Title: People v. Maultsby

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 1/5/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S182042 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C060532 
WILLIAM FREDERICK MAULTSBY, 
) 
 
 
) 
Yolo County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 08868 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
Under Penal Code1 section 1237.5, a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo 
contendere generally may not appeal his felony conviction without obtaining a 
certificate of probable cause.  In this case, defendant was convicted by a jury of a 
petty theft offense, but admitted a prior felony conviction.  He appealed only his 
admission of the prior conviction.  We must determine whether section 1237.5 
applies under these circumstances.  Relying on its recent decision in People v. 
Fulton (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1237 (Fulton), the Court of Appeal here 
concluded that ― ‗section 1237.5 applies to an enhancement allegation to which a 
defendant has entered a plea.‘ ‖   
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
2 
 
Based on the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the provision is 
inapplicable here.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and also 
disapprove People v. Fulton, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 1230.    
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On July 22, 2008, a jury convicted defendant William Frederick Maultsby 
of petty theft.  Before trial, defendant admitted a prior felony conviction for 
robbery in 1991— considered a strike under the Three Strikes law — and admitted 
several prior convictions for theft.  The trial court sentenced defendant to two 
years eight months in state prison.  Defendant timely appealed, contending he 
admitted the prior strike without complete advisements.  (See Boykin v. Alabama 
(1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242-244; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 863.)  He did not 
obtain a certificate of probable cause.   
 
The Court of Appeal directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on 
whether defendant needed a certificate of probable cause under Fulton, supra, 179 
Cal.App.4th 1230.  Consistent with Fulton, the Court of Appeal held that 
defendant must comply with section 1237.5 to challenge his admission of an 
enhancement allegation.  It determined that defendant‘s claim was noncognizable 
and dismissed his appeal. 
  
Defendant petitioned for review.   
DISCUSSION 
 
In general, a defendant may appeal from a final judgment of conviction, 
unless otherwise limited by sections 1237.1 and 1237.5.  (§ 1237; see Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 8.304(b) [hereafter rule 8.304(b)].)  Section 1237.5, which is at issue 
here, provides in full:  ―No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment 
of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of  
probation following an admission of violation, except where both of the following 
are met:  [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, 
3 
executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, 
jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings.  [¶] (b) 
The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such 
appeal with the clerk of the court.‖2  (Italics added.)  The purpose of section 
1237.5 is ―to weed out frivolous and vexatious appeals from pleas of guilty or no 
contest, before clerical and judicial resources are wasted.‖  (People v. Buttram 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790; see Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1095 [§ 1237.5 ―is 
procedural in nature‖].)  
 
Defendant maintains that he was not required to obtain a certificate of 
probable cause under section 1237.5 because he did not plead guilty or nolo 
contendere to the current charge.  Echoing the Court of Appeal‘s reasoning, the 
People, however, contend that defendant‘s challenge to his admission of the prior 
conviction is a challenge to the validity of a plea; therefore, he must obtain a 
certificate of probable cause.   
A. Statutory Interpretation 
 
In interpreting a statute to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent, we give the 
words their usual and ordinary meaning.  The statute‘s plain language controls 
unless its words are ambiguous.  (People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 
1138.)  By its terms, section 1237.5 applies only to ―a judgment of conviction 
upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of probation following an 
                                              
2  
A defendant who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, however, need not 
file a written statement or obtain a certificate of probable cause if the appeal is 
based on the following grounds:  ―(A) The denial of a motion to suppress evidence 
under Penal Code section 1538.5; or [¶] (B) Grounds that arose after entry of the 
plea and do not affect the plea‘s validity.‖  (Rule 8.304(b)(4); see also People v. 
Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1099 (Mendez).)  Defendant here does not base 
his appeal on either noncertificate ground.   
4 
admission of violation.‖  It makes no mention of admissions of prior conviction 
allegations or other sentence enhancement allegations.  Contrary to the People‘s 
suggestion, the Legislature has distinguished between pleas, such as guilty, not 
guilty, or nolo contendere (§ 1016), and admissions to sentencing allegations (§§ 
1025, 1158).  Indeed, a sentence enhancement, such as a prior conviction or prison 
term enhancement, is ―an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term‖ 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(3)), which cannot be imposed without a 
conviction for the substantive offense.  (See People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
126, 134.)  
 
As noted above, section 1237.5 is an exception to section 1237, the general 
statute governing appeals following final judgments of conviction.  (See § 1237, 
subd. (a) [defendant may appeal from final judgment of conviction ―except as 
provided in . . . Section 1237.5‖].)  The differences between appeals from 
convictions resulting from not guilty pleas and ensuing trials (§ 1237), on the one 
hand, and those following guilty or nolo contendere pleas (§ 1237.5), on the other, 
―are reflected in distinct but analogous statutes and related rules of court defining 
the procedure applicable to the taking of each type of appeal.‖  (In re Chavez 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 649 (Chavez), italics added.)  In that regard, we have 
construed section 1237.5 narrowly, concluding that it does not apply to admissions 
made in juvenile court because minors are not ―defendants‖; they do not ―plead 
guilty‖ but admit allegations of a petition; and adjudications of juvenile 
wrongdoing do not constitute ―criminal convictions.‖  (In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 
Cal.3d 952, 955 [juvenile appeals governed by Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800]; see 
also People v. Wagoner (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 605, 609-610 [§ 1237.5 does not 
apply to insanity pleas].) 
5 
 
Based on its plain language, we conclude that section 1237.5 does not apply 
to an appeal where a defendant does not plead guilty or nolo contendere.3  Instead, 
section 1237, subdivision (a) applies when, as here, a defendant appeals from a 
judgment of conviction following a plea of not guilty.  (See Chavez, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at pp. 649-650; Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1094.)  Section 1237, 
subdivision (a) does not otherwise limit a defendant‘s right to appeal as long as he 
or she files a timely appeal.  (Chavez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 649 [§ 1237, subd. 
(a) ―generally authorizes an appeal without imposing any limitations on subject 
matter‖]; Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1094; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.304(a).) 
 
In concluding to the contrary, the Court of Appeal here relied on its recent 
decision in Fulton, which held that section 1237.5 applies when a defendant 
appeals an admission of an enhancement allegation regardless of whether he 
pleads guilty or goes to trial on the substantive charges.  We discuss Fulton next. 
B.  Fulton Decision 
 
In Fulton, a jury convicted defendant David Louis Fulton for evading an 
officer with willful or wanton disregard and for driving on a suspended license.  
Waiving his right to a jury determination, Fulton entered a negotiated admission of 
a prior prison term allegation in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining 
                                              
3  
―The absence of ambiguity in the statutory language dispenses with the 
need to review the legislative history.‖  (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 
56.)  Although recognizing that section 1237.5 specifically does not mention 
admissions of sentencing enhancements, the People discuss its legislative history 
at great length, and maintain that the Legislature‘s failure to include such 
admissions within the statute‘s purview was ―inadvertent.‖  We find their 
discussion, which broadly asserts that the Legislature by adding pleas of nolo 
contendere and admissions of probation violations to the section ―intended the trial 
court screening function to apply to a broader class of cases,‖ unpersuasive.   
6 
allegations.  (Fulton, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1232.)  After the trial court 
denied his motion to withdraw his admission of the prior prison term, Fulton 
appealed without first obtaining a certificate of probable cause.  Although he had 
not pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to the substantive charges, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that Fulton needed a certificate to challenge his admission.  (Id. 
at p. 1237.)  In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on several cases 
suggesting that admissions of sentencing enhancements should be treated virtually 
the same as guilty pleas in this context.  (Id. at pp. 1236-1238, discussing People 
v. Perry (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1151 (Perry), People v. Lobaugh (1987) 
188 Cal.App.3d 780, 785 (Lobaugh), and People v. Thurman (2007) 157 
Cal.App.4th 36 (Thurman).) 
 
In Perry, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery and admitted a 
firearm use allegation.  He appealed the admission of the allegation, but did not 
obtain a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5.  Dismissing the appeal, 
the Court of Appeal reasoned:  ―Section 1237.5 applies to a judgment of 
conviction after a ‗plea of guilty or nolo contendere.‘  At issue here is the validity 
or truth of a ‗use‘ allegation.  A technical, literal argument could be made that 
defendants do not ‘plead guilty’ to enhancement allegations, they ‘admit’ them.  
We can see no reason to draw such a fine distinction regarding the words used.  
Appellant‘s attack goes to his guilt or innocence, the truth of the alleged 
enhancement, and would require consideration of evidence.  Such issues have 
been removed from consideration by the plea and admission.‖  (Perry, supra, 162 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1151, italics added.)  It concluded that ―an appeal which 
questions proceedings before appellant‘s admission of the use of a firearm must 
comply with section 1237.5.‖  (Ibid.)  
 
Similarly, in Lobaugh, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery 
and admitted allegations for firearm use, a prior serious felony conviction, and a 
7 
prior prison term.  (Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 783.)  Regarding the 
defendant‘s challenge to the evidentiary sufficiency of the firearm allegation, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that it was not cognizable on appeal because the 
defendant had not obtained a certificate of probable cause:  ―As part of his guilty 
plea, defendant admitted the firearm use allegation.  Admissions of enhancements 
are subject to the same principles as guilty pleas.  (See People v. Jackson (1985) 
37 Cal.3d 826, 836.)  A guilty plea admits every element of the offense charged 
and is a conclusive admission of guilt.  (People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 
889, 895; People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 125.)  It waives any right 
to raise questions about the evidence, including its sufficiency.‖  (Lobaugh, supra, 
188 Cal.App.3d at p. 785, italics added.)   
 
Both Perry and Lobaugh are distinguishable.  In each case, the defendant 
had pleaded guilty to the substantive charge.  This factual circumstance alone 
triggers section 1237.5‘s requirement that a defendant obtain a certificate of 
probable cause.  (See Chavez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 650-651; Mendez, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at pp. 1094-1095.)  Regarding the underlying analysis, we conclude that 
each case incorrectly equated an admission of an enhancement with a guilty plea 
for purposes of section 1237.5.  Neither case lends support to the conclusion that a 
certificate is required to challenge an admission on appeal where the defendant 
goes to trial on the main charge.   
 
Both Perry and Lobaugh concluded that like a guilty plea, an admission 
removes from consideration evidence going to the truth of the alleged 
enhancement.  (Perry, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151; Lobaugh, supra, 188 
Cal.App.3d at p. 785; see also Fulton, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1237.)  
This aspect of a guilty plea, however, has little to do with the application of 
section 1237.5.  As we have observed, ―A guilty plea admits every element of the 
crime and constitutes a conviction.  [Citations.]  For that reason, and without 
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regard to section 1237.5, issues going to the determination of guilt or innocence 
are not cognizable on appeal; review is instead limited to issues going to the 
jurisdiction of the court or the legality of the proceedings, including the 
constitutional validity of the plea.‖  (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 
1177-1178 (Hoffard), italics added.)  Section 1237.5 is a procedural statute whose 
impact ― ‗relates to the procedure in perfecting an appeal from a judgment based 
on a plea of guilty, and not to the grounds upon which such an appeal may be 
taken.‘  [Citation.]  Section 1237.5 does not restrict the scope of inquiry into a 
cognizable error once a certificate has been issued.‖  (Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 
p. 1178.)  Contrary to both Perry and Lobaugh, section 1237.5 by its terms is 
triggered only by a defendant‘s plea of guilty or nolo contendere to the substantive 
charge.  In other words, whether or not a defendant‘s appellate claim challenges 
the validity of his plea — or in this case, his admission of an enhancement 
allegation — matters only if the appeal implicates section 1237.5 in the first place.  
(See Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1177 [§ 1237.5 ―determines only whether or 
not an appeal may be taken‖].)4   
 
In fact, Perry and Lobaugh each concluded that the defendant‘s challenge 
to the admission of enhancements was noncognizable on appeal irrespective of 
section 1237.5 considerations.  Each found that had the defendant obtained a 
certificate of probable cause, the claim could not be reviewed on appeal.  (Perry, 
                                              
4  
Perry‘s statement that section 1237.5 should apply to admissions of 
enhancements because they may also be subject to a jury trial does not support the 
People‘s position.  (See Perry, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151, fn. 3 [trial on 
enhancements ―would be contested, there would be a record, and the appeal would 
not be attacking the validity of a plea of guilty regarding the enhancements‖].)    
Again, this aspect has little to do with the application of section 1237.5, which 
focuses on whether a defendant has pled guilty or nolo contendere to the 
substantive charges in the first place.   
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supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 1152 [―Aside from the procedural bar of section 
1237.5, the limited scope of review after a guilty plea precludes review of 
appellant‘s contention‖]; Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 785 [any error 
regarding evidentiary sufficiency ―was waived by his guilty plea and may not be 
raised on appeal‖].)  In addition, Lobaugh‘s generalized conclusion that the ―same 
principles‖ govern an admission of an enhancement and a guilty plea is based on a 
misapplication of our decision in People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d 826.  
(Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 785.)  Jackson, which did not discuss 
section 1237.5, dealt with the specific and narrow issue of allowing a defendant as 
part of a plea bargain to admit an enhancement the prosecution may be unable to 
prove (see People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 612-613).  (Jackson, supra, 37 
Cal.3d at p. 836 [―defendant should have the same latitude with respect to 
enhancements‖ as with substantive offenses].)  Contrary to Lobaugh‘s suggestion, 
Jackson does not support its sweeping assertion that admissions of enhancements 
and guilty pleas should be treated the same in this context.5 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Fulton erroneously determined 
that section 1237.5 applies to appeals where the defendant has not pleaded guilty 
or nolo contendere.  We disapprove People v. Fulton, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 
1230 to the extent it is inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.  
                                              
5  
Moreover, the Fulton Court of Appeal‘s reliance on Thurman, supra, 157 
Cal.App.4th 36, is also misplaced.  (See Fulton, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1237-1238.)  In Thurman, after the jury deadlocked on several counts, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to a count of carjacking, which judgment he subsequently 
appealed.  (Thurman, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 39-40.)  The Thurman Court 
of Appeal concluded that he needed to obtain a certificate of probable cause to 
raise claims relating to the carjacking count.  (Id. at pp. 42-44.)  Like the courts in 
Perry and Lobaugh, the Thurman court also concluded that the defendant‘s 
evidentiary challenge was ―not cognizable on appeal, with or without a certificate 
of probable cause.‖  (Id. at p. 43.)  
10 
C. Other Considerations 
 
Furthermore, section 1237.5‘s underlying purpose of promoting economy 
(see Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1095) would not be advanced by extending it 
to convictions after pleas of not guilty.  By screening out wholly frivolous appeals 
after guilty or nolo contendere pleas, section 1237.5 prevents the unnecessary 
expenditure of time and money spent on preparing the record on appeal, 
appointing appellate counsel, and considering and rendering the decision of the 
appeal itself.  (Ibid.; Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1180 [§ 1237.5‘s goals are 
―efficiency and practicality‖].)  The underlying assumption is that a conviction 
entered on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere generally ―does not present any 
issue warranting relief on appeal, and hence should not be reviewed thereon.‖  
(Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1097; id. at p. 1098 [through § 1237.5, 
Legislature ―established a mechanism that did not invite consideration of the 
peculiar facts of the individual appeal‖].)  In contrast, when a defendant pleads not 
guilty and is convicted after trial, as is the situation here, generally ―any issue 
bearing on the determination of guilt and apparent from the record is cognizable 
on appeal.‖  (Chavez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 649.) 
 
The People, however, argue that by admitting the prior conviction 
enhancement, defendant removed from consideration the evidence supporting the 
allegation.  They maintain that like guilty or nolo contendere pleas, admissions of 
prior convictions ―involve the same forfeiture of rights‖ and ―result from 
negotiated bargaining and involve tactical decisions.‖6  In that regard, they assert 
                                              
6  
The People assert that defendant agreed to admit the alleged prior 
convictions in exchange for the main charge to be reduced from petty theft with a 
prior to simple petty theft. They argue that defendant is ―trifl[ing] with the courts 
by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process‖ (People v. 
Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295), and that his appellate claim attacks the 
validity of his plea.  Defendant, however, disagrees that the proceedings below 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
11 
that appellate claims following either pleas or admissions are equally likely to be 
frivolous, and that screening all such claims through the issuance of a certificate of 
probable cause will serve judicial economy.  
 
We disagree with the People that any efficiency would be gained by 
requiring defendants to obtain a certificate of probable cause after going to trial.  
Although defendant here challenged only his admission and not his conviction of 
the petty theft charge, the People do not suggest that defendant would have been 
required to obtain a certificate to appeal the latter.  Because defendants who go to 
trial generally have the right to pursue an appeal without limitation (Chavez, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 649; § 1237), any savings in clerical or judicial resources 
would not be realized by prohibiting them from also seeking review of an 
admission without a certificate of probable cause.  In advancing this efficiency 
argument, the People appear to assert that under section 1237.5, courts should 
effectively determine and certify each nonfrivolous issue reviewable on appeal.  
We have already rejected this argument and its related policy concerns.  (Hoffard, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1176-1180.)   
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
resulted from a negotiated plea agreement.  The disputed characterization is 
unimportant here.  We have pointed out that whether a defendant‘s appellate claim 
challenges the validity of his plea matters only if section 1237.5 is implicated in 
the first place.  (See ante, at p. 8.)  We have concluded that the section is 
inapplicable here.  This conclusion, however, only means that the appeal is 
operative without a certificate of probable cause; the court is not precluded from 
later finding that defendant‘s claim lacks merit.   
12 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, ACTING C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
BRUINIERS, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, 
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Maultsby 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 3/16/10 – 3d Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S182042 
Date Filed: January 5, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Yolo 
Judge: Thomas Edward Warriner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Meredith Fahn, under appointment by 
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Christina Hitomi 
Simpson and Jamie Scheidegger, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Elizabeth Campbell 
1215 K Street, 17th Floor 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 444-8538 
 
Jamie Scheidegger 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-1213