that he would do anything to hurt her and that she did not think the photos 
were sexual in nature. 
{¶ 14} Detective Wuertz testified that he had not intended to mislead the 
judge who issued the search warrant.  He explained that at the time he typed the 
search-warrant affidavit, he thought there was a chance that he could charge 
Dibble with something related to his conduct with E.K., and he said that he still 
considers E.K. to be a victim. 
{¶ 15} The trial court granted Dibble’s motion to suppress evidence, 
finding that Wuertz had “knowingly and intentionally made false statements in his 
affidavit” and that without those statements, the affidavit did not support a finding 
of probable cause to search Dibble’s home.  The trial court declined to consider 
sworn oral statements made by Wuertz to the judge issuing the warrant when he 
submitted his search-warrant affidavit, since no record of any such statements had 
been made.  The trial court then held that evidence outside the “false” affidavit 
standing alone was insufficient to support probable cause.  The state appealed, 
and the Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court.  The case is now before this court upon our acceptance of the state’s 
discretionary appeal.  State v. Dibble, 130 Ohio St.3d 1493, 2011-Ohio-6556, 958 
N.E.2d 956. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 16} As a preliminary matter, both courts below concluded that the 
search warrant affidavit in question failed to meet Crim.R. 41(C), which excludes 
consideration of unrecorded sworn oral information.  The state contends that this 
finding compels us to hold that Crim.R. 41(C) is unconstitutional because the 
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Fourth Amendment requires only that the information be given under oath or 
affirmation.  However, we find that we need not reach the issue whether Crim.R. 
41(C) is unconstitutional, because we find that the statements made by the 
detective were not false statements made intentionally or with reckless disregard 
for the truth.  We are remanding this matter for a new hearing which will now 
require the trial court to consider the affidavit on its face. 
{¶ 17} Turning now to the issue of falsity in a search-warrant affidavit, In 
1978, the United States Supreme Court held that  
 
where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that 
a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the 
finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a 
hearing be held at the defendant's request.  In the event that at that 
hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is 
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's 
remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the 
search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded 
to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of 
the affidavit. 
 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-156, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 
(1978). 
{¶ 18} This court set forth the analysis for determining whether a law-
enforcement affiant intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth made a 
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false statement in a search-warrant affidavit in State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 
588 N.E.2d 819 (1992), where we noted that  
 
“[r]eckless disregard” means that the affiant had serious doubts of 
an allegation’s truth.  United States v. Williams (C.A.7, 1984), 737 
F.2d 594, 602.  Omissions count as false statements if “designed to 
mislead, or * * * made in reckless disregard of whether they would 
mislead, the magistrate.”  United States v. Colkley (C.A.4, 1990), 
899 F.2d 297, 301. 
 
Id. at 441. 
{¶ 19} The focus of the trial and appellate courts in this case was on the 
detective’s use of the word “victim” to describe E.K., the woman who was over 
18 at the time of the sexual conduct alleged in the affidavit.  According to 
Wuertz’s testimony, however, he considered her to be a victim because Dibble’s 
relationship with E.K. involved a pattern of grooming and manipulation that 
began when E.K. was a minor and a student of Dibble’s.  Although the affidavit 
indicated that the “inappropriate” touching of E.K. occurred after she graduated 
from high school, Wuertz testified that he had told the judge about the teacher-
student relationship.  It is therefore difficult to understand how the courts could 
have deemed the affidavit misleading, since it stated clearly that Victim #2 (E.K.) 
had graduated before the “inappropriate” touching began. 
{¶ 20} However, the trial court found that the detective’s use of the term 
“victim” to refer to E.K. amounted to knowingly and intentionally including false 
information in his search-warrant affidavit in order to establish probable cause to 
search Dibble’s house.  The court of appeals held that competent and credible 
evidence supported that finding.  We disagree and conclude that the trial court 
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used too narrow a definition of “victim” by viewing the term to encompass only 
victims of crime.  We find this hypertechnical analysis inappropriate. 
{¶ 21} The United States Supreme Court has explained that search-
warrant affidavits are usually drafted by nonlawyers and should be reviewed with 
that in mind.  United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 
L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).  Citing Ventresca, the dissenting judge in this case reasoned 
as follows: 
 
