Title: Clark v. Scarpelli

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 2001-Ohio-39.] 
 
 
CLARK, ADMR., APPELLANT, ET AL., v. SCARPELLI ET AL.; MID-CENTURY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271.] 
Insurance — Motor vehicles — Mandatory offering of uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage — “Amounts available for payment” 
language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), for the purpose of setoff, construed. 
(Nos. 00-206 and 00-374 — Submitted November 29, 2000 — Decided April 11, 
2001.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 
No. 17883. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For the purpose of setoff, the “amounts available for payment” language in R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts actually accessible to and recoverable 
by an underinsured motorist claimant from all bodily injury liability bonds 
and insurance policies (including from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier). 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  On October 16, 1996, Shane T. Parker died as a result of 
injuries sustained in a one-car collision in Montgomery County, Ohio.  The 
automobile in which Shane was an occupant was owned by his mother, appellant, 
Cheryl Clark.  At the time of the accident, appellant was insured through a policy 
of automobile liability insurance issued by appellee, Mid-Century Insurance 
Company.  Appellant’s policy with Mid-Century included an uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage provision with limits of $100,000 for each person 
and $300,000 for each occurrence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
On January 24, 1997, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 
County, appellant filed a cause of action individually and as administrator of her 
son’s estate.1  In the complaint, appellant sought wrongful death damages 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2125 on behalf of herself and other statutory wrongful 
death beneficiaries.  The complaint also included a survival claim on behalf of 
Shane’s estate and a declaratory judgment action against appellee seeking 
underinsured motorist benefits. 
 
On December 23, 1998, the trial court entered its decision granting in part 
and denying in part appellee’s motion for summary judgment.  The trial court 
found that reasonable minds could only conclude that James Scarpelli, the alleged 
tortfeasor, was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident.  The 
tortfeasor’s liability carrier subsequently settled with appellant for the $100,000 
per person limit and appellant dismissed all claims against tortfeasor Scarpelli.  
Relevant to the matters before this court, the trial court held that appellant and the 
other wrongful death beneficiaries were not entitled to underinsured motorist 
benefits because a provision of the Mid-Century policy unambiguously reduced 
all claims arising out of the death of one person to the single, “each person” 
policy limit of $100,000.  The trial court therefore held that since the each-person 
policy limit of the Mid-Century policy matched the per-person limit of the 
tortfeasor’s automobile liability policy, underinsured motorist benefits were not 
available. 
 
Appellant appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Montgomery County 
Court of Appeals.  The court of appeals primarily focused on two specific issues 
raised by the parties.  The first issue concerned the parties’ conflicting 
interpretations of the setoff language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), specifically the 
meaning of the “amounts available for payment” language set forth in the statute.  
Before the court of appeals, appellant argued that the phrase “amounts available 
                                                          
 
1.  Shane’s father, Richard Parker, was also named a plaintiff. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
for payment” means the amount “actually available” for payment from the 
tortfeasor.  In contrast, appellee contended that the phrase requires a policy-limit-
to-policy-limit comparison and if the tortfeasor’s liability limits are the same as 
the underinsured motorist coverage limits, then no recovery is available.  The 
second issue involved whether the language of the Mid-Century policy purporting 
to limit all wrongful death beneficiary claims to the single each-person limit is 
unambiguous and thus valid or ambiguous and thus invalid. 
 
In regard to the first issue, the court of appeals decided in favor of 
appellant and held, in effect, that if the actual amount available under the 
tortfeasor’s liability policy to each insured is less than the Mid-Century 
underinsured motorist coverage limit, the insureds should recover the difference 
up to the total of the appropriate limit of coverage.  The court of appeals noted 
that comparing the amount actually received from the tortfeasor with the limits of 
the insureds’ underinsured motorist coverage, instead of a limits-to-limits 
comparison, is “the only interpretation of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) which comports 
with statutory public policy.” 
 
On the second question, the court of appeals considered whether each 
wrongful death beneficiary was entitled to recover for his or her individual claims 
under the separate, each-person limit of the Mid-Century policy up to the 
maximum $300,000 each-occurrence limit, or whether all claims were restricted 
to the $100,000 each person limit.  An aggregate total of $100,000 had been 
received and distributed among the four wrongful death beneficiaries, each 
receiving less than the each-person underinsured motorist coverage limit.  In 
resolving this issue, the court of appeals found that the language of the Mid-
Century policy clearly and unambiguously restricted all wrongful death claims to 
the single each-person limit.  Thus, the amount recovered from the tortfeasor’s 
liability carrier, $100,000, was set off against the each-person limit of 
underinsured motorist coverage of the Mid-Century policy, $100,000, thereby 
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4 
precluding Shane’s wrongful death beneficiaries access to underinsured motorist 
benefits. 
 
Thereafter, appellant filed a motion requesting the court of appeals to 
certify its decision as in conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ decision 
in Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc. v. Atkinson (Oct. 29, 1992), Stark App. No. 
CA-8931, unreported, 1992 WL 318886.  The court of appeals agreed and entered 
an order certifying a conflict. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists (case No. 00-374) and upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal (case 
No. 00-206). 
 
On October 20, 1994, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 
(“S.B. 20”), which effectuated changes to R.C. 3937.18, that section of the 
Revised Code providing for the mandatory offering of uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage.  145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204, 240.  R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2), as amended by S.B. 20, provided2: 
 
“Underinsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of 
coverage equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage 
and shall provide protection for an insured against loss for bodily injury, sickness, 
or disease, including death, suffered by any person insured under the policy, 
where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily 
injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured 
are less than the limits for the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.  
Underinsured motorist coverage is not and shall not be excess insurance to other 
applicable liability coverages, and shall be provided only to afford the insured an 
amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under the 
                                                          
 
2.  There have been two subsequent amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) since the enactment of 
S.B. 20.  See 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2373; 2000 Sub.S.B. No. 267, effective September 21, 2000.  
However, those changes were relatively minor, and the language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) under 
consideration here has remained unchanged. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
insured’s uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons liable were 
uninsured at the time of the accident.  The policy limits of the underinsured 
motorist coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under 
all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons 
liable to the insured.”  (Emphasis added.)  145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 210-211. 
 
The first issue that we must address involves the practical application of 
the setoff provision regarding underinsured motorist coverage in R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2).  This setoff provision was amended by S.B. 20 to provide that 
“[t]he policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced by 
those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability 
bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.”  Our 
consideration of this matter will focus specifically on the “amounts available for 
payment” language of the statute. 
 
