Title: State v. Robinson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2833-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jacqueline R. Robinson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 62, 823 N.W.2d 840 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2014   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 3, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul Van Grunsven   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Dustin C. Haskell.   
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sara 
Lynn Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ellen Henak and Henak 
Law Office. S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
  
 
 
2014 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2011AP2833-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF288) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,    
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Jacqueline R. Robinson   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.    
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a 
decision and order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court2 denying 
defendant Jacqueline R. Robinson's (Robinson) post-conviction 
motion to reinstate her original sentence. 
¶2 
The 
question 
before 
us 
is 
whether 
Robinson's 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy was violated 
when the circuit court increased her sentence one day after 
                                                 
1 State v. Robinson, No. 2011AP2833-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2012).  
2 The Honorable Paul R. Van Grunsven presiding.   
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
2 
 
initially imposing it.  Robinson argues that the circuit court's 
decision to resentence her one day after her original sentence 
was imposed violated both state and federal constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy because she had a legitimate 
expectation of finality in her original sentence.3  The State 
contends that Robinson had no legitimate expectation of finality 
and, consequently, Robinson's constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy was not violated. 
¶3 
Under the reasoning of United States v. DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980) and the 
factors set forth in State v. Jones, 2002 WI App 208, 257 
Wis. 2d 163, 650 N.W.2d 844, we hold Robinson did not have a 
legitimate expectation of finality and the circuit court acted 
appropriately in resentencing Robinson.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals.   
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed.  On 
January 19, 2011, Robinson was arrested for operating a motor 
vehicle while her driving privileges were suspended, for 
loitering, and for violation of probation.  Robinson was taken 
to the police station for processing.  At the police station, a 
police officer conducted a search of Robinson and recovered a 
                                                 
3 In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 
426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980), the United States Supreme Court 
held that if a defendant has a legitimate expectation in the 
finality of her sentence, then an increase in that sentence 
violates double jeopardy. 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
3 
 
pill bottle containing Alprazolam pills.4  Due to suspicion 
Robinson might be hiding additional narcotics, Robinson was 
escorted to a bathroom and two police officers conducted a 
further search of Robinson's person.  During this search, the 
police officers recovered a second pill bottle containing 
Oxycontin pills.5  At this point, a struggle ensued.  Robinson 
struck one of the police officers on the officer's jaw and 
forehead, and kicked the second police officer twice on the 
officer's left knee.  
¶5 
On January 22, 2011, the State filed a criminal 
complaint charging Robinson with one count of possession of 
narcotic 
drugs, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(am)(2009-10)6 (Count One), and two counts of battery 
to a law enforcement officer, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.20(2) (Count Two and Count Three).  
¶6 
On April 12, 2011, Robinson and the State entered into 
a plea agreement.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Robinson pled 
guilty to all three counts.   
¶7 
Robinson's arrest on January 19, 2011, was not her 
first encounter with the law.  At the time of her arrest, 
                                                 
4 Alprazolam 
is 
the 
generic 
ingredient 
in 
Xanax, 
a 
prescription 
anxiety 
medication, 
which 
is 
a 
Schedule 
IV 
controlled substance.   See Wis. Stat. § 961.20(2)(a)(2009-10).   
5 Oxycontin 
(Oxycondine) 
is 
a 
Schedule 
II 
controlled 
substance.  See Wis. Stat. § 961.16(2)(a)11 (2009-10).      
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
4 
 
Robinson was on probation after pleading guilty to three 
criminal charges in Waukesha County in 2008.7  Those three 
criminal charges were comprised of two counts of receiving 
stolen property less than or equal to $2,500, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.34(1)(a) (Waukesha County cases 08-CM-2563 and 
08-CM-1636) and one count of possession with intent to deliver 
narcotics, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(a) (Waukesha 
County case 08-CF-518).  Sentence on the Waukesha County cases 
was withheld and Robinson was placed on three years of 
probation.  No jail time was ordered as a condition of that 
probation.    
¶8 
As a result of her arrest in Milwaukee County on 
January 19, 2011, Robinson was revoked from probation on all 
three Waukesha County cases.  On April 6, 2011, the Waukesha 
County 
Circuit 
Court, 
the 
Honorable 
William 
J. 
Domina, 
presiding, sentenced Robinson to two years initial confinement 
and four years extended supervision for case 08-CF-518.  For 
Waukesha County cases 08-CM-2563 and 08-CM-1636, Robinson was 
sentenced to nine months initial confinement for each count, 
with each sentence to run concurrent with the sentence imposed 
for case 08-CF-518.  In sum, the circuit court sentenced 
Robinson to two years of initial confinement and four years of 
probation as a consequence of the revocation of her probation 
(collectively, "Waukesha County sentences").   
                                                 
7 As part of the plea agreement for the 2008 charges, eleven 
charges were dismissed and read-in to a global sentence for the 
three other criminal convictions. 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
5 
 
¶9 
On May 10, 2011, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
the Honorable Judge Van Grunsven, presiding, held a sentencing 
hearing for Robinson for Counts One, Two, and Three.  The 
hearing began with the State and Robinson making a joint 
recommendation that any sentence the circuit court imposed be 
concurrent with the Waukesha County sentences.  The State 
recited Robinson's prior criminal record and the factual 
background that led to Robinson's most recent charges.  The 
State explained that, in 2008, eleven charges had previously 
been dismissed and read-in for three other convictions in 
Waukesha County and Robinson had received only probation for 
those three offenses.  The State further explained that 
Robinson's probation had been revoked and she had been sentenced 
to "two years in custody and four years extended supervision."  
The State recommended that the circuit court not impose any 
additional incarceration time for Robinson's most recent plea 
agreement for Counts One, Two, and Three.  
¶10 Prior to imposing sentence on those counts, Judge Van 
Grunsven noted that "much of what [he] read in the complaint 
[was] absolutely despicable behavior."  At one point during the 
sentencing hearing, he addressed the defendant directly:  
Quite frankly, in relation to your character, this 
Court 
considers 
the 
litany 
of 
cases 
that 
were 
dismissed and read-in as part of the plea negotiations 
out in Waukesha and while everyone seems to say that 
Jacqueline has turned the corner, I think the history 
and violation of laws of the state give me great cause 
for concern, despite the fact she's been off of 
probation she's been revoked and I also see her as a 
threat to society.  
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
6 
 
She is continuing to commit crimes, despite the fact 
she has pending charges, leading to the bail jump 
charge and other cases and I just, while she indicates 
that she's now clean and sober and going to take the 
opportunities seriously, I'm not so certain.  
I think she has a vicious addiction that is going to 
be a life-long struggle. I consider the fact Judge 
Domina ordered a sentence of two years in and four 
years out after she was revoked and returned to him 
for sentencing. I do need to consider that.  
I also look at the fact she has pled guilty, accepted 
responsibility. I also look at the need to protect the 
public.  
¶11 After his remarks, Judge Van Grunsven sentenced 
Robinson on Count One to 42 months in the Wisconsin State Prison 
System, consisting of 18 months initial confinement and 24 
months extended supervision, concurrent with any other sentence.  
On Counts Two and Three, Judge Van Grunsven sentenced Robinson 
to 60 months in the Wisconsin State Prison System, consisting of 
24 
months 
initial 
confinement 
and 
36 
months 
extended 
supervision, concurrent with any other sentence.  Because Judge 
Van Grunsven ordered that the sentences run concurrent with the 
Waukesha County sentences, Robinson effectively received no 
additional incarceration after being sentenced on Counts One, 
Two, and Three.   
¶12 The next day, May 11, 2011, the circuit court sua 
sponte recalled the case.  Judge Van Grunsven stated that after 
the hearing, he did some research on the Consolidated Court 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
7 
 
Automation Programs (CCAP) and realized he made a mistake.8  
Specifically, the court remarked that it mistakenly believed the 
Waukesha 
County 
sentences 
Robinson 
was 
currently 
serving 
amounted to two years and nine months initial incarceration, 
when in fact she had only been sentenced to two years.  Judge 
Van Grunsven explained:          
At the conclusion of the hearing and subsequent 
thereto the Court did some research and I realized I 
made a mistake.  The split sentence I proposed 
yesterday did not reflect this Court’s intent as far 
as a fair sentence in this case.   
. . .  
There was a lengthy record with regard to a number of 
cases in Waukesha County and I mis-heard and mis-noted 
some 
of 
the 
sentences 
that 
were 
handed 
down.  
Specifically 08CM1636, in which the Receiving Stolen 
Property case, Ms. Robinson was given nine months.  It 
was my mistaken impression that she said the nine 
months was consecutive and tacked on to the 24 months 
that Judge Domina ordered in that case.  Quite frankly 
a review of CCAP subsequent to yesterday’s hearing 
revealed that in fact the nine months in that case was 
concurrent to 08CF518 and 08CM2563.   
In fashioning a sentence in this case, the Court does 
look at the gravity of the offense, the defendant’s 
character and need to protect the public and yesterday 
I started my sentencing arguments by talking about how 
despicable the behavior was by Ms. Robinson in this 
case in terms of her reactions and interactions with 
the police officers in this case.   
                                                 
8 CCAP is a case management system provided by the Wisconsin 
Circuit Court Access program.  Its purpose is to provide public 
access online to reports of activity in Wisconsin circuit 
courts.  See, e.g., State v. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d 
344, 717 N.W.2d 133.   
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
8 
 
In fashioning a sentence the Court does need to look 
at probation and probation is not appropriate.  The 
court considers prior record of convictions and the 
court does look at a period of incarceration and 
believes it is necessary to accomplish the objectives 
of good sentencing, which is the gravity of the 
offense, the defendant’s character and need to protect 
the public.   
Given all of that and harkening back to the comments 
made yesterday, I asked this case be called back so I 
can re-state and announce the sentence I wanted to 
achieve yesterday . . . .  
¶13 Judge Van Grunsven then modified Robinson's sentences 
for Counts Two and Three.  For both Counts Two and Three, Judge 
Van Grunsven increased Robinson's sentence from 60 months, 
consisting of 24 months initial confinement and 36 months 
extended supervision, to 69 months, consisting of 33 months 
initial confinement and 36 months extended supervision, to run 
concurrently with any other sentence.  The effect of Judge Van 
Grunsven's modification of Robinson's sentences for Counts Two 
and Three was a nine-month increase in Robinson's time of 
incarceration.    
¶14 On November 14, 2011, Robinson filed a postconviction 
motion seeking restoration of the sentence imposed on May 10, 
2011.  Robinson's postconviction motion asserted that the 
circuit court violated both her state and federal constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy when it resentenced her on 
May 11, 2011.  In her postconviction motion, Robinson noted that 
the May 10, 2011, sentence was neither illegal nor incorrect and 
the record clearly established the court understood Robinson's 
existing sentences.  Instead, Robinson argued the circuit court 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
9 
 
"increased the sentence based upon mere second guessing of its 
original decision" and therefore violated Robinson's right to be 
free from double jeopardy. 
¶15 The circuit court denied the postconviction motion, 
finding no violation of the double jeopardy clause.  Relying on 
State v. Burt, 2000 WI App 126, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 N.W.2d 42, 
the circuit court found that it had "not increase[d] defendant 
Robinson's sentence upon reflection but instead because the 
court was under a mistaken impression about her Waukesha County 
sentence." 
¶16 The court of appeals issued a per curiam decision 
affirming the circuit court, holding the circuit court did not 
violate Robinson's double jeopardy protection when it increased 
her sentence.  The court of appeals recognized that "[a] 
sentencing court violates double jeopardy when it increases a 
previously imposed sentence if the defendant had a legitimate 
expectation of finality in the original sentence." Robinson, No. 
2011AP2833-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶3.  The court of appeals 
noted that in Burt the court had held the sentencing court did 
not violate an individual's right to be free from double 
jeopardy when it changed a sentence later the same day in order 
to correct a "'slip of the tongue.'" Id. at ¶5 (quoting Burt, 
237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶12).  In comparing the facts of Burt to the 
facts of Robinson's case, the court of appeals noted that 
"Robinson served only one day of her sentence when the circuit 
court realized its mistake . . . and recalled Robinson to 
increase her sentence." Id.  The court of appeals reasoned that 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
10 
 
"[t]he difference in time between the circuit court's action in 
Burt and the circuit court's action here is a matter of hours, 
not days."  Id. at ¶11.  The court of appeals acknowledged that 
"Robinson's expectation in the finality of her sentence was not 
illegitimate," but concluded "the sentence did not yet have a 
degree of finality that prohibited the circuit court from 
correcting 
its 
own 
mistake 
the 
day 
after 
the 
initial 
sentencing." Id.  
¶17 Robinson petitioned this court for review of the 
decision of the court of appeals.  We accepted the petition on 
February 12, 2013.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 The sole issue in this case is whether Robinson's 
protection against double jeopardy was violated by the circuit 
court's decision to increase Robinson's sentence the day after 
her original sentence was imposed.  "Whether an individual's 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy has been 
violated is a question of law that this court reviews de novo." 
State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 746, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998).  
III. DISCUSSION 
¶19 The 
question 
before 
us 
is 
whether 
Robinson's 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy was violated 
when the circuit court increased her sentence one day after 
initially imposing it.  Robinson argues that the circuit court's 
decision to resentence her one day after her original sentence 
was imposed violated her state and federal constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy because she had a legitimate 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
11 
 
expectation of finality in her original sentence.  The State 
contends that Robinson had no legitimate expectation of finality 
and, consequently, Robinson's constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy was not violated.  
¶20 In order to fully understand the arguments put forth 
by the parties, we briefly review the case law upon which their 
arguments are based.   
¶21   The 
Fifth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution protects an individual from being twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.  The Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, 
"[N]or shall any person be subject to the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  In Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969), this 
guarantee against double jeopardy was held enforceable against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Wisconsin 
Constitution also guarantees protection from double jeopardy.  
Article I, § 8(1) states, in relevant part, "[N]o person for the 
same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment. . . ."  
Because the protections afforded by these provisions are 
coextensive, Wisconsin courts have traditionally treated them as 
one. State v. Gruetzmacher, 2004 WI 55, ¶21, 271 Wis. 2d 585, 
679 N.W.2d 533. 
¶22 The guarantee against double jeopardy encompasses 
three separate constitutional protections. North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 
(1969).  "It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
12 
 
offense 
after 
acquittal. 
 
It 
protects 
against 
a 
second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.  And it 
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Id.  
The prohibition at issue in this case concerns an individual's 
protection against multiple punishments.    
¶23 In DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the appropriate inquiry under the third 
of these constitutional protections is whether the defendant has 
a legitimate expectation of finality in her sentence.  If a 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality in her 
sentence, then an increase in that sentence violates double 
jeopardy.  Id. at 437-38; see also Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 
376, 394, 109 S. Ct. 2522, 105 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("It is clear from DiFrancesco . . . that when a 
sentence is increased in a second proceeding, the application of 
the double jeopardy clause turns on the extent and legitimacy of 
a defendant's expectation of finality in that sentence.  If a 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an 
increase in that sentence is prohibited.") 
¶24 The Supreme Court in DiFrancesco elaborated on the 
underlying rationale of the Double Jeopardy Clause:  
The 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
'double 
jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual from 
being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible 
conviction more than once for an alleged offense. . . 
. The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in 
at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, 
is that the State with all its resources and power 
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
13 
 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty.  
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 127-28 (quoting Green v. United States, 
355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S. Ct. 221, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957)). 
¶25 The Court noted that, while these considerations are 
rational with regard to reprosecution after acquittal, they do 
not have "significant application to the . . . review [of] a 
sentence." Id. at 136.  The Court in DiFrancesco concluded that 
sentences and acquittals are very different for double jeopardy 
purposes.  While the Double Jeopardy Clause renders an acquittal 
final and unreviewable, the same does not hold true for 
sentences.  "[A] sentence does not have the qualities of 
constitutional finality that attend an acquittal."  Id. at 134.  
Consequently, "the Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the 
defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time 
what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be."  
Id. at 137. 
¶26 As this court observed in Gruetzmacher, the "issuance 
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in DiFrancesco 
changed the landscape of double jeopardy law" in sentencing 
cases.  Gruetzmacher, 271 Wis. 2d 585, ¶30.  "After DiFrancesco 
dismissed the notion that there was a per se rule against 
modifying a sentence, the idea that modification to increase 
sentences already being served ran afoul of the double jeopardy 
clause 
was 
no 
longer 
sound." 
Id. 
 
Under 
DiFrancesco's 
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
14 
 
Amendment, 
it 
is 
unquestionably 
permissible, 
in 
certain 
contexts, to review and modify a defendant's sentence after the 
defendant has already begun serving the originally-imposed 
sentence. 
¶27 Following DiFrancesco, several cases in Wisconsin have 
considered whether sentence modifications violated a defendant's 
protection against double jeopardy due to the defendant's 
legitimate expectation of finality in her sentence. 
¶28 In Burt, the court of appeals applied the rationale 
set forth in DiFrancesco in a case where the circuit court 
misspoke during sentencing and sentenced the defendant to 
concurrent sentences rather than consecutive.  The circuit court 
became aware of the mistake when it sentenced Burt's co-
conspirator immediately after sentencing Burt.  The circuit 
court called Burt back into the courtroom the same day and 
modified the sentence.  The court of appeals held that "the 
protections against double jeopardy were not violated when the 
trial court realized it made an error of speech in pronouncing  
Burt's sentence and took immediate steps to correct the sentence 
before the judgment of conviction was entered into the record."  
Burt, 237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶11.  The court of appeals reasoned that 
"Burt had already been convicted and was not faced with the 
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal or continued state of anxiety 
and insecurity caused by repeated attempts to convict him."  Id.  
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court of appeals 
concluded that, where the circuit court was simply correcting an 
error in speech in the pronouncement of the sentence later in 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
15 
 
the same day the original sentence was imposed, the defendant's 
interest in finality "is not a significant concern."  Id. at 
¶12. 
¶29 In State v. Willet, 2000 WI App 212, 238 Wis. 2d 621, 
618 N.W.2d 881, the court of appeals examined the same question 
that was presented in Burt——that is, whether the defendant had a 
legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence——and 
concluded that the circuit court erred in modifying its original 
sentence after the defendant had already begun serving it.  The 
circuit 
court 
in 
Willet 
initially 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant's sentences for three convictions could not, under the 
law, be served consecutively to a sentence that the defendant 
was to receive four days later when his probation was revoked.  
Willet, 2000 WI App 212, ¶2.  Four months later, the circuit 
court concluded that the defendant's initial sentence was based 
on an erroneous understanding of the law and modified the three 
sentences so that they were consecutive to the later sentence.  
Id. at ¶1.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
concluding the defendant had a legitimate expectation of 
finality under the circumstances.  Id. 
¶30 The court of appeals in Willet reasoned that, unlike 
the defendant in Burt, "who was resentenced on the same day, 
Willet had already been serving his sentence for four months 
when the trial court changed it from concurrent to consecutive."  
Id. at ¶6.  Also, the court of appeals emphasized the fact that, 
unlike Burt, this was clearly not a "slip of the tongue" by the 
circuit court.  Id.  Instead, the circuit court misunderstood 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
16 
 
the law, and, four months later, attempted to "seek a stiffer 
sentence for Willet."  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that 
Willet had a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence, 
and that "[t]he double jeopardy clause prevents the trial court 
from going back, four months later, to redo the sentence."  Id.  
¶31 In State v. Jones, 2002 WI App 208, the court of 
appeals, in light of DiFrancesco, provided a framework for 
analyzing whether a defendant's right to be free from double 
jeopardy has been violated when he is resentenced after an 
original sentence has already been imposed.  Jones distilled two 
principles from DiFrancesco concerning the issue of whether a 
court may increase a sentence after the defendant has begun 
serving the sentence.  First, a per se rule no longer exists 
prohibiting a court from increasing a defendant's sentence after 
the defendant has begun to serve the sentence.  Jones, 2002 WI 
App 208, ¶9.  Second, "'[i]f a defendant has a legitimate 
expectation of finality [in the sentence], then an increase in 
that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.'"  
Id. (quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)).  The corollary to that second principle, however, is 
that "if a circumstance exists to undermine the legitimacy of 
that expectation, then a court may permissibly increase the 
sentence."  Id. 
¶32 The court of appeals in Jones further noted that 
Wisconsin precedent has long recognized that "the application of 
the double jeopardy clause to an increase in a sentence turns on 
the extent and legitimacy of a defendant's expectation of 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
17 
 
finality in the sentence."  Id. at ¶10.  The court of appeals 
then concluded that whether a defendant has a legitimate 
expectation of finality is "the analytical touchstone of double 
jeopardy . . . , which may be influenced by many factors, such 
as the completion of the sentence, the passage of time, the 
pendency of an appeal, or the defendant's misconduct in 
obtaining sentence."  Id. 
¶33 In Gruetzmacher, this court applied the non-exhaustive 
list of factors set forth in Jones to determine whether the 
circuit court erred in modifying the defendant's sentence two 
weeks after it was initially imposed.  In Gruetzmacher, the 
circuit court originally sentenced the defendant to 40 months 
initial 
confinement 
for 
a 
substantial 
battery 
charge.  
Gruetzmacher, 2004 WI 55, ¶7.  During the initial sentencing 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
indicated 
that 
40 
months 
incarceration was the minimum period the court believed was 
appropriate as a consequence of the defendant's actions.  Id. at 
¶10.  Later the same day, the circuit court realized that the 
substantial battery charge was a Class E felony that carried a 
maximum initial confinement of 24 months.  Id. at ¶8.  Realizing 
that the 40-month sentence exceeded the maximum amount that 
could be imposed for the offense, the circuit court attempted to 
contact the parties to schedule another hearing.  Id.  The 
parties were unable to reconvene until two days later.  Id.  
When the parties reconvened, the circuit court explained the 
error to the parties and scheduled a new sentencing hearing for 
two weeks later.  Id.  At the new sentencing hearing, the 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
18 
 
circuit court modified Gruetzmacher's sentence so that he was 
serving 24 months initial confinement on the substantial battery 
charge. Id. at ¶11.  Additionally, the circuit court modified 
another sentence Gruetzmacher was to serve for bail jumping from 
12 years of probation to 40 months initial confinement, all to 
run concurrent with the substantial battery charge.  Id.  In 
effect, the resentencing did not increase the amount of 
incarceration time originally imposed, but shifted the 40-month 
sentence from the substantial battery charge to the bail jumping 
charge. 
¶34 In Gruetzmacher, this court noted that the factors set 
forth 
in 
Jones 
illustrate 
"there 
is 
no 
immutable 
rule 
prohibiting sentence increases once a defendant has begun to 
serve the sentence.  Instead, the Jones factors must be 
evaluated in light of the circumstances in each particular 
case."  Id. at ¶34.  We then observed that the record indicated 
the circuit court clearly stated that 40 months was the 
appropriate sentence for Gruetzmacher considering his lengthy 
prior criminal record and violent conduct, and concluded the 
circuit court acted appropriately.  Id. at ¶37.  We stressed 
that the circuit court discovered the error in sentencing on the 
same day and the parties reconvened two days later to address 
the matter.  Id. at 38.  Additionally, the circuit court took 
steps to keep Gruetzmacher from entering the prison system until 
the sentencing error was corrected, and "[t]he fact that the 
justice system as a whole had not yet begun to act upon the 
circuit court's sentence is an important fact that bears 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
19 
 
emphasis." Id.  Moreover, this court reasoned that Gruetzmacher 
"was not a case where, upon mere reflection, the circuit court 
decided to increase . . . [the defendant's] sentence."  Id.  
Accordingly, 
we 
concluded 
"Gruetzmacher 
did 
not 
have 
a 
legitimate expectation of finality" and that the circuit court 
acted appropriately in resentencing him.  Id.   
¶35 The State argues that Gruetzmacher and Burt are 
analogous to the facts of the present case.  The State contends 
that, like Gruetzmacher and Burt, there was a very limited 
passage of time between when the circuit court erred in imposing 
the original sentence and when it recalled the case.  Further, 
the State argues that in Burt, the circuit court misspoke when 
it imposed the original sentence, stating the defendant would 
serve "concurrent" sentences when the circuit court intended to 
say "consecutive" sentences.  Similarly, the State argues that 
in the instant case the circuit court misspoke when it first 
sentenced Robinson due to misunderstanding the nature of how the 
new sentences would interact with Robinson's prior criminal 
record.  
¶36 Robinson disagrees with the State's reading of Burt 
and 
Gruetzmacher 
and 
argues 
both 
cases 
are 
easily 
distinguishable from the present case.  Robinson points out 
that, 
in 
Burt, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
intention 
to 
impose 
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences was clear from 
the circuit court judge's notes, which were sealed into the 
record.  Here, Robinson argues, nothing in the record suggests 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
20 
 
the circuit court misunderstood the nature of the sentences 
being imposed at the time of the original sentencing hearing.  
¶37 With regard to Gruetzmacher, Robinson contends that 
the present case is distinguishable because the circuit court 
did not misunderstand the law when it imposed the original 
sentence.  In Gruetzmacher, the circuit court changed what was 
an illegal sentence because the court initially exceeded the 
maximum 
allowable 
sentence. 
Robinson 
argues 
that, 
unlike 
Gruetzmacher, Robinson's original sentence was legally imposed 
and nothing in the record suggests the circuit court intended to 
impose 
a 
sentence 
different 
from 
the 
original 
sentence.  
Robinson further argues that the present case is more properly 
compared to Willet than it is to Burt or Gruetzmacher.   
¶38 We agree with the State's argument that this case is 
analogous to Burt and Gruetzmacher and distinguishable from 
Willet.  As detailed above, the court of appeals in Jones set 
forth a list of factors, which were adopted and applied by this 
court in Gruetzmacher, that are relevant to whether a defendant 
has a legitimate expectation of finality in his or her sentence.9  
                                                 
9 It bears emphasis that the factors listed in Jones are 
non-exhaustive. See State v. Jones, 2002 WI App 208, ¶10, 257 
Wis. 2d 163, 650 N.W.2d 844 (emphasis added) (noting that a 
"defendant's legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence 
. . . may be influenced by many factors, such as the completion 
of the sentence, the passage of time, the pendency of an appeal, 
or the defendant's misconduct in obtaining sentence.")  However, 
regarding the other two factors specifically set forth in Jones, 
both parties agree that Robinson did not engage in any 
misconduct in obtaining her original sentence and there was no 
pendency of an appeal.  Accordingly, they do not apply here.    
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
21 
 
Here, two Jones factors are particularly germane: (1) the 
completion of the sentence and (2) the passage of time between 
the original sentence and resentencing. In Burt, the circuit 
court modified the defendant's sentence on the same day the 
original sentence was imposed.  In Gruetzmacher, the circuit 
court realized its error on the same day the original sentence 
was imposed, notified the parties the same day, and scheduled a 
hearing to resentence the defendant two days later.  Here, Judge 
Van Grunsven realized hours after sentencing Robinson that he 
had misunderstood the Waukesha County sentences and, because of 
that misunderstanding, erred in imposing the original sentence.  
Consequently, in order to rectify this mistake, Judge Van 
Grunsven recalled and resentenced Robinson the following day.  
Like Burt and Gruetzmacher, little time passed between the 
original imposition of Robinson's sentence and her resentencing. 
Willet is easily distinguishable from this line of cases, in 
that a four-month gap existed between the original sentencing of 
the defendant and the circuit court's attempt to recall the 
defendant and impose a greater sentence.   
¶39 Additionally, 
in 
Gruetzmacher, 
we 
emphasized 
a 
significant factor in determining that the circuit court acted 
appropriately in resentencing the defendant was that "the 
justice system as a whole had not yet begun to act upon the 
circuit court's sentence."  Gruetzmacher, 271 Wis. 2d 585, ¶38.  
Upon review of the record, we conclude the same holds true in 
the present case.  The circuit court notified the parties it had 
made a mistake regarding Robinson's original sentence and 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
22 
 
corrected the sentence one day later, before any judgment of 
conviction had been entered.  In fact, no judgment of conviction 
was ever produced reflecting the originally-imposed sentence. 
See Gruetzmacher, 2004 WI 55, ¶38; Burt, 2000 WI App 126, ¶11 
(holding "the protections against double jeopardy were not 
violated when the trial court realized it made an error of 
speech in pronouncing Burt's sentence and took immediate steps 
to correct the sentence before the judgment of conviction was 
entered into the record"). 
¶40 Robinson raises a number of arguments in an attempt to 
distinguish the present case from Gruetzmacher and Burt.  The 
essence of Robinson's arguments, however, focuses on the same 
point: Robinson contends that nothing in the record supports the 
circuit court's explanation for modifying Robinson's sentence.  
According to Robinson, the sentence the circuit court originally 
imposed was lawful and no misunderstanding of fact is evident 
from the record.  Robinson stresses that in the cases on which 
the State relies, there is clear evidence in the record 
corroborating the justifications provided by the circuit courts 
for resentencing.  See Burt, 2000 WI App 126, ¶18 (noting the 
judge's intention to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, 
sentences was supported by his notes); Gruetzmacher (noting that 
the judge's original intention to impose a sentence of 40 months 
was clear from the transcript of the original sentencing 
hearing).  Here, Robinson argues, no such evidence exists in the 
record.  
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
23 
 
¶41 This is problematic, Robinson contends, because with 
nothing in the record to corroborate a judge's explanation for 
resentencing a defendant after a lawful sentence has been 
imposed, a judge will be free to deliberate on any previously 
imposed 
sentence 
and 
sua 
sponte 
modify 
it 
without 
any 
constitutional safeguard available for the defendant. 
¶42 Cases that examine double jeopardy claims in the 
context of sentencing present a difficult balancing act for 
appellate courts.  On the one hand, it is unacceptable for the 
defendant's sentence to be seen as a work in progress that a 
circuit court can add to or subtract from at will.  This result 
would clearly conflict with the underlying rationale of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause; that is, to prevent the State from 
effectively "mak[ing] repeated attempts to convict an individual 
for an alleged offense . . . and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity."  DiFrancesco, 449 
U.S. at 127-28 (quoting Green, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88).  On the 
other hand, a circuit court should not be tethered in every 
instance to a sentence that is based on a mistake of law, 
mistake of fact, or inconsistent with the court's intent.  "The 
Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game 
in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the 
prisoner."  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135 (quoting Bozza v. 
United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67, 67 S. Ct. 645, 91 L. Ed. 
818 (1947)).  
¶43 Accordingly, we reaffirm today the approach set forth 
in Jones and adopted by this court in Gruetzmacher as the 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
24 
 
appropriate framework for determining whether a defendant has a 
legitimate expectation of finality.  In cases such as these, a 
bright line rule is simply unworkable.  As we noted in 
Gruetzmacher, "the Jones factors must be evaluated in light of 
the circumstances in each case." Id. at ¶34.  Evaluating the 
extent and legitimacy of a defendant's expectation of finality 
is a multi-factor inquiry that rests largely on the facts of 
each individual case.  
¶44 Here, Judge Van Grunsven noticed he had misunderstood 
Robinson's prior criminal record during the original sentencing 
hearing on the same day it occurred and scheduled a new 
sentencing hearing for the following day.  This was not a case 
where 
the 
circuit 
court 
judge 
decided, 
after 
further 
deliberating on the initial sentence imposed, that a different 
sentence length was more appropriate.  Here, as Judge Van 
Grunsven explained on the record, he misunderstood Robinson's 
lengthy criminal record, failed to sentence Robinson in a way 
that matched his intention, and acted to remedy the error as 
expeditiously as possible.  We hold that the record supports 
this explanation, considering the complexity of the defendant's 
prior criminal history as recited on the record, Judge Van 
Grunsven's lengthy remarks regarding the "despicable" nature of 
Robinson's conduct and the need to protect the public, and the 
promptness with which the sentence was rectified.10   
                                                 
10 In addition, no Presentence Investigation Report was 
produced in this case.  Judge Van Grunsven therefore had no 
written explanation of Robinson's previous sentences.  
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
25 
 
¶45 We agree with Robinson's observation that the record 
shows the State and the circuit court correctly described 
Robinson's prior criminal record and the structure of Robinson's 
plea agreement before Robinson was sentenced.  The record of the 
original sentencing hearing is replete with references from the 
State and the circuit court regarding Robinson's prior criminal 
record and how the sentences for Counts One, Two, and Three 
would interact with the Waukesha County sentences she was 
currently serving.    
¶46 We disagree, however, with Robinson's contention that 
nothing exists in the record of the original sentencing hearing 
to support the circuit court's explanation for modifying 
Robinson's sentence.  During Robinson's original sentencing 
hearing on May 10, 2011, Judge Van Grunsven emphasized his 
concerns regarding Robinson's conduct repeatedly:  
With regard to the gravity of the offense, I will tell 
you, much of what I read in the complaint is 
absolutely despicable behavior. Police officers are 
brought to a scene to help you after a relapse and you 
start . . . taking swipes at them . . . 
Quite frankly, in relation to your character, this 
Court 
considers 
the 
litany 
of 
cases 
that 
were 
dismissed and read-in as part of plea negotiations out 
in Waukesha and while everyone seems to say that 
Jacqueline has turned the corner, I think the history 
and violation of laws of the state give me great cause 
for concern, despite the fact she's been off of 
probation she's been revoked and I also see her as a 
threat to society.   
She is continuing to commit crimes, despite the fact 
she has pending charges, leading to the bail jump 
charge and other cases and I just, while she indicates 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
26 
 
that she's now clean and sober and going to take the 
opportunities seriously, I'm not so certain.  
¶47 After 
observing 
that 
Robinson's 
conduct 
was 
"despicable," and noting that he considered her to be a "threat 
to society," Judge Van Grunsven sentenced Robinson for Counts 
One, Two, and Three in a manner that provided no additional time 
of incarceration beyond the amount that had already been imposed 
for the Waukesha County sentences.  In light of Judge Van 
Grunsven's observations regarding Robinson's conduct, we find 
the record supports Judge Van Grunsven's explanation for 
resentencing Robinson after realizing he misunderstood the 
nature and length of the Waukesha County sentences.     
¶48 Robinson argues that, without more in the record 
corroborating the circuit court's explanation for modifying 
Robinson's sentence, we should conclude the circuit court 
modified the sentence in a way that violated Robinson's right 
against double jeopardy.  We disagree for two reasons.  First, 
as we explained above, there is evidence in the record 
supporting the circuit court's justification for modifying 
Robinson's sentence.  Second, Robinson's argument essentially 
says that, without clear and convincing evidence in the record 
corroborating the circuit court's explanation, a reviewing court 
should presume that the circuit court, after deliberating on the 
initial sentence imposed, decided a harsher sentence would be 
more appropriate than the one originally intended and imposed.  
In light of the great deference we afford sentencing courts, we 
decline to create such a presumption.  See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
27 
 
463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983) 
("Reviewing 
courts, 
of 
course, 
should 
grant 
substantial 
deference to the . . . discretion that trial courts possess in 
sentencing convicted criminals."); State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 
52, 70, 471 N.W.2d 55 ("We will review sentencing for abuse of 
discretion."); 7 Crim. Proc. § 27.5(e)(3d ed.) ("Sentencing 
decisions in many jurisdictions are subject only to review for 
abuse of discretion.  In some states, sentences are evaluated 
under an even less exacting 'shock-the-conscience' standard.").     
We do not, as a matter of course, presume that judges act 
capriciously without clear evidence supporting their actions. 
Quite the contrary——taking judges at their word is a fundamental 
assumption built into our legal system.  In the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary, we decline to assign improper motive 
on the part of the circuit court. 
¶49 The dissent accuses us of failing to address the 
reflection doctrine.  We agree with the dissent's statement 
that, in cases concerning a judicial change of a sentence, 
double jeopardy and reflection are two distinct doctrines.  We 
disagree with the dissent's implicit contention, however, that——
regardless of the arguments advanced by the parties——both 
doctrines must always be addressed.  In its attempt to bring 
this case within the ambit of the reflection doctrine, the 
dissent mischaracterizes the issue before this court, the 
arguments raised by the parties, and the impact of our holding.   
¶50  Robinson petitioned this court to review whether her 
"state 
and 
federal 
constitutional 
rights 
against 
double 
No.  2011AP2833-CR 
28 
 
jeopardy" were violated by the circuit court's actions.  We 
accepted Robinson's petition on this question and today we 
answer it.  Our analysis relies on the double jeopardy arguments 
advanced by the parties in order to address the double jeopardy 
issue raised by the defendant.  We do not cite or discuss——just 
as the parties do not cite or discuss——the numerous cases in our 
reflection doctrine jurisprudence the dissent comprehensively 
reviews and suggests we are altering or overruling.  Simply put, 
the dissent wishes to discuss the vitality of a body of law that 
is beyond the scope of the issue raised in the petition for 
review.  "Typically, appellate courts do not take it upon 
themselves to create and develop arguments on a party's behalf," 
State v. Brown, No. 2011AP2907-CR, unpublished order, (Feb. 26, 
2014) (Bradley, J. dissenting), and we decline to do so here. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶51 The circuit court, upon discovering its error in 
imposing the original sentence for Robinson, promptly notified 
the parties.  Robinson was resentenced on the following day.  
The judgment of conviction for the original sentence had not yet 
been entered into the record.  Under the reasoning of 
DiFrancesco and the factors set forth in Jones, we hold Robinson 
did not have a legitimate expectation of finality and the 
circuit court acted appropriately in resentencing Robinson.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.          
 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶52 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This is a close 
case that requires some "reflection" upon existing precedent.  I 
join the majority opinion but write separately to provide 
support for the court's decision. 
I 
¶53 The dissent relies heavily on the reflection doctrine.  
To explain the doctrine, the dissent repeatedly cites Scott v. 
State, 64 Wis. 2d 54, 218 N.W.2d 350 (1974), which is the 
seminal case on the subject. 
¶54 The Scott case deserves close attention, however, 
because it created a new rule that did not arise naturally from 
Wisconsin case law.  Understanding Scott puts a circuit court's 
sentencing "mistakes" in a different light. 
¶55 Calvin Scott was charged with armed robbery.  Scott, 
64 Wis. 2d at 56.  He was convicted at a jury trial on May 17, 
1973, and immediately sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
more than five years, which term was to be served consecutive to 
any previously imposed sentence.  Id.  On May 18——the following 
day——the trial court, sua sponte, resentenced Scott, increasing 
his indeterminate term to not more than seven and one-half 
years, consecutive to any previously imposed sentence.  Id. 
¶56 At the initial sentencing, the court relied on the 
fact that Scott had no criminal record prior to the armed 
robbery, but the court knew that Scott had been convicted of 
injury by conduct regardless of life——after the robbery——for 
shooting and injuring his alleged accomplice.  Id. at 57 & n.1.  
For that offense, Scott had already been sentenced to an 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
2 
 
indeterminate term of not more than five years.  Id. at 57 n.1.  
Thus, the court's five-year sentence for the armed robbery 
produced a projected ten years in prison for Scott.  Id. at 57. 
¶57 At 8:20 a.m. on May 18, the court, sua sponte, ordered 
a further sentencing hearing for later in the day.  Id.  At 4:10 
p.m. the hearing commenced and the court increased Scott's 
indeterminate sentence by two and one-half years, bringing his 
projected time in prison to 12 and one-half years instead of 
ten.  See id. at 57-58. 
¶58 The circuit court explained its position: 
When I was driving home last night, it became 
clear to me that I had not accomplished the goal that 
I 
set 
out 
to 
do 
in 
the 
sentencing 
of 
this 
matter. . . .  
[In sentencing the defendant,] I tried to find 
some fairness in treating the two people involved in 
the situation the same. . . .  You were already in 
jail for another matter for five years.  The other 
gentleman received ten years for his offense. . . .  
[M]y intent at the time was a sentence of seven 
and one-half years, because if I sentenced you to 
seven and one-half years, I was doing two very 
important things, I thought, but I didn't communicate 
them to you. 
I was giving you less than what Mr. Porter got 
for the same offense, and there were reasons for that, 
and those reasons were in your favor . . . .  If I 
gave you just five years, you would be receiving a ten 
year sentence the same as Mr. Porter.  But Mr. Porter 
was receiving ten years for one offense, and you were 
serving ten years for two offenses.  That was not fair 
to the community. 
So 
my 
notes 
indicated 
that 
you 
should 
be 
sentenced to seven and one-half years for this 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
3 
 
offense, for the March 6, 1969 robbery.  And that was 
my intent yesterday and always has been. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶59 On appeal the Scott court reversed the circuit court 
with respect to the sentence.  Id. at 61-62.  It quoted State v. 
Foellmi, that "[a] trial court should not reduce a sentence on 
'reflection' alone or simply because it has thought the matter 
over and has second thoughts.  It must base its modification on 
'new factors' brought to its attention."  Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 
59 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Foellmi, 
57 
Wis. 2d 572, 
582, 
205 
N.W.2d 144 (1973)).  Then it added: 
Logic dictates that if a court is precluded from 
reducing a sentence after some later reflection, it 
should also be precluded from increasing a sentence 
for the same reasons.  It would create a double 
standard to not allow such a reduction and to permit 
the increase. 
. . . .  
A review of the record in the instant case shows 
that the decision to increase the sentence was based 
solely on "reflection."  Here the court amended the 
sentence so as to conform the sentence to its unspoken 
intent.  This in our opinion does not constitute a new 
factor upon which a trial court may increase a 
defendant's sentence. 
Id. at 59-60. 
¶60 There are several problems with the Scott opinion. 
¶61 First, the court relied on three cases, State v. 
Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d 461, 159 N.W.2d 577 (1968); Denny v. State, 
47 Wis. 2d 541, 178 N.W.2d 38 (1970); and Foellmi, as foundation 
for its legal conclusions.  All three cases are problematic. 
¶62 The Scott court quoted Leonard as follows: 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
4 
 
Hereafter, on resentencing following a second 
conviction after retrial, or mere resentencing, the 
trial court shall be barred from imposing an increased 
sentence unless (1) events occur or come to the 
sentencing court's attention subsequent to the first 
imposition of sentence which warrant an increased 
penalty; and (2) the court affirmatively states its 
grounds in the record for increasing the sentence. 
Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 58 (quoting Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d at 473). 
¶63 Leonard 
involved 
a 
fact 
situation 
related 
to 
sentencing after a second trial.  Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d at 464-65.  
Had this court's ruling been confined to these facts, it would 
have been grounded in the sound principle that a defendant 
should not be punished solely for asserting his rights in a 
successful appeal.  But the court extended the principle to 
"mere" resentencings because "we see no good reason" to 
distinguish some resentencings from others.  Id. at 465.  Thus, 
the court said, "the trial court shall be barred from imposing 
an increased sentence unless (1) events occur or come to the 
sentencing court's attention subsequent to the first imposition 
of sentence which warrant an increased penalty . . . ."  Id. at 
473 (emphasis added).  This language is arguably ambiguous in 
its effect on a judicial "mistake" in sentencing.  Is a judicial 
mistake in sentencing an "event"?  If a mistake is an "event" 
and the mistake comes "to the sentencing court's attention 
subsequent to the first imposition of sentence," the court may 
increase the sentence.  However, if a judicial mistake is not an 
"event," the formulation makes no provision for correcting a 
judicial error if the correction would increase a defendant's 
sentence. 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶64 The Scott court then quoted the Denny case as follows: 
"A trial judge is not free to re-evaluate the first sentence; he 
is in effect bound by the maximum of the previous sentence 
unless new factors or newly known factors justify a more severe 
sentence." 
 
Scott, 
64 
Wis. 2d at 
59 
(quoting 
Denny, 
47 
Wis. 2d at 544). 
¶65 Because Denny also involved a sentence imposed after a 
second trial, the quoted statement was intended to apply in a 
different context from the situation in Scott. 
¶66 The court then quoted the "reflection" sentence from 
Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 582.  Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 59.  Foellmi 
is a curious decision written by Justice Horace W. Wilkie, who 
also wrote a concurring opinion.  Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 578, 
586.  The concurring opinion is at odds with the majority 
opinion.  Compare id. at 579, with id. at 586-87 (Wilkie, J., 
concurring).  Chief Justice Harold Hallows also concurred but 
disagreed with the majority's reasoning.  Id. at 583 (Hallows, 
C.J., concurring).  Justice Connor T. Hansen, by contrast, wrote 
a third concurring opinion, joined by two other justices, 
pointedly disagreeing with Justice Wilkie's concurrence.  Id. at 
587 (Hansen, J., concurring). 
¶67 At issue in Foellmi was a sentence by a La Crosse 
County circuit judge who sentenced a defendant to prison after 
he pled guilty to 16 burglaries.  Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 574-75.  
The judge sentenced Foellmi to eight concurrent sentences of not 
more than five years on the first eight counts.  Id. at 575.  He 
then sentenced the defendant to eight concurrent sentences of 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
6 
 
not more than five years on the second eight counts, with the 
sentence for count nine to run consecutively to the sentence for 
count one.  Id.  Less than two months later, the court ordered 
that the defendant be returned to La Crosse from the Wisconsin 
State Reformatory——solely on the court's initiative——to be 
resentenced.  Id. 
¶68 The court explained that its undisclosed intention all 
along was to impose a "trial run" sentence in which the 
defendant would be ordered back to court within 90 days of the 
original sentence, after the defendant had heard "the prison 
gates clank behind him" and experienced the reality of prison 
life, e.g., the ultimate example of "Scared Straight."  Id. at 
576.  Upon the defendant's return, the court reduced all 16 
sentences from five years to three years and stated that counts 
two through eight would be concurrent with count one, counts ten 
through 16 would be concurrent with count nine, and count nine 
would run consecutively with count one.  Id. at 577.  The court 
then stayed execution of all sentences and placed the defendant 
on probation.  Id. 
¶69 Was this procedure proper?  The divided Foellmi court 
affirmed the second sentence but adopted rules to prevent "trial 
run" sentences from happening in the future——at least without 
legislative authorization.  Id. at 579-81.  The court stated, 
"It is inappropriate for a sentencing court to make a change in 
an imposed sentence unless new factors are made known."  Id. at 
582.  The court quoted a passage from the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts: 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
7 
 
Occasions inevitably will occur where a conscientious 
judge, after reflection or upon receipt of new 
probation reports or other information, will feel that 
he has been too harsh or has failed to give due weight 
to mitigating factors which properly he should have 
taken into account.  In such cases the interests of 
justice and sound judicial administration will be 
served by permitting the trial judge to reduce the 
sentence within a reasonable time. 
Id. (quoting Dist. Attorney for the N. Dist. v. Superior Court, 
172 N.E.2d 245, 250 (Mass. 1961)).  Then this court rebutted the 
Massachusetts court: "We think the Massachusetts court goes too 
far.  A trial court should not reduce a sentence on 'reflection' 
alone or simply because it has thought the matter over and has 
second thoughts.  It must base its modification on 'new factors' 
brought to its attention."  Id. 
¶70 No doubt Chief Justice Hallows was miffed by the first 
sentence because he had cited the Massachusetts decision with 
approval in a unanimous decision, Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 
102 n.2, 104, 175 N.W.2d 525 (1970), which declared that "a 
trial court may exercise its inherent power to change and modify 
its 
judgments 
after 
the 
execution 
of 
the 
sentence 
has 
commenced . . . ."  Id. at 101.  "We adopt one year from the 
date of sentencing for the time being as a time limit within 
which a motion can be made to have the court exercise its 
inherent power to modify a criminal sentence."  Id. at 106. 
¶71 The Foellmi decision was this court's full retreat 
from the Hayes decision, and Scott was the court's effort to 
treat sentence increases the same as sentence reductions.  The 
court used Scott to make this point, rather than to establish 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
8 
 
coherent policy, because this court certainly allowed circuit 
courts to correct "mistakes" when the correction benefited a 
defendant. 
¶72 Examination of Scott and other early cases suggests 
that this court was reluctant to repudiate judicial authority to 
modify sentences, but it was apprehensive about permitting trial 
judges to modify their sentences whenever they had second 
thoughts about them.  Judicial discretion of that nature would 
seriously undermine finality, creating uncertainty in the system 
as well as possible unfairness to defendants.  As a practical 
matter, judicial authority to modify sentences had to be 
cabined.  The new factor analysis set out in Rosado v. State, 70 
Wis. 2d 280, 
288, 
234 
N.W.2d 69 
(1975), 
complemented 
the 
reflection doctrine described in Scott.  These cases established 
parameters for discretionary sentence modification. 
¶73 However, changing a sentence after rethinking or 
second-guessing it on the merits is different from correcting a 
sentence because of a judicial mistake.  The new factor criteria 
are not suitable for evaluating judicial mistakes.  This is one 
reason why the reflection doctrine does not control this case. 
¶74 In addition, the Scott decision was influenced in part 
by 
concerns 
about 
double 
jeopardy. 
 
This 
is 
true, 
notwithstanding the fact that there was minimal discussion of 
double jeopardy in the opinion.  See Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 58.  
The Scott court stated: "Jeopardy in a constitutional sense has 
not attached and said sentence could be increased."  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶75 Chief Justice Hallows was still a member of the court 
when Scott was decided.  In the Hayes case, Justice Hallows 
wrote: 
[United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931)] pointed 
out the so-called lack of power to change a sentence 
after the commencement thereof was not a question of 
jurisdiction or the power of the court but the result 
of the application of the theory that to change a 
sentence after commencement raised a question of 
double jeopardy.  However, this question can only 
arise if the sentence is increased; there is no 
question of double jeopardy where the length of 
sentence is shortened. 
Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 101. 
¶76 Hayes was cited in State v. North, 91 Wis. 2d 507, 
509-10, 283 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1979), where the court of 
appeals said: 
Once a criminal defendant begins serving a sentence, a 
court may, in certain situations, properly modify or 
correct 
the 
sentence. 
 
Modification 
to 
correct 
sentencing flaws runs afoul of the double jeopardy 
provisions when the amending court seeks to increase 
sentences already being served. 
 . . . . 
[The Wisconsin Supreme Court] has stated that double 
jeopardy situations arise in modifying sentences when 
the sentence is enhanced or increased.   
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 101). 
¶77 The majority opinion here emphasizes United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), which was decided ten years 
after Hayes and one year after North.  DiFrancesco "changed the 
landscape of double jeopardy law."  State v. Gruetzmacher, 2004 
WI 55, ¶30, 271 Wis. 2d 585, 679 N.W.2d 533.  DiFrancesco said: 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
10 
 
Historically, the pronouncement of sentence has 
never carried the finality that attaches to an 
acquittal. . . .  [Under English common law, the] 
trial court's increase of a sentence, so long as it 
took place during the same term of court, was 
permitted.  This practice was not thought to violate 
any double jeopardy principle.  The common law is 
important in the present context, for our Double 
Jeopardy Clause was drafted with the common-law 
protections in mind. 
 . . . . 
The 
double 
jeopardy 
considerations 
that 
bar 
reprosecution after an acquittal do not prohibit 
review of a sentence. 
 . . . . 
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the 
defendant with the right to know at any specific 
moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment 
will turn out to be. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 133-34, 136-37 (citations omitted). 
¶78 DiFrancesco disavowed the "dictum" in Benz, 282 U.S. 
at 307, to the effect that the federal practice of barring an 
increase in sentence after service of the sentence began was 
constitutionally barred.  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138.  This 
disavowal removed the foundation for this court's comments in 
Hayes and the court of appeals decision in North.  Indeed, 
Gruetzmacher withdrew language from North that would have 
greatly impeded the ability of circuit judges to correct 
mistakes.  Gruetzmacher, 271 Wis. 2d 585, ¶35. 
¶79 Gruetzmacher discussed several post-DiFrancesco cases 
from 
Wisconsin, 
State 
v. 
Jones, 
2002 
WI 
App 
208, 
257 
Wis. 2d 163, 650 N.W.2d 844, State v. Willett, 2000 WI App 212, 
238 Wis. 2d 621, 618 N.W.2d 881, and State v. Burt, 2000 WI App 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
11 
 
126, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 N.W.2d 42, which, together, make the 
Scott case outmoded with respect to quickly-addressed judicial 
mistakes. 
¶80 "The Constitution does not require that sentencing 
should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means 
immunity for the prisoner."  Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 
160, 166-67 (1947).  This aphorism was quoted in both 
DiFrancesco and Gruetzmacher and provides guidance in the review 
of judicial "mistakes."  See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135; 
Gruetzmacher, 271 Wis. 2d 585, ¶29. 
II 
¶81 Human beings make mistakes.  Even judges.   
¶82 Sigmund Freud once lectured on "The Psychology of 
Errors"——"certain phenomena which are very frequent, very 
familiar and very little heeded, and which have nothing to do 
with the pathological, inasmuch as they can be observed in every 
normal person."1  Freud said: 
I refer to the errors which an individual commits——as 
for example, errors of speech in which he wishes to 
say something and uses the wrong word; or those which 
happen to him in writing, and which he may or may not 
notice; or the case of misreading, in which one reads 
in the print or writing something different from what 
is actually there. A similar phenomenon occurs in 
those cases of mishearing what is said to one, where 
there is no question of an organic disturbance of the 
auditory function. Another series of such occurrences 
is based on forgetfulness——but on a forgetfulness 
which is not permanent, but temporary, as for instance 
                                                 
1 Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis 10 
(G. Stanley Hall trans., Boni & Liveright, Inc. 1920). 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
12 
 
when one cannot think of a name which one knows and 
always recognizes; or when one forgets to carry out a 
project at the proper time but which one remembers 
again later, and therefore has only forgotten for a 
certain interval. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶83 One need not buy into Freud's explanation of these 
phenomena to acknowledge that they exist.  For instance, in this 
case, at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, there was 
discussion between the court and the defense attorney: 
[THE COURT:] State and Mr. Rypel are making a joint 
recommendation of concurrent time to a sentence she's 
currently serving in Waukesha County.  Is that 
correct? 
MR. RYPEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Matter is here for sentencing.  I trust I 
will be enlightened as to what she's serving in 
Washington and I will hear from the State. 
(Emphasis added.)  The reference to Washington County is a 
classic slip-of-the-tongue, to which no one responded.  Did 
counsel mishear what the court said?  Or did counsel disregard 
what the court said? 
¶84 In my view, neither constitutional law nor sound 
public policy demands that a defendant benefit from an authentic 
judicial mistake in sentencing.  The challenge for an appellate 
court in reviewing a sentence modification is identifying an 
authentic mistake that may be corrected from a change of 
position based on reflection that requires a new factor as a 
prerequisite to modification. 
¶85 In North, the court sentenced a defendant for one 
count of misdemeanor theft and one count of uttering a forged 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
13 
 
check, which was a felony.  North, 91 Wis. 2d at 508-09.  The 
maximum penalty for misdemeanor theft was six months in the 
county jail, or a fine of $200, or both.  Id. at 509.  The 
maximum penalty for forgery-uttering was ten years in prison or 
a fine of $5,000, or both.  Id.  Inexplicably, the court 
sentenced North to two and one-half years in prison on the theft 
charge, and six months concurrent on the forgery charge.  Id.  
The court's sentencing objective——two and one-half years in 
prison——seems clear, but the prison sentence was assigned, 
mistakenly, to the wrong offense.  Id.  When the court attempted 
to correct the "obvious error" several months later, it was 
reversed.  Id. at 511. 
¶86 In my view, the circuit court's error in North was 
indeed "obvious" and the circuit court should have been 
permitted to correct it. 
¶87 However, not all errors are so obvious. 
¶88 In Burt, the circuit court sentenced a defendant on 
three serious felonies: (1) party to a crime of first-degree 
reckless homicide; (2) party to a crime of attempted armed 
robbery by the use of force; and (3) party to a crime of armed 
robbery by threat of force.  Burt, 237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶1.  In 
imposing sentence, the circuit court said: 
As to count one [first-degree reckless homicide], 
Mr. Burt, you're sentenced to the Wisconsin state 
prison system for a period of forty years. 
As to count three, you're sentenced to the 
Wisconsin state prison system for——Let me correct 
that. 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
14 
 
As to count four [attempted armed robbery], 
you're sentenced to the Wisconsin state prison system 
for a concurrent term of twenty years. 
As 
to 
count 
three 
[armed 
robbery], 
you're 
sentenced 
to 
a 
term 
of 
consecutive 
probation 
consecutive to both counts one and four for a term of 
seven years and a sentence of forty years is imposed 
and stayed. 
Id., ¶3 (brackets in original). 
¶89 Burt was sentenced on the morning of March 6, 1997.  
Id.  Later, the court sentenced Burt's co-defendant, Anthony 
Sandifer.  Id., ¶4.  Sandifer's attorney immediately objected to 
Sandifer's sentence, asserting that it was much longer than 
Burt's 40-year sentence.  Id.  The circuit court responded by 
calling Burt back to the courtroom for a corrected sentence.  
The court explained: 
I'm going to place my original notes in a sealed 
envelope in the file for appellate purposes, but my 
notes are clear, and I did misspeak, and the court is 
fully aware——very little time having passed in this 
matter——as to what its original intent was, and quite 
honestly, based on what the court thought it imposed——
this sentence was somewhat less than the sentence that 
this defendant was to receive, the court believing 
that this defendant was a more aggressive actor in the 
matter, quite candidly. 
So I understand whenever there is a change of 
this kind, it's bound to raise eyebrows and raise 
concerns, but the court intends to impose the sentence 
that it had in mind and meant to say at the time of 
the sentencing . . . . 
Id. 
¶90 The court then repeated the sentence that it imposed 
on Burt in the morning, except that it changed the 20-year 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
15 
 
concurrent sentence for attempted armed robbery to a 20-year 
consecutive sentence for attempted armed robbery.  Id. 
¶91 The court of appeals upheld the 20-year increase in 
Burt's sentence, noting that "the trial court realized it made 
an error of speech in pronouncing Burt's sentence and took 
immediate steps to correct the sentence before the judgment of 
conviction was entered into the record."  Id., ¶11.  The court's 
"error" in executing its original intention was substantiated by 
its "original notes" and its sentence of Sandifer.  Would the 
result have been different if Sandifer had been sentenced the 
day after Burt was sentenced so that Burt's sentence could not 
be corrected the same day? 
¶92 Misstatements 
involving 
consecutive 
sentences 
and 
concurrent sentences may not be uncommon.  During the pendency 
of this case, the court received a petition for review in State 
v. Maxcey, No. 2012AP1988-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. July 30, 2013),2 a sentencing dispute that included the 
following colloquy: 
THE COURT: . . . I think, Mr. Maxcey, that I do 
have to sentence you for four separate crimes and I am 
going to do that.  I am, however, going to make your 
confinement concurrent to the confinement that you are 
now serving and you don't get any credit for it.  
Because you committed these armed robberies without a 
gun, I am going to sentence you to three years of 
confinement time on each of the armed robberies, so it 
should be a total of twelve years of confinement.  
That would be consecutive to the five years you are 
                                                 
2 This case is being cited solely for the facts and not as 
precedent or authority. 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
16 
 
serving but that is a length of time that makes sense 
to me, given the nature of the crime—— 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I thought you said it was 
going to be concurrent. 
THE COURT: Did I say consecutive?  Three years 
consecutive to——this is what I meant to say, I am 
sentencing [you] on one count with three read-ins; the 
bottom line number is twelve years because there are 
four crimes that I am considering here, but it will be 
concurrent to the sentence he is serving.  Does that 
explain it? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. 
Id. (emphasis added) (brackets in original). 
¶93 In both Burt and Maxcey, a circuit court judge 
misspoke but an attorney alerted the judge to the error and the 
error was promptly corrected. 
¶94 The difficulty in the present case is that it involves 
an error of "mishearing" rather than the more familiar error of 
misspeaking.  In addition, the circuit court's position that it 
"misheard" 
information 
about 
the 
concurrent 
sentences 
in 
Waukesha County is contradicted by the fact that the court 
repeated what it heard.  The circumstances of this case were 
such that no attorney alerted the court to the error because the 
court did not misspeak.  The parties asked for concurrent 
sentences, the court imposed concurrent sentences, and the court 
intended to impose concurrent sentences.  The court seemingly 
misunderstood the effect of the sentences it imposed because it 
thought it was imposing sentences concurrent to a 33-month 
sentence of confinement from Waukesha County. 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
17 
 
¶95 That misunderstanding is inconsistent with the "two 
years in and four years out" statement found in the transcript.  
Thus, if this court were to adopt the position that judicial 
errors simply may not be corrected if correction produces an 
increased sentence, it could reverse the circuit court here 
based solely on its statements at the initial sentencing.  Such 
inflexibility, 
however, 
would 
effectively 
dispute 
the 
authenticity of statements the court made about the defendant 
during the initial sentencing, statements the court made about 
its intentions during resentencing, and statements the court 
made in its written opinion denying a postconviction motion.  It 
would not explain why the court went to CCAP to check out the 
Waukesha County sentences shortly after its own sentencing.  It 
would place great importance on the fact that Robinson was 
sentenced in the afternoon, unlike Burt who was sentenced in the 
morning, so that the court could not modify its sentence the 
same day.  It also would place significance on the fact that no 
attorney spoke up and rescued the court from a mistake.  
However, it would place no significance on the fact that the 
court was dealing with a complicated set of facts, that it had 
no presentence investigation that put the Waukesha sentences in 
writing, and that it acted to correct its mistake within 24 
hours.   
¶96 The confusion related to the sentences is evident from 
the discussion during the plea hearing on April 12, 2011.  The 
following exchange took place between the court and the 
Assistant District Attorney (ADA): 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
18 
 
[ADA]: The State's recommendation is for count two, 
five months, House of Corrections, that would be 
concurrent with count three, consecutive to count one.  
Or count three, five months, House of Corrections, 
that is concurrent with count two and consecutive to 
count one.  And for count one, six months in the House 
of Corrections with release to CJRC for treatment, 
consecutive to count two and three. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry.  Count one was what? 
[ADA]: Count one was six months in the House of 
Corrections, with release to CJRC for treatment, and 
that would be consecutive to counts two and three. 
THE COURT: So let me see if I get this straight.  
Count one, six months, House of Corrections, with 
release to CJRC, consecutive to any other sentence.  
Count two, five months in the House of Corrections, 
concurrent to any other sentence.  Counts three, five 
months in the House of Corrections, concurrent to 
count two but consecutive to count one. 
[ADA]: Yes. 
 . . . . 
THE COURT: I'm confused. 
 . . . . 
[ADA] I think the bottom-line is that——for the three 
counts in this case, [we're] asking for, essentially, 
11 months in the House of Corrections—— 
THE COURT: Well, that doesn't make any sense.  You 
want me to run all counts concurrent with the 
sentences in 08-CF-518 -- 08-CM -- So while on the one 
hand you're saying all counts concurrent, you're also 
saying counts one and counts three to be consecutive. 
Why don't you guys take a moment and pass this 
case.  Take a moment to set this out because this is 
getting extremely confusing.  I don't know what you're 
asking me to sentence . . . . 
¶97 Eventually, the ADA told the court that the sentence 
was to be concurrent with the Waukesha sentences, but she also 
No.  2011AP2833.dtp 
 
19 
 
said, "I'm willing to change the offer to a lengthy House 
sentence, concurrent to the sentence in the three cases, in 
which she was just revoked."  It is true that the confusion 
related to the three counts from the Milwaukee County incident, 
but the plea hearing demonstrates that the judge was having a 
hard time wrapping his head around which sentences were 
concurrent 
and 
which 
ones 
were 
consecutive. 
 
It 
is 
understandable that the confusion would linger until the 
sentencing hearing less than a month later. 
¶98 This is a close case, but I come down on the side of 
the judge.  It does not take psychoanalysis to understand that 
the phenomenon of "mishearing" is different from not hearing.  A 
misunderstanding, when acted upon very quickly, should not 
prevent a court from correcting a sentence.  Such a correction 
does not violate double jeopardy and is a reasonable result in 
this case. 
¶99 For 
the 
reasons 
stated, 
I 
respectfully 
concur. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶100 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Wisconsin 
case law sets forth two separate doctrines governing a judicial 
change in a sentence:  double jeopardy and reflection.1 
¶101 The 
majority 
opinion 
addresses 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional double jeopardy argument and denies that it 
addresses the reflection doctrine.2  The majority opinion admits 
that 
constitutional 
double 
jeopardy 
protection 
and 
the 
reflection doctrine both apply in "cases concerning a judicial 
change of a sentence."3  Nevertheless, the majority opinion 
sometimes addresses the act of reflection but avoids the term 
and refers to reflection as the judge "deliberating," ¶¶41, 44, 
48, or similar words.  Paragraphs 42 and 43 of the majority 
opinion openly address the defendant's reflection arguments. 
¶102 I examine the application of the reflection doctrine 
in the present case, in which the circuit court changed the 
terms of a sentence after the circuit court imposed a valid 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Scott v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 54, 58, 218 
N.W.2d 350 (1974) (overturning a change in a sentence on 
reflection grounds even when "[j]eopardy in a constitutional 
sense has not yet attached"). 
2 See 
majority 
op., 
¶50 
("We 
do 
not 
cite 
or 
discuss . . . the numerous cases in our reflection doctrine 
jurisprudence . . . .").   
3 Majority op., ¶49. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
2 
 
sentence.4  I would vacate the second sentence and reinstate the 
original sentence. 
¶103 I 
address 
the 
reflection 
doctrine 
because 
the 
reflection doctrine has been raised at every stage of the 
litigation; because this court typically decides cases on 
grounds other than constitutional grounds when it can;5 because 
the reflection doctrine presents difficulties for litigants and 
the courts; and because the reflection doctrine is dispositive 
in the instant case. 
¶104 By neglecting the reflection doctrine, the majority 
opinion 
ignores 
an 
important 
and, 
in 
the 
present 
case, 
dispositive issue and muddles the present law on the reflection 
doctrine.  Because I conclude that the circuit court overstepped 
its limited authority under the existing reflection law to 
change the sentence it imposed, I dissent. 
                                                 
4 The case law variously refers to such a change in an 
original 
valid 
sentence 
interchangeably 
as 
"amending 
the 
sentence," Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 57; "resentencing," State v. 
Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572, 581, 205 N.W.2d 144 (1973); "a change 
in an imposed sentence," Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 582; "sentence 
modification," State v. Hedgwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 546, 335 
N.W.2d 399 (1983); a "sentence increase," Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 
59; "sentence reduction," State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 472, 
230 N.W.2d 665 (1975); or a "sentence change," Wuensch, 69 
Wis. 2d at 480.  I use the word "change" to include all these 
terms.  The majority opinion similarly refers to "a judicial 
change of a sentence."  Majority op., ¶49. 
5 See, e.g., Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶105 In 
response 
to 
my 
dissent, 
the 
concurrence 
acknowledges that the reflection doctrine is alive (but not 
well) in Wisconsin law and is germane to the present case.  The 
concurrence "reflects" on the reflection doctrine "to provide 
support for the court's decision."  Concurrence, ¶52.   
¶106 The concurrence does not advocate discarding the 
reflection doctrine.  Instead, the concurrence recasts the 
doctrine to distinguish between an "authentic mistake that may 
be corrected" (which the concurrence concludes happened in the 
instant case) and "a change of position based on reflection that 
requires a new factor as a prerequisite to modification."  
Concurrence, ¶84. 
¶107 My discussion of the reflection doctrine is organized 
as follows: 
I. 
The parties' positions on the recollection doctrine. 
II. An examination of the reflection doctrine and its 
application to the present case. 
III. The concurrence's position on the reflection doctrine. 
IV. The future prospects of the reflection doctrine.  
I 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶108 The reflection doctrine has been presented to this 
court by both parties and the amicus.6  The majority opinion 
asserts that the dissent is "creat[ing] and develop[ing] 
arguments on a party's behalf."7  Yet the parties addressed this 
issue time and again and the reflection issue was fully before 
this court. 
¶109 Both parties addressed the issue of reflection in 
their briefs in this court.  The defendant's brief notes that 
the increase in the defendant's sentence "was impermissibly 
based on the court's second guessing of its original sentence."8  
The State's brief defends against the charge of reflection, 
stating "the sentencing court in this case did not impermissibly 
modify the sentence 'upon reflection.'"9   
¶110 The circuit court's order denying the defendant's 
post-conviction motion was appealed to the court of appeals.  
Both the judgment of conviction and the post-conviction order 
are before this court for review.  The post-conviction motion 
                                                 
6 The parties spent most of oral argument and their briefs 
discussing the double jeopardy issue.  The short unpublished per 
curiam opinion of the court of appeals addressed only the double 
jeopardy issue.   
7 Majority op., ¶50 (quoting State v. Brown, No. 2011AP2907-
CR, 
unpublished 
order 
(Feb. 
26, 
2014) 
(Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting)). 
8 Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 6. 
9 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 16.   
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
5 
 
noted that the modified sentence "is neither permissible nor 
fair and constitutes double jeopardy and modification of the 
sentence without a new factor."10     
¶111 Additionally, 
a 
nonparty 
(amicus) 
brief 
of 
the 
Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers discussed the 
"reflection" issue at length.     
¶112 At oral argument, the issue of reflection emerged 
again.  Defense counsel noted:   
I don't believe that there's anything suggesting, or 
to meet that burden of proof in this record.  I think 
there are only the comments of the judge on Day Two 
that make any suggestion of whether or not it was 
reflection. . . . It does, I think, kind of sound like 
reassessing and reweighing some of the factors insofar 
as he misunderstood the nine-month sentence, but I 
don't believe that any evidence was introduced into 
the record at that point that would suggest it was not 
reflection.11 
¶113 The State in its oral argument before this court 
stated:  "[R]eflection is a factor that can be considered in 
addition to the [State v. Jones, 2002 WI App 208, 257 
Wis. 2d 163, 650 N.W.2d 844, double jeopardy] factors.  I think 
you can look what the sentencing, the record, you can look to 
                                                 
10 State v. Robinson, Case No. 11-CF-288, Post-conviction 
Motion To Restore Original Sentence (Milwaukee Cnty. Cir. Ct., 
Nov. 14, 2011). 
11 Oral 
arg. 
at 
24:48-25:28, 
available 
at 
http://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/scoa.jsp?docket_number=2011ap283
3&begin_date=&end_date=&party_name=&sortBy=date 
(last 
visited 
June 2, 2014) (emphasis added).  See the defendant's reflection 
argument, discussed at ¶¶40-41 of the majority opinion. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
6 
 
the time it took for the court to resentence, and you can look 
to whether the trial court impermissibly reflected."12  The State 
continued:  "[W]hat you can discuss is, you know, well, the 
State's argument is that there is no reflection.  I do think 
this court should address that issue, because prior cases in the 
appellate courts have discussed in the double jeopardy context 
whether the trial court impermissibly reflected in imposing its 
sentence, resentence."13  The State openly recognized that 
impermissible reflection would bar the circuit court's change in 
the sentence imposed in the present case.   
¶114 The majority opinion erroneously asserts that no 
arguments regarding the reflection doctrine are before the 
court.  Majority op., ¶¶49-50.  The majority opinion declares 
that it "do[es] not cite or discuss . . . the numerous cases in 
our reflection doctrine jurisprudence . . . ."  Majority op., 
¶51.  Nevertheless, the very cases the parties and the majority 
opinion discuss involved the reflection doctrine.  See State v. 
Gruetzmacher, 2004 WI 55, ¶38, 271 Wis. 2d 585, 679 N.W.2d 533 
(discussed at majority op., ¶¶33-40); State v. Burt, 2000 WI App 
126, ¶¶14-15, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 N.W.2d 42 (discussed at 
majority op., ¶¶28, 35-39).  By denying that it is addressing 
the reflection doctrine, the majority opinion contravenes our 
goals of finality and fundamental fairness, casts doubt on the 
continued vitality of the reflection doctrine, and undermines, 
                                                 
12 Oral arg. at 1:00:24-1:00:44. 
13 Oral arg. at 1:01:40-1:01:56.   
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
7 
 
if not overrules, numerous cases of long standing adopting the 
reflection doctrine.14 
II 
¶115 I turn now to an explanation of the reflection 
doctrine and its application to the present case. 
¶116 The reflection doctrine is one aspect of the law that 
a circuit court's inherent power to change a sentence is a 
"discretionary 
power 
that 
is 
exercised 
within 
defined 
parameters."15  The doctrine prevents a circuit court from 
                                                 
14 In addition to the cases cited herein, a long line of 
cases addresses the question of when it is appropriate for a 
circuit court to change a valid sentence it has imposed.   
See State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 335 N.W.2d 402 
(1983) ("The rule in Wisconsin is that it is inappropriate for a 
sentencing court to make a change in an imposed sentence unless 
new factors are made known.  'A trial court should not reduce a 
sentence on "reflection" alone or simply because it has thought 
the matter over and has second thoughts.  It must base its 
modification on "new factors" brought to its attention.'  State 
v. Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572, 582, 205 N.W.2d 144 (1973)."); State 
v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 674 n.1, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985) ("A 
trial court is not free to modify a sentence solely on 
reconsideration and reflection and a deliberate change of mind.  
See Scott v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 54, 58-60, 218 N.W.2d 350 
(1974)."); State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 113, 401 N.W.2d 748 
(1987) ("In Scott, the court made clear that a court should not 
increase 
a 
sentence 
on 
'"reflection" 
alone.' 
[Scott, 
64 
Wis. 2d ] at 59, 218 N.W.2d 350."); State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI 
App 106, ¶21, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507 (overturning a 
circuit court's change in a sentence because "it may not reduce 
a 
sentence 
merely 
upon 
'reflection' 
or 
second 
thoughts.  
[Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d at] 480; Scott v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 54, 59, 
218 N.W.2d 350 (1974)").  
15 State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶88, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 
N.W.2d 451 (citing State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶12, 273 
Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524) (emphasis added)).  
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
8 
 
changing its imposed sentence "to conform the sentence to its 
unspoken intent."16       
¶117 The reflection doctrine can be traced to State v. 
Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572, 581-82, 205 N.W.2d 144 (1973), which 
held that a sentencing court may reduce or modify a sentence 
after its imposition if new factors bearing on the sentence are 
made known, but a sentencing court should not reduce a sentence 
"on 'reflection' alone or simply because it has thought the 
matter over and has second thoughts."  Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 
582. 
¶118 The case law recognizes that a sentencing court may 
change a valid sentence that it has imposed for a variety of 
reasons other than reflection.  It can, for example, change a 
valid sentence it has imposed because of a new factor,17 or for 
erroneous exercise of discretion based upon its conclusion that 
                                                 
16 Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 60.  See also State v. Crochiere, 
2004 WI 78, ¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524. 
Whether a circuit court has changed a sentence it has 
imposed on reflection is a question of law for this court. 
For 
a 
discussion 
of 
sentence 
modification 
and 
the 
reflection doctrine, see Jeffrey Kassel, Comment, Sentence 
Modification by Wisconsin Trial Courts, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 195, 
200-03. 
17 See Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 234 N.W.2d 69 
(1975). 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
9 
 
the sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable,18 or because it 
is impossible to carry out the original sentence,19 or to correct 
formal or clerical errors.20   
¶119 In addition, a circuit court can change a valid, 
imposed sentence to comport with the circuit court's initial 
intention, when the circuit court's initial intention appears on 
the record of the original proceedings.21   
¶120 This court has carefully explained that evidence of 
the circuit court's original intention must be in the record of 
the original proceedings if a circuit court is to change a 
sentence to conform to its original intention.  Such a rule 
enables 
an 
appellate 
court 
to 
avoid 
inquiring 
into 
the 
authenticity of a circuit court's assertion at a second 
sentencing 
proceeding 
of 
its 
intention 
at 
the 
original 
proceedings.  As this court explained:  "Were we clairvoyant and 
able to say for certain in every case what the trial judge 
                                                 
18 Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d at 478-80 ("The trial court cannot 
change the sentence upon mere reflection or indulge in 'shock 
treatment.'  However, we perceive no valid reason why a trial 
court should not be permitted to review a sentence for abuse of 
discretion based upon its conclusion the sentence was unduly 
harsh or unconscionable."); see also State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 
28, ¶35 n.8, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828 (citing Wuensch for 
the same proposition). 
19 State 
v. 
Sepulveda, 
119 
Wis. 2d 546, 
555-56, 
350 
N.W.2d 96 (1984) 
20 Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101-01, 175 N.W.2d 625 
(1970) (overruled in part by State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 
210 N.W.2d 873 (1973)). 
21 Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 59-60. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
10 
 
really 'intended,' this [court might investigate the trial 
judge's intentions].  Being mere mortals however, we must 
refrain from such delicate undertakings, and we refuse to 
sanction a procedure that encourages such an inquiry."22 
¶121 Along these lines, the majority opinion urges that 
"taking judges at their word is a fundamental assumption built 
into our legal system," and that in "the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary, we decline to assign improper motive 
on the part of the circuit court."  Majority op., ¶48.  The 
reflection doctrine accomplishes exactly the goal the majority 
opinion espouses.   
¶122 Under the reflection doctrine, an appellate court does 
not gauge whether a circuit court's explanation at resentencing 
is an accurate statement of the circuit court's original 
intention.  
¶123 The 
paradigmatic 
application 
of 
the 
reflection 
doctrine and the requirement of contemporaneous evidence in the 
record to support the circuit court's original intention is 
found in Scott v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 54, 60, 218 N.W.2d 350 
(1974), one of the seminal reflection cases.23   
¶124 In Scott, two defendants were charged with armed 
robbery.  The first defendant, Calvin Scott, was sentenced to up 
to five years in prison.  The second defendant, James Porter, 
                                                 
22 Id. at 59 (citations and quotations omitted). 
23 Scott was not a double jeopardy case.  Scott, 64 Wis. 2d 
at 58. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
11 
 
was sentenced to up to ten years in prison.  Scott, however, was 
already serving a five-year prison sentence for another crime.  
Thus, defendant Scott was sentenced to a total of ten years of 
prison for two crimes while defendant Porter was sentenced to 
ten years but for only one crime. 
¶125 The sentencing court realized this difference in the 
two 
sentences 
while 
driving 
home 
after 
sentencing 
the 
defendants.  The next day, the sentencing court ordered 
defendant Scott back to court to be resentenced.  At the hearing 
to change the sentence, the circuit court explaining that it did 
not intend to have one defendant serve ten years for a single 
crime and have another serve ten years for two crimes; such a 
result, said the circuit court at resentencing, "was not fair to 
the community."  Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 58. 
¶126 In Scott, the supreme court reinstated the original 
sentence, 
concluding 
that 
when 
a 
sentencing 
court 
unintentionally erred in imposing a sentence, an appellate court 
would not engage in the delicate inquiry of examining the 
original intention of the sentencing court.  Rather, the Scott 
court concluded that because the sentencing court's decision to 
increase the sentence attempted to conform the sentence to its 
unspoken intention, the increase in the sentence was based on 
reflection and was prohibited.   
¶127 The Scott court explained: 
A review of the record in the instant case shows that 
the decision to increase the sentence was based solely 
on "reflection."  Here the court amended the sentence 
so as to conform the sentence to its unspoken intent. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
12 
 
. . . [T]he trial court's amended sentence . . . must 
be 
reversed 
and 
the 
original 
sentence . . . re-
instated. 
Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 59-60. 
¶128 Numerous cases have reiterated and applied the Scott 
holding:  A court cannot change a sentence to conform to its 
original intention, unless the record demonstrates that original 
intention.24   
¶129 When the record demonstrates that a changed sentence 
conforms 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
original 
intention, 
no 
impermissible reflection has occurred.  For example, in State v. 
Burt, 2000 WI App 126, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 N.W.2d 42, the 
circuit court's notes from the first sentencing proceeding 
demonstrated the original intention for the duration of the 
sentence and that the circuit court judge had a "slip of the 
tongue"25——that is, that the circuit court meant to say one word 
at the original sentencing proceeding and said another word 
instead.  The change in the sentence was therefore upheld under 
the Scott test.  Burt, 237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶15. 
¶130 By contrast, the record in the instant case fails to 
demonstrate that the court's initial intention was the longer 
sentence.  Indeed, the circuit court in the present case 
apparently acknowledged that its original intention was not in 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Harbor, 333 Wis. 2d 53, ¶35; State v. Kluck, 
210 Wis. 2d 1, 6-7, 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997); Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 
at 480.  
25 State v. Burt, 2000 WI App 126, ¶12, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 
N.W.2d 42. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
13 
 
the record, explaining that it was changing the sentence to 
conform the sentence to its unspoken intention that a longer 
sentence be imposed:  
Yesterday afternoon we had a sentencing hearing 
involving [the defendant].  At the conclusion of the 
hearing and subsequent thereto the [circuit court] did 
some research and I realized I made a mistake.  The 
split sentence I proposed yesterday did not reflect 
this Court's intent as far as a fair sentence in this 
case. 
¶131 The circuit court in the present case changed the 
initial sentence when, after thinking the sentence over and 
doing some research, it decided that the original sentence did 
not conform with its unspoken, unstated intention.  The circuit 
court stated it came to realize that the sentence imposed was 
not harsh enough.  
¶132 Put differently, the circuit court in the present case 
came to the conclusion that the original sentence would have to 
be increased in order to meet its intended but unstated 
sentencing goals.26 That reasoning is exactly the kind of 
reasoning prohibited by the reflection doctrine. 
III 
¶133 The 
concurrence 
critiques 
three 
aspects 
of 
the 
reflection doctrine:  
(A) The initial reflection cases relied on cases with 
different facts.  Concurrence, ¶¶60-74.  
                                                 
26 See Burt, 237 Wis. 2d 610, ¶15. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
14 
 
(B) Double jeopardy "make[s] the Scott case outmoded 
with 
respect 
to 
quickly-addressed 
judicial 
mistakes." 
Concurrence, ¶79. 
(C) The concurrence changes the reflection doctrine to 
rely 
on 
what 
the 
concurrence 
characterizes 
as 
psychoanalysis and mind-reading to determine a circuit 
court's unspoken intention.  Concurrence, ¶98. 
A 
¶134 With respect to the concurrence's first critique, the 
Scott 
court 
explicitly 
stated 
that 
it 
was 
adopting 
the 
reflection doctrine by relying on the rationale of past cases 
with different fact scenarios.27  The Scott court knew what it 
was doing.  Regardless of the concurrence's hindsight view of 
the persuasiveness of the seminal cases, see concurrence, ¶¶66-
70, or its analysis of the motivations and positions of 
individual 
justices, 
the 
concurrence 
recognizes 
that 
the 
holdings of Scott and Foellmi are good law in Wisconsin: A 
circuit court is barred from "amend[ing] the sentence so as to 
conform the sentence to its unspoken intent."  Scott, 64 Wis. 2d 
at 59-60.   
B 
¶135 With respect to the concurrence's double jeopardy 
argument, nowhere in our case law has it been suggested that the 
                                                 
27 Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 58-59 (citing State v. Leonard, 39 
Wis. 2d 461, 473, 159 N.W.2d 577 (1968); Denny v. State, 47 
Wis. 2d 541, 544, 178 N.W.2d 38 (1970); Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 
582). 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
15 
 
application of double jeopardy principles abrogates the need for 
the reflection doctrine.  Indeed, the concurrence implicitly 
concedes that even if the double jeopardy case of United States 
v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133-37 (1980), limits the 
application of the reflection doctrine, the reflection doctrine 
retains importance whenever a circuit court changes a valid, 
imposed sentence.  Concurrence, ¶84. 
¶136 The concurrence cites Burt, 137 Wis. 2d 610, ¶¶12-15, 
to show the limits of the reflection doctrine,28 but Burt 
demonstrates that courts analyze both the double jeopardy and 
reflection doctrines and apply each test independently. 
C 
¶137 With respect to the concurrence's application of the 
reflection doctrine to the present case, the concurrence 
modifies the reflection test to uphold the circuit court's 
sentence in the instant case as follows:  A sentence changed 
because of an "authentic judicial mistake in sentencing" is 
permissible, even though the record of the initial proceedings 
does not demonstrate the circuit court's original intention.  
Concurrence, ¶84.   
¶138 The concurrence justifies its modified reflection test 
to eliminate the record requirement, but at the same time seeks 
to avoid the use of psychoanalysis and mind-reading to "dispute 
the authenticity of . . . statements the court made about its 
intentions . . . ."  Concurrence, ¶95.   
                                                 
28 Concurrence, ¶¶88-91. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶139 Yet the concurrence's modification of the reflection 
doctrine 
forces 
an 
appellate 
court 
in 
the 
trap 
of 
psychoanalyzing and reading the mind of the circuit court. 
¶140 The concurrence has constructed a long, involved 
narrative engaging in mind-reading to determine the circuit 
court's original intention in the present case and to conclude 
that the circuit court made an authentic judicial mistake. 
¶141 According to the concurrence, "the [circuit] court 
seemingly misunderstood the effect of the sentences it imposed," 
concurrence, ¶94; was in "confusion" during the original 
sentencing proceeding, concurrence, ¶¶96, 97; and had "a hard 
time wrapping [its] head around" which sentences were concurrent 
and which were consecutive.  Concurrence, ¶97.   
¶142 Despite the circuit court's hearing and correctly 
repeating the defendant's various sentences at the original 
sentencing proceeding, concurrence, ¶94, the concurrence gamely 
attempts to read the circuit court's mind to find evidence of 
confusion at the original sentencing hearing regarding what the 
circuit court "thought it was imposing."  Concurrence, ¶94.   
¶143 This is exactly the type of psychoanalysis that the 
concurrence expressly claims to avoid.  Concurrence, ¶98.  The 
concurrence puts appellate courts in the position of having to 
assess whether a circuit court's post-sentencing assertion of a 
mistake at the original sentencing is "authentic" or not.  
¶144 In contrast, the existing reflection doctrine allows 
an appellate court to avoid psychoanalyzing the authenticity of 
the circuit court's assertion at a second sentencing of a 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
17 
 
mistake at the original sentencing by requiring that the change 
in the sentence conform with the circuit court's original 
intention 
as 
expressed 
in 
the 
record 
of 
the 
original 
proceedings.   
¶145 As the court noted in Scott, appellate courts are not 
mind-readers and must rely on the record to assess the circuit 
court's original intention.29  The record must contain clear and 
convincing evidence that the reason for the change in the 
sentence is not mere reflection.  In Burt, the circuit court's 
contemporaneous sealed notes demonstrated the court's original 
intention.30  In the present case, as in Scott, the sentencing 
court based the change of the sentence on its unspoken intention 
at the original sentencing proceedings and fails to pass the 
reflection test.31    
¶146 Consequently, I conclude that the circuit court erred 
in the present case in changing the sentence.  
IV 
¶147 Many states impose far stricter limitations on trial 
courts' sentence changes than Wisconsin.  These states do not 
                                                 
29 Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 59-60.  See ¶120, supra. 
30 Burt, 237 Wis. 2d at 610, ¶4.    
31 Scott, 64 Wis. 2d at 59 (vacating a defendant's new 
sentence and reinstating the original sentence when the only 
evidence of the circuit court's original intention came from the 
court's own statement at the resentencing hearing). 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
18 
 
need or have a reflection doctrine to limit a trial court's 
authority to change a sentence.32  
¶148 This court has grappled with the circumstances under 
which a circuit court may change a valid sentence after it is 
imposed.  The appellate courts have decided numerous cases 
involving sentence changes.33  The legislature has also addressed 
this issue in crafting statutes regarding sentence changes.34   
¶149 If the court wishes to overrule or modify the 
reflection doctrine, it should do so, rather than create a 
                                                 
32 At 
the 
time 
the 
reflection 
doctrine 
was 
adopted, 
Wisconsin was the only state that permitted circuit courts to 
modify a sentence after the sentence had begun or the term had 
ended.  See Kassel, supra note 16, at 200-03.  Attorney Kassel 
notes:   
Prior to 1970, Wisconsin followed the common-law 
majority rule that the power of the trial court to 
modify its judgment or sentence ceases when the 
sentence has begun or the term of the court has 
expired.  This long-standing limitation on the power 
of the trial court was rejected by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Hayes v. State [46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 
N.W.2d 625 (1970)]. 
Id. at 200. 
The general rule in other states more strictly prevents 
trial courts from changing a sentence.  See Lee R. Russ, Power 
of State Court, During Same Term, To Increase Severity of Lawful 
Sentence—Modern Status, 26 A.L.R. 4th 905, §§ 3, 8 (1983 & Supp. 
2013). 
33 See Harbor, 333 Wis. 2d 53, ¶¶35-51 (analyzing our 
court's history of "new factor" analysis). 
34 See Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 106 (holding that the new 
criminal code mandated a 90-day window for sentence changes). 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
19 
 
confusing and contradictory outcome as it does in the present 
case.     
¶150 The court might conclude that the reflection doctrine 
is not good policy, or that it is too difficult to apply, and 
that the doctrine should be abandoned.     
¶151 Or the court could create a bright-line rule, holding 
that a circuit court, on its own motion or on motion of a party, 
may change a valid, imposed sentence within a fixed amount of 
time after the imposition——say, 48 hours.35   
¶152 If, however, the court is overruling or altering the 
numerous cases adopting and applying the reflection doctrine, it 
                                                 
35 In areas of imprecise durational requirements, courts 
occasionally set bright-line time limits in the interests of 
certainty.  The United States Supreme Court recently confronted 
the issue in Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 130 S. Ct. 1213 
(2010), when dealing with the time limit after an invocation of 
counsel that police can recommence interrogation: 
It is impractical to leave the answer to that question 
for clarification in future case-by-case adjudication; 
law enforcement officers need to know, with certainty 
and beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful. 
And while it is certainly unusual for this Court to 
set forth precise time limits governing police action, 
it is not unheard-of. In County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin, 
500 
U.S. 44, 
111 
S. Ct. 1661, 
114 
L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991), we specified 48 hours as the time 
within 
which 
the 
police 
must 
comply 
with 
the 
requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 
S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975), that a person 
arrested without a warrant be brought before a 
magistrate to establish probable cause for continued 
detention.  
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110.  The Court in Shatzer settled on a 14-
day time period, after weighing and balancing various factors. 
No.  2011AP2833.ssa 
 
20 
 
should state its intention.  Instead, the majority opinion 
muddles the existing doctrine, while claiming not to address it.   
¶153 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  I would hold 
that the record of the proceedings in the present case does not 
demonstrate that the circuit court increased the imposed 
sentence to conform to the circuit court's original intention.  
Rather, the record shows the circuit court reflected on the 
sentence initially imposed:  it checked records; it did 
research; and it changed the sentence because it concluded that 
the sentence it imposed was not the one it intended to impose or 
should have imposed. 
¶154 Indeed the concurrence in effect concedes that the 
record is not sufficient to permit a sentence change under 
existing law and must modify the reflection doctrine to uphold 
the changed sentence in the present case.   
¶155 Adhering to the current law on reflection, I would 
vacate the second sentence and reinstate the original sentence. 
¶156 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
 
 
                                  
                             
 
 
 
No. 
   
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
   
 
 
 
1