Title: State v. Smith

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP756-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Frederick S. Smith, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 184, 888 N.W.2d 22 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 9, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen E. Ehlke 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents joined by ABRAHAMSON 
J. (opinion filed).   
KELLY, J. dissents joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. and 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Lisa E.F. 
Kumfer, assistant attorney general.  There was an oral argument 
by Tiffany M. Winter. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Christopher D. Sobic, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
2018 WI 2
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP756-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF667) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Frederick S. Smith, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 9, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We are asked to decide 
whether 
the 
police 
violated 
Frederick 
S. 
Smith's 
Fourth 
Amendment rights when a police officer asked for his driver's 
license during a traffic stop even though reasonable suspicion 
for the stop dissipated as the officer approached the car, or 
when the police officer opened the passenger door after being 
told the driver's door and window were broken.  The Fourth 
Amendment protects "against unreasonable searches and seizures,"1 
                                                 
1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
2 
 
and our analysis focuses on what is reasonable in light of the 
particular circumstances.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 
(1960)("What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and 
seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures."). 
¶2 
We hold that when an officer conducts a valid traffic 
stop, part of that stop includes checking identification, even 
if the reasonable suspicion that formed the basis for the stop 
in the first place has dissipated.  See Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) ("Beyond determining 
whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes 
'ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.'" (citing 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)); State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI App 306, ¶1, 258 Wis. 2d 395, 655 N.W.2d 462 
("We conclude the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion 
                                                                                                                                                             
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution likewise 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
3 
 
to stop Williams's vehicle to determine if he was the suspect in 
a domestic abuse incident.  We also conclude that, because the 
initial detention was lawful, the officer could properly ask 
Williams his name and for identification even if she had already 
decided he was not the suspect.").  Asking for a driver's 
license does not impermissibly extend a stop because it is part 
of the original mission of the traffic stop.  However, the 
"ordinary inquiries," which are related in scope to the purpose 
of a traffic stop, must be executed within the time it should 
have reasonably taken to complete them.  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1614. 
¶3 
We further hold the police officer's act of opening 
the passenger door in order to effectively communicate with a 
driver otherwise inaccessible due to the malfunctioning driver's 
door and window did not constitute an unreasonable search 
because the officer's actions, viewed objectively, would warrant 
a person of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was 
appropriate.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.  Because Smith's 
stop was reasonably executed, we hold that no Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred.  The circuit court2 correctly denied Smith's 
suppression motion.  Accordingly, the decision of the court of 
appeals3 is reversed and Smith's judgment of conviction stands. 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke, Dane County Circuit Court, 
presiding. 
3 State v. Smith,  No. 2015AP756-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶1, (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016) (per curiam). 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On April 6, 2014, Madison Police Sergeant Bernard 
Gonzalez's duties included monitoring a Madison neighborhood for 
gang retaliation following what police believed to be gang-
related shots fired the previous night.  At about 10:45 p.m., 
Gonzalez, while parked in the watch area, observed a car with 
dark tinted windows drive by and stop in the middle of the 
street for 10 to 15 seconds.4  This drew Gonzalez's attention 
"because [the car] did not pull to the curb.  It stopped in the 
middle of the street."5  Then, a passenger got out of the car and 
walked to apartment buildings, after which the car drove away.  
Gonzalez followed the car, checked the license plate, and 
learned the registered owner, Amber Smith, had a suspended 
driver's license.  Gonzalez activated the squad's lights to get 
the car to pull over.  The car did not pull over right away, but 
proceeded to turn off the main street and turn again into a 
parking lot before finally pulling into a parking space and 
stopping.  When Gonzalez was five-to-ten feet from the driver's 
door, he "was pretty sure" the driver was not Amber Smith 
because the driver appeared to be a man.  When the sergeant 
                                                 
4 The record indicates that at the preliminary hearing, held 
ten days after the stop, the sergeant testified Smith's car 
stopped in the middle of the road "[f]or about three minutes."   
At the suppression hearing, four months later, the testimony 
described the time as 10 to 15 seconds.  This discrepancy does 
not affect our analysis. 
5 The facts are presented in chronological order; all quoted 
testimony comes from the suppression hearing. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
5 
 
asked6 the driver, later identified as Frederick Smith, to open 
the door or roll down the window, Smith shrugged his shoulders 
and responded that both the door and window were broken.  As is 
his typical practice in a traffic stop with an inoperable 
driver's side door and window, Gonzalez walked to the passenger 
side of the car to speak "more effectively" with Smith.  Smith 
appeared to be cooperating and moving toward the passenger seat, 
either activating the lock or reaching for the passenger door 
handle.  Gonzalez did not ask Smith to open the passenger side 
door or window; rather, the sergeant put his hand on the door 
handle, and testified that "together we opened the door."  
"[Smith] reached over and worked the door handle."  Gonzalez, 
believing Smith was cooperating by moving toward the passenger 
seat and trying to open the passenger door, testified that they 
"simultaneously . . . opened the door."7 
¶5 
Smith admitted that he "was maneuvering to the 
passenger seat" after telling Gonzalez the driver's door and 
                                                 
6 The record is unclear as to whether Gonzalez simply 
motioned for Smith to roll down the window and open the door or 
verbally asked Smith to do so.  This uncertainty does not impact 
our analysis. 
7 The circuit court initially noted:  "So whether Sergeant 
Gonzalez first started to open the door or whether they opened 
it simultaneously, either way I conclude that under the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standards that it was a reasonable 
thing to do."  When Smith's lawyer asked the circuit court to 
find "Gonzalez was the one that opened the door," the circuit 
court found that "the sergeant went to open the door and began 
to open the door."  In doing so, the circuit court did not 
impugn the credibility of Gonzalez's testimony. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
6 
 
window were broken.  Smith explained that "every day I use the 
car, I pull on the handle to get out because the driver's side 
don't open."  Smith also said he stopped in that parking lot 
because he lived in a building next to it. 
¶6 
With the door open, Gonzalez observed that Smith had 
red, bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.  When Gonzalez 
asked Smith for his driver's license, Smith responded that his 
license had been revoked.  After conducting field sobriety 
tests, Gonzalez arrested Smith and took him to the police 
station where Smith refused to voluntarily give a blood sample.  
Gonzalez obtained a warrant and transported Smith to the 
hospital for the evidentiary blood test.  Afterwards, Gonzalez 
drove Smith to the Dane County Jail where he agreed to provide a 
breath sample pursuant to the jail admitting procedures.  The 
breath test showed Smith's blood alcohol to be .38.  The State 
charged Smith with operating a motor vehicle under the influence 
of an intoxicant, seventh offense. 
¶7 
Smith moved to suppress all evidence acquired from the 
traffic stop, arguing that when Gonzalez saw a man (rather than 
a woman) driving the car, reasonable suspicion dissolved, and 
the stop should have immediately ceased.  He also argued 
Gonzalez violated the Fourth Amendment when he opened the 
passenger door without any lawful basis to do so.  The trial 
court denied Smith's motion and he pled guilty to operating a 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
7 
 
motor vehicle under the influence, seventh offense, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 939.62(1)(b) (2015-16).8 
¶8 
Smith did not file a postconviction motion but 
appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that all evidence 
should be suppressed and his judgment should be vacated because: 
(1) once Gonzalez saw a man (instead of a woman) behind the 
wheel, reasonable suspicion for the initially lawful stop 
evaporated, and the sergeant's failure to immediately release 
Smith improperly extended the duration of the seizure; and (2) 
the sergeant conducted an unlawful search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment by opening the passenger door without consent 
or probable cause.  The court of appeals declined to decide the 
case on the merits; instead, it determined the State's response 
to Smith's arguments on appeal were too cursory to warrant a 
review on the merits.  The court of appeals vacated Smith's 
conviction and remanded the case to the circuit court ordering 
it to grant Smith's suppression motion; it sua sponte ordered 
that Smith be allowed to withdraw his plea.  State v. Smith, No. 
2015AP756-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 
2016) (per curiam).  We granted the State's petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW 
¶9 
A 
suppression 
issue 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional fact.  See State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶11, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560.  "We review the circuit court's 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
8 
 
findings 
of 
historical 
fact 
under 
the 
clearly 
erroneous 
standard.  But the circuit court's application of the historical 
facts to constitutional principles is a question of law we 
review independently."  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
¶10 The reasonableness of a traffic stop involves a two-
part inquiry:  first, whether the initial seizure was justified 
and, second, whether subsequent police conduct "was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified" the 
initial interference.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; see United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).  The mission of a 
traffic stop includes "determining whether to issue a traffic 
ticket" and the ordinary inquiries incident to the stop.  
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.  As long as the initial stop was 
lawful, requesting identification is a permissible part of the 
dual mission of every traffic stop.  Id.  The ordinary inquiries 
portion of the traffic stop's mission includes "checking the 
driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding 
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's 
registration and proof of insurance."9  Id. 
                                                 
9 The United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), distinguished between inquiries 
that are related to a traffic stop and those that are unrelated.  
It concluded that asking for identification is an ordinary 
inquiry that is related to the purpose of a lawful stop as part 
of its dual mission and the stop "may last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate that purpose."  Id. at 1614-15.  
Unrelated inquiries, such as a dog sniff, occurring after the 
dual mission has been completed, violate the Fourth Amendment 
unless supported by additional reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause.  Id. at 1612-14. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
9 
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Initial Stop and Ordinary Inquiries 
¶11 Smith insists the circuit court should have suppressed 
the evidence that led to his seventh drunk-driving conviction 
because the officer unlawfully extended the duration of the 
seizure by continuing to question Smith after reasonable 
suspicion dematerialized.  The State contends that because a 
traffic stop's mission includes the ordinary inquiries, such as 
checking a driver's license, an officer who lawfully stops a 
vehicle should be able to complete that mission even if the 
reason for the traffic stop ended during the officer's walk to 
the stopped vehicle.10  The State is correct. 
¶12 The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed 
that 
a 
police 
officer's 
"ordinary 
inquiries," 
reasonably 
executed during a lawful traffic stop—including "checking the 
driver's license"—do not violate the Fourth Amendment because 
these "routine measures" are "fairly characterized as part of 
the officer's traffic mission."  See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 
1615.  "Because the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 11 provide 
                                                 
10 We note, however, that other facts of record in this case 
support ongoing reasonable suspicion that did not dissipate 
during this traffic stop and therefore provide further basis for 
upholding Smith's conviction.  For example, Gonzalez could have 
issued a ticket to Smith under Wis. Stat. § 346.51 for stopping 
his car "upon the roadway."  Nonetheless, because this case 
comes to us for a decision on whether an officer may continue 
with 
the 
ordinary 
inquiries 
when 
reasonable 
suspicion 
dissipates, our analysis focuses on that question.  For the 
purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding that 
reasonable suspicion had dissipated. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
10 
 
substantively 
identical 
protections, 
we 
have 
historically 
interpreted this section of the Wisconsin Constitution in 
accordance with United States Supreme Court interpretations of 
the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶11, 376 
Wis. 2d 644, 898 N.W.2d 541.  Thus, we apply Rodriguez's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
¶13 There is no dispute that the initial seizure of Smith 
(the traffic stop) was justified.11  Gonzalez had a legal basis 
to stop the car Smith was driving.  Specifically, Gonzalez 
observed the driver of the car engage in suspicious activity in 
an area being watched for gang retaliation; these concerns 
prompted Gonzalez to run the license plate, which in turn came 
back registered to an owner who could not be legally driving.  
These facts provide reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct a 
traffic stop.  See State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, ¶¶5, 7, 306 
Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923 (reasonable suspicion exists to stop 
a vehicle if an officer has knowledge the owner of the vehicle 
has an invalid license); see also Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶20 
("Reasonable suspicion that a driver is violating a traffic law 
is sufficient to initiate a traffic stop.").  Thus, part one of 
the two-part test we apply to determine whether a traffic stop 
was reasonable is satisfied.  See Terry, 391 U.S. at 19-20. 
                                                 
11 As 
this 
court 
acknowledged 
recently, 
"It 
is 
an 
unremarkable truism that a traffic stop is a seizure within the 
meaning of our Constitutions."  State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶20, 
377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
11 
 
¶14 We 
turn 
our 
attention 
to 
part 
two 
of 
the 
reasonableness test——whether subsequent police conduct "was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified" 
the initial interference.  After Sergeant Gonzalez stopped 
Smith, he approached the driver's door.  Moments before reaching 
the door, Gonzalez was "pretty sure" the driver was a man and 
not Amber Smith, the woman identified as the registered owner, 
who could not legally drive her car because her license had been 
suspended.  The State conceded that the reasonable suspicion 
underpinning the traffic stop dissipated at that moment. 
¶15 But in these particular circumstances, does the Fourth 
Amendment require a police officer to freeze, do an about-face, 
and walk away?  Such a reaction is neither practical nor 
required.12  According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment 
does not compel such an about-face because the mission of any 
lawful traffic stop includes routine measures like checking a 
driver's license.  See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (the 
                                                 
12 Justice Kelly asserts an officer can speak with the 
driver under these circumstances, but only to "inform him he was 
free to leave."  Justice Daniel Kelly's dissent, ¶33.  But, 
under Justice Kelly's analysis, any further contact with the 
driver is not permitted under the Fourth Amendment because the 
officer cannot continue the seizure past the moment reasonable 
suspicion dissipates.  Justice Kelly can't have it both ways.  
The idiocracy of having to waive a driver off who has been 
legally seized without any explanation is another reason why the 
ordinary inquiries do not violate the Fourth Amendment.  The 
officer must be able to complete the traffic stop by speaking 
with the driver, documenting a name for the officer's reporting 
requirements, and providing the stopped driver with the courtesy 
of an explanation for the seizure. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
12 
 
mission of a lawful traffic stop includes both "determining 
whether to issue a traffic ticket" and conducting the ordinary 
inquiries). 
¶16 Before 
applying 
Rodriguez 
to 
the 
particular 
circumstances in Smith's case, we first examine the conditions 
surrounding the Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez.  In its 
2014-15 term, the Supreme Court had before it petitions for 
certiorari in two related cases:  (1) Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), where the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals upheld Dennys Rodriguez's drug conviction arising 
from drugs discovered by a narcotics dog after all the business 
related to a traffic stop had been completed; and (2) People v. 
Cummings, 2014 IL 115769, ¶¶1-2, 6 N.E.3d 725 (hereinafter 
Cummings I), where the Illinois Supreme Court granted the 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence police discovered during 
a traffic stop.  In Cummings I, an outstanding warrant for the 
registered owner of the vehicle, who was a woman, generated 
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.  Cummings I, 6 N.E.3d 
725, ¶5.  As the officer approached the stopped vehicle, 
however, the officer saw the driver was a man, not a woman.  
Id., ¶7.  All three levels of Illinois courts held that 
suppression was appropriate because reasonable suspicion for the 
lawful stop disappeared when the officer saw a man (not a woman) 
behind the wheel.  Id., ¶¶8-9.  The Illinois Supreme Court held 
that by asking the driver for identification, the officer 
"impermissibly extended the stop."  Id., ¶26. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
13 
 
¶17 Rodriguez and Cummings are both Fourth Amendment cases 
involving traffic stops where defendants sought suppression of 
evidence based on arguments that police unlawfully extended the 
stop.  Six days after the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, it 
vacated the judgment in Cummings I, and "remanded to the Supreme 
Court of Illinois for further consideration in light of" 
Rodriguez.  See Illinois v. Cummings, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Mem) 
(Apr. 27, 2015). 
¶18 On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth the 
Supreme Court's conclusions in Rodriguez: 
 A dog sniff that prolongs a stop in an attempt to detect 
evidence of wrongdoing is "not part of the officer's 
'mission' for the stop." 
 "The Court defined the mission of the stop as 'to address 
the traffic violation that warranted the stop' and to 
'attend to related safety concerns.'" 
 The mission's safety concerns permit officers to make 
"ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic stop]." 
 "Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's 
license, 
determining 
whether 
there 
are 
outstanding 
warrants 
against 
the 
driver, 
and 
inspecting 
the 
automobile's registration and proof of insurance." 
 Actions outside the mission of the stop that "measurably 
extend the duration of the stop" "cause the stop to 
become unlawful" unless reasonable suspicion supports the 
extension. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
14 
 
 The Court drew a bright line against extending a stop 
"with inquiries outside the mission of a traffic stop" 
absent reasonable suspicion for the outside inquiries. 
 The Court precisely defined what inquiries are part of 
the traffic stop and what inquiries fall outside the 
mission of a traffic stop. 
See Cummings, 2016 IL 115769, ¶7, 46 N.E.3d 248 (hereinafter 
Cummings II) (citations omitted).  Based on the directives of 
Rodriguez, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed its earlier 
determination that the stop in Cummings I violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id., ¶13.  Instead, it ruled a police officer may 
lawfully check a driver's license even though reasonable 
suspicion for the stop ended when the officer saw a man (not a 
woman) behind the wheel.  Id.  The Illinois Supreme Court held 
this did not render the seizure unreasonable because Rodriguez 
recognized the purpose of a traffic stop includes the "ordinary 
inquiries" of checking a driver's license.  Id.  In other words, 
when a traffic stop is lawful at its inception, a police officer 
may complete the ordinary inquiries even if reasonable suspicion 
"vanished upon seeing the defendant" because the purpose of the 
stop 
is 
not 
concluded 
until 
the 
ordinary 
inquiries 
are 
completed.  Id., ¶18.  "Such ordinary inquiries are part of the 
stop's mission and do not prolong the stop, for fourth amendment 
purposes."  Id. 
¶19 When the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in 
Cummings I and remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court 
for further consideration in light of Rodriguez it signaled that 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
15 
 
"ordinary inquiries" remain reasonable for the duration of an 
otherwise 
lawful 
stop. 
 
The 
Illinois 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation 
of 
Rodriguez 
in 
Cummings 
II 
is 
correct.  
Rodriguez concludes that an officer's mission in conducting a 
traffic stop includes "whether to issue a traffic ticket" and 
the "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic stop]."  
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.  These include:  "checking the 
driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding 
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's 
registration and proof of insurance."  Id.  The justification 
for the ordinary inquiries is two-fold:  (1) these checks serve 
to enforce the traffic code by "ensuring that vehicles on the 
road are operated safely and responsibly"; and (2) for officer 
safety.13  Id. at 1615-16.  The Supreme Court protected Fourth 
Amendment rights by emphasizing that a traffic stop's mission 
                                                 
13 This court just last term acknowledged the "legitimate 
and weighty" concern for officer safety attendant to every 
traffic stop: 
Traffic stops are "especially fraught with danger to 
police 
officers...." 
 Rodriguez, 
135 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
1616 (quoting [Arizona v.] Johnson, 555 U.S. [323, 330 
(2009)]); see also [Pennsylvania v.] Mimms, 434 U.S. 
[106, 110 (1977)] ("We think it too plain for argument 
that the State's proffered justification—the safety of 
the officer—is both legitimate and weighty.").  That 
makes officer safety an integral part of every traffic 
stop's 
mission.  
Rodriguez, 
135 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
1616 ("Unlike 
a 
general 
interest 
in 
criminal 
enforcement, however, the government's officer safety 
interest stems from the mission of the stop itself."). 
Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶26. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
16 
 
should not extend beyond the amount of time reasonably required 
to complete it, and an officer must proceed diligently, id. at 
1616, thereby eliminating the potential for police to delay the 
ordinary inquiries to delve into unrelated and undiscovered 
criminal wrongdoing. 
¶20 We return to the particular facts in Smith's case in 
light of Rodriguez's conclusion that the lawfully initiated 
traffic stop includes both considering whether to issue a ticket 
and conducting the ordinary inquiries.  When Gonzalez saw the 
driver of the stopped car was a man, the first part of the 
mission ended.  Gonzalez would not be issuing a ticket to Amber 
Smith for driving with a suspended license.  The second mission 
of the traffic stop, however, had not been performed——checking 
the 
driver's 
license, 
registration, 
and 
insurance. 
 
