Title: Couch v. City of Sheffield

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

708 So. 2d 144 (1998)
Travis COUCH
v.
CITY OF SHEFFIELD and Richard Lesley.
1961048.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 9, 1998.
*145 Dennis Neal Odem, Florence, for appellant.
Vincent McAlister of Almon, McAlister, Baccus & Hall, L.L.C., Tuscumbia, for City of Sheffield.
H. Thomas Heflin, Jr., Tuscumbia, for Richard Lesley, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiff, Travis Couch, appeals from a summary judgment for the defendants, Richard Lesley and the City of Sheffield, in this action seeking damages under state and federal law in connection with an alleged illegal arrest and an alleged malicious criminal prosecution. Couch also complains of the denial of his motion for a partial summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' liability. We affirm.
Lesley, a nine-year veteran of the Sheffield Police Department, arrested Couch at the Stagecoach lounge in the early morning hours of July 2, 1995.[1] Couch, along with another man arrested at the same time, Billy Joe Berryman,[2] was charged with public intoxication and taken to jail. Berryman, who admitted to being under the influence of alcohol and marijuana, eventually pleaded guilty to public intoxication. Couch was tried in the Sheffield Municipal Court and was acquitted.
Couch filed this action on March 25, 1996. He sought damages from Lesley under state law, based on allegations of intentional and malicious false arrest/imprisonment, malicious *146 prosecution, and an illegal "strip search." He also sought damages from the City, based on allegations of negligent or wanton failure to properly train, supervise, and discipline Lesley; on allegations of intentionally encouraging and covering up illegal police conduct; and on allegations of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.[3] Couch also sought to recover damages from Lesley and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights by government officials acting "under color of state law") and § 1985 (providing a cause of action based on allegations of a conspiracy to deny constitutional rights and to obstruct justice). His federal claims were based on allegations of intentional and malicious false arrest/imprisonment, defamation, malicious prosecution, and an illegal "strip search."
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted, among other things, the affidavits of Lesley, Al Blackburn, and Doug Aycock. Those affidavits read as follows:
In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and in support of his own motion for a partial summary judgment, Couch submitted a copy of a "Notice of Claim" that he says he filed with the City in accordance with Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-23. This document, which was signed by Couch and notarized by his attorney on April 1, 1996, is not stamped "filed," and it contains nothing otherwise indicating that it was filed with the City clerk. The document contains a section entitled "Factual Allegations," which reads as follows:
It appears from a comparison of the "Notice of Claim" with Couch's complaint that the above-quoted section entitled "Factual Allegations" was simply lifted from the complaint and incorporated into the "Notice of Claim." The notary's certification on the last page of the document states:
(Emphasis added.) Couch also submitted unverified copies of portions of the transcript of his trial in the municipal court on the public intoxication charge, as well as copies of the defendants' answers to interrogatories. Couch's "Narrative Summary" of "undisputed facts," contained in his motion for a partial summary judgment, was drawn from his attached "Notice of Claim" and the copies of the transcript of his trial in the municipal court.
The defendants make a number of arguments in support of the summary judgment. Specifically, Lesley argues that he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the state law claims (the claims based on allegations of intentional and malicious false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and an illegal "strip search"), under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-338, which extends discretionary function immunity to city police officers. According to Lesley, there is no evidence indicating that he acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith when he arrested Couch, so as to take him out from under the protection of the doctrine of discretionary function immunity. See Wright v. Wynn, 682 So. 2d 1 (Ala.1996). With respect to the § 1983 claim, Lesley argues that he is protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity as expressed in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). He also argues that there is no evidence supporting either the allegations of intentional and malicious false arrest/imprisonment, defamation, malicious prosecution, and an illegal "strip search," or the allegations under § 1985 of a conspiracy to deny Couch's constitutional rights or to obstruct justice. The City argues that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the state law claims (the claims based on allegations of negligent or *152 wanton failure to train, supervise, or discipline Lesley; on allegations of intentionally encouraging and covering up illegal police conduct; and on allegations of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior) either under the immunity extended to municipalities in Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-190, or on the ground that there was no evidence to support the claims. The City also maintains that the state law claims must fail because, according to the City, Lesley failed to timely file a notice of a claim with the City, in accordance with § 11-47-23. As to the § 1983 claim, the City, relying primarily on Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), argues that it cannot be held liable for Lesley's actions under a respondeat superior theory. The City argues that there is no evidence indicating that Lesley illegally arrested Couch pursuant to a policy officially adopted or implemented by the City and that there is no evidence otherwise supporting any of the allegations underlying the § 1983 or § 1985 claims.
