Title: Mudlaff v. McLeod

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1176 and 2011AP1177  
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the estate of Nancy Ellen Laubenheimer: 
 
Joseph McLeod, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Patricia Mudlaff n/k/a Patricia Guske, Barbara 
Nigh and Millard Laubenheimer, 
          Objectors-Appellants.   
 
------------------------------------------------ 
In re the estate of Nancy Ellen Laubenheimer: 
 
Patricia Mudlaff n/k/a Patricia Guske, Barbara 
Nigh and  
Millard Laubenheimer, 
          Appellants, 
     v. 
Joseph McLeod, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 12, 2013  
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew T. Gonring   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J., dissent. (Opinion filed.) GABLEMAN, 
J., dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the objectors-appellants, there were briefs by Gregory 
S. Mager and O’Neil, Cannon, Hollman, DeJong & Laing S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Gregory S. Mager.   
 
 
 
 
2
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief by Alan L. 
Spiegel, Paul Bugenhagen Jr., and Mclario, Helm & Bertling S.C., 
Menomonee Falls, with oral argument by Alan L. Spiegel. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177   
(L.C. No. 
2009PR25 & 2009PR26) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the estate of Nancy Ellen Laubenheimer: 
 
Joseph McLeod, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Patricia Mudlaff n/k/a Patricia Guske,  
Barbara Nigh and Millard Laubenheimer, 
 
          Objectors-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Washington 
County, Andrew T. Gonring, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   These consolidated estate cases 
are before the court on certification from the court of appeals, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2009-10).1 
¶2 
The cases arise from competing petitions for the 
appointment 
of 
a 
personal 
representative 
and 
the 
formal 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
2 
 
administration of the estate of Nancy Ellen Laubenheimer 
(Laubenheimer).  Joseph McLeod (McLeod) filed a petition for 
formal 
administration 
of 
Laubenheimer's 
estate 
and 
his 
appointment as personal representative.  He also asserted his 
right, as Laubenheimer's husband, to a share of her estate.  
Patricia Mudlaff (Patricia), Laubenheimer's stepdaughter, also 
filed a petition for formal administration and appointment as 
personal representative.  Patricia asserted that Laubenheimer's 
marriage to McLeod was invalid because Laubenheimer lacked the 
mental capacity to consent to the marriage to McLeod.  Thus, 
Patricia asked the circuit court to declare Laubenheimer's 
marriage void, making McLeod ineligible to receive a share of 
Laubenheimer's estate. 
¶3 
The principal issue in this case is whether a court 
has the authority to declare a marriage void after the death of 
one of the parties to the marriage. 
¶4 
The 
Washington 
County 
Circuit 
Court2 
rejected 
Patricia's argument, concluding that annulment was the only 
method to void a marriage and that a Wisconsin statute prohibits 
annulment after the death of one of the parties to the marriage. 
¶5 
We reverse.  In Ellis v. Estate of Toutant (Estate of 
Toutant), 2001 WI App 181, 247 Wis. 2d 400, 633 N.W.2d 692, the 
court of appeals held that there is a fundamental distinction 
between annulment and a judicial declaration that a marriage is 
void.  The court of appeals further held that in an estate 
                                                 
2 Judge Andrew T. Gonring presiding.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
3 
 
action challenging a marriage, a court may use its declaratory 
judgment powers to declare that a marriage prohibited by law was 
void and incapable of validation by the parties to the marriage.   
¶6 
We conclude that the holdings and analysis in Estate 
of Toutant are correct.  Annulment is certainly an appropriate 
remedy to void a marriage when the parties to the marriage are 
still alive, but it is not the exclusive remedy to challenge the 
validity of a marriage.  The common law drew a distinction 
between an annulment and a declaration that a marriage was void, 
especially a declaration after the death of one of the parties.  
Our statutes and case law have preserved that distinction. 
¶7 
Wisconsin Stat. ch. 765 sets out the criteria for a 
valid marriage in this state.  Failure to meet one of these 
criteria will often result in a void marriage.  An action under 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (the UDJA) is the 
established mechanism for testing the validity of a marriage in 
an estate case because the UDJA explicitly provides standing for 
interested parties in an estate action. 
¶8 
The change in the annulment statute in 2005 Wis. Act 
443 did not alter the holdings in the Estate of Toutant case.  
There is no evidence that the legislature sought to curtail a 
court's power to address fraud, mistake, and other exigencies in 
a disputed marriage in order to "declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations."  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).  Limiting a 
court's power to address these issues would effectively shut off 
declaratory remedies for parties in an estate action. 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
4 
 
¶9 
We remand the case to the circuit court for further 
action consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶10 Nancy and Luke (Luke) Laubenheimer were married 30 
years before Luke's death in 2001.  Their marriage produced no 
children, but Luke had three children from a previous marriage.  
Two 
of 
those 
children, 
Patricia 
and 
Millard 
(Millard) 
Laubenheimer, are parties in this case.  Laubenheimer never 
adopted Luke's children.   
 
¶11 Laubenheimer executed a will in 1999 leaving the bulk 
of her estate to Luke, but if Luke died before she did, the bulk 
of Laubenheimer's estate was to be distributed to Luke's 
children.  Laubenheimer did not alter this will in the decade 
after Luke's death.   
 
¶12 Laubenheimer suffered a stroke in January 2007.  From 
that time until her death in February 2009, Laubenheimer also 
suffered from hypertension, insulin-dependent diabetes, and 
renal failure.  At some point, McLeod came to live with 
Laubenheimer.  McLeod claims that he lived with her beginning in 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
5 
 
July 2003.  His presence in her home clearly preceded March 
2007.3   
¶13 On October 1, 2008, Community Memorial Hospital in 
Menomonee Falls admitted Laubenheimer with stroke-like symptoms, 
including "right side weakness, difficulty speaking, and facial 
droop."  Two doctors at the hospital noted Laubenheimer's 
diminished mental capacity.  On October 11, Dr. Lisa M. Rich and 
Dr. Colleen Poggenburg signed a "Statement of Incapacitation," 
concluding that Laubenheimer was "unable to receive and evaluate 
information effectively or to communicate decisions" and that 
she lacked the capacity to make health care decisions.  The 
Statement of Incapacitation activated Laubenheimer's health care 
power of attorney, which designated Laubenheimer's cousin, Diane 
Kulpa, to serve in that capacity.  Laubenheimer's mental state 
purportedly never improved and the health care power of attorney 
remained in effect until she died.   
¶14 On October 13, 2008, Laubenheimer was transferred from 
Community Memorial Hospital to Virginia Highlands Health and 
Rehabilitation Center (Virginia Highlands), a nursing home in 
                                                 
3 A March 2007 Washington County Sheriff's Department case 
report indicates that a sheriff's deputy conducted a welfare 
check of Laubenheimer's home based on a call from an Aurora 
Health nurse assigned to take care of Laubenheimer.  The case 
report identified McLeod as "Clark McLeod."  Although the case 
report noted that Laubenheimer admitted to "Clark" getting 
"rather upset" at times, and that the nurse expressed concern 
about "Clark" not allowing Laubenheimer to get the care she 
required, apparently neither the deputy nor the Washington 
County Division of Social Services took any further action in 
regard to this report.  
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
6 
 
Washington County.  From the time of her admittance to Virginia 
Highlands until her death on February 5, 2009, Laubenheimer was 
treated by Dr. Dirk Steinert, the attending physician at the 
nursing home.   
¶15 McLeod removed Laubenheimer from Virginia Highlands on 
October 27, 2008, to obtain a marriage license.  He removed her 
again on November 34 for a marriage ceremony before Washington 
County Court Commissioner Jeffrey A. Jaeger.  McLeod did not 
inform Laubenheimer's family, friends, doctors, or social 
workers about the wedding.  A representative of a medical 
insurance carrier for Laubenheimer was the first to communicate 
the marriage of Laubenheimer and McLeod to a member of the 
Virginia Highlands staff.   
¶16 On January 13, 2009, Patricia filed petitions in 
Washington County Circuit Court seeking temporary and permanent 
guardianship of the person and the estate for Laubenheimer, as 
                                                 
4 Patricia's brief and the court of appeals certification 
state that McLeod removed Laubenheimer from Virginia Highlands 
on November 3 to obtain a marriage license and that they were 
married on November 7.  McLeod's brief and the circuit court 
decision state that McLeod removed Laubenheimer on October 27 
and again on November 3.  McLeod referred to both sets of dates 
in the circuit court, while Patricia consistently referred to 
the November 3 and November 7 dates.  The discrepancy in dates 
does not affect our holding in any way.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
7 
 
well as protective placement.5  Patricia's guardianship petition 
alleged that Laubenheimer "suffer[ed] from severe cognitive 
disability 
due 
to 
several 
strokes." 
 
In 
addition, 
the 
guardianship 
petition 
claimed 
that 
McLeod 
"continues 
to 
interfer[e] with [Laubenheimer's] necessary health care in 
contravention of the direction of [Laubenheimer's] health care 
power of attorney."  One example of this interference, according 
to the petition, was McLeod discharging Laubenheimer from 
Virginia Highlands against medical advice.  Patricia alleged 
that Laubenheimer needed a guardian to readmit her to the 
nursing home.   
¶17 Patricia's guardianship petition also contained an 
examining physician's report from Dr. Steinert, opining that 
Laubenheimer was incompetent and in need of a guardian.6   
¶18 On January 27, 2009, the circuit court appointed 
Laubenheimer's power of attorney for health care, Diane Kulpa, 
as temporary guardian of Laubenheimer's person, and Barbara Nigh 
(Nigh), 
Laubenheimer's 
sister, 
as 
temporary 
guardian 
of 
                                                 
5 On the same date, Patricia filed a Temporary Restraining 
Order and Injunction against McLeod, alleging that Laubenheimer 
was an elderly at-risk individual and that McLeod abused and 
financially exploited her.  According to Consolidated Court 
Automated Programs (CCAP) records, the circuit court granted the 
temporary restraining order immediately, but the court dismissed 
the pending injunction against McLeod because of Laubenheimer's 
death.   
6 Dr. Steinert's report concluded that Laubenheimer had 
"cognitive inability to comprehend long[-]term or even short[-
]term concerns (health, welfare related & therefore probably 
financial)."   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
8 
 
Laubenheimer's estate, concluding that there was a "reasonable 
likelihood" Laubenheimer was incompetent.7   
¶19 Laubenheimer died at Virginia Highlands on February 5, 
2009, while the permanent guardianship proceedings were pending.  
In a letter dated February 7, 2009, Dr. Steinert concluded that 
at no time after Laubenheimer's admission to Virginia Highlands 
(including the date of the November marriage ceremony) did she 
have sufficient capacity to consent to marriage.   
¶20 On June 9, 2009, McLeod filed a petition for formal 
administration of Laubenheimer's estate, requesting that the 
court appoint him as personal representative and asserting his 
right to a share of Laubenheimer's estate.  McLeod attached a 
copy of Laubenheimer's October 13, 1999, will, but claimed that 
the will was not "properly executed" or "valid," and that after 
a "diligent inquiry," he was unable to find the original will or 
any subsequent wills executed by Laubenheimer.  McLeod asserted 
that because the 1999 will was executed prior to his marriage to 
Laubenheimer, he had a right to a share of his wife's estate 
under Wis. Stat. § 853.12.  Section 853.12(1) provides that "if 
the 
testator 
married the surviving spouse . . . after the 
testator executed his or her will, the surviving spouse . . . is 
entitled to a share of the probate estate."  The surviving 
spouse's share is equal to what his or her share would be if the 
                                                 
7 Patricia's petition for temporary guardianship of the 
estate requested the authority to "[f]ile an objection and/or 
annulment of purported marriage between [Laubenheimer] and 
Joseph C. McLeod."  In its order granting the temporary 
guardianship, the circuit court denied this additional power.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
9 
 
testator died intestate, minus devises made to the testator's 
children and their issue.  Wis. Stat. § 853.12(2).  McLeod 
argued that inasmuch as Laubenheimer did not have any biological 
children and never adopted Luke's children, he was the sole heir 
of Laubenheimer's estate.   
¶21 The next day, June 10, 2009, Patricia8 also filed a 
petition for formal administration of Laubenheimer's estate, 
seeking to be named co-personal representative of the estate 
with her brother Millard.9  Patricia asked the court to admit a 
conformed copy10 of Laubenheimer's will into probate.  Patricia 
also argued that Laubenheimer's marriage to McLeod was invalid 
on grounds that Laubenheimer lacked the mental capacity to enter 
                                                 
8 For the sake of simplicity, the objectors/appellants 
Patricia, Millard, and Nigh will be referred to as "Patricia" 
hereinafter.   
9 Patricia also filed an objection to McLeod's petition for 
formal 
administration 
and 
appointment 
as 
personal 
representative.   
10 A conformed copy is "[a]n exact copy of a document 
bearing written explanations of things that were not or could 
not be copied, such as a note on the document indicating that it 
was signed by a person whose signature appears on the original."  
Black's Law Dictionary 385 (9th ed. 2009).  Patricia claims that 
the conformed copy of Laubenheimer's will was obtained from the 
attorney 
who 
drafted 
substantially 
identical 
wills 
for 
Laubenheimer and Luke.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
10 
 
into a marriage contract, and therefore McLeod had no right to a 
surviving spouse's share of Laubenheimer's estate.11   
¶22 In a written decision dated December 23, 2009, the 
circuit court recognized that the issue of whether it had the 
authority to invalidate the Laubenheimer-McLeod marriage after 
Laubenheimer's death would "control the course of this estate."  
Examining the statutes, in particular Wis. Stat. § 767.313, the 
circuit court concluded that "the only way a marriage may be 
invalidated in the state of Wisconsin is through annulment.  
However, pursuant to Wis. Stat. [§] 767.313(2), no marriage may 
be annulled after the death of a party to the marriage."  Thus, 
the court rejected Patricia's argument that it had the power to 
invalidate the marriage.  The circuit court subsequently 
affirmed its decision in an order dated February 21, 2011, while 
granting McLeod's petition for formal administration and denying 
Patricia's petition.12  However, the circuit court, cognizant of 
Patricia's intention to appeal the order, appointed a neutral 
party to serve as personal representative of the Laubenheimer 
estate.   
                                                 
11 Nigh filed a petition to be found an interested person 
and to join Patricia and Millard for formal administration of 
the estate.  Nigh was Laubenheimer's sister, which would make 
her an intestate beneficiary if the court found Laubenheimer's 
marriage to McLeod invalid and the conformed will was not 
admitted into probate.   
12 Patricia appealed the circuit court's December 23, 2009, 
decision to the court of appeals.  The court of appeals decided 
that the December 23 decision of the circuit court was not an 
appealable order because it was not a final order or judgment.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
11 
 
¶23 Patricia appealed.  The court of appeals certified the 
matter to this court, and we accepted the certification on 
October 17, 2012. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶24 In this case, we must determine whether the statutes 
allow a court, in an estate case, to declare a marriage void 
after the death of one of the parties.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo.  
Wis. Dolls, LLC v. Town of Dell Prairie, 2012 WI 76, ¶19, 342 
Wis. 2d 350, 815 N.W.2d 690; Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks 
Valley, 2012 WI 7, ¶20, 338 Wis. 2d 488, 809 N.W.2d 362.   
III. ANALYSIS 
 
¶25 This case presents a legal issue about the authority 
of a Wisconsin court to pass on the validity of a marriage after 
the death of one of the parties to the marriage.  In addressing 
this issue, our intent is to avoid any determination by this 
court of the validity of the marriage between Laubenheimer and 
McLeod.   
¶26 The 
parties 
in 
this 
case 
offer 
very 
different 
interpretations of the statutes and cases on the legal issue of 
whether a court may evaluate the validity of a marriage after 
the death of one of the parties. 
 
¶27 McLeod focuses on Wis. Stat. § 767.313.  He contends 
that annulment is the exclusive means to invalidate a void or 
voidable marriage, and that § 767.313(2) absolutely prohibits a 
marriage from being annulled after the death of a party to the 
marriage.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
12 
 
 
¶28 Patricia concedes that under Wis. Stat. ch. 767, a 
court cannot annul the Laubenheimer-McLeod marriage.  However, 
Patricia relies on several provisions in Wis. Stat. ch. 765 that 
prohibit a marriage in various situations and state that a 
marriage is void if one of those provisions is violated.  One of 
the provisions in Wis. Stat. ch. 765 prohibits marriage where a 
party has such want of understanding as renders him or her 
incapable of assenting to marriage.  Wis. Stat. § 765.03(1).  
Patricia claims that a court has authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(4) to declare such a marriage void in an estate case 
even after the death of one of the parties. 
 
¶29 When interpreting a statute, "we begin with the 
language of the statute, because it is the language that 
expresses the legislature's intent."  Hocking v. City of 
Dodgeville, 2010 WI 59, ¶18, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398 
(citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 
WI 
58, 
¶¶44–45, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110).  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  The scope, context, and 
purpose of a statute, derived from statutory text and structure, 
are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation.  Id., 
¶48.  Statutory history also is part of a plain-meaning 
analysis.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 
309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  Legislative history may be 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
13 
 
relevant to confirm a statute's plain meaning.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.   
A. Current Marriage Law in Wisconsin 
 
¶30 We begin our analysis with the current statutes.  
Marriage requirements are determined by statute.  See Watts v. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 519 n.11, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987) (noting 
that Wisconsin abolished common law marriage in 1917); see also 
§ 3, ch. 218, Laws of 1917.   
 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 765 is entitled "Marriage" and it 
lays out the requirements for entering into marriage in 
Wisconsin.  Wisconsin Stat. § 765.001(2) explains the intent 
behind Wis. Stat. chs. 765 through 768, "The Family Code": 
 
It is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 to promote 
the stability and best interests of marriage and the 
family. . . .  Marriage is the institution that is the 
foundation of the family and of society.  Its 
stability is basic to morality and civilization, and 
of vital interest to society and the state.  The 
consequences 
of 
the 
marriage 
contract 
are 
more 
significant to society than those of other contracts, 
and the public interest must be taken into account 
always. . . .   The impairment or dissolution of the 
marriage relation generally results in injury to the 
public wholly apart from the effect upon the parties 
immediately concerned. 
Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2).  Section 765.001(3) states that The 
Family Code "shall be liberally construed to effect the 
objectives" in § 765.001(2).   
 
¶32 Marriage in Wisconsin, "so far as its validity at law 
is concerned, is a civil contract, to which the consent of the 
parties capable in law of contracting is essential."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 765.01 (emphasis added).  See also Campbell v. Blumberg, 260 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
14 
 
Wis. 625, 628, 51 N.W.2d 709 (1952) ("[M]arriage is a civil 
contract. It is different from ordinary contracts in that it 
cannot be modified or abrogated by the parties themselves.  Once 
entered into, a valid marriage contract continues until the 
contract is changed by law or by the death of one of the 
parties."). 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 765 prohibits marriage between 
parties in certain situations.  Only competent persons who have 
attained the age of 18 may marry in this state, although a 
person between 16 and 18 years of age may marry with the 
requisite parental permission.  Wis. Stat. § 765.02.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 765.03 lists four situations in which marriage shall not 
be contracted: (1) "while either of the parties has a husband or 
wife living"; (2) when the parties "are nearer of kin than 2nd 
cousins" (with certain exceptions); (3) when "either party has 
such want of understanding as renders him or her incapable of 
assenting to marriage"; and (4) when any person who is or has 
been a party to a divorce in this state or elsewhere marries 
again within six months after the judgment of divorce is 
granted.  In addition, Wis. Stat. § 765.04 forbids a marriage 
when a person who is prohibited from marrying in this state goes 
into 
another 
state 
or 
country 
and 
contracts 
a 
marriage 
prohibited under the laws of this state.  Finally, Wis. Stat. 
§ 765.16 states that a marriage "may be validly solemnized and 
contracted in this state only after a marriage license has been 
issued therefor," and only after mutual declarations by the 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
15 
 
parties in front of an authorized officiating person and 
witnesses.   
 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 765.21 declares that all marriages 
contracted in violation of the above sections "shall be void," 
excepting for immaterial irregularities.  "'[V]oid' means null 
and void and not voidable."  Wis. Stat. § 765.002(6).  However, 
§ 765.21 allows the parties to a void marriage to validate it by 
complying with any of the requirements set forth in the above 
cited provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 765 "if the marriage is 
declared void."  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, the 
impediments to a valid marriage must be removed before the void 
marriage may be validated.13   
 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 767 is entitled "Actions Affecting 
the Family."  Actions in this chapter include, inter alia, 
annulment.  Wis. Stat. § 767.001(1)(b).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 767.313(1) lists the grounds for an annulment suit brought by 
a party, a parent or guardian, or a legal representative: 
(a) A party lacked capacity to consent to the 
marriage at the time the marriage was solemnized, 
either because of age, because of mental incapacity or 
infirmity or because of the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or other incapacitating substances, or a party 
was induced to enter into a marriage by force or 
                                                 
13 We note that Wis. Stat. § 765.21 declares certain alleged 
marriages to be "void," yet the section states how those same 
void marriage can be validated by the parties.  See also John P. 
Foley, Comment, The Voidable Void Marriage in Wisconsin, 49 
Marq. L. Rev. 751 (1966).  However, this statute is of no moment 
in a collateral proceeding such as an estate action; the death 
of an incapacitated party means that the marriage is incapable 
of validation by the parties. 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
16 
 
duress, or by fraud involving the essentials of 
marriage. . . . 
(b) A party lacks the physical capacity to 
consummate the marriage by sexual intercourse, and at 
the time the marriage was solemnized the other party 
did not know of the incapacity. . . . 
(c) A party was 16 or 17 years of age and did 
not have the consent of his or her parent or guardian 
or judicial approval, or a party was under 16 years of 
age. . . . 
(d) The marriage is prohibited by the laws of 
this state. . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 767.313(1).  The same section contains a provision 
that "[a] judicial proceeding is required to annul a marriage.  
A marriage may not be annulled after the death of a party to the 
marriage."  Wis. Stat. § 767.313(2).   
 
¶36 This annulment provision is central to the matter 
before us.   McLeod asserts that a marriage cannot be voided 
except by annulment, and annulment is not available when one of 
the parties is deceased.  Patricia, on the other hand, relies on 
provisions throughout Wis. Stat. ch. 765 that seem to say that 
unless certain conditions are met, a marriage is void from its 
inception.  Patricia asserts that a court has the power to 
declare a marriage void outside the annulment process in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 767. 
B. Estate of Toutant: Courts Have the Power to Declare 
a Marriage Void After the Death of One of the Parties 
to the Marriage 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
17 
 
 
¶37 When the parties to a marriage are alive, the 
appropriate remedy for voiding a marriage is annulment.14  
However, at common law, when one of the parties died, such that 
any impediment to a valid marriage was no longer capable of 
being corrected, a declaration that a marriage was void was the 
proper remedy.  Our case law has retained this common law 
principle, and the most recent example is Estate of Toutant. 
 
¶38 In Estate of Toutant, a Wisconsin resident, Toutant, 
married a Scottish national named Ellis in Texas only 30 days 
                                                 
14 Although the appropriate method for voiding a marriage 
when the parties are alive is annulment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.313, an annulment action is not the only method for 
testing the validity of a marriage. 
For example, Wis. Stat. § 767.18, entitled "Actions to 
affirm marriage," reads:  
If the validity of a marriage is denied or 
doubted by either of the parties the other party may 
commence an action to affirm the marriage.  The 
judgment in an action to affirm marriage shall declare 
the marriage valid or annul the marriage, and is 
conclusive upon all persons concerned.   
If the judgment "is conclusive upon all persons concerned," 
persons concerned must have the opportunity to present evidence 
that the marriage was and is void, as where one of the parties 
is still married to another person.  See Kitzman v. Kitzman, 167 
Wis. 308, 166 N.W. 789 (1918).   
 
In addition, a declaratory judgment action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(1) or (4) may be filed by an interested person who is 
able to satisfy the standing requirements under the declaratory 
judgment statute.  This is signaled by a close reading of Wis. 
Stat. § 765.21: "The parties to any such marriage may validate 
the marriage by complying with the requirements of ss. 765.02 to 
765.24 as follows: (1) At any time, if the marriage is declared 
void under s. 765.02 or 765.16." (Emphasis added.)  
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
18 
 
after Ellis's Scottish divorce.  Estate of Toutant, 247 
Wis. 2d 400, ¶¶3, 6.  Toutant died shortly after returning to 
Wisconsin with Ellis.  Id., ¶7.  Toutant died testate, but Ellis 
filed a Surviving Spouse's Selection of Personal Property, 
selecting the bulk of Toutant's personal property.  Id., ¶8.  
The personal representative of the estate filed a petition for a 
declaratory judgment asking the circuit court to declare the 
marriage of Toutant and Ellis null and void.  Id., ¶9.  The 
circuit court ruled that the marriage was void because it 
"violated Wisconsin's six-month waiting period between a divorce 
and a subsequent marriage."  Id., ¶11.   
¶39 Ellis argued that the circuit court did not have the 
authority to annul the marriage because a marriage cannot be 
annulled after the death of one of the parties.  Id., ¶15.  The 
court of appeals agreed with this assertion, but noted that "the 
estate was not asking the marriage to be annulled."  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  Instead, the 
estate was asking the circuit court to declare the marriage null 
and void.  Id.   
¶40 The court of appeals looked to then-Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.03 (1999–2000), which stated that judicial proceedings 
were needed to annul or hold void a marriage, and "[n]o marriage 
may be annulled after the death of either party to the 
marriage."  The court of appeals concluded that the second part 
of this provision "pointedly prohibits only annulment after the 
death of either spouse.  Thus, a marriage can be declared null 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
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and void after the death of a spouse."  Id., ¶16 (emphasis 
added).   
¶41 Ellis argued that his marriage to Toutant was, at 
most, a voidable marriage and thus was valid until subsequently 
annulled.  Id., ¶25.  However, the court of appeals held that 
such distinction was beside the point because it ignored the 
plain language of the applicable statute: Wis. Stat. § 765.03(2) 
"specifically states that a 'marriage . . . solemnized before 
the expiration of 6 months from the date of the granting of 
judgment of divorce shall be void,'" and void means "null and 
void and not voidable."  Id., ¶¶25–26 (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§§ 765.03(2) and 765.002(6) (1999–2000)).   
 
¶42 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's use of its declaratory judgment powers to void the 
Toutant-Ellis marriage.  See id., ¶12 n.1 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(1) and (4)(c), the UDJA).   
 
¶43 There is a clear statutory and case law basis for the 
Estate of Toutant court's conclusion.  The common law drew a 
distinction between annulment and declaring a marriage void 
after death, and that distinction has been preserved.   
¶44 Wis. Stat. ch. 78 of the Revised Statutes of 1849 was 
titled "Of Marriage," similar to what Wis. Stat. ch. 765 is 
titled today.  It contained several sections relating to the 
incapability of certain individuals to contract marriage——
including mental incapability——and additional requirements for 
marriage.  Wis. Stat. ch. 79 of the 1849 Revised Statutes, 
titled "Of Divorce," also contained a section that declared that 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
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certain marriages prohibited by law "shall be void," including 
those in which either of the parties was incapable of assent 
because of want of understanding.  Wis. Stat. ch. 79, § 2 
(1849).  Furthermore, Section 3 read that: "When a marriage is 
supposed 
to 
be 
void, 
or 
the 
validity 
thereof 
is 
disputed, . . . either 
party 
may 
file 
a 
petition . . . for 
annulling the [marriage] . . . and upon due proof of the nullity 
of the marriage, it shall be declared void."  Wis. Stat. ch. 79, 
§ 3 (1849).  However, Section 5 stated that a marriage of an 
"insane 
person" 
shall 
not 
be 
declared 
void 
after 
"his 
restoration 
to 
reason" 
if 
it 
appeared 
that 
the 
parties 
cohabitated together for a time and the incapacitated person was 
"restored to a sound mind."  Wis. Stat. ch. 79, § 5 (1849). 
 
¶45 In sum, our first statutory compilation prohibited 
certain marriages and deemed these prohibited marriages "void."  
Furthermore, the first statutory compilation set out a petition 
for annulment as the mechanism to declare a marriage void during 
the life of the parties.15  
 
¶46 The case of Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 23 
N.W. 110 (1885), was an ejectment action that interpreted these 
marriage provisions.  The issue in Williams was whether the 
plaintiff was still married to her first husband (who also may 
                                                 
15 Wis. Stat. ch. 78 "Of Marriage" and Wis. Stat. ch. 79 "Of 
Divorce" were subsequently relocated to Wis. Stat. ch. 109 and 
Wis. Stat. ch. 111 of the 1858 Revised Statutes, respectively.  
Later, these same provisions were moved again in the Revised 
Statutes of 1878; "Of Marriage" was assigned Wis. Stat. ch. 107 
and "Of Divorce" was assigned Wis. Stat. ch. 109.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
21 
 
have been married to another woman); if so, "then she was 
incapable of entering into the marriage contract with" her 
second husband.  Williams, 63 Wis. at 58–59 (statement of the 
case), 61 (citing Wis. Stat. ch. 107, § 2330; ch. 109, § 2349 
(1878)) (stating that no marriage shall be contracted while 
either of the parties has a husband or wife living, and if still 
solemnized it shall be "absolutely void").   
 
¶47 This 
court 
held 
that 
the 
marriage 
between 
the 
plaintiff and her first husband was invalid because the first 
husband was still married to his first wife.  Id. at 68.  
Looking to the divorce statutes in Wis. Stat. ch. 109, the court 
explained when actions for divorce or annulment are appropriate: 
When the action is for a divorce for any of the 
causes named in the statutes, it is necessarily upon 
the assumption that there has been a valid marriage, 
or one binding, at least, until adjudged void.  But 
when the validity of the marriage itself is to be 
determined, then the action should be to affirm or to 
annul the marriage, and the judgment of affirmance or 
nullity therein is made by statute "conclusive upon 
all persons concerned." 
Id. at 75 (citing Wis. Stat. ch. 109, §§ 2348, 2350–2352 
(1878)).  While seeming to conclude that annulment was the 
method to void an invalid marriage, the court also said: 
The marriage between the plaintiff and [her first 
husband] being absolutely void ab initio, it was good 
for no legal purpose, and its invalidity may be 
maintained in any proceeding in any court between any 
parties, whether in the life-time or after the death 
of the supposed husband or wife, or both, and whether 
the question arises directly or collaterally.  It is 
otherwise where the marriage is voidable merely. 
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  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
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Id. at 69 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Williams cited 
two treatises in support of this proposition.  Id. (citing 1 
Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and 
Divorce, with the Evidence, Practice, Pleading, and Forms; Also 
of Separations Without Divorce, and of the Evidence of Marriage 
in All Issues § 105 (6th ed. 1881) [hereinafter Bishop]; 2 Simon 
Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 464 (10th ed. 
1868)).  Bishop cited numerous state and federal cases from the 
early to mid-1800s that involved questions about the validity of 
marriage during either the lifetime or after the death of the 
parties to a marriage.  Bishop, supra, at § 105 n.2.    
¶48 Thus, the Williams court concluded that a void 
marriage, whatever the mechanism or process for challenging the 
validity of the marriage, may be challenged in the lifetime or 
after 
the 
death 
of 
the 
marriage 
parties, 
directly 
or 
collaterally.  See Williams, 63 Wis. at 69.   
 
¶49 This court interpreted the revised marriage statutes16 
again in Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920), 
                                                 
16 In 1909 the legislature enacted several changes to the 
marriage statutes relevant to this appeal.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 
107 "Of Marriage" kept the same restrictions on who may marry: 
no one with a husband or wife still living, nor between parties 
nearer of kin than first cousins, and no one with mental 
incapacity.  § 2, ch. 323, Laws of 1909.  However, Wis. Stat. 
ch. 109 "Of Divorce" contained a new Section 2351 listing the 
grounds upon which a marriage may be annulled: impotence; 
consanguinity; when either party had a husband or wife still 
living; fraud, force, or coercion; insanity or "want of 
understanding"; and non-age of either party.  § 8, ch. 323, Laws 
of 1909.  Thus, the legislature placed limits on when an 
annulment action could be brought.   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
23 
 
a case involving two Wisconsin residents who married in 
Michigan, although one party was underage and neither party 
obtained consent of parents.  Id. at 382–83 (statement of the 
case).  The plaintiff brought an action to annul the marriage 
and to declare it void.  Id. at 383.   
 
¶50 The Lyannes court noted that "public policy has 
consistently and continuously recognized substantially three 
different classes" of marriage or claims of marriage: valid, 
void, and voidable.  Id. at 389–90.   
 
¶51 Lyannes concluded that in the valid marriage the 
parties are competent to contract and have complied with 
statutory requirements.  Id. at 389.   
 
¶52 In the void marriage, the parties, "by reason of some 
positive inhibition of the law, are absolutely disabled and 
prohibited from sustaining to each other the lawful relationship 
of husband and wife."  Id.  Lyannes held that a void marriage is 
"an absolute nullity from its very beginning and cannot be 
ratified."  Id. at 390.   
 
¶53 Finally, Lyannes addressed the voidable marriage, 
which "may subsequently ripen into an absolute marriage, and is 
                                                                                                                                                             
Further changes were made to the marriage statutes in 1917.  
Twenty-seven new sections were added to Wis. Stat. ch. 107 on 
"Marriage," including Section 2339n——21., which was entitled 
"Unlawful marriages void; validation."  § 3, ch. 218, Laws of 
1917.  This section held that all marriages contracted in 
violation 
of 
Section 
2339n——1. 
(valid 
marriages 
must 
be 
licensed, performed by an authorized celebrant, and in the 
presence of two competent witnesses) shall be "null and void," 
but that the parties could validate the marriage later by 
complying with the statutory requirements.  Id. 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
24 
 
considered valid and subsisting until annulled by judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction."  Id. at 391.  The Lyannes 
court admitted that the distinction between void and voidable 
marriages is "often shadowy and the line hard to place," with 
both forms "intermingled" in Wis. Stat. ch. 107's prohibitions 
on marriage and Wis. Stat. ch. 109's causes for which marriages 
may be annulled.  Id.  In either case, however, Lyannes held 
that the 1909 statutory changes made annulment "the proper 
remedy to set aside both the void and the voidable marriage."  
Id. at 392.   
 
¶54 However, the Lyannes court retained language similar 
to the Williams decision more than three decades earlier: 
In the void marriage the relationship of the 
parties, so far as its being legal is concerned, is an 
absolute nullity from its very beginning and cannot be 
ratified.  It may be questioned at any time during the 
life 
of 
both, 
and, 
with 
some 
statutory 
exceptions[17] . . . , after the death of either or 
                                                 
17 The exception that the Lyannes court cites was Wis. Stat. 
§ ch. 109, § 2351(2) (1919).  Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 
390, 177 N.W. 683 (1920).  Section 2351 listed the causes for 
annulment, including consanguinity ("where the parties are 
nearer of kin than second cousins") in subsection (2).  However, 
subsection (2) also directed that "when any such marriage shall 
not have been annulled during the lifetime of the parties, the 
validity thereof shall not be inquired into after the death of 
either party."   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
25 
 
both, 
and 
generally whether the question arises 
directly 
or 
collaterally. 
 
As 
between 
the 
two 
individuals concerned no rights spring therefrom, and, 
generally speaking, except as modified by positive 
legislation, it needs no adjudication by a court that 
it is void.  That such is the law of this state has 
been repeatedly held. 
Id. at 390 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Therefore, the 
Lyannes court continued to recognize the ability of a court to 
invalidate a marriage after death.18    
 
¶55 Sixteen years later, in the estate case of King v. 
Canon, 221 Wis. 322, 266 N.W. 918 (1936), the validity of a 
deceased woman's marriage was questioned because she was an 
                                                                                                                                                             
This additional language prohibiting posthumous inquiry 
into a particular cause for annulment is noteworthy.  Here, the 
legislature unambiguously prohibited the questioning of a 
marriage's validity, based on consanguinity, after one of the 
parties died; by contrast, no such prohibition appears with 
respect to mental incapacity of a party.  The legislature's 
break with the common law could not have been clearer, 
illustrating that when the legislature wants to contravene the 
common law it does so clearly and unambiguously.  See infra, 
¶76. 
18 In 
1925 
the 
marriage 
and 
divorce 
statutes 
were 
renumbered. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
ch. 
107 
on 
"Marriage" 
was 
renumbered as Wis. Stat. ch. 245, and Wis. Stat. ch. 109, now 
titled simply "Divorce," was renumbered as Wis. Stat. ch. 247.  
§ 1, ch. 4, Laws of 1925.   
In the 1979–80 legislative session, Wis. Stat. ch. 245 on 
"Marriage" was renumbered Wis. Stat. ch. 765.  § 48, ch. 32, 
Laws of 1979.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 247 on "Actions Affecting 
Marriage" was renumbered Wis. Stat. ch. 767, § 50, ch. 32, Laws 
of 1979, and the title was changed to "Actions Affecting the 
Family."  Chapter 32, Laws of 1979 (emphasis added). 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
26 
 
epileptic and incapable of contracting marriage in this state.19  
Id. at 323–25.  The question before this court was whether the 
marriage of the decedent——originally contracted in Illinois but 
contrary to the existing laws of this state——was void.  Id. at 
324.  The King court concluded that, because Chapter 218, Laws 
of 1917 prohibited epileptics from contracting marriage, Canon's 
marriage was void.  Id. at 327.  Quoting Lyannes, the King court 
reiterated that void marriages may be questioned after the death 
of the parties.  Id. at 328 (quoting Lyannes, 171 Wis. at 390).   
 
¶56 Once again, in Davidson v. Davidson, 35 Wis. 2d 401, 
151 N.W.2d 53 (1967), this court had occasion to interpret the 
marriage statutes in an action for annulment brought by a wife 
who alleged that her husband was still married to another woman 
at the time of the marriage ceremony.  Id. at 403 (statement of 
the case).  However, the wife died before the annulment action 
was brought to trial.  Id. at 404.  The circuit court denied the 
application of the wife's estate to continue the annulment 
action.  Id.   
 
¶57 According to the Davidson court, the issue of whether 
to allow the annulment action to continue depended upon whether 
the marriage was void or voidable:   
If the marriage was voidable it was valid and in 
effect at the time of [the second wife]'s death and 
the personal cause of action for annulment abated at 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 245.03(1) (1925), in effect at the time 
of the marriage at issue in the case, stated that, "[n]o insane 
person, epileptic, or idiot shall be capable of contracting 
marriage." 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
27 
 
the time of her death.  If the marriage was void during 
its entirety the cause of action survives in her 
estate and the court could retain jurisdiction to 
declare the marriage void and restore her property to 
the estate. 
Id. at 406 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The Davidson 
court looked to Lyannes' definitions of void and voidable, id. 
at 406–07, but also focused on another set of definitions: 
[A] marriage may be considered voidable although 
prohibited by law when it is possible, under any 
circumstances, 
for 
the 
parties 
to 
contract 
the 
marriage, or subsequently to ratify it, while it 
should be considered void if it is impossible for them 
under the law to contract it, and if it is impossible 
for them subsequently by any conduct to ratify it, and 
if the statute expressly declares that the marriage is 
void. 
Id. at 407 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 
¶58 Other more modern cases continued to recognize a 
common law right to post-death challenges to the validity of a 
marriage.  See, e.g., Corning v. Carriers Ins. Co., 88 
Wis. 2d 17, 21, 276 N.W.2d 310 (1979); Estate of Gibson v. 
Madison Bank & Trust Co., 7 Wis. 2d 506, 96 N.W.2d 859 (1959).   
 
¶59 The central holding of Estate of Toutant——that a court 
can declare a marriage void after the death of one of the 
parties——comports with persuasive authority on the topic.  An 
American Law Reports article discusses general attacks on 
marriages after the death of a party: 
The later cases, as do the earlier ones, amply 
show that, except as statutes occasionally otherwise 
provide, the question whether the validity of a 
marriage is open to attack in a judicial proceeding 
subsequently to the death of a party to the marriage 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
28 
 
ordinarily resolves itself into the inquiry whether 
the marriage is in the true sense void, or, on the 
contrary, voidable only.   
If the marriage is void, the fact of nullity may 
be shown, directly or collaterally, after the death of 
either or both of the parties.   
Annotation, Right to Attack Validity of Marriage After Death of 
Party Thereto, 47 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1394 (1956).  The article then 
specifically discusses marriages that are challenged due to the 
mental incompetency of a party: 
The later cases show that the rule of the common 
law, and the one which ordinarily prevails in the 
absence 
of 
contrary 
statutory 
provision 
or 
implication, is that the marriage of a person who was 
insane or otherwise mentally incompetent to enter into 
the marriage, is void, and consequently open to attack 
after the death of either or both of the parties. 
Id. at 1396.  American Jurisprudence also discusses the 
consequences of void marriages specifically: 
As a rule, a void marriage, as distinguished from 
one that is merely voidable, is null from its 
inception, that is, when a marriage is void, it is for 
most purposes, as if no marriage had taken place.  
Under this view, a void marriage is good for no legal 
purpose, and is not attended or followed by any of the 
incidents of a valid marriage.  It can be attacked 
either directly or collaterally, and in fact, a 
marriage void ab initio is subject to collateral 
attack at any time whereas a marriage merely voidable 
cannot be annulled after the death of either spouse. 
52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage § 82 (2011) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted).  See also 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 43 (2009) (describing a 
void marriage as a nullity, "subject to both direct and 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
29 
 
collateral attack, . . . at any time," including after the death 
of either or both parties).20 
 
¶60 Therefore, the holding in Estate of Toutant is based 
on the common law principle that, in either direct or collateral 
proceedings, a marriage may be declared void after the death of 
one of the parties.  Our case law has always followed this 
common law principle. 
C. What is a Void Marriage? 
 
¶61 As noted earlier, Davidson provided a comprehensive 
definition of a void marriage: "if it is impossible for [the 
parties] under the law to contract it, and if it is impossible 
for them subsequently by any conduct to ratify it, and if the 
statute 
expressly 
declares 
that 
the 
marriage 
is 
void."  
Davidson, 35 Wis. 2d at 407 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 765 sets out the criteria for who 
may contract a marriage and who shall not marry.  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 765.21 
provides 
that 
"[a]ll 
marriages 
hereafter 
contracted in violation of ss. 765.02, 765.03, 765.04 and 765.16 
shall be void, except as provided in ss. 765.22 and 765.23." 
¶63 Wisconsin Stat. § 765.01 requires that an individual 
be "capable in law of contracting" to marry in this state.  See 
also Wis. Stat. § 765.02(1) ("Every person who has attained the 
                                                 
20 The article in 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 43 describes a void 
marriage as a nullity, "subject to both direct and collateral 
attack, by anyone, at any time . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
phrase "by anyone" makes the proposition too broad.  To attack 
the validity of a marriage, a person must have standing to raise 
the issue. 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
30 
 
age of 18 years may marry if otherwise competent."); Wis. Stat. 
§ 765.03 ("A marriage may not be contracted if either party has 
such want of understanding as renders him or her incapable of 
assenting to marriage."); Wis. Stat. § 765.21 (a marriage is 
void if it is contracted contrary to certain provisions in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 765).   
¶64 The death of an incompetent party to an alleged 
marriage makes it impossible for the parties to ratify the 
marriage if the party remains incompetent from the time of the 
marriage until death.  More specifically, if a party to an 
alleged marriage is incompetent at the time of a marriage 
ceremony and subsequently dies before he or she is able to 
ratify the marriage, the fatal defect to the marriage can never 
be cured.   
D. The UDJA is the Proper Mechanism to Declare a Marriage Void 
¶65 As 
explained 
in 
Estate 
of 
Toutant, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.04, the UDJA is the mechanism for voiding a marriage when 
one of the parties to the marriage is dead.  See Estate of 
Toutant, 247 Wis. 2d 400, ¶¶12–14.   
¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.04, the UDJA, reads, in relevant 
part: 
 
(1) Scope.  Courts of record within their 
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed.  No action 
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground 
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.  
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative 
in form and effect; and such declarations shall have 
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree, 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
31 
 
except that finality for purposes of filing an appeal 
as of right shall be determined in accordance with s. 
808.03 (1). 
 
 . . . . 
 
(4) Representatives, etc.  Any person interested 
as or through a personal representative, trustee, 
guardian, 
or 
other 
fiduciary, 
creditor, 
devisee, 
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust in the 
administration of a trust, or of the estate of a 
decedent, infant, individual adjudicated incompetent, 
or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or 
legal relations in respect to the administration of 
the trust or estate . . . . 
 
(5) Enumeration not exclusive.  The enumeration 
in subs. (2), (3) and (4) does not limit or restrict 
the exercise of the general powers conferred in sub. 
(1) in any proceeding where declaratory relief is 
sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate 
the controversy or remove an uncertainty.  
Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1), (4), (5).21   
 
¶67 A declaratory judgment is a "binding adjudication that 
establishes the rights and other legal relations of the parties 
without providing for or ordering enforcement."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 918 (9th ed. 2009).  Declaratory relief may be 
obtained in the following circumstances: 
(1) There must exist a justiciable controversy——
that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of 
right is asserted against one who has an interest in 
contesting it. 
                                                 
21 The declaratory judgment statute has often been used in 
cases involving the status of marriages.  Cf. Georgiades v. Di 
Ferrante, 871 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App. 1994) (determination of 
whether common law marriage existed between parties); Henry v. 
Henry, 106 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. 1960) (wife's challenge to whether 
husband's Nevada divorce was valid).   
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
32 
 
(2) The controversy must be between persons 
whose interests are adverse. 
(3) The party seeking declaratory relief must 
have a legal interest in the controversy——that is to 
say, a legally protect[a]ble interest. 
(4) The issue involved in the controversy must 
be ripe for judicial determination.  
Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 409, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) 
(quoting State ex. rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 22, 
264 N.W. 627 (1936) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  An 
action under the UDJA can be brought either directly or 
collaterally, in estate actions, in contract actions, and in 
actions construing statutes or ordinances.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04; see also Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d 506 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1957) (petition brought under UDJA to validate marriage 
while both were parties still alive); In re O'Quinn, 355 S.W.3d 
857 (Tex. App. 2011) (UDJA used in an estate action that inter 
alia decided the validity of a marriage); State ex rel. Joyce v. 
Farr, 236 Wis. 323, 295 N.W. 21 (1940) (motion for declaratory 
judgment in estate action); Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis. 199, 242 
N.W. 570 (1932); Shovers v. Shovers, 2006 WI App 108, 292 
Wis. 2d 531, 718 N.W.2d 130; Estate of Lonquest v. Jones, 526 
P.2d 994 (Wyo. 1974) (UDJA used for determination of heirship).   
¶68 The Corning case provides a good illustration of why 
declaratory judgment authority to review a marriage after the 
death of one of the parties is necessary.  James Corning died 
from injuries suffered when a truck insured by Carriers collided 
with the truck operated by him.  Corning, 88 Wis. 2d at 19.  The 
wrongful death case was settled for $200,000, contingent upon 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
33 
 
Colleen Corning establishing that she was the decedent's wife 
(the two were married in Illinois less than a year after 
Colleen's divorce in her first marriage).  Id. at 19–20.  The 
court ruled in favor of Colleen, but it observed: "A wrongful 
death action is not an action to affirm or annul a marriage.  We 
believe that Carriers does have the right to assert the defense 
that Colleen Corning is not the spouse of James Corning."  Id. 
at 21.   
¶69 As Estate of Toutant affirmed, Wis. Stat. ch. 765 
establishes the legal basis for invalidating a marriage, whereas 
the UDJA provides the mechanism for doing so when an interested 
party is not able to seek an annulment.   
E. 2005 Changes to the Annulment Statute Did Not Disturb the 
Holding of Estate of Toutant 
 
¶70 McLeod argues that even if Williams, Lyannes, and a 
long line of our cases, including most recently Estate of 
Toutant, retained the common law rule that allowed a court to 
invalidate a marriage after death, the changes to Wis. Stat. ch. 
767 by 2005 Wis. Act 443 left no doubt that the legislature 
abrogated this rule and that annulment is the only way to 
invalidate a marriage.  We disagree. 
 
¶71 At the time the court of appeals decided Estate of 
Toutant, the annulment statute, then-Wis. Stat. § 767.03, read 
in part: "No marriage may be annulled or held void except 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
34 
 
pursuant to judicial proceedings.  No marriage may be annulled 
after the death of either party to the marriage."22 
 
¶72 In 2005 the Wisconsin Legislative Council's Special 
Committee 
on 
Recodification 
of 
Ch. 
767, 
Stats., 
Actions 
Affecting 
the 
Family (the Special Committee), recommended 
legislation to reorganize and revise the chapter.23  Wis. Legis. 
Council Rep. to the Leg., Spec. Comm. on Recodification of Ch. 
767, Stats., Actions Affecting the Family, at 5 (April 11, 
2005).  One of the changes suggested by the Special Committee, 
and adopted into law, removed any reference in the annulment 
statute to a judicial proceeding being used to "void" a 
marriage.  2005 Wis. Act 443, §§ 23, 145.  Thus, the current 
annulment statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.313(2) reads in pertinent 
                                                 
22 The precise language relating to judicial proceedings has 
been in the statutes since 1959.  § 44, ch. 595, Laws of 1959.  
The language on death of the parties was added in 1977.  § 9, 
ch. 105, Laws of 1977.   
23 The report by the Special Committee, in making its report 
to the Wisconsin Joint Legislative Council for introducing 
legislation in the 2005–06 session, explained the charge to the 
Special Committee as follows: 
The committee was directed to conduct a recodification 
of ch. 767, Stats., including possibly reorganizing 
the chapter in a logical manner, renumbering and 
retitling sections, consolidating related provisions, 
modernizing 
language, 
resolving 
ambiguities 
in 
language, codifying court decisions and making minor 
substantive changes. 
 
Wis. 
Legis. 
Council 
Rep. 
to 
the 
Leg., 
Spec. 
Comm. 
on 
Recodification of Ch. 767, Stats., Actions Affecting the Family, 
at 5 (April 11, 2005). 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
35 
 
part: "A judicial proceeding is required to annul a marriage.  A 
marriage may not be annulled after the death of a party to the 
marriage." 
 
¶73 2005 Wisconsin Act 443 contained an explanatory note 
after the language amending the annulment statute to eliminate 
the words "or held void."  The note read: "Reference to voiding 
a marriage is not included in the restated language because 
[Wis. Stat.] ch. 767 does not include actions to void a 
marriage."  2005 Wis. Act 443, § 145.   
 
¶74 The 
explanatory 
note 
to 
the 
new 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.313(2) in 2005 Wis. Act 443 means exactly what it says: 
Chapter 767, on "Actions Affecting the Family," does not contain 
an action to void a marriage.  Wis. Stat. § 767.001(1).  The 
action to void a marriage comes through Wis. Stat. ch. 765 on 
"Marriage."  "[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a 
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶39 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank 
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 
¶75 Drafting records for 2005 Wis. Act 443 do not indicate 
that the legislature intended for annulment to be the only 
remedy to invalidate a marriage.  In a preliminary bill draft 
for the Special Committee, a bill drafter asked, "Is it 
necessary to continue reference to voiding a marriage (ch. 767 
does not cover actions to void a marriage)?"  Preliminary Draft, 
WLC:0004/P1, Spec. Comm. on Recodification of Ch. 767, Stats., 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
36 
 
Actions Affecting the Family, Wis. Leg. Council, Madison, Wis. 
(Oct. 15, 2002).24 
 
¶76 We 
also 
observe 
that 
the 
Special 
Committee 
incorporated 
explanatory 
notes 
into 
the 
body 
of 
draft 
legislation, in part to "[i]dentify the source of the recodified 
law (i.e., previous law, court decision, decision by the Special 
Committee) and, if previous law, the previous location of the 
provisions."  Memorandum from Don Dyke, senior staff attorney, 
Wis. 
Leg. 
Council 
to 
Members 
of 
the 
Spec. 
Comm. 
on 
Recodification of Ch. 767, Stats., Actions Affecting the Family  
(Sept. 20, 2002) (available at Wis. Leg. Council, Madison, 
Wis.).  The removal of "or held void" in 2005 Wis. Act 443, 
§ 145, and in earlier bill drafts, was accompanied by an 
explanatory note that did not reference the Estate of Toutant 
decision.  Thus, we are not persuaded that this change by the 
Special Committee came in response to Estate of Toutant.  
Compare 2005 Wis. Act 443, § 145, Note, with 2005 Wis. Act. 443, 
§ 166, Note (citing Racine Family Court Comm'r v. M.E. and S.A., 
165 Wis. 2d 530, 478 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1991)).  
 
¶77 If the legislature had wanted to eliminate this common 
law remedy, then it would have done so in clear, unambiguous 
                                                 
24 The "question" whether to retain the reference to the act 
of voiding in Wis. Stat. ch. 767 was entirely appropriate 
inasmuch as the revision of the chapter involved efforts to 
remove unnecessary language.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.001(1) 
defines "[a]ction affecting the family" to include affirmance of 
marriage, annulment, divorce, and legal separation, but does not 
list voiding a marriage.  Reference to voiding is only in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 765. 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
37 
 
language.  See, e.g., Schmidt v. N. States Power Co., 2007 WI 
136, ¶67, 305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294; Aslakson v. Gallagher 
Bassett Servs., 2007 WI 39, ¶82 n.34, 300 Wis. 2d 92, 729 
N.W.2d 712; Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, 
¶25, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833.  See also John P. Foley, 
Comment, The Voidable Void Marriage in Wisconsin, 49 Marq. L. 
Rev. 751, 752 (1966) (asserting that annulment "applies only to 
a direct attack upon the status of marriage" and that marriage 
"may also be attacked collaterally and the court can declare the 
marriage 
void 
when 
rights 
incident 
to 
marriage 
are 
in 
question").  If this common law principle were indeed abrogated, 
it would adversely affect the UDJA and cases maintaining the 
common law right to post-death challenges to the validity of a 
marriage.  See supra, ¶58. 
¶78 Finally, allowing a court to invalidate a marriage 
after the death of one of the parties to a void marriage accords 
with public policy and legislative intent on marriage.  The 
declared intent of the legislature in Wis. Stat. chs. 765 to 768 
is "to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and 
the family."  Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2).  We do not see how the 
"best interests of marriage" are protected where legitimate 
questions about a spouse's capacity to contract marriage are 
precluded from consideration after the spouse dies.   
¶79 McLeod argues that a decedent's family has no recourse 
to question the validity of marriage after a party to the 
marriage dies.  That rule would apply not only to cases 
commenced after the spouse dies but also to annulment actions 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
38 
 
commenced when the spouse was living but not completed before 
the spouse dies.  McLeod would have us hold that the legislature 
intended that an incompetent decedent's estate or an aggrieved 
party is simply out of luck——that an incomplete annulment action 
cannot be converted into an action to declare the marriage void.  
Troubling scenarios can be avoided by an option to declare a 
marriage void after the death of one of the parties, either 
directly or in a collateral proceeding.  See Davidson, 35 
Wis. 2d at 407. 
¶80 Interpreting the changes to the annulment statute as a 
limitation on courts would drastically curtail a court's power 
to address fraud, mistake, and other exigencies in a disputed 
marriage in order to "declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations."  Limiting a court's power would effectively shut off 
declaratory remedies for parties in an estate action.   
¶81 Once again, the issue in this case is whether a court 
may consider the validity of a marriage after the death of one 
of the parties to the marriage.  In holding that a court has 
this power, we do not take a position on the merits of the 
present dispute.  On remand, the marriage between Laubenheimer 
and McLeod will be presumed valid, and the objectors will have 
the burden of proving that it is void by clear and convincing 
evidence.   
¶82 We believe that Laubenheimer's capacity to enter into 
marriage is somewhat analogous to a person's capacity to make or 
revoke a will.  Wis. Stat. § 853.01.  "Generally, a person 
competent to make a will may give or devise his property as he 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
39 
 
wishes within the public policy of the state."  Farrell v. Nw. 
Loan & Trust Co., 199 Wis. 273, 278, 226 N.W. 306 (1929).  On 
remand, the circuit court will have the responsibility of 
weighing the evidence to determine whether Laubenheimer had the 
capacity to enter into marriage at the time of the marriage 
ceremony.  Will contest cases such as Schultz v. Lena, 15 
Wis. 2d 226, 112 N.W.2d 591 (1961); Brandon v. Hagen, 264 
Wis. 269, 58 N.W.2d 636 (1953); and Smits v. Valley, 202 
Wis. 434, 232 N.W. 845 (1930), may provide the court with some 
assistance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶83 In Estate of Toutant, the court of appeals held that 
there is a fundamental distinction between annulment and a 
judicial declaration that a marriage is void.  The court of 
appeals further held that in an estate action challenging a 
marriage, a court may use its declaratory judgment powers to 
declare that a marriage prohibited by law was void and incapable 
of validation by the parties to the marriage.   
¶84 We conclude that the holdings and analysis in Estate 
of Toutant are correct.  Annulment is certainly an appropriate 
remedy to void a marriage when the parties to the marriage are 
still alive, but it is not the exclusive remedy to challenge the 
validity of a marriage.  The common law drew a distinction 
between an annulment and a declaration that a marriage was void, 
especially a declaration after the death of one of the parties.  
Our statutes and case law have preserved that distinction. 
No. 
  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177 
 
40 
 
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 765 sets out the criteria for a 
valid marriage in this state.  Failure to meet one of these 
criteria often results in a void marriage.  An action under the 
UDJA is the established mechanism for testing the validity of a 
marriage in an estate case because the UDJA explicitly provides 
standing for interested parties in an estate action. 
¶86 The change in the annulment statute in 2005 Wis. Act 
443 did not alter the holdings in the Estate of Toutant case.  
There is no evidence that the legislature sought to curtail a 
court's power to address fraud, mistake, and other exigencies in 
a disputed marriage in order to "declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations."  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).  Limiting a 
court's power to address these issues would effectively shut off 
declaratory remedies for parties in an estate action. 
¶87 We remand the case to the circuit court for further 
action consistent with this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶88 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I write 
separately because I adopt neither the majority opinion nor 
Justice 
Gableman's 
dissenting 
opinion, 
and 
I 
urge 
the 
legislature to consider taking action.  In Wisconsin, statutes 
not common law, govern marriage, divorce, and annulment.  
Because the issues raised in this case are not clearly addressed 
in the statutes, the legislature should consider the policy 
reasons that militate in favor of and against the positions 
taken by the majority opinion and by Justice Gableman's dissent.  
In sum, I dissent because while case law may support a court's 
ability to void, as a matter of law, a marriage that is invalid 
ab initio, neither case law nor statutes support a court taking 
such action under the facts of this case.     
¶89 The majority opinion concludes that the circuit court 
always has the ability to declare a marriage void after the 
death of one of the parties to the marriage.  See majority op., 
¶¶83-84.  I part ways with the majority's sweeping opinion, 
under which any interested person may bring a declaratory action 
to void another person's marriage.  The majority's policy reason 
is as follows: "We do not see how the 'best interests of 
marriage' are protected where legitimate questions about a 
spouse's capacity to contract marriage are precluded from 
consideration after the spouse dies."  See majority op., ¶78 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2)).  The majority opinion 
however, is not cabined, as was previous case law, to an 
uncontroverted paper review of a marriage that was void ab 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.akz 
 
