Title: Snap! Mobile v. Vertical Raise

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
 
Supreme Court Docket No. 49418 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County, John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
Stoel Rives, LLP, Boise, for Appellants Vertical Raise, LLC, and Paul Landers. W. 
Christopher Pooser argued.  
 
Lake City Law Group, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Appellants Vertical Raise, LLC, 
and Paul Landers. Nathan Ohler appeared.  
SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
VERTICAL RAISE, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; and PAUL 
LANDERS, individually, 
 
     Defendants-Appellants. 
____________________________ 
 
SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
VERTICAL RAISE, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company; and PAUL 
LANDERS, individually, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
PAUL CROGHAN, 
 
     Interested Party-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Docket No. 49418 
 
 
 
 
Boise, September 2023 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: February 2, 2024 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
 
 
 
 
Docket No. 49483 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Duke Evett, PLLC, Boise, for Respondent Snap! Mobile, Inc. Keely E. Duke 
argued.  
_____________________ 
 
Supreme Court Docket No. 49483 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County, Lamont C. Berecz, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Duke Evett, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant Snap! Mobile, Inc. Emma Nowacki 
argued.  
 
Owens, McCrea & Linscott, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondent Paul Croghan. 
April Linscott argued.  
 
Bolton Law, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondents Vertical Raise, LLC, and Paul 
Landers. K. Jill Bolton argued.  
 
Lake City Law Group, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondents Vertical Raise, 
LLC, and Paul Landers. Nathan Ohler appeared.  
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice. 
 
This appeal concerns the modification of a jury’s verdict and a challenge to an injunction 
on overbreadth grounds and for lack of specificity under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). 
There are two separate proceedings at issue involving many of the same participants but with two 
different district judges. The first proceeding (Supreme Court Docket Number 49418) involved a 
jury trial in which the district court (Judge John T. Mitchell or “trial court”) granted an additur or 
a new trial following a jury’s verdict. The second proceeding (Supreme Court Docket Number 
49483) involved a challenge to contempt enforcement of a preliminary injunction which was 
originally issued by the trial court. However, the trial court later recused itself and the case was 
thereafter assigned to a different district court judge (Judge Lamont C. Berecz or “contempt 
court”).  
Snap! Mobile, Inc. (“Snap”) and Vertical Raise, LLC (“Vertical Raise”) are competing 
online fundraising companies that work with schools, clubs, and coaches to raise money through 
online donation campaigns. In 2019, Snap filed suit against Vertical Raise and its CEO Paul 
3 
 
Landers 
(collectively 
“VR/Landers”), 
alleging 
tortious 
interference 
with 
contract, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, and common law unfair competition. Snap alleged that 
VR/Landers poached its sales representatives and customers knowing that this would violate non-
compete and confidentiality provisions contained in the former sales representatives’ employment 
agreements with Snap. 
The trial court granted Snap a preliminary injunction to enforce provisions of its 
employment agreements and also granted partial summary judgment in favor of Snap on liability 
for its tortious interference with contract and misappropriation of trade secrets claims. The 
damages issue proceeded to trial in which a jury awarded Snap $1,000,000. On Snap’s post-trial 
motion, the trial court entered an additur increasing the jury’s total award to $2,310,021 and gave 
VR/Landers the option of either accepting the additur or having a new trial. The trial court also 
entered a permanent injunction against VR/Landers. 
While the trial court case was pending, before the trial took place, Snap alleged violations 
of the preliminary injunction and brought motions for contempt against VR/Landers and Paul 
Croghan (“Croghan”), an independent contractor for Vertical Raise. The trial court recused itself 
from the contempt matters after it recognized that it had committed a procedural error, and the 
contempt matters were then reassigned to the contempt court, which subsequently dismissed the 
contempt charges after concluding the terms of the preliminary injunction were vague and 
overbroad and could not be enforced.  
 
On appeal, VR/Landers argues that the trial court erred in (1) granting the additur or new 
trial, (2) awarding discretionary costs to Snap for its expert witness fees, and (3) entering a 
permanent injunction against VR/Landers.  
In a separate appeal which has been consolidated for purposes of this opinion, Snap 
contends that the contempt court erred in dismissing the contempt charges because VR/Landers 
and Croghan were procedurally barred from challenging the preliminary injunction in a collateral 
proceeding and because the injunction complied with the specificity requirements of Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65(d). We affirm the decisions of the trial court in part and reverse in part and 
remand this case for further proceedings. We affirm the decision of the contempt court.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Snap is an online software platform that works with schools, clubs, and nonprofit 
organizations to raise money through online donation campaigns. Since 2013, Snap compiled 
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financial, sales, and business data from its campaigns into a proprietary database, which it refers 
to as the Snap Database. In 2018, Snap’s sales representatives signed agreements that included 
restrictive covenant provisions addressing confidentiality (Section 4.1), non-competition (Section 
4.3), non-acceptance of business (Section 4.4), and non-solicitation (Section 4.5). Snap’s 
Employment Agreement for sales representatives in California did not include a non-compete 
clause, but contained limitations on sales representatives’ use of confidential, proprietary, and 
trade secret information. 
 Vertical Raise is a competing online fundraising company formed by Paul Landers. In 
2018, Vertical Raise began recruiting Snap’s sales representatives. When hiring former Snap 
employees, Vertical Raise knew that those employees had agreements with Snap and that the 
agreements included non-compete and/or confidentiality provisions. Vertical Raise also 
encouraged former Snap employees to target Snap’s customers.  
A. Complaint and Preliminary Injunction  
In December 2019, Snap filed suit against VR/Landers, alleging tortious interference with 
contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, various violations of unfair competition laws, and civil 
conspiracy. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Snap on the issue of liability for 
its claims of tortious interference with contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.  
The trial court also granted Snap’s request for a preliminary injunction, stating that the 
“evidence provided shows that Vertical Raise has made a concerted effort to solicit and employ 
[Snap] employees, knowingly conflicting with those employees’ valid contracts with [Snap].” The 
preliminary injunction prohibited Vertical Raise, Landers, and “anyone acting in concert or on 
behalf of” Vertical Raise from engaging in certain conduct, which included soliciting, transacting, 
or accepting business with former Snap customers or business partners or paying a sales 
representative for such activities. The order further prohibited VR/Landers from “aiding or 
abetting” the former Snap employees in breaching their employment contracts, recruiting Snap 
sales representatives, and “using Snap[]’s confidential, trade secret information including, without 
limitation, customer lists, compilations of customer information and/or pricing information.” No 
exceptions were made for the California representatives, who were not subject to non-compete and 
non-solicitation covenants.  
 
 
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B. Contempt Proceedings 
Snap filed multiple motions to hold VR/Landers in contempt of court for alleged violations 
of the preliminary injunction order. Snap sought both civil and criminal sanctions. The trial court 
summarily granted the motions for criminal contempt without affording VR/Landers a jury trial 
and without charging or arraigning VR/Landers as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 
75. After recognizing its procedural error, the trial court rescinded its prior orders sanctioning 
VR/Landers for criminal contempt and then recused itself from presiding over further contempt 
proceedings in this case, which were reassigned to the contempt court.   
Shortly before trial, Snap filed its fourth motion for contempt requesting $290,000 in fines 
against VR/Landers and 175 days of jail time against Landers. During the damages trial, Snap filed 
a separate motion for contempt requesting $80,000 in fines and 80 days of jail time against Paul 
Croghan, a non-party to this litigation. Croghan is a former employee of Snap who works as an 
independent contractor for Vertical Raise. Croghan lives and works exclusively in California. Snap 
alleged that Croghan was responsible for sixteen of the ninety-three violations of the preliminary 
injunction “by soliciting the business of, transacting business with, and accepting business from 
Snap[]’s Business Partners” who were located in California.  
In August 2021, Croghan traveled to Idaho to testify on behalf of Vertical Raise. During a 
break in his testimony, the trial court, at Snap’s request, directed the parties and Croghan into 
different courtrooms and had the bailiff serve Croghan with Snap’s motion for contempt. The trial 
court stated, “[t]he record will reflect that Mr. Croghan has been served with those documents, and 
I do have concerns about my jurisdiction.” After Croghan was served with the contempt motion, 
three Vertical Raise witnesses fled the courthouse without testifying or being served.  
Croghan and VR/Landers subsequently filed motions before the contempt court to dismiss 
the charges of contempt, arguing that the preliminary injunction order was overbroad and vague. 
Croghan further argued that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him due to 
alleged defects in Snap’s service of process. In response, Snap argued that the preliminary 
injunction satisfied the specificity requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) and the 
motions to dismiss were an “improper attempt to obtain appellate review” of the trial court’s order 
granting injunctive relief. The contempt court granted the motions to dismiss, determining that the 
preliminary injunction order was vague, overbroad, and “patently unenforceable.” The contempt 
court further determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Croghan because he was immune 
6 
 
from service of process while appearing as a witness to testify for Vertical Raise and because 
Idaho’s long-arm statute did not provide jurisdiction.  
C. Damages Trial  
The trial judge presided over an eight-day jury trial to determine damages. Both parties 
retained economic damages experts who provided competing valuations of Snap’s damages. 
VR/Landers’ expert Arik Van Zandt (“Van Zandt”) calculated Snap’s damages in the form of lost 
profits and testified that “lost profits” capture the economic benefit that Snap otherwise would 
have received from the former sales representatives. Van Zandt testified that Snap’s lost profits 
ranged from $360,000 to $485,000 for former, non-California representatives, and $230,000 to 
$311,000 for former California representatives.  
In contrast, Snap’s expert, Harold Martin (“Martin”), calculated three types of damages: 
(1) lost profits; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3) cost of workforce damages. Martin explained that 
even though Snap had claims for tortious interference with contract, misappropriation of trade 
secrets, and unfair competition, Snap’s damages were the same under each cause of action. Martin 
testified that lost profits “represent the profits that Snap lost as a result of Vertical Raise’s and Mr. 
[Landers]’s hiring of the former Snap reps and solicitation of the former Snap clients in violation 
of the Snap sales agreement” and that unjust enrichment “is more or less the mirror image of lost 
profits, except it's looking at it from the perspective of what Vertical Raise gained by virtue of 
hiring the former Snap[] reps and soliciting their former clients[.]” Martin clarified that Snap could 
not recover both lost profits and unjust enrichment damages.  
Martin opined that unjust enrichment damages, with prejudgment interest, ranged from 
$960,021 under “Scenario One” to $1,065,179 under “Scenario Two.” Scenario One represented 
Martin’s estimate of damages “where the former [Snap representative] had a prior relationship 
with the former Snap[] client while that [representative] worked at Snap[].” Scenario Two 
“expanded” on Scenario One by adding Martin’s estimate of damages “where the former Snap[] 
representative did not have a relationship with a former Snap[] client while they worked at Snap[], 
but later, when that rep left Snap[] and joined VR, they solicited that client[.]”  
 
