Title: State v. Martel

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_MARTEL.94-225; 164 Vt 501; 670 A.2d 845

[Filed:  22-Dec-1995]


  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                           No. 94-225


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

Eugene P. Martel                             November Term, 1995


David Suntag, J. 

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

       Judith Brownlow, Norwich, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Eugene Martel appeals his conviction for
  sexual assault, claiming that the trial court erred by (1) not requiring
  the State to elect which of three alleged sexual acts it relied upon to
  prove the single count of sexual assault, (2) denying his motion for a
  mistrial because evidence of a prior assault by defendant on complainant
  was elicited during redirect examination, (3) not sua sponte declaring a
  mistrial based on an improper statement in the State's closing argument,
  and (4) denying his motion for a mistrial and his motion for a new trial
  based on jury taint.  We affirm.

       Prior to the events that gave rise to this prosecution, defendant had
  known complainant for more than two years.  The two had maintained a close
  and intimate relationship, and had even discussed marriage.  Their
  relationship included consensual sexual relations.  Complainant visited
  defendant at his apartment for dinner on the night of January 22, 1993. 
  After eating dinner and conversing, complainant said that she wanted to go
  home to care for her children.  Defendant became angry and told her he
  would hurt her if she did not stay.  He then forced her

 

  to have sex with him three separate times.  Afterwards, he inquired as to
  whether she was injured, but still refused to let her leave until the next
  day.

       Complainant refused contact with defendant during the following week. 
  She would not accept his phone calls and would not visit his apartment. 
  When the two encountered each other on the street on January 28, defendant
  forced her to accompany him back to his apartment.  On the way to his
  apartment, complainant pounded on the door of a neighboring apartment. 
  When the door opened, she rushed inside.  Defendant finally agreed to let
  her go home if she gave him a hug, which she did.

       As a result of the January 28 incident, an arrest warrant was issued
  for defendant.  He was discovered hiding in the attic of his apartment
  building and apprehended.  When the police interviewed complainant
  regarding the incident and asked why she was so frightened of him, she
  revealed the events of January 22.

       The State charged defendant with one count of sexual assault. 
  Following a jury trial, the district court entered a judgment convicting
  defendant of sexual assault under 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(1)(A), and sentenced
  him to fifteen to twenty years imprisonment. 

                                     I.

       Defendant contends on appeal that the district court erred by allowing
  the State to introduce evidence of three separate sexual acts in support of
  one count of sexual assault.  At a pretrial conference, defendant sought
  clarification as to which of the three sexual acts the State had elected to
  rely upon to prove the charged crime.  The State argued that all three acts
  constituted the offense.  The court noted that the three events were
  temporally distinct, and therefore could not be construed as one event; it
  also expressed concerns about duplicity.  The court then concluded that,
  absent some objection, the jury would be instructed that it must be
  unanimous about which of the three acts constituted the offense.  Defendant
  acknowledged the court's proposed instruction but did not object at the
  pretrial conference or when the jury was instructed.  Because defendant
  failed to object at trial, we will reverse only if we find plain

 

  error.  State v. Senna, 154 Vt. 343, 346, 575 A.2d 200, 202 (1990).

       As a general rule, where the State charges a person with one unlawful
  act, but the evidence reflects two or more acts, the State can obtain only
  one conviction and should be required to elect which act constituted the
  charged crime.  State v. Bailey, 144 Vt. 86, 98,