Title: Friends of the Black River Forest v. Wis. Department of Natural Resources

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Friends of the Black River Forest and Claudia 
Bricks, 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
     v. 
Kohler Company, 
          Intervenor-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and 
Natural Resources Board, 
          Respondents-Respondents-Cross  
          Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 523, 950 N.W.2d 685 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 1, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan & Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Edward L. Stengel & Stephen E. Ehlke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAROFSKY, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the intervenor-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Deborah C. Tomczyk, Jessica Hutson Polakowski, Monica 
A. Mark, and Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Madison. There 
was an oral argument by Eric A. Shumsky.  
 
 
 
2 
For the respondents-respondents-cross-petitioners, there 
were briefs filed by Gabe Johnson-Karp, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney 
general. There was an oral argument by Gabe Johnson-Karp.  
 
For the petitioners-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Christa O. Westerberg, Leslie A. Freehil, Aaron G. Dumas and 
Pines Bach LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Christa O 
Westerberg.  
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Katie Nekola and Evan 
Feinauer for Clean Wisconsin, Inc.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 52 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP299 & 2019AP534 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV178 & 2018CV2301) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Friends of the Black River Forest and Claudia 
Bricks, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Kohler Company, 
 
          Intervenor-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and 
Natural Resources Board, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents-Cross  
 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAROFSKY, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Kohler Company (Kohler), 
the Natural Resources Board (the Board), and the Department of 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
2 
 
Natural Resources (the Department) seek review of a court of 
appeals decision1 reversing orders of the circuit court for 
Sheboygan and Dane Counties dismissing challenges by the Friends 
of the Black River Forest and Claudia Bricks (collectively, the 
Friends) to a land exchange between Kohler and the Department.2  
Kohler asserts the Friends do not have standing to challenge the 
Board's land swap decision under Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53 
(2017–18)3 because their alleged injuries satisfy neither the 
"injury-in-fact" nor the "zone of interests" elements of the 
two-part standing analysis, both of which must be satisfied in 
order to establish standing.  Kohler claims the court of appeals 
decision unlawfully expanded the zone, opening the door to 
challenges of any agency decision related to the management of 
state-owned lands.  The Department separately contends the 
Friends lack standing under the "zone of interests" prong. 
¶2 
We hold the Friends lack standing to challenge the 
land transfer decision.  We assume without deciding that the 
Friends allege sufficient injuries under the "injury-in-fact" 
element of the standing test.  While historically we have 
labeled the second prong of the test as a "zone of interests" 
                                                 
1 Friends of the Black River Forest v. DNR, Nos. 2019AP299 & 
2019AP534, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2020) 
(per curiam).  
2 The Honorable L. Edward Stengel, Sheboygan County Circuit 
Court, and the Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke, Dane County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
3 
 
inquiry 
in 
line 
with 
federal 
standing 
principles, 
this 
nomenclature has no basis in the text of Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 or 
227.534 and does not accurately describe the test we have 
consistently applied.  We ground our decision instead in our 
well-established 
formulation 
for 
standing 
to 
challenge 
administrative decisions, which requires the alleged injury to 
adversely affect "an interest which the law recognizes or seeks 
to regulate or protect."  Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 
Wis. 2d 499, 505, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988); see also Foley-
Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 2011 WI 
                                                 
4 Evidently dissatisfied with the outcome in this case, 
Justice 
Karofsky 
launches 
a 
diatribe 
against 
textualism.  
Dissent, ¶¶71-73.  Justice Karofsky mimics Justice Dallet's 
disparagement 
of 
textualism 
and 
the 
canons 
of 
statutory 
construction the approach employs as comprising "'a rhetorical 
smokescreen' obscuring a result-oriented analysis."  Id., ¶73; 
James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶23 n.12, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 
N.W.2d 350.  Like Justice Dallet, Justice Karofsky fundamentally 
"misunderstands how to interpret legal texts."  James, 397 
Wis. 2d 517, ¶23 n.12.  Justice Karofsky thinks textualism means 
judges "[j]ust read and apply the law as written.  Simple, 
right?"  Dissent, ¶72.  Justice Karofsky's conception of 
textualism is uninformed.  "[N]either written words nor the 
sounds that the written words represent have any inherent 
meaning.  Nothing but conventions and contexts cause a symbol or 
sound to convey a particular idea."  James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶23 
n.12 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts xxvii (2012)).  Textualism and the 
canons which guide its application "represent 'a generally 
agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal texts.'"  
Id. (quoting 
Scalia 
& 
Garner, 
supra, 
at 
xxvii).   
Justice Karofsky's "marginalization of their role flies in the 
face of centuries of jurisprudence and her proffered method of 
statutory interpretation falls on the fringes of acceptable 
approaches, far outside of the judicial mainstream."  Id.  
"'[L]egislators enact; judges interpret' and the canons simply 
'explain how [judges] should perform this task.'"  Id. (quoting 
Scalia & Garner, supra, at xxx). 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
4 
 
36, ¶55, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 797 N.W.2d 789 (lead opinion) ("[T]he 
question is whether the party's asserted injury is to an 
interest 
protected 
by 
a 
statutory 
or 
constitutional 
provision."); Fox v. DHSS, 112 Wis. 2d 514, 529, 334 N.W.2d 532 
(1983) 
("[T]he 
injury 
must 
be 
to 
a 
legally 
protected 
interest."). 
¶3 
The Friends alleged injuries resulting from the 
Board's 
land 
swap 
decision 
under 
several 
statutes 
and 
regulations, arguing the interests harmed fall within the zone 
of interests protected or regulated by these laws.  We disagree.  
None of the statutes or regulations cited protect any legally 
protected, recognized, or regulated interests of the Friends 
that would permit them to challenge the Board's decision as 
"person[s] aggrieved."  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals.      
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
The Land Swap Decision 
¶4 
Kohler-Andrae State Park (the Park), located on the 
Lake Michigan shoreline in Sheboygan County, borders private 
land owned by Kohler.  In 2014, Kohler revealed plans to build 
an 18-hole golf course, which has since become the subject of 
numerous lawsuits, including this one.5  In June 2017, the 
Department initiated a master planning process to consider 
                                                 
5 See Friends of the Black River Forest v. DNR, 2021 WI App 
54, 964 N.W.2d 342; Kohler Co. v. DNR, No. 2021AP1187 (Wis. Ct. 
App., Filed July 12, 2021); Friends of the Black River Forest v. 
DNR, No. 2019CV000080 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sheboygan Cnty., Filed Feb. 
8, 2019).  
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
5 
 
Kohler's request to use Park land for the proposed golf course.  
As part of this process, on February 16, 2018 the Department 
recommended a land exchange agreement with Kohler, seeking 
approvals from both the Board and the governor. 
¶5 
At its next meeting later that month and following 
public comment, the Board first determined that a 4.59-acre 
parcel of upland woodland within the Park was "not being used 
for any park functions" and was no longer needed for the state's 
use for conservation purposes and therefore removed it from Park 
boundaries.  The Board next approved an agreement between the 
Department and Kohler for a land exchange, under which the 
Department would transfer the 4.59 acres to Kohler, in addition 
to a 1.88-acre easement, in exchange for 9.5 acres of Kohler 
land——including upland woodland, crop land, and a building——
straddling the boundary of the Park.  Kohler planned to use the 
4.59 acres for a maintenance facility and parking area, and the 
easement for public access to the golf course.  The agreement 
required "[r]estrictions placed on the deed transferring title 
to Kohler" in order to "ensure that" the transferred land "is 
adequately landscaped and screened, that its use will not 
compromise park aesthetics, and that its proposed future use 
will be compatible with adjacent park uses." 
B. 
The Friends' Amended Petition and Circuit Court Proceedings 
¶6 
The Friends filed a Wis. Stat. ch. 227 petition in 
Sheboygan County Circuit Court seeking review of the Board's 
February 28, 2018 "vote to convey 4.89 acres of land within 
Kohler-Andrae State Park to Kohler Co., as well as a 1.88 acre 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
6 
 
easement."6  Kohler intervened and filed a motion to dismiss 
under Wis. Stat. § 227.56(3), arguing that the Friends were not 
an "aggrieved" party because, as relevant here, they failed to 
satisfy both the "injury in fact" and "zone of interest" prongs 
of the test for Chapter 227 standing.  The Friends filed an 
Amended Petition, identifying the following alleged injuries 
from the land exchange: 
24. Petitioners are aggrieved by the Respondents' 
decisions to approve the land transaction.  The 
Respondents' 
decision 
permanently 
eliminates 
Petitioners' opportunity to use land within Kohler 
Andrae State Park currently available to the public 
for recreation and enjoyment, which members of FBRF 
such as Ms. Felde and Ms. Bricks have used and enjoyed 
previously, and would continue to use and enjoy but 
for Respondents' decision. 
25. The 
Respondents' 
decision 
will 
also 
reduce 
habitat for and populations of plants, birds, and 
animals that are currently enjoyed by FBRF members 
such as Ms. Felde, as well as Ms. Bricks, harming 
their ability to observe wildlife and study nature in 
and around the park. 
26. The Respondents' decision will impact and reduce 
enjoyment of other resources used by FBRF members such 
as Ms. Felde, as well as Ms. Bricks, including areas 
of the park adjacent to the proposed road and 
maintenance facility.  Construction of Kohler Co.'s 
facility will harm the aesthetics of these adjacent 
                                                 
6 The Friends also filed a common law certiorari action in 
Dane County Circuit Court against the Board, challenging the 
same land swap decision.  Kohler and the Board moved to dismiss.  
The Dane County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint under Wis. 
Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)10.  This case was consolidated with the 
Sheboygan County case on appeal, and the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded the Dane County Circuit Court's decision, 
concluding it erred in dismissing the complaint.  Friends of the 
Black River Forest, Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534, at ¶3.   
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
7 
 
areas and impair Petitioners' use and enjoyment of the 
areas for recreation and conservation. 
27. FBRF and its members, including Ms. Felde and Ms. 
Bricks, will be affected by increased traffic and 
noise 
caused 
in 
and 
around 
the 
park 
by 
the 
Respondents' decision, as Kohler Co.'s project is 
constructed and operated. 
28. FBRF and its members, including Ms. Felde and Ms. 
Bricks, 
are 
also 
interested 
in 
the 
Respondents 
following required procedures for state park planning 
that ensure uses in the park are properly classified 
to avoid user conflicts and preserve recreational and 
scenic 
qualities, 
and 
are 
aggrieved 
by 
the 
Respondents' decision to follow procedures in this 
case. 
¶7 
The Sheboygan County Circuit Court determined the 
Friends lacked standing because the alleged injuries did not 
flow directly from the land swap decision and accordingly 
granted Kohler's motion to dismiss.  Reasoning that "[t]he land 
swap agreement does not clear the way for the immediate 
construction 
of 
the 
proposed 
golf 
course 
or 
any 
other 
structures," the circuit court concluded the Friends failed to 
meet the first element of the two-part test establishing that 
they were aggrieved because none of the alleged injuries were a 
direct consequence of the land transfer.  Consequently, the 
court did not address the "zone of interests" element of the 
standing analysis.  
C. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision 
¶8 
The court of appeals, in an unpublished, per curiam 
opinion, reversed and remanded the decision of the Sheboygan 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
and 
held 
that 
the 
Friends 
alleged 
sufficient injuries to satisfy standing under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
8 
 
