Title: State v. Oliphant

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: October 8, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
JESSICA LEE OLIPHANT,
fka Jessica Lee Rilatos,
fka Jessica Lee Bayya,
fka Jessica Lee Fairman,
aka Jessica Lee Olson,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 050245; CA A131381 (control))
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
FRANCISCA DARLENE RILATOS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 050246; CA A131382)
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
KENNETH ROBERT WOOD,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 050824; CA A131519) (SC
S056404)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted April 15, 2009.
Robin A. Jones, Deputy
Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on
review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services.
Tiffany Keast,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent on review.  With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney
General, and Erika L. Hadlock, Acting Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed with respect to defendant Wood's convictions for
resisting arrest and assaulting a public safety officer.  In all other
respects, the judgments of the circuit court are affirmed.  Defendant Wood's case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
*Appeal from Lincoln
County Circuit Court, Thomas O. Branford, Judge. 221 Or App 384, 190 P3d 495
(2008).  
GILLETTE,
J.
This criminal case arose out of a jaywalking
stop that degenerated into a mutual affray involving three defendants and two
police officers.  During the defendants' ensuing trial for resisting arrest,
assaulting a police officer, and other charges, all the defendants raised the
defense of self-defense.  The trial court refused to give a special instruction
that the defendants had requested and gave other instructions to which the
defendants had excepted.  The defendants were convicted of most of the charged
offenses.  They appealed their convictions to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed without opinion.  State v. Oliphant, 221 Or App 384, 190 P3d
495 (2008).  We allowed defendants' petition for review to consider the
parameters of a person's right to use physical force against a police officer in
self-defense during an arrest and how a jury should be instructed with respect
to that self-defense claim.  For the reasons set out below, we reverse in part
and affirm in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court, and remand the case to the circuit court for further
proceedings.  
Most of the following facts are undisputed,
although their legal significance is much debated.  We take our statement primarily
from the trial testimony of the police officers principally involved in the
affray and from a transcript of the recording of the events taken by a patrol
car recording device.  When discussing defendants' requested instructions, we
view the facts in the light most favorable to defendants.  See Hernandez
v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 101 n 1, 957 P2d 147 (1998) (court views
evidence in the light most favorable to the establishment of the facts
necessary to require giving the requested instruction).
On December 21, 2004, sometime before
9:00 p.m., Officer Gulbranson was on patrol in Toledo, Oregon, when he saw
defendant Francisca Rilatos enter a crosswalk and start walking across the
street.  Gulbranson was acquainted with Rilatos, who was then 19 years old,
five feet, two inches tall, and known by Gulbranson to have a volatile temper. 
Gulbranson testified that he saw Rilatos leave the crosswalk and walk diagonally
to the sidewalk in front of the apartment building where she lived, thereby
committing the offense of "improper positioning of a pedestrian in the
highway."  Although Gulbranson testified that he had stopped five or six
car lengths before the crosswalk to allow her to cross safely, Rilatos apparently
perceived him to have been speeding through the crosswalk and began yelling at
him to slow down and shouting profanities at him.(1) 
At that point, Gulbranson decided to investigate the crime of disorderly
conduct.  He contacted the police dispatcher to say that he would be "out
with Cissy Rilatos."  Gulbranson also radioed another police officer,
Miller, who also knew Rilatos, requesting "code 3" backup, which is a call for emergency assistance when an officer is in dire need of backup
because of an injury or threat to the officer's life.  
Gulbranson activated the flashing
lights on his patrol car, which automatically turned on the video and audio
recording devices that captured the events at issue here.  He then got out of
the car and called out Rilatos's name, "Cissy Rilatos."  She replied,
"I was in the crosswalk," and continued walking toward her
apartment.  The officer called Rilatos's name again and ordered her to
"come here," "get over here," and "get over here right
now."  Rilatos refused, shouting, "You know, I was in the
crosswalk."  Gulbranson persisted, shouting, "Get over here," to
which Rilatos responded, "Why?  You were speeding.  I was in the
crosswalk."  The verbal exchange continued for several seconds.  
At that point, Rilatos's boyfriend,
defendant Kenneth Wood, walked out of the tavern across the street, crossed the
street, and walked down the sidewalk toward where Gulbranson was standing. 
Gulbranson turned to Wood and said, "What can I do for you?"  Wood
responded with words to the effect of "I'm just going home." 
Gulbranson then said, "How about you stay over there."  Wood did not
stop walking and, according to Gulbranson, put his hands up.  Wood approached
to within three or four feet of Gulbranson.  Gulbranson decided at that point
to arrest Wood for the crime of interfering with a police officer.(2) 
Gulbranson then pushed Wood in the chest, grabbed Wood by the neck, and commanded,
"Get on the ground.  Get on the ground.  Do it now."  Wood responded,
"I didn't do nothing."  Gulbranson repeated his command and Wood
again responded, "I didn't do nothing."  Wood then complied, lying
face down on the ground with his arms under his body.  
Gulbranson, who is six feet, three
inches tall and weighs 260 pounds, then placed his knee and left arm on Wood's
back to prevent him from getting up, while reaching for his handcuffs with his
right hand.  Gulbranson repeatedly shouted, "Get your hands behind your
back" and "Do it now, do it now."  Wood, who is five feet, ten
inches tall and weighs between 160 and 180 pounds, did not immediately respond. 

Meanwhile, Rilatos continued to shout
epithets at Gulbranson, which, according to Gulbranson's later testimony, was
distracting to him.  In addition, defendant Jessica Oliphant, Rilatos's mother,
came out of the apartment to see what was going on, and began shouting as well,
telling the officer to "Knock it off" and that "He's not wanted
or anything."  When Wood did not immediately comply with Gulbranson's
order to put his hands behind his back, Gulbranson decided that he "had to
escalate."  He grabbed his can of pepper spray, called "Cap-Stun,"
and sprayed Wood directly in the face from a distance of between six and 12 inches. 
(The Cap-Stun aerosol canister is designed to reach someone six to eight feet
away.)  Wood responded to the Cap-Stun spray by pulling his legs up and thrashing
about, and Rilatos, still shouting at Gulbranson to get off Wood, advanced
toward them.  Gulbranson yelled at her to get away from him, threatened to
spray her with the Cap-Stun as well, and in fact did spray a small burst in her
direction.  
Miller had arrived by then and had
started to deal with Rilatos and Oliphant.  Miller told Rilatos that she was
under arrest, but Rilatos continued walking up the stairs to her apartment. 
Miller followed her.  Oliphant then stepped between them and pushed at Miller's
chest, saying, "That's my daughter."  Miller responded by shoving
Oliphant onto a nearby bench and yelling at her to get away from him.  Miller
told Rilatos to place her hands behind her back and then attempted to grab her
arm as she pulled away.  Miller grabbed Rilatos's jacket instead and pulled on
it, splitting the jacket down the back and pinching Rilatos's arm.  Miller then
was able to place Rilatos in handcuffs.  
While Miller was dealing with Rilatos
and Oliphant, Gulbranson began delivering "focused blows" to Wood's
back and striking Wood eight times in the ribs, all the while shouting,
"Let me see your hands, give me your hands."  At the same time,
Oliphant was approaching, shouting, "Please don't hit him," and
"He's not wanted or anything," to which Gulbranson responded by
telling her to go away or she would be going to jail as well.  
By that time, Gulbranson saw that ten
or more people had come out of the tavern and onto the street and were watching
the fracas.  He managed to place a handcuff onto Wood's left wrist and looked
up to see what Miller was doing.  Wood then got to his feet and, as Gulbranson
also struggled to his feet, Wood wrapped his arms around Gulbranson's waist. 
Gulbranson said, "Give me your goddam arm."  Wood forced Gulbranson onto some nearby landscaping rocks, injuring Gulbranson's hip and causing Gulbranson
to sprain his thumb.  Wood was then behind Gulbranson, and, when Gulbranson
looked down, he saw that Wood's hand was touching the front edge of
Gulbranson's holster.  Gulbranson began yelling, "Got a gun! Got a
gun!"  He and Miller, who, by that time, had forced Rilatos to walk down
the stairs and sit down on the sidewalk, then ordered Wood to get down and give
them his right arm (as noted, the left was already handcuffed) or "you're
going to be hurt real bad here."  
Miller ordered Wood to stop resisting
and attempted to prevent Wood from standing again by getting behind him and
pushing his legs aside.(3) 
As he did so, Wood drew his legs back and, with a sort of mule-kick, kicked
Miller in the right hip with his foot.  Miller then began delivering "focused
blows" to Wood's right shoulder.  When that proved to be ineffective, he
struck Wood twice on the brachial nerve,(4)
which enabled him to place Wood's right wrist in the handcuff.  Miller then
left Wood with Gulbranson and put Rilatos, who was continuing to scream and stomp
toward the officers, in a patrol car.(5) 
He also placed Oliphant under arrest and put her in a different patrol car.  Officers
took Wood to the Toledo police department, where they searched him for weapons,
and then took him to the hospital for treatment of his injuries.   
