Title: State ex rel. Stokes v. Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Stokes v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4201.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-4201 
THE STATE EX REL. STOKES, APPELLANT, v. DEPARTMENT OF 
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Stokes v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Slip Opinion 
No. 2023-Ohio-4201.] 
Mandamus—Court of appeals did not err in dismissing inmate’s mandamus action, 
because his minimum sentence was correctly calculated—Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2023-0402—September 26, 2023—Decided November 29, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 21AP-482, 2023-Ohio-468. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Patrick O. Stokes, appeals the judgment of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus.  Stokes 
was sentenced in 1996 to three life sentences and two sentences of 10 to 25 years, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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all to be served consecutively.  Appellees, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation 
and Correction and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, “DRC”), 
calculated Stokes’s aggregate sentence to be 45 years to life.  In 2021, Stokes filed 
a mandamus action in the Tenth District, arguing that DRC improperly calculated 
his minimum sentence by adding three 10-year minimum sentences associated with 
his life sentences.  Stokes sought mandamus relief to compel DRC to calculate his 
minimum sentence to be 15 years.  The Tenth District granted DRC’s motion to 
dismiss, holding that DRC’s calculation of Stokes’s minimum sentence was correct.  
We affirm. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} In 1996, Stokes was convicted on three counts of rape, one count of 
kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery.  At the time, R.C. 2907.02(B) 
mandated a life sentence when a rape victim was less than 13 years old.  See Former 
R.C. 2907.02(B), Sub.S.B. No. 31, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 342, 345.  Stokes was 
sentenced to life on each count of rape, with the sentences to be served 
consecutively.  Stokes was sentenced to 10 to 25 years for each of the kidnapping 
and aggravated-robbery convictions, with those sentences to be served 
consecutively to each other and to the three life sentences.  DRC determined that 
Stokes would become eligible for parole after serving 45 years—10 years for each 
of the three rape convictions and 15 years for the other convictions. 
{¶ 3} In 2019, before filing his mandamus action in the Tenth District, 
Stokes filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition for failure to state a claim.  Stokes 
appealed the common pleas court’s dismissal to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals, arguing, as he does here, that DRC’s calculation of his 45-year minimum 
aggregate sentence was incorrect.  Stokes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 109569, 2021-Ohio-316, ¶ 3.  The Eighth District affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal and held that Stokes’s arguments were better suited for “ ‘post-
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conviction petitions, habeas corpus, and motions to vacate,’ ” id. at ¶ 7, quoting 
Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 44, rather 
than a declaratory judgment, id. at ¶ 7-8. 
{¶ 4} In 2021, Stokes filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth 
District, requesting that the court of appeals compel DRC to “correctly” compute 
the length of his minimum sentence.  Asserting that he is an “old law” inmate, 
which he defined in his petition as an incarcerated person who was “sentenced for 
crimes committed prior to July 1, 1996,” Stokes claimed that DRC miscalculated 
his minimum sentence.  Stokes alleged that he has a right to an accurately calculated 
minimum sentence and DRC has a duty to impose a correct minimum sentence.  
Citing R.C. 2907.02(B), Stokes argued that because the only available sentence for 
the rape offenses was life in prison, he is not subject to a minimum sentence for 
those convictions.  Stokes claimed that DRC had “modified” his sentences by 
adding three 10-year minimum sentences for each of his rape convictions, which 
incorrectly increased his minimum sentence by 30 years. 
{¶ 5} DRC moved to dismiss Stokes’s petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), 
asserting that they had accurately calculated Stokes’s multiple sentences.  Citing 
Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-10(H)(1), DRC argued that an inmate convicted of rape 
committed against a victim under the age of thirteen prior to July 1, 1996, 
“[b]ecomes eligible for parole consideration after serving ten full years.” 
{¶ 6} The Tenth District dismissed Stokes’s petition, holding that DRC had 
not “modified” Stokes’s sentence, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-482, 2023-Ohio-
468, ¶ 20, and finding that the absence of a minimum term in his rape sentences 
meant that they were not indefinite sentences and therefore fell outside the 
sentencing caps of R.C. 2929.41, id. at ¶ 13-16, citing Pollock v. Ohio Adult Parole 
Auth., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-839, 2002-Ohio-1319, and McMeans v. State 
Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-42, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5331 
(Oct. 27, 1998). 
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ANALYSIS 
{¶ 7} The Tenth District’s judgment dismissing Stokes’s petition was 
correct.  DRC accurately calculated his parole-eligibility date and correctly applied 
the sentencing statutes and Administrative Code provisions that were in effect at 
the time of his conviction. 
{¶ 8} To dismiss a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond 
doubt from the petition that the relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief, 
after all factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are 
made in his favor.  State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio 
Bur. of Emp. Servs., 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 181, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998).  This court 
reviews de novo the court of appeals’ dismissal of Stokes’s petition.  State ex rel. 
