Title: Michigan v. Huston

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

FILED JULY 26, 2011 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 141312 
 
CECIL D. HUSTON, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
MARKMAN, J. 
At issue in this case is whether the trial court properly assessed 15 points for 
offense variable (OV) 10.  OV 10 should have 15 points assessed when the defendant has 
engaged in “predatory conduct” to “exploit[] . . . a vulnerable victim.”  MCL 
777.40(1)(a).  Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ holding, in order to assess 15 points for 
OV 10, the defendant’s preoffense conduct only has to be directed at “a victim,” not any 
specific victim, and the victim does not have to be inherently vulnerable.  Instead, a 
defendant’s “predatory conduct,” by that conduct alone (eo ipso), can create or enhance a 
victim’s “vulnerability.”  In this case, defendant engaged in “predatory conduct” to 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
“exploit[] . . . a vulnerable victim” because, before defendant and his cohort robbed the 
victim, they were lying in wait, armed with two BB guns and a knife, and hidden from 
the victim, who was by herself at night in an otherwise empty parking lot.  Because the 
trial court properly assessed 15 points for OV 10, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment of sentence. 
I.  HISTORY 
This case arises from events that occurred in February 2005 in the Orchards Mall 
parking lot in Benton Harbor.  The victim, Jackie Flanagan, drove to the mall and parked 
her vehicle in front of the Sears store where she intended to shop.  The victim chose a 
well-lit parking spot because it was dark outside.  When she got out of her vehicle, she 
was approached by defendant and his cohort, who were 15 and 16 years old respectively.  
One of the boys pointed a BB gun at the victim’s face and demanded her purse, wallet, 
and car keys, while the other boy put a BB gun to the back of the victim’s head.  The 
victim gave the boys her cell phone and car keys but had trouble getting her purse off her 
shoulder.  Defendant’s cohort pushed the victim to the ground and cut the purse from her 
shoulder with a utility knife.  Both boys then fled the scene in the victim’s vehicle.  The 
next day, police recovered the victim’s vehicle and found two BB guns inside it.  Further 
investigation led police to defendant and his cohort.   
Defendant was charged with armed robbery and carjacking.  He entered a plea of 
guilty of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, pursuant to a plea bargain offered by the 
prosecutor.1  At sentencing, defendant challenged the scoring of OV 10, arguing that it 
                                              
1 Defendant’s cohort also entered a guilty plea to armed robbery. 
 
 
 
 
3
was incorrectly scored at 15 points.  OV 10 addresses “exploitation of a vulnerable 
victim” and requires “predatory conduct” for the assessment of 15 points.  MCL 
777.40(1)(a).  Defendant argued that there was nothing “predatory” about this robbery 
because it was a “random” act.  The trial court rejected defendant’s argument and 
concluded that predatory conduct was established for purposes of scoring OV 10 at 15 
points because defendant was lying in wait in the parking lot where he robbed the victim.  
Defendant’s recommended minimum sentence range under the sentencing guidelines was 
calculated as 126 to 210 months.  The trial court sentenced defendant to 180 months to 
600 months in prison. 
On appeal in the Court of Appeals,2 defendant argued that the trial court had 
improperly scored OV 10 and that this error affected his sentencing guidelines range.3  In 
a published opinion per curiam, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s judgment of 
sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that OV 10 should have been scored 
at zero points, not at 15 points.  People v Huston, 288 Mich App 387, 397-398; 794 
NW2d 350 (2010).  The Court of Appeals held that the “vulnerability” of a victim must 
be determined by characteristics personal to the victim.  Id. at 395-397.  The Court of 
                                              
2 The Court of Appeals originally denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal.  
However, this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on 
leave granted in light of People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152; 749 NW2d 257 (2008).  People 
v Huston, 485 Mich 885 (2009). 
3 If OV 10 had been scored at zero points instead of 15 points, defendant’s total OV score 
would have been 51 points, which would decrease his OV level from IV to III.  This 
reduction would have made defendant’s minimum sentence range 108 to 180 months, 
instead of 126 to 210 months.  See MCL 777.62. 
 
 
 
 
4
Appeals acknowledged that at the time of the offense it was dark outside and the victim 
was alone, which may have made the robbery easier to carry out.  Id. at 397.  
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reasoned that those facts failed to establish that the 
victim was personally or inherently vulnerable and, therefore, that the trial court erred by 
assessing 15 points for OV 10.  Id. 
This Court granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal in order to 
consider whether the “vulnerability” of a victim, for purposes of scoring OV 10, is 
limited to the victim’s personal characteristics.  People v Huston, 488 Mich 876 (2010). 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The interpretation and application of the legislative sentencing guidelines, MCL 
777.1 et seq., involve legal questions that this Court reviews de novo.  People v Morson, 
471 Mich 248, 255; 685 NW2d 203 (2004).   
III.  ANALYSIS 
MCL 777.40 provides: 
(1) Offense variable 10 is exploitation of a vulnerable victim.  Score 
offense variable 10 by determining which of the following apply and by 
assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest 
number of points: 
(a) Predatory conduct was involved .................................... 15 points 
(b) The offender exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental 
disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender 
abused his or her authority status .................................................... 10 points 
(c) The offender exploited a victim by his or her difference in size or 
strength, or both, or exploited a victim who was intoxicated, under the 
influence of drugs, asleep, or unconscious ....................................... 5 points 
(d) The offender did not exploit a victim’s vulnerability ...... 0 points 
 
 
 
 
5
(2) The mere existence of 1 or more factors described in subsection 
(1) does not automatically equate with victim vulnerability. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) “Predatory conduct” means preoffense conduct directed at a 
victim for the primary purpose of victimization. 
(b) “Exploit” means to manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical 
purposes. 
(c) “Vulnerability” means the readily apparent susceptibility of a 
victim to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation. 
(d) “Abuse of authority status” means a victim was exploited out of 
fear or deference to an authority figure, including, but not limited to, a 
parent, physician, or teacher.  [Emphasis added.] 
A.  “PREDATORY CONDUCT” 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ and the dissents’ contentions, MCL 
777.40(3)(a) does not define “predatory conduct” to mean preoffense conduct directed at 
the victim; instead, MCL 777.40(3)(a) defines “predatory conduct” to mean “preoffense 
conduct directed at a victim . . . .”4  (Emphasis added.)  As this Court has explained: 
“Traditionally in our law, to say nothing of our classrooms, we have 
recognized the difference between ‘the’ and ‘a.’  ‘The’ is defined as 
‘definite article. 1. (used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or 
particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of 
the indefinite article a or an) . . . .’  Random House Webster’s College 
                                              
4 We recognize that in Cannon, 481 Mich at 162, this Court indicated that the defendant’s 
preoffense conduct must be directed at “one or more specific victims . . . .”  However, 
this question was not at issue in Cannon, there was no analysis concerning this issue in 
Cannon, and it was clearly dictum in Cannon.  See Wold Architects & Engineers v Strat, 
474 Mich 223, 232 n 3; 713 NW2d 750 (2006).  Contrary to the dissent’s contention, it 
was clearly dictum because it was not “essential to [the] determination of the case in 
hand,” id. (quotation marks and citations omitted), whatever Cannon’s desire “to provide 
the correct framework for lower courts to apply when deciding whether to assess points 
for predatory conduct under OV 10,” post at 5 n 7. 
 
 
 
 
6
Dictionary, p 1382.”  [Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 461; 613 NW2d 
307 (2000) (citation omitted).] 
Because the Legislature chose to use the words “a victim” in MCL 777.40(3)(a), we must 
construe MCL 777.40(3)(a) to mean a victim, rather than the victim.  That is, we must 
take care not to construe MCL 777.40(3)(a) as requiring that the defendant’s preoffense  
predatory conduct have been directed at one particular or specific victim, but instead as 
requiring only that the defendant’s preoffense  predatory conduct have been directed at a 
victim.5 
 
Furthermore, from a policy perspective, we are unsure why the Legislature would 
want a defendant who directed his preoffense conduct toward a specific victim, say, for 
example, at his ex-girlfriend, to be sentenced more severely than the defendant who 
directed his preoffense conduct at the community-at-large by lying in wait, armed, in a 
parking lot at night, waiting for the first random person to come along so that he or she 
could be criminally victimized.  Who poses the greater threat to society-- the defendant 
                                              
5 The dissents conclude that the defendant’s preoffense predatory conduct must be 
directed at one particular or specific victim because “vulnerability” is defined as a 
“readily apparent susceptibility . . . to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or 
temptation,” MCL 777.40(3)(c), and “[i]t cannot become ‘readily apparent’ to an 
offender that a victim is susceptible before the offender identifies the victim.”  Post at 6 
(HATHAWAY, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis in the original).  We respectfully disagree.  
If a defendant hides in the bushes of a mall parking lot at night with the intention of 
waiting there until a woman who is by herself parks nearby so that he can rob her, it is 
most certainly “readily apparent” to that defendant that the victim is susceptible before he 
even identifies the victim.  Indeed, that is the very reason the defendant is hiding in the 
bushes at night in the first place-- to render the victim more susceptible to robbery.  And, 
contrary to the dissents’ contentions, we are not “delet[ing] the phrase ‘directed at a 
victim’” from the statute.  Post at 6 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).  Instead, we are simply 
refusing to rewrite the statute to read “directed at one or more specific victims,” as do the 
dissents.  Post at 6 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). 
 
 
 
 
7
who seeks revenge on his ex-girlfriend, and thus who directs his preoffense conduct only 
toward a single person, or the defendant who seeks opportunistically to rob the first 
vulnerable person within the community-at-large who happens along?  Certainly, the 
latter instills greater fear and apprehension in more people and has a greater impact on 
society.  Indeed, this case illustrates how this fear is diffused throughout the community.  
The victim here felt vulnerable even before the attack and testified that she specifically 
“circled the parking lot” to “park[] safely under a street lamppost . . . .”  Unfortunately, 
her fears were justified, and defendant’s preoffense conduct effectively made a victim not 
only of this victim, but all members of the larger community, each of whom must take 
precautions against criminal behavior and each of whom may have reasonable 
apprehensions concerning the threat of criminal conduct being directed toward them. 
 
This also explains why the Legislature chose to assess 15 points for “predatory 
conduct,” the highest number of points that can be assessed under OV 10.  The 
hierarchical range of points that may be assessed under OV 10 extends from zero to 15 
points.  Zero points are to be assessed when “[t]he offender did not exploit a victim’s 
vulnerability.”  MCL 777.40(1)(d).  Five points are to be assessed when “[t]he offender 
exploited a victim by his or her difference in size or strength, or both, or exploited a 
victim who was intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, asleep, or unconscious”-- 
things that are largely within the victim’s own control.6  MCL 777.40(1)(c).  Ten points 
are to be assessed when “[t]he offender exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental 
disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her 
                                              
6 We, of course, recognize, as does the dissent, post at 3 n 2, that these things are not 
always within the victim’s own control. 
 
 
 
 
8
authority status”-- things that are largely outside of the victim’s control.  MCL 
777.40(1)(b).  Finally, 15 points are to be assessed when “[p]redatory conduct was 
involved”-- something that is always outside of the victim’s control and something that 
may impact the community as a whole and not only persons with already-existing 
vulnerabilities.  That is, we can only interpret the Legislature’s hierarchical approach in 
OV 10 as indicating its own view that “predatory conduct” deserves to be treated as the 
most serious of all exploitations of vulnerability because that conduct itself created or 
enhanced the vulnerability in the first place, and it may have done so with regard to the 
community as a whole, not merely with regard to persons who were already vulnerable 
for one reason or another.  By its essential nature, predatory conduct may render all 
persons uniquely susceptible to criminal exploitation and transform all persons into 
potentially “vulnerable” victims.  Only in this way can MCL 777.40(1)(a) be understood 
as connected with MCL 777.40(1)(b) through (d). 
 
The fact that the Legislature has directed sentencing courts to assess 15 points, the 
highest number of points that can be scored under OV 10, for “predatory conduct,” also 
strongly suggests that the Legislature did not intend “predatory conduct” to describe any 
manner of “preoffense conduct.”  Indeed, if that were the case, 15 points could be 
assessed under OV 10 in almost all cases because there will almost always be some 
manner of preliminary or “preoffense conduct.”  Few criminal offenses arise utterly 
spontaneously and without forethought.  Most importantly, reading MCL 777.40(1)(a) as 
requiring 15 points to be assessed for OV 10 in every case would essentially render 
nugatory MCL 777.40(1)(b) through (d), the provisions directing when OV 10 requires a 
score of 10, 5, and zero points respectively, “and it is well established that ‘[i]n 
 
 
 
 
9
interpreting a statute, we [must] avoid a construction that would render part of the statute 
surplusage or nugatory.’”  Robinson v City of Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 21; 782 NW2d 171 
(2010) (citation omitted) (alteration in Robinson).  To enable MCL 777.40(1)(a) 
whenever there is any “preoffense conduct” would effectively ensure that MCL 
777.40(1)(b) through (d) would never be enabled.  Thus, to give meaning to the entirety 
of MCL 777.40(1), and out of recognition that 15 points for “predatory conduct” 
constitutes the highest number of points available under OV 10 and that “preoffense 
conduct” is being used to define “predatory conduct,” we conclude that the latter term 
does not encompass any “preoffense conduct,” but rather only those forms of “preoffense 
conduct” that are commonly understood as being “predatory” in nature, e.g., lying in wait 
and stalking, as opposed to purely opportunistic criminal conduct or “preoffense conduct 
involving nothing more than run-of-the-mill planning to effect a crime or subsequent 
escape without detection.”7  People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 162; 749 NW2d 257 
(2008).  This is the only interpretation that gives meaning to all the paragraphs of MCL 
777.40(1), while respecting the obviously hierarchal character of those provisions.  In 
                                              
7 Given that we expressly hold that only genuinely predatory conduct, such as lying in 
wait and stalking, can justify assessing 15 points for OV 10, our construction of MCL 
777.40(3)(a), contrary to the partial dissent’s contention, does not “lack[] any limitation 
on the circumstances in which a court may assess the highest number of points possible 
under OV 10.”  Post at 8.  And given that we specifically hold that “preoffense conduct 
involving nothing more than run-of-the-mill planning to effect a crime or subsequent 
escape without detection” is not “predatory conduct,” the partial dissent is simply wrong 
to assert that “under the majority’s standard today, such ‘run-of-the-mill planning’ could 
be used to assess 15 points for OV 10.”  Post at 11 n 26; see also post at 8 n 19 (“[I]t is 
unclear . . . whether the mere planning of a crime would suffice.”). 
 
 
 
 
10
short, “preoffense conduct” must be read in context.  Robinson, 486 Mich at 15 (statutory 
language “cannot be read in isolation, but must be read in context”). 
In the instant case, although defendant may not have been lying in wait for a 
specific victim, he was unquestionably lying in wait for a victim.  Therefore, his 
preoffense conduct was directed at “a victim.”  MCL 777.40(3)(a).  In this regard, it is 
helpful to consider why defendant was lying in wait, armed and hidden from view.  And 
the answer to this question is quite obvious-- he was doing this in order to place himself 
in a better position to be able to successfully rob someone in the parking lot.  That is, 
defendant’s preoffense conduct of predatorily lying in wait, armed, and hidden from view 
was directed at “a victim.”  Although defendant may not have known whom his victim 
was going to be when he first undertook these actions, that does not undermine the fact 
that he was lying in wait for “a victim,” and thus that his preoffense conduct was directed 
toward such “a victim.”   
In addition, defendant’s preoffense conduct was “for the primary purpose of 
victimization.”  MCL 777.40(3)(a).  As Cannon, 481 Mich at 161, explained, 
“‘[v]ictimize’ is defined as ‘to make a victim of.’”  (Citation omitted.)  And “victim” is 
defined as “‘a person who suffers from a destructive or injurious action . . . .’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Therefore, “predatory conduct” under the statute is behavior that is 
predatory in nature, “precedes the offense, [and is] directed at a person for the primary 
purpose of causing that person to suffer from an injurious action . . . .”  Id.  In this case, 
before the robbery, defendant laid in wait while armed and hidden from view for the 
primary purpose of eventually causing a person to suffer from an injurious action, i.e., an 
armed robbery.  In light of these facts, defendant’s preoffense conduct constituted 
 
 
 
 
11
“predatory conduct” both under the statutory definition of this phrase and according to 
common understanding under which lying in wait constitutes quintessential “predatory 
conduct.” 
B. “VULNERABILITY” 
The Court of Appeals concluded and the dissent agrees that the victim was not 
“vulnerable” because there was nothing in the record to indicate that she suffered from an 
inherent or personal vulnerability.  Huston, 288 Mich App at 395-396.  We disagree.  
The Court of Appeals’ and the dissent’s analyses limit “vulnerability” of a victim to 
inherent or personal characteristics of the victim, and such a limitation is contrary to the 
express language of MCL 777.40.  We read the statute as contemplating vulnerabilities 
that may arise not only out of a victim’s characteristics, but also out of a victim’s 
relationships or circumstances. 
MCL 777.40(1)(b) and (c) explicitly define characteristics, relationships, and 
circumstances that may make a victim susceptible to injury, physical restraint, 
persuasion, or temptation.8  The specified factors listed in subdivisions (b) and (c) relate 
to the inherent characteristics of the victim, as well as the victim’s relationships and 
circumstances. 
                                              
8  Subdivision (b) directs the assessment of 10 points in the expressly limited instances of 
when the offender exploited “a victim’s physical disability, mental disability, youth or 
agedness, or a domestic relationship, or [when] the offender abused his or her authority 
status[.]”  Subdivision (c) directs the assessment of 5 points in the expressly limited 
instances of when the offender exploited “a victim by his or her difference in size or 
strength, or both, or [when the offender] exploited a victim who was intoxicated, under 
the influence of drugs, asleep, or unconscious[.]” 
 
 
 
 
12
Using the statutory language as guidance, Cannon listed factors to be considered 
by a sentencing court when determining whether a victim was vulnerable.  Cannon, 481 
Mich at 158-159.  Those factors include the expressly listed characteristics, relationships, 
and circumstances identified in subdivisions (b) and (c), which are:   
(1) the victim’s physical disability, (2) the victim’s mental disability, 
(3) the victim’s youth or agedness, (4) the existence of a domestic 
relationship, (5) whether the offender abused his or her authority status, (6) 
whether the offender exploited a victim by his or her difference in size or 
strength or both, (7) whether the victim was intoxicated or under the 
influence of drugs, or (8) whether the victim was asleep or unconscious.  
[Id.][9] 
Both Cannon and the express language of MCL 777.40(2) instruct that the mere existence 
of one of the listed factors does not automatically render the victim “vulnerable” for 
purposes of scoring OV 10.  Id. at 159. 
In contrast to subdivisions (b) and (c), subdivision (a) does not list any specific 
characteristics, relationships, or circumstances of the victim.  Rather, that subdivision 
merely requires that “[p]redatory conduct was involved” in order to assess 15 points for 
OV 10.  MCL 777.40(1)(a).  Recognizing this notable distinction, Cannon explained that 
the factors it enumerated were not meant as an exhaustive list for purposes of finding 
“vulnerability.”  Cannon, 481 Mich at 158 n 11.  Instead, Cannon clarified that  
                                              
9 We disagree with the dissent that all of these factors are “independent of the victim’s 
external physical environment.”  Post at 3.  The existence of a domestic relationship, 
whether the offender abused his or her authority status, and whether the offender 
exploited a victim by his or her difference in size or strength or both are clearly not.  
Rather, they are at least in part dependent on the offender’s relationship to the victim, the 
offender’s authority status over the victim coupled with the offender’s decision to abuse 
this status, and the offender’s size or strength. 
 
 
 
 
13
[t]he absence of one of these factors does not preclude a finding of victim 
vulnerability when determining whether it is appropriate to assess 15 points 
for predatory conduct.  Rather, the evidence must show merely that it was 
readily apparent that the victim was susceptible to injury, physical restraint, 
persuasion, or temptation.  [Id.] 
Accordingly, to assess 15 points for OV 10, a court must find that an offender engaged in 
predatory conduct and exploited a vulnerable victim, using only the statutory definition 
of “vulnerability.”  Again, MCL 777.40(3)(c) defines “vulnerability” as the “readily 
apparent susceptibility of a victim to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation,” 
and such vulnerability may or may not arise from the explicitly listed characteristics, 
relationships, and circumstances set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c).  The statute does 
not mandate that this “susceptibility” be inherent in the victim.  Rather, the statutory 
language allows for susceptibility arising from external circumstances as well.   
In the instant case, the victim was alone in the dark, and defendant and his cohort 
outnumbered her.  Moreover, a key fact that greatly increased the “vulnerability” of the 
victim in these specific circumstances was that defendant and his cohort were lying in 
wait for her, armed and hidden from her view.  By lying in wait for a victim in the 
manner that defendant did here, he made the victim more “susceptib[le] . . . to injury [or] 
physical restraint,” i.e., more “vulnerable.”  MCL 777.40(3)(c).10  That is, just as the 
                                              
10 Although the partial dissent is “unclear . . . whether the mere planning of a crime 
would suffice” to establish “genuinely” predatory conduct, post at 8 n 19, it is worth 
emphasizing that lying in wait is not the equivalent of the “mere planning of a crime.”  
See, e.g., Webster v Woodford, 369 F3d 1062, 1073 (CA 9, 2004) (“[L]ying in wait 
requires three elements: concealment, watching, and waiting.”).  Each of these elements, 
when joined together, has the potential to render any member of the public vulnerable to 
criminal activity, as the perpetrator by such conduct both strengthens his own hand and 
weakens that of the public, until the former believes that his opportunity to victimize the 
latter has been optimized.  Lying in wait describes the kind of conduct that in the context 
 
 
 
 
 
14
defendant in People v Apgar, 264 Mich App 321; 690 NW2d 312 (2004), enhanced the 
victim’s “vulnerability” by forcing her to smoke marijuana before he sexually assaulted 
her; and the defendant in People v Kimble, 252 Mich App 269; 651 NW2d 798 (2002), 
enhanced the victim’s “vulnerability” by following her and waiting until she pulled into 
her driveway before striking; and the defendant in People v Mahon, 485 Mich 971; 774 
NW2d 691 (2009) (CORRIGAN, J., concurring), enhanced the victim’s “vulnerability” by 
waiting for the bar to close and the victim to exit the bar before he assaulted her, the 
defendant in the instant case enhanced the victim’s “vulnerability” by lying in wait while 
armed and hidden from view before he robbed her.   
We conclude that a person walking alone at night in a parking lot while two armed 
people hidden from that person’s view lie in wait to rob that person is a “vulnerable” 
victim because he or she would have a “readily apparent susceptibility . . . to injury [or] 
physical restraint . . . .”  MCL 777.40(3)(c).  This conclusion avoids the problem that the 
dissent is concerned about of characterizing all victims of crimes as “vulnerable” victims, 
while at the same time it recognizes that a defendant’s “predatory conduct” can establish 
or enhance the “vulnerability” of a victim.11  Finally, defendant unquestionably 
                                              
of a homicide would be sufficient to satisfy the elements of first-degree murder.  See 
MCL 750.316(1)(a) (“Murder perpetrated by . . . lying in wait” is “first degree murder.”). 
11 The dissent is concerned that under our approach “all victims [are] vulnerable.”  Post at 
4.  However, what the dissent does not seem to appreciate is that we only find the victim 
here to be “vulnerable” because defendant and his cohort engaged in “predatory conduct” 
that transformed an “ordinary” victim into a “vulnerable” victim.  Obviously, not all, or 
even most, defendants engage in “predatory conduct,” and, thus, not “all victims [are] 
vulnerable.” 
 
 
 
 
15
“exploit[ed]” the “vulnerable victim” in this case because he “manipulate[d] [her] for 
selfish or unethical purposes” by lying in wait for her and then robbing her of her purse 
and car.12  MCL 777.40(3)(b).  As this Court explained in Cannon, 481 Mich at 159, 
“predatory conduct” “inherently involves some level of exploitation,” and thus “points 
may be assessed under OV 10 for exploitation of a vulnerable victim when the defendant 
has engaged in conduct that is considered predatory under the statute.” 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we conclude that defendant engaged in “predatory conduct” to 
“exploit[] . . . a vulnerable victim,” MCL 777.40(1)(a), and thus that the trial court did 
not err by assessing 15 points for OV 10.  For a trial court to assess 15 points for OV 10, 
the defendant’s preoffense conduct only has to be directed at “a victim,” not any specific 
victim, and the victim does not have to be inherently vulnerable.  Instead, a defendant’s 
“predatory conduct,” by that conduct alone (eo ipso), can create or enhance a victim’s 
“vulnerability.”  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the trial court’s judgment of sentence.   
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
                                              
12 Contrary to the partial dissent’s contention, post at 7 n 18, OV 10 could not be assessed 
at 15 points under our approach if the defendant engaged in preoffense predatory conduct 
but was arrested before he could commit the intended offense because OV 10 requires 
“exploitation of a vulnerable victim.”  MCL 777.40(1). 
 S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 141312 
 
CECIL D. HUSTON, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
HATHAWAY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that for purposes of scoring offense 
variable (OV) 10, the “vulnerability” of a victim is not limited to inherent or personal 
characteristics of the victim.  I agree with this conclusion because MCL 777.40 expressly 
contemplates vulnerabilities that may arise out of a victim’s characteristics, as well as a 
victim’s relationships or circumstances.  However, I dissent from the majority’s 
conclusion that a defendant’s preoffense conduct need not be directed at a specific victim 
in order to constitute “predatory conduct.”  Instead, I believe that this Court correctly 
interpreted MCL 777.40(1)(a) in People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152; 749 NW2d 257 
(2008), to require that a defendant’s preoffense conduct must have been directed at one or 
more specific victims for 15 points to be assessed under OV 10.   
Accordingly, I would vacate the Court of Appeals’ holdings that a victim’s 
vulnerability is limited to personal or inherent characteristics of the victim and that 
defendant’s preoffense conduct was targeted at this victim.  I would affirm the judgment 
 
 
 
2
of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant’s sentence and remanding this matter to the 
trial court for resentencing and instruct the trial court assess zero points for OV 10. 
I.  ANALYSIS 
A.  OFFENSE VARIABLE 10—EXPLOITATION OF A VULNERABLE VICTIM 
At issue in this case is whether defendant exploited a vulnerable victim by 
engaging in predatory conduct for purposes of assessing 15 points for OV 10.  In 
deciding this matter, we must interpret the statute governing OV 10, MCL 777.40.  When 
interpreting statutes, this Court must determine and give effect to the Legislature’s 
intent.1  The words used in the statute are the most reliable indicator of the Legislature’s 
intent and should be interpreted in light of their ordinary meaning and the context within 
which they are used in the statute.2  When interpreting a statute, this Court avoids a 
construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.3  Similarly, 
when determining how offense variables should be scored, this Court reads the 
sentencing guidelines statutes as a whole.4 
 
MCL 777.40 governs OV 10 and provides: 
(1)  Offense variable 10 is exploitation of a vulnerable victim.  Score 
offense variable 10 by determining which of the following apply and by 
                                              
1 People v Lowe, 484 Mich 718, 721; 733 NW2d 1 (2009), citing People v Koonce, 466 
Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002).   
2 People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). 
3 People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 126; 771 NW2d 655 (2009). 
4 Id. at 124-125. 
 
 
 
3
assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest 
number of points: 
(a) Predatory conduct was involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 points 
(b) The offender exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental 
disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender 
abused his or her authority status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 points 
(c) The offender exploited a victim by his or her difference in size or 
strength, or both, or exploited a victim who was intoxicated, under the 
influence of drugs, asleep, or unconscious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 points 
(d) The offender did not exploit a victim’s vulnerability. . . . 0 points 
(2) The mere existence of 1 or more factors described in subsection 
(1) does not automatically equate with victim vulnerability. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) “Predatory conduct” means preoffense conduct directed at a 
victim for the primary purpose of victimization. 
(b) “Exploit” means to manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical 
purposes. 
(c) “Vulnerability” means the readily apparent susceptibility of a 
victim to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation. 
(d) “Abuse of authority status” means a victim was exploited out of 
fear or deference to an authority figure, including, but not limited to, a 
parent, physician, or teacher. 
 
 
In Cannon, this Court considered MCL 777.40 in its entirety and specifically 
addressed the issue of when 15 points are properly assessed under OV 10.5  Cannon 
                                              
5 Cannon, 481 Mich at 156-162.  In Cannon, the defendant and his two cohorts waited 
outside a Burger King until no customers were inside.  They then entered the Burger 
King, where four employees were on duty, and committed a robbery.  The trial court 
assessed 15 points for OV 10, following the prosecutor’s argument that defendant and his 
cohorts targeted the restaurant and planned their actions to victimize the employees.  Id. 
at 154-155. 
 
 
 
4
clarified that “the Legislature did not intend that 15 points be assessed for preoffense 
conduct involving nothing more than run-of-the-mill planning to effect a crime or 
subsequent escape without detection.”6  Instead, the focus of MCL 777.40(1)(a) is on the 
exploitation of vulnerable victims involving predatory conduct.7 
Pursuant to Cannon, 5 to 15 points should be assessed under OV 10 only when it 
is “readily apparent that a victim was ‘vulnerable,’ i.e., was susceptible to injury, physical 
restraint, persuasion, or temptation.”8  In addition, MCL 777.40 requires that 5 to 15 
points be assessed when the offender exploited a vulnerable victim.  The statute defines 
“exploit” as “to manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical purposes.”9  If a “vulnerable 
victim” has not been “exploited,” MCL 777.40(1)(d) expressly mandates that OV 10 
must be scored at zero points. 
For a score of 15 points under OV 10, the offender who exploited the vulnerable 
victim must have also engaged in “predatory conduct.”10  MCL 777.40(3)(a) defines 
“predatory conduct” as “preoffense conduct directed at a victim for the primary purpose 
of victimization.”  Cannon clarified when 15 points should be assessed for predatory 
conduct by setting forth three analytical questions to aid lower courts: 
                                              
6 Id. at 162. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 158. 
9 MCL 777.40(3)(b). 
10 MCL 777.40(1)(a). 
 
 
 
5
(1) Did the offender engage in conduct before the commission of the 
offense? 
(2) Was this conduct directed at one or more specific victims who 
suffered from a readily apparent susceptibility to injury, physical restraint, 
persuasion, or temptation? 
(3) Was victimization the offender’s primary purpose for engaging 
in the preoffense conduct?[11] 
 
The three-pronged Cannon test for predatory conduct incorporates the statutory 
requirements of predatory conduct, exploitation, and vulnerability.  Thus, all three prongs 
of the test must be met in order to assess 15 points for OV 10.12   
B.  PREDATORY CONDUCT 
 
In this case, defendant did not engage in predatory conduct because his preoffense 
conduct was not directed at this victim, as this Court has concluded is required by MCL 
777.40(1)(a).  According to Cannon, the preoffense conduct “must have been ‘directed at 
a victim’ before the offense was committed.”13  Cannon provided the following guidance 
regarding this part of the test: 
A lion that waits near a watering hole hoping that a herd of antelope 
will come to drink is not engaging in conduct directed at a victim.  
However, a lion that sees antelope, determines which is the weakest, and 
stalks it until the opportunity arises to attack it engages in conduct directed 
at a victim.  Contrast that with an individual who intends to shoplift and 
watches and waits for the opportunity to commit the act when no one is 
looking.  The individual has not directed any action at a victim.[14] 
                                              
11 Cannon, 481 Mich at 162. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 160. 
14 Id. 
 
 
 
6
The majority focuses on the use of the phrase “a victim” rather than “the victim” 
in the definition of “predatory conduct” in MCL 777.40(3)(a) to conclude that the 
offender’s conduct need not be directed at a specific victim.  But the definition of 
“vulnerability” in MCL 777.40(3)(c) requires that a victim have a “readily apparent 
susceptibility . . . to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation.”  This language 
suggests that, before points can be assessed for preoffense conduct, it must be clear that 
the victim was ascertainable before the offense took place. It cannot become “readily 
apparent” to an offender that a victim is susceptible before the offender identifies the 
victim.15 
However, it is more reasonable to conclude that the Legislature selected the term 
“a victim” rather than “the victim” simply because it contemplated that a defendant might 
victimize more than one victim.  In the case of more than one victim, the Legislature 
intended 15 points to be assessed for OV 10 when the defendant directed predatory 
conduct at “a” preselected victim, but ultimately victimized multiple victims.16 
                                              
15 For example, in this case, when defendant decided to lie in wait in the mall parking lot, 
he did not know the identity of the victim he would eventually rob.  The victim whom 
defendant eventually robbed was allegedly “vulnerable” because she was alone in the 
dark and outnumbered.  However, suppose that defendant had engaged in exactly the 
same preoffense conduct but eventually robbed a group of three women in broad 
daylight.  Under the majority’s analysis, 15 points would still be assessed because simply 
lying in wait for any victim is sufficient to justify a score of 15 points for OV 10. The 
majority essentially disregards the statutory requirement that a victim’s vulnerability be 
“readily apparent.”   
16 For example, consider a situation in which a defendant selects a robbery target 
(Victim A) and stalks him, waiting for an opportunity to strike.  When the best 
opportunity presents itself, however, Victim A has been joined by Victim B.  The 
 
 
 
 
7
In any situation in which a defendant engages in “nothing more than run-of-the-
mill planning to effect a crime,” the community at large is still a conceivable target 
because the offender will inevitably carry out the offense against some member of the 
community.17  However, that member of the community may only become the offender’s 
target by random chance.  If simply targeting the community at large and then carrying 
out an offense against a random victim who comes along is sufficient to establish 
predatory conduct, then nearly any type of preoffense conduct will suffice for assessing 
15 points under OV 10.18  Under the majority’s analysis, it is difficult to imagine a 
situation in which a person intending to carry out a crime would not engage in some type 
                                              
defendant seizes the opportunity and robs both Victim A and Victim B.  Even though 
Victim A and Victim B would each be considered “a victim” of the eventual crime, only 
Victim A was “a victim” who was the target of defendant’s predatory conduct.  
17 Cannon, 481 Mich at 162. 
18 The majority’s analysis reads the requirement that the preoffense conduct be “directed 
at a victim” out of the statute.  See People v Couzens, 480 Mich 240, 249; 747 NW2d 849 
(2008) (“‘Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid 
an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.’”) (citation 
omitted).  Preoffense conduct for the primary purpose of victimization is always 
generally directed at victimizing the community at large.  Thus, under the majority’s 
approach, any “preoffense conduct . . . for the primary purpose of victimization” will 
always be sufficient to assess 15 points for OV 10.  MCL 777.40(3)(a). 
Consider a defendant who lies in wait in a mall parking lot to rob someone who 
passes by.  Before the defendant selects a victim to rob, the police observe him and 
attempt to detain him.  He puts up a fight and attempts to flee.  The officers catch him, 
and he is convicted of resisting arrest under MCL 750.81d(1).  Under the majority’s 
approach, 15 points could be assessed for OV 10 could be scored at 15 points because 
defendant’s conduct was directed at the community at large for the primary purpose of 
victimization.  It does not matter under the majority’s test that no victim was actually 
robbed or that the defendant did not engage in the preoffense conduct to carry out the 
crime of resisting arrest. 
 
 
 
8
of preoffense conduct for the purpose of victimizing someone before actually selecting a 
victim to carry out the offense against.  The majority’s construction of MCL 777.40(3)(a) 
lacks any limitation on the circumstances in which a court may assess the highest number 
of points possible under OV 10.19   
The majority uses hindsight to suggest that defendant’s conduct was “directed at a 
victim” because he lay in wait for “a victim” whom he ultimately robbed.  By taking this 
approach, the majority essentially rewrites the applicable statute to state that an 
offender’s preoffense conduct must be “directed at a potential victim,” even if that victim 
is not identifiable at the time of the preoffense conduct.20  In contrast, Cannon correctly 
concluded that an offender’s preoffense conduct must be directed at a specific victim.  
Cannon’s interpretation of MCL 777.40 was not only consistent with the statutory 
                                              
19 The majority states that its analysis is not without a limiting factor because only 
“genuinely predatory conduct” can be used to justify a 15-point score for OV 10.  But the 
guidance the majority offers regarding what constitutes “genuinely predatory conduct” is 
simply that it includes “e.g., lying in wait and stalking” and does not include “purely 
opportunistic criminal conduct.” Obviously, “purely opportunistic criminal conduct” 
cannot justify a 15-point score for OV 10 because such conduct is by its nature 
spontaneous and, therefore, will not be “preoffense” conduct.  Thus, it is unclear what 
constitutes “genuinely” predatory conduct and whether the mere planning of a crime 
would suffice.  Certainly, planning a crime involves “preoffense conduct . . . for the 
primary purpose of victimization” and exploits the community at large. 
20 See, e.g., Reed v Breton, 475 Mich 531, 550; 718 NW2d 770 (2006) (KELLY, J., 
dissenting) (“The interpretation offered by the majority contradicts well-established rules 
of statutory construction because it adds words to the statute that the Legislature did not 
put there.”). 
 
 
 
9
language, but it properly limited the assessment of 15 points to circumstances in which an 
offender’s preoffense conduct involved first selecting a specific victim to target.21   
In applying the second part of the Cannon test for predatory conduct, the Court of 
Appeals correctly acknowledged that a defendant’s conduct must have been directed at a 
specific victim; however, it then erroneously concluded that this defendant’s preoffense 
conduct was directed at this victim.22  The Court of Appeals reasoned that even though 
defendant was initially looking for “any victim,” he eventually chose “a lone and isolated 
victim . . . .”23  The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s actions were similar to a 
                                              
21 In analyzing whether preoffense conduct was sufficiently directed at a victim, Cannon 
cited People v Kimble, 252 Mich App 269; 651 NW2d 798 (2002), as instructive.  
Cannon, 481 Mich at 160.  In Kimble, the defendant drove around for an hour in search 
of a car he could steal so that he could sell its wheel rims. Kimble, 252 Mich App at 274.  
The defendant spotted the victim driving a car with valuable rims and followed her home.  
Id. at 274-275.  After watching the victim pull into her driveway, the defendant shot the 
victim and stole her car.  Id.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the preoffense conduct 
of seeking out a victim and following her home for the specific purpose of committing a 
crime against her constituted predatory conduct.  Id. at 275.  Cannon observed that once 
the defendant in Kimble had targeted the owner of the car with valuable rims, his act of 
following her and waiting for the opportunity to strike was “conduct directed at a victim.” 
Cannon, 481 Mich at 160.     
The facts of the instant case are distinguishable from Kimble.  In Kimble, the 
prosecutor presented evidence that the defendant was specifically looking for a vehicle 
with expensive rims, searched until he found the victim driving a car with expensive 
rims, and followed the victim for quite some time before shooting the victim in her 
driveway and stealing her car.  Unlike in the record in Kimble, the record in this case 
does not reflect that the victim was specifically targeted for any reason other than that she 
happened to arrive in the shopping mall parking lot where defendant was waiting for 
someone to rob.  In fact, the prosecutor acknowledged that this victim was probably a 
“random” target and that she may just have been the first person defendant came across. 
22 Huston, 288 Mich App at 394. 
23 Id. 
 
 
 
10
lion “focusing on the weakest antelope in the herd” because defendant waited for 
particular circumstances to arise before seizing his opportunity to commit the offense.24  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that this was “not a random attack on just 
anyone in the parking lot but a planned attack on an individual perceived to be weak.”25 
From the record, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant’s objective was to rob 
a shopper in the mall parking lot.  To accomplish this offense, defendant waited in the 
mall parking lot for a shopper to come along.  The prosecutor acknowledged that the 
victim may simply have been the first person who did come along.  The apparent 
reasoning of the prosecutor and the Court of Appeals was that once a random person 
came along and defendant carried out his intended offense against that random person, 
defendant’s conduct was targeted at a specific victim.  I disagree.   
If defendant’s act of waiting for someone to come along and then robbing the 
unlucky person who happened to arrive in that location constituted preoffense conduct 
sufficiently directed at a “specific” victim, there would be only rare circumstances in 
which this part of the Cannon test would not be met.  It may be true that defendant waited 
for the right time to approach the victim and commit the offense; however, this same 
argument can be made about almost every offense involving an attack on an individual.  
                                              
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
 
 
 
11
Unless an offense is truly of a random nature, eventually every offender will select a 
victim or victims against whom to carry out their intended offenses.26 
As previously noted, using the analogy suggested in Cannon, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that defendant’s actions were “akin to focusing on the weakest antelope in the 
herd.”27  However, defendant’s preoffense conduct was much more analogous to a lion 
simply waiting near a watering hole, hoping that a herd of antelope will come to drink.28  
Defendant wanted to rob someone, presumably to get money and a vehicle.  A shopping 
mall is a location where potential victims with money would almost certainly arrive.  
Therefore, defendant went to a shopping mall where he waited in the hope of a victim 
arriving.  While it is true that defendant may have narrowed in on this particular victim 
during the short time between when the victim entered the parking lot and when she got 
                                              
26 The majority dismisses language from Cannon—that a defendant’s preoffense conduct 
must be directed at one or more specific victims—as dictum.  However, in Cannon we 
also stated that “the Legislature did not intend that 15 points be assessed for preoffense 
conduct involving nothing more than run-of-the-mill planning to effect a crime or 
subsequent escape without detection.”  Cannon, 481 Mich at 162.  This statement was not 
dictum, as it directly involved the issue in Cannon.  Yet under the majority’s standard 
today, such “run-of-the-mill planning” could be used to assess 15 points for OV 10. 
27 Huston, 288 Mich App at 394. 
28 Cannon provided a hypothetical example explaining that “[a] lion that waits near a 
watering hole hoping that a herd of antelope will come to drink is not engaging in 
conduct directed at a victim.”  Cannon, 481 Mich at 160.  But under the majority’s 
analysis, simply “lying in wait” is now sufficient to assess 15 points for OV 10.  Thus, 
the majority’s analysis is directly contrary to the hypothetical example in Cannon that we 
crafted specifically to guide lower courts in determining what constitutes “predatory 
conduct.” 
 
 
 
12
out of her vehicle, almost every crime involves the offender’s eventually settling on one 
or more targeted persons and waiting for just the right moment to carry out the offense. 
Cannon clearly directed that targeting a specific person, following that person, and 
waiting for the opportunity to commit an offense against that person is preoffense 
conduct sufficiently directed at a victim.29  On the record in the instant case, I conclude 
that defendant’s preoffense conduct of waiting in the mall parking lot was not sufficiently 
directed at this victim. 
Because a requirement of the Cannon test for predatory conduct cannot be met, 
and Cannon directed that all three prongs of the test must be answered affirmatively in 
order to properly assess 15 points for OV 10, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that 
defendant is not entitled to resentencing. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that, for purposes of scoring OV 10, the 
“vulnerability” of a victim is not limited to inherent or personal characteristics of the 
victim.  However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that a defendant’s preoffense 
conduct need not be directed at a specific victim in order to constitute “predatory 
conduct.”  I believe that the majority opinion creates an overly broad test for “predatory 
conduct” and misconstrues the language of MCL 777.40. 
Contrary to the majority’s analysis, I do not believe that defendant engaged in 
“predatory conduct.”  This Court has held that a defendant’s preoffense conduct must be 
                                              
29 Id. 
 
 
 
13
directed at a specific victim in order to constitute predatory conduct, and the record here 
does not reflect that defendant’s preoffense conduct was directed at this victim.  Instead, 
the record only establishes that defendant was in a shopping mall parking lot waiting for 
someone to rob and that, ultimately, this victim arrived.  Defendant’s preoffense conduct 
was simply run-of-the-mill planning to effect a crime, which is not “predatory conduct” 
for purposes of MCL 777.40(1)(a). 
 
Accordingly, I would vacate the Court of Appeals’ holdings that a victim’s 
vulnerability is limited to personal or inherent characteristics of the victim and that 
defendant’s preoffense conduct was targeted at this victim.  I would affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant’s sentence and remanding this matter to the 
trial court for resentencing and instruct the trial court to assess zero points for OV 10.   
 
 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 141312 
 
CECIL D. HUSTON, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.   
Today, the majority holds that in order to assess 15 points for predatory conduct 
under offense variable (OV) 10, MCL 777.40(1)(a), the victim’s vulnerability need not 
arise from the victim’s inherent or personal characteristics.  Further, the majority 
concludes that the victim here qualified as a “vulnerable victim” because she was alone 
and outnumbered at night while defendant and his cohort hid in the bushes adjacent to the 
parking lot.  Lastly, the majority holds that a defendant’s preoffense conduct need not 
have been directed at a specific victim, even though MCL 777.40(3)(a) defines 
“predatory conduct” as “preoffense conduct directed at a victim for the primary purpose 
of victimization.”  (Emphasis added.)  I respectfully disagree and would hold that (1) the 
victim’s vulnerability for purposes of scoring OV 10 must be personal or inherent to the 
victim, (2) the victim in this case was not a “vulnerable victim” within the meaning of 
MCL 777.40(3)(c), and (3) the preoffense conduct engaged in by an offender for the 
primary purpose of victimization must be “directed at one or more specific victims . . . .”  
 
 
 
2
People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 162; 749 NW2d 257 (2008).1  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of defendant’s sentence and remand this case to the 
trial court for resentencing with instructions to assess zero points for OV 10.   
I.  VULNERABILITY 
In my view, in order to assess 15 points for predatory conduct under OV 10, the 
readily apparent vulnerability exploited by the offender must relate to some inherent or 
personal characteristic of the victim.  As this Court declared in Cannon, the exploitation 
of a vulnerable victim is a prerequisite for the assessment of points under OV 10.  Id. at 
156.  Relying on the definition of “vulnerability” provided by MCL 777.40(3)(c), we held 
further that “points should be assessed under OV 10 only when it is readily apparent that 
a victim was ‘vulnerable,’ i.e., was susceptible to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or 
temptation.”  Id. at 158.  Therefore, the first step when applying OV 10 is to ask whether 
the victim was a “vulnerable victim” within the meaning of the statute.  For assessing this 
threshold determination, Cannon provided a nonexhaustive list of considerations based 
on the statutory language to guide courts in assessing victim vulnerability: 
(1) the victim’s physical disability, (2) the victim’s mental disability, 
(3) the victim’s youth or agedness, (4) the existence of a domestic 
relationship, (5) whether the offender abused his or her authority status, (6) 
whether the offender exploited a victim by his or her difference in size or 
strength or both, (7) whether the victim was intoxicated or under the 
influence of drugs, or (8) whether the victim was asleep or unconscious.  
[Id. at 158-159.]  
                                              
1 While I did not join the Cannon majority in full, Cannon, 481 Mich at 163 (CAVANAGH, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I agree that for purposes of scoring OV 10, 
the preoffense conduct must have been directed at one or more specific victims.     
 
 
 
3
Notably, all these factors relate to the victim’s inherent characteristics or personal 
situation and are independent of the victim’s external physical environment.2  The 
majority’s conclusion that vulnerability need not be inherent to the victim is misguided 
because it is inconsistent with Cannon’s statutorily based threshold test for vulnerability 
under OV 10.     
Because I believe that the readily apparent vulnerability exploited by the offender 
must relate to some inherent or personal characteristic of the victim, I believe the Court 
of Appeals correctly held that the victim in this case was not a vulnerable victim, within 
the meaning of MCL 777.40(3)(c).  Merely being alone and outnumbered in a parking lot 
at night does not relate to an inherent or personal characteristic, but is instead the product 
of the victim’s external environment.3  And while hiding in the bushes may have 
                                              
2 While certain factors may at first blush seem substantively externalized, closer 
examination reveals that they too are premised on the victim’s inherent state of 
vulnerability.  The existence of a domestic relationship and the offender’s abuse of his or 
her authority status over the victim both consider vulnerabilities that result from a 
preexisting relationship of trust or authority between the offender and the victim.  This 
relationship renders the victim inherently more susceptible to an offender who chooses to 
exploit that relationship.  Further, when an offender exploits a victim by his or her 
difference in size or strength, the relevance of this factor is premised on the victim’s size 
and strength, both of which are inherent and personal characteristics.    
Additionally, I take issue with the majority’s declaration that differences in size or 
strength, or being intoxicated, drugged, asleep, or unconscious are “things that are largely 
within the victim’s own control.”  Ante at 7.  Differences in size or strength depend in 
large part on genetics—inherent characteristics over which the victim has no control.  
Further, being drugged, intoxicated, or asleep often may be induced by another—such as 
the use of a so-called date-rape drug.  Likewise, being unconscious may be the result of 
an injury or ongoing medical treatment. 
3 I find it notable that when considering the types of vulnerabilities to include in MCL 
777.40, the Legislature did not include one of the most obvious circumstances—being 
outnumbered—as a listed vulnerability.  While certainly not dispositive, this supports my 
 
