Title: Stockett v. Asso. Calif. Water Agencies

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 11/1/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JERRY STOCKETT et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
) 
S108220 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C035330 
ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA 
) 
WATER AGENCIES JOINT POWERS 
) 
INSURANCE AUTHORITY, 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 96AS04669 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
___________________________________ ) 
JERRY STOCKETT et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C035469 
ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA 
) 
WATER AGENCIES JOINT POWERS 
) 
INSURANCE AUTHORITY, 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 96AS04669 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The question presented is whether a dismissed government employee is 
precluded under the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) from asserting, in 
a complaint for wrongful termination, theories of illegal motivation that were not 
specified in the required notice of claim.  We conclude the claimant is not barred 
from asserting additional wrongful dismissal theories in his complaint where, as 
 
2 
here, the notice of claim informs the public entity of the employment termination 
cause of action giving rise to the claim and provides sufficient detail for 
investigation by the public entity.  We therefore reverse the Court of Appeal. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Insurance 
Authority (JPIA) is a public agency that provides insurance and risk management 
services to nearly 300 public water agencies in California.  Plaintiff Jerry Stockett 
was the general manager of JPIA from 1983 until his termination on August 25, 
1995.  Under the terms of his 1992 employment contract, he was an at-will 
employee.  Stockett was terminated by JPIA’s Executive Committee (the 
committee) after it discussed his job performance in a closed session meeting.  
Stockett asked Warren Buckner, president of the committee, why he had been 
terminated, but Buckner said the committee was unwilling to disclose its reasons.   
Stockett presented a notice of tort claim to JPIA, alleging he had been 
wrongfully terminated.  The claim stated that Stockett was terminated for 
supporting a female employee’s sexual harassment complaints against William G. 
Malone, JPIA’s insurance broker, which harassment was in violation of the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act and the public policy of the State of California; that 
Stockett became aware that members of the committee and Malone had purchased 
insurance without determining that the insurer provided the lowest price or value 
to its members, and refused to select a provider through a competitive bidding 
process; and that Malone and some members of the committee, learning that 
Stockett was considering soliciting other bids, conspired to induce the committee 
to terminate Stockett by meeting secretly and making false charges against him. 
Stockett’s notice of claim stated he was wrongfully terminated on 
August 25, 1995, after the committee held a closed session meeting.  It asserted 
that Buckner (the committee president), Wes Bannister (the vice-president), 
 
3 
Malone (JPIA’s insurance broker and consultant), Daniel Klaff (the assistant 
general manager) and other unknown parties caused his injury, and identified 
Malone as the instigator of the action through his close ties with Buckner, 
Bannister and Klaff.   
After JPIA denied Stockett’s claim, Stockett and his wife, Judith Stockett, 
(collectively Stockett) filed this lawsuit against JPIA.  Stockett later moved to 
amend his complaint to allege he had been terminated in violation of public policy 
on three grounds:  (1) opposing sexual harassment by Malone in the workplace; 
(2) objecting to a conflict of interest involving Malone’s dual role as both JPIA’s 
insurance consultant and a vendor of insurance products to JPIA; and 
(3) exercising his First Amendment right of free speech by objecting to JPIA’s 
practice of not having its insurance purchased on the open market through an open 
bid process, which was in the best interests of JPIA’s member agencies.  JPIA 
unsuccessfully opposed Stockett’s motion to amend the complaint, claiming the 
facts in the amended complaint had not been set forth in the government tort 
claim.  At trial, Stockett also argued he had been terminated for exercising his free 
speech rights when he made statements to Smart’s California Workers’ 
Compensation Bulletin (Smart’s), an insurance industry newsletter, to the effect 
that JPIA’s workers’ compensation insurer was selling insurance below cost.   
JPIA again raised the issue of variance between Stockett’s claim and his 
theories of liability in a motion for nonsuit, which the trial court denied.  
Ultimately, the court instructed the jury on three public policies that JPIA was 
alleged to have violated.  The jury was told:  (1) an employer shall not terminate 
an employee in retaliation for disclosing a practice that violates the conflict of 
interest provisions of the Political Reform Act; a conflict of interests exists when a 
public official makes, participates in making, or attempts to influence a 
governmental decision in which he knows he has a financial interest; (2) an 
 
