Title: Mayhugh v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1023 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Adam R. Mayhugh, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections and Redgranite Correctional 
Institution, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Gary Hamblin, Michael A. Dittmann, John A. Doe, 
John B. Doe, ABC Engineering Company, DEF 
Construction Company, GHI Insurance Company, JKL 
Insurance Company, MNO Insurance Company and PQR 
Insurance Company, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waushara 
 
JUDGE: 
Guy D. Dutcher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs. (Opinion Filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Nicholas Andrew Wagener and Bollenbeck Fyfe SC, Appleton, and 
oral argument by Nicholas Andrew Wagener. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, the cause was argued by 
Karla Z. Keckhaver, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2015 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2013AP1023 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV124) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Adam R. Mayhugh, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections and Redgranite Correctional 
Institution, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Gary Hamblin, Michael A. Dittmann, John A. Doe, 
John B. Doe, ABC Engineering Company, DEF 
Construction Company, GHI Insurance Company, 
JKL Insurance Company, MNO Insurance Company 
and PQR Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Petitioner, Adam R. Mayhugh, 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming an order of the circuit court that dismissed his tort 
action against the State and the Department of Corrections 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
2 
 
(DOC).1  The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that 
recovery was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
¶2 
Mayhugh contends that sovereign immunity does not 
apply to the DOC.  He maintains that by granting the DOC broad 
powers, the legislature established the DOC as an independent 
going concern.  Based on his determination that the DOC is 
independent from the state, Mayhugh concludes that the DOC is 
not entitled to the sovereign immunity accorded to the state.  
In the alternative, Mayhugh asserts that the statutory grant of 
power to the DOC to sue and be sued should be interpreted as an 
express waiver of sovereign immunity. 
¶3 
We conclude that the DOC is entitled to sovereign 
immunity.  The DOC lacks sufficient attributes to render it an 
independent going concern.  Despite the breadth of its statutory 
powers, 
the 
character 
of 
those 
powers 
reveals 
that 
the 
legislature did not intend the DOC to be anything other than an 
arm of the state. 
¶4 
We further conclude that the legislature has not 
expressly waived the DOC's sovereign immunity.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 301.04 (2011-12),2 which permits the DOC to sue and be sued, is 
not an express waiver of the DOC's tort immunity but rather 
addresses the DOC's capacity to be sued.  Accordingly, we affirm 
                                                 
1 Mayhugh v. State, No. 2013AP1023, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 3, 2014) (affirming order of the circuit 
court for Waushara County, Guy D. Dutcher, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
3 
 
the court of appeals' determination that Mayhugh's suit against 
the DOC is barred by sovereign immunity. 
I 
¶5  In 2011 Mayhugh, then an inmate at Redgranite 
Correctional Institution (Redgranite), attended a baseball game 
in Redgranite's recreational yard.  Staff directed him to sit in 
the bleachers to watch the game.  While he was sitting there, 
one of the players hit a foul ball, which flew into the 
bleachers and hit Mayhugh in the head.  As a result, Mayhugh 
suffered a fracture to his right temporal lobe and a severed 
artery that led to a blood clot, strokes, and acute respiratory 
failure.                                                                    
¶6 
Mayhugh subsequently filed a complaint against the 
state of Wisconsin, the DOC, Redgranite, unnamed construction 
and engineering companies, and unnamed insurers.  The complaint 
alleged negligence in the design of the baseball field and 
asserted that spectators were not protected from foul balls, 
that Redgranite failed to remedy the situation, and that Mayhugh 
was injured as a result. 
¶7 
The DOC moved for dismissal, arguing that as a state 
agency it was entitled to sovereign immunity.  It explained that 
the state had not consented to suit and therefore the court 
lacked personal jurisdiction. 
¶8 
After Mayhugh amended the complaint to include the 
Secretary of the DOC, the warden of Redgranite, and two unnamed 
officers as defendants, the DOC submitted another motion to 
dismiss.  It again claimed sovereign immunity.  Additionally, it 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
4 
 
