Title: State ex rel. Ohioans for Secure & Fair Elections v. LaRose

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ohioans for Secure & Fair Elections v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1459.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1459 
THE STATE EX REL. OHIOANS FOR SECURE AND FAIR ELECTIONS ET AL. v. 
LAROSE ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ohioans for Secure & Fair Elections v. LaRose, 
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1459.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus granted against Ohio Ballot Board to 
compel it to certify that initiative petition contains only one proposed 
constitutional amendment and writ of mandamus granted against the 
secretary of state to compel him to convene a meeting of the board to 
facilitate such certification—Writ sought against the attorney general 
denied. 
(No. 2020-0327—Submitted March 23, 2020—Decided April 14, 2020.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relators, Ohioans for Secure and Fair 
Elections and the individual petition-committee members1 (collectively, “Ohio-
SAFE”), seek writs of mandamus against respondents, Secretary of State Frank 
LaRose, the Ohio Ballot Board (“the board” or “the ballot board”), and Attorney 
General Dave Yost.  We grant writs of mandamus against the board and the 
secretary of state and we deny the requested writ against the attorney general.  Ohio-
SAFE also requests an extension of time in which to circulate petitions, which we 
deny. 
I.  Background 
A.  The procedure for amending the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 2} The Ohio Constitution reserves to the people the right to propose 
amendments to the Constitution by initiative petition.  Ohio Constitution, Article 
II, Section 1.  The process for proposing a constitutional amendment begins with 
the submission of a petition, signed by at least 1,000 Ohio electors, to the Ohio 
attorney general, along with a summary of the proposed amendment.  R.C. 
3519.01(A), paragraph two.  Within ten days of receiving the petition, the attorney 
general must determine whether the summary is a fair and truthful summary of the 
proposed amendment.  Id.  If the summary is fair and truthful, the attorney general 
must certify that fact and then forward the petition to the ballot board.  Id. 
{¶ 3} The ballot board consists of the secretary of state, who serves as 
chairperson, and four appointed members, no more than two of whom may be of 
the same political party.  R.C. 3505.061(A) and (D).  Within ten days after receiving 
a petition from the attorney general under R.C. 3519.01, the board must examine it 
“to determine whether it contains only one proposed * * * constitutional 
amendment so as to enable the voters to vote on a proposal separately.”  R.C. 
                                                 
1. The individual relators are Darlene L. English, Laura A. Gold, Hasan Kwame Jeffries, Isabel C. 
Robertson, and Ebony Speakes-Hall. 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
3505.062(A).  If the board so determines, then the board will certify its approval to 
the attorney general, who will in turn file with the secretary of state a verified copy 
of the proposed amendment, along with the summary and the attorney general’s 
certification.  R.C. 3519.01(A); R.C. 3505.062(A).  At that point, the petitioners 
may begin circulating petitions to gather the necessary signatures to qualify for the 
ballot. 
{¶ 4} However, if the board determines that the initiative petition contains 
more than one proposed constitutional amendment, then the board shall “divide the 
initiative petition into individual petitions containing only one proposed * * * 
constitutional amendment so as to enable the voters to vote on each proposal 
separately.”  R.C. 3505.062(A), paragraph two.  The petitioners must then submit 
separate summaries for each proposal to the attorney general for approval, R.C. 
3519.01(A); R.C. 3505.062(A), before they may begin circulating petitions. 
{¶ 5} To qualify for the ballot, the petitioners must file their petitions with 
the secretary of state no later than 125 days before the general election.  Ohio 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1a.  This year, in order to qualify for the November 
general-election ballot, the petitioners must submit their petitions on or before July 
1, 2020.  The petitions must contain valid signatures from at least 44 of Ohio’s 88 
counties, in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total votes cast in the last 
gubernatorial election in those 44 counties.  See id., Sections 1a, 1g.  The signatures 
collected statewide must equal at least ten percent of the total vote cast for governor 
in the last gubernatorial election.  Id., Section 1a; see id., Section 1g. 
B.  The facts in the record 
{¶ 6} On February 10, 2020, Ohio-SAFE submitted to Attorney General 
Yost an initiative petition and summary, titled the “Secure and Fair Elections 
Amendment,” which would amend Article V, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.  
That section provides, in its entirety: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Every citizen of the United States, of the age of eighteen 
years, who has been a resident of the state, county, township, or 
ward, such time as may be provided by law, and has been registered 
to vote for thirty days, has the qualifications of an elector, and is 
entitled to vote at all elections.  Any elector who fails to vote in at 
least one election during any period of four consecutive years shall 
cease to be an elector unless he again registers to vote. 
 
{¶ 7} The proposed amendment would eliminate the 30-day registration 
requirement to be eligible to vote.  In addition, the proposed amendment would 
guarantee the following rights to every U.S. citizen who is—or is eligible to 
become—an elector in Ohio: 
(1) 
If serving in the military or residing outside the United States, the right to 
have an absentee ballot sent, upon application, beginning 46 days before an 
election. 
(2) 
The right to be registered to vote upon applying for, renewing, updating, or 
replacing an Ohio driver’s license, learner’s permit, or state-issued 
identification card, unless the citizen declines in writing to be registered to 
vote. 
(3) 
The right to obtain and cast a ballot on weekdays during an early-voting 
period, to begin 28 days before an election (excepting state holidays) and 
include at least 12 hours of in-person early voting per weekend for the two 
weekends immediately preceding a general election. 
(4) 
The right to register and immediately vote, during either early or election-
day voting, upon proof of residency. 
(5) 
The right of persons with disabilities to have full and equal access to register 
to vote and to vote. 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
In addition, the proposed amendment would require a “representative sample of 
statewide elections to be audited to ensure the accuracy and integrity of elections.”  
The amendment provides that items 2 and 4 above will take effect on February 1, 
2022. 
{¶ 8} The petition submitted to Attorney General Yost contained the 
requisite 1,000 signatures.  On February 20, Yost certified that the summary was a 
fair and truthful statement of the proposed constitutional amendment. 
{¶ 9} The board met to consider the petition on March 2, 2020.  Counsel for 
Ohio-SAFE addressed the board.  He told the board that the various provisions of 
the Ohio-SAFE amendment have “a common purpose or common subject.  The 
common purpose or subject is voting or voting and registration.  Everything in the 
proposal today relates in some way to voting.”  Speaking in opposition, an attorney 
for the Ohio Republican Party argued that the proposed amendment “comprised 
* * * several discrete amendments, most of which should be voted on on a separate 
proposal, because there is not a sufficiently singular purpose to present all of these 
proposals to voters in a single ballot initiative.” 
{¶ 10} Following these presentations, Secretary of State LaRose made a 
motion for the board to find that the Ohio-SAFE amendment contained four 
separate proposals: 
(1) 
“a constitutional right to requirements regarding casting ballots,” 
(2) 
“a constitutional right regarding the manner in which one becomes a 
registered voter and when any registration is effective,” 
(3) 
“a constitutional right for citizens with disabilities to register to vote and 
vote,” and  
(4) 
“postelection audits.”2 
                                                 
2. LaRose prepared a color-coded copy of the amendment to show how he proposed to apportion 
the various sections of the amendment.  That color-coded draft is in the record as Relators’ Exhibit 
H, page 62 of the evidence PDF. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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LaRose then made a motion for the board to divide the amendment into four 
separate proposals.  The board approved the motion by a 3-2 vote.  However, one 
of the members who voted against LaRose’s proposal thought that the section of 
the proposed amendment relating to postelection audits did not reasonably relate 
to, and should be severed from, the rest. 
C.  Procedural history 
{¶ 11} Ohio-SAFE filed a complaint for writs of mandamus in this court on 
March 5, 2020.  We granted Ohio-SAFE’s motion for an expedited briefing 
schedule. 
II.  Legal analysis 
A. Summary of the claims 
{¶ 12} The complaint asks for three separate writs of mandamus.  First, it 
seeks to compel the board to certify to the attorney general that the Ohio-SAFE 
petition contains only one proposed constitutional amendment.  Second, to facilitate 
that process, the complaint requests a writ of mandamus compelling the secretary 
of state to convene a meeting of the board.  Third, in the alternative, the complaint 
asks for a writ ordering the attorney general to file a verified copy of the proposed 
amendment, as written, along with the certified summary, with the secretary of state 
(essentially cutting the board out of the process). 
B.  Standard of review 
{¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish, by clear 
and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 
legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Cleveland Right to Life v. 
State Controlling Bd., 138 Ohio St.3d 57, 2013-Ohio-5632, 3 N.E.3d 185, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 14} In extraordinary actions challenging the decisions of the secretary of 
state or county boards of elections, “ ‘the standard is whether they engaged in fraud, 
corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
provisions.’ ”  State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 130, 2010-Ohio-
1374, 926 N.E.2d 617, ¶ 26, quoting Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 
Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11.  This standard also applies 
when evaluating a ballot-board decision to divide a proposed constitutional 
amendment into separate ballot measures.  State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. 
Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 30. 
C.  The mandamus claim against the ballot board 
{¶ 15} We hold that a writ of mandamus should issue against the board 
because Ohio-SAFE has a clear legal right to certification of the proposed 
amendment as written and the board has a clear legal duty to make that 
certification.3  Moreover, Ohio-SAFE does not have an adequate remedy because 
there is no statutory right to appeal from a decision of the ballot board.  R.C. 
3505.062; Ohio Liberty Council at ¶ 27.  We grant a writ of mandamus directing 
the board to certify the amendment as drafted. 
D.  The mandamus claim against the secretary of state 
{¶ 16} We also hold that a writ of mandamus should issue against the 
secretary of state.  Ohio-SAFE has a clear legal right to compel the secretary to 
convene a meeting of the ballot board, the secretary has a clear legal duty to 
convene such a meeting, and Ohio-SAFE has no adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law. 
{¶ 17} R.C. 3505.061(D) provides that after its first meeting, the ballot 
board “shall meet at the call of the chairperson or upon the written request of three 
other members.”  The board and the secretary of state do not dispute that LaRose, 
as chairperson, see id., has the statutory authority to convene the board, and they 
do not present any argument in opposition to this mandamus request other than their 
claim that the board’s decision was correct in the first instance.  Therefore, we grant 
                                                 
