Title: P. v. Cogswell

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 4/1/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S158898 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D049038 
HENRY IVAN COGSWELL, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCN201693 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A witness‟s preliminary hearing testimony is admissible at trial if the 
witness is “unavailable” despite the exercise of “reasonable diligence” by the party 
seeking the witness‟s attendance.  (Evid. Code, § 1291.)  At issue is whether, to 
show “reasonable diligence” in obtaining the presence at trial of a sexual assault 
victim living outside California, the prosecution in this case had to ask a court to 
order the victim taken into custody and transported to California to testify at 
defendant‟s trial.  
On a visit to California, a Colorado woman was sexually attacked.  At the 
preliminary hearing, she testified against defendant Henry Ivan Cogswell, her 
attacker, but thereafter she refused to return to California to testify at his trial.  The 
prosecution then sought to compel her attendance at trial through a law that has 
been adopted in all 50 states and is known as the Uniform Act to Secure the 
Attendance of Witnesses from without the State in Criminal Cases.  (Uniform Act; 
Pen. Code, § 1334 et seq.)  Under the Uniform Act, as adopted in California, a 
2 
party in a criminal case can ask a court in the state where an out-of-state material 
witness is located to subpoena the witness and also to have the witness taken into 
custody and brought to the prosecuting state to testify.   
At the prosecution‟s request, a Colorado court issued a subpoena to the 
sexual assault victim.  When she did not appear at defendant‟s California trial, the 
California trial court declared her to be unavailable as a witness, and it permitted 
the prosecution to use the victim‟s preliminary hearing testimony as evidence at 
defendant‟s trial.  A jury convicted defendant of various sexual assaults.  He 
appealed. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court‟s determination of the 
Colorado witness‟s unavailability.  In the Court of Appeal‟s view, the prosecution 
had not used reasonable diligence in securing her presence at defendant‟s 
California trial because it did not avail itself of the Uniform Act‟s provision 
allowing for an out-of-state material witness‟s detention and transportation to the 
prosecuting state.  Unlike the Court of Appeal, we conclude that the prosecution 
did use reasonable diligence in obtaining the witness‟s presence. 
I 
Defendant was accused of sexually assaulting Lorene B., a Colorado 
resident, while she was vacationing in California.  Lorene returned to California to 
testify at defendant‟s preliminary hearing, where she was thoroughly cross-
examined by defense counsel.  Based on that testimony, defendant was held to 
answer on the charged sexual offenses.  
Because Lorene had previously been cooperative, the prosecution had not 
subpoenaed her to testify at defendant‟s California trial.  On the date of trial, 
Lorene told the prosecution she would not testify against defendant.  Without 
Lorene‟s testimony at trial, the prosecution could proceed against defendant only 
3 
if it could use, as evidence of defendant‟s guilt, the testimony that Lorene had 
previously given at the preliminary hearing.   
Because the prosecution could not show that it had used reasonable 
diligence in securing Lorene‟s attendance at defendant‟s trial (Evid. Code, § 240, 
subd. (a)(5)), and because without such a showing it could not use at trial the 
testimony that Lorene had given at the preliminary hearing, it asked the trial court 
to dismiss the case.  A new complaint against defendant was then filed.  The 
parties stipulated that defendant could be held to answer on the complaint and that 
the complaint could be deemed the information.  The case was set for trial on 
December 20, 2005.   
On November 2, 2005, the prosecution asked the San Diego Superior Court 
that, in accordance with the Uniform Act, a request be made to the Denver District 
Court in Colorado for the issuance of a subpoena to Lorene.  The court did so.  As 
required under the Uniform Act, the subpoena request was accompanied by a 
round-trip airplane ticket from Denver to San Diego, plus a daily allowance for 
food and hotel expenses.   
