Title: State v. Goss

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 104 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1113-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jason E. Goss, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 23, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 5, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
Lisa K. Stark 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Dan Chapman and Chapman Law Office, Hudson and oral argument by 
Dan Chapman. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2011 WI 104
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1113-CR 
(L.C. No. 
08-CF-712) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Jason E. Goss,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
DEC 23, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the 
conviction of Jason Goss for fifth offense drunk driving.1 The 
case arises from a traffic stop.  Goss was stopped by a police 
officer for having a dirty license plate and a broken license 
plate lamp.  After pulling Goss over, the officer discovered 
that Goss had a revoked license and had four prior drunk driving 
convictions and was therefore subject to a .02 prohibited 
                                                 
1 State v. Goss, No. 2010AP1113-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2010). 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
2 
 
alcohol content (PAC) standard.2  In the course of arresting Goss 
for the license offense, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol 
and asked Goss to provide a breath sample for a preliminary 
breath test (PBT), a request that under statute may be made only 
where there is probable cause to believe the driver is operating 
a vehicle in violation of one of the statutes related to drunk 
driving. 
¶2 
We are asked to determine whether the officer's 
request for the PBT breath sample was made in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.303, which states that an officer "may request" a 
PBT breath sample "[i]f a law enforcement officer has probable 
cause to believe that the person is violating or has violated s. 
346.63," which prohibits driving or operating a motor vehicle 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration.  We agree with Goss 
that the legislature's intent was to require probable cause for 
a request for a PBT breath sample for all non-commercial 
drivers, including those who are subject to a reduced prohibited 
alcohol content standard.  This case presents a question we have 
not previously addressed: whether probable cause exists to 
request a PBT breath sample when the driver is known to be 
subject to a .02 PAC standard, the officer knows it would take 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 340.01 (46m)(c) (2007-08) defines "Prohibited 
alcohol concentration" as "an alcohol concentration of more than 
0.02" for persons who have three or more "prior convictions, 
suspensions or revocations as counted under s. 343.307(1)."  
There is no dispute that Goss was subject to the .02 PAC 
standard under Wis. Stat. § 340.01 (46m)(c). All references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless 
otherwise noted. 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
3 
 
very little alcohol for the driver to exceed that limit, and the 
officer smells alcohol on the driver. We now hold that under 
these circumstances, there is probable cause to request a PBT 
breath sample.  The PBT breath sample in this case was requested 
on the basis of probable cause as the statute requires, and we 
therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On October 12, 2008, Goss was pulled over by an Eau 
Claire Police Department officer for an obstructed license plate 
violation.  Goss admitted to the officer that his driver’s 
license was currently revoked, which the officer confirmed by 
contacting headquarters.  The officer was also informed that 
Goss had four prior drunk driving convictions.  The officer then 
placed Goss under arrest for operating with a revoked license.  
As the officer placed Goss in the squad car, the officer noticed 
the smell of alcohol.3 
                                                 
3  Questioning occurred before Goss was given his Miranda 
warnings and Goss's statements were later suppressed by the 
circuit court. The suppression of these statements was not 
appealed by the State and is not at issue here. Goss's 
suppressed statements are not considered in our analysis. 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
4 
 
¶4 
The officer then asked Goss to provide a breath sample 
for a PBT, and Goss complied.4  The PBT indicated a 0.084% blood 
alcohol content. Following the PBT, the officer asked Goss to 
perform field sobriety tests and then took him to a local 
hospital, where a sample of his blood was taken pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(2).5  Chemical analysis of the blood sample 
revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.080%.  Goss was 
subsequently charged with fifth offense drunk driving in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
¶5 
In pretrial motions before the circuit court for Eau 
Claire County, the Hon. Lisa K. Stark presiding, Goss asked that 
the results of the PBT be suppressed on the grounds that 
probable cause did not exist under these circumstances for the 
                                                 
