Title: RANDALL K. BOYKIN V. CARBON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; SILVER SPUR LAND AND CATTLE, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; BETTY MERRILL; BOB SWITZER; and TED VYVEY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RANDALL K. BOYKIN V. CARBON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; SILVER SPUR LAND AND CATTLE, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; BETTY MERRILL; BOB SWITZER; and TED VYVEY2005 WY 158124 P.3d 677Case Number: 05-83Decided: 12/13/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
RANDALL 
K. BOYKIN,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
CARBON 
COUNTYBOARD 
OF

COMMISSIONERS; 
SILVERSPURLAND

AND 
CATTLE, LLC, a Colorado limited

liability 
company; BETTY MERRILL;

BOB 
SWITZER; and TED VYVEY,

 
 
Appellees

(Respondents).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
William L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Thomas A. Thompson, Carbon County Attorney Civil Deputy, Rawlins, 
Wyoming; John A. MacPherson of MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
MacPherson.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After a contested 
case hearing, the Carbon County Board of Commissioners (Board) entered an order 
establishing a road, a portion of which crosses Randall K. Boykin's land, as a 
county road and public right of way by adverse possession and prescription.  Mr. Boykin filed a petition for review 
of the Board's order in district court.  
The district court affirmed the Board's decision and Mr. Boykin appeals 
the district court's order.  We 
affirm.

          

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Boykin 
presents the following issues:

 
 
            
I.          
Are the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the 
Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County: (A) arbitrary and capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or not otherwise in accordance with law; (B) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority of limitations or lacking statutory right; (C) 
contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; (D) without 
observance of procedure required by law; or (E) unsupported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
II.          
Can the county, by establishing a county road by prescription or adverse 
possession, expand the right of public use of the road beyond the use which has 
historically been made of the road?

 
 
The 
Board phrases the issues as:

 
 
            
1.         
Is there substantial evidence in the record supporting the Board of 
Carbon County Commissioners' finding that County Road 648 was established under 
W.S. § 24-1-101 and the common law doctrine of adverse possession or 
prescription?

 
 
            
2.         
Are the rights to use a road acquired by a governmental entity under the 
common law doctrine of adverse possession or prescription limited to the road's 
historical use?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Boykin owns 
property located in the NE1/4, T15N, R84W, in Carbon County, Wyoming.  
The road at issue in this case crosses Mr. Boykin's property, passing 
between his ranch house and his barn.  
The road has existed in its present location for fifty years and the 
parties agree it has been used during that time by Mr. Boykin and his 
predecessors in interest, other landowners having property beyond the Boykin 
ranch to access their property, and the school district as a school bus 
route.  The parties agree the road 
has also been used by the general public to some extent but disagree concerning 
how much the public has used it and during what time period.  

 
 
[¶4]      In 1999, the 
Board adopted and published Resolution 5, which was intended to identify all of 
the county roads in CarbonCounty.  The road at issue here was one of the 
roads identified in the resolution as a county road. 

 
 
[¶5]      Sometime in 1999 
or 2000, Mr. Boykin became concerned with what he perceived to be an increase in 
the general public's use of the road.  
In May 2000, he posted no trespassing signs on the north and south 
boundaries of his property.  In 
November 2001, the county removed the signs and told Mr. Boykin he could not 
post signs on a county road.  The 
following May, Mr. Boykin filed a complaint against the county in district 
court.  He sought judgment declaring 
the road was not a county road and quieting title in his name to the portion of 
the road located on his property.

 
 
[¶6]      Although 
Resolution 5 identified the road as a county road in 1999, and people in the 
area historically referred to it as a county road, the Board took no formal 
action to establish it as a county road until after Mr. Boykin filed his action 
to have title to the road quieted in him.  
On November 19, 2002, the Board voted to formally establish the road as a 
county road by adverse possession or prescription pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-1-101 (LexisNexis 2005).  In 
accordance with the statute, the Board published notice of its intent in the 
Rawlins Daily Times and the Saratoga Sun on December 11, 18 and 25, 
2002.  Mr. Boykin and the Kermit 
Platt Revocable Trust filed objections to the establishment of the road as a 
public right of way.  Mr. Boykin's 
action against the county in district court was stayed pending the outcome of 
the Board's proceedings. 

