Title: Commonwealth v. Gomez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12437 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANKE GOMEZ.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 2, 2018. - August 10, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Plea, Motion to suppress.  Supreme Judicial 
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 18, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Laurence D. Pierce, J., and a question of law was reported by 
Peter B. Krupp, J., to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
David Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
                     
 
1 As is our practice, we spell the defendant's name as it 
appears in the indictments. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In response to a reported question from a 
Superior Court judge, we decide whether a defendant may enter a 
guilty plea expressly conditioned on his or her right to appeal 
from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, otherwise 
known as a conditional guilty plea.  Although Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12, as appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015), does not specifically 
authorize a conditional guilty plea and nothing in the language 
of the rule or its amendments contemplates this approach, 
neither does the rule or any statute prohibit such a plea.  In 
response to the reported question, we exercise our 
superintendence power to conclude that a conditional guilty plea 
is permissible if it is entered with the consent of the court 
and the Commonwealth and identifies the specific ruling from 
which the defendant intends to appeal.  In light of our 
decision, we ask this court's standing advisory committee on the 
rules of criminal procedure (standing advisory committee) to 
propose a suitable amendment to rule 12 to delineate the 
requirements for conditional guilty pleas.  In the interim, we 
instruct judges and parties to follow the approach taken in Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).2 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Factual summary.  After a hearing on 
the defendant's motion to suppress, the motion judge found the 
following facts.  On October 6, 2014, a Framingham police 
sergeant and detective stopped for dinner at a restaurant in 
Framingham.  Inside, they saw two men who were known to them, 
the defendant and another man who they believed had an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest.  They then determined that 
the man did not have an outstanding warrant, and left the 
restaurant to return to their unmarked police cruiser. 
From the cruiser, the officers continued to observe the 
defendant as he left the restaurant and met a man later 
identified as Alcides Zimmerman.  The defendant reached into his 
front right pants pocket; Zimmerman then did the same, and 
handed the defendant some money.  The officers saw the defendant 
touch Zimmerman's hand two times, after which Zimmerman drove 
away in his motor vehicle.  The officers followed Zimmerman's 
vehicle for one mile before executing an investigatory stop.  
The sergeant asked Zimmerman, "Where is it?" and Zimmerman 
responded, "In my pocket."  Zimmerman reached his hand toward 
his pocket, but the sergeant grabbed it and then reached his own 
hand into Zimmerman's pocket, retrieving a small glassine bag 
with a white powdery substance. 
The officers arrested Zimmerman and then returned to the 
restaurant where they had seen the defendant.  They entered the 
4 
 
 
restaurant with two additional officers.  The defendant was 
standing with another person, counting a large amount of money.  
As the officers approached, the defendant reached toward his 
waistband.  The officers each grabbed one of the defendant's 
arms and escorted him from the restaurant.  The defendant was 
"sweating profusely and appeared to be weak in the knees."  He 
moved and shook his body as if trying to remove something from 
his waist.  The officers pat frisked him and found a loaded 
handgun.  On searching him further, they found ammunition and 
seven glassine bags, one of which had a substance resembling 
heroin.  The defendant was then arrested. 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted for 
narcotics and firearm offenses.3  He moved to suppress the 
evidence seized following the search of his person.  A Superior 
Court judge denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing; the 
judge reasoned that the officers had conducted a proper 
investigatory stop because they had reasonable suspicion that a 
crime was being committed, and also reasonably suspected that 
                     
 
3 The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm 
without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); possession of a 
loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); possessing ammunition 
without a firearms identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); 
distribution of cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c); possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c); 
and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32 (a).  He also faced sentencing enhancements for 
being a second-time offender, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d), and under 
the armed career criminal statute, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b). 
5 
 
 
when they approached the defendant, he was reaching for a 
weapon.  Prior to the scheduled trial date, the defendant 
"indicated he wishe[d] to plead guilty and avoid the costs of 
trial, provided he [were] able to secure appellate review of the 
ruling on the motion to suppress and to withdraw his plea if he 
prevail[ed] on appeal."  He argued that "the outcome of the 
trial is a fait accompli, effectively determined by the 
suppression ruling."  The Commonwealth was initially amenable, 
but ultimately would not agree to a conditional guilty plea.  A 
second Superior Court judge stayed the trial date and reported 
the case to the Appeals Court in order to obtain an answer to 
the following question:4 
"To avoid a trial that is otherwise only required to 
preserve appellate review of the denial of a dispositive 
pretrial motion, may the Superior Court, with the 
Commonwealth's agreement or over the Commonwealth's 
                     
4 See Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 
(2004) ("If, prior to trial . . . a question of law arises which 
the trial judge determines is so important or doubtful as to 
require the decision of the Appeals Court, the judge may report 
the case so far as necessary to present the question of law 
arising therein.  If the case is reported prior to trial, the 
case shall be continued for trial to await the decision of the 
Appeals Court"); Mass. R. A. P. 5, as amended, 378 Mass. 930 
(1979) ("A report of a case for determination by an appellate 
court shall for all purposes under these rules be taken as the 
equivalent of a notice of appeal.  Whenever a case or any part 
of it is reported after decision or verdict, the aggrieved party 
[as designated by the lower court] shall be treated as the 
appellant.  Whenever a case or any part of it is reported 
without decision or verdict, the plaintiff in a civil action or 
the defendant in a criminal case shall be treated as the 
appellant"). 
6 
 
 
objection, accept a defendant's guilty plea and sentence 
the defendant expressly conditioned on [the] defendant's 
rights to appeal the denial of the specific dispositive 
pretrial motion and to withdraw his/her plea if defendant 
prevails on appeal?" 
 
We transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this court on 
our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.5  Ordinarily, a guilty plea "by its terms 
waives all nonjurisdictional defects."  Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 
449 Mass. 825, 830 (2007).  "This is because a counseled plea of 
guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where 
voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of 
factual guilt from the case" (citation, quotations, and 
alterations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 
500 (1992).  Accordingly, this court has repeatedly denied a 
defendant's attempt to appeal from the denial of a suppression 
motion after he or she has entered a guilty plea.  See, e.g., 
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth mentions in passing in its brief that the 
issue before us is moot, because "the Commonwealth does not 
agree to a guilty plea conditioned on reserving the defendant's 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress."  Our 
answer to the reported question in this case may render this 
issue moot, since we conclude that conditional guilty pleas are 
permissible only with the consent of the court and the 
Commonwealth.  "However, we make an exception to the general 
rule against hearing moot claims in some cases because of the 
public interest involved and the uncertainty and confusion that 
exist" (citation, quotations, and alterations omitted).  See 
Matter of the Liquidation of Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 Mass. 
796, 805 n.13 (2004).  "We are most willing to make this 
exception where, as here, the parties have fully briefed and 
argued the issue."  Id. 
7 
 
 
Cabrera, 449 Mass. at 830-831; Commonwealth v. Quinones, 414 
Mass. 423, 432, 435 (1993); Garvin v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 
661, 663-664, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 13 (1967).  These 
decisions, however, were made in the context of unconditional 
guilty pleas.  See generally Cabrera, supra; Quinones, supra; 
Garvin, supra.  See also United States v. Limley, 510 F.3d 825, 
827 (8th Cir. 2007) (pleas are presumptively unconditional).  
This court has not yet considered whether a defendant may 
preserve his or her right to appeal from the denial of a motion 
to suppress at the time the defendant tenders a guilty plea. 
 
a.  Rule 12.  Rule 12, which governs guilty pleas, is 
silent regarding conditional guilty pleas.  The rule permits a 
defendant to enter a guilty plea, with or without an agreement 
with the Commonwealth, and details the procedural requirements 
in each circumstance.  With regard to pleas that involve an 
agreement with the Commonwealth, Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (5) 
(A) expressly permits a plea agreement conditioned on a 
particular sentence and charge concessions.  The judge may 
accept or reject such a plea agreement.  If the judge accepts 
the plea agreement and the defendant's plea, Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12 (d) requires the judge to sentence the defendant according to 
the terms of the plea agreement.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (d) (4) 
(A).  Therefore, rule 12 only explicitly recognizes pleas 
8 
 
 
conditioned on dispositional terms, such as sentences and charge 
concessions, as outlined in Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (5) (A).6 
 
The language of rule 12 also differs significantly from 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), which has expressly permitted 
conditional guilty pleas since 1983.7  See Advisory Committee 
Notes to Rule 11 (1983), Federal Criminal Code and Rules, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, at 68-69 (Thomson Reuters 2018 rev. ed.).  
The Federal rule states:  "With the consent of the court and the 
government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an 
appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified 
pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal may then 
withdraw the plea."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). 
 
Where rule 12 expressly differs from the comparable Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11, we have declined to interpret rule 12 according to 
                     
 
6 The defendant notes that Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (5) (B), 
as appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015), permits guilty pleas 
"conditioned on . . . plea agreement[s] other than one described 
in [r]ule 12 (b) (5) (A)."  These types of plea agreements are 
treated as "non-binding, joint recommendation[s]."  Reporters' 
Notes (Jan. 2015) to Rule 12 (b) (5), Mass. Ann. Laws Court 
Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1575 (2016).  As 
explained infra, however, the language and history of rule 12 as 
a whole indicate that it cannot be reasonably interpreted to 
contemplate conditional guilty pleas. 
 
 
7 Prior to the amendment of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in 1983, the 
Federal Courts of Appeals were divided on the permissibility of 
conditional guilty pleas.  See United States v. DePoli, 628 F.2d 
779, 781 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (collecting cases). 
9 
 
 
Federal standards.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Dean-Ganek, 
461 Mass. 305, 312 (2012), we recognized that, "'[i]n contrast 
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, our rule 12 does not identify any plea 
agreement where the recommendation shall bind the judge,' and 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3) requires a judge at the plea hearing 
to accept or reject a 'plea agreement' while our rule 
12 (c) (5) (B) requires a judge at the plea hearing to accept or 
reject 'the plea or admission,' not the plea agreement."  See 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Mass. 440, 442-443 (1999) (rejecting 
Commonwealth's argument that Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 [f], which 
prevents statements made in course of plea negotiations from 
being admissible against accused, be interpreted to exclude only 
statements from government attorneys, as is case under Federal 
rules). 
 
It is doubtful, then, that rule 12 can reasonably be 
interpreted to allow for conditional pleas, particularly because 
there is already an existing statute and rule that allows for a 
defendant to seek leave from a single justice of this court to 
take an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to 
suppress.  See G. L. c. 278, § 28E; Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (a) (2), 
as appearing in 474 Mass. 1501 (2016).  At the same time, "[a] 
defendant only may apply for leave to pursue such an appeal, and 
a single justice of this court, as a matter of discretion, may 
allow such an application if the single justice determines 'that 
10 
 
 
the administration of justice would be facilitated.'"  
Commonwealth v. Ringuette, 443 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2004), quoting 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2).  As rule 12 does not expressly 
prohibit conditional guilty pleas, we consider the approaches 
adopted in other jurisdictions, as well as the practical 
implications of permitting such pleas. 
 
b.  Other jurisdictions.  The majority of other States and 
the District of Columbia allow conditional pleas in some form.8  
                     
 
8 See Cal. Penal Code §§ 1237.5, 1538.5(m); Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 54–94a; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–204(3); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 174.035(3); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70; N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 15A–979(b); Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.335(3); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 
Ann. art. 44.02; Va. Code § 19.2–254; Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10); 
Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.9(b)(4); Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b); D.C. 
Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Fla. R. A. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A); 
Haw. R. Penal P. 11(a)(2); Idaho R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Ky. R. 
Crim. P. 8.09; Me. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Mich. R. Crim. P. 
6.301(C)(2); N.J. R. Crim. P. 3:9–3(f); N.M. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. 
P. 5–304.A(2); N.D. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Ohio R. Crim. P. 
12(I); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A); Tex. R. A. P. 
25.2(a)(2)(A); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(j); Vt. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); 
W. Va. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Wyo. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Cooksey 
v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255–1256 (Alaska 1974), disapproved on 
other grounds by Miller v. State, 617 P.2d 516, 519 n.6 (Alaska 
1980); State v. Crosby, 338 So. 2d 584, 586–592 (La. 1976).  The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not definitively ruled on this 
issue, but lower courts in Pennsylvania routinely permit 
conditional guilty pleas.  See Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 
A.3d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2017) (collecting cases). 
 
 
Of the remaining States, fifteen do not allow conditional 
guilty pleas.  See State v. Zunino, 133 Ariz. 117, 118 (Ct. App. 
1982); Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶¶ 11-20; Hooten v. State, 
212 Ga. App. 770, 775 (1994); People v. Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 
3d 607, 618-619 (2000); Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 
(Ind. 2009); State v. Freilinger, 557 N.W.2d 92, 93 (Iowa 1996); 
State v. Kelly, 295 Kan. 587, 592 (2012); Bishop v. State, 417 
 
11 
 
 
Five of these States have enacted statutes or rules specifically 
exempting a motion to suppress evidence from the general rule 
that a defendant forfeits certain appellate rights when entering 
a plea of guilty or no contest.9  As the Commonwealth notes, most 
States that permit conditional pleas do so by statute or rule.  
See Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 9.  Just over one-half of 
those jurisdictions modeled their statutes or rules on Fed. R. 
                                                                  
Md. 1, 20 (2010); State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 
1986); State v. Liston, 271 Neb. 468, 471 (2006); State v. 
Parkhurst, 121 N.H. 821, 822 (1981); State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 
327, 329 (R.I. 2003); State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 145 (2004); 
State v. Rondell, 2010 SD 87, ¶¶ 4-10; State v. Smith, 134 Wash. 
2d 849, 853 (1998).  The Illinois Appellate Court has, however, 
"urge[d] the legislature or [the] supreme court to consider 
instituting conditional pleas."  Gonzalez, supra at 619.  
Delaware, Mississippi, Missouri, and Oklahoma do not appear to 
have addressed this issue. 
 
 
9 See Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m) ("A defendant may seek 
further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal 
from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact 
that the judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of 
guilty"); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70 ("An order finally 
denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an 
appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding 
the fact that such judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty"); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–979(b) ("An order finally denying a motion 
to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from a 
judgment of conviction, including a judgment entered upon a plea 
of guilty"); Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) ("An order denying a motion 
to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the admissibility 
of a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a 
final judgment or order notwithstanding the fact that the 
judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest to the information or criminal complaint"); Ohio R. 
Crim. P. 12(I) ("The plea of no contest does not preclude a 
defendant from asserting upon appeal that the trial court 
prejudicially erred in ruling on a pretrial motion, including a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence"). 
12 
 
 
Crim. P. 11(a)(2), which requires the consent of the court and 
the government and also requires that the defendant specify the 
pretrial motion from which he or she intends to appeal.10  Most 
of the remaining States that have departed from the wording of 
the Federal rule nonetheless require the consent of the court or 
of the prosecutor (or both), and that the defendant specify the 
motion from which he or she seeks to appeal.11 
                     
 
10 See D.C. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Haw. R. Penal 
P. 11(a)(2); Idaho R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Mich. R. Crim. 
P. 6.301(C)(2); N.J. R. Crim. P. 3:9-3(f); N.M. Dist. Ct. R. 
Crim. P. 5–304A(2); N.D. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(j); Vt. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); W. Va. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); 
Wyo. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–204(3); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 174.035(3); Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.335(3); Va. Code 
§ 19.2–254.  Variances among these provisions are negligible for 
our purposes.  For example, Idaho, New Jersey, North Dakota, and 
Virginia only permit conditional guilty pleas, not conditional 
"no contest" pleas.  See Va. Code § 19.2–254; Idaho R. Crim. P. 
11(a)(2); N.J. R. Crim. P. 3:9–3(f); N.D. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).  
Michigan, Nevada, and Utah permit conditional "guilty but 
mentally ill" pleas in additional to conditional guilty and 
conditional no contest pleas, and Michigan also permits 
conditional "not guilty by reason of insanity" pleas.  See Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 174.035(3); Mich. R. Crim. P. 6.301(C)(2); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(j).  Montana does not specify that the plea must be 
in writing or otherwise on the record.  Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–
204(3). 
 
 
11 See Cal. Penal Code §§ 1237.5, 1538.5(m) (requires 
court's "certificate of probable cause" for appeal of particular 
motion); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54–94a (limited to motions to 
suppress and motions to dismiss, and requires trial court first 
to ensure that motion from which defendant seeks to appeal is 
dispositive); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–979(b) (does not require 
consent of court or prosecutor); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 
§ 710.70(2) (does not require consent of court or prosecutor); 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02 (only requires consent of 
court); Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) (does not require consent of 
 
13 
 
 
 
A handful of State courts have also recognized conditional 
guilty pleas "despite the absence in those jurisdictions of any 
authorizing court rule or statute."  State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935, 939–940 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).  Alaska and Louisiana 
currently permit conditional pleas exclusively by judicial 
decision, and at least five other States (Alabama, Florida, 
Michigan, New Mexico, and Utah) first recognized conditional 
guilty pleas by judicial decision and thereafter promulgated 
court rules permitting such practices.12  See id.; Neuhaus, 2012 
                                                                  
court or prosecutor, but limited to "motion to suppress evidence 
or a motion challenging the admissibility of a statement"); Ala. 
R. Crim. P. 26.9(b)(4) (does not require consent of court or 
prosecutor, but requires defendant to specify motion for 
appeal); Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) (requires consent of court and 
prosecutor, limited to appeal of motions to suppress, speedy 
trial issues, and constitutional challenges of statutes defining 
offenses charged); Fla. R. A. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A) (does not 
require consent of court or prosecutor, but requires defendant 
to specify motion and issue for appeal); Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.09 
(requires court approval and requires defendant to specify 
motion for appeal); Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(I) (does not require 
consent of court or prosecutor); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A) 
(requires consent of court and prosecutor and that defendant 
reserve "right to appeal a certified question of law that is 
dispositive of the case"); Tex. R. A. P. 25.2(A) (only requires 
consent of court). 
 
 
12 See Ginn v. State, 894 So. 2d 793, 801-804 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2004); Cooksey, 524 P.2d at 1255–1256; State v. Ashby, 245 
So. 2d 225, 228-229 (Fla. 1971); Crosby, 338 So. 2d at 586–592; 
People v. Reid, 420 Mich. 326, 337 (1984); State v. Hodge, 1994-
NMSC-087118, ¶ 18; State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938–940 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.9(b)(4); Fla. R. A. P. 
9.140(b)(2)(A); Mich. R. Crim. P. 6.301(C)(2); N.M. Dist. Ct. R. 
Crim. P. 5–304.A(2); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(j). 
 
 
14 
 
 
CO 65, ¶ 9A n.5.  Conditional guilty pleas "were also accepted 
by two [F]ederal circuits long before the 1983 adoption of Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)."  Sery, supra at 939-940, citing United 
States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978), and United States 
v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 
c.  Practical considerations.  Without the availability of 
a conditional guilty plea and due to the limited availability of 
interlocutory review, a defendant typically must proceed to 
trial in order to preserve his or her appellate rights, even if 
the defendant desires only to appeal from a particular pretrial 
ruling.  See, e.g., Fanelli, 412 Mass. at 500.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized, this is a "completely 
unnecessary waste of time and energy."  Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 
420 U.S. 283, 292 (1975).  See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 
11 (1983), Federal Criminal Code and Rules, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, supra at 68 ("a defendant who has lost one or more 
pretrial motions will often go through an entire trial simply to 
preserve the pretrial issues for later appellate review.  This 
results in a waste of prosecutorial and judicial resources, and 
causes delay in the trial of other cases . . . .  These 
                                                                  
 
Georgia initially authorized conditional pleas by judicial 
decision but subsequently reversed the decision.  See Hooten v. 
State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 775 (1994); Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 
277, 278-279 (1991). 
15 
 
 
unfortunate consequences may be avoided by the conditional plea 
device . . ."). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that there is no need for 
conditional guilty pleas because of the availability of 
stipulated evidence trials.  In such proceedings, a defendant 
stipulates "that the Commonwealth's witnesses [will] testify in 
the manner asserted by the prosecutor," and thereby expedites 
the trial and purportedly saves resources.  See Commonwealth v. 
Garcia, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 259, 264-265 (1986).  This procedure 
is disfavored.  See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 
34, 37 (2006); Commonwealth v. Babcock, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 
691 (1988).  See also E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and 
Procedure § 24:13, at 293 n.1 (4th ed. 2014) (collecting cases).  
This is because a trial based on stipulated evidence is 
incapable of supporting a conviction without a comprehensive 
colloquy itemizing the rights surrendered, confirming that the 
defendant understands the significance of the rights he or she 
gives up in a stipulated trial, and ensuring that the defendant 
intelligently and voluntarily relinquishes those rights.  See 
Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 287-288 (2009), 
citing Commonwealth v. Stevens, 379 Mass. 772, 776 (1980). 
 
Specifically, in a stipulated evidence trial, the trial 
judge should "question the defendant whether he recognizes that 
1) he is entitled to confront witnesses against him; 2) the 
16 
 
 
Commonwealth has the burden of proving the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt; 3) he may be giving up the right not to 
incriminate himself; 4) he is giving up the right to cross-
examine; and 5) . . . he is acknowledging evidence likely to 
lead to a finding of guilty" (citation omitted).  Monteiro, 75 
Mass. App. Ct. at 289.  At the same time, the judge must take 
care not to ask whether the defendant is pleading guilty.  See 
Castillo, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 37 n.4.  If the judge elicits a 
guilty plea during such a proceeding, the defendant will have 
waived the very appellate rights he or she sought to preserve 
through a stipulated evidence trial.  The defendant also must be 
careful not to "stipulate[] to the truth of facts which 
constitute[] all the elements of the offences charged and [are] 
conclusive of guilt," in order to avoid constructively pleading 
guilty and thereby waiving his or her appellate rights.  Garcia, 
23 Mass. App. Ct. at 265.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 55 Mass. 
App. Ct. 440, 448-449 (2002). 
 
Not infrequently, the parties or the judge makes mistakes 
during the colloquy at a stipulated evidence trial.  See, e.g., 
Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 288 (trial judge failed to warn 
defendant of right to cross-examination, to call own witnesses, 
and to confrontation, and of right not to incriminate himself); 
Castillo, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 37 ("There is nothing in this 
record that demonstrates that the defendant was aware of the 
17 
 
 
significance of a trial based on stipulated evidence or that he 
was aware of any constitutional rights he was waiving"); Brown, 
55 Mass. App. Ct. at 448-449  ("The stipulation was tantamount 
to a guilty plea. . . .  The jury waiver colloquy that [the 
defendant] received did not contain critical elements that must 
be included in a guilty plea colloquy"). 
 
Even when conducted correctly, however, a stipulated 
evidence trial constitutes a flawed procedure.  A stipulated 
evidence trial is confusing to the defendant and to members of 
the public, as it is a legal fiction rather than an actual 
trial.  "Although there is a remote theoretical possibility that 
the defendant may be acquitted, the reality is that factual 
guilt is a foregone conclusion.  After all, neither a reasonable 
defendant nor a prosecutor would choose to pursue a stipulated 
bench trial (or guilty plea) if the evidence is doubtful."  
People v. Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 607, 617 (2000).  "A 
stipulated bench trial is, in reality, nothing more than a 
glorified guilty plea that wastes precious judicial resources 
and is likely to be misunderstood . . . ."  Id. at 618. 
 
As a practical matter, a stipulated jury trial is available 
to a defendant to preserve appellate review from a denial of a 
motion to suppress evidence.  In reality, the required colloquy 
turns out to be difficult to do, and even if the colloquy is 
sufficient, it does not necessarily provide a realistic 
18 
 
 
alternative to a conditional plea.  For example, for a 
defendant, a stipulated evidence trial presents a more limited 
opportunity to negotiate a sentence or charge concessions.  For 
a prosecutor, the procedure is rife with procedural pitfalls 
that "expose[] a conviction to recantation and subsequent 
proceedings far more onerous than the original administration of 
the warning."  Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 288. 
 
A conditional guilty plea, on the other hand, facilitates 
plea bargaining.  See Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 618.  See 
also United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995) 
("Indeed, as a logical matter, it simply makes no sense to 
conclude that mutual settlement will be encouraged by precluding 
negotiation over an issue that may be particularly important to 
one of the parties to the transaction.  A sounder way to 
encourage settlement is to permit the interested parties to 
enter into knowing and voluntary negotiations without any 
arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips").  Moreover, victims 
of crime may derive vindication from a defendant's willingness 
to concede guilt, even if the defendant preserves limited issues 
for appeal; without the option of a conditional guilty plea, 
fewer defendants will have incentives to plead guilty. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that a conditional guilty plea 
undermines the finality of a defendant's plea.  This concern is 
not without merit.  On the other hand, conditional guilty pleas 
19 
 
 
inevitably result in more guilty pleas.  A defendant who may 
want to agree to an offer by the Commonwealth if his or her 
motion to suppress is denied, but does not plead guilty because 
the defendant wants to first litigate that motion to suppress, 
would have another option –- a conditional plea -– if the 
Commonwealth and the court agreed to the procedure.  In 
addition, while a conditional guilty plea "does not have the 
complete finality of an unconditioned plea, . . . it still 
results in a judgment of conviction, not an interlocutory order.  
That judgment is as final as any conviction after trial that 
might be reversed on direct appeal."  See Sery, 758 P.2d at 939.  
See also Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 
573 (1980) (Conditional Guilty Pleas). 
 
Some courts in other jurisdictions have determined that it 
is inconsistent to plead guilty and yet preserve certain 
appellate rights.  See, e.g., Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 
773 (1994).  Even an unconditional guilty plea does not 
foreclose all appellate rights, however.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 55-56 (2015) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel claim can survive guilty 
plea); Commonwealth v. Negron, 462 Mass. 102, 105 (2012) 
("defendant is not barred by his guilty plea from bringing an 
appeal or collateral challenge to his conviction on the ground 
20 
 
 
that the conviction violated the prohibition against double 
jeopardy"). 
 
Any suggestion that the allowance of conditional guilty 
pleas would overwhelm the appellate courts seems unlikely.  
While some increase in the courts' caseload is certainly 
possible, the requirement that a defendant obtain the consent of 
the Commonwealth and the court will generally ensure that 
frivolous issues are not reserved for appeal.  In any event, 
"allowing conditional pleas would undoubtedly reduce claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel that frequently arise in 
appeals from stipulated bench trials."  Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 
3d at 619.  And, in addition, "[e]xperience with conditional 
pleas in New York and California indicates that a relatively 
small number of additional appeals are generated; no 'flooding' 
of appellate courts has resulted."  See Conditional Guilty 
Pleas, supra at 573. 
 
The Federal rules include certain safeguards to protect 
against many of the Commonwealth's concerns, namely 
(1) requiring the consent of the court and the government, 
(2) requiring that the reservation of appellate rights be made 
in writing at the time the plea is entered, and (3) requiring 
the defendant to specify at the time the plea is entered which 
pretrial motion he or she intends to appeal.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(a)(2).  See Note, "A Pious Fraud":  The Prohibition of 
21 
 
 
Conditional Guilty Pleas in Rhode Island, 17 Roger Williams U. 
L. Rev. 480, 498 (2012). 
 
Though not required by the express language of Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11 (a) (2), Federal Courts of Appeals that have reached 
the issue have interpreted the Federal rule to require that the 
pretrial motion from which a defendant seeks to appeal be 
dispositive.  See, e.g., United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 
647 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wise, 179 F.3d 184, 186 
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 42 (3d Cir. 
1994); United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996, 999 (7th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Wong Ching Hing, 867 F.2d 754, 758 (2d 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Carrasco, 786 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th 
Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Jacobo-Castillo, 496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007).  "The essential 
problem created by use of the conditional guilty plea when the 
issues reserved are not dispositive is that further judicial 
proceedings will be required if the defendant prevails on 
appeal," resulting in further delay.  See Walters v. State, 197 
P.3d 1273, 1278 (Wyo. 2008).  Accord State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 
92, 101 (1985).  Additionally, nondispositive issues may not be 
capable of resolution without a trial record, and the lack of 
such a record on appeal would make it impossible for a court to 
conduct harmless error analysis.  See Walters, supra at 1278-
1279.  In light of these considerations, it shall be within the 
22 
 
 
motion judge's discretion to require that the motion from which 
the defendant seeks to appeal be dispositive.13 
 
We therefore exercise our superintendence powers, G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, in deciding that a conditional guilty plea is 
permissible, so long as it is entered with the consent of the 
Commonwealth and the court, and the defendant specifies the 
pretrial motion from which he or she seeks to appeal at the time 
the plea is entered.  We ask this court's standing advisory 
committee to propose a rule reflecting these requirements for 
this court's consideration, taking into consideration other 
issues related to the adoption of this procedure.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hanright, 465 Mass. 639, 648-649 (2013).  In the 
interim, we adopt the approach taken by Federal courts 
concerning conditional guilty pleas.  See id. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the reported question, "Yes," 
temporarily adopting the procedures utilized in Federal court 
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), until Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 is 
amended consistent with this opinion.  We ask this court's 
standing advisory committee on the rules of criminal procedure 
                     
 
13 The Commonwealth argues that a conditional guilty plea 
"may reduce the effectiveness of appellate review due to the 
lack of a full trial record, and vitiates the harmless error 
doctrine by forcing consideration of alleged errors which have 
not practically wronged the defendant."  As explained above, 
however, the motion judge has discretion to limit the 
defendant's appeal to dispositive issues, and may consider the 
completeness of the record when making this determination. 
23 
 
 
to propose an amendment to rule 12 accordingly.  The matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.