Title: DiVenere v. University of Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DiVenere v. University of Wyoming1991 WY 68811 P.2d 273Case Number: 90-268Decided: 05/10/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Vince DiVENERE and Margo 
DiVenere, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

The UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Michael Schilling, 
Laramie, for 
appellants.

Mayo Sommermeyer of 
Anderson, Sommermeyer, Wick & Dow, Ft. Collins, Colo., for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants, Vince and 
Margo DiVenere, sought damages pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
(GCA), W.S. 1-39-101 through 1-39-120, alleging that Mrs. DiVenere was injured 
when she slipped and fell on an icy patch on the concourse leading to the upper 
deck of the University of Wyoming's football stadium.1 The district court granted summary 
judgment for appellee, the University 
of Wyoming, deciding that Wyoming's close-ended 
tort claims act made no exception to immunity for ramps or 
concourses.

[¶2.]     We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings.

[¶3.]     The DiVeneres assert 
that the University of Wyoming's immunity is waived by W.S. 
1-39-106:

§ 1-39-106. Liability; 
buildings, recreation areas and public parks.

     A governmental entity 
is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property 
damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the 
scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, 
recreation area or public park.

They contend that the 
concourse ramps are permanently affixed as an integral part of the stands within 
the football stadium (War Memorial Stadium) and the area itself fits within the 
definition of "building." In addition, the DiVeneres contend the "building" is a 
part of the athletic complex at the University of Wyoming and is included within the 
definition of "recreation area." The district court rejected this argument, 
finding that the claim did not fit within any of the terms of the statute and, 
thus, immunity governed per Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶4.]     The University of Wyoming agrees there is no contention 
about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, and the only issue is 
the application of the GCA. The University of Wyoming contends, and the district court 
agreed, that W.S. 1-39-106 does not make specific mention of ramps or concourses 
and, therefore, immunity, as provided for by the GCA, governs. The University of Wyoming also argues that the ramps or 
concourses are included within the retraction of immunity found in W.S. 
1-39-120:

§ 1-39-120. Exclusions 
from waiver of immunity.

(a) The liability imposed 
by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 does not include liability for damages caused 
by:

(i) A defect in the plan 
or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or 
parking area;

(ii) The failure to 
construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, 
sidewalk or parking area; or

(iii) The maintenance, 
including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, 
culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.

The University of Wyoming contends the ramps or concourses 
are "sidewalks" and, hence, immunity governs.2 The district court rejected this 
contention in the summary judgment, reasoning that they are not included within 
any of the terms used by the statute.

[¶5.]     The word "recreation" 
means, "1 a: the act of recreating or the state of being recreated: * * * 
diversion, play * * *. b: a means of getting diversion or entertainment * * *." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1899 (1971). More directly, as used 
in W.S. 1-39-106, in its adjectival form, "recreation" means: "equipped so as to 
provide diversions or amusements * * *." Id. If a statute employs a term which has a 
standard meaning, the term is presumably used in its ordinary and usual sense 
unless another sense is clearly intended. W.S. 8-1-103(a)(i); Soles v. State, 
809 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1991). Here, the word "recreation" is 
used in its standard meaning; indeed, we know of no other meaning the word might 
have. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will not resort to rules of 
statutory construction, and the words will be given their plain and ordinary 
meaning. Id. 
We hold that War Memorial Stadium at the University of Wyoming is a recreation area as 
contemplated by W.S. 1-39-106. Sports facilities are recreation areas. In re 
Stagebrush Promotions, Inc., 98 Pa.Cmwlth. 634, 512 A.2d 776 (1986). This 
includes football, Taylor v. City of Appleton, 147 Wis.2d 644, 
433 N.W.2d 293 (1988).

[¶6.]     The University of Wyoming contends the ramps or concourses 
are "sidewalks" as contemplated by W.S. 1-39-120. These structures do not 
readily fit the usual meaning of the term "sidewalk," "a walk for foot 
passengers usu[ally] at the side of a street or roadway: a foot pavement." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 2113. Moreover, in 
context, it is clear that "sidewalks" refer to those foot paths that appear in 
conjunction with bridges, highways, roadways, streets, alleys, or parking areas. 
A sidewalk is generally considered to be part of the public street. Nikiel v. 
City of Buffalo, 7 Misc.2d 667, 165 N YS.2d 592 
(1957); Pitzer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ohio App. 35, 31 N.E.2d 450 (1940); Brunette v. Bierke, 
271 Wis. 190, 
72 N.W.2d 702 (1955). The ramps or concourses at issue here are not such 
sidewalks. Rather, they are, in our view, an integral part of the recreation 
area itself. Thus, the summary judgment must be reversed. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 634-35 (Wyo. 1986) (Stage One).

[¶7.]     In conclusion, we hold 
that the DiVenere complaint, as filed, first states a cause of action, at least 
insofar as it alleges bodily injury caused by the negligence of public employees 
while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of 
a recreation area, and second, that the University of Wyoming is not immune from 
such suit.

[¶8.]     Reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The DiVenere complaint 
alleges a variety of negligence claims including: negligent construction of the 
concourse; negligent maintenance; negligent failure to warn of a dangerous 
condition; failure to inspect for dangerous conditions such as the presence of 
ice; negligent failure to guard or barricade the area of ice or otherwise warn 
pedestrians of the danger.

     We will not directly 
comment on which of these claims are to be the subject of further proceedings 
because we address here only the district court's grant of summary judgment 
based upon the application of W.S. 1-39-106, infra.

     The question whether 
liability insurance existed under the purview of W.S. 1-39-118(b) was neither 
considered in district court before summary judgment was granted nor briefed for 
presentation in this court on appeal. See Pickle v. Board of CountyCom'rs 
of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262 (Wyo. 1988).

2 
The anomalies to be created by W.S. 1-39-120 have not been without recognition. 
White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1333 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting).