Title: P. v. Hawthorne

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 4/23/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S064769 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
CARLOS ANTHONY HAWTHORNE, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA137272 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Carlos Anthony Hawthorne of the first degree 
murder of Vanessa Sells (Pen. Code, § 187),1 the attempted murder of Kristian F. 
(§§ 187, 664), the first degree robbery of both Sells and Kristian (§ 211), and first 
degree residential burglary (§ 459).  It found true special circumstance allegations 
of robbery murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and burglary murder (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(17)(G)).  After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial 
court imposed that sentence.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We 
affirm the judgment. 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
1 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  The Prosecution’s Case 
a.  The burglary, robbery, shootings, and defendant’s arrest 
On August 25, 1996, 16-year-old Kristian and her mother Vanessa Sells 
lived in a house on Sunlight Plaza in Los Angeles.  In the early evening hours, 
Kristian was in her bedroom and heard her mother scream from the vicinity of the 
front door.  When Kristian entered the hallway to check on her mother, she saw a 
man with a revolver in his hand and a bandana covering the bottom of his face.  
The masked man ordered her to lie on the floor; she complied.  Sells then entered 
the hallway followed by a different man, later identified by Kristian as defendant.  
Defendant was also armed with a revolver, but was not wearing anything over his 
face.  Defendant ordered Sells, who was crying, to lie on the floor next to her 
daughter.   
Defendant stood watch over the two women as the masked man went 
through the house.  Although Kristian tried to calm her crying mother, defendant 
threatened to shoot them if they were not quiet and cocked the gun for emphasis.  
He warned that they would be killed if they reported this incident to anyone.  By 
this time, Sells was crying “very hard” and praying aloud.  Defendant ordered 
Sells to go into her bedroom, followed her, and rummaged through her closet and 
inside some drawers.  As he was looking through everything, he yelled at Sells — 
who was still crying — to be quiet.   
Defendant returned to the hallway and yelled to the masked man to find 
something to use to tie up the women.  Defendant remarked to Kristian that she 
was a “real pretty girl” and she was “lucky he [was] not Jeffrey Dahmer or he 
would rape [her].”  The masked man produced a T-shirt, but defendant used a 
2 
telephone cord instead to tie Kristian’s hands behind her back and her hands to her 
feet.  Defendant took a silver bracelet with the inscription “Jinneh” from Kristian’s 
wrist and a silver necklace from her neck.  He then carried her to her bedroom, 
placed her on the bed, and searched through her belongings.  He ordered the 
masked man to unplug and take the radio.  They then left the bedroom, leaving 
Kristian there.   
From her bedroom, Kristian overheard defendant ask her mother about the 
location of her money.  Sells directed him to her purse on the kitchen table.  
Shortly afterwards, defendant asked if there was any more money.  Sells 
responded no and explained that she had been laid off from her job two weeks 
earlier.  When defendant inquired about a cellular phone, Sells told him it was in 
her car.  Kristian then heard her mother say she had been cooking and asked 
defendant to turn off the stove so that the house would not burn down.  Defendant 
retorted, “Do you think this is a fucking joke or something?”  He yelled to his 
masked accomplice, “She think we’re playing with her.”   
Defendant returned to Kristian’s bedroom and searched through her closet 
and dresser drawers.  After a few minutes, defendant shouted to his accomplice to 
check if anyone was outside.  The man responded that he saw some neighbors 
outside and told defendant to “hurry up.”  Defendant left Kristian’s bedroom.   
Kristian heard both men walking towards the front door and defendant say, 
“Fuck that.  They’re going to tell.”  She then heard a set of footsteps coming back 
into the house and the masked man say, “Hurry up.”  Kristian heard her mother 
scream “no,” followed by three gunshots.  Defendant appeared in Kristian’s 
bedroom with a gun.  He directed her to turn her head away from him, shot her 
once in the back of the head, and then shot her again.  Pretending she was dead, 
Kristian closed her eyes and held her breath.  Defendant went to the side of the 
3 
bed where her head was facing and said “hey” to her, but she did not respond.  He 
left the bedroom.   
After Kristian thought the two men had left, she untied herself and called 
911.  While she was speaking to the 911 operator, Jerold Smith, a family friend, 
arrived and took the phone from her.  Kristian tied a shirt around her head to 
decrease the bleeding and checked her mother.  She found her mother tied with a 
telephone cord and lying motionless on the bedroom floor.  Kristian began to cry 
and told her mother to get up.  Her mother did not respond.  When Kristian went 
outside to wait for the ambulance, she noticed that her mother’s Lexus automobile 
was missing from the driveway.   
At 7:17 p.m. the following evening, August 26, defendant made a 911 call.  
He told the operator that he had some helpful information about “some lady 
missing a Lexus” as had been reported on television and that he had found the 
keys to that car.  When asked how he found the keys, defendant claimed he saw 
two men — who appeared to be “dope smokers” — switch the license plates on a 
Lexus car.  They abandoned the unlocked car; the keys were under the driver’s 
seat.  Defendant said he drove the car to a location near his house, claiming this 
had occurred around 3:25 p.m. that day.  When the operator asked defendant if he 
would wait there for the police, he replied, “Hell no, they might kill my ass.”   
Defendant related the car was silver/bronze in color, like “what they [had] 
said on TV,” and provided some crude directions to its location.  When asked for 
better directions, defendant replied he could not stay there and said he would leave 
the keys on the roof of the car.  When the operator asked defendant to place the 
keys under a mat instead, he refused, saying, “I ain’t touching that car no more.”  
When the operator pointed out that defendant had already touched the car, 
defendant responded, “I wiped my shit off.”  When the operator suggested 
4 
defendant use his shirt sleeve to open the door handle and put the keys inside the 
car, defendant agreed.   
Defendant asked if he would be “getting something for this,” but refused to 
give his telephone number for fear the police would come to his house.  Although 
defendant provided his name, race, and age, he refused to meet with the police and 
explained he did not want to “get labeled as no informant.”  Nevertheless, he 
related he was at a pay telephone across the street from a Fedco store, described 
his clothing, and added he had “real curly hair.”   
In the meantime, police officers responded to a radio broadcast regarding 
an auto theft and found the stolen Lexus car near Sunlight Plaza.  The dispatcher 
directed the officers to the pay telephone from which defendant was calling, 
located about 10 blocks away.  The officers found defendant — who was still 
talking to the operator and holding the keys to the Lexus car — and arrested him.  
They discovered Kristian’s silver necklace and bracelet in defendant’s pocket.   
Five days after the shootings, Sells died from three gunshot wounds to the 
head and base of her skull and neck.  Kristian survived, with a bullet still lodged 
inside her head at the time of trial.   
b.  Defendant’s tape-recorded confession 
Shortly after defendant’s arrest, Detectives Ray Morales and Bill Smith 
interviewed defendant.  Initially, defendant denied any personal knowledge of, or 
involvement in, the crimes against Sells and Kristian.  He claimed that, while 
walking around, he saw the Lexus car and recognized it from a television news 
report of the robbery and shooting that occurred the night before.  He saw three 
“dope fiends” taking things from inside the car.  After they left, defendant found 
the car keys inside the unlocked car and drove the car home.  His mother warned 
5 
defendant not to drive the car because the police were looking for it.  Defendant 
asserted that Kristian’s silver necklace and bracelet belonged to his sister.   
When the detectives expressed disbelief at his story, defendant admitted he 
was involved in the crimes, but claimed that the other man — whom he called 
Charles Williams — was the mastermind.  Although defendant did not want to be 
involved in the incident, he went along because Williams was bigger, had a gun, 
and had just gotten out of prison.  At first, defendant asserted that Williams 
ordered the women on the ground, demanded money, shot the women, and stole 
their belongings.  Defendant claimed that he was not armed and did not know 
Williams was going to shoot the women, and that Williams later gave him the 
stolen jewelry.  Defendant volunteered that he turned off the stove when requested 
by Sells and suggested that the fact he was unmasked supported his 
nonculpability.   
When the detectives continued to express their disbelief, defendant began 
admitting piecemeal his direct participation in the crimes.  He maintained that 
Williams shot the women, claiming he only held the gun “for a minute,” pointed it 
at the women when they were on the floor, tied up Kristian after Williams ordered 
him to do so, and carried Kristian into her bedroom.  He admitted making a 
comment about Jeffrey Dahmer, but asserted he had to persuade Williams not to 
rape the victims.   
Eventually defendant admitted he shot the victims, but claimed that 
Williams “made” him after he threatened to “get” defendant if he did not shoot 
them.  He told the police he liked both women and did not want to shoot them.   
6 
2.  The Defense’s Case 
At defendant’s request, the trial court admitted a copy of a form defendant 
signed consenting to a search of his home.  Otherwise, he rested on the state of the 
evidence and did not present any witnesses in the guilt phase.   
B.  The Penalty Phase 
1.  The Prosecution’s Case 
In addition to relying on the circumstances of the charged offenses, the 
prosecution introduced evidence that defendant committed two prior bicycle thefts 
and presented the testimony of Kristian, as well as that of Sells’s father, regarding 
the impact of Sells’s death.   
The bicycle thefts occurred in 1991 and 1993.  Defendant was 14 years old 
at the time of the first theft and 17 years old at the time of the second.  Humberto 
Sanchez, whose bicycle was stolen in 1991, and the arresting officer testified.  
Regarding the 1993 offense, the prosecution introduced documentary evidence to 
establish that the case was certified to adult court, where defendant suffered a 
conviction for second degree robbery with a finding that he used a BB gun during 
its commission.  The parties stipulated that defendant was released from the 
former California Youth Authority (CYA) on July 9, 1996, less than two months 
before the crimes in this case.   
2.  The Defense’s Case 
The defense presented evidence relating to defendant’s history of emotional 
and behavioral problems, his religious education, and his family background.  The 
evidence included testimony of an early childhood diagnosis of attention deficit 
disorder (ADD) and the physical abuse inflicted on his mother by his stepfather. 
Defendant testified about the physical abuse inflicted on him by his 
stepfather and the violence inflicted on him outside of the home.  He was 
kidnapped and tortured when he was 12 years old, hit by a car when he was 13 
7 
years old, and shot in a drive-by shooting when he was 16 or 17 years old.  
Regarding the crimes in this case, defendant essentially repeated the same 
statements made to the police.  He admitted that he shot the two victims, but 
claimed that a man named “Lumpy” forced him to do so and to participate in the 
robbery.  Defendant, who was not armed, acted out of fear because “Lumpy” was 
armed, had just been released from prison, and was older, physically bigger, and 
stronger than he was.  He stated he did not intend or plan to rob or kill anyone.  He 
apologized for what he did, but said there was nothing he could do to change it, 
and asked for “a chance to do something good in [his] life.”   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jury Selection Issues 
1.  Peremptory Challenges  
Defendant, who is African-American, claims the prosecutor improperly 
exercised peremptory challenges against three African-American prospective 
jurors on the basis of race.  (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).)  The applicable law is well 
settled.  Under Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 “[a] prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias—that is, bias 
against ‘members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, 
ethnic, or similar grounds’—violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a 
jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, 
section 16 of the state Constitution.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1008.)  “Such a practice also violates the defendant’s right 
to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid., citing 
Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 88.) 
8 
“The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that Batson 
states the procedure and standard trial courts should use when handling motions 
challenging peremptory strikes.  ‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie 
case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose.”  [Citations.]  Second, once the defendant has made out a 
prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial 
exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.  
[Citations.]  Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must 
then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1008-1009, quoting Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168.) 
Without objection from defense counsel, the prosecutor exercised her first 
peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror D.T. and her fourth peremptory 
challenge to excuse Prospective Juror L.W.  After the prosecutor used her 11th 
peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror C.C., defense counsel made “a 
Wheeler motion” because the prosecutor had excused three prospective jurors who 
were African-American.  The trial court found that based on the circumstances 
before it, it did “not find a prima facie case.”   
Nevertheless, the trial court then asked the prosecutor if she wanted to give 
an explanation “to protect the record.”  The prosecutor explained that as to 
Prospective Juror D.T., she “felt her answers here in court conflicted with her 
answers on her jury questionnaire, which made me feel very uncomfortable about 
her responses.  That is why I kicked her.”  Regarding Prospective Juror L.W., the 
prosecutor recalled, “Her views on the death penalty were very weak.  She seemed 
very uncomfortable with that decision.  I think she said she would prefer not to sit 
on a death case.”  The prosecutor continued, “[She] said she had a problem with 
the death penalty. . . .  [M]y feeling about her was because she said she had a 
9 
problem with it and she was uncomfortable with making this kind of a decision, I 
didn’t think she would ever make this decision.”  With respect to Prospective Juror 
C.C., the prosecutor stated, “His personality is such that I didn’t think he would 
mix with the rest of the jurors, and I also had him as a weak juror on the death 
penalty.  He wants to know everything.  No one can know everything before 
making this decision.  And for that reason, I felt that he would be a weak juror on 
death.  In fact, I scored him low even before he took the box.”   
The trial court denied defendant’s Wheeler motion, stating, “Again, the 
court does not find a prima facie case,” without articulating the standard used in 
finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case.2  Nevertheless, 
defendant contends that reversal is required because the trial court presumptively 
used the wrong standard, i.e., whether defendant established a “strong likelihood” 
that a juror has been peremptorily challenged on the basis of group bias.  
(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.)  The high court later disapproved that 
standard for purposes of a defendant’s establishing a prima facie case.  (Johnson v. 
California, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166-168.)  Under Batson, the court stated, the 
prima facie burden is simply to “produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial 
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”  (Johnson v. 
California, at p. 170.) 
Here, we cannot be sure the court used the correct standard as later 
established by Johnson v. California.  Regardless of the standard used by the trial 
court, we have reviewed the record independently (applying the high court’s 
                                              
2  
Although the court asked the prosecutor for her reasons, the question 
whether a prima facie case has been made is not mooted, nor is a finding of a 
prima facie showing implied.  (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 422; 
People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 746.) 
10 
standard) to resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference 
that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.  (People v. Bonilla (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 313, 342.)  We conclude that the record does not support such an 
inference.   
In establishing a prima facie showing, a defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating that the facts and circumstances of the case raise an inference that 
the prosecutor excluded prospective jurors based on race.  (Batson, supra, 476 
U.S. at p. 96.)  In making such a showing, a defendant should make as complete a 
record of the circumstances as is feasible.  (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.) 
Here, in support of his Wheeler/Batson motion, defendant relied solely on 
the fact that, at that point, the prosecutor had used three of her 11 peremptory 
challenges to excuse African-American prospective jurors.  He never claimed that 
the prosecutor used her peremptory challenges to strike most or all African-
American prospective jurors from the jury venire (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 
280) or that there were no African-American prospective jurors remaining on the 
jury panel —consisting generally of 18 prospective jurors — when the 
Wheeler/Batson motion was made.  Thus, the record is silent as to the number of 
African-American prospective jurors, if any, that were included in the entire jury 
venire or in the jury panel when the motion was made.  Further, the record is silent 
regarding the racial composition of the jury that ultimately tried and sentenced 
defendant.  (Contrast Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 164-165, 173 
[of 43 eligible prospective jurors, only three were Black; prima facie case 
established where prosecutor used three of his 12 peremptory challenges to 
remove all Black prospective jurors and defendant was tried by all White jury].)  
Defendant’s cursory showing (see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 115 
[cursory reference to prospective jurors by name, number, occupation, and race 
insufficient]; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 136-137), along with the 
11 
relatively “small absolute size of this sample makes drawing an inference of 
discrimination from this fact alone impossible.”  (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
582, 598.)  Moreover, the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for the excusals 
confirmed the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to permit 
the court to draw an inference that discrimination had occurred.3  Because 
defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case of group 
discrimination, the trial court correctly denied his Wheeler/Batson motion.   
2.  Challenges for Cause  
Defendant contends that his right to an impartial jury under the federal and 
state Constitutions was violated because the trial court erred in excusing two 
prospective jurors for cause.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424; 
People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 13.)  “A prospective juror may be challenged 
for cause based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those 
views would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of the juror's 
duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath.”  (People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 
U.S. at p. 424.)  “On review of a trial court's ruling, if the prospective juror's 
statements are equivocal or conflicting, that court's determination of the person's 
state of mind is binding.  If there is no inconsistency, the reviewing court will 
uphold the court's ruling if substantial evidence supports it.”  (People v. Hillhouse 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488.) 
                                              
3  
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s use of 
strikes should be subjected to a comparative juror analysis.  We decline to do so in 
this “first stage” Wheeler/Batson case.  (People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 
350; cf. People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602.) 
