Title: PEDRO/ASPEN, LTD. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PEDRO/ASPEN, LTD. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING2004 WY 8494 P.3d 412Case Number: 02-236Decided: 07/16/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

PEDRO/ASPEN, 
LTD., a Wyoming

Limited 
Partnership,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

FOR 
NATRONA COUNTY, WYOMING, a

political 
subdivision of the State of Wyoming,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Richard W. Walden and Robert D. Singletary of Budd-Falen Law Offices, 
P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
R. Michael Shickich, Casper, Wyoming and Eric A. Easton, Natrona County 
Attorney, Casper, Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. 
(Pedro/Aspen) sought to subdivide land it had acquired through a contract for 
deed into parcels larger than thirty-five acres.  The Natrona County Board of County 
Commissioners (Natrona County) required that Pedro/Aspen obtain approval for the 
subdivision pursuant to its zoning regulations.  Contending Natrona County did not have 
the authority to regulate the division of land into parcels greater than 
thirty-five acres, Pedro/Aspen sought a declaratory judgment to that 
effect.  The district court 
determined Pedro/Aspen did not have standing to maintain its action, but 
proceeded, upon stipulation of the parties, to determine Natrona County's zoning 
regulation for "major land subdivisions" was within the authority granted to 
counties by the legislature.  We 
disagree with both conclusions and reverse.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Pedro/Aspen poses 
the following issues for our consideration:

 

A.        
Whether Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. has standing to bring a Declaratory Judgment 
Act claim challenging the validity of Chapter IX of the Natrona County Zoning 
Resolution ("NCZR").

 

B.        
Whether Chapter IX of the NCZR is a proper exercise of county zoning 
authority.

 

[¶3]      Natrona County's 
view of the issues is quite similar:

 

A.        
Whether Natrona County has the authority to regulate the division of land 
pursuant to the exercise of its zoning authority.

 

B.        
Whether Pedro/Aspen has standing to seek judicial 
relief.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Natrona County 
adopted a zoning resolution entitled "Major Land Subdivisions," which purports 
to require approval of any division of land into parcels that are between 
thirty-five acres and eighty-acres in size.  On or about October 8, 1999, Pedro/Aspen 
entered into an agreement with Robinett Property Holdings, LLC for the sale of 
certain real property in Natrona County and recorded a document entitled "Notice 
of Execution of Agreement."  
Beginning November 9, 1999, Pedro/Aspen began selling individual 
forty-acre parcels and executing agreements entitled "Standard Agreement for 
Sale of Real Estate" with individual buyers.  Simultaneously, Pedro/Aspen submitted 
the following letter, together with a major land division application, to the 
Natrona County Planning Department (Planning Department):

 

Enclosed 
please find our application for a major land division.

 

By 
way of background, we have been in business for over 30 years and have never 
been involved in a lawsuit with a government agency or with anyone who has ever 
purchased land from us.  Our market 
is primarily people who wish to speculate on land or simply want to own a "piece 
of the West" and not necessarily for residential use.

 

Since 
1989 we have owned the Aspen Highlands subdivision west of Casper near Garfield 
Peak.  One of our owners in this 
subdivision is Congresswoman Barbara [Cubin].

 

Should 
you need any additional information, please feel free to contact me.  

 

Natrona 
County began receiving calls from individuals requesting information as to what 
was necessary to construct residences on the property.

 

[¶5]      The Planning 
Department reviewed the application and directed a report to the Chairman of the 
Natrona County Zoning and Planning Commissioners on January 25, 2000, 
recommending that the preliminary plat be approved subject to a list of sixteen 
contingencies.  One of those 
contingencies was that the record title owner of the subject property, Robinett 
Property Holdings, LLC, also sign the application.  Natrona County intended to consider the 
application on February 15, 2000, but the applicant asked that it be postponed 
until Natrona County's March 7, 2000, meeting.  By letter dated February 22, 2000, the 
Planning Department notified the applicant that the Board had passed a 
resolution instituting a moratorium on major land divisions in Natrona County.1

