Title: State ex rel. Massie v. Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Massie v. Board of Education of Gahanna-Jefferson Public 
Schools et al. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Massie v. Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. 
(1996),   Ohio St.3d   .] 
Schools -- Mandamus to compel board of education and superintendent 
of schools to issue grades and credits to students with unpaid 
instructional fees -- Writ denied, when. 
 
(No. 96-276 -- Submitted July 24, 1996 -- Decided October 2, 1996.) 
 
In Mandamus. 
 
Due to a projected deficit following the defeat of school operating levies, 
respondent Jack J. Schmidt, Superintendent of Gahanna-Jefferson Public Schools, 
proposed that respondent Board of Education of Gahanna-Jefferson Public 
Schools impose a student instructional fee.  On August 10, 1995, the board 
adopted Schmidt’s proposal and established a student instructional fee of twenty 
dollars per student in kindergarten, thirty-five dollars per student in grades one 
through five, forty dollars per student in grades six through eight, and forty-five 
dollars per student in grades nine through twelve.  The instructional fee is assessed 
up to a maximum of three children per family and is waived for students in serious 
 
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financial need.  The instructional fee is in addition to certain class-specific fees at 
the high school level.   
 
The instructional fees have been used by the board to purchase materials 
used in courses of instruction. The fees have not been used to purchase 
administrative materials or necessary textbooks. Included in the materials 
purchased by the board with the instructional fees are workbooks, notebooks, 
clipboards, maps, pencils, and copy paper used to reproduce learning aids, 
workbooks, and assignments.  In a letter dated September 13, 1995, 
Superintendent Schmidt advised parents of Gahanna-Jefferson students that “[t]he 
money collected from the students will be used to buy workbooks and other 
materials used within the classroom.”   
 
Relator, John Massie, has three children, William, Samuel, and Jessica, who 
are students in Gahanna-Jefferson Public Schools.  The board has withheld grades 
and credits for Massie’s children because he did not pay the applicable student 
instructional fees for the 1995-1996 school year.  Massie paid $65 in class-specific 
charges for William’s twelfth grade art classes.  William had seven other classes in 
twelfth grade that did not have class-specific charges.  Massie also purchased 
sewing materials for Jessica to use in a class in lieu of being provided the same 
 
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materials by school officials.  According to the Massie children, they have not 
been given any other materials for classes.     
 
Massie instituted this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board 
and Schmidt to issue grades and credits to Massie’s children. We granted an 
alternative writ and further granted Massie’s motion to amend the complaint to 
indicate that this action is being brought in the name of the state on his relation.  
75 Ohio St.3d 1424, 662 N.E.2d 26;  see, also, R.C. 2731.04; State ex rel. 
Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 530, 533, 653 
N.E.2d 349, 353.  After the parties filed evidence and Massie filed his merit brief, 
respondents failed to file a brief.  Instead, respondents filed motions to dismiss the 
amended complaint and vacate the alternative writ as to the claim relating to 
William’s grades and credits.  Massie filed a memorandum opposing the motions,  
which contained affidavits of both Massie and William.  Respondents then moved 
to strike these affidavits. 
 
The cause is now before this court on the merits as well as on respondents’ 
motions. 
____________________ 
 
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Alden & Associates Co., L.P.A., Matthew L. Alden and Erick R. Alden, for 
relator. 
 
Scott, Scriven & Wahoff, Julie C. Martin and Gregory B. Scott, for 
respondents. 
 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
Motions to Dismiss, Vacate, and Strike 
 
As a preliminary matter, respondents request that we dismiss the complaint 
and vacate the alternative writ as to Massie’s claim relating to his son William’s 
grades and credits.  Civ.R. 17(A) requires that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest.”  A real party in interest is directly 
benefited or injured by the outcome of the case rather than merely having an 
interest in the action itself.  State ex rel. Botkins v. Laws (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 
383, 387, 632 N.E.2d 897, 902. 
 
Respondents assert that Massie is not a real party in interest as to William’s 
grades and credits because his statutory duty to support William ceased when 
William became eighteen.  The evidence presented established that William is an 
eighteen-year-old high school student.  Respondents rely on R.C. 2151.03, which 
 
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defines “neglected child,” and R.C. 2151.011(B)(1)(a), which defines “child.”  
Respondents’ reliance is misplaced.  The applicable provision is R.C. 3103.03(B), 
which provides that “the parental duty of support to children, including the duty of 
a parent to pay support pursuant to a child support order, shall continue beyond 
the age of majority as long as the child continuously attends on a full-time basis 
any recognized and accredited high school.”  Therefore, the fact that William had 
reached eighteen was not dispositive.  The evidence presented pursuant to the 
alternative writ indicated that William was still attending high school on a full-
time basis.  Massie possessed a duty under R.C. 3103.03(B) to support William.  
Furthermore, the evidence established that William’s grades are being withheld 
due to Massie’s failure to pay his student instructional fee.  Based on the 
foregoing, Massie is a real party in interest on his claim for the issuance of 
William’s grades and credits.  We overrule respondents’ motions to dismiss and 
vacate.  Since we need not consider the affidavits attached to Massie’s 
memorandum in opposition to the motion in deciding the motion, respondents’ 
motion to strike these affidavits is moot. 
Mandamus; R.C. 3313.642 
 
6
 
In his first proposition of law, Massie contends that a board of education 
cannot impose a fee for instruction or for consumable materials as part of a deficit 
reduction plan.  Massie did not pay the student instructional fees for his three 
children because he believed that his children were entitled to a free public 
education.  
 
The General Assembly “shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”  Section 
2, Article VI, Ohio Constitution.  R.C. 3313.48 provides that “[t]he board of 
education of each city, exempted village, local, and joint vocational school district 
shall provide for the free education of the youth of school age within the district 
under its jurisdiction ***.”  See, also, R.C. 3313.64.   
 
However, R.C. 3313.642 provides: 
 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 3313.48 and 3313.64 of the 
Revised Code, the board of education of a city, exempted village, or local school 
district shall not be required to furnish, free of charge, to the pupils attending the 
public schools any materials used in a course of instruction with the exception of 
the necessary textbooks required to be furnished without charge pursuant to 
 
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section 3329.06 of the Revised Code.  The board may, however, make provision 
by appropriations transferred from the general fund of the district or otherwise for 
furnishing free of charge any materials used in a course of instruction to such 
pupils as it determines are in serious need of such materials.  ***”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Unlike tuition, which pays the costs of instruction or teaching, student fees 
charged by many educational institutions typically pay the costs of items actually 
used by students, such as textbooks and supplies.  See, generally, 1 Rapp, 
Education Law (1996) 5-115, Section 5.04[1].  According to Massie, R.C. 
3313.642 does not authorize the student instructional fees charged by respondents.  
“‘In construing a statute, a court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent in 
enacting the statute.  *** In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to 
the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.’”  State ex rel. 
Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 220, 
631 N.E.2d 150, 153, quoting State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 
589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323.  Words used in a statute must be taken in their usual, 
normal or customary meaning.  R.C. 1.42; State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & 
 
8
Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 
65, 647 N.E.2d 486, 489. 
 
“Materials” are tools or articles needed to make or do something.  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1392.  “Instruction” refers to teaching.  
Id. at 1172.  Therefore, R.C. 3313.642 authorizes boards of education to charge 
fees for all articles used in courses where students are taught, with the exception of 
necessary textbooks required to be furnished under R.C. 3329.06 to pupils 
attending public schools.  The General Assembly enacted R.C. 3313.642 to 
“relieve the undue burden placed upon boards of education because of inability to 
charge for materials in the course of instruction.”  Am.S.B. No. 214, Section 2, 
128 Ohio Laws 286, 287 (1959). 
 
In Assn. for the Defense of the Washington Loc. School Dist. v. Kiger 
(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 116, 537 N.E.2d 1292, we granted a peremptory writ of 
mandamus to compel the Superintendent and the Board of Education of the 
Washington Local School District to issue grades and credits of students which 
had been withheld for failure to pay a five-dollar-per-pupil fee.  The 
superintendent had announced that the fees would “assist in providing paper 
products, copier materials, student record keeping/test supply sheets, work sheets, 
 
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and other necessary consumable educational supply items which directly affect all 
students in their classrooms/buildings.”  Id., 42 Ohio St.3d at 116-117, 537 N.E.2d 
at 1292.  We noted that since free public education is the general rule in Ohio, the 
exception under R.C. 3313.642 should be strictly construed.  Id., 42 Ohio St.3d at 
118, 537 N.E.2d at 1293.  After strictly construing R.C. 3313.642, we determined 
that the student fees at issue were “for the costs of administrative materials, not 
classroom materials.”  Id., 42 Ohio St.3d at 118, 537 N.E.2d at 1293.  We noted 
that this conclusion was strengthened by language in the announcement that the 
fees were “in addition to other laboratory, workbook, and activity fees, etc., being 
assessed for science, industrial arts, art, weekly readers, etc.”  Id., 42 Ohio St.3d at 
118, 537 N.E.2d at 1293.  Since the fees were not authorized by R.C. 3313.642, 
the superintendent and board of education possessed a clear legal duty to issue 
grades and credits to the parents of students who had not paid the fees.  Id., 42 
Ohio St.3d at 118, 537 N.E.2d at 1293-1294. 
 
Massie claims that based on Kiger, respondents’ fees here are not authorized 
by R.C. 3313.642 because all consumable supplies constitute administrative rather 
than classroom materials.  Massie misreads Kiger.  Kiger did not hold that 
consumable supplies can never constitute materials used in courses of instruction 
 
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under R.C. 3313.642.  While the fees in Kiger were referred to by the respondents 
therein as “consumable educational supply items which directly affect all 
students,” there was no indication that these materials were actually used in 
classrooms during courses.  In fact, “student record keeping” sheets indicated 
administrative rather than classroom materials in Kiger. 
 
Conversely, the record in this case establishes that the instructional fees 
assessed by respondents have been used to purchase classroom materials, i.e., 
materials used in courses of instruction.  Similarly, although like Kiger, the 
challenged fees are being charged in addition to certain class-specific fees, this 
does not mandate a finding that these instructional fees are also for administrative, 
rather than classroom, materials. 
 
The 
term 
“administrative” 
“pertains 
to 
administration, 
especially 
management, as by managing or conducting, directing, or superintending, the 
execution, application or conduct of persons or things” and particularly has the 
characteristics of “executive or ministerial action.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (6 
Ed.1990) 45.  The evidence indicates that the instructional fees established by 
respondents are for classroom materials instead of administrative materials.  The 
treasurer of the school district stated that the fees generated less income than the 
 
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expenses he posted to categories of the State Auditor designated under the 
Uniform School Accounting System as covering “instructional supplies” or 
“teaching aids.”  These are defined respectively as “[e]xpenditures for consumable 
non-food instructional supplies used in classroom, such as paper, paste, pencils, 
[and] paint” and “[e]xpenditures for items and supplies used by teachers to aid in 
their instruction of the student, for example, flash cards, geographical maps, and 
so forth.”  These accounting classifications comport with the conclusion that the 
challenged fees are assessed to cover the cost of classroom materials, as 
authorized by R.C. 3313.642.   
 
While Massie emphasizes that the court must narrowly construe R.C. 
3313.642, courts do not have the authority to ignore the plain language of a statute 
under the guise of statutory interpretation or liberal or narrow construction.  See, 
e.g., Morgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 626 
N.E.2d 939, 942.  The plain language of R.C. 3313.642 permits the instructional 
fees established by respondents because they are being used for classroom 
materials.  Therefore, Massie is not entitled to a writ of mandamus based on Kiger 
and the applicable statutes.  His first proposition of law is meritless and is 
overruled. 
 
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Constitutionality of R.C. 3313.642 
 
In his second proposition of law, Massie asserts that even if the fees are 
authorized by R.C. 3313.642, he is entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus to 
compel issuance of the withheld grades and credits of his children because R.C. 
3313.642 is unconstitutional.  Massie claims that R.C. 3313.642 violates due 
process because it penalizes children (by withholding grades and credits) for the 
actions of their parents (failure to pay fees for materials used in a course of 
instruction).   
 
Massie did not raise this constitutional claim in his complaint or motion to 
amend the complaint.  The alternative writ was issued on a pleading which did not 
include this claim.  Evidence was presented by respondents without notice that this 
claim was being raised.  Massie has not sought leave to amend his complaint to 
raise this claim.  Finally, respondents have not expressly or impliedly consented to 
trial of this issue.  Civ.R. 15(B).  Therefore, we need not consider the merits of 
this improperly raised claim.  See, e.g., Austintown Loc. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities (1993), 66 Ohio 
St.3d 355, 364-365, 613 N.E.2d 167, 174-175; State ex rel. Evans v. Bainbridge 
Twp. Trustees (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 41, 5 OBR 99, 448 N.E.2d 1159, syllabus. 
 
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Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, in that Massie has failed to establish either a clear legal right 
to the withheld grades and credits of his children or a corresponding clear legal 
duty on the part of respondents to issue them, he is not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus.  The writ is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.