To 
accomplish this, Gonzalez followed his normal practice where a 
driver's door does not work and walked around to the passenger 
side of the car.  Smith concedes he was moving over to the 
passenger side and reaching for a handle on the passenger door.  
He even explained this is a movement he makes every time he has 
to get in and out of the car.  In fact, unless Smith planned to 
sleep in the car, it is logical that Smith would get out of the 
car because he had pulled into a parking spot in the lot where 
his residence is located.  Gonzalez thought Smith was struggling 
to open the passenger door so he put his hand on the outside 
door handle and pulled the door open.  Upon opening the door, 
Gonzalez learned Smith did not have a valid driver's license 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
17 
 
either.  It is at this point Gonzalez suspected Smith had been 
driving drunk. 
¶21 Thus, applying the directives from Rodriguez, we hold 
the stop in Smith's case did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
The mission of the lawful traffic stop did not end when 
reasonable suspicion dissipated because at that moment, the 
sergeant had not completed the ordinary inquiries of checking 
Smith's license, registration, and insurance.  Before Gonzalez 
could complete the ordinary inquiries incident to the stop, he 
discovered Smith did not have a valid driver's license and saw 
signs Smith had been driving drunk.  At this point, the sergeant 
had probable cause to extend the stop to investigate and 
eventually arrest Smith for drunk driving. 
¶22 In addition, the record shows Gonzalez acted promptly 
in his attempt to accomplish the mission of this traffic stop; 
there is nothing to suggest Gonzalez slothed through the mission 
to fish for wrongdoing.  We emphasize, as did the Rodriguez 
Court, that "[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks 
tied to the traffic infraction are——or reasonably should have 
been——completed."  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.  Police 
actions in all traffic stops will be scrutinized to ensure a 
temporary detention "last[s] no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop."  Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 684; 
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.  Neither the Fourth Amendment nor 
the cases interpreting it require this traffic stop seizure to 
end at the moment Gonzalez saw a man instead of a woman in the 
driver's seat.  The Fourth Amendment presented no bar to 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
18 
 
Gonzalez taking the minimally intrusive, routine measure of 
checking the identification of the driver.  Because Gonzalez did 
so in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable amount of 
time, Smith's stop was not unlawfully prolonged.  See Rodriguez, 
135 S. Ct. at 1615; see also, State v. House, 2013 WI App 111, 
¶¶6, 9, 350 Wis. 2d 478, 837 N.W.2d 645 (concluding the purpose 
of traffic stop ended when "everything related to the initial 
stop" 
had 
been 
completed 
including 
running 
a 
check 
on 
defendant's license and returning license to the defendant); 
State 
v. 
Gammons, 
2001 
WI 
App 36, 
241 
Wis. 2d 296, 
625 
N.W.2d 623 (holding the purpose of the traffic stop had 
concluded after the reason for the initial seizure had been 
satisfied, the driver and the two passengers had provided 
identification, and the officer had run computer checks on all 
three). 
¶23 Our conclusion that this traffic stop comports with 
the Fourth Amendment is further supported by existing Wisconsin 
case law.  Before the United States Supreme Court decided 
Rodriguez, our court of appeals already decided that when "the 
initial detention was lawful" an officer can properly ask for a 
driver's name and identification card even when the officer "had 
already decided" the driver "was not the suspect."  See State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI App 306, ¶1, 258 Wis. 2d 395, 655 N.W.2d 462.  
In Williams, a police officer stopped a vehicle thinking the 
driver was a wanted domestic abuse suspect named Demetrius 
Phillips.  Id., ¶¶2-3.  The driver told the officer his name was 
Vernell Williams, but he did not have any identification to 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
19 
 
prove his identity.  Id.  The officer called another officer who 
knew a lot of people in the neighborhood to see if Williams' 
identity could be verified.  Id., ¶4.  The second officer 
confirmed that Williams was who he said he was.  Id.  At this 
point, the police knew the driver was not the domestic abuse 
suspect, but they had the dispatcher run his name and birthdate 
anyway and found Williams did not have a valid driver's license.  
Id.  Further investigation led to the discovery of cocaine in 
the car and Williams filed a motion to suppress the evidence.  
Id., ¶¶4-5, 8.  The court of appeals concluded the officer's 
actions were lawful because the request for the driver's name 
and identification was reasonable, even if the request came 
after the officer realized the driver was not the suspect the 
officer sought.14  Id., ¶18.  The court of appeals further held 
that when "Williams stated that he had no identification, there 
was a reasonable ground for further detention," id., ¶22, based 
on Wis. Stat. § 343.18(1)'s requirement that persons operating 
                                                 
14 The court of appeals also relied on a community caretaker 
vehicle 
case, 
State 
v. 
Ellenbecker, 
159 
Wis. 2d 91, 
464 
N.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1990), in reaching its conclusion.  See 
State v. Williams, 2002 WI App 306, ¶¶18-21, 258 Wis. 2d 395, 
655 N.W.2d 462.  We question whether Ellenbecker was properly 
decided but decline to address that specific issue as it is not 
dispositive here. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
20 
 
motor vehicles must have their driver's licenses with them.15  
These routine measures are reasonable because they ensure the 
driver has a valid license and they document the driver's 
identity in case there is a complaint after the stop. 
¶24 Smith distinguishes his case from Rodriguez because 
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop in that case continued 
for the duration of the stop, whereas here, the State conceded 
that reasonable suspicion dissipated as Sergeant Gonzalez 
approached  Smith's car.  We need not guess whether the Supreme 
Court would rule differently if faced with a case where 
reasonable suspicion dissipated after a lawful stop but before 
the ordinary inquiries could take place.  The Supreme Court in 
fact had that very case before it——Cummings I——concomitantly 
with Rodriguez and although the Court never issued an opinion, 
its procedural actions signal that the Fourth Amendment does not 
compel an officer to prematurely terminate a lawful stop by 
dispensing with the ordinary inquiries. 
¶25 First, Rodriguez does not specifically limit its 
holding to a lawful stop where reasonable suspicion does not 
dissipate.  Given that the Supreme Court had before it both 
Rodriquez——a case where reasonable suspicion remained until the 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.18(1)'s 
requirement 
that 
all 
drivers possess a driver's license while driving and display it 
"upon demand from any judge, justice, or traffic officer" 
further supports our opinion.  It is reasonable to expect to 
show a driver's license when a police officer conducts a traffic 
stop. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
21 
 
ordinary inquiries had been completed, and Cummings——a case 
where 
reasonable 
suspicion 
vanished 
before 
the 
ordinary 
inquiries could be made, the Supreme Court most certainly would 
have pointed out this distinction if the Court determined it 
commands opposite Fourth Amendment outcomes. 
¶26 Second, six days after deciding Rodriguez, the Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment in Cummings I and told the Illinois 
Supreme Court to reconsider its ruling.  See Illinois v. 
Cummings, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Mem) (2015).  Again, the Illinois 
Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of the defendant in 
Cummings I, holding that the police officer could not ask to see 
his driver's license after reasonable suspicion vanished.  See 
Cummings I, 6 N.E.3d 725, ¶20.  It is not logical or reasonable 
for the Supreme Court to have vacated Cummings I if it believed 
the Illinois Supreme Court reached the correct result.  There 
would be no reason to make the Illinois Supreme Court redo its 
decision if the Supreme Court believed the law prohibits a 
license check when reasonable suspicion dissipates before the 
officer speaks with the driver.  That is what the Illinois 
Supreme Court had already ruled.  If the Supreme Court wanted to 
limit the ordinary inquiries only to cases where reasonable 
suspicion 
remained 
until 
those 
routine 
procedures 
were 
completed, presumably the Court would have simply let the 
Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Cummings I stand.  If the 
disappearance of reasonable suspicion extinguished an officer's 
ability to proceed with ordinary inquiries, logically the 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
22 
 
Supreme Court would have said so either in Rodriguez itself or 
by writing an opinion in Cummings I. 
¶27 Third, the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis in 
Cummings II upon remand from the Supreme Court is sound.  That 
court certainly could have distinguished Cummings from Rodriguez 
based on the vanishing reasonable suspicion factor, but did not.  
A unanimous court interpreted Rodriguez and the Supreme Court's 
granting, vacating, and remanding in Cummings I to mean a police 
officer who lawfully stops a vehicle may engage in the ordinary 
inquiries even if the reasonable suspicion initiating the stop 
dissipates. 
¶28 Fourth, our court of appeals recently interpreted 
Rodriguez in the same way the Illinois Supreme Court did.  In 
State v. Cotter, No. 2015AP1916-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016)(per curiam) a police officer stopped a 
car based on information that the registered owner (a woman) had 
a non-valid license.16  Id., ¶¶7, 9.  The driver of the car, 
however, turned out to be a man, not a woman.  Id., ¶9.  One of 
the car's passengers, Charles Cotter, challenged his narcotic 
drug conviction resulting from the discovery of heroin on his 
person during a pat-down search.  Id., ¶¶10-14.  Cotter argued 
                                                 
16 We 
note 
that 
State 
v. 
Cotter, 
No. 
2015AP1916-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016)(per curiam) 
is an unpublished per curiam, which according to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.23(3) may not be cited by the parties.  This court, of 
course, is not a party.  Moreover, Cotter is cited for the fact 
that the decision exists rather than for reliance on its legal 
analysis and holding. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
23 
 
this evidence should have been suppressed because once the 
officer saw the driver was a man, and not the woman with the 
invalid license, the officer no longer had any valid reason to 
extend the stop.  Id., ¶14.  That case also involved a broken 
driver's-side window, resulting in the officer having to open 
the passenger door to speak with the occupants.  Id., ¶10.  Our 
court of appeals held that Rodriguez controlled and this stop 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) the police 
lawfully stopped the car based on the registered owner's invalid 
license; and (2) even though the officer "could not issue a 
ticket on the basis for which the stop was initiated" the 
officer could "continue the stop for purposes of completing 
routine matters such as gathering [the driver's] license 
information, making attendant observations in the process."  
Id., ¶18.  The court of appeals concluded that the reasonable 
suspicion that developed while the ordinary inquiries occurred 
"provided a basis for the officers to extend the stop" and as a 
result, the discovery of heroin during Cotter's pat-down did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id., ¶19.  Cotter correctly 
points out that conducting the ordinary inquiries is not an 
extension of the stop; it is part of the mission of the stop 
itself.  Discovering additional reasonable suspicion during the 
ordinary inquiries can lead to a legal basis upon which to 
extend the stop beyond the ordinary inquiries. 
¶29 The three cases on which Smith heavily relies in 
advancing his contrary position, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979), Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), and State v. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
24 
 
Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 2017), are either distinguishable 
or not controlling. 
¶30 First, 
Smith 
argues 
Delaware 
v. 
Prouse 
shows 
Gonzalez's conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  Prouse 
held that random traffic stops simply to check a driver's 
license and registration absent any basis to stop the vehicle 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  440 U.S. at 650.  But this is 
not what happened to Smith.  Here, it is undisputed there was a 
lawful basis to stop the car Smith drove. 
¶31 Second, Smith turns to Florida v. Royer for its 
holding that police may not detain a person for "longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," and the 
"methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short 
period of time."  460 U.S. at 500.  Royer involved an airport 
traveler suspected of transporting narcotics in his suitcase. 
Id. at 493-94.  After approaching the traveler and questioning 
him, undercover officers took him into a large closet with a 
desk and two chairs, where he was in essence under arrest.  Id. 
at 494-97.  Smith's situation, unlike Royer, involved a traffic 
stop based on reasonable suspicion.  As already explained, 
Rodriguez tells us the purpose and scope of any lawful traffic 
stop includes both the officer's decision on whether to issue a 
ticket (which Gonzalez could not do because reasonable suspicion 
on that aspect dissipated), as well as the officer's completion 
of ordinary inquiries (which Gonzalez was attempting to do when 
he saw signs that Smith was driving drunk).  We are also not 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
25 
 
persuaded by Smith's assertion that Gonzalez violated Royer's 
requirement that an officer should use the "least intrusive 
means" in an investigative detention.  Smith argues the least 
intrusive means here required Gonzalez to speak to Smith through 
the closed and inoperable window.  Even if we could agree that 
requiring Gonzalez to shout through a closed window late at 
night constitutes the least intrusive means, it is unreasonable 
to expect Gonzalez to accomplish the ordinary inquiries through 
a closed window.  Under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 
(1977), an officer may ask a driver to step out of the car 
during a traffic stop because "[e]stablishing a face-to-face 
confrontation diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, 
that the driver can make unobserved movements" which could 
threaten the officer's safety.  A face-to-face confrontation is 
also necessary to accomplish the ordinary inquiries, as it would 
be difficult if not impossible to check a driver's license, 
registration, and insurance without having those documents in 
hand.  Requiring Gonzalez to accomplish the ordinary inquiries 
in 
the 
dark 
through 
a 
closed 
window 
is 
illogical 
and 
unreasonable. 
¶32 The third case Smith proffers to support his position 
is State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 2017).  Coleman is a 
post-Rodriguez case in which a sharply divided Iowa Supreme 
Court held, based on the Iowa Constitution, that an officer 
cannot conduct the ordinary inquiries if reasonable suspicion 
dispels after the initially lawful stop.  Id. at 285.  The 
majority in Coleman rejected Rodriguez's recitation of the long-
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
26 
 
established rule that ordinary inquiries are part of a lawful 
traffic stop as "dicta."  Id. at 300.  Three Iowa Supreme Court 
Justices dissented in Coleman, criticizing the majority for 
disregarding 
Rodriguez, 
for 
ignoring 
Iowa's 
statute 
that 
requires drivers to carry a driver's license and "display it 
upon an officer's request," for overruling prior Iowa case law 
consistent with Rodriguez, and for concluding for the first time 
that the search and seizure provision in Iowa's Constitution 
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Id. at 301-05.  We are not 
persuaded by Coleman for several reasons.  First, we are not 
bound by Iowa law, particularly judicial interpretations of its 
own constitution.  Second, it applies an untenably cramped 
interpretation of the holding in Rodriguez.  Third, it ignores 
the clear message the Supreme Court conveyed in its handling of 
Cummings I, resulting in the Illinois Supreme Court's reversal.  
Notably, Coleman is the only post-Rodriguez case in the country 
to conclude that checking a driver's license during an initially 
lawful traffic stop constitutes an unreasonable seizure when 
reasonable suspicion for the stop evaporates as the officer 
approaches the stopped car.17  We agree with the dissenters in 
                                                 
17 Smith also cites numerous other state and federal cases 
he contends prohibit police from asking for identification if 
reasonable suspicion triggering the traffic stop dissipated as 
the officer approached the vehicle.  All of these cases, 
however, pre-date the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
27 
 
Coleman in regarding an officer's request to see a driver's 
license during a traffic stop as "completely unobjectionable 
and, 
indeed, 
mundane" 
and 
therefore 
unquestionably 
constitutional.  Id. at 302.18 
                                                 
18 Justice Daniel Kelly's dissent conjures a law enforcement 
boogeyman but if speculation and storytelling determine the 
reasonableness of a police officer's actions, consider this 
reworked storyline: 
Female driver (name unknown as the officer will not be 
permitted to ask):  What are you stopping me for 
officer? 
Officer Doe:  I'm sorry.  I stopped this minivan 
because it is registered to Mr. Jones whose license is 
suspended.  But, you are not Mr. Jones.  I apologize 
for any inconvenience.  You are free to go. 
Female driver drives away. 
Officer Doe returns to his squad car and 30 minutes 
later hears a radioed alert to be on the lookout for a 
female suspect wanted for sex trafficking.  There are 
warrants out for her arrest.  The female is thought to 
be driving a minivan with six kidnapped girls.  The 
suspect matches the description of the driver Officer 
Doe just let go.  The female driver is never caught 
and five of the six girls are never heard from again.  
When the police locate the minivan, they find the 
sixth missing girl who has been badly beaten and 
drugged.  She reports the girls were forcibly drugged 
and physically and sexually abused and further reveals 
the trafficker's plan to transport the girls overseas 
to be sold as sex slaves.  The sixth girl later dies 
at the hospital during surgery to stop her internal 
bleeding. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Kelly's strawman overlooks a significant restraint 
on law enforcement:  constitutional reasonableness.  The parade 
of horribles Justice Kelly proffers is as probable as the 
proverbial boogeyman's existence.  They are designed to frighten 
despite materializing only in imagination and myth.  The 
principles declared today are not new.  Nearly 40 years ago, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that checking a driver's 
license during an otherwise lawful traffic stop constitutes a 
permissible inquiry.  See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-660 (1979)).  No court has 
expanded the ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop to 
include headlight, horn, or exhaust performance because the 
Fourth Amendment commands reasonableness.  We think the typical 
scenario in Officer Doe's stop of Mrs. Brown's minivan would be: 
Officer Doe:  License and registration please. 
Mrs. Brown:  Yes Officer.  Here it is.  Did I do 
something wrong? 
Officer Doe:  The car you are driving is registered to 
a Mr. Jones whose license is suspended. 
Mrs.  Brown:  Oh no.  I borrowed this minivan to get 
these kids to soccer practice.  The Jones' are my 
neighbors. 
Officer Doe:  Got it.  Give me a couple minutes to 
clear this up. 
Officer Doe goes back to the squad car and runs Mrs. 
Brown's license.  He comes back moments later, returns 
Mrs. Brown's license, and says:  "I'm sorry for the 
inconvenience.  Everything checks out.  You may be on 
your way." 
It is often easy for a court, which has the luxury to study 
the cold transcripts and ponder the nuances of case law, to 
criticize an officer's split-second decisions in high crime 
areas late at night.  But reasonableness cannot be measured with 
20/20 hindsight; instead, "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must 
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments——in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving . . . "  Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).  Sergeant Gonzalez's 
actions here were reasonable. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
29 
 
