Title: Thompson v. DeSantis

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-985 
____________ 
 
REPRESENTATIVE GERALDINE F. THOMPSON, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
GOVERNOR RON DESANTIS, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
August 27, 2020 
 
MUÑIZ, J. 
 
Representative Geraldine Thompson wants us to undo Governor Ron 
DeSantis’s appointment of Judge Renatha Francis to fill a vacancy in office on this 
Court.  Thompson argues that the Florida Constitution requires Judge Francis to 
have been a member of the Florida Bar for ten years at the time of the appointment, 
which Judge Francis undisputedly was not.  Thompson asks us to invalidate the 
appointment, require the judicial nominating commission to certify a new list of 
candidates, and order the Governor to appoint someone from the new list. 
 
The Governor did exceed his authority in making this appointment.  In a 
nutshell, when a governor fills by appointment a vacant judicial office, the 
 
- 2 - 
appointee must be constitutionally eligible for that office at the time of the 
appointment.1  But that is not the end of the analysis, because the remedy 
Thompson seeks is legally unavailable under these circumstances.  There is no 
legal justification for us to require a replacement appointment from a new list of 
candidates, rather than from the one that is already before the Governor.  And the 
correct remedy (an appointment from the existing list of eligible nominees) would 
be contrary to Thompson’s stated objectives in filing this case.  Therefore, we hold 
Thompson to the remedy she requested and deny her petition. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Former Justices Barbara Lagoa and Robert Luck resigned from this Court in 
November 2019.  As mandated by article V, section 11(c), the Supreme Court 
Judicial Nominating Commission then carried out the process of selecting 
nominees to replace the outgoing justices.  On January 23, 2020, the JNC certified 
to the Governor a total of nine nominees for the two vacancies.  It is undisputed 
that this started the clock running on the Governor’s duty under article V, section 
11(c) to fill the vacancies by appointment “within sixty days after the nominations 
have been certified.” 
 
1.  Throughout this opinion, when we refer to the “time of the appointment” 
or the “date of the appointment,” we mean the time or date when the appointment 
takes effect. 
 
- 3 - 
 
Because he was focused on the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the 
declared state of emergency, the Governor delayed his appointments beyond the 
constitutional deadline of March 23, 2020.2  Then, on May 26, 2020, the Governor 
appointed John Couriel and Judge Renatha Francis to the offices of justice of the 
supreme court.3  The Couriel appointment is not at issue in this case. 
 
The Petitioner filed an “Emergency Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto and 
Writ of Mandamus” in this Court on July 13, 2020.  The petition seeks relief 
against Supreme Court JNC Chair Daniel Nordby and Governor Ron DeSantis in 
their official capacities.  The factual basis for the petition is that, on the date of her 
appointment, Judge Francis had not been a member of the Florida Bar for the 
preceding ten years.  It is undisputed that Judge Francis will not have attained ten 
years’ Bar membership until September 24, 2020.  The Petitioner alleges that 
 
 
2.  We express no view on whether the state of emergency made it 
permissible for the Governor to miss the constitutional deadline. 
 
 
3.  The parties dispute the validity of Judge Francis’s appointment, but they 
agree that the Governor has in fact made an appointment, effective on May 26, 
2020, even though no commission has been issued.  The Governor’s response is 
replete with representations that he has “appointed” Judge Francis to the Court, not 
merely announced his selection of Judge Francis.  And the response asserts that, 
“[u]pon appointment, the Governor has met his constitutional obligations under 
Article V.”  Specifically with regard to the Petitioner’s request for mandamus 
relief, the Governor’s response says that “Governor DeSantis completed his legal 
duty by appointing Judge Francis . . . to the Florida Supreme Court on May 26, 
2020.”  For purposes of our analysis, we will take the case as it has been argued to 
us and assume that the Governor has in fact made an appointment. 
 
- 4 - 
article V, section 8 requires Judge Francis to have been a member of the Bar for at 
least ten years as of the date of her appointment, and that accordingly the JNC’s 
nomination and the Governor’s appointment of her are invalid. 
 
As to the JNC, the Petitioner seeks a “writ of quo warranto specifically 
concluding that the JNC exceeded its legal authority by including Judge Francis on 
the list of certified nominees.”  The Petitioner also seeks a “writ of mandamus 
compelling the JNC to immediately provide Governor DeSantis with a new list of 
nominees.”  The Petitioner asks that the candidates for inclusion on the revised list 
be limited to those who originally applied to fill the Lagoa and Luck vacancies and 
who were “constitutionally eligible to hold the office as of January 23, 2020, the 
date the JNC was originally required to certify its list of nominees to Governor 
DeSantis.”  Based on a concern for diversity in the judiciary, the Petitioner urges 
the JNC to “strongly consider” including on its revised list the six African-
American candidates in the original applicant pool.  The Petitioner argues that this 
remedy is warranted because “the entire process for filling the vacancy in question 
was corrupted by the JNC including an ineligible nominee” on its certified list. 
 
