Title: Hayes v. Garvey Drilling Co.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

188 Kan. 179 (1961)
360 P.2d 889
EUGENE B. HAYES, Appellee,
v.
GARVEY DRILLING COMPANY, INC., and CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellants.
No. 42,246

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 8, 1961.
Tudor W. Hampton, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Jerry M. Ward and Herb Rohleder, both of Great Bend, were with him on the brief for the appellants.
Hugh D. Mauch, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Melvin O. Nuss and Vernon L. Nuss, both of Great Bend, and John K. Bremyer, of McPherson, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is a workmen's compensation case. The only question involved is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding of increased disability in a proceeding for review and modification of the original award.
On June 6, 1957, while engaged in building a pump shed around the draw works of an oil well, and while standing on a part of the machinery to install roof rafters, claimant momentarily lost his balance and stepped backward onto the pump belts. He was thrown to the ground and suffered severe injuries to his left leg, back and chest, and suffered belt burns on his body. He was hospitalized for ninety-six days and underwent an operation on his knee. His left leg remained numb and his back pained him almost constantly. It is conceded that his accidental injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
On March 27, 1959, the commissioner found that claimant had suffered a 25.4% permanent partial general disability and made an award accordingly. No appeal was taken from that award.
On June 6, 1959, under the provisions of G.S. 1959 Supp. 44-528, claimant filed an application for review and modification in which he alleged that he was then totally disabled, and prayed for an order increasing the original award on the basis of total disability.
Following a hearing on this application, the record of which was made by and consisted of deposition testimony, the commissioner found 
*181 Upon appeal by claimant to the district court the order of the commissioner denying an increased award was reversed, and the pertinent portion of the court's judgment reads:
Judgment was rendered accordingly, and the employer and its insurance carrier have appealed.
Before entering into a discussion of the evidence, brief mention should be made of the review and modification statute, 44-528, above. As here material, it provides that at any time before the final payment has been made under or pursuant to any award it may be reviewed by the commissioner, the purpose being to determine whether such award is excessive or inadequate, or that the incapacity or disability of the workman has increased or diminished since the date of the original award. The reason for the statute is of course evident, for, in the very nature of things, the question of the extent of disability in the first instance is oftentimes conjectural. Human nature being what it is, and medical science not being perfect, it is conceivable that a claimant may not be as badly disabled a few weeks or months after the original hearing as he seemed to be at the time the award was made. On the other hand, his condition might have grown much worse. The statute was enacted to meet such a situation and its provisions safeguard the welfare of the workman as well as the employer. (Williams v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 159 Kan. 266, 270, 154 P.2d 126.)
Because of a contention made by respondent appellants, we mention briefly the evidence at the hearing on the original award.
There was considerable testimony concerning the actual physical injuries sustained by claimant. A Dr. Moore testified that in his opinion claimant was suffering 100% disability at that time. He qualified that opinion, however, by stating that his estimate was on the basis of temporary total disability until such time as claimant's true condition could be determined by specialists in an Oklahoma City clinic, where Dr. Moore wanted to send him. He further testified *182 that at that time claimant's condition was to a considerable extent due to a number of conditions, such as worry, mental stress and strain, and the like, all of which, coupled with his physical condition as a result of the injury, brought about what he then considered a 100% disability.
At the hearing on the application for review and modification it was brought out that while in military service in World War II the claimant had been hospitalized on at least three occasions for "emotional and nervous disorders." Certain records of the Veterans Administration were introduced by the testimony of a Dr. Bernstorf, by deposition, and they definitely established that claimant had suffered emotional strain for a number of years.
Dr. Moore also testified by deposition at the hearing for review and modification. Rather than attempt to summarize, we quote excerpts from his testimony:
..............
"Q. Do you notice any improvement?
..............
..............
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is that opinion?
"Q. I mean just generally.
"A. Yes."
Respondents argue that inasmuch as Dr. Moore's testimony at both hearings was to the effect that claimant was 100% disabled, it cannot be said he added any substantial testimony at the later hearing upon which the court could base its finding of 100% disability, and, the original award of 25.4% disability being unappealed from, therefore became final.
*184 In so contending we believe that respondents inaccurately construe the testimony of Dr. Moore at the hearing on the original award. It is true that at that time he did state that in his opinion claimant was 100% disabled, but his estimate was on the basis of temporary total disability pending further evaluation by specialists, whereas at the later hearing he unqualifiedly expressed the opinion that claimant was "100 percent totally disabled."
The above-quoted portions of the medical testimony speak for themselves. While claimant's physical injuries were principally to his leg, back and chest  the end result was that his mental condition became such as to render him totally disabled  all of which was directly traceable to his accidental injury. Traumatic neurosis, following physical injury, long has been recognized as being compensable under workmen's compensation laws, and the rule is applicable to such injury even though financial and other worries play a part. (Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 792, 62 P.2d 920; Barr v. Builders, Inc., 179 Kan. 617, syl. 4, 296 P.2d 1106.) Furthermore, it is well-settled that the workmen's compensation act prescribes no standard of health for workmen, and where a workman is not in sound health but is accepted for employment and a subsequent industrial accident suffered by him aggravates or accelerates an existing disease, or intensifies the affliction, he is not to be denied compensation merely because of such pre-existing condition. (Strasser v. Jones, 186 Kan. 507, 511, 350 P.2d 779.)
In Jones v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 165 Kan. 1, 192 P.2d 141, it was said:
This record contains substantial evidence to support the court's finding that claimant was suffering 100% permanent disability as a result of traumatic neurosis; that such condition was directly caused by and was a result of his accidental injuries, and that claimant's predisposition to a neurosis was immaterial in view of the fact his injury was the exciting cause which precipitated his nervous symptoms.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.