Title: National Credit Corporation v. Ritchey

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

477 S.W.2d 488 (1972) NATIONAL CREDIT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. J. T. RITCHEY, Appellee. No. 5-5770. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 13, 1972. *489 Dickey, Dickey & Drake, Pine Bluff, for appellant. Jones & Matthews, Pine Bluff, for appellee. JONES, Justice. This is a "slip and fall" case in which National Credit Corporation appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson County Circuit Court on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, J. T. Ritchey, in the amount of $37,500. Mr. Ritchey alleged in his complaint that he went to National Credit's place of business as a business invitee; that he was carrying a bank deposit bag containing $6,300 consisting of sixty $100 bills and six $50 bills; that he slipped and fell on the slick terrazzo floor in the lobby of National's office and was injured. He alleged that National Credit was negligent in maintaining a slippery floor and by the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the floor was slippery and likely to cause injury; that the floor was highly waxed and polished and National Credit failed to warn him of the dangerous condition. He alleged that after his fall the money was taken from the bank deposit bag and that the loss of the $6,300 was proximately caused by the negligence of National Credit and was an element of his damage. In its answer National Credit denied that Mr. Ritchey slipped and fell as he alleged, but that if he did so it was because of his own negligence. National Credit further denied that Mr. Ritchey had $6,300 *490 in cash and alleged that if he did have such sum of money, it was never in the possession of National Credit or in the possession of its agents or employees and that National Credit was not liable for such loss. On its appeal to this court National Credit designates the points on which it relies for reversal as follows: Considering the points in the order designated, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in refusing National Credit's motion for a directed verdict and its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Mr. Ritchey testified that he took three or four steps on the terrazzo floor and his feet slipped on the slick floor; that he tried to protect himself from falling, but that he first landed on his left hip and then on his elbow and shoulder and then finally he bumped his head on the floor. He says that after he bumped his head he was unable to see, but does remember that he had his bank book and money beside him when he first fell. He says that his left side was paralyzed and that he was unable to get up from the floor. He says that he went back to the credit company after he was released from the hospital and the floor was still as "slick as ice." He testified that about three weeks before his accident he walked over the same area with Mr. George Puddephatt, the manager of National Credit, and that Mr. Puddephatt's foot slipped five or six inches on the slick floor and that he remarked to Mr. Puddephatt that the floor was too slick, whereupon Mr. Puddephatt told him that they had just recently changed wax; that they knew it was too slick but did not know whether any changes would be made or not. He testified that he told Mr. Puddephatt that somebody was going to get hurt on the floor as it was too slick to stand up on and that Mr. Puddephatt told him he knew it. Mr. George Puddephatt testified that he examined the floor and could see no difference in its condition after Mr. Ritchey fell and its condition prior to his fall. He testified that Mr. Ritchey had been in the place of business nearly every day for a period of five years. He denied that he ever slipped on the floor himself or had ever seen anyone else slip on it, and he denied that he ever discussed a slick floor with Mr. Ritchey. Mr. Oliver Lee Thompson testified that he has been janitor and caretaker of the building involved for 13 years. He testified that there are two kinds of floor in the National Credit lobby and offices. He says that on the inside where the employees work, the floor is tile and that in the lobby the floor is terrazzo. He says that in cleaning the terrazzo floor he uses a liquid material in water and wet mops the terrazzo floor in order to clean it. He says that after the terrazzo floor dries thoroughly, he buffs it. He says this is done once a week except in bad weather when it is done more often. He testified that he does not apply wax to the terrazzo floor. He says that he goes over the floor every morning with a dust mop before anyone gets to the building and that once each month he cleans and waxes the tile floor inside the offices. He testified that he waxes and buffs the tile floor where the employees work and that after he cleans the terrazzo floor with the liquid *491 substance in water and it dries, he buffs it with the same buffer he uses on the tile floor. The decisions are not in harmony on slip and fall cases. As pointed out by Chief Judge Miller in the United States District Court case of Pearson v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 934, our previous slip and fall cases in Arkansas involve situations where the plaintiffs slipped on "something." Very recently in J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Thompson, 251 Ark. ___, 475 S.W.2d 697 (Feb. 7, 1972), we said: The Colorado court in Sanderson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 161 Colo. 271, 421 P.2d 472, in affirming the trial court's dismissal of an action for damages in a slip and fall case, said: In California a slightly different rule seems to prevail. In Nicola v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 612, 123 P.2d 529, the California Court of Appeal said: By this opinion we adopt the view expressed by the California court in Nicola and hold that the question of negligence was properly submitted to the jury in the case at bar. Under the appellant's second point it argues that as a matter of law Mr. Ritchey's negligence was as great or greater than that of National Credit. The cases cited in support of this contention are automobile-train collision cases wherein comparative, or contributory negligence, is more clearly distinguishable than in slippery floor cases. The appellant seeks to invoke the general rule that when reasonable minds cannot differ as to the plaintiff's negligence being at least equal to, if not greater than, the defendant's negligence, then the court should so hold as a matter of law, without submitting the question to a jury for determination. The parties have cited no Arkansas slip and fall cases on this point and we have found none. However, in the Wisconsin case of Sturm v. Simpson's Garment Co., 271 Wis. 587, 74 N.W.2d 137, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a snow covered vestibule floor and the court in that case said: We hold likewise in the case at bar. *492 As to the appellant's third point, the plaintiff's instruction No. 13, as given by the trial court, is as follows: We are of the opinion that the trial court did not commit reversible error in giving plaintiff's instruction No. 13 and in refusing to give defendant's instruction No. 19 under the circumstances of this case. The defendant's proposed instruction No. 19 is clearly not a correct instruction. It is apparent from the record that the attorneys as well as the trial judge recognized the problem in connection with plaintiff's instruction No. 13, so we are of the opinion that the problem will not arise again in the event of a new trial. We find no merit in the appellant's fourth point. The defendant's instruction No. 20, which was refused by the court, is as follows: The trial court gave as plaintiff's instruction No. 10 AMI instruction 1104 as follows: *493 The trial court also gave AMI instruction 603 as the defendant's instruction No. 16 as follows: We are of the opinion that these two instructions given by the court sufficiently covered the points intended by the defendant's instruction No. 20 which was refused by the court. Appellant's fifth point has given us considerable difficulty, but after sifting through considerable obiter dictum we reach the conclusion that this case must be reversed and remanded. In support of its motion for a new trial, National Credit offered in evidence the affidavit of one of the jurors to the effect that after the jury retired to the jury room, they discussed the case for quite awhile and were unable to agree on a verdict; they then agreed that each member of the jury would write down the amount he felt Mr. Ritchey should receive and that these figures would be totaled and divided by 12; that the jurors agreed to be bound by the figure arrived at through this procedure; that this was the procedure followed in arriving at the verdict returned by the jury. In overruling the motion on this point, the trial court correctly noted that the courts frown generally on quotient verdicts and indicated that had the matter been called to the court's attention promptly after the trial, the court would not have hesitated to call each of the jurors back and allowed them to be questioned as to how they arrived at their verdict in order to determine whether they agreed to be bound by a quotient verdict. The trial court then stated as follows: The trial court then held the affidavit inadmissible and denied the motion for a new trial. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2204 (Repl.1964) provides as follows: This section was a part of the Criminal Code when it was adopted in 1868. In the very early case of Pleasants v. Heard, 15 Ark. 403 (decided in 1854), in a civil suit for damages the jury awarded $620 to the plaintiff. One of the jurors stated in an affidavit that in assessing the damages, the jury agreed that each juror should state the amount he was in favor of assessing, that the several amounts should be added up, and the product divided by the number of jurors and the quotient should be taken as the damages to be assessed in favor of the plaintiff, and this was done. After citing cases pro and con, this court sustained the trial court in refusing a new trial based primarily on the proposition as stated by the court that: The court went on to say that to permit such declarations to be proven by others would open a wide door to fraud. In the 1881 case of St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. Co. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519, the jury, in a personal injury suit, returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $800. The trial judge suggested to the jury they should not let $100 or $200 stand in the way of reaching a verdict and on motion for a new trial, the affidavit of a juror was offered which stated that he was in favor of only $500 and that the urging *494 of the judge induced him to agree to the higher verdict. In holding that the affidavit of the juror should not have been allowed to be filed, this court said: The 1886 case of Ward v. Blackwood, 48 Ark. 396, 3 S.W. 624, was a civil action for damages resulting in a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,800. In a motion for a new trial the defendant alleged misconduct of the jury in arriving at its verdict by lot. He filed the affidavits of three of the jurors stating that the jury differed as to the amount of the verdict, and finally by agreement, they wrote the amount of $2,000 on one slip of paper and the amount of $1,800 on another slip of paper, and the two slips of paper were then placed in a hat and one piece of paper was drawn from the hat which contained the verdict of $1,800 on it. This court, without referring to the above statute, recited from the opinion in Pleasants v. Heard, supra, and then said: In the 1929 case of Steed v. Wright, 179 Ark. 812, 18 S.W.2d 340, a civil suit for damages from an automobile accident resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant urged reversal because the jury reached its verdict by lot. In passing on the contention this court said: The footnote in this case appears as follows: In the 1932 case of St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Steele, 185 Ark. 196, 46 S.W.2d 628, a verdict by nine jurors was rendered for the plaintiff in a civil suit for damages and the defendant moved