 
 
[¶7]      On October 28 and 
29, 2003, the Board held a hearing on the objections.  The county and Mr. Boykin presented 
evidence.  Kermit Platt Revocable 
Trust, the other objector, did not appear at the hearing.  On February 3, 2004, the Board entered 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order designating the road as a 
county road and public highway right-of-way pursuant to § 24-1-101(a) and the 
common law doctrines of adverse possession or prescription.  Most significantly, the Board concluded 
from the evidence presented: 

 
 
[T]he 
general public has openly, notoriously and continuously used the road for a 
variety of purposes for more than fifty years. In addition, CarbonCounty has openly, notoriously and 
continuously improved and maintained the road at public expense since 1973, and 
probably much longer. Although Boykin is entitled to a presumption that the 
general public's use and Carbon County's maintenance of the road were 
permissive, the proponent has established by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Carbon County regularly and exclusively improved, maintained and repaired 
the road from 1973 or earlier until 1985, a period in excess of ten years. 
CarbonCounty's regular and 
exclusive maintenance of the road during this period was sufficient to place the 
adjacent landowners on notice that it was asserting control over the road in a 
manner that was inconsistent with their rights of private ownership. The 
adjacent landowners neither interrupted nor objected to CarbonCounty's exclusive maintenance of the road 
prior to 1985. Instead, the adjacent landowners, including Boykin's predecessor 
in title, relied upon CarbonCounty to maintain the road and, over 
time, came to believe that the road was a county road. CarbonCounty has successfully rebutted the 
presumption of permissive use in this case.

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Boykin filed 
a petition for review of administrative action in district court, raising the 
same issues he presents to this Court.1  Upon considering the parties' briefs and 
arguments, the district court issued a decision letter upholding the Board's 
findings. The district court stated:

 
 
While 
this Court may have some sympathy for the problems Boykin has encountered with 
the ever-increasing use by the public of the road in question, particularly 
where the road separates his house from the barn, it cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the County in the face of the substantial evidence 
supporting the findings.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      Pursuant to § 
24-1-101(b), Mr. Boykin's appeal from the Board's decision to establish County 
Road 648 as a public road by adverse possession or prescription is governed by 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  
Therefore, we give no deference to the district court's decision and 
consider the case as though it came directly from the Board.  LincolnCountyBd. of Comm'rs v. Cook, 2002 WY 23, ¶ 
33, 39 P.3d 1076, 1084 (Wyo. 2002).  
Both Mr. Boykin and the county presented evidence at the hearing and so 
our review of the factual findings is limited to determining whether they were 
supported by substantial evidence.  
Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, ¶ 8, 109 P.3d 887, 889 (Wyo. 
2005).  We have stated the 
substantial evidence test as follows:

 
 
In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence. 

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).

 
 
[¶10]   The interpretation and correct 
application of Wyoming statutes are questions of law over 
which our review is plenary.  
Lincoln County, ¶ 34, 39 P.3d  at 1085.  We affirm an administrative agency's 
conclusions of law only if they are in accord with the law.  Id.  We give no deference to the agency's 
determination, and will correct any error made by the agency in interpreting or 
applying the law.  Id.

            

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   In his first issue, Mr. Boykin 
argues generally that the Board's order was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, not in accordance with Wyoming law and unsupported by substantial 
evidence.  The thrust of his claim 
is that sufficient evidence was not presented to show that the county's use of 
the road was adverse, hostile or exclusive to his use of the road.  Rather, he contends, the evidence 
established that the county's use was permissive, and that is not sufficient 
under Wyoming 
law to support the establishment of a county road by prescription.  He cites Lincoln County, 39 P.3d 1076, Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, 78 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003), and other Wyoming cases cited therein as support for his 
claim.

 
 
[¶12]   The county responds that the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence supported the Board's findings.  The county points to evidence 
showing:  the road existed in its 
current location for at least fifty years and all of the landowners who used the 
road, except Mr. Boykin, thought it was an established county road; it is a 
well-defined, improved gravel road and was marked with a county road sign as 
early as 1957; the county has worked to maintain the road for over twenty-five 
years, including installing and repairing culverts, installing cattle guards, 
hauling gravel, and grading and plowing the road; the road has been designated 
and used as a school bus route since the 1950s; Mr. Boykin observed the use of 
the road between his house and outbuildings by the county and numerous others on 
a daily basis; Mr. Boykin knew the county did not have a recorded easement for 
the road but did nothing about it; the road was identified as a county road in 
1999 in Resolution 5; it was shown on maps as a county road as early as 1962; 
Mr. Boykin's mother, who purchased the ranch in 1957 and lived there until 1985, 
testified the county used and maintained the road for more than ten years and 
its use was inconsistent with her ownership of the road.  The county asserts this evidence was 
sufficient to overcome the presumption that use of the road by the county and 
general public was permissive, making the determination of whether the use was 
adverse to Mr. Boykin's asserted ownership of the road a factual one for the 
Board based upon weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the 
witnesses.  

 
 
[¶13]   Section 24-1-101 provided a process 
whereby boards of county commissioners were to determine by January 1, 1924, 
what roads within their respective counties were "necessary or important for the 
public use as permanent roads" and to record those roads as county 
highways.  With but one exception, 
roads within the state constitute public roads only if they were lawfully 
established in accordance with the statute.  The one exception to the statutory 
procedure for establishing public roads is at issue here.  That exception, found in § 24-1-101(a), 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
Except, 
nothing contained herein shall be construed as preventing the creation or 
establishment of a public highway right-of-way with reference to state and 
county highways under the common-law doctrines of adverse possession or 
prescription either prior to or subsequent to the enactment hereof. 

 
 
By its 
express reference to the common law doctrines, the statute incorporates past 
decisions by this Court in which we settled upon the standards governing claims 
of adverse possession and prescription.  
Lincoln County, ¶ 38, 39 P.3d  at 1086.    

 
 
[¶14]   Under the common law, a party 
asserting a claim of adverse possession or prescription has the burden of 
proving adverse use, under color of title or claim of right, such as to put the 
owner on notice that an adverse right was being claimed. Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Wyo. 1987).  The adverse use must be continuous and 
uninterrupted for the prescriptive period, which, in Wyoming, is ten 
years.  Id.  Adverse or hostile use is use 
inconsistent with the rights of the owner, without permission asked or given, 
use such as would entitle the owner to a cause of action against the intruder.  
Id.  
If use is permissive, no easement can be acquired by prescription.  Id.  Use is presumed to be permissive absent 
evidence of adverse use. 

[¶15]   Open, notorious, continuous and 
uninterrupted use for the ten year period is not sufficient to overcome the 
presumption that the use was permissive.  
Lincoln County, ¶ 41, 39 P.3d  at 1086.  Use by permission or the absence of 
objection will not ripen into title no matter how long continued.  Id., ¶ 40, 39 P.3d  at 1086.  To rebut the 
presumption that use was permissive, the claimant has the burden of establishing 
that his hostile and adverse use inconsistent with the owner's interest was 
brought home to the owner in a clear and unequivocal way.  Powder River Ranch, Inc. v. Michelena, 
2005 WY 1, ¶ 16, 103 P.3d 876, 881-82 (Wyo. 2005).  The subjective intent of the party 
claiming the easement is immaterial.  
A.B. Cattle Co. v. Forgey Ranches, 
Inc., 943 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1997).  In cases like this one involving a 
public claimant, the claimant's construction or maintenance of a road is 
evidence of its control of and jurisdiction over the road, a necessary element 
to showing that its use is adverse and under a claim of right.  Lincoln County, ¶ 41, 39 P.3d  at 1086.  Although not determinative, maintenance 
or repair of a road by a claimant suggests that the use is adverse to the 
owner's interest.  Powder River Ranch, ¶ 13, 103 P.3d  at 881. 

