Title: Keeley v. Ayala

State: connecticut

Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court

Document:

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ROBERT T. KEELEY, JR. v. SANTA I. AYALA,
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, ET AL.
(SC 20029)
(SC 20040)
Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D’Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Vertefeuille, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff, who ran in a primary held in Bridgeport to nominate Democratic
candidates to run in a general election for certain city council seats,
challenged the results of that primary pursuant to statute (§ 9-329a),
citing various improprieties in the counting of votes. Following a hearing,
the parties stipulated that the primary results would be vacated and
that a new special primary would be held. In light of irregularities in
the first primary, the trial court appointed M as a neutral moderator
and retained jurisdiction over the matter. Six days before the special
primary, M visited a nursing home in Bridgeport that housed at least
eighty residents to conduct supervised absentee balloting, which was
mandated by statute (§ 9-159r). Although representatives of the registrar
of voters brought absentee ballots to the nursing home, they made no
effort to distribute them to the residents, and none of the residents
voted. One day prior to the special primary, the trial court was notified
that N, a Bridgeport police officer, was retrieving absentee ballots from
voters and delivering them to the town clerk’s office at the behest of
T, the chairman of Bridgeport’s Democratic Town Committee, and D,
one of the candidates running in the special primary. On the day of the
special primary, M witnessed the city hall mailroom supervisor holding
a stack of absentee ballots, many of which had stamps but had not been
postmarked. After the plaintiff lost to two other candidates in the special
primary, he challenged the special primary results pursuant to § 9-329a,
claiming that several improprieties in the absentee balloting process
had undermined the reliability of the outcome of the special primary.
The trial court concluded that there were substantial violations of the
law and that, as a result of those violations, the reliability of the result
of the special primary was seriously in doubt. Accordingly, the trial court
ordered that a new special primary be held. The trial court concluded
specifically that the absentee ballots that N retrieved and delivered to
the town clerk’s office were not in compliance with the statute (§ 9-140b)
governing the procedure for returning absentee ballots to municipal
officials, that the absentee ballots that arrived at city hall without post-
marks were not ‘‘mailed’’ within the meaning of that term, as used in
§ 9-140b (c), and that proper procedure was not followed in conjunction
with the supervised absentee balloting at the nursing home insofar as
the representatives of the registrar of voters failed to take reasonable
steps to deliver the absentee ballot applications and the ballots, and
failed to post reasonable notice of the supervised absentee balloting.
The defendants, one of the winning candidates in the special primary
and certain Bridgeport election officials, thereafter filed a reservation
of four questions of law with the trial court, which that court certified
and transmitted to this court for review pursuant to statute (§ 9-325).
The defendants also appealed from the trial court’s judgment, raising
the same issues as those raised in the certified questions. Held:
1. The trial court properly invalidated the absentee ballots that N had
retrieved from voters, as the text of § 9-140b (a) and its legislative history
indicated that partisan individuals, such as T and D, are prohibited from
directing a police officer to act as a designee for an absentee voter by
retrieving his or her absentee ballot and delivering it to the town clerk:
the term ‘‘designee’’ used in combination with the phrase ‘‘of an ill or
physically disabled ballot applicant’’ in § 9-140b (a) (3) strongly suggests
that it is only the ballot applicant, and not a third party, such as T or
D, who may select, appoint or nominate an individual, from within the
defined classes of qualified persons, to return his or her ballot to the
town clerk; furthermore, § 9-140b (d), which delineates those individuals
authorized to possess absentee ballots, does not include any partisan
individuals, and § 9-140b (b), which defines the term ‘‘designee,’’ does
not include partisan individuals among the list of persons who may act
as an absentee voter’s designee for the purpose of returning a ballot;
moreover, the statute, read as a whole, and its legislative history reflect
a clear legislative intent to maintain distance between partisan individu-
als and the casting and submission of absentee ballots, in recognition
of the potential for undue influence, intimidation or fraud in the use of
those ballots.
2. The trial court’s factual finding that the absentee ballots without postmarks
were not sent by the United States Postal Service and, thus, were not
‘‘mailed,’’ as contemplated by § 9-140b (c), was not clearly erroneous,
that finding having been supported by the circumstantial evidence and
the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom: the absentee ballots without
postmarks arrived at city hall at the same time as other absentee ballots
that were postmarked, and, because a postmark is strong evidence that
a piece of mail was processed for delivery at a United States post office
on a specific date, the trial court properly could have reasoned that the
lack of postmarks on multiple absentee ballots was anomalous and
strongly suggestive of irregularity; moreover, other circumstances sur-
rounding the delivery of those ballots to city hall increased the likelihood
that they had originated from somewhere other than the post office,
including that those ballots had been left unattended in an unlocked
vehicle at various locations between the post office and city hall, that
the city hall mailroom supervisor had falsely reported that he brought
the ballots directly from the post office to city hall, and that the mail
from the post office had been commingled with other mail that had
been picked up at other offices before it arrived at city hall.
3. The trial court’s conclusion that the supervised absentee balloting con-
ducted at the nursing home did not comply with the minimum require-
ments of the law was not supported by the evidence and, therefore,
could not stand: the statutory provisions governing absentee ballot pro-
cedures did not require Bridgeport election officials to provide notice
of the scheduled supervised absentee balloting session to the residents
of the nursing home or to approach the residents and offer them absentee
ballot applications in advance of the balloting; moreover, the fact that the
representatives of the registrar of voters had made efforts to ascertain
whether residents at the nursing home wanted to submit absentee ballot
applications for the earlier primary did not give rise to any obligation
to repeat that process for the special primary, the onus was on the
residents to request applications if they wanted to cast absentee ballots
for the special primary, and, if they had done so, the registrar of voters
or her representatives would have been obligated to deliver those ballots
to the residents at the supervised absentee balloting session.
4. The trial court having correctly concluded that the absentee ballots that
N returned to the town clerk and the absentee ballots that arrived at
city hall without postmarks were invalid and should not have been
included in the vote count for the special primary, and the number of
invalidated ballots having exceeded the amount of votes by which one
of the plaintiff’s opponents defeated the plaintiff, the court properly
determined that the result of the special primary had been placed seri-
ously in doubt; accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
ordering that a new special primary be conducted.
Argued December 21, 2017—officially released April 3, 2018
Procedural History
Action seeking, inter alia, a recount of the votes cast
in a certain special primary held by the city of Bridge-
port and an order directing a new special primary, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the court, Bellis,
J.; judgment for the plaintiff; thereafter, the defendants
filed a reservation of questions of law with the court,
Bellis, J., which certified the questions of law and trans-
mitted the reservation to this court; subsequently, the
defendants appealed from the trial court’s judgment to
the Appellate Court, and the appeal was transferred
to this court and consolidated with the reservation of
questions of law. Affirmed; remanded with direction.
Peter W. Finch, with whom was Anne Pappas Phil-
lips, for the appellant (plaintiff).
John P. Bohannon, Jr., deputy city attorney, and
James J. Healy, with whom was Edwin J. Maley, Jr.,
for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
PALMER, J. This appeal requires us to interpret and
apply various statutory provisions that govern the cast-
ing of absentee ballots in a municipal primary election.
On November 14, 2017, a special primary was held in
the city of Bridgeport to nominate candidates from the
Democratic party to run in the general election for two
seats on the Bridgeport City Council. After the results
of the Democratic special primary were determined,
the plaintiff, Robert T. Keeley, Jr., a losing candidate,
challenged them pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329a,1
claiming that several improprieties in the absentee bal-
loting process had undermined the reliability of the
outcome. Following an expedited hearing, the trial
court agreed with three of the plaintiff’s claims of impro-
priety and ordered, as a remedy, that a new special
primary be held. The defendants, a winning candidate
and certain city officials involved in the election process
(city defendants),2 thereafter filed with the trial court
a reservation of four questions of law,3 which that court
certified and transmitted to this court for review pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 9-325.4 The defendants also
filed an appeal raising the same issues as those raised
in the certified questions.5 The defendants claim that
the trial court improperly concluded that (1) General
Statutes § 9-140b (a)6 prohibits a party official or candi-
date from directing a police officer to retrieve absentee
ballots from electors and to deliver them to the town
clerk, (2) certain absentee ballots were not ‘‘mailed,’’
as contemplated by § 9-140b (c), and (3) supervised
absentee balloting at a certain nursing home did not
comply with the statutory provisions governing that
process. The defendants also claim generally that the
trial court improperly allocated the burden of proof
applicable to the proceedings, effectively placing on
them the burden of disproving the plaintiff’s allegations.
