Title: GRAY v. STRATTON REAL ESTATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GRAY v. STRATTON REAL ESTATE2001 WY 12536 P.3d 1127Case Number: 00-323Decided: 12/12/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

JAN 
CHARLES GRAY, 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

STRATTON 
REAL ESTATE, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff) .

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Jan Charles Gray, pro se.

 Representing 
Appellee:

            
Keith P. Tyler and Peter C. Nicolaysen, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
Jan 
Charles Gray appeals from a judgment entered against him on a lease 
contract.  Finding Gray's argument 
on appeal to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the district court and, 
finding no just cause for this appeal, award sanctions against 
Gray.

 

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]           
Appellant 
frames the issue as:

 

Whether 
a real estate listing agreement without a "definite expiration date," as 
required by Wyoming Statute § 33-28-111 is enforceable.

 

Appellee 
rephrases the issue slightly:

 

Whether 
the written contract between the parties is illegal by operation of Wyoming 
Statute § 33-28-111 (1999), thereby rendering the contract void in its 
entirety.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Gray and 
Stratton Real Estate (Stratton) entered into an "Exclusive Leasing and 
Commission Agreement" (Agreement) in May 1999.  Under the terms of the Agreement, Gray, 
as the owner of certain office space, agreed to pay Stratton a commission of ten 
thousand dollars in exchange for Stratton negotiating a lease for the office 
space on his behalf.  The proposed 
tenant with whom Stratton was to pursue negotiations was delineated in the 
Agreement.  Gray agreed to pay 
Stratton five thousand dollars upon consummation of the lease, and the remaining 
five thousand dollars on September 1, 1999.  

 

[¶4]           
Stratton 
successfully negotiated the lease, and the lease agreement was signed.  Gray refused to pay any portion of the 
commission.  Stratton brought suit 
against Gray for breach of contract.  
After a trial, judgment was entered against Gray in the amount of ten 
thousand dollars plus interest and costs.  
Gray filed a timely notice of appeal.  Stratton claims that there is no 
reasonable cause for this appeal and requests this Court impose sanctions on 
Gray pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶5]           
Gray 
presents a pure question of law for our review, requiring an interpretation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-111(a)(xx).  
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law, so our standard of review 
is de novo."  May v. 
May, 945 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Wyo. 1997).  

Our 
rules of statutory interpretation are well established.  We decide initially whether the statute 
is clear or ambiguous.  Lyles v. 
State ex rel. Division of Workers' Compensation, 957 P.2d 843, 845 (Wyo. 
1998).  This Court makes that 
determination as a matter of law.  
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991); see also Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993).  If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.

 

Wyoming 
Dept. of Transp. v. Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo. 1999).  "[W]e 
refuse to enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters which do not 
fall within its express provisions."  
Bowen v. State, Wyoming Real Estate Comm'n, 900 P.2d 1140, 1143 
(Wyo. 1995).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]           
Gray 
argues that the Agreement is not enforceable because it violates Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 33-28-111(a)(xx).  Title 33, 
chapter 28, article 1 contains general licensing provisions for real estate 
brokers and salesmen.  Section 
111(a)(xx) is entitled "[c]ensure of licensee and suspension or revocation of 
license; grounds," and specifically provides:

 

(a)  The commission shall upon a written 
sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the actions of any 
broker, associate broker or salesman and may censure the licensee, suspend or 
revoke any license issued under this act . . . for any of the 
following:

 

            
* * * *

 

(xx) 
Failing to obtain written listing agreements identifying the property and 
containing all terms and conditions under which the property is to be sold 
including the price, the commission to be paid, the signatures of all parties 
concerned and a definite expiration date.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 33-28-111(a)(xx) (LexisNexis 2001).  We fail to discern how this statute 
applies to the facts of this case.  
This statute is a licensing regulatory statute that, by its terms, 
applies only to listing agreements for the sale of property.  It does not apply to lease agreements. 

 

[¶7]           
In a 
brief totally lacking in pertinent authority and woefully sparse of cogent 
argument, Gray argues that the Agreement does not contain a "definite expiration 
date" and is therefore unenforceable because it violates the statute.  We fail to discern any merit in this 
argument. Obviously, a lease agreement cannot violate a statute intended to 
regulate a broker's conduct regarding the sale of real property.  

 

[¶8]           
Gray 
also seems to argue that the statute reflects a strong public policy that all 
written listing agreements (presumably including lease agreements) include a 
definite expiration date.  He 
contends that the absence of such a definite expiration date makes the listing 
agreement unenforceable as against public policy.  Gray reads far too much into § 
33-28-111(a)(xx).  The statute 
simply does not apply to lease agreements in any sense.  

 

[¶9]           
Even if 
the statute did apply to establish public policy for lease agreements, Gray 
takes the public policy argument too far.  
While Gray professes to have found no pertinent authority, this Court has 
previously had occasion to interpret § 33-28-111(a)(xx).  In Wyoming Realty Co. v. Cook, 
872 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1994), this Court specifically spoke to the purpose of § 
33-28-111(a)(xx).  In Cook, a 
licensed real estate broker concluded a sale of certain real property under an 
oral agreement with the owner of the property.  The owner then tried to invoke § 
33-28-111(a)(xx) to avoid payment of any commission to the broker, stating that 
any oral agreement was unenforceable under the statute.  

 

[¶10]       
This 
Court refused to interpret § 33-28-111(a)(xx) in such a way that it would defeat 
the payment of an earned commission of a broker.  We determined that § 33-28-111(a)(xx) 
was a regulatory statute and that this "regulatory statute adopted in Wyoming, 
taken together with the regulations of the Commission, appear, at best, to 
evidence a legislative intent to structure a special statute of frauds."  Cook at 553.  Because the statute of frauds can be 
satisfied by full performance of one of the parties, the lack of a written 
listing agreement would not bar the enforcement of the oral 
agreement:

 

We reverse the holding of the 
district court that, as a matter of public policy in Wyoming, a written listing 
agreement is a prerequisite to recovery of a real estate sales commission, if 
the contract has been performed by the broker.  The broker's right to the commission 
should not be defeated under these circumstances when it is clear that the 
broker is the procuring cause for the sale of the 
property.

 

Id. at 554.  We clearly stated in Cook that public policy does not favor 
the forfeiture of contract rights.   
It should not need to be restated that:

 

"[c]ourts do not like to aid 
litigants in avoiding their contractual obligations by joining in their games of 
hide-and-seek behind statutory technicalitiesespecially is this so where the 
other party has performed and the party looking to avoid the contract has reaped 
all the benefits of the performance.  
We will not aid and abet such efforts if we can possibly avoid 
it."

 

Id. 
(quoting 
Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, 656 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Wyo. 1983)).  In this case, we not only have a written 
contract, but Stratton also successfully concluded its duties under the contract 
within a few months.  The public 
policy evinced in § 33-28-111(a)(xx) would not be furthered by a finding that 
the lack of a definite expiration date makes the entire written agreement, 
already performed by Stratton, unenforceable.  We decline Gray's invitation to 
interpret a statute intended to prevent fraud in such a way as to allow Gray to 
avoid his contractual obligations after he "has reaped all the benefits of the 
performance."  

 

[¶11]       
As a 
final issue, Stratton claims that there is no reasonable cause for this appeal 
and this Court should award sanctions pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.  "Generally, this Court is reluctant to 
impose sanctions, but we will make such an award in those rare circumstances 
where an appellate brief lacks cogent argument, is devoid of pertinent authority 
to support the claims of error, and/or fails to make adequate references to the 
record."  Small v. Convenience 
Plus Partners, Ltd., 6 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Wyo. 2000).  This is such a rare 
circumstance.

 

[¶12]       
Gray 
failed to include any pertinent authority in his brief to support his 
claim.  In fact, the existing law is 
to the contrary.  Section 
33-28-111(a)(xx) applies only to regulate listing agreements for the sale of 
real property.  It simply does not 
apply to the Agreement at issue in this appeal.  Even if it did, it could not be used to 
defeat the claim of Stratton to a commission agreed to by Gray and fully earned 
by Stratton.  We can discern no good 
faith legal basis for this action.  
We therefore certify that there is no reasonable basis for this appeal 
and that sanctions are appropriate.

CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]       
There is 
no basis in law, equity or public policy for Gray to defeat the contractual 
obligations into which he freely entered with Stratton.  Gray's argument against enforcement of 
the Agreement is not supported by any pertinent authority and is completely 
lacking in merit.  We affirm the 
judgment of the district court and will impose sanctions on Gray.  Stratton shall submit a statement of 
costs and attorney's fees associated with responding to this appeal.  Upon review, we will award an 
appropriate amount in the form of sanctions.