Title: Reay v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Reay v. State1990 WY 122800 P.2d 499Case Number: 90-106Decided: 11/05/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
STEPHEN V. REAY, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Senior Asst. Public Defender, 
and David L. Serelson, Asst. Public Defender, Public Defender Program, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Kaylin D. Kluge, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, Retired 
J.

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from a denial by District Court Judge, the Honorable Hunter Patrick, of 
appellant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty made before imposition of 
sentence.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      We agree with 
that said by Judge Patrick in his opinion letter. It 
reads:

     "Defendant Stephen 
Vance Reay entered a guilty plea to a charge of unlawfully possessing a firearm, 
having been previously convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violent felony in 
violation of W.S. 6-8-102. He now seeks to withdraw that guilty 
plea.

[¶4]      "Rule 33(d), 
W.R.Cr.P. governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas. It provides as 
follows:

     "`Withdrawal of 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or 
of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 
sentence may set aside the judgment o[f] conviction and permit the defendant to 
withdraw his plea.'

"A defendant 
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing must present a plausible 
reason for the withdrawal. Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 137 (Wyo. 1989); 
Chorniak v. State, 715 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Wyo. 1986); Ecker v. State, 545 P.2d 641, 642 (Wyo. 1976). The withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an absolute right, 
even before sentencing. It rests within the discretion of the court. Hanson v. 
State, 590 P.2d 832, 835 (Wyo. 1979); Schmidt v. State, 668 P.2d 656, 661 (Wyo. 
1983).

[¶5]      "The reason for 
Defendant's motion is his contention that there exists, in fact, no prior 
conviction to be the predicate for the present charge of being a convicted 
violent felon in possession of a firearm. To resolve this issue the statutes of 
Wyoming and California must be considered. The Wyoming Statute to which 
Defendant pleaded guilty, W.S. 6-8-102, provides [as] 
follows:

     "`Any person who has 
previously pleaded guilty or been convicted of a violent felony or an attempt to 
commit a violent felony and has not been pardoned and who uses or knowingly 
possesses any firearm is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than three (3) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00) or both.'

"Defendant 
concedes that on or about March 22, 1968 he was sentenced in Sacramento, 
California on a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced 
pursuant to Section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code which provides as 
follows (with emphasis added by this Court):

     "`(a) In any case in 
which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire term 
of probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of 
probation, or in any other case in which a court, in its discretion and the 
interests of justice, determines that a defendant should be granted the relief 
available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time after the 
termination of the period of probation, if he is not then serving a sentence for 
any offense, on probation for any offense, or charged with the commission of any 
offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of guilty or plea of 
nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if he has been convicted 
after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; 
and, in either case, the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or 
information against the defendant and except as noted above, he shall 
thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the 
offense of which he has been convicted, except as provided in Section 13555 of 
the Vehicle Code. The probationer shall be informed, in his probation papers, of 
this right and privilege and his right, if any, to petition for a certificate of 
rehabilitation and pardon. The probationer may make such application and change 
of plea in person or by attorney, or by the probation officer authorized in 
writing; provided, that, in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant for 
any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have 
the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or 
information dismissed, and provided further that the order shall state, and 
the probationer shall be informed that the order does not relieve him of the 
obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question 
contained in any questionnaire or application for public office or for licensure 
by any state or local agency.

"`Dismissal of an 
accusation or information pursuant to this section does not permit a person to 
own, possess, or have in his custody or control any firearm capable of being 
concealed upon the person or prevent his conviction under Section 
12021.

"`This subdivision shall 
apply to all applications for relief under this section which are filed on or 
after November, 23, 1970.

     "`(b) Subdivision (a) 
of this section does not apply to any misdemeanor which is within the provisions 
of subdivision (b) of Section 42001 of the Vehicle Code, or to any 
infraction.'

"Defendant 
successfully completed the probation imposed for his previous conviction 
and the provisions of Section 1203.4 were  
applied. The question is whether that conviction may serve as the 
underlying felony required by W.S. 6-8-102.

[¶6]      "Defendant argues 
that California law, like W.S. 7-13-301 precludes the use of his conviction in 
Wyoming to substantiate a charge under W.S. 6-8-102. Some courts have accepted 
his reasoning, that an offense with sentencing under statutes similar to W.S. 
7-13-301 followed by successful completion of probation cannot serve as the 
felony predicate to a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. State 
v. Ritte, 710 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1985); State v. Randall, 464 So. 2d 971, 973 (La. 
App. 1985). Other states and the U.S. Supreme Court have held that such a 
conviction is sufficient to serve as the necessary predicate. State v. Thomas, 
35 Wn. App. 161, 665 P.2d 914, 915 (1983); State v. Cartwright, 246 Or. 120, 418 P.2d 822, 834 (1966) cert. denied 386 U.S. 937, 87 S. Ct. 961, 17 L. Ed. 2d 810 
(1967); State v. Robinson, 251 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1969); Dickerson v. New 
Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 103 S. Ct. 986, 74 L. Ed. 2d 845 reh. denied 
461 U.S. 911, 103 S. Ct. 1887, 76 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1983).

[¶7]      "Focusing the 
analysis upon the specific statutes to be construed in this case, the California 
statute retains a prohibition against possession of a concealable firearm. It 
specifically provides that in any subsequent prosection the prior conviction 
could be pleaded, proved and have the same effect as if the accusation had not 
been dismissed would still be a conviction for purposes of state licensing 
procedures. The restoration of Defendant's rights under that statute was not 
absolute; there was no `blotting out' of the entire conviction. W.S. 
7-13-301(d), on the other hand, provides that `Discharge and dismissal under 
this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for 
any purpose.' The Wyoming statute is an extreme act of grace whereas the 
California statute only restores some of the defendant's previous rights and 
privileges.

[¶8]      "When a 
California court was faced with this factual situation, it held that a `pardon' 
from the Nevada Board of Pardon and Parole Commissioners, restoring the 
defendant's civil rights without specifically mentioning the right to possess a 
concealable firearm, did not prevent a conviction under their version of W.S. 
6-8-102. People v. Norton, 80 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14, 146 Cal. Rptr. 343, 346-348 
(1978).

[¶9]      "Although the 
felony conviction of the Defendant was set aside and the accusations or 
information dismissed pursuant to California's Section 1203.4, that did not 
preclude its use against the Defendant in the present proceedings. The grace 
extended to the Defendant by the State of California did not go so far as to 
extinguish his conviction for all purposes. The conviction remains extant for 
purposes of W.S. 6-8-102.

[¶10]   "Since the Court finds that the 
California felony exists for purposes of W.S. 6-8-102, there exists no plausible 
reason for the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, Zanetti v. State, supra, 
and therefore Defendant's motion is denied."

[¶11]   Additionally, we note that appellee 
words the issue on appeal: "Whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
not allowing appellant to withdraw his guilty plea?" Judge Patrick recognized 
the existence of discretion citing Hanson, 590 P.2d  at 835 and Schmidt, 668 P.2d  
at 661.

     "A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 
251, 232 P.2d 713 (1951); Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977 (1910); 
DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 303 A.2d 709 (1972); In re Estate of Horman, 
265 Cal. App. 2d 796, 71 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1968)."

Martinez v. 
State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).

     "Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)."

Martin v. State, 
720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶12]   Inasmuch as appellant's specified 
basis for withdrawal of his guilty plea is a contention that his California 
predicate conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was "set aside and 
dismissed" pursuant to California Penal Code 1203.4, and since such section of 
the Code excepts a charge pertaining to possession of a concealable firearm from 
its operation, the district court cannot be said to have committed an act which 
exceeded the bounds of reason or which was a commission of error under the 
circumstances. The court could easily conclude as it did. Appellant's reason for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea was not plausible in view of the exception 
relating to firearms contained in the California Penal Code 1203.4. The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion.

[¶13]   Affirmed.