Title: Milwaukee County v. Louise M.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
Nos.95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In Re the Commitment 
of Louise M.: 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
  
Petitioner-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Louise M., 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 27, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
In Re the Commitment 
of Louise M.: 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
  
Petitioner-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Theodore S., 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.    Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.   
 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  The issue in this case is whether 
the circuit court has the authority to review probable cause 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
2
determinations by a court commissioner for involuntary detention 
under the Mental Health Act and, if so, what procedures and time 
guidelines apply. Because the circuit court retains its original 
jurisdiction over matters that it delegates to court 
commissioners, we hold that the circuit court does have the power 
to review such probable cause determinations.  However, there is 
no statutory or constitutional right guaranteeing to the parties 
such a review.  Consequently, we also hold that this is a 
discretionary review of the record to be held in a timely manner 
prior to the final hearing or trial in the matter. 
 
 On January 8, 1995, Louise M. was involuntarily detained 
pursuant to the Mental Health Act, WIS. STAT. § 51.15 (1)(a)1 & 2,
1 
when a City of Milwaukee police officer filed a statement of 
Emergency 
Detention 
by 
Law 
Enforcement 
Officer 
(Emergency 
Detention).  Louise M. was removed from her residence, a nursing 
home, and taken against her will to a locked ward of the Milwaukee 
                                                          
 
1WIS. STAT. §51.15 (1)(a) provides as follows: 
(1) Basis for detention. (a)  A law enforcement 
officer or other person authorized to take a child into 
custody under ch. 48 may take an individual into 
custody if the officer or person has cause to believe 
that such individual is mentally ill, drug dependent or 
developmentally disabled, and that the individual 
evidences any of the following: 
1. A substantial probability of physical harm to 
himself or herself as manifested by evidence of recent 
threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily 
harm. 
2. A substantial probability of physical harm to 
other persons as manifested by evidence of recent 
homicidal or other violent behavior on his or her part, 
or by evidence that others are placed in reasonable 
fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to 
them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or 
threat to do serious physical harm on his or her part. 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
3
County Mental Health Complex ("M.C.M.H.C."), an acute care 
psychiatric treatment facility.  WIS. STAT. § 51.08.
2    
 
On January 11, 1995, the case was heard by a court 
commissioner who found probable cause to believe the allegations 
in the Emergency Detention statement.  Louise M. was present at 
the probable cause hearing, represented by her court-appointed 
counsel from the Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc.  At the 
close of the probable cause hearing, Louise M. filed a request for 
a hearing de novo by the circuit court.   
 
In a hearing before Reserve Circuit Court Judge David L. 
Dancey, Louise M.'s request was denied. The circuit court ruled 
that it lacked the authority to conduct such a review.  The court 
found that the case of In the Matter of Mental Condition of 
C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d 703, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992) must be held to its 
facts and that C.M.B. dealt only with the right to a hearing de 
novo when a court commissioner dismisses an Emergency Detention at 
a probable cause hearing.   
                                                          
 
 2  WIS. STAT. § 51.08 provides as follows: 
Any county having a population of 500,000 or more 
may, pursuant to s. 46.17, establish and maintain a 
county mental health complex.  The county mental health 
complex shall be a hospital devoted to the detention and 
care of drug addicts, alcoholics, chronic patients and 
mentally ill persons whose mental illness is acute.  
Such hospital shall be governed pursuant to s. 46.21. 
Treatment of alcoholics at the county mental health 
complex is subject to approval by the department under 
s. 51.45 (8).  The county mental health complex 
established pursuant to this section is subject to rules 
promulgated 
by 
the 
department 
concerning 
hospital 
standards. 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
4
 
On the date of a scheduled jury trial, the case against 
Louise M. was dismissed by Judge Dancey.  Milwaukee County was 
unable to proceed to the jury trial and informed the court that it 
could not meet its burden of proof.  At the time of her release, 
Louise M. had been involuntarily detained at the M.C.M.H.C. for 
forced psychiatric treatment and denied her liberty for 17 days. 
 
On the day before Louise M. was detained, January 7, 1995, 
Theodore S. was involuntarily detained pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 
51.15 (1)(b)
3.  Police officers removed Theodore S. from his home 
and took him to the M.C.M.H.C.  On January 11, 1995, the probate 
court commissioner found probable cause to believe the allegations 
in the Emergency Detention statement filed against Theodore S.  
Theodore S. was present at the probable cause hearing, represented 
by his court-appointed counsel from the Legal Aid Society of 
Milwaukee, Inc. 
 
Like Louise M., Theodore S. filed a request for a de novo 
hearing 
by 
the 
circuit 
court 
shortly 
after 
the 
court 
commissioner's order.  The circuit court, Judge Dancey, also 
denied his request.  On the date set for a jury trial in Theodore 
S.'s case, Wednesday, January 25, 1995, the circuit court 
                                                          
 
3 WIS. STAT. § 51.15 (1) (b) provides: 
(1) Basis for detention. (b)  The officer's or 
person's belief shall be based on any of the following: 
1.  A specific recent overt act or attempt or 
threat to act or omission by the individual which is 
observed by the officer or person. 
2.  A specific recent overt act or attempt or 
threat to act or omission by the individual which is 
reliably reported to the officer or person by any other 
person, including any probation and parole agent 
authorized by the department to exercise control and 
supervision over a probationer or parolee. 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
5
dismissed the case when Milwaukee County stated that it could not 
meet its burden of proof.  Theodore S. had spent 19 days in 
detention at the time of his dismissal.    
 
Leave to appeal to the court of appeals was filed and granted 
in the cases of Louise M. and Theodore S. and these cases were 
consolidated for appeal.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court, holding that the circuit court does have the 
authority to review a probable cause finding by a court 
commissioner.  Milwaukee Cty. v.  Louise M. and Theodore S., 196 
Wis. 2d 200, 538 N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1995).  The consolidated 
cases will be referred to as "Louise M."  
 
The court of appeals' decision in this case requires the 
circuit court to provide, upon a request, a de novo probable cause 
hearing to a subject of an involuntary mental commitment 
proceeding within 72 hours after a court commissioner has already 
found that probable cause exists to believe the allegations of the 
petition for commitment. 
 
Because the scope of judicial authority and jurisdiction and 
the construction of statutes are questions of law, this court owes 
no deference to the court of appeals in deciding the issues of 
this case.  In Matter of Mental Condition of C.M.B, 165 Wis. 2d at 
707.  
 
The court of appeals in Louise M. relied heavily on this 
court's decision in the C.M.B. case in reaching its conclusion.  
In C.M.B., this court held that an order or judgment of the 
circuit court is required for an appeal to the court of appeals in 
an involuntary commitment proceeding, and an order of a court 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
6
commissioner is not the same as an order from the circuit court. 
C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d at 705; cf., State v. Trongeau, 135 Wis. 2d 
188, 400 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1986) (requiring review by circuit 
court of court commissioners' dismissal orders in criminal 
context).  
 
The facts in C.M.B. are simple.  The court commissioner 
ordered the release of a woman after finding no probable cause to 
detain 
the 
subject, 
thereby 
dismissing 
the 
petition 
for 
involuntary detention.  Because the court commissioner dismissed 
the petition, there was no final order of the circuit court from 
which to appeal.  As a result, this court required that at the 
request of the county a circuit court must conduct a de novo 
hearing to review a court commissioner's decision to dismiss a 
petition for lack of probable cause.  Id.   This practice is 
necessary to create a final order that can be appealed directly to 
the court of appeals.  See id. at 709; WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1).
4  
 
The present cases are markedly different from the C.M.B. 
case.  C.M.B. dealt with the dismissal of an action by a court 
commissioner.  The dismissal terminated the entire matter in 
                                                          
 
 4WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) provides: 
(1) APPEALS AS OF RIGHT.  A final judgment or a 
final order of a circuit court may be appealed as a 
matter of right to the court of appeals unless otherwise 
expressly provided by law.  A final judgment or final 
order is a judgment or order entered in accordance with 
s. 806.06(1)(b) or 807.11 (2) or a disposition recorded 
in docket entries in ch. 799 cases or traffic regulation 
or municipal ordinance violation cases prosecuted in 
circuit court which disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more of the parties, whether 
rendered in an action or special proceeding.  
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
7
litigation between the parties and would meet the definition of a 
final order for purposes of appeal but for the fact that it was 
entered by a court commissioner and not a circuit court.  Because 
there was no statutory provision that allowed a party to appeal 
this dismissal to either the circuit court or the court of 
appeals, this court required the circuit court to conduct a 
hearing so that a final, appealable order would be created. Id. at 
705. 
 
In the present cases, there was no final order from the court 
commissioner.  Probable cause determinations are nonfinal orders. 
Much like a court's denial of a motion for summary judgment, such 
nonfinal orders are a procedural device which allow the matter to 
proceed to a final hearing or trial before the circuit court.  
This hearing or jury trial under ch. 51 is the last step which 
will automatically result in a final circuit court order 
appealable as of right pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1).  The key 
difference between C.M.B. and this case is the final and nonfinal 
nature of the respective orders from which review was sought.    
 
The Wisconsin Statutes provide strict procedural guidelines 
that a court must follow in an involuntary detention proceeding. 
The procedures set out in ch. 51, specifically those involving 
Emergency Detention, meet the requirements of due process.  See In 
the Matter of Haskins, 101 Wis. 2d 176, 191-92, 304 N.W.2d 125 
(1980); Contempt In Interest of J.S., 137 Wis. 2d 217, 223, 404 
N.W.2d 79 (1987).  Wisconsin Statutes §§ 51.15(4)(b) and 
51.20(7)(a) require that a probable cause hearing be held within 
72 hours of a subject's detention.   The statutes allow a circuit 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
8
court to delegate the duty to hold these hearings to a court 
commissioner as was done in the present cases. WIS. STAT. § 
757.69(1)(h). If probable cause to believe the allegations of the 
petition is found to exist, two experts are appointed by the court 
to examine the subject and file reports pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 
51.20(9).  A final hearing by the circuit court must then be held 
on the petition within 14 days of the subject's detention.  WIS. 
STAT. § 51.20(7)(c).  Alternatively, the subject can request a jury 
trial which then must be held within 21 days of the subject's 
detention. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(8)(bm).  These deadlines are 
jurisdictional and the court loses competency to proceed if they 
are not met.  State ex rel. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 
325, 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982).   
 
Coupled with these strict statutory requirements, the court 
of appeals' Louise M. decision creates a tremendous burden on the 
legal system for involuntary mental commitment cases.  Under the 
appellate court decision, a probable cause hearing will be held by 
a court commissioner within 72 hours of the subject's detention at 
the facility; then, upon request, another probable cause hearing 
must be held by the circuit court within 72 hours of the 
commissioner's hearing.  Yet another hearing must then be held a 
few days thereafter, given the requirement that a final hearing be 
held within 14 days of detention.  This results in three court 
hearings to determine essentially the same issue within a two-week 
span of time. 
 
Such requirements as the court of appeals mandates in Louise 
M. would further burden the already strained resources of 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
9
Wisconsin circuit courts and would defeat the purpose of using 
court commissioners to promote judicial efficiency. If the circuit 
court were required to conduct a de novo hearing in every case in 
which a party requests a review, then there would be little need 
for 
court 
commissioners 
in 
the 
mental 
health 
context.  
Additionally, the likelihood that witnesses would be reluctant to 
appear three times in a short period of time could make the 
process difficult or impossible.  The procedures required by the 
court of appeals in Louise M. are impractical and unmanageable in 
light of the limited resources and expanding workload of the 
circuit courts.  
 
 The Wisconsin Constitution provides that "the circuit court 
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal 
within this state and such appellate jurisdiction as the 
legislature may provide by law." Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.  
Although the legislature has not provided the circuit courts with 
appellate jurisdiction over ch. 51 actions, the circuit court has 
the right to review these probable cause determinations because it 
retains its original jurisdiction even when it delegates its 
authority to a court commissioner. See In the Matter of the Mental 
Condition of C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d at 712.  If the circuit court did 
not retain its original jurisdiction, “circuit court judges might 
be 
less 
inclined 
to 
delegate 
their 
authority 
to 
court 
commissioners knowing that in doing so they have stripped 
themselves of power over matters of which they have original 
jurisdiction.”  Id.  In order for the use of court commissioners 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
10
to be effective, then, it is only logical to conclude that the 
circuit court loses none of its power through delegation.    
 
The United States Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial 
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.”  U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1.  Despite this 
constitutional provision, federal district judges may still 
delegate some of their authority to magistrate judges in the same 
manner that circuit court judges delegate to court commissioners. 
Courts have held that such delegation of certain duties to 
appointed magistrates does not violate the Constitution because 
the district judges do not delegate away their judicial power in 
such matters.  See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America v. 
Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
824 (1984) (Article III requires that federal district judges 
retain their judicial power even if they delegate some authority 
to court-appointed magistrates).  See generally Noorlander v. 
Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1973) (upholding rule providing 
for delegation of authority by district judges to magistrates to 
conduct preliminary evidentiary hearings).  This is because the 
magistrate system “permits . . . control over specific cases by 
the resumption of district court jurisdiction on the court’s own 
initiative.” Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544.   
 
Similar to the federal courts, the circuit court in our 
state does not lose its original jurisdiction simply by 
delegating some power to court commissioners.  Despite the 
delegation of authority to the court commissioner to conduct a 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
11
probable cause hearing, the circuit court retains jurisdiction by 
virtue of the Wisconsin Constitution and within that court's 
discretion it may review the finding.  However, the circuit court 
is not required to conduct such a review as of right.  
 
It has been held that the right to appeal is generally not 
constitutional, but the right to appeal is primarily a creature of 
statute.  See State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 59, 291 N.W.2d 809 
(1980).  See also In re Brand, 251 Wis. 531, 536, 30 N.W.2d 238 
(1947), citing Western Union R. Co. v. Dickson, 30 Wis. 389 
(1882).  There is no inherent duty to provide a review of the 
court commissioner's finding of probable cause.  There is no 
constitutional requirement that a subject be given a right to a de 
novo probable cause hearing in the circuit court.  There is no 
statutory right to such a review in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(15).
5 
Wisconsin Statutes § 808.03(2)
6 does not create a right to 
                                                          
 
 5  WIS. STAT. § 51.20(15) provides as follows:   
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals 
within the time period specified in s. 808.04(3) in 
accordance with s. 809.40 by the subject of the petition 
or the individual's guardian, by any petitioner or by 
the representative of the public. 
 6  WIS. STAT. § 808.03(2) provides as follows:   
(2) Appeals by permission. A judgment or order not 
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be 
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final 
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if it 
determines that an appeal will: 
(a) Materially advance the termination of the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation; 
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or 
irreparable injury; or 
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the 
administration of justice. 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
12
“appeal” a court commissioner's order to the circuit court; it 
only creates a right to seek leave to appeal a nonfinal circuit 
court order.    
 
The court commissioner’s order is not a final order.  Unlike 
a final order where a right to appeal is guaranteed by WIS. STAT. § 
808.03(1), the court of appeals' authority to review nonfinal 
orders of circuit courts is discretionary.  WIS. STAT. § 808.03(2). 
Similarly, the circuit court's authority to review nonfinal orders 
of court commissioners should be discretionary.     
 
In the past when the legislature has wanted to guarantee the 
right to a review of a court commissioner's decision by a circuit 
court, it has written such a right directly into the statutes.  
Currently, an absolute right to review of a court commissioner’s 
decision by a circuit court exists, by creation of statute, in 
juvenile, small claims, and family court actions upon motion of 
either party. WIS. STAT. §§ 757.69(1)(g), 799.207(3)(a), 767.13(6). 
Because of its obvious absence from the statutes, there is no 
reason to conclude that the legislature has mandated any circuit 
court review of a commissioner's nonfinal orders. 
 
There is a need for judges to be able to review decisions of 
the court commissioners if the judge so desires because court 
commissioners are not elected officials who are accountable to the 
people.  However, the judge, an elected official, has indicated 
confidence in the abilities of the court commissioner by virtue of 
the appointment to that post.  If the judge did not find the 
commissioner competent and fair, the judge would likely not have 
chosen 
that 
individual 
to 
ease 
the 
court’s 
workload.  
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
13
Consequently, not all of the commissioner's decisions should be 
subject to de novo review.   
 
Nothing prevents a circuit court from reviewing the record of 
a probable cause hearing if it wishes to do so as part of its 
retained original jurisdiction to review commissioners' decisions, 
but nothing gives the subject a right to such a review.  Among the 
factors that a circuit court may want to take into consideration 
in deciding whether to grant a review are 1) the severity of the 
conditions of confinement, including the amount and type of 
psychotropic medication, if any, being administered to the 
detainee, 2) the amount of time that elapsed between the initial 
detention of the individual and the probable cause hearing, 3) 
whether a request has been made for a jury trial up to that point, 
thereby potentially lengthening the time spent in detention, and 
4) the extent of the testimony at the probable cause hearing, 
including whether the detainee was present to testify and whether 
there was psychiatric testimony presented on behalf of the 
individual.  These and other factors should provide the court with 
guidance in determining whether to grant the requested review. 
 
The circuit court within the judge's discretion may review 
the record in the mental commitment context just as it does in the 
criminal court context.  The doctors' reports, the Emergency 
Detention statement, the petition, and other documentation should 
provide sufficient grounds for the judge to render an informed 
decision if he or she chooses to review the court commissioner’s 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
14
decision.
7  A mandatory de novo hearing would, in this court's 
opinion, be a misuse of the judicial resources of the circuit 
court. 
 
If the circuit court judge chooses to conduct a review based 
on the record, it shall be timely done after the probable cause 
determination and before the final hearing or the jury trial.  A 
discretionary practice of reviewing the court commissioners' 
probable cause determinations within a reasonable time prior to 
the final hearing or trial is sufficient to protect the liberty 
interests of the detainee without overburdening the judicial 
system.   
 
For the foregoing reasons, this court affirms the court of 
appeals' decision insofar as it held that the circuit court does 
have authority to review a court commissioner's order finding 
probable cause to proceed in an involuntary commitment action.  
This court reverses the court of appeals' decision that such 
review is mandatory and requires a hearing de novo within 72 hours 
after the probable cause hearing.  We hold that the circuit court 
may conduct a discretionary review of a court commissioner's 
probable cause determination at any time prior to the final 
hearing or trial in the matter. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
                                                          
 
7 In the cases of Louise M. and Theodore S., the record 
reflects that the probable cause hearing before the court 
commissioner was reported by a court reporter.  Such transcripts 
may also be helpful to the circuit court when reviewing the court 
commissioner’s decisions.  
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
15
 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
16
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No.: 
 
95-0291-FT and 95-0292-FT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case:  
 
In Re the Commitment of Louise M.: 
 
 
 
 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
Louise M., 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
In Re the Commitment of Theodore S.: 
 
 
 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Theodore S., 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis. 2d 200, 538 N.W.2d 550 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
 
September 27, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
September 5, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE:  
David L. Dancey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
17
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Mark A. Grady and Office of Corporation Counsel, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Mark A. Grady. 
 
 
 
For the respondents-appellants there was a brief by Karen 
Kotecki and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Karen Kotecki. 
 
 
Nos.  95-0291-FT & 95-0292-FT 
 
 
18
 
1