Title: Thompson v. Coats

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

547 P.2d 92 (1976)
Earl THOMPSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Kathleen B. Thompson, Deceased, Appellant,
v.
Robert L. COATS, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted October 28, 1975.
Decided March 25, 1976.
*93 Stanley E. Clark, of Clark & MacMurray, Redmond, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
James C. VanVoorhees, Prineville, argued the cause for respondent. James F. Bodie, Bodie, Minturn, VanVoorhees & Larson, Prineville, were on the brief.
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, DENECKE, TONGUE, HOWELL and BRYSON, JJ.
Argued and Submitted at Pendleton October 28, 1975.
McALLISTER, Justice.
This action for wrongful death was brought against Robert L. Coats, a highway contractor, by Earl Thompson as the personal representative of the estate of his daughter, Kathleen B. Thompson. At the close of plaintiff's case defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit was allowed. Plaintiff has appealed. We reverse.
Kathleen B. Thompson died as the result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident on July 26, 1971. The accident occurred on an 11.8 mile stretch of highway in Wasco County which the defendant had just repaved under a contract with the State Highway Commission. The repaving had raised the level of the highway and had left an abrupt drop-off of from five to eight inches on each side of the pavement. Defendant's contract did not include any work on the shoulders of the highway, which were to be built up by the Highway Commission after defendant's paving contract had been completed.
Kathleen was driving her car in a north-westerly direction on the new pavement at a point about a mile or so from the south end of the paving project. It was in the evening and Kathleen was driving toward the setting sun. There was evidence from which the jury could have found that one or both of the right wheels of the decedent's car dropped off the right or east edge of the highway and that the car had then skidded sideways diagonally across the pavement, dropped off the west edge of the pavement, and then rolled over several times and came to rest 171 feet from the west edge of the pavement.
At the time of the accident there was no center line, nor any fog lines painted on the pavement, but there were small florescent squares indicating where the center line would be painted.
The contract between Coats and the Highway Commission consisted of a Contract and Bond for Highway Construction and a book of Standard Specifications for Highway Construction, both of which contain provisions pertinent to this case. We quote a provision from the Standard Specifications:
The Contract contained the following provisions:
There was ample testimony that the reflectorized guideposts were not in place from the south end of the project to the scene of the accident. In fact, the case seems to have been tried on the tacit understanding that the reflectorized guideposts had never been installed, at least on the south portion of the project where this accident occurred. Pictures taken of the scene of the accident the day after it occurred showed clearly that there were no reflectorized guideposts along either side of the pavement and there was testimony that these pictures were an accurate portrayal of the scene of the accident at the time it occurred.
Defendant's liability, if any, arises from a common law duty to protect the public from any dangerous condition which he may have created in the performance of his contract. Archer v. Rogers Construction, Inc., 252 Or. 165, 171, 447 P.2d 380 (1968). In Larson v. Heintz Const. Co. et al, 219 Or. 25, 53, 345 P.2d 835 (1959), we held that a highway construction contract, as here, is admissible in evidence as a circumstance to be considered in determining whether reasonable care was exercised.[1] See, also, Waterway Terminals v. P.S. Lord, 242 Or. 1, 50-51, 406 P.2d 556, 13 A.L.R.3d 1 (1965); Collins v. Lantz, Vickery, 244 Or. 62, 67, 415 P.2d 763 (1966). In this case we hold that the contract provisions requiring the installation of reflectorized guideposts along each edge of the pavement were sufficient, together with the other evidence, to make a case for the jury.
Defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit was based on five grounds, but the trial court allowed the nonsuit only on the ground that the defendant had, for practical purposes, completed his contract and that control of the project had passed to the Highway Commission.
The pertinent provisions of the contract regarding completion of the contract and acceptance of the work by the Highway Commission are as follows:
The defendant's primary contention is that "the contractor had been relieved of liability at the time of the accident by the practical acceptance of the pavement work *95 by the State of Oregon through its Resident Engineer Clark."[2]
We disagree with defendant's contention for two reasons. In the first place, it is clear from the evidence that two conditions precedent for acceptance of the work had not occurred. In addition to the preliminary inspection by the resident engineer, it was necessary for the work to be inspected by the regional engineer. This inspection was not completed until July 29, 1971. In addition, the work was not finally accepted by resolution of the Highway Commission until about September 1, 1971.
In allowing the nonsuit the trial court relied on the doctrine of practical completion as stated in the Annotation, Contractor  Liability to Third Person, 13 A.L.R.2d 191, 211, from which we quote:
We question whether the preliminary inspection by the resident engineer can amount to practical acceptance when the resident engineer testified that his preliminary inspection was subject to approval by an inspection made by his superior, the regional engineer. The final inspection was not made until July 29, 1971, or three days after the accident.
In any event, the doctrine of practical acceptance is out of harmony with our cases which have imposed liability on a contractor for damage to third persons caused by the contractor's negligence in the performance of his contract, but occurring after the work had been completed by the contractor and accepted by the owner.
In Strandholm v. General Const. Co., 235 Or. 145, 155, 382 P.2d 843 (1963), we said:
We further said, at page 157, 382 P.2d at page 849:
In American Insurers v. Bessonette, 235 Or. 507, 384 P.2d 223, 385 P.2d 759 (1963), we applied the rule adopted in Strandholm to a case in which the defendant construction company had negligently constructed a concrete wall of a building so as to cause a main sprinkler pipe to break after the building had been completed and accepted. We held that the completion and acceptance of the building did not relieve the construction company from liability to the owner of groceries stored in the building which were damaged by water escaping from the broken sprinkler pipe.
The modern view is well expressed in the following quotation from 41 Am.Jur.2d 824, Independent Contractors, § 50:
See, also, Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Company, 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958); Hanna v. Fletcher, 97 U.S.App. D.C. 310, 231 F.2d 469, 58 A.L.R.2d 847, cert. den. 351 U.S. 989, 76 S. Ct. 1051, 100 L. Ed. 1501 (1956).
We also quote from Prosser on Torts (4th ed.) 681, § 104:
In this case the resident engineer testified that there were several signs posted by defendant at the south end of the project. These included, first, a sign identifying the contractor, next, a flasher sign reading "ROAD CONSTRUCTION AHEAD", next, a sign reading "SLOW", next, a sign reading "CONSTRUCTION SPEED 40", and, lastly, a sign reading "ABRUPT PAVEMENT EDGE". According to the resident engineer it was nine-tenths of a mile from the last sign to the scene of the accident.
The resident engineer further testified that when he inspected the project on July 23rd he requested the defendant to leave the signs in place "until after we had made our final inspection." The jury could have inferred that if the reflectorized guideposts had been installed as required by the contract that the engineer would have requested that the guideposts also be left in place.
But whether the engineer would have made such a request is not conclusive. The jury could, nevertheless, find that the contractor owed travelers a duty, both to install the guideposts and to leave them in place until the dangerous condition had been eliminated by the buildup of the shoulders to the pavement level. The jury could also have inferred that if the guideposts had been installed and left in place "delineating the hazard" Kathleen Thompson would not have driven so close to the east edge of the pavement that her right wheels dropped off the abrupt edge, causing her death.
We find that the court erred in allowing defendant's motion for a nonsuit and the case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
DENECKE, Justice (specially concurring).
I concur that the trial court erred. It was at least a question for the jury whether *97 at the time of death the state had assumed responsibility for placing warnings of the drop-off and, if not, whether the defendant was negligent in failing to reasonably warn of the drop-off.
I do not join in the majority, however, because I am of the opinion that the principle stated in Strandholm v. General Const. Co., 235 Or. 145, 382 P.2d 843 (1963), is inapplicable.
In Strandholm v. General Const. Co., supra (235 Or. at 158, 382 P.2d 843), we held the defendant liable for negligently constructing a boom which it rebuilt for the plaintiff's employer, Dreyfus. About six months after Dreyfus had accepted the work the boom injured plaintiff. We rejected the rule that acceptance of the work ended the defendant's liability for negligent construction. We quoted from Harper and James that the rule of nonliability was an "`offspring of the privity rule and the last-wrongdoer rule.'" 235 Or. at 158, 382 P.2d  at 849. For this reason we also rejected the argument that Dreyfus's negligence was an intervening cause which terminated the defendant's liability.
American Insurers v. Bessonette, 235 Or. 507, 384 P.2d 223, 385 P.2d 759 (1963), extended the principle of Strandholm to building contractors. The defendant builder "`caused a concrete wall to be constructed so as to cause a main sprinkler pipe to break after the building had been completed and accepted.'" 235 Or. at 508, 384 P.2d  at 224.
In neither case was there merely a "practical acceptance." Dreyfus, in Strandholm, and the owner of the premises in Bessonette, fully and finally accepted the work. The principle of Strandholm and Bessonette is that a negligent contractor or builder will be responsible for an injury occurring long after the work is completed and accepted if the builder's negligence caused the injury. We applied the Strandholm principle in Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 256 Or. 318, 473 P.2d 862 (1970), and held a manufacturer liable for an injury occurring nine years after the crane was manufactured and accepted.
I joined the majority opinions in Strandholm and Bessonette and believe they are clearly correct. I do not believe, however, that they are applicable to the present facts.
The rule we adopted in Strandholm was not based upon contract. We held the duty of the builder to build a reasonably safe product was not terminated by acceptance of the product by Dreyfus. While we did not expressly so state, I believe it logically follows that Dreyfus could not limit defendant's liability by contracting that upon Dreyfus's acceptance of the work the defendant would no longer be liable to subsequently injured third parties. Such a contract might create a right in defendant to be indemnified by Dreyfus; however, it could not bar defendant's liability to third parties.
I view the relationship of the defendant road contractor, the Highway Commission and users of the highway to be different than the relationships in Strandholm and Bessonette. The period when the defendant contractor was to be responsible for warning motorists was fixed by the contract with the Commission. I can think of no reason why such a contractual provision should not be honored and should not under usual circumstances govern the contractor's liability to third persons. For example, if the contract between the Highway Commission and the contractor provided that the state would at all times assume full responsibility for furnishing warnings of the drop-off, I am of the opinion that the contractor would not be liable to a motorist who was injured because of inadequate warnings.
A land possessor such as the State Highway Commission has a duty to maintain land in a reasonably safe condition. I know of no reason, however, why the landowner should not have the power to direct *98 a contractor what it may and may not do on its land, and when.
I view the question raised by this case to be, when did the contractor's duty to warn, including the erection and maintenance of reflectors, terminate? The plaintiff similarly viewed the question:
The two decisions on which plaintiff principally relied also regard the problem in the same light.
In Soden v. Bennett, 173 Kan. 142, 244 P.2d 1204 (1952), the defendant contractor rebuilt a road with black top pavement and soft shoulders on the edges. The charge was that the decedent was killed because the contractor failed to adequately warn of the soft shoulders. The contract provided that the contractor was to provide warnings. It further provided: "The contractor's responsibilities for the maintenance of barricades and lights on any individual item of work included in the contract shall cease only when released in writing by the engineer." 173 Kan. at 147, 244 P.2d  at 1209.
The court held:
Breslin v. Fredrickson, 152 Cal. App. 2d 780, 313 P.2d 597 (1957), was a similar case. The court held:
As initially stated, I concur in the majority's decision to reverse because it was at least a question of fact whether the defendant's responsibility as fixed by the contract ceased.
O'CONNELL, C.J., joins in this specially concurring opinion.
[1]  The specially concurring opinion, on the other hand, erroneously assumes that the liability of defendant Coats, if any, is based solely on his contract with the State Highway Commission.
[2]  Defendant also contends that the nonsuit should have been allowed on the grounds (1) that plaintiff's evidence did not show a violation of any duty owed by defendant to the decedent, and (2) that plaintiff's evidence established contributory negligence on the part of the deceased as a matter of law. We think both of these contentions are devoid of merit.