Title: Vasquez v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12556 
 
PEDRO VASQUEZ  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 5, 2018. - March 28, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Bail. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 25, 2018. 
 
 
The case was considered by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In this appeal we review and apply the legal 
standards for bail decisions in cases where the defendant has 
been charged with murder in the first degree and the judge must 
decide whether the defendant should be admitted to bail, or held 
without bail to assure the defendant's appearance at future 
2 
 
 
court proceedings.  The defendant,1 Pedro Vasquez, has been in 
pretrial detention since his arrest on January 5, 2015, for the 
murder of his girlfriend.  Following the defendant's indictment 
and arraignment for murder in the first degree and related 
charges, a judge of the Superior Court ordered him to be held 
without right to bail, and the defendant's four subsequent 
requests for admission to bail in the Superior Court were all 
denied.  The defendant then challenged the denial of his bail 
requests in a petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, which 
was also denied by a single justice of the county court.  In 
this appeal from the judgment of the single justice, the 
defendant contends that, under the constitutional and other 
legal standards applicable to bail decisions, the Commonwealth's 
anticipated evidence against him was not strong enough to 
justify his pretrial detention without bail, given his local 
family ties and lack of past court defaults or "meaningful" 
prior convictions. We conclude that a defendant charged with 
murder in the first degree has no right to bail, but may be 
admitted to bail in the discretion of the judge.  The judge's 
exercise of discretion should not rest solely on a presumption 
against bail, but should be based on a careful review of the 
                                                          
 
 
1 Although Pedro Vasquez commenced this action by filing a 
petition in the county court, for convenience, we refer to him 
as "the defendant." 
3 
 
 
specific details of the case and the defendant's history.  The 
judge should consider the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and weigh the defendant's risk of flight in light of the 
strength or weakness of the Commonwealth's case and the 
potential penalty of a sentence to life in prison.  Further 
appropriate considerations include the defendant's family ties, 
financial resources, length of residence in the community, 
character and mental condition, and record of convictions and 
appearances at court proceedings or of any previous flight to 
avoid prosecution or any failure to appear at any court 
proceedings, along with the other factors listed in G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, insofar as they are relevant.  The 
defendant is entitled to representation by counsel at a hearing2 
and the opportunity to present argument concerning the relevant 
bail factors. 
 
Pretrial detention without bail is appropriate where the 
judge concludes, based on a preponderance of the evidence and 
the relevant factors for bail, that it is necessary to assure 
the defendant's appearance at future court proceedings.  The 
decision must be accompanied by a statement of findings and 
reasons, either in writing or orally on the record.  Finally, 
when a bail order comes before a judge for reconsideration, the 
                                                          
 
 
2 There is no requirement that there be an evidentiary 
hearing. 
4 
 
 
judge should also consider, among other factors, the length of 
the defendant's pretrial detention and the equities of the case, 
including the extent of the prosecution's responsibility for the 
delay, and the strength of the Commonwealth's case, especially 
if the character of the evidence has changed. 
 
Applying these standards in the present case, we conclude 
that the bail judge did not abuse his discretion or commit an 
error of law in denying the defendant's bail request, and 
therefore affirm the single justice's judgment denying the 
defendant's petition. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts based on the record 
available to the bail judge, reserving certain details for 
further discussion below.  Early in the morning of January 5, 
2015, police officers responding to a 911 call discovered the 
body of a woman slumped over in the passenger seat of a sport 
utility vehicle (SUV) parked on the side of the road in 
Springfield.  She had suffered a single gunshot wound to the 
head and was bleeding profusely.  Attempts to revive her failed, 
and she was declared dead at the scene.  The victim was later 
identified as the defendant's girlfriend. 
 
Detectives discovered that a home across the street from 
the crime scene maintained a video security system.  The 
detectives viewed the videotape footage from this system and 
found that it included the sequence of events surrounding the 
5 
 
 
shooting.  The videotape shows the SUV stopping and parking on 
the street.  The vehicle's rear passenger door on the driver's 
side opens, and an argument between a man and a woman in Spanish 
can be heard.  The woman demands that the man return her keys 
and threatens to call the police.  A single gunshot can then be 
heard as the male leaves the vehicle and runs away. 
 
Police also interviewed the victim's family and friends, 
including the victim's son, her brother, and her brother's 
girlfriend.  The officers learned that the defendant and the 
victim had been romantically involved and had lived together for 
four or five years, along with the victim's son.  The officers 
also learned that there had been a history of domestic violence 
between the defendant and the victim.   The victim's son, her 
brother, and her brother's girlfriend were all familiar with the 
defendant due to his relationship with the victim.  At the 
police station, the officers played the security videotape 
separately for each of them, first playing only the audio 
portion and then showing the video portion to each witness.  In 
each case, they identified the voices of the man and the woman 
as the defendant and the victim; the victim's brother also noted 
that the victim had used the defendant's name twice.  After 
being shown the video recording, they also identified the man 
who fled the vehicle as appearing to be the defendant, although 
6 
 
 
they could not make a positive identification because the man's 
face was not visible. 
 
Based on this information, a warrant was issued for the 
defendant's arrest, and he was taken into custody later that 
evening.  Following the defendant's indictment and arraignment 
on charges of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; 
unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and 
unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
a Superior Court judge ordered him to be held without right to 
bail in May 2015.  Judges of the Superior Court also denied the 
defendant's four subsequent requests for admission to bail after 
hearings in July 2016, December 2016, December 2017, and May 
2018.  Following the December 2017 and May 2018 decisions of a 
judge (bail judge) to deny bail, the defendant then filed a 
petition for review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county 
court, which was denied by a single justice without hearing in 
June 2018.3 
                                                          
 
 
3 In addition to these bail proceedings, the defendant was 
heard on various motions to suppress evidence.  After 
evidentiary hearings in April and June 2017, a judge issued 
orders denying the defendant's motions to suppress certain 
identifications (including the voice and video identifications 
described above) and evidence obtained from a search of the 
defendant's cell phone, but allowing his motion to suppress his 
postarrest statement to the police.  A different judge denied 
the defendant's motion to suppress cell site location 
information evidence from his cell phone service provider after 
a nonevidentiary hearing in December 2017.  Single justices of 
the county court allowed the defendant's and the Commonwealth's 
7 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  As we explain further 
infra, bail decisions concerning defendants charged with murder 
in the first degree are subject to the discretion of the bail 
judge, and therefore the bail judge's decision is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion or error of law.  See Commonwealth v. 
Marshall, 373 Mass. 65, 66-67 (1977) (applying abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing denial of bail where defendant 
was charged with murder in first degree); Commonwealth v. Baker, 
343 Mass. 162, 168-169 (1961) (considering whether denial of 
bail where defendant was charged with murder in first degree may 
have been tainted by error of law).  In this case, the single 
justice denied the defendant's petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
because the single justice concluded that the bail judge did not 
abuse his discretion in rejecting the defendant's request for 
bail. 
 
As a general matter, we review decisions of the single 
justice under G. L. c. 211, § 3, for clear error of law or abuse 
of discretion.  See Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 697 
(2017); Commonwealth v. Chism, 476 Mass. 171, 176 (2017); Boston 
Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 602 (2000) (Sharpe).  In 
this instance, however, the single justice did not exercise his 
                                                          
 
respective requests for leave to appeal from these orders and, 
following our grant of direct appellate review, their appeals 
are now pending before us in a separate docket. 
8 
 
 
discretion,4 and consequently, we focus our attention on his 
legal ruling that the bail judge did not abuse his discretion.  
We review this legal ruling independently to determine whether 
it is erroneous, without giving any deference to the single 
justice's decision.  See Sharpe, supra at 603.  In effect, this 
means that we must address the same legal issue presented to the 
single justice:  whether the bail judge's decision to deny the 
defendant's bail request involved an abuse of discretion or 
error of law.  See Chism, supra at 182-185 (directly considering 
whether trial judge abused his discretion in denying impoundment 
motion, without deference to rulings on that issue by single 
justice of Appeals Court and single justice of county court 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3). 
 
Insofar as the bail judge's decision involved an exercise 
of discretion, we must accord it great deference, and we will 
not overturn his decision for abuse of discretion merely because 
we would have reached a different result.  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 
                                                          
 
 
4 We have previously indicated that the single justice of 
the county court has the discretionary power to make de novo 
bail decisions in certain circumstances.  See Commesso v. 
Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 373 (1975) (under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58, "the single justice has the power to consider the matter 
anew, taking into account facts newly presented, and to exercise 
his own judgment and discretion without remanding the matter for 
reconsideration by the Superior Court").  We need not determine 
the scope of this discretionary power or whether it would apply 
in the circumstances of this case, given that the single justice 
did not exercise this discretion. 
9 
 
 
470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  But that deference is not 
unlimited.  "[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes an 
abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made a clear 
error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision, such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  
To the extent that the bail judge's decision is premised on 
legal rulings, we consider those legal issues independently and 
without deference.  See Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 603. 
 
The defendant urges us to go further, asking us to conduct 
a de novo review of the Commonwealth's evidence against him and, 
in particular, of the bail judge's statement that the 
Commonwealth had a "strong case" against the defendant.  We 
decline to do so.  The defendant argues that the bail judge's 
characterization of the Commonwealth's case as "strong" should 
be reviewed de novo because it is analogous to a factual finding 
made by a motion judge based on documentary evidence when a 
defendant has moved to suppress evidence, citing Commonwealth v. 
Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 293 (2015) ("We review de novo any findings 
of the motion judge that were based entirely on the documentary 
evidence . . .").  But the bail judge's statement was not a 
factual finding, so much as the judge's general assessment of 
the weight of the evidence made as part of his over-all 
discretionary bail decision.  While we must consider whether the 
10 
 
 
bail judge's assessment of the evidence involved a clear error 
of judgment, it is not appropriate for us to substitute our own 
assessment for his in reviewing his exercise of discretion. 
 
