Title: Burdge v. Palmateer

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  May 12, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
WILLIAM DEAN BURDGE,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JOAN PALMATEER,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 97C12207; CA A108298; SC S50753)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 6, 2004.
Laura S. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief on the merits for petitioner on
review.  Stacey RJ Guise, Assistant Attorney General, Salem filed
the petition for review.  With them on the petition and brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Steven H. Gorham, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
Balmer, and De Muniz, Justices.**
RIGGS, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
De Muniz, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which
Durham, J., joined.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Paul J. Lipscomb, Judge. 187 Or App 295, 67 P3d 397 (2003).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
RIGGS, J.
The issue in this post-conviction proceeding is whether
petitioner's lawyer provided constitutionally adequate assistance
at petitioner's criminal trials.  In the criminal cases, the
trial court applied a particular statute to increase petitioner's
sentences.  Petitioner's lawyer did not challenge whether the
statute applied.  Two years later, in a different case, the Court
of Appeals interpreted that statute and concluded that it could
not be used to enhance sentences in cases like petitioner's.  The
post-conviction court rejected petitioner's petition for relief,
but the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner's trial
counsel had been inadequate and reversed.  Burdge v. Palmateer,
187 Or App 295, 67 P3d 397 (2003).  For the reasons that follow,
we now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm
the judgment of the post-conviction court.
In evaluating whether petitioner's lawyer rendered
inadequate assistance, we first consider the relevant legal
standard under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. 
See, e.g., Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 358-59, 39 P3d 851
(2002) (court should consider state constitutional claims before
federal constitutional claims).  Our analysis under that section
ordinarily proceeds in two steps.
"First, we must determine whether petitioner
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
[his lawyer] failed to exercise reasonable professional
skill and judgment.  Second, if we conclude that
petitioner met that burden, we further must determine
whether he proved that counsel's failure had a tendency
to affect the result of his trial."
Id. at 359 (citations omitted).
In considering a claim of inadequate assistance of
counsel, we "make every effort to evaluate a lawyer's conduct
from the lawyer's perspective at the time, without the distorting
effects of hindsight."  Id. at 360.  The courts "will not second-guess a lawyer's tactical decisions in the name of the
constitution unless those decisions reflect an absence or
suspension of professional skill and judgment."  Gorham v.
Thompson, 332 Or 560, 567, 34 P3d 161 (2001).  "The constitution
gives no defendant the right to a perfect defense -- seldom does
a lawyer walk away from a trial without thinking of something
that might have been done differently or that he would have
preferred to have avoided."  Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867,
875, 627 P2d 458 (1981).
Only general statements can be made about what
constitutes the exercise of professional skill and judgment.  Id.
at 873.  Generally, "counsel must * * * prepare himself on the
law to the extent appropriate to the nature and complexity of the
case * * *."  Id. at 875.  Counsel need not, however, "expend
time and energy uselessly or for negligible potential benefit
under the circumstances of the case."  Id. at 874.
With those standards in mind, we turn to the facts
here.  Petitioner originally was charged in three different cases
with committing a total of five crimes.  The first case ("case
one") charged petitioner with committing one crime, first-degree
burglary, on October 12, 1993.  The second case ("case two")
charged petitioner with committing one crime, again first-degree
burglary, on January 9, 1994.  The third case ("case three")
charged petitioner with committing three crimes on January 14,
1994:  first-degree burglary, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree sexual abuse.
All three cases were tried separately, one after
another, but not in the same order as the crimes.  The trial
court first tried case two, then case one, then case three. 
Petitioner was convicted in all three cases.
After the trials concluded, the trial court held a
consolidated hearing to sentence petitioner in all three cases. 
The state asked the court, among other things, to impose
determinate sentences under ORS 137.635 (1993) (1) in cases two
and three.  That statute, which is the statute at issue here,
provided, in part:
"(1) When, in the case of a felony described in
subsection (2) of this section, a court sentences a
convicted defendant who has previously been convicted
of any felony designated in subsection (2) of this
section, the sentence shall not be an indeterminate
sentence to which the defendant otherwise would be
subject under ORS 137.120, but * * * the court shall
impose a determinate sentence, the length of which the
court shall determine, to the custody of the Department
of Corrections. * * *  The convicted defendant who is
subject to this section shall not be eligible for
probation.  The convicted defendant shall serve the
entire sentence imposed by the court and shall not,
during the service of such a sentence, be eligible for
parole or any form of temporary leave from custody. 
The person shall not be eligible for any reduction in
sentence pursuant to ORS 421.120."
All three cases here involved felonies listed in subsection (2)
of that statute. (2)
The trial court imposed the sentences in the order in
which petitioner committed the crimes.  The court first sentenced
petitioner in case one.  Then, when the court sentenced
petitioner in case two, it used the conviction in case one to
impose a determinate sentence under ORS 137.635.  Similarly, when
the court sentenced petitioner in case three, it used the
convictions in cases one and two to impose determinate sentences
for two of case three's three counts.
Petitioner's lawyer did not object to the court
imposing determinate sentences in cases two and three.  That
failure to object is the crux of the present case.  For whatever
reason, petitioner presented no competent evidence at the post-conviction hearing regarding why his lawyer failed to object to
the court applying ORS 137.635. (3)
Almost two years later, the Court of Appeals decided
State v. Allison, 143 Or App 241, 923 P2d 1224, rev den, 324 Or
487 (1996).  In an en banc decision, with four judges concurring,
the Allison court for the first time interpreted how ORS 137.635
applied to facts such as those at issue here.
In Allison, the Court of Appeals concluded that
"convicted," as used in that statute, means a finding of guilt. 
143 Or App at 246 (majority); id. at 257 (Leeson, J., concurring,
joined by Deits, Riggs, and De Muniz, JJ.).  The statute thus
applied when there was a particular temporal relationship between
two findings of guilt on qualifying felonies.  However, the court
concluded, the words "previously been convicted" left an
ambiguity about that temporal relationship.  Id. at 246-47
(majority); id. at 257 (concurrence).  
The majority identified three plausible ways to resolve
the ambiguity.  The statute might apply when either (1) one
finding of guilt preceded sentencing on another finding of guilt,
or (2) one finding of guilt preceded another finding of guilt, or
(3) one finding of guilt preceded the defendant's committing the
crime that led to the other finding of guilt.  Id. at 247-48. 
The majority adopted the third interpretation:  ORS 137.635
applied only to defendants who had been found guilty of one
qualifying felony before they committed a second qualifying
felony.  Id. at 256.
The Allison concurrence agreed with the second
plausible interpretation:  ORS 137.635 applied to defendants who
had been found guilty of one qualifying felony before they were
found guilty of a second qualifying felony.  Id. at 259.  The
four concurring judges did not think that the majority's
interpretation was even plausible.  Id.
Under the Allison majority's interpretation -- found
guilty before committing another qualifying felony -- none of
petitioner's five crimes would have qualified for an ORS 137.635
determinate sentence.  So petitioner sought post-conviction
relief, arguing that his trial lawyer had been constitutionally
inadequate because (among other things) the lawyer did not
challenge the ORS 137.635 determinate sentences.  The post-conviction court rejected that argument and dismissed the post-conviction petition.
The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision. 
When petitioner was sentenced, the majority noted, no reported
appellate court opinion had interpreted that aspect of ORS
137.635.  Burdge, 187 Or App at 300.  As noted, Allison later
concluded that the statute had more than one plausible
interpretation.  Id.  "The question presented in this case
[Burdge], then, is how reasonable counsel must go about the task
of construing and arguing for the construction of a statute that
has two or more plausible meanings and, thus, is ambiguous."  Id.
at 300-01.  The Burdge majority concluded that a reasonable
lawyer would have advanced the argument that ORS 137.635 did not
apply to the facts of petitioner's cases, because the argument
involved a plausible reading of the statute, petitioner faced no
tactical risks for making it, and petitioner would have reaped a
substantial benefit if the argument had succeeded.  Id. at 301.
One judge dissented, noting that four of the Allison
judges had rejected even the plausibility of the interpretation
that the Allison majority finally adopted.  Id. at 312 (Edmonds,
P. J., dissenting).  "If four judges on this court could conclude
that the Allison majority's interpretation of ORS 137.635 was not
plausible, clearly, reasonable trial counsel could have come to
that same conclusion."  Id.  
The Burdge majority dismissed that argument:
"Of course, reasonable attorneys can, and often do,
differ as to which possible meaning of a statute is
correct or, for that matter, how many plausible
interpretations exist.  However, lawyers representing
criminal defendants, unlike judges, are expected to be
advocates, not neutrals; they must undertake to discern
and advance plausible interpretations of ambiguous
statutes that would benefit their clients."
