Title: Ex Parte Kennedy

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

472 So. 2d 1106 (1985)
Ex parte Victor KENNEDY.
(Re: Victor Kennedy v. State of Alabama).
83-664.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 22, 1985.
Rehearing Denied June 7, 1985.
*1108 Gould H. K. Blair, Birmingham, and William T. Denson, Goodwater, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Joseph G. L. Marston III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is a capital murder case. The facts are fully and accurately reported in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 472 So. 2d 1096; therefore, we briefly summarize the facts here only to the extent necessary to our holding.
On December 24, 1980, petitioner entered the home of eighty-six-year-old Mrs. Annie Laura Orr in Montevallo. Petitioner was accompanied by Darrell Grayson. (See Grayson v. State, [7 Div. 3, Jan. 31, 1984] (Ala.Crim.App.1984), affirmed, [MS. 83-756, Feb. 15, 1985] (Ala.1985).) One of the men was armed with a pistol. Inside Mrs. Orr's home the two men assaulted Mrs. Orr and placed a pillowcase over her head. They then wrapped her head with masking tape so that her head resembled that of a mummy. Mrs. Orr was repeatedly raped and terrorized with threats and gunfire. Finally, petitioner and Grayson left the house with two decks of playing cards, Mrs. Orr's wallet, and a small amount of money. Mrs. Orr slowly suffocated to death.
Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and overruled his application for rehearing. We granted certiorari as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala. R.A.P. Petitioner presents seven issues for our review.
Relying on Bufford v. State, 382 So. 2d 1162 (Ala.Crim.App.1980), petitioner contends that during the sentencing phase, the judge's instructions to the jury regarding aggravating circumstances included an offense which constituted an element of the indictment and, as a result, he contends he was being punished twice for the same offense. We disagree.
As the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held, Bufford was effectively overruled in Kyzer v. State, 399 So. 2d 330, 334-39 (Ala.1981), and Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala.1980); Dobard v. State, 435 So. 2d 1338 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), affirmed, Ex parte Dobard, 435 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 745, 79 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1984).
Kennedy contends that the effect of Bufford cannot be overruled because the language of Code 1975, § 13A-5-31, mandates that a death sentence be imposed only if certain crimes are committed "with aggravation." The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a rape, robbery, and burglary; and, (2) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, especially when compared to other capital felonies.
We have reviewed the findings made by the trial judge and hold that the evidence supports the judge's determination that two aggravating circumstances were present in this case.
Finally, Kennedy contends that even though Bufford has been overruled, the instant offense was committed before it was overruled; consequently he contends that if Bufford is not applied, the result is an ex post facto violation. Again, we find this argument to be without merit.
As the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated, the Bufford court's misinterpretation of Code 1975, § 13A-5-31, was corrected in Kyzer v. State, supra. It is a settled principle that the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws applies strictly to legislative acts and does not extend to changes in law effected by judicial decisions. This principle was expressly stated in the following Supreme Court cases: Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S. Ct. 990, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1977); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 33 S. Ct. 220, 57 L. Ed. 458 (1913); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall 386, 1 *1109 L. Ed. 648 (1798). Specifically, it was declared in Frank v. Mangum, supra, that the constitutional prohibition against state enactment of ex post facto laws is, "as its terms indicate, directed against legislative action only, and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the court." 237 U.S.  at 344, 35 S. Ct.  at 593. (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner next contends that the trial judge's instruction defining "aiding and abetting" violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments, which prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on one who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. He cites Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982). We find that Enmund is not applicable to the case at hand.
Prior to instructing the jury regarding the meaning of "aiding and abetting," the trial judge familiarized the jury with the meaning of "intent to kill." He instructed the jury as follows:
It was after the judge had thoroughly instructed the jury on the need for finding that Kennedy intended to kill that the trial judge instructed the jury regarding the complicity statute and the definition of "aiding and abetting." The jury was instructed as follows:
The Court of Criminal Appeals, in addressing this issue, held:
We adopt the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals as being the law of this case.
Petitioner's third contention is that the trial judge's instructions during the sentencing phase of the trial had the effect of misleading the jury into believing that voluntary intoxication was immaterial to the determination of his sentence. We disagree.
The specific instruction which Kennedy contends to be misleading is as follows:
Having carefully reviewed this charge in the context in which it was heard by the jury, we find no error. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' finding that the above charge merely instructed the jury to apply the same rules and guidelines in ascertaining the factual truth from the evidence presented in the sentencing phase as they applied in the guilt phase. Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing, although the trial judge did not specifically instruct the jury on intoxication, he did instruct the jury that they could consider "a substantially lessened or substantially diminished capacity" as a mitigating factor.