4 The State at oral argument suggested that the court adopt 
a rule for those refusing to provide a PBT breath sample that is 
analogous to the rule the court of appeals set forth in State v. 
Babbitt, 188 Wis. 2d 349, 362, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that "admission of [a driver's] refusal to perform a 
field sobriety test as evidence of probable cause to arrest did 
not violate her fifth amendment rights").  Goss did not refuse 
to provide a breath sample, and we have no reason to address 
that question on the facts of this case.  
5 Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2) provides:  
Implied consent. Any person who . . .  drives or 
operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of 
this state . . . is deemed to have given consent to 
one or more tests of his or her breath, blood or 
urine, for the purpose of determining the presence or 
quantity 
in 
his 
or 
her 
blood 
or 
breath, 
of 
alcohol . . . when requested to do so by a law 
enforcement officer under sub. (3)(a) or (am) or when 
required to do so under sub. (3)(ar) or (b). Any such 
tests shall be administered upon the request of a law 
enforcement officer. . . .  
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
5 
 
officer to request it.6  Goss argued that the only basis for the 
officer's request was the odor of alcohol; he argued that such a 
basis is insufficient because this court had stated in County of 
Jefferson v. Renz that the probable cause required by the PBT 
statute for a non-commercial driver was intended to mean "more 
proof than 'any presence' of an intoxicant."7 
¶6 
The circuit court found that probable cause existed to 
request a breath sample from Goss under these circumstances.  
The circuit court stated,  
The question is then: Based upon the fact that the 
officer knew this gentleman's license was revoked, he 
had four prior OWI offenses and he smelled like 
intoxicants and the officer clearly knew that the 
blood alcohol content permissible is .02, is that 
enough to request a preliminary breath test and field 
sobriety tests?   
 . . . . 
                                                 
6 The consequence of suppressing the blood test would 
generally be the suppression of all subsequently obtained 
evidence.  
[I]n its broadest sense, the [fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine] can be regarded . . . as a device to 
prohibit the use of any secondary evidence which is 
the product of or which owes its discovery to illegal 
government activity.'   
Although the fruit of the poisonous tree sprouted from 
the Fourth Amendment . . . [the] doctrine has been 
applied to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well as 
statutory violations. 
State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶¶24-25, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899 (internal citations omitted). 
7 Cnty. of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 310, 603 
N.W.2d 541 (1999). 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
6 
 
 . . . I'm going to find that it is.  
¶7 
The court went on to distinguish the probable cause 
needed to request a PBT breath sample from the probable cause 
needed for arrest on the PAC violation:  
I think that is not probable cause for arrest, but it 
was sufficient basis to continue to conduct additional 
testing, and it's different from just smelling alcohol 
on someone with no prior violations or a different 
applicable statute because you've got the four prior 
violations that the officer knew about, and I think 
that makes a difference.  
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed on the same grounds, 
holding that probable cause existed to request the PBT breath 
sample.  State v. Goss, No. 2010AP1113-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2010).  It stated in denying Goss's 
motion for reconsideration, "[W]e agree with the circuit court 
that the odor of intoxicants, in conjunction with knowledge that 
Goss had four prior OWI convictions, provided probable cause to 
believe that Goss was in violation of the OWI laws."  State v. 
Goss, No. 2010AP1113-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 
7, 2011).  This court granted Goss's petition for review. 
II. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
¶9 
This case requires us to construe a statute, which is 
a matter of law that we review de novo.  Cnty. of Jefferson v. 
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 301, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). It also 
requires that we make a determination about whether probable 
cause existed in the particular circumstances presented here.  
"We uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  Id. at 316.  "Whether those facts satisfy 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
7 
 
the statutory standard of probable cause is a question of law we 
review de novo."  Id.  In determining whether probable cause 
existed, we look to the totality of the circumstances.  State v. 
Babbitt, 188 Wis. 2d 349, 356, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶10 When we construe a statute, we apply the following 
principles to our analysis.   
[S]tatutory interpretation "begins with the language 
of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry." Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning . . . .   
Context is important to meaning. So, too, is the 
structure of the statute in which the operative 
language appears. Therefore, statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; 
and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results.  Statutory language is read where possible to 
give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
avoid surplusage. 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (internal citations 
omitted). 
¶11 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.303, 
the 
statute 
we 
are 
concerned with here, states in relevant part, "If a law 
enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the 
person is violating or has violated s. 346.63 [which prohibits 
driving or operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration] . . . the officer, prior to an arrest, may 
request the person to provide a sample of his or her breath for 
a preliminary breath screening test . . . ." (emphasis added). 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
8 
 
¶12 For commercial drivers,8 the statute eliminates the 
requirement of probable cause and permits a PBT request "if the 
officer detects any presence of alcohol . . . on a person 
driving . . . a commercial motor vehicle or has reason to 
believe that the person is violating or has violated s. 
346.63(7) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith . . . ." 
Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (emphasis added).  These two alternatives 
for commercial drivers are commonly referred to as the "any 
presence" standard and the "reason to believe" standard to 
distinguish these standards from the probable cause standard 
required for non-commercial drivers.  See Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293.  
If either the "any presence" or the "reason to believe" standard 
is satisfied, the officer may request a PBT breath sample from a 
commercial driver.  Wis. Stat. § 343.303. 
¶13 We examined this statute in Renz in the context of a 
challenge to a request by an officer for a PBT breath sample 
from a non-commercial driver who was suspected of having 
violated the county OWI ordinance and was subject to what was 
that time a .10 prohibited alcohol content standard.9  Renz, 231 
Wis. 2d at 299.  In Renz, we determined that this statute was 
                                                 
8 The stricter drunk driving provisions for commercial 
drivers were first created in 1989 by Wisconsin Act 105, which 
reduced the PAC for such drivers to 0.04% and created other 
penalties.  See An Historical Summary of Wisconsin's Drunk 
Driving Legislation Legislative Reference Bureau Informational 
Memorandum 09-1, LRB-09-IM-1 (Jan. 2009). 
9 The Jefferson County ordinances Renz had been charged with 
violating had adopted Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and (b) (1993-
94). 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
9 
 
ambiguous 
because 
it 
was 
"subject 
to . . . conflicting, 
reasonable interpretations," id. at 305, concerning the meaning 
of the words "probable cause to believe" and what quantum of 
evidence satisfied the requirement of probable cause prior to a 
breath sample request.  We determined that a reasonable person 
could conclude that "probable cause to believe" means "probable 
cause for arrest" on the grounds that "case law commonly defines 
probable cause for an arrest as proof that would lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe that a person probably 
committed a crime."  Id. at 302.  We determined that it was also 
reasonable to conclude, given the context of the surrounding 
language, that "probable cause to believe" was intended to mean 
"something less than probable cause for arrest."  Id. at 302-03. 
¶14 We therefore turned to the "context, history, and 
purpose of the statute in order to determine the legislative 
intent." Id. at 305.  The stated purpose of the statute,10 the 
                                                 
10 Renz quoted the following statement of purpose: 
The legislature intends by passage of this act: 
1. To provide maximum safety for all users of the 
highways of this state. 
2. To provide penalties sufficient to deter the 
operation of motor vehicles by persons who are 
intoxicated. 
3. To deny the privileges of operating motor vehicles 
to persons who have operated their motor vehicles 
while intoxicated. 
4. To encourage the vigorous prosecution of persons 
who operate motor vehicles while intoxicated. 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
10 
 
removal of the penalty for refusal of a request for a breath 
sample for a PBT,11 the words chosen to describe the test,12 and 
the absurd results produced by reading the statute to require 
                                                                                                                                                             
5. To promote driver improvement, through appropriate 
treatment or education or both, of persons who operate 
motor vehicles while intoxicated. 
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 315 (quoting § 2051(13)(b), ch. 20, Laws of 
1981). 
11 "The fact that the legislature removed the penalty for 
refusing to take a PBT is further evidence that the legislature 
intended the PBT to be a preliminary, investigative test."  
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 314.  This court made a similar observation 
in State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶32, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 N.W.2d 
629.  There we stated, "In the evidentiary gap between 
reasonable 
suspicion 
and 
probable 
cause 
for 
arrest, 
a 
voluntarily taken PBT can furnish the necessary evidence to 
remove an impaired driver from the road."  Id., ¶32.  Justice 
Annette Kingsland Ziegler, in her concurrence in Fischer, joined 
the majority but wrote to emphasize the lack of reliability of 
PBT results: "I conclude that as a matter of law PBT results are 
neither reliable nor admissible for the purpose of confirming or 
dispelling a defendant's specified alcohol concentration in an 
OWI or PAC trial."  Id., ¶37 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  In 
granting a "conditional writ" of habeas corpus to Fischer after 
our decision, a United States magistrate judge ordered that the 
conviction be set aside "unless the state initiates proceedings 
to retry and commences the retrial of Fischer."  Fischer v. 
Ozaukee Cnty. Circuit Court, 741 F. Supp. 2d 944, 958-59 (E.D. 
Wis. Jan. 7, 2011).  Online court records indicate that a 
retrial is currently scheduled for March 20, 2012. 
12 "The 
legislature 
entitled 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.303 
'Preliminary breath screening test,' and the text of the statute 
also describes the test as a 'preliminary breath screening 
test.' . . . [W]hen it described the test as 'preliminary,' the 
legislature clearly indicated that it intended the test to be a 
preparation for something else. It seems obvious that that 
something else——the main matter——is the arrest itself." Renz, 
231 Wis. 2d at 313. 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
11 
 
probable cause for arrest before a breath sample test13 convinced 
us that the legislature intended for a PBT to function as a 
preliminary screening tool to be used prior to an arrest and 
thus intended to permit police to request a PBT breath sample 
with something less than probable cause for arrest.14   
¶15 The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c) in 
2000, after Renz was decided, establishing a PAC of .02 for 
drivers with three or more prior OWI convictions.  1999 Wis. Act 
109.  The legislature has since enacted legislation that makes 
the 
.02 
PAC 
standard 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 340.01(46m)(c) 
                                                 
13 Thus, under 
the defendant's interpretation, an 
officer could . . . request a PBT [only] after already 
having established probable cause for an arrest, even 
though the statute explicitly provides that the 
officer may use the PBT result in determining whether 
to make an arrest. Furthermore, before presenting 
evidence of the PBT result to rebut a challenge to 
probable cause for an OWI arrest, the petitioner would 
have to prove that probable cause to arrest existed 
before the PBT was administered, even though the 
statute clearly states that the PBT result will be 
admissible "to show probable cause for an arrest, if 
the arrest is challenged."   
Basic principles of statutory construction disfavor an 
interpretation of the first sentence that yields such 
unreasonable results.  
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 306-07 (internal citations omitted). 
14 There is a large body of law setting forth probable cause 
standards at various stages of criminal proceedings.  For an 
analysis 
and 
overview, 
see 
Renz, 
231 
Wis. 2d at 
317-27 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  This case does not produce any 
new standard but rather applies the established PBT breath 
sample request standard to a set of facts not previously 
addressed. 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
12 
 
applicable to people subject to an ignition interlock order.  
See 2009 Wis. Act 100. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶16 As the parties agree, this court has not specifically 
applied the probable cause standard from Wis. Stat. § 343.303 as 
interpreted in Renz in a PAC case involving a subject limited to 
a .02 PAC standard.  We now turn to the application of this 
standard to the facts of this case.  "We uphold the trial 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." 
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 316.  "Whether those facts satisfy the 
statutory standard of probable cause is a question of law we 
review de novo."  Id. 
¶17 In this case the officer knew before he requested the 
PBT breath sample that Goss had four prior OWI convictions and 
was therefore subject to a very low PAC standard.  The officer 
testified at the motion hearing that, as he placed Goss in the 
back of the squad car, he "smelled an odor of intoxicants coming 
from his person."  And he testified that he took into 
consideration the knowledge that even a small amount of alcohol 
could put a suspect over a .02 PAC standard:  "[I]f I smell any 
odor of intoxicant, I guess there's more suspicion that he's 
going to be over that .02 . . . ."  
¶18 The facts as found by the circuit court and not 
disputed on appeal are as follows: 
Based 
upon 
all 
of 
the——the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances and the information in the officer's 
knowledge, the Defendant . . . smelled of alcohol, 
which [the officer] learned after he'd arrested the 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
13 
 
Defendant [on the operating after revocation charge] 
and placed him in the squad car, and he knew that he 
had 
four 
prior 
arrests 
for 
operating 
while 
intoxicated.15 
The 
circuit 
court 
also 
referenced 
the 
low 
PAC 
standard 
applicable to Goss and the fact that a person consuming even a 
small amount of alcohol would exceed that limit: "[W]ith four 
prior OWIs, a revoked license and smelling like alcohol when 
you're buckling someone in, it would be reasonable, I think, for 
the officer to check and to believe that he had consumed alcohol 
and to question whether or not.  I mean, basically, it's a drink 
or a drink and a half." 
¶19 While there is no dispute as to the facts, the parties 
characterize 
the 
application 
of 
the 
law 
under 
these 
circumstances differently.  Goss argues that the officer in this 
case asked for a breath sample for the PBT solely on the basis 
of the smell of alcohol and that he therefore did so without the 
statutorily required probable cause.  He argues that under the 
statute, only a commercial driver can be asked by an officer to 
provide a PBT breath sample without a showing of probable cause 
when "the officer detects any presence of alcohol . . . on [the] 
person driving . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  He reasons that 
because the legislature created the two levels of proof 
required——the "any presence of alcohol" standard and the 
                                                 
15 The question of whether the officer also knew Goss was on 
probation was also discussed in the motion hearing, but as the 
State acknowledges, "[T]he trial court opined that the state had 
not met its burden of proof as to this issue, and thus dismissed 
it from its analysis."  Resp. Br. at 6 n.1. 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
14 
 
"probable cause to believe standard"——that probable cause has to 
mean something more than "detect[ing] any presence of alcohol."  
See id.  His position, as explained in his briefs and at oral 
argument, is based on three points: first, that the requirement 
of probable cause under Renz applies to all non-commercial 
drivers, even those subject to a lower PAC standard; second, 
that Goss's prior convictions have no probative value and are 
irrelevant to a probable cause determination; and finally, that 
there was nothing but the odor of alcohol in this instance to 
support the request for the breath sample for the PBT. 
¶20 The State agrees that probable cause is required to 
request a PBT breath sample, but it argues that probable cause 
existed here and was supported by the facts that Goss smelled of 
intoxicants and that the officer knew Goss had four prior OWI 
convictions and would therefore be subject to the .02 PAC 
standard.  The State asserts that the standard of probable cause 
established in Renz is therefore satisfied here. It argues that 
Renz was not intended to create a bright line rule and that 
there are significant differences between the facts of Renz and 
the facts of this case.  Renz involved an investigation of an 
OWI violation, not a PAC violation, and the defendant in Renz 
was subject to a PAC five times the PAC level Goss was subject 
to.16  Instead, it argues that Renz stands for the proposition 
that a breath sample may be requested for a PBT with less 
                                                 
