Title: Leonard v. Converse County School Dist. No. 2

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Leonard v. Converse County School Dist. No. 21990 WY 24788 P.2d 1119Case Number: 89-102Decided: 03/13/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JEAN LEONARD, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

CONVERSE COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 2, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Converse County, William A. Taylor, J.

Patrick E. 
Hacker, Cheyenne, for appellant.

J.N. Murdock of 
Reeves & Murdock, Casper, and Mark R. Stewart of Hickey & Evans, 
Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]            
Appellant Jean Leonard commenced an action against Appellee Converse 
County School District No. 2, seeking reinstatement as a counselor, recovery of 
damages, and attorney's fees. The suit arose from the Converse County School 
Board's decision not to offer Leonard a contract as a continuing contract 
teacher after she had completed three years of employment as an initial contract 
teacher. The School District moved for a summary judgment, which the district 
court granted.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]            
Leonard raises the following issues for our review:

     1. Whether it is 
arbitrary and capricious for a school district to discharge an employee for 
reasons contrary to fundamental state policy?

     2. Whether it is 
arbitrary and capricious for a school district to discharge a teacher by a 
procedure which violates the district's own rules and regulations? 

     3. Whether Appellant 
established a proper cause of action for breach of an express 
contract?

     4. Whether Appellant 
established a proper cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing?

     5. Whether a teacher 
has a cause of action for breach of a statutory duty?

     6. Whether Appellant 
has established a valid claim for violation of substantive constitutional 
rights?

     7. Whether Appellant 
has established a claim for violation of due process?

     8. Whether material 
issues of fact exist as to each of the claims precluding summary 
judgment?

[¶4]      The materials 
submitted in support of and in opposition to the School District's motion for 
summary judgment reveal the following facts. In the fall of 1982, Leonard began 
working for the School District as a guidance counselor at the Glenrock Middle 
School. The School District hired Leonard as an initial contract teacher, and 
she worked as such for three consecutive years.1 During Leonard's employment, the 
School District maintained a policy and regulation prescribing an evaluation 
procedure. The policy stated that all professional staff would be evaluated to 
ensure a quality educational program, and it defined the specific areas which 
would be evaluated. The regulation required that the program and procedure for 
the evaluations and a written summary of expected standards be presented to the 
staff within two weeks of the beginning of the school year. It also contained 
provisions for informal and formal probationary periods for teachers with 
unsatisfactory evaluations. Both the regulation and Wyo. Stat. § 
21-3-110(a)(xvii) (1977) required that initial contract teachers be evaluated in 
writing twice a year and receive copies of their evaluations.

[¶5]      In 1983, Leonard 
received a copy of her evaluation which indicated she needed improved 
professional rapport. The following year, her evaluation noted improved rapport 
and indicated that all areas of performance were satisfactory. During her third 
year as a counselor, Leonard was not evaluated, and, through a letter dated 
March 15, 1985, the School District informed Leonard that it would terminate her 
initial contract at the end of the school year. Leonard was never placed on 
probation under the terms of the evaluation regulation.

[¶6]            
Leonard filed a grievance with the School Board, seeking renewal of her 
contract. After a hearing, the School Board denied Leonard's request, and on 
September 5, 1986, she filed a complaint with the district court. The complaint 
alleged that the School District and its employees: (1) breached a legal duty 
owed to Leonard by failing to follow the evaluation and probationary procedures 
set out in Wyo. Stat. §§ 21-3-110(a)(xvii) and 21-3-111(a)(vi)(B) (1977) and in 
its policies and regulations; (2) denied Leonard procedural due process at her 
grievance hearing and failed to provide her with sufficient reasons for her 
dismissal; (3) discriminated against her because of her sex and marital status; 
(4) retaliated against her because of her personal life; (5) violated her 
substantive due process rights by arbitrarily and capriciously dismissing her; 
(6) denied her right to academic freedom; (7) violated her right to continued 
employment; and (8) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Leonard sought reinstatement, damages, and attorney's fees under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, 1988, and 2000 (1982). Leonard also sought reinstatement and 
damages for the School District's negligence, breach of contract, and violation 
of her constitutional rights.

[¶7]      The School 
District answered, generally denying the allegations, and filed a motion for 
summary judgment. The School District's memorandum in support of its motion 
maintained that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because 
Leonard, as an initial contract teacher, had no entitlement to, or reasonable 
expectation of, reemployment. On April 12, 1989, the district court granted a 
summary judgment in favor of the School District. In its decision letter, the 
court, relying upon Roberts v. Lincoln County School District Number One, 676 P.2d 577 (Wyo. 1984), stated that Leonard was an "untenured" initial contract 
teacher whose employment was properly terminated. The court further explained 
that the School District's administrative rules could not abrogate the School 
Board's authority to terminate the employment of initial contract teachers.2 This appeal arose from that 
decision.

[¶8]      The party moving 
for a summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a 
matter of law. If the movant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing a genuine 
issue of material fact does exist. Conclusory statements or mere opinions are 
insufficient to satisfy an opposing party's burden. Nelson v. Crimson 
Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1989); Jones Land and Livestock Co. v. 
Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶9]            
Leonard contends that the School District's decision not to offer her a 
new contract was arbitrary and capricious because the School District failed to 
follow the evaluation requirements set out in its policy, its regulation, and § 
21-3-110(a)(xvii). In Roberts, 676 P.2d 577, this Court upheld a school 
district's decision to terminate the employment of an initial contract teacher 
despite its failure to follow required evaluation procedures. We 
explained:

The only statutory 
requirement for terminating an initial contract teacher is that [the teacher] be 
notified of the termination no later than March 15 of each year. An initial 
contract teacher has no statutory right to a statement of reasons for 
termination or to a hearing. They do not have a claim, entitlement, or 
reasonable expectation of re-employment. Therefore, they do not have a property 
interest under state law or otherwise.

Id. at 579 
(footnote omitted).3 This Court also stated that the 
evaluation regulations established by the district did not alter the initial 
contract teacher's rights because they "were primarily for the benefit of the 
school district in performing its operational and supervisory duties." Id. at 
581.

[¶10]   In this case, the School District 
argues that it adopted the evaluation policy primarily for use in performing 
operational and supervisory duties and not for the primary purpose of protecting 
initial contract teachers. We agree. The evaluation rules did not protect 
initial contract teachers from dismissal because, as teachers without tenure, 
they could be dismissed even after receiving favorable evaluations. Id. In 
addition, the policy stated that the primary purpose for teacher supervision and 
evaluation was to develop staff and improve teaching. We hold that, even if the 
evaluation rules had a secondary purpose relating to termination or retention, 
they did not give initial contract teachers a claim to, entitlement to, or 
reasonable expectation of reemployment. Id. at 580 (citing Willis v. Widefield 
School District No. 3, 43 Colo. App. 197, 603 P.2d 962 (1979)). The School 
District's failure to follow the evaluation requirements did not result in an 
arbitrary and capricious decision to terminate Leonard's employment.

[¶11]            
Leonard also asserts that the School District's policy and regulation 
were incorporated into her employment contract and that the School District 
breached the contract by failing to follow them.4 In Roberts, 676 P.2d 577, this 
Court addressed the same breach of contract issue which was premised on similar 
contractual provisions. We held that, "[a]lthough the contract is specifically 
subject to the `policies, rules, and regulations of the school district,' these 
particular provisions did not operate to afford appellant any contractual right 
of employment." Id. at 582. We also stated that the board could not abrogate its 
statutory authority to terminate initial contract teachers. Id.

[¶12]   In this case, Leonard's contract 
and Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-112 (1977) incorporated the evaluation policy and 
regulation, but those rules did not create a contractual right of employment. A 
contrary result would be in conflict with a school district's authority to 
terminate the employment of initial contract teachers. Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-105 
(1977); Roberts, 676 P.2d 577. Section 21-7-112 specifically states that school 
district policies, rules, and regulations cannot be in conflict with Wyoming 
laws. Thus, we hold that the School District's violation of its evaluation 
policy and regulation and of § 21-3-110(a)(xvii) did not constitute an 
actionable breach of contract.

[¶13]            
Leonard also asks this Court to adopt and apply the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. Both theories serve as exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine by granting an employee greater rights to sue his 
employer for termination of his employment. Nelson, 777 P.2d 73; Wagenseller v. 
Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985). This Court 
has previously held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
does not apply to at-will employment relationships because either party may 
terminate an at-will contract for any reason, without reason, or for the wrong 
reason. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985). We have 
recognized a limited cause of action to vindicate the public policy of 
compensating workers for work-related injuries. Griess v. Consolidated 
Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989).5

[¶14]   We now hold that the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine do not apply to the termination of employment 
contracts between school districts and initial contract teachers. The adoption 
of these theories would alter the tenure status of initial contract teachers 
defined in Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-109 (1977) and explained in Roberts, 676 P.2d 577. 
The power to modify that status belongs to the legislature.

[¶15]            
Leonard's remaining arguments relate to her claim that the School 
District's decision not to offer her a fourth contract was made on the basis of 
constitutionally impermissible grounds. Leonard contends that she is entitled to 
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) because the School District terminated her 
employment due to her marital status, her residency, her personal life, and the 
fact that she reported incest cases to government agencies.6

[¶16]            
Leonard correctly states that a school district's decision to terminate 
the employment of a teacher without tenure must not violate constitutionally 
protected interests. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972); Roberts, 676 P.2d 577. To prevail under this principle, 
however, Leonard must first meet her burden in opposing the School District's 
motion for summary judgment. Jones Land and Livestock Co., 733 P.2d 258. In 
Nelson, 777 P.2d  at 77, we stated that "[e]vidence opposing a summary judgment 
that is conclusory or speculative is insufficient and the trial court has no 
duty to anticipate possible proof." In opposition to the School District's 
motion, Leonard presented the depositions of the Glenrock Middle School 
principal, the school district superintendent, and five school board members. 
After reviewing those depositions, we conclude that Leonard failed to 
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact which would 
preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. The materials supporting Leonard's 
contention that the School District terminated her employment in violation of 
her constitutionally protected rights were merely speculative and conclusory. 
Hence, the School District is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

[¶17]            
Affirmed.

GOLDEN, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in which URBIGKIT, J., 
joined.

GOLDEN, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, in which URBIGKIT, J., joins.

[¶18]            
Although I concur in most aspects of the majority opinion, I dissent from 
that part of it that holds that "the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine [does] not apply to the termination of employment 
contracts between school districts and initial contract teachers."

[¶19]   This court identified the rationale 
supporting the public policy exception to the at-will rule in Allen v. Safeway 
Stores, Incorporated, 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985):

     A tort action premised 
on violation of public policy results from a recognition that allowing a 
discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go 
unvindicated.

As it was so 
aptly put by the Arizona Supreme Court in Wagner v. City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 
722 P.2d 250, 255-56 (1986),

     [e]mployees should not 
have to choose between their jobs and the demands of important public policy 
interests * * *. [E]mployees should not be discharged because they performed an 
act that public policy would encourage * * *.

[¶20]   A fundamental principle of 
Wyoming's public policy is our commitment to protect children from abuse or 
neglect. If a school district can decide not to renew a school counselor's 
employment contract based in substantial part on that counselor's fulfilling a 
statutory obligation of reporting suspected child abuse and neglect and of 
cooperating with law enforcement authorities and child protection agencies, then 
very soon that school counselor will stop reporting and cooperating. The 
unacceptable end result is that child abuse and neglect will go unreported and 
children will continue to be harmed.

[¶21]            
Wyoming's clearly defined and well-established public policy concerning 
child abuse finds expression in W.S. 14-3-104 through 215 (July 1986 Repl.). In 
particular, § 14-3-205(a) provides that any person who has reasonable cause to 
suspect that a child has been abused or neglected shall immediately report it to 
the child protection agency or local law enforcement agency. Under § 
14-3-205(b), if a staff member of a school suspects child abuse or neglect, that 
staff member shall notify as soon as possible a person in charge who is also 
responsible to report the matter. But the reporting staff member is not relieved 
of his or her obligation to report in the first instance. Under § 14-3-212, the 
creation of multi-disciplinary child protection teams within the communities in 
the state is encouraged. Among the members of that team is a designated 
representative from the school district. The local child protection teams are to 
facilitate diagnosis and prognosis and provide an adequate treatment plan for 
the child and the child's family. Under § 14-3-214, a child counselor employed 
by the school may attend interviews of a child that are conducted on school 
property by law enforcement personnel or child protective agency 
personnel.

[¶22]   School counselors and teachers in 
particular are serving in the trenches in our society's war against child abuse. 
Any chilling of that obligation to report and cooperate cannot be tolerated. Our 
children are much too precious and valuable a resource to be sacrificed in the 
name of the "at-will" doctrine. We have recognized and adopted a public policy 
exception for the worker who files a worker's compensation claim. Griess v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989). This 
court surely has the courage to recognize and adopt a public policy exception 
which will inure to the benefit of abused and neglected children.

[¶23]            
Keeping this public policy in mind, our fidelity to the bedrock 
principles of summary judgment law requires us to examine the record in the 
light most favorable to Ms. Leonard, the party against whom the summary judgment 
was entered, and give her the benefit of all favorable inferences which 
reasonably can be drawn from the record evidence.

[¶24]   The record evidence surrounding the 
reasons for principal Dodd's recommendation that Ms. Leonard's employment 
contract not be renewed shows the following:

1.Leonard's deposition 
testimony:

·        
"And 
Mr. Dodd * * * said to me, something about don't discover any more incest cases, 
and he kind of laughed. And I guess I had a little difficulty with that. I 
didn't think it was very funny. * * * I felt that he really meant it * * 
*."

2. Dodd's deposition 
testimony:

·        
When 
asked if he intended that Ms. Leonard should not work with incest and abuse 
matters and alcoholic parents, Dodd testified, "It would be my intent that [she] 
recognize the limit to which a school counselor can do that and still do the 
normal things * * *."

·        
When 
asked if she did more for abused children than Dodd wanted her to do, Dodd 
testified, "I would have to say in terms of the total context of the job she 
spent more time with them than could be provided within the school setting at 
the expense of the other group of students."

·        
When 
asked if the special cases were taking more time than Dodd felt she could afford 
as a counselor, Dodd answered, "Unfortunately, yes."

·        
Against the backdrop of 
the amount of time involved in reporting abuse cases and in cooperating with 
investigations by the law enforcement authorities in such cases, Dodd testified, 
"For the way all of this impacted upon the total school program, it was my 
professional judgment that too much time was being spent there."

3. Assistant school 
superintendent Hoyt's deposition testimony:

·        
In 
early March, Hoyt asked Dodd to explain why he did not recommend Ms. Leonard for 
renewal of her contract. Hoyt testified, "If I can recall his phrasing, there 
was a lack of balance between dealing with those more severe cases and what he 
perceived as being her major responsibility as far as a school counselor was 
concerned."

·        
According to Hoyt, Dodd's 
reasons for his nonrenewal recommendation were her need to listen, her rapport 
with other staff members, and the "balance."

[¶25]   After reviewing the record and 
evidence in the light most favorable to school counselor Leonard and being of 
the view that Wyoming has a clearly defined and well-established public policy 
regarding the reporting of child abuse and neglect and of cooperating with the 
authorities in such matters, I find that genuine issues of material fact exist 
concerning the school district's reasons for failing to renew Ms. Leonard's 
contract. I would reverse and remand for a jury trial on that 
issue.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. § 
21-7-102(a)(iv) (1977) defines an initial contract teacher as "[a]ny teacher who 
has not achieved continuing contract status." A continuing contract teacher is 
"[a]ny initial contract teacher who has been employed by the same school 
district in the state of Wyoming for a period of three (3) consecutive school 
years, and has had his contract renewed for a fourth consecutive school year." 
Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-102(a)(ii)(A) (1977).

2 Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-105 
(1977) provided:

An initial contract 
teacher who has taught in the system continuously for a period of at least 
ninety (90) days shall be hired on an annual basis and shall be notified in 
writing of termination, if such is the case, no later than March 15 of each 
year.

This section was amended 
in 1987 by substituting "April" for "March."

3 In 1987, the legislature 
changed the date in Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-109 (1977) from March 15 to April 
15.

4 The following two 
contract provisions apply to Leonard's assertion:

4.         It is 
understood and agreed between the parties that this contract is subject to the 
applicable laws of the State of Wyoming, the duly adopted rules of the State 
Board of Education and the policies of this District which are, by reference, 
incorporated herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set 
forth herein.

* * * * * *

6.         Any 
person signing a contract for a fourth consecutive full school year shall be 
placed on a renewable contract status pursuant to Section 21-7-102, Education 
Code of 1969 as amended, 1981.

Wyo. Stat. § 
21-7-102(a)(ii) (1977) states in pertinent part:

"Continuing Contract 
Teacher". - (A) Any initial contract teacher who has been employed by the same 
school district in the state of Wyoming for a period of three (3) consecutive 
school years, and has had his contract renewed for a fourth consecutive school 
year[.]

Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-112 
(1977) provides:

The 
contracts of all teachers in the state of Wyoming from and after the effective 
date of this act shall be subject to the policies, rules, and regulations of the 
school district not in conflict with this law or the other laws of the state of 
Wyoming.

(Emphasis 
added.)

5 In Griess, 776 P.2d  at 
754, we held that an employee

whose employment is 
terminated for exercising rights under the worker's compensation statutes and 
who is not covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement has a cause 
of action in tort against the employer for damages.

6 Leonard also asserts 
that the School District deprived her of her property right in continued 
employment without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. This argument has no merit because we have 
determined that Leonard, as an initial contract teacher, did not have a claim 
to, entitlement to, or reasonable expectation of reemployment.

Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-205 
(1977) imposes a duty to report cases of child abuse and neglect.