Title: Matthews vs. Harley Davidson

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
EMANUEL MATTHEWS, ET AL., 
) 
Opinion issued January 30, 2024 
 
) 
 
Appellants, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC100116 
 
) 
HARLEY-DAVIDSON, ET AL.,  
) 
 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PLATTE COUNTY 
The Honorable W. Ann Hansbrough, Judge 
The Appellants appeal the circuit court’s judgment dismissing their claims against 
Harley-Davidson Motor Company Operations, Inc., (“Harley”) and syncreon.US 
(“Syncreon”) for creating a hostile work environment and aiding and abetting racial 
discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), chapter 213, RSMo.1  
Because Appellants’ petition alleged facts that – if taken as true – establish the elements of 
a hostile work environment claim and aiding and abetting claims, the circuit court’s 
judgment is vacated as to those claims, and the case is remanded.  
 
 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2017 unless otherwise noted. 
2 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
Until May 24, 2019, Harley operated a facility (“Plant”) in Kansas City, Missouri, 
that manufactured and assembled Harley-Davidson equipment, parts, and merchandise.  
Harley contracted with another company, Syncreon, to provide some of the workers in the 
Plant.  The majority of Harley’s employees at the Plant were white, and approximately 90 
percent of Syncreon’s employees at the Plant were black.   
On May 16, 2019, several employees, including each of Appellants, filed a charge 
of racial discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights.  The commission 
issued all the employees a notice of right to sue.  Twenty-five employees filed a petition 
against Harley and Syncreon, primarily alleging multiple violations of the MHRA.  Harley 
and Syncreon moved to dismiss Appellants’ claims alleging a hostile work environment 
and aiding and abetting racial discrimination, arguing Appellants failed to allege facts 
sufficient to state each claim.2  Harley and Syncreon argued Appellants, as opposed to the 
other seven employees named in the petition, failed to allege Appellants “personally 
experienced” any of the alleged harassing conduct or that Harley or Syncreon aided and 
abetted by providing “substantial assistance” or “encouragement” in the commission of 
acts prohibited under the MHRA.  The circuit court sustained the motion and dismissed 
Appellants for failure to state claims.  The circuit court did not dismiss the claims of the 
other seven employees who had filed suit.  Appellants appeal the circuit court’s dismissal 
                                              
2 Harley and Syncreon also moved to dismiss Appellants’ claim for race discrimination, 
which the circuit court sustained.  Appellants do not seek review of this claim.  Harley and 
Syncreon did not seek to dismiss the other seven employees bringing discrimination claims 
against them. 
3 
 
of three counts: hostile work environment against Harley and Syncreon, aiding and abetting 
racial discrimination against Harley, and aiding and abetting racial discrimination against 
Syncreon.  
Appellants’ petition alleged all Appellants are “Black (African American) or a 
Person of Color” and were jointly employed by Harley and Syncreon.3  One Appellant was 
employed directly by Harley; all other Appellants were employed directly by Syncreon.  
The petition further alleged: “multiple incidents with racial overtones took place” at the 
Plant, including Syncreon hiring a white man to supervise Syncreon’s predominantly black 
employees, even though Harley had previously terminated the same man for discriminating 
against Harley’s black employees; frequent racially-motivated insults at the Plant; a 
“physical racial division” at the Plant, including a line that the predominantly-black 
Syncreon employees were prohibited from crossing, but that the majority-white Harley 
employees were permitted to cross; and bathrooms that were “functionally . . . racially 
segregated.”  Appellants claimed these “racially motivated acts and confrontations” created 
a “racially charged climate of fear, intimidation, and hostility for Black employees in the 
Plant that was a pattern and practice and constituted a continuing violation that subjected 
[Appellants] to discrimination, harassment and retaliation based on their race,” and caused 
Appellants to feel “unsafe” working at the Plant.   
                                              
3 In their petition, Appellants alleged Harley controlled the operations at the Plant, and 
Syncreon’s involvement and employees were thoroughly entwined with and dependent on 
Harley’s business operations.  Appellants alleged Harley had a right to control Syncreon’s 
actions and employment decisions at the Plant.  
4 
 
Appellants also alleged in the petition that several specific racially charged incidents 
occurred from 2017 through 2019.  In June or July of 2017, a noose was found in the 
women’s bathroom.  In April 2018, a swastika and a doll of a black woman hanging by a 
noose were discovered in the women’s bathroom.  In November 2018, a black female 
Syncreon employee was assaulted by a male coworker; when she complained to 
Syncreon’s human resources department, the representative discarded the employee’s 
complaint into a trash can and told the assailant to forget about the incident and get back 
to work.  In December 2018, a white female Syncreon employee showed coworkers – 
including at least one black Syncreon employee – a family photo bordered by Confederate 
flags; in the photo, some or all of the white family members were “depicting racist signs.”  
When a black Syncreon employee complained to Syncreon, the employee was told not to 
worry about it and to get back to work.  In January 2019, graffiti, including swastikas and 
the words “N****** die” and “N****** go back to Africa,” was found in a bathroom used 
by Syncreon employees.  In February 2019, racist graffiti again appeared in a Syncreon 
bathroom.  When black employees took photographs of the graffiti, “Syncreon 
management or Harley management directed the Black employees to delete the photos.”  
In February 2019, an employee also discovered a noose while working and reported the 
discovery to Syncreon.  Later, a different black Syncreon employee overheard a Plant 
manager tell a Plant supervisor, “I want you to dispose of it.”  Yet another Syncreon 
employee witnessed the Plant supervisor cutting up the noose.  An employee later asked a 
Syncreon manager what investigation of the noose had taken place and was told the noose 
had been “given to forensics.”  Appellants alleged Harley and Syncreon did not investigate 
5 
 
or issue any discipline for any racially motivated incident that occurred at the Plant or 
otherwise attempt to prevent the occurrence of racially charged incidents at the Plant.  
Jurisdiction 
 
Before addressing the merits of an appeal, this Court must first determine whether 
it has jurisdiction.  Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Mo. banc 2020).  “For 
this Court to have jurisdiction, the judgment entered by the circuit court and appealed by 
the parties must have been a ‘final judgment’ as that phrase is used in section 512.020(5).”  
Id.  To be “final,” the judgment must either dispose of all claims (or the last claim) in a 
lawsuit, or be certified by the circuit court for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b).  
Id. at 768.  A judgment is eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) as a “final 
judgment” only if it disposes of a “judicial unit” of claims, meaning the judgment resolves 
“all claims by or against at least one party” or “disposes of one or more claims that are 
sufficiently distinct from the claims that remain pending in the circuit court.”  Id. at 771.  
A circuit court has discretion over whether an eligible judgment should be certified under 
Rule 74.01(b).  Id. 
 
Here, the circuit court’s judgment is a “final judgment” for purposes of section 
512.020(5).  While claims made by other employees remain against Harley and Syncreon 
in the case pending in the circuit court, the court’s judgment resolved all of Appellants’ 
claims.  The circuit court properly found the dismissed claims constituted a “judicial unit” 
because the judgment disposed and resolved all claims made by Appellants and did not 
abuse its discretion certifying its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 74.01(b).  Following 
an opinion by the court of appeals, Harley and Syncreon sought and were granted transfer 
6 
 
to this Court pursuant to article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution.  Therefore, this 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.   
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews a circuit court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.  R.M.A. 
by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Mo. banc 2019).   
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted 
is solely a test of the adequacy of the petition.  When considering whether a 
petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court 
must accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving the pleadings their 
broadest intendment, and construe all allegations favorably to the pleader. 
 
Mo. State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 601 S.W.3d 241, 246 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal 
quotation omitted).  “The Court does not weigh the factual allegations to determine whether 
they are credible or persuasive.”  Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393, 398 (Mo. banc 
2012).  “Instead, this Court reviews the petition to determine if the facts alleged meet the 
elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.”  
Id. (internal quotation omitted).  Missouri is a fact-pleading state.  ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. 
Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 379-80 (Mo. banc 1993).  The facts that 
must be pleaded are the ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.  Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 
285, 290 (Mo. banc 1976).  Ultimate facts are those the jury must find to return a verdict 
for the plaintiff.  Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp., 523 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Mo. banc 2017). 
Analysis 
On appeal, Appellants allege the circuit court erred in dismissing: 1) Appellants’ 
claim for hostile work environment because Appellants sufficiently pleaded the elements 
and 2) Appellants’ claims for aiding and abetting because Appellants sufficiently stated a 
7 
 
claim alleging Harley and Syncreon aided and abetted discriminatory conduct.  This Court 
agrees.  Appellants sufficiently pleaded claims for hostile work environment and aiding 
and abetting. 
Hostile Work Environment 
Appellants assert they stated a claim for hostile work environment under the 
MHRA.  The MHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual with 
respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because4 of such 
individual’s race  . . . .”  Section 213.055.1(1)(a).  When reviewing cases under the MHRA, 
appellate courts “are guided by both Missouri law and any federal employment 
discrimination (i.e., Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]) case law that is consistent 
with Missouri law.”  Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Mo. banc 
2019) (internal quotation omitted).  Title VII’s analogous provision to section 213.055 of 
the MHRA is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.5  This Court has recognized that generalized 
                                              
4 The General Assembly amended the MHRA effective August 28, 2017.  The MHRA 
newly defined “because” to mean “as it relates to the adverse decision or action, the 
protected criterion was the motivating factor.” § 213.010(2).  “Motivating factor” is defined 
to mean “the employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse action 
or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision or action.”   
§ 213.010(19).  Before the 2017 amendment, this Court held a party seeking to make a 
claim of discrimination need plead and prove only that consideration of the party’s 
protected characteristics “contributed to” the unfair treatment.  Daugherty v. City of 
Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo. banc 2007).   
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin[.] 
 
8 
 
claims of discrimination based on a course of conduct, such as hostile work environment 
claims, are governed by the MHRA if the hostility was directed at an individual because 
of his or her status in a protected class.  Gilliland v. Mo. Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 516, 
521 (Mo. banc 2009); see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. banc 
2009).  Likewise, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized hostile work 
environment claims under Title VII.  See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 67 (1986).  The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment” to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women 
in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or 
abusive environment.”  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal 
quotation omitted).  Likewise, a discriminatory hostile or abusive environment affects the 
“terms, conditions, and privileges of employment” under Missouri law.  See Section 
213.055.1(1)(a).  
The elements of a hostile work environment claim under the MHRA have been 
defined by Missouri courts: 
A successful claim of a hostile work environment requires the [claimant] to 
show: (1) he is a member of a group protected under the MHRA; (2) he was 
subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the [claimant]’s membership in the 
protected group was a motivating factor in the harassment; and (4) a term, 
condition, or privilege of the [claimant]’s employment was affected by the 
harassment.  
9 
 
Eivins v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 179 (Mo. App. 2021); see also Hill, 277 
S.W.3d at 666.6  Conduct “creates a hostile work environment when [discriminatory] 
conduct either creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment or has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance.” Hill, 
277 S.W.3d at 666 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).  “Further, in most claims 
of a hostile work environment, the discriminatory acts are ‘not of a nature that can be 
identified individually as significant events; instead, the day-to-day harassment is primarily 
significant ... in its cumulative effect.’” McGaughy v. Laclede Gas Co., 604 S.W.3d 730, 
748 (Mo. App. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Alhalabi v. Mo. Dep’t. Nat. Res., 300 
S.W.3d 518, 526 (Mo. App. 2009)).   
Harley and Syncreon do not dispute that Appellants pleaded facts sufficient to 
satisfy the first and third elements necessary to support their harassment claims.  Section 
213.055 states that race is a protected class, and Appellants specifically alleged “[e]ach 
[Appellant] is Black (African American) or a Person of Color.”  Appellants sufficiently 
pleaded they were members of a group protected under the MHRA.  Appellants pleaded 
that “[a]ll of the aforementioned racial, derogatory race-based comments, insults, and 
bullying by [Harley and Syncreon] were directed at [Appellants] because of their race,” 
                                              
6 Because Hill was decided prior to the MHRA amendment, the contributing factor test was 
used for the third element.  Because Harley and Syncreon are not contesting that race was 
a motivating factor, the differing test does not affect the analysis.  Hill also provides, “If 
the alleged harassers are co-workers, the plaintiff must also show that the employer knew 
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial 
action.” 277 S.W.3d at 666 n.6   
 
10 
 
and Appellants’ race was “a motivating factor” in Harley and Syncreon’s efforts to create 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment for Appellants.7  Appellants 
sufficiently pleaded that race was a motivating factor in the harassment.  
Harley and Syncreon contend, however, that the second and fourth elements are not 
sufficiently pleaded.  The second element requires Appellants to plead they were subjected 
to unwelcome harassment.  Appellants pleaded that Harley and Syncreon “subjected” 
Appellants to a “continuous pattern of hostile work environment based on race 
discrimination—including outrageous instances such as swastikas, nooses, a noose 
hanging a doll of a Black woman, and multiple graffiti using vile racial slurs against Black 
employees,” all of which constituted “individually and collectively, racial harassment.”  
Such allegations constitute unwelcome harassment.  For their part, Harley and Syncreon 
argue none of the Appellants pleaded they personally witnessed or experienced any of the 
incidents about which they now complain.  While the petition did not specifically allege 
Appellants witnessed or experienced the racially charged incidents, these incidents – such 
as nooses, graffitied swastikas, and racist threats written on bathroom walls – by their very 
nature, targeted and preyed on all black employees in the Plant.  Because Appellants 
                                              
7 The 2017 MHRA amendments apply to actions accruing on or after August 28, 2017.  See 
R.M.A., 568 S.W.3d 420 at 425 n.3.  Of Appellants’ allegations of specific racially charged 
incidents, only one incident – a noose being found in the women’s bathroom in June or 
July 2017 – is alleged to have occurred before the MHRA amendments went into effect.  
Because Appellants claim that all incidents were “because of” Appellants’ race, the 
allegations plainly satisfy both the “contributing factor” test in Daugherty and the 
“motivating factor” test in section 213.010.  
11 
 
alleged they were “subjected to” this unwelcome harassment, the second element of a 
hostile work environment claim is sufficiently pleaded. 
To satisfy the fourth element, Appellants must plead that a term, condition, or 
privilege of their employment was affected by the harassment.  Discriminatory harassment 
affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment if it is “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive [enough] to alter the conditions of the [claimant]’s employment and create an 
abusive working environment.”  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) 
(internal quotation omitted); see also McGaughy, 604 S.W.3d at 748.  The harassing 
conduct must be severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive working 
environment as viewed subjectively by the claimant and as viewed objectively by a 
reasonable person.  Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.  “A [claimant] can show that harassment 
affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment by showing a tangible 
employment action, or an abusive working environment.”  McGaughy, 604 S.W.3d at 748 
(citing Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 666); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 64.  “In 
assessing the hostility of an environment, [the Court] look[s] to the totality of the 
circumstances.” Eivins, 636 S.W.3d at 179 (citing Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 
F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir.1994)).   
Appellants pleaded that the “ongoing series and cumulative effect” of the racial 
incidents they alleged “was so pervasive or severe as to create a hostile work environment 
for each [Appellant],” which directly caused Appellants damages and injury to their dignity 
and civil rights.  Appellants additionally pleaded that the harassment unreasonably 
interfered with their work performance and adversely affected their physiological well-
12 
 
being.  Appellants specifically pleaded that the harassing conduct was severe and pervasive 
as viewed subjectively by Appellants and as viewed objectively by a reasonable person:   
The harassment to which [Appellants] were subjected would affect the 
psychological well-being of a reasonable person and would unreasonably 
interfere with the work performance of a reasonable person.  [Appellants] 
subjectively perceived [Harley and Syncreon]’s treatment to be 
inappropriate, hostile, and offensive; and a reasonable person in 
[Appellants’] circumstances would consider [Harley and Syncreon]’s 
treatment to be objectively inappropriate, hostile and offensive. 
 
Appellants sufficiently pleaded they were subjected to discriminatory harassment severe 
or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment.  Appellants pleaded they 
subjectively viewed it as such, alleging the harassment affected their dignity, work 
performance, and physiological well-being.  The display of nooses, graffitied swastikas, 
and racist threats constitute severe and pervasive harassing conduct as objectively viewed 
by a reasonable person.  Accordingly, Appellants have pleaded all elements to state a claim 
for hostile work environment under the MHRA.  
Aiding and Abetting 
Appellants additionally assert they stated claims for aiding and abetting under the 
MHRA against both Harley and Syncreon.  It is an “unlawful discriminatory practice for 
an employer . . . [t]o aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the commission of acts prohibited 
under [the MHRA] or to attempt to do so[.]” Section 213.070.1(1).  The MHRA does not 
define the terms “aid” and “abet.”  “In the absence of a statutory definition, words will be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary.”  State v. Oliver, 
293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009).  “[W]ords having a peculiar and appropriate 
meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import,” and “may be 
13 
 
derived from Black’s Law Dictionary.”  State v. Bales, 630 S.W.3d 754, 761 n.5 (Mo. banc 
2021) (internal quotation omitted).  “Additionally, when the legislature utilizes an 
undefined statutory term with an established judicial or common law meaning, this Court 
presumes the legislature acted with knowledge of that meaning.”  State v. Stewart, 560 
S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. banc. 2018).  The phrase “aiding-and-abetting liability” is defined 
as “[c]ivil or, more typically, criminal liability imposed on one who assists in or facilitates 
the commission of an act that results in harm or loss, or who otherwise promotes the act’s 
accomplishment.”  Aiding-and-abetting liability, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).   
This Court has not previously set forth the ultimate facts necessary to support an 
aiding and abetting claim under the MHRA but finds the Restatement (Second) of Torts to 
be persuasive.  Section 876(b) of the Restatement states: “For harm resulting to a third 
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that 
the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or 
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.”  “The assistance of or participation by 
the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable for the act of the other.”  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d (1979).  To determine whether a defendant provided 
substantial encouragement or assistance, the Court considers “the nature of the act 
encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at 
the time of the tort, his relation to the other[,] and his state of mind  . . . .”  Id.  Employment 
discrimination cases “are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences rather than 
on direct evidence.”  Lampley, 570 S.W.3d at 22.   
14 
 
In their petition, Appellants alleged both Harley and Syncreon aided and abetted 
acts prohibited by the MHRA.  As explained above, Appellants have pleaded sufficient 
allegations to establish a hostile work environment claim against both Harley and 
Syncreon.8  The alleged actions of Harley and Syncreon individually, therefore, would 
constitute an MHRA violation.  Appellants, however, also pleaded sufficient facts that 
Harley’s and Syncreon’s acts aided and abetted others in creating and fostering a hostile 
work environment at the Plant.  Appellants specifically pleaded multiple instances in which 
Syncreon provided “substantial encouragement or assistance,” including “urg[ing]” 
employees to “stay quiet about” incidents that allegedly created the hostile work 
environment at the Plant, “discard[ing] written employee complaints into a trash can,” and 
misleading an employee as to the status of an investigation into a noose incident.  All these 
actions taken by Syncreon could be inferred to suggest that it not only allowed but also 
provided substantial encouragement and assistance in creating and fostering a hostile work 
environment at the Plant. 
Appellants also pleaded facts that would support a reasonable inference that Harley 
provided substantial encouragement or assistance to create and foster a hostile work 
environment at its Plant.  Appellants alleged Syncreon’s business operations at the Plant 
were thoroughly entwined with and dependent on Harley.  In fact, “Harley had a right to 
                                              
8 Appellants argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in dismissing their claims for 
aiding and abetting even if Appellants failed to state an underlying MHRA violation.  
Appellants reasoned that the MHRA does not require a valid underlying discrimination 
claim because it is unlawful on its own “to attempt” to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce 
discrimination.  Because this Court finds Appellants sufficiently stated an underlying claim 
for hostile work environment, this Court will not address this point. 
15 
 
control Syncreon’s actions” at the Plant.  In this role, Harley “physically divided the Plant” 
with a line that the predominantly black Syncreon employees were prohibited from 
crossing, but that the majority-white Harley employees were permitted to cross, and 
provided bathrooms that were “functionally . . . racially segregated.”  Appellants alleged 
Harley’s “command over the employment structure, and the resulting deference shown to 
Harley management by Syncreon, reinforced the Plant’s physical segregation and endorsed 
the ongoing structural conflict between Black and White employees.”  Appellants also 
pleaded multiple instances when Harley failed to prohibit Syncreon management or its own 
employees from engaging in acts creating the alleged hostile work environment.  In doing 
so, Harley affirmed the ongoing racial conflict conducted by others in the Plant and 
substantially encouraged or assisted in the creation of a hostile work environment.   
Finally, Appellants also alleged that, after racist graffiti appeared in a bathroom used 
by Syncreon employees, “Syncreon management or Harley management directed the 
Black employees to delete the photos” the employees had taken of the racist graffiti. 
(Emphasis added).  When reviewing a motion to dismiss, appellate courts liberally construe 
the pleadings, “accept all alleged facts as true[,] and construe the facts in a light most 
favorable to the pleading party.”  Atkinson v. Atkinson, 185 S.W.3d 780, 781 (Mo. App. 
2006); see also Rule 55.24.  By pleading that either Syncreon or Harley management 
attempted to destroy evidence of racial harassment, Appellants pleaded that Syncreon, 
Harley, or both substantially encouraged or assisted the discriminatory conduct that created 
and fostered a hostile work environment.  Similarly, Appellants pleaded that “a Plant 
manager” told “a Plant supervisor” to dispose of a noose, then an employee witnessed “the 
16 
 
Plant supervisor” cutting up the noose.  This pleading can be liberally construed as 
Appellants not knowing whether the manager and supervisors were employed by Syncreon 
or Harley.  Again, such allegations amount to “substantial encouragement or assistance.”  
Appellants, therefore, have sufficiently pleaded claims against Harley and Syncreon for 
aiding and abetting under the MHRA.   
Conclusion 
The circuit court erred in sustaining Harley and Syncreon’s motion to dismiss 
Appellants’ hostile work environment and aiding and abetting claims.  All three claims 
avoid dismissal because they were sufficiently pleaded.  The circuit court’s judgment is 
vacated as to these three claims, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.  
___________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Ransom, Wilson  
and Broniec, JJ., concur.  Gooch, J., not participating.