Title: State ex rel. LeVan v. YoungÆs Shell Serv.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. LEVAN, APPELLANT, v. YOUNG’S SHELL SERVICE; INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. LeVan v. Young’s Shell Serv. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 55.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission’s denial of permanent total 
disability compensation returned for Noll compliance. 
(No. 95-1100 — Submitted September 10, 1997 — Decided October 8, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD03-290. 
 
On October 6, 1980, appellant-claimant, George LeVan, was injured in the 
course of and arising from his employment with Young’s Shell Service.  His 
workers’ compensation claim was ultimately recognized for “herniated 
intervetebral disc on posterior ligament of the lumbosacral level with radicular 
compromise; generalized anxiety disorder.” 
 
On November 12, 1991, claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio for permanent total disability compensation.  Among the evidence before the 
commission was a report from commission specialist Dr. Paul H. Dillahunt, which 
assessed a forty percent combined-effects permanent partial impairment and 
concluded that claimant could perform sustained remunerative employment. 
 
The commission on December 28, 1993 denied claimant permanent total 
disability compensation, writing: 
 
“The reports of Drs. Ward, Korb, Vetter, Howard, and Dillahunt were 
reviewed and evaluated.  This order is based particularly upon the reports of Drs. 
Vetter, Howard and Dillahunt. 
 
“Dr. Vetter states claimant is 25% permanently partially impaired due to the 
orthopedic component.  Most notably[,] Dr. Vetter found no objective evidence of 
nerve root compromise.  His opinion is [that] while claimant cannot return to work 
as a mechanic, he can perform work that is essentially sedentary to light in nature 
 
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with restriction[s] against push-pull activities, bending at the waist or repetitibe 
[sic] use of foot controls.  While Dr. Howard does find claimant to be 15% 
permanently partially impaired due to the psychological component, he concludes 
that such does not prevent claimant from returning to his previous type of 
employment.  Accordingly, no restrictions upon claimant’s activities need be 
imposed due to his psychological conditions.  Dr. Dillahunt’s opinion is that the 
combined effect of claimant’s allowed conditions render[s] him 40% permanently 
partially impaired. 
 
“Claimant is found to be able to engage in sedentary to light work, to be 
able to sit, walk, or to alternate between such positions and movements, limited 
only by the need to avoid lifting in excess of 20 pounds, to bend at the waist or to 
perform push-pull activities. 
 
“Although his sixth grade education limits him to non-intellectual work, his 
youth (age 43) leaves claimant with over 20 productive work years in the labor 
force, while his wide and varied unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled work history 
as a laborer, cab driver, trash collector, service station attendant, painter and 
mechanic all indicate a flexibility and adaptability to various kinds of work 
environments that would be assets in performing sedentary to light work for which 
he retains the physical capacity.  Accordingly, claimant is held not to be 
permanently and totally disabled.” 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Franklin County Court of 
Appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying him 
permanent total disability compensation.  The court of appeals denied the writ 
after finding that the order was supported by “some evidence” and satisfied State 
ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
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__________________ 
 
Steven C. Carr, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Craigg E. Gould, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Three issues are presented:  (1)  Did the commission abuse its 
discretion in excluding claimant’s preexisting personality disorder from its 
permanent total disability analysis?  (2)  Did the commission’s order satisfy Noll? 
and  (3)  Is claimant entitled to relief pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 
68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666?  We answer all three questions in the 
negative. 
 
The first issue has been resolved by State ex rel. Whetstone v. Bonded Oil 
Co. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 205, 652 N.E.2d 762.  At issue there was the directive 
in State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 173, 31 
OBR 369, 374, 509 N.E.2d 946, 951, that the commission “look at the claimant’s 
age, education, work record, and all other factors, such as physical, psychological, 
and sociological, that are contained within the record in making its determination 
of permanent total disability.”  Whestone held that a claimant could not seek 
consideration of a nonallowed condition — in this case, preexisting personality 
disorder — under the guise of “all other factors.”  The commission did not, 
therefore, abuse its discretion in refusing to consider this condition. 
 
We do find that the commission abused its discretion by crafting an order 
that does not meet Noll, supra.  At issue is the commission’s nonmedical analysis, 
which we find to be deficient in two respects. 
 
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The first involves the commission’s treatment of claimant’s work history, 
which is little more than a recitation of claimant’s past jobs.  The commission’s 
attempt to add a substantive dimension to this recitation by using the phrases 
“wide and varied” and “flexibility and adaptability” fails.  Such hollow phrases are 
reminiscent of the boilerplate previously decried in Noll, and simply restate what 
the earlier recitation had already revealed — that claimant had worked many jobs 
prior to injury.  These phrases do not explain how claimant’s occupational history 
enhances his reemployment potential. 
 
We also find the commission’s explanation to be inadequate for a second 
reason.  The cornerstone of the commission’s order is the future — the many years 
of work-force participation available to one of claimant’s age.  The commission’s 
order, however, merely says that this availability exists.  It does not address 
whether claimant is, or could be, vocationally capable of taking advantage of it.  
The order says nothing about claimant’s retraining or rehabilitation potential. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the commission’s order violates Noll.  We do 
not, however, find that relief pursuant to Gay is appropriate.  Gay relief is intended 
for only the most egregious of situations, where the evidence is so one-sided as to 
compel but one result.  This is not the case here.  Claimant’s young age and 
moderate level of impairment are inconsistent with the evidentiary one-sidedness 
necessary to sustain such a remedy. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and return the 
cause to the commission for further consideration and amended order pursuant to 
Noll. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  The appropriate standard for this 
court’s review is to determine whether there is “some evidence” in the record to 
support the stated basis for the commission’s decision.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil 
Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936.  Because the 
record below contains “some evidence” in support of the commission’s decision, I 
would affirm the court of appeals.