Title: Sauer v. Crews

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Sauer v. Crews, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3655.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3655 
SAUER ET AL. v. CREWS ET AL., APPELLEES; CENTURY SURETY COMPANY, 
APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Sauer v. Crews, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3655.] 
Insurance—Commercial general-liability policy—Exclusions from coverage—
Trailers—Policy definition of “mobile equipment” does not include 
trailers—Provision excluding trailers from coverage not ambiguous—In 
determining whether insurance policy provision is ambiguous, court must 
consider context in which provision is used. 
(No. 2013-0283—Submitted February 26, 2014—Decided September 2, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 12AP-320,  
2012-Ohio-6257. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In determining whether an insurance policy provision is ambiguous, a court must 
consider the context in which the provision is used. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are again asked to consider the language of an 
insurance policy.  Specifically, the question is, Should ambiguity be determined 
only after the language at issue is examined in light of the overall context of the 
policy?  We answer in the affirmative, i.e., that in determining whether a policy 
provision is ambiguous, courts must consider the context in which the specific 
language of the provision is used.  Based on this rule, we conclude that the policy 
provision in this case is not ambiguous and does not provide coverage. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} On November 24, 2006, Julia S. Augenstein’s vehicle collided 
with a flatbed trailer owned by appellees, Stinson J. Crews and Stinson Crews 
Trucking (collectively, “Crews”).  During paving work on Columbus Street in 
Grove City, Ohio, Crews had parked without a permit in a no-parking zone and 
blocked most of Augenstine’s lane of travel.  Augenstine, who was 86 years old, 
died as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident. 
{¶ 3} The executors of Augenstine’s estate, Sharon A. Sauer and Karen 
S. Streets, filed a survivorship action and an action alleging wrongful death 
against Crews; Raymond L. Jackson, the driver of a dump truck involved in the 
paving work; and Mariann Jackson, the owner of the dump truck driven by 
Raymond.1  Crews then filed a third-party complaint against appellant, Century 
Surety Company (“Century”), seeking a declaration that Crews is entitled to 
coverage in the wrongful-death action as an insured under a commercial general-
liability (“CGL”) policy issued by Century.  Century counterclaimed, seeking its 
own declaration that the CGL policy excludes coverage in the wrongful-death 
action.  Before trial, the liability and coverage portions of the case were 
bifurcated.  The court held a bench trial on the issue of liability. 
                                                 
1 Raymond L. Jackson and Mariann Jackson are not parties to this appeal.     
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 4} The trial court found that Crews’s negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident and entered a judgment of $251,552.04 in 
compensatory damages against Crews. The judgment entry stated that there was 
no just cause for delay, thus permitting an immediate appeal even though the 
third-party complaint and counterclaim had not been resolved. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, Crews argued that it was not solely liable for the 
accident.  Crews asserted that Augenstein was herself partly liable due to her own 
negligence.  Crews contended that Augenstein failed to maintain an assured clear 
distance ahead in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A), she operated her motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and 
she was driving with significantly reduced vision due to macular degeneration.  
The Tenth District Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court assigning Crews sole liability for the accident.  Sauer 
v. Crews, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-834, 2011-Ohio-3310. 
{¶ 6} On remand, both Crews and Century agreed to submit Crews’s 
declaratory-judgment action to the trial court for a decision on the briefs.  After 
examining the CGL policy that Century issued to Crews, the trial court’s analysis 
focused upon a provision in the policy providing that “mobile equipment” is not 
included within the definition of “auto” and is therefore not excluded from 
coverage.  The trial court wrote that to determine whether the trailer qualified as 
“mobile equipment,” it had to decide whether the paving machinery that Crews 
transported on the trailer was “cargo” as used in the policy.  The trial court found 
the term “cargo,” which is not defined in the policy, to be ambiguous and 
accordingly construed this language against Century, the insurer.  The court 
concluded that the CGL policy provides coverage in this underlying wrongful-
death action. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, Century argued that the trial court had misinterpreted 
the language of the CGL policy.  Century asserted that the trial court had 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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incorrectly determined that the trailer is “mobile equipment” as defined by the 
policy and that even if the trailer were mobile equipment, the claim involving the 
trailer was not covered because of a provision in the CGL policy excluding 
coverage for claims arising out of the transport of mobile equipment.  The Tenth 
District disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the CGL provides 
coverage. 
{¶ 8} Century appealed to this court, and we accepted Century’s two 
propositions of law: 
 
1.  A registered commercial flatbed trailer, used to haul 
construction equipment to and from job sites, is not a vehicle 
maintained for purposes other than transportation of cargo within 
the meaning of a commercial general liability policy, and, 
therefore, claims arising out of the ownership or use of such a 
trailer are excluded from coverage under the terms of such 
policies. 
2.  When considering whether an insurance policy 
provision is ambiguous, a reviewing court must consider the 
context in which the policy provision is used—particularly where 
that context pertains to a highly regulated commercial activity such 
as the use of commercial vehicles upon public roadways. 
 
135 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2013-Ohio-2285, 988 N.E.2d 578. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 9} The outcome of this cases hinges upon whether the CGL policy 
insured the trailer used by Crews.  Century argues in its second proposition of law 
that the lower courts improperly determined that the relevant policy provisions 
were ambiguous.  We accordingly address this second proposition of law, which 
January Term, 2014 
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deals with the proper method of interpreting the language of insurance policies, 
before addressing the first proposition of law, which asks us to apply that method 
to the particular language in the CGL policy before us. 
A.  The Context in Which a Provision Is Used Must Be Considered in Determining 
Whether Ambiguity Exists 
{¶ 10} “An insurance policy is a contract whose interpretation is a matter 
of law.”  Sharonville v. Am. Emp. Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-2180, 
846 N.E.2d 833, ¶ 6.  “[W]ords and phrases used in an insurance policy must be 
given their natural and commonly accepted meaning, where they in fact possess 
such meaning, to the end that a reasonable interpretation of the insurance contract 
consistent with the apparent object and plain intent of the parties may be 
determined.”  Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 167-168, 
436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982), citing Dealers Dairy Prods. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 170 
Ohio St. 336, 164 N.E.2d 745 (1960), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 11} We have stated that “an exclusion in an insurance policy will be 
interpreted as applying only to that which is clearly intended to be excluded.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., 64 Ohio 
St.3d 657, 665, 597 N.E.2d 1096 (1992).  Furthermore, “[i]f provisions are 
susceptible of more than one interpretation, they ‘will be construed strictly against 
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.’ ”  Sharonville at ¶ 6, quoting 
King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380 (1988), 
syllabus. 
{¶ 12} We have previously discussed the effect of ambiguity in an 
insurance contract: 
 
Although ambiguous provisions in an insurance policy 
must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor 
of the insured, see, e.g., King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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208, 519 N.E.2d 1380, syllabus, it is equally well settled that a 
court cannot create ambiguity in a contract where there is none.  
See, e.g., Hacker v. Dickman (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 118, 119, 661 
N.E.2d 1005.  Ambiguity exists only when a provision at issue is 
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.  Id. at 119-
120, 661 N.E.2d 1005. 
 
Lager v. Miller-Gonzalez, 120 Ohio St.3d 47, 2008-Ohio-4838, 896 N.E.2d 666, 
¶ 16. 
{¶ 13} Century argues that the language of the provisions in its policy 
must be examined in the context of the overall policy and with respect to the 
policy’s purpose.  We agree.  We have previously stated that insurance policies 
cannot be read in an overly circumscribed fashion.  Gomolka, 70 Ohio St.2d at 
172, 436 N.E.2d 1347.  “One may not regard only the right hand which giveth, if 
the left hand also taketh away.  The intention of the parties must be derived 
instead from the instrument as a whole, and not from detached or isolated parts 
thereof.”  Id., citing Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 136 Ohio St. 49, 53, 23 
N.E.2d 839 (1939), and Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Schild, 69 Ohio St. 136, 68 
N.E. 706 (1903). 
{¶ 14} Since courts must examine the insurance policy as a whole to 
determine the parties’ intentions, it follows that courts must also examine the 
policy as a whole when determining whether a word or phrase of the policy is 
ambiguous.  We accordingly hold that in determining whether an insurance policy 
provision is ambiguous, a court must consider the context in which the provision 
is used. 
{¶ 15} In this case, the trial court and the Tenth District found the word 
“cargo” to be ambiguous.  The analysis of those courts, however, isolated the 
word “cargo,” rather than examining the intended scope of the policy as a whole.  
January Term, 2014 
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A consideration of the overall context of the policy would show that the policy is 
unambiguous in excluding the trailer from coverage. 
B.  The Language of the CGL Policy 
{¶ 16} The insuring portion of the CGL policy provides that Century “will 
pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.”  
Then the policy sets forth the exclusions that state what the insurance does not 
cover. 
 
SECTION I—COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY 
DAMAGE LIABILITY 
* * *  
2.  Exclusions 
This insurance does not apply to: 
* * *  
g.  Aircraft, Auto Or Watercraft 
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any 
aircraft, “auto” or watercraft owned or operated by or rented or 
loaned to any insured.  Use includes operation and “loading or 
unloading.” 
 
(Capitalization and boldface sic.) 
{¶ 17} The CGL policy defines “auto” as: 
 
SECTION V—DEFINITIONS 
* * *  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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2.  “AUTO” MEANS: 
a.  A land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer designed for 
travel on public roads, including any attached machinery or 
equipment; or  
b.  Any other land vehicle that is subject to a compulsory or 
financial responsibility law or other motor vehicle insurance law in 
the state where it is licensed or principally garaged. 
However, “auto” does not include “mobile equipment.” 
 
(Boldface sic; italics added for emphasis.)   
{¶ 18} “Mobile equipment” is also defined in Section V of the policy: 
 
12.  “Mobile equipment” means any of the following types 
of land vehicles, including any attached machinery or equipment: 
a.  Bulldozers, farm machinery, forklifts and other vehicles 
designed for use principally off public roads; 
b.  Vehicles maintained for use solely on or next to 
premises you own or rent; 
c.  Vehicles that travel on crawler treads; 
d.  Vehicles, whether self-propelled or not, maintained 
primarily to provide mobility to permanently mounted: 
(1)  Power cranes, shovels, loaders, diggers or drills; or 
(2)  Road construction or resurfacing equipment such as 
graders, scrapers or rollers; 
e.  Vehicles not described in a., b., c. or d. above that are 
not self-propelled and are maintained primarily to provide mobility 
to permanently attached equipment of the following types: 
January Term, 2014 
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(1)  Air compressors, pumps and generators, including 
spraying, welding, building cleaning, geophysical exploration, 
lighting and well servicing equipment; or  
(2)  Cherry pickers and similar devices used to raise or 
lower workers; 
f.  Vehicles not described in a., b., c. or d. above 
maintained primarily for purposes other than the transportation of 
persons or cargo. 
 
(Boldface sic; italics added for emphasis.) 
{¶ 19} Century argues that the policy is unambiguous, asserting that in 
this case the trailer qualifies as an “auto” and is not “mobile equipment” under the 
policy definitions.  Crews counters, and the appellate court held, that the policy is 
ambiguous because its failure to define the term “cargo” makes it unclear whether 
the policy is intended to exclude the trailer from coverage.  Crews asserts that the 
policy’s ambiguity should be construed strictly against Century and that we 
should accordingly hold that the trailer meets the definition of “mobile 
equipment” under Section V(12)(f) of the policy and thus the policy provides 
coverage for the trailer.  We agree with Century that the policy is unambiguous 
and does not provide coverage for the trailer. 
C.  The CGL Policy Does Not Provide Coverage   
{¶ 20} When viewing the CGL policy as a whole we conclude that the 
policy clearly excludes the trailer from coverage in this case.  The fault in 
Crews’s analysis is that it fixates upon a single word, “cargo,” and fails to 
consider the intent of the policy as a whole. 
{¶ 21} The policy excludes coverage for any bodily injury or property 
damage arising from the use of an “auto” by the insured.  Section V(2)(a) of the 
policy explicitly states that a “trailer” designed for travel on public roads is an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“auto” for purposes of the policy.2  This provision establishes a fundamental 
premise of the policy:  trailers are excluded from coverage. 
{¶ 22} Crews is correct that the policy provides an exception to the “auto” 
exclusion.  Anything qualifying as “mobile equipment” as defined by the policy is 
excepted from the definition of “auto.”  Crews argues that the trailer qualifies as 
“mobile equipment” pursuant to Section V(12)(f) of the policy.  However, when 
looking at this section in context, it is clear that the trailer does not qualify as 
“mobile equipment.” 
{¶ 23} Section V(12) of the CGL policy lists specific types of land 
vehicles that qualify as “mobile equipment.”  Subsections (a) through (d) group 
these specific types of vehicles into categories, such as vehicles maintained solely 
on or next to premises rented or owned by the insured and vehicles that travel on 
crawler treads.  Subsections (e) and (f) are catchall provisions, but Crews relies 
only on (f), which classifies the following as “mobile equipment”:  “Vehicles not 
described in a., b., c. or d. above maintained primarily for purposes other than the 
transportation of persons or cargo.”  (Boldface sic.)  When read in context with 
the rest of Section V(12), it is clear that the catchall provision of subsection f is 
meant to classify as “mobile equipment” those land vehicles not specifically 
named in Section V(12) that are of the same subclass of vehicles as those that are 
named in the section.  A trailer is not of the same subclass as the land vehicles 
identified in Section V(12).  It follows, then, that Section V(12)(f)’s catchall 
provision does not apply to the trailer in this case and that it is excluded from 
coverage pursuant to Section V(2)(a). 
{¶ 24} Because we conclude that the trailer does not belong to the 
subclass of land vehicles set forth in Section V(12) of the CGL policy, the precise 
definition of the word “cargo” as used in that section is irrelevant to our analysis.  
                                                 
2 Crews concedes that the trailer in this case was designed for travel on public roads. 
January Term, 2014 
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We accordingly disagree with the lower courts’ conclusion that the CGL policy’s 
failure to define the term “cargo” creates an ambiguity that, when construed in 
favor of the insured, must be read in a way that provides coverage for the trailer.  
Instead, we conclude that the plain language of the CGL policy clearly excludes 
trailers from coverage as autos pursuant to Section V(2)(a) of the policy.  We 
finally note that because trailers do not fit into the subclass of land vehicles 
described in Section V(12) of the CGL policy, we need not address the portion of 
Century’s first proposition of law asking us to construe the phrase “maintained 
primarily for purposes other than the transportation of persons or cargo” as found 
in Section V(12)(f). 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 25} When interpreting a provision in an insurance policy, courts must 
look at the provision in the overall context of the policy in determining whether 
the provision is ambiguous.  The CGL policy issued by Century clearly provides 
that trailers are excluded from coverage.  We accordingly reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and remand this case to the court of common pleas for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed, 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, DEWINE, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
PAT DEWINE, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for FRENCH, J. 
____________________ 
 
Plymale & Dingus, L.L.C., and M. Shawn Dingus, for appellees. 
Davis & Young and Richard M. Garner, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Koehler Neal, L.L.C., and Timothy J. Fitzgerald, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Thomas E. Szykowny, and 
Michael Thomas, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Insurance Institute. 
_________________________