Title: State v. Tiner

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: May 18, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff on Review,
v.
JEFFREY DALE TINER,
Defendant on Review.
(CC 10-95-11814; SC S47643)
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of
convictions and sentences of death imposed by the Circuit Court
of Lane County.
Darryl L. Larson, Judge.
Argued and submitted May 6, 2005.
Mary M. Reese, Bend, argued the cause and filed the briefs
for defendant on review.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for plaintiff on review.  With her
on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General, and Kathleen M. Cegla and Denis M.
Vannier, Assistant Attorneys General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,* and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,** and Balmer, JJ.***
RIGGS, J.
The judgment of conviction and the sentences, including the
sentences of death, are affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
*Chief Justice when this case was argued.
**Chief Justice when this case was decided.
***Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
RIGGS, J.
This case is before us on automatic and direct appeal
of defendant's judgment of conviction and sentences of death.  We
have considered defendant's assignments of error and conclude
that the trial court erred only in the form of the judgment.  We
therefore affirm the convictions and the sentences, but reverse
in part and remand this case to the trial court for the limited
purpose of correcting the form of the judgment. 
I. FACTS
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we state the
facts in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Thompson, 328 Or 248, 250, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042
(1999).  With permission from his California parole officer,
defendant traveled to Springfield to visit Eklof in March 1993. 
Eklof and her three children resided with victim, who had invited
them to live with him.  After a party at victim's house,
defendant and Eklof told victim that they wanted him to leave his
house that night.  Eklof and defendant argued with and then
assaulted victim.  By assaulting victim, defendant risked
revocation of his parole.  Also, in violation of his parole
conditions, defendant had acquired a handgun.  Defendant killed
victim with Elkof's assistance.  He disposed of the body in a
remote forested area of the Cascade Range.  
Despite changes that Eklof and defendant made to the
interior of the house after victim's disappearance, such as
painting the walls and replacing the carpet, the police found
traces of blood in the house.  Defendant later boasted to others
that he had killed victim and detailed how he had disposed of
victim's body.  Meanwhile, Eklof participated in four videotaped
interviews with police concerning the murder.  In May 1994,
police arrested Eklof for victim's murder.  In November 1994, a
mushroom hunter found victim's remains near a logging road in the
Cascade Range.
In mid-1994, defendant began serving an unrelated
sentence in a Nevada prison.  There, he associated with members
of a white supremacist gang, the Aryan Warriors.  Defendant's
upper body featured various tattoos suggesting sympathy for white
supremacy, including a swastika, a woodpecker, and the words
"White" and "Pride."  Defendant also used a Nazi symbol, SS
lightning bolts, (1) in a letter to his wife.
In December 1995, the State of Oregon indicted
defendant for aggravated murder and other crimes relating to the
murder of the victim.  In August 1996, while still serving his
Nevada sentence, defendant was transferred to Oregon.  The trial
court initially scheduled trial for November 1996, but later
granted defendant's motion to postpone the trial until June 10,
1997.
On June 10, 1997, the day set for trial, the state
received an adverse ruling concerning the admissibility of
Eklof's videotaped statements.  The trial court determined that
only some of Eklof's statements were admissible as evidence,
although the state argued that all four videotapes of her
interviews should be admitted in their entirety.  In light of the
ruling, the state informed the court that it intended to appeal.
On July 7, 1997, the state filed its notice of
appeal. (2)  There followed a year and a half devoted to
settling the record on which the appeal would be based.  A few
days before the state's opening brief was due, the United States
Supreme Court issued an opinion that caused the state's appellate
attorney to reconsider whether to proceed with the appeal.  See
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 US 116, 119 S Ct 1887, 144 L Ed 2d 117
(1999) (plurality opinion regarding Sixth Amendment confrontation
clause and hearsay exception against penal interest).  On July
13, 1999, a little more than two years after filing the notice of
appeal, the state moved to dismiss the appeal.  The Court of
Appeals granted the motion and issued an appellate judgment. 
The trial court set a new trial date of April 4, 2000. 
Late in 1999, defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of a
speedy trial.  The trial court issued a written order, supported
by findings, rejecting defendant's motion.  On April 4, 2000,
trial began.  A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated murder,
among other crimes, and imposed a sentence of death.
Defendant raises numerous issues regarding alleged
errors in his trial.  We address his constitutional arguments
regarding the delays in bringing him to trial, his arguments that
the state improperly inspected and photographed his tattoos, and
his arguments that the trial court should not have admitted
evidence during the penalty phase of his gang affiliations while
in prison in Nevada.  We have considered defendant's other
assignments of error not discussed here, but, based on our
review, we conclude that no error occurred as claimed with
respect to any of them, except as to the form of the judgment.
II. TRIAL "WITHOUT DELAY"
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution
provides that "[n]o court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without
delay."  In State v. Harberts, 331 Or 72, 11 P3d 641 (2000), this
court explained that, when examining a speedy-trial question,
this court considers the delay and prejudice to the defendant. 
First, this court examines the length of the delay and the
reasons for the delay.  Id. at 84.  Second, the court must assess
prejudice to the defendant in light of the interests that the
speedy-trial requirement was designed to protect: (1) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize the anxiety
and concern of the criminally accused; (3) and to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.  Id. at 85
(quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 532, 92 S Ct 2182, 33 L Ed
2d 101 (1972)).  Of those, the last is the most serious, because
the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare a case skews
the fairness of the entire system.  Id.  In that regard,
defendant must show that the delay caused a reasonable
possibility of prejudice to the defendant's ability to prepare a
defense.  Id. at 86.
A. Reasons for Delay
Defendant argues, and the state concedes, that the
length of delay of more than four years between defendant's
indictment and trial is constitutionally significant.  Defendant
focuses on the delay that resulted from the state's decision to
appeal the trial court's adverse ruling on admission of Eklof's
videotaped statements to the police.  
Defendant argues that the state's appeal was not
justified for several reasons.  First, defendant argues that the
state knew at the time that it took its appeal that the
admissibility of Eklof's statements hinged on trustworthiness and
reliability.  The state had argued at Eklof's separate, earlier
trial that she was neither trustworthy nor credible.  Second,
defendant argues that the state knew that its appeal, like the
appeal in Harberts, was based on a fact-intensive inquiry, which
usually offers little chance of success at the appellate level. 
Third, defendant points out that the state faced a procedurally
problematic appeal because it had offered Eklof's multiple
statements as a single unit.  See Pumpelly v. Reeves, 273 Or 808,
812, 543 P2d 682 (1975) (if single offer of proof contains both
admissible and inadmissible matter, rejection of entire offer is
not error).  Defendant also argues that the state unreasonably
took more than a year to settle the record before dismissing the
appeal.  Finally, defendant argues that, whatever the merits of
the appeal, the state did not pursue the appeal diligently.
In response, the state argues that it was justified in
pursuing its appeal, because the admission of potentially pivotal
evidence of defendant's guilt could well depend upon the outcome
of the appeal.  The state also asserts that it had a reasonable
chance of success on appeal and that it was justified in pursuing
its appeal because of the seriousness of the offense charged.  
We conclude that the state's appeal in this case had
little chance of success and, more importantly, that that
conclusion should have been obvious to the state's attorneys from
the outset of the appeal.  At trial, the state insisted that all
Eklof's statements must be admitted into evidence and did not
make separate offers of evidence.  It was all or nothing,
according to the state.  However, as defendant notes, it is
beyond dispute that some of Eklof's statements were inadmissible. 
This court long has held that, when a single offer of proof
contains admissible and inadmissible evidence, the trial court
does not err if it rejects the entire offer.  See Pumpelly, 273
Or at 812 (so stating).  We therefore conclude that the state has
offered little justification for the delay.
B. Prejudice to Defendant
We turn to a determination of what, if any, prejudice
befell defendant as a result of that delay.  Defendant may
establish prejudice in three ways: (1) the damage arising from
lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) the anxiety and public
suspicion resulting from public accusation of a crime; and (3)
the impairment of the defense.  Harberts, 331 Or at 93. 
Defendant asserts that he suffered all three forms of prejudice
due to the delay that the state caused.  In particular, defendant
argues that the passage of time affected his ability to attack
the state's proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the following
ways: (1) Eklof, originally unavailable as a witness because of
her asserted right against self-incrimination, completed her
trial and appeal, and the state thus gained her as an important
witness; (2) a case decided during pendency of appeal, State v.
Goree, 151 Or App 621, 950 P2d 919 (1997), rev den, 327 Or 123
(1998), changed certain rules of evidence and, as a result, the
trial court admitted previously suppressed evidence of a
telephone conversation between Eklof and defendant; (3) a witness
died who might have testified that a gun sold to Eklof (and
transferred to defendant) was of a different caliber than the
weapon that had killed victim; and (4) witnesses could have
testified that defendant had not been involved with prison gangs
in Nevada.  The first two events merely were fortuitous and do
not demonstrate that the passage of time undermined the defense. 
We need not address them further.
The loss of witnesses is a more serious question.  As
noted, those witnesses allegedly included (1) a witness who would
testify that the gun that defendant obtained from Eklof was a
different caliber than the one used in the murder; and (2) other
witnesses, specifically two Nevada prison guards, once available
to refute defendant's association with white supremacist prison
gangs, could not be located for the April 2000 trial. (3)  The
value of the missing witnesses was modest, at best.  As the state
points out, the defense never located the gun-sale witness.  The
state also asserts that other witnesses were available to testify
as to defendant's prison associations and that the two that
defendant cited would have provided only cumulative evidence.  
We agree with the state that the loss of the missing
witnesses did not cause a reasonable possibility of prejudice to
defendant's ability to prepare a defense.  The gun-sale witness's
potential testimony was speculative.  The defense never located
him and, above all, never determined what he might have had to
say.  The substance of the prison guards' testimony was available
from other witnesses.  For example, a retired Nevada prison
chaplain testified that defendant had not caused problems and had
associated with inmates who avoided trouble.  He stated that
defendant "was never any particular problem.  He was kind of a
loner.  Just, you know, basically kept to himself and kept out of
trouble."
In our view, the state exercised poor judgment in
pursuing its appeal; however, we conclude that defendant did not
demonstrate that the delay significantly prejudiced the defense
of this case.  We therefore reject defendant's argument that the
case should be dismissed because the state did not afford him a
trial "without delay" under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution.
We also reject defendant's argument that the state
violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.  In addition to the elements
discussed above pertaining to defendant's state constitutional
claim of lack of speedy trial, defendant acknowledges that a
federal claim requires proof of one more factor, namely, that
defendant asserted his right to speedy trial.  See Barker, 407 US
at 530 (identifying four factors for federal speedy-trial claim:
length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of
right, and prejudice to defendant).  Here, we conclude that
defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial in timely
fashion and thus failed to raise that issue under the Sixth
Amendment.
III. INSPECTION AND PHOTOGRAPHY OF DEFENDANT'S TATTOOS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it
issued an order ex parte authorizing the state to photograph
tattoos located on defendant's upper body and erred when it
permitted the state to use those photographs at trial.
A. Background
In September 1995, defendant was brought to Oregon as a
possible witness in Eklof's trial.  While in jail, the state
informed defendant that it wanted to take pictures of defendant's
tattoos.  Defendant initially resisted but, after the state
informed him that he had no choice, acquiesced to having
photographs taken of the tattoos on his upper body.  Those
photographs were not used at defendant's trial.
In May 1997, the state sought an ex parte order
permitting the state again to photograph defendant's
tattoos. (4)  The application was based on a police detective's
affidavit.  According to the affidavit, the state wanted an
expert to examine defendant's tattoos to determine his
affiliation with a white-supremacist gang, in connection with the
penalty-phase issue of future dangerousness.  See ORS
163.150(1)(b)(B) (in penalty phase of capital case, jury must
consider "probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society").  The state had contacted the chief investigator of the
Nevada Department of Prisons, Swann, who previously had testified
as an expert on the subject of prison gangs and who was
acquainted with defendant from his time in prison in Nevada. 
Swann indicated, according to the affidavit, that prisoners
affiliated with those gangs display tattoos specific to those
gangs.  In addition, according to Swann, the tattoos may indicate
the bearer's criminal history and rank within a gang
organization.  The detective had provided Swann with the 1995
photographs of defendant's upper body, but the photographs had
provided inadequate detail of defendant's tattoos.  The detective
had requested defendant's cooperation in photographing his
tattoos again, but defendant refused, telling the detective that
he would have to obtain a court order.  The court granted the
order, and the state thereafter obtained new photographs of
defendant's upper body.  It was this second set of photographs
that were admitted into evidence at trial.
Shortly after the state had taken the photographs,
defendant's counsel filed an objection and requested a hearing. 
In particular, defense counsel objected to the ex parte nature of
the order, arguing that no exigency existed.  The state responded
that it did not need an order to photograph defendant while in
custody.  The trial court defended its issuance of the order,
observing that it was in the nature of a search warrant and that
defendant would have an opportunity to challenge the state's use
of the photographs as evidence.
Closer to the date of trial, defendant moved to
suppress any unlawfully seized evidence, including the
photographs of the tattoos, under his state and federal
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and based on the argument that displaying the tattoos to the jury
would be unduly prejudicial to him.  The state countered that
defendant had no privacy interest in his tattoos, particularly
when he was in the state's custody.  After a hearing, the trial
court concluded that the state had the authority to photograph
defendant's body while he was in custody.  
During the guilt phase of defendant's trial, one
witness, who had been present during the party that preceded
victim's death, could not make a positive identification of
defendant at trial because, according to the witness, defendant's
appearance had changed.  However, the witness stated that he
would be able to recognize defendant based on several distinct
tattoos on defendant's upper body, including the words "San
Diego," a picture of a bird, and a prison tower.  Over
defendant's objection, the state introduced photographs of
defendant's tattoos, which the witness recognized.
During the penalty phase, the state moved to allow a
prison-gang expert, Scott, another investigator from the Nevada
Department of Prisons, to inspect defendant's upper body so that
he personally could observe defendant's tattoos prior to
testifying, because the prior photographs had not been of
sufficient quality to permit a definitive statement about the
significance of defendant's tattoos.  Scott wanted to examine one
tattoo, in particular, because he could not discern it from the
photographs.  The trial court permitted Scott to observe
defendant personally outside the jury's presence, with defense
counsel present.
Defendant argues that photographing defendant's tattoos
pursuant to the court's order violated his right against self-incrimination, his right against unlawful searches and seizures,
and his right to counsel.  The state disagrees and adds that the
error, if any, was harmless.
B. Self-Incrimination
Defendant first argues that, in permitting the state's
witness to view his tattoos and in admitting the photographs of
the tattoos at trial, the trial court violated his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.  Article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be * * *
compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against
himself."  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no "person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."  As defendant
acknowledges, the state and federal privileges apply to only
testimonial evidence -- the communication of a person's belief,
knowledge, or state of mind -- but not to defendant's physical
characteristics, such as identity, appearance, and physical
condition.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 US 582, 590-92,
110 S Ct 2638, 110 L Ed 2d 528 (1990) (physical evidence not
subject to Fifth Amendment testimonial privilege); State v.
Fisher, 242 Or 419, 410 P2d 216 (1966) ("we are unable to find a
valid reason for holding that a person whose handwriting has been
secured for comparison has had his constitutional right to
counsel and privilege against self incrimination invaded."). 
However, defendant contends that the tattoos in this case carry a
communicative content, which the state used to demonstrate
defendant's current beliefs and state of mind.  Thus, according
to defendant, photographing defendant's tattoos and admitting
those photographs into evidence forced defendant to testify
against his will.
We disagree for several reasons.  Defendant's tattoos
identified him and the state used them, in part, to help a
witness identify him at trial.  This court has held that a
defendant may be required to display part of his or her body on
request, and such a display does not raise an issue of self-incrimination.  State v. Cram, 176 Or 577, 582-83, 160 P2d 283
(1945).  In addition, the tattoos were preexisting documentary
evidence available to the state as part of the discovery process. 
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 US 27, 34-35, 120 S Ct 2037,
147 L Ed 2d 24 (2000) (Fifth Amendment provision against self-incrimination does not apply to documentary evidence created in
past or to documents that were not created in response to state
compulsion).  We therefore conclude that exposure of defendant's
tattoos did not constitute compelled self-incrimination.
C. Lawfulness of Search
Defendant argues that the state's taking photographs of
his tattoos amounted to an unlawful search.  He makes that
argument under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution
([n]o law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in
their persons") and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution ("[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons * * * against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated").
Under Article I, section 9, a search occurs when a
government agent intrudes into an individual's protected privacy
interest.  State v. Meredith, 337 Or 299, 303-04, 96 P3d 342
(2004).  By contrast, the Fourth Amendment protects a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Oliver v. United States, 466
US 170, 177, 104 S Ct 1735, 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984).  
Defendant argues that "[p]hotographing the skin on
defendant's upper arms and stomach constitutes a search of
defendant's person for it reveals that which is private and not
knowingly exposed to the public: the skin underlying one's normal
clothing."  Defendant does not argue merely that the state needed
a search warrant to photograph his tattoos, but that the tattoos
cannot be searched in any manner.
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Oregon
Constitution requires a search warrant or its equivalent before
the state may take pictures of or inspect defendant's torso
because, once defendant became a prisoner, he enjoyed few rights
regarding his privacy.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 US 517, 526,
104 S Ct 3194, 82 L Ed 2d 393 (1984) (prisoner does not have
subjective expectation of privacy in prison cell); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 US 520, 558, 99 S Ct 1861, 60 L Ed 2d 447 (1979)
(visual cavity search of prisoner does not violate Fourth
Amendment); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 620, 625 P2d 123 (1981)
("Those sentenced to prison forfeit many rights that accompany
freedom.").  Once defendant was imprisoned, he lacked the right
to privacy that he enjoyed when he was not in prison.  Among the
rights that he forfeited was the right to keep his personal
appearance -- including any distinguishing marks such as tattoos
-- from being known to the state.  The state thus reasonably
could compel defendant to remove his shirt so that he could be
photographed.  The state's directive that defendant remove his
shirt so that police could photograph his tattoos therefore was
not a violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
D. Right to Counsel
Defendant next argues that the state's act of
photographing his tattoos violated his right to counsel under
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Yet, even as he
makes that argument, defendant concedes that, "if the hearing on
the state's motion was the functional equivalent of an
application for a search warrant, then defense counsel need not
be present."  However, defendant argues that the state's
photographing of the defendant was a critical stage of the
proceedings, at which counsel must be present, in the same manner
as lineups and interrogations.
We disagree.  The state's act of photographing
defendant constituted the act of collecting preexisting evidence. 
It was not a critical stage in the prosecution, such as when
identification takes place or testimony is given.  See State v.
Classen, 285 Or 221, 223-24, 590 P2d 1198 (1979) (discussing
concept).  Collecting and recording existing evidence does not
require the presence of defense counsel.  See State v. Jones, 279
Or 55, 566 P2d 867 (1977) (ex parte application for search
warrant seeking blood sample from defendant was permissible). 
The state therefore did not violate defendant's right to counsel
when the state took photographs of defendant's torso when defense
counsel was not present.
IV. PENALTY-PHASE EVIDENCE OF PRISON GANG AFFILIATIONS
During the penalty phase, the state offered testimony
of an investigator from the Nevada Department of Prisons who
stated that defendant openly associated with members of the Aryan
Warriors at the Nevada prison, that defendant displayed white-supremacist tattoos and used white-supremacist symbols in his
written communications, and that the Aryan Warriors had a history
of violence.  Defendant argued that the state should not have
been permitted to present evidence of defendant's beliefs
because, among other reasons, defendant's beliefs were not
relevant and, even if they were relevant, the evidence was
unfairly prejudicial.  The state responded that defendant had
opened the door for such testimony during the penalty phase and
that it was entitled to rebut the testimony of defense witnesses
who testified that defendant did not associate with problem
inmates in prison.
A. Relevance
Defendant argues that his association with a white-supremacist gang was not relevant, because it did not rebut the
testimony of defense witnesses that defendant's associations
reflected his lack of interest in making trouble or creating
problems in the prison.  Under OEC 401, "relevant evidence"
includes not only evidence "having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable," it also includes evidence that has
a tendency to make any fact "less probable than it would be
without the evidence."  Here, there is no question that the
evidence was relevant.  Defendant offered evidence that he was a
model prisoner and that he was not involved with troublemakers. 
The state responded to that evidence with the testimony of its
expert, who was familiar both with defendant and with gangs in
Nevada prisons.  The state's rebuttal evidence had some tendency
to controvert defendant's evidence of his prior conduct as a
prisoner.  The evidence related to defendant's gang associations
in Nevada thus was relevant to the issues at trial.
B. Unfairly Prejudicial
Defendant next argues that the admission of his white-supremacist gang associations was unfairly prejudicial. 
Defendant asserts that any inference to be drawn to the effect
that he was violent because he was seen posturing alongside gang
members known for unlawful activity was tenuous, because the
state provided no evidence of defendant's involvement with those
activities.
We disagree.  OEC 403 forbids admission of relevant
evidence under certain circumstances:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Although defendant contends that display and discussion of his
tattoos was unfairly prejudicial to him, we observe that the
evidence of his gang associations, again, was relevant to
defendant's contention that he was a model prisoner.  Defendant
argues, in effect, that the state was foreclosed from challenging
that assertion, because the evidence might reflect poorly on him. 
Defendant, however, chose to have himself tattooed and to display
his tattoos openly with others in prison yard in Nevada, and the
state's evidence that he had done so was calculated to refute
defendant's own evidence suggesting that he was not involved with
prison gangs.  The tattoos themselves were thus closely related
to the point that the state advanced and were not submitted
merely to undermine defendant's character.  We conclude that
admission of that evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.
V. ERRORS IN FORM OF JUDGMENT
Finally, defendant asks that we address three
unpreserved errors in the trial court judgment.  The state
acknowledges the errors, but argues that they do not require
remand to correct the judgment.  
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred when
it failed to merge count three (intentional murder) into count
one or count two (aggravated murder).  The jury convicted
defendant of aggravated murder as specified in count one and
count two of the indictment and intentional murder as specified
in count three of the indictment.  While the jury was
deliberating during the penalty phase, the trial court imposed a
life sentence with a 25-year minimum for the jury's conviction
for intentional murder under count three of the indictment.  The
state acknowledged at the time of sentencing that the life
sentence should merge into one of the aggravated-murder counts. 
The final judgment, however, did not merge count three into
another count.  The state agrees that intentional murder is a
lesser-included offense of aggravated murder and that that
conviction should have merged with one of the convictions for
aggravated murder.  Although the state agrees that the error is
apparent on the face of the record, the state argues that this
court should not exercise its discretion to consider it. (5) 
The state contends that the court should not exercise its
discretion, because the execution of the death sentence will
render the mistake moot.  We choose to exercise our discretion,
however, to order that the trial court correct the judgment to
reflect accurately the charges and penalties for which defendant
is liable.  On remand, the trial court shall merge the
intentional murder count into the aggravated murder counts.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred
when it imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for count three,
intentional murder.  We need not address that issue, because
merging count three into another count will render this issue
moot.
Third, defendant maintains that the trial court erred
when it entered two convictions for aggravated murder and two
sentences of death.  Defendant argues that, although the state
may charge a defendant with multiple counts of aggravated murder
based on the existence of multiple aggravating factors, in the
event of multiple guilty verdicts on those counts, the trial
court may enter only one judgment of conviction for aggravated
murder for each victim, enumerating each of the separate
aggravating factors.  See State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 37, 10 P3d
901 (2000) (so stating).  Defendant did not object at trial.  The
state concedes that the judgment is erroneous, because it
includes two sentences of death, but argues that execution of the
sentence of death will render the issue moot.  
The trial court erred when it imposed two convictions
and two sentences of death, and that error is apparent on the
face of the record.  Again, we exercise our discretion to order
that the trial court correct the judgment so that it accurately
reflects the penalty for which defendant is liable.  We remand
the case for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction
reflecting defendant's guilt on the charges of aggravated murder. 
On remand, the trial court shall amend the judgment to merge the
two convictions for aggravated murder into a single conviction,
enumerating separately the aggravating factors on which the
conviction was based.  See Barrett, 331 Or at 37 (so stating). 
The court then shall impose a single sentence of death.  See
State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 578, 113 P3d 423, cert den, __ US __, 126 S Ct 760 (2005) (so stating).
VI. CONCLUSION
We have considered defendant's other assignments of
error and every argument made in support of those assignments. 
Based on our review, we conclude that no error occurred as
claimed in any of the assignments of error, including the ones
not discussed in this opinion, other than the assignments of
error regarding the form of the judgment.  Further discussion of
those other claimed errors would not benefit the public, the bar,
or the bench.
The judgment of conviction and the sentences, including
the sentences of death, are affirmed in part and reversed in
part.  The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. "SS" is an abbreviation for the German term "Schutzstaffel" ("security detachment"), an
elite military organization that played a prominent role in the history of Nazi Germany.  See
United States v. Zajanckauskas, 441 F3d 32, 34 n 1 (1st Cir 2006) (explaining term).
2. Defendant cross-appealed, but the state later successfully moved to dismiss the cross-appeal.
3. Defendant refers to other witnesses and their allegedly
failing memories, but the state correctly observes that defendant
failed to preserve all but the arguments set out above. 
4. Defendant still was serving his Nevada prison sentence, even though he was in the Lane
County Jail at that time.
5. An appellate court may review unpreserved error as plain error if (1) it is an error of law;
(2) the error is "obvious, not reasonably in dispute"; and (3) it appears "on the face of the record." 
State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435, 7 P3d 522 (2000).  In addition, if the error is plain,
the court may exercise its discretion to consider the claim of error, but only if it explains its
reasons for doing so.  Id.