Title: State ex rel. Greco v. Conrad

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Greco v. Conrad, 91 Ohio St.3d 105, 2001-Ohio-293.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. GRECO, APPELLANT, v. CONRAD, ADMR., ET AL.; 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Greco v. Conrad (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 105.] 
Workers’ compensation — Allegation of several specific safety violations 
involving safety lines, belts, and lanyards by claimant — Court of appeals’ 
judgment that no violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) occurred 
is reversed. 
(No. 99-946 — Submitted November 28, 2000 — Decided March 7, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP-108. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  The facts in this case are scant.  What is known is that 
appellant-claimant Anthony Greco worked for T.H.E. Roofing & Sheet Metal 
Company.  On November 17, 1995, claimant was assigned to clean the gutters of 
a church.  He did so “by leaning over the edge of the roof and removing the debris 
by hand.”  He was not wearing a safety belt or line. 
 
The roof pitch was approximately 3/12 to 4/12, and the distance from the 
top edge of the gutter to the ground was approximately twenty-four feet and 
eleven inches.  While cleaning, claimant fell from the roof and was severely 
injured.  There were no witnesses to the fall. 
 
Claimant alleged several specific safety violations (“VSSR”) involving 
safety lines, belts, and lanyards.  An investigation by the Industrial Commission 
of Ohio, appellee, revealed little.  Company employees said only that due to the 
roof’s low pitch, no safety equipment was used.  Claimant averred that the 
company had never provided or required the use of safety belts or lines. 
 
The commission investigator took several pictures of the accident site and 
two photos at company headquarters on his visit there on January 8, 1997.  The 
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first picture showed a safety harness, belt, and lifeline and was apparently taken in 
the employer’s storeroom.  The second showed a roofer’s bracket.  In addition, 
receipts were provided showing the purchase of similar items in early 1995. 
 
The commission denied claimant’s application, writing: 
 
“Investigator Creager did establish a distance of 24′ 11″ from the church’s 
roof to the ground.  Since the uncontroverted evidence finds that the work place 
was less than 25′ above the ground, OAC 4121:1-3-03(L) likewise is inapplicable. 
 
“Investigator Creager’s measurements are uncontroverted. 
 
“Employer’s invoices * * * substantiate the recent purchase of the safety 
equipment mandated by OAC 4121:1-3-03(J).  The photographs 1 & 2 at Exhibit 
# 1, moreover, depict equipment evidently soiled from usage, and at least one roof 
bracket showing signs of usage.  This supports employer’s contentions and 
detracts from the credibility of claimant’s allegations.  Employer, therefore, is 
held to have been in compliance with OAC 4121:1-3-03(J).” 
 
Reconsideration was denied. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying his 
VSSR application.  The court of appeals disagreed and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) and (L)(1) are the focus of our inquiry.  
The commission found no violations, and the court of appeals agreed.  For the 
reasons to follow, we find a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1). 
 
At the time of claimant’s accident, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) 
required: 
 
“Lifelines, safety belts and lanyards shall be provided by the employer and 
it shall be the responsibility of the employee to wear such equipment when * * * 
exposed to hazards of falling when the operation being performed is more than 
fifteen feet above ground * * *.”  1979-1980 Ohio Monthly Record 4-25. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
Controversy centers on the word “provided,” which is relevantly defined 
for purposes of the above rule as “to make available.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
01(B)(20).  All agree that the named equipment was not at the accident/job site.  
“Availability” was found nevertheless based on two pictures showing soiled 
equipment in the employer’s storeroom and the invoices for purchases of safety 
equipment. 
 
The equation of possession with availability is troubling.  An employer 
can own safety equipment, but if it is locked in a remote warehouse, it is hardly 
“available.”  Possession is meaningless without an additional element – employee 
accessibility. 
 
Accessibility was a key element in finding availability in State ex rel. 
Mayle v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 74, 711 N.E.2d 687.  Mayle 
involved a fatal fall from an electric transmission tower.  As here, no safety belts 
or other similar equipment was on site.  Mayle nevertheless found availability 
based on two things: (1) equipment accessibility and (2) evidence that claimant’s 
lack of a belt stemmed from a personal preference and an industry-wide pattern of 
avoiding such equipment as posing an unacceptable risk of electrocution.  
Regarding the former, we stressed evidence indicating that prior to every job, the 
crew assembled at the home office, where the employees had the chance to obtain 
whatever safety equipment was needed for the job.  Further testimony revealed 
that the employer would deliver to the site any safety equipment that a worker 
subsequently requested. 
 
In this case, the commission points to soilage on the employer’s 
equipment as evidence of use, and, therefore, accessibility.  The flaw in this logic 
is that the photos were taken fourteen months after the accident.  Yes, there are 
equipment purchase invoices that predate the accident, but these establish only 
that the employer owned some safety equipment on the date of injury.  They do 
not establish accessibility, nor does the soilage on the equipment.  That soilage 
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could have just as easily occurred in the fourteen months after the accident as 
before. 
 
We accordingly find that the commission’s denial of claimant’s 
application was not based on “some evidence” of equipment availability on the 
date of injury, and we further find that the commission abused its discretion in 
finding no violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1). 
 
In light of the above finding, analysis of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
03(L)(1) is unnecessary.  If Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) applies, as we 
have found, then the use of safety lines, etc., is not “impractical” and (L)(1) is 
irrelevant. 
 
That portion of the court of appeals’ judgment that found no violation of 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03(J)(1) is reversed.  The balance of the judgment is 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Based on the rationale set forth in the decision of 
the court of appeals’ magistrate, I respectfully dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Mark B. Weisser, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Jon D. Grandon, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
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