Title: Isbell v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Brandon Anthony ISBELL v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-517                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 23, 1996


1.   Criminal law -- admission of pretrial statement -- trial
     court's overruling of motion to suppress not error. --
     Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in
     overruling his motion to suppress his pretrial statement in
     that he was not given the benefit of the requirement that his
     parent enter an agreement to the execution of the waiver of
     the right to counsel was without merit where there was no
     showing or argument that appellant, when taken into custody,
     asked to consult with his parent; Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-317
     (g) clearly placed the burden on appellant to consult with his
     parent. 

2.   Criminal law -- waiver of rights in custodial statements of
     juveniles -- statement must be voluntarily and intelligently
     given. -- When a person in police custody makes a statement
     after executing a waiver of rights, the law makes
     admissibility in evidence of the statement dependent upon a
     showing that the waiver was made voluntarily and
     intelligently; this requirement applies regardless whether the
     person said to have executed the waiver is entitled to the
     protection of the juvenile code; in deciding whether it is
     convinced, according to the totality of the circumstances,
     that a confession was voluntarily and intelligently given, the
     appellate court considers whether the special rights accorded
     to a juvenile by statute were observed by the authorities
     taking the statement.  

3.   Criminal law -- appellant repeated all material aspects of
     pretrial statement at trial -- failure to suppress earlier
     confession harmless. -- Even if the appellant's pretrial
     confession should have been suppressed, the error was harmless
     beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the fact that appellant
     testified at his trial and essentially repeated his earlier
     confession, clearly admitting having committed every element
     of capital-felony murder; apparently the decision to testify
     and give a "judicial confession" was solely that of appellant.

4.   Evidence -- trial court properly admitted evidence of gunshot
     residue -- any error in admitting testimony was harmless. --
     The trial court properly admitted testimony of the crime lab
     expert that gunshot residue was found on both of appellant's
     hands where, after appellant's objection to the testimony
     because the test had been administered without the use of
     control swabs, the trial court concluded the objection would
     go to the weight to be given to the expert's testimony rather
     than its admissibility; where appellant admitted having shot
     the victim, any error in admitting the gunshot residue
     testimony would have been harmless.     

5.   Appeal & error -- no specific objection made at trial --
     appellate court will not reverse. -- Where, at trial, the
     trial court was not informed as to the nature of the
     objection, the appellate court would not reverse; absent a
     specific objection informing the trial court of the nature of
     the error alleged on appeal, the appellate court will not
     reverse.  

6.   Witnesses -- rebuttal witnesses -- State need not provide
     defense with names of rebuttal witnesses. -- The rules of
     criminal procedure do not require the State to provide the
     defense with the names of rebuttal witnesses because until the
     defense case has been presented, the State can not know of
     witnesses needed for rebuttal.

7.   Criminal procedure -- oral statements made by defendant
     disclosed to defense -- rebuttal evidence may overlap State's
     case-in-chief -- no abuse of discretion found. -- Appellant
     argued that the State did not tell the defense about the oral
     statement of appellant to the rebuttal witness as it was
     required to do; however, pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 19.2
     there was disclosure, albeit later than the defense would have
     liked, and the trial court was thus permitted to consider
     whether it was proper rebuttal or not; even though the
     evidence might properly have been presented in its case-in-
     chief, that did not mean the evidence was not proper for
     rebuttal; rebuttal evidence may overlap the State's case-in-
     chief so long as it is responsive to the defense evidence; it
     is within the trial court's discretion to decide the propriety
     of evidence offered in rebuttal; there was no abuse of
     discretion here.


8.   Evidence -- effect of judicial confessions -- judicial
     confessions do not universally cure trial error. -- Although
     it is true that evidence rules can be "relaxed" when a
     defendant had confessed in open court, allegedly improper
     evidence may well be of no consequence to the appellant and
     not prejudicial when the evidence has to do solely with the
     elements of the crime and whether they were committed; in a
     case, however, where the evidence alleged to have been
     received in error may have further consequences, such as
     influencing the jury with respect to the sentence to be
     received, prejudice may occur; a judicial confession does not 
     universally cure trial error. 


     Appeal from Arkansas Circuit Court; Russell Rogers, Judge;
affirmed.
     Dennis R. Molock, Public Defender, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Gil Dudley, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     Brandon Anthony Isbell shot and killed Lois Wallace in the
course of a robbery of a grocery store in Stuttgart.  He was
convicted in a jury trial of capital murder for causing the death
of Ms. Wallace in furtherance of the robbery and under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life.  Ark. Code Ann.  5-10-101(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).  Mr.
Isbell was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  We
affirm the judgment.
     The murder occurred October 28, 1994, when Brandon Isbell was
aged 14 years.  The sufficiency of the evidence is not at issue, so
we need not recite the facts in great detail.  In a pretrial
statement given to the police and again in his testimony at the
trial, Mr. Isbell said he and two friends, Clint Lammers and Sean
Smith, planned to rob the store to get money to run away from home. 
Clint Lammers had a .357 pistol.  On the day of the crime they
acquired a second weapon by taking a .22 pistol from the home of
Mr. Isbell's grandmother.  They walked to the grocery store and
spoke of using the .22 which was the quieter of the two weapons to
shoot the grocery check-out clerk so she could not identify them. 
     Mr. Isbell had fired the .22 pistol previously and knew that
the double action did not work, so the hammer would have to be
cocked to fire it.  The three first purchased some batteries and
then continued to mill about the grocery store.  Mr. Isbell then
approached Ms. Wallace, the store clerk, and  pointed the .22
pistol at her head.  The gun discharged, and Ms. Wallace went down. 
Mr. Isbell stood up on the counter, attempting unsuccessfully to
get the cash register open.  They ran from the store, taking only
the batteries, some cigarettes, and a pair of gloves.  They went to
Clint Lammers' home from which they phoned the police to turn
themselves in.  In relating the story to the police, Mr. Isbell
said, "It didn't turn out like it does in the movies."

             1. Admissibility of pretrial statement
     In his first point of appeal, Mr. Isbell contends the Trial
Court erred in overruling his motion to suppress his pre-trial
statement.  When he was taken into custody, Mr. Isbell was
questioned by a police officer after executing a waiver form
indicating his knowledge and understanding of his rights and
declining the assistance of counsel.  Although his mother was
present in the police station and had expressed her wish to speak
with Mr. Isbell, she was not allowed to do so until the
interrogation had been completed.  
     The officer who interrogated Mr. Isbell confirmed that he had
told Mr. Isbell of his rights, including the right to an attorney,
but the officer admitted at the suppression hearing that he did not
give any extra explanation as he did not wish Mr. Isbell to have an
attorney or parent present because that would have hindered the
effort to obtain a confession.
     Citing Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-317, Mr. Isbell argues as
follows: 

     a waiver of the right to counsel shall be accepted only upon
     a finding by the court from clear and convincing evidence,
     after questioning the juvenile, that (1) the juvenile
     understands the full implications of the right to counsel; (2)
     the juvenile freely and voluntarily and intelligently wishes
     to waive the right to counsel; and (3) the parent ... for the
     juvenile has agreed with the juvenile's decision to waive the
     right to counsel.

     The argument made in Mr. Isbell's brief to this Court is not
that the State has failed to show that the waiver was involuntary
or not intelligently made; rather, it is that Mr. Isbell was not
given the benefit of the requirement that his parent enter an
agreement to the execution of the waiver of the right to counsel. 
     Previously,  9-27-317(f) provided that, "All waivers of the
right to counsel shall be in writing and signed by the juvenile and
his parent, guardian, or custodian."  The General Assembly removed
the requirement that the parent sign by Acts 67,  1, and 68,  1,
of the Second Extraordinary Session of 1994 which became effective
August 26, 1994, some two months before Mr. Isbell's offense
occurred.  By amending the opening subsection of  9-27-317, those
same acts made it clear that its provisions, at least subsections
(a) through (f), apply in "a delinquency or family in need of
services hearing."  Subsection (g)(2)(A) of the statute provides:

     No law enforcement officer shall question a juvenile who has
     been taken into custody for a delinquent act or criminal
     offense if the juvenile has indicated in any manner that he: 
          
          (i) Does not wish to be questioned;
          (ii) Wishes to speak with a parent or guardian or to    
          have a parent or guardian present; or
          (iii) Wishes to consult counsel before submitting to
          any questioning.
     
     If the provisions of subsection (g) apply beyond the juvenile
forum, they were not invoked here.  There is no showing or argument
that Mr. Isbell, when taken into custody, asked to consult with his
parent.  Mr. Isbell's argument on appeal includes a remark to the
effect that the burden should not have been placed on a 14-year-old
to ask to consult with his parent, but that is precisely where
subsection (g) places it.
     Our Rule 4-3(h) requires that we examine the transcript in a
case in which there has been a sentence to death, life
imprisonment, or life imprisonment without parole to determine any
errors prejudicial to the appellant.  Mr. Isbell's motion to
suppress his confession was not limited to the failure to give him
the protection of the Juvenile Code.  Rather, it was couched in
general terms as well, stating the confession was involuntary and
not intelligently given.
     When a person in police custody makes a statement after
executing a waiver of rights, the law makes admissibility in
evidence of the statement dependent upon a showing that the waiver
was made voluntarily and intelligently.  Clay v. State, 318 Ark.
122,