§§ 227.52 and 227.53.  Friends of the Black River Forest v. DNR, 
Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534, unpublished slip op., ¶3 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 15, 2020) (per curiam).  That court determined the 
alleged 
injuries 
included 
"recreational, 
aesthetic, 
and 
conservational injuries caused by the land exchange."  Id., ¶17.  
Looking "beyond the land exchange to the sequence of events that 
has been set in motion," including Kohler's desired end result 
of the construction of the golf course, the court of appeals 
determined 
the 
Friends' 
alleged 
injuries 
were 
neither 
hypothetical 
nor 
conjectural, 
and 
had 
a 
close 
causal 
relationship 
"to 
a 
change 
in 
the 
physical 
environment 
precipitated by the land exchange," satisfying the first element 
of the standing inquiry.  Id., ¶¶19–27.  
¶9 
The court of appeals also concluded the Friends 
satisfied the "zone of interests" prong by alleging injuries to 
interests recognized by law, including Wis. Stat. §§ 23.11, 
23.15, 27.01(1), and Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 1 & 44.  Id., 
¶¶28–32.  Kohler petitioned for review, the Department cross-
petitioned, and we granted both petitions.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 "Whether a party has standing is a question of law 
that we review independently."  City of Mayville v. DOA, 2021 WI 
57, ¶15, 397 Wis. 2d 496, 960 N.W.2d 416 (citing Marx v. Morris, 
2019 WI 34, ¶21, 386 Wis. 2d 122, 925 N.W.2d 112).  In reviewing 
a motion to dismiss a petition seeking judicial review of an 
agency decision, we determine "whether a petition on its face 
states 'facts sufficient to show that the petitioner named 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
9 
 
therein 
is 
aggrieved . . . by 
the 
decision 
sought 
to 
be 
reviewed.'"  Wisconsin's Env't Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 
of Wis. (WED I), 69 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975). 
¶11 On review of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, 
the court must "take all facts alleged by [the petitioner] to be 
true in determining whether he has standing to bring his claim."  
McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶14 n.5, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 
N.W.2d 855 (citing Repetti v. Sysco Corp., 2007 WI App 49, ¶2, 
300 Wis. 2d 568, 730 N.W.2d 189).  In evaluating a Wis. Stat. 
ch. 227 motion to dismiss, we apply "the rules that the 
allegations of the petition are assumed to be true; that the 
allegations are entitled to a liberal construction in favor of 
the petitioner; and that this court is not concerned with the 
ability of the petitioner to prove the facts alleged at trial."  
WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 8–9. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶12 Because 
Wisconsin's 
current 
standing 
analysis 
is 
derived from federal standing principles, we begin there.  We 
then discuss the principles of standing under Wisconsin law, 
including the two prongs of the standing test in the context of 
a petition for judicial review under Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Next, 
we explain how the "zone of interests" prong represents an 
improper departure from Wisconsin standing principles and a 
misnomer in the context of our well-established test.  Finally, 
assuming without deciding that the Friends' injuries satisfy the 
"injury-in-fact" prong of the standing test, we conclude none of 
the statutes or regulations cited by the Friends "recognize[] or 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
10 
 
seek[] to regulate or protect" the Friends' asserted interests.  
Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 505.  Accordingly, for purposes of 
standing, the Friends fail to establish they are "person[s] 
aggrieved" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 227.52, 
227.53(1), and 227.01(9), whose "substantial interests are 
adversely affected by a determination of" the Board. 
A. 
Federal Standing Principles  
¶13 In federal court, "[t]here are two concepts of 
standing."  See, e.g., MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet 
City, 505 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2007).  "There is Article III 
standing, 
which 
requires 
just 
an 
injury 
in 
fact, 
and 
'prudential' standing, a more complex, judge-made concept of 
standing. . . .  This doctrine precludes the federal courts from 
exercising jurisdiction over some types of case[s] that Article 
III would not forbid the courts to adjudicate."  Id. at 744–45.    
Under the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" 
identified by federal courts, a plaintiff "must have suffered or 
be imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized 
'injury in fact' that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a 
favorable judicial decision."  Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125 (2014) (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see 
also Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 
1302 (2017).  This standing threshold arises from Article III, 
which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" or 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
11 
 
"controversies."  McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 n.6 (quoting U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).     
¶14 Apart from the "constitutional minimum" of an "injury 
in fact" that is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct 
and likely to be "redressed by a favorable decision," see 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997), "prudential 
standing" encompasses "judicially self-imposed limits on the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction . . . founded in concern about 
the proper——and properly limited——role of the courts in a 
democratic 
society[.]" 
 
Id. 
(quotations 
omitted). 
 
The 
"prudential standing" doctrine has traditionally included the 
"zone of interests" inquiry, which first appeared in Association 
of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
(1970) and its companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 
(1970).  See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162–63.  In Data Processing, 
the United States Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff 
challenging 
an 
administrative 
agency 
decision 
under 
the 
Administrative Procedure Act (the APA) must meet the two-pronged 
standing requirement, including suffering an "injury in fact" 
within the "zone of interests to be protected or regulated by 
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."7  397 U.S. 
at 153.   
                                                 
7 The statutory language of the APA, interpreted by Data 
Processing, provided, "A person suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof."  5. U.S.C.A. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. 
IV). 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
12 
 
¶15 The United States Supreme Court later clarified in 
Lexmark 
that 
the 
"zone 
of 
interests" 
inquiry 
is 
more 
appropriately understood as a question of whether a cause of 
action exists, rather than a matter of "prudential standing."  
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127.  As framed by Lexmark, this inquiry 
requires the Court to "determine, using traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred 
cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff's claim."  
Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 
U.S. 83, 97 & n.2 (1998); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 
388, 394–95 (1987); Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 
258, 288 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).  The 
Court elaborated: 
In 
sum, 
the 
question 
this 
case 
presents 
is 
whether . . . [the plaintiff] has a cause of action 
under the statute.  That question requires us to 
determine the meaning of the congressionally enacted 
provision creating a cause of action.  In doing so, we 
apply 
traditional 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  We do not ask whether in our judgment 
Congress should have authorized [the plaintiff's] 
suit, 
but 
whether 
Congress 
in 
fact 
did 
so. . . .  Thus, this case presents a straightforward 
question of statutory interpretation:  Does the cause 
of action in [the statute] extend to [the plaintiff]? 
Id. at 128-29.   
¶16 In the context of the APA, the Lexmark Court explained 
that the "lenient" zone-of-interests approach "is an appropriate 
means of preserving the flexibility of the APA's omnibus 
judicial-review provision, which permits suit for violations of 
numerous statutes of varying character that do not themselves 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
13 
 
include causes of action for judicial review."  Id. at 130.  
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized "that the breadth of the zone 
of interests varies according to the provisions of law at issue, 
so that what comes within the zone of interests of a statute for 
purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action 
under the 'generous review provisions' of the APA may not do so 
for other purposes."  Id. at 130 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 
163) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the Lexmark 
Court clarified that the zone of interests test "forecloses suit 
only when a plaintiff's 'interests are so marginally related to 
or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that 
it cannot reasonably be assumed that' Congress authorized that 
plaintiff to sue."  Id. (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band 
of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012)). 
B. 
Standing Principles in Wisconsin 
¶17 Federal law on standing is not binding in Wisconsin.  
Foley-Ciccantelli, 333 Wis. 2d 402, ¶46 n.23 (lead op.); see 
also id., ¶46 n.24 (citing WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 11; Metro 
Builders Ass'n of Greater Milwaukee v. Village of Germantown, 
2005 WI App 103, ¶13, 282 Wis. 2d 458, 698 N.W.2d 301) ("Federal 
standing terminology has been used in cases that do not involve 
constitutional challenges.").  Because our state constitution 
lacks 
the 
jurisdiction-limiting 
language 
of 
its 
federal 
counterpart, 
"standing 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
not 
a 
matter 
of 
jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy."  McConkey, 326 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (citing Zehetner v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 2004 WI 
App 80, ¶12, 272 Wis. 2d 628, 679 N.W.2d 919); see also Wis. 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
14 
 
Legis. v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶12, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 
(quoting Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶38, 327 
Wis. 2d 572, 
786 
N.W.2d 177 
(lead 
op.)). 
 
Nevertheless, 
Wisconsin has largely embraced federal standing requirements, 
and we "look to federal case law as persuasive authority 
regarding standing questions."  McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 n.7 
(citing WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 11).  
¶18 Although 
not 
constitutionally 
required, 
we 
have 
described our two-step standing approach as "conceptually 
similar to the analysis required by the federal rule."  WED I, 
69 Wis. 2d at 10.  As a matter of "sound judicial policy," 
McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15, typically our courts ask first 
"whether the decision of the agency directly causes injury to 
the interest of the petitioner" and second "whether the interest 
asserted is recognized by law."  WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 10.  We 
likened this approach to the federal two-pronged standing 
inquiry: "(1) Does the challenged action cause the petitioner 
injury in fact? and (2) is the interest allegedly injured 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated 
by 
the 
statute 
or 
constitutional 
guarantee 
in 
question?"  Id. (citing Data Processing Service, 397 U.S. at 
153); see also Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 509 ("[T]he Wisconsin 
standing analysis is conceptually similar to the federal 
analysis."); 
Cornwell 
Pers. 
Assocs., 
Ltd. 
v. 
DILHR, 
92 
Wis. 2d 53, 61, 284 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1979) ("The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court construed ['person aggrieved'] to impose a 
standing requirement similar to the federal rule in [WED I]."). 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
15 
 
¶19 We construe the law of standing "liberally, and 'even 
an injury to a trifling interest' may suffice."  McConkey, 326 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶15 (quoting Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 524); see also WED 
I, 69 Wis. 2d at 13 (citing Kubista v. State Annuity & Inv. Bd., 
257 Wis. 359, 43 N.W.2d 470 (1950)).  At the same time, "while 
standing is to be liberally construed, the claim asserted must 
be legally recognizable in Wisconsin jurisprudence."  Foley-
Ciccantelli, 333 Wis. 2d 402, ¶165 (Roggensack, J., concurring) 
(citing Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶22, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 
N.W.2d 517).   
¶20 In the context of judicial review of an administrative 
decision, standing is governed by Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 
227.53.  See WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 9; Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 
504.  "Both sections require a petitioner to 'show a direct 
effect 
on 
his 
legally 
protected 
interests.'" 
 
Fox, 
112 
Wis. 2d at 524 (quoting WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 9).  Section 227.52 
provides, in relevant part: 
Administrative decisions which adversely affect the 
substantial interests of any person, whether by action 
or inaction, whether affirmative or negative in form, 
are subject to review as provided in this chapter, 
except as otherwise provided by law and [certain 
exceptions.] 
§ 227.52.  Section 227.53(1) provides, as pertinent: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, any 
person aggrieved by a decision specified in s. 227.52 
shall be entitled to judicial review of the decision 
as provided in this chapter and subject to [certain] 
procedural requirements[.] 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
16 
 
§ 227.53(1).  Chapter 227 defines "[p]erson aggrieved" as "a 
person or agency whose substantial interests are adversely 
affected by a determination of an agency."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(9). 
¶21 In applying the first element of standing——"injury in 
fact"——we ask "whether the petition alleges injuries that are a 
direct result of the agency action."  WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 13.  
We have applied the federal standard, maintaining that an 
"[i]njury alleged, which is remote in time or which will only 
occur as an end result of a sequence of events set in motion by 
the agency action challenged, can be a sufficiently direct 
result of the agency's decision to serve as a basis for 
standing."  Id. at 14.  Nevertheless, the injuries must be 
neither 
hypothetical 
nor 
conjectural. 
 
