Title: Matthews v. Matthews

State: rhode-island

Issuer: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Document:

249 A.2d 647 (1969) Elvira MATTHEWS, v. John MATTHEWS. No. 487-Appeal. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. February 5, 1969. Rustigian & Rosenfield, Lloyd A.G. Rustigian, Providence, for plaintiff. Joseph G. LeCount, Providence, for defendant. PAOLINO, Justice. The plaintiff brought this civil action against her husband for partition of certain real estate owned jointly by them in the city of Providence. The case was heard on February 6, 1968, before a justice of the superior court, and is now before us on the defendant's appeal from certain orders granting the relief prayed for. The pertinent facts are briefly as follows. The parties were married in 1943, three children being born of the marriage. *648 The real estate involved consists of a parcel of land with a house located thereon. The property was formerly owned by plaintiff's father and was conveyed by him to the plaintiff and her husband in 1946 subject to a mortgage, the balance of which has been paid in full by the defendant in monthly installments. The parties lived in the house from 1946 to 1965, when, due to marital discord, plaintiff left her husband. He continued to live in the house. He testified that he did not put her out, that the whole family was welcome to come home any time they desired, and that he wishes to keep the house as a home. It was also elicited during the hearing in the superior court that divorce proceedings commenced by the wife have been pending in the family court for more than three years and that she had not proceeded to have that case heard on the merits. The plaintiff commenced the instant action on June 15, 1967, while the parties were living separate and apart. It appears from statements in the briefs of both parties that at the close of the testimony counsel conferred in chambers with the trial justice and then, after a conference with plaintiff and defendant, the following order, which was signed by the parties and their counsel, was entered: After the expiration of 45 days, defendant having failed to comply with the option contained in the order entered on February 19, 1968, plaintiff, on April 12, 1968, filed a motion for the appointment of co-commissioners pursuant to the provisions in the February 19, 1968 order. On May 8, 1968, an order was entered appointing plaintiff's counsel commissioner and authorizing him to sell the property. The order contains a statement that defendant's counsel "* * * declines to serve as a co-commissioner as provided in an order filed in this case dated February 19, 1968." The record also contains a stipulation signed by counsel for both parties stating that "The order dated May 8, 1968 is assented to as to form and may be entered as an order of this Honorable Court." The May 8, 1968 order reads in pertinent part as follows: *650 Thereafter, pursuant to rule 73 (b) of the rules of civil procedure of the superior court, the defendant filed an appeal to this court from the orders entered on February 19, 1968, and May 8, 1968, in the superior court. The defendant does not challenge the authority of the superior court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, to order the partition sought by plaintiff, Bianchini v. Bianchini, 76 R.I. 30, 68 A.2d 59; but he argues that in the circumstances in the case at bar the trial justice abused his discretion. On this record we do not reach that question. The order entered on February 19, 1968, was for all intents and purposes the final judgment in this case. As we have previously indicated, it was consented to not only by counsel for the parties, but also by the parties themselves. The order entered on May 8, 1968, was consistent with the conditions of the February 19, 1968 order and merely implemented the provisions contained therein. Reading the May 8 and February 19 orders together, they are in effect a single consent order, which, being of a private contractual nature, cannot be appealed except under limited circumstances not present here. The general rule that a consent order or decree, in the absence of fraud, collusion, or mistake, is not subject to appellate review has been recognized and applied in the vast majority of jurisdictions. See 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 243 and 69 A.L.R.2d 755. Compare Allen & Reed v. Investments, Inc., 182 A. 3. The inclusion in the record of the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties stating that the May 8 order was assented to as to form does not change the nature or effect of the February 19 order. The defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.