Title: Rosen v. Celebrezze

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853.] 
 
 
 
ROSEN, APPELLANT, v. CELEBREZZE, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853.] 
Child 
custody—Jurisdiction—Uniform 
Child 
Custody 
Jurisdiction 
and 
Enforcement Act—Definition of “home state”—R.C. 3127.01(B)(7)—Writ 
of prohibition granted. 
(No. 2007-1571 — Submitted January 8, 2008 — Decided March 5, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 89090, 2007-Ohio-3771. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for a 
writ of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court judge from proceeding with 
the issues of child custody and parental rights in a case that began as an action for 
legal separation and is currently a contested divorce action.  Because the court of 
appeals erred in dismissing the complaint and the common pleas court judge 
patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying case, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ. 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Dr. David A. Rosen, and appellee Dr. Kathleen R. 
Rosen, married and had four children, three of whom are still minors.  From May 
1992 to December 2005, the Rosen family resided in Morgantown, Monongalia 
County, West Virginia. 
{¶ 3} On December 1, 2005, Kathleen moved from West Virginia to 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, with the Rosens’ two youngest children, who are twins.  
The Rosens’ other minor child never relocated to Ohio. 
{¶ 4} About four months later, on April 6, 2006, Kathleen filed a 
complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Division, for legal separation, financial support, and custody of the parties’ three 
minor children.  Kathleen later filed an amended complaint for divorce, spousal 
support, child support, attorney fees, allocation of parental rights and 
responsibilities, and further legal and equitable relief. 
{¶ 5} On April 27, 2006, David filed his own petition for divorce and a 
motion for an expedited hearing on the issue of custody in the Family Court of 
Monongalia County, West Virginia.  The West Virginia court determined that it 
had jurisdiction over the custody of the parties’ three minor children 
notwithstanding Kathleen’s previously filed Ohio action.  On appeal, a West 
Virginia circuit court affirmed the judgment of the family court. 
{¶ 6} In the Ohio case, appellee Judge James P. Celebrezze of the 
domestic relations court granted Kathleen’s motion for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction, denied David’s motion to dismiss all issues regarding parental rights 
in Kathleen’s action, and designated Kathleen as the temporary residential parent 
of all three of the parties’ minor children.  Judge Celebrezze found that “Ohio is 
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the minor children,” that 
“the evidence of the minor children’s present and future care is likely to be found 
in the State of Ohio and therefore the State of West Virginia is a[n] inconvenient 
forum for the determination of parental rights and responsibilities,” that Kathleen 
“and at least two of the three minor children have significant connection with the 
State of Ohio and substantial evidence exists in the State of Ohio with regard to 
the children’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships,” and that 
David “waived his rights under the Ohio [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act] by agreeing to the relocation of [Kathleen] and the minor 
children to the State of Ohio.”  The court of appeals dismissed for lack of a final 
appealable order David’s appeal from Judge Celebrezze’s denial of his motion to 
dismiss. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 7} In November 2006, David filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge 
Celebrezze from exercising jurisdiction over the issues of child custody and 
parental rights in the underlying case filed by Kathleen.  David named Judge 
Celebrezze and Kathleen as respondents in the prohibition action.  Judge 
Celebrezze and Kathleen filed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss David’s 
prohibition complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
David filed briefs in opposition. 
{¶ 8} In July 2007, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motions and 
dismissed David’s prohibition complaint. 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court upon David’s appeal as of right. 
Motions for Oral Argument 
{¶ 10} David and Kathleen both request oral argument.  Oral argument is 
not mandatory in this appeal as of right.  S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(1).  “Nevertheless, we 
have discretion to grant oral argument pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A), and in 
exercising this discretion, we consider whether the case involves a matter of great 
public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional 
issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals.”  State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. 
Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 11} This case does not involve either complex legal or factual issues, a 
substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals.  Moreover, 
notwithstanding the parties’ contentions that this case raises issues of first 
impression and great public importance, the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve 
the legal issues.  Cf. State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council 
v. Cleveland, 114 Ohio St.3d 183, 2007-Ohio-3831, 870 N.E.2d 1174, ¶ 44.  
Significantly, we have resolved comparable prohibition cases involving 
jurisdiction over child-custody issues without requiring oral argument.  State ex 
rel. Morenz v. Kerr, 104 Ohio St.3d 148, 2004-Ohio-6208, 818 N.E.2d 1162; 
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4 
State ex rel. Seaton v. Holmes, 100 Ohio St.3d 265, 2003-Ohio-5897, 798 N.E.2d 
375. 
{¶ 12} Therefore, we deny the motions for oral argument. 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Standard 
{¶ 13} David asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his 
complaint for a writ of prohibition for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.  The Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of David’s prohibition complaint 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted was appropriate if, 
after presuming the truth of all factual allegations of the complaint and making all 
reasonable inferences in David’s favor, it appeared beyond doubt that David could 
prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary writ of 
prohibition.  See State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler, 99 Ohio St.3d 402, 2003-Ohio-
4124, 792 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 8.  The court of appeals dismissed David’s complaint, 
concluding that the complaint had an improper caption and that Judge Celebrezze 
did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to determine custody in the 
underlying divorce case.  The propriety of these conclusions is next considered. 
Caption of Prohibition Complaint 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals determined that David’s prohibition 
complaint is defective because the complaint does not specify that it is brought on 
relation of the state.  The court of appeals relied on its opinion in Davis v. Ohio 
State Adult Parole Auth., Cuyahoga App. No. 88335, 2006-Ohio-5429, ¶ 7, in 
which it held that the “caption of a complaint in prohibition must reflect that the 
action is brought on relation of the state.”  Davis, in turn, cited Thomas v. 
McGinty, Cuyahoga App. No. 87051, 2005-Ohio-6481, ¶ 2, for this proposition.  
McGinty, which was an action in both prohibition and mandamus, cited Maloney 
v. Allen Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1962), 173 Ohio St. 226, 19 O.O.2d 45, 
181 N.E.2d 270, and Dunning v. Cleary (Jan. 11, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 
78763, 2001 WL 61077. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 15} Maloney and Dunning, however, were both mandamus cases that 
interpreted the statutory requirement that an “[a]pplication for the writ of 
mandamus must be by petition, in the name of the state on the relation of the 
person applying.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2731.04.  “If * * * a respondent in a 
mandamus action raises this R.C. 2731.04 defect and relators fail to seek leave to 
amend their complaint to comply with R.C. 2731.04, the mandamus action must 
be dismissed.”  Blankenship v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-Ohio-5596, 
817 N.E.2d 382, ¶ 36. 
{¶ 16} There is no comparable statutory requirement for prohibition cases, 
and we have not implied one.  Therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding that 
David’s prohibition complaint was defective and subject to dismissal because it 
was not captioned in the name of the state on his relation. 
Prohibition:  Jurisdiction Under the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals also determined that David’s complaint did 
not state a viable prohibition claim.  In order to be entitled to the requested writ of 
prohibition, David must establish that (1) Judge Celebrezze is about to exercise 
judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is not authorized by law, and (3) 
denying the writ will result in injury for which no adequate remedy exists in the 
ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Wellington v. Kobly, 112 Ohio St.3d 195, 
2006-Ohio-6571, 858 N.E.2d 798, ¶ 14.  It is uncontroverted that David 
established the first requirement because Judge Celebrezze has exercised and 
continues to exercise jurisdiction over the custody issues in Kathleen’s divorce 
case. 
{¶ 18} Regarding the remaining requirements, “[i]f a lower court patently 
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will 
issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the 
results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. 
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Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.  In those 
cases where jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, the requirement 
of the lack of an adequate remedy at law need not be proven, because the 
availability of alternate remedies like appeal is immaterial.  See State ex rel. 
Florence v. Zitter, 106 Ohio St.3d 87, 2005-Ohio-3804, 831 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 16, 
and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 19} David asserts that Judge Celebrezze patently and unambiguously 
lacks jurisdiction to determine child-custody issues in Kathleen’s case because of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 
{¶ 20} “To help resolve interstate custody disputes, the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (‘UCCJA’) was drafted in 1968 and adopted by Ohio in 
1977.”   Justis v. Justis (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 691 N.E.2d 264, citing 
former R.C. 3109.21 to 3109.37, 137 Ohio Laws, Part I, 359.  A purpose of the 
UCCJA was “to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other 
jurisdictions” in custody matters.  In re Palmer (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 194, 196, 
12 OBR 259, 465 N.E.2d 1312.  This purpose, however, was defeated by 
departures from the original text of the UCCJA in many states and by inconsistent 
decisions by state courts during about 30 years of litigation.  See Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Prefatory Note (1997), 9 Uniform 
Laws Ann. 649, 650. 
{¶ 21} To 
rectify 
this 
problem, 
the 
National 
Conference 
of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) in 1997 to replace the UCCJA.  
Prefatory Note, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 649, 650; Watson v. Watson (2006), 272 
Neb. 647, 651, 724 N.W.2d 24.  “The most significant change[] the UCCJEA 
makes to the UCCJA is giving jurisdictional priority and exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction to the home state.”  Annotation, Construction and Operation of 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (2002), 100 A.L.R.5th 
January Term, 2008 
7 
1, 20, Section 2[b].  The UCCJEA “eliminates a determination of ‘best interests’ 
of a child from the original jurisdictional inquiry.”  Stephens v. Fourth Judicial 
Dist. Court (2006), 331 Mont. 40, 2006 MT 21, 128 P.3d 1026, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 22} Since the conference’s adoption of the UCCJEA, over 40 states, 
including Ohio and West Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia and the 
Virgin Islands, have repealed their versions of the UCCJA and adopted the 
UCCJEA.  See Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 9 Uniform 
Laws Ann. (Supp.2007) 90-91.  In Ohio, the UCCJEA is codified in R.C. Chapter 
3127. 
{¶ 23} R.C. 3127.15(A) specifies the following jurisdictional grounds for 
an Ohio court to make an initial determination in a child-custody proceeding: 
{¶ 24} “Except as otherwise provided in section 3127.18 of the Revised 
Code, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination in a 
child custody proceeding only if one of the following applies: 
{¶ 25} “(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six 
months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from 
this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. 
{¶ 26} “(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under 
division (A)(1) of this section or a court of the home state of the child has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that this state is the more appropriate 
forum under section 3127.21 or 3127.22 of the Revised Code, or a similar statute 
of the other state, and both of the following are the case: 
{¶ 27} “(a) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one 
parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state 
other than mere physical presence. 
{¶ 28} “(b) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the 
child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 29} “(3) All courts having jurisdiction under division (A)(1) or (2) of 
this section have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this 
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under 
section 3127.21 or 3127.22 of the Revised Code or a similar statute enacted by 
another state. 
{¶ 30} “(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the 
criteria specified in division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.” 
{¶ 31} Thus, the UCCJEA, as codified in Ohio, provides four types of 
initial child-custody jurisdiction:  home-state jurisdiction, significant-connection 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction because of declination of jurisdiction, and default 
jurisdiction.  R.C. 3127.15(A)(1) through (4).  “ ‘Home state’ means the state in 
which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six 
consecutive months immediately preceding the commencement of a child custody 
proceeding * * *.”  R.C. 3127.01(B)(7). 
{¶ 32} For purposes of R.C. 3127.15(A)(1), Ohio is not the home state of 
the Rosens’ minor children because it was not the home state of the minor 
children on the date of the commencement of Kathleen’s action or within six 
months before that date.  R.C. 3127.01(B)(7).  When Kathleen filed her complaint 
for legal separation, she and the Rosens’ two youngest minor children had lived 
only about four months in Ohio and had not lived at least six consecutive months 
in Ohio ending within the six-month period before she filed the case. The 
presence of Kathleen and two of the minor children for “almost six months is 
insufficient” to confer home-state jurisdiction on Ohio under the UCCJEA.  See 
Annotation, 100 A.L.R.5th at 15, Section 2[a], and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 33} Judge Celebrezze and the court of appeals, however, relied on their 
conclusion that West Virginia also lacks home-state jurisdiction in order to find 
that 
Ohio 
might 
have 
significant-connection 
jurisdiction 
under 
R.C. 
3127.151(A)(2) to determine the child-custody issue. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 34} To be sure, there appears to be contradictory language in the 
UCCJEA, as reflected in the Ohio and West Virginia statutes.  R.C. 
3127.15(A)(1) and W.Va.Code 48-20-201(a)(1) manifestly confer home-state 
jurisdiction on the state that either (1) “is the home state of the child on the date of 
the commencement of the proceeding” or (2) “was the home state of the child 
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, and the child is 
absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in 
this state.”  Yet R.C. 3127.01(B)(7) defines “home state” as “the state in which a 
child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive 
months immediately preceding the commencement of a child custody proceeding.”  
(Emphasis added.)  See also W.Va.Code 48-20-102(g), which contains a 
substantially similar definition of “home state.” 
{¶ 35} Judge Celebrezze argues that because West Virginia was not the 
home state of any of the minor children for six consecutive months immediately 
preceding the April 2006 commencement of David’s West Virginia divorce 
proceeding, he does not lack jurisdiction to proceed in Kathleen’s Ohio divorce 
case, based on significant-connection jurisdiction. 
{¶ 36} This argument, however, lacks merit.  In Stephens, 331 Mont. 40, 
2006 MT 21, 128 P.3d 1026, the Montana Supreme Court decided this issue in the 
context of a comparable prohibition case.  In that case, the parents and their minor 
children lived in Arkansas from 2002 until May 2005, when they moved to 
Montana.  Less than six months later, the father filed a dissolution action in 
Montana.  The Montana Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition to the 
mother to prevent the Montana dissolution action from proceeding because 
Arkansas was the home state of the minor children within six months before the 
filing of the case. 
{¶ 37} In so holding, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the argument 
relied on by Judge Celebrezze here: 
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10 
{¶ 38} “The drafters intended that the UCCJEA should be construed to 
promote one of its primary purposes of avoiding the jurisdictional competition 
and conflict that flows from hearings in competing states when each state 
substantively reviews subjective factors, such as ‘best interest,’ for purposes of 
determining initial jurisdiction.  We thus resolve any statutory conflict in the 
application of home state jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the UCCJEA’s 
intent of strengthening the certainty of home state jurisdiction. 
{¶ 39} “As a result, we held that ‘home state’ for purposes of determining 
initial jurisdiction under [the Montana UCCJEA] is not limited to the time period 
of ‘6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child 
custody proceeding.’  The applicable time period to determine ‘home state’ in 
such circumstances should be ‘within 6 months before the commencement of the 
[child custody] proceeding.’  [Montana UCCJEA.]  This interpretation promotes 
the priority of home state jurisdiction that the drafters of the UCCJEA specifically 
intended.  The interpretation posed by the District Court and [one of the parents] 
would result in narrowing home state jurisdiction.  It would increase the number 
of potentially conflicting jurisdictional disputes in competing jurisdictions.  This 
result conflicts with the UCCJEA’s purpose.”  Stephens, 331 Mont. 40, 2006 MT 
21, 128 P.3d 1026, ¶ 12-13. 
{¶ 40} Courts that have addressed this issue have reached a similar 
holding.  See, e.g., Welch-Doden v. Roberts (App.2002), 202 Ariz. 201, 42 P.3d 
1166, ¶ 33-36, and cases from Texas and New York cited therein (Oklahoma had 
home-state jurisdiction because it was the child’s home state within six months 
before the Oklahoma divorce case was filed); Lebejko v. Lebejko (2007), 42 
Conn.L.Rptr. 760, 2007 WL 824452, *5 (“when children move with a parent from 
a state with home state status to another state the former state does not lose its 
home state status if the other parent resides there until the children have lived in 
the new state for six months, at which point that state has acquired home state 
January Term, 2008 
11 
status”); Thomas v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs. (Ark.App.2005), 2005 WL 
768729, *3 (Illinois was the child’s home state under the Arkansas UCCJEA 
because “it was the child’s home state within six months before the 
commencement of the proceeding and the maternal grandparents, who acted as 
parents to the child, continue to live there”); cf. In re Adoption of Asente (2000), 
90 Ohio St.3d 91, 734 N.E.2d 1224 (court reaches similar holding in construing 
comparable, albeit differently worded, UCCJA provisions). 
