Title: BYRD v. MAHAFFEY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BYRD v. MAHAFFEY2003 WY 13778 P.3d 671Case Number: 02-261Decided: 10/29/2003
October 
Term, A.D. 2003

 
 

 

RONALD 
HOWARD BYRD,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

LINDA 
LEE MAHAFFEY, f/k/a

LINDA 
LEE BYRD,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Stan 
Decker Cannon of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich, Stith & Cannon, P.C., Rock 
Springs, WY.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
GOLDEN, J., filed a specially concurring 
opinion.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Ronald 
Howard Byrd appeals the district court's decision allowing his counsel of record 
to withdraw from representing him prior to trial.  Byrd also contests the district court's 
subsequent refusal to grant him a continuance of the trial date.  Upon review, we affirm. 

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Byrd sets forth 
the following issues on appeal:

 

I.  Did the trial 
court commit reversible error when it allowed appellant's counsel to withdraw 
eight (8) business days before trial?

 

II.  Did 
the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for continuance to obtain new 
counsel after the court had allowed counsel to withdraw shortly before trial 
require reversal?

 

Appellee 
Linda Lee Mahaffey, formerly known as Linda Lee Byrd, phrases the issues 
as:

 

1.  Whether 
Appellant is estopped from raising issues on appeal that were not preserved in 
the district court by proper objection or exception.

 

2.  Whether 
the district court committed reversible error in granting the motion for 
Appellant's counsel to withdraw.

 

3.  Whether 
the district court committed reversible error in denying Appellant's motion for 
a continuance.

 

4.  Whether 
Appellee's substitute Statement of the Evidence, which was adopted by the 
district court, was timely filed.

 

 

FACTS1

 

[¶3]      A Complaint for 
Divorce was filed by Mahaffey on May 2, 2001, with Byrd answering the complaint 
on June 4, 2001.  On June 25, 2001, 
the district court scheduled trial for November 27, 2001.  This date was vacated by order of the 
district court based on a joint motion filed by the parties due to the death of 
Byrd's father.  On January 7, 2002, 
the district court rescheduled the trial date for May 16, 2002.  

 

[¶4]      On April 26, 
2002, counsel for Byrd filed a motion to withdraw.  A hearing on this motion was scheduled 
for May 3, 2002.  Byrd, however, did 
not appear.  Ultimately, the 
district court granted the motion to withdraw.  On May 14, 2002, Byrd filed a motion to 
continue trial.  The motion was 
denied, and trial commenced on May 16, 2002, culminating with the district court 
granting the divorce and dividing the subject marital property.  This appeal followed.  

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶5]      In Honan v. 
Honan, 809 P.2d 783, 786-87 (Wyo. 1991), we 
recognized:

 

            
The district court has the authority to control the course of a 
litigation.  That power includes the 
discretion to grant continuances, either upon its own motion or 
upon a motion by one of the parties, and to grant an attorney's request to 
withdraw. Bromley v. Haberman, 583 P.2d 703 (Wyo. 1978); 
Wyo.Stat. § 1-9-102 (1988); Rules 102 and 201 of the Uniform Rules for the 
District Courts of the State of Wyoming.  
The district court must exercise its discretion in a way which promotes 
justice. See Bromley, 583 P.2d 703.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  We have further indicated 
that issues concerning the withdrawal of counsel and continuances are matters 
that are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be upset 
on appeal absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion.  Bacon v. Carey Co., 669 P.2d 533, 
534 (Wyo. 1983).  An abuse of 
discretion is found only when a court acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds 
of reason under the circumstances.  
The ultimate issue is whether the trial court could reasonably conclude 
as it did.  The decision of the 
trial court will not be reversed absent proof of such abuse.  Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, 
Inc., 2002 WY 173, ¶¶13-14, 58 P.3d 322, ¶¶13-14 (Wyo. 2002). 

 

[¶6]      We have also 
stated:

 

In 
criminal cases, the withdrawal of counsel, particularly on the eve of trial, may 
implicate due-process considerations and defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel.  Epperson 
v. State, Wyo., 637 P.2d 671 (1981); Adger v. State, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1056 (1978). However, in civil cases, withdrawal of counsel does not always 
provide grounds for the granting of a continuance.  Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1155, 
1157.  

 

" 
The withdrawal, on the eve of trial, of the attorney for one of the parties to 
an action, leaving such party unprepared for trial, is not ipso facto a ground 
for continuance . . . .' " Benson v. Benson, 66 Nev. 94, 204 P.2d 316, 318 (1949).

 

            
Particularly relevant to the matters with which we are concerned in this 
appeal is this court's holding

 

". . . 
that the trial court may deny a continuance if the problem which gives rise to 
the request for a continuance is the fault of the party moving for the 
continuance." Craver v. Craver, supra, 601 P.2d  at 
1000.

 

Bacon, 
669 P.2d  at 535.

 

[¶7]      This court has 
further clarified:

 

            
The trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying of a motion 
for continuance; and, absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing court 
will not disturb such ruling.  
Craver v. Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999 (1979); Holly Sugar Corp. 
v. Perez, Wyo., 508 P.2d 595 (1973).  
To find an abuse of discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to 
deny appellant due process, and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual 
prejudice and a violation of his rights.  
Bacon v. Carey Co., Wyo., 669 P.2d 533; State v. Spurlock, 
161 Mont. 388, 506 P.2d 842 (1973).

 

            
On review we look at the peculiar circumstances of the case and the 
reasons presented to the trial judge at the time of the request. Ungar v. 
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921, reh. denied 377 U.S. 925, 84 S. Ct. 1218, 12 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1964).

 

Cates 
v. Eddy, 
669 P.2d 912, 915-16 (Wyo. 1983).

 

[¶8]      Finally, this 
court has declared:

 

            
Withdrawal of an attorney or his discharge in a civil case does not give 
a party an absolute right to a continuance. Grunewald v. Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Co., 331 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1964).  Even though the denial of the 
continuance may have seriously inconvenienced appellant, the situation was due 
to his own making and that is a factor to be considered.

 

            
Many jurisdictions weigh the appellant's right to counsel against the 
prompt administration of justice. Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 725.  The trial court is better able to judge 
the matter, is more conversant with local conditions, status of the docket, and 
the capacity and disposition of counsel.  
It is more familiar with the background and general setting of the 
situation, which is frequently not embalmed in the formal record. Absent a clear 
abuse of judicial discretion, this court will not interfere. State v. 
Hathaway, 224 Iowa 478, 276 N.W. 207 (1937); see, Randolph v. Hays, 
Wyo., 665 P.2d 500 (1983). 

 

Id. 
at 916.

 

 

 

Appealable 
Issues

 

[¶9]      Initially, 
Mahaffey 
contests 
that Byrd failed to raise to the district court the issues now presented because 
Byrd did not object to the district court's rulings.  Thus, Mahaffey contends that Byrd is 
precluded from bringing these issues up on appeal. 

 

[¶10]   We have often expressed that issues 
raised for the first time on appeal generally will not be considered by this 
court unless they are jurisdictional or issues of such a fundamental nature that 
they must be considered.  Joyner 
v. State, 2002 WY 174, ¶13, 58 P.3d 331, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002); Robinson v. 
Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2000); WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City 
of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998).  We have also made it clear that it is 
appropriate for us to address issues that are bound to emerge again if left 
unresolved.  Joyner, at ¶13; 
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Wyo. 
1982); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980). 

 

[¶11]   We find that it is important for 
this court to address the issues raised by Byrd on appeal 1) because they are 
fundamental in nature inasmuch as they concern specific due process questions, 
and 2) they are issues that continue to arise following the modification of 
Uniform Rules for District Courts of the State of Wyoming (U.R.D.C.), Rule 
102(c) in 1993.  Therefore, 
recognizing that special circumstances exist, we choose to attend to the issues 
brought before this court on appeal, as most recently dictated in Joyner, 
at ¶13.

 

 

 

Withdrawal 
of Counsel

 

[¶12]   In his first issue on appeal, Byrd 
complains that the district court committed reversible error when it allowed his 
counsel to withdraw eight business days before trial.  Specifically, Byrd argues that the 
district court erred because no "extraordinary circumstances" existed to allow 
withdrawal of counsel pursuant to U.R.D.C. 102(c).  In addition, Byrd asserts that the case 
of Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 302 (Wyo. 1992) discloses this 
court's directive that the "better practice" is to require that counsel not be 
allowed to withdraw unless other counsel has made a written entry of appearance 
except in extraordinary circumstances.  

 

[¶13]   Uniform Rule for District Courts 
102, in pertinent part, provides the following:

 

(a)(1)  An 
attorney appears in a case:

 

(A)  By 
attending any proceeding as counsel for any party;

 

(B)  By 
permitting the attorney's name to appear on any pleadings or motions, except 
that an attorney who assisted in the preparation of a pleading and whose name 
appears on the pleading as having done so shall not be deemed to have entered an 
appearance in the matter; or

 

(C)  By 
a written appearance.  Except in a 
criminal case, a written entry of appearance may be limited, by its terms, to a 
particular proceeding or matter. 

 

(2)  Except 
as otherwise limited by a written entry of appearance, an appearing attorney 
shall be considered as representing the party or parties for whom the attorney 
appears for all purposes.  

 

. . .

 

(c)  Counsel 
will not be permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court order. 
Except in the case of extraordinary circumstances, the court 
shall condition withdrawal of counsel upon the substitution of other counsel by 
written appearance.  In the 
alternative, the court shall allow withdrawal upon a statement submitted by the 
client acknowledging the withdrawal of counsel for the client, and stating a 
desire to proceed pro se.  An 
attorney who has entered a limited appearance shall be deemed to have withdrawn 
when the attorney has fulfilled the duties of the limited entry of 
appearance.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  In Carlson, at 302, 
this court stated:

 

            
We review the record to determine whether the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment entered against 
appellant. On January 31, 1991, the district court granted Mrs. Carlson's motion 
for a new trial on the first phase of the litigation between these parties.  The notice of setting for the new trial 
was filed on March 13, 1991. Very shortly thereafter, on March 25, 1991, a 
consent to withdrawal of counsel which Carl had signed was filed with the 
district court.  The district judge 
sent Carl a letter on March 25, 1991, which informed him that he should seek new 
counsel "as soon as possible" because "[t]his case has been lingering in court 
since 1986 and I intend to keep May 14, 1991, as the trial 
date."

 

            
The order permitting Carl's counsel to withdraw was filed on April 1, 
1991, just a little over a month before the scheduled trial.  The district court entered its order 
before replacement counsel had entered an appearance which is not a favored 
practice.  Rule 102(c) of the 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming provides 
"[c]ounsel will not be permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court 
order."  In contrast, Rule 19.02 of 
the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure provides "[n]o attorney or firm who has 
appeared in a cause on appeal may withdraw from it without written consent of 
the court filed with the clerk. Such consent may be conditioned upon 
substitution of other counsel."  
The Uniform District Court Rules do not require that substitute 
counsel be obtained before the court allows withdrawal of an attorney. However, 
a better practice, and one that will avoid the difficulties here presented, 
would be to condition withdrawal on substitution of new counsel.  This practice would avoid the waste of 
time and resources that may occur in a case such as this. Nevertheless, the 
order permitting withdrawal of appellant's attorney was permissible under the 
rules for district courts. 

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶14]  Upon our review of Carlson, we 
acknowledge our recognition of "a better practice" and continue to support the 
proffered suggestion noted therein. However, we further recognize such 
suggestion is not mandatory, particularly when it is noted that our opinion in 
Carlson 1) was published prior to the 1993 enactment of the pertinent 
modified provisions of U.R.D.C. 102(c), and 2) acknowledges the clear 
applicability of that rule and the specific language utilized within the 
rule.  As provided by the modified 
rule and our statements in Carlson, the district court merely had to 
condition withdrawal of counsel upon the substitution of other counsel by 
written appearance unless extraordinary circumstances 
existed.  Thus, we must 
review this action to determine if "extraordinary circumstances" existed whereby 
the district court could allow the withdrawal of counsel without the condition 
of a written substitution of other counsel.

 

[¶15]   Counsel for Byrd conditioned his 
request for withdrawal on specific facts.  
These facts included Byrd's refusal to keep appointments and return 
telephone messages after Byrd had authorized his counsel to enter into an 
agreement.  In addition, Byrd declined to execute through his counsel 
the deed that was subject to the earlier agreement, and such deed was only 
eventually executed by Byrd through the efforts of Mahaffey.  
As such, with counsel recognizing that trial was set in the matter for 
May 16, 2002, counsel concluded that, given Byrd's unwillingness to communicate 
with him and Byrd's direct dealings with Mahaffey, counsel could not 
appropriately prepare for trial and protect Byrd's interests.  

 

[¶16]   Further, although no transcripts 
were made of the proceedings in this case, the record does reflect that Byrd 
failed to reasonably cooperate and obstructed the orderly progression of this 
case, which placed his counsel in a very difficult position.  Indeed, although the district court 
entered an order for temporary spousal support, Byrd refused to make payments to 
Mahaffey as required under that order.  
Byrd did not cooperate with discovery requests, requiring a motion to 
compel to be filed by Mahaffey and forcing Mahaffey to attempt to obtain some of 
the requested documentation through a third party.  After the district court entered a 
stipulated order to execute a quitclaim deed concerning the primary marital real 
estate property resolving the temporary spousal support issues, Byrd delayed 
execution of the deed.  Therefore, 
it becomes apparent that Byrd, by his own actions, contributed to his counsel's 
request to withdraw. 

 

[¶17]   Mahaffey also accurately points out 
that counsel for Byrd may have been somewhat restrained by Wyoming Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.16 from fully expressing to the district court each of 
the actual reasons for counsel's requested withdrawal.  Under that rule, while an attorney must 
obtain a court order allowing withdrawal after appearing in an action  and support such request with an 
adequate basis, counsel must also be careful to keep confidential certain facts 
and not disclose facts that might prejudice the court against his client.  Thus, an artful balance between 
confidentiality and providing an adequate basis for withdrawal must be obtained 
by counsel requesting to withdraw.  
A lawyer's general statements that professional considerations require 
termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted by the court as 
sufficient.  See Wyoming Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.16, cmt. 3.

 

[¶18]   Additionally, this matter was 
initiated on May 2, 2001.  On June 
25, 2001, trial was initially scheduled for November 27, 2001.  This date was then vacated by order 
based on a joint motion filed by the parties due to the death of Byrd's 
father.  On January 7, 2002, the 
district court rescheduled the trial date for May 16, 2002.  Hence, this matter had been pending for 
over one year in the district court at the time that trial was actually 
held.

 

[¶19]   Under these facts, we cannot 
conclude that the situation did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" as 
required under U.R.D.C. 102(c).  
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing Byrd's counsel to withdraw.  
As noted above, many jurisdictions including Wyoming consider the actions 
of the appellant, whether these actions contributed to the situation at hand, 
and weigh the appellant's right to counsel against the prompt administration of 
justice.  It is also recognized that 
the trial court is better able to judge the matter, is more conversant with 
local conditions, the status of the docket, and the capacity and disposition of 
counsel, and is more familiar with the background and general setting of the 
situation, which is frequently not embalmed in the formal record. Cates v. 
Eddy, 669 P.2d  at 915-16.  
Therefore, we grant the district court these same presumptions in this 
case.

 

[¶20]   Additionally, Byrd complains that 
the district court order allowing his counsel to withdraw is based solely on 
expressions by the district court that "good cause" existed for entry of the 
order, which is different than the requisite finding of "extraordinary 
circumstances" called for by U.R.D.C. 102(c).  Byrd also criticizes the district court 
for not particularly identifying its findings of fact and reasoning supporting 
its ruling allowing the withdrawal of Byrd's counsel.2  Nevertheless, we find upon review of the 
record, that the district court could have reasonably concluded that 
extraordinary circumstances existed to allow the requested withdrawal by Byrd's 
counsel.  

 

[¶21]   Byrd also infers that based upon 
his interpretation of our opinion in JAG v. State, Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2002 WY 158, ¶18, 56 P.3d 1016, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002), it is incumbent 
upon the district court to ensure that the hearing on the motion to withdraw as 
counsel was reported.  However, 
while a transcript of the proceedings may have proved helpful to this court in 
making its review, such a burden should not be placed upon the district 
court.  Certainly, given the fact 
that Byrd believed he was prejudiced by the ruling allowing his counsel to 
withdraw, he could have arranged to bring such issues again before the district 
court for review having such proceedings recorded.  Yet, Byrd failed to take such 
actions.  

 

[¶22]   Finally, Byrd argues that the 
reasoning utilized by this court in Honan, 809 P.2d  at 787, must be 
applied in this case.  In 
Honan, a wife filed for divorce and requested a hearing to determine 
temporary support and alimony.  The 
husband failed to appear at the hearing and later failed to abide by the court's 
rulings made at the hearing.  At a 
later contempt proceeding, the husband's counsel was present, but the husband 
again failed to personally appear, leading to the issuance of a bench 
warrant.  The husband also did not 
appear at the time of the scheduled trial and, when his counsel requested to 
withdraw, the court granted that request.  
The court then proceeded with trial in the absence of the husband.  This court reversed the resultant 
judgment stating:

 

            
In this case, the husband suffered an injustice when the district court, 
in the husband's absence, allowed the attorney to withdraw because no one was 
present to represent the husband's interests. Those interests included an 
opportunity to challenge the contempt order and to make a formal request for a 
continuance.  Thus, we hold that the 
district court abused its discretion when it permitted the husband's attorney to 
withdraw and then immediately proceeded with the trial in the absence of the 
husband.  The husband is entitled to 
have a new trial after being given reasonable notice of the trial setting so 
that he may appear and defend through his attorney or pro 
se.

 

Honan, at 
787.

 

[¶23]   The circumstances in this case are 
much different than those that existed in Honan; we, therefore, do 
not find the holding in that case to be dispositive.  Here, Byrd was present to represent his 
own interests at trial and made a motion for continuance before the district 
court.  Byrd was extended notice 
concerning his counsel's motion to withdraw.  The withdrawal hearing was held days 
before the actual trial date, and Byrd was provided notice of the pending trial 
date many months in advance.  
Further, although the record before this court is limited, it does 
indicate that Byrd knew of his counsel's withdrawal prior to the trial date 
because he filed a motion for a continuance and appeared at trial with his file 
that he had obtained from his withdrawn counsel.  Byrd was also allowed to participate in 
the trial representing his own interests after the district court denied his 
motion for continuance.    

 

Denial of 
Continuance

 

[¶24]   In his final issue on appeal, Byrd 
contends that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant 
his motion for continuance.   
Again, we do not agree.  Byrd 
filed his pro se motion for continuance on or about May 14, 2002, approximately 
two days prior to the scheduled trial date.  That motion stated that it was "based on 
the reason that the defendant has an appointment with Elizabeth Greenwood, new 
legal council [sic]."  According to 
Byrd's own statement of the evidence filed with the district court, Byrd 
clarified at hearing that the reason for the continuance was not a conflict in 
the meeting with Ms. Greenwood and the trial.  Rather, the continuance was requested 
because Byrd wished to pursue the possibility of hiring her to represent 
him in the matter.  Therefore, it 
appears that Byrd misrepresented in his motion that Ms. Greenwood had already 
been retained.  In addition, Byrd 
indicated that his motion was filed jointly by both parties when this was not 
the case.  Also, as indicated 
previously, this matter had been pending for over one year in the district court 
at the time that trial was actually held.  
Byrd had been allowed at least five months prior notice of the date of 
trial before it actually commenced and was previously granted a continuance of 
the initial trial date based on a joint motion filed by the parties. 

 

[¶25]   Finally, Byrd argues that he is not 
to blame for his counsel's late withdrawal and, therefore, such occurrence 
should not be held against him.  
However, as recognized above, Byrd failed to keep appointments and return 
telephone messages left for Byrd by his counsel.  In addition, Byrd delayed the execution of a deed which 
was part of an agreement reached through the efforts of counsel.  Byrd further obstructed the 
orderly progression of this case.  
While the district court entered an order for temporary spousal support, 
Byrd did not make payments to Mahaffey as required.  Byrd further did not cooperate with 
discovery requests requiring Mahaffey to file a motion to compel and employ 
other alternative methods to obtain some of the requested documentation. 

 

[¶26]   As admitted by Byrd in his own 
brief, this court has traditionally not favored those who have contributed to 
delay and caused the need for continuance by their own actions.  See Inskeep v. Inskeep, 
752 P.2d 434, 437 (Wyo. 1988); Urich v. Fox, 687 P.2d 893, 894 (Wyo. 
1984); Sharp v. Sharp, 671 P.2d 317, 319 (Wyo. 1983); Cates v. 
Eddy, 669 P.2d  at 916; Teton v. Teton, 933 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 
1997).  In Sharp, at 319 
(footnote omitted), we stated:

 

            
A continuance will be granted only upon good cause and a court will deny 
a continuance where the problem which gives rise to the request is the fault of 
the movant.  We said as much in 
Craver v. Craver, [601 P.2d 999 (Wyo. 1979)] at 1000, where it was 
held:

 

". . . 
that the trial court may deny a continuance if the problem which gives rise to 
the request for a continuance is the fault of the party moving for the 
continuance."

 

Likewise, in 
Inskeep, at 437, we declared:

 

            
We have consistently held that the granting or denying of a continuance 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is considered according to 
the circumstances unique to the case. Shanor v. Engineering, Inc. of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 705 P.2d 858 (1985); Smith v. Smith, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1319 (1985).  Under § 1-9-102, 
W.S.1977, a court may grant a continuance "for good cause shown." Alternatively, 
a continuance may not properly be granted based upon the mere whim, request or 
convenience of counsel, and absent a substantial factual or legal reason for 
doing so. Smith v. Smith, supra; Tomash v. Evans, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1296 (1985).  We have 
additionally held that a continuance may be denied by the trial court if the 
need for the continuance is caused by the movant.  Carlson v. BMW Industrial Service, 
Inc., Wyo., 744 P.2d 1383 (1987).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶27]   Given those reasons set forth 
above, the actions of the district court are affirmed. 

  

GOLDEN, 
J., specially 
concurring.

 

[¶28]      
I 
would summarily affirm.  The 
circumstances of this case do not indicate that Byrd's due process rights were 
ever threatened to the point of requiring this Court to consider the issues 
herein raised by Byrd when he never objected to the procedure below.  Byrd's attempt to "play the system" 
failed, and this Court should not entertain his objections to circumstances he 
created.

 

[¶29]      
Further, 
I see no reason for this Court to engage in an advisory opinion regarding 
U.R.D.C. 102(c).  Since the majority 
opinion has done so, however, I am compelled to comment.  An uncooperative client may create 
grounds to support an attorney's withdrawing his representation of that 
client.  But, by itself, the fact 
that a client is uncooperative is not enough to constitute an "extraordinary 
circumstance" as required by the rule.  
Without an "extraordinary circumstance," the trial court is without 
discretion to accept the withdrawal of an attorney of record without substitute 
counsel being in place, or at least acknowledgement from the client.  The language of U.R.D.C. 102(c) is 
clearly mandatory in this regard.

 

[¶30]      
As 
the majority opinion emphasizes, this case had been pending for quite some 
time.  The parties had at least four 
months notice of the final trial date.  
The client became uncooperative at some point early in the proceedings 
(appellee's brief suggests Byrd was uncooperative with his attorney from the 
beginning).  Thus, Byrd's attorney 
had plenty of time to determine whether or not he wanted to continue to 
represent Byrd under the circumstances.  
While Byrd's uncooperativeness may have justified counsel's withdrawal, 
nothing in the record justifies counsel's withdrawal within two weeks of trial 
without providing some protection for his (ex)client.  

 

[¶31]      
I 
would hold that U.R.D.C. 102(c) was violated in this case.  However, I would still affirm.  Under the particular circumstances of 
this case, Byrd cannot prove that a substantial right was violated, and thus the 
error in violating the rule was harmless.  
W.R.A.P. 9.04.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1No 
transcript was made of any proceedings including the trial and motions 
hearings.  Therefore, the statement 
of facts herein is based on the court record. 

 

2Certainly, 
the enumeration of the specific findings of fact, reasoning, and conclusions of 
law made by a district court in support of its ruling is most welcome and 
sometimes even critical in this court's appellate review.