 

[¶6]      On March 3, 2000, 
Pedro/Aspen filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the 
district court, contending that Chapter IX of the Natrona County Zoning 
Resolution (NCZR) was in direct contravention of Wyoming law and, therefore, 
ultra vires and of no force and effect.  
In addition, Pedro/Aspen asked that Natrona County be enjoined from 
enforcing Chapter IX.  On June 16, 
2000, Pedro/Aspen filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of 
the validity of NCZR, Chapter IX.  
In its response, Natrona County contended Pedro/Aspen did not have 
standing to challenge the regulation and the statutes granted it ample authority 
to adopt the same.  The parties 
stipulated that the district court could decide the motion for partial summary 
judgment based on the briefs and without oral argument.  In a letter opinion dated March 4, 2002, 
the district court concluded Pedro/Aspen did not have standing to challenge the 
regulation because it was not the record owner of the property.  However, it also found it was 
"appropriate to decide the issue on the merits."  The court then declined to rule that 
NCZR, Ch. IX, was invalid and on April 23, 2002, it issued an order denying 
Pedro/Aspen's motion for partial summary judgment.  Pedro/Aspen filed an amended complaint, 
alleging additional claims that Natrona County's actions constituted arbitrary 
and capricious agency action, inverse condemnation (which included Pedro/Aspen's 
assertion that Natrona County could not require that the owner of record of the 
lands in question also sign the land division application), an uncompensated 
taking, an unconstitutional condition (that being the requirement that the owner 
of record sign the application), inverse condemnation and an uncompensated 
taking (based on Natrona County's requirement that lots visible from U. S. 
Highway 20/26 could not be developed), and an unconstitutional condition 
(Natrona County's requirement that Pedro/Aspen construct county roads).  Ultimately, the parties stipulated to 
dismissal of the additional claims in the amended complaint and to entry of 
judgment in favor of Natrona County on the issue of the validity of NCZR, 
Chapter IX.2  The district court issued its judgment 
consistent with the stipulation.  
Pedro/Aspen timely appealed that judgment.

 

            

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]   This matter is before us for review 
of the district court's judgment as a matter of law.  Where a judgment raises only issues of 
law, we review the matter de novo without affording any deference to the 
decision of the district court.  
Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶ 4, 86 P.3d 1287, ¶ 4 (Wyo. 2004); Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Resources, Inc., 
2003 WY 41, ¶ 10, 65 P.3d 703, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2003); Mathewson v. City of 
Cheyenne, 2003 WY 10, ¶ 4, 61 P.3d 1229, ¶ 4 (Wyo. 2003);  Stoneking v. Wheatland Rural Electric 
Ass'n., 2003 WY 81, ¶ 9, 72 P.3d 272, ¶ 9  (Wyo. 2003).

 

 
1.         
Standing

 

[¶8]      On appeal, 
Natrona County reasserted its claim that Pedro/Aspen lacked standing to litigate 
the issue of the validity of NCZR, Chapter IX, under the Declaratory Judgments 
Act and we address that issue first.  
We have described the concept of standing in these 
terms:

 

Standing 
is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently 
affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable 
controversy.  

 

Jolley 
v. State Loan and Investment Board, 
2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2002) (citations 
omitted).

 

            
The doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional 
magnitude.  At its most elementary 
level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain 
from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in 
vigorously advocating.  Accordingly, 
the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to 
assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination.  A litigant is said to have standing when 
he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."  This personal stake requirement has been 
described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at stake.  The tangible interest requirement 
guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a 
justiciable controversy.

 

Id. 
(quoting Roe v. Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Wyo.2000)). 

 

[¶9]      We generally do 
not relax the standing requirement in the context of an action under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act, but require:

 

1.  The parties must have existing and 
genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or 
interests.

 

2.  The controversy must be one upon which 
the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a 
debate or argument evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or 
academic conclusion.

 

3.  It must be a controversy the judicial 
determination of which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law 
or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one 
or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of 
such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of 
all of them.

 

4.  The proceedings must be genuinely 
adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient 
militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major 
issues.

 

Department 
of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted); Riedel v. Anderson, 
2003 WY 70, ¶¶ 18-19, 70 P.3d 223, ¶¶ 18-19 (Wyo. 2003); also see 
Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 10, 79 P.3d 500, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2003); Director of the Office of State 
Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, ¶¶ 12-14, 70 P.3d 241, ¶¶ 12-14 (Wyo. 2003); Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Wyoming 
Public Service Commission, 2003 WY 22, ¶¶ 10-13, 63 P.3d 887, 
¶¶ 10-13 (Wyo. 2003); Union Pacific Railroad v. Trona Valley Federal 
Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, ¶¶ 8-10, 57 P.3d 1203, ¶¶ 8-10 (Wyo. 
2002); Kroenlein v. Eddington, 2001 WY 115, ¶ 11, 35 P.3d 1207, 
¶ 11 (Wyo. 2001); In re Estate of Peters, 2001 WY 71, ¶ 10, 29 P.3d 90, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2001); and Hirschfield v. Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1142-43 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶10]   The fundamental question is whether 
the litigant has a "tangible interest" at stake in the controversy.  In this matter, the controversy centers 
on the authority of Natrona County to regulate the subdivision of land into 
parcels greater than thirty-five acres.  
Pursuant to the authority granted by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-201 et seq., 
(LexisNexis 2003), Natrona County adopted a zoning regulation providing no sales 
of land within a "major land subdivision" could occur until a plan, approved by 
Natrona County, was filed.  A "major 
land division" is defined as "a division of land into three (3) or more lots or 
parcels 35 acres through 80 acres in size each, when the three or more divisions 
occur in a five-year period, and parts not immediately conveyed to others may 
remain in their present use for some time."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-303(b) 
(LexisNexis 2003) grants counties the authority to regulate the subdivision of 
land, and provides, "[t]his article shall not apply to the sale . . . of land 
where the parcels involved are thirty-five (35) acres or larger."  Natrona County's regulation also applies 
to "the division of land into three (3) or more lots smaller than 35 acres when 
not otherwise covered by the Wyoming Subdivision Act.  W.S. § 18-5-101, et seq."  The regulation also requires that the 
owner of record of the property sign any application for a major land division. 

 

[¶11]   Pedro/Aspen began selling 
forty-acre parcels of land within Natrona County without first obtaining major 
subdivision plan approval from Natrona County.  Although it filed an application for 
approval of its plan "in the spirit of cooperation," Pedro/Aspen ultimately 
asked the court to declare the zoning regulation invalid because it exceeded 
Natrona County's statutory authority to regulate the subdivision of land granted 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-301 et seq. (LexisNexis 2003).  In order to demonstrate that it had the 
requisite standing to pursue the declaratory judgment action, Pedro/Aspen had to 
establish it had a "tangible interest" at stake in the controversy over the 
validity of Natrona County's zoning regulation.  

 

[¶12]   Natrona County suggests two reasons 
why Pedro/Aspen lacks standing to challenge its zoning regulation.  First, it claims that Pedro/Aspen is not 
the owner of record, only such owners may apply for a major land development 
permit, and therefore, since Pedro/Aspen cannot apply for a permit, it cannot 
challenge the validity of the regulation requiring the permit.  Next, Natrona County argues 
Pedro/Aspen's equitable interest as a purchaser under a contract for deed is too 
speculative and does not qualify as a "tangible interest."

 

[¶13]   Natrona County's claim that 
Pedro/Aspen did not have standing to challenge the regulation because it could 
not apply for a permit as an "owner of record" ignores the fact that without 
such a permit Pedro/Aspen could not exercise its rights to the property it had 
acquired under a contract for deed.  
Natrona County's position is analogous to arguing that a statute 
authorizing only men to obtain a driver's license could not be challenged by 
women because they have no right to a license.  Natrona County's regulation purported to 
prevent Pedro/Aspen from selling parcels of land that it acquired through a 
contract for deed.  To conclude that 
a party who cannot comply with a regulation has no standing to challenge the 
legality of the regulation is nonsensical.  
If the claim is made that a regulation exceeds the county's statutory 
authority, a party whose tangible interest is affected by that regulation has 
standing to challenge it.

