Title: Board of County Com'rs of Johnson County v. Atter

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Board of County Com'rs of Johnson County v. Atter1987 WY 31734 P.2d 549Case Number: 86-107, 86-108Decided: 03/23/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
The 
BOARD OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSON COUNTY, Wyoming, a body corporate and politic, 
Appellant (Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

 
 
Warren 
D. ATTER and Geraldine Atter, and Atter Ranch Limited Partnership, Appellees 
(Defendants); Warren D. ATTER and Geraldine Atter, Appellants (Defendants), 
Atter Ranch Limited Partnership (Defendant), v. The BOARD OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSON COUNTY, Wyoming, a body corporate and politic, 
Appellee (Plaintiff)

 
 
Greg L. 
Goddard, JohnsonCounty and Prosecuting Attorney, Buffalo, for Board of 
CountyCommissioners.

 
 
Dennis 
M. Kirven of Kirven and Kirven, Buffalo, for Atters. 

 
 

Before 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an eminent 
domain action. Appellant Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County appeals 
from the district court's order dismissing its complaint seeking condemnation of 
two parcels of land owned by appellees Warren and Geraldine Atter and Atter 
Ranch Limited Partnership.

 
 

[¶2.]     Three issues are 
presented on appeal. The first, as stated by appellant, is whether the trial 
court improperly substituted its judgment for that of a legislative body in 
dismissing appellant's complaint on the ground of lack of public necessity. 
Appellant's second issue is whether § 1-26-801, 
W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986, permits condemnation of private land for fill 
material when that land is not a site for public improvement. By way of 
cross-appeal, appellees assert that the district court erroneously denied them 
an award of litigation expenses as provided in § 
1-26-512(a), W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986.

 
 

[¶3.]     We affirm in part and 
reverse in part.

 
 

[¶4.]     On November 6, 1984, 
the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County (hereinafter Board) filed a 
"preapplication" with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for a grant to 
design a runway extension for the Johnson County airport, located near Buffalo, 
Wyoming. A runway extension was designed which would increase the length of the 
runway from 4,544 feet to 6,200 feet and bring the airport into compliance with 
the federal criteria for Basic Utility Stage II Aircraft. The Board decided to 
proceed with the runway extension project.

 
 

[¶5.]     Initially the plan was 
to construct the entire runway extension to the northwest. In August of 1985, 
however, the Board decided to add 900 feet of the extension to the northwest and 
760 feet to the southeast. The decision to extend the runway to the southeast 
made it necessary for the County to acquire two noncontiguous parcels of land 
owned by appellees Warren and Geraldine Atter and Atter Ranch Limited 
Partnership (hereinafter Atters). One parcel (parcel No. 2), encompassing 17.64 
acres, was needed for the runway extension and "clear zone." The other parcel 
(parcel No. 1), containing 6.22 acres, contained fill material which the County 
wished to use for the airport project.

 
 

[¶6.]     The airport engineers 
contacted appellees and informed them of the County's interest in acquiring 
parcel No. 2. They also offered a royalty for the fill material contained in 
parcel No. 1. After months of negotiation, the parties were unable to agree on a 
price for parcel No. 2 or the value of the fill material in parcel No. 1. On 
January 7, 1986, the Board adopted a resolution authorizing the county attorney 
to file a complaint for condemnation of both parcels because they were 
"necessary for the * * * * airport expansion." The county attorney filed the 
complaint the same day.

 
 

[¶7.]     The Atters moved to 
dismiss the action. At a hearing on the motion to dismiss the Atters advanced 
two theories. First, they asserted that the Board could not demonstrate public 
necessity for the runway extension project as required by § 1-26-504(a), W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986,1 and Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P.2 Second, they contend that the 
County had no authority to condemn parcel No. 1 and thereby obtain the desired 
fill material because that parcel was not a public improvement site. In 
response, the Board maintained that it had already determined that acquisition 
of the Atters' property was necessary and that its determination was not subject 
to judicial interference unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or a result 
of fraud. The Board further asserted that the County's need for fill material 
from parcel No. 1 constituted a "necessity allowing for condemnation" of that 
parcel.

 
 

[¶8.]     After an evidentiary 
hearing and extensive briefing by the parties, the district court granted the 
Atters' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the County had failed to 
make a showing that "there [was] a reasonable basis for the Commissioners to 
determine [that] there is a necessity to enlarge or lengthen the runway." The 
district court also concluded that the County was without authority to condemn 
parcel No. 1 merely for the purpose of acquiring fill material at an economical 
cost. After dismissal of its complaint, the Board moved the district court for 
reconsideration and the taking of additional testimony and oral arguments. This 
motion was granted, and another evidentiary hearing was held. After this second 
hearing the court again concluded, for the same reasons, that the Board's 
complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. The Board now appeals from the 
order of dismissal.

 
 
MOOTNESS

 
 

[¶9.]     After the Board filed 
its notice of appeal, the Atters filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for 
mootness. In support of their motion to dismiss, the Atters alleged that while 
this appeal was pending the Board had abandoned its plan to extend the runway to 
the southeast and instead, pursuant to its original plan, had decided to 
construct the entire extension to the northwest, thus making acquisition of the 
Atter lands unnecessary. The Board resisted the motion, asserting that: (1) the 
Board had not withdrawn its resolution authorizing condemnation of the Atter 
lands; (2) regardless of the location of the runway extension, the airport could 
not meet FAA requirements without acquiring the Atter lands; and (3) "additional 
needs for the airport and the Atter land are contemplated." At oral argument, 
the Board conceded that the runway extension had been constructed to the 
northwest.

 
 

[¶10.]  With these considerations in mind, we 
must determine whether the appeal now before us is moot.

 
 
"We have 
often repeated the universal rule that a reviewing court will dismiss a case 
when, pending appeal, an event occurs which renders a cause moot and makes a 
determination of the issues unnecessary. Appellate courts will not hand down 
decisions which cannot be given effect or which pertain to matters that may 
arise in the future.

 
 
"In 
determining whether events subsequent to the Commission's order render this case 
moot, we will examine all such events called to our attention by the parties to 
this petition." (Citations omitted.) Gulf Oil 
Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission, Wyo., 693 P.2d 227, 233 
(1985).

 
 
With the 
completion of the total runway extension to the northwest, little is left of the 
controversy that existed between the Board and the Atters at the time the 
district court dismissed the Board's complaint for 
condemnation.

 
 

[¶11.]  The Board's resolution of March 4, 1986, 
stated that the Atter lands were necessary for "extension of the runway, fill 
material, land use protection and clear zone." After passing that resolution, 
however, the Board decided to construct the runway extension to the northwest, 
and the fill material for the extension has apparently been obtained elsewhere. 
By the time oral arguments were presented, the Board no longer asserted any need 
for fill material; therefore, we will not address the propriety of the district 
court's ruling on that issue. As far as we can tell, all that remains is the 
Board's possible need for clear zone.3 We cannot tell from the record 
whether the clear zone that the Board now desires is the same clear zone that it 
originally needed for the proposed southeast portion of the runway extension. 
The facts brought out at oral argument indicate that it is not and that the area 
now needed for clear zone is different in both size and location from the clear 
zone specified in the Board's earlier plan. This was not disputed and logically 
must be correct, for the required clear zone depends upon the location of the 
runway. Therefore, the public necessity issue, as it relates to the Board's need 
for clear zone, appears to be moot as well. We are reluctant to make that 
determination, however, on the unsettled facts presented to us on appeal. The 
district court is the proper forum for the resolution of disputed and clouded 
factual issues. We, therefore, direct the district court to decide the remaining 
mootness issue on remand. Because the district court could conceivably find that 
the case is not entirely moot, we will address the public necessity issue raised 
by appellant.

 
 
REASONABLE 
NECESSITY

 
 

[¶12.]  Historically, the decision to exercise 
the power of eminent domain has been treated as a legislative determination that 
could not be reviewed by the judiciary unless shown to be an abuse of discretion 
or the result of fraud or bad faith. See generally, 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§§ 4.11 and 4.11[2] (1985). This general rule is not applicable, however, when 
the legislature has conferred upon the courts the duty of determining public 
necessity. See id. at § 4.11[4]. This is precisely what happened when the 
Wyoming 
legislature enacted § 1-26-504, W.S.1977, Cum. 
Supp.1986.4 It conferred upon the courts the 
duty of making certain factual determinations, including whether "the public 
interest and necessity require the project." Section 
1-26-504(a) (i), W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986. Consequently, public necessity 
is a justiciable issue in Wyoming.

 
 

[¶13.]  Section 1-26-504(a) places 
the burden of proving public necessity on the condemnor.5 The manner in which a condemnor may 
satisfy this burden depends on whether the condemnor falls within subsection (b) 
of § 1-26-504. Those condemnors identified in 
subsection (b) may discharge their burden by merely introducing their findings 
on the requirements of subsection (a), as the statute provides that such 
findings are "prima facie valid." Section 
1-26-504(b). The findings of all other condemnors, however, are not 
"prima facie valid." Therefore, those condemnors who do not fall within 
subsection (b), like the Board of County Commissioners (not a state agency, see 
§ 16-3-101(b)(x), W.S.1977) in the present 
case, must put on evidence of public necessity at the hearing before the 
district court; a resolution of necessity is not prima facie sufficient.6

 
 

[¶14.]  Once a condemnor has established a prima 
facie case of public necessity, either by introducing its findings on the matter 
as provided in subsection (b) or by the production of evidence which factually 
supports its determination of public necessity, the burden then shifts to the 
condemnee who "must then either concede the existence of a necessity or be 
prepared to show bad faith or abuse of discretion as an affirmative defense." 
City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, Fla., 
346 So. 2d 988, 990 (1977).

 
 

[¶15.]  Initially, the correct procedure was 
followed by the district court in this case. Two evidentiary hearings were held. 
The Board called witnesses who testified to the necessity of the project. The 
court then concluded that the Board had not met its burden of establishing 
necessity. That conclusion was erroneous. The error arises from the court's 
misinterpretation of "public necessity" as that term appears in § 1-26-504(a)(i), supra. When a condemnor seeks to 
establish the requirement of necessity in an eminent domain proceeding, it need 
only show a reasonable necessity for the project. As explained by one 
court, the term "necessity," when used in the context of an eminent domain 
proceeding, means "reasonably convenient or useful to the public." City of Dayton v. 
Keys, 21 Ohio Misc. 105, 252 N.E.2d 655, 659 
(1969). A showing that the project will increase public safety is 
sufficient. See Greasy Creek Mineral Company v. 
Ely Jellico Coal Company, 132 Ky. 692, 116 S.W. 1189 
(1909).

 
 

[¶16.]  In the present case, the Board presented 
evidence which showed, among other things, that the airport project would result 
in increased safety for pilots and passengers. In doing so, the Board satisfied 
its burden of establishing that the public necessity required the project. At 
that point the district court could dismiss the complaint only if the Atters 
demonstrated that the Board acted in bad faith or that its actions were 
fraudulent or constituted an abuse of discretion. No such showing was made. The 
district court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint for condemnation on the 
ground of lack of public necessity.

 
 
LITIGATION 
EXPENSES

 
 

[¶17.]  In their cross-appeal the Atters assert 
that the district court erred in denying them litigation expenses as required by 
§ 1-26-512(a), W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986. That 
section provides in relevant part:

 
 
"A 
public entity may not commence a condemnation action until it has first adopted 
a written resolution in substantial conformity with this section, authorizing 
commencement and prosecution of the action. The authorization may be amended or 
rescinded at any time before or after commencement of the condemnation action 
but if rescinded the public entity shall pay the litigation expenses of the 
condemnee."

 
 
The 
Atters maintain that the district court's dismissal of the Board's complaint 
effected a rescission of the resolution adopted by the Board. Alternatively, 
they contend that the Board rescinded the resolution of January 7, 1986, by 
adopting a second resolution covering the same subject matter on March 4, 1986. 
We disagree.

 
 

[¶18.]  We have already observed that when the 
legislature enacted the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, it relied heavily on the 
Uniform Eminent Domain Code and the California Eminent Domain Law. Section 1303 
of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code, which addresses litigation expenses, 
provides:

 
 
"(a) The 
court shall award the defendant his litigation expenses, in addition to any 
other amounts authorized by law, if the action is wholly or partly dismissed for 
any reason.

"(b) If 
the scope of the property to be taken is reduced as the result of (1) a partial 
dismissal, (2) a dismissal of one or more plaintiffs, or (3) a final judgment 
determining that the plaintiff cannot take part of the property originally 
sought to be taken, the court shall award the defendant the portion of his 
litigation expenses attributable to the property within the scope of the 
reduction." Uniform Eminent Domain Code, § 1303, 13 U.L.A. 128-129 
(1986).

 
 
The 
California Eminent Domain Law also requires payment of litigation expenses to a 
condemnee if "the proceeding is wholly or partly dismissed for any reason." 
Section 1268.610(a)(1), Cal. Civ. Code (West 1982). The Wyoming legislature, 
however, did not follow this approach. Instead it enacted § 1-26-512, supra, which contemplates an award of 
litigation expenses only if the public entity which adopted the resolution 
authorizing condemnation later rescinds that resolution. The Board has not 
rescinded its resolution.

 
 

[¶19.]  We find no merit in the Atters' argument 
that the Board's adoption of a second resolution covering the same subject 
matter amounts to a rescission of the earlier resolution. Two differences exist 
between the resolution adopted by the Board on January 7, 1986, and the similar 
resolution adopted on March 4, 1986. First, the March resolution adds "the Atter 
Ranch Limited Partnership" as an owner of the lands to be acquired. Second, the 
March resolution contains a more detailed description of the purposes for which 
the land is needed. The Atters contend that these changes amounted to a 
"rescission" of the January resolution; the Board asserts that the changes 
amount to an "amendment" of the January resolution.  Section 
1-26-512, supra, requires payment of litigation expenses in the event of 
a "rescission" but not an "amendment" of a resolution authorizing 
condemnation.

 
 

[¶20.]  Because the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act 
does not define "amend" or "rescind," we must apply the general rule which 
provides that in interpreting statutes, "words and phrases shall be taken in 
their ordinary and usual sense." Section 8-1-103, 
W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(1981) defines "rescind" as "to take back: annul, cancel" and defines "amend" as 
"to change or modify in any way for the better." When the Board adopted the 
second resolution, it still needed the Atter lands for the southeast portion of 
the runway extension. Clearly it did not intend to "take back" the condemnation 
resolution at that time. The changes found in the March resolution reflect a 
desire to clarify and correct the January resolution. Thus, we conclude that the 
adoption of the March resolution was an amendment and not a rescission of the 
January resolution.

 
 

[¶21.]  The district court's order denying 
litigation expenses is affirmed, and the balance of the case is reversed and 
remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See note 4, 
infra.

 
 

2Rule 71.1(e), W.R.C.P., provides in 
relevant part:

 
 
"The hearing shall be held not less than 
fifteen (15) days after service upon the defendant, unless the defendant 
otherwise consents in writing. At the hearing, which may be adjourned from time 
to time, the district judge shall require evidence that notice of hearing has 
been given as provided in this rule, and shall hear and determine the questions 
of the plaintiff's right to make the appropriation, plaintiff's inability to 
agree with the owner, the necessity for the appropriation, and shall hear proofs 
and allegations of all parties interested touching the regularity of the 
proceeding."

3The Board's need of the Atter lands for 
"land use protection" has never been clearly 
explained.

 
 

4 Section 
1-26-504, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986, provides:

 
 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by 
law, the power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a 
proposed use only if all of the following are 
established:

"(i) The public interest and necessity 
require the project or the use of eminent domain is authorized by the Wyoming 
Constitution;

"(ii) The project is planned or located 
in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the 
least private injury; and

"(iii) The property sought to be 
acquired is necessary for the project.

"(b) Findings of the public service 
commission, the interstate commerce commission and other federal and state 
agencies with appropriate jurisdiction are prima facie valid relative to 
determinations under subsection (a) of this section if the findings were made in 
accordance with law with notice to condemnees who are parties to the 
condemnation action and are final with no appeals from the determinations 
pending."

 
 

5In lieu of establishing public interest 
and necessity, a condemnor may satisfy § 
1-26-504(a)(i), W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986, by showing that "the use of 
eminent domain is authorized by the Wyoming Constitution." In the present case, 
the County's power to exercise eminent domain arises not from the Wyoming 
Constitution, but from § 1-26-801, W.S.1977, 
Cum.Supp.1986.

 
 

6This interpretation of § 1-26-504 is supported by the legislative history 
of the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act. In drafting the Act, the legislature relied 
extensively on the California Eminent Domain Law and the Uniform Eminent Domain 
Code. See Comment, Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: 
Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 Land 
& Water L.Rev. 739 (1983). In fact, § 
1-26-504(a) is nearly identical to § 1240.030 of the California Eminent 
Domain Law. In addition, the Wyoming Act, like that of California, requires that 
a public entity must adopt a resolution of necessity before it can exercise the 
power of eminent domain. Section 1-26-512, 
W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986; § 1240.040, Cal. Civ. Code (West 
1982).

 
 
The California Act provides that a 
resolution of necessity adopted by a public entity, such as a county governing 
body, "conclusively establishes" the requirements to exercise eminent domain. 
Section 1245.250, Cal. Civ. Code (West 1982). The Wyoming Act 
contains no parallel provision. Under the Wyoming Act, a county governing 
board's resolution of necessity is not conclusive nor are its findings "prima 
facie valid." Therefore, the district court must look beyond the language of the 
resolution and examine the facts underlying the board's determination of 
necessity.