Title: Freeman v. COMMONWEALTH L. INS. CO. OF LOUISVILLE, KY.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

286 N.E.2d 396 (1972)
Martha Smith FREEMAN, Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISVILLE, Kentucky, Appellee.
No. 1170A182.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
August 22, 1972.
John R. Dollens, Scottsburg, for appellant.
Ernest W. Smith, Fox & Smith, Jeffersonville, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This case is before us on a Petition to Transfer, and for the reasons stated herein the petition is denied. The appeal concerns an action for accidental death benefits by the beneficiary of the insured, the alleged aggressor in an encounter in which he was killed by his victim. The insured, Smith, and the victim, Bowling, were apparently friends except when Smith had been drinking. After drinking, Smith allegedly initiated a fracas with Bowling. Smith was shot and killed by a pistol which Bowling had pulled from his pocket during the tussle.
Summary judgment was entered for the insurer on the basis of the "reasonable foreseeability" test which is:
*397 The Appellate Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the decedent's death was reasonably foreseeable, but additionally that the rule of "reasonable foreseeability" as stated above is not the law in Indiana and should not govern. We agree with the Appellate Court on both positions.
It is clear that even under the "reasonable man" foreseeability test stated above an issue of fact does exist. Accepting for the argument that Smith started the fight there is no evidence that he could have known that Bowling would draw a pistol and shoot him. It is also not clear whether the pistol was fired intentionally, in self-defense, or whether it was discharged accidentally. With this issue very much in doubt, summary judgment is not proper.
The insurer does not base its petition on that issue, but upon the test of "accidental means" adopted by the Appellate Court. The pertinent portion of the accidental death clause reads:
It is the rule, as petitioner admits, that an ambiguous term in an insurance policy will be resolved in favor of the insured. See Freeman, supra, Ind. App., 271 N.E.2d  at 181, and cases cited therein. "Accidental means" is surely an ambiguous phrase susceptible to several interpretations. Petitioner contends that the phrase has received prior judicial interpretation by the courts of this state. The most recent of those cited is Pearlmen v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co. (1955), 126 Ind. App. 294, 299, 130 N.E.2d 54, 57, which contains the following language:
Admitting that the actions must in some sense be unforeseen or unexpected, neither the case cited above nor the other cases cited by petitioner address themselves to the questions of from whose viewpoint do we look to see if it is unforeseen and whether it must be actually foreseen from the viewpoint of the deceased or only "reasonably foreseeable" from the viewpoint of an "ordinarily reasonable man." The Appellate Court admits that the majority rule is the "reasonable foreseeability" test but declares the better rule in this case to be:
We agree. We are not here concerned with a negligence action but with the interpretation of a contract. Thus, reading the phrase "accidental means" in favor of the insured, the test set down by the Appellate Court is entirely proper and should be the guideline for the trial court on remand.
Petition to transfer denied.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.