Title: Prioleau v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:    Prioleau v. State, No. 40, September Term, 2008
                                                                                                                                             
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; THE “FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT” OF CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION:   Custodial interrogation occurs when a suspect who has been arrested
is asked questions by a law enforcement officer that  (1) are directed to the issue of whether
the suspect has knowledge of and/or engaged in criminal activity, or (2)  the law enforcement
officer knows or should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.  The
functional equivalent of custodial interrogation occurs when a suspect who has been arrested
is subjected to statements made by and/or actions taken by a law enforcement officer that the
officer knows or should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Because it is not reasonable for a law enforcement officer to expect that uttering the words
“What’s up” would be likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect in custody,
the Petitioner was not subjected to custodial interrogation when he was greeted with the
words, “What’s up, Maurice?”
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 40
September Term, 2008
                                                                              
MAURICE DARRYL PRIOLEAU
    
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                              
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                              
Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                              
Filed:   December 9, 2009
1 The pretrial motion for suppression, which was included in the “Omnibus Pre-
Trial Defense Motions” filed on behalf of Petitioner and a co-defendant, asserted that
“any statements or confessions taken from Defendant by police authorities were
involuntary and elicited without observance of procedural safeguards required by law.” 
Although that motion did “respectfully pray for ... [s]uppression of all statements and
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury convicted Maurice Darryl Prioleau,
Petitioner, of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and several related violations of the
Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act.  The State’s evidence was sufficient to
establish that he committed those offenses on March 28, 2005.  Petitioner noted an appeal
to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgments in Prioleau v. State, 179
Md. App. 19, 943 A.2d 696 (2008).  Petitioner then requested that this Court issue a writ
of certiorari to address the following question:  
Was the question “What’s up, Maurice?” the functional
equivalent of interrogation under all the circumstances of this
case, where the question was posed by a police officer standing
in the doorway of a stash house the suspect had been seen using,
and was directed toward a handcuffed suspect who had just been
arrested by another officer nearby and brought back to the stash
house?
That request was granted.  405 Md. 290, 950 A.2d 828 (2008).  For the reasons that
follow, we hold that the words at issue did not constitute the functional equivalent of
custodial interrogation, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals.
Background
Detective Timothy Stach was the only witness who testified at the suppression
hearing.1   The Court of Special Appeals provided the following summary of the
confessions taken from defendant by State agents[,]” it was not supported by a
memorandum asserting that Petitioner had made an inculpatory statement after he had
been subjected to the “functional equivalent” of interrogation.  
2
Detective’s testimony:  
On March 28, 2005, Baltimore City Police Detective
Timothy Stach and his partner Officer Jenkins were conducting
a covert surveillance of the 1600 block of Regester Street. Det.
Stach testified that, at about 6:00 p.m., he observed an Acura
automobile pull to the curb. An individual, whom the detective
recognized as Maurice Prioleau, [Petitioner], got out of the
Acura and jogged to 1614 Regester Street.
Det. Stach watched as [Petitioner] took out a clear plastic
bag and tossed it onto the front steps of the house at that
address. Det. Stach was using 10 by 50 binoculars at the time
and could see small vials inside the plastic bag. The detective
opined at the hearing as an expert in the packaging, distribution,
and identification of controlled dangerous substances that the
bag contained cocaine.
Det. Stach saw [Petitioner] walk around the corner at the
end of the block. The detective then saw a man, later identified
as Keith Evans, walk up to the house at 1614 Regester Street to
retrieve the bag. Det. Stach watched Evans distribute the
contents of the bag to several individuals who had followed him.
Those individuals walked away after the transactions. Evans
continued to pace Regester Street, distributing items from the
bag to individuals who approached him.
[Petitioner] appeared and walked with Evans south on
Regester Street toward Federal Street. [Petitioner] turned onto
Federal Street, while Evans continued to distribute the contents
of the bag to additional individuals along Regester Street.
Det. Stach recalled that, at about 4:20 p.m., [Petitioner]
returned. He entered 1610 Regester Street, and, after one
minute, emerged with another bag of suspected cocaine.
[Petitioner] gave the bag to Evans, who resumed his routine of
strolling back and forth on Regester Street, engaging in
"hand-to-hand transactions" with individuals who approached.
Det. Stach alerted Officer David Crites, who was at the
3
police station, that he believed he was witnessing "narcotics
activity," and [Petitioner] and Evans were "working in tandem."
Officer Crites responded to the scene, driving a marked police
vehicle. Officer Crites saw Evans walking northbound toward
the house at 1608 Regester Street and handing off the bag to an
unknown person at that address. Officer Crites arrested Evans.
Det. Stach and Officer Jenkins emerged from their
undercover observation position and joined Officer Crites. Det.
Stach instructed Officer Crites to “go get [Petitioner].” 
             Det. Stach then escorted Evans into the house at 1610 
Regester Street. The detective testified that there were 
numerous torn clear plastic bags on the floor, indicating 
drug activity in the house.
Meanwhile, Officer Crites located [Petitioner], arrested
him, and placed him in the cruiser. Officer Crites then drove to
the front of 1610 Regester Street and removed [Petitioner] from
the vehicle. [Petitioner] was reluctant to move, so Officer Crites
employed a "wrist lock" and walked [Petitioner] up to the
entrance of the house.
As Officer Crites appeared at the front door of 1610
Regester Street with [Petitioner], Det. Stach was standing there.
He said to [Petitioner]: "What's up, Maurice?" [Petitioner] then
said: “I'm not going in that house. I've never been in that house.”
Det. Stach testified that his words to [Petitioner] were "not a
question on anything that has to do with illegal activity." He
stated, moreover, that [Petitioner] appeared very agitated and
nervous when he "blurted out" those words. Det. Stach
acknowledged that [Petitioner] was under arrest by the time he
was brought to the house. . . . 
Inside 1610 Regester Street, the police recovered a
handgun with live rounds in it and three plastic bags containing
25 clear vials of cocaine, all of which had been stashed above
the ceiling tiles. The police searched [Petitioner] incident to his
arrest and recovered $210.00 [from Petitioner’s person].
179 Md. App. at 22-24, 943 A.2d at 698-99 (footnotes omitted).  
The record shows that the following transpired during Detective Stach’s direct
examination:
4
[STATE’S ATTORNEY:] And when you observed [Petitioner] being
brought up to the house, could you explain his
demeanor and his tone when he was making the
statements to you?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
Oh, he was very agitated, nervous and
he, again, he blurted out, as I said, “Hi,
Maurice,” to him, “I’m not going in that
house.  I was never in that house.”  
The following transpired during Detective Stach’s cross-examination: 
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
And when [Petitioner] was
brought back by Officer Crites,
was he free to leave at that time?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
No, he was under arrest.  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
He was under arrest at that time?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
Yes, at my direction.  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
And did you read [Petitioner] his
Miranda rights at that time?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
No, I did not.  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
And are you aware of whether
Officer Crites did?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
No, I do not believe so.  I don’t
know. [Petitioner] was never
questioned.  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
Well, you asked him what was up,
didn’t you?  
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
That’s not a question on anything
that has to deal with illegal
activity.  
5
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
I’m not asking you that[.]
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
I did ask him what was up.
* * * 
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
And after [Petitioner] blurted out
[that] he didn’t want to go into the
house, I assume that’s when the
arrest and control technique was
used; is that correct?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
He was escorted in.  I asked
[Officer Crites] to bring him in. 
We needed him in the house.  I
didn’t want one officer outside,
one officer inside and then me
looking around the house with
three suspects, three Defendants
[in there with me].  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
Detective, I asked you[,] was that
before or after he blurted it, the
statement out.
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
He was put into the house after he
blurted out the statement, he was
brought into the house.  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
And it’s my understanding from
your testimony that nobody asked
[Petitioner] any questions except
you?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
I said, “What’s up, Maurice?” 
That’s a question, yes, ma’am.  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
And that’s when he blurted the
statement out?
6
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
That’s when he stated, “I’m not
going in that house.  I haven’t
been in that house.” Yes, ma’am.  
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
And after that, were there any
other questions that were asked of
him?
[DETECTIVE STACH:]
Not by me. 
The following transpired at the conclusion of Detective Stach’s testimony:
[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL:]
Your Honor, I’m just going to
submit.  Thank you very much.  
THE COURT: 
Okay. 
[STATE’S ATTORNEY:]
Your Honor, I just simply argue
that the statement that was made
wasn’t really . . . in response to an
interrogation, therefore Miranda
didn’t really apply at that time.  It
was a statement that was blurted
out and I don’t think it should be
suppressed.  And as far as the
money that was recovered off of
[Petitioner], it was [a] search
incident to arrest and there was
probable cause based on the facts
that Your Honor heard.  
THE COURT:  
Okay, based on the evidence before the
Court, the Court is satisfied that there
was compliance with the Constitution of
Maryland.  Also, the Court is further
satisfied that the law of the State is that
an interrogation is where the officer
expressly ask[s] an individual a question
or employ[s] any word or act that the
officer should [have] know[n] [was]
7
reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.  The evidence
before the Court establishes that the
comments by Detective[] Stach
amounted to merely an exchange of
greetings [under] the case law [of]
[Rhode Island v.] Innis, 446 U.S. 291
[(1980)], [and]. . . [State v.] Conover,
312 Md. 33 [537 A.2d 1167 (1988)].
Also, the law of the State is [that]
volunteer[ed] statements or blurts that
are not the product of an interrogation,
[do] not trigger Miranda warnings.  The
Motion to Suppress. . .the statements [is]
considered and denied.  
The State’s case-in-chief included the testimony that Petitioner sought to suppress.
Standard of Review 
The following standard of review is applicable to a case in which a petitioner
argues that this Court should reverse the denial of a motion to suppress his or her
inculpatory statement:   
In reviewing a circuit court’s grant or denial of a motion
to suppress evidence, we ordinarily consider only the evidence
contained in the record of the suppression hearing.  State v.
Tolbert, 381 Md. 539, 548, 850 A.2d 1192, 1197 (2004); State
v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 443-44 (2003);
White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 249, 821 A.2d 459, 469 (2003).
The factual findings of the suppression court and its conclusions
regarding the credibility of testimony are accepted unless clearly
erroneous. Tolbert, 381 Md. at 548, 850 A.2d at 1197. We
review the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably
drawn in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id.;
Rucker, 374 Md. at 207, 821 A.2d at 444; White, 374 Md. at
249, 821 A.2d at 469. We “undertake our own independent
constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and
2 “[P]ersons temporarily detained pursuant to [Terry stops and ordinary traffic]
stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.”  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984).  A “custodial” arrest occurs when “a known or
suspected offender” is detained and taken into custody “for the purpose of prosecuting
him [or her] for a crime.”  Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 67-68, 137 A.2d 170, 172
(1957).  Petitioner’s “custodial arrest” occurred before he made the incriminating
response.  
3 The exceptions to the Miranda requirements include the “routine booking
question” exception discussed in Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 87, 695 A.2d 132, 136
(1997); the “public safety” exception recognized in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
104 S.Ct. 2626 (1984); and the “rescue doctrine” exception discussed in Thomas v. State,
128 Md. App. 274, 737 A.2d 622 (1999), cert. denied, 357 Md. 192, 742 A.2d 521
(1999).
4 Although Petitioner has never expressly conceded that his statement was not the
product of actual or “express” interrogation, he has asked this Court to determine only the
issue of whether (in the words of his Petition) “the question ‘What’s up, Maurice?’ [was]
the functional equivalent of interrogation under all the circumstances of this case. . .?”
(Emphasis supplied).
8
applying it to the facts of the present case.” Tolbert, 381 Md. at
548, 850 A.2d at 1197; White, 374 Md. at 249, 821 A.2d at 469.
Rush v. State,  403 Md. 68, 82-83, 939 A.2d 689, 697 (2008).
Discussion
In the case at bar, it is clear that (1) Petitioner was “in custody” when he made the
inculpatory statement,2 and (2) none of the exceptions to the requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona are applicable.3   Petitioner was therefore entitled to suppression of the statement
at issue if that statement resulted from either actual interrogation or the functional
equivalent of interrogation.  We hold, however, that Petitioner was subjected to neither.  
As to whether “What’s up, Maurice?” constituted actual interrogation,4 it is very
9
well settled that not every question constitutes “interrogation” of a suspect who is in
custody when the question is asked.  As the Supreme Court of Indiana has stated:
The term “interrogation” has been defined as a process of
questioning by law enforcement officials which lends itself to
obtaining incriminating statements.  Escobedo v. Illinois, (1964),
378 U.S. 478, 485, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 986.
Not every statement uttered by a police officer which is
punctuated with a question mark will necessarily constitute an
interrogation. . . .  Rather, it is necessary to view the statement
in the context in which it was made.  
 Johnson v. State, 380 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 1978).
While the Miranda warnings must precede questions directed to the issue of
whether a suspect who is in custody has engaged in and/or has knowledge of criminal
activity, a classic example of a question that does not constitute “interrogation
contemplated by Miranda” is a question that asks the defendant, “Do you understand your
(Miranda) rights?”  Richardson v. State, 6 Md. App. 448, 452, 251 A.2d 924, 927 (1969),
cert. denied 255 Md. 743 (1969).  
In Richardson, an appellant who had been convicted of rape and related offenses
argued that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the State’s evidence included
statements attributed to him while he was being asked questions to determine whether he
understood his Miranda rights.  After the appellant had been placed under arrest, he was
advised of his rights by a detective who read from a “Miranda card” that was introduced
5 The Richardson opinion includes the entire contents of the Miranda card.  6 Md.
App. at 450 n.1, 251 A.2d at 926 n.1. 
10
into evidence.5  That card contained four questions to be asked of the defendant after he
or she had received the advise required by Miranda:
Do you understand your rights and what I have just
explained to you?
Are you willing to make a statement without a lawyer
present at this time?
Do you understand and know what you are doing?
Have any promises, threats or inducements been made to
pressure or coerce you into making this statement?
Id. at 450 n.1, 251 A.2d at 926 n.1.  The suppression hearing court accepted the following
testimony of the arresting officer.  After he had read to appellant the Miranda rights
contained on the card, and while he was asking appellant the questions contained on the
card, appellant stated, “I did not rape that girl.  She gave in to me voluntarily.”  While
rejecting the appellant’s contention that his statement should have been suppressed, the
Court of Special Appeals stated:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the appellant was
in police custody at the time the statement was given; but it is
equally clear that the statement was not the result of
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers [quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612
(1966)].” . . .   It is apparent that the appellant simply interrupted
the officer and “blurted out” or “volunteered” the statement.
The officer had not asked him any questions concerning the
crimes for which he was arrested; interrogation, in the sense
contemplated by Miranda, had not begun. 
Id. at 452, 251 A.2d at 926-27. 
11
 
Cases holding that not every question constitutes “interrogation” include United
States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1999), in which an appellant who had been
convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute argued that he was
entitled to a new trial on the ground that the government’s evidence included his post-
arrest statements made after he had been asked whether he “would like to assist in
different avenues of investigation that [you] could help us on[?]”  Id. at 506.  On June 16,
1997, the appellant was arrested for driving without a valid license, crack cocaine was
discovered in the trunk of the vehicle he had been driving, and a vial containing crack
cocaine was found under the seat of the patrol car in which he had been placed before 
being transported to police headquarters.  On June 17, 1997,  the appellant (1) was
removed from his cell by a detective of the East St. Louis Police Department (the
detective) and advised of his Miranda rights, (2) stated that he would not make a
statement unless a lawyer was present, and (3) was returned to his cell.  On June 18, 1997,
upon learning that the appellant had been arrested, an agent of the Illinois State Police
(the agent) requested that the detective bring the appellant to an interview room where the
agent requested that the appellant assist the officers in their investigation of the
appellant’s supplier.  The statements at issue were made as the appellant was being
returned to his cell.  The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
ruled that the appellant was not entitled to suppression of those statements.  While
affirming that ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided
12
the following factual background:
During the interview, . . . [the agent] explained to
Jackson that he was not concerned with any of the details of
Jackson’s arrest of June 16, 1997. [The agent] also advised
Jackson that . . . he [(the agent)] had knowledge that [the
appellant] had sold crack cocaine on two separate occasions to
an undercover officer. [The agent] also told [the appellant] that
he was not interested in obtaining any statement from him and
that he was a “little fish” who could help the police catch his
supplier. . . . [The appellant] stated that he would call [the agent]
upon his release. [The agent’s] conversation with [the appellant]
lasted approximately twenty minutes. . . .  As [the detective]
escorted [the appellant] back to his cell, [the appellant]
mentioned to [the detective] that after speaking to [the agent] he
realized “that he was in a lot of trouble.  He stated that he
wanted to clear up an earlier matter of the traffic stop in the
park.” . . . 
During the ensuing conversation, [the appellant]
volunteered information to [the detective] concerning the June
16 traffic stop, none of which related to [the agent’s] narcotics
distribution investigation.  Jackson stated that the bag of crack
found in the trunk of [the] car [he had been driving immediately
prior to his arrest] was his and took responsibility for placing the
cocaine vial beneath the seat of the squad car.
Id. at 505-06 (footnote omitted).   After citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 678,
108 S. Ct. 2093, 2096 (1988), (in which the United States Supreme Court held that, even
if a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel when interrogated with respect to a
particular investigation, the investigating officers “are free to inform the suspect of the
facts of the second investigation as long as such communication does not constitute
interrogation”), the Jackson Court stated:
When [the agent] explained to Jackson that . . . he knew that [the
13
appellant] had sold crack cocaine to the undercover office on
two occasions in April, he was “informing the suspect of the
facts of the second investigation,” Robertson, 486 U.S. at 687,
108 S. Ct. at 2101, and soliciting Jackson’s assistance if he was
willing to give it after he was released from jail. [The agent]
also told [the appellant] that he had no interest in obtaining a
statement from him.   With respect to the constitutional claim
that Jackson has raised concerning his interview with [the
agent], in view of the fact that [the agent] did not ask any
questions of Jackson concerning the traffic stop on June 16,
1997, and since [the agent] advised  Jackson of the fact that the
only reason he was speaking with him was to solicit his help in
an ongoing drug investigation after he was freed from jail, [the
agent’s] meeting with Jackson should not be considered an
interrogation.
* * *
“An accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with
the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880,
1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981) (emphasis added).  After
speaking with [the agent] on June 18, 1997, and as [the
detective] was returning [the appellant] to his cell, Jackson
personally requested that he be allowed to speak with the police
in order that he might “clear up” the traffic stop.  Obviously, . .
.  it was Jackson who “initiated further communication.” Id.  
Id. at 511.  (Emphasis in opinion). 
The above cited cases are consistent with Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 695 A.2d
132 (1997), in which, while holding that the “routine booking question” exception (to the
requirements of Miranda v. Arizona) does not encompass a question as to whether the
arrestee is a “narcotics or drug user,” this Court stated that “the critical inquiry is whether
14
the police officer, based on the totality of the circumstances, knew or should have known
that the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”  Id. at 95-96,
695 A.2d at 139-40.  For these reasons, we conclude that, even if “What’s up, Maurice?”
was a question rather than a greeting, this “question” did not constitute “interrogation”
contemplated by Miranda.  
While concluding that the words spoken by Detective Stach were words of
greeting rather than words of interrogation, the Court of Special Appeals stated:  
The motions court concluded that Det. Stach’s words,
under the circumstances, were merely a greeting.  Upon our
independent assessment of the record, we agree.  The phrase
“what’s up?” is commonly used as a greeting, especially, as the
State points out, among young people. At least one other
jurisdiction has recognized that the phrase is generally
understood as a greeting. See Arnett v. State, 353 Ark. 165, 122
S.W.3d 484, 488 (Ark. 2003) (stating that the phrase “What’s
up?” constitutes a general term of salutation, and holding that the
officer’s use of the phrase, under the circumstances of that case,
was not interrogation or its functional equivalent); United States
v. Paredes, 388 F. Supp. 2d, 1185, 1193-94 (D. Ha. 2005)
(holding statement admissible where there was no evidence that
a simple “Okay, what’s up?” by the police officer would elicit an
incriminating response).
Det. Stach’s testimony indicates that he did not intend the
words he spoke to appellant to be anything other than a greeting.
He testified that “W hat’s up, Maurice?” was “not a question on
anything that has to do with illegal activity.” The court did not
indicate that it disbelieved that testimony, and we accept it. That
fact is significant because “the police surely cannot be held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or
actions,” and “the definition of interrogation can extend only to
words or actions on the part of police officers that they should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
15
response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 (footnote omitted).
* * *
Given that the phrase “what’s up” is generally understood
to be a greeting, and that Det. Stach did not intend the phrase to
relate to anything “illegal,” we conclude that the detective’s
utterance of the words “what’s up, Maurice” was not the
functional equivalent of interrogation, under the circumstances
of this case.  Consequently, appellant’s statement that followed
on the heels of Det. Stach’s greeting was not the product of
interrogation but rather was volunteered by appellant. It was a
classic “blurt,” to which the protections of Miranda do not apply.
See Fenner [v. State], 381 Md. [1,] at 10[, 846 A.2d 1020, 1025
(2004), (holding that the petitioner had not been subjected to
custodial interrogation during a bail review hearing when the
presiding judge asked him, “Is there anything you would like to
tell me about yourself?”)]; Conover [v. State], 312 Md. [33,] at
45[, 537 A.2d 1167, 1172 (1988)] ; see also Conboy v. State, 155
Md. App. 353, 373, 843 A.2d 216[, 228] (2004) (holding that a
police officer’s comment, remarking that a key discovered in
defendant’s pocket fit the ignition of a car involved in an
accident, “was merely an observation made without inviting a
response;” and, although the appellant “nonetheless did respond,”
the response was not the product of interrogation and was
properly admitted into evidence at trial). 
179 Md. App. at 28-30, 943 A.2d at 702-03 (footnote omitted). 
In Arnett v. State, 122 S.W.3d 484 (Ark. 2003), the Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed a sexual child abuse conviction obtained in part on evidence that, while the arresting
officer was placing handcuffs on the defendant, (1) the arresting officer asked, “what’s up?”
and (2) the defendant stated that he had sexually abused his daughter and that he needed help.
While rejecting the contention that the defendant’s response should have been suppressed,
the Arnett Court stated:
6 In The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2005), “salutation” is defined as “an
expression of greeting, goodwill or courtesy [usually] by word or gesture.” 
16
We hold that [the officer’s] general question in this case of
"What's up?" is a general term of salutation much like the
officer's salutation in Weber v. State, 326 Ark. 564, 933 S.W.2d
370 (1996), wherein we held that the trial court was correct in
admitting a defendant's incriminating statement made in reply to
the responding officer's salutation. It is not reasonable to view
[the officer’s] general "What's up?" as designed to elicit an
incriminating response. 
Id. at 488.  The Court of Special Appeals expressly agreed with that analysis.6  So do we. 
We therefore hold that Petitioner’s statement did not result from actual or express
custodial interrogation.
As to the issue of whether Petitioner was entitled to suppression on the ground that
his statement resulted from the functional equivalent of interrogation, it is well settled
that the functional equivalent of interrogation can occur even if the defendant is not asked
a single question.  In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980), while
holding that the incriminating statement made by a robbery suspect being transported to
the police station was admissible even though the statement was made in response to a
conversation between the officers who were transporting the suspect, the United States
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent. That is to say, the term ‘interrogation’
under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also
to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
17
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather
than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the
Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody
with an added measure of protection against coercive police
practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying
intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a
suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police
surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results
of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can
extend only to words or actions on the part of the police officers
that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.”
Id. at 300-302, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90 (footnotes omitted).  
In Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 793 A.2d 567 (2002), while concluding that a
petitioner had been subjected to the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation, even
though he had not been asked a single question before he made an inculpatory statement, this
Court stated:
It is a basic principle that a statement taken during custodial
interrogation conducted before a defendant is informed of his or
her Miranda rights may not be used by the State in its case in
chief against the defendant. The test to be applied in
determining whether the police officer’s statements . . . was
tantamount to interrogation is whether the words and actions of
the officer were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating
responses from petitioner. See Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724,
760, 679 A.2d 1106, 1124-25 (1996).
Id. at 335-36, 793 A.2d at 510.  In Drury, a jury convicted the petitioner of second degree
burglary and related offenses.  The State’s case  included evidence that the petitioner made
18
an inculpatory statement after he had been (1) “picked up for questioning,” (2) placed in an
interrogation room, (3) shown a tire iron recovered at the scene of the crime, (4) shown a
trash bag containing magazines that had been stolen during the burglary, and (5) told that
those items would be examined for fingerprints.  Even though the petitioner had not been
asked any questions before he made the inculpatory statement, because that statement was
made before he was advised of his Miranda rights, this Court held that the statement should
have been suppressed on the ground that “the officer’s conduct and words were the
functional equivalent of interrogation within the meaning of Innis,” explaining:
It is undisputed that, although petitioner was in custody,
he was not subjected to express interrogation. The officer did
not ask petitioner questions, but rather made a statement to him
and displayed the tire iron and magazines.
Petitioner had been brought to the police station for the
express purpose of questioning and, in fact, had been told so by
Corporal Whaley. The police were not engaged in routine
booking procedures; they were not required by any Maryland
rule or procedure to read any document (other than the Miranda
rights) to petitioner. Nonetheless, the officer placed the tire iron
and the trash bag containing the stolen magazines on the table
before petitioner before advising him of his Miranda rights. The
officer told petitioner that he was going to send the evidence to
be examined for fingerprints. Moreover, the officer testified that
he “was presenting the evidence that was going to be used for
questioning.”
It appears to us that the only reasonable conclusion that
can be drawn from the foregoing facts is that the officer should
have known, in light of his having told petitioner that he was
being brought in for questioning, that putting the evidence
before petitioner and telling him that the items were going to be
fingerprinted was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
19
response from him. The only plausible explanation for the
officer’s conduct is that he expected to elicit a statement from
petitioner.
Id. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571.
On the other hand, in State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 537 A.2d 1167 (1988), this Court
reversed a holding of the Court of Special Appeals “that delivery of the Statement of Charges
and Application to the respondent after he had requested an attorney constituted a form of
interrogation.”  Id. at 38, 537 A.2d at 1169.  In that case, a jury convicted the respondent of
murder and related offenses.  The State’s case included evidence that he made an inculpatory
statement after he had been advised of his Miranda rights and invoked his right to counsel.
The respondent was arrested on a warrant, transported to the Baltimore County Police
Headquarters, and taken to the office of the captain of the homicide squad, where he was
read his Miranda rights and invoked his right to an attorney.  Although he was not asked any
questions at that time, while the detectives were completing his “processing,” a detective (1)
read the Statement of Charges to him, (2) handed him copies of that document as well as the
Application for Statement of Charges, and (3) suggested that he “read them, look at them,
[and] if [he] had any questions[,] ask them.”  Id. at 37, 537 A.2d at 1169.   The respondent
then asked several hypothetical questions, and made the incriminating statement at issue.
  While holding that the respondent’s incriminating statement was admissible, this
Court stated:  
[W]e are persuaded, as was the trial judge, that the police did
not “interrogate” Respondent within the meaning of Miranda.
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They intended to question him, and took him to the captain’s
office for that purpose -- an entirely proper procedure.
However, when Respondent declined to waive his right to
counsel, all questioning ceased.  The officers were entitled to
complete the processing of the arrestee, and were required to
furnish him with a copy of the Charging Document. . . . 
We infer no sinister motive from the fact that police provided
Respondent with a copy of the Application as well as a copy of
the Statement of Charges. . . .  We do not consider it unusual for
the detectives to have treated the Application for a Statement of
Charges as a part of the “packet” of charging documents.
. . .  The police acted reasonably and lawfully, and the
Respondent was not subjected to compelling influences,
psychological ploys, or direct questioning.  His volunteered
statement was properly admitted.
 
Id. at 42-45, 537 A.2d at 1171-72.  
In Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218, 849 A.2d 410 (2004), this Court cited Conover for
the proposition that “[m]erely presenting an accused with a charging document, without
more is not the functional equivalent of interrogation.”  Id. at 236, 847 A.2d at 420.  In
Blake, however, while holding that all statements made by the petitioner after he invoked
his Miranda rights were inadmissible, this Court stated:
When the charging document was given to petitioner, containing
a false statement of the law with respect to the penalty of death,
it was accompanied by an officer’s statement which served no
legitimate purpose other than to encourage petitioner to speak.
* * *
. . . We reject the State’s characterization . . . that the
officer’s  statement [“I bet you want to talk now, huh!”]  was
merely a rhetorical question. The officer’s statement to
7 In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547 (1980), the United
States Supreme Court noted that it “has not decided whether Simmons precludes the use
of a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at trial.”  Id.
at 93, 100 S. Ct. at 2554.  The Salvucci Court also noted that Gray v. State, 43 Md. App.
238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979) is one of several cases holding “that such testimony is
admissible as evidence of impeachment.”  Id. at 94 n.8, 100 S.Ct. at 2554 n.8. 
8 In Conover, after noting that the respondent’s trial counsel “did not argue that the
delivery of a copy of the application constituted interrogation,” but rather that “[t]here
came a point in time at which Christopher Conover was asked whether or not he might be
able to provide some information[,]” this Court stated:
Respondent did not testify at the suppression hearing, and no
21
petitioner could only be interpreted as designed to induce
petitioner to talk and it was improper.  
 
Id. at 235-36, 849 A.2d at 420. 
In the case at bar, Petitioner presented no evidence in support of his argument that
his inculpatory statement resulted from the functional equivalent of custodial
interrogation.  He was entitled to testify at the suppression hearing without running the
risk that the State could use his testimony in its case-in-chief,7 because a defendant’s
suppression hearing testimony “may not thereafter be admitted against [the defendant] at
trial on the issue of guilt unless [the defendant] makes no objection.”  Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976 (1968).  As was the situation in Conover,
however, only one witness testified at the suppression hearing.  Under these
circumstances, the suppression hearing court was not required to speculate that, when
Petitioner heard the words, “What’s up,” he actually believed that he was being subjected
to custodial interrogation.8  
direct evidence was offered in support of [the] argument
[presented during the suppression hearing].  The trial judge was
under no obligation to accept the inference for which
Respondent’s [trial] counsel argued, and we accept the finding
of the trial judge on that fact.
312 Md. at 44, 537 A.2d at 1172.  
22
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, it is
clear that the suppression hearing court found that Detective Stach did not intend to ask
Petitioner “a question on anything that has to do with illegal activity.”  That factual
finding was not clearly erroneous.  The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether Detective
Stach, based on the totality of the circumstances, knew or should have known that
greeting Petitioner with the words, “What’s up, Maurice?,” would be reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response.  From our own independent constitutional appraisal of
the record, we hold that it is not reasonable to expect that those words would be likely to
elicit an incriminating response.  We therefore agree with the suppression hearing court
and the Court of Special Appeals that there is no merit in Petitioner’s argument that he
was subjected to the functional equivalent of interrogation.  
J U D G M E N T S  
A F F I R M E D ;
PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.
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