Title: State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 2000-Ohio-168.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BAKER, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 376.] 
Workers’ compensation — Claimant who leaves former position of employment 
for a new position does not forfeit temporary total disability compensation 
eligibility. 
When a claimant who is medically released to return to work following an 
industrial injury leaves his or her former position of employment to accept 
another position of employment, the claimant is eligible to receive temporary 
total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56(A) should the 
claimant reaggravate the original industrial injury while working at his or her 
new job. 
(No. 98-556 — Submitted May 9, 2000 — Decided August 9, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD10-1283. 
ON RECONSIDERATION. 
 
On July 27, 1989, appellant, Paul W. Baker, suffered an industrial injury to 
his left knee during his employment as a general laborer for appellee, Stahl-
Wooster Division, A Scott Fetzer Company (“Stahl-Wooster”). As a result of his 
industrial injury, the Industrial Commission allowed Baker’s claim for a lateral tear 
 
 
2
of the meniscus of the left knee, and Baker subsequently missed work due to 
arthroscopic knee surgeries that were performed on January 9, 1990 and May 4, 
1990.  Baker received temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”) from 
January 9, 1990 to July 15, 1990. 
 
On July 15, 1990, Baker’s treating physician, James J. Heintz, M.D., 
released Baker to resume full-time work, restricted to light duty.  The following 
day, Baker returned to Stahl-Wooster and, that same day, signed a termination 
notice stating that he had “accepted other employment.”  Thereafter, Baker began 
his new job as a truck mechanic with Truck Stops of America (“Truck Stops”).  On 
September 24, 1990, Baker left his position with Truck Stops, allegedly due to his 
original industrial injury. 
 
After examinations by Dr. T. Kenneth Krutky and Dr. Heintz, Baker filed a 
request for a further allowance and for additional TTC.  Specifically, Baker 
requested TTC from September 24, 1990 through an estimated return-to-work date 
of May 16, 1991.  After considering Baker’s request, a commission district hearing 
officer (“DHO”) issued an order granting Baker TTC for the requested time period.  
After a timely appeal of the DHO decision by Stahl-Wooster, the Canton Regional 
Board of Review agreed with Stahl-Wooster, and denied TTC to Baker.  The 
regional board denied TTC on the basis that Baker had voluntarily terminated his 
employment with Stahl-Wooster.  Baker then timely appealed the board’s decision 
 
 
3
to the Industrial Commission.  On behalf of the commission, two staff hearing 
officers denied Baker’s appeal, thereby agreeing with the board’s decision.1 The 
commission’s decision to deny Baker’s appeal was based on a finding that Baker 
had voluntarily abandoned his position of employment with Stahl-Wooster. 
 
On October 2, 1996, Baker filed a complaint in mandamus in the Franklin 
County Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
denying his TTC request.  The court of appeals disagreed and denied the writ.  
From the judgment of the court of appeals, Baker appealed to this court.  On 
January 26, 2000, we issued our first decision in this case, State ex rel. Baker v. 
Indus. Comm. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 561, 722 N.E.2d 67 (“Baker I”).  In a per 
curiam opinion, we held that under the principles of State ex rel. McGraw v. Indus. 
Comm. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 137, 564 N.E.2d 695, and State ex rel. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 145, 29 OBR 162, 
504 N.E.2d 451, Baker was not eligible for TTC because he had voluntarily 
abandoned his employment with Stahl-Wooster by accepting new employment 
with Truck Stops. 
 
In response to our initial decision, Baker filed a motion for reconsideration.  
Baker’s request for reconsideration was joined by amici curiae Ohio AFL-CIO, 
Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, Ohio 
Conference of Teamsters, Ohio State Building and Construction Trades Council, 
 
 
4
Northwestern Ohio Building and Construction Trades Council, and the Ohio 
Education Association.  Appellees, Industrial Commission and Stahl-Wooster, 
filed memoranda opposing Baker’s motion for reconsideration, and appellees’ 
opposition was joined by amici curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association and Ohio 
Manufacturers Association. 
 
On March 15, 2000, we granted Baker’s motion for reconsideration and 
issued an order permitting the parties to submit supplemental briefs.  We also 
ordered that the case be set for oral argument. 
 