16 The ordinance applicable to Renz adopted a statute that 
established 
the 
PAC 
standard 
at 
.10. 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
340.01(46m)(a) (1993-94); Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 299 n.3.  
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
15 
 
evidence than that required to establish probable cause for 
arrest; it argues that the evidence necessary to establish 
probable cause to arrest is less for one crime than for another, 
and the amount of evidence that constitutes probable cause to 
request a PBT also changes accordingly.17  The State also 
contends that as a practical matter, requiring more facts than 
odor and the knowledge that the driver is subject to a lower PAC 
standard would render the PBT statute meaningless and unusable 
for PAC cases.18  In such cases, a driver who is in violation is 
still unlikely to display any other perceptible signs of having 
consumed alcohol.   
                                                 
17 As the State argues in its brief, "There is nothing in 
the [Renz] opinion to suggest that this middle standard is not 
flexible as to its requirements, depending on the type of 
offense involved.  Goss is selling Renz short, arguing in effect 
that it  . . . set[s] up a rigid test that must be met even if 
laws change."  Resp. Br. at 7-8.  
18 Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), the OWI statute, prohibits any 
person from driving or operating a motor vehicle while "[u]nder 
the influence of an intoxicant . . . to a degree which renders 
him or her incapable of safely driving."  The PAC statute, 
§ 346.63(1)(b), in contrast, prohibits any person from driving 
or operating a motor vehicle while "[t]he person has a 
prohibited alcohol concentration."  The PAC standard that 
applies to drivers with two or fewer prior OWI convictions is 
.08, Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(a); the PAC standard that applies 
to Goss under Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c) is .02; and a person 
who has not attained the legal drinking age may not drive with 
an alcohol concentration of "more than 0.0," Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(2m).  (The statute concerning drivers who have not 
attained the legal drinking age makes no specific reference to a 
requirement 
of 
probable 
cause 
but 
depending 
on 
the 
circumstances, case law may require such a determination.  See 
State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 710, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984) 
(applying standards for probable cause to arrest an adult in a 
case involving a juvenile).)        
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
16 
 
¶21 Our task is to determine whether probable cause 
existed to request a PBT breath sample from a non-commercial 
driver on the facts presented.  Goss asks us to approach the job 
of determining whether probable cause is established on this set 
of facts by essentially placing him not in one of the categories 
of commercial and non-commercial drivers established in the 
statute, but instead within a third category of drivers——those 
non-commercial drivers subject to the .02 PAC standard.  Goss 
argues that only then should we turn to the task of gathering 
other remaining facts besides the applicable lower PAC standard 
that would support probable cause to request a PBT breath 
sample.  His approach, in other words, would remove the 
applicable PAC standard from the list of facts to be considered 
in the totality of the circumstances for a determination of 
probable cause.  He supports this approach with the assertion 
that the prior convictions have no probative value and therefore 
are not relevant to a determination of probable cause.   His 
argument seems to be that to uphold the request for a PBT breath 
sample in this case would in effect, for all drivers in the 
category of non-commercial drivers subject to the .02 PAC, erase 
the requirement of probable cause and substitute instead the 
"any presence of alcohol" standard that the statute applies only 
to commercial drivers. 
¶22 One flaw in his argument is the proposition that prior 
convictions have no probative value and are irrelevant in a 
probable cause analysis.  That is inconsistent with our 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
17 
 
reasoning in State v. Lange, in which we listed several factors 
in support of probable cause,19 one of which was the following: 
[B]y the time of the arrest, Officer Hoffman had 
discovered that the defendant had a prior conviction 
for 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
under 
the 
influence of an intoxicant. Officer Hoffman could take 
this evidence into account when determining whether 
she had probable cause to believe that the defendant 
was under the influence of an intoxicant while 
operating his vehicle. 
State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶33, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551 
(emphasis added).   
¶23 Another flaw in Goss's approach is that he cites no 
basis in the statute or case law that would lead us to formulate 
the question presented as he essentially does ("For drivers 
subject to a .02 PAC, is the odor of alcohol alone sufficient to 
establish probable cause, notwithstanding our holding in Renz to 
the contrary?").  Rather, the question should be:  "For any non-
commercial driver, does probable cause exist to request a PBT 
breath sample when the facts known to the officer include an 
odor of alcohol and the knowledge that the driver is subject to 
a .02 PAC that takes very little consumed alcohol to exceed?"  
The statute creates two categories of drivers, and Goss falls 
                                                 
19 State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 
N.W.2d 551, addressed the question of whether there was probable 
cause to arrest, rather than the question we address here, which 
is whether there was probable cause to request a PBT breath 
sample; we cite it here because it illustrates that regardless 
of the quantum of evidence needed to satisfy a given standard, a 
prior conviction may be taken into consideration. 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
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into the category of the first, non-commercial drivers.  There 
is no basis for implicitly establishing a third category. 
¶24 We see no reason to exclude those facts given our 
holding in Lange, which recognizes the appropriateness of 
considering prior convictions in a probable cause determination, 
and given the high relevance of prior convictions in this case 
because the statute drastically changes the PAC applicable to 
the suspect, from .08 to .02.  The circuit court found that such 
facts were known to the officer at the time when he determined 
that probable cause existed to request a PBT breath sample.   
¶25 We next address whether, given those facts, probable 
cause existed to request the breath sample for the PBT.  We have 
often 
stated 
the 
principle 
that 
probable 
cause 
is 
a 
determination 
made 
"looking 
at 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances" and is a "flexible, common-sense measure of the 
plausibility of particular conclusions about human behavior." 
Lange, 317 Wis. 2d 383, ¶20.  The applicable standard of 
probable cause established in Renz to request a breath sample 
was "a quantum of proof that is greater than the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop, and 
greater than the 'reason to believe' necessary to request a PBT 
from a commercial driver, but less than the level of proof 
required to establish probable cause for arrest."  Renz, 231 
Wis. 2d at 317.  Given these governing principles and the facts 
found by the circuit court and not challenged on appeal, we 
conclude that probable cause existed under the circumstances of 
this case to request a breath sample for a PBT.  These facts are 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
19 
 
enough to provide the quantum of proof this court determined was 
required in Renz. 
¶26 In this case, both the smell of alcohol on Goss and 
the officer's knowledge that Goss could drink only a very small 
amount before exceeding the legal limit that applied to him make 
the conclusion that Goss was likely in violation of the statute 
highly plausible.  This holding is fully consistent with our 
holding in Renz concerning the amount of proof required to 
request a PBT from a non-commercial driver such as Goss.  Renz 
said the legislature intended to require for such drivers "a 
quantum of proof that is greater" for probable cause than what 
is required to request a PBT breath sample from a commercial 
driver.  Id.  That standard has been met here.  We reiterate 
what we stated in Renz: that the legislature provided the PBT as 
a screening tool for officers investigating impaired drivers. 
Id. at 310. 
¶27 To hold otherwise would hamstring the ability of law 
enforcement to investigate a suspected violation of the .02 PAC 
statute.  The ordinary investigative tools employed in an 
investigation of an OWI case with a .08 PAC standard are of 
little or no use where the PAC standard is one fourth of that 
level because the ordinary physical indications of intoxication 
are not typically present in a person with that level of blood 
alcohol content.  The legislature has signaled its intention to 
make the .02 PAC statute applicable to more drivers, and it is 
essential that law enforcement have the PBT screening tool 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
20 
 
provided by the legislature at its disposal in investigating 
suspected PAC violations such as the one here.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶28 This case presents a question we have not previously 
addressed: whether probable cause exists to request a PBT breath 
sample when the driver is known to be subject to a .02 PAC 
standard, the officer knows it would take very little alcohol 
for the driver to exceed that limit, and the officer smells 
alcohol on the driver.  We now hold that under these 
circumstances, there is probable cause sufficient to request a 
breath sample.  The PBT breath sample in this case was requested 
on the basis of probable cause as the statute requires, and we 
therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—Affirmed. 
  
 
No. 
2010AP1113-CR   
 
 
 
1