In mid-December 2005, the San Diego Superior Court vacated the 
December 20 trial date, and set a new trial date for January 31, 2006.  On 
December 20, in a telephone call to the prosecution in California, Lorene said she 
would not testify at defendant‟s trial.  Thereafter, the prosecution made no further 
efforts to contact Lorene, fearing that she would view this as “intimidation,” and 
that if she were told about the new January 31, 2006, trial date before she had been 
subpoenaed she would try to evade service of the subpoena.  Instead, the 
prosecution again asked the San Diego Superior Court to have the Denver, 
Colorado court subpoena Lorene to appear as a material witness at defendant‟s 
San Diego trial, rescheduled for January 31, 2006.  Again, the request was 
accompanied by a round-trip airplane ticket to San Diego and a daily allowance 
4 
for food and hotel expenses.  The prosecution did not request, as permitted under 
the Uniform Act, that Lorene be taken into custody and brought to San Diego to 
testify. 
The Denver, Colorado court issued the subpoena, and the Denver 
District Attorney then confirmed that the subpoena was served on Lorene on 
January 20, 2006, and that Lorene was given the requisite plane ticket and 
witness fees.   
When on February 1, 2006, the first day of defendant‟s trial in San Diego, 
Lorene did not appear, the prosecution asked the trial court that, because Lorene 
was “unavailable as a witness” (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)) notwithstanding the 
prosecution‟s use of reasonable diligence in attempting to secure her presence (id., 
§ 240, subd. (a)(5)), the prosecution be allowed to use as evidence at defendant‟s 
trial Lorene‟s previously given preliminary hearing testimony.  The prosecutor 
explained:  “[Lorene] has stated to me and to my investigator . . . that she has had 
as much of this matter as she can possibly handle.  [¶]  She‟s had contact from the 
family members of the defendant, from her prior friends.  Given the small nature 
of the deaf community,[1] she lives in Colorado to escape what she has lived 
through here.  And she has emotional issues with coming back here to court.  She 
informed me prior to yesterday at the last trial call that she would not be here.”  
Defendant objected, unsuccessfully, that the prosecution had not used reasonable 
diligence to secure Lorene‟s attendance as a witness because of its failure to ask a 
Colorado court to order that, as allowed under the Uniform Act, Lorene be taken 
into custody and brought to San Diego to testify at defendant‟s trial.   
                                              
1  
Both defendant and Lorene are deaf. 
5 
Based primarily on Lorene‟s preliminary hearing testimony, the jury 
convicted defendant as charged.  In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that 
defendant had a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-
(i), 668), that he had served a prison term for that conviction and had not remained 
free from any new offense for 10 years after his release (id., §§ 667.5, subd. (a), 
667.6, subd. (a)), and that a previous conviction for forcible rape made him a 
habitual sex offender (id., § 667.61, subds. (a), (c), (d)).  The trial court sentenced 
defendant to consecutive indeterminate terms of 50 years to life on two counts of 
rape, and it imposed a consecutive term of five years for his prior serious felony 
conviction.  On the remaining counts, the court imposed concurrent sentences.   
On appeal, defendant reiterated the argument he had made in the trial court 
that to show reasonable diligence in securing Lorene‟s presence at trial, the 
prosecution should have invoked the Uniform Act‟s custody-and-delivery 
provision.  The Attorney General responded that the prosecution could not resort 
to that provision because Code of Civil Procedure section 1219‟s subdivision (b) 
(hereafter section 1219(b)) prohibits the confinement of a sexual assault victim 
who refuses to testify about the arrest.  That provision states:  “Notwithstanding 
any other law, no court may imprison or otherwise confine or place in custody the 
victim of a sexual assault . . . for contempt when the contempt consists of refusing 
to testify concerning that sexual assault . . . .”  (Ibid.)2   
The Court of Appeal reversed defendant‟s convictions, holding that section 
1219(b) “does not . . . limit the power of a California court to utilize the custody 
and delivery provisions of the Uniform Act.”  The purpose of section 1219(b), the 
                                              
2  
As discussed later, the Attorney General no longer argues that this 
provision barred the prosecutor from asking that Lorene be taken into custody 
under the provisions of the Uniform Act. 
6 
Court of Appeal stated, is to forbid the confinement of a sexual assault victim 
based on “a finding of contempt arising from a refusal to testify.”  (Italics added.)  
But, the court explained, the “custody and delivery provision of the Uniform Act 
is a device to assure the attendance of a witness at trial and not a punishment for 
contempt arising from a refusal to testify.”  Thus, the Court of Appeal held, 
section 1219(b) “did not forbid the use of the act‟s custody and delivery provisions 
to secure Lorene‟s attendance at trial.”   
The Court of Appeal further stated that because “the prosecution was on 
notice that it was highly probable Lorene would not return to California even if 
ordered by a court to do so,” the prosecution did not use “every reasonable means 
to secure her attendance and, therefore, did not exercise reasonable diligence” in 
securing Lorene‟s presence at defendant‟s California trial.  Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal concluded, the trial court erred in declaring Lorene unavailable as a 
witness and in allowing the prosecution to use at defendant‟s trial Lorene‟s 
preliminary hearing testimony.  This error, the Court of Appeal held, was 
prejudicial, because without the use of that testimony at defendant‟s trial there was 
no evidence of his guilt.   
We granted the Attorney General‟s petition for review. 
II 
We here consider the interaction among four statutes:  the Uniform Act, 
which allows a prosecutor or a defendant in a criminal case to request that an out-
of-state witness be subpoenaed and be taken into custody and transported to the 
prosecuting state in which trial is pending; Evidence Code sections 240 and 1292, 
which permit the use of prior testimony by an unavailable declarant; and Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1219(b), which prohibits the confinement of a sexual 
assault victim for contempt based on a refusal to testify about the assault.  A brief 
review of each follows. 
7 
A.  The Uniform Act 
The Uniform Act was initially approved by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1931.  The commissioners approved a 
revised version of the act in 1936, which California adopted in 1937.  There are 
slight differences between the version of the Uniform Act adopted in Colorado 
(Colo. Rev. Stats., § 16-9-201 et. seq.) — the state where sexual assault victim 
Lorene was living at the time of the trial in this case — and the version adopted in 
California (Pen. Code, § 1334 et seq.), but none is pertinent here. 
Under the Uniform Act, as adopted in California, when a person located in 
a sister state that has also adopted the Uniform Act is a “material witness” in a 
“prosecution pending in” California, the judge of the court in which the 
prosecution is pending “may issue a certificate . . . specifying the number of days 
the witness will be required,” which “shall be presented to a judge of a court of 
record in the county of such other state in which the witness is found.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 1334.3, subd. (a); see also Colo. Rev. Stats., § 16-9-203(1).)  A witness 
who travels by airplane is compensated for the flight, and a small allowance is 
provided to cover the witness‟s expenses.  (Pen. Code, § 1334.3, subd. (a); see also 
Colo. Rev. Stats., § 16-9-203(2).)  The witness is paid statutory witness fees, is 
reimbursed “for any additional expenses of the witness which the judge . . . shall 
find reasonable and necessary” (Pen. Code, § 1334.3; the Colo. law does not 
contain this requirement), and may not be arrested or served with legal documents 
while present in the state where the witness is testifying (Pen. Code, § 1334.4; see 
also Colo. Rev. Stats., § 16-9-202 (2)).   
Under the Uniform Act, a sister state court that receives a certificate 
described in the preceding paragraph must direct the witness named on the 
certificate to appear at a hearing.  (Pen. Code, § 1334.2; see also Colo. Rev. Stats., 
§ 16-9-202(1).)  If at that hearing the sister state court “determines that the witness 
8 
is material and necessary, that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to be 
compelled to attend and testify” (Pen. Code, § 1334.2), that “the laws of the state 
in which the prosecution is pending” will give the witness protection from arrest 
while the witness is present, and that the witness will be paid the fees mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, the court “shall issue a subpoena . . . directing the witness 
to attend and testify in the court where the prosecution is pending” (ibid.; see also 
Colo. Rev. Stats., § 16-9-202(2)).  
At issue here is a provision of the Uniform Act that permits a party in a 
criminal case to ask the trial court to “recommend[] that the witness be taken into 
immediate custody and delivered to an officer of this state to assure his or her 
attendance in this state” (Pen. Code, § 1334.3, subd. (a); see also Colo. Rev. Stats., 
§ 16-9-202(3)), and that gives the court in the state where the witness is located 
the power to act upon that recommendation.  This provision of the Uniform Act 
mirrors statutes in California and in most states allowing a trial court to order the 
confinement of material witnesses to ensure their presence at trial.  (See Pen. 
Code, §§ 879, 881, 882; Studnicki, Material Witness Detention:  Justice Served or 
Denied? (1994) 40 Wayne L.Rev. 1533.) 
B.  Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291 
Hearsay evidence, which is “evidence of a statement that was made other 
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the 
truth of the matter stated” (Evid. Code, § 1200), is generally inadmissible in 
California (id., subd. (a)).  But there are several statutory exceptions.  Pertinent 
here is the one that allows admission at trial of a person‟s former testimony if that 
person is “unavailable as a witness” and “[t]he party against whom the former 
testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony 
was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with 
9 
an interest and motive similar to that which he has” at trial.  (Id., § 1291, subd. 
(a).)  A witness is considered to be unavailable if “the proponent of his or her 
statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or 
her attendance by the court‟s process.”  (Id., § 240, subd. (a)(5), italics added.) 
C.  Code of Civil Procedure section 1219 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1219, originally enacted in 1872, provides 
that when a person has been found in contempt of court for refusal to perform an 
act that the person is capable of performing, the court may order the person jailed 
until that act is performed.  (In re Mark A. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1143.)  
Section 1219(b), added to section 1219 in 1984, stated at the time of defendant‟s 
trial in this case:  “Notwithstanding any other law, no court may imprison or 
otherwise confine or place in custody the victim of a sexual assault for contempt 
when the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning that sexual assault.”  
(Stats. 1993, ch. 219, § 69.7, p. 1587.)  (After defendant‟s trial, the Legislature in 
2008 amended section 1219(b) to include victims of domestic violence.) 
III 
In this court, the Attorney General has abandoned the argument he made in 
the Court of Appeal that section 1219(b) prohibited the prosecution from invoking 
the Uniform Act‟s custody-and-delivery provision.  He now accepts the Court of 
Appeal‟s holding that section 1219(b), which prohibits the jailing of sexual assault 
victims for contempt of court based on their refusal to testify, does not preclude 
the prosecution from using the Uniform Act‟s custody-and-delivery provision.  
The Attorney General now argues that even though the prosecution in this case 
could have invoked that provision of the Uniform Act, it was not required to do so 
in order to show in this case the sexual assault victim‟s unavailability as a witness 
at defendant‟s trial.  We agree, as discussed below. 
10 
In requiring that prior testimony be admissible at trial only when the person 
who previously testified has later become unavailable to testify, the Legislature 
sought to ensure that “only when necessary” is prior testimony to be substituted 
for live testimony, which is generally “the preferred form of evidence.”  (People 
v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 225.)  Live testimony compels a witness “to stand 
face to face with the jury” so it “may look at him and judge by his demeanor upon 
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of 
belief.”  (Mattox v. United States (1895) 156 U.S. 237, 242-243.)  But that 
assessment by the jury “ „is severely hampered‟ ” when the “ „witness is absent 
and when his prior testimony is read into evidence.  [Citation.]  Only if the 
necessity . . . is clearly demonstrated may the defendant‟s right of confrontation be 
overcome . . . .‟ ”  (People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 983.)  Such necessity is 
shown, for instance, if a witness is unavailable to testify at trial notwithstanding a 
party‟s use of “reasonable diligence” in attempting to secure the presence of the 
witness.  (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(5).)   
Reasonable diligence, often called “due diligence” in case law, “ „connotes 
persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest, efforts of a substantial 
character.‟ ”  (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 904.)  Here, the Court of 
Appeal faulted the prosecution for not doing enough to obtain Colorado resident 
Lorene‟s presence as a material witness at defendant‟s trial.  What the prosecution 
should have done, the Court of Appeal said, was to invoke the Uniform Act‟s 
provision that would have permitted the prosecution to ask a Colorado court to 
have Lorene taken into custody and transported to California as a witness for the 
prosecution. 
As there is no published California case involving the Uniform Act‟s 
provision on custody and delivery of a material witness, the parties here rely on 
decisions from other states that have considered the issue.  Three of these cases — 
11 
Gray v. Commonwealth (Va.Ct.App. 1993) 431 S.E.2d 86, People v. Thorin 
(Mich.Ct.App. 1983) 336 N.W.2d 913, and People v. Arguello (Colo.Ct.App. 
1987) 737 P.2d 436) — generally support the Attorney General‟s view that to 
establish an out-of-state witness‟s unavailability at trial, a party is not required to 
invoke the Uniform Act‟s custody-and-delivery  provision.  A fourth case — State 
v. Archie (Ariz.Ct.App. 1992) 831 P.2d 414 — generally supports defendant‟s 
contrary view.  In all four, however, the facts are quite different from the case 
before us.  None of them resolves the issue before us here:  Did the prosecution 
have to invoke the Uniform Act‟s custody-and-delivery provision before it could 
establish its use of due diligence in securing sexual assault victim Lorene‟s 
presence at defendant‟s trial?  Our answer is “no,” as explained below. 
To have a material witness who has committed no crime taken into custody, 
for the sole purpose of ensuring the witness‟s appearance at a trial, is a measure so 
drastic that it should be used sparingly.  (See, e.g., State v. Reid (Ariz. 1976) 559 
P.2d 136, 145 [“Confinement of a witness, even for a few days, not charged with a 
crime, is a harsh and oppressive measure which we believe is justified only in the 
most extreme circumstances.”].)  Confinement would be particularly problematic 
when, as in this case, the witness is a sexual assault victim. 
Although any crime victim may be traumatized by the experience, sexual 
assault victims are particularly likely to be traumatized because of the nature of 
the offense.  To relive and to recount in a public courtroom the often personally 
embarrassing intimate details of a sexual assault far overshadows the usual 
discomforts of giving testimony as a witness.  And the defense may, through 
rigorous cross-examination, try to portray the victim as a willing participant.  (See 
generally, Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation:  Rape Cases in the 
Courtroom (1977) 77 Colum. L.Rev. 1.)  Also, seeing the attacker again — this 
time in the courtroom — is for many sexual assault victims a visual reminder of 
12 
the harrowing experienced suffered, adding to their distress and discomfort on the 
witness stand.  (See Ellison, The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness 
(2001) pp. 16-17.)  It comes as no surprise, therefore, that often a victim of sexual 
assault is hesitant to report the crime.  Even fewer such crimes would be reported 
if sexual assault victims could be jailed for refusing to testify against the assailant. 
Recognizing these concerns, the California Legislature in 1984 amended 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1219 to add subdivision (b).  (Sen. Bill No. 1678 
(1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) § 2.)  That provision, as mentioned earlier, prohibits a trial 
court from jailing for contempt a sexual assault victim who refuses to testify 
against the attacker.  As the author of that legislation explained to his fellow 
senators:  “The purpose of [section 1219(b)] is not only to protect victims of 
sexual assault from further victimization resulting from imprisonment or threats of 
imprisonment by our judicial system, but also to begin to create a supportive 
environment in which more victims might come forward to report and prosecute 
[perpetrators of] sexual assault.”  (Sen. Floor Statement by Sen. Dan 
McCorquodale on Sen. Bill No. 1678, May 1, 1984.)  Enactment of section 
1219(b) reflects the Legislature‟s view that sexual assault victims generally should 
not be jailed for refusing to testify against the assailant.   
In this case, the prosecution acted reasonably when it chose not to request 
— even though permitted under the Uniform Act‟s custody-and-delivery provision 
— to have sexual assault victim Lorene taken into custody and transported from 
Colorado to California to testify at defendant‟s trial.  As mentioned earlier, 
Lorene‟s refusal to testify at defendant‟s first scheduled trial led to a dismissal of 
the case against defendant.  Thereafter, the prosecution refiled the charges against 
defendant.  Lorene again told the prosecution she would not testify against 
defendant, and she ignored a subpoena ordering her to appear at defendant‟s trial.  
It is highly unlikely that had Lorene been taken into custody, she would have 
13 
become a cooperative witness.  Moreover, if she had been transported against her 
will to California and then refused to testify, the trial court could not have held her 
in contempt and jailed her until she agreed to testify, because that remedy 
(ordinarily available when a witness refuses to testify) is not available when the 
witness who refuses to testify is a sexual assault victim.  (§ 1219(b).)  Having 
spoken directly to Lorene, the prosecutor was in the best position to assess the 
strength of her determination not to testify at defendant‟s trial.  Based on that 
assessment, the prosecutor could reasonably conclude that invoking the Uniform 
Act‟s custody-and-delivery provision would not have altered Lorene‟s decision 
not to testify again about the sexual assault, and thus it would have been a waste of 
time and resources. 
In holding that the prosecution in this sexual assault case did not use 
reasonable diligence in securing Lorene‟s presence at defendant‟s California trial, 
the Court of Appeal pointed to the prosecution‟s failure to invoke the Uniform 
Act‟s custody-and-delivery provision.  In the court‟s words:  “Lorene was an 
essential witness in this case, her appearance was crucial.  The prosecution did not, 
under the circumstances of this case, use every reasonable means to secure her 
attendance and, therefore, did not exercise reasonable diligence.”  But 
confinement of a sexual assault victim to ensure her presence at the assailant‟s 
trial would, for reasons we discussed earlier, not be a reasonable means of 
securing the witness‟s presence.   
Pertinent here is our decision in People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581.  In 
that case, the trial court ruled that a sexual assault victim‟s refusal to testify at the 
defendant‟s trial made her unavailable as a witness.  We rejected the defendant‟s 
argument that to get the victim to testify the trial court should have threatened to 
fine her.  We said:  “Trial courts „do not have to take extreme actions before 
making a finding of unavailability.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 624.)  In this sexual assault case, 
14 
the prosecution‟s resort to the Uniform Act‟s custody-and-delivery provision to 
ensure victim Lorene‟s presence at defendant‟s trial would have been an action far 
more extreme than the fine at issue in Smith.  Thus, the Court of Appeal here erred 
in reversing the trial court‟s ruling that Lorene was unavailable as a witness 
notwithstanding the prosecution‟s use of reasonable means to secure her presence 
at defendant‟s trial, and that therefore the prosecution could use at that trial the 
testimony that Lorene had previously given at defendant‟s preliminary hearing.  
DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  We remand the matter to 
that court for consideration of defendant‟s remaining claims, which the Court of 
Appeal did not address. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cogswell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 156 Cal.App.4th 698 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S158898 
Date Filed: April 1, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: John S. Einhorn 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. 
De Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, 
Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf, Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Patricia A. Scott 
Post Office Box 12876 
Prescott, AZ  86304 
(928) 445-8380 
 
Melissa Mandel 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2211