Title: Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554.] 
 
 
WELLINGTON v. MAHONING COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Cite as Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554.] 
Prohibition — Elections — R.C. 311.01(B)(9) — Abuse of discretion — Court 
cannot liberally construe a statute with an unequivocal meaning — Writ 
granted. 
(No. 2008-0157 ─ Submitted February 7, 2008 ─ Decided February 14, 2008.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent respondent, Mahoning County Board of Elections, from placing David P. 
Aey’s name on the ballot as a candidate for the office of Mahoning County 
Sheriff in the March 4, 2008 Democratic Party primary election.  Because the 
board of elections abused its discretion by clearly disregarding R.C. 311.01(B), 
we grant the writ. 
{¶ 2} On November 21, 2007, David P. Aey filed a declaration of 
candidacy and petition to become a candidate for the Democratic Party 
nomination for the office of Mahoning County Sheriff on the March 4, 2008 
primary election ballot.  In accordance with R.C. 3513.05, on January 5, relator, 
Mahoning County Sheriff Randall A. Wellington, filed a protest in the board of 
elections challenging Aey’s candidacy.  Sheriff Wellington claimed that Aey was 
not eligible to be a candidate for sheriff because “he does not meet the 
qualifications to run for the office of sheriff” under R.C. 311.01(B)(9). 
{¶ 3} On January 18, 2008, the board of elections held a hearing on the 
protest.  At the hearing, Aey withdrew his claim that he qualified as a candidate 
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2 
for sheriff based on the postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b).  The following pertinent evidence was introduced on the issue of 
whether 
Aey 
met 
the 
supervisory-experience 
requirement 
of 
R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(a). 
Evidence at Protest Hearing 
{¶ 4} In December 1993, the Mahoning County Sheriff’s Department 
hired Aey, and he was later promoted to deputy sheriff.  Aey conceded that he had 
never held a rank higher than deputy sheriff while employed at the sheriff’s 
office.  When Aey was hired, the classified ranks in the office were deputy 
sheriff, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, and captain.  Promotions to corporal from 
deputy sheriff were made by appointment rather than by examination. 
{¶ 5} During Aey’s employment, however, collective bargaining resulted 
in the abolishment of the rank of corporal in the sheriff’s office.  Corporals who 
did not take or pass a promotional examination for sergeant were returned to the 
rank of deputy sheriff, and those corporals who passed the examination were 
promoted to sergeant.  After the abolition of the corporal position, the classified 
positions in the sheriff’s office were deputy sheriff, sergeant, lieutenant, and 
captain.  Aey never held the position of sergeant, lieutenant, or captain, and he 
declined to take a promotional examination.  Aey’s title was designated as 
“Deputy 3” on his payroll records from 2003 through 2007.  And in a July 2007 
letter Aey filed with his candidacy petition, the personnel coordinator for the 
sheriff’s office stated that Aey had been employed there “as a full-time Deputy 
Sheriff since December 6, 1993.” 
{¶ 6} After the corporal position was abolished, the United States 
Marshals Violent Fugitive Task Force was established as a collaborative, 
multijurisdictional effort to issue warrants and arrest certain fugitives.  In June 
January Term, 2008 
3 
2003, Major Michael Budd1 of the Mahoning County Sheriff’s Department 
appointed Aey to be in charge of the task force for the sheriff’s office.  According 
to Aey, Major Budd advised him that he would be given the position of corporal 
to oversee three more senior deputy sheriffs on the task force, that his overtime 
would offset the pay difference between the ranks of deputy sheriff and corporal, 
and that once the county’s financial crisis had ended, the major would issue an 
order recognizing that he was working as a corporal on the task force.  Major 
Budd also informed Aey not to tell anybody about the promotion because the rank 
of corporal had been abolished and not to take any promotional examination 
because he had already been placed in the position.  Major Budd, however, never 
issued an order formalizing Aey’s purported promotion to the rank of corporal. 
{¶ 7} Sheriff Wellington acknowledged that Major Budd was the 
second-in-command at the sheriff’s office, but noted that the major had no 
authority to promote Aey.  Aey, as well as the deputy sheriffs who testified, 
agreed that Aey had never held a rank other than deputy sheriff and had never 
served as a corporal. 
{¶ 8} Aey worked with the task force as the sheriff’s department 
representative, supervising other deputy sheriffs in executing warrants, accepting 
payroll forms, issuing press releases, and generally coordinating task force 
activities for the sheriff’s office until his resignation in August 2007. 
{¶ 9} At the protest hearing, Aey argued that his supervisory experience 
as a member of the U.S. Marshals task force was “tantamount” to or the “de 
facto” equivalent of the responsibilities of a corporal.  In his written brief 
submitted to the board of elections, Aey claimed that although he “was not 
provided a specific title of Corporal or any higher rank, he in fact, performed each 
                                                 
1.  Budd was later convicted in federal court of conspiracy to commit an offense against the 
United States and three counts of depriving another of constitutional rights under color of law.  
His conviction was affirmed on appeal.  United States v. Budd (C.A.6, 2007), 496 F.3d 517. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
and every responsibility of a ‘Corporal’ or of a higher ranking individual within 
the Mahoning County Sheriff’s Department.” 
Decision of Board of Elections 
{¶ 10} At the conclusion of the evidence and argument presented by 
Sheriff Wellington and Aey, the board of elections denied the protest and decided 
to place Aey’s name on the March 4, 2008 primary election ballot as a candidate 
for sheriff.  One of the board members had stated that he felt that Aey’s service 
with the U.S. Marshals task force constituted supervisory experience that was 
“equivalent to that of a corporal.”  Another board member noted that despite the 
abolition of the position of corporal in the sheriff’s office, a liberal construction of 
the supervisory-experience requirement warranted denial of the protest.  The 
remaining board member who voted on the protest stated that he had a “problem 
with the corporal ranking,” but that he would deny the protest. 
{¶ 11} On January 22, Sheriff Wellington filed this expedited election 
action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the board of elections from placing 
Aey’s name on the primary election ballot as a candidate for sheriff.  The board 
filed an answer, and the parties submitted evidence and briefs pursuant to the 
expedited election schedule set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  Sheriff Wellington 
also filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition or complaint instanter. 
{¶ 12} This cause is now before the court for its consideration. 
Preliminary Motions 
{¶ 13} Before we address the merits, we first consider several preliminary 
issues raised by the board of elections.  The board asserts that this case should be 
dismissed because (1) Sheriff Wellington failed to comply with the affidavit 
requirements of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B), (2) Sheriff Wellington violated 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(A) by filing a petition instead of a complaint, (3) the petition 
was not brought in the name of the state on the relation of the sheriff, (4) the 
January Term, 2008 
5 
petition failed to name the board members as respondents, and (5) the petition 
fails to state a cognizable prohibition claim. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) Affidavit Requirements 
{¶ 14} S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) provides that for complaints instituting an 
original action in this court: 
{¶ 15} “All complaints shall contain a specific statement of facts upon 
which the claim for relief is based, shall be supported by an affidavit of the relator 
or counsel specifying the details of the claim, and may be accompanied by a 
memorandum in support of the writ.  The affidavit required by this division shall 
be made on personal knowledge, setting forth facts admissible in evidence, and 
showing affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to all matters stated 
in the affidavit.  All relief sought, including the issuance of an alternative writ, 
shall be set forth in the complaint.” 
{¶ 16} The board of elections claims that the affidavit submitted by 
Sheriff Wellington in support of his petition fails to comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(4)(B) because the affidavit does not specify the details of the claim, does not 
set forth facts admissible in evidence, and does not affirmatively show that Sheriff 
Wellington is competent to testify to all matters stated in the affidavit.  Sheriff 
Wellington’s affidavit states that he has “reviewed the facts contained in the 
foregoing Petition for Writ of Prohibition, and affirm that they are accurate based 
on my personal knowledge.” 
{¶ 17} The board contends that based on the court’s precedent concerning 
violations of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B), this case should be dismissed.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an Elected Law Director v. Bay 
Village, 115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-5380, 875 N.E.2d 574, ¶ 14; State ex rel. 
Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 18} The board’s contention lacks merit.  Although “a substantial 
disregard of the whole body of these rules cannot be tolerated,” “[i]n order to 
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6 
promote justice, the court exercises a certain liberality in enforcing a strict 
attention to its rules, especially as to mere technical infractions.”  Drake v. Bucher 
(1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 37, 40, 34 O.O.2d 53, 213 N.E.2d 182; see also State ex rel. 
Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 
1208, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 19} By specifying in his affidavit that he swore to the accuracy of the 
facts in the petition and stating that those facts are based on his personal 
knowledge, Sheriff Wellington satisfied the rule because his petition ─ as verified 
by his affidavit ─ specified the details of his claim, set forth facts admissible in 
evidence, and affirmatively established that he is competent to testify to the 
material facts ─ i.e., he filed a protest challenging Aey’s candidacy for sheriff, 
and the board denied the protest at the conclusion of a hearing at which he 
testified and presented evidence.  He did not need to repeat these same statements 
in his affidavit, which already verified the truth of these statements. 
{¶ 20} Therefore, Sheriff Wellington did not substantially disregard 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B).  The cases cited by the board in support of its request for 
dismissal are not applicable because they involved our “longstanding legal 
construction of [the personal-knowledge requirement of] S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B).”  
Commt. for the Charter Amendment, 115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-5380, 875 
N.E.2d 574, ¶ 14.  The board does not claim that Sheriff Wellington failed to 
comply with the personal-knowledge requirement.  As noted by Sheriff 
Wellington, we recently granted a writ of prohibition in a case in which the 
relators supported their complaint with a comparable affidavit incorporating the 
averments of the complaint.  See State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, ___ N.E.2d ___. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(A) Complaint Requirement 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 21} S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(A) provides that “[a]n original action shall be 
instituted by the filing of a complaint.”  The board argues that dismissal is 
required because Sheriff Wellington filed a petition instead of a complaint. 
{¶ 22} The S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(A) requirement is analogous to the R.C. 
2731.04 requirement that “[a]pplication for the writ of mandamus must be by 
petition.”  Even though we have held that a motion cannot commence a writ 
action, we have expressly permitted either a complaint or a petition to do so.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Brantley v. Ghee (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 521, 522, 700 N.E.2d 
1258 (“original actions for extraordinary relief like a writ of mandamus must be 
commenced by filing a complaint or petition rather than a motion”); State ex rel. 
Thomas v. Ghee (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 191, 193, 690 N.E.2d 6 (party seeking 
relief “should have filed a complaint or petition for a writ of mandamus instead of 
a ‘motion’ ”). 
{¶ 23} The board raises what is at most a technical defect that did not 
prejudice its ability to defend against the prohibition claim and does not constitute 
the type of substantial disregard of our Rules of Practice that warrants dismissal.  
See Morgan, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 22, 
distinguishing Drake, 5 Ohio St.2d at 38, 34 O.O.2d 53, 213 N.E.2d 182 
(pervasive failure to comply with rules), and State ex rel. Queen City Chapter of 
Soc. of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. McGinnis (1984), 10 Ohio 
St.3d 54, 55, 10 OBR 316, 461 N.E.2d 307 (failure to file compliant brief after 
being ordered twice to do so). 
Petition Not Brought in the Name of the State 
on Relation of the Person Applying 
{¶ 24} The board next claims that this case should be dismissed because it 
is not brought in the name of the state on the relation of the sheriff. 
{¶ 25} The board cites S.Ct.Prac.R. X(3) in support of this proposition.  
That rule provides that the “party filing an action in mandamus, prohibition, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
procedendo, or quo warranto shall be referred to as the relator.”  A relator is 
commonly defined as the “real party in interest in whose name a state or an 
attorney general brings a lawsuit.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1315. 
{¶ 26} Nothing in this rule, however, expressly requires that a party file a 
prohibition action in the name of the state on that party’s relation.  The rule differs 
from the statutory requirement that a mandamus action be “in the name of the 
state on the relation of the person applying.”  R.C. 2731.04. 
{¶ 27} Moreover, the board’s citation of Davis v. Ohio State Adult Parole 
Auth., Cuyahoga App. No. 88335, 2006-Ohio-5429, ¶ 17, in support of its claim is 
not persuasive because that case relies on cases that ultimately cite precedent 
interpreting the R.C. 2731.04 mandamus requirement.  See, e.g., Maloney v. Allen 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1962), 173 Ohio St. 226, 19 O.O.2d 45, 181 N.E.2d 
270.  There is no comparable statutory requirement for prohibition cases. 
{¶ 28} Therefore, the board’s claim lacks merit. 
Failure to Name the Board Members as Respondents 
{¶ 29} The board next argues that this case should be dismissed because 
Sheriff Wellington did not name the individual board members as parties. 
{¶ 30} We have recognized that the proper respondent in a prohibition 
case to prevent the placement of names or issues on the ballot is the board of 
elections.  Campaign to Elect Larry Carver Sheriff v. Campaign to Elect Anthony 
Stankiewicz Sheriff, 101 Ohio St.3d 256, 2004-Ohio-812, 804 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 11.  
Boards of elections have duties set forth in R.C. 3501.11 and throughout Title 35 
and other sections of the Revised Code.  There is no precedent or argument that 
boards of elections are not sui juris.  Cf.  State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v. 
Cleveland City Council (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121-122, 63 O.O.2d 199, 296 
N.E.2d 544. 
{¶ 31} Therefore, individual board members need not be named as parties 
in these actions.  In fact, the board’s lead counsel has previously filed expedited 
January Term, 2008 
9 
election cases against boards of elections in which he did not name the individual 
board members as additional respondents.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Stevens v. 
Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 736 N.E.2d 882; 
State ex rel. Chance v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 42, 
661 N.E.2d 697. 
Failure to State a Cognizable Claim in Prohibition 
{¶ 32} The board contends that Sheriff Wellington’s petition should be 
dismissed because it contains no allegation that the board has exercised or is 
about to exercise quasi-judicial power.  Yet the petition manifestly alleges that the 
board denied the protest after conducting a hearing that included testimony.  The 
petition sufficiently alleged that the board exercised quasi-judicial authority.  
State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-
Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 17 (“the board of elections exercised quasi-
judicial authority by denying [relator’s] protest after conducting a hearing that 
included sworn testimony”). 
Conclusion:  Preliminary Matters and 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition Instanter 
{¶ 33} Therefore, the board’s preliminary claims are insufficient to justify 
dismissal of this prohibition action.  This conclusion is consistent with the axiom 
that the “fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio is that courts should decide 
cases on their merits.”  State ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 
505, 756 N.E.2d 1228.  “Fairness and justice are best served when a court 
disposes of a case on the merits.”  DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio 
St.2d 189, 193, 23 O.O.3d 210, 431 N.E.2d 644. 
{¶ 34} Our holding renders moot Sheriff Wellington’s motion for leave to 
file an amended petition or complaint instanter.  The sheriff’s proposed amended 
pleading addresses four of the board’s five preliminary objections.  For the 
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10 
reasons previously discussed, however, no amendment is necessary to withstand 
dismissal here. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 35} Sheriff Wellington requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
board of elections from placing the name of David P. Aey on the March 4, 2008 
Democratic Party primary election ballot as a candidate for Mahoning County 
Sheriff.  To be entitled to the writ, Sheriff Wellington must establish that (1) the 
board of elections is about to exercise quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of 
that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury 
for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  Reese, 
115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 36} Sheriff Wellington established the first requirement for the writ 
because the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial authority by denying his 
protest after conducting a hearing that included sworn testimony.  See Tatman v. 
Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 
1130, ¶ 14 (“even if the board [has] already exercised its quasi-judicial power by 
denying [the] protest, relief in prohibition is still available to prevent the 
placement of names or issues on a ballot, as long as the election has not yet been 
held”). 
{¶ 37} Sheriff Wellington also established the third requirement for the 
writ because he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law due to the 
proximity of the primary election.  State ex rel. Columbia Res. Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 111 Ohio St.3d 167, 2006-Ohio-5019, 855 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 38} For the remaining requirement ─ that the board’s exercise of 
power was unauthorized by law ─ “we must determine whether the board acted 
fraudulently or corruptly, abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable 
law.”  State ex rel. Brown v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 63, 
2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 8, ¶ 23.  Sheriff Wellington claims that the board of 
January Term, 2008 
11 
elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) by 
determining that Aey met the supervisory-experience requirement even though 
Aey had never served as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above for the 
pertinent period. 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9) 
{¶ 39} R.C. 311.01(B) provides that “no person is eligible to be a 
candidate for sheriff * * * unless that person meets all of the following 
requirements”: 
{¶ 40} “* * * 
{¶ 41} “(9)  The person meets at least one of the following conditions: 
{¶ 42} “(a)  Has at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace 
officer at the rank of corporal or above, or has been appointed pursuant to section 
5503.01 [pertaining to the State Highway Patrol] of the Revised Code and served 
at the rank of sergeant or above, in the five-year period ending immediately prior 
to the qualification date; 
{¶ 43} “(b) Has completed satisfactorily at least two years of post-
secondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hours in a college or 
university authorized to confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents or the 
comparable agency of another state in which the college or university is located or 
in a school that holds a certificate of registration issued by the state board of 
career colleges and schools under Chapter 3332. of the Revised Code.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 44} A candidate for sheriff can satisfy R.C. 311.01(B)(9) in one of the 
following ways:  (1) have at least two years of supervisory experience as a peace 
officer at the rank of corporal or above in the five-year period ending immediately 
before the qualification date, (2) be appointed to the Highway Patrol under R.C. 
5503.01 and serve at the rank of sergeant or above in the five-year period ending 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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immediately before the qualification date, or (3) satisfactorily complete at least 
two years of qualifying postsecondary education or the equivalent. 
{¶ 45} Aey was never appointed to the Highway Patrol and never 
obtained two years of qualifying postsecondary education.  Therefore, to comply 
with R.C. 311.01(B)(1), he had to have “at least two years of supervisory 
experience as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above” in the applicable 
five-year period.  R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) and (H)(1).  The board of elections 
determined that even though Aey had never served at the rank of corporal or 
above, his experience as a member of the U.S. Marshals task force was the 
equivalent of supervisory experience at a rank of corporal or above. 
{¶ 46} The board of elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9) in so holding.  “Under the language used in the pertinent 
portion of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a), in order to be eligible to be a candidate for 
sheriff, the person must, within the five-year period, have two years of 
supervisory experience and that supervisory experience must have been earned 
when the person served as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 
88 Ohio St.3d 182, 184, 724 N.E.2d 771; see also State ex rel. Watson v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 239, 241, 725 N.E.2d 255. 
{¶ 47} Like the prospective candidates for sheriff in Wolfe and Watson, 
Aey did not earn the requisite supervisory experience.  Instead, he admitted that 
he had never served as a peace officer at the rank of corporal or above.  Aey’s 
reliance on State ex rel. Hawkins v. Pickaway Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 275, 662 N.E.2d 17, is misplaced because in that case, we construed a 
substantially different, previous version of R.C. 311.01(B)(9), which permitted “at 
least two years of supervisory experience or its equivalent” instead of requiring 
that the supervisory experience be earned as a peace officer at a specified rank.  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 277.  141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5506; cf. Wolfe, 88 Ohio 
January Term, 2008 
13 
St.3d at 185-186, 724 N.E.2d 771; Watson, 88 Ohio St.3d at 241-242, 725 N.E.2d 
255. 
{¶ 48} Moreover, although we have a duty to liberally construe the 
statutory limitations on the right to be an eligible candidate for sheriff in order to 
permit electors to choose from all qualified candidates, the court cannot liberally 
construe a statute with an unequivocal and definite meaning.  Wolfe, 88 Ohio 
St.3d at 186, 724 N.E.2d 771. 
{¶ 49} The board and Aey both claim that the board’s decision is further 
supported by evidence that Aey had been promoted by Major Budd to the rank of 
corporal when Aey served on the task force.  They assert that although the 
evidence is conflicting on this point, the court must defer to the board’s 
conclusion.  The board and Aey are correct that “[w]e will not substitute our 
judgment for that of a board of elections if there is conflicting evidence on an 
issue.”  Wolfe, 88 Ohio St.3d at 185, 724 N.E.2d 771; State ex rel. Duncan v. 
Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346, 875 N.E.2d 
578, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 50} But even though Aey testified that Major Budd had informed him 
that he did not need to take any promotional examination because he had already 
been placed in the position and had further advised him that the major would issue 
an order promoting him to corporal when the county’s financial crisis ended, the 
uncontroverted evidence is that the major never issued the order, Aey never 
served at a rank higher than deputy sheriff, the corporal position that the major 
referenced had been abolished, and the major lacked authority to promote Aey. 
{¶ 51} Nor is there any indication that the board’s determination denying 
the protest was based on any conclusion that Aey had been promoted to the rank 
of corporal while serving on the task force.  In fact, in its answer to the sheriff’s 
petition for a writ of prohibition, the board of elections admitted that, in denying 
the protest, it “found [Aey’s] experience equivalent to that of a ‘corporal or 
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above.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Under these circumstances, there is no conflict 
regarding any material issue. 
{¶ 52} Therefore, the board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by denying Sheriff Wellington’s protest and placing Aey’s 
name on the primary election ballot. 
Clean Hands 
{¶ 53} Aey also claims that the writ should be denied because Sheriff 
Wellington has not come to the court with clean hands.  This issue, however, is 
not raised by the board of elections.  In general, “[a]mici curiae are not parties to 
an action and may not, therefore, interject issues and claims not raised by the 
parties.”  Lakewood v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 387, 
394, 584 N.E.2d 70.  We have applied this general rule in an expedited election 
case.  State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379, 875 N.E.2d 902, ¶ 26-27.  
Because Aey raises an issue that is not raised by the board of elections and was 
not raised by him at the board’s protest proceeding, we will not address it.  Id. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 54} Based on the foregoing, Sheriff Wellington has established his 
entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief.  Accordingly, we grant a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the board of elections from placing the name of David P. 
Aey on the ballot as a candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for 
Mahoning County Sheriff at the March 4, 2008 primary election. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents for the reasons set forth in his dissent in State ex rel. 
Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 186-187, 724 
N.E.2d 771. 
January Term, 2008 
15 
 
O’CONNOR, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., James B. Hadden, and Anne M. 
Hughes, for relator. 
 
The McTigue Law Group, Donald J. McTigue, Mark A. McGinnis, and 
John M. Stephan, for respondent. 
 
Robert L. Berry Co., L.P.A., and Robert L. Berry, urging granting of the 
writ for amicus curiae Buckeye State Sheriffs Association. 
 
Matthew C. Giannini, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae David P. 
Aey. 
______________________