 
 
[¶16]   On the basis of these principles, 
we held in Koontz that the undisputed 
evidence of regular public use of the road inconsistent with the owner's rights 
combined with evidence that the town had maintained the road since the 1950s 
effectively rebutted the presumption of permissive use and established 
sufficient notice to the owners that an adverse right was being claimed.2  In Koontz, the owners of three lots in the 
town of Superior 
discovered in 1980 that Division 
Street ran across two of the lots and not, as 
everyone believed, south of the lots.  
Upon learning that the street crossed their property, the landowners 
blocked its passage by placing a mobile home where the street was located.  The town claimed the street had been 
traveled continuously and in an open, notorious and adverse manner by the 
general public since at least the 1950s.  
The town also claimed it had maintained the street since that time.  The landowners did not dispute that the 
public had regularly used the street since the 1950s, but attempted to refute 
the town's claim that the use was adverse by submitting two affidavits.  The first contained the landowners' 
statement that they permissibly allowed the property to be used as a public 
street.  The second contained the 
statement of the landowners' predecessor in interest that if the town had 
informed him of its claim, he would have denied use of his property as a public 
street.  We concluded neither of the 
affidavits demonstrated that permission was asked or given.  Because the landowners presented no 
other evidence to refute the evidence presented by the town to rebut the 
presumption, we upheld the order granting a prescriptive easement.           

 
 
[¶17]   We applied the same principles to 
conclude in Lincoln County that an 
administrative finding of adverse use was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  In that case, the county 
sought to establish a road as a county road by prescription.  The landowners objected and the board of 
county commissioners held a hearing.  
Evidence was presented that the public used the road historically for 
access to camping, hunting and woodcutting.  Evidence was also presented that the 
road was used for search and rescue operations, transporting cattle and to 
access adjacent property.  The prior 
owners stated they had allowed public use of the road in recognition of an 
established course of dealing to facilitate the use of private and public 
property for ranching, governmental, recreational and other purposes.  There was also evidence that those who 
used the road in most cases did not ask permission, use for the stated purposes 
was never denied, and when permission was sought it was given.  The county presented evidence of county 
maintenance of the road.  However 
that maintenance was performed primarily upon specific request and ended in the 
1980s.  Thereafter, private parties 
maintained the road.  We concluded 
the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of permission. 

 
 
[¶18]   More recently, in Powder River Ranch, we held private 
claimants established a prescriptive easement by showing the requisite 
elements.  The evidence in that case 
showed the claimants used the road consistently for nearly forty years, did not 
seek or obtain permission, directed guests and invitees to use the road, 
installed cattle guards and performed other maintenance and repair of the road 
without seeking permission.  In 
addition, the servient estate owner filed an affidavit stating it had not given 
anyone permission to use the road.  

 
 
[¶19]   In the case before us, the evidence 
the county presented to rebut the presumption that use of the road across Mr. 
Boykin's property was permissive included the testimony of Bill Nation, the 
county road and bridge superintendent.  
Mr. Nation testified that in his sixteen years with the county the road 
at issue was known to him only as county road 648, recognized and treated as 
part of the county road system and identified as county road 648 on all of the 
maps of the county road system he had seen. 

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Nation also testified county 
road 648 received at least the same regular routine maintenance that all roads 
within the county road system received and may have received more because it was 
also used by the school district as a bus route.  He testified the county bladed the road 
at least twice a year throughout his sixteen years with the county and plowed as 
necessary to keep the road open and passable for the school bus and other 
traffic through the winter.  He 
testified that public funds were expended to improve the road, including money 
for culvert and cattle guard repairs, road signs, gravel and recycled 
asphalt.  In addition, the county 
expended funds for the equipment and man hours involved in maintaining the 
road.  Mr. Nation testified that he 
never asked any of the landowners along the road for permission to use or 
maintain the road, nor did any of the landowners object to his use or 
maintenance of the road prior to Mr. Boykin's objection in 2001. 

 
 
[¶21]   Neighboring landowners, some of 
whom had lived along the road for several decades, testified they always 
considered the road to be a county road.  
They testified the road was used by the school bus, utility services, 
area ranchers, recreational vehicles and the general public.  They testified no one ever asked them 
for permission to use the road.  
They testified it was their understanding the county was responsible for 
maintaining the road and the county in fact maintained it. 

 
 
[¶22]   Other county road and bridge 
department employees testified they considered the road to be a county road and 
it was treated and maintained by the county as though it was a county road.  Ron Garretson, a twenty-six year 
employee of the road and bridge department, testified that in 1979 or 1980 he 
installed extensions on cattle guards on the road on the southern and northern 
boundaries of Mr. Boykin's property to make it easier to get the county road 
grader through for snow removal.  He 
also replaced a culvert on the road at the request of Mr. Boykin's mother, who 
lived on the property prior to Mr. Boykin obtaining ownership.  He testified the county paid for the 
repairs.  He also testified he 
graveled the road for the county sometime in the 1980s.  He never asked for permission to 
maintain or make repairs on the road because he believed it was a county road. 

 
 
[¶23]   A former member of the school board 
for Carbon County School District No. 2 testified that school district policies 
and state regulations require that school buses be run only on publicly owned 
and maintained roads.  He testified 
that during his tenure on the board, beginning in 1985, the school district 
complied with the policies and regulations and did not run buses on private 
roads.  The school district ran a 
bus on county road 648 because it believed, like most people, that it was a 
county road.     

 
 
[¶24]   Ms. Nina Parkhurst, Mr. Boykin's 
mother, who lived on the ranch continuously from 1957 to 1985, testified the 
school bus used and the county maintained the road the entire time she lived 
there.  She testified she asked the 
county about fixing the culvert to the south of her property because puddles 
were forming on the road.  She 
testified she must have thought it was the county's responsibility or "something 
like that" to fix the culvert or she would not have approached the county about 
it.  She testified she never told 
the county not to grade the road nor did she give permission for them to grade 
it.  She also testified the county's 
maintenance of the road was inconsistent with her ownership of it.  In fact, she testified, she did not think 
the road was her property, it had been there a long time before she got there, 
people had always used it and she did not build it or maintain it. 

 
 
[¶25]   From this evidence, we conclude the 
county met its burden of rebutting the presumption that use of the road was 
permissive.  The undisputed evidence 
of regular public use of the road inconsistent with Mr. Boykin's rights combined 
with evidence that the county expended significant public funds to consistently 
maintain the road beginning in at least the 1950s effectively rebutted the 
presumption of permissive use and established sufficient notice to Mr. Boykin 
that an adverse right was being claimed.  
The county presented substantial evidence establishing that its use was 
hostile and adverse, inconsistent with Mr. Boykin's claim of ownership and 
brought home to Mr. Boykin in a clear and unequivocal way.  As a public claimant, evidence of the 
county's exercise of control and jurisdiction over the road for many years 
demonstrated its claim of right which was by its nature adverse to Mr. Boykin's 
title. 

 
 
[¶26]   Despite the substantial evidence of 
adverse use, Mr. Boykin claims the evidence was insufficient because it did not 
show the county's use was exclusive or inconsistent with his use.  Citing Yeager and Lincoln County, Mr. Boykin contends 
CarbonCounty must present 
evidence of "exclusive use."  Mr. 
Boykin's contention misses an important distinction.

 
 
[¶27]   The authority cited in Yeager and Lincoln County made clear that a showing of 
exclusive use was necessary only when a claimant relied upon a presumption of 
adverse or hostile use.  See Shumway v. Tom Sanford Inc. 637 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 
1981); 28 C.J.S. Easements § 68, pp. 
736-37 (1941).  In Shumway, the claimant argued for a 
presumption of adverse and hostile use arising out of the establishment of open, 
visible, continuous, unmolested use.  
While noting such a presumption had been recognized by this court in 
previous cases, we addressed the inconsistency between the presumption of 
adverse use and the presumption of permissive use, and concluded the presumption 
of permissive use should prevail in Wyoming.3   In discussing the presumption of 
adverse use we cited 28 C.J.S. Easements § 68, which 
states:

 
 
            
Presumptions arising out of 
user.  The continuous user of an 
easement under a claim of right is presumptive evidence of ownership thereof, as 
against anyone who does not show a superior right.  While the contrary is true in some 
jurisdictions, sometimes by reason of statute, the general rule is that proof of 
an open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted user for the prescriptive 
period, without evidence to explain how it began, raises a presumption that it 
was adverse and under a claim of right, or, as is sometimes stated, raises a 
presumption of a grant, and casts on the owner of the servient tenement the 
burden of showing that the user was permissive or by virtue of some license, 
indulgence, or agreement, inconsistent with the right claimed.  The facts to admit of such presumption 
are not, however, presumed; and the presumption itself is merely prima facie and 
may be rebutted.  The presumption 
does not arise where the user is shown to be permissive in its inception, or 
where it is not shown to have continued for the prescriptive period; nor, in the 
absence of some decisive act indicating separate and exclusive use, does it 
arise where the user is not inconsistent with the rights of the owner, as, for 
instance, where the user is in connection with that of the owner or the public 
or is claimed with respect to unoccupied, unenclosed, and unimproved lands, the 
use in such cases being presumed to be permissive and in subordination to the 
owner's title.  The latter 
presumption is not conclusive, however, and may be rebutted. 

 
 

Shumway, 637 P.2d  at 669-70.  The only mention of 
the need to show "exclusive use" in this excerpt was in the context of a 
claimant seeking to rely upon the presumption of adversity.  In that context, a claimant must show a 
decisive act of separate and exclusive use.  A claimant cannot rely upon the 
presumption of adverse use if the use is consistent with the rights of the owner 
such "as, for instance, where the user is in connection with that of the owner 
or the public . . . ."  Id.

 
 
[¶28]   This authority suggests that if 
CarbonCounty had relied upon the 
presumption of adverse and hostile use, it was required to present evidence of 
its "exclusive use" of the easement.  
However, CarbonCounty did not attempt to rely upon that 
presumption.  In fact, in the 
context of a public entity's claim that a public road had been established by 
easement, one may wonder what kind of evidence could demonstrate "exclusive 
use."  Perhaps it could be evidence 
of the county maintaining the road and preventing the owner from doing so.  In any event, such musing is unnecessary 
because the county did not rely upon the presumption of adversity, but instead 
provided evidence of the lack of a permissive use.

 
 
[¶29]   Mr. Boykin's second claim is that 
the establishment of the road as a county road constituted an impermissible 
expansion of the historic adverse use that was the basis for the prescriptive 
claim.  His claim is twofold:  first, he claims the road established as 
a county road is wider than the road that historically crossed his property; 
and, second, he claims the Board's order allows for the road to be used in a 
manner in which it has not been historically used.  With respect to the latter claim, he 
asserts the general public now has unrestricted use of the road and the property 
owner beyond him can subdivide his property and guarantee access to the many new 
residents by way of the road across his land.  In support of his claim, Mr. Boykin 
cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions involving private parties and 
Haines v. Galles, 303 P.2d 1004, 
(Wyo. 
1956).  Like Mr. Boykin's other 
authorities, Haines was a dispute 
between private landowners in which we held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
use the private right of way across the defendants' land only in a manner 
consistent with the use giving rise to the claim for 
prescription.

