Title: Burns v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT BURNS, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 64, 2008 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
ID No. 0605017137 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 31, 2009  
        Decided:  August 17, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.  
 
O R D E R 
This 17th day of August 2009, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Defendant-Appellant Robert Burns appeals his Superior Court 
conviction of three counts of rape second degree, two counts of unlawful sexual 
contact second degree and one count of continuous sex abuse of a child.  Burns 
initially raised three arguments on appeal.  First, he contended that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it refused to declare a mistrial following certain 
inappropriate testimony.  Second, he contended that the trial court erred when it 
refused to conduct an in camera review of the complainants’ statements made in 
therapy regarding the facts underlying the charges.  Third, he contended that the 
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trial court erred when it refused to provide the jury, upon defense request, a copy 
of each complainant’s statement to the Child Advocacy Center.  In an earlier 
Opinion, we concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion either in 
denying Burns’ mistrial motion or in refusing to provide the jury access to the 
victims’ video-taped statements we found, however that the trial court erred in 
denying Burns’ request for an in camera review of the victims’ therapist records 
and remanded.1  Burns now appeals from the Superior Court’s Report of July 6, 
2009 addressing, on remand, its in camera review of the alleged victims’ therapy 
records.  Burns contends that in determining that those records contained no 
information that would probably have changed the outcome of the trial, the trial 
court failed adequately to respond to our order.  We find no merit in Burns’s 
argument and affirm. 
(2) 
In early April 2006, Tina and Sara Ames2 came forward with claims 
that they had been inappropriately touched by their uncle, Robert Burns.  The 
“touching” occurred between two and four years earlier, a period during which the 
girls would occasionally spend the night at Burns’s house.  After the girls revealed 
this information to their parents, the police were called and each girl had a separate 
interview with the Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”) at the A.I. DuPont Hospital 
for Children.  Prior to the CAC interview, the victims’ mother asked them to 
                                          
 
1 See Burns v. State, 968 A.2d 1012, 1014 (Del. 2009). 
2 Pseudonyms have been assigned to the two complainants by the parties. 
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prepare notes so they would remember everything at the interview.  These notes 
were destroyed by the girls after their CAC interviews. 
(3) 
Burns was arrested on May 22, 2006 and was indicted on five counts 
of rape in the second degree and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child 
against each of the two minor victims.  The indictment was subsequently amended 
at trial, reducing the five counts of rape in the second degree regarding Tina to five 
counts of unlawful conduct in the second degree. 
(4) 
On December 15, 2006, Burns requested the complainants’ therapist 
records.  The State objected and Burns moved pursuant to Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 17 to compel an in camera review of statements or notes of statements made 
by the complainants in discussing the facts of the case with their therapist.  The 
court denied Burns’s motion to compel. 
(5) 
After a six-day trial, the jury reached a verdict.  As to the offenses 
involving Tina Ames, the jury acquitted Burns of four counts of unlawful sexual 
contact in the second degree and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, 
but was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining count of unlawful sexual 
contact.  As to the offenses involving Sara Ames, the jury found Burns guilty of 
three counts of rape in the second degree, two counts of the lesser included offense 
of unlawful sexual contact in the second degree, and one count of continuous 
sexual abuse of a child.  Following trial, Burns moved for a new trial, which the 
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Superior Court denied.3  Burns was then sentenced to forty-one years at Level V, 
suspended after thirty-five years for two years of probation. 
(6) 
Burns appealed his conviction to this Court, contending, inter alia, 
that the Superior Court erred in denying his request to review the girls’ therapist’s 
notes in camera.  We affirmed on the other issues raised, but found that the trial 
court abused its discretion by denying Burns’s request.  We concluded, pursuant to 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,4 that Burns 
was entitled to a new trial “only if information in the victim’s therapy records 
would have changed the outcome of the trial.”  Accordingly, we remanded, 
instructing the “Superior Court [to] conduct an in camera review, and determine 
whether the information in the victims’ therapy records would probably have 
changed the outcome of Burns’s trial.”5  We retained jurisdiction. 
(7) 
On remand, Burns moved for an order allowing his counsel inspect 
the victims’ therapy records, subject to the restrictions of a protective order.  Burns 
argues that the purpose of the motion was to enable his counsel to assist the trial 
court in discerning what information was needed for impeachment purposes.  The 
trial court denied the motion.  Burns then sent the trial court an unsolicited 
                                          
 
3 See State v. Burns, No. 0605017137 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007). 
4 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
5 Burns, 968 A.2d at 1026. 
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summary of the trial testimony, which was intended to highlight for the trial court 
the witness testimony Burns felt was important to the court’s determination. 
(8) 
In its report following remand, the Superior Court’s response included 
the following: 
The Superior Court has conducted a review of the records, during 
which the Court consulted with the therapist to determine the meaning 
of certain abbreviations and to discern handwriting that was not clear.  
The Court also considered each aspect of the defense submission.  
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that there is no information 
in the victims’ therapy records that would probably have changed the 
outcome of the trial.6 
(9) 
Burns contends that the Superior Court’s report fails adequately to 
comply with this Court’s order.  He argues that the paragraph is conclusory and 
provides no insight into: (i) what the trial court reviewed; (ii) the factual findings 
of the trial court; (iii) the legal conclusions of the trial court; (iv) the “therapist’s 
qualifications (to discern whether the privilege even exists); or (v) the reasons the 
trial court decided that nothing in the therapy records was relevant to any of the 
areas of impeachment identified in Burns’s summary.  He asserts that the trial 
court was required to create a record and make a decision so that this Court can 
conduct a proper review on appeal. 
(10) In our previous Opinion, we ordered the Superior Court to: (1) 
“conduct an in camera review”; and (2) “determine whether the information in the 
                                          
 
6 State v. Burns, Del. Super., No. 0605017137 (July 6, 2009) (Report to the Supreme Court) 
[Hereinafter Superior Court Report on Remand.]. 
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victims’ therapy records would probably have changed the outcome of Burns’ 
trial.”7  We explained that “[i]f the Superior Court so finds, then it shall vacate the 
convictions and order a new trial.  If, however, the Superior Court finds that the 
information would not have changed the outcome, then the convictions shall stand.  
In either case, the Superior Court shall report its findings to this Court within sixty 
days of the date of this Opinion.”8 
(11) The record shows that the Superior Court complied with our 
instructions upon remand.  The trial court specifically stated that it “conducted a 
review of the records, during which the Court consulted with the therapist to 
determine the meaning of certain abbreviations and to discern handwriting that was 
not clear.”9  The Superior Court explained that it “considered each aspect of the 
defense submission.”10 
(12) We agree with the Superior Court that Burns was not entitled to 
receive the records in order to assist the trial court in determining whether they 
contained any factual statements that could be necessary for impeachment.  In 
Ritchie, the United States Supreme Court found that a neutral tribunal was 
competent to evaluate the records in camera without the need for disclosure to the 
seeking party.  Indeed, that Court expressly rejected the notion that defense 
                                          
 
7 Burns, 968 A.2d at 1026. 
8 Id. 
9 Superior Court Report on Remand at 1-2. 
10 Id. at 2. 
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counsel is entitled to view the otherwise privileged documents, finding that a 
defendant’s interest “in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring that 
the [privileged documents] be submitted only to the trial court for in camera 
review.  Although this rule denies [a defendant] the benefits of an ‘advocate’s 
eyes,’ we note that the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded.”11  In our prior 
Opinion in this case, we adopted Ritchie as the rule in Delaware and granted the 
precise relief the United States Supreme Court found to be appropriate.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
11 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60.