Title: Davis v. Mark IV Transportation

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID DAVIS, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 374, 2011 
 
Claimant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for Kent County 
 
 
§ 
MARK IV TRANSPORTATION, 
§ 
C.A. No. K10A-06-012 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Employer Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
   Submitted:  October 21, 2011 
   Decided:  December 19, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY. 
 
O R D E R 
This 19th day of December 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Claimant-Below/Appellant, David Davis, appeals from a Superior 
Court Order affirming the decision of the Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”) 
granting Employer Mark IV Transportation’s (“Mark IV’s”) petition for review to 
terminate Davis’s total disability benefits.  Davis raises two arguments on appeal.  
First, Davis contends that the Board erred as a matter of law when it based its 
decision on evidence not in the record.  Second, Davis contends that the Superior 
Court erred when it determined that the Board’s error was harmless.   We find no 
merit to Davis’s appeal and affirm.  
 
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(2) 
Davis suffered a compensable injury to his neck, lower back, knees, 
and left arm on December 18, 2006, while employed with Mark IV.   Mark IV has 
paid Davis total disability benefits since February 6, 2009, the date of Davis’s 
second surgery.    
(3) 
On November 19, 2009, Mark IV filed a petition for review to 
terminate benefits to Davis on grounds that Davis was able to return to work with 
restrictions.  After holding an evidentiary hearing, the Board granted Mark IV’s 
petition as of the date of filing.  The Board awarded Davis partial disability 
benefits in the amount of $571.64 per week and medical witness fees.   
(4) 
Davis appealed the Board’s decision in its entirety to the Superior 
Court.  The Superior Court affirmed in a June 30, 2011 order.1  This appeal 
followed.  
(5) 
We review a decision of the Board for errors of law, and determine 
whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.2  “Substantial evidence equates to ‘such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”3  We will not 
weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make our own factual 
                                          
 
1 See Davis v. Mark IV Transp., 2011 WL 2623906 (Del. Super. June 30, 2011). 
2 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009) (citing Stanley v. 
Kraft Foods, Inc., 2008 WL 2410212, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 24, 2008)). 
3 Id. (quoting Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)). 
 
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findings.4  Errors of law are reviewed de novo.5  Absent an error of law, the 
standard of review for a Board’s decision is abuse of discretion.6  “The Board has 
abused its discretion only when its decision has ‘exceeded the bounds of reason in 
view of the circumstances.’”7   
(6) 
Davis contends that the Board made factual findings and related 
conclusions not supported by the record, as evidenced by the following statement 
in its decision: 
Claimant testified that he drives his car and the RV for up to an 
hour at a time, he goes grocery shopping and pushes the 
shopping car around the store, and he babysits his grandsons 
and even puts the baby into the crib for his nap.  If he is able to 
carry his infant grandson, then he is capable of lifting and 
carrying up to ten pounds occasionally at work within his 
restrictions.  The activities that Claimant would do at a job such 
as the ones listed on the labor market survey are not any more 
strenuous than the activities that he does at home and with his 
grandchildren.8  
 
In fact, Davis had testified as follows during examination by Mark IV’s attorney: 
Harrison: [Y]ou told [the defense’s medical examiner] that you 
go on the weekends with the RV, is that correct? 
Davis: Yes ma’am, not every weekend, but on occasional 
weekends yes, ma’am.  
Harrison: And she also indicated in her report that you told her 
that you do grocery shopping is that correct? 
                                          
 
4 Id. (citing Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965)). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. (citing Stanley, 2008 WL 2410212, at *2). 
7 Id. (quoting Stanley, 2008 WL 2410212, at *2). 
8 Davis v. Mark IV Transp., No. 1296631, at 18 (Del. I.A.B. June 3, 2010). 
 
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Davis: I go with my wife grocery shopping I push the cart. 
* ** 
Board Member: You drive and you were injured back in 
December of 2006, what have you done your time between now 
and back when the injury [sic]?  
Davis: Help my daughter with my last grandchild that was born 
and when I say help I just go up and sit on the sofa and kind of 
put the child to sleep . . . .  
(7) 
Neither Davis’ testimony nor other evidence in the record supports the 
Board’s findings that David could “carry his infant grandson” or “puts the baby 
into the crib for his nap.”  Accordingly, the Superior Court properly found that 
there was not substantial evidence to support these particular factual findings. 
(8) 
Davis next contends that Superior Court erred when it found that 
Board’s unsupported factual findings constituted harmless error. The Superior 
Court found harmless error on grounds that the record contained other substantial 
evidence to support the Board’s conclusion about Davis’s work ability.  “A 
Board’s decision may be upheld if it rests upon substantial evidence after 
objectionable evidence is removed from consideration.”9   Here, the Superior Court 
properly found that the testimony of medical examiner Dr. Stephens—who did not 
consider any of Davis’s activities with his grandchild—provided independent 
substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion.  
                                          
 
9 Davis v. Mark IV Transp., 2011 WL 2623906, at *3 (Del. Super. June 30, 2011) (citing Wyrick 
v. Leaseway Auto Carriers, 2002 WL 537591, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 10, 2002)).  
 
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(9) 
Dr. Stephens’ deposition testimony was introduced at the hearing on 
Mark IV’s behalf.  Dr. Stephens had performed a physical exam of Davis on 
September 11, 2009, taken Davis’s history, and evaluated the Functional Capacity 
Evaluation (“FCE”) report.  Dr. Stephens opined that Davis was fit for sedentary 
work activity for four hours per day, five days per week.  Dr. Stephens also stated 
that Davis could lift no more than ten pounds and needed to be able to change 
positions during work activity.   
 
(10) Dr. Katz’s deposition testimony was introduced on Davis’s behalf.  
Dr. Katz first evaluated Davis on September 3, 2008.  He recommended minimal, 
part-time work activity of two hours per day, three days per week in a sedentary to 
light-capacity position.  He also recommended no frequent lifting or carrying, and 
weight restrictions per the FCE.  Dr. Katz based his recommendations on Davis’s 
complaints and the FCE.   
 
(11) Davis contends that the Superior Court’s finding of harmless error is 
inadequate because “there is nothing in record to state why [the Board] found Dr. 
Stephens’ restrictions to be more reasonable than those of Dr. Katz.”  Yet, the 
Board’s decision articulates that it found Dr. Stephens’ recommendation to be 
more reliable than Dr. Katz’s because it was better supported.  The Board stated 
that Dr. Katz “does not explain why he limited Claimant to working only two 
hours a day, three days a week,” and “does not know anything about Claimant’s 
 
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activities and abilities.”10  In contrast, “Dr. Stephens based his release on the 
medical records, physical examination findings, and the FCE Report.”11  Moreover, 
“Dr. Stephens was aware of Claimant’s ability to do certain activities, such as 
driving a car and RV, pushing the shopping car when grocery shopping, and 
occasionally mowing the lawn.”12    
 
(12) The record does not suggest that Dr. Stephens was aware of any 
activity Davis may have had with his grandchild.  The Board later noted that it 
found Dr. Stephens’ restrictions were “appropriate” for Davis, and based that 
assessment in part on its own unsupported findings.13  But the Board’s comparison 
of Dr. Stephens’ and Dr. Katz’s findings indicates that the Board believed Davis’s 
testimony simply corroborated Dr. Stephens’ findings.  The Board credited Dr. 
Stephens’ findings and conclusion apart from its own findings about Davis’s 
activities with his grandchild.   
 
(13) This Court has recognized that “[a]n IAB decision stands unless no 
substantial evidence supports it.”14  “[T]he sole function of the Superior Court, as 
is the function of this Court on appeal, is to determine whether or not there was 
substantial competent evidence to support the finding of the Board, and, if it finds 
                                          
 
10 Davis v. Mark IV Transp., No. 1296631, at 17 (Del. I.A.B. June 3, 2010).  
11 Id.     
12 Id.     
13 Id. at 18. 
14 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009).   
 
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such in the record, to affirm the findings of the Board.”15  Here, Dr. Stephens’ 
deposition testimony provided substantial, competent evidence to support the 
Board’s finding of a partial, but not total, disability.  This testimony stood 
independent of the unsupported factual findings.  
 
(14) Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err when it found that the 
Board’s unsupported factual findings and conclusions constituted harmless error.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
15 Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1965).