Title: Wilby v. Gostel

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
CHARLES DAVID WILBY 
 
v. 
Record No. 021606 
 
SHEREE T. GOSTEL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
 ESTATE OF CARRIE ANNE NEWTON 
 
DANIEL J. MIDDLETON, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 021646 
   JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    April 17, 2003 
SHEREE T. GOSTEL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
 ESTATE OF CARRIE ANNE NEWTON 
 
SHEREE T. GOSTEL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
 ESTATE OF CARRIE ANNE NEWTON 
 
v. 
Record No. 021655 
 
CHARLES DAVID WILBY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
Catherine C. Hammond, Judge 
 
These appeals arise out of an action for wrongful 
death in which the trial court granted partial summary 
judgment to one of the defendants on the ground that the 
decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  
In companion appeals brought by the defendants, we consider 
whether the trial court erred in permitting the 
administrator of the decedent’s estate to take a voluntary 
nonsuit as to all claims alleged in her motion for judgment 
after the motion for partial summary judgment had been 
granted.  In a separate appeal, the administrator has 
assigned error to the trial court’s granting the partial 
summary judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
We will recite the facts relevant to the motion for 
summary judgment in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.  Slone v. General Motors Corp., 249 Va. 520, 
522, 457 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1995).  The issue regarding the 
nonsuit presents a question of law, and as such we review 
the record on appeal under a de novo standard.  
Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 262 Va. 502, 
514, 551 S.E.2d 313, 319 (2001). 
On March 8, 2000, Carrie Anne Newton (“Newton”) had an 
argument with Charles David Wilby (“Wilby”), her boyfriend, 
at the apartment that the couple shared in Henrico County.  
Both Newton and Wilby had been consuming alcohol.  At some 
point that day, Wilby left the apartment and got behind the 
wheel of a van parked outside.  The van was owned by 
Middleton Heating & Air, Inc., Wilby’s employer. 
Newton followed Wilby to the van, and stepped onto its 
front bumper so that she was positioned facing Wilby behind 
the wheel.  Although the parties dispute whether the van 
was moving at the time Newton stepped onto the bumper, 
Wilby subsequently caused the van to travel forward at a 
speed of up to 25 miles an hour, and then to decelerate 
 
2
rapidly.  Newton was thrown from the front of the vehicle 
and sustained fatal injuries. 
Sheree T. Gostel (“Gostel”), the administrator of 
Newton’s estate, filed a motion for judgment on November 
17, 2000, in the Circuit Court of Henrico County.  The 
first count of the motion for judgment alleged that Wilby 
“operated the van while and despite the fact that Newton 
was standing on the bumper of the van,” and, thus, was 
responsible for the wrongful death of Newton as a result of 
his “negligent operation of the van.”  It was alleged 
further in the same count that “Wilby’s actions constituted 
. . . willful and wanton conduct and demonstrate such 
recklessness as to evince a conscious disregard for the 
rights of others.”  The second count alleged that Wilby’s 
failure to render assistance to Newton after she was 
injured also constituted negligent and willful and wanton 
conduct proximately contributing to Newton’s death. 
The motion for judgment also named Middleton Heating & 
Air, Inc. and Daniel J. Middleton, the owner and operator 
of that company, as defendants (collectively “Middleton”) 
in the third count.  This count alleged that Middleton was 
liable for Wilby’s actions under a theory of negligent 
entrustment.  All defendants filed answers to the motion 
 