Milwaukee 
Brewers 
Baseball Club v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 56, 65, 387 N.W.2d 245 
(1986).   
¶22 In cases alleging harm to the environment, "injuries 
'must show a direct causal relationship to a proposed change in 
the physical environment.'"  Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC v. DOR, 
2021 WI 26, ¶17 n.7, 396 Wis. 2d 69, 955 N.W.2d 793 (quoting 
Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 528).  In the environmental context, the 
"federal test [established in Data Processing Service, 397 U.S. 
at 153] has been viewed as a substantial liberalization of the 
standing requirements."  WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 10 (citing Kenneth 
Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
450 (1970); Donald W. Large, Is Anybody Listening? The Problem 
of Access in Environmental Litigation, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 62, 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
17 
 
94).  Since then, we have concluded that "allegations of injury 
to aesthetic, conservational, recreational, health and safety 
interests will confer standing so long as the injury is caused 
by a change in the physical environment."  Milwaukee Brewers, 
130 Wis. 2d at 65 (citing Metro. Edison v. People Against 
Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 771–73 (1983); Joseph v. Adams, 
467 F. Supp. 141, 156 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 
525).  "The question of whether the injury alleged will result 
from the agency action in fact is a question to be determined on 
the merits, not on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing."  
WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 14. 
¶23 Under 
what 
we 
have 
described 
as 
the 
"zone 
of 
interests" prong of the analysis, expressed in terms derived 
from federal standing cases——we ask whether "the injury is to an 
interest which the law recognizes or seeks to regulate or 
protect."  Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 505.  This inquiry 
requires us to "examine a specific statute to determine standing 
rather than consider all interests of the petitioner."  MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 164 Wis. 2d 489, 493, 476 
N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1991).  In WED I, we acknowledged the 
federal 
courts' 
"willingness 
to 
find 
that 
environmental 
interests are arguably within the zone of interest[s] protected 
by virtually any statute related to environmental matters."  WED 
I, 69 Wis. 2d at 10–11 (citing Env't Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 
428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. 
Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Citizens 
Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970)).  
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
18 
 
¶24 For example, federal courts have determined the 
National 
Environmental 
Protection 
Act 
(NEPA) 
provides 
an 
adequate basis "for standing to challenge an agency's failure to 
comply with its provisions."  WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 19 (citing 
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); W. Va. Highlands 
Conservancy, 441 F.2d at 232; Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 
(W.D. Wis. 1971)).  We have likewise concluded that the 
Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act (WEPA) "does, similar to 
NEPA, recognize an interest sufficient to give a person standing 
to question compliance with its conditions where it is alleged 
that the agency's action will harm the environment in the area 
where the person resides."8  Id.  
¶25 Having 
been 
adopted 
from 
federal 
jurisprudence 
interpreting the APA, the "zone of interests" terminology is 
                                                 
8 In 
our 
prior 
cases 
recognizing 
standing 
in 
the 
environmental context, the petitioners successfully sought to 
challenge the administrative decision at issue under WEPA.  See, 
e.g., Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC v. DOR, 2021 WI 26, ¶17 n.7, 396 
Wis. 2d 69, 955 N.W.2d 793 (concluding Applegate had standing to 
challenge DOR's decision not to prepare an environmental impact 
statement (EIS) because it alleged "an injury in fact to its 
legally 
protected 
conservational 
interest" 
under 
WEPA);  
Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 56, 70, 387 
N.W.2d 245 (1986) (determining petitioners alleged injuries 
sufficient to acquire standing under WEPA); Wisconsin's Env't 
Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis. (WED I), 69 Wis. 2d 1, 
19, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975) (holding that WEPA "recognize[s] an 
interest sufficient to give a person standing to question 
compliance with its conditions where it is alleged that the 
agency's action will harm the environment in the area where the 
person resides").  In this case, an environmental impact study 
was performed and the Friends have not asserted the Department 
made a negative-EIS decision nor have they brought any claim 
under WEPA.  
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
19 
 
untethered to the text of Wis. Stat. ch. 227 and obscures the 
standing test we have consistently applied in challenges to 
administrative decisions.  Chapter 227 authorizes persons who 
are "aggrieved" to seek judicial review of administrative 
decisions.  Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1).  A "person aggrieved" is 
defined as "a person or agency whose substantial interests are 
adversely affected by a determination of an agency."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(9).  Consistent with our longstanding application of 
this test for standing purposes, the adversely affected interest 
must be protected, recognized, or regulated by law.  The 
determination of whether a statute protects, recognizes, or 
regulates the asserted interest is a purely statutory inquiry, 
from which the judicially subjective consideration of the "zone 
of interests" is properly omitted.  This has been our consistent 
jurisprudential practice and we do not depart from it now. 
¶26 The statutory history of Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 
227.53 confirms the "zone of interests" language is grounded 
neither 
in 
the 
statutory 
text 
governing 
administrative 
challenges nor in our longstanding conception of standing.  
Prior to 1976, Wis. Stat. ch. 227 had not defined "person 
aggrieved"; in the absence of a statutory definition, we applied 
the definition articulated in Greenfield v. Joint County School 
Comm., under which an "aggrieved party" meant "one having an 
interest recognized by law in the subject matter which is 
injuriously affected by the judgment."  See Pasch v. DOR, 58 
Wis. 2d 346, 357, 206 N.W.2d 157 (1973) (quoting Greenfield, 271 
Wis. 442, 447, 73 N.W.2d 580 (1955)).  The WED I court relied on 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
20 
 
Greenfield's definition of "a person aggrieved."  WED I, 69 
Wis. 2d at 9–10 (quoting Greenfield, 271 Wis. at 447).  The 
court explained:    
We have held that a person must be "aggrieved" and 
"directly affected" by the agency decision, and also 
that the decision must "directly affect the legal 
rights, duties or privileges" of the person seeking 
review.  [Sections] 227.15 and 227.16 do not, however, 
create separate and independent criteria.  It is clear 
that both sections essentially require the petitioner 
to show a direct effect on his legally protected 
interests.9   
Id. at 9.  At the same time, WED I improperly framed its inquiry 
in terms of the federal "zone of interests" test, with no 
support in the text of Chapter 227 or our prior enunciation of 
standing principles.10 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. §§ 227.15 and 227.16 were the precursors to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53.  The statutes were renumbered 
in 1986.  See 1985 Wis. Act 182, §§ 35, 37.  
10 Even though it described the Wisconsin standing test as 
similar to the federal "zone of interests" test, WED I seemingly 
adhered to the "legally protected interest" test by asking 
"whether the interest asserted is recognized by law."  WED I, 69 
Wis. 2d at 14.  The WED I court concluded, "WED's members, who 
are customers in the area affected by the PSC's order in this 
case, have a sufficient interest under the cited sections of ch. 
196, Stats., in the future adequacy of their service, and that 
WED has standing, if the facts alleged in the petition are true, 
to 
challenge 
the 
PSC's 
failure 
to 
consider 
conservation 
alternatives to the proposed priority system."  Id. at 17.  WED 
I partly based its determination on the "express recognition of 
the protective purposes of the law," as determined by Wisconsin 
P. & L. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 45 Wis. 2d 253, 259, 172 
N.W.2d 639 (1969).  Id. at 16.  At the same time, WED I 
recognized standing under WEPA, which it stated "recognize[s] an 
interest sufficient to give a person standing to question 
compliance with its conditions where it is alleged that the 
agency's action will harm the environment in the area where the 
person resides."  Id. at 19.  We have consistently recognized 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
21 
 
 
¶27 In 1976, the legislature made a number of relevant 
amendments to Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  See Chapter 414, Laws of 
1975.  First, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 227.15 so 
that administrative decisions formerly required to "directly 
affect the legal rights, duties or privileges," now must 
"adversely affect the substantial interests of any person" to be 
subject to judicial review.11  § 19, ch. 414, Laws of 1975.  
Second, 
the 
legislature 
removed 
"directly 
affected" 
from 
§ 227.16(1), 
rewording 
the 
statute 
to 
allow 
"any 
person 
aggrieved by a decision specified in s. 227.15" to "be entitled 
to judicial review thereof[.]"12  § 20, ch. 414, Laws of 1975.  
Third, the legislature defined "person aggrieved" to "include[] 
                                                                                                                                                             
broad environmental interests under WEPA for standing purposes.  
See supra, ¶24 n.8.  The petitioners have not brought such a 
claim in this case. 
11 The previous language provided, as relevant: 
227.15 
Judicial 
review; 
orders 
reviewable.  
Administrative decisions, which directly affect the 
legal rights, duties or privileges of any person, 
whether affirmative or negative in form, . . . shall 
be subject to judicial review as provided in this 
chapter[.] 
Wis. Stat. § 227.15 (1973–74). 
12 The previous language provided, as relevant: 
227.16 Parties and proceedings for review. (1) Except 
as otherwise specifically provided by law, any person 
aggrieved by a decision specified in s. 227.15 and 
directly 
affected 
thereby 
shall 
be 
entitled 
to 
judicial review thereof as provided in this chapter. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.16(1) (1973–74). 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
22 
 
any person or agency whose substantial interests are adversely 
affected by a determination of an agency."  § 5, ch. 414, Laws 
of 1975.  For purposes of standing, our subsequent cases have 
not treated these statutory changes as either abrogating our 
longstanding requirement that an alleged injury must be "to an 
interest which the law recognizes or seeks to regulate or 
protect," nor endorsing the "zone of interests" formulation 
described in WED I.  Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 504–05; see 
also Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 65 ("[T]he Petitioner 
must show that the alleged injury is an injury to a legally 
protected interest."); Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 529 ("[T]he injury 
must be to a legally protected interest.").  
¶28 We conclude the "zone of interests" nomenclature WED I 
superimposed on Wisconsin's test for standing has no basis in 
the text of Wis. Stat. ch. 227, which limits judicial review to 
any "person or agency whose substantial interests are adversely 
affected by a determination of an agency."  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.01(9), 227.52, 227.53(1).  The "zone of interests" test 
risks an improper judicial overextension of our well-established 
standing requirement that a person aggrieved by an agency 
decision must allege an injury "to an interest which the law 
recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect."  Waste Mgmt., 144 
Wis. 2d at 505.  As substantively reflected in many of our prior 
decisions, this inquiry centers on a textually-driven analysis 
of the language of the specific statute cited by the petitioner 
as the source of its claim to determine whether that statute 
"recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect" the interest 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
23 
 
advanced by the petitioner.13  Id. at 505, 508; see also Air 
Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 
U.S. 517, 529 (1991) ("[T]he relevant statute [under the APA] of 
course, is the statute whose violation is the gravamen of the 
complaint." (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 886)).    
¶29 In WED I, this court misguidedly described this prong 
of the standing test——citing an administrative law treatise as 
sole authority for the proposition——as follows:  "The only 
                                                 
13 This textually-driven analysis means the language of the 
cited statutes drives the inquiry into whether the injured 
interest is "protected, recognized, or regulated" by the law.  
See Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 508.  Despite accepting and 
ostensibly applying this test, which it frames as "a 'statutory 
question,'" the dissent misconstrues our application of this 
"decades-old 
framework" 
as 
"prejudging 
the 
merits" 
and 
"conflating standing with statutory interpretation."  
See 
dissent, ¶¶53, 59, 67 (citing Moustakis v. DOJ, 2016 WI 42, ¶3 
n.2, 
368 
Wis. 2d 677, 
880 
N.W.2d 142). 
 
The 
dissent’s 
irreconcilable dual critique confuses the law of standing in 
administrative cases.  On the one hand, the dissent says it 
accepts and applies our precedent that directs us to engage in 
statutory interpretation.  Id., ¶¶75, 82 (citing State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶46, 48–49, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  On the other hand, the dissent 
also suggests that statutory interpretation is an improper 
component of standing.  Id., ¶67 (citing Moustakis, 368 
Wis. 2d 677, ¶3 n.2).  The dissent may believe the statutes on 
which the Friends base their claims "protect[], recognize[], or 
regulate[]" their injured interests just as the dissent believes 
substantive criteria are not required, but positing the inquiry 
itself is somehow improper would overturn the entirety of our 
Wis. Stat. ch. 227 cases with a single footnote from a case 
having nothing to do with Chapter 227.  See Moustakis, 368 
Wis. 2d 677, ¶3 n.2.  Notably, the dissent does not attempt to 
develop this point because its analysis in fact adheres to the 
longstanding legal requirement that we analyze the statutes 
cited by petitioners to determine whether they "recognize[], 
protect[], or regulate[]" the Friends' injured interests.  
Dissent, ¶77 (citing Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 505). 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
24 
 
problems about standing should be what interests deserve 
protection against injury, and what should be enough to 
constitute 
an 
injury. 
 
