Title: State v. Roman

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

772 P.2d 113 (1989) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Haila Diane ROMAN, Defendant-Appellee. No. 12986. Supreme Court of Hawaii. April 11, 1989. *114 Wallace W. Weatherwax (Lila B. LeDuc on the briefs), Deputies of the Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant. Anthony K. Bartholomew (Brook Hart with him on the brief; Hart & Wolff, of counsel), Honolulu, for defendant-appellee. Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ. HAYASHI, Justice. Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawaii (hereinafter "State") appeals the order suppressing the confessions made by Defendant-Appellee Haila Diane Roman (hereinafter "Roman"). After using a polygraph examination to verify rape charges filed by Roman, the investigating police officers had suspected that she was lying, questioned her about the accusations without first giving Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) warnings (hereinafter "Miranda warnings"), and then obtained oral plus written confessions admitting to fabricating the allegations. The trial court had ruled that the police had improperly interviewed Roman after the polygraph session by failing to issue the required Miranda warnings. State contends that the trial court erred because 1) there was no custodial interrogation necessitating Miranda warnings; and 2) Roman had received adequate Miranda warnings prior to the polygraph testing. We disagree, instead affirm the suppression order, and therefore remand the case for further proceedings. The facts are not disputed. On January 5, 1987, Roman, an inmate serving weekends at the Women's Correctional Facility reported having been repeatedly raped by two male Adult Corrections Officers on November 7, 1986, December 9, 1986, December 26, 1986, December 27, 1986, and January 2, 1987. But the investigating Honolulu Police Department (hereinafter "HPD") Detective Leighton Fujinaka (hereinafter "Det. Fujinaka") suspected Roman was lying (based on the inconsistencies in her story plus the lack of corroborating physical evidence) and arranged a polygraph examination to confirm her charges. On January 15, 1987 at the Beretania Street police station, qualified examiner HPD Detective John Paekukui (hereinafter "Det. Paekukui") went over two standard police forms apprising Roman of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, seeking consent *115 to the polygraph testing, plus telling that the test results would be discussed afterwards. Roman signed the forms. After the questioning had ended, Det. Paekukui reviewed the readings for a few minutes, determined that Roman had not been truthful describing the purported rapes, and confronted her. As Det. Paekukui later testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress: Transcript of July 10, 1987 1 at 18 (emphasis added).[1] Det. Paekukui next brought Det. Fujinaka into the examination room where Roman repeated her confession. Det. Fujinaka thereafter took Roman to another room to have her write down her statement and informed his superior officer HPD Lieutenant James Neely (hereinafter "Lt. Neely"). Lt. Neely then instructed Det. Fujinaka to arrest Roman for making false accusations plus tape record her confession. On February 19, 1987, Roman was charged with violating Hawaii Revised Statutes § 710-1015 (1985) by filing a false crime report.[2] On June 15, 1987, the defense moved to suppress all of Roman's confessions arguing that 1) she had been improperly pressured into talking; 2) no Miranda warnings had issued after the questioning, based on the polygraph examination results, had commenced; and 3) the warnings on the two standard police forms had failed to alert Roman about any post-testing interrogation. State answered that 1) Roman was not under custodial interrogation but had voluntarily confessed; 2) the two police forms had adequately explained her Miranda rights; plus 3) no unlawful coercion had occurred. Det. Fujinaka subsequently testified as follows: Transcript of July 10, 1987 2 at 8-9, 16 (emphasis added). On April 19, 1988, the trial court rendered its written decision suppressing Roman's statements by concluding that: Record at 87-88 (emphasis added). The trial court therefore held that a custodial interrogation had begun when Roman became the focus of a false charges investigation, the police detectives had improperly failed to give Miranda warnings after the polygraph examination, and the official misconduct had tainted all the statements which had to be suppressed. State then appealed. We will answer the issues as follows: 1. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings had taken place? NO. 2. Whether the trial court erred by holding that Roman had not been adequately apprised of her constitutional rights by the two standard police forms? NO. State maintains that Roman did not undergo any custodial interrogation since the questioning concerned her rape accusations and not her involvement in any other crime, she was free to leave after receiving the polygraph examination results, plus the police detectives did not attempt to incriminate her. Roman counters that the inherently coercive, intimidating situation forced her to admit to the fabrication and amounted to custodial interrogation. Miranda warnings must precede any police questioning which subjugates an individual to the will of the examiner and thereby undermines the privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126, 681 P.2d 553 (1984), appeal after remand, 69 Haw. ___, 734 P.2d 156 (1987). The test to determine if a custodial interrogation had taken place is whether the investigating officer should have known that his or her words or conduct were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 698 P.2d 281 (1985). *117 Here, Roman voluntarily underwent the polygraph testing, was not at first a suspect, so was not initially in custody. State v. Sugimoto, 62 Haw. 259, 614 P.2d 386 (1980); see also State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 687 P.2d 544 (1984). Yet, Det. Paekukui knew about Det. Fujinaka's suspicions, confirmed that Roman had probably lied about the rape incidents, and then encouraged her to tell the truth (i.e. confess to concocting a false story). State does not challenge the trial court's crucial finding that: Record at 85-86 (emphasis added). The criminal investigation had now focussed on Roman, and the questioning by Det. Paekukui (and later Det. Fujinaka) became specific as to her misconduct. See State v. Blanding, 69 Haw. ___, 752 P.2d 99 (1988). What had originally been a relatively innocuous interview had turned into a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. See State v. Amorin, 61 Haw. 356, 604 P.2d 45 (1979). State, however, declares that 1) neither Det. Paekukui nor Det. Fujinaka had sought to institute any charges based on Roman's admissions (until Lt. Neely's later intervention); 2) the questioning was not designed to elicit any incriminating evidence; so 3) Miranda warnings were unnecessary. See State v. Paahana, 66 Haw. 499, 666 P.2d 592 (1983). But regardless of their initial, actual, subjective intent, the police detectives should have realized that they were essentially asking Roman to confess to the false reporting offense. See State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479, 643 P.2d 541 (1982). That a subsequent decision by Lt. Neely changed the situation should not excuse the police detectives' initial failure to give Miranda warnings. We do not condone any police ignorance about the law and the consequences of a custodial interrogation. See e.g., State v. Uganiza, 68 Haw. ___, 702 P.2d 1352 (1985). State next advances that 1) the two standard police forms which Roman had signed before submitting to the polygraph test provided sufficient Miranda warnings; so 2) she had willingly waived her constitutional rights by confessing. Roman replies that 1) the police forms were inadequate; and 2) there was no knowing, intelligent relinquishment of her Miranda rights. Miranda warnings must clearly convey to the accused a full understanding of the applicable constitutional protections: the right to remain silent, that anything said can and will be used against the accused, the right to an attorney present during the questioning, plus an appointed counsel will be offered if needed. State v. Hong, 62 Haw. 83, 611 P.2d 595 (1980) (per curiam); State v. Kalai, 56 Haw. 366, 537 P.2d 8 (1975). That the defendant read and signed police forms providing Miranda warnings prior to confessing may be sufficient to indicate a valid waiver of one's constitutional rights, but the defendant's age, background, intelligence, and situation should be considered. State v. Kreps, 4 Haw. App. 72, 661 P.2d 711 (1983); see State v. Maluia, 56 Haw. 428, 539 P.2d 1200 (1975). As the trial court accurately discerned, the forms revealed nothing about a post-testing interrogation leading to a criminal prosecution arising out of an offense *118 other than the alleged rapes. Cf. Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 103 S. Ct. 394, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982) (per curiam). This is not an instance where the person under the police questioning was a suspect knowing about being the focus of an investigation and the chance of criminal liability. See State v. Ramones, 69 Haw. ___, 744 P.2d 514 (1987); cf. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S. Ct. 851, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987). Because Roman was not informed about the totally separate false charges problem (although arising out of the inquiry into her rape complaint), the earlier Miranda warnings (relating solely to the polygraph examination) were inadequate, so rewarnings specifically pertaining to the subsequent interrogation were mandated. See State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. ___, 748 P.2d 365 (1987). Where the prosecution has not proven that the accused was properly admonished about her constitutional rights, there could be no valid waiver. See State v. Kaahanui, 69 Haw. ___, 747 P.2d 1276 (1987). The first improper questioning by Det. Paekukui therefore tainted all of Roman's subsequent confessions, rendering them inadmissible. See State v. Kim, 68 Haw. ___, 711 P.2d 1291 (1985). We agree with the trial court's reasoning that: Record at 88 (emphasis added). Accordingly based on the above analysis, we affirm the suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [1] There are two transcripts numbered 5340 for the July 10, 1987 suppression motion hearing. The morning session containing Det. Paekukui's testimony will be designated as "1." The afternoon session describing the accounts of Det. Fujinaka plus Roman will be referred to as "2." [2] The statute provides: § 710-1015 False reporting to law-enforcement authorities. (1) A person commits the offense of false reporting to law-enforcement authorities if he intentionally makes a report or causes the transmission of a report to law-enforcement authorities relating to a crime or other incident within their concern when he knows that the information contained in the report is false. (2) False reporting to law-enforcement authorities is a misdemeanor.