Title: Raintree Health Care Center v. Human Rights Comm'n

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the 
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are 
subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior 
to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, 
because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to 
the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered 
the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of 
Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final 
action by the Court. 
 
                 Docket No. 80075--Agenda 20--May 1996. 
      RAINTREE HEALTH CARE CENTER, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS HUMAN 
                  RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellees. 
                     Opinion filed October 18, 1996. 
 
     JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the judgment of the court: 
     James Davis, the original complainant in this case, filed a 
discrimination charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights 
alleging that his employer, Raintree Health Care Center (Raintree), 
violated the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 
68, par. 1--101 et seq.) by discharging him after learning that he 
tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). After 
a three-day hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded 
that Raintree had discriminated against Davis by constructively 
discharging him on the basis of a physical handicap, his infection 
with HIV. The ALJ recommended Davis' reinstatement to his former 
position, or a substantially equivalent position with pay and 
benefits, and awarded him back pay, plus interest, and reasonable 
attorney fees. The Illinois Human Rights Commission upheld the 
ALJ's recommended order and decision. Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm'n Rep. 
1988CN2190 (April 15, 1994). The appellate court, with one justice 
dissenting, affirmed the final order of the Illinois Human Rights 
Commission. 275 Ill. App. 3d 387. We allowed Raintree's petition 
for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315. 
     The central issue raised in this appeal is whether the 
Illinois Human Rights Commission properly determined that 
Raintree's constructive discharge of Davis, based on his HIV- 
positive status, amounted to a violation of the Illinois Human 
Rights Act. To resolve this issue we must also determine whether 
public health statutes and regulations in effect at the time of 
this action prohibited Davis from working at the Raintree nursing 
home and whether Raintree's belief that these regulations did in 
fact bar Davis from working at its facility is relevant in 
determining liability under the Illinois Human Rights Act. The 
final issue raised by Raintree is whether it was entitled to 
discovery and a hearing on Davis' petition for attorney fees. For 
the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court. 
     The testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing before the 
ALJ established the following facts. Raintree operates a nursing 
home facility in Evanston, Illinois. Raintree hired James Davis as 
a kitchen helper in March of 1987. Raintree later promoted Davis to 
the position of cook at the facility. In June of 1987, Davis was 
fired for fighting on the job, but Raintree rehired Davis in 
November of 1987, when his supervisor asked him to return. Both 
parties stipulated that after Davis was rehired, he performed his 
duties as a cook in an acceptable manner consistent with Raintree's 
standards. Davis' responsibilities as a cook consisted of preparing 
the evening meal, placing the food on trays, and cleaning and 
straightening the kitchen and storeroom areas. In performing these 
duties, Raintree required Davis to wear gloves. Davis had no direct 
contact with the residents of the facility. 
     On January 12, 1988, Davis' doctor informed him that he had 
tested positive for HIV. After reporting to work that same day, 
Davis told his supervisor, Pearl Smith, that he had just been 
diagnosed as being HIV-positive. Smith suggested that Davis begin 
working while she went to discuss the matter with Burton Behr, the 
administrator of the facility. Behr then called Davis into his 
office for a meeting. At this first meeting, Behr told Davis that 
Raintree needed information from public health officials to 
determine whether Davis could continue his employment. Behr then 
allowed Davis to return to work. Behr testified that after this 
first meeting, he began looking through the Illinois Department of 
Public Health regulations and the City of Evanston regulations 
governing the licensing of nursing homes. Behr found nothing in the 
nursing home regulations that addressed the situation of an HIV- 
positive employee. 
     Behr testified that on this day, he made several telephone 
calls to the Evanston board of health, the Illinois Department of 
Public Health, and the Illinois Council on Long Term Care for 
advice on how to handle Davis' situation. Behr was unable to 
receive a definitive answer as to whether Davis' condition made him 
ineligible to work in a nursing home. Behr testified that when he 
spoke with Louise Brown, the director of the Evanston board of 
health, he explained to her that he "could not find anything in the 
rules and regulations anywhere that specifies HIV-positive," and 
asked whether Davis could continue working at the facility. Behr 
testified that Brown responded, "I can't tell you he can't work 
there, but I can tell you if something should occur because he is 
working there, then you are subject to the rules and regulations." 
Behr replied that "there are no rules and regulations governing 
this." Brown again responded, "You will have to go with the rules 
and regulations that stand until it can be clarified, so according 
to the rules and regulations, he is unable to work there at the 
present time ***." Behr also spoke with Rose Ferrell, a regional 
supervisor of the Illinois Department of Public Health. Behr 
testified that Ferrell simply told him to follow the rules and 
regulations and that she would check further and get back to him. 
Similarly, Terry Sullivan, the director of the Illinois Council on 
Long Term Care, offered no recommendation on how Behr should 
proceed. 
     After conducting this inquiry, Behr called Davis back to his 
office. Behr told Davis that he thought it was best that Davis go 
home until he found out more information as to whether the nursing 
home regulations prohibited HIV-positive persons from working at 
Raintree. Behr advised Davis that when he found out more 
information he would telephone him. Behr also requested that Davis 
bring a note from his doctor stating that "he was free of a 
communicable disease or that he was allowed to work with the HIV 
virus." That same week, Davis obtained a doctor's note as Behr 
requested. The note, signed by Davis' doctor stated: 
               "To Whom It May Concern: 
               Mr. James Davis HIV status does not restrict him 
          from performing his current job as a cook in a nursing 
          home. The HIV (AIDS Virus) is NOT transmitted through the 
          preparation or serving of food and beverages. 
          Transmission is through blood and body fluids. Should Mr. 
          Davis cut himself in the course of the food preparation, 
          that food should be discarded the same as if any employee 
          had bled into food. Should you have any further 
          questions, please contact the nurse with the clinic, 
          Kathy Pietschmann, R.N., M.S. at 943-6600 ext. 401. 
               Sincerely, 
               (Signed) TOM SKOUTELIS 
               Tom Skoutelis, M.D." 
     Despite the note, Behr did not allow Davis to return to work 
at Raintree. Behr testified that the Evanston board of health 
informed him that the note was insufficient to permit Davis to 
return to work because it did not specify that Davis was free from 
a contagious or infectious disease. Behr further stated that he 
contacted the nurse referred to in the doctor's note and she just 
reiterated the information contained in the note. Behr continued to 
communicate with the Illinois Department of Public Health and the 
Evanston board of health to try to get an opinion as to whether 
Davis' condition made him ineligible to work in a nursing home. As 
stated, Behr never received a conclusive answer from either of 
these agencies. 
     For several weeks after he was initially requested to go home, 
Davis contacted the Raintree facility on numerous occasions to find 
out if Behr had received an answer from the board of health and if 
he could return to work. Each time he called, Davis was told that 
Raintree had not yet received an answer from public health 
officials. From the time that he left the facility on January 12, 
1988, Davis was never contacted by either Behr or Smith and was 
never allowed to return to work. Throughout this time when Behr was 
seeking an official opinion as to the impact of Davis' condition on 
his employment, Davis received no salary from Raintree. 
     In early February 1988, Davis' brother, who also worked as a 
cook at Raintree, informed Davis that he had been fired. Davis 
testified that he believed what his brother told him because he had 
not heard from anyone at Raintree for over three weeks. Davis did 
not call Raintree or seek confirmation that he had been fired. In 
early February, Davis filed for unemployment compensation benefits. 
Raintree contested the unemployment claim contending that it had 
never terminated Davis' employment. Davis was ultimately denied 
unemployment benefits. 
      On February 3, 1988, Davis filed a discrimination charge with 
the Illinois Department of Human Rights. After an investigation of 
the charge, on January 5, 1989, the Department of Human Rights 
filed a complaint on behalf of Davis, alleging that Raintree 
discriminated against Davis on the basis of a physical handicap. In 
February of 1989, Raintree offered Davis another position, at the 
same $4.20 rate of pay per hour, at a different nursing home 
facility located in Highland Park, Illinois. At the time of the 
offer, Davis lived at 43rd and Michigan Avenue in downtown Chicago. 
Davis did not own a car and relied on public transportation. The 
job at Highland Park was over 40 miles from Davis' home and would 
require approximately a 2«-hour commute each way on public 
transportation. Davis refused the job due to the long commute. 
     The parties appeared for a three-day hearing before an ALJ 
beginning on February 24, 1992. Upon consideration of the evidence 
presented, the ALJ issued a recommended liability determination on 
October 9, 1992. The ALJ found that Raintree discriminated against 
Davis by constructively discharging him based on his HIV-positive 
status, a protected physical handicap. On October 28, 1992, Davis 
filed a petition for attorney fees and costs in the amount of 
$42,909.98, supported by affidavits of his counsel and a billing 
worksheet. Davis also requested a multiplier in the amount of 50%. 
Raintree filed a motion for discovery and depositions regarding the 
reasonableness of the attorney fees. After a hearing on Raintree's 
motion, the ALJ denied the request for discovery. Raintree 
eventually responded to Davis' petition for fees and moved for an 
evidentiary hearing and oral argument on these issues. The ALJ 
denied Raintree's motion, noting that oral arguments in such a 
circumstance were "highly unusual" and that Raintree offered "no 
explanation why this case required a variation from standard 
procedure." On July 8, 1993, the ALJ issued a recommended order and 
decision regarding attorney fees in this case. The ALJ rejected 
Davis' request for a fee multiplier of 50%, reduced the hourly rate 
requested for two of the attorneys, and rejected Raintree's 
challenge to the number of hours billed and the costs requested. 
The ALJ awarded Davis $28,956.50 in attorney fees. 
     Raintree filed exceptions to the ALJ's recommendations as to 
liability and attorney fees with the Human Rights Commission. On 
April 15, 1994, the Commission issued its order and decision 
adopting the recommended decision of the ALJ and rejecting the 
exceptions filed by Raintree. Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm'n Rep. 1988CN2190 
(April 15, 1994). The Commission reasoned that Raintree 
discriminated against Davis on the basis of a physical condition 
which was unrelated to his ability to do the job in question, which 
amounted to a violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. The 
Commission noted that the only medical evidence presented was the 
doctor's note obtained by Davis, which stated that Davis' infection 
with HIV did not restrict him from performing his current job. The 
Commission further determined that the guidelines which Raintree 
relied on, section 300.650(a)(4) of Title 77 of the Illinois 
Administrative Code (77 Ill. Adm. Code 300.650(a)(4) (1985)) did 
not bar Davis from working at the facility with his condition. The 
Commission concluded that HIV was not included in the list of 
"contagious and infectious diseases" outlined in section 690.100 of 
Title 77 of the Illinois Administrative Code (77 Ill. Adm. Code 
690.100 (Supp. 1987)) which would have limited Davis' ability to 
work in a nursing home. The Commission further held that Raintree's 
good-faith belief that the public health regulations prohibited it 
from employing Davis was not relevant in determining whether it had 
violated the Human Rights Act. Davis died on November 27, 1994, and 
his estate was substituted as the complainant in this action in 
March 1995. 
     On August 25, 1995, the appellate court issued its opinion 
confirming the Commission's decision. 275 Ill. App. 3d 387. The 
court agreed that firing Davis based solely on his infection with 
HIV, a protected physical condition, violated the Human Rights Act. 
The court reasoned that before rejecting Davis for employment, 
Raintree should have made an individualized determination as to 
Davis' ability to perform the work of a cook. The court further 
rejected Raintree's argument that its decision to terminate Davis 
was compelled by nursing home regulations. The dissenting justice 
believed the Commission's decision to be against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. He would have held that Raintree's good- 
faith belief that it was required to terminate Davis' employment 
based on public health regulations exempted it from liability for 
handicap discrimination. Raintree now appeals, arguing that the 
dissenting justice properly determined that the Commission's 
decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
      When reviewing a decision by an administrative agency, "the 
findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions 
of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct." 735 ILCS 
5/3--110 (West 1994). In addition, the Commission's findings of 
fact should be sustained unless the court determines that such 
findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Zaderaka 
v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n,  131 Ill. 2d 172 , 180 (1989). 
However, a reviewing court is not bound to give the same deference 
to an administrative agency's conclusions of law and statutory 
construction, and exercises independent review over such questions. 
See Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 190 Ill. 
App. 3d 1036, 1046 (1989). 
      On this appeal, we will first address whether Raintree's 
decision to discharge Davis, because he tested positive for HIV, 
constituted employment discrimination under the Human Rights Act. 
We will later address whether the existing health regulations 
compelled Raintree's discriminatory actions and whether Raintree's 
belief that Davis' discharge was required should relieve the 
nursing home from liability. 
      The Illinois Human Rights Act (the Act) specifically 
prohibits discrimination in employment against the physically and 
mentally handicapped. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 1--102(A). 
The term "unlawful discrimination" is defined by the Act as 
"discrimination against a person because of his *** handicap." Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 1--103(Q). The Human Rights Act 
further defines "handicap," for purposes of employment 
discrimination, as: "a determinable physical or mental 
characteristic of a person, *** the history of such characteristic, 
or the perception of such characteristic by the person complained 
against, which may result from disease, injury, congenital 
condition of birth or functional disorder and which characteristic 
*** is unrelated to the person's ability to perform the duties of 
a particular job or position." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 
1--103(I)(1). Finally, the Act provides that it is a civil rights 
violation "[f]or any employer to *** discharge *** on the basis of 
unlawful discrimination." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 2-- 
102(A). Therefore, under the Act, it would be unlawful for an 
employer to fire an employee because of his physical handicap, if 
that handicap was unrelated to his ability to perform his job 
duties. Such a firing would be deemed "unlawful discrimination" 
based on a physical handicap under the terms of the Human Rights 
Act. 
     Respondents, the estate of Davis and the Illinois Human Rights 
Commission, assert that it is undisputed that Davis' HIV infection 
is a protected condition under the Act. We agree that infection 
with HIV is a determinable physical characteristic resulting from 
a disease which has been held to be a qualifying condition under 
civil rights laws. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C.,  862 F. Supp. 1310 , 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Doe v. District of Columbia,  796 F. Supp. 559 , 568 (D.D.C. 1992). The issue then becomes whether Davis' 
handicap was unrelated to his ability to perform his job duties, 
rendering his termination unlawful. 
     Traditionally, when analyzing employment discrimination claims 
under the Human Rights Act, Illinois courts and the Commission 
generally apply a three-part analysis. Zaderaka v. Illinois Human 
Rights Comm'n,  131 Ill. 2d 172 , 178-79 (1989). First, under this 
analysis, "plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination." Zaderaka, 
131 Ill. 2d  at 178-79. Second, to rebut the presumption that an 
employer unlawfully discriminated against an employee, the employer 
must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
decision, such as an employee's poorly performing his job, 
committing some act of misconduct, or missing excessive days of 
work. Finally, if an employer articulates a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason, then plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence "that the employer's articulated 
reason was not its true reason, but was instead a pretext for 
unlawful discrimination." Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d  at 179. 
     Although this is the conventional formulation, this three-part 
analysis is not useful in the case before us because, here, there 
is no dispute as to why Raintree discharged Davis. The facts 
establish that the sole reason Raintree terminated Davis was 
because he tested positive for HIV. Where, as here, the reasons for 
an adverse job action are uncontroverted, the dispositive issue is 
simply whether the handicapped person could perform the particular 
work involved. See Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 
v. Human Rights Comm'n, 138 Ill. App. 3d 71, 75 (1985). 
     As stated, the Illinois Human Rights Act provides that adverse 
employment actions cannot be taken against any person due to his or 
her physical handicap if the handicap is unrelated to the person's 
ability to perform job duties. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 
1--103(I)(1). Courts have applied this principle to require 
employers to make individualized determinations of whether a 
particular handicapped employee or applicant is able to perform the 
work required by a particular job. See Board of Trustees, 138 Ill. 
App. 3d at 75; Melvin v. City of West Frankfort, 93 Ill. App. 3d 
425, 429 (1981). An individualized determination of a handicap 
person's abilities is required because "it is the express policy of 
this State that eligibility for employment be based upon individual 
capacity." See Melvin, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 429. 
      In Melvin, the court examined whether a section of the 
Illinois Municipal Code which barred amputees from employment 
eligibility with the fire and police departments, except for 
clerical duties, was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the 
Illinois Constitution, article I, section 19 (Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. I, 19), prohibits "distinctions in hiring handicapped 
individuals which are not related to the ability of a particular 
applicant to satisfactorily perform particular work." See Melvin, 
93 Ill. App. 3d at 429. The court noted that these guarantees set 
forth by article I, section 19, have since been implemented by the 
Illinois Human Rights Act which prohibits discrimination in 
employment based on a physical handicap. See Melvin, 93 Ill. App. 
3d at 430. The court concluded that this section of the Municipal 
Code was unconstitutional because the regulation imposed a blanket 
restriction against all amputees and failed to allow for an 
individualized determination of whether a particular person could 
perform a particular job. See Melvin, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 429-31. 
     In Board of Trustees, the court applied the standard 
enunciated in Melvin to hold that the University of Illinois 
discriminated against an amputee because it did not make a more 
thorough inquiry into plaintiff's ability to overcome his handicap 
and perform the duties required. See Board of Trustees, 138 Ill. 
App. 3d at 76. In Board of Trustees, an amputee who had been a 
sheet metal worker for over 17 years applied for a sheet metal 
position with the university. The university would not hire him due 
to his amputation. The court held that the university unfairly 
discriminated against the plaintiff by deciding not to hire him 
without first testing his agility or ability to climb, and without 
any evidence that his handicap impaired his past work performance 
as a sheet metal worker. See Board of Trustees, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 
75. The court further noted that the reason for rejecting plaintiff 
seemed to be "a good faith but overly cautious decision after an 
insufficiently thorough investigation" of whether this particular 
handicapped person could perform the particular work involved. See 
Board of Trustees, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 76. 
     In this case, both the appellate court and the Commission 
found that Raintree did not prove that it had made an 
individualized determination of Davis' ability to perform his job 
duties without undue harm to himself or others. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 
395. The appellate court and the Commission also noted that the 
only medical evidence submitted, the doctor's note, stated that 
Davis' handicap would not prevent him from performing his job as a 
cook. We agree with the appellate court's holding. 
      In the case at bar, Raintree discharged Davis without making 
a determination on its own whether employing Davis as a cook would 
pose a risk to its residents. The doctor's note was the only 
medical evidence presented, and it established that Davis' 
infection with HIV was unrelated to his ability to perform his 
duties as a cook at Raintree. The note specifically stated that 
Davis' HIV status did not restrict him from performing his job as 
a cook and that HIV was not transmitted through food preparation. 
Raintree presented absolutely no contrary medical evidence. Nothing 
in the record indicates that Raintree made any inquiry as to how 
HIV is transmitted or whether there was any risk of an HIV-infected 
cook passing on the disease to nursing home residents. There is no 
evidence that Raintree spoke to any other doctors, such as the ones 
working at their nursing home facility, or consulted any medical 
literature as to the characteristics and risks of transmission of 
HIV. Raintree was only concerned with receiving a definitive answer 
from the Department of Public Health or the Evanston board of 
health as to whether it would violate any rules or regulations to 
continue to employ Davis. Raintree's actions do not constitute an 
individualized inquiry as to whether James Davis could safely 
perform his duties as a cook with the HIV virus. But rather, just 
as the University of Illinois in the Board of Trustees decision, 
here, Raintree seems to have made an overly cautious decision after 
an insufficiently thorough investigation which resulted in unfair 
treatment for Davis. Illinois courts have not tolerated blanket 
restrictions against the employment of amputees in Melvin and Board 
of Trustees and we will not allow such an unqualified bar against 
the employment of an individual inflicted with HIV. We conclude 
that Raintree's constructive discharge of Davis amounted to 
unlawful discrimination in violation of the Illinois Human Rights 
Act. 
     Raintree argues that the public health regulations outlining 
nursing home policies in existence at the time of this action, 
prohibited Davis from working in its nursing home. Specifically, 
Raintree refers to section 300.650(a)(4) of Title 77 of the 
Illinois Administrative Code, which outlined personnel policies for 
nursing homes and provided: 
               "An employee diagnosed or suspected of having a 
          contagious or infectious disease shall not be on duty 
          until such time as a written statement is obtained from 
          a physician that the disease is no longer contagious or 
          is found to be noninfectious." 77 Ill. Adm. Code 
          300.650(a)(4) (1985). 
Raintree contends that Davis' infection with HIV constituted a 
diagnosis of a contagious and infectious disease and that section 
300.650(a)(4) prevented such an employee from working in a nursing 
home. According to Raintree, section 300.650(a)(4), on its face, 
encompassed HIV as a contagious and infectious disease and no 
extrinsic sources needed to be consulted. Furthermore, Raintree 
notes that since the Public Health Code compelled it to terminate 
Davis because of his HIV status, it cannot be held liable under the 
Human Rights Act. It is Raintree's position that section 
300.650(a)(4) conflicted with the Human Rights Act and required it 
to commit a discriminatory employment action against Davis to 
comply with the health regulations governing nursing homes. 
Raintree argues that complying with health regulations is a 
legitimate reason for terminating Davis' employment. 
     In this case, both the Commission and the appellate court held 
that section 300.650(a)(4) did not serve to bar Davis from working 
at Raintree because HIV was not considered a contagious and 
infectious disease. 275 Ill. App. 3d at 394. The appellate court 
and the Commission noted that the section in question, 
300.650(a)(4), did not define the terms contagious and infectious 
disease. Both the Commission and the appellate court turned to 
section 690.100 for such a definition. 77 Ill. Adm. Code 690.100 
(Supp. 1987). Section 690 was cross-referenced in section 
300.650(a)(3)(A), which was the same subject regulation as 
300.650(a)(4). In general, section 300.650 outlined personnel 
policies for nursing homes, and made reference to section 690 which 
addresses the reporting and control of communicable diseases. 
     Section 690.100 lists reportable diseases and conditions and 
specifically states: "The following are declared to be contagious, 
infectious, communicable and dangerous to the public health and 
each suspected or diagnosed case shall be reported to the Illinois 
Department of Public Health." 77 Ill. Adm. Code 690.100 (Supp. 
1987). The section goes on to list a number of contagious, 
infectious, communicable and dangerous conditions and diseases. 
AIDS is among the diseases listed, but the status of being HIV 
positive is not on the list. There are no other regulations 
declaring which diseases are considered contagious and infectious 
to the public or which diseases must be reported to protect the 
safety of others. We cannot interpret section 300.650(a)(4) as 
referring to all possible contagious and infectious diseases, when 
another section, which was cross-referenced in the subject 
regulation, specifically lists which diseases the Illinois 
Department of Public Health considers to be contagious, infectious, 
communicable, and dangerous. We hold that the terms "contagious" 
and "infectious" are terms of art defined within section 690.100 of 
the public health regulations, and if the disease was not included 
in the list, it is not considered to be "contagious" or 
"infectious." It is undisputed that when Davis was terminated in 
January 1988, he did not suffer from AIDS, and was just diagnosed 
as having HIV. Since HIV was not listed within section 690.100, it 
was not considered a contagious and infectious disease for purposes 
of applying section 300.650(a)(4). Therefore, section 300.650(a)(4) 
did not serve to bar Davis from continuing his employment with 
Raintree or require him to obtain a doctor's clearance. 
     Raintree argues that the distinction drawn between HIV and 
AIDS by the appellate court and the Commission in this case was 
inappropriate and irrational. However, other sections in these 
public health regulations support this distinction. At the time of 
this action, section 690.290, part of the chapter on the control 
and reporting of communicable disease, defined a suspected case of 
AIDS as having two or more of the following signs or symptoms: 
"unexpected weight loss of greater than 10% body weight, chronic 
fever, chronic lymphadenopathy, night sweats and chronic diarrhea." 
77 Ill. Adm. Code 690.290(a) (Supp. 1987). This definition did not 
encompass the status of being HIV positive and showing no visible 
signs of AIDS. In addition, the regulation goes on to state, at 
section 690.290(d), that "Persons who are prohibited from donating 
blood *** because of evidence of infection with HTLV-III virus, 
increased risk of infection with HTLV-III virus, AIDS or suspected 
AIDS may make donations for the limited purpose of autologous 
transfusion, instillation, transplantation or injection." 77 Ill. 
Adm. Code 690.290(d) (Supp. 1987). Furthermore, section 
690.290(c)(3) provides that all blood and serum from blood donors 
should be tested for HTLV-III. 77 Ill. Adm. Code 690.290(c)(3) 
(Supp. 1987). The term HTLV-III was an early name for HIV, and was 
referred to as a separate condition, distinct from AIDS, in 
sections 690.290(c) and (d). Accordingly, from the references in 
sections 690.290(a), (c), and (d), it is clear that the Department 
of Public Health recognized the difference between HIV-positive 
status and AIDS in 1988. Therefore, the Department's reference to 
AIDS as an infectious and contagious disease cannot be interpreted 
as automatically including the condition of HIV. When the 
Department meant HIV in other regulations, it referred to it 
separately or as its early name HTLV-III. We hold that on its face, 
the regulation in question did not prevent employees infected with 
HIV from working in nursing homes. 
     Moreover, Raintree cites the language of section 300.650(a)(4) 
of Title 77 of the Illinois Administrative Code as completely 
justifying its decision to terminate Davis, reasoning that the 
section required Raintree to prevent an HIV-positive cook from 
working at its facility. However, the language from section 
300.650(a)(4) was not a blanket restriction compelling all 
employees with HIV to be terminated and never allowed to return to 
their nursing home jobs. Rather, section 300.650(a)(4) allowed 
employees diagnosed as having contagious or infectious diseases to 
return to work after obtaining a doctor's note stating the disease 
was no longer contagious or found to be noninfectious. 
     Although Davis himself was not subject to the note 
requirement, he obtained such a note and presented it to Burton 
Behr. The note, signed by Davis' physician, explained that Davis' 
HIV status did not prevent him from performing his job as a cook 
and that HIV was not transmitted through food preparation or 
service. Behr stated that he was informed by the Evanston board of 
health that the note was inadequate because it did not state that 
Davis was free of contagious or infectious disease. However, Behr 
did not specify that the note had to contain this exact language. 
Behr admitted at the hearing before the ALJ that he asked Davis to 
get documentation stating "that he was free of a communicable 
disease or that he was allowed to work with the HIV virus." Davis 
complied producing a note which stated that his infection with HIV 
did not restrict him from performing his job as a cook. Yet 
Raintree refused to return Davis to work, and never contacted Davis 
to give him further information explaining what he could do to 
return to work. 
      We hold that Davis was not required to present a note since 
section 300.650(a)(4) did not apply in this case. However, even if 
this section applied to Davis, the doctor's note which he provided 
may have complied with the provisions of section 300.650(a)(4), and 
certainly complied with the instructions he was given from Burton 
Behr. At this point, Raintree should have conducted its own 
investigation concerning whether it was safe to return Davis to 
work, and contacted Davis to give him a chance to comply with any 
further requirements in order to get his job back. 
     Raintree next argues that even if it improperly interpreted 
the regulation in question, its good-faith belief that Davis' 
continued employment was in violation of section 300.650(a)(4) 
relieved it from liability under the Illinois Human Rights Act. 
Raintree contends that it was entitled to rely on the Evanston 
health department director's interpretation of the subject 
regulation. According to Raintree, Louise Brown, the director of 
the Evanston health department, informed him that Davis could not 
work at Raintree at the present time, and that his doctor's note 
was inadequate. Raintree states that when it sent Davis home it was 
only making a good-faith attempt to comply with state law as 
interpreted by the Evanston health department. The dissenting 
justice in the appellate court agreed that the only reason for 
Davis' termination was Behr's good-faith belief that keeping Davis 
would be a violation of section 300.650. Both Raintree and the 
dissenting appellate court justice assert that under the reasoning 
of Le Beau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 727 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1984), 
a good-faith belief that one's actions are required to comply with 
state law is a defense to liability under the Illinois Human Rights 
Act. 
     The Le Beau case was a gender discrimination suit concerning 
a conflict between a state law prohibiting women from working 
overtime and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
forbade employers from refusing to offer overtime work to women. In 
Le Beau, plaintiffs, female employees of Libbey-Owens-Ford, brought 
suit claiming that defendants violated Title VII by restricting 
females to employment in only two departments, and by employing men 
in departments where overtime was required, while employing women 
in departments where overtime was less frequent. Beginning in 1909, 
Illinois had in effect the Illinois Female Employment Act (Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1908, ch. 48, par. 25), which provided that women could 
not work more than eight hours in any one day or more than 48 hours 
in any one week. Therefore, Libbey-Owens-Ford separated men and 
women into these two different departments, placing men in the 
continuous operations of glass production because these jobs 
frequently required overtime. In making their employment decisions, 
Libbey-Owens-Ford relied on 1965 guidelines promulgated by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) providing that state 
laws protecting women against overtime work would be considered by 
the EEOC as bona fide occupational qualifications not in conflict 
with Title VII. In Le Beau, the court held that the employer did 
not violate Title VII because it relied in good faith on these 1965 
EEOC guidelines. See Le Beau, 727 F.2d  at 149. 
     We find that Le Beau is distinguishable from the case at bar, 
and its reasoning should not be applied to create a good-faith 
defense to liability under the Human Rights Act when the state 
regulation Raintree relied on did not even apply in this case. 
Title VII contains a defense to liability for a civil rights 
violation when it was pleaded and proved that the act or omission 
complained of was in good faith and in reliance on "any written 
interpretation or opinion" of the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. 2000e--12(b) 
(1994). In the Le Beau decision, the employer, Libbey-Owens-Ford, 
relied on EEOC guidelines which specifically stated that actions to 
protect women from exploitation and hazard would not violate Title 
VII. Therefore, in Le Beau, the employer's actions fell under this 
good-faith defense to liability. The Human Rights Act does not 
contain any good-faith exemption analogous to the exemption in 
section 2000e--12(b) of the Civil Rights Act. Nowhere does the 
Human Rights Act state that a good-faith belief that one's 
discriminatory actions are required by state law is a defense to 
liability. A statute must be enforced as enacted by the 
legislature. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional 
Regulation,  153 Ill. 2d 76 , 91 (1992). Because the Human Rights Act 
does not contain a good-faith exemption, we will not apply the 
reasoning from Le Beau to create one. 
     Moreover, in Le Beau, there was an actual conflict with the 
Illinois Female Employment Act preventing overtime employment for 
women and Title VII. In the case at bar, there was no conflict 
between the state regulation and the Illinois Human Rights Act. 
This is because the state regulation does not even apply in this 
case. We previously stated that section 300.650(a)(4) did not ban 
Davis from working at Raintree because his HIV-positive status was 
not considered a contagious or infectious disease. An employer's 
good-faith belief that it is required to discriminate under another 
law is of no legal consequence when that law does not apply. Unlike 
the employer in Le Beau, Raintree was not required to violate one 
act to comply with another. In Board of Trustees, the court held 
that a good-faith belief that an employment restriction is 
justified did not negate the impropriety of unfairly denying a 
handicapped plaintiff employment. We agree that the question is not 
whether Raintree had a good-faith belief that the rules prohibited 
Davis from working at a nursing home with the HIV virus, but 
whether in fact the rules so provided. We find that Raintree's 
alleged good-faith belief, that it was required to terminate Davis, 
is irrelevant in determining liability under the Human Rights Act. 
     Furthermore, we find it questionable whether the facts of this 
case even support a finding that Raintree was acting in good faith. 
Raintree contends that it believed in good faith that it was 
required to fire Davis to comply with the regulation, yet the ALJ 
and the Commission determined that Raintree never received a 
definitive answer from health authorities regarding whether Davis 
could continue to work there. The only information close to a 
definite answer was from Louise Brown, the Director of the Evanston 
board of health. Brown first stated that she could not tell Behr 
that Davis could not work there, but that if something should 
occur, Raintree would be subject to the rules and regulations. 
Brown went on to state that Behr should go with the rules and 
regulations until it could be clarified, "so according to what is 
in the rules and regulations, he is unable to work there at the 
present time." Raintree claims that it should be permitted to rely 
on Brown's interpretation of the subject regulation. However, 
section 300.650(a)(4), the regulation cited by Raintree, is an 
Illinois Department of Public Health Regulation. Raintree has not 
cited any authority indicating that it was permitted to rely on a 
local official's construction of state law. In addition, this 
information from Brown was not a definitive interpretation of the 
regulation. She merely told Behr that Davis should not work at 
Raintree until the regulations could be clarified. 
     Raintree claims that its actions were compelled by state 
regulations and Brown's directives, yet it still clings to its 
assertion that neither the public health regulations nor the public 
health authorities ever gave it guidance on how to handle Davis' 
situation. Behr claims that throughout the entire time Davis waited 
for a decision, he attempted to obtain an official opinion 
regarding Davis' future employment. Behr concedes that he never 
received a definitive answer. Behr also admitted that the 
regulation itself did not specifically address the situation of an 
HIV-positive employee when he testified that he did not "find 
anything in the rules and regulations anywhere that specifies HIV- 
positive." Raintree cannot persuasively argue that Behr's 
subjective belief was that the regulation unequivocally prohibited 
Davis from working at the facility, when throughout his testimony 
Behr maintained that he never really knew what to do about Davis. 
      Furthermore, if Raintree had a strong belief that Davis' 
continued employment would be in violation of public health 
regulations, one would have expected Raintree to have contacted 
Davis and explained to him that it would have to let him go to 
comply with state law. However, Davis was never contacted by 
Raintree, and every time he called Raintree to find out his status, 
it informed him that it was still searching for an answer as to 
whether the public health regulations actually prohibited his 
employment. In addition, the evidence Davis presented, which proved 
that it was safe for him to continue to work at Raintree, was 
dismissed as insufficient. Without any medical inquiry or 
discussion, Raintree concluded that the doctor's note Davis 
obtained was completely inadequate, in spite of the fact that the 
note complied with the instructions given by Behr himself. 
Accordingly, even if Raintree's good faith were a defense under the 
Human Rights Act, it could not be invoked by Raintree here. 
     Raintree next makes a very brief argument that the Human 
Rights Act and the health regulation in question failed to give it 
adequate notice of what conduct was warranted or prescribed under 
these circumstances. According to Raintree, to hold it liable under 
the Human Rights Act for its efforts to comply with the law 
violates its due process rights and amounts to a taking of property 
without just compensation. We need not consider the merits of these 
constitutional issues because Raintree concedes that it raised this 
argument for the first time in its petition for rehearing before 
the appellate court. It is well established that "issues not raised 
during an administrative proceeding are waived and will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal." See Illinois Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 190 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1044 
(1989). 
     Finally, Raintree contends that it was entitled to discovery 
and a hearing on Davis' petition for attorney fees and that the 
award of attorney fees constituted an abuse of discretion by the 
ALJ. According to Raintree, a party who is charged with the payment 
of attorney fees should be afforded an evidentiary hearing and 
ample opportunity to cross-examine as to the reasonableness of the 
amounts claimed. Raintree claims that it is entitled to such a 
hearing because in its response to Davis' petition for attorney 
fees it raised numerous issues concerning the credibility, 
authenticity, and reliableness of the attorney's time records and 
whether they were kept contemporaneously and in the normal course 
of litigation. 
     It is well established that it is within the discretion of the 
trier of fact to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fees 
requested, and a court of review should not make a de novo decision 
as to the appropriate award of attorney fees. See Harris Trust & 
Savings Bank v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 230 Ill. App. 
3d 591, 598-99 (1992). The Illinois Human Rights Act specifically 
states that upon a finding of a civil rights violation, an ALJ may 
recommend and the Commission may require that reasonable attorney 
fees be paid to the complainant for the cost of maintaining the 
action. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8--108(G). The Human 
Rights Commission's rules governing petitions for attorney fees and 
costs impose no requirements that a hearing be conducted to resolve 
contested issues regarding claims for fees. But rather, the rule 
states that the ALJ "may convene a hearing to resolve contested 
issues and may take other steps to produce a complete record with 
regard to a claim for fees and/or costs." 56 Ill. Adm. Code 
5300.765(e) (1996). The rules go on to state that after the 
submission of the petition for fees and objections thereto "and the 
completion of a hearing, if any, the Administrative Law Judge shall 
prepare a Recommended Order and Decision." 56 Ill. Adm. Code 
5300.765(f) (1996). Under these authorities, it is within the 
ALJ's discretion to determine whether or not a hearing is 
necessary. As long as the ALJ is able to determine what amount 
would be a reasonable award of attorney fees, from evidence 
presented in the petition and the answer, such a determination 
should not be disturbed on review. 
     Furthermore, courts frequently award attorney fees without 
discovery by the party charged with paying them and without holding 
evidentiary hearings. In Singer v. Brookman, 217 Ill. App. 3d 870, 
880 (1991), the appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of 
attorney fees and costs as sanctions, without holding a hearing. 
The Singer court found that the attorney fees awarded by the lower 
court without an evidentiary hearing were not unreasonable and were 
properly determined "after a detailed breakdown of fees and 
expenses by defendant's counsel." See Singer, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 
880. In addition, in Kellett v. Roberts, 276 Ill. App. 3d 164, 174- 
75 (1995), the court held that the trial court did not err in 
failing to hold a hearing on the amount of sanctions or attorney 
fees. The court reasoned that since the trial court was able to 
rely on the plaintiff's attorney's legally sufficient affidavit and 
detailed time sheet, and defense counsel was not denied an 
opportunity to present evidence, "the trial court did not err in 
failing to hold a hearing on the amount of fees." See Kellett, 276 
Ill. App. 3d at 175. 
     In this case, once a civil rights violation was established, 
and the ALJ and Commission decided to award attorney fees, all that 
remained was a determination of the amount. The ALJ carefully 
examined the fee petition, affidavits, the detailed billing 
worksheet submitted by Davis' counsel, and the written response 
submitted by Raintree, to calculate what amount would be considered 
a reasonable fee. Based on this evidence, the ALJ reduced the 
hourly rate requested for two of Davis' attorneys, rejected the 
request for a fee multiplier, and reduced the requested amount of 
$42,909.98 to an award of $28,956.50. The Commission affirmed this 
recommendation. We hold that the ALJ did not err in failing to hold 
a hearing on Davis' petition for attorney fees. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
     CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring: 
     I concur in the plurality opinion except for its discussion of 
two issues. 
     First, the plurality needlessly restricts the definition of 
"contagious" or "infectious" disease in section 300.650(a)(4) of 
the public health regulations to those diseases actually listed in 
section 690.100 of the regulations. Slip op. at 12-14. The 
plurality states that because section 690.100 did not list HIV as 
being a "contagious" or "infectious" disease at the time of Davis' 
discharge, then HIV infection was not considered, for purposes of 
section 300.650(a)(4), to be a "contagious" or "infectious" 
disease. In my view, the plurality thereby unnecessarily and 
unwisely limits the term "contagious" or "infectious" disease as 
used in section 300.650(a)(4). This case can be resolved without 
the potentially far-reaching holding that if a disease is not 
listed in section 690.100, then it is not considered to be 
"contagious" or "infectious" under section 300.650(a)(4). 
     As the plurality later concludes, Raintree's argument that it 
was required to discharge Davis pursuant to section 300.650(a)(4) 
fails even if HIV was a "contagious" or "infectious" disease within 
that section because Raintree failed to comply with the provisions 
of that section. Slip op. 14-15. Section 300.650(a)(4) expressly 
allows employees diagnosed as having "contagious" or "infectious" 
diseases to return to work after obtaining a doctor's note stating 
that the disease "is no longer contagious or found to be 
noninfectious." In this case, Davis obtained a note from his doctor 
explaining that his HIV status did not prevent him from performing 
his job as a cook and that HIV was not transmitted through food 
preparation or service. Raintree was informed by the Evanston board 
of health that the note was inadequate. Under these circumstances, 
the plurality opinion finds that Raintree should have contacted 
Davis to give him a chance to comply with any further requirements 
necessary for him to return to work and also should have conducted 
its own investigation to determine whether it was safe for Davis to 
return to his position as a cook. Raintree, however, did nothing in 
response to Davis' note. Raintree therefore did not comply with 
section 300.650(a)(4). Raintree's argument that it was compelled to 
commit a discriminatory employment action in order to comply with 
the public health regulations therefore fails even if HIV was a 
"contagious" or "infectious" disease within the meaning of those 
regulations. 
     Limiting the definition of "contagious" or "infectious" 
disease, as the plurality opinion does, is not only unnecessary, it 
is also ill-advised. New diseases may develop that are "contagious" 
or "infectious." An employer should not be precluded from relying 
on section 300.650(a)(4) to protect the public health merely 
because such disease has not yet been listed in section 690.100. 
     Second, I do not join in the plurality's broad holding that a 
good-faith defense to liability does not exist for violations of 
the Human Rights Act. Slip op. at 15-17. I would not resolve in 
this case whether the Human Rights Act bars all good-faith defenses 
to liability. Like the plurality, I agree that the facts of this 
case show that Raintree did not act in good faith. Slip op. at 17- 
18. I would therefore limit this court's holding to only the facts 
of this case. 
     For these reasons, I do not join in either of the 
aforementioned discussions. 
 
     JUSTICES MILLER, HEIPLE and McMORROW join in this special 
concurrence.