12 
The trial court excused two prospective jurors for cause.  As will appear, 
because the excused prospective jurors indicated either that they were not prepared 
to impose the death penalty or were undecided as to their ability to do so, the trial 
court did not err in excusing them.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 
982.)  Moreover, at the least, the potential jurors' statements were equivocal and 
conflicting regarding their ability to render a death verdict.  (People v. Moon, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 14.)  Thus, we must defer to the trial court's determination 
of their states of mind. 
a.  Prospective Juror A.R. 
In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror A.R. stated that she was generally 
against the death penalty, but that her view might be impacted if her own family 
member or friend had been murdered.  She explained that she felt that way about 
the death penalty because “I don’t believe anyone has the right to choose who 
lives or dies, unless acting in self defense.”  When asked if her feelings about the 
death penalty were “very strong,” Prospective Juror A.R. responded, “yes” and 
explained, “My feelings are pretty set — but I have no way to know if an 
individual case m[a]y impact them.”   
Prospective Juror A.R. agreed with the statements “you should hear all of 
the circumstances surrounding a case” and “you should hear and review all of the 
circumstances concerning the defendant and his background before deciding 
between the penalties of life without parole and death.”  On the other hand, when 
asked, “in what cases do you believe the death penalty may be appropriate?” she 
replied, “none.”  When asked, “in what cases do you believe the death penalty 
may not be appropriate?” she answered, “all.”  Given two options in the 
appropriate case, she could see herself rejecting the death penalty and choosing 
13 
life without the possibility of parole, but could not see herself rejecting life 
imprisonment and choosing death.   
The questionnaire further asked, if defendant was found guilty of first 
degree murder and the felony-murder special circumstance allegation was found to 
be true, would she always vote for death and reject life without parole, regardless 
of the evidence at the penalty phase.  Prospective Juror A.R. circled “no.”  
However, when the same hypothetical was posed in terms of whether she would 
always vote for life without parole and reject death regardless of the evidence at 
the penalty phase, Prospective Juror A.R. circled “yes,” and wrote in, “I don’t 
know.”  Regarding the felony-murder special circumstance allegation, she 
indicated that she “strongly disagree[d]” that “anyone who commits murder during 
the course of a robbery or burglary should always get the death penalty,” but 
“agree[d] somewhat,” that “anyone who commits murder during the course of a 
robbery or burglary should never get the death penalty.”   
In response to the trial court’s questions, Prospective Juror A.R. reiterated 
that she was against the death penalty in theory, and that she could not see herself 
rejecting life imprisonment and choosing the death penalty.  She acknowledged 
there may be cases in which she might vote for the death penalty, although she 
would “still have great difficulty.”  When asked to elaborate, she replied, “I guess 
I don’t know the specifics.  I guess I would have to be presented with the 
information that would make me feel that way.”  The court responded that it could 
not present particular facts, but attempted to explore the topic further.  In response 
to more questions from the court, Prospective Juror A.R. indicated that certain 
circumstances relating to malice, remorse, and life experiences might influence her 
to choose the death penalty.  The court then asked if she could “see [her]self 
voting for death if [she] thought it was appropriate” in the following situation: she 
found defendant guilty of first degree murder, determined the truth of the special 
14 
circumstance allegation, and decided that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors.  Prospective Juror A.R. stated she could not answer that 
question, but assured the court she could give both sides a fair trial.  Defense 
counsel refused to stipulate to an excusal for cause.   
Later, during questioning by the prosecutor, Prospective Juror A.R. 
acknowledged that, although it was difficult for her to envision circumstances in 
which she would vote for death, she asserted that she could vote for the death 
penalty “if the circumstances would allow me to do that.”  She would consider the 
heinousness of the crime, the person who committed it, and whether the victim 
had been tortured.  But when the prosecutor asked, “When it comes right down to 
it, do you really feel that you could ever say death?” Prospective Juror A.R. 
answered, “I guess I don’t know.”   
In granting the prosecutor’s challenge for cause, the trial court reasoned, 
“She takes a long time in answering.  She is obviously struggling; this is difficult 
for her.  It’s clear to me this is something that would be almost impossible.  She 
might come up with some imaginary situation, but I find she would be 
substantially impaired and I do find cause.”  In response to the court’s invitation 
for further argument, defense counsel said, “submitted,” and the court reiterated, 
“I do find cause.”   
As in People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262, defendant merely 
submitted the question to the trial court.  “Hence, as a practical matter, he ‘did not 
object to the court's excusing the juror, but . . . also refused to stipulate to it.’  
(People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734.)  Although ‘this failure to object 
does not forfeit the right to raise the issue on appeal, . . . it does suggest counsel 
concurred in the assessment that the juror was excusable.’  (Id. at pp. 734-735; see 
Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 434-435 [in light of counsel's failure to question the 
prospective juror or object to her excusal for cause, ‘it seems that . . . no one in the 
15 
courtroom questioned the fact that her beliefs prevented her from sitting’].)”  
(People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262.) 
Moreover, as did the prospective juror in People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 
1, Prospective Juror A.R. gave equivocal answers and was “less than consistent in 
her answers.”  (Id. at p. 15.)  “ ‘In many cases, a prospective juror's responses to 
questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting.  Given the 
juror's probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled with the 
stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation 
should be expected.  Under such circumstances, we defer to the trial court's 
evaluation of a prospective juror's state of mind, and such evaluation is binding on 
appellate courts.’  (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1094.)”  (People v. 
Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 15-16.)   
Here, the trial court found sufficient cause for excusal based on its 
observation of Prospective Juror A.R.’s demeanor, her equivocal and conflicting 
responses, and her inability to state her views.  (People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 262 [excusals for cause proper where prospective jurors could not 
state they would be able to consider imposing the death penalty, either in any case 
or in the kind of case at issue there].)  “ ‘ “[W]e pay due deference to the trial 
court, which was in a position to actually observe and listen to the prospective 
jurors.  Voir dire sometimes fails to elicit an unmistakably clear answer from the 
juror, and there will be times when ‘the trial judge is left with the definite 
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially 
apply the law. . . . [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees 
and hears the juror.’ ”  (Quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. [at p.] 426.)’  
(People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 559.)”  (People v. Moon, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 14; see also People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 263.)  
16 
Deferring to the trial court's assessment of her state of mind, we conclude that 
Prospective Juror A.R. was properly excused. 
b.  Prospective Juror N.T. 
Prospective Juror N.T.’s responses in her questionnaire and on voir dire 
reflected that she had been a volunteer tutor and counselor at the CYA for five 
years.  She indicated that, because of her prior CYA experience, she tended to 
favor the defense in terms of sympathy or compassion and had an “uneasy feeling” 
about imposing “such a permanent punishment” as the death penalty.   
Although Prospective Juror N.T. related in her questionnaire that she 
believed she should hear all of the evidence before deciding the penalty, her 
responses on voir dire reflected otherwise.  She asserted she would be “more 
inclined to vote for life instead of death.”  When questioned by the trial court if 
she could “ever vot[e] for death,” she replied, “I don’t believe I could.”  When 
asked if there was any circumstance in which she would vote for death, she 
responded she would “lean towards dea[th]” in cases involving “serial killers.”  
When questioned by the prosecutor, Prospective Juror N.T.’s responses became 
more definitive.  Initially, she stated it “would be very difficult” for her ever to 
vote for death.  When questioned again if she could see herself ever voting for the 
death penalty, she responded, “In this case, knowing what I know, I don’t think 
so.”  She explained that, because the case did not involve “an extreme mass 
murder,” she could not return a death verdict.  As a final clarification, the 
prosecutor asked, “As far as you are concerned, the only case you could see 
yourself personally ever voting for the death penalty would be in a situation where 
there was a mass murder?”  Prospective Juror N.T. replied, “I would have to be 
shown that, yes.”  When the court asked defense counsel if he wanted to question 
Prospective Juror N.T., counsel responded no.   
17 
The record here supports the trial court's decision to excuse Prospective 
Juror N.T. for cause.  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 169 [prospective 
juror’s assertion he could never impose the death penalty in a case that did not 
involve mass murder supported excusal for cause]; see also People v. Ochoa 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 430-432 [prospective juror’s belief he could not consider 
voting for death in case at hand supported excusal for cause].)  Again, defense 
counsel’s failure to object suggests counsel concurred in the assessment that the 
juror was excusable.  (People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262.)  To the 
extent her responses could support multiple inferences, we defer to the trial court’s 
determination of her unfitness to serve.  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 
432.) 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Suppression Motion  
At trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of his videotaped 
confession to the police on the ground that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436).  
The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant had impliedly waived 
those rights.  A redacted copy of defendant’s videotaped statement was played for 
the jury.  On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
suppression motion.  We conclude that the claim lacks merit. 
Los Angeles Police Department Detectives Ray Morales and Bill Smith 
interrogated defendant around 9:24 p.m. on the day of defendant’s arrest.  At the 
beginning of the interview, Detective Morales advised defendant of his Miranda 
rights as follows: 
“[Det. Morales:]  Before we get started, I just want to go over some of your 
rights, okay?  It’s kind of important.  I want you to pay attention to this, all right? 
18 
“[Defendant:]  Mmnh-mmnh. 
“[Det. Morales:]  You have the right to remain silent. 
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law. 
You have the right to speak with an attorney and to have the attorney 
present during questioning. 
If you so desire and cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed for 
you without charge before questioning. 
Carlos, do you understand these rights I’ve explained to you? 
“[Defendant:]  Yes. 
“[Det. Morales:]  Okay. 
Now, uh, why don’t you tell me a little bit about how – what happened 
tonight with this car? 
“[Defendant:]  Uh -- 
“[Det. Morales:]  In your own words . . . . 
“[Defendant:]  Okay.”   
As reflected above, Detective Morales advised defendant of his Miranda 
rights and asked him if he understood them.  After defendant answered in the 
affirmative, Detective Morales immediately proceeded to question defendant 
without requesting an oral or written waiver.  Defendant renews his claim that his 
Miranda rights were violated because he did not expressly or impliedly waive 
those rights before the interview. 
“In reviewing defendant's claim that his Miranda rights were violated, we 
must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, as well as 
its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses where supported by substantial 
evidence.  [Citations.]  Miranda makes clear that in order for defendant's 
statements to be admissible against him, he must have knowingly and intelligently 
19 
waived his rights to remain silent, and to the presence and assistance of counsel.  
[Citation.] 
“It is further settled, however, that a suspect who desires to waive his 
Miranda rights and submit to interrogation by law enforcement authorities need 
not do so with any particular words or phrases.  A valid waiver need not be of 
predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact knowingly 
and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda decision.  [Citation.]  
We have recognized that a valid waiver of Miranda rights may be express or 
implied.  [Citations.]  A suspect's expressed willingness to answer questions after 
acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been held 
sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights.  [Citations.]  In contrast, 
an unambiguous request for counsel or refusal to talk bars further questioning.  
[Citation.] 
“Although there is a threshold presumption against finding a waiver of 
Miranda rights [citation], ultimately the question becomes whether the Miranda 
waiver was knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
636, 667-668.) 
Here, defendant testified at the suppression hearing.  He stated that the 
detective who interviewed him was not in uniform, did not have a gun, and was 
“okay” to him.  At the time defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, the 
detective was speaking in a “regular tone of voice” and did not yell at defendant.  
At that point, defendant was not scared or intimidated.   
Although the officer gave him his Miranda rights and he said he understood 
them, defendant claimed that he, in fact, did not understand he had the right to 
remain silent, to speak with an attorney, to have one present during questioning, 
and to have an attorney appointed if he could not afford one.  Nevertheless, he did 
20 
not ask the detective for clarification.  Defendant asserted that he spoke with the 
police only because they promised him, once before the interview and several 
times during the interview, that he could go home if he cooperated with them.  
Although the police drew their guns and handcuffed him when they apprehended 
him at the telephone booth, defendant claimed he did not believe he was under 
arrest.  The police never said he was under arrest or was a suspect in a 
murder/robbery, but only told him he was being detained as a witness for the theft 
of the Lexus automobile he possessed.   
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that, as a juvenile, he had 
been arrested many times before, had been represented by counsel in past juvenile 
proceedings on more than one occasion, had pleaded guilty to criminal charges 
several times while represented by counsel, and had been advised of his 
constitutional rights during those prior arrests and guilty plea proceedings.  He 
asserted that he also did not understand his rights on those occasions, yet never 
asked the police, his attorneys, or the court for an explanation.  He also 
acknowledged that during the interview, the police provided him food.   
After watching defendant’s videotaped statement and listening to 
defendant’s testimony at the suppression hearing, the trial court denied the 
suppression motion.  It determined that defendant had impliedly waived his 
Miranda rights and that the waiver was voluntary and knowing.  The court found 
not credible defendant’s testimony that (1) he did not understand his Miranda 
rights, (2) he believed he was detained and questioned only as a witness to the 
theft of the Lexus automobile, and (3) the police repeatedly assured him he could 
go home if he cooperated. 
On the first finding, the court noted that the admonitions were simple and 
straightforward and that defendant was “not unsophisticated with respect to his 
contact with the [legal] system.”  On the second finding, the court found that 
21 
defendant’s later statements during the interview reflected he clearly knew the 
significance of his presence with the car, especially since defendant later admitted 
“having been present and having done the shooting.”  The court reasoned, “I think 
he was, of course, hoping that they wouldn’t get to the other harder questions, but 
that hope does not invalidate his voluntariness in responding to the questions.”  On 
the third finding, the court noted that the videotape of the interview showed that 
the officers never assured defendant he could go home if he answered their 
questions, thereby contradicting his testimony.  The court observed from the 
videotape that the interviewing detective’s demeanor was “low key,” he never cut 
defendant off, and he gave defendant an opportunity to invoke his rights.  The 
court further observed that defendant “appeared to be quite eager to give his side.  
He goes on and on and on in the initial statement.  The officers hardly say 
anything other than a word here or there as he is proceeding through the initial 
presentation to the officers.”   
Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, we 
find that defendant’s willingness to answer questions after expressly affirming his 
understanding of his Miranda rights constituted a valid implied waiver of them.  
(People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 668-669.)  The record reflects that 
defendant was aware of the rights he was abandoning and of the consequences of 
his decision, and voluntarily waived his rights with the intention of deceiving the 
officers.  As the trial court observed, defendant had been admonished with his 
Miranda rights during his prior experiences with the criminal justice system.  As 
the trial court further observed, defendant “appeared to be quite eager to give his 
side.”  Indeed, defendant admitted that, at the time of the Miranda admonitions, he 
was not afraid of or intimidated by the police. 
Defendant’s answers were clear and responsive to the questions asked of 
him.  (People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 245.)  Initially, he attempted to 
22 
deceive the officers by claiming that he took the Lexus car after three strange men 
had abandoned it.  Even while maintaining this story, defendant readily admitted 
that he knew the car had been connected with an alleged murder/robbery, the 
account of which he saw on the news the previous night.  Because defendant knew 
the connection between the Lexus car and the crimes, he could not have 
reasonably believed the police were only interested in questioning him as a 
witness regarding an auto theft.  In any event, the Constitution does not require 
“that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate 
his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.”  (Moran v. 
Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 422.) 
At no time did defendant request the presence of counsel or attempt to 
terminate the detectives’ questioning.  The police did not resort to physical or 
psychological pressure or improper promises to elicit statements from defendant, 
and did not wear defendant down by improper interrogation tactics.  (People v. 
Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 248-250.)  Although defendant testified that he 
did not understand his Miranda rights, believed he was detained and questioned 
only as a witness to the theft of the Lexus automobile, and the police repeatedly 
assured him he could go home if he cooperated, the interview videotape and 
defendant’s suppression hearing testimony supports the court’s rejection of that 
testimony.  Thus, we must accept the court’s evaluation of defendant’s credibility.  
(People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 248.) 
Accordingly, we find that defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing and 
intelligent under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 
23 
2.  Instructional Issues 
a.  First degree felony-murder instruction  
Defendant contends that, because the information charged him only with 
murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a) (which defines second degree 
murder), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him for first degree murder and 
prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the “uncharged crime” of first degree 
felony murder.  We reject this contention.   
We have held for nearly a century that if the charging document charges the 
offense in the language of the statute defining murder (§ 187), the offense charged 
includes murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.  (People v. 
Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, 107-108 (Witt).)  Thus, defendant’s underlying premise 
that the information charged him only with second degree murder is incorrect.  
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 362; People v. Harris (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 1269, 1294-1295; People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 21.) 
Defendant further argues that, under People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 
felony murder and premeditated murder are separate crimes, and that Dillon 
implicitly overruled Witt, supra, 170 Cal. 104 (defendant may be convicted of 
felony murder even though information charged only murder with malice).  We 
have consistently rejected that same claim (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
593, 617; People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1294-1295; People v. Geier 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 591; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369) and 
continue to do so.  Thus, the trial court correctly instructed on felony murder and 
the jury, in returning a general verdict for first degree murder, did not convict 
defendant of an “uncharged” offense. 
24 
b.  Failure to instruct that jurors must agree unanimously on 
theory of first degree murder  
The trial court instructed the jury on first degree premeditated murder and 
on first degree felony murder predicated on the commission or attempted 
commission of a robbery or a residential burglary.  The court did not instruct the 
jury that it must agree unanimously on a theory of first degree murder (i.e., 
premeditated murder or felony murder) to find him guilty of that charge.  
Defendant argues that this instructional omission was prejudicial error.  We have 
repeatedly held that a unanimity instruction is not required.  (People v. Zamudio, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 362-363; People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1295; 
People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 617; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
1158, 1221; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1131; People v. Box (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 1153, 1212.)  In any event, the jury unanimously found to be true the 
felony-murder special circumstance allegations.  Therefore, the jury unanimously 
agreed with a first degree felony-murder theory.  (People v. Harris, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1296; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 395.) 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant claims that the prosecutor’s pervasive and egregious misconduct 
during the penalty phase cross-examination of the defense expert, defendant’s 
mother, and defendant deprived him of due process and a reliable sentence 
determination.  We disagree. 
The standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled.  A 
prosecutor commits misconduct under the federal Constitution when his or her 
conduct infects the trial with such ‘ “unfairness as to make the resulting conviction 
a denial of due process.” ’  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181; see 
People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 862.)  Under state law, a prosecutor who 
25 
uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct 
even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.  (People v. 
Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 969.)  In order to preserve a claim of misconduct, a 
defendant must make a timely objection and request an admonition; only if an 
admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved 
for review.  (People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1328.) 
The Attorney General argues that many of the prosecutorial misconduct 
claims have been forfeited for failure to object.  We have read the record and 
determined that, except where we have found forfeiture, defendant made sufficient 
objections.  
a.  Cross-examination of defense expert Dr. Adrienne Davis 
Defendant claims that, during cross-examination of defense expert Dr. 
Adrienne Davis, the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning her about 
the disciplinary violations reflected in defendant’s CYA and probation records. 
On direct examination, Dr. Davis testified that she was retained by the 
defense to examine defendant’s psychological history and to form an opinion 
about aspects of his history important in understanding his commission of the 
offenses in this case.  In forming her opinion, Dr. Davis reviewed defendant’s 
school records, juvenile records, and his videotaped interview with the police, and 
conducted interviews of defendant, his parents, and his sister.   
Dr. Davis noted that defendant had a history of behavioral and emotional 
problems which stemmed largely from having ADD, a neurological condition he 
was diagnosed with early in his childhood.  Because it is believed that ADD is 
caused by a chemical imbalance in the brain, ADD is often treated with 
medication.  She testified that children with ADD, such as defendant, are 
hyperactive and very disruptive, have very little control over their behavior, have 
26 
difficulty learning, and are intrusive in their interactions with other people.  They 
are particularly impulsive in stressful situations.  Dr. Davis opined that, because 
ADD is a neurologically based disease, “a lot of this [negative] behavior the child 
is exhibiting is not volitional, they are not doing it on purpose, they just don’t 
really have control.”   
Dr. Davis believed that a child with ADD is predisposed to aggressive and 
delinquent behavior, especially if he or she is not treated with medication, there is 
no family intervention, and there is aggressive behavior in the family and 
community.  Dr. Davis stated that, after defendant was diagnosed with ADD, he 
did not receive proper treatment, was not given medication, and did not undergo 
family or individual counseling.  Dr. Davis noted that defendant was medicated 
while housed at CYA, but believed that he stopped taking his medication after his 
release.   
On cross-examination, Dr. Davis confirmed she had reviewed and 
considered defendant’s CYA records.  When asked if the records reflected that 
defendant engaged in criminal conduct while he was incarcerated and receiving 
treatment for his ADD, Dr. Davis answered that they did not and explained that 
fighting with other minors was not a crime.  Defense counsel objected to questions 
about defendant’s criminal behavior in CYA on grounds of relevance and that the 
questioning was argumentative.  After argument outside the presence of the jury, 
the trial court noted that Dr. Davis relied on the CYA reports in forming her 
opinions and that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the contents of the reports 
were proper rebuttal and impeachment.   
In the presence of the jury, Dr. Davis confirmed that defendant’s records 
reflected that defendant had been disciplined for theft, possession of a weapon, 
sexual harassment, and engaging in two fights while in CYA.  One report 
indicated that, even while on medication, defendant was still a serious behavior 
27 
problem.  Through further cross-examination, the prosecutor established that, 
while medication and counseling were provided for defendant in CYA, he 
generally did not respond to treatment.   
Defendant argues that Dr. Davis’s testimony regarding the disciplinary 
violations in CYA was improper nonstatutory aggravating evidence and exceeded 
the scope of direct examination, and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence 
outweighed its probative value.  Defendant further argues that the prosecutor 
failed to give proper notice of the nonstatutory aggravating evidence.  Initially, we 
note that defendant failed to object on the ground that the testimony was improper 
nonstatutory aggravating evidence or that the prosecutor failed to give notice 
regarding the evidence.  Having made no objection, defendant has forfeited the 
claims on appeal.  (People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1328.)  In any event, 
because the underlying arguments lack merit, the claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct necessarily fails as well. 
The prosecution may only present aggravating evidence that relates to 
statutory factors enumerated in section 190.3.  (People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 
762, 772-776 (Boyd).)  However, evidence offered to rebut defense mitigating 
evidence need not relate to any specific aggravating factor listed in section 190.3.  
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 109.)  On rebuttal, a 
prosecutor may refer to prior conduct not admitted as evidence in aggravation 
under section 190.3, if it relates to evidence offered by the defendant in mitigation.  
(People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1023.)  A prosecutor does not 
violate Boyd by showing that the evidence in mitigation offered by the defendant 
fails to carry extenuating weight when evaluated in a broader factual context.  
(People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1021.)   
Here, cross-examination was not conducted to establish evidence in 
aggravation, but to impeach Dr. Davis’s opinions.  On direct examination, Dr. 
28 
Davis suggested that, because of his ADD, defendant acted impulsively and did 
not engage in volitional behavior during the commission of the crimes.  In 
rebuttal, the prosecutor properly showed that despite receiving treatment for his 
ADD in CYA, defendant committed various disciplinary violations.  This evidence 
rebutted Dr. Davis’s opinion that defendant suffered from ADD and that the 
disease contributed significantly to his criminal conduct in this case.  In turn, it 
was relevant to establish that, instead of acting impulsively and without volition 
and control, defendant intentionally committed the offenses in this case.  Thus, the 
prosecutor did not commit misconduct in attempting to reduce the weight of Dr. 
Davis’s expert opinion.  (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 
111-112; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 519; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 877, 923-924.) 
Because defendant’s assertion of Boyd error lacks merit, his related notice 
claim also fails.  (§ 190.3 [“Evidence may be introduced without such notice in 
rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in mitigation”]; People v. 
Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 109.)  Similarly, for the reasons 
stated above, we reject defendant’s contention that evidence of the disciplinary 
violations exceeded the scope of direct examination and was more prejudicial than 
probative under Evidence Code section 352.  (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a) [“[A]  
witness testifying as an expert . . . may be fully cross-examined as to . . . the 
subject to which his or her expert testimony relates, and . . . the matter upon which 
his or her opinion is based and the reasons for his or her opinion”]; People v. 
Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 619 [courts have considerable discretion to 
control the manner in which an expert is questioned and to weigh the probative 
value of information relied on by an expert against the risks].) 
Regarding the potential for undue prejudice or that the jury would consider 
the evidence of defendant’s disciplinary violations as substantive evidence in 
29 
aggravation, any such danger was dispelled by the trial court’s admonition.  
(People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 919.)  It admonished the jury that the 
reports on which Dr. Davis’s opinions were based were hearsay and not offered 
for their truth, but only admitted for the purpose of evaluating the expert 
testimony.  Moreover, the prior disciplinary violations were relatively tame given 
the calculated, methodical, and callous nature of the crimes in this case, to which 
defendant confessed.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting cross-examination as to the disciplinary violations, the prosecutor did 
not commit misconduct.4   
Defendant further contends that the prosecutor went outside the scope of 
permissible cross-examination and thereby committed misconduct when she 
questioned Dr. Davis about the factual inaccuracies in her report.  On cross-
examination, Dr. Davis acknowledged her report inaccurately stated that the 
charge was second degree robbery rather than first degree robbery, that Sells was 
shot three times in the head and back when in fact she was shot three times in the 
head, and that her assertion in the report that Kristian survived and is in good 
physical condition was made without the knowledge that she still had a bullet in 
her head.  In offering an expert opinion, the expert invites investigation into the 
extent of his knowledge, the reasons for his opinion, including facts and other 
matters upon which it is based and which he took into consideration; he may be 
                                              
4  
In arguing that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352, defendant points to a comment made by the court.  
During its ruling, the court stated, “At some point I am going to be dealing with 
352, but I’m going to overrule the objection at this point.”  This ruling was made 
before the prosecutor elicited evidence of the specific disciplinary violations 
committed by defendant in CYA.  Given the timing of the court’s ruling, the 
court’s comment reflected it was exercising its discretion at that point, but it might 
need to reweigh the evidence after it heard additional testimony.   
30 
subjected to the most rigorous cross-examination concerning his opinion and its 
sources.  (People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 374-375.)  Because the report’s 
inaccuracies tended to downplay the severity of the crimes, the prosecutor was 
entitled to question Dr. Davis about those inaccuracies in attempting to rebut her 
suggestion that defendant’s criminal conduct here was uncontrolled and not 
volitional.   
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
cross-examining Dr. Davis regarding defendant’s lack of remorse for committing 
the offenses in this case and in other cases.  Regarding this case, the prosecutor 
was entitled to develop and argue the lack of evidence of remorse.  (People v. 
Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1019; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 
855.)  Regarding the other cases, various statements in the reports indicated 
defendant minimized his criminal behavior and showed little remorse towards his 
victims.  The prosecutor could have reasonably concluded that those statements 
impeached Dr. Davis’s opinion regarding defendant’s emotional and behavioral 
stability.  In any event, because the trial court overruled defendant’s objection, the 
prosecutor’s questions, in accord with the ruling, were not misconduct. 
b.  Cross-examination of defendant’s mother  
On direct examination, defense counsel questioned Brenda Sampson, 
defendant’s mother, about defendant’s behavior and progress in school.  Sampson 
testified that, during elementary school, defendant was not “really a bad child.”  
When asked if some problems had been brought to her attention, Sampson replied, 
“A little.  Not much to really complain about.”  When asked if defendant had been 
disruptive and would cause trouble in school, she responded, “Not really.”  
Instead, she blamed his problems in school on the other children who had picked 
on him.  When asked if defendant’s problems continued in junior high school, 
31 
Sampson stated, “A little, but I think they had put him in special education.”  
Although it had been recommended that defendant undergo psychological 
counseling, Sampson could only afford two or three counseling sessions.   
When asked about the appropriate punishment for her son, Sampson 
testified that she wanted him to live.  She explained, “I don’t feel that he did it and 
I don’t feel that he has no anger or nothing in his heart like he would want to hurt 
anyone.  I never had any problem with him, you know, wanting to hurt me or none 
of my children or anyone that I know.”   
Out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor asked permission of the court 
to question Sampson about defendant’s prior violent conduct.  The prosecutor 
sought to impeach Sampson by asking if she knew about the adult robbery 
conviction and the juvenile robbery adjudication that the prosecution had 
presented in aggravation.  She also sought to use his admitted gang activity and a 
“nondetained” petition for a robbery defendant was alleged to have committed at 
age 12 — evidence which had not been presented by the prosecution in 
aggravation.  The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could not question Sampson 
about the gang activity or about the nondetained juvenile petition. 
In addition, the prosecution sought to question Sampson about her 
knowledge of defendant’s involvement in the juvenile system since the age of 11, 
having had a 90-day CYA diagnostic evaluation for petty theft.  The prosecutor 
argued that, although defendant had been in the juvenile justice system, Sampson 
“makes it sound like he had some problems at school and that was it.”  The trial 
court allowed the prosecutor to question Sampson about the 90-day diagnostic 
examination for petty theft.  It explained, “I don’t think that is that damaging, but 
it does show there are problems.”   
On cross-examination of Sampson, the prosecutor referred to her testimony 
on direct that “defendant had not been involved in any trouble to complain of” and 
32 
asked if she was aware of the 90-day CYA diagnostic evaluation.  Initially, 
Sampson stated she did not remember, but then recalled the incident after being 
reminded that defendant had been gone from home for 90 days.  The prosecutor 
then questioned Sampson about her knowledge of the two robbery convictions that 
the prosecution had presented in aggravation.   
Defendant does not contest the cross-examination regarding the robbery 
convictions.  Rather, he argues that, by questioning Sampson about the 90-day 
diagnostic examination, the prosecutor committed misconduct because the 
questioning exceeded the scope of direct examination and constituted inadmissible 
nonstatutory aggravating evidence of which he did not receive proper notice.  We 
disagree. 
A prosecutor may impeach evidence of the defendant’s good character with 
rebuttal evidence of bad character, and is not bound by the statutory aggravating 
factors or by the prosecutor’s statutory pretrial notice of aggravating evidence.  
(People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 237.)  Here, the challenged cross-
examination was not offered as evidence in aggravation, but to impeach the 
evidence presented in mitigation.  Because Sampson characterized defendant as 
not “really a bad child” and minimized any problems with defendant, the 
prosecutor was entitled to impeach that testimony by questioning her about her 
knowledge of defendant’s 90-day CYA diagnostic evaluation.  (People v. Payton 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1066; People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 238-239.)  
Moreover, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court “abdicated its duty to 
control the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence under Evidence Code 
section 352.”  In allowing questioning, the trial court commented that evidence 
about the diagnostic evaluation was not that damaging.  Also, by excluding 
evidence about defendant’s nondetained petition for robbery and his gang 
involvement, and by allowing questioning on the robberies of which the jury was 
33 
already aware, the trial court clearly engaged in the required weighing process.  
Because we find no error, the related claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
necessarily fails.   
c.  Cross-examination of defendant 
Defendant complains of several instances of prosecutorial misconduct 
committed during his cross-examination.  First, defendant argues that, in 
questioning him about the differences between his account of the 1991 bicycle 
theft and that testified to by the arresting officer, the prosecutor improperly asked 
him if the officer had lied during his testimony.  Deputy Sheriff Tom Fortier 
testified that he stopped defendant and another suspect together.  Each of them had 
a bicycle.  Humberto Sanchez, the victim, identified defendant and the other 
person as having stolen his and his friend’s bicycles.  Defendant told Deputy 
Fortier that he approached Sanchez, ordered him off his bicycle, and rode off with 
it.  But Sanchez told Fortier that defendant ordered him off the bicycle and 
punched him in the face.  After a brief fight, defendant rode off with Sanchez’s 
bicycle.   
During cross-examination, defendant admitted that he rode off with 
Sanchez’s bicycle, but denied that he hit or punched Sanchez.  He claimed that he 
was only a bystander, having taken Sanchez’s bicycle after two other people — 
whom defendant did not know — ordered Sanchez off.  He rode off with the 
bicycle while those two people fought with Sanchez.  Contrary to Deputy Fortier’s 
testimony, defendant claimed that he knew nothing about the second bicycle theft, 
that he was arrested alone, and that the other suspect was arrested at another 
location by a different officer.   
The following testimony followed: 
34 
“Q.  You heard Deputy Fortier testify here yesterday that he was directed to 
a location where there were two suspects with bicycles, and he arrested both of 
them there at that location, didn’t you? 
“A.  Yes. 
“Q.  Isn’t that how it happened? 
“A.  No, it’s not. 
“Q.  So Deputy Fortier lied? 
“A.  I’m not going to call him a liar, but I would say that that statement is 
incorrect. 
“Q.  So the bottom line is you do not take full responsibility for what 
occurred on that day in April when you took that bike? 
“[Defense counsel]:  Objection, argumentative. 
“[Defendant]:  Yes, I do. 
“The Court:  Overruled. 
“[Prosecutor]: Pardon? 
“A.  Yes, I do. 
“Q.  Well, then how do you explain the difference between what you say 
occurred and what Deputy Fortier said occurred with respect to your arrest? 
“[Defense counsel]:  Objection, speculation. 
“The Court:  Overruled.  You can answer, sir.  [¶] . . . [¶] 
“A.  It’s because I was the person who was arrested.  He [Fortier] was not.”   
Defendant claims that the prosecutor’s question as to whether Deputy 
Fortier lied invaded the province of the jury regarding credibility determinations, 
elicited improper lay opinion about the veracity of witnesses, and constituted 
misconduct by attempting to induce defendant to call a law enforcement witness a 
liar.  We disagree. 
35 
Having made no objection to that particular question and having sought no 
curative admonition, defendant has forfeited the claim on appeal.  (People v. 
Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1328.)  In any event, the claim fails on the merits. 
“Courts from various jurisdictions have treated ‘were they lying’ questions 
differently.  One line of cases concludes they are always improper, while another 
concludes they are never so.  (People v. Foster[ (2003)] 111 Cal.App.4th [379,] 
384.)  Zambrano joins a third line of cases that counsels a trial court to consider 
these questions in context.”  ([People v.] Zambrano[ (2004)] 124 Cal.App.4th 
[228,] 239.)”  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 381-382.)  In Chatman, 
we followed the Zambrano approach and held that courts should carefully 
scrutinize “were they lying questions” in context.  (Chatman, at p. 384.) 
“A defendant who is a percipient witness to the events at issue has personal 
knowledge whether other witnesses who describe those events are testifying 
truthfully and accurately.  As a result, he might also be able to provide insight on 
whether witnesses whose testimony differs from his own are intentionally lying or 
are merely mistaken.”  (People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 382.)  In asking 
whether Deputy Fortier lied, the prosecutor sought to clarify defendant’s 
testimony, giving him the opportunity to explain the divergent testimony.  
Defendant explained that his version was more accurate because he, not Fortier, 
was the person arrested.  Thus, the cross-examination was legitimate inquiry to 
clarify defendant’s position.  (Id. at p. 383.) 
Moreover, the prosecutor’s “was he lying” question did not constitute 
misconduct.  “ ‘Although it is misconduct for a prosecutor intentionally to elicit 
inadmissible testimony [citation], merely eliciting evidence is not misconduct.’ ”  
(People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 379-380.)  Nothing in the record 
suggests the prosecutor sought to present evidence she knew was inadmissible.  
(Id. at p. 380.)  The prosecutor only asked the question once and did not repeatedly 
36 
ask it to berate defendant or force him to call Deputy Fortier a liar in an attempt to 
inflame the passions of the jury.  (Contrast People v. Zambrano (2004) 124 
Cal.App.4th 228, 242.)  Indeed, defendant refused to call Detective Fortier a liar, 
saying only that his testimony was incorrect.  The prosecutor’s sole question was 
neither deceptive nor reprehensible, and did not constitute misconduct. 
Second, defendant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
asking argumentative and sarcastic questions.  He argues that the sole purpose for 
the prosecutor’s questions was “to put the facts and insinuations of the questions 
before the jury without seeking new facts.”  Again, we disagree. 
During his confession to Detective Morales, defendant sought to minimize 
his role in the crimes, claiming he was forced to participate in the robbery by a 
man he called Charles Williams who was bigger, had a gun, and had just gotten 
out of prison.  Defendant characterized Williams as the mastermind of the crimes, 
who possessed the only gun used to commit the crimes.  According to defendant, 
Williams ordered the victims to lie on the floor, ordered defendant to tie Kristian 
up and shoot the victims, and decided what property to take, including the Lexus.  
During direct examination, defendant reiterated that the other man instigated the 
robbery, asked him if he wanted to “pull a lick” (i.e., commit a robbery), and 
forced him to shoot the victims.  Defendant’s account differed substantially from 
the testimony of Kristian, who testified that defendant controlled the situation and 
did most of the talking. 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned defendant about his 
claim that the other man (whom defendant now referred to as “Lumpy”) was the 
architect of the entire operation.  As part of this questioning, the prosecutor asked 
about Lumpy’s request to defendant to commit a “lick.”  Defendant testified that 
he asked Lumpy why he was asking him, and that Lumpy replied defendant 
“looked like [he] was down.”  Defendant explained Lumpy was “stereotyping me 
37 
as a type of individual that would do something like that.”  In response, the 
prosecutor asked if Lumpy had made an accurate character assessment of him.  
After the trial court overruled defendant’s objection to the question as 
argumentative, defendant replied, “I can’t say I agree, but it was a stereotype.”  
Citing the two prior robberies and the robbery in this case, the prosecutor then 
asked, “You do commit robberies?”  Defendant responded yes, but made the 
distinction that he only took small items and not valuables, in contrast to Lumpy’s 
request. 
When questioned as to whether he tried to leave Lumpy, defendant 
admitted that he had not tried and explained that he feared Lumpy because he was 
bigger, had a gun, had just been released from prison, and had “the mentality that 
he had.”  When the prosecutor inquired, “and what mentality did he have?” 
defendant replied, “[to] go and commit a robbery.”  The prosecutor continued: 
“Q.  You have gone and committed a robbery, haven’t you? 
“A.  Yes. 
“Q.  So you have the same mentality as Lumpy, don’t you? 
“A.  No, I do not, no.”   
The trial court admitted defendant’s testimony over defense counsel’s 
objection to the question as argumentative.   
Unless precluded by statute, any evidence is admissible to attack the 
credibility of a witness if it has a tendency in reason to disprove the truthfulness of 
the witness’s testimony.  (Evid. Code, § 780; People v. Humiston (1993) 20 
Cal.App.4th 460, 479.)  Although a defendant cannot be compelled to be a witness 
against himself, if he takes the stand and denies the evidence presented against 
him, the permissible scope of cross-examination is “ ‘very wide.’ ”  (People v. 
Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 822.)  A defendant cannot, by testifying to a state of 
things inconsistent with the evidence presented by the prosecution, thereby limit 
38 
cross-examination to the precise facts concerning which he testifies.  (People v. 
Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 822.)  Rather, when a defendant testifies, the 
prosecutor “may fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and 
circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence through 
cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which 
may necessarily be drawn from them.”  (Ibid.)   
Here, the prosecutor was entitled to impeach defendant’s statements — 
inconsistent with the prosecution’s evidence — that Lumpy instigated the robbery 
and forced him to participate in it.  Thus, when defendant suggested that his 
accomplice had unfairly stereotyped him as being “down” to commit a robbery 
and that his accomplice had a “mentality” different from his own, the prosecutor 
was free to confront him with evidence showing the contrary.   
Also, contrary to defendant’s claim, the prosecutor did not commit 
misconduct in questioning defendant about the differences between his account of 
the events at issue and Kristian’s.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 
1025 [“Evidence tending to contradict a witness’s testimony is relevant for 
purposes of impeachment”].)  Similarly, there was no impropriety in questioning 
defendant about whether he knew how young Kristian was when he shot her, as 
this went to the “circumstances of the crime.”  (§ 190.3, factor (a).)   
Finally, regarding his cross-examination, defendant contends that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly suggesting he had fabricated his 
trial testimony; she asked defendant if he had a year and a half to think about what 
happened on the night in question and contrasted his purported inability to 
remember what Kristian testified to only a few days before with his ability to 
recollect details about his arrest in 1991.  Defendant argues that the prosecutor 
exacerbated the alleged misconduct by later arguing to the jury that defendant had 
39 
“proven himself to be a liar and untrustworthy,” had “proven himself to be 
untruthful at best,” had “every reason to lie,” and “was not to be trusted.”   
A prosecutor’s suggestion or insinuation that the defense has been 
fabricated is misconduct only when there is no evidence to support such a claim.  
(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 862-863; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 865, 948.)  Here, the prosecutor’s questions during cross-examination and 
comments during argument were based on the inconsistencies between 
defendant’s and Kristian’s testimony and the reasonable inferences drawn from 
that evidence.  No misconduct occurred.   
2.  Admission of 911 Tape as Victim Impact Evidence  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Kristian’s 911 
tape as victim impact evidence during the penalty phase.  After defendant shot 
Kristian and her mother in the head and left the residence, Kristian called 911 for 
help.  Initially, afraid that defendant might still be present, Kristian whispered that 
two Black males had shot her and her mother in the back of the head.  Kristian 
described the assailants and their clothing, and gave her address.  While talking to 
the dispatcher, her mother’s friend Jerold Smith arrived at the house and took the 
telephone from Kristian.  Kristian told Smith that someone had shot her and her 
mother.  As Smith spoke with the 911 dispatcher, Kristian went into her mother’s 
bedroom and began screaming when she discovered her injured mother.  Kristian’s 
screaming is heard in the background of the tape.  Smith urged the dispatcher to 
send paramedics quickly because Kristian was becoming a “hysterical teenager.”   
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted the 911 tape as relevant 
victim impact evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor 
(a)) and further determined that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial 
40 
effect (Evid. Code, § 352).  The prosecution played the 911 tape for the jury 
during Kristian’s testimony.   
On defendant’s request, the trial court then admonished the jury as follows, 
“To the extent that your reaction may be emotional to the 911 tape, you are 
permitted and it’s admissible for your consideration as part of the circumstances of 
the crime, but I do want to caution you with respect to if you have [an] emotional 
reaction, that your emotion doesn’t wipe out your evaluation of all the evidence.  
You are to weigh all the factors, including the circumstances of the crime, but 
emotion doesn’t control.  You are judges.  Your reactions are as human beings.  
That is why we have human beings sitting on juries instead of computers.  But it’s 
not presented in order to have emotion control and weigh out all the other factors 
presented to you.”  The prosecution replayed the 911 tape at the end of its rebuttal 
argument.   
Defendant claims that admission of the 911 tape was error because (1) it 
was nonstatutory aggravating evidence, (2) its prejudicial effect outweighed its 
probative value (Evid. Code, § 352), and (3) it was so inflammatory that it 
rendered his trial unreliable and unfair under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  We conclude that the trial court properly admitted the 911 tape as 
victim impact evidence. 
“ ‘In a capital trial, evidence showing the direct impact of the defendant's 
acts on the victims' friends and family is not barred by the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment[ ] to the federal Constitution. [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  ‘The federal 
Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is “so unduly prejudicial” as to 
render the trial “fundamentally unfair.”  [Citation.]  State law is consistent with 
these principles.  Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the 
devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant 
and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).’  
41 
[Citations.]”  (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 364.)  Victim impact 
evidence is admissible under California law provided it “is not so inflammatory as 
to elicit from the jury an irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of 
the case.”  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180; see also People v. 
Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 793.) 
In People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1063, the defendant shot and 
killed a jewelry store owner during a robbery and shot an employee, who survived.  
At the penalty phase of the capital trial, the surviving employee described the 
psychological and emotional trauma she suffered as a direct result of the 
defendant’s homicidal conduct, as related to the nature and circumstances of the 
capital offense.  We held that the impact of the offense on the surviving victim 
constituted a circumstance of the crime and was relevant under factor (a) of 
section 190.3.   
Here, the 911 tape clearly showed the immediate impact and harm caused 
by defendant’s criminal conduct on the surviving victim and was relevant because 
it “ ‘could provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to . . . impose the ultimate 
sanction.’ ”  (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836.)  The 911 tape here 
was relevant under factor (a) of section 190.3.  (People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 
Cal.4th at p. 1063; see People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 515-517 
[husband’s 911 tape after discovery of wife’s body admissible as relevant to guilt 
phase issues].)   
Defendant argues that, because the 911 tape was cumulative of Kristian’s 
testimony at the guilt and penalty phases, the sole purpose of the 911 tape was to 
inflame the jury.  However, the trial court found otherwise.  In weighing the 
probative value and the prejudicial effect, the court agreed with defense counsel 
that Kristian’s “hysteria is clear on the tape.”  On the other hand, the court 
determined that the tape showed the impact of the crimes on Kristian that was not 
42 
evident from the other evidence at trial.  The court noted that on the tape Kristian 
sounded “extremely calm in the beginning,” but “allow[ed] herself to let go” and 
became hysterical only after someone “safe” had entered the house.   
The trial court reasoned, “It’s not like the defendant is there and she has to 
keep that lock on her emotions.  I think it is relevant to the circumstances of the 
crime to the extent that the trial itself reflected that she was the one that kept trying 
to calm her mother down.  I think it is consistent with the attempt on her part to 
remain calm in spite of what was happening.  The trial itself I think was very 
sanitized and clinical.  Her recitation was extremely clinical.  And I think for the 
benefit of [defendant] she did not display any emotion whatsoever.  And I think to 
the extent that the People have a right to show the real horror and the impact on 
her, they theoretically could have had that presented at the trial itself, and I think 
they restrained themselves by not.  It does show the hysteria.  I think the tape does 
indicate the impact on the victim which is not reflected in the trial itself.”   
The record supports the trial court’s finding that the 911 tape was not 
cumulative of other evidence.  Although Kristian testified about defendant’s and 
his accomplice’s commission of the crimes during the guilt phase, and about the 
longer-term impact of those crimes on her during the penalty phase, only the tape 
conveyed the more immediate impact of the crimes on her.  Although the 911 tape 
“would naturally have tended to arouse emotion and evoke strong feelings of 
sympathy for [Kristian’s] condition, it was not so inflammatory as to have diverted 
the jury’s attention from its proper role or invited an irrational response.”  (People 
v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1063; see also People v. Jurado (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 72, 133-134 [relevant though emotional victim impact testimony did not 
surpass constitutional limits].)  Indeed, the trial court admonished the jurors not to 
let any emotional response subvert their reasoned evaluation of the evidence.  
Nothing suggests the jury did not follow the court’s instruction.  Moreover, the 
43 
jury did not ask to hear the 911 tape during deliberations, reflecting it did not place 
undue emphasis on it.   
Given the relevance of the 911 tape, the trial court did not abuse its broad 
discretion in concluding the 911 tape was more probative than prejudicial.  
(People v. Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 515-517 [admission of 911 tape 
showing husband’s distress in finding dead wife’s body not an abuse of discretion 
under Evid. Code § 352].)  Having concluded there was no error and no prejudice, 
we also reject the claims that admission of the 911 tape deprived defendant of his 
federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable and 
nonarbitrary penalty determination.  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 
445.) 
3. Challenges to the Death Penalty Law and Penalty Phase Instructions  
Defendant challenges California’s death penalty law and the standard 
penalty phase instructions for reasons previously rejected by this court in other 
cases.  He raises no basis for reconsideration of these rulings.   
Specifically, the death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-
eligible defendants.  (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 868.)  “ ‘The jury 
need not make written findings, or achieve unanimity as to specific aggravating 
circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance is proved (except for other crimes), that aggravating circumstances 
outweigh mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty.  
[Citations.]  The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide 
the jury with instructions of the burden of proof and standard of proof for finding 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination.’ ”  
(People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 800.)  Recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions do not undermine these conclusions.  (Ibid.; People v. Morgan, 
44 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 626-627; People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 1068.)  “Nor do our jury instructions require jury unanimity on mitigating 
factors or mislead a jury into believing that such unanimity is required.”  (People 
v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 860.)  The use of such words in the sentencing 
factors statute as “extreme” (§ 190.3, factors (d) & (g)), “reasonably believed” 
(§ 190.3, factor (f)), and “impaired” (§ 190.3, factor (h)) is constitutional.  (People 
v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 801; People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 860.)  
Section 190.3, factor (a) is not unconstitutionally overbroad, arbitrary, capricious, 
or vague.  (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 800; People v. Jenkins (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 900, 1050-1053.)  The  “so substantial” standard for comparing 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in CALJIC No. 8.88 is not 
unconstitutionally vague.  (People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 625.)  
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not constitutionally defective for not instructing the jury to 
return a verdict of life imprisonment if aggravating factors do not outweigh 
mitigating ones.  (People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 625.)  Intercase 
proportionality review is not constitutionally required.  (People v. Combs, supra, 
34 Cal.4th at p. 868; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 596.)  Equal 
protection principles do not require this court to give capital defendants the same 
sentence review afforded other felons under the determinate sentencing law.  
(People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 801.)  Finally, we reject defendant’s claim 
that a death sentence violates provisions of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, a treaty which the United States ratified in 1992, and violates 
international norms of human decency reflected in the laws and practices of most 
civilized nations.  (People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 627-628.)  “[A] 
sentence of death that complies with state and federal constitutional and statutory 
requirements does not violate international law.”  (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 801.) 
45 
46 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Hawthorne 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S064769 
Date Filed: April 23, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Jacqueline A. Connor 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
Arcelia Hurtado and Katherine Froyen, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey and 
Russell A. Lehman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Arcelia Hurtado 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, Tenth Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Russell A. Lehman 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2280