Relying on the "Notice of Claim" and the "Factual Allegations" section contained therein, as well as the unverified copies of the transcript of his trial in the municipal court, Couch contends that Lesley lacked probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication. The gravamen of Couch's claims, both state and federal, is that Lesley, pursuant to official City policy, intentionally and without justification singled him out for arrest and demeaning interrogation for the purpose of harassing him, in an attempt to obtain information about possible drug trafficking at the Stagecoach Lounge, and that the City attempted to cover up any wrongdoing on Lesley's part by threatening Couch and fabricating evidence, i.e., by suborning perjury on the part of Captain Blackburn, who, according to Couch, provided false testimony as to Couch's condition at the time of the arrest.
After reviewing the record and the briefs, and after carefully examining the very serious charges of misconduct leveled by Couch against the defendants, we conclude, as the trial court did, that the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala. R.Civ.P. In determining whether a summary judgment is appropriate, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Wayne J. Griffin Electric, Inc. v. Dunn Construction Co., 622 So. 2d 314 (Ala.1993). Rule 56(e) provides:
We do not consider the "Notice of Claim" and the accompanying unverified copies of the municipal trial transcript to be sufficient in form to satisfy Rule 56(e) and, thus, to defeat the motion for summary judgment. See Osborn v. Johns, 468 So. 2d 103 (Ala.1985). It is significant, we think, that the "Notice of Claim" is not in proper affidavit form. An affidavit sufficient to satisfy Rule 56(e) is a written declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily and based on personal knowledge, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before a person having authority to *153 administer an oath or affirmation. See Black's Law Dictionary, "Affidavit" (6th ed.1990); Rule 56(e). It is apparent that Couch's "Notice of Claim" was intended to satisfy § 11-47-23 by putting the City on notice of Couch's allegations of misconduct. It is also apparent that the bulk of the "Notice of Claim," which was filed on or about April 1, 1996, apparently was made up of pages lifted almost verbatim from Couch's complaint, which was filed on March 25, 1996, including the sections entitled "Identity of the Parties," "Factual Allegations," "Count 1False Arrest," and "Relief Sought." In the notary's certification, Couch "avers that he has read and understands the information in the foregoing Notice of Claim and he affixes his signature thereto." It is one thing for a person to confirm on personal knowledge and under oath or by affirmation the truthfulness of the contents of a document that he has signed (such a document being an affidavit); it is quite another thing for a person to confirm under oath or by affirmation that he has read, understands, and has signed a document that was intended to satisfy a statutory notice requirement and that contains a section entitled "Factual Allegations," which includes matters ranging from information of which the claimant could have had personal knowledge to other information composed of legal conclusions, hearsay, and speculation. In this respect, we note that in the "Factual Allegations" section Couch does not refer to himself in the first person; rather, he refers to himself in the third person, i.e., calling himself "the plaintiff." Furthermore, the "Factual Allegations" section also contains statements that were allegedly made by Lesley and the city prosecutor to Couch's attorney and with respect to which Couch apparently had no personal knowledge. We conclude, therefore, that the defendants made a prima facie showing of no wrongdoing on their part and that Couch failed to rebut that showing by presenting evidence of misconduct on the part of the defendants, sufficient to satisfy Rule 56. An adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. Rule 56(e).
Although the summary judgment was proper for the reasons discussed above, we think it appropriate to point out that even if we were to treat the "Notice of Claim" and the accompanying copies of the municipal court transcript as sufficient to satisfy Rule 56(e), we would still hold that the summary judgment was proper. Section 6-5-338 provides in pertinent part as follows:
This section extends discretionary function immunity to municipal police officers, such as Lesley, unless the officer's conduct is so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct or conduct engaged in in bad faith. See Wright v. Wynn, supra. However, it would be pure speculation for one to infer from Couch's evidence that Lesley had a personal ill will against him and that he *154 maliciously or in bad faith arrested him solely for purposes of harassment. There is nothing to reasonably dispute Lesley's affidavit testimony that he believed he had probable cause to arrest Couch based on Couch's appearance and demeanor (he said Couch's eyes were red and glazed; that he was nervous and unbalanced; that he was standing outside a lounge that had a reputation for being a hangout for drug users and drug traffickers; and that he was standing directly next to and talking with a person who was heavily intoxicated and who reeked of alcohol and marijuana), regardless of the fact that Couch was later acquitted of the offense of public intoxication. We further note that the defendants made a prima facie showing, through the affidavit of the police chief, Doug Aycock, that the "strip search" conformed to police department regulations and note that Couch submitted no evidence indicating that Lesley personally participated in the search of Couch's person at the jail or that that search, under the circumstances, was either illegal or in violation of police department regulations. For these reasons, the summary judgment for Lesley on the state law claims alleging intentional and malicious false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and an illegal "strip search" would be upheld. As to the state law claims against the City (the claims based on allegations of negligent or wanton failure to properly train, supervise, and discipline Lesley; allegations of intentionally encouraging and covering up illegal police conduct; and allegations of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior), we note that the City has immunity under § 11-47-190 with respect to each of those claims, except the one based on allegations of negligence in failing to train, supervise, and discipline Lesley. See Scott v. City of Mountain Brook, 602 So. 2d 893 (Ala.1992) (§ 11-47-190 limits the liability of municipalities to injuries suffered through neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness of an agent, officer, or employee). That claim would also fail, however, because there is no credible evidence to rebut the City's prima facie showing that it did properly train, supervise, and discipline its police officers.
In addition, we note that § 11-47-23 required Couch to file a notice of his state law claims with the City within six months of the accrual of his causes of action. A cause of action is deemed to have accrued under § 11-47-23 when an action can be maintained. See Hill v. City of Huntsville, 590 So. 2d 876 (Ala.1991). Notwithstanding the fact that his trial on the charge of public intoxication was pending, Couch could have maintained an action against the City immediately, at least with respect to his claims based on his allegations of intentional and malicious false arrest/imprisonment and an illegal "strip search" (under the doctrine of respondeat superior), and his claims based on allegations of negligent or wanton failure to properly train, supervise, and discipline Lesley.[4] However, the record indicates that Couch signed the "Notice of Claim" on April 1, 1996, approximately nine months after his arrest on July 2, 1995. Assuming that it was filed on or about April 1, 1996, the notice was untimely as to those claims; and the complaint, which was not filed until March 25, 1996, was not filed in time to satisfy § 11-47-23. Hill v. City of Huntsville, supra.[5]
*155 With respect to the federal claims against the defendants, we note that Lesley was protected from § 1983 liability under the doctrine of qualified or "good faith" immunity extended to a municipal police officer performing a discretionary function. See Roden v. Wright, 646 So. 2d 605 (Ala.1994); Point Properties, Inc. v. Anderson, 584 So. 2d 1332 (Ala.1991), discussing, among other cases, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra. In deciding whether a public official, such as a police officer, is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, this Court employs the following two-step analysis:
646 So. 2d  at 610, quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (11th Cir.1988). (Citations omitted.) In Point Properties v. Anderson, supra, at 1338-39, this Court, quoting Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1990), explained that "`the relevant question on a motion for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity is whether a reasonable official could have believed his or her actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official at the time the conduct occurred.'" This Court went on to note that "`the qualified immunity defense provides ample protection to all except the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" 584 So. 2d  at 1339, quoting Stewart, supra. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Couch, as we are required to do under our summary judgment standard of review, we conclude that Lesley was engaged in a discretionary function when he arrested Couch and, as previously noted, that he could have reasonably believed he was acting lawfully when he arrested Couch. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Hardeman v. State, 651 So. 2d 59, 67-68 (Ala.Crim. App.1994), noted:
"`A person commits the crime of public intoxication if he appears in a public place under the influence of alcohol, narcotics or other drug to the degree that he endangers himself or another person or property, or by boisterous and offensive conduct annoys another person in his vicinity.' Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-11-10(a). Although the evidence presented by the State may not have been sufficient to sustain a conviction for public intoxication, that same evidence was sufficient to provide the officers with probable cause to arrest the appellant for that offense. See Parks v. Director, State Department of Public Safety, 592 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) (`[a]n acquittal in a DUI case [is] not synonymous with an unlawful arrest'; `there [may] be a lawful arrest even though there is a finding of "not guilty" of the offense charged'). `"Probable cause" does not mean that the officers must possess enough evidence in admissible form to convict the person whom they arrest or search.' Yeager v. State, 281 Ala. 651, 653, 207 So. 2d 125, 127 (1967), quoting Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d 647 (5th Cir.1959).
Notwithstanding the fact that Couch was later acquitted of the public intoxication charge, the following undisputed facts, which were known to Lesley on the morning of the arrest, are sufficient to extend qualified immunity to Lesley: 1) The Stagecoach lounge was a known hangout for drug users and drug traffickers; 2) Sheffield police officers had been called to the lounge many times to deal with intoxicated patrons, to investigate property damage, etc.; 3) the owner of the lounge had requested that Sheffield police officers keep a close watch on his premises; 4) Lesley observed Couch and Berryman outside the lounge in an area where Lesley knew, from past experience, drug using and dealing had gone on before; 5) Couch's eyes were glazed and red and he appeared unbalanced and nervous during his conversation with Lesley outside the lounge; 6) Couch was directly beside and conferring with Berryman, who was heavily intoxicated and smelled of marijuana. From Lesley's perspective, Couch appeared to smell of, and to be high on, marijuana, in the middle of the night, at a lounge with a history of disturbances by intoxicated patrons, and he appeared to pose a danger to himself, to someone else at the lounge, or to someone's property. Couch's version of the incident is not sufficient, standing alone, to create a fact question as to whether Lesley could have reasonably believed that Couch had committed a crime and, thus, to take Lesley out from under the protection of the qualified immunity doctrine.
We further note that the City could not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for Lesley's actions, see Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, supra; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981), and that there is no credible evidence from which one could reasonably infer that Lesley violated Couch's civil rights pursuant to some official policy sanctioned by the City. See Monell, 436 U.S.  at 691, 98 S. Ct.  at 2036 ("Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable [under § 1983] unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort"). Bare speculation that the City was involved in fabricating evidence and suborning perjury, or that it was involved in a conspiracy to deny constitutional rights and obstruct justice, within the meaning of § 1985, simply will not suffice.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment for the defendants is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and COOK and SEE, JJ., concur.
ALMON, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  We note a discrepancy between the dates stated in the affidavits of the police officers and the dates stated by Couch in his statement of claim filed with the city clerk. This discrepancy is of no consequence for the purposes of this appeal.
[2]  This man's last name also appears in the record as "Berriman."
[3]  The complaint does not clearly indicate whether Couch sought to predicate liability on the City for Lesley's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior; however, for purposes of this appeal, we assume that he did.
[4]  "False imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of the person of another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-170. For there to be a false imprisonment, there must be some direct restraint of the person; however, it is not necessary that there be confinement in a jail, although detention and confinement in jail formed the basis of Couch's false arrest/imprisonment claim. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 679 So. 2d 651 (Ala.1996). Any factual issues surrounding the training, supervising, and disciplining of Lesley; the "strip search"; or the question whether Lesley had probable cause to arrest Couch, were subject to consideration by a jury in a civil action. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., supra; Lindsey v. Camelot Music, Inc., 628 So. 2d 314 (Ala.1993).
[5]  Of course, Couch could not have filed an action alleging malicious prosecution until his acquittal of the public intoxication charge in municipal court. See Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc. v. McGugin, 530 So. 2d 730 (Ala.1988) (resolution of the criminal charge in the plaintiff's favor is a prerequisite to a cause of action for malicious prosecution). However, as noted previously, the City had immunity under § 11-47-190 with respect to Couch's malicious prosecution claim. See Scott v. City of Mountain Brook, supra, 602 So. 2d  at 894 ("[w]e have emphasized that a claim of malicious prosecution against a municipality... is not within the `neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness' genre of liability").