Title: State ex rel. Smith v. Smith

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Smith, Appellee, v. Smith, Judge, et al., Appellants. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Smith v. Smith (1996),     Ohio St.3d        .] 
Prohibition preventing juvenile court judge from proceeding with a 
parentage action denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-1215 -- Submitted February 20, 1996 -- Decided April 10, 1996.) 
 
Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 67806.  
 
Appellee, Paula Ann Smith, was born in Zimbabwe to parents who were 
citizens of South Africa.  Appellee subsequently became a Canadian citizen.    
Appellee met appellant Timothy Johnson while they were students attending 
Bowling Green State University in Ohio.  At the time, appellee and her parents 
resided in Ohio.   
 
After appellee became pregnant as a result of sexual intercourse occurring 
in Ohio, she left for South Africa in September 1993.  On December 25, 1993, 
appellee gave birth to a son in Pretoria, South Africa.  Appellee placed her child 
for adoption in South Africa in accordance with the law of that country, which 
requires the consent only of the mother of an illegitimate child to effectuate an 
adoption.    The adoption was finalized in January 1994.   
 
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In February 1994, Johnson filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court 
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to establish a parent and child relationship 
between himself and appellee’s child.  As of the date Johnson filed his parentage 
action, appellee had returned to Ohio.  Appellee moved to dismiss the parentage 
action because the juvenile court lacked in personam jurisdiction over her child 
and the adoption had been finalized in South Africa.  Appellant Judge Burke E. 
Smith overruled appellee’s motion. Judge Smith noted that the parties had 
acknowledged that Johnson had no knowledge that appellee gave birth to the child 
until February 1994, when he promptly filed the parentage action. Judge Smith 
further determined that the South African adoption decree did not bar the 
parentage action and was not res judicata. He set the matter for evidentiary 
hearing.   
 
Appellee then filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga 
County requesting a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Smith from proceeding 
with the parentage action.  The court of appeals permitted Johnson to intervene.  
Following the submission of evidence and briefs, the court of appeals granted the 
writ of prohibition. 
 
The cause is now before the court upon  appeals as of right. 
 
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____________________ 
 
Mary Ann S. Johanek, for appellee. 
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Gregory 
B. Rowinski and Jeffrey I. Sherwin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant 
Judge Burke E. Smith. 
 
Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz and Barbara K. Roman, for appellant Johnson. 
____________________        
 
Per Curiam.  Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in granting the 
writ of prohibition.  In order to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, appellee had to 
establish that Judge Smith was about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial 
authority, that the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and that 
denying the writ would have resulted in injury for which no other adequate remedy 
existed in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 115, 116, 647 N.E.2d 807, 809.  It is uncontroverted that Judge Smith 
was about to exercise judicial authority in proceeding with the parentage action.   
 
As to the remaining requirements for a writ for prohibition, absent a patent 
and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s 
 
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jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law by appeal.  State ex rel. Enyart v. 
O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112.  The court of 
appeals determined that the availability of appeal was immaterial because Judge 
Smith patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed. 
 
Juvenile courts have original jurisdiction over parentage actions.  R.C. 
3111.06(A).  A putative father is a proper party to bring an action to determine the 
existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship.  R.C. 3111.07(A).  
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, Judge Smith possessed basic authority to 
proceed in the parentage action.  See State ex rel. Fenwick v. Finkbeiner (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 457, 460, 650 N.E.2d 896, 898. 
 
Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that despite Judge Smith’s 
basic statutory jurisdiction, the South African adoption decree divested him of 
jurisdiction under R.C. 3107.15 and 3107.18.  R.C. 3107.15(A) provides that a 
final decree of adoption issued by an Ohio court has the effect of terminating all 
parental rights of biological parents and creating parental rights in adoptive 
parents.  
 
R.C. 3107.18 provides: 
 
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“Except when giving effect to such a decree would violate the public policy 
of this state, a court decree terminating the relationship of parent and child, or 
establishing the relationship by adoption, issued pursuant to due process of law by 
a court of any jurisdiction outside this state, whether within or outside the United 
States, shall be recognized in this state, and the rights and obligations of the 
parties as to all matters within the jurisdiction of this state, including without 
limitation, those matters specified in section 3107.15 of the Revised Code, shall be 
determined as though the decree were issued by a court of this state.” 
 
In support of the court of appeals’ holding, appellee contends that an 
adoption decree bars subsequent parentage actions because of considerations of 
res judicata and standing.  See, e.g., Gilbraith v. Hixson (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 
127, 512 N.E.2d 956, syllabus (“The doctrine of res judicata can be invoked to 
give conclusive effect to a determination of parentage contained in a dissolution 
decree or a legitimation order, thereby barring a subsequent paternity action 
brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3111.”); Farley v. Farley (1992), 85 Ohio 
App.3d 113, 116, 619 N.E.2d 427, 429 (R.C. 3107.15 denies standing to relatives 
of parents whose parental rights were terminated by adoption). 
 
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However, assuming its applicability to the South African adoption decree, 
R.C. 3107.15 does not divest juvenile courts of jurisdiction to proceed in 
parentage actions.  Issues of  res judicata and standing do not attack a court’s 
jurisdiction and can be adequately raised by postjudgment appeal.  State ex rel. 
LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 251, 594 N.E.2d 616, 621; State 
ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div.(1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1305-1306. 
 
Further, it is not patent and unambiguous that the South African adoption 
decree is entitled to comity and the effects specified in R.C. 3107.15(A).  Under 
R.C. 3107.18, a foreign adoption decree will not be accorded the status of an Ohio 
adoption decree if public policy of this state would be violated or the foreign 
adoption decree was not issued pursuant to due process of law.  Therefore, the 
recognition and effectiveness of a foreign adoption decree are subject to the 
condition that the decree not be repugnant to the laws of Ohio.  See, generally, 3 
Spike, Ohio Family Law and Practice (1994) 686, Section 46.39. 
 
The court of appeals determined that giving effect to the South African 
adoption decree would not violate the public policy of the state because “R.C. 
3107.15(A)(1) sets forth a clear public policy of terminating the relationship 
 
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between the biological parents and the adopted child.”  The court of appeals 
further stated that the South African decree was effective because “due process 
does not require actual notice to the biological father of adoption proceedings in 
all circumstances.” 
 
We have previously noted that R.C. 3107.15 reflects the General 
Assembly’s intent to find families for children.  In re Adoption of Ridenour 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 328, 574 N.E.2d 1055, 1063.  However, R.C. 3107.06 
and 3107.07 reflect a countervailing policy that biological parents’ consent to 
adoption is required except under limited circumstances.  The requirement of 
consent to adoption by a natural parent, except under the specific statutorily 
enumerated conditions, “protects the statutory adoption scheme from attack on the 
ground that the adoption proceedings operate to deprive such a parent of the rights 
of custody and control without due process of law.”  Spike, supra, at 644, Section 
46.08. 
 
“Because of the finality and serious impact of adoption, the law accords 
protections to a natural parent when the adoption of a child is proposed.  Among 
those protections are the right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before any parental rights which may exist are terminated.”  In re Adoption of 
 
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Greer (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 293, 298, 638 N.E.2d 999, 1003, citing Lehr v. 
Robertson (1983), 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614.  Parents have a 
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their children.  
In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171. 
 
In the case at bar, South African law did not require any notice to the 
biological father of an illegitimate child to effectuate the adoption decree.  Unlike 
the putative father in Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 261-262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993-2994, 77 
L.Ed.2d at 626-627, there was no evidence that Johnson forfeited his opportunity 
to demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood so as to 
waive the requirement of notice of the adoption proceeding.  Therefore, it is 
arguable that the South African adoption decree was not entered in accordance 
with due process of law and that giving effect to such decree would violate the 
public policy of this state. 
 
Judge Smith did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to 
proceed in Johnson’s parentage action, and appellee failed to establish the 
inadequacy of a postjudgment appeal to raise her claims concerning R.C. 3107.15, 
3107.18, res judicata, and standing.  Accordingly, appellee is not entitled to 
 
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extraordinary relief in prohibition.  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
court of appeals is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
WRIGHT, J., not participating.