Title: Brown v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THOMAS BROWN, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 260, 2013 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
ID No. 1111021773 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 15, 2014 
Decided:  March 25, 2014 
 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
On this 25th day of March 2014, it appears to the Court that:  
(1)  Defendant-Below/Appellant Thomas Brown appeals from a jury 
conviction in the Superior Court of Aggravated Possession, Drug Dealing, two 
counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Receiving a 
Stolen Firearm, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, and Conspiracy Second 
Degree.  Brown was also found guilty following a bench trial of Possession of a 
Firearm or Ammunition by a Person Prohibited.  Brown raises three claims on 
appeal.  Brown contends that (1) the trial court committed plain error when it 
admitted evidence of Brown’s prior crimes and failed sua sponte to provide the 
2 
jury with a limiting instruction, (2) the trial court committed plain error when it 
allowed testimony about Brown’s co-defendant’s plea negotiations, and (3) Brown 
was improperly sentenced for two drug offenses and two firearm offenses in 
violation of a recently passed Delaware statute.  The State concedes Brown’s third 
claim.  We conclude that Brown’s first and second claim are without merit but that 
there is merit to his third claim.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part 
and remand for resentencing.   
(2)  In November 2011, Jameel Lunnon, a confidential informant, called 
Brown while Delaware State Police monitored the call.  Lunnon agreed to assist 
police in order to avoid a possible life sentence following a July 2011 drug arrest.  
Lunnon asked to purchase nine ounces of cocaine, but Brown explained that he 
could only get eight ounces.  Lunnon and Brown agreed to meet that evening for 
the exchange.  Police set up surveillance at the exchange site as well as the location 
from which they believed Brown would obtain the cocaine.   
(3)  Before the exchange could occur, police stopped Brown’s vehicle.  
Police ordered Brown and his passenger, John Dupree, out of the vehicle.  After a 
search of the vehicle, police found 216.57 grams (roughly eight ounces) of crack 
cocaine; a loaded, stolen .38 caliber revolver behind the driver’s seat; a loaded, 
stolen 9mm semi-automatic handgun under the front passenger seat; and less than a 
gram of crack cocaine on Dupree.  Brown and Dupree were arrested and charged 
3 
with two counts of drug dealing, four firearms offenses, and related offenses.  
Dupree later accepted a plea deal on the condition that he testify against Brown.  
(4)  At trial, Lunnon, Dupree, and Detective Christopher Sutton all testified 
for the State against Brown.  After Dupree had testified, Brown called John Malik, 
Dupree’s defense counsel, to testify to the favorable plea deal that Dupree 
received.  The jury found Brown guilty of Aggravated Possession of Cocaine, 
Drug Dealing, Conspiracy Second Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony, Receiving a Stolen Firearm, and Carrying a 
Concealed Deadly Weapon related to the 9mm handgun.  The jury found Brown 
not guilty of two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony, Receiving a Stolen Firearm, and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon 
related to the .38 caliber revolver.  The trial judge also found Brown guilty of 
Possession of a Firearm or Ammunition by a Person Prohibited following a 
separate bench trial.  Brown was sentenced to seventeen years at Level 5 
supervision reduced to probation thereafter.  This appeal followed.   
(5)  On appeal, Brown argues that the trial court erred when it (1) admitted 
evidence of Brown’s prior crimes and failed to sua sponte provide a limiting 
instruction, (2) allowed testimony about Brown’s co-defendant’s plea negotiations, 
and (3) improperly sentenced Brown for two drug offenses and two firearm 
offenses that should have merged.  Because none of these claims were raised 
4 
below, our review is limited to plain error.1  “Under the plain error standard of 
review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights 
as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”2  The plain error 
standard “is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the 
record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which 
clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest 
injustice.”3  “[P]lain error is predicated upon oversight, as opposed to a tactical 
decision, of counsel.”4 
 
(6)  Brown first argues that the Superior Court erred in allowing references 
to Brown’s criminal history and for failing to provide a limiting jury instruction.  
Under Delaware law, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a defendant to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith.5  Such evidence may be used for another purpose, “such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or 
absence of mistake or accident.”6  Where character evidence is introduced for a 
                                          
 
1 See Collins v. State, 56 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Del. 2012) (citing Sup. Ct. R. 8). 
2 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Dutton v. State, 452 
A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982)). 
3 Id. (citing Bromwell v. State, 427 A.2d 884, 893 n. 12 (Del. 1981). 
4 Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904, 923 (Del. 2009) (citing Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 
956, 961 (Del. 2006); Bell v. State, 625 A.2d 278, 1993 WL 169143, at *3 (Del. 
1993)). 
5 D.R.E. 404(b).  
6 Id.  
5 
limited non-character purpose, “the jury should be instructed concerning the 
purpose for its admission.”7   
 
(7)  At trial, the State called Detective Sutton in order to establish that 
Lunnon has arranged a cocaine deal with Brown.  During his cross-examination, 
Detective Sutton discussed the events leading up to the drug exchange between 
Brown and Lunnon.  In relevant part, the testimony reads as follows: 
[Defense Counsel].  All right. Did all of this happen over one 
phone call that you overheard or were there back-and-forth 
phone calls? 
 
[Detective Sutton].  Oh, no ma’am.  This was going on -- they  
-- the confidential informant and Mr. Brown had been dealing 
with each other for some time.   
 
[Defense Counsel].  Over this transaction? 
 
[Detective Sutton].  This and others.  
 
 . . . . 
 
[Defense Counsel].  Now, why nine ounces?  What’s special 
about nine ounces, that amount? 
 
[Detective Sutton].  I believe that was the amount of cocaine 
that they—that Mr. Lunnon and Mr. Brown normally dealt 
with.8   
 
(8)  The State next called Lunnon, the confidential informant, to testify.  
Again on cross-examination, Defense Counsel questioned Lunnon about his 
                                          
 
7 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988). 
8 Appellant’s Opening Br. Appendix at A22–23.  
6 
relationship with Brown.  Following an exchange about Brown’s vehicle, the 
cross-examination testimony went as follows:   
[Defense Counsel].  How many times did you meet [Brown]? 
 
[Lunnon].  Several.  
 
[Defense Counsel].  Several when? 
 
[Lunnon].  Before and after the case.  
 
[Defense Counsel].  Okay.  When before November 30th, when 
[Brown] was arrested?  
 
[Lunnon].  Before contact with Detective Sutton and after 
contact with Detective Sutton.  
 
[Defense Counsel].  Okay.  When did you have contact with 
Detective Sutton.  
 
[Lunnon].  In July.9  
 
(8)  Detective Sutton was later recalled to the stand, where on recross-
examination Defense Counsel again elicited information about the past relationship 
between Lunnon and Brown.   
[Defense Counsel].  So would it be fair to say your expectation 
was, to use the expression, [Lunnon] was going to have to cure 
cancer for you, right?  I, mean he’s got to land a big plane, do 
something giant for you, right? 
 
[Detective Sutton].  He was going to have to produce. 
 
                                          
 
9 Id. at A39.  
7 
[Defense Counsel].  All right.  And he did. He called my client 
up on the phone and, how do I say that, began a drug 
transaction.  Is that correct?  Set the wheels in motion? 
 
[Detective Sutton].  For this deal, correct, but I believe there 
was prior -- he stated there was [sic] prior dealings or 
conversations with your client as well.10   
 
(9)  Throughout each of these exchanges, the testimony was elicited by 
Brown’s trial counsel on cross-examination without any contemporaneous 
objection.  This line of questioning appears to have been part of Brown’s strategy.  
That is, showing that Brown was a drug dealer but not guilty of all of the charges 
against him or at least trying to cast doubt on the prior relationship between Brown 
and Lunnon.  Because plain error is based on judicial oversight—and not tactical 
decisions by counsel—Brown’s claims do not fall within the plain error review.  
Thus, Brown’s first claim is without merit.   
(10)  Brown next contends that the trial court erred when it allowed Malik to 
testify about information he provided to the State during plea negotiations.  
Specifically, Brown argues that Malik’s testimony was irrelevant opinion 
testimony that should have been excluded by the trial judge.  The Delaware Rules 
of Evidence provide that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by statute or by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of 
                                          
 
10 Id. at A47.  
8 
this State.  Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”11  Witness testimony 
may also include opinion testimony so long as the underlying opinion or inference 
is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the 
scope of Rule 702.”12   
(11)  After Malik testified to the favorable plea agreement provided to 
Dupree, the State questioned him about the reason to accept the plea deal and thus 
rebut Dupree’s testimony.   
[Prosecutor].  And in doing so, can you explain, as you recall, 
information you provided to me which resulted in a favorable 
plea to your client?  
 
[Malik].  Well, I had indicated that my client was working at 
the time. I also had indicated to you that I had sat in on the 
preliminary hearing, and that I heard what the State’s case was, 
and that I felt after having spoke [sic] to my client that, again, 
the police, they made the arrest.  And they saw that there were 
guns and drugs in the car, and they just arrested everybody.  
And it gets figured out with prosecutors and defense attorneys 
and sometimes courtrooms.   
 
I indicated to you what my client had advised me with 
respect to how he ended up in the car, what his purpose was.  
You had indicated you wanted to speak to Detective Sutton 
about that.  We got back, and you asked me whether my client 
would be willing to make a recorded statement, waive his right 
not to make any statements, and make a statement.  And we 
                                          
 
11 D.R.E. 402.  
12 D.R.E. 701. 
9 
ultimately agreed to do that which happened in April and July 
of this year.13 
 
Brown objected, arguing that the prosecutor was testifying and making himself a 
witness.  In response, the trial judge agreed to provide an instruction that the jury 
should disregard any factual statements made by the prosecutor that are not 
sustained by witness testimony.  Brown agreed, and Malik’s testimony continued.   
(12)  On appeal, Brown argues that this testimony elicited by the State was 
impermissible and irrelevant opinion testimony.  In support of this contention, 
Brown cites to our decision in McKinney v. State.  There we held that the 
testimony an attorney who was proffered as a purported expert was properly 
excluded as irrelevant.14  This was because the testimony sought to show that 
inmates charged with multiple crimes have a tendency to provide confession 
testimony against other inmates.15  McKinney does not stand for the proposition 
that any opinion testimony by an attorney is inadmissible as Brown suggests.  Nor 
was Malik’s opinion testimony on cross-examination so egregiously irrelevant, 
depriving Brown of a substantial right or clearly showing manifest injustice, as is 
required for the plain error standard.  Therefore, Brown’s second claim is without 
merit.    
                                          
 
13 Appellant’s Opening Br. Appendix at A73–74.  
14 McKinney v. State, 466 A.2d 356, 360 (Del. 1983). 
15 Id.  
10 
(13)  In his final claim, Brown alleges that the trial court improperly 
sentenced him for two drug dealing offenses and two weapons offenses when he 
could only be found guilty of one each.  On September 1, 2011, the General 
Assembly amended the Delaware Code by adding 16 Del. C. § 4766.16  In relevant 
part, Section 4766 provides: 
In any prosecution for any violation of the following sections of 
this chapter, the defendant may be convicted under any 1 of the 
following respective sections of this chapter in accordance with 
the table set forth below establishing lesser included offenses:  
 
(1)  The lesser-included offenses under § 4752 are §§ 4753, 
4754, 4755, 4756, 4758, 4763, and 4764 of this title.17 
(14)  In the trial below, Brown was convicted of Drug Dealing – Aggravated 
Possession of cocaine under 16 Del. C. § 4752(3) as well as Aggravated Possession 
with the Intent to Deliver under 16 Del. C. § 4754(1).  Due to the changes to the 
code prior to Brown’s actions and subsequent trial, the more serious offense of 
Aggravated Possession under Section 4752 prevails over the Section 4754 charge, 
a lesser included offense under the code.  As the State concedes on appeal, the trial 
court could only convict Brown under Section 4752.   
(15)  As a result of this merger, the State also concedes that one of Brown’s 
convictions for Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony should 
be vacated as well.  Brown’s two firearm possession charges were predicated on 
                                          
 
16 78 Del. Laws 2011, ch. 13, § 49 (H.B. 19). 
17 16 Del. C. § 4766 (emphasis added). 
11 
each of the separate drug offenses.  Because only one drug offense is permissible 
under Delaware statute, only one firearm possession during the course of a felony 
charge is sustainable.  Accordingly, we reverse the drug conviction under Section 
4754 and one charge of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony and remand this matter for resentencing. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED for 
resentencing.    
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice