Title: Nica v. Div. of Administrative Hearings

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

686 So. 2d 1349 (1997)
FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
v.
FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, et. al., Respondents.
No. 87233.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 16, 1997.
*1350 Bruce Culpepper and William E. Whitney of Pennington, Culpepper, Moore, Wilkinson, Dunbar & Dunlap, P.A., Tallahassee; W. Douglas Moody, Jr. of Bateman Graham, Tallahassee; and David W. Black of Frank, Effman, Weinberg & Black, P.A., Plantation, for Petitioner.
Larry Sands of Sands, White & Sands, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a decision passing upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:
Florida Birth Related Neurological v. Florida Div. of Admin. Hearings, 664 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We approve the result of the district court's decision but not the reasoning thereof.
On July 19, 1991, Judith and Fred Birnie, as parents and natural guardians of their son, Eric Birnie, who was born on March 12, 1989, timely filed a petition for compensation for birth-related neurological injuries pursuant to the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, sections 766.301-766.316, Florida Statutes (1995).[1] Petitioner NICA, the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, disputed the Birnies' claim for compensation based on its conclusion that Eric had not suffered an injury covered by section 766.302(2) because he was not "substantially mentally impaired." An administrative hearing subsequently was held to determine whether Eric's injury was covered under the Plan.[2] Rejecting as unduly narrow NICA's assertion that "mental impairment" should be equated with "cognitive functioning as measured by intelligence tests" for purposes of compensation under the NICA Plan, the hearing officer concluded that Eric "is permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired and has suffered a `birth-related neurological injury,' within the meaning of section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes."
*1351 NICA appealed the hearing officer's order granting the Birnies' petition for compensation under the Plan. The district court affirmed the order, finding that the stated legislative policy behind the Plan could not be given effect by requiring that an infant "suffer both substantial mental and substantial physical impairment." Thus, the Fifth District went beyond the hearing officer's reading of the statute and construed the definition of "birth-related neurological injury" to include those injuries which cause "permanent and substantial impairment, mental and/or physical." Florida Birth Related, 664 So. 2d  at 1021. However, recognizing "the possible impact of this decision on the fund and on pipeline cases," id., the Fifth District stayed its mandate and certified to us the above question as one of great public importance.
Eric Ryan Birnie was born to Judith and Fred Birnie on March 12, 1989, at Halifax Hospital in Daytona Beach. As a result of birth-related events causing oxygen deprivation, Eric suffered a focal injury to the basal ganglia, an area of the brain which aids the body in performing "physical functions." The physician delivering obstetrical services during the birth of Eric was a "participating physician" with the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
In July, 1991, when Eric was two years and four months old, the Birnies filed a petition for compensation for a birth-related neurological injury which NICA contested based on its conclusion that Eric had not suffered an injury covered by section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes (1991), because he was not "substantially mentally impaired." An administrative hearing was held to determine whether Eric's injury was covered by the Plan.
After hearing the evidence, the hearing officer rendered his decision finding that Eric had suffered a birth-related neurological injury and granted the Birnies' petition for compensation under the Plan. He specifically found that during the delivery, Eric had suffered "perinatal asphyxia ... hypoxic ischemia encephalopathy," the loss of oxygen to the brain. Additional findings of fact were included in the final order, the relevant portions of which were quoted in the Fifth District's opinion as follows:
Florida Birth Related, 664 So. 2d  at 1017-19.
The hearing officer also made the following conclusions of law pertinent to the issue of statutory construction before us here:
This case presents this Court with a straightforward question of statutory interpretation and construction. That is, should the word "and," as used in the phrase "substantially mentally and physically impaired" in section 766.302(2) be read in the conjunctive, *1354 or must it be replaced with the word "or" and read in the disjunctive to remain consistent with the legislature's intent in enacting the NICA statute? Although certifying the question for our review, the Fifth District construed "the definition of `birth-related neurological injury' to include those injuries which cause permanent and substantial impairment, mental and/or physical," Florida Birth Related, 664 So. 2d  at 1021, based upon its finding that the literal language of the statute was in conflict with "the stated legislative policy of the act." Id. at 1019.
The NICA Plan was established by the legislature "to provide compensation, on a no-fault basis, for a limited class of catastrophic [birth-related neurological] injuries that result in unusually high costs for custodial care and rehabilitation." § 766.301(2), see also § 766.303(1). As the Birnies did here, the injured infant or his personal representative may seek compensation under the Plan by filing a claim for compensation with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) within five years of the infant's birth. See §§ 766.302(3), 766.303(2), 766.305(1), and 766.313. NICA, which administers the Plan, has "45 days from the date of service of a complete claim ... in which to file a response to the petition and to submit relevant written information relating to the issue of whether the injury is a birth-related neurological injury." § 766.305(3).
If NICA determines that the injury alleged in a claim is a compensable birth-related neurological injury, it may award compensation to the claimant, provided that the award is approved by the hearing officer to whom the claim has been assigned. § 766.305(6). If, on the other hand, NICA disputes the claim, as it did in this case, the dispute must be resolved by the assigned hearing officer in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1995). §§ 766.304, 766.307, 766.309, 766.31. Pertinent to the issue before us, the hearing officer must determine whether the infant's injury is compensable under the statute.
Section 766.302(2) states:
Where, as here, the legislature has not defined the words used in a phrase, the language should usually be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So. 2d 1351 (Fla.1984). Nevertheless, consideration must be accorded not only to the literal and usual meaning of the words, but also to their meaning and effect on the objectives and purposes of the statute's enactment. See Florida State Racing Comm'n v. McLaughlin, 102 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1958). Indeed, "[i]t is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that legislative intent is the polestar by which the court must be guided [in construing enactments of the legislature]." State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981).
In Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d 974 (Fla.1996), we approved the decision of the district court below wherein the district court explained,
Humana of Florida, Inc. v. McKaughan, 652 So. 2d 852, 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)) (citation *1355 omitted); see also Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1978); Adventist Health System/Sunbelt v. Hegwood, 569 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (stating that statutes designed to supersede or modify rights provided by common law must be strictly construed and will not displace common law remedies unless such an intent is expressly declared).
In light of these well-settled rules of statutory construction, the Fifth District's conclusion that the word "and" in the phrase "permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired," should not be read in the conjunctivebut instead replaced with the word "or" and read in the disjunctiveis inappropriate here. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from those cases upon which the Fifth District relies for the proposition that courts may construe the word "and" as the word "or" in statutes where legislative intent mandates it.
In Winemiller v. Feddish, 568 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), the appellant sustained injuries when the pedal of the bike she was riding hit a coral rock in the swale of appellee's property. The appellant subsequently filed a two-count complaint against the appellee. Count I of the complaint alleged common law negligence for failure to properly maintain the swale area, and Count II alleged a violation of a city ordinance which appellant alleged was negligence per se. Id. at 484. The city ordinance in question stated:
Winemiller, 568 So. 2d  at 484 (quoting Tamarac, Fla., Ordinances Art. I, § 23.2(c) (1990)). The appellee in Winemiller filed a motion for summary judgment on Count II and asserted that the ordinance in question did not apply to him since it was the previous owner who had placed the rocks in the swale, and not himself. Finding that the ordinance only prohibited the placement and maintenance of the rocks, not the placement or maintenance, the trial court entered summary judgment for the appellee. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District was faced with determining the proper construction of the city ordinance. The Fourth District concluded: "We agree with appellant that the obvious purpose of this ordinance is to prevent injuries to the travelling public. To exempt some hazards in the swales because they were not placed there by the current owners even though they continue to be maintained by the owners would thwart the purpose of the legislation. The construction advocated by appellee is thus unreasonable." Id.
Winemiller and the cases discussed therein all illustrate situations where the word "and" or "or" could not be read literally or given its ordinary meaning because to do so would lead to unreasonable, absurd results and thus defeat the legislature's intent. Accord Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla.1984). Unlike those cases, however, reading the word "and" as used in the phrase "permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired," section 766.302(2), in the conjunctive does not lead to absurd results, nor does it undermine the legislative policy in enacting the NICA statute.
Quite to the contrary, reading the phrase as it is plainly written and construing the word "and" in the conjunctive is completely consistent with the legislature's intent to "provide compensation, on a no-fault basis, for a limited class of catastrophic injuries," § 766.301(2), in an effort to stabilize and reduce malpractice insurance premiums for providers of obstetric services in Florida. See § 766.301(c). In fact, the hearing officer in this case specifically rejected the Fifth District's subsequent interpretation of the statute in its final order, noting: "To the extent that Petitioners contend that the *1356 NICA Plan covers injuries that result in only physical or mental impairment, their interpretation is rejected. The Statute is written in the conjunctive and can only be interpreted to require permanent and substantial impairment that has both physical and mental elements." Further, as previously noted, the hearing officer made a factual determination that this case falls within the statute even when the statute is given its plain meaning.
We are left with the hearing officer's findingwhich is properly predicated on a reading of the statute in the conjunctive that Eric Bernie is "permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired and ... has suffered a `birth-related neurological injury' within the meaning of section 766.302(2)." Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the hearing officer's final order, we conclude that it is supported by competent and substantial evidence. Consequently, we disapprove the opinion below to the extent that it misconstrues the plain language of the statute, but approve the result, and direct that the case be remanded to DOAH for a determination of the amount of compensation Eric is entitled to under the NICA Plan.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
[1]  Herein, the NICA statute, or the Plan.
[2]  Before the hearing, the parties agreed that the amount of compensation, if any, should be bifurcated from the issue of compensability. Consequently, no evidence was presented at the hearing on the issue of benefits.