asserted that Mayhugh had failed to comply with the notice 
requirements for suits against state employees and therefore 
failed to state a claim against them.  
¶9 
The circuit court granted the DOC's motion.  The court 
agreed with the DOC that it was entitled to sovereign immunity 
under the Wisconsin Constitution unless the state had waived 
such immunity by consenting to be sued.  It observed that 
although the legislature had provided that the DOC could "sue 
and be sued," a number of authorities have declined to construe 
such language as a waiver.  It then concluded that the State had 
not consented to suit.  The court further determined that 
Mayhugh failed to comply with the notice statute for suits 
against state employees.  Accordingly, it determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction over the state employee defendants. 
¶10 Mayhugh appealed the portion of the decision relating 
to sovereign immunity.  He contended that the defense of 
sovereign immunity is unavailable because the DOC is an 
independent going concern and not an arm of the state.  In the 
alternative, he advanced that the legislature waived sovereign 
immunity for the DOC by enacting Wis. Stat. § 301.04, which 
permits the DOC to sue and be sued.    
¶11 The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit 
court.  Mayhugh v. State, No. 2013AP1023, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 3, 2014).  It observed that in Lindas v. 
Cady, 142 Wis. 2d 857, 861-63, 419 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1987), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 150 Wis. 2d 421, 441 N.W.2d 705 
(1989), it determined that the phrase "sue and be sued" was not 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
5 
 
consent for suit against the DOC's predecessor agency, the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  Id. at 2.  Given that 
holding, it concluded that the language in Wis. Stat. § 301.04 
was not a waiver of sovereign immunity.  Id.  The court of 
appeals further determined that the DOC was not an independent 
political body or an independent state agency, and therefore was 
not exempted from sovereign immunity.  Id. at 3. 
II 
 
¶12 We are asked to determine whether the circumstances of 
this case fall within either of the two asserted scenarios 
rendering sovereign immunity inapplicable to a state entity.  
Specifically, whether the legislature created the DOC in a 
manner that renders it an independent going concern, which acts 
neither as the state's arm nor its agent, and whether the 
legislature has expressly waived the DOC's sovereign immunity.  
Both of these issues present questions of law which we review 
independently of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and 
court of appeals.  Canadian Nat'l R.R. v. Noel, 2007 WI App 179, 
¶5, 304 Wis. 2d 218, 736 N.W.2d 900. 
III 
¶13 We begin with the first scenario rendering sovereign 
immunity inapplicable: the creation of an independent state 
entity.  The sovereign immunity derived from Article IV, Section 
27 of the Wisconsin Constitution protects the state from suit.  
Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 N.W.2d 610 
(1976).  Generally, for purposes of sovereign immunity, an 
action against a state agency or board is deemed an action 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
6 
 
against the state.  Bahr v. State Inv. Bd., 186 Wis. 2d 379, 
387-88, 521 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1994).  However, when the state 
creates an entity independent from the state, which acts as 
neither its arm nor its agent, such entity falls outside the 
protection of sovereign immunity.  Majerus v. Milwaukee Cnty., 
39 Wis. 2d 311, 315, 159 N.W.2d 86 (1968).  Cases often refer to 
such entities as "independent going concerns."  See, e.g., 
German v. Wisconsin DOT, 2000 WI 62, ¶18, 235 Wis. 2d 576, 612 
N.W.2d 50; Townsend v. Wisconsin Desert Horse Ass'n., 42 Wis. 2d 
414, 424, 167 N.W.2d 425 (1969); Majerus, 39 Wis. 2d at 314. 
¶14 This 
court 
first 
referred 
to 
independent 
going 
concerns in Sullivan v. Bd. of Regents, 209 Wis. 242, 244 N.W. 
563 (1932).  There, the plaintiff brought suit against the Board 
of Regents, asserting that the State had waived sovereign 
immunity by creating the Board as a body corporate. The court 
disagreed, stating that although the Board was a body corporate, 
it was merely an arm of the state.  Id. at 244. 
¶15 To explain its conclusion, the court observed that the 
Board lacked the following attributes: it had "no power to raise 
money by taxation"; it could "not incur any liability beyond the 
amount appropriated to it by act of the legislature"; "the title 
to all property acquired by [the Board] is held by it in trust 
for the state"; the Board "may not dispose of real property 
without express authority from the state"; "[the Board's] power 
to dispose of personalty is limited"; and "[a]ll funds belonging 
to the institution, whether derived from appropriations or from 
the sale of property, are in the custody of the state treasurer 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
7 
 
and can only be disbursed on a warrant drawn by the secretary of 
state."  Id. at 244.   
¶16 The absence of these attributes indicated that if the 
plaintiff were to recover a judgment against the Board, "there 
would be no property out of which execution could be satisfied."  
In other words, if the Board created liability, "it is a 
liability of the state and must be enforced as other liabilities 
against the state are enforced."  Id. at 245.  Accordingly, the 
court determined that nothing in the statutes indicated any 
intention that the Board be an independent going concern, and 
sovereign immunity applied.  Id. at 244. 
¶17 As Sullivan suggests, the determination that a state 
entity is an independent going concern is a narrow exception to 
sovereign immunity.  Canadian Nat'l R.R., 304 Wis. 2d 218, ¶7.  
To date, our case law has identified only three entities that 
fall into this category: the State Armory Board, the State 
Housing Finance Authority, and the State Investment Board.  
Majerus, 39 Wis. 2d 311; State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 
Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973); Bahr, 186 Wis. 2d 379. 
¶18 In Majerus, 39 Wis. 2d 311, the court considered 
whether the State Armory Board was an independent going concern.  
The legislature had designated the Armory Board as "a body 
politic and corporate" with the power "to sue and be sued."  Id. 
at 315.  It had also granted the Board the powers to convey real 
estate, dispose of personal property, hold and disburse its own 
funds independent of state warrants, borrow money, and issue and 
sell bonds and other evidences of indebtedness to accomplish its 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
8 
 
purposes.  Id. at 314-15.  The court acknowledged that an entity 
need not have all of the powers enumerated in Sullivan in order 
to be independent.  Id. at 315.  It determined that the 
designation of the Board as a body politic and corporate, 
combined with the Board's broad proprietary powers, rendered it 
an independent going concern, outside the scope of sovereign 
immunity.  Id.  
¶19 The court conducted a similar inquiry with regard to 
the State Housing Finance Authority in Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391.  
It noted that although the legislature had stated that the 
Authority was "a public body corporate and politic," the court 
must look beyond that denomination and independently consider 
"the powers and structure conferred upon the entity in order to 
determine its nature."  Id. at 424. 
¶20 The court reviewed the broad proprietary powers the 
legislature granted to the Authority: 
The Authority, pursuant to sec. 234.03, is granted all 
the powers "necessary or convenient" to implement its 
public purpose, including but not limited to the power 
to sue and be sued; to have perpetual existence; to 
make and execute contracts; to incur debt; to acquire 
and dispose of mortgages or security interests; to 
acquire leaseholds, real or personal property or any 
interest therein; and, under certain conditions, to 
own, hold, clear, improve and rehabilitate and to 
sell, 
assign, 
exchange, 
transfer, 
convey, 
lease, 
mortgage or otherwise dispose of or encumber the same.  
Id. at 424.  Turning its attention to the fiscal powers, the 
court continued: 
The Authority has the power to hold and disburse its 
own funds independent of state warrants. It has the 
power to borrow money and issue and sell bonds and 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
9 
 
other evidences of indebtedness to accomplish its 
purposes. Its debts thus created are satisfied out of 
rents and interest the Authority receives from the 
property the Authority acquires and the investments it 
makes. 
Id.  Acknowledging that the proprietary and fiscal powers 
supported the legislature's declaration that the Authority was 
an independent entity, the court determined that the Authority 
"is neither an arm nor agent of the state."  Id. at 425. 
¶21 Likewise, the State Investment Board was declared an 
independent going concern in Bahr, 186 Wis. 2d 379.  To support 
this determination, the court identified the following statutory 
features of the Board: its broad authority to manage and invest, 
sell, reinvest, and collect income and rents, to employ outside 
counsel and contractors, and to acquire, manage, and sell real 
estate without Department of Administration (DOA) participation; 
the power to sue and be sued; the legislature designated it as a 
body corporate, and the legislature's stated intent that the 
Board be an independent agency of the state.  Id. at 396, 399.  
Thus, the court determined that the Board was "ineligible to 
raise the defense of sovereign immunity."  Id. at 399. 
¶22 Majerus, 
Nusbaum, 
and 
Bahr 
demonstrate 
that 
in 
determining whether a state entity is an independent going 
concern, courts should consider both the character and breadth 
of the statutory powers granted to the entity.  We observe that 
the entities at issue in those cases shared some common 
features: they were authorized to sue and be sued, they were 
created as a body corporate or politic, they had powers 
indicating budgetary autonomy, and they had the power to hold 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
10 
 
and convey real estate.  Although the presence of this 
combination of features will generally weigh in favor of 
independence and therefore ineligibility for sovereign immunity, 
we caution that it is a totality of the circumstances analysis 
and no one factor is determinative.  
¶23 Applying these factors to the DOC, we conclude that it 
is not an independent going concern.  The DOC has only one of 
the attributes identified in Majerus, Nusbaum, and Bahr: the 
ability to sue and be sued.  The DOC was not established as a 
body politic or body corporate.  Additionally, it lacks 
budgetary autonomy as it is funded by general state revenue,  
has a budget controlled by the appropriation process and the 
DOA, 
and 
cannot 
incur 
any 
liability 
beyond 
the 
amount 
appropriated to it. Wis. Stat. §§ 16.50(1)(a), 20.410, 301.10.  
Further, the DOC is subject to state controls in the purchase of 
real estate, goods, and services.  Wis. Stat. §§ 16.848, 
301.235(2)(a).  We could find no other statutory powers that 
would suggest that the DOC is anything other than an arm of the 
state. 
¶24 The various statutory powers identified by Mayhugh do 
not support his assertion that the DOC is an independent going 
concern.  Specifically, Mayhugh points to a number of the DOC's 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
11 
 
statutory powers relating to managing finances3; the DOC's 
limited contracting power4; the DOC's limited powers with respect 
to real estate5; and the DOC's general purpose, right to govern 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 301.10 (the power to audit bills and make 
payments); Wis. Stat. § 301.075 (authorization to withdraw or 
disburse moneys deposited in a public depository to the credit 
of the DOC); Wis. Stat. § 301.085 (the power to make benefit 
payments and charge counties for making those payments); Wis. 
Stat. § 301.105 (the power to collect commissions from telephone 
companies); Wis. Stat. § 301.12 (the power to enforce and seek 
judgments, compel payments, charge interest, present documents 
in 
court 
to 
seek 
payment, 
and 
appoint 
counsel 
to 
seek 
enforcement of collection and deportation); Wis. Stat. § 301.05 
(the DOC's ability to accept gifts, grants, or donations, and to 
hold money in trust). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 301.065 (power to contract with religious 
organizations); Wis. Stat. § 301.07 (power to contract with the 
federal government); Wis. Stat. § 301.031 (contracting powers 
for youth programs); Wis. Stat. § 301.08 (power to contract for 
the purchase of goods, care, and services for incarcerated 
individuals and individuals supervised by the DOC). 
5 Wis. Stat. § 301.235 (the authorization to construct and 
refinance indebtedness for construction of new buildings, convey 
title on property owned by the DOC, lease property and assign 
revenues coming in from the properties); Wis. Stat. § 301.24 
(condemnation power to acquire land, sell excess land, purchase 
land and lease land); Wis. Stat. § 301.37 (design control and 
approval authority over various facilities in Wisconsin).  
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
12 
 
and a number of powers relating to the care, custody, and 
control of inmates6.  We address each in turn. 
¶25 First, the financial powers referred to by Mayhugh 
must be considered in light of the fact that the DOC's funds are 
controlled 
by 
the 
legislature 
through 
the 
appropriations 
process.  Wis. Stat. § 20.410.  Additionally, the DOC cannot pay 
its bills until they have been audited under the supervision of 
the DOA.  Wis. Stat. § 301.10.  Further, all payments must be 
made on the warrant of the DOA.  Id.  Thus, the overarching 
character of the DOC's budget does not support a conclusion that 
the DOC is independent of the state. 
¶26 Likewise, the contracting powers identified by Mayhugh 
do not convince us that the DOC is independent.  These powers 
are limited to contracts with specific parties and contracts for 
specific purposes.  Notably, the DOC's ability to contract for 
youth programs is limited to available revenues and subject to 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 301.001 (purpose of avoiding sole reliance on 
incarceration); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
301.03 
(general 
corrections 
authority); Wis. Stat. § 301.02 (power to maintain and govern 
correctional institutions); Wis. Stat. § 301.055 (power to limit 
the number of prisoners); Wis. Stat. § 301.29 (police powers); 
Wis. Stat. § 301.025 (power to establish a separate division for 
juveniles); Wis. Stat § 301.06 (power to set up its own 
educational system); Wis. Stat. § 301.30 (power to setup an 
independent wage scale for inmates).  Wis. Stat. § 301.035 (the 
establishment of a DOC division for hearings and appeals related 
to parole and probation); Wis. Stat. § 301.045 (the DOC's power 
to investigate, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and make 
recommendations to public or private entities). 
 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
13 
 
the review and approval of the legislature's joint committee on 
finance.  Wis. Stat. § 301.031(2g).  Its ability to contract 
with religious organizations is subject to DOA provisions.  Wis. 
Stat. § 301.065(2).  Further, as noted above, payments for the 
DOC's contracts must be made on the warrant of the DOA.  Wis. 
Stat. § 301.10.  Overall, the limited contracting powers 
identified by Mayhugh do not evince an independent character of 
the DOC. 
¶27 Additionally, contrary to Mayhugh's assertion, the 
real estate powers he identifies reveal that the DOC is not 
independent from the state.  The DOC cannot sell land on its 
own, but must first seek approval of the Building Commission or 
the Joint Committee on Finance.  Wis. Stat. § 301.24(4), (4m).  
Similarly, before purchasing land, the DOC must obtain the 
approval of and release of state building trust funds by the 
Building Commission.  Wis. Stat. § 301.24(5).  Thus, the overall 
character of the DOC's powers with respect to real estate 
support the conclusion that it is dependent on rather than 
independent of the state. 
¶28 Considering the DOC's general purpose and the powers 
granted to it to fulfill that purpose, we fail to see how they 
support a conclusion that the DOC is an independent going 
concern.  Rather than suggesting independence, the statutory 
statement of purpose reveals that the legislature intended the 
DOC to be intertwined with other state programs:  
The purposes of this chapter and chs. 302 to 304 are 
to prevent delinquency and crime by an attack on their 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
14 
 
causes; to provide a just, humane and efficient 
program 
of 
rehabilitation 
of 
offenders; 
and 
to 
coordinate and integrate corrections programs with 
other social services. In creating the department of 
corrections, chs. 301 to 304, the legislature intends 
that the state continue to avoid sole reliance on 
incarceration of offenders and continue to develop, 
support and maintain professional community programs 
and placements. 
Wis. Stat. § 301.001 (emphasis added).  Further, by framing the 
statement of purpose in terms of the purpose of the state, as 
opposed to the purpose of the DOC, the statute suggests a 
legislative intent that the DOC operate as an arm of the state, 
rather than an independent agency. 
¶29 The power to govern correctional institutions and the 
powers relating to the care, custody, and control of inmates do 
not weigh in favor of or against DOC independence.  These powers 
are akin to those granted to other governmental entities to 
fulfill their purpose.  The Board of Regents, for example, has 
similar powers to govern its system, determine the educational 
systems offered within that system, set admission policies, 
police authority, fix salaries, and hold hearings for its 
personnel.  Wis. Stat §§ 36.09(1), 36.11(2), 36.115.  Even with 
these powers the Board of Regents is not an independent going 
concern.  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 292.  These types of powers have 
not been mentioned in our jurisprudence relating to independent 
going concerns and say little about whether an entity is 
independent from the state. 
¶30 Finally, Mayhugh bases a significant portion of his 
arguments on the statutes permitting the DOC to set up and 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
15 
 
regulate the Prison Industries Board.  Wis. Stat. § 303 et seq.  
However, that Board is but a segment of the DOC and is not 
itself the entity being sued.   
¶31 We acknowledge that the Prison Industries Board has 
some budgetary autonomy.  See George v. SC Data Ctr., 884 F. 
Supp. 329, 330 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (explaining that revenues from 
the sale of goods and services produced are applied to service 
debt on any bonds issued under the authority of the state 
legislature to finance Prison Industries programs).  However, 
there is no indication that the revenues produced by the prison 
industries are the primary source of funding for the DOC as a 
whole.  To the contrary, the Prison Industries Board receives 
appropriations from the state for prison industries costs that 
are not covered by its revenues, suggesting that its revenues 
may not even cover its own operations.  Wis. Stat. §§ 20.410, 
20.866(2)(uy).  Therefore, the statutory powers of the Prison 
Industry Board do not support a conclusion that the DOC is an 
independent going concern. 
 
¶32 In sum, the statutory powers granted to the DOC do not 
render it an independent going concern.  Courts must consider 
both the character and breadth of the statutory powers granted 
to the entity when determining whether it is an independent 
going concern.  Here, despite their breadth, the character of 
the DOC's powers reveals that the legislature did not intend for 
the DOC to be anything other than an arm of the state. 
IV 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
16 
 
¶33 Having established that the DOC is not exempt from 
sovereign immunity as an independent going concern, we turn to 
consider whether the state has expressly waived the DOC's 
sovereign immunity.  
¶34 Article IV, Section 27 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: "The legislature shall direct by law in what manner 
and in what courts suits may be brought against the state."    
Courts have traditionally interpreted this language as meaning 
that the state can be sued only with its consent.  Holytz v. 
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 41, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).   
¶35 "[C]onsent to suit may not be implied."  Bahr, 186 
Wis. 2d at 387.  It must be express.  See German, 235 Wis. 2d 
576, ¶17 ("It is axiomatic that the state cannot be sued without 
the express consent of the legislature."); Metzger v. Wisconsin 
Dep't of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 131, 150 N.W.2d 431 (1967) 
("Well established in Wisconsin is the principle that in the 
absence of express legislative permission the state may not be 
subjected to suit."); State ex rel. Martin v. Reis, 230 Wis. 
683, 685, 284 N.W. 580 (1939) ("it is an established principle 
of law that no action will lie against a sovereign state in the 
absence of express legislative permission."). 
¶36 We can find no express waiver of the DOC's sovereign 
immunity.  The court of appeals addressed this issue in Lindas, 
142 Wis. 2d 857.  In that case, the circuit court dismissed on 
sovereign immunity grounds the plaintiff's suit against the 
DOC's predecessor, the Department of Health and Social Services.  
On review, the court of appeals reiterated that "[i]n the 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
17 
 
absence of express legislative authorization, the State of 
Wisconsin may not be sued."  Id. at 861.  It examined whether a 
statute providing that the department could sue and be sued 
provided such authorization and determined that it did not.  Id.   
¶37 The court reasoned that the "sue and be sued" statute 
was created "at a time when Wisconsin enjoyed governmental 
immunity from tort suits."  Id.  It observed that governmental 
immunity was subsequently eliminated in Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d 26.  
It then determined that the fact that Holytz "removed the 
defense of tort immunity" did not permit it to put more meaning 
into the sue and be sued statute.  Id. at 862 (quoting Townsend, 
42 Wis. 2d at 420-21).  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
there was no express consent for tort suit against the 
Department of Health and Social Services.  Id. at 863.   
¶38 The court of appeals subsequently clarified that 
Lindas did not set forth "a blanket rule that legislative 
consent for an agency to sue and be sued [could not] be 
considered a waiver of sovereign immunity."  Bahr, 186 Wis. 2d 
at 392-93.  Rather, the holding in Lindas was limited to tort 
actions.  Id. 
¶39 Because we are considering a tort action against the 
DOC, we determine that Lindas governs.  We acknowledge that 
unlike the statute at issue in Lindas, the statute permitting 
the DOC to sue and be sued was enacted after Holytz.  However, 
the current DOC statute was based on the statute discussed in 
Lindas.  It contains identical language.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.04 ("The department may sue and be sued."); Wis. Stat. 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
18 
 
§ 46.017 (1987-88) ("The department may sue and be sued.").  
Considering this background, we determine that the "sue and be 
sued" language in Wis. Stat. § 301.04 does not constitute an 
express waiver of sovereign immunity for tort suits.  
¶40 As our statutes recognize, not every entity has the 
capacity to sue and be sued.  Wis. Stat. §§ 802.03, 802.06.  In 
other words, not every entity can be named as a party in a 
lawsuit.  See, e.g., Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. 
Indianapolis Athletics Dep't, 510 F.3d 681, 694 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(observing that the Athletics Department "is merely a division 
of the University that is not capable of being sued").  For 
example, Wis. Stat. § 775.01 provides a procedure for the state 
to be sued in contract.  The "sue and be sued" language in Wis. 
Stat. § 301.04 clarifies that the DOC could be named in such a 
suit.   
¶41 Other jurisdictions have determined that "sue and be 
sued" can refer to the capacity to be named in a lawsuit.  See 
Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Community Fund, 658 N.E.2d 
989, 995 (N.Y. 1995) ("statutory power to sue and be sued 
contained in the D.C. and New York nonprofit corporation laws 
did nothing more than recognize the Fund's status as an entity 
with the capacity to enter our courts"); Self v. Atlanta, 377 
S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ga. 1989) (sue and be sued "should be read as 
providing an entity with the status and capacity to enter 
courts, and not as waiving sovereign immunity"); Town of 
Highland Park v. Iron Crow Constr., Inc., 168 S.W.3d 313, 318 
(Tex. App. 2005) (sue and be sued speaks to an entity's 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
19 
 
"capacity to sue and its capacity to be sued when immunity has 
been waived").7  We agree and conclude that in the context of 
Wis. Stat. § 301.04 the "sue and be sued" language clarifies 
that the DOC is a legal entity with the capacity to sue and be 
sued once immunity has been waived.   
¶42 We acknowledge that there is conflicting federal case 
law regarding the import of "sue and be sued" provisions.  In 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 480 
(1994), the United States Supreme Court determined that "sue and 
be sued" clauses are presumed to waive the sovereign immunity 
absent a showing that the clause was intended to have a more 
narrow purpose.  However, Meyer was addressing sovereign 
immunity under federal common law and not the sovereign immunity 
derived 
from 
Article 
IV, 
section 
27 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Accordingly, the federal law on this point is not 
                                                 
7 See also A. Craig Carter, Is Sue and be Sued Language a 
Clear and Unambiguous Waiver of Immunity?, 35 St. Mary's L.J. 
275, 277 (2003-04) (asserting that the "more[] plausible" 
interpretation of "sue and be sued" is "that it is simply a 
grant of capacity to be a party to a lawsuit"). 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
20 
 
persuasive.8  Cf. Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 
246-47 (1940) ("State decisions barring garnishment against a 
public body though it may 'sue and be sued' are not persuasive 
here 
as 
they 
reflect 
purely 
local 
policies 
concerning 
municipalities, 
counties 
and 
the 
like, 
and 
involve 
considerations not germane to the problem of amenability to suit 
of the modern federal governmental corporation."). 
¶43 Finally, Mayhugh advances that a determination that 
the DOC is immune from suit would violate Article I, Section 9 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states that "[e]very person 
is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or 
character. . . ."   
¶44 The argument that Article I, Section 9 is violated by 
the application of sovereign immunity has been consistently 
rejected by courts.  See, e.g., Forseth v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 2d 
676, 688, 158 N.W.2d 370 (1968) (declining to find a violation 
of Art. I, Sec. 9 because "[t]here is no 'right' of a citizen to 
                                                 
8  This analysis is distinct from that of Bahr v. State 
Investment Board, 186 Wis. 2d 379, 393-94, 521 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. 
App. 1994), in which the court referred to language from Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 480 (1994), to 
support its conclusion that the investment board was an 
independent going concern.  The Bahr court did not separately 
consider whether the legislature expressly waived sovereign 
immunity for the board.  We are not convinced that Bahr's 
determination that a "sue and be sued" clause supports a 
conclusion that an entity is an independent going concern should 
be extended to an analysis of whether there was an express 
waiver of sovereign immunity. 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
21 
 
hold 
his 
sovereign 
substantively 
liable 
for 
a 
tort"); 
Apfelbacher v. State, 160 Wis. 565, 577, 152 N.W. 144 (1915) 
("The immunity from suit is a privilege which a sovereign may 
waive or refuse to waive at its pleasure. No constitutional 
right of its residents is violated whatever its action in that 
regard may be."); Erikson Oil Products, Inc. v. State, 184 Wis. 
2d 36, 55, 516 N.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1994) ("In Cords, 62 Wis.2d 
at 52, 214 N.W.2d at 411, the court specifically rejected the 
argument that Wis. Const. art. I, § 9, gave an injured party the 
right to sue the State and concluded there is no right of a 
citizen to hold the sovereign liable.").  We decline to diverge 
from this precedent. 
V 
 
¶45 In sum, we conclude that the DOC is entitled to 
sovereign immunity.  The DOC lacks sufficient attributes to 
render it an independent going concern.  Despite the breadth of 
its statutory powers, the character of those powers reveals that 
the legislature did not intend the DOC to be anything other than 
an arm of the state. 
¶46 We further conclude that the state has not expressly 
waived the DOC's sovereign immunity.  Wisconsin Stat. § 301.04, 
which permits the DOC to sue and be sued, is not an express 
waiver of the DOC's tort immunity but rather addresses the DOC's 
capacity to be sued.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals' determination that Mayhugh's suit against the DOC is 
barred by sovereign immunity. 
No. 
  2013AP1023 
 
22 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2013AP1023.mjg 
 
1 
 
 
¶47 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  At issue in 
this case is whether the legislature has waived sovereign, that 
is state immunity, in tort for injuries sustained by Mayhugh 
while, as an inmate, he attended a baseball game in Redgranite's 
recreational yard.  I join the majority opinion affirming the 
court of appeals.  The majority correctly determines that the 
Department of Corrections ("DOC") is not an independent going 
concern, and that the legislature has not waived the state's 
sovereign immunity in tort actions.   
¶48 I cannot, however, join the majority's reliance on 
Lindas v. Cady, 142 Wis. 2d 857, 419 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1987), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 150 Wis. 2d 421, 441 N.W.2d 705 
(1989).  Majority Op., ¶¶36-39.  Simply put, the majority's 
reliance on Lindas for its conclusion that "sue and be sued" is 
not a waiver of sovereign immunity is misplaced because Lindas 
examined the "sue and be sued" language in Wis. Stat. § 46.017 
(1979-80) which applied to the Department of Health and Social 
Services ("DHSS"), the DOC's predecessor.  Here, we examine Wis. 
Stat. § 301.04,1 which the legislature passed into law after the 
decision in Lindas and well after our decision in Holytz v. City 
of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), which 
abrogated the doctrine of governmental immunity for tort 
actions. 
A.  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2013AP1023.mjg 
 
