Title: Ex Parte Brooks

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

562 So. 2d 604 (1990)
Ex parte Samuel Robert BROOKS.
(Re Samuel Robert Brooks v. State of Alabama.)
88-1258.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 16, 1990.
*605 Paul D. Brown, Mobile, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Lusk, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
HORNSBY, Chief Justice.
Samuel Robert Brooks was indicted in a two-count indictment for theft of property in the first degree and possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. A jury found him guilty of theft and acquitted him of possession of a forged instrument. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on the theft conviction.
Brooks was a practicing attorney. He undertook to assist Hazel and William Day in collecting their claim against an insurance company for damage to their property. He eventually received full satisfaction ($16,810.77) of the claim by check, which was made payable to the Days. Brooks endorsed the check by signing the Days' names and deposited the check into his attorney's trust account. He subsequently withdrew the same amount from the trust account to pay personal obligations. The Days never recovered any of the funds.
1) Whether the trial court erred in failing to recognize the due process violation that occurred when the prosecutor argued in closing that Brooks had (in a previous unconnected matter) exercised his right to remain silent and had requested counsel before answering questions.
2) Whether there was a fatal variance between the indictment charging theft of lawful currency and the evidence at trial that a "check," not "currency," was taken.
Because our analysis with respect to the two issues above effectively resolves this appeal, other issues raised by the petitioner are not discussed in this opinion.
Brooks argues that the mention of his silence by the prosecutor in his closing argument was error.
The prosecutor's remarks during closing argument were:
Improper argument of counsel is not grounds for a new trial when the defendant's objections are sustained and no curative instruction is sought. See Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 323, 327 (Ala.1977). An exception would be where counsel's remarks were so grossly improper and highly prejudicial as to be beyond corrective action by the trial court. Id. The remarks in this case fall within this category.
Regardless, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in its opinion that "the prosecutor, *606 by cross-examination, attempted to bring out the silence of Appellant during the disciplinary proceedings in an effort to show that his present defense [was] that he took the money as payment for legal fees [and that this] was not advanced in the prior proceedings." 562 So. 2d 601. This effort by the prosecutor was improper to show a tacit admission on behalf of Brooks, under this Court's decision in Ex parte Marek, [1989] 556 So. 2d 375 (Ala.1989).[1] In Marek, we abolished the tacit admission rule, "which previously allowed the introduction of evidence of an accused's silence when confronted with an accusation." Id. at 382. We specifically held that this abolition applied to pre-arrest situations as well as to post-arrest situations.
A review of the record of this trial reveals the following colloquy when the defendant was being cross-examined by the prosecutor:
The State, on cross-examination, attempted to introduce evidence that Brooks had expressed a desire to consult an attorney before answering any further questions at a prior disciplinary proceeding before the Alabama State Bar. The State proceeded to cross-examine Brooks on this point, even after he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. Finally, the State proceeded to argue his silence to the jury as an indication of guilt. This was an improper use of the now-abolished tacit admission rule, as well as a violation of Brooks's due process rights. The cumulative effect of the prosecutor's questions, coupled with his improper closing argument, was so prejudicial to Brooks that a new trial is required, particularly in light of the prosecutor's continued questions to Brooks even after objections to these questions were sustained by the trial judge. Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Blackwell, 221 Ala. 225, 228, 128 So. 389 (1930); see, e.g., Trent v. State, 380 So. 2d 960, 963 (Ala.Crim.App.1979).
We stated the following in Birmingham Baptist Hospital, supra, 221 Ala. at 229, 128 So. at 392:
Quoting Louisville & N.R.R. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352, 353 (1909). For this reason, we reverse.
Because our reversal will likely cause the defendant to be tried again on the original indictment, we consider it appropriate to address the defendant's argument that the indictment is defective.
Ex parte Airhart, 477 So. 2d 979 (Ala.1985), clearly states the rule that when the charge involves "currency" and the proof shows that a "check" was involved, there is a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof. The Court of Criminal Appeals distinguishes this case from Ex parte Airhart, supra, acknowledging that a check was deposited into Brooks's account, but holding that it had been converted into "currency" when Brooks later withdrew it from his trust account. According to the facts as stated in the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion, it was not until this point, when the amount represented by the check had become currency in his account, that Brooks formed the requisite intent to commit the theft, thus exerting unauthorized control over the Days' property. If Brooks had cashed the Days' settlement check and used it for his personal obligations, he would have converted a check, and there would have been a variance between the indictment and the proof. In this instance, however, because Brooks deposited the check, so that it was converted into currency, and then converted the currency, there was no variance.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
I am persuaded that the opinion authored by Judge Patterson and concurred in by all Judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals is correct. I would quash the writ, or affirm; therefore, I must dissent. I would point out, however, that I agree with the majority's holding on the fatal variance issue.
MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
[1]  We note that Marek had not been decided at the time of the trial court's ruling in this case.