B.  Opening of the Passenger Door 
¶33 Smith also argues that opening the passenger door 
constituted 
a 
separate 
Fourth 
Amendment 
event 
requiring 
additional reasonable suspicion.  We do not agree.  Whether a 
search or seizure is reasonable depends upon the particular 
facts of each case, and what Gonzalez did under these facts was 
reasonable.  See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 
(1976) (citation omitted).19  Gonzalez approached the driver's 
door and asked Smith to open the door or the window.  Smith 
responded that both were broken.  As Gonzalez walked around to 
the passenger door, Smith appeared to be cooperating and moving 
toward the passenger seat, and seemed to be trying to open the 
passenger door.  The officer testified that Smith and he 
simultaneously 
opened 
the 
door 
and 
that 
they 
opened 
it 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
19 Courts have recognized a variety of circumstances where a 
search of a car does not infringe upon the Fourth Amendment:  
(1) when the driver consents, see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
248 (1991); (2) when an officer sees contraband in plain view, 
see State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, ¶¶26-27, 334 Wis. 2d 379, 799 
N.W.2d 775; (3) incident to an arrest, see Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332 (2009); (4) when an officer has probable cause to 
suspect a crime, see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); 
and (5) when a car has been impounded, see South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).  Police may also order the driver 
out of a vehicle for officer safety.  See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106 (1977); see also United States v. Stanfield, 109 
F.3d 976, 981 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing certain circumstances 
in which opening at least one of the vehicle's doors is 
consistent with concerns of officer safety). 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
30 
 
together.20  An officer may make reasonable inferences based on 
the facts drawn from his experience.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.  
It was reasonable for Gonzalez to infer that Smith's movements 
indicated he was willingly opening (or attempting to open) the 
passenger door.  The sergeant needed to communicate with and 
identify the driver whom he had stopped and there was no avenue 
to do that on the driver's side of the car due to the inoperable 
driver's window and door. 
¶34 Smith offers New Jersey v. Woodson, 566 A.2d 550 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), in support of his argument that 
Gonzalez unreasonably opened the door.  Smith's reliance on 
Woodson is misplaced.  We are neither bound by New Jersey 
authority nor persuaded that it presents similar facts.  In 
Woodson, police conducted a traffic stop and immediately opened 
the car door without making any attempt to speak with the 
driver.  Id. at 551.  The New Jersey court held this police 
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 552.  Woodson's 
facts are clearly distinguishable from Smith's. 
¶35 Finally, Gonzalez's act of opening the passenger door 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because under all the facts 
and circumstances, the action was reasonable and this intrusion 
on Smith's personal liberty was an incremental, de minimus one.  
See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109-11.  Under Mimms, a police officer 
                                                 
20 Again, we acknowledge the circuit court found it was the 
officer who opened the door.  Nonetheless, the circuit court did 
not find the officer's testimony in this regard not credible. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
31 
 
has the right to a face-to-face encounter with a driver during a 
lawful traffic stop.  "[T]his additional intrusion can only be 
described as de minimus."  Id. at 111.21 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We acknowledge that the police are not infallible, and 
a police officer may intentionally or unintentionally infringe 
upon the constitutional rights of Wisconsin citizens.  If that 
happens, it is the duty of this court to impose consequences for 
such violations.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 ("[E]xcluding evidence 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized 
as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.").  
Likewise, when the police abide by the rules and act reasonably, 
the Fourth Amendment is not violated and we must uphold 
convictions. 
¶37  The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the 
scope of constitutionally reasonable traffic stop seizures, 
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), requires 
upholding Smith's conviction.  Rodriguez acknowledges that 
"ordinary inquiries" are part of the mission of every lawful and 
reasonably executed traffic stop.  The mission of such stops is 
not completed until the police officer checks a driver's 
identification, even if reasonable suspicion for stopping the 
                                                 
21 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent assumes that Smith 
had permission to drive his sister's car.  See Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley's dissent, ¶11.  There is nothing in the record 
establishing that Smith had permission to drive his sister's 
car. 
No. 
2015AP756-CR 
 
32 
 
vehicle dissipates as the officer approaches the vehicle.  
Further, the officer's act of opening the passenger door to 
facilitate 
safe, 
face-to-face 
contact 
with 
the 
otherwise 
inaccessible driver did not constitute an unreasonable search. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP756-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶38 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I join Justice 
Kelly's dissent.  However, I write separately because I 
determine that the majority compounds its error when it departs 
from the clear directive of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 
(1977) (per curiam), extending the holding past its breaking 
point and further eroding the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
¶39 Contrary to the majority, I apply the clear precedent 
and conclude that Smith's Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when Sergeant Gonzalez opened Smith's passenger side door 
without a warrant or consent.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶40 In 
Mimms, 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
pulled 
the 
defendant over for driving a vehicle with an expired license 
plate.  Id. at 107.  One of the officers approached the car and 
asked the defendant to step out.  Id.  When the defendant did 
so, the officer noticed a bulge in his jacket, which turned out 
to be a gun.  Id.  After the State indicted the defendant on two 
weapons related offenses, the defendant moved to suppress the 
gun as evidence.  Id. 
¶41 The United States Supreme Court concluded that the 
police officers acted properly because law enforcement officers 
are allowed to order occupants to exit a lawfully stopped 
vehicle even if there is nothing unusual or suspicious about 
their behavior.  Id. at 111.  This court has recognized Mimms as 
No.  2015AP756-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
establishing a clear directive, "a per se rule that an officer 
may order a person out of his or her vehicle incident to an 
otherwise valid stop for a traffic violation."  State v. 
Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶23, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182 
(emphasis added); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶24, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560. 
¶42 Therein lies the rub.  As set forth in Justice Kelly's 
dissent, the facts here do not support the conclusion that this 
was "an otherwise valid stop."  Indeed, the State conceded that 
reasonable suspicion had dissipated when the officer realized 
the male driver was not the female registered owner.  Majority 
op., ¶14. 
II 
¶43 Not only does the majority violate Mimms' clear 
directive, 
it 
extends 
the 
holding 
beyond 
what 
is 
constitutionally 
permissible. 
 
Mimms 
explains 
that 
law 
enforcement officers may order occupants out of a vehicle during 
a traffic stop.  It does not suggest that police may open a 
vehicle door and invade the space inside absent a warrant.  See 
State v. Woodson, 566 A.2d 550, 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1989) ("There is a significant difference between ordering one 
out of a car and opening a car door without warning. In the 
former case, the occupant has an opportunity, before opening the 
door and leaving the car, to safeguard from public view matters 
as to which he has a privacy interest"). 
¶44 The majority fails to acknowledge the limitations of 
Mimms and extends its holding past its breaking point, reading 
No.  2015AP756-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
language into that opinion that is not present.  Mimms does not 
permit the officer's conduct in this case.  Contrary to the 
majority's assertion, Mimms does not imply that a police officer 
has "the right to a face-to-face encounter."  See Majority op., 
¶35.  And, it certainly does not extend such a right once the 
validity of the stop has been undermined because reasonable 
suspicion has dissipated. 
¶45 Rather, Mimms is limited to an officer verbally 
ordering an occupant out of a vehicle.  In determining that 
Mimms allows an officer to not only order an occupant out of a 
vehicle but to also invade the interior space of a vehicle by 
opening 
the 
door, 
the 
majority 
departs 
from 
what 
is 
constitutionally permissible and disregards the facts of this 
case. 
¶46 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and focuses on the reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  U.S. Const., amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Bruski, 
2007 WI 25, ¶22, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503; see also Wis. 
Const. art I, § 11.  Yet, the majority's conclusion ignores that 
a defendant in Smith's position has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the interior of a vehicle.  See State v. Dixon, 177 
Wis. 2d 461, 470, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993) ("This relationship 
[between the vehicle owner and the driver] and prior use of the 
vehicle point to the defendant having an expectation of privacy 
in the interior of the truck that society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable"). 
No.  2015AP756-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶47 The record reflects that the vehicle Smith was driving 
belonged to his sister.  A person who borrows a car and drives 
it with the owner's permission has an expectation of privacy in 
the interior of the vehicle which society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable, especially where the owner of the car 
is a family member.1  See id. at 470-72 (citing United States v. 
Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 830 (1984) (accused who borrowed a car from his brother 
had a protectable privacy interest in the vehicle)).  Opening 
the door of a vehicle is clearly contrary to this reasonable 
expectation of privacy.2 
¶48 With no reasonable suspicion remaining to support the 
stop, the objective of the stop at the point Gonzalez opened the 
door was simply to communicate with Smith.  But this easily 
could have been accomplished without invading the interior of 
the 
car. 
 
The 
record 
reflects 
that 
Sergeant 
Gonzalez 
successfully communicated with Smith through the closed door and 
                                                 
1 The record indicates that the prosecutor never contended 
that Smith used the vehicle without permission.  During cross 
examination, Smith reiterated that the car was his sister's.  
The prosecutor did not elicit any testimony about consent and 
there is nothing in the record indicating that Smith's use of 
the vehicle was without his sister's permission. 
2 I further observe that Officer Gonzalez violated the 
United States Supreme Court's decree that law enforcement must 
employ "investigative methods" that are the "least intrusive 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's 
suspicion in a short period of time."  Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 500 (1983).  The record does not support the assertion 
that opening Smith's passenger side door was the least intrusive 
means of completing the objective of the stop. 
No.  2015AP756-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
window on the driver's side of the car and understood Smith's 
responses without having to repeat himself.  Why then was it 
necessary to open the door? 
¶49 Applying 
the 
clear 
precedent 
under 
the 
facts 
presented, I conclude that Smith's Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated when Sergeant Gonzalez opened Smith's passenger side 
door without a warrant or consent. 
¶50 Finally, I observe that once again a majority of this 
court continues the trend of diminishing Fourth Amendment 
protections we have seen in recent years.  See Floyd, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, ¶¶83-89 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).  To 
give meaning to the Fourth Amendment, we must use it as a check 
on governmental power.  This court's decision fails to provide 
this check, instead giving law enforcement carte blanche to 
detain individuals when there is no reasonable suspicion that 
they have done anything wrong.  The majority further gives 
officers free reign to invade a space in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy without a warrant or consent 
when less intrusive means of communication demonstrably suffice. 
¶51 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶52 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶53 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (dissenting). 
I 
¶54 Frederick Smith is not a sympathetic character.  This 
case is here only because he was driving an automobile while 
drunk——really drunk:  his blood alcohol level was .38 when he 
was arrested.1  This is not his first time, or even his second.  
In fact, this is the seventh time he has been arrested and 
convicted of driving while intoxicated. And because we can be 
pretty confident that drunk drivers are not caught every time 
they go abroad with too much alcohol in their system, it's 
reasonable to believe that seven-time offenders make a habit of 
putting at risk the lives of everyone around them.  It is not 
without reason that drunk drivers have been described as a 
scourge.  See, e.g., State v. Nordness, 381 N.W.2d 300, 307, 128 
Wis. 2d 15 (1986) (describing drunk driving as "transform[ing] 
an innocent user of a highway into a victim at any time . . . " 
and as "a scourge on society").  To live in society peacefully, 
we must have at least a minimal level of trust that our 
neighbors won't habitually place us in mortal danger. We can 
count ourselves fortunate that Officer Gonzalez apprehended Mr. 
                                                 
1 To put this in context, a person with a blood alcohol 
concentration of .31 (that is, less than Mr. Smith), is at risk 
of death by alcohol poisoning.  See, e.g., National Institute on 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Alcohol Overdose: The Dangers of 
Drinking 
Too 
Much, 
https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/alcoholoverdosefactsheet
/overdosefact.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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Smith before he could maim or kill someone with the car he was 
driving.  The people of Wisconsin want drunk drivers to be 
stopped.  They need drunk drivers to be stopped. 
¶55 None of that, however, has anything to do with the 
proper understanding of the Fourth Amendment's proscription 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Whatever rule of 
police conduct we derive from that provision must be just as 
applicable to a soccer mom taking the neighborhood children to 
practice as it is to habitual drunk drivers like Mr. Smith.  
Indeed, the rule we announce today would probably benefit from 
considering how it would apply in a legally identical but less 
emotionally-fraught situation. 
¶56 So let's consider the soccer mom, Mrs. Brown.  Her 
automobile is in the shop for maintenance, so Mrs. Jones (Mrs. 
Brown's neighbor and best friend) lent her the family's minivan.  
While Mrs. Brown is en route to soccer practice with a vehicle 
full of children, Officer Doe runs the plates and discovers the 
registered owner, Mr. Jones, has a suspended driver's license.  
Believing Mr. Jones is driving the minivan, he pulls it over.  
Upon approaching the driver's window, he realizes his mistake.  
But instead of apologizing for his interference with Mrs. 
Brown's liberty, the following conversation takes place: 
"Good afternoon, ma'am," said Officer Doe.  "I pulled 
you over because I thought you were Mr. Jones.  
Obviously, I couldn't be more wrong.  You needn't be 
alarmed——I don't believe you have broken any laws, nor 
does it appear you are contemplating doing so." 
"Oh," 
replied 
Mrs. 
Brown, 
somewhat 
disconcerted.  
"Just 
so 
I 
understand, 
you 
presently 
have 
no 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
reasonable suspicion to believe I have done anything 
wrong?" 
"That is correct, ma'am." 
"Then I may leave?" Mrs. Brown inquired. 
"Actually, no," said Officer Doe.  "You see, I'm 
curious about a few things.  I want to know whether 
you have your driver's license with you.  I'm also 
curious about whether it is valid, and whether there 
are any warrants for your arrest, or if there are any 
other reasons law enforcement might be interested in 
you." 
"Please understand that I have no reason to believe 
you don't have a valid driver's license with you, or 
that law enforcement has any reason to be interested 
in you," Officer Doe continued.  "And, of course, this 
has absolutely nothing to do with the reason I 
mistakenly pulled you over in the first place.  
However, a new Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, State 
v. Smith, says I can compel you to remain here until I 
finish satisfying my curiosity on these subjects." 
¶57 That's enough of a vignette for the analysis.  But 
it's important to note that this is not the full extent of the 
intrusion Officer Doe could command under these entirely 
innocent circumstances.  If our decision today is correct, he 
could also have his narcotics-detection dog sniff the perimeter 
of the automobile to see if it would alert for the presence of 
illegal substances while awaiting the report on Mrs. Brown.2  And 
he could order Mrs. Brown out of the minivan.3  He could even 
order all of the children to stand along the roadside while he 
                                                 
2 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
3 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
completed his "incidental" questioning.4  His authority to do all 
of this comes not from anything Mrs. Brown did, but from a 
mistake of Officer Doe's own making.5 
II 
¶58 This case requires us to identify the point at which 
the Fourth Amendment says a traffic stop must end.  Is it when 
the purpose for initiating the stop is satisfied, or may a 
police officer continue the seizure to pursue other objectives?  
That is, must Officer Doe end Mrs. Brown's seizure when he 
discovers she is not Mr. Jones, or may he maintain the seizure 
to ask questions that have no connection to a reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing? 
¶59 In giving our imprimatur to the latter, we erred, and 
significantly so.  In adopting the constitutionally-unique 
concept of a "dual mission" traffic stop, we created a mission 
                                                 
4 See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. 
Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11 (no 
Fourth Amendment violation occurs where an officer orders "a 
driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle") and 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997) (an officer may 
require passengers to exit a vehicle lawfully stopped for a 
traffic violation).   
5 The court says my hypothetical is a strawman.  Majority 
op., ¶32 n.18.  A strawman is a debate technique in which one 
participant pursues a rhetorical advantage by positing and 
refuting an argument the other participant didn't make.  All I 
have done with this vignette is remove the elements that make 
Mr. Smith an unsympathetic character and replace them with 
elements that make the subject of the seizure neutral or 
sympathetic——elements, that is, that should not affect our 
analysis.  Because the court has identified no constitutionally-
significant difference between Mrs. Brown and Mr. Smith, I 
disagree with its conclusion that this is a strawman. 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
that allows a police officer to seize an individual without any 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  And we took this ground-
breaking step based largely on a "signal" we discerned from the 
vacation of the Cummings I6 judgment by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
A 
¶60 Let's start with this——we should never countenance a 
traffic stop "mission" that is not tied to the Constitution.  
Power bristles at restraint, which is why we chain it firmly to 
constitutional anchor points.  That is true whether the exercise 
of power involves the taking of personal property for public 
use, or inhibiting speech or publications, or the possession of 
arms, or conducting a traffic stop.  We may disagree about the 
length of the chain, but we have always agreed that the 
Constitution must hold its anchor.  Until today.  Today we have 
dual mission traffic stops in which one mission is tethered to 
the Fourth Amendment and the other is not.  
¶61 The first mission we describe in our opinion is the 
conventional one, the one which we have always understood to be 
inexorably linked to the purpose for the traffic stop, and thus 
to the Constitution.  Notwithstanding our suggestion to the 
contrary, Rodriguez didn't say a single word from which we may 
infer the existence of any other mission.  It started with the 
                                                 
6 Like the majority, I will refer to People v. Cummings, 6 
N.E.3d 725 (Ill. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015), as 
"Cummings I."  I will likewise refer to People v. Cummings, 46 
N.E.3d 248 (Ill. 2016) as "Cummings II." 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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broad observation that "[l]ike a Terry[7] stop, the tolerable 
duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is 
determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic 
violation that warranted the stop, . . . and attend to related 
safety concerns[.]"  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (citations omitted).  And it 
recognized that "'[t]he scope of the detention must be carefully 
tailored to its underlying justification.'"  See id. (quoting 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)).  
The underlying justification that defines the scope of the 
detention is the event that caused the officer to initiate the 
stop:  "Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the 
stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that 
purpose."  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (internal marks and 
citation omitted).  From this the Rodriguez Court concluded that 
the authority for a traffic stop cannot outlast its purpose:  
"Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the 
traffic 
infraction 
are——or 
reasonably 
should 
have 
been——
completed."  Id.  Most importantly to our decision today, 
Rodriguez confirmed that even if a seizure was constitutional 
when it began, it can lose this status if it continues after the 
purpose for the stop has been satisfied.  "[A] traffic stop 'can 
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete th[e] mission' of issuing a warning 
ticket."  Id. at 1614-15 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
                                                 
7 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).  Everything Rodriguez said about the 
traffic mission——everything——describes it in terms of the 
singular mission we have always ascribed to a valid traffic 
stop, to wit, the investigation of an officer's reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing.  As discussed at length, infra, 
"officer safety" and "the usual inquiries" have always been 
incidents to the purpose of the traffic stop, and Rodriguez said 
not a single word to the contrary. 
¶62 And everything Rodriguez said about the constraining 
chain refers back to the constitutional anchor:  Reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing.  That, and that alone, is what defines 
the purpose of the stop.  That purpose, in turn, defines "the 
tolerable duration of police inquiries."  And the tolerable 
duration of police inquiries defines, in its own turn, the 
uttermost extent of the authority to seize a person.  If the 
seizure goes beyond that, the police are on forbidden ground.  
Link by link by link, courts test the soundness of the 
connection between the constitutional anchor and the exercise of 
power.  This has been the state of the law for long enough to 
consider it settled.  Inasmuch as Rodriguez did nothing but 
recite these principles, we can safely conclude it hasn't 
disturbed the chain's continued integrity.  And nothing in that 
recitation of well-established principles hints at the existence 
of a companion mission. 
¶63 The second mission, the one we created today, breaks 
the link to the constitutional anchor point.  This mission is 
triggered by a constitutional traffic stop, but after its 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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genesis it lives separately and apart from the purpose of the 
stop and, hence, its constitutional limits.  We called this 
second 
mission 
into 
existence 
by 
promoting 
the 
"usual 
inquiries,"8 which used to occupy the lowly office of incidents 
to a traffic stop, all the way up to a rank of equal dignity 
with the purpose of the traffic stop itself. 
¶64 Rodriguez 
referred 
to 
these 
usual 
inquiries 
as 
"incident to the traffic stop."  135 S. Ct. at 1615 (citation, 
brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).  So did 
Caballes, in which the court observed that "the duration of the 
stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense 
and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop."  543 
U.S. at 408; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 
(1984) ("Typically, this means that the officer may ask the 
detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his 
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or 
dispelling the officer's suspicions."). 
¶65 As "incidents" to a traffic stop, the usual inquiries 
are logically and constitutionally subordinate to the purpose of 
the stop.  An incident does not exist on the same plane as its 
premise.  That is true as a matter of definition.  An incident 
is "something dependent upon, appertaining or subordinate to, or 
accompanying something else of greater or principal importance."  
Incident, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986).  
                                                 
