Title: State v. Alexis

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1341 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
REUBEN ALEXIS,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 9, 2015] 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
In this case we consider whether a trial court is required to obtain a conflict-
of-interest waiver when criminal codefendants are represented by the same lawyer 
but there is no actual conflict of interest between the codefendants.  The State of 
Florida seeks review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Alexis 
v. State, 140 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), on the ground that it expressly and 
directly conflicts with a decision of this Court, Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 
1993), as well as a decision of another district court of appeal, Dixon v. State, 758 
So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), on a question of law.  Alexis held that a waiver is 
required in the absence of an actual conflict, while Gorby and Dixon held that a 
 
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waiver is necessary only if there is an actual conflict.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
 
An off-duty police officer was providing security in the parking lot of a 
nightclub when a patron (hereinafter “the victim”) reported that he had been 
accosted by two men at gunpoint and pointed out the car in which the two men 
were riding.  With assistance from other police, the officer stopped the car and 
ordered the occupants to get out.  Officers searched the car and found two loaded 
guns.  At trial, the victim identified two of the car’s occupants, Terry Guerrier and 
Respondent Reuben Alexis, as the men who had confronted him with guns.  In her 
arrest report, the officer stated that after being advised of his rights against self-
incrimination, Guerrier said that he had asked the victim to get out of a car 
occupied by some women who did not want him there, that the victim refused, and 
that Alexis had pulled the victim out of the car.  Defense counsel expected that this 
testimony—as to an out-of-court statement by Guerrier incriminating Alexis—
would be introduced at trial.   
 
At a pretrial hearing on defense counsel’s motion for severance of 
defendants and for separate trials under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.152(b)(2), defense counsel argued that because the State intended to introduce 
Guerrier’s post-arrest statement against Alexis, there was a possible issue under 
 
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rule 3.152(b)(2) and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), that needed to 
be addressed.  After the court and the attorneys discussed the severance issue, 
Respondent’s attorney brought up the issue of dual representation, which led to the 
following exchange: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And by the way Judge, since both 
young men are here, I discussed with them a possible conflict of 
interest here because of the facts.  Terry Guerrier, though wants me to 
continue to be his attorney; because he emphatically denies ever 
making the statement to law enforcement.  So I think that would take 
it out of the conflict.  But I told him it was his call.  And he’s in the 
courtroom, but he’s told me he wants me to continue to represent both 
of them.  And Mr. Alexis says the same thing. 
[PROSECUTOR]:  And, Your Honor, for [rule 3.850] 
purposes, could we inquire of the defendants to make sure that there is 
no conflict, and that they waive any possible conflict by being 
represented by the same counsel? 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  Okay. And the State Attorney does want to 
make sure that you don’t come back later; and file a claim and say 
[defense counsel] was ineffective, because he was representing you 
with a conflict.  But you heard what [defense counsel] just said? 
DEFENDANT GUERRIER:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  And knowing that there’s that potential conflict, 
both of you still want him to be your attorney? 
DEFENDANT GUERRIER:  Yes, sir. 
DEFENDANT ALEXIS:  Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Is that okay? 
[PROSECUTOR]:  That should be sufficient, your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Okay. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you, Judge. 
The defendants proceeded to trial jointly, represented by one privately retained 
attorney.  
 
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At trial, the victim testified that Respondent pulled him out of the car, that 
after he was pulled from the car, Guerrier pointed a gun at him, and that during the 
confrontation Respondent had a gun in his hand.  Another witness, the victim’s 
cousin and companion the night of the incident, testified that one of the defendants 
pulled the victim from the car and that Guerrier “pulled a gun” on the victim.  The 
arresting officer testified that after being warned of his rights, Guerrier said that he 
had asked the victim to get out of a car occupied by some women who were friends 
of Guerrier and Alexis and that then Alexis had pulled the victim out of the car. 
At a later point in the trial, after the State rested, the following exchange 
took place: 
THE COURT:  Are the defendants going to testify? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  So I have got . . . instructions on—let me go 
ahead and ask you then, if that’s your decision, because even though I 
always say it’s a good idea to listen to your lawyer, and the final 
analysis in the decision of whether you testify or not is yours alone 
and you have a constitutional right not to testify and you also have a 
constitutional right to testify, but it has to be your decision.  I tell the 
jury one thing based on what you decide to do.  So, have you both 
decided that you do [wish] to be a witness? 
THE DEFENDANTS:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  All right, then I will –  
[PROSECUTOR]:  Can we also just question again about, I 
know we questioned them before about any possible conflicts in their 
defenses and them waiving being represented by the same attorney. 
THE COURT:  Let me ask you that too, [defense counsel] says 
you all decided [you were] not going to have separate juries, we’re 
going to do it together and you all are going to waive any possible 
conflict there might be with him representing both of you, is that 
right? 
 
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THE DEFENDANTS:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  I just want to make sure there’s no 
problem down the road.  Okay.   
 
Both of the defendants testified that they pulled the victim out of the car 
together.  They both denied possessing or displaying a gun during the encounter 
and they each denied that the other displayed or possessed a gun.  As stated above, 
Respondent was convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm. 
On appeal, initially Respondent’s conviction was affirmed without opinion.  
See Alexis v. State, 65 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).  However, on 
Respondent’s petition claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the 
district court granted him a new appeal limited to the issue of whether “his waiver 
of the right to conflict-free trial counsel was invalid.”  Alexis v. State, 112 So. 3d 
144, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).  Upon consideration of the new appeal, the district 
court held that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry when 
Respondent consented to his attorney representing both him and his codefendant 
and that the error could not be found harmless.  See Alexis, 140 So. 3d at 618-19. 
The district court grounded its decision on its earlier decision in Lee v. State, 
690 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and this Court’s decision in Larzelere v. 
State, 676 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1996).  In Lee, the court stated that when counsel 
discloses before trial a possible conflict of interest with the defendant, “the trial 
court must either conduct an inquiry to determine whether the asserted conflict of 
 
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interest will impair the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel or 
appoint separate counsel.”  Lee, 690 So. 2d at 667.  In Lee, the district court found 
that the defendant and defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest due to the 
circumstances surrounding defense counsel’s recent representation of the State’s 
main witness.  The court turned to Larzelere for the “requirements of a valid 
waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel.”  Lee, 690 So. 2d at 667.   In Larzelere, 
we said:  “For a waiver [of conflict-free counsel] to be valid, the record must show 
that the defendant was aware of the conflict of interest, that the defendant realized 
the conflict could affect the defense, and that the defendant knew of the right to 
obtain other counsel.”  Larzelere, 676 So. 2d at 403 (citing United States v. 
Rodriguez, 982 F.2d 474, 477 (11th Cir. 1993)).  The Lee court found that the trial 
court had “met the first two requirements of the test but not the third,” Lee, 690 So. 
2d at 667, and held that the court’s error could not be deemed harmless.  The court 
based the conclusion that such error could not be treated as harmless on cases 
where the United States Supreme Court reasoned that requiring a defendant to face 
trial with an attorney operating under a conflict of interest amounts to a denial of 
the right to counsel itself, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Glasser 
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), superseded in part on other grounds by Fed. 
R. Evid. 104(a), the denial of which is never treated as harmless because prejudice 
is presumed.  See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967). 
 
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In the present case, the district court found that the inquiry conducted by the 
trial court only covered the first element, awareness of the conflict.  The other two 
elements required by Larzelere—the defendant’s knowing that the conflict could 
affect the defense and knowing of the right to other counsel—were not covered by 
the trial court’s inquiry, nor, the district court found, did they appear to be satisfied 
by looking elsewhere in the record.  See Alexis, 140 So. 3d at 619.  The district 
court reversed Respondent’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENTS 
The State argues that a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel is only 
required when there is an actual conflict of interest and that an attorney’s 
representation of two or more codefendants does not necessarily create an actual 
conflict of interest.  Defense counsel’s calling the court’s attention to a potential 
conflict of interest from dual representation, the State argues, did not trigger an 
obligation to conduct the three-part inquiry discussed in Larzelere, because a 
Larzelere inquiry and waiver are only required when there is an actual conflict of 
interest.  In the State’s view, since the codefendants’ respective defenses were 
compatible rather than conflicting—they both admitted pulling the victim from the 
car, they both denied being armed, and neither claimed the other was armed—the 
dual representation did not create a conflict of interest between Respondent and his 
attorney.  If there was no actual conflict of interest, the State maintains, then there 
 
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was no need for a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel.  The State argues that 
the district court misapplied Lee: in Lee there was an actual conflict of interest, and 
the court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry to ensure that the defendant’s 
waiver of the conflict was a knowing one.  The present case, the State argues, is 
not controlled by Lee because here there was no actual conflict. 
Respondent argues that the district court’s reversal of his conviction should 
be upheld because (1) there was a conflict of interest between Respondent and his 
defense attorney caused by the attorney’s divided loyalty in representing two 
codefendants whose interests were in conflict; and (2) Respondent’s purported 
waiver was not valid because the trial court failed to conduct the proper inquiry to 
ensure that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Respondent 
questions the State’s distinction between potential and actual conflicts of interest 
and argues that once a court is made aware of any possibility of a conflict—such as 
might arise in a case of dual representation—the court must conduct the full three-
part inquiry discussed in Larzelere.  Although he consented on the record to dual 
representation, Respondent argues that this purported waiver was not valid because 
the trial court failed to conduct the proper inquiry and advise the defendant to 
ensure that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.  Thus Respondent concludes 
that he was defended by an attorney with a conflict of interest and there was no 
valid waiver.  As in Lee, Respondent argues, there can be no harmless error inquiry 
 
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because prejudice from an attorney’s conflict of interest is presumed.  Respondent 
relies on Thomas v. State, 785 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), where the Second 
District Court of Appeal, citing Lee, held that the trial court, having been advised 
that defense counsel had formerly represented a prosecution witness, erred in 
failing to obtain “a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of [the] right to 
conflict-free counsel.”  Thomas, 785 So. 2d at 629.      
ANALYSIS 
 
We are presented with the legal issue of whether a waiver—along with the 
appropriate inquiry to ensure the knowing and voluntary nature of the waiver—was 
required under the facts of this case.  The standard of review for a legal issue is de 
novo.  See, e.g., State v. Blair, 39 So. 3d 1190, 1191-92 (Fla. 2010); Insko v. State, 
969 So. 2d 992, 997 (Fla. 2007).  The issue of whether there was an actual conflict 
of interest is a mixed question of law and fact.  See Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 
786, 792 (Fla. 2002).  Mixed questions of law and fact require an appellate court to 
defer to the trial court on factual matters but provide independent review of legal 
determinations.  See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001); 
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 1999). 
As stated above, the cases relied on for this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction 
under express and direct conflict of decisions are Dixon, 758 So. 2d 1278, and 
Gorby, 630 So. 2d 544.  In Dixon, the appellant and her codefendant were tried 
 
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together and had the same defense attorney.  The trial court itself raised the issue 
and advised the defendant of the possible conflict of interest.  The court did not 
conduct a Larzelere three-part inquiry or obtain an express on-the-record waiver 
from the defendant.  On appeal the defendant claimed her lawyer had a conflict of 
interest and the court had erred in failing to conduct the three-part inquiry.  The 
Third District held that because the defendant did not object to the joint 
representation, to prevail on appeal she had to show that an actual conflict 
adversely affected the lawyer’s performance.  Dixon, 758 So. 2d at 1280.  In the 
joint representation context, the court said, a conflict of interest exists when one 
codefendant stands to gain significantly from actions of counsel that harm the 
interests of the other codefendant.  Id. at 1280-81.  A disparity in the amount of 
evidence of guilt between two codefendants does not necessarily create a conflict 
of interest.  Id. at 1281.  The court held:  “Before reaching the issue of waiver . . . it 
is essential to determine whether an actual conflict existed.”  Id. at 1280.  Finding 
no actual conflict of interest that adversely affected appellant’s defense, the court 
affirmed the conviction.  Id.  The district court decision in the instant case conflicts 
with Dixon because in Dixon, the court held that it was essential to determine 
whether there was an actual conflict of interest before reaching the issue of waiver, 
while in the instant case the court held that a waiver was required without first 
finding that there was an actual conflict of interest.   
 
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In Gorby, the appellant claimed his defense attorney had a conflict of 
interest because his former law partner had represented a state witness.  Defense 
counsel put the trial court on notice of the possible conflict, but did not move to 
withdraw.  On appeal, we held that to prevail on a claim of violation of the right to 
conflict-free counsel, a defendant must show that an actual conflict of interest 
affected counsel’s performance, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 
(1980).  Based on counsel’s actions as shown in the record, the Court found that 
Gorby had failed to show an actual conflict affecting counsel’s performance.  The 
potential conflict brought to the court’s attention by defense counsel did not 
become an actual conflict.  Gorby, 630 So. 2d at 546.  As in the instant case, 
defense counsel brought the issue of a possible conflict to the trial court’s 
attention, but did not object to the representation on the ground of conflict of 
interest.  Finding no actual conflict of interest, we did not hold that an inquiry into 
the knowing and voluntary nature of any waiver by the defendant was required.  
The decision under review therefore also conflicts with our decision in Gorby. 
 
Respondent argues that the district court was correct to reverse his 
conviction because the trial court’s failure to conduct the three-part inquiry after 
the issue of conflict of interest was raised violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and such a violation requires automatic reversal without regard to 
prejudice.  As did the district court, Respondent relies heavily on Lee, 690 So. 2d 
 
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664, which in turn cited as authority the United States Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Holloway and Glasser.   
In Lee, defense counsel, an assistant public defender, disclosed to the trial 
court that his office had recently defended the State’s key witness on a criminal 
charge; the witness had been the defendant’s cellmate and was to testify that the 
defendant had confessed.  The court obtained a waiver from the defendant after 
explaining to him what a conflict of interest is and what effect it might have on his 
attorney’s ability to cross-examine the witness or use privileged information 
against him.  The defendant waived the conflict of interest, but later attempted to 
withdraw his waiver, stating he wanted a lawyer who could challenge the witness.  
Finding that the earlier waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the court 
refused to revisit the issue of conflict and told the defendant he could either 
continue with the same appointed counsel, hire his own lawyer, or represent 
himself.  Lee, 690 So. 2d at 665-67.  On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal 
found that under the circumstances, the Public Defender’s Office having recently 
represented the State’s witness created an actual conflict of interest.  The 
defendant’s waiver, however, was obtained without an adequate inquiry into the 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the waiver.  The trial court explained 
what a conflict of interest was and how it might affect the defense, but did not 
advise the defendant of his right to have other counsel appointed.  Thus, the first 
 
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and second elements of the Larzelere three-part inquiry were included, but not the 
third element.  Since there was an actual conflict of interest and no valid waiver, 
the district court reversed the conviction.  Lee, 690 So. 2d at 667-69.    
In Glasser, the trial court required Glasser’s attorney to represent another 
defendant over Glasser’s objection that he wanted his attorney to represent only 
him.  On appeal, Glasser argued that defense counsel’s duty to the second 
defendant prevented him from properly defending Glasser.  The record showed 
that defense counsel was inhibited in his defense of Glasser because of his duty to 
the other defendant.  This was a conflict of interest.  The Court reversed Glasser’s 
conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding: “The right to have the assistance 
of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice 
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.”  Glasser, 315 
U.S. at 76. 
 
In Holloway, appointed counsel for three codefendants moved for 
appointment of separate counsel on the ground that confidential communications 
he had received from the defendants made a conflict of interest likely.  One 
defendant had made a statement to the police incriminating the others and 
admitting less serious culpability for himself.  At trial, all three defendants denied 
their guilt, and defense counsel, continuing to object, believed he could not cross-
examine or even question them because their interests were in conflict.  The Court 
 
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observed that permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants does not deny 
the right to effective counsel per se and it can even be beneficial.  Holloway, 435 
U.S. at 482.  However, when defense counsel objected and argued to the trial court 
that he believed there was a probability that the interests of the defendants were in 
conflict, the trial court was obligated to either appoint separate counsel or “take 
adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate 
counsel.”  Id. at 484.  The trial court’s failure to take either action deprived the 
defendants of the right to the assistance of counsel.  The Court placed great weight 
on the role of defense counsel, observing that counsel is in the best position to 
judge the potential for a conflict of interest and suggesting that when counsel, 
based on representations made as an officer of the court, seeks appointment of 
separate counsel on the ground of conflict, it should generally be granted.  Id. at 
485-86.  The Court went on to hold, based on Glasser, that “whenever a trial court 
improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is 
automatic.”  Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488.  Prejudice is presumed because the right 
to the assistance of counsel is essential to the fairness of a trial.  Id. at 489-91. 
 
  In arguing that the Holloway rule, requiring a court to appoint separate 
counsel or conduct an inquiry, applies to his case, Respondent equates his 
attorney’s bringing up the issue of joint representation in court to the defendants’ 
clear objections in Glasser and Holloway.  However, defense counsel in the instant 
 
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case did not object, nor did he claim he could not effectively represent both 
defendants.  He represented to the court that there was no impediment to joint 
representation.  In Cuyler, the Court stated that unless a court knows or should 
know of a conflict, the Sixth Amendment does not require a state court to initiate 
inquiry into the issue of a conflict of interest from multiple representation.  
Multiple representation alone does not violate the Sixth Amendment, and in the 
absence of an objection, a court can presume there is no conflict of interest.  When 
the defendant does not object, only an actual conflict of interest violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights; courts should not presume that a possible 
conflict will violate the Sixth Amendment.  “[T]he possibility of conflict is 
insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.  In order to demonstrate a violation of 
his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. 
 
Respondent disputes the validity of the distinction the State draws between a 
possible or potential conflict of interest and an actual conflict of interest.  In either 
event, Respondent argues, if the issue is brought to the court’s attention, an inquiry 
must be conducted, failing which, under the federal Sixth Amendment caselaw, 
reversal is automatic without any need for a showing of adverse effect on the 
representation.  However, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), explains that 
the presumption of prejudice means that the defendant whose right to the 
 
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assistance of counsel has been violated need not show an effect on the outcome.  
Id. at 166-67.  When the claim is that the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry 
about a potential conflict which it knew or should have known about, the claimant 
must show that a conflict of interest affected counsel’s performance.  Id. at 170-72.  
Showing an effect on counsel’s performance is essential to showing an actual 
conflict of interest; a theoretical conflict is almost always present in cases of 
multiple representation.  Id. at 169-70.  The “prejudice” that need not be shown 
when Sixth Amendment rights are denied is a probability of effect on the outcome 
sufficient to undermine the reliability of the verdict.  Id. at 166.  An attorney’s 
active representation of conflicting interests is an “actual” conflict of interest; joint 
representation of codefendants by itself is at most a possible, potential, or 
theoretical conflict.  Under the United States Supreme Court’s caselaw, the 
distinction drawn by the State is valid, and decisions holding that a conflict of 
interest violates the right to counsel and is per se reversible apply to actual 
conflicts, i.e., conflicts that adversely affect counsel’s performance. 
 
In Mickens, a state prisoner convicted of murder sought federal habeas 
corpus relief, claiming his appointed counsel was ineffective because of a conflict 
of interest.  Unknown to the defendant, counsel had previously represented the 
murder victim.  Counsel accepted the appointment to represent the defendant 
without objection, but the judge was presumptively aware of the prior 
 
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representation, having made the prior appointment less than three weeks before 
appointing counsel to the defendant’s case.  The petitioner argued that the language 
of the Court’s remand order in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), directing 
the trial court to grant a new probation revocation hearing if it found an “actual 
conflict of interest” without also requiring a finding of adverse effect on counsel’s 
performance, established a principle that a showing of adverse effect was not 
required.  Rejecting this argument, the Court said:  “As used in the remand 
instruction . . . we think ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict 
that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of 
loyalties.  It was shorthand for the statement in [Cuyler v.] Sullivan that ‘a 
defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of 
his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.’ ” 
Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50).  Holding that a 
showing of adverse effect was required and had not been made, the Court upheld 
the denial of habeas relief.  The decision supports the State’s position that the 
phrase “actual conflict of interest” includes the element of adverse effect on the 
representation.  Requiring a criminal defendant to proceed with an attorney with 
whom the defendant has an actual conflict of interest is a violation of the 
defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  Caselaw holding that 
such a violation cannot be harmless should be understood to mean that there is no 
 
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requirement to show a probable effect on the outcome.  Some adverse or 
detrimental effect on the representation, however, is required in order to establish 
an actual conflict of interest.   
 
As discussed above, the Lee case held: “When defense counsel makes a 
pretrial disclosure of a possible conflict of interest with the defendant, the trial 
court must either conduct an inquiry to determine whether the asserted conflict of 
interest will impair the defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel or 
appoint separate counsel.”  690 So. 2d at 667.  The phrase “asserted conflict of 
interest” in the main clause of this sentence must be understood to relate back to 
the phrase “possible conflict of interest” in the dependent clause.  Before deciding 
that the trial court had erred in failing to ensure a valid waiver, the district court in 
Lee found there was “an actual conflict of interest.”  Id.  The requirement to 
“conduct an inquiry” does not necessarily mean there must be a waiver with a full 
three-part inquiry to determine the knowing and voluntary nature of the waiver.  
Here, Respondent stated on the record that he agreed to his attorney representing 
both him and his codefendant.  The statement was made in a colloquy during 
which defense counsel represented to the court that he had discussed the dual 
representation with his clients.  The colloquy between the trial judge and the 
defendant at the time of this statement did not satisfy the requirements of the 
Larzelere three-part inquiry.  But there was no need for an inquiry into the 
 
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knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the waiver because, since there had 
been no finding of an actual conflict of interest, there was no need for a waiver.   
The district court of appeal applied the standard for “waiver of conflict-free 
counsel” to a case where counsel was not shown to have labored under an actual 
conflict of interest.  This was error.   
 
The decision of the district court of appeal is quashed and the case is 
remanded with directions that Respondent’s conviction be affirmed.  To the extent 
that Thomas v. State, 785 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and Forsett v. State, 790 
So. 2d 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), hold that a waiver is required in the absence of a 
determination that an actual conflict of interest exists, they are inconsistent with 
our holding and are disapproved to the extent of the inconsistency. 
 
It is so ordered.  
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D13-2489 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, 
Criminal Appeals, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Dane Kristofor Chase of Chase Law Florida, P.A., Saint Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent