Title: Ex parte J. Christopher Murphy, as director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Christopher Battle and Greg Ogles, individually and as representatives of the classes of individualsdescribed herein v. J. Christopher Murphy, as director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 05/13/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1090699
_________________________
Ex parte J. Christopher Murphy, as director of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Christopher Battle and Greg Ogles, individually and
as representatives of the classes of individuals described
herein
v.
J. Christopher Murphy, as director of the Alabama Department
of Public Safety)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-08-900750)
PARKER, Justice.
1090699
Murphy is no longer director of the Department of Public
1
Safety.  He resigned as director in September 2010, while this
petition was pending.  See Rule 43(b), Ala. R. App. P.: "When
a public officer is a party to an appeal or other proceeding
in the appellate court in that officer's official capacity,
and during its pendency ... resigns ..., the action shall not
abate and the public officer's successor is automatically
substituted as a party."  The current director is Hugh B.
McCall.
2
J. Christopher Murphy, as then director of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety ("Murphy"),  petitioned this Court
1
for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court
to vacate its judgment denying Murphy's motion to dismiss
certain claims in the action against him based upon the
defense of sovereign immunity under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.
1901, also known as State immunity, and to enter an order
dismissing certain claims against him in this matter.  We
grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On July 21, 2008, Christopher Battle, individually and as
a representative of a class of individuals, sued the Alabama
Department of Public Safety ("the Department") and Mike
Coppage, the then director of the Department, requesting
declaratory relief and injunctive relief and alleging claims
of unjust enrichment and unlawful taking and seeking money
1090699
3
damages.  Battle purported to bring the action on behalf of
himself and all members of a class composed of people who had
allegedly been overcharged by the Department for renewed
drivers' licenses.
On February 13, 2009, an amended complaint was filed by
Battle and Greg Ogles, individually and as representatives of
two separate classes of individuals (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the respondents"), dismissing the Department
as a defendant and substituting J. Christopher Murphy for
Coppage as director of the Department.  The amended complaint
alleged that Battle had renewed his driver's license with the
Department in February 2005 and that he had been charged
$23.25 for doing so.  The amended complaint alleged that the
$23.25 charge by the Department was charged in violation of §§
32-6-4 and 32-6-6, Ala. Code 1975.  Section 32-6-4(b)
provides, in pertinent part:
"(b) For the purpose of defraying the cost of
issuing 
drivers' 
licenses 
or 
nondriver
identification cards with color photographs of the
licensee or nondriver thereon, except as provided in
Section 32-6-4.1, the Department of Public Safety,
Driver License Division, judge of probate, or
license commissioner shall collect for each license
or identification card the sum of twenty dollars
($20) for a four-year license or an identification
card, and the Department of Public Safety, Driver
1090699
4
License Division, judge of probate, or license
commissioner shall give the licensee a driver's
license or identification card."
Section 32-6-6 provides, in pertinent part:
"In addition to all current and existing fees, the
department may charge an additional fee to recover
the cost of producing and issuing photo drivers'
licenses and photo nondriver identification cards.
The fee may not exceed ten cents ($.10) over the
actual cost of producing and issuing the license or
card including the cost of materials, labor costs,
telecommunications costs, computer costs, postage,
and any other costs incurred in producing and
issuing a license or card."
The amended complaint also alleged that Ogles had, in late
June or early July 2004, been charged $18.00 by the Department
for obtaining a duplicate driver's license from the Department
and that said charge was in violation of §§ 32-6-6 and 32-6-
15, Ala. Code 1975.  The amended complaint purported to assert
claims on behalf of a class composed of people who had been
overcharged by the Department for duplicate drivers' licenses.
Section 32-6-15(a) provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) In the event any driver's license issued
under the provisions of this article is lost or
destroyed, the person to whom the same was issued
may upon payment of a fee of fifteen dollars ($15)
and upon furnishing proof to the Director of Public
Safety that the same has been lost or destroyed,
secure a duplicate. The second and subsequent
duplicates applied for will require the payment of
a fee of fifteen dollars ($15) and, upon furnishing
1090699
5
proof to the Director of Public Safety that his
previously held license or duplicate has been lost
or destroyed, secure another duplicate. Application
for such duplicate will be made to the Director of
Public Safety on forms provided by him. The fee
shall be collected by the director, paid into the
State Treasury and credited to the Highway Traffic
Safety Fund for the Department of Public Safety."
The amended complaint alleged that Murphy, as the then
director of the Department, had the authority to establish the
charges explained above and that the charges he established
were beyond those statutorily permissible as the result of
either a mistaken interpretation of the law or a willful
misapplication of the law.  The amended complaint requested
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and money damages under
claims of unjust enrichment and unlawful taking for the
alleged overages paid to the Department.
On August 22, 2008, Murphy filed a motion to dismiss the
respondents' action under Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
asserting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and under Rule 12(b)(6),
asserting that the respondents had failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.  On May 15, 2009, Murphy
filed a motion for a summary judgment.  On February 5, 2010,
the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and the
1090699
6
summary-judgment motion.  On February 26, 2010, Murphy filed
this petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court.
Standard of Review
"'Mandamus review is available when
the 
question 
presented 
is 
one 
of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
"'"'Mandamus is a drastic
and extraordinary writ, to be
issued only where there is (1) a
clear 
legal 
right 
in 
the
petitioner to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the
r e s p o n d e n t  
t o  
p e r f o r m ,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court.' Ex parte Integon Corp.,
672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).
The question of subject-matter
jurisdiction is reviewable by a
petition for a writ of mandamus.
Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775
So. 2d 805 (Ala. 2000)."
"'Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888
So. 2d 478, 480 (Ala. 2003) (emphasis
added). "When a party without standing
purports to commence an action, the trial
court 
acquires 
no 
subject-matter
jurisdiction." State v. Property at 2018
Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Ala.
1999). Under such a circumstance, the trial
court has "no alternative but to dismiss
the action." 740 So. 2d at 1029.'
"Ex parte Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 929 So. 2d
1007, 1010 (Ala. 2005)."
1090699
7
Ex parte Richardson, 957 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Ala. 2006).  We
note that "'[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion
for a summary judgment generally is not reviewable by a
petition for writ of mandamus, subject to certain narrow
exceptions, such as the issue of immunity.'" Drummond Co. v.
Alabama 
Dep't 
of 
Transp., 
937 
So. 
2d 
56, 
57 
(Ala.
2006)(quoting Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 931 n. 2
(Ala. 2003)).
Discussion
Initially, we note that this case involves the immunity
of the director of a State agency, in his official capacity,
against an action seeking money damages and injunctive relief.
The issue of immunity is a jurisdictional one.  "This
constitutionally guaranteed principle of sovereign immunity,
acting as a jurisdictional bar, precludes a court from
exercising 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
Without 
jurisdiction,
a court has no power to act and must dismiss the action."
Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 435
(2001).  Therefore, a court's failure to dismiss a case for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity may properly be addressed by a petition for
1090699
8
the writ of mandamus.  See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808, 810-11 (Ala.
2002).
In Alabama Department of Transportation v. Harbert
International, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2008), this Court
set forth the established principles of sovereign or State
immunity:
"[Article I,] Section 14[, Ala. Const. 1901,]
provides generally that the State of Alabama is
immune from suit: '[T]he State of Alabama shall
never be made a defendant in any court of law or
equity.' This constitutional provision 'has been
described as a "nearly impregnable" and "almost
invincible" "wall" that provides the State an
unwaivable, absolute immunity from suit in any
court.' Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d
1203, 1206 (Ala. 2006). Section 14 'specifically
prohibits the State from being made a party
defendant in any suit at law or in equity.'
Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 288
Ala. 
20, 
23, 
256 
So. 
2d 
281, 
283 
(1971).
Additionally, under § 14, State agencies are
'absolutely immune from suit.' Lyons v. River Road
Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 261 (Ala. 2003).
"Not only is the State immune from suit under §
14, but '[t]he State cannot be sued indirectly by
suing an officer in his or her official capacity
....' Lyons, 858 So. 2d at 261. 'Section 14
prohibits actions against state officers in their
official capacities when those actions are, in
effect, actions against the State.' Haley v. Barbour
County, 885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004). To
determine whether an action against a State officer
1090699
9
is, in fact, one against the State, this Court
considers
"'whether "a result favorable to the
plaintiff would directly affect a contract
or property right of the State," Mitchell
[v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 806 (Ala.
