Title: Hartman v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Keisha Ann Hartman v. State of Maryland, No. 15, September Term, 2016. Opinion by 
Hotten, J. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW — PLEA AGREEMENTS — STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Court of Appeals held that determining whether a plea agreement has been violated is a 
question of law that this Court reviews de novo. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW — REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES, OR COERCION; PLEA 
BARGAINING 
Court of Appeals held that under contract principles governing plea agreements, a 
reasonable person in Petitioner’s position would not understand that a plea agreement 
originating in a District Court proceeding would remain enforceable after Petitioner notes 
a de novo appeal to the circuit court under Maryland’s two-tier trial system for minor 
offenses. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW — PRESERVATION — APPELLATE DISCRETION 
Court of Appeals held that Petitioner’s claim regarding the due process concerns implicated 
by the enforcement of plea agreements was preserved for appellate review.  The Court also 
held that under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), the Court retained discretion to consider 
Petitioner’s unpreserved due process claim regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness because 
there was no unfair prejudice to the parties and because consideration of Petitioner’s claim 
provides important guidance on the constitutionality of the prosecutor’s conduct during 
plea bargaining in Maryland’s two-tier trial system. 
 
CONSTITUTUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS — PLEA AGREEMENTS —
FAIRNESS AND ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
Court of Appeals held that due process concerns of “fairness and adequacy of procedural 
safeguards” in this case do not override our conclusion that the original District Court plea 
agreement was inapplicable in the de novo circuit court proceeding because Petitioner did 
not detrimentally rely on the continued existence of the original plea agreement and the 
State’s recommendation of a harsher sentence after Petitioner noted a de novo appeal did 
not unconstitutionally deter Petitioner from exercising her statutory right to appeal. 
 
CONSTITUTUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS — PLEA NEGOTIATIONS — 
REALISTIC LIKELIHOOD OF VINDICTIVENESS 
Court of Appeals held that the State’s conduct in making a new plea offer in the de novo 
proceeding that recommended a harsher sentence than what was offered in the District 
Court proceeding does not pose a “realistic likelihood of vindictiveness” because as the 
Supreme Court held in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978), “in the 
‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so 
 
 
long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”  Id. at 363, 98 S. Ct. 
at 668.  Here, Petitioner was free to accept or reject the State’s plea offer, and if she rejected 
it, the State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed 
the alleged theft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Allegany County 
Case No. 01-K-15-16567 
Argued: October 7, 2016 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 15  
 
September Term, 2016 
 
__________________________________ 
 
KEISHA ANN HARTMAN 
 
 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 27, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We consider whether a plea agreement entered into in the District Court of Maryland 
remains binding once a defendant files a de novo appeal to the circuit court, pursuant to 
Courts & Judicial Proceedings (Cts. & Jud. Proc.) §12-401.1  Keisha Ann Hartman 
                                              
1 Cts. & Jud. Proc. §12-401 states in relevant part: 
* 
* 
* 
Criminal cases 
(b) In a criminal case: 
* 
* 
* 
(2) The defendant may appeal even from a final judgment entered in the 
District Court though imposition or execution of sentence has been 
suspended. 
* 
* 
* 
Time for appeal 
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an appeal shall 
be taken by filing an order for appeal with the clerk of the District Court 
within 30 days from the date of the final judgment from which appealed. 
(2) If the final judgment was entered in a case filed under §8-332, §8-401, 
§8-402, §14-109, or §14-120 of the Real Property Article, the order 
for appeal shall be filed within the time prescribed by the particular 
section. 
 
Appeals heard on the record or tried de novo 
 
(f) In a civil case in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000 
exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney’s fees are recoverable by law or 
contract, in any matter arising under §4-401(7)(ii) of this article, and in 
any case in which the parties so agree, an appeal shall be heard on the 
record made in the District Court. In every other case, including a 
criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or suspended 
following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty … an appeal shall be tried 
de novo. 
 
Criminal appeals tried de novo 
 
(g) In a criminal appeal that is tried de novo: 
(1) There is no right to a jury trial unless the offense charged is subject to 
a penalty of imprisonment or unless there is a constitutional right to a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
(“Petitioner”) pled guilty to a theft charge in the District Court in exchange for the State’s 
recommendation that she receive no executed jail time.  Both parties satisfied the terms of 
the plea agreement, but the District Court judge did not follow the State’s recommendation, 
instead imposing a sentence of thirty days’ incarceration.  Thereafter, Petitioner filed a de 
novo appeal to the circuit court. Prior to the de novo proceeding, the State offered a new 
plea agreement whereby, in exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the State would 
recommend Petitioner receive thirty days’ incarceration.  Petitioner subsequently filed a 
Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement that was presented to the circuit court.  After a 
hearing, the circuit court denied Petitioner’s motion. 
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Allegany County. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On June 14, 2014, Petitioner was observed stealing several t-shirts, hair color, and 
screen protectors, valued at approximately $82.51, from a Walmart in Allegany County.  
Petitioner was arrested and charged with theft under $100.  
 
In the District Court, Petitioner and the State entered into a plea agreement whereby 
Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to theft, in exchange for the State’s agreement to 
                                              
(. . . continued) 
jury trial for that offense; and 
 
(2) On the filing of a notice of appeal, the circuit court may stay a sentence 
of imprisonment imposed by the District Court and release the 
defendant pending trial in the circuit court. 
 
 
3 
 
recommend no executed jail time.  Both parties acknowledged that the plea agreement was 
not binding on the District Court. During the District Court proceeding, the District Court 
judge found Petitioner guilty.  During the sentencing phase of the hearing, the State 
recommended Petitioner not serve any jail time.  The State advised the court that in 2013, 
charges against Petitioner for theft and credit card fraud were placed on the stet docket; in 
2011, charges for false imprisonment and disorderly conduct were also placed on the stet 
docket; and in 2007, bad check charges were also placed on the stet docket.  Finally, the 
State indicated that in 2006, in West Virginia, Petitioner was convicted for writing a bad 
check and fraud.  Petitioner’s defense counsel noted that Petitioner paid $205 to Walmart 
after receiving a demand letter from Walmart’s attorneys and that she was a single mother 
with three children.  Petitioner testified that “[it was] just something that happened, [a] 
mistake.”  In response, the District Court judge remarked that Petitioner had “made a lot 
of mistakes[,]” and sentenced Petitioner to thirty days’ incarceration.  Thereafter, Petitioner 
noted a timely de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Allegany County.   
On June 2, 2015, Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and requested a jury trial.  
The State subsequently offered Petitioner a new plea agreement whereby Petitioner would 
plead guilty in exchange for the State’s recommendation of 30 days’ incarceration.  On 
July 2, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement in the circuit court, 
arguing the State violated the terms of the District Court plea agreement by altering its 
sentencing recommendation from no incarceration to thirty days’ incarceration.  During a 
hearing scheduled on July 28, 2015, Petitioner argued that the terms of the District Court 
plea agreement remained binding on the State during the de novo appeal to the circuit court.  
 