We agree with the defendants’ third claim but disagree
with their remaining claims. Because the number of
absentee ballots invalidated as a result of our disposi-
tion of the issues remains sufficiently high to place the
reliability of the November 14, 2017 special primary
results seriously in doubt, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court ordering a new special primary.7
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to the appeal. An earlier, citywide Democratic pri-
mary was held in Bridgeport on September 12, 2017, in
which four candidates vied to be the two party nomin-
ees from the 133rd district.8 The two endorsed Demo-
cratic party candidates were Michael DeFilippo and the
defendant Jeanette Herron, and the two challenging
candidates were the plaintiff and Anne Pappas Phillips.
At the close of voting on September 12, 2017, the follow-
ing results were announced and filed with the secretary
of the state: DeFilippo, 187 votes; Herron, 170 votes; the
plaintiff, 170 votes; and Phillips, 137 votes. Following
a recanvass conducted on September 19, 2017, the tie
vote between Herron and the plaintiff was broken by
one additional vote counted in favor of Herron. On
September 26, 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action
pursuant to § 9-329a, claiming various improprieties in
connection with the counting of the tiebreaking vote.
In October, 2017, the trial court conducted a two day
hearing on the plaintiff’s complaint. At that hearing,
counsel for the city defendants represented to the court
that, citywide, there were eleven hand counted absentee
ballots that had not been tallied on the night of the
primary, and that one of those ballots had contained
the tiebreaking vote for Herron that was added to her
total during the recanvass. The defendant Charles D.
Clemons, Jr., the Bridgeport town clerk, was questioned
regarding an official absentee ballot affidavit that was
notarized and purportedly bore his signature and oath.
Clemons testified that, in fact, he had not signed the
affidavit, and, thereafter, he invoked his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The following day,
the parties stipulated that the results of the September
12, 2017 Democratic primary for the 133rd district
would be vacated and that a new special primary includ-
ing all four Democratic candidates would be conducted
on November 14, 2017. In light of the irregularities that
had surfaced in connection with the September 12, 2017
Democratic primary, the court appointed a moderator,
Attorney Maximo Medina, to act as a neutral monitor
in connection with the November 14, 2017 special pri-
mary. In addition, the court retained jurisdiction to
resolve any disputes that might arise during the spe-
cial primary.
Prior to the November 14, 2017 special primary, one
such issue arose. Specifically, on November 13, 2017,
Medina became aware that a Bridgeport police officer,
Paul Nicola, was retrieving absentee ballots from voters
and delivering them to the town clerk’s office at the
behest of Mario Testa, the chairman of Bridgeport’s
Democratic Town Committee. Upon learning of this
information, the trial court ordered that, if any further
ballots were delivered to the town clerk by a police
officer, Medina must confirm that the delivery was initi-
ated by the voter through either the Bridgeport Police
Department or the town clerk’s office. Otherwise, the
court’s order provided, it would hold an evidentiary
hearing to address the legitimacy of any absentee bal-
lots lacking Medina’s confirmation. The court reserved
decision as to whether to conduct such a hearing as to
the absentee ballots that already had been delivered by
Nicola at Testa’s direction on November 13, 2017.
The special primary was held on November 14, 2017,
as ordered. The results of that election were: DeFilippo,
240 votes; Herron, 230 votes; the plaintiff, 212 votes;
and Phillips, 168 votes. Following the ballot count, the
plaintiff again challenged the special primary results
pursuant to § 9-329a, claiming multiple improprieties in
the absentee balloting process. Specifically, the plaintiff
claimed that (1) Nicola’s delivery of fourteen absentee
ballots to the town clerk at Testa’s direction did not
comply with § 9-140b, and, as a consequence, those
ballots were invalid and should not have been counted,
(2) twelve other absentee ballots, which had arrived at
town hall lacking postmarks, were not ‘‘mailed’’ within
the meaning of § 9-140b (c) and, therefore, were invalid
and should not have been counted, and (3) normal and
customary supervised absentee balloting procedures
were not followed at the Northbridge Health Care Cen-
ter (Northbridge), a nursing home, thereby disenfran-
chising that facility’s residents from voting in the special
primary. The plaintiff further claimed that, as a result
of the foregoing improprieties, the results of the special
primary were placed seriously in doubt, thus requiring
that a new special primary be held.
The trial court conducted an expedited evidentiary
hearing on the plaintiff’s claims on November 27, 28
and 29, 2017, and, on November 30, 2017, the court
issued an oral decision in which it agreed with each of
those claims. Although a civil standard of proof applied
to the proceedings; see, e.g., Simmons-Cook v. Bridge-
port, 285 Conn. 657, 668, 941 A.2d 291 (2008); the court
was persuaded ‘‘even beyond a reasonable doubt that
there were substantial violations of the law . . . and
that, as a result of those violations, the reliability of the
result of the special [primary] is seriously in doubt.’’ In
the court’s view, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff . . . far exceeded [his]
heavy burden of proof’’ in establishing the claimed viola-
tions. The court thereafter ordered that a new special
primary be conducted to nominate the Democratic can-
didates for the city council seats in the 133rd district.9
The defendants claim that the trial court improperly
resolved each of the plaintiff’s claims of absentee bal-
loting impropriety. The defendants also claim generally
that the trial court improperly allocated the burden of
proof applicable to the proceedings, effectively placing
on them the responsibility of disproving the plain-
tiff’s allegations.
Before turning to the defendants’ claims, we briefly
summarize the general principles applicable to those
claims. Section 9-329a authorizes a court to set aside
the results of a primary on the basis of, inter alia, an
improper ruling of an election official,10 and to order
that a new primary be held, if the court ‘‘finds that but
for the error in the ruling of the election official . . .
the result of [the] primary might have been different
and [the court] is unable to determine the result of such
primary.’’ General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (3). Pursuant
to this standard, ‘‘the court must be persuaded that (1)
there were substantial violations of the requirements
of [an applicable] statute . . . and (2) as a result of
those violations, the reliability of the result of the elec-
tion is seriously in doubt. . . . [A]lthough the underly-
ing facts . . . are to be established by a preponderance
of the evidence and are subject on appeal to the clearly
erroneous standard . . . the ultimate determination of
whether, based on those underlying facts, a new elec-
tion is called for—that is, whether there were substan-
tial violations of the statute that render the reliability
of the result of the election seriously in doubt—is a
mixed question of fact and law that is subject to plenary
review on appeal . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Simmons-Cook v. Bridge-
port, supra, 285 Conn. 668. Our review of the trial court’s
interpretation of the statutes governing absentee ballot
voting also is plenary, with reference to General Stat-
utes § 1-2z and, if necessary, additional tools of statu-
tory construction.11
Although § 9-329a allows for the invalidation of elec-
tion results, we have emphasized that such a measure
should not be taken lightly. As ‘‘[w]e previously have
recognized . . . under our democratic form of govern-
ment, an election is the paradigm of the democratic
process designed to ascertain and implement the will
of the people. . . . [E]lection laws . . . generally vest
the primary responsibility for ascertaining [the] intent
and will [of the voters] on the election officials . . . .
We look, therefore, first and foremost to the election
officials to manage the election process so that the will
of the people is carried out. . . . Moreover, [t]he deli-
cacy of judicial intrusion into the electoral process . . .
strongly suggests caution in undertaking such an intru-
sion. . . . Finally, we have recognized that voters have
a powerful interest in the stability of [an] election
because the ordering of a new and different election
would result in their election day [disen]franchisement.
. . . [This] background counsels strongly that a court
should be very cautious before exercising its power
under the [statutes governing election contests] to
vacate the results of an election and to order a new
election.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Simmons-Cook v. Bridgeport, supra,
285 Conn. 667; see also Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250
Conn. 241, 254–57, 736 A.2d 104 (1999) (‘‘[The statutory
scheme] authorizes the one unelected branch of govern-
ment, the judiciary, to dismantle the basic building
block of the democratic process, an election. Thus, [t]he
delicacy of judicial intrusion into the electoral process
. . . strongly suggests caution in undertaking such an
intrusion. As we [previously] have indicated, therefore,
[the statutory scheme] provides for remedies only under
narrowly defined circumstances . . . and for limited
types of claims . . . .’’ [Citations omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.]).
Finally, this case concerns various statutes applicable
to absentee balloting, which is ‘‘a special type of voting
procedure established by the legislature for those other-
wise qualified voters who for one or more of the [statu-
torily] authorized reasons are unable to cast their
ballots at the regular polling place.’’ Wrinn v. Dunleavy,
186 Conn. 125, 142, 440 A.2d 261 (1982); see also General
Statutes § 9-135.12 ‘‘The right to vote by absentee ballot
is a special privilege granted by the legislature, exercis-
able only under special and specified conditions to
[e]nsure the secrecy of the ballot and the fairness of
voting by persons in this class.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hardin v. Montgomery, 495 S.W.3d
686, 696 (Ky. 2016); see also 26 Am. Jur. 2d 129, Elec-
tions § 333 (2014) (‘‘[t]he procedures required by the
absentee voting laws serve the purposes of enfranchis-
ing qualified voters, preserving ballot secrecy, pre-
venting fraud, and achieving a reasonably prompt
determination of election results’’). This court pre-
viously has recognized ‘‘that there is considerable room
for fraud in absentee [ballot] voting and that a failure
to comply with the regulatory provisions governing
absentee [ballot] voting increases the opportunity for
fraud.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wrinn v.
Dunleavy, supra, 142–44. At the same time, ‘‘[i]f there
is to be [disen]franchisement, it should be because the
legislature has seen fit to require it in the interest of
an honest suffrage, and has expressed that requirement
in unmistakable language.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 144–45. Guided by the foregoing governing
legal principles, we now turn to the issues presented
in this case.
I
The defendants claim first that the trial court incor-
rectly concluded that § 9-140b (a) prohibits a party offi-
cial or candidate from directing a police officer to
retrieve absentee ballots from electors and to deliver
them to the town clerk. We disagree.
The trial court made the following factual findings
related to this issue. Officer Nicola was on patrol duty
during the daytime on November 13, 2017, when he was
summoned by another officer and directed to meet with
Police Chief Armando J. Perez. Nicola then met face
to face with Perez, who gave Nicola a duty order to
contact and meet with Testa, the chairman of Bridge-
port’s Democratic Town Committee, because Testa and
the party needed an officer to retrieve absentee ballots.
Perez told Nicola that Testa would draw up a list and
tell Nicola what needed to be done. Nicola then went
to a restaurant run by Testa, where Testa introduced
him to DeFilippo, one of the endorsed candidates for the
Democratic party. Approximately one-half hour later,
DeFilippo provided Nicola with a list of absentee ballots
to retrieve.
Over the course of that day, Nicola traveled through-
out Bridgeport to retrieve absentee ballots, with DeFili-
ppo texting him names and addresses along the way.
Nicola continued to pick up ballots on November 14,
2017, despite the court’s November 13, 2017 order aimed
at discouraging that practice. Nicola retrieved absentee
ballots without seeking identification from any of the
individuals who delivered them to him and, at times,
accepted multiple ballots from a single person.13 Nicola
picked up nine absentee ballots on November 13, 2017,
and five absentee ballots on November 14, 2017, for
a total of fourteen ballots. After Nicola retrieved the
absentee ballots, he delivered them in batches to the
town clerk’s office, where he signed, dated and timed
each ballot in the presence of the town clerk.
The trial court analyzed the language of § 9-140b,
governing the return of absentee ballots, and the appli-
cable legislative history, concluding that Nicola’s
retrieval of ballots at Testa’s behest did not comport
with the requirements of that statutory provision. The
court explained that ‘‘[t]he statute allows an absentee
voter to contact the registrar of voters . . . or the
police department for police officer pickup of an absen-
tee ballot due to [a] voter’s illness or disability. That
process allows for the voter who claims an illness or
disability to identify [himself or herself] and voluntarily
initiate a request for a ballot pickup.’’ According to the
court, the integrity of an absentee ballot submitted in
that manner was ‘‘entirely lacking’’ in the present case
because Nicola did not know the identities of the people
from whom he took ballots, he had, in some cases,
taken multiple ballots from a single person, and, in one
case, he simply retrieved a ballot from a mailbox. The
court also concluded that § 9-140b ‘‘does not allow a
candidate to inject [himself or herself] into this aspect
of [the] voting process’’ and that, in the present case,
‘‘illegal, partisan party interference [had come] into
play.’’ The court determined that, if voters had con-
tacted Testa or DeFilippo for ballot delivery assis-
tance,14 they should have been advised to contact either
the Democratic registrar of voters or the police depart-
ment directly to have their ballots retrieved.
The defendants argue that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that § 9-140b precluded Testa and DeFilippo
from dispatching Nicola to retrieve absentee ballots
from voters. They claim that nothing in the statute bars
a third party, including a party official or a candidate,
from asking a police officer to contact an absentee
voter and to act as that voter’s designee for purposes of
returning the voter’s absentee ballot. In the defendants’
view, the plain language of § 9-140b authorizes anyone
to request a ballot pickup on an absentee voter’s behalf
because there is no explicit restriction in that regard.15
The plaintiff, for his part, claims that the trial court
correctly interpreted § 9-140b as requiring an absentee
voter, himself or herself, to request that a police officer
act as a designee for purposes of returning that voter’s
absentee ballot and as prohibiting partisan individuals
from doing so on a voter’s behalf. We agree with the
plaintiff.
The return of absentee ballots, by various authorized
methods, is governed by § 9-140b,16 which provides in
relevant part that ‘‘(a) [a]n absentee ballot shall be cast
at a primary, election or referendum only if . . . (3) it
is returned by a designee of an ill or physically disabled
ballot applicant, in person, to [the town] clerk not later
than the close of the polls on the day of the election,
primary or referendum . . . .’’ The term ‘‘designee’’ is
statutorily defined as ‘‘(1) a person who is caring for the
applicant because of the applicant’s illness or physical
disability, including but not limited to . . . a licensed
physician or a registered or practical nurse, (2) a mem-
ber of the applicant’s family, who is designated by an
absentee ballot applicant and who consents to such
designation, or (3) if no such person consents or is
available, then a police officer, registrar of voters, dep-
uty registrar of voters or assistant registrar of voters
in the municipality in which the applicant resides.’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 9-140b (b).
This court previously has held that the requirements
of § 9-140b are mandatory. See Wrinn v. Dunleavy,
supra, 186 Conn. 145–46 (interpreting predecessor stat-
ute). Accordingly, the return of ballots in a manner not
substantially in compliance with § 9-140b will result in
their invalidation, regardless of whether there is any
proof of fraud. Id., 148–49. ‘‘Whether fraud has been
committed in the handling of certain absentee ballots
is irrelevant to the question of whether there has been
substantial compliance with all of the mandatory provi-
sions of the absentee voting law. . . . Had the legisla-
ture chosen to do so, it could have enacted a remedial
scheme under which ballots would . . . be invalidated
[only] upon a showing of fraud or other related irregu-
larity. The legislature has instead enacted a regulatory
scheme designed to prevent fraud as far as practicable
by mandating the way in which absentee ballots are to
be handled. The validity of the ballot, therefore,
depends not on whether there has been fraud, but on
whether there has been substantial compliance with
the mandatory requirements.’’ Id., 149; see also Domb-
kowski v. Messier, 164 Conn. 204, 209, 319 A.2d 373
(1972) (failure of town clerk to follow mandatory statu-
tory requirements with respect to submission of absen-
tee ballots warranted voiding of those ballots without
finding of fraud or wilful misconduct).
To determine whether § 9-140b permits third parties,
in particular, partisan individuals, to direct police offi-
cers to act as designees for absentee voters, we begin
with the text of that statute and related provisions.
Section 9-140b, read as a whole, reflects a clear legisla-
tive intent to maintain distance between partisan indi-
viduals and the casting and submission of absentee
ballots, undoubtedly in recognition of the potential for
undue influence, intimidation or fraud in the use of
those ballots.17 That statute expressly provides that,
except in certain narrowly defined circumstances, ‘‘[n]o
(1) candidate or (2) agent of a candidate, political party
or committee . . . shall knowingly be present when an
absentee ballot applicant executes an absentee ballot
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 9-140b (e); see also Gonzalez
v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 145 Conn.
App. 458, 471–74, 476, 77 A.3d 790 (candidate violated
§ 9-140b [e] by accompanying voters while they com-
pleted absentee ballots at town clerk’s office), cert.
denied, 310 Conn. 954, 81 A.3d 1181 (2013). Subsection
(d), delineating which persons are authorized to pos-
sess absentee ballots, does not include any partisan
individuals, and subsection (b) does not include such
persons among the list of persons who may act as absen-
tee voters’ designees for the purpose of returning bal-
lots. See General Statutes § 9-140b (b) and (d).
With respect to who may choose a ‘‘designee’’ for an
absentee voter, the language used in § 9-140b manifests
an intent on the part of the legislature that a ‘‘designee’’
be a person whom the absentee voter, himself or herself,
selects to return his or her ballot. Specifically, that
statutory provision indicates that ‘‘a designee of an ill
or physically disabled ballot applicant’’ may return the
ballot in person; (emphasis added) General Statutes
§ 9-140b (a) (3); and otherwise that ‘‘a designee of a
person who applies for an absentee ballot because of
illness or physical disability’’ may return the ballot by
mail. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 9-140b (a)
(1) (B). The verb ‘‘designate’’ is defined as ‘‘[t]o indicate,
select, appoint, nominate, or set apart for a purpose or
duty . . . .’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p.
447. By combining the term ‘‘designee’’ with the phrase
‘‘of an ill or physically disabled ballot applicant,’’ or
‘‘of [an ill or physically disabled] person,’’ § 9-140b (a)
strongly suggests that it is the ballot applicant, and not
some third party, who is to select, appoint or nominate
an individual, from within the defined universe of quali-
fied persons, to deliver his or her ballot to the town
clerk.
Subsection (b) of § 9-140b, which defines ‘‘designee,’’
is somewhat more ambiguous in this regard. Although
three classes of designees are described, it is only the
second class, namely, family members of an absentee
ballot applicant, that the statute expressly qualifies with
the phrase ‘‘designated by an absentee ballot applicant
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 9-140b (b) (2). Looking to
the relevant statutory genealogy, however, an earlier
version of the provision made clear that, regardless of
the category of designee, the absentee voter was to
make any such designation. Specifically, General Stat-
utes (Rev. to 1989) § 9-140b (b) provided that, ‘‘[i]n the
case of a person who applied for an absentee ballot
because of illness or physical disability, the ballot shall
only be mailed by the applicant or by any eligible and
consenting person designated by the applicant . . . .
An applicant may designate for such purposes only
one of the following persons: A licensed physician, reg-
istered or practical nurse or any other person who is
caring for the applicant because of the applicant’s ill-
ness or physical disability, a member of the applicant’s
family or, if no such person consents or is available, then
a police officer, registrar of voters or deputy registrar
of voters in the municipality in which the applicant
resides.’’ (Emphasis added.)
When subsection (b) was amended in 1989; see Public
Acts 1989, No. 89-297, § 4; the bill that included those
changes—the language of which is substantially similar
to the current version of § 9-140b (b)—was described
by legislators variously as ‘‘an omnibus bill for the [s]ec-
retary of [the] [s]tate’s office . . . mak[ing] a number
of technical changes in the election law’’; 32 S. Proc.,
Pt. 5, 1989 Sess., p. 1737, remarks of Senator John Atkin;
and a ‘‘primarily [noncontroversial] cleanup . . . of
certain of the state’s election statutes.’’ 32 H.R. Proc.,
Pt. 12, 1989 Sess., p. 4062, remarks of Representative
Miles Rapoport. The remaining history accompanying
the 1989 legislation contains no indication that lawmak-
ers amended subsection (b) with the intent to change its
meaning at all, let alone to permit third-party, partisan
individuals to assist absentee voters who seek to cast
their ballots by selecting designees to return those bal-
lots. In short, the genealogy of § 9-140b (b) also supports
the trial court’s conclusion that it is only absentee voters
who may select designees, from within the described
classes of persons, to return their ballots for them.18
To the extent that any ambiguity remains, we agree
with the trial court that the legislative history accompa-
nying Public Acts 1974, No. 74-312, § 1—which added
to General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 9-146, as amended
by Public Acts 1972, No. 196, § 14, and Public Acts
1973, No. 73-472, § 1, the predecessor to § 9-140b, the
language describing permissible designees for absentee
ballot returns—makes it abundantly clear that the legis-
lature intended for partisan individuals like Testa and
DeFilippo to be excluded from the process. In introduc-
ing the legislation in the House of Representatives, its
sponsor, Representative M. James Canali, stated that it
would remedy ‘‘a very important inequity in our absen-
tee ballot process that exists under the current laws.
It will, as much as possible, restrict the partisan party
worker from any involvement with the voter after he
or she has received his or her ballot, [t]hereby pre-
venting the harassment that currently occurs in many
cases today.’’ 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1974 Sess., p. 4616.
Representative Canali explained further: ‘‘[W]e have
arrived at a point in time where we must remove the
partisan party worker from any involvement in the
absentee ballot once an application has been received
by the [t]own [c]lerk and the elector has received his
or her ballot. The common practice of pursuing the
voter and sometimes harassing him to allow the ballot
to be picked up [by] party workers has reached the
point in many areas of our [s]tate where the inherent
privacy [to which] the voter is entitled . . . is being
seriously violated. We would be seriously outraged if
a party worker brought a voter to a polling place, into
the place itself and then sits in the voting booth with
him or her and exert[s] pressure for [him or her] to
vote one way or another. Moreover, we have stringent
laws that prevent this activity. . . . I submit . . . that
once an absentee voter receives his . . . absentee bal-
lot, [he is], in fact, in the polling place, and [he is]
entitled to the same rights of privacy of action [applica-
ble] . . . should [he] decide to vote in person . . .
those rights being to ultimately decide who[m] to vote
for, or not [to] vote for, or not [to] vote at all, as is [his]
conscience, without anyone exerting any pressure on
[him]. . . . [W]e must, once and for all, end the absen-
tee ballot contest that pervades our political process.’’
Id., p. 4617.
In addressing the mechanics of the proposed legisla-
tion with respect to the return of an absentee ballot by
an
ill
or
disabled
elector,
Representative
Canali
explained that such a ballot could be returned by ‘‘an
elector himself, or by any person designated by that
elector . . . [such as] a physician, a registered or prac-
tical nurse, or any other person who is caring for . . .
[the] elector because of . . . [the] elector’s illness or
physical disability, a member of such elector’s family,
or if no such person exists or is available, then a police
officer, a [r]egistrar of [v]oters, or a [d]eputy [r]egistrar
of [v]oters, in the municipality in which such an elector
resides. That gives it the broadest context of allowing
that disabled elector to get [his] ballot mailed without
having a party worker involve [himself].’’ (Emphasis
added.) Id., pp. 4618–19. Finally, in concluding his
remarks, Representative Canali stated that the pro-
posed legislation would ‘‘once and for all, as much as
possible . . . remove the partisan party worker from
all political parties from pursuing those people who
have requested absentee ballots for whatever reason
and harassing them to either vote the ballot or to turn
the ballot over to the party workers.’’ Id., p. 4634.
We glean two clear intentions from the foregoing
legislative history. First, it is an absentee voter himself
or herself, and not a third party, who must appoint or
select a designee, from within the approved categories
of persons, to return his or her absentee ballot on the
voter’s behalf. Second, similar to the mandatory proce-
dures pertaining to in person voters, partisan individu-
als are required to distance themselves from absentee
voters when those voters are in the process of casting
their ballots, that is, when they are returning them to
the town clerk for submission pursuant to § 9-140b.
In sum, the language and genealogy of § 9-140b sup-
port the trial court’s conclusion that Nicola’s retrieval
and return of absentee ballots at the behest of Testa
and DeFilippo did not comply with the requirements
of § 9-140b. Consequently, the trial court properly invali-
dated the fourteen ballots that had been returned in
that fashion.
II
The defendants next contend that the trial court
incorrectly concluded that twelve absentee ballots that
arrived at city hall on the day of the Democratic special
primary without postmarks were not ‘‘mailed’’ within
the meaning of that term, as used in § 9-140b (c). We
also reject this claim.
The following additional facts, as found by the trial
court, are relevant to our resolution of this issue. On
the day of the special primary, Medina, while fulfilling
his duties as moderator, spent some time in the mail-
room at Bridgeport’s city hall. While there, he witnessed
Jack McDowell, the mailroom’s supervisor, holding a
stack of fifteen absentee ballots. Of those ballots, three
bore postmarks, whereas the other twelve, although
bearing stamps, were not postmarked.19
McDowell told Medina that he had brought the absen-
tee ballots directly from the post office to city hall. This
was shown, however, to be untrue. Instead, McDowell,
while accompanied by another city employee, Emily
Zahorsky, had picked up the city’s mail from the post
office, and then, before returning to city hall, made three
more stops at the city’s fire department, emergency
operations center and health department to deliver and
retrieve mail. The two retrieved loose, outgoing mail
from both the fire department and the emergency opera-
tions center, and commingled that mail in the same
mail bin that contained the mail previously retrieved
from the post office. Additionally, during each of the
three stops, the mail bin was left unattended in the
unlocked car that McDowell and Zahorsky had used
for the mail pickups.
The trial court found that the evidence established
a lack of security with respect to the absentee ballots,
which, according to the court, provided a ‘‘clear oppor-
tunity for absentee ballots that were not sent by the
United States Postal Service to be added to the mail
either by mistake or by foul play.’’ The court observed
that Zahorsky, the city’s only witness with respect to
the mail pickup,20 had not seen the absentee ballots
until she and McDowell arrived back at the mailroom.
In light of the foregoing, the court found that the twelve
absentee ballots that were stamped but not postmarked
‘‘were not sent by the United States Postal Service’’
and, therefore, were not ‘‘mailed,’’ as contemplated by
§ 9-140b (c). In accordance with this finding, the court
concluded that those ballots were invalid and should
have been rejected by election officials.
The return of absentee ballots by mail is governed
by § 9-140b, and those mailing provisions, which we
discuss more fully hereinafter, are mandatory. See
Wrinn v. Dunleavy, supra, 186 Conn. 145–46. Thus,
the return of ballots in a manner not substantially in
compliance with the statutory mailing requirements will
result in their invalidation, regardless of whether there
is any proof or indication of fraud. Id., 148–49.
Subsection (a) of § 9-140b provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[a]n absentee ballot shall be cast at a primary,
election or referendum only if: (1) It is mailed by (A)
the ballot applicant . . . so that it is received by the
clerk of the municipality in which the applicant is quali-
fied to vote not later than the close of polls . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) The term ‘‘mailed’’ is further defined
as ‘‘sent by the United States Postal Service or any
commercial carrier, courier or messenger service recog-
nized and approved by the Secretary of the State.’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 9-140b (c). Reading these two provisions
together, for absentee votes to be validly cast, the absen-
tee ballot applicants must send their ballots by the
United States Postal Service or another recognized car-
rier so that they are received by the municipal clerk
before the close of the polls.
After considering all of the surrounding circum-
stances, the trial court found, as a factual matter, that
the twelve absentee ballots at issue had not been ‘‘sent
by the United States Postal Service’’ and, therefore, that
they had not been returned in substantial compliance
with § 9-140b.21 We review the trial court’s finding for
clear error only. See, e.g., Simmons-Cook v. Bridgeport,
supra, 285 Conn. 668. ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support
it . . . or when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed. . . .
‘‘Because factual findings and credibility determina-
tions are squarely within the trial court’s purview, we
afford them great deference. . . . In reviewing factual
findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine
whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion
other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make
every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the
court’s ruling. . . . Finally, a finding is not clearly erro-
neous merely because it relies on circumstantial evi-
dence. See Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 310
Conn. 768, 777, 83 A.3d 576 (2014) ([t]here is no distinc-
tion between direct and circumstantial evidence so far
as probative force is concerned . . .). [T]riers of fact
must often rely on circumstantial evidence and draw
inferences from it. . . . Proof of a material fact by
inference need not be so conclusive as to exclude every
other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence pro-
duces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the
probability of the existence of the material fact. . . .
In short, the court, as fact finder, may draw whatever
inferences from the evidence or facts established by
the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Lyme Land Conservation Trust, Inc. v. Platner, 325
Conn. 737, 755–56, 159 A.3d 666 (2017).
We conclude that the trial court’s factual finding—
namely, that the twelve absentee ballots at issue were
not ‘‘sent by the United States Postal Service’’—is sup-
ported by the circumstantial evidence and the infer-
ences reasonably drawn therefrom. First, those ballots
were not postmarked, although other absentee ballots
that arrived at city hall at the same time were post-
marked. A postmark is strong evidence that a piece of
mail was processed for delivery at a United States post
office on a specific date. See, e.g., In re Coviello v.
Knapp, 91 App. Div. 3d 868, 869, 937 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2012)
(in state requiring absentee ballots to be cast no later
than day before election, ballot lacking ascertainable
postmark date and received six days after election could
not be cast). The trial court properly could have rea-
soned that the lack of postmarks on not one but twelve
absentee ballots was anomalous and strongly sugges-
tive of irregularity.
Second, McDowell falsely reported to Medina that
he had brought the absentee ballots at issue directly
from the post office to city hall. To the contrary, sworn
testimony at the hearing in the trial court showed that
McDowell and Zahorsky made three stops on the way
to city hall and, during each of those stops, left the
city’s mail unattended in their vehicle, creating repeated
opportunities for tampering. Moreover, mail retrieved
during those stops was commingled with the mail from
the post office. These circumstances, coupled with
McDowell’s falsehood to Medina, increased the likeli-
hood that the absentee ballots lacking postmarks had
originated from somewhere other than the post office.
Additionally, as a preface to its rulings on the specific
issues before it, the trial court outlined the unusual
circumstances that had led to the need for a special
primary to be held. More particularly, in the earlier
Democratic primary, a tie vote between Herron and the
plaintiff was broken after a recanvass when a single
additional absentee ballot cast for Herron, a party
endorsed candidate, happened to emerge. When called
to testify in relation to that ballot, Clemons, the Bridge-
port town clerk, invoked his constitutional right against
self-incrimination, and the parties’ stipulated agreement
to hold a new primary followed soon thereafter. Fur-
thermore, the day before the special primary, the court
was informed that Testa, a partisan individual, improp-
erly was directing Nicola to retrieve absentee ballots
from voters at their homes and to deliver them to city
hall. In light of this apparent impropriety, the court
issued an order intended to stop that practice.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial
court’s finding that the twelve absentee ballots lacking
postmarks, which Zahorsky had not seen until she and
McDowell had completed their circuitous journey back
to city hall with the day’s mail, were not ‘‘sent by the
United States Postal Service’’ was a reasonable and
logical one, predicated on the facts established and fair
inferences drawn from those facts. On the basis of all
the facts and circumstances, we disagree with the
defendants’ contention that the court’s finding that the
ballots were not ‘‘mailed,’’ as contemplated by § 9-140b
(c), was merely speculative or conjectural. Conse-
quently, we cannot say that the finding that the ballots
were not ‘‘mailed’’ in accordance with the statutory
requirement was clearly erroneous, and, as a result, the
defendants’ second claim fails.
III
The defendants also maintain that the trial court
incorrectly concluded that the supervised absentee bal-
loting conducted at Northbridge did not comply with
the minimum requirements of law. We agree with the
defendants.
The following additional facts, which were found by
the trial court or are not disputed, are necessary to
our determination of this issue. Supervised absentee
balloting was mandated by statute at Northbridge, a
nursing home that had at least eighty residents. See
General Statutes §§ 9-159q and 9-159r. Such balloting
was scheduled to take place on November 8, 2017, for
the November 14, 2017 Democratic special primary.
In the days preceding the earlier Democratic primary
held on September 12, 2017, Jennifer Rodriguez, direc-
tor of therapeutic recreation at Northbridge, and repre-
sentatives of the Democratic registrar of voters, had
gone door to door at the facility to determine which
residents wanted to vote in that primary. They distrib-
uted absentee ballot applications to those who did and
later returned with their absentee ballots. Several resi-
dents then voted in the September 12, 2017 primary.
The plaintiff campaigned at Northbridge prior to the
September 12, 2017 primary and again before the
November 14, 2017 special primary. Prior to the latter
event, he went door to door on all four floors of the
facility, speaking to residents, and a number of those
residents indicated that they intended to vote. In con-
trast to the assistance that they had rendered to North-
bridge residents in advance of the earlier primary,
however, neither Rodriguez nor the registrar’s represen-
tatives visited residents individually in the days prior
to the scheduled supervised balloting session on
November 8, 2017, to determine whether they sought
to vote and, if so, to distribute absentee ballot applica-
tions to those voters.
At 9:30 a.m. on November 8, 2017, Medina arrived at
Northbridge as part of his moderator duties. He spoke
with the individual working at the front reception desk,
who had no knowledge of the scheduled supervised
balloting. Printed signs announcing the balloting were
posted, however, in each of two elevators used by
the residents.22
The scheduled supervised balloting session occurred
between 10 a.m. and 12 p.m. in a second floor reading
room, where the Democratic registrar’s two representa-
tives awaited residents who wished to cast absentee
ballots. Although the representatives had brought
absentee ballot applications with them that day, they
made no efforts to distribute them to residents. Medina
remained at Northbridge throughout the voting period.
Residents were seen in the area but did not vote. Ulti-
mately, no Northbridge residents voted at the super-
vised absentee balloting session on November 8, 2017.
The trial court found that the procedure employed in
anticipation of and at the November 8, 2017 supervised
absentee balloting session was ‘‘in sharp contrast’’ to
the procedure that had been employed prior to the
September 12, 2017 primary. After observing, without
elaboration, that §§ 9-159q and 9-159r ‘‘put affirmative
obligations on the [town] clerk and [the] registrar [of
voters] with respect to the preparation and delivery of
absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots,’’ the
trial court concluded ‘‘that the proper procedure was
not followed here.’’ In particular, the court explained,
‘‘the [Democratic] registrar [of voters] and [her] desig-
nees failed to take reasonable steps to deliver the appli-
cations and ballots, and failed to post reasonable notice
of the supervised absentee balloting so as to inform the
potential voters at Northbridge such that Northbridge
residents were unaware that the supervised absentee
balloting was taking place.’’ The court also stated that
the November 8, 2017 session was ‘‘[s]tealth supervised
balloting [rather than] supervised balloting,’’ and that it
was ‘‘fundamentally unfair to the Northbridge residents
and the candidates . . . who, along with the residents
of Bridgeport, [were] entitled to cast their votes in a
fair and honest election.’’
The defendants claim that the trial court incorrectly
determined that the supervised absentee balloting held
at Northbridge was not compliant with the statutes
governing that process. They contend that the applica-
ble law did not require the Democratic registrar of vot-
ers or her representatives to notify the Northbridge
residents of the scheduled supervised absentee bal-
loting and did not mandate that the officials approach
residents to discern their voting intentions and to offer
them ballot applications. Rather, the defendants argue,
the onus is on a voter to apply for an absentee ballot, and
only when an application is submitted is the registrar
of voters required to deliver an absentee ballot. They
emphasize that, ‘‘[i]n this case, because no voter at
Northbridge applied for an absentee ballot for this elec-
tion, there was nothing to be delivered.’’ (Emphasis in
original.) Our review of the statutes governing super-
vised absentee balloting leads us to conclude that the
defendants’ claim is meritorious.
Sections 9-159q and 9-159r govern supervised absen-
tee balloting at certain institutions where electors may
reside, including nursing homes. See General Statutes
§ 9-159q (a) (1) (defining ‘‘institution’’ for purposes of
supervised absentee balloting). At institutions housing
fewer than twenty electors, supervised absentee bal-
loting may be conducted at the request of the institu-
tion’s administrator or a registrar of voters; General
Statutes § 9-159q (b); at those institutions housing
twenty or more electors, such as Northbridge, super-
vised absentee balloting is mandatory, and must be
held on a date mutually agreed on by the institution’s
administrator and the registrars of voters. See General
Statutes § 9-159r (a) and (b).
As to either discretionary or mandatory supervised
absentee balloting, the relevant statutory provisions
direct registrars or their representatives to deliver
absentee ballots directly to applicants at institutions
on the day that balloting is to occur. General Statutes
§ 9-159q (f) and (g); see General Statutes § 9-159r (b).
Procedures also are specified for the selection of the
registrar’s representatives, the casting and collection
of the absentee ballots, and the delivery of such ballots
to the town clerk. See General Statutes § 9-159q (g),
(h) and (i); see also General Statutes § 9-159r (c) (incor-
porating foregoing subsections for purposes of manda-
tory supervised absentee balloting). Notably, however,
there are no provisions that require town officials either
to notify residents at an institution that supervised
absentee balloting is to occur there or to approach
those residents and to offer them absentee ballot appli-
cations in advance of that balloting.23
Rather, in regard to the absentee ballot application
process, § 9-159r (b), governing mandatory supervised
absentee balloting, provides only that an ‘‘[a]pplication
for an absentee ballot for [a] . . . patient [at an institu-
tion having twenty or more electors] shall be made to
the clerk of the town in which such patient is eligible
to vote. The application procedure set forth in section
9-140 shall apply . . . .’’ General Statutes § 9-140 is the
statutory provision that governs absentee ballot appli-
cations generally and, like §§ 9-159q and 9-159r, does
not require town officials to correspond with electors
or to offer them absentee ballot applications. Instead,
in regard to town officials, § 9-140 explains with a high
level of detail what procedures those officials should
undertake, or what requirements they must adhere to,
after an application for an absentee ballot, or a request
for such an application, is received. See General Stat-
utes § 9-140 (a) through (i).
In light of the foregoing, we agree with the defendants
that, under our absentee balloting statutes, the onus
was on the residents at Northbridge to request absentee
ballot applications if they wanted to cast absentee bal-
lots for the November 14, 2017 Democratic special pri-
mary. If they had done so, the registrars or their
representatives would have been obligated to deliver
those ballots to them on November 8, 2017, to be cast
in the supervised absentee balloting session that was
scheduled on that date. To the extent that those repre-
sentatives, prior to the September 12, 2017 Democratic
primary, made efforts to ascertain whether residents at
Northbridge wanted to submit applications for absentee
ballots, we conclude that those efforts, while commend-
able, were not statutorily required and did not give
rise to any obligation to repeat the process in a later
primary.24 Similarly, nothing in our statutes required
town officials to provide notice of the scheduled super-
vised absentee balloting session to the residents of
Northbridge.25 It appears, to the contrary, that such
notice typically is provided by the administrator of an
institution where supervised balloting is to occur, or
by his or her agents, as those individuals are in the best
position to communicate with the residents. Although,
in the present case, that notice likely was ineffective,
leading to confusion among the residents,26 that circum-
stance does not constitute a violation of a statutory
duty by a town official sufficient to warrant a new
special primary. Consequently, the trial court’s conclu-
sion to the contrary cannot stand.27
IV
To summarize, the trial court properly found that
the fourteen absentee ballots returned by Nicola at the
behest of Testa and DeFilippo did not comply with § 9-
140b (a) (3) and that the twelve absentee ballots that
arrived at city hall without postmarks on November 14,
2017, were not ‘‘mailed,’’ as contemplated by § 9-140b
(c). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded
that all of those ballots were invalid and that they should
not have been included in the vote count for the Novem-
ber 14, 2017 special primary. The trial court’s separate
conclusion that the supervised absentee balloting at
Northbridge did not comply with the statutes governing
that process is not supported by the evidence. Because
the number of absentee ballots properly invalidated by
the trial court is greater than Herron’s eighteen vote
margin of victory over the plaintiff, however, the court
correctly determined that the results of the November
14, 2017 special primary had been placed seriously in
doubt, thereby necessitating that a new special primary
be conducted.
With respect to the reservation of questions of law
in Docket No. SC 20029, the answer to the first and
third certified questions is yes, and the answer to the
second and fourth certified questions is no;28 with
respect to the appeal in Docket No. SC 20040, the judg-
ment is affirmed and the case is remanded for any
further proceedings that the trial court may deem appro-
priate and that are in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 General Statutes § 9-329a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any . . . candi-
date aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with any
primary . . . may bring his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court
for appropriate action. . . . If such complaint is made subsequent to such
primary it shall be brought, not later than fourteen days after such pri-
mary . . . .
‘‘(b) Such judge shall forthwith order a hearing to be held upon such
complaint upon a day not more than five nor less than three days after the
making of such order . . . . Such judge shall, on the day fixed for such
hearing, and without delay, proceed to hear the parties and determine the
result. . . . Such judge shall thereupon, if he finds any error in the ruling
of the election official . . . certify the result of his finding or decision to
the Secretary of the State before the tenth day following the conclusion of
the hearing. Such judge may . . . determine the result of such primary . . .
[or] . . . order a new primary if he finds that but for the error in the ruling
of the election official . . . the result of such primary might have been
different and he is unable to determine the result of such primary.
‘‘(c) The certification by the judge of his finding or decision shall be final
and conclusive upon all questions relating to errors in the ruling of such
election official . . . and shall operate to correct any returns or certificates
filed by the election officials, unless the same is appealed from as provided
in section 9-325. . . .’’
2 The defendants are Jeanette Herron, a winning candidate in the special
primary at issue, as well as Santa I. Ayala, Bridgeport’s Democratic registrar
of voters, James Mullen, head moderator for the special primary, Thomas
Errichetti, head moderator of absentee ballots for the special primary, and
Charles D. Clemons, Jr., Bridgeport’s town clerk.
3 The questions reserved by the defendants are:
‘‘1. Does . . . General Statutes § 9-140b prohibit any person other than
the elector from arranging for a designee to return an elector’s absentee
ballot to the [t]own [c]lerk?
‘‘2. Did the trial court err in rejecting twelve absentee ballots that were
stamped but not postmarked on the ground that they were not ‘mailed’
pursuant to . . . § 9-140b?
‘‘3. Did the trial court err in deciding that the administration of the super-
vised absentee balloting at the Northbridge Health Care Center did not meet
the minimum standards required by law?
‘‘4. Did the trial court err in applying the burden of proof, and in rejecting
votes validly cast by electors, thereby undermining the trial court’s conclu-
sion that there were substantial statutory violations that left the reliability
of the election seriously in doubt?’’
In this opinion, we have reformulated the reserved questions to reflect
more accurately the precise issues before us. Cf., e.g., State v. Ouellette,
295 Conn. 173, 184, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010).
4 General Statutes § 9-325 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If, upon [a] . . .
hearing by a judge of the Superior Court [pursuant to § 9-329 (b)], any
question of law is raised which any party to the complaint claims should
be reviewed by the Supreme Court, such judge . . . shall transmit [the
certificate of his finding or decision], including therein such questions of
law, together with a proper finding of facts, to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, who shall thereupon call a special session of said court for
the purpose of an immediate hearing upon the questions of law so certified.
. . . Nothing in this section shall be considered as prohibiting an appeal to
the Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Superior Court. . . .’’
5 We transferred that appeal from the Appellate Court to this court pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1, and consoli-
dated it with the reservation of questions that the trial court certified and
transmitted to this court pursuant to § 9-325. Accordingly, this decision
disposes of both the appeal and the reservation of questions.
Section 9-325 explicitly provides that a party is not precluded from filing
a simultaneous appeal, provided the appeal is from a final judgment. See
footnote 4 of this opinion; see also Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125,
133–35, 440 A.2d 261 (1982) (explaining that expedited review proceeding
permitted by § 9-325 is in essence appeal but is limited to certain questions
of law, and that, if judgment is final, aggrieved party may proceed under § 9-
235 and file appeal, normally resulting in consolidation of two proceedings
or mooting of one upon disposition of other).
6 General Statutes § 9-140b provides: ‘‘(a) An absentee ballot shall be cast
at a primary, election or referendum only if: (1) It is mailed by (A) the ballot
applicant, (B) a designee of a person who applies for an absentee ballot
because of illness or physical disability, or (C) a member of the immediate
family of an applicant who is a student, so that it is received by the clerk
of the municipality in which the applicant is qualified to vote not later than
the close of the polls; (2) it is returned by the applicant in person to the
clerk by the day before a regular election, special election or primary or
prior to the opening of the polls on the day of a referendum; (3) it is returned
by a designee of an ill or physically disabled ballot applicant, in person, to
said clerk not later than the close of the polls on the day of the election,
primary or referendum; (4) it is returned by a member of the immediate
family of the absentee voter, in person, to said clerk not later than the close
of the polls on the day of the election, primary or referendum; (5) in the
case of a presidential or overseas ballot, it is mailed or otherwise returned
pursuant to the provisions of section 9-158g; or (6) it is returned with the
proper identification as required by the Help America Vote Act, P.L. 107-
252, as amended from time to time, if applicable, inserted in the outer
envelope so such identification can be viewed without opening the inner
envelope. A person returning an absentee ballot to the municipal clerk
pursuant to subdivision (3) or (4) of this subsection shall present identifica-
tion and, on the outer envelope of the absentee ballot, sign his name in the
presence of the municipal clerk, and indicate his address, his relationship
to the voter or his position, and the date and time of such return. As used
in this section, ‘immediate family’ means a dependent relative who resides
in the individual’s household or any spouse, child or parent of the individual.
‘‘(b) As used in this section and section 9-150c, ‘designee’ means (1) a
person who is caring for the applicant because of the applicant’s illness or
physical disability, including but not limited to, a licensed physician or a
registered or practical nurse, (2) a member of the applicant’s family, who
is designated by an absentee ballot applicant and who consents to such
designation, or (3) if no such person consents or is available, then a police
officer, registrar of voters, deputy registrar of voters or assistant registrar
of voters in the municipality in which the applicant resides.
‘‘(c) For purposes of this section ‘mailed’ means sent by the United States
Postal Service or any commercial carrier, courier or messenger service
recognized and approved by the Secretary of the State.
‘‘(d) No person shall have in his possession any official absentee ballot
or ballot envelope for use at any primary, election or referendum except
the applicant to whom it was issued, the Secretary of the State or his or
her authorized agents, any official printer of absentee ballot forms and his
designated carriers, the United States Postal Service, any other carrier,
courier or messenger service recognized and approved by the Secretary of
the State, any person authorized by a municipal clerk to receive and process
official absentee ballot forms on behalf of the municipal clerk, any authorized
primary, election or referendum official or any other person authorized by
any provision of the general statutes to possess a ballot or ballot envelope.
‘‘(e) No (1) candidate or (2) agent of a candidate, political party or commit-
tee, as defined in section 9-601, shall knowingly be present when an absentee
ballot applicant executes an absentee ballot, except (A) when the candidate
or agent is (i) a member of the immediate family of the applicant or (ii)
authorized by law to be present or (B) when the absentee ballot is executed
in the office of the municipal clerk and the municipal clerk or an employee
of the municipal clerk is a candidate or agent.’’
7 On January 25, 2018, we issued an order answering the four certified
questions, upholding the trial court’s decision to order a new special election,
and remanding the case for any further proceedings that the trial court may
deem appropriate. We further indicated that a full written opinion of this
court, that is, this opinion, would follow in due course.
8 In Bridgeport, two city council members are elected from each of ten
districts within the city. The districts are numbered from 130 to 139. For
each district, a political party may nominate or endorse a maximum of
two candidates.
9 The trial court also directed the court clerk to provide a copy of the
court’s decision to the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, the secretary of
the state, and the State Elections Enforcement Commission, and, addition-
ally, to unspecified federal authorities. The court explained that ‘‘[t]he fact
that [the statutory violations at issue] all occurred in a court-ordered special
[primary] election with a court-appointed moderator speaks to the level of
dishonesty and corruption when it comes to absentee ballots in . . .
Bridgeport.’’
10 We previously have explained that ‘‘a ruling of an election official must
involve some act or conduct by the official that . . . interprets some statute,
regulation or other authoritative legal requirement, applicable to the election
process.’’ Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 268, 736 A.2d 104 (1999).
This test ‘‘is broad enough to include conduct that comes within the scope
of a mandatory statute governing the election process, even if the election
official has not issued a ruling in any formal sense. When an election statute
mandates certain procedures, and the election official has failed to apply or
to follow those procedures, such conduct implicitly constitutes an incorrect
interpretation of the requirements of the statute and, therefore, is a ruling.’’
Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 647, 941 A.2d 266 (2008); see also
Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 138–39, 440 A.2d 261 (1982) (election
officials’ counting of absentee ballots, which was deemed void on appeal
due to noncompliance with predecessor statute to § 9-140b, constituted
ruling of election official subject to judicial review). The parties do not
dispute that the issues presented in this case constitute rulings of elec-
tion officials.
11 ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain
and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words,
we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory
language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of
whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that
meaning . . . § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself
and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and
considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambig-
uous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence
of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute
is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to
the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the
legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to
existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general
subject matter.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 638–39, 941 A.2d 266 (2008). ‘‘The test
to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Price v. Independent Party of CT—State Central, 323 Conn.
529, 539–40, 147 A.3d 1032 (2016).
12 General Statutes § 9-135 provides: ‘‘(a) Any elector eligible to vote at a
primary or an election and any person eligible to vote at a referendum may
vote by absentee ballot if he or she is unable to appear at his or her polling
place during the hours of voting for any of the following reasons: (1) His
or her active service with the armed forces of the United States; (2) his or
her absence from the town of his or her voting residence during all of the
hours of voting; (3) his or her illness; (4) his or her physical disability; (5)
the tenets of his or her religion forbid secular activity on the day of the
primary, election or referendum; or (6) the required performance of his or
her duties as a primary, election or referendum official, including as a town
clerk or registrar of voters or as staff of the clerk or registrar, at a polling
place other than his or her own during all of the hours of voting at such
primary, election or referendum.
‘‘(b) No person shall misrepresent the eligibility requirements for voting
by absentee ballot prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, to any elector
or prospective absentee ballot applicant.’’
13 The court, although finding Nicola to be a credible witness, questioned
the accuracy of his testimony that the majority of voters from whom he
had retrieved ballots were elderly, in light of the known birth dates of those
voters, which indicated otherwise. For that reason, the court found that
many individuals who gave Nicola ballots ‘‘were not the actual absentee
ballot voters, therefore calling into question violations of . . . § 9-140b (d),
which delineates who may legally possess completed absentee ballots.’’
14 The precise manner in which the ballot pickups were initiated was not
established at the evidentiary hearing. Testa and DeFilippo retained counsel,
who informed the trial court at the start of the evidentiary hearing that
neither of them would appear without a subpoena. At an earlier court
proceeding, however, counsel for Testa and DeFilippo apparently had con-
veyed the impression that both men would appear voluntarily, thereby mak-
ing a subpoena unnecessary. In any event, neither was served with a
subpoena, and neither testified at the hearing.
15 The defendants also claim that § 9-140b must be construed liberally
because, pursuant to General Statutes § 9-359 (5), a violation of § 9-140b
carries criminal consequences. In contrast to those cases on which the
defendants rely to support this argument, however, the present case is not
a criminal one; rather, it is an election dispute to be decided under the rules
and principles applicable to such disputes. Notably, in the event of any
criminal prosecution, the state, to obtain a conviction, must prove a wilful
violation of § 9-140b. General Statutes § 9-359 (5).
The defendants further argue that the secretary of the state and the
State Elections Enforcement Commission have interpreted the law to allow
partisan contact with absentee voters. This case goes beyond mere contact
with voters, however, and involves active participation in the process of
the casting of an absentee ballot.
16 See footnote 6 of this opinion.
17 Maintaining distance between partisan individuals and the casting and
submission of absentee ballots is consistent with the law governing voting
at a polling place, which requires partisan individuals to stay outside a radius
of at least seventy-five feet from the entrance to such polling place on an
election day. See General Statutes § 9-236 (a).
18 General Statutes § 9-150c, which governs the procedure to be used when
a person requests an absentee ballot within six days of an election due to
unforeseen illness or physical disability, provides further support for the
proposition that an absentee voter must be the one to choose his or her
designee. Specifically, § 9-150c borrows the definition of ‘‘designee’’ from
§ 9-140b (b), and provides that ‘‘[a]n applicant [suffering from an unforeseen
illness or physical disability] may appoint [such] a designee . . . to deliver
the ballot to him . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
19 Medina testified that McDowell had told him that mail lacking postmarks
was not unusual. When Medina asked McDowell to provide another example,
however, he could not do so. Medina testified further that absentee ballots
that arrived after November 14, 2017, were postmarked.
20 McDowell was in Florida at the time of the evidentiary hearing and,
according to counsel for the city defendants, was not reachable by telephone.
21 The trial court did not conclude, as a matter of law, as the defendants
suggest, that a ballot lacking a postmark is necessarily not sent by the United
States Postal Service. Although the lack of a postmark is not dispositive of
the question of whether the ballot at issue was mailed, it is one factor,
among others, to be considered, and the trial court’s analysis clearly reflects
that multifactor approach.
22 Rodriguez testified that an announcement pertaining to the absentee
balloting session was made on the facility’s overhead audio system between
9:30 and 10 a.m. on November 8, 2017, but the trial court, noting that Medina
did not mention any announcement, rejected Rodriguez’ testimony in this
regard. In its decision, the court did not acknowledge Rodriguez’ additional
testimony that notice also was posted on a large calendar in an area that
notified residents of daily events and that she personally had reminded
residents of the scheduled voting when she encountered them around the
facility.
23 In contrast, General Statutes § 9-159s requires, in the case of residents
at certain institutions who have conservators or guardians to manage their
affairs, that a conservator or guardian receive advance notice of ‘‘any voter
registration or voting opportunity . . . presented to the resident with
respect to a primary, referendum or election,’’ including absentee balloting.
General Statutes § 9-159s (a). Notably, even in these circumstances, the
individual charged with giving such notice is the administrator of the institu-
tion rather than any town official. General Statutes § 9-159s (a).
24 The plaintiff contends that the supervised absentee balloting practices
utilized at Northbridge in the previous Democratic primary ‘‘set the minimum
standards required by law.’’ Because he has not provided any authority or
analysis in support of this proposition, we reject it.
25 In contrast, municipal officials are required to provide published notice
of municipal elections to the electorate generally. See General Statutes § 9-
226 (‘‘The warning of each municipal election shall specify the objects for
which such election is to be held. Notice of a town election shall be given
by the town clerk or assistant town clerk, by publishing a warning in a
newspaper published in such town or having a general circulation therein,
such publication to be not more than fifteen, nor less than five days previous
to holding the election.’’). There is no claim in the present case with respect
to the adequacy of the foregoing notice.
26 Notably, supervised balloting for the general election took place at
Northbridge on November 7, 2017, the day before the November 8, 2017
supervised balloting session for the new special primary to nominate Demo-
cratic candidates to run for the council seats in the 133rd district. Under
the circumstances, it is not surprising that voters at Northbridge might have
been confused.
27 Our disposition of the defendants’ first three claims necessarily disposes
of the fourth. More specifically, because we already have determined that
the trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff had established two
sets of violations of § 9-140b, and also have agreed with the defendants that
no impropriety was proven in connection with the supervised absentee
balloting at Northbridge, the defendants’ claim that the court improperly
allocated the burden of proof in this case requires no further discussion.
28 See footnote 3 of this opinion.