3. Although six justices agree that a writ should issue, there is no majority in support of a single 
legal rationale for that result. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
a writ of mandamus directing LaRose to convene a meeting of the board for the 
purpose of certifying the amendment as drafted, to occur as soon as possible after 
the expiration of the seven-day notice period required by R.C. 3505.061(D). 
E.  The mandamus claim against the attorney general 
{¶ 18} Ohio-SAFE asks for a writ compelling the attorney general to certify 
the amendment to the secretary of state.  But until the board complies with this 
court’s directive, the attorney general’s duty will not have ripened, and therefore 
mandamus is premature.  State ex rel. Evans v. Tieman, 157 Ohio St.3d 99, 2019-
Ohio-2411, 131 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 16 (holding that mandamus will not lie to remedy 
the anticipated nonperformance of a duty). 
{¶ 19} In its reply brief, Ohio-SAFE clarifies that it is not alleging that a 
duty presently exists on the part of the attorney general.  Rather, Ohio-SAFE views 
this alternative remedy, which would simply cut the ballot board out of the process, 
as a reasonable response to the restrictions on in-person gatherings due to the 
current public-health crisis.  We conclude that there are other reasonable ways to 
address those concerns, and so we will not abandon the basic rules governing 
mandamus. 
{¶ 20} The request for a writ of mandamus against the attorney general is 
denied. 
F.  Ohio-SAFE’s request for an extension of time 
{¶ 21} Finally, Ohio-SAFE requests, as an equitable remedy, an extension 
of time in which to collect signatures equal to the delay caused by the board’s 
improper action.  We denied a similar request in Ohio Liberty Council for three 
reasons, one of which was that there was no urgency for the proposed amendment 
to appear on the next general-election ballot.  Id., 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-
1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, at ¶ 64.  The proposed amendment in that case was intended 
to stop the provisions of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
from taking effect in Ohio, but the federal law was not scheduled to take effect until 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
2014, so the amendment did not need to appear on the 2010 ballot.  Likewise, by 
its own terms, the provisions in the Ohio-SAFE amendment that have specified 
effective dates are not scheduled to take effect until February 1, 2022, so the 
amendment could appear on ballots in 2021.  As for the other provisions, Ohio-
SAFE has not demonstrated any urgency to placing them on this November’s ballot 
as opposed to a ballot in 2021. 
{¶ 22} We therefore deny the request for additional time to gather 
signatures. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 23} We grant a writ of mandamus directing the secretary of state to 
convene a meeting of the ballot board at the earliest possible date and we grant a 
writ of mandamus directing the ballot board to certify the Ohio-SAFE amendment 
as a single amendment.  We deny mandamus relief against the attorney general and 
deny the request for additional time to gather signatures. 
Writ granted in part 
and denied in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY and 
STEWART, JJ. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by FRENCH 
and DEWINE, JJ. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 24} I agree with the per curiam opinion in its entirety.  I write separately 
to explain why a writ of mandamus should be granted directing respondent the Ohio 
Ballot Board (“the board” or “the ballot board”) to certify to respondent Attorney 
General Yost that the initiative petition seeking to place the “Secure and Fair 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
Elections Amendment” on the ballot contains only one proposed constitutional 
amendment.  I also write separately to address why it is unnecessary to eradicate 
decades of this court’s precedent to reach that result, as the opinion concurring in 
judgment only would have us do. 
The Right of the People to Amend the Constitution 
{¶ 25} The per curiam opinion thoroughly explains the right of the people 
to propose amendments to the Constitution by initiative petition as it is set forth in 
Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1, as well as the process for proposing a 
constitutional amendment outlined in Chapters 3505 and 3519 of the Ohio Revised 
Code.  Significant to the issues raised herein, an initiative petition shall only contain 
one proposal of law or constitutional amendment to enable the voters to vote on 
that proposal separately.  R.C. 3519.01(A), paragraph one. 
{¶ 26} Upon receipt of an initiative petition from the attorney general, the 
board’s sole purpose in examining an initiative petition is “to determine whether it 
contains only one proposed * * * constitutional amendment so as to enable the 
voters to vote on a proposal separately.”  R.C. 3505.062(A). 
The Separate-Vote Requirement 
{¶ 27} Seemingly erasing decades of precedent and statutory provisions, the 
opinion concurring in judgment only expounds that there is no “ ‘single-subject 
rule’ that limits the people to proposing a constitutional amendment with only one 
subject, purpose, or objective,” opinion concurring in judgment only at ¶ 75.  In the 
view of the opinion concurring in judgment only, the separate-vote requirement 
applies only when the General Assembly proposes a constitutional amendment, not 
when the people propose an amendment. 
{¶ 28} Following this line of misinterpretation, theoretically, the General 
Assembly is restricted to one subject, purpose, or objective while the people enjoy 
no such restriction and could propose a constitutional amendment containing any 
number (10, 20, or more) of subjects, purposes, or objectives.  This leads me to 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
question why the General Assembly—the direct representative of the people—
would be limited to one subject per amendment but the people would not?  One 
would question how this distinction upholds the purpose attributed to the one-
subject-per-amendment rule, i.e., 
 
“to prevent imposition upon or deceit of the public by the 
presentation of a proposal which is misleading or the effect of which 
is concealed or not readily understandable * * * to afford the voters 
freedom of choice and prevent ‘logrolling’ or the combining of 
unrelated proposals in order to secure approval by appealing to 
different groups which will support the entire proposal in order to 
secure some part of it although perhaps disapproving of other parts.” 
 
State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, 
¶ 28, quoting Fugina v. Donavan, 259 Minn. 35, 38, 104 N.W.2d 911 (1960). 
{¶ 29} As I describe below, this court has already explained why that is not 
the law in Ohio, and that explanation is based on sound constitutional interpretation. 
{¶ 30} Despite recognizing that Article XVI, Section 1 imposes a 
requirement that multiple constitutional amendments proposed by the General 
Assembly be submitted to the voters separately, the opinion concurring in judgment 
only then reviews several of our decisions concerning amendments submitted by 
the General Assembly and inexplicably concludes that “this history shows, over the 
past several decades this court has both recognized that the Ohio Constitution does 
not restrict an amendment to the Constitution to a single subject, purpose, or object 
and also asserted that an amendment’s provisions must share a common subject, 
purpose, or object—sometimes in the same opinion.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Opinion 
concurring in judgment only at ¶ 87.  This conclusion does not fairly summarize 
this court’s precedent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
{¶ 31} Contrary to the view of the opinion concurring in judgment only, this 
court has been consistent in recognizing that an amendment to the Constitution 
proposed by the General Assembly is restricted to a single subject, purpose, or 
object.  See State ex rel. Burton v. Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp., 7 Ohio St.2d 
34, 36, 218 N.E.2d 446 (1966) (Article XVI, Section 1 is “directed to those 
instances where two or more different objects are sought to be accomplished in a 
single proposal.  The singleness of purpose or object sought to be accomplished by 
the amendment is the test as to whether it complies with such section”); State ex 
rel. Roahrig v. Brown, 30 Ohio St.2d 82, 84, 282 N.E.2d 584 (1972) (Under Article 
XVI, Section 1 “a proposal consists of one amendment to the Constitution only so 
long as each of its subjects bears some reasonable relationship to a single general 
object or purpose” [emphasis added]); Willke, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 
836 N.E.2d 536, at ¶ 28 (one objective of the “ ‘constitutional mandate that 
multifarious amendments shall be submitted separately’ ” “ ‘is to prevent * * * the 
combining of unrelated proposals in order to secure [their] approval’ ” [quoting 
Fugina, 259 Minn. at 38, 104 N.W.2d 911]). 
{¶ 32} Only one case could be said to deviate from this well-established 
principle.  In State ex rel. Foreman v. Brown, 10 Ohio St.2d 139, 144-145, 226 
N.E.2d 116 (1967), the court found that “[t]here is nothing in the Ohio Constitution 
that will support a reasonable conclusion that a single amendment to that 
Constitution proposed by the General Assembly can involve no more than one 
subject, purpose or object.”  At best, Foreman is an outlier and has not, in the 53 
years since its publication, been relied on for the proposition that amendments are 
not restricted to a single subject.  And given that the opinion concurring in judgment 
only acknowledges that the Constitution imposes a separate-vote requirement on 
amendments proposed by the General Assembly, any reliance on Foreman is 
misguided. 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
{¶ 33} The question then turns to whether the separate-vote requirement 
imposed on the General Assembly also applies to amendments proposed by the 
people.  This court resolved this question in State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. 
Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, wherein we 
analogized Article XVI, Section 1’s separate-vote requirement on amendments 
proposed by the General Assembly to the requirement in R.C. 3519.01(A) 
applicable to a citizen-initiated proposed constitutional amendment.  The opinion 
concurring in judgment only proposes that we overrule Ohio Liberty Council, 
disregards R.C. 3519.01(A), and seeks to throw over 50 years of our caselaw into 
chaos and confusion—all in a matter in which no party cites a need for clarification 
or change in Ohio law. 
{¶ 34} Ohio Liberty Council concerned an initiative petition by a citizen 
group to amend the Ohio Constitution to preserve Ohioans’ freedom to choose their 
health care and health-care coverage.  Ohio Liberty Council at ¶ 3.  The ballot board 
found that the initiative petition contained two separate issues and certified the 
original petition to the attorney general as two proposed constitutional 
amendments.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 35} In that opinion, we recognized the people’s right to propose 
amendments to the Constitution in Article II, Section 1 and the separate-vote 
requirement imposed on the General Assembly’s right to propose constitutional 
amendments in Article XVI, Section 1.  And we concluded that “R.C. 3519.01(A) 
imposes a similar requirement on citizen-initiated proposed constitutional 
amendments.”  Id. at ¶ 34.  We emphasized that the statute requires that 
 
[o]nly one proposal of law or constitutional amendment to be 
proposed by initiative petition shall be contained in an initiative 
petition to enable the voters to vote on that proposal separately.  A 
petition shall include the text of any existing statute or constitutional 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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provision that would be amended or repealed if the proposed law or 
constitutional amendment is adopted. 
 
(Emphasis added in Ohio Liberty Council.)  Id. at ¶ 35, quoting R.C. 3519.01(A). 
{¶ 36} And we noted that “R.C. 3505.062, in turn, specifies the duty of the 
ballot board to determine whether an initiative petition contains only one proposed 
* * * constitutional amendment.”  Id. at ¶ 37.  Because the separate-vote 
requirement and the separate-petition requirement are clearly comparable, we 
applied our Article XVI, Section 1 precedent and concluded that the proposal 
consisted of one amendment because all the sections bore some reasonable 
relationship to the single general purpose of preserving Ohioans’ freedom to choose 
their health care and health-care coverage.  Ohio Liberty Council at ¶ 43.  By 
dividing the petition into two amendments, the ballot board abused its discretion 
and clearly disregarded the law.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 37} Ohio Liberty Council was soundly decided based on well-
established Ohio law and did not add any limitations, “by judicial fiat,” on the rights 
of Ohioans to propose a constitutional amendment, as the opinion concurring in 
judgment only denunciates.  Opinion concurring in judgment only at ¶ 97.  To the 
contrary, the decision favored, and in no way limited, the people’s proposed 
amendment in that case.  As we cautioned: 
 
The power of initiative must be liberally construed, and the 
General Assembly cannot diminish that power.  State ex rel. Hodges 
v. Taft, 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (1992).  By imposing 
the separate-vote requirement on citizen-initiated proposed 
amendments, therefore, the General Assembly could not diminish 
citizens’ constitutional right of initiative by construing that 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
requirement more strictly than the similar constitutional requirement 
applicable to the legislative right of initiative. 
 
Id. at ¶ 56. 
{¶ 38} As a final point, the opinion concurring in judgment only 
inexplicably concludes that “the separate-vote requirement of Article XVI, Section 
1 does not apply to an amendment to the constitution initiated by the people” 
because amendments by the people “may be submitted on one petition and * * * 
each amendment is a separate ballot issue,” opinion concurring in judgment only at 
¶ 90.  But this language from Article II, Section 1g demonstrates the opposite of 
the conclusion of the opinion concurring in judgment only.  That provision states:  
 
The ballot language shall be prescribed by the Ohio ballot board in 
the same manner, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as 
apply to issues submitted by the general assembly pursuant to 
Section 1 of Article XVI of this constitution. The ballot language 
shall be so prescribed and the secretary of state shall cause the 
ballots so to be printed as to permit an affirmative or negative vote 
upon each law, section of law, or item in a law appropriating money, 
or proposed law, or proposed amendment to the constitution. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 39} In resolving what it recognizes is the key question in this case—what 
constitutes an amendment—the opinion concurring in judgment only curiously 
introduces definitions of the word and concludes that the constitution does not 
really say what it says about citizen amendments. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
{¶ 40} In the course of attempting to disrupt decades of consistent 
precedent—which no party has challenged or sought clarification of—the opinion 
concurring in judgment only does an injustice to the parties and the public. 
Application to the Ohio-SAFE Amendment 
{¶ 41} Applying decades of precedent as outlined above, I would hold that 
the provisions of the Ohio-SAFE amendment all relate in some fashion to voting.  
The underlying premise appears to be that, if more eligible voters register to vote 
and cast ballots, and if the results of elections are accurate, then the outcome of 
elections will more accurately reflect the will of eligible voters.  The petition 
therefore seeks to ensure that the outcome of elections accurately reflects the will 
of the population eligible to vote by amending Article V, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution to make it easier for eligible voters to register to vote and cast a ballot 
and to require election results to be audited to ensure their accuracy. 
{¶ 42} The proposed amendment would simplify the process of registering 
to vote: registration would be automatic upon renewal of a driver’s license, 
eligibility requirements would be reduced by eliminating the 30-day-registration 
limitation on voting, and same-day registration would be become possible.  And 
likewise, the amendment would change the process of voting in ways intended to 
ensure ballot access: a constitutional guarantee of absentee ballots for military and 
overseas voters, expanded early-voting periods, and guaranteed ballot access for 
disabled voters.  And finally, the provision mandating postelection audits “to ensure 
the accuracy and integrity of elections” relates to this core purpose because it serves 
as a means to check whether individuals who benefit from the other provisions of 
the amendment by registering to vote and casting ballots actually have those ballots 
counted for the purpose of determining the outcome of the election. 
{¶ 43} The board contends that the Ohio-SAFE amendment has no central 
purpose and that even if it does, the various provisions are not reasonably related 
to that purpose.  Although not typically treated separately, these issues are 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
analytically distinct: (1) whether a proposed amendment has a single unifying 
purpose and (2) whether each provision of the amendment relates to or serves that 
purpose. 
{¶ 44} We have “generally taken a ‘liberal [view] in interpreting what such 
a single general purpose or object may be.’ ”  (Brackets added in Ohio Liberty 
Council.)  Ohio Liberty Council, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 
410, at ¶ 42, quoting Foreman, 10 Ohio St.2d at 146, 226 N.E.2d 116.  In Willke, 
for example, we considered a proposed constitutional amendment to 
 
“permit the issuance of general obligation bonds to create and 
preserve jobs, enhance employment and educational opportunities, 
and promote economic growth through funding local government 
public 
infrastructure 
capital 
improvements, 
research 
and 
development, and the development of certain sites and facilities, and 
to expand state and local government authority regarding economic 
development.” 
 
Willke, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, at ¶ 2, quoting 
Am.Sub.H.J.R. 2.  Despite the fact that the amendment addressed multiple topics, 
we declined to issue a writ of mandamus to keep it off the ballot. 
 
After applying this deferential test to H.J.R. 2, we find that 
although the issuance of state bonds for the public-works, Third 
Frontier, and business-facilities projects may represent different 
components, they are all reasonably related to the single general 
purpose of job creation or economic development in Ohio.  The 
General Assembly’s combination of these three programs in one 
amendment—although seemingly the product of a tactical 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
decision—is not so incongruous that it could not, by any reasonable 
interpretation, be considered germane to the purposes of statewide 
job creation and economic development. 
 
Id. at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 45} In other decisions, we have recognized similarly broad, single 
purposes unifying disparate provisions in proposed constitutional amendments, 
such as “allow[ing] the state and governmental subdivisions to give financial 
assistance to private industry or to other governmental units in order to create new 
employment within this state,” Burton, 7 Ohio St.2d at 36-37, 218 N.E.2d 446, and 
“preserving Ohioans’ freedom to choose their health care and health-care coverage 
as it existed on March 19, 2010, with certain exceptions, before the enactment of 
the [(federal)] Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Ohio Liberty Council 
at ¶ 43.  “Voting” as a category is no more vague or overbroad than “job creation” 
or “economic development.” 
{¶ 46} The board purports to be unable to figure out what the unifying 
purpose of the proposed amendment could possibly be, because the Ohio-SAFE 
amendment does not explicitly state its alleged unifying purpose.  And in the 
absence of such a statement in the amendment itself, the board contends, “[o]nly 
[relators] know the true purpose in proposing it.”  But the board cites no statutory 
or common-law requirement that a proposed constitutional amendment must state 
its central purpose in order to have one. 
{¶ 47} To the contrary, our pronouncement in Willke and elsewhere that 
courts will take a liberal view in interpreting what such a single general purpose or 
object may be, id., 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, at ¶ 34, 
supports the conclusion that the general purpose is to be deduced from the various 
provisions of the amendment.  In Ohio Liberty Council, for example, we relied on 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
the substance of the proposed amendment to deduce the overarching purpose.  Ohio 
Liberty Council, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, at ¶ 43. 
{¶ 48} The Ohio-SAFE amendment has a title that suggests its intended 
purpose.  In her remarks to the board, counsel for the Ohio Republican Party 
suggested that the title of the Ohio-SAFE amendment itself encompassed multiple 
subjects, because “secure” elections and “fair” elections are two separate topics.  
But that argument underscores the conceptual problem with the board’s position: 
every proposed amendment that exceeds one sentence could theoretically be 
subdivided into multiple amendments.  For this reason, the board is supposed to 
“liberally” construe the amendment in favor of finding a single purpose.  See id. at 
¶ 57. 
{¶ 49} The related question, and the heart of this case, is whether each of 
the provisions of the Ohio-SAFE amendment is sufficiently related to that common 
purpose.  As discussed, the test is whether the various provisions all relate to, and 
are incidental to and reasonably necessary to effectuate, the common purpose.  This 
is not the test the speaker who opposed the measure urged the ballot board to apply.  
Rather, she informed the board that each provision had to be reasonably necessary 
to effectuate the other provisions: 
 
And if you look at No. 2 and compare it to No. 1, you’ll see 
that the method by which a citizen is automatically registered to vote 
is not reasonably related or incidental to UOCAVA voters’ rights to 
an absentee ballot.  They’re separate and distinct. 
* * * 
Again, when you compare [Section 3] to the other sections, 
you see that the subject of this proposal is not reasonably related or 
incidental to UOCAVA voters’ rights to an absentee ballot [or to] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
the method by which a citizen is auto—or the method by which a 
citizen is automatically registered to vote. 
 
Relying upon these representations when it voted to divide the Ohio-SAFE 
amendment, the board acted contrary to clearly established law. 
{¶ 50} The board’s merit brief argues that “if [Ohio-SAFE’s] purpose [was] 
to propose an Amendment that relates only to voting, it should not have included 
provisions that govern registering to vote.”  This argument treats “voting” and 
“registration” as unrelated topics.  But registering to vote and casting a ballot are 
both plainly related to the overarching concept of “voting.”  Furthermore, if the 
central purpose is to increase ballot access for Ohio voters, the processes of 
registering to vote and casting a ballot clearly both relate to that central purpose. 
{¶ 51} The ballot board need not always defer to the drafters of an 
amendment.  We held that a proposed amendment should have been divided in 
Roahrig, 30 Ohio St.2d 82, 282 N.E.2d 584.  In Roahrig, the proposed amendment 
would have revised a number of constitutional provisions relating to the 
administration, organization, expenses, and procedures of the General Assembly, 
with the general purpose, according to the amendment’s proponents, of providing 
a strong, independent General Assembly.  Id. at 84.  We accepted that general 
statement of purpose but held that at least three parts of the amendment bore no 
reasonable relationship to that purpose: the proposal to require the governor and 
lieutenant governor to run for office together as a team, the proposal to repeal a 
constitutional provision concerning the Supreme Court Commission, and a 
provision repealing a section of the Constitution that prohibited certain persons 
from holding public office.  Id. at 84-85.  The discontinuity of those provisions 
stands in sharp contrast to the terms of the Ohio-SAFE amendment. 
{¶ 52} Two themes run through the board’s merit brief, both suggesting that 
the board protected Ohio voters by dividing the Ohio-SAFE amendment into four 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
separate ballot measures.  First, the board says Ohio-SAFE’s right of initiative is 
not the only constitutional value at stake; the voters have a countervailing right to 
vote on proposed constitutional amendments separately.  The board correctly notes 
that and as discussed above, the separate-vote requirement has 
 
“two great objectives.  The first is to prevent imposition upon or 
deceit of the public by the presentation of a proposal which is 
misleading or the effect of which is concealed or not readily 
understandable.  The second is to afford the voters freedom of 
choice and prevent ‘logrolling’ or the combining of unrelated 
proposals in order to secure approval by appealing to different 
groups which will support the entire proposal in order to secure 
some part of it although perhaps disapproving of other parts.” 
 
Ohio Liberty Council, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, at 
¶ 52, quoting Fugina, 259 Minn. at 38, 104 N.W.2d 911.  But the board provides 
no reason to believe the amendment as written will actually confuse voters, nor has 
it suggested any way in which the amendment reflects the practice of logrolling.  
See id. at ¶ 53 (rejecting board’s division of an amendment because the inclusion 
of the sections at issue “does not render the amendment as a whole deceptive or 
constitute the attachment of an unrelated, unpopular proposal”). 
{¶ 53} Second, the board’s brief suggests that Ohio-SAFE failed to meet its 
burden of proof to show that the various provisions all relate to a single general 
purpose.  According to the board, this case presents legal questions of first 
impression, such as who bears the burden of proof in a one-subject dispute and 
whether the question should be subject to some sort of burden-shifting analysis.  
But these questions of proof are inapplicable.  The board does not hear and weigh 
evidence when it conducts its meetings.  The two people who spoke at the ballot-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
board meeting were not witnesses; they were not under oath and did not present 
testimony.  They were attorneys making arguments and answering questions.  
Rather, the only question before the board was whether there was a reasonable 
relationship between the various provisions of the proposed amendment and its 
central purpose, and that could be determined from the face of the document. 
{¶ 54} Ohio Liberty Council instructs a board to make all reasonable 
interpretations in favor of submitting a proposed amendment undivided.  The ballot 
board failed to comply with that duty when it separated the Ohio-SAFE amendment 
into four separate ballot measures.  For these reasons, I would grant a writ of 
mandamus directing the board to certify the amendment as drafted. 
DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 55} In this expedited election case, relators, Ohioans for Secure and Fair 
Elections and the individual petition-committee members (collectively, “Ohio-
SAFE”) seek separate writs of mandamus against respondents, Secretary of State 
Frank LaRose, the Ohio Ballot Board, and Attorney General Dave Yost, as well as 
an order extending the July 1, 2020 deadline for submitting petition signatures to 
the secretary of state to qualify for the November 2020 ballot.  Although Ohio-
SAFE prays for various forms of relief, the core question in this case is whether the 
ballot board abused its discretion by dividing Ohio-SAFE’s proposed constitutional 
amendment into four separate amendments thereby requiring the submission of four 
separate initiative petitions. 
{¶ 56} For the reasons that follow, I would hold that Ohio-SAFE is entitled 
to writs of mandamus (1) compelling Secretary of State Frank LaRose to convene 
a meeting of the Ohio Ballot Board and (2) directing the ballot board to certify to 
Attorney General Dave Yost that the initiative petition seeking to place the “Secure 
and Fair Elections Amendment” on the ballot contains only one proposed 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
constitutional amendment.  I would also hold that Ohio-SAFE is not entitled to a 
writ ordering the attorney general to file a verified copy of the proposed amendment 
and its summary with the secretary of state or to an order extending the July 1, 2020 
deadline for submitting petition signatures to the secretary of state to qualify for the 
November 2020 ballot. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 57} On February 10, 2020, Ohio-SAFE submitted to Attorney General 
Yost an initiative petition and summary proposing the “Secure and Fair Elections 
Amendment,” which would amend Article V, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.  
That section provides, in its entirety: 
 
Every citizen of the United States, of the age of eighteen 
years, who has been a resident of the state, county, township, or 
ward, such time as may be provided by law, and has been registered 
to vote for thirty days, has the qualifications of an elector, and is 
entitled to vote at all elections.  Any elector who fails to vote in at 
least one election during any period of four consecutive years shall 
cease to be an elector unless he again registers to vote. 
 
