Title: Desenco, Inc. v. Akron

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

DESENCO, INC. ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF AKRON ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535.] 
Municipal corporations — R.C. 715.70 and 715.71 allowing for the creation of 
joint economic development districts are constitutional. 
(No. 98-162 — Submitted December 15, 1998 — Decided March 10, 1999.) 
APPEAL  from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 18321. 
 
On September 26, 1995, appellants, Desenco, Inc., Lamborn Associates, 
Inc., and Linruth, Inc., filed in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas a 
complaint for declaratory judgment, specific performance, and injunctive relief.  
Appellants also titled their action a “taxpayer’s action.”  Appellants alleged that the 
statutes allowing for the establishment of joint economic development districts 
(“JEDDs”) and for an income tax within the JEDDs are unconstitutional and thus 
cannot be enforced against them. 
 
According to the complaint, appellant Desenco, Inc. is a for-profit 
corporation conducting business in a JEDD located in Coventry Township in 
Summit County.  Appellant Lamborn Associates, Inc. is a for-profit corporation 
conducting business in a JEDD located in Copley Township in Summit County.  
Appellant Linruth, Inc. is a for-profit corporation conducting business in a JEDD 
located in Springfield Township in Summit County.  According to the complaint, 
the boards of directors of each JEDD have assessed an income tax against the 
appellant corporation within its district.  The city of Akron collects this tax from 
appellants. 
 
In their complaint, appellants named as defendants (appellees herein) the 
entities and officials of the city of Akron, the Summit County townships of 
Springfield, Coventry, and Copley, and the Springfield-Akron, the Akron-
Coventry, and the Copley-Akron JEDDs.1 
2 
 
On January 5, 1996, appellees filed a motion to dismiss and on January 8, 
1997, the trial court found the legislation establishing the JEDDs to be 
constitutional and dismissed the case.  On December 10, 1997, the Court of 
Appeals for Summit County affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Slater & Zurz and Richard V. Zurz, Jr., for appellants. 
 
Thompson Hine & Flory L.L.P., Leslie W. Jacobs, Stephen L. Buescher and 
Kenneth G. Cole, for appellees city of Akron et al. 
 
Max Rothal, Director of Law, and Cheri Cunningham, Assistant Director of 
Law, for appellees city of Akron, Donald L. Plusquellic, and Richard A. Merolla. 
 
Robert A. Edwards, for appellee Copley Township. 
 
Goldman & Rosen, Ltd., and Irving B. Sugerman, for appellees Springfield 
and Coventry Townships. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  Appellants challenge the statutes that allow for 
the establishment of joint economic development districts (“JEDDs”) on four 
constitutional grounds:  (1)  that the statutes improperly delegate the power to levy 
taxes, (2) that the statutes violate the Uniformity Clause of the Ohio Constitution, 
(3) that the statutes deny equal protection as guaranteed by the United States and 
the Ohio Constitutions, and (4) that the statutes violate due process as guaranteed 
by both Constitutions. 
 
In 1993, the General Assembly adopted legislation that allowed for the 
creation of JEDDs in order to facilitate economic development to create or 
preserve jobs and employment opportunities, and to improve the economic welfare 
of the people in the state.  144 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5776; R.C.  715.70(B)(1) and 
3 
715.71(B).  R.C. 715.70 and 715.71 set forth the requirements and alternative 
procedures for establishing these districts.  One or more townships located within a 
county that has adopted a charter under Sections 3 and 4, Article X of the Ohio 
Constitution may contract with one or more municipalities that are similarly 
located to form a JEDD.  R.C. 715.70(A) and (B)(1); 715.71(B).  The created 
district must be located within the territory of one or more of the contracting 
parties and may consist of all or a portion of that territory.  R.C. 715.70(B)(1) and 
715.71(B).  The contract must set forth or provide for the amount or nature of the 
contribution of each municipal corporation and township to the development and 
operation of the district and may provide for the sharing of the costs of the 
operation of and improvements for the district.  R.C.  715.70(D)(1) and 715.71(F).  
For three years following the filing of the contract establishing the JEDD, no 
municipality may annex the territory of the JEDD unless each board of township 
trustees whose territory is included, in whole or part, within the district and the 
territory proposed to be annexed adopts a resolution consenting to the annexation 
proceeding.  R.C. 715.70(B)(5) and 715.71(H). 
 
The involved municipalities and townships must each give notice of the 
proposed contract and then hold a public hearing prior to adopting ordinances and 
resolutions approving the contract.  R.C. 715.70(D)(2) and 715.71(C).  If the 
procedure set forth in R.C. 715.70 is used, any such resolution adopted by a 
township board of  trustees shall be subject to a referendum by the electors of the 
township.  R.C. 715.70(D)(3).  If the procedure set forth in R.C. 715.71 is used, the 
voters of each participating township must approve the resolution of its board of 
trustees approving the JEDD contract.  R.C. 715.71(E). 
 
Under the R.C. 715.70 procedure, the involved municipalities and townships 
then must file a petition with the legislative authority of each county within which 
a party to the contract is located.  R.C. 715.70(C)(1).  The county legislative 
4 
authority must hold a public hearing and then certify the adequacy of the petition.  
Id.  If the county takes no action within a certain time period, the petition is 
deemed approved and the contract goes into effect no sooner than thirty days after 
that approval.  Id.  See, also, Meck & Pearlman, Ohio Planning and Zoning Law 
(1998) 648, Section 15.34.  Under the procedure of R.C. 715.71, the involved 
municipalities and townships must file with the county the documents listed in that 
division.  The resolution of the board of township trustees is then submitted to the 
electors of the township for approval.  R.C. 715.71(E). 
 
Once created, the district is governed by a board of directors established by 
the contract; the members of the board must be appointed from among the elected 
members of the legislative authorities and the elected chief executive officers of 
the contracting parties.  R.C. 715.70(E) and 715.71(A).  The contract shall set forth 
the duties, powers, and functions of the board and may also grant to the board the 
power to adopt a resolution to levy an income tax within the district “for the 
purposes of the district and for the purposes of the contracting municipal 
corporations and townships pursuant to the contract.”  R.C. 715.70(F) and 
715.71(G).  This income tax may be no greater than the highest rate levied by a 
municipality that is party to the contract.  Id.  If the JEDD was created pursuant to 
R.C. 715.70, the tax is subject to a referendum or initiative by the electors of the 
district.  R.C. 715.70(F)(1) and (2).  If the alternative procedure set forth in R.C. 
715.71 was used to create the JEDD, then no vote is required by the electors 
residing in the district.  R.C. 715.71(G). 
 
In 1995, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 715.72 through 715.81, adding 
more alternative procedures and requirements to those set forth in R.C. 715.70 and 
715.71.  146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3219, 3229-3239.  These newer provisions do not 
affect our decision and opinion today. 
I 
5 
 
In Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 280, 649 
N.E.2d 182, 184, we set forth the proper standard of review for a case that was 
dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6): 
 
“The factual allegations of the complaint and items properly incorporated 
therein must be accepted as true.  Furthermore, the plaintiff must be afforded all 
reasonable inferences possibly derived therefrom.  Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753, 756.  It must appear beyond 
doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief.  O’Brien v. Univ. 
Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 
N.E.2d 753, syllabus.” 
 
When reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, this court must presume 
the statutes to be constitutional.  Hughes v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 305, 307, 681 N.E.2d 430, 432, citing State ex rel. Dickman v. 
Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59.  In Hughes, 
we continued: 
 
“In reviewing a statute, a court, if possible, will uphold its constitutionality.  
Winslow-Spacarb, Inc. v. Evatt (1945), 144 Ohio St. 471, 475, 30 O.O. 97, 99, 59 
N.E.2d 924, 926.  All reasonable doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute must 
be resolved in its favor.  Dickman.  Courts have a duty to liberally construe statutes 
in order to save them from constitutional infirmities.  Wilson v. Kennedy (1949), 
151 Ohio St. 485, 492, 39 O.O. 301, 304, 86 N.E.2d 722, 725.”  Hughes, 79 Ohio 
St.3d at 307, 681 N.E.2d at 432. 
 
Before we can declare a statute unconstitutional, “ ‘it must appear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly 
incompatible.’ ”  Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 
47, 554 N.E.2d 97, 98, quoting Dickman at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
II 
6 
 
In appellants’ first challenge to the statutes establishing JEDDs, they assert 
that the statutes unconstitutionally delegate the General Assembly’s power to levy 
taxes.  The General Assembly’s power to legislate is limited solely by the state and 
federal Constitutions.  State ex rel. Swetland v. Kinney (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 567, 
573, 23 O.O.3d 479, 483, 433 N.E.2d 217, 222; Angell v. Toledo (1950), 153 Ohio 
St. 179, 181, 41 O.O. 217, 218, 91 N.E.2d 250, 251.  This plenary power includes 
the power to levy taxes.  Weed v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 20, 21, 7 O.O.3d 63, 64, 372 N.E.2d 338, 338; Saviers v. Smith (1920), 101 
Ohio St. 132, 128 N.E. 269, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
This court has repeatedly held that pursuant to this plenary power, the state 
may establish special districts and boards of directors to administer the districts, 
and the state may grant these boards various duties and powers, including the 
power to levy taxes within the district.  State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park 
Dist. (1929), 120 Ohio St. 464, 166 N.E. 407, affirmed (1930), 281 U.S. 74, 50 
S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710 (park districts and boards of park commissioners).  See, 
also, State ex rel. McElroy v. Baron (1959), 169 Ohio St. 439, 8 O.O.2d 457, 160 
N.E.2d 10 (port authorities); State ex rel. Wuebker v. Bockrath (1949), 152 Ohio 
St. 77, 39 O.O. 389, 87 N.E.2d 462, paragraph nine of the syllabus (joint township 
district general hospital and district hospital boards); State ex rel. Fritz v. Gongwer 
(1926), 114 Ohio St. 642, 151 N.E. 752 (joint county ditch improvement districts). 
 
In Bryant, this court explained the purpose behind the creation of these 
special districts: 
 
“In the complexity of our advancing civilization, in the wide differences in 
conditions in different localities in the same state, and in the ever-changing 
conditions in a given locality, the Legislature has found it necessary to content 
itself with declaring the principles governing a general public purpose, and to 
confer upon existing local officials, or upon local boards to be created in a 
7 
designated manner, the authority to provide, within definite limitations, rules and 
regulations to execute the general purpose expressed in the law itself.  It does not 
argue against the completeness of the law that a given locality or district may or 
may not at its option avail itself of the provisions of the law.  Statutes are 
sometimes peremptory and mandatory, and sometimes optional and permissive.  
One locality may have no need of governmental activity along a given line, while 
another locality in the same state may have an urgent need.  That need must be 
ascertained and declared by means and methods prescribed by the law itself, which 
must be scrupulously followed.  While the Legislature may not delegate to any 
other power the right to declare principles and standards, or general public policy, 
it may delegate to other competent agencies the power to determine whether or not 
they will avail themselves of the privileges conferred, and also delegate to certain 
named executive or administrative agencies authority involving discretion in 
relation to the execution of the law. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“The creation of boards and commissions has become a familiar means in 
recent periods to perform the executive functions which are essential to the 
administration of laws.  Parks and reservoirs for conservation of natural resources 
are for the public welfare, and the general policy of creating them, and the methods 
of doing so, are subject-matters of legislation.  It is axiomatic that they cannot be 
created or maintained without the expenditure of money.  Not being in that class or 
character of public improvement where assessments can be made upon property in 
the vicinity by reason of special benefits, that method of providing funds is not 
available.  Manifestly a levy of taxes upon all the property in the state cannot be 
made to create and maintain a district park.  It is inevitable, therefore, that a district 
levy must be made * * *.”  Bryant, 120 Ohio St. at 478-480, 166 N.E. at 411-412. 
8 
 
The Bryant court went on to analyze the power of various governmental 
entities to levy and collect taxes for public purposes, concluding that “[t]he power 
of taxation is therefore a sovereign power and a legislative power, but the exercise 
of that power calls for certain administrative functions as indispensable to a wise 
and economical administration of public affairs.”  Id. at 482, 166 N.E. at 412-413.  
The court held that “the [Ohio] Constitution has fully authorized the Legislature to 
create districts, as separate political subdivisions, and to create boards to exercise 
the governmental activities of the district, and to utilize such boards as fact-finding 
agencies, and to determine the financial needs of such districts, and to impose and 
collect taxes to defray the same.”  Id. at 490, 166 N.E. at 415. 
 
As it did with the park districts at issue in Bryant, the General Assembly has 
declared “the principles governing a general public purpose,” that of using JEDDs 
to improve the economic welfare of people in those districts.  To effectuate that 
purpose, the General Assembly conferred upon local boards, created in a 
designated manner, the authority to provide, within definite limitations, rules and 
regulations, which necessarily include taxing authority.  As the Bryant court stated, 
the authority to execute a general purpose includes the authority to confer the 
power to tax within the district. 
 
Appellants assert that by authorizing the creation of JEDDs, the General 
Assembly has unconstitutionally created a way for townships to tax income, when 
they ordinarily are not authorized to do so.  Appellants are correct in stating that 
townships cannot ordinarily tax income.  See, generally, 3 Shimp, Baldwin’s Ohio 
Township Law (1991) 134, Section 31.29.  However, as we held above, a JEDD is 
a special taxing district, independent of the individual governmental entities that 
contracted to form the JEDD, and the board of the JEDD derives its authority to 
tax directly from the General Assembly, not the township.  Thus, the townships are 
9 
not taxing income through a JEDD, but rather the JEDD entity through its board is 
taxing income on authority of the General Assembly. 
 
Appellants also argue that Bryant is distinguishable from the case sub judice 
because the park district in Bryant was authorized to tax real estate, not to tax 
income as the JEDDs are authorized to do.  However, the reasoning that the court 
used in Bryant applies no matter what the type of tax involved.  The General 
Assembly identified a general public purpose and conferred upon a local board the 
specific authority to execute the general purpose expressed in the law itself.  As 
noted above, the General Assembly has plenary power to legislate and that 
includes the power to create a special district with the power to levy a tax, 
regardless of the type of tax. 
 
Appellants also assert that individuals and businesses who are required to 
pay the income tax are never allowed to vote on the tax.  However, very often 
individuals work in political subdivisions in which they do not live.  They do not 
vote in the subdivision in which they work; rather, they vote in the subdivision in 
which they live.  There is no right to vote in the subdivision in which an individual 
works.  These people benefit from the services the taxing authority of their work 
place provides, those services being paid for by the tax on their income.  See 
Angell, 153 Ohio St. at 185, 41 O.O. at 220, 91 N.E.2d at 253.  Likewise, 
appellants benefit from the services provided in the district by the JEDD board.  As 
in Angell, we do not find that this situation creates an unlawful tax. 
III 
 
Appellants next challenge the JEDD statutes as violating the Uniformity 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  Because R.C. 715.70 and 715.71 apply only to 
certain municipalities and townships,2 see R.C. 715.70(A)(1), (2), and (3), 
appellants contend that that statutes are both of a special nature and do not operate 
uniformly throughout the state. 
10 
 
The Uniformity Clause, Section 26, Article II, states:  “All laws, of a general 
nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the state * * *.”  The 
constitutionality under this clause of legislation is a two-part test:  (1) whether the 
statute is a law of a general or special nature, and (2) whether the statute operates 
uniformly throughout the state.  Put-In-Bay Island Taxing Dist. Auth. v. Colonial, 
Inc. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 449, 451, 605 N.E.2d 21, 22; Austintown Twp. Bd. of 
Trustees v. Tracy (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 353, 356-357, 667 N.E.2d 1174, 1177; 
State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 130, 137-138, 568 N.E.2d 
1206, 1212-1213. 
 
In Hixson v. Burson (1896), 54 Ohio St. 470, 481, 43 N.E. 1000, 1001-1002, 
this court set forth the test to determine whether a statute’s subject matter is of a 
general or special nature: 
 
“[E]very subject of legislation is either of a general nature on the one hand, 
or local or special on the other.  It can not be in its nature both general and special, 
because the two are inconsistent.  If it is of a general nature, the constitution 
requires that all laws — not some laws — on that subject shall have a uniform 
operation throughout the state. 
 
“But how are we to determine whether a given subject is of a general nature?  
One way is this:  if the subject does or may exist in, and affect the people of, every 
county, in the state, it is of a general nature.  On the contrary, if the subject cannot 
exist in, or affect the people of every county, it is local or special.  A subject matter 
of such general nature can be regulated and legislated upon by general laws having 
a uniform operation throughout the state, and a subject matter which cannot exist 
in, or affect the people of every county, can not be regulated by general laws 
having a uniform operation throughout the state, because a law can not operate 
where there can be no subject matter to be operated upon.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
11 
 
Thus, this first test applies to the statute’s subject matter, not the 
geographical application.  See State ex rel. Wirsch v. Spellmire (1902), 67 Ohio St. 
77, 86, 65 N.E. 619, 622.  The statutes provide for the creation of JEDDs, special 
economic districts which are formed by a contract between various governmental 
entities for the purposes of facilitating economic development, creating or 
preserving jobs and employment opportunities, and improving the economic 
welfare of the people in the state.  These are necessarily subjects of a general 
nature.  The needs the statute seeks to address exist throughout the state and by all 
the state’s residents and, as we conclude below, a JEDD can be a possible solution 
throughout the state.  See State ex rel. Stanton v. Powell (1924), 109 Ohio St. 383, 
385, 142 N.E. 401.  Moreover, in Zupancic, 58 Ohio St.3d at 138, 568 N.E.2d at 
1213, we stated that “[h]istorically, tax statutes have been viewed by this court to 
be of a general nature,” citing Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 301, 140 
N.E. 773, 777; State ex rel. Wilson v. Lewis (1906), 74 Ohio St. 403, 415, 78 N.E. 
523, 525. 
 
Because we find R.C. 715.70 and 715.71 to be of a general nature, we must 
determine whether they operate uniformly throughout the state.  In Stanton, this 
court articulated a test for the uniform operation of a statute: 
 
“Section 26, Art. II of the Constitution, was not intended to render invalid 
every law which does not operate upon all persons, property or political 
subdivisions within the state.  It is sufficient if a law operates upon every person 
included within its operative provisions, provided such operative provisions are not 
arbitrarily and unnecessarily restricted.  And the law is equally valid if it contains 
provisions which permit it to operate upon every locality where certain specified 
conditions prevail.  A law operates as an unreasonable classification where it seeks 
to create artificial distinctions where no real distinction exists.”  Id., 109 Ohio St. 
at 385, 142 N.E. at 401. 
12 
 
The Stanton court considered the uniformity of operation of a statute that by 
its terms applied only to those counties with two or more common pleas judges 
where, at the time, the majority of the counties in Ohio had only one common pleas 
judge.  The court held that even though the statute at issue in that case could apply 
only to certain counties, nothing prevented application of the statute to a county 
that, in the future, adds a judge to its common pleas bench.  Id. at 385, 142 N.E. at 
401.  Similarly, in Zupancic, this court considered a statute that classified taxing 
districts into those containing an electric company plant having production 
equipment with an initial cost exceeding $1 billion and those containing a plant 
having such property under that amount.  At the time, only one $1 billion plant 
existed.  The court held the statute to operate uniformly because nothing in the 
statute prevented its prospective application, however unlikely, to any taxing 
district in which a plant is built having production equipment with an initial cost 
exceeding $1 billion.  The Zupancic court stated: 
 
“[A] statute is deemed to be uniform despite applying to only one case so 
long as its terms are uniform and it may apply to cases similarly situated in the 
future.  See State, ex rel. Core, v. Green (1953), 160 Ohio St. 175, 183, 51 O.O. 
442, 445, 115 N.E.2d 157, 161-162; Miller v. Korns, supra [107 Ohio St.], at 295, 
140 N.E. at 775.”  Zupancic, 58 Ohio St.3d at 138, 568 N.E.2d at 1213. 
 
Appellants assert that because the legislation at issue in the case sub judice 
can apply only to municipalities and townships located in counties that have 
adopted a charter and because, at the time the legislation was approved, Summit 
County was the only county that had adopted a charter, the legislation could not 
operate uniformly throughout the state.  However, pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, 
Article X, Ohio Constitution, a county may adopt a charter at any time and R.C. 
715.70 and 715.71 do not prevent municipalities and townships that are located in 
13 
a county that adopts a charter other than Summit County from creating a JEDD.3  
The JEDD legislation thus operates uniformly throughout the state. 
 
Since R.C. 715.70 and 715.71 address a subject matter of a general nature 
and operate uniformly throughout the state, the legislation does not violate Section 
26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
III 
 
Appellants next challenge the JEDD statutes based upon the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Ohio and the United States Constitutions.  Initially, we 
note that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, contained 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution, contained in Section 2, Article I, are functionally equivalent.  
Austintown Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 76 Ohio St.3d at 359, 667 N.E.2d at 1179.  That 
protection requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state 
interest unless the classification categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect 
characteristic or jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right.  Valvoline Instant 
Oil Change, Inc. v. Tracy (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 676 N.E.2d 114, 115-116. 
 
Appellants contend that the JEDD legislation denies them the fundamental 
right to vote and sets up a classification of (1) those who reside in the township and 
voted for the creation of the JEDD and the accompanying income tax, and (2) 
those who work or generate income in the JEDD and must pay the tax, but who 
had no opportunity to vote on the tax.  The right to vote is a fundamental right.  
Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999-1000, 31 L.Ed.2d 
274, 280.  However, as the court of appeals in the case sub judice stated, there is no 
denial of the actual right to vote: 
 
“Appellants’ right to vote is not affected, as they have no right to vote in the 
first place.  Appellants are corporations located within the boundaries of the 
JEDDs at issue.  Corporations cannot vote.  Appellants’ shareholders and 
14 
employees do have the right to vote.  However, a shareholder or employee 
generally votes where he resides, not where he works or where the business in 
which he has an ownership interest or at which he is employed is located.  The 
JEDD legislation does not infringe upon the shareholders’ or employees’ 
fundamental right to vote.” 
 
The classification created by the legislation is not a suspect class, and as we 
held above, the legislation does not restrict the right to vote.  Thus, the proper test 
under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislation rationally furthers a 
legitimate state interest.  The legislative purpose of the JEDD statutes is to 
facilitate economic development to create or preserve jobs and employment 
opportunities, and to improve the economic welfare of the people in the state.  R.C. 
715.70(B)(1) and 715.71(B).  This is a goal with which any governmental entity 
should be concerned and thus is legitimate. 
 
Under the JEDD statutes, “two or more governmental units may negotiate a 
contract to share the fiscal benefits from the economic development of large tracts 
of land.  The statutes encourage the participating governments to engage in joint 
planning and land use and building regulation.”  Meck & Pearlman, supra, at 649, 
Section 15.35.  Thus, the statute provides for an efficient way for municipal 
services to be extended to the JEDD.  The imposition of an income tax upon the 
businesses located in and the employees who work in the JEDD is a reasonable 
method of funding such services.  Accordingly, the classification created by the 
JEDD statutes is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and the United States Constitutions. 
IV 
 
Finally, appellants assert that the JEDD statutes violate the Due Process 
Clauses of the Ohio and the United States Constitutions.  In Fabrey v. McDonald 
Village Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 354, 639 N.E.2d 31, 34, we set out 
15 
the standards for substantive due process under each Constitution, when a 
fundamental right is not involved. 
 
“Under the Ohio Constitution, an enactment comports with due process ‘if it 
bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare of the public and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary.’  Benjamin v. 
Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 110, 4 O.O.2d 113, 117, 146 N.E.2d 854, 860, 
citing Piqua v. Zimmerlin (1880), 35 Ohio St. 507, 511.  Federal due process is 
satisfied if there is a rational relationship between a statute and its purpose.  
Martinez v. California (1980), 444 U.S. 277, 283, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 
481, 488.” 
 
Appellants argue that the JEDD income tax effectively deprives them of 
property without allowing them the opportunity to vote on the tax.  As we stated 
above, while there is a right to vote in general, there is no right to vote specifically 
for or against a tax.  State ex rel. v. Cincinnati (1895), 52 Ohio St. 419, 456, 40 
N.E. 508, 513 (“[T]he power of taxation does not rest upon the consent of the 
taxed, except as that consent is implied or shown in the enactment of laws by the 
representatives of the people, or is made requisite by legislation; and, therefore, 
taxes may be imposed, or authorized by the legislative body, within its discretion, 
for all public purposes, so long as the fundamental law is not violated.”). 
 
The legislative purpose of the JEDD statutes, to facilitate economic 
development to create or preserve jobs and employment opportunities, and to 
improve the economic welfare of the people in the state, is legitimate and the 
imposition of an income tax upon the businesses located in and the employees who 
work in the JEDD is a reasonable method of funding such services.  Likewise, this 
legislative purpose bears a definite and substantial relationship to the general 
welfare of the state and because those paying the income tax benefit from the 
services provided, the tax imposed is not arbitrary or unreasonable.  Accordingly, 
16 
the tax does not violate the Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and the United States 
Constitutions. 
V 
 
Because we hold that the statutes allowing for the creation of JEDDs do not 
improperly delegate the General Assembly’s power to levy taxes and do not violate 
the Uniformity Clause of the Ohio Constitution or deny equal protection and due 
process as guaranteed by the United States and the Ohio Constitutions, we find the 
statutes to be constitutional.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Appellants also named as a defendant the Attorney General of Ohio but 
voluntarily dismissed the Attorney General as a defendant on December 15, 1996. 
2. 
In 1995, the General Assembly adopted R.C. 715.72 through 715.81, which, 
among other changes, allows for municipalities and townships located in counties 
that have not adopted a charter to contract to create JEDDs.  See R.C. 715.72(B); 
146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3219, 3229-3239.  In 1998, the General Assembly 
amended the JEDD statutes (effective March 22, 1999).  Sub. H.B. No. 434.  These 
changes do not affect our decision and opinion sub judice. 
3. 
This court has invalidated legislation as violating the Uniformity Clause 
when the legislation does not allow for future application.  See, e.g.,  Put-In-Bay 
Island Taxing Dist. Auth., 65 Ohio St.3d 449, 605 N.E.2d 21, where the taxing 
district created by the legislation was limited to islands that are not connected to 
the mainland by a highway or a bridge.  The court held this to violate the 
Uniformity Clause because it applied only to a limited geographical setting and 
17 
“unlike the statute at issue in Zupancic, does not have the potential to apply 
throughout the state.”  Id. at 452-453, 605 N.E.2d at 23.  See, also, State ex rel. 
Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. State Emp. Relations Bd. 
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 1, 22 OBR 1, 488 N.E.2d 181, where this court held that the 
statute at issue violated the Uniformity Clause because it affected only those 
employees “who have previously been determined to be ‘supervisors.’ ”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 5, 22 OBR at 5, 488 N.E.2d at 185.