Title: Physicians Plus Insurance Corporation v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 80 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1836 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Physicians Plus Insurance Corporation,  
 
Subrogated-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Midwest Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant, 
Theresa Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Donald 
Franke, Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance 
Company, Dodge County, Robert Embertson, Rural 
Mutual Insurance Company, Township of Leroy and 
Linus Schraufnagel,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
 
Estate of Timothy J. Smith, Deceased,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
State of Wisconsin, Department of Health and 
Family Services, Division of Health,  
 
Subrogated-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Theresa Mutual Insurance Company, Don-Er Farms, 
Inc., Donald Franke, Ermanelda Franke, Wisconsin 
Municipal Mutual Insurance Company, Dodge 
County, Robert Henken, Highway Commissioner for 
Dodge County, Robert Embertson, Rural Mutual  
Insurance Company, and Township of Leroy,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 148 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 933, 632 N.W.2d 59 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge   
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew P. Bissonnette   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
JUSTICES: 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
Theresa 
Mutual 
Insurance Company, Don-Er Farms, Inc., Donald Franke and 
Ermanelda Franke, there were briefs by Arnold P. Anderson and 
Mohr & Anderson, S.C., Madison, and Thomas E. Goss, Jr. and 
Mueller, Goss & Possi, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Arnold P. Anderson and Thomas E. Goss, Jr. 
 
For defendants-appellants-petitioners, Dodge County, Robert 
Embertson, Wisconsin Municipal Insurance Company and Robert 
Henken, there were briefs by Robert E. Storck and Storck, 
Schnabl & Madden, Mayville, and oral argument by Robert E. 
Storck. 
 
For defendants-appellants-petitioners, Township of Leroy, 
Linus Schraufnagel and Rural Mutual Insurance Company, there 
were briefs by Phillip J. Eckert and O'Meara Law Form, LLP, West 
Bend, and oral argument by Phillip J. Eckert. 
 
For plaintiff-respondent, Timothy J. Smith, there was a 
brief by Eric A. Farnsworth and DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Eric A. Farnsworth. 
 
 
2002 WI 80 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1836  
(L.C. No. 
97-CV-198, 97-CV-297) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Physicians Plus Insurance Corporation,  
 
          Subrogated-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Midwest Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Theresa Mutual Fire Insurance Company,  
Donald Franke, Wisconsin Municipal Mutual  
Insurance Company, Dodge County, Robert  
Embertson, Rural Mutual Insurance  
Company, Township of Leroy and Linus  
Schraufnagel,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
__________________________________ 
 
Estate of Timothy J. Smith, Deceased,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
State of Wisconsin, Department of Health  
and Family Services, Division of Health,  
 
          Subrogated-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Theresa Mutual Insurance Company, Don-Er  
Farms, Inc., Donald Franke, Ermanelda  
Franke, Wisconsin Municipal Mutual  
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
2
Insurance Company, Dodge County, Robert  
Henken, Highway Commissioner for Dodge  
County, Robert Embertson, Rural Mutual  
Insurance Company, and Township of Leroy,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals, Physicians Plus 
Insurance Corp. v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co., 2001 WI App 
148, 246 Wis. 2d 933, 632 N.W.2d 59, affirming the order of the 
Dodge County Circuit Court granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of Timothy J. Smith.  The circuit court and the court of 
appeals both concluded that the petitioners were liable for 
maintaining a public nuisance, consisting of tree branches 
obstructing the view of a stop sign at a highway intersection.  
Each petitioner, Theresa Mutual Insurance Company, Don-Er Farms, 
Inc., Donald and Ermanelda Franke, (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "the Frankes" or "the homeowners"); Wisconsin 
Municipal Mutual Insurance Company, Dodge County, Robert Henken, 
Highway 
Commissioner 
for 
Dodge 
County, 
Robert 
Embertson 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Dodge County"); and 
Rural Mutual Insurance Company and the Township of Leroy, 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Town of Leroy"), 
individually claims it is excluded as a matter of law, from 
No. 
00-1836   
 
3 
 
liability for failing to remove the tree branches obstructing 
the view of a stop sign. 
¶2 
We begin reviewing this case by discussing the 
important, but often confusing, relationship between public 
nuisance and negligence.  Both the circuit court and the court 
of appeals held that the defendants were liable for maintaining 
a public nuisance.  We begin our analysis by defining public 
nuisance as a condition or activity which substantially or 
unduly interferes with the use of a public place or with the 
activities of an entire community.  See Schiro v. Oriental 
Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 546, 76 N.W. 355 (1956); see also 
State v. Quality Egg Farm, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d 506, 520, 311 
N.W.2d 650 (1981) (noting that the court considers many factors 
in concluding that a public nuisance exists).1  We then discuss 
this court's decision in Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Railway 
Co., 199 Wis. 575, 224 N.W. 748, on reargument, 199 Wis. 588, 
227 N.W. 385 (1929), which we conclude provides the proper 
framework for determining liability here.  We work to clarify 
the relationship between public nuisance and negligence and hold 
that liability for maintaining a public nuisance is based on the 
following elements, plus public policy.  First, the existence of 
the public nuisance itself; second, actual or constructive 
                                                 
1 "The primary function of nuisance as a separate topic in 
the law of torts is to mark out the area within which it is 
unreasonable for one to subject his neighbors or the public to 
noise, vibrations, fumes, immorality or the risk of physical 
harm."  Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance:  Contributory Negligence and 
Other Mysteries, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 984, 995 (1952). 
No. 
00-1836   
 
4 
 
notice of the public nuisance;  and third, that the failure to 
abate the public nuisance is a cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries.  For the purposes of comparing and apportioning 
responsibility for the accident and for determining contribution 
among culpable parties, we conclude that when all of those 
elements are affirmatively proven, a defendant's failure to 
abate a public nuisance is analogous to negligence per se.  We 
also look to public policy considerations because we conclude 
that 
similar 
to 
liability 
for 
negligence, 
liability 
for 
maintaining a public nuisance can be limited on public policy 
grounds. 
¶3 
Applying this framework to the facts presented here, 
we conclude that the circuit court properly concluded that the 
tree branches obstructing the view of the stop sign resulted in 
a public nuisance as a matter of law.  We conclude from the 
photographic evidence depicting the tree and the stop sign on 
the date of the accident, that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact to preclude a summary judgment determination that 
the condition was a public nuisance.  Furthermore, we conclude 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding 
whether all three defendants had actual or constructive notice 
of the condition.  The tree branches were obstructing the view 
of the stop sign for at least two to three months before the 
accident, and this is a sufficient length of time to impute 
notice to the Frankes, Dodge County, and the Town of Leroy.  
Regarding whether the failure to abate the obstructed view of 
the stop sign was a cause of the accident, we affirm the court 
No. 
00-1836   
 
5 
 
of appeals' conclusion that disputed reasonable inferences 
preclude summary judgment on that issue.  We further conclude, 
however, that if causation is established at trial, for the 
purposes of comparing and apportioning responsibility and for 
determining contribution among culpable parties, a defendant's 
failure to abate the public nuisance is analogous to negligence 
per se. 
¶4 
We then turn to each individual defendant's arguments 
that public policy considerations relieve each of liability.  We 
reject all of the defendants' public policy arguments and 
conclude that the Frankes, Dodge County and the Town of Leroy 
all had a relationship to either the tree involved or the stop 
sign at issue that resulted in a duty to abate the public 
nuisance——to trim the branches obstructing the view of the stop 
No. 
00-1836   
 
6 
 
sign.  We further conclude that public policy does not relieve 
any of the defendants of liability.2 
I.  FACTS 
A. 
The accident 
¶5 
For the purposes of this case, the pertinent facts are 
not in dispute.  On July 21, 1996, Timothy J. Smith (hereinafter 
Smith) 
and 
his 
passenger, 
Tracey 
Leistico 
(hereinafter 
Leistico), were injured in an accident at the intersection of 
Highway Z and Ledge Road, in the Town of Leroy, in Dodge County.  
Smith was driving his motorcycle north on Highway Z and Diane C. 
Smith (hereinafter Diane), of no relation to Timothy Smith, was 
                                                 
2 We recognize that the parties also asked us to review the 
court of appeals' recommendation to the circuit court regarding 
the form of the jury verdict on remand.  In its conclusion, the 
court of appeals suggested that the jury might be asked to 
"apportion responsibility for the accident between the obscured 
stop sign and Diane Smith's negligence (and possibly Smith's 
contributory negligence . . . )."  Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. 
Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 148, ¶67, 246 Wis. 2d 933, 
632 N.W.2d 59.  The Frankes argue that the court of appeals' 
jury verdict recommendation was improper for several reasons.  
We note, however, that the parties' arguments were based on the 
court of appeals' slip opinion, not the language quoted above in 
the published opinion.  Before publishing, the court apparently 
revised the language relating to the verdict form.  The change 
in language significantly altered what was characterized as a 
recommendation, to merely a suggestion.  While we do not address 
directly the parties' arguments regarding the court of appeals' 
verdict form suggestion, we direct the parties' attention to ¶32 
of this opinion.  In that paragraph, we discuss the analogy to 
negligence per se.  We conclude that for the purposes of 
comparing and apportioning responsibility for the accident, and 
for determining contribution among culpable parties, when all of 
the elements to establish liability for maintaining a public 
nuisance have been affirmatively proven, a defendant's failure 
to abate a public nuisance is analogous to negligence per se. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
7 
 
driving her car eastbound on Ledge Road.  There is a stop sign 
requiring traffic on Ledge Road to stop for traffic on Highway 
Z; however, Diane failed to stop and her vehicle collided with 
Smith's motorcycle.  Diane stated that she failed to see the 
"stop ahead" sign and failed to stop for the stop sign because 
there were tree branches obstructing the visibility of the stop 
sign.  Diane later admitted to drinking approximately four or 
five beers the day of the accident, that she had an open can of 
beer in her car, and that after the accident she removed full 
beer cans from her car and hid them in a culvert. 
B.  The tree and the stop sign 
¶6 
The tree at issue is located on Donald and Ermanelda3 
Frankes' property and is partially within the Town of Leroy's 
highway right-of-way.  The day after the accident, Town of Leroy 
personnel inspected the tree branches and decided to remove 
them.  Linus Schraufnagel, the Frankes' neighbor and Town of 
Leroy Chairman, and one of the homeowners, Donald Franke, 
subsequently trimmed the branches at issue. 
¶7 
The stop sign requiring traffic to stop on Ledge Road 
was installed by Dodge County and is within the County's right-
of-way.  Highway Z is an arterial highway.  The speed limit on 
both Highway Z and Ledge Road is 55 miles per hour. 
¶8 
Although 
not 
aimed 
at 
checking 
for 
foliage 
obstruction, Dodge County personnel checked the visibility of 
                                                 
3 We note that at the time of the accident, Ermanelda Franke 
was the Town of Leroy Assessor. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
8 
 
signs in the county on an annual basis.  The purpose of the 
inspection was to determine the reflectivity of county signs and 
was usually done at night in November.  In addition to the 
county inspection, Town of Leroy personnel inspected all of its 
roads and ensured its stop signs were in good condition in April 
of each year.  The town, however, also does not inspect 
specifically for obstruction of stop signs. 
C. 
Trial Court proceedings 
¶9 
Following the accident, Smith and his passenger, 
Leistico, filed separate actions in Dodge County Circuit Court 
for injuries resulting from the collision with Diane Smith.  The 
plaintiffs both filed suit against the Frankes, the Town of 
Leroy and Dodge County,4 claiming that all were either actually 
or constructively aware of the developing hazard and all were 
negligent in failing to take action to remedy the hazard, 
including trimming the branches of the tree obstructing the view 
of the stop sign.  Smith also claimed that the Frankes' 
maintenance of their tree constituted a nuisance to the safe and 
unobstructed use of the highway.  For purposes of pretrial 
administration and trial, the two cases were consolidated. 
¶10 All three defendants, the Frankes, the Town of Leroy, 
and Dodge County, moved for summary judgment claiming they had 
                                                 
4 Diane Smith and her insurance company subsequently entered 
into Pierringer releases with Leistico and were dismissed from 
her case.  Diane and her insurance company also entered into a 
Pierringer release with Timothy Smith, but did so even before 
Smith commenced his lawsuit against the other defendants.  See 
Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963). 
No. 
00-1836   
 
9 
 
no obligation to trim the tree in order to maintain visibility 
of the stop sign.  On June 18, 1998, the Honorable Andrew P. 
Bissonnette, denied the motions.  The Frankes, Theresa Mutual, 
the Town of Leroy, and Dodge County petitioned the court of 
appeals to review the denials of the motions for summary 
judgment; however, all three petitions were denied.  A trial 
date was subsequently set for January 10, 2000.  Leistico then 
voluntarily dismissed her claim, but her subrogated health 
carrier, Physicians Plus Insurance Company, remains a party. 
¶11 In December 1999, the court, in agreement with the 
parties, took the case off of the trial calendar and invited 
motions for summary judgment.  Smith filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on liability against the defendants, the 
Frankes, the Town of Leroy, and Dodge County.  The three 
defendants also renewed their motions for summary judgment.  On 
May 10, 2000, after briefing and arguments, the circuit court 
issued an order finding the Frankes, the Town of Leroy, and 
Dodge County all causally negligent as a matter of law in 
failing to meet their duties to trim the tree and remedy the 
hazard.  On July 6, 2000, the circuit court issued a supplement 
to its decision and order.  The court concluded that in failing 
to trim the tree and render the stop sign visible on the date of 
the accident, the defendants had maintained a public nuisance. 
D. 
Court of Appeals' decision 
¶12 The Frankes, the Town of Leroy, and Dodge County 
petitioned for leave to appeal the circuit court's non-final 
order and the Court of Appeals, District IV, granted the 
No. 
00-1836   
 
10 
 
petitions.  Relying on Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Railway Co., 
199 Wis.  575, 224 N.W. 748, on reargument, 199 Wis. 588, 227 
N.W. 385 (1929), the court held that each defendant had a duty 
to trim the offending branches.  Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 
148, ¶64.  The court recognized that the term "duty" is usually 
reserved for negligence cases, but stated that "duty" really 
presents a question of public policy:  "Should a party whose act 
or omission has caused harm to another be shielded from 
liability on public policy grounds?"  Id. at ¶11.  Based on the 
statutes and case law, the court concluded that each defendant 
was liable for maintaining a nuisance.  Although the defendants' 
acts did not create the nuisance, the liability was based on 
whether each defendant had "notice of the existence of the 
danger."  Id. at ¶10.  Before engaging in an analysis specific 
to each defendant, the court noted that these three defendants 
are the only persons or entities who might possibly bear some 
responsibility and that "If each is excluded from liability on 
public policy grounds (that is, if none 'had a duty' to 
eliminate the hazard), the result would be that an obvious 
hazard to public safety could continue to exist, with no one 
having any obligation to correct it."  Id. at ¶14.  "We would be 
hard pressed to conclude that the public policy of our state, as 
reflected in its statutes and case law, would support such a 
result."  Id. (footnote omitted). 
¶13 Regarding the Frankes' liability, the court of appeals 
rejected the arguments that the reasoning in Brown was limited 
to "falling dead tree" cases and that this case relates to the 
No. 
00-1836   
 
11 
 
Frankes' duty to maintain the stop sign.  Id. at ¶¶16-17.  
Rather, the court emphasized that the Frankes' liability is 
based on "their failure to eliminate a safety hazard created by 
a tree growing in their yard."  Id. at ¶19.  Finally, the court 
rejected the Frankes' public policy arguments.  The court 
rejected the argument that imposing liability here creates "no 
logical stopping point," Id. at ¶27, and the court refused to 
extend the public policy rationale of Walker v. Bignell, 100 
Wis. 2d 256, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981) (public policy exclusion from 
liability 
for 
municipalities 
regarding 
keeping 
highway 
intersections clear of visual obstructions).  Physicians Plus, 
2001 WI App 148, ¶26. 
¶14 The court of appeals then turned to Dodge County's 
duty to ensure that the tree branches did not obscure visibility 
of the stop sign.  The court rejected Dodge County's argument 
that the public policy considerations in Walker preclude 
municipalities5 from liability for failure to cut vegetation.  
The court concluded that Walker did not affect the holding in 
Naker v. Town of Trenton, 62 Wis. 2d 654, 215 N.W.2d 38, on 
rehearing, 62 Wis. 2d 660, 217 N.W.2d 665 (1974), holding that a 
municipality's failure to trim foliage obscuring a stop sign is 
actionable.  Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶26.  The court 
                                                 
5 We 
recognize 
that, 
strictly 
speaking, 
a 
county is 
generally classified as a quasi-municipality.  City of Madison 
v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 372, 243 N.W.2d 422 
(1976).  Like the court of appeals, however, we use the term 
"municipality" in this case to refer to both the Town of Leroy 
and Dodge County. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
12 
 
therefore refused to extend Walker from general visibility at 
intersections to circumstances involving a traffic control sign.  
Id. at ¶31.  The court found further support for its conclusion 
not 
to 
extend 
Walker 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 349.065 
(1995-1996)6 
directing local authorities to maintain traffic control devices, 
and 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation's 
manual7 
requiring 
                                                 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 349.065 states: 
349.065  Uniform traffic control devices.  Local 
authorities shall place and maintain traffic control 
devices, upon highways under their jurisdiction to 
regulate, warn, guide or inform traffic.  The design, 
installation and operation or use of new traffic 
control 
devices 
placed 
and 
maintained 
by 
local 
authorities after the adoption of the uniform traffic 
control devices manual under s. 84.02(4)(e) shall 
conform to the manual.  After January 1, 1977, all 
traffic control devices placed and maintained by local 
authorities shall conform to the manual. 
 
The court also cited § 84.02(4)(e), which states:   
(e) The 
department 
shall 
adopt 
a 
manual 
establishing a uniform system of traffic control 
devices for use upon the highways of this state.  The 
system shall be consistent with and, so far as 
practicable, conform to current nationally recognized 
standards for traffic control devices. 
 
7 All traffic signs should be kept in proper position, clean 
and legible at all times. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
13 
 
municipalities to pay special attention to ensure that "weeds, 
trees, [and] shrubbery . . . do not obscure the face of any 
sign."  Id. at ¶34.  The court also rejected Dodge County's 
argument that § 86.03(3) and (4)8 prohibit the county from 
trimming the branches of the Frankes' tree.  Relying on 
                                                                                                                                                             
To insure adequate maintenance, a suitable schedule 
for inspection, cleaning and replacement of signs should be 
established.  Employees of the highway department, police 
and other governmental employees whose duties require that 
they travel on the highways should be encouraged to report 
any damaged or obscured signs at the first opportunity. 
Special attention and necessary action should be taken 
to see that weeds, trees, shrubbery and construction 
materials do not obscure the face of any sign. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. §  86.03(3) and (4) state: 
(3)  PLANTING TREES AND SHRUBS IN HIGHWAY.  Any 
person owning or occupying land adjoining any highway 
may, with the approval of the public authority 
maintaining the highway, plant, cultivate and maintain 
trees, shrubs or hedges on the side of the highway 
contiguous to and within 10 feet of that person's 
land.  Such trees, shrubs or hedges shall be cut or 
removed only by the owner or occupant of the abutting 
land or by the public authority having control of the 
highway. 
(4) CUTTING OR INJURING TREES ON HIGHWAY.  No 
person shall cut down, break, girdle, bruise the bark 
or in any other manner injure, or allow any animal 
under that person's control to injure, any public or 
private trees, shrubs or hedges growing within the 
highway, except as the owner thereof or the public 
authority maintaining the highway may cut down, trim 
and remove trees, shrubs and hedges for the purpose of 
and conducing to the benefit and improvement of the 
owner's land or the highway facility. 
 
No. 
00-1836   
 
14 
 
§ 83.015(2)(a),9 the court concluded that the county was not 
powerless to trim the tree branches, and that "even if it could 
only act by requesting or requiring others to trim the offending 
branches . . . it had a 'duty' to do so."  Id. at ¶36. 
¶15 Finally, the court addressed the Town of Leroy's 
liability and specifically rejected the argument that several 
statutes, 
specifically 
Wis. Stat. § 349.065, 
§ 83.025,10 
and 
§ 81.01(10)11, establish a public policy prohibiting the Town's 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 83.015(2)(a) states: 
(2)  POWERS AND DUTIES.  (a) Except as provided 
under par. (b), the county highway committee shall 
purchase and sell county road machinery as authorized 
by the county board, determine whether each piece of 
county aid construction shall be let by contract or 
shall be done by day labor, enter into contracts in 
the 
name 
of 
the 
county, 
and 
make 
necessary 
arrangements 
for 
the 
proper 
prosecution 
of 
the 
construction and maintenance of highways provided for 
by the county board, enter private lands with their 
employes to remove weeds and brush and erect or remove 
fences that are necessary to keep highways open for 
travel during the winter, direct the expenditure of 
highway maintenance funds received from the state or 
provided by county tax, meet from time to time at the 
county seat to audit all payrolls and materials claims 
and 
vouchers 
resulting 
from 
the 
construction of 
highways and perform other duties imposed by law or by 
the county board. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 83.025 allows county boards to make 
changes in the county trunk highway system. 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 81.01(10) states:  "(10) Enter any 
private lands with their employes and agents for the purposes of 
removing weeds and brush and of erecting or removing such fences 
as may be necessary to keep highways reasonably free from snow 
and open for travel during the winter season." 
 
No. 
00-1836   
 
15 
 
liability for a hazard created by a condition in the Town's 
right-of-way.  Relying on provisions in Chapter 81,12 the court 
stated that the statutes "indicate public policies which 
obligate towns to maintain and supervise town roads, and which 
empower them to remove impediments to safe travel occasioned by 
vegetation growing along town roads."  Id. at ¶¶38-39.  The 
court also rejected the Town's argument that the County's "non-
delegable" duty to maintain the stop sign precludes the Town's 
liability.  Id. at ¶¶41-42. 
¶16 After concluding that none of the defendants were 
precluded from liability, the court discussed the circuit 
court's application of nuisance and negligence concepts.  The 
court then concluded that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact to preclude summary judgment that the tree 
branches created a nuisance and that each of the defendants knew 
or should have known of the condition.  Id.  The court further 
concluded, 
however, 
that 
the 
issue 
of 
causation 
was 
inappropriate for summary judgment on the present record.   
¶17 In conclusion, the court discussed how responsibility 
should be apportioned, suggesting to the trial court that the 
verdict form used in products liability cases——apportioning 
causal negligence between the product and plaintiff——"may be 
suitable on the present facts."  Id. at ¶67.  The court stated, 
                                                 
12 The court relied on both Wis. Stat. § 81.01 and § 81.15.  
Although the court of appeals cited § 81.15, it promptly 
recognized that the town's liability could not be based on that 
statute because there is no allegation of a "highway defect." 
No. 
00-1836   
 
16 
 
"[T]he jury might be asked to apportion responsibility for the 
accident between the obscured stop sign and Diane Smith's 
negligence 
(and 
possibly 
[Timothy] 
Smith's 
contributory 
negligence . . . .)"  Id. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 We independently review the circuit court's grant or 
denial of summary judgment by applying the same standards and 
methods utilized by the circuit court, and benefiting from the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals. See 
Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling,  2001 WI 64, 
¶8, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate 
"if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  To 
defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate 
more than a mere existence of some alleged factual dispute; 
there must be a genuine issue of material fact.  Baxter v. DNR, 
165 Wis. 2d 298, 312, 477 N.W.2d 648 (1991).  "A factual issue 
is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"  Id. (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). 
III. PUBLIC NUISANCE AND NEGLIGENCE 
¶19 We begin first by defining public nuisance, and then 
reviewing the seminal case that links public nuisance and 
negligence concepts, Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Railway Co., 
No. 
00-1836   
 
17 
 
199 Wis. 575, 224 N.W. 748, on reargument, 199 Wis. 588, 227 
N.W. 385 (1929).  We then review the record to determine whether 
summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of whether the tree 
branches obscuring the stop sign resulted in a public nuisance 
as a matter of law.  Specifically, we examine the record to 
determine the existence of the public nuisance itself, actual or 
constructive notice of the public nuisance, and whether the 
failure to abate the public nuisance was a cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. 
¶20 By first focusing on the relationship between public 
nuisance and negligence, we attempt to clarify that relationship 
as much as possible, given the somewhat confusing precedent.13  
Based on this court's precedent, mainly Brown, we hold that 
negligence and nuisance concepts overlap in several respects.  
First, liability for maintaining a public nuisance can be based 
on either negligent or intentional conduct that maintains a 
condition or activity which substantially or unduly interferes 
with the use of a public place or with the activities of an 
entire community.  Second, both notice and causation, concepts 
oftentimes reserved for negligence cases, are required to 
                                                 
13 As this court has recognized, nuisance is a "slippery 
term," and often the best way to determine whether a nuisance 
exists is by determining whether or not there is liability for 
the activity or condition.  Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. 
Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958); see also 
Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 545, 76 N.W. 355 
(1956) ("It would be difficult to find a term which has been the 
subject of more mystifying confusion of utterance in the reports 
and texts."). 
No. 
00-1836   
 
18 
 
establish liability for maintaining a public nuisance. Third, 
for the purposes of comparing and apportioning responsibility 
for the accident, and for determining contribution among 
culpable parties, we conclude that when all of the elements to 
establish liability for maintaining a public nuisance are 
affirmatively proven, a defendant's failure to abate a public 
nuisance is analogous to negligence per se.  Finally, similar to 
liability for negligence, liability for maintaining a public 
nuisance can be limited by public policy considerations. 
¶21 A nuisance14 is a condition or activity which unduly 
interferes with the use of land or of a public place.  Schiro, 
272 Wis. at 546.  A public nuisance is a condition or activity 
which substantially or unduly interferes with the use of a 
public place or with the activities of an entire community.15  
                                                 
14  We note that a nuisance can either be public or private.  
Here, however, we are focusing solely on public nuisance.  In 
Schiro, this court quoted with approval the following language 
defining a private nuisance:  "As commonly used, [nuisance] 
connotes a condition or activity which unduly interferes with 
the use of land or of a public place.  Conduct which interferes 
solely with the use of a relatively small area of private land 
is tortious but not criminal and is called a private nuisance."  
272 Wis. at 546. 
15 This definition of public nuisance is consistent with the 
definition of public nuisance in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 821B (1979): 
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public. 
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an 
interference with a public right is unreasonable 
include the following: 
No. 
00-1836   
 
19 
 
See id. (quoting Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance:  Contributory 
Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 984 (1952)).  
The number of people affected does not strictly define a public 
nuisance.16  State v. Quality Egg Farm, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d 506, 
520, 311 N.W.2d 650 (1981).  Rather, the court considers many 
factors, including, among others, the nature of the activity, 
the reasonableness of the use of the property, location of the 
activity, and the degree or character of the injury inflicted or 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) 
Whether 
the 
conduct 
involves 
a 
significant interference with the public health, 
the public safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort or the public convenience, or 
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by 
statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, 
or 
(c)  whether the conduct is of a continuing 
nature or has produced a permanent or long-
lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has 
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the 
public right. 
16 Comment g to The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 821B 
(1979), echoes this idea that a public nuisance is not defined 
by the number of people involved, and does so in the context of 
a public highway.   
It 
is 
not, 
however, 
necessary 
that 
the 
entire 
community be affected by a public nuisance, so long as 
the nuisance will interfere with those who come in 
contact with it in the exercise of a public right or 
it otherwise affects the interests of the community at 
large.  The obstruction of a public highway is a 
public nuisance, although no one is travelling upon 
the highway or wishes to travel on it at the time.  In 
many cases, the interests of the entire community may 
be affected by a danger to even one individual. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
00-1836   
 
20 
 
right impinged upon.  Id.  As early as 1875, this court defined 
a public nuisance with regard to highways, stating: "Any 
obstruction 
in 
or 
encroachment 
upon 
a 
highway, 
which 
unnecessarily impedes or incommodes the lawful use of such 
highway by the public, is a public nuisance . . . ."  Hubbell v. 
Goodrich, 37 Wis. 84, 86 (1875).17 
¶22 The central issue in this case requires us to examine 
and 
define 
the 
relationship 
between 
public 
nuisance 
and 
negligence.  The court of appeals specifically rejected the 
defendants' arguments that the circuit court "erred by injecting 
the notion of 'nuisance' into its analysis, or that it confused 
                                                 
17 The historical development of public nuisance law sheds 
further light on the definition of public nuisance, and its role 
in tort law. 
Parallel with this civil remedy protecting rights in 
land [private nuisance], there developed an entirely 
separate principle, that an infringement of the rights 
of the crown, or of the general public, was a crime.  
The 
earliest 
cases 
appear 
to 
have 
involved 
purprestures, which were encroachments upon the royal 
domain or the public highway, and might be redressed 
by a suit by the crown.  There was enough of a 
superficial resemblance between the blocking of a 
private right of way and the blocking of a public 
highway to keep men contented with calling the latter 
a nuisance as well; and "thus was born the public 
nuisance, that wide term which came to include 
obstructed highways . . . ." . . . The remedy remained 
exclusively 
a 
criminal 
one 
until 
the 
sixteenth 
century, when it was recognized that a private 
individual who had suffered special damage might have 
a civil action in tort for the invasion of the public 
right. 
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 86 
(5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). 
No. 
00-1836   
 
21 
 
the issues of nuisance and negligence, or simply that it could 
not determine the existence of a nuisance on summary judgment."  
Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶43.  Instead, the court 
specifically relied on the language and reasoning from Brown, 
where this court concluded that the defendant was liable for 
maintaining a nuisance, consisting of a dead and rotten tree 
located between the sidewalk and the curb.  The court of appeals 
relied on language from Brown concluding that "a tree, which 
'because of any change in [its] structure . . . becomes a menace 
to the safety of those who travel the street,' is a nuisance."  
Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶44 (citing Brown, 199 Wis. at 
589).  We conclude that the court of appeals correctly focused 
its analysis on Brown; therefore, we first discuss Brown as the 
seminal case framing the relationship between public nuisance 
and negligence.18   
¶23 In Brown, a large tree stood between the street and a 
public sidewalk in the City of Milwaukee.  Brown, 199 Wis. at 
577.  For some time prior to the accident, the tree was dead and 
                                                 
18 We note that there are several different remedies that 
can be pursued in nuisance cases.  See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 84, 
631 (1998) ("Modern remedies for a nuisance include summary 
abatement, suit in equity for injunction or abatement, action at 
law for damages, and criminal prosecution.")  This case is not a 
nuisance abatement case.  Rather, like the plaintiffs in Brown 
v. Milwaukee Terminal Railway Co., 199 Wis. 575, 224 N.W. 748, 
on reargument, 199 Wis. 588, 227 N.W. 385 (1929), the plaintiffs 
here are seeking damages resulting from the maintenance of a 
public nuisance.  As such, "[T]he injurious consequences 
resulting from the nuisance, rather than acts which produce the 
nuisance, constitute the cause of action."  66 C.J.S. Nuisances 
§ 133, 712 (1998).   
No. 
00-1836   
 
22 
 
decaying.  Id.  On June 9, 1925, the tree suddenly fell, 
striking the plaintiff and causing serious injury.  Id.  The 
plaintiff subsequently sued the owner of the property, Milwaukee 
Terminal Railway Co., and the jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff.  On appeal, the majority of this court initially 
reversed, 
holding 
that 
the 
primary 
responsibility 
for 
maintaining the tree belonged to the city rather than the 
private landowner.  Id. at 585. 
¶24 On reargument, the court vacated its original opinion 
and affirmed the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  The court 
discussed the relationship between nuisance and negligence, 
stating:  "Negligence of the defendant is not ordinarily an 
essential element in an action for damages sustained by reason 
of a nuisance.  The action is founded on the wrongful act in 
creating or maintaining it, and the negligence of the defendant, 
unless in exceptional cases, is not material."  Brown, 199 Wis. 
at 589 (quoting Lamming v. Galusha, 31 N.E. 1024 (N.Y. 1892)).  
The court held that liability for maintaining a public nuisance 
is based on "the degree of danger existing even with the best of 
care."  Brown, 199 Wis. at 589 (quoting 20 Ruling  
381).  The court then noted,  that there is a "class of cases"——
meaning cases where liability is based on maintenance of a 
public nuisance—— where the existence of a public nuisance does 
not create liability unless the defendant had notice of the 
danger.  Id.  In this class of cases, the court held it must be 
shown "either that the defendant knew of the danger . . . or 
that such condition had existed for such length of time that, by 
No. 
00-1836   
 
23 
 
the exercise of ordinary care, the defendant ought to have 
discovered the danger and to have removed it before injuries 
were sustained by the plaintiff."  Id. at 590.19  The court 
specifically addressed the basis for the landowner's duty to 
remove the nuisance there, the dead tree. 
In removing the menace of the dead tree the lotowner 
is not performing any duty imposed upon the public.  
He is simply discharging the duty which the common law 
imposes upon him as the owner of a tree that has 
become a menace to the safety of those who travel the 
street. 
                                                 
19 Brown distinguishes liability for maintaining a public 
nuisance from liability for creating a public nuisance, by 
requiring actual or constructive notice in maintenance of public 
nuisance cases.  Based on this distinction, we interpret Brown 
as essentially dividing public nuisance cases into two classes.  
The first class, maintenance of a public nuisance, bases 
liability on the defendant's failure to abate a public nuisance 
of which the defendant had actual or constructive notice.  The 
defendant 
did 
not 
affirmatively 
create 
the 
nuisance, 
so 
liability is necessarily predicated on the defendant's notice of 
the hazardous condition.  This is the kind of nuisance case we 
are faced with here.  In contrast, the second class of cases 
focuses on the defendant's creation of the public nuisance and 
likewise does not require proof that the defendant had actual or 
constructive notice of the hazardous condition.   
The 
concurring 
opinion 
misreads 
this 
distinction 
by 
interpreting Brown as requiring a showing of negligence as an 
essential element for liability for maintaining a public 
nuisance.  Concurrence at ¶83.  The concurring opinion focuses 
on the language, "by the exercise of ordinary care," but when 
examined in context, it is clear that the court's reference here 
relates to whether the defendant has constructive notice of the 
public nuisance and that proof of negligence is not required.  
The concurring opinion uses the phrase "exercise of ordinary 
care" out of context, and in doing so, misinterprets Brown. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
24 
 
Id. at 591-592.  The essence of the opinion, addressing the 
relationship between maintenance of a public nuisance and 
negligence, is stated in this paragraph: 
One who maintains a nuisance created by another is 
liable for injuries sustained because of the danger 
incident thereto just as clearly as if he had himself 
created the danger in the first place.  "If the owner 
or the occupier of property continues a nuisance 
created thereon by others, he is liable, not because 
he owns or occupies the premises, but because he does 
not abate the nuisance." 
Id. at 590 (quoting 20 Ruling  392).   
¶25 Since Brown, this court has decided other public 
nuisance cases.  However, we note that although the cases 
referenced 
the 
relationship 
between 
public 
nuisance 
and 
negligence, the cases often seem to have created more confusion, 
rather than clarified that relationship.  See Jost v. Dairyland 
Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969) (noting that 
the concepts of negligence and nuisance are not exclusive); 
Raisanen v. City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 504, 151 N.W.2d 129 
(1967) (recognizing that nuisance can be grounded on negligent 
or intentional conduct but holding that if the condition does 
not create liability for negligence, there is no liability for 
negligently maintaining a public nuisance); Plesko v. Allied 
Inv. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 107 N.W.2d  201 (1961) (upholding 
and applying Brown and framing the issue in terms of placing 
responsibility because neither the landowner nor the city acted 
No. 
00-1836   
 
25 
 
to remove a public nuisance);20 Krejci v. Lojeski, 275 Wis. 20, 
80 N.W.2d 794 (1957) (concluding that if a condition could not 
                                                 
20 We reject the Frankes' argument that Brown and Plesko v. 
Allied Investment Co., 12 Wis. 2d 168, 107 N.W.2d 201 (1961), do 
not apply because the tree here did not obstruct the highway 
itself.  In making this argument, the Frankes claim that 
subsequent cases, Hei v. City of Durand, 22 Wis. 2d 101, 125 
N.W.2d 341 
(1963), 
and 
Peppas 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
29 
Wis. 2d 609, 139 N.W.2d 579 (1966), limit Brown to situations 
where no maintenance of a municipality is involved and the 
impediment is within the control of the property owner.  We 
reject this argument because we disagree with the Frankes' 
interpretation of the treatment of Brown and Plesko in these 
subsequent cases.  In Hei, this court held that the property 
owner adjacent to the sidewalk was not liable for injuries 
resulting from defects in the sidewalk arising from the natural 
growth of roots of a tree on the owner's property.  22 
Wis. 2d at 106.  The court distinguished Brown and Plesko 
because those cases did not involve keeping a street or highway 
in repair, and in those cases the matter (the tree) was wholly 
within the control of the property owner.  Hei, 22 Wis. 2d  at 
104.  In Peppas, this court made the same distinction between a 
dangerous condition in a driveway and the holdings in Brown and 
Plesko.  Peppas, 29 Wis. 2d at 618.  The court further expanded 
on the distinction though by explaining that the original Brown 
decision was explained as unsound because it was based on 
"sidewalk cases" involving statutory liability for failure to 
perform a governmental function.  Id.  For this reason, the 
court in Peppas explained that on reargument, the Brown court 
based liability on nuisance theories.  Id. at 618-619.  In 
Peppas, therefore, the court concluded "that Brown and Plesko 
are not controlling in the present case."  Id. at 619.   
No. 
00-1836   
 
26 
 
create liability for negligence, it likewise could not create 
liability for negligently maintaining a public nuisance); Schiro 
v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 546, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956) 
(concluding that when a nuisance is created or maintained by 
negligence, "the defendant should be accorded the same defenses 
that would be available in any other action grounded upon 
negligence").21   
                                                                                                                                                             
We conclude that Brown and Plesko are properly applied in 
this situation because unlike the facts in Hei and Peppas, we 
are not concerned with the actual maintenance of the highway.  
Rather, we are concerned with tree branches obstructing the view 
of a stop sign.  The so called "sidewalk cases" are not 
persuasive because although a highway may include sidewalks, 
liability here is not predicated on maintenance of the highway.  
Accordingly, because we do not find the "sidewalk cases" 
persuasive, we do not rely on Hagerty v. Village of Bruce, 82 
Wis. 2d 208, 262 N.W.2d 102 (1978), Jasenczak v. Schill, 55 
Wis. 2d 378, 198 N.W.2d 369 (1972), Petroski v. Eaton Yale & 
Towne, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 617, 178 N.W.2d 53 (1970), and Corpron 
v. Safer Foods, Inc., 22 Wis. 2d 478, 126 N.W.2d 14 (1964). 
21 Although we are solely dealing with a public nuisance, we 
note 
that 
private 
nuisance 
cases 
similarly 
discuss 
the 
relationship between nuisance and negligence.  In Bell v. Gray-
Robinson Construction Co., 265 Wis. 652, 62 N.W.2d 390 (1954), 
this court specifically distinguished between negligence and 
nuisance. 
Nuisance and negligence are different kinds of torts.  
A nuisance does not rest on the degree of care used, 
for that presents a question of negligence, but on the 
degree of danger existing even with the best of 
care. . . .  
To 
constitute 
a 
nuisance, 
the 
wrongfulness must have been in the acts themselves 
rather than in the failure to use the requisite degree 
of 
care 
in 
doing 
them, 
and 
therein 
lies 
the 
distinction . . . between 
nuisance 
and 
negligence.  
The one is a violation of an absolute duty; the other 
a failure to use the degree of care required in the 
particular circumstances——a violation of a relative 
duty. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
27 
 
¶26 Based on the relationship between public nuisance and 
negligence, especially as discussed in Brown, we conclude that 
public nuisance and negligence intersect in several respects.  
First, a public nuisance can be either intentionally or 
negligently maintained.  See Schiro, 272 Wis. at 546.  Second, 
although notice and causation are concepts usually reserved for 
negligence cases, liability for maintaining a public nuisance 
requires that the defendant had either actual or constructive 
notice of the public nuisance and that the failure to abate the 
public nuisance was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries.  Third, 
for the purposes of comparing and apportioning responsibility, 
and determining contribution among culpable parties, we conclude 
that when all of the elements to establish liability for 
maintaining a public nuisance have been affirmatively proven, a 
defendant's failure to abate a public nuisance is analogous to 
negligence 
per 
se. 
 
Finally, 
similar 
to 
liability 
for 
negligence, liability for maintaining a public nuisance can be 
limited by public policy considerations.  See Walker v. Bignell, 
100 Wis. 2d 256, 265, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981); Coffey v. City of 
Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). 
                                                                                                                                                             
265 Wis. at 657.  Furthermore, in Walley v. Patake, 271 Wis. 
530, 541, 74 N.W. 130 (1956), this court noted that "nuisance 
may exist with or without negligence," and that "[a]ny act or 
obstruction which unnecessarily incommodes or impedes the lawful 
use of a highway by the public is a nuisance." Id. (citing State 
v. Carpenter, 68 Wis. 165, 173, 31 N.W. 730 (1887)).  The court 
also referenced the notice requirement, concluding that in order 
to be liable for maintaining a nuisance, the condition needed to 
exist long enough so that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the dangerous condition.  Id. at 543. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
28 
 
¶27 First, a public nuisance can be maintained by either 
negligent or intentional conduct.22  We recognize that this first 
intersection of negligence and public nuisance arises under the 
first element for establishing liability for maintaining a 
public nuisance (the existence of the public nuisance), and that 
                                                 
22 We emphasize that negligence and nuisance are distinct 
torts, and that negligence is just one way (as opposed to 
intentional) that a nuisance can be maintained.   
[Nuisance and negligence] are not synonymous, but 
describe 
completely 
distinct 
concepts, 
which 
constitute distinct torts, different in their nature 
and in their consequences.  A claim of nuisance is 
more than a claim of negligence, and negligent acts do 
not, in themselves, constitute a nuisance; rather 
negligence is merely one type of conduct upon which 
liability for nuisance may be based, and thus, 
negligence 
is 
not 
a 
necessary 
ingredient 
of 
a 
nuisance. 
58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 9, 676 (1989).  "The point is that 
nuisance is a result and negligence is a cause and they cannot 
be distinguished otherwise."  Culwell v. Abbott Constr. Co., 
Inc., 506 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Kan. 1973); see also J.D. Lee & Barry 
A. Lindahl, Mod Tort Law § 35.08 (Rev Ed) (2001) ("Negligence 
and nuisance are separate and distinct torts, . . . There are 
well defined distinctions between negligence and nuisance."); 66 
C.J.S. Nuisances § 18, 555-556 (1998) ("[A] nuisance may exist 
either with or without negligence. . .  [while] the elements of 
nuisance and negligence frequently coexist . . . [as] a general 
rule 
negligence 
is 
not 
involved 
in 
nuisance 
actions 
or 
proceedings and is not essential to the cause of action.") 
(footnotes omitted).  Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with 
the concurring opinion's position that "allegations of public 
nuisance based on negligent conduct remain essentially an action 
for negligence."  Concurrence at ¶72. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
29 
 
is where much confusion is created.23  The complexity of the 
relationship is evident, particularly when a public nuisance is 
negligently maintained, because one automatically wants to 
trigger liability by the defendant's negligent conduct.  When a 
public nuisance is negligently maintained it is difficult to 
separate the condition——the nuisance itself——from negligent 
conduct 
that 
allegedly 
allowed 
maintenance 
of 
the 
condition/nuisance.  Brown recognizes, however, that liability 
for maintaining a public nuisance does not depend on the 
defendant's negligence or want of ordinary care.  Brown, 199 
Wis. at 589.  Instead, liability is "founded on the wrongful act 
in [either negligently or intentionally] creating or maintaining 
[the nuisance]."  Id.  The liability is imposed for "the damage 
done by or danger inherent in the creation or maintenance of 
that which constitutes a nuisance."  Id.  Accordingly, although 
either 
negligent 
or 
intentional 
conduct 
can 
result 
in 
maintenance of a public nuisance, liability for maintaining a 
public nuisance is predicated on the existence of the public 
nuisance itself. 
                                                 
23 "[T]hese torts [nuisance and negligence] may be, and 
frequently are, coexisting and practically inseparable, as where 
acts or omissions constituting negligence also give rise to a 
nuisance, and it is difficult at times to distinguish between 
actions of nuisance and those based on negligence."  58 Am. Jur. 
2d Nuisances § 9, 676-677 (1989).  We note, however, that, even 
when a nuisance is negligently maintained, the nuisance claim 
and the negligence claim remain distinct conceptually.  "In the 
case of a nuisance resulting from negligence the nuisance in 
such case is distinguishable from the negligence in that the 
former is a condition that is the result of wrongdoing, 
surviving the negligent act, while the latter involves the 
wrongdoing itself."  58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 11, 677 (1989). 
No. 
00-1836   
 
30 
 
¶28 Since a public nuisance can arise by either negligent 
or intentional conduct, the first element necessary to prove 
liability for maintaining a public nuisance requires only the 
existence of the public nuisance itself.  The circuit court's 
inquiry appropriately focuses on the dangerous condition,24 and 
whether it meets the definition of public nuisance.  We conclude 
that in this case, the court of appeals correctly interpreted 
Brown, by focusing first on the existence of the public nuisance 
itself and determining whether the tree branches obstructing the 
view of the stop sign resulted in a public nuisance. 
¶29 The second intersection between public nuisance and 
negligence involves two concepts that are oftentimes reserved 
for negligence cases——notice and causation.  Brown demonstrates 
that 
notice 
is 
appropriately 
a 
requirement 
for 
imposing 
liability for maintaining a public nuisance.  This court stated 
in Brown that maintenance of public nuisance cases are a "class 
of cases" where actual or constructive notice is required 
because "the mere existence of danger does not create liability, 
unless the circumstances are such as to charge [the] defendant 
with notice of the existence of the danger."  Brown, 199 Wis. at 
                                                 
24 We emphasize that a public nuisance claim is not the only 
claim that focuses on a condition.  For example, in cases filed 
under the safe place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1), the "focus 
[is] on the property condition that caused the injury rather 
than on the duty that the property owner or employer breached."  
Barry v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 2001 WI 101, ¶21, 245 
Wis. 2d 560, 630 N.W.2d 517. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
31 
 
589.  To demonstrate the need for the notice requirement, the 
court stated: 
In such cases where danger results, not from the 
planting of the tree, but through subsequent changes 
for which the defendant is not responsible, it is 
essential to liability that it be shown either that 
the defendant knew of the danger incident to the 
maintenance of the tree or that such condition had 
existed for such length of time that, by the exercise 
of 
ordinary 
care, 
the 
defendant 
ought 
to 
have 
discovered the danger and to have removed it before 
injuries were sustained by the plaintiff. 
Id. at 590.  The key here is that a public nuisance, especially 
a public nuisance that was negligently maintained, can result 
from changes that the defendant did not direct.  The decaying 
tree in Brown and the growing tree here,25 demonstrate that a 
public nuisance can be maintained by no action or direction on 
the 
part 
of 
the 
landowner. 
 
Accordingly, 
liability 
for 
maintaining such a public nuisance requires proof that the 
                                                 
25 We specifically reject the defendants' argument that 
Brown and Plesko, are inapplicable here because both cases 
involved a rotten tree, whereas the tree here is alive.  The 
reasoning of Brown was clearly not limited to decaying, rotten 
trees. 
[T]rees, properly placed, do not constitute nuisances.  
But when such a tree, through decay or because of any 
change in the structure of the tree or in its 
surroundings, becomes a menace to the safety of those 
who travel the street, such tree may become a nuisance 
which will render the owner of the adjoining lot 
liable for injuries which may be caused to those who 
lawfully use the streets. 
199 Wis. at 589-590 (emphasis added).  Based on this court's 
clear language to the contrary, we reject the argument that 
Brown is limited to its facts. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
32 
 
defendant had actual or constructive notice of the public 
nuisance.  We conclude, therefore, that it was appropriate to 
require the plaintiff to establish that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact that the defendants had actual or 
constructive notice of the hazardous condition. 
¶30 In addition to notice, we conclude that causation, 
another concept oftentimes reserved for negligence cases, is 
appropriately required to prove a public nuisance claim.  
Accordingly, we conclude, as did the court of appeals, that 
liability for maintaining a public nuisance requires proof that 
the failure to abate the public nuisance was a cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. 
¶31 Another intersection of negligence and public nuisance 
involves the responsibility comparison and apportionment among 
culpable parties.  We find it useful to analogize conceptually 
the allocation of responsibility in a public nuisance case to 
negligence per se26 or negligence as a matter of law.  For the 
purposes of comparing and apportioning responsibility for the 
accident and for determining contribution among the parties 
responsible for maintaining the nuisance, we conclude that when 
all of the elements necessary to establish liability for 
maintaining a public nuisance have been affirmatively proven——
existence of the public nuisance, notice, and causation——a 
                                                 
26 "As a general rule, the violation of a public duty, 
enjoined by law for the protection of person or property, 
constitutes [negligence per se]."  Black's Law Dictionary 1187 
(4th ed. 1957). 
No. 
00-1836   
 
33 
 
defendant's failure to abate a public nuisance is analogous to 
negligence per se.27  In order to provide for the allocation of 
responsibility and to determine contribution, a defendant's 
failure to abate a public nuisance could be treated as analogous 
to negligence per se——the failure to follow a legislatively 
prescribed minimum standard.  By concluding that a defendant's 
failure to abate a public nuisance is analogous to negligence 
per se, it allows the jury to allocate responsibility among 
culpable 
parties, 
which 
is 
consistent 
with 
contributory 
negligence principles established in Wis. Stat. § 895.04528 and 
                                                 
27 This analogy is consistent with the comments to the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts 
§ 821B 
(1979), 
where 
the 
Restatement analogizes public nuisance to negligence as a matter 
of law.  In a discussion of public nuisance, Comment e to § 821B 
states: 
There is a clear analogy to the doctrine of negligence 
as a matter of law. . . . In the case of negligence as 
a matter of law, the standard defined by a legislative 
enactment is normally a minimum standard. . . . The 
same general principle applies to public nuisance.   
28 895.045 
Contributory 
negligence. 
 
(1) 
COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE.  Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an 
action by any person or the person's legal representative to 
recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property, if that negligence was not greater than 
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, 
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.  
The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately 
against the negligence of each person found to be causally 
negligent.  The liability of each person found to be causally 
negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is less than 51% 
is limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence 
attributed to that person.  A person found to be causally 
negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more 
shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages allowed. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
34 
 
as 
applied 
in 
Schiro. 
 
See 
Schiro, 
272 
Wis. 
at 
547 
("[C]ontributory negligence is a defense in an action for 
damages occasioned by a nuisance grounded upon negligence."); 
see also McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391, 392 
(N.Y. 1928) (Judge Cardozo holding that where negligence is the 
basis of the nuisance contributory negligence principles apply).  
We conclude, therefore, that the negligence per se analogy 
appropriately 
frames 
the 
fact-finder's 
role 
to 
apportion 
responsibility and to determine contribution among culpable 
parties in a public nuisance case. 
¶32 Finally, 
we conclude 
that 
negligence 
and 
public 
nuisance intersect with regard to public policy considerations.  
Similar to liability for negligence, we conclude that liability 
for maintaining a public nuisance can be limited by public 
policy 
considerations. 
 
By 
examining 
public 
policy 
considerations we direct our attention to the question:  Should 
a party who has maintained a public nuisance which has caused 
harm to another be shielded from liability on public policy 
grounds?  "The application of the public policy considerations 
is solely a function of the court."  Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541.  
We find sufficient reason to apply public policy considerations 
here, where we are analyzing liability for the alleged negligent 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2)  CONCERTED ACTION.  Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 or 
more parties act in accordance with a common scheme or plan, 
those parties are jointly and severally liable for all damages 
resulting from that action, except as provided in s. 895.85(5). 
 
No. 
00-1836   
 
35 
 
maintenance of a public nuisance.  The existence of a public 
nuisance, combined with notice, creates a duty to abate the 
nuisance because of foreseeable danger.  As with negligence, 
however, there are circumstances where imposing liability would 
be unreasonable.  See Walker, 100 Wis. 2d at 265; see also 
Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 264-265, 580 
N.W.2d 233 (1998) (enumerating six policy considerations).  We 
recognize that even though "the chain of causation is complete 
and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on grounds of 
public policy. . . ."  Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that the court of appeals appropriately examined 
public policy considerations in this case. 
IV. EXISTENCE OF A PUBLIC NUISANCE 
¶33 We now turn to the record to determine whether the 
tree branches obstructing the view of the stop sign resulted in 
a public nuisance as a matter of law.29  Based on the definition 
of public nuisance from State v. Quality Egg Farm, Inc., 104 
Wis. 2d 506, 517, 311 N.W.2d 650 (1981), and State v. Michels 
Pipeline 
Construction, 
Inc., 
63 Wis. 2d 278, 
286-287, 217 
N.W.2d 339 
(1974), 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
tree 
branches 
obstructing the view of the stop sign resulted in a condition 
                                                 
29 We note that this case comes before us on review of the 
circuit court's summary judgment decision.  Accordingly, we 
determine whether the elements to establish liability for 
maintaining a public nuisance are established as a matter of law 
based on the undisputed facts.  We are in no way precluding an 
inquiry in future cases where questions regarding the existence 
of a public nuisance, notice, and causation would be issues 
proper for the fact-finder. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
36 
 
that substantially or unduly interfered with the use of a public 
place or with the activities of an entire community.  See 
Schiro, 272 Wis. at 546.  Our inquiry focuses on two questions:  
(1) whether there are any disputed issues of material fact to 
preclude a summary judgment determination that the condition of 
the tree branches in relation to the stop sign amounted to a 
public nuisance, and (2) if not, whether there are any disputed 
issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants had 
actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition.  We 
agree with the circuit court and the court of appeals, that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact on these matters. 
¶34 Based on our review of the photographs and videotape 
in the record, we conclude that "the stop sign was largely, if 
not completely, obscured from the view of drivers approaching 
the intersection in the direction Diane Smith was traveling."  
Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶47.  The obstruction of the 
view of the stop sign is evident in the record.  The photographs 
and the videotape are convincing because they show the tree and 
the stop sign in the condition they were in on the afternoon of 
the accident, from the same vantage point as that of Diane 
Smith; and the second photo also shows the tree and the stop 
sign at a later date, after the tree was trimmed. 
 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
37
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
38
¶35 We further conclude that none of the defendants 
submitted evidence to dispute our conclusion reached upon review 
of the photographs and videotape.  Neither Dodge County nor the 
Town of Leroy point to evidence contrary to the photos and 
videotape.  The Frankes, however, oppose summary judgment by 
arguing that the photos are not reliable because wind and shade 
may have altered the visibility, and that their deposition 
testimony disputes whether the tree branches actually obscured 
the stop sign.  We reject both arguments.  As the court of 
appeals 
concluded, 
the 
Frankes' 
first 
argument 
is 
mere 
conjecture and does not satisfy the nonmoving party's obligation 
to oppose summary judgment by advancing specific facts showing 
the presence of a genuine material dispute.  See Physicians 
Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶48; see also Baxter, 165 Wis. 2d at 312 
(nonmovant must demonstrate more than a mere existence of an 
alleged factual dispute). 
¶36 With regard to the second argument, the Frankes 
contend that the circuit court improperly acted as a fact-finder 
in concluding that their deposition testimony did not raise any 
genuine issue of material fact.  The Frankes' argue that their 
testimony indicated that the sign was only partially blocked.  
The Frankes' further rely on testimony of their neighbor, a Town 
of Leroy supervisor, stating that he never had trouble seeing 
the stop sign, although he knew it was there.  We conclude, as 
the circuit court and court of appeals did, that the Frankes' 
evidence does not create a genuine material factual dispute that 
the stop sign was significantly obstructed from the view of a 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
39
driver coming from the west on Ledge Road.  Testimony from the 
Frankes and their neighbor, all persons familiar with the 
intersection, is not credible evidence sufficient to place in 
dispute the fact that the tree branches obscuring the view of 
the stop sign resulted in a public nuisance.  Furthermore, we 
rely on the photographic evidence because where physical 
evidence is in conflict with oral testimony, the physical 
evidence must control.  Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 
Wis. 2d 91, 111, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977); State v. Lucynski, 48 
Wis. 2d 232, 238, 179 N.W.2d 889 (1970); see also Whitefish Bay 
v. 
Hardtke, 
40 
Wis. 2d 150, 
153, 
161 
N.W.2d 259 
(1968) 
("Physical evidence may not only contradict oral testimony but, 
if irrefutable and unquestionable, it may render testimony 
incredible."). 
 
Accordingly, 
based 
on 
the 
undisputed 
photographic evidence, we conclude that the tree branches 
obstructing the view of the stop sign constituted a public 
nuisance as a matter of law. 
V. 
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 
¶37 Since we conclude that there is no genuine material 
factual dispute regarding whether the condition constituted a 
public nuisance, we now look at whether there are any genuine 
disputed 
issues 
of 
material 
fact 
regarding 
whether 
the 
defendants had actual or constructive notice of the condition.  
Under Brown, a defendant is only liable for the maintenance of a 
public nuisance if the defendant "knew of the danger incident to 
the maintenance of the tree or that such condition had existed 
for such length of time that, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
40
the defendant ought to have discovered the danger and to have 
removed it before injuries were sustained by the plaintiff."  
199 Wis. at 590.  The Frankes and Dodge County both argue that 
the circuit court and court of appeals erred in concluding they 
had notice of the condition, because the question of notice is 
one for the jury.  In contrast, Smith contends that the hazard 
was not something that appeared suddenly.  Rather, it was a slow 
occurring hazard and therefore, a jury is not required to 
determine whether there was reasonable time to discover the 
condition. 
¶38 We independently 
review the 
record 
to 
determine 
whether, as a matter of law, the defendants had actual or 
constructive notice.  Smith points to the arborist's affidavit, 
stating the "opinion that the obstruction of the stop sign 
(during time of foliage) existed for at least the spring and 
summer of 1996 and the foliage season of 1995."  There is no 
direct evidence in the record to the contrary.  While the 
Frankes' try to rely again on their testimony and their 
neighbor's testimony that the sign was only partially obscured, 
that testimony does not relate to when the condition occurred, 
let alone whether the obstruction of the stop sign was more 
recent than what the arborist opined.  Based on the arborist's 
affidavit, 
we 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
the 
tree 
branches 
substantially obstructed the view of the stop sign for at least 
the spring of 1996 through the date of the accident, July 21, 
1996. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
41
¶39 We now turn to whether this period of time, two to 
three months, is sufficient to impute constructive notice of the 
condition as a matter of law. 
[C]onstructive notice is chargeable only where the 
hazard has existed for a sufficient length of time to 
allow the vigilant owner or employer the opportunity 
to discover and remedy the situation.  The length of 
time viewed as sufficient varies according to the 
nature of the business, the nature of the defect, and 
the public policy involved. 
May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 36-37, 264 N.W.2d 574 
(1978) (footnote omitted).  We agree with the circuit court and 
the court of appeals that the hazardous condition existed for a 
sufficient time to the allow the Frankes, Dodge County, and the 
Town of Leroy to discover and remedy the hazard.  With regard to 
the Frankes, this tree was in their yard and they acknowledged 
seeing the intersection on a daily basis.  While they maintain 
that the stop sign was only "partially" obstructed, their 
testimony is sufficient to conclude that they had at least 
constructive knowledge of the condition, and perhaps even actual 
knowledge.  Therefore, like the court of appeals, we find "no 
difficulty concluding that the Frankes knew or ought to have 
known that the branches of their tree posed a hazard to traffic 
at the intersection by obscuring the stop sign."  Physicians 
Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶57. 
¶40 We also conclude that Dodge County and the Town of 
Leroy had constructive notice.  While both municipalities 
conducted inspections of roads and signs, the inspections were 
conducted in April and November, the non-foliage season.  For 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
42
the rest of the year, the municipalities apparently relied on 
citizens to report hazardous roads and conditions.  Two to three 
months is a sufficient length of time for representatives of the 
municipalities to drive by, or be notified of the hazard.  See 
Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis. 2d 352, 359, 130 N.W.2d 835 (1964) 
(nineteen days after actual notice is sufficient time to 
constitute unreasonable delay in replacing traffic sign).  Dodge 
County and the Town of Leroy therefore had sufficient time to 
discover and remedy the hazard.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the circuit court and the court of appeals correctly concluded 
that there was no genuine material factual dispute regarding the 
existence of a public nuisance or the defendants' actual or 
constructive notice of the hazardous condition. 
VI. CAUSATION 
¶41 We now turn to the issue of causation, and whether 
causation may be decided on summary judgment.  We keep in mind 
that disputed reasonable inferences preclude a determination on 
summary judgment.  See Wills v. Regan, 58 Wis. 2d 328, 339, 206 
N.W.2d 398 (1973).  The circuit court concluded that the issue 
of causation was appropriate for summary judgment.  Based on the 
record, the court concluded that the defendants, owing a duty to 
remove the obstruction and failing to do so, contributed to 
cause the accident.  In fact, the circuit court stated, "To 
conclude that that was not a cause of this accident is utterly 
unsupported in fact, law or logic."  The court of appeals, 
however, disagreed and reversed the decision on causation, 
concluding "that disputed reasonable inferences from the facts 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
43
of record preclude a determination on summary judgment that the 
obscuration of the stop sign was a cause of the accident in 
which Smith was injured."  Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 148, 
¶58.   
¶42 We agree with the court of appeals' decision on the 
issue of causation.  There is evidence in the record that Diane 
Smith had consumed alcohol immediately prior to the accident.  
In fact, Diane Smith told a police investigator that she had 
consumed "4-5 beers" during the two hours prior to the accident 
and admitted to being possibly under the influence of alcohol.  
Based on the record, and the disputed reasonable inferences, we 
agree with the court of appeals "that reasonable fact finders 
could differ on the issue of whether Diane Smith's actions were 
the sole cause of the accident, that is, whether the tree-
obscured stop sign was a substantial factor contributing to the 
accident."  Id. at ¶62.  The circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment on the issue of causation was therefore inappropriate 
on this record.30  We, therefore, affirm the court of appeals' 
decision that the tree branches obstructing the view of the stop 
sign created a public nuisance, that all three defendants had 
actual or constructive notice of the hazard, but that disputed 
reasonable inferences make the issue of whether the failure to 
                                                 
30 We note, however, as did the court of appeals, that this 
conclusion does not suggest that a jury verdict assigning all or 
nearly all causation to the hazard would not be sustainable.  
See Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 
App 148, ¶63, 246 Wis. 2d 933, 632 N.W.2d 59.  We simply find 
the issue inappropriate for summary judgment on this record. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
44
abate the public nuisance was a cause of plaintiff's injuries 
inappropriate for summary judgment. 
VII. FAILURE TO ABATE A PUBLIC NUISANCE AS ANALOGOUS TO 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE 
¶43 As noted earlier, we conclude that for the purposes of 
comparing 
and 
apportioning 
responsibility, 
and 
determining 
contribution among culpable parties, when all of the elements 
necessary to establish liability for maintaining a public 
nuisance have been affirmatively proven, a defendant's failure 
to abate a public nuisance is analogous to negligence per se.  
We emphasize that this case comes before the court on review of 
the circuit court's summary judgment decision.  We previously 
concluded that the circuit court correctly decided that the 
hazardous condition constituted a public nuisance as a matter of 
law, and that each defendant had actual or constructive notice 
of the public nuisance.  The remaining element, causation, 
however, is not appropriately decided on summary judgment here 
because disputed reasonable inferences remain.  The issue of 
causation remains a question for the jury, so all elements 
necessary to prove liability for maintaining a public nuisance 
are not affirmatively decided in this case.  We conclude, 
however, that if causation is established at trial, for the 
purposes 
of comparing 
and 
apportioning 
responsibility and 
determining contribution 
among the 
culpable 
parties, 
each 
defendant's failure to abate the public nuisance would be 
analogous to negligence per se.   
VIII. 
PUBLIC POLICY 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
45
¶44 We now turn to the last intersection between public 
nuisance and negligence and determine whether each defendant is 
excluded from liability for public policy reasons.  See 
Physician Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶12; see also Walker, 100 
Wis. 2d at 265 ("Whether liability should be imposed in a given 
situation is a question of policy, whether the liability is 
regulated by the notion of duty . . . or whether . . . liability 
is cut off after the elements . . . have been established.").  
The court of appeals concluded that each defendant here was 
responsible for maintaining a public nuisance and would not be 
excused from liability based on public policy grounds.  As we 
have previously recognized, "The application of the public 
policy considerations is solely a function of the court."  
Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541.  Accordingly, we review each 
defendant's relationship to the public nuisance and then address 
the public policy arguments of each defendant, since each claims 
it is excluded from liability for failure to trim the offending 
branches in this case. 
¶45 A duty of care exists under Wisconsin law "whenever it 
was foreseeable to the defendant that his or her act or omission 
to act might cause harm to some other person."  Gritzner v. 
Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶20, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906.  
Liability for breach of a duty——here, the duty to abate a public 
nuisance——may be limited or precluded, however, based on public 
policy.  See Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶24.  Whether each of the 
defendants in this case is excused from liability based on 
public policy considerations is appropriately before this court 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
46
based on the conclusions we have previously reached in this 
case. 
¶46 Before discussing the public policy considerations, we 
note that none of the defendants argue that no one is liable for 
the hazardous condition.  Instead, the Frankes, Dodge County, 
and the Town of Leroy point fingers at each other, claiming that 
one or both of the other defendants are liable for maintaining 
the public nuisance.31  We conclude, however, that all three 
defendants had a duty to abate the public nuisance and are 
therefore liable for maintaining a public nuisance, if causation 
is established at trial. 
A. 
Frankes 
¶47 The Frankes frame the issue in this case in terms of 
maintaining the stop sign and argue that they are not liable for 
failing 
to 
abate 
the 
public 
nuisance 
because 
(1) 
the 
municipalities, not the homeowners, have a non-delegable duty to 
maintain the stop sign; and (2) public policy considerations 
                                                 
31 We note that the Town of Leroy explicitly takes no 
position regarding the duty or liability of the Frankes. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
47
recognized in Walker and Miller preclude their liability.32  
Before 
addressing 
these 
arguments, 
however, 
we 
note 
a 
significant fact:  the offending tree is located on Frankes' 
land.  As it was their tree, the Frankes' had control over it, 
which was demonstrated by the fact that they trimmed the tree 
branches on the side of the tree facing their residence.  The 
Frankes' control over the tree is also noted by the fact that 
Donald Franke joined in trimming the tree branches the day after 
the accident. 
                                                 
32 The Frankes also make two arguments relating to common 
law obligations.  First, they argue that they do not have a duty 
under common law principles.  They specifically refer to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363 (1965), concluding "that a 
landowner incurs no liability for physical harm caused by the 
natural condition of his land to those outside his property."  
Wells v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 565, 
569, 283 N.W.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1979).  We reject this argument, 
however, because we conclude that Restatement § 363 does not 
resolve this case since this court, in affirming the court of 
appeals' decision, did not rely on or adopt that section of the 
Restatement.  See Wells v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 
98 Wis. 2d 328, 296 N.W.2d 559 (1980).  Furthermore, we conclude 
that § 363 is not controlling because that section is undermined 
in both the Comment to § 363 ("[Reasonable care] will at least 
require [the possessor of land] to take reasonable steps to 
prevent harm when he is in fact aware of the dangerous condition 
of the tree."), and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840 
(indicating the exception to the general rule in § 363). 
The Frankes also argue, however, that the imposition of 
liability in this case is a change in common law obligations and 
therefore should be applied prospectively.  We disagree that 
this is a change in common law obligations.  This court decided 
Brown in 1929, and has discussed Brown in subsequent decisions.  
While this case presents a new set of facts for application of 
the reasoning in Brown, this is not a change in common law 
obligations.  Accordingly, we decline the Frankes' invitation to 
apply the legal conclusions of this case prospectively. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
48
¶48 The Frankes first argue that they are relieved of 
liability because the municipalities, not the landowner, have a 
non-delegable duty to maintain the stop sign.  In making this 
argument, the Frankes erroneously restrict the scope of this 
case to the stop sign, rather than the relationship between the 
stop sign and the offending tree branches.  We reject the 
Frankes' argument because we are not concluding that the 
Frankes' are liable for failing to maintain a stop sign.  We 
reiterate that they are liable for failing to abate a public 
nuisance, if found to be causal of the injuries.  Their 
liability is based on their failure to trim the branches of 
their tree, which they knew, or should have known, to be 
obstructing the view of a stop sign and thus, resulting in a 
hazardous condition.  We agree with the court of appeals' 
statement: 
We emphasize again that the liability of the Frankes 
on the present facts is in no way premised on their 
failure to maintain 
the 
'streets, 
highways, and 
related signage' adjacent to their home, but on their 
failure to eliminate a safety hazard created by a tree 
growing in their yard. 
Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶19.    We will not discuss 
the 
specific 
duties 
of 
municipalities 
here 
because 
we 
specifically address those duties in Section VIII. B. and VIII. 
C., as they relate to Dodge County and the Town of Leroy.  We 
note, however, that a municipality's non-delegable duty is not 
necessarily an exclusive duty.  See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 
of Racine v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 264 Wis. 404, 409, 59 
N.W.2d 445 (1953) (property owner and city both liable for 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
49
injuries caused by broken curbstone); Holl v. City of Merrill, 
251 Wis. 203, 209, 28 N.W.2d 363 (1947) (city and adjoining 
landowner both liable for creating or maintaining a nuisance 
regarding sidewalk repair).  The Frankes' argument that a 
municipality's non-delegable duty to maintain the stop sign 
relieves them of liability for failing to trim the tree 
branches, therefore fails. 
¶49 The Frankes' also argue that they should be relieved 
of liability based on general public policy grounds set forth in 
our case law.  Relying on the public policy exclusion from 
liability stated in Walker, 100 Wis. 2d at 265, and this court's 
acknowledgement of six public policy considerations; see Miller, 
219 Wis. 2d at 264-265, the Frankes contend that imposing 
liability here (1) would be an imposition of liability and 
expense out of proportion to the liability of the motoring 
public and municipalities; (2) would place an unreasonable 
burden (patrol and decide what to cut or what crops not to 
plant) on landowners; and (3) will cause liability to enter a 
field where there is no sensible or just stopping point.   
¶50 We first reject the Frankes' argument that Walker 
applies because the public policy exclusion in that case related 
to municipalities and eliminating visual obstructions at "areas 
adjacent to every highway intersection."  100 Wis. 2d at 266.  
We conclude that Walker does not relieve the Frankes of 
liability because that case related to municipal liability 
rather than that of private landowners.  See Beacon Bowl v. Wis. 
Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740, 764, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993).  
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
50
Furthermore, as we discuss in Section VIII B., the Walker public 
policy holding does not apply to an obstructed view of a stop 
sign. 
¶51 We also reject the Frankes' other public policy 
arguments by noting the limited scope of this decision.  We 
reiterate that the Frankes' liability is not based on their 
failure to maintain the highway, a stop sign, or a general area 
of visibility.  Rather, their responsibility is based solely on 
their failure to trim the branches of their tree, which they 
knew, or should have known to be obstructing the view of a stop 
sign——their failure to abate the public nuisance.  Because 
responsibility is strictly based on the facts of this case, we 
disagree with the Frankes' conclusions that there is no sensible 
or just stopping point.   
¶52 We also disagree with the Frankes' argument that 
liability places an unreasonable burden on the landowner.  The 
burden is to trim one's own tree when one knows, or should know, 
that it is creating a hazardous condition.  We do not find this 
unreasonable.  Furthermore, we reject the Frankes' arguments 
that their liability is out of proportion to the liability of 
the motoring public and municipalities.  As we discuss below, 
the municipalities in this case are also liable for maintaining 
a 
public 
nuisance. 
 
The 
proportion 
of 
each 
defendant's 
liability, however, is an issue of causation, and of comparison, 
which we previously concluded is not appropriate for summary 
judgment.  We, therefore, reject their final public policy 
argument and affirm the court of appeals' holding that the 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
51
Frankes had a duty to abate the public nuisance, and, if causal, 
are liable for failing to do so. 
B. 
Dodge County 
¶53 We now turn to whether Dodge County's liability is 
limited by public policy considerations.  Before turning to 
Dodge County's legal arguments, we note the relationship between 
Dodge County, the tree, and the stop sign.  Highway Z is an 
arterial highway and Dodge County installed the stop sign 
requiring drivers to stop when proceeding on Ledge Road.  
Furthermore, Dodge County personnel annually drove through the 
county to check the visibility of signs.  The inspection was 
usually during November, at night, and the primary purpose was 
to determine reflectivity. 
¶54 Dodge County argues it is not liable for failing to 
trim the branches of the Frankes' tree because (1) under the 
public policy in Walker, municipalities may not be held liable 
for failure to cut vegetation; (2) under Brown, Dodge County 
cannot be liable because it does not maintain either the right 
of way or the Frankes' property; and (3) Dodge County is 
prohibited from trimming the Frankes' tree branches under 
Wis. Stat. § 86.03(3) and (4).  We address each argument in 
turn. 
¶55 First, based on the public policy discussion in 
Walker, Dodge County contends that a municipality cannot be held 
liable for failure to trim vegetation in order to assure 
motorist visibility.  Dodge County contends that Walker controls 
here, and that as a matter of law it cannot be held liable.  We 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
52
disagree.  In Walker, the plaintiffs were in a traffic accident 
and sued both the town and county in charge of maintaining the 
roads.  The plaintiffs alleged that the municipalities were 
negligent in failing to trim weeds in the areas adjacent to the 
roads, and because they were so overgrown, the weeds obstructed 
the view of the intersection.  Walker, 100 Wis. 2d  at 258.  
This court declined to assert that municipalities have "an 
affirmative duty to cut roadside vegetation in order to assure 
motorist visibility," and declared as a matter of public policy 
that "municipalities should not be exposed to common law 
liability" in these circumstances.  Id. at 266.  The court 
reasoned that such liability would place an unreasonable and 
unmanageable burden upon municipalities, and that "the height 
and density of vegetation would become a factor in nearly every 
intersection accident case."  Id. 
¶56 The court of appeals recently applied Walker in 
another roadside vegetation case, Estate of Robert Wagoner v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 292, 249 Wis. 2d 306, 638 
N.W.2d 382.  In Wagoner, the court of appeals refused to 
distinguish between a municipality that does not cut roadside 
vegetation and a municipality that cuts roadside vegetation, but 
does so negligently.  Id. at ¶8.  Based on the same policy 
concerns enunciated in Walker, the court of appeals refused to 
create 
municipal 
liability 
for 
failure 
to 
cut 
roadside 
vegetation.  Id. at ¶10. 
¶57 Dodge County argues that the policy concerns in Walker 
(and 
subsequently 
Wagoner) 
apply 
here, 
concluding 
that 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
53
municipalities are not liable for failing to cut vegetation, 
even if the vegetation is obstructing the view of a stop sign.  
In contrast, Smith contends that Walker does not apply here 
because a stop sign is involved, and Dodge County has an 
affirmative 
duty 
to 
maintain 
the 
stop 
sign 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 349.065.  We agree with Smith, the circuit court, 
and the court of appeals that Walker "should not be extended to 
circumstances where a traffic control sign, and not just general 
visibility at the intersection, is obscured."  Physicians Plus, 
2001 WI App 148, ¶31.   
¶58 We decline to conclude that Dodge County's liability 
is limited by public policy because under the statutes and case 
law, Dodge County had an affirmative duty to maintain the stop 
sign.  Wisconsin Stat. § 349.065 states, "Local authorities 
shall place and maintain traffic control devices upon highways 
under their jurisdiction to regulate, warn, guide or inform 
traffic."  (Emphasis added.)  Furthermore, the statute requires 
that local authorities use and maintain such traffic control 
devices according to the Department of Transportation's manual.  
Id.; see also Wis. Stat. § 84.02(4).  The manual requires "All 
traffic signs should be kept in proper position, clean and 
legible 
at 
all 
times." 
 
The 
manual 
also 
requires 
the 
municipality to schedule "inspection, cleaning and replacement"  
and states that "Special attention and necessary action should 
be taken to see that weeds, trees, shrubbery and construction 
materials do not obscure the face of any sign."  Based on these 
express recognitions of a county's duty to maintain traffic 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
54
control signs, we refuse to conclude that Dodge County is 
excused from such a duty regarding the stop sign it placed in 
this case. 
¶59 In addition to 
the 
statutory requirements, 
this 
court's prior decisions support our conclusion.  In Naker v. 
Town of Trenton, 62 Wis. 2d 654, 215 N.W.2d 38 on rehearing, 62 
Wis. 2d 660, 660a, 217 N.W.2d 665 (1974), this court explicitly 
stated, "A sign once erected by legislative action must be 
properly maintained . . . ."  As the municipality with the duty 
to erect the stop sign at the intersection of Ledge Road and 
Highway Z, Dodge County appropriately took action to erect the 
stop sign, and subsequently also had a duty, based on the 
statutes and case law, to maintain that sign.  According to the 
Department of Transportation Manual, Dodge County's maintenance 
duty encompasses assuring visibility and taking "necessary 
action" to assure the face of the stop sign is not obscured by 
trees.  This duty could not be stated any clearer.   
¶60 In affirming this duty, we also recognize that the 
policy concerns of Walker shift significantly when the focus is 
on a traffic control sign, rather than general visibility at an 
intersection.  The uncertainty of whether trimming vegetation 
increases general visibility is not present when the question 
focuses 
on 
a 
specific 
object 
such 
as 
the 
stop 
sign.  
Accordingly, based on the explicit directives discussed above, 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
55
including the statutes, the manual, and the case law, we decline 
to extend Walker to the present facts.33 
¶61 Dodge County's second argument is that it cannot be 
liable because, under Brown, liability is limited to the Frankes 
and the Town of Leroy.  Dodge County contends that it escapes 
liability because it does not maintain either the property on 
which the tree is located, or the right-of-way where the stop 
sign is placed.  Again, we disagree with Dodge County's 
interpretation of this court's precedent.  In Brown, this court 
concluded that city ordinances gave the city authority to remove 
the dead tree on the landowner's property, and in no way limited 
the power of the landowner to remove the dead tree on his or her 
property.  199 Wis. at 591.  Applied here, the principles 
enunciated in Brown require that we conclude that Dodge County 
cannot escape liability for failing to trim, or to request 
others to trim, the tree branches.  As we discussed above, the 
statutes and the Department of Transportation Manual give Dodge 
County the authority to——and in fact require——that Dodge County 
maintain 
the 
visibility 
of 
the 
stop 
sign. 
 
This 
duty 
specifically encompasses taking "necessary action," for example, 
trimming trees, to assure that trees do not obscure the face of 
                                                 
33  We note that our decision here does not address whether 
Wis. Stat. § 349.065 and the related statutes and regulations, 
themselves, "provide a basis for the civil liability of 
municipalities to injured motorists on the present facts."  
Physicians Plus, 2001 WI App 148, ¶35 n.11.  Our decision here 
is limited to the facts before us, and relies on those statutes 
and 
regulations 
only 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
determining 
a 
municipality's duty to maintain the stop sign. 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
56
the 
stop 
sign. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
reject 
Dodge 
County's 
interpretation of Brown as limited to its facts. 
¶62 Finally, 
Dodge 
County 
argues 
that 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 86.03(3) and (4), it is prohibited from trimming 
the tree branches.  Dodge County argues that it was prohibited 
from trimming the tree because the tree was not within its 
right-of-way, and the most it could do was request others to 
trim the offending branches. Specifically, Dodge County relies 
on language in § 86.03(3) and (4) stating, "trees . . . shall be 
cut or removed only by the owner or occupant of the abutting 
land or by the public authority having control of the highway."  
We agree with the court of appeals' discussion of this argument, 
and similarly reject that argument for several reasons.  First, 
as 
discussed 
above, 
§ 349.065 
and 
related 
statutes 
and 
regulations require Dodge County, in the course of maintaining 
the stop sign, to take "necessary action" to assure the 
visibility of the stop sign.  Furthermore, as Smith points out, 
§ 83.015(2)(a) allows Dodge County to "enter private lands with 
their employees to remove weeds and brush . . . ."  Accordingly, 
Dodge County was not powerless in being able to trim the 
offending branches, or request the assistance of the Frankes or 
the Town of Leroy in trimming the branches that it knew, or 
should have known, were obstructing the visibility of the stop 
sign.  We, therefore, conclude that Dodge County does not escape 
liability based on its failure to trim the offending branches——
to abate the public nuisance. 
C. 
Town of Leroy 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
57
¶63 Finally, we determine whether the Town of Leroy should 
be held liable for its failure to trim the branches obstructing 
the view of the stop sign.  Again, we first note the 
relationship between the Town of Leroy, the tree, and the stop 
sign.  The tree is partially within the Town of Leroy's highway 
right-of-way for Ledge Road.  In April of each year, Town of 
Leroy personnel inspect the roads to assure stop signs are in 
good condition, but apparently do not inspect for obstruction of 
stop signs.  We again note that the morning after the accident a 
Town of Leroy representative assisted Donald Franke in cutting 
the offending branches.  We also note that at the time of the 
accident Ermanelda Franke was the Town of Leroy Assessor and her 
neighbor, Linus Schraufnagel, was Town Chairman.34 
¶64 The Town of Leroy argues that it is not liable for 
failing to abate the public nuisance because (1) under the 
Wisconsin Statutes the sole duty to maintain the stop sign lies 
with Dodge County, and (2) the Town of Leroy does not have a 
common law duty to maintain the stop sign.   
¶65 With regard to the first issue, we acknowledge that 
Dodge County has a duty to maintain the stop sign.  However, we 
decline to conclude that this is an exclusive duty that relieves 
                                                 
34 We note that public policy considerations would preclude 
the individual liability of Linus Schraufnagel, the Frankes' 
neighbor, for his failure to abate the public nuisance.  
Although Schraufnagel likely had actual or constructive notice 
of the hazardous condition, holding him liable would cause 
liability to enter a field where there is no sensible or just 
stopping point.  See Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 265, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998). 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
58
the 
Town 
of 
Leroy 
of 
its 
responsibilities. 
 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 81.01, the Town of Leroy "shall have the care and 
supervision of all highways in the town," and shall "[e]nter any 
private lands with their employees and agents for the purposes 
of removing weeds and brush . . . ."  § 81.01(10).  We further 
recognize that § 81.15 grants a private right of action against 
a town, city or village to recover damages due to the 
"insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway . . . ."  While 
the Town of Leroy's liability is not directly based on a claim 
under § 81.15, this statute, in combination with the other 
statutes previously discussed, leads us to conclude that there 
is no public policy rationale for relieving the Town of Leroy of 
liability for a hazardous condition present in its right-of-way. 
¶66 Second, the Town of Leroy argues that it is not liable 
here because it did not have a common law duty to maintain the 
stop sign.  We first note that this argument erroneously 
restricts the scope of this case to the stop sign and ignores 
the Town of Leroy's duty to trim the tree branches located in 
its right-of-way obstructing visibility of a stop sign.  While 
we acknowledge that the Town of Leroy does not have a common law 
duty to maintain stop signs placed and maintained by Dodge 
County, this argument ignores the statutory provisions discussed 
above, charging it with "the care and supervision of all 
highways in the town."  Although Wis. Stat. § 81.01 includes the 
phrase, "except as otherwise provided," we decline to construe 
that phrase to mean that if another governmental entity also has 
a duty to maintain a stop sign, the Town of Leroy is relieved of 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
59
its duty to maintain its highways.  Rather, we conclude that 
both governmental units had a duty, neither of which was 
exclusive of the other.  Based on the statutory provisions 
requiring the Town of Leroy to maintain its highways, including 
its rights-of-way, we conclude that it had a duty here to trim 
the tree branches that it knew, or should have known, were 
present in its right-of-way, and which were obstructing the view 
of a stop sign.  Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the 
court of appeals regarding the Town of Leroy's duty to abate the 
public nuisance. 
¶67 In summary, we affirm the court of appeals' decision 
that, if the public nuisance is found to be a cause of the 
accident, none of the defendants can escape liability for 
maintaining 
a 
public 
nuisance 
due 
to 
public 
policy 
considerations.  Based on the statutes, regulations, case law, 
and public policy concerns, we conclude that each of the 
defendants, the Frankes, Dodge County, and Town of Leroy, had a 
relationship with respect to either the stop sign or the tree, 
making each individually responsible for trimming the offending 
branches——abating the public nuisance. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
¶68 We have concluded that the Frankes, the Town of Leroy, 
and Dodge County are all liable, if causation is established, as 
a matter of law for maintaining a public nuisance, consisting of 
tree branches obstructing the view of a stop sign at a highway 
intersection.  We have defined a public nuisance as a condition 
or activity which substantially or unduly interferes with the 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
60
use of a public place or with the activities of an entire 
community.  Based on the framework in Brown, we have attempted 
to clarify the relationship between negligence and public 
nuisance.  Specifically, we have noted that a public nuisance 
can result from either negligent or intentional conduct and that 
liability for maintaining a public nuisance requires existence 
of the public nuisance, either actual or constructive notice of 
the public nuisance, and a determination that the failure to 
abate the public nuisance is a cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries.  We have concluded that for the purposes of comparing 
and apportioning responsibility and for determining contribution 
among culpable parties, when all of the elements for liability 
for maintaining a public nuisance have been affirmatively 
proven, a defendant's failure to abate a public nuisance is 
analogous to negligence per se.  We have further concluded that 
similar to liability for negligence, liability for maintaining a 
public nuisance can be limited by public policy considerations. 
¶69 Applying the Brown framework here, we have concluded 
that the hazardous condition——the tree branches obstructing the 
view of a stop sign——constituted a public nuisance as a matter 
of law; there is no genuine issue of material fact in that 
regard.  Furthermore, we have concluded that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on the issue 
of notice.  The hazard existed for at least two to three months 
before the accident, which is sufficient time to impute either 
actual or constructive notice to the Frankes, the Town of Leroy 
and Dodge County.  Regarding the issue of whether the failure to 
No. 
00-1836   
 
 
 
61
abate the public nuisance was a cause of plaintiff's injuries, 
however, we have concluded that disputed reasonable inferences 
preclude a determination now, so that it is not appropriate to 
grant summary judgment on that issue.  The record contains 
evidence that Diane Smith had consumed four to five beers before 
the accident.  The jury is therefore the appropriate fact finder 
to determine a cause or causes of the accident and apportion 
liability accordingly.  If causation is established at trial, 
however, we conclude that for purposes of comparing and 
apportioning responsibility for the accident and for determining 
contribution among culpable parties, each defendant's failure to 
abate the public nuisance is analogous to negligence per se. 
¶70 Finally, we have reviewed the public policy arguments 
of each defendant, and have concluded that the Frankes, Dodge 
County, and the Town of Leroy all had responsibility to abate 
the public nuisance.  Public policy considerations do not 
preclude liability here for any of the defendants. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶71 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  00-1836.awb 
 
1 
 
¶72 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  The majority 
attempts to clarify the relationship between public nuisance and 
negligence.  Its attempt, although thorough, ultimately proves 
unsuccessful.  It fails because the majority refuses to 
acknowledge what is interspersed throughout its opinion:  that 
allegations of public nuisance based on negligent conduct remain 
essentially an action for negligence. 
¶73 I do not understand why the majority goes to such 
trouble to insist that negligence is unnecessary to this case.  
Instead of recognizing that the case is grounded in negligence, 
the majority engages in judicial gymnastics trying to fit public 
nuisance into something it labels "analogous to negligence per 
se."  Majority op. at ¶20.  When all is said and done, the 
majority opinion ends up looking like a negligence analysis 
anyway. 
¶74 In describing the intersection of public nuisance and 
negligence, the majority opinion cites elements and rules that 
lead me to conclude that this public nuisance cause of action is 
essentially an action for negligence.  Indeed, the majority 
opinion acknowledges each of the following: 
¶75 First, liability for maintaining a public nuisance can 
be based on negligent conduct. 
¶76 Second, 
the 
same 
principles 
of 
comparing 
and 
apportioning negligence apply also to a public nuisance. 
¶77 Third, both notice and causation, which are generally 
hallmarks of negligence actions, are required in public nuisance 
actions. 
No.  00-1836.awb 
 
2 
 
¶78 Fourth, as in negligence cases where an action can be 
maintained for an omission, a public nuisance action is 
maintained for failure to abate (which is an omission). 
¶79 Fifth, and again as in negligence cases, public policy 
considerations can limit liability for public nuisance cases.35 
¶80 On top of all this, sprinkled throughout the majority 
opinion are numerous other statements suggesting that the public 
nuisance action in this case is ultimately an action for 
negligence: 
 
"nuisance 
can 
be 
grounded 
on 
negligent 
or 
intentional conduct," majority op. at ¶25 (citing Raisanen v. 
City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 504, 514, 151 N.W.2d 129 (1967)); 
"[c]ontributory negligence is a defense in an action for damages 
occasioned by a nuisance grounded upon negligence," majority op. 
at ¶31 (quoting Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 
547, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956)); "where negligence is the basis of 
the nuisance contributory negligence principles apply," majority 
op. at ¶31 (citing McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 
391, 392 (N.Y. 1928)). 
¶81 Also, the majority opinion discusses each of the 
defendant's liability in terms of its acts or omissions, further 
reinforcing my conclusion that this case is grounded in 
                                                 
35 The majority cites no authority for the proposition that 
the public policy factors that limit liability for negligence 
also apply to limit liability for public nuisance.  It appears 
that the majority is relying on Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 
256, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981), and Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 
Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976), for the proposition.  See 
majority op. at ¶44.  However, Walker and Coffey involved only 
negligence, not public nuisance. 
No.  00-1836.awb 
 
3 
 
negligence.  As to the Frankes, the majority determines, "their 
responsibility is based solely on their failure to trim the 
branches of their tree."  Majority op. at ¶51.  Likewise, the 
majority states that "Dodge County does not escape liability 
based on its failure to trim the offending branches."  Majority 
op. at ¶62.  Finally, the majority addresses "whether the Town 
of Leroy should be held liable for its failure to trim the 
branches," concluding that it should.  Majority op. at ¶¶63, 66. 
¶82 In addition to interspersing its opinion with what 
reads like a negligence analysis, the majority relies heavily 
upon Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 199 Wis. 575, 224 N.W. 
748, on reargument, 199 Wis. 588, 227 N.W. 385 (1929).  Brown, 
however, recognizes that nuisance cases like the one before us 
are essentially grounded in the failure to exercise ordinary 
care, that is, negligence. 
¶83 The Brown court explained: 
In such cases where danger results, not from the 
planting of the tree, but through subsequent changes 
for which the defendant is not responsible, it is 
essential to liability that it be shown either that 
the defendant knew of the danger incident to the 
maintenance of the tree or that such condition had 
existed for such length of time that, by the exercise 
of 
ordinary 
care, 
the 
defendant 
ought 
to 
have 
discovered the danger and to have removed it before 
injuries were sustained by the plaintiff. 
199 Wis. at 590 (emphasis added).  Thus, even Brown, which the 
majority terms the "seminal case that links public nuisance and 
negligence concepts," majority op. at ¶19, explains that 
negligence is "essential" to liability here. 
No.  00-1836.awb 
 
4 
 
¶84 The 
reason 
the 
majority 
opinion 
reads 
like 
a 
negligence analysis is also explained by leading authorities on 
tort law.  For example, Dobbs recognizes three grounds for a 
public nuisance cause of action for damages and explains that 
nuisance is little more than a label that covers all three: 
"[T]alk of public nuisance in personal injury cases 
can be confusing when the plaintiff claims damages 
rather than abatement.  If the defendant should be 
liable 
for 
the 
injury, 
it 
is 
because 
he 
has 
intentionally caused personal injury, carried on an 
abnormally dangerous activity, violated a statute 
aimed at protecting the plaintiff, or was negligent.  
To label the case as one of nuisance adds nothing to 
the clarity of decision-making or policy.  Plaintiffs 
usually assert a public nuisance causing personal 
injury for strategic reasons, for example, to avoid 
the effect of their own contributory fault.  But as 
Cardozo said in the leading case, "whenever a nuisance 
has its origin in negligence, one may not avert the 
consequence 
of 
his 
own 
contributory 
fault 
by 
affixing . . . the label of a nuisance." 
Dan B. Dobbs, 2 Law of Torts § 467, p. 1337-38 (2001) (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted). 
¶85 Similarly, 
the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts 
recognizes the same three grounds for nuisance and that 
allegations of nuisance based on negligent conduct remain 
essentially an action for negligence: 
Many nuisances, both public and private, are not 
intended by the defendant and do not arise from any 
abnormally dangerous activity, but are the result of 
mere negligence in failing to take proper precautions 
to prevent the invasion of the right.  When this is 
the case the contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
is available as a defense as fully and under the same 
rules and conditions as in the case of any other 
action founded upon negligence.  This is true, for 
example, when the defendant allows his building to 
No.  00-1836.awb 
 
5 
 
fall into disrepair through failure to make reasonable 
inspection of it and its condition becomes dangerous 
to travelers on the highway or to the owner of 
adjoining land.  In such a case the defendant's 
conduct is not removed from the field of ordinary 
negligence because it results in nuisance.  The action 
remains 
essentially 
one 
for 
negligence 
and 
the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is a defense. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840B cmt. d (1979) (emphasis 
added). 
¶86 I am persuaded by these learned authorities, and I am 
also persuaded by the adage:  "[w]hen I see a bird that walks 
like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, I call 
that bird a duck."  City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 
168, 179 (D.D.C. 1998), aff'd, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417 (1998).  I call this case essentially one of 
negligence. 
¶87 I agree with the majority that on summary judgment 
none of the defendants are precluded from liability.  However, I 
disagree with the majority that the plaintiff should be granted 
partial summary judgment based on a public nuisance cause of 
action as the majority defines it.36 
¶88 In addition, I disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that public nuisance is "analogous to negligence per se."  
Majority op. at ¶20.  Based on the interspersed negligence 
                                                 
36 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 823, entitled "Nuisances," contains 
various provisions pertaining to public nuisances, including a 
statute authorizing causes of action for public nuisance.   
Wis. Stat. § 823.01.  Thus, I do not question the power of 
government entities or others to bring actions to abate a public 
nuisance.  I do, however, question the majority's conception of 
public nuisance in this action for damages. 
No.  00-1836.awb 
 
6 
 
analysis in the majority opinion, the Brown case, and the 
secondary authorities cited, I conclude that this case remains 
essentially an action for negligence.  Because the majority does 
not, I respectfully concur. 
¶89 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  00-1836.awb 
 
1