We begin, as we do in all cases involving statutory construction, by 
ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly in enacting a statute and giving 
effect to that intent.  Cochrel v. Robinson (1925), 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871, 
paragraph four of the syllabus.  “If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and 
definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.”  
State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1996), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463, 465.  In order to determine the intent of the 
General Assembly in enacting legislation the court must give effect to the words 
used in the statute.  Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 12 O.O.3d 1, 3, 387 N.E.2d 1222, 1224.  However, 
where the words of the statute are ambiguous, a court is charged with construing 
the language in a manner that reflects the intent of the General Assembly.  
Cochrel, 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871, paragraph four of the syllabus. 
 
A statute is ambiguous when its language is subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation.  State v. Jordan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492, 733 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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N.E.2d 601, 605.  Initially, we note that the phrase “amounts available for 
payment” is not defined in R.C. 3937.18.  Since the enactment of S.B. 20 on 
October 20, 1994, much confusion has surrounded R.C. 3937.18.  Predictably, 
and perhaps unavoidably, the General Assembly’s promulgation of S.B. 20 has 
spawned an increasing amount of litigation involving uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage.  The changes to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) brought about by S.B. 20 
have resulted in conflicting interpretations by various trial and appellate courts 
throughout Ohio, leading to a state of uncertainty among insurers and insureds 
concerning underinsured motorist coverage.  Here, the statutory language at issue 
is susceptible of at least two conflicting interpretations.  The arguments raised in 
this matter are a testament to the resultant confusion surrounding the statutory 
language.  Thus, we must delve further into the intent of the General Assembly in 
enacting S.B. 20. 
 
Accordingly, we must now look beyond the words of the statute and 
construe R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), as amended by S.B. 20, in a manner that reflects the 
purpose of the General Assembly.  Cochrel, 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871, 
paragraph four of the syllabus.  We are guided by the rule that when a statute is 
ambiguous, the court, in determining the intent of the General Assembly, may 
consider the objective of the statute and the consequences of any particular 
construction.  R.C. 1.49(A) and (E).  Moreover, R.C. 3937.18 is remedial 
legislation.  Stanton v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 
623 N.E.2d 1197, 1199.  We, therefore, must construe the statute liberally to give 
effect to its legislative purpose.  R.C. 1.11; Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. 
(1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 33, 38, 54 O.O.2d 166, 169, 266 N.E.2d 566, 569. 
 
In James v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 386, 18 OBR 
440, 481 N.E.2d 272, disapproved on other grounds in Cole v. Holland (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 220, 667 N.E.2d 353, the court discussed the motivation behind the 
General Assembly’s adoption of mandatory underinsured motorist coverage, 
January Term, 2001 
7 
which was found at that time in former R.C. 3937.181.  See 138 Ohio Laws, Part 
I, 1459.  “Underinsured motorist coverage was first required by statute after the 
legislature discovered the ‘underinsurance loophole’ in uninsured motorist 
coverage—i.e., persons injured by tortfeasors having extremely low liability 
coverage were being denied the same coverage that was being afforded to persons 
who were injured by tortfeasors having no liability coverage.  Thus, the original 
motivation behind the enactment of [former] R.C. 3937.181(C) was to assure that 
persons injured by an underinsured motorist would receive at least the same 
amount of total compensation that they would have received if they had been 
injured by an uninsured motorist.”  (Emphasis sic.)  James, 18 Ohio St.3d at 389, 
18 OBR at 443, 481 N.E.2d at 274-275.  In discussing the issue of setoff, we held 
that “[a]n insurer may apply payments made by or on behalf of an underinsured 
motorist as a setoff directly against the limits of its underinsured motorist 
coverage, so long as such setoff (1) is clearly set forth in the terms of the 
underinsured motorist coverage and (2) does not lead to a result wherein the 
insured receives a total amount of compensation that is less than the amount of 
compensation that he would have received if he had been injured by an uninsured 
motorist.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
We reiterated that position regarding underinsured and uninsured motorist 
coverage in Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 162, 165, 556 
N.E.2d 1150, 1153, when we concluded that “it would make no sense for this 
court to reach the absurd result that an injured party is better off when struck by 
an uninsured tortfeasor than by a person who possesses liability insurance.”  
Finally, in Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Andrews (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 362, 365, 
604 N.E.2d 142, 145, construing former R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) in light of the 
General Assembly’s purpose in enacting the statute, we emphasized that “the 
well-reasoned public policy behind requiring underinsured motorist coverage is to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
assure that an injured person receive at least the same amount of compensation 
whether the tortfeasor is insured or uninsured.” 
 
It is clear that underinsured motorist coverage, as described in R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) as amended by S.B. 20, was not intended to be “excess insurance” 
to the tortfeasor’s applicable automobile liability insurance.  The language of the 
statute is unmistakable.  The language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) also makes clear 
that the statute was intended to ensure that a person injured by an underinsured 
motorist should never be afforded greater protection than that which would have 
been available had the tortfeasor been uninsured. 
 
As can be gleaned from the public policy behind the enactment of the 
underinsured motorist statute, as well as the statutory language, the purpose of 
underinsured (and uninsured) motorist coverage is to treat injured automobile 
liability policyholders the same whether a tortfeasor is underinsured or uninsured.  
It is apparent from the foregoing that the General Assembly intended that when a 
person carries automobile liability insurance and that person is injured in an 
accident by an uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor, the insured policyholder may 
be compensated up to the limits of his or her applicable uninsured/underinsured 
motorist coverage for any losses sustained. 
 
Based on this premise, we construe the “amounts available for payment” 
language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), as amended by S.B. 20, as requiring a 
comparison between the amounts that are actually accessible to the injured 
claimant from the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance carrier and the 
injured claimant’s own underinsured motorist coverage limits.  The phrase 
“amounts available for payment” means just that.  In other words, it means those 
amounts the insured actually recovers from a tortfeasor whose liability policy is 
subject to the claim of the insured and also to the claims of other injured persons.  
For the reasons stated throughout this opinion, we find that this construction is 
supported by the statutory language and prior decisions of this court regarding 
January Term, 2001 
9 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), and, we believe, is the only interpretation that truly reflects 
the public policy behind the adoption of mandatory underinsured motorist 
coverage in this state. 
 
