Title: Lake Bluff Housing Partners v. City of South Milwaukee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-1155 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Lake Bluff Housing Partners, 
a Wisconsin limited partnership, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of South Milwaukee 
and Michael Vesperman, in his 
capacity as City Building  
Inspector, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
NOV 20, 1995 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed. 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, John E. McCormick, Judge, 
granting a writ of mandamus ordering the City of South Milwaukee 
(the City) to issue a building permit to Lake Bluff Housing 
Partners (Lake Bluff).  This case presents the following issue: 
may a court, through the exercise of discretion, resort to 
"equitable principles" to supply a "right" to the issuance of a 
building permit where the building plans submitted did not comply 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
2 
with the applicable zoning and building code requirements, and 
thereby find a positive and plain duty on the part of the 
municipality to issue a building permit for a construction that 
would be in violation of the ordinance.  We conclude that the 
circuit court in this case erred in granting a writ of mandamus in 
the absence of a clear legal right on the part of Lake Bluff and a 
positive and plain duty on the part of the City, and therefore 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
The facts in this case are largely undisputed.  Lake Bluff, a 
Wisconsin 
limited 
partnership, 
is 
a 
developer 
of 
rental 
properties.  In December 1992, Lake Bluff purchased a parcel of 
land for $294,000 along the shoreline of Lake Michigan in South 
Milwaukee, intending to construct a multi-family development that 
would qualify for low income housing tax credits administered by 
the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA). 
 The zoning on the parcel was "C-2," a classification allowing the 
construction of multi-family residential units.  Although the 
parcel had been zoned C-2 since 1965, there were no multi-family 
units on the land in 1992.  Lake Bluff verified through the land's 
previous owners that the land was zoned C-2, and that such zoning 
would allow for a multi-family development, before purchasing the 
land.   
 
Lake Bluff had applied for a tax credit through WHEDA in 
October, 1992.  WHEDA awarded Lake Bluff a $266,903 site-specific 
tax credit in December, 1992.  Later that same month, Lake Bluff 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
3 
paid WHEDA a non-refundable fee of $16,314 to reserve the credit. 
 Lake Bluff then had the property surveyed at a cost of $1,150, 
and contracted with an architect to prepare project plans at a 
cost of $29,513.  In order to preserve the WHEDA tax credit, Lake 
Bluff's project had to be built and certificates of occupancy had 
to issue by December 31, 1994.  The trial court found that Lake 
Bluff would have had to begin construction "immediately" after the 
issuance of the trial court's May 1994 order granting mandamus in 
order to complete the project in time. 
 
In February 1993, representatives of Lake Bluff met with the 
mayor, city administrator, building inspector, city engineer, and 
district alderperson of South Milwaukee to review initial plans 
for its project.  At this meeting, Lake Bluff proposed building 
seven apartment buildings on the land, each with space for eight 
family units.1  The City confirmed that the property was in a C-2 
zone that permitted a multi-family project.  However, the City 
advised Lake Bluff that all construction along the lake bluff 
required a bluff assessment establishing that the project would 
not cause bluff erosion.  The City also advised Lake Bluff that 
South Milwaukee's parking requirements had changed and that Lake 
                     
    1  Lake Bluff ultimately proposed three separate plans for 
development of its property.  As noted below, by August 1993, Lake 
Bluff had changed its proposed construction to a plan for two 
buildings, totalling 56 units, and in September 1993, Lake Bluff 
proposed constructing a single three-story building with 68 units. 
 The August plans were later resubmitted in March of 1994, along 
with Lake Bluff's complaint for a writ of mandamus.   
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
4 
Bluff would have to modify its plans to meet the new requirements. 
 Lake 
Bluff 
subsequently 
modified 
its 
parking 
plans 
and 
commissioned a bluff erosion study costing $4,950. 
 
In a letter to a City of South Milwaukee alderperson dated 
April 28, 1993, William J. Fox, III, a neighboring landowner, 
requested that Lake Bluff's land be rezoned from C-2 to R-A.  This 
zoning change would allow for single-family housing, but not for 
Lake Bluff's proposed multi-family units.  On May 6, the City 
referred Fox's request to its Plan Commission; on May 24, the Plan 
Commission referred the matter to the South Milwaukee City 
Attorney for review and comment.  The Plan Commission also 
recommended that no building permits issue while the rezoning 
request was under consideration.  The trial court found that Lake 
Bluff did not learn that the City was considering a moratorium on 
the issuance of any building permits for the property or a 
rezoning until June 22, 1993, and that Lake Bluff did not have an 
opportunity to participate in the May meetings of the Plan 
Commission or the Common Council. 
 
On July 6, 1993, the South Milwaukee Common Council adopted 
resolution number 93-30, pertaining only to the Lake Bluff 
property, imposing a moratorium on the issuance of any building 
permits while the Council considered the rezoning request.2  The 
                     
    2  At oral argument before both this Court and the court of 
appeals, counsel for defendant stated that this moratorium was of 
questionable legality, although it was counsel's opinion that the 
moratorium would have been legal if enacted by ordinance.  Because 
the moratorium was never challenged, and is not challenged here, 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
5 
Plan Commission then considered the rezoning request at its 
meeting of July 12, 1993.  
 
On August 5, 1993, the Wisconsin Department of Industry, 
Labor and Human Relations issued its conditional approval of Lake 
Bluff's plans.  This approval enabled Lake Bluff to seek a 
"footing and foundation" building permit from the City and 
subsequently begin construction.  Lake Bluff submitted an 
application for the permit on that same day.  Lake Bluff now 
proposed construction of two buildings: one a three-story building 
containing 40 units, and the other a two-story building containing 
16 units.  The City's building inspector denied the permit that 
same day.  The building inspector wrote "per resolution number 93-
30 [the moratorium], permit is denied" on Lake Bluff's permit 
application and returned it to Lake Bluff's representative. 
 
Two days later, in an apparent effort to determine whether 
the denial was based solely on the moratorium or on some defect in 
its 
plans, 
Lake 
Bluff 
wrote 
to 
Michael 
Vesperman, 
South 
Milwaukee's building inspector:  
Pursuant to our application for a "Footing/Foundation" permit 
on 
Thursday, 
August 
5, 
1993, 
. . . 
it 
is 
the 
understanding 
of 
this 
office 
that 
the 
following 
additional information will be required:  
a. the City Engineer . . . will review the drawings 
deposited 
with 
your 
office 
to 
"verify 
site/building grades" for conformance,  
b. your office will review the drawings deposited with 
your office for "conformance to required set 
backs,"  
                                                                  
we will accept it as valid for the purposes of this review.  
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
6 
c. two (2) additional sets of drawings are required for 
application, 
one 
(1) 
additional 
"State 
Approved" copy, plus one (1) not necessarily 
stamped set,  
d. evidence of "DILHR Letter of Approval" dated August 
5, 1993 for each building, copies of which 
have been sent directly to your office by 
DILHR via the U.S. Mail, and  
e. Footing/Foundation permit for the above captioned 
project 
"has 
been 
denied" 
per 
[the 
moratorium] 
dated 
July 
6, 
1993. 
 
Any 
questions concerning this matter should be 
referred 
to 
the 
City 
Attorneys 
office, 
attention Mr. Joseph Murphy.   
 
Should you be in disagreement with any of the contents of 
this letter, please notify this writer via facsimile 
. . . with a hard copy via U.S. mail, prior to the close 
of business on Monday, August 9, 1993.  
 
The City did not formally respond to this letter.3  On August 20, 
Lake Bluff again wrote to the City requesting a specific response 
to its concerns.  On August 24, the City Attorney replied to the 
August 20 letter, writing, in part: 
Please be advised that Mr. Vesperman has not yet reviewed the 
plans presented for the structural aspects of the 
property, has not verified the setbacks and zoning 
compliance and erosion control measures contemplated and 
the City Engineer has not had the opportunity to check 
the grading and zoning compliance.  Furthermore, the 
Building Board of Review has not yet reviewed the plans.  
                     
    3  Although it is undisputed that the City never provided a 
written reply to Lake Bluff's letter, there is some dispute as to 
whether the City responded to Lake Bluff's inquiries by other 
means.  The trial court found that the City "did not notify Lake 
Bluff of any deficiencies in its plans, specifications and 
application" and that the City only identified the deficiencies 
after the commencement of Lake Bluff's lawsuit on March 10, 1994. 
 However, the record also shows that the City's engineer, Michael 
Lemens, recalled that he contacted Ron Klaas, a representative of 
Lake Bluff, during September or October 1993, and that Lemens 
informed Klaas that problems existed with Lake Bluff's proposed 
plans, including a problem with the setback requirement.  
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
7 
 
Also, please be advised that inasmuch as the moratorium will 
not allow construction of this project until after 
November 4, 1993, neither the City Building Inspector 
nor the City Engineer intends to drop everything else 
that they are currently engaged in to process this 
application for a building permit.  Your application for 
a permit will simply have to wait its turn for their 
attention like everything else that is coming across 
their desk.  If there is some reason that their review 
ought to be advanced and expedited, please advise me. 
 
Lake Bluff did not reply to the City Attorney's request to be 
advised "if there is some reason that . . . review ought to be 
advanced and expedited."  Instead, the partnership attempted to 
resolve its difficulties through the political process.  A Lake 
Bluff general partner wrote letters to the Mayor of South 
Milwaukee on September 24 and October 7, 1993, requesting the 
cooperation of the City in consideration of the development plans, 
and in the scheduling of a Plan Commission meeting at which to 
discuss alternative solutions4 to the dispute. 
 
On October 7, the Common Council of the City of South 
Milwaukee held a public hearing on the rezoning request.  On 
November 2, 1993, the City enacted an ordinance rezoning the Lake 
Bluff property from C-2 to R-A.5  On March 10, 1994, Lake Bluff 
                     
    4  As part of its attempt at political persuasion in 
September, Lake Bluff proposed still another plan, for a single 
three-story building with 68 units.  Lake Bluff never applied for 
a building permit for this proposal. 
    5  This ordinance was applicable only to Lake Bluff's 
property.  However, the record shows that the City also considered 
rezoning an adjacent parcel of land from commercial to residential 
at the same time, but decided against the change when it was 
informed that the parcel, a former site of two large industrial 
waste pits, would be subject to an environmental cleanup.  
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
8 
resubmitted its application for a building permit, and also filed 
a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of the 
permit.6  The complaint alleged that Lake Bluff had acquired 
vested rights in the C-2 zoning of the property prior to the 
City's enactment of the change in the zoning, and requested the 
trial court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the City to 
issue Lake Bluff a building permit. 
 
In its answer to the complaint, the City asserted that Lake 
Bluff's plans failed to comply with the requirements of the former 
C-2 zoning and other statutory and administrative provisions.7  It 
is undisputed that the plans submitted on August 8, 1993, and 
March 10, 1994 were for a building too large to comply with the 
setback requirements of the C-2 zoning on the parcel.8  The March 
                     
    6  The proposed building plans were the same plans submitted 
by Lake Bluff on August 8, 1993.  As already noted, this plan 
proposed the construction of two buildings, totalling 56 units. 
    7  The City asserted the following instances of noncompliance 
in its answer:  
a. set-back requirements of the zoning code  
b. parking requirements of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act  
c. proper connection to existing sewer, water and street 
systems for the proper collection and conveyance of 
storm water runoff including:  
i. a continuous easement for storm sewer  
ii. no easement had been dedicated  
iii. a portion of the planned storm sewer was improperly 
sized  
iv. fail to provide for a required manhole  
v. failed to provide sufficient inlets and inlet leads  
d. insufficient detail was provided to determine if the plans 
required driveway approaches which conform to City 
standards. 
    8  The City's building inspector testified at his deposition 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
9 
10, 1994 plans were also not in compliance with the then-existing 
R-A zoning on the land, which prohibited multi-family housing.  
During the course of the litigation, Lake Bluff sent its architect 
to the depositions of various City officials.  The architect 
determined the details of the zoning and building code violations, 
and changed the plans to conform to code by the time the case was 
heard on April 29, 1994. 
                                                                  
that city ordinances required a twenty-foot setback on rear yards, 
and a fifteen-foot setback on side yards.  The building depicted 
in Lake Bluff's plans had a five-foot stoop along one side of the 
structure.  The building inspector further testified: 
 
Q:Now, 
so 
in 
order to 
comply 
with 
the 
setback 
requirements, building one would have to move 
how far north in order to . . . give them the 
stoop that they have asked for on their plan 
and comply with the absolute minimum setback 
which is the . . . 15-foot side yard?  How 
far north does that building have to go? 
 
A:In excess of five feet. 
 
Q:It has to go five feet just for the 15-foot, right? 
 
A:Correct. 
 
Q:And then an additional five foot for the stoop? 
 
A:Correct. 
 
Q:And how much room is there on the north of the plan 
between the north edge of the building and 
the lot line? 
 
A:Eight feet two inches. 
 
Q:So this building can't fit on the lot? 
 
A:The way it is designed here, no, it can't. 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
10 
 
The trial court found that "Lake Bluff would suffer 
significant and irreparable harm if it is not allowed to proceed 
with its planned construction at the Property immediately" and  
rendered the following conclusions of law:  
Lake Bluff acquired protected vested rights and interests in 
the Property by virtue of the expenditures it made for 
the purchase price of the Property, the payment to WHEDA 
to reserve the low income housing tax credits, the cost 
of architectural plans and specifications, the survey 
costs and the costs for the bluff study, all in reliance 
upon the zoning in existence at the Property at the time 
that it purchased it.  
 
Lake 
Bluff 
acquired 
its 
vested 
rights 
before 
South 
Milwaukee's enactment of the moratorium prohibiting the 
issuance of building permits at the Property.  
 
South Milwaukee's actions in denying Lake Bluff's application 
for a building permit were arbitrary, capricious and 
invalid.  
 
Because it acquired vested rights in the existing C-2 zoning 
at the property, Lake Bluff is entitled to a Writ of 
Mandamus directing the Building Inspector to issue a 
permit allowing it to construct its project at the 
Property.  
 
South Milwaukee is estopped from raising its belated 
objections to Lake Bluff's plans.   
 
 
On April 29, 1994, the trial court granted the writ of 
mandamus directing the City to issue a building permit to Lake 
Bluff for its planned development.  The City appealed. 
 
The court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed the 
circuit court.  See Lake Bluff Housing Partners v City of South 
Milwaukee, 188 Wis. 2d 230, 525 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1994).  The 
majority of the court of appeals held that the circuit court's 
granting of the writ of mandamus had not been an erroneous 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
11 
exercise of discretion.  The majority ruled that although Lake 
Bluff had never submitted a proposal for a building permit which 
conformed to the zoning and building code requirements on the 
property, the partnership had nonetheless acquired a vested right 
in the former zoning of the land.  According to the majority, 
Wisconsin case law on vested rights and mandamus allowed the 
consideration of equitable factors in determining the existence of 
two requirements of a writ of mandamus, a clear legal right and a 
plain duty. 
 
Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy, available only to 
parties that can show that the writ is based on a "clear, specific 
legal right which is free from substantial doubt."  Collins v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 477, 483, 451 N.W.2d 
429 (1990) (quoting Eisenberg v. ILHR Dept., 59 Wis. 2d 98, 101, 
207 N.W.2d 874 (1973)).  A party seeking mandamus must also show 
that the duty sought to be enforced is positive and plain; that 
substantial damage will result if the duty is not performed; and 
that no other adequate remedy at law exists.  State ex rel. 
Iushewitz v. Personnel Review Bd., 176 Wis. 2d 706, 711, 500 
N.W.2d 634 (1993) (citing Collins, 153 Wis. 2d at 483-84).   
 
This court will uphold a trial court's granting or denying a 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
unless 
the 
judge 
erroneously 
exercised 
discretion.  Miller v. Smith, 100 Wis. 2d 609, 621, 302 N.W.2d 468 
(1981); State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 375-
76, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969).  A judge's discretion in issuing a writ 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
12 
of mandamus is erroneously exercised if based on an erroneous 
understanding of the law.  State ex rel. Althouse v. City of 
Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 106, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977). 
 
The trial court in this case granted mandamus in part because 
it determined that Lake Bluff had obtained vested rights in its 
building project through its various expenditures made prior to 
the City's moratorium.  The City argues that, under Wisconsin law, 
a builder must submit an application for a building permit which 
conforms to applicable zoning and building code requirements in 
order to obtain vested rights; because Lake Bluff never submitted 
a conforming application before the change in zoning in the 
instant case, it never obtained vested rights and mandamus should 
not have been granted in the absence of any clear right.   
 
In the Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 
(1923), this court established criteria for adjudicating zoning 
vested rights cases.  The court examined three separate fact 
situations, and ruled on the nature of the vested rights, if any, 
in each.  In the first case, State ex rel. Klefisch v. Wisconsin 
Telephone Co., a builder had designed and obtained building 
permits for an addition of five floors to an eight-story building. 
 Id. at 530-31.  The builder had incurred various expenses for 
materials, 
and 
had 
already 
begun 
construction, 
when 
the 
Legislature enacted a restriction on the height of structures 
which would have forbidden the building.  Id. at 531.  The court 
held that the builder's "substantial rights had vested" prior to 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
13 
the passage of the restriction, and the builder could proceed with 
the construction.  Id. at 532. 
 
