Title: State v. Walker

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 12–1065 
 
Filed November 14, 2014 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
JABARI LAMAR WALKER, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Nancy A. 
Baumgartner, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 
sustaining the writ of certiorari requested by the State, vacating the 
sentence imposed by the district court, and remanding for resentencing.  
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AFFIRMED, WRIT SUSTAINED, AND 
CASE REMANDED. 
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, 
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney General, and Jerry 
Vander Sanden, County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
2 
MANSFIELD, Justice. 
The general assembly has enacted enhanced penalties for persons 
who commit a second “sexually predatory offense” after having been 
previously convicted of a sexually predatory offense.  See Iowa Code 
§ 901A.2 (2011).  Under this law, sexually predatory offense includes 
“[a]ny offense involving an attempt to commit [sexual abuse].”  Id. 
§ 901A.1(1)(e).  Today, we must decide whether a jury finding that the 
defendant committed kidnapping with intent to subject the victim to 
sexual abuse, see id. § 710.1(3), means that the defendant committed an 
offense involving an attempt to commit sexual abuse and therefore is 
eligible for this enhancement.  For the reasons set forth herein, we follow 
our prior decision in State v. Harrington, 608 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2000), 
and hold that the jury finding has that effect.  We therefore sustain the 
State’s requested writ of certiorari, vacate the district court’s ruling that 
the jury finding cannot serve as the basis for an enhanced sentence 
under Iowa Code section 901A.2(3), affirm the court of appeals decision, 
and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
 
During the early morning hours of May 7, 2011, a Linn County 
sheriff’s deputy was on routine patrol in a rural, northeastern part of the 
county.  He noticed a vehicle parked at an abandoned farmstead with its 
lights off. 
The deputy decided to investigate.  As he pulled up the driveway, 
he saw two individuals.  One was sitting in the front passenger seat of 
the car.  The other, a man, was standing between the open front 
passenger door and the vehicle.  The standing man was later identified as 
the defendant, Jabari Walker, and the person seated in the front 
passenger seat was later identified as the female victim, L.N.  Upon the 
 
 
 
3 
deputy’s approach, L.N. jumped out of the car and ran toward the 
deputy’s vehicle crying and upset. 
 
Walker yelled at L.N. to tell the deputy she was Walker’s girlfriend.  
He started to run after her.  As he ran, he zipped up his pants.  L.N., 
speaking frantically, said that she did not know Walker, that she had 
just met him, that she was afraid Walker was going to kill her, and that 
Walker had demanded that she give him oral sex. 
 
It later turned out that Walker and L.N. had met in an Iowa City 
bar about an hour earlier and, according to the bar’s surveillance video, 
walked out of the bar together.  Walker and L.N. then drove their 
respective vehicles to a Coralville motel where Walker dropped off two 
male companions and paid for their motel room.  After that, Walker and 
L.N. proceeded away from the motel in Walker’s car, leaving L.N.’s car 
behind in the motel parking lot. 
 
According to L.N., the plan was for the two of them to go out to eat 
at a nearby restaurant.  However, Walker refused to do this and instead 
drove toward Cedar Rapids on I-380.  While Walker was driving, 
according to L.N., he grabbed her head and forced her mouth on his 
penis.  Urgently seeking an excuse to get out of the car, L.N. told Walker 
she needed to urinate.  As related by L.N., Walker ignored her pleas and 
continued north on I-380.  Walker drove past the exit for his own Cedar 
Rapids apartment, took a subsequent exit, drove another five miles, and 
finally parked at the abandoned farmhouse in a rural area. 
When they reached the deserted farmstead, as L.N. related at trial, 
Walker let her out of the car to urinate but she was unable to do so.  
According to L.N., Walker then made her get back into the car and was 
again forcing her to engage in oral sex when the sheriff’s deputy arrived. 
 
 
 
4 
 
L.N.’s DNA was found on Walker’s penis.  At trial, Walker took the 
stand and described a different set of events.  He claimed that L.N. had 
consensually committed an oral sex act on him in his vehicle in an Iowa 
City parking lot right after leaving the bar.  He also claimed that the plan 
was for the two to go to Walker’s Cedar Rapids apartment for the night 
after dropping off Walker’s companions at the motel, but that L.N. 
changed her mind while they were in Walker’s car on I-380. 
Walker testified he told L.N. he was too tired to turn around and 
drive her back home, but when L.N. mentioned having a friend in Cedar 
Falls, he agreed to take her there and proceeded to drive further north on 
I-380.  Walker explained that he was new to the area and did not 
immediately realize how far away Cedar Falls was.  According to Walker’s 
version of events, L.N. then began insisting she needed to urinate, so he 
took the exit after the one for his apartment and drove around 
unsuccessfully looking for a restroom, finally ending up at the 
abandoned farmhouse.  Walker denied that he had involuntarily confined 
L.N. or that he had forced or intended to force L.N. to have sex with him. 
 
On May 31, the State filed a trial information charging Walker with 
first-degree kidnapping, a class “A” felony, in violation of Iowa Code 
sections 710.1 and 710.2.1  The trial information included a proposed 
1According to section 710.1, 
A person commits kidnapping when the person either confines a 
person or removes a person from one place to another, knowing that the 
person who confines or removes the other person has neither the 
authority nor the consent of the other to do so; provided, that to 
constitute kidnapping the act must be accompanied by one or more of 
the following: 
. . . . 
3.  The intent . . . to subject the person to a sexual abuse. 
Iowa Code § 710.1.  According to section 710.2, first-degree kidnapping occurs when 
the victim “is intentionally subjected to . . . sexual abuse.”  Id. 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 
enhancement under Iowa Code section 901A.2(3) based on Walker’s prior 
2006 conviction in Ohio of a sexually predatory offense.2 
 
Trial commenced on August 22.  On August 30, the jury returned a 
verdict finding Walker guilty of the lesser included offense of third-degree 
degree kidnapping, a class “C” felony.  Kidnapping in the third-degree 
required the jury to find that the defendant confined or removed the 
victim with the intent to commit sexual abuse on her, but did not require 
a finding that the victim had actually been subjected to sexual abuse.  
See Iowa Code §§ 710.1(3), .4.  In particular, according to the relevant 
marshaling instruction, the jury had to find: 
1.  On or about the 7th day of May, 2011, Jabari Walker: 
a. confined [L.N.], or 
b. removed [L.N.] from one place to another. 
2.  Jabari Walker knew he did not have the consent of the 
victim to do so. 
3.  Jabari Walker did so with the specific intent to subject 
[L.N.] to sexual abuse, as defined in Instruction No. 21.3 
2Section 901A.2(3) provides in part: 
[A] person convicted of a sexually predatory offense which is a felony, 
who has a prior conviction for a sexually predatory offense, shall be 
sentenced to and shall serve twice the maximum period of incarceration 
for 
the 
offense, 
or 
twenty-five 
years, 
whichever 
is 
greater, 
notwithstanding any other provision of the Code to the contrary.  A 
person sentenced under this subsection shall not have the person’s 
sentence reduced under chapter 903A or otherwise by more than fifteen 
percent. 
Iowa Code § 901A.2(3). 
3The jury was further instructed: 
A person is “confined” when her freedom to move about is 
substantially restricted by force, threat or deception.  The person may be 
confined either in the place where the restriction began or in a place to 
which she has been removed. 
No minimum time of confinement or distance of removal is 
required.  It must be more than slight.  The confinement and removal 
must have significance apart from the sexual abuse. 
In determining whether confinement and removal exists, you may 
consider whether: 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 
 
In the ensuing enhancement proceeding, Walker did not dispute 
that he had a prior Ohio conviction for “sexual imposition,” a 
misdemeanor.  However, he argued the Ohio conviction did not qualify as 
a sexually predatory offense within the meaning of Iowa Code section 
901A.1(1).4  He further argued that his Iowa third-degree kidnapping 
conviction was not a sexually predatory offense under section 901A.1(1), 
either.  Walker urged that a jury finding he had intended to commit 
sexual abuse did not amount to a finding he had attempted to commit 
sexual abuse as required by section 901A.1(1). 
 
