Title: Ex Parte Perry

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

586 So. 2d 242 (1991)
Ex parte Waylon Dwight PERRY.
(Re Waylon Dwight Perry v. State).
89-1534.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 19, 1991.
Rehearing Denied June 7, 1991.
*244 Richard M. Payne and Pamela Wilkinson Tucker, Scottsboro, for Waylon Dwight Perry.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
KENNEDY, Justice.
Waylon Dwight Perry was convicted of capital murder, and the trial court, accepting the jury's recommendation, sentenced Perry to life imprisonment without parole. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Perry v. State, 586 So. 2d 236 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). We granted certiorari review to address one issue: Whether DNA evidence, which was used to identify Perry as the perpetrator of the crime, is admissible in Alabama. The Court of Criminal Appeals held it admissible. ("DNA" stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. DNA exists in the nucleus of most cells of the body; it is unique to the individual, except in the case of identical twins.)
In July 1988 Bryce Wallace was strangled to death in his house. When law enforcement officers investigated, they found bloodstains on Wallace's clothing and on the front doorknob of Wallace's house. Those bloodstains were later analyzed with a procedure called "DNA print analysis" by Lifecodes Corporation ("Lifecodes"), a New York corporation that performs DNA tests in relation to criminal and paternity lawsuits.
In October 1988 Perry was indicted for Wallace's murder, and in December 1988 he was tried for that offense. The record does not indicate when Perry discovered that Lifecodes had performed the DNA print analysis. By the time the case went to trial, however, Perry's lawyers apparently knew that the State might attempt to introduce that DNA evidence, because, when the State, at the beginning of its case, requested that two Lifecodes scientists be allowed to testify out of order, Perry's lawyers knew who they were and had a cross-examination prepared. Perry's trial lawyers never asked for a hearing outside the presence of the jury to challenge the admissibility of the DNA evidence.
At trial the State called as its first two witnesses Joanne Squeglia and Dr. Kevin McElfresh. Squeglia testified at some length concerning how she performed the DNA testing procedures comparing the DNA of the individual whose blood was on Wallace and on Wallace's front doorknob to Perry's DNA. Dr. McElfresh, the assistant manager of Lifecodes' forensics laboratory, testified that he interpreted the results of the tests Squeglia performed. Dr. McElfresh explained the procedures that Lifecodes normally performs in DNA analysis; when the State asked Dr. McElfresh to state the conclusions that he drew from that analysis, Perry's attorney objected, with this statement:
Dr. McElfresh testified that Perry's DNA "matched" the DNA of the blood found on Wallace and on Wallace's front doorknob. We refer to this testimony as testimony concerning DNA "matching" evidence. Dr. McElfresh also testified that based on a certain chromosome pattern, the probability of finding similar DNA was 1 in 209,100,000. We refer to this testimony as evidence of "DNA population frequency statistics."
Perry argues that the trial court erred by submitting the DNA evidence to the jury without first holding a hearing outside the presence of the jury as to its admissibility. Such a hearing is necessary, Perry argues, because, the trial court otherwise is presuming that the evidence is admissible, *245 although DNA evidence is novel scientific evidence that this Court has never held to be admissible. Such a holding, Perry contends, turns the only contention about the DNA evidence to an argument over its proper weight without ever addressing the threshold issue of admissibility.
The State contends that Perry never requested a hearing outside the jury's presence concerning the DNA evidence and that Perry did not object to the introduction of the evidence until the State asked Dr. McElfresh to give his opinions and conclusions concerning the DNA print analysis. The record supports that contention. Perry objected to the admission of Dr. McElfresh's testimony based on the DNA print analysis that identified his blood as the blood on Wallace's body and on Wallace's front doorknob, however. Perry's objection may be viewed as ambiguousit says in substance that Dr. McElfresh's testimony is inadmissible because Lifecodes' "test" has not been proved "trustworthy," but it does not explain specifically what Perry challenges about Lifecodes' DNA print analysisbut inasmuch as it challenges the admissibility of the DNA evidence because such evidence has not previously been held admissible by this Court and because there is the possibility that DNA testing can produce flawed results, it preserves those issues for review.
Many courts have stated that the general scientific theory underlying DNA print analysis is almost universally accepted in the scientific community. See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990); People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup.Ct.1989); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn.1989); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1988). That underlying scientific theory was well explained in Castro, 144 Misc.2d at 961-63, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 988-89:
Techniques for implementing DNA print analysis based on the theory above have also been discussed by other courts. In Schwartz, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
*247 "Three commercial laboratories in the United States currently perform DNA analysis: Cellmark (the company that did the testing in this case) Lifecodes Corporation, and Cetus Corporation. Both Cellmark and Lifecodes employ restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis in their DNA testing. RFLP analysis involves the following steps:
447 N.W.2d  at 425. Schwartz's description of the procedures involved in the DNA print analysis technique employed by Lifecodes is consistent with Dr. McElfresh's description of the same techniques.
The interpretation of the autorads is the basis for DNA "matching" evidence and DNA population frequency statistical evidence. Castro, 144 Misc.2d at 967, 545 N.Y.S.2d  at 992, provides this explanation concerning interpretation of autorads:
144 Misc.2d at 967, 545 N.Y.S.2d  at 992.
In Alabama, whether novel scientific evidence is admissible is determined normally by using the test established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). In Frye, a criminal defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning a systolic blood pressure lie detector test. In affirming the trial court's exclusion of the evidence, the court wrote:
293 F.  at 1014.
Other courts have discussed what Frye requires to permit the introduction of DNA evidence and whether the Frye requirements should be modified somewhat in relation to the admission of DNA evidence. Cf. State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990); State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781 (S.C.1990); Castro; Cobey v. State, 80 Md.App. 31, 559 A.2d 391 (1989); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.1990). For example, in Castro, the court, addressing the admissibility of DNA evidence, wrote:
144 Misc.2d at 959-60, 545 N.Y.S.2d  at 987-88.
In Two Bulls, a case of first impression in the federal circuit courts, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a standard similar to Castro's. After holding that Frye and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would require the establishment of similar foundations to allow the admission of DNA evidence, the court wrote:
918 F.2d  at 61.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, addressing the admissibility of DNA testing, described its modified Frye standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence:
Pennington, 393 S.E.2d  at 853.
Each of the cases from which we have quoted, as well each case that we have reviewed concerning the admissibility of DNA evidence, including cases from jurisdictions that do not follow Frye, note one similar concern with the admission of the evidence: however accepted and proper the scientific theory underlying DNA evidence analysis is, and however acceptable the techniques for DNA testing based on that theory, there remains the possibility for error in the interpretation and performance of the tests. Caldwell; Pennington; Ford; Castro; Schwartz; Cobey; Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S. Ct. 759, 107 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1990); Andrews; People v. Harbold, 124 Ill.App.3d 363, 79 Ill.Dec. 830, 464 N.E.2d 734 (1984); Two Bulls. As the court in Castro said, "`Perhaps the most important flaw in the Frye test is that by focusing attention on the general acceptance issue, the test obscures critical problems in the use of a particular technique.'" 144 Misc.2d at 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d  at 987, quoting Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence; *250 Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Col.L.Rev. 1197, 1201 (1980). As regards the concern for the problems in the use of a particular technique, the sole source of disagreement seems to be whether Frye or some other source of law requires that for DNA evidence to be admissible, it must be shown that there was no error in the interpretation and performance of the tests.
We do not determine whether it is Frye's standard of "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" that makes it a requisite to admissibility to prove that there was no error in the interpretation and performance of the tests. Like every other court that has addressed the admissibility of DNA evidence, we recognize the possibility of error in the interpretation and performance of the tests as a legitimate concern, however. Accordingly, considering both this concern and the Frye test, we hold that the following three-pronged test, substantially similar to that announced in Castro, is the test by which to determine the admissibility of the contested evidence:
We believe that our statement of the third prong says in substance what the court in Castro meant.
Prong I: The theory.
Considering both the record in this case and the holdings of other courts that have addressed this issue, we hold that as to the DNA "matching" evidence there is a theory, generally accepted in the scientific community, that supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable results. Caldwell; Pennington; Ford; Castro; Schwartz; Spencer; Andrews; see also People v. Wesley, 140 Misc.2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1988). We described that theory earlier. As we explain in detail presently, we do not hold that this portion of the test was met concerning the DNA population frequency statistical evidence (e.g., in Perry's case, Dr. McElfresh's testimony that the probability of finding similar DNA was 1 in 209,100,000).
Prong II: Techniques.
Considering the holdings of other courts that have addressed this issue, we hold that there are current techniques that are capable of producing reliable results in DNA "matching" and that are generally accepted in the scientific community. Caldwell; Ford; Pennington; Castro; Schwartz; Spencer; Andrews. Again, we do not hold that this portion of the test was met concerning DNA population frequency evidence.
