Title: State v. Gilman

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Gilman (99-332); 173 Vt. 110; 787 A.2d 1238

[Filed 09-Nov-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 1999-332

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

Charles Gilman	                                 March Term, 2000

Alan W. Cook, J., and Elizabeth A. Leopold, Acting J.

Robert Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Johnsbury, 
  and Jane Woodruff,  Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

David C. Sleigh of Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Charles Gilman appeals a conviction for
  operating under the  influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI) pursuant to 23
  V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2), entered on a conditional  plea.  On appeal, defendant
  argues that the Caledonia District Court erred in failing to suppress 
  evidence that he refused to take a breath test and allowing such evidence
  to be introduced pursuant to  23 V.S.A. § 1202(b).  He argues that his
  refusal was obtained in violation of his statutory right to  counsel
  because:  (1) his refusal to provide a breath sample was not voluntary
  because he was not  afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with a
  public defender, and (2) the police's failure to 

 

  provide consultation with an interested party working on defendant's behalf
  rendered his refusal  involuntary.  We reverse on the first issue and do
  not reach the second.

       The material facts are not in dispute.  At approximately 5:30 p.m., on
  October 9, 1998,  defendant was stopped, arrested, and processed for OUI by
  a Vermont state trooper.  At the barracks  in St. Johnsbury, as part of the
  arrest procedure, the trooper read to defendant from a standardized 
  "implied consent" processing form, explaining defendant's statutory implied
  consent rights to him.   When asked if he wished to consult an attorney
  before deciding to submit a breath sample for  analysis, defendant answered
  affirmatively and gave the trooper the name of a specific attorney to 
  call.  The trooper reached the named attorney, but she was unable to speak
  with defendant because  she was a state's attorney in another county at the
  time.  Defendant told the trooper that he did not  know any other attorney
  to call, so the trooper gave defendant a list of public defenders. 
  Defendant  selected an attorney from the list, and the trooper twice tried
  to contact the attorney without success.   The trooper then called the
  remaining nine attorneys on the list, but reached only one, who advised 
  him that she was no longer a public defender.

       In all, the trooper made twelve phone calls to eleven attorneys
  between 6:40 p.m. and 7:10  p.m.  The trooper's efforts met with futility
  primarily because, at the time, the Defender General's  Office did not
  provide state-wide, on-call service on weekdays between 4:30 p.m. and 9:00 
  p.m. (FN1)  At the end of this period, defendant was again asked to provide
  a breath sample, but  refused.

       In October 1998, an information was filed against defendant charging
  him with misdemeanor  OUI in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2).  In
  November 1998, a hearing was held regarding  defendant's civil license
  suspension pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a).  Defendant argued at that 

 

  hearing that he was denied his statutory right to counsel.  In December
  1998, defendant filed a  motion to suppress use of the refusal in the
  criminal case because, he argued, his statutory right to  counsel was
  violated.  Defendant asserted the same violation during both the civil and
  criminal  proceedings, namely, that because the Defender General did not
  provide twenty-four hour public  defender coverage as required by 23 V.S.A.
  § 1202(g), he was denied a meaningful opportunity to  consult with counsel
  and his refusal to take the test was involuntary.  On January 26, 1999, the
  court  ruled on defendant's motion; it concluded that defendant's "refusal
  was not obtained in violation of  his statutory right to counsel," and
  entered judgment for the State in the civil suspension proceeding. (FN2)
  The court also denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the
  refusal in the criminal  case.  On July 23,1999, defendant entered into a
  conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the  court's denial of his
  motion to suppress, and on July 28, 1999, defendant filed his notice of
  appeal to  this Court.

       On appeal, defendant renews his arguments made in the trial court.  He
  argues that because  there was no public defender available as directed by
  § 1202(g), he was denied any meaningful  opportunity to consult with
  counsel; hence, his refusal was involuntary.  He argues that compliance 
  with § 1202(g) is a necessary predicate before evidence of a refusal can be
  admitted against him.

       The State's position below, and again here on appeal, is that the
  Legislature's 1997  amendment to 23 V.S.A. § 1202(c), in response to this
  Court's decision in State v. Garvey, 157 Vt.  105, 595 A.2d 267 (1991),
  governs and makes clear that an operator in defendant's position has 

 

  thirty minutes to consult with an attorney, and if the thirty minutes
  passes with or without  consultation, then the operator must decide whether
  to submit to an alcohol level test.  The amended  § 1202(c) reads as
  follows:

         A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to
    submit  to an evidentiary test or tests has a right as herein
    limited to consult  an attorney before deciding whether or not to
    submit to such test or  tests.  The person must decide whether or
    not to submit to the  evidentiary test or tests within a
    reasonable time and no later than 30  minutes from the time of the
    initial attempt to contact the attorney.   The person must make a
    decision whether or not to submit to the test  or tests at the
    expiration of the 30 minutes regardless of whether a  consultation
    took place.

  Relying on the "regardless of whether a consultation took place" language
  at the end of § 1202(c),  the State argues that this case involves a simple
  matter of statutory construction, and the trial court  agreed.

       The resolution of an appeal to this Court often depends upon how the
  issues are framed here.  This case is a very good example of that point. 
  This case is not about statutory construction of 23  V.S.A. § 1202(c) or
  about situations where an OUI detainee cannot reach a lawyer despite the 
  presence of full time defender coverage throughout the state.  Nor is the
  issue, as the State argues,  whether the trooper acted in good faith in
  calling ten lawyers who had no responsibility to answer the  phone and
  would not be compensated for doing so.

       The issue instead is whether defendant has any remedy for failure of
  the State of Vermont to  comply with 23 V.S.A. § 1202(g) by making legal
  services available to him to decide whether to take  the breath test, as
  the Legislature directed.  Section 1202(g) commands:

    The defender general shall provide statewide 24-hour coverage
    seven  days a week to assure that adequate legal services are
    available to  persons entitled to consult an attorney under this
    section.

 

  It is undisputed that the Defender General failed to comply with this
  mandate, leaving a gap in  coverage between the end of normal business
  hours and the late evening hours.  Thus, as a result of  the failure of the
  executive branch of the State to comply with the law, defendant could not
  obtain  legal advice to aid him in weighing his options as the law
  intended.

       If there is any lesson in our OUI decisions, it is that the failure of
  the State to comply with  counsel-related rights of an OUI detainee has
  consequences for the State in OUI prosecutions.  This  lesson came first in
  State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537,