 
 
 
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“Scenario 1.”  
 
Unjust Enrichment 
Prejudgement [sic] 
Interest 
Total 
Indicated value 
 
 
 
 
 
Former Snap Reps – Sales Reps (Excl. California) 
$355,656 
(1) 
$57,526 
(2) 
$413,182 
Former Snap Reps – California Sales Reps 
258,533 
(1) 
64,284 
(2) 
322,817 
Total – Former Snap Reps 
614,189 
 
121,810 
 
735,999 
VR Reps (not affiliated with Snap) 
126,932 
(1) 
26,663 
(2) 
153,595 
Total indicated value 
$741,121 
 
 
$148,473 
 
$889,594 
 
Scenario 1 – Period 1 
 
Unjust Enrichment 
Prejudgement [sic] 
Interest 
Total 
Indicated value 
 
 
 
 
 
Former Snap Reps – Sales Reps (Excl. California) 
$64,158 
(1) 
$6,269 
(2) 
$70,427 
Total indicated value 
$64,158 
 
$6,269 
 
$70,427 
 
Scenario 1 - Period 2 
Thus, under Scenario 1, Martin opined that Snap was entitled to $805,279 ($741,121 + 
$64,158) for unjust enrichment damages, plus $154,742 ($148,473 + $6,269) in prejudgment 
interest, for a total of $960,021.  
“Scenario 2.”  
 
Unjust Enrichment 
Prejudgement [sic] 
Interest 
Total 
Indicated value 
 
 
 
 
 
Former Snap Reps – Sales Reps (Excl. California) 
$391,146 
(1) 
$63,322 
(2) 
$454,468 
Former Snap Reps – California Sales Reps 
  296,202 
(1) 
72,865 
(2) 
369,067 
Total – Former Snap Reps 
687,348 
 
136,187 
 
823,535 
VR Reps (not affiliated with Snap) 
133,618 
(1) 
27,719 
(2) 
161,337 
Total indicated value 
$820,967 
 
$163,906 
 
$984,872 
 
Scenario 2 - Period 1 
 
Unjust Enrichment 
Prejudgement [sic] 
Interest 
Total 
Indicated value 
 
 
 
 
 
Former Snap Reps – Sales Reps (Excl. California) 
$73,319 
(1) 
$6,987 
(2) 
$80,306 
Total indicated value 
$73,319 
 
$6,987 
 
$80,306 
 
Scenario 2 - Period 2 
8 
 
Under Scenario 2, Martin opined that Snap was entitled to $894,286 ($820,967 + $73,319) for 
unjust enrichment damages, plus $170,893 ($163,906 + $6,987) in prejudgment interest, for a total 
of $1,065,178. 
Martin further testified that “regardless of which form the jury decides in terms of 
damages,” Snap would also be entitled to $1,017,054 for the cost of assembled workforce and 
$182,383 in prejudgment interest, for a total of $1,199,437 in workforce replacement damages. 
Martin defined cost of workforce as “the amount that Snap[] invested in both recruiting and 
training of the former Snap[] reps who then ultimately left to join Vertical Raise” and that 
replacement costs were “part and parcel of the definition of the cost of the assembled work force.” 
Martin calculated the “cost of assembled workforce” by adding the costs associated with 
recruitment, training, human resource costs, and administrative costs for each former Snap sales 
representative who left to join Vertical Raise. However, the jury instruction defining cost of 
workforce stated:   
The cost of workforce [Snap] suffered to replace its Sales Representatives is the 
investment [Snap] more likely than not incurred to recruit, hire, and train new Sales 
Representatives 
to 
replace 
Sales 
Representatives 
who 
became 
Sales 
Representatives for Vertical Raise. 
 
(Emphasis added).  
 
Despite Martin’s testimony that Snap’s economic damages were the same under each cause 
of action, the special verdict form tasked the jury to separately determine the “type and amount of 
damages” specific to each of Snap’s claims. The jury returned verdicts awarding Snap $750,000 
in unjust enrichment damages and $250,000 in punitive damages for a total award of $1,000,000:  
(1) For Tortious Interference with Contract: 
Lost Profits:  
 
$ 0 
Cost of Workforce  
 
$ 0 
Unjust Enrichment  
 
$550,000 
(2) For Misappropriation of Trade Secrets: 
Lost Profits:  
 
$ 0 
Cost of Workforce  
 
$ 0 
Unjust Enrichment  
 
$ 0 
(3) For Unfair Competition:  
Lost Profits:  
 
$ 0 
Cost of Workforce  
 
$ 0 
Unjust Enrichment  
 
$200,000 
(4) For Punitive Damages:  
Vertical Raise:  
 
$150,000 
Paul Landers:   
 
$100,000  
9 
 
 
The trial court subsequently issued a permanent injunction against VR/Landers, which had 
identical terms to the preliminary injunction, except that the duration of the permanent injunction 
spans 18 months after the entry of judgment. The district court also granted Snap $33,174.27 in 
costs as the prevailing party and $238,629 in discretionary costs for Martin’s expert witness fees.  
D. Additur or New Trial 
Dissatisfied with the jury’s verdict, Snap subsequently sought an additur to increase the 
jury’s award for its tortious interference with contract claim. Snap contended that the jury had 
disregarded Martin’s testimony and the jury’s award was a product of passion and prejudice caused 
by VR/Landers’ multiple violations of the trial court’s order on motions in limine. The trial court 
granted Snap’s request from the bench and entered an additur increasing the jury’s total award 
from $1,000,000 to $2,310,021. 
In addressing Snap’s motion for additur, the trial court separately analyzed the jury’s 
verdicts on unjust enrichment damages and cost of workforce damages. On unjust enrichment 
damages, the trial court found that Martin’s testimony at trial was credible and uncontradicted. 
The trial court further determined that Van Zandt did not contradict Martin’s testimony on unjust 
enrichment damages because his testimony only addressed lost profits. On this basis, the trial court 
held that the jury’s award was against the “clear weight of the evidence,” noting that “the jury did 
find unjust enrichment damages . . . but gave them in an amount that was less than the 
uncontradicted evidence for unjust enrichment damages.” Therefore, the trial court granted an 
additur of “$410,021 to get unjust enrichment up to $960,021.”  However, the trial court further 
stated that it would not award prejudgment interest because the damages were not liquidated:  
I am not awarding the alternative amount . . . that would include prejudgment 
interest.  I wasn’t persuaded at trial that these were liquidated damages under [Idaho 
Code § 28-22-104], and I’m still not, and so I’m not willing to award the higher 
amount that would include prejudgment interest, and the basis for that ruling 
granting the additur is that the -- the testimony of Martin on that issue, on an unjust 
enrichment was uncontradicted. 
 
On cost of workforce damages, the trial court further determined that Martin’s testimony 
at trial was credible and uncontradicted, “other than vague criticism by Van Zandt that shouldn’t 
have come in.” The trial court further determined that “there’s no other explanation for [the] 
amount reached by the jury other than passion or prejudice due to the defendants’ disregard of this 
[c]ourt’s orders on motions in limine and expert witness disclosure.” However, the trial court 
10 
 
indicated that it was unwilling “to give the entire $1,199,437 that Martin testified to” and instead 
entered an additur increasing the jury’s award from $0 to $900,000.  
Following the oral ruling, the trial court directed Snap’s counsel to “prepare an order to 
that effect.” However, instead of submitting a proposed order conditionally granting a new trial 
subject to an additur, Snap submitted an “Amended Judgment,” which awarded Snap the additur 
without VR/Landers being consulted or being given the option of accepting the additur in lieu of 
a new trial. The amended judgment was signed and entered by the trial court. VR/Landers have 
not accepted the additur or requested a new trial.   
II. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Additur or New Trial  
“The decision by a trial court to grant or deny a motion for a new trial rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear 
and manifest abuse of discretion.” McCandless v. Pease, 166 Idaho 865, 872, 465 P.3d 1104, 1111 
(2020) (citation omitted). “Moreover, ‘[a] trial court’s grant of additur is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.’ ” Id. (quoting Ellefson v. Palmer, 162 Idaho 393, 398, 397 P.3d 1152, 1157 (2017)). 
“If the district court decides to [increase] the amount of a jury award, it must enter detailed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law explaining its reasoning and the basis” for the additur. Litke v. 
Munkhoff, 163 Idaho 627, 636, 417 P.3d 224, 233 (2018); see I.C. § 6-807(2).  
Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court conducts a four-part inquiry to determine 
whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg 
v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).  
B. Overbreadth and Specificity under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)  
 “An injunction is an equitable remedy[,]” SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 
370, 385 (4th Cir. 2017), and “[a] district court’s decision granting injunctive relief is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.” Hood v. Poorman, 171 Idaho 176, 519 P.3d 769, 786 (2022) (citing 
Gem State Roofing, Inc. v. United Components, Inc., 168 Idaho 820, 828, 488 P.3d 488, 496 
(2021)). “Although a district court has ‘a wide range of discretion in framing an injunction in terms 
it deems reasonable to prevent wrongful conduct,’ it is nonetheless ‘the essence of equity 
jurisdiction’ that a court is empowered ‘to grant relief no broader than necessary to cure the effects 
11 
 
of the harm caused by the violation.’ ” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 
114, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Forschner Grp., Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 406 
(2d Cir.1997)). “[A]n overbroad injunction is an abuse of discretion.” City & Cnty. of San 
Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 
582 (9th Cir. 2018)).  
For an injunction issued under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), “[a] district court’s 
interpretation of its own order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Citizens Against 
Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish And Game Dep't, 153 Idaho 630, 634, 289 P.3d 32, 36 (2012) 
(quoting Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir.2009)). Nonetheless, we will not 
“give equal deference to every aspect of a court’s decision.” Garcia, 561 F.3d at 103. “The abuse 
of discretion standard is used to evaluate the . . . court’s application of the facts to the appropriate 
legal standard, and the factual findings and legal conclusions underlying such decisions are 
evaluated under the clearly erroneous and de novo standards, respectively.” Id. (citation omitted). 
“Accordingly, we review de novo the legal question of whether the district court issued a 
preliminary injunction or restraining order in satisfaction” of Rule 65. Id. (citation omitted); see 
also Premier Commc’ns Network, Inc. v. Fuentes, 880 F.2d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation 
omitted) (“[C]hallenges to an injunction on specificity grounds . . . are reviewed de novo.”); City 
of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 143 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We review de novo 
whether the injunctions comply with Rule 65(d).”). This standard is consistent with the standard 
of review for determining whether a court order is ambiguous. See Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 
873, 880, 292 P.3d 264, 271 (2012) (“Whether a court order is ambiguous is a question of law” 
and “[i]nterpretation of an unambiguous court order is also a question of law.”).  
Our case law does not address the standards for reviewing a separate court’s order 
dismissing charges of contempt on the grounds that the underlying injunction failed to meet the 
specificity requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), or that the injunction issued was 
overly broad. However, as each conclusion reached by the contempt court resolved legal questions, 
not factual disputes, we review the contempt court’s order de novo. See Rowley v. Ada Cnty. 
Highway Dist., 156 Idaho 275, 277, 322 P.3d 1008, 1010 (2014) (“We review a district court's 
conclusions of law de novo.”). 
 
 
12 
 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in granting Snap an additur because the jury’s 
award is not solely attributable to passion or prejudice.  
 
VR/Landers appeal the trial court’s order granting an additur that increased the jury’s total 
award from $1,000,000 to $2,310,021 and request this Court to reinstate the jury’s original verdict, 
or alternatively, allow VR/Landers to elect to have a new trial. VR/Landers contend that the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting the additur by: (1) failing to consider possible justifications 
for the jury’s award of damages other than passion or prejudice; and (2) considering attorney 
misconduct as a basis for awarding an additur under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(F). 
We agree with VR/Landers and remand this matter with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict 
of $1,000,000. 
Rule 59(a)(1)(F) permits a court to order a new trial due to “excessive damages or 
inadequate damages, where the jury’s determination of damages appears to have resulted from 
passion or prejudice.” I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(F). Under Rule 59.1, a court may conditionally grant a 
new trial subject to either an additur or a remittitur. I.R.C.P. 59.1(a). An additur is “[a] trial court’s 
order . . . that increases the jury’s award of damages to avoid a new trial on grounds of inadequate 
damages.” McCandless, 166 Idaho at 879, 465 P.3d at 1118 (2020) (quoting Additur, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)). The decision to grant an additur “is a highly discretionary 
decision that, first, requires the trial court to determine whether to grant a new trial based on an 
[inadequate] award of damages” under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(F). SRM Arms, Inc. 
v. GSA Direct, LLC, 169 Idaho 196, 202, 494 P.3d 744, 750 (2021) (discussing remittitur). 
Our review of a trial court’s order granting a new trial “primarily focuses on the process 
by which the [trial] court reached its decision, not on the result of the [trial] court’s decision.” Id. 
at 203, 494 P.3d at 751 (quoting Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 780, 25 
P.3d 88, 93 (2001)). The process for determining whether passion or prejudice influenced a jury’s 
determination of damages under Rule 59(a)(1)(F) involves three steps: first, the trial court “must 
weigh the evidence” and calculate the award it would have imposed if it had sat as the trier of fact. 
Id. at 202, 494 P.3d at 750 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Second, the trial judge must 
“compare the jury’s award to what he would have given had there been no jury.” Id. Third, if there 
is a great disparity between the two damage awards, then the trial court must determine whether 
the disparity can be “explained away as simply the product of two separate entities valuing the 
13 
 
proof of the plaintiff[’]s injuries in two equally fair ways.” McCandless, 166 Idaho at 875, 465 
P.3d at 1114 (quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 769, 727 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1987)).   
“[I]f a trial court’s calculated damages award is substantially different from the jury’s 
award, and the trial court cannot attribute the jury’s award to an equally fair alternative 
interpretation of the facts—i.e. the trial court determines the jury’s award could only be due to 
passion or prejudice—then the trial court may order” an additur or new trial for damages. SRM 
Arms, Inc., 169 Idaho at 203, 494 P.3d at 751.  However, “respect for the collective wisdom of the 
jury and the function entrusted to it under our constitution suggests the trial judge should, in most 
cases, accept the jury’s findings even though he may have doubts about some of their conclusions.” 
Quick, 111 Idaho at 768, 727 P.2d at 1196. “[M]ere disagreement with the jury’s verdict is not 
enough for a trial court to override it; the court must determine that the jury’s verdict is such a 
great departure from the clear evidence at trial that the court’s differing view is more than just a 
fair difference of opinion.” McCandless, 166 Idaho at 875, 465 P.3d at 1114. “[I]n order for us to 
uphold the [trial] court’s [increased] damages award, the record must make clear the jury could 
not have arrived at its award except by passion or prejudice.” SRM Arms, Inc., 169 Idaho at 205, 
494 P.3d at 753.  
On appeal, we must determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the jury’s tortious 
interference with contract award was solely attributable to passion or prejudice. “[W]e must first 
determine whether the [trial] court properly divined the jury’s reasoning, and then second, whether 
the [trial] court abused its discretion in responding to that reasoning.”  Id. at 203, 494 P.3d at 751. 
For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the trial court failed to “reach its decision by 
the exercise of reason” because the jury’s award of unjust enrichment and cost of workforce 
damages cannot be solely attributable to passion or prejudice. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 
P.3d at 194.  
1. The jury’s failure to award the cost of workforce damages may be attributed to the jury 
instructions.  
 
The trial court determined that (1) the jury’s failure to award Snap any damages for the 
cost of workforce went against the “clear weight of the evidence,” and (2) there was “no other 
explanation for an amount reached by the jury other than passion or prejudice due to the 
defendants’ disregard of this [c]ourt’s orders on motions in limine and expert witness disclosure”:  
I am going to grant an additur to work force replacement damage in the amount of 
$900,000, again, finding that that testimony, that category of damage really came 
14 
 
in in [sic] an uncontradicted fashion. Any contradiction by Van Zandt and by 
defense counsel, which isn’t evidence but I think that that is what caused passion 
or prejudice in the jury not awarding anything for this when it was uncontradicted, 
so $900,000 for that category. 
. . .  
I have read all the submissions on this issue, and I did not see any inaccuracies by 
the plaintiff as far as claims where this [c]ourt’s motions in limine rulings were 
violated. I found that [Snap’s counsel] was accurate in that.  My decision isn’t -- 
and so I am finding passion or prejudice by the defendant in violating this [c]ourt’s 
orders on the motions in limine and on expert witness disclosure limitations . . .  
More importantly, in this [c]ourt’s estimation, it’s the fact that Martin’s evidence 
was uncontradicted, and that puts us back to the clear weight of the evidence 
standard, not even . . . needing to reach the passion or prejudice, but I do find that 
the – there’s no other explanation for an amount reached by the jury other than 
passion or prejudice due to the defendants’ disregard of this [c]ourt’s orders on 
motions in limine and expert witness disclosure, but preliminarily, again, it's due to 
the jury’s finding being against the clear weight of the evidence. 
 
This Court has acknowledged “the difficult challenge a trial court faces when attempting 
to reverse engineer a jury’s verdict,” especially in complex cases with multiple variables. SRM 
Arms, Inc., 169 Idaho at 206, 494 P.3d at 754. “Nevertheless, in order for us to uphold the [trial] 
court’s [increased] damages award, the record must make clear the jury could not have arrived at 
its award except by passion or prejudice.” Id. at 205, 494 P.3d at 753. This is not the case here.  
We conclude that the jury’s failure to award workforce damages can be attributed to the 
jury instructions’ definition of workforce replacement damages as well as the jury’s discretion not 
to be bound by any expert’s opinion. Instruction 15b explained that workforce replacement 
damages were costs “incurred to recruit, hire, and train new Sales Representatives to replace Sales 
Representatives who became Sales Representatives for Vertical Raise.” (Emphasis added.) 
However, Martin testified that cost of workforce damages represented “the amount that Snap[] 
invested in both recruiting and training of the former Snap [representatives] who then ultimately 
left to join Vertical Raise.” (Emphasis added.) While Martin later testified that cost of workforce 
damages represented the “cost of replacing the person that leaves,” his calculation of damage to 
Snap only considered the costs associated with onboarding the former Snap sales representative. 
In other words, Snap did not present evidence concerning the costs associated with onboarding 
“new Sales Representatives to replace Sales Representatives who became Sales Representatives 
for Vertical Raise.” Instead, Snap only presented evidence of its lost investment in its former 
representatives. Moreover, because Snap did not provide any evidence on the number of new 
15 
 
employees it actually had to hire due to former representatives going to work for Vertical Raise or 
the actual cost incurred in onboarding any new employees to replace the former representatives, 
the jury’s decision to decline to award cost of workforce damages is subject to “an equally fair 
alternative interpretation of the facts.” Id. at 203, 494 P.3d at 751.  
Next, Instruction 4b instructed the jury that it is not bound by an expert’s opinion, and it 
may give such testimony any weight it deems it is entitled. Without being unduly influenced by 
passion or prejudice, the jury could have determined the other damages awarded were sufficient 
to compensate Snap. Snap cannot prevent employees from leaving its employment; it can only 
enforce its covenants not to compete or share confidential information. The jury could have 
weighed all the testimony and determined replacing employees is simply a cost of doing business 
or that Snap did not incur expenses to train new employees because there was no testimony to that 
effect during trial. Therefore, the district court failed to reach its decision to increase the jury’s 
award by the exercise of reason by assuming the workforce damages were based solely on passion 
or prejudice.  
2. The trial court erred in evaluating the jury’s unjust enrichment award. 
 
As stated above, our review of a trial court’s order on whether to grant a new trial 
“primarily focuses on the process by which the [trial] court reached its decision, not on the result 
of the [trial] court’s decision.’” SRM Arms, Inc., 169 Idaho at 203, 494 P.3d at 751 (quoting 
Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 780, 25 P.3d at 93). Under the first step, the trial court “must weigh the 
evidence” and calculate the award it would have imposed if it sat as the trier of fact.” Id. at 202, 
494 P.3d at 750 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). While the trial court completed this step 
as required, the trial court’s calculation of the damages it would have awarded as the trier of fact 
did not follow from its findings. Based on its additur award, it can be inferred that the trial court 
would have awarded $960,021 in unjust enrichment damages. Yet, when addressing unjust 
enrichment damages, the trial court stated it was not awarding prejudgment interest because the 
damages were not liquidated:  
I am not awarding the alternative amount . . . that would include prejudgment 
interest.  I wasn’t persuaded at trial that these were liquidated damages under [Idaho 
Code § 28-22-104], and I’m still not, and so I’m not willing to award the higher 
amount that would include prejudgment interest . . . . 
 
It is unclear what the trial court was referring to when it stated that it would not award the 
“alternative amount” or “higher amount that would include prejudgment interest” because the 
16 
 
alternative calculations presented to the jury by Martin (Scenario One and Scenario Two) both 
included prejudgment interest. While an additur award of $960,021 is consistent with Martin’s 
calculation of unjust enrichment damages with prejudgment interest included under “Scenario 
One,” the trial court determined that Snap was not entitled to prejudgment interest. Thus, the trial 
court’s calculation of unjust enrichment damages should have been reduced by $154,742, leaving 
a remainder of $805,279. 
Under the second step, the trial court erred by comparing its increased award ($960,021) 
with an inaccurate assessment of the jury’s award for unjust enrichment damages ($550,000), 
leaving a disparity of $410,021. While the jury’s verdict on the tortious interference with contract 
claim awarded Snap $550,000 for unjust enrichment damages, the trial court failed to consider 
Martin’s testimony that, collectively, there was only one damage amount available for Snap’s 
tortious interference with contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition 
claims, which ranged from $960,021 under Scenario One and $1,065,179 under Scenario Two. In 
other words, in evaluating the jury’s award for unjust enrichment damages, the trial court needed 
to assess the combined unjust enrichment awards for each of Snap’s claims.  
Here, the jury awarded Snap $550,000 in unjust enrichment damages for its tortious 
interference with contract claim and $200,000 in unjust enrichment damages for its unfair 
competition claim, for a total award of $750,000 in unjust enrichment damages. While Martin 
testified that his calculations of damages under each claim were not commutative and were not to 
be added together, the special verdict form asked the jury to separately determine the “type and 
amount of damages” for each of Snap’s claims, which it did. Furthermore, we do not read Martin’s 
testimony to stand for the proposition that Snap was only to be awarded the jury’s highest unjust 
enrichment or lost profit award under the separate sections of the special verdict form. Instead, 
Martin was clarifying that his calculation of damages, $960,021 under Scenario One or $1,065,179 
under Scenario Two, was not to be awarded under each of Snap’s claims, but instead represented 
the total amount of Snap’s economic damages. Therefore, under the second step, the trial court 
should have compared its calculation of unjust enrichment damages ($805,279) against the jury’s 
total award for unjust enrichment damages ($750,000), leaving a significantly lower disparity of 
$55,279. 
Under the third step, the trial court needed to determine whether the disparity of $55,279 
could be “explained away as simply the product of two separate entities valuing the proof of the 
17 
 
plaintiff[’]s injuries in two equally fair ways.” McCandless, 166 Idaho at 875, 465 P.3d at 1114 
(quoting Quick, 111 Idaho at 769, 727 P.2d at 1197). We determine that it can.  
The trial court granted an additur on unjust enrichment, in part, because it determined 
Martin’s testimony on unjust enrichment damages was uncontradicted as Van Zandt opined only 
on Snap’s damages in the form of lost profits and not unjust enrichment. While “[a] trier of fact 
may not arbitrarily disregard credible and unimpeached testimony of a witness,” this does not 
mean that a jury is required to render an award that directly aligns with an expert’s calculation of 
damages if the evidence is contradicted or improbable. Papin v. Papin, 166 Idaho 9, 22, 454 P.3d 
1092, 1119 (2019) (quoting Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 703, 963 P.2d 383, 386 (1998)).  
We have acknowledged that a trial judge’s determination to discount the testimony of an 
expert witness was a proper exercise of his discretion in weighing the evidence. See Ellefson, 162 
Idaho at 398, 397 P.3d at 1157. Under this step, however, the trial court did not consider how Van 
Zandt’s testimony may have impacted the jury’s award. During trial, the jury heard from Van 
Zandt that “lost profits capture the economic benefit that Snap[] otherwise would’ve received from 
those sales representatives.” Martin further testified that unjust enrichment “is more or less the 
mirror image of lost profits, except it’s looking at it from the perspective of what Vertical Raise 
gained by virtue of hiring the former Snap[] reps and soliciting their former clients[.]” Based on 
this testimony, a reasonable jury could have compared the competing calculations of Snap’s 
economic damages, which, in turn, informed their award on unjust enrichment damages.  
In addition, jurors can apply their own common sense and general knowledge in evaluating 
the evidence: 
[I]n appraising evidence before them, “jurors have the right to apply their own 
common sense and to use the general knowledge they have in common with the 
rest of mankind.” Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107 Idaho 701, 704, 692 P.2d 
345, 348 (1984) (quoting Noland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 207 Kan. 72, 483 P.2d 
1029, 1033 (1971)); see also I.C.J.I. 1.00 (“In your everyday affairs, you determine 
for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you 
attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more 
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you 
should apply in your deliberations in this case.”). 
 
McCandless, 166 Idaho at 875–76, 465 P.3d at 1114–15. Here, the jury was presented with 
conflicting calculations of Snap’s economic damages by the parties’ experts at trial and the jury’s 
damages award fell within the range of those competing calculations. On this basis, the disparity 
18 
 
between the jury’s award and the trial court’s award can be explained away as simply the product 
of two separate entities valuing the proof of Snap’s injuries in two equally fair ways.  
Furthermore, we hold that the trial court did not act “consistently with the legal standards 
applicable” to granting a new trial subject to additur under Rule 59(a)(1)(F) by considering 
attorney misconduct as a basis to find passion or prejudice. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d 
at 194. While attorney misconduct may form the basis for granting a new trial under Rule 
59(a)(1)(A) for “irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party[,]”a trial court 
may only grant a new trial subject to additur under Rule 59(a)(1)(F) based on the inadequacy of 
damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. See Quick, 111 
Idaho at 770 n.2, 727 P.2d at 1198 n.2 (“It is obvious that since a remittitur of damages arises only 
out of a new trial motion based on the excessiveness of damages . . .  a remittitur cannot be based 
on any of the other grounds for a new trial enumerated under I.R.C.P. 59(a).”). To determine 
whether a jury’s award of damages was influenced by passion or prejudice, the trial court must 
follow the three-step process as set forth above. 
In short, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the jury’s awards were 
solely attributable to passion or prejudice. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order granting an 
additur or new trial and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury’s original verdict.  
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Snap discretionary costs. 
 
VR/Landers assert that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Snap $238,629 in 
discretionary costs for Martin’s expert witness fees. A trial court may award discretionary costs 
“upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). The 
trial court must make express findings explaining why a discretionary cost should or should not be 
allowed. Valiant Idaho, LLC v. N. Idaho Resorts, LLC, 164 Idaho 222, 230, 428 P.3d 800, 808 
(2018). This Court has explained that a trial court should assess the context and nature of a case as 
a whole to determine whether a particular expense is exceptional: 
[N]umerous complaints, depositions and expert testimony does not render a case in 
and of itself exceptional. Rather, courts should assess the context and nature of a 
case as a whole along with multiple circumstances. The mere fact numerous experts 
were retained or numerous amendments were filed does not standing alone render 
a case exceptional. Particular standards a court should consider include, but are not 
limited to, whether there was unnecessary duplication of work, whether there was 
an unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity of issues presented, and creation of 
19 
 
unnecessary costs that could have been easily avoided. Most importantly, however, 
a court should explain why the circumstances of a case render it exceptional. 
 
Id. (quoting Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 914, 303 P.3d 587, 601 (2013)). “The party 
opposing an award of discretionary costs bears the burden of demonstrating that the district court 
abused its discretion.” Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169, 158 P.3d 937, 945 (2007). 
VR/Landers has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in awarding 
discretionary costs to Snap. VR/Landers cite Nightengale v. Timmel to support the proposition that 
the trial court erred in finding that the costs were exceptional merely because they were necessary. 
151 Idaho 347, 354, 256 P.3d 755, 762 (2011) (abrogated by State v. Cox, 169 Idaho 14, 490 P.3d 
14 (2021)). However, the facts of Nightengale are distinguishable from this case. In Nightengale, 
a district court granted discretionary costs for an expert’s witness fees because the case required 
expert testimony regarding the vascular system and such experts had to travel to testify. Id. at 355, 
256 P.3d at 763. Because expert testimony is required in every medical malpractice case under 
Idaho Code section 6–1012, we held that expert witness fees in these cases are generally considered 
ordinary—not exceptional. Id. Absent other findings, there was “no basis for every expert witness’ 
testimony to be considered ‘exceptional’ simply because it requires specialized knowledge.” Id.  
Unlike the district court in Nightengale, the trial court here did not find that Martin’s 
witness fees were per se exceptional because Snap’s claims required expert testimony. Instead, the 
trial court based its decision to award discretionary costs on the unique “data-extreme” features of 
this case, which the trial court found to be exceptional. The trial court stated:  
[I]n this case I don’t know how the case could’ve been pursued without an expert, 
so I do find that Mr. Martin’s testimony was an extraordinary – an extraordinary 
expense. Sorting through the material, I’m certain [it] took the amount of time that 
Mr. Martin claimed that it did. I just can’t imagine how obviously data-sensitive 
and data-extreme this case is, and I think that’s really what makes it extraordinary.  
 
The trial court further differentiated ordinary cases that require expert medical testimony and the 
data-intensive nature of this case that rendered Martin’s testimony extraordinary:   
In the [medical malpractice] scenario a doctor or even an expert, you know, his 
testimony could come on in a half a day and really not take a lot of time in 
preparation compared to what Mr. Martin had to do in this case to make it even 
remotely digestible to a jury.  I mean, this – the other option would really be to 
have this be a two-month-long trial, and so I do find his expenses to be 
extraordinary, and I don’t find anything in the amounts requested for him to be 
inappropriate. I find them to be appropriate.  
 
20 
 
VR/Landers further cite to Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 914, 303 P.3d at 601, and Valiant Idaho, 
164 Idaho at 232, 428 P.3d at 810, to support the proposition that “the fact that a case is complex 
does not make it exceptional.” However, Hoagland and Valiant Idaho do not sweep as broadly as 
VR/Landers suggest and the facts are distinguishable. The main takeaway from Hoagland and 
Valiant Idaho, LLC, is that a court must adequately explain why the circumstances of a case render 
it exceptional; we did not hold that a court could not consider unique factors of a case, including 
its complexity, in determining whether it was exceptional. Furthermore, we have previously 
affirmed an award of discretionary costs on this same basis. See Puckett, 144 Idaho at 169, 158 
P.3d at 945) (affirming an award of discretionary cost where the district considered the 
“exceptionality of the costs in light of the ‘long course of litigation and complexity’ ” of the case).  
In short, the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in granting Snap 
discretionary costs because the trial court made express findings that the unique circumstances of 
the case rendered the costs exceptional, and the record supports the trial court’s determination. 
Therefore, the trial court’s award of discretionary costs is affirmed.  
C. The contempt court did not err in dismissing the charges of contempt.   
 
The contempt court dismissed Snap’s ninety-three charges of contempt against 
VR/Landers and Croghan, holding that the preliminary injunction order was impermissibly vague, 
overbroad, and “patently unenforceable.” The contempt court further determined that it lacked 
personal jurisdiction over Croghan because Snap failed to properly serve Croghan and that it also 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Croghan under the long-arm statute. On appeal, Snap challenges 
the contempt court’s dismissal on several bases. First, Snap contends that VR/Landers and 
Croghan were procedurally barred from challenging the enforceability of the preliminary 
injunction in the contempt proceedings under the collateral bar rule and the doctrine of res judicata. 
Second, Snap argues that the preliminary injunction was not vague and complied with the 
specificity requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Finally, Snap contends that 
service on Croghan was proper.  
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that (1) VR/Landers and Croghan were not 
procedurally barred from challenging the enforceability of the preliminary injunction in the 
contempt proceedings; (2) the preliminary injunction complied with the specificity requirements 
of Rule 65(d); and (3) the preliminary injunction was overly broad and unenforceable. Each 
conclusion is addressed in turn. 
21 
 
1. VR/Landers and Croghan were not barred from challenging the enforceability of the 
preliminary injunction under the collateral bar rule or res judicata.  
 
Snap contends that VR/Landers and Croghan were procedurally barred from challenging 
the enforceability of the preliminary injunction before the contempt court under the doctrine of res 
judicata and the “collateral bar rule.” Before addressing the merits of Snap’s arguments, it is 
important to discuss the application of the collateral bar rule. “In brief, the collateral bar rule 
permits a judicial order to be enforced through criminal contempt even though the underlying 
decision may be incorrect and even unconstitutional.” In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron 
Works, Inc., 881 F.2d 722, 725–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Put differently, a “contemnor 
cannot ordinarily raise the invalidity of the judicial order as a defense to a contempt charge.” Id. 
This rule stems from the premise “that a smoothly functioning judicial process may be jeopardized 
if parties are able to determine for themselves when and how to obey court orders.” Id.  
While this Court has not used the term “collateral bar rule” in a reported decision, we have 
recognized the principle that a contemnor may not challenge the merits of the underlying 
injunction as a defense to contempt charges. See Mathison v. Felton, 90 Idaho 87, 94, 408 P.2d 
457, 461 (1965) (stating that “[e]ven though the judgment in this case which formed the basis for 
this contempt proceeding has been reversed, it is our conclusion that such reversal will be of no 
avail to the petitioner here in the determination of whether the contempt judgment should be 
upheld”); see also Jim & Maryann Plane Fam. Tr. v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 933, 342 P.3d 639, 
645 (2015) (citation omitted) (“Generally, ‘final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not 
subject to collateral attack.’ ”); In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 278, 127 P.3d 178, 181 (2005) (“When 
a court has jurisdiction over the suit and the parties before it, its orders are to be obeyed until they 
are set aside by appropriate proceedings.”). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has likewise made it clear that a contemnor may not ignore a 
court order even though he believes it to be incorrect: 
[T]he contemnor may challenge the procedure by which the contempt is 
adjudicated. He may argue that there is no substantial evidence to support the 
finding that he knowingly violated a court order. He may even challenge the 
penalties imposed. However, he may not knowingly ignore an order of the court, 
even though he believes it to be incorrect, and then contest the validity of the 
underlying order on appeal from a finding of criminal contempt. 
 
In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 579, 733 P.2d 795, 800 (Ct. App. 1987).  
22 
 
There are, of course, exceptions to Idaho’s collateral bar rule. First, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(4) provides that “[o]n a motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgment is void.” I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). “A void 
judgment is a nullity, and no rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be 
collaterally attacked at any time.” Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50, 382 P.2d 910, 912 (1963) 
(citations omitted). A void judgment is generally one involving a jurisdictional defect. See Jim & 
Maryann Plane Fam. Tr., 157 Idaho at 933, 342 P.3d at 645 (citations omitted) (listing 
jurisdictional defects that render a judgment void). Second, as the Idaho Court of Appeals 
recognized in Reeves, a contemnor may challenge an order if it is “transparently invalid or had 
only a frivolous pretense to validity.” 112 Idaho at 579, 733 P.2d at 800 (quoting Walker v. 
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967)). The Court of Appeals has explained, however, that 
convincing an appellate court that a lower court’s order or judgment is “transparently invalid” is a 
heavy burden and that the better course of action is to bring the error to the issuing court’s attention 
rather than risk contempt. Reeves, 112 Idaho at 580, 733 P.2d at 801. Third, a contemnor may 
challenge an order if its terms are not specific and definite. See State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 
116, 426 P.3d 461, 467 (2018) (“Allowing punishment only for disobedience to specific and 
definite orders accords with notions of fairness and due process.”). 
In this case, Snap contends that the contempt court did not have the authority to consider 
the validity of the preliminary injunction because VR/Landers’ and Croghan’s motions to dismiss 
collaterally attacked the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. In response, VR/Landers 
contend that the collateral bar rule is inapplicable because the contempt court “stepped in the shoes 
of [the district court] . . . with authority over the injunction and discretion to review its enforcement 
in the context of a criminal contempt proceeding.”   
The case before us is in an unusual posture. Initially, the trial court summarily granted 
Snap’s requests to hold VR/Landers in contempt of court for violating its preliminary injunction 
order. However, as we recently explained, Rule 75 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure does not 
allow for the adjudication of non-summary contempt through a summary proceeding. See Abell v. 
Abell, __ Idaho __, 534 P.3d 957, 969 (2023). After recognizing its error, the trial court rescinded 
its prior orders sanctioning VR/Landers for contempt, recused itself from presiding over further 
contempt proceedings, and the contempt proceedings were then reassigned to the contempt court.  
23 
 
Following this reassignment, Snap requested VR/Landers and Croghan be held in contempt 
of the preliminary injunction order and sought criminal sanctions, including the imposition of large 
fines and jail time. In response, VR/Landers and Croghan requested the contempt court dismiss 
Snap’s charges of contempt, arguing that the preliminary injunction was vague and overbroad. 
Croghan further argued that the contempt court lacked personal jurisdiction due to defects in 
Snap’s service of process and that the long-arm statute did not afford the contempt court personal 
jurisdiction. The contempt court agreed with VR/Landers and Croghan and dismissed the contempt 
charges on these bases, holding that the preliminary injunction issued by the district court was 
vague, overbroad, and “patently unenforceable.”  
Based on this unique procedural posture and the recognized exceptions to this rule, we 
conclude that the collateral bar rule did not prevent the contempt court from dismissing Snap’s 
charges of contempt. The bases for the contempt court’s order of dismissal largely addressed 
recognized exceptions to Idaho’s collateral bar rule. As discussed above, the collateral bar rule 
does not preclude a contemnor from challenging the enforceability of an order on the grounds that 
its terms are not “specific and definite” or due to jurisdictional defects. Thus, the collateral bar rule 
could only have prevented VR/Landers and Croghan from challenging the enforceability of the 
injunction on the basis that it was overly broad. However, because the trial court recused itself 
from the contempt proceedings during the pendency of the underlying litigation, we agree with 
VR/Landers and Croghan that they should be allowed to challenge the preliminary injunction on 
overbreadth grounds because the preliminary injunction entered by the trial court was not a final 
appealable judgment. If the trial court had not recused itself, it could have examined the scope of 
the preliminary injunction while the contempt motions were pending and modified the scope of its 
order. Given the unique posture of this case, the reasons underlying the application of the collateral 
bar rule simply do not exist.   
Snap further contends that the doctrine of res judicata estopped VR/Landers from 
challenging the enforcement of the preliminary injunction because the trial court had denied 
similar challenges to its enforcement and because a final judgment was entered against them. We 
disagree because there was a not a final judgment entered in the case at the time VR/Landers took 
this position.  
The doctrine of res judicata is well understood: 
24 
 
The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and 
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action 
between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims relating to the same 
cause of action ... which might have been made. Issue preclusion protects litigants 
from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. Separate tests are 
used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies.  
 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007) (citations and quotations 
omitted). However, the tests for both res judicata and collateral estoppel require a final judgment 
on the merits in the prior litigation. See Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618.  “As a general rule, a final 
judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the 
controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties.” Int. of Dudley, 167 
Idaho 56, 58, 467 P.3d 420, 422 (2020) (quoting Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 
148 Idaho 616, 620, 226 P.3d 1263, 1267 (2010)). In this case, the preliminary injunction would 
not qualify as a final judgment because it is, by its nature, a temporary measure to maintain the 
status quo until the case could proceed to trial. See Gem State Roofing, Inc. v. United Components, 
Inc., 168 Idaho 820, 834, 488 P.3d 488, 502 (2021) (“A preliminary injunction is a temporary 
injunction effective for the pendency of the litigation before the merits of the case are decided. 
I.R.C.P. 65(e).”). And the judgment entered after trial would not qualify as a final judgment 
because Snap subsequently filed a motion for an additur on October 13, 2021. This motion 
obviated the finality of the judgment later entered by the trial court on October 15, 2021, because 
there was no longer a final determination of the rights of the parties while the motion was pending 
before the trial court. Therefore, res judicata is inapplicable to this case because the preliminary 
injunction was not a final order.  
Consequently, VR/Landers and Croghan were not barred from challenging the 
enforceability of the preliminary injunction, and we must next consider whether the contempt court 
erred in dismissing the charges of contempt.  
2. The contempt court did not err in holding that the preliminary injunction was 
unenforceable.  
 
Next, Snap contends that the contempt court erred in dismissing its charges of contempt 
because the language of the preliminary injunction was reasonably specific. Snap also argues that 
the former sales representatives knew what conduct the order prohibited, which Snap could 
establish at trial.  
25 
 
Challenges to the language of an injunction generally take two forms.  First, a party may 
challenge an injunction on the grounds that it is vague.  See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108 (1972) (“An order too vague to understand contravenes due process standards: It is a basic 
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly 
defined.”). An injunction is vague if it fails to satisfy the specificity requirements set out in Rule 
65(d)(1), which, in summary, states: “ ‘[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining 
order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in 
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought 
to be restrained . . . .’ ” Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game Dep’t, 153 Idaho 
630, 634, 289 P.3d 32, 36 (2012) (citing I.R.C.P. 65(d)(1)). In addressing Rule 65(d)’s federal 
counterpart, the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Rule was designed to prevent 
uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the 
possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.” Schmidt v. 
Lessard, 414 U.S 473, 476-77 (1974) (per curiam). “[T]hus, Rule 65(d) ‘is satisfied only if the 
enjoined party can ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden’ 
or required.” Citizens Against Range Expansion, 153 Idaho at 635, 289 P.3d at 37 (quoting Petrello 
v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.2008)). 
 
Second, a party may challenge an injunction on the grounds that it is overly broad. “An 
injunction is overly broad when there is a risk that it restrains legal conduct, or the injunction 
prohibits illegal conduct that is not the subject of the litigation or is not closely related to the 
conduct found to justify injunctive relief.” Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Cromer, 31 F.4th 356, 
364 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 
360-61 (6th Cir. 1998)). “A preliminary injunction is the ‘strong arm of equity’ which, as an 
extraordinary remedy, must be exercised with great restraint.” Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. 
State, 172 Idaho, 321, 325, 532 P.3d 801, 805 (2022) (citation omitted). Therefore, “[a]n injunction 
‘should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiffs before the court.’ ” City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753, 765 (9th Cir. 
2020) (quoting Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
While these challenges are similar insofar as each concerns the proper scope of an 
injunction, each challenge is unique. As Wright & Miller note in their treatise discussing the Rule 
65 federal counterpart, the “broadness” of an injunction pertains to the range of activity that is 
26 
 
prohibited by the order whereas “vagueness” pertains to whether the prohibited conduct has been 
described with sufficient particularity: 
It is important to note that the scope of an injunction or restraining order may be 
broad but at the same time the draft is in a manner that is not vague, but that is 
specific and precise. There is no inherent inconsistency between the two 
characteristics. Broadness encompasses the range of activity brought within the 
parameters of the decree; a decree is vague when the delineation of the prescribed 
activity lacks particularity. 
 
11A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2955 (3d ed.).  
In this case, the contempt court determined that the preliminary injunction was 
unenforceable because (1) the terms of the preliminary injunction were vague and failed to comply 
with the specificity requirement of Rule 65(d); and (2) the scope of the preliminary injunction was 
overly broad because it imposed Snap’s non-compete and non-solicitation covenants against 
employees who were no longer bound to these covenants.  
a. The preliminary injunction complies with the specificity requirements of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d).  
 
Whether a court order is vague is a question of law; and interpretation of an unambiguous 
court order is also a question of law. See Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 880, 292 P.3d 264, 
271 (2012) (discussing the standard for an ambiguous order). Thus, we consider the relevant 
language of the preliminary injunction that the contempt court determined was vague. The trial 
court’s preliminary injunction enjoined VR/Landers and “anyone acting in concert or on behalf 
of” VR/Landers from: 
1. Directly or indirectly soliciting any Snap customer or Business Partner, i.e. 
schools and independent organizations, who were served by a Vertical Raise 
sales representative formerly employed by Snap[] and where such individual 
was employed by Snap[] for any product or service similar to or competitive 
with one offered by Vertical Raise in the same geographic area in which former 
Snap[] employees performed services for Snap[]. 
 
2. Transacting business with any Snap[] customer, Business Partner, or 
organization who was served by a Vertical Raise sales representative formerly 
employed, engaged, or contracted with by Snap[] and that individual was 
employed by Vertical Raise in the same geographic area in which that former 
Snap[] employee performed Services for Snap[]. 
 
3. Soliciting or accepting business from any Snap[] customer, Business Partner, 
or organization in the same geographic area in which any Vertical Raise sales 
representative formerly employed, engaged, or contracted with by Snap[] 
27 
 
performed services for Snap[] who were served by that former Snap[] employee 
while he/she was employed by Snap[].  
 
4. Paying any sales representative formerly employed by Snap[] any form of 
compensation for transacting business with a current or former Snap[] 
customer, Business partner, or organization who was served by that sales 
representative while he/she was employed, engaged, or contracted with by 
Snap[] in the geographic area in which that sales representative performed 
services for Snap[].   
. . . . 
 
Each of the ninety-three contempt charges Snap raised against VR/Landers and Croghan alleged 
violations of one or several of these provisions and did not concern other provisions of the 
preliminary injunction. The contempt court concluded that paragraphs 1 through 4 failed to meet 
the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d) because the following terms and phrases in these 
paragraphs were not clearly defined: (1) the term “geographic area,” (2) the phrase “customer, 
Business Partner, or organization,” and (3) the qualifying phrases “who was served,” “who were 
served,” and “engaged.”  
To be sure, the terms of the order could have been drafted in a clearer manner. However, 
these terms are not so vague as to render them unenforceable. Take, for example, the term 
“geographic area,” which was the center of the vagueness dispute. The contempt court determined 
that the use of the phrase “geographic area” was vague because the phrase was never defined:  
[A]side from Snap arguing that its meaning is “self-explanatory,” no one appears 
to know the meaning of that phrase. The preliminary injunction provides no 
guidance as to the scope of the geographic area. For example, does the “geographic 
area” consist of a state, a city, a school district, or a particular school? Is 
“geographic area” defined by reference to city, county, or state boundary lines? Or 
is “geographic area” defined by specific distances, e.g., within 25 miles of a 
particular customer’s location? Or is “geographic area” simply as nebulous and 
subjective as wherever a particular sales representative considers their home 
territory to be? The injunction fails to address any of these questions. 
 
We disagree. This term is not nebulous, nor is it undefined. The “geographic area” of each former 
sales representative is the area “in which [the] former [Snap employee] performed services for 
Snap.” Each of the former representatives was assigned an area to provide services for Snap’s 
clients, these areas were known to the former representatives, and the parameters of these areas 
can be established by Snap during a contempt trial. While the contempt court may have preferred 
an addendum outlining each of the former sales representatives’ geographic areas, the focus of the 
analysis is whether the “enjoined party can ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely 
28 
 
what acts are forbidden.” Citizens Against Range Expansion, 153 Idaho at 634, 289 P.3d at 36 
(emphasis added). The order’s four corners sufficiently describe the acts forbidden.  
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario. Boise State Landscape, LLC, 
provides professional lawn care services throughout the state of Idaho. Each sales employee of 
Boise State Landscape signed a non-compete agreement and was assigned a specific geographic 
area to achieve sales objectives and targets. An employee’s geographic area could range from a 
single city to multiple cities, depending on population size. Landscaper Joe is assigned the cities 
of Moscow and Lewiston as his geographic area. After Joe and thirty-six other employees left 
Boise State Landscape to work for Vandal Lawn Services, a court enjoined the former employees 
from “selling lawn care services in the geographic area in which former Boise State Landscape 
employees performed services for Boise State Landscape.” Subsequently, Boise State Landscape 
filed charges of contempt against Joe for selling lawn care services in Lewiston and Joe moved to 
dismiss the charges on the grounds that the order’s use of the term “geographic area” rendered it 
vague. Would the geographic area specified in the injunction satisfy the specificity requirements 
of Rule 65(d)? Yes. The injunction prohibited Joe from selling lawn care services in the geographic 
area where he formerly worked. That geographic area was not spelled out in the injunction or in 
an appendix to the injunction, as the contempt court may prefer, but the injunction did contain 
sufficient information to inform Joe what acts were forbidden and the actual boundaries of his 
former sales territory could be proven as a matter of fact at a contempt trial. And if it turns out Joe 
only provided landscape services for Vandal Lawn Services in Coeur d’Alene, and not Moscow 
or Lewiston, then Boise State Landscape would have failed to present evidence on an essential 
element of its case and Joe would be acquitted.  
Here, each of the former employees was assigned to work in specific geographic areas to 
provide Snap’s customers with its online fundraising software. These geographic areas were not 
spelled out in the injunction, but they are known to the former representatives and Snap. Snap has 
the burden to establish the areas for each representative during the contempt proceedings. While 
Rule 65(d), overall, prefers certainty to flexibility, this rule is not so inflexible as to require an 
appendix outlining the geographic areas of each former sales representative.  
Next, neither the phrase “Snap[] Customer or Business Partner, i.e. schools and 
independent organizations,” nor the qualifiers “who was served,” “who were served,” and 
“engaged” are so vague as to render the injunction unenforceable.  
29 
 
First, the contempt court raised questions about what the term “customer, Business Partner, 
i.e. schools and independent organizations” means:  
Again, it is unclear what is included in the phrase “customer, Business Partner, or 
organization,” even with the simple definition provided. Would a student run 
fundraiser be included if Snap did business with a coach at that same school . . . If 
Snap worked with one organization at a school, are all organizations considered off 
limits even if those organizations never worked with Snap? 
 
The answers to the contempt court’s questions are all “yes.” If Snap worked with one group at the 
school, then the entire school would fall under the injunction’s scope because the school is the 
customer, not a particular student group or a coach.  
Second, the contempt court further raised issues with whether the injunction applied to 
former Snap customers that no longer had a contract with Snap or future customers: 
What about a customer, business partner, or organization that no longer had a 
contract with Snap? 
. . . 
In those paragraphs, the [qualifiers are] in past tense presenting the reader with the 
question of whether it applies to customers served prior to the lawsuit or the 
injunction? Does the past tense phrase apply to customers Snap serves in the future 
or during the pendency of the case?  
 
The injunction’s past tense use of “serve” does not limit the injunction’s application to 
customers Snap served prior to the lawsuit or the injunction; instead, it could apply to customers 
served before the injunction was issued and it also could apply to customers who are served by 
Snap during the pendency of the case. When interpreting the scope of this provision, the paragraphs 
must be read as a whole and not in isolation. Take paragraph one for example. To prove a violation 
of paragraph one in a contempt proceeding, in addition to showing that the contemnor’s violation 
was “willful,” In re Weick, 142 Idaho at 280, 127 P.3d at 183, Snap must also prove the following 
six elements: 
(1) That Vertical Raise or “anyone acting in concert or on behalf of” Vertical Raise, 
(2) solicited, 
(3) any schools and independent organizations, 
(4) who were served by a Vertical Raise sales representative formerly employed by 
Snap, 
(5) where such individual was employed by Snap for any product or service similar 
to or competitive with one offered by Vertical Raise, and 
(6) in the same geographic area in which former Snap employees performed 
services for Snap. 
 
30 
 
Nothing in these elements makes any distinction between customers Snap previously served before 
the injunction and customers Snap representatives may serve during the pendency of the case. If a 
Snap representative provided software services to a new school after the preliminary injunction 
was issued, was then hired by Vertical Raise, and attempted to sell Vertical Raise’s software to 
that same school at a later time, then the injunction would be violated. The order provides Snap 
with the means to enforce the terms of its employment agreements throughout the lawsuit. 
 
Third, the contempt court raised issues with the injunction’s use of the word “served”: 
More troubling than the tense, is divining what “serve” means . . . Is “served” the 
same as becoming a customer? Does that phrase mean that Snap actually worked 
with a client contractually? Or is one “served” if Snap merely discusses working 
with a potential client? This [c]ourt is uncertain how and in which ways Snap 
“served” its customers, business partners, and organizations.  
 
Snap and Vertical Raise are in the business of providing fundraising software services to schools.  
If a former Snap employee provided these services to Lake City High School’s debate team, then 
Lake City High School was the customer who was “served” for the purposes of the injunction.  
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the language of the preliminary injunction complies 
with the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d).  
b. The preliminary injunction is overly broad because it restrains lawful conduct. 
 
Next, we address the contempt court’s conclusion that the preliminary injunction was 
overly broad. As discussed above, “[a]n injunction is overly broad when there is a risk that it 
restrains legal conduct[.]” Union Home Mortg. Corp., 31 F.4th at 364.  
In our view, Snap’s arguments challenging the order of dismissal only marginally 
addressed the contempt court’s holding that the preliminary injunction was overly broad, if at all.  
At most, Snap argued that Rule 65(d) does not require that the trial court issue a preliminary 
injunction that only “prohibited conduct that was also prohibited by the Snap[] contracts.” We 
agree that Rule 65(d) does not prohibit overly broad injunctions: 
Overly broad or sweeping injunction may have been held not to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 65(d), however, even though the rule does not expressly deal 
with that problem. Since a question of over broadness typically is closely related to 
the content of the governing substantive law, in the sense that it really deals with 
the question of the propriety of issuing the order prohibiting a certain spectrum of 
conduct, it appears to be improper to strike down an over broad injunction solely 
on the basis of noncompliance with the specificity requirement of Rule 65(d). 
 
 
31 
 
Wright et al., supra, § 2955. Nonetheless, a trial court fails to “reach its decision by the exercise 
of reason” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018), by issuing 
an injunction that risks restraining legal conduct, and, in effect, grants greater than complete relief 
to the plaintiff.  
While ordinarily the failure to address the alternative grounds for the contempt court’s 
decision would be fatal to an appeal, we will address the merits here because VR/Landers challenge 
the breadth of the permanent injunction, which largely mirrors the preliminary injunction. See T3 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc., 164 Idaho 738, 755, 435 P.3d 518, 535 (2019) 
(quoting Andersen v. Prof’l Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005)) 
(“When a decision is ‘based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in 
error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of 
the other grounds.’ ”). 
We agree with the contempt court that provisions (1) through (4) of the preliminary 
injunction are overly broad, because they granted Snap injunctive relief beyond what it was entitled 
to under the provisions of its employment contracts and therefore restrained lawful conduct. Snap’s 
efforts to enforce the preliminary injunction illustrate this point. Of the ninety-three charges of 
contempt, twenty-one of the charges involved former Snap sales representatives who joined 
Vertical Raise after their non-compete and non-solicitation covenants had expired under Snap’s 
employment agreement. Another twenty-three of the charges concerned former Snap sales 
representatives based in California, such as Croghan, who are not subject to the non-compete 
provisions of Snap’s employment agreement under California law. As the contempt court stated:  
Croghan is accused in this contempt action of violating paragraphs (1) through (4) 
of the injunction. These paragraphs of the injunction purport to enforce Snap’s non-
compete and nonsolicitation contracts with its former employees. The problem, of 
course, is that Croghan’s conduct, alleged to be in violation of the non-compete and 
non-solicitation contracts, all occurred in California. As [the trial court] earlier 
ruled: “It is clear to this [c]ourt that Snap’s California noncompete and non-
solicitation clauses are void ab initio under California Code § 16601 and California 
Case Law.” Put simply, even though Snap’s non-compete and non-solicitation 
contracts with Croghan were void ab initio, Snap asks this [c]ourt to jail and fine 
Croghan for violating those very clauses. That these void contract clauses are now 
cloaked with a judicial order, in the form of a preliminary injunction, does not 
magically transform these void clauses into enforceable super-contracts punishable 
with criminal sanctions. That is, a judge cannot create a remedy in contempt for an 
underlying non-enforceable contract. Because Snap convinced [the district court] 
32 
 
to broadly include those clauses with no carve outs for California actors-the 
injunction is patently unfair, overreaching, and unenforceable as to Croghan. 
 
 
In short, the injunction clearly prohibited lawful conduct and the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting the overly broad injunction. For this reason, we hold that the contempt court 
did not err in dismissing the charges of contempt. Because the contempt court’s order dismissing 
the charges of contempt against VR/Landers and Croghan is affirmed on this basis, we do not 
reach the alleged contemnors’ defenses based on process immunity and lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
D. The permanent injunction is overly broad.  
VR/Landers contend that the trial court erred in granting the permanent injunction, because 
the order was vague and overly broad. Before addressing the merits of this argument, we must first 
determine whether this issue is moot.  
“Generally, appellate review of an issue will be precluded where an issue is deemed moot.” 
State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005). “An issue is moot if it presents no 
justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the 
outcome.” Edmondson v. Finco, 172 Idaho 421, 533 P.3d 1012, 1015 (2023) (quoting Frantz v. 
Osborn, 167 Idaho 176, 180, 468 P.3d 306, 310 (2020)). Here, the trial court’s permanent 
injunction contained the same provisions as the preliminary injunction, except that it applied for a 
“period of (18) months from the date of entry of Judgment in this case[.]” This duration expired 
during the pendency of this appeal, and therefore, the issue is now moot. However, one exception 
to the application of the mootness doctrine occurs “when there is the possibility of collateral legal 
consequences imposed on the person raising the issue[.]” Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 
163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008) (quoting AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 
141 Idaho 849, 851–52, 119 P.3d 624, 626–27 (2005)). We conclude that this exception is 
applicable here because the permanent injunction may form the basis for further contempt 
proceedings. 
For the reasons discussed above, we reject VR/Landers’ argument that the language of the 
permanent injunction was vague. We also determine that, like the provisions of the preliminary 
injunction, the provisions of the permanent injunction are overly broad because they granted 
greater relief to Snap than it was entitled to under the terms of its employment contracts. The 
permanent injunction is also overly broad because, by its terms, it applies not only to VR/Landers, 
33 
 
but also to “their employees, independent contractors, servants, and agents, and anyone acting in 
concert or on behalf of Vertical Raise, LLC and Paul Landers . . . for a period of eighteen (18) 
months from the date of entry of Judgment in this case.” The trial court justified the eighteen-
month duration based on the employment agreement’s non-competition, non-solicitation, and non-
acceptance of business covenants, which expired eighteen months after employment with Snap 
ended.  
However, as written, the permanent injunction appears to apply to each former employee, 
regardless of whether the employee’s eighteen-month period had expired under the terms of Snap’s 
employment agreement. By failing to carve out exceptions for former Snap sales representatives 
who are no longer subject to the restrictive covenants that are central to the permanent injunction, 
or former sales representatives in Washington and California who were not subject to the 
restrictive covenants, the permanent injunction was “more burdensome . . . than necessary to 
provide complete relief” to Snap. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 965 F.3d at 765 (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court failed to “reach its decision by the exercise of reason” 
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 194, by issuing an injunction that unduly restrains legal 
conduct. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the permanent injunction. As the 
eighteen-month duration for the permanent injunction has now expired, no injunction shall issue 
on remand. 
E. A new trial judge is not warranted on remand. 
VR/Landers request that a new trial judge be assigned on remand, listing various decisions 
made by the trial court which “call into question its ability to fairly oversee the remaining 
proceedings, whatever they may be.” VR/Landers did not, however, appeal the trial court’s denial 
of the motion to disqualify itself after the trial court’s daughter joined Snap’s counsel as an 
attorney. Instead, VR/Landers ask this court to exercise its own inherent authority to find that “a 
new judge would provide a much needed fresh perspective and would eliminate any concern of 
bias[,]” citing Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 424, 283 P.3d 728, 741 
(2012). We disagree because the remand to the trial court requires only the entry of an amended 
judgment consistent with this opinion, a ministerial task. Accordingly, we will not order the 
appointment of a new district judge. 
 
 
34 
 
F. Croghan is awarded attorney fees on appeal, but all other fee requests are denied. 
 
In the first proceeding (Supreme Court Docket Number 49418), Snap requests an award of 
attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. “Under section 12-121, we award 
attorney fees to the prevailing party, as a matter of discretion, if we find an appeal was ‘pursued, 
defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.’ ” Asher v. McMillan, 169 
Idaho 701, 711, 503 P.3d 172, 182 (2021) (citing Idaho Military Hist. Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 
Idaho 624, 632–33, 329 P.3d 1072, 1080–81 (2014)). We hold there is no prevailing party given 
the mixed results of this appeal and decline to award Snap attorney fees on appeal.  
In the second proceeding (Supreme Court Docket Number 49483), Snap, VR/Landers, and 
Croghan request attorney fees on appeal. VR/Landers seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 but did not specify a statutory basis authorizing an award of fees. This 
Court has “ ‘repeatedly held that simply requesting an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41, without citing any statutory or contractual basis for the award, is insufficient 
to raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal.’ ” Sallaz v. Rice, 161 Idaho 223, 230, 384 P.3d 987, 
994 (2016) (quoting International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 821–22, 
340 P.3d 465, 470–71 (2014)). “A party must point to a statute or contractual provision authorizing 
an award of attorney fees on appeal.” Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 127, 157 P.3d 613, 
621 (2007). Therefore, we decline to award VR/Landers attorney fees on appeal.  
Snap and Croghan seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 75(m). However, Rule 75(m) is a “rule of civil procedure applicable ‘in the district 
courts and the magistrate’s divisions of the district courts in the state of Idaho.’ ” State Dep’t of 
Health & Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 279, 311 P.3d 286, 291 (2013) (quotation omitted); see 
also I.R.C.P. 1(b). It does not provide a basis for attorney fees on appeal. See 155 Idaho at 279, 
311 P.3d at 291. Therefore, we decline to award Croghan and Snap attorney fees on appeal.  
Croghan also seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 7–610. Idaho 
Code section 7–610 provides that, in a contempt proceeding, “the court in its discretion, may award 
attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.” Because Croghan is a prevailing party, we award 
him attorney fees on appeal to be paid by Snap.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In the first proceeding (Supreme Court Docket Number 49418), we reverse the trial court’s 
order granting an additur or new trial and remand with instructions to enter an amended judgment 
35 
 
consistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court’s award of discretionary costs for Martin’s 
expert witness fees. We reverse the trial court’s decision granting Snap a permanent injunction. 
Since the permanent injunction has expired, no further injunction shall issue. No appeal costs are 
awarded to either Snap or VR/Landers because each has prevailed in part in the appeal from the 
trial court. Snap is not awarded attorney fees on appeal.  
In the second proceeding (Supreme Court Docket Number 49483), the contempt court’s 
order dismissing the charges of contempt is affirmed. The contempt court’s award of costs and 
fees to Croghan and VR/Landers is affirmed. Costs are awarded to VR/Landers and Croghan as 
the prevailing parties on this appeal. Croghan is awarded attorney fees on appeal. Snap and 
VR/Landers are not awarded attorney fees on appeal.  
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justice MOELLER, and Justice Pro Tem BASKIN CONCUR.  
 
 
STEGNER, J., concurring in the result but dissenting from the analysis in Sections C.2.a. 
and D. of the majority’s opinion. 
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must: (A) state the reasons 
why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail, and not by 
referring to the complaint or other document, the act or acts restrained or required. I.R.C.P. 
65(d)(1). The purpose and scope of this section of the rule is “to prevent the issuance ‘of an order 
so vague that an enjoined party may unwittingly and unintentionally transcend its bounds.’ ” 
Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish and Game Dep’t, 153 Idaho 630, 634–35, 289 
P.3d 32, 36–37 (2012) (quoting Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008)).1 Thus, “Rule 
65(d) is satisfied only if the enjoined party can ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely 
what acts are forbidden or required.” Id.  
In other words, “an ordinary person reading the court’s order should be able to ascertain 
from the document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed.” Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 11A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 2955 (2d ed.)). “The specificity provisions of Rule 65(d) are no mere 
technical requirements.” Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974). “The Rule was designed 
 
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is virtually identical to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See F.R.C.P. 65. 
Therefore, commentary on the federal rule and cases interpreting the federal rule are instructive here. See, e.g., 11A 
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure (3d ed.). 
36 
 
to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid 
the possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.” Id. “Since 
an injunctive order prohibits conduct under threat of judicial punishment, basic fairness requires 
that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.” Id. 
Here, the contempt court held the injunction failed to satisfy Rule 65’s specificity 
requirements because it did not clearly define: (1) the term “geographic area,” (2) the phrase 
“customer, Business Partner, or organization,” and (3) the qualifiers “who was served,” “who were 
served,” and “engaged,” in the following paragraphs:  
1. Directly or indirectly soliciting any Snap! customer or Business Partner, i.e. 
schools and independent organizations, who were served by a Vertical Raise 
sales representative formerly employed by Snap! and where such individual 
was employed by Snap! for any product or service similar to or competitive 
with one offered by Vertical Raise in the same geographic area in which former 
Snap! employees performed services for Snap!. 
 
2. Transacting business with any Snap! customer, Business Partner, or 
organization who was served by a Vertical Raise sales representative formerly 
employed, engaged, or contracted with by Snap! and that individual was 
employed by Vertical Raise in the same geographic area in which that former 
Snap! employee performed Services for Snap!. 
 
3. Soliciting or accepting business from any Snap! customer, Business Partner, or 
organization in the same geographic area in which any Vertical Raise sales 
representative formerly employed, engaged, or contracted with by Snap! 
performed services for Snap! who were served by that former Snap! employee 
while he/she was employed by Snap!.  
 
4. Paying any sales representative formerly employed by Snap! any form of 
compensation for transacting business with a current or former Snap! customer, 
Business partner, or organization who was served by that sales representative 
while he/she was employed, engaged, or contracted with by Snap! in the 
geographic area in which that sales representative performed services for Snap!.   
. . . . 
At the center of the vagueness dispute is the key phrase “geographic area.” As noted by the 
contempt court, “geographic area” is not defined anywhere in the injunction. In fact, there is no 
guidance as to the scope of any given geographic area. Even so, the majority holds the language 
of the preliminary injunction complies with the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d). The 
majority reasons that because each of the former employees’ assigned areas were known to them, 
Snap will be able to establish the geographic areas for each representative during the contempt 
proceedings, regardless of whether those areas are spelled out in the injunction.  
37 
 
However, the geographic areas assigned to each representative are much less clear than the 
majority suggests. For example, one former sales representative described his territory as “the 
Phoenix metro area, to include – at times, to include Scottsdale, at times not.” Not only are the 
boundaries of this geographic area uncertain, but also the representative’s definition of his assigned 
geographic area appears to fluctuate based on the day. This leaves a high level of uncertainty based 
on the representative’s understanding of his assigned territory.  “The Phoenix metro area” is simply 
too uncertain to comport with the specificity required. 
Another sales representative described his territory as “essentially 45, I-45 run north and 
south 15 through Houston, east of Interstate 45.” As described by the contempt court: 
Trying to apply what “essentially 45” means in a criminal contempt trial would be 
nearly impossible. Imagine all the areas that parties could legitimately dispute fall 
into the area around “I-45 and south 15 through Houston.” What if a school is within 
five miles of I-45? Is that part of [the representative’s] territory? What if it is within 
10 miles? 25 miles? 50 miles? 60 miles? Nobody knows; nobody could possibly 
know on such subjective, nebulous definitions.  
There is simply no guidance as to the scope of what is meant by “geographic area.” Can 
“geographic area” be broad enough to encompass an entire state? During discovery, Snap asserted 
that a separate sales representative’s territory consisted of the “Northeast United States.” Can 
“geographic area” include multiple unnamed states? Is it defined by a specific distance to a specific 
customer’s location? By failing to include a specific definition within the injunction, 
representatives are left to their subjective opinions on what constituted their particular “geographic 
area” at a particular time. 
Wright & Miller succinctly articulate the problem with allowing these kinds of subjective 
opinions to control an injunction:  
If the order is vague or too general, a bold individual, left to determine exactly what 
conduct has been enjoined, might end up engaging in the activity that the court is 
seeking to prevent, thereby defeating its utility. On the other hand, a less aggressive 
individual might refrain from undertaking innocent or even desirable conduct 
because of concern about the possibility of being held in contempt. 
11A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2955 (3d ed.).  
In National Labor Relations Board v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Taxicab Drivers, 
Local Union 373, the Sixth Circuit held an order requiring the local union to cease and desist from 
restraining or coercing “employees of any other employer within its jurisdictional territory” to 
commit various acts of picketing could not be enforced because it failed to meet the specificity 
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requirement contained in Rule 65(d). 419 F.2d 1282, 1283 (6th Cir. 1970). Relevant here, the Sixth 
Circuit recognized “the order does not define the jurisdiction of Local 327 and thus it provides no 
means of defining the people for whom protection is sought.” Id. I would posit that there is no 
substantive distinction between a union’s “jurisdictional territory” and a sales representative’s 
“geographic area” for the purposes of specificity. 
Rule 65(d) was designed to prevent uncertainty and “basic fairness requires that those 
enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.” Lessard, 414 U.S. at 476.  
This is a high standard to meet, but not an impossible one. For example, one sales representative 
described his territory as “60 miles in any direction from the epicenter (my address at xxxx 
xxxxxxx Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19146).” This level of specificity demonstrates that Snap could 
have provided clear boundaries in the injunction in lieu of referring to the infinitely more general 
“geographic area,” but failed to do so.  
Ultimately, leaving the injunction’s boundaries to each sales representative’s subjective 
opinion may enjoin far more activity and include areas that were not intended to be enjoined. 
“Geographic area” gives the reader (and this Court) no idea what area is contemplated by the 
injunction, despite the mandate of Rule 65 that the enjoined party be able to ascertain precisely 
what acts are forbidden or required “from the four corners of the order.” Citizens Against Range 
Expansion, 153 Idaho at 634–35, 289 P.3d at 36–37. The majority attempts to fill in some of these 
gaps, but it is not this Court’s job to salvage poor drafting when it comes to the high standards of 
an injunction. The contempt court correctly identified the problem created by the phrase 
“geographic area” contained in the injunction. As a result, the contempt court’s decision should be 
affirmed. 
The contempt court additionally found the words “customer, Business Partner, or 
organization” vague and overbroad:  
Again, it is unclear what is included in the phrase “customer, Business Partner, or 
organization,” even with the simple definition provided. Would a student run 
fundraiser be included if Snap did business with a coach at that same school? What 
about a customer, business partner, or organization that no longer had a contract 
with Snap? If Snap worked with one organization at a school, are all organizations 
considered off limits even if those organizations never worked with Snap? 
The majority answered these questions in the affirmative, concluding that if Snap worked 
with one group at the school, then the entire school would fall under the injunction’s scope because 
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the school is the customer, not a particular student group or a coach. And whether a school had an 
active contract with Snap is irrelevant – the injunction makes no exceptions.  
However, as with the uncertainty surrounding the term “geographic area,” the majority 
overlooks the specific evidence of ambiguity that was determined by the contempt court. One of 
Snap’s contempt allegations was made against a sales representative who ran a campaign for a 
wrestling coach. The coach worked as a coach and a gym teacher at a high school and ran a separate 
youth organization called “Rough Riders.” Snap ran a fundraiser for the high school’s wrestling 
team, and a former Snap sales representative ran a fundraiser campaign with Vertical Raise for 
Rough Riders—the coach’s separate and presumably independent organization. Snap argued that 
Vertical Raise violated the preliminary injunction by running a fundraiser campaign for the Rough 
Riders because Snap previously ran a fundraiser for that coach’s wrestling team. 
The ensuing questions posed by the contempt court contemplated whether any organization 
that the coach becomes associated with automatically become a Snap customer, business partner, 
or organization. How far could this uncertainty extend? What if subsequent organizations do not 
want to hire Snap to run their fundraisers? What is necessary for an entity to qualify as a customer 
of Snap? That Snap communicated with the entity? That Snap previously ran a fundraiser for the 
entity? What if, as with the coach, Snap worked with an individual running multiple entities, but 
Snap only worked for one of the entities? The majority opinion fails to adequately address these 
questions.  
Finally, the contempt court found the qualifiers of “who was served,” “who were served,” 
and “engaged,” were also too vague to comply with Rule 65’s specificity requirement. In 
particular, the contempt court struggled with whether the word “served” only applied when 
someone became a customer, or whether someone could be “served” simply by discussing a 
possible opportunity for Snap to work with them. The contempt court found the same questions 
arose with the term “engaged.” The majority dismisses these concerns by focusing on whether 
“who was served” is limited to a particular timeframe. However, this does not resolve the contempt 
court’s valid question. The question is the extent of what it means to be “served” or “engaged,” 
not when those terms are applicable.  
Ultimately, “[t]he judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is founded upon a 
decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Loc. 1291 
v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967). With the threat of contempt, an 
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injunction must be specific and explicit in its terms so that the enjoined party is properly on notice 
regarding what conduct the injunction prohibits. The injunction in this case has left too many 
questions unanswered. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Section C.2.a. of the majority’s 
opinion. I would affirm the contempt court’s determination that the injunction failed to meet the 
specificity requirements of Rule 65(d).  
I also disagree with the majority’s statement in Section D. that “[f]or the reasons discussed 
above, we reject VR/Landers argument that the language of the permanent injunction was vague.” 
As noted above, I would hold that the preliminary injunction is vague. Because the preliminary 
injunction and the permanent injunction are identical, I would likewise hold that the permanent 
injunction is vague. 
Other than my disagreement with these two portions of the majority’s opinion, with which 
I respectfully dissent, I join in the remainder of the majority’s opinion and with its ultimate result.