Title: State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Industrial Commission

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-
7577.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7577 
THE STATE EX REL. OHIO PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT SERVICES, INC., 
APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7577.] 
Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission does not have authority to award 
permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) to an 
injured worker who is receiving permanent-total-disability compensation 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.58 in the same claim—Court of appeals’ judgment 
reversed and writ granted. 
(No. 2015-1074—Submitted June 7, 2017—Decided September 14, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 14AP-624,  
2015-Ohio-2122. 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
_______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., 150 Ohio St.3d 102, 2016-Ohio-8024, 79 N.E.3d 522 (“Ohio Presbyterian 
I”), we held that the Industrial Commission does not have authority to award an 
injured 
employee 
permanent-partial-disability 
compensation 
under 
R.C. 
4123.57(A) when the employee has previously been determined to be entitled to 
permanent-total-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58 for the same claim. 
{¶ 2} This court has the authority to grant motions for reconsideration filed 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02 in order to “correct decisions which, upon reflection, are 
deemed to have been made in error.”  State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village 
Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 662 N.E.2d 339 (1995).  Appellee Sherry L. 
Redwine moved this court to reconsider our holding in Ohio Presbyterian I, arguing 
that the commission has authority to award concurrent permanent-total-disability 
compensation under R.C. 4123.58 and permanent-partial-disability compensation 
under R.C. 4123.57(A) for different conditions within the same claim. 
{¶ 3} We granted Redwine’s motion, reopened the case for further 
consideration, and sua sponte ordered oral argument with no additional briefing.  
147 Ohio St.3d 1480, 2016-Ohio-8492, 66 N.E.3d 766.  Having heard oral 
argument and reconsidered the parties’ arguments, we conclude that our holding in 
Ohio Presbyterian I was not made in error, and we adhere to it.  When an injured 
employee is receiving permanent-total-disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 
4123.58, the commission is without statutory authority to grant in the same claim 
permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A).  Therefore, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a writ of mandamus ordering 
the commission to vacate its award to Redwine of permanent-partial-disability 
compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) and to issue an order denying the award. 
 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
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I.  Case Background 
{¶ 4} On August 13, 2003, Redwine was injured at work.  She filed a 
workers’ compensation claim that was allowed for the following conditions:  
lumbosacral strain, radiculopathy right lower extremity, aggravation of pre-existing 
degenerative disc disease, depression, and ruptured disc at L4-5 with free disc 
fragment. 
{¶ 5} Redwine applied for permanent-total-disability compensation.  The 
commission concluded that Redwine was unable to perform any sustained 
remunerative employment due solely to the medical impairment caused by the 
allowed psychological condition in her claim and awarded her benefits beginning 
July 12, 2010, to continue until her death. 
{¶ 6} In August 2013, Redwine applied for permanent-partial-disability 
compensation.  She conceded that she was not entitled to permanent-partial-
disability benefits for her psychological condition (for which she had been granted 
permanent-total-disability compensation), but she maintained that she was entitled 
to this award based on the physical conditions allowed in her claim. 
{¶ 7} A district hearing officer denied her application based on a lack of 
statutory authority for concurrent awards under R.C. 4123.57(A) and 4123.58.  In 
addition, the hearing officer noted that the physical and psychological conditions 
were the result of the same workplace injury and under State ex rel. Murray v. 
Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855 (1992), a claimant is precluded 
from receiving simultaneous benefits for permanent partial disability and 
permanent total disability for the same injury. 
{¶ 8} On reconsideration, a staff hearing officer concluded that a claimant 
is not barred from concurrent compensation for permanent partial disability if it is 
based on conditions that were not the basis for the prior finding of permanent total 
disability in the same claim.  The hearing officer relied in part on the commission’s 
analysis of the same issue in claim No. 02-354357 involving a different injured 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
employee.  In that case, the commission determined that the analysis of concurrent 
awards focuses on an injured employee’s allowed medical conditions, not the injury 
or claim, citing State ex rel. Missik v. Youngstown, 65 Ohio St.3d 189, 602 N.E.2d 
633 (1992), and State ex rel. Hoskins v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 560, 722 
N.E.2d 66 (2000). 
{¶ 9} Redwine’s employer, Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Services, Inc. 
(“OPRS”), filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that there was no 
statutory authority for the commission’s order and therefore it was not supported 
by some evidence.  A magistrate determined that the writ should be denied.  The 
magistrate relied on State ex rel. Mosley v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 
13AP-127, 2014-Ohio-1710, and concluded that because the psychological 
condition formed the basis for the permanent-total-disability award, Redwine’s 
physical conditions could be the basis of permanent-partial-disability 
compensation.  The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied 
the writ. 
{¶ 10} OPRS filed a direct appeal in this court.  We reversed the judgment 
of the court of appeals and granted the request for a writ of mandamus in Ohio 
Presbyterian I.  Having granted reconsideration of that decision, we now turn to 
the propositions of law presented in OPRS’s direct appeal: (1) “R.C. 4123.95’s 
requirement of liberal construction in favor of employees does not allow a court to 
read into a statute something that cannot reasonably be implied from the language 
of the statute” and (2) “A claimant who is receiving permanent and total disability 
compensation under R.C. 4123.58 is ineligible to receive permanent partial 
disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) in the same claim.” 
{¶ 11} In response, Redwine, asserts that “[t]he Industrial Commission 
does not abuse its discretion when finding that an injured worker is entitled to 
receive compensation for her percentage of permanent partial impairment 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
under R.C. 4123.57(A) for conditions that were not the basis for a prior award 
of permanent and total disability.” 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
{¶ 12} It is well settled that the commission is responsible for making 
factual findings.  State ex rel. Cordell v. Pallet Cos., Inc., 149 Ohio St.3d 483, 2016-
Ohio-8446, 75 N.E.3d 1230, ¶ 19.  Such findings will be disturbed only if the 
commission abuses its discretion, which occurs only if there is not “some” evidence 
to support the finding.  Id.  However, in this case we are not concerned with factual 
findings, but rather with the commission’s interpretation of the workers’ 
compensation statutes. 
{¶ 13} If the commission misinterprets a statute, this court may issue a writ 
of mandamus to compel the commission to correct its erroneous interpretation.  See 
State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65, 322 N.E.2d 660 
(1975) (“A mandatory writ may issue against the Industrial Commission if the 
commission has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law”), citing State ex rel. Breidigan v. 
Indus. Comm., 43 N.E.2d 114 (2d Dist.1942) (mandamus may issue against the 
commission in situations other than those involving an abuse of discretion, such as 
when the commission failed to follow the law or incorrectly interpreted the law). 
B. Statutes at Issue 
{¶ 14} There are two types of workers’ compensation benefits at issue in 
this case: (1) permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57 and 
(2) permanent-total-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58. 
1.  R.C. 4123.57—Permanent-Partial-Disability Compensation 
{¶ 15} R.C. 4123.57 authorizes the commission to pay permanent-partial-
disability compensation to an employee who has suffered a “permanent partial 
disability resulting from an injury or occupational disease.”  This compensation “is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
intended to compensate injured [employees] who can still work.”  State ex rel. 
Kaska v. Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 743, 746, 591 N.E.2d 235 (1992). 
{¶ 16} There are two types of permanent-partial-disability compensation: 
compensation for a scheduled loss pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B), which is not the 
type of compensation at issue here, and compensation based on the percentage of 
permanent disability pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(A), which is the type of 
compensation at issue here.  For compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A), a district 
hearing officer determines the percentage of the employee’s permanent disability 
based on the evidence submitted at a hearing and the amount of compensation is 
calculated based on the employee’s weekly wages. 
2.  R.C. 4123.58—Permanent-Total-Disability Compensation 
{¶ 17} Permanent-total-disability compensation is also calculated based on 
the employee’s weekly wages.  R.C. 4123.58(A).  The purpose of permanent-total-
disability benefits is “to compensate an injured worker for impairment of earning 
capacity,” Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1), and the benefits are paid until the 
employee’s death, R.C. 4123.58(A). 
{¶ 18} Like permanent-partial-disability compensation, permanent-total-
disability compensation is also broken down into two categories: compensation for 
a loss of two body parts, R.C. 4123.58(C)(1), which is not the type of compensation 
at issue here, and compensation for a workplace injury that prevents the worker 
from “engaging in sustained remunerative employment,” R.C. 4123.58(C)(2), 
which is the type of compensation at issue here. 
C. Law 
{¶ 19} In construing a statute, a court’s main objective is to determine and 
give effect to the legislative intent.  State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s 
Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 
(1995).  The intent of the General Assembly must be determined primarily from the 
language of the statute itself.  Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 34 Ohio 
January Term, 2017 
 
7
St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676 (1973).  When a statute is unambiguous, we apply 
it as written.  Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-
Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). 
{¶ 20} Along with these rules of statutory construction, we are mindful of 
the General Assembly’s mandate that the workers’ compensation laws be liberally 
construed in favor of employees.  R.C. 4123.95. 
 
A liberal construction has been defined as giving “generously all 
that the statute authorizes,” and “adopting the most comprehensive 
meaning of the statutory terms in order to accomplish the aims of 
the Act and to advance its purpose, with all reasonable doubts 
resolved in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular 
case.  Interpretation and construction should not result in a decision 
so technical or narrow as to defeat the compensatory objective of the 
Act.” 
 
Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121 
(2001), quoting Fulton, Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 1.7, 9 (2d 
Ed.1998).  That mandate does not, however, give a reviewing court authority to 
rewrite the statute, Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-
Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 13, citing Kilgore v. Chrysler Corp., 92 Ohio St.3d 
184, 189, 749 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 21} With these principles in mind, we turn to OPRS’s propositions of 
law.  We agree with its first proposition of law that R.C. 4123.95 requires the court 
to liberally construe the workers’ compensation laws in favor of employees but that 
the mandate does not grant us the authority to read words out of or into a statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
{¶ 22} OPRS’s remaining proposition of law is the crux of the controversy, 
and after construing the statutes in favor of Redwine, we must decide whether the 
commission has authority to grant in the same claim concurrent awards of 
permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) and permanent-
total-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58.  We hold that it does not. 
{¶ 23} The language of R.C. 4123.57(A) and 4123.58 is plain and 
unambiguous.  Therefore, we apply the language of the statutes as written. 
{¶ 24} R.C. 4123.57(A) and 4123.58 are devoid of any language 
authorizing the commission to award permanent-partial-disability compensation 
under R.C. 4123.57(A) in the same claim for which an injured worker is receiving 
permanent-total-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58.  The only references 
to concurrent payments are found in R.C. 4123.57(C) and 4123.58(E). 
{¶ 25} Although not at issue here, R.C. 4123.57(C) is nevertheless 
illustrative of the fact that the General Assembly knows how to authorize the 
commission to grant concurrent payments.  R.C. 4123.57(C) specifically authorizes 
the commission to award permanent-partial-disability compensation under 
divisions (A) and (B) of R.C. 4123.57 in addition to any compensation paid to an 
injured employee pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 (temporary-disability compensation).  
And R.C. 4123.58(E) specifically authorizes the commission to award scheduled 
loss benefits pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) in the same claim for which the injured 
worker is receiving permanent-total-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58. 
{¶ 26} The commission argues that because the statutes do not specifically 
prohibit concurrent payments under R.C. 4123.58 and 4123.57(A) in the same 
claim, a liberal construction of the statutes in favor of the injured worker gives the 
commission the authority to award concurrent payments.  However, this argument 
runs afoul of our case law that holds that an injured employee has a right to recover 
workers’ compensation benefits only as specifically allowed by statute.  Indus. 
January Term, 2017 
 
9
Comm. v. Kamrath, 118 Ohio St. 1, 160 N.E. 470 (1928), paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 27} Here, the General Assembly expressly authorized permanent-total-
disability compensation to be paid concurrently with other benefits only in the 
limited circumstances outlined in R.C. 4123.58(E).  Had the legislature intended to 
allow an injured worker receiving permanent-total-disability compensation under 
R.C. 4123.58 to also receive in the same claim concurrent permanent-partial-
disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(A), it could easily have included 
that language in the statutes. 
{¶ 28} The commission argues that the silence of the statutes on the issue 
of concurrent payments under R.C. 4123.57(A) and 4123.58 creates an ambiguity 
that must be decided in the worker’s favor.  But under the statutory-construction 
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express inclusion of one thing 
implies the exclusion of the other), the express reference to division (B) of R.C. 
4123.57 in R.C. 4123.58(E) but not to division (A) of R.C. 4123.57 indicates that 
the omission of division (A) was intentional. 
 
In determining rights arising by force and out of Workmen’s 
Compensation Law it is well to remember that the duties of the 
Industrial Commission and its obligation to injured employees * * * 
are only such duties and obligations as are imposed by statute; that 
the rights of injured employees * * * to recover from or participate 
in the state insurance fund are neither constitutional rights, inherent 
rights, nor common law rights, but are wholly statutory; * * * that if 
the right to participate in the fund be not found in the Workmen’s 
Compensation Law itself, the right does not exist. * * * 
* * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
[And t]he power of a court upon appeal is not different 
from the power of the administrators of the fund * * *.  The 
statutory law in force upon the date the cause of action accrues is 
the measure of the right, and is not subject to enlargement or 
diminishment by the Industrial Commission or the courts at any 
time * * *. 
 
Kamrath, 118 Ohio St. at 3-4, 160 N.E. 470. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 29} When an injured employee has previously been determined to be 
entitled to permanent-total-disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.58, the 
commission does not have statutory authority to grant in the same claim a 
permanent-partial-disability award pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(A).  Therefore, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a writ of mandamus ordering 
the commission to vacate its award of permanent-partial-disability compensation to 
Redwine under R.C. 4123.57(A) and to issue an order denying the award. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., 
concur. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Rosemary D. Welsh, for 
appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew Alatis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Robert A. Muehleisen, for appellee Sherry L. Redwine. 
January Term, 2017 
 
11 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and Chelsea Fulton Rubin, 
urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Association of Claimants’ Counsel and 
Ohio Association for Justice. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
_________________