Title: Foundations of East Chicago, Inc. v. City of East Chicago and State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
FOUNDATIONS OF EAST CHICAGO, INC. 
CITY OF EAST CHICAGO 
Peter J. Rusthoven 
James A. Knauer 
Mark J. Crandley 
William Bock, III 
Deborah Pollack-Milgate 
Steven E. Runyan 
Paul L. Jefferson 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
STATE OF INDIANA 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
SAINT STANISLAUS CHURCH AND SCHOOL, 
Attorney General of Indiana 
THE TWIN CITY MINISTERIAL ALLIANCE, AND 
 
THE NORTHWEST INDIANA FEDERATION,  
Thomas M. Fisher   
F/K/A INTERFAITH FEDERATION 
Solicitor General of Indiana 
Kathleen A. DeLaney 
 
Amanda Couture 
Heather L. Hagan 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Deputy Attorney General  
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
NEIGHBORS INCORPORATED OF HAMMOND, 
 
INDIANA, ST. CATHERINE HOSPITAL, INC., 
 
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC., 
 
CALUMET COLLEGE OF ST. JOSEPH, INC., 
 
JANELLE SCOTT, AND 
 
THE HON. WILLIAM H. HUDNUT 
 
Stephen J. Peters 
David I. Rubin 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
 
 
No. 49S02-0908-CV-00383 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF EAST CHICAGO, INC., 
SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO EAST CHICAGO 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, 
INC. AND TWIN CITY EDUCATION 
FOUNDATION, INC., 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF EAST CHICAGO, 
 
Appellee (Defendant below), 
 
and 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Sep 16 2010, 12:14 pm
2 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Intervenor-Defendant  
 
below).   
 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D13-0705-PL-019348 
The Honorable S.K. Reid, Judge 
 
 
On Petition for Rehearing 
 
 
September 16, 2010 
 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
The present appeal concerns the constitutionality of a 2007 amendment to Indiana’s 
gaming law that the City of East Chicago has contended authorizes it to redirect to itself, 
unilaterally, certain revenue from the riverboat gaming licensee operating in East Chicago 
dedicated in support of economic development. 
 
 
We earlier declined to address the constitutionality of that amendment after concluding 
that there was a nonconstitutional basis for resolving the instant dispute.  We rejected the 
arguments advanced by appellant Foundations of East Chicago that the amendment impaired its 
contract rights.  We held instead that the amendment merely recognized what had been true 
before its adoption:  that at least within certain bounds the City was free to change its mind about 
the local development agreement it had consummated with the original license applicant, but that 
the flow of funds in support of local economic development was governed by the license issued 
by the Indiana Gaming Commission and that alteration of this distribution was within the 
authority, judgment, and supervision of the Commission.  Foundations of East Chicago v. City of 
East Chicago, 927 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. 2010). 
3 
 
 
 
By way of petition for rehearing, Foundations reports that even before our decision had 
been certified the City moved the trial court to terminate the escrow account into which the 
licenseholder’s economic development contributions have been deposited and return the balance 
in the account to the City of East Chicago.  (Foundations Add. Ex. A.)  This motion was, of 
course, premature under the appellate rules.  Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E) (“[P]arties shall not take 
any action in reliance upon the opinion or memorandum decision [by a court on appeal] until the 
memorandum or decision is certified.”).  The trial court rightly denied the City’s request on that 
ground alone. 
 
 
Even if timely, however, the request that the trial court order the economic development 
funds redirected to the City on the basis of its ordinance and the 2007 amendment fell within the 
core of our decision in this case, and that decision was adverse to the City’s position that it 
possessed unilateral authority to redirect the funds.  Thus, the City’s motion for an order 
directing that the escrowed funds be transferred to the City should be denied on its merits if 
timely filed. 
 
 
We grant rehearing for purposes of this clarification of our mandate, and otherwise leave 
intact our original opinion. 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.