Title: Commonwealth v. Ellsworth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12816 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARLANA L. ELLSWORTH. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     January 7, 2020. - June 15, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Continuance without a finding, Dismissal, 
Appeal by Commonwealth, Sentence, Double jeopardy, 
Duplicative punishment.  Moot Question.  Constitutional 
Law, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Pittsfield Division 
of the District Court Department on November 17, 2017, and March 
5, 2018. 
 
 
A motion to revise or revoke sentence was considered by 
Robert T. Santanniello, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Megan L. Rose, Assistant District Attorney (Jeanne M. 
Kempthorne, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Cara M. Cheyette for the defendant. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In this companion case to Commonwealth v. 
Beverly, 485 Mass.     (2020), and Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 485 
2 
 
Mass.     (2020), we conclude that the sentencing judge imposed 
illegal sentences by entering continuances without a finding and 
immediately dismissing criminal charges without imposing any 
terms and conditions, or probation.  In the present 
circumstances, however, we nevertheless decline to remand this 
case for resentencing as to the illegal sentences. 
1.  Background.  This case arises from three separate 
incidents involving the defendant.  In the first incident, the 
defendant walked into her boyfriend's bedroom while he was 
asleep and began yelling and screaming at him.  The boyfriend 
went into the bathroom and called police.  The defendant kicked 
in the bathroom door and pushed her boyfriend into the bathtub.  
He sustained scratches to his neck and head.  The defendant was 
charged with assault and battery on a household member, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a). 
 
In a second incident, police responded to a report of a man 
and woman fighting.  Officers identified the woman as the 
defendant.  Upon being approached by officers about the fight, 
the defendant began yelling and screaming at the officers, 
attracting the attention of passersby.  The defendant was 
charged with disorderly conduct, in violation of G. L. c. 272, 
§ 53. 
 
The third incident took place in a public park.  Officers 
observed the defendant kicking a woman who was on the ground in 
3 
 
the fetal position.  Officers arrested the defendant and 
discovered that she was in possession of lorazepam and 
clonazepam, class C substances under G. L. c. 94C, § 31.  The 
defendant was charged with assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, §  b); assault and 
battery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); and possession 
of a class C substance, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34. 
 
On April 5, 2018, the defendant entered an Alford plea1 on 
all charges, except for the disorderly conduct charge, to which 
she agreed there were facts sufficient for a guilty finding.  
The Commonwealth recommended that the defendant be found guilty 
of disorderly conduct with the charge placed on file.  As to the 
remaining four charges, the Commonwealth recommended that the 
judge enter guilty findings, and sentence the defendant to 
ninety days in a house of correction for each conviction, to run 
consecutively.  The Commonwealth noted that the defendant had a 
prior criminal record and had recently violated probation.  The 
                     
1 "Under Alford, a defendant who professes innocence may 
nevertheless plead guilty and 'voluntarily, knowingly and 
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence,' 
if the State can demonstrate a 'strong factual basis' for the 
plea."  Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 398 Mass. 288, 297 (1986), 
quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).  
Here, the defendant entered Alford pleas as to the charges 
stemming from the first and third incidents.  Defense counsel 
indicated that the defendant was intoxicated during the first 
incident and could not recall what had occurred.  Defense 
counsel similarly indicated that the defendant had blacked out 
and did not recall the third incident. 
4 
 
Commonwealth also observed that the charges at issue in the 
instant case had been committed while the defendant was released 
on her own recognizance. 
 
For the disorderly conduct and assault and battery on a 
household member charges, the defendant recommended entering 
continuances without a finding and immediate dismissals.  As to 
the remaining three charges, the defendant requested entering a 
continuance without a finding, conditioned on her participation 
in a level-three community corrections program.  Defense counsel 
represented that the defendant struggled with alcohol abuse that 
left her unable to recall two of the three incidents at issue.  
He further stated that continuances without a finding would be 
preferable because they would provide the defendant with the 
opportunity to "get out of this without . . . a felony on her 
record," such that she "might get a decent job."  The 
defendant's boyfriend, the victim of the first incident, also 
gave a victim impact statement requesting that the court not 
sentence the defendant to incarceration.  The probation 
department did not recommend the defendant as a candidate for 
probation due to her prior record. 
 
The judge sentenced the defendant to thirty days in a house 
of correction for the charge of assault and battery, with credit 
for time served.  The judge entered continuances without a 
finding and immediately dismissed all remaining charges.  The 
5 
 
Commonwealth requested written findings as to the judge's 
decision to continue four of the charges without a finding. 
 
On May 21, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion asking the 
judge to revise or revoke the continuances without a finding, 
arguing that the continuances without a finding, which were 
immediately dismissed without any terms and conditions, 
constituted illegal sentences under G. L. c. 278, § 18. 
 
The judge denied the Commonwealth's motion on June 12, 
2018.  In his written decision, the judge indicated that he 
found the sentences to be appropriate in light of the 
defendant's prospects for future employment, and the fact that 
any guilty finding would "likely result in the potential for 
reduced opportunities for gainful employment."  The sentencing 
judge also referred to the dispositions he had entered as 
"[continuances without a finding] for a period of one day," 
which he characterized as "tantamount to a finding of guilty and 
a sentence imposed as [thirty-one] days to the House of 
Correction, credit for time served."2  The Commonwealth appealed.  
                     
 
2 The sentencing judge's decision denying the Commonwealth's 
motion to revise or revoke makes repeated reference to the 
defendant serving a sentence of thirty-one days.  Both the 
hearing transcript and the docket reflect, however, that the 
disposition was for thirty, not thirty-one days, with credit for 
time served. 
6 
 
We subsequently granted the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Mootness.  We briefly address the 
issue of mootness.3  The defendant contends that the instant case 
is moot because the Commonwealth failed to seek a stay of 
execution of the sentences, and the defendant has finished 
serving her sentences.  See Commonwealth v. Resende, 427 Mass. 
1005, 1006 (1998) ("When the Commonwealth appeals from an order 
continuing a case without a finding, it may file a motion 
seeking to stay the probationary period pending appeal to 
prevent the appeal from becoming moot").  The issue of mootness 
arises somewhat unconventionally in the instant case.  As a 
general matter, "litigation is considered moot when the party 
who claimed to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in 
its outcome."  Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 
703 (1976).  Our prior cases examining the legality of a 
particular sentencing disposition have typically arisen in the 
context of a defendant's motion to revise or revoke.  In such 
instances, we examined whether the defendant had a "personal 
                     
 
3 We address this issue separately from our discussion of 
mootness in Beverly, 485 Mass. at    , and Rossetti, 485 Mass. 
at    , wherein the Commonwealth conceded the issue of mootness 
during oral arguments before the Appeals Court.  This case, by 
contrast, was not argued before the Appeals Court, and the 
Commonwealth has not conceded the issue of mootness here.  
Accordingly, a separate discussion of the mootness issue is 
warranted in this case. 
7 
 
stake in the outcome of [the] litigation" to determine whether 
the case was moot.  See Commonwealth v. Argueta, 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. 564, 566 (2009).  Here, however, the Commonwealth moved to 
revise or revoke the defendant's sentences, not the defendant.  
The Commonwealth contends that the case is not moot because, if 
the sentences are found to be illegal, the defendant may be 
subject to resentencing.  We agree and conclude that the instant 
case is not moot.  However, for the reasons discussed infra, we 
nonetheless rule that resentencing would not be appropriate in 
the instant case. 
b.  Legality of sentences.  We next examine whether the 
entry of the continuances without a finding in the instant case 
constituted illegal sentences.  As explained in Beverly, 485 
Mass. at    , entry of a continuance without a finding, without 
imposing any terms and conditions, or probation, amounts to an 
illegal sentence in violation of G. L. c. 278, § 18. 
In his denial of the Commonwealth's motion to revise or 
revoke, the sentencing judge asserted that the entry of the 
continuance without a finding was "tantamount to a finding of 
guilty and a sentence imposed as thirty-one days to the House of 
Correction, credit for time served."  This is inaccurate on its 
face.  The thirty-day sentence in a house of correction was for 
the assault and battery charge, not any of the charges for which 
the defendant received a continuance without a finding.  The 
8 
 
continuances without a finding entered here corresponded to four 
separate offenses. 
Entry of a continuance without a finding pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 18, requires that the sentencing judge abide by the 
requirements of the statute.  As we stated in Beverly, 485 Mass. 
at    , one such requirement under the statute is that the 
sentencing judge impose terms and conditions, or probation, on 
the defendant, satisfaction of which will earn the dismissal of 
the criminal charge.  Here, the sentencing judge imposed no such 
conditions.  To the contrary, the record reflects that the 
sentencing judge declared, as to each of the continuances 
without a finding, "I'm going to continue without a finding and 
dismiss it."  The judge does not appear to have contemplated, 
let alone announced, conditions that the defendant would be 
required to satisfy in order to warrant the dismissal.  The fact 
that the defendant was sentenced and received credit for time 
served on one of the five charges did not alter the statutory 
requirements as to the other four charges -- namely, the 
imposition of terms and conditions, or probation, from the date 
of the finding of facts sufficient to warrant a guilty finding.  
See G. L. c. 278, § 18.  As no such terms and conditions, or 
probation, were entered here, the sentences were illegal. 
c.  Double jeopardy.  Finally, the defendant argues that, 
even if these sentences were illegal, remanding this case for 
9 
 
resentencing would violate principles of double jeopardy.  Under 
the doctrine of double jeopardy, "[o]nce a defendant has served 
fully the proper sentence prescribed by law for the offense 
committed, the State may not punish him again."  Aldoupolis v. 
Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 272, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864 
(1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 (1983).  When a defendant has 
finished serving such a sentence, "any resentencing therefore 
necessarily would violate principles of double jeopardy by 
increasing the aggregate punishment imposed under the original 
sentence" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 311 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 
468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014).  While this concept appears 
"seemingly straightforward" on its face, applying the doctrine 
has proved to be "far from clear."  Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 
Mass. 502, 509 (2014). 
Issues of double jeopardy in this context turn on the 
question of the defendant's legitimate expectation of finality.  
See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 687 (1998) ("If a 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an 
increase in that sentence is prohibited" [citation and 
quotations omitted]).  In making the determination regarding a 
defendant's legitimate expectation of finality, we have 
considered a number of different factors, including whether the 
original sentence was legal or illegal, see Selavka, 469 Mass. 
10 
 
at 513-514; the timeliness of the motion to revise or revoke, 
see Commonwealth v. Grundman, 479 Mass. 204, 207–208 (2018); 
whether a motion to stay the execution of the sentence was 
filed, see Resende, 427 Mass. at 1005; and whether the sentence 
has already been fully served, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 86 
Mass. App. Ct. 812, 815 (2015).  A sentence is considered final 
once the sixty-day window within which to file a motion to 
revise or revoke has expired.  See Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 274.  
Consequently, if no motion to revise or revoke has been filed, 
even an illegal sentence will nonetheless "become final for the 
purposes of double jeopardy after the expiration of that time 
period" (citation omitted).  Grundman, supra at 207–208. 
Here, the Commonwealth had filed a timely motion to revise 
or revoke.  Thus, the defendant did not have a fully realized 
expectation of finality at the time when the Commonwealth filed 
its motion.  See Selavka, 469 Mass. at 508 (sixty-day window 
"reasonably balances the defendant's interest in finality 
against society's interest in law enforcement" [citation 
omitted]).  The Commonwealth did not, however, move to stay the 
execution of the sentence.  Resende, 427 Mass. at 1005.  The 
defendant also had finished serving her sentences as to all of 
the charges stemming from the underlying incident before the 
motion to revise or revoke had even been filed.  Selavka, supra 
at 506, 514 ("A defendant's expectation of finality in his 
11 
 
sentence increases once he has begun to serve that sentence" and 
"[w]e conclude that, although the judge was empowered to correct 
the defendant's sentence, he was not permitted to do so nearly 
one year after the defendant received that sentence, where the 
defendant already had served his entire period of incarceration 
and had a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence as 
initially imposed"). 
We also are cognizant of a number of practical 
considerations in the instant case.  First, it has now been two 
years since the continuances without a finding were initially 
entered and the charges dismissed, and, as mentioned, the 
defendant has long since finished serving her sentences as to 
all charges.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Barclay, 424 Mass. 377, 380-
381 (1997) (regardless whether rule 29 motion is timely, it must 
be ruled on within reasonable time).  Given the brevity of the 
original sentences, it is also reasonable to conclude that, had 
the sentencing judge properly imposed terms and conditions, or 
probation, such terms likely would have been satisfied within a 
short period of time. 
The defendants in the companion cases, Beverly, 485 Mass. 
at    , and Rossetti, 485 Mass. at    , have highlighted 
numerous instances of the District Court engaging in the 
practice of entering a continuance without a finding and 
immediately dismissing a charge, without imposing terms and 
12 
 
conditions, or probation.  Singling out this particular 
defendant for resentencing at this point would therefore seem to 
serve little purpose.  Thus, in these circumstances, "[w]e think 
it would be unfair to the defendant to vacate [a] disposition" 
reflecting what appears to be a not entirely uncommon practice 
so as to remand the case for resentencing on charges that were 
continued without a finding two years ago.  See Commonwealth v. 
Norrell, 423 Mass. 725, 730 (1996).  See also Selavka, 469 Mass. 
at 511-514.  In light of these considerations, we apply our 
ruling in Beverly, 485 Mass. at    , prospectively from the date 
of this decision.  All defendants who have been sentenced to 
continuances without a finding absent any terms and conditions, 
or probation, prior to the issuance of this opinion, will be 
"allowed to retain those dispositions."  See Norrell, supra.  
After the date of this opinion, however, no such dispositions 
shall be permissible. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed in Beverly, 485 
Mass. at    , we rule that the continuances without a finding 
entered in the instant case constituted illegal sentences, as 
they contained no terms and conditions.  We further conclude, 
however, that vacating these dispositions and ordering that the 
defendant be resentenced would not be just.  Accordingly, the 
continuance without a finding dispositions entered without terms 
13 
 
and conditions in the instant case may be retained, and are thus 
affirmed, but cannot be imposed in any such future case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.