4 
 
In response, the State argued that since the trial was de novo, the circuit court considered 
the case anew, and therefore, no plea agreement existed between the parties.  The circuit 
court agreed that on de novo appeal, the case began anew for both the prosecution and the 
defense, and that the District Court plea agreement was no longer enforceable.  
Petitioner timely filed an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Prior 
to briefing, the Court of Special Appeals sua sponte transferred the case to this Court, 
pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132.2  
Additional facts shall be provided, infra, to the extent they prove relevant in 
addressing the issues presented. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 
For questions of law, we “undertake an independent review of the legal correctness 
of the [c]ircuit [c]ourt’s ruling, without according it any deference.”  Oku v. State, 433 Md. 
582, 593, 72 A.3d 538, 544 (2013).  Whether a plea agreement has been violated is a 
question of law which this Court reviews de novo.  Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 482, 845 
A.2d 1215, 1219 (2004).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
2 Maryland Rule 8-132 states,  
[i]f the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals determines that an 
appellant has improperly noted an appeal to it but may be entitled to appeal 
to another court exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Court shall not dismiss 
the appeal but shall instead transfer the action to the court apparently having 
jurisdiction, upon the payment of costs provided in the order transferring the 
action. 
 
5 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
Petitioner argues that the State violated the terms of the District Court plea 
agreement by offering a new plea in the de novo proceeding, whereby Petitioner would 
plead guilty in exchange for the State’s recommendation of thirty days’ incarceration, 
instead of no incarceration as the parties originally agreed.  
I. 
Plea Agreements as Contracts 
a. Reasonable Interpretation of Terms 
This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that plea bargains are akin to contracts.   
See, e.g., Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 579, 7 A.3d 557, 563 (2010) (“Plea bargains are 
likened to contracts.”) (quoting Tweedy, 380 Md. at 482, 845 A.3d at 1219); see also 
Solorzano v. State, 397 Md. 661, 668, 919 A.2d 652, 668 (2007) (“Because plea bargains 
are similar to contracts ….”).  In considering whether a plea agreement has been violated, 
appellate courts “construe the terms of the plea agreement according to the reasonable 
understanding of the defendant when he [or she] pled guilty.”  Solorzano, 397 Md. at 668, 
919 A.2d at 656 (citations omitted).  In Cuffley, we concluded that: 
[A]ny question that later arises concerning the meaning of the sentencing 
term of a binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely to the 
record established at the [Maryland] Rule 4-243 plea proceeding.  The record 
of that proceeding must be examined to ascertain precisely what was 
presented to the court, in the defendant’s presence and before the court 
accepts the agreement, to determine what the defendant reasonably 
understood to be the sentence the parties negotiated and the court agreed to 
impose. The test for determining what the defendant reasonably understood 
at the time of the plea is an objective one. It depends not on what the 
defendant actually understood the agreement to mean, but rather, on what a 
reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position and unaware of the niceties 
of sentencing law would have understood the agreement to mean, based on 
the record developed at the plea proceeding. 
 
6 
 
 
Cuffley, 416 Md. at 582, 7 A.3d at 565 (emphasis in original).  
“[I]f examination of the terms of the plea agreement itself, by reference to what was 
presented on the record at the plea proceeding before the defendant pleads guilty, reveals 
what the defendant reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement, then that 
determination governs the agreement.”  Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604, 615, 7 A.3d 578, 585 
(2010).  Further, “[i]f the record of the plea proceeding clearly discloses what the defendant 
reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement, then the defendant is entitled to 
the benefit of the bargain, which, at the defendant’s option, is either specific enforcement 
of the agreement or withdrawal of the plea.”  Cuffley, 416 Md. at 583, 7 A.3d at 566 
(internal citations omitted).  If the plea agreement is ambiguous then the ambiguity should 
be construed in favor of the defendant.  Solorzano, 397 Md. at 673, 919 A.2d at 659.  
 
Petitioner argues that the plea agreement neither limited the State’s obligation to the 
District Court proceeding nor indicated that the State’s obligation would cease if Petitioner 
noted an appeal.  The State disagrees, and argues that because the plea agreement did not 
include a provision that the State would make the same no-jail recommendation on a de 
novo appeal, no reasonable person in Petitioner’s position would interpret the agreement 
to apply in the circuit court proceeding.  
The parties agree that the terms of the District Court plea agreement were simple: 
Petitioner would plead guilty to the crime of theft, and in exchange, the State would 
recommend she receive no jail time.  Under Cuffley, however, our interpretation of the 
original plea agreement occurs within the context of the District Court proceeding, and we 
 
7 
 
must examine the record from the April 30, 2015 hearing, including “what was presented 
to the court, in the defendant’s presence and before the court accepts the agreement, to 
determine what [Petitioner] reasonably understood to be the” terms of the plea.  See 
Cuffley, 416 Md. at 582, 7 A.3d at 565.  This review is an objective analysis based on the 
plea proceeding’s record.  See id. at 582, 7 A.2d at 565; see also Baines, 416 Md. at 615, 
7 A.3d at 585.  
The record reflects that at the commencement of the April 30, 2015 hearing, the 
State informed the District Court of the parties’ intent to enter into a plea agreement with 
the previously referenced terms.  After entering her guilty plea, Petitioner’s counsel 
explained to Petitioner that: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you want to, you can enter a plea of not guilty 
and have a trial. If you have a trial, you’d [sic] presumed innocent and the 
State would have the burden of trying to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. They would do that by calling witnesses and presenting evidence and 
testimony. If we went to trial, you would have an opportunity to present your 
case, to challenge the State’s case, and you could call any witnesses you 
wished. If you wanted to, you could testify. You also have an option not to 
testify. If you remain silent, your silence would not be taken as a sign of guilt. 
Upon entering a guilty plea you’re waiving these trial rights; do you 
understand that? 
 
[PETITIONER]: Yeah. 
 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you understand the State is making a 
recommendation for not [sic] actual jail time in this matter, just a suspended 
sentence. But that’s only a recommendation. The Judge can impose whatever 
penalty he feels is appropriate under the circumstances up [to] the maximum 
meaning 90 days in this case; do you understand that? 
 
[PETITIONER]: Yes. 
 
 
8 
 
The State then explained the underlying facts it would have presented had Petitioner pled 
not guilty and proceeded to trial.  Once the State presented the facts, the District Court 
judge held that “[i]t will be a finding of guilty.”  At that point, the terms of the plea were 
satisfied and the agreement was complete.  
 
We hold that, based on the above-referenced record, a reasonable person in 
Petitioner’s position would not have expected the plea agreement to extend beyond the 
District Court proceeding.  During defense counsel’s colloquy  with Petitioner, he 
explained what trial rights Petitioner was foregoing by pleading guilty, but provided no 
notice to Petitioner that her appellate rights remained intact or that an appeal of her 
conviction would result in a de novo proceeding.  Absent any evidence in the record to the 
contrary, we conclude the plea agreement was limited to the District Court proceeding. 
b. Oku v. State as Precedent for Extending District Court Plea 
Agreement to De Novo Proceeding 
 
i. Under Oku, De Novo Proceedings Are A “Do Over For 
Findings of Fact and Judgment of Guilt”  
 
Petitioner quotes Oku v. State for the proposition that “[o]ur de novo trial system 
provides for what is essentially a ‘do over’ in terms of the findings of fact and judgment of 
guilt.”  Oku, 433 Md. at 595, 72 A.3d at 545.  Petitioner argues that in Oku we rejected the 
notion that the nature of a de novo appeal either precluded the State from presenting the 
defendant’s District Court trial testimony in the circuit court or eliminated what occurred 
in the District Court.  Based on this interpretation of Oku, Petitioner argues that the original 
plea agreement did not expire when the de novo appeal was filed.  The State disagrees, and 
argues that Petitioner ignores the fact that the judgment of guilt in the District Court rested 
 
9 
 
entirely on her guilty plea.  The State contends that once Petitioner sought the de novo 
appeal of her conviction, the District Court plea agreement was also subject to a “do over.” 
We agree with the State’s characterization of Oku and its applicability to this case.  
In Oku, we concluded that filing a de novo appeal from the District Court to the circuit 
court does not extinguish the District Court judgment.  See Oku, 433 Md. at 592, 72 A.3d 
at 544.  “Rather, ‘the District Court’s judgment remains in effect pending the appeal to the 
circuit court, unless and until superseded by a judgment of the circuit court or a disposition 
by nolle prosequi or stet.’” Id. (quoting Stone v. State, 344 Md. 97, 104, 685 A.2d 441, 444 
(1996)).3   
Additionally, we have interpreted de novo to mean “afresh” or “anew,” and that a 
de novo trial affords a criminal defendant a “brand new bite at the apple[.]”  Id. 433 Md. at 
591, 72 A.3d at 543 (citations omitted).  A de novo appeal to the circuit court is treated “as 
a wholly original proceeding as if the charges had not been heard before and no decision 
had been rendered.”  Garrison v. State, 350 Md. 128, 136, 711 A.2d 170, 173 (1998) 
(quoting State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 681, 574 A.2d 918, 921 (1990)).   On de novo 
appeal, the circuit court “receive[s] evidence and make[s] determinations of facts as though 
no prior proceeding had occurred.”  Oku, 433 Md. at 592, 72 A.3d at 544 (quoting In re 
Marcus, J., 405 Md. 221, 234-35, 950 A.2d 787 (2008).  The parties to the de novo  
proceeding are neither limited by the evidence presented at the District Court trial nor 
                                              
3 Maryland Rule 7-112(b) mirrors the language in Oku.  Specifically, Maryland Rule 
7-112(b) states “[t]he District Court judgment shall remain in effect pending the appeal 
unless and until superseded by a judgment of the circuit court or, in a criminal action, a 
disposition by nolle prosequi or stet entered in the circuit court.” 
 
10 
 
required to present the same evidence on appeal.  Id.  (citing Garrison, 350 Md. at 136, 
711 A.2d at 174).  Our holding in Oku does not, therefore, support the proposition that 
because the District Court judgment remains in effect, the factual and procedural 
underpinnings that led to the judgment – the plea agreement – also remain in effect on de 
novo appeal. 
ii. Effect of Petitioner’s District Court Guilty Plea 
Because we hold that the District Court plea agreement does not extend to the de 
novo proceeding, it is pertinent to clarify the impact Petitioner’s guilty plea in the District 
Court may have in the de novo proceeding.   
The facts in this case are similar to those in Oku.  In Oku, we considered whether 
the de novo system contemplated by Cts. & Jud. Proc. §12-401(f) barred the State from 
using a criminal defendant’s admission – made during the District Court trial – in the 
State’s case during the subsequent de novo trial. Oku, 433 Md. at 593, 72 A.2d at 544.  We 
emphasized in Oku “that a de novo appeal has the effect of ignoring the judgment below, 
but only for the limited purpose of granting a defendant, who was convicted upon trial in 
the District Court, a second trial.”  Id. at 594, 72 A.3d at 545 (emphasis in original).  We 
concluded that “[a]t the second trial, no deference is accorded to the District Court’s factual 
findings or legal conclusions.”  Id. at 594, 72 A.3d at 545.  We also noted that the United 
States Supreme Court, in describing another state’s two-tier trial system,4 explained that in 
                                              
4 The Supreme Court’s description of Kentucky’s de novo trial system in Colten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1958 (1972), applies with equal force to 
Maryland’s two-tier, de novo trial system established by Cts. & Jud. Proc. §12-401.  See 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
11 
 
a trial de novo the “[p]rosecution and defense begin anew” and “neither the judge nor jury 
determines guilt or fixes a penalty in the trial de novo is in any way bound by the [District 
Court’s] findings or judgment.”  Id. at 595, 72 A.3d at 545 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 
407 U.S. 104, 113, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1958 (1972)).  We concluded that a de novo trial “does 
not call for the exclusion of testimony voluntarily given in the District Court trial, as long 
as that testimony is admissible under our rules of evidence.”  Oku, 433 Md. at 595, 72 A.3d 
at 545. 
We also noted that, in contrast to appeals from the District Court that are reviewed 
“on the record,”5 there is a new fact finder in the de novo proceeding who owes no 
deference to the District Court’s findings or conclusions.  Id. at 595-96, 72 A.3d at 546. 
“Both parties are free to present new evidence or a new theory of the case[,]” and the circuit 
court “must decide the admissibility of the proffered evidence by resort to the applicable 
evidentiary rules.”  Id.  We held: 
the factfinder at a trial de novo makes a fresh determination of the weight to 
be accorded to any evidence that is admitted. In short, applying the rules of 
evidence to [c]ircuit [c]ourt trials that are the result of a de novo appeal in the 
same manner as they are applied in a trial that originates in that court does 
                                              
(. . . continued) 
Oku, 433 Md. at 595, 72 A.2d at 545; see also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112 fn. 
4, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1958 fn. 4 (1972) (recognizing the similarity between Kentucky and 
Maryland’s two-tier trial system for adjudicating less serious criminal cases). 
 
5 In Oku, we stated that reviewing a District Court judgment “on the record” means 
the circuit court acts in an appellate role.  Oku, 433 Md. at 595 fn. 9, 72 A.3d at 546 fn. 9 
(citations omitted).  The circuit court is thus “bound by the record below, and must consider 
the evidence adduced in the District Court trial ‘in a light most favorable to the prevailing 
party’ below.”  Id.  Only if the District Court’s findings are clearly erroneous, may the 
circuit court set them aside.  Id. 
 
12 
 
not deprive a defendant of the second “bite at the apple” mandated by [Cts. 
& Jud. Proc.] §12-401, nor does it convert a trial de novo into a record appeal. 
 
The de novo trial system in Maryland affords the defendant many benefits, 
for example, a quicker, less costly resolution of minor offenses, a chance to 
preview the State’s case against him [or her] in District Court, and, if the 
defendant chooses to appeal, a second chance at acquittal. But the purpose 
and structure of our de novo system, as laid out in our statutes, rules, and 
caselaw, do not require the feature [p]etitioner seeks, that is, to have his [or 
her] District Court testimony ignored by the State during its case-in-chief in 
[c]ircuit [c]ourt. 
 
Id. at 596, 72 A.3d at 546.  
II. 
Due Process6 Concerns in This Case 
a. Preservation of Due Process Claims 
 
Before addressing the merits of Petitioner’s due process claims, we must first 
address the State’s argument that those claims are not preserved for appellate review.  First, 
the State argues that Petitioner did not preserve her argument that due process requires the 
plea agreement to be construed to extend to the circuit court.  Specifically, the State avers 
that, in the circuit court, Petitioner only argued that under a plain contractual interpretation 
of the original plea agreement and under our holding in Oku, the State was obligated by 
the same plea terms that it agreed to in the District Court proceeding.  The State 
acknowledges, and the record reflects, however, that Petitioner also argued in her 
Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement that, 
[u]nder due process, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to some 
form of remedy for a broken agreement. (Santobello v. New York, [404 U.S. 
257,] 257 [, 92 S. Ct. 495] (1971)). “When a plea rests in any significant 
                                              
6 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “… nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 
13 
 
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to 
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” 
[Id.]  
 
Thus, Petitioner preserved her claim that due process requires the enforcement of the terms 
of a plea agreement agreed to by the parties. See Maryland Rule 8-131(a).  
Second, the State argues that Petitioner never advanced a claim in the circuit court 
regarding her due process right to avoid prosecutorial vindictiveness in noting a de novo 
appeal.  Petitioner instead first raised this issue in her brief to this Court. Petitioner argues 
– in her reply brief – that “[t]he due process concern discussed in [Petitioner’s] brief is not 
a separate issue. It is merely one more reason why the plea agreement should be construed 
in the manner consistently advocated by [Petitioner].”  We disagree.  
Although Petitioner raised a due process claim before the circuit court, the claim 
advanced before this Court was outside the scope of the earlier claim.  Petitioner’s circuit 
court due process claim relied on the Supreme Court case Santobello v. State, where the 
Supreme Court held that when “a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”  Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S. Ct. at 
499.  The Santobello Court concluded that if the defendant did not receive the benefit of 
his or her bargain, then he or she can either: (1) have the bargain specifically enforced, or 
(2) withdraw his or her plea of guilty.  Id. at 263, 92 S. Ct. at 499.  We subsequently relied 
on Santobello for the conclusion that “when either the prosecution breaches its promise 
with respect to a plea agreement, or the court breaches a plea agreement that it agreed to 
abide by, the defendant is entitled to relief[]” under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
 
14 
 
Amendment.  See Solorzano, 397 Md. at 667-68, 919 A.2d at 656 (citations omitted).  Thus, 
the basis for Petitioner’s due process claim in the circuit court was that a defendant has a 
due process right to enforce the terms of his or her plea agreement when the State or the 
trial court violates the terms of that agreement. 
On appeal, Petitioner’s due process claim instead relies on the Supreme Court case 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974).  In Blackledge, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a felony indictment brought after the defendant exercised his statutory 
right to appeal constituted a penalty in contravention of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 25, 94 S. Ct. at 2101.  The Supreme Court 
held that,  
“since the fear of [] vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s 
exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due 
process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such 
retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” [North Carolina 
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1969)7]. We think it [is] 
                                              
7 In North Carolina v. Pearce, the Supreme Court consolidated two cases whereby 
the defendant in each was convicted and sentenced in state court, but subsequently obtained 
postconviction relief and was retried, convicted a second time in state court, and sentenced 
to a harsher period of incarceration than the defendant had been sentenced originally.  395 
U.S. at 713-15, 89 S. Ct. at 2074-75.  The Pearce Court held that due process  
 
requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully 
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives 
after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may 
unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or 
collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a 
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the 
part of the sentencing judge. 
 
395 U.S. at 725, 89 S. Ct. at 2080.  The Court also held that for a judge to impose a more 
severe sentence on a defendant after a new trial, the judge must state reasons for the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
15 
 
clear that the same considerations apply here. A person convicted of an 
offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without 
apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious 
charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased 
potential period of incarceration. 
 
Id. at 28, 94 S. Ct. at 2102-03.  Thus, Petitioner’s due process claim before us is not based 
on enforcement of the plea agreement. Rather, Petitioner’s claim is based on whether the 
State’s action – recommending a harsher sentence after Petitioner exercised her statutory 
right to appeal – created a “fear of vindictiveness” that could deter defendants like 
Petitioner from exercising their statutory right to appeal in contravention of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner’s claim 
regarding her due process right to avoid prosecutorial vindictiveness in noting a de novo 
appeal was not preserved.  
b. Discretion Under Maryland Rule 8-131(a) 
Maryland Rule 8-131(a) governs our scope of review in considering issues on 
appeal. Sub-section (a) states: 
The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and, unless 
waived under [Maryland] Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and 
decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the 
trial court. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue 
unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by 
the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or 
desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another 
appeal. 
                                              
(. . . continued) 
increased punishment.  Id. at 726, 89 S. Ct. at 2081.  Pearce was subsequently overturned 
by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989) (holding that no presumption 
of vindictiveness arises when the first sentence was based upon a guilty plea, and the 
second sentence follows a trial). 
 
16 
 
Maryland Rule 8-131(a).  
We made clear in State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 638 A.2d 107 (1994) that our review 
of arguments not raised at the trial level is discretionary, not mandatory.  See Bell, 334 Md. 
at 188, 638 A.2d at 113.  We also noted that the primary purpose of Maryland Rule 8-
131(a) is to “ensure fairness for all parties in a case and to promote the orderly 
administration of law.”  Id. at 189, 638 A.2d at 113 (quoting Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 
661, 255 A.2d 28, 31 (1969)) (other citations omitted).  In Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 
918 A.2d 506 (2007), we concluded that the discretion authorized by Maryland Rule 8-
131(a) 
is a discretion that appellate courts should rarely exercise, as considerations 
of both fairness and judicial efficiency ordinarily require that all challenges 
that a party desires to make to a trial court’s ruling, action, or conduct be 
presented in the first instance to the trial court so that (1) a proper record can 
be made with respect to the challenge, and (2) the other parties and the trial 
judge are given an opportunity to consider and respond to the challenge. 
 
Chaney, 397 Md. at 468, 918 A.2d at 511.  “We usually elect to review an unpreserved 
issue only after it has been thoroughly briefed and argued, and where a decision would[:] 
(1) help correct a recurring error, (2) provide guidance when there is likely to be a new 
trial, or (3) offer assistance if there is a subsequent collateral attack on the conviction.”  
Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 151, 729 A.2d 910, 920 (1999).  
In Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 843 A.2d 778 (2004), we held that when presented 
with a plausible exercise of discretion under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), “appellate courts 
should make two determinations concerning the promotion or subversion of [Maryland 
Rule] 8-131(a)’s twin goals.”  Jones, 379 Md. at 714, 843 A.2d at 784.  First, we consider 
 
17 
 
whether the exercise of discretion will work an unfair prejudice to either of the parties.  Id.; 
see also Ball, 334 Md. at 189, 638 A.2d at 113 (“[D]iscretion should be exercised only 
when it is clear that it will not work an unfair prejudice to the parties or to the court.” 
(citations and footnote omitted)).  Part of our determination of whether unfair prejudice 
would exist is consideration of the rationale for the default or waiver and whether the 
failure to raise the issue was a considered, deliberate one, or whether it was inadvertent and 
unintentional.  Jones, 379 Md. at 714, 843 A.2d at 784.  Second, we consider whether the 
exercise of discretion will promote the orderly administration of justice.  Id. at 715, 843 
A.2d at 784.  We noted that Maryland Rule 8-131(a) “seeks to prevent the trial of cases in 
a piecemeal fashion, thereby saving time and expense and accelerating the termination of 
litigation.” Id.  
 
In determining whether to consider the merits of this issue, our precedents recognize 
that constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal, and not raised in the trial court, 
are not automatically entitled to consideration on the merits under Maryland Rule 8-131(a).  
See, e.g., Oku, 433 Md. at 588-89, 72 A.3d at 541-42 (declining to consider petitioner’s 
Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claim because petitioner failed to raise 
either issue in the trial court, and therefore did not properly preserve them for appellate 
review); see also Balt. Teachers Union v. Bd. of Edu., 379 Md. 192, 205, 840 A.2d 728, 
736 (2004) (“Since the constitutional issue raised in the [petitioner’s] brief was not raised 
in the trial court, we shall decline to address it.”).  Our “established policy is to decide 
constitutional issues only when necessary.” Burch v. United Cable Television of Balt. Ltd. 
P’ship, 391 Md. 687, 695, 895 A.2d 980, 984 (2006) (quoting Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 
 
18 
 
306 Md. 556, 565, 510 A.2d 562, 566 (1986)); see also Balt. Teachers Union, 379 Md. at 
205-06, 840 A.2d at 736 (“It is particularly important not to address a constitutional issue 
not raised in the trial court in light of the principle that a court will not unnecessarily decide 
a constitutional question.”).  
 
The State argues that Petitioner’s failure to assert the prosecutorial vindictiveness 
due process claim in the circuit court created unfair prejudice for two reasons: (1) we do 
not have the benefit of the circuit court’s consideration of this due process argument, and 
(2) had the circuit court concluded a presumption of vindictiveness should govern 
construction of the plea agreement, the State would have had an opportunity to present 
facts that refuted the presumption of vindictiveness.  Petitioner notes in her reply brief that 
the State explained to the circuit court that its reasoning for offering a harsher sentence in 
the de novo proceeding was because the prosecutor saw no reason to deviate from the 
District Court’s sentence.  Petitioner also argues that the State’s subjective reasons for 
recommending a harsher sentence after she noted her de novo appeal are of no consequence 
because, in her view, when a prosecutor recommends a harsher sentence after a defendant 
notes a de novo appeal, there is a presumption of vindictiveness that renders the 
prosecutor’s subjective intent in recommending the harsher sentence irrelevant.  
Since both parties briefed the issue before this Court and the trial record below is 
sufficient for us to consider the merits, we may consider Petitioner’s prosecutorial 
vindictiveness due process claim, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(a).  Additionally, 
deciding this due process claim will promote the fair administration of justice because it 
will dispose of Petitioner’s concerns regarding the State’s conduct in this case.  
 
19 
 
Considering the merits of this issue will also provide important guidance regarding the 
constitutionality of prosecutorial conduct during plea bargaining in Maryland’s two-tier 
trial system.  See Chaney, 397 Md. at 468, 918 A.2d at 511 (considering petitioner’s 
unpreserved challenge to a restitution order because it constituted plain error and the issue 
“transcends this case; it is one that may affect hundreds of cases that flow through our 
criminal and juvenile courts and that implicates important Constitutional and statutory 
rights, and guidance is needed.” (footnote omitted)). 
c. Contract Principles and Concerns of “Fairness and Adequacy of 
Procedural Safeguards”8  
 
In considering the enforcement of plea agreements, we have consistently held that 
in addition to considering contract principles, “[d]ue process concerns for fairness and the 
adequacy of procedural safeguards guide any interpretation of a court approved plea 
agreement.”  See Cuffley, 416 Md. at 580, 7 A.3d at 564 (quoting Solorzano, 397 Md. at 
688, 919 A.2d at 656).  Notably, in considering our jurisprudence in this area, however, 
the central issue was not whether the plea agreement itself existed, as is the case here, but 
rather a consideration of what the specific terms of the agreement were and whether those 
terms had been violated.  See, e.g., Cuffley, 416 Md. at 573-75, 7 A.3d at 560 (considering 
whether a judge, who accepted plea on the record, could sentence defendant to fifteen years 
in prison, with all but six years suspended, when the terms of the plea stated defendant was 
to be sentenced “within the guidelines[,]” meaning sentenced to between four and six years 
                                              
8 See Cuffley, 416 Md. at 580, 7 A.3d at 564 (quoting Solorzano, 397 Md. at 688, 
919 A.2d at 656).    
 
20 
 
of imprisonment); see also Solorzano, 397 Md. at 664-67, 919 A.2d at 654-55 (determining 
whether court violated terms of plea agreement when defendant pled guilty, and the State 
recommended he receive a sentence at the “top of the guidelines, which is believed to be 
twelve to twenty years,” but after accepting the plea, the court sentenced defendant to life 
imprisonment with all but fifty years suspended).  
Unlike the aforementioned cases, we must determine whether the plea agreement 
remains intact, and therefore enforceable, in a de novo circuit court proceeding. The Court 
of Special Appeals’ decision in Rios v. State, 186 Md. App. 354, 974 A.2d 366 (2009) is 
instructive.  In Rios, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether the parties had 
reached a plea agreement during plea negotiations.9  In determining whether a plea 
agreement existed, the Court quoted our decision in State v. Brockman, 227 Md. 687, 357 
A.2d 376 (1976): 
[T]he standard to be applied to plea negotiations is one of fair play and equity 
under the facts and circumstances of the case, which, although entailing 
certain contract concepts, is to be distinguished from … the strict application 
of the common law principles of contracts. The rigid application of contract 
law to plea negotiations would be incongruous since, for example, the trial 
                                              
9 In Rios, the parties entered into plea negotiations, and on April 8, 2008 the 
defendant’s attorney offered to have the defendant enter an Alford plea to reckless 
endangerment and be sentenced to time served in exchange for the dismissal of the 
remaining charges on the express stipulation that the defendant had to agree to the terms.  
The prosecutor agreed to defense counsel’s plea offer. See Rios, 186 Md. App. at 358-59, 
974 A.2d at 368-69.  On April 18th and 21, defense counsel left the prosecutor several 
messages regarding the defendant accepting the agreement, but did not reach the prosecutor 
directly.  Id. at 359, 974 A.2d at 369.  On April 22nd, defense counsel asked the prosecutor 
about allowing a plea of nolo contendre to reckless endangerment, which the prosecutor 
refused.  Id.  Defense counsel then informed the prosecutor that the defendant would accept 
the plea offer originally made on April 8th.  Id.  Later that week, the prosecutor called and 
informed defense counsel that no plea was being offered.  Id.  Defendant subsequently filed 
a Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement.  Id. 
 
21 
 
court is not ordinarily bound by the compact and, as the State concedes, it 
cannot obtain “specific performance” of a defendant’s promise to plead 
guilty. 
 
Rios, 186 Md. App. at 367, 974 A.2d at 373 (quoting Brockman, 227 Md. at 697, 357 A.2d 
at 382-83) (citations omitted).  The Court of Special Appeals concluded, 
In this case, the issue before us is not the construction of a plea agreement, 
but rather whether any contract was formed. Given that [the defendant] has 
not detrimentally relied upon the existence of the alleged plea agreement and 
that there is no suggestion of unfair conduct by the State in the course of the 
plea negotiations, we see no reason to depart from standard principles of 
contract law in determining whether the parties ever reached an enforceable 
plea agreement. 
 
Id. at 367, 974 A.2d at 374.  
 
 
 
Similar to Rios, there is no evidence in the case at bar that Petitioner detrimentally 
relied on the existence of the alleged plea agreement.  In her initial appearance in the circuit 
court on June 2, 2015, Petitioner pled not guilty to the charge of theft under $100 and 
requested a jury trial.  Although Petitioner alleges the State’s action in recommending a 
harsher sentence after she noted a de novo appeal violated her due process rights, as 
discussed infra, the State’s conduct prior to the de novo proceeding does not 
unconstitutionally deter her from exercising her statutory right to appeal her conviction. 
There is no reason, therefore, to depart from the standard principles of contract law and our 
holding, supra, that the plea agreement only applies in the District Court proceeding does 
not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 
 
22 
 
d. Limitations on the Due Process Right to Avoid Prosecutorial 
Vindictiveness 
 
Petitioner argues that allowing the State to recommend a harsher sentence on de 
novo appeal poses a “realistic likelihood of ‘vindictiveness’” that violates her due process 
right to appeal her District Court conviction.  Petitioner relies on two United States 
Supreme Court cases in support: Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974), 
and Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 104 S. Ct. 2916 (1984).  In both cases, the Supreme 
Court considered whether a defendant’s due process rights were violated after the 
defendant was convicted of misdemeanor charges in an inferior court, 10 noted a de novo 
appeal to a superior court, and was indicted and convicted on felony charges based on the 
same conduct that underlay the misdemeanor convictions.  See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 21-
22, 94 S. Ct. at 2099; Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 28-29, 104 S. Ct. at 2917-18.  
In Blackledge, the defendant was convicted in North Carolina’s district court for 
misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation with an inmate in a North 
Carolina penitentiary.  See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 22, 94 S. Ct. at 2099-2100.  The 
defendant subsequently noted a de novo appeal to the county superior court.  Id. at 22, 94 
S. Ct. at 2100.  Prior to the de novo proceeding, the prosecutor obtained an indictment from 
a grand jury charging the defendant with felony assault with a deadly weapon with intent 
to kill and inflict serious bodily injury, based on the same conduct that underlies the 
                                              
10 The Supreme Court uses the term “inferior court” to describe the equivalent of 
Maryland’s District Court, and uses the term “superior court” to describe the equivalent of 
Maryland’s circuit courts. 
 
 
23 
 
misdemeanor conviction.  Id. at 23, 94 S. Ct. at 2100.   The defendant pled guilty in the 
Superior Court and was sentenced to a term of five to seven years in the penitentiary.  Id. 
In concluding the prosecutor’s actions were unconstitutional, the Blackledge Court 
noted that “the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause is not offended by all possibilities of increased 
punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only those that pose a realistic likelihood of 
‘vindictiveness.’”  Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27, 94 S. Ct. at 2102.  The Court opined, 
however, that the prosecutor’s action in that case posed a “realistic likelihood of 
‘vindictiveness[,]’” and was thus unconstitutional, because 
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted 
misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo in the 
[s]uperior [c]ourt, since such an appeal will clearly require increased 
expenditures of prosecutorial resources before the defendant’s conviction 
becomes final, and may even result in a formerly convicted defendant’s 
going free. And, if the prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage 
such appeals — by “upping the ante” through a felony indictment whenever 
a convicted misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy — the 
State can insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards 
of a de novo trial. 
 
Id. at 27-28, 94 S. Ct. 2102.  The Blackledge Court also emphasized that, 
 since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a 
defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his [or her] 
first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed from 
apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing 
judge …. A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his [or her] 
statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will 
retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus 
subjecting him [or her] to a significantly increased potential period of 
incarceration.  
 
Id. at 28, 94 S. Ct. at 2102-03.  
 
24 
 
In Thigpen, the defendant was convicted of four misdemeanors in a justice of the 
peace court resulting from a vehicular accident caused by the defendant.  See Thigpen, 468 
U.S. at 28, 104 S. Ct. at 2917.  The defendant noted a de novo appeal to the circuit court.  
Id. at 28, 104 S. Ct. at 2918.  Prior to the de novo proceeding, the prosecutor obtained an 
indictment for felony manslaughter based on the same conduct as the misdemeanor 
convictions.  Id. at 28, 104 S. Ct. at 2918.  A jury subsequently convicted the defendant of 
manslaughter, and the defendant was sentenced to twenty years in prison.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court affirmed its decision in Blackledge, and held that Blackledge “established a 
presumption of unconstitutional vindictiveness” when a prosecutor charges a defendant 
with a harsher crime after the defendant notes a de novo appeal from a misdemeanor 
conviction.  See Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 30, 104 S. Ct. at 2918.  
Petitioner argues that a prosecutor’s decision to seek a harsher sentence after a 
defendant notes a de novo appeal to the circuit court is analogous to the factual 
circumstances underlying Blackledge and Thigpen because it is another means of “upping 
the ante” to discourage Petitioner from appealing her conviction.  See Blackledge, 417 U.S. 
at 27-28, 93 S. Ct. at 2102.  Paraphrasing the Blackledge Court, Petitioner argues that “[a] 
person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his [or her] statutory right to a trial de 
novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by recommending a harsher 
sentence, thus subjecting him [or her] to a significantly increased potential period of 
incarceration.” (internal quotation marks omitted). 
As the State argues, there is a key factual difference between Blackledge and 
Thigpen, and the case at bar.  In Blackledge and Thigpen, the prosecutor took unilateral 
 
25 
 
action in obtaining new felony indictments against the defendants once they noted their de 
novo appeals.  See Blackledge, 413 U.S. at 23, 93 S. Ct. at 2100; Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 29, 
104 S. Ct. at 2918.  Here, because we concluded, supra, the District Court plea agreement 
was unenforceable on de novo appeal, the prosecutor’s recommendation of thirty days’ 
incarceration after Petitioner noted the de novo appeal is a plea offer that Petitioner is free 
to accept or reject.  If Petitioner rejects the State’s plea offer, the offer dissipates and the 
State will be forced to take Petitioner’s case to trial and prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that she committed the alleged theft.  This factual scenario is more analogous to cases relied 
on by the State: Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978), United States 
v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982), and our holding in State v. Adams, 293 
Md. 665, 447 A.2d 833 (1982). 
In Bordenkircher, the defendant was indicted for uttering a forged instrument – an 
offense that was punishable by a term of two to ten years in prison.  Bordenkircher, 434 
U.S. at 358, 98 S. Ct. at 665.  During subsequent plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered 
to recommend a sentence of five years in prison if the defendant agreed to plead guilty.  Id. 
The prosecutor also stated during the plea negotiations that if the defendant did not plead 
guilty, the prosecutor would seek an indictment under Kentucky’s habitual criminal act, 
thereby subjecting the defendant to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment due to the 
defendant’s two prior felony convictions.  Id. at 358-59, 98 S. Ct. at 665.  The defendant 
pled not guilty, and he was subsequently convicted of the uttering a forged instrument 
charge and of violating the habitual criminal act.  Id. at 359, 98 S. Ct. at 666.  Pursuant to 
 
26 
 
the habitual criminal act, the defendant was sentenced to a life term in the penitentiary.  See 
id. at 359, 98 S. Ct. at 665.  
The Supreme Court noted in Bordenkircher that the due process violations in cases 
like Blackledge, “lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the 
exercise of a legal right, … but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating 
against the accused for lawfully attacking his [or her] conviction.”  Id. at 363, 98 S. Ct. 
667-68 (citations omitted).  The Bordenkircher Court held, however, that “in the ‘give-
and-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long 
as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”  Id. at 363, 98 S. Ct. at 
668.  
The Bordenkircher Court also determined that “[w]hile confronting a defendant 
with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a ‘discouraging effect on the 
defendant’s assertion of his [or her] trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices 
[is] an inevitable’ – and permissible – ‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates 
and encourages the negotiation of pleas.’”  Id. at 364, 98 S. Ct. at 668 (quoting Chaffin v. 
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31, 93 S. Ct. 1977, 1985 (1973)).  The Supreme Court 
concluded that “by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has 
necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s 
interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not 
guilty.”  Id.  The Bordenkircher Court also concluded that 
[t]o hold that the prosecutor’s desire to induce a guilty plea is an 
“unjustifiable standard,” which, like race or religion, may play no part in his 
charging decision, would contradict the very premises that underlie the 
 
27 
 
concept of plea bargaining itself. Moreover, a rigid constitutional rule that 
would prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his dealings with the 
defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the practice 
of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so recently 
emerged. 
 
Id. at 364-65, 98 S. Ct. at 669.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that 
 
[t]here is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country’s legal 
system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both 
individual and institutional abuse. And broad though the discretion may be, 
there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise. We hold only 
that the course of conduct engaged in the prosecutor in this case, which no 
more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of 
foregoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to 
prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 
In Goodwin, the defendant was charged with several misdemeanors, including 
assault, for striking a police officer with his car in an attempt to flee after being stopped for 
speeding.  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 370, 102 S. Ct. at 2487.  The defendant was arrested and 
arraigned before a United States Magistrate, but fled the jurisdiction prior to trial.  Id.  
Three years later, after he was apprehended, the defendant’s case was assigned to a 
Magistrate.11  Id. at 371, 102 S. Ct. at 2487.  The defendant entered into plea negotiations, 
but ultimately elected to plead not guilty and sought a trial by jury in the U.S. District 
Court.  The case was transferred, and the Assistant United States Attorney obtained a four-
count indictment charging the defendant with one felony and three misdemeanor counts.  
                                              
11 The defendant’s case was assigned to an attorney from the Department of Justice, 
who was detailed, on a temporary basis, to prosecute petty crimes and misdemeanor cases. 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 370-71, 102 S. Ct. at 2487.  
 
 
28 
 
Id.  The defendant was subsequently convicted on the felony count and one misdemeanor 
count.  Id. 
In declining to apply a presumption of vindictiveness to the actions of the Assistant 
United States Attorney, the Supreme Court concluded that 
[t]he imposition of punishment is the very purpose of virtually all criminal 
proceedings. The presence of a punitive motivation, therefore, does not 
provide an adequate basis for distinguishing governmental action that is fully 
justified as a legitimate response to perceived criminal conduct from 
governmental action that is an impermissible response to noncriminal, 
protected activity. Motives are complex and difficult to prove. As a result, in 
certain cases in which action detrimental to the defendant has been taken 
after the exercise of a legal right, the Court has found it necessary to 
“presume” an improper vindictive motive. Given the severity of such a 
presumption, however – which may operate in the absence of any proof of 
an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal 
conduct – the Court has done so only in cases in which a reasonable 
likelihood of vindictiveness exists. 
 
Id. at 372-73, 102 S. Ct. at 2488.  The Goodwin Court noted that Blackledge12 involved a 
defendant exercising a procedural right that resulted in a retrial after the defendant had 
been once tried and convicted.  Id.  The Goodwin Court concluded, however, that under the 
facts in that case, 
[t]here is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible 
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. In the course 
of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover additional 
information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he simply may 
come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader 
significance. At this stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor’s assessment of 
the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized. In contrast, once 
a trial begins – and certainly by the time a conviction has been obtained – it 
is much more likely that the State has discovered and assessed all of the 
information against the accused and has made a determination, on the basis 
of that information, of the extent to which he should be prosecuted. Thus, a 
                                              
12 The Goodwin Court also cited to North Carolina v. Pearce, supra footnote 7.  
 
29 
 
change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is completed is 
much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision. 
 
Id. at 381, 102 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court held, 
 
[T]he timing of the prosecutor’s action in this case suggests that a 
presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted. A prosecutor should remain 
free before trial to exercise broad discretion entrusted to him to determine 
the extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision should 
not freeze future conduct. As we made clear in Bordenkircher, the initial 
charges filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual 
is legitimately subject to prosecution. 
 
Id. at 381-82, 102 S. Ct. at 2493 (footnotes omitted). 
 
 
In State v. Adams, the defendant was charged in the Maryland District Court with 
one count of conspiracy to violate the gambling laws.  Adams, 293 Md. at 666, 447 A.2d 
at 833.  The defendant subsequently sought to dismiss the charging document on the ground 
it was not signed by a judicial officer as required under the Maryland Rules.  Id. at 667, 
447 A.2d at 833.  The defendant’s motion was granted, but the following day the State filed 
a new charging document against the defendant that contained three separate counts of 
conspiracy to violate the gambling laws.  Id. at 667, 447 A.2d at 833-34.  The defendant 
again moved to dismiss the charges, alleging the prosecutor acted vindictively in filing 
three separate conspiracy charges against him after he had successfully moved to dismiss 
the earlier single-count charging document.  Id. at 667, 447 A.2d at 834.  The defendant 
argued that he had exercised a constitutional or procedural right in having the first charging 
document dismissed and the institution of the new charging document – increasing the 
charges against him – gave rise to the appearance of vindictiveness, together with a realistic 
apprehension of such vindictiveness, in contravention of the due process clause of the 
 
30 
 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  The trial judge subsequently dismissed the defendant’s 
motion because he found “there is [no] evidence of any realistic apprehension that the 
prosecutor … retaliated because the defendant … exercised his right to question the legality 
of the original charging document.”  Id. at 668, 447 A.2d at 834.  
 
Relying on Goodwin, we concluded that “a defendant’s ability to exercise his 
constitutional rights must not be chilled by heavy-handed prosecutorial conduct. It is 
equally true, however, that good faith alterations in a prosecutor’s approach to a case 
should not automatically abrogate the entire potential culpability of a defendant.”  Id. at 
674, 447 A.2d at 837.  We also acknowledged that “[d]ue process commands courts to 
imbue the criminal justice system with fairness[,] [but] it does not mandate inappropriate 
and inflexible palliatives.” Id. at 675, 447 A.2d at 838.  Ultimately, we held that “[the 
defendant] has not presented any objective evidence of bad faith on the part of the State. 
[The defendant’s] subjective fears, standing alone, are hardly sufficient in light of 
Goodwin’s rejection of a pretrial presumption of vindictiveness.”  Id. at 674, 447 A.2d at 
837-38. 
Because we determined, supra, that the District Court plea agreement was no longer 
enforceable once Petitioner noted her de novo appeal to the circuit court, the procedural 
posture of this case is a pretrial, rather than post-trial, proceeding.  The record reflects that 
after Petitioner noted a de novo appeal, she pled not guilty, and the State subsequently 
offered Petitioner a new plea whereby, in exchange for her guilty plea, the State would 
recommend that Petitioner serve thirty days’ incarceration.  Petitioner is free to accept or 
reject the State’s plea offer, and if she rejects it, the State bears the burden of proving at 
 
31 
 
trial that she committed the alleged theft.  As the Supreme Court noted in Bordenkircher, 
in the “give-and-take of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or 
retaliation[,] so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”  434 
U.S. at 363, 98 S. Ct. at 668 (emphasis added).  Here, because Petitioner retains the power 
to accept or reject the State’s plea offer there is no “realistic fear of ‘vindictiveness” from 
the prosecutor’s actions.  
Additionally, as we observed in Goodwin, “[a] prosecutor should remain free before 
trial to exercise broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal 
interest in prosecution.”  457 U.S. at 382, 102 S. Ct. at 2493.  As the State argues, one of 
the reasons the prosecutor may have sought a harsher sentencing recommendation after 
Petitioner noted her de novo appeal was because he obtained new information during the 
District Court proceeding that may have changed his opinion on the appropriate 
punishment.  The State notes that during Petitioner’s allocution in the District Court she 
referred to her actions as “just something that happened, [a] mistake,” despite the fact she 
had multiple convictions and stets for similar crimes of theft.  Based on this lack of apparent 
remorse for her actions, it was well within the State’s discretion to re-assess whether 
recommending a sentence of no incarceration would serve the sentencing goal of 
rehabilitation once Petitioner noted a de novo appeal to the circuit court.   
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we hold that under the basic contract and due process principles that 
govern plea agreements, the District Court plea agreement  did not extend to the de novo 
circuit court proceeding.  We also hold that, although Petitioner’s claim regarding her due 
 
32 
 
process right to avoid prosecutorial vindictiveness in noting a de novo appeal was not 
preserved, under Maryland Rule 8-131(a) we may still consider Petitioner’s claim because 
doing so will not unfairly prejudice either party and considering the issue will provide 
important guidance on the constitutionality of the prosecutor’s conduct during plea 
bargaining in Maryland’s two-tier trial system.  Finally, we hold that because Petitioner 
was free to accept or reject the State’s new plea offer, the prosecutor’s actions did not 
generate an unconstitutional “fear of vindictiveness” that contravened the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR 
ALLEGANY 
COUNTY 
IS 
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 
PETITIONER.
 
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