Title: Lavalley v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Lavalley v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co.  (94-657); 166 Vt. 205; 692 A.2d 367

[Filed 17-Jan-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 94-657

Carrie Lavalley                                   Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

E.B. & A.C. Whiting Company                       June Term, 1995

Linda Levitt, J.

       Andrew D. Mikell, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

       Christopher A. Micciche, Burlington, for defendant-appellee

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Seth A. Steinzor, Assistant
  Attorney General, and Melissa Jurgens, Law Clerk, Montpelier, for amicus
  curiae State of Vermont

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Carrie Lavalley claims that defendant, E.B. and
  A.C. Whiting Company discriminated against her on the basis of sex in
  violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act, 21 V.S.A. §
  495(a)(1).  She appeals the decision of the superior court granting
  defendant's motion for summary judgment.  We affirm.

       Plaintiff is a full-time employee at defendant's plant, where she
  earns $359.20 per week. She works on a production line as a cutter/packer,
  responsible for cutting long bundles of plastic fibers produced at the
  plant.  She is required to stand throughout the shift and to lift heavy
  items.

       In March 1991, plaintiff advised defendant that she was pregnant and
  unable to perform her job requirements.  She presented defendant with a
  note from her physician stating that her condition rendered her unable to
  stand for extended periods of time and made it difficult for her to perform
  heavy lifting.  Plaintiff asked defendant to accommodate her for the
  duration of her

 

  pregnancy either by having a co-worker assist her with heavy lifting or by
  temporarily assigning her to light duty.  Defendant denied plaintiff's
  request to be accommodated on the job, and pursuant to the company's
  disability policy, classified her disability as a long-term, nonwork-
  related injury, and placed her on disability leave with half-pay of $160
  per week.  On July 5, 1991, plaintiff gave birth and, after her maternity
  leave, returned to her former job at full pay.

       Defendant's policy divides workers into those whose disability is
  work-related and qualifies them for workers' compensation benefits, and
  those whose disability is not work-related.  The former are encouraged to
  accept whatever accommodations are possible, and compatible, with their
  ability to work.  If alternative work is available, workers in this
  category are placed in it.  Whatever the accommodation, including the
  placement in alternative work, the employees in this category receive full
  pay as long as they work.

       The second category, those with nonwork-related disabilities, is
  further divided into two subcategories.  The first subcategory is made up
  of minor and short-term disabilities that are handled by shift supervisors
  through accommodations that enable the employee to continue at full pay. 
  The second subcategory is made up of those with long-term disabilities that
  render the worker unable to substantially perform his or her
  responsibilities.  According to defendant's union contract, these employees
  are placed on disability leave at fifty percent of salary up to a maximum
  of $160 per week.  Plaintiff is in this subcategory.

       Plaintiff brought an action alleging that defendant discriminated
  against her on account of her pregnancy, violating Vermont's Fair
  Employment Practices Act (FEPA).  See 21 V.S.A. § 495(a)(1) ("It shall be
  unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or any employer . . . to discriminate
  against any individual because of . . . sex . . . .").  In her complaint,
  she alleged that defendant violated FEPA "[b]y placing Plaintiff (who was
  pregnant) into a class of persons (those injured away from the job) and
  treating her differently from others who are disabled (those injured on the
  job)."

       Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the superior court
  granted defendant's

 

  motion.  The court reasoned:

     Here, the Plaintiff has not presented evidence proving
     discriminatory motive.  In fact, the practice of paying half salary
     for long term non-work-related illness was motivated by a union
     contract, not gender.  The Plaintiff's reduction in salary was not
     due to her gender or pregnancy, but the length of time and
     physical limitations created by her condition.

     Even if we assume that the Plaintiff established gender as
     the motivating factor, we could not conclude that the Defendant
     violated Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act.  Defendant's
     decision to pay the plaintiff fifty percent of her salary during the
     time she was unable to substantially perform her employment was
     made and would have been absent any discriminatory motive.

  Plaintiff appealed the court's decision to this Court.

       Before we address the reasoning of the trial court, we must examine
  the basic premise of plaintiff's claim -- that discrimination because of
  pregnancy can be a violation of FEPA.(FN1)  Defendant argues that pregnancy
  discrimination cannot be found to be sex discrimination because: (1) in
  interpreting FEPA, this Court follows the decisions of the federal courts
  interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the statute after
  which FEPA is modeled; (2) the United States Supreme Court ruled in General
  Electric Co. v. Gilbert,