Title: Dominick Occhicone v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC93343
____________
DOMINICK OCCHICONE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[June 29, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the denial of Dominick Occhicone's initial motion for
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the following reasons,
we affirm the trial court's denial.  
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
In 1986, Occhicone was convicted for the first-degree murders of the mother
and father of his former girlfriend, Anita Gerrety.  The circumstances of the murders
were described by this Court on direct appeal:
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     In the early morning hours of June 10, 1986 Occhicone
awakened his former girlfriend by knocking on the sliding
glass door to her bedroom in a house she shared with her
children and her parents.  The woman refused to talk with
him and he left.  He returned an hour or so later, armed
with a handgun, and cut the telephone lines and roused the
household.  When the woman's father confronted him
outside the house, Occhicone shot him.  The woman and
her daughter fled the house while Occhicone was breaking
into it through a locked door.  Once inside Occhicone shot
the woman's mother four times.   
Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990).  At trial, Occhicone asserted a
voluntary intoxication defense claiming that his level of intoxication on the night of
the murders, as well as his documented drinking habit, prevented him from having
the requisite mental state to premeditate the murders.  However, the jury found him
guilty and recommended the death penalty for both murders by a seven-to-five vote.  
Although the trial judge sentenced Occhicone to life in prison for the murder
of his ex-girlfriend's father, he sentenced him to death for the murder of her mother. 
In support of the death sentence, the trial judge found three aggravating factors: (1)
previous conviction of a violent felony; (2) murder committed during a burglary; and
(3) murder committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.  As statutory
mitigation, the trial judge found that the murder was committed while Occhicone
was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance.  Finally, as
nonstatutory mitigation, the judge found that Occhicone was a good prisoner and
1The seven issues were as follows: (1) whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963); (2) whether counsel provided ineffective assistance during the guilt phase; (3)
whether counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase; (4) whether Occhicone
was denied a competency evaluation; (5) whether the trial judge provided unreasonably vague and
confusing jury instructions; (6) whether the death sentence was based on an unconstitutionally
obtained prior conviction; and (7) whether the cumulative impact of judicial error denied
Occhicone a fair trial. 
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had acclimated to his custodial environment.  On appeal, this Court affirmed
Occhicone's conviction and sentence.  See Occhicone  v. State, 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
1990).  The United States Supreme Court denied Occhicone's petition for writ of
certiorari on May 20, 1991.  See Occhicone v. Florida, 500 U.S. 938 (1991).  On
July 7, 1992, Occhicone filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court,
which was denied on April 8, 1993.  See Occhicone v. Singletary, 618 So. 2d 730
(Fla. 1993).
On May 20, 1993, Occhicone filed his initial 3.850 motion raising seven
issues.1  The trial court summarily denied claims (1), (4), (5), (6), and (7) in their
entirety and claims (2) and (3) in part.  The trial court then conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the remaining portions of Occhicone's ineffective assistance of counsel
allegations contained in claims (2) and (3), and subsequently denied the remaining
portions of these claims.
APPEAL
On appeal, Occhicone raises a number of issues relating to the trial court's
2In addition to the denial of his specific claims, Occhicone alleges he was denied a fair
hearing by the court’s refusal to hear three alleged mitigation witnesses and the court’s allowing
the state attorney to testify.  
Occhicone alleges that the trial court erred by preventing him from presenting three
witnesses who did not testify at trial and who allegedly could have provided mitigating evidence. 
At the hearing, the judge ruled that postconviction counsel had failed to lay an adequate predicate
for this testimony in that counsel did not allege that trial counsel either knew of these witnesses or
should have discovered them through the use of due diligence.  We find no abuse of discretion,
especially in view of the fact that on appeal, Occhicone has still failed to point to proper
allegations as to trial counsel’s conduct.  
As to this second claim, Occhicone alleges that the court erred in allowing the lead
attorney for the State at trial and at the evidentiary hearing, Michael Halkitis, to testify as a
rebuttal witness at the evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, Occhicone called Dr. Mussenden to
establish that after reviewing affidavits prepared by Lilly Lawson, Joanne Parmenter (Carrico),
and Ann Montana during the postconviction process, his opinion on Occhicone’s state of mind at
the time of the offense had changed in favor of Occhicone.  During his testimony, an issue arose
as to whose depositions Dr. Mussenden had reviewed prior to his testimony at trial.  Although Dr.
Mussenden remembered having reviewed certain depositions and that Halkitis had sent him a
letter referring him to certain depositions, Dr. Mussenden did not remember exactly whose
depositions they were.  The evidentiary hearing judge allowed Halkitis to testify as to whose
depositions he had sent Dr. Mussenden and relied on part of this testimony in his order denying
Occhicone's 3.850 motion for relief.  
It is generally understood that under the "advocate-witness" rule, a prosecutor should
avoid appearing as both an advocate and a witness except under extraordinary circumstances. 
See United States v. Hosford, 782 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Shargaa v. State, 102
So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1958).  These extraordinary circumstances usually arise when the evidence is not
otherwise available.  See United States v. Johnston, 690 F.2d 638, 644-45 (7th Cir. 1982).  Even
under these circumstances, some suggest that counsel should withdraw from further participation
in the case.  See id.  
Although the policy considerations for this rule remain applicable when the prosecutor
testifies before a judge instead of a jury, more flexibility may be permitted when it occurs before a
judge.  See id. at 644.  After weighing the circumstances and factors surrounding Halkitis'
testimony, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Halkitis to testify
for this very limited purpose.  Because the trier of fact at the evidentiary hearing was the judge,
not a jury, we believe any potential prejudice was considerably diminished.  Moreover, the
transcript reflects that counsel for both the State and Occhicone, as well as the judge, first tried to
obtain the actual letter and depositions that were allegedly sent to Dr. Mussenden before allowing
him to testify.  Finally, because Halkitis did not testify until the end of the evidentiary hearing, it
would have created a hardship to the State for him to withdraw as counsel that late in the
proceedings.  Furthermore, we find that Halkitis' testimony was not of the type that would
materially prejudice Occhicone.  As noted, Dr. Mussenden himself conceded that he had reviewed
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denial of his claims.2  We conclude some of these issues are procedurally barred,3 
several depositions provided by Halkitis before rendering his opinion at trial, but could not
remember which depositions.  
3Claims (5), (6), and (7) raised below are procedurally barred.  In claim (5), Occhicone
alleges that the penalty phase jury instructions were unreasonably vague and confusing.  As noted
by the court below, this claim is procedurally barred because claims challenging the validity of jury
instructions should be raised on direct appeal, not on motions for postconviction relief.  See
Buenoano v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 1116, 1118 (Fla. 1990); Gorham v. State, 521 So. 2d 1067,
1070 (Fla. 1988).  
In claim (6), Occhicone alleges that his death sentence was based upon an
unconstitutionally obtained prior conviction (resisting arrest with violence).  However, Occhicone
has not provided any reasons for failing to raise this issue at trial or on direct appeal; therefore, he
is procedurally barred from raising the issue now.  Further, as noted by the State, a defendant
must first collaterally challenge his prior conviction in a separate proceeding before bringing this
claim.  See Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 951-52 (Fla. 1998); Eutzy v. State, 541 So. 2d
1143, 1146 (Fla. 1989).  Occhicone has not challenged this prior conviction nor has he alleged
how his conviction for resisting arrest with violence was obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights.  Finally, this claim also fails on its merits because this aggravating factor could also have
been applied solely based on the additional and contemporaneous murder conviction obtained in
this case.
Lastly, in claim (7), Occhicone alleges that the cumulative impact of judicial error at trial
denied him his right to a fair trial.  However, any claim that cumulative errors committed at trial
prejudiced the outcome of his case must be raised on direct appeal; therefore, Occhicone is
procedurally barred from raising this claim here.  See Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d
1321, 1323-24 (Fla. 1994).  
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and, upon review, find the rest are without substantial merit.  
CLAIMS SUMMARILY DENIED
Occhicone alleges that the lower court erred in summarily denying several of
his other claims including: his Brady claim, the claim that the State presented false
evidence, his competency to stand trial claim, and parts of his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.  
To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a 3.850 motion,
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the claims must be either facially invalid or the record must conclusively refute
them.  See Fla. R. Crim. Pro. 3.850(d); Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1999);
Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1998).  Further, where no evidentiary hearing
is held below, we must accept the defendant's factual allegations as true to the
extent they are not refuted by the record.  See Peede, 748 So. 2d at 257; see also
Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1989); Harich v. State, 484 So.
2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1986).  
As his first claim, Occhicone alleges that the State withheld the names of
material witnesses Lilly Lawson, Anita Gerrety, Debra Newell, Phillip Baker, David
Hoffman, Barbara Talbert, and Kimberly Connell, all of whom had information of
Occhicone's intoxication on the night of the offense and would have assisted the
presentation of his voluntary intoxication defense.  As to witnesses Hoffman and
Talbert, Occhicone maintains that the State withheld notes of interviews it had with
each one of them in which they told the State they saw Occhicone on the day of the
murders at Shooter's Bar.  Specifically, Hoffman told the State that Occhicone "had
a buzz."  As to Connell, Occhicone alleges that the State failed to disclose notes of
an interview it had with Goddard, Connell's sister, wherein Goddard told the State
that Connell had been with Occhicone on the day of the murders.  Finally, as to
Gerrety, Occhicone claims that the State failed to reveal notes of an interview it had
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with Gerrety where she stated that on the night of the murders and prior to the
shootings, Occhicone had difficulty walking and was staggering, evidence which
could have been used to cross-examine her at trial. 
Just recently, the United States Supreme Court restated the three components
that a defendant must show to successfully assert a Brady violation:
The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by
the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice
must have ensued.  
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).  This prejudice is measured by
determining "whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the
whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’"  Id.
at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  In applying these
elements, the evidence must be considered in the context of the entire record.  See
Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466, 470 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Cruse v. State,
588 So. 2d 983, 987 (Fla. 1991)). 
At issue in this claim are notes about possible witnesses.  This Court had
stated that notes of witness interviews maintained by the State constitute Brady
material.  See Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1999) (finding that attorney
notes of interviews with State witnesses withheld from the defendant constituted a
4Several witnesses also stated in pretrial depositions that Occhicone frequented this bar
and was a heavy drinker.  Moreover, Newell stated that she had seen Occhicone at the bar the
night of the murders.   
-8-
Brady violation); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446-50.  The court below denied
Occhicone's claim based on the materiality prong of the test as well as the fact that
the record affirmatively reflects that Occhicone was aware of these witnesses and,
more importantly, he knew about the information they would testify to.  
Based on the record in this case, we conclude the trial court's summary denial
of Occhicone's claims on this issue was proper.  In fact, as conceded by Occhicone,
these witnesses are allegedly material precisely because they were with him during
the hours before the murders.  Therefore, no one better than Occhicone himself
could have known about these witnesses.  Moreover, in several evaluations
conducted by mental health experts appointed in this case, Occhicone stated that he
had visited Shooter's Bar the days before the murders and discussed some of the
people he had visited with.4  Therefore, this serves as further proof that Occhicone
knew he had visited Shooter's Bar before the murders and was aware of these
people.  Additionally, some of these witnesses now complained about testified at
trial; therefore, Occhicone clearly was aware of them.  As noted by the trial court,
Occhicone has failed to even allege that he did not know of these witnesses. 
Although the "due diligence" requirement is absent from the Supreme Court's most
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recent formulation of the Brady test, it continues to follow that a Brady claim cannot
stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it,
simply because the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the
defendant.  
Next, Occhicone alleges that the State knowingly provided false testimony. 
In support of this claim, Occhicone relies on a sworn affidavit by State witness Lilly
Lawson, a barmaid at Shooter's Bar, wherein she states: "There was tremendous
pressure put on me by the police pretrial; they made things very difficult for me, and
they put words in my mouth.  They wanted me to testify a certain way, and they
made sure I did so."  Additionally, Occhicone alleges that the State failed to disclose
a deal it had made with Phil Baker, a "jailhouse snitch,"  and that it remained silent
at trial when Baker denied having any understanding with the State.  The trial court
summarily denied these claims, finding that the testimony of both of these witnesses
was not material.  
Lawson's most damaging testimony at trial was that a couple of weeks prior
to the murders, Occhicone told her that he felt like murdering Gerrety's parents and
making her watch.  However, as noted by the trial court, Lawson has not alleged
that she actually lied or testified falsely at trial as to any particular fact.  Moreover,
she was not the only witness who testified that Occhicone did not like Gerrety's
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parents and wished they were not around.  Hence, Occhicone has failed to allege
that he was prejudiced by the State’s alleged misconduct.  
Baker testified at trial that while he and Occhicone were together in jail,
Occhicone had told him that "the only mistake he made was not killing her [Gerrety]
too."  Additionally, Occhicone told him "they [Gerrety's parents] were fucking
assholes and he should have shot them a long time ago."  At the time Baker was
contacted by the State, he had four felony convictions, was on parole, and was
facing a charge of grand theft.  Before Occhicone's trial, Baker received a
downward departure sentence to probation instead of jail time on this grand theft
charge because of his agreement with the State to testify against Occhicone.  On
cross-examination at trial, although he testified that he was expecting a favorable
recommendation to the parole board, he said that he did not have a specific
understanding with the prosecutor for testifying against Occhicone.  
Even though the court below recognized that a deal had been made with
Baker, it denied Occhicone's claim, finding no reasonable probability that the false
testimony affected the jury's judgment.  As conceded by Occhicone, Baker's
credibility had already been called into question at trial when he testified that he was
expecting a favorable recommendation to the parole board, and when it was
revealed that he had prior convictions for other crimes involving dishonesty besides
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the recent grand theft charge.  Finally, as noted earlier, there were several more
damaging statements of premeditation made by Occhicone to other witnesses who
testified at trial and there was independent evidence of premeditation such as
Occhicone cutting the telephone wires of Gerrety's home before entering.  Because
of these circumstances, we uphold the trial court’s ruling.
As his next claim, Occhicone argues that the trial court erred in summarily
denying his claim that he was forced to undergo trial while legally incompetent, and
that counsel failed to adequately investigate his mental health and failed to provide
the experts with relevant and necessary background information.  After a review of
the record, we affirm the lower court's findings and find that this claim is also
conclusively refuted by the record.  
The record reflects that three different mental health experts evaluated
Occhicone before trial and all three testified that as part of their evaluations, they
conducted competency evaluations.  Two of these three experts specifically testified
that Occhicone was competent to stand trial.  Dr. DelBeato, who was court-
appointed, testified there was no question in his mind that Occhicone was competent
to stand trial.  Dr. Fireman, who was appointed by the defense to evaluate
Occhicone, also opined that Occhicone was competent to stand trial.  Finally,
Occhicone does not present any expert who can opine that based on evidence that
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was not presented to these experts, Occhicone was not competent to stand trial.  As
such, the trial court correctly ruled that Occhicone's claim on this issue was
conclusively refuted by the record. 
Finally, Occhicone alleges that the trial court erred in denying portions of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims summarily.  Specifically, as to the guilt
phase representations, Occhicone alleges that the trial court erred in denying his
claims that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to present evidence of Occhicone's
cocaine use; (2) failing to provide the defense experts with sufficient background
information; (3) failing to question potential jurors as to a possible taint after a
spectator during voir dire made a comment that Occhicone was guilty; and (4)
failing to object to a deputy's testimony that Occhicone had refused to submit to an
atomic absorption test.  In summarily rejecting these claims, the trial court attached
relevant portions of the trial record that refute Occhicone's claims.  After a review of
these portions of the record, we find that the trial court's findings are supported by
the record.  
In support of this first subclaim, Occhicone alleges that Joanna Carrico had
stated that if asked by counsel, she would have testified that Occhicone began using
cocaine heavily after Gerrety broke up with him.  However, the transcript of the
penalty phase reflects that Carrico was specifically questioned about Occhicone's
5Although we noted on direct appeal that "counsel did not so inquire during voir dire," see
Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990), after a second review of the record, we note
that counsel did ask some of the members of the voir dire panel about the spectator's comments.    
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drug use and at that time did not mention any cocaine use by Occhicone.  As for
counsels' failure to question potential jurors as to a possible taint, the record reflects
that defense counsel specifically questioned jurors about the spectator's comments
during voir dire.5  Also, on appeal, this Court addressed the merits of Occhicone's
claim concerning his failure to allow his hands to be swabbed for an atomic
absorption test and concluded that the issue had no merit. 
Finally, Occhicone’s claim that defense counsel failed to present experts with
background information must fail because none of his experts were called during the
guilt phase of the trial, and he does not specifically allege what evidence counsel
failed to provide the experts with, nor does he allege that counsel would have
otherwise called these witnesses.  Moreover, during their penalty-phase testimony
the experts discussed the extensive information that had been provided to them by
way of deposition and background.  Therefore, we approve the trial court's summary
denial of these claims.  
As to the penalty phase, Occhicone alleges that counsel were ineffective for
failing to provide their experts with sufficient background information, for failing to
present evidence regarding Occhicone's personal hardships, for failing to present
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evidence of Occhicone's cocaine problem, and for failing to request a special jury
instruction adequately defining the aggravating circumstances.  Again, after
reviewing the record and proceedings in this case, we agree that Occhicone's claims
on this issue are refuted by the record.  
First, Occhicone alleges that if counsel had provided the experts with
background information, the experts would not have been as easily attacked on
cross-examination.  However, each defense expert testified that they relied on
numerous depositions and statements to assist them in preparation for testifying at
Occhicone's trial.  Therefore, even assuming they did not review this information
before they evaluated Occhicone, they clearly had reviewed it before they were
cross-examined by the State.  For example, the record reflects that Dr. Fireman
talked to Occhicone's sister before evaluating him and Dr. Szabo read depositions
before he interviewed him.  
Similarly, Occhicone's claim that defense counsel failed to present evidence
of Occhicone's personal hardships is also refuted by the record.  The mental health
experts testified that Occhicone had emotional problems as a result of Gerrety's
decision to abort their baby and their eventual break-up.  Moreover, other witnesses,
including Occhicone himself, testified about his wife's death due to cancer and his
responsibility of having to raise a child by himself.  As noted in connection with his
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase, this claim was also
properly denied because defense counsel inquired as to Occhicone's prior drug use
at trial during Carrico's testimony at the penalty phase.  Finally, we find no error
with the jury instructions defining the aggravating circumstances; therefore, defense
counsel could not have been ineffective, as is now alleged, for failing to request a
specific instruction.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
As noted above, the court below conducted an evidentiary hearing on parts of
Occhicone's ineffective assistance of counsel claims concerning both the guilt and
penalty phases of the trial.  We first address the claim as to counsel’s performance
during the guilt phase.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Guilt Phase
As previously noted, Occhicone's main defense at trial was that he was
voluntarily intoxicated.  Occhicone does not question the strategy to present this
defense; rather, he disagrees with the particulars regarding how the defense was
presented to the jury.  At trial, counsel attempted to establish the defense through
the cross-examination of State witnesses rather than by separately presenting
independent evidence or witnesses on the issue.  Trial counsel testified extensively
as to this strategy at the hearing below.
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In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately
assert a defense, Occhicone must establish two elements: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.    
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Rutherford v. State,
727 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1998); Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1996).  In
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1986), this Court further explained
the application of the Strickland standard:
     A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be
considered meritorious, must include two general
components.  First, the claimant must identify particular
acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be
outside the broad range of reasonably competent
performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must
further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness
and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the
outcome is undermined. 
Id. at 932 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Downs v.
6The U.S. Supreme Court has explained: “The touchstone of an ineffective-assistance
claim is the fairness of the adversary proceeding . . . .”  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370
(1993).
-17-
State, 453 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1984)).6  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
present a mixed question of law and fact subject to plenary review based on the
Strickland test.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 1999) (citing
Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996)).  This requires an independent
review of the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial
court's factual findings.  See id.    
In support of his claim, Occhicone alleges that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance at the guilt phase by failing to effectively cross-examine State witnesses
Lily Lawson and Cheryl Hoffman; for failing to present the testimony of Patricia
Goddard, Kimberly Connel, Michael Stillwagon and Audrey Hall; and for failing to
present experts during the guilt phase.  Occhicone claims that this evidence would
have painted a different picture of Occhicone's intoxicated state on the night of the
murders.  As we have noted in the past, voluntary intoxication is a recognized
defense to premeditated first-degree murder.  See Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91,
92-93 (Fla. 1985).  Moreover, evidence elicited during cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses may provide sufficient evidence for a jury instruction on
voluntary intoxication.  See id.
7The defense deposed both of these witnesses before trial. 
8Because the murders occurred at 4 a.m. on the morning of June 10, we will refer to the
events that transpired on June 9, as the day and night of the murders.   
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At trial, both Lilly Lawson and Cheryl Hoffman, barmaids at Shooter's Bar,
testified as State witnesses to help establish premeditation.7  Specifically, Ms.
Lawson testified that two weeks before the murders, Occhicone had told her that he
wanted to shoot Gerrety's parents.  Ms. Hoffman also testified that on at least two
occasions, Occhicone had told her that he wanted to kill Gerrety's parents.  On
cross-examination, they admitted that Occhicone was a heavy drinker, but they were
not asked about their contact with Occhicone on the day and night of the murders.8 
However, at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, they both testified that
Occhicone had been drinking for prolonged periods on the day and night of the
murders.
Specifically, Ms. Lawson testified that during her morning shift, she saw
Occhicone consume approximately ten shots of schnapps and also drink a vodka
and cranberry.  She also testified that she saw Occhicone at the bar again at 7:30
p.m. that evening and that Occhicone was again drinking.  Finally, at some time
prior to 11 p.m. on the night of the murders, she saw Occhicone leaving the bar with
a bottle of vodka.  Ms. Hoffman, who had the afternoon shift, testified at the
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evidentiary hearing that she had served Occhicone alcohol the day of the murder and
that she could tell he had been drinking prior to the beginning of her shift.
Occhicone also claims that counsel were ineffective in failing to call Kimberly
Connell and Patricia Goddard.  At the evidentiary hearing they testified that they
had met Occhicone on June 8, two days before the murders, when Occhicone
crashed his car into a tree outside of Goddard's house.  Although they were
contacted by the State, they were never contacted by Occhicone's attorneys or
investigators prior to trial.  Ms. Connell testified that at the time of the crash,
Occhicone smelled of alcohol and that he appeared drunk.  She further testified that
from the day of the crash until the night of the murders, she had drunk with
Occhicone and had smoked marijuana with him.  Ms. Connell also maintained that
she saw Occhicone at approximately 2:30 a.m. on the morning of June 10, just a
short time before the murders, and that Occhicone was intoxicated and was very
upset and emotional over his ex-girlfriend, Gerrety.  Ms. Goddard testified at the
evidentiary hearing that when she first came in contact with Occhicone after the
accident, he smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech and had trouble standing.  She
also testified that she saw Occhicone briefly the day after the accident, that he was
very distraught over Gerrety, and that he had a gun.    
Occhicone alleges that counsel also erred in failing to present Michael
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Stillwagon and Audrey Hall as witnesses.  At the evidentiary hearing, Stillwagon
testified that he saw Occhicone at Shooter's Bar at approximately 6:30 p.m. on June
9 and left with Occhicone that evening in Occhicone's car at approximately 8:30. 
According to Stillwagon, Occhicone appeared to be intoxicated.  As to Hall,
Occhicone alleges that she could have testified that Occhicone routinely parked his
car at the Artzers’ house where it was found on the night of the murders when he
would go to visit Gerrety.  He claims that this testimony should have been presented
to rebut the State's argument that parking his car away from the victim's house on
the night of the murder demonstrated his premeditation rather than his routine
practice.  
As the final category of evidence supporting his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on this issue, Occhicone claims that counsel was ineffective for failing
to present experts at trial who had evaluated Occhicone and could have testified that
Occhicone did not have the mental state to premeditate the murders.  In support of
this claim, Occhicone presented Dr. Fireman and Dr. Mussenden at the
postconviction evidentiary hearing, both of whom had testified previously during the
penalty phase of the trial.  Dr. Fireman testified on behalf of the defendant while Dr.
Mussenden testified on behalf of the State.  
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Fireman testified that he was requested by the
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defense team to provide a mental status examination on Occhicone.  He was asked
to concentrate on the following areas: (1) competency to stand trial; (2) competency
at the time of the offense; and (3) sentencing issues.  He testified that Occhicone's
trial attorneys never consulted with him about assisting them in preparing the guilt
phase of Occhicone's trial, even though they could have utilized his expert testimony
in the area of diminished capacity by reason of voluntary intoxication.  He also
testified that counsel never communicated to him that they were attempting to put on
a voluntary intoxication defense during the guilt phase.  As to the possible harmful
rebuttal testimony of Dr. Mussenden concerning Occhicone's detailed description of
the events of the murder, Dr. Fireman testified that he could have aided in
impeaching the State's expert since, in his opinion, Dr. Mussenden was inadequately
informed about the complexity of the case, the data base he used was unreliable for
the conclusions he had, and the presence of other people during Occhicone's
evaluation placed a constraint on the reliability of the information provided by
Occhicone.  Notwithstanding this testimony, during cross-examination at the
evidentiary hearing, Dr. Fireman concluded that although Occhicone had a
diminished capacity to premeditate, he did not have an inability to do so.  Moreover,
during Dr. Fireman’s direct examination, he stated that Occhicone had no
equivocation under the diminished responsibility by voluntary intoxication.  
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Dr. Mussenden also testified at the evidentiary hearing.  He had testified for
the State at the penalty phase of the trial and had opined that Occhicone had the
cognitive ability to premeditate.  At the evidentiary hearing, he testified that his
opinion had now changed in part because of his review of Lawson's and Ann
Montana's recent affidavits.  He also stated that if he had been aware of these
affidavits at the time of trial, he would have testified consistently with the testimony
that he was providing at the evidentiary hearing.  Moreover, he also conceded that
he was not comfortable with the results of his evaluation performed on Occhicone
because he had evaluated him in the presence of counsel for the State and the
defendant; therefore, Occhicone may not have been completely open with his
responses. 
At the evidentiary hearing, all three defense attorneys testified extensively
concerning their reasons for failing to present the evidence and witnesses now
claimed by Occhicone to have been critical.  They testified that although they
intended to present witnesses at the guilt phase of the trial, they changed their minds
after the State had rested because they felt that sufficient evidence of Occhicone's
intoxication had been presented during their cross-examination of the State's
witnesses to permit them to advance the intoxication defense.  Moreover, they all
testified that it was important for them to be able to have the first and last word with
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the jury before deliberations, a right they would lose if they presented evidence
independent of the State’s case.  Attorney LaPorte also testified that, to the best of
his knowledge, he was not aware of Patricia Goddard or Kimberly Connell and that
he only learned of Stillwagon after the guilt phase and prior to the penalty phase.
