Title: VYVX of Virginia v. Cassell

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
VYVX OF VIRGINIA, INC. 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 990285 
September 17, 1999 
 
JOHN W. CASSELL, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
 
I. 
 
In this appeal of an order entered by the State 
Corporation Commission ("Commission"), we consider the 
validity of a fine that the Commission imposed upon VYVX of 
Virginia, Inc. ("VYVX"), and whether the Commission erred in 
denying VYVX's application for authority to construct and 
acquire fiber optic telecommunications facilities for 
intrastate purposes. 
II. 
 
Williams Communication, Inc. ("Williams") is a Delaware 
corporation which is licensed to conduct business in Virginia.  
Williams, through its subsidiaries, conducts a 
telecommunications business throughout the United States and 
internationally.  In 1997, Williams began to construct a new 
fiber optic cable system that would extend from Houston, 
Texas, to Manassas, Virginia.  The cable system would be 
capable of transmitting 34,000,000 simultaneous long-distance 
telephone calls and would be installed between existing gas 
pipelines owned by Williams' subsidiary, Transcontinental Gas 
Pipeline Corporation. 
 
The Federal Communications Commission granted Williams 
authority to operate its interstate and international 
telecommunications systems.  Even though Williams intended to 
provide interstate service on its cable system, Williams also 
desired to utilize the system to provide intrastate service 
within Virginia.  In furtherance of its goal to provide 
intrastate service within Virginia, Williams created a 
subsidiary, VYVX, which was incorporated in Virginia as a 
public service corporation. 
 
On April 23, 1997, VYVX filed with the Commission an 
application for a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to provide interLATA telecommunication services 
within Virginia and to have rates established based on 
competitive factors.1  VYVX stated in its application that it 
                     
1 The phrases "interLATA service" and "LATA" are defined 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151, et 
seq.  "The term 'interLATA service' means telecommunications 
between a point located in a local access and transport area 
and a point located outside such area."  47 U.S.C. 
§ 153(21)(Supp. III 1997).  "The term 'local access and 
transport area' or 'LATA' means a contiguous geographic area— 
(A) established before February 8, 1996, by a 
Bell operating company such that no exchange area 
includes points within more than 1 metropolitan 
statistical area, consolidated metropolitan 
statistical area, or State, except as expressly 
permitted under the AT&T Consent Decree; or  
 
2
"proposes to offer services to the public within Virginia over 
its own facilities and through resale of services provided by 
other carriers."  VYVX requested authority to construct, 
acquire, extend, and operate equipment and facilities to be 
used in the operation of an intrastate telecommunications 
public facility. 
 
VYVX also stated in its application that it would own the 
facilities to be constructed in Virginia.  VYVX sought 
"authority to offer a full range of intrastate interLATA 
telecommunications services to the public on a statewide basis 
within the Commonwealth of Virginia as a non-dominant 
interexchange carrier."  VYVX further stated in its 
application that:  "[VYVX] will build and operate its fiber 
optic telecommunications facilities in Virginia as a public 
service company.  [VYVX] plans to complete construction of the 
facilities in Virginia by December 31, 1997, and intends to 
begin construction as soon as it has obtained all necessary 
governmental authorizations."  Finally, VYVX stated that 
Williams "and [VYVX] have authorization to construct 
interstate telecommunications facilities and to provide 
interstate services pursuant to rules adopted by the Federal 
                                                                
(B) established or modified by a Bell operating 
company after February 8, 1996, and approved by the 
[Federal Communications] Commission."  47 U.S.C. 
§ 153(25)(Supp. III 1997). 
 
3
Communications Commission.  47 C.F.R. § 63.07 (1996).  [VYVX] 
is filing the instant application to ensure that it has the 
ability to offer intrastate interLATA services as well." 
 
VYVX attached a copy of its amended and restated articles 
of incorporation to its application.  Article II of the 
amended and restated articles of incorporation states:  "The 
purpose for which the Corporation is formed is to construct, 
own and operate telecommunications facilities, including fiber 
optic lines, for the purposes of providing audio, video and 
data telecommunications transmission services and other 
telephone services as a public service corporation, public 
utility and communications common carrier."   
 
As required by an order issued by the Commission, VYVX 
caused notice of its application to be published in newspapers 
having general circulation throughout Virginia and mailed 
notices to certain public officials.  On January 14, 1998, the 
Commission issued an order granting VYVX authority to provide 
intrastate, interexchange services subject to certain 
restrictions contained in the Commission's rules governing the 
certification of interexchange carriers and certain applicable 
statutes.  The Commission's January 14, 1998 order stated that 
the Commission would consider separately VYVX's requested 
certification to construct its proposed facilities.  
 
4
 
The Commission directed VYVX to publish notice of its 
request to construct facilities throughout the localities in 
which it proposed to construct those facilities.  VYVX 
requested an amendment to its application to reflect its 
desire to construct a lateral fiber optic telecommunications 
line.  The Commission granted VYVX's request and ordered that 
the public notice include the areas affected by the 
construction of the additional lateral line.   
 
In response to the notice, the Commission received 
several comments and complaints.  Certain landowners 
complained to the Commission because VYVX and its agent, 
Coates Field Service, Inc., had threatened the property 
owners.  VYVX and its agents told the property owners that 
VYVX would condemn their properties if the property owners did 
not consent to give VYVX easements necessary for the 
installation of its cable fiber.  For example, Mark E. Decot, 
a property owner whose land was affected by the installation 
of the cable, testified at a hearing before the Commission 
that VYVX threatened to condemn a portion of his land if he 
refused to convey an easement to it.  Diana Orr, who was 
employed with Coates Field Service, told Decot that if he did 
not sign a document that she had mailed to him, then his 
property would be "condemned and . . . taken anyway, so what 
[he] should do is go ahead and sign it and get as much money 
 
5
as [he] can get out of it right now."  VYVX filed a 
condemnation proceeding against Decot in the Circuit Court of 
Orange County.  Decot eventually signed a document with VYVX 
which gave VYVX the requested easement. 
 
John and Janete Cassell also testified that they were 
told by VYVX's agents that VYVX would condemn their property 
if they failed to convey a requested easement.  A stipulation 
of undisputed facts reveals that VYVX had filed four 
condemnation proceedings in various circuit courts to acquire 
easements of right-of-way from property owners. 
 
David R. Clossin, an employee of Coates Field Service, 
testified that Coates entered into a contract with VYVX to 
assist it with the acquisition of easements in Virginia.  
Clossin testified:  "I work for Coates Field Service, with a 
business card that we represent VYVX of Virginia."   
 
In September 1997, the Commission, which was of the 
opinion "that the allegations raised by the complaints 
constitute 'substantive objections' to [VYVX's application]," 
ordered VYVX to respond to the landowners' complaints and 
directed that VYVX "clarify what certification(s) it seeks 
from the Commission and explain whether . . . since its 
application seeks authority to construct, acquire, extend, or 
operate equipment or facilities for use in public utility 
service, certification pursuant to [Code] § 56-265.2 . . . 
 
6
should be required."  The Commission ordered that VYVX 
"demonstrate why it should not be ordered to cease 
condemnation activities until it receives all necessary 
certificates of public convenience and necessity from the 
Commission." 
 
VYVX responded to the Commission's order and stated that 
VYVX proposed to install a fiber optic cable system in 
Virginia and asserted that it did not need any certification 
before exercising the right of eminent domain.  Continuing, 
VYVX requested that the Commission issue a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity under Code § 56-265.2 which 
would authorize VYVX to provide intrastate interLATA 
telecommunications services as a non-dominant interexchange 
carrier. 
 
On October 17, 1997, the Commission staff asked the 
Commission to order VYVX to cease its condemnation activities 
because, as of that date, VYVX had filed four condemnation 
actions to obtain easements for the installation of its fiber 
optic cable, and those proceedings were pending in various 
circuit courts.  On October 21, 1997, VYVX informed the 
Commission that VYVX would not initiate any further 
condemnation proceedings until the Commission had acted upon 
VYVX's application.  Unbeknownst to the Commission and its 
staff, VYVX and its parent corporation, Williams, were 
 
7
constructing the proposed cable system that was the subject of 
VYVX's application. 
 
