Title: ANNETTE METZ; BONNIE HORTON; and PAM BASILE V. LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1; LINDA WILLMAN; TOM ROONEY; and JEFF CONINE, in their individual and official capacities

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ANNETTE METZ; BONNIE HORTON; and PAM BASILE V. LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1; LINDA WILLMAN; TOM ROONEY; and JEFF CONINE, in their individual and official capacities2007 WY 166173 P.3d 334Case Number: 06-159Decided: 10/23/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ANNETTE 
METZ; BONNIE 
HORTON; and PAM 
BASILE,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1; LINDA WILLMAN; TOM ROONEY; and JEFF CONINE, in their individual 
and official capacities,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Bruce S. 
Asay of Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

David 
Evans and Brandi L. Monger of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Monger.  

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Annette Metz, Bonnie Horton and Pam 
Basile (appellants) appeal from an order granting summary judgment to Laramie 
County School District No. 1 (LCSD) on their claims for breach of contract, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and sex discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
2000(e)(2).  We reverse the summary 
judgment order with respect to the breach of contract and § 1983 claims and 
affirm the order on the claims of sex discrimination and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.            

            

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Appellants present the following 
statement of the issues:

 
 
[I]         
Did the district court err in holding that a termination without notice 
and a hearing was compliant with the due process procedures required in 42 USC 
§1983?

 
 
[II]        Did 
the district court err in dismissing Appellants' claim for breach of 
contract?

 
 
[III]       Did the 
district court err in dismissing Appellants' claim for Title VII sexual 
discrimination?

 
 
[IV]      Were the summary 
judgment motions deemed denied pursuant to Rule 6 (c) (2) of the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure after ninety days?

 
 
[V]       Should the 
court recognize the importance of prior precedence in a companion case with 
exactly the same legal and factual basis?

 
 
[VI]      Were the court's 
findings on certain facts contrary to the evidence?

 
 
[VII]     Did the district court 
err in granting summary judgment on Appellants' claim for breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing?

 
 
[VIII]    Did the district court err in 
finding that the plaintiffs were terminated on a day other than when they were 
fired?

 
 
LCSD 
restates the issues as follows: 

 
 
1.         
Does this Court have jurisdiction over Appellants' 
appeal?

 
 
2.         
[Were] the district court's March 2, 2006 decision letter and May 3, 2006 
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
proper?

 
 
3.         
Did the district court retain jurisdiction to rule on the summary 
judgment motion more than 90 days after its filing?  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  Appellants were employed by LCSD as 
nutrition service workers at McCormick Junior High School (MJHS) in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
A written agreement defined the terms of their employment.  During their employment, LCSD established 
a policy allowing students who did not have money to pay for lunch to charge the 
cost of their lunch.  MJHS placed a 
limit of $6.00 on the amount students could charge.  If a student with a balance of $6.00 on 
his account attempted to charge another lunch, the nutrition service cashiers 
were directed to have the student speak with an 
administrator.

 
 
[¶4]  On Thursday, December 16, 2004, a 
student in Ms. Horton's line during the first lunch period did not have money to 
pay for his lunch.  His account 
showed a balance of over $6.00.  In 
accordance with the policy, Ms. Horton sent him to speak with the school 
principal, Jeff Conine.  The student 
told Mr. Conine he did not know his account was in arrears.  Mr. Conine brought the student back to 
Ms. Horton, informed her that the student did not know his account was in 
arrears and said he was to be allowed to eat.

 
 
[¶5] 
After first lunch, Ms. Horton confirmed with Ms. Basile that the student had 
been told previously that his account was overdue.  Ms. Horton went to Mr. Conine and 
informed him that the student knew he owed money.  Meanwhile, Ms. Basile went to her 
supervisor, Maxine Titus, and told her what had happened after Ms. Horton sent 
the student to speak with Mr. Conine.  
Ms. Titus spoke with Ms. Horton and then decided to speak with Mr. 
Conine.  She asked him when he was 
going to start believing the employees instead of the students.  According to Ms. Titus, Mr. Conine 
became angry, pointed his finger at her and hollered at her that she was "out of 
line" and no one was taking sides.  
After the confrontation, both Mr. Conine and Ms. Titus contacted Ms. 
Willman, the director of nutrition services for LCSD, and requested a meeting, 
which was scheduled for that afternoon.

 
 
[¶6]  Ms. Titus was meeting with a parent and 
did not work during second lunch period.  
After second lunch, Ms. Basile, Ms. Metz, Ms. Horton and a couple of 
other employees decided they would not resume their work until their concerns 
about how they were being treated were addressed.  They turned off the lunchroom lights and 
remained in the kitchen during the third lunch period.  Several administrators, faculty members 
and other nutrition service employees served the students.

 
 
[¶7]  Ms. Willman arrived at the school as the 
administrators and others were serving third lunch.  Mr. Conine informed her generally what 
had happened.  Ms. Willman asked the 
nutrition service employees to meet her in the break room.  Mr. Conine and Tom Rooney, LCSD's 
director of support operations, were also present.  Ms. Willman asked the appellants "what 
the hell is going on here?" and said they had better have a "damn good reason" 
for walking off the job.  Ms. Basile 
responded that the administration did not "give a rat's ass" about them.  Ms. Willman told Ms. Basile that she was 
fired and to leave.  Ms. Basile left 
the break room but returned a few minutes later.  Mr. Rooney said, "[Ms. Basile], you 
didn't understand.  You are 
fired.  Get out."  Ms. Horton indicated she was not willing 
to work under conditions as they existed.  
Ms. Willman told Ms. Horton that her resignation was accepted.  After the meeting in the break room, Ms. 
Willman told Ms. Metz that she was fired as well.  

 
 
[¶8] The 
following day, Friday, December 17, 2004, John Lyttle, the assistant 
superintendent of human resources for LCSD, met with Mr. Conine, Ms. Willman and 
Mr. Rooney to discuss what had happened.  
During the meeting, Mr. Conine became aware that only Mr. Lyttle had the 
authority to terminate the appellants.  
After the meeting, Mr. Lyttle made telephone calls to the appellants, 
leaving messages for them indicating that he wanted to talk with them about what 
happened.  Ms. Horton and Ms. Metz 
did not return his phone call.  Ms. 
Basile called him back the following Monday, December 20, or Tuesday, December 
21.  She told him she could not meet 
with him that day.  Mr. Lyttle said 
he had a letter for her but would hold it until they could meet.   She tried twice without success to 
reach him and then received the letter in the mail.  

 
 
[¶9]  In separate letters dated December 21, 
2004, to each of the appellants, Mr. Lyttle stated that Ms. Willman terminated 
them on December 16 for gross negligence and insubordination, both of which were 
grounds for immediate termination under the employment agreement.  He advised them that their terminations 
were effective December 21, 2004.  
He also advised Ms. Metz and Ms. Basile that they had the right to file a 
grievance within thirty days.  LCSD 
stated in its appeal brief that Mr. Lyttle did not similarly advise Ms. Horton 
because she had resigned.     

 
 
[¶10]  On March 28, 2005, Ms. Metz, Ms. Horton 
and Ms. Basile filed a complaint for wrongful termination in Laramie County 
District Court against LCSD, Ms. Willman, Mr. Conine and Mr. Rooney.  They alleged claims for breach of 
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2).  In their factual allegations, the 
appellants claimed generally that the administrators were condescending and 
demeaning toward nutrition service employees, failed to keep them advised of 
events affecting their duties, ignored their complaints about a gas leak, and 
contributed to an intolerable and hostile work environment.  They alleged that on the day which 
culminated in their terminations, the administrators treated them in an abusive, 
threatening and humiliating manner.  
They further alleged that their terminations were wrongful in that the 
administrators breached the progressive disciplinary provisions of the 
employment agreement and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, violated their 
constitutional rights to free speech and due process and subjected them to a 
hostile work environment.

 
 
[¶11]  LCSD answered the complaint and filed a 
motion to dismiss the claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and hostile work environment.  Appellants responded with a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion and their own motion for summary judgment in which 
they claimed they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it was 
undisputed that they were terminated without a pre-termination hearing in 
violation of their contractual and constitutional rights.  LCSD filed responses to the appellants' 
memorandum and motion and, on November 14, 2005, filed its own motion for 
summary judgment.  On December 16, 
2005, the district court held a hearing on the motions.  Subsequently, the appellants notified 
the district court that the federal district court had recently issued a 
decision denying LCSD's summary judgment motion on claims their supervisor, Ms. 
Titus, had filed as a result of the termination of her employment with 
LCSD.    

 
 
[¶12]  On March 2, 2006, the district court 
issued a decision letter in which it granted LCSD's summary judgment 
motion.  On March 13, 2006, the 
appellants filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its ruling on two 
grounds.  First, they asserted the 
federal district court ruling denying LCSD's summary judgment motion in Titus v. Laramie County School District No. 
1, U.S.D.C., D. Wyo., Case No 05-CV-098-D, was based on the same facts and 
the same law as their case and was binding on the state district court.  Second, they argued LCSD's summary 
judgment motion was deemed denied under W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) and Paxton Resources, LLC v. Brannaman, 2004 
WY 93, 95 P.3d 796, 798 (Wyo. 2004), when it was not decided within ninety days 
of filing.

 
 
[¶13]  LCSD responded to the motion for 
reconsideration arguing that Paxton 
and Rule 6(c)(2) were not applicable to their summary judgment motion and that 
the Titus decision was not binding on 
the state district court.  LCSD also 
asserted that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize motions for 
reconsideration and, under Plymale v. 
Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, 125 P.3d 1022 (Wyo. 2006), the motion was a nullity. 

 
 
[¶14]  On April 6, 2006, LCSD filed a motion 
asking the district court to enter an order on its summary judgment ruling.  LCSD stated that more than ten days had 
elapsed since it had forwarded to appellants' counsel a draft order granting the 
motion for summary judgment and counsel still had not approved the order.  LCSD also filed a W.R.C.P. 581 certificate stating that it had 
attempted to obtain opposing counsel's signature on the proposed order more than 
ten days before and counsel had not responded.  The certificate advised that objections 
to the proposed order must be made within 10 days.  The appellants did not object to the 
proposed order and, on May 3, 2006, the district court entered the order 
granting LCSD's summary judgment motion.  
Apparently, appellants' counsel was not served with a copy of the 
order.

 
 
[¶15]  Six days later, the district court 
entered a notice setting a hearing on the appellants' motion for reconsideration 
for May 26, 2006.  At LCSD's 
request, the hearing was continued to June 7, 2006.  The hearing was held as scheduled and on 
June 9, 2006, appellants' counsel filed a motion requesting an additional 
fifteen days to file a notice of appeal.  
In the motion, counsel stated that he was not served with the order 
granting summary judgment and was not aware until the June 7 hearing that the 
order had been entered on May 3.  By 
June 7, the thirty days for filing a notice of appeal from the summary judgment 
order had expired.  Citing W.R.A.P. 
2.01(a)(1), counsel asked for an extension. 

 
 
[¶16]  On June 12, 2006, the district court 
entered an order granting the appellants an extra fifteen days in which to file 
a notice of appeal.  Appellants 
filed their notice of appeal the same day.            

  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶17]  When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, we consider the record de 
novo.  Hincks v. Walton Ranch Co., 2007 WY 12, 
¶ 7, 150 P.3d 669, 670 (Wyo. 2007).  
Our review of orders granting summary judgment is governed by W.R.C.P. 
56(c), which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  

 
 
We view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly 
drawn from the record.  Hincks, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d  at 670.   A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.  Gillett v. White, 2007 WY 44, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 911, 914 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶18]  As a preliminary matter, we address 
LCSD's claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the 
appellants made no showing of excusable neglect to support extending the time 
for filing the notice of appeal as required by our appellate rules.  W.R.A.P. 2.01 provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(a)  An appeal from a trial court to an 
appellate court shall be taken by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of 
the trial court within 30 days from entry of the appealable order.  

(1) Upon 
a showing of excusable neglect, the trial court in any action may extend the 
time for filing the notice of appeal not to exceed 15 days from the expiration 
of the original time prescribed, provided the application for extension of time 
is filed and the order entered prior to the expiration of 45 days from entry of 
the appealable order; * * * *

 
 
[¶19]  There is no dispute that the notice of 
appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of the summary judgment 
order.  The district court entered 
the order on May 3, 2006, and the notice of appeal was filed on June 12, 2006, 
40 days later.  The dispute concerns 
whether the claim by appellants' counsel that he did not receive a copy of the 
summary judgment order or know that it had been entered constitutes excusable 
neglect within the meaning of W.R.A.P. 2.01.  Citing Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop Partnership, 
946 P.2d 417 (Wyo. 1997), LCSD argues it does not.   