The cause is now before the court as an appeal of right and on rehearing. 
__________________ 
 
Stewart R. Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. 
Jaffy; and M. Blake Stone, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and C. Bradley Howenstein, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., Richard A. Hernandez, Brett L. 
Miller and Julie M. Young, for appellee Stahl-Wooster Division, A Scott Fetzer 
Company. 
 
Stewart R. Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. 
Jaffy, urging reversal and issuance of writ for amici curiae AFL-CIO and Ohio 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
5
 
Paul L. Cox, urging reversal and issuance of writ for amicus curiae Fraternal 
Order of Police of Ohio, Inc. 
 
Gallon & Takacs Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, urging reversal and 
issuance of writ for amici curiae Ohio Conference of Teamsters and Northwestern 
Ohio Building and Construction Trades Council. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., N. Victor Goodman and 
Mark D. Tucker, urging reversal and issuance of writ for amicus curiae Ohio State 
Building and Construction Trades Council. 
 
Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Christopher A. Flint and 
Frederic A. Portman, urging reversal and issuance of writ for amicus curiae Ohio 
Education Association. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association, and Ohio 
Manufacturers Association. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The issue before us is whether a claimant who leaves his2 
former position of employment for a new position forfeits TTC eligibility under 
the theory of voluntary abandonment of employment. 
 
In Baker I, we held that Baker’s voluntary departure from Stahl-Wooster 
precluded Baker’s eligibility for TTC, as his departure from his former position of 
 
 
6
employment was predicated on his own actions, i.e., acceptance of a truck 
mechanic position with Truck Stops, and not on his industrial injury.  Baker, 87 
Ohio St.3d at 563, 722 N.E.2d at 68.  As previously mentioned, the per curiam 
opinion in Baker I was largely based upon the principles set forth in McGraw and 
Jones & Laughlin, and, notably, the opinion did not explore the relationship and 
differences between a claimant’s eligibility for TTC, voluntary abandonment of a 
former position of employment, and continued employment for a different 
employer.  Baker’s continued employment, albeit not at Stahl-Wooster, is an 
important and distinguishing fact that separates this case from the typical voluntary 
abandonment of employment.  In order to appreciate this distinction, it is first 
necessary to discuss the eligibility requirements for TTC and to review the purpose 
of TTC, particularly as it relates to the judicially created voluntary-abandonment 
theory. 
 
The pertinent portions of R.C. 4123.56, governing temporary disability 
compensation, provide: 
 
“(A) * * * [I]n the case of temporary disability, an employee shall receive 
sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of his average weekly wage so long as such 
disability is total * * *.  Payments shall continue pending the determination of the 
matter[;] however payment shall not be made for the period when any employee 
has returned to work, when an employee’s treating physician has made a written 
 
 
7
statement that the employee is capable of returning to his former position of 
employment, when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made 
available by the employer or another employer, or when the employee has reached 
the maximum medical improvement.  * * * The termination of temporary total 
disability, whether by order or otherwise, does not preclude the commencement of 
temporary total disability at another point in time if the employee again becomes 
temporarily totally disabled.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
R.C. 4123.56 is instructive in that it ties an injured worker’s eligibility for 
TTC to the worker’s capability of returning to his former position of employment.  
This “former position of employment” standard was intended to be a threshold 
physical measurement of whether an injured worker was able to perform the duties 
of the job that he held at the time of injury.  A worker’s physical capabilities are 
unrelated to whether the worker is actually working at his former position of 
employment and whether the former position is even available for the injured 
worker to return to after he is medically released. 
 
In State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 
O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586, at syllabus, we held, “Under R.C. 4123.56, 
temporary total disability is defined as a disability which prevents a worker from 
returning to his former position of employment.”  Quoting Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1961), this court stated that “position” is defined as “the 
 
 
8
group of tasks and responsibilities making up the duties of an employee.”  Id. at 
632, 23 O.O.3d at 519, 433 N.E.2d at 588.  Ramirez did not hold that the injured 
worker had to actually return to the specific job that he held at the time of his 
injury; rather, this court merely stated that the proper criterion was the injured 
worker’s ability to perform the job duties of his former position of employment.  
Since the Industrial Commission had failed to take evidence regarding Ramirez’s 
ability to return, either partially or completely, to his former position of 
employment as a construction laborer, this court affirmed the court of appeals’ 
judgment, which granted appellant a writ of mandamus and ordered the Industrial 
Commission to take evidence to determine Ramirez’s ability to return to his former 
job.  Id. at 634, 23 O.O.3d at 520, 433 N.E.2d at 590.  As exemplified in Ramirez, 
the former-position-of-employment test does not involve any consideration of 
whether the injured worker returns to his actual job that he held at the time of his 
injury or whether that job is even available; rather, the test is a physical guideline 
by which an injured worker’s eligibility for TTC is determined. 
 
Eligibility for TTC is contingent upon an injured worker’s inability to 
perform the duties of his former position of employment.  Ramirez; Jones & 
Laughlin, supra.  This eligibility standard is consistent with the purpose of TTC, 
which is to compensate an injured employee for the loss of earnings he incurs 
while his injury heals.  State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio 
 
 
9
St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 533, 535.  In some cases, however, a worker’s own 
actions, rather than his industrial injury, may result in the worker’s not being able 
to return to his former position of employment.  In such cases, the injured worker 
is said to have voluntarily abandoned his former position of employment, thereby 
precluding his eligibility for TTC. 
 
For example, in Jones & Laughlin,3 the facts were that the claimant had 
voluntarily retired from the work force and was receiving a regular pension.  The 
Franklin County Court of Appeals held that “where the employee has taken action 
that would preclude his returning to his former position of employment, even if he 
were able to do so, he is not entitled to continued temporary total disability benefits 
since it is his own action rather than the industrial injury, which prevents his 
returning to such former position of employment.”  Jones & Laughlin, 29 Ohio 
App.3d at 147, 29 OBR at 164, 504 N.E.2d at 454.  This was obviously meant to 
explain that where an employee voluntarily undertakes some action that precludes 
that employee from returning to employment from a temporary total disability, the 
employee has voluntarily abandoned the work force and is therefore not entitled to 
receive TTC, because the purpose for which TTC was created (compensation for 
loss of income during temporary and total disability) no longer exists.  Thus, when 
an employee receiving TTC chooses for reasons unrelated to his industrial injury 
 
 
10
not to return to any work when able to do so, that employee has abandoned both 
his employment and his eligibility for TTC. 
 
In addition to Jones & Laughlin, where the claimant voluntarily and 
permanently removed himself from the work force, there are a number of other 
examples of situations wherein a claimant has been denied continued TTC based 
on his voluntary abandonment of his former position of employment: State ex rel. 
Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 517 N.E.2d 533 (incarcerated 
claimant was precluded from TTC, as claimant was presumed to have tacitly 
accepted the consequences of his voluntary acts leading to his incarceration and 
was therefore deemed to have voluntarily abandoned his former position of 
employment); State ex rel. McGraw v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 137, 
564 N.E.2d 695 (claimant who voluntarily abandoned his former position of 
employment by quitting his job for reasons unrelated to his injury was precluded 
from TTC); State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 401, 650 N.E.2d 469 (claimant voluntarily abandoned his former position of 
employment when he was terminated for failing to report to work for three 
consecutive days, thereby precluding his eligibility for TTC); State ex rel. Cobb v. 
Indus. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 54, 723 N.E.2d 573 (claimant voluntarily 
abandoned his employment when he was terminated for testing positive for drugs 
 
 
11
in violation of a written company policy, thereby precluding his eligibility for 
TTC). 
 
Relying on two of the foregoing voluntary-abandonment cases, McGraw and 
Jones & Laughlin, this court held in Baker I that Baker voluntarily abandoned his 
former position of employment by accepting a new position of employment and, 
therefore, Baker was not eligible for TTC.  Upon reconsideration, we now find that 
both McGraw and Jones & Laughlin are factually distinguishable from the facts of 
the case now before us.  Specifically, we now find that changing jobs is clearly 
distinguishable from some other situations of voluntary abandonment of 
employment and that a job change does not preclude a claimant from TTC. 
 
In Jones & Laughlin, the employer contended that because its employee was 
receiving a regular pension, the employee had voluntarily retired from the work 
force and was therefore precluded from receiving TTC.  While denying the 
employer’s request for a writ for other reasons, the court of appeals did agree with 
the employer that “voluntary retirement may preclude a claimant from receiving 
temporary total disability benefits to which he otherwise might be entitled, if by 
such retirement the claimant has voluntarily removed himself permanently from 
the work force.”  (Emphasis added.)  29 Ohio App.3d at 147, 29 OBR at 164, 504 
N.E.2d at 454.  We agree with this statement of the law, but the case that is now 
 
 
12
before us does not present facts that are the same as or similar to the facts in Jones 
& Laughlin. 
 