{¶ 58} The proposed amendment would eliminate the 30-day registration 
requirement to be eligible to vote.  In addition, the proposed amendment would 
guarantee the following rights to every U.S. citizen who is—or is eligible to 
become—an elector in Ohio: 
(1) 
If serving in the military or residing outside the United States, the right to 
have an absentee ballot sent, upon application, beginning 46 days before an 
election. 
(2) 
The right to be registered to vote upon applying for, renewing, updating, or 
replacing an Ohio driver’s license, learner’s permit, or state-issued 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
identification card, unless the citizen declines in writing to be registered to 
vote. 
(3) 
The right to obtain and cast a ballot on weekdays during an early-voting 
period, to begin 28 days before an election (excepting state holidays) and 
include at least 12 hours of in-person early voting per weekend for the two 
weekends immediately preceding a general election. 
(4) 
The right to register and immediately vote, during either early or election-
day voting, upon proof of residency. 
(5) 
The right of persons with disabilities to have full and equal access to register 
to vote and to vote. 
The proposed amendment would also require a “representative sample of statewide 
elections to be audited to ensure the accuracy and integrity of elections.”  The 
amendment provides that items 2 and 4 above will take effect on February 1, 2022. 
{¶ 59} On February 20, 2020, Attorney General Yost certified that the 
summary was a fair and truthful statement of the proposed constitutional 
amendment.  He then forwarded the petition to the ballot board. 
{¶ 60} The ballot board consists of the secretary of state, who serves as 
chairperson, and four appointed members, no more than two of whom may be of 
the same political party.  R.C. 3505.061(A) and (D).  On March 2, 2020, the ballot 
board met to determine whether the petition “contains only one proposed * * * 
constitutional amendment so as to enable the voters to vote on a proposal 
separately,” as required by R.C. 3505.062(A).  Counsel for Ohio-SAFE addressed 
the board and explained that the various provisions of the Ohio-SAFE amendment 
have “a common purpose or common subject.  The common purpose or subject is 
voting or voting and registration.  Everything in the proposal today relates in some 
way to voting.”  Speaking in opposition, an attorney for the Ohio Republican Party 
argued that the proposed amendment “comprised * * * several discrete 
amendments, most of which should be voted on on a separate proposal, because 
January Term, 2020 
 
25 
there is not a sufficiently singular purpose to present all of these proposals to voters 
in a single ballot initiative.” 
{¶ 61} Following these presentations, the ballot board found that the Ohio-
SAFE amendment contained four separate proposals: (1) “a constitutional right to 
requirements regarding casting ballots,” (2) “a constitutional right regarding the 
manner in which one becomes a registered voter and when any registration is 
effective,” (3) “a constitutional right for citizens with disabilities to register to vote 
and vote,” and (4) “postelection audits.” 
{¶ 62} The ballot board then exercised its statutory authority to “divide the 
initiative petition into individual petitions containing only one proposed * * * 
constitutional amendment so as to enable the voters to vote on each proposal 
separately.”  R.C. 3505.062(A), paragraph two.  Following the ballot board’s 
action, Ohio-SAFE must submit separate summaries for each proposal to the 
attorney general for approval before it may begin circulating petitions.  R.C. 
3519.01(A); R.C. 3505.062(A). 
{¶ 63} To qualify for the November general-election ballot, Ohio-SAFE 
must file its petition with the secretary of state no later than 125 days before the 
general election, which is July 1, 2020.  Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1a.  
The petition must contain valid signatures from at least 44 of Ohio’s 88 counties, 
in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total votes cast in the last 
gubernatorial election in those 44 counties.  See id., Sections 1a, 1g.  The signatures 
collected statewide must equal at least ten percent of the total votes cast for 
governor in the last gubernatorial election.  Id., Section 1a; see id., Section 1g. 
{¶ 64} Ohio-SAFE filed a complaint for writs of mandamus in this court on 
March 5, 2020.  The complaint asks for three separate writs of mandamus.  First, it 
seeks to compel the board to certify to the attorney general that the Ohio-SAFE 
petition contains only one proposed constitutional amendment.  Second, to facilitate 
that process, the complaint requests a writ of mandamus compelling the secretary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
of state to convene a meeting of the board.  Third, in the alternative, the complaint 
asks for a writ ordering the attorney general to file a verified copy of the proposed 
amendment, as written, along with the certified summary, with the secretary of state 
(essentially cutting the board out of the process). 
{¶ 65} We granted Ohio-SAFE’s motion for an expedited briefing schedule. 
II.  THE MANDAMUS CLAIM AGAINST THE BALLOT BOARD 
A.  Standard of review 
{¶ 66} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish, by clear 
and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 
legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Voters First v. Ohio Ballot 
Bd., 133 Ohio St.3d 257, 2012-Ohio-4149, 978 N.E.2d 119, ¶ 22.  Ohio-SAFE does 
not have an adequate remedy because there is no statutory right to appeal from a 
decision of the ballot board.  See R.C. 3505.062.  For the remaining requirements 
of clear legal right and clear legal duty, in the absence of any evidence of fraud or 
corruption, the dispositive issue is whether the ballot board abused its discretion or 
clearly disregarded applicable law in dividing the proposed constitutional 
amendment into four proposals.  Voters First at ¶ 23. 
Positions of the parties 
{¶ 67} Ohio-SAFE relies on this court’s decision in State ex rel. Ohio 
Liberty Council v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, 
to argue that “the standard for determining whether an amendment proposed by 
initiative petition under Article II, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution” meets the 
separate-petition requirement of R.C. 3519.01(A) “derives from the Court’s 
precedent construing the ‘separate-vote’ requirement for amendments proposed by 
the General Assembly” that is found in Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Ohio-SAFE points out that the separate-vote requirement is similar 
to the “single-subject” rule imposed by Article II, Section 15(D) on bills enacted 
January Term, 2020 
 
27 
by the General Assembly, and it relies on our decision in State ex rel. Willke v. Taft 
as establishing the test for when an amendment initiated by the people has a single 
subject: “ ‘a proposal consists of one amendment to the Constitution only so long 
as each of its subjects bears some reasonable relationship to a single general object 
or purpose.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 
536, ¶ 34, quoting State ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown, 30 Ohio St.2d 82, 84, 282 N.E.2d 
584 (1972).  According to Ohio-SAFE, Ohio Liberty Council is the controlling 
precedent and requires the ballot board to certify that the Secure and Fair Elections 
Amendment contains only one subject. 
{¶ 68} The secretary of state and the ballot board agree that Ohio Liberty 
Council is the controlling precedent and that the people may not propose a 
constitutional amendment if it contains more than a single subject.  They maintain 
that the people’s right to initiate an amendment has the same limits as the General 
Assembly’s authority to propose a constitutional amendment under Article XVI, 
Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.  The secretary of state and the ballot board assert 
that R.C. 3505.062(A) authorizes the ballot board to divide an initiative petition 
presented by the people if the proposed constitutional amendment contains multiple 
subjects that do not bear some reasonable relationship to a single general object or 
purpose.  And here, they argue that the Secure and Fair Elections Amendment 
relates to multiple purposes and that the ballot board therefore did not abuse its 
discretion by dividing it into separate proposals. 
{¶ 69} Before addressing these positions, it is important to point out what 
this case is not about.  This case is not about the wisdom of adopting the proposed 
Secure and Fair Elections Amendment or whether matters that have traditionally 
been governed by statute should form the basis of an amendment to the 
Constitution; those decisions are best left to the sound discretion of Ohioans.  See 
State ex rel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 27, 176 N.E. 664 (1931).  This 
case is also not about addressing any constitutional issue regarding the statutory 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
scheme that governs the amendment of the Constitution or any individual part of 
that scheme.  All those questions remain for another day. 
{¶ 70} Instead, this case asks us to determine whether the ballot board 
abused its discretion, thereby entitling Ohio-SAFE to an extraordinary writ of 
mandamus establishing that the Secure and Fair Elections Amendment is a single 
constitutional amendment that may be proposed to the people in a single initiative 
petition.  To answer that question, I begin with the text of the Ohio Constitution. 
C.  Law and analysis 
1.  The people’s right to amend the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 71} Our Constitution is founded on the fundamental principle that “[a]ll 
political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, 
whenever they may deem it necessary.”  Article I, Section 2, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 72} When the people ratified the Ohio Constitution, they reserved in 
Article II, Section 1 the power of the people to propose an amendment to the 
Constitution by initiative petition.  Article II, Section 1a provides,  
 