As to Hall, defense counsel testified they did not present her as a witness
because they had tried to elicit this same testimony in Gerrety's cross-examination. 
In addition, attorney Young recalled that the State had a witness available to rebut
Hall's testimony that Occhicone routinely parked his car at the Artzers’ house,
which neighbored Gerrety’s house.  Moreover, attorney Boyer also noted that
presenting Hall would have led to testimony concerning Occhicone's pattern of
routinely annoying the neighbors when he would drive away loud and fast at about 3
or 4 a.m.
Finally, all three of the defense attorneys testified concerning the reasons for
not presenting the additional experts.  Boyer testified that his intent and strategy was
simply to present sufficient evidence at the guilt phase as to Occhicone's
intoxication, without presenting the doctors, and to then use the doctors during the
penalty phase only in order to secure more information from their testimony.  Young
and LaPorte testified that they refrained from presenting any experts during the guilt
phase because of the potential harmful rebuttal that could have been presented by
-24-
Dr. Mussenden concerning Occhicone's vivid recall to him of the details surrounding
the murders, a recall inconsistent with heavy intoxication.  Moreover, immediately
after the State rested its case, the trial court denied Occhicone's motion to exclude
and prevent the State from using the taped statements made by Occhicone to Dr.
Mussenden during his evaluation.  Hence, there was no doubt that the experts could
have been cross-examined on these statements.  Finally, the attorneys had concluded
that there was very little chance of obtaining a verdict of less than first-degree
murder, and they consciously decided that they could not credibly and effectively
utilize the doctors at both phases of the trial without diminishing their effectiveness. 
Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel
disagrees with trial counsel's strategic decisions.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
(“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . .”); Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d
1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995) ("The standard is not how present counsel would have
proceeded, in hindsight . . . .").  Moreover, strategic decisions do not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and
rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional
conduct.  See Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 223; State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247,
1250 (Fla. 1987).       
-25-
In the instant case, all three attorneys testified at the evidentiary hearing that
they consciously chose not to present evidence during their case because they
believed they had presented enough evidence to the jury through cross-examination,
and they felt it was more important to have the first and last word with the jury
during closing argument.  Moreover, they testified they had intended to present
several witnesses, including mental health experts, but finally decided against it
when the court denied their motion to prevent the State from introducing the taped
statements made to Dr. Mussenden, which in part showed that Occhicone had a
good recall of what transpired the night of the murders and therefore was not
intoxicated to the level of not being able to premeditate the murders.  Further, they
believed they could not credibly offer these witnesses at both phases of the trial. 
Finally, as to witness Audrey Hill, counsel testified that they strategically chose not
to present her because the State had a witness available to rebut her testimony, and
her testimony would have opened the door for negative evidence of Occhicone's
behavior when he would regularly visit Gerrety.  Clearly, this testimony suggests a
carefully considered and planned defense and provides a proper evidentiary basis
for the trial court’s ruling denying relief.  For these reasons, we affirm the trial
court’s ruling.
As to the prejudice prong of this claim, the trial court also concluded that
9See Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 249-50 (Fla. 1993) (finding no ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to present voluntary intoxication defense where defense was
inconsistent with defendant's detailed testimony and where notwithstanding, counsel had
presented evidence that defendant was a chronic alcoholic and was intoxicated at the time of the
murder); Routly v. State, 590 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla. 1991) (finding defendant did not demonstrate
reasonable probability that outcome would have been different because the evidence not presented
by counsel was already before the judge and jury, but in a different form); White v. State, 559 So.
2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1990) (rejecting defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing
to assert the voluntary intoxication defense where counsel testified that such a defense was
inconsistent with the deliberateness of defendant's actions).   
-26-
presentation of the independent evidence now advanced would not have materially
affected the outcome of the trial because it was cumulative to the other substantial
evidence of intoxication that was already before the jury: namely that Occhicone
was a heavy drinker, that Newell had served him two drinks the night of the murders
and that Gerrety had smelled alcohol on him and had stated that he could not stand
up straight and staggered when he came to her house the night of the murders.  A
review of the record supports the trial court's findings, and we find that the trial
court's legal conclusions are also supported by our prior decisions.9 
After a review of the record and the trial court's findings, we find no proper
basis for overturning the trial court’s conclusion that defense counsel were not
deficient nor was Occhicone sufficiently prejudiced by the alleged deficiency to
mandate a new trial.  We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that counsel's
conduct and decision not to present any independent evidence of Occhicone's
intoxication constituted a strategic decision of counsel.  If we were to accept
10 Occhicone also asserts that counsel were ineffective for failing to provide the mental
health experts with information concerning Occhicone's background.  This claim is without merit
because Occhicone does not allege what information counsel failed to provide to these experts. 
Moreover, although some of the experts may have evaluated Occhicone and submitted their
reports before reviewing outside information and depositions, the record reflects that at the time
they testified, they had actually reviewed this information.
-27-
Occhicone's challenge to this conduct, we would find ourselves engaging in the
hindsight analysis so many courts have warned should not occur when evaluating
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The issue is not what present counsel or
this Court might now view as the best strategy, but rather whether the strategy was
within the broad range of discretion afforded to counsel actually responsible for the
defense.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Dugger, 541 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1989) (finding
counsel was not deficient for failing to present expert testimony where the record
showed that counsel presented substantial evidence of defendant's intoxication). 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Penalty Phase
Occhicone also contends that defense counsel were ineffective at the penalty
phase for failing to present the testimony of Ann Montana and Father Ed Lamp as
mitigation.  Occhicone alleges that Ms. Montana could have testified about
Occhicone's relationship with Gerrety and his fragile emotional state after Gerrety
left him.  Moreover, Father Lamp could have testified concerning the couple's
tumultuous relationship and Occhicone's drinking problem.10 
-28-
In order to obtain a reversal of his death sentence on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, Occhicone must show "both (1) that the
identified acts or omissions of counsel were deficient, or outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance, and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense such that, without the errors, there is a reasonable probability
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been
different."  Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Bolender v.
Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1556-57 (11th Cir.1994)); see also Hildwin v. Dugger,
654 So.2d 107, 109 (Fla.1995).
After reviewing the record below, we again find no error in the trial court’s
conclusion that counsel were not deficient in failing to call these witnesses nor was
Occhicone prejudiced by the failure to call them.  As far as Ms. Montana is
concerned, attorney LaPorte testified at the hearing that defense counsel were aware
of her possible testimony at trial, but chose not to present her as a witness because
the substance of her testimony had already been provided to the jury through various
other witnesses.  As to counsel’s failure to present Father Lamp, the attorneys
testified at the evidentiary hearing that they had contacted all the priests that had
been named to them by Occhicone.  Therefore, the trial court concluded that counsel
conducted a thorough investigation of Occhicone's background and they provided
-29-
valid reasons for not presenting these witnesses.  
Although Ms. Montana's and Father Lamp's testimony would have been
admissible as mitigating evidence, the trial court found that when compared to the
testimony adduced during the penalty phase and throughout the trial, the evidence
would have been cumulative because counsel had already presented evidence of
Occhicone's intoxication, habit of heavy drinking, and his distraught state and
depression over his relationship with Gerrety.  Specifically, Joanne Carrico, a friend
of Occhicone's who had known him for about a year at the time of trial, described
the "highs and lows" of Occhicone's relationship with Gerrety after the break-up. 
She also described Occhicone's reaction to the news that Gerrety had gotten an
abortion and testified about how she helped him write a letter to Gerrety asking her
to leave him alone and stop calling him if she was not going to stay with him. 
Occhicone also presented three doctors at the penalty phase, who testified
that Occhicone was under extreme mental and emotional distress and that his ability
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.  Finally, Occhicone himself testified
during the penalty phase about how his prior wife had died of cancer and how he
was the father of a young child.  
Again our decisions support the trial court’s conclusion that counsel cannot
-30-
be deemed to have provided ineffective assistance for failing to present this
evidence.  See Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 224-25 (Fla. 1998) (stating that
counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence that was essentially
cumulative to the testimony presented by trial counsel at the penalty phase); Routly
v. State, 590 So. 2d 397, 401-02 (Fla. 1991) (denying defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim since most of the evidence that defendant claimed
should have been presented was already before the judge and jury, except in a
different form than originally proffered); Lusk v. State, 498 So. 2d 902, 906 (Fla.
1986) (finding that evidence concerning defendant's family background was largely
cumulative where defendant had already testified about his background and personal
problems during the penalty phase).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order in all respects. 
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County,
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Stanley R. Mills, Judge - Case No. 86-1355-CF-AWS
Harry P. Brody, Assistant CCRC, and John P. Abatecola, Staff Attorney, Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee