Title: Roth v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICHARD F. ROTH, SR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 184, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9901000322 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  October 14, 2013 
Decided:  October 31, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 31st day of October 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s 
motion to withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
In 2001, the defendant-appellant, Richard F. Roth, Sr., was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of one count of Felony Murder, four 
counts of Robbery in the First Degree and related conspiracy and weapon 
charges arising out of the armed robberies of several New Castle County, 
Delaware businesses.  He was sentenced to life in prison on the felony 
murder conviction and to additional terms of incarceration in connection 
 
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with his twelve other convictions.  Roth’s convictions were affirmed by this 
Court on direct appeal.1   
 
(2) 
In 2005, Roth filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in 
the Superior Court.  In 2006, counsel was appointed for Roth.  Roth’s 
counsel filed an amended opening brief asserting claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  That same year, Roth’s two trial attorneys filed 
affidavits responding to those claims and the State filed an answer.  In 2008, 
new counsel was appointed for Roth.  Depositions of Roth’s trial counsel 
and the prosecutor were taken later that year.  An evidentiary hearing was 
held in 2009.  Additional briefing ensued.  On January 6, 2012, the Superior 
Court denied Roth’s postconviction motion.  The Superior Court re-issued 
its order on April 1, 2013 following this Court’s remand, which permitted 
Roth to file a timely appeal.2  This is Roth’s appeal from the Superior 
Court’s judgment.   
 
(3) 
Roth’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
                                                 
1 Roth v. State, 2002 WL 432021 (Del. Mar. 11, 2002). 
2 Roth v. State, 2012 WL 5351204 (Del. Oct. 26, 2012). 
 
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that could arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so 
totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided 
without an adversary presentation.3 
 
(4) 
Roth’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record and the law, there are no arguably appealable 
issues.  By letter, Roth’s counsel informed Roth of the provisions of Rule 
26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the 
accompanying brief and the complete record in the Rule 61 proceedings.  
Roth also was informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s 
presentation.  The record reflects that Roth did not respond to his attorney’s 
request for points for this Court’s consideration.  However, defense counsel 
has submitted for this Court’s consideration the three points originally raised 
in the postconviction proceedings in the Superior Court, a number of 
additional points addressed by the Superior Court in its order denying Roth’s 
postconviction motion as well as points raised by Roth in conversations with 
defense counsel. 
 
(5) 
The points so raised may fairly be summarized as follows: a) 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by 1) failing to prevent the jury 
                                                 
3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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from hearing statements of witnesses who called Roth a “safecracker” and 
mentioned that he was in jail, 2) failing to object to an erroneous jury 
instruction on accomplice liability and 3) stipulating to the admissibility of 
certain DNA evidence; and b) trial counsel further provided ineffective 
assistance by 1) failing to appeal the judge’s refusal to recuse himself, 2) 
refusing to object to a jury sequestration violation, 3) failing to object to the 
continued presence of a certain juror, 4) threatening Roth not to testify, 5) 
refusing to conduct the defense as Roth directed and 6) failing to obtain 
evidence of police perjury.  Roth’s counsel also raises on Roth’s behalf 
various claims of misconduct on the part of the trial judge and the 
prosecutor.  
 
(6) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.4  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.5  The 
                                                 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
5 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
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defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.6 
 
(7) 
In its order denying Roth’s claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the Superior Court acknowledged that Roth’s trial counsel 
committed error by failing to listen to the taped statements of two witnesses 
prior to trial, relying instead on the transcriptions of the tapes.  As a result, 
several comments characterizing Roth as a “safecracker” and as being in jail 
were played to the jury.  Following the playing of the tapes, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial.  The judge denied the motion, but ordered the 
offending portions to be removed from the tapes prior to jury deliberations.  
Defense counsel informed the judge that they did not wish a curative 
instruction to be given.   
 
(8) 
In spite of the acknowledged error on the part of Roth’s 
counsel, the Superior Court determined that, in light of the overwhelming 
evidence against him, Roth had failed to demonstrate that his counsels’ error 
resulted in any prejudice to him.  The Superior Court also acknowledged that 
Roth’s counsel arguably had committed another error by failing to raise the 
judge’s denial of their mistrial motion as an issue on direct appeal.  Again, 
however, the Superior Court determined that, without a demonstration of 
                                                 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
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prejudice, any ineffectiveness claim on that ground was meritless.  We agree 
with the Superior Court’s analysis of those claims and conclude that they 
were properly denied. 
 
(9) 
In the Superior Court proceedings, Roth also claimed that his 
counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the jury instruction on 
accomplice liability and for stipulating to the admissibility of DNA 
evidence.  In its order, the Superior Court again determined that, because the 
jury instruction was, in fact, not erroneous and because whether or not to 
enter into a stipulation regarding evidence that would have been admissible 
in any case was for counsel to make, Roth had failed to demonstrate that his 
counsel had committed error and that, therefore, his ineffectiveness claims 
on those grounds were meritless.  Again, we agree with the Superior Court’s 
analysis of those claims and conclude that they were properly denied. 
 
(10) Also submitted for this Court’s consideration are claims that 
Roth’s trial counsel committed error by failing to object to various rulings 
by the trial judge, failing to obtain certain evidence, failing to conduct the 
defense as Roth wished and threatening Roth not to testify.  Finally, Roth’s 
counsel submits claims of various forms of misconduct on the part of the 
trial judge and the prosecutor.  In its order below, the Superior Court 
addressed each of these points individually and found each to be either 
 
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meritless or procedurally defaulted.7  Once again, we conclude that the 
Superior Court properly denied those additional claims.           
 
(11) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Roth’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Roth’s counsel in this appeal has 
made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has 
properly determined that Roth could not raise a meritorious claim in this 
appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
     
 
                                                 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3).