Whether 
interests 
deserve 
legal 
protection 
depends 
upon 
whether 
they 
are 
sufficiently 
significant and whether good policy calls for protecting them or 
for denying them protection."  See WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 13 
(quoting 
Kenneth 
Culp 
Davis, 
Administrative 
Law 
Treatise 
§ 22.00–4, at 722 (1970 Supp.)).  In expressing standing in 
Chapter 227 cases in terms of what "should be" and what 
constitutes "good policy," this court cloaked itself with 
legislative powers rather than adhering to its judicial duty to 
say what the law is and not what the court may wish it to be.  
If the "zone of interests" test comprises the WED court's 
formulation of it, this court would be compelled to reject it.  
However, in subsequent cases, this court grounded the inquiry in 
the text of the statutes or regulations cited, rather than in 
judicial notions of what "should be" or what may constitute 
"good policy." 
¶30 While Wisconsin cases frequently reference the "zone 
of interests" test, they rarely apply it in the manner described 
by WED I.  See, e.g., Foley-Ciccantelli, 333 Wis. 2d 402, ¶56 
(lead op.) (explaining that the phrase "legally protectable 
interest" "is used in the case law to mean 'an interest within 
the zone of interests protected by a statute or constitution'").  
While discarding this anachronistic misnomer, we retain our 
well-established 
standing 
test. 
 
Although 
the 
dissent 
characterizes this clarification as a "twist[]" that "creat[es] 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
25 
 
additional barriers to judicial review,"14 removing the "zone of 
interests" label leaves the test's substance intact: "the 
injury" must be "to an interest which the law recognizes or 
seeks to regulate or protect."15  Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 
505.       
¶31 In Waste Mgmt., this court framed "the issue presented 
for our review" as "the statutory question of whether, under 
secs. 227.15 and 227.16(1)" the statute to which the petitioner 
pointed as the source of its protected interests "operates to 
grant standing."  Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).  In that case, 
the court explained Wisconsin's "zone of interests" test asks 
whether "the injury is to an interest which the law recognizes 
or seeks to regulate or protect."  Id. at 505.  Properly absent 
from the analysis were any considerations of whether the 
asserted interests "deserve" legal protection; instead, the 
court tailored the test to whether the law actually affords the 
asserted interest legal protection.  See also Applegate-Bader 
Farm, 396 Wis. 2d 69, ¶17 n.7 ("A party has standing to 
                                                 
14 Dissent, ¶89. 
15 The dissent claims no party asked us to "overhaul" the 
zone of interests limitation, and that "[d]eciding this issue, 
when no one asked us to do so, both deprives our deliberations 
of analysis refined in the fires of adversarial litigation and 
unfairly surprises the parties."  Dissent, ¶57.  This overblown 
assertion overlooks decades of precedent demonstrating that the 
"zone of interests" label does not accurately reflect the test 
we have consistently applied and apply no differently in this 
case.  Our conclusion seeks not to avoid the "fires of 
adversarial litigation" but to extinguish any last embers of a 
fire that has long since died out. 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
26 
 
challenge an administrative decision when 'the decision of an 
agency directly causes injury to the interest of the petitioner' 
and if the 'interest asserted is recognized by law."); Milwaukee 
Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 65 ("In addition to showing a direct 
injury" requiring petitioner to "show that the alleged injury is 
an injury to a legally protected interest" rather than within a 
"zone of interests"); Fox, 112 Wis. 2d at 529 (phrasing the 
second prong of the standing test as "the injury must be to a 
legally protected interest" and making no mention of a "zone of 
interests" test).  Recognizing that the second prong of the 
standing test requires the allegedly adversely affected interest 
to be one protected, recognized, or regulated by an identified 
law, we next consider whether the interests asserted by the 
Friends satisfy this element of standing. 
C. 
The Statutes Cited Do Not Protect or Regulate the Friends' 
Asserted Interests 
¶32 The 
Friends 
allege 
five 
aesthetic, 
recreational, 
conservational, and procedural injuries arising from the land-
swap decision.16  We assume without deciding the Friends' alleged 
injuries satisfy the first prong of the standing analysis.  
                                                 
16 The dissent hyperbolically concludes the Department will 
have "the unfettered right to redraw all state park boundaries" 
and "not a single Wisconsin citizen . . . could challenge that 
conduct in court."  Dissent, ¶89.  Nothing in our opinion 
supports such a bewildering misconception.  Our standing review 
in this case is limited by the Friends' Amended Petition 
challenging the "decision to convey" the property to Kohler, 
under the statutes identified by the Friends.  See id., ¶77.  
The dissent premises its entire analysis on a basic misreading 
of the Friends' claims.  See infra, ¶45 n.21.     
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
27 
 
Standing to challenge an agency decision under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.52 and 227.53 also requires the Friends to identify a 
statute protecting or regulating the interests they allege were 
injured by the decision.  While the Friends cite several 
statutes and regulations to support their standing argument, 
none of them protect or regulate their asserted interests.   
1. 
Wisconsin Stat. §§ 27.01, 23.11 & 23.15 
¶33 The Friends first point to Wis. Stat. § 27.01(1),17 
which describes the purpose of the state parks system.  The 
statute declares it is "the policy of the legislature to 
acquire, improve, preserve and administer a system of areas to 
be known as the state parks of Wisconsin.  The purpose of the 
state parks is to provide areas for public recreation and for 
public education in conservation and nature study."  § 27.01(1).  
Such a statutory statement of purpose, however, "does not 
provide for an independent, enforceable claim, as it is not in 
                                                 
17 Section 27.01(1) provides in full: 
Purpose.  It is declared to be the policy of the 
legislature 
to 
acquire, 
improve, 
preserve 
and 
administer a system of areas to be known as the state 
parks of Wisconsin. The purpose of the state parks is 
to provide areas for public recreation and for public 
education in conservation and nature study. An area 
may qualify as a state park by reason of its scenery, 
its 
plants 
and 
wildlife, 
or 
its 
historical, 
archaeological or geological interest. The department 
shall be responsible for the selection of a balanced 
system of state park areas and for the acquisition, 
development and administration of the state parks. No 
admission charge shall be made to any state park, 
except as provided in subs. (7) to (9). 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
28 
 
itself substantive."  Schilling v. Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 2005 
WI 17, ¶14, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W. 2d 623.  Merely expressing 
a statement of purpose, nothing in § 27.01(1) establishes the 
requisite "substantive criteria" by which petitioners could 
challenge the Department's or the governor's decisions impacting 
state parks.  Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of 
Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶21, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573.  
Lacking such substantive criteria, nothing in § 27.01 protects, 
recognizes, or regulates any person's interests or contemplates 
a challenge to the agency's decision to convey the land to 
Kohler.   
¶34 The Friends also assert Wis. Stat. § 23.1118 affords 
them standing, focusing on the following statutory language:  
"In addition to the powers and duties heretofore conferred and 
imposed upon said department by this chapter it shall have and 
take the general care, protection and supervision of all state 
                                                 
18 Section 23.11(1) provides in full: 
In addition to the powers and duties heretofore 
conferred and imposed upon said department by this 
chapter it shall have and take the general care, 
protection and supervision of all state parks, of all 
state fish hatcheries and lands used therewith, of all 
state forests, and of all lands owned by the state or 
in which it has any interests, except lands the care 
and supervision of which are vested in some other 
officer, body or board; and said department is granted 
such further powers as may be necessary or convenient 
to enable it to exercise the functions and perform the 
duties required of it by this chapter and by other 
provisions of law. But it may not perform any act upon 
state lands held for sale that will diminish their 
salable value. 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
29 
 
parks[.]"19  Similar to Wis. Stat. § 27.01, this statute lacks 
any "substantive criteria" by which petitioners could challenge 
the Board's decisions regarding state parks and nothing in the 
text protects, recognizes, or regulates any person's interest in 
state parks or contemplates a challenge to agency action related 
to state parks. 
¶35 The Friends' reliance on Wis. Stat. § 23.15 is 
likewise unavailing.  That statute provides for the sale of 
state-owned lands by the Board and includes a number of 
procedures by which the Board is to conduct such sales, 
including gubernatorial approval.  The statute provides, in 
part: 
The natural resources board may sell, at public or 
private sale, lands and structures owned by the state 
under the jurisdiction of the department of natural 
resources, . . . when 
the 
natural 
resources 
board 
determines that the lands are no longer necessary for 
the state's use for conservation purposes[.] 
§ 23.15(1).  The statute further requires the Board to "present 
to the governor a full and complete report of the lands to be 
sold, the reason for the sale, the price for which said lands 
should be sold together with an application for the sale of the 
                                                 
19 Although the Friends did not include Wis. Stat. § 23.11 
among the "Grounds for Review" in its Amended Petition for 
Judicial Review, the Friends did allege the Department "is 
responsible for the general care, protection and supervision of 
all state parks pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 23.11."  Because we 
review a motion to dismiss, we elect to apply a liberal 
construction of the Amended Petition in favor of the Friends and 
therefore consider § 23.11 as a basis for Friends' claims.  See 
WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 8.  
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
30 
 
same."  § 23.15(2).  The governor shall then investigate the 
sale 
"as 
the 
governor 
deems 
necessary" 
and 
"approve 
or 
disapprove such application."  Id. 
¶36 Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 23.15, including its other 
procedural requirements relating to land sales, empowers private 
parties alleging environmental injuries to challenge Board 
decisions under this land-management provision.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 23.15 contains no textual indication that this statute 
protects, recognizes, or regulates any individual's interests 
that might be injured by a decision to exchange state-owned land 
for privately-owned land, nor does it provide any standards by 
which to do so.  The Department cites Chenequa to support its 
contention that § 23.15 does not provide the Friends a legally 
protectable interest in the land exchange.  In Chenequa, the 
court of appeals concluded petitioners lacked standing under a 
similarly-worded statute——Wis. Stat. § 84.09(5)——to challenge a 
land sale authorized by the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
and approved by the governor.  Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶¶25–
26, 30.  We agree that Chenequa is on point. 
¶37 The 
statute 
at 
issue 
in 
Chenequa, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.09(5), outlined certain procedural requirements the DOT 
must follow in the sale of land, including presenting to the 
governor "a full and complete report of the property to be sold, 
the reason for the sale, and the minimum price for which the 
same should be sold, together with an application for the 
governor's approval of the sale."  Id., ¶4 n.2 (quoting 
§ 84.09(5)).  In order to sell the land, the DOT must have 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
31 
 
determined "that the property is no longer necessary for the 
state's use for highway purposes[.]"  Id. (quoting § 84.09(5)).  
This language mirrors the text of Wis. Stat. § 23.15(1) and (2), 
authorizing the Board to sell state land when it "determines 
that the lands are no longer necessary for the state's use for 
conservation purposes" and requiring the Board to "present to 
the governor a full and complete report of the lands to be 
sold[.]"  See § 23.15(1), (2).   
¶38 The court of appeals concluded in Chenequa that Wis. 
Stat. § 84.09(5) imposes "no substantive requirements governing 
the sale . . . on either DOT or the governor, other than DOT's 
obligation to determine that the property is no longer necessary 
for highway purposes[.]"  Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶25.  
Regarding the statute's lack of substantive or procedural 
criteria, the court explained: 
Other than the determination under the first point 
[that the property is no longer necessary for the 
state's use for highway purposes], there are no 
substantive criteria for determining what property to 
sell.  There are also no substantive criteria for 
determining whether to sell at a public or private 
sale or for determining to whom to make the sale.  The 
only procedures established in the statute for the 
sale . . . relate to the process between DOT and the 
governor . . . .   
There is nothing in Wis. Stat. § 84.09(5) that 
indicates this section was intended to establish 
procedures to protect persons or entities interested 
in purchasing state property.  The "full and complete 
report" is plainly for the governor's benefit, not the 
benefit of potential purchasers. 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
32 
 
Id., ¶¶21–22.  The court elaborated, "[t]here is nothing in 
§ 84.09(5) that suggests it is intended to ensure the public 
gets the highest price for the property, or that the sales be 
carried out in particular ways to benefit the public."  Id., 
¶25. 
 
Consequently, 
the 
court 
determined 
"neither 
the 
[petitioner's] interest as a potential purchaser of property for 
sale under Wis. Stat. § 84.09(5) nor the general public's 
interest in such sales are arguably within the zone of interests 
the statute is intended to protect."  Id., ¶26. 
 