8 The usual inquiries, of course, refer to a police 
officer's request to see a person's driver's license and proof 
of registration and insurance. 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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Because 
the 
usual 
inquiries, 
according 
to 
Rodriguez 
and 
Caballes, are incidents to a traffic stop, they can have no 
independent existence.  In the world of logic, that's what it 
means to be dependent on something.  That's why a seizure that 
begins with a constitutional basis can become unconstitutional:  
"[A] traffic stop 'can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond 
the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission' of 
issuing a warning ticket."  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15 
(quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407).   
¶66 Therefore, by main force of precedent and logic, the 
usual inquiries cannot be made after the purpose for the traffic 
stop——investigation of a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing——no 
longer exists.  The usual inquiries are thereby subjected to 
constitutional restraint, but only because they are subordinate 
to the purpose of the traffic stop, which is textually bound to 
the Fourth Amendment. 
¶67 That is why we had to give the usual inquiries a 
promotion.  As mere incidents they can have no existence beyond 
the purpose of the traffic stop.  If Officer Doe is to 
authoritatively 
maintain 
Mrs. 
Brown's 
seizure 
after 
the 
dissipation of reasonable suspicion (the constitutional anchor 
point), the usual inquiries must be more than incidents.  We 
accomplished the promotion with some clever melding of our voice 
with Rodriguez.  We said that Rodriguez "concluded that asking 
for identification is an ordinary inquiry that is related to the 
purpose of a lawful stop as part of its dual mission and the 
stop 'may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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purpose.'"  Majority op., ¶10 n.9 (quoting Rodriguez, 135 
S. Ct. at 1614-15).  Placing "dual mission" in the sentence 
where we did suggests that Rodriguez says the "purpose" of the 
stop includes both the traffic infraction and the desire to make 
the ordinary inquiries.  Notwithstanding our voice-melding, 
however, Rodriguez still says the purpose of the stop is to 
address the traffic infraction. 
¶68 With this promotion from "incident" to parity with the 
"purpose of the traffic stop," we freed the usual inquiries from 
their constitutional anchor point.  We observed that "[w]hen 
Gonzalez saw the driver of the stopped car was a man, the first 
part of the mission ended."  Majority op., ¶20.  That is to say, 
the mission anchored in the Fourth Amendment ended.  But because 
of the promotion, Officer Gonzalez didn't need to end the 
traffic stop:  "The second mission of the traffic stop, however, 
had 
not 
been 
performed——checking 
the 
driver's 
license, 
registration, and insurance."  Id.  So we concluded that "[t]he 
mission of the lawful traffic stop did not end when reasonable 
suspicion dissipated because at that moment, the sergeant had 
not completed the ordinary inquiries of checking Smith's 
license, registration, and insurance."  Majority op., ¶21.  Et 
voilà:  The advent of a traffic mission that allows a police 
officer to seize a person with no reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing whatsoever. 
¶69 This should shock us.  The "reasonable suspicion" 
requirement is not an archaic formula to which we give rote 
obeisance.  It is, instead, the only textual link to the Fourth 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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Amendment's promise that we shall be free of "unreasonable" 
seizures.  This is the stuff of our deepest bedrock principles:  
"[A person] may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so . . . ."  Royer, 460 
U.S. at 498.  Courts have spent decades fine-tuning what this 
principle means in the context of traffic stops.  They have 
scrupled over, for just a few examples, whether the officer may 
require drivers to exit their vehicles,9 or make passengers exit 
a vehicle,10 or request permission to perform a pat-down search,11 
or ask questions unrelated to the traffic stop,12 or conduct a 
canine sniff,13 or extend the stop based on discoveries made 
while reasonable suspicion exists.14  We went through this very 
exercise just last term, when we said: 
[W]e draw the line between traffic stops of proper 
duration and those that extend into unconstitutional 
territory 
according 
to 
functional 
considerations. . . .  Generally speaking, an officer 
is on the proper side of the line so long as the 
incidents necessary to carry out the purpose of the 
traffic stop have not been completed, and the officer 
has not unnecessarily delayed the performance of those 
incidents. . . .  He steps across that line (again 
speaking generally) when he maintains the seizure 
                                                 
9 Mimms, 434 U.S. 106. 
10 Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). 
11 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
12 Id. 
13 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1609; Caballes, 543 U.S. 405. 
14 State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
12 
 
after he has completed all the necessary functions 
attendant on the traffic stop. 
State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶22, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 
(internal citations omitted; emphasis added).  In all of this, 
the courts microscopically examined the purpose of the stop so 
that they could identify the point at which it must end. 
¶70 Identifying the end point of the second mission 
requires no such fastidiousness.  This mission is not based on 
"reasonable, objective grounds" to believe legal mischief is 
afoot.  Until today, those grounds had always been the 
constitutional anchor to which we tethered the exercise of an 
officer's power during a traffic stop.  And it is the anchor we 
now discard.  This mission has no textual link to the Fourth 
Amendment, so our new "usual inquiries" jurisprudence sets us at 
odds with Royer (and the rest of the Fourth Amendment "seizure" 
canon):  The police may detain a person without "reasonable, 
objective grounds" for doing so. 
¶71 This frees traffic stops from constitutionally-defined 
limitations on at least two dimensions——length and content.  In 
the pre-Smith world, the duration of the stop was subject to an 
externally imposed limitation——it could last no longer than 
necessary to investigate the officer's reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing.  The second mission has no such limitation.  So how 
long may it last?  Well, we said "the 'ordinary inquiries,' 
which are related in scope to the purpose of a traffic stop, 
must be executed within the time it should have reasonably taken 
to complete them."  Majority op., ¶2.  In other words, the 
inquiries must be executed in the time it takes to execute them.  
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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We also said that Rodriguez "signaled that 'ordinary inquiries' 
remain reasonable for the duration of an otherwise lawful stop."  
Majority op., ¶19.15  Which is a different way of saying the same 
thing.  One of the problems with defining an activity's lawful 
boundary in terms of how long the activity lasts is that it is 
not possible to cross the boundary.  Ever.  That's the "limit" 
we set today on the second part of our brand new dual mission. 
¶72 The 
reason 
we 
have 
traditionally 
required 
a 
constitutional anchor point is so that we may have a boundary 
that is not self-referential.  That is, we tie the duration of 
the traffic stop to its purpose, and then we tie the purpose to 
the reasonable suspicion that inspired the stop, and then we tie 
the reasonable suspicion to the Fourth Amendment's text by 
observing that it prevents unreasonable seizures.  Thus, the 
temporal aspect of the seizure had a constitutional anchor and 
limit that was not self-referential.  That's part of what we 
lose today.  Because the usual inquiries no longer require the 
existence of any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, there is no 
                                                 
15 The meaning of this statement is not entirely clear.  On 
its face, its reference to an "otherwise lawful stop" seems to 
undermine (in the space of three words) the entire rationale of 
the opinion.  The only "otherwise" about the lawful duration of 
the traffic stop was the existence of reasonable suspicion, 
which everyone acknowledges ran out before the officer engaged 
in the usual inquiries.  That would mean the inquiries in this 
case were extra-constitutional.  The other potential reading of 
the statement makes it appear we are defining the lawful 
duration of the stop in terms of how long it takes to conduct 
the inquiries.  That doesn't help at all.  One can't measure 
something by reference to itself.  If someone asks after the 
height of our Capitol and we say it is one Capitol high, we have 
been perfectly accurate while conveying exactly no information. 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
14 
 
link between them and the Fourth Amendment.  So they may last as 
long as they last.  We may eventually encounter a case in which 
the amount of time the officer took to make the ordinary 
inquiries will make us uncomfortable.  But when we try to 
explain why the seizure lasted too long, we'll find that we have 
put our constitutional measuring stick beyond our reach.  It is 
not immediately apparent what will take its place. 
¶73 The same is true with respect to the contents of the 
"usual 
inquiries." 
 
These 
aren't 
spelled 
out 
in 
the 
Constitution, and we've not given much attention to their 
content because an officer may question drivers even on 
unrelated subjects so long as they do not extend the traffic 
stop.  See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15.  The Supreme Court 
explained that the usual inquiries are justifiable "incidents" 
of a traffic stop because they "serve the same objective as 
enforcement of the traffic code:  ensuring that vehicles on the 
road are operated safely and responsibly."  Id. at 1615.  As 
incidents, there was an external limitation on how far the 
police could go in "enforc[ing] the traffic code" during a 
traffic stop, to wit, the amount of time within which there was 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. 
¶74 Because we have elevated the usual inquiries beyond 
the status of incidents, however, there is no longer any 
external limitation on how far they can go.  If demanding 
presentation of a driver's license during a traffic stop is 
constitutionally 
permissible 
because 
it 
"serves 
the 
same 
objective as enforcement of the traffic code," then it must 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
15 
 
certainly be true that ascertaining compliance with the actual 
traffic code can be no less constitutional. 
¶75 Our opinion teaches that the traffic stop does not end 
until inquiries related to the safe and responsible operation of 
the vehicle have been conducted.  Enterprising officers may 
teach us, in turn, that there is a whole lot more to the safe 
and responsible operation of a vehicle than a driver's license 
and proof of registration and insurance.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.10(2) (describing the required performance of headlights); 
Wis. Stat. § 347.13 (describing the required performance of 
taillights); Wis. Stat. § 347.39(2) (describing required exhaust 
system 
performance 
and 
safety 
requirements); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.36(1) (describing required brake system performance); Wis. 
Stat. § 347.38(1) (describing the horn's required performance); 
Wis. Stat. § 347.40 (describing the required performance of 
rear-view mirrors).  Each of these traffic-code provisions is at 
least as closely related to the safe and responsible operation 
of a vehicle as possession of a driver's license. 
¶76 Perhaps the court will say that inquiring into these 
aspects of the safe and responsible operation of a vehicle is 
not part of what we call "usual."  Which would be both true and 
irrelevant.  The "usual inquiries" are usual not because the 
Constitution says they are, but because the judiciary says they 
are.  The only limitation any court has ever placed on them is 
that they must be related to the safe and responsible operation 
of vehicles, and that they be incidents to the traffic stop.  
We've removed the latter limitation, so we are free to give the 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
16 
 
"usual" label to as many inquiries as we wish, so long as they 
comply with the "safe and responsible operation" boundary. 
¶77 The court says this should present no worries because 
the 
usual 
inquiries 
are 
subject 
to 
the 
constraint 
of 
"constitutional reasonableness."  Majority op., ¶32 n.18.  I had 
thought this type of reasonableness consisted of "reasonable" 
suspicion of wrongdoing.  Our opinion today says that's wrong 
(or at least incomplete), so it would have been helpful if we 
had described the parameters of this constraint and identified 
its reference point in the Constitution.  The police and our 
courts will need this guidance. 
B 
¶78 Authorizing a police officer to seize an individual 
when there is no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing is enough to 
send a tremor through the foundation of the Fourth Amendment.  
If the United States Supreme Court had explicitly commanded such 
a result, we would be justified in questioning whether the 
Fourth Amendment's terms really are congruent with Article I 
section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.16  But we aren't 
responding 
to 
an 
explicit 
command 
here——we're 
reading 
a 
"signal." 
                                                 
16 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
17 
 
¶79 Our opinion carefully avoids an independent analysis 
of whether Rodriguez is truly responsible for this seismic 
event.  Instead, we focus on environmental factors at the time 
of the Court's decision:  "Before applying Rodriguez to the 
particular circumstances in Smith's case, we first examine the 
conditions 
surrounding 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
holding 
in 
Rodriguez."  Majority op., ¶16.  One of the conditions was the 
Supreme Court's treatment of an Illinois Supreme Court case 
involving the same issue we are addressing.  See majority op., 
¶¶16-19; see also People v. Cummings, 6 N.E.3d 725 (Ill. 2014), 
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015).  We concluded that "[w]hen the 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Cummings I and remanded 
the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for further consideration 
in light of Rodriguez it signaled that 'ordinary inquiries' 
remain reasonable for the duration of an otherwise lawful stop."  
Majority op., ¶19.17  And then we adopted the Cummings II 
analysis of Rodriguez as our own.  Id. ("The Illinois Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation 
of 
Rodriguez 
in 
Cummings 
II 
is 
correct.").   
¶80 Armed with the Rodriguez "signal" and Cummings II, we 
decided the merits of this case.  That puts a premium on the 
incisiveness of the Cummings II opinion.  But it appears the 
Illinois Supreme Court also relied on signaling.  In relevant 
part, the court said: 
                                                 
17 This statement is substantively problematic apart from 
the importance it attaches to a Supreme Court "signal."  See 
supra note 15. 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
18 
 
The seizure's mission consists of the purpose of the 
stop——in Rodriguez, traffic enforcement——and "related 
safety concerns."  Those related safety concerns 
include "'ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] 
stop,'" and typically "involve checking the driver's 
license, determining whether there are outstanding 
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 
automobile's registration and proof of insurance." 
People v. Cummings, 46 N.E.3d 248, 251 (Ill. 2016) (citations 
omitted).  The court concluded that the traffic stop may 
continue even without the existence of reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing because "[t]he interest in officer safety permits a 
driver's license request of a driver lawfully stopped."  Id. at 
253. 
¶81 The Cummings II analysis is an unabashed bootstrap.  
Between Officer Doe and Mrs. Brown, it would sound something 
like this: 
"Why are you continuing my seizure?" Mrs. Brown asked. 
"To engage in the usual inquiries," replied Officer 
Doe. 
"But why do you need to engage in the 
usual 
inquiries?" persisted Mrs. Brown. 
"To 
ensure 
my 
safety," 
Officer 
Doe 
patiently 
explained. 
"Why is your safety an issue?" 
"Because I'm continuing your seizure, of course," 
concluded Officer Doe. 
¶82 Is it really necessary to point out that concerns over 
the officer's safety would vanish if he ended the seizure?  Or 
that ending the seizure would make the usual inquiries moot? 
¶83 So, based on nothing more than a Supreme Court signal 
and the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of that signal, 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
19 
 
we decided that the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of an 
individual without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  That's 
an awfully momentous decision to base on a signal. 
III 
¶84 We ask, semi-rhetorically:  "But in these particular 
circumstances, does the Fourth Amendment require a police 
officer to freeze, do an about-face, and walk away?"  Majority 
op., ¶15.  The answer is definitively "no."  But not for the 
reasons we gave, and certainly not with the same consequences. 
¶85 The real reason the answer is "no" is because the 
officer deprived Mr. Smith of his liberty and had no continuing 
justification for withholding that liberty from him.  Once 
seized by a police officer during a traffic stop, a driver may 
not leave until the traffic stop is finished.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(2t) ("No operator of a vehicle, after having received a 
visible or audible signal to stop his or her vehicle from a 
traffic officer or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly resist 
the traffic officer by failing to stop his or her vehicle as 
promptly as safety reasonably permits."); see also, Arizona v. 
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) ("Normally, the stop ends when 
the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform 
the driver and passengers they are free to leave.").  So, in 
these circumstances, the officer's clear, unequivocal, mandatory 
duty was to approach Mr. Smith and inform him he was free to 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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leave.18  Of course, if the officer develops a reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing during this brief interaction, he may 
proceed with the seizure just as if the reasonable suspicion had 
never lapsed. 
¶86 If our focus is on whether it was a good thing to 
catch Mr. Smith, then this is a galling result, given what we 
know about his state of inebriation when Officer Gonzalez seized 
him.  But the Constitution is not a Dorian Gray-like bargain in 
which we accept the beauty of apprehending Mr. Smith in exchange 
for the ugliness of Mrs. Brown's unreasonable seizure. The 
Constitution's instruction on this question is categorical:  A 
person may not be "detained even momentarily without reasonable, 
objective grounds for doing so."  And because it is categorical, 
                                                 
18 The court says my analysis would not allow the officer to 
excuse Mr. Smith because I eschew "any further contact with the 
driver . . . past the moment reasonable suspicion dissipates."  
Majority op., ¶15 n.12.  I don't think that is so.  Every 
traffic stop must eventually end, and it ends when the officer 
tells the motorist he is free to go.  Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.  
The duty to release the motorist stems from the constitutional 
mandate that a person "may not be detained even momentarily 
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so . . . ."  
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).  Actualizing that 
mandate requires the officer to approach the motorist to tell 
him the seizure is over.  Requiring production of a driver's 
license, and proof of registration and insurance, however, does 
nothing to further that task. 
No.  2015AP756-CR.dk 
 
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it applies even when it means we don't catch Mr. Smith and his 
like.19 
¶87 It is important, essential even, to consider how our 
decision impacts Mrs. Brown.  Neither she nor anyone like her 
will ever come before this court, for she has done nothing wrong 
and, consequently, will never be party to a case we can review.  
But we have, nonetheless, decided how she may be treated.  So 
Mrs. Brown may spend an evening fielding calls from irate 
parents asking why their children were lined up along the 
roadside while a narcotics-detection dog searched the minivan.  
After the last call, perhaps she will pull out her pocket 
Constitution and puzzle over why the promise of freedom from 
unreasonable seizures means she can be seized for no reason at 
all.  Because I can't explain that to her, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
                                                 
19 To illustrate why my analysis is untenable, the court 
proposes an alternate scenario in which the apparently innocent 
minivan driver is actually a sex trafficker.  Majority op., ¶32 
n.18.  Conducting the usual inquiries in those circumstances, it 
says, would have revealed there was criminal behavior afoot.  
True enough.  But doesn't that just prove my point?  The court's 
scenario could be read as favoring suspicion-free police 
investigations because of the results they might produce.  But 
we don't measure the constitutionality of a search in terms of 
its effectiveness in revealing hidden malefaction.  According to 
Royer, we measure it in terms of reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing.  If the investigation is not necessary to address 
the purpose of the stop, it may last only as long as there is 
reasonable suspicion.  Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.  Suspicion-free 
investigations like the one the court described might be very 
productive, but that doesn't make them constitutional. 
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