3
for judgment denying liability and asserting the 
affirmative defense of contributory negligence. 
In response to requests for admission from Middleton, 
Gostel admitted that Newton “had used intoxicants on the 
night of March 8, 2000” and had voluntarily “climbed onto 
the van operated by” Wilby.  In response to requests for 
admission from Wilby, Gostel denied that Newton had 
“jumped” onto the van and denied that “the van being 
operated by Charles David Wilby was moving” at the time she 
stepped onto the bumper of the vehicle. 
On October 15, 2001, Wilby filed a motion for summary 
judgment asserting that the admissions made in response to 
Middleton’s discovery established that Newton was 
contributorily negligent in causing her death and sought 
dismissal of the motion for judgment on that ground.  
Gostel filed a brief opposing the motion for summary 
judgment, contending that neither consuming intoxicants nor 
stepping onto the bumper of a vehicle constituted 
negligence per se and that a jury should decide the matter. 
On October 26, 2001, the trial court held a hearing on 
Wilby’s motion for summary judgment.  At that hearing, 
Wilby contended that Gostel had admitted that Newton had 
climbed onto a moving vehicle because the admission stated 
that the vehicle was “operated by” Wilby.  Gostel contended 
 
4
the admission was only that Wilby operated the vehicle at 
some point, but that this did not necessarily mean that the 
vehicle was moving when Newton climbed onto it.  Gostel 
noted that she had specifically denied that the van was 
moving when Newton stepped onto its bumper.  The trial 
court observed that “the fact . . . missing is that the van 
was moving.  See there is nothing in these admissions that 
says the van was moving.”  The trial court took the matter 
under advisement. 
In an opinion letter dated November 6, 2001, the trial 
court stated that “[t]he admissions in the pleadings show 
that Ms. Newton was negligent as a matter of law . . . 
[because the] Motion for Judgment states that she was 
standing on the bumper of Mr. Wilby’s van while Mr. Wilby 
operated it.”  The trial court further opined that the 
conclusion that Newton was negligent “does not end the 
case, because plaintiff alleges ‘willful and wanton’ 
conduct by Mr. Wilby.”  The trial court directed counsel 
for Wilby to “submit an Order for partial summary judgment 
on the issue of Ms. Newton’s contributory negligence, 
preserving the remaining issues for trial.” 
On January 14, 2002, the trial judge entered an order 
granting partial summary judgment to Wilby, finding that 
Newton was contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
 
5
based upon the rationale stated in the November 6, 2001 
opinion letter.  The order further stated that “there 
remain for trial material issues of fact respecting Wilby’s 
conduct, whether it was ‘willful and wanton’, and whether 
Wilby can rely upon Newton’s contributory negligence as a 
defense under Wolfe v. Baube, 241 Va. 462 (1991).” 
Also on January 14, 2002, Gostel filed a motion for a 
nonsuit as to the claim asserted against Middleton.1  On 
January 24, 2002, Gostel filed a motion for a nonsuit as to 
the claims against Wilby.  In response to the motion for 
nonsuit against him, Wilby proffered a draft order that 
would grant the nonsuit, but expressly preserve the trial 
court’s ruling that Newton was contributorily negligent, 
                     
1Middleton did not join in Wilby’s motion for summary 
judgment, and the trial court’s January 14, 2002 order did 
not award judgment to Middleton on the issue of Newton’s 
contributory negligence.  Middleton did not independently 
seek a determination of whether Newton’s contributory 
negligence would bar recovery on the claim of negligent 
entrustment.  Accordingly, the trial court did not address 
that issue.  Whether contributory negligence by the 
plaintiff will bar recovery under a claim of negligent 
entrustment where the entrustment resulted in either simple 
negligence or in willful and wanton negligence by the 
bailee has not been addressed in Virginia.  We need not 
resolve that issue in this appeal.  But see, e.g., Keller 
v. Kiedinger, 389 So.2d 129, 133 (Ala. 1980) (“In cases of 
negligent entrustment, as in any negligence case, the 
defense of contributory negligence reflects the strong 
public policy that one should not benefit from his own 
negligence”). 
 
 
6
and limit any refiling by Gostel to “the causes of action 
that survived” the January 14, 2002 order.2
Thereafter, Gostel filed a motion to reconsider the 
January 14, 2002 order, and in the same pleading stated her 
objections to the language in Wilby’s draft order of 
nonsuit.  On April 19, 2002, the trial court entered a 
final order denying Gostel’s motion to reconsider.  In 
addressing the nonsuit issue, the trial court determined 
that the holding of Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 Va. 511, 515, 499 
S.E.2d 279, 282 (1998), relied upon by Wilby and Middleton, 
was inapplicable to its January 14, 2002 ruling, because 
the granting of “partial summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants did not dismiss any claim(s) or count(s) with 
prejudice.”  Accordingly, the trial court awarded Gostel a 
nonsuit on all claims.  These appeals followed. 
DISCUSSION 
We awarded appeals to Wilby and Middleton on the 
following assignment of error: 
 
The trial court erred in the entry of its 
Order of April 19, 2002 when it granted the 
plaintiff’s request to suffer a voluntary nonsuit 
as to all counts and claims in her Motion for 
Judgment including the plaintiff’s claim for 
negligence that was resolved by partial summary 
judgment in the Court’s Order of January 14, 
2002. 
                     
2The draft order was not made a part of the record, but 
the trial court quoted from it in its final order. 
 
7
 
We also awarded an appeal to Gostel to consider 
whether the trial court erred in finding that Newton was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  However, any 
consideration of the issue raised by Gostel in her appeal 
necessarily is contingent upon our first finding that the 
trial court erred in not limiting the nonsuit order.  This 
is so because an appeal from a nonsuit order is limited to 
resolving disputes regarding the propriety of granting the 
nonsuit.  Otherwise, a nonsuit order is not an appealable 
order.  McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 32, 458 S.E.2d 759, 
761 (1995).  Thus, only if we conclude that the trial court 
erred in not preserving within the nonsuit order the ruling 
that Newton was contributorily negligent will we be able to 
reach the issue of whether that ruling was proper.  See 
Dalloul, 255 Va. at 514-15, 499 S.E.2d at 281-82.  For this 
reason, we will consider the issue raised in the Wilby and 
Middleton appeals first. 
Code § 8.01-380, which governs the right of a 
plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit, provides, in 
pertinent part, that: 
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a 
nonsuit as to any cause of action or claim, or 
any other party to the proceeding, unless he has 
done so before a motion to strike the evidence 
has been sustained or before the jury retires 
 
8
from the bar or before the action has been 
submitted to the court for decision. 
 
In Dalloul, we held that “‘the action’ subject to a 
plaintiff’s nonsuit request is comprised of the claims and 
parties remaining in the case after any other claims and 
parties have been dismissed with prejudice or otherwise 
eliminated from the case.”  255 Va. at 514, 499 S.E.2d at 
281.  In that case, the trial court entered an order 
dismissing with prejudice four of six counts of a motion 
for judgment.3  Subsequently, the trial court entered a 
voluntary nonsuit order as to the entire case, overruling 
the defendants’ request to limit the nonsuit order to the 
two remaining counts.  Reversing that judgment, we 
concluded that “when the trial court dismissed with 
prejudice Counts III through VI, the respective defendants 
obtained a final disposition of those counts that was 
adverse to Agbey and was res judicata as to those claims 
. . . .  Thus, when Agbey requested the nonsuit, Counts I 
and II were the only claims remaining in the action.”  Id. 
at 514-15, 499 S.E.2d at 281-82. 
Wilby’s motion for summary judgment was premised upon 
Newton’s contributory negligence being an absolute bar to 
                     
3A seventh count of the motion for judgment dismissed 
in a prior ruling was not at issue in the subsequent 
appeal. 
 
9
recovery by the administrator of her estate for any 
liability arising from his actions.  However, as the trial 
court noted, if the evidence were to show that Wilby’s 
conduct rose to the level of willful and wanton negligence, 
he could not rely upon Newton’s contributory negligence as 
a defense unless Newton’s conduct also rose to that level 
of negligence.  Wolfe v. Baube, 241 Va. 462, 465, 403 
S.E.2d 338, 339 (1991).  “Willful and wanton negligence is 
acting consciously in disregard of another person’s rights 
or acting with reckless indifference to the consequences, 
with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing 
circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably 
would cause injury to another.”  Griffin v. Shively, 227 
Va. 317, 321, 315 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1984). 
Nonetheless, Wilby and Middleton assert that the trial 
court erred in ruling that Dalloul did not require a 
limitation on the nonsuit order in this case.  This is so, 
they contend, because the claims of negligence and willful 
and wanton conduct contained in both count 1 and count 2 of 
the motion for judgment qualify as separate “claims.”  
Thus, they contend that when the trial court found as a 
matter of law that Newton was contributorily negligent, 
Gostel’s “claim” for liability premised on Wilby’s simple 
_______________________ 
 
 
10
negligence was resolved adverse to her and was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata, just as the claims in Dalloul 
had been resolved adverse to the plaintiff in that case.  
We disagree. 
In Dalloul, each count of the motion for judgment 
contained a separate claim based upon a distinct theory of 
liability.  255 Va. at 512, 499 S.E.2d at 280.  The trial 
court’s dismissal of those counts eliminated entirely from 
the case those theories of liability and the evidence that 
would have been adduced thereon.  Here, by contrast, the 
trial court’s ruling did not eliminate either count 1 or 
count 2 or otherwise limit the evidence that would be 
relevant to the resolution of the claims made in those 
counts. 
The claims made in count 1 and count 2 of the motion 
for judgment relate to Wilby’s liability for his conduct.  
Gostel alleged that this conduct was “negligent” and also 
that it was “willful and wanton.”  However, these two 
allegations do not represent separate claims or theories of 
liability.  Rather, in this context, negligent conduct and 
willful and wanton conduct merely refer to different 
degrees of proof that can be applied to the same theory of 
liability.  As we have previously explained:  
 
11
Willful and wanton negligence is one of 
three levels of negligence.  Simple negligence is 
the failure to use the degree of care an ordinary 
person would exercise to avoid injury to another.  
The second level of negligence, gross negligence, 
is action which shows indifference to others, 
disregarding prudence to the level that the 
safety of others is completely neglected.  Gross 
negligence is negligence which shocks fair-minded 
people, but is less than willful recklessness.  
Willful and wanton negligence, the third level, 
is acting consciously in disregard of another 
person’s rights or acting with reckless 
indifference to the consequences, with the 
defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing 
circumstances and conditions, that his conduct 
probably would cause injury to another. 
 
Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. 336, 340-41, 486 S.E.2d 99, 101 
(1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 
see also Alfonso v. Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 545, 514 S.E.2d 
615, 618 (1999). 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that 
its ruling on Wilby’s motion for summary judgment did not 
render final judgment on the claims asserted in count 1 and 
count 2 of Gostel’s motion for judgment.  Rather, the 
ruling had the effect of an in limine determination that in 
the posture of this case Gostel’s burden of proof would be 
to establish willful and wanton negligence.  While it was 
undoubtedly adverse to Gostel, this ruling did not dismiss 
any count or claim in the motion for judgment, as in 
Dalloul, and it did not dismiss with prejudice either Wilby 
or Middleton as parties to the suit.  Thus, we hold that 
 
12
Gostel was entitled under Code § 8.01-380 to take a 
voluntary nonsuit as to her entire cause of action and as 
to all the defendants. 
Having determined that the trial court did not err in 
entering the nonsuit order without limitation, we hold that 
the nonsuit order was not a final appealable order with 
respect to the issue of contributory negligence decided in 
the motion for summary judgment.  See Spotsylvania County 
School Board v. Seaboard Surety Co., 243 Va. 202, 220, 415 
S.E.2d 120, 130 (1992) (holding that issues raised on 
demurrer and motion for summary judgment were rendered moot 
by the taking of a nonsuit).  Accordingly, we will dismiss 
Gostel’s appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 
judgment entering a voluntary nonsuit as to all counts and 
claims alleged in Gostel’s motion for judgment. 
                             Record No. 021606 – Affirmed. 
                             Record No. 021646 – Affirmed. 
Record No. 021655 – Dismissed. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, dissenting. 
 
 
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the 
trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment 
merely had “the effect of an in limine determination that 
 
13
in the posture of this case [the plaintiff’s] burden of 
proof would be to establish willful and wanton negligence.”  
Rather, I conclude that the ruling was a determination on 
the merits disposing of the simple negligence claims 
asserted against one of the defendants, Charles David 
Wilby.4  Therefore, the nonsuit should have been limited to 
the claims that survived the trial court’s award of partial 
summary judgment.  See Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 Va. 511, 514, 
499 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1998). 
 
A party may take a nonsuit as to any cause of action 
or claim provided the party does so “before the action has 
been submitted to the court for decision.”  Code § 8.01-
380(A).  An action is deemed “submitted to the court” when 
both parties have yielded the issues to the court for 
consideration and decision.  Liddle v. Phipps, 263 Va. 391, 
395, 559 S.E.2d 690, 693 (2002).  A party may not take a 
nonsuit after the court has announced its decision, Khanna 
v. Dominion Bank of Northern Virginia, 237 Va. 242, 245, 
377 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1989) (holding that the trial court 
                     
4 The plaintiff alleged simple negligence as well as 
willful and wanton negligence with regard to both Wilby’s 
operation of the vehicle (Count I) and his alleged failure 
to render assistance (Count II).  In a third count, the 
plaintiff alleged both negligent and willful and wanton 
entrustment claims against Middleton Heating & Air, Inc. 
and Daniel J. Middleton. 
 
 
14
did not err by denying defendant’s motion for nonsuit made 
after the court had granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment), or reached a final determination regarding any 
claims or parties to those claims, Dalloul, at 514, 499 
S.E.2d at 281.  Instead, “ ‘the action’ subject to a 
plaintiff’s nonsuit request is comprised of the claims and 
parties remaining in the case after any other claims and 
parties have been dismissed with prejudice or otherwise 
eliminated from the case.”  Id. (Emphasis added.) 
 
In this case, Wilby moved for summary judgment on the 
basis that Newton was contributorially negligent as a 
matter of law.5  Summary judgment exists “to allow trial 
courts to bring litigation to an end at an early stage when 
it clearly appear[s] that one of the parties [is] entitled 
to a judgment in the case as made out by the pleadings and 
the admissions of the parties.”  Kasco Mills, Inc. v. 
Ferebee, 197 Va. 589, 593, 90 S.E.2d 866, 870 (1956); 
accord Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 140, 427 S.E.2d 189, 
192 (1993); see also Rule 3:18.  Wilby’s summary judgment 
motion, if it had been granted by the trial court, would 
have disposed of the entire case as to Wilby. 
                     
5 The other two defendants did not join in Wilby’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
15
 
The court, however, concluded that full summary 
judgment was not appropriate.  In a letter opinion 
subsequently incorporated in the order granting partial 
summary judgment, the court found that Newton’s negligence 
was contributory and barred recovery as a matter of law.  
However, the court recognized that contributory negligence 
will not bar recovery against a defendant who is willfully 
and wantonly negligent unless the plaintiff is also guilty 
of willful and wanton conduct.  See Wolfe v. Baube, 241 Va. 
462, 465, 403 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1991).  The court determined 
that, while “[the] undisputed facts, Virginia law, [and] 
argument of counsel” established that Newton was “negligent 
as a matter of law,” the question remained whether Wilby’s 
conduct was “willful and wanton,” and “whether Wilby 
[could] rely upon Newton’s contributory negligence as a 
defense.”  Thus, the trial court granted “partial summary 
judgment for Wilby on the issue whether Ms. Newton’s 
conduct was contributory negligence.” 
 
Partial summary judgment is “[a] summary judgment that 
is limited to certain issues in a case and that disposes of 
only a portion of the whole case.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
1449 (7th ed. 1999).  By granting partial summary judgment 
on the issue of contributory negligence, the trial court 
decided, on the merits, that portion of the case pertaining 
 
16
to Wilby’s alleged simple negligence and thereby eliminated 
those claims from the case.  See Litchford v. Hancock, 232 
Va. 496, 499, 352 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1987) (plaintiff’s 
negligence that is proximate cause of accident will bar 
recovery); Watson v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 199 Va. 
570, 575, 100 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1957) (one who is guilty of 
contributory negligence that caused injuries is not 
entitled to recover damages therefor).  Once those simple 
negligence claims had been disposed of, “ ‘the action’ 
subject to [the] plaintiff’s nonsuit request[,]” with 
regard to Wilby, consisted of only the claims alleging 
willful and wanton negligence.  Dalloul, 255 Va. at 514, 
499 S.E.2d at 281.  Those were the only claims asserted 
against Wilby “remaining in the case” after the trial court 
granted partial summary judgment in his favor.  Id.
 
The majority’s suggestion that the trial court’s 
ruling granting partial summary judgment did not dismiss 
any “count or claim in the motion for judgment” places form 
over substance.  It should not matter whether the plaintiff 
in this case alleged simple negligence and willful and 
wanton negligence in the same or separate counts.  The fact 
remains that the order awarding partial summary judgment 
based on Newton’s contributory negligence eliminated the 
simple negligence claims alleged against Wilby.  The trial 
 
17
court obviously recognized this fact when stating, in its 
letter opinion, that material issues regarding Wilby’s 
willful and wanton conduct remained for trial. 
 
This Court has defined the term “claim” as “ ‘an 
authoritative or challenging request,’ ” “ ‘a demand of a 
right or supposed right,’ ” or “ ‘a calling on another for 
something due or supposed to be due.’ ”  Stamie E. Lyttle 
Co. v. County of Hanover, 231 Va. 21, 26 n.4, 341 S.E.2d 
174, 178 n.4 (1986); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 240 
(7th ed. 1999) (the term “claim” is defined as “[t]he 
aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right 
enforceable by a court”).  The right eliminated by the 
order granting partial summary judgment was the right to 
recover damages caused by Wilby’s alleged simple 
negligence.  See Woodbury v. Courtney, 239 Va. 651, 654-55, 
391 S.E.2d 293, 295-96 (1990) (affirming trial court’s 
grant of partial summary judgment dismissing negligence 
claim and holding that plaintiff was not entitled to 
present evidence of negligence during trial on remaining 
battery claim); see also United Masonry Inc. v. Riggs Nat’l 
Bank, 233 Va. 476, 484, 357 S.E.2d 509, 514 (1987) 
(affirming trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment 
to defendant). 
 
18
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would 
reverse the trial court’s judgment sustaining the 
plaintiff’s request to nonsuit all claims alleged in the 
motion for judgment.  Consequently, unlike the majority, I 
must now address the plaintiff’s separate appeal in which 
she asserts that the trial court erred in finding that 
Newton was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. 
 
As the trial court noted in its letter opinion and 
order granting partial summary judgment, the plaintiff 
admitted that Newton “climbed onto the van operated by 
Charles David Wilby” and that Newton “had used intoxicants” 
before doing so.  Based on these undisputed facts, I agree 
with the trial court’s determination that Newton was 
contributorially negligent as a matter of law. 
 
Thus, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the 
judgments of the circuit court in the appeals filed by the 
defendants (Record Nos. 021606 and 021646) and affirm the 
judgment in the appeal filed by the plaintiff (Record No. 
021655). 
 
19