Title: Crosby v. City of Burlington

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Crosby v. City of Burlington (2001-271); 176 Vt. 239; 844 A.2d 722

2003 VT 107

[Filed 21-Nov-2003]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 11-Feb-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 107

                                No. 2001-271

  Paul Crosby                                    Supreme Court
                       					
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Chittenden Superior Court
                                             

  City of Burlington                         	 August Term, 2003(FN1) 

  David A. Jenkins, J.

  Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Middlebury, for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.

  John T. Leddy and Kevin J. Coyle of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, Burlington,
    for Defendant-Appellant. 

  Susan P. Ritter, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Vermont League of Cities and
    Towns.

  Joseph C. Galanes of Biggam, Fox & Skinner, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae
    Vermont Association for Mental Health.

  James J. Dunn of Mickenberg, Dunn, Kochman, Lachs & Smith, PLC, Burlington,
    and Kurt Rumsfeld, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Professional
    Firefighters of Vermont and International Association of Fire Fighters.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J. (Ret.)
            and Gibson, J.(Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  AMESTOY, C. J.   In this workers' compensation action,
  defendant City of Burlington appeals from a judgment based on a jury
  verdict, finding that plaintiff Paul Crosby suffered a compensable
  psychological injury arising out his employment as a firefighter with the
  City.  The City raises two principal claims on appeal: (1) that Chapter II,
  § 70 of the Vermont Constitution precludes workers' compensation benefits
  for psychological injuries unconnected to physical trauma; and (2) that the
  trial court's jury instruction on the standard for determining whether such
  injuries resulted from unusual workplace stress requires reversal because
  it was inconsistent with the standard adopted by the Commissioner of the
  Department of Labor and Industry and the purpose of the workers'
  compensation law.  We agree with the second contention, and therefore
  reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views
  expressed herein. 

       ¶  2.  Plaintiff began working for the City as a firefighter in 1975
  and was promoted to the position of lieutenant in 1989.  In the summer of
  1994, he stopped working and sought workers' compensation benefits because
  he was experiencing stress at a level greater than he could handle. 
  Plaintiff identified the stress causing his injury as anxiety resulting
  from the collapse of a building during a May 1994 three-alarm fire and his
  transfer in June 1994 from a shift he had been working since 1989.  He
  alleged that his reaction to the foregoing incidents triggered repressed
  memories of a gruesome 1991 car fire and caused him to lose confidence in
  his superiors and his ability to do his job safely.
   
       ¶  3.  Between the summer of 1994 and the spring of 1995, plaintiff
  saw a number of physicians, including two psychiatrists, and a succession
  of therapists who generally agreed that plaintiff was not fit to return to
  duty.  Several diagnosed his injury as post-traumatic-stress disorder.  The
  City formally terminated plaintiff in March 1995, and later denied his
  claim for workers' compensation benefits.  The matter was brought before
  the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry, who found in
  favor of the City, ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to benefits
  because he had failed to demonstrate that the stressful stimuli causing his
  injury were objectively real and unusual.

       ¶  4.  In so ruling, the Commissioner noted that the diagnoses
  provided by plaintiff's medical experts, in contrast to that of the City's
  expert, were based on plaintiff's own subjective beliefs concerning the
  danger posed by the May 1994  fire, beliefs that were contradicted by other
  witnesses.  In the Commissioner's view, irrespective of whether plaintiff's
  injury was brought on by a sudden stimulus or cumulative stress, plaintiff
  was required to demonstrate an objectively sound basis for his injury.  The
  Commissioner concluded that he had failed to do so.  The Commissioner also
  concluded that the appropriate control group to consider in determining
  whether plaintiff had been subjected to unusual stress was firefighters in
  general rather than all workplace employees.  The Commissioner determined
  that plaintiff was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because
  the evidence demonstrated that the stress he was experiencing stemmed from
  normal workplace pressures related to fighting fires, being transferred,
  and engaging in conflicts with his superiors.

       ¶  5.  Plaintiff appealed the decision and sought a de novo jury trial
  in the superior court.  See 21 V.S.A. § 670.  Following a two-day trial,
  the court instructed the jury to determine: (1) whether plaintiff had
  suffered a psychological injury; (2) if so, whether the injury was caused
  by factors arising from his employment; and (3) if so, whether the injury
  resulted from stress that was significantly greater than that experienced
  by the general population of employees.  The jury answered each of the
  three questions in the affirmative, and the trial court granted judgment in
  favor of plaintiff.  This appeal followed.  
   
                                     I.

       ¶  6.  The City first contends that the Vermont Constitution bars
  plaintiff's recovery because it prohibits workers' compensation benefits
  for psychological injuries unconnected with physical trauma.  We disagree.
         
       ¶  7.  In relevant part, Chapter II, § 70 of the Vermont Constitution
  provides that the "General Assembly may pass laws compelling compensation
  for injuries received by employees in the course of their employment
  resulting in death or bodily hurt."  The City argues that the plain meaning
  of the phrase "bodily hurt," particularly when considered in its historical
  context, is that the Legislature may authorize workers' compensation
  benefits only for injuries having a physical component.  In support of this
  position, the City notes that at the time § 70 was added to the Vermont
  Constitution in 1913, the Vermont House of Representatives reported that
  workers' compensation would be allowed only for "violence to the physical
  structure of the body," Journal of the House of the State of Vermont,
  Biennial Session, at 1034 (February 20, 1913), and compensation for mental
  injuries unconnected to physical trauma was virtually unknown in Vermont
  negligence law.  See Nichols v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 94 Vt. 14, 18, 109 A. 905, 907 (1919) (citing contemporary authority for the doctrine that, in
  absence of statute, no recovery for mental suffering without attendant
  physical injury is available in ordinary actions for negligence).
   
       ¶  8.  We find the constitutional argument unpersuasive.  The phrase
  on which the City relies - "violence to the physical structure of the
  body" - is taken from an amendment to a House bill that failed to pass the
  Senate.  See Journal of the House of the State of Vermont, Biennial
  Session, at 1033-34 (Feb. 20, 1913); Journal of the Senate of the State of
  Vermont, Biennial Session, at 972-73 (Feb. 21, 1913).  Even if we assumed
  that the language in question barred awards for psychological injuries, but
  cf. Bailey v. Am. Gen. Ins. Co.,