In 1992, this court decided the case of Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 
65 Ohio St.3d 362, 604 N.E.2d 142.  In Andrews, the court considered the 
application of underinsured motorist coverage in a situation similar to the case at 
bar, involving multiple claimants.  In Andrews, the question before the court was 
“whether underinsured motorist coverage is available to an insured where the 
tortfeasor’s policy limit is greater than the insured’s policy limits but the claims of 
multiple claimants have resulted in undercompensation of the insured’s injuries.”  
Id. at 364, 604 N.E.2d at 144.  We held in Andrews that “[w]hen determining 
whether a motorist is underinsured within the meaning of [former] R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2), the amount actually available for payment under the tortfeasor’s 
liability insurance policy must be compared with the insured’s underinsured 
motorist coverage limits.  If the amount available for payment is less than the 
insured’s underinsured policy limits, then the insured is entitled to underinsured 
motorist coverage.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at syllabus. 
 
In Andrews we rejected a comparison-of-the-limits approach where “the 
claims of multiple claimants result in reduction of the amount available for 
payment to the insured below the underinsured motorist limits.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Id. at 365-366, 604 N.E.2d at 145.  In so doing, the court determined that “the 
clear language of [former] R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) requires a comparison between the 
amount actually available for payment to an insured and the policy limits of the 
insured’s underinsured motorist coverage.  The operative language of [former] 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) states that ‘[u]nderinsured motorist coverage * * * shall 
provide protection * * * where the limits of coverage available for payment to the 
insured * * * are less than the limits for the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage 
at the time of the accident. * * *’  Reading this statute, in conjunction with the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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public policy behind its adoption, the inescapable conclusion is that, when 
determining whether a motorist is underinsured, the amount actually available for 
payment under the tortfeasor’s policy must be compared with the insured’s 
underinsured motorist coverage limits.  If the amount available for payment is 
less than the insured’s underinsured policy limits, then the insured is entitled to 
underinsured motorist coverage.  This is the only reading of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) 
which can give full effect to the General Assembly’s stated intent.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id. at 366-367, 604 N.E.2d at 145-146. 
 
The court, in applying the above rationale to the facts of Andrews, 
concluded that the Andrewses were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits.  
The court reached this result by first determining the amount available for 
payment, i.e., the amount that was actually available, and could in fact be paid, to 
the Andrewses from the tortfeasor’s automobile liability policy.  The court then 
compared that amount, which was zero dollars after the exhaustion of the 
tortfeasor’s liability limits by payments made to one injured claimant, to the 
underinsured motorist coverage limits of the Andrewses’ policy.  Id. at 364 and 
367, 604 N.E.2d at 144 and 146. 
 
We realize that the court in Andrews did not focus its attention on the 
question of setoff and instead limited its analysis to certain, specific language in 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) that is not under consideration in this case.  In addition, we 
recognize that our decision in Andrews preceded the enactment of S.B. 20 by 
approximately two years.  Moreover, in deciding this matter, we are cognizant of 
the fact that S.B. 20 eliminated the phrase “amounts actually recovered” from 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) and substituted the phrase “amounts available for payment” 
when it amended R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  However, the court in Andrews did 
specifically consider the term “amount available for payment,” a term virtually 
identical to that which we are called upon to interpret today. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
It is presumed that the General Assembly is fully aware of any prior 
judicial interpretation of an existing statute when enacting an amendment.  State 
ex rel. Huron Cty. Bd. of Edn. v. Howard (1957), 167 Ohio St. 93, 96, 4 O.O.2d 
83, 84, 146 N.E.2d 604, 607.  In enacting S.B. 20, the General Assembly chose to 
adopt the language “amounts available for payment,” a phrase that is repeated 
throughout Andrews and interpreted in our decision to mean those amounts 
actually accessible to and recoverable by the claimant from the tortfeasor’s 
liability policy.  Thus, we conclude that the General Assembly was fully advised 
when the Senators and Representatives chose the language “amounts available for 
payment.” 
 
Further, if we were to adopt a strict “policy-limits-to-policy-limits” 
comparison approach we would be creating the potential for the law to treat 
uninsured and underinsured motorist claimants differently.  Had the General 
Assembly intended such a result there would be no need for the “amounts 
available for payment” language.  The General Assembly could have simply 
chosen other language, such as “the policy limits of the underinsured motorist 
coverage shall be reduced by the policy limits under all applicable bodily injury 
liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.”  Of 
course such an approach would be inequitable and would defeat, rather than 
advance, the public policy reasons, set forth by the General Assembly in the 
statute itself, for adopting mandatory underinsured motorist coverage. 
 
The argument might be made that our resolution of Andrews was in error.  
Despite our holding in Andrews, some may contend that, through the plain 
language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), it was the intent of the General Assembly to 
provide that underinsured motorist coverage is never available where the limits of 
the tortfeasor’s coverage are equal to or greater than the limits of the underinsured 
motorist coverage.  An additional contention might be that Andrews is no longer 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
good law in light of the S.B. 20 changes to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  We have 
considered these arguments and reject them for the following reasons. 
 
Our decision in Andrews completely and properly resolves the issue in this 
matter.  The court in Andrews noted that a limits-to-limits comparison approach is 
proper only in situations where a single claimant is involved.  Id., 65 Ohio St.3d 
at 365-366, 604 N.E.2d at 145.  Therein lies the distinction.  The court, 
accordingly, determined that in situations where “the claims of multiple claimants 
result in reduction of the amount available for payment to the insured below the 
underinsured motorist limits,” the insured is entitled to underinsured motorist 
coverage.  Id.  We noted that a strict policy-limits-to-policy-limits approach in 
situations involving multiple claimants would not give full effect to the public 
policy behind the General Assembly’s enactment of the underinsured motorist 
statute.  Id. at 366-367, 604 N.E.2d at 145-146. 
 
Furthermore, the enactment of S.B. 20 had no effect whatsoever on the 
validity of our holding in Andrews.  We find it significant that nowhere in the S.B. 
20 amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), either in the codified or uncodified 
sections, does the General Assembly indicate any intent, express or implied, to 
legislatively supersede our decision in Andrews.  In fact, by adopting virtually the 
same language, “amounts available for payment,” from our decision in Andrews, 
the presumption is that the General Assembly approved of our holding when it 
enacted the S.B. 20 changes to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  Thus, Andrews is still good 
law and completely dispositive of the matters before us. 
 
Of course, and in any event, in construing statutory language, we must 
proceed under a presumption that, in enacting a statute, the General Assembly 
intended a “just and reasonable result.”  R.C. 1.47(C).  However, that intention 
would be utterly destroyed should we adopt a strict “limits to limits” comparison 
approach.  It would be manifestly absurd to interpret the S.B. 20 amendments to 
R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) as permitting an insurer to offset, against its own insured, 
January Term, 2001 
13 
those amounts that a tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance carrier has paid to 
other injured parties.  In circumstances involving matching limits and multiple 
claimants, if an insurer were able to set off payments made to injured parties other 
than its own insureds, in many if not most instances, an insured would receive no 
compensation from the tortfeasor and would also be unable to collect 
underinsured motorist benefits.  We cannot and do not believe that that is what the 
General Assembly intended when it enacted R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).3 
                                                          
 
3.  The emphasis of this section, and the fallacy of a strict “limits-to-limits” comparison approach, 
can perhaps be best demonstrated by the following two examples. 
 
Suppose one person (“Craig”) is injured in an automobile accident caused by an insured 
tortfeasor (“Bob”).  Bob has automobile liability insurance with limits of $100,000 per person and 
$300,000 per accident.  Craig has provable damages of $150,000.  Craig recovers $100,000 from 
Bob’s insurer.  Craig has automobile liability insurance that includes a provision for 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per 
accident.  Pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), Craig’s automobile liability carrier can “set off” the 
$100,000 that Craig received from Bob’s automobile liability carrier.  Thus, since the tortfeasor’s 
(Bob’s) limits and the injured claimant’s (Craig’s) limits are the same, Craig receives nothing 
from his underinsured motorist coverage even though his provable damages are $150,000.  This 
outcome is consistent with the interpretation of the setoff provision and the “amounts available for 
payment” language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  That is, Craig’s underinsured motorist coverage 
cannot be accessed as “excess insurance” and Craig is not any better or any worse off than if the 
tortfeasor had been uninsured as opposed to underinsured.  In either instance, Craig would recover 
only $100,000 as compensation for his injuries. 
 
Now suppose that, in addition to Craig, there are three other passengers traveling in 
Craig’s automobile.  All four occupants suffer injuries as a result of Bob’s negligence and sustain 
provable damages in excess of $100,000 each.  Each person in Craig’s vehicle has separate 
automobile liability insurance policies that include uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage 
provisions of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.  Bob’s insurer pays $300,000, the 
per-accident limit of liability, to Craig and his three passengers.  Thus, assuming equal 
distribution, each person in Craig’s vehicle receives $75,000. 
 
Suppose that the setoff provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) and the “amounts available for 
payment” language are interpreted using a strict policy-limits-to-policy-limits comparison 
approach.  In that instance, each passenger’s automobile liability insurer would be permitted to set 
off the $300,000 per-accident limit of the tortfeasor’s policy against the policy limits of each 
passenger’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.  Thus, since the tortfeasor’s liability policy 
limits ($100,000/300,000) equals or exceeds the per-person limits ($100,000) of each individual’s 
policy, neither Craig nor his three passengers would recover under the provisions of their 
underinsured motorist coverage.  The net effect of permitting each person’s insurer to set off the 
per-accident limit of the tortfeasor’s policy is, in this instance, to credit each insurer with the same 
$300,000 obtained from the tortfeasor’s insurer when, of course, only a total of $300,000 (not 
$1,200,000) was actually distributed to the injured claimants. 
 
If, however, Craig and his passengers had been injured by an uninsured motorist, each 
person would have a separate uninsured motorist claim against his or her own insurer and would 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
Accordingly, we hold that for the purpose of setoff, the “amounts 
available for payment” language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) means the amounts 
actually accessible to and recoverable by an underinsured motorist claimant from 
all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies (including from the 
tortfeasor’s liability carrier).  We, therefore, affirm the well-reasoned judgment of 
the court of appeals on this issue. 
 
A final issue remains for our consideration:  the court of appeals’ 
certification, and our determination, of the existence of a conflict between two 
appellate districts.  We now proceed to answer the certified question. 
 
The question that has been certified for our consideration is: 
 
“Does the [policy language quoted below] unambiguously limit [uninsured 
motorist/underinsured motorist] coverage to a single per-person limit for all 
wrongful death claims derived from one deceased insured?” 
 
The insurance policy at issue provides the following with regard to 
underinsured motorist coverage: 
 
“The limits of liability shown in the Declarations apply subject to the 
following: 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
be able to collect uninsured motorist benefits up to the $100,000 per person limit.  Thus, 
comparing the two examples with the stated purpose and intent of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), Craig and 
his passengers would certainly be in a better position financially speaking had they been injured 
by an uninsured tortfeasor. 
 
Conversely, by interpreting the “amounts available for payment” language in R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) to mean those amounts that each claimant can actually access or recover from the 
tortfeasor’s automobile liability carrier, the result is the same whether Craig and his passengers are 
injured by an uninsured tortfeasor or by an underinsured tortfeasor.  Accordingly, where the 
“amounts available for payment” from the tortfeasor to each occupant is $75,000, each person in 
Craig’s vehicle could access up to an additional $25,000 in underinsured motorist benefits from 
his or her automobile liability carrier with no one person being able to recover more than his or her 
$100,000 per-person policy limit.  Under this interpretation, the result is the same whether Craig 
and his passengers are injured by an uninsured tortfeasor or by an underinsured tortfeasor – the 
result mandated by the General Assembly when it expressed, in the statute, the purpose for 
enacting the mandatory offering of underinsured motorist coverage. 
January Term, 2001 
15 
 
“1.  The limit for ‘each person’ is the maximum for bodily injury sustained 
by any person in any one accident.  Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to 
the relationship arising from this injury shall be included in this limit. 
 
“2.  Subject to the limit for ‘each person,’ the limit for ‘each accident’ is 
the maximum for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one 
accident. 
 
“3.  Subject to the law of the state of the occurrence, we will pay no more 
than these maximums regardless of the number of vehicles insured, insured 
persons, claims, claimants, policies, or vehicles involved in the accident.”  
(Boldface omitted.) 
 