 
 
[¶30]   We have not applied the restrictive 
use principle from Haines to claims 
of adverse possession or prescription brought by public entities under § 
24-1-101.  Faced with this question, 
the district court concluded the restrictive use principle applicable between 
private parties did not apply to claims for the establishment of public highway 
right-of-ways under the statutory provision.  The district court 
stated:

 
 
This 
Court is persuaded that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-101(a), as used by the County, 
creates a "public highway right-of-way." The use of a public highway 
right-of-way cannot be limited to historical uses as may be the case for private 
claimants of particular prescriptive easements. To rule otherwise would take us 
down a road we should fear to travel. Boykin's argument could logically be used 
to prohibit any motor vehicle use of 
the road in question, since, in its early years, the road was undoubtedly used 
only by some form of foot or horse travel. The use of the road may well increase 
in the future, and the method of such increased use cannot be foreseen. Such is 
the nature of a "public highway right-of-way." "To rule otherwise would defeat 
the very nature of a public road system." Heath v. Parker, 30 P.3d 747, 750 
(Colo. 
2001).

 
 
We agree 
with the district court's reasoning.  
It is consistent with the definition of "public road" found in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-1-133(b) (LexisNexis 2005), which states in pertinent part as 
follows:  "For purposes of this 
section public road' means any passageway . . . to which a governing body has 
acquired unrestricted legal right for the public to use the passageway."  As stated by the court in Lovvorn v. Salisbury, 701 P.2d 142, 144 
(Colo. App. 1985):

 
 
While 
private easements, acquired by prescription, can, and have been so limited, the 
imposition of such restrictions on public roads or portions of public roads 
would defeat the very concept of a public road system. The ultimate distinction 
between a public road and a private easement, however acquired, is that the 
private easement can be, and is, limited to specific individuals and/or specific 
uses while a public road is open to all members of the public for any uses consistent with the dimensions, 
type of surface, and location of the roadway.                 

 
 
[¶31]   Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Boykin 
asserted an additional issue before the district court that he does not present 
to this Court.  He claimed that the 
hearing examiner erred in allowing counsel for the county and the Board to 
appear in this action when a member of said counsel's firm also represented an 
affected party who sought, and stood to benefit from, the establishment of a 
county road by prescription.

 
 

2Koontz involved a municipality 
and was not decided under § 24-1-101.  
Additionally, the provision in the statute allowing county roads to be 
established by adverse possession or prescription was added after Koontz was decided. Despite these 
distinctions, Koontz is pertinent 
authority because it applies the common law doctrines at issue 
here.

    

3"While we 
recognize that this disposition has the possibility of permitting termination of 
long and historic uses of unimproved roads, we are firm in our conviction that 
the best rule for the State of Wyoming is one which requires that a landowner 
claiming an easement by prescription in an unimproved road crossing the lands of 
his neighbor must assume the burden of establishing that his intention to make a 
hostile use of the road adverse to the interests of his neighbor was brought 
home to the neighbor in a clear and unequivocal way.  His subjective intent will not be 
considered material, and while it is likely true that a manifestation of his 
hostile and adverse intent will result in revocation of permission to use the 
road across the neighbor's land, this is the best posture for the law to assume 
in the State of Wyoming.  
The claimant cannot rely upon a 
presumption arising out of the open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use 
for the prescriptive period, but in the absence of more that use will be 
presumed to have been with permission.  
To rebut this presumption the claimant must introduce evidence of the 
facts which demonstrate the manner in which the hostile and adverse nature of 
his use was brought home to the owner of the adjacent land."  Shumway, 637 P.2d at 670  (emphasis 
added).