Title: Esquibel v. State

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

576 P.2d 1129 (1978) 91 N.M. 498 Patricio ESQUIBEL, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent. No. 11813. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 27, 1978. Rehearing Denied April 12, 1978. *1130 John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Reginald J. Storment, Appellate Defender, Douglas Barr, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for petitioner. Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Paquin M. Terrazas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Eloy Martinez, Dist. Atty., Anthony Tupler, Asst. Dist. Atty., Santa Fe, for respondent. FEDERICI, Justice. Defendant-appellant was convicted of escape from the New Mexico State Penitentiary in violation of § 40A-22-9, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. 1972). He contends the trial court erred in refusing a requested instruction which was based upon N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.20 [Vol. 6, N.M.S.A. 1953 at 329 (Supp. 1975)]. The trial court refused a tendered instruction by defendant in substantially the language of N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.20. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We reverse. The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.20 does not appear to be a sufficient instruction on duress as a defense to any crime because it does not cover "opportunity to avoid the danger." The Court of Appeals cites State v. LeMarr, 83 N.M. 18, 487 P.2d 1088 (1971) in support of this view. LeMarr, however, did not establish an additional element of the duress defense which is absent from our present instruction. The "full opportunity to avoid the act without danger" language *1131 quoted in LeMarr is merely an alternative expression of the traditional requirement that, in order to constitute a defense, the coercion or duress must be "present, imminent, and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury." Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 678, 684 (1976). The Court of Appeals further stated that N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 41.20 was not intended to cover duress as a defense to an escape charge and that, as a consequence, no uniform jury instruction on duress as a defense to an escape charge has been provided for New Mexico. The Court of Appeals recognizes the rule that it has no authority to set aside an instruction approved by the Supreme Court. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973). Duress and coercion are defenses to a criminal charge, if the accused feared immediate great bodily harm to himself or another person if he did not commit the crime charged and if a reasonable person would have acted the same way under the circumstances. State v. LeMarr, supra; State v. Lee, 78 N.M. 421, 432 P.2d 265 (Ct.App. 1967), N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.20; Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 678 at 684 (1976). N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.20 reads: N.M.U.J.I.Crim., General Use Note [Vol. 6, N.M.S.A. 1953 at 289 (Supp. 1975)] provides in pertinent part as follows: In State v. LeMarr, supra, this Court sets forth the statement of the rule applicable to duress: 83 N.M. at 21, 487 P.2d at 1091. In State v. Lee, supra, the Court of Appeals said: 78 N.M. at 423, 432 P.2d at 267. Duress, as it is expressed in State v. Lee, supra, and State v. LeMarr, supra, is an historical and widely recognized defense. See generally: Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 908 (1955); Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 678 (1976); People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975). We hold that duress is a defense available in New Mexico except when the crime charged is a homicide or a crime requiring intent to kill. The defense of duress is a question for the jury. People v. Luther, supra. A defendant successfully raises the defense of duress when he presents evidence, as here, from which a jury could conclude that he feared immediate great bodily harm to himself or another person if he did not commit the crime charged and that a reasonable person would have acted in the same way under the circumstances. The defendant thus having established a prima facie case of duress, the burden then shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under such reasonable fear. N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.20. The State urges that we adopt a contrary view, as expressed by the California Court of Appeals in the case of People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). That court, speaking of duress as "necessity," held: 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (footnote omitted). The preconditions set forth in Lovercamp are, in our view, matters which go to the weight and credibility of the testimony upon which the defendant bases his prima facie case. People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 5 Ill.Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977). To the extent that competent evidence may be produced as to any of these conditions, it is relevant to both the proof and disproof of the claim of defense. People v. Luther, supra. Such evidence is available to the prosecution in its task of overcoming the defendant's prima facie case of duress. One final point remains to be addressed. Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court held that the testimony presented by defendant was insufficient to present a jury issue as to immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm. We have reviewed the transcript of the proceedings and have found that it reveals substantial evidence of a prolonged history of beatings and serious threats toward this defendant by certain guards and prison personnel. In this case a jury might conclude that the defendant acted under a genuine fear of great bodily harm to himself. The most recent threat occurred some 48 to 72 hours before the defendant's escape from the institution. Under the circumstances of this case, the passage of two to three days between threat and escape does not suffice to *1133 remove the defense of duress from the consideration of the jury. What constitutes present, immediate and impending compulsion depends on the circumstances of each case. People v. Harmon, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975); Note, Duress And The Prison Escape: A New Use For An Old Defense, 45 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1062 (1972). We hold that the jury in this case should have been instructed on the duress defense under N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.20. The Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant defendant a new trial and to proceed in accordance with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. McMANUS, C.J., SOSA, EASLEY and PAYNE, JJ., concur.