Title: Commonwealth v. Soto

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12074 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ALEXANDER SOTO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 7, 2016. - February 9, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, 
& Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Trial of indictments together, 
Dismissal.  Youthful Offender Act.  Statute, Construction.  
Jurisdiction, Juvenile, Superior Court.  Juvenile Court, 
Jurisdiction.  Superior Court, Jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 2, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney (Mark A. Hallal & 
Montez D. Haywood, Assistant District Attorneys, also present) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
Benjamin L. Falkner for the defendant. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  Alexander Soto, a juvenile, was indicted in the 
Superior Court for murder in the first degree and for related 
offenses under G. L. c. 119, § 74.  A judge in the Superior 
 
 
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Court dismissed the nonmurder indictments, ruling that the 
nonmurder charges must be brought first in the Juvenile Court by 
a complaint for delinquency or a youthful offender indictment 
prior to joinder with the murder indictments.  The Commonwealth 
appealed, and we granted its application for direct appellate 
review.  We conclude, based on the plain language of G. L. 
c. 119, § 74, and the overarching statutory scheme governing the 
treatment of juveniles charged with a violation of the criminal 
law, that when a juvenile is indicted for murder, nonmurder 
offenses that are properly joined with the murder indictment 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (1), 378 Mass. 859 (1979), must be 
brought in the Superior Court.  Therefore, we reverse the order 
allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss the nonmurder 
indictments and remand the matter to the Superior Court. 
 
Background.  On November 5, 2014, the defendant and two 
codefendants were involved in a shooting that resulted in the 
death of Ryan Morrissey and serious injury to James Lawton.  In 
April, 2015, a Suffolk County grand jury returned five 
indictments against the defendant:  (1) murder, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 1; (2) armed assault with the intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18 (b); (3) assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, causing serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A (c) (i); (4) unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a); and (5) unlawful possession of a loaded 
 
 
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firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  Because the defendant was 
seventeen years old at the time of the shooting, the 
Commonwealth brought the indictments in the Superior Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 74. 
 
After the arraignment on the murder indictment, the court 
deferred arraignment on the nonmurder indictments for reasons 
that are not apparent on the record.  The Commonwealth filed a 
motion for joinder of the nonmurder indictments under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 9 (a) (1).  The defendant countered with a motion to 
dismiss the nonmurder indictments, arguing that these charges 
could be properly joined with the murder indictment only after 
being brought first in the Juvenile Court and transferred to the 
Superior Court as provided in G. L. c. 211B, § 9 (x).1  This 
statute vests authority in the Chief Justice of the Trial Court 
to consolidate cases pending in different departments of the 
Trial Court and to assign a justice of one Trial Court 
department to sit as a justice in another Trial Court 
department.  More specifically, the defendant claimed that the 
Commonwealth was required to bring the unlawful possession of a 
firearm charge as a delinquency complaint and the remainder of 
                     
 
1 This procedure contemplates an entirely different set of 
circumstances involving separate cases and the same parties that 
have been filed in different trial court departments.  Here, 
there is only one case against the juvenile defendant. 
 
 
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the nonmurder counts as youthful offender indictments in the 
Juvenile Court. 
 
After a nonevidentiary hearing on the motions, the judge 
denied the Commonwealth's motion for joinder and granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss.  In allowing the defendant's 
motion to dismiss, the judge ruled that a juvenile defendant "is 
not automatically subject to indictment, arraignment, trial, or 
sentencing as an adult on . . . non-murder charges . . . that he 
faces by sole reason that those charges arise from the same 
circumstances upon which his murder indictment is based."  In 
addition, the judge cited to two Superior Court cases in which 
the Commonwealth followed the G. L. c. 211B, § 9 (x), 
interdepartmental transfer procedure it opposes in this case.  
This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  This appeal presents 
an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  
See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 531 (2015). 
 
2.  Statutory interpretation.  In deciding the question 
before us, we apply well-settled rules of statutory 
interpretation.  "[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first 
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, 
and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is 
to enforce it according to its terms."  Commonwealth v. Dalton, 
467 Mass. 555, 557 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 
 
 
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Mass. 337, 347 (2010).  "Where the language is clear and 
unambiguous, it is to be given its 'ordinary meaning,'" 
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 775 (2000), and "it is 
conclusive as to the intent of the Legislature."  Commissioner 
of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 446 
Mass. 123, 124 (2006). 
 
Thus, we begin with the relevant statutory language: 
 
 
"The juvenile court shall not have jurisdiction over a 
person who had at the time of the offense attained the age 
of fourteen but not yet attained the age of [eighteen] who 
is charged with committing murder in the first or second 
degree.  Complaints and indictments brought against persons 
for such offenses, and for other criminal offenses properly 
joined under [Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (1)], shall be 
brought in accordance with the usual course and manner of 
criminal proceedings." 
 
G. L. c. 119, § 74.  The plain language of the statute sets 
forth two directives essential to our determination whether 
nonmurder indictments related to a juvenile defendant's murder 
indictment must be brought in the Superior Court:  (1) it 
unequivocally divests the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction over a 
juvenile charged with murder; and (2) it dictates the procedure 
for disposition of complaints and indictments against a juvenile 
charged with murder.  As we explain, both the jurisdictional 
limitation and the mandated procedure for the disposition of 
charges against juveniles charged with murder are incompatible 
 
 
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with a requirement that related nonmurder offenses be brought 
first in the Juvenile Court.  We discuss each in turn. 
 
a.  Jurisdictional limitation.  The statutory language 
divesting the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction over a juvenile 
charged with murder and transferring jurisdiction over the 
"person" to the Superior Court manifests a clear legislative 
intent to exclude this class of juveniles from the protections 
afforded to all other juveniles charged with violations of the 
criminal law.  This intent is evident from G. L. c. 119, § 53,2 
which excludes § 74 from the mandate that delinquency 
proceedings "shall be liberally construed so that . . . 
[children] shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children 
in need of aid, encouragement and guidance."  Accordingly, 
juveniles charged with murder are not entitled to the benefit of 
a juvenile justice system that is "primarily rehabilitative, 
cognizant of the inherent differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders, and geared toward 'the correction and redemption to 
society of delinquent children.'"  Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 
464 Mass. 807, 814 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 119, § 53, provides:  "Sections [52] to 
[63], inclusive, shall be liberally construed so that the care, 
custody and discipline of the children brought before the court 
shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should 
receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, 
they shall be treated, not as criminals but as children in need 
of aid, encouragement and guidance.  Proceedings against 
children under said sections shall not be deemed criminal 
proceedings." 
 
 
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461 Mass. 459, 461 (2012).  Read together, G. L. c. 119, §§ 53 
and 74, impose a jurisdictional boundary that eliminates the 
role of the Juvenile Court in the prosecution of juveniles 
charged with murder.  The transfer procedure urged by the 
defendant would flout the legislative intent by preserving 
protections unavailable in the adult system, including the more 
favorable sentencing options under G. L. c. 119, § 58,3 for the 
nonmurder offenses.  Therefore, in deference to the clear 
legislative intent that juveniles charged with murder be treated 
as adults under the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, we 
decline to interpret the statute in a manner that would defeat 
that purpose.  See Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 827 
(2012) (Lenk, J., concurring) ("juveniles indicted for murder in 
any degree must be treated as adults in all respects" [emphasis 
in original]). 
 
b.  Procedure under G. L. c. 119, § 74.  Although we have 
not directly addressed whether complaints or indictments for 
                     
 
3 Section 58 provides that where a juvenile is adjudicated 
delinquent, "Juvenile Court judges have broad 'discretion . . . 
to render individualized dispositions consistent with the best 
interests of the child,'" including placing the case on file, 
placing the child in the care of a probation officer, or 
committing the child to the custody of the Department of Youth 
Services (department).  Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 
627, 631 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 
807, 808 (2013), and citing G. L. c. 119, § 58.  Where the child 
is adjudicated a youthful offender, the Juvenile Court judge has 
the authority to impose "a sentence provided by law," a 
combination sentence, or commitment to the department until the 
age of twenty-one.  G. L. c. 119, § 58. 
 
 
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related nonmurder charges must be brought in adult criminal 
proceedings, the procedural framework underlying G. L. c. 119, 
§ 74, points to the Superior Court as the sole venue for such 
cases.  First, the statute expressly authorizes the joinder of 
murder and nonmurder charges so long as they are "properly 
joined" under Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (1).  This rule permits 
joinder of "related" offenses, defined as conduct "aris[ing] out 
of a course of criminal conduct or series of criminal episodes 
connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or 
plan."  Id.  Rule 9 (a) (1) is the sole test for joinder, and 
nothing in the statute implies a legislative intent to encumber 
the trial of related nonmurder charges with an extraneous 
transfer procedure at odds with the method for joinder expressly 
provided in G. L. c. 119, § 74.  Indeed, to compel the 
Commonwealth to follow the G. L. c. 211B, § 9 (x), 
interdepartmental transfer procedure would require that we "read 
into the statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there" (citation omitted).  Chin, 470 Mass. at 537.  
We decline to do so. 
 
Our conclusion that the Legislature intended to establish 
rule 9 (a) (1) as the sole test for joinder of murder and 
related nonmurder offenses is buttressed by the public safety 
policy underlying the mandate in G. L. c. 119, § 74, to treat 
juvenile defendants charged with murder as adults.  The joinder 
 
 
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rule insures that a juvenile charged with murder is treated as 
an adult for the totality of the conduct related to the murder 
charge, eliminating the possibility that the conduct that does 
not cause death would be adjudicated and punished differently 
from how related criminal conduct that does cause death is.  Put 
simply, an interpretation of the statute to permit a juvenile 
defendant charged with murder to straddle the jurisdictional 
fence between the Juvenile Court and the Superior Court would 
undermine this policy imperative. 
 
Last, we address the defendant's argument that the 
provision in G. L. c. 119, § 74, that complaints and indictments 
"shall be brought in accordance with the usual course and manner 
of criminal proceedings" cannot be interpreted to mean that 
nonmurder charges must be initiated as adult criminal 
proceedings where the Legislature used identical language in 
G. L. c. 119, § 54, which applies only to juvenile proceedings.  
We agree that the phrase does not mean that the nonmurder charge 
must be brought in the Superior Court as a criminal offense.  
Nor can such meaning be imputed to the phrase as it is used in 
§ 54 with respect to youthful offender complaints and 
indictments.  Our interpretation of this language does not 
advance the defendant's position, however, because we do not 
rely on this phrase in concluding that the nonmurder charges 
related to a juvenile defendant's murder charge must be brought 
 
 
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in the Superior Court.  The phrase "shall be brought in 
accordance with the usual course and manner of criminal 
proceedings" specifies not where the charges are to be brought, 
but rather what procedures are to be applied in the trial of the 
case.  In other words, the phrase as it is used in § 74, in the 
context of a murder charge against a juvenile, means that the 
procedures used in criminal proceedings apply to complaints and 
indictments brought against juvenile defendants for murder in 
any degree and for properly joined nonmurder offenses.  See 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. at 631 n.2, citing G. L. c. 119, § 74 
(noting that "juveniles between the ages of fourteen and 
[eighteen] who have been charged with murder in the first or 
second degree . . . must be prosecuted as an adult in the 
Superior Court, in accordance with the usual course and manner 
of criminal proceedings"); Walczak, 463 Mass. at 827 (Lenk, J., 
concurring) ("By [G. L. c. 119, § 74,] so limiting the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, the act required that a 
juvenile indicted for murder be tried 'in accordance with the 
usual course and manner of criminal proceedings' applicable to 
adult defendants in the Superior Court").  Thus, contrary to the 
defendant's argument, we see no conflict with Commonwealth v. 
Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 865-866 (2001), which involved only 
the joinder of a juvenile delinquency complaint and a youthful 
offender indictment for trial in the Juvenile Court. 
 
 
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Conclusion.  Where a juvenile has been indicted for murder 
under G. L. c. 119, § 74, Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a) (1) is the 
sole test for whether related offenses must be initiated in 
Superior Court.  If the related nonmurder offenses are properly 
joined with the murder offense under the rule, the Commonwealth 
may proceed to trial in the Superior Court without the necessity 
of a transfer procedure.  Therefore, we reverse the order 
allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss the nonmurder 
indictments, and remand this case to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.