 

[¶14]   Therefore, the focus of the 
standing analysis should be upon Natrona County's argument regarding the nature 
of Pedro/Aspen's interest in the property and whether it constitutes a 
sufficient "tangible interest" to provide standing to challenge a zoning 
regulation purporting to apply to the property.  Throughout its argument, Natrona County 
hints that because Pedro/Aspen never produced the actual contract, perhaps that 
contract fails to create a sufficient interest to support standing.  The evidence of Pedro/Aspen's interest 
in this matter consisted of the following:

 

1.  A recorded document entitled "Notice of 
Execution of Agreement" which recited Pedro/Aspen had "entered into an Agreement 
for Sale of Real Property" with the record title owner of the property in 
question.   

 

            
2.         
Pedro/Aspen's admission that it "purchased the property contained in the 
land division pursuant to a contract for deed."  An admission in response to a request 
for admission "conclusively establishes" the fact pursuant to W.R.C.P. 36 
(b).  Orcutt v. Shober 
Investment, Inc., 2003 WY 60, 69 P.3d 386 (Wyo. 2003).  

 

            
3.         
Twenty-five individual contracts, entitled "Standard Agreement for Sale 
of Real Estate", filed in response to Natrona County's request for production of 
documents and represented to be "existing contracts in place."  Each contract was executed by 
Pedro/Aspen and various individual purchasers and provided a sales price of 
$19,995 for a forty-acre parcel within the lands covered by the recorded "Notice 
of Execution of Agreement."   

 

            
4.         
Verified Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 representing that  Pedro/Aspen placed advertisements for 
sale of property in Wyoming in USA Today, the Wall Street Journal, and 
newspapers in seventeen states.  

 

            
5.         
Various other documents demonstrating Pedro/Aspen's efforts to sell the 
forty-acre parcels in question.  

 

            
6.         
Evidence that Pedro/Aspen was involved in several similar real estate 
sales projects in Wyoming, including Verified Answer to Interrogatory No. 7, 
which identified one involving 6,000 acres in Carbon County and another 
involving 3,000 acres in Natrona County, and that all of the parcels in these 
projects were sold to individual purchasers with many having been issued 
deeds.   

  

            
7.         
An affidavit in which a Natrona County planner stated he had "personal 
knowledge" that Pedro/Aspen was selling individual forty-acre parcels of the 
property in question and had been contacted by persons who had purchased or were 
considering purchasing such parcels.  

 

[¶15]   All of this uncontested evidence 
demonstrated Pedro/Aspen had sufficient interest in the property to allow it to 
sell individual parcels, presumably for a profit, and had, in fact, made 
twenty-five such sales.  Those sales 
resulted in the division of the land in question into parcels of approximately 
forty acres in size.  Natrona 
County's regulation purported to prohibit the division of land into three or 
more parcels from thirty-five to eighty acres in size.  Violation of that regulation subjected 
the responsible person to enforcement.  
Natrona County's actions indicated it intended to enforce its regulations 
and to impose conditions upon Pedro/Aspen, which would have required the 
expenditure of substantial money before the subdivision would be allowed.  Irrespective of the absence from the 
record of the actual contract for deed between Pedro/Aspen and Robinett, the 
owner of record, we have no difficulty concluding the evidence demonstrated it 
created a sufficiently tangible interest to support standing. 

 

[¶16]   Natrona County also argues that 
even if the contract for deed created an equitable interest in the purchaser, 
that interest is too speculative and insufficient to support standing.  While we have found no cases directly on 
point, and Natrona County cited none, we note that in Ford v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Converse County,  924 P.2d 91 (Wyo. 1996), an equitable 
owner, presumably a buyer under a contract for deed, successfully challenged a 
Converse County zoning regulation.

 

[¶17]   As we stated in Mayflower 
Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Wyo. 1987), "When property is 
sold under a valid contract and an escrow created, the purchaser under the 
contract is the equitable owner and assumes all the risk, including liability of 
ownership, while the seller holds legal title in trust for the purchaser as 
security for the performance of the contract."  See Withers v. Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of San Juan, 628 P.2d 316 (N.M. 1981); and 
Cox v. Fowler, 169 Okla. 355, 37 P.2d 291 (1934).  We have held the vendor under a typical 
contract for deed has parted with title, possession, and control of the 
property.  Dubray v. Howshar, 
884 P.2d 23, 26 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶18]   The uncontested evidence proved 
Pedro/Aspen had a sufficient interest in the property to allow it to market, 
sell, and presumably realize profits from the forty-acre parcels in 
question.  Unable to provide 
authority for its proposition that only the legal title holder would have 
standing to challenge the rule, Natrona County attempts to rely upon In re 
Estate of Ventling, 771 P.2d 388, 390 (Wyo. 1989), which held that a 
judgment lien did not attach to the equitable interest of a buyer under a 
contract for deed.  However, the 
rationale of that case was based upon statutory construction and did not suggest 
a buyer under a contract for deed would not have standing to challenge a zoning 
regulation restricting the use of the land in question.  Likewise, neither did other cases upon 
which Natrona County  
relied.  Tri-State Nat'l 
Bank v. Safren, 726 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1986) (which dealt with the equitable 
interest of a vendor, not a vendee, where the deed had actually been delivered); 
In re Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir v. Texaco, Inc., 623 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 1981) (in which a mortgagee was found not to have standing to 
appeal an administrative decision regarding water rights related to the 
mortgaged property).  

 

[¶19]   Pedro/Aspen also meets the four 
part test required to pursue a declaratory judgment action as set forth in 
Pacificorp, 872 P.2d  at 1168.  
As mentioned above, we generally do not relax the standing requirement in 
the context of an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.  Id. 

 

[¶20]   Having concluded Pedro/Aspen 
provided sufficient evidence of its interest in a contract for sale of the 
property allowing it to resell forty-acre parcels, and the direct impact of the 
zoning regulation upon that interest, we hold the first element (existing and 
genuine, not theoretical, rights or interest) of the four part test set out in 
Pacificorp was met.  The 
uncontested evidence demonstrated sales and division of the property purportedly 
prohibited by the zoning regulation were occurring, and, in fact, those sales 
were the basis for Natrona County's claim of harm.  Neither did any question exist that 
Natrona County intended to enforce its regulation.  Pedro/Aspen's interest was not 
theoretical.

 

[¶21]   With regard to the second element 
(judgment of the court may effectively operate), 
Natrona County was actively enforcing its regulations and requiring county 
approval before any land could be subdivided into parcels greater than 35 
acres.  Pedro/Aspen sought a 
declaratory judgment that "Chapter IX of the Zoning Resolution of Natrona County 
is ultra vires, unlawful and invalid in that it is in direct contravention of 
§§18-5-201 through 18-5-207 and §18-5-303(a)(v) of the Wyoming Statutes."  If the regulation were found to be 
unlawful, it would be unenforceable against anyone.  Pedro/Aspen's claim clearly met the 
second element of the test.

 

[¶22]   The third element (judicial 
determination will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or in 
equity) is likewise met in this case.  
A judgment declaring the regulation invalid would prevent its enforcement 
and allow Pedro/Aspen to continue to sell property and thus, "have the 
force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, 
status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in 
interest."    
Pacificorp, 872 P.2d  at 1168. 

 

[¶23]   In an apparent effort to show the 
fourth element (proceedings are genuinely adversary) was not met, Natrona County 
suggests the matter was not truly adversary because Pedro/Aspen submitted an 
application in the "spirit of cooperation."  However, that application was withdrawn 
and no doubt exists that the parties' positions were adverse.  Pedro/Aspen's attempt to comply with the 
regulation does not prevent it from contending, in the alternative, that the 
regulation is invalid.  No doubt 
existed that Natrona County's position that subdivision of parcels larger than 
35 acres required approval was diametrically opposed to Pedro/Aspen's position 
that Natrona County had no authority to require such approval.  The dispute was "genuinely adverse" and 
the fourth element of the test was met.

