Title: State v. Jamison

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 245 (1974) 517 P.2d 1241 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Maurice JAMISON, Appellant. No. 2755. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 16, 1974. *246 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix by John S. O'Dowd, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack L. Lansdale, Law Student, University of Arizona, Tucson, for appellee. Schroeder, Soelter & Rosenthal, P.C. by Larry S. Rosenthal, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of guilt to the crime of aggravated assault while armed with a gun, § 13-245(A)[7] and (C) A.R.S. We are called upon to answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are basically as follows. Prior to the alleged offense, defendant Jamison, after a 19 year marriage, was divorced from his wife. On the evening in question, he drove his ex-wife from work to their former domicile. An argument ensued at which time a shot was fired by the defendant from a small pistol which allegedly belonged to the wife. Defendant's two daughters left the house and proceeded across the street to the neighbors while he and his ex-wife continued with their argument. Defendant fired two shots aimlessly towards the kitchen area. Defendant's ex-wife and son then left the house and proceeded to a neighbor's house to call the police. The defendant left before the police arrived. After the police were gone, the defendant returned and the police were again summoned. The police officers were in uniform. Officer Tennyson testified as follows: An indictment was returned charging the defendant with Count I, aggravated assault upon a police officer while armed with a gun, § 13-245(A)[7], (C) A.R.S., and Count II, aggravated assault upon a police officer, § 13-245(A)[7] A.R.S., without mentioning the gun. The two police officers testified on behalf of the State. Defendant's ex-wife and children testified on behalf of the defendant. The wife testified that the defendant had never acted that way before and the children indicated that the defendant was acting differently. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to Count II, but guilty as to Count I. Defendant was given a five year suspended sentence and appeals from his conviction. IS AGGRAVATED ASSAULT A CRIME OF SPECIFIC INTENT? Defendant first contends that the crime of aggravated assault is a crime that requires specific as opposed to general intent. The statute which the defendant was convicted of violating reads as follows: There are two types of intent in criminal law, general and specific. In crimes of general intent, the party is presumed to have the requisite criminal intent from the commission of the crime itself. Specific intent, however, is an additional mental element to certain crimes, and criminal statutes that use the words "wilfully" or "intentionally" will usually require a specified intent as, for example, assault with intent to commit murder which requires a specific intent on the part of the defendant to commit a murder, in addition to a general intent to commit an assault. The difference between general and specific intent is important in a case like the one before the court because of the different burden placed on both the State and the defense. In general intent cases, once the commission of the crime has been shown, the absence of general intent may be shown by the defendant, but this is the defendant's burden and voluntary intoxication will not negate general intent. On the other hand, in crimes of specific intent, this specific intent must be proved by the State and voluntary intoxication may be a defense: General criminal intent is implied from the act itself while specific intent is not. In the instant case, we believe that the crime of assault of a police officer is a crime of general intent. See also United States v. Harvey, 428 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.1970). We believe that defendant confuses specific intent with specific knowledge. It is true that lack of knowledge may disprove the existence of specific intent: But lack of specific intent is not the same thing as lack of specific knowledge. In the instant case, the State has shown the defendant had the requisite general intent together with the specific knowledge required by § 13-245(A)[7] A.R.S. Defendant places strong reliance upon a recent Court of Appeals case, State v. Fimbres, 20 Ariz. App. 65, 510 P.2d 64 (1973), in which our Court of Appeals approved the finding by the trial court that the crime of obstructing a police officer in *249 the performance of his duties required a specific intent. The statute construed in Fimbres, supra, reads in part as follows: The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the State had the burden of showing a specific intent on the part of the defendant because, unlike the statute in the instant case, the statute in Fimbres, supra, requires the specific intent to wilfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer. Fimbres, supra, is distinguishable from the instant case. The defendant also places reliance on a prior statement of this court: While this statement is, at the most, merely dicta, we, by this opinion, disapprove said statement insofar as it indicates a holding by this court that the crime of aggravated assault of a police officer requires a specific as opposed to general intent. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATION The court initially ruled that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the specific intent interpretation of the statute and allowed the State to introduce certain evidence concerning defendant's intoxication. The court later changed its mind on this point and excluded offers of evidence on the question of voluntary intoxication. The court also instructed the jury as follows: Our statute on the effect of intoxication reads as follows: The court was correct in the later ruling excluding evidence of intoxication. Considering the instruction regarding involuntary intoxication, it would appear that the defendant not only was not prejudiced by this action, but benefited from the admission of evidence in the State's case and an instruction he may not have been entitled to as a matter of right. We find no prejudice to the defendant in the court's ruling. TESTIMONY AS TO THE DEFENDANT'S HISTORY OF INTOXICATION Defendant also attempted to introduce evidence by Dr. Davis Lloyd Cutler, an Air Force psychiatrist, concerning the defendant's history of intoxication and the effects of Librium which, the doctor stated, would make a person such as the defendant "profoundly more susceptible to the effects of alcohol." For the reasons stated above, we find no error in excluding this evidence. COLONEL GINN'S TESTIMONY Defendant made an offer of proof concerning a statement made by defendant to Col. Robert W. Ginn some four or five hours after the arrest of the defendant. The testimony was excluded. Defendant in his brief states as follows: The evidence that defendant attempted to elicit on redirect examination would have brought to the jury evidence concerning lack of specific intent as a result of voluntary intoxication. Defendant may, of course, present evidence which would negate general intent, but we read our statute, § 13-132 A.R.S., to mean that voluntary intoxication may be used to negate specific intent only. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.