 
 
[¶20]  Mr. Ahearn filed a notice of appeal 
listing both defendants in the underlying action, a partnership and a bank, on 
the caption.  Id. at 421.  He served both of them with a copy of 
the notice of appeal.  The notice, 
however, referred only to the order granting summary judgment for the 
partnership.  In the meantime, 
unbeknownst to Mr. Ahearn, the district court had entered a second order 
granting summary judgment for the bank.  
Mr. Ahearn discovered the second order months later and filed an amended 
notice of appeal, which the bank moved to strike as untimely.  This Court concluded the notice of 
appeal was untimely as to the bank and dismissed the bank from the appeal.  Id.   

 
 
[¶21]  Mr. Ahearn sought relief in the district 
court by filing a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion.  
The district court found that the clerk's office had failed to comply 
with W.R.C.P. 77, which required the clerk to mail copies of all court orders to 
all parties.  Concluding that denial 
of relief would violate due process, the district court entered an order 
vacating the original summary judgment order and entering a new order.  Id.  Mr. Ahearn timely appealed from the new 
order.

 
 
[¶22]  The issue this Court was asked to 
consider was whether Rule 60(b) could be used to avoid the mandate of Rule 77, 
which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
            
(d)  Service of orders or judgments.  
Immediately upon entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall mail a copy 
thereof . . . to every party who is not in default for failure to appear, and 
who has not in person or by attorney acknowledged receipt of a copy 
thereof.  * * * * Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk 
does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve 
a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted by 
the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

   

[emphasis 
added.]  Mr. Ahearn claimed he was 
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because the clerk's office failed to comply 
with Rule 77.  This Court held that 
factor alone did not warrant Rule 60(b) relief.  Ahearn, 946 P.2d  at 423.  We said:

 
 
Rule 
60(b) is available in situations where a party does not learn of a judgment 
until after the time provided in W.R.A.P. 2.01(a)(i), but relief is limited to 
only those instances where the party has shown due diligence, or sufficient 
reason for the lack thereof, or other special circumstances.  Rule 60(b) was not intended as a means 
of enlarging . . . the time for appeal except in compelling circumstances where 
justice requires that course.

 
 
Courts 
have uniformly held that Rule 77(d) bars [Rule 60(b)] relief when the sole 
reason asserted for relief is the failure of a litigant to receive notice of the 
entry.

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).

 
 
[¶23]  Ahearn is distinguishable from the 
present case because in that case relief was sought under W.R.C.P. 60(b) after 
the 15 days provided for in W.R.A.P. 2.01 had expired and the question for 
determination was whether relief was available under Rule 60(b) when the reason 
for the untimely notice of appeal was the clerk's failure to serve the order on 
the appealing party as required by Rule 77(d).  We found the answer to that question in 
the express language of Rule 77(d) stating that the clerk's failure to comply 
with the rule does not extend or authorize the district court to extend the time 
for appeal, and in our prior interpretations of Rule 60(b) limiting relief to 
instances where due diligence or other special circumstances are 
shown.

 
 
[¶24]  Here, relief was sought under W.R.A.P. 
2.01 within the 15 days provided.  
The question for determination is whether the appellants made a showing 
of excusable neglect within the meaning of Rule 2.01.  W.R.C.P. 77(d) does not come into play 
because the portion of the rule disallowing extensions of time based upon the 
clerk's failure to comply specifically states "except as provided in the rules 
of appellate procedure."  Likewise, 
Rule 60(b) is not at issue because the appellants did not seek relief in the 
district court on the basis of that provision.  

 
 
[¶25]  In Crossan v. Irrigation Dev. Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo. 1979), in the context of W.R.A.P. 2.01, 
the Court said:          

 
 
Excusable 
neglect is measured on a strict standard to take care of genuine emergency 
conditions, such as death, sickness, undue delay in the mail and other 
situations where such behavior might be the act of a reasonably prudent person 
under the circumstances.  

 
 
More 
recently, in Venable v. State, 854 P.2d 714, 718 (Wyo. 1993), the Court 
stated:

 
 
[T]he 
excusable neglect standard can be met only in extraordinary cases where 
injustice would otherwise result.  
The appellate court normally accords great deference to the district 
court's ruling.  * * * Because of 
the wide array of factual situations, the decisions one finds are useful more as 
illustrations of the judicial problem rather than as a talisman to interpreting 
"excusable neglect."   In the 
final analysis, each case stands on its own facts since the district court's 
exercise of discretion is at the heart of the case.

 
 
[¶26]  In the present case, the facts upon 
which the district court relied in granting the extension included:  appellants' counsel claimed not to have 
received notice of the entry of the May 3 summary judgment order; counsel for 
LCSD was unable to verify that his office sent appellants' counsel a copy of the 
order as required by district court procedure; a hearing was set for May 26 on 
the motion for reconsideration, within the time for filing a notice of appeal, 
however LCSD's counsel requested a continuance; the hearing was rescheduled for 
June 7, past the time for filing a notice of appeal; upon learning on June 7 
that an order had been entered, appellants' counsel moved for an extension; the 
oral motion was followed by a written motion supported by the affidavit of 
appellants' counsel's secretary, in which she averred that the summary judgment 
order was first received in their office by fax from the school district's 
counsel on June 7.   

 
 
[¶27]  Giving effect to our prior 
pronouncements that each case stands on its own facts and the district court's 
exercise of discretion is the heart of the matter, we are unable to find from 
these facts that the district court abused its discretion in granting the 
extension.  LCSD's counsel could not 
verify that he sent a copy of the order to appellants' counsel as required by 
district court procedure.  The 
hearing on the motion for reconsideration was originally scheduled within the 30 
days for filing a notice of appeal.  
A reasonable inference can be made that if the hearing had been held as 
scheduled, appellants' counsel would have realized then that the order had been 
entered and filed a notice of appeal and no extension would have been necessary. 
Instead, LCSD's counsel asked for a continuance and the hearing was rescheduled 
for June 7, past the 30 day period for filing a notice of appeal.  Upon realizing the district court had 
entered an order, appellants' counsel requested an extension of time to file a 
notice of appeal.  The request was 
made within the 15 days provided for in Rule 2.01.  Given appellants' counsel's claim that 
he did not receive notice of the summary judgment order and LCSD's inability to 
verify that it forwarded him a copy, the district court reasonably could have 
concluded excusable neglect was shown as required by Rule 2.01. The district 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 15 day extension. 

 
 
2.         
Due Process

 
 
[¶28]  The federal statute under which the 
appellants brought their due process claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Cum.Supp.2001), 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
Every 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State . . ., subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

 

This 
statute creates a federal cause of action for damages to vindicate violations of 
federal law committed by persons acting "under color of state law."   Garnett v. Coyle, 2001 WY 94, ¶ 17, 33 P.3d 114, 120 (Wyo. 2001).  To 
establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has 
been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States; and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under 
color of state law.  Id.  State courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal courts over § 1983 actions.  Van Riper v. Odekoven, 2001 WY 58, ¶ 4, 
26 P.3d 325, 326 (Wyo. 2001).     

 
 
[¶29]  It is undisputed that, by virtue of the 
LCSD nutrition service employees' agreement, appellants had a constitutionally 
protected property right in their continued employment with LCSD entitling them 
to due process prior to being terminated.  
In their complaint, the appellants claimed that their due process rights 
were violated when they were terminated without written notice and a 
pre-termination hearing.  The 
district court concluded there was no due process violation because the 
appellants were not officially terminated until December 21, 2004, and, prior to 
that date, LCSD attempted to afford them due process by giving them an 
opportunity to tell their side of the story.  The district court concluded that the 
appellants were given the opportunity to be heard and chose not to avail 
themselves of that opportunity.  
Therefore, the district court concluded, LCSD did not deprive them of the 
opportunity to be heard.  

 
 
[¶30]  On appeal, the appellants assert the 
district court misconstrued the facts in order to find for LCSD.  They contend the evidence was undisputed 
that they were fired without notice or a hearing on December 16, the day they 
refused to serve lunch.  LCSD argues 
the appellants' due process rights were not violated because they were given two 
chances to tell their side of the story prior to their official termination on 
December 21first on December 16 when Ms. Willman asked them to explain their 
actions and again the next day when Mr. Lyttle attempted to contact them.  LCSD contends these pre-termination 
opportunities to be heard satisfied due process because a full post-deprivation 
hearing was also available to the appellants by virtue of the grievance 
procedure.  LCSD argues this was all 
that was required to satisfy due process under Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985). 

 
 
[¶31]  In Loudermill, the United States Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the rule that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing 
before an individual is deprived of any significant property interest.  Id. 
at 542.  The Court described the 
pre-termination hearing as requiring oral or written notice of the charges, an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to 
tell his side of the story.  
Id. at 546.  Applying this test, the Court held, in 
the first of the two consolidated cases before it, that a security guard 
employed by the board of education was deprived of due process when he was 
dismissed without a pre-termination hearing for failing to disclose on his job 
application a prior felony conviction. In the second case, the Court held a 
school bus mechanic who was fired for failing an eye examination without a 
pre-termination hearing was deprived of due process.  

 
 
[¶32]  In both cases, the Court emphasized that 
a pre-termination opportunity to explain what happened and why termination 
should not result was essential.  
"The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why 
proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement." 
Id. at 546.   Moreover, "[t]he only meaningful 
opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decision maker is likely to be 
before the termination takes effect."  
Id. at 543.  The availability of procedures for a 
full post-termination hearing was also an important factor in the Court's 
decision.  "We conclude that all the 
process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, 
coupled with post-termination administrative procedures . . . 
."

 
 
[¶33]  This Court has applied Loudermill when considering due process 
violation claims in termination cases involving public employees.  In Lucero v. Matthews, 901 P.2d 1115 
(Wyo. 1995), a 
deputy sheriff was terminated because he allegedly mishandled two criminal 
matters.  The sheriff moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the law was not clearly established that 
the deputy could not be terminated without notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.  We held the law was clearly 
established that:

 
 
A 
nonprobationary . . . public employee is entitled to written notice of the 
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an 
opportunity to present his side of the story. This pretermination hearing 
opportunity, which necessarily includes notice and a hearing, is not only a 
by-product of § 18-3-611 [the Wyoming statute defining the conditions 
required for removal of deputy sheriffs], but is also a function of 
constitutional law.  The due process 
clause of the United States Constitution requires such notice and hearing, and 
we point out that Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution also affords 
equivalent protection to the nonprobationary public employee. 

 
 
            
The notice of which we speak is the same kind of notice that is due any 
public employee who has a property right in continued employment, which includes 
tenured teachers, municipal judges, and any other nonprobationary public 
employee.  The required notice must 
afford the public employee "a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the 
opposing party and to meet them."  
The notice must contain adequate and specific notice of the charges for 
which the employee is being terminated.  

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
            
The opportunity to be heard before a public employee's property interest 
may be taken away goes hand in hand with the notice he must receive.  Constitutional due process requires that 
a public employee be afforded a hearing wherein he may respond to the charges 
that are contained within the notice before his constitutionally protected 
property interest may be terminated.  
This necessarily means that the public employee must be given a real and 
meaningful opportunity to respond to every charge or allegation that is being 
brought against him and which will be used as a cause for his termination.  If the public employee has not been 
given an opportunity to respond to every allegation which is used against him as 
a cause for termination of his property interest, then he has not been given a 
real and meaningful opportunity to be heard and, thus, he has been deprived of 
constitutionally protected property without due process of 
law.

 
 

Id. at 
1120-21 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶34]  A year later, in Mondt v. Cheyenne Police Dep't, 924 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 
1996), we considered the requirements of due process in the context of a police 
officer who was suspended for unsatisfactory work performance.  On a certified question from the 
district court asking what process the police officer was due before he was 
suspended, we said he was entitled to written notice of the charges against him, 
knowledge of the basis of those charges and, in the case of the denial of the 
allegations, an effective opportunity to respond either in person or in writing 
to an impartial decision maker.  
Id. at 82.   

 
 
[¶35]  More recently, in Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 
17, 88 P.3d 481, 488 (Wyo. 2004) we reiterated these principles as 
follows:

 
 
[P]ublic 
employees must be given notice sufficient to afford them a reasonable 
opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and meet them.  "The notice must contain adequate and 
specific notice of the charges for which the employee is being terminated."  The notice must be sufficient to afford 
the employee "a real and meaningful opportunity to respond to every charge or 
allegation brought against him as a basis for termination."  Absent an opportunity to respond to 
every allegation that is the basis for termination, a public employee has not 
been given a real and meaningful opportunity to be heard and is deprived of due 
process.  

 
 
[¶36]  Before considering the substance of the 
appellants' due process claim in light of Loudermill and our state court 
decisions, we address the district court's finding that the appellants were 
terminated effective December 21, the date the letters were sent to them, rather 
than December 16, 2004, the day Ms. Willman fired them.  Viewing the record de novo and in the light most favorable 
to the appellants, we cannot agree with that finding.  Evidence was presented that all of those 
present in the break room on December 16, with the possible exception of Mr. 
Rooney, believed that Ms. Willman terminated the appellants at that time.  There was testimony indicating that Ms. 
Willman had the authority only to recommend termination, not to actually 
terminate employees, however, Ms. Willman did not tell the appellants she was 
going to "recommend" their terminations.   Rather, she told Ms. Metz and Ms. 
Basile that they were fired.   
She also accepted Ms. Horton's resignation although Ms. Horton did not 
say she was resigning.  Ms. Willman 
testified that "it never crossed her mind" that her actions would not be 
supported by Mr. Lyttle.  

 
 
[¶37]  Given this testimony, the termination 
arguably was a "done deal" on December 16 despite Ms. Willman's lack of 
authority to unilaterally terminate employees.  Mr. Conine viewed it that way, 
testifying that from his perspective the appellants were fired on December 
16.   Not surprisingly, Ms. 
Basile testified that she believed she was fired on December 16.  When she spoke with Mr. Lyttle the 
following Monday, he did not tell her that Ms. Willman did not have the 
authority to fire her and could only recommend her termination nor did he relay 
that information to Ms. Horton or Ms. Metz.  We hold that the record does not support 
a finding that, as a matter of law, the appellants' termination was effective on 
December 21.     

 
 
[¶38]  Turning our attention back to the 
substance of the appellants' due process claim, we hold that genuine issues of 
material fact exist as to whether, prior to being deprived of their property 
interest in their employment with LCSD, the appellants received sufficient 
notice and opportunity to be heard to satisfy due process.  Viewed in the light most favorable to 
appellants, the evidence showed questions of fact as to whether, at the time 
they were told they were terminated, appellants had sufficient notice of the 
charges and evidence against them.  
Additionally, the evidence demonstrated the existence of factual 
questions as to whether they were afforded a meaningful opportunity to tell 
their side of the story.  As the 
United States Supreme Court 
stated in Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 546, "The opportunity to 
present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not 
be taken is a fundamental due process requirement." Moreover, the only 
meaningful opportunity an employee has to influence the decision is before it is 
made.  Id. at 543.   Evidence was presented from which 
a jury might conclude that once Ms. Willman uttered the words "you are fired," 
meeting with Mr. Lyttle would have been futile.  Evidence was also presented from which a 
jury might conclude that when Ms. Basile spoke with Mr. Lyttle the following 
Monday, he in essence acknowledged that she was terminated the week before and 
was simply following procedure before putting the official termination letter in 
the mail.

 
 
[¶39]  Conversely, evidence was presented from 
which a jury might conclude that the appellants received adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard because they really were not terminated until December 
21 and by then Mr. Lyttle had called them and tried to meet with them to hear 
their side of the story, thereby affording them an opportunity for a 
pre-termination hearing.  While 
evidence was also presented showing that by that time, the appellants had been 
told their employment was terminated, and Mr. Lyttle did not advise them 
otherwise or tell them Ms. Willman's recommendation was subject to review, this 
evidence only further demonstrates the existence of factual questions about 
whether the appellants were given a meaningful opportunity to be heard before 
they were terminated.  We reverse 
the district court's order granting summary judgment to LCSD on the § 1983 
claim.  

 
 
3.         
Breach of Contract 

 
 
[¶40]  The district court granted LCSD's 
summary judgment motion on the appellants' breach of contract claim on the 
ground that they failed to exhaust the grievance procedures contained in their 
employment agreement.  The 
appellants claim they were not required to file a grievance in order to maintain 
their breach of contract claim in district court.  They claim the grievance procedures were 
permissive rather than mandatory.

 
 
[¶41]  In addressing this issue, we note first 
that LCSD did not claim on summary judgment that the appellants' failure to 
follow the grievance procedures barred their breach of contract claim. Rather, 
LCSD contended the appellants' failure to follow the grievance procedures 
precluded their claims for sexual discrimination under Title VII and violation 
of due process under 42 U.S.C. §1983.2  The district court, however, concluded 
the absence of a grievance barred the breach of contract 
claim.

 
 
[¶42] 
The relevant provisions of the grievance procedure contained in the agreement 
between LCSD and the nutrition service employees provided:

 
 
ARTICLE 
16  GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

 
 
16.1    This grievance procedure 
shall provide for the equitable settlement of disputes in a timely manner, 
without the fear of reprisals.  
Earnest efforts shall be made, by all parties, to resolve disputes at the 
lowest level.  At all times, the 
focus shall be on problem solving.

 
 

16.2         
    Definitions/Procedures:

 
 
A.        
Grievance:  A dispute arising 
from interpretations or applications of contract terms, District policies and/or 
regulations.

 
 
B.        
Grievant:  Employee, or group 
of employees, or WPEA representing employees filing 
grievance.

 
 
C.        Class 
Action Grievances:  Grievances 
directly affecting two (2) or more grievants shall be filed at Level 
II.

 
 

D.                
Sexual 
Harassment Grievances:  Sexual 
harassment grievances shall be filed at Level II.

 
 

E.                 
Written 
Grievance:  The written grievance 
shall include the following:

 
 

1.                  
A 
description of the grievance

2.                  
Time-frame 
or date

3.                  
Identity 
of the party(ies) involved

4.                  
The 
provision of Board policy, regulations or negotiated agreement in 
dispute

5.                  
A 
suggested remedy

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

H.                
Time 
limits:

 
 

1.                  
Filing:  The grievance shall be presented within 
thirty (30) contract days of actual knowledge of the 
dispute.

 
 

2.                  
Resolution:  At the end of each time limit, the 
grievance shall automatically proceed to the next level, if the process has not 
been completed.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 

16.3    Level 
I

 
 
Time 
Limit:    Five (5) days to 
complete after receipt of written grievance.

 
 
Grievant 
presents immediate supervisor with a written grievance. A meeting shall be held 
between the grievant and the supervisor, with every effort made to resolve the 
grievance by consensus.  The outcome 
of this meeting shall be:

 
 
*           
Resolution of the grievance; or

*           
Immediate elevation to Level II; or

*           
Withdrawal of the grievance by the grievant.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 

16.4    Level II 

 
 
Time 
Limit:  Ten (10) days to complete 
after receipt of the written statement elevating to Level 
II.

 
 
Grievant 
and/or supervisor presents the grievance to the Superintendent.  Within two (2) days, the Superintendent 
shall inform the grievant of the District Level Administrator assigned the 
grievance.   A meeting shall be 
held between the grievant, supervisor, and District Level Administrator with 
every effort made to resolve the grievance by consensus.  The outcome of this meeting shall 
be:

 
 
*           
Resolution of the grievance; or

*           
Immediate elevation to Level III; or

*           
Withdrawal of the grievance by the grievant.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 

16.5    Level 
III

 
 
Time 
Limit:    Ten (10) days to 
complete the Board hearing after receipt of the written statement elevating to 
Level III.

 
 
The 
grievant and/or Superintendent present[s] the grievance to the Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees.  A hearing shall 
be held to resolve the grievance.  
The decision shall be rendered by the action of the Board at the next 
scheduled Board meeting following the hearing.  

 
 
[¶43]  According to the plain language of 
Section 16.2.B., the grievance procedure applied to LCSD employees.  Upon being terminated, the appellants 
were no longer employees of LCSD.  
However, the grievance procedure was made applicable to appellants after 
their discharge by the following provision contained in the discipline and 
discharge provisions of the agreement:

 
 

20.5         
Any 
employee . . . who considers that he has been discharged or disciplined without 
proper cause . . . shall have the right to appeal such discharge in accordance 
with the provisions of the grievance procedure set forth in this agreement. 

 
 
[¶44]  In its decision letter, the district 
court focused on the language in Article 20.5, giving discharged employees the 
right to appeal, and the language in Article 16.1, providing that the "grievance 
procedure shall provide for the equitable settlement of disputes" and "earnest 
efforts shall be made, by all parties, to resolve disputes at the lowest level." 
The district court acknowledged:  
"The mandatory language of the grievance section is in apparent discord 
with the non-mandatory language of termination appeals."  The district court asked:  "What is the meaning of the contract, 
given these conflicting provisions?"  
Despite the ambiguity, the district court applied the rules of contract 
interpretation to conclude the reasonable construction of the agreement was that 
the grievance procedures were mandatory.         

 
 
[¶45]   Normally, the construction and 
interpretation of a contract is for the court as a matter of law.  Hoff v. City of Casper-Natrona County Health 
Dept., 2001 WY 97, ¶ 16, 33 P.3d 99, 103 (Wyo. 2001).  If the meaning of a contract is 
ambiguous or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the 
parties from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes 
a mixed question of law and fact.  
Id.  Where the meaning and effect of an 
employment relationship is a mixed question of law and fact, we have held that 
summary judgment is not appropriate.  
Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of 
America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶46]  In concluding that the grievance 
procedures were mandatory despite the apparent ambiguity, the district court 
relied on Bryant v. Pacific Power & 
Light, 701 P.2d 1165 (Wyo. 1985), where this Court considered a collective 
bargaining agreement containing the following language:  "Employee . . . shall file with the 
Company a written grievance."  
Id. at 
1166.  In Bryant, the employee conceded that 
ordinarily, "access to the courts is barred to one who fails to exhaust mandatory grievance procedures in a 
collective-bargaining agreement."  
Id. at 1167 
(emphasis added).  Because of the 
mandatory language requiring an employee to file a grievance and because Mr. 
Bryant did not do so, this Court held summary judgment was appropriate on his 
breach of contract claim.  

 
 
[¶47]  In contrast to the agreement in Bryant, the appellants' employment 
agreement did not contain clear language requiring discharged employees to file 
a grievance.  Nor did it contain any 
language suggesting that a discharged employee must comply with the grievance 
procedures or be barred from judicial relief.   Pursuant to Article 20.5, the 
appellants had the "right" to appeal their discharge by filing a grievance in 
accordance with the procedures contained in Article 16.  

 
 
[¶48]  The plain and ordinary meaning of the 
word "right" as used in Article 20.5 is, to paraphrase Merriam-Webster's On-line 
Dictionary:  something to which one 
has a just claim; a power or privilege to which one is justly entitled (such as 
the right to vote).  In the context 
in which it appears in Article 20.5, the word "right" does not suggest a 
grievance was mandatory.  The 
provision does not state that a discharged employee "must" or "is required" to 
file a grievance or, as in Bryant, 
"the employee shall file a grievance."  
Instead, the agreement provides an employee "shall have the right" to 
file a grievance, a usage suggesting a choice on the part of the employee.  Had LCSD intended to make the filing of 
a grievance mandatory or to require employees to exhaust the grievance 
procedures or be barred from filing a claim in court, it could have clearly 
stated that intent in the agreement.  
We hold that the appellants' failure to appeal their discharge by filing 
a grievance did not preclude them from filing a breach of contract claim in 
court.      

 
 
[¶49]  In reaching this result, we are aware of 
the statement in Glover v. State, 860 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Wyo. 1993), cited by the district court, that "the decision to 
decline jurisdiction because a party failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court."  Glover, however, is distinguishable from 
the present case and the language cited by the district court in its summary 
judgment order is not applicable under the present facts. 

 
 
[¶50]  Glover involved a discharged state 
employee governed by the state personnel rules and the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedures Act (WAPA).  He filed an 
action in district court without having exhausted the procedures available to 
him in the personnel rules and state statutes.  In affirming the district court's 
decision to decline jurisdiction to consider his termination claims, this Court 
concluded that the intent of the personnel rules was to place exclusive 
jurisdiction with the state department of administration and information until 
the available administrative procedures were exhausted.  The Court reached this result based on 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) (Michie 1990), which expressly provided that 
judicial review was available only after the administrative remedies were 
exhausted, and the personnel rules which provided that the hearing authority had 
original jurisdiction in all hearings involving employee dismissals.  Glover, 860 P.2d  at 1172-73. 

 
 
[¶51]  The quotation from Glover the district court relied on in 
appellants' case came from Union Pacific 
Resources Company v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 366 (Wyo. 1992).  Union Pacific involved a taxpayer's 
direct appeal to district court from county and state tax assessments.  We held the taxpayer was required to 
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the tax 
assessments.  We reached this result 
because, pursuant to the Wyoming Constitution, the state board of equalization 
was given jurisdiction to hear appeals from county and state tax determinations. 
Given the extensive and important administrative structure for handling review 
of tax assessments, we concluded the district court properly exercised its 
discretion in declining jurisdiction until the administrative remedies were 
exhausted.

 
 
[¶52]  As we said in Glover, 860 P.2d  at 1171, "the 
exhaustion doctrine applies where an agency alone has been granted or found to 
possess exclusive jurisdiction over the case."  The purpose of the doctrine then is to 
avoid premature interruption of the administrative process where the agency has 
been created to apply a statute in the first instance.  Id. The doctrine does not apply in the 
present case because there is no agency created to apply a statute in the first 
instance and the LCSD nutrition service employees' agreement does not indicate a 
clear intent to make the grievance procedure mandatory, to give LCSD exclusive 
jurisdiction over employment disputes, or to bar judicial remedies.  Under these circumstances, in contrast 
to the situations in Glover and Bryant, the question of whether the 
grievance procedures were mandatory was to be determined by applying the usual 
rules of contract interpretation. Giving the words used in the agreement their 
plain and ordinary meaning, we hold the appellants were entitled, but not 
required, to file a grievance after they were terminated. Their decision not to 
file a grievance did not bar their claim in district court.   

 
 
4.         
Sex Discrimination  

 
 
[¶53]  The district court held that the 
appellants failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on their claim for 
sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  More specifically, the district court 
concluded that the appellants' evidence of sexual harassment and a hostile work 
environment consisted almost exclusively of complaints made by other employees; 
only one such complaint came from a nutrition service employee.  The district court further concluded the 
appellants presented no evidence that the alleged harassment created an abusive 
working environment. 

 
 
[¶54]  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the phrase "terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment" reflects a congressional intent "to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in 
employment," including hostile or abusive work environments.  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 
126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993), citing Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986).  When the workplace is permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult of sufficient severity or 
pervasiveness to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an 
abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.  Harris, 510 U.S.  at 21.  The anti-discrimination provision seeks 
a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their 
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status.

 
 
[¶55]  Appellants claim on appeal that they 
presented sufficient evidence of unwelcome harassment.  They cite to a student conduct log 
detailing incidents of unacceptable language and behavior by students in 2004 
and 2005.  The log is not included 
in the record on appeal.  They 
further cite to testimony concerning two incidents where students grabbed each 
other's breasts and crotches while waiting in the lunch line and one incident 
where a student called Ms. Horton a "f---ing b----."  Other than this testimony, the 
appellants present only unsupported, conclusory assertions such as:  the students were allowed to treat 
employees in a demeaning way; the administration allowed a hostile environment 
to continue because it did not properly supervise the students; the incidents of 
profane language and obscene behavior were constant and created an abusive work 
environment; and, because appellants were female and worked in nutrition 
services, the administration ignored their complaints.  

 
 
[¶56]  We agree with the district court's 
conclusion that the appellants' assertions did not establish a genuine issue of 
material fact on their Title VII claim.  
We will not consider evidence not contained in the record and the only 
other evidence of an abusive environment, i.e. the testimony concerning the two 
incidents of student behavior in the lunch line and the student using profanity 
toward Ms. Horton, are not sufficient to show a pervasively abusive 
environment.  Additionally, the 
appellants presented no evidence that the student behavior about which they 
complained was gender based.  To the 
contrary, the evidence suggested that the student behavior occurred regardless 
of the gender of the employees present.              

 
 
5.         
The Deemed Denied Rule

 
 
[¶57]  Citing W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) and Paxton, 2004 WY 93, 95 P.3d 796, 
Appellants claim LCSD's summary judgment motion was deemed denied when the 
district court had not entered an order within 90 days after the motion was 
filed.  Because the motion was 
deemed denied, they assert, the district court erred in not allowing the case to 
go to trial.

 
 
[¶58]  The version of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) in 
effect in 2005-2006 provided:

 
 
A 
request for hearing may be served by the moving party or any party affected by 
the motion within 30 days after service of the motion.  Absent a timely request for hearing the 
court may, in its discretion, determine the motion without a hearing.  A motion not determined within 90 days 
after filing shall be deemed denied. A party whose motion has been deemed denied 
shall have 10 days after the effective date of such denial to serve such 
pleadings or other papers, if any, as may be required or 
permitted.

 

Addressing 
this rule in Paxton, we held that 
post-trial motions left undetermined 90 days after filing were deemed 
denied.  In reaching that result, we 
said:

 
 
The 
present version of the rule . . . covers motions for judgment, motions to amend 
or make additional findings of fact, motions to alter or amend a judgment, and 
motions for new trial, once again broadening the application of the "deemed 
denied" principle.  Further, the 
present rule sets the "deemed denied" date at ninety days after filing of the 
motion and contains no provision for continuance, which indicates a firm 
commitment to the rule's purpose of preventing delay in the determination of 
post-trial motions.

 
 

Paxton, ¶ 11, 
95 P.3d  at 800.  Thus, we made clear 
in Paxton that the deemed denied rule 
applied to post-trial motions not 
ruled upon within 90 days of filing.

 
 
[¶59]  Subsequently, in Mueller v. Zimmer, 2005 WY 156, 124 P.2d 340 (Wyo. 2005), we held that the lapse of 90 days from the filing of a summary 
judgment motion did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to decide the 
motion.  We distinguished between 
summary judgment orders entered more than 90 days after filing, like the one at 
issue in Mueller, and orders on 
post-trial motions, such as those at issue in Paxton.  The district court loses jurisdiction to 
decide the latter after 90 days but retains jurisdiction to decide the 
former.  We hold that the district 
court retained jurisdiction to enter its summary judgment order after 90 days 
had expired.              

 
 
6.         
Federal Court Ruling 

 
 
[¶60] 
Appellants claim that it was inequitable and contrary to the doctrines of 
estoppel and law of the case for the state district court to reach a different 
result than the federal court reached in Titus v. Laramie County School Dist. No. 
1, which they assert involved "exactly the same legal and factual basis" as 
their state court case.  LCSD 
responds by asserting that state courts are not bound by federal court rulings 
and, given the substantial factual and legal differences in the two cases, the 
federal court ruling had little bearing on the state court case. 

 
 
[¶61]  From the record before us, it is 
impossible to determine whether Titus 
involved the same legal and factual basis as the instant case.  The appellants assert without 
evidentiary support that it did; LCSD asserts without evidentiary support that 
it did not.  Even assuming the same 
facts and legal basis, however, while we consider relevant federal precedent, we 
are not bound by it.  Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 411 
(Wyo. 
1995).  The appellants' contention 
that the state district court was bound by the federal court decision is without 
merit.

 
 
7.         
Specific District Court Finding

 
 
[¶62]   Appellants claim the district court 
incorrectly found that they refused to serve lunch on the day they were 
terminated even though their supervisor, Ms. Titus, had arranged for a meeting 
that afternoon with the administration to discuss their concerns.  They take issue with the following 
statement in the district court's decision letter:

 
 
            
The supervisor, Ms. Titus [on] behalf of [appellants], Director of Food 
Services, Ms. Willman and Mr. Conine, the principal, had previously scheduled a 
meeting for 1:30 or 2:00 p.m. to discuss the issue.  Plaintiffs did not even await the 
outcome of the scheduled meeting before their sit-down strike.  Thus, Plaintiffs failed not only to 
pursue the grievance procedure but to even await the informal attempt to resolve 
the dispute "at the lowest level."

 
 
We find 
nothing in the record to support a finding that the appellants knew about the 
scheduled meeting.  However, our 
holding that genuine issues of material exist for trial means the parties will 
have the opportunity to present evidence on the issue.  It is unnecessary for this Court to 
address the matter further.           

 
 
8.         
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing

 
 
[¶63]  In its decision letter, the district 
court stated:

 
 
As a 
matter of law, [LCSD, Mr. Conine, Mr. Rooney and Ms. Willman] have immunity from 
the [appellant]s' claim for breach of [the implied covenant of] good faith and 
fair dealing under the Wyoming Governmental  Claims Act (WGCA).

 
 
A claim 
for breach of good faith and fair dealing is an action in tort.  Hoff v. City of Casper-Natrona CountyHealth Dept., 33 P.3d 99, 106 (Wyo. 
2001).

 
 
Although 
the employment relationship is based on contract and provides the setting within 
which the parties interact with each other, it is that interaction which truly 
forms the basis of the tort claim on which the employee seeks a remedy.  It is more accurate to say that the tort 
claim arises from the employment contract setting, but it is based on alleged 
tortious conduct, not on the contract.

 
 
            
The WGCA states, "a governmental entity and its employees while acting 
within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort 
except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 and limited by W.S. 
1-29-121."

 
 
Therefore, 
because breach of good faith and fair dealing is not enumerated in one of the 
WGCA's specific exceptions [LCSD] has immunity from the Plaintiffs' 
claim.

 
 
[¶64]  The appellants contend the district 
court erred in granting LCSD's summary judgment motion on their claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because, first, LCSD did 
not provide competent argument supporting its motion as to the claim and, 
second, the WGCA provides that the liability of an entity is extended to the 
extent of its insurance coverage.  
Because LCSD purchased insurance coverage for employment claims, the 
appellants assert, the claim for breach of the implied covenant is covered.  LCSD responds that the district court 
correctly held that it is immune from liability for any tort except as provided 
by the WGCA, breach of the implied covenant is a tort that does not fall within 
any of the exceptions; therefore, it is immune from the claim.  LCSD further asserts that its insurance 
policy does not cover a tort claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing; therefore, it is immune from liability for the tort as provided by the 
WGCA.

 
 
[¶65]  We held in Hoff v. City of Casper-Natrona County Health 
Dep't, 2001 WY 97, ¶ 32, 33 P.3d 99, 107 (Wyo. 2001), that a state 
employee's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing was barred by the WGCA.  We 
said: 

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 1-39-119 does not 
enumerate [the tort of breach of the implied covenant] and cannot serve as an 
exception to immunity.  The 
legislature has clearly stated in plain language in the Act the public policy 
that a covered governmental entity is liable for only those torts expressly 
recognized in that Act.   

 
 
Because 
the WGCA does not except the tort from the general rule of immunity, LCSD has 
immunity from the claim unless, as appellants maintain, it waived its immunity 
in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-118(b) (LexisNexis 2007) by purchasing 
insurance coverage for employment claims.

 
 
[¶66]  Section 1-39-118(b) 
provides:

 
 
            
A governmental entity is authorized to purchase liability insurance 
coverage covering any acts or risks including all or any portion of the risks 
provided under this act.  Purchase 
of liability insurance coverage shall extend the governmental entity's liability 
as follows:

            
(i)         
If the governmental entity has insurance coverage either exceeding the 
limits of liability as stated in this section or covering liability which is not 
authorized by this act, the governmental entity's liability is extended to the 
coverage;

 
 
Selected 
provisions of LCSD's liability insurance policy are contained in the 
record.  Among those provisions is 
an exclusion from coverage for:

 
 
(g)       Injury 
to:

(1)       Any person arising out 
of:

            
* * *

                
(b)       
Termination of that person's employment; or

                                    
(c)        
Employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions including, but 
not limited to . . . discipline, . . . harassment, . . . or discrimination 
directed at that person;   

 
 
Assuming 
there is no other provision in the policy to the contrary, the insurance policy 
did not cover liability for the appellants' claims and did not waive LCSD's 
immunity from their claims.     

 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶67]  Genuine issues of material fact exist as 
to whether the appellants were denied notice and a meaningful pre-termination 
hearing as required by due process.  
Therefore, we reverse the district court's summary judgment ruling on 
their § 1983 claim.  We also reverse 
the district court's order on the breach of contract claim because we conclude 
as a matter of law the employment agreement did not require appellants to file a 
grievance after they were terminated.

 
 
[¶68]  No genuine issues of material fact exist 
on the appellants' sex discrimination / hostile work environment claim and we 
affirm the summary judgment on their Title VII claim.  We also affirm the summary judgment on 
their claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
because, from the record before us, it appears LCSD is immune from 
liability.   

  

[¶69]   Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part.

 
 
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.C.P. 58 
provides in relevant part:

 
 
            
(a)  Presentation.   . . . unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, written judgments or orders shall be presented to the court within 20 
days after its decision is made known.  
Before submitting the judgment or order, the party drafting it shall seek 
to secure the written approval as to form of the other parties.  If, within 10 days, approval as to form 
is not obtained, the party drafting the form of judgment or order may forward 
the original to the court and serve a copy on the other parties with a notice 
advising objections must be made within 10 days.  If no written objection is timely filed, 
the court may sign the judgment or order.

  

2It is 
more than well-settled that a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 need not exhaust his administrative remedies before 
filing suit in federal court. Hopkins v. 
Oklahoma Pub. 
Emples. Retirement Sys., 150 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1998), citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982); Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 864 F.2d 680, 683 (10tth Cir. 1988) 
(reinstating a § 1983 suit that had been dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies).   
This rule is equally applicable in state court.  Leach v. N.M.Junior 
College, 132 N.M. 106, 45 P.3d 46 (N.M. 
2002).