Id. at 303.  "The issue is not whether petitioner's counsel was
required to divine the correct meaning of an ambiguous statute
but, rather, whether he was required to discern and advance a
plausible alternative meaning of the statute that would likely
benefit his client.  We conclude that he was."  Id. at 304.
We return to the issue in this case:  Whether the
exercise of reasonable professional skill and judgment under
these circumstances required petitioner's counsel to object to
the determinate sentences imposed on petitioner under ORS
137.635.
By answering that question affirmatively, the state
contends, the Burdge majority significantly expanded post-conviction relief.  The state argues that the Burdge majority
opinion incorrectly examines issues in hindsight, and so
effectively requires defense counsel to predict accurately how
the law will develop in the future.  The state contends that the
Burdge majority failed to give adequate weight to the nature and
complexity of the case.  In passing, the state suggests that
defense counsel may have no constitutional obligation to argue
unsettled issues at all, citing in support this court's decision
in Wells v. Peterson, 315 Or 233, 844 P2d 192 (1992).
Petitioner, in turn, contends that the Burdge majority
appropriately restated and applied existing law.  A lawyer has a
duty to advocate any position that aids the client, petitioner
argues.  All that the Burdge majority did was to require defense
counsel to make an argument that would have favored petitioner.
The Court of Appeals and petitioner both incorrectly
assume that, because a court eventually recognized a statute's
ambiguity, any lawyer exercising reasonable professional skill
and judgment would have done the same.  But issues do not
recognize themselves; the task of identifying and evaluating
potential issues rests on the skills of the lawyer.  Although
that is a skill, the Court of Appeals' majority nevertheless
failed to apply the "reasonable professional skill and judgment"
test to its exercise.  The correct rule remains as this court
described it previously, with the caution that it must be applied
to all aspects of a lawyer's reasoning process, not just to
selected parts.  In situations similar to this one, the post-conviction court may grant a petitioner relief only if it can say
affirmatively that a lawyer exercising reasonable professional
skill and judgment would have recognized the statutory ambiguity,
would have seen an interpretation that could benefit the
defendant, and would have concluded under the circumstances that
the potential benefits of advancing that interpretation exceeded
any risks.
This case fails at the first step.  Assuming that ORS
137.635 is ambiguous, it is not so obviously ambiguous that any
lawyer exercising reasonable professional skill and judgment
necessarily would have seen it.  
As noted, we look at the statute as a lawyer would have
seen it at the time.  ORS 137.635 applies "[w]hen, in the case of
a felony described in subsection (2) of this section, a court
sentences a convicted defendant who has previously been convicted
of any felony designated in subsection (2) of this
section * * *."  At sentencing, a lawyer asking whether
petitioner fell within the meaning of the statute would first
note, as the Court of Appeals did, that "convicted" means "found
guilty."  The lawyer would then consider the remaining criteria. 
Is petitioner being sentenced for "a felony described in
subsection (2) of this section"?  Yes, in all three cases. (4) 
"Has" petitioner "previously been [found guilty] of" a qualifying
felony?  Again, yes, in all three cases.  Petitioner was found
guilty in cases two and three before being sentenced in case one;
he was found guilty in cases one and three before being sentenced
in case two; and he was found guilty in cases one and two before
being sentenced in case three.  The statute, then, would appear
to apply to every qualifying felony in all three cases.  Among
the many statutes implicated in a criminal sentencing, nothing
makes this statute stand out as being ambiguous. (5)
So even lawyers exercising reasonable professional
skill and judgment may well not see any ambiguity to be
exploited.
Our conclusion does not depend on whether Allison
correctly identified an ambiguity or ultimately interpreted the
statute correctly.  To echo this court's conclusion in
Krummacher:
"It may be that another lawyer would have tried the
case differently; it may be that a reviewing court
would disagree with * * * counsel's decision.  It may
even be that, in hindsight, the decision was an error. 
In the context of this [sentencing], however, we cannot
agree that defense counsel's decision * * * constituted
a suspension of professional representation which
denied petitioner [his] constitutionally due assistance
of counsel."
Id. at 881.  The Burdge majority erred.
We pause here to discuss one additional point raised by
the state.  As the state notes, this court's decision in Wells,
315 Or 233, suggests that a reasonable attorney never has a duty
to argue unsettled questions of law.  We conclude that that
statement in Wells was an unfortunate and perhaps misleading
generalization, and we now take the opportunity to correct it. 
In at least some cases, a lawyer's failure to present an
unsettled question may be inadequate assistance of counsel.
In Wells, the petitioner was a juvenile offender
remanded to adult court for trial.  Id. at 235.  The trial court
convicted the petitioner of murder and sentenced him to life in
prison with a 20-year minimum sentence.  Id.  Although
ORS 161.620 provided, in part, that "a sentence imposed upon any
person remanded from the juvenile court * * * shall not
include * * * imposition of any mandatory minimum
sentence * * *," petitioner's lawyer did not raise the issue. 
Id. (second omission in original).  This court agreed that ORS
161.620 prohibited the 20-year minimum sentence, id., but it also
concluded that counsel's failure to raise it was not inadequate,
id. at 236.
"Failure of petitioner's criminal trial counsel to
contend that ORS 161.620 prohibited the sentence here
was not inadequate assistance of counsel, because at
the time of trial the meaning of the statute was not
clearly settled.  Reasonable counsel could have
disagreed about whether to make that argument at the
time that the original case was tried."
Id. (6)
Whatever the merits of that statement in Wells in
connection with its particular facts, it must be qualified when
asserted as a general statement of law.  The correct standard is
whether counsel exercised reasonable professional skill and
judgment.  Even if the meaning of a statute remains unsettled,
the statute may so obviously offer possible benefits to a
defendant that any lawyer exercising reasonable professional
skill and judgment would raise it.  It is the "reasonable
professional skill and judgment" standard, and not generalized
and imprecise rules of thumb such as "unsettled questions of
law," that determines whether counsel rendered inadequate
assistance.
We conclude that petitioner failed to demonstrate that
counsel, exercising reasonable professional skill and judgment at
the time of petitioner's sentencing, would have objected to the
trial court imposing determinate sentences under ORS 137.635. 
Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that
there was no violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution.
Finally, we turn to whether petitioner received
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Under Strickland
v. Washington, 466 US 668, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984),
a defendant must show (among other things) that "counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" -- specifically, "reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms."  Id. at 688.  "A fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances
of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time."  Id. at 689.  For the reasons
previously discussed, we conclude that petitioner's counsel did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.  Thus petitioner was not deprived
of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
DE MUNIZ, J., dissenting.
In State v. Allison, 143 Or App 241, 923 P2d 1224,
rev den, 324 Or 487 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that ORS
137.635, (7) the so-called "Denny Smith" sentencing law,
applied only to a defendant who had been convicted of one of the
crimes listed in the statute before the defendant committed the
crime for which he or she was to be sentenced under that statute. 
Id. at 247-56. (8)  Under Allison, because petitioner committed
his crimes before his first conviction, he was not subject to ORS
137.635 (1993) for any of the crimes for which he eventually was
sentenced.  
At the time that petitioner was sentenced, ORS
137.635 (1993) had not been interpreted by an appellate court. 
The state requested that the trial court sentence petitioner
under ORS 137.635 (1993).  Petitioner's lawyer did not object to
the state's request and did not argue to the trial court that the
statute did not apply to petitioner.  In the absence of any claim
to the contrary, the trial court sentenced petitioner under ORS
137.635 (1993), thereby substantially increasing the length of
petitioner's prison term. (9)  
Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief,
arguing that his ORS 137.635 (1993) sentences were illegal in
light of the Court of Appeals' holding in Allison and that his
trial lawyer had been constitutionally inadequate in failing to
advance the interpretation of the statute that the Allison court
later accepted.  The post-conviction court denied petitioner
post-conviction relief.  The Court of Appeals, however, agreed
with petitioner, reversed the post-conviction court, and ordered
the entry of judgment granting petitioner post-conviction relief. 
This court allowed review.  Now a majority of this
court refuses to grant petitioner relief from the illegal
sentences imposed by the trial court.  Because the majority's
determination that petitioner received constitutionally adequate
counsel is completely at odds with this court's constitutional
standard for adequate counsel and because that determination
misunderstands the obligations of a criminal defense lawyer in
our adversarial system, I respectfully dissent.
It is difficult to determine the principal
elements of the majority's decision to reject petitioner's claim
that he was denied constitutionally adequate counsel.  However,
it appears that the heart of the majority's reasoning is found in
the following passage:
"The Court of Appeals and petitioner
both incorrectly assume that, because a court
eventually recognized a statute's ambiguity,
any lawyer exercising reasonable professional
skill and judgment would have done the same. 