As to the Governor, the Petitioner seeks a writ of quo warranto establishing 
that the appointment of Judge Francis exceeded the Governor’s constitutional 
authority.  The Petitioner further asks for a writ of mandamus ordering the 
 
- 5 - 
Governor to “immediately appoint” one of the individuals from the JNC’s “new 
list.” 
 
In the analysis that follows, we will consider the Petitioner’s claims for relief 
against the Governor, but not her claims against Chair Nordby.  The Petitioner 
asserts that the JNC violated its procedural rules and the constitution by including 
Judge Francis on its list of nominees—an alleged defect that was immediately 
apparent on January 23, 2020.  Nonetheless, the Petitioner waited nearly six 
months to bring this action.  It would not be proper under these circumstances for 
us to entertain a challenge to the JNC’s list of nominees.  See State ex rel. Pooser 
v. Wester, 170 So. 736 (Fla. 1936) (petitioner’s unreasonable four-month delay 
precluded grant of extraordinary relief). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standing 
 
It is undisputed that article V, section 3(b)(8) gives this Court discretionary 
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers.  
Nonetheless, the Governor argues that the Petitioner lacks standing to bring this 
action “because she alleges no direct and articulable stake in the outcome of this” 
 
- 6 - 
proceeding.  The Petitioner responds that she has standing as a citizen and 
taxpayer.4 
 
This Court’s precedent favors the Petitioner.  For example, the petitioner in 
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 705 (Fla. 2011), sought a writ of quo warranto to 
establish that an executive order suspending certain agency rulemaking exceeded 
the governor’s constitutional authority.  As to standing, a majority of the Court 
held that “the extent of harm to the petitioner is not pertinent.”  Id. at 706 n.4.  
Suggesting that the case involved the vindication of a “public right,” the majority 
held that “when bringing a petition for writ of quo warranto, individual members 
of the public have standing as citizens and taxpayers.”  Id.  Similarly, in Pleus v. 
Crist, 14 So. 3d 941 (Fla. 2009), the Court unanimously found that the petitioner 
had standing as a “citizen and taxpayer” to seek mandamus relief compelling the 
governor to comply with his constitutional duty to fill a judicial vacancy.  Id. at 
945.  We observed that mandamus relief was necessary “in order to effectuate the 
intent of the framers to avoid or minimize further delay in filling” the vacant 
office.  Id. at 946. 
 
Our Court recently addressed the issue of stare decisis in State v. Poole, 45 
Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020), clarified 45 Fla. L. Weekly S121 (Fla. 
 
 
4.  The Petitioner also asserts standing in her capacity as a member of the 
Florida Legislature, but we fail to see how this case has anything to do with the 
Petitioner’s legislative duties. 
 
- 7 - 
Apr. 2, 2020).   There we held: “When we are convinced that a precedent clearly 
conflicts with the law we are sworn to uphold, precedent normally must yield.”  Id. 
at S48.  In this case, to justify departing from the principle of stare decisis, we 
would have to conclude that our relevant precedents clearly erred in their 
understanding of the “judicial power” vested in Florida’s courts by article V, 
section 1. 
We will not lightly conclude that precedents of this Court are clearly 
erroneous.  Based on our review of the arguments and analysis that have been 
presented to us, we cannot say that the Respondents have shown that the clearly 
erroneous standard is met here.  We must therefore adhere to precedent and find 
that the Petitioner has standing. 
B.  Merits 
Article V, section 8 says that “[n]o person is eligible for the office of justice 
of the supreme court . . . unless the person is, and has been for the preceding ten 
years, a member of the bar of Florida.”  This case requires us to decide when this 
eligibility requirement attaches in the context of a governor’s appointment to fill a 
vacancy in judicial office under article V, section 11.  The Petitioner argues that 
the eligibility requirement attaches at the time of appointment.  The Governor 
responds that the eligibility requirement does not attach until the appointee actually 
takes the oath and assumes the duties of her office.  According to the Governor, 
 
- 8 - 
because Judge Francis does not intend to take the oath and assume office until 
September 24, 2020, “eligibility is not material, nor is it in question.” 
The plain text of article V, section 8—with its bare reference to eligibility 
“for the office of justice of the supreme court”—does not explicitly resolve the 
parties’ dispute.  But the constitution nonetheless yields a clear answer to the 
question before us.  That is because, “in construing multiple constitutional 
provisions addressing a similar subject, the provisions ‘must be read in pari materia 
to ensure a consistent and logical meaning that gives effect to each provision.’ ”  
Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 283 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Caribbean Conserv. 
Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conserv. Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 501 (Fla. 2003)).  
When we read Article V, section 8 together with article V, section 11, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that the Bar eligibility requirement attaches at the time of 
appointment.5 
When a vacancy arises in the office of justice of the supreme court, article 
V, section 11 imposes on the governor a simple and circumscribed duty: (1) to “fill 
the vacancy” in office, (2) by “appointment,” (3) “within sixty days after the 
[JNC’s] nominations have been certified to the governor.”  Under this provision, 
the appointment is a means to an end—to fill the vacancy—not an end in itself.  
 
