Title: State v. Reed

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

306 P.2d 640 (1957) 62 N.M. 147 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edna REED, Defendant-Appellant. No. 6144. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 23, 1957. G. T. Watts, Roswell, Hartley & Buzzard, Clovis, Neal & Girand, Hobbs, for appellant. Richard H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., Harry E. Stowers, Jr., Paul L. Billhymer, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee. *641 COMPTON, Justice. The appellant was convicted by a jury of Curry County of the crime of perjury, and she appeals from the judgment imposing sentence upon her. The applicable statute, § 40-32-2, 1953 Comp., reads: The alleged perjury grew out of the testimony given by appellant before a Grand Jury. The Grand Jury was investigating, among other things, an assault, attempted robbery, and the sale of intoxicating liquor, which allegedly occurred on the night of January 24, 1956, in the Cattlemen's Club of Clovis. Appellant, a barmaid at the club, was called as a witness before the Grand Jury in its investigation. In response to a question with regard to the serving of liquor in the club, appellant testified, "that Louise Jenkins (not an employee of the club) served Harold Gress, Mrs. Harold Gress, V.O. Davenport, Marvin Hale and James Star, and that no employee of the club served them on that particular evening because I was there." At the trial, the parties mentioned, except Louise Jenkins and Harold Gress, were called as witnesses and testified that Joyce Ellis, an employee of the club, served them intoxicating liquor repeatedly throughout the evening; that appellant was tending bar in the club on the occasion mentioned; and, that on several occasions she knowingly furnished liquor to Joyce Ellis to be served by her to them. But in view of the disposition we make of the appeal, the sufficiency of the evidence becomes unimportant. The court instructed the jury as to the material allegations of the information as follows: It is first contended that the court failed to instruct that an essential element of the crime of perjury is the materiality of the alleged perjured statement to the matters under investigation by the Grand Jury, and that there was a failure of proof in this regard. Conversely, the State contends otherwise. Without passing on the correctness of these conflicting contentions, it suffices to say the materiality of her testimony was shown. The indiscriminate serving of intoxicating liquor was material to the matters concerning which the inquiry was made. The selling and serving of liquor go hand in hand. Moreover, no exception was taken to the instructions. State v. Clarkson, 58 N.M. 56, 265 P.2d 670. Appellant offered to prove by various witnesses that no sales were made to them at the club at the time and place in question. The tender was refused and correctly so. Being negative in character, it was without probative force. The court did not err in denying the tender. Further assignment of error has to do with the trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction. After the case was closed and the court had prepared its instructions, the following occurred in chambers: The claim of error must be sustained. While there was a failure to comply with the provisions of § 41-11-11, 1953 Comp., Rule 51(b), our Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring requested instructions to be in writing, the oral request here served the purpose of the rule. It served to alert the mind of the judge that he was about to fall into error and afford him an opportunity if necessary to correct it, to avoid the injustice which might otherwise result. The refusal to give the instruction requested, or one of similar import, is so basic as to require a reversal. The case was submitted to the jury on the basis that the giving of false testimony knowingly, was the offense charged. Clearly, this is not so; wilfully testifying falsely is the gravamen of the offense charged. The jury was denied an opportunity to pass upon the state of mind of the appellant, an essential element in determining her guilt or innocence when she testified as she did before the Grand Jury. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330. The text writers support the conclusion reached. At 70 C.J.S., Perjury, § 74, it is said: Another question urged for a reversal, and which again may arise on a subsequent trial, relates to the sentence imposed. The court followed the penalty provision of § 40-32-1, 1953 Comp., in imposing sentence. The section reads: Appellant contends that since § 40-32-2, 1953 Comp., upon which the prosecution was based, did not provide a specific penalty for its violation, the offense was punishable under § 40-1-7, 1953 Comp., which provides for imprisonment in the county jail, or by fine, or by both. In support of this she strongly relies on the phrase, "if committed in any other case", appearing in § 40-32-1, 1953 Comp. She insists that the word "case" as used therein means a "case" being tried in court. This contention must be rejected. The word "case" in a legal sense, means "suit", but as used in the statute it means "event", "instance", or "happening." Dickey v. Smith, 42 W. Va. 805, 26 S.E. 373. *643 The two penal statutes, both dealing with perjury, were passed at the same time, Chapter VI, Sections 1 and 2, Laws 1853-54. We direct attention to Sections 3 and 4 of the same Act. By Section 3, 1953 Comp. § 40-32-4, subordination of perjury is punishable "as for the crime of perjury." By Section 4, 1953 Comp. § 40-32-5, even an attempt to suborn perjury, though no perjury is committed, is made a crime. To hold that a mere attempt to suborn perjury is made a greater offense than actual subordination of perjury, or perjury itself, leads to an illogical conclusion. While perjury was a misdemeanor at common law, perjury before a Grand Jury, by statute, is made a felony. The judgment will be reversed with direction to grant appellant a new trial, and it is so ordered. LUJAN, C. J., and SADLER and KIKER, JJ., concur. McGHEE, Justice (dissenting in part). I concur in the opinion proposed by Justice COMPTON except the part holding the defendant was properly sentenced under Sec. 40-32-1, N.M.S.A. 1953, which as I read and construe it relates only to perjury committed in a case in court. A matter being investigated by a grand jury is not a case in court as is held in Gamble v. State, 164 Md. 50, 163 A. 859, 861, which is the only case I have found which is squarely in point. It is agreed the defendant was tried under Sec. 40-32-2, reading: The three following sections relate to false swearing before a legislative committee or either house of the legislature, subordination of perjury, and attempt to suborn perjury. Two carry specific penalties which are different, while subordination of perjury carries none. I agree with the contention of appellant that she should have been sentenced under Section 40-1-7, N.M.S.A. 1953. The case of Dickey v. Smith cited in the majority opinion involved the question of the number of times a justice of the peace could grant a new trial in a civil case, and also whether a certain account could be set up as a counterclaim. I do not regard it as authority for what is held here.