1992)], whether the defendant is simply a
"conduit" through which the plaintiff seeks
recovery of damages from the State, Barnes
v. Dale, 530 So. 2d 770, 784 (Ala. 1988),
and whether "a judgment against the officer
would directly affect the financial status
of the State treasury," Lyons [v. River
Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So. 2d [257] at
261 [(Ala. 2003)].'
"Haley, 885 So. 2d at 788. Additionally, '[i]n
determining whether an action against a state
officer is barred by § 14, the Court considers the
nature of the suit or the relief demanded, not the
character of the office of the person against whom
the suit is brought.' Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d
65, 67-68 (Ala. 1980).
"The immunity afforded State officers sued in
their 
official 
capacities, 
however, 
is 
not
unlimited:
"'[Section 14] immunity from suit does not
extend, in all instances, to officers of
the 
State 
acting 
in 
their 
official
capacity. Unzicker v. State, 346 So. 2d 931
(Ala. 1977). In limited circumstances the
writ of mandamus will lie to require action
of state officials. This is true where
discretion is exhausted and that which
remains to be done is a ministerial act.
See Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co.,
Inc., 353 So. 2d 779 (Ala. 1977); Tennessee
& Coosa R.R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371
(1860). Action may be enjoined if illegal,
1090699
10
fraudulent, unauthorized, done in bad faith
or under a mistaken interpretation of law.
Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery
Co., 280 Ala. 635, 197 So. 2d 428 (1967).
If judgment or discretion is abused, and
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, mandamus will lie to compel a
proper exercise thereof. The writ will not
lie to direct the manner of exercising
discretion and neither will it lie to
compel the performance of a duty in a
certain manner where the performance of
that duty rests upon an ascertainment of
facts, or the existence of conditions, to
be determined by an officer in his judgment
or discretion. See Barnes v. State, 274
Ala. 705, 151 So. 2d 619 (1963).'
"McDowell-Purcell, Inc. v. Bass, 370 So. 2d 942, 944
(Ala. 1979).
"Moreover, certain causes of action are not
barred by § 14:
"'"There are four general categories
of actions which in Aland v. Graham, 287
Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1971), we stated
do not come within the prohibition of § 14:
(1) 
actions 
brought 
to 
compel 
State
officials to perform their legal duties;
(2) 
actions 
brought 
to 
enjoin 
State
o f f i c i a l s  
f r o m  
e n f o r c i n g  
a n
unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel
State officials to perform ministerial
acts; and (4) actions brought under the
Declaratory Judgments Act ... seeking
construction 
of 
a 
statute 
and 
its
application in a given situation. 287 Ala.
at 229-230, 250 So. 2d 677. Other actions
which are not prohibited by § 14 are: (5)
valid inverse condemnation actions brought
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
1090699
11
representative capacity; and (6) actions
for injunction or damages brought against
State officials in their representative
capacity and individually where it was
alleged that they had acted fraudulently,
in bad faith, beyond their authority or in
a mistaken interpretation of law. Wallace
v. Board of Education of Montgomery County,
... 280 Ala. [635] at 639, 197 So. 2d 428
[(1967)]; Unzicker v. State, 346 So. 2d
931, 
933 
(Ala. 
1977); 
Engelhardt 
v.
Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 141 So. 2d 193
(1962)."'
"Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937 So.
2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006)(quoting Carter, 395 So. 2d at
68)(emphasis omitted). These actions are sometimes
referred to as 'exceptions' to § 14; however, in
actuality these actions are simply not considered to
be actions '"against the State" for § 14 purposes.'
Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142
(Ala. 
2002). 
This 
Court 
has 
qualified 
those
'exceptions,' noting that '"[a]n action is one
against the [S]tate when a favorable result for the
plaintiff would directly affect a contract or
property right of the State, or would result in the
plaintiff's recovery of money from the [S]tate."'
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d
867, 873 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Shoals Cmty. Coll. v.
Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995)) ...."
Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 839-40 (emphasis omitted).
Murphy argues that the respondents' action should be
dismissed because, he says, it is barred by the doctrine of
sovereign or State immunity.  Specifically, Murphy argues that
even though the respondents sued him in his official capacity
1090699
12
as director of the Department, the respondents' action is, at
least in part, an action seeking money damages against the
State and, thus, is barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.  Murphy concedes in his brief that counts I (styled
in the respondents' complaint as "Class Claim for Declaratory
Relief") and II (styled in the respondents' complaint as
"Class Claim for Injunctive Relief") of the respondents'
complaint are not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
to the extent that the respondents seek a declaratory judgment
for the purposes of obtaining prospective injunctive relief.