2 
 
initio.  See infra, ¶93.  The majority does not seem concerned 
with any limitations on such an action, nor does it lament that 
a decedent would never be able to defend his or her decision to 
marry.  Notably, even an individual who has been declared 
legally incompetent and in need of a guardian may retain the 
capacity to marry.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 54.25(2)(c)1.a., 51.59(1) 
(2009-10).1  While the majority does opine that a marriage is 
presumed valid, it does not set forth the burden of proof that 
the challenger must meet, nor does it sufficiently address the 
practical evidentiary concerns raised by the circuit court.  See 
majority op., ¶¶81-82; infra, ¶95.     
¶90 On the other hand, I part ways with Justice Gableman's 
sweeping dissent, which concludes that a court can never void a 
marriage, even a marriage that is undisputedly void ab initio.  
See Gableman dissent, ¶98.  Justice Gableman concludes that the 
legislature has made a public policy determination by not 
providing for a court to posthumously void a marriage.  Id., 
¶123.  Under Justice Gableman's approach, I find it troubling 
that a court would be powerless to posthumously void an 
undisputedly invalid marriage and that those who are rightfully 
entitled to receive the decedent's estate would be left with no 
recourse, even if the marriage was undisputedly void ab initio.     
¶91 Different, yet reasonable, considerations support the 
conclusions reached by either the majority opinion or Justice 
Gableman's dissent.  As a matter of policy, the legislature 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.akz 
 
3 
 
could reasonably conclude that a court is endowed with the power 
to posthumously void a marriage always, sometimes, or never.   
¶92 I dissent because no statute clearly provides a 
circuit court with the authority to posthumously void a marriage 
in a probate matter under the circumstances of this case.  In 
Wisconsin, marriage, divorce, and annulment are governed by 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 765; Watts v. Watts, 137 
Wis. 2d 506, 519 n.11, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987) (noting that there 
is no common law marriage in Wisconsin); see Gableman dissent, 
¶110 (criticizing the majority opinion for relying on a common 
law action to void a marriage when marriage, divorce, and 
annulment are all governed by statute).  No statute under Wis. 
Stat. chs. 765 (marriage), 767 (actions affecting the family), 
or 851-82 (probate), specifically provides the circuit court 
with the power to void a marriage posthumously.  The statutes 
are clear, however, that a court may not annul a marriage after 
the death of one of the parties to the marriage.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.313(2).   
¶93 Case law may provide the court with the power to void 
a marriage after the death of one of the parties when the 
marriage is undisputedly void ab initio.  The majority relies 
heavily on that case law and common law principles to conclude 
that the circuit court has the power to posthumously void a 
marriage.2  However, as Justice Gableman's dissent discusses, 
                                                 
2 The circuit court distinguished this case from Davidson v. 
Davidson, 35 Wis. 2d 401, 151 N.W.2d 53 (1967), and Ellis v. 
Estate of Toutant, 2001 WI App 181, 247 Wis. 2d 400, 633 
N.W.2d 692, based on the uncontested evidence that the marriages 
were void: 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.akz 
 
4 
 
subsequent 
legislative 
action 
arguably 
undermines 
the 
precedential value of those cases.3  See Gableman dissent, ¶111. 
In addition, the facts of those cases are distinguishable from 
the facts of the case at issue.  For example, in Toutant, the 
decedent Toutant had married Ellis within 30 days of Ellis's 
                                                                                                                                                             
The arguments of those parties seeking to void the 
marriage in both Davidson and Toutant were based on 
uncontested factual realities.  In Davidson, it was 
uncontested that Robert was still married to his first 
wife Mildred, at the time his marriage to Leona was 
solemnized on March 12, 1956.  In Toutant, it was 
uncontested that Marjorie and John were married only 
30 days following his Scottish divorce.  Those 
uncontested factual realities served as the basis of 
the argument that each of the respective marriages was 
contrary to Wisconsin law. . . .  The proponents of 
invalidating [Nancy's] marriage need to prove that, in 
fact, the decedent was incompetent at the time of her 
marriage to Mr. McLeod.  That is not a given.  That is 
not undisputed.   
3 The precedential value of those cases is questionable 
because the legislature changed a key provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.313 since those cases were decided.  See majority op., 
¶¶70-73.  At the time Toutant was decided, then-Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.03 (1999-2000) read "No marriage may be annulled or held 
void except pursuant to judicial proceedings.  No marriage may 
be annulled after the death of either party to the marriage." 
(Emphasis added.)  In 2005, the legislature amended that 
language to remove the reference to a judicial proceeding to 
"void" a marriage.  2005 Wis. Act 443, § 145.  A legislative 
note to that Wisconsin Act states: "Reference to voiding a 
marriage is not included in the restated language because [Wis. 
Stat.] ch. 767 does not include actions to void a marriage."  
That note can be read in two ways.  First, the note can be read 
to state that the legislature was responding to Toutant and 
removing the court's ability to "void" a marriage, leaving 
annulment and divorce as the only proceedings to terminate a 
marriage.  Second, the legislature could have been removing the 
reference to voiding a marriage within ch. 767 (actions 
affecting the family), because that action properly belongs in 
ch. 765 (marriage) or is a product of common law.   
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.akz 
 
5 
 
divorce from a prior spouse.  Ellis v. Estate of Toutant, 2001 
WI App 181, ¶6, 247 Wis. 2d 400, 633 N.W.2d 692.  In Wisconsin, 
a person is prohibited from marrying again within six months of 
a divorce.  Wis. Stat. § 765.03(2).  Similarly, in Williams and 
Davidson, the marriages were challenged because, in both cases, 
one of the parties to the marriage was alleged to have been 
married at the time the challenged marriage took place.  
Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 23 N.W. 110 (1885); Davidson 
v. Davidson, 35 Wis. 2d 401, 151 N.W.2d 53 (1967).  The statutes 
clearly prohibit a person from being marriage to two people at 
the same time.  See Wis. Stat. § 765.03; Davidson, 35 Wis. 2d at 
407; majority op., ¶44.  Similarly, in King v. Canon, 221 
Wis. 322, 266 N.W. 918 (1936), the validity of a decedent's 
marriage was challenged because the decedent was an epileptic.  
However, at that time, a statute prohibited an epileptic from 
marrying.  Id. at 325; majority op., ¶55.  Thus, in these cases, 
a court could conclusively determine that the challenged 
marriage was void based upon the documentation alone.   
¶94 Significantly, to the extent that these cases support 
the circuit court's ability to void a marriage after death, in 
each case, unlike the case at issue, the contested marriage was 
undisputedly void ab initio.  Cf. State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 
¶¶71-73, 
327 
Wis. 2d 524, 
785 
N.W.2d 568 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring) (discussing a warrant that was void ab initio, as 
the circuit court lacked the authority to issue the challenged 
warrant).  In other words, as a matter of law, the contested 
marriage was undisputedly invalid from inception.  See Lyannes 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.akz 
 
6 
 
v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920) (discussing void 
and voidable marriages); majority op., ¶¶52-53.  In such 
actions, for example, the party challenging the marriage simply 
submitted documentary evidence to prove that the marriage was 
void, and the court could determine the validity of the 
challenged marriage from the documents alone.  The evidentiary 
concerns raised by the circuit court in the case at issue, see 
infra, ¶95, are not of concern in such uncontroverted matters.   
¶95 In this case, however, Patricia Mudlaff argued that 
her stepmother Nancy Laubenheimer's marriage to Joseph McLeod 
was invalid because Nancy lacked the mental capacity to enter 
into the marriage.  To determine whether Nancy was competent to 
marry Joseph, the court would presumably need to hear evidence 
such as examinations and testimony from doctors on Nancy's 
mental state at the time she married Joseph.  As the circuit 
court recognized, that is a difficult task given Nancy's death: 
[I]f this Court is wrong in its determination that a 
court cannot invalidate [Nancy's] marriage, this Court 
will need great assistance from the reviewing court in 
determining what sort of evidence can be raised at 
this point in time to challenge [Nancy's] competency.  
Issues such as privilege, hearsay, the 'dead man's 
statute' and other relevancy concerns all come in to 
question where the potential 'ward' is deceased.  
Additionally, great prejudice could result if a party 
seeking a determination [of] incompetency (and lack of 
right to consent to marriage) was able to have mom (or 
step-mom) examined by a doctor of [his or her] 
choosing prior to her death, whereas those opposed to 
the incompetency finding have not.  The equities of 
that scenario are highly questionable. 
I would affirm the circuit court's reasoning.  Since the case 
law is questionable, and the relevant statutory provisions do 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.akz 
 
7 
 
not clearly provide that a court has the power in a probate 
matter to void a marriage posthumously, legislative response to 
this situation is seemingly appropriate. 
¶96 Strong policy concerns and equities militate both in 
favor of and against allowing a court to void a marriage after 
death.  To the extent that the legislature deems it appropriate 
to endow courts with the authority to void marriage under 
certain circumstances, it should clarify the court's power to so 
act.  Current statutes and case law do not clearly empower a 
court with the ability to void a marriage after the death of one 
of the parties to the marriage.  As marriage, divorce, and 
annulment are all governed by statute, the legislature should 
likewise consider when, if ever, a marriage may be deemed void 
after the death of one of the parties to the marriage.   
¶97 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶98 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (dissenting).  There is 
great confusion in this area of Wisconsin law, and there has 
been for many years.  The majority makes a valiant effort to 
clarify 
it, 
exhaustively 
and 
eloquently 
summarizing 
the 
statutory and jurisprudential developments that have brought us 
to the present quandary.  Unfortunately, though, the court's 
ultimate resolution of the question presented codifies a legal 
misunderstanding that has been germinating for decades and now 
bursts into full bloom.  Although the issue we take up here is 
not an easy one, it can and should be disposed of on the basis 
of a simple proposition: annulment is the only process for 
invalidating 
a 
marriage 
other 
than 
divorce, 
as 
per 
the 
legislature's wishes, and that process cannot be undertaken 
after the death of a spouse.  It was the legislature's 
prerogative 
to 
limit 
the 
remedies 
available 
to 
parties 
challenging marriages, and it is not our place to expand them 
beyond their statutory confines.  Because the majority holds 
otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
DISCUSSION 
¶99 The majority cobbles together a variety of statutory 
and common-law sources in its mission to prove the existence of 
a posthumous means to invalidate marriage outside of annulment.  
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
2 
 
I take up each source in turn and demonstrate why it does not 
substantiate the asserted power.1 
A. THE ANNULMENT STATUTE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ASSERTED POWER 
¶100 The majority does not claim that Wis. Stat. § 767.313 
(2009-10),2 the annulment statute, establishes the power to 
nullify a marriage after death.  Nevertheless, it is worth 
beginning with the provision's history.  For that history not 
only provides no support for such a power, it actually 
conclusively proves that none exists. 
¶101 There is no need to set forth all the various and 
sundry changes made to the statute over the decades, as the 
majority ably does.  For present purposes, there are only two 
salient features to its evolution.  First, in 1909 the 
legislature began listing grounds for annulment, including 
incompetence.  Majority op., ¶49 n.16.  At the same time, it 
started to "place[] limits on when an annulment action could be 
brought," 
id., 
most 
significantly 
barring 
the 
posthumous 
annulment of a marriage between cousins.  Wis. Stat. ch. 109, 
§ 2351(2) (1909).  In the ensuing years it continued that 
process and, in 1977, imposed the most important limitation with 
                                                 
1 I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
incompetence of a spouse renders a marriage void, not voidable. 
See majority op., ¶¶61-64.  That common ground does not alter 
the bottom line, however, because annulment is the exclusive 
mechanism for invalidating any marriage, void or voidable, Falk 
v. Falk, 158 Wis. 2d 184, 189, 462 N.W.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1990), 
and for the reasons set forth below annulment cannot be utilized 
after death.      
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
3 
 
respect to this dispute, pronouncing that any annulment, 
regardless of the grounds for the action, could no longer be 
obtained after the death of either of the spouses.  Majority 
op., ¶71 n.22.   
¶102 The second relevant turn of events began in 1959, when 
the legislature inserted the following emphasized language into 
the annulment statute: "[n]o marriage shall be annulled or held 
void except pursuant to judicial proceedings."  1959 Wis. Laws, 
ch. 595, § 44 (emphasis added).  Nearly 50 years later the 
legislature withdrew those three crucial words.  2005 Wis. Act 
443.   
¶103 Taken 
together, 
these 
two 
parallel 
developments 
underscore two legislative directives: 1) lawmakers wanted to 
restrict 
the 
circumstances 
in 
which 
marriages 
could 
be 
invalidated, first ruling out posthumous invalidations for some 
annulments as one of those restrictions, and then ruling out 
posthumous invalidations altogether; and 2) they wanted, at one 
point, to acknowledge a route to invalidation other than 
annulment 
and 
then, at a later point, to retract that 
acknowledgement.  Stated differently, the right to a posthumous 
annulment was taken away, and then the right to have a marriage 
"held void" was as well.  In sum, the majority restores to 
circuit courts an authority that the legislature eradicated 
through a hundred years of statutory refinement.    
B. WISCONSIN STAT. § 765.03(1) DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ASSERTED 
POWER 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
4 
 
¶104 Since the history of the annulment statute is so 
unhelpful to its cause, the majority focuses far more heavily on 
another statute: Wis. Stat. § 765.03(1).  That section provides 
that "[a] marriage may not be contracted" in cases of sufficient 
incompetence.  In the majority's view, "[t]he action to void a 
marriage comes through" § 765.03(1).  Majority op., ¶74.  This 
cannot be so.  Section 765.03 does not purport to endow courts 
with the authority to do anything.  It is true that the statutes 
categorize a marriage with an incompetent spouse as "null and 
void," Wis. Stat. §§ 765.21, 765.002(6), but nowhere, outside of 
the annulment statute, do they empower courts to invalidate 
marriages on that ground.  The mere fact that a statute makes a 
statement about the world does not entitle a court to do 
whatever it likes with that statement.  Indeed, the application 
and enforcement of several of the most important rules in our 
system of government are entirely outside the province of the 
judiciary.  See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) 
(forbidding the courts, on political question grounds, from 
considering 
cases 
concerning 
the 
federal 
constitution's 
guarantee 
of 
a republican form of government).  It is 
particularly improbable that Wis. Stat. § 765.03 provides courts 
with a license to enforce its requirements however they like 
when there is another statute, only a few pages later in the 
statute book, that is plainly designed as its enforcement 
mechanism.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted  . . . in relation to the 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
5 
 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes . . . .") 
(citations omitted).  Wisconsin Stat. § 765.03(1) spells out 
grounds to invalidate marriages through the annulment process, 
and with the limitations imposed on that process, including the 
limitation 
preventing 
post-mortem 
annulments. 
 
Cf. 
Sinai 
Samaritan Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McCabe, 197 Wis. 2d 709, 713 n.3, 
541 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1995) (observing that an action to 
invalidate a marriage as violative of § 765.03(1) must be filed 
under the annulment statute).  Wisconsin Stat. § 765.03(1) 
provides the majority no succor. 
C. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
ASSERTED POWER 
¶105 Perhaps sensing that Wis. Stat. § 765.03 cannot 
withstand the weight it is asked to carry, the majority turns 
also to the Declaratory Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04.  See 
majority op., ¶¶65-69.  That statute is not up to the task 
either.  As an initial matter, it is curious that the court 
would place such heavy emphasis on the Act in this of all cases, 
given that neither the objectors nor the circuit court ever 
relied upon it.  The circuit court granted a petition for formal 
administration of the estate, not a motion for declaratory 
judgment.   
¶106 Even if the Declaratory Judgments Act had played a 
role below, it should not play a role in our decision.  Two of 
the most universally accepted canons of statutory construction 
compel us, respectively, to favor a more specific statute over a 
more general one, see, e.g., Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
6 
 
2013 WI 29, ¶45, 346 Wis. 2d 450, 828 N.W.2d 812, and to give 
effect to every word the legislature enacted if possible.  See, 
e.g., State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, ¶14, 563 N.W.2d 528 
(1997).  Both canons counsel against the majority's approach.   
¶107 Wisconsin Stat. 767.313 was written specifically to 
elucidate the process for obtaining a judicial determination 
regarding the validity of a marriage.  By contrast, the 
Declaratory Judgments Act is exceptionally broad in reach and 
used in all sorts of situations, including any number of 
contexts that have nothing to do with marriage or family law 
whatsoever.  See, e.g., Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 
286-87 (1995) (discussing the breadth of declaratory judgment 
actions).  To use the Declaratory Judgments Act, a highly 
general law, to broaden the scope of Wis. Stat. § 767.313, a 
highly specific one, as the majority does, is to directly 
contradict a well-established rule of statutory interpretation.    
¶108  The second canon cuts against the majority's holding 
even 
more 
forcefully. 
 
In 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.313(2) 
the 
legislature unequivocally expressed its intention to prohibit 
annulments "after the death of a party to the marriage."  The 
majority honors these words in the most superficial sense 
possible, while completely undermining them in every practical 
respect.  Under the majority's decision, a party seeking to 
invalidate a marriage can accomplish the exact same result as an 
annulment if she styles her action as one for a declaratory 
judgment rather than one for annulment.  As a result, the 
carefully chosen language of the legislature is stripped of all 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
7 
 
force on the basis of a few strategically placed words in a 
caption, a consequence we have heretofore been loath to 
sanction.  See, e.g., State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 355, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996) (reiterating that the court endeavors "to give 
effect to every word so as not to render any part of the statute 
superfluous.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
¶109 Tellingly, the majority's device for invalidating 
marriages exists, by its own account, only to nullify marriages 
after death.  It professes to preserve the common-law rule that 
"[w]hen the parties to a marriage are alive, the appropriate 
remedy for voiding a marriage is annulment" whereas "when one of 
the parties died . . . a declaration that a marriage was void 
was the proper remedy."  Majority op., ¶37 (footnote omitted).  
To translate, the courts utilize the "declaration of voidness" 
specifically 
and 
exclusively 
so 
as 
to 
eviscerate 
the 
legislature's deadline for invalidating marriages.  Though it 
should not be necessary, I feel compelled to note that on non-
constitutional matters the legislature can overrule the courts, 
not 
vice-versa. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Challoner 
v. 
Pennings, 
6 
Wis. 2d 254, 257, 94 N.W.2d 654 (1959) (recognizing that the 
legislature "may by amending a statute nullify a supreme court 
decision . . . .") 
(citation 
and 
internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted).         
D. THE COMMON LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ASSERTED POWER 
¶110 To bolster its infirm statutory argument, the majority 
seeks refuge in the common law.  See majority op., ¶¶37-60.  
There are a number of fatal flaws with its approach.  Starting 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
8 
 
with the threshold question, it is not clear, even in theory, 
how the common law can work in tandem with the other elements of 
the majority's reasoning.  After all, everything else in the 
case is, by the majority's own lights, statutory: marriage 
itself is statutory, id., ¶30, the factors rendering marriages 
void are statutory, id., ¶33, annulment is statutory, id., ¶35, 
and the Declaratory Judgments Act is statutory.  Id., ¶66.  
Apparently we are meant to believe that in this field of law, 
entirely occupied by statute, the "voiding" of marriages somehow 
snuck in from the common law, even though, as explained above, 
that power flies in the face of the governing statutory 
provisions.  It is a leap of faith a little too far.   
¶111 At any rate, the supposed common-law doctrine upon 
which the majority is premised simply does not exist.  From 
Wisconsin's earliest years as a state, its courts3 have been 
relentlessly imprecise on the matter of whether annulment is the 
sole avenue for questioning a marriage or simply one option 
amongst others.  Some cases took the former position.  See, 
e.g., Falk v. Falk, 158 Wis. 2d 184, 189, 462 N.W.2d 547 (Ct. 
App. 1990) ("Annulment is the proper procedure for setting aside 
both void and voidable marriages.") (citations omitted).  Others 
the opposite.  See, e.g., Ellis v. Estate of Toutant, 2001 WI 
App 181, ¶¶15-17, 247 Wis. 2d 400, 633 N.W.2d 692 (permitting 
                                                 
3 Unlike the majority, I do not find authorities concerning 
other jurisdictions relevant to the analysis.  On the contrary, 
as this discussion makes clear, the legislative and judicial 
developments that resolve the appeal are highly specific and 
unique to our state.    
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
9 
 
trial courts to invalidate marriages pursuant to the Declaratory 
Judgments Act).  Still others appeared to take both positions at 
once.  See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 69, 75, 23 
N.W. 110 (1885) (indicating at one point that when a party 
desires 
to 
invalidate 
a 
marriage 
"the 
action 
should 
be 
to . . . annul" the union, while indicating elsewhere that a 
void marriage may be called into question "in any proceeding in 
any court between any parties . . . .").  Yet another group of 
cases employed language conflating annulment with a judicial 
declaration of invalidity, making it difficult to ascertain 
whether there was even a difference between the two.  See, e.g., 
Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 388, 177 N.W. 683 (1920) 
(discussing the power of a circuit court "to annul and declare 
as void ab initio a marriage . . . .") (emphasis added).   
¶112 The variation in language is not surprising when one 
considers how closely related and commonly used these different 
words are in judicial parlance.  A court could not be reasonably 
expected to refrain from using a word like "declare" or "void" 
while discussing annulment when such terms were perfectly 
accurate in context.  See, e.g., Falk, 158 Wis. 2d at 191 
(remarking on a marriage that was "void as a result of the 
annulment . . . .").  Moreover, there was no decision clearly 
finding an independent power to declare a marriage void outside 
of annulment until quite recently, see ¶¶116-17 infra, so the 
courts can hardly be faulted for inadvertently using language 
that later gave birth to a distinction they had no good reason 
to anticipate.      
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
10 
 
¶113 It is also important to remember, though the majority 
would 
have 
you 
forget, 
that 
this 
ambiguity 
was 
largely 
linguistic, not legal.  Whatever phraseology courts may have 
adopted, inexact though it may have been, their holdings were 
consistent.  As a long and soundly-reasoned chain of cases 
explains, a marriage can be lawfully undone only through one of 
two statutory vehicles: divorce or annulment.  Wheeler v. 
Wheeler, 76 Wis. 631, 633, 45 N.W. 531 (1890) ("[W]here the 
marriage is valid, the judgment is . . . for a divorce; but 
where the marriage is void, the judgment is to annul it.").  
Judges enjoy no equitable (or "declaratory," to use the 
majority's nomenclature) power to act outside those well-paved 
avenues.  Kuehne v. Kuehne, 185 Wis. 195, 196, 201 N.W. 506 
(1924) ("[T]he jurisdiction of a court to annul a marriage is 
statutory, and . . . such a judgment may be entered only for the 
reasons authorized by statute.") (citation omitted).  When the 
legislature saw fit to end that avenue at death, the courts were 
thenceforth duty-bound to comply.  McCabe, 197 Wis. 2d at 713 
n.3 ("Although 'void,'" a marriage contracted in violation of 
the 
statutes 
"governs 
legal 
relations 
unless 
it 
is 
annulled . . . .  This may not be done after one of the parties 
to the marriage dies.") (citations omitted).                
¶114 In short, there is no case law establishing a 
mechanism for voiding a marriage after death other than 
annulment.  Quite to the contrary, the better and clearer case 
law has always held that courts could use annulment and 
annulment alone to invalidate marriages, and that they were 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
11 
 
constrained 
to 
follow 
the 
procedures 
constructed 
by 
the 
legislature when they did so.  Viewing the cases in the light 
most charitable to the majority, it has at best a smattering of 
inconsistent language here and there, some intimating the 
existence of an independent mechanism, some intimating its 
nonexistence, some intimating both simultaneously, and some 
collapsing annulment into "voiding."  To glean from this 
discordant hodgepodge an unambiguous statement of judicial power 
is, to put it mildly, a stretch.   
¶115 In fact, a close examination of the majority opinion 
reveals some evasiveness on this point.  The relevant section is 
given the definitive heading, "Courts Have the Power to Declare 
a Marriage Void After the Death of One of the Parties to the 
Marriage."  In the same vein, the body of the section begins 
with the following overview:  
When the parties to a marriage are alive, the 
appropriate 
remedy 
for 
voiding 
a 
marriage 
is 
annulment.  However, at common law, when one of the 
parties died, such that any impediment to a valid 
marriage was no longer capable of being corrected, a 
declaration that a marriage was void was the proper 
remedy.        
Majority op., ¶37 (footnote omitted).  With one arguable 
exception, discussed in a moment, the cases cited in the 
following section cannot fairly be characterized as standing for 
such a proposition, and the majority, to its credit, does not 
even attempt to make the case that they do.  The teaching that 
the majority actually, and accurately, draws from the cases is 
merely that Wisconsin courts historically allowed for the 
posthumous invalidation of marriage, not that such invalidations 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
12 
 
could be obtained through a "declaration of voidness."  See id., 
¶48 ("[T]he Williams court concluded that a void marriage, 
whatever the mechanism or process for challenging the validity 
of the marriage, may be challenged in the lifetime or after the 
death of the marriage parties . . . .) (emphasis altered); id., 
¶54 ("[T]he Lyannes court continued to recognize the ability of 
a court to invalidate a marriage after death.") (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted); id., ¶57 ("According to the" court in 
Davidson v. Davidson, 35 Wis. 2d 401, 151 N.W.2d 53 (1967), "the 
issue of whether to allow the annulment action to continue 
depended 
upon 
whether 
the 
marriage 
was 
void 
or 
voidable . . . .").      
¶116 It is quite true that these and other cases recognized 
that a party could challenge a marriage after one of the spouses 
passed away, and quite beside the point.  Until 1977, there was, 
with one exception,4 no prohibition on annulling a marriage when 
one of the partners in the marriage was deceased.  It therefore 
hardly comes as a surprise that courts allowed for such 
annulments.  That in no way implies the existence of an 
independent type of challenge, i.e., the so-called "declaration 
of voidness."      
¶117 The only case that holds to the contrary is Toutant, 
which justifiably receives most of the majority's attention.  
See majority op., ¶¶37-42, 65.  In that case, handed down in 
2001, the court of appeals granted, for the first time in 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. ch. 109, § 2351(2) (1909) (providing that 
an action to annul a marriage on the grounds that the spouses 
were cousins could not be brought after death).     
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
13 
 
Wisconsin history, a power to circuit courts to "declare" 
marriages "void" under the Declaratory Judgments Act.  But 
Toutant cannot support the majority's "common-law" rule either, 
for two reasons: 1) it was not a common-law decision and 2) its 
reasoning is obsolete.  The first point is self-evidently true 
because Toutant itself situated the power to "declare voidness" 
in the Declaratory Judgments Act, a statute, not in the common 
law.  247 Wis. 2d 400, ¶22.   
¶118 As for the second point, one need only take a moment 
to 
consider 
Toutant's 
own 
succinct 
articulation 
of 
its 
reasoning:  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.03 states, "No marriage may be 
annulled or held void except pursuant to judicial 
proceedings.  No marriage may be annulled after the 
death of either party to the marriage."  While the 
first sentence expressly prohibits both the annulment 
or voiding of a marriage except pursuant to court 
proceedings, the second sentence pointedly prohibits 
only annulment after the death of either spouse.  
Thus, a marriage can be declared null and void after 
the death of a spouse.  All arguments concerning 
annulment are therefore immaterial.  
Id., ¶16 (emphasis added).  In other words, Toutant 
explicitly relied upon the "or held void" language that the 
legislature subsequently excised.  The majority deems the 
removal of that language a routine, housekeeping clarification, 
noting that the drafters declined to announce that they were 
responding to Toutant.  Majority op., ¶76.  It makes no 
difference whether they were or not.  What matters is that the 
Toutant court certainly ascribed meaning to the language, and 
undoubtedly would not have ruled as it did in the absence of 
those three now-erased words.  Consequently, the only precedent 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
14 
 
even remotely supportive of the majority's thesis is, in light 
of the rationale underlying that precedent, outdated.  
E. EVEN IF THE COMMON LAW SUPPORTED THE ASSERTED POWER, IT 
WAS ABROGATED BY THE LEGISLATURE 
¶119 Granting arguendo the existence of this nonexistent 
common-law doctrine, there remains the intractable problem of 
the 2005 revisions.  The court writes off those revisions as 
insufficiently clear and unambiguous to displace the common law.  
Majority op., ¶77.  To the contrary, I do not see how the 
legislature could have been clearer or less ambiguous.  The "or 
held void" language was there, and then it was gone.  And it is 
entirely absent from the rest of the marriage statutes,5 
including, most conspicuously, Wis. Stat. § 767.001, which lists 
"actions affecting the family" and notably omits any mention of 
"holding void," "declaring void," or the like.  If such decisive 
action cannot abrogate the common law, what can?  Simply and 
plainly put, when the legislature removed the phrase "or held 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 766.01(7) defines "dissolution" with 
reference to "a decree of dissolution, divorce, annulment or 
declaration of invalidity . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  However, 
it also notes that "[t]he term does not include a decree 
resulting from an action available under ch. 767 which is not an 
annulment, a divorce or a legal separation."  § 766.01(7).  
Because the majority rightly recognizes that a "declaration of 
voidness" is not available under the annulment statute, this 
definitional provision does not suggest that Wisconsin law 
allows for any "declaration of invalidity" outside of the 
annulment statute.  Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 767.803 makes passing 
reference to "marriages declared void" but there is no evidence 
that it means anything other than "annulled marriages," which is 
precisely how it has been interpreted.  Rascop v. Rascop, 274 
Wis. 254, 79 N.W.2d 828 (1956).  These provisions have no 
bearing on the case.  
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
15 
 
void" from the statutes, whatever right an individual might have 
had to invalidate a marriage outside of annulment was removed 
with it. 
¶120 Interestingly, as an example of clear and unambiguous 
abrogation, the majority points to the legislature's prohibition 
of posthumous annulments on consanguinity grounds.  Majority 
op., ¶54 n.17.  I could not agree more.  But if a ban on 
posthumous 
annulments 
in 
one 
narrow, 
confined 
set 
of 
circumstances is clear and unambiguous, why is the legislature's 
1977 ban on all posthumous annulments not as well?     
F. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT THE ASSERTED POWER 
¶121 The majority concludes with a recitation of the policy 
goals advanced by its rule.  Majority op., ¶¶78-80.  Now, we are 
assured, "an incompetent decedent's estate or an aggrieved 
party" will not be "simply out of luck" and "a court's power to 
address fraud, mistake, and other exigencies in a disputed 
marriage" 
will 
be 
preserved. 
 
Id., 
¶79-80. 
 
Valid 
considerations, to be sure.  As is so often the case, however, 
there are equally valid considerations on the other side of the 
equation.  Just as the limitation embodied in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.313, 
if 
we 
faithfully 
enforced 
it, 
would 
unfairly 
disadvantage 
some 
individuals, 
the 
limitless 
access 
to 
declaratory judgments made possible by the majority will 
unfairly disadvantage others.   
¶122 Consider the case of a fully competent wife who 
marries a fully competent husband.  The husband's relatives want 
nothing to do with him until he grows ill, at which point they 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
16 
 
manage to obtain a questionable medical opinion that he was 
incompetent when he signed the wedding certificate.  Upon the 
husband's death, the relatives go to court, seeking to nullify 
the marriage and inherit the assets that would otherwise pass to 
the wife.  Though the marriage "will be presumed valid," 
majority op., ¶81, the unscrupulous relatives have the benefit 
of documentary medical evidence, and the innocent wife may have 
only her own, self-interested (albeit truthful) word.  Is such a 
scenario more inequitable than the hypotheticals feared by the 
majority? 
¶123 None of which is to say that this describes McLeod's 
situation.  Nor is it to say that the worries on one side of the 
ledger are more compelling than those on the other.  It is only 
to show that the policy choice here is a difficult one, with 
powerful competing interests at stake.  In forbidding posthumous 
annulments, the legislature made that difficult choice.  It is 
not for us to second-guess its judgment.  See, e.g., Progressive 
N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶60, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417 ("When acting within constitutional limitations, the 
legislature settles and declares the public policy of a state, 
and not the court.") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
¶124 Like most mythical creatures, the power to "declare a 
marriage void" is neither fish nor fowl, neither statutory, nor 
judge-made, nor a legitimate policy decision made by the 
appropriate branch of government.  It may have roamed the earth 
once, but if so it has long since gone extinct. 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
17 
 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
¶125 The legislature has not been blameless in generating 
the confusion that has led to the present state of affairs.  At 
the very least, it could have made plain its intention in 
removing the "or held void" language in 2005.  Presumably it 
will be aware of the court's decision, and hopefully it will 
take the opportunity to lay to rest, once and for all, the 
persistent uncertainty that has plagued this important issue for 
too long. 
¶126 When the legislature does revisit the question, it 
might keep in mind the worryingly extreme consequences of its 
current all-or-nothing approach.  Under the majority's misguided 
reading of the law, as noted, a marriage can apparently be 
challenged at any time after the death of a party, no matter the 
circumstances or the evidentiary obstacles.  Under the correct 
reading of the law, as set forth here, equally disturbing 
situations may arise.  A marriage between, say, a minor and an 
adult, would remain valid after the death of the adult, even if 
uncontested documentation established the voidness.  Cf. McCabe, 
197 Wis. 2d at 713 n.3 ("Although 'void,'" a marriage contracted 
in violation of the statutes "governs legal relations unless it 
is annulled . . . .  This may not be done after one of the 
parties to the marriage dies.") (citations omitted).  This is so 
because annulment is the only means to invalidate a marriage 
that is either void or voidable.  Falk, 158 Wis. 2d at 189.  The 
law has not drawn any further distinctions within the void 
category regarding marriages in which there is incontrovertible 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
18 
 
evidence, like a birth certificate in the preceding example, 
obviating the need for any further fact-finding.  It may make 
good sense, as a policy matter, for the legislature to allow 
courts to invalidate such marriages.              
¶127 In the meantime, I would hold, for the reasons stated, 
that the circuit court properly declined to exercise a power it 
did not possess, and would therefore affirm its decision.  
Because the majority instead elects to give a longstanding 
misunderstanding the force of law, I respectfully dissent.       
                                
 
 
No.  2011AP1176 & 2011AP1177.mjg 
 
 
 
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