Title: Mark E. Lunsford et al. v. Jefferson County, Alabama

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:05/04/07markelunsford
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050253
_________________________
Mark E. Lunsford et al.
v.
Jefferson County
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-05-3884)
BOLIN, Justice.
Mark E. Lunsford, Montevallo Twin Homes, LLC, and
Montevallo Square, LLC (hereinafter referred to collectively
as "the landlords"), appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson
1050253
In 1948 Section 224 provided:
1
"No county shall become indebted in an amount
including present indebtedness, greater than three
and one-half percentum of the assessed value of the
property therein .... Nothing herein contained shall
prevent any county from issuing bonds, or other
obligations, to fund or refund any indebtedness now
existing or authorized by existing laws to be
created."
Section 224 was subsequently amended by Amendment No. 342,
ratified in 1976, which increased the debt limit for counties
to five percent. 
2
Circuit Court declaring § 35-9-14, Ala. Code 1975 ("the
statute"), unconstitutional.  We affirm.  
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
In 1948 Jefferson County found it necessary to make
improvements to its sewer system.  In order to avoid
violating § 224 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901,1
Jefferson County, acting pursuant to Amendment No. 73, Ala.
Const. 1901, now codified as Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.),
Local Amends. (Jefferson County, § 4) ("the amendment"),
incurred bonded indebtedness "to pay the expenses of
constructing, improving, extending and repairing sewers and
sewerage treatment and disposal plants in [Jefferson] county."
The amendment, proclaimed ratified on November 15, 1948,
provided: 
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3
"Said 
bonds 
shall 
be 
general 
obligations 
of
Jefferson county but shall also be payable primarily
from and secured by a lien upon the sewer rentals or
service charges, which shall be levied and collected
in an amount sufficient to pay the principal of and
interest on such bonds, replacements, extensions and
improvements to, and the cost of operation and
maintenance of, the sewers and sewerage treatment
and disposal plants.  ...  [S]uch charges or rentals
shall be a personal obligation of the occupant of
the property the sewerage from which is disposed of
by such sewers or treated in such plants and shall
also be a lien upon such property, enforceable by a
sale thereof."  
(Emphasis added.)  
After specifying December 31, 1958, as the expiration
date for the authority to issue bonds, the amendment provided:
"The authority to levy and collect sewer charges and
rentals shall be limited to such charges as will pay
the principal of and interest on the bonds and the
reasonable 
expense 
of 
extending, 
improving,
operating and maintaining said sewers and plants;
and when the bonds shall have been paid off, service
charges and rentals shall be accordingly reduced, it
being the intent and purpose of this amendment that
the expenses of needed improvements and extensions
and maintenance and operation of the sewers and
sewerage treatment and disposal plants and no other
expenditures shall be paid from such service charges
and rentals."
None of the bonds issued pursuant to the amendment
remains 
outstanding. 
 
The 
statute, 
entitled 
"Tenant
responsible for sewer services bill," became effective August
1, 2004; it provides:
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According to Jefferson County, it ceased recording liens
2
against landlords for a time during the pendency of this
litigation.  It resumed its former practice when the trial
court declared the statute unconstitutional.
4
"Notwithstanding 
any 
other 
provision 
of 
law, 
any
bill for sewer service received in the name of a
tenant or tenants, shall be the sole responsibility
of the tenant or tenants and shall not constitute a
lien on the property where the sewer service was
received."  
Jefferson County, before and after  the passage of the
2
statute, billed landlords for the delinquent sewer charges of
their tenants and placed liens on landlords' properties for
the nonpayment of those charges by tenants.  
The landlords, acting on behalf of themselves and all
other landlords similarly situated, commenced an action in the
Jefferson Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring that
Jefferson 
County's 
practice of imposing liens against
landlords for debts for sewer service incurred by and in the
name of their tenants violated the statute.  The landlords
further sought injunctive relief and the refund of moneys
collected after the effective date of the statute.  The
landlords contend that once all the bonds issued pursuant to
the amendment were paid, Jefferson County's special rights
with respect to collection of indebtedness, including the
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5
authority to impose liens on property of landlords for sewer
charges incurred by and in the name of their tenants, expired.
The landlords' action was consolidated with an action brought
by Jefferson County against two landlords, seeking payment for
their tenants' sewer charges.  The relevant facts were
stipulated by the parties, and the consolidated case was
submitted to the trial court on cross-motions for a summary
judgment.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
Jefferson County and against the landlords.  The trial court
concluded that the statute was inconsistent with the amendment
and that the statute was therefore unconstitutional.  The
order consolidating the landlords' action with the proceeding
commenced by Jefferson County was vacated, and the action
brought by Jefferson County was placed on the trial court's
administrative docket.  The landlords appeal from the summary
judgment entered in their action against Jefferson County.
II. Standard of Review
As this Court stated in Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So.
2d 829, 832-33 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen.
Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999)):
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6
"The standard by which this Court will review a
motion for summary judgment is well established:
"'The principles of law applicable to
a motion for summary judgment are well
settled.  To grant such a motion, the trial
court must determine that the evidence does
not create a genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  When the movant
makes a prima facie showing that those two
conditions are satisfied, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to present "substantial
evidence" creating a genuine issue of
material fact.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of
Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
(Ala. 1989); § 12-21-12(d)[,] Ala. Code
1975.  Evidence is "substantial" if it is
of 
"such 
weight 
and 
quality 
that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
"'In our review of a summary judgment,
we apply the same standard as the trial
court.  Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d 462,
465 (Ala. 1997).  Our review is subject to
the caveat that we must review the record
in a light most favorable to the nonmovant
and must resolve all reasonable doubts
against the movant.  Hanners v. Balfour
Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412 (Ala.
1990).'"
 
This 
Court 
has 
further 
stated, 
in 
reviewing 
a
constitutional challenge to a statute:
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7
"The standard of review for determining the
constitutionality of a statute was stated in State
Board of Health v. Greater Birmingham Ass'n of Home
Builders, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1058, 1061 (Ala. 1980):
"'Before turning to the constitutional
issue posed in this case, it is appropriate
to reiterate the fundamental proposition
that 
validly 
enacted 
legislation 
is
presumed to be constitutional.  As we
stated in Mobile Housing Board v. Cross,
285 Ala. 94, 97, 229 So. 2d 485, 487
(1969):
"'"Every presumption is in favor
of the constitutionality of an
act of the legislature and this
court will not declare it invalid
unless in its judgment, the act
clearly and unmistakably comes
within the inhibition of the
constitution."
"'We will not invalidate a statute on
constitutional grounds if by reasonable
construction it can be given a field of
operation within constitutionally imposed
limitations.  See Ex parte Huguley Water
System, 282 Ala. 633, 213 So. 2d 799
(1968).'
"In Home Indemnity Co. v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836,
840 (Ala. 1984), this Court stated:
"'In determining whether the act is
constitutional, 
we 
are 
bound 
by 
the
following presumption:
"'"[I]n 
passing 
upon 
the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  
o f  
a
legislative 
act, 
the 
courts
uniformly approach the question
1050253
8
with 
every 
presumption 
and
intendment 
in 
favor 
of 
its
validity, and seek to sustain
rather 
than 
strike 
down 
the
enactment of a coordinate branch
of 
government. 
 
All 
these
principles are embraced in the
simple statement that it is the
recognized duty of the court to
sustain the act unless it is
clear beyond reasonable doubt
that it is violative of the
fundamental law."
"'Alabama State Federation of Labor v.
McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So. 2d 810, 815
(1944).'
"See Crosslin v. City of Muscle Shoals, 436 So. 2d
862, 863 (Ala. 1983)."
Town of Vance v. City of Tuscaloosa, 661 So. 2d 739, 742-43
(Ala. 1995).  
III. Challenges to a Statute on Constitutional Grounds
In Rice v. English, 835 So. 2d 157, 162 (Ala. 2002), this
Court, citing Ex parte Selma & Gulf R.R., 45 Ala. 696 (1871),
reiterated "the settled principle that the people have
forbidden the Legislature from conducting itself in a manner
inconsistent with their constitution and when it does, it is
incumbent upon the judiciary to nullify a legislative
enactment contrary to the constitution."  We there stated that
"the authority of this Court to review challenges to acts of
1050253
9
the Legislature on constitutional grounds is a bedrock
principle of our State's legal heritage." 835 So. 2d at 163.
However, in Ex parte Selma & Gulf R.R., this Court
cautioned:
"No power of this grave nature [i.e., judicial
review of legislative acts] is expressly given.
Considering its importance, it is a little strange
that it has been wholly omitted.  But, grant that it
exists.  It can not be permitted to rest upon mere
inference and argument; because, if the inference is
a mistake, or the argument is false, its exercise is
an usurpation by one branch of the government
against the authority of another.  Did the people
mean to grant such a power, unless some express
clause of the constitution was clearly disregarded?
I think not."
45 Ala. at 728 (emphasis added).
IV. Juxtaposition of the Statute Against the Amendment
We turn to the question whether in enacting the statute
"some express clause of the constitution was clearly
disregarded."  Ex parte Selma & Gulf R.R., 45 Ala. at 728.
The landlords contend that the collection powers conferred on
Jefferson County by the amendment expired with the payment of
the last bond outstanding.  They refer to the unambiguous
provision terminating Jefferson County's authority to issue
bonds pursuant to the amendment on December 31, 1958.  They
then contend that the phrase in the amendment, "it being the
1050253
10
intent and purpose of this amendment that the expenses of
needed improvements and extensions and maintenance and
operation of the sewers and sewerage treatment and disposal
plants and no other expenditures shall be paid from such
service charges and rentals," requires the conclusion that all
power to collect charges for the maintenance and operation of
the sewer system financed by the bonds ceased upon the payment
of the bonds.  Specifically, the landlords state: "It follows,
then, that since the County has no powers of issuance today,
and since no bonds issued under [the amendment] are
outstanding, the County can have no collection powers
thereunder today."  (Landlords' brief, p. 19.)  
The landlords' construction, however, contradicts the
plain language of the amendment.  The cessation of the
authority to issue bonds and the cessation of the authority to
collect sewer charges are not inexorably linked as the
landlords contend.  The last paragraph of  the amendment
speaks directly to cessation of the authority to issue bonds.
The first sentence of that paragraph, dealing solely with
issuance of bonds, states: "The authority to issue bonds shall
cease December 31, 1958."  The next sentence in that paragraph
1050253
11
deals exclusively with the separate subject of the authority
to collect certain charges.  It provides: "The authority to
levy and collect sewer charges and rentals shall be limited to
such charges as will pay the principal of and interest on the
bonds and the reasonable expense of extending, improving,
operating and maintaining said sewers and plants ...."
(Emphasis added.)  Obviously, operation and maintenance are
activities that do not necessarily terminate upon the payment
of the last of the bonded indebtedness.  The necessity for
operation and maintenance of the sewer system continues today.
Speaking directly to what occurs after the bonds have been
paid off, the amendment provides: "[S]ervice charges and
rentals shall be accordingly reduced, it being the intent and
purpose of this amendment that the expenses of needed
improvements and extensions and maintenance and operation of
the sewers and sewerage treatment and disposal plants and no
other expenditures shall be paid from such service charges or
rentals."  (Emphasis added.)  Clearly, the amendment does not
contemplate 
the 
elimination 
of 
charges; 
in 
fact, 
it
contemplates the continuation of the collection of service
charges and rentals after the payment of the last of the
1050253
12
bonded indebtedness.  As this Court stated in Shell v.
Jefferson County, 454 So. 2d 1331, 1335-36 (Ala. 1984),
construing the amendment: "[W]e do not agree that the language
of the last paragraph of [the amendment] refers to a sewerage
system frozen in time." 
We return to the statute, § 35-9-14, which provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any bill for
sewer service received in the name of a tenant or tenants,
shall be the sole responsibility of the tenant or tenants and
shall not constitute a lien on the property where the sewer
service was received."  (Emphasis added.)  As previously
noted, the amendment provides: 
"[S]uch charges or rentals [for, among other things,
the cost of operating and maintaining the sewers and
sewerage treatment and disposal plants] shall be a
personal obligation of the occupant of the property
the sewerage from which is disposed of by such
sewers or treated in such plants and shall also be
a lien upon such property, enforceable by a sale
thereof."  
(Emphasis added.)  It is axiomatic that the inclusion in a
statute of the phrase "notwithstanding any provision of law"
cannot trump a constitutional provision.  See Opinion of the
Justices No. 206, 287 Ala. 337, 341, 251 So. 2d 755, 759
(1971) ("We have said that 'no legislation may restrict or
1050253
13
alter a self-executing constitutional provision.'  In re
Opinion of the Justices [No. 94], 252 Ala. 199, 40 So. 2d 330
[(1949)], and authorities cited; Opinion of the Justices [No.
164], 269 Ala. 127, 111 So. 2d 605 [(1959)].").  See also City
of Bessemer v. McClain, [Ms. 1031917, November 3, 2006] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006)(opinion on second application for
rehearing) ("However, '[w]hen the Constitution and a statute
are in conflict, the Constitution controls ....' Parker v.
Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 446 (Ala. 1987).").  The provision of
the statute depriving Jefferson County of the right to impose
liens on landlords for charges for sewer services incurred in
the name of a tenant clearly conflicts with the amendment, and
the amendment controls. 
V. Conclusion
The statute clearly disregards an express clause in the
amendment.  Ex parte Selma & Gulf R.R.  The presumption of the
constitutionality of the statute has been overcome by the
plain language of the amendment.  We affirm the judgment of
the trial court declaring § 35-9-14 unconstitutional as
applied to Jefferson County in this case.  
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.