Title: State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4986.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4986 
THE STATE EX REL. CORDRAY, ATTY. GEN., APPELLEE, v. MARSHALL, JUDGE; 
RAWLINS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4986.] 
Prohibition — Attorney general — Standing of attorney general to bring action 
seeking writ to compel judge to vacate entries granting relief to defendant 
convicted of murder whose appeal on same grounds was rejected — 
Attorney general has common-law standing as chief law officer of state to 
act in public interest — Judge was patently and unambiguously without 
jurisdiction to vacate conviction already affirmed on appeal on grounds 
that were rejected on appeal — Writ granted. 
(No. 2009-0025 — Submitted August 11, 2009 — Decided September 30, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, No. 05CA3004, 
2008-Ohio-6341. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting appellee, Ohio 
Attorney General Richard Cordray,1 a writ of prohibition compelling a common 
pleas judge to vacate certain entries in favor of appellant, Adrian Rawlins, and to 
immediately return him to prison.  The writ compels Scioto County Court of 
Common Pleas Judge William T. Marshall to vacate the entries granting Rawlins 
relief from his murder conviction and sentence, convicting him of voluntary 
manslaughter, and releasing him from prison, and also compels the judge to 
immediately return Rawlins to prison to continue serving the original murder 
sentence.  Because the attorney general has common-law standing to institute this 
prohibition action and Judge Marshall patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to vacate the murder conviction based on grounds that had previously 
been rejected by the court of appeals in Rawlins’s direct appeal, we affirm the 
judgment granting the writ. 
Facts 
Murder Conviction and Appeal 
{¶ 2} In April 1997, Rawlins shot and killed James Thomas, who had 
been having an affair with Rawlins’s wife.  Rawlins shot Thomas three times, 
including at least once from close range.  Rawlins was charged with aggravated 
murder and a firearm specification.  Following trial, a jury convicted Rawlins of 
murder with the firearm specification, and the Scioto County Court of Common 
Pleas sentenced him to a prison term of 15 years to life. 
{¶ 3} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Scioto County affirmed.  State 
v. Rawlins, Scioto App. No. 97CA2539, 1998 WL 961056.  The court of appeals 
                                                 
1.  This case was originally instituted by then-Attorney General Jim Petro, and has been continued 
by the various successor attorneys general, up to and including current Attorney General Richard 
Cordray.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(2) and Civ.R. 25(D)(1). 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
rejected Rawlins’s claims that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury 
on the lesser offenses of involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter.  
Id. at *4-7.  The court of appeals concluded that under any reasonable view of the 
evidence, the victim’s death was purposeful and the alleged provocation was not 
reasonably sufficient to have incited Rawlins to use deadly force.  Id. at * 4, 7.  
We did not accept Rawlins’s discretionary appeal for review.  State v. Rawlins 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 1489, 709 N.E.2d 1216. 
Motion for Relief from Judgment 
{¶ 4} In 2003, Rawlins filed a motion in the common pleas court for 
relief from the judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to Crim.R. 57(B)2 
and Civ.R. 60(B).  Rawlins raised the same claims in his motion that he had in his 
previous, unsuccessful direct appeal.  The Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney at 
that time filed a response opposing the motion. 
{¶ 5} In March 2005, Judge Marshall, who had not presided over 
Rawlins’s trial, held a hearing on Rawlins’s motion for relief from judgment.  At 
the hearing, the judge orally granted the motion, accepted Rawlins’s plea of guilty 
to voluntary manslaughter, sentenced Rawlins to ten years’ imprisonment, and 
granted Rawlins a judicial release from prison.  A new prosecuting attorney had 
taken office since the initial trial and the filing of the motion for relief from 
judgment.  At the hearing, the assistant prosecuting attorney representing the state 
informed Judge Marshall that the state had no objection to Rawlins’s motion for 
relief from judgment.  The judge then noted that “the Court will make a finding 
with no objection from the State of Ohio that the verdict was against the manifest 
weight of the evidence and instead they should have been instructed on Voluntary 
Manslaughter * * *.” 
                                                 
2.  Crim.R. 57(B) provides, “If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may 
proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules of criminal procedure, and shall 
look to the rules of civil procedure and to the applicable law if no rule of criminal procedure 
exists.” 
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{¶ 6} In journal entries dated March 23, 2005, Judge Marshall granted 
Rawlins’s motion for relief, convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, sentenced 
him to ten years, and then released him.  A couple of weeks later, the judge 
journalized detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  He found that 
Rawlins was entitled to the requested relief from his murder conviction because 
“[f]ailing to instruct the jury on involuntary and voluntary manslaughter violated 
[Rawlins’s] Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his Fifth Amendment due 
process right to have the law accurately stated.”  He concluded that the evidence 
introduced at trial warranted jury instructions on the lesser offenses of voluntary 
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. 
Prohibition Case 
{¶ 7} In May 2005, then-Attorney General Jim Petro filed a complaint in 
the Scioto County Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to compel Judge 
Marshall to vacate his entries granting Rawlins’s motion for relief from judgment, 
convicting him of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder, and releasing him 
from prison.  After Judge Marshall filed an answer and he and the parties 
submitted briefs, the court of appeals granted the writ.  State ex rel. Petro v. 
Marshall, Scioto App. No. 05CA3004, 2006-Ohio-5357.  Rawlins was then 
arrested and returned to prison to continue serving his murder sentence.  Until that 
time, he had not been notified about the prohibition case. 
Intervention, Appeal, and Remand 
{¶ 8} Three weeks after the court of appeals granted the writ, Rawlins 
filed a motion to intervene as a respondent in the prohibition case as well as a 
motion for relief from judgment.  The court of appeals granted the motion to 
intervene and ordered the parties to file responses to the motion for relief from 
judgment.  Rawlins appealed the judgment granting the writ to this court and also 
filed motion for a limited remand so that the court of appeals could rule on his 
pending motion for relief from judgment.  We granted the motion and remanded 
January Term, 2009 
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the cause for the court of appeals to rule on Rawlins’s motion for relief from 
judgment.  State ex rel. Petro v. Marshall, 112 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2006-Ohio-6712, 
859 N.E.2d 557. 
{¶ 9} On remand, the court of appeals granted Rawlins’s motion and 
vacated its previous judgment granting the writ of prohibition.  The court ordered 
that the parties submit evidence and briefs on the attorney general’s prohibition 
claim and further ordered that Rawlins remain in prison during the pendency of 
the case.  We granted Rawlins’s application to dismiss his appeal from the 
vacated judgment.  State ex rel. Dann v. Marshall, 114 Ohio St.3d 1496, 2007-
Ohio-4160, 871 N.E.2d 1496. 
{¶ 10} In November 2008, the court of appeals again granted the writ 
“[b]ecause Judge Marshall did not have jurisdiction to grant Rawlins’ Civ.R. 
60(B) motion.”  State ex rel. Rogers v. Marshall, Scioto App. No. 05CA3004, 
2008-Ohio-6341, ¶ 39. 
{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court upon Rawlins’s appeal as of 
right. 
Legal Analysis 
Standing 
{¶ 12} “Before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the 
person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue.”  Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. 
Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-
Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 112 
Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 22.  In general, “a prohibition 
action may only be commenced by a person who is either a party to the 
proceeding sought to be prohibited * * * or [who] demonstrates an injury in fact 
to a legally protected interest.”  State ex rel. Matasy v. Morley (1986), 25 Ohio 
St.3d 22, 23, 25 OBR 18, 494 N.E.2d 1146. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 13} The court of appeals determined that the attorney general had 
common-law standing to institute the prohibition action.  Rogers, 2008-Ohio-
6341, at ¶ 14-19.  Rawlins asserts that the court of appeals erred in so holding. 
{¶ 14} In Ohio, the attorney general is a constitutional officer.  Section 1, 
Article III, Ohio Constitution.  In addition, the General Assembly has recognized 
the attorney general’s status as the chief law officer for the state and has set forth 
the following duties: 
{¶ 15} “The attorney general is the chief law officer for the state and all 
its departments and shall be provided with adequate office space in Columbus.  
Except as provided in division (E) of section 120.06 and in sections 3517.152 to 
3517.157 of the Revised Code, no state officer or board, or head of a department 
or institution of the state shall employ, or be represented by, other counsel or 
attorneys at law.  The attorney general shall appear for the state in the trial and 
argument of all civil and criminal causes in the supreme court in which the state is 
directly or indirectly interested.  When required by the governor or the general 
assembly, the attorney general shall appear for the state in any court or tribunal in 
a cause in which the state is a party, or in which the state is directly interested.  
Upon the written request of the governor, the attorney general shall prosecute any 
person indicted for a crime.”  R.C. 109.02. 
{¶ 16} Rawlins asserts that the attorney general’s liberal interpretation of 
his powers would render R.C. Chapter 109 meaningless.  In essence, Rawlins 
contends that the attorney general’s powers should be restricted to those specified 
by the General Assembly and that the attorney general thus has no standing in the 
underlying prohibition case because the case was not instituted in this court and 
neither the governor nor the General Assembly requested that the attorney general 
bring the action. 
{¶ 17} Rawlins’s assertion is incorrect. 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 18} We have held that “when these constitutions were adopted (both 
state and federal), they were adopted with a recognition of established 
contemporaneous common-law principles; and * * * they did not repudiate, but 
cherished, the established common law.”  State v. Wing (1902), 66 Ohio St. 407, 
420, 64 N.E. 514.  “ ‘[T]he general assembly will not be presumed to have 
intended to abrogate a settled rule of the common law unless the language used in 
a statute clearly supports such intention.’ ”  Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 121 
Ohio St.3d 433, 2009-Ohio-1222, 905 N.E.2d 172, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. 
Hunt v. Fronzier (1907), 77 Ohio St. 7, 16, 82 N.E. 518.  Nothing in R.C. Chapter 
109 appears to abrogate the attorney general’s common-law powers within the 
limited context of this case. 
{¶ 19} In State ex rel. Little v. Dayton & South-Eastern RR. Co. (1881), 
36 Ohio St. 434, we held that the attorney general has common-law – as well as 
statutory – authority to institute suits on behalf of the public and that the attorney 
general could bring the suit “without a relator.”  Id. at 440.  Similarly, in State ex 
rel. Crabbe v. Plumb (1927), 116 Ohio St. 428, 430, 156 N.E.2d 457, we held that 
“the Attorney General, being the chief law officer of the state and all the 
departments thereof, has authority to institute an action in mandamus against a 
public officer of the state to require him to discharge a duty placed upon him by a 
mandatory statute * * *.” 
{¶ 20} As the court of appeals persuasively concluded in granting the 
writ, “[e]qually important legal interests are at stake here in the attorney general’s 
efforts to obtain the common law writ of prohibition.  If the attorney general can 
enjoin a public nuisance in the absence of an individual relator [as in Little], 
surely the attorney general can promote the proper allocation of judicial power 
among Ohio’s courts, notwithstanding the absence of the prosecuting attorney’s 
participation.”  Rogers, 2008-Ohio-6341, at ¶ 17. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 21} Further, Rawlins mistakenly contends that the presence of the 
prosecuting attorney during the proceeding before Judge Marshall to vacate the 
murder conviction adequately represented the state’s interests so that the attorney 
general is precluded from collaterally asserting the state’s interests in a 
prohibition case. 
{¶ 22} The attorney general did not directly interfere with the local 
prosecutor’s criminal prosecution of Rawlins.  Instead, as the court of appeals 
concluded, the attorney general “filed a distinct civil action that seeks to prohibit a 
court from acting where it purportedly lacks jurisdiction.”  Rogers, 2008-Ohio-
6341, at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 23} Given the unique, limited nature of the attorney general’s exercise 
of authority in this matter and the important statewide interests in reinstating a 
murder conviction vacated by a court without jurisdiction to do so, we hold that 
the attorney general had the requisite common-law standing to commence the 
prohibition action against Judge Marshall.  The exercise of this authority under 
the unique, limited facts of this case is consistent with the common-law powers of 
the majority of state attorneys general.  See, generally, Myers and Ross, State 
Attorneys General, Powers and Responsibilities (2 Ed.2007) 40. 
Prohibition Claim 
{¶ 24} The court of appeals granted the attorney general a writ of 
prohibition to compel Judge Marshall to vacate his entries granting Rawlins relief 
from his murder conviction and sentence, convicting him of voluntary 
manslaughter, and releasing him from prison.  The writ further ordered the judge 
to immediately return Rawlins to prison to continue serving his murder sentence. 
{¶ 25} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, the attorney 
general had to establish that (1) Judge Marshall was about to exercise judicial or 
quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and 
(3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy 
January Term, 2009 
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existed in the ordinary course  of law.  State ex rel. Furnas v. Monnin, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 279, 2008-Ohio-5569, 898 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 10.  It is uncontroverted that Judge 
Marshall exercised judicial power in the underlying criminal case by vacating 
Rawlins’s murder conviction and releasing him from prison. 
{¶ 26} For the remaining requirements, “[i]f a lower court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will 
issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the 
results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. 
Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.  The 
dispositive issue is whether Judge Marshall patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to vacate Rawlins’s murder conviction and release him from prison. 
Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction 
{¶ 27} This case involves the doctrine of the law of the case.  “The law of 
the case is a longstanding doctrine in Ohio jurisprudence.”  Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 
Ohio St.3d 461, 2004-Ohio-6769, 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15.  “The portion of the 
[law-of-the-case] doctrine generally applied in extraordinary-writ cases provides 
that ‘[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the 
Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a 
superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.’ ”  State ex rel. Dannaher v. 
Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 394, 678 N.E.2d 549, quoting Nolan v. 
Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 11 OBR 1, 462 N.E.2d 410, syllabus; State ex rel. 
Non-Employees of Chateau Estates Resident Assn. v. Kessler, 107 Ohio St.3d 197, 
2005-Ohio-6182, 837 N.E.2d 778, ¶ 14.  “The doctrine is necessary to ensure 
consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, 
and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the 
Ohio Constitution.”  Hopkins, at ¶ 15; Hubbard ex rel. Creed v. Sauline (1996), 
74 Ohio St.3d 402, 404, 659 N.E.2d 781. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 28} Under the pertinent portion of the law-of-the-case doctrine, “ ‘the 
decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal 
questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and 
reviewing levels.’ ”  Hopkins, at ¶ 15, quoting Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d at 3, 11 OBR 
1, 462 N.E.2d 410. 
{¶ 29} Rawlins first claims that the law of the case did not prevent Judge 
Marshall from vacating his murder conviction and releasing him from prison 
because the transcript of the hearing on his motion for relief from judgment 
established that the judge granted the motion based, in part, on the conviction 
being against the manifest weight of the evidence, which was not raised by the 
parties or addressed by the court of appeals in his prior appeal. 
{¶ 30} Rawlins’s claim lacks merit.  In his subsequently journalized 
findings of fact, Judge Marshall found that the sole basis for his judgment 
granting Rawlins’s motion for relief from the murder conviction and sentence was 
the common pleas court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary and involuntary 
manslaughter. 
{¶ 31} Rawlins next asserts that any failure by Judge Marshall to comply 
with the law of the case was a nonjurisdictional defect that is not cognizable by 
extraordinary relief in prohibition.  As a general rule, courts of common pleas 
have jurisdiction to rule on postjudgment motions, including motions for relief 
from judgment.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 
655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110 (“In that [the common pleas court judge] possessed 
jurisdiction to rule on the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, the fact that she may have 
exercised that jurisdiction erroneously does not give rise to extraordinary relief by 
prohibition”); State ex rel. Gyurcsik v. Angelotta (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 345, 4 
O.O.3d 482, 364 N.E.2d 284 (writ of prohibition denied in case in which trial 
court granted relief from judgment based on Civ.R. 60(B)(5)). 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 32} Rawlins’s assertion, however, is again mistaken.  We have 
expressly held that the Ohio Constitution “does not grant to a court of common 
pleas jurisdiction to review a prior mandate of a court of appeals.” State ex rel. 
Potain v. Mathews (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32, 13 O.O.3d 17, 391 N.E.2d 343; 
State ex rel. Heck v. Kessler (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 104, 647 N.E.2d 792.  
Therefore, “a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a lower court 
from proceeding contrary to the mandate of a superior court.”  State ex rel. 
Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 652 
N.E.2d 742; State ex rel. Smith v. O’Connor (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 660, 662, 646 
N.E.2d 1115. 
{¶ 33} Similarly, in State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges of Belmont 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 
162, we granted a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial from proceeding when the 
trial court had granted a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after the conviction and 
sentence based on the plea had been affirmed on appeal.  By so holding, we 
concluded that the trial court had no power to vacate a judgment that has been 
affirmed by the appellate court, “for this action would affect the decision of the 
reviewing court, which is not within the power of a trial court to do.”  Id., 55 Ohio 
St.2d at 98, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162. 
{¶ 34} Notwithstanding Rawlins’s claim to the contrary, we did not 
overrule Potain sub silentio in State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-
4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, and Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 
806 N.E.2d 992.  Neither Payne nor Pratts involved a lower court disregarding 
the mandate of a reviewing court in a prior appeal in the same case. 
{¶ 35} Rawlins’s reliance on our dismissal of an original action instituted 
by a former attorney general for writs of mandamus and prohibition is also 
misplaced.  See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Bolt-Meredith (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 
1475, 733 N.E.2d 250.  That case was not premised upon the law of the case or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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our holding in Potain.  Unlike in this case, Montgomery sought to vacate a trial 
court order granting relief to a defendant on grounds not resolved in the previous 
appeal.  While new arguments are barred by the res judicata portion of the law-of-
the-case doctrine, see Creed, 74 Ohio St.3d at 405, 659 N.E.2d 781, res judicata – 
unlike the portion of the law-of-the-case doctrine at issue here – is not a basis for 
extraordinary relief in prohibition.  See State ex rel. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Henson, 96 Ohio St.3d 33, 2002-Ohio-2851, 770 N.E.2d 580, ¶ 11; State ex rel. 
Whiteside v. Fais (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 463, 464, 746 N.E.2d 1113.  And the 
preeminent claim in Montgomery was whether the Crim.R. 33(B) new-trial 
timeliness requirements were jurisdictional.  There is no comparable claim at 
issue here. 
{¶ 36} For these reasons, Judge Marshall’s exercise of jurisdiction to 
grant the motion on the same grounds that had been previously rejected on appeal 
in the same case was unauthorized.  Moreover, this lack of jurisdiction was patent 
and unambiguous.  Under these circumstances, Rawlins’s argument that the state 
has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through its local 
representative – the prosecuting attorney – is thus without merit.  “Where 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking, [a relator] need not establish 
the lack of an adequate remedy at law because the availability of alternate 
remedies like appeal would be immaterial.”  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. 
Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. 
Res Judicata, Waiver, and Laches 
{¶ 37} Rawlins finally claims that res judicata, waiver, and laches barred 
the attorney general’s prohibition claim. 
{¶ 38} These defenses are inapplicable here.  Res judicata “presupposes a 
judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Rose v. Ohio 
Dept. of Rehab. and Corr. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 453, 455, 746 N.E.2d 1103.  
Judge Marshall lacked jurisdiction to disregard the mandate of the court of 
January Term, 2009 
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appeals established in Rawlins’s direct appeal when Rawlins’s motion raised the 
same claims. 
{¶ 39} Nor can waiver apply to a challenge to the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of a court.  Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, 
883 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 45. 
{¶ 40} Laches is also inapplicable because Rawlins ultimately received a 
full and fair opportunity to contest the writ sought by the attorney general.  See 
State ex rel. King v. Summit Cty. Council, 99 Ohio St.3d 172, 2003-Ohio-3050, 
789 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. Roadway Express v. Indus. Comm. 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 510, 514, 696 N.E.2d 1064 (“for laches to apply, ‘prejudice 
is ordinarily represented by a respondent’s inability to defend due to the passage 
of time’ ”).  Rawlins’s ability to defend against the attorney general’s prohibition 
claim was not prejudiced here. 
Oral Argument 
{¶ 41} We deny Rawlins’s motion for oral argument.  This case does not 
involve issues of factual complexity, substantive constitutional considerations, or 
conflict between courts of appeals.  And although this appeal does raise 
interesting issues of arguable legal significance, the parties’ briefs are sufficient to 
permit a resolution of the case.  See State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, 121 Ohio St.3d 507, 2009-Ohio-1523, 905 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 32; 
State ex rel. Allen v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-
Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507, ¶ 21. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 42} Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, under the narrow facts 
presented in this specific case, the attorney general possessed common-law 
standing to bring the prohibition action, and he established his entitlement to the 
writ.  Judge Marshall patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to grant a 
motion for relief from a murder conviction and sentence based on claims that had 
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previously been rejected by the court of appeals in an appeal in the same case.  
Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting the writ of 
prohibition.  By so holding we need not address the attorney general’s alternate 
argument for affirmance – that Judge Marshall lacked jurisdiction over Rawlins’s 
motion for relief from judgment, which should have been treated as an untimely 
petition for postconviction relief. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
and Elisabeth A. Long and M. Scott Criss, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________