 
5.  Again, by this we mean the time or date when the appointment becomes 
effective. 
 
 
- 9 - 
The text indicates that the appointment brings about clear legal effects: it fills the 
vacancy in office, and it sets the length of the appointee’s term.6  We also can infer 
a legal effect from the fact that the text imposes a deadline for the appointment; if 
the appointment itself had no legal effect, the deadline would serve no purpose. 
The most important point is that the appointment must—and does—fill the 
vacancy in office.  And it does so immediately.  Not at some time in the future, but 
on the effective date of the appointment itself.  It necessarily follows that, in this 
context, any constitutional eligibility requirement “for the office” attaches at the 
time of appointment.  Otherwise, the governor would be filling an office—again, 
under article V, section 11 this happens at the time of appointment—with someone 
whom the constitution deems ineligible for that office. 
The Governor’s representatives oppose this straightforward interpretation 
with an argument that is untenable.  They contend that the constitution demands 
only that an appointee meet the constitutional eligibility requirements prior to the 
end of her term (the beginning of which, they maintain, is unconnected to the date 
of the appointment).  And they acknowledge that their interpretation yields a 
startling result: notwithstanding its 60-day appointment deadline, the constitution 
would permit a legally “filled” judicial office to remain empty for over three years, 
 
 
6.  Article V, section 11(a) says that the appointment is “for a term ending 
on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January of the year following the 
next general election occurring at least one year after the date of appointment.” 
 
- 10 - 
while the governor, the court, and the public wait for the appointee to meet the 
constitution’s eligibility requirements.  This implausible reading of the relevant 
constitutional provisions conflicts with the “presumption against ineffectiveness” 
canon, which “ensures that a text’s manifest purpose is furthered, not hindered.”  
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 63 (2012).   
The Governor’s advocates support their interpretation with a couple of 
unpersuasive text-based arguments.  The first is that “a reasonable person would 
understand ‘eligible for the office’ to mean one must meet certain requirements 
prior to assuming the office and exercising the duties.”  The problem with this 
argument is that the hypothetical reasonable person would have to read the phrase 
“eligible for the office” not in isolation, but together with the related provisions in 
article V, section 11.  And the reasonable person would then see that, because a 
governor’s appointment has the effect of filling the office, the appointee must be 
eligible for that office at the time of appointment. 
The second textual argument points out that other provisions in article V 
explicitly refer to the time of appointment.  Article V, section 3(a) imposes a 
residency requirement “at the time of the original appointment or election.”  
Article V, section 11(a) sets the length of an appointee’s term partly in relation to 
“the date of appointment.”  And article V, section 8 itself includes the phrase “a 
 
- 11 - 
person shall be eligible for election or appointment to the office of county court 
judge.”7  In light of the existence of these other provisions, the Governor urges us 
to infer that the article V, section 8 Bar eligibility requirement does not attach at 
the time of appointment. 
It is true that one canon of construction holds that “a material variation in 
terms suggests a variation in meaning.”  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 170.  
Here it is not clear that the Governor has identified a “material” variation in terms, 
because the relatively vague phrase “eligible for the office” is being compared to 
relatively more specific phrases used elsewhere.  And, as we have noted, the bare 
phrase “eligible for the office” does not explicitly speak to the time of attachment.  
But even if we assume that the Governor has identified material variations in 
terms, this canon comes with a warning sign: “Because it is so often disregarded, 
this canon is particularly defeasible by context.”  Id. at 171.  Here the contextual 
clues overwhelmingly cut against the interpretation advanced on the Governor’s 
behalf.  We would require much more clarity from the constitutional framers to 
justify an interpretation that is not compelled by the text and that produces such 
anomalous results. 
 
 
7.  This phrase was added to the text of article V, section 8 years after the 
Bar eligibility requirement for supreme court justices.  See art. V, § 8, Fla. Const. 
(1968), amended by Fla. SJR 52-D (1971), and Fla. HJR 37 (1984). 
 
- 12 - 
Looking for support in our case law, the Governor relies principally on 
Miller v. Mendez, 804 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2001), which arose in a different 
context—a judicial election rather than the filling of a vacancy in judicial office 
under article V, section 11.  In Miller we confronted the question whether 
residence for purposes of meeting the article V, section 8 residence eligibility 
requirement “refers to residence at the time of qualifying [for election] or residence 
at the time of assuming office.”  Id. at 1243-44.  We answered that the residency 
requirement attaches “on the date of assuming office,” which our opinion clearly 
equated with “the day the term of office begins.”  Id. at 1247.  We based our 
decision not on any close textual analysis, but on deference to prior advisory 
opinions of our Court (also not text-based) and to administrative agency opinion 
letters that we deemed “reasonable.”  Id.  A majority of the Court joined a 
concurrence by Justice Wells concluding that, while precedent dictated the main 
opinion’s result, if writing on a “clean slate” he would “hold the residency 
requirement to be at the time of filing.”  Id. 
Applying the principle underlying Miller to the appointment context, we 
think the case supports our view that the article V, section 8 Bar membership 
requirement attaches at the time of appointment.  Elected officers, including 
judges, are generally elected for terms that begin on a fixed date set in advance by 
law.  See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor—Terms of County Court Judges, 
 
- 13 - 
750 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1999).  Before the start of an elected judge’s term, the 
judge has not in any sense filled the office.  By contrast, an appointment under 
article V, section 11 fills a vacancy in judicial office immediately at the time of 
appointment.  And, just as the law fixes in advance the start of an elected judge’s 
term, Article V, section 11 imposes a hard deadline on a governor’s duty to fill a 
vacant judicial office.  If we assume that the Governor is correct that the term of 
office of an appointed justice can start anytime between the date of appointment 
and the end of the justice’s initial term, then the date of appointment is far more 
closely analogous to the beginning date of an elected judge’s term.  As we have 
pointed out before, to conclude otherwise would strip the article V, section 11 
appointment deadline—and the appointment itself—of any legal and practical 
significance. 
 
We conclude our analysis of the merits by restating first principles.  The 
goal of constitutional interpretation is to arrive at the fair meaning of the 
constitutional text.  We ask how a reasonable member of the public would have 
understood the text at the time of its enactment.  Here a reasonable member of the 
public would have understood that a governor’s appointment carries legal 
significance, that an office can only be filled by a person eligible for that office, 
and that a hard 60-day appointment deadline would be fatally undermined by a rule 
that permits a judicial seat to remain empty for more than three years.  We believe 
 
- 14 - 
that ours is the only reasonable interpretation of article V, sections 8 and 11, one 
that honors the whole text and “furthers rather than obstructs the document’s 
purpose.”  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 63.  After all, “our role [is] to make 
sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”  W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. 
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991). 
C.  Remedy 
 
It is not enough for the Petitioner to establish that the Governor exceeded his 
authority by appointing Judge Francis.  To prevail in this action, the Petitioner also 
must have sought proper relief.  This is where the Petitioner’s case fails. 
 
There are two insurmountable problems with the Petitioner’s requested 
remedy.  First, as we have explained, by her unexcused delay the Petitioner has 
forfeited any challenge to the composition of the JNC’s list or to the JNC’s 
nomination process.  And second, the Petitioner has shown no reason why the 
irregularity of one ineligible nominee on the JNC’s certified list requires discarding 
the whole list.  As noted, that list already includes more than the minimum number 
of candidates that article V, section 11(a) requires.  At this point, the only legally 
appropriate and available remedy would be to require the Governor immediately to 
appoint a constitutionally eligible person from the JNC’s existing certified list of 
nominees.  See Pleus, 14 So. 3d at 946. 
 
- 15 - 
 
Yet in her initial petition and in her reply, the Petitioner has asked for 
something else: that the JNC reconvene and certify a new list from the existing 
applicant pool, and that the Governor then be compelled to select an appointee 
from that new list.  The Petitioner’s filings characterize this as “the only remedy 
that complies with the Florida Constitution” and as “the only appropriate and fair 
remedy in this case.”  What the Petitioner seeks is fundamentally different from the 
remedy that we are authorized to grant in the circumstances presented.  And more 
than that, the authorized remedy would defeat the Petitioner’s stated objectives in 
filing this action. 
 
It is not our role to impose a remedy that the Petitioner has not requested and 
that is inconsistent with the Petitioner’s stated goals.  This is the parties’ case, not 
ours.  Accordingly, we must deny the petition. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The petition is denied. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LABARGA and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
COURIEL, J., recused. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
ON OR BEFORE MONDAY, AUGUST 31, 2020.  A RESPONSE TO THE 
MOTION FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED ON OR 
BEFORE FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 2020.  NOT FINAL UNTIL THE TIME 
 
- 16 - 
EXPIRES TO FILE A REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF 
FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., specially concurring. 
 
I fully concur with the majority’s conclusion that Governor DeSantis 
exceeded his constitutional authority in appointing a nominee, Judge Francis, who 
was not constitutionally eligible at the time of the appointment.  I write only to 
underscore two points.  First, the Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Commission 
(Supreme Court JNC) also exceeded its authority in nominating Judge Francis.  
Second, petitioner Thompson’s concerns relating to a diverse judiciary are only 
highlighted by the Supreme Court JNC’s failure to certify any of the six 
constitutionally eligible African-American or Caribbean-American applicants. 
I.  The Supreme Court JNC Exceeded Its Authority 
 
Pursuant to article V, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, “[u]niform rules 
of procedure shall be established by the judicial nominating commissions at each 
level of the court system.”  (Emphasis added.)8  Consistent with its constitutional 
mandate, the Supreme Court JNC established rules of procedure which in relevant 
part, state as follows: “Within a reasonable time after the deadline for applications, 
the Commission shall meet to consider the applicants and to select applicants for 
 
 
8.  Article V, section 11(d) provides for a Supreme Court JNC, a JNC for 
each of Florida’s five district courts of appeal, and a JNC for each of Florida’s 
twenty judicial circuits. 
 
- 17 - 
further investigation and consideration.  No person shall be selected for further 
investigation and consideration who does not meet all legal requirements for the 
office to be filled.”  Section II, Initial Screening, Supreme Court Nominating 
Commission Rules (emphasis added).  Moreover, “no applicant shall be nominated 
to the Governor or to the Attorney General for appointment unless the Commission 
finds the applicant to be fit for appointment after full and careful consideration. 
The Commission’s consideration of applicants for appointment shall include . . . 
[a]pplicable constitutional and statutory criteria.”  Section V(a), Standards and 
Qualifications; Criteria, Supreme Court Nominating Commission Rules (emphasis 
added). 
 
As the Supreme Court JNC carries out its role in nominating applicants to 
fill a vacancy in the office of justice of this Court, it cannot do so in a manner that 
is irrespective of the Governor’s duty to appoint a constitutionally eligible 
candidate.  Under article V, section 11(a) of the Florida Constitution, “the governor 
shall fill the vacancy by appointing . . . one of not fewer than three persons nor 
more than six persons nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating 
commission.”  “No person is eligible for the office of justice of the supreme court 
or judge of a district court of appeal unless the person is, and has been for the 
preceding ten years, a member of the bar of Florida.”  Art. V, § 8, Fla. Const. 
(emphasis added). 
 
- 18 - 
 
Because the Governor’s appointee must satisfy this minimal eligibility 
requirement, the Supreme Court JNC is obligated to nominate only individuals 
who fulfill the requirement.  A nominee must be constitutionally eligible at the 
time of nomination.  The reason for this is clear: while the Governor has up to sixty 
days to fill the vacancy, the Governor does not have to utilize that entire time 
period.  Each nominee must be immediately ready to fill the vacancy. 
 
On January 23, 2020—the date that the Supreme Court JNC certified its list 
of nominees to the Governor—not only was Judge Francis constitutionally 
ineligible to fill a vacancy on this Court, fully eight months remained until she 
would meet the ten-year requirement.  As a result, the Supreme Court JNC’s 
nomination exceeded its authority. 
 
Not only is this interpretation consistent with article V, it is consistent with 
how the members of Florida’s JNCs are educated regarding the constitutional 
eligibility of appellate court applicants.  During a training session mere weeks 
before the Lagoa and Luck vacancies occurred, one of the panel members 
acknowledged the “bar” of ten years to be eligible to serve as an appellate court 
judge in Florida.  See Judicial Nominating Commission Training, at the 2:07:37 
mark, available at www.thefloridachannel.org/videos/10-21-19-judicial-
nominating-commission-training/, last visited August 21, 2020. 
 
- 19 - 
 
Thus, although the majority concludes that Thompson’s Supreme Court JNC 
claims were untimely, it is nonetheless clear that the Supreme Court JNC also 
exceeded its authority in nominating a constitutionally ineligible applicant. 
II.  The Supreme Court JNC Had a Diverse Slate of 
Constitutionally Eligible Candidates From Which to Choose 
 
 
Thompson’s requested remedy—requiring the Governor to appoint a 
candidate from the original list of applicants—is motivated by a “widely-
recognized interest in diversity on the judiciary.”  Pet. at 4.  While I agree with the 
majority that there is no legal basis for granting this remedy, I write to underscore 
the missed opportunity to enhance the diversity of this Court and to do so in a 
manner that adheres to the Florida Constitution.  The original pool of applicants to 
the Supreme Court JNC included a generous slate of diverse applicants who were 
constitutionally eligible to fill the Lagoa and Luck vacancies.  In particular, the list 
of applicants included six constitutionally eligible African-American or Caribbean-
American applicants.  Each of these six applicants is an experienced attorney who, 
at the time of application, had no fewer than twenty-one years of Florida Bar 
membership.  In fact, the most experienced of the six was a member of the Florida 
Bar for thirty-six years at the time of application.  Instead, the Supreme Court JNC 
nominated the only African-American or Caribbean-American applicant who was 
constitutionally ineligible to fill either vacancy. 
 
- 20 - 
POLSTON, J., concurring in result only. 
Representative Thompson filed a petition seeking a writ of quo warranto and 
a writ of mandamus.  At the heart of the petition for both writs is her specifically 
requested relief seeking to compel the JNC to certify a new list of nominees (with 
strong consideration of the other African-American applicants who had originally 
applied) and to compel the Governor to appoint an individual from that new list.  
Because this relief cannot be granted and her petition does not include a request for 
any other relief that the Court deems appropriate in its discretion, the petition must 
be denied.  Moreover, the petition for a writ for quo warranto must be denied 
because the Governor has not yet issued a commission for Judge Francis, the 
official act of appointment.  Although the Governor does not have the authority to 
appoint someone ineligible, he has not yet done so by announcing Judge Francis as 
his selection. 
Although Representative Thompson could have filed a mandamus petition to 
require the Governor to immediately appoint someone else from the existing 
certified list, because he is outside the constitutionally mandated time period to do 
so, she chose to not do so.  We cannot make this case into something it is not by 
providing a remedy not requested.  Accordingly, I concur in result only to deny 
this petition. 
 
- 21 - 
I.  ANALYSIS 
Article V, section 8 of the Florida Constitution sets forth the following 
eligibility requirements for justices of this Court: 
No person shall be eligible for office of justice or judge of any court 
unless the person is an elector of the state and resides in the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court.  No justice or judge shall serve after attaining 
the age of seventy-five years except upon temporary assignment.  No 
person is eligible for the office of justice of the supreme court or judge 
of a district court of appeal unless the person is, and has been for the 
preceding ten years, a member of the bar of Florida. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Here, it is undisputed that Judge Francis will not meet the eligibility 
requirement of having been a member of the Florida Bar for the preceding 10 years 
until September 24, 2020.  However, I would deny Representative Thompson’s 
writ petition because the challenge to the composition of the JNC’s list for 2 
vacancies is now moot, because the petition fails to demonstrate that the Governor 
has exceeded his authority, and because the petition fails to establish that the JNC 
and the Governor have clear and indisputable duties to perform the requested 
actions.9 
 
 
9.  The Respondents invite this Court to revisit and clarify our precedent 
regarding standing and jurisdiction in extraordinary writ proceedings, but I would 
decline to do so at this time.  
 
- 22 - 
A.  JNC List 
Although the petition focuses primarily upon Judge Francis’ inclusion on the 
JNC list certified to the Governor, Representative Thompson’s challenge involves 
the composition of the entire list and the whole process.  For example, the petition 
states that “the entire process for filling the vacancy in question was corrupted by 
the JNC including an ineligible nominee on the list of individuals it certified to the 
Governor.”  And in the motion to disqualify Justice Couriel from this case, 
Representative Thompson reiterates that the petition “challenges the legality of the 
process which resulted in Justice Couriel being appointed to the Florida Supreme 
Court.” 
To the extent the petition challenges the composition of the JNC list for the 
2 vacancies, I conclude that the issue is moot.  Cf. Tyler v. Peacock, 124 So. 463, 
464 (Fla. 1929) (dismissing the case because the issue of whether the county 
commissioners should be prohibited from placing a particular name on the ballot 
for the office of county judge was moot after the election); Gill v. City of N. Miami 
Beach, 156 So. 2d 182, 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (“Inasmuch as the election sought 
to be enjoined has already been held, the issues presented by this appeal have 
become moot.”).  Justice Couriel has since assumed office and participated in 
cases.  To be clear, there is no dispute regarding Justice Couriel’s constitutional 
eligibility to hold office.  Allowing citizen taxpayers to attack the composition of a 
 
- 23 - 
list of nominees after judges are seated and deciding cases would undermine the 
judiciary and the interests of justice.10 
Furthermore, this is not a situation where a JNC certified a list and then a 
governor selected from that list very quickly, leaving one without opportunity to 
challenge the JNC’s authority regarding the list’s composition.  Here, the JNC 
certified its list on January 23, 2020, and Governor DeSantis selected two 
individuals from that list on May 26, 2010.  There was ample time to file a 
challenge between those 2 dates.  In fact, within that time (on February 14, 2020), 
Representative Thompson authored an opinion column, which she included in the 
appendix to her petition, asserting that Judge Francis was ineligible and should not 
have been included on the JNC list.  However, Representative Thompson waited 
until July 13, 2020 to file the instant petition.11 
Accordingly, because I conclude the issue is now moot, I do not address the 
merits of the challenge to the composition of the JNC list. 
 
 
10.  This Court has also recognized that the doctrine of laches can bar 
consideration of unreasonably delayed writ petitions where the delay prejudices the 
judicial process.  See, e.g., McCray v. State, 699 So. 2d 1366, 1368 (Fla. 1997). 
 
11.  Florida courts have also recognized that the delayed assertion of an 
argument can waive consideration of its merits.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 960 
So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). 
 
