Title: In re Walker

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In re: Anthony D. Walker and Denicia P. Walker, Misc. No. 8, September Term 2020.  
Opinion by Hotten, J.  
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – LIENS 
 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland requested the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland to answer the following certified question:  
 
Can a community association’s lien perfected under the Maryland Contract 
Lien Act, Md. Code Ann., Real Property (“Real Prop.”) §§ 14-201[–206] 
secure unpaid damages, costs of collection, late charges, and attorney’s fees 
arising under the association’s governing documents that accrue subsequent 
to the recordation of the lien? 
 
Pursuant to Md. Code Ann., §§ 12-601–613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland answered the certified question in the negative.  The 
Court of Appeals held that the Maryland Contract Lien Act, Real Prop. §§ 14-201–206 
does not permit a lien that secures unpaid damages, costs, charges, and fees which accrue 
after the recordation of the lien, otherwise known as a continuing lien.  The Court of 
Appeals determined that the Maryland Contract Lien Act’s plain text, legislative history, 
relevant case law, and comparison with other statutes precluded community associations 
from using a continuing lien to secure debts, as a matter of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Bankruptcy Court  
for the District of Maryland 
Case No.  18-23752-NVA 
Argued: February 4, 2021 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. No. 8 
 
September Term, 2020 
 
__________________________________ 
 
IN RE: ANTHONY D. WALKER AND 
DENICIA P. WALKER 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 30, 2021 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-03-30 11:49-04:00
The Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act,1 Maryland Code, §§ 
12-601–613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”) empowers 
this Court to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States . . . if 
the answer may be determinative of an issue in a pending litigation in the certifying court 
and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this 
State.”  Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-603.  This Court has been asked to answer the following 
certified question of law by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Maryland (“the Bankruptcy Court”):   
Can a community association’s lien perfected under the Maryland Contract 
Lien Act, Md. Code Ann., Real Property. (“Real Prop.”) §§ 14-201[–206] 
secure unpaid damages, costs of collection, late charges, and attorney’s fees 
arising under the association’s governing documents that accrue subsequent 
to the recordation of the lien? 
 
We answer this question in the negative.  For reasons to be explained, we hold that 
the Maryland Contract Lien Act (“MCLA”) does not permit liens that secure unpaid 
damages, costs, charges, and fees which accrue after the recordation of the lien. 
 
1 [The] Maryland [General Assembly] adopted the first version of the 
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act in 1972 as part of a uniform 
code promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (also known as the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) and codified 
the Act as Article 26 §§ 161 to 172.  1972 Md. Laws, ch. 427.  The following 
year, Article 26 was recodified as the [Cts. & Jud. Proc.] Article.  1973 Md. 
Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 2.  In 1995, the Uniform Law Commission issued 
a new model Certification of Questions of Law statute, which Maryland then 
adopted in 1996.  1996 Md. Laws, ch. 344.  The Maryland Uniform 
Certification of Questions of Law Act is currently codified at [Cts. & Jud. 
Proc.] §§ 12-601 to 12-613, Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.).   
 
United Bank v. Buckingham, Misc. No. 1, Sept. Term, 2020, 2021 WL 865246, at *1 n.1 
(Md. Mar. 9, 2021). 
 
2 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In accordance with Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-605(a), “the court certifying a question 
of law” to this Court “shall issue a certification order.”  Pursuant to Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-
606(a)(2), the certification order must contain “[t]he facts relevant to the question, showing 
fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose[.]”  We accept the facts 
provided by the certifying court, Price v. Murdy, 462 Md. 145, 147, 198 A.3d 798, 799 
(2018), and supplement with additional facts as necessary. 
The Underlying Incident 
Appellee and debtor, Denicia P. Walker,2 purchased a unit at the Long Reach Knolls 
Condominium, Inc. (“Appellant”) in Columbia, Maryland.  Walker formally accepted the 
deed on June 30, 2000.  Appellant serves as the governing body of the condominium unit 
owners.  Unit owners must adhere to Appellant’s bylaws and the Maryland Condominium 
Act (“MCA”), Real Prop. §§ 11-101–143.3  Appellant’s bylaws require unit owners to pay 
monthly “assessments” or fees, which Appellant uses to cover common expenses, 
including insurance, landscaping, property management, and improvement of common 
areas.   
 
2 Denicia Walker married co-debtor Anthony D. Walker after she purchased the 
property.  An ownership interest was never conveyed to Anthony Walker. 
 
3 “In exchange for the benefits of owning property in common, condominium 
owners agree to be bound by the rules governing the administration, maintenance, and use 
of the property.”  Ridgely Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Smyrnioudis, 343 Md. 357, 359, 681 
A.2d 494, 495 (1996) (footnote omitted).  Condominium rules and bylaws must conform 
with the MCA, which “regulates the formation, management, and termination of 
condominiums in Maryland.”  Id. at 360, 681 A.2d at 495.  
 
3 
 
Walker defaulted multiple times on her monthly assessments.  While Appellant has 
never restricted Walker’s access to common areas, it recorded eight liens against Walker’s 
unit between December 31, 2002, and April 4, 2014.  The liens secured unpaid assessments, 
interest, and attorney’s fees.  Appellant also obtained three personal judgments against 
Walker during this time span. 
On October 6, 2015, Appellant notified Walker of its intent to record a ninth lien 
against her unit to secure unpaid assessments, interest, and attorney’s fees arising on or 
after January 1, 2015.  The lien notice stated that it would secure $4,702.80 in unpaid 
damages owed as of October 6, 2015, “plus all sums becoming due thereafter[.]”  Walker 
neither paid the owed amount nor challenged the intended lien.  Appellant recorded its 
ninth lien on December 22, 2015 and obtained a fourth personal judgment against Walker 
in the District Court of Maryland for Howard County on August 9, 2016.  The court entered 
a judgment of $13,933.99 against Walker, which included unpaid assessments from 
January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2016.  
Legal Proceedings 
Walker filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief on January 12, 2017.  The Bankruptcy 
Court denied Walker’s Chapter 13 plan without leave to amend on August 17, 2017 and 
dismissed Walker’s case on September 8, 2017.  Walker paid four monthly assessments 
between January and September 2017.  Walker filed a second petition for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy on September 11, 2017.  The Bankruptcy Court denied Walker’s Chapter 13 
plan without leave to amend on September 24, 2018.  The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the 
 
4 
 
second petition on October 16, 2018.  Walker paid three monthly assessments during the 
pendency of the second petition. 
Walker filed a third petition for Chapter 13 relief on October 16, 2018.  Appellant 
filed proof of a secured claim for $42,298.89 on October 31, 2018.4  This amount partly 
consisted of assessments, interest, and other costs that did not accrue until after Appellant 
recorded its ninth lien.   
Walker objected to Appellant’s proof of secured claim on August 5, 2019.  Walker 
asserted that the MCLA does not permit a lien to secure assessments, costs of collection, 
and attorney’s fees that accrue following the recordation of the lien.  Appellant filed a 
response on August 29, 2019.  The parties agreed to petition the Bankruptcy Court to certify 
the instant question to this Court.  The parties also agreed to a joint stipulation of facts and 
documents on February 19, 2020.  At the time of the joint stipulation, Walker had not paid 
a monthly assessment since August 29, 2019.  According to Appellant, Walker resumed 
making monthly payments beginning April 28, 2020, but remains in default of her post-
bankruptcy petition assessments.  The Bankruptcy Court ordered certification on 
September 23, 2020. 
 
 
4 A proof of secured claim indicates the amount of secured debt that the debtor owed 
a creditor on the date of the bankruptcy filing.  When calculating the total debt owed, the 
United States Bankruptcy Court, Official Form 410, part 2:7, permits creditors to include 
“in addition to [the] principal amount, . . . interest, fees, expenses, or other charges[.]”  Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 3001(c)(2)(A).  Walker owed Appellant a principal judgment balance of 
$24,205.89 at the time of bankruptcy filing.  Appellant added $18,093.00 to this claim, 
reflecting subsequent delinquent assessments, interest, attorney’s fees and costs that 
accrued subsequently to the lien’s recordation, for a total secured claim of $42,298.89. 
 
5 
 
DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
This Court may answer a question of law certified by a federal court if “the answer 
may be determinative of an issue . . . in the certifying court and there is no controlling 
appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.”  Fangman v. Genuine 
Title, LLC, 447 Md. 681, 690, 136 A.3d 772, 777 (2016) (citing Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-
603).  This Court cabins its review of certified questions to issues of Maryland law, not to 
issues of fact.  Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 681, 756 A.2d 526, 
531 (2000).  This Court “may go no further than the question certified.”  Price, 462 Md. at 
147, 198 A.3d at 799 (quoting AGV Sports Grp., Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 417 Md. 
386, 389 n.1, 10 A.3d 745, 746 n.1 (2010)). 
The certified question of law concerns the interpretation of the MCLA.  Statutory 
interpretation requires ascertaining and effectuating the intent of the General Assembly.  
Montgomery County v. Phillips, 445 Md. 55, 62, 124 A.3d 188, 192 (2015).  We review 
questions of statutory interpretation under a de novo standard of review without deference 
to other courts’ interpretation of the statute.  Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 257, 884 
A.2d 1171, 1179 (2005) (citing Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 66-67, 871 A.2d 575, 577 
(2005)). 
Parties Contentions 
According to Appellant, as long as a lien complies with the procedural requirement 
for creation under the MCLA, a lien can secure unpaid damages that arise after the 
 
6 
 
recordation of the lien.5  In short, Appellant argues that the MCLA permits continuing 
liens.6 
For Appellant, the strongest support for continuing liens comes from the plain text 
of the statute, which neither prohibits continuing liens, nor requires a lienholder to impose 
a new lien to secure additional unpaid damages that arise after a lien’s recordation.  
According to Appellant, finding a prohibition against continuing liens in the MCLA would 
impermissibly require the insertion of new language “as to reflect an intent not evidenced 
in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute[.]”  Woznicki v. GEICO Gen. Ins. 
Co., 443 Md. 93, 108, 115 A.3d 152, 161 (2015) (quoting Stickley v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 431 Md. 347, 358-59, 65 A.3d 141, 148 (2013)). 
Appellant also notes that this Court has never held that the MCLA requires multiple 
liens to secure unpaid sums arising from a single contract.  Instead, the past cases of this 
Court have focused on the purpose of the MCLA in creating a framework for recording 
and enforcing liens that accord with the minimum requirements of due process.  See, e.g., 
Golden Sands Club Condo., Inc. v. Waller, 313 Md. 484, 495, 545 A.2d 1332, 1337-38 
 
5 These subsequent damages must also be provided by contract, governing bylaws, 
or statute. 
 
6 The Supreme Court defined a continuing lien as one “cover[ing] property or rights 
to property in the delinquent’s hands at any time prior to expiration.”  Glass City Bank of 
Jeanette, Pa. v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267, 66 S. Ct. 108, 110 (1945).  A continuing 
lien, in the context of a condominium association lien, constitutes not only the amount 
claimed in the lien, but the aggregate of unpaid charges, fees, and interest that have accrued 
since its recordation.  See Bd. of Mgrs. of Netherlands Condo. v. Trencher, 128 A.D.3d 
452, 453, 9 N.Y.S.3d 213, 214 (1st Dept. 2015) (“plaintiff is entitled to not only the amount 
claimed in the lien, but also the amount of unpaid common charges and fees that have 
accrued since the filing of the lien[.]”) (emphasis added). 
 
7 
 
(1988) (“We hold that procedural due process does not prevent the approach to hearing 
which the [General Assembly] has taken [under the MCLA].  In balancing the interests of 
the parties, the General Assembly has looked to economy, efficiency, and minimal 
involvement of the judiciary.  At the same time, it has given the unit owner a reasonably 
simple and not unduly expensive way to secure a hearing and judicial action as prerequisites 
to the creation of a lien on the unit.”) (emphasis added).      
Appellant contends that a continuing lien satisfies the minimum requirements of due 
process outlined by this Court in Golden Sands because continuing liens conserve time and 
expense for unit owners, condominiums, and the judiciary without increasing the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of the unit owner’s property.  See id. at 495, 545 A.2d at 1338 (citing 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976)) (“[D]ue process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: [f]irst, the private interest that will 
be affected . . . second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, . . . the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.”).  The interest of a council of unit owners would be furthered by conserving time 
and expense in filing multiple liens.  A continuing lien also protects the interests of the 
entire condominium because it ensures that accruing costs and interests from a delinquent 
unit owner are covered by a single lien.  Unit owners meanwhile would still receive prior 
notice and an opportunity to challenge putative charges in a formal proceeding before the 
lien is recorded.  Requiring successive liens would not in any meaningful way decrease the 
 
8 
 
risk of erroneous deprivation of a unit owner’s property interests compared to a continuing 
lien. 
Appellant argues that prohibiting continuing liens could produce absurd results and 
deleterious consequences for both condominium associations as a whole and individual 
unit owners.  See Blue v. Prince George’s County, 434 Md. 681, 689, 76 A.3d 1129, 1133 
(2013) (“An examination of interpretive consequences, either as a comparison of the results 
of each proffered construction, or as a principle of avoidance of an absurd or unreasonable 
reading, grounds the court’s interpretation in reality.”).  The prohibition of continuing liens 
would subject the lienholder and property owner to unnecessary time and expense of 
additional proceedings.  These proceedings could lead to contradictory results.  Less 
sophisticated parties, or those with financial constraints, may incur greater hardship when 
trying to comply with the multiple lien requirement.  According to Appellant, prohibiting 
continuing liens would increase the fiscal and administrative burdens on the council of unit 
owners, and any other party subject to the MCLA’s lien procedures. 
Appellant also urges this Court to rely on non-Maryland authority to resolve this 
undecided question of Maryland law.  Appellant cites Archie v. Nagle & Zaller, P.C., No. 
GJH-17-2524, 2018 WL 3475429 (D. Md. Jul. 19, 2018), in which the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland stated in an unreported memorandum opinion 
that prohibiting continuing liens, under the MCLA, “would be bizarre [and] idiosyncratic 
and not tenable[]” because it would require a creditor to file a new lien every time an 
additional cost accrued.  Id. at *6 (internal quotation and citation omitted).   
 
9 
 
Appellant also cites to a line of cases from New York, culminating in a 2015 
intermediate appellate court decision, that concluded the equivalent New York 
condominium association lien statute permits continuing liens.  Trencher, 128 A.D.3d at 
453, 9 N.Y.S.3d at 214; see also Bd. of Managers of Soho Greene Condo. v. Clear, Bright 
& Famous LLC, 2012 N.Y. slip op. 33273(U) (Trial Order), 2012 WL 5877658 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 5, 2012) (“To read into this statute, as has been suggested, a requirement that the 
board of managers update its liens monthly in order to protect additional amounts accruing 
each month would be an interpretation which would be costly, burdensome and contrary 
to the . . . legislative objective.”). 
Walker argues that the MCLA prohibits any sum from being secured by a statutory 
lien before the property owner has an opportunity to contest the sum prior to attachment.  
According to Walker, continuing liens are prohibited by the plain language, legislative 
history, and due process requirements previously recognized by this Court.   
Walker contends that the plain language of the MCLA excludes continuing liens 
because it enumerates an exhaustive and bounded list of payment categories that may be 
secured by a lien, namely damages, costs, late charges, and attorney’s fees.  According to 
Walker, the plain language of the statute only covers these payment categories when they 
are actually due.  A continuing lien impermissibly stretches the meaning of the statutory 
language because it would cover payments that are not actually due.  As future sums, they 
have not yet, nor may ever, become due. 
According to Walker, continuing liens would contravene the purpose of the MCLA, 
which was amended by the General Assembly to conform with due process and ensure 
 
10 
 
debtors have the right to contest amounts allegedly owed.  The Senate hearings indicated 
that debtors must have an opportunity to challenge a debt before the lien attaches.  A 
continuing lien would circumvent the purpose of the statute because it would deny debtors 
the opportunity to challenge the precise amounts owed before the recordation of the lien.   
Walker also asserts that a continuing lien conflicts with the precedent of this Court.  In 
Golden Sands, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the MCLA because “no lien 
attaches until after the unit owner has an opportunity to be heard . . . the lien claimant has 
the burden of proof . . . these provisions give the necessary opportunity for hearing and 
provide a reasonable procedure for testing the validity of the lien prior to its creation[.]”  
313 Md. at 493, 545 A.2d at 1337 (emphasis added).  Walker maintains that this Court 
underscored again, in Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. v. Saddlebrook West Utility 
Company, LLC, 455 Md. 313, 167 A.3d 606 (2017), the importance of unit owner’s ability 
to challenge putative costs before the lien is imposed.  Id. at 336, 167 A.3d at 619 (“Under 
the [MCLA], . . . no lien attaches until after the [property] owner has an opportunity to be 
heard.”).  A continuing lien contradicts this Court’s previous decisions that upheld a 
debtor’s due process right in being able to challenge the amount of debt putatively owed 
before the governing body of a condominium records a lien.  
Analysis of the MCLA 
A. Overview of Maryland Statutory Liens and the MCLA  
Legislatures have the power, subject to due process constraints, to authorize liens 
that secure payments, debts, or other obligations—like unit owner assessments—by statute.  
Hon. William Houston Brown & Lawrence R. Ahern, III, The Law of Debtors and 
 
11 
 
Creditors: Bankruptcy, Security Interests, Collection § 9:7 (Nov. 2020).  The creation and 
enforcement of a statutory lien is entirely limited to and governed by its statutory terms.  
MacBride v. Gulbro, 247 Md. 727, 729, 234 A.2d 586, 588 (1967) (noting that when a 
statute “creates a cause of action which did not exist at common law, [it is] in derogation 
of the common law [and thus] is to be strictly construed.”).  Maryland courts construe 
statutory liens “strictly” in favor of the debtor to protect a debtor’s common law rights.  
Patapsco Trailer Serv. & Sales, Inc. v. Eastern Freightways, Inc., 271 Md. 558, 564, 318 
A.2d 817, 820 (1974); T.R. Ltd. v. Lee, 55 Md. App. 629, 635, 465 A.2d 1186, 1191 (1983) 
(“Consent being an important element of a common law lien, any statutory attempt to create 
such lien without the element of consent would have to be strictly construed in derogation 
of the common law.”). 
A corollary of this Court’s strict interpretation of statutory liens is that a court cannot 
create or impose a lien itself based on what it considers just in a particular case.  See 
Equitable Trust Co. v. Imbesi, 287 Md. 249, 271, 412 A.2d 96, 107 (1980) (“[t]he creation 
of a lien is an affirmative act, and the intention to do such act [cannot] be implied from an 
express negative.”). 
The General Assembly enacted the MCLA, in part, for condominiums and their 
council of unit owners to secure the payment of assessments with a lien.  Real Prop. § 14-
202(a)(1) (“A lien on property may be created by a contract and enforced under this subtitle 
if: [] The contract expressly provides for the creation of a lien[.]”).  The MCLA gives 
condominium associations “limited senior priority” over first recorded mortgage liens to 
ensure condominium associations receive some financial recoupment after a unit owner 
 
12 
 
defaults.  Grahame K. Wells, The Use of Super-Liens to Promote Cooperation Between 
Condominium Associations and Lenders, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 477, 479 (1994).   
Prior to the MCLA, when a condominium unit owner defaulted, the mortgage lender 
would ordinarily have first priority in a foreclosure and would acquire all of the debtor’s 
assets—leaving nothing for the condominium association.  In response, Maryland, along 
with most states, created a statutory lien (sometimes called a “super lien”) that enabled 
condominium associations to jump the foreclosure line and deduct some delinquent 
assessments and related costs from the sale proceeds.  Real Prop. § 11B-117(c) (creating a 
super lien for a portion of unpaid unit owner assessments).  In sum, the MCLA created a 
shortcut for condominium associations to recover delinquent unit owner assessments by 
placing a lien on the unit owner’s unit. 
The parties dispute whether the MCLA grants a different type of legislative shortcut 
for condominium associations: whether the MCLA permits continuing liens—i.e., the 
securing of damages, fees, and interest that arise after the recordation of the lien.  As we 
shall explain, the MCLA does not permit continuing liens.  The plain text and legislative 
history of the statute, as well as relevant case law of the statute, both from Maryland and 
our sister jurisdictions, support our conclusion.     
B. Statutory Interpretation of the MCLA 
The first indication that the MCLA prohibits continuing liens comes from the 
statutory text itself.  “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and 
effectuate the real and actual intent of the [General Assembly]. . . .  To ascertain the intent 
of the General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the statute.”  State 
 
13 
 
v. Bey, 452 Md. 255, 265, 156 A.3d 873, 878 (2017).  “[T]he plain language must be viewed 
within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, 
aim, or policy of the [General Assembly] in enacting the statute.”  Id. at 266, 156 A.3d at 
878.  “Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable 
interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, 
but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve 
the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of 
the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.”  
Id., 156 A.3d at 879.7 
Real Prop. § 14-202(b) provides the four types of payments that may be secured by 
a lien provided for by contract: 
A lien may only secure the payment of:  
(1) Damages;  
(2) Cost of collection;  
(3) Late charges permitted by law; and  
(4) Attorney’s fees provided for in a contract or awarded by a court 
for breach of contract.  
 
(Emphasis added). 
While the plain text of Real Prop. § 14-202 does not prohibit continuing liens, 
Archie v. Nagle & Zaller, P.C., 790 F. App’x 502, 505 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), the 
term “only” clearly limits the four types of payments that may be secured by a lien: “(1) 
 
7 This Court also will construe a statute so “as to avoid a conflict with the 
Constitution whenever that course is reasonably possible.”  Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 
404, 425-26, 921 A.2d 171, 183 (2007) (quoting In re James D., 295 Md. 314, 327, 455 
A.2d 966, 972 (1983)). 
 
 
14 
 
Damages; (2) Cost of collection; (3) Late charges permitted by law; and (4) Attorney’s fees 
provided for in a contract or awarded by a court for breach of contract.”  Real Prop. § 14-
202(b).  The circumscribed list demonstrates the legislature’s intent in restricting the scope 
of payments secured by liens.  Within this bounded list, Real Prop. § 14-202(b) notably 
omits mention of payments that accrue subsequent to the lien’s recordation.  Construing 
Real Prop. § 14-202(b) to authorize a continuing lien would cut against the limiting 
language used by the General Assembly and impermissibly require the insertion of 
additional statutory language.  Woznicki, 443 Md. at 108, 115 A.3d at 161. 
A continuing lien also contradicts the time-limited definition of “Damages” 
provided in the statute.  Real Prop. § 14-201(c)(1) defines “Damages” as “unpaid sums due 
under contract, plus interest accruing on the unpaid sums due under a contract or as 
provided by law, including fines levied under the Maryland Condominium Act or the 
Maryland Real Estate Time-Sharing Act.”  (Emphasis added).  The definition of damages 
plainly limits payments that may be secured by the lien to those that are “due.”  A 
continuing lien would allow a condominium association to place liens on future damages 
that have not accumulated yet.  Future, unaccumulated damages cannot logically be “due” 
at the time of the lien’s recording.   
For example, when Appellant recorded its ninth lien against Walker on December 
22, 2015, it cannot be said, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, that Walker’s future  
assessments were due under contract.  A continuing lien does not comport with a common 
sense reading of the plain text of the statute, and we decline to interpret the MCLA to allow 
a lien that is not grounded in the specific language chosen by the legislature.  Kushell v. 
 
15 
 
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (“A court may . . . 
[not] construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its 
application.”); 5500 Coastal Highway Ltd. P’ship v. Elec. Equip. Co., Inc., 305 Md. 532, 
536, 505 A.2d 533, 535 (1986) (“It follows, therefore, that there can be no lien for anything 
which does not fall within the statutory provision.”). 
Reading Real Prop. § 14-202 in context with the broader statute lends additional 
support to our interpretation.  “[W]e analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt 
to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.”  
Kushell, 385 Md. at 577, 870 A.2d at 193.  Real Prop. § 14-204(d)(2) provides in pertinent 
part: 
[A] governing body [i.e., council of unit owners] may foreclose on a lien 
against a unit owner or lot owner only if the damages secured by the lien:  
 
(i) Consist of:  
 
1. Delinquent periodic assessments or special assessments and any 
interest; and  
 
2. Reasonable costs and attorney’s fees directly related to the filing of 
the lien that do not exceed the amount of the delinquent assessments, 
excluding any interest; and 
 
(ii) Do not include fines imposed by the governing body or attorney’s fees or 
costs related to recovering the fines. 
 
(Emphasis added).   
The language “directly related to the filing of the lien” suggests that recoverable 
costs and fees must cover the cost of creating and enforcing the lien, not future costs and 
fees that may eventually spring from the lien.  It would untenably stretch the meaning of 
 
16 
 
“directly related to” if the lien could encompass costs and fees that accumulate years after 
the lien is recorded.8  While the statute does not expressly prohibit continuing liens, its 
language read in its entirety, restricts damages only to those accrued at the time of recording 
the lien. 
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that because the plain text does not 
prohibit continuing liens, condominium associations may secure costs and fees that arise 
after a lien is recorded with proper notice.9  Appellant finds support of its argument in 
Archie v. Nagle & Zaller, P.C., 790 F. App’x 502 (4th Cir. 2019), an unreported per curiam 
 
8 The General Assembly could have used different language if it had intended to 
permit reasonable costs and attorney’s fees that accumulate subsequent to the lien’s 
recordation.  The equivalent condominium association statute in Oregon, for example, 
omits any limiting language and permits the lien to continue indefinitely.  Or. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 100.450(1) (“Whenever an association of unit owners levies any assessment against 
a unit, the association of unit owners shall have a lien upon the individual unit. . . .  The 
lien includes interest, late charges, attorney fees, costs or other amounts levied under the 
declaration or bylaws.”) & (2)(d) (“as long as the original or any subsequent unpaid 
assessment remains unpaid, the unpaid amount of assessments automatically continue to 
accumulate with interest without the necessity of further recording”) (emphasis added).   
 
9 Appellant notes that this argument, also known as the negative implication canon 
of construction, has been used many times before by this Court in aid of its statutory 
interpretation.  Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 574 n.6, 911 A.2d 427, 433 n.6 (2006) 
(acknowledging that this Court has extensively employed the negative implication canon 
in its case law, embodied in the maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius—“to express 
or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”).  For the 
reasons we have previously stated, we decline to apply the negative implication canon to 
the interpretation of the MCLA in this case.  See S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 
U.S. 344, 350, 64 S. Ct. 120, 123 (1943) (“However well these rules [of statutory 
construction] may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have 
been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in 
conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in light of context and will 
interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in 
particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.”) (footnote omitted).   
 
17 
 
decision from the Fourth Circuit.  In Archie, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland that held a condominium association’s 
continuing lien was not prohibited under Maryland law, or at the very least, was not a 
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—the relevant federal statute in the case.  
Id. at 505-06 (“[The condominium association’s] conduct – ‘pursuing its clients’ 
contractual rights in a way that was not proscribed’ under state law – did not amount to a 
violation of the [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act].”).  The district court reasoned that 
because the unit owner signed the condominium association’s governing documents, the 
unit owner was “on notice that the amount of the lien may change, and also on notice as to 
exactly what those costs may be.”  Id. at 505 (internal quotations omitted).  The Fourth 
Circuit approved of the district court’s reasoning that the MCLA must tolerate continuing 
liens otherwise the statute “would lead to an impractical and costly result, with creditors 
obliged to file a new lien every time an additional cost accrued or a partial payment was 
made.”  Id. 
The Archie opinion has minimal persuasive weight in the determination of this 
certified question.  The opinion is unreported and comes from a different jurisdiction.  The 
Fourth Circuit mostly repeats the district court’s decision, which did not analyze the 
language of the MCLA, did not consult the legislative history of the statute, and did not 
cite any of the Maryland cases on the statute.  The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the district 
court on appeal, explained that the district court’s dismissal of state law claims left the 
issue of MCLA interpretation open for Maryland courts to resolve.  Id. at 506 n.3 
 
18 
 
(“allowing state courts to decide any remaining state law claims in this case would ‘best 
accommodate the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”).10   
We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that interpreting the MCLA to 
prohibit continuing liens would lead to impractical results.  This Court explained in Select 
Portfolio that the MCLA’s lien procedure did not harm the condominium association’s or 
future creditors’ interests.  By recording a lien, the condominium association has already 
put future creditors on notice that the property is encumbered.  455 Md. at 327, 167 A.3d 
at 614 (“Discovery of a recording . . . might prompt further inquiry into whether payment 
of the assessment was current.”).  The MCLA also established a quick and formulaic way 
to record liens under the statute, so requiring additional liens to secure future costs and fees 
(after they become due) would not impose an undue burden on condominium associations.  
The statute includes a short template for creditors to fill in the blanks and quickly file.  Real 
Prop. § 14-203.11  It only asks for (1) the unit address, (2) the name of the unit owner, (3) 
 
10 Even if it was necessary to examine Archie’s discussion of the MCLA on the 
merits, we do not find the district court’s reasoning persuasive here.  As we have previously 
noted, the district court did not directly address the MCLA in its analysis, rather framing 
its brief discussion of the statute in the context of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”).  According to the district court, the defendant’s continuing lien did not violate 
the FDCPA because it “was not proscribed by the MCLA.”  Archie, 2018 WL 3475429, at 
*6.  We offer no opinion as to whether the continuing lien in Archie may have violated the 
FDCPA, but as we have explained in the context of the mechanic’s lien statute, “there can 
be no lien for anything which does not fall within the statutory provision[]” and “[t]his 
Court has no power to extend the mechanic’s lien law to cases beyond its obvious design 
and plain requirements.”  5500 Costal Highway, 305 Md. at 536, 505 A.2d at 535.  A 
condominium association may not secure future debts through a lien merely because the 
MCLA is silent on the issue. 
 
11 The “Statement of Lien” included in the statute provides, in its entirety: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued…) 
 
19 
 
the signature of the creditor, and (4) the amount of debt owed at the time of recording.  
After recording the short document within the land records, the condominium association 
has established a valid lien. 
Admittedly, a continuing lien would make the process for securing delinquent 
payments more expedient for condominium associations.  In this case, Appellant would 
have been able to secure, by operation of statute, delinquent assessments that had accrued 
since the last recorded lien.  The countervailing interest of expediency does not withstand 
practical experience or judicial scrutiny.  Appellant’s own actions reveal that routinely 
recording liens is not too burdensome.  Appellant has already recorded nine different liens 
against Walker.  Our case law has also recognized the preference of the General Assembly 
for protecting a unit owner’s constitutional rights over expedience.  Id. at 335-36, 167 A.3d 
at 619; Golden Sands, 313 Md. at 493, 545 A.2d at 1337 (“no lien attaches until after the 
unit owner has an opportunity to be heard. . . .  The court may not order a lien imposed 
unless it finds that probable cause exists to establish a lien[.]”) (internal citation omitted).  
 
(…continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is to certify that the property described as _______________ is subject 
to a lien under Title 14, Subtitle 2 of the Real Property Article, Maryland 
Annotated Code, in the amount of $______. The property is owned by 
____________________. 
 
I hereby affirm under the penalty of perjury that notice was given under § 
14-203(a) of the Real Property Article, and that the information contained in 
the foregoing statement of lien is true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge, information, and belief. 
_________________________ 
(name of party claiming lien) 
 
Real Prop. § 14-203(j)(1). 
 
20 
 
The plain language of Real Prop. § 14-202 limits sums that can be secured by the 
lien to unpaid damages, costs, and fees due under contract.  A continuing lien would sweep 
future damages, costs and fees that have yet, and may never materialize into the lien’s 
scope.  Such an outcome is not supported by the plain text of the statute. 
C. Legislative History 
The prohibition of continuing liens by the MCLA garners further support from the 
statute’s legislative history.  “Enacted in 1985, the MCLA was established as a direct result, 
and in response to, the 1985 Court of Special Appeals unreported opinion in Surfside 84 
Condominium Council of Unit Owners v. Mullen, No. 495, Sept. Term 1984 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. Jan. 28, 1985).[12]  The purpose of the MCLA was to ‘establish procedural rules that 
comported with due process for establishing, enforcing, or denying a lien based on a 
contract.’”  In re Stein Props., Inc., 598 B.R. 213, 218 (Bankr. D. Md. 2019) (quoting Select 
Portfolio, 455 Md. at 332, 167 A.3d at 617).  The MCLA’s predecessor had allowed the 
statement of the lien to be recorded within two years after the assessment came due.  Select 
Portfolio, 455 Md. at 332, 167 A.3d at 616 (citing Real Prop. § 11-110(d)).  The General 
Assembly amended the MCLA to prevent a lien’s recordation until the unit owner received 
both prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Id. at 336, 167 A.3d at 619 (“Under the 
[MCLA], . . . no lien attaches until after the [property] owner has had an opportunity to be 
heard.  It would be completely at odds with that purpose to provide for the creation of a 
 
12 Even though the Surfside 84 decision was unreported, the General Assembly 
moved quickly to address the procedural due process deficiencies identified by the Court 
of Special Appeals.  Select Portfolio, 455 Md. at 332, 167 A.3d at 617 (citing Report of 
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee concerning Senate Bill 625 (March 20, 1985)). 
 
21 
 
lien by virtue of a contract alone and exempt it from the procedures the statute created.”) 
(internal citation omitted).  
A continuing lien appears similarly at odds with the legislative purpose of the 
MCLA because it deprives debtors of the opportunity to challenge the accrual of a finite 
amount of debt in a proceeding before the condominium association records the lien.  In 
Select Portfolio, this Court dismissed the creditor’s reading of the MCLA that it permitted 
“creation of a lien simply by virtue of the existence of a contract[,]” in part, because 
“[n]othing in the legislative history of the statute supports such a reading.”  Id. at 335, 336, 
167 A.3d at 619 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).  Similar to Select Portfolio, 
nothing in the legislative history of the MCLA demonstrates the intent of the General 
Assembly to permit continuing liens.  The General Assembly amended the MCLA to better 
protect the due process rights of the debtor.  Whether a continuing lien may also satisfy the 
minimum due process concerns expressed by the legislature in 1985 is irrelevant.  The 
legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly did not contemplate or evaluate 
continuing liens in amending the MCLA.  When a continuing lien “is not only inconsistent 
with the structure and language of the [MCLA], but it is also at odds with the legislative 
history[,]” it is not permitted.  Id. at 335, 167 A.3d at 619.   
The desire of the General Assembly to model the MCLA on the mechanic’s lien 
statute further demonstrates the MCLA’s prohibition of continuing liens.  Id. at 332, 167 
A.3d at 617; see also Golden Sands, 313 Md. at 491 n.5, 545 A.2d at 1336 n.5 (“Although 
the 1985 enactment . . . is not a clone of the 1976 Mechanic’s Lien Law, there is enough 
similarity to suggest cousinship even if not parentage.”).  Like a condominium association 
 
22 
 
lien, a mechanic’s lien is created by and limited to its statutory terms.  Southern Mgmt. 
Corp. v. Kevin Willes Const. Co., Inc., 382 Md. 524, 543, 856 A.2d 626, 637 (2004).  The 
mechanic’s lien statute requires prior notice before the lien’s recordation, which should 
specify the kind of work or materials furnished, the expected date of completion and the 
amount or sum due.13  Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 414, 90 A.2d 686, 687 (1952) 
(“It has always been held in Maryland that if notice is given to the owner of the property 
before the lien claim is filed, it should definitely state the intention of the claimant to claim 
the lien, and also fully and specifically state the particulars of the claim . . . and the amount 
of the claim.”) (emphasis added).  This Court has construed the mechanic’s lien statute to 
prohibit a mechanic’s lien from attaching to future indebtedness.  Dickerson Lumber Co. 
v. Herson, 230 Md. 487, 493, 187 A.2d 689, 692 (1963).  It follows that the MCLA would 
similarly require advanced notice to challenge the proposed amount or sum due before 
recordation of the lien. 
The conscious omission of continuing liens in the MCLA by the General Assembly 
becomes more apparent when juxtaposed against other titles within the Maryland Code.  
The General Assembly has authorized liens that are “continuing” in different kinds of 
commercial transactions.  See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Commercial Law (“Com. Law”) § 15-
602(a) (“When an attachment is levied against the wages of a judgment debtor, it shall 
 
13 Similar to the boilerplate “Statement of Lien” provided in Real Prop. § 14-203, 
see supra note 11, the mechanic’s lien statute also provides a boilerplate “Intention to 
Claim a Lien” form that states in pertinent part: “The total amount earned under the 
subcontractor’s undertaking to the date hereof is $___ of which $___ is due and unpaid as 
of the date hereof.”  Real Prop. § 9-104.  This form indicates that the lien covers only a 
fixed, ascertainable amount due before the lien is created. 
 
23 
 
constitute a lien on all attachable wages that are payable at the time attachment is served 
or which become payable until the judgment, interest, and costs, as specified in the 
attachment, are satisfied.”)  (emphasis added).  Unlike with the MCLA, the plain text of 
Com. Law § 15-602(a) explains that the lien covers payments both at the time of attachment 
and in the future.  If the General Assembly had intended for the MCLA to permit continuing 
liens, as an expedient mechanism for securing future condominium association costs and 
fees, it could have said so in the statute.14     
D. Other Authority 
We find further support in our interpretation of the MCLA by turning to how other 
jurisdictions have treated the issue of continuing liens.  While appellate courts across the 
country have reached different conclusions as to the validity of continuing liens, each case 
confirms that the outcome depends on the particular text, legislative purpose and history, 
and case law of the respective jurisdiction.  A United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
of the Ninth Circuit exemplified this kind of jurisdiction-specific analysis of continuing 
liens in In re Basave De Guillen, 604 B.R. 826 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019).  In De Guillen, a 
condominium association attempted to secure a continuing lien under a California state 
 
14 Other states have expressly permitted “continuing liens” in their statutory 
language as well.  See N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 32-09.1-21 (West 2020) (Continuing lien 
on wages); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 6.27.330 (2020) (Continuing lien on earnings—
Authorized); S.D. Codified Laws § 9-43-100 (2020) (“Any special assessment lawfully 
levied upon real property assessed pursuant to this chapter is a continuing lien on the 
property as against all persons except the United States and this state.  The lien continues 
for fifteen years from the due date of the last installment.”).     
 
 
24 
 
statute15 with requirements substantially similar to the MCLA.  Id. at 830.  The court held 
that the statute authorizing a lien on unit owner assessments “does not provide for a 
continuing lien, and case law is scant regarding whether the Act may be fairly interpreted 
as so providing.”  Id. at 833.  “To hold otherwise would offend the comprehensive notice 
scheme and homeowners’ rights to contest delinquent assessments as established in the 
[statute].”  Id. at 834.   
The De Guillen court’s analysis appears particularly persuasive in this case because 
the text and legislative history of Cal. Civ. Code § 5675 parallels the text and legislative 
history of Real Prop. § 14-204.  Both statutes permit liens on uncollected assessments, late 
charges and fees, but omit reference to continuing liens.  The legislative history underlying 
each statute reflects that both were intended to protect the due process rights of unit owners 
and limit what condominium associations can secure in a recorded lien.  The De Guillen 
court similarly found no California case law that authorized continuing liens.  In sum, the 
 
15 Cal. Civ. Code § 5675 provides in pertinent part: 
 
(a) The amount of the assessment, plus any costs of collection, late charges, 
and interest assessed in accordance with subdivision (b) of Section 5650, 
shall be a lien on the owner’s separate interest in the common interest 
development from and after the time the association causes to be recorded 
with the county recorder of the county in which the separate interest is 
located, a notice of delinquent assessment, which shall state the amount of 
the assessment and other sums imposed in accordance with subdivision (b) 
of Section 5650, a legal description of the owner’s separate interest in the 
common interest development against which the assessment and other sums 
are levied, and the name of the record owner of the separate interest in the 
common interest development against which the lien is imposed. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
25 
 
court declined to read continuing liens into the statute when its plain text, legislative history 
and purpose, and relevant case law provided no basis to do so. 
The jurisdiction-specific approach to analyzing the validity of condominium 
association liens also explains why the cases cited by Appellant are not persuasive.  Some 
state legislatures intended to permit continuing liens,16 while others, like Maryland, did 
not.  Appellant cites to a line of cases in New York that most recently culminated in a state 
intermediate appellate court’s ruling that permitted continuing liens.  The New York 
appellate court reached an opposite conclusion than this Court because of notable 
differences in the respective statutory texts, legislative histories, and case law.  Trencher, 
128 A.D.3d at 453, 9 N.Y.S.3d at 214 (citing a line of cases dating back to 1978 that 
expressly approved of continuing liens in New York).  Unlike the MCLA, which limits 
damages to those due under contract and directly relating to filing, the New York statute 
used broader language that supported a recognition of continuing liens: 
The board of managers, on behalf of the unit owners, shall have a lien on 
each unit for the unpaid common charges thereof, together with interest 
thereon. . . .  Any grantor or grantee of a unit shall be entitled to a statement 
from the manager or board of managers, setting forth the amount of the 
unpaid common charges accrued against the unit, and neither such grantor 
 
16 Missouri’s intermediate appellate court, for example, interpreted its equivalent 
condominium association statute to permit continuing liens.  Carroll v. Oak Hall Assocs., 
L.P., 898 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“The Association’s lien, then, arose when 
the common expense assessments became due and were unpaid.  The first of the delinquent 
assessments was due January 1, 1988, and each month’s assessment since that date has 
remained unpaid and constitutes a lien on the respective units.”) (emphasis added).  Other 
jurisdictions, such as Connecticut, permit continuing liens subject to parameters specified 
in the statute.  Lakeridge Ass’n, Inc. v. Lynch, 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 530, 2011 WL 1087513, 
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011) (noting Connecticut’s statute limits a condominium 
association’s priority lien to six months of common charges plus fees and costs). 
 
26 
 
nor grantee shall be liable for . . . any unpaid common charges against such 
unit accrued prior to such conveyance[.]    
 
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 339-z (McKinney 2004) (emphasis added).   
 
The New York legislature also articulated a different legislative purpose than the 
Maryland General Assembly when enacting the MCLA.  In the New York legislature, the 
“overriding concern” was “that of ensuring the continued viability of the entire 
condominium project and protecting those who have invested substantial sums of their life 
savings from unit owners who have failed to pay their common charges.”  Washington Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Schneider, 95 Misc. 2d 924, 929 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).  The Maryland 
General Assembly presumably had this goal in mind too, but it was not the “overriding 
concern.”  Maryland’s General Assembly weighed the rights of the condominium against 
a debtor’s constitutional due process rights and achieved a different balance of interests 
than the New York legislature by requiring that Maryland debtors have an opportunity to 
challenge fixed sums in a lien before it is recorded.   
CONCLUSION 
The plain text, legislative history, and case law relevant to the MCLA collectively 
demonstrate the intent of the General Assembly to prohibit continuing liens.  We 
accordingly answer the certified question in the negative: Real Prop. §§ 14-201–206 does 
not secure unpaid damages, costs of collection, late charges, and attorney’s fees that accrue 
subsequent to the recordation of the lien. 
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW 
ANSWERED 
AS 
SET 
FORTH 
ABOVE.  COSTS TO BE EQUALLY 
DIVIDED BY THE PARTIES.