Therefore, Murphy is petitioning this Court for a writ of
mandamus 
concerning 
only 
counts 
III 
(styled 
in 
the
respondents' 
complaint 
as 
"Class 
Claim 
for 
Unjust
Enrichment/Disgorgement") and IV (styled in the respondents'
complaint as "Class Claim for Unlawful Taking") of the
respondents' complaint, which both seek money damages.
The respondents argue that their claims for money damages
are not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because,
they say, they fit within the exception to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity that "actions for ... damages brought
against State officials in their representative capacity and
1090699
13
individually where it was alleged that they had acted
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority or in a
mistaken interpretation of law," Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 840,
are not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and,
thus, an action asserting such claims is in actuality not an
action against the State.  The respondents contest that the
plain language of the "exception" should govern and that they
should be allowed to recover money damages against the State.
We disagree.
As set forth above, the "exceptions" to § 14 are
qualified by the general principle that "'[a]n action is one
against the [S]tate when a favorable result for the plaintiff
... would result in the plaintiff's recovery of money from the
[S]tate.'"  Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d
867, 873 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Shoals Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross,
674 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)(emphasis
omitted)); see also Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala.
2000) ("A complaint seeking money damages against a State
employee in his or her official capacity is considered a
complaint against the State, and such a complaint is barred by
Art. I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901.").  Further, this
1090699
14
Court has held that actions to recover money damages from the
State that seek to compel the payment of money the State is
not legally obligated to pay pursuant to a contract are
generally barred.  For example,
"[i]n Stark v. Troy State University, 514 So. 2d 46
(Ala. 1987), the plaintiff, an employee of a State
university, sued certain State officers employed by
the university, arguing that they had violated the
university's policies in underpaying him during a
prior academic year. He thus sought damages for back
pay. The defendants argued that the action was
barred by § 14. We stated:
"'Based on the foregoing, if the
individual defendants have not acted toward
the plaintiff in accordance with the rules
and regulations set by the university,
their acts are arbitrary and an action
seeking to compel them to perform their
legal duties will not be barred by the
sovereign immunity clause of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901; however, the action
for 
compensatory 
damages 
cannot 
be
maintained. The reason was stated in Gunter
v. Beasley, 414 So. 2d 41 (Ala. 1982):
"'"Section 14 prohibits the
State from being made a defendant
in any court of this state and
neither 
the 
State 
nor 
any
individual can consent to a suit
against 
the 
State. 
Aland 
v.
Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d
677 (1971). The application of
Section 
14 
to 
suits 
against
officers of the State was treated
in Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65
(Ala. 1980), as follows:
1090699
15
"'"'... In determining
whether 
an 
action
against a state officer
is barred by § 14, the
Court 
considers 
the
nature of the suit or
the 
relief 
demanded,
not the character of
the 
office 
of 
the
person against whom the
suit 
is 
brought.
Wallace 
v. 
Board 
of
Education of Montgomery
County, 280 Ala. 635,
197 So. 2d 428 (1967).
This 
Court 
has 
held
that 
§ 
14 
prohibits
suit 
against 
State
officers and agents in
their official capacity
or individually when a
result favorable to the
p l a i n t i f f  
w o u l d
directly 
affect 
a
contract 
or 
property
right 
of 
the 
State.
Southall 
v. 
Stricos
Corp., 275 Ala. 156,
153 
So. 
2d 
234
(1963).'" 
(Emphasis
added.)
"'414 So. 2d at 48.'
"514 So. 2d at 50-51."
Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 844-45.
It is undisputed that the respondents are seeking money
damages from the State.  Although the respondents' action
1090699
16
alleging that Murphy had improperly overcharged them for
renewal and duplicate drivers' licenses based upon either a
misinterpretation of the law or a willful misapplication of
the law is not necessarily barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, a judgment in the respondents' favor would affect
the financial status of the State treasury, and, thus, the
action for money damages cannot be maintained.  Accordingly,
to the extent that the respondents' action seeks money damages
from the State, it is barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Conclusion
Murphy has demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal
of counts III and IV of the respondents' complaint.
Accordingly, we direct the circuit court to grant Murphy's
motion to dismiss counts III and IV of the respondents'
amended complaint.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.