- 24 - 
B.  Governor DeSantis’ Selection 
Representative Thompson alleges that Governor DeSantis exceeded his 
authority in selecting Judge Francis for appointment to this Court because she was 
not yet eligible for office when she was nominated or selected.  However, I 
disagree. 
In Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 707 (Fla. 2011), this Court stated, “The 
term ‘quo warranto’ means ‘by what authority,’ and the writ is the proper means 
for inquiring into whether a particular individual has improperly exercised a power 
or right derived from the State.”  Further, in League of Women Voters of Fla. v. 
Scott, 232 So. 3d 264, 265 (Fla. 2017), this Court explained that “the history of the 
extraordinary writ reflects that petitions for relief in quo warranto are properly 
filed only after a public official has acted.” 
“The interpretation of a constitutional provision involves ‘a question of law.’ 
”  Adv. Op. to the Gov. re Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration 
Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of 
Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc. (FACDL), 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008)).  And 
“[f]irst and foremost, this Court must examine the actual language used in the 
Constitution.”  Id. (quoting Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So. 3d 597, 603 (Fla. 
2013)).  “ ‘If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in 
issue,’ then our task is at an end.”  Id. (quoting Graham, 108 So. 3d at 603).  
 
- 25 - 
Further, this Court gives the text its “plain, obvious, and common sense” meaning, 
“unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”  Id. 
(quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 157-
58 (1833)). 
Article V, section 11 of the Florida Constitution provides the following: 
(a) Whenever a vacancy occurs in a judicial office to which 
election for retention applies, the governor shall fill the vacancy by 
appointing for a term ending on the first Tuesday after the first 
Monday in January of the year following the next general election 
occurring at least one year after the date of appointment, one of not 
fewer than three persons nor more than six persons nominated by the 
appropriate judicial nominating commission. 
. . . . 
(c) The nominations shall be made within thirty days from the 
occurrence of a vacancy unless the period is extended by the governor 
for a time not to exceed thirty days.  The governor shall make the 
appointment within sixty days after the nominations have been 
certified to the governor. 
 
Nothing in article V, section 11 specifies that the Governor must only select 
nominees certified by the JNC that are eligible under article V, section 8 on the 
date of certification or the date of selection.  Instead, the text of section 11 requires 
a governor to appoint from the nominations certified by the JNC, and Governor 
DeSantis has stated his intention to do so in regard to Judge Francis.  The plain 
meaning of section 11 does not foreclose the possibility of an individual becoming 
eligible between the time a governor selects that individual from the JNC list and 
the time the individual assumes office. 
 
- 26 - 
Representative Thompson appears to argue that sections 8 and 11 of article 
V must be read together to require a governor to only select currently eligible 
nominees or only those that were eligible when nominated by the JNC, but those 
readings would be inappropriately adding words to the constitution in order to 
connect the eligibility requirements for justices in section 8 to the governor’s 
responsibilities to fill judicial vacancies in section 11.  And “[w]e [must] remain 
mindful that in construing a constitutional provision, we are not at liberty to add 
words that were not placed there originally or to ignore words that were expressly 
placed there at the time of adoption of the provision.”  Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 
941, 945 (Fla. 2009). 
This Court’s precedent regarding the timing of when candidates for judicial 
office must meet the bar and residency eligibility requirements of article V, section 
8 also supports my conclusion that the Governor has not exceeded his authority.  In 
Miller v. Mendez, 804 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2001), this Court held “that a 
candidate for judicial office must be a resident of the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court at the time he or she assumes office,” disapproving the conclusion “that the 
residence requirement refers to residence at the time of qualifying or taking the 
oath of candidate.”  Further, in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 192 So. 2d 
757, 759 (Fla. 1966), this Court stated that the bar membership eligibility 
requirement “refer[s] to eligibility at the time of assuming office and not at the 
 
- 27 - 
time of qualification or election to office.”  This precedent makes sense given the 
text of article V, section 8 provides that “[n]o person is eligible for the office of 
justice of the supreme court . . . unless the person is, and has been for the preceding 
ten years, a member of the bar of Florida.”  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, the 
text of section 8 plainly addresses eligibility for “office,” not eligibility for 
“nomination” or “selection.”  Compare art. V, § 8, Fla. Const. with art. V, § 3(a), 
Fla. Const. (“Of the seven justices, each appellate district shall have at least one 
justice elected or appointed from the district to the supreme court who is a resident 
of the district at the time of the original appointment or election.” (emphasis 
added)). 
Additionally, as acknowledged by the petition, Governor DeSantis has not 
appointed Judge Francis under this Court’s precedent because she has not yet 
received a commission for her to assume office that has been attested by the 
Secretary of State.  In State ex rel. Lawson v. Page, 250 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 
1971), this Court held that “[w]here, as in this case, no election by the voters or 
approval by the State Senate are required, a simple statement or letter of intent 
from the Governor saying he was appointing a person to office would not be final 
and valid unless and until a commission is executed by the Governor and attested 
by the Secretary of State.”  Here, on May 26, 2020, Governor DeSantis announced 
that he was appointing Judge Francis to this Court and that she would take office 
 