Kennedy's fourth contention is that under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 835 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), he was denied due process because the trial judge refused to grant his request for production of the written confessions of co-defendant Grayson.
To establish a Brady violation, Kennedy must demonstrate (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that that evidence was favorable to him or exculpatory; and (3) that the evidence was material. United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir.1983), citing Ogle v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.1981).
Here, as the Court of Criminal Appeals found, favorable or exculpatory evidence was not suppressed:
Grayson's statements were reviewed in camera by the trial court and were reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. After carefully re-examining Grayson's statements we find that this evidence is not in any way favorable to Kennedy. Having found the evidence to be neither suppressed nor favorable to Kennedy, we find his contentions under Brady are without merit.
Kennedy's fifth contention is that the trial judge erroneously charged the jury that Kennedy could be convicted of capital murder on the basis of criminal negligence. After reviewing the charge in its entirety, we find no error in the trial court's jury instructions.
The trial court, in defining mental culpability, read Code 1975, § 13A-2-2, to the jury verbatim, thereby defining each mental state along the spectrum from "intentional" to "criminal negligence." Each definition was relevant to the various verdict options except "criminal negligence." The definition of "intentionally" was relevant to the court's instructions on the "intent to kill" element of the capital offense. The definition of "knowingly" was relevant to the court's instructions on first degree burglary and theft. The definition of "recklessly" was relevant to the court's instructions on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. While the charge on criminal negligence served no purpose except to provide a contrast to the other definitions, the court's inclusion of this definition in the jury charge is not reversible error because here the instructions as a whole present the case properly, in that the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that it must find the killing to have been intentional in order to render a verdict of capital murder. This same result was reached in Harris v. State, 412 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), where the court found as follows:
412 So. 2d  at 1281. See Bighames v. State, 440 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); Bragg v. State, 453 So. 2d 756, 759 (Ala. Crim.App.1984).
Furthermore, we note that at the time these instructions were given, Kennedy made no objection. While this failure to object does not preclude review in a capital case, it does weigh against any claim of prejudice. Bush v. State, 431 So. 2d 563, 565 (Ala.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 200, 78 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1983); cf. Ex parte Harrell, 470 So. 2d 1309 (Ala.1985). As this Court pointed out in Harrell, the plain error doctrine is one which this *1112 Court may apply if we find substantial prejudice, even though no objection was made at trial.
Kennedy's sixth contention is that because of prejudicial pretrial publicity, the trial court's denial of his motion for change of venue constituted reversible error. This allegation is totally unsupported by the record and, therefore, we find, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, no error.
In Ex parte Magwood, 426 So. 2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S. Ct. 3097, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1355 (1983), this Court examined the standard of review utilized when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for change of venue and the defendant's burden of proof to show he was actually prejudiced. This Court held as follows:
In Anderson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1296 (Ala.Crim.App.1978), the Court of Criminal Appeals held as follows:
"Recently the Supreme Court affirmed the principles expressed in Murphy.
362 So. 2d  at 1298-99.
To establish prejudice, Kennedy introduced evidence of a telephone survey in which thirty out of one hundred people surveyed felt as though the two men arrested were probably guilty. In addition, Kennedy contends that there was a "strong probability of prejudice" because the crimes involved were rape, murder, and robbery of an elderly and prominent white woman by a black man on Christmas Eve in the "small-town atmosphere" of Shelby County. As the Court of Criminal Appeals found, no newspaper articles or other examples of media coverage were introduced into evidence. Thus, this was not a case in which the "trial atmosphere was utterly corrupted by press coverage." In addition, the telephone survey was conducted in Shelby County, which has a population of approximately 66,000 residents. Because only 100 people were questioned, this is not sufficient to demonstrate extensive knowledge in the community and is not sufficient to warrant a finding that the trial was constitutionally unfair. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977). Finally, here as in Dobbert, the defendant pointed "to no specific portions of the record, in particular the voir dire examination of the jurors, which would require a finding of constitutional unfairness as to the method of jury selection or as to the character of the jurors actually selected." Dobbert, supra, at 303, 97 S. Ct.  at 2303.
Finally, Kennedy contends that the admission into evidence of the transcript of his tape-recorded statement, without production of the tape itself, erroneously violated the best evidence rule. We disagree.
Here, as the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated, the officer who listened to the confession at the time of the recording testified that the transcript accurately reflected the conversation. Hawkins v. State, 443 So. 2d 1312 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); Beech v. State, 439 So. 2d 1331 (Ala.Crim. App.1983). We find that the Court of Criminal Appeals carefully examined and reviewed this issue and we find no error in its application of the law to the facts at hand.
In accordance with Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala.1980), and Code 1975, § 13A-5-53, we find no error in the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the imposition of the death penalty in this case. Pursuant to Beck, we find that Kennedy did violate Code 1975, § 13A-5-31(a)(4), which is a capital offense; similar crimes are being punished capitally throughout the state, Lindsey v. State, 456 So. 2d 383 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), 456 So. 2d 393 (Ala. 1984); Clisby v. State, 456 So. 2d 86 (Ala. Crim.App.1982), affirmed in part and remanded in part, 456 So. 2d 95 (Ala.1983).
Having carefully reviewed all issues raised and having independently examined the record for error, we hold that the judgment of the lower court is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, Justice.
Petitioner, on his application for rehearing, raises some claims that were not *1114 raised in his initial petition. Because this is a capital case, we will address each of these claims of prejudicial error.
First, petitioner argues that the jury should have been charged on burglary in the second and third degrees and on criminally negligent homicide. He claims that failure to instruct the jury on these lesser included offenses violates the principle of law set out in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980). We disagree. As stated in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1984), "nothing in Beck requires that the jury determine the guilt or innocence of lesser included offenses for which the defendant could not be convicted and adjudicated guilty."
The elements of burglary in the first degree are:
The elements of burglary in the second degree are:
Burglary in the third degree is described as follows:
A defendant is not entitled to charges on lesser included offenses where the only reasonable conclusion from the testimony is that he is guilty of the crime charged or no crime at all. Williams v. State, 377 So. 2d 634 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), cert. denied, 377 So. 2d 639 (Ala.1979).
The indictment in this case charged, as follows:
The indictment was returned in January 1981, prior to the effective date of Act No. 81-178, Acts 1981 (§§ 13A-5-39 through 13A-5-59).
The only reasonable conclusion from the testimony in this case was that the defendant broke or entered, in the nighttime, an inhabited dwelling house, with intent to commit a felony, to wit: robbery; therefore, because the evidence supported a conviction of no offense of burglary less than first degree burglary, the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on the lesser degrees of burglary.
Here, the indictment charged the defendant with an intentional killing during a nighttime burglary, and there was no rational basis in the evidence for convicting the defendant of any degree of burglary less than first degree.[1]
Petitioner also argues, for the first time, that the state failed to tender a copy of one of the three statements he gave to police. At trial, petitioner's counsel stated for the record that the state failed to furnish him with a copy of petitioner's first statement, and that he was unaware that this statement existed until after the trial had already commenced. Petitioner's counsel claims that he made statements in his opening statement which were inconsistent with information contained in the first statement given and, thus, that Kennedy was severely prejudiced.
We have carefully reviewed the trial transcript regarding this issue, and we find that there is direct testimony that defendant's counsel was furnished with all statements made by Kennedy. The record reflects, therefore, that petitioner's counsel was given copies of all statements or was aware of all information contained in the statements. As this Court stated on original deliverance: "To establish a Brady violation, Kennedy must demonstrate (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that that evidence was favorable to him or exculpatory; and (3) that the evidence was material."
Based on the sworn testimony in the record, we find no Brady violation here.
Finally, petitioner contends that this Court applied in his case rules of decision different from the rules applied in other cases, with a view toward upholding the death sentence imposed. In particular, appellant argues as follows:
The portion of the original opinion he claims is erroneous reads as follows:
He contends that this statement of the law is a violation of his right to equal protection and due process.
On original deliverance we followed fundamental rules regarding appellate review of jury instructions, and we have not applied any rule of law to petitioner which we have not applied in other appeals.
In addition, Kennedy reargues all claims raised in his petition for certiorari which we addressed on original deliverance. We have reviewed the original opinion in light of Kennedy's argument on rehearing, and we are of the opinion that the application is due to be overruled.
OPINION EXTENDED; APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED.
All the Justices concur.
[1]  While not applicable here, it is noted that Code 1975, § 13A-5-41, now provides as follows:

"Subject to the provisions of section 13A-1-9(b), the jury may find a defendant indicted for a crime defined in section 13A-5-40(a) not guilty of the capital offense but guilty of a lesser included offense. Lesser included offenses shall be defined as provided in section 13A-1-9(a), and when there is a rational basis for such a verdict, include but are not limited to, murder as defined in section 13A-6-2(a), and the accompanying other felony, if any, in the provision of section 13A-5-40(a) upon which the indictment is based. (Acts 1981, No. 81-178, § 3.)"