Title: Nation v. Nation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nation v. Nation1986 WY 60715 P.2d 198Case Number: 85-173Decided: 03/05/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
SUSAN NATION, N/K/A SUSAN 
CHABAK, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
DAVID NATION, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert T. Moxley, 
Wheatland.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Richard H. Peek, 
Casper.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     By this appeal we 
review Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., as relating to the date of filing responsive 
affidavits to resist a motion for summary judgment in a child custody and 
visitation controversy arising subsequent to entry of the original divorce 
decree. The trial court held that affidavits not filed on the day prior to hearing would 
not be considered by the court even though earlier served. Additionally involved is newly 
claimed grandparent visitation rights granted by summary judgment upon petition 
in the divorce proceeding without evidentiary hearing. We 
reverse.

 
 

[¶2.]     The parties to this 
litigation, David Nation and Susan Nation Chabak, were divorced upon default 
status in 1979, by waiver of service by David Nation, and then, in contemporary 
terms, after divorced, the parties really started to fight, the father's 
visitation with the two children, boys aged ten and one half and twelve, being a 
primary issue.

 
 

[¶3.]     The course of the 
litigation has proceeded through a petition to terminate parental rights as a 
separate action, filed by Susan Chabak on December 4, 1981, resulting in denial 
by the trial court and affirmance by this court in March, 1983, Matter of Parental Rights of SCN and 
NAN, Wyo., 659 P.2d 568, motion for order to show cause by David Nation, 
filed March 28, 1983, and now this third post-divorce 
proceeding.

 
 

[¶4.]     This new activity was 
initiated by petition filed in the divorce docket on March 21, 1985. Petitioners 
named in that pleading are David Nation, the father, and Marilyn Nation and 
Doyle Nation, as paternal grandparents, who, by the verified petition, seek to 
establish grandparent visitation rights. No motion by the grandparents to 
intervene in the divorce case was made or considered by the court. An answer was 
filed on April 15 and included a cross petition, to which a response was 
seasonably filed on April 19, 1985.1

 
 

[¶5.]     In accord with the 
apparent practice in NatronaCounty, petitioners submitted a request 
for setting for a motion for summary judgment to the district court, dated April 
16, 1985, and filed April 18, 1985, with a notice of setting then entered on April 
18, 1985 to schedule the case for that hearing on May 30, 1985, or 42 days 
later.

 
 

[¶6.]     To complete the 
pleading scenario, Susan Chabak served interrogatories April 29. If ever 
answered, the answers are not presently part of the 
record.

 
 

[¶7.]     The motion for summary judgment was then 
filed by petitioners on May 16, or 28 days after the entry of the setting order. 
Affidavits in detail were attached as signed and dated April 22 and 23, or about 
23 days before the motion and affidavits were actually 
filed.

 
 
 
 

[¶8.]     Since the 16th of May 
was on a Thursday, it would reasonably be expected that counsel for Susan Chabak 
would receive the motion and affidavits on Monday, May 20, or exactly ten days 
before the earlier scheduled hearing date. This was apparently what happened. 
Susan Chabak, by her attorney, filed on May 24 a traverse dated May 23, which, 
with affidavits then unsigned, were mailed to petitioners' counsel, and included 
affidavits of the children relating to the visitation questions. Receipt of the 
unsigned affidavits by counsel is not in dispute. Additionally, Susan Chabak 
certified under oath by separate affidavit that she had mailed executed copies 
of the affidavits of herself, her two children and the notary public, Lester 
Hadrick, to counsel for petitioner on May 24, 1985. A traverse to the statement 
of serving is not included in the record, and the subject is not directly 
addressed by brief of appellee.2

 
 

[¶9.]     Counsel for Susan 
Chabak, officing in Wheatland (located about 100 miles from Casper, where the hearing 
was held), in concern about mail service, carried the original affidavits to 
court with him for the scheduled hearing for personal presentation to the trial 
judge at the hearing.

 
 

[¶10.]  The court refused, as then offered, to 
consider the affidavits on the basis that they had not been filed on the prior 
day, denied a motion for a continuance to file affidavits, and proceeded to 
determine the case on the resulting uncontroverted affidavits of petitioners. 
The tendered responsive affidavits were file-stamped by the clerk's office on 
the next day, since the court had the file for hearing purposes on May 30.3 

 
 

[¶11.]  The custody-visitation4 order then was entered to generally 
change the prior amended order by granting 30 days summer visitation to the 
grandparents in Oklahoma, in addition to the 
four weeks July visitation also in Oklahoma, earlier provided to the father by 
the first amendment to the decree. The trial court denied the cross-petition 
relief requested by the mother, and also the original prayer in behalf of the 
father which might have been construed to be a request for additional 
visitation, since it asked for a joint, all-summer visitation for the father and 
grandparents.

 
 

[¶12.]  A casual examination of all affidavits 
reveals antipathy, hostility and anger, as well as concern for the welfare of 
the children sufficient to clearly raise issues of fact. If the responsive 
affidavits are considered, there is no question but that summary judgment should 
not have been granted. See the excellent review and analysis of summary judgment 
by Justice Brown in Colorado National 
Bank v. Miles, Wyo., 711 P.2d 390 (1985). Garner v. Hickman, Wyo., 
709 P.2d 407 (1985). See also an extended and detailed analysis, 
Schwarzer, Summary Judgment under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine 
Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465.

 
 
Issues 
Involved

 
 

[¶13.]  The issues raised in the brief by Susan 
Chabak include the service versus filing of responsive affidavits under Rule 
56(c), W.R.C.P., and a substantive issue as to the propriety of the entry of 
summary judgment in this case. David Nation views the case in the context that 
the affidavits were not properly filed in order to be considered by the court 
and in absence thereof no factual issue existed militating against entry of the 
summary judgment to award grandparent visitation in Oklahoma of one month 
each summer.

 
 

[¶14.]  We view those issues raised at this stage 
to be definable as the following:

 
 
(1) Propriety of the 
trial court's rejection of affidavits that had been served but not filed on the 
day prior to the hearing under the purview of Rule 56(c).

 
 
(2) Propriety of the 
entry of the order by summary judgment for grandparental visitation in the 
context of the record and evidence, and the sufficiency of the order itself as 
compliance with the grandparent visitation statute, § 20-2-113, W.S. 1977, 1985 
Cum.Supp.

 
 
(3) Jurisdictional status 
of the present proceeding in utilization of the divorce action file to issue the 
grandparent visitation order.

 
 

[¶15.]  The initial issue requires this court to 
determine whether the affidavits prepared in support of the position of the 
mother should have been considered to be properly before the trial court and, if 
considered, then sufficient to raise issues of fact requiring trial disposition 
rather than the default-status summary judgment.

 
 

[¶16.]  Before addressing that dispositive issue, 
another disturbing question is to be seen in the record before us. The 
litigative justification for a pre-assigned hearing date and then filing the 
motion for summary judgment on the very last pre-ten-day notice time is not 
discernable. It has been said many times that procedure under the present rules 
should not be trial by ambush. Whitaker 
v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1940). Suffice it to suggest that if in 
reality the ten-day notice time is unfairly used, then the discretional capacity 
of the trial court either under Rule 56 or the general law of continuances, is 
severely confined. If this practice is to be followed in general, then this 
court may be faced with rule amendment as preferable to individual case review 
by appeal. We invite attention to Art. 5, § 2 of the Wyoming Constitution and 
§ 5-2-118, W.S. 1977.5

 
 

[¶17.]  In any event, this court would observe 
that, whenever this type of practice is utilized, the trial court should 
liberally vacate the setting upon motion of the opposing party to permit that 
party to meet the facts presented in the affidavits, and especially so in a 
major case or where both counsel and his client are out of town or out of state 
resulting in difficulty in communicating, preparing and serving 
responses.

 
 
I

 
 
Filing Versus Service of 
Responsive Affidavits Under Rule 56(c)

 
 

[¶18.]  Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. (identical to the 
federal rule), provides:

 
 
"The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. * * 
*"

 
 

[¶19.]  The traverse by the mother to the motion 
for summary judgment stated:

 
 
"1. THAT as more fully 
set forth in the affidavits filed by the Plaintiff Susan Chabak in opposition to 
the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, there exist material issues of fact 
as to all matters affecting the propriety of the Court granting the relief 
requested in the Defendant's Motion for Grandparent's Visitation 
Rights.

 
 
"2. THAT the Summary 
Judgment procedure is not intended to be a substitute for trial, and inter alia, 
the Defendant's motion would require that the Court find, after an adversary 
proceeding, that visitation, as requested in the said motion, is in the best 
interests of the parties' minor children.

 
 
"3. THAT the Defendant's 
deadline for responding to discovery motions made by the Plaintiff is within two 
or three days of the schedule motion hearing on the Defendant's Summary Judgment 
Motion, and counsel would not be satisfied that this discovery would be complete 
as of the 30th day of May, 1985."

 
 

[¶20.]  The trial-process problem had been 
appropriately raised by the mother, and now matures to the question before this 
court as to the relationship between the word "served" as used in the rule and 
the "filed" requirement determined by the trial court. This is a subject not 
resolved by the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming.6 

 
 

[¶21.]  The subject of filing versus service is, 
however, covered in a number of jurisdictions by specific local rules defining 
required filing times for affidavits used with Rule 12 and Rule 56, W.R.C.P., 
motions, and in some courts for other areas of pleading wherein the formal rule 
requirement relates directly to service and not filing times. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 
supra, ¶ 56.14(1), p. 56-359.

 
 

[¶22.]  Rule 5(d) and (e), W.R.C.P., as identical 
with the federal rule, states:

 
 
"(d) Filing. - All papers after the complaint 
required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before 
service or within a reasonable time thereafter [emphasis 
added].

 
 
"(e) Filing with the court defined. - The 
filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules 
shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge 
may permit the papers to be filed with him, in which event he shall note thereon 
the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the 
clerk."

 
 

[¶23.]  We hold that, in the absence of local 
written rules providing otherwise, when the affidavits have been served in 
compliance with the general rule requirement, concurrent presentation to the 
court at the commencement of the scheduled hearing on a motion for summary 
judgment under the purview of Rule 56 is sufficient so that the text of the 
affidavits will be considered by the trial court in order to determine whether 
there are specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 10 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 
2738.

 
 

[¶24.]  No prior Wyoming case distinguished the filing from 
required service. The cited cases are not determinative of the issue we now 
address, Harden v. Gregory Motors, 
Wyo., 697 P.2d 283 (1985); Larsen v. 
Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 (1984); DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon 
County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 (1979), since no evidence of earlier service was 
involved. The differentiation is not specifically discussed in the treatise by 
any rule stated. Adickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). See 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 
2719.

 
 

[¶25.]  Although not a summary judgment case, Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 
431 (6th Cir. 1963) discussed Rule 5(d), and stated:

 
 
"In the 1937 preliminary 
draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proposed Rule 5(b) in part 
provided:

 
 
"`When a time is 
prescribed for the service of a pleading or other paper, it shall be filed with 
the court as well as served within that time.'

 
 
"This proposed rule was 
rejected. 2 Moore's Federal Practice Par. 5.10, p. 
1352."

 
 
In support of the 
position which we take, see Claybrook 
Drilling Co. v. Divanco, Inc., 336 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1964); Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Company, 302 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962); 2 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 5.10, p. 5-38. The 
oft-cited case of Beaufort Concrete Co. 
v. Atlantic States Construction Co., 352 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1965), and see 
dissent on denial of certiorari, 384 U.S. 1004, 86 S. Ct. 1908, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (1966), relates to service and not filing:

 
 
"* * * had not been 
served `prior to the day of hearing.'" 384 U.S.  at 1004, 86 S. Ct.  at 1908, Black, dissenting.

 

 
 
II

 
 
Propriety of Entry Of the 
Summary Judgment Order

 
 

[¶26.]  As a second issue of this appeal, we 
consider the propriety of the entry of the order by summary judgment for the 
grandparent visitation period of one month each summer in Oklahoma in the 
context of the record in evidence and the further sufficiency of the order 
itself in compliance with the grandparent visitation statute, § 20-2-113(c), 
W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.,7 which 
provides:

 
 
"(c) Subsequent to the 
death or remarriage of one (1) or both parents or after a divorce or judicial 
separation, the court may, upon petition of a grandparent, grant reasonable 
visitation rights to the grandparent of the children, if the court finds, after 
a hearing, that the visitation would be in the best interest of the 
child."

 
 

[¶27.]  Considering the disposition of this 
appeal, it is unlikely that the same legal concerns will reoccur as are implicit 
in the question raised. May it suffice to say that the requirement of the 
statute "if the court finds, after a hearing, that the visitation would be in 
the best interest of the child," is mandatory, and requires both a hearing and a 
written finding of best interest. The record in this case, as created upon 
summary judgment disposition, lacks assurance of either the facts or the 
finding.8

 
 
III

 
 
Case Status and 
Jurisdiction Process

 
 

[¶28.]  The third issue of this appeal, untested 
in this jurisdiction, is the pleading process whereby the grandparents seek to 
effectuate claimed visitation rights under the newly enacted statute, as now 
first litigated at a time after entry of the original divorce decree. The 
terminology of the statute may call into question whether the grandparents have 
any right to become involved until after the initial divorce has been concluded. 
"Subsequent to the death or remarriage * * * or after a divorce or judicial 
separation, the court may * * *." Section 20-2-113(c). Since the issue is not 
before us in this case, we decline to consider the question at this time, Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of 
Riverton, 70 Wyo. 84, 247 P.2d 660 (1952), except to note that the Wyoming 
statute lacks the detail or specificity afforded in many other 
jurisdictions.

 
 

[¶29.]  In this case, the paternal grandparents, 
as uncaptioned intervenors, enunciated the "visitation" claim under the statute 
by "petition" filed concurrently with the father in the divorce docket long 
after the original divorce decree entry, to effect a result of amending the 
prior custody orders and divorce decree.

 
 

[¶30.]  The other 47 grandparent-visitation 
statutes are of various kinds and character. Some specifically provide for 
rights of intervention pre-divorce, some specifically prohibit intervention 
pre-divorce, and other statutes and some cases specifically provide that an 
independent lawsuit is required.9

 
 

[¶31.]  Four questions are raised which are novel 
in this jurisdiction and not answered by statute:

 
 
(1) May an independent 
action be used or is it required?

 
 
(2) Is intervention in a 
divorce proceeding permitted?

 
 
(3) Is compliance with 
Rule 24, W.R.C.P., required for intervention?

 
 
(4) Is intervention 
permissive or "of right"?

 
 

[¶32.]  Complexities abound, including the simple 
question for trial resolution as to whether the grandparents' petition is simply 
a subterfuge to increase the period of partial custody or visitation for the 
noncustodial parent. Shriver v. 
Shriver, 7 Ohio App.2d 169, 219 N.E.2d 300 (1966); Matter of Adoption by M, 140 N.J. Super. 
91, 355 A.2d 211 (1976).10 

 
 

[¶33.]  Doubling the Oklahoma visitation-custody, 
as in this case, could seem to test the limitations of judicial discretion and 
would only give fire to the litigative nightmare to which the families and these 
two boys have been subjected since the original decree was entered in 1979. 
Compare the factual situation with that in Kudler v. Smith, Colo. App., 643 P.2d 783 (1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 837, 103 S. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982).

 
 

[¶34.]  Of paramount consideration is the present 
and future welfare of the children. Their welfare must be provided for with as 
little uncertainty as possible. All other considerations, including the wishes, 
rights and happiness of parents are subordinate thereto. Nelson v. Murray, 58 Del. (8 Storey) 516, 211 A.2d 842 (1965). See extensive case citations in Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 222, 232, 
including appendix, with cases from 20 states.11

 
 

[¶35.]  Cases on grandparent visitation are 
numerous and increasing. The Annotation at 90 A.L.R.3d 222, supra, encompasses 
63 pages, with cases from 23 states, as numbering with the current supplement in 
excess of 100. At least a half dozen current law journal notes or comments can 
likewise be found on this subject. Various sociological developments in our 
current society can immediately be recognized.12

 
 

[¶36.]  Case law and statutory precedent relating 
to all four procedural concerns can be found. Often the decision turns on the 
particular statute or a specific rule of procedure in that jurisdiction. No 
statute with the same phraseology as Wyoming's can be found in another state which 
would encompass precedential authority for determination of the decision to be 
made by this court.

Clearly, if we are to 
determine that the grandparents can advance their litigative interest in 
visitation through participation in the divorce case, then in some fashion an 
intervention process, either actual or pro forma, is required. SeeSchool District No. 9 v. District Boundary Board, 
Wyo., 351 P.2d 106 (1960). Lacking even a motion to intervene under Rule 24, we hold that the 
court lacked jurisdiction in this case to enter the order granting a 
specifically claimed statutory right of visitation in behalf of nonparties to 
the divorce proceeding.13 Since jurisdiction was involved, 
it is further determined that the failure of the issue to be raised in either 
the trial court or by present brief is not waived under the purview of Rule 
12(h)(3), W.R.C.P.:

 
 
"Whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."

 
 

Pease Brothers, Inc. v. 
American Pipe & Supply Co., Wyo., 522 P.2d 996 (1974); Steffens v. Smith, Wyo., 477 P.2d 119 
(1970).

 
 

[¶37.]  Determining the intent of the 
legislature, analyzing the orderly process of the adjudicatory system in 
compliance with the rules of procedure, and the concurrent recognition of the 
need for expeditious resolution of the issues raised by the best interest of the 
child, do not easily afford an answer to the four questions 
raised.

 
 

[¶38.]  As required for the further resolution of 
the litigative interests between the paternal grandparents and the mother, we 
would then address the four jurisdictional procedural questions earlier 
listed.14 See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of 
Riverton, supra.

 
 
1. May an independent 
action be used or is it required?

 
 

[¶39.]  Clearly by the scope of the cases and the 
regularity of the process, an independent action may be used for the purpose of 
grandparent visitation litigation. We emphasize visitation since if the scope 
approaches a change of custody order, then provisions of § 20-2-113(c) may not 
apply at all since the subsection relates only to "reasonable visitation." See 
Commissioner ex rel. Shee v. Holewsky, 
316 Pa. 
Super. 509, 463 A.2d 480 (1983). "`The right * * to go to see the child wherever 
he might be,' which does not include the right to take possession of the child." 
Id., 463 A.2d  at 483 n. 2, quoting from Com. ex rel. Rosequist v. Rosequist, 216 
Pa. Super. 
388, 268 A.2d 140, 143 (1970).

 
 

[¶40.]  Cases supporting utilization of the 
independent action are extensive, and would include: Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 11 S.E.2d 782 (1940); Visitation of J.O., 
Ind. App., 441 N.E.2d 991 (1982); 
Schumacher v. Schumacher, Mo. App., 223 S.W.2d 841 (1949); Hupp v. Hupp, 238 Mo. App. 964, 194 S.W.2d 215 (1946); Logan v. Smith, 
Okla., 602 P.2d 647 (1979); Zachary v. 
Zachary, 155 Or. 346, 63 P.2d 1080 (1937);15 Prock v. Morgan, 
supra.

 
 

[¶41.]  Habeas corpus is a process frequently 
used and specifically approved for some states. See Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 170 
Pa. Super. 
254, 85 A.2d 686 (1952); Application of 
Grover, supra; and numerous citations as an approved approach in New York 
State, e.g., State ex rel. Herman v. 
Lebovits, 66 Misc.2d 830, 322 N.Y.Supp.2d 123 (1971). We do not find that 
complex process of habeas corpus is necessary for this state. However, that 
litigation teaches that the indispensable parties are the custodial parent and 
the involved children who will become the subject matter of the court order. 

 
 

[¶42.]  Obviously, cases exist where intervention 
is not the answer since there may not be an active divorce proceeding, e.g., 
single-parent and death cases.

 
 
2. Is intervention 
post-decree permitted in the divorce proceeding?

 
 

[¶43.]  This question is not susceptible to a 
dogmatic answer, and the authorities are not particularly helpful because of 
differing processes, rules and state statutes. In the absence of other 
legislation in Wyoming, we would find that normally the independent action could 
be utilized, but that cases may occur where the court, in its discretion, would 
permit intervention since the order may affect existing custody orders, or the proceedings might 
also involve issues to be properly litigated between the parents in regard to 
ancillary or separate questions, including custody or support 
payment.

 
 

[¶44.]  Other examples of cases where 
intervention has proved to be effective include cases where the father or 
noncustodial parent is not able to actually exercise his separate visitation and 
it is intended that the grandparent would pursue that right in a representative 
capacity as, for example, absence in military service, or penitentiary 
confinement. Solomon v. Solomon, 319 
Ill. App.? 
618, 49 N.E.2d 807 (1943).

 
 

[¶45.]  The decision we adopt is an alternative 
between the nonintervention status of Oklahoma 
and the law permitting intervention now in effect in California by rule, and Oregon by present statute.16

 
 
3. Is compliance with 
Rule 24 required for intervention?

 
 

[¶46.]  The answer is yes.

 
 

[¶47.]  The orderly process for handling 
intervention is created by the rules of procedure, and no justification for 
omission in this type of case is demonstrated.

 
 

[¶48.]  Rule 1, W.R.C.P., 
reads:

 
 
"These rules govern 
procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all actions, suits 
or proceedings of a civil nature, in all special statutory proceedings except as 
provided in Rule 81 * * *. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action."

 
 

[¶49.]  School District No. 9 v. District 
Boundary Board, supra.

 
 
4. Is the intervention 
permissive or of right?

 
 

[¶50.]  This court will also hold that 
intervention is permissive only, as determined within the discretion of the 
court when meeting the criteria for permissive intervention under Rule 24(c). By 
this result, it is determined that the independent action is normally available, 
although limited in its scope to the proper subject matter of the visitation 
statute,17 and that intervention in the 
divorce docket is available upon a discretionary decision of the trial 
court.

 
 

[¶51.]  If the proceeding utilized is by 
intervention in the existing divorce proceeding, then actual and not pro-forma 
representation of the children under the statute relating to decrees involving 
someone under the age of majority is also required. This is not intended to say 
that in every case a guardian ad litem would be required, but certainly the 
direct interest of the children, without the conflict of parental emotion, 
should be secured by primary representation. Matter of Parental Right to Child X, 
Wyo., 617 P.2d 1078 (1980).

 
 

[¶52.]  In this case we find, in the absence of 
either a motion to intervene in the divorce case, Susan B. Nation, Plaintiff, v. 
David E. Nation, Defendant, Civil No. 46893, or the filing of an independent 
action whereby the minors are parties or are properly represented, that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order from which the appeal was 
taken.

 
 

[¶53.]  To summarize, we 
hold:

 
 

[¶54.]  (1) In the absence of a local district 
court rule, with proper service, filing of responsive affidavits in a 
summary-judgment proceeding is not required at any time prior to the 
commencement of the motion hearing.

 
 

[¶55.]  (2) The provisions of § 20-2-113(c), W.S. 
1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., require a hearing and written findings that visitation 
would be in the best interest of the child.

 
 

[¶56.]  (3) Visitation claims under § 
20-2-113(c), W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., may be litigated by independent 
proceedings; or, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(b), W.R.C.P., in the 
exercise of discretion of the court, when the requisite facts under the rule 
exist.

 
 

[¶57.]  The decision of the trial court is 
reversed, and the case remanded to vacate entry of the order dated June 7, 1985 
and entered June 10, 1985, and for such further proceedings as are not 
inconsistent with this decision.

 
 

[¶58.]  Reversed.

1 By their pleading 
designated as a petition, the grandparents asked:

 
 
(a) summer visitation in 
conjunction with the father for the entire summer when the boys were out of 
school, to be exercised in Oklahoma;

 
 
(b) one week alternate 
Christmas visitation in Oklahoma in addition to the one week afforded 
the father;

 
 
(c) mother be required to 
furnish street address and phone number and allow contact on a regular basis with 
the grandchildren.

 
 
The father separately 
asked that child support be abated during the summer.

By cross petition the 
mother asked for modification, by suspension, of the father's existing 
visitation order, on the basis of the father's character and 
care.

 
 
In the order as entered, 
the court denied the father's motion for an order to show cause (which motion 
does not appear of record); denied the father's petition to increase his 
visitation, which was not separately claimed; denied the cross petition of the 
mother; and stated:

 
 
"* * * That the Court 
does not find a material question of fact, and that the Court should enter 
judgment as a matter of law,"

 
 
and then ordered one 
month visitation right each summer for the grandparents, in addition to the 
four-week visitation provided for the father "in the locality of the 
grandparents' residence," which was Oklahoma.

2 It is not suggested that 
mailing of the unsigned affidavit alone provides the service requirement of Rule 
56. It is only evidence of attempted diligence. However, service by a client as 
occurred in this case may not be preferable but is not excluded by Rule 5, 
W.R.C.P., and particularly under exigent circumstances.

3 Although perhaps not 
determinative in the normal case, it would be favored trial procedure in a case 
where pleading documents would be handed to the court at a hearing, for clarity 
and record purposes, to have the clerk's office file-stamp in advance of 
presentation.

4 There comes a time when 
a "visitation" order produces a partial custody result. Two months of each 
summer is hardly just visitation. Shriver 
v. Shriver, 7 Ohio App.2d 169, 219 N.E.2d 300 (1966); Application of Grover, 
Okla., 681 P.2d 81 (1984); Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 
170 Pa. 
Super. 254, 35 A.2d 686 (1952). See comments and footnotes 90 A.L.R.3d 222, 
231.

5 The litigant's 
responsive alternative of the unavailability affidavit of Rule 56(f), W.R.C.P., 
is probably mandatory upon a court, if adequately submitted in form and 
substance. See discussion, 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 2740, p. 722. See also discussion as to timing evidencing a 
split of authority, 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil § 2719, p. 453:

 
 
"* * * [T]here is some 
question whether an affidavit by the nonmoving party under Rule 56(f) stating 
why he is unable to present affidavits justifying his opposition to the summary 
judgment motion also must be served prior to the day of the 
hearing."

 
 
See also 6 Moore's 
Federal Practice ¶ 56.14, p. 56-359; Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 1961-1963 (II), 77 Harvard L.Rev. 801, 827 
(1964).

 
 
"* * * Summary judgment 
procedure is not a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into its 
toils and deprive them of a trial, it is a liberal measure, liberally designed 
for arriving at the truth. Its purpose is not to cut litigants off from their 
right of trial by jury if they really have evidence which they will offer on a 
trial, it is to carefully test this out, in advance of trial by inquiring and 
determining whether such evidence exists. Rule 56 is carefully drawn to 
effectuate this purpose. Subdivisions (a) and (b) provide for the institution of 
the procedure. Subdivisions (c) and (d) provide, the one for complete, the other 
for partial determination of the existence of genuine issues as to material 
facts. Subdivision (e) provides for affidavit and other forms of proof while 
Subdivision (f), making it further clear that the judgment is to be rendered 
only where it clearly appears that there is no issue, provides for the granting 
of a continuance to obtain proofs which appear to be existent but not then 
available." Whitaker v. Coleman, 
supra, 115 F.2d  at 307.

6 Rule 301, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming reads:

 
 
"Each motion filed, 
except motions for summary judgment, shall set out the specific point or points 
upon which the motion is brought, and may be accompanied by a concise brief. No 
answer brief is required. There will be no specific motion day. When required, 
hearing of motions will be set on request of counsel or by motion assignment 
issued by the court. Motions may be submitted on brief if desired. All motions 
not called up or set for hearing within 60 days after filing will automatically 
be denied, with 10 days then allowed for pleading."

 
 
Rule 302, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming reads:

 
 
"Discovery documents 
shall not be filed except:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(b) At the time of 
filing a motion for summary judgment the movant shall designate and file 
relevant portions of the discovery documents relied upon. The opponents of a 
summary judgment motion shall designate and file relevant discovery documents 
within the time allowed by Rule 56, W.R.C.P."

7 The order provided by 
finding and decision:

 
 
"IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED 
that the petition filed by the paternal grandparents should be, and it hereby 
is, granted, and the grandparents are hereby awarded visitation with the 
parties' minor children for a period of 30 days, which is in addition to the 
visitation of the Defendant, and may be exercised in the locality of the 
grandparents' residence. The grandparents 
shall provide written notification to the Plaintiff by May 1st of each year of 
the date when said visitation shall commence and when it shall terminate, 
except for this year, and they shall notify the Plaintiff within two weeks 
of the date of this Order. Provided, however, that the visitation rights of the 
grandparents and the father shall not interfere with the regular schooling of 
the minor children." (Emphasis added.)

8 The children involved 
are two boys, ten and one half and twelve years of age. The unanswered question 
is whether their best interest will be adequately considered unless a guardian 
ad litem is appointed for their separate representation. Probably before summary 
judgment disposition could ever be utilized, guardian-ad-litem assistance would 
be required by Rule 17(c), Rule 55(b)(2) and Rule 56, W.R.C.P. The entire 
subject of guardian-ad-litem representation of the children in these 
custody-visitation situations well may be an appropriate subject for legislative 
review. See Rule 17(c), § 3-1-108, W.S. 1977, and § 14-3-211, W.S. 1977. In the 
Matter of Parental Rights to Child X, 
Wyo., 617 P.2d 1078 (1980). See Petrey v. Petrey, 
127 Mich. 
App. 577, 339 N.W.2d 226 (1983); Prock v. 
Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 291 S.W.2d 489 (1956). Under the order as entered, the 
grandparents would set the children's summer schedule without any mutuality of 
consideration or determination of convenience or appropriate time arrangement. 
All that the record contained was that the grandparents "have the desire and the 
facilities to care." That does not mean much for "best interest" as 
facts.

9 Compare the Wyoming statute as earlier quoted with § 15-5-24.2, 
General Laws of Rhode 
Island 1956, 1983 Cum.Supp.:

 
 
"In any divorce 
proceeding commenced before or after the effective date of this section, should 
the noncustodial parent fail to exercise his or her visitation rights with his 
or her minor children for any reason, or should the noncustodial parent have 
been denied said visitation rights, then the Family Court may, upon petition of 
a grandparent whose child is the noncustodial parent, grant reasonable 
visitation rights of said grandchild or grandchildren to said grandparent. The 
Court may issue all necessary orders to enforce such visitation 
rights,"

 
 
and § 25-4-52 through § 
25-4-54, South 
Dakota Codified Laws 1984 
Revision:

 
 
"The circuit court may 
grant grandparents reasonable rights of visitation with their grandchild, with 
or without petition by the grandparents, if it is in the best interests of the 
grandchild." Section 25-4-52.

"The grandparent of a 
child may petition the circuit court for grandchild visitation rights 
if:

"(1) The parents of the 
child are divorced or legally separated; or

 
 
"(2) An action for 
divorce or separate maintenance has been commenced by one of the parents of the 
child; or

 
 
"(3) The parent of the 
child, who is the child of the grandparent, has died.

 
 
"The circuit court may 
grant a petition for grandchild visitation rights only upon a finding that the 
visitation right to be granted is in the best interests of the child." Section 
25-4-53.

 
 
"The provisions of §§ 
25-4-52 to 25-4-54, inclusive, do not apply if the child has been placed for 
adoption with a person other than the child's stepparent or grandparent. Any 
grandparent visitation rights granted pursuant to §§ 25-4-52 to 25-4-54, 
inclusive, prior to placement for adoption of the child with persons other than 
the child's stepparent or grandparent shall terminate upon the placement of the 
child for adoption." Section 25-4-54.

 
 

Colorado has one of the more 
complex and interesting statutes, § 19-1-116, C.R.S., 1985 Cum.Supp. See Kudler v. Smith, Colo. App., 643 P.2d 783 (1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 837, 103 S. Ct. 83, 74 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982); and 
In re Seright, Colo. 
App., 649 P.2d 730 (1982).

 
 
State statutes are 
summarized in the Family Law Reporter, Bureau of National Affairs, State Divorce 
Laws, and the included chart would indicate that grandparent visitation statutes 
exist in all states except the District of 
Columbia and Nebraska, with an 
obvious error in the omission of Wyoming. The law in Maine has since been 
repealed. See discussion of individual state statutes in an excellent review in 
Note, Grandparents' Statutory Right to 
Petition for Visitation: Vermont and the National Framework, 10 Vermont L.Rev. 55 (1985). 
For a comprehensive analysis of each state law, see also Note, The Constitutional Constraints on 
Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 Colum. L.Rev. 118 
(1986).

10 The petition filed and 
the order entered in this case under the reasoned criteria of relevant cases may 
invoke partial custody and may not actually be visitation-rights in scope. Application of Grover, supra n. 4. See 
Tobler v. Tobler, 78 Idaho 218, 299 P.2d 490 (1956); Johnson v. Johnson, 
214 La. 912, 39 So. 2d 340 (1949); 
Ogden v. Ogden, La. App., 220 So. 2d 241 (1969); Poole v. Poole, La., 270 So. 2d 215 
(1972), writ denied 273 So. 2d 295 
(1973); Urban v. Urban, 149 Neb. 757, 
32 N.W.2d 410 (1948); Leithold v. 
Plass, Tex., 413 S.W.2d 698 (1967). Cf. McDonald v. McDonald, La. App., 
357 So. 2d 1293 (1978) and Doherty v. 
Mertens, La. 
App., 326 So. 2d 405 (1976). Attention is also directed to the consideration by 
the Wyoming Supreme Court in Leitner v. Lonabaugh, Wyo., 402 P.2d 713 
(1965); Butcher v. Butcher, Wyo., 363 P.2d 923 (1961). It could be argued that this proceeding was a custody action 
and consequently correctly pursued in a divorce case, see Leitner v. Lonabaugh, supra, and as such 
it did not invoke the visitation rights afforded by the grandparent-visitation 
statute. We will confine our consideration to the grandparent-visitation 
statute, and not pursue custody questions which have been raised by the scope 
and extent of the petition as filed. The grandparents' claim by petition 
specifically relied on § 20-2-113(c).

11 The best-interest 
criteria in grandparent visitation cases has a different substance as compared 
with parental rights which are deemed to include a constitutional essence. Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 512 (1982); Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446 (1923); In re 
Marriage of Ebbighausen, 42 Wn. App. 99, 708 P.2d 1220 
(1985).

 
 
Lacking the 
constitutional overlay, grandparent visitation decisions can actually personify 
the judicial search for the best interest and welfare of the child. 
Gratification of wishes, and rights and happiness of relatives are subordinate. 
Weichman v. Weichman, 50 Wis.2d 731, 
184 N.W.2d 882 (1971); Nelson v. 
Murray, supra; Application of 
Grover, supra n. 4. Current research suggests that stability may be primary. 
See thoughtful discussion in In Interest 
of Tremayne Quame Idress R., 286 Pa. Super. 480, 429 A.2d 40 (1981). See also 
86 Colum.L.Rev. 118, 128, supra n. 9.

12 Excellent examples of 
current journal articles include: Note, Grandparents' Statutory Right to Petition 
for Visitation: Vermont and the National Framework, 10 Vermont L.Rev. 55, supra 
n. 9; Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation 
Rights: Social Policies and Legal Right, 87 W.Va.L.Rev. 295 (1984-85); 
Foster and Freed, Grandparent Visitation: 
Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 St. Louis Univ. 
L.J. 643 (1979); Note, Grandparent 
Visitation Rights in Georgia, 29 Emory L.J. 1083 
(1980).

13 We do not determine if a 
differing result on jurisdiction would have been appropriate if the court had 
elected by subsequent order to consider the original petition of March 21, 1985, 
to have constituted a motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24, so that some 
court order made the grandparents parties in a lawsuit where they otherwise were 
not involved. International Marine 
Towing, Inc. v. Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd., 722 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 94, 83 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1984); Farina v. 
Mission Investment Trust, 615 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1980); Spring Construction Co., Inc. v. Harris, 
614 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1980); Securities 
and Exchange Commission v. Investors Security Leasing Corp., 610 F.2d 175 
(3d Cir. 1979); State of Illinois v. 
Scarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 889, 98 S. Ct. 262, 
54 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1977); Hourston v. 
Harvlan, Inc., 457 F.2d 1105 (3rd Cir. 1972); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America v. Keystone Freight Lines, 123 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1941); Walker v. 
Reynolds Metals Co., 87 F. Supp. 283 (D.Or. 1949); In re Elliott, Cal., 144 Cal. 501, 77 P. 1109 (1904); Mansfield Lumber Company v. 
Johnson, Mo. App., 91 S.W.2d 239 (1935); Dietrich v. Steam Dredge, 14 Mont. 261, 
36 P. 81 (1894); 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 
1914, p. 563; 3B Moore's Federal Practice, Rule 24(c), p. 24-143; 59 Am.Jur.2d 
Parties § 172, p. 604. Cf. Macy v. 
Macy, Wyo., 
714 P.2d 774 (1986).

14 We would recognize that 
attention of the Permanent Rules Advisory Committee is well justified. However, 
in the absence of rule adoption or new statutory provision, our declaration is 
required for this case and others that will follow.

15 Oregon has since changed 
its process by statutory enactment, and even permits pre-decree "intervention", 
§ 109.121, O.R.S.

16 We specifically do not 
address the right to intervene in either adoption or termination cases by this 
opinion.

17 Custody and visitation 
proceedings may occasion differentiations in the application of the "change of 
circumstance" rule.

 
 

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶59.]  The majority state that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the grandparents' petition, because they did not 
move to intervene or file an independent action. I do not 
agree.

 
 

[¶60.]  It is well established that the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not abridge, enlarge or modify the jurisdiction of 
the court but merely govern procedure. Rule 82, W.R.C.P.; State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court of 
Fifth Judicial District in and for County of Big Horn, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 
12 A.L.R.3d 1 (1965).

 
 

[¶61.]  In the present case the grandparents did 
precisely what the statute required them to do for the trial court to have 
jurisdiction. The procedural niceties may not have been strictly adhered to, but 
the court certainly had the discretion to hear the grandparents in the manner in 
which it did in the absence of an objection to do so. Exception must be taken to 
error relating to the pleadings if such error is to be preserved for 
consideration on appeal. 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error § 325 (1957); Snavely v. Snavely, Tex.Civ.App., 445 S.W.2d 531 (1969).