Title: VAN HAELE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VAN HAELE v. STATE2004 WY 5990 P.3d 708Case Number: 03-138Decided: 05/25/2004
April 
Term, A.D. 2004

 

 

MARK 
QUIXOTE VAN HAELE,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

James 
P. Castberg, Sheridan, WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; Robin 
Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a judgment finding appellant Mark Quixote Van Haele guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery upon the district court's acceptance of an unconditional 
plea of nolo contendere under a 
plea agreement.  In addition, Van 
Haele seeks relief from the 
district court's refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea at the sentencing 
hearing.  Van Haele further asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his earlier motion 
for continuance of trial on the aggravated 
assault and battery charge in order to try it with a related charge also 
asserted against him.  Upon our review, we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues, as 
phrased by Van Haele, are as follows:  

 

I.  Was it arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of 
judicial discretion for the trial judge to deny appellant's motion to reschedule 
jury trial in order that both of the felony charges filed against the appellant 
arising out of the same incident could be tried at the same time?
 

II.  Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing 
to comply with Rule 11(d) to insure that the appellant's change of plea to "nolo 
contendere" was voluntary and to require that a factual basis be established 
before entering judgment on the defendant's change of plea to "nolo contendere" 
as required by Rule 11(f) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure?
 

III.  Was it arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of 
judicial discretion for the trial judge to deny appellant's request to withdraw 
his plea of "nolo contendere" prior to entering conviction and passing sentence 
as provided by Rule 32(d) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On July 2, 2001, 
Van Haele was charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery stemming 
from Van Haele's alleged stabbing of another person in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).1  Initially Van Haele pled not guilty to 
this charge.  A trial date was then 
set by the district court for January 16, 2002.  

 

[¶4]      On January 2, 
2002, Van Haele was also charged with property destruction and defacement 
stemming from the same altercation as the aggravated assault and battery 
charge.  Accordingly, Van Haele 
filed a motion to reschedule the trial in order that the two charges could be 
tried together.  This motion was 
denied.  

 

[¶5]      On January 16, 
2002, a jury trial commenced on the aggravated assault and battery charge.  After two and a half days, during which 
Van Haele took the stand in his own defense, the trial concluded.  Upon deliberation, the jury was unable 
to reach a verdict.  On March 27, 
2002, the State filed its Notice of Intent to Retry Case with respect to the 
aggravated assault and battery charge.  
The district court then set a new trial date of September 16, 2002, on 
both the aggravated assault and battery and property destruction and defacement 
charges.  Upon motion, the district 
court then allowed Van Haele's attorney of record to withdraw from the case on 
August 14, 2002.  

 

[¶6]      On August 27, 
2002, new counsel formally entered an appearance on Van Haele's behalf and soon 
thereafter filed a motion to vacate and reschedule the impending trial.  This motion was granted, and the 
district court rescheduled the trial for February 10, 2003.  A plea agreement was reached on February 
3, 2003, and a change of plea hearing was held on February 4, 2003. 

 

[¶7]      At this hearing 
the State explained that the parties had agreed that, in exchange for Van 
Haele's plea of nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault and battery, 
the State would dismiss the property destruction and defacement charge and that 
the State would recommend that Van Haele be sentenced to a term of one to three 
years, suspended in favor of eighteen months of supervised probation.  After receiving the details of the plea 
agreement, the district court confirmed through Van Haele that the terms of the 
plea agreement were correctly expressed.  
Van Haele further indicated that he had ample opportunity to discuss the 
agreement with his counsel.  

 

[¶8]      The court then 
determined that Van Haele was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 
advised Van Haele that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement, 
that a pre-sentence investigation report would be conducted and, thereafter, 
another hearing would be held so that the district court could determine if it 
would accept the plea.  The district 
court further informed Van Haele that if it rejected the plea agreement, Van 
Haele could withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.  However, if the district court accepted 
the plea agreement, a conviction would be entered, sentence would be imposed, 
and Van Haele would not be permitted to withdraw his plea.  The court also explained to Van Haele 
some of the terms of supervised probation in the event the district court 
accepted the plea agreement. 

 

[¶9]      At that time Van 
Haele indicated that he still desired to change his plea and formally 
unconditionally pled nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault and 
battery.  The district court further 
recognized that, because it had sat through the initial trial concerning the 
alleged facts related to this charge, there was an adequate factual basis to 
warrant acceptance of the plea. 

 

[¶10]   On March 27, 2003, a sentencing 
hearing was held, and the district court indicated that it would accept the plea 
agreement reached between the parties.  
Nevertheless, after having just confirmed his desire to proceed based 
upon his nolo contendere plea, Van Haele surprisingly stated that he wanted to 
withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.  
The district court denied Van Haele's request.  Judgment and sentence was entered, 
consistent with the plea agreement, on June 3, 2003.  This appeal followed.2  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]                                       
The procedure utilized to accept a guilty plea is reviewed by this court 
as a whole. Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 187 (Wyo. 1994).  "Our inquiry determines if the district 
court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including 
the possible penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; 
informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a 
factual basis for the plea." Mehring [v. State], 860 P.2d [1101] 
at 1106 [(Wyo. 1993)] (emphasis added). These procedural requirements are 
intended to assure that the individual facing the criminal charges is not misled 
into an unintentional waiver of substantial rights.  Id.

 

McCarty v. 
State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 (Wyo. 1994).  We look to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a plea.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1108 
(Wyo. 1993).

 

Reyna v. 
State, 2001 WY 
105, ¶9, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶12]   The standard of review for 
determining the voluntariness of a plea is de novo.  

 

            
The United States Supreme Court's standard, by which the voluntariness of 
guilty pleas is measured, is as follows:

 

"[A] plea of 
guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. 
bribes)."

 

Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 
572 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S. Ct. 563, 2 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1958)).

 

Rude v. 
State, 851 P.2d 20, 23 (Wyo. 1993).  Furthermore, 
W.R.Cr.P. 11(d) requires that this same inquiry as to voluntariness must be made 
when a defendant pleads "nolo contendere."

 

[¶13]   In Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo. 
1993), we noted that W.R.Cr.P. 15(f) (Rule 11 under the present rules) requires 
a court to satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for a guilty plea before 
accepting such plea.  Moreover, we 
recognized that in their treatise on criminal procedure, LaFave and Israel 
outlined the following purposes of inquiry into the factual 
basis:

 

Most 
importantly, it should protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading 
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without 
realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge. 
. . .  In addition, the 
inquiry into the factual basis of the plea provides the court with a better 
assessment of defendant's competency and willingness to plead guilty and his 
understanding of the charges, increases the visibility of charge reduction 
practices, provides a more adequate record and thus minimizes the likelihood of 
the plea being successfully challenged later, and aids correctional agencies in 
the performance of their functions.  

 

Wayne R. 
LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal 
Procedure 938 (2d ed. 1992).  
These purposes are served if the record discloses a factual basis 
composed of the defendant's testimony and admissions and/or the State's 
presentation of evidence.  The trial 
judge may properly draw inferences from the defendant's admissions or the 
evidence presented by the State to satisfy all elements of the crime to which 
the defendant is pleading guilty.  
Rude, at 18.  However, this court has clarified 
that a factual basis is unnecessary upon acceptance of a nolo contendere plea, so long as the 
charging document, whether it be an information, indictment, or other charging 
form, contains an accurate and complete statement of all the elements of the 
crime charged.  Peitsmeyer v. State, 2001 WY 38, ¶7, 21 P.3d 733, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).   

 

[¶14]   An abuse of discretion standard is 
appropriate when determining whether an appellant should have been allowed to 
withdraw his plea.

 

            
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed 
by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty 
plea is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a 
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.  A defendant has no absolute right to 
withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed, and where the strictures 
of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the district court's decision to 
deny such a motion is within its sound discretion. Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Wyo. 1999); 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure:  Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 
and Supp. 2001).  Seven factors have 
been suggested as pertinent to the exercise of the court's discretion:  (1) Whether the defendant has 
asserted his innocence; (2) whether the government would suffer 
prejudice;  (3) whether the 
defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) whether withdrawal would 
substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assistance of 
counsel was present; (6) whether the original plea was knowing and 
voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial 
resources.  3 Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure:  Criminal 2d 
§ 538 (Supp. 2001); United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 
(10th Cir. 2000).

 

Doles v. 
State, 2002 WY 
146, ¶11, 55 P.3d 29, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Frame v. State, 2001 WY 
72, ¶7, 29 P.3d 86, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001)).  
Wyoming Rule Criminal Procedure 32(d) similarly addresses the withdrawal 
of nolo contendere pleas, providing that if a motion for withdrawal of a plea of 
nolo contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit 
withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just 
reason.

 

[¶15]   Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Belden v. 
State, 2003 WY 89, ¶27, 73 P.3d 1041, ¶27 (Wyo. 2003); O'Brien v. 
State, 2002 WY 63, ¶27, 45 P.3d 225, ¶27 (Wyo. 2002); Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  
We will not overturn a district court's discretionary decision unless the 
court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally 
conclude as it did. Billingsley v. State, 2003 WY 61, ¶9, 69 P.3d 390, ¶9 
(Wyo. 2003); English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999); Simmers 
v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Wyo. 1997).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Denial 
of Motion for Continuance

 

[¶16]   On July 2, 
2001, Van Haele was charged with aggravated assault and battery stemming from 
his alleged stabbing of another person with a Leatherman tool.  A trial date of January 16, 2002, was 
then set by the district court for this charge on September 7, 2001.  Six months later and just prior to 
trial, Van Haele was charged on January 2, 2002, with property destruction and 
defacement stemming from the same altercation as the aggravated assault and 
battery charge.  Accordingly, Van 
Haele filed a motion to reschedule the trial in order that the two charges could 
be tried together.  This motion was 
denied.  Van Haele asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for continuance 
of trial.  

 

[¶17]   In Taylor 
v. State, 
2003 WY 97, ¶11, 74 P.3d 1236, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003), we 
recognized:

 

            
We have consistently held that an unconditional guilty plea waives an 
appellate review of non-jurisdictional claims. Kitzke 
v. State, 
2002 WY 147, ¶8, 55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo. 2002). The only claims that remain are 
those that go to the jurisdiction of the court or the voluntariness of the plea. 
Id. 
(citing Wilson 
v. United States, 
962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992)).

 

Examples 
of jurisdictional defects are unconstitutionality of the statute defining the 
crime, failure of the indictment or information to state an offense, and double 
jeopardy.  Non-jurisdictional 
defects include the use of inadmissible evidence, the use of unlawfully obtained 
statements, a claim that a grand jury was improperly convened and conducted, and 
a claim of violation of the right to speedy trial.

 

Kitzke, 
¶9 (citations omitted).

 

[¶18]   We further explained in Nixon v. 
State, 2002 WY 118, ¶24, 51 P.3d 851, ¶24 (Wyo. 2002):

 

            
The need for finality in criminal cases when a defendant has voluntarily 
and knowingly agreed to plead guilty has been recognized on a number of 
occasions by this Court. When considering the circumstances under which a 
defendant may appeal after entering into an agreement to plead guilty, this 
Court has recognized the need for finality in holding that an individual may 
only raise issues concerning either the jurisdiction of the trial court or the 
voluntariness of the plea.  In that 
regard, this Court has stated:

 

            
In reaching this result, we are aware of the argument that, for the sake 
of judicial economy, a criminal defendant should not be forced to go to trial 
merely to preserve his right to appeal pretrial objections.  United 
States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden of Attica State Prison, 
381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967).  
However, against that interest, we must weigh the need for finality in 
the judicial process.

 

"A 
guilty plea should mark the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to future 
litigation. More than a confession, a guilty plea signals defendant's intention 
not to litigate the question of his guilt, and necessarily involves the 
surrender of certain constitutional rights . . . .'" People 
v. Taylor, 
65 N.Y.2d 1, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154, 478 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1985), quoting 
People 
v. Lynn, 
28 N.Y.2d 196, 201-02, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74, 269 N.E.2d 794 
(1971).

 

Sword 
v. State, 
746 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1987).  In 
addition, in Smith 
v. State, 
871 P.2d 186, 188 (Wyo. 1994), this Court noted:

 

            
A guilty plea prohibits appellate review of all but a few defenses. 
Ochoa 
v. State, 
848 P.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Wyo. 1993); Sword 
v. State, 
746 P.2d 423, 425 (Wyo. 1987).

 

"When 
a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact 
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise 
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that 
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."

 

Davila 
v. State, 
831 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Zanetti 
v. State, 
783 P.2d 134, 138 (Wyo. 1989) and Tollett 
v. Henderson, 
411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 
(1973)).

 

[¶19]   Some time after filing his motion 
for continuance of new trial, Van Haele entered an unconditional plea of nolo 
contendere to the charge of 
aggravated assault and battery.  In 
such circumstances, an unconditional 
plea of nolo contendere is tantamount to an unconditional plea of guilty.  Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 
1361, (Wyo. 1993); State v. Steele, 620 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Wyo. 1980).  Further, the charge of 
property destruction and defacement was dismissed under the 
plea agreement the district court ultimately accepted. 

 

[¶20]   Due to his plea, Van Haele waived 
all issues but those related to jurisdiction and voluntariness.  The denial of a continuance being 
neither, we will not address Van 
Haele's first raised issue on appeal.  

 

Voluntariness 
of Plea/Factual Basis For Plea

 

[¶21]   Van Haele contends that the 
district court did not substantiate that his plea of nolo contendere to the 
charge of aggravated assault and battery was made voluntarily or that a 
sufficient factual basis supported the plea.  In 
the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere, a judge is required to follow the 
dictates of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, in general, and W.R.Cr.P. 
11, in particular.3  Rule 11 acts as a guideline for courts 
in determining that a plea by a defendant is intelligent, knowing and voluntary, 
and that the plea has been entered with an understanding of the 
consequences.  Ingalls v. 
State, 2002 WY 75, ¶¶10-11, 46 P.3d 856, ¶¶10-11 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶22]   We have also 
stated:

 

A guilty 
plea must be "knowing and voluntary."  
McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Parke v. 
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992)).  "The validity of a guilty plea is tested 
by determining whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" McCarty at Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 
31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970)).

 

Becker v. 
State, 2002 WY 
126, ¶11, 53 P.3d 94, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶23]   Van Haele's contention that his 
nolo contendere plea was involuntary is not persuasive.  At the change of plea hearing, the State 
provided the district court with details of the plea agreement, including the 
sentencing recommendation and restitution amounts.  After receiving the details of the plea 
agreement, Van Haele confirmed that the terms of the plea agreement were 
correctly expressed.  Van Haele 
further indicated that he had ample opportunity to discuss the agreement with 
his counsel. 

 

[¶24]   The court then made inquires to 
determine that Van Haele was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  The district court also explained to Van 
Haele that it was not bound by the plea agreement, that a presentence 
investigation report would be conducted and, thereafter, another hearing would 
be held so that the district court could determine if it would accept the plea 
agreement.  The district court 
further advised Van Haele that if it rejected the plea agreement, Van Haele 
could withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.  However, if the district court accepted 
the plea agreement, a conviction would be entered, sentence imposed, and Van 
Haele would not be permitted to withdraw his plea.  The court also explained to Van Haele 
that his plea would entail the loss of certain civil rights, which the district 
court noted had been discussed with Van Haele at previous proceedings.4  The district court further summarized 
some of the terms of his supervised probation should the district court accept 
the plea agreement. 

 

[¶25]   At that time Van Haele indicated 
that he affirmatively desired to change his plea and formally plead nolo 
contendere to the charge of aggravated assault and battery.  In particular, after the above detailed 
admonishments were given, the following transpired:

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, what do you think you want to do, Mr. Van Haele?  Do you want to change your plea in hopes 
this agreement will go through, or do you want to go to 
trial?

 

[VAN 
HAELE]:  Change my plea, Your Honor. 

 

THE 
COURT:  All right, sir, would you please stand.

 

            
As to the charge that on or about June 29, 2001 here in Sheridan County, 
Wyoming you did attempt to cause or intentionally or knowingly did cause bodily 
injury to [the victim] in violation of our aggravated assault and battery 
statute, how do you plead?

 

[VAN 
HAELE]:  Guilty.

 

[VAN HAELE'S 
COUNSEL]:  Say "nolo contendere."

 

THE 
COURT:  All right, you may be seated, Mr. Van 
Haele.

 

Thus, we 
conclude that Van Haele's plea of nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated 
assault and battery was intelligent, knowing and voluntary, and that such plea 
was entered with Van Haele's understanding of the consequences.  

 

[¶26]   Van Haele further argues that the 
district court did not obtain a sufficient factual basis concerning his nolo 
contendere plea.  The record on 
appeal discloses that the district court did not question Van Haele about the 
factual basis establishing Van Haele's nolo contendere plea at the change of 
plea hearing.  Rather, the district 
court commented as follows:

 

Because 
this Court has sat through the one trial concerning the alleged facts in this 
case, I believe there is an adequate factual basis to accept the Defendant's 
plea of no contest.

 

[¶27]   It is true that W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) 
provides that notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court 
should not enter a judgment on a guilty plea without making such inquiry as 
shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.  Ingalls, at ¶11.  However, the factual basis for accepting 
a plea may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the crime and need not be 
established only from the defendant's statements.  Anderson v. State, 2002 WY 46, 
¶32, 43 P.3d 108, ¶32 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Barnes v. State, 951 P.2d 386, 
388-89 (Wyo. 1998); Rude v. State, 851 P.2d at 17-18).  Rule 11(f) does not require proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads is actually guilty; the rule's 
standard is much lower.  
Reyna, ¶14 (citing United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 
(1st Cir. 1970) and McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C.Cir. 
1966)).  Rule 11(f) merely requires 
the court to satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for the guilty plea 
before accepting such plea.  Lee 
v. State, 2001 WY 129, ¶14, 36 P.3d 1133, ¶14 (Wyo. 2001) (citing 
Rude, at 7)).  Additionally, 
this court has expressly held that the above-cited requirements do not apply in 
the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere, so long as the charging document, 
whether it be an information, indictment, or other charging form, contains an 
accurate and complete statement of all the elements of the crime charged.  Peitsmeyer, ¶7.   

 

[¶28]   In support of this position, this 
court noted:

 

            
At one time in the past the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules proposed 
that a plea of nolo contendere not be accepted without the court first 
satisfying itself that the defendant committed the crime charged.  This overlooked the fact that an 
innocent defendant may not wish to contest the charge and that the nolo plea is 
a means for him or her to do this.  
Accordingly that proposal was not adopted and Rule 11(f), requiring the 
court to determine the accuracy of a plea, applies to guilty pleas but not to 
pleas of nolo contendere.  

            

1A Charles 
Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Criminal 3d § 177 
(1999).

 

            
We embrace that proposition because any other reading of W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) 
would obliterate the distinction between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo 
contendere.  State v. Steele, 
620 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Wyo. 1980); State v. Merino, 81 Hawaii 198, 915 P.2d 672, 691-92 (1996).  Thus, we 
expressly hold that a district court need not obtain a factual basis when 
accepting a plea of nolo contendere, so long as the charging document, whether 
it be an information, indictment, or other charging form, contains an accurate 
and complete statement of all the elements of the crime 
charged.

 

Peitsmeyer, at 
¶¶6-7.

 

[¶29]   Here, the information expresses an 
accurate and complete statement of the elements of the charge of aggravated 
assault and battery.  In addition, 
the affidavits of probable cause made a part of the information give detailed 
descriptions of the events that were alleged to have occurred on the evening in 
question. 

 

[¶30]   Upon reading the transcript of the 
initial trial, however, we conclude that Van Haele, himself, provided an 
adequate factual basis to support his nolo contendere plea to the aggravated 
assault and battery charge.  
Specifically, Van Haele clearly admitted that after he kicked in the 
doors of the victim's vehicle, a fracas ensued between himself and the 
victim.  Thereafter, Van Haele 
realized that a Leatherman tool was in his pocket so he unfolded it under his 
belly and stabbed the victim.  
Moreover, both the victim and Ms. Van Haele gave their eyewitness 
testimony substantiating these facts.  
Numerous other witnesses who later arrived at the scene testified they 
saw that the victim had been stabbed and Van Haele admitted to them that he had 
stabbed the victim.  The Leatherman 
tool was found at the scene and was identified as being in Van Haele's 
possession.  Additionally, Dr. 
Walter H. Gould testified that the stabbing wound resulted in the laceration of 
the victim's skin and lung causing bleeding into the chest cavity, which had to 
be drained.  The victim was required 
to stay in the hospital for four days as a result of the injury he 
sustained.  The record is sufficient 
to support the district court's conclusion that a factual basis existed for Van 
Haele's nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and battery even though a 
factual basis was not required.  

 

Withdrawal 
of Plea

 

[¶31]   Finally, Van Haele 
complains that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow 
him to withdraw his nolo contendere plea at the sentencing hearing.  Van Haele contends the district court 
erred in failing to even make an inquiry into the reason why he wanted to 
withdraw his plea. 

 

[¶32]   At the sentencing hearing the 
following transpired after Van Haele noted certain areas within the pre-sentence 
investigation report with which he disagreed:

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, the Court is very familiar with the case and is prepared 
to approve the plea agreement.  
Anything else you want, counsel?

 

. . 
.

 

THE 
COURT:  Mr. Van Haele, is there anything you'd like to say to the 
Court before the sentence is imposed?

 

[VAN 
HAELE]:  I would  I would really like to revoke that plea and have a 
jury trial again.

 

THE 
COURT:  You may be seated, Mr. Van Haele.

 

Mr. Van 
Haele, the Court is satisfied that you have been given all possible advisements 
concerning your rights and how the procedure would work in this case.  At the change of plea hearing I 
explained to you that if the plea agreement is accepted, which I have just done, 
a conviction would be entered against you; you would not be permitted to 
withdraw your plea and you would be sentenced pursuant to the terms of the 
agreement.

 

So, based on 
advisements that have been given since July of 2001, I would deny a request to 
allow you to withdraw your plea of no contest.

 

Anything 
else?

 

[VAN 
HAELE]:  No.

 

[¶33]   Regarding the seven factors guiding 
the district court's discretion, it may be said from this record:  (1) Van Haele's assertion of innocence 
was his original plea of not guilty; he confessed to witnesses after the 
incident and at the initial trial to having stabbed the victim with the 
Leatherman tool, however at trial he claimed self-defense; (2) the government 
would likely suffer prejudice from a plea withdrawal because the crime involved 
occurred almost a year and a half earlier; (3) Van Haele delayed making any 
motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere for nearly two months after 
formally entering such plea and did so only after the district court indicated 
that it was going to approve the plea agreement at his sentencing hearing; (4) 
such delay would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) there is nothing to 
suggest the assistance of Van Haele's counsel was inadequate or unavailable; (6) 
the nolo contendere plea was accepted after thoroughly establishing its knowing 
and voluntary character; and (7) withdrawal of the plea would obviously squander 
not only judicial resources but the time and efforts of the prosecutor and 
defense attorney.

 

[¶34]   Van Haele failed to supply the 
district court with any fair and just reason for withdrawing the nolo contendere 
plea, and the record manifestly demonstrates compliance with W.R.Cr.P. 11 in 
accepting the plea.  Van Haele is 
critical that the district court erred in failing to make a specific inquiry 
into the reason that Van Haele wanted to withdraw his plea. Nevertheless, the 
district court allowed Van Haele an opportunity to do so by inquiring if Van 
Haele had anything further to add.  
Therefore, we conclude that denying the motion was a sound exercise of 
the court's discretion. 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶35]   For the foregoing reasons, the 
conviction of Van Haele and related sentence are affirmed.  

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

(a)  A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

 

 . . .

 

(ii)  Attempts 
to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon[.]

 

            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(iv) (LexisNexis 2001) defines "deadly weapon" 
as, but not limited to, "a firearm, explosive or incendiary material, motorized 
vehicle, an animal or other device, instrument, material or substance, which in 
the manner it is used or is intended to be used is reasonably capable of 
producing death or serious bodily injury."

 

2On 
appeal, Van Haele is represented by his initial counsel of record who originally 
was allowed to withdraw from this case on August 14, 2002. 

 

3W.R.Cr.P. 
11 states, in pertinent part:

 

(a)  Alternatives. 

 

(1)  In 
General.  A defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency, guilty, or nolo contendere. 
. . .

 

(A)  Nolo 
Contendere.  A defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the consent of the 
court.  Such a plea shall be 
accepted by the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties 
and the interest of the public in the effective administration of 
justice.

 

. . .

 

(d)  Insuring 
That Plea Is Voluntary.  The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open 
court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or 
threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.  The court shall also inquire as to 
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results 
from prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or 
the defendant's attorney.

 

  4At Van Haele's arraignment hearing 
concerning the aggravated assault and battery charge, he was plainly informed by 
the district court that in the event he was found guilty at trial, or if he pled 
guilty, he could be imprisoned for up to ten years, fined up to $10,000, or both 
and that he would be subject to a surcharge assessed to the Victims Compensation 
Fund of at least $100.  He was 
further advised that if he pled guilty, he would waive his right to trial, the 
right to present and confront witnesses, the right to present evidence in his 
defense, and the right to object to any evidence presented.  He was also advised that he would waive 
his right to remain silent, that he would lose his rights to vote, own firearms, 
serve on juries, and hold public office, as well as other consequences.  Critically, he was specifically advised 
that if he pled no contest or nolo contedere and such plea was accepted by the 
district court, he would be sentenced just the same as if he had pled guilty.