Title: NYLES SPURLOCK v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NYLES SPURLOCK v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, CARBON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 59699 P.2d 270Case Number: 84-66Decided: 05/02/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
NYLES SPURLOCK, APPELLANT 
(APPELLANT-PETITIONER), 

v. 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
CARBONCOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1, STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(APPELLEE-RESPONDENT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
C.M. Aron and 
Sid L. Moller, of Aron and Hennig, Laramie, for appellant.

John A. 
MacPherson and Catherine MacPherson, of Johnson, MacPherson & Noecker, 
Rawlins, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals from 
a decision of the district court which affirmed the decision of appellee to 
discharge appellant from the position of principal of MorrowSchool 
in Baggs, Wyoming, and from his teaching position in the 
school district.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part and 
reverse in part.

[¶3.]     Appellant words the 
issues on appeal as follows:

"A. Whether a school 
principal, who was initially employed as a classroom teacher, retains tenure 
rights under the Wyoming Teacher Employment Law once he accepts a principal's 
position? If so, then in the circumstances of this case,

"(1) Whether the 
Appellant was afforded procedural due process by the Board of Trustees when it 
denied Appellant's claim for reinstatement as a classroom teacher; 
and/or

"(2) Whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the Board's decision that the Appellant was unfit 
to return to classroom teaching?

"B. Whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the Appellant's dismissal as a 
principal?"

[¶4.]     Appellant was employed 
by appellee as a classroom teacher during the school years of 1970-71, 1971-72 
and 1972-73. He was offered and signed a classroom-teacher contract for the 
school year 1973-74, but was later appointed principal of the MorrowSchool 
at Baggs, Wyoming, by appellee for that school year. He 
held that position for nine years, until he was terminated after the 1981-82 
school year.

[¶5.]     Bruce Harvey was 
employed by appellee as a classroom teacher at the Morrow School for the school 
year 1981-82, and his wife, Susan, was there employed by appellee as a part-time 
classroom teacher for the same school year. The teaching contracts for the 
Harveys were not 
renewed for the 1982-83 school year.

[¶6.]     A few weeks before the 
end of the 1981-82 school year, on May 5, 1982, the Harveys and appellant had 
a confrontation for which incident appellant was discharged. The nature of the 
confrontation will be more detailed infra.

DISCHARGE FROM POSITION 
AS PRINCIPAL

[¶7.]     We need not consider 
whether or not appellant received proper notice of a hearing in connection with 
the discharge from the position as principal, or whether or not sufficient 
evidence was presented for such discharge at the hearing, inasmuch as 
appellant's position as principal was not a tenured position and appellee had no 
obligation to renew appellant's contract as a principal for the 1982-83 school 
year. We settled this issue in Seyfang v. 
Board of Trustees of Washakie County School District No. 1, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1376 
(1977). It would serve little purpose to here repeat the rationale there set 
forth. We only note that we carefully analyzed the language of the Wyoming 
Teacher Employment Law, § 21-7-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, and the legislative 
intent thereof to conclude that tenure afforded for the classroom teacher 
position or its equivalent was not likewise afforded for administrative or 
supervisory positions. We said at :

"Even the applicability 
provision of the act refers to the function of teaching, not supervising. This 
separation of functions is emphasized by the certification provisions, § 
21.1-14(c), supra, [now § 21-2-304(a)(iii), W.S. 1977] which clearly distinguish 
the qualifications for teaching and administrating, even though one must be a 
teacher to be an administrator."

[¶8.]     Appellant attempts to 
distinguish the Seyfang case from 
this case in that Mr. Seyfang was a superintendent and appellant was a 
principal. The rationale and analysis scrivened by Justice Rose in Seyfang is equally applicable to both 
positions. Both positions are included in that which is commonly referred to as 
"management." The Wyoming Teacher Employment Law does not grant tenure to the 
position of principal, and appellee was not prevented by the act from refusing 
to renew appellant's contract as principal.

DISCHARGE FROM TEACHING 
POSITION

[¶9.]     However, the Wyoming 
Teacher Employment Law is specific in granting tenure to a classroom teacher who 
has

"* * * been employed by 
the same school district in the state of Wyoming for a period of three (3) 
consecutive school years, and has had his contract renewed for a fourth 
consecutive school year." Section 21-7-102(a)(ii)(A), W.S. 
1977.

 

As noted, there 
is a distinction between the ability to obtain tenure for a teaching position 
and the ability to do so for an administrative position. There may also be a 
distinction between the ability to maintain tenure status in a teaching position 
when one later assumes an administrative position and the ability to attain a 
tenure status in a teaching position by virtue of time spent in an 
administrative position. We do not here have to consider the latter inasmuch as 
appellant qualified for tenure as a classroom teacher under the portion of § 
21-7-102(a)(ii)(A) quoted supra before he assumed the position as 
principal.

[¶10.]  Appellee contends that appellant lost 
this tenure when he became a principal. We cannot agree. If appellee were 
correct, there would be a simple procedure to circumvent a teacher's tenure: 
make him a principal and then discharge him. It is desirable - and even 
important - to have people with extensive classroom teaching experience in 
administrative positions. It would be difficult to fill administrative positions 
with experienced teachers if the teachers would have to give up tenure upon 
accepting administrative positions.

[¶11.]  Appellant became tenured as a teacher 
pursuant to the provisions of the Wyoming Teacher Employment Law. His continued 
employment as a certified professional employee did not change his tenured 
position as a classroom teacher. There is nothing in the act to reflect that 
such a change should occur. Accordingly, appellee had to afford appellant the 
procedural and evidentiary standards incident to a tenured classroom teacher 
position before it could discharge appellant from such 
position.

[¶12.]  The incident which gave rise to the 
confrontation between appellant and the Harveys began with a letter to the editor of a 
local newspaper written by Bruce Harvey concerning appellant. The letter angered 
appellant, and he confronted the Harveys in one 
of the classrooms after the Harveys' working hours. The Harveys had gathered up 
some books to take home when appellant appeared and stood in the only doorway to 
the classroom. Bruce Harvey asked appellant if he could help him and appellant 
said "I don't know, can you?" From this mild start, the conversation became more 
acrimonious.

[¶13.]  Susan Harvey and Bruce Harvey testified 
separately that appellant blocked the doorway to the room, and that when Bruce 
asked him to get out of the way, appellant said, "don't touch me." The Harveys then went to some 
desks in the room and sat down. Susan Harvey said that physical contact between 
Bruce Harvey and appellant did not occur. Bruce Harvey also said he did not 
recall any physical contact. The Harveys testified that the letter to the editor 
was discussed. They testified appellant accused Bruce Harvey of calling him a 
sex fiend, but that appellant said Bruce Harvey was the sex fiend, having 
married a woman half his age. They testified that appellant said they had better 
leave town as soon as school was out and that he was going to sue them and put a 
lien on their house. They testified that Bruce Harvey told appellant he was 
crazy and sick and needed help. Susan Harvey testified that appellant was 
shouting, and Bruce Harvey testified that appellant was loud and aggressive. 
They both testified that when they left the classroom and were in the hall, 
Bruce Harvey said to Susan Harvey, within hearing distance of appellant, "do you 
think the letter got to him," whereupon appellant said he would shoot them and 
that the shooting would be torture. Bruce Harvey said, "I believe you," and the 
incident ended. Bruce Harvey testified that during the incident he supposed he 
"was trying to needle Spurlock a little bit, and that's what I regretted later 
on because it wasn't a mature thing to do," that "I guess I was trying to get at 
him a little bit," and that he regretted losing his temper and "getting louder 
than usual" during the confrontation. Bruce Harvey testified that he believed it 
was "abnormal for a school administrator to react in such a fashion," and Susan 
Harvey testified that she considered appellant's language to be "very 
unprofessional." The Harveys estimated the confrontation to have 
lasted 10 to 15 minutes. 

[¶14.]  Appellant testified that he went to the 
room in an effort to persuade the Harveys to "back off" in their animosity toward 
him, but it "blew up" on him. He testified that Bruce Harvey said it was 4:00 
o'clock and he was going home, and that Bruce Harvey pushed him on the shoulder. 
Appellant said "Bruce, don't lay another hand on me," whereupon Bruce said they 
didn't have to listen and both Harveys went to the desks and sat down. He 
testified that the letter to the editor was discussed, that Bruce Harvey accused 
him of being sick and crazy and having been run out of Georgia, and that he accused the Harveys of calling him a 
sex fiend. He testified that he told Bruce Harvey that if anyone was "kinky" he 
was for marrying a woman half his age. He acknowledged threatening to sue the 
Harveys after 
the school year ended and denied that he told them to leave town. When Bruce 
Harvey said he wanted to go home, appellant testified that he said "fine" and 
left the room. He testified that after they went into the hall Bruce Harvey said 
"I got to him. That letter got to him that time," and when appellant turned 
around, Bruce Harvey said, "you're crazy * * * you're liable to shoot somebody," 
to which appellant responded, "if I shoot you, I'll shoot you to torture you." 
He estimated the confrontation to have lasted for about five 
minutes.

[¶15.]  On May 27, 1982, the chairman of appellee 
advised appellant by letter that there would be a hearing on June 8, 1982. The 
letter recited in pertinent part:

"This letter is written 
notice to you of the initiation of hearing proceedings involving you, together 
with the written reasons giving rise to such hearing.

"The reasons for the 
initiation of the hearing proceedings involving you are your actions on May 5, 
1982, at MorrowSchool in Baggs, Wyoming, at which time and place you initiated 
a confrontation with Mr. Bruce Harvey and Mrs. Susan Harvey, teachers at the 
school. Attached hereto is a copy of Mr. Richard Colson's written report of his 
investigation of the confrontation."

Mr. Colson was 
an assistant superintendent of appellee. His one page report reflected an 
interview with Bruce Harvey in which Mr. Harvey related in summary form 
substantially that to which he later testified. It also reflected an interview 
with appellant in which appellant said he did not feel he had done anything 
wrong, and that they both made statements they probably should not have made. He 
said he had purposely overlooked acts by the Harveys so the school year could end without 
any more disruption. The report related that some faculty members "made the same 
observation on behalf of Spurlock." The testimony recited supra was received at 
the hearing.

[¶16.]  As a result of the hearing, the appellee, 
by a four-to-two vote decided

"* * * that Mr. W. Nyles 
Spurlock, be, and he is hereby immediately discharged and dismissed from his 
position as principal of Morrow School, and his contract of employment, be, and 
it is hereby immediately cancelled."

On petition by 
appellant to review the Board's action, the district court remanded the matter 
to appellee on March 14, 1983,

"* * * to take such 
additional evidence as may be appropriate relating to the status of W. Nyles 
Spurlock as a continuing contract teacher and such other matters relevant 
thereto."

The order was 
pursuant to a stipulation of counsel which noted that evidence was not received 
at the original proceedings concerning appellant's status as a continuing 
contract teacher and that the remand would be for the purpose of reviewing such 
evidence.

[¶17.]  At the second hearing on June 9, 1983, 
documentary evidence was received relative to appellant's teaching contract with 
appellee and to his having maintained his teaching certification with the state. 
No other evidence was presented. Counsel and the members of appellee discussed 
the damages suffered by appellant and to be paid by appellee for the time he had 
not worked if tenure existed. Appellee's counsel contended that even if tenure 
existed, the evidence of the first hearing was sufficient to cause discharge of 
appellant from his teaching position as well as from his principal 
position.

[¶18.]  On July 28, 1983, appellee issued its 
decision in which it held that appellant

"* * * enjoyed no tenured 
status with the District. However, even if he held tenure status, the events 
surrounding his termination as a principal justify his termination as a teacher 
as well."

[¶19.]  Section 21-7-110, W.S. 1977 (part of the 
Wyoming Teacher Employment Law) provides:

"(a) The board may 
suspend or dismiss any teacher for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, 
insubordination, or any other good or just cause.

"(b) Written notice. - Suspension or 
dismissal proceedings shall be initiated by the superintendent or any member of 
the board delivering to the teacher a written notice thereof, together with 
written reasons therefor.

"(c) Hearing. - Every teacher who has 
dismissal or suspension proceedings instituted against him shall have a hearing 
before the board on the reasons for such dismissal or suspension, unless such 
hearing is waived in writing by the teacher.

"(i) The hearing shall be 
conducted before the board and shall be held not less than ten (10) nor more 
than thirty (30) days after the date of initiation of such dismissal or 
suspension proceedings. Written notice of the time and place of said hearing 
shall be delivered to the teacher at least ten (10) days prior 
thereto.

"(ii) At any such hearing 
conducted by the board, the teacher shall have the right to appear in person 
with or without counsel; shall have the right to be heard and to present 
testimony or witnesses and other evidence bearing upon the reasons for the 
proposed dismissal or suspension; and shall have the right to cross-examine 
witnesses at the hearing. No testimony shall be received from a witness except 
under oath or affirmation, which may be administered by any member of the board 
of trustees. The board shall make provisions for the recording of all evidence 
and testimony presented at the hearings, and such record shall be retained in 
the minutes of the board as a public record for a period of five (5) years after 
the date of said hearing.

"(d) Majority of board. - Any action 
resulting in the teacher's suspension or dismissal shall be approved by a 
majority of the duly elected members of the board of 
trustees."

[¶20.]  The confrontation upon which the 
discharge was based did not concern appellant's incompetency, neglect of duty, 
immorality, or insubordination as a teacher. Therefore, the only basis for 
discharge would be "any other good or just cause."

[¶21.]  Appellee made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law after the first hearing and supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law after the second hearing. Although the second hearing was 
restricted to evidence concerning appellant's status as a tenured teacher, the 
supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law generally repeated that 
said in the original findings of fact and conclusions of law. They referred to 
general school policies and goals to develop "in students * * * an understanding 
and appreciation for the democratic form of government and for the rights and 
responsibilities of the individuals"; that all individuals, "students and 
teachers alike, * * * enjoy full rights of citizenship as provided in the First 
Amendment"; that "freedom of speech is entitled to comprehensive protection"; 
that a "teacher has the right to criticize his or her employers"; and that 
"teachers cannot be the victims of retaliation and threats from either 
administrators or boards of education for exercising constitutional rights," 
etc.

[¶22.]  Neither in the notice of the original 
hearing nor in the findings of fact and conclusions of law are there specified 
particular rules or regulations of the school district alleged or found to be 
violated. The findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect that appellant was 
found to have interfered with the Harveys' freedom of speech 
rights.

[¶23.]  Of course, that which immediately comes 
to mind is the question as to whether or not appellant's right of freedom of speech 
is being invaded by discharging him for speaking as he wished to the Harveys. It is this type 
of circumstance in which these teacher-discharge cases usually come to us. The 
discharged teacher complains because the school district or its agents are not 
respecting that teacher's right to free speech, e.g., Board of Trustees, Laramie County School 
District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976). Of course, the misuse 
of free speech between individual teachers or administrators may result in a 
defamation action, but such is a private matter in which a school district is 
not involved. The district would be involved only if it interfered with the free 
speech by discharge or otherwise.

[¶24.]  The findings of fact and conclusions of 
law allude to the effect of the confrontation on students, but there is no 
evidence whatsoever that any student had knowledge of the incident. We recognize 
the ease in which the most insignificant confrontation or occurrence, let alone 
one involving teachers or public officials, is soon made known to everyone in a 
community the size of Baggs (1980 census, 433), but there must be some 
evidentiary showing of the knowledge by, and effect on, students if such is made 
the basis for action under § 21-7-110(a), W.S. 1977, 
supra.

[¶25.]  The original findings of fact and 
conclusions of law do not refer to appellant's teaching status. They continually 
refer to his administrative status. For example, they 
recite:

"His behavior and conduct 
demonstrates that he is unable to supervise properly his teaching staff * * 
*."

"Such conduct and 
behavior on behalf of the school principal demonstrates that he lacks necessary 
qualities, including the qualities of competence and the quality of good 
judgment required for the management and the educational leadership of his 
assigned attendance center."

"Mr. Spurlock's behavior 
and conduct demonstrates a substantial shortcoming in his educational 
leadership, and displays bad judgment in such a nature that it renders his 
continuance in the office of principal as detrimental to the discipline and 
efficiency of that position."

[¶26.]  The supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law again refer to the right of freedom of speech and conclude 
that "[t]eachers must respect and protect, not extinguish and inhibit, a fellow 
teacher's right to express ideas," and apply the requirement to appellant 
without consideration of his right to freedom of speech when talking to the 
Harveys.

[¶27.]  Both the original and the supplemental 
findings of fact and conclusions of law contain a conclusion 
that:

"His conduct of standing 
in the doorway in such a manner as to block Mr. and Mrs. Harvey's exit of the 
classroom during their off-hours demonstrates an attempt to abridge Mr. and Mrs. 
Harvey's freedom of movement rights under the federal and state 
constitutions."

Although the 
evidence was in conflict on the nature and extent of the restraint by appellant 
of the Harveys, 
there was evidence to support appellee's finding that such occurred. Again, 
however, the question is presented as to how much control should a school 
district have over private actions of its school teachers after school hours. 
Only Mr. and Mrs. Harvey and appellant were present. The Harveys have the privilege 
of instituting criminal and civil proceedings for false imprisonment. There is 
certainly a point at which a school district should be concerned with after 
hours antagonistic situations between its teachers, but a five- to 
fifteen-minute argument during which accusations were exchanged even with one of 
the participants standing in the only exit would seem to be less than "good and 
just cause" for discharge.

[¶28.]  The notice of the hearing, the original 
hearing itself, and the original findings of fact and conclusions of law taken 
separately or in total do not pertain to appellant's position as a tenured 
classroom teacher. They specifically address themselves to his position as 
principal. When the district judge evidenced his concern for this fact, the 
question arose as to whether or not appellant was a tenured teacher, and the 
matter was remanded to appellee for the receipt of documentary evidence on this 
issue. Appellee then made the contention that even if appellant were a tenured 
teacher sufficient evidence was presented at the original hearing to warrant his 
dismissal from such position. Supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were made to buttress this position. Not only were such supplemental 
findings of fact and conclusions of law beyond that for which the matter was 
remanded, but they do not reflect that which would be sufficiently substantial 
evidence for discharge of a tenured teacher.

[¶29.]  The supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law fit into that which is condemned in Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary 
School District No. 9, County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 237 
(1971):

"* * * Although such a 
hearing was conducted April 10, 1969, it is clear from the record as a whole, 
from the statement of counsel at the hearing, and even from the admission of 
appellee's attorney in oral argument to us that Monahan did not have a bona fide 
hearing to determine whether there was just cause for his termination. Instead, 
the hearing was nothing more than an exercise engaged in for the sole purpose of 
making a record which could make legal and justifiable the decision which the 
board had already made prior to the hearing."

[¶30.]  That which is "good or just cause" was 
carefully analyzed in Powell v. Board of 
Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Crook County, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112 (1976). It was there said at pages 1118 and 1119:

"We make one final 
observation concerning the `good cause' facts necessary to support the discharge 
of a teacher. `Good cause' cannot be just any reason that the Board deems 
sufficient for the discharge of the teacher. We have held in Monahan v. Board of Trustees, etc., County 
of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 237:

"`It becomes clear then, 
from what we have said, that a hearing on termination of a continuing contract 
teacher involves the question of whether there is good cause for termination. 
There must not only be good cause but there must be substantial evidence before 
the board to show that there is good cause. Absent either, a decision on the 
part of the board to terminate will be arbitrary.'

* * * * * 
*

"Therefore, it is the 
decision of this court that the `good cause' to which the statute refers when 
the term `any other good or just cause' is used in § 21.1-160, W.S. 1957, 1975 
Cum.Supp., or when good cause is contemplated as discussed in Monahan, supra, these terms assume facts 
which bear a relationnship [sic] to the teacher's ability and fitness to teach 
and discharge the duties of his or her position."

[¶31.]  The evidence placed before the Board in 
the original hearing and in the supplemental hearing bears no relationship to 
appellant's ability and fitness to teach and discharge the duties of a classroom 
teacher.

[¶32.]  Inasmuch as the original notice was 
insufficient to advise appellant of the standard, rule, or regulation he was 
alleged to have violated, and inasmuch as the hearing was not with reference to 
his classroom teacher tenured status, and inasmuch as there was not substantial 
evidence presented at the hearing to reflect "good or just cause" for 
appellant's discharge as a classroom teacher, we reverse the holding of the 
appellee and of the district court that appellant was properly discharged from 
his position of classroom teacher.

[¶33.]  Affirmed as to the dismissal of appellant 
from the position of principal and reversed as to the dismissal of appellant 
from the position of tenured classroom teacher.