Title: State ex rel. Schultz v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Schultz v. Indus. Comm., 96 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-3316.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SCHULTZ, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Schultz v. Indus. Comm., 96 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-
3316.] 
Workers’ compensation — Ability to do any work warrants a denial of 
permanent total disability compensation benefits — Claimant who 
performs sustained remunerable activity without pay demonstrates that 
he or she is capable of doing the same work for remuneration. 
(No. 2001-0001 — Submitted April 9, 2002 — Decided July 10, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-166. 
__________________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
{¶1} 
Appellant-claimant, Elizabeth B. Schultz, was injured in 1978 
while working for Southern Ohio Medical Center.  In 1986, she was awarded 
permanent total disability compensation (“PTD”) for those injuries.  At issue is 
claimant’s subsequent involvement with the S.S. Swim Shop and whether that 
involvement warranted termination of PTD. 
{¶2} 
In the mid 1980s, claimant’s daughter, Susan Hunter, owned a 
shop selling swimwear and aquatic equipment in Portsmouth, Ohio.  In a 1999 
report, an investigator for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) 
described claimant’s involvement in the business: 
{¶3} 
“[W]hen the business was first opened, Schultz [claimant] mostly 
watched the children of Hunter.  Hunter stated that Schultz was on the business 
account, paid bills, filled in on the schedule when Hunter could not work, and 
consulted with merchants.  Presently, Schultz waits on customers, pays bills, signs 
payroll, does the scheduling, and places orders.” 
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{¶4} 
Claimant made a similar statement to bureau investigators: 
{¶5} 
“When the store was opened, I paid the business bills, did payroll, 
consulted with merchants on swimwear, placed orders, and filled in on the 
schedule when others weren’t available.  The business checking account was set-
up with my name on it. 
{¶6} 
“Presently, I still do the same duties with the swim shop.  I usually 
go into the swim shop three days per week, usually from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.  
While up at the store, I wait on customers, keep the displays stocked, and 
continue with all of my previous duties of paying bills, consulting, payroll, 
ordering, and complete the scheduling. 
{¶7} 
“* * * 
{¶8} 
“I sometimes go to swimmeets [sic] and set up stands/displays and 
sell the swim gear.  We set up at local swimmeets and sometimes go to Dayton 
and Columbus, Ohio for meets.  Over the past several years, I would help the 
expansion of the business by making telephone calls to solicate [sic] business.” 
{¶9} 
Claimant made the following comments in a recorded conversation 
with an insurance adjuster after she filed an insurance claim for a 1998 fall while 
selling equipment at a YMCA swim meet: 
{¶10} “Q.. [Adjuster] [D]o you work outside the home? 
{¶11} “A. [Claimant] No.  All I do is I manage, uh, a swim shop for my 
daughter. 
{¶12} “* * * 
{¶13} “Q.  Okay.  Uhm, how many hours a week do you normally work? 
{¶14} “A.  Uh, usually, oh, sometimes, uh, 18-20 hours. 
{¶15} “* * * 
{¶16} “Q.  Okay.  Are you a member of the ‘Y’? 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶17} “A.  No. No.  I was in there, uh, doing a swim meet.  Uh, we come 
in and, uh,  service their swim meets.  We bring our suits in, anything pertaining 
to swimming we bring. 
{¶18} “Q.  Okay. 
{¶19} “A.  And we sell. 
{¶20} “Q.  How often do you frequent the ‘Y?’ 
{¶21} “A.  Well, usually twice a year.  I usually come in and suit up their 
team and then I usually do their meet for them. 
{¶22} “* * * 
{¶23} “Q.  Okay.  Do you recall, did you know any of them [the 
witnesses to her 1998 fall]? 
{¶24} “A.  Well, no.  But I, the girl that was with me, Joanne Phillips, 
that, you know, had come with me — 
{¶25} “Q.  Uh, huh. 
{¶26} “A.—to help me was there. 
{¶27} “Q.  [I]s Joanne a friend of yours? 
{¶28} “A.  Yes.  Uh, huh.  She works for me part time. 
{¶29} “* * * 
{¶30} “Q.  Okay.  [D]o you have any physical handicaps at all? 
{¶31} “A.  No. 
{¶32} “* * * 
{¶33} “Q.  Okay.  Did you walk with a cane, uh, prior to this past injury 
[at the YMCA]? 
{¶34} “A.  No.  No. 
{¶35} “* * *  
{¶36} “Q.  Okay.  Is there anything else that you can think of that you’d 
like to mention about this claim that we haven’t already discussed? 
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{¶37} “A.  No.  It just, it cost me quite a bit.  [I]t cost me my business 
cause I had to pay somebody to come in and work for me. 
{¶38} “* * * 
{¶39} “Q.  Uh, huh.  And how many hours do you pay someone to work 
for you? 
{¶40} “A.  Well, I had, well, I was off, you know, we were paying out 
like, you know, 30 and 40 hours * * * a week. 
{¶41} “* * * 
{¶42} “Q.  Okay.  And you still had the other employee in addition to 
hiring someone else to work? 
{¶43} “A.  No.  I have three girls that filled in for me that, you know, 
were able to, uh, you know, take care of the business while I was laid up. 
{¶44} “Q.  Okay. 
{¶45} “A.  Which I hadn’t planned on believe me. 
{¶46} “* * * 
{¶47} “Q.  Okay.  So then after you were injured you had three people 
working?  
{¶48} “A.  Yes.  Uh, huh. 
{¶49} “Q.  So actually you’d only hired one other person to —  
{¶50} “A.  That’s right. 
{¶51} “Q. — to work while you were off? 
{¶52} “A.  To help. Yeah.” 
{¶53} Other evidence obtained by the bureau included  (1) a business 
card for S.S. Swim Shop, with claimant’s name listed first, (2) surveillance videos 
of claimant behind the counter at S.S. Swim Shop, (3) a statement from a BWC 
investigator that he entered the store and purchased an item from claimant, who 
was the only person there, and (4) a business transaction journal from TYR Sport, 
Inc. that established claimant as a contact person for S.S. Swim Shop. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
{¶54} On October 5, 1999, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation moved 
appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio, to terminate PTD and declare an 
overpayment.  In a meticulous five-page order, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) 
granted the bureau’s motion.  Citing State ex rel. Smothers v. Mihm (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 566, 634 N.E.2d 1017, the SHO stated that PTD could be terminated if 
claimant is (1) engaged in sustained remunerative employment or (2) engaged in 
activities that, even if unpaid, were inconsistent with PTD receipt.  Lacking 
evidence of claimant’s receipt of wages for her services, the SHO relied on the 
second criterion. 
{¶55} Citing much of the evidence quoted above, the SHO rejected 
claimant’s assertion that her involvement with S.S. Swim Shop was minimal and 
that she only worked as an occasional “favor” to her daughter.  The SHO wrote: 
{¶56} “The SHO further finds an ongoing pattern of assistance to be 
work.  The SHO finds that the claimant was involved in the latter.” 
{¶57} And: 
{¶58} “[T]he SHO finds that the claimant was engaged in activity which 
is/was inconsistent with the receipt of [PTD].  While the claimant may have 
performed some favors for her daughter, the claimant’s pattern of work since 
1984 is of such duration and degree that she was an ongoing, active participant in 
the running of the swimp [sic] shop.  The claimant was working.” 
{¶59} Reconsideration was denied. 
{¶60} Having lost her bid for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County, claimant now appeals to this court as of right. 
{¶61} Permanent total disability is the inability to do any sustained 
remunerative work.  State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio 
St.3d 167, 170, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946.  Therefore, an ability to do any 
work warrants the denial of PTD.  Consequently, a claimant who performs 
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sustained remunerable activity without pay demonstrates that he or she is capable 
of doing that same work for remuneration. 
{¶62} That is the case here.  There is no evidence that claimant was paid 
for her efforts.  The commission instead focused on claimant’s activities without 
pay and concluded that claimant was capable of doing those same duties for pay, 
i.e., that she was capable of performing sustained remunerative employment. 
{¶63} Completing its analysis, the commission found, in effect, that 
claimant’s activities were sustained, not sporadic, in nature.  It rejected the notion 
that claimant’s involvement was limited to ‘intermittent favors,’ finding instead 
that claimant engaged in a “an ongoing pattern of assistance” — in other words, 
sustained activity. 
{¶64} Claimant proposes that PTD can never be terminated absent 
medical evidence of an ability to work.  That is untrue.  Medical evidence that 
supported the original award of PTD may be impeached by evidence other than 
medical evidence.  It can be impeached by subsequent evidence that claimant is 
actively doing work.  As the magistrate observed in the court of appeals, “When 
there is evidence that claimant is actually engaged in certain physical activities, it 
is not necessary to have an expert opinion that the claimant is capable of 
performing those activities.” 
{¶65} In conclusion, the commission has “some evidence” to support a 
finding that claimant is medically capable of sustained activity for which she 
could be remunerated.  Therefore, it did not abuse its discretion in terminating 
PTD and declaring an overpayment for periods in which compensation and 
inconsistent activity overlapped. 
{¶66} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2002 
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__________________ 
 
Angela D. Marinakis, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
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