Title: Ex parte Robert Keyon Wimes. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Robert Keyon Wimes v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 1/16/09
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070785
_________________________
Ex parte Robert Keyon Wimes
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Robert Keyon Wimes
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-06-256;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1424)
SEE, Justice.
Robert Keyon Wimes was convicted of first-degree robbery
and was sentenced to 22 years' imprisonment.  The Court of
1070785
2
Criminal Appeals affirmed that conviction in an unpublished
memorandum, Wimes 
v. 
State 
(No. 
CR-06-1424, 
January 
25, 
2008),
___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (table), and Wimes
petitioned this Court for certiorari review.  We granted his
petition to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision conflicted with Ex parte Appleton, 828 So. 2d 894
(Ala. 2001).  After reviewing the parties' arguments and the
record, we quash the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 24, 2005, Curtis Pannell's wife dropped him
off outside the bakery where he worked.  As Pannell was
walking around the building to the entrance, two young men
approached him and demanded his wallet.  Pannell refused to
give it to them.  One of the men had a gun and hit Pannell on
the head with it.  Pannell retreated into the building, and
the two men ran away. 
Pannell's supervisor immediately telephoned the police.
When the police arrived, Pannell gave them a description of
the two men.  According to Officer Jonathan Whaley, who took
Pannell's statement, Pannell stated that the two men were tall
and dark-skinned, that one of them was wearing a light-colored
1070785
3
shirt and dark shorts, and that the other was wearing a black
hooded jacket and blue sweatpants.  Another officer, Officer
Derek Womack, who was the first to respond to the call,
testified that Pannell told him the direction in which the
young men had run.
A short time after Pannell gave his statement, and within
about a half hour of the actual robbery, an officer drove
Pannell to a house where, Pannell stated, he was shown three
men, one at a time, and was asked to identify which two had
been involved in the robbery.  Pannell identified the two
taller men, saying that the third man was too short to have
been one of the robbers.  The police officer testified that
Pannell identified the man who he said had hit him with the
gun and that he identified him by the clothes he was wearing.
One of the two men Pannell identified was Wimes.
At trial, Pannell identified Wimes as one of his
attackers.  Wimes objected to this in-court identification
because, Wimes argued, the pretrial identification at the
house was unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive.  The
trial 
court 
overruled 
Wimes's 
objection. 
 
On 
cross-
examination, Pannell testified that it was dark where he was
1070785
Section 13A-8-41 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]
1
person commits the crime of robbery in the first degree if he
violates Section 13A-8-43 and he: (1) is armed with a deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument."  
Section 13A-8-43, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent
part:
"A person commits robbery in the third degree if in
the course of committing a theft he: 
"(1) Uses force against the person of
the owner or any person present with the
intent to overcome his physical resistance
or physical power of resistance; or 
"(2) Threatens the imminent use of
force against the person of the owner or
any person present with intent to compel
acquiescence to the taking of or escaping
with the property."  
4
mugged.  He further testified that he could not recall the
size of the gun with which he had been hit, even though he had
previously told defense counsel that it was a large gun and,
apparently, had told police that it was small.  Pannell
further testified on cross-examination that he had described
the young men to the police as tall dark-skinned individuals
and that, on the night of the robbery, he had identified the
two men by their height and their clothing.
Wimes was convicted of first-degree robbery, a violation
of § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code 1975,  was sentenced to 22 years'
1
1070785
5
imprisonment, and was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine and a $500
assessment to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund.  
Wimes appealed, arguing that the trial court had exceeded
its discretion by allowing Pannell's in-court identification
because, Wimes argued, it was based on an impermissibly
suggestive pretrial identification.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, stating in its
unpublished memorandum that, under the totality of the
circumstances, 
the 
pretrial 
identification 
was 
not
impermissibly 
suggestive 
and 
the 
likelihood 
of
misidentification was low.  We granted Wimes's petition to
address a possible conflict between the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision in this case and this Court's decision in Ex
parte Appleton, supra.
Analysis
Wimes argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
affirmance of the trial court's judgment conflicts with Ex
parte Appleton because, he says, "the identification procedure
involving Wimes was unnecessarily suggestive." Wimes's brief
at 18.  In Ex parte Appleton, Vincent Flores was robbed by two
men while he was using a pay telephone.  Both robbers were
1070785
6
masked, and one of them held a gun to Flores's head.  The
robbery lasted five to seven minutes.  In describing the
robbers to the police, about 15 minutes after the robbery,
Flores said:
"'They both had three-quarter length black
leather coats with hoods on.  The tall guy had a
black ski mask on.  He had gloves, it looked like
gray, olive-type kind.  Black trousers.  Black
boots.  And held an automatic weapon, which I
believe was a 45.  I say it was a 45.  I can
distinguish the difference between a 45 and a nine
mill.  Nine mill is smaller, so I told the guy it
was a 45, and even described it was blue nickel with
a brown handle.'"
828 So. 2d at 897 (emphasis omitted).  
About the same time Flores was reporting the robbery to
the police, other officers were responding to a loitering
complaint.  When the officers pulled the police vehicle into
the area that was the subject of the loitering complaint,
Appleton and another man were standing on the street.  When
the pair saw the police car, they started to run.  The
officers chased them, and, when they caught Appleton, they
found in the pocket his jacket a nine-millimeter Beretta
handgun.  The officers also found in Appleton's possession a
black ski mask and a black glove.
1070785
7
When the officers arrived at the police station with
Appleton, Sgt. Kenneth Youngblood telephoned Flores and asked
him to come to the station because they had a suspect in
custody.  About 15 minutes after he had reported the robbery,
Flores returned to the police station to, in his own words,
"'actually identify the guy.'" 828 So. 2d at 897.  Youngblood
showed Flores the jacket, mask, glove, and a gun, which Flores
testified was a .45-caliber pistol, and asked Flores if the
items looked familiar.  Flores told Youngblood that they
looked like the clothes the men who had robbed him were
wearing and the pistol the men had used.  Flores also told
Youngblood that because the men who robbed him were masked, he
could not identify his assailants by their faces but that he
would be able to identify them by their voices.  Youngblood
took Flores into a room where Appleton was sitting and asked
Appleton to state his name and address.  From Appleton's
voice, Flores identified Appleton as the man who had held the
gun to his head during the robbery.
At trial, the defense argued that the manner in which the
pretrial identification was conducted –- showing Appleton by
himself for the purposes of identification, i.e., a one-man
1070785
8
showup –- was unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive.  The
trial court disagreed and denied Appleton's motion to suppress
Flores's pretrial identification.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, and we granted
Appleton's petition for certiorari review.  After reviewing
the record, we agreed with Appleton and concluded that
"[s]everal characteristics of the identification procedure
used in this case render it 'unnecessarily or impermissibly
suggestive.'" Ex parte Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 902.  
This Court stated:
"'The United States Supreme Court has long
recognized that the practice of showing a suspect
singly for the purposes of identification "has been
widely condemned" as being unnecessarily suggestive
and 
conducive 
to 
irreparable 
mistaken
identifications that constitute a denial of due
process. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104, 97
S. Ct. 2243, 2248, 53 L.Ed. 2d 140, 147 (1977)
(quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct.
1926, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (1967)).'"
828 So. 2d at 899 (quoting Ex parte Frazier, 729 So. 2d 253,
254-55 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis omitted)).  This Court continued:
"'In determining the constitutional adequacy of pretrial
identification 
procedures 
and 
the 
admissibility 
of
identification testimony, the central question is whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the identification
1070785
9
was reliable.'"  Ex parte Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 900 (quoting
Brazell v. State, 369 So. 2d 25, 28 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)).
Determining the reliability of a witness's identification
involves a two-pronged test:
"'"The first question is whether the
initial 
identification 
procedure 
was
'unnecessarily' ... or 'impermissibly' ...
suggestive.  If it is found to have been
so, the court must then proceed to the
question whether the procedure found to
h a v e  
b e e n  
' u n n e c e s s a r i l y '  
o r
'impermissibly' 
suggestive 
was 
so
'conducive 
to 
irreparable 
mistaken
identification' ... or had such a tendency
'to give rise to a very substantial
l i k e l i h o o d  
o f  
i r r e p a r a b l e
misidentification' ... that allowing the
witness to make an in-court identification
would be a denial of due process." United
States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.
2d 912, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1970).'
"Brazell v. State, 369 So. 2d [25] at 28-29 [(Ala.
Crim. App. 1978)].... In evaluating the likelihood
of misidentification, the court must consider the
following factors: 
"'(1) the opportunity of the witness to
view the criminal at the time of the crime,
(2) the witness's degree of attention, (3)
the 
accuracy 
of 
the 
witness's 
prior
description of the criminal, (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the confrontation, and (5) the length of
time 
between 
the 
crime 
and 
the
confrontation.'" 
1070785
10
Ex parte Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 900 (quoting Neil v. Biggers,
409 So. 2d 188, 199 (1972) (emphasis omitted)). 
Addressing the first prong of the Brazell test, this
Court in Ex parte Appleton stated that the following facts
demonstrated that the identification procedure used in that
case was unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive: Flores's
statement that he went to the police department to identify
the robber, Youngblood's conduct in showing Flores the clothes
and asking if they looked familiar, the fact that Youngblood
showed Flores only Appleton as a possible suspect and asked
only Appleton to speak in Flores's presence, and, finally, the
lack of necessity or emergency justifying the one-man showup.
Id.  
As to the second prong, this Court stated:
"The record before us contains too much evidence
of 
[a 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
irreparable
misidentification] for us to approve the use of
Flores's identification of Appleton.  First, Flores
admitted in his testimony that assumptions based on
Sergeant 
Youngblood's 
conduct 
affected 
[his]
identification of Appleton.  Second, Appleton's
accouterments, actually seized from him by the
police, 
did 
not 
match 
Flores's 
pre-showup
description.  The clothes and boots seized differed
in color from those described by Flores before the
showup.  Even more significantly, while the police
seized a nine-millimeter black Beretta pistol from
Appleton, Flores, who prided himself on his ability
1070785
11
to distinguish between a nine-millimeter pistol and
a .45-caliber pistol, had told police that the
weapon held by the robber who matched Appleton's
stature was 'a .45, ... blue nickel with a brown
handle.'  These inconsistencies tend to prove a
misidentification."
828 So. 2d at 903.  This Court concluded that the
unnecessarily 
suggestive 
showup 
was 
"'conducive 
to 
irreparable
mistaken 
identification[]'" 
and 
that, 
therefore, 
it
"'constitute[d] a denial of [Appleton's] due process' rights."
Ex parte Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 903 (alterations in
original). 
Wimes argues further that the facts in Ex parte Frazier
and Brazell also are analogous to the case before us.  In Ex
parte Frazier, Kristie Richardson testified that as she was
returning to a nightclub from a parking lot, she saw a dark-
colored car, possibly red, enter the parking lot.  Richardson
testified that there were three black men in the car and that
there was a fan in the backseat.  She could not describe the
passengers but said that she got a good look at the driver.
Richardson also testified that she was unsure about the color
of the car because she "'had only got a glimpse of it.'" 729
So. 2d at 255.  While Richardson was in the nightclub, her
friend, Kimberly Howard, and Richardson's boyfriend, Jerry
1070785
12
Lamar Metcalf, were robbed at gunpoint in the parking lot by
two passengers who got out of an "older, reddish-colored car."
729 So. 2d at 255.  Neither Howard nor Metcalf saw the driver
of the car.  After the robbers left, Howard ran into the
nightclub, screaming that she had been robbed.  
Richardson immediately left the club to check on Metcalf.
Richardson testified that as she left the nightclub, she saw
the same car she had seen earlier; it was leaving the parking
lot.  Fifteen minutes after the robbery, a police officer
interviewed Howard, Metcalf, and Richardson.  Richardson
testified that she told the officer that the car she had seen
was "dark-colored, and possibly was red, and that there was a
fan inside the vehicle"; however, "nothing to that effect was
reflected in the deputy's incident report." 729 So. 2d at 256.
She also testified that she had told the officer that the
driver was a tall black male in his 30s, who weighed
approximately 160 pounds, but this information was also
missing from the report.  
Roger Dale Frazier was arrested a few hours after the
robbery.  Frazier stated that he had been driving his mother's
red 1967 Chevrolet Impala automobile earlier in the evening.
1070785
13
During a search of the Impala, officers found a .32-caliber
revolver and a fan.  No one else was with Frazier at the time
of his arrest.  Howard, Metcalf, and Richardson went to the
police station to give further statements regarding the
robbery.  When they arrived at the station, the sheriff's
investigator showed them Frazier's mother's red Impala, which
had just been impounded.  A fan was visible in the backseat.
Howard and Richardson identified the Impala as being the car
used in the robbery.  Approximately three to four hours after
the robbery, the sheriff's investigator took Richardson to
view Frazier through a two-way mirror.  Frazier was handcuffed
and seated alone in a small room at the police department.
The investigator asked Richardson if Frazier was the one she
had seen driving the vehicle into the parking lot of the
nightclub.  Richardson stated that he was the man.  Frazier
was convicted of one count of first-degree robbery and one
count of second-degree robbery.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed those convictions.
This Court granted Frazier's petition for certiorari
review.  After concluding that the one-man showup had been
unnecessarily suggestive, this Court weighed the Neil v.
1070785
14
Biggers factors to determine whether there was a substantial
likelihood of misidentification.  This Court stated:
"[T]his Court's analysis of the Neil v. Biggers[,
409 U.S. 188 (1972),] factors leads to these
conclusions:
"(1) While Richardson did have an
opportunity to view the driver of the
robbers' vehicle, that opportunity was a
fleeting one;
"(2) While Richardson noticed the
robbers' car as it approached her in the
parking lot of the nightclub, she did not
give particular attention to the vehicle or
its occupants until after it had passed
from her sight, and her attention may have
been diverted because she and Metcalf were
attempting to console Howard; 
"(3) Evidence in the record regarding
Richardson's describing the driver of the
vehicle before she saw Frazier in the one-
man showup at the sheriff's department is
scant and uncorroborated.  Moreover, if
Richardson's description of the driver as
being a black male, fairly tall, in his
30s, and weighing about 160 pounds, is
accepted at face value, it is nonetheless
a highly generic description and not a
precise depiction of Frazier's actual
appearance at the time of his arrest;
"(4) Although Richardson did not state
a particular reason for her certainty, she
did testify that she was sure that Frazier
was the man she saw driving the robbers'
vehicle just before Howard and Metcalf were
robbed; and
1070785
15
"(5) 
Although 
Richardson 
did 
not
identify Frazier as the driver of the
robbers' car immediately after Howard and
Metcalf were robbed, she did identify him
within a reasonably short time thereafter."
729 So. 2d at 259.  This Court then held that there was a
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and
it reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment upholding
the in-court identification.
In Brazell, on which this Court relied in Ex parte
Appleton, two men robbed at gunpoint a service station and
convenience store operated by Mr. and Mrs. Lige McQueen.  Pam
Brooks, who was then 10 years old, was in the store during the
robbery.  Approximately nine hours after the robbery, the
McQueens and Brooks went to the police station to view two
suspects.  Brooks testified that the police had told her that
"'they had seen two men hitchhiking that looked like
the two men that we had described ..., and they said
they thought it was probably the men, so they took
them to police headquarters, and that night, they
called us to come up there.'"
369 So. 2d at 27.  The McQueens both testified that the police
told them that they had two suspects for them to view but that
the police did not say that they thought the suspects were the
men who had robbed the service station.  Each witness viewed
1070785
16
each suspect separately, through a two-way mirror.  Brazell
was one of the men viewed by the witnesses.  Each witness
identified him as one of the robbers.  
Brooks testified that one of the robbers was wearing a
green shirt and that that was the most unusual thing about
that robber.  Brazell was wearing a green shirt during the
showup.  Mrs. McQueen also testified that the shirt stood out
in her mind.  Brazell was convicted of robbery and was
sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.  He appealed the
conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals.  After noting the
two-pronged test for determining the reliability of a pretrial
identification, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 
"It is mere sophistry to argue that the showup
was not unnecessarily suggestive.  A showup by its
inherent nature is suggestive because the witness is
given no other choices.  However[,] it is permitted
where conducted promptly after the commission of a
crime or demanded by necessity, emergency or exigent
circumstances.  No justification for the use of the
showup can be advanced in this case.  Under the
particular circumstances facing us, the showup was
held at an unusual hour in light of the facts that
the robbery had occurred nine hours earlier and that
a lineup was held at 1:00 P.M. the following
afternoon.  Also, the fact that the appellant wore
a 
green 
shirt 
in 
the 
showup 
constituted 
an
additional 
element 
of 
suggestiveness 
in 
the
identification procedure."
1070785
The Court of Criminal Appeals did not address the second
2
prong of the Brazell test.  It concluded that the record did
not contain enough evidence of the Neil v. Biggers factors to
enable 
the 
court 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
in-court
identification 
was 
based 
on 
the 
suggestive 
pretrial-
identification 
procedures or on an independent basis.
Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals "remand[ed] the
conviction of the appellant to the trial court for a hearing
to determine whether the in-court identifications had an
independent basis or source."  369 So. 2d at 30.
17
369 So. 2d at 29.  Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals
concluded, the "totality of the circumstances ... create[d] an
unduly suggestive identification procedure." 369 So. 2d at
29.  
2
We turn now to the case at hand.  Wimes first argues that
the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance, upholding Pannell's
in-court identification, conflicts with Ex parte Appleton
because, 
he 
says, 
the 
out-of-court-identification 
procedure 
in
this case was "unnecessarily suggestive." Wimes's brief at 18.
