Title: State v. Kimble

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

411 So. 2d 430 (1982) STATE of Louisiana v. Valvis V. KIMBLE. (2 cases) Nos. 81-K-1902, 81-K[A]-2179. Supreme Court of Louisiana. March 1, 1982. Rehearing Denied April 5, 1982. *431 Robert E. Tillery, Baton Rouge, for defendant-relator. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Kay Kirkpatrick, Wiley Dial, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-respondent. MARCUS, Justice. Valvis V. Kimble was charged by bill of information in the district court with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of La.R.S. 14:98. Defendant filed a motion to quash the information on the ground, inter alia, that the time limitation for commencement of trial after institution of prosecution against him for the same offense in the city court had expired. After a hearing, the motion was denied. The matter then proceeded to trial. After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. Prior to sentencing, we granted defendant's application for certiorari, 406 So. 2d 590, to review the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge denying defendant's motion to quash.[1] *432 On December 30, 1979, defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Baton Rouge City Code § 11:140 (ORD. No. 2550, § 1, 9-23-70). In connection with his arrest, defendant was issued a "Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint Affidavit" bearing No. 82545. On the same day, defendant posted an appearance bond securing his presence in the Baton Rouge City Court on February 14, 1980. File No. 87873 was assigned to this case. On February 14, 1980, the city prosecutor moved the court to transfer the case to the district court believing it to be a third offense over which the city court had no jurisdiction. The city court judge ordered the matter transferred to the district attorney's office for the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. On January 8, 1981, the district attorney filed the instant bill of information charging defendant with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of La.R.S. 14:98. Defendant contends the time limitation for commencement of trial after institution of prosecution had expired. He argues that prosecution was instituted in the city court on or before February 14, 1980. He further argues that trial was not commenced within one year from the date of institution of the prosecution; therefore, there can be no prosecution against him for the same offense in the district court. La.R.S. 13:1894.1 provides in pertinent part: The above statute provides for prosecutions in city courts for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated under R.S. 14:98 or under a city ordinance which incorporates the standards and elements of R.S. 14:98. For the purposes of this section, city courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts over violations of R.S. 14:98, except in those cases wherein the person is charged as a third or subsequent offender under R.S. 14:98(D) and (E). Hence, the city court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in the instant case. La.Code Crim.P. art. 382 provides: La.Code Crim.P. art. 578 provides in pertinent part La.Code Crim.P. art. 581 provides: La.R.S. 13:1894.1 requires that "[a]ll ... charges ... shall be on affidavit." See also La.Code Crim.P. art. 382. La.Code Crim.P. art. 385 provides: In the instant case, defendant was never charged by affidavit. Under R.S. 32:398.4, a traffic ticket may be sufficient to institute prosecution if it is "sworn to" and includes information necessary to charge a person with an offense. The Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint Affidavit issued to defendant is in the form of an affidavit. It is a written accusation of crime which adequately informs defendant of the crime for which he is charged. However, the accusations in the ticket, although signed by the arresting officers, were not made under oath or sworn to. Hence, the traffic ticket is not an affidavit and is thus insufficient for the purpose of instituting prosecution. The fact that defendant was arrested and ticketed is of no moment. The purported transfer from the city court to the district attorney's office was merely a matter of bookkeeping. Since prosecution was never instituted in the city court, the time limitation for commencement of trial after institution of prosecution had never commenced to run. Accordingly, prosecution was timely instituted when the bill of information was filed in the district court on January 8, 1981, less than two years after the offense was committed. La.Code Crim.P. art. 572.[2] Hence, this contention is without merit. The other contentions urged by defendant are likewise without merit. He first argues that since the city court and district court have concurrent jurisdiction, the city court, being the first to obtain jurisdiction, retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of the district court. In view of our finding that prosecution was never instituted in the city court, we do not reach this issue. Next, defendant contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his person because he was never issued a summons nor arrested for violation of La.R.S. 14:98. A court, however, also acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the filing of a bill of information. State v. Polk, 258 La. 738, 247 So. 2d 853 (1971); State v. Grey, 257 La. 1070, 245 So. 2d 178 (1971). Defendant was charged by information with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of La.R.S. 14:98. Hence, the district court had jurisdiction over his person. Finally, defendant argues that the district court failed to charge him by affidavit as required by La. R.S. 13:1894.1. Criminal prosecutions in a *434 district court other than those for an offense punishable by death or for an offense punishable by life imprisonment, shall be instituted by indictment or by information. La.Code Crim.P. art. 382. Hence, defendant was properly charged in the district court by information. In sum, the trial judge correctly denied defendant's motion to quash. For the reasons assigned, the application for a writ of review in No. 81-K[A]-2179 is denied; the writ previously granted in No. 81-K-1902 is recalled and vacated; the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with law. CALOGERO, J., concurs for reasons assigned by LEMMON, J. LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons. WATSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons. LEMMON, Justice, concurring. Even if the prosecution in city court had been properly instituted, the state's attempted transfer to district court clearly signaled the intent to abandon the prosecution in city court.[1] The state's motion to transfer, granted by the city judge, constituted a dismissal of the prosecution in city court. After that dismissal (which was not for the purpose of avoiding C.Cr.P. Art. 578's time limitation for commencement of trial), prosecution was timely instituted in the district court by the filing of the information within two years of the offense. C.Cr.P. Art. 576. WATSON, Justice, dissenting. The State cannot rely upon the City's negligent failure to have the "Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint Affidavit" notarized or signed by some person authorized to administer oaths to avoid the time limitation within which to timely commence trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. [1] In addition to applying for a writ of review (No. 81-K-1902) under our supervisory jurisdiction, defendant sought review under our appellate jurisdiction (No. 81-K[A]-2179). Since defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor which carries a penalty that does not exceed a fine of $500 or imprisonment of more than 6 months, there is no right of appeal. La.Const. art. 5, § 5(D). Accordingly, defendant's appeal will be treated as an application for a writ. La.S.Ct.Rule 1, § 11. Since both applications involve identical arguments, they have been consolidated for review. [2] La.Code Crim.P. art. 572 provides in pertinent part: No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for an offense not punishable by death unless the prosecution is instituted within the following periods of time after the offense has been committed: .... (3) Two years, for a misdemeanor punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both; .... [1] Under La.Const.Art. V, § 16(A) (1974), the city court lacked jurisdiction over a felony charge of third offense driving while intoxicated, which the city prosecutor believed to be the offense with which defendant would be charged in district court.