Title: In Re Inquiry Concerning Baker

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

535 So. 2d 47 (1988) In re Inquiry Concerning Dennis M. BAKER, Chancellor. No. 59159. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 23, 1988. Luther T. Brantley, III, Jackson, for petitioner. Richard T. Phillips, Smith, Phillips & Mitchell, Batesville, for respondent. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER and GRIFFIN, JJ. GRIFFIN, Justice, for the Court: On January 13, 1987, the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) filed a formal complaint charging Dennis M. Baker, Chancellor, Place 1, Third Chancery District of Mississippi, with judicial misconduct in violation of § 177A, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended. The Comission found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Baker had violated Canons 1, 2 A, 2 B and 7 B(1)(a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi Judges. These canons state: The Commission issued its "Commission's Findings of Fact and Recommendations" on March 11, 1988, recommending a public reprimand. While this Court commends the Commission for its diligence, we find that this case does not compel public reprimand. The background of the charge against Judge Baker is long and arduous. Judge Baker was accused of wrongdoing by an attorney, Christian Goeldner. Goeldner was suspended from the practice of law for two years as a result of Judge Baker's report of unethical activities. Goeldner v. Miss. State Bar Ass'n., 525 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1988). These charges against Goeldner arose in 1984, from a bill submitted to the Conservator of Ms. Florence Middleton. Chancellor Baker did not allow the hourly fee originally charged by Goeldner. A subsequent bill showed "padded" hours at the lower fee which resulted in approximately the same charge. Christian Goeldner's trial before the Tribunal for the Central Supreme Court District was held on April 10, 1986. At this trial, it was determined that Goeldner should be disbarred. This Court suspended Goeldner. Twenty-three (23) charges were lodged by Goeldner against Chancellor Baker in March of 1986. These allegations were distributed to the Memphis Commercial Appeal by Goeldner, and published in that paper on March 1, 1986, contrary to Rule 4, Rules of Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. The Judicial Performance Commission investigated all of the Goeldner allegations. Of the twenty-three (23) charges levied by Goeldner against Judge Baker, twenty-one (21) were dismissed as totally groundless; the other two, after extensive hearing, were found insufficient to warrant public reprimand. The investigation of the Goeldner allegations by the Judicial Performance Commission coincided with a contested election campaign for the post of Chancellor of the Third Chancery District, the post occupied by Judge Baker since 1978. (This election has been enjoined by the federal court). Judge Baker's opponent in the election was an attorney from Grenada, Mississippi. During the investigation of the Goeldner charges, an incident of alleged campaign impropriety was charged in Grenada County. The campaign incident involved a phone call from Judge Baker to John Grantham on May 9, 1986. John Grantham had been divorced in September of 1984. In this divorce, styled "Judy Boyd Grantham versus John Leland Grantham, Sr., Grenada County Chancery Court Cause No. 83-12-303," Dennis Baker was the presiding chancellor. The divorce itself was final at the time of the telephone call in question. This divorce was not amicable, but had resulted in extensive litigation. As a result of the divorce the child of this marriage had experienced severe emotional problems. Chancellor Baker had personally attempted to resolve the conflict between John Grantham and his daughter on several occasions. In March of 1986 a petition for modification of the divorce settlement was filed by John Grantham; Judy Grantham cross-filed. A hearing was held on these petitions on Friday, March 21, 1986. This hearing was not completed on that day, but was orally continued until June 4, after the scheduled election. The continued case was not docketed, however, and the only *49 record of the continuance is in the transcript of the record. The telephone call from Chancellor Baker was made while this cause was continued. The case was continued again in June and no action had been taken at the time of the hearing on Chancellor Baker's conduct. Some time after May 9, 1986, the Judicial Performance Commission amended its charge to include the Grantham matter. Judge Baker cooperated fully in the investigation and proceedings before the Judicial Performance Commission. When notified of the possible impropriety of the Grantham phone call, Judge Baker checked his personal files and found no file on Grantham. He then checked the court docket and found no Grantham matters pending. It was only after checking the transcript of the March hearing that Judge Baker found that the matter was still pending. Judge Baker made an "Offer of Judgment" on August 28, 1987 to accept judgment entered by the Commission by way of private admonition or reprimand. This offer was declined. A panel consisting of three persons, Circuit Judge Arthur B. Clark, Jr., Chancellor John C. Love, Jr. and Elizabeth Powers, held hearings on September 21, 1987 and December 9, 1987, and issued its opinion on January 20, 1988. By a two-to-one vote, the panel concluded that Judge Baker's offenses were the result of poor judgment and poor communications, and that a private reprimand was in order. The two judges voted for a private reprimand. A copy of this "Committee Findings of Fact and Recommendation" was forwarded to Judge Baker. On March 11, 1988, the Commission issued its final "Commission Findings of Fact and Recommendation." This document recommended a public reprimand and stated that the Comission by a five-to-two vote recommended public rather than private reprimand. It further stated that the minority favoring the private reprimand consisted of the two members of the designated panel who had initially recommended the private reprimand, Judges Clark and Love. On May 2, 1988, while the record of the Commission's proceedings was being prepared for filing with the Supreme Court, Judge Baker filed with this Court a "Motion to Retain Confidentiality of Judge's Identity with Regard to Proposed Public Reprimand Pending Supreme Court Review." On May 24, 1988, by a vote of seven-to-two, the Motion to Retain Confidentiality of Judge's Identity Pending Supreme Court Review was denied. On June 7, 1988, the record, findings of fact and recommendation were filed by the Commission with this Court. The recommendation of public reprimand, with Judge Baker identified by name, was promptly disseminated through the news media. Articles appeared in the Memphis Commercial Appeal, June 8, 1988; the Grenada Daily Sentinal Star, June 8, 1988; and the Jackson Clarion-Ledger, June 8, 1988. According to the Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI) articles, reported in the Commercial Appeal and Daily Sentinal Star, respectively, the Commission's Executive Director talked with AP and UPI wire service reporters concerning the charges and recommendation. "The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance found ... said Brant Brantly, [sic] the Executive Director of the Commission." "The Commission voted 5-2 to recommend the reprimand, Brantly [sic] said." AP news article reported June 8, 1988, in the Commercial Appeal; "Executive Director Brant Brantley said the Commission found that while campaigning for re-election...." UPI news article reported in June 8, 1988 Daily Sentinal Star. The commentary to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi Judges, states: The Commission found that Judge Baker's conduct fails to conform to the high standard required of a judge and did not uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary but rather created an appearance of impropriety. While not disputing the Commission's position, we note that: "not every failure of a judge to conform to the standards of the Code amounts to judicial misconduct or merits formal discipline." Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014 at 1016 (1985). We further note that: Section 177A was ratified on November 6, 1979. It reads in part: The Commission's recommendation states that Judge Baker's act of contacting Grantham is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in that he violated Canons 1, 2 A, 2 B and 7 B(1)(a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi. Judge Baker contends that this contact was made without knowledge or intent of impropriety and does not warrant public reprimand under § 177A. There is no simple, black-letter definition of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. The Maryland Supreme Court, in In re Diener and Broccolino, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S. Ct. 1586, 39 L. Ed. 2d 885 (1974) said: 304 A.2d at 594. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in defining language identical to that of our § 177A, went into more depth and detail in the case of In re Kneifl, 217 Neb. 472, 351 N.W.2d 693 (1984).[1] The Nebraska Court found that: 351 N.W.2d at 695-96. This Court in interpreting § 177A(e) in In re (Lloyd) Anderson, 412 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1982), as cited in In re (William) Anderson, 451 So. 2d 232 (Miss. 1984), has stated that: 451 So. 2d at 234. The Commission submits that: The primary substantive issue in this case is based on an interpretation of Canon 7 which is currently under intense scrutiny nationwide. The interpretation of Canon 7 is particularly problematic in states where judges must run for reelection in contested political campaigns.[2] The findings of the Commission and the designated panel are indicators of the quandary facing a sitting judge running in a contested election. The Commission in its "Findings of Fact and Recommendation" of March 11, 1988, stated: The Designated Panel who heard the witnesses in the case said: Both bodies found that the Judge's error was not in asking for John Grantham's support and vote, but in telephoning Grantham. It was this act of singling out Grantham while a case was pending which raised the specter of influence peddling. It should be noted that only Mr. Grantham's interpretation of Judge Baker's telephone conversation linked political support with favorable resolution of his litigation. According to the deposition of Alan Lancaster, the attorney contacted by Grantham after the telephone call, there was no indication that political support would result in a favorable outcome in the pending case at the time of call as can be seen in the following text of the deposition: According to Mr. Grantham's own testimony, Judge Baker did not refer to the pending litigation. Examination of John Grantham: Judge Baker did not request campaign funds, nor did he invite Grantham to visit his motel room. *53 Examination of John Grantham: The record is silent as to why and when the room number was given. Judge Baker admits to contacting Grantham and requesting his support, he contends that this does not warrant a public reprimand under Canon 7. A survey of recent Mississippi judicial disciplinary cases (see Appendix) reveals that the sanction of public reprimand is imposed for more than one offense. Only one case, In re William Anderson, involved a public reprimand for only one type of offense. Even in this case, Judge Anderson failed on three occasions to issue writs of garnishment after receiving filing fees to do so. We find no case in which one isolated instance of impropriety warranted public censure. The Commission compares the case sub judice to Matter of Hotchkiss, 415 Mich. 1101, 327 N.W.2d 312 (1982). Hotchkiss, a candidate for re-election, contacted a lawyer and personally solicited a campaign contribution in clear violation of Canon 7 B(2). Judge Baker's behavior is not as clear a violation of Canan 7B(1). Judge Baker candidly admits the impropriety of his action, yet contends "mistake" rather than willful violation. The problem with Judge Baker's position is that Grantham was involved in a child support proceeding. Mississippi courts have asserted continuing jurisdiction over the parties to these proceedings. Judge Baker was certainly aware of this. Any assessment of these charges is further complicated by Judge Baker's belief that these charges were instigated in retaliation for his filing charges against Chris Goeldner, and public sanction would have a "chilling effect" on judicial reports of lawyer misconduct. Judge Baker argues that the factors which determine whether a reprimand should be public are not found in this case. He cites case law from other jurisdictions to support his position. These factors include: (1) Was the wrongful conduct part of a recurring or habitual pattern (thereby necessitating public censure to stop the wrongful conduct). Complaint Concerning Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1984); Matter of Laster, 404 Mich. 449, 274 N.W.2d 742 (1979). (2) On the other hand, was the incident giving rise to the reprimand an isolated, atypical transaction (thereby requiring only a private, confidential reprimand). Matter of Szymanski, 400 Mich. 469, 255 N.W.2d 601 (1977). (3) Was the wrongdoing intentional or done with a corrupt motive. In re Dekle, 308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975); In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975). (4) Was the conduct a "willful disregard of the law and not mere error." Matter of Donohue, 390 Mass. 514, 458 N.E.2d 323 (1983).[3] *54 Factors which the court may consider as mitigating circumstances, weighing in favor of the confidential, private action, include the following: (1) The length and character of the judge's public service. Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985). (2) Positive contributions made by the judge to the courts and the community. Matter of Donohue, 390 Mass. 514, 458 N.E.2d 323, 327 (1983). (3) The lack of prior judicial precedent on the incident in issue. Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014, 1015 (1985). (4) Commitment to fairness and innovative procedural form on the part of the judge. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974). Mississippi Judicial Performance cases indicate that the same factors are considered in this state. In the recent case of In re Inquiry Concerning a Justice Court Judge, Robert C. Cooksey, 515 So. 2d 957 (Miss. 1987), the judge's prior disciplinary record was a factor. Public reprimand was based on the enumerated violations "and Judge Cooksey's previous, informal appearance before the Commission." In In re Inquiry Concerning Justice Court Judge, Ralph M. Hearn, 515 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Miss. 1987), the reprimand was made public where the conduct of the judge was "willful and persistent." We also consider the magnitude of the offense and the number of persons affected, as well as the fact that no "moral turpitude" was involved in this incident. Judge Baker offered the affidavits of the Chancery Clerks of Tate, DeSoto, Panola, Grenada, Yalobusha and Montgomery Counties. All attested to Chancellor Baker's proper conduct of court, professionalism, fairness, and efficient handling of heavy caseloads. Statistics in the record show that during Judge Baker's tenure as Chancellor, there have been over 23,000 original filings of new cases in the courts wherein Judge Baker resides. [Affidavit of DeSoto County Chancery Clerk (9100 filings); Affidavit of Panola County Chancery Clerk (4972 filings); Affidavit of Grenada County Chancery Clerk (3130 filings); Affidavit of Tate County Chancery Clerk (2679 filings); Affidavit of Yalobusha County Chancery Clerk (2069 filings); Affidavit of Montgomery County Chancery Clerk (1899 filings). Exhibits to the record]. This number of new filings does not include the numerous petitions for modifications, rehearings, and secondary filings in each case. Judge Baker served in the Mississippi Legislature (1952-1968), the Mississippi Senate (1960-1964), and the Judiciary (1978-present). Judge Baker fully cooperated with the Commission's investigators and proceedings. In light of the isolated nature of the offense and Judge Baker's long career of public service, we find that Judge Baker's conduct warrants a private reprimand. While we disagree with the Commission's recommendation, we believe that the Commission has discharged its function in the manner intended by the Mississippi Constitution, our Rules, and this Court. We find no fault in the Commission's procedure and commend the Commission for its work. The result we reach is different from the Commission's and this difference is based upon our interpretation of § 177A and Canon 7, an interpretation we have not heretofore been called upon to make. COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION REJECTED. THE COURT DIRECTS THAT CHANCELLOR BAKER BE PRIVATELY REPRIMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. [1] The Commission cites In re Kneifl as very similar to the charges filed against Chancellor Baker. On examining Kneifl we find that two charges were filed against that judge. Count I involved an incident in which Kneifl was being booked for driving while under the influence of intoxicants in Iowa. Kneifl cursed a police officer while she was in the performance of her duties, and threatened other officers, also while in the course of their duties, with reprisals by saying that they "better never be" in his court and that if they ever came before him in his court, they would "be sorry." Count II involved an incident in which Kneifl advised a county attorney's partner that one with whom Kneifl was acquainted had been charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicants and refusal to submit to testing. Kneifl asked the partner and county attorney to help or see what could be done for the acquaintance. There is no evidence that Kneifl directly asked the county attorney or his partner to reduce or dismiss the charges against the acquaintance, nor any evidence that he gained any financial or personal gain from the request he made. The commission found that Kneifl attempted to influence the county attorney to reduce the charges. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the threats made to police officers were in effect that Kneifl would wreak judicial vengeance upon them. In addition, the effort to influence the county attorney depended on Kneifl's presiding over a court in which that attorney and his partner could be expected to appear. It was the two incidents combined which were found to have brought the judicial office into disrepute. The court's sanctions included: public reprimand, suspension, and alcohol abuse evaluation and treatment. [2] See Ethical Dilemma of Campaigning for Judicial Office: A Proposed Solution, 14 Fordham Urban Law Journal 353 (1986), in which the authors examine Canon 7, particularly 7 B, and recommend a re-evaluation of Canon 7 B(2). [3] See also, State Judicial Disciplinary Commissions and Proceedings: Developing Administrative and Legal Standards for Evaluating Judicial Misconduct, 10 Rutgers Camden Law Journal 685 (1979).