Wood was charged with two counts of
assaulting a public safety officer (one involving Gulbranson and one involving
Miller), one count of interfering with a police officer, and one count of
resisting arrest.(6) 
Rilatos was charged with one count of resisting arrest, one count of
interfering with a police officer, and two counts of disorderly conduct. 
Oliphant was charged with one count of interfering with a police officer, one
count of disorderly conduct, and one count of harassment.   
Trial of the three defendants was
consolidated; all raised the issue of self-defense.  During the trial,
defendants introduced expert testimony concerning the appropriate use of force
by police officers in various situations.  One of the experts testified that
the standard to be applied was the "reasonable officer" standard, i.e.,
what a reasonable officer would do in a similar situation.  Defendants' experts
testified that Gulbranson's actions, particularly with respect to Wood, were
not reasonable, in light of the fact that -- according to the facts as reported
to them --Wood was not offering more than static resistance to Gulbranson's
commands.  The state also called an expert to testify about an officer's
authority to use force in making an arrest.  That expert testified that
Gulbranson's actions with respect to Wood were reasonable, given that Wood
presented an "ominous threat" to Gulbranson, insofar as Wood did not
obey Gulbranson's request to "stay over there," he had his chin
lowered as he walked, he appeared to quicken his pace as he approached
Gulbranson, and Gulbranson knew that Wood had a "reputation" for
"violent and resistive behavior."  In addition, Gulbranson and Miller
both testified at length about their thoughts during the course of the affray.
In his written request for
instructions, Wood asked the court to give the following instructions
pertaining to self-defense:  Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction (UCrJI) 1107 ("Defense
- Physical Force - Defense of Person"), UCrJI 1200 ("Definition of 'Resists'"),(7)
and UCrJI 1227 ("Self-Defense - Resisting Arrest").(8) 
Rilatos and Oliphant did not include requests for self-defense instructions in
their written requests.  At the conclusion of the trial, all the defendants
requested Special Instruction 101, which was based on wording taken from one of
this court's earlier cases dealing with a defendant's right to use force to defend
himself during an arrest, State v. Wright, 310 Or 430, 799 P2d 642
(1990).  That proposed instruction provided:  
"If a peace officer uses excessive force in making an
arrest, the arrestee may use only such physical force as is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances to defend himself or herself against the
excessive force being used against him or her."
The trial court declined to give that instruction, stating
that,
"as I explained in chambers,[(9)]
* * * although the word 'excessive' is one that is apt in terms of a
description of a person's conduct, legally, I think the standard is that -- set
forth in the statute and that's the standard by which a police officer's conduct
needs to be judged.  If the jury finds that the police officer reasonably
believed it was necessary to use whatever level of force he did and the jury
believes that, then the force used is legal.
"The statute also sets forth limitations on
the use of deadly physical force, and it's that that's the standard.  And if
the jury finds that the conduct fit within those permissible uses, then it's
lawful; if they don't, it's not lawful.  
"And I don't want to substitute the word
'excessive' as some kind of undefined, nebulous standard that is different than
what the statute sets forth, that it would become a subjective reading in a part
of a juror's mind of what do they think is excessive."
All three defendants took exception to the court's refusal to
give that instruction.  
The court also explained that it had decided
to instruct the jury about an officer's right to use force by using
instructions based on ORS 161.235 and ORS 161.239, which describe justification
defenses for police officers who have been charged with crimes arising out of
their conduct.(10) 
ORS 161.235 provides:  
"Except as provided in  ORS 161.239, a
peace officer is justified in using physical force upon another person only
when and to the extent that the peace officer reasonably believes it necessary:
"(1) To make an arrest or to prevent the
escape from custody of an arrested person unless the peace officer knows that
the arrest is unlawful; or
"(2) For self-defense or to defend a third
person from what the peace officer reasonably believes to be the use or
imminent use of physical force while making or attempting to make an arrest or
while preventing or attempting to prevent an escape."
ORS 161.239 provides:  
"(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS
161.235, a peace officer may use deadly physical force only when the peace
officer reasonably believes that:
"(a) The crime committed by the person was
a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use or threatened
imminent use of physical force against a person; or
"(b) The crime committed by the person was
kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the first degree or
any attempt to commit such a crime; or
"(c) Regardless of the particular offense
which is the subject of the arrest or attempted escape, the use of deadly
physical force is necessary to defend the peace officer or another person from
the use or threatened imminent use of deadly physical force; or
"(d) The crime committed by the person was
a felony or an attempt to commit a felony and under the totality of the
circumstances existing at the time and place, the use of such force is
necessary; or
"(e) The officer's life or personal safety
is endangered in the particular circumstances involved.
"(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this
section constitutes justification for reckless or criminally negligent conduct
by a peace officer amounting to an offense against or with respect to innocent
persons whom the peace officer is not seeking to arrest or retain in
custody."
All three defendants objected to the
court's proposed course of action, pointing out that the officers were not on
trial -- the defendants were -- and the primary consideration relevant to the
question of the defendants' right to use force in self-defense was the defendants'
reasonable belief in the necessity of using force, not the officers' belief. 
All three defendants argued that instructing the jury on an officer's
justification defense would confuse the jury and wrongly suggest that, if an
officer's use of force was lawful, then a defendant would not have the right to
defend himself.  The court responded that, as long as the officer reasonably
believed that it was necessary to use the force that he used, then the force
used was legal and, by definition, not excessive.  The court therefore rejected
defendants' arguments.  
The trial court instructed the jury
as follows.  With respect to Wood, the court first reviewed the two charges of
assaulting a public safety officer, explaining the elements of the first of those
offenses, and then giving the uniform instruction on self-defense: 
"With regard to the charge of Assaulting a Public
Safety Officer, the defense of self-defense has been raised by Kenneth Wood.  A
person is justified in using physical force on another person to defend himself
from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful
physical force.  In defending, a person may only use the degree of force which
he reasonably believes to be necessary.  The burden of proof is on the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply."
The court told the jury that the same elements, definitions,
and the defense of self-defense also applied to the second charge of assaulting
a public safety officer.
After instructing the jury on the
charge of interfering with a police officer, the court turned to the charges of
resisting arrest, which had been filed against Wood and Rilatos.  The court
instructed the jury as follows:  
"Oregon law provides that a person commits
the crime of Resisting Arrest if the person intentionally resists a person
known by him or her to be a peace officer in making an arrest.  
"In this case, to establish the crime, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the three elements -- Lincoln
County, Oregon, the date, and that the person intentionally resisted a person
known by him or her to be a peace officer in making an arrest.  Again, here the
culpable mental state alleged is intentionally, and it has the same definition
as I previously gave to you.  
"With regard to the charge of Resisting
Arrest, if the defendant knew that the person making the arrest was a peace
officer, whether the arrest was a lawful or an unlawful arrest is not a defense
to the charge of Resisting Arrest.
"A peace officer is justified in using
physical force on a person being arrested when, and to the extent, that he
reasonably believes it necessary to make an arrest and/or -- excuse me, or to
prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person, unless he knows that the
arrest is not lawful.  
"The use of deadly physical force by a
peace officer is justified only in the following circumstances -- and there are
five -- when the crime committed by the person being arrested was a felony or
an attempted felony that involved the use or threatened imminent use of
physical force against a person; or when the crime committed by the person
being arrested was Kidnapping, Arson, First Degree Escape, First Degree
Burglary, or any attempt to commit one of these offenses; or when, regardless
of the offense, it is necessary to defend the officer or another person from what
he reasonably believed to be the use or threatened use of deadly physical
force; four, when the crime committed by the other person under arrest was a
felony or an attempted felony and, under the totality of the circumstances
existing at the time and place, the use of deadly physical force is necessary;
and fifth, the officer's life or personal safety was endangered [in] the
particular circumstances involved.  So those are the five limits regarding the
use of deadly physical force by a police officer.  
"What is deadly physical force?  Deadly
physical force means physical force that, under the circumstances in which it
is used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.  
"What is serious physical injury?  Serious
physical injury means a physical injury -- which I previously defined to you --
that creates a substantial risk of death, or causes serious or protracted
disfigurement, or causes protracted impairment of health, or causes protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
"Finally, with regard to the charge of
Resisting Arrest, the [defense of] self-defense has been raised.  A peace
officer may use physical force on a person being arrested only when, and to the
extent that the officer reasonably believes it necessary to make an arrest.
"If a person being arrested [physically]
opposes an arresting officer, the officer may use reasonable force to overcome
the opposition.  If, however, the officer uses unreasonable physical force to
arrest a person who is offering no unlawful resistance -- as I have defined
that term for you -- that person may use physical force for self-defense from
what the person reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful
physical force by the officer.  In defending, the person may only use that
degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary.  The burden of
proof is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this defense does
not apply."  
(Emphasis added.)  Notwithstanding the court's suggestion in
the foregoing that it had defined the phrase "unlawful resistance"
for the jury, the trial court offered no such definition or instruction. 
Moreover, the trial court did not give the jury the uniform jury instruction
defining the term "resist," UCrJI 1200, which both the state and Wood
had requested, and which would have illuminated the concept of "unlawful
resistance."  That uniform instruction is based on ORS 162.315(2)(c),(11)
and provides:  
"Resists -- use or threatened use of violence, physical
force, or any other means that create a substantial risk of physical injury to
any person and includes, but is not limited to behavior clearly intended to
prevent being taken into custody by overcoming the actions of the arresting
officer.  The behavior does not have to result in actual physical injury to an
officer.  Passive resistance does not constitute behavior intended to prevent
being taken into custody."
The trial court did not give a
self-defense instruction with respect to any other offense charged against
Rilatos or any of the charges against Oliphant.  
Ultimately, the jury convicted Wood
and Rilatos of all the charged offenses.  It convicted Oliphant on the charge
of interfering with a police officer but acquitted her of the charges of
disorderly conduct and harassment.  Defendants filed a combined appeal from
their convictions to the Court of Appeals, assigning error to the trial court's
failure to give their requested special instruction based on Wright and
to the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on the police officers'
justification defense.  As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed without
opinion.   In this court, the three defendants jointly reprise the arguments
that they made to the Court of Appeals.  
As a preliminary matter, we observe
that Rilatos and Oliphant argue, in a vague and general way, that they were
entitled to self-defense instructions with respect to all the charges against
them, but that only Rilatos received a self-defense instruction, and then only
with respect to the charge of resisting arrest.  We easily dispose of those
arguments.  Neither Rilatos nor Oliphant requested a self-defense instruction
in their written requests for instructions, and neither objected to the trial
court's failure to give the instruction with respect to the charges of
interfering with a police officer or disorderly conduct.  In addition, as
noted, Oliphant was acquitted of the disorderly conduct and harassment charges. 

Furthermore, neither Rilatos nor Oliphant
were entitled to self-defense instructions with respect to the charges of
interfering with a police officer or disorderly conduct.   A person's right to
self-defense is set out in ORS 161.209, which provides:
"Except [in circumstances not present
here], a person is justified in using physical force upon another person for
self-defense or to defend a third person from what the person reasonably
believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force, and the
person may use a degree of force which the person reasonably believes to be
necessary for the purpose."
As is evident from the plain wording of that statute, the
self-defense justification applies only when the defendant uses physical force
against a person in response to the other person's use or imminent use of force. 
Oliphant's conviction for interfering with a police officer was based on
evidence that she stepped between Miller and Rilatos as Miller was attempting
to arrest Rilatos and then pushed on his chest to prevent him from following
Rilatos.  To that point, Miller had not used force on anyone, nor had he
threatened to use force.  Therefore, the evidence did not support a
self-defense instruction for Oliphant and the trial court did not err.  See State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 155, 630 P2d 796 (1981) (any error in trial court's
self-defense instruction was harmless because issue of self-defense was not
presented by the evidence); State v. Fuller, 203 Or 608, 611, 280 P2d
980 (1955) (trial court correctly refused to give self-defense instruction
where no evidence introduced or offered by defendant would have raised issue of
self-defense).  
Similarly, Rilatos's conviction for interfering
with a police officer was based on evidence that she repeatedly advanced toward
the officers as they tried to arrest Wood.  Her disorderly conduct convictions
were based on evidence that she yelled profanities at both officers during the
entire incident and that she kicked the windows of the patrol car once she had
been placed inside it.  Those actions on Rilatos's part involved no use of
force against another person.  Again, the evidence did not support self-defense
instructions for Rilatos on those charges and the trial court did not err in
failing to give them.  
We turn to what we view as the
fundamental issue(12)
presented in this case:  Under what circumstances does a person have a right to
use force in self-defense when he or she is being placed under arrest?  Wood(13)
contends that a defendant may use force to defend himself against what he
reasonably believes to be an officer's unlawful use of force against him,
whether the officer's use of force actually was unlawful or not.  Because the
focus is on the defendant's reasonable belief, Wood argues, the trial court
erred in instructing the jury to determine whether the officers' use of force
was lawful, and to do so by focusing, inter alia, on the officers'
belief in the reasonableness of their actions.  The state, by contrast, argues
that, "if an officer uses only lawful force to effect an arrest, the
arrestee may not respond with force, whether or not he reasonably thinks
he is defending himself against unlawful force."  (Emphasis in original.) 
Those contrasting views aptly frame the issue.
We begin with first principles:  Justification,
including the justification of self-defense, is a defense.  ORS 161.190.  That
means that, once self-defense has been raised by a defendant, the state has the
burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt.  ORS 161.055.  As noted, a
person's right to self-defense is governed by ORS 161.209, which provides that
a person may use physical force to defend himself "from what the person
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force."
 (Emphasis added.)  The plain wording of the statute thus establishes that, in
general, a person's right to use force in self-defense depends on the person's own
reasonable belief in the necessity for such action, and not on whether the
force used or about to be used on him actually was unlawful.  That
interpretation is borne out by this court's case law.  See, e.g.,
State v. Holbrook, 98 Or 43, 70, 188 P 947 (1920) ("The law
[respecting the right to use force in self-defense] is that the matter must be
considered from the standpoint of a reasonable man in the plight of the
defendants at the time, under all the conditions surrounding them, as disclosed
by the testimony."); State v. Jones, 179 Or 636, 639, 173 P2d 960
(1946) (same).  It also is supported by legislative history.  The Commentary to
the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report, sections 22 to 24 (July
1970) (adopting ORS 161.209), quotes with approval the following statement by
this court in State v. Rader, 94 Or 432, 456, 186 P 79 (1919):
"It is not the intent of the assailant which
harms the one he attacks, neither is the latter bound by it nor required to
ascertain it.  * * *  It is the imminent danger, real or apparent, of great
bodily injury to himself which justifies a defendant in protecting
himself."
Commentary to sections 22 to 24.  
The cases and the Commentary
specifically deal with a person's right to use force in self-defense against
another private citizen.  That begs the question whether a different rule
applies when a person reasonably believes it necessary to use force against a
police officer who is making an arrest.  Nothing in the wording of ORS 161.209 suggests
that the rule is altered in such a circumstance.  The text of that statute
contains two exceptions, neither of which is pertinent here.(14) 
Moreover, in at least one case, this court has suggested that a defendant would
have a right to assert self-defense if there had been "an overt act of a
hostile character on the part of [a police officer] or any demonstration on the
part of said officer that would have induced the defendant as a reasonably
prudent man to believe that he was in imminent danger likely to cause death or
great bodily injury."  State v. Weber, 246 Or 312, 318, 423 P2d 767
(1967).  
At the same time, however, the law is
clear that a person may not use physical force to resist arrest, even if the
arrest is unlawful:
"A person may not use physical force to
resist an arrest by a peace officer who is known or reasonably appears to be a
peace officer, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful."
ORS 161.260; see also ORS 162.315 (a person may not resist
arrest by intentionally using or threatening to use violence, physical force,
or any other means that creates a substantial risk of physical injury to any
person against a person known to be a peace officer making an arrest).(15)
This case, then, presents an apparent
conundrum:  A person may not use force to resist arrest, even if the arrest is
unlawful, but any person is entitled to use such force as is necessary to
overcome what the person reasonably believes to be the unlawful use of physical
force by anyone, including a police officer.  How can a person obey the statutes
prohibiting the use of force to resist arrest and still exercise his right
under ORS 161.209 to use force in self-defense?  To answer that question, as
this court stated in Wright, 
"it is crucial to distinguish between (1) the use of
physical force in resisting arrest and (2) the use of physical force in
defending oneself, i.e., self-defense, against excessive use of force by
the arresting officer.   The former is unlawful.  Depending on the
circumstances, the latter may be justifiable and not criminal.
"* * * * * 
"If a peace officer
uses excessive force in making an arrest, the arrestee has a right to use
physical force in self-defense against the excessive force being used by the
officer.  * * * In that circumstance, the arrestee is not 'resisting arrest,' but,
rather, is defending against the excessive force being used by the arresting
officer."  
310 Or at 434-35.
In Wright, the court noted
that the state had conceded that the defendant had presented evidence at trial
that the arresting officers had used excessive force, by which the court meant
unlawful force under ORS 161.235, which provides that an officer is justified
in using physical force only when and to the extent that the officer reasonably
believes it is necessary to make an arrest, prevent an escape from custody, or
for self-defense or defense of a third party.  Id. at 435.  For that
reason, the court observed, the defendant in Wright was entitled to
defend himself against that excessive use of force.  Id.  Because of the
state's concession, however, the court in Wright was not required to
confront the issue that is presented here -- whether the actual lawfulness
(under ORS 161.235 and ORS 161.239) of the officer's use of force is relevant
to the jury's consideration of the defendant's self-defense claim.  Here, of
course, the state did not concede that the evidence could be found to show that
the officers used excessive or, to be more precise, unlawful force in arresting
Wood, and the issue is squarely presented.  
We think that the answer to that
question follows directly from the wording of ORS 161.209, which makes the defendant's
reasonable belief that unlawful force was being used (or about to be used)
against him paramount.  Thus, while actual lawfulness of Gulbranson's and
Miller's conduct might in some way be deemed pertinent to assessing those
officers' own culpability in some other forum, such as in one hearing criminal
charges or a civil action against them, that subject is not a consideration
respecting Wood's right of self-defense.  Wood had a right to have the jury
consider the circumstances surrounding the event from his own point of view. 
If Wood believed, and a reasonable person in his position would have believed,
that the use or imminent use of force against him exceeded the force reasonably
necessary to effect the arrest, then he was entitled to defend himself from
that use of force.  Moreover, as we have already noted, the burden of proof was
on the state to disprove the existence of that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In this case, however, the court, in
instructing the jury on the charge of resisting arrest, gave the jury
instructions based on ORS 161.235 and ORS 161.239, which describe an officer's
right to use force, including deadly force, in effectuating an arrest or
preventing an escape.  Those statutes, and the instructions that the court gave
the jury based on them, provide that an officer is justified in using the
degree of physical force in those circumstances that the officer
reasonably believes is necessary.  Those instructions thus inserted an
irrelevant issue -- the arresting officers' actual state of mind -- into the jury's deliberations concerning Wood's claim of
self-defense.  The trial court erred in so instructing the jury with respect to
Wood's claim.  Instead, Wood was entitled to have his right to self-defense
explained to the jury in terms of what a reasonable person in his position
would have believed was occurring.  What the officers believed was not (indeed,
could not have been) any part of Wood's state of mind.(16)
In Wood's case, that error was not
harmless.   To "resist" arrest, a person must use or threaten to use
"violence, physical force or any other means that creates a substantial
risk of physical injury to any person," including "behavior clearly
intended to prevent being taken into custody by overcoming the actions of the
arresting officer."  ORS 162.315(2)(c).  Evidence was presented at trial
(including through Gulbranson's own testimony) from which the jury could have
found that Wood did not "resist" under that definition of the term
until after Gulbranson sprayed in him the face with Cap-Stun pepper spray and
began delivering "focused blows" to his back.  In that case, whatever
the officer's perception for the necessity (and, therefore, the actual
lawfulness) of using such force, the jury could have found that a reasonable
person in Wood's position would have believed that the officer was using
unlawful force against him.
In addition, because we conclude that
there was evidence from which a jury could have found that Wood did not resist
arrest, we think that Wood's convictions for assaulting a public safety officer
also must be reversed.  That is so because Wood's convictions for assaulting a public
safety officer were based on evidence that he injured the officers in the
course of engaging in what he claimed was the justifiable use of force to defend
himself.  If a jury finds that that use of force was justified, then it would
also be appropriate for the jury to reconsider the evidence supporting the
charges of assaulting a public safety officer.  
As discussed above, Rilatos also was
charged with resisting arrest, and the trial court instructed the jury with
respect to her self-defense claim at the same time and in the same way that it
did for Wood.  Rilatos's conviction for resisting arrest was based on evidence
that she pulled her arms away from Miller to avoid being handcuffed and taken
into custody.  Before Rilatos pulled her arms away from Miller, Miller had not
used any physical force on Rilatos, nor had he threatened to use force beyond
that necessarily involved in taking her into custody by handcuffing her. 
Rilatos did not respond to that action on Miller's part with any other use of
force.  In those circumstances, the evidence did not support a self-defense
instruction for Rilatos on the resisting arrest charge against her and,
therefore, any error in the instruction that the trial court gave the jury with
respect to Rilatos's self-defense claim was harmless.  
Finally, because the issue may arise
on retrial, we turn to consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to
give the special instruction that defendants requested.  That proposed
instruction provided:
"If a peace officer uses excessive force in making an
arrest, the arrestee may use only such physical force as is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances to defend himself or herself against the
excessive force being used against him or her."
That instruction was based on the following statement by this
court in Wright:
"We conclude that, if an officer making an arrest uses
excessive force, the permissible use of physical force by the arrestee is
limited to the use of such force as is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances for self-defense against the excessive force being used by the
arresting officer."
Wright, 310 Or at 436.  
Defendants cannot be faulted for
believing that Wright was pertinent.  However, as discussed above, the
state in Wright had conceded that evidence was presented at trial that the
officers had used "excessive force" in arresting the defendant. 
Moreover, as noted above, context shows that, by the phrase "excessive
force," the court in Wright was referring to force that was
unlawful under ORS 161.235, which focuses on the officer's state of
mind.  See Wright, 310 Or at 434-35 (illustrating proposition). 
The only issue addressed in the case was whether a defendant who had been
subjected to unlawful force by a police officer during an arrest was entitled
to a self-defense instruction that did not state that an arrestee's right to
use physical force in self-defense must be reasonable under the circumstances. 
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to such an instruction
because it was not a correct statement of the law.  Id. at 437.
Because the existence of evidence of the
unlawfulness of the officers' use of force was a given in Wright, we do
not think that the instruction that defendants culled from this court's
statements in that case is appropriate.(17) 
We also agree with the trial court that the proposed instruction requires the
jury to decide whether a police officer's use of force was
"excessive," a term that is not found in the statutes governing
either self-defense or resisting arrest.  As we have discussed in detail above,
ORS 161.209 provides that a person is entitled to use force in self-defense
against what the person reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of "unlawful"
physical force.  Asking the jury also to consider whether an officer's use of
force was "excessive" is not helpful or correct, particularly when
this court, in Wright, itself appeared to view the word
"excessive" as synonymous with "unlawful."(18) 
The trial court did not err separately in refusing to give defendants' special
instruction based on Wright.  The trial court will be required on
remand, however, to give some instruction that conforms to our analysis as to
whose state of mind is the proper focus of the self-defense claim.
Finally, we address one further matter
that is likely to arise on remand.  Defendant Wood requested, and the trial
court gave UCrJI 1227, the uniform jury instruction on "Self-Defense -- Resisting
Arrest," which begins as follows: 
"The defense of self-defense has been
raised.  
"A peace officer may use physical force on
a person being arrested only when and to the extent that the officer reasonably
believes it necessary to make an arrest.  * * *."
As our previous discussion shows, that statement
impermissibly shifts the focus of the jury's deliberations on a defendant's
self-defense claim from what the defendant reasonably believes to what the officer
believes.  That is incorrect and should not be included in the instructions
to the jury during the trial on remand.(19)
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed with respect to defendant Wood's convictions for resisting arrest and
assaulting a public safety officer.  In all other respects, the judgments of
the circuit court are affirmed.  Defendant Wood's case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.  
1. Other witnesses testified that Gulbranson drove through the crosswalk
and, when Rilatos started shouting, put the patrol car in reverse and stopped
near her.  Resolution of this disagreement is not necessary to answer the legal
issues presented by the case.
2. Gulbranson testified that Rilatos, who by that time was on the stairs
to the apartment, was in a position of advantage over him and, when he saw Wood
cross the street, he then had to "figure out which was the bigger
threat."  
3. Two bystanders testified that Miller kicked Wood while he was on the
ground.  One of them also testified that Gulbranson had his knee on Wood's back
and was shoving his face into the rocks during this part of the incident.  
4. Miller testified that the brachial nerve runs from the neck to the
shoulder, and a focused blow to that nerve is intended to weaken the arm
sufficiently to permit the officer to gain control over an individual.  
5. Even in the patrol car, Rilatos continued to yell profanities and
kick at the windows.  
16. Wood also was charged with one count of disorderly conduct, but the
trial court dismissed that count before trial.
7. The state also had requested the court to instruct the jury
concerning the definition of the word "resists" as provided in UCrJI
1200.
8. We discuss and set these instructions out in the text later in this
opinion.  
9. There is no record of what, specifically, the court discussed with
the parties in chambers.
10. Another statute, ORS 133.235(4), provides, "In order to make an
arrest, a peace officer may use physical force as justifiable under ORS
161.235, 161.239 and 161.245."  
11. ORS 162.315(2)(c) provides:
"'Resists' means the use or threatened use
of violence, physical force or any other means that creates a substantial risk
of physical injury to any person and includes, but is not limited to, behavior
clearly intended to prevent being taken into custody by overcoming the actions
of the arresting officer.  The behavior does not have to result in actual
physical injury to an officer.  Passive resistance does not constitute behavior
intended to prevent being taken into custody."
12. In their combined brief to this court, defendants in general, and Wood
in particular, do not make any argument specifically addressing the
self-defense instruction that the trial court gave respecting the charges
against Wood for assaulting a police officer.  We therefore confine our
discussion to the issue of a person's right to self-defense in the context of a
charge of resisting arrest.  
13. Although all three defendants jointly sought review in this court, for
convenience and clarity, we refer in this part of the opinion to Wood because
he is the defendant whose case most clearly raises the issue presented. 
14. ORS 161.209 states that it applies "[e]xcept as provided in ORS
161.215 and 161.219."  ORS 161.215 provides:  
"Notwithstanding ORS 161.209, a person is
not justified in using physical force upon another person if:
"(1) With intent to cause physical injury
or death to another person, the person provokes the use of unlawful physical
force by that person; or
"(2) The person is the initial aggressor,
except that the use of physical force upon another person under such
circumstances is justifiable if the person withdraws from the encounter and
effectively communicates to the other person the intent to do so, but the
latter nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful
physical force; or
"(3) The physical force involved is the
product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law."
ORS 161.219 provides: