Title: Bird v. Rozier

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bird v. Rozier1997 WY 129948 P.2d 888Case Number: 95-232Decided: 12/03/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

CHESTER L. BIRD, 

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

STEVEN ROZIER, in his official capacity and 
individually, 

and MONTY TRENARY, in his official capacity and 
individually, 

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County 

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 

 

Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring specially in which 
Macy, J., joined. 

  

Chester L. 
Bird, pro se. 

 

Hugh Kenny, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Joanna J. Shaff, Law Student/Extern, for 
Rozier and Trenary in their individual capacities; Ann M. Rochelle of Williams, 
Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for Rozier in his official capacity; 
and Judith Studer and Kathleen J. Doyle of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, 
Casper, for Trenary in his official capacity.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Chester L. Bird, 
appellant, filed a civil complaint against Kathy Heppner, who allegedly 
deposited his paycheck into her account without his permission, as well as 
Officer Steven Rozier and Deputy Monty Trenary, whom he alleges breached their 
duty to investigate Heppner's actions. He sought declaratory relief and 
compensatory, nominal and punitive damages. The district court dismissed the 
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Bird appeals only the dismissal of the claim against the 
officers.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

[¶3]      Bird, acting pro 
se, presents the issue as follows:

 

 

Was the Sixth Judicial District Court in error when 
it adopted and entered ¶ 2 of its Order of Dismissal, upon false statements of 
facts interposed by the appellees, through their individual capacity counsel; 
less than an honest representation of pertinent legal authorities by appellees, 
through their individual capacity counsel; and when the Honorable Dan R. Price 
II was barred from continued action in the case, upon appellant filing a 
peremptory disqualification?

 

[¶4]      In his 
consolidated reply brief, Bird restates the issues in the following 
way:

 

I. The appellees were subject to liability for their 
refusal and/or failure to investigate Ms. Heppner for 
forgery.

II. The trial court did improperly consider 
"evidence" from outside the complaint when granting appellees' motions to 
dismiss.

III. Appellant's motion for peremptory 
disqualification as to Judge Price was timely.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      Bird alleges in 
his complaint that on February 23, 1994, Kathy Heppner wrote her personal 
checking account number on the back of Bird's payroll check and deposited the 
check into her account. Bird states that Heppner had previously been advised by 
Julie Bird that she was not to cash Bird's payroll checks, but to send them to 
him at the Campbell County Detention Center. After Heppner cashed Bird's check 
on February 23, Julie Bird contacted Officer Steve Rozier of the Gillette Police 
Department and Deputy Monty Trenary of the Campbell County Sheriff's Office on 
behalf of Bird to request an investigation of Heppner's conduct. According to 
Bird, both Rozier and Trenary refused to investigate Heppner on the basis that 
Bird was a convict and not entitled to enforcement of the law on his 
behalf.

 

[¶6]      Bird filed this 
civil action against Heppner, Rozier and Trenary. Bird claims that Heppner 
breached her legal and moral duty to act in accordance with his request not to 
cash his paycheck. He sought from Heppner compensatory damages of $392.05 for 
replacement of his payroll check, pre- and postjudgment interest, and punitive 
damages of $1,000. Bird states that the police officers' failure to investigate 
rendered them accessories after the fact to Heppner's forgery of his paycheck in 
violation of W.S. 6-3-602. He claims that the officers had a legal, moral and 
ethical duty to investigate Heppner's actions, that their failure to investigate 
and cause Heppner to be prosecuted constituted a conscious and intentional 
wrongdoing against Bird, that they breached their duties to abide by and to 
uphold and enforce the laws of Wyoming, and that their conduct was legally and 
professionally negligent and careless, as well as unconscionable. He sought 
judgment against the officers as follows:

 

(a) A Declatory [sic] Order, setting forth that the 
defendants had the legal, moral and/or ethical duty to abide by or uphold and 
enforce the laws of the State of Wyoming and that the conduct of the defendants, 
as set forth herein, violated said legal, moral and/or ethical 
duty.

* 
* * * * *

(c) Punitive Damages in the amount of one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) from * * * defendant Rozier and defendant Trenary in their 
individual capacities, each.

(d) Nominal Damages from defendant Rozier and 
defendant Trenary in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) each, in 
their official capacities.

(e) Costs of this action and such and further relief 
the Court deems just and finds to be necessary.

 

[¶7]      Motions to 
dismiss Bird's complaint were filed on behalf of Rozier in his official 
capacity, Trenary in his official capacity, Rozier and Trenary in their 
individual capacities, and Heppner. A hearing was held on July 10, 1995, with 
all parties present. Pursuant to that hearing, the court filed an Order of 
Dismissal on July 25, 1995. The court dismissed the claim against Heppner for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not 
meet the $7,000 jurisdictional threshold requirement for the district court. The 
court dismissed the claims against Rozier and Trenary with prejudice. The court 
determined that Bird's complaint did not set forth a justiciable controversy and 
did not present a fit subject for relief under Wyoming's Declaratory Judgment 
Act. In addition, the court found the complaint did not set forth a claim upon 
which relief could be granted because Bird failed to establish that the officers 
had a duty to investigate Bird's complaint that Heppner converted Bird's 
personal property to her own use. Bird appeals only that portion of the order 
which dismisses the claims against Rozier and Trenary in their individual and 
official capacities (hereinafter appellees).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      As a preliminary 
matter, we address Bird's contention that he timely moved for disqualification 
of Judge Price, barring Judge Price from taking further action in the case. 
Parties may peremptorily disqualify a judge by filing a motion within the 
prescribed time frame. In a multi-judge district (as is the Sixth Judicial 
District), a plaintiff must file a motion "within five days after the name of 
the assigned judge has been provided by a representative of the court to counsel 
for plaintiff by * * * a mailed notice." W.R.C.P. 
40.1(b)(1).

 

[¶9]      The record before 
us contains a "Notice of Assignment of Judge" stating the case was assigned to 
Judge Dan R. Price II. The notice was dated and filed May 16, 1995, signed by an 
administrative assistant of the court, and indicates that a copy was distributed 
to Bird. Pursuant to Rule 40.1(b)(1), Bird had until May 26, 1995, to file a 
motion for peremptory disqualification.1 Bird did not file his motion until 
June 22, 1995. In that motion, Bird stated that Julie Bird, who personally filed 
Bird's complaint, was informed that Judge O'Brien was assigned to the case. In 
addition, Bird asserted that he had no knowledge that Judge Price was acting in 
the case until he received the Case Management Order on June 15, 1995.2 On June 27, 1995, the court issued 
an order denying Bird's motion as untimely. Bird filed an objection to the 
denial on July 7, 1995.

 

[¶10]   A notation in the court file that a 
representative of the court distributed a notice raises a presumption that the 
notice was sent and received, absent a finding to the contrary. See Morelli v. Manpower, Inc., 34 Conn. 
App. 419, 642 A.2d 9, 11 (1994); cf. 
Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Young, 713 P.2d 198, 200-01 (Wyo. 1986) (noting 
presumption of regularity of acts of public administrative officials and 
recognizing presumption that delivery of mail matter occurs when it is properly 
addressed, stamped and mailed). Bird had the burden of rebutting this 
presumption by producing evidence that he did not receive notice. 2 JOHN W. 
STRONG, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (4th ed. 1992). This burden is not met by 
merely claiming in a late motion for peremptory disqualification, unsupported by 
affidavit or other competent evidence, that he did not know Judge Price was 
acting in the case until he received the Case Management Order. Welborn-Hosler v. Hosler, 870 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex. App. 1994).

 

[¶11]   A sworn affidavit stating that the 
filing was not received will not automatically overcome the presumption, but 
such an affidavit will create an issue of fact which must be resolved by the 
trial court. Camerota v. Kaufman, 666 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla.App. 1996). On November 6, 1995, Bird filed a statement 
from an officer at the Wyoming State Penitentiary indicating that the prison 
mail logs showed Bird did not receive any legal mail from the state district 
court from May 16 through May 23, 1995. This evidence, like a sworn affidavit, 
would have created an issue of fact to be resolved by the trial court. However, 
Bird did not present the statement to the trial court, nor make it a part of the 
record below. Instead, he offered it for the first time as a supplement to the 
record on appeal. This court, when exercising its appellate jurisdiction, is not 
the proper forum in which to develop facts. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., Inc., 
618 P.2d 547, 551 (Wyo. 1980); W.R.A.P. 1.04(a). Bird did not present any 
evidence to the trial court, nor did he request a hearing to present evidence in 
either the motion for disqualification or the objection following denial. 
Consequently, we hold that Bird did not effectively rebut the presumption that 
he received the Notice of Assignment and the district court did not err in 
denying his motion for peremptory disqualification as 
untimely.

 

[¶12]   We turn, then, to Bird's contention 
that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint. When reviewing a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, this court accepts all facts stated in the 
complaint as being true and views them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575 (Wyo. 1996). Dismissal is a drastic remedy and is sparingly granted. Id. Nevertheless, we will sustain a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint 
that the plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would entitle him to 
relief. Id. A district court judgment 
may be affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by the record. Del Rossi v. Doenz, 912 P.2d 1116, 1119 
(Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶13]   Bird's primary argument is that 
appellees breached their legal, moral and/or ethical duty to investigate Heppner 
based on a complaint made by Julie Bird that Heppner deposited Bird's payroll 
check into Heppner's personal account. Though not clearly expressed in the 
complaint, Bird's claims are apparently founded on negligence principles.3 A cause of action founded upon 
negligence requires the plaintiff to establish that: 1) the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, 2) the defendant 
breached the duty of care, 3) the defendant's breach proximately caused injury 
to the plaintiff, and 4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by 
money damages. Keehn v. Town of 
Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 115 (Wyo. 1992); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).

 

[¶14]   In reviewing Bird's complaint, we 
conclude his negligence claim must fail because Bird does not establish an 
essential element - that he suffered any actual loss or damage. Bird sought only 
nominal and punitive damages from appellees.

 

Nominal damages, to vindicate a technical right, 
cannot be recovered in a negligence action, where no actual loss has occurred. * 
* * Negligent conduct in itself is not such an interference with the interests 
of the world at large that there is any right to complain of it, or to be free 
from it, except in the case of some individual whose interests have 
suffered.

 

Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1979). Likewise, if a 
plaintiff has failed to establish his basic cause of action, there is no 
separate cause of action for punitive damages alone. Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Wyo. 
1982). Absent compensatory damages, there is no cause of action at all and 
nothing to support an award of punitive damages. Id. Because Bird failed to allege 
compensatory damages, we need not reach the question of whether appellees owed 
any legal duty of care to Bird.

 

[¶15]   Bird also requested a declaratory 
order setting forth that appellees had a legal, moral and/or ethical duty to 
abide by or uphold and enforce the laws of Wyoming and that they violated their 
duty. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act authorizes Wyoming courts to declare 
the rights, status or other legal relations of parties. W.S. 1-37-101 et seq. 
(1988). The court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment where the judgment 
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy at issue. W.S. 1-37-108. 
Because the court has the discretion to deny declaratory relief where it would 
not be effective or would be inappropriate, a declaratory judgment is generally 
not available with respect to allegations of past negligence and damage. 22A 
AM.JUR.2D Declaratory Judgments § 66 
(1988). Similarly, a declaratory judgment cannot be employed as a device to 
enforce criminal statutes through the direct action of private parties. Id. § 67. If it appears from the face of 
the complaint that no justiciable controversy is present; dismissal is proper. 
See Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 
Wyo. 417, 466-67, 154 P.2d 318, 337 (1944).

 

[¶16]   Here, on the facts stated in Bird's 
complaint, no case is made showing that Bird is entitled to declaratory relief. 
Giving or refusing the relief requested in his complaint - a declaration that 
appellees violated a legal duty to abide by the law, enforce the law, or uphold 
the law - would have no effect upon the rights, status or legal relationship of 
Bird and appellees. Compare Wyoming Nat'l 
Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 285 (Wyo. 1994), 
where granting or denying the requested relief - placement of initiative on 
ballot - would effectively end the factual dispute between the parties. See also Taylor v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 182, 330 P.2d 954, 955 (1958) (court not required to adjudicate with respect to 
administrative orders absent showing that a judgment, if entered, would afford 
plaintiff present relief). In this case, a judgment would have no practical 
effect on the litigants and would serve no useful purpose. See Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Wyo. 1992). No justiciable controversy was presented to the 
district court, and the court did not err in so finding.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   Based on the record before it, we 
hold the district court did not err in denying Bird's request for a peremptory 
disqualification of the judge as untimely. Consequently, Judge Price had 
jurisdiction to proceed. Bird's negligence claim against the officers fails 
because he alleged no compensatory damages. Nor is a declaratory judgment an 
appropriate measure in this case because there is no justiciable controversy. 
Because Bird's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, the district court's Order of Dismissal is 
affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 
W.R.C.P. 6(d) provides that three days shall be added to the prescribed period 
when notice is served upon a party by mail. In addition, W.R.C.P. 6(a) states 
that where the time period prescribed is less than eleven days, weekends and 
legal holidays are excluded when computing the response date. Therefore, Bird 
had eight days, not counting weekends and holidays, in which to file a motion 
for peremptory disqualification. May 16 was a Tuesday. By our calculation, Bird 
had until Friday, May 26 to file the motion.

2 
Appellees incorrectly assert that even if Bird's first notification that Judge 
Price was the assigned judge was the Case Management Order, his motion was still 
not timely. Assuming the Case Management Order was mailed on the day it was 
dated, Tuesday, June 13, 1995, Bird's motion must have been filed by Friday, 
June 23. The motion was actually filed on June 22, 1995.

3 
Although Bird's complaint alleges that appellees' conduct was intentional, 
wanton, malicious and illegal, we are unable to discern from the complaint a 
legally cognizable, claim for any intentional tort recognized in Wyoming. 
Therefore, we do not address those allegations further.

 

THOMAS, Justice, concurring specially, with whom 
MACY, Justice, joins. 

[¶18]   This appeal must be dismissed, and 
the district court's order should be vacated for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. I am concerned because of the silence of the majority opinion with 
respect to the jurisdictional amount. That silence could lead to a legal 
inference that the claims against the officer defendants could be aggregated to 
achieve the requisite amount in controversy to establish jurisdiction in the 
district court. My investigation persuades me that the claim against each of the 
police officers would have to exceed $7,000 in order for the district court to 
be vested with jurisdiction. I am also satisfied that there is an additional 
reason for concluding that Bird's pleading fails to state a 
claim.

 

[¶19]   Bird alleges in his 
Complaint:

2. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Article 5, § 10, of the State of Wyoming Constitution and the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Plaintiff has made a claim unto both 
defendant Rozier's and defendant Trenary's respective employers, as is required 
by W.S. § 1-39-101 et seq., and said claims were denied.

 

In Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771-72 (Wyo. 1993) (emphasis added), we said:

 

In this instance, Amrein alleged the filing of the 
claim, but we expand upon the rule articulated in Bell [Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming 
v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1983)] and now hold that, in order to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the district court, such an allegation must encompass a 
statement of the date the claim was filed to demonstrate the filing of the claim 
within two years of the date of the "alleged act, error or omission" or, 
alternatively, the statutory ground for the late discovery of the "alleged act, 
error or omission." Since Amrein failed to make this allegation, the complaint 
was subject to dismissal for failure to allege the jurisdiction of the court 
with specificity. We recognize dismissal is within the discretion of the 
trial court, and it would generally be appropriate to enter that dismissal 
without prejudice. Boller v. Key Bank of 
Wyoming, 829 P.2d 260 (Wyo. 1992); Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. of 
Hartford, Connecticut, 608 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1980), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 1039, 102 S. Ct. 1743, 72 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1982); Breazeale v. 
Radich, 500 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1972). In this case, it appears from the file that 
it would be impossible for Amrein to present the requisite allegations and, 
consequently, we affirm the order of dismissal as to Dr. 
Swanson.