In the second case, State ex rel. Buchholz v. Hotel Wisconsin 
Realty Co., a builder had planned to construct an addition to a 
building which would have violated the height restriction, but had 
not incurred any expenses.  Id.  The builder did not attempt to 
obtain a building permit until after the passage of the height 
restriction, at which time the permit was denied.  Id.  The court 
held that the builder's rights in the proposed construction had 
not vested in that case.  Id. at 533. 
 
In the third case, Atkinson v. Piper, a builder had planned, 
prior to the enactment of the height restriction, a building with 
a prohibited height of 115 feet.  Id. at 533-34.  The builder had 
obtained a building permit and started construction, but the court 
noted that the builder had not incurred any expense which would be 
lost if the building were to conform to the new height 
restriction, and be 100 feet tall instead of 115.  Id. at 534.  A 
4-3 majority held that the builder's rights had nonetheless 
vested, and allowed the construction of the building at its full 
height of 115 feet.  Id.  
 
Although the court in the Building Height Cases stressed that 
determining whether rights have vested is "for the most part a 
matter of individual opinion," id., a common factor in the three 
cases there considered was the presence or absence of a building 
permit.  In the two cases where a permit had been obtained, the 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
14 
court held that the builder's rights had vested, while in the one 
case where a permit had not been applied for, the court found no 
vested rights.  From the very beginning of zoning jurisprudence in 
this state, then, a building permit has been a central factor in 
determining when a builder's rights have vested. 
 
This court, in State ex rel. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wahner, 
25 Wis. 2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964), stated: "Generally, a 
building permit must be obtained before vested rights arise.  
Other jurisdictions have held that construction must have begun, 
that merely applying for a permit, commencing a mandamus action, 
and even getting a mandamus action are insufficient."  Id. at 13 
(footnotes omitted).  The use of the word "generally" implies that 
receiving a building permit is not an absolute requirement in the 
vested rights analysis.  In fact, our cases show that a developer 
must at least apply for a building permit in order to obtain 
vested rights.   
 
In Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 215, 225 N.W. 
838 (1929), a builder had obtained a change in zoning on a parcel 
of land to allow construction of an apartment building.  The 
builder then incurred various expenses and prepared plans for the 
proposed construction.  Id. at 216.  Fifteen months after the 
change in zoning, the builder applied for a building permit.  The 
municipality denied the application, informing the builder that it 
wished to build a park on the parcel of land.  Id.  The 
municipality in Rosenberg apparently never alleged that the 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
15 
builder's application did not conform to the requirements of the 
zoning or building code.  The municipality then passed a new 
zoning 
ordinance 
which 
forbade 
the 
builder's 
proposed 
construction.  Id.  This court noted that the builder, like the 
builder in the third of the Building Height Cases, had incurred 
expenses in the preparation of building plans.  Id. at 217.  The 
court held that the builder's substantial rights had vested before 
the passing of the ordinance, and that the ordinance could not 
prevent the construction of the proposed buildings.  Id.   
 
In the instant case, as in Rosenberg, the builder had applied 
for, but not received, a building permit; Rosenberg would thus 
appear to support Lake Bluff's position that simply applying for a 
permit is sufficient to allow rights to vest.  However, our cases 
also state that the application for a building permit must be in 
conformance with all zoning and building code requirements.  In 
State ex rel. Schroedel v. Pagels, 257 Wis. 376, 378, 43 N.W.2d 
349 (1950), a builder planned to construct an apartment building 
on a parcel of land zoned for such use.  After discussing his 
plans with municipal officials, the builder was informed of new 
garage requirements for apartments, and changed the plans to 
comply with the requirements.  The builder then learned that the 
municipality planned to rezone the parcel of land; the builder 
promptly submitted an application for a building permit, "together 
with complete plans and specifications which had been approved by 
the Wisconsin industrial commission as conforming to the state 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
16 
code."  Id. at 378-79.  The municipality denied the request 
because of its plans to change the zoning on the parcel, and 
because it claimed that the builder's plans did not comply with 
certain local requirements for a sewer connection.  Id. at 379.  
The trial court, however, specifically found that the plans did 
comply with the local requirements and would "call for the 
erection of apartment buildings which would be valid and lawful 
under the zoning laws" as they existed at the time of the filing 
of the plans.  Id. at 380, 382.  This court held that the 
builder's rights in the construction project had vested.  Id. at 
382.   
 
Requiring strict and complete conformance with applicable 
zoning and building code requirements is in line with the general 
rule: 
 
In order for the applicant [for mandamus] to have a 
right to have the sought after act or action performed, 
strict and complete compliance with all necessary and 
applicable provisions of the relevant ordinance is 
required.  Lack of compliance with conditions precedent 
not only has the effect of precluding a clear legal duty 
on the part of the administrative officer or body, it 
deprives such officer or body of the power to perform 
the act.   
 
4 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and 
Planning § 44.04[1], at 44-14 to 44-15 (4th ed. 1956 & Supp. 1994) 
(footnotes 
omitted); 
see 
also 
Eugene 
McQuillin, 
Municipal 
Corporations § 25.157, at 703 (3d ed. 1991) ("No rights may vest 
where either the application submitted or the permit issued fails 
to conform to the existing zoning or building regulations."). 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
17 
 
Requiring an application for a building permit which conforms 
to applicable zoning or building code requirements in order to 
show a clear legal right also serves the goals of the vested 
rights doctrine.  The theory behind the vested rights doctrine is 
that a builder is proceeding on the basis of a reasonable 
expectation.  See State ex rel. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Board of 
Appeals, 21 Wis. 2d 516, 528-29, 124 N.W.2d 809 (1963); McQuillin, 
supra, § 25.157, at 701 ("[The vested rights] doctrine is also 
applicable to an applicant for a permit who acted in reliance on 
the ordinance as it existed at the time of his or her application 
for a permit.").  Vested rights should only be obtained on the 
basis of strict and complete compliance with zoning and building 
code requirements, because a builder's proceeding in violation of 
applicable requirements is not reasonable.  
 
In this case, it is undisputed that Lake Bluff never 
submitted an application for a building permit which complied with 
either the new single-family zoning or with the former C-2 zoning. 
 The record demonstrates that the plans submitted pursuant to Lake 
Bluff's applications for a building permit on August 8, 1993, and 
March 10, 1994 were, at least, not in compliance with the set-back 
requirements of the C-2 zoning.  In fact, the plans proposed a 
building too large for the zoning on the lot.  The trial court, in 
its findings of fact, acknowledged that the plans as first 
submitted were nonconforming by finding that "[s]ince the start of 
this lawsuit, Lake Bluff has changed its plans to correct the 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
18 
deficiencies belatedly identified by South Milwaukee in Lake 
Bluff's permit application."  Of course, the plans submitted by 
Lake Bluff on March 10, 1994, also did not comply with the 
residential zoning then in effect on the parcel of land, because 
they proposed a multi-family apartment complex.   
 
Lake Bluff argues that, in the words of the court of appeals 
majority in the instant case, "conceptually, vested rights can be 
separated from zoning compliance."  Lake Bluff, 188 Wis. 2d at 
250.  However, neither Lake Bluff nor the court of appeals 
majority cite a single Wisconsin case in which a court found that 
a builder's rights had vested when the builder had not submitted 
an application for a building permit which conformed to code.  In 
fact, the line of vested rights cases, including the Building 
Height Cases, Rosenberg, and Schroedel, holds exactly the 
opposite. 
 
Lake Bluff contends that State ex rel. Humble Oil & Refining 
Co. v. Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964), supports the 
general proposition that a property owner's noncompliance may not 
be fatal to a mandamus claim.  A builder, Humble, sought to 
construct a gas station.  According to local zoning requirements, 
the construction of such stations was not permitted on the land in 
question, but the stations could be constructed with the approval 
of the town board of appeals.  Id. at 3-4.  Humble made several 
attempts at securing a permit, but each time the town refused the 
request without explanation.  Id. at 3, 5.  Humble then filed suit 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
19 
against the town; shortly afterwards, the town changed its zoning 
requirements on the land in question, forbidding the construction 
of gas stations.  Id. at 6.  
 
This court first determined that the original zoning was 
invalid for failing to provide proper standards to guide the town 
board of appeals in ruling on petitions.  Id. at 11.  In addition, 
the court held that the builder's rights had not vested.  Id. at 
12-13.  The court distinguished Schroedel on the grounds that 
Humble's applications for building permits never proposed a use 
which was allowed under the existing zoning—as already noted, gas 
stations could only be constructed on the land with the approval 
of the town board of appeals.  Id.  The court concluded: 
 
Although since its first petition . . . Humble had 
obtained an option on the subject property, had 
exercised the option, and had gone to considerable 
expense in developing plans for the development of the 
site, Humble had no vested rights as of the time when 
the new ordinance was passed by the town board.   
 
Id. at 13.  By denying vested rights to a builder who submitted an 
application for a building permit that did not propose a permitted 
use under existing zoning, Humble is squarely in line with the 
general rule in Wisconsin: in order for a developer's rights to 
vest, the developer must submit an application for a building 
permit which conforms to the zoning or building code requirements 
in effect at the time of the application.   
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
20 
 
Ultimately, the court in Humble concluded that Humble's writ 
of mandamus should be granted, because the original ordinance was 
defective: 
 
Since this court has concluded that the portion of the 
ordinance permitting filling stations but requiring 
board approval of each permit is invalid as to this 
attempted delegation of authority to the board, Humble 
had a clear legal right to the issuance of the requested 
permit and the appellant building inspector had a 
positive and plain duty to issue the permit.  Under the 
circumstances Humble was clearly entitled to the writ of 
mandamus. 
 
Humble, 25 Wis. 2d at 16.  The reason for this holding is clear: 
but for the invalid portion of the municipality's original 
ordinance, Humble's applications would have been conforming.  As a 
result, Humble had a clear legal right to a permit. 
 
Thus, Humble does not stand for the proposition, advanced by 
the majority of the court of appeals, that a court may employ 
equitable considerations in determining the existence of a "clear 
legal right" in an action for a writ of mandamus.  See Lake Bluff, 
188 Wis. 2d at 254.  The court in Humble did not apply equity to 
supply or create a clear legal right; it only looked to the 
equities for the limited purpose of determining that the 
municipality's second zoning ordinance, as amended after the 
filing of the lawsuit in order to prohibit Humble's requested use, 
could not bar the builder's right to a permit.  Humble, 25 Wis. 2d 
at 13-15.  Similarly, in Schroedel, the court only looked to 
equitable 
considerations 
in 
discussing 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
municipality's change in the zoning ordinance, after having found 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
21 
that the builder had submitted a plan conforming to the former 
requirements and thus had a clear right to a permit.  See 
Schroedel, 257 Wis. 2d at 383-84.  This result is in line with the 
criteria for mandamus found in Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489, 492-93, 
71 N.W. 880 (1897): 
To be sure, the granting or refusing of a writ of mandamus is 
somewhat 
discretionary, 
but 
when 
the 
application 
therefor is made by a person to enforce a clear legal 
right; the duty sought to be enforced is positive and 
plain; the applicant for the writ shows that he will be 
substantially damaged by nonperformance of such duty; 
and there is not other adequate specific legal remedy 
for the threatened injury, and no laches on the part of 
such applicant, and no special reasons exist rendering a 
resort 
on 
his 
part 
to 
the 
remedy, 
under 
the 
circumstances, inequitable, to refuse to issue the writ 
constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion.   
 
As the court of appeals noted in Keane v. St. Francis Hospital, 
186 Wis. 2d 637, 647, 522 N.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1994): "The theme 
throughout the caselaw is that the four criteria preceding the 
`and no' clauses establish the legal prerequisites that must be 
satisfied before a trial court can grant the writ, while the `and 
no' 
clauses 
then 
carry 
the 
trial 
court 
to 
additional 
discretionary, equitable considerations."  The existence of a 
clear legal right, then, is not to be determined through the use 
of equitable principles. 
 
Lake Bluff contends that equitable considerations should 
require this court to nullify the City's change in the zoning 
ordinance, as did the court in Humble.  However, the amendment to 
the ordinance in Humble occurred after the builder had filed suit 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
22 
against the town.  The court noted that allowing the amendment 
"would be tantamount to approving the proposition that every time 
a party came close to successfully challenging a town and its 
zoning board on its zoning actions, his gains could be legislated 
away by the enactment of an amendment to the ordinance."  Id.  
This concern is not present in the instant case, because here the 
ordinance was changed before the filing of the suit, not after.  
The equities in the present situation do not require us to provide 
the remedy given in Humble.  In addition, there is nothing in the 
C-2 ordinance that is invalid, as there was in the ordinance in 
Humble. 
 
Lake Bluff also notes that the town in Humble raised 
noncompliance with building requirements as an argument against 
granting mandamus, but this court ruled that the town had waived 
any noncompliance by first raising the argument on appeal and by 
failing to give a reason for the denial of Humble's application 
for a permit on three separate occasions.  Id. at 16.  The issue 
of zoning compliance in the present matter is distinguishable from 
Humble.  First, the City did not raise Lake Bluff's noncompliance 
for the first time on appeal, but rather immediately, in its 
answer to 
the complaint.  Second, 
the City, 
unlike the 
municipality in Humble, did provide reasons for the denial of the 
permit.  The City first informed Lake Bluff that its permit was 
denied because of the moratorium.  As already noted, the legality 
of this moratorium has not been questioned, and we consider it as 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
23 
valid for purposes of this appeal.  South Milwaukee's City 
Attorney also informed Lake Bluff by letter that the moratorium 
was delaying the review of the plans, and that Lake Bluff should 
inform the City if it wanted the review of the plans to be 
expedited.  But Lake Bluff ignored this request, and chose instead 
to contact local officials, and propose alternative plans, in an 
attempt to avoid a change in zoning.  Third, as Judge Fine noted 
in his dissent to the court of appeals opinion in the instant 
case, even if the City had issued the requested building permit, 
that permit could not have authorized Lake Bluff to develop its 
property in conformity with the application filed August 5th, 
because a building permit grants no right to an unlawful use.  
Lake Bluff, 188 Wis. 2d at 255-56 (Fine, J., dissenting) (citing 
Jelinski v. Eggers, 34 Wis. 2d 85, 93, 148 N.W.2d 750 (1967)).  In 
Humble the town only alleged a failure to comply with "formal 
filing requirements," and the court noted "[n]o evidence was 
produced by the town to show that any vital documents had not been 
filed."  Humble, 25 Wis. 2d at 16.  The seriousness of the 
noncompliance in the present case is of a greater magnitude, and 
not merely alleged but clearly demonstrated in the record.  For 
these reasons, we conclude the City did not waive Lake Bluff's 
non-compliance. 
 
Lake Bluff also cites State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church 
v. Village of Bayside Bd. of Trustees, 12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 
288 (1961), for the proposition that the presence or absence of a 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
24 
building permit is not crucial to the determination of vested 
rights.  Lake Bluff notes that, although the Lake Drive Baptist 
court did not find any vested rights on the part of the builder, 
the court's discussion of the vested rights issue mentioned only 
the absence of any significant expenses on the part of the 
builder, not the absence of a building permit.  However, in Lake 
Drive Baptist, as in Schroedel, the trial court made a specific 
finding that the plans conformed to local building codes: "The 
[trial] court found that there is no issue between the parties 
concerning the adequacy of the proposed building according to the 
plans . . . , structurally, architecturally, or otherwise. . . .  
The plans and specifications comply with local building-code 
requirements and state law."  Lake Drive Baptist, 12 Wis. 2d at 
592-93.  The issue of compliance was not before the Lake Drive 
Baptist court, and the case therefore provides no support for Lake 
Bluff's contentions.  In any event, three years after the Lake 
Drive Baptist case, the Humble court determined that a builder who 
had incurred substantial expenses still had no vested rights 
because of the lack of a building permit.  Humble, 25 Wis. 2d at 
13.  The Lake Drive Baptist case does not deviate from the general 
pattern of requiring at least an application for a building permit 
which complies with applicable building codes in order for rights 
to vest.   
 
From our examination of relevant law, it is clear that Lake 
Bluff obtained no vested rights, because it never submitted an 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
25 
application for a building permit conforming to the zoning and 
building code requirements in effect at the time of the 
application.  Our cases have consistently held that no rights vest 
in such an instance.  Lake Bluff did not possess the "clear, 
specific legal right which is free from substantial doubt" that is 
required in an action for mandamus.  Collins v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 477, 483, 451 N.W.2d 429 (1990) 
(quoting Eisenberg v. ILHR Dept., 59 Wis. 2d 98, 101, 207 N.W.2d 
874 (1973)).   
 
We conclude that the trial court made its determination that 
mandamus could lie based on an erroneous understanding of the law. 
 Because a discretionary determination must be based on a correct 
understanding of the law, see Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 106, we hold 
that the trial judge's granting of mandamus was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court with 
instructions to quash the writ. 
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1155 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Lake Bluff Housing Partners, 
 
 
 
a Wisconsin limited partnership, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
City of South Milwaukee and Michael Vesperman, 
 
 
 
in his capacity as City Building Inspector, 
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  188 Wis. 2d 230, 525 N.W.2d 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 7, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
JOHN E. MC CORMICK 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
No. 94-1155 
 
 
94-1155 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Joseph G. Murphy, city attorney, and Murphy & 
Leonard, South Milwaukee and oral argument by Joseph G. Murphy. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Alan 
Marcuvitz, Debra A. Slater and Weiss, Berzowski, Brady & Donahue, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz & Debra A. Slater. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Curtis A. Witynski, Madison 
for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.