¶39 Although the court of appeals in Chenequa referenced 
what the statute "intended," that decision was released less 
than one month after this court declared in Kalal "[i]t is 
the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver."  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶52, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Antonin Scalia, A Matter 
of Interpretation, at 17 (Princeton University Press, 1997)).  
In describing the pre-Kalal approach to ascertaining statutory 
meaning, 
this 
court 
explained 
"[t]he 
typical 
statutory 
interpretation case will declare that the purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of 
the legislature, but will proceed to recite principles of 
interpretation 
that 
are 
more 
readily associated 
with 
a 
determination of statutory meaning rather than legislative 
intent[.]"  Id., ¶43.  This description fits the court of 
appeals' opinion in Chenequa to a tee.  Chenequa's focus on the 
absence of textually-imposed procedures designed to protect 
interested 
persons 
or 
textually-imposed 
"substantive 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
33 
 
requirements" on the agency or the governor reflected an effort 
to ascertain statutory meaning, rather than an endeavor to 
divine the legislature's "intent."  Notwithstanding Chenequa's 
use of the "zone of interests" terminology, we affirm the 
soundness of the statutory interpretation applied in Chenequa.20 
¶40 Like the parallel land-sale statute in Chenequa, Wis. 
Stat. § 23.15 provides no substantive criteria governing the 
sale other than the Department's obligation to determine the 
lands are no longer necessary for the state's use for 
conservation purposes.  See § 23.15(1).  Similar to Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.09(5), nothing in § 23.15 "establish[es] procedures to 
protect persons or entities interested in" challenging land-sale 
decisions.  See Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶22.  Additionally, 
the statute's gubernatorial-approval provision does not confer 
upon or contemplate the authority of private citizens to veto 
the governor's land-sale decisions via Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  See 
§ 23.15(2).  Because the interests the Friends assert are not 
protected, recognized, or regulated under § 23.15, that statute 
cannot serve as a basis for conferring standing on the Friends 
under Chapter 227.  
                                                 
20 In Chenequa, the court of appeals addressed standing in 
the context of a declaratory judgment action, determining the 
"zone 
of 
interests" 
requirement 
in 
administrative 
agency 
challenges was "essentially equivalent" to the "logical nexus" 
requirement in declaratory judgment actions.  See Chenequa Land 
Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, ¶¶14–
16, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573.  We confine our review of 
the "zone of interests" terminology to the context of petitions 
filed under Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
34 
 
2. Wisconsin Admin. Code §§ NR 1.47 & 44.04 
¶41 In addition to the aforementioned statutes, the 
Friends cite "various provisions of Wis. Admin. Code chs. NR 1 
and 44, including §§ NR 1.47 and 44.04" as a basis for their 
claims.  For purposes of determining a petitioner's standing to 
challenge agency decisions, we apply the same analysis to the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code as we apply to statutes.  The 
rules the Friends cite, dealing with procedures for selling land 
and the master plan process, do not protect, recognize or 
regulate any interests of the petitioners sufficient for 
standing under Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53.   
¶42 Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 1.47, addressing the 
disposition of state park lands, provides that "[s]tate-owned 
lands within state park boundaries shall not be sold or 
otherwise disposed of."  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 1.47(1).  "State-
owned lands outside state park boundaries and not within any 
other department project which serve no project purpose may be 
sold when the natural resources board determines such lands are 
no longer necessary for the state's use for conservation 
purposes and then shall be disposed of only in accordance with 
the following priorities:  (a) Sale to or exchange with a local 
unit of government when required for a public use[,] (b) 
Exchange with others to consolidate state ownership within a 
park boundary[, and] (c) Sale to others."  § NR 1.47(2).  
Finally, "[r]estrictions may be imposed on lands disposed of to 
insure aesthetic park settings or compatible adjacent land 
uses."  § NR 1.47(3).   
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
35 
 
¶43 None of these procedural regulations contain any 
"substantive criteria" by which petitioners could challenge the 
Board's determination that "such lands are no longer necessary 
for 
the 
state's 
use 
for 
conservation 
purposes" 
or 
the 
Department's sale or exchange of land, whether within or beyond 
state park boundaries, or the discretionary selection of 
restrictions "to insure" either "aesthetic park settings or 
compatible adjacent land uses."  Nothing in the text of these 
regulations indicates they establish procedures designed to 
protect individuals or entities who may be interested in the 
lands.  In the absence of such standards or procedures, these 
regulations do not protect, recognize, or regulate the interests 
of private parties who may wish to challenge agency action under 
them.   
¶44 The Friends' argument regarding Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
44.04 as a source for its claims is not well-developed.  As well 
as we can discern, the Friends argue § NR 44.04(7) requires 
"[t]he public" to "be provided opportunities to participate 
throughout the planning process for a property," but the Friends 
do not allege denial of an opportunity to participate.  In their 
Amended Petition, the Friends allege the Department in 2017 
"initiated a master planning process under Wis. Admin. Code ch. 
NR 44 to consider Kohler Co.'s request to use state park land 
for the golf course" and that the Friends "testified and 
provided comments" at the Board's meeting in February 2018 
regarding the land exchange, which the Board approved "before 
the master planning process was complete."  Nowhere in the 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
36 
 
Amended Petition do the Friends assert they were denied 
"opportunities to participate throughout the planning process."   
¶45 The Friends additionally cite § NR 44.04(9), under 
which 
"only 
those 
management 
and 
development 
activities 
identified in the master plan may be pursued by the department."  
Nowhere in the Amended Petition, however, do the Friends assert 
the master plan did not include a transaction with Kohler 
involving state land; to the contrary, the Amended Petition 
specifically says: "In 2017, the DNR initiated a master planning 
process under Wis. Admin Code ch. NR 44 to consider Kohler Co.'s 
request to use state park land for the golf course."  Although 
in their brief the Friends later suggest the removal of land 
from the Park and its conveyance to Kohler required "being 
approved in the master plan under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
44.04(9)," 
nothing 
in 
that 
regulation 
imposes 
such 
a 
requirement.  Neither of these code provisions serve as a basis 
for the Friends' challenge to the Board's decision to exchange 
land with Kohler.21   
                                                 
21 The dissent points to a number of WEPA cases in support 
of the Friends' alleged procedural violations.  Dissent, ¶84 
n.21 (citing Applegate-Bader Farm, 396 Wis. 2d 69; Milwaukee 
Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d 56; WED I, 69 Wis. 2d 1).  Although the 
dissent asserts the Friends raise the kind of procedural 
violation which "routinely bestow[s] standing on any member of 
the public directly injured by a procedurally flawed agency 
action," the Friends did not in fact raise such a violation 
under WEPA.  Id., ¶84. 
No. 
2019AP299 & 2019AP534   
 
37 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶46 In clarifying that the "zone of interests" expression 
of standing has no basis in Wisconsin law, we retain our well-
established standing inquiry for challenges to administrative 
decisions.  In order for Wis. Stat. ch. 227 petitioners to 
satisfy the second standing element, they must identify a 
statute which protects, recognizes or regulates an interest the 
petitioners allege has been "adversely affected."  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.01(9), 227.52, 227.53(1).  Absent from this purely 
statutory analysis is any subjective judicial assessment of 
whether the asserted interest falls within a "zone of interests" 
under an identified statute.       
¶47 The Friends' Amended Petition identifies statutes and 
regulations they assert protect or regulate interests they 
allege have been injured.  None of the statutes the Friends 
cite, however, protects, recognizes or regulates their asserted 
interests.  Accordingly, the Friends lack standing to challenge 
the Board's decision to approve the exchange of land between the 
Department and Kohler. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2019AP227 & 2019AP534.bh 
 
1 
 
¶48 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority 
correctly concludes that the petitioners in this case do not 
have a right to judicial review of the land transfer decision.  
I join the opinion.  In refocusing the zone-of-interests 
analysis on whether an agency decision "adversely affect[s] the 
substantial interests of any person," the court rightly turns 
the analytical framework closer to the statutory text it 
implements.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  I write separately to 
highlight 
a 
potential 
issue 
implicit 
in 
the 
majority's 
discussion. 
¶49 In 1976, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. ch. 227, 
replacing "legal rights, duties or privileges" with "substantial 
interests."  § 19, ch. 414, Laws of 1975.  As the majority 
observes, our cases have largely applied an identical analytical 
framework both before and after the 1976 amendment.  We have not 
addressed whether the 1976 amendment modified the right to 
judicial review of administrative decisions.  A careful focus on 
the text of our laws, rather than incorporating federal caselaw, 
may require an alteration to this approach.  While the parties 
do not raise or develop these issues, today's decision is a good 
step toward aligning the inquiry with the statute, as we should.  
Therefore, I join the majority opinion and respectfully concur. 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
1 
¶50 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  The law plainly 
grants the Friends standing to seek judicial review of the 
Department of Natural Resource's (DNR) actions that the Friends 
allege were unlawful and harmful to its members.  Yet a majority 
of this court prefers to slam shut the courthouse doors and 
reworks the law to reach its desired result.  The majority 
reworks the law by distorting case law, conflating standing with 
the 
merits, 
and 
failing 
to 
engage 
in 
any 
meaningful 
interpretation of the legislative text.  In the end, the 
majority reinvents the limits on judicial review in a manner not 
otherwise found in the legislatively enacted text.  Because I 
would 
apply 
the 
law 
as 
the 
legislature 
wrote 
it——which 
guarantees harmed parties like the Friends their day in court——I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶51 This case implicates statutes and regulations related 
to DNR's management of state parks and DNR-owned lands.  These 
laws exist entirely for the sake of the public's interest in 
conserving, enjoying, and using Wisconsin's cherished natural 
resources.  These laws were precipitated by concerns that our 
state had done too little to protect this paramount interest.  
Having witnessed other states squander opportunities to protect 
their 
natural 
resources 
from 
"commercial 
vandalism" 
and 
exclusive "private ownership," in 1907 Wisconsin Governor James 
Davidson, at the direction of the legislature, convened the 
state park board.  See John Nolen, State Parks for Wisconsin 7-8 
(1909); § 1, ch. 495, Law of 1907.  That board eventually 
endorsed the recommendation of renowned landscape architect John 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
2 
Nolen to establish state parks open to the public's use and 
enjoyment.  As Nolen stated: 
The issue appears plain.  Is Wisconsin going to look 
upon its bay and lake shores, its rivers and bluffs, 
its dells, its inland lakes, its forests, as natural 
resources to be conserved and some portion at least 
acquired and held for the benefit of all the people——
both for present and future generations? 
Nolen, supra, at 38 (emphasis added).  Wisconsin answered by 
adopting 
a 
state 
park 
system 
for 
the 
benefit 
of 
all 
Wisconsinites——a system protected in part by the laws DNR 
allegedly violated. 
¶52 Members of the public need not sit idly by when a 
state agency may have transgressed the very laws designed to 
protect their interests.  Rather, the legislature has guaranteed 
that any person "whose substantial interests are adversely 
affected" by an agency decision may call upon the judiciary to 
be 
a 
check 
on 
executive 
decision-making. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 227.01(9) & 227.53(1); see State ex rel. First Nat. Bank of 
Wis. Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 82 Wis. 2d 529, 544 
n.10, 263 N.W.2d 196 (1978) ("[J]udicial review of the action of 
an administrative agency is one of the checks and balances to 
achieve a proper balance between government regulation and the 
protection of personal and property interests from arbitrary 
action.").  This right to judicial review is broad; our 
precedent recognizes only two narrow limits on it.  First, the 
challenged action must "adversely affect[]" the person, that is, 
it must "directly cause[]" the person's injury.  Waste Mgmt. of 
Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988) 
(quoting Wis.'s Env't Decade, Inc. v. PSC, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 230 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
3 
N.W.2d 243 (1975) (WED I)).  Second, the person's injured 
interest must be "recognized by law," meaning it must be one 
"which the law recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect."  Id. 
¶53 Applying 
this 
decades-old 
framework, 
the 
Friends 
brought a routine environmental injury case.  The Friends claim 
that DNR's grant of an easement through the Kohler-Andrae State 
Park and DNR's removal and subsequent transfer of lands from the 
Park 
injured 
its 
members' 
aesthetic, 
conservational, 
and 
recreational interests.  Moreover, the Friends contend DNR's 
injurious actions were procedurally and substantively unlawful.  
Procedurally, 
the 
Friends 
complain 
that 
DNR's 
actions 
contravened the Park's master plan because the agency failed to 
revise that plan as required by Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 44.  
Substantively, the Friends allege that the agency transferred 
the removed Park lands to private ownership without a lawful 
finding that the "lands are no longer necessary for the state's 
use for conservation purposes," as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 23.15(1) and Wis. Admin. Code § NR 1.47(2). 
¶54 Existing law entitles the Friends to judicial review 
of these claims.  Yet the majority opinion inexplicably and of 
its own accord rewrites the law to restrict the right to 
judicial review beyond that which the legislative text grants.  
The majority does this in two regards.  First, it purports to 
realign the "zone of interests" limitation on Wis. Stat. ch. 227 
standing with the relevant text.  But upon closer inspection, 
all the majority has done is rename the test "substantial 
interests" to mimic the statutory language without any regard 
for what the words "substantial interests" actually mean.  This 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
4 
entire relabeling exercise turns out to be a distraction from 
the majority's second, more serious rewrite of the law.  Subtly, 
the majority opinion injects its own additional "substantive 
criteria" limitation into law, which finds no home in the 
legislative text.  Compounding its errors, the majority then 
misapplies its newly minted limit on ch. 227 review, sowing more 
confusion into ch. 227 standing.  Collectively, the majority 
opinion's errors provide a prime example of how "textualism" can 
be manipulated to conceal a result-oriented legal analysis. 
A.  The Atextual "Zone of Interests" Test 
¶55 Let's start with a point of agreement.  This court's 
determination that a person's injured interest must fall within 
the relevant law's "zone of interests" is disconnected from the 
legislative text.  We first adopted the "zone of interests" 
limitation in 1975, styling it after the United States Supreme 
Court's 
contemporaneous 
interpretation 
of 
the 
federal 
Administrative Procedure Act.  See WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 10 
(citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 153 (1970) & Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)).  
But 
even 
in 
1975, 
the 
two 
statutes 
being 
interpreted 
meaningfully differed: 
 The state statute read: "any person aggrieved by a[n 
agency] decision . . . and directly affected thereby shall 
be entitled to judicial review thereof," Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.16 (1973-74); 
 The federal statute read: "A person suffering legal wrong 
because 
of 
agency 
action, 
or 
adversely 
affected 
or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
5 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof," 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (emphasis added). 
¶56 From the latter's underlined text, it is evident why 
the United States Supreme Court limited federal judicial review 
to only those injuries "arguably within the zone of interests to 
be protected or regulated by the [relevant] statute."  Ass'n of 
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.16 
contained no similar language which would justify this court's 
imposition of an identical limitation.  To this day, Wisconsin 
statutory law omits its federal counterpart's "within the 
meaning of a relevant statute" language, stating instead that 
any "person or agency whose substantial interests are adversely 
affected by a determination of an agency" "shall be entitled to 
judicial review of the decision."1  The only change in Wisconsin 
law since our 1975 decision relevant here is that the statute 
now includes the words "substantial interests." 
¶57 In short, I agree that the "zone of interests" 
limitation lacks a textual basis in the otherwise broad cause of 
action the Wisconsin legislature affords those affected by 
agency decisions; in the appropriate case, perhaps this court 
should revisit it.  Here, though, no party asks us to do so, 
making this case an inappropriate vehicle for such an overhaul.  
                                                 
1 This simplified formulation combines Wis. Stat. § 227.53 
("any person aggrieved by a decision specified in [§] 227.52 
shall be entitled to judicial review of the decision") and Wis. 
Stat. § 227.01(9)'s definition of a "person aggrieved" ("a 
person or agency whose substantial interests are adversely 
affected by a determination of an agency").  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.52 ("Administrative decisions which adversely affect the 
substantial interests of any person, whether by action or 
inaction, whether affirmative or negative in form, are subject 
to review . . . ."). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
6 
Deciding this issue, when no one asked us to do so, both 
deprives our deliberations of analysis refined in the fires of 
adversarial litigation and unfairly surprises the parties.  See, 
e.g., City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶68, 
302 Wis. 2d 599, 734 N.W.2d 428 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
concurring).  Still, the majority heedlessly marches forward. 
¶58 Though 
the 
majority 
opinion 
pays 
homage 
to 
a 
"textually-driven analysis,"2 its analysis is anything but based 
in the text.  Removing the atextual "zone of interests" 
limitation on Wis. Stat. ch. 227 standing should make judicial 
review easier to obtain.  But the majority manages to do the 
opposite by: (1) merely applying the same restrictive "zone of 
interests" test under a label only superficially matching the 
text; and (2) using the nominally textual critique of "zone of 
interests" as cover for the introduction of a new, more 
restrictive, 
and 
still 
atextual, 
"substantive 
criteria" 
limitation. 
B.  Same Test, New Name 
¶59 The majority opinion declares a textualist victory 
over the "zone of interests" test.  In reality, all it has done 
is relabel the existing test to create the illusion that it is 
consistent with the legislative text.  The majority claims it 
has eradicated the subjectivity supposedly present in WED I's 
articulation of the "zone of interests" test.  But the truth is 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., majority op., ¶28; id., ¶25 (complaining "the 
'zone of interests' terminology is untethered to the text"); 
id., ¶26 (proclaiming that "the 'zone of interests' language" is 
not 
"grounded . . . in 
the 
statutory 
text"); 
id., 
¶39 
(criticizing 
a 
"pre-Kalal 
approach" 
to 
statutory 
interpretation). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
7 
that as early as the 1980s this court has articulated the "zone 
of interests" test exactly the same way the majority opinion now 
asserts: a "statutory question" on whether the "nature of the 
statute" "recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect" the 
plaintiff's injured interest.  See Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d 
at 503-508.  The only change the majority opinion makes is 
renaming the test "substantial interests" rather than "zone of 
interests."3 
¶60 Simply renaming the test "substantial interests," 
however, fails to actually interpret what the words "substantial 
interests" mean.  Is "substantial interests" a legal term of 
art?  Or is this test the result of those two words' common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning?  The majority does not say.  
Yes, the majority opinion recites some statutory history, but 
its conclusory musing that those changes somehow do not 
"endorse[]" the "zone of interests" label while simultaneously 
not "abrogating" its substance is far from a true text-based 
analysis.4  See majority op., ¶27.  In sum, the majority opinion 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶12 & 30 (calling "zone of 
interests" a "misnomer"); id., ¶25 (claiming to change only "the 
'zone of interests' terminology" (emphasis added)); id., ¶¶2 
& 28 (concluding that the "'zone of interests' nomenclature" has 
"no basis in the text" (emphasis added)); id., ¶46 (purporting 
to clarify only "that the "zone of interests" expression of 
standing has no basis in Wisconsin law" (emphasis added)). 
4 Citation to three cases decided after the 1975 amendment 
that never even mention "substantial interests"——except in 
footnotes merely quoting the full statutory text——does not cure 
the dearth of a "textually-driven analysis."  Those cases 
expressly rely on WED I's pre-amendment interpretations without 
reservation or even acknowledging the statutory changes. 
 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
8 
maintains a judicial limitation on Wis. Stat. ch. 227 standing 
that 
remains 
unaddressed 
in 
light 
of 
the 
legislature's 
"substantial interest" language. 
C.  A Distraction from the New "Substantive Criteria" Limit 
¶61 The majority opinion's hollow label change only 
obscures the subtle insertion of another, more exacting atextual 
limitation——and the majority's prompt misapplication of that 
limitation.  According to the majority, standing to invoke 
judicial review now turns on whether the law underlying the 
claim 
both: 
(1) protects, 
recognizes, 
or 
regulates 
the 
petitioner's injured interest; and (2) contains "substantive 
criteria."  The problem with the new "substantive criteria" 
limitation is threefold.  First, it is based on a single court 
of appeals decision that neither cites any authority for this 
limitation nor supports how the majority opinion applies it 
here.  Second, the search for "substantive criteria" conflates 
standing with a prejudgment on the merits.  And finally, 
demanding "substantive criteria" forsakes the actual legislative 
text.  Such a condition overrides the substantive criteria and 
procedures that Wis. Stat. ch. 227 already provides, thus 
                                                                                                                                                             
A real analysis of "substantial interests" might mean that 
neither the "zone of interests" label nor its substance survive.  
The test (under whichever label) requires interpreting the law 
allegedly violated.  That makes sense under the federal "within 
the meaning of a relevant statute" language; it makes little 
sense 
in 
a 
statute 
lacking 
similar 
language. 
 
Perhaps 
Wisconsin's legislature crafted a broader judicial review 
provision to ensure a more robust judicial check on state 
agencies than the federal Congress deemed necessary.  Whatever 
the answer is, the majority opinion's label change simply puts 
spoiled milk into a new carton, which fails to address the 
problem. 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
9 
overruling the legislature's policy decision to grant broad 
standing to challenge agency decisions. 
1.  Chenequa 
¶62 The majority opinion draws its "substantive criteria" 
limitation from Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of 
Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573.  The 
majority's reliance on Chenequa is puzzling, however.  For one, 
the Chenequa court created the "substantive criteria" limitation 
out of whole cloth as it cites no case or statute for this 
limit.  See id., ¶¶21 & 25.  More confounding, though, the 
majority misapplies Chenequa's "substantive criteria" limit to 
reach a result contrary to the one Chenequa compels. 
¶63 To explain, Chenequa involved a prospective buyer, the 
Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. ("Chenequa"), displeased that 
the Department of Transportation (DOT) sold DOT-owned lands to a 
competing bidder.  Chenequa's challenge invoked Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.09(5), a statute containing a similar provision to one in 
Wis. Stat. § 23.15(1) at issue in this case.  Section 84.09(5) 
authorizes DOT to sell department-owned property when it 
"determines that the property is no longer necessary for the 
state's use for transportation purposes."  That language 
parallels the "no longer necessary for the state's use for 
conservation purposes" language in § 23.15(1).  See also Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 1.47(2). 
¶64 As a prospective buyer, Chenequa was not challenging 
the determination that the land was no longer necessary for the 
state's use; it needed the land sale to happen in order to 
purchase it.  Rather, Chenequa's challenge centered on how DOT 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
10 
selected the winning bidder——a matter unrelated to whether the 
land remained "necessary for the state's use for transportation 
purposes."  But § 84.09(5) was silent as to the substantive 
criteria by which DOT should select the winning bid.  As such, 
the court of appeals concluded that because "there are no 
substantive requirements governing the sale . . . other than 
DOT's obligation to determine that the property is no longer 
necessary for highway purposes," Chenequa lacked standing to 
seek judicial review of the bidding process.  Chenequa, 275 
Wis. 2d 533, ¶25 (emphasis added).  By using "other than," the 
Chenequa 
court 
held 
that 
the 
statute's 
only 
substantive 
criterion was the determination about the lands' necessity for a 
specified purpose.5  But because that determination was the only 
substantive criterion and Chenequa's bid-selection challenge did 
not implicate it, Chenequa lacked standing. 
¶65 From this holding, the majority opinion engages in a 
glaring non sequitur.  Like the Chenequa court, the majority 
recognizes that "§ 23.15 provides no substantive criteria 
governing the sale other than [DNR]'s obligation to determine 
the lands are no longer necessary for the state's use for 
conservation purposes."  Majority op., ¶40 (emphasis added).  
But 
then, 
without 
explanation 
or 
analysis, 
the 
majority 
concludes that despite the Friends' challenge directly invoking 
the 
substantive 
criterion 
in 
§ 23.15, 
the 
Friends' 
conservational interests "are not protected, recognized, or 
                                                 
5 Other than, Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdiction
ary.com/us/dictionary/english/other-than ("You use other than 
after a negative statement to say that the person, item, or 
thing that follows is the only exception to the statement."). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
11 
regulated under § 23.15, [and] that statute cannot serve as a 
basis for conferring standing on the Friends."  Id.  That simply 
does not follow. 
¶66 Under the most generous read, the majority opinion is 
falsely equating the Friends' interests with those of Chenequa.  
But the two petitioners raised different challenges.  Chenequa 
did not challenge DOT's determination that the land was no 
longer necessary for state purposes (because they wanted the 
sale to occur, just under different terms).  The Friends, by 
contrast, do not want the transfer to occur and directly 
challenge DNR's determination that the affected lands are no 
longer necessary for conservational purposes.  Therefore, 
applying Chenequa's "substantive criteria" holding actually 
leads to the opposite conclusion than the one the majority 
reaches. 
2.  Prejudging the merits at the standing stage 
¶67 A 
threshold 
standing 
determination 
decides 
only 
whether a petitioner is entitled to be heard by the court; 
"standing in no way depends on the merits of the p[etitioner]'s 
contention that particular conduct is illegal."  Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).  Indeed, as we explained in 
Moustakis v. DOJ, "[s]tanding and statutory interpretation are 
distinct and should not be conflated."  2016 WI 42, ¶3 n.2, 368 
Wis. 2d 677, 880 N.W.2d 142.  Yet the majority's new 
"substantive criteria" limitation appears to do just that——it 
conflates the Friends' standing with a prejudgment on the laws 
allegedly violated.  Thus, not only is the majority's new 
"substantive criteria" limit on judicial review unsupported by 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
12 
any precedent, it also runs counter to our case law by 
conflating standing with statutory interpretation. 
3.  No basis in the text 
¶68 More 
fundamentally, 
this 
"substantive 
criteria" 
limitation betrays the legislative text.  No provision in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 227 directs courts to seek out substantive criteria in 
the statute or regulation at issue.  In fact, such a directive 
conflicts with portions of ch. 227 that already provide the 
substantive 
lens 
for 
judicial 
review 
and 
the 
applicable 
procedures. 
¶69 Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57, 
a 
reviewing 
court 
substantively evaluates the agency decision for: 
 "a material error in procedure or a failure to follow 
prescribed procedure" that impaired "the fairness of the 
proceedings or the correctness of the action"; 
 an erroneous interpretation of applicable law; 
 "any finding of fact" on which the agency action depends 
"that is not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record" or was "determined without a hearing"; or 
 an exercise of discretion "outside the range of discretion 
delegated to the agency by law," "inconsistent with an 
agency rule, an officially stated agency policy or a prior 
agency practice, if deviation therefrom is not explained to 
the satisfaction of the court by the agency," "or is 
otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory 
provision." 
Critically, these provisions provide the 
only 
substantive 
criteria by which a court may review an agency's decision.  See 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
13 
§ 227.57 (limiting the scope of judicial review to these 
criteria).6  Chapter 227 likewise establishes comprehensive 
procedures 
for 
judicial 
review 
of 
agency 
decisions.  
See §§ 227.40-227.60. 
¶70 Despite ch. 227's existing substantive and procedural 
judicial-review provisions, the majority opinion denies the 
Friends 
standing 
in 
part 
because 
"nothing 
in 
§ 23.15 
'establish[es] 
procedures 
to 
protect 
persons 
or 
entities 
interested in' challenging land sale decisions."  Majority 
op., ¶40 (alteration in original) (quoting Chenequa, 275 13 
Wis. 2d 533, ¶22).  But never has this court held, and certainly 
no statute directs, that the only reviewable agency decisions 
are those that implicate substantive laws containing their own 
judicial-review criteria and procedures.  Such a rule forsakes 
the plain text of ch. 227.  That rule is also nonsensical:  Why 
would the right to judicial review depend on substantive 
statutes containing their own judicial-review criteria and 
procedures when those criteria and procedures already appear in 
a statutory chapter entirely dedicated to judicial review?  The 
majority 
opinion's 
newly 
crafted 
"substantive 
criteria" 
limitation is nothing short of the enactment of judicial policy 
at odds with legislative policy enshrined in the statutory text. 
                                                 
6 The Friends' challenge fits well within these criteria.  
For example, a court could adjudicate whether redrawing the 
Park's boundaries without amending the Park's master plan was 
"inconsistent with" or "otherwise in violation of" Wis. Admin. 
Code ch. NR 44.  So, too, could a court answer whether the 
factual finding that the disposed lands were "no longer 
necessary for the state's use for conservation purposes" lacked 
"support[] [from] substantial evidence in the record." 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
14 
D.  The Textualism Smokescreen 
¶71 Though the majority opinion seeks to style itself as a 
"textually-driven analysis," the above shows it actually gives 
little regard to the text.  This dissonance supplies a prime 
example of how the textualism descriptor and the objectivity it 
allegedly imparts can be used to conceal or distract from an 
otherwise result-orientated analysis. 
¶72 Broadly 
speaking, 
textualism 
is 
an 
approach 
to 
interpreting laws that focuses almost exclusively on the "plain 
meaning" of the statutory text.  See generally State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶38-52, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  That emphasis on the text 
generally disregards the enacting body's intent and the law's 
underlying purpose, to the extent either is not "ascertainable 
from the text and structure."  Id., ¶¶48-51.  The purported 
virtue 
of 
this 
approach 
is 
that 
it 
constrains 
judicial 
discretion by curbing any tendency to let policy preferences 
color legal interpretations under the guise of legislative 
"intent" or "purpose."7  Just read and apply the law as written.  
Simple, right? 
¶73 Unfortunately, that's not always the case.  Empirics 
and experience tell us that a textualist approach is as 
susceptible 
to 
a 
result-driven 
analysis 
as 
any 
of 
its 
alternatives.  That is because textualism invites the very 
                                                 
7 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17-18, 22, 
40-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law at xxviii (2012); see also John F. Manning, Justice 
Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 747 
(2017). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
15 
judicial discretion it claims to oust; it simply shifts that 
discretion to between the lines.  Which version of textualism is 
appropriate?8  Which words deserve attention?9  When do those 
words shift from "plain" to "ambiguous"?10  Which canons of legal 
                                                 
8 Multiple ideological "camps" of textualism have emerged 
that emphasize either formalism or flexibility.  See Tara Leigh 
Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 265, 279-90 (2020).  
The 
divergent 
textualist 
opinions 
in 
Bostock 
v. 
Clayton 
County, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), exposed the wide 
discretion a textualist Justice exercises in identifying the 
relevant "context"——semantic, social, or otherwise——in which she 
interprets the text.  See Grove, supra, at 279-90. 
9 Not only do the United States Supreme Court's recent cases 
reveal that courts have a wide "choice of context," they also 
face 
a 
"choice 
of 
text" 
dilemma 
that 
can 
be 
outcome 
determinative.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Victoria F. 
Nourse, Textual Gerrymandering, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1718, 1738-88 
(2021).  "[T]he number of 5-4 splits in cases involving textual 
method deployed by both sides," which regularly turn on the 
Justices' differing "choice of text," indicate that no singular 
"plain 
meaning" 
actually 
exist. 
 
See 
Victoria 
Nourse, 
Textualism 3.0, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 667, 669-84 (2019). 
10 "Language is often ambiguous; the distinction between 
'plain' and 'ambiguous' is in the eye of the beholder; and both 
words too often are conclusory labels a court pins on a statute, 
making its decision appear result-oriented."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶63, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) 
(footnotes 
omitted); 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Byers, 
2003 
WI 86, ¶¶45-56, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring). 
 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
16 
interpretation apply?11  Which canons carry the day when two 
different sets of canons compel separate outcomes?12  What 
happens when a single canon cuts in both directions?13  Judicial 
discretion abounds, yet rarely does the rationale for how a 
court exercises any of that discretion find its way on to the 
                                                 
11 The choice of canons is vast, with as much as 187 
different options from which to cherry pick.  See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 
Colum. L. Rev. 531, 536 (2013) (reviewing Scalia & Garner, supra 
note 6).  Moreover, not every Justice on this court agrees on 
which interpretive canons are actually "canon," which can lead 
to diverging results.  See, e.g., United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2021 
WI 44, ¶15 & n.9, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317.  Nor is there 
agreement on when these canons should apply in any given case.  
See State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶14, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 
N.W.2d 171; see also James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶¶76-83, 397 
Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (Dallet, J., dissenting). 
12 "[T]here is no canon for ranking or choosing between 
canons; the code lacks a key."  Richard A. Posner, The Federal 
Courts: Crisis and Reform 277 (1985).  More vexingly, some of 
the most common canons directly spar against one another.  See 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950); see also Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 Duke L.J. 909 (2016). 
13 Case in point, the recent James v. Heinrch decision cited 
the canon against surplusage as supporting the majority's end 
result, despite the fact that the same canon cut in the opposite 
direction.  See James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶81 (Dallet, J., 
dissenting).  The majority opinion never explained why it 
nevertheless applied this canon only for its conclusion. 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
17 
written page.  Far from unfailing objectivity,14 the textualist 
label can be "a rhetorical smokescreen" obscuring a result-
oriented analysis.15 
¶74 The metaphor of a smokescreen precisely captures the 
majority opinion.  The majority attempts to pass its analysis 
off as impartially applying the text.  But in reality the 
majority reaches a result unsupported by that text.  Here the 
majority perpetuates the "zone of interests" limitation on 
ch. 227 standing by changing only its label.  While this label 
change from "zone of interests" to "substantial interests" 
superficially aligns the same "zone of interests" test with the 
statutory text, the majority's analysis fails to actually 
address this test's substantive inconsistency with the text.  
Indeed, that whole exercise of arbitrarily grafting the same 
                                                 
14 The textualist's various canons are often disconnected 
from legislative realities, meaning a textualist analysis 
"actively 
shape[s]" 
legal 
texts 
rather 
than 
"passively 
reflect[s]" the enacting body's plain meaning.  See Abbe R. 
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, 
and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 961-64 (2013).  
Indeed, many of the canons require the court to indulge 
substantive 
presumptions 
that 
reflect 
value 
preferences, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
enacting 
body 
shares 
those 
presumptions or preferences.  See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice 
Scalia's Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation, 92 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 2053, 2071-72 (2017). 
15 Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two 
Formalisms, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 591, 640 (2021); see also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law As 
Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 77-78 (1994).  Indeed, 
textualism can, at times, function as "indirect purposive 
analysis [that] enables just as much judicial discretion as the 
purposivist interpretive tools that textualists decry——but under 
the guise of neutral, objective linguistic or canon-based 
analyses."  Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 Duke 
L.J. 1275, 1280 (2020). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
18 
test onto different text only distracts from the majority's 
subtle 
adoption 
of 
an 
additional, 
judicially 
crafted 
"substantive criteria" limitation that lacks any textual basis. 
¶75 Further 
exposing 
the 
majority's 
disregard 
for 
legislative text and this court's interpretive principles is the 
majority's application of the enhanced limitations on Wis. Stat. 
ch. 227 standing.  The majority opinion ignores critical context 
by interpreting each substantive law underlying the Friends' 
petition in isolation.  See majority op., ¶¶32–45.  This divide-
and-conquer approach to legal interpretation is wholly foreign 
to our interpretive principles.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶¶46, 48-49 (explaining that "statutory language is interpreted 
in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part 
of a whole"; "a plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a 
textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose"). 
¶76 Of course, none of this is to say that the text of 
statutes or regulations is inherently unreliable; every court 
must read the law's words to interpret the law's meaning.  But 
here, the majority is not engaging in an objective, text-driven 
analysis. 
 
Rather, 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
invocation 
of 
textualist principles attempts to hide an otherwise result-
driven opinion aimed at keeping the Friends out of the 
courtroom. 
II 
¶77 Turning next to the proper analysis in this case, I 
conclude the Friends have standing to challenge DNR's actions.  
Current law asks only two questions: (1) did the challenged 
actions "directly cause[]" the Friends' injuries; and (2) are 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
19 
those injured interests ones that the challenged law recognizes, 
protects, or regulates?16  See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d 
at 505.  The answer to both inquiries is a straightforward 
"yes." 
A.  Injury 
¶78 The Friends claim that DNR granted an easement through 
the Park, removed Park lands, and conveyed those lands to 
private ownership contrary to law.  It contends these unlawful 
acts injured its members' interests in: 
 continuing to enjoy and recreate in the removed portion of 
the 
Park——including 
camping, 
hiking, 
snowshoeing, 
and 
biking——as they have in the past; 
 observing and studying plants, birds, and animals whose 
habitats will become inaccessible or reduced due to the 
transfer of public land to private ownership; 
 the conservational value of the affected Park lands in 
preserving "the Black River, its wetlands, the forest, and 
the adjoining Lake Michigan as an ecological whole"; and 
 the aesthetics of the area adjacent to the affected Park 
lands.17 
                                                 
16 Though I question the continued validity of the second 
limitation in light of the yet-to-be interpreted "substantial 
interests" language, this issue has not been properly presented 
to the court and so I continue to apply the law as it currently 
stands.  See supra, ¶¶6-8. 
17 Because 
I 
ultimately 
deem 
these 
alleged 
injuries 
sufficient to establish standing, I do not address the Friends' 
other alleged injuries arising from a proposed golf course 
project near the Park and their nearby homes.  The link between 
DNR's actions here and the golf course's construction raise a 
more complex analysis than necessary to resolve this case.  See 
generally Wis.'s Env't Decade, Inc. v. PSC, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 
230 N.W.2d 243 (1975) (WED I). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
20 
Perhaps trifling to some, these alleged injuries to the members' 
"aesthetic, conservational and recreational interests ha[ve] 
been readily accepted as sufficient to confer standing."  
WED I, 69 Wis. 2d at 10; see also City of Mayville v. DOA, 2021 
WI 57, ¶18, 397 Wis. 2d 496, 960 N.W.2d 416 (instructing that 
"standing should be liberally construed" such that "even a 
trifling 
interest 
may 
be 
sufficient 
to 
confer 
standing" 
(citations omitted)).  Indeed, the persuasive federal authority 
on this point uniformly holds that so long as the allegations 
include regular interaction with the affected lands and concrete 
intentions to interact with them in the future,18 as opposed to a 
solitary prior use or "some day" intentions,19 then the 
environmental harm constitutes a direct injury.  See, e.g., 
Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 509 (identifying the federal 
administrative standing doctrine as "particularly persuasive"). 
¶79 The Friends' allegations raise concrete injuries to 
its members' ongoing aesthetic, conservational, and recreational 
interests in the affected Park lands.  Accordingly, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
18 See, 
e.g., 
Summers 
v. 
Earth 
Island 
Inst., 
555 
U.S. 488, 494 (2009); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2000); Sierra 
Club v. EPA, 939 F.3d 649, 664 (5th Cir. 2019); Sierra Club v. 
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 283 (4th Cir. 2018); 
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340–41 (9th 
Cir. 1995); Save Our Cmty. v. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1160–61 (5th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 883 
F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1989). 
19 See, 
e.g., 
Lujan 
v. 
Defs. 
of 
Wildlife, 
504 
U.S. 555, 563-64 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 
U.S. 871, 889 (1990). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
21 
consistent with long-settled precedent, the Friends allege 
sufficiently direct injuries to confer standing. 
B.  Protected, Recognized, or Regulated Interests 
¶80 The question then becomes whether the Friends' injured 
interests are "protected, recognized, or regulated" by the 
"nature of" the laws supposedly violated.  Id. at 508.  To make 
that 
determination, 
we 
employ 
our 
usual 
interpretative 
principles.  See Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condo. 
Ass'n, Inc., 2011 WI 36, ¶¶43-44, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 797 N.W.2d 
789; see also Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014).  Here, the Friends contend its 
members' interests are protected, recognized, or regulated by 
two categories of laws:  (1) the substantive protections in Wis. 
Stat. § 23.15(1) and Wis. Admin. Code § NR 1.47(2); and (2) the 
procedural protections in Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 44.  I address 
each in turn. 
1.  Substantive protections 
¶81 "State−owned lands within state park boundaries shall 
not be sold or otherwise disposed of."  Wis. Admin Code 
§ NR 1.47(1).  Needing to circumvent this restriction so it 
could transfer 4.59 acres of Park lands to private ownership, 
DNR cleverly redrew the Park's boundaries to remove those 4.59 
acres.  With the lands now outside state park boundaries, DNR 
faced only one additional hurdle——a determination that the 
removed lands were "no longer necessary for the state's use for 
conservation purposes."  See Wis. Stat. § 23.15(1); Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 1.47(2).  DNR made that determination, but the Friends 
dispute whether DNR did so lawfully. 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
22 
¶82 The 
required 
determination 
that 
the 
lands 
are 
unnecessary "for conservation purposes" repeated in § 23.15(1) 
and § NR 1.47(2) plainly protects, recognizes, and regulates the 
conservational interests of any member of the public.  Though 
these laws reference the "state's use," the mention simply 
recognizes that the state is the steward of the public's 
interests in state park lands.  That is especially clear when 
viewed in context.  The closely related Wis. Stat. § 27.01(1) 
declares it to be the legislative policy that such lands be 
conserved "to provide areas for public recreation and for public 
education in conservation and nature study" (emphases added).  
See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 (emphasizing the importance of 
"closely-related statutes" such as "explicit statements of 
legislative purpose").  The next subsection, § 27.01(2), then 
empowers DNR to carry out that legislative policy as the steward 
of park lands.  This all comports with the precipitating 
history, culminating in John Nolen's declaration that these 
invaluable lands should be conserved "for the benefit of all the 
people——both for present and future generations."20  Nolen, 
supra, at 38. 
¶83 Therefore, § 23.15(1) and § NR 1.47(2)'s conditioning 
the disposition of DNR-owned lands on a finding that the lands 
are no longer necessary for conservation purposes——read in the 
                                                 
20 Though the class of persons whom a law protects, 
recognizes, or regulates can be large——as is the case here——that 
does not mean anyone in that class may sue whenever the relevant 
agency acts.  The first prong still limits the judicial-review 
right to those class members adversely affected (directly 
injured) by the agency action.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.01(9); 
Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 424 
N.W.2d 685 (1988). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
23 
proper context of DNR's role as the public's steward over public 
lands——makes 
clear 
that 
this 
required 
finding 
protects, 
recognizes, and regulates the public's interest in conserving 
those lands for their recreational, educational, and aesthetic 
value.  Cf. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) (concluding that a statute 
authorizing discretionary land acquisition did, in context, 
nonetheless 
regulate 
the 
acquired 
land's 
use, 
such 
that 
"neighbors to the use . . . are reasonable——indeed, predictable—
—challengers" to the land's acquisition given how the new use 
would affect their "economic, environmental, or aesthetic" 
interests).  Accordingly, § 23.15(1) and § NR 1.47(2)'s concern 
for the Friends' aesthetic, conservational, and recreational 
interests confer standing to raise its substantive challenge. 
2.  Procedural rights 
¶84 "Procedural rights are special."  Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (cleaned up).  Because 
process matters, alleged procedural violations routinely bestow 
standing on any member of the public directly injured by a 
procedurally flawed agency action.  We see this most often with 
claimed violations of the procedural Wisconsin Environmental 
Policy Act (WEPA).21  Though no WEPA claim is raised here, the 
Friends do allege a qualifying procedural violation of the 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC v. DOR, 2021 
WI 26, 396 Wis. 2d 69, 955 N.W.2d 793; Milwaukee Brewers 
Baseball Club v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 56, 387 N.W.2d 245 (1986); 
WED I, 69 Wis. 2d 1.  In fact, a procedural violation confers 
standing even when an agency might ultimately reach the same 
decision after satisfying the missed procedural step.  See 
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517-18 (2007). 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
24 
analogous procedures required by Chapter NR 44 of the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code. 
¶85 Chapter NR 44 creates a process for the uniform 
management of park lands following a land classification system.  
See §§ NR 44.01, NR 44.05-44.07.  "A master plan establishes the 
authorized management and development on a property, and only 
those management and development activities identified in the 
master plan may be pursued by [DNR]."  § NR 44.04(9) (emphases 
added).  The master plan must include, among other things, a 
"general property description"; a "statement of general goals 
and objectives for management and use, and a description of how 
the property's statutory and other purposes and benefits will be 
realized"; and "management, acquisition, development and use 
plans, with appropriate maps showing the land management 
classifications."  § NR 44.04(9)(a).  This regulatory chapter 
also provides a process for revising a park's master plan.  The 
revision process demands that the affected public be given 
opportunities 
to 
participate, 
see 
§§ NR 
44.04(1)(a) 
& 44.04(7)(f), and requires careful study of the issues similar 
to (if not exactly) the environmental analysis required under 
WEPA, see § NR 44.04(8) (cross-referencing Wis. Stat. § 1.11 
(WEPA)).22 
¶86 Kohler sought to acquire Park land adjacent to its own 
property to construct a golf course.  Because a golf course was 
                                                 
22 Even when a full WEPA-style impact analysis is not 
needed, Wis. Admin. Code § NR 44.04(8)(c)3. still requires that 
a plan revision or amendment involve "[a] regional analysis 
addressing the economic, ecological and social conditions, 
opportunities and constraints associated with the property on a 
local and regional scale." 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
25 
apparently inconsistent with the Park's master plan, DNR 
initiated a process to alter it; DNR never finished that plan 
revision.  Therefore, following its removal and transfer of Park 
lands to Kohler, the master plan contained an inaccurate 
"general 
property 
description" 
and 
land 
management 
classifications inconsistent with the Park's new geographic 
footprint.  DNR also failed to study the environmental impact 
this change would have on the Park.  The Friends maintain all of 
this is unlawful.  See § NR 44.04(9) ("[O]nly those management 
and development activities identified in the master plan may be 
pursued by [DNR]" (emphases added)); § NR 44.04(8)(c)3. 
¶87 While a plan's substance internally guides DNR's 
management of park lands, the regulatory text makes clear that 
the process to adopt or alter the plan exists to protect the 
affected public.  The affected public explicitly includes 
"persons or groups who are affected by a master plan or project" 
and "persons with an interest in [DNR] management practices 
across a specific area or statewide."  § NR 44.04(1)(a).  Park 
neighbors and users like the Friends' members are such affected 
persons.  The law protects these affected parties by ensuring 
"public involvement"——a phrase repeated no less than 18 times 
throughout ch. NR 44——in the process, which may take a variety 
of forms.  With few exceptions not applicable here, effectuating 
public involvement in any master plan process is mandatory.  
§ NR 44.04(7)(f). 
¶88 The 
Friends' 
petition 
raises 
serious 
procedural 
questions regarding the lawfulness of DNR's redrawing of Park 
boundaries contrary to the master plan's property description or 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
26 
without sufficient environmental study.  Our job here is not to 
decide those procedural questions.  Instead, we face a very 
narrow question: do these procedures protect, recognize, or 
regulate the interests of the Park's neighbors and users?  The 
answer is clearly yes.  The Friends' members are the "[a]ffected 
or interested parties" for whom the law's mandatory public 
involvement processes are meant to protect.  As such, the 
Friends have standing to pursue this procedural challenge as 
well. 
III 
¶89 The majority opinion goes to great lengths to slam 
shut the courthouse doors on those who seek judicial review of 
agency decisions.  In creating additional barriers to judicial 
review, the majority twists the statutory text and bends our 
case law.  And what's the toll of this court substituting its 
policy judgment for that of the legislature?  Taken to its 
logical conclusion, the majority's new approach to Wis. Stat. 
ch. 227 standing grants DNR the unfettered right to redraw all 
state park boundaries.  In redrawing the boundaries, DNR will be 
able to remove, and then sell off, every last inch of this 
cherished land to private entities, and not a single Wisconsin 
citizen——for whom the parks exist——could challenge that conduct 
in court.  Not only is that result absurd, it betrays the broad 
cause of action the legislature endowed on citizens to challenge 
such lawless agency behavior in court.  We have upheld that 
right for many just like the Friends, and we should uphold that 
right 
here. 
 
Because 
four 
Justices 
rule 
otherwise, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
27 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
Nos.  2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk 
 
 
 
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