Title: State v. Victor K. Johnson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 94 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2793-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Victor K. Johnson,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 1062, 668 N.W.2d 563 
(Ct. App.2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
James R. Lucius, Greenfield, and oral argument by James R. 
Lucius. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued Daniel J. 
O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 94 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2793-CR  
(L.C. Nos. 00 CF 3728, 00 CF 3779 & 01 CF 5883) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Victor K. Johnson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
D. 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   Victor 
K. 
Johnson 
petitions for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision 
that affirmed judgments and an order of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee 
County, 
Jeffrey 
A. Conen, 
presiding, 
convicting 
Johnson of one count of armed robbery, one count of robbery with 
threat of force, one count of attempted armed robbery, and three 
counts 
of 
felony 
bail 
jumping, 
and 
denying 
Johnson's 
postconviction 
motion 
alleging 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
2 
 
counsel.1  Johnson claims that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in permitting the State to question him 
about the truthfulness of another witness, contrary to State v. 
Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984).  He 
also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the questions.  
¶2 
We conclude that the purpose and effect of the 
prosecutor's 
cross-examination 
of 
Johnson 
was 
to 
impeach 
Johnson's credibility, not to bolster the credibility of another 
witness, because both Johnson and the other witness were 
testifying to their personal observations about the same events.  
Therefore, the cross-examination of Johnson was permissible.  
Because we have concluded that the cross-examination was not 
improper, we also conclude that trial counsel's performance was 
not deficient for failing to object to it.  And finally, we 
conclude that because Johnson did not object to his cross-
examination, the issue of whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in permitting the questioning has not 
been preserved for appeal; however, we have reviewed the 
admission 
of 
this 
testimony 
in 
our 
review 
of 
Johnson's 
                                                 
1 We note that in his petition for review, as he did below, 
Johnson points out that the judgment of conviction in case 
number 01-CF-005883 is inaccurate.  The judgment indicates he 
was convicted of armed robbery, when the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty as to attempted armed robbery.  We note that Johnson 
is correct, but also that the judgment of conviction in case 
number 01-CF-003728 indicates he was convicted of attempted 
armed robbery when in fact the jury returned a verdict of guilty 
as to armed robbery.  Johnson requests no relief for these 
scrivener's errors; accordingly, we do not address them further. 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
3 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the order denying Johnson postconviction relief and affirm the 
judgments of conviction.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On three separate occasions in 2000, Johnson entered a 
retail establishment, took some items, and left without paying 
for them.  Johnson took several packages of batteries from 
Kohl's; a number of videotapes from Blockbuster Video; and power 
tools from Home Depot.  In each instance, when store personnel 
followed Johnson out of the store to confront him about taking 
merchandise, Johnson threatened them with a knife.  The State 
charged Johnson with one count of armed robbery and one count of 
felony bail jumping in each of the three cases. 
¶4 
At trial, Evelyn Zahn testified for the State.  Zahn 
was working at Blockbuster Video the day that Johnson stole the 
videotapes.  She testified that she saw Johnson enter the store 
with an empty canvas bag and go to a table near the front of the 
store on which previously viewed videotapes were stacked for 
sale.  Zahn said she saw Johnson ripping the cardboard boxes 
that the tapes were in, and once saw him put a video into his 
canvas bag.  She testified that she found the pieces of nine or 
ten cardboard slip sleeves strewn about the store.  Those pieces 
contained the bar codes for the videos Johnson took.  Zahn said 
that she noticed when Johnson began walking out of the store his 
canvas bag was now full, and that she asked him what was in it.  
She testified that he ignored her, and as he left the store he 
set off the security devices.  Zahn said she followed Johnson 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
4 
 
outside and demanded the return of the tapes.  According to 
Zahn, Johnson put the bag in a car on the passenger side, then 
walked around the back of the car to the driver's side, stopping 
to slightly open the trunk.  When he reached the driver's side 
of the car, where she was standing, he was holding a knife that 
he brandished at her.     
¶5 
When Johnson testified on direct examination about the 
Blockbuster Video robbery, he acknowledged that he put a number 
of videos from the resale table into his canvas bag and that he 
set off the security device when he walked through it.  Johnson 
said that he cut off the bar codes, which he seemed to think 
were security tags, using a serrated knife.  He also testified 
that he left pieces of the cardboard slip sleeves around the 
store.  On cross-examination the next day, Johnson contradicted 
his direct testimony, and said that he did not take videotapes 
from the resale table because those videotapes did not have any 
street value, and he was stealing videos to re-sell them on the 
street.  The following exchange occurred between the prosecutor 
and Johnson: 
Q 
And do you agree with Ms. Zahn that there was a 
table where they have the resale videos that is 
up near the front where the checkout area is? 
A 
No, ma'am, I do not agree with that. 
Q 
What area did you say you were in? 
A 
I was on [sic] the shelves on the right side of 
the store. 
Q 
Did you go over to that table? 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
5 
 
A 
I don't remember, ma'am. 
Q 
So what you recall of the incident on July 23rd 
is not crystal, it is just—— 
A 
It is crystal, but I would stay away from the 
table because the tables had three dollar movies 
and they wouldn't sell so I wouldn't steal them. 
Q 
So when Ms. Zahn says she picked up the remnants 
from this table and they were movies that were on 
sale at that table, she is mistaken? 
A 
I don't——I can't say.  I can't call no one a 
liar, but I tell you I had remnants all over the 
store.  As I moved, I picked and choose [sic].  I 
pierced the cellophane and tossed the cardboard 
and I stuffed them in my bag.  So I left 
remnants, as you say, all over the store. 
¶6 
Johnson also testified, contrary to Zahn's testimony, 
about what she said to him as he left the store, setting off the 
security device.   
Q 
. . . Do you remember Ms. Zahn asking you what 
was in the bag before you hit the security 
buzzer? 
A 
That is not true at all. 
Q 
That just didn't happen? 
A 
That just didn't happen. 
Q 
So she is lying about that? 
A 
That is her version, ma'am, I can't call her a 
liar. 
Q 
She is just not telling the truth, correct? 
A 
If you want to insist, that didn't happen.  
¶7 
Johnson's counsel did not object to the line of 
questioning, nor did the circuit court intervene.  The jury 
found Johnson guilty of one count of armed robbery, one count of 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
6 
 
robbery with threat of force, one count of attempted armed 
robbery, and three counts of felony bail jumping, and he was 
sentenced accordingly.  Johnson filed a postconviction motion, 
arguing that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by allowing the prosecutor, on cross-examination, to 
seek his opinion on the truthfulness of the State's witness, 
Zahn.  Johnson also argued that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object 
to what he termed the prosecutor's "improper cross-examination."  
The circuit court denied Johnson's motion.  Johnson appealed, 
and the court of appeals affirmed.  We accepted Johnson's 
petition for review. 
¶8 
The issue here involves what has been described as 
conflicting 
court 
of 
appeals 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
admissibility of testimony that purportedly gives an opinion 
about the truthfulness of another witness's testimony.  Cf. 
State v. Kuehl, 199 Wis. 2d 143, 545 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1995); 
State v. Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d 431, 523 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 
1994); Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92.  We accepted review in part to 
clarify the law in this area.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶9 
Whether the circuit court erred in permitting the 
questions to which Johnson now objects is a discretionary 
decision that we will not overturn unless the court's discretion 
was erroneously exercised.  See Lease Am. Corp. v. Insurance Co. 
of N. Am., 88 Wis. 2d 395, 402, 276 N.W.2d 767 (1979). 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
7 
 
¶10 Whether Johnson's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination of 
Johnson and whether Johnson was prejudiced are mixed questions 
of fact and law.  See State v. (Edward) Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 
121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990); State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 
628, 633-34, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).  We will uphold a circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127; Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 634.  
However, 
questions 
regarding 
the 
deficiency 
of 
counsel's 
performance or its prejudicial effect are questions of law that 
we review de novo.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 128; Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d at 634. 
B. 
Ineffective Assistance   
¶11 We 
follow 
a 
two-step 
approach 
in 
reviewing 
an 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
claim. 
 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 
127.  A defendant must prove both that his or her attorney's 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was 
prejudicial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 
at 127.  We will not determine that an attorney's performance 
was deficient unless the attorney "made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  Additionally, we review 
an attorney's performance with deference, and there is a 
presumption 
that 
counsel 
acted 
reasonably 
and 
within 
professional norms.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127.  When 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
8 
 
deficient 
performance 
has 
been 
shown, 
it 
must 
also 
be 
prejudicial in order to warrant reversal.  Therefore, a 
defendant must show that, but for his or her attorney's errors, 
there is a "reasonable probability" the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 129 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  Though this is a two-part 
analysis, each part is independent.  It does not matter which 
part is analyzed first.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 128.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
¶12 In this 
case, 
whether Johnson's 
trial 
counsel's 
performance was deficient depends on whether the prosecutor's 
cross-examination was improper such that Johnson's counsel 
should have objected to it.  The State argues that there are two 
lines of cases, one that addresses questioning of expert 
witnesses, as occurred in Haseltine, and another that addresses 
questioning of eye-witnesses, such as occurred in Jackson.  
Johnson contends the way in which he was questioned violates 
both Haseltine and Kuehl.  He points out that Kuehl involved the 
questioning of an eye-witness. 
¶13 We agree with the State that two lines of cases have 
developed that address a witness being questioned about another 
witness's testimony:  those cases that arise from the testimony 
of an expert witness elicited on direct examination and those 
cases that focus on eye-witness testimony brought out in cross-
examination.  In Haseltine, the court of appeals concluded that 
it was improper for a psychiatrist to give his opinion that the 
victim, who claimed to have been sexually assaulted by her 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
9 
 
father, was an incest victim, as that was tantamount to his 
testifying that she was telling the truth.  Haseltine, 120 
Wis. 2d at 96.  In State v. Romero, 147 Wis. 2d 264, 432 N.W.2d 
899 (1988), we also reviewed the testimony of expert witnesses.  
There, a police officer and a social worker were permitted to 
testify about their evaluations of the victim's truthfulness.  
Romero, 147 Wis. 2d at 266.  We held it was error because the 
testimony permitted expert witnesses to usurp the jury's role in 
determining the credibility of the only witness against Romero.  
Romero, 147 Wis. 2d at 278.  The opinion of an expert witness 
about whether another competent witness is telling the truth 
serves no useful purpose, and may be detrimental to the process 
because the jury does not need any expert assistance in 
assessing credibility.  See 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice, Wisconsin Evidence § 608.3 (2d ed. 2001); see also 
Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96 (stating that an expert witness's 
opinion, "with its aura of scientific reliability, creates too 
great a possibility that the jury abdicated its fact-finding 
role to the [expert]").   
¶14 The court of appeals has addressed defendants' claims 
that witnesses have improperly testified about the truthfulness 
of another witness in the second line of cases:  those dealing 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
10 
 
with the cross-examination of an eye-witness to the crime.2  
State v. Bolden, 2003 WI App 155, 265 Wis. 2d 853, 667 N.W.2d 
364; Kuehl, 199 Wis. 2d 143; Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d 431.   
¶15 In Jackson, the court of appeals determined that the 
State's cross-examination of the defendant, who had given eye-
witness testimony, did not violate the Haseltine rule, even 
though Jackson apparently was asked to restate the testimony of 
previous witnesses and asked if those witnesses were lying.  
Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d at 437-38.  The court of appeals explained 
that such cross-examination may appear, at first blush, to 
violate the rule set out in Haseltine; however, the court 
concluded:  
a closer examination of the purpose and effect of the 
testimony reveals that these questions were solely to 
impeach Jackson's 
credibility.  
In asking 
these 
questions, 
the 
prosecution 
was 
highlighting 
the 
inconsistencies between Jackson's testimony and the 
testimony of other witnesses in an effort to impeach 
Jackson and to see if he had any explanation for the 
differences 
in 
the 
testimony. 
 
Allowing 
the 
questioning, given its intended purpose and effect, 
was not violative of Haseltine. 
                                                 
2 Cf. State v. Snider, 2003 WI App 172, ¶27, 266 Wis. 2d 
830, 668 N.W.2d 784 (concluding that permitting a detective to 
testify to what he believed at the time he was conducting his 
investigation was not testimony about whether Snider or the 
victim was telling the truth at trial); State v. Smith, 170 
Wis. 2d 701, 490 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 1035 (1993) (explaining that a detective's testimony about 
what happened during his interrogation of a witness and the 
reasons for the questions he asked then was an explanation of 
what had transpired during the investigation and therefore not 
improper). 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
11 
 
Id. at 437-38.  This same analysis of eye-witness testimony 
appears in Bolden, where the court of appeals said the 
prosecutor's cross-examination was within permissible bounds.  
Bolden, 265 Wis. 2d 853, ¶6.  The exchange between the 
prosecutor and the defendant in Bolden was as follows: 
Q: 
So if I understand, Mr. Bolden, out of the 
witnesses we heard in this trial, [the victim] is 
either lying or mistaken about the fact3 that you 
guys had this mutually agreed-upon fight, is that 
fair to say? 
A: 
That's fair. 
Q: 
And [the witness to the incident] is mistaken in 
that you never were on top of [the victim] and 
that you never were choking [the victim], is that 
fair to say? 
A: 
That's fair to say. 
Q: 
And that [the witness to the incident] is 
mistaken in the sense that you weren't driving 
around 
on 
Meinecke 
shortly 
before 
this 
altercation with [the victim], is that fair to 
say? 
A: 
Right. 
 . . . . 
Q: 
And that [the police sergeant who apparently 
investigated the incident] is mistaken when you 
mentioned anything about robbing [the victim]? 
A:  Right.    
Id., ¶4.  The court of appeals in Bolden concluded that this 
cross-examination was permissible because it was not designed, 
                                                 
3 At this point, the State is referencing Bolden's version 
of the events. 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
12 
 
like the challenged testimony in Romero and Haseltine, to 
bolster the credibility of witnesses.  Id., ¶7.  The court 
further explained that it had no tendency to usurp the jury's 
function; "indeed, if anything, [the questioning helped] the 
jury evaluate each witness's demeanor."  Id., ¶8.  In both 
Jackson and Bolden, the cross-examination was directed at 
impeaching a witness about an event the witness claimed to have 
seen. 
¶16 In between the Jackson and Bolden decisions, the court 
of appeals also decided Kuehl.4  In Kuehl, the prosecutor on 
cross-examination confronted the defendant with parts of the 
victim's testimony that conflicted with the defendant's version 
of events.  Kuehl, 199 Wis. 2d at 147.  The court determined 
that the prosecutor's continued use of the statement, "She must 
be mistaken; is that correct?" resulted in the defendant being 
asked to testify about the truthfulness of another witness, and 
thus it violated Haseltine.  Kuehl, 199 Wis. 2d at 149.  In the 
end, though, the court of appeals concluded that in Kuehl's case 
such questioning amounted to harmless error and it affirmed the 
conviction.  Id. at 152. 
¶17 The court in Kuehl stated that Haseltine (where a 
witness gave his expert opinion) and Jackson (where an eye-
witness 
testified 
about 
what 
he 
claimed 
to 
have 
seen) 
                                                 
4 Both State v. Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d 431, 523 N.W.2d 126 
(Ct. App. 1994), and State v. Bolden, 2003 WI App 155, 265 
Wis. 2d 853, 667 N.W.2d 364, were decided by the same court of 
appeals district. 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
13 
 
conflicted, and it concluded that because of that perceived 
conflict, it was "free to follow the decision which [it] 
conclude[s] is correct."  Kuehl, 199 Wis. 2d at 149.  The court 
gave no authority for this proposition; and we know of none.  
Therefore, any language in Kuehl that purports to overrule or 
undermine Jackson should not be accorded any precedential value 
in the future. 
¶18 It is our goal that the court of appeals speak with a 
unified voice, see Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 
N.W.2d 
246 
(1997), 
and 
it 
generally 
achieves 
that 
goal 
exceedingly well.  However, when a perceived conflict arises, 
which is understandable given the huge volume of cases the court 
of appeals so capably handles, a certification to this court 
that points out the perceived conflict will best serve the 
public interest and will also aid this court in its law 
developing 
and 
clarifying 
function. 
 
See 
id. 
 
However, 
overruling an earlier court of appeals decision is not an 
option. 
¶19 We perceive no conflict between the Haseltine and 
Romero line of cases and those headed by Jackson and Bolden.  In 
the Haseltine line, the objected to testimony is simply 
bolstering another witness's testimony of an event about which 
the expert witness has no personal knowledge.  It is generally 
done on direct examination and usurps the jury's role as the 
"lie detector in the courtroom."  See Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 
96.  The jury can independently determine the credibility of 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
14 
 
each witness, see Romero, 147 Wis. 2d at 278, and does not 
require an expert witness to assist it with that determination.   
¶20 By contrast, in the Jackson line of cases, two 
witnesses are testifying about an event that both claim to have 
seen, and their testimony conflicts.  The purpose5 and effect of 
the cross-examination of the second witness is to test that 
witness's credibility through his or her demeanor and answers to 
questions.  It aids the jury in its truth-finding function.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 906.07 (2001-02) (stating the credibility of any 
witness may be attacked by any party).  The testimony elicited 
by the prosecutor in Bolden and Jackson was not placed before 
the jury to bolster the credibility of the other witnesses.  
Instead, 
cross-examination 
was 
used 
to 
highlight 
the 
inconsistencies in the testimony, and give the witness an 
opportunity to explain those inconsistencies.  Bolden, 265 
Wis. 2d 853, ¶8; Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d at 437-38.  As the court 
of appeals concluded, the questions posed "were solely to 
                                                 
5 In State v. Kuehl, the court says that, "[i]t is not the 
purpose of the question which controls the admissibility issue; 
rather, it is whether the witness being questioned has any 
basis, foundation or knowledge on which to premise a belief that 
another witness is telling the truth."  199 Wis. 2d 143, 150, 
545 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis in original).  We do 
not agree that the purpose behind the question cannot control 
the admissibility of the resulting testimony. See, e.g., State 
v. Kutz, 2003 WI App 205, ¶36, 267 Wis. 2d 531, 671 N.W.2d 660 
(explaining that testimony that would be hearsay does not fall 
within that category of testimony if it is not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted); State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 
746, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991) (concluding that the receipt of other 
acts evidence offered for the purpose of showing motive or plan 
is permissible).   
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
15 
 
impeach [the defendant's] credibility."  Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d at 
437.  Such questions may help the jury assess the credibility of 
witnesses.  Bolden, 265 Wis. 2d 853, ¶8.  Such a technique is 
permissible cross-examination.6   
¶21 Having established the parameters of Haseltine, Romero 
and Jackson, we turn now to applying them to the facts of this 
case.  Here both witnesses, Zahn and Johnson, were eye-witnesses 
to the events that occurred at Blockbuster Video.  Zahn 
testified as to her recollection of the events during the 
State's case-in-chief.  When Johnson testified on direct 
examination, he gave a similar version of some of the events as 
Zahn had.  However, on cross-examination, his testimony began to 
conflict not only with Zahn's, but also with his own direct 
testimony.   
                                                 
6 Our conclusion is consistent with the results reached in 
other jurisdictions.  See State v. Hart, 15 P.3d 917, 924 (Mont. 
2000) (indicating that not all "was the other witness lying" 
questions are improper, and in some cases such questions can 
clarify a line of testimony or assist in evaluating the 
credibility of a defendant who says everyone else is lying).  
See also State v. Morales, 10 P.3d 630, ¶13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2000); Whatley v. State, 509 S.E.2d 45, 51 (Ga. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1101 (1999); State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 
518 (Minn. 1999); People v. Overlee, 666 N.Y.S.2d 572, 577 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1997).  We do recognize that there are some 
jurisdictions that have adopted a bright-line rule prohibiting 
this sort of questioning, similar to the court of appeals 
decision in Kuehl, supra; however, we are not persuaded by their 
reasoning.  See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 837 A.2d 917, 920 
(D.C. Cir. 2003); State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 236-39 (Conn. 
2002); State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 871-74 (Iowa 2003); 
State v. Manning, 19 P.3d 84, 100-01 (Kan. 2001); Daniel v. 
State, 78 P.3d 890, 904 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, ___ S.Ct. ___ 
(May 17, 2004). 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
16 
 
¶22 For example, Zahn said she saw Johnson take videos 
from the resale table at the front of the store, and that 
several of the remnants she later found were from videos that 
had been at the resale table.  On direct examination, Johnson 
admitted he took videos from the resale table.  However, on 
cross-examination, he said he stayed away from the resale table 
because the videos on it did not have enough of a street value 
on resale to interest him in them.  When he was asked if Zahn 
was "mistaken" in her testimony, Johnson responded, "I don't——I 
can't say.  I can't call no one a liar . . . ."  Johnson also 
testified, contrary to Zahn's testimony, that Zahn did not ask 
him what was in his bag before the security buzzer sounded as he 
went through it.  He said, "That just didn't happen."  The 
prosecutor responded, "So she is lying about that?"  Johnson 
said, "That is her version, ma'am, I can't call her a liar."   
¶23 Based 
on 
this 
record, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
prosecutor's purpose was to undermine Johnson's credibility, by 
comparing Johnson's testimony with that of Zahn, both of whom 
were eye-witnesses to Johnson's acts at Blockbuster Video.  The 
prosecutor was not attempting to bolster Zahn's credibility.  As 
the court of appeals explained,  
The testimony challenged in Jackson and in the present 
case 
involved 
witnesses 
who 
were 
not 
experts 
testifying to the occurrence or non-occurrence of an 
event.  Instead, the witnesses testified about their 
recollection of the events in question, and their 
recollection contradicted the testimony of another 
witness.  In both cases, each witness was involved in 
the event and the purpose of the questioning was to 
highlight 
inconsistencies 
in 
testimony. 
 
This 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
17 
 
testimony did not detract from the jury's role as fact 
finder. 
State v. Johnson, No. 02-2793, unpublished slip op. at ¶12, 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 2003).  There was nothing improper in 
the prosecutor's attempts to impeach Johnson's credibility. 
¶24 Because we conclude there was nothing objectionable 
about the line of testimony Johnson claims was improper, we must 
also conclude that there was nothing deficient about his trial 
counsel's performance in failing to object to the questions.7  
Therefore, we conclude that Johnson was not denied effective 
assistance of counsel, and we affirm his convictions.8  
C. 
Admission of Evidence 
¶25 Johnson also argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in allowing the prosecutor, in her 
cross-examination, to question him regarding his opinion of the 
truthfulness of another witness.  See Romero, 147 Wis. 2d at 
278; Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96.  The record reflects that 
Johnson's counsel did not object to this questioning, or to the 
                                                 
7 In its decision on Johnson's motion for postconviction 
relief, the circuit court said that had Johnson's counsel 
objected to the line of questioning, it would have overruled the 
objection.  
8 We decide today that it is permissible to cross-examine a 
witness to an event by asking the witness about another 
witness's testimony concerning the same event.  We do not 
address the broader issue of whether it is permissible to cross-
examine a witness about another witness's testimony based on the 
comparison of the professed personal knowledge of the two 
witnesses, which personal knowledge is based on something other 
than personal observations.  Accordingly, this latter issue 
remains an open question.      
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
18 
 
circuit court's admission of the testimony.  Without an 
objection, the issue of whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion has not been preserved for appeal.  
Romero, 147 Wis. 2d at 274 (stating, "In order to preserve an 
issue for appeal as a matter of right, a party must object to 
the error 
at 
trial, stating 
the 
proper 
ground for the 
objection").  The circuit court has no duty to independently 
strike testimony that is inadmissible.  State v. Delgado, 2002 
WI App 38, ¶12, 250 Wis. 2d 689, 641 N.W.2d 490.  However, even 
though this claimed evidentiary objection is not directly 
reviewed, we have tested the propriety of the testimony through 
Johnson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is 
grounded in the same sequence of questions and answers, where we 
concluded there was no deficient performance. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 We conclude that the purpose and effect of the 
prosecutor's 
cross-examination 
of 
Johnson 
was 
to 
impeach 
Johnson's credibility, not to bolster the credibility of another 
witness, because both Johnson and the other witness were 
testifying to their personal observations about the same events.  
Therefore, the cross-examination of Johnson was permissible.  
Because we have concluded that the cross-examination was not 
improper, we also conclude that trial counsel's performance was 
not deficient for failing to object to it.  And finally, we 
conclude that because Johnson did not object to his cross-
examination, the issue of whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in permitting the questioning has not 
No. 
02-2793-CR   
 
19 
 
been preserved for appeal; however, we have reviewed the 
admission 
of 
this 
testimony 
in 
our 
review 
of 
Johnson's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the order denying Johnson postconviction relief and affirm the 
judgments of conviction.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶27 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
1 
 
¶28 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that Johnson was not denied effective assistance of 
counsel in this case.  He has failed to establish prejudice 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).   
¶29 I write separately, however, because I fear that the 
majority has opened the door to a line of questioning which 
invades the province of the jury, is of no probative value, and 
may prove misleading.  In the end, the majority has fashioned a 
test embraced by no other jurisdiction.  It exchanges a bright 
line 
rule 
for 
one 
that 
may 
prove 
difficult 
to 
apply.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶30 This case involves a defendant being asked by a 
prosecutor whether one of the State's witnesses was "lying" when 
she gave testimony incriminating the defendant.  Eschewing the 
bright line rule of State v. Kuehl, 199 Wis. 2d 143, 150, 545 
N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1995), the majority concludes that the 
purpose and effect of the prosecutor's cross-examination of 
Johnson was to impeach him, not to bolster the credibility of 
another witness.  Majority op., ¶2.  It thus deems the cross-
examination permissible.  Id.  
¶31 In the criminal context, "were they lying" questions 
are generally questions posed by the prosecutor to a criminal 
defendant during cross-examination.  State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 
511, 516, n. 1, (Minn. 1999).  Typically, the prosecutor will 
first ask if the defendant heard the testimony of one or more of 
the state's witnesses on direct examination.  Id.  Then, the 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
2 
 
prosecutor will ask if the witnesses' testimony was accurate.  
Id.  If the defendant states that the witnesses' testimony was 
not accurate, the prosecutor will ask the defendant whether the 
witnesses were lying.  Id. 
¶32 Of the states that have addressed the issue, a vast 
majority consider such questioning improper.  See, e.g., State 
v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 239 (Conn. 2002); Knowles v. State, 632 
So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. 1993); People v. Riley, 379 N.E.2d 746, 753 
(Ill. App. 1978); State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 873 (Iowa 
2003); State 
v. Manning, 
19 
P.3d 
84, 100 
(Kan. 
2001); 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 726 N.E.2d 913, 923-24 (Mass. 2000); 
Daniel v. State, 78 P.3d 890, 904 (Nev. 2003); State v. 
Flanagan, 801 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. App. 1990); Burgess v. State, 
495 S.E.2d 445, 447 (S.C. 1998); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 
787 (Utah 1992); State v. Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d 74, 79 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991); Beaugureau v. State, 56 P.3d 626, 636 
(Wyo. 2002).9 
¶33 Similarly, a number of federal circuits have condemned 
this cross-examination tactic.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 1987). 
                                                 
9 Indeed, it appears that only two states have adopted an 
unequivocal rule that the question "Is the witness lying?" is 
proper.  See Whatley v. State, 509 S.E.2d 45, 51 (Ga. 1998), 
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1101; Fisher v. State, 736 A.2d 1125, 
1162-63 (Md. App. 1999). 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
3 
 
¶34 Several reasons underlie the disapproval of such 
questioning.  First, the function of weighing the credibility of 
witnesses is exclusively in the province of the jury.  The 
Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions recognize this, stating: 
It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to weigh 
the testimony of witnesses and to determine the effect 
of the evidence as a whole.  You are the sole judges 
of the credibility, that is, the believability, of the 
witnesses and of the weight to be given to their 
testimony. 
Wis. JI——Criminal 300.   
¶35 Likewise, Wisconsin courts and commentators echo this 
well-established truth: 
The starting point is the venerable principle that the 
jury 
is 
the 
sole 
judge 
of 
the 
credibility 
of 
witnesses. 
 
Although 
the 
jury 
is 
sometimes 
characterized as the "lie-detector" in the courtroom, 
more often it functions to determine the subtle 
shadings which distinguish inaccurate from accurate 
testimony.  In order to preserve the jury's role, the 
courts have consistently held that a witness may not 
testify that another mentally and physically competent 
witness is telling the truth.   
7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 608.3, at 402 (2d ed. 2001) (citing State v. Romero, 147 Wis. 
2d 264, 278, 432 N.W.2d 899 (1988); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 
2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984); Schleiss v. State, 71 
Wis. 2d 733, 745, 239 N.W.2d 68 (1976)) (emphasis added).   
¶36 Second, this type of confrontational examination has 
no probative value because it does nothing to assist the jury in 
assessing witness credibility in its fact-finding mission.  
Pilot, 595 N.W.2d at 518.  The defendant's opinion on another 
witness's credibility is irrelevant.  Moreover, such tactics 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
4 
 
generally are not intended to seek information at all, but 
instead to score rhetorical points with the jury.  As one court 
noted, 
"the 
predominate, 
if 
not 
sole, 
purpose 
of 
such 
questioning is simply to make the defendant look bad" since "the 
accused's answer is unimportant."10  Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 872. 
¶37 Third, such questioning may mislead the jury into 
believing that either the defendant or the witness lied.  This, 
in turn, creates the risk that, in order to acquit the 
defendant, the jury must find that the witness has lied.  Singh, 
793 A.2d at 237.  See also Emmett, 839 P.2d at 787 ("The 
prejudicial effect of such a question lies [partly] in the fact 
that . . . it puts the defendant in the untenable position of 
commenting on the character and motivation of another witness 
who may appear sympathetic to the jury.").  
¶38 The fact is that inconsistencies between the testimony 
of two or more witnesses do not prove that one of the witnesses 
has committed perjury.  Rather, differences of perception and 
memory can result in conflicting testimony without giving rise 
to an implication of deliberate, willful falsehood.11  The Graves 
court explained this, noting: 
                                                 
10 The United States Supreme Court reminds us that a 
prosecutor should prosecute with earnestness and vigor but 
"while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike 
foul ones."  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
11 
As 
Johnson 
notes, 
there 
is 
nothing 
inherently 
inconsistent about his testimony, in context, as it relates to 
testimony given by the state's witness, Ms. Zahn.  It is, for 
example, possible that Ms. Zahn asked him what he had in the 
bag.  So, too, it is possible that he simply did not hear her.  
Under this analysis, neither Ms. Zahn nor Johnson would be 
lying.   
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
5 
 
People 
have 
different 
perceptions 
of 
the 
same 
conversation that affect how and what they remember.  
Perhaps there was a misunderstanding of what was said; 
perhaps one person was distracted and did not fully or 
correctly hear the words uttered by the other person.  
People sometimes hear what they want to hear.  It is 
unjust to make the defendant give an opinion as to who 
is lying when, in fact, it is possible that neither 
witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth. 
668 N.W.2d at 872. 
 
¶39 Despite these concerns, the majority maintains that 
such a tactic is permissible cross-examination.  Majority op., 
¶21.  It dismisses the contrary precedent as unpersuasive.  Id., 
¶21, n. 5.  Additionally, the majority insists that its 
conclusion "is consistent with the results reached in other 
jurisdictions."  Id. (citing State v. Morales, 10 P.3d 630 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Hart, 15 P.3d 917 (Mont. 2000); 
Pilot, 595 N.W.2d at 511; Whatley v. State, 509 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. 
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1101; People v. Overlee, 666 
N.Y.S.2d 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)). 
 
¶40 The majority's reliance on other jurisdictions is 
misplaced.  None of the courts to which it cites considers the 
"purpose and effect" of the prosecutor's cross-examination in 
determining whether it is permissible.  Instead, they either 
allow such questioning unequivocally, Whatley, 509 S.E.2d at 51, 
or allow it when the only possible explanation for the 
inconsistent testimony is deceit or when a defendant has opened 
the door by testifying about the veracity of other witnesses on 
direct examination.  See Morales, 10 P.3d at 633; Pilot, 595 
N.W.2d at 518; Hart, 15 P.3d at 924; Overlee, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 
575. 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
6 
 
 
¶41 There is good reason why no other jurisdiction has 
embraced the majority's test.  Discerning the purpose behind a 
particular line of questions may prove more difficult in 
application than the majority acknowledges.  In each case, 
judges will have to ask themselves:  was this an attempt to 
bolster credibility or was this an attempt to impeach the 
defendant?  These purposes, of course, are two sides of the same 
coin.  Often they will both be at play, as the State concedes is 
apparent in the present case. 
¶42 Highlighting 
inconsistencies 
in 
testimony 
may 
be 
accomplished by means other than asking one witness whether 
another witness is lying.  While I acknowledge that some other 
questions, asked with certain inflections, may come close to 
that line, there is no doubt that the question here has crossed 
it.  
¶43 If there is a saving grace to the majority opinion, it 
is that judges remain free to control the mode and order of 
interrogation and presentation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 906.11 (2001-
02) requires judges to exercise control of their courtrooms so 
as to (a) make the interrogation effective for the ascertainment 
of truth, (b) avoid needless consumption of time, and (c) 
protect witnesses from harassment.12  While under the majority's 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 906.11 (2001-02) provides in relevant 
part: 
(1) CONTROL BY JUDGE.  The judge shall exercise 
reasonable 
control 
over 
the 
mode 
and 
order 
of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as 
to do all of the following: 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
7 
 
new test attorneys are not precluded from asking whether another 
witness is lying, circuit courts are not required to permit this 
mode of interrogation. 
¶44 Even without a bright line rule prohibiting the "were 
they lying" question, judges should preclude this mode of 
interrogation under Wis. Stat. § 906.11 (2001-02) because a 
witness's opinion on another's credibility is irrelevant, and is 
often offered not to ascertain the truth but rather to harass.  
Even if it is deemed to be relevant, and thus have some 
probative value, it should be precluded under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03 (2001-02) because such minimal value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury or unfair 
prejudice.13  
¶45 In the end, I view the majority's opinion as a step 
backwards in our pursuit of promoting civility in the courtrooms 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Make the interrogation and presentation effective 
for the ascertainment of the truth. 
(b) Avoid needless consumption of time. 
(c) 
Protect 
witnesses 
from 
harassment 
or 
undue 
embarrassment. 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 (2001-02) provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
These rules of evidence referenced are not meant to be an 
exhaustive list but rather illustrative of rules that should be 
used to preclude the "were they lying" questions. 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
8 
 
of this state.   Although the majority's new test takes away a 
bright line rule, judges remained armed with the rules of 
evidence in order to exercise the appropriate control in their 
own courtrooms.  Because I fear that the majority has opened the 
door to a line of questioning which invades the province of the 
jury, is of no probative value, and may prove misleading, I urge 
judges 
to 
use 
those 
rules 
to 
preclude 
these 
questions.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶46 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.   
 
No.  02-2793.awb 
 
 
 
1