 
 
 
4
increased defendant’s likelihood of success, it did not actively alter the victim’s state of 
inherent susceptibility.4   
In my view, to hold that OV 10 does not depend on a victim’s inherent state of 
vulnerability will lead to overscoring because, under the common meaning of 
“vulnerability,” all victims were vulnerable.  Had they not been, the crime would not 
have been successful.  I can think of no situation in which a crime has been successful 
that it is not possible to point to specific facts of the offense to support the conclusion that 
the victim was “vulnerable,” as that term is commonly understood.  In an effort to narrow 
such a broad applicability of OV 10, the Legislature chose to limit its application to only 
situations in which an offender exploited some inherent or personal characteristic of the 
victim.  Accordingly, I believe that this victim was not a vulnerable victim for purposes 
of scoring OV 10.    
II.  PREDATORY CONDUCT5 
Even if I were to determine that this victim was vulnerable, I believe that 
nonetheless zero points should have been assessed for OV 10 because the preoffense 
conduct—hiding in the bushes waiting for a likely victim to happen along—was not 
                                              
conclusion that the vulnerability must be inherent, focused on the victim, and not on 
independent externalities. 
4 Conversely, when an offender drugs an intended victim, he has actively altered the 
victim’s inherent state of susceptibility. 
5 While I agree generally with Justice HATHAWAY’S discussion of predatory conduct in 
part I(B) of her partial dissent, I write separately to elaborate further on my position. 
 
 
 
5
directed at this particular victim.6  In Cannon, a majority of this Court explained that 
when assessing points for predatory conduct, the preoffense conduct “must have been 
‘directed at a victim’ before the offense was committed.”  Cannon, 481 Mich at 160, 
quoting MCL 777.40(3)(a).  Additionally, the second prong of the Cannon test for 
predatory conduct mandated that the preoffense conduct must have been “directed at one 
or more specific victims . . . .”  Cannon, 481 Mich at 162.  Today’s majority opinion, 
however, holds that the preoffense conduct need not be directed at a particular victim in 
order to assess 15 points for predatory conduct.7     
I disagree with the majority opinion’s boundless interpretation of “conduct 
directed at a victim” in MCL 777.40(3)(a) as meaning conduct directed at the 
“community-at-large.”  Ante at 6-8.  “Whenever possible, every word of a statute should 
                                              
6 On this point, I think the Court of Appeals clearly erred by holding that defendant’s 
choice of this specific victim to attack sufficed as preoffense conduct directed at the 
victim.  Merely choosing a victim is not conduct directed at a victim.   
7 I think it is questionable for the majority to label as “clearly dictum” the statement in 
Cannon that the preoffense conduct must be directed at one or more specific victims.  
The whole point of the majority opinion in Cannon was to provide the correct framework 
for lower courts to apply when deciding whether to assess points for predatory conduct 
under OV 10.  Cannon, 481 Mich at 154, 161-163.  The second prong of the analytical 
framework Cannon provided required that the preoffense conduct be “directed at one or 
more specific victims . . . .”  Id. at 162.  The majority argues that this portion of Cannon 
was “clearly dictum” because it was “not essential to [the] determination of the case in 
hand . . . .”  Ante at 5 n 4 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  I would, however, 
remind the majority that there were four employees in the restaurant robbed by the 
Cannon defendant and his cohorts, and, thus, when the majority in Cannon outlined a 
structural paradigm for the trial court to apply on remand, it was essential that the trial 
court be clear on how to apply OV 10 to a crime involving multiple victims.  I would not 
be so quick to label as dictum an essential prong of an analytical framework provided by 
this Court. 
 
 
 
6
be given meaning.  And no word should be treated as surplusage or made nugatory.”  
Cannon, 481 Mich at 158 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  In direct contravention 
of this accepted principle of statutory construction, however, the majority essentially 
deletes the phrase “directed at a victim” from the explicit definition of “predatory 
conduct” found in MCL 777.40(3)(a).  Under the majority opinion, preoffense conduct 
need only have been engaged in for the primary purpose of eventually victimizing 
someone, but need not be directed at anyone in particular.  This interpretation fails to 
give effect to the statute’s plain language.    
I think the answer is simple concerning why the preoffense conduct must have 
been directed at a particular victim or group of victims: one cannot direct conduct at “a 
victim” without first identifying and selecting a victim.  In addition, MCL 777.40(3)(c) 
defines “vulnerability” as “the readily apparent susceptibility of a victim to injury, 
physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation,” and it is not possible to assess the “readily 
apparent susceptibility” of a victim until that victim is particularly identified.  Therefore, 
I believe that the Cannon majority was correct in holding that the preoffense conduct 
must be “directed at one or more specific victims . . . .”  Cannon, 481 Mich at 162 
(emphasis added).    
The majority’s reliance on the differences between the definite and indefinite 
articles is difficult to understand when the statute so clearly provides that the conduct 
must be directed at a victim.  See MCL 777.40(3)(a).  The indefinite articles “a” or “an” 
have little meaning when taken out of context.  In the context of MCL 777.40(3)(a), “a 
victim” means “any one” or “one of many” victims, and that is the only meaning that 
should be definitively attributed to the Legislature’s choice to use the indefinite instead of 
 
 
 
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the definite article.  To now hold that “a victim” actually means the “community-at-
large” is simply not consistent with the statutory language.   
I also disagree with the majority’s attempt to mitigate the potential damage caused 
by its boundless interpretation of “a victim” by declaring that 15 points may be assessed 
only for preoffense conduct that is “commonly understood as being ‘predatory’ in 
nature . . . .” Ante at 9.  Although it is correct that when a term is not defined by statute, it 
must be interpreted according to its common meaning, MCL 8.3a; McCormick v Carrier, 
487 Mich 180, 192; 795 NW2d 517 (2010), such is not the case here.  Instead, the 
Legislature expressly defined “predatory conduct” as “conduct directed at a victim for the 
primary purpose of victimization.”  MCL 777.40(3)(a).  This statutory definition says 
nothing about how predatory conduct is commonly understood.   
Finally, today’s majority decision creates difficulty distinguishing between mere 
planning and preparation to commit a crime and actual preoffense conduct that supports 
assessing points under OV 10 for predatory conduct.  See Cannon, 481 Mich at 162 
(“[T]he Legislature did not intend that 15 points be assessed for preoffense conduct 
involving nothing more than run-of-the-mill planning to effect a crime . . . .”).  Before 
today’s decision, courts only needed to consider the preoffense conduct during the 
limited window of time between the selection of a particular victim and the time the 
offense conduct began.  Because it is no longer necessary under the position of the 
majority that the conduct be directed at any specific victim, but only toward the 
community at large, courts must now consider all conduct the offender engaged in for the 
primary purpose of victimizing some eventual victim.  In my view, rather than clarifying 
our OV 10 jurisprudence, today’s decision merely muddies the waters more.   
 
 
 
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I therefore respectfully dissent.  
 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh