Title: JOHN T. HILBERT V. HON. JOHN DAVID SEAY, JUDGE, NELSON CIRCUIT COURT, ET AL.

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHE D OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. ixpremP C~nixrf a~ ~~~; RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2008 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 2008-SC-000312-OA JOHN T . HILBERT APPELLANT V . ORIGINAL ACTION IN SUPREME COURT HON . JOHN DAVID SEAY (JUDGE, NELSON CIRCUIT COURT) ET AL APPELLEES MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS Petitioner, John Hilbert, petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition or mandamus prohibiting, on double jeopardy grounds, the Nelson Circuit Court from allowing the Commonwealth to seek the death penalty against him at his retrial for the murder of Joe Stump, Jr . For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the writ of prohibition . Petitioner was indicted on December 23, 1999, for two counts of intentional murder . The two counts in the indictment charged that, on December 18, 1999, Petitioner shot and killed Danny Elmore and Joe Stump, Jr . On November 20, 2001, after a jury trial, a Nelson County jury recommended that Hilbert's punishment for those killings be set at twenty-seven (27) years for the murder of Elmore and, upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance, set Petitioner's punishment for the murder of Stump at confinement in the penitentiary for life without the benefit of probation or parole, until he served a minimum of twenty-five (25) years . As a matter of right, Petitioner directly appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court . Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b) . On May 19, 2005, this Court reversed Petitioner's conviction, citing the failure of the trial court to grant Hilbert's request for a self defense instruction . The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial . The trial court set the trial date for May 12, 2008 . However, in response to Hilbert's request for a stay pursuant to CR 76 .36(4), the trial court granted the stay on May 2, 2008 . On May 5, 2008, this Court granted Petitioner's motion to withdraw the motion for stay of the trial (which had previously been filed in this Court) . Petitioner now seeks interlocutory review of the trial court's order entered on April 24, 2008, denying Hilbert's motion to prohibit the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty upon retrial with respect to the intentional murder of Stump . Petitioner asks this Court for a writ prohibiting the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty against him for the intentional murder of Stump, based on an alleged violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions . U .S . Const . amend . VII I ; Ky . Const . § 13. Specifically, Petitioner contends the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty against a defendant who successfully appealed an earlier conviction and sentence for the same offense where the jury gave meaningful consideration and effect to mitigating evidence, The trial court's order concluded that the Commonwealth was precluded from seeking the death penalty with respect to the murder of Elmore because the jury failed to find an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 as required by the Eighth Amendment, and decided that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not justify imposing a death sentence . Petitioner also argues the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty against a defendant who successfully appealed his conviction and sentence where the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury was an aggravating circumstance that did not exist under state law . In order for Petitioner to obtain the relief sought, he must first establish that his petition has been filed in the proper forum . At the outset, we note that, traditionally, a writ of prohibition will originate in the Court of Appeals, upon the request of such relief . However, this is not to say that the Court of Appeals is the exclusive avenue for seeking such remedy . As we recognized in Russell County, Thus, . Dist . HealthFacilities Corp . v . E hraim McDowell Health, Inc ., 152 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Ky. 2004), the Supreme Court is explicitly vested with the authority to entertain writs of prohibition under both the Kentucky Constitution and the Civil Rules . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(a) vests this Court with the authority to issue all writs necessary to aid our appellate jurisdiction, or to aid in the "complete determination of any cause," or as may otherwise be required "to exercise control of the Court of Justice." Likewise, the Civil Rules establish that an original proceeding may be brought in "an appellate court [and] may be prosecuted only against a judge or agency whose decisions may be reviewed as a matter of right by that appellate court." CR 76.36(1) (emphasis added) . [n]one of the Civil Rules says that an original action may not be prosecuted in the Supreme Court, and the rules that do discuss 3 original actions refer either to "an appellate" or "appropriate" court, or explicitly to the Supreme Court . Thus, even though "[a] petition seeking relief under this rule is normally filed in the Court of Appeals," we can only conclude that the Rules also allow for the prosecution of an original action in this forum . Russell County , 152 S.W.3d at 235 (quoting Kurt A . Phillips, Jr . Kentucky Practice- Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated , Rule 76.36 cmt . 1, at 697 (5th ed . 1995) (emphasis in original) . Therefore, recognizing that this Court has the authority to entertain such writs, the question becomes when is it proper for us to do so? As we have previously recognized, this is not per se a matter of jurisdiction, but rather one of discretion . See Hoskins v . Maricle , 150 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2004) (citing Bender v . Eaton , 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961)) ("The exercise of this authority has no limits except our judicial discretion .") . Bearing in mind the exceptional nature of a writ of prohibition, and that traditionally these proceedings initiate in the Court of Appeals, we are of the mindset that our discretion should extend to their issuance in this Court in extremely limited circumstances . See Martin v. Admin . Office of the Courts , 107 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Ky . 2003) . The preliminary threshold which must be satisfied in order for this Court to exercise its discretion in issuing a writ, is that the underlying decision must be reviewable by this Court as a matter of right . See CR 76.36(1) . In Russell County , we observed that this will typically only occur in a very limited set of circumstances if the petition has been contemporaneously brought before the Court of Appeals . 152 S.W.3d at 235 ("Such occurrence is rare because most decisions of the Court of Appeals are subject only to discretionary review by this Court.") In Russell County , the respondent had initially filed both an original action seeking a writ of prohibition and a motion for relief from the temporary injunction with the Court of Appeals . The Court of Appeals granted his request for stay of the temporary injunction ; however, the writ of prohibition was still pending . Id. at 231-233 . Thereafter, while respondent's writ in the Court of Appeals was still pending, petitioner filed a writ of prohibition in this Court seeking to prohibit enforcement of the Court of Appeals' stay of the temporary injunction . In granting the writ, we concluded that because the petitioner was seeking a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of a temporary stay by the Court of Appeals, and because the original action in the Court of Appeals was still pending, the matter fell within a very narrow class of cases where a writ against the Court of Appeals, filed in the Supreme Court was allowed . Id . at 236 . In so holding, we concluded that when one has filed a writ in the Court of Appeals, but a W is also filed in this Court seeking to prohibit the pending Court of Appeals action, it may be brought before this Court because the Court of Appeals decision with regard to the writ would be appealable as a matter of right . Id . at 235-236 . As noted, however, this is very limited situation and only exists when the underlying writ is already in the Court of Appeals and is still pending . However, another narrow class of petitions exists in which this Court may exercise its discretion with regards to an original action . In St . Clair v. Roark, 10 S .W.3d 482, 485 (Ky . 1999), a defendant filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in this Court seeking to preclude the death penalty as a punishment in the event that he would be subsequently convicted of kidnapping a victim whom he had previously been convicted of murdering . Although we recognized that the kidnapping conviction would not violate double jeopardy, we once again noted that double jeopardy and capital conviction was an appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition petitioned directly to the Supreme Court. Id . In so holding, we reiterated, although double jeopardy is an appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition, it is not mandatory that it be addressed in that context. The court in which the petition is filed may, in its discretion, address the merits of the issue within the context of the petition for the writ, or may decline to do so on grounds that there is an adequate remedy by appeal . Neither approach is mandatory and the exercise of discretion may well depend on the significance of the issue as framed by the facts of the particular case . Likewise, in Salinas v. Payne, 169 S.W.3d 536, 537 (Ky. 2005), petitioner filed a writ of prohibition in this Court seeking to prohibit the trial court from allowing the death penalty to be sought as a potential punishment at his retrial. Therein, we once again noted that a double jeopardy situation concerning capital issues was an appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition filed in this Court. Id. Thus, taking the aforementioned into consideration, we are left with the conclusion that a petition for a writ of prohibition may- but not must - be filed in the Supreme Court, bypassing its traditional forum in the Court of Appeals, when it concerns a decision that may be reviewed by this Court as a matter of right. Assuredly, this concerns instances wherein the death penalty is being sought and double jeopardy is the issue. See Salinas, 169 S.W.3d at 537; see also St. Clair, 10 S.W .3d at 485. However, and of significant import, this does not include all decisions appealable to this Court as a matter of right. Although Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) also vests this Court with the authority to review every criminal conviction resulting in a sentence over twenty (20) years, we resolutely reject the 6 notion that every criminal case in which the prosecution is seeking such sentence may likewise be directly petitioned to the Supreme Court . All writs of prohibition which do not concern capital matters should continue to be