But issues do not recognize themselves; the
task of identifying and evaluating potential
issues rests on the skills of the lawyer. 
Although that is a skill, the Court of
Appeals' majority nevertheless failed to
apply the 'reasonable professional skill and
judgment' test to its exercise.  The correct
rule remains as this court described it
previously, with the caution that it must be
applied to all aspects of a lawyer's
reasoning process, not just to selected
parts.  In situations similar to this one,
the post-conviction court may grant a
petitioner relief only if it can say
affirmatively that a lawyer exercising
reasonable professional skill and judgment
would have recognized the statutory
ambiguity, would have seen an interpretation
that could benefit the defendant, and would
have concluded under the circumstances that
the potential benefits of advancing that
interpretation exceeded any risks.
"This case fails at the first step. 
Assuming that ORS 137.635 is ambiguous, it is
not so obviously ambiguous that any lawyer
exercising reasonable professional skill and
judgment necessarily would have seen it.
"As noted, we look at the statute as a
lawyer would have seen it at the time.  ORS
137.635 applies '[w]hen, in the case of a
felony described in subsection (2) of this
section, a court sentences a convicted
defendant who has previously been convicted
of any felony designated in subjection (2) of
this section * * *.'  At sentencing, a lawyer
asking whether petitioner fell within the
meaning of the statute would first note, as
the Court of Appeals did, that 'convicted'
means 'found guilty.'  The lawyer would then
consider the remaining criteria.  Is
petitioner being sentenced for 'a felony
described in subsection (2) of this section'? 
Yes, in all three cases.  'Has' petitioner
'previously been [found guilty] of' a
qualifying felony?  Again, yes, in all three
cases.  Petitioner was found guilty in cases
two and three before being sentenced in case
one; he was found guilty in cases one and
three before being sentenced in case two; and
he was found guilty in cases one and two
before being sentenced in case three.  The
statute, then, would appear to apply to every
qualifying felony in all three cases.  Among
the many statutes implicated in a criminal
sentencing, nothing makes this statute stand
out as being ambiguous."
Burge v. Palmateer, ___ Or at ___, ___ (May 12, 2005) (slip op.
at 9-10) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
The majority's conclusion appears to proceed from
the premise that a reasonable lawyer would not have recognized
any ambiguity in ORS 137.635 (1993) that, if resolved in
petitioner's favor, would have benefitted petitioner.  That
premise is false.
The opening clause of ORS 137.635(1) (1993)
provides:
"(1) When, in the case of a felony described in
subsection (2) of this section, a court sentences a
convicted defendant who has previously been convicted
of any felony designated in subsection (2) of this
section, the sentence shall not be an indeterminate
sentence * * *."
Subsection (2) of the statute lists the "[f]elonies to which
subsection (1) of this section apply * * *."
The phrase in subsection (1) of ORS 137.635 (1993),
"previously been convicted," signals that the court's duty to
apply the statute arises when the court sentences a defendant who
is convicted of a listed felony and the defendant is a person who
"previously" was convicted of a listed felony.  However, the term
"previously" gives rise to a critical interpretive issue.  The
statute fails to identify with reasonable clarity the point in
time when the characteristic of a previous conviction must apply
with respect to the defendant. 
As the majority opinion in Allison demonstrated, there
are three possible answers to that conundrum:  the previous
conviction must precede either (1) the time of the sentencing
proceeding for the current felony crime of conviction; (2) the
time of the conviction for the current felony crime of
conviction; or (3) the time of the commission of the current
felony crime of conviction.  143 Or App at 247-48.  The last of
those possible answers is the interpretation that the Court of
Appeals majority adopted in Allison, after rejecting the other
two as impractical and contrary to the statute's purpose.  Id. at
255-56.  The parties assume, as we must for the purpose of
analyzing this case, that the Court of Appeals in Allison
correctly interpreted ORS 137.635 (1993).  Yet, according to the
majority, the words of the statute plausibly support only the
first, or perhaps the first and second, possible answers listed
above, each of which the Court of Appeals demonstrated in Allison
was unworkable and inconsistent with the legislature's intent. 
Moreover, according to the majority, the statutory text not only
fails to support the interpretation that the Court of Appeals
adopted in Allison, but it fails to give even a hint that the 
court's interpretation represented one plausible reading of the
statute.  The majority's view is wrong, because the majority
analyzes the statute incompletely. 
The majority fails to examine an important textual clue
that contradicts its reading of the statute:  The phrase
"previously been convicted" in ORS 137.635(1) (1993) states a
criterion that modifies the term "convicted defendant."  One
reasonable reading of the statute, as Allison demonstrated, is
that the statute applies to only a defendant who satisfied the
previous-conviction criterion when the defendant committed the
crime of conviction, i.e., "in the case of a felony described in
subsection (2) of this section[.]"  The majority fails to
acknowledge that ORS 137.635 (1993) is subject to that reasonable
alternative interpretation and that a competent lawyer would have
detected it.  That interpretation, if properly applied by the
trial court in petitioner's criminal sentencing proceeding, would
have rendered ORS 137.635 (1993) inapplicable to that proceeding,
resulting in a substantially shorter prison term for petitioner. 
Any competent lawyer would have advocated that reasonable reading
of the statute and objected to the application of ORS 137.635
(1993) in petitioner's sentencing proceeding. 
With respect, the majority appears not to comprehend
the difference between tactical matters, for which criminal
defense lawyers are accorded great leeway, and the issue
presented here.  There was no tactical choice to be made by
petitioner's lawyer.  Instead, at sentencing, the lawyer's duty
was to argue that, properly interpreted, ORS 137.165 (1993) did
not apply to petitioner's proceeding. 
The American Bar Association has advanced standards to
measure the criminal defense function:  
"Counsel for the accused is an essential component of
the administration of criminal justice. * * * The basic
duty defense counsel owes to the administration of
justice and as an officer of the court is to serve as
the accused's counselor and advocate with courage and
devotion and to render effective, quality
representation."  
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and
Defense Function, Standard 4-1.2 (3d ed 1993) (emphasis added). 
In particular, at sentencing, "[d]efense counsel should present
to the court any ground which will assist in rendering a proper
disposition favorable to the accused."  Standard 4-8.1. 
Accepting the state's interpretation of an obviously ambiguous
sentencing statute, in the absence of appellate guidance
supporting the state's reading of the statute, is inconsistent
with the above-described professional standard.
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to be heard by himself and counsel[.]"  Similarly,
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."  To fulfill the role assigned to defense counsel under
our adversarial system of criminal justice, a lawyer must
investigate the facts and inform himself or herself with respect
to the law "to the extent appropriate to the nature and
complexity of the case[.]"  Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867,
875, 627 P2d 458 (1981).  
In my view, a lawyer in a case like this who was
attempting to meet the standards outlined in Krummacher
necessarily would have reviewed the wording of ORS 137.635 (1993)
to determine how that statute affected his or her client.  And,
that lawyer certainly should have recognized that a reading of
the statute could have resulted in the sentence that this
particular defendant ultimately received.  However, I reject the
majority's assertion that a constitutionally adequate lawyer also
would not have recognized that another permissible reading of the
statute existed, precisely along the lines eventually adopted in
Allison, i.e., reading the phrase "previously been convicted" in
a way that would have excluded this client.  And, I doubt that
any member of this court would deny that, once the lawyer saw the
alternative reading, the lawyer was obliged to argue it. 
The majority purports to accept the interpretation of
ORS 137.635 (1993) set out in Allison.  Under that
interpretation, petitioner's sentences are excessive by at least
four years. The trial lawyer's failure to take the minimum steps
necessary to protect petitioner from the unlawful imposition of
those extra years in prison was not constitutionally adequate
representation.  The prejudice to petitioner is obvious and is
extreme.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
Durham, J., joins this dissent.
1. ORS 137.635 has been amended twice since 1993.  Neither amendment affects our
reasoning here.  The first amendment added a cross-reference to conform the statute to the
sentencing guidelines.  Or Laws 1995, ch 79, § 49.  The second amendment was technical,
changing a word in subsection (2) from the singular to the plural.  Or Laws 2003, ch 14, § 59. 
Unless otherwise specified, all references to ORS 137.635 in this opinion are to ORS 137.635
(1993).
2. Only two of the three crimes in case three involved qualifying felonies.  The third crime,
first-degree sexual abuse, is not "a felony described in subsection (2) of" ORS 137.635.
3. Petitioner presented an affidavit from his trial lawyer in which the lawyer asserted that he
believed himself to have been "inadequate" in representing petitioner.  "Inadequacy," however, is
a legal conclusion for the court.
4. Except for the first-degree sexual abuse charge in case three.
5. A more technical grammatical analysis could proceed along the following lines. 
"Previously" is an adverb modifying the compound verb "has been convicted."  "Has been
convicted" is present perfect tense, indicating that the earlier conviction may have taken place at
any time before the present -- the present being the time of sentencing for the later conviction
("when * * * a court sentences * * *").  Moving the adverb helps show the meaning of the statute
without changing it:  When a court sentences a convicted defendant who has been convicted
previously.
6. The Court of Appeals here tried to distinguish Wells.  It
understood Wells to address those situations when a conflict
existed in the case law at the time that defense counsel failed
to make the objection.  Burdge, 187 Or App at 301-02 n 3.
That understanding is incorrect factually, because no
conflict existed in the case law when Wells's counsel failed to
object.  Wells did note that the Court of Appeals had interpreted
ORS 161.620 differently "in a series of cases starting with State
v. Noble, 94 Or App 123, 764 P2d 949 (1988), rev dismissed[,] 307
Or 506 (1989) * * *."  315 Or at 236.  But the trial court
sentenced Wells on July 28, 1986, over two years before the Court
of Appeals decided Noble (on November 23, 1988).  4741 Oregon
Briefs, Appellant's Brief at App-2 (copy of post-conviction
petition listing judgment date).
7. As footnote one of the majority opinion notes, ORS
137.635 has been amended twice since 1993.  I agree with the
majority that those amendments do not affect the analysis in this
case.  For purposes of consistency, we cite here the text of ORS
137.635 (1993).  That statute provided:
"(1) When, in the case of a felony described in subsection
(2) of this section, a court sentences a convicted defendant
who has previously been convicted of any felony designated
in subsection (2) of this section, the sentence shall not be
an indeterminate sentence to which the defendant otherwise
would be subject under ORS 137.120, but, unless it imposes a
death penalty under ORS 163.105, the court shall impose a
determinate sentence, the length of which the court shall
determine, to the custody of the Department of Corrections. 
Any mandatory minimum sentence otherwise provided by law
shall apply.  The sentence shall not exceed the maximum
sentence otherwise provided by law in such cases. The
convicted defendant who is subject to this section shall not
be eligible for probation. The convicted defendant shall
serve the entire sentence imposed by the court and shall
not, during the service of such a sentence, be eligible for
parole or any form of temporary leave from custody.  The
person shall not be eligible for any reduction in sentence
pursuant to ORS 421.120.
"(2) Felonies to which subsection (1) of this section apply
include and are limited to:
"(a) Murder, as defined in ORS 163.115, and any aggravated
form thereof.
"(b) Manslaughter in the first degree, as defined in ORS
163.118.
"(c) Assault in the first degree, as defined in ORS 163.185.
"(d) Kidnapping in the first degree, as defined in  ORS
163.235.
"(e) Rape in the first degree, as defined in ORS 163.375.
"(f) Sodomy in the first degree, as defined in ORS 163.405.
"(g) Unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree, as
defined in ORS 163.411.
"(h) Burglary in the first degree, as defined in ORS
164.225.
"(i) Arson in the first degree, as defined in ORS 164.325.
"(j) Robbery in the first degree, as defined in ORS 164.415.
"(3) When the court imposes a sentence under this section,
the court shall indicate in the judgment that the defendant
is subject to this section."
8. This court has not reviewed the merits of the Allison
decision.  However, the state does not assert in this court that
the rule of law announced in Allison is legally incorrect.
9. It is difficult to determine on this record exactly the
increased prison term that petitioner received under ORS 137.635
(1993).  At a minimum, it appears that petitioner will serve an
additional four years in prison as a result of the erroneous
application of ORS 137.635 (1993).  The impact on the length of
petitioner's incarceration may in fact be much greater.  That is
so because a person sentenced under ORS 137.635 (1993) "shall
serve the entire sentence imposed by the court and shall not,
during the service of such sentence, be eligible for * * * any
reduction in sentence pursuant to ORS 421.120 or for any
reduction in term of incarceration pursuant to ORS 421.121."  ORS
421.120 and ORS 421.121 authorize prison term reductions for
commendable institutional conduct, and various work and
educational activities in prison.