Title: Meanor v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Glenn Lydell Meanor v. State of Maryland
No. 106, Sept. Term, 2000
Driving while intoxicated per se is a separate crime and is not included under charge of driving while
intoxicated.
Jury instruction that defendant was intoxicated if he had BAC of 0.10 or more was error.
0
Circuit Court for Howard County
Case No. 13-K-99-38325
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 106
September Term, 2000
______________________________________
GLENN LYDELL MEANOR
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   June 22, 2001
Petitioner, Glenn Meanor, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County of driving while
intoxicated, driving under the influence of alcohol, and failure to obey a traffic control device, for which he
was given a suspended jail sentence.  Those judgments were affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.
Meanor v. State, 134 Md. App. 72, 758 A.2d 1124 (2000).
We granted certiorari to consider whether (1) petitioner was effectively charged with driving
while intoxicated per se, (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that petitioner was intoxicated if his
blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.10 or more, and (3) the results of a breath test that he opted to take
were admissible in light of the arresting officer’s failure to inform him that, if he refused to take the test, the
Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) could modify an otherwise automatic suspension of his driver’s
license and issue him a restrictive license if he participated in the Ignition Interlock System Program.  Our
responses to these questions, which we shall address in a slightly different order, will lead to a vacation of
the Court of Special Appeals judgment.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are essentially undisputed.  Meanor and a friend, Dixon, spent the evening of
February 11, 1999, drinking at a nightclub.  When they left the club, they agreed that Meanor had too much
to drink and that Dixon should drive Meanor’s car.  They had not proceeded far when Dixon was stopped
by Officer Mui, who had observed the car weaving between lanes.  After failing several field sobriety tests,
Dixon was arrested.  Mui and Sergeant Christis, a backup officer who arrived at the scene, noted a strong
odor of alcohol on Meanor’s breath and the fact that he had glassy eyes and slurred speech.  Believing that
he, too, was intoxicated, the officers directed him not to drive.  They offered to take him to the police
station or to a public telephone and advised that they could arrange to have the car towed or he could wait
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on the shoulder for a ride home.  Meanor declined their offer of assistance and said that he would use his
cell phone to make the necessary arrangements.  Officer Mui transported Dixon to the police station, and
Sergeant Christis drove a short distance away and parked in the center median strip so that she could keep
Meanor’s vehicle in view.
Some 20 minutes later, Christis observed Meanor pull onto the road and resume his journey.  She
began following the car, and, when it crossed the white line separating the road from the shoulder, she
initiated a traffic stop.  When Meanor performed poorly on three field sobriety tests, Christis placed him
under arrest and seated him in the back of her police car.  She then read him the Advice of Rights from the
DR-15 form prepared by MVA regarding his right to take or refuse to take the breathalyzer test mandated
by State law.  Meanor made no election at that time, and they proceeded to the police station, where he
was directed to read for himself the Advice of Rights form.  After doing so, he initially refused to take the
test but later, upon learning that Dixon had been processed and released, he consented.  The test was
performed, and the results showed a BAC of 0.13.
Meanor was issued two citations.  One, we presume, was for the traffic control violation.  On the
other, relevant here, Sergeant Christis circled Item 33, charging Meanor with violating “21-902 Driving
While Intoxicated & Under Influence Alcohol & Under Influence of Drugs, & Drugs & Alcohol &
Controlled Dangerous Substance.”  Upon Meanor’s request for a jury trial, the case was transferred from
the District Court to the Circuit Court for Howard County.  At trial, Meanor said that, after the officers left,
he made several calls on his cell phone to arrange a ride but succeeded in reaching only answering
machines.  While waiting for someone to return his call, the battery in his cell phone went dead, and, fearing
for his safety while parked on the side of the road, he decided to proceed to the next exit and find a pay
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phone.
At the commencement of trial, the State informed the court and Meanor that he was being charged
generally under § 21-902 of the Transportation Article, and it asked that the case proceed under § 21-902
(a) and (b).  Meanor then moved, in limine, to exclude the results of the breath test on the ground that
he was not properly advised of the consequences of refusing to take the test.  Specifically, he pointed out
that the advice of rights he was given stated that a refusal to take the test would result in a suspension of
his driver’s license for 120 days, if this were a first offense, and that he would be ineligible for a modification
of the suspension or the issuance of a restricted license.  It did not, he complained, inform him that MVA
could modify the suspension if he agreed to participate in the Ignition Interlock System Program authorized
under § 16-404.1 of the Transportation Article.  The court denied the motion and, at the appropriate time,
the results of the breath test were admitted.
