Title: BROWN v CARTWRIGHT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

3 0 . i.2393 I N ChE jUPKhME :OUR1 O F THE STATE C 9 F WNTANA 1973 !iD(;wK G. YKOWI\I drld JOSEPHINE I , BROWN, husband and wife, p l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, -vs - CLAUUE D. CP*RTWRIGHT e t a 1 . , Defendants and Appellants. .lppeal from: District Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Pa t r i c k F . Hooks argued, Townsend, Montana Thomas F. Dowling argued, Helena, Montana Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, Great F a l l s , Montana Yarl J. Hanson argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: September 24, 1973 Decided : 1 - 1973 M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered upon findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court s i t t i n g without a jury. Plaintiffs Brown, husband and wife, brought an action t o quiet t i t l e t o certain ranch property i n Jefferson County. Defendants Cartwright, husband and wife, f i l e d a counterclaim t o quiet t i t l e t o the land i n themselves; and defendants Swain, husband and wife, crossclaimed against defendants Cartwright for breach of warranty t i t l e . Trial was had i n the d i s t r i c t court i n Jefferson County. The t r i a l judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law and f i l e d an opinion i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s and against a l l defendants. Defendants Swain were awarded money damages by virtue of t h e i r crossclaim against defendants Cart- wright for breach of warranty of t i t l e . Judgment was entered for p l a i n t i f f s and a l l defendants appeal. Hereafter i n t h i s opinion, the parties w i l l be referred t o i n the singular. The action involves a t r a c t of land containing 8.8 acres. This 8.8 acre t r a c t was a part of a larger pasture area consti- h t i n g about 700 acres. Prior to 1961, Brown was the record owner of the 700 acres which was under fence and used as pasture land. The 8.8 acre t r a c t had a fence, a t that time, along the easterly edge on the railroad right-of-way and a fence along the north section line. The t r a c t i s a triangular piece measuring 657' along the section l i n e east and west, 1057' along the quarter section line north and south, and bounded on the easterly and southerly side by the railroad right-of-way. There was a gate on the railroad fence and a railroad crossing which afforded access t o Brown i n going t o and from the 700 acre pasture with h i s c a t t l e . There was also a gate on the north fence which afforded access t o land i n the adjoining section owned by FJinslows. A few years prior t o 1961, Cartwright bought a neighboring ranch from one Herbert Marks. The basis of the controversy began when the estare or hlrred L. >larks was ~ r o b a t e d and rhe adminis- t r a t o r incorrectly included the 8.8 acre t r a c t i n the inventory and appraisement and deeded the t r a c t t o Cartwright through an administrator's deed. A s t o t h i s transaction, the t r i a l court described i t i n i t s "Basis of Decision and Opinion" i n t h i s way: r l The Estate of Alfred I. Marks had no i n t e r e s t i n the land involved here. When it attempted t o take it i n t o the Inventory, the attempt was a n u l l i t y . When i t t r i e d t o d i s t r i b u t e t h i s property described a s T R A C T ?/I, exhibit 2, f o r p l a i n t i f f and a s the property des- cribed a s defendants' exhibit A , the n u l l i t y was com- pounded and then when l a t e r an attempt t o s e l l the same property t o the Cartwrights by deed dated June 16, 1954, the n u l l i t y was s t i l l further compounded, a veritable comedy of e r r o r s , but without any l e g a l e f f e c t upon t h e property we a r e talking about i n t h i s action; the record t i t l e of which was i n the p l a i n t i f f s a t a l l of those times. 11 In 1961, Cartwright purchased the Winslow ranch immediately north o f the 8.8 acre t r a c t , After buying the Winslow ranch, Cartwright continuously drove c a t t l e across the 8.8 a c r e t r a c t entering from the r a i l r o a d gate and then through the gate on the north section l i n e . A t t h e time there was no fence between t h e 8.8 acre t r a c t and the balance of the 700 acre pasture t o the west. Also i n 1961, Cartwright was approached by a right-of-way agent for Montana Power Company who wanted t o procure an easement for a n a t u r a l gas transmission l i n e across the 8.8 acre t r a c t . Cartwright f i r s t told him t o double check the t i t l e t o be sure i t was Cartwright ground. The Montana Power agent came back l a t e r and told Cartwright t h a t he was the l e g a l owner, although Brown had t r i e d t o claim t i t l e . Cartwright then executed an easement, received $800, and the Montana Power Company b u i l t i t s gas l i n e . .3ignificantly, Brown not only knew of the Cartwright easement t o the Power Company, but watched them build the l i n e across the ~ r a c t ; he could "see them from the house. I I Brown t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n 1961--after the Cartwright-Power Company easement-- he went t o the Jefferson County Assessor t o check the assessment l i s t . H e was told the t r a c t was assessed t o Cartwright. Brown took no steps t o change the assessment and the evidence i s uncontroverted t h a t Brown did not pay any taxes on the 8.8 acre t r a c t from 1961 u n t i l 1971--after the lawsuit was f i l e d . The record i s likewise c l e a r t h a t Cartwright did pay the taxes from before 1961 t o 1968, when the property was sold t o Swain under a contract requiring Swain t o make tax payments. Both Brown and Cartwright t e s t i f i e d t o a conversation between them i n e i t h e r 1961 o r 1962. Both agreed t h a t Cartwright offered t o s e l l Brown the 8.8 acre t r a c t f o r $800. Brown wanted t o buy i t a t t h a t price and the only c o n f l i c t i n the testimony i s a s t o why the deal f e l l through. The t r i a l judge asked Brown why he wanted t o buy h i s own property and e l i c i t e d t h i s response: "THE COURT: Yes, sustained. W h y were you trying t o buy your own property from t h i s man i s what he's asking you r e a l l y . A . I don't know how t o answer the question. W e had thought it was ours, and then when Montana Power went through the area they s a i d t h a t it belonged t o Claude Cartwright and they had paid him the easement f o r the r i g h t of way through the property. I checked the Assessor's o f f i c e t o see who it was assessed with and they had assessed it t o Claude Cartwright." From 1961 t o 1966, Cartwright continued t o use the 8.8 acre t r a c t i n going t o and from the Winslow place. O n occasion he l e f t the Winslow gate open so h i s c a t t l e could graze and water. Brown admitted he saw Cartwright stock on the t r a c t and the gate open. During t h i s same time, Brown had access t o the t r a c t i n the absence of a fence along the west boundary. Cartwright t e s t i f i e d he made no objection because he knew Brown could not keep c a t t l e off without fence and he did not turn h i s c a t t l e i n because they would "have been on ~rown". According t o Cartwright, a d i r e c t o r of the Bozeman Production Credit Association f o r some twenty years, the 8.8 acre t r a c t would only graze one cow. I n 1964, Cartwright hired a M r . Bandy t o survey the west boundary of the 8.8 acre t r a c t . Bandy did not complete the job and another surveyor, M r . Erickson, completed it i n 1966. That fall--1966--Cartwright hired Bud Swann t o build a fence along t h e west boundary. Cartwright went up t o t e l l Brown about it and tu be sure t h a t the location of the gate--to allow Brown access t o h i s acreage--met ~ r o w n ' s approval. Both Brown and Swann t e s t i f i e d t h a t Brown came down during fencing and made no objec- tion t o anyone. After fencing i n October 1966, Cartwright occupied the t r a c t exclusively. However, Cartwright recognized then, and does now recognize, the r i g h t of Brown t o go across the t r a c t f o r access t o ~ r o w n ' s pasture. In August 1967, Cartwright sold the 8.8 acre t r a c t t o Swain under a standard contract f o r deed. That same f a l l Swain widened the road i n t o the premises, dug a basement and then moved a house onto the t r a c t . A picture of the house, which is now the Swain family home, was received i n evidence a s Exhibit D. Brown admitted he observed these improvements being made and made no objection t o anyone. Then, i n July 1970, nine years a f t e r the Montana Power ease- ment and three years a f t e r the Swain house, Brown retained an attorney who made a t i t l e search and Brown made h i s f i r s t objection t o the Cartwright t i t l e . In July 1970, Brown's attorney gave notice t o defendants Cartwright and Swain t o vacate t h e premises. The complaint was f i l e d September 18, 1970, some three years and ten months a f t e r Cartwright cut off Brown's use by fencing t h e t r a c t . ~ r o w n ' s complaint sounds i n two counts. In the f i r s t count, h e alleges t h a t he i s , and f o r twenty years l a s t past, has been the owner of the 8.8 acre t r a c t , i s e n t i t l e d t o possession thereof, and seeks a decree quieting t i t l e t o the premises. I n the second count, Brown alleges t h a t a f t e r October 1966, defendants "wilfully and forcefully" trespassed upon the premises. H e alleges t h a t a s a r e s u l t of t h i s trespass he has been deprived of t h e use of the d . 8 acre t r a c t f o r both grazing and passage. H e seeks damages under the second count f o r $5,000 a s and f o r damage t o the remainder of the ranch; and the sum of $2,000 a s and f o r the reasonable value of the use of the 8.8 acre t r a c t during the period defendants occupied it, and f o r the further sum of $2,000 as ~ r o w n ' s c o s t s of recovering possession of the property. In answer t o Brown's f i r s t count (quiet t i t l e ) , Cartwright denied the material allegations of the complaint. Additionally, Cartwright alleged a s a t h i r d defense t h a t Brown was not possessed a r seized of the 8.8 acre t r a c t within f i v e years p r i o r t o the f i l i n g of the complaint and the action i s barred by sections 93-2504 and 93-2505, R.C.M. 1947. A s a fourth defense Cartwright alleged t h a t Brown has been g u i l t y of such laches and unreasonable delays a s t o estopand preclude him from prevailing on the f i r s t count. I n answer t o t h e second count, Cartwright denied the material allegations of trespass and s e t up the affirmative defenses of laches and the s t a t u t e of limitations, section 93-2607, R.C.M. 1947. Finally, Cartwright asserted a counterclaim f o r quiet t i t l e t o the 8.8 acre t r a c t i n h i s name, subject t o the r i g h t s of Swain under the contract. ~ r o w n ' s reply generally denied the counterclaim. swain's answer generally denied the material allegations I I of the Brown complaint. Then, a s an affirmative defense" Swain alleged t h a t he entered i n t o the Cartwright contract i n good f a i t h and alleged: 'I* * * should the Court find t h a t the [Cartwrights] a r e not the owners 9 ; * * [Swains] should be e n t i t l e d t o recover a l l sums of money paid under t h i s contract together with damages which they s u f f e r a s a r e s u l t of t h i s action together with c o s t s , i n t e r e s t and attorney fees. ?I The t r i a l court made no findings on the Brown trespass claim. L n i t s opinion the t r i a l court held t h a t Brown had f a i l e d t o prove the amount of damages, and therefore, no recovery could be had. Brown has not f i l e d a cross appeal so the trespass action i s out o f the lawsuit. The determinative issue on appeal i s whether Brown l o s t l e g a l t i t l e t o Cartwright by adverse possession o r , more s p e c i f i c a l l y here, who had possession of the 8.8 acre t r a c t f o r the f i v e years immediately preceding September 18, 1970? In order t o obtain legal t i t l e under the doctrine of adverse possession, Cartwright must prove t h a t he possessed and occupied the land pursuant t o the requirements of sections 93-2508 and 93- 2509, R.C.M. 1947, which provide: "93-2508. Occupation under written instrument or judgment - when deemed adverse. When i t appears t h a t the occupant, o r those under whom he claims, entered i n t o the possession of the property, under claim of t i t l e , exclusive of other r i g h t , founding such claim upon a written instrument, a s being a conveyance of the property i n question, o r upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and t h a t there has been a continued occupation and possession of the nroperty included i n such instrument, decree, o r judgment, o r of some part of the property, under such claim, f o r f i v e (5) years, the property so included i s deemed t o have been held adversely, except t h a t when it consists of a t r a c t divided i n t o l o t s , the possession of one (1) l o t i s not deemed a possession of any other l o t of the same t r a c t . I I "93-2509. What constitutes adverse possession under written instrument or judgment, For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a t i t l e founded upon a written instrument, o r a judgment o r decree, land i s deemed t o have been possessed and occupied i n the following cases: "1. Where i t has been usually cultivated or improved. I I 2. Where it has been protected by a sub- s t a n t i a l inclosure. "3. Where, although not inclosed, i t has been used f o r the supply of f u e l , o r of fencing timber, e i t h e r f o r the purpose of husbandry, o r f o r pasturage, o r f o r the ordinary use of the occupant. "4. Where a known farm o r a s i n g l e l o t has been partly improved, the portion of such farm o r Lot t h a t has been l e f t not cleared o r not inclosed, according t o the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, s h a l l be deemed t o have been occupied f o r the same length of time a s the p a r t improved and cultivated." The term "claim of t i t l e " a s used i n section 93-2508, was discussed i n Sullivan v. Neel, 105 Mont. 253, 257, 73 P.2d 206, h he phrase 'claim of t i t l e ' a s used i n the foregoing section of the s t a t u t e i s synonymous t with t h a t of 'color of t i t l e . (Morrison v. Linn, 50 Mont. 396, 147 Pac. 166; Fitschen Bros. Com.Co. v. Noyes' Estate, 76 Mont. 175, 246 Pac. 773.) "1t is argued t h a t the quitclaim deeds were i n s u f f i c i e n t t o vest i n the p l a i n t i f f a color of t i t l e within the meaning of the s t a t u t e . The second deed correctly described the e n t i r e t r a c t of land, and the f i r s t deed correctly described one-half of the area. Color of t i t l e does not depend upon the v a l i d i t y o r e f f e c t of the instrument, but e n t i r e l y upon i t s i n t e n t and meaning. (Fitschen Bros. Com.Co. v. ~ o y e s ' Estate, supra.) "Pn the case of Morrison v. Linn, above c i t e d , t h i s court quoted with approval the d e f i n i t i o n of 'color of t i t l e ' from the case of Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 440, 54 Am.Dec. 351, reading as follows: 'What is meant by color of t i t l e ? It may be defined t o be a writing, upon i t s face rofessing t o pass t i t l e , but which does not o i t , e i t h e r from a want ot t i t l e i n the person making it, o r from the defective conveyance t h a t i s used - a t i t l e t h a t i s imperfect, but not so obviously so t h a t it would be apparent t o one not - s k i l l e d i n the law.' And i n the case of Fitschen Rros. Com. Co. v. Noyes' Estate t h i s court said: 'And color of t i t l e i s t h a t which i s t i t l e i n appearance, but not i n r e a l i t y . As a basis of claim by adverse possession, color of t i t l e may be shown by any instrument purporting t o convey the land or the r i g h t t o i t s possession provided claim i s made thereunder i n good f a i t h . 1 " ~ h e s e statements a r e i n accord with the current authority generally. " (Emphasis supplied. ) Here, Cartwright, a rancher and not a lawyer, received two deeds in h i s chain of t i t l e , which purported t o convey land west o i the railroad t r a c t . Cartwright t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had two attorneys review h i s t i t l e and they apparently f a i l e d t o note the discrepancy i n the two Marks deeds. From the evidence, it i s c l e a r t h a t the e r r o r or erroneous description not only fooled Cartwright, a layman, but also misled the right-of-way department f o r the Xontana Power Company and the County Assessor of Jefferson County. Under these circumstances, when an occupant i s paying taxes on a t r a c t of land and when a public u t i l i t y pays him $800 f o r an under- ground pipeline easement across t h a t t r a c t , the occupancy i s under claim o r color of t i t l e within the meaning of the s t a t u t e . Section 93-2513, R.C.M. 1947, applicable t o any claim of a d v e r s e possession, provides: s I Occupancy and payment of taxes necessary t o prove adverse possession. I n no case s h a l l adverse posses- sions be considered established under the provisions of any section o r sections of t h i s code unless it s h a l l be shown t h a t the land has been occupied and claimed f o r a period of f i v e (5) years continuously, and the party o r persons, t h e i r predecessors and grantors, have, during such period,paid a l l the taxes, s t a t e , county, o r municipal, which have been legally levied and assessed upon said land." (Emphasis supplied). Applying t h i s s t a t u t e , it i s apparent t h a t there a r e two time spans involved. F i r s t , there i s the period from October 1966 (completion of the fence) u n t i l the f i l i n g of the complaint (September 18, 1970). Second, there i s the period from 1961 u n r i l October 1966. Dealing f i r s t with the period of time, October 1966 t o September 1970, there can be no question raised a s t o the actual, exclusive and notorious possession of the t r a c t by Cartwright and Swain a f t e r the fence was completed - a period of three years and ten months before the f i l i n g of the complaint. Before discussing t h e evidence a s t o the period before completion of the fence i n October 1966, we note what t h i s and other courts have s a i d i n construing the nature and type of posses- sion required. It i s c l e a r t h a t the type, nature and character of the land involved must be considered. I n Sullivan a t p. 259, t h i s Court held: "Thus, it w i l l be observed t h a t the foundation of the claim of p l a i n t i f f and the character of the land i n question determine the degree and character of possession o r occupancy necessary t o s a t i s f y the I I s t a t u t e s . (Emphasis supplied.) Tn 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession 14, p. 94, i t i s said: 11%- * 9 : The r u l e of a c t u a l possession i s t o be applied reasonably i n view of the location and character of the land claimed. It i s s u f f i c i e n t , i f the a c t s of ownership a r e of such a character a s t o openly and publicly indicate an assumed control or use such a s i s consistent with the character of the premises i n question. * * *I' (Emphasis supplied,) From 1961 u n t i l October 1966, t h e 8.8 acre t r a c t did not have a west fence and immediately adjoined the 692 o r so acres Brown used a s h i s pasturage. The 8.8 acre t r a c t would only graze one cow. Obviously, a s Cartwright t e s t i f i e d , he could not put a cow o r cows on the t r a c t f o r he well knew, a s an experienced c a t t l e - man, t h a t h i s animals would trespass on Brown. Likewise, Cart- wright was obviously well aware of h i s obligation t o "fence out", f o r he had M r . Bandy on the property t o survey the fence l i n e a s e a r l y a s 1964. I n Magewssen v. Atwell, 152 Mont. 409, 414, 451 P.2d 103, t h i s Court pointed out t h a t the question of adverse possession or occupancy i s one of the intention of t h e p a r t i e s : "The law of t h i s s t a t e i s that: 'The question of adverse possession i s one of intention. The intention must be discovered from a l l the circum- 1 stances of the-case. Lamrne v. Dodson, 4 Mont. 560, 591, 2 P. 298, 303 (1883); Stetson v. Young- q u i s t , 76 Mont. 600, 248 P. 196, 198 (1926) ." 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession 513, p. 91, puts the r u l e i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t fashion: "* * * While there i s no fixed r u l e whereby the a c t u a l possession of r e a l property by an adverse claimant may be determined i n a l l cases, it may be s t a t e d a s a general r u l e t h a t t h e claimant's possession must be such a s t o indicate h i s exclusive ownership of the property. Not only must t h i s possession be without subserviency t o , o r recognition o f , the t i t l e of the t r u e owner, but it must be h o s t i l e thereto, and t o the whole I world. It has been declared t h a t the d i s s e i s o r must unfurl h i s f l a g on the land, and keep it flying, so t h a t the owner may see, i f he w i l l , t h a t an enemy has invaded h i s domains, and planted the standard of conquest.'& (Emphasis supplied.) Did Cartwright i n t e n t t o claim and occupy the 8.8 acre t r a c t p r i o r t o October 1966? It i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine any a c t indi- cating t h a t i n t e n t more c l e a r l y than acceptance of consideration from t h e Montana Power Company f o r the granting of the easement, p a r t i c u l a r l y when Cartwright was advised t h a t Brown claimed some t i t l e t o the t r a c t . However, i f there was any doubt, Cartwright then put the question of i n t e n t beyond argument when he went t o Brown and offered t o s e l l him the very t r a c t here involved. Brown did not dispute t h a t obvious claim of ownership f o r he admitted t h a t he offered t o buy it. The "flag of conquest" was not only flying high over the 8.8 acre t r a c t , but was a l s o firmiy implanted a t Brown's barn door where t h i s conversation took place. Following the negotiations i n 1961 or 1962, Cartwright con- tinued h i s use of the 8.8 acre t r a c t i n getting t o and from the Winslow place, and it i s uncontradicted that he employed Bandy t o s t a r t the survey i n 1964, which was f i n a l l y completed i n 1966. The only claim of possession during the period from 1961 t o 1966 that Brown can possibly advance i s that of pasturage by h i s c a t t l e i n the absence of a fence. ~ r o w n ' s argument that he was grazing the 8.8 acre t r a c t a s a matter of right from 1961 u n t i l 1966 collapses when one con- siders h i s testimony that he was s t i l l waiting for Cartwright t o give him a deed t o the t r a c t , Additionally, i f that were ~ r o w n ' s intent a t that t i m e , why did he remain s i l e n t when he visited the premises, a t Cartwright's suggestion, t o observe Bud Swann erect the fence which would end h i s grazing privileges on the t r a c t . I f Brown did indeed claim ownership and right of possession of the 8.8 acre t r a c t prior t o the fencing, why did he, with f u l l knowledge of the assessment situation i n Jefferson County, allow Cartwright t o pay the taxes on the t r a c t i n 1961 through 1966? There can be only one answer: Brown knew that Cartwright claimed ownership of the t r a c t and Brown, i n h i s own mind, thought Cart- wright owned it. The only thing that Brown did with respect t o the 8.8 acre t r a c t was t o turn h i s c a t t l e out on h i s own 700 acre pasture, and l e t them graze on the t r a c t i f they so desired. The t r i a l court failed t o give any consideration t o the nature or character of the t r a c t of land here i n question or the multiple acts and statements of the parties which evidenced the clear inten- tion of Cartwright t o claim possession and ownership of t h i s t r a c t from 1961 t o 1966. The t r i a l court abused i t s discretion in entering findings rejecting the defense of the statute of limitations, denying Cartwright's counterclaim and entering judgment which i s not supported by any substantial evidence. A s t o the payment of taxes, it is admitted that Cartwright paid a l l of the r e a l property taxes levied and assessed against t h i s 8.8 acre t r a c t for the years 1954 through 1967, a period of fourteen years. During seven of these years, 1961 through 1967, Brown had personal knowledge t h a t the t r a c t was being assessed t o Cartwright. Under the contract f o r deed between Cartwright and Swain, August 9, 1967, Swain was obligated t o pay the r e a l property taxes f o r the year 1968, and succeeding years while t h e contract remained i n force and e f f e c t . Swain breached h i s contract by f a i l i n g t o pay the taxes levied and assessed f o r the years 1968 and 1969. The tax notices f o r these years, received i n evidence over objection, show t h a t the property was assessed t o Cartwright "in care of" M r . and Mrs, Swain. This lawsuit was commenced on September 18, 1970, before any taxes were due and payable f o r t h a t year. More than four months a f t e r t h e commencement of t h i s lawsuit, on January 29, 1971, Mrs. Brown went t o the county treasurer of Jefferson County and paid the taxes f o r the years 1968, 1969 and 1970, which Swain had allowed t o go delinquent. M r s . Brown t e s t i f i e d t h a t she paid the taxes on the advice of one of t h e i r attorneys i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . I n November 1971, M r s . Brown went . i n and paid the taxes, assessed against Cartwright and Swain, f o r t h a t year. A l l of the Brown testimony a s t o the payment of t h e taxes, a s well a s t h e t a x r e c e i p t s , was admitted by the t r i a l judge over repeated objections of a l l defendants. While the t r i a l court indicated the objections were being overruled "pro forma", the presiding judge did indicate t h a t he would study the matter further. However Finding of Fact I1 taken with the general findings and conclusions and opinion, indicates the t r i a l judge considered the evidence of these payments and a t l e a s t i n f e r e n t i a l l y found t h a t Cartwright and Swain had not complied with section 93-2513, R.C.M. 1947, with respect t o the obligation t o pay t h e taxes. While t h i s Court has never passed on t h i s precise question, the Court has c l e a r l y held t h a t the f i l i n g of a quiet t i t l e action freezes the respective r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s a t the time of commence- ment of the action. I n Flathead Lumber Corp. v. Everett, 127 Mont. 291, 295, 2b3 P.2d 376, t h i s Court w a s presented with the reverse of the s i t u a t i o n here. I n Flathead Lumber Corp., defendant sought t o u t i l i z e the time between the f i l i n g of the action and the t r i a l as possession time f o r computation of the statutory period of adverse possession. The Court f l a t l y rejected t h i s contention: "The r u l e i s t h a t the bringing of an action against one i n adverse possession disputing h i s t i t l e a r r e s t s the running of the s t a t u t e . [Citing cases] "During the pendency of the action defendants can acquire no new r i g h t as against p l a i n t i f f s by the mere f a c t t h a t they remain i n possession. [Citing cases]." (Emphasis supplied.) The s t a t u t e , section 93-2513, R.C.M. 1947, merely s t a t e s t h a t the adverse possessor must have occupied and claimed the land f o r a period of f i v e years continuously and "during such period, paid a l l taxes f: * which have been legally levied and assessed upon s a i d land." Cartwright complied with t h a t s t a t u t e , even without regard t o the "after the fact" payments. Having found t h a t the evidence does not uphold the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t on adverse possession, defendant's contentions on laches need not be discussed. W e do comment though t h a t f o r nine years p l a i n t i f f not only stood by with f u l l knowledge of Cartwright's claim of ownership and aggressive a c t s of possession, but even discussed purchasing the property. The findings, conclusions and judgment of the t r i a l court are reversed and the cause remanded with directions t o enter judgment f o r Cartwright. The judgment i n favor of Swain against Cartwright i s likewise reversed. Chief Justic u / Justices ............................. Hon. M. James Sorte, District Judge, sitting for Justice John Conway Harrison.