The Commission, in an order dated November 25, 1997, held 
that "VYVX is not yet 'lawfully authorized to operate' 
anywhere in the Commonwealth and . . . its proposed 
construction is not an ordinary extension or improvement of 
its facilities, and therefore [VYVX] requires certification," 
pursuant to Code § 56-265.2.  The Commission held that VYVX 
did not have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain 
and directed VYVX to "cease acquisition of property or rights 
therein, by exercise of, or by implying its right to exercise, 
eminent domain authority, until such time as the Commission 
has acted upon its application." 
 
On February 9 and 11, 1998, contractors who were 
installing the optic fiber cable system severed telephone 
cable owned by Bell-Atlantic Corporation.  Bell-Atlantic 
reported these incidents to the Commission which learned, for 
the first time, that construction had already begun on the 
facilities that were the subject of the certification 
proceeding.  The Commission staff filed "a motion for a rule 
to show cause and a temporary injunction." 
 
VYVX responded to the motion and acknowledged that 
construction of the cable facilities had begun, but asserted 
that Williams, and not VYVX, was constructing the facilities.  
 
8
Continuing, VYVX claimed that Williams was constructing the 
facilities pursuant to its federal authority and that the 
facilities would be used for interstate service.  VYVX stated 
in its response that it would use the system to provide 
intrastate interLATA telecommunications. 
 
The Commission conducted a hearing on the motion for a 
rule to show cause and also considered VYVX's request for 
construction certification pursuant to Code § 56-265.2.  The 
Commission held VYVX had violated the Commission's orders of 
November 25, 1997 and January 14, 1998 because VYVX had 
assisted its parent corporation, Williams, with the 
construction of facilities that were the subject of the 
application.   
 
The Commission entered an order dated October 8, 1998 
holding, among other things, that VYVX had essentially 
completed construction of the facilities for which such 
authority was sought and that such construction was 
implemented "knowingly and by design of [VYVX] and, as 
admitted in the testimony of its own witnesses . . . such 
construction had begun as early as September 1997" and that 
the requested construction "is now an accomplished fact." 
 
The Commission implicitly found that VYVX had made 
certain misrepresentations and misstatements in its 
application, but the Commission explicitly concluded that 
 
9
those misrepresentations and misstatements did not relate to 
VYVX's ability to provide interexchange services.  Rather, the 
misrepresentations and misstatements "apply to that part of 
the application in which VYVX requests a certificate to 
construct facilities."  The Commission denied VYVX's 
certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct 
telecommunications facilities and imposed a fine in the sum of 
$197,000 pursuant to Code § 12.1-33.  The Commission suspended 
$175,000 of the fine, conditioned upon VYVX's compliance with 
orders or rules of the Commission or any statute of the 
Commonwealth for a period of five years and the payment of 
court costs.  VYVX appeals. 
III. 
 
VYVX contends that the Commission's order constitutes an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.  VYVX argues 
that Williams has authority to construct facilities for 
interstate telecommunications services and that the fiber 
optic cable system that was constructed will be used for 
interstate commerce.  Continuing, VYVX says that the 
"Commission ordered a fine as a penalty for construction of 
facilities under federal authority to be used in interstate 
commerce.  This it cannot do."  We disagree with VYVX. 
 
The Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution 
grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate commerce . . . among 
 
10
the several states."  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Even 
though the Commerce Clause speaks in terms of powers bestowed 
upon Congress, the Supreme Court has held that the Commerce 
Clause limits the power of the States "to erect barriers 
against interstate trade."  Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 
Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).   
 
Discussing the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme 
Court has stated: 
"This limitation upon state power, of course, is by 
no means absolute.  In the absence of conflicting 
federal legislation, the States retain authority 
under their general police powers to regulate 
matters of 'legitimate local concern,' even though 
interstate commerce may be affected.  See e.g., 
Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 
429, 440 (1978); Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 
U.S. 366, 371 (1976).  Where such legitimate local 
interests are implicated, defining the appropriate 
scope for state regulation is often a matter of 
'delicate adjustment.'  Ibid., quoting H.P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. [525,] 553 [1949] 
(Black, J., dissenting).  Yet even in regulating to 
protect local interests, the States generally must 
act in a manner consistent with the 'ultimate . . . 
principle that one state in its dealings with 
another may not place itself in a position of 
economic isolation.'  Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 
Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).  However important 
the state interest at hand, 'it may not be 
accomplished by discriminating against articles of 
commerce coming from outside the State unless there 
is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat 
them differently.'  Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 
U.S. [617] 626-27 [1978]." 
 
 
11
Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36.  Accord Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 
137-38 (1986); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 
U.S. 662, 669-70 (1981). 
 
Applying these principles, we hold that the Commission's 
order which imposed a fine upon VYVX does not contravene the 
limitations imposed upon the States by the Commerce Clause.  
VYVX filed an application to operate intrastate facilities.2  
The Commission imposed a fine upon VYVX because VYVX 
participated in the construction of the facilities even though 
the Commission had entered orders informing VYVX that 
certification was necessary before such construction could 
commence.  The Commission's order is directed solely to 
violations of VYVX, which is incorporated in Virginia, and 
which applied for and was granted a certificate to provide 
intrastate interexchange service within Virginia.  The fine 
                     
2 VYVX states that it "is immaterial who built the 
facilities because [VYVX] and Williams have federal authority 
to construct facilities for interstate telecommunications 
service, and the Commission cannot regulate such service 
. . . ."  VYVX's contention is without merit.  VYVX repeatedly 
stated before the Commission that it would construct, operate, 
and own the facilities that would provide intrastate service 
within Virginia.  We will not permit VYVX to ignore its 
representations before the Commission and assert a contrary 
position in this Court.  Additionally, the record reveals that 
VYVX participated in the construction of the cable network.  
Decot testified that VYVX personnel participated in the 
construction activities that occurred on his property.  
Additionally, Clossin, VYVX's agent, directed construction and 
was responsible for resolving disagreements with local 
property owners. 
 
12
that the Commission imposed does not affect Williams, a 
separate corporate entity.  Williams was not before the 
Commission, and the Commission did not impose a fine upon 
Williams.  The Commission's order simply does not restrict 
Williams' use of its interstate facilities.3
IV. 
A. 
 
VYVX argues that the Commission's November 25, 1997 order 
is unenforceable.  This order, among other things, directed 
that VYVX cease acquisition of real property or rights therein 
by the exercise of eminent domain authority until the 
                     
3 We also note that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
from which Williams derives the power to construct its 
interstate telecommunications cable, recognizes the authority 
of the States to manage public rights-of-way.  The Act 
specifically states: 
 
"(b) State regulatory authority 
"Nothing in this section shall affect the 
ability of a State to impose, on a competitively 
neutral basis and consistent with section 254 of 
this section, requirements necessary to preserve and 
advance universal service, protect the public safety 
and welfare, ensure the continued quality of 
telecommunications services, and safeguard the 
rights of consumers. 
"(c) State and local government authority 
"Nothing in this section affects the authority 
of a State or local government to manage the public 
rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable 
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a 
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, 
for use of public rights-of-way on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation 
required is publicly disclosed by such government." 
47 U.S.C. § 253 (1999). 
 
13
Commission acted upon VYVX's application for certificates of 
public convenience and necessity.  VYVX contends that the 
Commission did not hold a hearing before the entry of that 
order and, thus, the order is void.  Continuing, VYVX 
challenges the legality of the Commission's subsequent order, 
dated October 8, 1998, which imposed a fine upon VYVX because, 
among other reasons, VYVX failed to comply with the November 
25, 1997 order.  VYVX also asserts that the November 25, 1997 
order violated Article IX, § 3, of the Constitution of 
Virginia and Code § 12.1-28. 
 
At the outset, we will not consider VYVX's constitutional 
argument because it was not raised before the Commission.  
Rule 5:25.   
 
Code § 12.1-28 states in relevant part: 
 
"Before the Commission shall enter any finding, 
order, or judgment against any person, it shall 
afford such person reasonable notice of the time and 
place at which he shall be afforded an opportunity 
to introduce evidence and be heard." 
 
 
Our review of the record reveals that the Commission 
complied with this statute because the Commission accorded 
VYVX numerous opportunities to be heard.  As we have already 
stated, the Commission entered an order directing VYVX to 
respond to complaints that property owners had filed.  The 
Commission requested that VYVX declare the legal basis upon 
which it relied to acquire property by use of eminent domain.  
 
14
VYVX's response did not necessitate the taking of evidence, 
but, rather, required that VYVX set forth the legal basis for 
its assertion that it could acquire easements using the power 
of eminent domain.   
 
VYVX did not deny before the Commission, and does not 
deny here, that VYVX represented to property owners that it 
had the power of eminent domain.  VYVX admits that it 
initiated condemnation proceedings.  In VYVX's response to the 
Commission's order, VYVX submitted a written explanation of 
its purported source of authority to exercise the power of 
eminent domain. 
 
VYVX did not request an opportunity to present testimony 
before the Commission, and such testimony would have been 
unnecessary because the Commission's decision was not 
predicated upon factual matters, but, rather, on principles of 
law.  And, the Commission afforded VYVX a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard on the legal questions that were the 
subject of the Commission's order. 
 
Furthermore, the Commission did not impose the fine upon 
VYVX until the Commission issued its October 1998 order.  
Before the entry of that order, VYVX presented evidence, 
written depositions, legal memoranda, and oral argument to the 
Commission.   
B. 
 
15
 
We also hold that there is no merit in VYVX's contention 
that the Commission violated Rule 5:6 of the Commission's 
Rules of Practice and Procedure.  That Rule states in relevant 
part: 
"Upon petition of any aggrieved party, or upon its 
own motion if necessary for full relief, the 
Commission will convert any unresolved valid 
complaint to a formal proceeding by the issuance of 
a rule to show cause, or by an appropriate order 
setting a formal hearing, upon at least ten (10) 
days notice to the parties, or as shall be required 
by statute." 
 
This Rule is not implicated here because VYVX did not file a 
petition requesting that the Commission convert the complaints 
to a formal proceeding. 
C. 
 
Code § 12.1-33 states in relevant part: 
"Any person failing or refusing to obey any order or 
any temporary or permanent injunction of the 
Commission may be fined by the Commission such sum, 
not exceeding $1,000, as the Commission may deem 
proper; and each day's continuance of such failure 
or refusal shall be a separate offense." 
 
VYVX contends that the November 25, 1997 order commanded only 
that it refrain from exercising and asserting its power of 
eminent domain, and that VYVX did so.  We disagree. 
 
The Commission's November 25, 1997 order stated, among 
other things, that VYVX must obtain certification from the 
Commission before it constructs its facility and operates as a 
utility in this Commonwealth.  The Commission, in its October 
 
16
1998 order, concluded that VYVX violated the November 1997 
order because it participated in the construction of the 
facilities even though it had not acquired the necessary 
certification.  The Commission's finding is amply supported by 
the facts contained in Section II of this opinion.  And, we 
have stated that a finding of the Commission "will not be 
disturbed by us 'unless it is contrary to the evidence or 
without evidence to support it.'"  Thaxton v. Commonwealth, 
211 Va. 38, 43, 175 S.E.2d 264, 268 (1970); Security Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Schoolfield Bank & Trust Co., 208 Va. 458, 461, 
158 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1968).  Thus, we hold that the Commission 
did not err in concluding that VYVX had violated the November 
25, 1997 order. 
V. 
A. 
 
VYVX asserts that the Commission did not have 
jurisdiction to determine whether a public service company has 
the power of eminent domain to acquire easements for 
telecommunication facilities.  We disagree with VYVX. 
 
We have stated that the "Commission has no inherent power 
simply because it was created by the Virginia Constitution; 
and therefore its jurisdiction must be found either in 
constitutional grants or in statutes which do not contravene 
that document."  City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric & Power 
 
17
Co., 197 Va. 505, 514, 90 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1955); Appalachian 
Power Co. v. John Stewart Walker, Inc., 214 Va. 524, 528, 201 
S.E.2d 758, 762 (1974); see also Commonwealth v. Old Dominion 
Power Co., 184 Va. 6, 11-12, 34 S.E.2d 364, 366, cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 760 (1945); City of Richmond v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Telephone Co., 127 Va. 612, 619, 105 S.E. 127, 129 (1920). 
 
However, Code § 56-35 states: 
"The Commission shall have the power, and be charged 
with the duty, of supervising, regulating and 
controlling all public service companies doing 
business in this Commonwealth, in all matters 
relating to the performance of their public duties 
and their charges therefor, and of correcting abuses 
therein by such companies." 
 
 
Code § 56-35 confers upon the Commission the duty and the 
authority to supervise, regulate, and control public service 
companies, including VYVX, in all matters relating to the 
performance of their duties and requires that the Commission 
correct any abuses by public service companies, such as VYVX.  
Here, the Commission had jurisdiction to consider whether VYVX 
had abused its status as a public service company by 
threatening to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire 
easements from property owners even though VYVX had not yet 
received its requested certification from the Commission.4
                     
4 We reject VYVX's contention that Code § 56-35 limits the 
Commission's authority to the supervision or regulation of 
"the 'public duties' of utilities for which they impose 
 
18
B. 
 
As we have already stated, the Commission held that VYVX 
did not have the power to exercise the right of eminent domain 
to acquire easements for its fiber optic lines because it had 
not been granted a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity.  VYVX contends that public service corporations 
have the right to acquire easements for facilities to be used 
in serving the public and, therefore, it has the right to 
exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire such 
easements.  We disagree with VYVX. 
 
Code § 56-49(2) states in relevant part: 
"A public service corporation which has not been 
allotted territory for public utility service by the 
State Corporation Commission shall acquire lands or 
interests therein by eminent domain as provided in 
this subdivision for electric lines, facilities, 
works or purposes only after it has obtained any 
certificate of public convenience and necessity 
required for such lines, facilities, works or 
purposes under Chapter 10.1 (§ 56-265.1, et seq.) of 
Title 56." 
 
In deciding the meaning of this statute, we consider the plain 
language contained therein.  Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. 
Co., 254 Va. 265, 268, 492 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1997); Abbott v. 
Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997); Barr v. 
Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 
672, 674 (1990). 
                                                                
'charges' to the public."  VYVX's interpretation of the 
 
19
 
The plain language of Code § 56-49(2) does not permit a 
public service corporation which has not been allotted 
territory for public utility service by the Commission to 
exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire land or 
interests therein for electric lines, facilities, works, or 
purposes until the public service corporation has obtained a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the 
Commission.  Here, VYVX actually filed condemnation 
proceedings against landowners to acquire easements even 
though it had not obtained a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity. 
 
VYVX contends, however, that Code § 56-49(2) does not 
apply to it because VYVX "does not propose to acquire property 
for 'electric' facilities."  Apparently, VYVX believes that 
the word "electric" which is contained in the phrase "electric 
lines, facilities, works, or other purposes" modifies the 
words "facilities, works, or other purposes."  VYVX simply 
misreads the statute.  A plain reading of the statute 
indicates that the word "electric" only modifies the word 
"lines" because of the punctuation contained in that sentence.  
Even though the General Assembly amended Code § 56-49(2) by 
eliminating the word "electric" effective July 1, 1999, such 
amendment does not affect our analysis.  The deletion of the 
                                                                
statute is simply contrary to its plain language. 
 
20
word "electric" from the statute simply expands the types of 
lines that fall within the scope of the statutory regulatory 
scheme. 
C. 
 
VYVX, relying upon Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. Colonial 
Pipeline Co., 206 Va. 711, 146 S.E.2d 169, cert. denied, 385 
U.S. 823 (1966), and Kricorian v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Telephone Co., 217 Va. 284, 227 S.E.2d 725 (1976), argues that 
it acquired the right to exercise eminent domain by virtue of 
its incorporation as a public service company.  We find no 
merit in VYVX's contention.   
 
In Peck Iron & Metal Co., we held that a public service 
corporation was not required under Code § 56-265.1(b) of the 
Utility Facilities Act to obtain a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity before exercising the power of 
eminent domain because the public service company was not a 
public utility as defined by Code § 56-265.1(b).  Peck Iron & 
Metal Co., 206 Va. at 717-18, 146 S.E.2d at 173.  This statute 
states in relevant part: 
 
"'Public utility' means any company which owns 
or operates facilities within the Commonwealth of 
Virginia . . . for the furnishing of telephone 
service." 
 
 
Code § 56-265.2 of the Utility Facilities Act states in 
relevant part:   
 
21
"A.  It shall be unlawful for any public utility to 
construct, enlarge or acquire, by lease or 
otherwise, any facilities for use in public utility 
service, except ordinary extensions or improvements 
in the usual course of business, without first 
having obtained a certificate from the Commission 
that the public convenience and necessity require 
the exercise of such right or privilege.  Any 
certificate required by this section shall be issued 
by the Commission only after opportunity for a 
hearing and after due notice to interested parties." 
 
VYVX, unlike the public service corporation in Peck Iron & 
Metal Co., is a public utility and, therefore, is subject to 
the provisions of Code § 56-265.2 which prohibits a public 
utility from performing certain acts without a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission.   
 
In Kricorian, we held that a public utility was not 
required to comply with the provisions of the Utility 
Facilities Act by obtaining approval from the Commission 
before initiating condemnation proceedings.  The utility in 
Kricorian, however, unlike VYVX, exercised the power of 
eminent domain to acquire property for "ordinary extensions or 
improvements in the usual course of business" which is 
expressly permitted by Code § 56-265.2.  Kricorian, 217 Va. at 
289, 227 S.E.2d at 729.  VYVX's request for the construction 
and extension of facilities does not fall within this 
statutory exception. 
VI. 
 
22
 
VYVX argues that the Commission erred by denying VYVX's 
request for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.  
Continuing, VYVX states that the only reason the Commission 
gave for denying the requested certificate was that a 
certificate would not be meaningful since the initial phase of 
construction had been completed.  VYVX also says that this 
reason is an erroneous application of Code § 56-265.2, and 
that the Commission's order discriminates against VYVX in 
favor of other telecommunications companies which construct 
such facilities in Virginia. 
 
We have held that "[t]he Commission is given broad 
discretionary authority in determining whether a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity will be approved."  
Stafford Serv. Corp. v. State Corp. Commission, 220 Va. 559, 
562, 260 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1979); Bralley-Willett Tank Lines, 
Inc. v. Holtzman Oil Corp., 216 Va. 888, 890-91, 223 S.E.2d 
892, 895 (1976).  This Court has also stated that "[w]e cannot 
sit as a board of revision to substitute our judgment for that 
of the Commission on matters within its province."  Bralley-
Willett Tank Lines, Inc., 216 Va. at 891, 223 S.E.2d at 895; 
Atlantic Greyhound Lines of Va., Inc. v. Silver Fox Lines, 204 
Va. 360, 363, 131 S.E.2d 284, 286 (1963). 
 
The Commission, upon consideration of the facts and 
circumstances before it, concluded that the issuance of a 
 
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certificate of public convenience and necessity would not be 
meaningful because VYVX had participated in the construction 
of facilities that were the subject of the application in 
violation of the Commission's orders.  Additionally, the 
Commission made a specific finding "that the public interest 
and convenience do not require the exercise by VYVX of the 
rights and privileges under [Code § 56-265.2]" which include 
the power to exercise the right of condemnation to construct, 
enlarge, or acquire, by lease or otherwise, any facilities for 
use in VYVX's public utility service.  We cannot conclude, 
based upon the record before us, that the Commission abused 
its broad discretion in determining that the issuance of a 
certificate would not be in the public interest, particularly 
in consideration of VYVX's widespread practice of acquiring 
easements with the threat of the power of eminent domain when 
it did not possess such power. 
 
We find no merit in VYVX's contention that the 
Commission's order discriminates against it in favor of other 
telecommunication companies.  VYVX ignores the fact that it 
was denied a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
because of its own acts, and not because of favoritism 
directed towards other telecommunications companies that 
construct facilities in Virginia.  And, the record simply does 
not support VYVX's claims of discrimination. 
 
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VII. 
 
We have examined VYVX's remaining arguments and hold that 
such arguments are without merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the Commission's order. 
Affirmed. 
 
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