Title: Dodd v. Croskey

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dodd v. Croskey, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2362.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2362 
DODD ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. CROSKEY ET AL., 
APPELLEES; EVANS, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dodd v. Croskey, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2362.] 
Mineral rights—Dormant Mineral Act—Mineral-interest holder’s claim to 
preserve mineral interests filed pursuant to R.C. 5301.56(H)(1) is 
sufficient to preclude the mineral interests from being deemed abandoned 
if filed within 60 days after notice of the surface owner’s intent to declare 
those interests abandoned. 
(No. 2013-1730—Submitted October 7, 2014—Decided June 18, 2015.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Harrison County, 
No. 12-HA-6, 2013-Ohio-4257. 
_____________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address important aspects of Ohio’s Dormant 
Mineral Act and its effect on the interaction between the rights of the owner of the 
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surface lands and the rights of the holder of an interest in the minerals beneath the 
surface.  Specifically, we resolve the question of whether a mineral-interest 
holder’s claim to preserve a mineral interest from being deemed abandoned in 
accordance with R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) is sufficient to preserve that interest if the 
claim was filed after notice of the surface owner’s intent to declare the mineral 
interest abandoned and outside the 20-year window immediately preceding that 
notice. 
{¶ 2} We answer this question in the affirmative.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Oil and gas exploration in Ohio is hardly a new phenomenon.  Oil 
was first discovered in Ohio in 1814.  James C. Cissel, Oil and Gas Law in Ohio, 
Ohio Legislative Service Commission Staff Research Report No. 63, at 12 (1965).  
By the late 19th century, Ohio was the nation’s leading oil producer.  Id.  Levels 
of production have not remained steady, however, and Ohio’s oil industry has 
been marked by boom and bust periods.  See id. at 13 (referring to a decline prior 
to the Morrow County oil boom in late 1963). 
{¶ 4} Production of mineral resources has driven the development of 
energy law in Ohio.  Indeed, an oil boom resulted in the General Assembly’s 
enactment of Ohio’s first major regulations of the oil and gas industry in 1965, 
which marked a dramatic shift from the simple conservation statutes that had 
existed before.  Id.; Lucas P. Baker, Forced into Fracking: Mandatory Pooling in 
Ohio, 42 Cap.U.L.Rev. 215, 221 (2014); J. Richard Emens & John S. Lowe, Ohio 
Oil and Gas Conservation Law—The First Ten Years (1965-1975), 37 Ohio 
St.L.J. 31, 33-35 (1976) (“Ohio, however, had only the most rudimentary 
conservation legislation prior to 1965”). 
{¶ 5} More recently, the natural gas boom in the Utica and Marcellus 
Shale regions has presented new challenges for Ohio law, including the interplay 
January Term, 2015 
 
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between statutes that govern the rights to the surface and to the minerals below.  
See Baker at 215, 227.  The fact that farmland is now more valued for what lies 
beneath rather than what can be grown or raised above has heightened interest in 
who owns the land and, more specifically, who holds the mineral rights and the 
rights to make the potentially lucrative leases.  See, e.g., Ray Paprocki, Cadiz 
starts to ride the boom, Columbus Dispatch (May 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/insight/2012/05/06/1-cadiz-starts-to-
ride-the-boom.html (“Some of the talk is about the out-of-state license plates 
spotted in town and the researchers clogging the Harrison County recorder’s 
office, poring over land records”). 
{¶ 6} These inquiries can be difficult to sort out. 
{¶ 7} Commonly, parcels of land in mineral-producing areas have mineral 
rights severed from the surface rights.  Over time, the severed mineral interests 
are transferred and divided through business and familial transactions.  As a 
result, it can be difficult, or even impossible, to find the owners of such severed 
mineral rights. 
{¶ 8} To address this challenge, the General Assembly enacted the 
Dormant Mineral Act in 1989.  Sub.S.B. No. 223, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 981.  
Codified at R.C. 5301.56, the act supplements the Marketable Title Act, R.C. 
5301.47 et seq., and provides a mechanism to reunite severed and abandoned 
mineral rights with the surface estate. 
The Dormant Mineral Act 
{¶ 9} To accomplish its purpose, the Dormant Mineral Act, as amended, 
establishes that a mineral interest held by someone other than the surface owner 
“shall be deemed abandoned and vested in the owner of the surface lands” if the 
statutory notice requirements are met and none of the following apply:  (1) the 
mineral interest is in coal or coal-related, (2) the mineral interest is held by the 
United States, the state, or any other political body described by the statute, or (3) 
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a saving event enumerated in the statute occurs within the 20 years immediately 
preceding the notice required by the Dormant Mineral Act.  R.C. 5301.56(B). 
{¶ 10} Under R.C. 5301.56(B)(3), there are six saving events that would 
render a mineral interest ineligible to be deemed abandoned if the event occurred 
in the 20 years preceding the required notice: 
 
(a) The mineral interest has been the subject of a title 
transaction that has been filed or recorded in the office of the 
county recorder of the county in which the lands are located. 
(b) There has been actual production or withdrawal of 
minerals by the holder from the lands, from lands covered by a 
lease to which the mineral interest is subject, from a mine a portion 
of which is located beneath the lands, or, in the case of oil or gas, 
from lands pooled, unitized, or included in unit operations * * *. 
(c) The mineral interest has been used in underground gas 
storage operations by the holder. 
(d) A drilling or mining permit has been issued to the 
holder * * *. 
(e) A claim to preserve the mineral interest has been filed 
in accordance with division (C) of this section. 
(f) In the case of a separated mineral interest, a separately 
listed tax parcel number has been created for the mineral interest in 
the county auditor’s tax list and the county treasurer’s duplicate tax 
list in the county in which the lands are located. 
 
{¶ 11} This appeal addresses the effect of a claim to preserve filed under 
R.C. 5301.56(H) in the absence of an affidavit describing the occurrence of one of 
the saving events described in subsections (B)(3)(a) through (f). 
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Mineral Rights Dispute 
{¶ 12} By deed dated August 2009, appellants, Phillip Dodd and Julie 
Bologna, acquired the surface rights to certain land in Harrison County.  The deed 
indicated that oil and gas rights underlying the surface property were not part of 
the conveyance as follows: 
 
Excepting and reserving unto Samuel A. Porter and 
Blanche Long Porter all of the oil and gas in Warranty Deed to 
Consolidated Fuel Company filed for record May 27, 1947 in 
Volume 121, page 381, Deed Records for the 148.105 acre.  (Note: 
No further transfers) 
* * * 
Excepting a one-third interest in the oil and gas to Samuel 
A. Porter and Blanche Long Porter in Warranty Deed filed for 
record may [sic] 27, 1947 in Volume 121, page 383, Deed 
Records.[1] 
 
{¶ 13} There is no dispute that the 2009 deed did not convey to appellants 
all of the mineral rights underlying their surface property, because of the 
exception in the deed.  But after an oil and gas company contacted appellants 
about leasing the mineral rights to the land, appellants initiated procedures under 
the Dormant Mineral Act to have the mineral interests deemed abandoned and 
vested in them along with their surface ownership. 
{¶ 14} On November 27, 2010, appellants published a notice of 
abandonment of the mineral interests underlying their property.  The notice was 
                                          
 
1  The trial court found that the 2009 deed incorrectly cited the 1947 instrument found in Volume 
121, page 383, of the deed records and determined that it should state that the reservation was 
retained by Emma Croskey.  Both the trial and appellate courts determined that this error did not 
affect the outcome of their decisions.  2013-Ohio-4257 at ¶ 5, fn. 1. 
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published in the local newspaper, the Harrison News Herald, and was addressed 
to “Samuel A. Porter and Blanche Long Porter, their unknown successors and 
assigns.” 
{¶ 15} Two days later, appellee John William Croskey recorded a 
quitclaim deed for mineral interests underlying the property.  That deed purported 
to transfer from John William Croskey to him and Anita M. Croskey, as trustees 
of the John William Croskey Revocable Trust, all the oil and gas rights 
underlying the surface property acquired by appellants through the 2009 deed. 
{¶ 16} On December 23, 2010, John William Croskey filed and recorded a 
document entitled “Affidavit Preserving Minerals.”  The Croskey affidavit 
outlined a history of transactions affecting the mineral rights underlying 
appellants’ surface property.  And it identified 36 persons as “current owners of 
the minerals and oil and gas reserved by the deeds” set forth in the affidavit who 
“do not intend to abandon their rights to the mineral interest, but intend to 
preserve their rights.” 
{¶ 17} On February 9, 2011, appellants filed a declaratory-judgment 
action to quiet title to the oil and gas interests against Croskey and all the persons 
Croskey named in his affidavit as owners of the mineral rights.  Appellants moved 
for summary judgment, contending that pursuant to the Dormant Mineral Act, the 
mineral rights had been abandoned.  Therefore, they asserted, the ownership 
rights to the minerals had vested in them.  Appellees also moved for summary 
judgment on various grounds.  One motion for summary judgment was filed by 
appellees Karen A. Chaney, Patty Hausman, Linda C. Boyd, and Terri Hocker, 
who contended that the Croskey affidavit was sufficient to preserve the interests 
of the mineral-rights holders.  In response, appellants asserted that the Croskey 
affidavit was not sufficient to preserve the mineral rights, because it was filed 
after they gave notice of their intent to declare the mineral interests abandoned. 
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{¶ 18} The trial court concluded that the mineral interests had been the 
subject of a title transaction, the 2009 deed, that was recorded within the 20 years 
preceding appellants’ notice of intent to declare the mineral interests abandoned 
in accordance with R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(a) and that the Croskey affidavit 
preserved the mineral-rights holders’ interests for purposes of the Dormant 
Mineral Act.  Thus, the trial court determined as a matter of law that appellants 
could not establish a claim for the abandonment of the oil and gas rights 
underlying their surface property and granted summary judgment to appellees. 
{¶ 19} The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, but agreed with 
only one of the trial court’s conclusions.  Specifically, the appellate court agreed 
that the Croskey affidavit complied with R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) to preserve the 
mineral holders’ interests.  2013-Ohio-4257, ¶ 22, 25.  For this reason alone, the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment. 
{¶ 20} The appellate court also concluded in dicta, however, that the 
reservation or exception of the mineral interests in the 2009 deed conveying the 
surface rights was not a saving event under R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(a).2  Id. at ¶ 49. 
{¶ 21} We accepted appellants’ discretionary appeal on their sole 
proposition of law regarding the mineral-interest holder’s claim to preserve.  138 
Ohio St.3d 1432, 2014-Ohio-889, 4 N.E.3d 1050.  After oral argument, we sua 
sponte accepted the cross-appeal of appellee Harriet C. Evans on her second 
proposition of law regarding the exception of mineral rights in the 2009 deed and 
ordered additional briefing.  140 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2014-Ohio-3708, 14 N.E.3d 
1052. 
                                          
 
2  The appellate court further concluded that although appellants’ notice of their intent to declare 
the mineral interests abandoned was inadequate under the statutory requirements, the error was 
harmless because notice was actually received.  2013-Ohio-4257, ¶ 59.  Lastly, the appellate court 
concluded that appellants failed to meet their burden to establish a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding Croskey’s status as an heir or assign of the Porters.  Id. at ¶ 65.  Neither of these issues 
is before this court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 22} Because we resolve the appeal on the issue of the claim to preserve, 
and because the appellate court’s discussion on the remaining issues is dicta, we 
need not reach the effect of the language of exception in the 2009 deed. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 23} Appellants contend that in order to preclude abandonment, the 
Dormant Mineral Act requires evidence that a saving event occurred in the 20-
year window prior to the surface owner’s notice of intent to declare the mineral 
interests abandoned and thus a mineral-interest holder’s claim to preserve that is 
filed after the surface owner’s notice does not preclude the mineral rights from 
being deemed abandoned.  According to appellants, the Croskey affidavit was not 
sufficient by itself to preclude abandonment because it was filed after appellants’ 
notice was published. 
{¶ 24} To determine what the statute requires, our paramount concern is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the General Assembly.  Henry v. Cent. 
Natl. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968), paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  To determine the legislative intent, we look to the language of the 
statute and the purpose to be accomplished by the statute.  Boley v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20.  
When the statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as 
written and refrain from adding or deleting words.  Id.; Armstrong v. John R. 
Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 25} In 2006, the General Assembly amended the Dormant Mineral Act 
by adding a notice procedure that the surface owner must initiate in order to have 
the mineral rights deemed abandoned.3  R.C. 5301.56(E) through (H). 
                                          
 
3  The original 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act did not include a notice procedure.  142 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 981, 985-987.  This absence has resulted in litigation questioning whether 
mineral rights automatically vested after 20 years without action by the surface owner if no saving 
event occurred, which is an issue currently before this court, including in the following cases:  
Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, case No. 2014-0803; Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., case 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 26} Before the mineral interests can be vested in the surface owner 
under the Dormant Mineral Act, the surface owner must complete two tasks.  R.C. 
5301.56(E).  First, the surface owner must serve notice of the intent to declare the 
mineral interest abandoned on the purported mineral-rights holders pursuant to the 
statutory requirements.  R.C. 5301.56(E)(1).  Second, between 30 and 60 days 
after the notice is served or published, the surface owner must file and record an 
affidavit of abandonment that meets the statutory requirements, including a 
statement that the mineral interest has been abandoned and a description of the 
facts supporting the abandonment.  R.C. 5301.56(E)(2) and (G). 
{¶ 27} To assert that the mineral interest has not been abandoned, the 
holder of the mineral interest, or the holder’s successors or assigns, has 60 days 
from the date the notice was served or published to file in the county recorder’s 
office either of the following: 
 
(a) A claim to preserve the mineral interest in accordance 
with division (C) of this section [R.C. 5301.56]; 
(b) An affidavit that identifies an event described in 
division (B)(3) of this section that has occurred within the twenty 
years immediately preceding the date on which the notice was 
served or published under division (E) of this section. 
 
R.C. 5301.56(H)(1). 
                                                                                                                   
No. 2014-0804; Swartz v. Householder, case No. 2014-1208; and Shannon v. Householder, case 
No. 2014-1209.  But in this appeal, the parties do not dispute whether the 1989 or 2006 version of 
the act applies.  In fact, the appeal addresses the effect of a claim under R.C. 5301.56(H), which is 
a provision added by the 2006 amendments.  Sub.H.B. No. 288, 151 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5960.  
Because there is no dispute about which version of the act applies, we do not craft one, and instead 
apply the Dormant Mineral Act as amended in 2006. 
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{¶ 28} In order to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 5301.56(C), as referred 
to in subsection (H)(1)(a) above, as well as R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(e), the claim to 
preserve must be one that does all of the following: 
 
(a) States the nature of the mineral interest claimed and any 
recording information upon which the claim is based; 
(b) Otherwise complies with section 5301.52 of the 
Revised Code; 
(c) States that the holder does not intend to abandon, but 
instead to preserve, the holder’s rights in the mineral interest. 
 
 
R.C. 5301.56(C)(1).  A claim that meets these requirements preserves the rights of 
all of the mineral-interest holders in the land.  R.C. 5301.56(C)(2). 
{¶ 29} If the mineral-interest holder fails to comply with either of the 
alternative requirements of R.C. 5301.56(H)(1) by filing a claim to preserve or an 
affidavit identifying a saving event, the surface owner must file a notice of failure 
to file pursuant to the statutory requirements.  R.C. 5301.56(H)(2).  After this 
notice is recorded, the mineral interest “shall vest in the owner of the surface of 
the lands.”  Id. 
{¶ 30} Reading the statute as a whole, we conclude that the plain language 
of the Dormant Mineral Act permits a mineral-interest holder’s claim to preserve 
to serve two separate but similar functions depending on when it is filed for 
record:  one as a saving event under R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(e) when filed in the 20 
years preceding notice and another to preclude the mineral interest from being 
deemed abandoned under R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) when filed within 60 days after 
service of the surface owner’s notice.  Nothing in the act states that a claim to 
preserve filed under R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) must refer to a saving event that 
occurred within the preceding 20 years.  Nor do the notice procedures in R.C. 
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5301.56(H)(1)(a) require that the claim to preserve be itself filed in the 20 years 
preceding notice by the surface owner.  The statute plainly states that such a claim 
can be filed within 60 days after notice.  R.C. 5301.56(H).  Thus, to preserve the 
mineral holder’s interests, the plain language of R.C. 5301.56(H) permits either a 
claim to preserve the mineral interest or an affidavit that identifies a saving event 
that occurred within the 20 years preceding notice. 
{¶ 31} Here, there is no question that Croskey did not file his affidavit in 
the 20 years preceding appellants’ notice of intent to declare the mineral interests 
abandoned.  And although the Croskey affidavit was styled as an affidavit, it did 
not meet the requirements in R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(b) because it did not identify a 
saving event in the 20 years preceding notice. 
{¶ 32} The issue, then, is whether the affidavit qualified as a claim to 
preserve the mineral interests from being deemed abandoned.  In form and 
substance, the Croskey affidavit satisfied the requirements for a claim to preserve 
under R.C. 5301.56(C), including that it be in the form of an affidavit pursuant to 
R.C. 5301.52.  And because it was filed within 60 days after appellants’ notice, it 
satisfied R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) to preserve the mineral interests. 
{¶ 33} To interpret the statute as appellants contend would require the 
insertion of language in R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) instructing that the claim to 
preserve be filed in the 20 years prior to notice and would further require the 
deletion of language that expressly permits the filing within 60 days after notice.  
But this court must give effect to the words used and refrain from inserting or 
deleting language chosen by the General Assembly.  Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. 
Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 53-54, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988). 
{¶ 34} Adding a requirement that the claim to preserve under R.C. 
5301.56(H)(1)(a) be filed within the 20 years preceding notice would render 
meaningless the deadline in R.C. 5301.56(H)(1) of 60 days after notice.  And it 
would render superfluous the option under R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(b) of filing an 
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affidavit that identifies a saving event in the 20 years preceding notice.  The court 
should avoid a construction that renders a provision superfluous, meaningless, or 
inoperative.  Boley, 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, at  
¶ 21.  The statute plainly permits a mineral-interest holder to preserve his or her 
claim by filing either a claim to preserve within 60 days or an affidavit identifying 
a saving event in the 20 years preceding notice.  R.C. 5301.56(H). 
{¶ 35} Even if the statute were ambiguous, we would be able to determine 
the General Assembly’s intent by considering several factors, including the 
legislative history, and arrive at the same conclusion.  R.C. 1.49.  The Final 
Analysis of the 2006 amendments to the act explains that a mineral-interest 
holder’s claim to preserve under R.C. 5301.56(H), “itself preserves the holder’s 
interest” if filed within 60 days after the surface owner’s notice.  Amber Hardesty, 
Final Analysis of Sub.H.B. 288, Legislative Service Commission.  The analysis 
explains that “[a]lternatively, where applicable,” the mineral-interest holder can 
file an affidavit describing a saving event that occurred within the 20 years 
proceeding notice.  Id.  Thus, the legislature clearly intended that either a claim to 
preserve filed after notice or an affidavit describing a saving event that occurred 
in the 20-year window preceding notice could be filed to preclude abandonment.  
There is nothing in the legislative history that would support an interpretation that 
the claim to preserve under R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) must be filed in the 20 years 
preceding notice in order to preclude abandonment. 
{¶ 36} Moreover, we recognize that the Marketable Title Act mandates 
liberal construction of its provisions, including R.C. 5301.56, “to effect the 
legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by 
allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title.”  R.C. 5301.55.  Allowing a 
claim preserving a mineral interest to be filed after the surface owner’s notice 
furthers the legislative purpose because a claim to preserve describes an 
January Term, 2015 
 
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identifiable mineral-interest holder who presents a chain of title from which that 
holder claims interest in the mineral rights.4 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 37} We hold that a mineral-interest holder’s claim to preserve filed 
pursuant to R.C. 5301.56(H)(1)(a) is sufficient to preclude the mineral interests 
from being deemed abandoned if filed within 60 days after notice of the surface 
owner’s intent to declare those interests abandoned.  We therefore affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals on this issue alone, and the appellants are 
precluded from declaring the mineral interests abandoned under the Dormant 
Mineral Act. 
Judgment affirmed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
_____________________ 
 
Crawford, Lowry & Associates, L.L.C., and G. Ian Crawford, for 
appellants and cross-appellees. 
Rupert Beetham for appellees John William Croskey, Mary E. Surrey, 
Roy Surrey, Emma Jane Croskey, Margaret Ann Turner, Mary Louise Morgan, 
Martha Beard, Lee Johnson, Edwin Johnson, JoAnn Zitko, David B. Porter, 
JoAnn C. Wesley, Cindy R. Weimer, Evart Dean Porter, Stuart Barry Porter, 
Brian Porter, Mary Elaine Porter, Kim Berry, Samuel G. Boak, Lorna Bower, 
Sandra Dodson, and Ian Resources, L.L.C. 
McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., R. Jeffrey Pollock, and Erin K. Walsh, for 
appellees Karen A. Chaney, Patty Hausman, Linda C. Boyd, and Terri Hocker. 
Marquette D. Evans for appellee and cross-appellant Harriet C. Evans. 
                                          
 
4  Presumably, the surface owner can challenge the accuracy of the mineral-interest holder’s claim.  
But that is outside the operation of the Dormant Mineral Act, which addresses only whether a 
surface owner can employ the act’s provisions to deem the mineral rights abandoned, reunite the 
mineral rights with the surface rights, and vest them in the surface owner. 
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Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews and James F. Mathews, for 
amicus curiae Jon D. Walker Jr. 
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Gregory W. Watts, 
Matthew W. Onest, David E. Butz, and William G. Williams, for amici curiae 
Jeffco Resources, Inc., Mark and Kathy Rastetter, Douglas Henderson, Djuro and 
Vesna Kovacic, Brett and Kim Trissel, and Steven E. and Diane Cheshier. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor, for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
Jackson Kelly, P.L.L.C., Clay K. Keller, and J. Alex Quay, for amicus 
curiae Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Matthew W. Warnock, Daniel C. Gibson, and 
Daniel E. Gerken, for amici curiae Noon and Shepherd Mineral Interest Owners. 
_____________________