{¶ 41} This interpretation of the pertinent UCCJEA provisions advances 
the primary purpose of the act ─ to avoid jurisdictional competition ─ and avoids 
rendering meaningless the provision conferring home-state jurisdiction on the 
state that was the home state within six months before the commencement of the 
child-custody proceeding.  See R.C. 3127.15(A)(1) and W.Va.Code 48-20-
201(a)(1); see also United Tel. Credit Union v. Roberts, 115 Ohio St.3d 464, 
2007-Ohio-5247, 875 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 10 (court construes statutes to avoid 
unreasonable or absurd results). 
{¶ 42} Similarly, West Virginia was the home state of David and 
Kathleen’s minor children because they had lived there for six consecutive 
months as of a date within the six-month period before David filed his West 
Virginia divorce action.  Therefore, West Virginia was the home state of the 
minor children “within six months before the commencement” of David’s West 
Virginia divorce case, i.e., they had lived in West Virginia for six consecutive 
months ending within the six months before the West Virginia case commenced.  
R.C. 3127.15(A)(1) and 3127.01(B)(7); see also W.Va.Code 48-20-201(a)(1).  
Consequently, significant-connection jurisdiction under R.C. 3127.15(A)(2) is 
inapplicable and provides no basis for an Ohio court to proceed. 
{¶ 43} Nor is this a case in which West Virginia has declined jurisdiction 
to determine the custody of the minor children or a case in which Ohio has default 
jurisdiction over the custody issue.  R.C. 3127.15(A)(3) and (4).  And there is no 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
contention or evidence that Ohio has temporary emergency jurisdiction over the 
minor children under R.C. 3127.18. 
{¶ 44} Therefore, Ohio lacks jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make the 
initial custody determination.  Despite appellees’ claims, this is not a mere error 
in the exercise of jurisdiction; it is a defect in the Ohio court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  See R.C. 3127.15(B) (“Division (A) of this section is the exclusive 
jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this 
state” [emphasis added]); Harshberger v. Harshberger (N.D.2006), 724 N.W.2d 
148, ¶ 15 (“the UCCJEA establishes the criteria for deciding which state’s courts 
have subject matter jurisdiction to make a child custody decision involving 
interstate custody disputes”); S.B. v. State Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs. (Alaska 
2002), 61 P.3d 6, 15, fn. 39 (UCCJEA provides “exclusive bases for assertion of 
subject matter jurisdiction to make initial custody determination”). 
{¶ 45} Judge Celebrezze’s contention that David waived any UCCJEA 
claim also lacks merit. 1  “Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of 
the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be 
challenged at any time.”  Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 
806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11.  Courts have thus held that UCCJEA claims cannot be 
waived.  See, e.g., In re A.C.S. (Tex.App.2004), 157 S.W.3d 9, 15 (“subject 
matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA cannot be waived”); In re Marriage of 
Pritchett (Colo.App.2003), 80 P.3d 918, 921 (parent did not waive UCCJEA 
jurisdictional objection); Foley v. Foley (2003), 156 N.C.App. 409, 411-412, 576 
                                                 
1.  Insofar as Kathleen raises this same argument and related claims in her February 8, 2008 
motion to dismiss, the motion lacks merit and is denied.  Moreover, we generally dismiss an 
appeal as of right only when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review the appeal, the 
appeal is barred by statute, or the appeal has been rendered moot.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Scruggs 
v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002-Ohio-5315, 776 N.E.2d 101; In re Bozsik, 114 Ohio St.3d 1473, 
2007-Ohio-3699, 870 N.E.2d 727; State ex rel. Gordon v. Murphy, 112 Ohio St.3d 329, 2006-
Ohio-6572, 859 N.E.2d 928.  None of these grounds applies here. 
January Term, 2008 
13 
S.E.2d 383 (trial court erred in ruling that parent signing consent order waived 
UCCJEA challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction of court). 
{¶ 46} Moreover, the mere fact that the Ohio court has basic statutory 
jurisdiction to determine custody matters in legal-separation and divorce cases, 
see, e.g., R.C. 3109.04(A), 3105.21(A), and 3105.011, does not preclude a more 
specific statute like R.C. 3127.15 from patently and unambiguously divesting the 
court of such jurisdiction.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Kaylor v. Bruening (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 142, 146, 684 N.E.2d 1228 (granting writ of prohibition after finding 
that while the court and judge had basic statutory jurisdiction, “R.C. 
3107.15(A)(1) patently and unambiguously divested them of jurisdiction to 
proceed on the biological mother’s motions relating to visitation following the 
adoption decree terminating the natural mother’s parental rights”). 
{¶ 47} In addition, notwithstanding Judge Celebrezze’s assertions, the fact 
that the Ohio case was filed before the West Virginia case did not prevent the 
West Virginia court from proceeding, because the Ohio court does not have 
“jurisdiction substantially in conformity” with the UCCJEA and therefore priority 
is irrelevant.  W.Va.Code 48-20-206 and R.C. 3127.20(A); see also Welch-Doden, 
202 Ariz. 201, 42 P.3d 1166, ¶ 47 (“Because Oklahoma had home state 
jurisdiction, Arizona did not have jurisdiction ‘substantially in conformity with 
this chapter’ ”). 
{¶ 48} Therefore, once the material factual allegations of David’s 
prohibition complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are construed most 
strongly in his favor, his complaint stated a viable prohibition claim based on the 
UCCJEA.  The court of appeals thus erred in granting appellees’ motion and 
dismissing the complaint. 
Plenary Authority 
{¶ 49} The court of appeals erred in dismissing David’s complaint for a 
writ of prohibition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
“Generally, reversal of a court of appeals’ erroneous dismissal of a complaint 
based upon failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted requires a 
remand to that court for further proceedings.”  State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163, 656 N.E.2d 1288.  “If the parties, however, are in 
agreement about the pertinent facts, we can exercise our plenary authority in 
extraordinary actions and address the merits.”  State ex rel. Cuyahoga Cty. v. 
State Personnel Bd. of Review (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 496, 500, 696 N.E.2d 1054. 
{¶ 50} Therefore, because the pertinent evidence here is uncontroverted 
and from that evidence David is entitled to the requested extraordinary relief 
because Judge Celebrezze patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to determine child custody, see R.C. 
3127.15(A)(1), no remand is necessary.  The parties are in agreement about the 
pertinent facts here.  Furthermore, although there seems at first to be some textual 
conflict within the UCCJEA between the “home state” definition and the initial-
custody provisions, the courts’ unanimous construction of these provisions to 
confer home-state jurisdiction on the state that was the home state within six 
months of the commencement of the child-custody proceeding, which is 
consistent with the purpose of the UCCJEA, makes the lack of jurisdiction of the 
Ohio court patent and unambiguous.  Notably, in Stephens, 331 Mont. 40, 2006 
MT 21, 128 P.3d 1026, ¶ 18, the Montana Supreme Court granted a writ of 
prohibition under similar circumstances (“In light of the tender ages of the minor 
children and the upheaval from having to return from their home state of 
Arkansas to participate in a judicial process that likely would be reversed on 
appeal, we determine that the granting of the Writ of Prohibition would be 
appropriate under these circumstances”).  Therefore, we grant a writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Celebrezze from proceeding with the issues of child 
custody and parental rights in the underlying case. 
Judgment reversed 
January Term, 2008 
15 
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
William T. Wuliger, for appellant. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Judge James P. 
Celebrezze. 
 
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., Jonathan A. Rich, Robert M. Fertel, and 
Andrew A. Zashin, for appellee Kathleen R. Rosen. 
______________________