Title: Cross v. A-Best Prods. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cross v. A-Best Prods. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-121.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-121 
CROSS, APPELLEE, ET AL., v. A-BEST PRODUCTS COMPANY ET AL; AMERICAN 
OPTICAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cross v. A-Best Prods. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-121.] 
Discretionary appeal accepted and court of appeals’ judgment reversed on the 
authority of Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co. 
(No. 2009-1774 — Submitted December 15, 2009 — Decided January 21, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 90388, 
2009-Ohio-3079. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The discretionary appeal is accepted. 
{¶ 2} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed on the authority of 
Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 120 Ohio St.3d 228, 2008-Ohio-5243, 897 
N.E.2d 1118. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 3} With 2003 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3970 
(“H.B. 292”), the General Assembly, deciding that a crisis existed in Ohio 
regarding the administration of claims for alleged injuries caused by exposure to 
asbestos, radically changed the nature of asbestos litigation.  The General 
Assembly, however, allowed certain plaintiffs to escape the purview of H.B. 292: 
pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(3)(a), the requirements of H.B. 292 do not apply if 
they impair the substantive rights of the plaintiff and that impairment is 
“otherwise in violation of Section 28 of Article II, Ohio Constitution.”  In such 
instances, the parties proceed under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of 
H.B. 292. R.C. 2307.93(A)(3)(b). 
{¶ 4} Pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(3)(a), the trial court below exempted 
plaintiff appellee, Milton B. Cross, from the requirements of H.B. 292 in regard to 
what constitutes “competent medical authority” under R.C. 2307.91(Z). Cross 
claims to have suffered lung cancer due to his exposure to asbestos, and the trial 
court found that applying the dictates of H.B. 292 to what constitutes “competent 
medical authority” impaired Cross’s substantive rights and that that impairment 
violated Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  The trial court then 
applied the standard of witness competency contained in Evid.R. 702, which 
governed asbestos-injury cases prior to the enactment of H.B. 292.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
{¶ 5} The majority reverses this case summarily, on the authority of 
Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 120 Ohio St.3d 228, 2008-Ohio-5243, 897 
N.E.2d 1118.  The majority opinion in Ackison, however, does not address the 
savings clause contained in R.C. 2307.93(A)(3).  This case gives this court an 
opportunity to determine whether R.C. 2307.93(A)(3) has any vitality, or at the 
very least, why it does not apply in this case.  I wrote of R.C. 2307.93(A)(3) in 
January Term, 2010 
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my dissent in Ackison, noting that “[t]he majority * * * effectively cuts that 
lifeline today for all plaintiffs.” Ackison, at ¶ 68.  Did Ackison indeed doom R.C. 
2307.93(A)(3), or can that statute still be applied on a case-by-case basis?  Parties 
and courts need to know whether R.C. 2307.93(A)(3) is useful or whether it is a 
vestigial remnant of the General Assembly’s conscience. 
{¶ 6} This case should be briefed and argued.  Short of that, I dissent for 
the reasons stated in my dissent in Ackison. 
__________________ 
 
Kelley & Ferraro, L.L.P., Anthony Gallucci, Jaeson L. Taylor, Eric C. 
Wiedemer, and Jennifer L. Gardner, for appellee. 
 
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Susan M. Audey, and Jeffrey A. Healy, for 
appellant. 
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