to set the verdict aside because it was arrived at by lot. Three of the jurors who did not sign the verdict testified that each of them was unwilling to render a verdict for the plaintiff; that the jurors who agreed on the verdict were in favor of returning a verdict for the plaintiff in different amounts; that these nine jurors set down the different amounts each was willing to allow and divided it by nine and the result was the amount of the verdict returned by the nine jurors signing it, in the amount of $1,737.50. The foreman of the jury testified that he had no recollection of the matter but if such suggestion was made, it was not carried out. He testified that the verdict was arrived at by the jurors continuing to lower and raise the individual *495 amounts of what they thought the verdict should be. In that case this court said: This court then continued: Under civil procedure, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-1901 (Repl. 1961) provides grounds for granting a new trial, two of the grounds being as follows: Under criminal procedure, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2203 (Repl. 1964), a new trial may be granted on seven grounds, the third one being, as follows: The above sections as well as § 43-2204, supra, were lifted verbatim from the civil and criminal codes approved July 22, 1868. In the preface to the original code, the code commissioners who prepared it make the following observation: As indicated in the above cited cases, affidavits of jurors have heretofore been offered in civil cases in support of motions for new trials based on the contention that the verdict was arrived at by lot, but in each of these cases it was determined that the verdict was a "quotient" verdict rather than a verdict by lot. However, in the 1955 case of Scott v. Shairrick, 225 Ark. 59, 279 S.W.2d 39, a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in an automobile negligence case and the defendant attempted to have the verdict set aside because of misconduct on the part of the jury. The misconduct complained of concerned an allegation that one of the jurors inquired about the identity of a person in the courtroom and was advised that he was an insurance adjuster. The trial court properly refused to allow the defendant to call one of the jurors to testify at the hearing on the motion, but in affirming the judgment of the trial court, we said: *496 We recognize the inherent dangers in permitting a juror to testify, by affidavit or otherwise, as to irregularities concerning the manner in which a jury arrives at its verdict, or as for that matter, to anything else that goes on inside the jury room during the course of deliberation. However, we also recognize the importance of a jury verdict reflecting the combined serious and honest deliberation of each member of the jury in attempting to arrive at a true and just verdict, for in no other way can the integrity of our jury system be protected and preserved. We see no good reason why § 43-2204, supra, should not apply in civil cases the same as in criminal cases. Following the suggestion, supra, made by the commissioners who originally prepared our civil and criminal codes, we find that the Supreme Court of Kentucky, as recently as 1942, was confronted with the precise question on similar facts as is presented in the case at bar. In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Marshall's Adm'x, 289 Ky. 129, 158 S.W.2d 137, the plaintiff was awarded judgment on a jury verdict for $13,538.16. The defendant, in an amended motion for a new trial, charged misconduct on the part of the jury in arriving at its verdict. The defendant alleged that upon entering the jury room to consider their verdict, the jurors first determined the liability of the defendant; that they then entered into an agreement among themselves for each member to write down the amount he thought the verdict in favor of the plaintiff should be, and that the sum of these amounts would be divided by 12 and the quotient returned as the amount of the verdict. The defendant alleged that this allegation could be proven by members of the jury and it requested that the jurors be permitted to testify on that issue. The Kentucky Criminal Code contained the same provision as our code, § 43-2204, supra. The Kentucky Court quoted at length from the text in 27 R.C.L., §§ 19 and 20 and held that a verdict rendered, as alleged in the motion, amounted to a verdict reached by lot and that a juror's testimony is admissible in evidence to prove such allegations in civil as well as criminal cases. We are of the opinion, therefore, and we so hold, that § 43-2204, supra, applies in civil cases as well as in criminal cases. When each juror first arrives at the amount he thinks the verdict should be and makes known that amount to the other jurors, if the jury then adds the amounts and divides the sum by their number and agree on the result as the jury verdict, then the verdict so made is a quotient verdict. While we in no wise approve of such procedure, a verdict so made cannot be later impeached by the testimony of a member of such jury. Where such procedure is agreed to by the jury in advance before each juror determines and reveals what amount he thinks the verdict should be, a verdict so made is no longer a mere quotient verdict, but amounts to a verdict by lot and each juror is in a position to control the odds. We hold, therefore, that where by prior agreement a quotient verdict is made by lot in civil as well as in criminal cases, the affidavits and testimony of the jurors may be admitted in evidence in proof of such fact, and when it is properly proven that a verdict was made by lot, the verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the trial court erred in concluding that he had no authority to accept the proffered affidavit or hear the testimony of the jurors in the case at bar, and that this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to accept the affidavits or hear testimony in connection with the appellant's petition for a new trial and grant or deny the motion as the proof may require. Reversed and remanded. HARRIS, C. J., not participating. BROWN, J., concurs.