Title: Husske v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
PAUL JOSEF HUSSKE 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 951880              September 13, 1996 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The primary issue we consider in this appeal is whether an 
indigent defendant has made the particularized showing necessary 
to require the Commonwealth, under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution, to supply at its expense a DNA expert to assist the 
defendant.   
 
I. 
 
Paul Josef Husske was convicted in a bench trial of breaking 
and entering with intent to commit rape and the offenses of 
forcible sodomy, rape, and robbery.  He was sentenced as follows: 
 20 years' imprisonment, suspended after serving 10 years, for 
breaking and entering with the intent to commit rape; 20 years' 
imprisonment, suspended after serving 10 years, for forcible 
sodomy; 40 years' imprisonment, suspended after serving 20 years, 
for rape; and 10 years' imprisonment, suspended after serving 
five years, for robbery.   
 
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and a panel 
of that Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.  The 
panel held that the defendant had a constitutional right to the 
appointment of a DNA expert at the Commonwealth's expense to 
assist him, and that the trial court erred by admitting in 
evidence certain statements that the defendant had made to mental 
health workers.  Husske v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 30, 448 
S.E.2d 331 (1994).  The Court of Appeals granted the 
Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en banc, vacated the 
panel's judgment, and, by an equally divided Court, affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court.  Husske v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 
91, 462 S.E.2d 120 (1995).  We awarded the defendant an appeal.   
 
II. 
 
The victim, a young woman, lived in an apartment complex in 
Henrico County.  One night as she was asleep in bed, she was 
awakened by being struck in the face with a hard object.  She 
observed that her assailant, who was wearing a stocking over his 
face, was a white male with brown hair.  He wore fabric gloves 
and threatened to kill her unless she was quiet.  She recognized 
the attacker's voice because, on several earlier occasions, he 
had placed telephone calls to her home and left sexually obscene 
comments recorded on her telephone answering machine.   
 
The assailant forced the victim to commit an act of oral 
sodomy upon him.  He then placed a knife against her throat, and 
he moved the blade of the knife over her breasts, stomach, and 
toward her genital area.  He committed an act of oral sodomy upon 
her and then raped her.   
 
The assailant directed the victim "to go to her bathroom and 
shower."  She turned on the water, but she did not bathe.  The 
assailant took a purse, containing about $500 in cash, from the 
victim's room.   
 
After the attacker fled, the victim went to her neighbors' 
apartment.  Police officers were summoned, and the victim was 
taken to a hospital where a physical evidence recovery kit was 
prepared.  Hospital personnel used swabs to take specimens from 
the victim's mouth, upper thigh, vulva, and vaginal vault.  A 
nurse also extracted blood from the victim which, along with the 
specimens, were placed in sealed containers and given to a police 
investigator, who took them to a laboratory for testing.   
 
About four months after the victim was assaulted, a Henrico 
County police officer saw the defendant standing near the rear of 
an apartment located about 200 feet from the victim's apartment. 
 The officer arrested the defendant and charged him with two 
"peeping tom" offenses.   
 
Two days after his arrest, the defendant voluntarily 
contacted the Henrico County Mental Health and Retardation 
Services offices.  An intake referral form was completed, and a 
notation was made on that form that the defendant had been 
referred by an attorney.  The form contained a place to mark 
whether the contact was court ordered.  A block containing the 
word "no" was marked.   
 
On October 17, 1990, Ann C. Creed, an employee of Henrico 
County Mental Health and Retardation Services, completed a "Brief 
Evaluation Form and Client Data Form" for the defendant.  Creed 
noted on the form that the defendant was depressed and 
chronically suicidal, and that his condition was exacerbated by 
his arrest on the "peeping tom" charges.  The defendant stated 
that even though this was his first arrest on such a charge, he 
had been engaging in this behavior for 20 years and had gone "one 
step further."  He told Creed that he felt shame about his 
behavior and that he was "not worried about court involvement but 
[was] concerned over family's reaction to learning of his 
behavior." 
 
The defendant appeared in the Henrico County General 
District Court on October 31, 1990, and pled guilty to the 
"peeping tom" offenses.  He was sentenced on each charge to 12 
months in jail with 12 months suspended, conditioned upon being 
of good behavior and keeping the peace for five years, and 
monitoring by the Community Diversion Incentive Program.  The 
defendant was also required to continue participation in the 
Henrico County Mental Health and Retardation Services treatment 
program as a condition of his suspended sentence.  On November 9, 
1990, the defendant met with Dr. Michael Elwood, an employee of 
Henrico County Mental Health and Retardation Services.  Dr. 
Elwood and the defendant discussed the defendant's arrest on the 
"peeping tom" charges and the problems the arrest had caused with 
the defendant's marriage. 
 
The defendant met with Dr. Elwood on December 28, 1990, for 
"a suicide screening."  The defendant had attempted suicide a 
week earlier.  Dr. Elwood made arrangements for the defendant to 
be admitted on a voluntary basis to a hospital.  The defendant's 
wife, who was present at this meeting, told the defendant that he 
should tell Dr. Elwood "what else was troubling him."  The 
defendant's wife left, and Dr. Elwood asked the defendant about 
his wife's comments.  The defendant stated that he had attempted 
rapes in the past and that he had "completed a rape."  Dr. Elwood 
did not question the defendant about the crimes at that time.   
 
The defendant remained in the hospital for a few weeks, and 
Dr. Elwood did not contact him.  Dr. Elwood met with the 
defendant on January 17, 1991.  During that session, the 
defendant told Dr. Elwood that the defendant had attempted three 
rapes in the midwest and that he had "completed a rape" in the 
Richmond area about six months earlier in the same complex where 
he had been arrested for "peeping."  The defendant said that he 
had watched the victim for several days before he raped her, and 
he conveyed to Dr. Elwood the details of his "successful rape."  
The defendant mentioned that he had used a rubber mallet to stun 
his victim, that he had pulled her nightclothes over her head, 
and that he ordered her "to shower" after the attack.  Dr. Elwood 
did not insist upon details from the defendant, but listened to 
his statements.  
 
Dr. Elwood recommended that the defendant be considered for 
participation in a sexual offenders' group.  Subsequently, Dennis 
K. Kilgore and Patricia L. Winterberger, employees of Henrico 
County Mental Health and Retardation Services, evaluated the 
defendant.  Dr. Elwood was present and did not observe anyone 
threaten or coerce the defendant during the session.  The 
defendant essentially made the same statements about the 
"completed rape" to Kilgore and Winterberger that he had made to 
Dr. Elwood.  The defendant's incriminating statements were 
subsequently communicated to the police, and he was arrested and 
charged for these offenses. 
 
III. 
 
Several months before trial, the defendant filed a motion 
asserting his indigency and requesting that the trial court 
appoint an expert, at the Commonwealth's expense, to help him 
challenge the DNA evidence that the Commonwealth intended to use. 
 The trial court denied the motion.  Two months later, the 
defendant renewed his motion for the appointment of an expert.  
He attached an affidavit from an attorney, William T. Linka, who 
had read extensively on the subject of DNA and who held himself 
out as an attorney familiar with issues surrounding the forensic 
applications of DNA technology.  Even though the trial court 
denied the defendant's motion, the court appointed Linka as co-
counsel to assist the defendant. 
 
On the morning of trial, the defendant again asserted that 
he was entitled to the appointment of an independent defense 
expert in the forensic applications of DNA science and 
technology.  The trial court informed the defendant's counsel 
that it had appointed Linka to serve as co-counsel for the 
defendant because the defendant's primary counsel had represented 
to the court that Linka was "the most knowledgeable member of the 
local bar in the area of forensic DNA application."  The trial 
court denied the defendant's request for the appointment of a DNA 
expert at the Commonwealth's expense.   
 
Marion S. Vanti, an employee of the Commonwealth's Division 
of Forensic Science, and Dr. Bruce Spencer Weir, a Professor of 
Statistics and Genetics at North Carolina State University, 
testified at trial for the Commonwealth as expert witnesses on 
the subject of DNA analysis.  Both witnesses testified that the 
defendant's DNA profile matched the profile of the individual who 
had attacked the victim.  Vanti testified that the DNA analysis 
did not exclude the defendant as a contributor of the genetic 
material that the assailant left on the victim's body and 
clothing.  She further stated that the statistical probability of 
randomly selecting a person unrelated to the defendant in the 
Caucasian population with the same DNA profile was 1 in 700,000. 
 Weir also testified that the likelihood of a randomly selected 
Caucasian bearing the same DNA profile as the defendant was 1 in 
700,000.   
 
The defendant, relying principally upon Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68 (1985), asserts that the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment required that the trial court 
appoint, at the Commonwealth's expense, an expert to help him 
challenge the Commonwealth's forensic DNA evidence.  The 
Commonwealth asserts that the defendant has no constitutional 
right under the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses for the 
appointment, at the Commonwealth's expense, of a DNA expert. 
 
In Ake, the Supreme Court considered whether an indigent 
defendant has a constitutional right to a psychiatric examination 
and psychiatric assistance necessary to prepare an effective 
defense based on his mental condition, when his sanity at the 
time he committed the criminal offense is seriously in question. 
 The Court stated: 
 
 
"This Court has long recognized that when a State 
brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps 
to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to 
present his defense.  This elementary principle, 
grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental 
fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot 
be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a 
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his 
liberty is at stake." 
 
Id. at 76.  The Supreme Court, holding that an indigent defendant 
is entitled to the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist him in 
his defense, explained its rationale: 
 
"We recognized long ago that mere access to the 
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper 
functioning of the adversary process, and that a 
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State 
proceeds against an indigent defendant without making 
certain that he has access to the raw materials 
integral to the building of an effective defense.  
Thus, while the Court has not held that a State must 
purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance 
that his wealthier counterpart might buy, see Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), it has often reaffirmed 
that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants 
to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims 
fairly within the adversary system,' id., at 612.  To 
implement this principle, we have focused on 
identifying the 'basic tools of an adequate defense 
. . .' Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 
(1971), and we have required that such tools be 
provided to those defendants who cannot afford to pay 
for them." 
 
Id. at 77.  The Supreme Court concluded that the Due Process 
clause's guarantee of fundamental fairness is implicated  
 
"when [an indigent] defendant demonstrates to the trial 
judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to 
be a significant factor at trial, [and that in such 
circumstances] the State must, at a minimum, assure the 
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will 
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in 
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the 
defense."  
 
Id. at 83.     
 
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Supreme 
Court noted that a trial court had properly denied an indigent 
defendant's requests for the appointment of a criminal 
investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert, and 
also that the Supreme Court of Mississippi properly affirmed the 
trial court's decision because the defendant's requests were 
accompanied by no showing of reasonableness.  The Supreme Court 
stated: 
 
"[T]he defendant's request for a ballistics expert 
included little more than 'the general statement that 
the requested expert "would be of great necessarius 
witness."' . . .  Given that petitioner offered little 
more than undeveloped assertions that the requested 
assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation 
of due process in the trial judge's decision. . . .  We 
therefore have no need to determine as a matter of 
federal constitutional law what if any showing would 
have entitled a defendant to assistance of the type 
here sought."  
 
Id. at 323 n.1.   
 
Our research reveals that most courts which have considered 
the question whether an indigent defendant is entitled to the 
appointment of a non-psychiatric expert have applied the 
rationale articulated in Ake, and, those courts have held that 
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses require the 
appointment of non-psychiatric experts to indigent defendants 
depending upon whether the defendants made a particularized 
showing of the need for the assistance of such experts.  See, 
e.g., Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (8th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); Moore v. Kemp, 809 
F.2d 702, 709-12 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987); 
Thornton v. State, 339 S.E.2d 240, 241 (Ga. 1986); Harrison v. 
State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1252-53 (Ind. 1995); Kennedy v. State, 
578 N.E.2d 633, 639-40 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 921 
(1992); State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Iowa 1987); Polk 
v. State, 612 So.2d 381, 393-94 (Miss. 1992); State v. Moseley, 
449 S.E.2d 412, 424-25 (N.C. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
115 S.Ct. 1815 (1995); State v. Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114, 117-19 
(N.C. 1992); Rogers v. State, 890 P.2d 959, 966-67 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 312 (1995); 
State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682, 697-98 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); 
Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 337-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 
 
We are of opinion that Ake and Caldwell, when read together, 
require that the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide 
indigent defendants with "the basic tools of an adequate 
defense," Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, and, that in certain instances, 
these basic tools may include the appointment of non-psychiatric 
experts.  This Due Process requirement, however, does not confer 
a right upon an indigent defendant to receive, at the 
Commonwealth's expense, all assistance that a non-indigent 
defendant may purchase.  Rather, the Due Process clause merely 
requires that the defendant may not be denied "an adequate 
opportunity to present [his] claims fairly within the adversary 
system."  Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974). 
 
Moreover, an indigent defendant's constitutional right to 
the appointment of an expert, at the Commonwealth's expense, is 
not absolute.  We hold that an indigent defendant who seeks the 
appointment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth's expense, 
must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the 
assistance of the expert is "likely to be a significant factor in 
his defense," Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83, and that he will be 
prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.  Id. at 83.  An 
indigent defendant may satisfy this burden by demonstrating that 
the services of an expert would materially assist him in the 
preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services 
would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.  See State v. 
Mills, 420 S.E.2d at 117.  The indigent defendant who seeks the 
appointment of an expert must show a particularized need: 
 
"'Mere hope or suspicion that favorable evidence is 
available is not enough to require that such help be 
provided.' . . . 'This particularized showing demanded 
. . . is a flexible one and must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.' . . . The determination . . . 
whether a defendant has made an adequate showing of 
particularized necessity lies within the discretion of 
the trial judge." 
 
Id.  Accord Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323-34 n.1. 
 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's arguments, we have not 
specifically held that Ake is implicated only in those cases 
where the defendant's sanity at the time he committed an offense 
is seriously in question.  In Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 
360 S.E.2d 352 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988), we 
rejected an indigent defendant's contention that he had a 
constitutional right to the appointment, at the Commonwealth's 
expense, of a private investigator.  There, we held that the 
trial court properly denied the defendant's motion "to appoint an 
investigator to 'comb the neighborhood' for potential witnesses." 
 Id. at 119, 360 S.E.2d at 356.   
 
Although in Pope we rejected the defendant's argument that 
he was entitled to relief in accord with Ake, we relied upon 
Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986), in reaching our conclusion.  
In Watkins, we held that consistent with the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, the mere "fact that a particular 
service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not 
mean that the service is constitutionally required."  Id. at 478, 
331 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 
(1974)).  Thus, in Pope and Watkins, the indigent defendants 
failed to make the requisite particularized showing of the need 
for the requested expert assistance.   
 
Here, we are of opinion that the trial court did not err by 
refusing to appoint a DNA expert witness to assist Husske with 
the preparation of his defense.
*  As we previously stated, an 
indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an expert, at the 
Commonwealth's expense, must show a particularized need for such 
services and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert 
assistance.  The defendant failed to meet these requirements.  At 
best, the defendant asserted, inter alia, that:  DNA evidence is 
"of a highly technical nature;" he thought it was difficult for a 
lawyer to challenge DNA evidence without expert assistance; and 
he had concerns about the use of DNA evidence because "the 
Division of Forensic Science [was] no longer [conducting] 
                     
     
*We do not consider the defendant's contention that his 
Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and compulsory process 
were abridged.  The defendant did not make these arguments in the 
trial court, and we will not consider them here.  Rule 5:25.  
Additionally, in view of our holding, we need not consider 
defendant's assertion that the trial court abridged his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by refusing to 
appoint an expert to assist him with the preparation of his DNA 
defense.   
paternity testing in [c]riminal cases."  The defendant's 
generalized statements in his motions simply fail to show a 
particularized need.   
 
Additionally, the defendant failed to demonstrate that he 
would be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.  Indeed, he 
could not make such a showing because, as the evidence of record 
reveals, he confessed to the crimes, and he described the details 
of his offenses with great specificity.  
 
We emphasize that the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses do not require the appointment, at the Commonwealth's 
expense, of an expert witness for every indigent defendant.  As 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has 
stated: 
 
"Requiring trial courts, both state and federal, to 
provide for expert assistance--through direct 
appointment or a grant of funds--would place a 
substantial, if not onerous, burden on the 
administration of criminal justice.  For example, the 
trial court would have to (1) appoint a defense expert 
for every expert available to the government; (2) 
provide for expert assistance whether or not such 
assistance turned out to be needed; and (3) provide for 
any additional experts the appointed experts might need 
to explore theories that could aid the defense in 
cross-examining prosecution witnesses or in presenting 
the defense's case.  We question the wisdom of such due 
process requirements absent a substantial showing, such 
as the one made in Ake, of a significant benefit to the 
truth-seeking function of a trial." 
 
Moore, 809 F.2d at 712 n. 8. 
 
IV. 
 
The defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing 
to suppress his "incriminating statements made to mental health 
workers during the course of court-ordered therapy," and that the 
use of "evidence derived therefrom, violated due process and his 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against compulsory self-
incrimination."  As we previously mentioned, the defendant 
voluntarily enrolled in the Henrico County Mental Health and 
Retardation Services treatment program before he was convicted of 
the "peeping tom" offenses.  The general district court, which 
convicted him of these offenses, suspended imposition of the 
sentences conditioned upon his continued participation in this 
program.  The defendant says that his "admissions to his mental 
health worker were coerced by the necessity of his complying with 
the terms of his suspended sentences.  The alternative to 
incriminating himself was the imposition of a twenty-four (24) 
month jail sentence."  We disagree with the defendant.   
 
The Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution states, in 
relevant part, that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself."  This prohibition "not 
only protects the individual against being involuntarily called 
as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also 
privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any 
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where 
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
proceedings."  Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
 
The Fifth Amendment, however, only prohibits the use of a 
witness' statements which are the product of compulsion: 
 
"The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion.  It does 
not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in 
matters which may incriminate him.  If, therefore, he 
desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim 
it or he will not be considered to have been 
'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." 
 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (quoting United 
States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943)).  The Supreme Court 
has stated that 
 
"in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to 
testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the 
privilege, the government has not 'compelled' him to 
incriminate himself. . . . Witnesses who failed to 
claim the privilege were once said to have 'waived' it, 
but we have recently abandoned this 'vague term,' . . . 
and 'made clear that an individual may lose the benefit 
of the privilege without making a knowing and 
intelligent waiver.'"   
 
465 U.S. at 427-28. 
 
In Murphy, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction in evidence 
of incriminating statements that a parolee made during a meeting 
with his probation officer.  In 1974, Marshall Murphy was 
questioned by police concerning the rape and murder of a teenage 
girl.  In 1980, Murphy pleaded guilty to an unrelated criminal 
charge.  His punishment was fixed at 16 months' imprisonment, 
which was suspended, and three years' probation.  As conditions 
of probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment 
program for sexual offenders, to report to his probation officer 
as directed, and to be truthful with the probation officer "in 
all matters."  Murphy was informed that if he failed to comply 
with these conditions, his suspension could be revoked.  Id. at 
422.   
 
Murphy met with his probation officer regularly until July 
1981, when the probation officer learned that Murphy had ceased 
participation in the sexual offenders' treatment program.  The 
probation officer informed Murphy by letter that his failure to 
meet with her would result in an immediate request for a warrant. 
 Subsequently, a counselor in the sexual offender treatment 
program informed Murphy's probation officer that, during the 
course of treatment, Murphy had admitted that he had committed a 
rape and murder in 1974.  The probation officer met with her 
supervisor, and the probation officer decided that she would 
convey this information to the police.  The probation officer 
sent a letter to Murphy and asked him to contact her to discuss a 
treatment plan for the rest of his probationary period.  Even 
though the probation officer did not contact the police before 
she met with Murphy, she had decided before the meeting that she 
would report any incriminating statements he made to her to the 
police.  Id. at 423.   
 
Subsequently, Murphy met with the probation officer in her 
office.  The probation officer told Murphy that she had learned 
that he had admitted to having committed a rape and murder in 
1974 and that this information indicated to her that he needed 
additional treatment.  Murphy admitted to the probation officer 
that he had committed the rape and murder.  The probation officer 
informed Murphy that she intended to relay the information to the 
police, and she encouraged him to turn himself in, which he 
refused to do.  Subsequently, Murphy was arrested and convicted 
of first-degree murder.  Id. at 423-25.   
 
Rejecting Murphy's contention that his confession was the 
product of compulsion and, thus, inadmissible, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
 
 
"The threat of punishment for reliance on the 
privilege [against self-incrimination] distinguishes 
cases of this sort from the ordinary case in which a 
witness is merely required to appear and give 
testimony.  A State may require a probationer to appear 
and discuss matters that affect his probationary 
status; such a requirement, without more, does not rise 
to a self-executing privilege.  The result may be 
different if the questions put to the probationer, 
however relevant to his probationary status, call for 
answers that would incriminate him in a pending or 
later criminal prosecution.  There is thus a 
substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if 
the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts 
that invocation of the privilege would lead to 
revocation of probation, it would have created the 
classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the 
privilege would be excused, and the probationer's 
answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution.   
 
 
 
Even so we must inquire whether Murphy's probation 
conditions merely required him to appear and give 
testimony about matters relevant to his probationary 
status or whether they went further and required him to 
choose between making incriminating statements and 
jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining 
silent.  Because we conclude that Minnesota did not 
attempt to take the extra, impermissible step, we hold 
that Murphy's Fifth Amendment privilege was not self-
executing."   
 
Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted). 
 
Applying the aforementioned principles here, we hold that 
Husske's statements were not the product of compulsion and, thus, 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not 
violated.  First, we note that the defendant's obligation to 
participate in the mental health treatment program did not in 
itself convert his "otherwise voluntary statements into compelled 
ones."  Id. at 427.  We also observe that the defendant, just as 
in Murphy, was not in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda 
protection when he made his incriminating statements.  Id. at 
430.   
 
Here, just as in Murphy, no one required Husske "to choose 
between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his 
conditional liberty by remaining silent."  Id. at 436.  The 
record before us is devoid of any evidence that the employees of 
Henrico County Mental Health and Retardation Services coerced the 
defendant in any manner.  There is no evidence of record that 
anyone forced the defendant to talk or threatened him in any way. 
 To the contrary, the defendant, at the urging of his wife, 
volunteered to Dr. Elwood the statement that the defendant had 
"completed a rape."  After the defendant made his confessions, he 
executed a release authorizing Henrico County Mental Health and 
Retardation Services to transmit this information to the 
Community Diversion Incentive Program.   
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals.   
 
Affirmed. 
SENIOR JUSTICE POFF, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
The majority affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
sitting en banc, Husske v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 91, 462 
S.E.2d 120 (1995).  Under the mandate of that judgment, the 
earlier judgment and mandate of a panel of that Court, Husske v. 
Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 30, 448 S.E.2d 331 (1994), were 
"withdrawn" and "vacated", and the judgment of the trial court 
was "affirmed", 21 Va. App. at 92, 462 S.E.2d at 120. 
 
On the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issue, I concur 
with the decision of the majority to apply the rule in Minnesota 
v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).  I dissent from the majority's 
decision upholding the denial of Husske's request for expert 
assistance concerning the controversy over the reliability of 
forensic DNA evidence that prevailed at the time of this trial.  
I do not, however, advocate a per se rule applicable in every 
prosecution of an indigent defendant.
1
 
In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Supreme Court, 
invoking the principles applied in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12 (1956) and in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), 
held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment require a State to provide "the basic tools 
of an adequate defense . . . to those defendants who cannot 
afford to pay for them."  470 U.S. at 77.  The panel of the Court 
of Appeals held that the rule in Ake is not limited to capital 
murder prosecutions or to cases involving an insanity defense.  I 
agree.  The majority of this Court does not disagree. 
 
The Ake rule applies, however, only when the defendant makes 
a "threshold showing" that the assistance of an expert to 
confront the prosecution will be "a significant factor at trial". 
 470 U.S. at 83.  In satisfying that requirement, the defendant's 
                     
     
1Compare the facts and circumstances underlying the 
conclusions reached in the precedents of this Court in Stewart v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 239, 427 S.E.2d 394, 405, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 848, 114 S. Ct. 143 (1993); George v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 271, 411 S.E.2d 12, 16 (1991), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 
686, 364 S.E.2d 491, 499, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); 
Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 332, 362 S.E.2d 650, 664 
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988); Pope v. Commonwealth, 
234 Va. 114, 119, 360 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1987), cert. denied, 485 
U.S. 1015 (1988).  See also Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 n. 8 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987). 
burden is twofold.  The accused must demonstrate that the expert 
is required to address a critical issue and that the expert's 
assistance will contribute to the formulation and perfection of a 
viable defense.  In response to such a showing, "the State must, 
at a minimum, assure the defendant access to [an expert] who will 
. . . assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the 
defense."  Id. 
 
The majority of this Court holds that the Commonwealth had 
no such duty here because, they conclude, Husske failed to "show 
a particularized need and that he [would] be prejudiced by the 
lack of expert assistance."  My reading of the record compels the 
opposite conclusion. 
 
Husske made five "threshold" motions for expert assistance. 
 Their cumulative effect was sufficient to show the trial judge 
that expert knowledge was to become "a significant factor at 
trial."   
 
In the first motion, counsel advised the court that "[t]he 
Commonwealth intends to introduce . . . the evidence of DNA 
analysis" which he characterized as "crucial to the 
Commonwealth's case."  In support of the second motion, he filed 
the affidavit of an adjunct counsel, a practicing attorney 
reputed to be the most knowledgeable member of the local bar in 
the area of forensic DNA application.  The affiant opined that 
"it is impossible for a lay person to successfully challenge the 
DNA testing and results without the aid of an expert."  He 
explained that he was "concerned about the problems in testing 
degraded, low molecular weight forensic samples" and by "over 100 
possible problem areas in the use of restrictive enzymes that 
could lead to an erroneous inclusion." 
 
In preparation for the third request for assistance, counsel 
filed a motion for discovery of the Commonwealth's DNA evidence 
which resulted in disclosure of "all the protocols, copies of the 
autorads, as well as a 47-page Certificate of Analysis."  In 
support of the fourth and fifth motions for assistance, counsel 
pursued the arguments he had advanced earlier.   
 
Renewing the motion at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's 
evidence, he proffered some 400 pages of court opinions and 
testimony "taken in various other cases" that dramatized the 
nature and dimensions of the DNA dispute prevalent at that time 
in the scientific community
2.  A sampling of the expert testimony 
adduced in those cases reveals that, in the two years preceding 
Husske's trial, many learned scientists had concluded that 
portions of the DNA testing procedure were "badly flawed," 
"unreliable" and "demonstrably wrong."  And, at least one expert 
characterized the scientific debates as "significant and 
honestly-held disagreement" over the validity of testing 
techniques. 
 
Clearly, the Commonwealth's forensic DNA evidence was a 
critical issue because it was "a significant factor" in the 
identification of Husske as the criminal agent.  Hence, the 
prevailing scientific controversy created a "particularized need" 
to challenge the laboratory methodology employed in the DNA 
                     
     
2Although the items proffered were excluded from evidence, 
they were admitted as exhibits for the record. 
analysis, the validity of the conclusions reached by the 
analysts, and the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert 
witnesses.  Knowledgeable as they were in the law, Husske's 
attorneys were laymen in the science of forensic chemistry, and 
as an indigent accused, Husske was prejudiced by his inability to 
obtain the expert assistance necessary to satisfy that need. 
 
Consequently, under the facts of this case, the denial of 
the defense motions for expert assistance was a denial of 
Husske's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process and 
equal protection of the laws.