Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF BOBBY JOE: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. BOBBY JOE PICKENS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF BOBBY JOE: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. BOBBY JOE PICKENS2006 WY 54134 P.3d 1231Case Number: 05-162Decided: 05/04/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF BOBBY JOE

PICKENS:

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
BOBBY 
JOE PICKENS,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big HornCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Edward 
G. Luhm of Scott, Shelledy and Luhm, P.C., Worland, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ., and PERRY, 
D.J.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Bobby Joe Pickens 
(the claimant) sought permanent total disability benefits under the "odd lot" 
doctrine.  The Workers' Compensation 
Division (the Division) denied benefits and, after a contested case hearing, the 
Medical Commission (the Commission) agreed with the Division.  On appeal, the district court reversed 
the Commission and held that the claimant had proven his eligibility for odd lot 
treatment and awarded him permanent total disability benefits.  The Division now appeals.  We will reverse the district court and 
affirm the Commission's denial of permanent total disability benefits.   

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the Medical 
Commission err when it found that the claimant did not qualify for permanent 
total disability benefits under the odd lot doctrine?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      At the time of 
his contested case hearing before the Commission, the claimant was 51 years 
old.  The claimant dropped out of 
school in the ninth grade and reads at a fourth grade level.  He had been employed throughout his life 
as a truck driver, oil field worker, and equipment 
operator.

 
 
[¶4]      In September 
1990, the claimant worked for MI Drilling Fluids, LLC (the employer).  He was injured at work when a loader he 
was operating slid down a ramp and collided with a pile of material at the base 
of the ramp.  The claimant stated 
that he felt a tear under his shoulder blade and sought chiropractic treatment, 
but he did not report the injury to the Division.

 
 
[¶5]      In September 
1991, the claimant experienced another workplace injury when an employee struck 
him from behind hard enough "to be knocked off balance."  This injury was reported to the employer 
and the claimant sought workers' compensation benefits.  The Office of Administrative Hearings 
determined that the claimant had suffered a compensable workplace injury to his 
back and he was eventually assigned a 9% permanent whole body impairment based 
on loss of motion as well as a 36% loss of earnings award.

 
 
[¶6]      From 1992 until 
he filed the instant claim, the claimant was examined by a variety of doctors 
and rehabilitation specialists.  
During these visits, the claimant complained of increasing back pain, 
pain in his arms and legs, numbness in his limbs, headaches, insomnia, stress, 
and depression.  Different doctors 
attributed these symptoms to different disorders.  Some doctors attributed the symptoms to 
the claimant's original workplace injuries while others attributed some or all 
of the symptoms to intervening falls, diabetes, high blood pressure, heart 
problems, carpal tunnel syndrome, obesity, and/or psychological issues.  On December 31, 2001, the claimant was 
also awarded Social Security Disability benefits because he was "disabled as 
defined in the Social Security Act . . . ."

 
 
[¶7]      The claimant 
applied for permanent total disability benefits but the claim was denied by the 
Division on July 3, 2002.  The 
claimant objected to that determination and the Commission held a hearing on May 
7, 2003.  The claimant argued that 
he qualified for permanent total disability benefits under what is known as the 
odd lot doctrine.  On May 29, the 
Commission issued an order denying the claimant benefits, concluding that the 
claimant's current disability was due to factors unrelated to his compensable 
workplace injuries.

 
 
[¶8]      The claimant 
appealed the Commission's decision to the district court.  The district court reversed the 
Commission, holding that the claimant had proven that he was entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits under the odd lot doctrine.  The Division now appeals the district 
court's ruling.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      When reviewing 
administrative action, we conduct our review as if the appeal had come directly 
from the administrative agency and afford no deference to the conclusions of the 
district court.  Hicks v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 11, ¶ 16, 105 P.3d 462, 469 (Wyo. 2005).  The scope of our review is limited by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), which 
provides:

 
 
(c)    To the extent necessary to 
make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i)     Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii)    Hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A)   Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B)   Contrary to constitutional right, 
power, privilege or immunity;

(C)   In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)   Without observance of procedure 
required by law; or

(E)   Unsupported by substantial evidence 
in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 
 
[¶10]   The claimant in a workers' 
compensation case bears the burden of proving each element of his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 
2005 WY 160, ¶ 21, 124 P.3d 686, 693 (Wyo. 2005).  When both parties present evidence, as 
in the instant case, we apply the substantial evidence test.  Id., ¶ 23, 124 P.3d  at 694.  When reviewing 
findings of fact under the substantial evidence test, 

 
 
"we 
examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings.  If 
the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on 
appeal.  Substantial evidence is 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions.  It is more 
than a scintilla of evidence."

 
 

Cramer 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 
WY 124, ¶ 10, 120 P.3d 668, 671 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 
2002)).

 
 
[¶11]   Even where substantial evidence 
supports an administrative decision, this Court applies the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review as a "safety net" to catch agency actions that 
violate the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act.  Decker, ¶ 24, 124 P.3d  at 694.  "Under the umbrella of arbitrary and 
capricious actions would fall potential mistakes such as inconsistent or 
incomplete findings of fact or any violation of due process."  Padilla v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 10, ¶ 6, 84 P.3d 960, 962 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶12]   Of course, we review conclusions of 
law de novo to determine if they are 
truly in accordance with the law.  
Blommel v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Dep't of Empl., Div. of Workers' Safety & Comp., 2005 WY 128, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]   On appeal, the Division argues that 
the Commission properly applied the odd lot doctrine and found that the claimant 
did not qualify for permanent total disability benefits.  The claimant counters that the district 
court, not the Commission, properly applied the doctrine and found that he was 
entitled to such benefits.  We first 
adopted the odd lot doctrine in In re 
Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1941), and we 
recently also said the following:

 
 
This 
court has long recognized the odd lot doctrine with respect to permanent total 
disability determinations made within the purview of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act.  In the case of Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo.1983) this court stated:

 
 
            
In our opinion in Cardin v. 
Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 
603 P.2d 862 (1979), this court adopted a definition of the "odd-lot doctrine" 
as follows:

 
 
". . . 
The odd-lot doctrine' is described in 2 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 57.51 at p. 10-109 (1976), as providing that permanent total disability may 
be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well 
known branch of the labor market.'" 603 P.2d  at 863-864.

 
 
            
An injured workman who comes within the "odd-lot doctrine" need not show 
that he is totally incapable of doing any work at all in order to be entitled to 
an award for permanent total disability.  
This court has stated the proposition in this 
fashion:

 
 
". . 
.  The theory of counsel for the 
employer appears to be that the workman must go further than to show that he 
cannot do any hard work;  that he 
must also show that he cannot do light work.  Of course, it would almost be 
impossible, in many instances, for a man educated only to do hard work, to show 
that at some time or other some good Samaritan might not turn up and offer him 
some light work which he might be able to do.  The law does not require 
impossibilities.  It is stated in 71 
C.J. 1071 that where it is found that the employee is permanently and totally 
disabled so far as hard or manual work is concerned, but that he might do light 
work of a special nature not generally available, the burden is on the employer 
to show that such special work is available to the employee.' . . ."  In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 452, 110 P.2d 826 (1941).

 
 
            
This court went on further to enunciate in Schepanovich, at 
528:

 
 
The 
burden of proof initially is assigned to the injured workman who is seeking to 
qualify as permanently totally disabled under the "odd-lot doctrine" to 
demonstrate that he is incapacitated "from performing any work at any gainful 
occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience and training."  Section 27-12-405(a), W.S.1977; Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, supra.  The test to be invoked is whether the 
workman is so disabled that the services which he is reasonably equipped to 
perform by his experience and training are not marketable in a well-known branch 
of the labor market in the community so as to provide a steady and continuous 
source of income rather than sporadic or intermittent employment.  If that showing is made, the burden of 
proof is then shifted to the employer to show that light work of a special 
nature which the employee could perform but which is not generally available in 
fact is available to the employee.  

 
 
            
Finally, this court adopted the following rule formulated in 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.61, at 
10-164.95 to 1-164.114 (1982) through its opinion in Schepanovich, at 
528-29:

 
 
". . 
.  If the evidence of degree of 
obvious physical impairment, coupled with other facts such as the claimant's 
mental capacity, education, training, or age, places claimant prima facie in the 
odd-lot category, the burden should be on the employer to show that some kind of 
suitable work is regularly and continuously available to the claimant.  Certainly in such a case it should not 
be enough to show that claimant is physically capable of performing light work, 
and then round out the case for noncompensability by adding a presumption that 
light work is available . . . .

 
 
            
"The corollary of the general-purpose principle just stated would be 
this: If the claimant's medical impairment is so limited or specialized in 
nature that he is not obviously unemployable or relegated to the odd-lot 
category, it is not unreasonable to place the burden of proof on him to 
establish unavailability of work to a person in his circumstances, which 
normally would require a showing that he has made reasonable efforts to secure 
suitable employment . . . ."

 
 
            
Other jurisdictions in this context have held that an employee in 
circumstances similar to those of the appellant must show that reasonable 
efforts have been made to obtain suitable employment in order to meet their 
burden of proof and shift the burden of proof to the 
employer.

 
 

Vaughan 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 2002 
WY 131, ¶¶ 8-10, 53 P.3d 559, 561-62 (Wyo. 2002) (some internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶14]   Under the odd lot doctrine, a 
claimant who is not actually permanently totally disabled is able to receive 
permanent total disability benefits because the claimant's disability and other 
factors make the claimant de facto 
unemployable.1  The doctrine also works to shift the 
traditional burden in a workers' compensation case.  The claimant is required to make a prima facie showing that (1) "he is no 
longer capable of working at the job in which he was employed at the time of his 
injury," and (2) "the degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other 
facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age" qualify him for odd 
lot treatment.  City of Casper v. Bowdish, 713 P.2d 763, 765 (Wyo. 1986).  Once a claimant has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the Division to show that light work of a special nature which the claimant 
could perform is available.  
Id. at 
766.

 
 
[¶15]   Both parties agree that the 
claimant is currently unemployable for a variety of reasons.  However, the Commission found that the 
claimant's inability to obtain work was not attributable to his workplace 
injuries, but to subsequent falls, illnesses, and psychological factors.  Reasoning that "[m]any of [the 
claimant's] physical problems which lead to his current condition are unrelated 
to the work injuries," the Commission determined that the claimant was not 
eligible for permanent total disability benefits.  The district court reversed, holding 
that the claimant had met his initial burden because

 
 
[t]otal 
disability compensable under the odd-lot doctrine is not required to be totally 
attributable to the compensable injuries suffered in a work-related 
accident.  For example, in City of Casper v. Bowdish, 713 P.2d 763 
(1986), Bowdish, who qualified for total permanent disability benefits pursuant 
to the odd-lot doctrine, had been turned down for reemployment with the City of 
Casper because of a heart condition unrelated to the injury involved in his 
case.  It is the physical impairment 
from the work-related injury "coupled with other facts such as the claimant's 
mental capacity, education, training or age" that we are to consider.  Also, it is to be remembered that the 
test is whether he is so disabled that he cannot continue to do the work he is 
trained and equipped to do.  Once 
the claimant establishes that much, the burden shifts to the employer, or, in 
this case, to the DIVISION to prove the availability of light work that the 
employee could do.

 
 
[¶16]   We are presented with a mixed 
question of fact and law.  We must 
first determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding 
that subsequent injuries, medical, and mental conditions caused the claimant's 
inability to work or whether his current disability is work-related.  The question then becomes whether, 
considering those facts, the claimant is eligible for odd lot treatment as a 
matter of law.

 
 
[¶17]   The Commission summarized its 
factual findings as follows:

 
 
            
The Panel finds that [the claimant] has not met his burden of proof in 
this matter.  [The claimant's] 
testimony was not credible nor consistent in many respects.  Likewise, the history and symptoms 
reported by [the claimant] to health care providers was inconsistent.  Further, although [the claimant] may be 
disabled at this time, it cannot be said that his disability is related to his 
minor work injuries in 1990 and 1991.  
His injury at that time was a mid-back strain.  This back strain has progressed to 
global problems [a]ffecting [the claimant] including neck pain and headaches, 
upper extremity radicular symptoms, low back pain, and lower extremity radicular 
problems.  Many of his physical 
problems which lead to his current condition are unrelated to the work injuries 
and include intervening falls in which he injured his low back and fractured his 
tail bone, diabetes which is causing polyneuropathy, high blood pressure, heart 
problems, carpal tunnel syndrome, obesity, and well diagnosed psychological 
factors which [a]ffect his pain, perception of pain and claimed disability.  

 
 
Our 
standard of review requires us to accept the factual findings of the Commission 
if they are supported by substantial evidence. 

 
 
[¶18]   The claimant, in arguing that the 
district court correctly reversed the Commission's findings of fact, identifies 
three portions of the Commission's findings that he contends were 
erroneous.  He argues that:  (1) the Commission ignored the previous 
adjudication of his 9% impairment; (2) his current medical condition is 
"materially related" to his compensable workplace injury; and (3) the 
Commission's finding that psychological conditions are a factor in his 
disability is not supported by substantial evidence.2

 
 
[¶19]   In two paragraphs in his appellate 
brief, the claimant argues that the Commission sought to "reconsider the issue" 
of whether he suffered compensable workplace injuries in 1990 and 1991.3  From even a cursory reading of the 
Commission's findings, it is evident that this is not the case.  The Commission mentioned that it could 
not "determine if there were any pre-existing conditions prior to the 1990 work 
injury" not to "question the validity of the previous adjudication" as the 
claimant suggests, but merely to document that it had comprehensively analyzed 
the claimant's medical history.  The 
Commission noted that it had not been presented with evidence of any 
pre-existing conditionswhich, indeed, it had notwent on to discuss the 
claimant's workplace injuries that resulted in the 9% whole body impairment, and 
then discussed the injuries and diagnoses that occurred after his work-related 
injuries.  The Commission did not 
disregard the claimant's workplace injuries, nor did it attempt to reevaluate 
those injuries.

 
 
[¶20]   The claimant next argues that the 
Commission erred when it found that his current medical condition is largely 
unrelated to his previous workplace injuries.  The record before the Commission 
consisted of nearly 350 pages of medical and other reports submitted by the 
Division and the claimant.  While we 
do not feel it is necessary to describe each of these documents or quote at 
length the facts as laid out in the parties' briefs, the district court's 
decision letter, or the Commission's findings, we have reviewed the record and 
it is clear that the Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence 
on this issue.  The evidence that 
supports this conclusion includes the following:

 
 

 
 
[¶21]   Although the Commission could have 
interpreted the evidence differently, under the substantial evidence test we 
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Commission.  Cramer, ¶ 10, 120 P.3d  at 671.  The Commission's factual findings on 
this issue are based on relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
in support of its conclusions and we must therefore accept its 
determination.  Id.

 
 
[¶22]   In his final factual attack, the 
claimant argues that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's 
finding that psychological factors are enhancing the claimant's disability.  The claimant argues that any diagnoses 
of psychological factors enhancing his pain were "rule out" diagnoses, 
apparently meaning that psychological causes for his pain only existed if all 
physical possibilities for the pain were excluded.  The district court similarly found that 
sufficient evidence did not exist to support a finding that psychological 
factors were contributing to the claimant's injuries but noted that, even if 
such factors existed, the claimant still qualified for benefits pursuant to the 
odd lot doctrine.

 
 
[¶23]   The record is replete with 
diagnoses that support the view that the claimant suffered from both physical 
and psychological pain.  We have 
already noted some of the non-work-related physical factors that contribute to 
the claimant's disability and a variety of doctors also noted psychological 
factors that exacerbate his pain:

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
[¶24]   The thrust of the claimant's 
argument is that the Commission could not properly rely on Dr. Louis' diagnosis 
because he qualified his conclusion as a "rule out" diagnosis and physical 
symptoms were never ruled out.  This 
argument, however, ignores Dr. Norris' determination that the claimant was 
suffering from "non-anatomic" ailments and the claimant's test results did not 
match his symptomatic complaints.  
We, therefore, find that the Commission's determination that the claimant 
suffered from psychological pain is supported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
[¶25]   It is apparent to us that the 
Commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.  We also note, as a final factual matter, 
that the claimant has never argued that the 9% permanent partial impairment he 
suffered as a result of his original compensable injury barred him from 
continuing in his previous work with the employer.  The question now becomes whether, based 
on its factual findings, the Commission correctly applied the law when it 
determined that the claimant was not eligible for permanent total disability 
benefits under the odd lot doctrine.

 
 
[¶26]   We agree with the Division that the 
Commission correctly applied the odd lot doctrine and the district court erred 
in reversing the Commission's denial of benefits.  A claimant seeking odd lot treatment 
must first show that he is incapable of working at his previous employment due 
to injury and, after doing so, must show that his physical impairment along with 
"other facts" qualify him for treatment as a member of the odd lot 
category.  Bowdish, 713 P.2d  at 765.  Put another way, a claimant must first 
show that "he is no longer capable of working at the job in which he was 
employed at the time of his injury."  
Id.  Once that fact is established, a 
claimant must then show that he is unable to obtain employment in another field 
that he may be physically able to perform, but due to his "physical impairment, 
coupled with other facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age," 
he will not be able to find such employment.  Id. The district court combined these 
two burdens to find that the claimant had proven he was unable to perform his 
previous employment both through his original workplace injury and his unrelated 
other injuries and medical conditions.  
This was error.  

 
 
[¶27]   In determining that "it is not 
required that work injuries be the sole cause of the disability" under the odd 
lot doctrine, the district court relied on our opinion in Bowdish.  Specifically, the district court relied 
on a sentence in our recitation of the facts in which we said that Bowdish "had 
sought reemployment with the City of Casper, but had been turned down because of a 
heart condition unrelated to the injury involved in this case."  Id.  The district court apparently came to 
the conclusion that, just as Bowdish was unable to secure employment due to a 
non-work-related injury, the claimant in the instant case was eligible for odd 
lot treatment based on his myriad of non-work-related medical problems.  

 
 
[¶28]   The district court's reliance on Bowdish is misplaced.  As we noted above, a claimant must 
satisfy two distinct burdens under the odd lot doctrine.  The issue in Bowdish was whether that claimant had 
proven that he was incapacitated from performing work at any occupation for 
which he was suited by his experience or trainingi.e., whether he had proven 
the second element of his prima facie 
case.  Id. at 766.  Neither party argued that Bowdish was 
able to continue in his employment as a mechanic for the city of Casper after his 
injury.  We ultimately held that 
sufficient evidence supported the Commission's finding that Bowdish was unable 
to work in another type of employment.  
Id.  To the extent that Bowdish's heart 
condition was relevant at all, it only tended to show that he was disqualified 
from working in another capacity for the city of Casper, but it had clearly never disabled him 
from working in his previous employment as a mechanic for the 
city.

 
 
[¶29]   We also note that adopting the 
district court's reasoning would impermissibly expand permanent total disability 
benefit awards under the Worker's Compensation Act.  The Worker's Compensation Act is meant, 
axiomatically, to compensate workers for workplace injuries.  In the instant case, the claimant 
received permanent partial disability for his original workplace injury and 
ultimately was deemed to have a 9% total body impairment and received a 36% loss 
of earnings award.  As years passed, 
the claimant was injured and developed illnesses and symptoms unrelated to his 
original compensable injury.  
Because the claimant had already been compensated for his workplace 
injury, the district court's grant of permanent total disability essentially 
amounted to compensation for non-work-related injuries.  According to the district court's 
reasoning, a heavy laborer who suffered an injury that resulted in a 1% 
permanent partial impairment would inevitably one day qualify for permanent 
total disability because, as the injured party dealt with the complications of 
aging, he would eventually become too disabled to work at his previous 
employment and, because of some distant workplace injury, would qualify for "odd 
lot" treatment. 

 
 
[¶30]   As in Bowdish, our previous cases have 
generally dealt with the second element of a claimant's prima facie case.5  To the extent we have expounded on the 
first element, we have said that a claimant must demonstrate that he was 
"disabled by his work-related injury" and would be unable to work in his 
previous occupation.  Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp., 928 P.2d 473, 475 (Wyo. 
1996).  We have not, however, 
clarified exactly what quantum of proof is required to show that disability 
under the first element of the odd lot test is a result of a compensable 
workplace injury.  In a normal 
workers' compensation case, a claimant "bears the burden of proving a causal 
connection between the injury and the course of employment."  Stuckey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. 
Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Wyo. 1995).  "A causal connection exists when there 
is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment.'"  Id. (quoting Bearden v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 868 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo. 1994), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & 
Comp. Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1997)).  It would seem that, in the context of 
the odd lot doctrine, such a causal connection must also exist between the 
compensable workplace injury and the claimant's inability to work at the job in 
which he was employed at the time of the injury.

 
 
[¶31]   The requirement that a work-related 
injury must cause a claimant to be unable to continue his previous employment 
prevents the situation presented by the instant case, wherein a 
partially-injured worker develops conditions independent of his workplace injury 
and seeks permanent total disability.  
The Worker's Compensation statutes do not compensate all workers who are 
injured, but only workers who become injured in the course of their 
employment.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 2005).  In the same vein, we will not broadly 
construe the odd lot doctrine as the claimant asks us to do.  The doctrine is merely a specialized 
application of the definition of permanent total disability under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xvi).  Vaughan, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d  at 563.  It is not an avenue 
around the second compensable injury rule6 and the doctrine does not allow 
workers' compensation claimants to receive permanent total disability when their 
disability is not causally related to their workplace 
injury.

 
 
[¶32]   In the instant case, it is clear 
that the claimant is not eligible for permanent total disability under the odd 
lot doctrine and we must reverse the district court and reinstate the decision 
of the Commission.  The Commission 
found that the claimant's current inability to work in his previous employment 
is a consequence of non-work-related injuries and ailments.  Because the claimant failed to meet his 
initial burden of proving that his work-related injury disabled him from 
continuing in his previous employment, his claim for benefits under the odd lot 
doctrine was properly denied by the Commission.

 
 
[¶33]   As a final matter, we note that 
neither party has presented an argument regarding the timeliness of the 
application for benefits under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 (LexisNexis 2005)7 and we will not raise the issue sua sponte in this instance.  We will, however, reiterate what we said 
in Schepanovich, 669 P.2d  at 530, in 
the context of an odd lot discussion:

 
 
[W]e 
find that the matter of applications for modifications is troublesome in 
worker's compensation cases.  Having 
achieved the award of a permanent partial disability, the appellant was applying 
for additional benefits, i.e., the permanent total disability award, pursuant to 
§ 27-12-606, W.S.1977.[8]  By virtue of the statutory language, 
such an application is submitted on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud.'

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶34]   The claimant failed to prove his 
work-related injury barred him from working in his previous employment.  As a result, the Commission correctly 
found that he was not eligible for permanent total disability benefits under the 
odd lot doctrine and the district court's reversal of the Commission was 
error.  We reverse the district 
court and reinstate the Order of the Commission denying 
benefits.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"[T]his 
court has previously recognized the statutory definition for permanent total 
disability [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xvi) (LexisNexis 1999)] is consistent 
with the odd lot doctrine."  
Vaughan, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d  at 563.

 
 

2As an 
ancillary matter, the claimant also contends that the Commission erroneously 
determined that his testimony was neither "credible nor consistent"; however, he 
correctly notes that the dispositive factual issues in determining this appeal 
are found in the medical reports, so we need not discuss the 
issue.

 
 

3The 
claimant's 1990 workplace injury was not actually a compensable injury under the 
Workers' Compensation Act because the claimant never filed a claim.  Therefore, the tendency of both parties, 
the district court, and the Commission to treat the claimant's 1990 and 1991 
injuries as compensable workplace injuries under the Act is incorrect.  However, the outcome of this appeal 
doesn't require that we address the issue further.

 
 

4The 
district court took issue with this evaluation reasoning that "[n]o other 
physician who actually examined and/or treated [the claimant] . . . agreed with 
that assessment."  While no other 
doctor attributed the claimant's pain primarily to psychological factors, it is 
clear that a variety of medical professionals found some element of 
psychological pain that contributed to the claimant's 
condition.

 
 

5See 
Vaughan, ¶¶ 
24-30, 53 P.3d  at 565-66 (Wyo. 2002) (central issue was whether the claimant was 
able to return to light duty work; we held that the claimant had established a 
prima facie case and the Division had 
failed to show that special work was available); Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp., 928 P.2d 473, 476 (Wyo. 1996) (claimant was unable to return to previous employment, but 
had failed to show that he had made efforts to find work or that he was so 
completely disabled that any such effort would be futile); Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Comp. Div., 875 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Wyo. 1994) (evidence showed the claimant 
was unable to continue in previous occupation, but other employment was 
available on a continuous basis); Banda 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 789 P.2d 124, 125-26 (Wyo. 1990) 
(economic factors making it difficult for claimant to find a job not sufficient 
to show that he was unemployable); Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 527-29 (Wyo. 1983) (claimant was medically retired from 
previous employment; the issue was whether he was able to find other suitable 
employment); and Cardin v. 
Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862, 863-64 (Wyo. 1979) (claimant's knee injuries 
prevented him from his previous warehouse employment, but light duty work was 
available).  

 
 

6"The 
second compensable injury rule applies when an initial compensable injury 
ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention.'"  Carabajal v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 119, ¶ 12, 119 P.3d 947, 951 (Wyo. 2005) 
(quoting Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 2000)).  Under the rule, a subsequent injury is 
compensable if it is causally related to the initial compensable work 
injury.  Id., ¶ 14, 119 P.3d  at 952.

 
 

7That 
statute states:

 
 
(a)   If a determination is made in favor 
of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act, an application 
may be made to the division by any party within four (4) years from the date of 
the last payment for additional benefits or for a modification of the amount of 
benefits on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the 
injury, or upon grounds of mistake or fraud.  . . . 

(b)   Any right to benefits shall be 
terminated and is no longer under the jurisdiction of this act if a claim for 
any benefit is not filed with the division within the four (4) year limitation 
prescribed under subsection (a) of this section.

(c)   A claim for medical benefits which 
would otherwise be terminated under subsection (b) of this section and barred 
under W.S. 27-14-503(a) and (b) and may be paid by the division if the 
claimant:

(i)     Submits medical reports 
to the division substantiating his claim;

(ii)     Proves by competent 
medical authority and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 
condition is directly related to the original injury; and 

(iii)    Submits to an examination by 
a health care provider selected by the division and results of the examination 
validate his claim.

 
 

8This 
statute is now § 27-14-605.