Title: State v. Hance

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-242


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit

Henry J. Hance                               February Term, 1991


Theodore S. Mandeville, Jr., J.

Marc D. Brierre, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for
  plaintiff-appellee

Kenneth Schatz, Acting Defender General, and Anna E. Saxman, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, Henry Hance, appeals from the trial court's
denial of his motion under V.R.Cr.P. 35 and 13 V.S.A. { 7042 for sentence
reconsideration.  The sole issue is whether a criminal defendant may
expressly waive the right to sentence reconsideration in a plea agreement in
which the State and the defendant jointly agree to a recommended sentence.
We hold that such a waiver is valid and affirm.
     On January 3, 1990, defendant pled no contest to three counts:  selling
cocaine, leaving the scene of an accident, and a third offense of driving
with a suspended license.  His plea was made pursuant to a written
agreement, dated December 1, 1989, and signed by the state's attorney,
defendant and his counsel.  It provided that the state's attorney and
defendant's attorney would jointly recommend a sentence of two-to-six years.
The State agreed to dismiss a fourth offense of driving under the influence
and a third offense of driving with a suspended license.  The agreement
also included the following provision:
         5)  DEFENDANT hereby understands and waives his right
         under 13 V.S.A. { 7042 to request the Court for
         reconsideration of the sentence(s) imposed under this
         agreement, except to the extent that the penalty imposed
         is greater than that recommended by the State herein.
     At the sentencing hearing, defendant's attorney explained that
defendant had agreed to the sentence, argued that the agreement was fair,
and urged the court to impose the agreed-upon sentence.  After determining
that defendant's waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the court
sentenced defendant to two-to-six years' imprisonment:  two-to-five years
for selling cocaine, with six months for driving with a suspended license to
be served concurrently; and zero-to-one year for leaving the scene of an
accident, to be served consecutively.
     On March 26, 1990, defendant filed a motion for sentence
reconsideration, asking that his minimum sentence be reduced by one year.
At the motion hearing, the court concluded that defendant had waived his
right to move for sentence reconsideration under the terms of the plea
agreement and refused to consider the merits of his motion.  This appeal
followed.
     Defendant argues that 13 V.S.A. { 7042 and V.R.Cr.P. 35 create an
absolute right to move for sentence reconsideration and provide no
authorization for waiver of that right and, as a matter of statutory
construction and sound policy, we should not allow such a waiver.  As
defendant concedes, neither the rule nor the statute speaks to this issue.
     At the outset, we note that our decisions authorize a defendant to
waive virtually any right, constitutional or statutory, as long as the
waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Thus, a defendant may waive
the right against self-incrimination, see State v. Caron, ___ Vt. ___, ___,
586 A.2d 1127, 1135 (1990), the right to counsel, see State v. Merrill, ___
Vt. ___, 584 A.2d 1129 (1990), the right to trial by jury, see State v.
Conn, 152 Vt. 99, 102, 565 A.2d 246, 247 (1989), and the right to any trial,
see V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(4).  It would be anomalous for us to allow waiver of
these important constitutional rights and then to deny waiver of a
statutory right to sentence reconsideration.
     Defendant responds to our waiver decisions by urging us to apply the
rationale of State v. Buck, 139 Vt. 310,