2.  Legal standards for bail decisions where the defendant 
has been charged with murder in the first degree.  a.  Judicial 
discretion.  Whether to grant bail to a defendant who has been 
charged with murder in the first degree is a matter for the bail 
judge's discretion.  In Commonwealth v. Baker, 343 Mass. 162 
(1961), this court reviewed the history of the common law and 
statutes pertaining to bail in such cases.  We noted that 
"[f]rom early colonial times bail appears to have been allowable 
in the court's discretion in capital cases . . . and as a matter 
of right in all other cases."  Id. at 165.  We also determined 
that this basic common-law framework had not been altered by 
subsequent statutory enactments.  Id. at 166-168.  In 
particular, we noted that G. L. c. 276, §§ 42 and 57, which were 
the principal bail statutes in force when Baker was decided, did 
not define nonbailable offenses.  Id. at 166.  We therefore 
concluded that "one charged with the capital offence of murder 
in the first degree may be admitted to bail, and that bail in 
such a case is not a matter of right but is discretionary with 
the judge, who is to give due weight to the nature and 
circumstances of the case."  Id. at 168.  Thus, we held that if 
the bail judge had denied bail based on the mistaken view that 
11 
 
 
murder in the first degree was a nonbailable offense, that 
decision would be tainted by an error of law, but if the judge 
exercised his discretion, there was no error.  Id. 
 
Although there have been significant developments in the 
law of bail and pretrial release during the one-half century 
since Baker was decided, the court's conclusion -- that whether 
to grant bail to a defendant charged with murder in the first 
degree is a matter for the judge's discretion -- remains sound.  
Notably, in 1971 the Legislature rewrote G. L. c. 276, § 58, to 
establish a presumption of release on personal recognizance 
pending trial.  See St. 1971, c. 473; Commonwealth v. Ray, 435 
Mass. 249, 254 (2001); Commesso v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 
369, 371 (1975); Matter of Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 35 n.10 (1973).  
Importantly, however, § 58 specifically excludes from its 
coverage persons charged with "an offense punishable by death," 
and we have interpreted that provision to mean that § 58 does 
not apply to persons charged with murder in the first degree, 
notwithstanding our holding that the death penalty statute then 
in effect was unconstitutional.  See Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 
384 Mass. 802, 802-803 (1981), citing District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980).  Accordingly, 
"[s]ince the statute does not apply, the question of bail for a 
person charged with murder in the first degree is a matter of 
discretion."  Abrams v. Commonwealth, 391 Mass. 1019, 1019 
12 
 
 
(1984) (rejecting defendant's contention that G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58, restricts judicial discretion to revise or revoke bail in 
murder in first degree case).  See Farley v. Commonwealth, 433 
Mass. 1004, 1004 (2000); Magraw v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 1004, 
1004 (1999). 
 
b.  Factors to be considered in exercising discretion.  In 
exercising discretion to decide whether a person charged with 
murder in the first degree should be admitted to bail, a judge 
should be guided by the same factors that apply to bail 
decisions in other types of cases, although the relative weight 
given to these factors will be affected by the nature and 
gravity of the offense charged.  These factors include, but are 
not limited to, the common-law historical factors for bail, such 
as the nature and circumstances of the offense charged and the 
accused's family ties, financial resources, length of residence 
in the community, character and mental condition, and record of 
convictions and appearances at court proceedings or of any 
previous flight to avoid prosecution or any failure to appear at 
any court proceedings.5  Judges should also consider the 
additional factors listed in G. L. c. 276, § 57, second par., 
                                                          
 
 
5 For a discussion of these factors, see Brangan v. 
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 698 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 504 (2004), and citing Querubin v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 115 n.6, 120 (2003). 
 
13 
 
 
where the murder or related offenses charged involve domestic 
abuse or violation of a restraining order, as defined therein.6  
Judges may also wish to consult the list of factors set out in 
                                                          
 
 
6 General Laws c. 276, § 57, second par., as amended through 
St. 2018, c. 69, § 167, states in part: 
 
"Any person authorized to take bail for such violation may 
impose conditions on a person's release in order to ensure 
the appearance of the person before the court and the 
safety of the alleged victim, any other individual or the 
community; provided, however, that the person authorized to 
take bail shall, prior to admitting the person to bail, 
modifying an existing order of bail or imposing such 
conditions, have immediate access to all pending and prior 
criminal offender record information, board of probation 
records and police and incident reports related to the 
person detained, upon oral, telephonic, facsimile or 
electronic mail request, to the extent practicable, and 
shall take into consideration the following:  the nature 
and circumstances of the offense charged, the potential 
penalty the person faces, the person's family ties, the 
person's financial resources and financial ability to give 
bail, employment record and history of mental illness, the 
person's reputation, the risk that the person will obstruct 
or attempt to obstruct justice or threaten, injure or 
intimidate  or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate a 
prospective witness or juror, the person's record of 
convictions, if any, any illegal drug distribution or 
present drug dependency, whether the person is on bail 
pending adjudication of a prior charge, whether the acts 
alleged involve abuse, as defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1], 
a violation of a temporary or permanent order issued 
pursuant to [G. L. c. 208, § 18 or 34B; G. L. c. 209, § 32; 
G. L. c. 209A, § 3, 4, or 5; or G. L. c. 209C, § 15 or 20], 
whether the person has any history of issuance of such 
orders pursuant to the aforesaid sections, whether the 
person is on probation, parole or other release pending 
completion of sentence for any conviction and whether the 
person is on release pending sentence or appeal for any 
conviction." 
 
