Title: People v. Adams

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 10/30/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S118045 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
MARCUS DORWIN ADAMS, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA181702 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant Marcus Dorwin Adams of the 1994 first degree 
murders of Dayland Hicks, Lamar Armstrong, and Trevon Boyd (Pen. Code, 
§ 187),1 the attempted murder of Luis Hernandez (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and 
carjacking.  (§ 215, subd. (a).)  The jury found true the allegation that defendant 
discharged a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle causing great bodily injury and 
death within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), with respect to the 
three murder counts.  The jury also found true the alleged multiple-murder special 
circumstance.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  With respect to the attempted murder, the 
jury found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily 
injury upon the victim within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).  
The jury returned a verdict of death for the three first degree murders.   
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
 
The trial court denied defendant‟s motion to reduce the penalty and his 
motion for a new penalty phase trial and sentenced defendant to death.  The court 
also imposed, but stayed, a determinate sentence of nine years in prison for 
defendant‟s attempted murder conviction and an indeterminate term of life with 
the possibility of parole for his conviction of carjacking.  This appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment.  
I.  FACTS 
A. Guilt phase evidence 
 
In early September 1994, defendant, a member of the Six Deuce Brim 
Bloods gang, walked up to the car in which three members of the Rollin‟ 60s Crips 
gang were sitting.  He shot and killed all three men at close range.  Not quite a 
month later, defendant shot a security guard patrolling the parking lot of a credit 
union.  He fled the scene with his two companions.  In a nearby neighborhood, 
they carjacked a woman‟s car.   
 
At trial, regarding the first three shootings, defendant challenged the 
credibility of the witnesses who identified him as the shooter.  Regarding the later 
incidents, defendant claimed one of his companions was the shooter and had 
pulled the woman out of her car.   
1.  The September 7, 1994 homicides 
 
On the afternoon of September 7, 1994, Lewis Dyer was standing with 
Zenia Meeks, a drug addict, on Western Avenue at 47th Street in Los Angeles, 
across the street from Ford‟s Liquor store.  The area was known as a Crips gang 
neighborhood and Dyer was a member of the 46th Street Neighborhood Crips 
gang.  Dyer and Meeks saw Dayland Hicks, Lamar Armstrong, and Trevon Boyd, 
members of the Rollin‟ 60s Crips gang, drive up in a Cadillac and park in front of 
the liquor store.  The two Crips gangs were friendly.  Dyer and Meeks walked 
 
3 
over to the Cadillac, and Dyer began to speak with Hicks.  Dyer and Hicks went 
into the liquor store.  After Hicks bought a beer, they returned to the Cadillac.  
Hicks got into the driver‟s seat.  Boyd was sitting in the front passenger seat, and 
Armstrong was sitting in the backseat.  Dyer leaned on the passenger side of the 
car and continued to speak with the three men.  According to Meeks, she stood 
near the hood of the car, waiting for the men to finish their conversation.   
 
Dyer and Meeks both noticed a young man walking toward them.  Dyer 
recognized the man as defendant, whom he knew to be a Bloods gang member 
with the gang moniker of “Little Sonny.”  Dyer and defendant knew each other 
when they were both held in the same California Youth Authority (CYA) juvenile 
facility.  Although defendant belonged to a Bloods gang, he was not wearing 
colors associated with the Bloods gangs, but colors that blended into the Crips 
neighborhood.  During this time in 1994 a gang war was underway between the 
Bloods and the Crips.  The 46th Street Neighborhood Crips gang, along with the 
Rollin‟ 60s Crips gang, were enemies of the Six Deuce Brim Bloods gang — 
defendant‟s gang.  Defendant pulled out a gun and shot at Dyer.  Dyer ducked, 
crawled to the front of the car, then stood up and ran down the street while 
defendant fired a number of shots into the Cadillac at close range.  Meeks stood 
still.   
 
Hicks suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his head at the right temple area 
and a nonfatal gunshot wound to his upper right arm.  The wounds were consistent 
with Hicks having raised his arm up in a defensive position at the side of his head.  
Boyd suffered gunshot wounds to his chest, the ring finger of his left hand, and his 
right forearm.  One of the bullets that entered his chest fatally damaged his liver 
and heart.  Armstrong was also shot in the arm and chest.  The bullet that entered 
his chest fatally damaged his liver, heart, and left lung.  When defendant finished 
 
4 
shooting, he walked back toward an alley, got into a red four-door car, and drove 
down 47th Street.   
 
Hicks died in the Cadillac.  Boyd exited the Cadillac and ran into Ford‟s 
Liquor store.  Meeks followed Boyd into the store and saw that he had been shot.  
She ran back across the street to a pay phone, dialed 911, and reported the 
shootings.  Lisa Mallard, who was in the liquor store with the owner, an employee, 
and another individual, tried to calm Boyd.  Mallard told him that the paramedics 
were coming, but Boyd passed out and died.  Armstrong exited the Cadillac, but 
collapsed near the corner of 47th and Western.  Armstrong and Boyd were 
transported to area hospitals.  Armstrong died at the hospital.   
 
When Dyer returned to the scene, he saw Hicks‟s body still in the driver‟s 
seat, with blood everywhere.  He saw the police and paramedics arrive, but he did 
not talk to them.  Dyer felt that he should not say anything because a gang member 
would be labeled a “snitch” if he spoke to the police about a gang-related crime, 
even if the crime was committed by a rival gang against the member‟s own gang.  
Dyer feared that if he told the police what he knew about the shooting, others 
would try to harm him.  He did not want to get involved.  Instead, Dyer went to a 
nearby pay phone and called Hicks‟s uncle, Gregory Shoaf.  He told Shoaf that 
Hicks had been shot and that defendant was the shooter.   
 
On the day of the homicides, police officers took Meeks to the police 
station for an interview.  Meeks did not give Dyer‟s name to the police because 
she wanted to protect him.  And although Meeks had recognized defendant as the 
shooter, she did not identify him to the police because she was frightened and did 
not want to get involved.  Instead, she told the police that she was unable to 
identify the shooter, claiming she was high and on psychiatric medication.  Police 
spoke with Meeks several times and showed her a set of photographs of possible 
suspects.  Meeks did not identify anyone because of concerns about her own and 
 
5 
her family‟s safety.  At trial, she explained that a member of her family had 
received a telephone call that Meeks understood as a warning to keep quiet.   
 
A week after the shootings, the police contacted Dyer, but he gave them no 
information.  He claimed that he was inside the liquor store when the shots were 
fired.  The next day, after receiving information from Shoaf that Dyer was a 
witness to the shooting, the police asked Dyer to come into the police station.  
When Dyer arrived, Shoaf, Shoaf‟s sister, and Boyd‟s mother were there.  Dyer 
was initially reluctant to talk to the police, but changed his mind after the family 
members convinced him he should tell the police what he knew about the killing 
of his friends.  Dyer told the police what happened and gave a written statement.  
He identified defendant as the shooter in a photographic lineup.   
 
Defendant was taken into custody early in October 1994 and interviewed as 
a suspect regarding various gang murders.  Defendant told the interviewing 
detectives that he knew about the killings on Western Avenue.  He said the shooter 
put on a blue shirt to make the victims think he was a Crips gang member.  He 
walked up to their car and “dumped on them,” using a .9-millimeter handgun and 
fled in a red car.  Defendant, however, denied being present, denied committing 
the shootings, and refused to disclose the name of the perpetrator.  He stated that 
the shooter knew the Crips gang member who witnessed the shooting because they 
had been in jail together, but defendant denied knowing the witness himself.  
Defendant told the detectives that his family fell apart after Rollin‟ 60s gang 
members killed his brother.  He blamed the 60s for what happened to his family.  
Defendant told the detectives that he was not admitting the murders, but if he had 
done them, the reason would be the killing of his brother.   
 
Dyer was subsequently arrested on a parole violation and taken to county 
jail.  Defendant was in the same jail at that time.  When Dyer was asked to view a 
live lineup that included defendant, Dyer did not identify defendant as the shooter 
 
6 
because he was afraid of what could happen to him in jail if he was labeled a 
snitch.  Sometime later, Dyer was brought to an office where defendant was 
waiting.  Defendant told Dyer not to say anything and showed him a copy of the 
statement Dyer had made to police identifying defendant as the shooter.  
Defendant told Dyer that the sheriff‟s deputy who escorted him to the office was 
defendant‟s cousin and that defendant could have Dyer moved to a safe facility as 
long as Dyer did not identify him.  Defendant told Dyer that he had given him “a 
pass,” meaning he could have killed him when he shot the others but chose not to.  
Dyer assured defendant that he had not picked him out of the lineup and that he 
did not intend to “tell on [him].”  At trial, Dyer testified that he had decided not to 
testify or cooperate with the police even before this conversation.  Dyer testified 
that he was concerned that if his statement to police “[got] around the jail” he 
could be hurt or killed.  He said that he received threats before and after the lineup.   
 
When a defense investigator subsequently came to interview him at the 
CYA facility where Dyer was transferred, Dyer lied and said that he had been in 
the liquor store at the time of the shootings.  He told the investigator that he did 
not see anything and claimed the victims‟ families pressured him into making his 
statement to the police.  Meeks continued to be uncooperative with the police.  In 
1995, the case against defendant was dismissed and he was released.   
 
In 1998, investigators from the Santa Barbara County District Attorney‟s 
Office contacted Dyer, who had been released from custody a couple of years 
earlier.  The investigators asked about the 1994 murders.  Because Dyer was 
trying to reform his life, he decided to cooperate with them and to testify against 
defendant.  He told the investigators about being threatened and about his 
jailhouse conversation with defendant.  When Dyer was contacted by Los Angeles 
police detectives and asked to attend a live lineup in 1999, Dyer identified 
 
7 
defendant as the shooter of his three friends.  Dyer also identified defendant as the 
shooter at defendant‟s preliminary hearing and again at trial.   
 
Kipchoge Johnson testified at defendant‟s trial that until 2000 he belonged 
to the Van Ness Gangsters, a Brim Bloods gang that was “best friends” with 
defendant‟s gang, the Six Deuce Brim gang.  Johnson testified that he decided to 
tell the police what he knew about this shooting because he had become 
“disgusted” with the gang lifestyle and had become friends with the brother of one 
of the three victims.   
 
Johnson recalled being with defendant in 1994 when defendant received an 
upsetting phone call.  Defendant told Johnson that one of defendant‟s “homies” 
had just been killed by a Crips gang member.  A few days later defendant came in 
with a newspaper article.  He said, “This is what I did for the homies” and threw 
the newspaper on the floor.  Everybody ran to look at it.  Johnson saw that it was 
an article about the killings of the three Rollin‟ 60s gang members.  Some of the 
older gang members who were present asked defendant what had happened.  
Defendant replied that he “ran up on them” and with five shots “domed,” meaning 
shot in the head, all three of the men who were inside a parked Cadillac.  He had 
made sure they were Crips gang members by “throwing” their neighborhood sign 
at them and having them throw the sign back to him.  Johnson testified that using 
only five shots and shooting a person in the head would garner more status for a 
gang member.  He also testified that a gang member would not take credit for a 
killing that he did not commit because if he did, he would be disciplined and 
kicked out of the neighborhood.  According to Johnson, if defendant bragged 
about killing someone, he must have done it.  Johnson believed it fair to say that 
defendant hated the Rollin‟ 60s gang.   
 
A few months after the killings, Johnson met defendant on the county jail 
bus while going to court.  Johnson asked defendant who had identified him as the 
 
8 
shooter and defendant replied it was the person to whom he had given a “pass” 
and allowed to run away based on their prior custody together in CYA.  Defendant 
said that he should have killed him too.  Johnson subsequently heard defendant tell 
some Crips gang members that he was going to “beat this,” get out of jail, and kill 
some more of their members.   
 
Christopher Fennelle was a member of the Six Deuce Brim Bloods gang 
until 1995.  He knew defendant for a number of years as a member of the same 
gang.  Fennelle testified that sometime in 1995 defendant came to Fennelle‟s 
home because he wanted to buy a gun.  As they were talking, defendant brought 
up the subject of the three Rollin‟ 60s Crips who were killed the previous year.  
Defendant told Fennelle that he had seen the Cadillac parked with three Crips 
inside and one standing outside.  As defendant walked up to the car, the man by 
the passenger door saw him and took off running.  Defendant said he fired shots at 
the fleeing man and then shot everyone in the car.   
 
Special precautions were taken to protect both Johnson and Fennelle while 
they were testifying during the trial.  And they were both promised that whenever 
they were released from prison they would be provided with witness relocation 
services.   
 
In 2001, Meeks was in a drug rehabilitation program and had become a 
Christian.  She decided to cooperate with authorities regarding the 1994 shooting.  
She subsequently identified defendant in a photo lineup as the shooter.   
2.  The October 3, 1994 attempted murder and carjacking 
 
On October 3, 1994, Luis Hernandez was working as a security guard 
patrolling a parking lot for several Santa Monica businesses, including the 
Telephone Employees Credit Union.  About 10:30 a.m., a car approached 
Hernandez.  There were three African-American men in the car.  The front 
 
9 
passenger asked Hernandez if he knew the location of Santa Monica College.  As 
Hernandez pointed to the left, the man said, “Don‟t move,” reached into the glove 
compartment of the car, and pulled out a handgun.  Hernandez turned and ran 
toward the entrance to the credit union.  He heard several shots behind him.  He 
was hit and fell down, but got up again and continued running.  He was shot again 
as he reached the credit union door and collapsed after he entered the building.  He 
was taken to the hospital where he had surgery and remained for a week.  He was 
out of work for two months.   
 
Jasmine Green was inside the credit union that morning, and looked up 
when she heard gunshots.  She observed a yellow Cadillac parked outside and as 
she watched, a man stepped from the passenger side of the car and shot at 
Hernandez, the security guard.  Hernandez ran past the window and into the credit 
union, collapsing in front of her.  Green then saw the shooter get back in the car 
and the car drive away.  She got a good look at the shooter.  She believed he used 
a .9-millimeter gun, and described all three men in the car as African-American.   
 
About 11:15 a.m. on the same day, Socorro Navarro drove to the Santa 
Monica home of her friend, Linda Nicastro, to give her a ride to work.  Navarro 
stopped in front of her friend‟s home on Oak Street, which is about six blocks 
away from the Telephone Employees Credit Union.  Navarro honked her horn and 
Nicastro came out of the house.  Before Nicastro could get to Navarro‟s car, a 
yellow car with two African-American men in the front seat suddenly came from 
the opposite direction and stopped next to Navarro.  The driver got out and 
approached Navarro.  He produced a gun and said, “Bitch, get out of the car.”  
Frightened, Navarro complied.  She walked over to Nicastro.  They grabbed hands 
and walked toward the apartment building without looking back toward the car.  
Navarro heard the sound of cars speeding away.  She turned and saw her car and 
the yellow car drive away in the same direction.   
 
10 
 
Jerry Flannery lived across the street from Nicastro.  Around 11:15 a.m. 
that morning, he had just parked his car and was walking across the street when he 
heard another car approaching at a high rate of speed.  He heard it slam on its 
brakes and saw it pull up next to Navarro‟s car.  He saw three people inside the 
car.  Flannery testified that the driver, an African-American male in his late 20s, 
got out and walked up to Navarro, yelling at her to get out of her car.  Flannery 
started toward Navarro to help her, but the man raised a gun, which Flannery 
recognized as a .9-millimeter semiautomatic.  When the man pointed it at 
Flannery, Flannery dove behind the parked cars, then crawled to the front of one 
of the cars and peeked around the corner.  Flannery saw the man yank Navarro‟s 
car door open, grab Navarro by the hair, and drag her out of the car.  Flannery 
turned and went to nearby apartment buildings, knocking on three or four doors in 
an attempt to get someone to call the police.  Flannery returned to the street in 
time to see the two cars drive away.  Flannery got back into his car and tried to 
follow them in order to obtain a license plate number, but was unable to find the 
cars.   
 
In 1999, Santa Monica Police Sergeant Gary Steiner was assigned to 
reinvestigate the 1994 credit union shooting and subsequent carjacking.  He 
interviewed defendant after he heard that defendant had information regarding the 
case.  Defendant told Steiner that he wanted to get his former friend Chauncey 
Bowen, who was the brother of Fennelle, in trouble because Bowen had tried to 
kill defendant and defendant‟s girlfriend.  Defendant described the shooting of 
Hernandez at the credit union and the subsequent carjacking of Navarro, but 
claimed that he had acted only as a lookout and that Bowen was both the shooter 
at the credit union and the man who dragged Navarro out of her car.  Defendant 
told Steiner that he later bought the gun that Bowen had used and it was that gun 
he had with him when he was arrested back in October 1994.   
 
11 
 
Forensic examination in 1995 of the shell casings and bullet fragments 
recovered in connection with the shooting of Hernandez determined that the shell 
casings were fired from one gun and that the bullets were also fired from one gun.  
But without the benefit of analyzing the gun itself, it could not be determined that 
the casings and bullets were fired from the same gun.  After defendant‟s interview 
statements in 1999, the shell casings and bullet fragments were reanalyzed, along 
with the gun seized when defendant was arrested in 1994.  It was then determined 
that the shell casings and bullet fragments had been fired from that gun.  That gun 
was not the weapon used in the 1994 killings of Hicks, Boyd, and Armstrong.   
 
In 1999, credit union customer Green was shown a photographic lineup of 
possible suspects in the credit union shooting.  She identified defendant‟s picture 
as being that of the shooter.  She also identified defendant as the shooter in a 
subsequent live lineup and later at trial.   
B. Penalty phase evidence 
1.  Evidence submitted in aggravation under factor (b) of section 190.3 
 
In the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of defendant‟s 
history of numerous criminal activities involving the use or attempted use of force, 
violence or threat.  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  
a.  Carjackings committed as a juvenile 
 
The prosecution presented evidence of two carjackings committed by 
defendant when he was 17 years old.   
 
According to Alice Rox, on January 21, 1988, she parked her car on her 
way to a swap meet in Los Angeles.  When she got out of her car, a male, whom 
she later identified as defendant, pointed a gun at her and demanded the keys to 
her car.  She tossed the keys to him, and defendant took her car.  The car was 
recovered a few days later.   
 
12 
 
Dwain Edwards testified that on February 4, 1988, he drove his car to a gas 
station.  Edwards was about to fill his car when a male, whom Edwards later 
identified as defendant, pointed a machine gun at him and demanded his keys.  
Edwards complied and ran approximately 50 feet away.  When he turned around, 
he saw defendant leaving in his car.  Defendant was taken into custody later that 
day on the campus of a local high school, and police seized a machine gun that a 
witness claimed to have seen defendant hide.  The weapon held a 50-round clip, 
which contained 40 rounds when it was examined.  Defendant admitted 
committing both the January 21 and February 4 carjackings.  Edwards‟s car was 
recovered several days later.   
b.  September 1994 robbery of Pacific Marine Credit Union 
 
On the morning of September 27, 1994 — three weeks after the triple 
homicide of Hicks, Boyd, and Armstrong and six days before the attempted 
murder of Hernandez and the carjacking of Navarro — Melissa Lopez was 
working as the head teller and assistant manager at the Pacific Marine Credit 
Union in Oceanside.  Lopez testified that at approximately 11:30 a.m., the glass 
double doors of the credit union flew open and three or four African-American 
men ran inside.  They were carrying semiautomatic weapons, which they pointed 
at the tellers.  Two of the men hurdled the first two teller counters and ordered 
everyone to the ground.  Lopez was ordered to get up when she identified herself 
as the person who was in charge of the credit union that morning.  One man, later 
determined to be defendant, led her to the vault at gunpoint and demanded she 
open it.  Lopez fumbled with the keys.  Defendant put his gun next to her temple 
and said he would shoot her if she did not hurry.  After she opened the vault, 
defendant took the currency and placed it in a bag.  Lopez could hear another man 
on the other side of the credit union ordering tellers to open their drawers.  The 
 
13 
men left the credit union, and someone called 911.  After the robbery, the credit 
union manager performed an audit and determined that $161,589.23 had been 
taken.  Lopez identified defendant at trial as the man who had forced her back to 
the vault, held a gun at her head, and took the currency.   
 
Michael Loughran worked for a company whose office was inside the 
credit union.  He testified that he heard the commotion in the credit union that 
morning.  He looked around his door and saw an African-American man, whom 
Loughran identified in court as defendant, pointing a gun at him.  Defendant told 
Loughran to come into the bank and lie down by the tellers.  Loughran complied, 
and heard sounds from the vault area.  Then defendant, holding a big bag, jumped 
over the counter and landed next to Loughran.  Defendant put his knee on 
Loughran‟s chest and asked if he had any money.  Loughran reached into his top 
pocket, where he usually kept his cash, but pulled out his business cards by 
mistake.  Defendant hit Loughran in the head with his gun and said, “Give me all 
your money, white boy.”  He pointed the gun at Loughran‟s face.  Loughran 
remembered his money was in a different pocket.  He handed defendant two $100 
bills.  Defendant took Loughran‟s pager, stood up, and walked out of the credit 
union.  Loughran identified defendant at trial as the man who pointed the gun at 
him and took his money and pager.   
 
According to Bloods gang member Kipchoge Johnson, defendant bragged 
about the robbery of the credit union.  Johnson explained that defendant did not 
have a job; defendant‟s job was being a gangster.  Johnson said that defendant 
would rob banks and kill people, go to prison, get out and do the same thing over 
again.   
 
Santa Monica Detective Steiner interviewed defendant in 1999.  According 
to Steiner, defendant said that he and Chauncey Bowen had robbed the credit 
 
14 
union in Oceanside in September 1994.  According to defendant, they stole almost 
$200,000.  Defendant described his role in the robbery to Steiner.   
 
Melissa Lopez testified regarding the impact the robbery had on her life.  
According to Lopez, she had worked at the Pacific Marine Credit Union for three 
and a half years at the time of the robbery.  She loved working there and felt she 
had a strong future.  After the robbery, she immediately started looking for a 
different job.  She completely changed her field of work.  She required six months 
of posttraumatic stress syndrome therapy, seeing a therapist twice a week.  She 
suffered nightmares for a long time after the robbery.  At the time of trial in 2003, 
she was still frightened of doors opening quickly and of people who looked 
“suspicious.”  She did not trust people and avoided public areas after dark.  
Defendant‟s face was forever ingrained in her head and she “freaked out” 
whenever she saw someone who resembled defendant.   
c.  October 1995 shooting of George Minor 
 
One night in October 1995 — two weeks after defendant had been released 
from custody — George Minor, a drug dealer and gang member, was standing in 
the front yard of his home speaking with some neighbors.  According to Minor, 
defendant and two other African-American men approached him.  One of the men 
asked for an individual named “Ray Ray.”  Minor said Ray Ray was not there.  
Defendant, who was holding a gun, then moved the two other men aside and 
stepped up to Minor, saying, “You Ray Ray.”  Defendant announced he was “East 
Coast,” a rival gang, and he and one of the other men began shooting at Minor.  
Minor was hit in the arm and the leg before he ran behind a car parked in the 
driveway.  Both shooters fired multiple additional shots at the car and the house.  
When the gunfire ceased, the men scattered.   
 
15 
 
Minor testified that he ran into his house, and someone called 911.  
Although a number of bullets went through the walls of the house, Minor‟s sisters 
and nieces who were inside were not injured.  Minor was taken to the hospital, 
where he stayed for several weeks.  At the hospital, Minor selected defendant‟s 
picture from a photographic lineup as one of the shooters.  He also identified 
defendant at trial as the man who called him Ray Ray and shot him.  He had no 
doubt about his identification.   
 
Minor‟s wife, Saudia, testified that she was coming home from the store 
when she saw the men shooting at her husband.  Defendant was one of the 
shooters.  When she saw everyone scatter, she got out of the car and went into the 
house, where she was told Minor had been shot.  Paramedics arrived and Minor 
was taken to the hospital.   
 
Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Angel Jaimes was patrolling with his 
partner on the night of the shooting.  Upon hearing approximately 10 gunshots, 
Jaimes testified that he drove toward the sound of the gunfire and was flagged 
down by a man who was standing in the middle of the street.  The man said he had 
seen the shooters and that they were headed west.  Jaimes allowed him to get into 
the rear seat of the patrol car and they drove west.  When they spotted a white 
Cadillac with two African-American males inside, the man got excited and 
pointed, saying, “That‟s him, that‟s him.”  Jaimes and his partner requested 
assistance and conducted a traffic stop of the Cadillac.  Defendant and another 
man exited the Cadillac.  Jaimes searched the car and found two hidden handguns, 
a .9-millimeter automatic and a .380-caliber automatic.  Both men were taken into 
custody.  During booking, Jaimes tested defendant‟s hands for gunshot residue.  
Subsequent analysis determined that gunshot residue was present on both of his 
hands.  A criminalist testified that analysis of the bullet casings and an expended 
 
16 
bullet recovered from the scene of the shooting determined that they were fired 
from the two guns recovered from the Cadillac.   
 
Minor testified that after he was subpoenaed as a witness regarding the 
shooting, he received a phone call telling him not to come to court.  Saudia 
testified that she received multiple strange phone calls after she was subpoenaed as 
a witness.  According to Saudia, the calls to her were from a woman and a man.  
On one occasion, she was asked by the caller to attend a court hearing and lie 
about what she saw.  On another occasion, a man said he knew where Saudia‟s 
daughter went to school and that Saudia worked at International House of 
Pancakes.  Saudia testified that she was frightened.  Both Minor and his wife 
testified that they believed the calls were “three-way” calls from the county jail.  
According to Saudia, she responded to the subpoena and went to court, but when 
she saw defendant behind a window, she left because she was worried about her 
family‟s safety.  At defendant‟s capital trial, however, Saudia identified defendant 
as one of the shooters.   
d.  August 1997 robbery of Vandenberg Federal Credit Union and 
killing of Christine Orciuch 
 
Defendant was released on parole on July 15, 1997.   
 
On the morning of August 8, 1997, Jasper Altheide was working as a teller 
at the Vandenberg Federal Credit Union in Lompoc.  He testified that four men, 
including Chauncey Bowen and defendant, entered the credit union.  Bowen 
walked over to the counter and pretended to fill out a deposit slip or envelope.  
Defendant then ran up to the counter with a shotgun.  Defendant began screaming, 
“Get the fuck down or I‟ll shoot you.”  He jumped over the counter and asked for 
the manager.  When no one responded, defendant said he would shoot someone.  
Another credit union employee, Moira Philley, testified that she told defendant 
that the manager was in the back.  Defendant told Philley to get up and kicked her 
 
17 
hard in the foot.  When she rose, defendant put the shotgun against her back and 
shoved her.  Philley led defendant toward the back where the manager was.  
According to Philley, as she and defendant were walking through a doorway, two 
gunshots were fired.  The gunshots came from the other side of the counter near 
the front door and were not fired by defendant.  Defendant screamed, “What the 
fuck?”  Someone said, “let‟s get out of here,” and defendant and the other robbers 
left the credit union.  Philley raced to call 911 and report the robbery.  An audit 
later determined that the robbers had taken a little over $11,000 from the teller 
drawers.   
 
Octavio Gallardo was approaching the front door of the credit union while 
the robbery was in progress.  He had a broken left leg and was walking on 
crutches.  Gallardo testified that a woman, later determined to be Christine 
Orciuch, asked if he needed help and opened the door for him.  After he entered, a 
man wearing a mask pointed a handgun at him and told him to get down.  
According to Gallardo, the man shot him in the right thigh before he could 
comply.  Gallardo fell to the ground.  The woman, who was behind Gallardo, 
turned and ran out.  The man with the gun yelled at her to stop and come back.  
Gallardo then heard another gunshot.  Orciuch was fatally shot and immediately 
fell to the sidewalk.  Someone said, “Let‟s go,” and Gallardo heard the sound of 
running toward the parking lot.  One of the robbers stopped to take a backpack 
from Orciuch before running away.   
 
Orciuch‟s 11-year-old son, Quentin, was waiting for his mom in their car 
when he heard the gunshots and heard his mother scream his name.  According to 
Quentin, he jumped out of the car and saw his mother lying facedown on the 
ground.  Three men were running from the credit union.  Quentin ran to the side 
door of the credit union, where he banged on the door and yelled that his mother 
 
18 
had been shot.  He was allowed inside, but was prevented from going to his 
mother‟s body.   
 
Defendant‟s former fellow gang member Fennelle testified that a few 
weeks before this robbery and murder, Fennelle spoke with defendant and Bowen 
at the house of Sabrina Johnson.  The two men told Fennelle that they were 
planning an armed bank robbery.  They said they needed cars, and that they would 
collect a lot of money.  They asked Fennelle if he wanted to participate.  Fennelle 
refused and tried to convince Bowen and defendant not to do it.  He warned them 
that if someone was killed in the robbery, they would be equally responsible for 
the murder.  Defendant told him that he did not care and was determined to go 
ahead as planned.  According to investigating officers, defendant admitted, in 
interviews after his arrest, that he was present during the robbery.2   
 
Several witnesses testified concerning the impact of the robbery and 
shooting on them and their family as follows. 
 
Jasper Altheide testified that she had difficulties after the robbery because 
during the robbery she had lain under the counter, and although she had the keys 
to the vault and could have given the robbers the money, she did not do so because 
she was so frightened.  According to Altheide, she felt very guilty about not 
allowing Orciuch‟s son to see Orciuch after Orciuch was shot and felt directly 
responsible for her death.  Every time she saw Orciuch‟s family, her heart hurt.  
Altheide had nightmares, was fearful, and no longer wanted to be around people.  
                                              
2  
In his application for a new penalty phase trial, defendant acknowledged 
that he was subsequently convicted of the Vandenberg Federal Credit Union 
robbery and murder and had received a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole.   
 
19 
She constantly worried and had difficulty working at the credit union.  She had 
counseling, and testified that “the innocence of living is gone.”   
 
Moira Philley testified that the robbery and shootings at the Vandenberg 
Federal Credit Union had a tremendous effect on her life.  Her marriage almost 
“fell apart from it.”  She and her children were “freaked out” by it.  She would not 
open the front door and installed an alarm system.  She testified that she was 
constantly watchful, had anxiety attacks when at work, and eventually had to 
receive trauma counseling.  She had nightmares of Quentin screaming, and felt 
guilty because she survived, but Orciuch did not.  She knew the Orciuch family 
and felt for them.  For years, the credit union maintained a memorial near the 
flower beds where Orciuch died and Philley found it terrible to watch Orciuch‟s 
husband light the candles every night and then blow them out every morning.   
 
Octavio Gallardo testified that the shooting at the credit union caused him 
to be very fearful.  For a time he was afraid to leave his apartment.  He required 
medical attention for his gunshot wound and his leg still hurt when the weather 
was very cold.   
 
Orciuch‟s husband, Chester Orciuch, testified that at the time of his wife‟s 
death, they had three children; a daughter age 17, a daughter age 14, and a son, 
Quentin, age 11.  When he arrived at the hospital, he was taken to a room and told 
that his wife had been fatally shot.  He screamed “Oh, no” and asked for his 
family.  He was taken to another room where his eldest daughter was trying to 
comfort Quentin, who was asking if his mommy was okay.  Chester told his 
children that their mother had gone to heaven.  They went to the emergency room 
and said a prayer at her body.  Chester was overwhelmed by her death.  Christine 
had been the caretaker of the family and home-schooled all three children.  
Chester testified that he had difficulty as a single father and sometimes woke up in 
 
20 
the morning with dry heaves.  There were also times that he woke up in the night 
screaming.  According to Chester, he lacked focus at home and at work.   
 
Quentin Orciuch testified that after his mother was shot and he was allowed 
into the credit union, he tried to page his father, but he was crying too hard.  He 
tried to run outside to see his mother, but was stopped.  Eventually, a fireman 
drove him to the hospital where he waited for his father and sisters to arrive.  After 
they arrived, his father told him his mother had died.  He was devastated.  
According to Quentin, everything was difficult after his mother‟s death.  He thinks 
about her every day and spent approximately one and one-half years in counseling 
after her death.   
e.  March 1998 attempted escape and carjacking 
 
Defendant and Bowen were held in custody in the Santa Barbara County 
jail after their arrest for the Vandenberg Federal Credit Union robbery.  On a 
morning in mid-March 1998, they escaped with another inmate from the jail 
exercise yard.  According to witnesses, the three African-American male inmates 
were seen walking down the hill from the jail to a parking lot, where they 
surrounded Matilde Ulrich‟s car.  One of the inmates pulled Ulrich from her car, 
while defendant got in on the passenger side and pushed Ulrich out.  The inmates 
drove off in Ulrich‟s car, which was spotted by a sheriff‟s deputy a short time later 
and was chased by the California Highway Patrol.  A spike strip was used to stop 
the car.  Defendant, Bowen, and the third inmate were captured without further 
incident.   
f.  Acts of force or violence or threats of force or violence while in 
custody 
 
Witnesses testified concerning 12 different incidents involving defendant‟s 
use of force or violence, or threats of force or violence during the periods of time 
that he was held in custody as follows. 
 
21 
 
Defendant and Antoine Phillips were both in custody at Avenal State Prison 
in March 1994.  The men were members of different Bloods gangs.  Defendant 
started an argument with Phillips regarding the murder of one of defendant‟s 
“homegirls” by a member of Phillips‟s gang and they agreed to fight.  A few 
weeks later, Phillips was lying on the grass of the prison yard when defendant 
walked up and kicked him in the mouth.  Later that evening the two men fought 
and defendant broke Phillips‟s jaw.   
 
In November 1997, Sheriff‟s Deputy Brian Parker was conducting a 
security check at the Santa Barbara County jail.  Parker told defendant to remove 
several items that defendant had secured into his cell wall in violation of jail rules.  
Defendant became verbally abusive and challenged him to enter the cell and fight.   
 
In November 1998, while he was in a holding cell at the Santa Maria 
courthouse, defendant broke a plastic coat hanger that had been used for his 
civilian clothes, took a large piece and began sharpening it to a point on the 
concrete floor.  Defendant hid the other pieces of the coat hanger in clothing in the 
corner of the cell.  Deputies entered the cell and took from defendant the 
sharpened piece of plastic, as well as the hidden pieces.   
 
In September 2000, while he was being held in the Los Angeles County 
jail, defendant became upset when he was told that the nurse did not have his 
medication.  Sheriff‟s Deputy Phillips directed defendant to calm down.  
Defendant challenged Phillips and two other deputies to enter his cell and fight 
him, threatening to harm them.   
 
In February 2001, defendant was housed on the disciplinary row in the Los 
Angeles County jail.  Defendant handed Sheriff‟s Deputy John Hermann a note 
and told him to post it in the guard booth so that everyone could see it.  Defendant 
specifically said that he wanted Deputy Lindenmayer to see it.  The note consisted 
of a cartoon drawing of stick figures, which depicted defendant announcing his 
 
22 
gang membership, beating up Lindenmayer, and Lindenmayer lying on the ground 
dead.  Both Lindenmayer and Hermann took the note as a threat to Lindenmayer.   
 
In July 2001, Sheriff‟s Deputy Charles Nowotny searched defendant‟s cell 
in the Los Angeles County jail and found a handmade “club” in a manila envelope 
in defendant‟s personal property.  The club consisted of a tightly rolled-up 
newspaper with a torn white sheet wrapped around it to form a handle.  This was a 
contraband item that could be used as a weapon.   
 
In September 2001, sheriff‟s deputies were escorting defendant from the 
medical clinic to his single cell in a lockdown module of the Los Angeles County 
jail.  When they arrived at defendant‟s cell, defendant saw a third deputy removing 
several gang photographs from his cell.  Defendant began cursing and refused to 
enter his cell until his photographs were returned.  Eventually defendant was 
convinced to go back inside his cell.  However, while the deputies were removing 
defendant‟s handcuffs and waist chain, defendant pulled the chain into the cell and 
began swinging it, hitting the door and walls.  Defendant yelled that he was “going 
to tear this place apart,” and, “If I get out of here, I am going to tear you apart, 
too.”  The deputies were able to close the gate and secure the latch so that 
defendant could not hit them with the chain.  It took approximately one hour to 
talk defendant into handing over the chain.  During this time, defendant was 
cursing and threatening people.   
 
Not quite three weeks later, sheriff‟s deputies approached defendant‟s cell 
in the Los Angeles County jail to provide defendant with his dinner.  When 
defendant‟s food was passed through the food tray slot, defendant refused the food 
and threw a white watery liquid at Sheriff‟s Deputy Alejandro Martinez, saying, 
“Take that, fuckin‟ deputy.”  The liquid landed on Martinez‟s face and upper 
body.  Sheriff‟s Deputy James Brown sprayed pepper spray into the cell so that the 
food slot could be closed.  As the slot was being closed, defendant threw more of 
 
23 
the liquid at Brown, which landed on Brown‟s face and upper body.  When 
Martinez sprayed additional pepper spray into the cell, defendant loudly said, 
“You fucking bitches,” and attempted to throw more liquid at the deputies.  
Martinez testified that he did not know what the liquid was, but it might have 
come from a milk container.  Martinez explained that when an inmate throws 
something at an officer, it is commonly called “gassing.”   
 
In February 2002, defendant complained to Sheriff‟s Deputy Martinez at 
the Los Angeles County jail that Deputy Valente kept “fucking with [him] and 
said that [he was] going to get him.”  Defendant gave Martinez a note that he 
wanted given to the floor supervisor.  The note said, “I give you my word as a man 
that I will slice or stab this guy the first chance I get.”  Martinez understood the 
note to refer to Valente.  After giving Martinez the note, defendant said he would 
“gas” a deputy if he were given the chance.   
 
In June 2002, when defendant was housed in the Los Angeles County jail‟s 
“high power” module, a jail inmate trustee, Douglas Lance, was picking up trash 
and food trays along the walkway in the cell block.  As Lance picked up a trash 
bag attached to defendant‟s cell, defendant reached through the bars with his left 
hand and swiped across the right side of Lance‟s neck.  Lance cried out in pain 
and called for help.  As Sheriff‟s Deputy Damien Ortega responded, Ortega heard 
the toilet flush in defendant‟s cell.  Lance told Ortega that defendant had cut him.  
Lance had a two-and-one-half inch laceration from under his ear to the front part 
of his neck.  The laceration was about one-quarter inch deep and was bleeding 
profusely.  Lance was taken to the medical clinic, and subsequently transferred to 
an emergency room for treatment.  When Ortega saw Lance two weeks later, he 
noticed a sizeable scar on Lance‟s neck.   
 
In January 2003, Sheriff‟s Deputy Mat Taylor was sitting in the control 
booth at the Los Angeles County jail when he heard a loud thud against the 
 
24 
concrete wall of one of the rows of cells.  Taylor looked down the row and 
initially saw nothing.  But when he heard noises sounding like an assault, Taylor 
stood up and saw defendant on top of another inmate, Richard Aguirre.  Only 
Aguirre was supposed to be out of his cell; defendant had escaped from his cell.  
Defendant was savagely striking Aguirre, who was curled up in a ball, and blood 
was “flying everywhere.”  When Taylor saw that each of defendant‟s blows was 
creating an injury that produced blood, he knew that a jail-made shank was 
involved.  Taylor and his partner went down the row to break up the fight.  Taylor 
pepper-sprayed defendant and Aguirre, but defendant continued to hit Aguirre.  As 
additional deputies arrived, defendant ran back to his cell.   
 
Taylor did not find any weapons on Aguirre, who was covered in blood.  
His clothing had multiple slash marks.  Aguirre was taken to the medical clinic 
and then transferred to a hospital trauma center.  Sometime after the incident, 
defendant told Taylor that he wished he had “finished the job” on Aguirre and that 
he should have done the job right the first time.  Aguirre was a “validated” 
associate of the Mexican Mafia, which is a large Hispanic prison gang.   
 
In March 2003, Sheriff‟s Deputy Thomas Davis searched defendant at the 
Los Angeles County jail before he was brought to court.  Inmates in defendant‟s 
module were segregated so that they did not come into contact with other inmates 
and Davis was looking for, among other things, any notes that could be passed to 
other inmates during their transportation to court.  During his search, Davis found 
a handwritten note at the bottom of a page of transcript.  The note read, “Breezo is 
a rat . . . .  Breezo and Marlo need to die.”  It was signed with defendant‟s gang 
moniker and other gang terms.  According to Lompoc Police Officer Harry Heidt, 
who had been assigned to investigate the 1997 robbery and murder at the 
Vandenberg Federal Credit Union, the transcript on which the note was written 
was of a telephone conversation Heidt had in December 1997 with Sabrina 
 
25 
Johnson, known as “Breezo,” regarding the conversation that had taken place at 
her apartment between defendant, Bowen, and Fennelle.  (Fennelle had testified 
that the conversation concerned defendant and Bowen‟s plan to commit an armed 
bank robbery.)  Heidt understood the term “rat” to refer to an informant or 
“snitch” and believed that the writer of the note wanted to have Johnson killed.   
 
Defendant‟s mail was monitored while he was in the Los Angeles County 
jail.  Several letters were confiscated.  In those letters, defendant referenced his 
robbery of a credit union, his cutting of a “white boy with a razor blade in the 
face” while in custody, and his serious cutting and beating of “a Mexican” in 
January 2003 while in lockup.   
2.  Evidence submitted in aggravation under factor (c) of section 190.3 
 
In September 1993, defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm with 
gross negligence.  (§ 246.3.)  He received a sentence of 16 months in prison.  
Defendant was paroled one year later, on September 3, 1994 — four days before 
the murders of Hicks, Boyd, and Armstrong.   
3.  Aggravating evidence of victim impact  
a.  Dayland Hicks 
 
Dayland Hicks was 22 years old when he was killed.  His uncle, Gregory 
Shoaf, testified that Hicks was respectful, quiet, good-natured, and “very lovable.”  
He liked to play basketball, football, and video games.  He enjoyed dancing, 
rapping, singing, and going to church.  He was learning the Bible and taking “his 
life in that direction.”  Shoaf believed Hicks was on the right path, but never had 
the chance to straighten his life out.  Shoaf loved Hicks like his own son.  Shoaf 
was in shock when he received the news that Hicks had been killed.  The hardest 
thing Shoaf had to do was tell Hicks‟s sister Jamise that her brother was dead.  
Hicks and Jamise were very close and Jamise had no family left after Hicks‟s 
 
26 
death, other than Shoaf and his family, because her mother and father had both 
died earlier.  Shoaf testified that he thought about Hicks every day and missed his 
smile and the things they did together.  Shoaf tried to look out for Hicks‟s son, 
who was four or five months old when Hicks was shot, but he knew he would 
never replace Hicks.  Hicks‟s death also “took a toll” on his grandmother.   
 
Jamise Shoaf testified that she was nine years old when her brother was 
killed.  She cried when she was told of his death and it left her with an empty 
feeling.  He was her only sibling, and it was hard to go on without him.  She 
testified that she thought about his death every day.  She missed his laugh, his 
silliness, and watching television with him.   
b.  Lamar Armstrong 
 
Lamar Armstrong was 19 years old when he was killed.  His mother, Doris 
Hayes, testified that Armstrong had enjoyed playing football and baseball, running 
track, and cooking.  He was a good son, worked part time at Home Base, a 
building supply store, and was in the process of getting his GED when he was 
killed.  Doris had difficulty believing Armstrong was actually dead.  She could not 
plan the funeral, and she suffered from nightmares.  She testified that she missed 
everything about him.  Holidays were particularly difficult.  Part of her died when 
her son did and she struggled every day.   
 
Dan Hayes, Armstrong‟s stepfather, testified that he raised Armstrong from 
the time he was an infant.  He described his stepson as a “good kid,” who enjoyed 
athletics and things that challenged his mind.  Dan had “an empty feeling” when 
told at the hospital that Armstrong had died.  He testified that it was very difficult 
to hold his family together after Armstrong‟s death.  According to Dan, his wife 
had “problems” on the anniversary of Armstrong‟s death, on his birthday, and on 
every holiday.  He characterized it as “a nightmare.”  He testified that Armstrong‟s 
 
27 
two daughters cried on Father‟s Day because they did not understand why they 
could not see their father.  Dan told the jury that he thought about Armstrong 
every day.  His death affected not just the immediate family, but the extended 
family.   
 
Milika McCoy testified that she was Armstrong‟s girlfriend and was eight 
months pregnant when he died.  The night before, they had attended a Lamaze 
class together.  Armstrong had just been promoted in his job, was a very nice 
person, and was excited about McCoy‟s pregnancy.  McCoy collapsed when she 
was told that Armstrong had died after being shot.  After his death, she did not 
want to wake up in the morning.  Her daughter, Cherish, was born a little over a 
month later.  At the time of trial, Cherish was eight years old.  She asked about her 
father “all the time” and had difficulty with not having a “daddy.”  McCoy, 
similarly, had difficulty raising Cherish by herself.  McCoy testified that she 
thought about Armstrong, her best friend, every time she looks at her daughter.   
c.  Trevon Boyd 
 
Carolyn Boyd, Trevon Boyd‟s mother, testified that Trevon was 20 years 
old when he died.  She described him as a beautiful and intelligent person who 
enjoyed writing music, sports, fishing, and dancing.  When Carolyn learned of her 
son‟s death, she felt like a part of her was gone.  She could not eat or sleep, and it 
was difficult to make the funeral arrangements.  Carolyn missed everything about 
her son.  She testified that her family “will never be whole, . . . again.”  Holidays 
were difficult, and she thought about her son every day.   
 
Olive Burgess testified that Trevon Boyd was her cousin.  According to 
Burgess, Boyd was a “sweet kid” growing up in a rough neighborhood.  He meant 
everything to her.  His death made her feel numb and the family still cried at night.  
The hardest thing for Burgess to do after Boyd‟s death was to explain it to her 
 
28 
children, who were all close to him.  They found it difficult to cope with his death, 
and she missed his smile and thought of him every day.   
4.  Mitigating evidence offered by defendant 
 
The defense case in mitigation included evidence of defendant‟s family 
history and upbringing, as well as opinion testimony by three expert witnesses 
who described for the jury defendant‟s learning disabilities and his psychological, 
neurological, and intellectual dysfunction.  The defense also presented evidence 
that defendant possessed a genetic condition that, when combined with childhood 
maltreatment, has been identified as a risk factor for antisocial behavior.   
a.  Defendant’s upbringing and background 
 
Defendant‟s mother, Pearl Thomas, testified that she had a poor 
relationship with her own mother and ran away from home when she was 12 years 
old.  She got into trouble and was sent to CYA when she was 15.  She became a 
single mother at the age of 17 when she gave birth to defendant‟s older brother, 
who became known as “Big Sonny.”  Thomas denied drinking alcohol, but 
admitted being a drug user, and taking barbiturates when defendant was 
conceived.  Defendant‟s father was a professional boxer with whom Thomas had a 
short relationship.  Defendant‟s father was a heroin addict and was not 
significantly involved in defendant‟s life.   
 
When defendant was a toddler, Thomas married Ronald Biggles.  He was 
abusive to Thomas and often came home drunk.  Biggles favored his own daughter 
over defendant and Big Sonny.  He hit defendant.  After Thomas left Biggles, she 
lived with James Wright, who disliked and hit defendant.  Thomas testified she 
also hit and whipped defendant because that was the way she was raised.  She did 
not know how to be a good mother.   
 
29 
 
Thomas supported her family with public welfare assistance and by 
stealing.  She estimated that she had been arrested almost 50 times in her life and 
she was in and out of custody during defendant‟s childhood.  When Thomas was 
in prison, defendant sometimes stayed with his grandmother, Amy Parks.  
According to Beverly Parks, who was Parks‟s daughter-in-law and defendant‟s 
aunt, Parks seemed to hate defendant and his sister Larhonda.  She often drank and 
became “wild and . . . brutally violent.”  Defendant suffered excessive beatings, 
almost every day, when he was staying in his grandmother‟s house.  Parks also 
abused the children by calling them names.  One time she scared defendant and 
Larhonda by turning off the lights and following them around with a long knife.  
She believed in voodoo and performed “curses” on people.  She was described as 
being “evil” by both Beverly Parks and defendant‟s godmother, Linda Gavin.  
Gavin testified that Parks showed her evilness to “anyone she didn‟t like” and she 
particularly disliked defendant and his sister Larhonda.  According to Gavin, Parks 
would sometimes call on the telephone and tell her to come get “these 
motherfuckers,” referring to defendant and his sister.   
 
Defendant was an energetic and very hyperactive child.  He had learning 
disabilities and was sent to special-needs schools.  Defendant was prescribed 
Ritalin, but his mother took him off the medication.  He was bullied and picked 
on, particularly by one member of a local Crips gang.  Defendant started getting 
into trouble at an early age.  But one childhood friend of defendant‟s, Reginald 
Campbell, recalled an incident in which defendant jumped into the swimming pool 
and saved him from drowning.   
 
Several witnesses (Reginald Campbell, Linda Woods, a neighbor who 
watched defendant grow up, defendant‟s half sister Ralene, and his aunt Beverly 
Parks) testified about the rough neighborhood in which defendant grew up.  It was 
filled with drugs and numerous gangs, which actively recruited members through 
 
30 
violence, including stabbings, carjackings, and shootings.  The witnesses 
explained that to acquire protection in the neighborhood, a person had to join a 
gang.  Defendant found protection by joining the Bloods gang to which his 
brother, Big Sonny, belonged.  Big Sonny was a violent person and well known in 
the neighborhood.  Defendant, however, idolized him and saw him as a father 
figure.  Defendant was devastated when Big Sonny was killed in a gang shooting, 
which increased his hatred for Crips gang members.   
b.  Expert witness testimony in mitigation 
 
Dr. Nancy Cowardin, who had a doctorate in educational psychology and 
special education, testified as an expert witness regarding learning disabilities.  
She assessed defendant by reviewing documents regarding his personal 
background, meeting with him and giving him current tests of his skills.  She 
noted that defendant started needing remedial help in the first grade or shortly 
thereafter.  He attended special-needs schools in grades eight and nine.  In eighth 
grade, his individualized education program (IEP) included a dual diagnosis of 
being seriously emotionally disturbed and having learning disabilities with 
attention deficits.  Defendant‟s IEP in ninth grade similarly assessed him as being 
seriously emotionally disturbed.  According to Cowardin, defendant had a clear 
history of attention deficit disorder (ADD).  His records from CYA indicated he 
was very impulsive and lacked sound decisionmaking skills.  Cowardin performed 
a complete psychoeducational assessment of defendant and concluded his ADD 
was still present in adulthood, but was more subdued.  She found that he had an 
auditory processing problem that could account for his learning disabilities in 
reading and writing at school.  As an adult, defendant had improved his reading 
and written language scores, but not his math scores.  Defendant‟s IQ was exactly 
average when verbal and nonverbal scores were combined, but he had large 
 
31 
deviations in some of the scores.  Cowardin found that defendant had lapses in 
mature executive functions that control problem solving, decisionmaking, and 
adaptability under stress in typical adults.  She concluded that defendant‟s 
disability profile may have led to some of his self-control problems.   
 
Dr. Arthur Kowell, a specialist in neurology, evaluated defendant‟s brain 
function.  He interpreted a brain electrical activity mapping study or “BEAM” test 
conducted on defendant in August 2000.  Three of the four parts of the test — the 
standard electroencephalogram, the electroencephalogram spectral analysis, and 
an auditory “evoked potential” test — had normal results.  But the visual evoked 
potential test showed some abnormal functioning of defendant‟s brain in the 
vertex, the right parietal region, and the right frontal region.  The vertex deals with 
motor behavior and initiation of activity.  The right parietal region deals with 
sensory functions and the right frontal lobe deals with impulse control and 
executive functions.  An abnormality in this last area might indicate the individual 
has a short temper or possibly a form of ADD.  Kowell testified that the test was 
nonspecific as to the time of onset and the causation for any abnormality shown 
and that the test was not predictive of behavior.  But Kowell concluded the test 
showed evidence of brain dysfunction.   
 
Dr. Kowell reviewed defendant‟s medical records, which included two 
positron emission tomography (PET) scans and a magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) scan of defendant‟s brain.  The results of a 1998 PET scan showed 
abnormalities, while the results of a followup MRI and a second PET scan in 2000 
were normal.  Kowell did not consider the latter tests to be inconsistent with his 
results.  He testified that a neuropsychological workup done by Dr. Kyle Boone in 
2002, which he reviewed, showed abnormalities consistent with Kowell‟s testing.  
Kowell noted Boone‟s opinion that defendant‟s decisionmaking skills were 
comparable to those of someone with mental retardation or borderline intelligence, 
 
32 
despite defendant‟s otherwise normal intelligence.  Kowell stated that, according 
to Boone, defendant may lack the essential brain equipment to exert reasoned 
control over his behavior.  Kowell also reviewed defendant‟s academic records, 
mental health records, and court records.  He considered the historical evidence 
from defendant‟s records to be consistent with his finding of abnormal brain 
function in defendant.   
 
Dr. Carl Osborn, a forensic psychologist, testified that scientific studies had 
shown that childhood abuse and neglect, i.e., maltreatment, alters the brain 
chemistry and functioning in ways that can produce aggressive behavior and that 
these changes will persist into adulthood.  According to Osborn, it had recently 
been shown that there is a powerful association with severe antisocial behavior 
later in life when childhood maltreatment combines with the presence of an 
inherited type of gene, the 3-repeat allele MAOA gene.  Genetic testing of 
defendant showed that he had inherited the 3-repeat allele MAOA gene and, in 
Osborn‟s opinion, defendant had been severely maltreated as a child.  Osborne 
testified that the 3 repeat allele MAOA gene is not a genetic defect, but is a risk 
factor.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Background regarding “witness intimidation” comments by the 
prosecutor, evidence, and related jury instruction 
 
Dyer and Meeks were eyewitnesses to defendant‟s shooting of Hicks, 
Armstrong, and Boyd.  But neither Dyer nor Meeks immediately identified 
defendant to the police as the shooter.  Both refused to cooperate with law 
enforcement at various points in time and told investigators that they could not 
identify the shooter.  In his guilt phase opening statement, the prosecutor 
acknowledged that the case had taken a long time to come to trial, but told the jury 
 
33 
that the explanation would lie in the evidence of “threats,” “fear,” and 
“intimidation” of the witnesses, which would explain their reluctance to come 
forward and speak with police.  The prosecutor referred to there being in the case a 
“theme” of such threats, intimidation, and fear.   
 
The prosecutor elaborated that Dyer was himself a gang member, that he 
initially did not want to get involved, and that he came forward and identified 
defendant as the shooter only at the urging of the victims‟ family members.  The 
prosecutor explained that when Dyer was subsequently asked to identify defendant 
at a lineup, Dyer was being held in custody with defendant and knew that it was 
very dangerous to testify against another inmate.  The prosecutor said that Dyer 
was frightened and then intimidated when he encountered defendant and was told 
by him that defendant had a relative who was a deputy sheriff.  According to the 
prosecutor, Dyer did not identify defendant in the 1995 lineup and later told lies to 
the defense investigator because of his fear.  The prosecutor told the jury that 
years later, when the investigation was reopened, Dyer “felt bad‟ about not 
identifying defendant in 1995 because “the victims were friends of his.”  Dyer 
revealed to prosecution investigators that he had been threatened and that the 
threats and intimidation he felt were the reasons for his earlier refusal to identify 
defendant.   
 
Continuing his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that Meeks 
was very afraid back in 1994 and 1995, consuming a lot of drugs, and hence 
reluctant to talk to the police.  She did not want to get involved, and did not want 
to get Dyer involved.  But, the prosecutor explained, Meeks also had a change of 
heart.  She had been sent to prison on a drug charge and while she was in prison, 
she turned her life “completely around.”  According to the prosecutor, Meeks 
explained to investigating detectives that she felt she had “to do the right thing” 
and that she knew who the shooter was because he had been just a few feet away 
 
34 
from her.  She told investigators that in the past she had been afraid to identify 
defendant for several reasons.  The prosecutor explained those reasons as follows:  
“[Meeks‟s] family had been threatened back in 1994 and 1995.  They had found 
out — someone had found out her address of her cousin and where her cousin 
lived and they received phone calls, and it was made quite clear to her that she 
[should] not say anything when she went to court.  And she kept that promise until 
she went to prison, got off drugs and got back straightening her life up, and now 
she has indicated the identification of the defendant.”   
 
The prosecutor further told the jury that “this concept of fear and 
retaliation” would also come up with respect to other witnesses.  He proceeded to 
very briefly describe the anticipated testimony of Johnson and Fennelle.  The 
prosecutor then warned the jurors that they might see witnesses who might not 
want to testify and who were very afraid to testify, but suggested it was “in the 
nature of these types of cases.”   
2.  Defendant’s claims  
 
Defendant complains on appeal that the prosecutor, by these comments, 
“poisoned” the jury against a fair assessment of his defense that these witnesses 
were not credible.  He contends that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for 
Dyer and Meeks when he described their change of heart.  And, he argues, the 
prosecutor‟s accusations, express and implied, that defendant was involved in this 
campaign of intimidation were prejudicial because they were never substantiated.  
Embedded in his claims regarding the prosecutor‟s opening statement are 
contentions regarding the admissibility of the witness intimidation evidence, the 
trial court‟s related consciousness of guilt instruction, and the prosecution‟s 
closing argument.  By his failure to object and raise the claims he now asserts, 
 
35 
defendant forfeited his contentions on appeal.  As we explain, they are meritless in 
any event.   
 
Most of defendant‟s claims assert prosecutorial misconduct.  The principles 
of law applicable to a defendant‟s claims of prosecutorial misconduct are well 
settled.  “ „ “A prosecutor‟s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 
conviction a denial of due process.  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a 
criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law 
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the trial court or the jury.”  [Citation.]  When a claim of 
misconduct is based on the prosecutor‟s comments before the jury, as all of 
defendant‟s claims are, “ „the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an 
objectionable fashion.‟ ”  [Citation.]  To preserve a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct for appeal, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection and 
ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the improper argument.  
[Citation.]‟  [Citation.]  A failure to timely object and request an admonition will 
be excused if doing either would have been futile, or if an admonition would not 
have cured the harm.”  (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1205.) 
 
As the Attorney General notes, defendant never objected at trial to any of 
the prosecutor‟s comments that he now asserts are prejudicial.  Nothing suggests 
an objection would have been futile or an admonition inadequate to cure any harm.  
Thus, his claim of misconduct during the opening statement is forfeited.  (People 
v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1011.)   
 
Moreover, the comments were not improper.  “The function of an opening 
statement is not only to inform the jury of the expected evidence, but also to 
prepare the jurors to follow the evidence and more readily discern its materiality, 
 
36 
force, and meaning.”  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 518.)  Here, the 
prosecutor‟s statements sought to prepare the jurors for the anticipated testimony 
of Dyer, Meeks, Johnson, and Fennelle and to offer in advance a possible 
explanation for their long delay in cooperating with law enforcement, their 
inconsistent statements to investigators, and any current reluctance to testify.   
 
We do not agree with defendant‟s claim that the prosecutor failed to state 
the facts correctly or that his comments were unsubstantiated by the evidence 
admitted at trial.  Dyer testified that he failed to immediately identify defendant as 
the shooter because Dyer was himself a gang member and a gang member would 
be labeled a “snitch” if he spoke to the police about a gang-related crime, even if 
the crime was committed by a rival gang against the member‟s own gang.  Dyer 
testified that he was afraid to talk to the police about the shooting, and did not 
want to get involved, because people — inferentially other gang members — 
would try to hurt him.  Defendant concedes that this testimony was admissible.   
 
Dyer testified that he changed his mind about keeping silent after several 
family members of Hicks and Boyd convinced him to tell the police what he knew 
about the killing of his friends.  He identified defendant as the shooter in a 
photographic lineup at that time.  But he was subsequently taken into custody and 
held in the same facility as defendant.  Dyer testified that because he was afraid of 
what could happen to him in jail if he was labeled a snitch, he did not identify 
defendant when he was asked to view a live lineup.  He testified that he was later 
taken by a sheriff‟s deputy, whom defendant identified as his cousin, to an office 
where defendant was waiting.  Defendant had a copy of Dyer‟s earlier interview 
statement to police identifying defendant as the shooter, which defendant showed 
to Dyer.  According to Dyer, defendant told him not to say anything and offered to 
arrange for Dyer to be transferred to a safe facility as long as Dyer did not identify 
defendant as the shooter.  Dyer told defendant he had not identified him in the live 
 
37 
lineup and assured defendant he did not intend to “tell on [him].”  Dyer testified 
that he was concerned that if his interview statement “[got] around the jail” he 
could be hurt or killed and he knew he could not cooperate with the prosecution 
once he was incarcerated.  According to Dyer, he received threats both before and 
after the lineup.  During the time he remained in custody, including the time he 
spent at a CYA facility, Dyer continued to deny knowledge of the shooting.   
 
Defendant did not object to the admission of Dyer‟s testimony, which in 
any event was properly admitted at trial.  “As we have recognized, „[e]vidence that 
a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the 
credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible.  [Citations.]  An explanation 
of the basis for the witness‟s fear is likewise relevant to [his] credibility and is 
well within the discretion of the trial court.  [Citations.]‟ ”  (People v. Mendoza 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1084.)  Dyer‟s testimony substantiated the prosecutor‟s 
opening comments.  
 
Defendant claims, however, that the prosecutor‟s comments were 
inaccurate and prejudicial because Dyer never testified that he was intimidated by 
defendant before he failed to identify defendant in the live lineup, and in 
defendant‟s view, any fear Dyer felt was not due to defendant‟s action or any 
action authorized by him.  It was unnecessary, however, for Dyer‟s fear to be 
directly linked to defendant in order for it to be admitted for purposes of assisting 
the jury in determining his credibility.  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 
270; People v. Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1087.)  We find People v. Hannon 
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 588 and People v. Weiss (1958) 50 Cal.2d 535, on which 
defendant relies, to be distinguishable on this ground.  (People v. Abel (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 891, 924-925.)   
 
Furthermore, although it appears that Dyer‟s fear was partially due to the 
general risk of gang retaliation and retribution from other inmates if he cooperated 
 
38 
with law enforcement and identified defendant as the shooter, Dyer also testified 
that he was intimidated and frightened by defendant directly.  Specifically, Dyer 
testified that he was brought by a sheriff‟s deputy, whom defendant identified as 
his cousin, to an office in the jail to meet with defendant.  Dyer testified that 
defendant had in his possession and showed Dyer a copy of Dyer‟s previous 
interview statement to police.  Defendant then offered to arrange a transfer for 
Dyer to a safe facility if Dyer continued to keep silent about what he witnessed.  
Implied in this encounter was a threat by defendant to publicize Dyer‟s police 
interview statement to the inmate population, thereby labeling him as a snitch, if 
Dyer did not maintain his silence.  Defendant‟s actions and comments also 
emphasized to Dyer the risk of any return to cooperation with law enforcement 
and intimated that he (defendant) had power over Dyer‟s movements, housing and 
safety while Dyer was in custody.  Contrary to defendant‟s claim, the jury could 
determine from Dyer‟s testimony that defendant successfully intimidated and 
frightened Dyer.  Defendant‟s direct involvement in persuading Dyer of the risk of 
being a witness distinguishes the circumstances of this case from Dudley v. 
Duckworth (7th Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 967, on which defendant relies because 
Dudley involved third party threats unconnected to the defendant.  (See People v. 
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 212.)  In anticipation of Dyer‟s admissible 
testimony, the prosecutor‟s opening statement did not improperly connect 
defendant to Dyer‟s fear.  
 
In a related claim, defendant complains of the prosecutor‟s closing 
argument referencing defendant‟s threats and intimidation of Dyer in jail and 
Dyer‟s fear of retaliation while he was being held in custody.  His failure to object 
forfeited his claim, which is also meritless.  Because the evidence was properly 
admitted, the prosecutor‟s closing argument constituted fair comment on the 
 
39 
evidence and fell within the permissible bounds of argument.  (People v. Williams 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 674.)   
 
We likewise reject defendant‟s further related contention that his right to 
due process was violated when the trial court instructed the jury with the 
consciousness of guilt instruction, CALJIC No. 2.06.  The testimony of Dyer 
regarding his meeting with defendant in jail supported the use of CALJIC 
No. 2.06, which informed the jury that if it found defendant attempted to suppress 
evidence against himself, “such as by the intimidation of a witness,” it could 
consider that as a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt.   
 
We also find no impropriety in the prosecutor‟s opening comments 
regarding Meeks.  Defendant did not object to the evidence that Meeks was afraid 
to cooperate with police because of her concern for her own and her family‟s 
safety.  Like the testimony of Dyer, her testimony was admissible in any event 
because it was relevant to her credibility.  Again, contrary to defendant‟s 
argument, it was unnecessary for the prosecution to establish that defendant was 
connected to the phone call to Meeks‟s family warning Meeks to keep silent in 
order for Meeks‟s testimony concerning the phone call to be admissible.  (People 
v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 270; People v. Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 1087.)  Because the prosecutor could in good faith anticipate the admission of 
supporting testimony, the prosecutor was entitled to comment in his opening 
statement on Meeks‟s fear of retaliation.   
 
We reject defendant‟s additional claim that the prosecutor impermissibly 
vouched for the credibility of Dyer and Meeks in his opening statement by 
asserting that they “had” changed their lives, instead of stating that they “claimed” 
to have changed their lives.  The prosecutor‟s comments appropriately anticipated 
the testimony of Dyer and Meeks and there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
jury would have understood the comments as vouching for these witnesses‟ 
 
40 
credibility based on the prosecutor‟s personal belief.  (People v. Martinez (2010) 
47 Cal.4th 911, 958 [a prosecutor “may not vouch for the credibility of a witness 
based on personal belief or by referring to evidence outside the record”].)   
 
In another challenge to the prosecution‟s use of evidence of witness 
intimidation and fear of retaliation, defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence that special precautions had been taken to protect witnesses 
Johnson and Fennell during and after defendant‟s trial because there was no 
evidence defendant was threatening or intimidating them.  Defendant failed, 
however, to object on this ground, which would properly have been overruled in 
any case.  Johnson and Fennelle, both former gang members who were 
incarcerated at the time of trial, agreed to testify against defendant, their former 
friend and fellow gang member.  Their willingness to do so despite a legitimate 
basis for concern about their safety enhanced their credibility.  (People v. Green 
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 20; see People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 285.)  
Again, there was no need for evidence directly linking defendant to the 
prosecution‟s concern for their safety in order to establish admissibility.  (People 
v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 270; People v. Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 1087.)   
 
Defendant has failed to show any error in the prosecution‟s introduction of 
and comment on evidence of witness intimidation and fear of retaliation.  Nor was 
there any instructional error related to such evidence. 
B.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Admission of victim impact testimony relating to aggravating 
evidence of uncharged crimes  
 
Over defense objection, a number of the victims of the uncharged robberies 
committed by defendant and his companions were allowed to testify regarding the 
impact of those crimes on their lives.  Melissa Lopez testified to the traumatic 
 
41 
effect on her of the robbery of the Pacific Marine Credit Union.  Jasper Altheide 
and Moira Philley, two of the tellers at the Vandenberg Federal Credit Union, 
testified to the continuing negative impacts on their lives, not only from the 
robbery but also from witnessing the killing of Christine Orciuch.  In addition to 
the robbery victims, Orciuch‟s son Quentin testified to the painful effects on him 
caused by his mother‟s sudden death at the credit union.  Orciuch‟s husband 
Chester likewise testified about the suffering he and his family experienced as a 
result of his wife‟s death.  He described the difficulties he faced as a single parent 
and the residual emotional effect on him of her death.   
 
Defendant recognizes that we have held that victim impact evidence related 
to a defendant‟s uncharged crimes is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b).  
(People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 581-582; People v. Bramit (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 1221, 1241; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 39.)  He asks us, 
however, to revisit the issue in light of Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808.  
Defendant fails to persuade us that there is reason to do so.  “Under Payne, victim 
impact testimony is unconstitutional when it is „so unduly prejudicial that it 
renders the trial fundamentally unfair . . . .‟ ”  (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
809, 884.)  The circumstances of defendant‟s uncharged violent criminal conduct, 
including its direct impact on the victims of that conduct, was relevant to the 
jury‟s penalty determination and its admission did not render defendant‟s trial 
constitutionally unfair.   
2.  Alleged prosecutorial misconduct in penalty phase closing 
arguments 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 
during his closing argument in the penalty phase by (1) suggesting that the 
testimony of Beverly Parks regarding the childhood abuse of defendant by his 
grandmother was unreliable because defendant‟s sisters did not testify and confirm 
 
42 
such abuse, and (2) arguing that a verdict of life without the possibility of parole 
would reward defendant with a “freebie” for Orciuch‟s death and the other 
aggravating crimes.  We reject defendant‟s claims.   
 
We earlier set forth the applicable standard of review for claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase.  (See ante, pt. II.A.2.)  The same 
standard applies to asserted misconduct at the penalty phase.  (People v. Lopez 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1075.)   
a.  Prosecutor’s argument regarding defendant’s mitigating 
evidence of childhood abuse by his grandmother   
 
Defendant presented evidence in mitigation that when he stayed as a child 
with his maternal grandmother, Amy Parks, he was verbally and physically abused 
by her.  During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that he found it 
interesting that defendant‟s aunt, Beverly Parks, was the only person in the 
household who came into court to testify that the grandmother beat defendant.  
The prosecutor argued that Beverly Parks was a woman “who [did not] like the 
grandmother to begin with” and that she was, therefore, “somewhat of a suspect 
witness.”  The prosecutor asked the jury to consider her demeanor during her 
testimony and asserted that “[s]he testified to a few things that she didn‟t even 
observe, that she had heard, but you saw her answers, so you have to weigh how 
much that evidence really means and you also have to consider the fact that no one 
else from that household — her daughters, Mrs. Parks‟s daughters didn‟t testify 
and they were there.  Jimmy Parks, her husband, didn‟t testify, and he could have 
testified that the grandmother beat on defendant, nor did any of the defendant‟s 
sisters testify that the grandmother mistreated the defendant.”  Acknowledging 
that it was up to the jury to evaluate the testimony, the prosecutor explained he 
was pointing this out “because I think there is a certain suspicion you should have 
 
43 
regarding that testimony, especially in light of all the other witnesses that could 
have testified.”  Defendant did not object to any of these comments. 
 
After the jury reached a verdict of death, defendant filed a motion for a new 
penalty phase trial.  He contended, in part, that he was entitled to a new trial 
because the prosecutor argued that defendant‟s sisters failed to corroborate the 
testimony of Beverly Parks when in fact the prosecutor was in possession of 
reports of interviews that defendant‟s sisters gave to defense investigators, which 
verified the abuse of defendant by their grandmother.  Copies of the reports were 
attached to the motion and at the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor stipulated 
that the reports were received by his office as part of discovery.  The trial court 
denied the new trial motion, concluding that any error that may have occurred in 
the prosecutor‟s argument would not have affected the outcome of the case in light 
of the circumstances of the crimes and the additional evidence in aggravation.   
 
Defendant now reasserts his contention that the prosecutor committed 
prejudicial misconduct by knowingly arguing a false inference that defendant‟s 
sisters would not have confirmed their grandmother‟s abuse of defendant had they 
testified.  He relies on, among other cases, Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 
78, 88, People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 829, and United States v. Blueford 
(9th Cir. 2002) 312 F.3d 962.  Defendant claims that the prosecutor‟s comments 
purported to tell the jury why these sisters were not called as witnesses by the 
defense and what their testimony would have been, thereby depriving defendant of 
his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.  (People v. 
Gaines (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 821, 825.)   
 
Defendant failed to object and request an admonition regarding these 
comments at trial.  Nothing in the record suggests that an objection would have 
been futile or that an admonition would have failed to cure any harm.  We 
conclude, therefore, that defendant forfeited his challenges to these comments.  
 
44 
(People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1205; People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 
Cal.4th 257, 289-290 [the failure to object on the basis of the 6th Amend. forfeits 
the constitutional objection].) 
 
Moreover, we agree with the trial court that it is not necessary to determine 
whether the prosecutor‟s comments were improper because even assuming, solely 
for purposes of argument, that they were, defendant was not prejudiced thereby.  
First, there was other evidence that tended to bolster Beverly Parks‟s credibility, 
diminishing the likelihood that the jury would discount her testimony on the 
grounds suggested by the prosecutor.  Specifically, defendant‟s godmother 
testified about the grandmother‟s “evilness” and corroborated Beverly Parks‟s 
description of the grandmother‟s verbal abuse of defendant and his sister 
Larhonda.  Second, defendant submitted evidence of other serious physical 
mistreatment that he received during childhood at the hands of his mother, his 
mother‟s husband and his mother‟s boyfriend.  And finally, the circumstances of 
the triple murder were egregious and the additional evidence in aggravation was 
extensive.  In light of the totality of the evidence before the jury, we agree with the 
trial court that there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a 
more favorable verdict in the absence of this argument.  (People v. Gonzales 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 953 [the reasonable possibility standard of prejudice 
applies to the evaluation of the effect of improper argument at the penalty phase].)   
b.  Prosecutor’s argument that murder of Orciuch would be a 
“freebie” if the jury did not return a verdict of death   
 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 
in the penalty phase by arguing that a death verdict was required in order to punish 
defendant for the murder of Christine Orciuch during the Vandenberg Federal 
Credit Union robbery, and that a verdict of life without the possibility of parole 
would reward defendant with a “freebie” for Orciuch‟s death and the other 
 
45 
aggravating crimes.  Defendant asserts that aggravating evidence of a defendant‟s 
other violent conduct is admitted under section 190.3, factor (b), not to punish the 
defendant for the factor (b) conduct, but to help the jury determine the appropriate 
penalty for the special circumstance murder.  Moreover, he alleges, the prosecutor 
knew it was false to imply defendant would escape punishment for the murder of 
Orciuch because the prosecutor was aware that defendant had been convicted of 
that crime and received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.  Some 
additional background is necessary to properly consider defendant‟s contentions.  
 
The prosecutor started his closing remarks with an overview of the penalty 
issue before the jury.  The prosecutor then discussed his view of the statutory 
mitigating factors, which he contended were either inapplicable or lacked 
persuasive support.  Moving on to the aggravating factors, the prosecutor started 
with section 190.3, factor (a), emphasizing how horrible were the execution-style 
murders committed by defendant.  He noted that once defendant murdered Hicks 
and Boyd, the penalty that defendant faced was either life in prison without the 
possibility of parole or the death penalty.  The prosecutor characterized a sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole as the minimum sentence and urged the 
jury to reach a death verdict, contending that the circumstances of the killing of 
Hicks and Boyd were in themselves “substantial enough to outweigh the 
mitigating factors.”  The prosecutor argued that if, however, the jury determined 
that the circumstances of the two murders were not enough to warrant a death 
sentence, there was the third murder to consider.  The prosecutor contended that 
defendant deserved additional punishment for Armstrong‟s murder and asked the 
jury not to treat Armstrong‟s murder as “a freebie.”   
 
The prosecutor then turned to discuss defendant‟s attempted murder of 
Hernandez and carjacking of Gonzalez, arguing that if the jury was not convinced 
 
46 
defendant deserved the death penalty for the three earlier murders, these additional 
crimes justified a death verdict.   
 
The prosecutor next reviewed the evidence of defendant‟s felony conviction 
and his other violent crimes, including the two credit union robberies, emphasizing 
that defendant repeatedly engaged in criminal conduct when he was incarcerated 
and soon after each time he was released.  In the course of summarizing the 
evidence of the Vandenberg Federal Credit Union robbery and discussing 
defendant‟s responsibility for the crimes directly committed by his companions, 
the prosecutor stated the following:  “I will stop at this point again and say the 
same thing I said earlier.  If all the previous aggravating evidence doesn‟t 
outweigh the mitigating evidence, another robbery and another murder certainly 
do.  And if you choose the other direction, then you are basically saying this is a 
freebie, we are not going to impose any additional punishment on this defendant 
for the murder of Christine Orciuch.  We are still going to give him life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.  This is a freebie.”  The prosecutor then resumed 
review of defendant‟s other violent criminal conduct, focusing on his conduct 
while he was held in custody.  Going back to “the same theme” he mentioned 
before, the prosecutor argued in summary that “all these other additional crimes, 
the additional crimes that — of the robberies, the carjackings, the other bank 
robberies, all of these are just additional, . . . additional, additional and additional 
crimes.  And if you are to decide that life without the possibility of parole is the 
correct verdict, you are basically going to say, as I mentioned before, this is a 
freebie, the defendant gets this free.  The murder of Christine Orciuch, we are just 
going to ignore that.”  The prosecutor emphasized that the aggravating evidence 
reflected “a collage of an extremely violent history, violence and greed” and 
argued that defendant did not deserve the jury‟s sympathy or mercy.  Throughout 
 
47 
his argument, the prosecutor continued to use the language of comparison and 
weight of the circumstances in urging that a death verdict was justified.  (§ 190.3.) 
 
In his final argument, the prosecutor again addressed the mitigating 
evidence presented by defendant and urged the jury to conclude that it did not 
establish that defendant deserved sympathy.  He repeated that defendant was 
eligible for the death penalty because he had committed two murders and claimed 
that the defense wanted the jury to ignore all the other aggravating evidence.  The 
prosecutor asserted that the defense “wants to say, no, just give him the minimum, 
just give him a freebie, give him a freebie on the third murder, on the attempted 
murders, on the robberies, on all of the other crimes of violence, we are not going 
to punish you anymore.  We will just stop at the two murders.”  The prosecutor 
concluded by urging the jury to impose the death penalty as the “fair” and “just” 
penalty that defendant deserved.   
 
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor‟s arguments, including any of 
the “freebie” comments.  Defendant raised this claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
only in his postverdict application for a new trial, which, as mentioned earlier, the 
trial court denied.  Once again, defendant has forfeited the claim on appeal by 
failing to timely object and request an admonition from the trial court.  (People v. 
Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1205.)  Moreover, we are not persuaded that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct in his argument, or that, if any misconduct 
occurred, it was prejudicial. 
 
“ „To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to 
the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or 
applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.  
[Citations.]  In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew 
the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor‟s 
statements.‟ ”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 771-772.)  Here, the 
 
48 
prosecutor‟s lengthy argument, viewed as a whole, built on defendant‟s eligibility 
for a death sentence after his commission of the murders of Hicks and Boyd.  It 
essentially contended that defendant deserved the death penalty for the charged 
triple murders because of the totality of the circumstances of the killing of Hicks, 
Boyd, and Armstrong when considered in light of all the aggravating evidence of 
defendant‟s violent conduct before and after those three murders.  (People v. 
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 822.)   
 
We have recognized as appropriate a similar prosecutorial argument urging 
that three murders warranted a death verdict to avoid a “freebie” for the third 
murder.  (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1174 & fn. 23.)  Defendant 
contends, however, that “[w]hile it may be appropriate to make such a freebie 
argument with regard to a third murder directly committed by a defendant . . . , it 
is improper to make this „freebie‟ argument with regard to factor (b) crimes, as the 
prosecutor did here.”  Although it is possible a prosecutor‟s use of the term 
“freebie” in connection with section 190.3, factor (b), evidence might in a 
particular case mislead a jury regarding its proper focus under section 190.3 in 
reaching a penalty verdict, and a prosecutor should be particularly careful in this 
regard, we are not convinced the prosecutor‟s argument in this case crossed the 
line into misconduct.  In the context of the entirety of the prosecutor‟s argument, 
the jury would likely have understood him to be contending that when defendant‟s 
involvement in the Vandenberg Federal Credit Union robbery and murder of 
Orciuch and the other factor (b) evidence was added to the jury‟s consideration of 
the appropriate penalty for the three murder convictions, a death verdict was all 
the more warranted — not that it was the jury‟s responsibility to impose separate 
punishment on defendant for Orciuch‟s murder.   
 
Furthermore, here the jury was instructed about how to properly evaluate 
the evidence submitted in aggravation and mitigation.  (CALJIC Nos. 8.85, 8.87, 
 
49 
8.88.)  The jury also was instructed that in the penalty phase of trial it could be 
influenced by pity or sympathy for defendant, allowing the jury to view 
defendant‟s mitigating evidence as compassionately as it wished.  The jury was 
specifically told that statements made by the attorneys during the trial do not 
constitute evidence, and that it must accept and follow the law as stated by the trial 
court.  (CALJIC Nos. 1.02, 8.84.1.)  We presume the jury followed the trial 
court‟s instructions.  (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 852.)  And we 
conclude that in light of the totality of the evidence presented at the penalty phase, 
there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have returned a different 
penalty verdict absent the prosecutor‟s “freebie” argument concerning Orciuch‟s 
murder.  (People v. Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 953.)   
3.  Alleged penalty phase instructional errors 
a.  Instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85  
 
CALJIC No. 8.85 instructs the jury regarding the aggravating and 
mitigating factors listed in section 190.3, factors (a) through (k), which, if 
relevant, the jury must consider in deciding the penalty to be imposed on a capital 
defendant.  Defendant asserts the instruction is constitutionally flawed because (1) 
it fails to instruct the jury as to which of the listed sentencing factors may be 
considered aggravating and which may be considered mitigating and (2) it uses the 
restrictive modifiers “extreme” and “substantial” in describing the sentencing 
factor of defendant‟s mental or emotional disturbance.  As defendant recognizes, 
we have repeatedly rejected these contentions.  (See e.g., People v. Lindberg 
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 50-51; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 191-192.)  
Defendant fails to persuade that reconsideration is necessary on the ground that 
our previous cases have failed to adequately address his arguments.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 649 [“[T]he catchall instruction 
 
50 
permits the jury to consider any evidence the defendant offers in mitigation, 
including any lesser mental or emotional disturbance”]; People v. Dickey (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 884, 928 [“[T]he aggravating or mitigating nature of the factors is self-
evident within the context of each case”].) 
b.  Instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88   
 
The jury was given CALJIC No. 8.88 concerning how to consider and 
weigh the mitigating and aggravating evidence.  Defendant claims the instruction 
violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the federal Constitution.  As defendant concedes, we have previously considered 
and rejected these arguments.  We do so again because defendant fails to persuade 
us that our prior decisions were erroneous.   
 
Thus, we repeat that CALJIC No. 8.88 is not “ „unconstitutional for failing 
to require the jury to return a verdict of life should it determine the mitigating 
circumstances outweigh the aggravating ones.‟ ”  (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
1013, 1078; accord, People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1028.)  The 
instruction “is not constitutionally defective for failing to inform the jury that it 
has the discretion to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
even in the absence of mitigating circumstances.”  (People v. Linton, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at p. 1211.)  CALJIC No. 8.88 “is not overly vague for using the words „so 
substantial‟ as a modifying phrase.”  (People v. Hovarter, supra, at p. 1028.)  The 
instruction “is not flawed for providing that the jury should choose the penalty that 
is „warranted‟ rather than „appropriate.‟ ”  (Ibid.)   
 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not flawed for failing to assign to the People the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating 
factor or that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.  (People v. 
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 100.)  The high court‟s decisions in Jones v. 
 
51 
United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, do not change this conclusion.  (People 
v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 149-150; People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
93, 167.)  The instruction is not unconstitutional for failing to require juror 
unanimity on aggravating factors.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 43.)  The 
United States Supreme Court‟s Apprendi line of decisions does not compel a 
different result.  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 753.)  The instruction is 
not unconstitutional for failing to inform the jury that the prosecution bears some 
burden of persuasion at the penalty phase.  (People v. Manibusan, supra, at 
p. 100.)  “[I]t is settled that „the trial court need not and should not instruct the jury 
as to any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase.‟ ”  (People v. Butler 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 874.)  The trial court was not required to instruct the jury 
that the defendant bears no burden to prove mitigating factors or that it need not be 
unanimous in finding the existence of any mitigating factor.  (People v. Riggs 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 328.)  “[T]he jury need not be told that there is no burden 
of proof at the penalty phase” (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 172) 
and the lack of such an instruction is not structural error.  (People v. Moon, supra, 
at p. 44.)   
 
Defendant‟s assertion that CALJIC No. 8.88 improperly reduced the 
prosecution‟s burden of proof below that required by section 190.3 does not raise a 
claim distinct from those we reject above.  (People v. Suff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 1078; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 43.)   
 
“The absence of written or other specific findings by the jury regarding 
aggravating factors did not deprive defendant of his federal due process and 
Eighth Amendment rights to meaningful appellate review, violate equal protection 
of the laws or violate defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.”  
(People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 150.) 
 
52 
 
“The trial court‟s failure to inform the jury that there is a presumption of 
life does not violate a defendant‟s constitutional rights to due process, to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment, to a reliable determination of his sentence, 
and to equal protection of the law under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution.”  (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
610, 698.) 
c.  Failing to instruct the jury about the meaning of life without the 
possibility of parole   
 
Defendant argues that neither CALJIC No. 8.88 nor any other instruction 
informed the jury that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole meant 
defendant would never be considered for parole.  He maintains that the trial court 
had a duty to instruct on its own motion concerning “the true meaning of this 
sentence.”  “We repeatedly have held, however, that trial courts are not required 
— either upon request, or on the court‟s own motion — to instruct that a sentence 
of life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out, because such an 
instruction would be an incorrect statement of the law.  [Citations.]  We likewise 
have rejected the suggestion that Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 
and its progeny mandate such an instruction.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Whalen 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 88.)  We have held that CALJIC No. 8.84, which was given 
in this case, adequately informs the jury that a defendant sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole is ineligible for parole.  (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 1, 28.)  We are not persuaded to revisit these prior holdings.   
4.  Cumulative effect of guilt and penalty phase errors   
 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the guilt and penalty phase 
errors requires reversal of the judgment.  We have concluded that defendant 
forfeited many of his claims of error.  In any event, we have either rejected the 
merits of defendant‟s claims or found that any error, assumed solely for purposes 
 
53 
of argument, was harmless.  We now conclude there is no cumulative effect of 
error requiring reversal of the judgment.  (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 
479-480.) 
5.  Constitutionality of California’s capital sentencing statutes   
 
Contrary to the claim of defendant, “ „California does not employ the death 
penalty as a “ „regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes‟ ” [citation], 
and its imposition does not violate international norms of decency or the Eighth 
Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.‟ ”  (People v. 
DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 151.)  And “ „[r]eview for intercase 
proportionality‟ is not required by the federal Constitution.”  (Ibid.) 
6.  International Law   
 
Defendant contends imposition of the death penalty violates international 
law and asks us to reconsider our previous rejection of this claim.  We decline to 
do so and repeat that “California‟s death penalty law does not violate international 
law.  We reach this conclusion taking into consideration defendant‟s assertions 
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights binds state courts and 
that international legal norms are among the evolving standards of decency used to 
define the scope of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 28.) 
 
54 
 
III. DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
YEGAN, J.*
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Adams 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S118045 
Date Filed: October 30, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Lance A. Ito 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Ronald F. Turner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 
Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Colleen M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ronald F. Turner 
321 High School Rd. NE, Suite D3, PMB 124 
Bainbridge Island, WA  98110 
(916) 396-6412 
 
Colleen M. Tiedemann 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1334