When a petition signed by [10 percent] of electors, shall have been 
filed with the secretary of state, and verified as herein provided, 
proposing an amendment to the constitution, the full text of which 
shall have been set forth in such petition, the secretary of state shall 
submit for the approval or rejection of the electors, the proposed 
amendment, in the manner hereinafter provided, at the next 
succeeding regular or general election in any year occurring 
subsequent to one hundred twenty-five days after the filing of such 
petition. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
29 
{¶ 73} The general requirements and procedures that apply to all initiative 
and referendum petitions on statewide issues are established by Article II, Section 
1g of the Ohio Constitution.  It states that its provisions “shall be self-executing, 
except as herein otherwise provided” and that “[l]aws may be passed to facilitate 
their operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either such provisions or the 
powers herein reserved.”  Once sufficient signatures have been collected and 
verified, Section 1g mandates that the secretary of state place the proposed 
amendment to the Constitution on the ballot, with the ballot language to be 
“prescribed by the Ohio ballot board in the same manner, and subject to the same 
terms and conditions, as apply to issues submitted by the general assembly pursuant 
to Section 1 of Article XVI of this constitution.” 
{¶ 74} Article XVI, Section 1 states that ballot language must “properly 
identify the substance of the proposal to be voted upon” but it “need not contain the 
full text nor a condensed text of the proposal.”  It also directs the ballot board to 
prepare an explanation of the proposed amendment and to certify the ballot 
language and the explanation to the secretary of state.  Article XVI, Section 1, Ohio 
Constitution.  The ballot board also may prepare arguments for and against the 
proposal.  Id.  The extent of the ballot board’s constitutional authority in the 
initiative-petition process is therefore to prescribe the ballot language, prepare an 
explanation, and certify both to the secretary of state. 
{¶ 75} R.C. 3505.062 provides that if the ballot board determines that an 
initiative petition contains more than one proposed constitutional amendment, then 
the board shall “divide the initiative petition into individual petitions containing 
only one proposed * * * constitutional amendment so as to enable the voters to vote 
on each proposal separately.”  The ballot board found that the Secure and Fair 
Elections Amendment included four separate proposals or subjects, and it required 
the proposal to be divided and circulated as four amendments on four separate 
petitions.  However, as I will explain more fully below, the Constitution does not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
establish a “single-subject rule” that limits the people to proposing a constitutional 
amendment with only one subject, purpose, or objective.  The single-subject 
requirement that this court applied in Ohio Liberty Council, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 
2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, originated in cases interpreting a separate 
provision of the Ohio Constitution: the separate-vote requirement of Article XVI, 
Section 1.  An analysis of these cases is necessary to determine whether we have 
properly overlaid caselaw interpreting the General Assembly’s authority to propose 
a constitutional amendment onto the people’s right to do the same. 
2.  The separate-vote requirement 
{¶ 76} The 1851 Constitution provided that the General Assembly, by 
three-fifths vote of each house, could submit proposed amendments for a vote.  
Article XVI, Section 1, Ohio Constitution of 1851.  Recognizing that the legislature 
could propose multiple amendments at one time, former Article XVI, Section 1 
provided that “[w]hen more than one amendment shall be submitted at the same 
time, they shall be so submitted, as to enable the electors to vote on each 
amendment, separately.”  The 1912 Constitution retained this language but 
amended it slightly to remove the comma after the word “submitted” and add a 
comma before the word “separately.”  It also reserved the power to the people to 
initiate an amendment to the Constitution in Article II, Sections 1a and 1g.  But 
these provisions, unlike Article XVI, Section 1, did not include express “separate-
vote” language for a constitutional amendment proposed by the people. 
{¶ 77} We have attempted to determine what the separate-vote requirement 
means in a series of cases reviewing amendments to the Constitution proposed by 
the General Assembly under the authority of Article XVI, Section 1. 
{¶ 78} In State ex rel. Burton v. Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp., we 
stated that Article XVI, Section 1 “is directed to those instances where two or more 
different objects are sought to be accomplished in a single proposal.  The singleness 
of purpose or object sought to be accomplished by the amendment is the test as to 
January Term, 2020 
 
31 
whether it complies with such section.”  7 Ohio St.2d 34, 36, 218 N.E.2d 446 
(1966). 
{¶ 79} One year later, we rejected this statement as dicta in State ex rel. 
Foreman v. Brown, stating that it was “unnecessary for us to determine in that case 
whether Section 1 of Article XVI prohibited submission of a constitutional 
amendment as one amendment, if it involved more than one subject, purpose or 
object.”  10 Ohio St.2d 139, 144, 226 N.E.2d 116 (1967).  We then explained that 
“[t]here is nothing in the Ohio Constitution that will support a reasonable 
conclusion that a single amendment to that Constitution proposed by the General 
Assembly can involve no more than one subject, purpose or object.”  Id. at 144-
145.  We pointed out that “if those who submitted Section 1 of Article XVI had 
intended that each amendment to the Constitution proposed by the General 
Assembly be confined to one subject, object or purpose, they would have so 
provided as they did in Section 16 of Article II [(the single-subject rule for 
statutes)].  They did not.”  Id. at 145.  The court in Foreman, in dicta, noted that 
other states had generally required amendments with multiple subjects to relate to 
a single general object or purpose, but it acknowledged that the proposed 
amendment would pass scrutiny under that standard.  Id. at 145-146. 
{¶ 80} In State ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown, this court, without analysis, relied 
on Burton and Foreman for the proposition that “[u]nder this constitutional 
provision [(Article XVI, Section 1)] a proposal consists of one amendment to the 
Constitution only so long as each of its subjects bears some reasonable relationship 
to a single general object or purpose.”  30 Ohio St.2d 82, 84, 282 N.E.2d 584 
(1972).  In that case, an amendment had been proposed by a joint resolution of the 
General Assembly and included changes related to the election of the governor and 
lieutenant governor, the disqualification of certain felony offenders from holding 
public office, and the repeal of a constitutional provision providing for the Supreme 
Court Commission.  We stated that “Section 1, Article XVI of the Constitution is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
clear and unequivocal in its admonition that only a single general purpose may be 
included in any one proposed constitutional amendment,” and we concluded that 
the three proposals lacked any reasonable relationship to the stated general purpose 
of the amendment and therefore had to be separately submitted to electors.  Id. at 
85. 
{¶ 81} Our decision in State ex rel. Willke v. Taft involved the question 
whether a constitutional amendment proposed by the General Assembly violated 
the separate-vote requirement of Article XVI, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.  
107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536.  Quoting cases from Maryland 
and Minnesota, we explained that the separate-vote requirement was designed to 
prevent voter confusion on the matter submitted while preventing “logrolling,” 
which is the combination of unrelated proposals in order to gather sufficient votes 
to pass otherwise unfavorable provisions.  Id. at ¶ 27-28.  We then explained that 
“[t]he separate-vote requirement of Section 1, Article XVI is comparable, but not 
identical, to the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  Although 
we reiterated our holding in Foreman that nothing in the Ohio Constitution requires 
all parts of an amendment proposed by the General Assembly to share one subject, 
purpose, or object, id. at ¶ 30, we nonetheless followed Roahrig’s test, stating that 
“ ‘a proposal consists of one amendment to the Constitution only so long as each 
of its subjects bears some reasonable relationship to a single general object or 
purpose’ ” (emphasis sic), id. at ¶ 34, quoting Roahrig, 30 Ohio St.2d at 84, 282 
N.E.2d 584.  That is, we said that there is no single-subject rule for constitutional 
amendments right before we said that there was one. 
{¶ 82} This review of our caselaw shows that our construction of the 
separate-vote requirement of Article XVI, Section 1 has been far from consistent, 
even within the same decision.  But whether the Ohio Constitution’s separate-vote 
requirement restricts the General Assembly to proposing constitutional 
amendments that relate to a single subject or underlying object or purpose is not 
January Term, 2020 
 
