Title: Hall v. Fulton

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PETER R. HALL, 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL J. GEOFFREY FULTON, 
DAVID H. YOUNG, MAXON R. 
DAVIS, LLOYD HICKMAN, OLA 
JUVKAM-WOLD, and MARITEK 
CORPORATION, 
 
Defendants Below, Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants. 
 
§ 
§  No. 4, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Court of 
§  Chancery of the State of  
§  Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. 2018-0738 
§    
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  June 23, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  August 21, 2023 
 
Before VALIHURA, LeGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Peter R. Hall, filed this appeal from the Court of 
Chancery’s final order and judgment, issued December 12, 2022, entering judgment 
in favor of the defendants-appellees for the reasons stated in the court’s letter 
decision of the same date.  The defendants-appellees filed a cross-appeal; they ask 
the Court to affirm the Court of Chancery’s judgment or, alternatively, to reverse the 
Court of Chancery’s denial of their motion to dismiss and enter an order dismissing 
the action with prejudice.  After consideration of the parties’ arguments and the 
record on appeal, we affirm. 
2 
 
(2) 
This litigation has a tortuous history.  In 2002, Hall negotiated a 
potential purchase of land in the Bahamas (the “Property”) from a subsidiary of 
Maritek Corporation.1  The transaction never came to fruition—exactly why has 
been a subject of protracted litigation in various jurisdictions.  In early 2004, the 
defendants-appellees Michael J. Geoffrey Fulton and David H. Young (or an entity 
controlled by Fulton and Young) acquired 50% of Maritek’s common stock.2  During 
a meeting on June 7, 2005 (the “2005 Maritek Board Meeting”), the Maritek board 
of directors discussed a potential sale of the Property to an entity affiliated with 
Young and the potential effect of the earlier dealings with Hall.  Certain drafts of the 
minutes of that meeting are the subject of this litigation.3 
(3) 
In 2005, the Maritek subsidiary initiated litigation against Hall in the 
Bahamas seeking a declaration that there was no enforceable agreement to sell the 
Property to Hall.  In 2008, the trial court in the Bahamas found, following a nine-
day trial, that there was no enforceable contract.4  Hall presented appeals to the Court 
of Appeal of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and then to the Privy Council in 
 
1 Opening Br. at 6–7; App. to Opening Br., at A10 (Compl.); Answering Br. at 8. 
2 Opening Br. at 8; App. to Opening Br., at A17 (Compl.); Answering Br. at 10. 
3 E.g., Opening Br. at 9–10, 13; App. to Opening Br., at A4 (Compl.), A20–21; Answering Br. at 
10. 
4 App. to Opening Br., at A358–59 (Judgment of the Privy Council). 
3 
 
London, but was ultimately unsuccessful.5  The Privy Council entered judgment in 
May 2015.6 
(4) 
In the meantime, in December 2007, two Maritek stockholders filed a 
derivative and class-action complaint in Delaware against Fulton, Young, and other 
directors of Maritek asserting, among other claims, that Fulton and Young engaged 
in self-dealing relating to the Property (the “Wang Action”).7  On June 10, 2008, 
following a trial in the Bahamas but before the trial court issued its decision, Hall 
moved to intervene in the Wang Action.  He asserted that he had a contractual 
interest in the Property and that the disposition of the Wang Action might impair his 
contractual rights.8  At a hearing on June 20, 2008, the Court of Chancery denied the 
motion to intervene.9   
(5) 
On March 28, 2013, while the Bahamian appeals were proceeding, Hall 
again moved to intervene in the Wang Action.  This time, he sought intervention for 
the purpose of receiving copies of certain documents—including drafts of minutes 
of the 2005 Maritek Board Meeting—that had been produced to the plaintiffs in the 
Wang Action but that, Hall alleged, his opposing parties in the Bahamian litigation 
 
5 Id. at A350–65; Answering Br. at 12, 15–18. 
6 App. to Opening Br., at A350 (Judgment of the Privy Council). 
7 Wang v. Fulton, C.A. No. 3409, Docket Entry No. 2, Verified Complaint (Del. Ch. filed Dec. 12, 
2007). 
8 Id. Docket Entry No. 52. 
9 Id. Docket Entry No. 61. 
4 
 
had wrongfully failed to produce in that action.10  On May 23, 2013, the Court of 
Chancery granted Hall’s motion to intervene in the Wang Action for the purpose of 
seeking the documents.11  Later, Hall and the parties to the Wang Action agreed that 
the Wang Action defendants would produce to Hall certain documents that they had 
produced to the Wang Action plaintiffs.  The Court of Chancery entered the parties’ 
stipulation as an order of the court on April 10, 2014 (the “Production Order”).12  
Specifically, the Production Order provided: 
1. Defendants shall produce to Mr. Hall the following documents that 
had been produced by defendants to plaintiffs in this action: 
a. all drafts of the minutes of the Maritek Corporation board of 
directors June 7, 2005 meeting; 
b. the document history of the June 7, 2005 board minutes, 
including metadata from the various versions of the minutes, 
showing, among other things, the dates of creation and 
editing; 
 
10 Wang, C.A. No. 3409, Docket Entry No. 107 (Del. Ch. filed Mar. 28, 2013). 
11 Id. Docket Entry No. 114 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2013).  The court wrote: 
The motion to intervene is granted.  In substance, Hall alleges that a fraud has been 
committed on a court in a sister jurisdiction, and that the production of non-
burdensome discovery materials in this action will assist him in determining and, if 
necessary, proving whether a fraud on the court took place.  In my view, showing 
comity and respect to other jurisdictions requires potentially making discovery 
available if it would assist in promoting the integrity of proceedings in the sister 
jurisdiction.  Were the shoe on the other foot, I would want to know whether or not 
a fast one had been pulled (or attempted).  I intimate no view as to whether this 
actually occurred.  I hold only that Hall has a legitimate purpose of seeking 
intervention and requesting the discovery sought.  Once the complaint in 
intervention is filed, the defendants shall answer its allegations and shall assert any 
Rule 12 defenses in their answer.  At that point, Hall may move to obtain the 
documents he seeks.  The Court is not currently granting the relief sought, only the 
right to intervene and file the complaint in intervention. 
Id. 
12 Id. Docket Entry No. 164 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2014). 
5 
 
c. agendas and draft agendas for the June 7, 2005 board meeting; 
and 
d. email and other communication related to the foregoing, 
including all drafts of such documents.13 
 
On May 27, 2014, the Court of Chancery granted a stipulation of dismissal of Hall’s 
complaint in intervention.14 
(6) 
In addition to the litigation in the Bahamas and the Court of Chancery, 
Hall also pursued relief in the Delaware Superior Court.  In July 2008, after the Court 
of Chancery denied Hall’s first motion to intervene in the Wang Action, Hall filed a 
Superior Court action against Fulton and Young (and later Maritek) for tortious 
interference with contract (the “Superior Court Action”).15  On April 29, 2009, the 
Superior Court stayed the action pending the completion of the litigation in the 
Bahamas.16  After the litigation in the Bahamas concluded with the issuance of the 
Privy Council’s judgment, Hall filed a second amended complaint in the Superior 
Court Action.17  Among other things, the complaint alleged that Fulton, Young, and 
Maritek had fraudulently altered the minutes of the 2005 Maritek Board Meeting 
and had violated the Production Order by concealing documents they were required 
to produce.18  On August 24, 2017, the Superior Court dismissed the action on forum 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. Docket Entry No. 165 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2014). 
15 Hall v. Fulton, C.A. No. 08C-07-123, Docket Entry No. 1 (Del. Super. filed July 14, 
2008). 
16 Id. Docket Entry No. 24. 
17 Id. Docket Entry No. 39 (filed Aug. 29, 2016). 
18 Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. 
6 
 
non conveniens grounds.19  The court noted that “to the extent that [Hall] alleges that 
Defendants failed to disclose additional documents” in the Court of Chancery, that 
claim should be asserted in the Court of Chancery rather than in Superior Court.20 
(7) 
This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling in March 2018.21  
Approximately six months later, Hall moved to reopen the closed Wang Action so 
Hall could pursue contempt sanctions for the alleged violations of the Production 
Order.  The court directed Hall to proceed by filing a new action, and on October 
12, 2018, Hall filed the Court of Chancery action that underlies this appeal.22  The 
complaint alleged that the defendants-appellees violated the Production Order by 
providing Hall with only four of eight known drafts of the 2005 Maritek Board 
Meeting and by failing to produce all related communications.  Hall alleged that in 
March 2015, Fulton had submitted an affidavit to the Privy Council that (i) attached 
 
19 Hall v. Maritek Corp., 170 A.3d 149 (Del. Super. 2017). 
20 Id. at 163 n.73; see also id. at 167 n.109 (“To the extent that [Hall] is dissatisfied with the 
production of documents in Wang v. Fulton, [Hall] could pursue this matter in Chancery Court.”). 
21 Hall v. Maritek Corp., 2018 WL 1256117 (Del. Mar. 12, 2018). 
22 Hall v. Fulton, C.A. No. 2018-0738, Docket Entry No. 1, Complaint (Del. Ch. filed Oct. 12, 
2018).  Counsel filed the action on Hall’s behalf.  The docket reflects that four different sets of 
counsel represented Hall in this litigation in the Court of Chancery—two were replaced by 
substitution and two sought, and were granted, leave to withdraw based on a “fundamental 
disagreement” or an “impasse” with Hall regarding how to proceed in the action.  Aside from a 
brief period when Hall was seeking counsel after the court granted the first motion to withdraw, it 
appears that Hall was represented by counsel from the commencement of the action in October 
2018 until the court granted the second motion to withdraw on November 3, 2022.  Hall proceeded 
pro se in the Court of Chancery from November 3, 2022, until the court entered the final judgment 
on December 12, 2022; he has proceeded pro se in this appeal.  Hall also was represented by 
counsel both times that he moved to intervene in the Wang Action, when he sought to reopen the 
closed Wang Action to pursue a contempt sanction, and in the action he filed in the Superior Court. 
7 
 
four drafts of the meeting minutes that Fulton represented had been produced to Hall 
and (ii) swore that Fulton had produced all drafts of the meeting minutes to Hall.23  
The complaint further alleged that the draft minutes that were attached to Fulton’s 
Privy Council affidavit had not previously been provided to Hall in accordance with 
the Production Order and were materially different from the drafts Hall previously 
received.24  The complaint alleged that Hall did not realize until on or about June 8, 
2016, that the drafts attached to the Fulton affidavit had not previously been 
produced to Hall.25 
(8) 
The defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by 
laches.  The Court of Chancery denied that motion.26  In its oral ruling on the motion, 
the court made clear that the scope of the action was limited to determining whether 
the defendants-appellees had violated the Production Order; the proceeding would 
not be an opportunity to “relitigate the Bahamian action, to grant remedies that could 
have been obtained in the Bahamian action, or to relitigate and [have the Court of 
Chancery] act as some-quasi-appellate body for the privy council proceeding.  The 
limited issue in this case is going to be whether there was contempt.”27  As discovery 
 
23 Id. ¶¶ 100–03. 
24 Id. ¶¶ 104–05. 
25 Id. ¶ 112. 
26 Id. Docket Entry Nos. 18, 21.  
27 App. to Opening Br., at A419–20 (Motion to Dismiss Tr.). 
8 
 
proceeded, numerous disputes arose.  The court continued to emphasize the limited 
scope of the action throughout the proceedings.28 
(9) 
On December 12, 2022, the Court of Chancery entered a final order and 
judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees.29  The court explained its judgment 
in an accompanying letter decision.  The court determined that the defendants-
appellees had complied with the Production Order by providing Hall with responsive 
documents from the broader set of documents that the Wang Action defendants had 
previously produced to the Wang Action plaintiffs.  The court concluded that the 
defendants-appellees’ production of documents from those already produced to the 
Wang plaintiffs—without “go[ing] back and look[ing] for documents that had not 
previously been produced”—was reasonable under the terms of the Production 
Order and did not support a finding of contempt.  The court rejected Hall’s 
 
28 See, e.g., id. at A771–72 (Tr. of Oral Arg. Motion to Intervene) (“As I have said before, I do not 
see it as my role to sit as a court of appeal, effectively, for the Bahamian proceeding.  Nor do I see 
myself as having the appropriate role of second-guessing the Privy Council.  Nor do I even see it 
as my role to police what may or may not have happened in the Delaware Superior Court 
proceeding.  It may be that there were problems.  I understand Mr. Hall’s theory that the 
withholding of documents in this case was a part of a major cover-up starting back in the early 
2000[s] that led to the problem in the Bahamas and then continued, and my action and the failure 
to comply with my order was a part of that.  So I do understand that theory.  The appropriate 
tribunals to consider that theory are the tribunals that Mr. Hall believes were defrauded. . . .” 
(formatting altered)). 
29 The procedural posture of the court’s final judgment was unusual.  Hall seems to characterize it 
as a ruling on summary judgment, see Opening Br. at 30 (stating that the Court of Chancery 
“summarily rule[d], . . . as a matter of law”); id. at 33 (stating that this Court “reviews a trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment de novo”), and the defendants-appellees agree, see Answering Br. at 
29 (“The Court of Chancery effectively entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and 
against Plaintiff.”).  We accept that characterization for purposes of this appeal. 
9 
 
contentions that the defendants-appellees or their counsel had wrongfully withheld 
certain documents from production to the Wang Action plaintiffs or deliberately 
misrepresented their Wang Action production to other courts.   
(10) In his appeal to this Court, Hall disagrees with the Court of Chancery’s 
determination that the defendants-appellees complied with the Production Order 
when they produced documents that had been produced to the Wang Action 
plaintiffs without conducting a new search for documents that had not been produced 
to the Wang Action plaintiffs.  He argues that the Court of Chancery’s decision is 
fraudulent and that it conceals misrepresentations made in foreign proceedings, in 
violation of the UN Convention Against Corruption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and 
other authorities “forbidding lawyers from presenting false evidence.”30   
(11) We find no basis to overturn the Court of Chancery’s judgment.  Hall 
has not identified any document that was produced to the Wang Action plaintiffs 
that was not produced to Hall as required by the Production Order.31  As the Court 
 
30 Opening Br. at 34. 
31 Indeed, Hall appears to concede that the documents that he alleges should have been produced 
were not produced to the Wang Action plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Opening Br. at 5 (stating that in 
September 2014 “Defendants produce[d] to Hall the drafts they had produced to the [Wang Action 
plaintiffs”); id. at 22 (arguing that certain documents were not produced to the Wang Action 
plaintiffs).   
Hall also indicates that he has pursued this contempt litigation for the benefit of a trust of 
which he is a trustee, and not on his own behalf.  Opening Br. at 8. This raises serious concerns 
about whether Hall can even continue pursuing this litigation.  See Tigani v. Director, 2020 WL 
5237278, at *3–5 (Del. Super. Sept. 2, 2020) (discussing law regarding pro se litigants’ pursuit of 
claims on behalf of artificial entities), aff’d, 2021 WL 2310426 (Del. June 4, 2021).  In any event, 
the “Motion for Oral Hearing” that Hall submitted on July 31, 2023, purportedly in his capacity as 
trustee of the trust, must be denied.  In addition to the issue of whether Hall can proceed on behalf 
10 
 
of Chancery repeatedly emphasized throughout the proceedings, that was the 
fundamental issue in this case.  Because we affirm the Court of Chancery’s ruling 
entering judgment against Hall, we need not address the defendants-appellees’ cross-
appeal asserting that the Court of Chancery erred by denying their motion to 
dismiss.32 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of 
Chancery is AFFIRMED.  The motion for oral hearing is DENIED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
of the trust, the motion seeks to have particular counsel that does not currently represent the trust—
and appears never to have represented the trust, or Hall, in this litigation or any of the litigation 
relating to the property at issue—present an oral argument in support of Hall’s position.  The 
requested relief is neither appropriate nor warranted. 
32 See Answering Br. at 42 (“In the alternative, the Court of Chancery should have dismissed this 
action based on the doctrine of laches.”); id. at 51 (requesting that the Court affirm the Court of 
Chancery’s judgment “or, in the alternative, enter judgment in Defendants’ favor under the 
equitable laches doctrine”).