Title: The Florida Bar v. Neely

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

372 So. 2d 89 (1979)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
v.
Gary H. NEELY, Respondent.
No. 55736.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 7, 1979.
*90 J. Doyle Tumbleson, Bar Counsel, Daytona Beach, and David G. McGunegle, Branch Staff Counsel, Orlando, for complainant.
Paul E. Raymond of Raymond, Wilson, Conway, Barr & Burrows, Daytona Beach, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before us on complaint of The Florida Bar against Gary H. Neely, report of the referee, and the Bar's petition for review of the disciplinary penalty recommended by the referee. The sole question presented for our review is the propriety of the recommended penalty of private reprimand under the circumstances of this case. We find that respondent's misconduct warrants more than a private reprimand but does not warrant the six-months suspension requested by the Bar. Consistent with disciplinary penalties imposed involving comparable misconduct, we conclude that a ninety-day suspension from the practice of law with automatic reinstatement after that time, to be followed by a supervised probation of six months, is warranted.
The referee has made the following findings of fact as to respondent's misconduct:
As to Count I, the referee recommends that respondent be found guilty of violating Disciplinary Rules 5-101(A),[1] 7-101(A)(1),[2] and 7-104(A)(2).[3] Relative to Count II, the referee recommends that respondent be found guilty of violating Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4),[4] 1-102(A)(5),[5] and 1-102(A)(6),[6] and The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, rule 11.02(3)(a).[7]
After review of the record and report of the referee, we hereby approve the referee's findings and recommendations as to guilt. We disagree, however, with the recommendation that the disciplinary penalty of private reprimand be imposed. Respondent argues that there are sufficient mitigating factors apparent from the record which justify such a lenient penalty in his case. These alleged factors include the *94 length of time that this disciplinary proceeding has been pending, the vindictiveness of the complaining witness, and the questionable credibility of the complaining witness. We find no merit to his contention that sufficient mitigating circumstances exist so as to warrant a private reprimand for misconduct which would normally be punished by suspension from the practice of law. There has been no inordinate delay in this case which could serve as a mitigating factor. The respondent was found guilty of self dealing to his client's detriment and to his own personal gain and was found guilty of lying under oath either before the grievance committee or referee hearing, or both, in an effort to hide the fact that he had taken advantage of his clients for his own personal gain. A disciplinary penalty must be fair to society and protect it from the unworthy while not denying the public the services of a qualified lawyer by an unduly harsh discipline. It must be fair to respondent by punishing him for the misconduct while at the same time encouraging rehabilitation, and it should be severe enough to deter others from similar misconduct. The Florida Bar v. Pahules, 233 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1970). With this view in mind, we find the appropriate discipline to be imposed in the present case is a ninety-day suspension followed by a six-months probation.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of ninety days, to be followed by supervised probation for six months during which time respondent shall report on a monthly basis to staff counsel of The Florida Bar as to his case load, his accounting practices including accountings of his trust or escrow accounts and his office account, a list of his associates, if any, and a list of his office staff including the name of the person considered to be his office bookkeeper. Respondent is further directed to pay the costs of these proceedings in the amount of $1,172.17. This suspension shall be effective July 9, 1979, thereby giving respondent thirty days to close his practice and to take the necessary steps to protect his clients.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C.J., and OVERTON, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, with which ADKINS, J., concurs.
BOYD, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Respondent's clients had sold land on an agreement for deed which provided that if the purchaser should fail to meet a monthly payment obligation he would forfeit all funds paid under the contract as liquidated damages. The purchaser had paid approximately one thousand dollars and owed approximately twenty-five hundred dollars at the time of default. The sellers sought respondent's assistance in foreclosing.
After learning that the purchaser was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price owed, the respondent advised the sellers to accept the money and to execute a deed. The sellers subsequently complained that respondent's conduct was unprofessional and that in advising them to deed the property he acted against their interests. In many instances in which buyers under contract for deed have defaulted on one or more monthly installments, but have tendered payment for the unpaid balance, courts of equity have denied forfeiture although provision for same has been made in the contract. The reason is that forfeiture under such literal enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable. The circumstances here would justify respondent's advice to his clients that their interest would be best served by accepting the unpaid balance of the contract when it was tendered, rather than to litigate in an uncertain effort to recover the land.
Since the buyer and sellers were hostile I see nothing wrong with respondent's meeting with them in separate conferences.
There is no clear and convincing evidence that respondent conspired with the buyer to purchase the property at the time the sellers accepted the balance of the purchase price. If he had no such intent at the time he concluded the matter for his clients, *95 there is no prohibition against his subsequent acquisition of an interest in the land.
The contradictory statements made to investigators for The Florida Bar demonstrates irresponsible office accounting practices. For this ethical violation I would privately reprimand the respondent, place him on six months of probation as is required by the majority, and require him to bear the costs of these proceedings.
ADKINS, J., concurs.
[1]  DR 5-101(A) provides:

Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests.
[2]  DR 7-101(A)(1) provides:

(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.
[3]  DR 7-104(A)(2) provides:

(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
.....
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.
[4]  DR 1-102(A)(4) provides:

(A) A lawyer shall not:
.....
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
[5]  DR 1-102(A)(5) provides:

(A) A lawyer shall not:
.....
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
[6]  DR 1-102(A)(6) provides:

(A) A lawyer shall not:
.....
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
[7]  Fla. Bar Integr. Rule, art. XI, rule 11.02(3)(a) provides:

(a) Standards. The standards of professional conduct to be observed by members of the Bar are not limited to the observance of rules and avoidance of prohibitive acts, and the enumeration herein of certain categories of misconduct as constituting grounds for discipline shall not be deemed to be all-inclusive nor shall the failure to specify any particular act of misconduct be construed as tolerance thereof. The commission by a lawyer of any act contrary to honesty, justice or good morals, whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney or otherwise, whether committed within or outside the State of Florida, and whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, constitutes a cause for discipline.