Mid-Century concedes that appellant and the other statutory wrongful 
death beneficiaries of decedent Shane Parker are all insureds pursuant to the Mid-
Century policy.  Mid-Century also acknowledges, in its brief before this court 
(although appellee’s attorney at oral argument seemed to assume a different 
posture), that pursuant to applicable law each wrongful death beneficiary has a 
separate, individual claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2125.01 and 2125.02(A)(1), in an action for wrongful 
death, the surviving statutory beneficiaries have the right to recover damages 
suffered by reason of the wrongful death of the decedent.  See Wood v. Shepard 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 526 N.E.2d 1089, 1092, and Sexton v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 431, 23 O.O.3d 385, 433 N.E.2d 555.  
Further, each statutory wrongful death beneficiary’s claim is considered separate 
and distinct from the claim of the estate, and from each other, pursuant to R.C. 
2125.02(A)(1).  Wood v. Shepard at 90, 526 N.E.2d at 1092. 
 
R.C. 3937.18(H) provides: 
 
“Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance 
that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section or selected in 
accordance with division (C) of this section and that provides a limit of coverage 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
for payment for damages for bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one 
person in any one automobile accident, may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125. of 
the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims 
resulting from or arising out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, 
shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, 
including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit 
shall constitute a single claim.  Any such policy limit shall be enforceable 
regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown 
in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident.” 
 
As set forth above, R.C. 3937.18(H) permits automobile liability insurers 
to include provisions in their insurance policies that consolidate all individual 
wrongful death claims arising out of any one person’s bodily injury into a single 
claim and thereby limit all wrongful death damages to a single per-person policy 
limit.  This consolidation must affirmatively appear in the policy, i.e., insurers 
must include language within their policies of insurance that clearly and 
unambiguously consolidates such claims in order to give effect to such a limit.  
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co. (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 584, 586, 687 N.E.2d 717, 719.  In addition, it is well settled that “[w]here 
provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably susceptible of more than one 
interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in 
favor of the insured.”  King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 
N.E.2d 1380, syllabus. 
 
Appellant contends in regard to the certified question that ambiguity exists 
in at least two respects.  First, appellant urges us to find that the terms “loss of 
consortium” and “injury to the relationship” as used in the Mid-Century policy are 
ambiguous.  Second, appellant contends that the Mid-Century policy language 
does not unambiguously consolidate all damages arising out of one person’s 
January Term, 2001 
17 
death to a single per-person limit but, instead, consolidates only loss-of-
consortium claims and injury-to-the-relationship claims into a single claim. 
 
In attempting to limit wrongful death damages, insurers are not required to 
use the exact wording set forth in R.C. 3937.18(H) or any other specific language.  
R.C. 3937.18(H) provides that automobile liability insurance policies “may * * * 
include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising 
out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be 
subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, 
sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute 
a single claim.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The Mid-Century policy provides in “Part II—Uninsured Motorist, 
Coverage C,”4 that the insurer “will pay all sums which an insured person is 
legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person.”  
(Boldface omitted.)  “Bodily injury” is defined in the Mid-Century policy as 
“bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any person.”  According to the 
Mid-Century policy’s uninsured/underinsured motorist provision, an “[i]nsured 
person” means “[a]ny person for damages that person is entitled to recover 
because of bodily injury to you, a family member, or another occupant of your 
insured car.”  (Boldface omitted.) 
 
As set forth in these sections of the Mid-Century policy, appellee has 
selected specific language that clearly allows for recovery of uninsured and 
underinsured motorist benefits for qualifying statutory wrongful death 
beneficiaries.  The Mid-Century policy language provides that appellee “will pay 
all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 
sustained by the insured person.”  (Emphasis added and boldface omitted.)  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
Further, “insured person” is defined as “any person for damages that person is 
entitled to recover because of bodily injury to you, a family member, or another 
occupant of your insured car.”  (Emphasis added and boldface omitted.) 
 
The question, however, remains whether the Mid-Century policy clearly 
and unambiguously limited all losses that resulted from the death of Shane Parker 
to a single per-person policy limit.  The “Limits of Liability” section of the 
uninsured/underinsured motorist provision of the policy provides: 
 
“The limits of liability shown in the Declarations apply subject to the 
following: 
 
“1. The limit for ‘each person’ is the maximum for bodily injury sustained 
by any person in any one accident.  Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to 
the relationship arising from this injury shall be included in this limit.” 
 
We do not agree with appellant that the phrases “loss of consortium” and 
“injury to the relationship” are ambiguous.  The term “consortium” has long been 
part of English and American jurisprudence.  Moreover, in Gallimore v. 
Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052, at 
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, we interpreted “consortium” to include 
services, society, companionship, comfort, love, solace, affection, guidance, and 
counsel.  Thus, we reject appellant’s contention that this term is “so broad as to be 
meaningless.” 
 
Furthermore, while we agree with appellant that a “loss of consortium” 
action is different from a wrongful death action, we find that the phrase “injury to 
the relationship” is a clear reference to claims for wrongful death as contemplated 
by the Mid-Century policy.  In reaching its resolution on this issue, the 
Montgomery County Court of Appeals noted that “an action for wrongful death 
arises out of the relationship between the decedent and his or her relatives [and 
thus] it is an injury to the relationship as defined by the policy.” 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
4. This provision of the Mid-Century policy includes underinsured motorist coverage. 
January Term, 2001 
19 
 
In an action for wrongful death pursuant to R.C. 2125.01, the surviving 
spouse, children, and parents of the decedent are all rebuttably presumed to have 
suffered damages by reason of the wrongful death.  R.C. 2125.02(A)(1).  The 
right of the statutory wrongful death beneficiaries to recover damages arises as a 
result of the suffering incurred by reason of the wrongful death of the decedent.  
Wood v. Shepard, 38 Ohio St.3d at 89, 526 N.E.2d at 1092.  While the action 
itself arises out of the death of the decedent, the action is brought for the 
“exclusive benefit” of decedent’s next of kin.  R.C. 2125.02(A)(1).  In that regard, 
the wrongful death itself and the relationship between the decedent and his next of 
kin are inextricably intertwined.  It is axiomatic that there would be no cause of 
action for wrongful death without both a wrongful death and the existence of at 
least one living statutory beneficiary of the decedent.  Thus, we agree with the 
court of appeals that the language “loss of consortium or injury to the 
relationship” encompasses all derivative claims, including claims for wrongful 
death. 
 
The remainder of paragraph one of the “Limits of Liability” section is also 
clear.  In construing this remaining policy language, we find that the Mid-Century 
policy does clearly and unambiguously restrict all wrongful death claims to a 
single per-person policy limit.  This section provides that the “each person” limit 
of $100,000, as shown on the declarations page of the policy, is the maximum 
amount available for bodily injury sustained by any person in any one accident.  
Only one person, Shane Parker, sustained bodily injury.  The “bodily injury” 
sustained by Parker was his death.  Bodily injury is defined in the Mid-Century 
policy as including death.  Because we have concluded that the phrase “injury to 
the relationship” encompasses wrongful death claims, any claim arising from the 
wrongful death of Shane Parker is included in the single each-person policy limit. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
Therefore, we hold that the language of the Mid-Century policy restricting 
all wrongful death claims to the single each-person policy limit is clear and 
unambiguous. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in all 
respects. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I agree with that 
part of the majority opinion that addresses whether the wrongful death claims can 
be limited to a single per-person limit.  But because the majority also reaches and 
resolves an issue that is not before this court, I respectfully dissent from the 
syllabus and that part of the opinion regarding R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). 
I 
 
The majority devotes several pages to interpreting the “amounts available 
for payment” language in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  In fact, the majority goes so far as 
to “affirm” the court of appeals on this issue and carry its interpretation over to 
the syllabus.  The syllabus and analysis of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), however, are 
gratuitous because the issue is not even before this court.  Neither party appealed 
the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion that interpreted the “amounts available 
for payment” language.  Although Clark mentioned the issue in her brief to this 
court, we did not accept jurisdiction over this issue.  Accordingly, the only issue 
actually raised here is whether Mid-Century’s policy properly limited wrongful 
death claims to a single per-person limit.  By “deciding” the R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) 
question, the majority reaches out to address an issue not directly presented by 
this case.  See Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 201, 203-
January Term, 2001 
21 
204, 724 N.E.2d 787, 789 (choosing not to render an “advisory opinion” on an 
issue not directly presented).  The result is syllabus law crafted from nothing more 
than dicta. 
II 
 
Even if the “amounts available for payment” language in R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) were before the court in this cause, I would nevertheless dissent 
because I view the majority decision as misconstruing the validity of Motorists 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Andrews (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 362, 604 N.E.2d 142, 
misappropriating authority reserved to the General Assembly, and misapplying 
the statute’s “triggering” provision.  Following an overview of pre-1994 R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2), I shall discuss each point in turn. 
A.  R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) Pre-S.B. 20 
 
The version of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) in effect prior to the passage of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 (“S.B. 20”) served three functions: 
 
First, the subsection’s opening sentence set the minimum amount of 
underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM coverage”) to be offered by an insurer: 
“Underinsured motorist coverage * * * shall be in an amount of coverage 
equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage * * *.”  
142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1739. 
 
Second, the subsection’s first sentence also established that UIM coverage 
was triggered for the insured only “where the limits of coverage available for 
payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance 
policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the 
insured’s uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident.”  This 
triggering language explicitly mandates a limits-to-limits comparison.  Id. at 
1739-1740. 
 
Third, the subsection’s second sentence explained how the limits of an 
insured’s recovery were to be calculated: “The limits of liability for an insurer 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, 
less those amounts actually recovered under all applicable bodily injury liability 
bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.”  Id. at 1740. 
 
This court interpreted the triggering language in Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co. 
(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 243, 553 N.E.2d 658.  We held that “[u]nless otherwise 
provided by an insurer, underinsured motorist liability insurance coverage is not 
available to an insured where the limits of liability contained in the insured’s 
policy are identical to the limits of liability set forth in the tortfeasor’s liability 
insurance coverage.”  Id., syllabus. 
 
Nearly three years later, the court revisited the triggering provision of 
former R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) in Andrews, 65 Ohio St.3d 362, 604 N.E.2d 142.  
Specifically, the court addressed “whether underinsured motorist coverage is 
available to an insured where the tortfeasor’s policy limit is greater than the 
insured’s policy limits but the claims of multiple claimants have resulted in 
undercompensation of the insured’s injuries.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 364, 604 
N.E.2d at 144.  In finding that such circumstances triggered underinsured motorist 
coverage, the court construed the phrase “the limits of coverage available for 
payment” in the first sentence of subsection (A)(2) to mean “the amount actually 
available for payment” under the tortfeasor’s policy.  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
366, 604 N.E.2d at 145-146. 
 
The court again considered former R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) in Savoie v. 
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809.  There, we 
addressed whether multiple parties could recover UIM benefits when the limits of 
the UIM policy involved are identical to the limits of the tortfeasor’s liability 
policy.  Id. at 508, 620 N.E.2d at 815.  Savoie explicitly overruled Hill’s limits-to-
limits comparison and held that “[a]n underinsurance claim must be paid when the 
individual covered by an uninsured/underinsured policy suffers damages that 
exceed those monies available to be paid by the tortfeasor’s liability carriers.”  Id., 
January Term, 2001 
23 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  With this holding, the Savoie court implicitly 
construed “the limits of coverage available for payment” to mean “the amounts 
which the tortfeasor’s insurer has already paid.”  Id. at 508, 620 N.E.2d at 815.  
Notably, while the language of the Savoie construction varies slightly from the 
construction set forth in Andrews, the result of the Savoie holding is the same as 
the holding in Andrews.  Neither case’s interpretation of the R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) 
triggering provision, however, is consistent with the intent of the General 
Assembly. 
B.  Legislative Intent and the R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) Triggering Provision 
 
By reaching the setoff issue, the majority implicitly accepts that UIM 
coverage has first been triggered.  But the majority ignores that the legislature 
expressly stated that it intended to supersede the interpretation of the triggering 
provision espoused in Andrews and Savoie.  In so doing, the General Assembly 
intended to provide for a limits-to-limits comparison in the triggering provision.  
And once a limits-to-limits comparison is done in this case, UIM coverage is not 
triggered, and the setoff question is not even reached. 
 
The majority of this court continues to indulge its preferred public policy.  
It evaluates the practical consequences of construing R.C. 3937.19(A)(2) as a 
limits-to-limits comparison and, finding the consequence of such a construction 
unpalatable, repeatedly concludes that this simply cannot be what the legislature 
intended. 
 
I find that the plain language of the triggering provision mandates a limits-
to-limits comparison.  But even assuming arguendo that the statute is ambiguous, 
the court may consider, in addition to other matters, not just the object of the 
statute and the consequences of a particular construction, but also “[t]he 
circumstances under which the statute was enacted,” “the legislative history,” and 
“[t]he common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same 
or similar subjects.”  R.C. 1.49(B), (C), and (D).  It is axiomatic that “[a]mbiguity 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
in a statute should be resolved by examining the legislative intent of the statute.”  
Delli Bovi v. Pacific Indemn. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 343, 345, 708 N.E.2d 
693, 694. 
 
The majority relies heavily upon the purported absence of a legislative 
explanation for the altered language of the setoff provision, stating that “[w]e find 
it significant that nowhere in the S.B. 20 amendments to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), 
either in the codified or uncodified sections, does the General Assembly indicate 
any intent, expressed or implied, to legislatively supersede our decision in 
Andrews.”  The majority would thus presume that Andrews’s interpretation of the 
triggering provision remains valid.  But the uncodified law states: 
 
“It is the intent of the General Assembly in amending division (A)(2) of 
section 3937.18 of the Revised Code to supersede the effect of the holding of the 
Ohio Supreme Court in the October 1, 1993 decision in Savoie v. Grange Mut. 
Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, [620 N.E.2d 809], relative to the application 
of underinsured motorist coverage in those situations involving accidents where 
the tortfeasor’s bodily injury liability limits are greater than or equal to the limits 
of the underinsured motorist coverage.”  Section 7, S.B. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part 
I, 238. 
 
Given such an explicit expression of legislative intent, I cannot agree that 
the General Assembly intended to adhere to the Andrews-Savoie construction of 
the triggering provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  Because Savoie and Andrews 
contain the same erroneous interpretation of the statute, superseding Savoie has 
the practical effect of superseding Andrews.  The “triggering” sentence of R.C. 
3937.18(A)(2) should therefore not be interpreted pursuant to the Andrews-Savoie 
“amount recovered to limits of UIM coverage” comparison.  Rather, the 
uncodified law should be viewed as evincing an intent to correct this court’s prior, 
erroneous interpretation of the triggering provision set forth in Andrews and 
January Term, 2001 
25 
Savoie and to reinforce the limits-to-limits comparison that the plain language of 
the statute warrants. 
 
I note that the effect of the statutory scheme is not to vitiate the actual 
existence of UIM coverage as some may claim.  Rather, the insured has purchased 
coverage that, as with much insurance, is subject to context-specific 
determinations of applicability.  While the policy may not provide accessible 
coverage in regard to a specific claim, depending upon a limits-to-limits 
comparison, the policy may at the same time remain fully accessible in another 
claim.  The insured chooses the amount of coverage he desires and is free to 
contract for greater levels of coverage that would increase the likelihood of 
applicability. 
C.  The Public Policy Behind R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) 
 
Instead of acknowledging the uncodified law, the majority continues to 
rely upon “the public policy behind the enactment of the underinsured motorist 
statute, as well as the statutory language” to conclude that “the purpose of 
underinsured (and uninsured) motorist coverage is to treat injured automobile 
liability policyholders the same whether a tortfeasor is underinsured or 
uninsured.”  I disagree for two reasons. 
 
First, the express words chosen by the General Assembly in the enacted 
statute and in the uncodified law evince a public policy contrary to that policy 
espoused by the majority.  The second sentence of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) as 
amended by S.B. 20 states, as the majority recognizes, that underinsured motorist 
coverage is not excess insurance to other applicable coverages.  That sentence 
provides that “[u]nderinsured motorist coverage * * * shall be provided only to 
afford the insured an amount of protection not greater than that which would be 
available under the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage if the person or persons 
liable were uninsured at the time of the accident.”  (Emphasis added.)  145 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 210-211.  While this declaration of purpose does not preclude equal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
recovery, neither does it guarantee equal recovery.  Rather, the sentence operates 
only as a limitation on the amount of recovery through UIM coverage.  Because a 
statute is to be read in its entirety, the first sentence of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) as 
described in the foregoing discussion demonstrates the intent to permit potentially 
different results under UM versus UIM coverage.  Even if this provision is 
construed as ambiguous, the previously addressed, probative, uncodified law 
found in S.B. 20 reveals the legislative intent to overrule expressly the Andrews-
Savoie rationale and to preserve the limits-to-limits comparison in the triggering 
provision, however inequitable a result it may at times produce.  See Section 7, 
S.B. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 238. 
 
Second, this court’s past articulation of the presumed public policy 
underlying the statutory scheme lacks support.  In James v. Michigan Mut. Ins. 
Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 386, 389, 18 OBR 440, 443, 481 N.E.2d 272, 274, the 
court stated: 
 
“Underinsured motorist coverage was first required by statute after the 
legislature discovered the ‘underinsurance loophole’ in uninsured motorist 
coverage—i.e., persons injured by tortfeasors having extremely low liability 
coverage were being denied the same coverage that was being afforded to persons 
who were injured by tortfeasors having no liability coverage.  Thus, the original 
motivation behind the enactment of [former] R.C. 3937.181(C) was to assure that 
persons injured by an underinsured motorist would receive at least the same 
amount of total compensation that they would have received if they had been 
injured by an uninsured motorist.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The articulation of public policy set forth in James should not be, and 
cannot be, regarded as authoritative.  This is so because there is no authority 
supporting James’s declaration of public policy, as a review of the legislative 
history of R.C. 3937.18 and 3937.181 reveals. 
January Term, 2001 
27 
 
The passage of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 22 in 1979 amended former R.C. 
3937.18 and enacted former R.C. 3937.181.  138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1459.  The 
amendments to former R.C. 3937.18 related to UM coverage and are not germane 
here.  Rather, the present inquiry is concerned with the enactment of former R.C. 
3937.181. 
 
Former R.C. 3937.181(A) defined underinsured motorist coverage and 
explained its application: 
 
“As used in this section, ‘underinsured motorist coverage’ means coverage 
in an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy protecting an insured against 
loss for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, where the limits of 
coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability 
bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are 
insufficient to pay the loss up to the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage 
limits.”  138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1459. 
 
This provision did not guarantee UIM recovery equal to the amount 
recoverable under UM coverage.  Rather, much like the second sentence of 
current R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), former R.C. 3937.181(A) expressly limited UIM 
recovery to no more than the amount recoverable under UM coverage.  This 
cannot be said to have created the guarantee of equal recovery that James and its 
progeny proclaimed as the public policy behind the statutory scheme. 
 
Nor does former R.C. 3937.181(C) support such public policy.  Yet, the 
James majority stated that the claimed public policy motivated the enactment of 
that specific section.  James, 18 Ohio St.3d at 389, 18 OBR at 443, 481 N.E.2d at 
274-275.  It was only in later decisions that the court stated that this “public 
policy” underlies the entirety of the statutory scheme.  Neither construction was 
correct, as former R.C. 3937.181(C) provided: 
 
“The benefits provided under underinsured motorist coverages shall be 
subject to the same provisions as to denial of coverage, insolvency, subrogation, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
or off-set as provided in uninsured motorist coverage under divisions (B), (C), and 
(D) of section 3937.18 of the Revised Code.”  138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1460. 
 
Former R.C. 3937.181(C) simply made various sections of the uninsured 
motorist statute applicable to underinsured coverage.  Former R.C. 3837.18(B), 
for example, defined when a motor vehicle was to be classified as uninsured.  
Section (C) of that statute permitted a right of subrogation and offset, qualified by 
insolvency proceedings and “subject to the terms and conditions of [uninsured] 
coverage.”  Id. at 1459.  Finally, section (D) precluded offset of workers’ 
compensation recovery.  Id.  None of these sections articulated a public policy 
guaranteeing equal recovery regardless of whether a tortfeasor was underinsured 
or uninsured.  Nor did they create a scheme whereby that would always be the end 
result.  Instead, these statutory provisions simply placed qualifications and 
protections upon UIM recovery, once such recovery could be had under the 
statutory scheme.  Therefore, there is simply no statutory support for the 
purported “public policy” animating James. 
 
Nonetheless, this court cited James’s articulation of the purported public 
policy underlying former R.C. 3937.181 as supporting the result reached in Hill, 
50 Ohio St.3d at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 661.  Such reliance was misplaced.  In Hill, 
the court addressed a situation in which the injured insured happened to receive 
the same amount of recovery from UIM coverage that he would have received 
under UM coverage, not because of the purported public policy, but because he 
was a single claimant who had purchased the same UIM and UM coverage limits.  
Cf. Beagle v. Walden (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 59, 63, 676 N.E.2d 506, 508-509 
(explaining that because “[i]nsureds purchase their levels of protection,” an 
insured who purchases equal UM/UIM coverage and who is the only claimant “is 
guaranteed total recovery for an accident up to those policy limits, regardless of 
the tortfeasor’s insurance status”).  The Hill court’s reference to James’s public 
January Term, 2001 
29 
policy was not dispositive, then, but merely mischaracterized the natural result of 
Hill as an outgrowth of public policy. 
 
James’s “public policy” soon became an enabling mantra, relied upon to 
ignore the actual language of the triggering provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2).  See, 
e.g., Savoie, 67 Ohio St.3d at 508, 620 N.E.2d at 815; Andrews, 65 Ohio St.3d at 
364-365, 604 N.E.2d at 144-145 (both citing James).  To accept James’s 
declaration of public policy is to accept judicial fiat as capturing the supposed will 
of the people.  The expressed will of the people as set forth in the statutory 
language and uncodified law, however, rejects the majority’s claimed public 
policy. 
 
With its analysis here, the majority uses this “public policy” to reject the 
legislature’s decision and again decides what the UM/UIM insurance law of this 
state should be.  But the role of a court is not to decide what the law should say; 
rather, the role of this court is to interpret what the law says as it has been written 
by the General Assembly—regardless of whether it constitutes sound policy.  
Cablevision of the Midwest, Inc. v. Gross (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 639 
N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (“A court’s role is to interpret, not legislate”). 
D.  UIM Coverage is not Triggered in This Case 
 
Following this court’s decisions in Andrews and Savoie, the General 
Assembly amended the setoff provision of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) in 1994 with the 
passage of S.B. 20.  Both the S.B. 20 version and current R.C. 3937.18(A)(2)5 
provide: 
 
“The policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage shall be reduced 
by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability 
                                                          
 
5. The General Assembly amended other sections of R.C. 3937.18 in 1997 (147 Ohio Laws, Part 
II, 2372), 1999 (S.B. No. 57), and 2000 (Sub.S.B. No. 267).  These amendments did not alter 
those provisions of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) discussed herein. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.”  145 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 211. 
 
In considering this amended language—specifically the change from 
“amounts actually recovered” to “amounts available for payment”—the majority 
concludes that the legislature intended to adhere to this court’s pre-S.B. 20 
interpretation in Andrews of what “amounts available for payment” means.  Such 
reasoning espouses the view that the 1994 amendment to the statute was merely 
cosmetic, then, as it would have effected no substantive change. 
 
Not only does this case fail to present this issue to this court, but this case 
also could not properly present the setoff issue, because UIM coverage is not even 
triggered under the policies involved here.  As the majority concedes, Andrews 
interpreted the triggering provision of (A)(2) and not the setoff provision.  While 
Andrews construed “the limits of coverage available for payment” in the 
triggering provision of subsection (A)(2) to mean “the amount actually available 
for payment”—essentially the same as “those amounts actually recovered” in the 
language of the former setoff sentence of the subsection—this interpretation was 
erroneous both then and now.  Andrews, 65 Ohio St.3d at 366, 604 N.E.2d at 145-
146.  The Andrews-Savoie rationale has not only been superseded; moreover, it 
was predicated on an unsupported perception of public policy and was contrary to 
the plain language of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2). 
 
That statute’s plain language both provided and provides for a limits-to-
limits comparison in the triggering provision.  In this case, the tortfeasor’s 
liability coverage was in the amount of $100,000 per person.  Clark’s UIM policy 
also had a $100,000 per-person limit.  Therefore, under the limits-to-limits 
comparison mandated by the first sentence of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), Clark’s UIM 
coverage is not triggered.  The statute’s setoff provision is therefore irrelevant. 
III 
January Term, 2001 
31 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I decline to reach an issue not presented by this 
case and then elevate resulting dicta to the level of syllabus law.  Further, were 
the issue presented, I would hold (1) that the intent of the General Assembly in 
S.B. 20 was to make clear that a limits-to-limits comparison is used in 
determining whether UIM coverage applies, and (2) that because the limits of the 
tortfeasor’s coverage are the same as the UIM coverage in this case, the issue of 
setoff is never reached. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Lamkin, Van Eman, Trimble, Beals & Rourke and Thomas W. Trimble; 
Crew, Buchanan & Lowe and Jeffrey A. Swillinger, for appellant. 
 
Smith, Rolfes & Skavdahl Co., L.P.A., Matthew J. Smith and James P. 
Nolan II, for appellee. 
 
Elk & Elk Co., L.P.A., and Todd O. Rosenberg, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________