addressed in the Court of Appeals as we will not speculate about the potential sentence which a jury may or may not assess at a later point in the proceeding . Therefore, this Court may choose to exercise its discretion to entertain as an original action a petition for a writ of prohibition in 1) capital cases involving double jeopardy and 2) that narrow class of cases involving petitions in this Court sought to address pending petitions in the Court of Appeals, as outlined in Russell County , when 3) they satisfy the requirements as set forth in the seminal case on the matter, Hoskins v . Maricle , 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004), which states, A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted . (emphasis in original) . Having determined that the facts of this particular case frame a significant issue very well i.e., the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Kentucky capital cases and the sufficiency of a finding of an aggravating circumstance within the KRS 532 .025 requirements, we exercise our discretion and substantively address the merits of Petitioner's argument. Sufficiency of the Jury Verdict Pursuant to KRS 532 .025, in order for a defendant to be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole (LWOP), or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years (LWOP- 25), the trier of fact must find one of the specifically enumerated aggravating circumstances listed .2 The aggravating circumstance relevant to the case-at-bar is KIRS 532.025(2)(a)(6), which reads : "[t]he offender's act or acts of killing were intentional and resulted in multiple deaths ." Here, for the aggravator, the jury, on the penalty phase verdict form, wrote : "[t]he defendants acts of killing was intentional" [sic](emphasis added) . Petitioner, inter afla, contends that the incomplete penalty phase verdict statement serves as an affirmative finding that the Commonwealth failed to prove one or more aggravating circumstances, thereby precluding the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty upon retrial . However, the Commonwealth notes the jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of intentional murder in the guilt phase and cites federal law for the proposition that a jury can find the required aggravating circumstances in either the guilt phase or the penalty phase . see Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U .S . 231, 245-246 (1988) ; Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-972 (1994) . In making its ruling on matter, the trial court compared the jury's written aggravating circumstance in this case to the situation in Salinas v . Commonwealth , which held that "[i]f the jury has found that evidence of an aggravating circumstance was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but chooses to impose a sentence of less than death, the Commonwealth cannot be precluded, on double jeopardy grounds, from seeking the full range of penalties, including death, upon retrial ." Salinas, 169 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Ky . 2005) . After its 2 The statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances are listed in KIRS 532 .025(2)(a)-(b) 8 Salinas analysis, the trial court held the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude the Commonwealth from seeking death at Petitioner's retrial, specifically citing four decisive factors to its decision ; 1) the trial court found it "clear" that the jury attempted to state an aggravating circumstance, 2) the jury foreman wrote the incomplete aggravating circumstance on the corresponding empty line on the verdict form for the aggravating factor to be written, 3) the words the jury foreman wrote on the verdict form were words contained in the one aggravating factor available to the jury as set out in the court's instructions to the jury, and 4) the trial court's belief that if the error had been noticed upon the return of the verdict, and if the court had provided the jury with an opportunity to correct the finding, the circumstances indicate the jury would have revised what it had first written to conform to the aggravating factor set out elsewhere in the instructions . Commonwealth v . Hilbert , No . 99-CR-00140 (Nelson Cir. Ct., Order dated April 28, 2008, at 3) . Petitioner, however, contends the situation at hand is unlike Salinas and, as such, the trial court committed reversible error . We begin with a general statement of our standard of review. Legal issues will be reviewed de novo . see Sherfey v . Sherfey , 74 S .W.3d 777 (Ky . App . 2002). A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. see Black Motor Co . v . Greene , 385 S .W.2d 954, 956 (Ky.1964) . Substantial evidence has been conclusively defined by Kentucky courts as that which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person . Secretary, Labor Cabinet v_Boston Gear, Inc., a Div . of IMO Industries Inc. , 25 S .W .3d 130, 134 (Ky. 2000) . In reviewing the sufficiency of the verdict, we must "review the evidence . . . to determine whether it is sufficient, when considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, for a reasonable jury to fairly find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moody v . Commonwealth , 170 S.W.3d 393 (Ky . 2005) In the instant case, we note that the intention of the jury on the penalty phase verdict form is a finding of fact; therefore, the trial court's finding of the jury's intention should not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Under this standard, we find substantial evidence in the record which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person that the jury intended to find a statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstance . We find it determinative that 1) the jury did in fact attempt to state a valid aggravating circumstance, KRS 532.025(2)(a)(6), 2) the jury foreman wrote the incomplete aggravating circumstance on the corresponding empty line on the verdict form where the aggravating circumstances were supposed to be written, 3) the words the jury foreman wrote on the verdict form were words contained in the only aggravating circumstance available to the jury as set out in the court's instructions to the jury, and 4) the jury stated "the defendants [sic] acts of killing were intentional ;" acts is plural and Hilbert was being tried for multiple murders, the murders of Elmore and Stump, for both of which, he was found guilty by the same jury. Therefore, in our review, we can only conclude that the jury's election to delete the word "act" and use only the word "acts of killing" in the sentencing phase of a trial wherein they had found the Appellant guilty of two murders, amply demonstrates their intentional finding that the "acts" were intentional and resulted in multiple deaths. 1 0 Thus, the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the jury's penalty phase verdict form . Double Jeopardy Because the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the jury's penalty phase verdict form, the question becomes whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the retrial of a death-eligible defendant when the jury finds an aggravating circumstance in the first trial, yet they do not elect the death penalty and the conviction is later reversed . The Double Jeopardy question presented in the case-at-bar provides another opportunity to examine and compare the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Bullington v. United States , 451 U .S . 430, 101 S.Ct 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), Arizona v. Rumsey , 467 U .S . 203, 1 04 S .Ct . 2305, 81 L .Ed .2d 164 (1984), and its progeny with this Court's ruling in Commonwealth v . Eldred, 973 S .W.2d 43 (Ky . 1998) . In Bullington , a capital case, the defendant was tried by a Missouri jury which found him guilty of murder during guilt phase deliberation, in addition to finding the statutorily required enumerated aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death penalty. Notwithstanding the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, the jury recommended Bullington receive a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Missouri's only statutorily authorized punishment for capital murder other than the imposition of the death penalty . Bullin ton , 451 U .S . at 432, 101 S.Ct . at 1854 (citing Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565 .008 .1 (1978))3 3 Section 565.008 .1 of the Missouri Statutes reads, in pertinent part:"Persons 11 Bullington moved for a new trial or judgment of acquittal . During his appeal process, the United States Supreme Court decided Duren v . Missouri , 439 U.S . 357, 99 S .Ct . 664, 58 L.Ed .2d 579 (1979), which held that "Missouri's constitutional and statutory provisions allowing women to claim automatic exemption from jury service deprived a defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community." Bullington , 451 U .S . at 436, 101 S .Ct . at 1856 . Accordingly, Bullington's request for a new trial was granted . At retrial, the prosecution again sought the death penalty, relying on the same aggravating circumstances introduced into evidence during the first trial . Defendant sought to preclude the prosecution from again trying to impose the death penalty claiming the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the imposition of the death penalty when the first jury had declined to impose the death sentence . Id. at 436, 101 S .Ct . at 1857 . After working its way up the Missouri appellate system, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari . The Supreme Court began its analysis with the "well established [principle] that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted of the crime charged ." (emphasis in original) Id. at 437, 101 S .Ct . at 1857 . They noted : This Court, however, has resisted . attempts to extend that principle to sentencing . The imposition of a convicted of the offense of capital murder shall, if the judge or jury so recommends after complying with the provisions of sections 565.006 and 565.012, be punished by death . If the judge or jury does not recommend the imposition of the death penalty on a finding of guilty of capital murder, the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment by the division of corrections during his natural life and shall not be eligible for probation or parole until he has served a minimum of fifty years of his sentence." 1 2 particular sentence usually is not regarded as an 'acquittal' of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed . The Court generally has concluded, therefore, that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside . Id . at 438, 101 S .Ct . at 1857-1858 . Conversely, it is also well-settled that "the established rule that there is no double jeopardy bar to retrying a defendant who has succeeded in overturning his conviction ." Id . at 438, 101 S.Ct. at 1858 . The latter rule "rests on the premise that the original conviction has been nullified and the slate wiped clean . Therefore, if the defendant is convicted again, he constitutionally may be subjected to whatever punishment is lawful . . . [.]" Id . at 442, 101 S . Ct . at 1860 . However, in normal sentencing proceedings, "it is impossible to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum 'constitute[s] a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case."' Id . at 443, 101 S .Ct . at 1860 . Yet, "[b]y enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence . . . Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has `proved its case."' Id. at 443, 101 S .Ct. at 1860 . In other words, by enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, a jury verdict that sentences a defendant to less that the statutorily authorized maximum penalty of death does serve as an "implied acquittal" of the death penalty and, as such, the prosecution is precluded from re-seeking the death penalty upon retrial, contrary to the "clean slate" concept embodied in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U .S . 711, 89 S.Ct . 2072, 23 L.Ed .2d 656 (1969) . 13 This Court, in Eldred , considered the application of Bullington to Kentucky's capital sentencing procedures, specifically whether Bullington "precludes the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty at a defendant's retrial, where during the penalty phase of the defendant's first trial the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of a statutory aggravating factor but did not recommend a sentence of death ." Eldred , 973 S .W.2d at 44 . In Eldred , the jury that convicted Eldred found, in writing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Commonwealth proved the existence of one of the statutorily enumerated aggravating factors : that the murder for which Eldred was convicted was committed for profit . However, even with their finding of an aggravating factor, the jury nonetheless recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole for twenty five years (LWOP-25), which the trial court then imposed . We thereafter reversed for other reasons . Upon retrial, the Commonwealth again sought the death penalty . Citing Bullington and Rumsey , Eldred argued that seeking the death penalty after a previous jury recommended a sentence of less than death violated the Double Jeopardy Clause . Id . The trial court agreed and prohibited the Commonwealth from re-seeking the death penalty . The Commonwealth's appeal brought the matter before this Court . Id. We began our analysis in Eldred by stating the general Double Jeopardy rule promulgated by Stroud v. United States , 251 U.S . 15, 40 S.Ct . 50, 64 L.Ed . 103 (1919) and its progeny, indicating that "the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent a defendant whose conviction is reversed from receiving a more 1 4 severe sentence upon retrial than he received at his first trial ." Id . Thereafter, we concluded that "[a]t the heart of the [Bulling-ton] Court's reasoning was that the Missouri capital sentencing procedure explicitly required a jury,to determine whether the prosecution had 'proved its case."' Id. at 45 . Subsequent cases make clear that "the case" that the prosecution failed to prove in Bullington was whether Bullington deserved the death penalty . Id. at 45 ; see Poland v . Arizona , 476 U.S . 147,153 n.3,106 S.Ct. 1749, 1854 n.3, 90 L.Ed.2d 123, 131 n.3 (1986) . Thus, the key question before the Court is "whether Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure so closely resembles Missouri's capital sentencing procedure that [Hilbert's] sentence of Life-25 at his first trial precludes the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty at [his] retrial, due to the Commonwealth's failure to prove that [he] deserved the death penalty at his first trial." Eldred , 973 S.W.2d at 45 . In comparing Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure with Missouri's capital sentencing procedure, we looked to the reasoning of Arizona v . Rumsev, 467 U .S . 203,104 S.Ct . 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) . In Rumsev , a case which reaffirmed Bullington , the U .S . Supreme Court identified the characteristics of Missouri's capital sentencing procedures that, for Double Jeopardy purposes, made it comparable to a trial ; 1) the limited discretion of the sentencer (the jury is limited to only two options, life or death) and 2) the guidance of the sentencer.4 4 The Rumsev Court recognized the critical importance of guiding the sentencer, and identified procedures to ensure proper guidance : "The sentencer must make the decision guided by detailed statutory standards defining aggravating and mitigating circumstances ; in particular, death may not be imposed unless at least one aggravating circumstance is found, whereas death must be imposed if there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance sufficiently substantial to call for leniency . The sentencer must 1 5 Rumsev at 209-210, 104 S.Ct. At 2309-2310, 81 L.Ed . 2D at 170-171 . We then distinguish Kentucky's capital sentencing procedures from the Missouri and Arizona capital sentencing procedures . Although we observed many similarities between Kentucky's capital sentencing procedures and Missouri's, we noted a "discernible and relevant difference between Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure and the procedures of Missouri and Arizona, is that, under Kentucky's procedure, the jury is not restricted to only two choices in the range of punishment that it may recommend . In Kentucky, upon finding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, the jury may recommend death, life without possibility of parole for 25 years, life imprisonment, or a term of years not less than 20 years ." Eldred , 973 S.W.2d at 45-46 (citing KRS 532.030(1)) . Moreover, they are not bound to recommend death absent the finding of a mitigating circumstance . Eldred then examined the applicability of Bullington to Kentucky's capital sentencing procedures basing our decision, in part, on their differing nature . We concluded "the BullincLton exception to the general rule of Stroud and Pearce can be viewed as resting on either of two alternative grounds : 1) [the Burks exception;] that unless the State produces sufficient evidence to support the death penalty at a defendant's first trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the State from seeking the death penalty at retrial; and/or 2) [the Green make findings with respect to each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing hearing involves the submission of evidence and the presentation of argument . The usual rules of evidence govern the admission of evidence of aggravating circumstances, and the State must prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt." Rumsev at 209-210, 104 S .Ct . at 2309-2310, 81 L.Ed . 2d at 170-171 (emphasis added) . 16 exception;] that a sentence of less than death acts as an implied acquittal of death penalty ." Id . at 47 . Upon applying the Bullington exception to Kentucky's capital sentencing procedures, we determined that the procedures in the cases that buttressed Bullington , Burks and Green, were distinguishable from our procedures ; therefore, Bullington did not apply to Kentucky's capital sentencing procedures . To distinguish Burks , we noted that before the death penalty can be imposed in Kentucky, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating factor, and the jury must designate any aggravating factors in writing . KRS 532.025(3) . In addition, we noted that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving the existence of the statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances required by KRS 532.025(3) to impose the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt . Lastly, we looked at the trial court proceedings in the initial Eldred trial and concluded that, because the jury found in writing the presence of a statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstance, murder for profit, the prosecution objectively carried its burden . Therefore, because there was an express jury verdict finding the presence of an aggravating factor, we concluded "the insufficiency of evidence exception of Burks has no application to this case or to Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure when there has been an express finding of the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt." Eldred , 973 S .W.2d at 47 . We then distinguished Green . Noting both Missouri's and Arizona's capital sentencing procedures left the sentencer with only two choices, life or death, we reasoned the "either/or decision of death or life lends itself fairly well to an 1 7 analogy between a decision of guilt or innocence by the jury, and, thus, by further analogy to the implied acquittal exception of Green . However, the same extended analogy is a poor fit with Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure." Id . In Eldred , the reason Bullington is inapplicable to either this case or to Kentucky capital sentencing in general is because "[u]nder Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure, the issue before the jury is not whether death is an appropriate sentence, but rather, the issue is what sentence is appropriate for the defendant. Even if the jury finds the existence of an aggravating factor, the jury may still recommend a sentence within the entire range of possible sentences." Id.; see Marlowe v. Commonwealth , 709 S .W .2d 424, 432, cert. denied, 479 U .S . 946, 107 S.Ct. 427, 93 L.Ed.2d 378 (Ky . 1986) . Because the jury can select from a wider range of punishments than just life or death, we stated "Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure does not have this particular hallmark of a trial on guilt or innocence in common with the capital sentencing procedures found in Missouri and Arizona." Id. Further, we recognized that "[t]aken to its extreme, the implied acquittal theory results in any sentence being an implied acquittal of any higher sentence . . . [and] [w]e reject any such outcome out of hand ." Id . at 48 . Thus, because the procedural hallmarks that were so decisive in Bullington are not present in Kentucky's capital sentencing procedures, Eldred embodies the Double Jeopardy standard in this Commonwealth . Petitioner's reliance on Bullington is, therefore, misplaced and we are not disposed to reconsider our logic and holding in Eldred . Thus, because the jury in Hilbert's trial did find a statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstance beyond a 1 8 reasonable doubt, in writing, and because Hilbert was sentenced to less than death in the trial does not serve as an "implied acquittal" of that sentence, we find there is no Double Jeopardy violation with Commonwealth's seeking the death penalty at Petitioner's retrial. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's writ is hereby denied . Minton, C.J ., Cunningham, Noble, Schroder and Scott, JJ ., concur. Abramson, J ., concurs in result only . Venters, J ., not sitting . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : James Sutton Rhorer Assistant Public Advocate Dept . of Public Advocacy 1001 Center St . Ste. 301 Bowling Green, KY 42101 Nancy Bowman-Denton Assistant Public Advocate Dept. of Public Advocacy P.O . Box 628 Elizabethtown, KY 42702 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Susan Roncarti Lenz Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601 Arch Cox Mckay III Assistant Commonwealth Attorney 116 E . Stephen Foster Ave . Bardstown, KY 40004