In the case at bar, Baker did not permanently abandon the work force.  Baker 
secured other employment and continued to work until the injuries received in his 
original industrial accident again rendered him temporarily and totally disabled. 
 
McGraw is also distinguishable from the facts of the case now before us.  
Unlike Baker, the appellant in McGraw abandoned the work force for reasons 
unrelated to his original industrial injury, and he was not working at the time of his 
subsequent injury, which he claimed was related to his original industrial injury 
and again rendered him temporarily and totally disabled.  McGraw, 56 Ohio St.3d 
137, 564 N.E.2d 695.  McGraw was originally injured in 1976 during his 
employment with Kenworth Trucking Company, and he was subsequently awarded 
workers’ compensation benefits for his injury.  Thereafter, he quit Kenworth for 
reasons unrelated to his work injury, and he moved to Pennsylvania.  After 
working in several different positions, McGraw quit his last job in mid-1986, and 
he did not work thereafter.  In March 1987, McGraw filed for continued TTC from 
Kenworth, which the Industrial Commission denied, based on his voluntary 
abandonment of his position with Kenworth.  For that reason, the court of appeals 
denied his request for a writ of mandamus, and this court affirmed the court of 
appeals’ judgment. 
 
 
13
 
The claimant in McGraw not only abandoned the work force, as he was 
unemployed for approximately eight or nine months before his request for 
continued TTC, but he requested continued TTC more than ten years after his 
original industrial injury.  McGraw was not working at the time of his injury; thus, 
he did not incur any loss of earnings at the time that he reaggravated his original 
industrial injury.  McGraw, unlike Baker, abandoned his employment and the work 
force. 
 
Much is being made of the court of appeals’ further statement in Jones & 
Laughlin that “[s]uch action [abandonment] would include such situations as the 
acceptance of another position, as well as voluntary retirement.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  29 Ohio App.3d at 147, 29 OBR at 164, 504 N.E.2d at 454.  We believe 
that the court’s language with regard to “another position” is being misconstrued, 
intentionally or otherwise.  What the court was saying in using that language, we 
believe, is that when a claimant starts work at another position, of course TTC 
benefits cease because the claimant is no longer temporarily and totally disabled.  
That does not mean that if the claimant again becomes temporarily and totally 
disabled from injuries related to the original industrial injury that gave rise to the 
former payments of TTC, the claimant is barred from reviving that original claim. 
 
To clarify these issues, we developed a two-part test to determine a 
claimant’s eligibility for TTC.  In State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 
 
 
14
Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 533, 535, this court stated, “The first part of the test 
focuses on the disabling aspects of the injury, whereas the latter part determines if 
there are any factors, other than the injury, which would prevent the claimant from 
returning to his former position.”  Id.  Futhermore, and significantly, we stated, 
“The secondary consideration is a reflection of the underlying purpose of 
temporary total compensation: to compensate an injured employee for the loss of 
earnings which he incurs while the injury heals.” Id. 
 
Applying the two-part test to the facts in Ashcraft, we held that the 
claimant’s incarceration constituted a factor that precluded his receipt of TTC 
independently of his previously recognized work-related injury.  Id. at 44-45, 517 
N.E.2d at 535.  This court found that claimant’s incarceration was a factor other 
than the industrial injury that prevented the claimant from returning to his former 
position of employment.  We held that claimant’s incarceration was a voluntary 
act, since one may be presumed to tacitly accept the consequences of one’s 
voluntary acts.  Id. at 44, 517 N.E.2d at 535.  Although not addressed in Ashcraft, 
this court’s conclusion to deny TTC is consistent with the purpose of TTC.  Since 
the incarcerated claimant would not be returning to work, he would not be 
experiencing a loss of earnings; hence, there was no purpose in awarding TTC.  As 
in Ashcraft, there was also no purpose in awarding TTC to the claimant in Jones & 
Laughlin because the claimant had voluntarily left the work force through his 
 
 
15
retirement, and the claimant would not, therefore, experience a loss of earnings due 
to his industrial injury. 
 