2 
 
¶49 The rule of governmental immunity, that is municipal 
immunity, is distinct from sovereign immunity, that is state 
immunity.  Governmental immunity grew out of "English law" and 
"expanded to the point where the historical sovereignty of kings 
was relied upon to support a protective prerogative for 
municipalities."  Id. at 30.  Governmental immunity was first 
adopted in Wisconsin in Hayes v. The City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 
314, 318 (1873).  However, applying the doctrine resulted in 
"some highly artificial judicial distinctions"2 which led this 
court to re-examine governmental immunity in 1962.  Holytz, 17 
Wis. 2d at 32.  In Holytz we abrogated the doctrine of 
governmental immunity such that, for municipalities, "so far as 
governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is 
liability—the exception is immunity."  Id. at 39.   
¶50 However, our decision in Holytz did not go so far when 
it came to the State and its agencies.  Rather, we made a 
"careful 
distinction . . . between 
the 
abrogation 
of 
the 
[governmental] immunity doctrine and the right of a private 
party to sue the state."  Id. at 40.  Thus, following our 
decision in Holytz, "there will be substantive liability on the 
part of the state, but the right to sue the state" can be waived 
                                                 
2 "For example, the municipality may be immune or liable 
depending upon whether we determine that the particular function 
involved is 'proprietary' or 'governmental'."  Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 32, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). 
No.  2013AP1023.mjg 
 
3 
 
only by the legislature pursuant to article IV, section 27 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.3  Id. at 41. 
B.  
¶51 In Lindas a former employee of DHSS, Lindas, sued the 
department for wrongful discharge and discrimination.  Lindas, 
142 Wis. 2d at 860.  The circuit court dismissed Lindas's claim 
as barred by sovereign immunity.  Id.  Lindas appealed, arguing 
that by enacting Wis. Stat. § 46.017 (1979-80) the legislature 
waived DHSS' immunity as the text of § 46.017 (1979-80) stated 
that "the department [DHSS] may sue and be sued."  The Lindas 
court reasoned that this "sue and be sued" language could not be 
considered a waiver of sovereign, that is state, immunity in 
tort because the statute was enacted "at a time when Wisconsin 
enjoyed governmental immunity from tort suits."  Lindas, 142 
Wis. 2d at 861.   
C. 
¶52 However, Wis. Stat. § 301.04, the statute at issue in 
the instant case, was not enacted "at a time when Wisconsin 
enjoyed governmental immunity from tort suits."  Id.  Instead, 
Wis. Stat. § 301.04 was enacted in 1989, when the DOC was 
created, nearly three decades after the doctrine of governmental 
immunity was abrogated by this court in Holytz.  As a result, 
the reasoning of Lindas cannot apply to Wis. Stat. § 301.04.  If 
it did, then the interpretation of statutory language would be 
frozen in time at the moment a court first interprets it. 
                                                 
3 "The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in 
what courts suits may be brought against the state." 
No.  2013AP1023.mjg 
 
4 
 
¶53 This does not mean, however, that the majority's 
ultimate interpretation of "sue and be sued" in § 301.04 is 
incorrect, only that its reliance on Lindas is misplaced and 
unnecessary.  Rather, the majority's conclusion that "sue and be 
sued" refers to "the capacity to sue and be sued" is well-
reasoned and gives full effect to the language of § 301.04.  
Majority Op., ¶40 (emphasis added).  For instance, in Boldt v. 
State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 305 N.W.2d 133 (1981), we explained that 
Wis. Stat. § 775.014 "has been interpreted as giving the state's 
consent to suit in some causes of action but not in others."  
Id. at 572 (emphasis added).  Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 775.01 
waives the state's immunity for actions in contract, and sets 
forth the manner in which a claim may be brought.  See 
Trempealeau Cnty. v. State, 260 Wis. 602, 605, 51 N.W.2d 499 
(1952) (explaining that a contract claim may be brought under 
Wis. Stat. § 285.01, the predecessor statute to Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.01).  Thus, the state's sovereign immunity is waived by 
the "procedural implementation" of a statute which sets forth 
                                                 
4 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 775.01 is: 
Upon the refusal of the legislature to allow a claim 
against the state the claimant may commence an action 
against the state by service as provided in s. 801.11 
(3) and by filing with the clerk of court a bond, not 
exceeding $1,000, with 2 or more sureties, to be 
approved by the attorney general, to the effect that 
the claimant will indemnify the state against all 
costs that may accrue in such action and pay to the 
clerk of court all costs, in case the claimant fails 
to obtain judgment against the state. 
 
No.  2013AP1023.mjg 
 
5 
 
the "manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the 
state."  Forseth v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 2d 676, 684, 158 N.W.2d 370 
(1968). 
¶54 The legislature has not implemented a procedure by 
which the DOC or the state may be sued in tort, as it has in 
contract, and therefore, the DOC may not be sued in tort.  As a 
result, the "sue and be sued" language in Wis. Stat. § 301.04 is 
not a waiver of sovereign immunity, but rather identifies the 
DOC as an entity that can be named in suits for which the 
legislature has waived sovereign immunity. 
¶55 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2013AP1023.mjg 
 
 
 
1