Here, the trial court interpreted the term “victim” to mean, 
and only to mean, “a person who is the object of a crime.”  I 
conclude, however, that it was improper for the trial court to apply 
such a limited definition.  Specifically, it is improper for a court to 
invalidate warrants by interpreting the accompanying affidavits in 
a “hypertechnical” manner because the affidavits are drafted by 
nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.  
United States v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 108-109, 85 S.Ct. 
741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684. 
Used more broadly, “victim” can mean (1) “a person who 
suffers from a destructive or injurious action,” or (2) “a person 
who is deceived or cheated, as by his own emotions or ignorance, 
by the dishonesty of others, or by some impersonal agency.”  
Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary (Random House 
1997). 
The trial court noted that few people “would argue with the 
notion that even minimal levels of manipulation and control 
exerted over young adult women by older men violate grounds of 
immorality and may create some measure of victimization.”  I 
agree.  And, applying this characterization to what may have 
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occurred between E.K. and appellee, an affiant could have 
reasonably concluded that E.K. was a “victim” under a definition 
broader than the one the court imposed.  Therefore, the 
characterization of E.K. as a victim was not false, and the trial 
court erred by suppressing the evidence on that basis. 
 
State v. Dibble, 195 Ohio App.3d 189, 2011-Ohio-3817, 959 N.E.2d 540, ¶ 57-59 
(French, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 22} We agree with the reasoning in Judge French’s dissent.  The 
validity of a search-warrant affidavit should not turn on the identifier that an 
officer selects when trying to protect a person’s identity.  The detective selected 
“victim” as a generic term to describe the two women in the affidavit so as to not 
identify them by name.  The trial court conceded that Dibble had created “some 
measure of victimization” with regard to E.K., but then went on to find that 
Wuertz had used the term “victim” in reference to E.K. to intentionally mislead 
the trial judge who reviewed the search-warrant affidavit. 
{¶ 23} A court abuses its discretion when its ruling lacks a sound 
reasoning process.  State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 
N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban 
Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} A determination whether information in a search-warrant affidavit 
is false must take into account the nontechnical language used by nonlawyers.  As 
noted by the United States Supreme Court in Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct. 
741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684:  
 
If the teachings of the [United States Supreme] Court’s cases are to 
be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for 
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search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and 
interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and 
realistic fashion.  They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the 
midst and haste of a criminal investigation.  Technical 
requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common 
law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or 
negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to 
discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a 
judicial officer before acting. 
 
{¶ 25} In this case, Dibble allegedly sexually exploited two young women 
while employed as a teacher at their school.  His alleged behavior with each, 
including back rubs behind closed doors, other inappropriate touching, and 
photographing both women in see-through unitards without any undergarments, if 
true, clearly made victims of these young women.  Therefore, the detective’s use 
of the term “victim” to refer to E.K., even though the sexual activity regarding 
E.K. that was described in the search-warrant affidavit occurred after she was 18 
and graduated, did not amount to his knowingly and intentionally including false 
information in his search-warrant affidavit. 
{¶ 26} Since the trial judge’s analysis of whether to suppress the evidence 
began with his conclusion that the detective’s testimony was false and we have 
called into question his basis for that conclusion, we find that consideration of the 
other assignments of error, which relate to later determinations in the judge’s 
analysis, would be premature.  Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court to hold a new suppression 
hearing consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 27} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals but would not 
adopt its reasoning. 
{¶ 28} Whether Detective Wuertz knowingly made false statements in his 
affidavit is ultimately irrelevant.  That is because any information about Dibble’s 
relationship with E.K., a consenting adult, describes no crime, and thus provides 
no basis for a search.  There is no allegation in the affidavit that any illegal 
activity regarding Victim #1, E.S., took place in defendant’s home.  Detective 
Wuertz was asked at the suppression hearing about the importance of information 
about E.K. to the probable-cause determination:  
{¶ 29} “Q. * * * And only the information from [E.K.] would be the 
probable cause basis to be able to search the home of Mr. Dibble, correct?  At that 
point in time, detective, that’s correct, is it not? 
{¶ 30} “A. At that point in time.” 
{¶ 31} The detective, the trial court, and the court of appeals agreed that 
without the information regarding E.K., there was no probable cause to search 
Dibble’s residence.  Since there was no basis for including information about E.K. 
in the supporting affidavit, we need not expend further judicial resources to 
determine that there was no basis for the search in this case. 
__________________ 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
R. William Meeks Co., L.P.A., and David H. Thomas, for appellee. 
January Term, 2012 
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Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. 
Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal on behalf of amicus 
curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorney’s Association. 
Hunter, Carnahan, Shoub, Byard & Harshman, Russell E. Carnahan, and 
Robert M. Cody, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae Fraternal Order of 
Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9. 
Jeanine Hummer, Upper Arlington City Attorney, and Tom Lindsey, 
Assistant City Attorney, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae city of Upper 
Arlington. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen Goldmeier and Sarah 
G. LoPresti, Assistant Public Defenders, urging affirmance on behalf of amicus 
curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________