The third prong asks: In this particular case, did the testing laboratory perform generally accepted scientific techniques without error in the performance or interpretation of the tests?
In order to answer this question, we must make two inquiries. First, were the techniques used by the testing laboratory generally accepted in the scientific community? Second, was there error in the performance or interpretation of the tests?
Regarding the first inquiry, we recognize and are almost persuaded by the holdings in other cases that have involved the question whether Lifecodes' techniques are generally accepted in the scientific community. In each instance, Lifecodes' techniques were held to be generally accepted in the scientific community. Caldwell; Ford; Castro; Spencer; Andrews. The *251 record before us does not support such a holding, however. Apart from specific testimony on the "Southern transfer" portion of the procedures used by Lifecodes (step 4 in the description of DNA analysis, supra), Squeglia and Dr. McElfresh testified in a limited, conclusory manner that the techniques they used were generally accepted in the scientific community. Considering the import of this issue, we will not hold that that testimony of Squeglia and Dr. McElfresh, who both have an obvious interest in validating Lifecodes' techniques, was sufficient to support a holding that those techniques are generally accepted in the scientific community.
We note that if in the future it is proved to this Court that certain techniques are generally accepted in the scientific community and then those same techniques are exclusively used in other cases, it may be possible to hold as a matter of law that the techniques are generally accepted in the scientific community.
The evidence in the record before us is not sufficient for us to determine whether there was error in the performance or interpretation of the tests.[1] Perry cross-examined Dr. McElfresh on this issue, but Perry did not provide his own evidence to establish that there was error in the performance or the interpretation of the tests. The cases that we have discussed in relation to other issues of admissibility strongly suggest that DNA evidence can meet every other requirement of admissibility but nevertheless fail on this requirement. Caldwell; Ford; Castro; Schwartz; Pennington; Two Bulls. Caldwell and Castro exemplify this.
In Caldwell, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed a defendant's "concerns [about] Lifecodes' quality control [and] the manner in which it declares a `match.'" 260 Ga. at 279, 393 S.E.2d  at 437. Addressing those concerns, the court wrote:
260 Ga. at 286-87, 393 S.E.2d  at 441-42. The court ultimately concluded that in Caldwell Lifecodes' declaration of a "match" was proper. 260 Ga. at 288-89, 393 S.E.2d  at 443.
In Castro, the court held a portion of the DNA evidence admissible and a portion inadmissible because Lifecodes, the testing laboratory, had made errors in the performance of the tests. The court discussed potential problems with the performance and interpretation of DNA tests:
144 Misc.2d at 969-70, 545 N.Y.S.2d  at 993-94.
Finally, in regard to whether there was error in the performance or interpretation of the tests, we note that this challenge to admissibility will be available even if the challenge under the first portion of the third prong is determined as a matter of law.
To summarize our discussion of the third prong of the admissibility test, we hold that the evidence in the record before us is insufficient for us to determine whether there was error under either of the two inquiries that must be addressed in the third prong of the analysis. As in the preceding sections, we do not address our discussion in this section to the DNA population frequency statistical evidence.
Dr. McElfresh testified that in his analysis to determine whether Perry's blood "matched" the blood found on Wallace's clothing and front doorknob, he examined three sets of chromosome groupings. In relation to that testimony, Dr. McElfresh also testified:
Courts addressing the admissibility of DNA evidence have distinguished between the admission of testimony that one sample of DNA "matches" another sample of DNA (the kind of testimony discussed in other sections of this opinion) and the admission of testimony concerning the frequency with which a given DNA pattern might occur statistically or might occur in a given population, which we denominate "DNA population frequency statistics." See, e.g., Caldwell; Castro; Schwartz; Harbold; Two Bulls. We explain presently why proper proof of DNA population frequency statistics requires additional evidence from DNA "matching" evidence.
We use the same three-pronged test that we stated earlier for testing the admissibility of evidence of DNA population frequency statistics. Restated specifically for this purpose, the test is:
The entire foundation for Dr. McElfresh's statistical testimony was his testimony that "We have a database of blood samples from all over the country and we *254 ask the question have we ever seen bands in this position.... We have asked the question `How many people would we have to look at before we saw another person like this?'" Such limited, conclusory evidence is insufficient to allow admissibility under any of the individual parts of the test stated above, much less all of it.
There are both scientific/mathematical and legal reasons for distinguishing between the admissibility of DNA "matching" evidence and the admissibility of DNA population frequency statistics. Stated simply, the evidence necessary to show a "match" does not by itself indicate the frequency with which a given DNA pattern might occur statistically or might occur in a given population; to establish population frequency generally requires data on the relevant populations involved as well as data for the mathematical, statistical analysis.
The legal reasons for distinguishing between the admissibility of DNA "matching" evidence and the admissibility of DNA population frequency statistics involve the potential impact of the population frequency testimony on the jury: DNA "matching" testimony may say that everyone's DNA is unique, but the impact of that testimony is not as strong as quantitatively stating that 1 in 209,100,000 people might have DNA similar to the DNA in the blood found at the scene of the killing. In Schwartz, the Minnesota Supreme Court, addressing DNA population frequency statistics, wrote:
447 N.W.2d  at 428.
We agree with Schwartz's assessment that DNA population frequency evidence creates a "potentially exaggerated impact on the trier of fact." We are concerned that the testimony unduly encourages the trier of fact in its determination of whether the State has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to focus solely upon a numerical conclusion and to disregard the weight of other evidence. See Harbold, 124 Ill.App.3d at 382-83, 79 Ill.Dec. at 845, 464 N.E.2d  at 749.
These concerns can be properly addressed in an analysis of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Even if population frequency statistics are otherwise admissible under the test set out in this discussion, if the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighs its probative value, the evidence is not admissible. Ex parte Smith, 581 So. 2d 531 (Ala.1991). See also Two Bulls, at 61 (trial court should determine "whether statistics used to determine the probability of someone else having the same genetic characteristics is more probative than prejudicial under [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 403").
Procedures for challenging DNA evidence.
Earlier, we stated that Perry contends that the trial court erred by submitting the DNA evidence to the jury without first holding a hearing concerning its admissibility. As we explain presently, we do not hold that the trial court has necessarily erred.
We do hold, however, that if the admissibility of DNA evidence is challenged, *255 the trial court should conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to address the considerations raised in this opinion. That hearing can be conducted either as a preliminary hearing or when the court chooses, but it should be held outside the presence of the jury, because the admissibility of the evidence is what is challenged. This is not an unusual or unduly burdensome procedure; trial courts routinely hear motions in limine prior to the offer of evidence at trial and routinely conduct evidentiary hearings. See Two Bulls, at 60.
DNA evidence is discoverable, at least by the defendant. The defendant's fair trial and due process rights, Art. I, § 6, Alabama Constitution, as well as Rule 16.1, A.R.Crim.P., clearly require that the prosecution allow the defendant access to the DNA evidence. See also Schwartz, 427-28. Discovery by the State of DNA evidence in the possession of the defendant should be conducted in accordance with Rule 16.2, A.R.Crim.P.
To produce uniformly sufficient information to allow a proper, well-informed determination of the admissibility of DNA evidence and to produce uniformity in DNA evidentiary hearings, we further suggest the following guidelines, which we take substantially from Castro, 144 Misc.2d at 978-79, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999:
Perry has not proved that the trial court committed reversible error; the State did not prove that either the DNA matching evidence or the population frequency statistical evidence was admissible under the tests established in this opinion. Normally, if the appellant does not prove reversible error, we simply affirm the judgment. Because of the novelty of the issues presented in this case, because only with this opinion have we established methods for admitting DNA evidence in Alabama, because the record does not sufficiently indicate whether the evidence was admissible, and considering the potentially devastating impact on Perry's defense caused by the DNA evidence presented at trial, we remand this cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals with instructions for it to remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of *256 both the DNA "matching" evidence and the DNA population frequency statistical evidence. If the trial court determines that either the "matching" evidence or the population frequency statistical evidence is inadmissible, then the admission of the testimony was improper and the trial court should enter an order granting Perry a new trial. If the trial court determines that the contested evidence is admissible under the tests prescribed in this opinion, it should then determine if the admission was otherwise proper. It should then enter an appropriate order, either modifying or leaving undisturbed its judgment of conviction.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
[1]  We are aware of the testimony of Squeglia and Dr. McElfresh that a DNA test cannot indicate a match when there is no match, because the test will simply fail to provide any results if it is improperly performed. Similar claims were made by scientists in Wesley, Andrews, and Castro. From these statements, the State contends that a match, if made, cannot be flawed. We strongly reject both this contention and the testimony supporting it as hyperbole. Our discussion, particularly of Castro and of Caldwell, indicates that there can be errors in both the performance of the tests and their interpretation, both of which can lead to an improper "match."