Accordingly, we apply the two-prong test of Ashcraft to the facts of the case 
now before us.  In this case, there is no debate about the application of the first 
prong.  It is the second prong of the Ashcraft test, namely the underlying purpose 
of TTC, that compels a different result in the case at bar. 
 
First, with respect to the disabling aspect of Baker’s injury, there is no 
dispute that Baker was unable to perform the duties of his former position of 
employment as a result of his industrial injury.  Baker’s original industrial injury 
was reaggravated at Baker’s new job, and it is uncontroverted that Baker’s 
subsequent injury was directly related to his original injury at Stahl-Wooster.  
Second, Baker’s acceptance of his new position at Truck Stops was not a factor 
that prevented Baker from returning to his former position.  Baker could (and did) 
return to his former position, but then he elected to move to different employment.  
This change of employment was not related to his injury.  Although Baker did not 
return permanently to his former position of employment,4 he did secure other 
employment, thereby maintaining his continued presence in the work force.  
Unlike the claimants in Ashcraft and Jones & Laughlin, Baker did not voluntarily 
abandon the work force.  Rather, Baker made a decision to accept a new position 
that was more aligned with his background, training, and career interests. 
 
 
16
 
Accordingly, we hold that when a claimant who is medically released to 
return to work following an industrial injury leaves his or her former position of 
employment to accept another position of employment, the claimant is eligible to 
receive temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56(A) 
should the claimant reaggravate the original industrial injury while working at his 
or her new job. 
 
Today’s decision does nothing more than recognize the job mobility of 
today’s labor market.  No citation of authority is needed to acknowledge the 
obvious that any number of people, different from day to day, are moving to other 
jobs for their same employer, or to different jobs for different employers.  To hold 
as appellees and their amici urge us would be to consign all workers to a particular 
employment position and employer unless they were willing to abandon some 
earned benefits.  This would be so regardless of promotional opportunities in the 
same company or other opportunities outside the company.  In this case, in the 
court of appeals, Judge Tyack dissented from the majority opinion, stating: 
 
“I see a significant distinction to be made between the situation where an 
injured worker stops employment entirely and the situation where an injured 
worker moves from one job within his or her capability to another job within his or 
her capabilities.  The workers’ compensation system cannot be used to chain a 
worker to one specific employer.  A worker who has an opportunity to advance his 
 
 
17
or her lot in life by a career change should not have to face the prospect of losing 
workers’ compensation benefits if an injury sustained on the job with a former 
employer causes the worker to become unemployed, even at a later date. 
 
“A complete abandonment of employment can, under certain circumstances, 
break the chain of cause and effect necessary to demonstrate that an injured worker 
actually is unemployed because of the injury.  A change of jobs does not constitute 
an abandonment of employment and does not automatically break the chain of 
cause and effect.” 
 
We agree, and we therefore vacate our decision in State ex rel. Baker v. 
Indus. Comm. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 561, 722 N.E.2d 67.  Further, we respectfully 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the requested writ of 
mandamus. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
The staff hearing officers adjusted the closing date of the period under 
consideration for TTC from May 16, 1991 to April 14, 1991, because Baker was 
 
 
18
receiving living-maintenance payments pursuant to R.C. 4121.63 during the period 
of April 15, 1991 through November 14, 1991. 
 
2. 
Since the claimant in the instant case is male, we use masculine 
adjectives and pronouns, except in the syllabus, throughout the opinion.  We do so 
only for ease of reading.  We continue to recognize that our opinions should 
always be gender-neutral. 
 
3. 
Appellee, Stahl-Wooster, lists an inaccurate citation for this case in its 
table of authorities and on page 3 of its supplemental brief.  The proper citation for 
State ex rel. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm. is (1985), 29 Ohio 
App.3d 145, 29 OBR 162, 504 N.E.2d 451.  Jones & Laughlin, accordingly, is a 
case from a court of appeals – not “this” court as stated by Stahl-Wooster. 
 
4. 
Baker actually returned to Stahl-Wooster the day after he was released 
to light-duty work.  On that day, Baker signed a termination notice with Stahl-
Wooster, stating that he had accepted other employment.  Thereafter, Baker began 
his new job as a truck mechanic with Truck Stops.