Title: Michael Barry d/b/a Michael Barry Properties, Inc. v. The D.M. Drennen and Emma Houston Drennen and Drennen Memorial Trust of Saint Mary's Church et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/14/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1060752
_________________________
Michael Barry d/b/a Michael Barry Properties, Inc.
v.
The D.M. Drennen and Emma Houston Drennen and Drennen
Memorial Trust of Saint Mary's Church et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-06-4645)
LYONS, Justice.
Michael 
Barry, 
doing 
business 
as 
Michael 
Barry
Properties, Inc. (hereinafter "Barry"), appeals from a final
judgment dismissing his action against The D.M. Drennen and
Emma Houston Drennen and Drennen Memorial Trust of Saint
1060752
On the complaint a line was drawn through the name
1
"Witherspoon" and "Walker" was written in its place.  We are
unable to determine who made this change.  The request for
service in the complaint refers to "Miriam Walker."  However,
the motion to dismiss by the City and the City Council members
refers only to "Miriam Witherspoon."
2
Mary's Church (hereinafter "the Trust"), Saint Mary's-on-the-
Highlands 
Episcopal 
Church 
(hereinafter 
"the 
Church"),
Rubaiyat Trading Company, Ltd. (hereinafter "Rubaiyat"), the
City of Birmingham (hereinafter "the City"), and the following
individuals in their official capacities as members of the
City Council of the City of Birmingham: Carol Smitherman,
Miriam Witherspoon,  Joel Montgomery, Carol Reynolds, Valerie
1
Abbott, Maxine Parker, William Bell, Steven Hoyt, and Roderick
Royal.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
This case involves the vacation of the 20-foot-wide alley
running north and south from 12th Avenue South to 11th Avenue
South of block 770 in Birmingham (hereinafter "the alley").
The Trust, the Church, and Rubaiyat each own property abutting
the alley, and on or about February 18, 2005, they executed a
declaration of vacation as to the alley.  The vacation of the
alley was approved by the City Council of the City of
Birmingham by the adoption of resolution no. 1131-05 on May
1060752
Three motions were filed: The Trust and the Church filed
2
one motion; Rubaiyat filed a motion; and the City and the
individual council members filed a motion.
3
31, 2005.  The resolution states that the Trust, the Church,
and Rubaiyat are the "owner[s] of all lands abutting the
portion of public ways or ways hereinafter declared vacated."
On August 10, 2006, Barry filed an action seeking a
judgment declaring that the vacation of the alley is void
because of "the City's failure to strictly comply with the
applicable law."  Barry alleges that he owns property on 13th
Avenue South in Birmingham that is "adjacent and in close
proximity" to the alley and that he has "an easement for
ingress and egress of handicap [sic] persons that has existed
and been used for more than 20 years and that abuts the
alley." 
The Trust, the Church, Rubaiyat, the City, and the City
Council members filed motions to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for a summary judgment.   They argued that
2
Barry's action was time-barred under § 23-4-5, Ala. Code 1975,
which requires that an appeal of a vacation order be filed
within 30 days of the decision of the governing body vacating
the street or alley.  Barry then filed a request for the
1060752
4
production of the City's files relating to the vacation of the
alley.  Barry, through an affidavit of counsel, asserted
pursuant to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., that the necessity
for further discovery precluded disposition of the defendants'
motions insofar as they sought a summary judgment.  Barry also
filed an affidavit attempting to establish his status as an
abutting landowner.  The trial court granted the motions to
dismiss on the basis that the appeal to that court was
untimely because it had not been filed within 30 days of the
City's decision vacating the alley.  Barry now appeals the
trial court's decision to this Court.
II. Standard of Review
"In Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.
1993), this Court set forth the standard of review
applicable to an order granting a motion to dismiss:
"'The appropriate standard of review under
Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is
whether, when the allegations of the
complaint are viewed most strongly in the
pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader 
could 
prove 
any 
set 
of
circumstances that would entitle her to
relief.  In making this determination, this
Court 
does 
not 
consider 
whether 
the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only
whether she may possibly prevail.  We note
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper
only when it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
1060752
We are unsure what "ordinance" the appellees are
3
referring to because there is no ordinance at issue in this
case.  Section 6-6-227, Ala. Code 1975, applies only to
statutes, ordinances, and franchises.  We assume that they are
arguing that resolution no. 1131-05, vacating the alley, is an
ordinance for purposes of § 6-6-227.    
5
support of the claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief.'"
Beckerle v. Moore, 909 So. 2d 185, 186-87 (Ala. 2005)
(citations omitted).    
III. Analysis
The dispositive issue presented is whether the trial
court erred in dismissing Barry's action based on its
conclusion that Barry's claim is time-barred under § 23-4-5,
Ala. Code 1975.
A. Jurisdiction
The Trust, the Church, Rubaiyat, the City, and the City
Council members argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over
Barry's constitutional challenge to the "ordinance" because
Barry failed to serve the attorney general with a copy of the
proceeding as required by § 6-6-227, Ala. Code 1975.   In
3
pertinent part, § 6-6-227 states that "[i]n any proceeding
which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance, or
franchise, ... if the statute, ordinance, or franchise is
1060752
6
alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the
state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and
be entitled to be heard."  Barry argues that he was not
required to serve the attorney general because he does not
allege that the vacation resolution, resolution no. 1131-05,
is unconstitutional.  Instead, Barry contends that the trial
court's application of the 30-day appeal provision in § 23-4-5
to 
dismiss 
his 
action 
resulted 
in 
a 
denial 
of 
his
constitutional right to due process.
 
This Court has clearly stated that § 6-6-227 does not
apply to an action challenging the enforcement of a statute or
an ordinance.  Ex parte Squires, [Ms. 1050900 December 1,
2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2006) (citing Bratton v. City of
Florence, 688 So. 2d 233 (Ala. 1996)).  Furthermore, the Court
of Civil Appeals accurately held that the attorney general
need not be served when "[t]he gravamen of th[e] action
concerned the actions of officials in interpreting and
enforcing 
the 
statute 
and 
regulations, 
not 
the
constitutionality of the statutes or regulations themselves."
Mobile County Dep't of Human Res. v. Mims, 666 So. 2d 22, 26
(Ala. Civ. App. 1995).  Because Barry is not challenging the
1060752
7
constitutionality of a statute, ordinance, or regulation
itself, Barry was not required to serve the attorney general
with his complaint in this matter, and, thus, this Court has
jurisdiction over Barry's claim.
B. Notice Requirements
The Alabama Code provides that an alley can be vacated
either (1) by a county or municipality, § 23-4-2, Ala. Code
1975, or (2) by the landowners abutting the subject alley, §
23-4-20, Ala. Code 1975.  Specifically, §§ 23-4-2 and 23-4-5
apply when a county or municipality instigates the vacation of
an alley, and § 23-4-20 applies when abutting landowners
instigate the vacation.  However, § 23-4-20 expressly
incorporates 
the 
notice, 
hearing, 
voting, 
and 
appeal
procedures set forth in §§ 23-4-2 and 23-4-5.  Section 23-4-20
provides:
"(a) Subject to the conditions set out in this
subsection, any street or alley may be vacated, in
whole or in part, by the owner or owners of the
land abutting the street or alley or abutting that
portion of the street or alley desired to be
vacated by following the procedures set out
herein. The owner or owners of the land abutting
the street or alley to be vacated shall join in a
written petition requesting that the street or
alley be vacated and shall file the petition with
the governing body with jurisdiction over the
street or alley, or portion thereof, requesting
1060752
8
the governing body's approval of the vacation.
Following receipt of the written request for
assent, the governing body shall act upon the
request applying the same notice, hearing, voting,
and appeal procedures as set forth in Sections
23-4-2 and 23-4-5, and if the governing body
approves the vacation, it shall have the same
effect as provided therein, including that the
vacation shall not deprive other property owners
of any right they may have to convenient and
reasonable means of ingress and egress to and from
their property, and if that right is not afforded
by the remaining streets and alleys, another
street or alley affording that right must be
dedicated.
"(b) The provisions of this section shall not
be held to repeal any existing statute relating to
the vacation of roads, streets, or alleys, or
parts thereof, and shall not be held to limit or
expand any civil causes of action available under
the law."
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 23-4-2(a) provides:
"Whenever the governing body of a municipality or
county proposes to vacate a public street, alley,
or highway, or portion thereof, the governing body
shall schedule a public hearing prior to taking
final action and shall publish notice of the
proposed hearing on the vacation in a newspaper of
general circulation in the portion of the county
where the street, alley, or highway lies once a
week for four consecutive weeks in the county
prior to deciding the issue at a regularly
scheduled meeting of the governing body. A copy of
the notice shall be posted on a bulletin board at
the county courthouse and shall also be served by
U.S. mail at least 30 days prior to the scheduled
meeting on any abutting owner and on any entity
1060752
We need not decide whether Barry's remedy would be
4
foreclosed absent the savings clause of § 23-4-20(b).
9
known to have facilities or equipment such as
utility lines, both aerial or buried, within the
public right-of-way of the street, alley, or
highway to be vacated. ..."
(Emphasis added.)  
C. Whether Dismissal of the Complaint
for Untimeliness Was Appropriate 
Section 23-4-5(a) provides that "[a]ny party affected by
the vacation of a street, alley, or highway pursuant to this
chapter may appeal within 30 days of the decision of the
governing body vacating the street to the circuit court of the
county in which the lands are situated."  The Trust, the
Church, Rubaiyat, the City, and the City Council members rely
on § 23-4-5 to argue that Barry's complaint is time-barred
because Barry failed to file his complaint challenging the
vacation of the alley within 30 days of the City's approval of
the vacation.  Barry contends that application to him of the
30-day limitation in an appeal from the decision vacating the
alley is a denial of due process and that he has "a right to
have a declaration of the rights of the parties in and to the
alley" under § 23-4-20(b).  (Barry's brief, at 21.)  Barry
4
contends that he is an abutting landowner and, therefore, that
1060752
10
he was entitled to notice by United States mail pursuant to §
23-4-2.  
Because there was a prohibition against vacation of a
public road at common law, statutes authorizing such a
vacation are in derogation of the common law and therefore
must be strictly construed. Holland v. City of Alabaster, 624
So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Ala. 1993); Bownes v. Winston County, 481
So. 2d 362 (Ala. 1985).  Applying this principle, we conclude
that the 30-day appeal limitation in § 23-4-5 cannot be
applied to an abutting landowner who never received the notice
required by § 23-4-2 to be given to abutting landowners by
United States mail.
Barry alleged in his complaint that his property is
adjacent to the alley.  The Trust, the Church, Rubaiyat, the
City, and the individual council members, however, contend
that Barry is not an abutting landowner.  The Trust and the
Church, in their response to Barry's Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment of dismissal
and in support of their motion to strike Barry's second
amended complaint, attached a tax map purporting to show that
Barry's property does not abut the alley.  As previously
1060752
11
noted, Barry attempted before the ruling on the motions to
dismiss to obtain a continuance of the hearing on those
motions on the basis that he had had inadequate time to
conduct discovery.  Barry also filed an affidavit attempting
to establish his status as an abutting owner by adverse
possession.
Use of materials beyond the allegations in a complaint
to support a motion to dismiss, as a general rule, converts
the motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment.
Dobbs & Sons, Inc. v. Northcutt, 819 So. 2d 607, 609 (Ala.
2001) ("Dobbs's attaching exhibits to its motion to dismiss
effectively converted it to a summary judgment motion."); see
also Donoghue v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 838 So. 2d 1032,
1035 (Ala. 2002) ("In general, exhibits provided in support of
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are considered 'matters
outside the pleading' and effectively convert the motion into
a motion for a summary judgment.  Ala. R. Civ. P. 12(b).");
Wesson v. McCleave, Roberts, Shields & Green, P.C., 810 So. 2d
652, 656 (Ala. 2001) (stating that conversion of a motion to
dismiss to a motion for a summary judgment under Rule 12(b)
occurs "'regardless of what the motion has been called or how
1060752
12
it was treated by the trial court'" (quoting Hornsby v.
Sessions, 703 So. 2d 932, 937-38 (Ala. 1997))).
The Trust, the Church, and Rubaiyat rely on Newson v.
Protective Industrial Insurance Co. of Alabama, 890 So. 2d 81
(Ala. 2003), in which this Court recognized an exception to
the rule precluding reliance upon matters beyond the face of
the complaint in disposing of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.  In Newson, we stated:
"The exception is that '"'if a plaintiff does not
incorporate by reference or attach a document to
its complaint, but the document is referred to in
the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's
claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably
authentic copy to the court to be considered on a
motion to dismiss.'"' Donoghue v. American Nat'l
Ins. Co., 838 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Ala. 2002)
(citations omitted) (quoting Wilson v. First Union
Nat'l Bank of Georgia, 716 So. 2d 722, 726 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998), quoting in turn GFF Corp. v.
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381,
1384-85 (10th Cir. 1997))."
890 So. 2d at 83-84.  The tax map, which purportedly defeats
Barry's status as an abutting landowner, is not referred to in
the complaint and is not central to the plaintiff's claim, as
was a provision in the insurance policy made the basis of the
1060752
13
action in Newson.  The map does not fall within the recognized
exception.   
As this Court stated in Patton v. Black, 646 So. 2d 8,
10 (Ala. 1994), in reviewing a motion to dismiss: "It is not
for this court to determine, based on the complaint, whether
the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only if he may
possibly prevail."  After reviewing the allegations in Barry's
complaint and construing them in his favor, we conclude that
it is conceivable that Barry could prove that he is an
abutting landowner and, therefore, that he was entitled to the
statutory notice of the hearing on the proposed vacation of
the alley required by § 23-4-2.  The fact that two of the
defendants--the Trust and the Church--deemed it necessary to
resort to evidentiary materials after an order had been
entered granting their motion to dismiss is sufficient indicia
that the trial court erred in not granting Barry's request for
a continuance and in failing to dispose of the matter under
Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.  Consequently, we cannot affirm the
trial court's dismissal based on the failure to appeal within
the time prescribed by § 23-4-5(a); the trial court improperly
1060752
In view of our holding, we do not reach the question
5
whether, assuming Barry is not an abutting landowner, relief
might be justified for failure to comply with the other notice
requirements of § 23-4-2, i.e., publication in a newspaper and
posting at the county courthouse.   
14
dismissed the action on the basis that Barry's appeal to the
trial court was untimely.  
5
D. Whether Dismissal Was Appropriate
as to the City Council Members
The members of the City Council argue that they are
immune from Barry's action because the complaint names them as
defendants in their official capacities and not in their
individual capacities.  Barry concedes in his reply brief that
the members of the City Council are entitled to be dismissed
from this action.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
judgment insofar as it dismisses the members of the City
Council, who were sued in their official capacities only. 
IV. Conclusion
The trial court's order dismissing the action as to the
Trust, the Church, Rubaiyat, and the City was premature; a
fact-intensive analysis is required to determine whether the
vacation procedures set forth in § 23-4-2 were complied with.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar
as it dismisses the action against the Trust, the Church,
1060752
15
Rubaiyat, and the City.  We affirm the trial court's judgment
insofar as it dismisses the action against the members of the
City Council: Carol Smitherman, Miriam Witherspoon, Joel
Montgomery, Carol Reynolds, Valerie Abbott, Maxine Parker,
William Bell, Steven Hoyt, and Roderick Royal.  We remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.