Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Cuckler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cuckler, 101 Ohio St.3d 318, 2004-Ohio-784.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CUCKLER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cuckler, 101 Ohio St.3d 318, 2004-Ohio-784.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Public reprimand — While not admitted to 
the Ohio bar, relator referred to himself as “counsel” to the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives — Engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation — Engaging in conduct 
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law. 
(No. 2003-1513 — Submitted December 1, 2003 — Decided March 10, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-032. 
________________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Steven R. Cuckler, Attorney Registration No. 
0074611, with a business address of Columbus, Ohio, was admitted to the Ohio 
bar on May 20, 2002.  On April 14, 2003, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline considered the cause 
on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement, which included stipulated facts, 
stipulated violations of the Disciplinary Rules, and a stipulated recommended 
sanction.  See Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline. 
{¶2} 
According to the parties, respondent graduated from Capital 
University Law School in May 2000.  He subsequently took but did not pass the 
July 2000 Ohio bar examination.  In October 2000, respondent accepted 
employment as a legislative aide to Larry Householder, a member of the Ohio 
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House of Representatives, who would soon become Speaker of the House.  In 
January 2001, after Householder assumed this new office, respondent was 
promoted and given the title Deputy Chief Legal Counsel.  Respondent was not 
yet a licensed attorney. 
{¶3} 
After his promotion, respondent identified himself using business 
cards provided by his employer on which the title Majority Deputy Legal Counsel 
appeared without any disclaimer that he was not licensed to practice law.  He 
signed correspondence and other documents as Deputy Chief Legal Counsel 
without indicating his unlicensed status.  The parties agree that notwithstanding 
his title, respondent actually performed as a legislative aide or law clerk under the 
supervision of a licensed attorney, the Chief Legal Counsel. 
{¶4} 
In February 2001, respondent took but again did not pass the Ohio 
bar examination.  On November 1, 2001, respondent applied to take the bar 
examination for a third time.  When asked in his application to describe his past 
and present employment, respondent listed his employment since January 2001 as 
an “aide” to the Speaker of the House, without specifying his formal title. 
{¶5} 
In February 2002, respondent took and passed the Ohio bar 
examination.  After his admission on May 20, 2002, respondent continued in his 
employment as the Deputy Chief Legal Counsel. 
{¶6} 
On June 10, 2002, respondent applied for a vacant city council seat 
in Delaware, Ohio, sending a cover letter and resume he had prepared specifically 
for that position.  His resume related that he had previously worked as a law clerk 
for the Ohio Auditor of State’s Office and a private law firm and that, from 
October 2000 to December 2000, he had served as a legislative aide in the Ohio 
House of Representatives.  Respondent described his duties as “Deputy Chief 
Legal Counsel (January 2001 - Present)” this way: “Assist Speaker and 59-
member Republican Caucus on all legal and policy issues.  Including but not 
limited to criminal and juvenile justice, ethics, tort reform, political subdivisions, 
January Term, 2004 
3 
commercial law, budgetary and Ohio Constitutional matters.”  However, he did 
not reveal in his resume that he had been licensed to practice law only since May 
20, 2002. 
{¶7} 
Respondent acknowledged and the parties jointly submitted that he 
had misrepresented his status as a licensed attorney prior to obtaining his license 
to practice law and that he had thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 1-
102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on an attorney’s fitness to 
practice law).  Pursuant to Sections 10 and 11 of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the parties also stipulated to 
mitigating factors for the panel’s consideration.  According to the stipulations, 
respondent has no prior disciplinary record, has cooperated fully in the 
disciplinary proceedings, and has distinguished himself in his educational pursuits 
and by his public service.  In addition, the parties stipulated that respondent did 
not engage in the unauthorized practice of law because, as Deputy Chief Legal 
Counsel, he “performed non-attorney matters and/or was under the direct 
supervision of * * * a licensed attorney.” 
{¶8} 
The parties stipulated that a public reprimand was the appropriate 
sanction for respondent’s misconduct.  The panel recommended acceptance of the 
consent-to-discipline agreement and consequently found the agreed-upon 
misconduct and adopted the recommendation that respondent receive a public 
reprimand.  The board accepted the consent-to-discipline agreement, finding the 
cited misconduct and recommending a public reprimand. 
{¶9} 
Based on the consent-to-discipline agreement, we find that 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6).  We also find that a public 
reprimand is the appropriate sanction for this misconduct. 
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{¶10} When an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates DR 
1-102(A)(4), we will ordinarily suspend the attorney’s license to practice law for 
an appropriate period of time.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237, syllabus.  In that case, an attorney was 
suspended for six months for lying repeatedly to a client in an effort to conceal his 
neglect of the client’s case.  However, because some violations of this 
Disciplinary Rule are more egregious than others, a lesser sanction may be 
justified where little or no harm resulted from the DR 1-102(A)(4) violation or 
where the violation represented an isolated incident in the attorney’s career.  
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cox, 98 Ohio St.3d 420, 2003-Ohio-1553, 786 N.E.2d 454 
(attorney publicly reprimanded for falsely denying his knowledge of certain 
information during a disciplinary investigation).  An abundance of mitigating 
evidence may also warrant our lenience.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 
Ohio St.3d 489, 2003-Ohio-4129, 794 N.E.2d 24 (six-month suspension, all 
stayed, was warranted for attorney’s violation of DR 1-102[A][4] after taking into 
account his expressed remorse, lack of a prior disciplinary record, restitution, 
report of his own misconduct, personal difficulties, and established professional 
competence and integrity apart from the misconduct). 
{¶11} Persons not admitted to the Ohio bar may not refer to themselves 
as “counsel” for the purpose of their employment in this state unless they provide 
appropriate notice of any jurisdictional limitations.  In re Application of Stage 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 554, 692 N.E.2d 993.  Respondent concedes that his use of 
the titles Majority Deputy Chief Counsel and Deputy Chief Legal Counsel 
deceived the public by misrepresenting his professional qualifications, precisely 
the conduct that In re Application of Stage addressed.  Our disposition depends, 
however, on the impact of his misconduct and the mitigating features of his case. 
{¶12} Upon review, we find no evidence in the record that anyone relied 
on respondent’s misrepresentations to their detriment.  First, the Chief Legal 
January Term, 2004 
5 
Counsel, who, along with respondent’s other superiors, knew of his unsuccessful 
attempts to pass the bar, oversaw respondent’s work.  Thus, to the extent that 
respondent may have provided some legal opinions, as compared to his having 
consulted on legislative policy issues, his services were adequately supervised 
prior to his admission to the bar.  Moreover, we are confident that, despite what 
the title Deputy Chief Legal Counsel implies, respondent served in this capacity 
primarily as a legislative aide to the Speaker, a fact that is consistent with his 
having referred to his position on his bar application as the Speaker’s “aide.” 
{¶13} Second, respondent was ultimately appointed to fill a vacancy on 
the Delaware City Council; however, nothing in the record suggests that his 
selection was influenced by respondent’s failure to report on his resume the date 
that he was admitted to the bar.  To the contrary, respondent recalled that at one of 
his interviews, a councilman had asked him how long he had been practicing law, 
and respondent had told him the date that he had passed the bar.  After that 
disclosure, respondent represents that his interviewers inquired only as to his 
experience in government, focusing on his understanding of the budgetary process 
and public policy.  From this, we conclude that the omission on his resume had no 
effect. 
{¶14} The mitigating features of respondent’s case also justify our 
departure from Fowerbaugh.  Respondent was only 26 years old when he began 
to work for the Ohio House of Representatives.  He expressed his remorse and 
contrition with conviction.  Finally, public officials, including the Mayor of 
Delaware, university professors, and attorneys for whom respondent has worked, 
have expressed their confidence in respondent’s integrity, lending even more 
weight to respondent’s assurance that he will hereafter comply with the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
{¶15} Based on the mitigating evidence and the limited harm caused by 
respondent’s misconduct, a public reprimand is the commensurate sanction.  
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Accordingly, respondent is hereby publicly reprimanded for having violated DR 
1-102(A)(4) and (6).  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
_______________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger Jr., 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., and Geoffrey Stern, for respondent. 
_______________________