The State, meanwhile, asserted that both the Ohio predicate 
offense and the Iowa conviction qualified as sexually predatory offenses 
within the meaning of section 901A.1(1).  According to the State, the 
jury’s findings that Walker had confined or removed L.N. while intending 
1.  The risk of harm to [L.N.] was increased. 
2.  The risk of detention was reduced. 
3.  Escape was made easier. 
4Section 901A.1(1) in turn provides: 
1.  As used in this chapter, the term “sexually predatory offense” 
means any serious or aggravated misdemeanor or felony which 
constitutes: 
a.  A violation of any provision of chapter 709. 
b.  Sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of section 728.12, 
subsection 1. 
c.  Enticing a minor away in violation of section 710.10, 
subsection 1. 
d.  Pandering involving a minor in violation of section 725.3, 
subsection 2. 
e.  Any offense involving an attempt to commit an offense 
contained in this section. 
f.  An offense under prior law of this state or an offense 
committed in another jurisdiction which would constitute an equivalent 
offense under paragraphs “a” through “e”. 
Iowa Code § 901A.1(1). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
7 
to sexually abuse her, as required for the third-degree kidnapping 
conviction, were enough to establish that Walker had committed an 
“offense involving an attempt to commit” sexual abuse.  Thus, in the 
State’s view, Walker met section 901A.2(3)’s grounds for an enhanced 
sentence. 
 
On May 29, 2012, the district court ruled that the third-degree 
kidnapping conviction did not qualify as a sexually predatory offense 
within the meaning of Iowa Code section 901A.1(1).  The district court 
essentially agreed with Walker’s position; it explained that an attempt to 
commit an offense and an intent to commit an offense were not 
interchangeable.  The district court found it unnecessary to reach the 
question whether the Ohio conviction met the definition of a sexually 
predatory offense.  Because the court denied the enhancement, it 
sentenced Walker to an indeterminate term of ten years, rather than 
imposing a twenty-five-year sentence. 
 
Walker appealed his conviction to this court.  In addition, the State 
sought review of the district court’s sentencing order by writ of certiorari.  
We granted the State’s petition and consolidated it with Walker’s appeal.  
For briefing purposes, we directed that the certiorari proceeding be 
treated as a cross-appeal by the State. 
Walker’s appeal raised a single argument—that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to move for a new trial on the ground that the 
verdict was against the weight of the evidence.5  On certiorari, the State 
argued the district court erred in ruling that Walker’s third-degree 
kidnapping conviction was not a sexually predatory offense within the 
5Trial counsel did move for a new trial on other grounds, which were rejected by 
the district court. 
                                                 
 
 
 
8 
meaning of Iowa Code section 901A.1(1).  We transferred the case to the 
court of appeals. 
The court of appeals rendered a decision on January 9, 2014.  It 
rejected Walker’s appeal, finding that “the record simply does not 
support Walker’s claim that the evidence preponderates heavily against 
the verdict.”  The court elaborated, 
From our review of the evidence, we find a greater weight of 
the evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and as a result, 
there is no reasonable probability the district court would 
have granted a new trial on this ground had Walker’s 
attorney raised it.  Because Walker cannot establish he was 
prejudiced by any breach of his trial counsel’s duty, his 
ineffective-assistance claim must fail on this ground. 
The court of appeals also agreed with the State’s position that 
Walker’s third-degree kidnapping conviction was a sexually predatory 
offense.  Relying significantly on Harrington, the court explained its 
reasoning as follows: 
Although kidnapping is not specifically designated as a 
sexually predatory offense in section 901A.1(1), Walker’s 
kidnapping conviction falls under section 901A.1(1)(e)—
“[a]ny offense involving an attempt to commit an offense 
contained in this section”—as a sexually predatory offense.  
Necessarily incorporated into Walker’s kidnapping conviction 
was the jury’s finding Walker confined or removed [L.N.] from 
one place to another, knowing he did not have [L.N.]’s 
consent, and “did so with the specific intent to subject . . . 
[L.N.] to sexual abuse,” for the jury, as instructed, had to 
make such findings in order to find Walker guilty of 
kidnapping in the third degree.  (Emphasis added.)  
Following the Harrington holding, we conclude Walker’s 
third-degree-kidnapping offense involved an attempt to 
commit another offense contained in section 901A.1.  That 
offense 
was 
sexual 
abuse, 
which 
is 
contained 
in 
subparagraph (a) of that section designating “any provision 
of chapter 709.” 
(Footnotes omitted.)  As a result, the court of appeals sustained the writ 
of certiorari, vacated Walker’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing.  
The court directed the trial court on remand to determine whether 
 
 
 
9 
Walker’s prior conviction in Ohio qualified as a sexually predatory offense 
and, if so, to impose the sentencing enhancement authorized by Iowa 
Code chapter 901A. 
One judge on the court of appeals panel concurred specially.  She 
agreed the court was bound by our Harrington decision, but added: 
[I]f we were writing on a blank slate, I would find the 
sentencing enhancement for sexually predatory offenses as 
defined in Iowa Code section 901A.1(1)(e) (2011) should only 
apply when the jury finds the defendant has committed the 
act or acts necessary to establish an attempt to commit one 
of the offenses listed in sections 901A.1(1)(a)–(d).  See 
generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476[, 120 
S. Ct. 2348, 2355, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 446] (2000) (holding 
any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the 
maximum 
penalty 
beyond 
the 
prescribed 
statutory 
maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt). 
Walker applied to this court for further review, and we granted his 
application. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
We review questions of statutory interpretation, such as the 
meaning of Iowa Code section 901A.1(1), for correction of errors at law.  
State v. Overbay, 810 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Iowa 2012).  We review 
constitutional questions, such as whether Apprendi requires a separate 
determination that Walker attempted to commit sexual abuse, de novo.  
State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Iowa 2007). 
III.  Analysis. 
When we grant further review of a decision of the court of appeals, 
we have discretion to let the court of appeals decision stand as the final 
decision on one or more issues.  State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 140 
(Iowa 2012).  We exercise that discretion here.  Thus, the court of 
appeals decision will stand on the question whether Walker’s trial 
 
 
 
10 
counsel committed ineffective assistance of counsel by not moving for a 
new trial on the ground the jury verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence. 
This leaves the question whether the district court erred in its 
ruling that Walker’s kidnapping conviction was not a sexually predatory 
offense.  Indisputably, the conviction required a jury finding that Walker 
confined or removed his victim with the intent to commit sexual abuse.  
Nonetheless, the district court found that this verdict did not amount to 
a determination that Walker had committed an “offense involving an 
attempt to commit” sexual abuse.  Iowa Code § 901A.1(1)(e).  The State, 
however, maintains that someone who confines or removes another 
person with the intent to sexually abuse her has attempted to commit 
sexual abuse within the meaning of Iowa Code section 901A.1(1)(e).  The 
court of appeals accepted this position. 
We agree with the court of appeals and the State that our 
Harrington decision confronted essentially the same question we are 
presented with today.  Harrington had been charged with third-degree 
kidnapping.  See Harrington, 608 N.W.2d at 440.  At trial, the State 
presented evidence that Harrington had attempted to sexually abuse his 
victim.  Id.  The jury convicted Harrington of the lesser included offense 
of false imprisonment, but in a special interrogatory found that he had 
committed false imprisonment with the intent to commit sexual abuse.  
Id.  The district court imposed an enhancement, indicating that it 
“believed the conviction for false imprisonment met the statutory 
definition of a sexually predatory offense because it had been an attempt 
to commit kidnapping as defined in section 710.1.”6  Id. at 441. 
6At that time, the definition of “sexually predatory offense” in the enhancement 
statute read as follows: 
                                                 
 
 
 
11 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had erred 
and that his false-imprisonment conviction was not a sexually predatory 
offense for enhancement purposes.  See id.  We decided the district court 
had followed the wrong reasoning: In our view, the false-imprisonment 
conviction was not tantamount to an attempt to commit kidnapping.  Id.  
However, we sustained the enhancement on another ground.  Id.  As we 
explained, 
[W]e think that, based on the jury’s answer to the 
interrogatory, the false-imprisonment offense involved an 
attempt to commit another offense contained in section 
901A.1.  That offense was sexual abuse, which is contained 
in subpart a of that section, which designates “any provision 
of chapter 709.” 
Id. 
1.  As used in this chapter, the term “sexually predatory offense” 
means any serious or aggravated misdemeanor or felony which 
constitutes: 
a.  A violation of any provision of chapter 709. 
b.  A violation of any of the following if the offense involves sexual 
abuse, attempted sexual abuse, or intent to commit sexual abuse: 
(1) Murder as defined in section 707.1. 
(2) Kidnapping as defined in section 710.1. 
(3) Burglary as defined in section 713.1. 
(4) Child endangerment under section 726.6, subsection 1, 
paragraph “e”. 
c.  Sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of section 728.12, 
subsection 1. 
d.  Pandering involving a minor in violation of section 725.3, 
subsection 2. 
e.  Any offense involving an attempt to commit an offense 
contained in this section. 
f.  An offense under prior law of this state or an offense 
committed in another jurisdiction which would constitute an equivalent 
offense under paragraphs “a” through “e”. 
Iowa Code § 901A.1(1) (1997).  The district court found that Harrington’s conviction was 
for a sexually predatory offense within the meaning of section 901A.1(1)(b)(2), as it then 
read.  See Harrington, 608 N.W.2d at 441. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
12 
 
False imprisonment is committed when a person, “having no 
reasonable belief that the person has any right or authority to do so, . . . 
intentionally confines another against the other’s will.”  Iowa Code 
§ 710.7.  Thus, we found in Harrington that intentionally confining 
another person against the other person’s will with the intent to subject 
the other person to sexual abuse “involved an attempt to commit” sexual 
abuse as required by the enhancement statute.  Harrington, 608 N.W.2d 
at 441. 
 
This case presents a similar scenario.  Walker was convicted of 
third-degree kidnapping, which, as instructed in this case, required the 
jury to find that he “confined or removed [L.N.] from one place to 
another” and “did so with the specific intent to subject [L.N.] to sexual 
abuse.”  Harrington would appear to govern here.  If Harrington’s crime 
involved an attempt to commit sexual abuse within the meaning of 
section 901A.1, seemingly so would Walker’s.  Both cases involved jury 
determinations that the defendant had engaged in conduct (confinement 
in Harrington, confinement or removal here) with the intent to subject the 
victim to sexual abuse. 
It is true that the jury found intent in different ways in the two 
cases—in Harrington, by way of special interrogatory, here, as one of the 
required elements of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.  
But Walker does not explain on appeal why that should make a 
difference.  In fact, neither his answering brief to the State’s cross-appeal 
nor his application for further review to this court discuss Harrington at 
all, even though it features prominently in the court of appeals decision. 
Notably, three members of our court dissented in part in 
Harrington on the ground that Iowa Code section 901A.2 requires a 
“conviction” of a sexually predatory offense.  Id. at 442 (Neuman, J., 
 
 
 
13 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Lavorato and Snell, 
JJ.).  In their view, a conviction of an offense that was not per se sexually 
predatory, i.e., that took on that status only because of a special 
interrogatory answer, would not suffice.  See id.  However, the rationale 
of the Harrington dissent seems inapplicable here.  In this case, the jury 
had to find the defendant intended to commit sexual abuse as an 
element of the underlying offense.  No special interrogatory answer was 
required.7 
In this case, the district court effectively disagreed with Harrington 
when it denied the enhancement.  The court of appeals special 
concurrence followed a different line of thinking.  It concluded that we 
are required to reconsider Harrington in light of the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Apprendi.  Against that backdrop, we will 
examine again the Harrington holding. 
 
It should be noted that shortly after Harrington was decided, the 
legislature amended chapter 901A.  See 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1030 
(codified at Iowa Code § 901A.1 (2001)).  As part of its amendment, the 
legislature struck the existing section 901A.1(1)(b), see id. ch. 1030, § 1, 
which had provided that sexually predatory offenses included 
b.  A violation of any of the following if the offense 
involves sexual abuse, attempted sexual abuse, or intent to 
commit sexual abuse: 
(1) Murder as defined in section 707.1. 
(2) Kidnapping as defined in section 710.1. 
7We do not understand the Harrington dissenters’ point to be that the defendant 
must actually have been convicted of an attempt offense per se.  There is no crime of 
“attempted sexual abuse” (or “attempted sexual exploitation of a minor,” or “attempted 
pandering”).  So if section 901A.1(1)(e) only applied if the defendant were actually 
convicted of something denominated as an attempt offense, it would seem to have no 
function. 
                                                 
 
 
 
14 
(3) Burglary as defined in section 713.1. 
(4) Child 
endangerment 
under 
section 
726.6, 
subsection 1, paragraph “e”. 
See Iowa Code § 901A.1(b) (1999). 
 
The legislature left in place the existing section 901A.1(1)(e), which 
provided that sexually predatory offenses included “[a]ny offense 
involving an attempt to commit an offense contained in this section.”  See 
Iowa Code § 901A.1(e) (2001).  That was the section we had relied on to 
sustain the enhancement in Harrington, noting that sexual abuse was an 
offense “contained in this section” and the defendant had confined the 
victim with intent to commit sexual abuse.  See 608 N.W.2d at 441. 
 
One could argue that by eliminating the express coverage for 
kidnapping involving “attempted sexual abuse” or “intent to commit 
sexual abuse,” the legislature meant to provide that kidnapping should 
not be considered a sexually predatory offense.  However, another 
conclusion seems more likely: The legislature viewed Iowa Code section 
901A.1(1)(b) as redundant in light of section 901A.1(1)(e).  Significantly, 
the legislature did not disturb the Harrington holding that false 
imprisonment with intent to commit sexual abuse is a sexually predatory 
offense.  It seems implausible that the legislature would want false 
imprisonment with intent to commit sexual abuse to be deemed a 
sexually predatory offense, but not the more serious crime of kidnapping 
with intent to commit sexual abuse.  These changes to the statutory 
scheme therefore do not affect our willingness to apply Harrington to the 
present case. 
 
We turn now to Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 
L. Ed. 2d 435.  That sentencing-enhancement case arose when the 
defendant fired multiple bullets into the home of an African-American 
 
 
 
15 
family that had recently moved into his neighborhood.  Id. at 469, 120 
S. Ct. at 2351, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442.  Allegedly, the defendant made a 
statement at the time that he had done so because the family was black.  
Id.  Under a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a 
firearm for an unlawful purpose.  Id. at 469, 120 S. Ct. at 2352, 147 
L. Ed. 2d at 442.  In addition, after the trial judge conducted an 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
the 
judge 
imposed 
a 
hate-crime 
sentence 
enhancement, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that “the crime 
was motivated by racial bias.”  Id. at 470–71, 120 S. Ct. at 2352, 147 
L. Ed. 2d at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The defendant challenged the enhancement on appeal, urging that 
“the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that 
the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must 
be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 471, 120 S. Ct. at 
2352, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 443.  The Supreme Court agreed.  It held, “Other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to 
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 
2362–63, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455. 
 
Thus, Apprendi makes clear that whether Walker committed an 
offense that involved an attempt to commit sexual abuse must be 
submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
Harrington, we equated a jury finding that the defendant had confined 
the victim with intent to abuse her with a determination he had 
attempted to commit sexual abuse.  However, we did so without the 
benefit of Apprendi.  Given the holding in Apprendi, we need to carefully 
review whether a jury finding that a defendant confined or removed a 
 
 
 
16 
victim with the intent to sexually abuse her is tantamount to a finding 
that he attempted to sexually abuse her. 
 
As the State points out, Iowa does not have a general attempt 
statute.  Instead, our law criminalizes attempts in certain circumstances, 
sometimes with a specific definition of “attempt” or “attempted.”  See, 
e.g., Iowa Code § 707.11 (2013) (defining “[a]ttempt to commit murder”); 
id. § 713.2 (defining “[a]ttempted burglary”).  As a result, our attempt law 
is relatively undeveloped.8 
When our criminal law penalizes an “attempt,” without a statutory 
definition, we have previously required 
(1) an intent to do an act or bring about certain 
consequences which would in law amount to a crime; and 
(2) an act in furtherance of that intent which . . . goes 
beyond mere preparation. 
State v. Spies, 672 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 2003) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted) (applying this definition to the question 
whether the defendant committed an “attempted transfer” of a controlled 
substance).  In another formulation, we said, “The common law 
principles of attempt require the State to prove (1) intent to commit the 
crime and (2) slight acts in furtherance of the crime that render 
voluntary termination improbable.”  Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 406 
(Iowa 1982) (applying this standard to the question whether the 
defendant had committed “attempted robbery”). 
8One treatise has observed that the nature of the act required for an attempt 
conviction “is not made very clear by the language which has traditionally been used by 
courts and legislatures.”  2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 11.4, at 218, 
Supp. 37 (2d ed. 2003 and Supp. 2013–2014).  The author goes on to list four different 
approaches to this issue, some of which surface in our own cases analyzing attempts.  
Id. at 220–28, Supp. 37–39. 
                                                 
 
 
 
17 
Going back further in time, in State v. Roby, we upheld a 
conviction for assault with intent to commit rape, which we treated as an 
attempt crime, explaining, 
In the instant case, defendant made preparation by enticing 
prosecutrix by signals to go to a secluded place where the act 
could be committed.  They were on the ground in position to 
have 
intercourse. 
 
Her 
clothing 
was 
more 
or 
less 
disarranged. . . .  These acts proximately led up to the 
consummation of the intended crime, and were overt acts. 
The [overt] act must reach far enough towards the 
accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the 
commencement of the consummation.  It must not be merely 
preparatory.  While it need not be the last proximate act to 
the 
consummation 
of 
the 
offense 
attempted 
to 
be 
perpetrated, it must approach sufficiently near to it to stand 
either as the first or some subsequent step in a direct 
movement towards the commission of the offense after the 
preparations are made. 
194 Iowa 1032, 1043, 188 N.W. 709, 714 (1922) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
These three formulations are not exactly the same, but they have 
been quoted in other cases.  See, e.g., State v. Erving, 346 N.W.2d 833, 
835–36 (Iowa 1984) (applying both the Fryer and the Roby standards to 
the question whether the defendant had committed attempted burglary 
as defined in Iowa Code section 713.2). 
In this case, we are tasked with determining if it is possible for 
someone to confine or remove another person with the intent to subject 
her to sexual abuse without actually committing an offense that involves 
an attempt to sexually abuse her.  Otherwise stated, could the 
confinement or removal be a “mere preparation,” Spies, 672 N.W.2d at 
797, not an act that “render[s] voluntary termination improbable,” Fryer, 
325 N.W.2d at 406, or something other than a “step in a direct 
movement towards the commission” of sexual abuse, Roby, 194 Iowa at 
 
 
 
18 
1043, 188 N.W. at 714?  The Harrington court concluded it was not 
possible, 608 N.W.2d at 441, and although we did not have the benefit of 
Apprendi at the time, our approach was consistent with Apprendi. 
In Harrington, we did not discuss the specific facts of the case in 
deciding the enhancement issue.  See 608 N.W.2d at 440.  Instead, we 
held the jury’s answer to the specific-intent interrogatory, combined with 
the false-imprisonment verdict, by themselves satisfied Iowa Code section 
901A.1(1)(e)’s requirement that the defendant have committed an 
attempt to commit sexual abuse.  Id. at 441.  That is the precise 
approach that Apprendi dictates. 
Apprendi does not establish a right to have a sentencing 
enhancement found by the jury.  Rather, it establishes a right to have 
the underlying facts that support the enhancement found by the jury.  
As one court has put it, 
[The defendant] attempts to argue that Apprendi 
requires the actual sentence enhancement itself to be found 
by the jury.  But that is not the law.  The trial judge may 
impose the sentence enhancement once the jury has found 
all of the facts necessary to satisfy the elements of the 
sentencing-enhancement statute.  Apprendi requires the jury 
to find not the sentence enhancement itself, but every fact 
required for the sentence enhancement to be imposed.  The 
jury having found all of the necessary facts, the trial judge 
has the authority to impose the sentence. 
Taylor v. State, 137 So. 3d 283, 287 (Miss. 2014). 
Our general assembly has said that a conviction for an offense 
involving an attempt to commit sexual abuse warrants an enhanced 
sentence if the defendant had a prior conviction for a sexually predatory 
offense.  In Harrington, we held that false imprisonment with intent to 
commit sexual abuse equated to an offense involving an attempt to 
commit sexual abuse.  This is a logical reading of both section 
901A.1(1)(e) and our precedents delineating the proof required for 
 
 
 
19 
criminal attempt.  While an attempt to commit sexual abuse clearly 
requires more than just intent, we cannot conceive of a confinement or 
removal of a victim with the intent to sexually abuse her that would not 
be considered attempted sexual abuse.9  Thus, the attempt to commit 
sexual abuse is inherent in the jury’s verdict in the present case.  
Apprendi is satisfied because the facts amounting to attempted sexual 
abuse were found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. 
IV.  Conclusion. 
For these reasons, we adhere to our holding in Harrington.  We 
therefore sustain the writ of certiorari, affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, affirm Walker’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for 
further sentencing proceedings.  As noted by the court of appeals, the 
district court did not decide whether Walker’s Ohio conviction qualified 
as “a prior conviction for a sexually predatory offense.”  Iowa Code 
§ 901A.2(3).  In light of our disposition of this appeal, that issue now 
needs to be resolved. 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AFFIRMED, WRIT SUSTAINED, 
AND CASE REMANDED. 
 
9We note also that a California appellate court, in an unpublished opinion, has 
held that kidnapping for the purpose of rape is an attempt to commit a sexual offense 
under California law.  People v. Majors, No. D037968, 2004 WL 2729758, at *7–8 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2004).  As the court put it,  
A kidnapping for the purpose of rape is not a mere act of preparation.  It 
demonstrates that the perpetrator is putting his plan into action and is 
necessarily an attempt to commit rape.  Kidnapping for the purpose of 
rape is, therefore, a sexual offense within the meaning of section 1108. 
Id. at *8.