Brown v. Nusbaum, 152 Ohio St.3d 284, 2017-Ohio-9141, 95 N.E.3d 365, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 9} To state a claim for a writ of mandamus, a relator must allege facts 
showing (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the 
part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 
2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 10} The Tenth District’s decision is consistent with prior decisions 
concerning the differentiation between indefinite sentences and life sentences and 
how that distinction affects an inmate’s parole eligibility.  Stokes was convicted in 
October 1996, for crimes committed in April 1996.  See State v. Stokes, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 71654, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5530, at *1 (Dec. 11, 1997).  Stokes 
therefore was subject to the criminal laws and sentences that existed prior to July 
1, 1996.  See R.C. 2967.021(A).  At the time of Stokes’s offenses, R.C. 
2929.41(E)(2) stated, “Consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed shall not 
exceed: * * * (2) An aggregate minimum term of fifteen years * * * when the 
consecutive terms imposed are for felonies other than aggravated murder or 
murder.”  Former R.C. 2929.41(E)(2), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, 145 Ohio Laws, Part 
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IV, 6341, 6397.  Similarly, at that time, R.C. 2967.13(F) read, “A prisoner serving 
a sentence of imprisonment for life for * * * rape or felonious sexual penetration * 
* * becomes eligible for parole after serving a term of ten full years’ imprisonment.”  
Former R.C. 2967.13(F), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6430. 
{¶ 11} Courts have held that a life sentence under R.C. 2907.03 is a definite 
sentence, regardless of the inmate’s potential for parole under R.C. 2967.13(F).  See 
McMeans, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-42, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5331, at *8-
9 (“the absence of a stated minimum term in the present matter takes the sentence 
outside the ambit of R.C. 2929.41(E). * * * [The ten-year minimum of R.C. 
2967.13(F)] is determined directly under the statutory provisions governing parole, 
rather than under the general sentencing statutes of R.C. 2929.01 et seq.”); see also 
McCleskey v. Adult Parole Auth., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19037, 2002-Ohio-
2699, ¶ 10 (“[t]his specific language [of R.C. 2907.02(B)] is to be construed as an 
exception to the general language of R.C. 2929.41(E). * * * [McClesky] is not 
entitled under R.C. 2929.41(E) to be eligible for parole after serving fifteen years 
of his sentence”). 
{¶ 12} These decisions are consistent with this court’s holding in Yonkings 
v. Wilkinson, 86 Ohio St.3d 225, 714 N.E.2d 394 (1999), that R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) 
applies only to indefinite sentences.  “Nowhere throughout this statutory 
framework is a definite term referred to in such terminology.  When former R.C. 
2929.41(E)(2) is read in pari materia with [other sentencing statutes], it becomes 
obvious that the cap on aggregate minimum terms was meant to apply only to 
indefinite sentences.”  Yonkings at 228.  In its analysis, this court also noted that 
“[a] ‘definite’ sentence is just what its name implies: a specific number of years of 
imprisonment rather than a range defined by minimum and maximum terms.  
Referring to a minimum or maximum term of imprisonment makes sense only when 
speaking of an indefinite sentence.”  Id. at 227.  See also State v. Bowers, 163 Ohio 
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St.3d 28, 2020-Ohio-5167, 167 N.E.3d 947, ¶ 3 (referring to a life-without-parole 
sentence under R.C. 2907.02(B) as a “definite sentence”). 
{¶ 13} Along the same lines, the courts in McMeans and McCleskey found 
no issues with calculating parole eligibility by taking the number of consecutive 
life sentences an inmate is serving for rape and multiplying that number by ten 
years, in accordance with R.C. 2967.13(F).  McMeans at *6 (“the ten year minimum 
under R.C. 2967.13(F) would be aggregated, given [McMeans’s] sentence of three 
consecutive life terms, to arrive at a thirty year minimum imprisonment before 
eligibility for parole * * *”); McCleskey at ¶ 15 (“McCleskey will have to serve ten 
years on each of his six consecutive life sentences, or sixty years, in addition to the 
minimum requirements on his other sentences, before he will be eligible for parole 
consideration”); see also Schrock v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 05AP-82, 2005-Ohio-3938, ¶ 11 (finding that Schrock would be parole eligible 
after serving 220 years for 22 rape convictions, in addition to serving other definite 
and indefinite sentences). 
{¶ 14} Because the Tenth District’s decision that DRC correctly calculated 
Stokes’s parole eligibility under R.C. 2967.13(F) is in line with this court’s holding 
on definite versus indefinite sentences, dismissal of Stokes’s petition was 
warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 15} We affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Stoke’s 
mandamus petition. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Patrick O. Stokes, pro se. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and George Horváth, Assistant Attorney 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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General, for appellees. 
_________________