Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Strauss

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Strauss, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1263.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-1263 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. STRAUSS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Strauss, Slip Opinion No.  
2021-Ohio-1263.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law—Engaging in an 
illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or 
trustworthiness—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension. 
(No. 2020-1512—Submitted January 27, 2021—Decided April 15, 2021.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2020-032. 
______________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Marc Ian Strauss, of Willoughby Hills, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0036808, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1986. 
{¶ 2} In a July 1, 2020 complaint, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar 
Association, alleged that Strauss committed illegal acts that adversely reflect on 
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his honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness to practice law when he operated a 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol, struck a parked police vehicle, and fled. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact, misconduct, and 
aggravating and mitigating factors and agreed that a one-year conditionally stayed 
suspension was the appropriate sanction for Strauss’s misconduct.  After a 
hearing, a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct issued a 
report finding that Strauss had committed the charged misconduct.  Though the 
panel rejected the stipulated aggravating factor and one of the stipulated 
mitigating factors, it recommended that the board adopt the parties’ stipulated 
sanction.  The board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and suspend Strauss 
from the practice of law for one year, stayed in its entirety on the conditions 
recommended by the board. 
Stipulated Facts and Misconduct 
{¶ 5} On March 2, 2018, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Strauss was driving 
southbound on I-271 in snowy conditions when he rear-ended a Beachwood 
police cruiser parked on the side of the road near the scene of another accident.  
Although the impact caused substantial damage to Strauss’s car and the cruiser, 
Strauss left the scene without stopping.  He continued driving southbound on I-
271 until he crashed into the median; he then abandoned his vehicle and fled on 
foot.  Police officers found Strauss walking in the middle of a nearby road.  He 
did not obey their orders to stop and continued walking.  The police officers 
arrested Strauss and took him to the Beachwood Police Department, where an 
officer read him his rights and administered field sobriety tests.  An Intoxilyzer 
breath-alcohol test performed at approximately 2:47 a.m. showed that Strauss’s 
blood-alcohol content was 0.148. 
{¶ 6} On January 7, 2019, Strauss pleaded no contest to two counts of 
operating a vehicle without reasonable control and single counts of resisting 
January Term, 2021 
 
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arrest, leaving the scene of an accident, unsafe operation of a vehicle in the 
vicinity of an emergency vehicle, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated 
(“OVI”).1  Beachwood v. Strauss, Shaker Heights M.C. case Nos. 18TRC00044, 
18CRB00246, and 18TRD012106. 
{¶ 7} On April 15, 2019, Strauss was sentenced to 90 days in jail with 87 
days suspended and three days’ credit for successful completion of an accredited 
driver-intervention program.  His driver’s license was suspended for two years 
from the date of the accident, with driving privileges conditioned on the 
installation of an interlock device on his vehicle.  He was also placed on active 
probation for 12 months followed by 24 months of inactive (nonreporting) 
probation.  Strauss completed his term of active probation, which required him to 
attend two Alcoholics Anonymous meetings per week, wear a secure continuous 
remote alcohol-monitoring device, and pay a fine and court costs.  He remains 
subject to inactive probation until April 15, 2022. 
{¶ 8} The parties stipulated and the board found that Strauss’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on 
the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(h) (engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  We adopt the board’s 
findings of misconduct and determine that his efforts to flee the scene of the 
accident and avoid arrest are sufficiently egregious to warrant finding a violation 
of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 
2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21. 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
                                                          
 
1. Strauss was previously charged with OVI in the Euclid Municipal Court in August 2012 and 
pleaded no contest to a charge of physical control of a vehicle while under the influence.    
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aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 10} The board did not find any aggravating factors in this case.  The 
board rejected the parties’ stipulation that Strauss’s past monetary sanctions for 
failing to comply with continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) requirements were an 
aggravating factor under Gov.Bar R. (V)(13)(B)(1).  See Gov.Bar. R. X(17)(C) 
(monetary sanctions imposed for CLE violations shall not be considered as prior 
discipline). 
{¶ 11} As to mitigating factors, because Strauss stipulated that he had 
engaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflected on his honesty or 
trustworthiness in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) when he fled the scene of the 
accident, the board rejected the parties’ stipulation that the absence of a dishonest 
or selfish motive was a mitigating factor in this case.  See Gov.Bar R. 
(V)(13)(C)(2).  The board did, however, attribute mitigating effect to Strauss’s 
clean disciplinary record and to his full and free disclosure to the board and 
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, as demonstrated by his 
extensive stipulations and candor at his disciplinary hearing.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(1) and (4).  We adopt these findings and also accept the parties’ 
stipulation that the criminal penalties imposed for Strauss’s misconduct qualify as 
an additional mitigating factor.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(6). 
{¶ 12} In addition to these mitigating factors, the board noted that 
although he maintains an active law license, Strauss left the practice of law in 
2006 to engage in real-estate development full time and he performs limited legal 
work for his friends, family, and business entities. 
{¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that a one-year 
conditionally stayed suspension is the appropriate sanction for Strauss’s 
misconduct.  In support of that sanction, the board considered three cases in 
which we have disciplined attorneys who have been convicted of OVI or related 
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offenses.  In two of those cases, we imposed two-year partially stayed 
suspensions, but those attorneys also had engaged in additional acts of 
misconduct.  In Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lewis, 152 Ohio St.3d 614, 2018-Ohio-
2024, 99 N.E.3d 404, we imposed a two-year suspension with the final six months 
conditionally stayed on an attorney who had been previously disciplined; he had 
left the scene of an auto accident after a night of drinking and was later convicted 
of obstructing official business for submitting a false, written witness statement to 
police.  And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, 157 Ohio St.3d 447, 2019-Ohio-
3748, 137 N.E.3d 1141, we imposed a two-year suspension with 18 months 
conditionally stayed on an attorney who, in addition to being convicted of OVI, 
appeared in court on behalf of himself and at least one client while under the 
influence of alcohol and committed additional client-related ethical offenses. 
{¶ 14} In the third case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Mitchell, 158 Ohio St.3d 
356, 2019-Ohio-5218, 142 N.E.3d 669, the attorney, like Strauss, stipulated that 
he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) and 8.4(h) by driving while intoxicated and 
leaving the scene of an accident.  Both the driver and passenger in the vehicle that 
Mitchell struck sustained minor injuries.  Consequently, Mitchell was convicted 
of a felony count of leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death and 
a misdemeanor count of driving while intoxicated.  Id. at ¶ 6.  In contrast, Strauss 
was the only person injured by his conduct in this case, and he was convicted of 
six misdemeanor offenses. 
{¶ 15} In Mitchell, the only aggravating factor present was Mitchell’s 
dishonest or selfish motive.  In addition to having the same mitigating factors that 
are present in Strauss’s case, Mitchell self-reported his criminal convictions to 
disciplinary authorities, submitted letters attesting to his good character, and 
established his diagnosed alcoholism as a mitigating factor pursuant to Gov.Bar 
R. V(13)(C)(7).  Id. at ¶ 11.  On those facts, we suspended Mitchell from the 
practice of law for one year, stayed in its entirety on the conditions that he 
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successfully complete his criminal probation, continue to actively participate in 
the substance-abuse-recovery and treatment programs recommended by his 
treatment professionals, remain drug- and alcohol-free, and commit no further 
misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 16} In this case, the board expressed some concern that Strauss was 
reluctant to submit to an assessment conducted by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program.  It noted, however, that that concern was diminished by the facts that (1) 
an assessment completed as part of Strauss’s criminal sanction found that he had 
no substance-use disorder and (2) relator never sought an order to compel any 
further assessment.  Ultimately, the board determined that a one-year suspension, 
stayed in its entirety on the conditions that Strauss commit no further misconduct 
and comply with the terms of his inactive probation—which requires him to 
refrain from using nonprescriptive drugs and submit to random drug testing—is 
the appropriate sanction for his misconduct. 
{¶ 17} Having thoroughly reviewed the board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the applicable mitigating factors, and the sanctions we have 
imposed for comparable misconduct, we agree. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, Marc Ian Strauss is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for one year, stayed in its entirety on the conditions that he engage in 
no further misconduct and abide by the terms of the probation imposed by the 
Shaker Heights Municipal Court in case No. 18TRC0004.  If Strauss fails to 
comply with either of these conditions, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the 
full one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Strauss. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., not participating. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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_________________ 
Brenda M. Johnson, and Jordan D. Lebovitz; and Heather M. Zirke, Bar 
Counsel, and Christopher J. Klasa, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Marc Ian Strauss, pro se. 
_________________