In its instructions to the jury, the court explained the offenses of driving while intoxicated and driving
under the influence of alcohol.  With respect to the former, it told the jury that a person is intoxicated when
the alcohol that he has consumed has substantially impaired normal coordination and, over Meanor’s
objection, added this language:
“Now you’ve heard evidence in this case that the Defendant’s breath was
tested for the purposes of determining the alcoholic content of the
Defendant’s blood.  The [e]ffect of such results is as follows.  If you find
that at the time of testing, the Defendant had point one zero percent or
more by weight of alcohol in the blood, the Defendant was intoxicated.”
The prosecutor stressed that point during closing argument and reminded the jury several times that
the test results showed a BAC of 0.13.  During its deliberations, the jury sent a note asking, “if we agree
that the blood alcohol level was point one three, are we required to find the Defendant guilty of driving
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while intoxicated,” to which the court replied that all elements of the crime must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the jury may review the court’s instructions.  As noted, the jury convicted of both
driving while intoxicated and driving under the influence of alcohol.
DISCUSSION
The issues raised by Meanor, centering on the challenged jury instruction and the reception into
evidence of the BAC test results, can be understood only in the context of statutory changes made over
the past decade to the laws relating to drunk driving.  We shall need, therefore, to examine those changes
in some detail.  Indeed, the changes are ongoing.  Some of the substance and much of the terminology
applicable in this case have been changed by legislation enacted in the 2001 Session of the General
Assembly.  See 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 5.  We shall note those recent changes where pertinent.
The Jury Instruction
(A) Whether Driving While Intoxicated Per Se Is A Separate Offense
At the time relevant to this case, Maryland Code, § 21-902(a) and (b) of the Transportation
Article, provided as follows:
“(a) Driving while intoxicated or intoxicated per se.
(1) A person may not drive or attempt to drive any vehicle while
intoxicated.
(2) A person may not drive or attempt to drive any vehicle while
the person is intoxicated per se.
 (b) Driving while under the influence of alcohol.
A person may not drive or attempt to drive any vehicle while
1 The major substantive change effected by the 2001 legislation was to reduce the BAC level for
what previously was termed “intoxicated per se” from 0.10% to 0.08%.  The bill also substituted the term
“under the influence of alcohol” for “intoxicated,” as used in § 21-902(a), and “impaired by” for “under the
influence of,” as used in § 21-902(b).  Thus, § 21-902(a)(1) will now prohibit a person from driving or
attempting to drive a vehicle “while under the influence of alcohol,” § 21-902(a)(2) will prohibit driving or
attempting to drive a vehicle “while the person is under the influence of alcohol per se,” and § 21-902(b)
will prohibit driving or attempting to drive a vehicle “while impaired by alcohol.”  Section 11-127.1 was
amended to define “under the influence of alcohol” as having an alcohol concentration at the time of testing
of 0.08 or more.
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under the influence of alcohol.”
Section 11-127.1 of the Transportation Article defined the term “intoxicated per se” as “having an
alcohol concentration at the time of testing of 0.10 or more as measured by grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.”
1 
 Meanor regards § 21-902(a)(1) and (2) as creating two separate offenses.  Though
acknowledging that, by virtue of the definition in § 11-127.1, evidence of a BAC of 0.10 or more would
suffice, on its own, to justify a conviction of driving while intoxicated per se under § 21-902(a)(2), he urges
that such a BAC would not be conclusive with respect to § 21-902(a)(1) – that it is possible for a person
to have a BAC of 0.10 or more and not have his normal coordination substantially impaired by alcohol.
Because, in his view, he was never properly charged with a violation of § 21-902(a)(2), the court’s
instruction informing the jury that a BAC of 0.10 or more would render him intoxicated created an
impermissible per se test for the § 21-902(a)(1) offense and was therefore erroneous as a matter of law.
The State’s view is that § 21-902(a)(1) and (2) are not separate offenses.  It contends that there
was but one offense of driving (or attempting to drive) while intoxicated, which may be proved either by
showing a BAC of 0.10 or more or by other evidence indicating coordination substantially impaired by
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alcohol.  The Court of Special Appeals adopted the State’s view, holding that § 21-902(a)(2) simply
“provide[s] a method of convicting an accused of driving while intoxicated by a reduced ‘grade of proof.’”
Meanor v. State, supra, 134 Md. App. at 81, 758 A.2d at 1129.  The legislative history of § 21-
902(a)(2) establishes rather conclusively the fallacy in the State’s position.
Prior to 1995, § 21-902(a) prohibited a person from driving or attempting to drive a vehicle while
intoxicated, and § 21-902(b) prohibited a person from driving or attempting to drive while under the
influence of alcohol.  Neither term – intoxicated or under the influence – was legislatively defined, and
neither had been judicially defined by us for purposes of § 21-902.  In Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 584,
128 A.2d 634, 638 (1957), we defined “under the influence of alcohol,” for purposes of the manslaughter
by automobile statute, as “drinking to the extent of probably affecting one’s judgment and discretion or
probably affecting one’s nervous system to the extent that there is a failure of normal coordination,
although not amounting to intoxication.”  (Emphasis added).  In Alston v. Forsythe, 226 Md.
121, 132, 172 A.2d 474, 479 (1961), we applied that definition in a civil action for negligence arising out
of an automobile accident.
 The pattern jury instruction drafted by the Maryland State Bar Association Standing Committee
on Pattern Jury Instructions (MPJI-Cr 4:10), which is often used by the trial courts and was used in this
case, not only makes clear that the distinction between the two states is one of degree but provides what
seems to us a better definition of “under the influence” and a workable and reasonable distinction between
that and intoxication.  It states:
“The distinction between driving while intoxicated and driving under the
influence of alcohol is one of degree.  A person is under the influence of
alcohol when the alcohol that [he] [she] has consumed has impaired
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normal coordination, although not amounting to intoxication.  Another way
of saying this is that the person’s abilities have been reduced or weakened
by the consumption of alcohol.
Intoxication means more than being under the influence of alcohol.  A
person is intoxicated when the alcohol that [he] [she] has consumed has
substantially impaired normal coordination.”
Under the pre-1995 law, evidence regarding the existence of either state came predominantly from
the observations of arresting officers or other witnesses regarding the defendant’s appearance and conduct,
how well he or she performed on field sobriety tests, and presumptions established by § 10-307 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  That section, which was part of the law dealing with chemical
tests for BAC, provided that (1) if the test showed a BAC of 0.05 or less, it was to be presumed in a
prosecution under § 21-902 that the person was not driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) if the test
showed a BAC of more than 0.05 but less than 0.07, that fact gave rise to no presumption, one way or the
other, of driving under the influence or while intoxicated but could be considered along with other evidence;
(3) a BAC test result of 0.07 or more constituted prima facie evidence that the defendant was driving under
the influence of alcohol; and (4) a BAC test result of 0.10 or more was prima facie evidence that the
defendant was intoxicated.
It was also the case under that regime, pursuant to § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, that
MVA was required to suspend a person’s driver’s license for certain periods of time – 60 days to 6 months
for a first offense, 120 days to one year for a subsequent offense – if the defendant refused to take the test,
unless the defendant was required to drive a vehicle in his/her employment, needed a license to attend an
alcoholic treatment or prevention program, or because of an unavailability of alternative means of
transportation, the lack of a license would severely impair the defendant’s ability to earn a living.  In those
2 Evidence showed that alcohol had been identified as a contributing factor in the highway deaths
of nearly 2,700 people in Maryland in the preceding seven years.  See 1988 INTERIM REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING at 1.
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circumstances, MVA could modify the otherwise mandated suspension.  Although MVA could revoke a
driver’s license upon the licensee’s conviction for driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol,
there was no provision for an administrative sanction based solely on a BAC test result.
In 1988, concerned over the carnage caused by drunk and drugged drivers,2 the General
Assembly, by House Joint Resolution 53 (1988), created a Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving,
for the purpose, among others, of examining methods of increasing the remedies then available for
combating drunk and drugged driving and recommending changes in the laws and regulations dealing with
that problem.  At its first meeting, the Task Force placed at the top of the list of issues to be considered
two forms of per se remedies – an administrative per se law that would provide for the suspension of
the license of a driver whose BAC exceeded a certain standard, and a criminal per se law that would
establish a certain BAC level and make a breath test result in excess of that level “dispositive of guilt.”  See
TASK FORCE ON DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING MINUTES, September 13, 1988, at 1. 
Those issues tended to predominate much of the work of the Task Force during the Fall of 1988,
in part, perhaps, because of incentives/sanctions from the Federal Government.  23 U.S.C. § 408
authorized Federal grants to the States for alcohol safety programs provided the State met certain
conditions set forth in the statute, one of which was that any person with a BAC of 0.10 or greater when
driving a motor vehicle “shall be deemed to be driving while intoxicated.”  § 408(e)(1)(C).  Evidence was
presented that 44 States and the District of Columbia had enacted a criminal per se law with 0.10 or less
3 The Task Force noted that the State was already in the process of replacing the existing machines
and that it would take between 18 months and three years to complete the replacement and training.
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as the standard and 23 States had enacted an administrative per se law.  Although most of the discussion
centered on the administrative per se recommendation and how such a law would be implemented, a
question was raised about how a criminal per se law would operate in relation to the existing offenses.
Judge Garmer, a member of the Task Force who was then a District Court judge, asked whether, “under
an illegal per se law, a person would be charged under both the per se and DWI offense,” and the reply,
from the State’s Attorney member of the Task Force, was that “this would be the case.”  See TASK
FORCE ON DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING MINUTES, October 25, 1988 at 4.
This view – that a criminal per se law would be a new, separate offense that could be charged in
addition to the existing driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence offenses – was made crystal
clear in the Task Force’s 1988 Interim Report to the General Assembly.  Although the Task Force urged
the immediate enactment of an administrative per se law and recommended deferring consideration of a
criminal per se law until after the antiquated breathalyzer machines then being used were replaced by more
modern and reliable equipment,3 it described the criminal per se proposal thusly:
“An illegal per se statute would establish a new criminal offense of
operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration in the driver’s
blood that meets or exceeds a certain statutorily defined limit.  It is not
necessary under an illegal per se law to prove that a driver
was intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol.  All that is necessary
is to prove that the individual was operating a motor vehicle with more
than a certain amount of alcohol in the individual’s blood.
*   *   *
An illegal per se law would not replace the current prohibitions, but would
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supplement them.  For example, if an individual’s BAC test revealed a
BAC level at or above 0.10, the individual could be charged with
2 separate violations; i.e., driving while intoxicated/under the
influence, and the separate per se offense.  If intoxication or being
under the influence cannot be proved, for example, due to insufficient
physical and behavioral evidence, the objective result of the BAC test
alone, unless successfully challenged (e.g., lack of probable cause, testing
error, etc.) would be sufficient to convict the individual of the per se
offense.”
1988 INTERIM REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING at 15, 16-17
(emphasis added).
In furtherance of the Task Force’s recommendation, the General Assembly enacted an
administrative per se law at its next session.  See 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 284.  Bills to create a criminal per
se law failed in the 1993 and 1994 sessions but one finally was enacted in 1995.   See 1995 Md. Laws,
ch. 498, enacting Senate Bill 256.  Both the manner in which the law was drafted and the reports issued
by the Senate and House Committees that considered the bill confirm beyond cavil that the new per se
offense was intended to be a separate criminal offense and not merely an easier way of proving the existing
offenses.
If all that was intended was an easier way of proving intoxication or driving under the influence, as
the State posits, the Legislature could simply have added that provision to § 10-307 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, which already set forth the evidentiary effects of BAC test results.  Indeed,
it did amend § 10-307 in the same bill, but only to conform it to the new offense.  It repealed that part of
§ 10-307 that made a test result of 0.10 or more “prima facie evidence” that the defendant was driving
while intoxicated.  Instead of addressing the issue in § 10-307, the Legislature split § 21-902(a), which
created the offense of driving while intoxicated, to establish a separate prohibition against driving with a
4 The new offense enacted in the 1995 legislation stated that “[a] person may not drive or attempt
to drive any vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more as measured by grams
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath as determined at the time
of testing.”  The next year, by 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 652, the Legislature amended § 21-902(a)(2) to read
that a person may not drive or attempt to drive any vehicle while the person is intoxicated per se and placed
the language defining that state into new § 11-127.1.  Those changes were ones of style.
5 Of some interest as well is the position paper presented to the Committees by Mothers Against
Drunk Driving Maryland Organization (MADD), an organization that was specifically represented on the
Task Force pursuant to House Joint Resolution 53 (1988) and which was one of the leading and most
active proponents of the criminal per se legislation.  In that paper, MADD addressed whether, if an “illegal
per se” law were enacted, the existing laws based on behavioral evidence should be discarded.  Its
response was “No, the older driving while intoxicated (DWI) or driving under the influence (DUI) laws
should be retained for those cases in which no chemical test is available.  This can occur either when an
offender refuses to take a chemical test or when some problem develops with the test result.  Often, an
offender is charged under both the ‘per se’ and ‘presumptive’ laws and one of the charges is dropped at
a later date.”  
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BAC of 0.10 or more.4  The Committee and Floor Reports well document the legislative intent.  Both the
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee and the House Judiciary Committee Bill Analysis state, at the
outset, that “[t]he bill makes it a misdemeanor for a person to drive or attempt to drive any vehicle
while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more,” and that it “imposes the same penalties for
this offense as are currently imposed on a person who is convicted of driving while intoxicated.”  See
SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITTEE BILL ANALYSIS and HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE BILL ANALYSIS on Senate Bill 256 (1995) at 1.5
Further evidence that the General Assembly intended driving while intoxicated per se to be a
separate offense is found in the fact that, in other sections of the Transportation Article that refer to, or use
as a base, violations of § 21-902, it has stated the intoxication and intoxication per se offenses separately.
See, for example, § 16-205(a)(1), permitting MVA to revoke the driver’s license of any person who “[i]s
convicted under § 21-902(a) or (d) of this article of driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while
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intoxicated, while intoxicated per se, or while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance.”
See also § 26-405, providing that, if a person is charged “with a violation of . . .  § 21-902 of this article
(‘Driving while intoxicated, while intoxicated per se, under the influence of alcohol . . .), the court may find
him guilty of any lesser included offense under any subsection of the respective section.”  Finally, it is clear
from the elements of the offenses themselves that they are not the same.  Driving while intoxicated does not
require proof of any particular BAC, but it does require proof of a substantial impairment of normal
coordination; driving while intoxicated per se, on the other hand, requires proof of a BAC of at least 0.10
(now 0.08) but does not require proof of any impairment of normal coordination.
Ignoring all of this clear and abundant evidence of legislative intent, which is dispositive of the issue,
the State looks to decisions in some other States to support its view that § 21-902(a)(2) creates no more
than a reduced evidentiary burden for proving intoxication.  Not only do the cases it cites not support its
position, but the predominant view around the country is exactly to the contrary.   State v. Gonzalez, 26
S.W.3d 919 (Tex. App. 2000) is cited for the proposition that the State may prove intoxication “by reason
of loss of faculties or by reason of alcohol concentration (intoxication per se),” and State v. Edmondson,
867 P.2d 1006 (Idaho App. 1994) is cited for a similar proposition.  What the State omits to mention,
however, is that the Texas and Idaho statutes, unlike that of Maryland, appeared to define intoxication in
that alternative manner.  As the Gonzalez court pointed out, the statute defined “intoxicated” as “not
having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol or other
proscribed substance into the body, or as having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more.”  Gonzalez,
26 S.W.3d at 920 (emphasis added).  When the trial court dismissed a prosecution because the BAC was
less than 0.10, the appellate court reversed, holding that the State could also prove intoxication by showing
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the impairment of mental or physical faculties.  In Edmondson, the State expressly limited the prosecution
to a showing that the defendant drove with a BAC in excess of 0.10, which, under the Idaho statute, was
one of two alternative methods of proving the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol.  In that
circumstance, the court held that evidence offered by the defendant of the lack of observable signs of
intoxication was irrelevant and properly excluded.
Of greater relevance are Anderjeski v. City Court, 663 P.2d 233 (Ariz. 1983); State v.
Carter, 810 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Hadden v. State, 349 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. App. 1986);
State v. Coulombe, 470 A.2d 1179 (Vt. 1983); and People v. Stiffler, 655 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997), all holding or implying that the traditional intoxication and the intoxication per se offenses
are separate crimes, and that the latter is not simply a device for facilitating proof of the former.
(B) Whether Driving While Intoxicated Per Se Was Properly Charged
Maryland law directs that a violation of the motor vehicle laws, including § 21-902, be charged by
citation, rather than by some other form of charging document.  See § 26-201 (a) and (b) of the
Transportation Article and Maryland Rule 4-201(b).  The law also directs the Chief Judge of the District
Court, after consultation with police administrators and MVA, to design arrest citation forms “that shall be
used by all law enforcement agencies in the State” when charging a person with traffic offenses.  See § 1-
605(d)(8) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  Meanor was charged via the Maryland Uniform
Complaint and Citation form adopted and distributed in accordance with § 1-605(d)(8).
Although Maryland Rule 4-203(a) and Maryland common law permit two or more offenses to be
charged in separate counts of a charging document if they are of the same or similar character or are based
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on the same act or transaction or connected acts or transactions, the Uniform Complaint and Citation form
expressly requires that only one violation be charged on a citation.  The citation form contains 42
enumerated violations, any one of which may be charged by circling the particular charge, and it also
contains a blank space for the officer to charge a “violation not listed above.”  The citation form directs the
officer to “Circle Violation Below (One Violation Only).”  Three of the 42 listed offenses involve § 21-902.
One – No. 33, the one circled here – states “21-902 Driving While Intoxicated & Under Influence Alcohol
& Under Influence of Drugs, & Drugs & Alcohol & Controlled Dangerous Substance.”  The other two,
Nos. 34 and 35, charge “21-902(a) Driving While Intoxicated” and “21-902(b) Driving Under Influence
of Alcohol” respectively.  There is no listed charge for driving while intoxicated per se; nor does No. 33,
which refers to the other offenses stated in § 21-902, mention that offense.  If driving while intoxicated per
se is to be expressly charged, therefore, it must be charged in the space available for a “violation not listed
above.”  That was not done.
In Beckwith v. State, 320 Md. 410, 578 A.2d 220 (1990), we held that, under Maryland
common law, “a defendant can ordinarily be convicted of an offense which is not charged but which is a
lesser included offense of one that is charged.”  Id. at 413, 578 A.2d at 222 (quoting Hagans v. State,
316 Md. 429, 433, 559 A.2d 792, 793-94 (1989)).  We noted that, under § 26-405 of the Transportation
Article, that rule applied as well to offenses under § 21-902.  There are two caveats to that general
proposition, however, one of which we dealt with in Beckwith and the other of which is applicable here.
In Beckwith, the defendant was not charged generally under § 21-902, but rather with driving while
intoxicated under § 21-902(a).  In that circumstance, we held that the State had limited the charge to that
offense alone and had effectively excluded the lesser included charge of driving under the influence.
6 The erroneous jury instruction does not affect the conviction for driving under the influence,
however.  Under our holding in Beckwith, that offense was effectively charged and there was more than
ample evidence to support the conviction.
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Unlike Beckwith, Meanor was charged generally under § 21-902, so he could have been convicted
of any lesser offense included within that charge, and, indeed, he was convicted of driving under the
influence.  The problem for the State, however, as we have held above, is that driving while intoxicated per
se is not a lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated.  It is a separate offense, as both driving while
intoxicated and driving while intoxicated per se each have an element not found in the other.  Accordingly,
we hold that Meanor was not charged with driving while intoxicated per se.
That holding necessarily renders the challenged jury instruction erroneous.  As noted, it informed
the jury that, if it found that Meanor had a BAC exceeding 0.10 at the time of testing, he was intoxicated.
Although the jury certainly could have found that Meanor was driving while intoxicated based on that
BAC test result, the test result itself does not establish intoxication.  For that reason, the conviction for
driving while intoxicated must be vacated.6  
Advice of Rights
As an alternative ground of reversal, Meanor complains that the BAC test result was inadmissible
because he was not properly advised of the consequences of refusing to take the test, namely, that MVA
could modify the otherwise mandated suspension of his driver’s license and issue him a restricted license
if he participated in the Interlock Ignition System Program for at least one year.  That omission, he urges,
amounted to a noncompliance with § 16-205.1(b)(2)(iii) of the Transportation Article, that the test was
therefore not in compliance with § 16-205.1 and, by virtue of § 10-309(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial
7 From 1982 to 2000, § 10-309(a)(1) was ambiguous in this regard.  When initially enacted as part
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article in 1973, it stated that a person may not be compelled to
submit to a chemical analysis provided for in this subtitle and that evidence of chemical analysis was not
admissible if obtained contrary to its provisions, the word “its” obviously referring to the subtitle – title 10,
subtitle 3 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  In State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 435 A.2d
764 (1981), we held that that exclusionary rule applied to prosecutions for manslaughter by automobile
under Article 27, § 388 and homicide by motor vehicle under § 388A and that it was triggered by violations
of Transportation Article, § 16-205.1, notwithstanding that § 16-205.1 was not then part of the subtitle
in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See also State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 474 A.2d
898 (1984).  In 1982 – the next session following the filing of Loscomb – the Legislature amended § 10-
309(a) to provide that evidence of a test or analysis is not admissible “in a prosecution for a violation of §
21-902 of the Transportation Article if obtained contrary to its provisions.”  See 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 93
(emphasis added).  That remained the language until 2000, when, as part of 2000 Md. Laws, ch. 629, the
Legislature deleted the word “its” and restored the reference to “this subtitle.”  The obvious intent of the
1982 law was to overturn Loscomb, to limit the exclusionary rule to prosecutions under § 21-902, and
thus to render it inapplicable to prosecutions under §§ 388 and 388A.  If one applies normal rules of
English grammar, however, the word “its” in that formulation of the statute would seem to apply only to §
21-902.  Apart from the fact that §21-902 contains no provisions relating to the test, which would make
that reference utterly meaningless, there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to detach the
exclusionary provision from a violation of § 16-205.1.  For whatever reason, the Legislature overlooked
an opportunity to correct the inappropriate reference in 1989.  See amendments made to § 10-309 by
1989 Md. Laws, ch. 284. Notwithstanding the grammatical “glitch,” we construe § 10-309(a) as still
triggered by a violation of the “subtitle,” including § 16-205.1.  We have long applied the principle that the
Legislature’s manifest intention will prevail over rules of grammatical construction. See Welsh v. Kuntz,
196 Md. 86, 75 A.2d 343 (1950).
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Proceedings Article, evidence of its results was inadmissible.7 
 Since the enactment of its simple predecessor in 1969, as § 92A of former Article 66½ of the
Code, § 16-205.1 has undergone multiple revisions and has grown from three to twelve pages, bringing
with it all of the complexities that such a growth ordinarily entails.  Prior to the 1969 enactment, the law
made the results of a chemical test admissible in a prosecution for driving while under the influence of
alcohol, but the test itself was not mandatory, a person could not be compelled to take it, and the fact that
the person refused the test was not admissible in evidence.  The only advice that a police officer was
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required to give was that the person may, but need not, submit to the test.  See Maryland Code (1957,
1965 Repl. Vol.) Article 35, § 100.
The 1969 law, keying on our favorable declaration in Mauldin v. State, 239 Md. 592, 595, 212
A.2d 502, 504 (1965), made it a condition to the issuance or renewal of a driver’s license that the licensee
consent in writing to take a chemical test to determine BAC should the person be detained on suspicion
of operating a vehicle while under the influence of or impaired by alcohol.  The law did not actually compel
the person to take the test, but it permitted MVA to suspend the license for up to 60 days if the person,
upon request, refused to do so.  Notwithstanding that suspension was the only mechanism for enforcing the
consent, it was merely permissive and not mandatory.  In that regard, the statute required a police officer
who stopped a person suspected of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of or while impaired by
alcohol to request that the person take the test and “[a]dvise the person of the administrative penalties that
may be imposed for such refusal.”  Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Supp.) Article 66 ½, § 92A(c)3. 
Under the 1969 law, as amended from time to time, the suspension sanction was available only if
the driver refused to take the test upon a proper request.  As noted, that changed with the enactment in
1989 of the administrative per se legislation.  The 1989 law had a dual thrust.  It required MVA to
suspend the license of a person who was properly stopped, asked to take the test, and refused.  The
suspension was mandatory and it was to last for 120 days for a first offense and one year for a subsequent
offense.  The law also mandated a suspension, for lesser periods, if the person took the test and it revealed
a BAC of 0.10 or more.  In the latter situation, however, the law permitted MVA to modify the suspension
or issue a restrictive license if (1) during the preceding five years, the person’s license had not been
suspended and the person had not been convicted under § 21-902, and (2) the person was required to
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drive a motor vehicle in the course of employment, a license was required to attend an alcoholic prevention
or treatment program, or the licensee had no alternative form of transportation available and, without the
license, his or her ability to earn a living would be severely impaired.  No such modification was allowed,
however, in the event of a test refusal.  The 1989 law required the arresting officer to advise the driver “of
the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test and for test results indicating
an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing.”  Maryland Code (1989 Supp.) Transp.
art., § 16-205.1(b)(2)(iii).
In 1992, we decided two cases bearing on the advice required to be given.  In Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 306, 604 A.2d 919 (1992), the defendant, who refused to take the
test and, as a result, had his license suspended for 120 days, complained that the officer failed to inform
him that, if he took the test and it showed a BAC of 0.10 or more, MVA could modify the mandated 45-
day suspension or issue him a restricted license under the conditions set forth in § 16-205.1.  He presented
the issue of “how much advice the Legislature intended the police to give a detained driver concerning the
consequences of refusing or failing a chemical test for alcohol.”  Id. at 312, 604 A.2d at 922.  We held that
the statute required advice only as to “administrative sanctions that shall be imposed,” and that “[m]ere
potential eligibility for modification of suspension or a restrictive license is not an ‘administrative sanction.’”
Id. at 318, 604 A.2d at 925.  In support of that holding, we noted, in relevant part:
“Eligibility for modification of suspension or for a restrictive license
becomes reality only if the driver meets the statutory prerequisites  and,
then, only if the [administrative law judge], in the exercise of discretion,
finds modification of suspension or issuance of a restrictive license
appropriate.  It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended ‘sanctions’
to include advice concerning a mere potentiality. . . . [T]he possibility that
the suspension will be modified or a restrictive license issued is only that --
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a possibility, a mere potentiality.”
Id. (citations omitted).
We pointed out a number of problems inherent in attempting to give advice as to possibilities,
including the prospect of actually misleading the person.  We therefore construed the word “sanctions” as
referring only “to an outcome that is certain to happen,” namely, the length of the suspension for refusing
the test or taking it and having it show a BAC of 0.10 or more.  Id. at 320, 604 A.2d at 925.  We
confirmed that view, against a due process attack, in the companion case of Hare v. Motor Vehicle
Admin., 326 Md. 296, 604 A.2d 914 (1992).
Following our decisions in Chamberlain and Hare, the Legislature made two additions to § 16-
205.1 relevant to the issue raised by Meanor.  In 1993, it reacted to those cases by adding to § 16-
205.1(b)(2)(iii) – the subsection dealing with the advice to be given by the officer – a requirement that the
advice include “ineligibility for modification of a suspension or issuance of a restrictive license.”  See 1993
Md. Laws, ch. 407.  In Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 218 n.8, 630 A.2d 753, 762
n.8 (1993), we construed that amendment as requiring officers “to specifically advise suspected drunk
drivers that the suspension for refusal to take an alcohol concentration test is mandatory,” and we presumed
that the DR-15 form used by law enforcement agencies “will be amended accordingly.”  It was.
The second change of significance came with 1998 Md. Laws, ch. 526, the major thrust of which
was to expand the Ignition Interlock Program and authorize MVA to impose an alcohol restriction that
prohibits the licensee from driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle unless the licensee is a participant
in that program.  The provision for that restriction was authorized by an amendment to § 16-113(a), dealing
with conditions that may be attached to the issuance of licenses, and by additions to § 16-205.1(n),
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dealing with the authority of MVA to modify the suspension of a license.  Subsection (n)(2), which
applies only if the licensee did not refuse to take the test, was amended to allow MVA to add as a
condition to a restrictive license a restriction that prohibits the licensee from driving or attempting to drive
unless the licensee is a participant in the Ignition Interlock Program.  An amendment to subsection (n)(3)
and the addition of a new subsection (n)(4), for the first time, allows MVA to modify a suspension or issue
a restrictive license to a person who refused to take the test if the person participates in the Ignition
Interlock Program.  Thus, under the 1998 Act, if the licensee participates in the Ignition Interlock Program,
MVA may modify a suspension or issue a restrictive license whether the licensee refused the test or took
it and showed a BAC of 0.10 or more.
The problem, for Meanor, is that, in making conforming amendments to § 16-205.1(b)(2)(iii),
which deals specifically with the advice required to be given to a person detained for driving while
intoxicated or under the influence, the Legislature omitted to include any reference to subsections (n)(3) or
(n)(4).  As amended by the 1998 Act, subsection (b)(2)(iii) requires that the officer:
“Advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed
for refusal to take the test, including ineligibility for modification of a
suspension or issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(1)
or (2) of this section, and for test results indicating an alcohol
concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing.”
(Emphasis added).
This amendment to subsection (b)(2)(iii), and similar amendments made to § 16-205.1(b)(3)(vii)
3. and (f)(7)(i) 3., changed nothing with respect to the required advice.  For a test refusal, the officer must
advise only as to the “administrative sanctions” that will be imposed.  It is only with respect to a BAC test
result of 0.10 (now 0.08) or more – the circumstance to which subsections (n)(1) and (n)(2) relate – that
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ineligibility for modification or restrictive license must also be disclosed.  If the licensee refuses to take the
test, the issue remains governed by Chamberlain and Hare.  The prospect of a modification of the
suspension or a restrictive license under subsection (n)(4) is a mere possibility and not a sanction.  The test
result was admissible.
CONCLUSION
Our holding with respect to the jury instruction requires that the judgment entered on the conviction
for driving while intoxicated be reversed and that that count be remanded to the Circuit Court for possible
retrial.  The error in the jury instruction does not affect the conviction for driving under the influence,
however.  Our conclusion that the test result was admissible renders that conviction valid.  The trial court,
quite properly, merged that conviction, for the lesser included offense, into the greater, so no sentence was
imposed on the driving under the influence conviction.
In order to avoid possible double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, law of the case, or other procedural
problems, in the event that, notwithstanding that the sentence imposed on the driving while intoxicated
conviction was only 90 days, all of which was suspended, the State elects to retry Meanor on the driving
while intoxicated offense, we shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that
court to vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand to that court for further proceedings in
accordance with this Opinion.  If the State elects not to retry Meanor for driving while intoxicated or if it
elects to retry him on that charge and he is acquitted, the Circuit Court shall reinstate the conviction for
driving under the influence and enter a proper sentence thereon.  If Meanor is retried for driving while
intoxicated and convicted, the court shall reinstate the conviction for driving under the influence but merge
it into the greater offense.
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JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY
AND REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS
OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY HOWARD
COUNTY.