In Ex parte Appleton, this Court noted: 
"'The danger inherent in a one-man showup, where
a witness is shown a single suspect and asked, "Is
that the man?" is twofold.  First, a one-man showup
conveys a clear message that "the police suspect
this man."  Second, a one-man showup does not give
the witness a choice of identifying another person
as being the perpetrator of the crime charged.
Consequently, when a one-man showup is used to
identify the perpetrator of a crime, the reliability
of the witness's identification is not put to an
objective test, such as a live or photographic
1070785
The State argues that Wimes did not address this prong
3
in his brief.  Although Wimes does not address this prong
separately, he does state that the identification procedure
was unnecessarily suggestive. Wimes's brief at 18.  Wimes also
provides some discussion of this prong in his discussion of
this Court's decision in Ex parte Appleton, Wimes's brief at
9, and the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Brazell.
Wimes's brief at 13-14.
18
lineup, in which a single suspect must be chosen
from a group of persons possessing similar physical
characteristics.'"
828 So. 2d at 899-900 (quoting Ex parte Frazier, 729 So. 2d at
254-55 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted)).  
The State argues that the out-of-court-identification
procedure was not impermissibly suggestive because (1) Pannell
was shown three suspects, not just one, and (2) Pannell was
shown the suspects individually and was "required to decide
each suspect one at a time based upon his own recollection of
who was involved in the robbery."  State's brief at 14.  
3
The showup in this case did involve three men, not just
one; however, we cannot agree that Pannell's identification
was "'put to an objective test.'" Ex parte Appleton, 828 So.
2d at 900 (quoting Ex parte Frazier, 729 So. 2d at 255).
Pannell testified that he was attacked by two tall men.  Only
two of the three suspects presented at the showup matched that
description.  Therefore, we cannot say that Pannell's
1070785
19
identification was "'put to an objective test ... in which a
single suspect must be chosen from a group of persons
possessing similar physical characteristics.'" Ex parte
Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 900 (quoting Ex parte Frazier, 729 So.
2d at 255).  Instead, we conclude that the identification
procedure was unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive. 
The second prong of the Brazell test requires us to
address 
whether 
the 
"'procedure 
found 
to 
have 
been
"unnecessarily" 
or 
"impermissibly" 
suggestive 
was 
so
"conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" ... or had
such a tendency "to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification" ... that allowing the
witness to make an in-court identification would be a denial
of due process.'" Brazell, 369 So. 2d at 28-29 (quoting United
States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 So. 2d 912, 914-15 (2d
Cir. 1970)).  We evaluate the likelihood of misidentification
under the five factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers:
"[1] [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the witness'
degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal, [4] the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the confrontation, and [5] the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation." 
1070785
20
409 U.S. at 199-200 (emphasis omitted). 
Wimes argues that, as in Ex parte Appleton, the
application of the Neil v. Biggers factors to the facts of
this case demonstrates a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.  Specifically, as to those five factors, he
argues (1) that it was dark at the time and place of the
robbery and that Pannell's encounter with the robbers was
brief; (2) that Pannell was distracted by his injury and "was
more concerned about his life than with viewing the suspects,"
Wimes's brief at 15, and that his degree of attention was
therefore not great; (3) that there were inconsistencies in
Pannell's description of the robbers (namely that Officer
Whaley and Officer Womack testified that Pannell had described
to them the clothing the robbers were wearing but that Pannell
testified at the hearing that he could not remember what kind
of clothes he told the police the robbers were wearing, and
that the police report indicated that Pannell told the police
that the gun used by the robbers was small, but Pannell
admitted at the hearing that he had told defense counsel
during a pretrial interview that the gun was large); (4) that
Pannell testified that he was certain that Wimes had been
1070785
21
involved in the robbery but, Wimes argues, Pannell's
identification was based "solely upon the height of and the
clothing worn by the suspects," Wimes's brief at 17; and (5)
that only 20-30 minutes elapsed between the robbery and the
showup.
The State argues in response that the facts of this case,
particularly as they relate to the Neil v. Biggers factors,
are distinguishable from those in Ex parte Appleton, Ex parte
Frazier, and Brazell.  The State argues that the area in which
the robbery occurred was well lighted, that Pannell interacted
with the robbers face-to-face, and that he testified that he
was able to give the police a "good description" of the
robbers.  The State also argues that Pannell was attentive
during the robbery and that any distractions came after he had
had the opportunity to view the robbers face-to-face. 
The State argues that, unlike the witness in Ex parte
Appleton, Pannell accurately described the two suspects in the
showup.  The police report indicated that Pannell had
described the robbers as tall black males and had stated that
one was wearing a light-colored shirt and dark shorts and the
other was wearing a black hooded jacket and blue sweatpants.
1070785
22
Pannell also told the officers the direction in which the
robbers had fled.  Pannell's description matched exactly the
two suspects he then identified as being involved in the
robbery, and those suspects had been apprehended in an area in
the direction in which Pannell had indicated that the robbers
had fled.  
The State further argues that "Wimes attempts to create
... discrepancies in this case by questioning Pannell's
inability to describe the gun as 'large or small' when the
police notes allegedly indicated that it was a 'small' gun."
State's brief at 24.  However, the State argues: 
"Pannell did not appear to have as much knowledge
regarding guns as did the victim in Appleton, [and]
his descriptions of the kind and size of guns was
much less certain and did not lead to any definite
inconsistences as in Appleton.  Wimes's efforts to
portray Pannell's identification as inaccurate are
more focused on the lack of detail in the record."
State's brief at 25.
The State argues that Pannell was very certain regarding
his identification of Wimes as one of the robbers.  Pannell
testified that he was "good at seeing things" and that he was
able to distinguish Wimes as the robber who did not have a gun
during both the pretrial and the in-court identifications.
1070785
23
The State further argues that Wimes acknowledges that Pannell
was certain in his identification but then attacks the basis
for that certainty, arguing that Pannell's identification was
based almost completely on the height of the suspects.
Pannell's testimony, the State argues, was that he remembered
both the robbers' heights and their clothes, and his
description of the clothes "not only proved sufficiently
detailed and accurate, but was the main factor in Officer
Womack's making contact with the suspects." State's brief at
27.  Finally, the State argued that only 20-30 minutes passed
between the robbery and the showup, which, the State argues,
provided "less likelihood that the suspects would change
clothes or appearance or that Pannell's memory would fade."
State's brief at 28.
The State would distinguish the circumstances of this
case from those in Ex parte Appleton, Ex parte Frazier, and
Brazell, arguing that this case is more analogous to O'Dell v.
State, 482 So. 2d 1341 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), Dunning v.
State, 659 So. 2d 995 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), and Gavin v.
State, 891 So. 2d 907 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), in all of which
the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the one-man
1070785
O'Dell was also convicted of two counts of burglary in
4
the third degree and theft of property in the second degree
with regard to property taken from other locations.
24
showup was not so suggestive as to create a substantial risk
of irreparable misidentification.  In O'Dell, the victim
testified that she heard a noise in her kitchen about 1:00
a.m.  When she went to find the source of the noise, she saw
a man standing and looking in her broken kitchen door.  She
screamed and the man ran away, but not before she had had
several seconds in which to observe his face and upper body.
She telephoned the police and gave a description of the
suspect.  At around 4:00 a.m., the police returned to the
victim's house with O'Dell, who matched the victim's
description.  The victim identified O'Dell as the man who had
tried to enter her apartment.  O'Dell was convicted of
attempted burglary.   
4
O'Dell argued on appeal that, under the Neil v. Biggers
factors, the pretrial-identification procedure was improper.
The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, noting: "It is
apparent from the testimony of Ms. Dreaden [the victim] that
she had ample opportunity to view the appellant and was
'positive' that he was the person who had committed the
1070785
25
crime." 482 So. 2d at 1345.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
further noted that the victim's testimony indicated that there
was a bright light on in the kitchen when she saw the
perpetrator, as well as lights on outside the kitchen door and
that she "'got a full look at [the appellant's] face.'" 482
So. 2d at 1346.  The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded:
"Under 
the 
facts 
presented 
by 
Ms. 
Dreaden's
testimony, all five of the [Neil v. ]Biggers factors
were established.  That is, Ms. Dreaden testified
that she had the opportunity to observe the
appellant at the time of the crime; that she was
alert and observed the appellant; that she was
subsequently able to describe the appellant; and
that she was certain of the identity of the
appellant when the police brought him to her later
that evening.  After considering these factors, we
conclude, as this court in Glass v. State, 424 So.
2d 687, 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), concluded, that
the identification of the appellant as the person
who had committed the crime was 'highly reliable.'
In the present case, the pretrial confrontation was
not so impermissibly suggestive that it created a
'substantial risk of misidentification,' and thus
the identification was proper."
482 So. 2d at 1346-47 (quoting Jackson v. State, 414 So. 2d
1014, 1018 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)).
In Dunning, Odessa Jones was at home with her four
children when she heard someone coming through her front door.
As she entered her living room, she saw two men with guns
coming in the front door.  Another man with a gun came in the
1070785
26
back door.  One of the men, whom Jones later identified as
Dunning, began shouting at Jones, asking her for money he said
her brother owed him.  Jones was unable to find the money in
the house and suggested that it might be in her brother's car.
Dunning went out to the car to look for the money, taking
Jones's 12-year-old daughter Valencia with him.  Jones and the
other children stayed in one of the bedrooms.  After about 20
minutes, Jones left the bedroom to look for Valencia.  In the
meantime, Dunning had left, and Valencia had gone to a
neighbor's house to telephone the police.  Dunning was
apprehended by a police officer who was en route to Jones's
house.  The officer took Dunning to Jones's house, and Jones
identified Dunning as one of the robbers.  
Dunning was convicted of robbery in the first degree and
was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.  He appealed his
conviction, 
arguing, 
among other things, that Jones's
identification of him was the result of a suggestive one-man
showup.  The Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
"Here, Officer Barnwell observed the appellant
running from the general area of Jones's house
immediately after receiving the call regarding a
burglary in process.  Odessa Jones had ample time to
observe the appellant while he was in her house.
Officer Barnwell brought the appellant to Jones's
1070785
27
house and she identified the appellant as one of the
robbers within minutes of the robbery. ... The
victim's 
identification 
was 
reliable 
and 
the
circumstances surrounding the identification were
not impermissibly suggestive."
Dunning, 659 So. 2d at 998.
In Gavin, Dewayne Meeks testified that he and his cousin,
Keith Edmund Gavin, drove to Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Gavin
to meet a certain woman.  When the woman did not appear at the
agreed location in Chattanooga, Meeks and Gavin drove to
Centre, Alabama, to find her.  Meeks testified that while he
and Gavin were stopped at an intersection in downtown Centre,
Gavin got out of the car and approached a van that was parked
nearby.  Meeks testified that he saw Gavin fire two shots at
the driver of the van.  Meeks testified that he fled as soon
as he saw Gavin shoot the driver and that Gavin got in the van
and followed him.  Meeks testified that he did not stop until
he got to Chattanooga.
Investigator Danny Smith of the district attorney's
office testified that he heard the report of the shooting over
the radio.  As he proceeded toward Centre, he saw a van
matching the description of the van involved in the shooting.
He followed the van and contacted law enforcement on his
1070785
28
radio.  Smith testified that after he put on his emergency
lights, the van stopped in the middle of the road, and the
driver got out, turned, and fired a shot at him.  Smith
testified that the driver then ran in front of the van, turned
and fired another shot at him, and ran into the woods.  Smith
described the driver of the van as "black, ... wearing a
maroon or wine-colored shirt, blue jeans, and some type of
toboggan or other type of cap." 891 So. 2d at 929.  The police
eventually caught Gavin, and Smith went to the jail so that
"he could 'look at the suspect that they had in custody to
make sure that they, in fact, had the right person.'" 891 So.
2d at 958.  Smith positively identified Gavin as the person
who had been driving the van and who had shot at him.  
Gavin was convicted of capital murder for killing the
driver of the van.  On appeal, he argued, among other things,
that the one-man showup in which Smith identified him was
impermissibly suggestive.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
disagreed, noting that Smith's testimony indicated that his
identification of Gavin was "not based on any preconceived
notion that the person the police had in custody was, in fact,
the person who had shot at him, but rather, was a
1070785
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted a discrepancy in
5
Smith's description of the gun Gavin fired at him.  Smith
stated "that based on the 'thickness' of the gun as he saw it,
he believed, but 'wasn't sure,' that Gavin had a revolver,
when, 
in 
fact, 
the 
weapon 
found 
was 
a 
.40 
caliber
semiautomatic pistol." 891 So. 2d at 961 (citation to record
omitted).  Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals
concluded: "[W]e do not believe this discrepancy undermines
Investigator Smith's otherwise accurate description." 891 So.
2d at 961.
29
precautionary measure to ensure that the right man was in
custody." 891 So. 2d at 960.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
went on to say that "even assuming that the showup was
unnecessarily 
and 
impermissibly 
suggestive," 
it 
concluded 
that
"the likelihood of misidentification was low." 891 So. 2d at
961.  The Court of Criminal Appeals based this conclusion on
the following analysis of the Neil v. Biggers factors: (1)
that Smith had ample opportunity and sufficient light by which
to view Gavin and that Gavin had shot at him; (2) that Smith's
degree of attention was very high, particularly considering
his training as a law-enforcement officer; (3) that Smith's
description of Gavin was detailed and accurate;  (4) that
5
Smith testified that he was positive in both his pretrial
identification and his in-trial identification of Gavin as the
man who was driving the van and who had fired the gun at him;
and (5) that a little over three hours had passed between the
1070785
30
crime and the identification. 891 So. 2d at 961-62.  The Court
of Criminal Appeals 
then concluded that "[u]nder the
circumstances, ... the trial court did not err in allowing
Investigator Smith's identification testimony." 891 So. 2d at
962.
Although 
we 
acknowledge 
that 
there 
are 
factual
differences between this case and each of the other cases
cited by Wimes and by the State, we agree with the State that
the facts of this case make it more analogous to O'Dell,
Dunning, and Gavin than to Ex parte Appleton, Ex parte
Frazier, and Brazell.  We further agree that under the
totality of the circumstances presented in this case, there
was not such a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification as to deprive Wimes of due process. See Ex
parte Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 900.
First, like the witnesses in O'Dell, Dunning, and Gavin,
Pannell viewed his assailants face-to-face.  Although he
testified that it was dark at the time of the robbery, he
stated that it was not so dark that he could not "pick out
facial features."  Pannell also testified that he was able to
give the police a good description of the robbers.  The police
1070785
31
report indicates that Pannell described one of the robbers as
wearing a black hooded jacket and blue sweatpants.  Thus, it
appears that the area in which the robbery occurred was
sufficiently lighted so that Pannell could distinguish between
those two similar colors.  Similarly, Smith, the officer in
Gavin, testified that it was dark and raining at the time that
Gavin shot at him but that the light from the car's headlights
was sufficient to enable Smith to tell law enforcement that
Gavin was wearing jeans and to describe the specific color of
Gavin's shirt.
Second, like the victims in O'Dell and Dunning and the
officer in Gavin, Pannell was attentive during the robbery.
He testified: "I'm pretty good at seeing things, especially
things in front of me, especially this kind of a situation
that happened like this here. ... I did give a good
description of them."  Wimes argues that Pannell was
distracted by his injury, but, as the State notes, Pannell's
injury did not occur until after he had seen and spoken with
the robbers face-to-face.
Third, unlike the victim's description in Ex parte
Appleton, 
Pannell's 
description of his assailants 
was
1070785
32
accurate.  Wimes argues that, as in Ex parte Appleton, there
was an inconsistency in Pannell's description of the gun.
However, Pannell, unlike the victim in Ex parte Appleton, did
not profess to be able to distinguish between types of guns or
testify with certainty as to the size or type of the gun.
Moreover, none 
of 
suspects 
shown 
to 
Pannell 
for 
identification
was found with a weapon.  Therefore, unlike the identification
made in Ex parte Appleton, in which the victim used a gun to
identify his attacker, these alleged inconsistencies are
irrelevant.  We conclude, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals
in Gavin, that this inconsistency does not "undermine
[Pannell's] otherwise accurate description of [Wimes]." See Ex
parte Gavin, 891 So. 2d at 961.  
Fourth, Wimes, like the witnesses in O'Dell, Dunning, and
Gavin, was certain of his identifications –- both pretrial and
in-court.  He testified with certainty that Wimes was one of
the robbers and, moreover, that Wimes was the robber who was
not carrying a gun.  Although Pannell's testimony on cross-
examination indicated that much of his identification was
related to the height of his assailants, he did state that he
identified his assailants based on their clothes as well.
1070785
33
When asked whether "there [was] any question in [his] mind
when [he] saw [Wimes] that he was one of the persons that
robbed [him]," Pannell responded: "There was no question in
mind."
Finally, only 20-30 minutes passed between the time of
the robbery and Pannell's identification of Wimes as one of
the robbers.
In light of these facts, we hold that, under the totality
of the circumstances, the identification in this case, like
those in O'Dell, Dunning, and Gavin, was sufficiently reliable
and that the identification procedure did not violate Wimes's
due-process rights.  We further conclude that Ex parte
Appleton is distinguishable on that ground and that there is
therefore no conflict between Ex parte Appleton and the
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case.  We,
therefore, quash the writ of certiorari.
Conclusion
Pannell's pretrial identification of Wimes was not so
"'"'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification' ... or
had such a tendency 'to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood 
of 
irreparable 
misidentification' 
... 
that 
allowing
1070785
34
the witness to make an in-court identification would be a
denial of due process."'" Ex parte Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 900
(quoting Brazell v. State, 369 So. 2d at 28-29, quoting in
turn United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d at
914-15).  Therefore, we quash the writ in this case.
WRIT QUASHED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
Woodall, J., dissents.