Title: Wilburn v. Boeing Airplane Co.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

188 Kan. 722 (1961)
366 P.2d 246
MARCIA RUTH WILBURN, an Incompetent Person, by ROY F. MONTGOMERY, Her Guardian, Appellee,
v.
BOEING AIRPLANE COMPANY, a Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SEDGWICK, Appellants.
No. 42,298

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 10, 1961.
Robert N. Partridge, of Wichita, argued the cause, and George B. Powers, Carl T. Smith, John F. Eberhardt, Stuart R. Carter, Robert C. Foulston, Malcolm Miller, Robert M. Siefkin, Richard C. Harris and Gerald Sawatzky, all of Wichita, were with him on the brief for the appellant, Boeing Airplane Company.
Ralph E. Gilchrist, Carl L. Buck and Bernard V. Borst, all of Wichita, were on the brief for the appellant, The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Sedgwick.
John C. Frank and Theodore M. Utchen, both of Wichita, argued the cause, and Thomas W. Cunningham, Patrick F. Kelly and Fred J. Gasser, all of Wichita, were with them on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is a common-law action against Boeing Airplane Company and the board of county commissioners of Sedgwick county to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff, an employee of Boeing, when she was struck by an automobile being driven by a third party. The accident occurred while plaintiff was crossing a public county street adjacent to Boeing's plant.
The theory of plaintiff's petition is that the crosswalk in which she was struck was in a dangerous and hazardous condition amounting to a nuisance, and that such condition was created and maintained jointly by defendants.
Defendants appeal from an order overruling their joint demurrer to the petition.
The questions involved in the case will develop as the opinion progresses.
We are reluctant to encumber an opinion with lengthy quotations from pleadings. On the other hand, all questions in the case turn upon the construction to be given the material allegations of the petition, and they are of such nature that no attempt to summarize will be undertaken. After alleging the identity of the parties to the action  that Boeing maintains a general office and factory for doing business; that the board of county commissioners is charged with the duty of supervising and maintaining the county highways in a safe condition, and that on the date in question, September 16, 1958, plaintiff, thirty-four years of age, was an employee of Boeing on the second shift from 4:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.  the petition alleges:
Paragraph 10 describes her injuries, and paragraph 11 refers to her life expectancy, former earning capacity, and medical bills  past, present and future. Recovery is sought in the amount of $1,250,000.
A motion by defendant Boeing to make the petition definite and certain in two particulars was overruled.
Defendants then filed a joint demurrer to the petition on the following grounds:
The demurrer was overruled, and defendants have appealed from that order.
The principal contention of Boeing is that, as to it, plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the workmen's compensation act.
The board of county commissioners asserts the doctrine of governmental immunity in matters arising out of the regulation of traffic on county streets and highways.
The contentions and our conclusions thereon will be discussed separately.
With respect to the question whether the injuries are compensable under the act, it must be borne in mind that consistency of decisions involving interpretation of the act is not maintained by construing it liberally in favor of compensation where a workman seeks compensation, and strictly against compensation when he seeks damages. In other words, the same rule and yardstick as applied to the same facts must govern, whether invoked by the employee or employer. (Shuck v. Hendershot, 185 Kan. 673, 679, syl. 1, 347 P.2d 362.)
The petition alleges that Boeing is a "factory" employing in excess of 20,000 persons. There can be no question, therefore, that it and its employees were compulsorily under the workmen's compensation act (G.S. 1959 Supp. 44-505, 44-507). In such cases, therefore, where compensation is payable, an injured employee's remedy against his employer is exclusively under the act. (G.S. 1949, 44-501; Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78; Lessley v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 203, 231 P.2d 239.) Boeing contends that as the petition alleges that it, Boeing, had assumed full control of all motor and pedestrian traffic on the street and at the crosswalk in question, the case falls within the rule of Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434, 312 P.2d 220. There the claimant, an employee of Boeing, had parked in *730 Boeing's parking lot prior to the time she was to begin work, and as she proceeded to her place of work slipped on ice in the parking lot and fell. She sought compensation under the workmen's compensation act for her injuries, and it was held that the accident was one arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Plaintiff argues the facts of that case are readily distinguishable from those here pleaded.
Finally, Boeing contends the petition charges it with negligence while plaintiff was leaving the duties of her employment, thus bringing her squarely within G.S. 1949, 44-508k, which reads:
This statute was construed in Madison v. Key Work Clothes, 182 Kan. 186, 318 P.2d 991, where it was said:
Plaintiff, in seeking to avoid the application of the statute, vigorously contends her petition is founded, not on negligence  but on nuisance.
We pass over the many authorities cited, pro and con, dealing with "on the premises" injuries, such as the Teague case, above, and prefer to base our decision on what appears to us to be the controlling and decisive question in the case  that is  the application of G.S. 1949, 44-508k, above.
