Title: PATRICIA GROVE and KRISTA GROVE V. RANDLE PFISTER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PATRICIA GROVE and KRISTA GROVE V. RANDLE PFISTER2005 WY 51110 P.3d 275Case Number: 04-121Decided: 04/20/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                
            

 
 
PATRICIA 
GROVE and KRISTA GROVE,

 
 
Petitioners,

 
 
v.

 
 
RANDLE 
PFISTER,

 
 

Respondent.

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Petitioners:

Jessica 
Rutzick of Jackson, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Respondent:

Timothy 
J. Bommer of Jackson, 
Wyoming

 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Patricia Grove 
(Grove) and her minor daughter, Krista, filed suit against Randle Pfister 
(Pfister) alleging that his negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulted in a 
collision with their vehicle causing them injury.  Upon motion by Pfister, the district 
court ordered joinder of a passenger in Grove's vehicle as an indispensable 
party under W.R.C.P. 19.  The order 
provided that failure to join would result in the dismissal of the action.  We granted Grove's Petition for a Writ 
of Review and reverse the district court's order, and remand for further 
proceedings.

 
 

[¶2]      Grove sets out 
five issues in her brief:

1.                  
In a 
personal injury suit arising from a motor vehicle collision, is a front-seat 
passenger, whose actions did not cause or contribute to the accident in any way, 
an indispensable party under W.R.C.P. 19(a)?

 
 

2.                  
Does the 
district court have jurisdiction over a front-seat passenger, whose actions did 
not cause or contribute in any way to the motor vehicle collision giving rise to 
the lawsuit?

 
 

3.                  
In a 
personal injury suit arising from a motor vehicle collision, is a front-seat 
passenger, whose actions did not cause or contribute to the accident in any way, 
an indispensable party whose failure to be joined in the lawsuit justifies 
dismissal of the suit under W.R.C.P. 19(b)?

 
 

4.                  
Did 
Respondent waive his right to move to join the front-seat passenger of 
Plaintiff's vehicle by failing to timely raise the issue?

 
 

5.                  
If the 
Wyoming Supreme Court finds that a front-seat passenger, whose actions did not 
cause or contribute to the accident in any way, is nevertheless an indispensable 
party under W.R.C.P. 19, what is the proper process for service, pleading and 
practice to join an involuntary plaintiff under these 
circumstances?

 
 
Pfister 
replies with six issues:

 
 

1.                  
Whether 
review by the Wyoming Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 13.02 W.R.A.P., of the 
District Court's order concerning a Rule 19 W.R.C.P. motion for joinder is 
appropriate.

 
 

2.                  
Whether 
the District Court abused its discretion when it held that Deborah Broberg was a 
party that must be joined in this action pursuant to Rule 19(a) 
W.R.C.P.

 
 

3.                  
Whether 
the District Court abused it [sic] discretion when it ordered that the 
[Groves'] action 
would be dismissed if the [they] failed to join Ms. Broberg in this action by 
June 8, 2004.

 
 

4.                  
Whether 
[Pfister] waived his right to move to have Ms. Broberg joined in this action 
pursuant to Rule 19 W.R.C.P. when his motion for joinder came after the 
confirmation under oath of relevant facts in discovery.

 
 

5.                  
Whether 
the District Court erred in the manner in which it ordered [the Groves] to join Ms. 
Broberg in this action.

 
 

6.                  
Whether 
there is an alternative form of relief that supports the District Court's 
holding.

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      In a complaint 
filed on July 28, 2003, Grove stated that she was driving northbound on State 
Highway 191 on December 7, 2001.  
Her daughter was in the back seat, and a friend, Deborah Broberg 
(Broberg), was in the front passenger seat.  At the time, the highway was slick with 
ice and snow.  Grove alleged that 
when she slowed down for a snowplow, Pfister negligently drove his vehicle into 
the rear of hers causing injury to Grove and her daughter.  Pfister filed an answer denying the 
allegation of negligence.  On March 
22, 2004, Pfister filed a motion seeking joinder of Broberg as a party pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 19.  Broberg had 
submitted a claim to Pfister's insurance company but had not filed any legal 
action against him.  After a 
hearing, the district court granted Pfister's motion, finding that, "Broberg is 
a person whose presence is needed for a just adjudication as provided by Rule 
19(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and that her joinder will not 
deprive this Court of jurisdiction[.]"  
Grove petitioned this Court for a writ of review, which we have 
granted.

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      District court 
rulings on joinder are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek 
Holding and Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 668-70 (Wyo. 1988); England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 
1139-40 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 
[T]he 
core of our inquiry must reach "the question of reasonableness of the choice 
made by the trial court."  Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Id. (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wash. App. 1985)); 
Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995).  We must ask ourselves whether the 
district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious.

 
 

Woods v. 
Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 2004 
WY 61, ¶20, 90 P.3d 724, ¶20 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Gore v. Sherard, 2002 
WY 114, ¶20, 50 P.3d 705, ¶20 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 

 
 
[¶5]      Preliminarily, we 
address a claim by Pfister that the district court's ruling on joinder is not 
the proper subject for appellate examination pursuant to a writ of a 
review.  Pfister asserts that 
W.R.A.P. 13.021 allows for interlocutory review of 
a lower court ruling only when the dispute concerns a question of law.  Pfister characterizes the district 
court's joinder ruling as "a factually based decision made in the discretion of 
the District Court."  Since there is 
no disagreement over the applicable rule of law, Pfister argues that the dispute 
must be over the factual findings of the court and, hence, not the proper 
subject of appellate review under Rule 13.02.

 
 
[¶6]      Historically, we 
have invoked our discretionary powers to issue a writ of review when a case 
involves an important state question or is of sufficient public significance to 
justify interlocutory review by this Court.  In re Big HornRiver 
System, 803 P.2d 61, 67 (Wyo. 1990).  While we do not grant a writ lightly, 
especially if an adequate alternative remedy is available, we will do so without 
hesitation when the timely resolution of a matter is of extreme and lasting 
importance to the citizens of Wyoming and may contribute to judicial 
efficiency.  Id.  This case raises an issue that has not 
been addressed by this Court.  The 
petitioners were faced with the choice of having their lawsuit dismissed or 
proceeding to trial joined with a co-plaintiff against their will.  That the decision was within the 
discretion of the district court is not a bar to our review under a writ.  We have said that a writ of review is a 
proper means for correcting an abuse of district court discretion.  V-1 Oil Company v. Ranck, 767 P.2d 612, 616 (Wyo. 1989).  An abuse of discretion can exist if the 
wrong law has been applied, the correct law has been applied but incorrectly 
interpreted, or if the correct law has been improperly applied.  This matter is properly before us for 
review.

 
 
[¶7]      Rule 19 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure governs joinder of persons needed for a just 
adjudication.  The analysis under 
Rule 19 first requires a determination if the person to be joined meets the 
criteria set forth in subsection (a):

 
 
(a)  Persons to be 
joined if feasible -- A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if: (1) in the person's 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties; or (2) 
the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may: (i) as 
a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that 
interest; or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so 
joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party.  If the person should join as a plaintiff 
but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, 
an involuntary plaintiff.  If the 
joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue 
of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the 
action.

 
 
If the person meets those criteria, 
he or she is then considered a "person to be joined if feasible."  Lamb v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 985 P.2d 433, 439 
(Wyo. 
1999).  If joinder is not feasible, 
the court then must examine the considerations set forth in subsection (b) to 
determine whether "in equity and good conscience" the action should 
proceed:

 
 
(b)  Determination by 
court whenever joinder not feasible -- If a person as described in 
subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall 
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among 
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable.  The 
factors to be considered by the court include:

(1)   To what extent a judgment rendered 
in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already 
parties;

(2)   The extent to which, by protective 
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the 
prejudice can be lessened or avoided;

(3)   Whether a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence will be adequate;

(4)   Whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

 
 
W.R.C.P. 19(b).  If the court concludes that "in equity 
and good conscience" the action cannot proceed without the person in question, 
that person is considered indispensable and must be joined, or dismissal will 
result.  Id.; Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En 
Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Wyo. 1988); Reilly v. Reilly, 671 P.2d 330, 332 
(Wyo. 
1983).

 
 
[¶8]      The question 
before us is whether a non-party with a tort cause of action for injuries 
arising out of the same incident that is the subject of a negligence action must 
be joined thereto under the criteria of Rule 19(a).  Grove argues that each person possesses 
a separate and distinct cause of action that does not trigger any of the 
criteria for joinder.  Grove insists 
that Broberg's absence would have no effect on her own ability to receive relief 
on her claim or Broberg's ability to protect her interests.  Furthermore, Grove declares that Pfister 
would not be subjected to multiple or inconsistent obligations since her claims 
and those of Broberg are independent of one another, as each is predicated on a 
claim of personal injury that is unrelated to the other's claim.  Pfister counters by declaring that the 
question is largely one of fact and that we should defer to the district court's 
exercise of its discretion.

 
 
[¶9]      Since the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after their federal counterparts, we have 
found federal court interpretations of their rules highly persuasive for 
interpretations of our corresponding rules.  Peters v. West Park Hospital, 
2003 WY 117, ¶10, 76 P.3d 821, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003); Caldwell v. Cummings, 
2001 WY 106, ¶10, 33 P.3d 1138, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001).  We begin our review then by quoting 
extensively from a Maryland court's review of the applicable 
federal law:

 
 
The purpose of the Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 
is "to bring before the court all persons whose joinder would be desirable for a 
just adjudication of the action."  7 
Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1604, at 36 
(2d ed. 1986). Professors Wright, Miller and Kane state:

 
 
"There is no precise formula for 
determining whether a particular nonparty must be joined under Rule 19(a).  The decision has to be made in terms of 
the general policies of avoiding multiple litigation, providing the parties with 
complete and effective relief in a single action, and protecting the absent 
persons from the possible prejudicial effect of deciding the case without 
them.  Account must also be taken of 
whether other alternatives are available to the litigants.  By its very nature, Rule 19(a) calls for 
determinations that are heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of 
individual cases, although certain general patterns are apparent in the 
decisions."

 
 
7 Wright, et al., supra, § 
1604, at 40.

 
 
With regard to tort actions 
involving multiple plaintiffs who are severally entitled to relief against a 
tortfeasor, it has been stated:

 
 
"When several tort actions 
instituted by different persons arise out of the same incident, the complaining 
parties need not be joined in the suits brought by the others.  For instance, in an action by a husband 
for personal injuries, his wife's joinder may not be essential if her claim for 
loss of consortium is wholly independent under state law and she is free to 
assert it in a separate action."

 
 
7 Wright, et al., supra, § 
1623, at 349-50. Professor Moore similarly states in this 
regard:

 
 
"The possibility of adjudications 
that are inconsistent merely as a matter of logic does not trigger the 
application of Rule 19(a).  Thus 
when several persons are injured by the same tort and proof of damage is 
individual, the fact that want of an estoppel may leave a defendant who has 
defended successfully against one of the injured parties with the risk that he 
will be liable to another in a subsequent suit does not make it necessary that 
all the putative plaintiffs be joined in the same suit ."

 
 
3A James W. Moore & Jo D. Lucas, 
Moore's Federal Practice para. 19.07-1[2.-2], at 19-123-24 
(1993).

 
 
In line with the commentators, 
federal decisions generally manifest a pattern of not requiring joinder of 
parties who possess separate and distinct causes of action arising out of a 
single tortuous incident. See Lewis v. Holden, 821 F.2d 291 
(5th Cir. 1987) (Under Mississippi law, parents and minor possess 
separate causes of action for negligent injury to minor and minor need not be 
joined in parent's action by Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)); Bakia v. County of Los 
Angeles, 687 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1982) (It is a misapplication of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 (a) to add parties who are neither necessary nor indispensable, 
who are not essential for just adjudication and who have a separate cause of 
action entirely); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(wife, whose cause of action for loss of consortium was separate and distinct 
from decedent spouse's claim, not required to be joined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
19(a)); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975) (airplane crash victims' next of kin, who 
may be potential plaintiffs, are not required to be joined in suit with other 
crash victims); Sove v. Smith, 311 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1962) 
(wife, whose cause of action for loss of consortium was separate and distinct 
from husband's own claim, not required to be joined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19); 
Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.R.D. 427 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (minor 
not required to be joined in parents' suit seeking recovery for emotional 
distress as a result of defendant's negligent medical treatment of minor); 
Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319 (S.D. Iowa 1965) (wife, whose cause 
of action for loss of consortium is a separate and distinct from husband's own 
claim, not required to be joined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)).  But see Aguilar v. County of Los 
Angeles, 751 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125, 105 S. Ct. 2656, 86 L. Ed. 2d 273 (1985) (where under California state law 
collateral estoppel may preclude minor from relitigating issue of negligence if 
his parents were unsuccessful in a federal diversity action, minor required to 
be joined in his parent's action for recovery of pre-majority medical expenses); 
Lopez v. Martin Luther King, Jr. Hosp., 97 F.R.D. 24 (C.D. Cal. 1983) 
(same).

 
 
State courts addressing this issue 
likewise have not required joinder of the child's claim for personal injuries 
and the parent's claim for medical expenses. Troutman v. Ollis, 134 
Mich.App. 332, 351 N.W.2d 301 (1984); Independent School Dist. I-29 v. 
Crawford, 688 P.2d 1291 (Okla. 1984); 
Glover v. Narick, 184 W.Va. 381, 400 S.E.2d 816 
(1990).

 
 
Indeed, as the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized in circumstances similar to the case 
sub judice, requiring joinder of separate causes of action arising out of 
a single tortious incident would render meaningless the distinction between 
permissive and compulsory joinder. Field, supra, 626 F.2d  at 301. 
In Field, supra, the court determined that a wife's separate and 
distinct cause of action for loss of consortium was not required to be joined in 
the same action brought by her deceased husband's estate and her son against the 
tortfeasor. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained in relevant 
part:

 
 
"The right to separate and 
individual relief asserted against VWAG by [the wife] in her individual 
capacity, however, even though it arises out of the same occurrence, exists 
quite apart from the claims asserted by [her son and her husband's] estate and, 
if upheld, would impose upon VWAG an obligation separate and distinct from its 
obligations to the other parties. Complete relief under Rule 19(a)(1) refers to 
relief as between the persons already parties, not as between a party and the 
absent person whose joinder is sought, and mere theoretical considerations of 
disposing of the whole controversy should not be employed' to dismiss an action 
where it appears unlikely that absent persons could be adversely 
affected.'  Indeed, to dismiss the 
action on the ground that [the wife] is indispensable would appear to deny a 
principal aspect of several liability.'

 
 
                        
626 F.2d  at 301 (footnotes omitted).

 
 
Although we have stated that one of 
the purposes of compulsory joinder is "to prevent multiplicity of litigation by 
assuring a determination of the entire controversy in a single 
proceeding,'"  Mahan v. 
Mahan, [320 Md. 262, 272, 577 A.2d 70, 75 (1990)] (quoting Bender v. 
Secretary, Dep't of Personnel, 290 Md. 345, 351, 430 A.2d 66, 69-70 (1981)), 
we agree with the commentators and other courts that have addressed this issue 
and hold that under [Maryland's equivalent of federal rule 19] the parents' 
claim for medical expenses arising because of a tortious injury to their minor 
child is not required to be joined in a single action with the minor's claim for 
personal injuries.

 
 

Garay v. Overholtzer, 631 A.2d 429, 437-38 (1993).  See also Harris v. 
Illinois-California Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 1361, 1367 (10th Cir. 1982) (In negligence action 
arising out of automobile accident, co-passengers' claims were not dependent on 
the other's presence as a party since their claims could be successfully 
advanced independently of each other.).  
Several more recent cases have reached the same result:  Le Blanc v. Cleveland, 248 F.3d 95, 98-99 (2nd Cir. 2001); Delgado v. Plaza Las Americas, 
Inc., 139 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1998); and Rishell v. Jane 
Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center, 94 F.3d 1407, 1410-13 
(10th Cir. 1996).  In 
Delgado, the First Circuit appellate panel vacated and remanded a 
district court order dismissing the complaint of a rape victim's father against 
a shopping center and insurance company for failure to join the victim, who had 
filed an action in a state court, as a necessary party.  The panel 
reasoned:

 
 
The primary question before us, 
then, is whether the district court correctly determined that [the daughter] is 
a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii). [Footnote omitted] As 
stated above, Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii) provides that an absentee may be 
deemed a necessary party if nonjoinder will "leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest."  Although the plaintiff has the right to 
control his own litigation and to choose his own forum, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
19(a)(2)(ii) balances these rights against the defendants' (and systemic) 
interests in avoiding judgments giving rise to "inconsistent obligations."  See Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 
421 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1970).

 
 
"Inconsistent obligations" are not, 
however, the same as inconsistent adjudications or results.  See Micheel v. Haralson, 586 F. Supp. 169, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice P 
19.03 (3d ed. 1997).  Inconsistent 
obligations occur when a party is unable to comply with one court's order 
without breaching another court's order concerning the same incident.  See 4 Moore's at P 19.03.  Inconsistent adjudications or results, 
by contrast, occur when a defendant successfully defends a claim in one forum, 
yet loses on another claim arising from the same incident in another forum.  See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 
117 F.R.D. 321, 322 (D. Mass. 1987) (citing Bedel v. Thompson, 103 F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D. Ohio 1984)); see also Boone v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 682 F.2d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 1982) (the threat of 
inconsistent obligations, not multiple litigations, informs Fed. R. Civ. P. 
19(a) considerations); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293, 301 (3d. 
Cir. 1980) (similar).  Unlike a risk 
of inconsistent obligations, a risk that a defendant who has successfully 
defended against a party may be found liable to another party in a subsequent 
action arising from the same incident  i.e., a risk of inconsistent 
adjudications or results  does not necessitate joinder of all of the parties 
into one action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).  See Field, 626 F.2d  at 301.  Moreover, where two suits arising from 
the same incident involve different causes of action, defendants are not faced 
with the potential for double liability because separate suits have different 
consequences and different measures of damages.  See In Re Torcise, 116 F.3d 860, 
866 (11th Cir. 1997). 

 
 
In this situation, defendants faced 
a federal action and a state action arising from the same incident.  In reasoning that defendants could be 
facing "inconsistent obligations," the district court noted that defendants 
could be found liable to [the father] in federal court, but not liable to [the 
daughter] in state court, or vice versa.  
Although the court also looked to other factors in reaching its 
conclusion, it is this determination  which is really a determination that 
defendants faced the threat of inconsistent results  that grounded the court's 
ruling that [the daughter] was a necessary party to this lawsuit.  Yet as we have explained, the mere 
possibility of inconsistent results in separate actions does not make the 
plaintiff in each action a necessary party to the other.  And even if it did, the fact remains 
that [the daughter] and her father have separate causes of action based on 
different theories of recovery.  We 
therefore cannot sustain the court's ruling that [the daughter] is a party both 
necessary and indispensable to this lawsuit.

 
 

Delgado, 139 F.3d  at 
5-8.

 
 
[¶10]   The only direct authority cited by 
Pfister in support of his argument for the district court's ruling is Mendez 
v. Vatican Shrimp Company, 43 F.R.D. 294 (S.D. Texas 1966).  There, two crewmen on one of the 
defendant's shrimp boats died at sea.  
The administratrix of the estate of one of the crewmen filed suit against 
the defendant, who moved to join the estate of the other crewman as a party 
under federal Rule 19.  The court 
ordered joinder on the basis that the rule "contemplates the joinder of parties 
to avoid a multiplicity of suits."  
Id. at 295-96; see also Ramsey v. 
Bomin Testing, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 335, 337 (W.D. Okla. 1975).  We cannot agree with that court's 
reasoning.  As the Delgado 
court noted above, Rule 19 does not concern itself with "multiplicity of suits." 
The Wyoming 
version of the Rule says:

 
 
(a)  Persons to be 
joined if feasible -- A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if:  (2) the person 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
the disposition of the action in the person's absence may:  
(ii)  leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Plainly, the Rule is referring to 
obligations -- not results.  See 
Boone v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 682 F.2d 552, at 554 (5th Cir. 1982).  For the reasons enunciated by 
Garay and Delgado and the cases cited therein, we decline to adopt 
the view espoused by the Mendez court.

 
 
[¶11]   Applying the reasoning of the above 
quoted cases, we conclude that the district court erred in requiring 
joinder.  Grove and Broberg possess 
separate and distinct causes of action that are independent of one another.  Broberg's absence from this litigation 
will not prevent complete relief from being accorded to Grove on her 
complaint.  Likewise, disposition in 
Broberg's absence will not in any way impair or impede her ability to protect 
any claim she may have against Pfister.  
The only consequence of not joining Broberg is the possibility that 
Pfister may face inconsistent adjudications.  Joinder is, however, appropriate under 
Rule 19 when a party faces inconsistent obligations.  As the Delgado decision quoted 
above stresses, the two concepts are not the same thing.  The mere possibility of inconsistent 
adjudications is not sufficient of itself to render a party necessary under Rule 
19.  Delgado, 139 F.3d  at 
3.  The fact is that Grove and 
Broberg possess claims that are not dependent upon the other, and each could 
successfully advance their respective claims independently.  Accordingly, we cannot sustain the 
district court's ruling that Broberg was a necessary and indispensable party to 
Grove's suit.

 
 
[¶12]   In a final effort, Pfister urges us 
to affirm the district court's order under W.R.C.P. 20.2  That Rule is concerned with permissive 
joinder and "joinder in situations falling within the rule's standard is not 
required unless it is within the scope of compulsory joinder prescribed by Rule 
19."  7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur 
R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1652, at 
395-96 (2001).  We need not consider 
Pfister's argument any further.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   Grove and Broberg possessed 
separate and independent causes of action.  
The district court erred when it found Broberg to be a necessary and 
indispensable party and required joinder.  
We reverse and remand to the district court so that Grove may proceed 
with her claim.

FOOTNOTES

  113.02 When interlocutory review 
may be granted.

 
 
A writ 
of review may be granted by the reviewing court to review an interlocutory order 
of a trial court in a civil or criminal action, or from an interlocutory order 
of an administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable under these 
rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to which there are 
substantial bases for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal 
from the order may materially advance resolution of the 
litigation.

 
 

2Rule 20. 
Permissive joinder of parties.

 
 

(a)               
Permissive 
joinder.  All 
persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief 
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if 
any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the 
action.  All persons may be joined 
in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising 
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will 
arise in the action.  A plaintiff or 
defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the 
relief demanded.  Judgment may be 
given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to 
relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective 
liabilities.

(b)               
Separate 
trials.  The 
court may make such orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, 
delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom the party 
asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the party, and may order 
separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or 
prejudice.