Title: Muller v. Muller

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Muller v. Muller1992 WY 123838 P.2d 198Case Number: 92-53Decided: 09/28/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gary 
MULLER, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Pauline 
MULLER, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District Court, SheridanCounty, Hunter Patrick, 
J.

 Fred R. 
Dollison of Shoumaker and Dollison, Sheridan, for appellant. 

Sharon 
L. Kinnison of Holstedt & Kinnison, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     Economic disaster 
attended these litigants' construction company, domestic disharmony followed in 
their marriage and, finally, the wife became seriously ill and in declining 
health. The trial court's effort to resolve these difficulties by an award of 
$100 per month alimony has dissatisfied the husband. He now 
appeals.

 [¶2.]     We affirm the trial 
court.

 [¶3.]     Gary Muller, appellant, 
and Pauline Muller, appellee, had been married for about sixteen years when they 
ended their relationship by a divorce. Three unpleasant occurrences combined to 
create their marital troubles. The construction business which they had operated 
fell into severe financial difficulty, Pauline developed disabling health 
problems, and Gary was accused of developing alternative 
romantic interests.

 [¶4.]     Although not desired by 
the husband, the trial court, in an effort to divide property and address debts, 
directed the general sale of their mutual assets for application to the business 
indebtedness, including federal withholding taxes from which bankruptcy would 
provide no relief. Although the husband's dissatisfaction developed from the 
trial court's direction to sell the business assets, this appeal only presents a 
simple challenge contesting the alimony award to Pauline of $100 per 
month.

 [¶5.]     The need for or 
propriety of the alimony award for Pauline is not an issue, leaving only for our 
resolution the even more confined issue: Did the trial court award alimony when 
the husband had no demonstrable capacity to pay? We resolve this appeal by 
finding absence of abuse of exercised discretion. Clearly the trial court 
considered the total record. Within the conflicting evidence, the trial court 
was entitled to find that the husband, after sixteen years of marriage and with 
his wife in ill health, could obtain adequate income to make a modest alimony 
contribution of $100 per month.

 [¶6.]     Certainties attend few 
human accomplishments and the trial court, in divorce decisions, is entitled to 
recognize reasonable possibilities for decisional purposes. Young v. Young, 472 P.2d 784, 786 (Wyo. 1970). The trial court was not confined 
to the husband's unemployment or potential future unemployment, but was 
justified in considering employment expectancy reasonably created by his 
experience, capability and physical ability. Certainly with the disabling health 
condition of Pauline and her budget "needs" of $1,000 per month, a $100 alimony 
award could not be considered factually excessive.

 [¶7.]     Although alimony may 
not be favored under Wyoming case law, Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731 
(Wyo. 1987); Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Wyo. 1978), 
McClintock dissenting; see also Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo. 
1984) and Young v. Young, 472 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1970), it is specifically 
authorized by statute and recognized to be appropriate under the proper 
circumstances. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1987) provides:

     In granting a divorce, 
the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom 
the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party.[1]

 [¶8.]     In considering alimony 
in a wide variety of factual circumstances, see Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1989); Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814; Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265; Young, 
472 P.2d 784; and Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 (1933), this 
court has stated that in making a just and equitable settlement, judicial 
discretion is not a reward or punishment but simply fairness. Storm v. Storm, 
470 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1970); Beckle v. Beckle, 452 P.2d 205 (Wyo. 
1969).

 [¶9.]     One procedural 
principle, followed by two substantive concepts, has found consistent 
application in Wyoming cases which now direct affirmation of 
this decision. First, the decision for any award of alimony is vested within the 
responsible discretion of the trial court. Underkofler v. Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140 (Wyo. 1992); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 761 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 
1988); Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265; and Young, 472 P.2d 784. In general 
substantive requirement, we are directed by statute and case law to find a 
reasonable ability to pay. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029; Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265; 
Young, 472 P.2d 784; Lonabaugh, 22 P.2d 199. See also Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205 
(Wyo. 
1987).

 [¶10.]  The third concept, as a component of the 
second, provides the specific adjudicatory challenge of this appeal. It is 
whether a reasonable expectancy can be used with the test of demonstrated 
ability to pay to meet the required fairness and equity end result. This 
specific issue has not previously garnered our attention in any designated 
appellate issue, although the generic understanding of the requirement to pay 
criteria has been regularly enforced. See, e.g., Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265; 
Young, 472 P.2d 784; Ramsey v. Ramsey, 76 Wyo. 188, 301 P.2d 377 (1956); and Lonabaugh, 
22 P.2d 199. In Ramsey, the property settlement (alimony) lump sum award was 
modified on appeal into periodic payments to meet an ability to pay standard for 
the husband. In Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 528 (Wyo. 1961), what was constituted in the decree 
to be alimony was reconstructed by this court into part of the property 
settlement for a result defined to be "just and 
equitable."

 [¶11.]  The closest this court came to any 
reasonable expectancy analysis was provided in a property division application. 
In Dice, 742 P.2d 205 and Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, we considered division of 
retirement programs not matured at the time of the divorce. In Storm, 470 P.2d 367, the settlement in lieu of alimony included a future inheritance. We 
said:

     Inasmuch as the 
divorce in this case was sought several months before defendant's expectancy 
matured; and inasmuch as trial was had and the decision of the court announced 
before defendant inherited a half interest in his father's ranch, the 
inheritance must, in equity, be considered the same as future property 
regardless of the exact date of the entry of the final decree. It would not be 
"just and equitable" to consider such property a part of the marital estate and 
in the hands of the court for disposition.

     In speaking of future 
property, we are referring to a prospective expectancy of an estate which may 
come into being in the future as distinguished from future benefits to be 
derived from an estate already in existence.

Id. at 
370.

 [¶12.]  That concept was further advanced in Kane 
v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175 (Wyo. 1978): 

[W]e do 
not question the contention of the defendant that whether a property settlement 
is just and equitable should be determined as of the date the decree was 
entered, but feel compelled to note that the disposition of property of the 
parties is an equitable function of the court, Storm v. Storm, Wyo., 470 P.2d 367 (1970), and that while a mere expectancy cannot be the subject of division, 
a distinction can and must be made between an estate that may come into 
existence in the future and future benefits to be derived from an estate already 
in existence. Here, the Montana ranch is owned by the parties. What 
may happen to it in the future may be somewhat uncertain, but the trial court 
was required to deal with it as a presently existing and material asset of the 
marriage.

 [¶13.]  It is logical to extract from that 
concept an equivalent rule. We approve the reasonable expectancy provided by a 
determinable earning capacity to sustain the minimal alimony provided here. The 
guideline was established by Justice Tobriner, some thirty-one years ago, in a 
California 
appellate decision:

     Instead of narrowly 
circumscribing the trial court to a consideration of the single aspect of the 
husband's current earnings, the cases wisely permit an examination of the total 
situation. * * *

     The argument that at 
the time of the hearing the husband's actual earnings failed to equal the 
awarded amount, and that the order was therefore arbitrary, does not strike a 
new note. It has been heard many times before. Yet the cases have frequently and 
uniformly held that the court may base its decision on the husband's ability to 
earn, rather than his current earnings. If the court were limited to the 
momentary current earnings of a husband, particularly one who was engaged in a 
seasonal industry or whose earnings had widely fluctuated, the court would get a 
distorted view of his financial potential.

Meagher 
v. Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650, 651 (1961); see also In re 
Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 183 Cal.Rptr 508, 511-12, 646 P.2d 179, 
182-83 (1982).

 [¶14.]  In one text, the rule is 
stated:

Earning capacity and other potential income 
- of obligor spouse.

     In the determination 
of alimony, consideration should be given to the obligor spouse's earning 
capacity, future prospects, and probable acquisition of wealth from any source 
whatever.

24 
Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 662 (1983). This rule has a seasoned history 
and application. See, e.g., Smyth v. Smyth, 198 Okla. 478, 179 P.2d 920, 923 (1947) and Hanks 
v. Hanks, 296 N.W.2d 523 (S.D. 1980); cf. Straub v. Straub, 381 N.W.2d 260 (S.D. 
1986); see also Hickland v. Hickland, 39 N.Y.2d 1, 382 N YS.2d 475, 346 N.E.2d 243 (1976).

 [¶15.]  The consistent perspective has also been 
applied to the earning capacity of the recipient spouse to come within, what we 
characterize for this appeal, a reasonable expectancy of earning capacity. In re 
Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 699 P.2d 79 
(1985); Marriage of Cromwell, 180 Mont. 40, 588 P.2d 1010 (1979). Compare Ross 
v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406, 648 P.2d 1119 (1982), where a large 
alimony award was reversed in view of the ex-wife's capacity to go back to 
fruitful employment.

 [¶16.]  Historical earning power can be fairly 
considered in awarding alimony. Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). Similar 
consideration was given to a future expectancy in Matter of Marriage of Klock, 
83 Or. App. 656, 733 P.2d 65 (1987), where both present unemployment 
compensation and future normal craft trade income were considered. A foreseeable 
circumstance case, in reverse application, resulting in award of only nominal 
alimony was found in Standage v. Standage, 147 Ariz. 473, 711 P.2d 612 (App. 
1985). See similarly, with the same one dollar alimony, Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140.

 [¶17.]  Present unemployment of the obligor 
spouse is not preclusive for alimony responsibility. Russell v. Russell, 101 
N.M. 648, 687 P.2d 83 (1984); see also Matter of Marriage of Klock, 733 P.2d 65. 
A realistic business income expectancy test, although not defined in those 
words, was applied in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), where the 
court reversed the alimony award as inequitably inadequate. Adequate business 
income to pay alimony to a sick ex-wife was established despite claimed 
impossibility by In re Marriage of Yadon, 216 Mont. 59, 699 P.2d 75 (1985). The husband was 
awarded the business in a divorce property settlement and its expectant income 
justified a realistic consideration of alimony for the divorced 
spouse.

 [¶18.]  Within the composite perspective of these 
cases, we can find appropriate compliance with the trial court's exercise of 
discretion. No abuse of discretion resulted from the trial court's consideration 
of circumstances of age, working capacity, and period of marriage. When weighed 
in conjunction with the significantly distressed status of the dispossessed 
wife, justification existed for the $100 monthly alimony 
award.

 [¶19.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 1 This court 
has considered a fair number of cases where alimony was granted, denied or 
otherwise considered. In addition to those cited above, these appeals, many of 
which were cited in present briefing, would generally include: Moore v. Moore, 
33 Wyo. 230, 237 P. 235 (1925); Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 
(1933); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 76 Wyo. 188, 301 P.2d 377 (1956); Warren v. Warren, 
361 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1961); Martens v. Martens, 364 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1961); 
Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff, 443 P.2d 524 (Wyo. 1968); Beckle v. Beckle, 452 P.2d 205 (Wyo. 1969); Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1970); Piper v. Piper, 487 P.2d 1062 (Wyo. 1971); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980); Kennedy v. 
Kennedy, 761 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1988); Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 
1989); Williams v. Williams, 817 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 1991). See also Underkofler v. 
Underkofler, 834 P.2d 1140 (Wyo. 1992) (involving $1 
alimony).