Title: Baker Bus Service v. Keith

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

Decided April 6, 1981. William F. Hufnagel (orally), Winthrop, for plaintiffs. Beins, Axelrod & Osborne, P.C., Jonathan G. Axelrod (orally), Washington, D.C., for Teamsters Local Union 48. Michael C. Ryan (orally), Maine Labor Relations Board, Augusta, Gary F. Thorne, Mitchell & Stearns, Bangor, for defendant. Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, GODFREY, GLASSMAN and CARTER, JJ. McKUSICK, Chief Justice. On May 29, 1979, Teamsters Union Local No. 48 filed with the Maine Labor Relations Board a prohibited practice complaint against Baker Bus Service alleging that Baker Bus had violated the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Act,[1] 26 M.R. S.A. § 964(1)(A) and (B),[2] by discharging an employee bus driver, Prescott Chapman, because of his union activities. In its decision of March 3, 1980, the Board ordered Baker Bus to cease and desist from interfering with or discouraging union activities of Local 48 members and to make an offer of reinstatement with back pay to Chapman. On September 4, 1980, the Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the decision of the Board finding the reasons given by Baker Bus for the discharge were "primarily pretextual." On the employer's further appeal to this court, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. *56 On its appeal to the Law Court, Baker Bus asserts that both the Board and the Superior Court based their decisions upon a legal rule that a discharge is a prohibited practice under the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Act even if it is motivated by antiunion animus only in part or as only one of several factors, and that such a legal rule is erroneous. Baker Bus contends that, to make a discharge unlawful under the Act, antiunion animus must be the dominant motive for the employer's action.[3] Although the Board has apparently adopted the "in part" rule, we have no occasion in the case at bar to choose between the two competing standards of proof. In any event, the Board found that the employer's reasons for discharging Chapman were primarily pretextual and that the only significant reason for the discharge was to interfere with union activity.[4] In other words, the Board found as a fact that Baker Bus' dominant motive in firing the employee was to discourage or interfere with unionization. On the record before the Board, that finding is not clearly erroneous and so it is binding on any appellate court. M.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Even if we were to adopt the more demanding "dominant motive" standard of proof, the Board's conclusion that Baker Bus had committed a prohibited practice would still stand.[5] The entry shall be: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. All concurring.