 

The allegation in Bird's 
Complaint is insufficient under Amrein.

 

[¶20]   In the Answer of Steve Rozier in 
His Official Capacity (emphasis added) it is alleged:

 

2. To the extent that Paragraph No. 2 of Plaintiff's 
Complaint calls for legal conclusion, all allegations therein are denied. 
Defendant Rozier in his official capacity denies that there has been compliance with 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. All other allegations in Paragraph No. 2 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint are denied.

 

As an affirmative defense 
the same pleading alleges:

 

3. There has been no compliance with the Wyoming 
Governmental's [sic] Claims Act.

 

In the Answer of Defendants 
Steven Rozier and Monty Trenary, Individually, it is 
alleged:

 

2. These answering defendants have insufficient 
information to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 2 and therefore deny 
the same.

 

In the Answer of Monty 
Trenary in His Official Capacity, it is alleged:

 

2. Inasmuch as Paragraph No. 2 calls for legal 
conclusion, the allegations contained therein are denied. All other averments 
expressed or implied contained within Paragraph No. 2 of the Plaintiff's 
Complaint are also denied.

 

* * * * * *

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

* * * * * *

 

4. The Plaintiff has failed to comply with the 
Wyoming Government [sic] Claims Act; therefore, this claim is 
barred.

 

In the Motion to Dismiss 
filed on behalf of Steve Rozier, one of the grounds stated 
is:

 

3. The Complaint fails to state a claim for relief 
pursuant to W.S. § 1-39-101 et seq.

 

The claims, if there were 
any, are not included in the Record on Appeal. Other than the quotations above, 
the matter of the filing of claims in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
district court is not addressed in the Record on Appeal. The appeal should be 
dismissed and the order of the district court vacated because the failure to 
properly allege the timely filing of any claim deprives the trial court of 
jurisdiction.

 

[¶21]   As a further ground for dismissal, 
I note that our statute provides:

 

(a) Each county court has exclusive original civil 
jurisdiction within the boundaries of the state for:

 

(i) An action where the prayer for recovery is an 
amount not exceeding seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00), exclusive of court 
costs; * * *

 

WYO. STAT. § 5-5-131(a) 
(1992). The effect of this statute is to deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction over such claims. Joslyn v. 
Professional Realty, 622 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Wyo. 1981). See Daulton v. Daulton, 774 P.2d 635 
(Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶22]   In pertinent part, the relief 
sought by Bird is described by him in his Complaint:

 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Chester L. Bird, prays for and 
otherwise demands judgment against the defendants, jointly, severally and in 
their official and individual capacities, as follows:

 

* * * * * *

 

(b). Compensatory Damages in the amount of three 
hundred and ninty-two [sic] dollars and five cents ($392.05) from defendant 
Heppner for replacement of the Plaintiff's payroll check, plus 1 1/2 % per month 
in prejudgment interest and 1 1/2 % per month in postjudgment 
interest.

 

(c). Punitive Damages in the amount of one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) from defendant Heppner, defendant Rozier and defendant 
Trenary in their individual capacities, each.

 

(d). Nominal Damages from defendant Rozier and 
defendant Trenary in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) each, in 
their official capacities. * * *

 

[¶23]   None of the parties raised the 
question of subject matter jurisdiction, but this Court has the right to 
consider the question of jurisdiction on its own motion. Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769 (Wyo. 1993); Kurpjuweit v. 
Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1985); Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 569 (Wyo. 
1979); Jackson v. State, 547 P.2d 1203 (Wyo. 1976); Wyoming State Treasurer 
ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dept. v. Niezwaag, 444 P.2d 327 (Wyo. 1968); 
Big Horn Coal Co. v. Sheridan-Wyoming 
Coal Co., 67 Wyo. 300, 224 P.2d 172 (1950). Indeed, we have a duty to do so. 
Niezwaag; Big Horn Coal 
Co.

 

[¶24]   I turn to federal cases for 
authority that I find eminently persuasive in this instance. In cases brought in 
the federal courts based upon diversity of citizenship between the parties, the 
statute provides, with respect to the jurisdictional 
amount:

 

(a) The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the 
sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between 
-

(1) citizens of different States; * * 
*

 

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). At 
various times the jurisdictional amount has been $3,000 and $10,000, but almost 
without exception the federal courts have ruled that, in the absence of joint 
liability, claims against several defendants cannot be aggregated to achieve the 
minimum jurisdictional amount. Davis v. 
Schwartz, 155 U.S. 631, 15 S. Ct. 237, 39 L. Ed. 289 (1895); Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U.S. 370, 13 S. Ct. 348, 37 L. Ed. 206 (1893); Libby, McNeill, and Libby v. City Nat. 
Bank, 592 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 683 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1976); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 404 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 
394 U.S. 988, 89 S. Ct. 1470, 22 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1969); Oikarinen v. Alexian Bros., 342 F.2d 155 
(3rd Cir. 1965); Jewell v. Grain Dealers 
Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1961); Reason v. General Motors Corp., 896 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.Ind. 1995); North American 
Mechanical Services Corp. v. Hubert, 859 F. Supp. 1186 (C.D.Ill. 1994); Crouch v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 596 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Corporate 
Resources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Surgical Center, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 503 (N.D.Ill. 1991); Hatcher v. 
Emergency Medical Specialty Services, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1124 (D.N.J. 1986); 
Carpenter v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. 
Co., 524 F. Supp. 249 (M.D.La. 1981); Welker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
502 F. Supp. 268 (C.D.Cal. 1980); Payne 
v. Volkswagon (sic) of America, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 565 (W.D.Okla. 1976); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); United Bonding Ins. Co. 
v. Parke, 293 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.Mo. 1968); Fratto v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 
242 F. Supp. 262 (W.D.Pa. 1965), aff'd on 
other grounds sub nom, Fratto v. New Amsterdam Fire Ins. Co., 359 F.2d 842 
(3rd Cir. 1966); Smith v. Abbate, 201 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Bree v. 
Mutual Ben. Health and Acc. Ass'n, 182 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.Pa. 1959); Whitford v. Boston Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 819 (E.D.Ill. 1958); Calvert 
Distillers Corp. v. Rosen, 115 F. Supp. 146 (N.D.Ill. 1953); Fechheimer Bros. Co. v. Barnwasser, 
146 F.2d 974 (C.C.A.6 1945). One state court has arrived at a similar 
conclusion. Crane v. Fulton, 270 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1978).

 

[¶25]   Bird pleaded an intentional wrong 
with respect to Rozier and Trenary in their individual capacities. Nothing in 
the Complaint suggests any joint activity by them or any agency relationship. 
Rozier was a police officer employed by the City of Gillette, and Trenary was a 
deputy sheriff employed by the Sheriff of Campbell County. While Bird asserts 
joint and several liability of the two officers, no fact is alleged that would 
serve to make either of them responsible for the conduct of the other. Under the 
federal rule set forth above, it would not be possible to aggregate the damages 
of $5,000 plus the punitive damages of $1,000 pleaded as to each of them so as 
to go beyond the $7,000 level as to which the county court has exclusive 
jurisdiction.

 

[¶26]   I would remand this case to the 
district court with instruction that it must be dismissed because exclusive 
jurisdiction over Bird's claims as to each of the defendants is assigned to the 
county court.