14 
 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 58, first par.,7 even though that statute does 
not apply to cases where the defendant has been charged with 
murder in the first degree, because those factors elaborate upon 
the common-law factors listed above.  See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 
697-698 & n.13 (observing that Superior Court judges sometimes 
rely on G. L. c. 276, § 58, in their bail orders, even though 
statute does not apply to bail proceedings in Superior Court, 
because common-law considerations for bail are among same as 
those contained in § 58). 
 
Certain aspects of the nature and circumstances of the 
offense charged merit special attention in a case involving 
                                                          
 
 
7 General Laws c. 276, § 58, first par. as amended through 
St. 2018, c. 69, § 171, states in part:  "In his determination 
under this section as to whether release will reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person before the court, said justice 
. . . shall, on the basis of any information which he can 
reasonably obtain, take into account the nature and 
circumstances of the offense charged, the potential penalty the 
person faces, the person's family ties, financial resources and 
financial ability to give bail, employment record and history of 
mental illness, his reputation and the length of residence in 
the community, his record of convictions, if any, any illegal 
drug distribution or present drug dependency, any flight to 
avoid prosecution or fraudulent use of an alias or false 
identification, any failure to appear at any court proceeding to 
answer to an offense, whether the person is on bail pending 
adjudication of a prior charge, whether the acts alleged involve 
abuse as defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1], or violation of a 
temporary or permanent order issued pursuant to [G. L. c. 208, 
§ 18 or 34B; G. L. c. 209, § 32; G. L. c. 209A, § 3, 4, or 5; or 
G. L. c. 209C, § 15 or 20], whether the person has any history 
of orders issued against him pursuant to the aforesaid sections, 
whether he is on probation, parole, or other release pending 
completion of sentence for any conviction, and whether he is on 
release pending sentence or appeal for any conviction." 
15 
 
 
murder in the first degree.  The potential penalty that the 
defendant faces, a factor listed in both § 57 and § 58, and the 
related "possibility of a defendant's flight to avoid 
punishment," Querubin v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 116 
(2003), are significant considerations.  The risk of flight is 
at its greatest where the defendant stands accused of murder in 
the first degree because of the magnitude of the punishment 
faced by the defendant upon conviction -- a mandatory sentence 
of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.  See 
G. L. c. 265, §§ 1, 2; G. L. c. 127, § 133A.8  This is "a 
uniquely severe penalty" that puts the defendant's "life . . . 
at stake . . . in a way it is not where a lesser crime is 
charged."  Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 135-136 
(2007).  Consequently, whenever a defendant is charged with 
murder in the first degree, there is a significant, inherent 
risk that the defendant will flee, and in light of that risk, 
"[i]t is presumed that a defendant charged with murder in the 
first degree is not entitled to bail."  Commonwealth v. Dame, 
473 Mass. 524, 539, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 132 (2016). 
                                                          
 
 
8 Persons serving a life sentence for murder in the first 
degree who had attained the age of eighteen at the time of the 
murder are not eligible for parole.  Persons under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the offense must be, after serving some 
mandatory period of incarceration, eligible for parole.  See 
G. L. c. 265, §§ 1, 2; G. L. c. 127, § 133A. 
16 
 
 
 
While this inherent risk may prove significant in the 
judge's denial of bail in a particular capital case, a generic 
risk of flight should not be treated as automatically 
dispositive.  See Baker, 343 Mass. at 168.  Nor should bail be 
denied solely on the presumption that a defendant charged with 
murder in the first degree is not entitled to bail, without 
considering the particulars of the case, as this would deprive a 
defendant of an individualized bail decision based upon his or 
her specific circumstances.  See id., quoting 4 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *299 ("there are cases, though they rarely happen, 
in which it would be hard and unjust to confine a man in prison, 
though accused even of the greatest offence").  Cf. Stack v. 
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951) ("traditional standards [for bail] 
. . . are to be applied in each case to each defendant. . . .  
To infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an 
unusually high amount is an arbitrary act"). 
 
In weighing the risk that the defendant will flee to avoid 
a lifetime sentence to prison without parole, the judge should 
also consider the strength or weakness of the Commonwealth's 
evidence against the defendant.  See former Fed. R. Crim. P. 
46(a)(1), cited in Baker, 343 Mass. at 168 ("A person arrested 
for an offense punishable by death may be admitted to bail by 
any court or judge authorized by law to do so in the exercise of 
discretion, giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature 
17 
 
 
and circumstances of the offense").  This consideration is 
important for two reasons.  First, the stronger the evidence, 
the greater the likelihood that the defendant will be convicted, 
and hence the greater the defendant's incentive to flee.  See 
Magraw, 429 Mass. at 1004 (observing that defendant had 
increased incentive to flee in light of Commonwealth's strong 
case).  Second, the stronger the evidence, the less likely it is 
that an innocent defendant will be unfairly detained while 
awaiting trial. 
 
In sum, in deciding whether to admit a defendant charged 
with murder in the first degree to bail, the judge's exercise of 
discretion should not rest solely on a presumption against bail; 
it should be based on a careful review of the specific details 
of the case and the defendant's history.  The judge should 
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, and weigh 
the defendant's risk of flight in light of the strength or 
weakness of the Commonwealth's case and the potential penalty, 
taking into consideration as well the defendant's family ties, 
financial resources, length of residence in the community, 
character and mental condition, record of convictions and 
appearances at court proceedings or of any previous flight to 
avoid prosecution or any failure to appear at any court 
proceedings, along with the other factors listed in G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, insofar as they are relevant. 
18 
 
 
 
c.  Constitutional considerations in the exercise of 
discretion.  The judge's exercise of discretion is also 
constrained by the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and arts. 1, 10, and 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which establish 
the fundamental principle that "in our society liberty is the 
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception."  Brangan, 477 Mass. at 704, 
quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).  Although 
"a defendant does not have a constitutional right to be released 
on bail prior to trial,"9 pretrial detention must satisfy due 
process requirements because it curtails an individual's 
fundamental right to liberty and freedom from physical restraint 
before he or she has been convicted of any crime.  Brangan, 
supra at 705, quoting Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112; Brangan, supra 
at 702-703. 
                                                          
 
 
9 The United States Supreme Court and this court have 
rejected the argument that the prohibitions against "excessive 
bail" in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights extend so 
far as to bar pretrial detention in all cases.  See United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987), quoting Carlson v. 
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) ("The bail clause was lifted 
with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.  In 
England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to 
bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be 
excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.  When 
this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing 
was said that indicated any different concept"); Mendonza v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 782 n.4 (1996). 
19 
 
 
 
There are two prongs to the due process analysis -- 
substantive due process and procedural due process.  "Under the 
test of substantive due process, '[w]here a right deemed to be 
fundamental is involved, courts must examine carefully the 
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent 
to which they are served by the challenged [procedure], and 
typically will uphold only those [procedures] that are narrowly 
tailored to further a legitimate and compelling governmental 
interest'" (quotations and citations omitted).  Brangan, 477 
Mass. at 703, quoting Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112.  Procedural 
due process tests whether governmental action depriving a person 
of life, liberty, or property has been implemented in a fair 
manner.  Brangan, supra.  Our previous decisions applying these 
due process requirements in cases where defendants have been 
subjected to pretrial detention offer guidance here. 
 
In Querubin, 440 Mass. at 113-116, we held that pretrial 
detention without bail of a defendant charged with drug 
trafficking met due process requirements where the court 
reasonably concluded after a hearing that pretrial detention was 
necessary to assure the defendant's appearance at future 
proceedings.  Addressing the substantive due process prong of 
the analysis, we held that the Commonwealth and its courts have 
a legitimate and compelling interest in assuring a defendant's 
presence at trial, and that the procedure for determining 
20 
 
 
whether to admit a defendant to bail under G. L. c. 276, § 57, 
applying the factors outlined above, was narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.  See id. at 116.  We further held that the 
requirements of procedural due process were satisfied where the 
defendant was afforded a hearing and an opportunity to attack 
the strength of the Commonwealth's case and to present arguments 
in favor of release, such as the defendant's good character and 
ties to the community.  See id. at 116-120.  We noted that "the 
rules of evidence do not apply" in such a hearing, and a "full-
blown evidentiary hearing that includes the right to be present 
and cross-examine witnesses is not needed or required."  Id. at 
118.  "The necessary determination can be adequately presented 
and decided based on documents (e.g., police reports, witness 
statements, letters from employers and others, and probation 
records) and the representations of counsel," provided that the 
evidence is "sufficiently reliable to avoid any significant risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of liberty."  Id.  However, an 
evidentiary hearing, "or some variation, may be held in the 
discretion of the judge when the circumstances of a particular 
case warrant" it.  Id.  Finally, we held that preponderance of 
the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof under G. L. 
c. 276, § 57, for determining whether a person presents a risk 
of flight and, if a person does present such a risk, that there 
21 
 
 
is no amount of bail or other conditions that will assure his or 
her presence as required.  Id. at 119-120. 
 
We have also held, in Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden 
Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228 (2004), that the defendant has a 
right to be represented by counsel at a bail hearing.  "Because 
a defendant's liberty, a fundamental right, is at stake at a 
bail hearing, the principles of procedural due process in art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights are implicated.  
They include the right to be heard, which necessarily includes 
the right to be heard by counsel. . . .  Neither a bail hearing 
nor a preventive detention hearing may proceed unless and until 
the defendant is represented by counsel."  Id. at 234.  
 
Where the requirements set out in Querubin and Lavallee are 
followed, a defendant charged with murder in the first degree 
may be properly held without bail to assure his or her future 
appearance without violating due process.  Due process demands 
additional safeguards, however, where the Commonwealth asks for 
pretrial detention of a defendant due to the danger that he or 
she may pose to another person or the community.  In Aime v. 
Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667 (1993), we held that the 1992 
amendments to G. L. c. 276, § 58, which authorized judicial 
officers to deny defendants admission to bail if their release 
posed a danger to another person or the community, violated due 
process requirements because the amendments gave judicial 
22 
 
 
officers "unbridled discretion to determine whether an arrested 
individual is dangerous," and lacked "procedures 'designed to 
further the accuracy' of the judicial officer's determination."  
Id. at 682-683, quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
751 (1987).  Subsequently, in Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 
Mass. 771 (1996), we upheld G. L. c. 276, § 58A, which was 
enacted in 1994 to permit pretrial detention of defendants due 
to their dangerousness, subject to numerous procedural 
protections, including limiting the statute's application to 
cases where certain serious crimes have been charged; giving the 
defendant the right to an evidentiary hearing where the 
defendant can testify, present witnesses, and cross-examine 
witnesses; and authorizing pretrial detention only where a judge 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of 
release will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or 
the community.  Id. at 773-775, 782-783.  Considered together, 
Aime and Mendonza compel the conclusion that, even where a 
defendant has been charged with murder in the first degree, a 
judge must still follow the procedures established in G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, before denying bail if the judge would have 
released the defendant on bail but for the danger the defendant 
poses to the community.10 
                                                          
 
 
10 In the present case, the Commonwealth did not move to 
have the defendant held under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, nor did the 
23 
 
 
 
More recently, in Brangan, supra, we discussed the due 
process and other constitutional requirements applicable to a 
defendant who is detained because he or she cannot afford to 
post the bail set by the court as a condition of his release.  
We principally focused on the requirement that, in setting the 
amount of bail, a judge must consider the defendant's financial 
resources, although the judge is not required to set a bail 
amount that the defendant can afford to pay.  See Brangan, 477 
Mass. at 697-698, 700-702.  Thus, much of our discussion in 
Brangan is inapplicable to the situation here, where the 
defendant has been held without bail on a charge of murder in 
the first degree. 
 
But some of the due process conditions stated in Brangan 
also apply in this case.  We held that "[a] statement of 
findings and reasons, either in writing or orally on the record, 
is a minimum requirement [of due process] where a defendant 
faces a loss of liberty."11  See id. at 708.  That requirement is 
                                                          
 
Commonwealth argue that the defendant should be held without 
bail because he posed a danger to the community. 
 
11 We recognize that it is often not realistic for the judge 
to reduce his or her findings to writing in the midst of 
presiding over a criminal session.  Oral findings in most 
instances are not only permissible, but also to be expected. 
 
24 
 
 
equally applicable where a judge orders a defendant to be held 
without bail.12 
 
We also held in Brangan that, when a bail order comes 
before a judge for reconsideration, the judge should consider 
the length of the defendant's pretrial detention and the 
equities of the case.  See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 709-710, citing 
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 118, and Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 781, 790.  
See also, e.g., United States v. El-Gabrowny, 35 F.3d 63, 65 (2d 
Cir. 1994) ("Due process analysis of pretrial detention calls 
for examination of the length of detention, the extent of the 
prosecution's responsibility for delay of the trial, the gravity 
of the charges, and the strength of evidence upon which 
detention was based").13  Where the defendant has been charged 
                                                          
 
 
12 In Brangan, we also required that, where the defendant 
cannot afford to pay the amount of bail set by the judge, likely 
resulting in the defendant's long-term pretrial detention, the 
statement of findings and reasons should explain why no less 
restrictive condition would suffice to assure the defendant's 
presence at future court proceedings.  See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 
707-709.  The bail judge's statement of findings and reasons 
need not specifically address this issue when the defendant has 
been charged with murder in the first degree, given the inherent 
risk that the defendant will flee in such cases, as discussed 
supra. 
 
13 The length of a defendant's pretrial detention is also 
effectively limited by Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, as amended, 422 
Mass. 1503 (1996), which requires trial within one year of 
arraignment, subject to certain exclusions, see generally 
Commonwealth v. Graham, 480 Mass. 516 (2018), and by the right 
to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, see generally Commonwealth v. Butler, 464 Mass. 706 
(2013). 
25 
 
 
with murder in the first degree, the nature of that calculus 
will be affected by the gravity of the charge and the complexity 
of the case.  Especially in a murder case, "preparing . . . for 
trial is a complex process, full of unexpected events and 
challenges" that can lead to delay for legitimate reasons.  
Commonwealth v. Graham, 480 Mass. 516, 532 (2018).  
Nevertheless, where, as here, a defendant has been held without 
bail for four years while awaiting trial, the length of the 
detention and the extent of the prosecution's responsibility, if 
any, for the delay, and the strength of evidence upon which 
detention was based (especially if there have been changes in 
the evidence since bail was previously denied, e.g., as a result 
of a successful motion to suppress), should also be considered 
on reconsideration. 
 
3.  Analysis of the challenged bail decisions.  With this 
legal framework in mind, we now review the bail proceedings in 
the Superior Court and the ruling of the single justice in the 
county court.14 
 
Various Superior Court judges conducted five separate bail 
proceedings in the defendant's case, in May 2015, July 2016, 
                                                          
 
 
14 As discussed supra, the single justice did not exercise 
his discretion in this case, and consequently our review of his 
decision only involves our independent consideration of his 
legal ruling that there was no abuse of discretion by the bail 
judge. 
 
26 
 
 
December 2016, December 2017, and May 2018.  We focus our review 
on the December 2017 and May 2018 proceedings, as these were the 
most recent, and present the most extensive record.15 
 
On December 14, 2017, the bail judge conducted a hearing on 
the defendant's request for bail and his motion to suppress 
information obtained from his cell phone service provider.  
During the course of this hearing, defense counsel had an 
opportunity to present arguments concerning the factors for bail 
we have cited supra.  Counsel noted that the defendant had no 
prior record of convictions except for the violation of a 
restraining order, to which he pleaded guilty; had no defaults 
on his record; had not attempted to flee before his arrest; had 
family in Springfield; and had lived in the United States for 
his entire life.  Counsel also challenged the strength of the 
                                                          
 
 
15 The only information presented to us concerning the first 
three bail proceedings is contained in the docket entries.  
According to the docket, the defendant was "[h]eld without right 
to bail/without prejudice," without any reason being stated, 
after his arraignment on May 18, 2015.  The docket entries for 
July and December 2016 state that the defendant was "committed 
without bail" because he was "charged with 1st degree murder."  
We cannot tell from these entries whether the judges knew that 
they had discretion to release the defendant on bail and 
exercised that discretion, or whether they automatically denied 
the defendant's bail request because of the offense charged, 
without exercising their discretion.  If the latter is what 
occurred, then those decisions were tainted by an error of law.  
See Commonwealth v. Baker, 343 Mass. 162, 168 (1961).  Nor can 
we tell what factors those judges may have considered in making 
those decisions.  But we need not resolve these issues, because 
the defendant was given two more opportunities to argue for his 
release on bail, in December 2017 and May 2018. 
27 
 
 
Commonwealth's case against the defendant.  He argued that the 
visual and audio quality of the security videotape was so poor 
that it was difficult to identify the voice or image of the 
apparent perpetrator.  Three members of the victim's family had 
identified the voice in the videotape as that of the defendant, 
but defense counsel suggested that the identifications were 
based on a preconceived belief that the defendant was 
responsible.  Defense counsel represented that five other 
persons who knew the defendant and heard the videotape did not 
recognize the voice. 
 
Defense counsel also stated that the defendant had not 
attempted to flee and that his ex-wife, daughter, and neighbors 
all placed him as being at or near his home at the time of the 
crime.  And he pointed out that the available forensic evidence 
did not connect the defendant to the crime:  a fingerprint found 
on the rear window of the vehicle where the victim was shot was 
not the defendant's fingerprint, and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
evidence found under the victim's fingernails belonged to 
another man with whom she had had a relationship.  Defense 
counsel asserted that the police nevertheless pursued the 
defendant because they were influenced by members of the 
victim's family who assumed that the defendant was the 
perpetrator. 
28 
 
 
 
In response, the prosecutor made the following arguments.  
With regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime, he 
described the murder as an "execution . . . a point-blank 
gunshot to the back of [the victim's] head."  As for the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case, he represented that, in 
addition to the victim's son and brother and her brother's 
girlfriend, two other persons had identified the male voice in 
the videotape as that of the defendant.  He noted that twice in 
the videotape, the victim called the perpetrator "Pedro" -- the 
defendant's first name.16  The prosecutor also observed that the 
fingerprint referenced by defense counsel was on the exterior of 
the rear window vehicle and the security video recording did not 
show the perpetrator touching there, so it was not relevant.  He 
acknowledged that the DNA evidence under the victim's 
fingernails belonged to another man, not the defendant, but 
noted that this other person had been in a sexual relationship 
with the victim.  The prosecutor also presented arguments on the 
other factors for bail.  He noted the defendant's incentive to 
flee in light of the severe penalty for murder in the first 
degree, and pointed out that the defendant had spent part of his 
life in Puerto Rico and had not worked for three years before 
                                                          
 
 
16 Defense counsel argued in rebuttal that his expert 
linguist denied that the name "Pedro" was used in the videotape 
and represented that one of the Commonwealth's witnesses had 
heard other names, not "Pedro," on the audio recording. 
29 
 
 
the crime.  He represented that the defendant had been the 
subject of two restraining orders issued under G. L. c. 209A, 
one protecting the victim and one protecting the defendant's ex-
wife, each arising out of his threats to kill the women by 
shooting them.  He also stated that the defendant had been 
convicted of violating the order protecting his ex-wife, and 
that the defendant was on probation for that violation at the 
time of the crime.17  And with regard to the delay in trying the 
defendant, the prosecutor observed that it had been to the 
defendant's "benefit as well as to his potential detriment." 
 
In addition to these arguments, the bail judge also 
considered an affidavit by a Springfield police officer in 
support of an application for a search warrant to obtain 
information from the defendant's cell phone service provider.  
This affidavit corroborated the prosecutor's description of the 
                                                          
 
 
17 In rebuttal, defense counsel challenged some of the 
prosecutor's representations concerning the restraining orders 
against the defendant.  He stated that the defendant had 
obtained a restraining order against the victim, that the victim 
had in turn taken out a restraining order against the defendant, 
and that both restraining orders had expired because neither the 
defendant nor the victim appeared to testify.  He stated that 
two other restraining orders involving the defendant concerned 
another woman and arose from a telephone call that the defendant 
made to visit his child. 
 
30 
 
 
security videotape and the witnesses' identifications based on 
their review of that videotape.18 
 
Following the December 14, 2017, hearing, the judge ordered 
the defendant held without bail.  Using a Superior Court form, 
the judge checked boxes citing the following factors for his 
decision: 
 "The nature and circumstances of the offense charged." 
 
 "The potential penalty the defendant faces." 
 
 "The defendant's financial resources and employment 
record." 
 
 "The defendant's record." 
 
 "The fact that the defendant's alleged acts involve 'abuse' 
as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1." 
 
 "The defendant's history of orders issued against him/her 
under the aforementioned sections." 
 
 "The defendant's status of being on probation, parole, or 
other release pending completion of sentence for any 
conviction." 
 
                                                          
 
 
18 The bail judge later issued a January 8, 2018, memorandum 
and order denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cell 
phone service provider information.  In that memorandum and 
order, he incorporated by reference the factual findings and 
rulings in a September 25, 2017, memorandum and order issued by 
another judge after an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
previous motions to suppress.  Among other rulings, the 
September 25, 2017, memorandum and order denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress the voice and visual identifications of the 
defendant that had been made by the victim's son, her brother, 
and her brother's girlfriend. 
31 
 
 
The judge also checked a statement reciting that he had 
"considered alternative nonfinancial conditions and a lesser 
bail amount, but . . . concluded that they would not be 
sufficient to assure the defendant's appearance at future 
proceedings for the following reasons," and then wrote:  "The 
court recognizes that a person charged [with] 1st degree murder 
may be admitted to bail[;] however, after hearing, the court 
exercises its discretion and orders the def[endant] held 
[without] bail.  See [Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112-113]." 
 
Five months later, defense counsel filed a new motion for 
the defendant's admission to bail, supported by a memorandum of 
law and affidavits.  Among other information, defense counsel's 
affidavit averred that four alibi witnesses who listened to the 
videotape did not identify the male voice as the defendant's 
voice; that the defendant had lived in Massachusetts for twenty 
years, that he had four daughters and a grandson living in 
Massachusetts, and that his parents and two brothers lived in 
Springfield. 
 
The motion was heard on May 8, 2018, by the same judge who 
had presided over the December 14, 2017, hearing.  At the May 
2018 hearing, defense counsel represented that the defendant's 
trial would likely be delayed for another twelve to eighteen 
months due to his appeals from the denial of his motions to 
suppress evidence.  Defense counsel and the prosecutor also 
32 
 
 
repeated many of the same points that they had previously made 
at the December 2017 bail hearing. 
 
The following day, the judge issued an order holding the 
defendant without bail.  The judge cited the same factors as in 
his December 2017 order, and again indicated that he had 
considered alternative conditions but had concluded that they 
would not be sufficient to assure the defendant's appearance at 
future proceedings.  He then stated the following rationale for 
his decision: 
"This is the [defendant's] 4th request to be admitted to 
bail.  The def[endant] argues that he faces at least an 
additional year in pretrial detention as a result of 
interlocutory appeals.  After consideration of all 
submissions, the [defendant's] request is denied.  He is 
charged w[ith] 1st degree murder.  This judge heard one of 
the [defendant's] motions to suppress.  It is a strong case 
for the Commonwealth.  It was an execution style killing." 
 
 
We agree with the single justice that the bail judge's 
December 2017 and May 2018 orders did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion or error of law.  At both hearings, the bail judge 
afforded defense counsel a full and fair opportunity to contest 
the strength of the Commonwealth's case and argue why the 
defendant should be admitted to bail.  The bail judge's orders 
make it clear that he was aware that he had discretion to decide 
whether to admit the defendant to bail, and that he was 
exercising that discretion to deny the defendant's bail requests 
based on the arguments and submissions presented to him.  The 
33 
 
 
judge's orders also indicate that he appropriately considered 
the relevant bail factors in making that decision, and the 
factors he cited are all supported by the prosecutor's 
presentations at the hearings.  In particular, we note that the 
bail judge's May 2018 order shows that he specifically weighed 
the strength of the Commonwealth's case and the prospect of the 
defendant's continuing detention for another year. 
 
The defendant contends that the bail judge failed to 
consider adequately the anticipated evidence described by his 
counsel, including witnesses who would dispute the 
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator appearing in 
the videotape and testify that the defendant was elsewhere at 
the time of the crime, the alleged bias of the victim's family 
members when they made those identifications, and the lack of 
forensic evidence tying the defendant to the crime.  The 
defendant also argues that the bail judge ignored his personal 
attributes, including his twenty-year residency in Springfield 
with numerous family members, the absence of any court defaults 
in his record, and his lack of any "meaningful" prior 
convictions.  But these arguments weighing in the defendant's 
favor were counterbalanced by other points presented by the 
prosecution, including the nature of the offense charged; the 
identifications of the defendant on the videotape by witnesses; 
the prior restraining orders taken out against him, his 
34 
 
 
violation of one of those orders, and the fact that he was on 
probation at the time of the alleged offense; his lack of 
employment; and his connections to Puerto Rico.  Finally, 
although the defendant's pretrial detention has been lengthy, he 
does not argue that it has resulted from any undue delay by the 
Commonwealth, and defense counsel acknowledged below that the 
prospective additional delay in his trial has been caused by his 
interlocutory appeals from the Superior Court's suppression 
rulings. 
 
On this record, we cannot say that the bail judge made a 
clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to his 
decision, such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives, and accordingly, we conclude that the 
bail judge did not abuse his discretion.  See L.L., 470 Mass. at 
185 n.27. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment of the county court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.