At the time and place in question, the petition alleges (paragraph 8, above) that plaintiff had left the duties of her employment and that her injuries were proximately caused (paragraph 9, above) by "the defective, dangerous and hazardous nuisance condition of said crosswalk within which she was injured, which was created and maintained by the defendants, the factors which rendered said crosswalk defective, hazardous, dangerous and a nuisance having heretofore been alleged."
The question, therefore, is whether Boeing is charged with negligence which proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. If so, the application *731 of 44-508k is inescapable, and her sole remedy against Boeing is under the compensation act.
As previously stated  plaintiff disclaims any theory of negligence and contends her petition is founded on nuisance  which, as contended, means the long continued maintenance of a deliberate and knowing use or condition of property in the form of a lighting arrangement, perhaps lawful in itself, but dangerous to life and unsafe by reason of its particular location on either side of a heavily traveled public road, and which such dangerous condition has resulted in damage and injury to the plaintiff. Plaintiff further argues that basic to any nuisance is the requirement that the use of property in question must be a use which endangers life or health or obstructs the reasonable use of property by others, and that that is precisely what her petition alleges.
There is no occasion here to "split hairs" in an academic discussion as to the alleged distinctions between negligence and nuisance. Briefly stated, the word "nuisance," while perhaps incapable of precise definition, generally is held to be something which interferes with the rights of citizens, whether in person, property, or enjoyment of property or comfort, and also has been held to mean an annoyance, and that which annoys or causes trouble or vexation, that which is offensive or noxious, or anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage. (Hofstetter v. Myers, Inc., 170 Kan. 564, 568, 228 P.2d 522, 24 A.L.R.2d 188; Steifer v. City of Kansas City, 175 Kan. 794, syl. 2, 267 P.2d 474; Lehmkuhl v. City of Junction City, 179 Kan. 389, 295 P.2d 621, 56 A.L.R.2d 1409.)
Although factually not precisely in point, we believe analogies are to be drawn from the case of Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78, cited above, in which it was held:
In the course of the opinion it was said:
Plaintiff refers to 44-508k as a "strange" statute which would require her to prove common-law negligence of her employer and freedom from contributory negligence on her part  although limiting recovery to the workmen's compensation act. One answer to that, of course, is that the propriety and wisdom of the statute is entirely a matter for the legislature  and not the courts.
Notwithstanding the many arguments made in behalf of plaintiff's position, we are concerned here only with the facts pleaded and not with the conclusion placed thereon by the pleader. With respect to Boeing, our conclusion is that it is charged with negligence which proximately caused plaintiff's injuries while leaving the duties of her employment. Under 44-508k, and as interpreted in the Madison case, above, her injuries therefore arose out of and in the course of her employment, thus rendering them compensable under the act and barring this common-law action against her employer for damages. As previously stated, the act is not to be construed liberally in favor of compensation where a workman seeks to come within its provisions and construed strictly against compensation when he seeks damages in a common-law action. The rule is as broad as it is long  whether invoked by the employee or the employer.
As to defendant Boeing, the demurrer should have been sustained.
The remaining question concerns the liability of defendant board of county commissioners under the allegations of the petition.
What heretofore has been said concerning those allegations with respect to their charging negligence  applies equally to defendant board. Our conclusion is that it is charged with negligence. We believe that no one will seriously question the statement that, generally speaking, means taken by a municipality in the control and regulation of traffic upon the streets and highways constitute a *733 governmental function. It is an elementary rule of law in this state that municipalities are not liable for negligence in the performance of a governmental function, unless such liability is expressly imposed by law. (Freeburne v. City of Emporia, 176 Kan. 503, 505, 271 P.2d 298.) An exception, however, to the general rule pertaining to immunity of a governmental instrumentality from tort liability while engaged in a governmental function, is that the doctrine of immunity does not extend to acts where the conduct of the municipality results in maintaining or creating a nuisance. (Rose v. Board of Education, 184 Kan. 486, 489, 337 P.2d 652, and authorities cited therein.) We have no doubt but that traffic conditions on the street in question  and particularly during nighttime change of workshifts at the Boeing plant  are bad, but in our opinion  as to defendant board  the facts alleged do not constitute a "nuisance."
Plaintiff's other theory  as to liability of the county under the "defective highway" statute (G.S. 1949, 68-301)  is likewise without merit. Without laboring the point further, we simply hold that the facts, conditions and circumstances pleaded do not, as a matter of law, constitute a "defect" in the highway within the meaning of the mentioned statute and the many decisions construing it.
As to defendant board of county commissioners, the demurrer should have been sustained.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment is reversed with directions to sustain the demurrer as to each defendant.
ROBB, J., dissents.
SCHROEDER, J., dissenting:
The rule is established in this jurisdiction that a general demurrer challenging the sufficiency of an entire petition to state a cause of action must be overruled if the pleading states a cause of action on any theory. (Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955.)
Liberally construed the petition in this case definitely alleges a cause of action on the theory of nuisance against each of the defendants. In paragraph six the floodlights are described in great detail as they affect the use of the highway described in the petition. The court is here confronted with the allegations of a petition on demurrer and not evidence produced at the trial. It is conceivable the plaintiff may not be able to prove a cause of action on the theory of nuisance at the trial, but in this connection see Voss v. Bridwell, supra. Certainly, a nuisance has been alleged *734 by the factual allegations of the petition in this case. (Neiman v. Common School District, 171 Kan. 237, 232 P.2d 422; Buckmaster v. Bourbon County Fair Ass'n, 174 Kan. 515, 256 P.2d 878; Eble v. State, 77 Kan. 179, 93 Pac. 803; see, also, Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 1; Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, 265 N.Y.S. 886, 148 Misc. 246; Robb v. Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 432, 6 N.W.2d 222; and Nat. Refining Co. v. Batte, 135 Miss. 819, 100 So. 388.) Floodlights can be so intense as to permeate an area and blind persons driving vehicles on a highway within such area, and constitute a nuisance just as effectively as permeating an area with noxious odors from a sewage disposal plant. (See Adams v. City of Arkansas City, 188 Kan. 391, 362 P.2d 829.)
It is immaterial to a cause of action in nuisance that negligence may also be incidentally alleged or involved. In Adams v. City of Arkansas City, supra, this court said:
On this point see Lehmkuhl v. City of Junction City, 179 Kan. 389, 394, 295 P.2d 621; Bailey v. Kelly, 93 Kan. 723, 727, 145 Pac. 556; 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, § 4, p. 282; 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, § 11a, p. 751; Warren v. Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 28 A.2d 1; and Robinson v. Westman, supra.
Under the workmen's compensation act a workman is entitled to compensation for injury occasioned by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Whether the accident is unavoidable or arises from negligence or a greater culpable act is immaterial, and contributory negligence on the part of the injured employee is of no consequence. It was on this theory of the workmen's compensation act that Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78, was decided, but this law is applicable only where the workman is injured on the premises or in the course of his employment. It has no application to a workman going to or from his place of employment. In this situation G.S. 1949, 44-508(k) has application. Clearly, this section of the act specifies only negligence. Furthermore, liability is imposed on the employer only if the injury occasioned is the proximate cause of the employer's negligence, thus injecting the issue of the injured workman's contributory negligence. An accidental injury, absent such negligence on the part of the employer, would not entitle the workman to compensation *735 under the act while enroute to his employment. (Madison v. Key Work Clothes, 182 Kan. 186, 318 P.2d 991.)
For the same reason an act of the employer, other than negligence, such as a nuisance created and maintained by the employer, or a culpable act of greater magnitude than ordinary negligence, would not be within the compass of 44-508(k), supra. Therefore, a workman who has a cause of action for an injury occasioned to him enroute to his place of work by a nuisance created and maintained by his employer should be free to assert his claim in a common law action against his employer.
Here the admitted facts on demurrer are that the defendant Boeing failed to assert any precautionary control or regulation over the crosswalk where the plaintiff was struck down, and thus by the absence of control had permitted the dangerous lighting condition to exist as a nuisance at the very spot where the plaintiff was injured.
It is true that if negligence on the part of the employer were also present and proximately caused the workman's injury, the workman could assert his right under the workmen's compensation act, but the workman is not required to invoke the provisions of the workmen's compensation act.
Under these circumstances the workman should have an election whether to proceed under the act on the ground of negligence or in a common law action against his employer on the ground of nuisance.
An analogous situation was presented in Davis v. Reed, 188 Kan. 159, 360 P.2d 847, where an employee was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third person while in the course of his employment. The court held that when the injury to a workman for which compensation is payable under the workmen's compensation act is caused under circumstances creating a liability against some person other than the employer to pay damages, and the injured workman fails to assert the right to take compensation under the act by filing the claim or accepting compensation, the provisions of G.S. 1959 Supp., 44-504 are not invoked, and the injured workman may assert his common law action against the third party wrongdoer in tort at any time within two years from the date the cause of action accrued under G.S. 1949, 60-306. In other words, the workman had an election of remedies.
Here the same principle should apply because the provisions of *736 the workmen's compensation act have not been invoked, and under the facts and circumstances of this case it should make no difference that the wrongdoer was the employer.
It is respectfully submitted the lower court should be affirmed.
WERTZ, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.