4 
employer shall not terminate an employee in retaliation for opposing sexual 
harassment as prohibited by the Fair Employment and Housing Act; and (3) an 
employer shall not terminate an employee in retaliation for the exercise of the 
employee’s free speech rights protected by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution; the First Amendment protects the right to speak out on matters 
of public concern.  
The jury returned a verdict in Stockett’s favor, awarding him about $4.5 
million in damages.  On JPIA’s appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the resulting 
judgment, holding that “[b]y allowing the conflict of interest and free speech 
theories to be presented to the jury, the trial court allowed the Stocketts to present 
a very different case than one based solely on retaliation for objection to sexual 
harassment.”   
DISCUSSION 
Government Code section 945.41 provides that “no suit for money or 
damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a 
claim is required to be presented in accordance with . . . Section 910 . . . until a 
written claim therefore has been presented to the public entity and has been acted 
upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .”  
Section 910, in turn, requires that the claim state the “date, place, and other 
circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim 
asserted” and provide “[a] general description of the . . . injury, damage or loss 
incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.”2   
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Government Code. 
2  
Section 910 provides in full:  “A claim shall be presented by the claimant or 
by a person acting on his or her behalf and shall show all the following: 
 
“(a) The name and post office address of the claimant.   
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
5 
The purpose of these statutes is “to provide the public entity sufficient 
information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if 
appropriate, without the expense of litigation.”  (City of San Jose v. Superior 
Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455.)  Consequently, a claim need not contain the 
detail and specificity required of a pleading, but need only “fairly describe what 
[the] entity is alleged to have done.”  (Shoemaker v. Myers (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 
1407, 1426; Turner v. State of California (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 883, 888.)  As 
the purpose of the claim is to give the government entity notice sufficient for it to 
investigate and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate meritorious actions (Blair v. 
Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 221, 225), the claims statute “should not be 
applied to snare the unwary where its purpose has been satisfied” (Elias v. San 
Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 70, 74).  
The parties disagree as to whether Stockett’s tort claim provided JPIA with 
sufficient notice of two wrongful termination theories Stockett asserted at trial:  
that he was fired for opposing Malone’s conflict of interest, and that he was fired 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim 
desires notice to be sent.   
 
“(c) The date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence or 
transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. 
 
“(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage 
or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. 
 
“(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the 
injury, damage or loss, if known. 
 
“(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) 
as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any 
prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the 
presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount 
claimed.  If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar 
amount shall be included in the claim.  However, it shall indicate whether the 
claim would be a limited civil case.” 
 
6 
for exercising the right to free speech in his statements to Smart’s.  JPIA argues 
that Stockett’s claim was insufficient under section 910, subdivision (c) to support 
the new theories.  Stockett contends he is not precluded from raising additional 
reasons at trial for his termination because he was not required, in order to comply 
with section 910, to claim more than that JPIA’s agents wrongfully terminated 
him, while giving the basic circumstances of that occurrence.  We agree with 
Stockett that his claim was sufficient under the Tort Claims Act to give JPIA 
notice of all theories of wrongful termination. 
As noted above, section 945.4 requires each cause of action to be presented 
by a claim complying with section 910, while section 910, subdivision (c) requires 
the claimant to state the “date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence or 
transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.”  If the claim is rejected and the 
plaintiff ultimately files a complaint against the public entity, the facts underlying 
each cause of action in the complaint must have been fairly reflected in a timely 
claim.  (Nelson v. State of California (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 72, 79.)  “[E]ven if 
the claim were timely, the complaint is vulnerable to a demurrer if it alleges a 
factual basis for recovery which is not fairly reflected in the written claim.”  (Ibid.)   
The claim, however, need not specify each particular act or omission later 
proven to have caused the injury.  (Blair v. Superior Court, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 225.)  A complaint’s fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond that given 
in the claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not based on an “entirely 
different set of facts.”  (Stevenson v. San Francisco Housing Authority (1994) 24 
Cal.App.4th 269, 278.)  Only where there has been a “complete shift of 
allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil liability on acts or 
omissions committed at different times or by different persons than those 
described in the claim,” have courts generally found the complaint barred.  (Blair 
v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 226.)  Where the complaint merely elaborates or 
 
7 
adds further detail to a claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or 
failures to act by the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly 
reflects the facts pled in the complaint.  (White v. Superior Court (1990) 225 
Cal.App.3d 1505, 1510-1511.)  
Stockett’s claim complied with sections 910 and 945.4.  He stated the date 
and place of his termination, named those JPIA officers and agents he believed 
responsible, and generally stated the “circumstances” (§ 910, subd. (c)) of his 
termination.  In addition, he stated the termination had been wrongful because it 
was effected in violation of California public policy.  He thus notified JPIA of his 
wrongful termination cause of action in compliance with section 954.4’s command 
that each “cause of action” be presented by notice of claim.  While Stockett’s 
claim did not specifically assert his termination violated the public policies 
favoring free speech and opposition to public employee conflicts of interest, these 
theories do not represent additional causes of action and hence need not be 
separately presented under section 945.4.3   
Unlike Fall River v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431, which 
JPIA cites as illustrating a fatal variance between a plaintiff’s claim and 
complaint, the additional theories pled in Stockett’s amended complaint did not 
shift liability to other parties or premise liability on acts committed at different 
times or places.  In Fall River, the plaintiff was injured at school when a steel door 
struck his head.  His notice of claim stated the injury was caused by the school’s 
                                             
 
3 
JPIA acknowledged at trial, and does not argue otherwise in its briefs, that 
under the primary right analysis used in California law (see 4 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, §§ 24-26, pp. 85-88) Stockett’s claim of 
dismissal in violation of public policy constitutes only a single cause of action 
even though his dismissal allegedly violated several public policies. 
 
8 
negligent maintenance of the door, but his complaint additionally alleged the 
school had negligently failed to supervise students engaged in horseplay.  (Id. at 
pp. 433-434.)  The court held the factual divergence between claim and complaint 
was too great; the complaint alleged liability “on an entirely different factual basis 
than what was set forth in the tort claim.”  (Id. at 435.)4  Stockett’s complaint, in 
contrast, alleged liability on the same wrongful act, his termination, as was stated 
in his notice of claim. 
Nor were the fundamental facts underlying Stockett’s claim changed in his 
amended complaint.  Rather, the free speech and conflict of interest theories 
simply elaborated and added detail to his wrongful termination claim by alleging 
additional motivations and reasons for JPIA’s single action of wrongful 
termination.  This case is thus similar to previous cases holding that the claim 
fairly reflected the theories of liability set forth in the complaint.  In Blair v. 
Superior Court, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 221, for example, the plaintiff was injured 
when he lost control of his vehicle on a highway and collided with a tree.  His 
claim stated the state had negligently constructed and maintained the highway 
surface, particularly by failing to sand it to prevent icing, whereas the complaint 
alleged the state had failed to provide warning signs and a guardrail on the 
                                             
 
4  
See also, e.g., Lopez v. Southern Cal. Medical Group (1981) 115 
Cal.App.3d 673, 676-677 (claim alleging the state negligently issued a driver’s 
license to defendant despite his epileptic condition was insufficient to allow 
amended complaint alleging the state neglected to suspend or revoke license 
despite defendant’s failure to comply with accident reporting and financial 
responsibility laws); Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 
803-804 (claim alleging the Department of Motor Vehicles negligently allowed an 
uninsured motorist to take a driving test did not give adequate notice of 
complaint’s allegation that the department negligently supervised and instructed 
the driver during the driving exam). 
 
9 
highway.  (Id. at pp. 223-224.)  The appellate court stated the general claim of 
“negligent construction” could “reasonably be read to encompass defects in the 
placement of highway guard rails . . . or inadequate warning signs,” and the 
plaintiff was not obliged to specify in his notice of claim his particular theories of 
negligence.  (Id. at p. 226.)  The claim and complaint were based on the same 
foundation:  “because of its negligent construction or maintenance, the highway at 
the scene of the accident constituted a dangerous condition of public property.”  
(Ibid.)5  Stockett’s claim and complaint, similarly, are based on the same factual 
foundation, viz., that certain named JPIA agents wrongfully terminated him. 
In comparing claim and complaint, “we are mindful that ‘[s]o long as the 
policies of the claims statutes are effectuated, [the statutes] should be given a 
liberal construction to permit full adjudication on the merits.’ ”  (Smith v. County 
of Los Angeles, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 280, quoting Minsky v. City of Los 
                                             
 
5  
See also, e.g., Shoemaker v. Myers, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at page 1426 
(state health investigator’s claim that his dismissal from government employment 
was an interference with his responsibility to carry out the law fairly reflected 
complaint’s theory that his termination violated the whistle-blower statute, as “any 
interference with plaintiff’s reporting duties implicated the whistle-blower 
statute”); Mouchette v. Board of Education (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 303, 311, 
disapproved on other grounds in Caldwell v. Montoya (1994) 10 Cal.4th 972, 984, 
footnote 6 (plaintiff’s claim alleging he was permanently terminated and that his 
job functions were being performed by other employees “set forth the factual 
basis” for the complaint’s theory he was illegally denied statutory reemployment 
rights); Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 266, 273-274, 279-
280 (claim that county “cut into the hill” to create a road, removing support for 
residences, fairly reflected allegation in complaint that county removed slide 
debris that had provided hillside support); Stephenson v. San Francisco Housing 
Authority, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pages 276-278 (claim that city negligently 
maintained public housing building and failed to discover plaintiff’s injured father, 
a building resident, for seven days after an earthquake fairly reflected allegation in 
complaint that defendant had failed to inspect and/or disclose latent defects of the 
premises). 
 
10 
Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123.)  If the claim gives adequate information for 
the public entity to investigate, additional detail and elaboration in the complaint is 
permitted.  
By notifying JPIA of its act (wrongful termination) that caused his injury 
(loss of earnings, mental and physical pain and suffering) and naming those JPIA 
agents he believed responsible, Stockett’s claim provided sufficient information 
for JPIA to investigate and evaluate its merits.  Contrary to JPIA’s suggestion, a 
reasonable investigation of a wrongful termination claim would not be limited to 
the motives for termination hypothesized in the fired employee’s claim form; 
certainly it would not be so limited where, as here, the employee at the time of 
termination asked for the reasons and was refused them.  A reasonable 
investigation by JPIA would have included questioning members of the committee 
to discover their reasons for terminating Stockett and an evaluation of whether any 
of the reasons proffered by the committee, including but not limited to the theories 
in Stockett’s claim, constituted wrongful termination.  (Cf. Sandhu v. Lockheed 
Missiles and Space Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 846, 859 [where administrative 
charge claimed only racial discrimination, complaint was not defective in alleging 
national origin discrimination as well; “we are confident that the administrative 
investigation into Sandhu’s claim of disparate treatment because he was ‘Asian’ 
would likely have encompassed both race and national origin”]; Baker v. 
Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1065 
[investigation of administratively charged instances of discrimination “would lead 
to the investigation of subsequent discriminatory acts undertaken by respondents 
in retaliation for appellant’s filing an internal grievance”].) 
In summary, Stockett adequately presented to JPIA his wrongful 
termination cause of action.  His notice of claim satisfied the purposes of the 
claims statutes by providing sufficient information for the public entity to conduct 
 
11 
an investigation into the merits of the wrongful termination claim, and the 
complaint’s free speech and conflict of interest theories of termination in violation 
of public policy were fairly reflected in the claim because the complaint did not 
change the fundamental facts of the claim.  Stockett was therefore not precluded 
from amending his complaint to include these theories or from presenting them to 
the jury.  The Court of Appeal erred in holding he was. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed 
herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
12 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Stockett v. Assciation of California Water Agencies etc. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  XXX  NP opn. filed 5/30/02 – 3d Dist. 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No.  S108220 
Date Filed:  November 1, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge:  Janice M. Hayes 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Peter Abrahams, Sandra J. Smith, Nina E. Scholtz; Matheny, Sears, Linkert & Long, 
Michael Bishop and Mary E. Wood for Defendant and Appellant.    
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Eisen & Johnston, Jay-Allen Eisen, Marian M. Johnston, Frederic L. Snowden; Wilcoxen, Callahan, 
Montgomery & Deacon, Callahan & Deacon, Gary B. Callahan and Ted Deacon for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents.   
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
 
Jay-Allen Eisen 
Jay-Allen Eisen Law Corporation 
980 Ninth Street, Suite 1900 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 444-6171 
 
Peter Abrahams 
Horvitz & Levy 
15760 Ventura Blvd., 18th Floor 
Encino, CA 91436 
(818) 995-0800