Title: Riemann v. Toland

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2022 ME 13 
Docket: 
Sag-21-77 
Argued: 
 November 3, 2021 
Decided: 
 February 15, 2022 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and 
CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
HELGE RIEMANN 
 
v. 
 
KRISTINA A. TOLAND 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  In this appeal, we consider whether a provision in a premarital 
agreement waiving the parties’ right to seek attorney fees is enforceable when 
the parties litigate the best interest of their child. 
[¶2]  Helge Riemann appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the 
District Court (West Bath, Raimondi, J.) in which the court adopted a referee’s 
findings and recommendations that Kristina A. Toland be awarded (1) primary 
residence of the parties’ minor child even if Toland relocates from Maine to 
Ohio and (2) attorney fees.  Because we conclude that the referee did not err or 
abuse her discretion in determining the child’s primary residence and that the 
attorney-fee-waiver provision in the parties’ premarital agreement is 
 
2 
unenforceable as applied to their litigation of parental rights, we affirm the 
judgment in all respects. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  On October 25, 2018, Riemann filed a complaint for divorce.  Toland 
answered and counterclaimed, requesting, in part, that the court determine the 
parties’ parental rights and responsibilities and allocate attorney fees.  In 
February and August 2019, the court held two interim hearings pending final 
resolution of the divorce.  After the first interim hearing, held on February 11, 
2019, the court (Adamson, M.) entered an order pending divorce that, in 
relevant part, awarded primary residence of the child to Toland while also 
setting a contact schedule for Riemann.  The focus of the second hearing was 
Toland’s desire to continue to have interim primary residence of the child and 
relocate, with the child, to Ohio.1   
[¶4]  In December 2019, Toland filed a motion for prospective attorney 
fees, arguing that a provision in the parties’ premarital agreement waiving their 
rights to seek attorney fees from the other party was void and unenforceable 
 
1  Following the second interim hearing, the court entered an interim order on November 4, 2019, 
finding that the child should reside primarily with Toland regardless of whether Toland moves to 
Ohio, but that the child could not relocate with her until Toland secured employment in Ohio that 
was “meaningfully connected to her field.”   
 
3 
because it “limits the ability of a spouse to effectively litigate the issue of 
custody or support.”  In April 2020, pursuant to a written stipulation and 
agreement of the parties, the court appointed a referee “to conduct all future 
proceedings in this case.”   
[¶5]  In May 2020, Toland filed a motion in limine seeking an order 
allowing her “to request an award of reasonable attorney’s fees . . . incurred 
litigating issues of parental rights and responsibilities.”  Riemann opposed both 
motions, arguing that a waiver of attorney fees in the parties’ premarital 
agreement was enforceable under Maine law.   
[¶6]  In June 2020, a three-day final hearing was held before the referee.  
The focus of the proceeding was again Toland’s desire to be awarded primary 
residence of the child even if she relocated to Ohio.  The referee issued a report 
in September 2020 and made the following findings, which are supported by 
competent evidence in the record.  See Akers v. Akers, 2012 ME 75, ¶ 3, 44 A.3d 
311. 
[¶7]  In 2012, Toland moved to Maine for a teaching position as a 
postdoctoral fellow at Bowdoin College.2  Sometime thereafter, she met and 
 
2  Toland had recently received her master’s and doctorate degrees. 
 
4 
began a relationship with Riemann, who had a successful medical practice in 
Brunswick.   
[¶8]  In January 2015, Riemann and Toland, each represented by separate 
counsel, executed a premarital agreement that included a provision requiring 
each party to “bear their own costs and attorney’s fees in the event . . . either 
party file[d] a Complaint.”3  Riemann and Toland were married approximately 
two weeks after executing the premarital agreement.   
[¶9]  Following the birth of their child in early 2015, Toland took an 
eight-week maternity leave from her teaching position, and Riemann reduced 
his work schedule.  At the conclusion of Toland’s leave, Toland and Riemann 
decided that Toland would stay at home and care for the child full-time rather 
than return to work.   
[¶10]  After Riemann filed for divorce, Toland informed him that she 
wanted to relocate to Ohio and return to teaching at the college level.  Her 
prospects for employment in her field are greater in Ohio, where Toland’s 
parents live and where she and the child would have family support while living 
with them.  Toland is committed to facilitating contact between the child and 
 
3  Neither party disputes that the provision waiving attorney fees, if enforceable, applies to a 
complaint for divorce.   
 
5 
Riemann, and she acknowledged that she would not relocate if the child could 
not accompany her to Ohio.  Riemann sought either primary or shared primary 
residence in Maine, proposing that he hire a nanny as necessary for childcare.  
Both parents love the child, want what is best for the child, and can meet the 
child’s daily needs.   
[¶11]  The child was five years old at the time of the trial and, although 
she was attending a pre-kindergarten school in Freeport, did not have close 
relationships in her community.  Toland has historically performed most of the 
caretaking for the child, and the child has strong bonds with both parents.  The 
hardest loss for the child if Toland moved to Ohio would be the loss of frequent 
contact with Riemann, though the GAL opined that the child would adjust more 
easily to the loss of frequent contact with Riemann than she would to a loss of 
frequent contact with Toland.   
[¶12]  The referee submitted her report to the District Court on 
September 8, 2020.  The report reflects the referee’s full consideration of the 
statutory factors relevant to application of the standard governing the 
determination of the best interest of the child, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(A)-(B), 
(E)-(F), (H), (N) (2021), and of all the evidence, including the opinion of the GAL 
 
6 
and competing testimony offered by the parties’ experts regarding the potential 
effect relocation could have on the child’s psychological well-being.   
[¶13]  The referee concluded that it was in the child’s best interest to live 
primarily with Toland in Ohio while maintaining contact with Riemann.  The 
referee also determined that, in the circumstances of this case, Toland should 
be awarded attorney fees because the parties’ waiver in their premarital 
agreement of the right to seek attorney fees was against public policy and 
therefore unenforceable.  In response to the referee’s report, Riemann filed 
motions to amend, to reconsider, and to make further findings, which the 
referee denied.   
[¶14]  Riemann filed an objection to the referee’s report with the court, 
challenging the referee’s award to Toland of (1) primary residence of the child 
in Ohio and (2) attorney fees.  Following a hearing on February 11, 2021, the 
court (Raimondi, J.) adopted the referee’s report in its entirety and entered it as 
a final judgment that same day.  The court concluded that the referee’s findings 
of fact were not clearly erroneous, M.R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2), and agreed with the 
referee’s legal conclusion as to the unenforceability of the provision for the 
waiver of attorney fees in the parties’ premarital agreement.  Riemann timely 
appealed.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2021); M.R. Civ. P. 123; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶15]  “When a trial court accepts a report of a referee, the findings of the 
referee become the trial court’s findings, and we review those findings 
directly.”  Wechsler v. Simpson, 2016 ME 21, ¶ 12, 131 A.3d 909 (quotation 
marks omitted).  The referee’s findings are entitled to substantial deference 
because of the referee’s opportunity to observe and assess the witnesses’ 
testimony, and we review the referee’s factual findings for clear error.  Id.  
Because a motion for further findings was timely filed and denied, we can 
consider only the express factual findings of the referee in reviewing the 
ultimate judgment.  Klein v. Klein, 2019 ME 85, ¶ 6, 208 A.3d 802.   
A.  
Relocation and Primary Residence 
[¶16]  Riemann contends that the evidence does not support the award 
of primary residence to Toland in Ohio and that the referee failed to conduct 
the requisite balancing of constitutional rights, which Riemann argues should 
be based on whether a parent has compelling reasons for relocation and other 
“objective” factors.  Riemann also contends that the referee’s best interest 
analysis focused only on whether the child should live with Riemann in Maine 
or with Toland in Ohio and was thus based on the “false premise” that Toland 
 
8 
would move to Ohio without the child, which Toland had said she would not 
do.4   
[¶17]  We review the referee’s recommendation as to parental rights for 
an abuse of discretion.  Wechsler, 2016 ME 21, ¶ 12, 131 A.3d 909. 
A determination of parental rights and responsibilities must be based on the 
best interest of the child as that standard is set forth in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).  
See, e.g., Vibert v. Dimoulas, 2017 ME 62, ¶ 15, 159 A.3d 325.  Applying the best 
interest standard when parental relocation is at issue, the referee must strike a 
balance between “a custodial parent’s right to engage in interstate travel and to 
decide where the parent and child will reside[] and a non-custodial parent’s 
right to have continuing and meaningful parent/child contact with the child.”  
Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 20, 105 A.3d 447 (quotation marks omitted).  
The referee must therefore “balance the rights and interests of the parents 
 
4  Riemann also argues that the referee erroneously considered Toland to be the primary caregiver 
and failed, in denying his request for “shared primary residential care,” to explain why it is not in the 
best interest of the child.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)(1) (2021).  These arguments are 
unpersuasive.  A fact finder’s consideration of a parent’s historical contributions to the child’s care is 
not error when it relates to the best interest of the child.  See Wechsler v. Simpson, 2016 ME 21, ¶¶ 7, 
20, 131 A.3d 909 (affirming the fact finder’s best interest determination when one parent’s historical 
role as the primary caregiver was considered in that analysis); Low v. Low, 2021 ME 30, ¶¶ 5, 10, 251 
A.3d 735 (same); see also 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(B).  And where, as here, a fact finder expressly 
concludes that the best interest of the child is served by granting primary residence to one parent, 
that conclusion sufficiently explains the reasons why shared primary residential care is not in the 
child’s best interest.  See Wechsler, 2016 ME 21, ¶¶ 20-21, 131 A.3d 909.  We have also noted that 
section 1653 “does not define ‘shared primary residential care’ or explain how it might differ from 
an award of primary residence to one parent with rights of contact to the other.”  Id. ¶ 19. 
 
9 
while taking into full consideration the child’s best interest.”  Low v. Low, 2021 
ME 30, ¶ 9, 251 A.3d 735. 
[¶18]  Here, the referee did exactly that.  The referee articulated the 
specific best interest factors that were important to this case, see 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1653(3)(A)-(B), (E)-(F), (H), (N), and made findings as to each that are 
supported by substantial record evidence, including expert testimony assessed 
and weighed carefully by the referee, see Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, 
¶ 33, 43 A.3d 978 (“[D]eterminations of the weight and credibility to assign to 
the evidence are squarely in the province of the fact-finder.”).   
[¶19]  The referee considered the age of the child, finding that she was 
five years old; the stability of any proposed living arrangements, finding that 
Toland’s mother would provide any necessary childcare and that the child was 
familiar with her grandmother’s Ohio home; and the relationship of the child to 
her parents and to other persons who may affect her welfare, crediting the 
GAL’s belief that it would be more detrimental to the child to be apart from 
Toland and finding that the child had not formed significant ties in Maine but 
was particularly close to Toland’s mother in Ohio.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1653(3)(A)-(B), (E).   
 
10 
 
[¶20]  While assessing the best interest factors fully, the referee carefully 
balanced the right of each parent to have contact with the child against Toland’s 
right to travel and decide where she and the child will live.  The referee 
considered the parties’ motivations, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(F), finding that 
Toland believed that the move was the best decision for her and the child, that 
her employment prospects as an accomplished scholar in her field would be 
greater in Ohio, and that she and the child both had family support there.5  The 
referee furthermore considered the capacity of each parent to facilitate contact 
with the other parent, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(H), placing great emphasis on 
the GAL’s belief that Toland would do “whatever possible” to mitigate any 
disruption to the child’s relationship with Riemann.   
[¶21]  The referee’s best interest analysis is distinguishable from that in 
Light, where the court awarded primary residence of the parties’ minor child to 
the mother, who wished to relocate from Maine to Italy, but concluded 
nonetheless that it was in the child’s best interest to remain in Maine if the 
 
5  Contrary to Riemann’s argument, the requisite balancing analysis does not require the 
relocating parent’s reason for relocation to “outweigh” the child’s best interest, nor do we conclude, 
as Riemann urges us to, that the parent’s reasons must be “compelling” or of a certain kind.  Rather, 
the parent’s motivations must be considered among the other relevant factors in assessing the child’s 
best interest.  See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005) (“[T]he issue in relocation 
cases is the extent to which the parents’ needs and desires are intertwined with the child’s best 
interests.”); Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 21, 105 A.3d 447 (citing Ciesluk to explain that a court’s 
balancing in relocation cases must ultimately focus on the child’s best interest). 
 
11 
mother did indeed relocate to Italy.  Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶¶ 9-10, 105 A.3d 447.  
Unlike the referee’s findings here, the child in Light was almost eight years old 
and had only visited Italy on vacation; the child’s mother was unlikely to 
encourage contact with the father if the child relocated to Italy with her; and 
the child’s stability in her home community of Falmouth was paramount to the 
child’s best interest given the child’s relationships there with her therapist, 
other family members, and a substantial network of friends.  Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 10. 
[¶22]  Furthermore, and contrary to Riemann’s argument, the scope of 
the referee’s best interest analysis under section 1653(3) was not erroneously 
limited to whether the child should live with Riemann in Maine or with Toland 
in Ohio.  The best interest factors, 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3), which the referee 
assessed fully, do not permit such a narrow inquiry when considering the best 
interest of a child.  The referee could have, as in Light, conditioned the award of 
primary residence on Toland staying in Maine.  Instead, the referee determined 
that it was in the child’s best interest to live with Toland, whether in Maine or 
Ohio. 
[¶23]  In making that determination, the referee’s assumption that 
Toland might move to Ohio was not error, nor did it create a “false premise” 
upon which the referee relied in her best interest analysis.  The balancing 
 
12 
analysis assumes the parent’s constitutional right to travel, and the central 
inquiry remains the best interest of the child.  See Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶¶ 19-22 
& n.1, 105 A.3d 447.  Toland’s admission that she would stay in Maine if the 
court refused her primary residence of the child in Ohio acknowledges only that 
the court’s ruling would affect her own decision making.  Cf. id. ¶ 19 (explaining 
that the court’s decision not to award the mother primary residence of the child 
if she moved to Italy did not constrain her freedom to travel to Italy because, 
while it might affect her decision making, it did not impair her right to travel 
and settle in whatever location she chooses). 
[¶24]  The referee’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and we do not 
disturb the referee’s determination, based on those findings, that the child’s 
best interest would be served by living with Toland in Ohio while maintaining 
contact with Riemann.  See, e.g., Akers, 2012 ME 75, ¶¶ 6-7, 44 A.3d 311. 
B.  
Award of Attorney Fees 
[¶25]  In domestic relations matters under Title 19-A, “[a] court is 
authorized to issue an award of reasonable attorney fees based on a 
determination of the parties’ relative capacity to absorb the costs of litigation 
. . . as well as all relevant factors that serve to create an award that is fair and 
 
13 
just under the circumstances.”  Pearson v. Wendell, 2015 ME 136, ¶ 45, 125 A.3d 
1149 (quotation marks omitted); see 19-A M.R.S. § 105 (2021). 
[¶26]  In their premarital agreement, Riemann and Toland waived the 
right to seek attorney fees in the event of divorce.  Toland contends that such a 
waiver is unenforceable as against public policy to the extent that it waives the 
right to seek attorney fees incurred in litigation of parental rights and 
responsibilities.  This is an issue of first impression in Maine.   
1. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
[¶27]  We review conclusions of law de novo, see, e.g., Est. of Martin, 2008 
ME 7, ¶ 18, 938 A.2d 812, and an award of attorney fees for an abuse of 
discretion, Dargie v. Dargie, 2001 ME 127, ¶ 30, 778 A.2d 353. 
 
[¶28]  Our starting point is Maine’s Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
(UPAA).  19-A M.R.S. §§ 601-611 (2021).  The interpretation of statutes is a 
matter of law, and we “construe the whole statutory scheme of which [any] 
section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the intent 
of the Legislature, may be achieved.”  York Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 2000 ME 27, 
¶ 5, 746 A.2d 906 (quotation marks omitted).  “All words in a statute are to be 
given meaning, and no words are to be treated as surplusage if they can be 
 
14 
reasonably construed.”  Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Devereux Marine, Inc., 2013 ME 
37, ¶ 8, 68 A.3d 1262 (quotation marks omitted).   
2. 
Maine’s Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
[¶29]  Maine’s UPAA authorizes individuals to enter into premarital 
agreements, see 19-A M.R.S. § 604, and it applies to all premarital agreements 
executed in Maine after September 28, 1987, see Est. of Martin, 2008 ME 7, ¶ 13, 
938 A.2d 812.  The UPAA “must be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to [its] subject . . . among 
states enacting it.”  19-A M.R.S. § 611.  
[¶30]  Section 604 of Maine’s UPAA provides that parties may validly 
contract in a premarital agreement with respect to (1) their rights and 
obligations to property, (2) the right to buy, sell, or use property; (3) the 
disposition of property upon the occurrence of specified events; (4) spousal 
support; (5) the making of a will or trust; (6) a death benefit; (7) the choice of 
law governing the agreement; and “(8) [a]ny other matter . . . not in violation of 
public policy.”  See 19-A M.R.S. § 604.  In addition to specifying the matters that 
can be the subjects of premarital agreements, section 604 also specifies that a 
 
15 
premarital agreement cannot adversely affect the “right of a child to receive 
support.”6  Id.   
[¶31]  Because section 604 explicitly precludes parties from contracting 
as to matters that affect the “right of a child to receive support” but does not 
mention attorney fees, Riemann contends that the public policy parameters for 
premarital agreements are already defined by section 604.  He argues that, 
based on application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,7 the 
absence of any mention of attorney fees implies that a premarital agreement 
concerning attorney fees is allowed by statute and does not violate public 
policy.  Section 604(8) provides, however, that parties can contract to “[a]ny 
other matter” only if the agreement as to that matter does not violate public 
policy.  Id. § 604(8).  Thus, the Legislature did provide a guard against parties 
 
6  Maine’s UPAA is closely modeled on the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983).  Maine’s 
legislative history does not clarify what qualifies as “support” as that term is used in the UPAA.  Other 
jurisdictions interpret “support” within the meaning of their own codifications of the UPAA to mean 
economic child support.  See In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970-71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); In re 
Marriage of Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Iowa 2018).  The Uniform Laws Annotated explains 
that it “makes clear that an agreement may not adversely affect what would otherwise be the 
obligation of a party to a child.”  Unif. Premarital Agreement Act § 3 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 44 (1983), 
superseded by Unif. Premarital and Marital Agreements Act 9C U.L.A. 13-30 (Supp. 2021). 
7  This maxim is a rule of statutory interpretation “that [the] express mention of one concept 
implies the exclusion of others not listed.”  Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me. 1994).   
 
16 
contracting as to other matters that, although not specifically prohibited by 
section 604, violate public policy.  
[¶32]  Riemann alternatively argues that section 608 of the UPAA 
provides the only circumstances under which a premarital agreement is 
voidable under the Act.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 608.  Section 608 provides that a 
premarital agreement is unenforceable when either (1) it was not executed 
voluntarily or (2) a court determines that it was unconscionable upon 
execution and that, before execution, one party lacked knowledge or disclosure 
of the other party’s financial circumstances.  See id.  In support, Riemann points 
to our decision in Estate of Martin, in which we said that “enforcement of a 
premarital agreement should only be denied under [the] circumstances” 
outlined in section 608.  2008 ME 7, ¶ 16, 938 A.2d 812.  Riemann misapplies 
section 608 in the case now before us and overreads our holding in Estate of 
Martin, in which we interpreted section 608—not section 604, which we 
construe here.8   
[¶33]  Like section 608, our case law thus far has addressed concerns for 
only the parties’ circumstances or positions at the time a premarital agreement 
 
8  In Estate of Martin, our statement that “the Legislature intended the enforceability of premarital 
agreements to be determined based on section 608” was in the narrow context of our conclusion that 
the common law had been superseded by the standards in section 608 “for purposes of determining 
whether [the Probate Code’s] requirement of ‘fair disclosure’ ha[d] been met.”  2008 ME 7, ¶¶ 9, 17, 
 
17 
is executed.  See Hoag v. Dick, 2002 ME 92, ¶¶ 3, 16, 799 A.2d 391; Est. of Martin, 
2008 ME 7, ¶¶ 18-19, 938 A.2d 812.  But unlike section 608 and those cases, the 
public policy concern raised here with respect to a waiver of the right to seek 
attorney fees is prospective because, regardless of the parties’ circumstances at 
the time they executed a premarital agreement, those circumstances may later 
be affected disproportionately such that one party is unable to pursue or defend 
litigation that involves the best interest of a child. 
[¶34]  Furthermore, any reading of section 608 as providing the only 
circumstances in which a premarital agreement is unenforceable would 
directly conflict with section 604(8), which permits parties to contract to other 
matters in a premarital agreement only if those matters are not against public 
policy.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 604(8); see also Lehigh v. Pittston Co., 456 A.2d 355, 
361 (Me. 1983) (“[C]ontracts against public policy . . . [are] void and 
unenforceable.”). 
[¶35]  Accordingly, we conclude that a waiver in a premarital agreement 
of the right to seek attorney fees is valid under the UPAA’s catch-all provision 
 
938 A.2d 812.  The parties in Estate of Martin did not dispute the premarital agreement on public 
policy grounds. 
 
18 
as “[a]ny other matter” only to the extent that its application does not violate 
public policy.9  See 19-A M.R.S. § 604(8). 
3. 
Public Policy  
[¶36]  We do not enforce contracts, or their provisions, that contravene 
public policy.  See, e.g., Court v. Kiesman, 2004 ME 72, ¶¶ 11, 14, 850 A.2d 330.  
“A contract is against public policy if it clearly appears to be in violation of some 
well established rule of law, or that its tendency will be harmful to the interests 
of society.”  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 513 A.2d 269, 272 (Me. 1986) (quotation 
marks omitted); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Koshy, 2010 ME 44, 
¶ 42, 995 A.2d 651 (explaining that a contract is void as against public policy 
 
9  Riemann argues that 19-A M.R.S. § 604 (2021) authorizes parties to waive the right to seek an 
award of attorney fees because such fees and the right to request them fall within two explicitly 
permitted subjects of a premarital agreement: “rights and obligations” in property and “spousal 
support.”  Id. § 604(1), (4).  His arguments are unavailing.  The right to request attorney fees does not 
fit within the “rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or both of 
them,” described in subsection 1, because such an expansive interpretation would render other 
subsections mere surplusage, a result that we take care to avoid.  See Thornton Acad. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 
21, 2019 ME 115, ¶ 14, 212 A.3d 340.  Specifically, because the disposition of property and spousal 
support are listed separately, see 19-A M.R.S. § 604(3), (4), it would be illogical and inconsistent to 
interpret subsection 1 so broadly as to sweep in those rights or any other rights that can be 
established only through a divorce judgment, see FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. Dep’t of Envt. Prot., 
2007 ME 97, ¶ 12, 926 A.2d 1197 (explaining that we seek to avoid absurd, inconsistent, 
unreasonable, and illogical results when considering a statute’s plain meaning).  And although 
attorney fees can be awarded “in the nature of support” in a divorce action, 19-A M.R.S. § 952(3) 
(2021) (emphasis added), attorney fees are not inherently spousal support and become a form of 
spousal support only if a court so specifies.  Finally, we interpret the meaning of these provisions in 
context and glean from the language of 19-A M.R.S. § 604(8) that by allowing parties to contract as to 
“[a]ny other matter . . . not in violation of public policy,” the Legislature conveyed that “other matters,” 
like the matters enumerated in subsections 1 through 7, are not authorized subjects of a premarital 
agreement if they violate public policy. 
 
19 
“only if it violates a well-defined and dominant policy that may be ascertained 
from the law and legal precedent”).  In order to determine whether a contract 
violates public policy, “we balance the freedom of the parties to contract against 
the detriment to society that would result from [its] enforcement,” Koshy, 2010 
ME 44, ¶ 42, 995 A.2d 651, while also recognizing that contracts “are not to be 
lightly set aside,” Elwell, 513 A.2d at 272 (quotation marks omitted).  
[¶37]  Although the enforceability of a provision in a premarital 
agreement waiving attorney fees is a matter of first impression in Maine, other 
jurisdictions that have considered such a waiver in the context of child-related 
matters have concluded that the waiver is unenforceable.10  The common public 
policy concern underlying each of those decisions was an awareness that 
enforcement of a provision waiving attorney fees could stifle a court’s ability to 
address issues affecting the best interest of the child.  See In re Marriage of 
Burke, 980 P.2d 265, 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“The state’s interest in the 
 
10  See In re Marriage of Burke, 980 P.2d 265, 266-68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an 
attorney fee waiver in a premarital agreement is unenforceable as applied to “parenting plan issues”); 
Best, 901 N.E.2d at 968-72 (holding the same as applied to “child-related issues”); Erpelding, 917 
N.W.2d at 246-47 (holding the same as applied to both child support and child custody matters); In re 
Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 670-71 (Colo. 2007) (holding that an attorney fee waiver in a 
premarital agreement is always reviewable for its unconscionability and that, as applied to parental 
responsibilities and child support, it will violate public policy when one party is financially 
disadvantaged); see also In re Marriage of Joseph, 266 Cal. Rptr. 548, 550-53 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(concluding that a provision in the parties’ post-dissolution settlement agreement waiving attorney 
fees was unenforceable as applied to the parties’ child custody dispute). 
 
20 
welfare of children requires that the court have the discretion to make an 
award of attorney fees and costs so that a parent is not deprived of his or her 
day in court. . . .”); In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 670-71 (Colo. 2007) 
(“If one spouse is unable to hire an attorney, . . . the lesser-earning spouse’s 
ability to effectively litigate the issues related to the children will be 
substantially impaired.  This, in turn, may negatively impact the court’s ability 
to assess the best interests of the children.”); In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 
967, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (“[T]he fee-shifting ban in the agreement . . . violates 
public policy by discouraging both parents from pursuing litigation in their 
child’s best interests.”); see also In re Marriage of Joseph, 266 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552 
(Ct. App. 1990) (“[P]arties cannot by contract limit the court’s power to resolve 
issues concerning children’s welfare. . . .”). 
[¶38]  Particularly persuasive is the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme 
Court, which determined that, because Iowa’s legislature requires that custody 
issues be determined by a court’s analysis of the child’s best interest, 
“provisions in a premarital agreement that limit child custody rights are void 
as a matter of public policy.”11  In re Marriage of Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d 235, 246 
 
11  When determining that an attorney-fee-waiver provision in a premarital agreement was 
unenforceable, other jurisdictions similarly considered laws providing that a premarital agreement 
as to child custody is not binding on a court.  See Best, 901 N.E.2d at 970 (“Illinois law per se rejects 
premarital agreements that impair child-support rights or specify custody.”); Burke, 980 P.2d at 
 
21 
(Iowa 2018).  It then concluded that, “[a]s a corollary, provisions in a premarital 
agreement that contain fee-shifting bars as to the litigation of child custody” 
must also be “void as a matter of public policy.” Id. at 247.  Such a conclusion 
was consistent with Iowa’s UPAA, the court reasoned, because, like Maine’s 
UPAA, Iowa’s law provided that parties could contract only as to “other 
matter[s] . . . not in violation of public policy.”  Id. at 238, 247; see 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 604(8).   
[¶39]  In light of the Maine Legislature’s similar, well-defined policy that 
courts must discern the best interest of the child in matters involving parental 
rights and responsibilities, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1001, 1653(3) (2021), we agree 
that any provision in a premarital agreement that may hinder the court’s ability 
to assess and address issues regarding the best interest of a child, including a 
provision that could negatively affect a party’s right to litigate such issues, is 
void and unenforceable, cf. Court, 2004 ME 72, ¶¶ 2, 9, 12-13, 850 A.2d 330 
(holding that a contract to sell a truck in exchange for the father’s release of his 
child support obligation was void as against public policy when court-ordered 
 
267-68 (“Washington [law] . . . generally prohibit[s] marital agreements that divest the court of its 
authority and discretion over issues affecting the rights and welfare of . . . children.”); see also Kessler 
v. Kessler, 818 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (App. Div. 2006) (“[A] prenuptial agreement as to child custody is 
not binding on [a] court.”). 
 
22 
child support is meant “to protect the best interests and welfare of the 
benefiting child”).12   
[¶40]  The effectiveness of the right to litigate issues related to a child’s 
best interest may depend on a party’s ability to fund that litigation, including 
the assistance of an attorney, and we share the concern expressed by other 
jurisdictions that a party’s financial circumstances could affect a court’s 
ability—and obligation—to discern the best interest of the party’s child.  
Enforcement of a provision in a premarital agreement waiving attorney fees 
could expose the child and the parties to the risk that the terms of the 
agreement, rather than the court’s understanding of the child’s best interest, 
 
12  The new Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (2012), which was proposed to 
supersede the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983) but has not been enacted in Maine, makes 
clear that “[a] term in a premarital agreement or marital agreement which defines the rights or duties 
of the parties regarding custodial responsibility is not binding on the court.”  Unif. Premarital and 
Marital Agreements Act § 10(a), (c), 9C U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 2021) (defining “custodial responsibility” as 
“physical or legal custody, parenting time, access, visitation, or other custodial right or duty with 
respect to a child”).  The rationale for this rule is the “long-standing consensus that premarital 
agreements may not bind a court on matters relating to children . . . . [P]arents and prospective 
parents do not have the power to waive the rights of third parties (their current or future children), 
and do not have the power to remove the jurisdiction or duty of the courts to protect the best 
interests of minor children.”  Id. § 10 cmt.; see also Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 191 (Am. L. Inst. 
1981) (“A promise affecting the right of custody of a minor child is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy unless the disposition as to custody is consistent with the best interest of the child.”).  
 
23 
will determine the outcome of issues, such as custody, that require an analysis 
of the best interest of the child.13 
[¶41]  Therefore, when the best interest of a child is at issue, the freedom 
to contract does not outweigh the detriment that could result from enforcement 
of a premarital agreement’s provision waiving attorney fees.  Here, the parties’ 
litigation of parental rights required a determination of the child’s best interest, 
and we hold that, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 604(8), the parties’ waiver in their 
premarital agreement of the right to seek an award of attorney fees is 
unenforceable as against public policy. 
4. 
The Referee’s Award of Attorney Fees 
[¶42]  Riemann last argues that the referee should have been required to 
make specific findings as to Toland’s inability to pay her own attorney fees.  
However, application of the holding we now announce is not dependent on a 
determination that one party is in fact financially disadvantaged.  Rather, an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 105 is committed to the fact 
finder’s sound discretion and necessarily requires consideration of the parties’ 
 
13  The potential effect of a provision in a premarital agreement waiving attorney fees on a party’s 
ability to obtain child support also directly conflicts with the UPAA’s direction in section 604 that 
“[t]he right of a child to receive support” not be “adversely affected by a premarital agreement,” 
19-A M.R.S. § 604; see Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d at 246, and frustrates a court’s ability to protect the best 
interest of the child, see Court v. Kiesman, 2004 ME 72, ¶¶ 9, 12-13, 850 A.2d 330. 
 
24 
relative capacity to absorb the costs of litigation in addition to all other relevant 
factors that serve to create a fair and just award under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Pearson, 2015 ME 136, ¶ 45, 125 A.3d 1149; see Rosen v. Rosen, 
651 A.2d 335, 336-337 (Me. 1994) (explaining that the “parties’ relative 
financial position . . . must be considered,” but that the trial court also “has 
discretion to consider all factors that reasonably bear on the fairness and the 
justness of the award”); see also Ackerman v. Yates, 2004 ME 56, ¶ 19, 847 A.2d. 
418 (clarifying that the fact finder can consider the parties’ income and assets 
when assessing their relative financial positions). 
[¶43]  Here, after making findings and recommendations as to the issues 
pending before her, the referee acknowledged her obligation to consider the 
parties’ capacity to absorb the cost of litigation, assessed the totality of the 
evidence, and concluded that Toland should be awarded $50,000 in attorney 
fees.  The record includes the parties’ financial statements and child support 
affidavits as well as the parties’ tax returns and the premarital agreement.  It 
also includes an attorney fee affidavit from Toland’s attorney, referencing 
counsel’s willingness to submit copies of billing statements for in camera 
review and providing counsel’s hourly rate and experience in the practice of 
 
25 
law.  See Pearson, 2015 ME 136, ¶ 47 & n.7, 125 A.3d 1149; Miele v. Miele, 2003 
ME 113, ¶ 17, 832 A.2d 760.   
[¶44]  Finally, neither party argues that the amount of attorney fees 
awarded was unreasonable, and the referee’s findings as to the parties’ income 
for the purpose of determining the “child-related issues,” which were “many 
and complicated in this case,” provide sufficient bases for the award of attorney 
fees.14  See Pearson, 2015 ME 136, ¶ 46, 125 A.3d 1149 (determining that 
findings presented in the context of other issues “were sufficient to apprise the 
parties of the reasons why the amount of attorney fees awarded . . . was 
reasonable under the circumstances” when those findings also extended to the 
issue of attorney fees).  Considering the disparity in the parties’ income as 
found by the referee, the totality of the circumstances, and the supporting 
record evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion in the referee’s award of 
attorney fees to be paid by Riemann. 
The entry is: 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
14  Neither party argued to the referee, to the court, or to us that other issues beyond parental 
rights were litigated in this case, and the parties’ premarital agreement was dispositive as to most, if 
not all, other issues.  Further, Toland’s attorney represented to the referee, and to us at oral argument, 
that the entire amount of his fees billed in this case were for his services in connection with the 
contested custody issue.   
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keith P. Richard, Esq. (orally), Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, 
Kennebunk, for appellant Helge Riemann 
 
Kenneth P. Altshuler, Esq. (orally), Childs Rundlett & Altshuler, Portland, for 
appellee Kristina A. Toland 
 
 
West Bath District Court docket number FM-2018-324 
For Clerk Reference Only