- 28 - 
on September 24, 2020.  The letter from Governor DeSantis to Judge Francis 
indicated that she soon would be receiving qualifying papers from the Department 
of State that would need to be filed before assuming office.  However, according to 
the Governor’s response, Judge Francis has not yet received a commission.  
Therefore, pursuant to Page, Governor DeSantis’ selection of Judge Francis from 
the JNC list cannot be considered a final appointment to this Court.  And because 
Judge Francis has not yet been appointed, Governor DeSantis could not have 
exceeded his authority by appointing an ineligible individual. 
Of course, under this Court’s precedent, Governor DeSantis would have 
exceeded his authority had he gone ahead and executed a commission for Judge 
Francis to assume office while she was ineligible.  In In re Advisory Opinion to the 
Governor, 192 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1966), this Court advised Governor Burns that 
he was “not authorized to sign [the] commission as provided by Section 14 of 
Article IV of the Florida Constitution for the term commencing January 3, 1967” 
because the individual would not have been a member of the Florida Bar for the 
constitutionally required number of years.  Similarly, in Advisory Opinion to the 
Governor re Commission of Elected Judge, 17 So. 3d 265, 267 (Fla. 2009), this 
Court advised Governor Crist that he was “not authorized to sign the commission 
of a circuit judge-elect under suspension from the practice of law at the time he is 
to take office” because “a lawyer who is suspended from the practice of law fails to 
 
- 29 - 
satisfy the constitutional eligibility requirements.”  However, according to the 
Governor’s response, Judge Francis has not received an executed commission. 
Accordingly, because the petition fails to demonstrate that Governor 
DeSantis exceeded his authority in selecting Judge Francis for appointment, I 
would deny quo warranto relief. 
C.  Mandamus 
Representative Thompson’s petition also requests a writ of mandamus to 
compel the JNC to immediately nominate 6 individuals to fill the remaining 
vacancy on this Court from those individuals who originally applied for 2 
vacancies and who were eligible to hold office as of January 23, 2020.  
Representative Thompson’s petition strongly urges the JNC to consider, in 
composing the new list, the 6 African-Americans who originally applied and were 
eligible on January 23.  Then, her petition asks this Court to compel Governor 
DeSantis to immediately appoint to this Court someone from the new list.  
However, because the JNC and the Governor do not have indisputable legal duties 
to perform these actions, I would deny mandamus relief. 
“In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus the petitioner must have a 
clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable 
legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other 
adequate remedy available.”  Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000). 
 
- 30 - 
In Pleus, 14 So. 3d 941, this Court granted a mandamus petition to compel 
Governor Crist to fill a vacancy on the Fifth District Court of Appeal and appoint a 
nominee from the JNC’s list within 60 days of the certification.  Governor Crist 
had rejected the list as certified and “requested that the JNC reconvene to consider 
the applications of three African-Americans who had applied to fill the vacancy.”  
Id. at 943.  In Pleus, this Court explained that article V, section 11 “requires the 
Governor to adhere to his duty to make an appointment within the mandated time 
frame from the certified list of nominees.”  Id. at 945.  But here, Representative 
Thompson is not seeking a mandamus writ to compel Governor DeSantis to 
immediately appoint an eligible nominee from the list as certified.  This Court’s 
decision in Pleus supports such a request since the Governor has failed to make an 
appointment within the constitutionally mandated time.  Instead though, 
Representative Thompson’s mandamus petition seeks to compel the JNC to do 
what this Court is Pleus determined that the Governor had no authority to do, 
namely compel the JNC to reconvene and certify a new list from the original 
applicants, reconsidering previously rejected African-American applicants to 
increase the diversity of the judiciary.  While a diverse judiciary is an important 
and worthy goal, the JNC simply does not have a clear and indisputable duty to 
reconvene and certify a new list of 6 for 1 vacancy from the 31 applicants who 
 
- 31 - 
applied to fill 2 vacancies, and the Governor does not have the clear duty to 
appoint from such a list. 
 
Accordingly, I would deny mandamus relief. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the challenge to the composition of the JNC list is now moot, 
the petition has not established that Governor DeSantis exceeded his authority, and 
the JNC and the Governor do not have indisputable legal duties to perform the 
requested actions.  Accordingly, I concur in result only to deny the petition for 
writs of quo warranto and mandamus. 
Original Proceeding – Quo Warranto 
 
William R. Ponall of Ponall Law, Maitland, Florida, and Lisabeth J. Fryer of 
Lisabeth J. Fryer, P.A., Sanford, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner, Geraldine F. Thompson, in her Official Capacity as 
Representative in the Florida House of Representatives 
 
Joe Jacquot, General Counsel, Nicholas A. Primrose and Kasey B. O’Connor, 
Deputy General Counsel, and Joshua E. Pratt, Assistant General Counsel, 
Executive Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Respondent, The Honorable Ron DeSantis, in his Official Capacity as 
Governor of Florida 
 
Daniel E. Nordby of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Respondent, Daniel E. Nordby, in his Official Capacity as Chair of the 
Florida Supreme Court Nominating Commission 
 
 
- 32 - 
Jesse Panuccio, Commissioner, Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Commission, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Commission