Title: The Florida Bar v. John T. Carlon, Jr

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1.  In consideration of the substituted opinion, we grant the motion for
rehearing.
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
_________________________
Nos. SC95539 & SC00-1344
_________________________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
JOHN T. CARLON, JR.,
Respondent.
REVISED OPINION
ON REHEARING GRANTED
[April 25, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Upon consideration of the motion for rehearing, we withdraw our previous
opinion and issue the following opinion.1
We have for review a referee’s report regarding an alleged ethical breach by
respondent John T. Carlon, Jr., during his representation of Darlene Woodburn
(Woodburn matter).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  During the
2.  Circuit Judge Virginia Gay Broome served as the referee.
3.  Rule 4-1.5(a) provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees.  An
attorney shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an
illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee or a fee generated by
employment that was obtained through advertising or solicitation not in
compliance with the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.  A fee is clearly
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pendency of that review, Carlon requested review of a separate referee’s report
regarding another alleged ethical beach by Carlon committed during his
representation of Bruce and Richard Whalley (Whalley matter).  We have
jurisdiction over that review pursuant to the same constitutional provision.  We have
consolidated our review of these cases.
WOODBURN MATTER
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against respondent John T. Carlon, Jr.,
alleging that Carlon charged a clearly excessive fee in connection with his
representation of Darlene Woodburn.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4–1.5(a).  The
appointed referee2 found Carlon guilty of violating rule 4-1.5(a) and recommended
that Carlon be:  (1) suspended for ninety-one days; (2) ordered to pay restitution to
Woodburn, within thirty days of the date of this Court’s order, in the amount of
$3,340.10 plus interest from December 18, 1997; and (3) ordered to pay the Bar’s
costs in the amount of $1,160.20.3
excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence
would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a
reasonable fee for services provided to such a degree as to constitute
clear overreaching or an unconscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of
intentional misrepresentation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party,
or any court, as to either entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
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The record indicates that Woodburn telephoned Carlon in December 1997
seeking assistance in securing an asset in Arizona improperly allocated to her ex-
husband under an Arizona divorce decree.  There was no prior attorney-client
relationship.  Carlon advised Woodburn that she would have to conform to both
Florida and Arizona laws.  On December 18, 1997, Woodburn and Carlon entered
into a written retainer agreement.  This agreement set forth Carlon’s fee schedule
and stated that Carlon’s hourly rate was $250, that he required a $4000 retainer, and
that he would charge a $500 administrative fee for opening the file.  Woodburn paid
Carlon the $4000 retainer.
Between December 18, 1997, and March 27, 1998, Carlon sent identical
letters to twelve separate Arizona attorneys soliciting their interest in securing the
asset.  Carlon also sent identical letters to two separate Arizona attorneys soliciting
their interest in a possible legal malpractice action against Woodburn’s former
attorney.  The names of the Arizona attorneys were extracted by Carlon from a
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Martindale-Hubbell directory.  After not hearing from Carlon, Woodburn
independently hired an Arizona attorney on April 1, 1998.  That attorney
successfully obtained an amended Arizona divorce decree and consequently secured
the asset for Woodburn.  The Arizona attorney charged Woodburn $404.  For his
services Carlon charged Woodburn a total of $3,340.10 and refunded her $659.90
from the $4000 retainer.  Carlon’s total charge was the sum of $2825 in services,
$15.10 in actual costs, and a $500 administrative fee for opening the file.
In her findings of fact, the referee found in pertinent part:
H.  As evidenced by the two (2) bills rendered by respondent to
Woodburn, the only services claimed to have been rendered by
respondent to Woodburn consisted of an initial consultation, securing
names from Martindale-Hubbell, drafting and mailing the two (2)
above referenced form letters, and receiving and responding to his
client’s two correspondences regarding respondent’s fees.
I.  Respondent’s task in securing names from Martindale-
Hubbell for purposes of obtaining Arizona counsel for Woodburn did
not present respondent with a novel, complex or difficult question
requiring any skill other than the ability to extract names from a
directory.
J.  In undertaking representation of Woodburn there was no
likelihood that the acceptance of such employment would preclude
other client employment of respondent.
K.  The significance of, amount and responsibility involved in
the subject matter of Woodburn’s representation was minimal.
L.  Respondent obtained no results for Woodburn.
M.  Woodburn imposed no time limitations upon respondent nor
did any circumstances arise during the course of his representation of
Woodburn which imposed any such time limitations.
N.  Woodburn made no special time demands or requests of the
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respondent.
O.  There was no prior attorney/client relationship between the
respondent and Woodburn nor any unusual nature or length of the
professional relationship.
P.  Respondent’s representation of Woodburn demonstrated no
skill, expertise or efficiency of effort.
Q.  Upon a review of the facts surrounding respondent’s
representation of Woodburn, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee (including a $500.00
administrative fee for opening Woodburn’s file) exceeds a reasonable
fee for services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear
overreaching and/or an unconscionable demand by respondent.
R.  Except for the $659.90 refund . . . respondent has made no
further refunds to Ms. Woodburn.
Florida Bar v. Carlon, No. SC95539, report of referee at 3-5 (report filed Mar. 13,
2000) (Woodburn Report).
Following these findings, the referee determined that respondent violated rule
4-1.5(a).  In considering her recommended sanctions, the referee found that Carlon
had a dishonest motive and failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his
conduct, and that Woodburn suffered actual and substantial harm as a result of
respondent’s misconduct.  The referee also considered Carlon’s previous
disciplinary history:
In Florida Bar v. Carlon, 505 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1987), Carlon
received a public reprimand for billing and suing a homeowner’s
association, securing a default judgment and garnishing the
association’s bank account, all in violation of a fee agreement.
In Florida Bar v. Carlon, October 15, 1996, Florida Bar File No.
95-51,391(17H), respondent received an admonishment for minor
4.  Judge Broome initially served as the referee.  After she recused herself,
Circuit Judge Elizabeth T. Maass was appointed referee.
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misconduct for running an advertisement considered to be misleading.
In Florida Bar v. Carlon, 727 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1/28/99)
respondent was placed on indefinite probation with conditions for
failing to make restitution directed in connection with the
admonishment he received in Florida Bar File No. 95-51,391(17H).
Woodburn Report at 9.
WHALLEY MATTER
The Florida Bar alleged that Carlon violated rule 4-1.5(a) by charging a
clearly excessive fee in his representation of Bruce Whalley and Richard Whalley
(the Whalleys) in connection with the administration of the estate of their mother,
Stella A. Whalley, who died intestate on May 9, 1998.  The appointed referee4
found Carlon guilty of violating rule 4-1.5(a) and recommended that Carlon be:  (1)
suspended for ninety-one days; (2) ordered to pay restitution to the Whalleys within
thirty days of the date of this Court’s order in the amount of $6580 plus interest
from November 30, 1998 (the date of Carlon’s final invoice); and (3) ordered to pay
the Bar’s costs in the amount of $1,155.25.
The record indicates that the Whalleys were referred to Carlon by a mutual
friend of Carlon and the Whalleys.  There was no previous relationship between
Carlon and Bruce, Richard, or Stella Whalley.  The estate consisted of a residence
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valued at $106,000, two bank accounts valued at approximately $8000, and
miscellaneous personal property valued at $500.  The estate had no creditors, and
no claims were filed against the estate.  The Whalleys were the sole beneficiaries
and distributees of the estate.
The Whalleys agreed that Bruce would petition to be appointed personal
representative.  Carlon advised that there were two ways he could charge:  either
hourly or by a flat fee.  The Whalleys requested that Carlon charge whichever way
would be least expensive.  The Whalleys and Carlon signed a written fee agreement
on May 16, 1998, in which the Whalleys agreed to pay Carlon $200 per hour. 
Carlon charged and received $11,080 in fees for his representation of Bruce
Whalley as personal representative.  The amount included $120 which Carlon
agrees was an overcharge due to a mathematical error on Carlon’s part.  Carlon was
entitled to an approximate fee of $3435 under section 733.6171, Florida Statutes
(2000).
The referee found that the administration of this estate was simple and
presented no novel, complex, or difficult questions.  The only unusual issue
presented was a “wild mortgage” on the real property, which the purchaser’s
attorney resolved.  The referee further found that there was no likelihood that
Carlon’s representation of the Whalleys would preclude other representation.  The
5.  The issues Carlon raised relating to the Woodburn matter are:  (1) whether
the referee and Bar counsel engaged in improper ex parte communication; (2)
whether the referee erred in denying Carlon’s request for a pretrial conference; (3)
whether the referee erred in restricting Carlon’s cross-examination of the Bar’s
complaining witness; and (4) whether there is competent, substantial evidence to
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Whalleys made no special time demand.  The estate was closed in ordinary fashion
on waivers, without an accounting.
The referee found, consistent with the testimony of the Bar’s expert, a board-
certified wills, trusts, and estates attorney, that $3500 would have been a reasonable
fee in this case, that $4500 would be excessive, and that any fee in excess of $6000
would be clearly excessive.  The referee also found that Carlon charged for
unnecessary research, unnecessary travel, secretarial functions, and other
inappropriate activities, all at the $200 contract rate.
Based upon these findings, the referee found that Carlon violated rule 4-
1.5(a).  In developing her recommended sanctions, the referee found no mitigating
factors.  In aggravation, the referee found that Carlon had a selfish motive in
charging a clearly excessive fee, that his client suffered actual harm, and that Carlon
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  The referee considered
Carlon’s prior disciplinary history, which was identical to that considered by the
referee in the Woodburn matter.
Carlon raises four issues for our consideration in the Woodburn matter.5  He
sustain the referee’s findings and recommendations.
6.  The issues raised by Carlon relating to the Whalley matter are:  (1)
whether the referee erred in denying Carlon’s request for a pretrial conference; (2)
whether competent, substantial evidence exists to find that Carlon charged a clearly
excessive fee; (3) whether the referee erred in denying Carlon’s motion for
sanctions; and (4) whether the referee’s recommended sanctions are appropriate.
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likewise raises four issues in the Whalley matter.6
GUILT PHASE
In the Woodburn matter, Carlon initially argues that the referee erred in
denying Carlon’s motion to disqualify her.  Carlon alleged that the referee and Bar
counsel engaged in a prohibited ex parte communication.  Rule Regulating the
Florida Bar 3–7.6(g)(8) provides that the disqualification of a referee shall be made
in the same manner as disqualification of a trial judge.
“A motion to disqualify will be dismissed as legally insufficient if it fails to
establish a well-grounded fear on the part of the movant that he will not receive a
fair hearing.”  See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 916 (Fla. 2000) (citing Correll
v. State, 698 So.2d 522, 524 (Fla. 1997)).  In determining whether such a motion is
legally sufficient, “this Court looks to see whether the facts alleged would place a
reasonably prudent person in the fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.”  Id.
In Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1992), we said that “a judge
should not engage in any conversation about a pending case with only one of the
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parties participating in that conversation.  Obviously, we understand that this would
not include strictly administrative matters not dealing in any way with the merits of
the case.”  The ex parte communication in the instant case involved the referee’s
request that Bar counsel seek an extension of time from this Court for the referee to
file her written report.  This communication was not prohibited because it concerned
a strictly administrative matter.  See Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 916 (ex parte
communication between trial judge and State over setting date for State to file
response to 3.850 motion is administrative matter).  Thus, Carlon’s motion to
disqualify the referee was not legally sufficient.
Carlon next argues in the Woodburn matter that the referee erred in denying
his motion for a pretrial conference.  Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3–7.6(e)(1)
provides that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply except as otherwise
provided in rule 3–7.6.  As that rule is silent regarding pretrial conference, Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.200 applies.  Rule 1.200(b) provides in part:  “After the action is
at issue the court itself may or shall on the timely motion of any party require the
parties to appear for a conference . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  We agree that Carlon’s
motion should have been granted.  However, Carlon has not shown any resulting
prejudice from the denial of this motion.  Cf. In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 752
(Fla. 1997) (respondent judge in Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC)
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proceeding required to show prejudice resulting from JQC’s failure to give complete
notice required by rule 1.200(c)).  Thus, we do not disturb the referee’s report in the
Woodburn matter on this basis.
Similarly, Carlon argues in the Whalley matter that the referee ignored his
request for a pretrial conference.  However, Carlon has not demonstrated any
resulting prejudice from the denial of that motion.  See id.  For the same reasons, we
do not disturb the referee’s report in the Whalley matter on this basis.
Carlon next argues in the Woodburn matter that the referee impermissibly
restricted his cross-examination of Woodburn.  The referee sustained the Bar’s
objections on relevancy grounds when Carlon attempted to ask Woodburn about her
employment history with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and her marital history. 
Carlon argues that Woodburn’s over twenty years at the IRS and extensive marital
history were proper areas to cover on cross-examination because these issues were
relevant to demonstrate that Woodburn was not deceived by Carlon.
A party is permitted wide latitude in cross-examination.  See Diaz v. State,
747 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).  While a trial court may place reasonable
limits on cross examination, those limits are reviewed by an appellate court for an
abuse of discretion.  See Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1083 (1998); Music v. Hebb, 744 So. 2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 2d
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DCA 1999).  Here, Carlon’s questions were relevant to Woodburn’s sophistication
in business affairs when entering into the retainer agreement and should have been
allowed.  However, under the facts of this case, we find the referee’s error in
limiting Carlon’s cross-examination of Woodburn to be harmless.
Carlon next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
referee’s finding of guilt in the Woodburn matter.  An expert for the Bar opined that
extracting names from Martindale-Hubbell neither presented a novel, complex, or
difficult task, nor precluded representation of other clients.  Based on these
conclusions, the expert testified that charging $3,340.10 was so clearly excessive for
the limited service provided that it constituted sheer overreaching.  The referee
found:
Upon a review of the facts surrounding respondent’s
representation of Woodburn, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee (including a $500.00
administrative fee for opening Woodburn’s file) exceeds a reasonable
fee for services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear
overreaching and/or an unconscionable demand by respondent.
Woodburn Report at 4-5.
Regarding our standard of review, we have said:
A referee's findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of
correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without
support in the record.  If the referee's findings are supported by
competent, substantial evidence, this Court is precluded from
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reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the
referee.  The party contending that the referee's findings of fact and
conclusions as to guilt are erroneous carries the burden of
demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record to support those
findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions.
Florida Bar v. Vining, 761 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Fla. 2000) (citations omitted).
Based on this record, we agree with the referee’s finding that Carlon charged
a clearly excessive fee.  The expert’s uncontroverted testimony that the total amount
charged by Carlon was clearly excessive constitutes competent, substantial
evidence.  We are convinced that what Carlon testified he did in rendering services
to Woodburn and what was on his itemized statement for services are at such a
substantial variance from what a lawyer of ordinary prudence would charge in this
situation that we conclude these statements for services were intentional
misrepresentations of the time expended for services rendered.  Accordingly, we do
not disturb the referee’s finding in the Woodburn matter that Carlon violated rule
4–1.5(a).
Likewise, in the Whalley matter, Carlon argues that there is no record
evidence indicating that $200 is a clearly excessive hourly fee.  Further, Carlon
argues that the Bar’s expert, a probate lawyer, did not criticize Carlon’s handling of
the real estate issue; thus, there was no basis for the expert’s opinion regarding the
fee charged.  Carlon asserts that he performed all duties contemplated by the written
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agreement and that the referee must refute all reasonable hypotheses before finding
a rules violation.
We reject Carlon’s arguments and find that there is competent, substantial
evidence contained in the record supporting the referee’s guilt finding.  For instance,
section 733.6171 sets forth a statutorily presumed reasonable fee for the personal
representative’s attorney.  Under the statutory compensation schedule, Carlon
would have received $3435.  Cf. Florida Bar v. Garland, 651 So. 2d 1182, 1184
(Fla. 1995) (finding no rule 4-1.5(a) violation where amount charged in probate
matter was consistent with amount section 733.6171 would have allowed).  Further,
the Bar’s expert testified that $3500 was reasonable.  The expert noted that while
Carlon was tangentially involved with the “wild mortgage” issue, any fee over
$4500 would be excessive and any fee over $6000 would be clearly excessive.  The
expert also testified as to specific instances of overcharges.
The referee found that Carlon charged a $200 hourly rate for unnecessary
research, travel, secretarial services, and other inappropriate activities as well as
finding that any fee over $4500 would be excessive and any fee over $6000 would
be clearly excessive.  These findings have evidentiary support in the record. 
Further, Carlon points to no case law for his proposition that all reasonable
explanations must be refuted before the clear and convincing standard is met.  As
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there is competent, substantial evidence in this record, we uphold the referee’s
finding in the Whalley matter that Carlon violated rule 4-1.5(a).  See Vining, 761
So. 2d at 1047.
We also reject Carlon’s other guilt phase issue in the Whalley matter.  Carlon
argues that he was entitled to a sanctions award under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.380(a)(4) for his reasonable expenses in obtaining an order compelling
discovery.  Carlon moved the referee for an order compelling discovery.  That
motion was denied by the original referee, but the order was later vacated and
Carlon’s motion was granted by the successor referee.  Likewise, the Bar’s motion
to compel was also granted.  The Bar’s order compelling discovery was never
vacated by the successor referee.  The record reflects no further action in respect to
these motions that was sought from the referee.  Thus, we find no basis for any
relief by this Court in respect to these discovery orders.
DISCIPLINE
This Court's review of a referee's recommended discipline is broader than the
review afforded to a referee’s factual findings because we have the ultimate
responsibility and authority to determine appropriate sanctions.  See Vining, 761 So.
2d at 1048.  Further, this Court views cumulative misconduct more seriously than an
isolated instance of misconduct.  See id.  In respect to discipline, the Bar argues in
7.  In aggravation, both referees identically considered Carlon’s previous
disciplinary action consisting of:  (1) a public reprimand in 1987, Florida Bar v.
Carlon, 505 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1987); (2) an admonishment for minor misconduct in
1996, Florida Bar v. Carlon, October 15, 1996, Florida Bar File No. 95-
51,391(17H); and (3) indefinite probation relating to the admonishment case due to
Carlon’s failure to pay restitution, Florida Bar v. Carlon, 727 So. 2d 912 (Fla.
1999).
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both cases that Florida Bar v. Richardson, 574 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1990), supports the
imposition of a ninety-one-day suspension.  In view of the same conduct being
found in both of Carlon’s cases when considered in light of Carlon’s disciplinary
history, we conclude that our decision in Richardson supports a ninety-one-day
suspension.7
In Richardson there were several instances of excessive fees being charged to
clients.  See Richardson, 574 So. 2d at 60.  One instance in Richardson was a
probate matter in which the disciplined lawyer charged nearly $11,000 in fees where
the non-complex probate estate was valued at approximately $22,000.  See id. 
There, the attorney charged his client a minimum of twenty minutes per phone call
even if the recipient of the call did not answer, charged a minimum of forty-five
dollars per page for document preparation, and charged a monthly cover charge. 
See id.  This is similar to Carlon’s conduct in inflating his statement for services
rendered in both matters.  Thus, a ninety-one-day suspension is appropriate.
We now turn to the referees’ other proposed sanctions.  We accept the
8.  Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(i) provides:
In addition to any of the foregoing disciplinary sanctions and any
disciplinary sanctions authorized elsewhere in these rules, the
respondent may be ordered or agree to pay restitution to a complainant
or other person if the disciplinary order finds that the respondent has
received a clearly excessive, illegal, or prohibited fee or that the
respondent has converted trust funds or property.  In such instances the
amount of restitution shall be specifically set forth in the disciplinary
order or agreement and shall not exceed the amount by which a fee is
clearly excessive, in the case of a prohibited or illegal fee shall not
exceed the amount of such fee, or in the case of conversion shall not
exceed the amount of the conversion established in disciplinary
proceedings.  The disciplinary order or agreement shall also state to
whom restitution shall be made and the date by which it shall be
completed.  Failure to comply with the order or agreement shall not
preclude further proceedings under these rules.
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referees’ findings that the Bar’s costs are to be taxed against Carlon in both the
Woodburn ($1,160.20) and Whalley ($1,155.25) matters.  We also accept the
proposed sanctions that Carlon must pay restitution to Woodburn with interest from
December 18, 1997, and that Carlon must pay restitution to the Whalleys with
interest from November 30, 1998.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(i).8  We impose
as an additional requirement that Carlon must make the restitution payments to
Woodburn and the Whalleys prior to his reinstatement to the practice of law.  We
disagree with the referee, however, with the amount of restitution found by the
referees in both cases. 
In the Woodburn matter, the referee recommended restitution in the amount
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of $3,340.10 plus interest from December 18, 1997, which is the entire amount
charged by Carlon after the refund.  In our original opinion, we did not agree that
Carlon performed no services in researching Martindale-Hubbell and writing the
letters; thus, we remanded the issue to the referee for a determination as to an
amount considered clearly excessive given the services Carlon did perform.  While
the motion for rehearing was pending before this Court, the referee conducted
further proceedings and determined $2,936.10 to be clearly excessive.  See Florida
Bar v. Carlon, No. SC95539, report of referee on remand at 5, (report filed Dec. 5,
2001).  Neither Carlon nor The Florida Bar contest the referee’s determination. 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s determination on remand.  Carlon must pay
to Woodburn $2,936.10 plus interest from December 18, 1997.  Additionally,
Carlon must pay Woodburn this amount before Carlon may be reinstated to the
practice of law.
In the Whalley matter, we disagree with the amount due the Whalleys is
$6580 plus interest from November 30, 1998.  We agree with the Bar’s argument
before the referee that rule 4-1.5 proscribes only charging a clearly excessive fee. 
See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(i) (“[T]he amount of restitution . . . shall not
exceed the amount by which a fee is clearly excessive . . . .”).  Only restitution of
the amount considered clearly excessive may be imposed as a condition for
9.  The $5080 in restitution due in the Whalley matter is the difference
between $6000, the maximum amount respondent could have charged without being
clearly excessive, and $11,080, the amount respondent actually charged.
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readmission or reinstatement.  As the referee made separate determinations as to
what was considered an excessive fee and what was considered a clearly excessive
fee, the referee should have based her determination of the amount due the Whalleys
on the clearly excessive figure.  Thus, Carlon must pay the Whalleys $5080 plus
interest from November 30, 1998.9  Carlon’s failure to pay this restitution will bar
any application by him for reinstatement to the practice of law.
In our original opinion, we imposed a ninety-one day suspension in each case
with the suspensions to run concurrently.  While the rehearing motion was pending,
Carlon advised this Court that he began his suspension on November 3, 2001. 
Accordingly, we suspend John T. Carlon, Jr., from the practice of law for ninety-one
days as discipline in each case with the suspensions to run concurrently, effective,
nunc pro tunc, to November 3, 2001.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650
Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from John T.
Carlon, Jr., in the amount of $2,315.45, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
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THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE SUSPENSIONS.
Two Cases Consolidated:
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John A. Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida; and David M. Barnovitz, Bar Counsel, and Ronna Friedman
Young, Co-Bar Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Complainant
John T. Carlon, Jr., pro se, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent