Title: State ex rel. Strothers v. Wertheim

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. STROTHERS, APPELLANT, v. WERTHEIM, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Strothers v. Wertheim (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 155.] 
Public records — Cuyahoga County Ombudsman Office is a “public office” as 
defined by R.C. 149.011(A) and subject to public records disclosure 
requirements of R.C. 149.43 — Records prepared by Ombudsman Office in 
investigating complaints of child abuse and neglect not excepted from 
disclosure. 
(No. 97-187 ⎯ Submitted May 6, 1997 ⎯ Decided October 22, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 71185. 
 
In June 1996, appellant, Gerald O. Strothers, Jr., contacted the Citizens of 
Cuyahoga County Ombudsman1 Office (“Ombudsman Office”) to request records 
pertaining to the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, records regarding allegations 
of child abuse by staff members of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Detention 
Center, a listing of all records maintained pertaining to the juvenile detention 
center, and complaint forms from Cuyahoga County residents regarding the 
juvenile detention center staff.  Appellee, Stephen Wertheim, Executive 
Ombudsman, declined to produce the requested documents, asserting that the 
Ombudsman Office was not a “public office” subject to the Public Records Act 
and that the requested materials were confidential. 
 
On August 30, 1996, appellant filed in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga 
County a complaint for writ of mandamus to compel appellee to produce the 
requested documents pursuant to R.C. 149.43.  On January 9, 1997, the court of 
appeals granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied the 
appellant’s request for a writ of mandamus. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
2 
 
Gerald O. Strothers, Jr., pro se. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Richard M. Markus and Tracey L. 
Turnbull, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  Today we are again called upon to decide what constitutes a 
“public office” and what records are “public records” for purposes of the Public 
Records Act.  The Citizens of Cuyahoga County Ombudsman Office is a private, 
nonprofit corporation, supported by public funds, established for the purpose of 
assisting the citizens of Cuyahoga County in resolving complaints against 
agencies of the county government.  The primary issue in this case is whether the 
Ombudsman Office is a “public office” as defined by R.C. 149.011(A) and thereby 
subject to the public records disclosure requirements of R.C. 149.43.  A secondary 
issue involves whether any of the documents appellant seeks are excepted from 
disclosure. 
I 
 
R.C. 149.011(A) defines “[p]ublic office” as “any state agency, public 
institution, political subdivision, or any other organized body, office, agency, 
institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any 
function of government.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 149.43(A)(1) defines “public 
record” as “any record that is kept by any public office,” subject to specific 
exceptions enumerated in the statute.  Therefore, if the Ombudsman Office is a 
public office, it must comply, absent any applicable exception, with the disclosure 
requirements of R.C. 149.43. 
 
Appellee contends that appellant’s request for records must fail because the 
Ombudsman Office is a private, nonprofit corporation that performs its own 
unique function and is not a “public office” pursuant to R.C. 149.011(A).  In State 
3 
ex rel. Fostoria Daily Review Co. v. Fostoria Hosp. Assn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
10, 531 N.E.2d 313, we specifically rejected the argument that R.C. 149.43 was 
not applicable where the entity was a private, nonprofit corporation supported by 
public funds.  In State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 529 N.E.2d 443, paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held that “[a] 
public hospital, which renders a public service to residents of a county and which 
is supported by public taxation, is a ‘public institution’ and thus a ‘public office’ 
pursuant to R.C. 149.011(A), making it subject to the public records disclosure 
requirements of R.C. 149.43.”  The entity before us is no different.  The 
Ombudsman Office receives support from public taxation.  The Ombudsman 
Office clearly performs a public service in seeking to curtail public agency abuse 
by investigating and mediating private citizens’ complaints about government. 
 
Time and time again we have held that R.C. 149.43 must be construed 
liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of 
disclosure of public records.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. 
Hamilton Cty. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334, 336.  In addition, 
“doubts as to the ‘public’ status of any entity should be resolved in favor of 
finding it subject to the disclosure statute.”  State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. 
of Toledo Found. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 258, 261, 602 N.E.2d 1159, 1161. 
 
The Ombudsman Office is unquestionably a publicly funded agency that 
acts as an intermediary between the citizens and government of Cuyahoga County.  
The activities of the Ombudsman Office are inextricably intertwined with the 
functions performed by Cuyahoga County government agencies.  In fact, in 
documents submitted to this court, the Ombudsman Office refers to its relationship 
with the Cuyahoga County Commissioners as a “partnership.”  The Ombudsman 
Office monitors Cuyahoga County government to ensure accessibility, quality and 
4 
effectiveness, and additionally provides oversight for some county services.  The 
Ombudsman Office is required to file with the county commissioners an annual 
accounting of all public funds it receives.  The Ombudsman Office, it appears, 
risks the loss of public funding if it performs its duties unsatisfactorily.  Since 
funding for the Ombudsman Office comes primarily from the county 
commissioners, it is obvious that the commissioners maintain some control over 
the entity.  Accordingly, even a cursory review of this court’s prior case law 
interpreting R.C. 149.43 and 149.011(A) leads to the inescapable conclusion that 
the Ombudsman Office is a “public office” and thus subject to the Public Records 
Act. 
II 
 
The appellee contends, and the court of appeals found, in the alternative, 
that if the Ombudsman Office is a public office, many of the documents appellant 
seeks would be exempt from disclosure under R.C. 2151.421.  We disagree. 
 
R.C. 2151.421 governs the reporting and investigating of incidents of child 
abuse and neglect.  R.C. 2151.421(H) states that reports made pursuant to this 
section are confidential.  The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals stated in State 
ex rel. Munici v. Kovacic (June 15, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 64818, unreported, 
1994 WL 264265, that “[t]he thrust of R.C. 2151.421 is directed to the children 
services boards or the departments of human services.”  It is the responsibility of 
the departments of human services and children services boards to investigate 
allegations of child abuse and neglect, and the reports that are mandated by R.C. 
2151.421 are prepared by those social service agencies.  Thus, records prepared by 
the Ombudsman Office in investigating complaints of child abuse and neglect are 
not excepted by R.C. 2151.421. 
III 
5 
 
Appellee additionally argues that the records appellant seeks are 
confidential law enforcement investigatory records excepted from disclosure 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A).  R.C. 149.43(A)(2) provides that a confidential law 
enforcement investigatory record is “* * * any record that pertains to a law 
enforcement matter.”  (Emphasis added.)  The records sought by appellant are not 
protected from disclosure because they do not pertain to a law enforcement matter.  
As noted previously, pursuant to R.C. 2151.421, it is the responsibility of the 
departments of human services and children services boards to investigate 
allegations of child abuse and neglect.  The Ombudsman Office is not a law 
enforcement agency, and it has no legally mandated enforcement or investigatory 
authority.  In fact, the Ombudsman Office verifies that all complaints concerning 
child abuse and neglect have been reported to the proper investigatory authority in 
Cuyahoga County, the Department of Children and Family Services. 
 
Finally, appellee contends that the records of the Ombudsman Office are not 
subject to disclosure because they contain medical records which are specifically 
excepted from disclosure under R.C. 149.43(A).  R.C. 149.43(A)(3) defines 
“medical record” as “any document or combination of documents * * * that 
pertains to the medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition of a 
patient and that is generated and maintained in the process of medical treatment.”  
In order to fit within the “medical record” exception to the public records law, “a 
record must pertain to a medical diagnosis and be generated and maintained in the 
process of medical treatment.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State, ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. 
Telb (C.P.1990), 50 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 10, 552 N.E.2d 243, 251.  In Telb, the court 
held that to be excepted from disclosure, the records sought must meet the 
conjunctive requirements of the statute.  In the instant matter, records held by the 
Ombudsman Office may involve diagnosis and treatment, but they are not 
6 
“maintained in the process of medical treatment” and therefore are not exempt 
from disclosure. 
Conclusion 
 
One of the salutary purposes of the Public Records Law is to ensure 
accountability of government to those being governed.  Thus, records, with certain 
enumerated exceptions, held by government entities belong to the public and must 
be open for inspection to all citizens.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals and order that a writ of mandamus issue 
directing appellee to make the requested records available for inspection. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 1086, defines “Ombudsman” as “[a]n 
official or semi official office or person to which people may come with 
grievances connected with the government.” 
 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent because the Cuyahoga 
County Ombudsman Office is not a “public office” as defined by R.C. 149.011(A). 
 
The Citizens of Cuyahoga County Ombudsman Office (“Ombudsman 
Office”) is a private, nonprofit corporation that receives financial assistance from 
Cuyahoga County as well as private contributors.  The Ombudsman Office 
resolves citizens’ complaints against Cuyahoga County government agencies by 
7 
functioning as an intermediary between the public and county government.  It 
offers information regarding certain county services and provides mediation when 
necessary. 
 
The Ombudsman Office commences an investigation only after it receives a 
complaint.  When the Ombudsman Office receives a complaint concerning child 
neglect or abuse that has not been previously reported to an appropriate 
government agency, it reports the matter to the investigative unit of the Cuyahoga 
County Department of Children and Family Services and also conducts its own 
investigation. 
 
The Ombudsman Office, however, has no legal duty to investigate any 
complaint; it can refuse to serve anyone or decline to investigate or mediate any 
complaint as long as it does not violate any antidiscrimination law.  In addition, 
although it provides the county commissioners with its annual report and budget, 
the Ombudsman Office has no duty to satisfy any government agency that it is 
performing any task properly.  It is not listed in the county government telephone 
directory. 
 
Beginning in June 1996, appellant, Gerald O. Strothers, Jr., requested that 
the Ombudsman Office provide him with access to certain records, including (1) 
records pertaining to allegations of child abuse by staff members of the Cuyahoga 
County Juvenile Detention Center, (2) a listing of all records maintained relating 
to the juvenile detention center, and (3) complaint forms from county residents 
concerning juvenile detention center staff.  The Ombudsman Office refused 
Strothers’s requests. 
 
We have consistently interpreted the Public Records Act to “ensure that 
governmental records be open and made available to the public * * * subject to 
only a few very limited and narrow exceptions.”  State ex rel. Williams v. 
8 
Cleveland (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 544, 549, 597 N.E.2d 147, 151.  However, our 
interpretations of the Public Records Act have never been meant to create a per se 
rule of disclosure.  With certain specified exceptions, “[p]ublic record” means 
“any record that is kept by any public office.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(1).  R.C. 
149.011(A) defines “public office” as “any state agency, public institution, 
political subdivision, or any other organized body, office, agency, institution, or 
entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of 
government.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
An entity need not be operated by the state, or a political subdivision 
thereof, to be a public office under R.C. 149.011(A).  State ex rel. Toledo Blade 
Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 258, 260, 602 N.E.2d 1159, 
1161.  An entity which performs a public function and is supported by public tax 
money is a “public office” within the meaning of R.C. 149.011(A).  Id. 
 
We have held that certain entities are public offices under R.C. 149.011(A) 
and are thereby subject to R.C. 149.43.  See, e.g., Toledo Blade, at paragraph one 
of the syllabus (“A private nonprofit corporation that acts as a major gift-receiving 
and soliciting arm of a public university and receives support from public taxation 
is a ‘public office’ pursuant to R.C. 149.011[A], and is subject to the public 
records disclosure requirements of R.C. 149.43[B].”); State ex rel. Fostoria Daily 
Review Co. v. Fostoria Hosp. Assn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 10, 531 N.E.2d 313 
(nonprofit corporation operating a city hospital under a rent-free lease with city is 
a public office under R.C. 149.011[A]); State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. 
Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 529 N.E.2d 443, paragraph one of the syllabus (“A 
public hospital, which renders a public service to residents of a county and which 
is supported by public taxation, is a ‘public institution’ and thus a ‘public office’ 
9 
pursuant to R.C. 149.011[A], making it subject to the public records disclosure 
requirements of R.C. 149.43.”). 
 
Strothers and the majority rely on the foregoing cases to assert that the court 
of appeals erred in holding that the Ombudsman Office is not a public office under 
R.C. 149.011 and denying the writ of mandamus.  For the reasons that follow, I 
conclude that the court of appeals properly held that the Ombudsman Office is not 
a public office under R.C. 149.011 and therefore is not subject to the disclosure 
requirements of R.C. 149.43. 
 
First, as the court of appeals determined, the Ombudsman Office, while 
providing services which undoubtedly benefit the public, does not exercise any 
government function.  It has no duty, other than complying with antidiscrimination 
laws, to serve the public or investigate complaints, and the Cuyahoga County 
government has no authority to compel it to perform these duties.  Cf. Ohio 
Historical Soc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 466, 476, 613 
N.E.2d 591, 599 (association is not public employer under R.C. Chapter 4117 
because it was not created by the state and it is not subject to state control).  In 
fact, the government investigation of previously unreported child neglect and 
abuse complaints is performed by the Cuyahoga County Department of Children 
and Family Services upon referral by the Ombudsman Office.  Conversely, in 
Fostoria Daily Review, we emphasized that the Fostoria Hospital Association had 
an express duty under its lease with Fostoria to act as a “public general hospital” 
in holding that the association was performing a government function.  40 Ohio 
St.3d at 12, 531 N.E.2d at 315. 
 
Second, the Ombudsman Office is not controlled by the county government 
to the extent generally required for entities to be subject to public records 
provisions.  See 1 O’Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure (2 Ed.1990) 4-7, 
10 
Section 4.02 (“Other entities enjoy statutory creation or governmental status, but 
not statutory inclusion within the [Freedom of Information Act’s] agency status.  * 
* * The court analyzes the substantial supervision and control exercised by federal 
officials.”).  The Ombudsman Office need not satisfy any government agency that 
it is performing any task properly.  In contrast, in Fostoria Daily Review, the city 
possessed the right to inspect the hospital and to terminate the lease of the 
building and equipment to the hospital association if it determined that the 
association failed to perform as a public general hospital.  40 Ohio St.3d at 12, 531 
N.E.2d at 315; see, also, Fox, 39 Ohio St.3d at 110, 529 N.E.2d at 445, where the 
respondents conceded that the hospital was “owned and operated by [the] county.” 
 
Third, the Ombudsman Office is not performing duties historically 
performed by entities that exercised government functions or were public 
institutions.  Instead, it acts in a unique role as an intermediary between the public 
and county government.  The cases cited by Strothers are thus inapposite.  Toledo 
Blade, 65 Ohio St.3d at 262, 602 N.E.2d at 1162 (“Given the relatively recent 
merger of the corporation and alumni foundation to create the present entity, the 
continuation of the essential mission of the predecessors, and the continued 
support of the university, the foundation cannot be viewed in legal isolation from 
those entities from which it came.”); Fostoria Daily Review (city operated hospital 
for over thirty years before leasing it rent-free to nonprofit hospital association); 
Fox, 39 Ohio St.3d at 110, 529 N.E.2d at 445 (hospital owned and operated by 
county). 
 
Fourth, although the Ombudsman Office receives funding from Cuyahoga 
County, the county possesses discretion under R.C. 307.691 to provide this 
assistance, and the Ombudsman Office also receives money from private sources.  
The expenditure of taxpayer funds does not automatically transform recipient 
11 
entities into public offices subject to R.C. 149.43.  Cf. Irwin Mem. Blood Bank of 
the San Francisco Med. Soc. v. Am. Natl. Red Cross (C.A.9, 1981), 640 F.2d 1051 
(receipt of money from government contracts did not make Red Cross an “agency” 
subject to FOIA absent substantial federal control or supervision of its operations). 
 
Finally, no public entity delegated its duties to the Ombudsman Office.  See 
State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 
678 N.E.2d 557; see, also, State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Economic Opportunity 
Planning Assn. of Greater Toledo (C.P.1990), 61 Ohio Misc.2d 631, 645, 582 
N.E.2d 59, 68, relied on by Strothers, where the common pleas court noted that 
critical aspects of power traditionally associated with the state had been delegated 
to the entity held to be a public office. 
 
Contrary to the assertions of the majority, the duties of the Ombudsman 
Office are not “inextricably intertwined” with the functions performed by the truly 
public agencies of Cuyahoga County.  Merely because the Ombudsman Office is 
required to file an accounting of public funds with the county commissioners does 
not create the presence of a relationship such that it can be said that the activities 
of the office are inextricably intertwined with the public agencies of the county.  
The Ombudsman Office is a private entity funded substantially through private 
means.  Far from holding itself out to the public as a public agency, it performs a 
function of resolving complaints against government agencies.  Although the 
office is, as the majority states, a partially publicly funded agency, that does not 
compel the inescapable conclusion that the office is a “public office” as defined by 
the Public Records Act. 
 
Today the majority effectively creates a new test for defining a public 
office.  The majority determines that the Ombudsman Office is a public office 
because it works in “partnership” with the county commissioners and because it 
12 
receives some public funding.  By placing emphasis upon these two aspects of the 
office rather than analyzing the nature of the office in its entirety, this new 
standard may cast a net far broader than the General Assembly envisioned when it 
defined “public office” under the Public Records Act.  There are countless private 
entities that work in tandem with agencies of government in public-private 
partnerships.  Likewise, hundreds of private organizations receive some public 
funding for their operations.  The holding here produces the result that the records 
of any private entity either receiving some public funding or maintaining a 
working partnership with a government agency are now subject to public 
disclosure.  If the policy of the law is to be changed by subjecting private 
organizations that are neither controlled nor created by a public agency to the 
Public Records Act, the General Assembly, not this court, should do it. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly held that the 
Ombudsman Office is not a public office under R.C. 149.011(A) and is therefore 
not subject to the disclosure requirements of R.C. 149.43.  The Ombudsman Office 
is neither a public institution nor an “entity established by the laws of this state for 
the exercise of any function of government” pursuant to R.C. 149.011(A).  It lacks 
sufficient ties to any government entity to be appropriately considered a public 
office.  See Toledo Blade, 65 Ohio St.3d at 261-262, 602 N.E.2d at 1162.  No 
authority cited by Strothers compels a contrary result, even after construing the 
summary judgment evidence most strongly in Strothers’s favor and resolving any 
doubts in favor of disclosure.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  The definition of “public 
office” found at R.C. 149.011(A) limits itself to entities “established by the laws 
of this state for the exercise of any function of government.” (Emphasis added.)  
13 
Today’s majority reads that part of the requirement out of the statute by classifying 
as a “public office” any entity that (1) performs a public service and (2) is 
supported by public funds.  That conclusion follows a short progression of cases in 
which this court has not specifically analyzed whether the entity involved was 
“established under the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of 
government,” instead, analyzing only whether the entity actually exercises a 
function of government.  I believe that we ought to give effect to the entire 
definitional phrase and apply it to this case to conclude that the Cuyahoga County 
Ombudsman Office does not meet the statutory definition of a “public office.” 
 
In State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 
529 N.E.2d 433, the court determined that a hospital owned and operated by 
Cuyahoga County was a “public institution” and, therefore, a “public office” 
within the meaning of R.C. 149.011(A).  The Fox court supported its classification 
of the hospital as a “public institution” by recognizing that the hospital rendered a 
public service to county residents and was supported by public taxation.  Because 
county hospitals are established pursuant to statute (R.C. 339.03; 339.06), the 
remaining issue in that case was whether the hospital was established to exercise 
“any function of government” as required under R.C. 149.011(A).  The court’s 
opinion did not specifically address the statutory authority under which the county 
hospital was created, focusing its analysis instead on whether county hospitals, in 
fact, exercise a function of government. Accordingly, R.C. 149.011(A)’s 
definitional requirement that a “public office” be “established by the laws of this 
state for the exercise of any function of government” was not fully incorporated 
into the body or syllabus of the Fox opinion. 
 
In State ex rel. Fostoria Daily Review Co. v. Fostoria Hosp. Assn. (1988), 
40 Ohio St.3d 10, 531 N.E.2d 313, this court apparently applied the syllabus in 
14 
Fox, supra, as a complete test to determine whether an entity falls under R.C. 
149.011(A)’s definition of a “public office,” stating that “[s]ince Fostoria City 
Hospital meets all the criteria stated in paragraph one of the syllabus in State ex 
rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. [Sys.], supra, it is a public institution, and its 
public records must be disclosed * * *.”  Id. at 13, 531 N.E.2d at 316.  The court 
reached this conclusion without explicitly analyzing whether the hospital was 
established by statute for the exercise of a function of government, noting only 
that “the main hospital building was originally leased pursuant to R.C. 749.35, 
which authorizes the lease of a city-owned hospital building to a nonprofit 
corporation for use as a general hospital.  See, also, R.C. 140.05.  According to 
R.C. 749.35, if the nonprofit corporation fails to operate the hospital as a public 
general hospital, the lease may be terminated and the control and management of 
the hospital, including equipment, revert to the city.”  Id. at 12, 531 N.E.2d at 315. 
 
While it is possible that the Fostoria court intended its discussion of the  
statutory relationship between the city of Fostoria as owner of the hospital 
building and the Fostoria Hospital Association as its tenant to fulfill R.C. 
149.011(A)’s definitional requirement that a “public office” be established by the 
laws of this state for the exercise of a function of government, that intent is not 
entirely clear from its opinion. 
 
In State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found. (1992), 65 Ohio 
St.3d 258, 602 N.E.2d 1159, this court again did not discuss that portion of the 
definition of “public office” requiring that an entity be “established by the laws of 
this state for the exercise of a public function.”  Instead, the court considered 
university support and the public function served by the private, nonprofit 
corporation therein under consideration, emphasizing that the corporation could 
not be separated from the public institution that it served (the University of 
15 
Toledo).  Because the court found the corporation was, in effect,  an “entity of the 
university,” it reasoned that it too was subject to R.C. 149.43’s reporting 
requirements. 
 
Although the laws of this state authorize a county or municipal authority to 
cooperate and give financial assistance to a nonprofit ombudsman corporation 
(R.C. 307.691), that corporation itself is not established by statute to exercise a 
function of government.  Instead, as a private, nonprofit corporation, the 
Cuyahoga County Ombudsman Office is formed by its incorporators under the 
laws of this state and those incorporators determine the corporation’s purpose. 
R.C. 1702.03.  Accordingly, I believe that the Cuyahoga County Ombudsman 
Office is not a “public office” within the meaning of R.C. 149.011(A).  Moreover, 
even assuming that Fostoria and Toledo Blade impliedly establish a relaxed 
interpretation of R.C. 149.011(A)’s requirement that a public office be 
“established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of 
government,” Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent nonetheless demonstrates that the 
Cuyahoga County Ombudsman Office does not meet even that relaxed 
interpretation. 
 
I am mindful that this court has repeatedly emphasized that R.C. 149.43 
must be “construed liberally in favor of broad access, and that any doubt is 
resolved in favor of disclosure of public records.” State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334, 336, 
citing State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State Univ. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 246, 
643 N.E.2d 126, 128.  Liberal construction, however, does not empower this court 
to ignore the phrasing of statutory definitions.  I would, therefore, affirm the 
judgment of the appellate court, based on the fact that the Cuyahoga County 
16 
Ombudsman Office is not established by the laws of this state for the exercise of a 
function of government. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.