33 
before us now.  Instead, we are asked to decide whether the people’s proposals to 
amend the Constitution are limited by a single-subject rule.  Acknowledging that 
the political power of this state emanates from the people, I turn to that question. 
3.  State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner 
{¶ 83} The foregoing cases construed the express separate-vote requirement 
of Article XVI, Section 1, which provides the process for the General Assembly to 
propose a constitutional amendment by joint resolution.  Then in Ohio Liberty 
Council, we applied that caselaw to an amendment to the Constitution initiated by 
the people.  See 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410.  The parties 
urge us to do so again today. 
{¶ 84} In Ohio Liberty Council, this court quoted Article II, Section 1 of the 
Ohio Constitution, which states that “[t]he limitations expressed in the constitution, 
on the power of the general assembly to enact laws, shall be deemed limitations on 
the power of the people to enact laws,” suggesting that this language somehow 
limits the power of the people to propose an amendment to the Constitution.  
However, it does not, and it was not relevant to the analysis in Ohio Liberty 
Council.  This limiting language applies when the people enact a law through the 
right of initiative, not when they propose an amendment to the Constitution.  
Throughout Article II, the Constitution distinguishes between “laws” and 
“amendments.”  For example, Article II, Section 1a grants the people the power “to 
propose an amendment to the constitution,” while Article II, Section 1b guarantees 
the right of the people to propose “a law.” 
{¶ 85} Article II, Section 1 simply provides that when the people enact a 
law through initiative, that law is subject to the same constitutional limitations that 
apply to a statute enacted by the General Assembly, such as the protections afforded 
by Ohio’s Bill of Rights.  It does not impose those limitations on the General 
Assembly’s power onto the people’s right to propose a constitutional amendment 
by initiative petition. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
{¶ 86} This court in Ohio Liberty Council then compared the separate-vote 
requirement of Article XVI, Section 1 to the statutory separate-petition requirement 
of R.C. 3505.062, which requires the ballot board to review an amendment initiated 
by the people to ensure that each initiative petition contains only one proposed 
amendment.  Ohio Liberty Council, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 
N.E.2d 410, at ¶ 32-40.  Concluding that “this separate-petition requirement is 
comparable 
to 
the 
separate-vote 
requirement 
for 
legislatively-initiated 
constitutional amendments under Section 1, Article XVI of the Ohio Constitution,” 
id. at ¶ 41, we applied the Roahrig test to decide whether a separate petition is 
necessary under the statute, stating that “ ‘ “a proposal consists of one amendment 
to the Constitution only so long as each of its subjects bears some reasonable 
relationship to a single general object or purpose.” ’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Ohio 
Liberty Council at ¶ 42, quoting Willke, 107 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 
N.E.2d 536, at ¶ 34, quoting Roahrig, 30 Ohio St.2d at 84, 282 N.E.2d 584.  In 
doing so, we layered language from the single-subject rule of Article II, Section 
15(D) onto the separate-vote requirement of Article XVI, Section 1 and then used 
both to burden the people’s right to propose amendments to the Constitution. 
4.  Resolving the conflicts in our caselaw 
{¶ 87} As this history shows, over the past several decades this court has 
both recognized that the Ohio Constitution does not restrict an amendment to the 
Constitution to a single subject, purpose, or object and also asserted that an 
amendment’s provisions must share a common subject, purpose, or object—
sometimes in the same opinion.  In doing so, we have taken precedent discussing a 
provision such as the single-subject rule in one case and overlaid it on other 
constitutional provisions and statutes in another case. 
{¶ 88} The parties ask us to continue this trajectory today by treating the 
separate-vote requirement of Article XVI, Section 1 as if it applies to an initiative 
petition to amend the Constitution by the people and imposes a one-subject rule on 
January Term, 2020 
 
35 
constitutional amendments proposed by the people.  This position is 
understandable, given the confusion in our caselaw.  However, our duty is to say 
what the law is, “[a]nd while briefing would be helpful, it is impractical or 
impossible here given the compressed time frame of an expedited election case.  In 
these circumstances, our prudential policy against addressing arguments not raised 
by the parties is not a barrier to addressing and remedying a clear mistake before it 
is repeated again.”  State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin, 155 Ohio St.3d 496, 2018-Ohio-
4035, 122 N.E.3d 1165, ¶ 14.  The alternative is to recognize our mistake but stay 
silent, thereby allowing the ballot board to continue to limit the people’s right to 
propose amendments to the Constitution based on our flawed analysis in Ohio 
Liberty Council, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410.  Further, 
stare decisis does not compel adherence to an incorrect interpretation of the 
Constitution; as we explained in Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd., “each 
judge remembers above all that she or he has sworn to support and defend the 
Constitution—not as someone else has interpreted it but as the judge deciding the 
case at bar interprets it.”  43 Ohio St.3d 1, 6-7, 539 N.E.2d 103 (1989). 
{¶ 89} Article XVI, Section 1 and Article II, Section 15(D) are express 
constitutional restrictions on the power of the General Assembly, unrelated to the 
reserved power of the people to initiate an amendment to the Constitution.  Those 
provisions govern joint resolutions and statutes, not initiative petitions.  The 
framers knew how to limit legislation to a single subject; Article II, Section 15(D) 
of the Ohio Constitution expressly states, “No bill shall contain more than one 
subject.”  But neither Article XVI, Section 1 nor Article II, Sections 1a or 1g 
expressly limit a proposed amendment to the Constitution to a single subject, 
purpose, or object.  Requiring a separate vote on each amendment and limiting an 
amendment to a single subject are different things.  The framers could have 
provided that no amendment shall contain more than one subject, but they did not, 
and we should not add words to the Constitution in the guise of interpreting it. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
{¶ 90} And, there is a more basic reason why the separate-vote requirement 
of Article XVI, Section 1 does not apply to an amendment to the Constitution 
initiated by the people.  Article II, Section 1g itself already provides that one 
amendment may be submitted on one petition and that each amendment is a 
separate ballot issue: “The ballot language shall be so prescribed and the secretary 
of state shall cause the ballots so to be printed as to permit an affirmative or negative 
vote upon each law, section of law, or item in a law appropriating money, or 
proposed law, or proposed amendment to the constitution.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 91} In contrast, Article XVI, Section 1 contemplates that multiple 
amendments may be proposed in a single joint resolution of the General Assembly, 
and it requires a separate vote of the people in order to protect their freedom to 
decide which amendments to the Constitution should be adopted.  That protection 
is not required when the people initiate a constitutional amendment, because only 
one amendment may be proposed in each initiative petition upon which the people 
will vote to ratify or reject. 
{¶ 92} For these reasons, I categorically reject the conclusion reached in 
Ohio Liberty Council that each constitutional amendment proposed by the people 
is restricted to a single subject.  Its holding limiting the power of the people to 
amend the Constitution finds no support in the language of Article II, Sections 1a 
or 1g and therefore should be overruled. 
5.  The meaning of the word “amendment” 
{¶ 93} Clarifying these constitutional provisions brings into focus the crux 
of this case: what is the meaning of the word “amendment”? 
{¶ 94} Although the word “amendment” has a usual and customary 
meaning, we nevertheless defined what an amendment means long ago in State ex 
rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).  We explained that 
when used in connection with the Constitution, the word “amendment” has “a dual 
January Term, 2020 
 
37 
meaning, the particular one to be determined by its relationship.”  Id. at 179.  We 
continued: 
 
An amendment to the Constitution, which is made by the addition 
of a provision on a new and independent subject, is a complete thing 
in itself, and may be wholly disconnected with other provisions of 
the Constitution; such amendments, for instance, as the first ten 
amendments of the Constitution of the United States.  * * * 
Then there is the use of the word “amendment” as related to 
some particular article or some section of the Constitution, and it is 
then used to indicate an addition to, the striking out, or some change 
in, that particular section. 
 
Id.  Simply put, an amendment is both the addition of a wholly new provision to 
the Constitution or the changes made to an existing article or section. 
{¶ 95} Nothing in the Greenlund court’s definition of the word 
“amendment” suggests that additions or changes made to an existing provision in 
the Constitution are required to have a single subject or unifying purpose or 
objective.  Neither definition of “amendment” contemplates the idea of a single 
subject and the words “amendment” and “subject” are not synonymous—though 
the ballot board’s actions suggest otherwise.  Indeed, were we to apply the ballot 
board’s understanding of “amendment” to the United States Constitution, a 
renumbering would be in order.  The First Amendment alone contains at least four 
“subjects”: free exercise and establishment of religion, freedom of speech and the 
press, the right to assemble, and the right to petition government. 
{¶ 96} The common understanding of the word “amendment,” then, is 
simply an addition or change, regardless of subject, and the Constitution does not 
impose any express limitations on the style or format in which the people must 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
express their fundamental rights.  Rather, the people have the right to amend the 
Constitution largely without any state-law limitation on its subject matter.  But see 
Article II, Section 1e, Ohio Constitution (limiting the right to use initiative to create 
nonuniform taxes, monopolies, oligopolies, or cartels).  The people possess the 
power to amend the Constitution, and in ratifying Article II, Sections 1a and 1g, 
they did not limit that right to proposing only an amendment that addresses one 
subject, purpose, or object at a time. 
{¶ 97} We cannot rewrite a provision of the Ohio Constitution to add such 
a limit by judicial fiat.  Ultimately, the judgment over whether a proposed 
amendment should be adopted—and what the Constitution should say and how it 
should say it—rests within the sound discretion of the people of Ohio. 
6.  Application 
{¶ 98} The Secure and Fair Elections Amendment seeks to amend an 
existing provision of the Ohio Constitution, Article V, Section 1, by deleting some 
language from and adding language to a single section.  It is plainly an amendment 
within the meaning of Article II, Section 1g, and it may be circulated on a single 
petition form.  A contrary holding would allow the ballot board, an entity that is not 
responsible to the people at the ballot box, to regulate the people’s right to amend 
the Constitution by deciding how many words added or deleted are too many for 
the proposal to stand as a single amendment. 
{¶ 99} The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part protests that 
the decision to follow the plain language of the Constitution runs afoul of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers by impermissibly infringing on the 
prerogatives of the executive branch.  Not true.  To the contrary, our Constitution 
grants to the people the right to amend the Constitution—and nothing in that 
document permits the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary to interfere with 
the right of the people to shape and amend provisions of their Constitution.  As 
members of the judiciary, it is our solemn duty to be guardians of the Constitution 
January Term, 2020 
 
39 
and to protect and defend the right of the people to self-governance.  Anything less 
and we would serve only as an underpinning to the other branches of government. 
{¶ 100} Accordingly, the ballot board abused its discretion when it 
separated the Secure and Fair Elections Amendment into four separate ballot 
measures.  I would grant a writ of mandamus directing the board to certify the 
amendment as drafted.  The mandamus claim brought against the secretary of state 
to convene a meeting of the ballot board therefore has merit and should be granted, 
but the mandamus claim against the attorney general should be dismissed as it is 
moot. 
III.  THE REQUEST FOR AN EXPANSION OF TIME 
{¶ 101} The decision reached above does not mean that we should extend 
the deadline for submitting a sufficient number of signatures so that the Secure and 
Fair Elections Amendment may appear on the November 3, 2020 general-election 
ballot.  Just as I am bound by the fact that the Ohio Constitution does not impose a 
single-subject requirement on the people’s right to amend the Constitution, I am 
equally bound by the plain and unambiguous language of Article II, Section 1a that 
an initiative petition to amend the Constitution must be filed 125 days before the 
next regular or general election in order to appear on that ballot.  While recognizing 
that we have extended constitutional time deadlines in cases such as State ex rel. 
LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 
462, it is manifest that this case is distinguishable.  In LetOhioVote.org, for 
example, the secretary of state’s actions precluded the petitioners from obtaining 
the required number of signatures within the 90-day period allowed to collect them, 
and it would have denied the right of the people to referendum without an extension.  
Id. at ¶ 8, 54. 
{¶ 102} But this is not a case in which government officials are thwarting 
the ability of the people to put an initiative to amend the Constitution on the ballot.  
Here, relators began the process to propose an amendment to the Constitution on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
February 10, 2020, when they submitted their initial petition to the attorney general.  
They therefore share responsibility for the compressed time in which they may file 
a sufficient number of signatures in order for their proposed amendment to appear 
on the November 3, 2020 ballot.  Further, their claim of prejudice fails.  Although 
they assert that delaying a vote on the amendment until November 2021 “would 
convert the specified February 1, 2021 effective date [for two sections of the 
amendment] from a delayed effective date into a retroactive effective date,” that 
assertion is wrong as a matter of fact.  The petition attached to the complaint 
indicates that those sections would take effect on February 1, 2022.  Equity 
therefore does not demand that we grant the requested order to extend the 125-day 
deadline to place the amendment on the November 3, 2020 general-election ballot. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 103} I am acutely aware of the potential implications of the conclusion I 
reach today.  Nevertheless, I am compelled based on the plain and unambiguous 
language of the Constitution to set the matter straight and would strictly overrule 
Ohio Liberty Council.  Therefore, Ohio-SAFE is entitled to writs of mandamus (1) 
compelling Secretary of State Frank LaRose to convene a meeting of the Ohio 
Ballot Board and (2) directing the ballot board to certify to Attorney General Dave 
Yost that the initiative petition seeking to place the “Secure and Fair Elections 
Amendment” on the ballot contains only one proposed constitutional amendment.  
However, Ohio-SAFE is not entitled to a writ ordering the attorney general to file 
a verified copy of the proposed amendment and its summary with the secretary of 
state or to an order extending the July 1, 2020 deadline for submitting petition 
signatures to the secretary of state to qualify for the November 2020 ballot. 
{¶ 104} Accordingly, I concur in the court’s judgment today but not in its 
reasoning. 
 
FRENCH and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2020 
 
41 
 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 105} Respectfully, I concur in the per curiam opinion’s judgment 
denying mandamus relief against respondent Attorney General Dave Yost and also 
denying the request for an extension of time to collect the required signatures. 
{¶ 106} Given the applicable law and standard of review, I disagree that 
relators, Ohioans for Secure and Fair Elections, Darlene L. English, Laura A. Gold, 
Hasan Kwame Jeffries, Isabel C. Robertson, and Ebony Speakes-Hall, are entitled 
to writs of mandamus against respondents Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the 
Ohio Ballot Board.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part. 
{¶ 107} The writ of mandamus is a form of extraordinary relief.  To be 
entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must establish, by clear and convincing 
evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the 
part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.”  State ex rel. Fockler v. Husted, 150 Ohio St.3d 422, 
2017-Ohio-224, 82 N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 108} In actions challenging the decisions of the ballot board and 
secretary of state, “the standard is whether they engaged in fraud, corruption, or 
abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.”  State 
ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 
N.E.2d 410, ¶ 30.  “ ‘An abuse of discretion implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable attitude.’ ”  State ex rel. Greene v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 121 Ohio St.3d 631, 2009-Ohio-1716, 907 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 12, quoting 
State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio 
St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 238 (1997). 
{¶ 109} The applicable provision here, R.C. 3505.062(A), states that the 
ballot board “shall” examine each written petition “to determine whether it contains 
only one proposed law or constitutional amendment so as to enable the voters to 
vote on a proposal separately.”  That statute further specifies what happens if the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
board decides that a petition complies with this single-issue requirement and what 
happens if the board decides, on the other hand, that the petition before it does not.  
Id.  When the board decides that the petition falls into the latter, noncompliant 
category, “the board shall divide the initiative petition into individual petitions 
containing only one proposed law or constitutional amendment * * *.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id. 
{¶ 110} By its text, R.C. 3505.062(A) grants the ballot board the discretion 
to determine whether an initiative petition contains more than one proposed law or 
constitutional amendment and mandates that the ballot board divide the petition if 
it makes such a finding.  Thus, R.C. 3505.062(A) contemplates the result reached 
here. 
{¶ 111} Accordingly, I find it very difficult to say that the ballot board 
abused its discretion or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.  
Under the statute, the ballot board simply decided that the initiative petition deals 
with more than one issue and voted to divide the petition.  That decision was hardly 
arbitrary or unreasonable, especially considering that all of the opinions in this case 
at least tacitly acknowledge that there are anywhere from two to three distinct issues 
(voting, registration, and auditing) being dealt with by this particular petition.  On 
the record before us then, relators, with whom the duty unequivocally resides, failed 
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they are entitled to the relief 
requested. 
{¶ 112} Moreover, granting these writs is inappropriate from a separation-
of-powers perspective.  At its core, the separation-of-powers doctrine—which is 
implicitly embedded within the Ohio Constitution—establishes that “ ‘powers 
properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and 
completely administered by either of the other departments, and further that none 
of them ought to possess directly or indirectly an overruling influence over the 
others.’ ”  State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, 
January Term, 2020 
 
43 
¶ 44, quoting State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. of Summit Cty., 120 
Ohio St. 464, 473, 166 N.E. 407 (1929).  By granting these writs, the court is 
ignoring this fundamental rule and, in effect, actively controlling from the bench 
the actions of executive and administrative officers who, in discharging their duties, 
must necessarily exercise a degree of discretion.  The writ of mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy that was not meant for these circumstances, and the 
separation-of-powers doctrine calls on us to be mindful of this fact. 
{¶ 113} Being mindful of this fact, of course, does not mean ignoring the 
Ohio Constitution.  Instead, it simply requires acknowledging the limits of this 
extraordinary writ—a writ that surely should not issue just because this court 
disagrees with the ballot board’s ultimate conclusion.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Armstrong v. Davey, 130 Ohio St. 160, 163-164, 198 N.E. 180 (1935). 
{¶ 114} Finally, making matters worse, the opinion concurring in judgment 
only wades into a discussion regarding a constitutional issue (i.e., a perceived 
tension between this court’s case law, the Ohio Constitution, and R.C.  3505.062) 
that was not addressed by any of the parties to this case and one that is obviously 
unnecessary to reach in order to resolve the narrow issue before this court—whether 
the writs should issue.  On this, the superfluousness of this constitutional exegesis, 
I agree with the concurring opinion.  As I have noted before, we generally should 
be hesitant to decide such issues of constitutional importance without the benefit of 
briefing or argument.  See State ex rel. Maxcy v. Saferin, 155 Ohio St.3d 496, 2018-
Ohio-4035, 122 N.E.3d 1165, ¶ 29 (Fischer, J., dissenting).  After all, as then Judge 
Antonin Scalia once wrote, “courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry 
and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by 
the parties before them.”  Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983). 
{¶ 115} For these reasons, in addition to denying the other relief requested, 
I would deny the writs against Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the Ohio Ballot 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
44 
Board.  Because the per curiam opinion does not do so, I respectfully concur in part 
and dissent in part. 
_________________ 
ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Freda J. Levenson, and David J. Carey; 
American Civil Liberties Union, Dale Ho, and Alora Thomas-Lundborg; McTigue 
& Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, Derek S. Clinger, and 
Ben F.C. Wallace, for relators. 
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Bridget C. Coontz and Brandi Laser 
Seskes, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents. 
_________________