 

 

2.         
Validity of Natrona County's "Major Land Subdivision" 
Regulation

 

[¶24]   Having concluded Pedro/Aspen had 
standing to challenge the regulations, we now address the merits of its claim 
regarding the authority of Natrona County to regulate the subdivision of land 
into parcels greater than thirty-five acres.  To properly analyze the question of 
Natrona County's statutory authority to adopt the major land subdivision 
regulation, the difference between zoning and subdivision must be 
understood.  The legislature granted 
Natrona County the authority to regulate the use of land pursuant to § 18-5-201 
which provides, "[t]o promote the public health, safety, morals and general 
welfare of the county, each board of county commissioners may regulate and 
restrict the location and use of buildings and structures and the use, condition 
of use or occupancy of lands for residence, recreation, agriculture, industry, 
commerce, public use and other purposes in the unincorporated area of the 
county."  We have held the authority 
granted by this provision is broad.  
Board of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, 
65 P.3d 720 (Wyo. 2003).  However, 
by express statutory language, this broad authority is limited to regulation of 
the use of land, not the division of it into parcels.  For example, the same planning and 
zoning statute specifies, in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-203 (LexisNexis 2003), that 
it is unlawful to "locate, erect, construct, reconstruct, enlarge, change, 
maintain or use any building or use any land within any area included in a 
zoning resolution without first obtaining a zoning certificate from the board of 
county commissioners and no zoning certificate shall be issued unless the plans 
for the proposed building, structure or use fully comply with the zoning 
regulations then in effect."  The 
clear import of this provision is, again, the regulation of the use of land, not 
its division into parcels.  We have 
defined zoning as "the division of land into zones and within these zones the 
regulation of both the nature of land usage and the physical dimensions of these 
uses including height setbacks and minimum area."  Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 
707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985). Natrona County has full authority to regulate 
the use of Pedro/Aspen's land pursuant to its zoning 
regulation.

 

[¶25]   However, the only authority granted 
to Natrona County by the legislature to regulate the division of land 
into parcels is § 18-5-301 et seq., the Real Estate Subdivisions Act. (e.g. "No 
person shall subdivide land . . . without first obtaining a subdivision permit 
from the board of the county in which the land is located.")  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-304 (LexisNexis 
2003).  Counties have only those 
powers granted expressly by statute or necessarily implied in order to execute 
express powers.  Schoeller v. Bd. 
of County Commissioners of the County of Park, 568 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 
1977).  The specific terms of § 
18-5-301 limit the authority it grants to counties.  Section 18-5-303(b) states, "[t]his 
article shall not apply to the sale or other disposition of land where the 
parcels involved are thirty-five (35) acres or larger."  Applying the plain meaning of the 
statute leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the legislature did not give 
counties the authority to require county approval for subdivision of land into 
parcels greater than thirty-five acres.

 

[¶26]   Natrona County attempted to avoid 
this interpretation by pointing to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-315 (LexisNexis 2003) 
and suggesting that provision gave it authority to impose more stringent 
regulations, thus authorizing county regulation of subdivision of land into 
parcels larger than thirty-five acres.  
That section provides, "[i]f any board has or enacts resolutions or 
regulations which impose requirements on subdividers or subdivisions which are 
more restrictive than the provisions of this article, the authority to enact 
such local resolutions or regulations being hereby granted, the local provisions 
are not superseded by the provisions of this article."  Id.

 

[¶27]   Two problems exist with Natrona 
County's reasoning.  First, reading 
the language of § 18-5-315 carefully, the legislature clearly authorized 
counties to impose more restrictive standards on subdivisions, but did not 
authorize them to change the explicit exemption of subdivisions in which the 
parcels are greater than thirty-five acres.  Second, if Natrona County's 
interpretations were correct, the definition of "subdivision", as well as the 
list of ten exemptions, would become meaningless, a result not likely intended 
by the legislature.  In interpreting 
statutes, we give effect to every word, clause and sentence, and construe them 
in pari materia.  Rawlinson v. 
Greer, 2003 WY 28, 64 P.3d 120 (Wyo. 2003).  We avoid construing a statute so as to 
render a portion of it meaningless.  
Wyodak Resources Development Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 2002 
WY 181, 60 P.3d 129 (Wyo. 2002).  
Reading § 18-5-315 as Natrona County does renders the statutory 
exemptions meaningless.

 

[¶28]   Two Attorney General opinions, 
spanning twenty years, agreed with the conclusion that counties have no 
authority to require approval of subdivisions involving parcels greater than 
thirty-five acres.  79 Op. Atty. Gen 
35 (Dec. 18, 1979); 99 Op. Atty. Gen. 2 (June 22, 1999).  Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions, 
when presented with similar issues, have reached the same conclusion.  In State ex rel. Swart v. Casne, 
564 P.2d 983 (Mont. 1977), the court rejected a state agency's effort to 
regulate a division of property which was exempt from that state's subdivision 
act, stating, 

 

They 
engraft additional and contradictory requirements on the statute in the guise of 
defining and implementing the evasion of statutory requirements.  They frustrate the purpose of the 
"occasional sale" exemption of the Act. As such, the DCA regulations are void on 
their face. 

 

Id. 
at 986.

 

[¶29]   The court went on to address the 
agency's argument that it had been given statutory authority to prescribe 
standards.

 

Where, 
as here, the Act provides for exemption of occasional sales from the subdivision 
requirements, DCA cannot prescribe subdivision regulations eliminating the 
exemption . . . .  An administrative 
agency is not a "super legislature" empowered to change statutory law under the 
cloak of an assumed delegated power.

 

Id.  See also Arundel v. Swain, 
374 A.2d 317 (Me. 1977) (town was without power to change statutory 
definitions); Soker v. Irvington, 177 A.2d 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1961) (town was without power to add to or delete from statutory exceptions); 
and Manalapan Builders Alliance, Inc. v. Township Committee of the Township 
of Manalapan, 606 A.2d 1132 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (adoption of 
township zoning ordinance which deviated from statutory definitions was ultra 
vires and beyond power of township).

 

[¶30]   Natrona County argued passionately 
about the evils of subdivisions such as Pedro/Aspen's, including the potential 
for inadequate roads, utilities, and other infrastructure.  It also cited incompatibility of these 
subdivisions with the Natrona County land use plan.  We have no doubt the problems raised by 
Natrona County do, in fact, exist.  
However, the fact that Natrona County has no authority to prevent the 
subdivision of land beyond that granted by the statute does not render it 
defenseless against the problems it perceives with subdivisions having parcels 
larger than 35-acres.  Natrona 
County retains full authority through its zoning powers to regulate the use of 
those lands by establishing approved uses in certain zones and standards for 
activities such as building, road construction and sewage disposal.  Although we appreciate Natrona County's 
concern that dealing with many individual owners is more difficult than handling 
these issues before the land is subdivided, the manner in which these concerns 
can be addressed by local governments is the business of the legislature.  It is not the job of the courts to grant 
such powers specifically withheld by the legislative branch. 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶31]   We hold Pedro/Aspen had standing to 
challenge the validity of Chapter IX of Natrona County's Zoning Resolution and 
that resolution exceeds Natrona County's statutory authority to regulate the 
subdivision of land.  The judgment 
of the district court is reversed and the matter is remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1During oral argument, counsel for Pedro/Aspen stated that the application 
had been withdrawn.

 

2While the record does not contain the actual pleadings referenced in the 
stipulation, the recitations in the stipulation indicate Pedro/Aspen filed and 
withdrew a motion to dismiss counts two through ten (those added by the amended 
complaint) and a motion for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b), and that 
Natrona County had filed and withdrew a motion for summary judgment.