Title: Wells v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CURTIS WELLS, 
 
§ 
§ 
No.  66, 2003 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§ 
  
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0112009733A 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: September 3, 2003 
Decided: 
September 16, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 16th day of September, 2003, upon consideration of the briefs of 
the parties, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Defendant-appellant Curtis Wells (“Wells”) has appealed from 
his convictions of first-degree robbery in violation of 11 Del. C. § 832; 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of 11 
Del. C. § 1447A; first and second degree burglary in violation of 11 Del. C. 
§ 826 and § 825; two counts of conspiracy in the second degree in violation 
of 11 Del. C. § 512; aggravated menacing in violation of 11 Del. C. § 
602(b); and wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony in 
violation of 11 Del. C. § 1239.  Wells was sentenced to twenty-three (23) 
 
2 
years imprisonment at Level 5 supervision, with the balance suspended for 
declining levels of supervision after serving eight (8) years at Level 5. 
 
(2) 
Wells advances two grounds for reversal.  The first is that the 
trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel, during his 
opening statement, from using a chart that depicted various burdens of 
proof.1  Wells’ second claim is that the trial court erred in allowing the State 
to explain accomplice liability to the jury, during the State’s closing 
argument, by use of an analogy. 
 
(3) 
We review the ruling of the trial court on the first issue for 
abuse of discretion.2  Under that standard, this Court will disturb a 
discretionary ruling of the trial court “only when the ruling is based upon 
unreasonable or capricious grounds.”
3 
 
(4) 
A judge must ensure that the instructions given to jurors are 
reasonably informative, not misleading, and correct statements of the law.4  
Limiting the use of an exhibit that is likely to confuse or mislead the jury 
about the burden of proof falls within the discretion of the trial judge.  In the 
                                        
1 Defense counsel sought to use a typewritten chart that depicted “mountain steps going up” (see Trial 
Transcript at A-45) and that listed various burdens of proof, including a description of the standard of proof 
in a criminal case as “proof so convincing that you would rely on it without hesitation in the most important 
of your own affairs.”  The state’s objection to the chart was sustained on the basis of irrelevance and the 
potential to confuse the jury, because the chart listed evidentiary standards of proof that were irrelevant in a 
criminal trial, and the above-quoted standard for “guilty” was inconsistent with the instructions given by 
the Court. 
2 Bridges v. State, 706 A.2d 489 (Del. 1998).  
3 Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62  (Del. 1993), citing Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 699 (Del. 1968). 
4 Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351 (Del. 1996); Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278 (Del. 1991).   
 
3 
case sub judice, the presentation of irrelevant burdens of proof, and of 
language inconsistent with the court’s instruction on burden of proof, could 
be reasonably anticipated to confuse the jury.  Preventing confusion about 
the applicable law and the applicable standard of proof is an important role 
of the trial judge.5  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court having 
excluded the use of the chart. 
 
(5) 
The second argument advanced by Wells on this appeal is that 
the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor, in his closing argument, to 
use an analogy to explain accomplice liability to the jury. Specifically, the 
prosecutor used an analogy that supposed (hypothetically) that Wells, Biasi 
and Knestant robbed a bank, with Knestant being the get-away driver.  The 
prosecutor then stated that if Wells or Biasi committed murder during such a 
robbery, Knestant could be charged with murder.  Immediately following the 
prosecution’s closing argument, the trial court gave a curative instruction 
that clarified and limited the hypothetical situation described by the 
prosecution, and emphasized that there had been no bank robbery or murder 
in this case. 
                                        
5 See, e.g. Thompson by Thompson v. Papastavros Assoc. Med. Imaging, L.L.C., 729 A.2d 874 (Del.Super. 
Ct. 1998); Johnson v. State, 604 A.2d 417 (Del. 1991). 
 
4 
 
(6)  
This Court’s review of the appropriateness of a prosecutor’s 
closing argument is plenary.6  In considering whether improper prosecutorial 
remarks require the reversal of a conviction, this Court considers four 
factors, namely:  (a) the centrality of the issue affected by the alleged error; 
(b) the closeness of the case; (c) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the 
alleged error; and (d) whether there is a pattern of repeated misconduct 
despite this Court’s oft-repeated admonitions against such practices.7 
 
(7)  
All four of those factors favor affirmance.  The prosecutor’s 
statements concerned an issue that was only marginally related to the central 
issue in the case.  The case was not close, because the physical and 
testimonial evidence of Defendant’s guilt was abundant.  Steps were taken to 
mitigate the effects of the alleged error, in that the Court gave an immediate 
curative instruction.  Finally, this Court does not perceive a pattern of 
prosecutors using inappropriate analogies in their closing arguments.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the statements of the prosecutor in her 
summation do not amount to reversible error. 
                                        
6 Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981). 
7 Chapman v. State, 821 A.2d 867 (Del. 2003). 
 
5 
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Justice