Title: Melanie Petrone v. Bernard Fernandez

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 100  
Melanie Petrone, 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Bernard Fernandez,  
            Defendant, 
James McCloy, 
            Appellant.
Terence F. Gilheany, for appellant.
Submitted by Michael A. Cervini, for respondent.
READ, J.:
On May 9, 2005, plaintiff Melanie Petrone, a mail
carrier employed by the United States Postal Service, was making
the rounds on a "drive-out" mail route in Douglaston, Queens.  At
about 11:30 A.M., she parked her Honda Accord along the side of a
one-way roadway, directly across the street from the house where
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No. 100
*Defendant disputes that the dog ever left the lawn.  This
opinion is written based entirely on plaintiff's recounting of
the facts, as given primarily in her deposition testimony.
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defendant James McCloy resided at the time.  The house's front
door is set back about 15 feet from the sidewalk, and the lawn
slopes down toward the street.  The lawn is unfenced.  As
plaintiff got out of her car, she observed at least two
landscapers working on the house's lawn.  After she had walked
about six feet toward the house, plaintiff also saw a dog --
defendant's then nine-year-old rottweiler -- lying on the lawn,
unleashed.  She immediately "turned back to walk back to [her]
vehicle," intending to skip the mail delivery because of the
unrestrained dog, a postal procedure she called "flagging" a
house.
According to plaintiff, when she was about four feet
from her car, she "turned to see if the dog had moved and the dog
had proceeded to run at [her] from the top of the hill"; and had
come to within approximately six feet of her.*  She "ran" the
short remaining distance to her car, and "tried to jump through"
the open window on the driver's side "[l]egs first."  As
plaintiff describes what she did, she "grabbed" the car and flung
her right leg through the open window, jamming her right middle
finger on "[t]he outside of the doorframe where the window comes
down" as she executed this maneuver.  She ended up stuck in an
awkward position -- with her right leg inside the car and her
left leg outside -- and "screaming . . . for someone to help." 
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No. 100
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The dog was "right next to [her]," but "did not do anything." 
Plaintiff does not recall whether the dog ever barked at her.  In
other words, the dog did not bite or threaten or apparently make
any contact whatsoever with plaintiff.
Plaintiff's cries attracted the landscapers' attention
and assistance.  And defendant, who was near the house, "yelled
for the dog to come back," and the dog obeyed.  Defendant then
approached plaintiff, and they had a conversation that "was just
about panic and [defendant] had come over to say that the dog's
okay, he doesn't do anything," and plaintiff was "just very
scared at that point.  Just letting [defendant] know how nervous
[she] was at that point."  
Plaintiff handed defendant his mail, and continued on
her rounds.  Soon, however, she "felt pain" in her right middle
finger, which "began to bruise."  She called her shop steward to
tell him what had happened and he, in turn, informed her manager. 
The manager met and accompanied plaintiff to a nearby medical
facility where her injured finger was x-rayed, and diagnosed as
"possibl[y] fracture[d]."  As a result of this diagnosis,
plaintiff's right middle finger was splinted for about five
weeks, and taped to the adjoining finger for an additional week
or so; no medication was ever prescribed to her for the injury. 
Plaintiff missed about six weeks of work, but was paid her full
salary during the absence.  At the time of her deposition, 10
months after the incident, plaintiff complained that the finger
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No. 100
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"still ache[d]," especially in the "colder weather," and was
"hard to bend . . . still."  In addition, she could not "really
put any pressure on it," and had "a hard time opening bottles." 
Plaintiff also was required to "vary her work" when "do[ing]
what's called, 'finger[ing] the mail'" on account of the residual
stiffness of her finger.
In September 2005, plaintiff sued defendant and the
owner of the house for personal injuries as a result of her
encounter with the dog.  She alleged a first cause of action
based on defendants' supposed knowledge of the dog's "prior
history of vicious propensities"; and a second cause of action
for negligence because of defendants' "violation of . . . laws,
statute[s], regulation[s], and ordinance[s]."  The second cause
of action was essentially premised on the local leash law,
section 161.05 (a) of the New York City Health Code (24 RCNY
161.05 [a]), which provides that "a person who owns, possesses or
controls a dog shall not permit it to be in a public place or in
any open or unfenced area abutting on a public place unless the
dog is effectively restrained by a leash or other restraint not
more than six feet long" (emphasis added).
In May 2006, the owner of the house sought summary
judgment dismissing the complaint.  Citing our decision in
Collier v Zambito (1 NY3d 444 [2004]), he observed that there was
"no indication that either of the defendants had any knowledge of
any type of vicious propensities," or "that the dog[] in question
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No. 100
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actually did anything vicious."  He also pointed out that he did
not own the dog and was not present when the complained-of events
took place.  Defendant supported his co-defendant's motion,
stating that although plaintiff "trie[d] to distinguish this case
by claiming 'common law negligence' . . ., it is or should be
clear that, just as in a 'dog bite' case, a vicious propensity
must be shown in an alleged 'dog chase' case," and that "[n]o
such showing has or can be made."  
Supreme Court issued a decision, dated November 29,
2006, granting the motion and, after searching the record,
dismissing the complaint against both defendants.  The court
noted that the owner of the house had made out a prima facie case
of entitlement to summary judgment by showing that he had no
knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities; that "the dog, in
fact, neither had vicious propensities nor behaved in a manner
that reflect[ed] a proclivity to act in a way that put others at
risk of harm"; and that "the dog's alleged conduct that resulted
in plaintiff's injuries was not vicious or reasonably
foreseeable."  Further, plaintiff failed to rebut this prima
facie case "with evidence establishing either the existence of
the [dog's] alleged vicious propensities or [the owner of the
house's] knowledge thereof."  Supreme Court opined that "the mere
fact that the dog was unrestrained at the time of the subject
incident [does] not raise a triable issue of fact as liability
cannot be premised solely on the fact that defendant . . . left
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No. 100
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the dog unrestrained."
Plaintiff subsequently took an appeal, which she
limited to the trial court's dismissal of her negligence cause of
action against both defendants.  The Appellate Division held,
contrary to the Third Department's decision in Alia v Fiorina (39
AD3d 1068 [3d Dept 2007]), that a dog owner "may be held liable
to a plaintiff based upon an alleged violation of a local leash
ordinance and the dog's behavior, even though the dog ha[s] not
displayed any prior vicious propensities" (Petrone v Fernandez,
53 AD3d 221, 222 [2d Dept 2008]).  As a consequence, the court
deleted the provision of Supreme Court's order which awarded
summary judgment dismissing the negligence cause of action
against defendant.  The Appellate Division has asked us if this
portion of its order was properly made, and we conclude that it
was not.
"[W]hen harm is caused by a domestic animal, its
owner's liability is determined solely by application of the rule
articulated in Collier" (Bard v Jahnke, 6 NY3d 592, 599 [2006]
[emphasis added]) -- i.e., the rule of strict liability for harm
caused by a domestic animal whose owner knows or should have
known of the animal's vicious propensities (see Collier, 1 NY3d
at 446-447; see also Bard, 6 NY3d at 601 [R. S. Smith, J.,
dissenting] [objecting to "the rule . . . adopted by the
majority, that the strict liability involved in Collier is the
only kind of liability the owner of a domestic animal may face --
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No. 100
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that, in other words, there is no such thing as negligence
liability where harm done by domestic animals is concerned"]). 
Just last year we unanimously affirmed an Appellate Division
decision rejecting the notion that a negligence cause of action
survives Collier and Bard (see Bernstein v Penny Whistle Toys,
Inc., 10 NY3d 787 [2008], affg 40 AD3d 224 [1st Dept 2007]). 
Here, defendant's violation of the local leash law is "irrelevant
because such a violation is only some evidence of negligence, and
negligence is no longer a basis for imposing liability" after
Collier and Bard (Alia, 39 AD3d at 1069).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs; that
part of Supreme Court's order dismissing the second cause of
action against defendant James McCloy should be reinstated; and
the certified question should be answered in the negative.
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Petrone v McCloy, et al.
No. 100 
PIGOTT, J. (concurring):
I write separately to make clear that, while I concur
with the majority in this case, I do so on constraint of Bard v
Jahnke (6 NY3d 592 [2006]).
In Bard, the plaintiff, a carpenter, was injured by a
bull that, for breeding purposes, was allowed to roam freely in
the barn in which Bard was working.  Bard submitted the affidavit
of an animal science expert, who opined that "bulls, in
particular breeding bulls, are generally dangerous and vicious
animals," and that the farmer should have restrained the bull or
warned Bard of its presence.  
The Court endorsed the standard proposition that "an
animal that behaves in a manner that would not necessarily be
considered dangerous or ferocious, but nevertheless reflects a
proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm, can
be found to have vicious propensities" (Bard, 6 NY3d at 597,
quoting Collier v Zambito, 1 NY3d 444, 447 [2004]), giving rise
to strict liability.  The Court found, however, that the bull had
regularly come into contact with other farm animals, farm workers
and members of the farmer's family "without incident or hint of
hostility . . . [and] had never acted in a way that put others at
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No. 100
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risk of harm" (Bard, 6 NY3d at 597). 
The Court of Appeals then turned to Bard's alternative
theory, sounding in negligence, that, because the bull was a
breeding bull housed with a herd over which it exercised
dominance, the farmer was negligent in failing to restrain the
bull or warn newcomers of its presence.  Bard had relied on two
Comments on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518.  The first,
"Knowledge of normal characteristics," provides that the keeper
of a domestic animal is required to know the characteristics of
that class of animal and to exercise suitable precautions.  The
second, "Animals dangerous under particular circumstances,"
provides that the keeper is required to know that even ordinarily
gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under particular
circumstances, and to exercise reasonable care.  Bulls are used
as illustrations in both comments.  (See Restatement [Second] of
Torts § 518 Comments g and h.) 
The Court of Appeals rejected Bard's negligence theory,
on the ground that Bard's claim was tantamount to saying that the
farmer should have known of the bull's vicious propensities
because breeding bulls are generally dangerous animals.  The
Court pointed out that we have never accepted such a theory of
imputed knowledge of the vicious propensity of a particular breed
or kind of animal (6 NY3d at 598-599).  The court then went on to
state, unnecessarily, in my view, that "when harm is caused by a
domestic animal, its owner's liability is determined solely by
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No. 100
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application of the rule articulated in Collier [1 NY3d at 446-
447]" (Bard, 6 NY3d at 599 [emphasis added]), i.e. the rule of
strict liability for harm caused by a domestic animal when the
owner knew, or should have known, of the animal's vicious
propensities. 
In my view, and for the reasons stated in Judge Smith's
dissent in Bard (see 6 NY3d at 602-03), it was wrong to reject
negligence altogether as a basis for the liability of an animal
owner.  "[N]egligence by an owner, even without knowledge
concerning a domestic animal's [vicious] propensity, may create
liability" (Hyland v Cobb, 252 NY 325, 326-327 [1929], citing
Dickson v McCoy, 39 NY 400 [1868]).  
Nevertheless, because I believe that the majority of
this Court in Bard intended to restrict liability for animal-
induced injuries to circumstances where there is strict
liability, I cannot accept the Appellate Division's position that
the present case is distinguishable from Bard as a leash law
negligence case.  Consequently, I vote to reverse and, although I
would not have joined the majority's opinion in Bard, I must, on
constraint of that decision, concur in the majority's opinion in
the present case.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with costs, that part
of Supreme Court's order that dismissed the second cause of
action against defendant James McCloy reinstated and certified
question answered in the negative.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Jones concur.
Judge Pigott concurs in result in an opinion in which Judge Smith
concurs.
Decided June 9, 2009