Title: Florida Bar v. TIKD Services LLC

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-149 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
TIKD SERVICES LLC, A FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY, and CHRISTOPHER RILEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 
FOUNDER OF TIKD SERVICES, LLC, 
Respondents. 
 
October 14, 2021 
 
LAWSON, J. 
We have for review a referee’s report on the petition of The 
Florida Bar (Bar) to enjoin respondents, TIKD Services, LLC and 
Christopher Riley (collectively TIKD), from engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  The referee recommends that we 
dismiss the Bar’s petition with prejudice.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.; see also R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-7.1.  For 
the reasons that follow, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommendation, conclude that TIKD is engaged in the 
 
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unauthorized practice of law, and permanently enjoin it from 
engaging in such acts in the future. 
BACKGROUND 
 
In January 2018, the Bar filed a two-count petition against 
TIKD alleging that it engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, 
and that it held itself out to the public via its website and 
advertisements as qualified to provide legal services.  A referee was 
appointed to consider the petition, as well as several motions filed 
by the parties.  The referee granted summary judgment in favor of 
TIKD and submitted a report with the following findings and 
recommendations. 
TIKD Services, LLC is not a law firm, and its chief executive 
officer, Christopher Riley, is not a member of the Bar.  TIKD 
operates a website and mobile application through which a driver 
can receive legal assistance in the resolution of a traffic ticket.  A 
driver who receives a traffic ticket in one of the four counties in 
which TIKD operates can request services by creating an account 
with TIKD via its website, agreeing to its Terms of Service, and 
uploading a picture of his or her traffic ticket.  TIKD then analyzes 
the ticket to determine whether it should provide any services to the 
 
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driver.  If TIKD declines the ticket, the driver is notified, and he or 
she is not charged a fee.  If TIKD accepts a ticket, the driver is 
charged a percentage of the ticket’s face value, and his or her 
contact information is forwarded to a Florida-licensed attorney 
whom TIKD has contracted with to provide traffic ticket defense 
services to its customers.  All costs associated with defending the 
traffic ticket are paid by TIKD, including any court costs or 
assessed fines.  TIKD does not guarantee that a driver’s case will be 
resolved favorably and provides a full refund if points are ultimately 
assessed against a driver’s license. 
A driver who agrees to TIKD’s Terms of Service specifically 
authorizes it to do the following: 
Representation.  By using the TIKD Properties and 
purchasing the Services, you authorize us to hire an 
independent licensed attorney on your behalf to 
represent you on all matters concerning the license plate 
number and traffic ticket number submitted by you with 
the TIKD Properties and to make payments to such 
independent licensed attorney on your behalf. 
 
The attorneys TIKD contracts with are paid a flat rate per case, 
regardless of the case’s outcome.  The fee paid to each attorney is 
set by TIKD and is paid from the fee it collects from each driver.  
Each attorney is free to accept or decline representation of any 
 
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driver, and drivers are likewise free to accept or decline 
representation from any attorney.  If representation is accepted, the 
attorney communicates directly with the driver and handles all 
aspects of his or her ticket defense case. 
On these facts, the referee determined that TIKD is not 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and that it does not 
advertise in a way that would lead a reasonable person to believe it 
is offering legal services to the public.  The referee found that TIKD 
provides only administrative and financial services, and that its 
payment of attorney’s fees on behalf of drivers did not convert its 
services into the practice of law, given that rules 4-1.8(f) and 4-
5.4(d) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules) authorize 
third-party payment of attorney’s fees.  She further found that all 
legal services were provided by Florida-licensed attorneys, and that 
there was no evidence TIKD’s services place the public at risk of 
being advised or represented by unqualified persons in legal 
matters.  The referee ultimately recommended that a judgment be 
entered in favor of TIKD and that the Bar’s petition be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
 
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The Bar, consistent with Bar Rule 10-7.1(f), filed an objection 
to the referee’s report, challenging the conclusion that TIKD is not 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  TIKD filed a response 
to the objection, and two amicus briefs were filed; one in support of 
the Bar from a group of private practice lawyers, collectively referred 
to as “Florida Private Practice Lawyers,” and another in support of 
TIKD from Consumers for a Responsive Legal System (Responsive 
Law) and the Center for Public Interest Law. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In this case, the referee granted summary judgment in favor of 
TIKD, concluding that no material facts were in dispute and that 
TIKD was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  This 
Court reviews a referee’s entry of summary judgment de novo.  Fla. 
Bar v. Gold, 937 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2006); Fla. Bar v. Rapoport, 
845 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. 2003).  We agree that no material facts 
are in dispute in this case.  From our review of the record, it is 
abundantly clear how TIKD operates, the nature of the services it 
provides, and the content of its advertisements.  The only question 
before this Court is thus whether TIKD, as a matter of law, is 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
 
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Under article V, section 15 of the Florida Constitution, this 
Court has the authority to “regulate the admission of persons to the 
practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.”  Included 
within this constitutional mandate is the authority to define what 
constitutes the practice of law, as well as the authority to regulate 
the activities of persons admitted or authorized to so practice.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 417 (Fla. 1980); State ex rel. Fla. 
Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 1962), vacated on other 
grounds by 373 U.S. 379 (1963).  Also included is the authority to 
prohibit unlicensed persons from engaging in acts constituting the 
practice of law.  Moses, 380 So. 2d at 417. 
 
In defining the practice of law, we have resisted attempts to 
formulate a singular, all-encompassing definition, as the practice 
itself “must necessarily change with the everchanging business and 
social order.”  Fla. Bar re Advisory Opinion—Medicaid Planning 
Activities by Nonlawyers, 183 So. 3d 276, 285 (Fla. 2015) (quoting 
Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1978)).  
Nevertheless, in assessing whether certain acts constitute the 
practice of law, we generally consider the following: 
 
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[I]n determining whether the giving of advice and counsel 
and the performance of services in legal matters for 
compensation constitute the practice of law it is safe to 
follow the rule that if the giving of such advice and 
performance of such services affect important rights of a 
person under the law, and if the reasonable protection of 
the rights and property of those advised and served 
requires that the persons giving such advice possess legal 
skill and a knowledge of the law greater than that 
possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of such 
advice and the performance of such services by one for 
another as a course of conduct constitute the practice of 
law. 
 
Sperry, 140 So. 2d at 591. 
The referee in this case did not apply the above factors in 
determining that TIKD was not engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  She instead primarily relied on her finding that 
TIKD provides only administrative and financial services, and that it 
delegates all substantive legal matters to Florida-licensed attorneys.  
Having considered the Sperry factors, however, we conclude that 
they support a finding that TIKD is engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
First, the services TIKD provides have the potential to 
substantially affect whether a driver timely receives legal 
representation and the quality of the representation he or she 
receives.  The ability to timely obtain quality representation in a 
 
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traffic citation matter, as well as the satisfaction of all assessed 
fines and costs, has the potential to substantially affect a driver’s 
rights under the law, such as whether he or she retains the 
privilege of driving or has points assessed against his or her license.  
See id. at 591; see also §§ 318.15 (Failure to Comply with Civil 
Penalty or to Appear; Penalty), 322.27 (Authority of Department to 
Suspend or Revoke Driver License or Identification Card), Fla. Stat. 
(2020). 
TIKD advertises the legal services that are at the core of its 
business model directly to the public and thereby directly solicits 
drivers with legal problems.  When a driver engages its services, 
TIKD conducts a business review of his or her legal matter to 
determine whether it can profitably handle the case (with 
profitability as the only apparent criterion considered).  It then 
either rejects the representation or sends the case to one of the 
lawyers it contracts with.  TIKD could routinely miss critical 
deadlines that substantially impair the legal rights of its clients.  It 
could also fail in its contractual obligation to pay fines owed, 
resulting in a client’s loss of driving privileges or other legal 
sanctions.  However, because TIKD is not a lawyer, this Court 
 
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would be powerless to act for the protection of the public.  See art. 
V, § 15, Fla. Const.1 
Second, TIKD collects money from its legal clients and 
promises to use that money to pay any court costs or fines that the 
legal client incurs as a result of the traffic citation.  If a lawyer took 
up-front money from a client to satisfy monetary obligations 
anticipated to be incurred at the conclusion of a legal proceeding, 
the lawyer would be required to hold that money in trust for the 
benefit of the client.  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1(a).  Because TIKD 
is not a law firm, there are no protections in place to safeguard the 
money of these legal clients and thereby assure that the money is 
actually available to satisfy the future legal obligations associated 
with the legal matter. 
Third, an inherent conflict and corresponding risk to the 
public arises whenever a nonlawyer like TIKD controls and derives 
its income from the provision of legal services.  Like any other 
 
1.  The fact that TIKD apparently does not routinely miss legal 
deadlines is of no consequence because the precedent we would set 
by allowing this nonlawyer entity to directly advertise legal services 
and accept legal clients would necessarily open the door for any 
nonlawyer to similarly control the provision of legal services in the 
same way—and with no oversight from this Court. 
 
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business entity, TIKD is motivated by a desire to maintain and 
increase profitability.  When coupled with the provision of legal 
services to the public, there is a risk that such motives will 
eventually give rise to a conflict between the profit demands of the 
nonlawyer and the professional obligations of attorneys to act in the 
interests of a client.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2).  TIKD is 
not subject to the Bar’s jurisdiction and, other than Bar discipline 
proceedings against individual attorneys, there is no means by 
which to protect the public or guard against such conflicts. 
Fourth, as a nonlawyer, TIKD simply lacks the skill or training 
to ensure the quality of the legal services provided to the public 
through the licensed attorneys it contracts with, nor does it possess 
the ability to ensure compliance with the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or to otherwise guard against the type of conflict discussed 
above.  By contrast, if this were a law firm, its owners would be 
ethically required to properly supervise any less-experienced 
lawyers to whom they assigned a legal matter, see R. Regulating 
Fla. Bar 4-5.1(a)-(b), and those owners would possess the legal 
training that would prepare them for that supervision.  Nowhere is 
TIKD’s lack of skill or training in the legal profession more evident 
 
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than in its advertisements, which include statements such as, 
“TIKD provides you with a more convenient, more cost-effective 
alternative to hiring your own lawyer or using a lawyer referral 
service.”  Such advertisements are likely to lead a reasonable 
person to believe that utilizing TIKD’s services is equivalent to or a 
substitute for hiring an attorney.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Becerra, 661 
So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1995) (enjoining respondent from advertising 
in a manner that may lead a reasonable person to believe that she 
is capable of providing legal services).  In the end, the reasonable 
protection of a driver’s legal rights and interests in a traffic citation 
matter require that the type of services TIKD provides and 
advertises to the public be performed or overseen by a person who 
possesses a knowledge and skill in the law greater than that 
possessed by the average citizen.  See Sperry, 140 So. 2d at 591. 
The referee also failed to cite any cases or rules authorizing a 
comparable bifurcation of responsibilities between lawyers and 
nonlawyers with respect to the provision of legal services.  A review 
of our case law reveals that we have unanimously determined 
similar arrangements to constitute the unauthorized practice of 
law, particularly when the arrangement resulted in a nonlawyer 
 
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either deriving income from or exercising a degree of control over 
the provision of legal services. 
In Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc., 
386 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1980), we adopted a referee’s recommendation 
to enjoin a corporation operated by nonlawyers from offering legal 
services to the public through licensed attorneys in its employ.  Id. 
at 798-801.  The referee in the case found that the respondent 
improperly exercised a degree of control over the legal services 
provided by the attorneys in its employ by engaging in acts typically 
reserved to those licensed to practice law.  Id. at 799.  Specifically, 
the referee found that the respondent controlled which legal 
services were offered, determined on what matters attorney time 
was spent, set and collected fees for legal services, and established 
policies for the advance payment of fees and costs.  Id. 
The referee in Consolidated Business ultimately concluded, 
however, that even if the respondent somehow changed its business 
practices to no longer exercise a degree of control over the attorneys 
in its employ and the provision of legal services, its inability to 
generate income from means other than the provision of legal 
 
- 13 - 
services was dispositive of whether it was engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Id.  The referee explained: 
Assuming that these practices could be corrected by the 
respondent, would the respondent then be free of the 
charge of unauthorized practice?  It is the finding of this 
Referee that this question must be answered in the 
negative.  The respondent has shown no other means of 
producing income other than by the providing of legal 
services which is clearly the practice of law.  Were the 
respondent to cease the providing of such services, then 
it would cease to exist as an income producing 
enterprise.  The nature of the corporate business is such 
that it must be deemed to be engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law with or without the 
examples of lay control . . . . 
 
Id. 
We quoted this analysis with approval in Consolidated 
Business and today reaffirm the principle that only attorneys 
licensed to practice law in Florida are authorized to act like a law 
firm by advertising and selling the legal services of lawyers to the 
public unless authorized by our rules.2  Therefore, we readily 
conclude that the nature of TIKD’s business is such that it cannot 
 
2.  While we reaffirm the test outlined in Consolidated 
Business for determining what conduct constitutes the practice of 
law, we also note that this Court can authorize nonlawyer 
organizations to profit from the marketing of legal services—and has 
done so.  See infra note 3. 
 
- 14 - 
be deemed as anything other than engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  As in Consolidated Business, TIKD exercises a 
degree of control over the attorneys it contracts with and the 
services they provide.  TIKD screens all traffic tickets and selects 
which matters, and correspondingly which legal issues, get 
assigned to an attorney, as well as the timing of that assignment.  
TIKD’s Terms of Service, not a licensed attorney, designate when an 
attorney-client relationship is initiated.  The fee paid to each 
attorney is set and collected by TIKD, and the contract TIKD enters 
into with each attorney requires that the attorney provide legal 
services in accordance with the “TIKD Guidelines,” which “describe 
the Attorney’s responsibilities in providing Services to each [driver].” 
Further, just like Consolidated Business and Legal Forms, 
TIKD has no means of producing income except through the 
provision of legal services—i.e., the representation of clients in a 
civil or criminal county court proceeding.  That is, TIKD is in the 
business of selling legal services to the public.  If it stopped 
contracting with attorneys, TIKD could not legally represent drivers 
in court proceedings, and its business would cease to exist. 
 
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More recently, we also addressed a similar business model in 
Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion—Medicaid Planning Activities by 
Nonlawyers, 183 So. 3d 276.  There, nonlawyer Medicaid planning 
companies advertised legal services to the public, accepted 
members of the public as clients, and employed attorneys to provide 
the legal services for which the planning companies collected a fee.  
We determined that “unless the client establishes an independent 
attorney-client relationship with the attorney, payment from the 
client is directly to the attorney, and the initial determination that 
the particular legal document or Medicaid planning strategy is 
appropriate for the client given the client’s particular factual 
circumstances is the determination of the attorney, then the 
company would be engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.”  Id. 
at 284 (quoting committee’s opinion with approval).  TIKD is 
engaged in the unlicensed practice of law under this test.  Although 
TIKD’s customers ultimately appear to establish an independent 
attorney-client relationship with one of TIKD’s contractually 
retained lawyers, the other two factors are clearly not met. 
We are convinced that our precedent in this area is sound 
given “the inherent danger of the [unregulated] intervention of lay 
 
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persons or organizations in the attorney-client relationship,” 
Consolidated Business, 386 So. 2d at 801.  Many of the dangers 
inherent in this type of intervention have already been addressed, 
as we explained how the ethical standards governing lawyers and 
law firms would apply to prohibit a law firm from dealing with legal 
clients (and their money) in the same way that TIKD does.  The 
bottom line is that “[a]n attorney in dealings with his client must 
exercise a much higher standard of good faith than is required in 
ordinary business dealings or arm’s length transactions.”  Brigham 
v. Brigham, 11 So. 3d 374, 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).  Were we to 
abandon these higher standards by allowing nonlawyer entities 
unburdened by them to profit from the commoditization of legal 
services—through the unregulated marketing and sale of a lawyer’s 
time—it would be difficult, if not impossible, to logically defend 
constraining the income potential of law firms by regulating their 
dealings with legal clients. 
Ideally, these regulations would be unnecessary.  They are, 
after all, designed to enforce high standards of conduct that would 
naturally flow, without regulation, from a professional culture in 
which attorneys are routinely inculcated with classic virtues such 
 
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as courage, truthfulness, diligence, humility, and an internalized 
ethic that places fidelity to just action, client loyalty, and support 
for the institutions that make freedom under the rule of law 
possible above raw financial gain.  We will certainly not jettison 
these ideals by sanctioning the unregulated commoditization of 
legal services—a paradigm shift that would put corporations 
governed solely by the profit motive between lawyers and their 
clients.3 
 
 
3.  We fully acknowledge that TIKD appears to have found a 
profitable business niche that capitalizes on an unusually high rate 
of traffic citation dismissals, resulting in a very “good deal” for most 
of the corporation’s legal clients.  We also acknowledge that Mr. 
Riley appears to run that business well and would presumably 
continue to do so—unless the anomalies that cause the high 
dismissal rate in those jurisdictions where his algorithm predicts a 
profit margin are corrected.  It could be argued, therefore, that TIKD 
in some ways increases affordable access to our justice system.  
However, irrespective of any benefits arguably created by TIKD’s 
unique, and perhaps temporary, niche, we cannot address the 
access to justice problem by allowing nonlawyer corporations to 
engage in conduct that, under this Court’s sound precedent, 
constitutes the practice of law. 
We recognize that advances in technology have allowed for 
greater access to the legal system through readily available legal 
forms, which represent the commoditization of legal work products 
that at one time were only readily accessed by hiring lawyers.  
Although continuing advances in technology could offer similar 
opportunities, those issues should be explored through this Court’s 
rulemaking process—see R. Regulating Fla. Bar 1-12.1—where 
 
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Two final points merit mention.  First, the referee in this case 
also determined that TIKD is simply paying for an attorney on 
behalf of a driver and that Bar Rules 4-1.8(f) and 4-5.4(d) authorize 
such payments by third parties.  Bar Rules 4-1.8(f) and 4-5.4(d) 
authorize an attorney to accept payment for services from a third-
party if the client gives informed consent, there is no interference 
with the attorney’s professional judgment, and information related 
to the representation is protected.  The two rules, as well as the rest 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, define what conduct attorneys 
may engage in and do not establish the boundary between what is 
or is not the practice of law.  Further, the two rules are not even 
implicated under the facts of this case.  TIKD designates a portion 
of the fee it collects from drivers for the payment of the attorney it 
retains on the driver’s behalf.  That is, TIKD does not use third-
party funds to pay the attorney, but instead uses the driver’s own 
 
differentiation is possible and where all ramifications can be fully 
explored with all interested parties.  Cf. In re Amends. to Rules 
Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7 (Law. Referral Servs.), 238 
So. 3d 164, 165 (Fla. 2018) (amending Bar Rule 4-7.22 to authorize 
and regulate nonlawyer “Qualified Providers” that receive a 
monetary or other benefit for the referral of prospective clients to 
lawyers or law firms). 
 
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funds, essentially holding the designated portion of the collected fee 
in trust for the benefit of the driver. 
Finally, TIKD contends that it plainly discloses its nonlawyer 
status to the public on its website and in its Terms of Service, and 
that the Bar has produced no evidence of harm to the public.  
However, TIKD’s disclosure of its nonlawyer status to the public 
does not permit it to do what its status as a nonlawyer prohibits it 
from doing.  See § 454.23 (Attorneys at Law; Penalties), Fla. Stat. 
(2020).  There is also no requirement in cases involving the 
unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law that the Bar produce 
evidence of actual harm to the public; rather, the potential for such 
harm is sufficient.  See Moses, 380 So. 2d at 417.  The inherent 
conflict that arises when a nonlawyer either derives income from or 
exercises a degree of control over the provision of legal services 
presents a substantial risk that the public will be exposed to and 
harmed by “incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible 
representation.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, the referee’s recommendation is disapproved.  
Respondents, TIKD Services, LLC, a foreign limited liability 
 
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company, and Christopher Riley, individually and as founder of 
TIKD Services, LLC, are hereby permanently and perpetually 
enjoined from engaging in the acts complained of, as well as any 
other acts constituting the unauthorized practice of law in the State 
of Florida. 
 
The Bar has requested that the costs of this proceeding be 
taxed against TIKD.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-7.1(d)(2).  The 
Court reserves ruling on the request until the Bar files an affidavit 
of costs. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
COURIEL, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON and 
MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, C.J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree that our precedents regarding the unauthorized 
practice of law support the Bar’s position in this case.  I therefore 
concur in enjoining the Respondents from the acts complained of 
and other acts constituting the unauthorized practice of law.  In my 
view, any reexamination of the policy judgments reflected in our 
 
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precedents on this subject should be undertaken in the context of 
rule proceedings related to proposed amendments to the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar. 
COURIEL, J., dissenting. 
 
TIKD formulated no legal strategy.  It gathered no evidence.  It 
filed no court papers.  It made no court appearances, no arguments 
to a judge or jury.  Other than in explaining its offerings on its 
website, it answered no questions.  It did not, because it could not, 
promise its customers that their communications would be 
privileged.  In short, if you had hired TIKD to solve your legal 
problem and received only what the company offered—without the 
services of the member of The Florida Bar it helped you find—you 
probably would have wanted your money back. 
That is because TIKD offered not legal services, but a business 
proposition: hire a lawyer we introduce, at a fee we set, and you will 
not bear the risk that the lawyer’s services, or indeed your ticket, 
will cost you more than our fee.  Offering that bargain does not 
constitute the practice of law, and thus cannot have constituted the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Because today’s decision reaches well 
beyond our constitutional mandate to “regulate the admission of 
 
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persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons 
admitted[,]” art. V, § 15, Fla. Const., and into the business 
arrangements of people trying to solve their legal problems, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
 
While it is true that we review a referee’s entry of summary 
judgment de novo, majority op. at 5, it is nevertheless worth 
pausing to acknowledge a few of the facts found by the referee in 
this matter. 
 
First, the referee found facts about TIKD’s business model.  
Reduced to its fundamentals, TIKD “provide[d] a technology 
platform and financial guarantee for drivers who have received a 
traffic ticket.”  Report of Referee at 6.  The technology platform was 
familiar to anybody with a smartphone: create an account, read (if 
you like) the company’s terms of service,4 visit (if you like) a link 
containing answers to “frequently asked questions,” then click in 
 
4.  Those terms state, in bold text, that the agreement forms 
no attorney-client relationship between TIKD and the customer, and 
that TIKD is not a law firm.  ROA at 86.  Additionally, and 
importantly, they state that TIKD will not provide services in 
connection with criminal and serious infractions.  ROA at 87. 
 
- 23 - 
agreement if you decide to proceed.  The financial guarantee was 
perhaps less familiar,5 but not complicated.  TIKD offered its 
customers a degree of certainty about the financial impact of 
defending a traffic ticket.  Customers paid more than zero, but no 
more than TIKD’s fee, which it set based on its assessment of what 
was likely to happen.  TIKD thus bought the upside potential of a 
positive financial outcome (when the ticket was resolved for less 
than what the customer was charged) and bore the downside risk of 
loss (when it was not, including when financial penalties and points 
were assessed).  TIKD charged no fee to potential customers whose 
tickets it declined to match with an attorney.  If TIKD did, in fact, 
make a match, it calculated its fee without discussion or 
negotiation with the customer. 
 
5.  Less familiar, that is, to those of us who are not financial 
professionals.  Those who are might see in TIKD’s product more 
than a passing resemblance to a hedge.  See Hedge, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“To use two compensating or offsetting 
transactions to ensure a position of breaking even; esp., to make 
advance arrangements to safeguard oneself from loss on an 
investment, speculation, or bet, as when a buyer of commodities 
insures against unfavorable price changes by buying in advance at 
a fixed rate for later delivery.”).  The Bar does not, at least in this 
case, argue that it would be improper for a lawyer to offer such a 
financial bargain. 
 
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Second, setting aside the majority’s conclusion that, as a 
matter of law, TIKD’s advertisements constituted legal advice—to 
which we will come later—the referee found that, as a matter of fact, 
TIKD did not give legal advice.  See Report of Referee at 6 (“In the 
process of deciding whether to accept a ticket, TIKD does not give 
the driver any legal advice or tell the driver about available defenses 
or the likelihood of a fine.”); id. at 7 (“TIKD does not give legal advice 
or provide legal representation to ticketed drivers.”).  From the 
“frequently asked questions” section of its website, where today’s 
majority finds impermissible attorney advertising, the referee 
quoted as follows: 
Why should I choose to use TIKD? 
 
TIKD provides a simple, cost-effective option for you to 
take action on your traffic ticket.  Remember, we are not a 
law firm and we do not provide legal advice.  We’re number 
crunchers and technology lovers and we’re here to offer you 
a new way to handle your traffic ticket. 
 
 Can’t I hire a lawyer to do the same thing for me? 
 
You sure can!  And we encourage you to do the 
research and make an informed choice on what’s best for 
you and your individual case. . . . 
 
 Can I talk to the lawyer who will handle my case? 
 
 
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Absolutely.  Your lawyer is YOUR lawyer.  Once we 
have reviewed and verified your traffic ticket you will be 
provided with your lawyer’s contact information.  You can 
contact your lawyer directly and TIKD does not participate 
in your relationship with your lawyer. 
 
 Do I have to pay my lawyer separately? 
 
No.  A portion of what you pay to TIKD will go directly 
to your lawyer.  The amount you pay to TIKD is all you will 
ever have to pay. 
 
Id. at 10.  TIKD did not, for example, participate in attorney-client 
communications over which a customer could plausibly assert the 
privilege; that is, communications in anticipation of litigation, in 
which advice tailored to the client’s particular case presumably 
would have occurred.  See id. at 8 (“Drivers communicate directly 
and confidentially with their attorneys, not through TIKD.”).  TIKD 
expressly advised potential customers that it was “not an attorney 
and does not provide any legal advice . . . ALL LEGAL MATTERS 
ARE HANDLED BY INDEPENDENT LICENSED ATTORNEYS HIRED 
ON YOUR BEHALF.  TIKD WILL NOT PROVIDE YOU WITH ANY 
LEGAL ADVICE OR DISCUSS THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF YOUR 
CASE WITH YOU.”  Id. at 9.  In sum, nobody claims, nor is there 
any evidence, that TIKD gave any customer individualized legal 
advice about his or her ticket or case; that anybody mistakenly 
 
- 26 - 
thought TIKD was a law firm; or that TIKD directed or interfered 
with the customer’s attorney’s legal work. 
Third, and again leaving aside the status of this conclusion as 
a legal matter, the referee found that TIKD’s customers did in fact 
enter into independent relationships with the attorneys matched 
individually to their cases.  Having determined that a ticket met its 
criteria, TIKD would pass the driver’s contact information and ticket 
to a licensed Florida attorney, who was free to accept or decline the 
opportunity to work for TIKD’s customer, at a rate of compensation 
set by TIKD.  If the attorney accepted, his or her representation of 
TIKD’s customer would be governed by an engagement letter 
negotiated between the two of them, without any involvement by 
TIKD.  The customer, meanwhile, was free to decline TIKD’s 
proposed match for any reason.  If the attorney declined, TIKD 
might send the customer’s information to another candidate; if 
there were no takers, TIKD gave the driver a full refund, and off he 
or she went to find a lawyer the old-fashioned way.  Report of 
Referee at 7.  Where there was a match, however, attorney and 
client worked and communicated directly together, with no 
participation by TIKD—which, crucially, had no control over how 
 
- 27 - 
the legal services were rendered, and no participation in the defense 
of the ticket.  At the end of the day, if the ticket was dismissed, 
TIKD kept its fee; if a fine was assessed, TIKD paid it, whether it 
was more or less than its fee; and if points were assessed, TIKD 
gave the customer a full refund.  Id. at 8. 
Fourth, and finally, the Bar does not allege, and provided the 
referee no evidence, that any customer complained about or was 
harmed by TIKD’s work.  The record contains no evidence of any 
complaints to the Bar about any of the independent lawyers to 
whom TIKD’s customers were introduced. 
The Bar’s complaint against TIKD alleged two violations 
amounting to the unauthorized practice of law: first, that TIKD 
advertised in a fashion that would lead a reasonable lay person to 
believe TIKD was qualified to offer legal services to the public; and 
second, that TIKD in fact offered legal services through members of 
The Florida Bar in a way that “violate[d] the letter and spirit” of our 
cases.  The referee disagreed on both counts. 
 
 
 
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II 
A 
 
As this Court noted in Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 
417 (Fla. 1980), “[t]he single most important concern in the Court’s 
defining and regulating the practice of law is the protection of the 
public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible 
representation.” 
Here, the record contains no evidence that the public received 
any incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representation due to 
TIKD’s business.  The lawyers to whom TIKD introduced its users 
were all members of the Florida Bar, subject to its rules and to its 
(and our) discipline.  We have been directed to no alleged 
malpractice, or even dissatisfaction, involving lawyers matched with 
their clients by TIKD.  We therefore cannot conclude, on this record, 
that the public needed the Bar’s protection from TIKD, or that its 
operations even once had a negative effect on the administration of 
justice.  But see Fla. Bar v. Neiman, 816 So. 2d 587, 596 (Fla. 2002) 
(“[D]efining the practice of law must be considered in the context of 
our obligation to protect the public . . . .  [T]he major purpose for 
prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law is to protect the 
 
- 29 - 
consuming public from being advised and represented in legal 
matters by unqualified persons who may put the consuming 
public’s interests at risk.”); Fla. Bar v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 
984 (Fla. 1993) (finding that it was necessary to enjoin a man and 
his company from publishing “kits” used for seeking legal relief and 
assisting debtors in bankruptcy because this constituted the actual 
practice of law which was in fact detrimental to the public). 
B 
Today’s majority winds up protecting something else: the 
traditional way people find, or fail to find, satisfactory counsel for 
traffic tickets, and the business interests that have come to rely on 
the way things have generally been.  The majority finds no “cases or 
rules authorizing a comparable bifurcation of responsibilities 
between lawyers and nonlawyers with respect to the provision of 
legal services.”  Majority op. at 12.  That presumes, incorrectly, that 
it is up to us to authorize how people in a free market bargain with 
lawyers and nonlawyers to address their legal problems.  If we have 
such authority, it is not given to us by our constitution, which says 
merely that we “regulate the admission of persons to the practice of 
law and the discipline of persons admitted.”  Art. V, § 15, Fla. 
 
- 30 - 
Const.  That mandate cannot be read to include a plenary power to 
regulate the business models of lawyers or their firms, to say 
nothing of nonlawyers and their enterprises. 
TIKD’s business model required it to accept tickets that could 
likely be resolved at a cost of production (that is, the amount it 
would pay to counsel, plus its overhead) lower than the fee the 
customer was willing to pay.  Nothing about that calculation would 
be different if TIKD was run by an attorney—because, after all, it is 
a calculation, followed by an investment of money, and not legal 
advice followed by the defense of a case. 
TIKD, the Bar says, cannot produce income without lawyers 
practicing law.  That is also true of parties who provide litigation 
finance,6 who do not themselves give legal advice or do other legal 
 
6.  See Paul Sullivan, Pandemic is Expected to Bring More 
Lawsuits, and More Backers, New York Times, June 19, 2020 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/your-money/lawsuits-
litigation-finance-coronavirus.html (explaining that litigation 
financing companies are “nonrecourse financing” arrangements, 
“meaning if the company or lawyers lose the case, they don’t owe 
the investors anything,” which allows law firms and companies to 
minimize risk while still having access to working capital); Connie 
Loizos, This Young Litigation Finance Startup Just Secured $100 
Million to Chase Cases it Thinks Will Win, Tech Crunch, Sept. 18, 
2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/17/this-young-litigation-
finance-startup-just-secured-100-million-to-go-after-cases-it-
 
- 31 - 
work.  It is true of insurers who hire lawyers for their covered 
customers.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.8(f), 4-5.4(d).7  It is true 
of court reporters, people who prepare trial graphics, and indeed an 
entire economy incident and complementary to the practice of law 
 
thinks-are-winners/ (describing a start-up litigation financing 
company and stating that litigation financing is, “[i]n a nutshell . . . 
fund[ing] plaintiffs and law firms in cases where it looks like there 
will be a winning ruling”); Jacob Gershman, Lawsuit Funding, Long 
Hidden in the Shadows, Faces Calls for More Sunlight, The Wall 
Street Journal, Mar. 21, 2018 8:00 AM, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-funding-long-hidden-in-the-
shadows-faces-calls-for-more-sunlight-1521633600 (reporting that 
as of December 31, 2017, the top four litigation financing funds 
raised a total of $1.2 billion); Sara Randazzo, Litigation Funding 
Moves into Mainstream, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 4, 2016 3:20 
PM, https://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-funding-moves-into-
mainstream-1470338402 (describing the increasing availability of 
litigation funding to investors other than large hedge funds, 
including individual “accredited investors” as that term is defined 
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); Mattathias 
Schwartz, Should You be Allowed to Invest in a Lawsuit?, New York 
Times, Oct. 22, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/should-you-be-
allowed-to-invest-in-a-lawsuit.html (describing the historical and 
modern use of litigation financing and reporting that one of the 
larger funds, formerly known as IMF Bentham and now known as 
Omni Bridgeway, had as of 2015 a portfolio of 39 cases with a value 
of over $2 billion). 
7.  Though it cites them, the majority reassures us these rules 
“are not even implicated under the facts of this case.”  Majority op. 
at 19.  And while well that thankfully may be, it is not because any 
logical principle limits the majority’s conclusion from affecting those 
rules.  
 
- 32 - 
that we have neither the constitutional authority nor the capacity to 
regulate. 
C 
We have not purported to have that authority in our cases.  
We did not do so in State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 
587 (Fla. 1962) vacated on other grounds by 373 U.S. 379 (1963).  
There, we prohibited a man not licensed to practice law in Florida 
from, among other things, holding himself out to the public as a 
patent attorney; rendering legal opinions; preparing, drafting and 
construing documents; and “otherwise engaging in the practice of 
law.”  Id. at 596.  As we said there: 
The reason for prohibiting the practice of law by 
those who have not been examined and found qualified to 
practice is frequently misunderstood.  It is not done to 
aid or protect the members of the legal profession either 
in creating or maintaining a monopoly or closed shop.  It 
is done to protect the public from being advised and 
represented in legal matters by unqualified persons over 
whom the judicial department can exercise little, if any, 
control in the matter of infractions of the code of conduct 
which, in the public interest, lawyers are bound to 
observe.   
 
Id. at 595.  TIKD, of course, did not advise or represent in legal 
matters any of its customers, who received those legal services from 
 
- 33 - 
duly licensed Florida attorneys, subject at all times to our 
discipline. 
Nor is the majority’s decision today compelled by Florida Bar v. 
Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 
1980).  In that case, we considered a company that was expressly 
“in the business of offering legal services through members of The 
Florida Bar who [we]re its full time employees.”  Id. at 798.  There 
as here, the officers and stockholders of the company were “non-
lawyers with no legal training,” but those nonlawyers “supervise[d] 
and control[led] the day to day business of the corporation” as it 
advised and performed legal services for clients.  Id.  The company, 
through its nonlawyer employees, limited the amount of client 
conference time per individual case, promulgated legal forms to be 
used as part of the legal services rendered, and had access to the 
files and work product generated by its lawyer employees on behalf 
of its customers.  Id. at 799.  Further, the company terminated its 
lawyer employees at will, holding on to client files when it did so, 
and not notifying clients when their matters were transferred to new 
lawyers.  Most importantly, the referee in that matter found that the 
company’s practices “resulted in injury or inadequate 
 
- 34 - 
representation of [its] clients,” several of which the referee 
specifically identified as having been prejudiced.  Id. at 800. 
On those very different facts, we concluded that the business 
in question was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and 
found it illustrated “the inherent danger of the intervention of lay 
persons or organizations in the attorney-client relationship.”  Id. at 
801.  We have been solicitous of that relationship, and rightfully so.  
See Fla. Bar re Advisory Op.—Medicaid Planning Activities by 
Nonlawyers, 183 So. 3d 276 (Fla. 2015) (finding that nonlawyers 
were impermissibly practicing law when they drafted personal 
service contracts, prepared and executed qualified income trusts, 
and gave legal advice about the implementation of Florida law to 
obtain Medicaid benefits).  But TIKD did not exercise similar control 
over anybody’s attorney-client relationship, direct the way legal 
services were rendered, or control any lawyer’s legal advice. 
Nor have we been given evidence that TIKD’s actions harmed 
anybody.  This is in stark contrast to the documented harm that 
occurred to clients in both Medicaid Planning Activities by 
Nonlawyers and Consolidated Business & Legal Forms, Inc.  See 
Medicaid Planning Activities by Nonlawyers, 183 So. 3d at 285 
 
- 35 - 
(“Testimony described the type of harm caused by nonlawyer 
Medicaid planners which includes denial of Medicaid eligibility, 
exploitation, catastrophic or severe tax liability, and the purchase of 
inappropriate financial products threatening or destroying clients’ 
life savings.”); see also Consol. Bus. & Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 
at 800 (approving referee report finding that company’s actions 
“resulted in injury or inadequate representation of [its] clients”).  
Tellingly, in both of those cases, the documented harm was directly 
caused by nonlawyers engaging in substantive legal work for their 
clients. 
D 
Next, we come to the majority’s decision that “TIKD advertises 
the legal services that are the core of its business model directly to 
the public and thereby directly solicits drivers with legal problems.”  
Majority op. at 8.  There is no dispute that TIKD advertised directly 
to the public.  And yet it advertised not its legal services or the legal 
services of any particular lawyer, but the financial bargain and 
attorney introduction described on its website.8  See Report of 
 
8.  While the record contains evidence of no such thing, the 
majority fears “TIKD could routinely miss critical deadlines that 
 
- 36 - 
Referee at 10 (quoting language about TIKD’s services from its 
“Frequently Asked Questions” page on its website); see also ROA at 
181 (screenshot of TIKD’s former website describing “What TIKD 
Does”). 
The parties to the communication matter, because “regardless 
of a putative client’s subjective beliefs, there can be no attorney-
client relationship when the client does not consult with the 
attorney, especially when there is no contact between them.”  
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1282 
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Fla. Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 
1996)).  TIKD’s advertisements were non-attorney communications, 
subject to the prohibitions on misleading advertisement generally 
applicable in Florida.  See §§ 817.41, 817.44, Fla. Stat. (2020). 
 
substantially impair the legal rights of its clients” or “fail in its 
contractual obligation to pay fines owed, resulting in a client’s loss 
of driving privileges or other legal sanctions.”  Majority op. at 8-9.  
TIKD might also abscond with its customers’ money, leaving 
nothing to pay the state if and when fines come due.  Id. at 9.  
Worst of all, “because TIKD is not a lawyer, this Court would be 
powerless to act for the protection of the public.”  Id.  Even as 
monsters under the bed go, these vanish with particular dispatch.  
This Court is not powerless to act where there has been a breach of 
contract and is not confined to remedying only those injuries to 
people’s rights and interests committed by lawyers. 
 
- 37 - 
So, too, does the content of the communication matter.  If 
what TIKD’s website contains—a list of options, not specifically 
addressed to any client, about certain legally permissible responses 
to a traffic ticket—constitutes legal advice, then so does Florida’s 
Uniform Traffic Citation, which itself lists “options.”9  To hold that 
so generalized a communication constitutes advice strains the word 
beyond its generally accepted meaning, which, especially as applied 
to lawyers, generally connotes learned and informed counsel.10  It is 
strange indeed that we have seized upon a company’s having told 
consumers that they have options to put it out of business. 
 
9.  The Florida Uniform Traffic Citation promulgated by the 
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles gives the 
recipient the option to (1) pay the fine, (2) contest the citation, or (3) 
take a driver improvement course.  If the driver elects to take the 
driver improvement course, there is a reduction in the applicable 
fine.  See Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Traffic 
Citations, flhsmv.gov/traffic-citations/ (last visited July 6, 2021). 
10.  Advice is “guidance offered by one person, esp. a lawyer, 
to another; professional counsel.”  Advice, Black’s Law Dictionary 
(11th ed. 2019); see also Advice, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 
1989) (“guidance or recommendations concerning prudent future 
action, typically given by someone regarded as knowledgeable or 
authoritative”). 
 
- 38 - 
III 
 
The practice of law is not, or at least it is not just, the manner 
and means of competition among lawyers for clients’ work.  Nor is it 
synonymous with any particular method for determining who gets 
access to legal services and at what price.  We do not protect the 
profession or the public when we equate the practice of law to these 
things.  I fear we have done that in this case, and in so doing, 
reached beyond our constitutional grasp. 
POLSTON and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Kellie D. Scott, Chair, 
Standing Committee on Unlicensed Practice of Law, William A. 
Spillias, Unlicensed Practice of Law Counsel, and Algeisa Maria 
Vazquez, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; and 
Chris W. Altenbernd of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Christopher M. Kise of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, Florida; 
and Ramón A. Abadin of Ramón A. Abadin, P.A., Coral Gables, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents 
 
Gregg D. Thomas and James J. McGuire of Thomas & Locicero PL, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
- 39 - 
for Amici Curiae Gold & Associates, P.A. d/b/a The Ticket 
Clinic, Joseph Lorusso, P.A., The Law Offices of Lou Arslanian, 
Steven Bell, Esq., and The Law Offices of H. A. Rodriguez 
 
Raoul G. Cantero of White & Case LLP, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Responsive Law and Center for Public 
Interest Law