Title: State v. Robinson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Robinson, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5937.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5937 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. ROBINSON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Robinson, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5937.] 
Criminal law — R.C 2909.04(A)(3) — The damaging of a single private telephone 
or cellular telephone disrupts public services in violation of R.C. 
2909.04(A)(3) if the conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-
enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-
services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an 
emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious 
physical harm. 
(Nos. 2008-1942 and 2008-2170 — Submitted September 29, 2009 — Decided 
November 18, 2009.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Union County, 
No. 14-07-20, 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160. 
______________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public 
services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) if the conduct substantially 
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impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue 
personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility 
personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any 
person or property from serious physical harm. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we must determine whether the damaging of a 
single private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public services sufficiently 
to constitute a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). 
{¶ 2} The state asserts that the statutory language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) 
is unambiguous and plainly contemplates a violation of Ohio law when a person 
has damaged a single private telephone or cellular telephone.  The state further 
contends that there was sufficient evidence that destruction of a phone by 
appellee, Raynell Robinson, substantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement 
and emergency medical personnel to respond to an emergent situation. 
{¶ 3} Conversely, Robinson contends that R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) does not 
apply to the damaging of a single private telephone and applies only to utility 
services provided to a sizeable segment of the public.  In the alternative, Robinson 
maintains that his destruction of the phone did not substantially impair the ability 
of law-enforcement and emergency medical personnel to respond. 
{¶ 4} We hold that the damaging of a single private telephone or cellular 
telephone disruptes public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) if the 
conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, 
rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility 
personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or 
property from serious physical harm.  We further hold that Robinson’s conduct 
substantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement officers and emergency-
medical-services personnel to respond.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
January Term, 2009 
 
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court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court convicting Robinson 
for disrupting public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 5} Anthony Robinson (“Anthony”), Antonio Robinson (“Antonio”), 
and Heather Hoge attended a party at the apartment of Raynell Robinson 
(“Robinson”) and his girlfriend, Judy Newhard, in the early morning hours of 
September 2, 2006.  Anthony is Robinson’s brother, Antonio is Robinson’s 
nephew, and Hoge is Antonio’s friend.  Robinson and Newhard reside at the 
Meadows apartment complex in Marysville, Ohio.  The Meadows has two 
entrances and includes several apartment buildings with addresses that are 
numbered from the 400s and 500s up into the 700s. 
{¶ 6} Robinson was not home when Anthony, Antonio, and Hoge 
arrived.  Robinson arrived home a couple of hours later; shortly thereafter, he 
became upset and told everyone to leave.  Hoge proceeded to leave, and Antonio 
went with her. 
{¶ 7} As they were getting into Hoge’s truck to leave, Robinson 
appeared and asked Antonio what Newhard had been doing in the apartment.  
Antonio responded to Robinson’s question, and then Robinson hit Antonio in the 
back of the head.  Robinson continued to attack Antonio; eventually, Antonio was 
able to call 9-1-1 on his cell phone. 
{¶ 8} Antonio told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that he was at the Meadows and 
his face was split open.  While Antonio was talking to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, 
Robinson grabbed the phone and smashed it.  The dispatcher asked Antonio for 
his specific location at the Meadows, but the call was disconnected before 
Antonio could answer the dispatcher’s inquiry.  The 9-1-1 operator dispatched the 
fire department, an ambulance, and police to the Meadows and told them that she 
did not know the address. 
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{¶ 9} Soon thereafter, Hoge called 9-1-1, and Robinson told her to show 
him her hands and that she had better not be calling the police.  Robinson then 
began attacking Antonio again, and Antonio ended up on the ground.  The 
dispatcher repeatedly asked Hoge for a specific address and stressed the 
importance of emergency personnel having a specific location, but Hoge was 
unable to give the dispatcher the information because Robinson told her to get off 
the phone and threatened to shoot anyone who called the police.  Hoge later called 
9-1-1 a third time and set her cell phone on the seat of her truck so Robinson 
would not see her using it. 
{¶ 10} Officers Bartholomew and Collier were dispatched to the 
Meadows for a suspected assault.  Officers are required to “clear the scene” 
before medics can come in and assist the injured parties.  Officer Bartholomew 
went to the main entrance of the Meadows and made a quick circle looking for 
anyone trying to get his attention.  Officer Collier headed toward the other end of 
the apartments but stopped to talk to Newhard, who was walking on the main 
road.  Officer Bartholomew proceeded into the area around the higher numbered 
apartments.  A man standing outside of his apartment directed the officer to the 
area where the assault had occurred. 
{¶ 11} As Officer Bartholomew approached a group of males, Robinson 
came toward him and told him he needed to leave.  Officer Bartholomew radioed 
Officer Collier for assistance.  A few minutes after Officer Collier arrived, the 
officers were able to ask for an ambulance.  After speaking with the people 
involved, the police cited Robinson for disorderly conduct, and Antonio was 
taken to the hospital. 
{¶ 12} The Union County Grand Jury indicted Robinson for the felonious 
assault of Antonio, disrupting public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), 
and intimidation of a victim of a crime.  The felonious-assault charge was 
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dismissed upon the state’s motion after Antonio moved to Arizona and refused to 
voluntarily return to Ohio to testify.  That charge is not at issue in this appeal. 
{¶ 13} The case proceeded to trial on the remaining charges, and the jury 
returned a verdict finding Robinson guilty of disrupting public services in 
violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) and guilty of intimidation of a victim in a 
criminal case in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B).  Robinson was sentenced to 15 
months’ imprisonment for disrupting public services and two years for 
intimidation of a victim, with the sentences to run concurrently. 
{¶ 14} Robinson appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, arguing 
that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence and not 
supported by sufficient evidence.  The Third District affirmed the conviction for 
intimidation of a victim but reversed Robinson’s conviction for disruption of 
public services.  State v. Robinson, 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160, 895 
N.E.2d 262.  The court of appeals found that R.C. 2909.04(A) clearly and 
unambiguously prohibits substantial interference with public emergency systems 
and utilities, not the destruction of a single private telephone or cell phone.  Id. at 
¶ 25. 
{¶ 15} The Third District Court of Appeals recognized that its decision is 
in conflict with decisions of the courts of appeals for the Second, Fifth, and 
Eighth districts that hold that destruction of a private telephone constitutes 
disruption of public services.1  Id. at ¶ 30.  The Third District further held that 
even if destruction of a cell phone constituted disruption of public services, the 
state failed to prove the element of substantial impairment because the officers 
                                          
 
 
1. The court of appeals certified that its decision was in conflict with the judgments rendered in 
State v. Yoakum (Jan. 17, 2002), 5th Dist. No. 01CA0005; State v. Thomas, 2nd Dist. No. 19435, 
2003-Ohio-5746; State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Nos. 81692 and 81693, 2003-Ohio-3241; and State v. 
Brown (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 293, 646 N.E.2d 838.  
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arrived at the scene of the assault within a few minutes of being dispatched.  Id. at 
¶ 31, 33. 
{¶ 16} We recognized the conflict between the courts of appeals and 
asserted jurisdiction over the state’s discretionary appeal, and we consolidated the 
appeals.  State v. Robinson, 120 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2008-Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 
967.  In the certified conflict, we are asked to determine whether the damaging of 
a single private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public services 
sufficiently to constitute a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3).  120 Ohio St.3d 1451, 
2008-Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 966.  The state’s discretionary appeal requires us to 
determine whether the destruction of a single private telephone or cellular phone 
substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue 
personnel, 
emergency-medical-services 
personnel, 
or 
emergency-facility 
personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or 
property from serious physical harm.  Robinson, 120 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2008-
Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 967. 
{¶ 17} We answer the certified question in the affirmative and further 
hold that Robinson substantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement officers 
and emergency-medical-services personnel to respond to the 9-1-1 call. 
Analysis 
Disruption of Public Services 
{¶ 18} Initially, we must decide whether the damaging of a single private 
telephone or cellular telephone constitutes a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3).  The 
primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 
the legislature.  State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 
N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11.  In interpreting a statute, this court has held that “the intent of 
the lawmakers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the 
words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and 
distinctly the sense of the lawmaking body, there is no occasion to resort to other 
January Term, 2009 
 
7 
 
means of interpretation.”  Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 
574, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 19} We find that the language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is plain and 
unambiguous.  Robinson was convicted of disrupting public services under R.C. 
2909.04, which provides as follows: 
{¶ 20} “(A) No person, purposely by any means or knowingly by 
damaging or tampering with any property, shall do any of the following: 
{¶ 21} “ * * * 
{¶ 22} “(3)  Substantially impair the ability of law enforcement officers, 
firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency medical services personnel, or 
emergency facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and 
preserve any person or property from serious physical harm.” 
{¶ 23} The language in R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is clear in that it prohibits (1) 
conduct that substantially impairs the ability of emergency-services personnel, (2) 
to either respond to an emergency or protect and preserve any person or property 
from serious physical harm.  The statute unambiguously specifies that in order for 
one to disrupt public services under R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), the conduct involved 
must be the knowing damaging or tampering with any property. 
{¶ 24} The word “property” is defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(10)(a) as 
follows: 
{¶ 25} “ ‘Property’ means any property, real or personal, tangible or 
intangible, and any interest or license in that property.  ‘Property’ includes, but is 
not limited to * * * telecommunications devices * * *.” 
{¶ 26} R.C. 
2901.01(A)(10)(c) 
provides 
that 
the 
term 
“telecommunications device,” as it is used in division (A)(10), has the same 
meaning as in R.C. 2913.01. 
{¶ 27} “Telecommunications device” is defined in R.C. 2913.01(Y) as: 
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{¶ 28} “[A]ny instrument, equipment, machine, or other device that 
facilitates telecommunication, including, but not limited to, a computer, computer 
network, computer chip, computer circuit, scanner, telephone, cellular telephone, 
pager, personal communications device, transponder, receiver, radio, modem, or 
device that enables the use of a modem.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 29} In accordance with the foregoing statutory provisions, a private 
telephone or cellular telephone constitutes property as the word is used in R.C. 
2909.04(A).  Therefore, the destruction of a private telephone or cellular 
telephone constitutes damaging or tampering with property under R.C. 
2909.04(A). 
{¶ 30} The plain language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) does not limit its 
application to the interference with public emergency systems and utilities on a 
large scale, as the Third District found.  Division (A)(3) of R.C. 2909.04 does not 
contain any reference to the words “public emergency systems” or “utilities.”  
Thus, the Third District’s interpretation that the statute does not apply to the 
destruction of a single private telephone or cellular telephone is not a sound 
reading of the plain language. 
{¶ 31} Despite finding that the statutory language is unambiguous, the 
court of appeals reviewed the legislative history of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) and 
examined the statute in pari materia with subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2).  177 Ohio 
App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160, 895 N.E.2d 262, ¶ 25-26.  Because the language of 
R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is clear, it is not necessary to resort to other means of 
interpretation as the court of appeals did.  Slingluff, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, 
at paragraph two of the syllabus.  We therefore decline to resort to other means of 
interpreting the statute. 
{¶ 32} For the reasons stated above, we hold that the damaging of a single 
private telephone or cellular telephone constitutes a violation of R.C. 
2909.04(A)(3) if the conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement 
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officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or 
emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and 
preserve any person or property from serious physical harm. 
Substantial Impairment 
{¶ 33} The remaining issue for our consideration is whether the 
destruction of Antonio Robinson’s cellular phone substantially impaired the 
ability of law-enforcement officers and emergency personnel to respond to 
Antonio’s 9-1-1 call or to protect and preserve any person or property from 
serious physical harm.  The court of appeals held that Robinson’s conviction for 
disrupting public services was not supported by sufficient evidence because the 
officers arrived on the scene of the assault within minutes of being dispatched.  
177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160, 895 N.E.2d 262, ¶ 33-34.  The appellate 
court therefore found that the destruction of the cell phone did not substantially 
impair the ability of emergency service providers to respond to the incident.  Id.  
We disagree. 
{¶ 34} In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support 
the jury verdict as a matter of law, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  In Jenks, we emphasized that “[w]here 
reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon conflicting evidence, 
determination as to what occurred is a question for the trier of fact.  It is not the 
function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder.  
Rather, upon appellate review, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution.”  Id. at 279. 
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{¶ 35} The determination as to whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support Robinson’s conviction for disruption of public services in violation of 
R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) turns solely on whether the destruction of Antonio’s cell 
phone substantially impaired the ability of the law enforcement officers and 
emergency services personnel to respond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call.2  The phrase 
“substantially impaired” is not defined in the Revised Code and thus it must be 
given the meaning generally understood in common usage.  State v. Zeh (1987), 
31 Ohio St.3d 99, 103, 31 OBR 263, 509 N.E.2d 414. 
{¶ 36} Applying this principle, the term “substantial” is commonly 
understood to mean “not seeming or imaginary,” “not illusive,” “considerable in 
amount,” and “being that specified to a large degree or in the main.”  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary (1986) 2280.  “Impair” means “to make 
worse” or diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength.”  Id. at 1131.  A 
rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the destruction of 
Antonio’s phone considerably diminished the ability of the police and emergency-
services personnel to respond to the 9-1-1 call. 
{¶ 37} Both the appellate court and Robinson focused on the fact that the 
officers arrived on the scene within minutes of being dispatched as being 
dispositive of whether the officers’ ability to respond was substantially impaired.  
R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), however, does not require proof of a substantial impairment 
of the officers’ response time.  The pertinent inquiry is directed toward their 
ability to respond. 
{¶ 38} Antonio was only able to tell the 9-1-1 dispatcher that he was at 
the Meadows and that his face had been injured.  When Robinson smashed the 
phone and disconnected the call, the dispatcher was attempting to elicit a more 
                                          
 
 
2.  For purposes of this appeal, Robinson does not dispute that sufficient evidence existed to prove 
the other elements of his disruption-of-public-services conviction. 
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specific location from Antonio.  The importance of emergency-services personnel 
knowing a caller’s exact location is critical so that police and medical responders 
can reach the location as quickly as possible.  This is especially true in the case of 
a suspected assault, when the officers must reach the scene of the incident and 
clear it before they can allow emergency medical personnel to attend to the 
victim’s injuries.  It is additionally important for emergency personnel to reach 
the victim immediately to prevent further harm to the victim. 
{¶ 39} The significance of the 9-1-1 dispatcher obtaining a caller’s precise 
location is further exhibited by comments made by the dispatcher when Hoge 
made the second call to 9-1-1.  The dispatcher repeatedly asked Hoge for her 
exact location and emphasized that emergency personnel could not help her 
unless they had a more specific location. 
{¶ 40} As a result of the negligible information that Antonio was able to 
provide to the 9-1-1 dispatcher before Robinson destroyed the cell phone, the 
police could not go directly to the scene of the incident.  Rather, the police had to 
search a large apartment complex and question bystanders before locating 
Antonio.  While the police were attempting to respond to Antonio’s request for 
help, Robinson continued to strike Antonio.  Also during this time frame, 
Robinson threatened physical harm if anyone called police, which the jury found 
sufficient to sustain an additional conviction for intimidation of a victim.  Once 
Officer Bartholomew eventually found Antonio, it took an additional few 
moments for him to call for back up and assess the situation before he was able to 
call for an ambulance.  Under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable 
for the jury to determine that the delay in locating Antonio substantially impaired 
the officers’ ability to respond to Antonio’s call. 
{¶ 41} Additional factors support a finding that Robinson’s destruction of 
the cell phone substantially impaired the ability of emergency personnel to 
respond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call.  The officers had to presume that Antonio had 
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been the victim of an assault based upon the content of the calls to 9-1-1.  
However, the officers did not know whether an assault had actually occurred, how 
the assault occurred, the extent of Antonio’s injuries, how many people were 
involved in the incident, or whether the perpetrator or perpetrators had weapons.  
As a result, they did not know how many officers were needed on the scene or 
what type of medical assistance was necessary.  The inability to get the required 
information created a safety issue not only for the 9-1-1- caller but also for the 
police officers, the emergency responders, and the public.  The information was 
significant to the officers’ ability to respond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call, and the lack 
of information substantially impaired the officers’ ability to respond to the call. 
{¶ 42} The jury was appropriately instructed that in order to find 
Robinson guilty of disrupting public services, it had to find that he “did 
knowingly by damaging or tampering with any property substantially impair the 
ability of law enforcement officers, fire fighters, rescue personnel, emergency 
medical services personnel, or emergency facility personnel to respond to an 
emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious 
physical harm.”  The trial court reemphasized that there must have been a 
substantial impairment when it defined the term “knowingly.” 
{¶ 43} Applying the jury instructions to the evidence, the jury could have 
rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson’s destruction of 
Antonio’s phone substantially impaired the ability of emergency personnel to 
respond to the 9-1-1 call.  By focusing solely on the length of the delay in 
reaching Antonio, the Third District erroneously substituted its judgment for that 
of the jury and failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution. 
{¶ 44} For the reasons stated above, we therefore hold that Robinson’s 
conduct substantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement officers and 
emergency-medical-services personnel to respond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call. 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the damaging of a single 
private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public services in violation of 
R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) if that conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-
enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services 
personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to 
protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm.  We 
further hold that Robinson’s conduct substantially impaired the ability of law 
enforcement officers and emergency medical services personnel to respond. 
{¶ 46} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
reinstate the judgment of the trial court convicting Robinson for disrupting public 
services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
David W. Phillips III, Union County Prosecuting Attorney, and Melissa A. 
Chase, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Lori J. Weisman, Assistant Solicitor, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio. 
______________________