Title: Bynum v. Wilson Cnty

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA12-1269 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 6 August 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Iredell County 
Nos. 09 CRS 53255, 09 CRS 
53992, 10 CRS 57417 
WILLIAM HERBERT PENNELL, IV 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 5 June 2012 by 
Judge Christopher W. Bragg in Superior Court, Iredell County.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 March 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Deborah M. Greene, for the State. 
 
Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for Defendant. 
 
 
McGEE, Judge. 
 
 
 
William Herbert Pennell, IV (Defendant) was indicted on 2 
November 2009 for one count of breaking or entering and one 
count of larceny after breaking or entering in 09 CRS 53255, for 
offenses that occurred on 12 February 2009; and one count of 
felony possession of cocaine in 09 CRS 53992, for an offense 
that occurred on 23 May 2009.  On that same day, Defendant 
waived indictment on an information alleging one count of 
breaking or entering and one count of larceny after breaking or 
-2- 
entering in 10 CRS 57417, for offenses that occurred on 22 
August 2010.  Defendant pleaded guilty on 2 December 2010 to 
those five charges in return for a negotiated plea agreement 
suspending the sentences and placing Defendant on supervised 
probation for thirty-six months.1   
Defendant's probation officer filed violation reports dated 
16 June 2011, 18 August 2011, and 3 February 2012, alleging that 
Defendant had violated the terms of his probation.  The 18 
August 2011 violation reports alleged that Defendant had cut off 
his electronic monitoring device and had "left his place of 
residence during curfew hours on 08/17/2011 and did not return." 
For those violations, Defendant's probation for the larceny 
after breaking or entering in 10 CRS 57417 was revoked, and his 
sentence of eight to ten months in prison was activated on 13 
October 2011.  Defendant served this sentence.  The 3 February 
2012 violation reports alleged that Defendant had not completed 
any of his community service requirements, had been charged with 
resisting a public officer, and had been convicted of three 
counts of felony breaking or entering for incidents that 
occurred in July and August of 2011 (just before Defendant's 
sentence in 10 CRS 57417 was activated).  Defendant admitted to 
                     
1 Defendant was placed on probation before the General Assembly's 
major overhaul of probation law, enacted through The Justice 
Reinvestment Act of 2011, went into effect. 
-3- 
those violations, and the trial court activated four of 
Defendant's sentences.  Defendant appeals. 
I. 
 
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's probation for his 
conviction of larceny after breaking or entering in 09 CRS 53255 
and (2) whether the trial court erred in revoking Defendant's 
probation for "larceny after breaking or entering" a second time 
in 10 CRS 57417, instead of revoking for "breaking or entering" 
in 10 CRS 57417. 
II. 
We must first decide whether this appeal is properly before 
this Court. There seems to be considerable confusion in the 
opinions of our appellate courts concerning what matters may be 
appealed following a probation revocation hearing when, as in 
this case, Defendant did not object to the conditions of his 
suspended sentence at the time judgment was initially entered. 
Though the law concerning appeal from revocation of 
probation is often contradictory, we believe N.C. Gen Stat. § 
15A-1347, and the greater weight of the precedent of our Supreme 
Court, allows appeal from revocation of probation to be based 
solely upon a challenge, either direct or collateral, to the 
trial court's jurisdiction.   
-4- 
"Appellate jurisdiction in criminal appeals by a defendant 
and grounds for appeal in criminal cases are set forth in N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 15A–1442 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1444.  '[A] 
defendant's right to appeal in a criminal proceeding is purely a 
creation of state statute.'"  State v. Singleton, 201 N.C. App. 
620, 623, 689 S.E.2d 562, 564 (2010) (citation omitted). 
Our General Assembly "within constitutional 
limitations, can fix and circumscribe the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this State."  
"Where jurisdiction is statutory and the 
Legislature requires the Court to exercise 
its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to 
follow a certain procedure, or otherwise 
subjects the Court to certain limitations, 
an act of the Court beyond these limits is 
in excess of its jurisdiction." 
 
In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590, 636 S.E.2d 787, 790 (2006) 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
Our 
General 
Assembly 
has 
granted 
defendants a right of appeal when suspended sentences are 
activated: "When a superior court judge, as a result of a 
finding 
of 
a 
violation 
of 
probation, 
activates 
a 
sentence . . . the defendant may appeal under G.S. 7A-27."  N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347 (2011).  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 states in 
relevant 
part: 
"From 
any 
final 
judgment 
of 
a 
superior 
court . . . appeal lies of right to the Court of Appeals."  N.C. 
Gen. Stat.§ 7A-27(b) (2011). 
 
The General Assembly first codified the authority to 
suspend a defendant's sentence in 1937.  In re Greene, 297 N.C. 
-5- 
305, 310, 255 S.E.2d 142, 145 (1979).  Our Supreme Court heard 
appeals from probation revocations both before and after the 
1937 enactments.  However, the General Assembly did not 
specifically grant any right of appeal from the activation of a 
suspended sentence until 1951.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-200.1 
(1953) (repealed).  In N.C.G.S. § 15-200.1, a right to appeal 
from "a court inferior to the superior court" to the superior 
court was granted for a de novo hearing, "but only upon the 
issue of whether or not there has been a violation of the terms 
of the suspended sentence[.]"  Id.  No right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court was therein granted, though our Supreme Court 
continued to hear appeals from revocations of probation.  See, 
e.g., State v. Robinson, 248 N.C. 282, 103 S.E.2d 376 (1958).  
N.C.G.S. § 15-200.1 was amended in 1963, adding, inter alia, 
that a de novo appeal from a lower court to the superior court 
"shall be determined by a judge without a jury, but only upon 
the issue of whether or not there has been a violation of the 
terms of probation or of the suspended sentence."  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15-200.1 (1965) (repealed).   
 
In 1977, N.C.G.S. § 15-200.1 was repealed and replaced by 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-200.1 (1978) 
(repealed); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347 (1978); Greene, 297 N.C. 
at 310, 255 S.E.2d at 145.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1347 provided for a 
-6- 
full de novo hearing on appeal from the district court to the 
superior court.  In addition, for the first time, the General 
Assembly introduced a specific statutory right of appeal from 
the superior court to the appellate courts of North Carolina: 
"When a superior court judge, as a result of a finding of a 
violation of probation, activates a sentence or imposes special 
probation, either in the first instance or upon a de novo 
hearing after appeal from a district court, the defendant may 
appeal under G.S. 7A-27."  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1347 (1978).  This 
remains the language in the current version of the statute.  See 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347 (2011). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 was enacted by our General Assembly 
in 1967, the same year the Court of Appeals was created.  See 
State v. Henry, 1 N.C. App. 409, 410, 161 S.E.2d 622, 622 
(1968).  N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(e) states: "From any other order or 
judgment of the superior court from which an appeal is 
authorized by statute, appeal lies of right directly to the 
Court of Appeals."  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(e) (2011).  N.C.G.S. 
§ 7A-27(b) states in relevant part: "From any final judgment of 
a superior court . . . appeal lies of right to the Court of 
Appeals."  N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b).   
 
Our Supreme Court heard appeals from the activation of 
suspended sentences well before a statute specifically allowing 
-7- 
for appeal had been enacted.  See, e.g., State v. Pelley, 221 
N.C. 487, 20 S.E.2d 850 (1942); State v. Smith, 196 N.C. 438, 
146 S.E. 73 (1929); State v. Tripp, 168 N.C. 150, 83 S.E. 630 
(1914).  In Tripp, the defendant argued three issues on appeal 
after his suspended sentence had been activated: 
1.  That defendant was entitled to a hearing 
de novo, as to the original issue of guilt 
or innocence.  
 
2.  That the judge should hear evidence on 
the questions presented to the recorder's 
court at time sentence was imposed as to the 
behavior of defendant, and pass upon same.  
 
3.  That the Legislature could not confer 
upon the recorder's court jurisdiction of 
the offense. 
 
Id. at 152, 83 S.E. at 631.  Our Supreme Court, in addressing 
the issue of whether the recorder's court (acting something like 
the district court today) had jurisdiction to impose, and then 
suspend, the original sentence, held that it did.  Id. at 150, 
83 S.E. at 633.  It also held that the superior court correctly 
dismissed the defendant's attempted appeal on the bases that the 
superior court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter de 
novo on the defendant's original guilt or innocence, or to hear 
the matter as to whether the recorder's court was correct in 
activating the suspended sentence.  Id. at 156, 83 S.E. at 632-
33.  This was because no right of appeal had "been provided by 
the statute, and there [was] nothing in the record to challenge 
-8- 
the validity or propriety of the sentence[.]"  Id. at 154, 83 
S.E. at 632.  For these reasons, the superior court order 
dismissing the defendant's appeal from the recorder's court was 
affirmed.  Id. at 156, 83 S.E. at 633.  It is important to note 
that our Supreme Court in 
Tripp heard and decided 
the 
defendant's collateral attack on the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to impose sentence in the first instance.  This is one of 
the same jurisdictional issues involved in the present case. 
As discussed above, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1347 places no specific 
limitations on a defendant's right to appeal from a final 
judgment activating a previously suspended sentence.  State v. 
Cloer, 197 N.C. App. 716, 719, 678 S.E.2d 399, 401-02 (2009).  
However, other case law pre-dating the 1977 adoption of N.C.G.S. 
§ 15A-1347 purports to place certain limitations on what may be 
appealed following a probation revocation hearing.  Our Supreme 
Court appears to have first imposed limitations on appeal from 
the activation of sentence following an alleged violation of a 
condition of the suspension of that sentence in State v. Miller, 
225 N.C. 213, 34 S.E.2d 143 (1945), which stated: 
[An] order suspending the imposition or 
execution 
of 
sentence 
on 
condition 
is 
favorable to the defendant in that it 
postpones 
punishment 
and 
gives 
him 
an 
opportunity to escape it altogether.  When 
he sits by as the order is entered and does 
not then appeal, he impliedly consents and 
thereby waives or abandons his right to 
-9- 
appeal on the principal issue of his guilt 
or innocence and commits himself to abide by 
the stipulated conditions.  He may not be 
heard 
thereafter 
to 
complain 
that 
his 
conviction was not in accord with due 
process of law.  
 
He is relegated to his right to contest the 
imposition of judgment or the execution of 
sentence, as the case may be, for that there 
is no evidence to support a finding that the 
conditions imposed have been breached, S. v. 
Johnson, 169 N.C., 311, 84 S.E., 767, or the 
conditions 
are 
unreasonable 
and 
unenforceable, or are for an unreasonable 
length of time.  S. v. Shepherd, 187 N.C., 
609, 122 S.E., 467. 
 
Id. at 215-16, 34 S.E.2d at 145 (some citations omitted).  
Miller was cited by our Supreme Court in State v. Caudle, which 
held: 
A defendant, having consented, expressly or 
by implication, to the suspension, upon 
specified conditions, of an otherwise valid 
sentence to imprisonment, may not thereafter 
attack the validity of an order putting such 
sentence into effect, entered after due 
notice and hearing, except: (1) On the 
ground that there is no evidence to support 
a finding of a breach of the conditions of 
suspension; or (2) on the ground that the 
condition which he has broken is invalid 
because it is unreasonable or is imposed for 
an unreasonable length of time. State v. 
Cole, 241 N.C. 576, 86 S.E.2d 203 [(1955)]; 
State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E.2d 495 
[(1950)]; State v. Miller, 225 N.C 213, 34 
S.E.2d 143 [(1945)]. 
 
State v. Caudle, 276 N.C. 550, 553, 173 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1970) 
(emphasis added). 
-10- 
Our Supreme Court has, however, addressed issues not 
specifically permitted by Miller and Caudle (hereinafter Caudle 
issues) on appeals from revocation of probation both before and 
after Miller and Caudle were filed.  For example, before Miller, 
our Supreme Court addressed: whether a defendant's probationary 
sentence was tolled while the defendant was a fugitive, and 
whether 
the 
original 
judgment 
in 
the 
case 
was 
in 
the 
alternative, or included both a fine and other conditions of 
probation, Pelley, 221 N.C. 487, 496-97, 20 S.E.2d 850, 856; and 
whether the underlying indictment was fatally defective, State 
v. Ray, 212 N.C. 748, 750, 194 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1938); Tripp, 
168 N.C. at 150, 83 S.E. at 633. 
Following Caudle, our Supreme Court addressed appeals from 
revocation of probation concerning: whether the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to hold revocation hearing in a certain 
county and, if not, whether statute determining where probation 
revocation hearing could take place violated the United States 
Constitution, State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 335, 196 S.E.2d 
185, 186-87 (1973); the amount of credit for time served applied 
after probation has been revoked, State v. Farris, 336 N.C. 552, 
553, 444 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1994); whether N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–
1347 
vested 
jurisdiction 
for 
appeal 
from 
district 
court 
probation revocation in superior court or Court of Appeals, 
-11- 
State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 122-24, 591 S.E.2d 514, 514-16 
(2004); and whether the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke 
probation after the probationary period had ended, State v. 
Bryant, 361 N.C. 100, 105, 637 S.E.2d 532, 536 (2006) ("we can 
reach no conclusion other than that the trial court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation due 
to its failure and inability to make the statutorily mandated 
finding of fact").  
 
This Court has also addressed on many occasions issues not 
specifically covered by Miller or Caudle, see, e.g.: whether the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend its order after notice 
of appeal had been filed with this Court and whether the trial 
court erred by denying the defendant's request to continue, 
State v. Dixon, 139 N.C. App. 332, 337, 533 S.E.2d 297, 301 
(2000); whether jurisdiction lay in superior court or Court of 
Appeals, whether the defendant should have received credit for 
time served, and whether it was proper for the trial court to 
consolidate 
the 
defendant's 
sentences 
when 
activating 
defendant's sentences, State v. Hooper, 158 N.C. App. 654, 656, 
658-59, 582 S.E.2d 331, 332-34 (2003), vacated, 358 N.C. 122, 
591 S.E.2d 514 (2004) (holding jurisdiction lay with superior 
court, not the Court of Appeals); whether the trial court 
abdicated its duty to exercise its discretion by allowing the 
-12- 
victim to determine whether defendant's probation should be 
revoked, State v. Arnold, 169 N.C. App. 438, 441, 610 S.E.2d 
396, 398 (2005); whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
activate a suspended sentence in a violation hearing held after 
probation had ended, State v. Reinhardt, 183 N.C. App. 291, 292, 
644 S.E.2d 26, 27 (2007); whether, after the trial court had 
elected to modify the defendant's probation, the trial court had 
jurisdiction to revoke probation for violations that occurred 
prior to the modification, and whether defendant was advised of 
the conditions of his probation, State v. Bridges, 189 N.C. App. 
524, 526, 658 S.E.2d 527, 528 (2008); whether the court lacked 
jurisdiction after the probationary period had ended, State v. 
Satanek, 190 N.C. App. 653, 656, 660 S.E.2d 623, 625 (2008) 
("Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation."); 
and whether the defendant had proper notice of the probation 
hearing pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1345(e), State v. Hubbard, 
198 N.C. App. 154, 157-58, 678 S.E.2d 390, 393 (2009).  
The above list of citations to opinions of our appellate 
courts that have decided non-Caudle issues in appeals from 
probation revocation hearings challenges the notion that Caudle 
was intended as an absolute limitation on what issues could be 
appealed following revocation of probation.  As further example, 
-13- 
in State v. Neeley, 57 N.C. App. 211, 290 S.E.2d 727, rev'd, 307 
N.C. 247, 297 S.E.2d 389 (1982), this Court dismissed the 
defendant's appeal for the following reasons: 
Defendant 
first 
argues 
that 
there 
was 
nothing in the record of his guilty plea to 
show whether defendant was indigent, whether 
he was represented by counsel or whether he 
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
counsel.  . . . .  This case is controlled 
by State v. Noles, 12 N.C. App. 676, 184 
S.E.2d 409 (1971).  Here as in Noles, the 
defendant tries to attack collaterally the 
validity of the original judgment where his 
sentence was suspended, in an appeal from 
the revocation of that suspension.  "When 
appealing 
from 
an 
order 
activating 
a 
suspended 
sentence, 
inquiries 
are 
permissible only to determine whether there 
is evidence to support a finding of a breach 
of the conditions of the suspension, or 
whether the condition which has been broken 
is invalid because it is unreasonable or is 
imposed for an unreasonable length of time."  
State v. Noles, 12 N.C. App. at 678, 184 
S.E.2d at 410 (1971); State v. Caudle, 276 
N.C. 550, 173 S.E.2d 778 (1970).  
 
Id. at 212, 290 S.E.2d at 727.  Our Supreme Court reversed the 
opinion of this Court, stating:  
Defendant's 
petition 
for 
discretionary 
review presents two questions for review by 
this Court.  The first question to be 
considered concerns the resolution of a 
conflict 
between 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals' 
opinion in this case and its opinion in 
State v. Black, 51 N.C. App. 687, 277 S.E.2d 
584 (1981). 
 That conflict concerns a 
determination of the proper procedure for 
raising a constitutional claim of right to 
counsel at a trial where the defendant 
received a suspended prison sentence in a 
-14- 
case where the defendant does not challenge 
the sentence until the suspension is revoked 
and an active sentence imposed.  We believe 
the sounder position is to follow the Black 
decision which allows the defendant to raise 
his right to counsel claim after the prison 
sentence has become active.  
 
State v. Neeley, 307 N.C. 247, 249, 297 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1982) 
(citation omitted).  In Neely, our Supreme Court held that this 
Court, in State v. Black, 51 N.C. App. 687, 277 S.E.2d 584 
(1981), "correctly determined that the defendant properly 
appealed from the activation of his prison term and the denial 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during his original 
trial."  Neely, 307 N.C. at 249-50, 297 S.E.2d at 391.  
 
This Court, in State v. Mauck, 204 N.C. App. 583, 584-85, 
694 S.E.2d 481, 483 (2010), has more recently and specifically 
addressed the issue currently before us ‒ whether we can decide 
if the trial court had jurisdiction to enter an order revoking a 
defendant's probation and activating his sentence.  This Court 
addressed the defendant's argument that, because there was 
insufficient evidence showing that the matter was heard in the 
correct county, "the trial court in Buncombe County did not have 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
15A–1344(a)."  Id. at 585, 694 S.E.2d at 483. 
 
The Court also addressed this issue in State v. Hall, 160 
N.C. App. 593, 586 S.E.2d 561 (2003), holding: 
-15- 
Under State v. Camp, 299 N.C. 524, 528, 263 
S.E.2d 592, 594-95 (1980), to revoke a 
defendant's probation after the period of 
probation has expired, the trial court must 
find "that the State had 'made reasonable 
effort . . . to 
conduct 
the 
hearing 
earlier.'"  (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1344(f)). 
 
In 
this 
case, 
although 
defendant's probation period ended on 17 May 
2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on 
19 
August 
2002-after 
the 
expiration 
of 
defendant's 
period 
of 
probation 
and 
suspension.  Because the record shows that 
the trial court did not make any findings 
(nor is there evidence in the record to 
support such findings) that the State made 
reasonable effort to conduct the hearing 
earlier, we are compelled by State v. Camp 
to hold that "jurisdiction was lost by the 
lapse of time and the court had no power to 
enter 
a 
revocation 
judgment 
against 
defendant."  Id.  Accordingly, as in Camp, 
the judgment appealed from is arrested and 
defendant is discharged. 
 
Id. at 593-94, 586 S.E.2d at 561 (footnotes omitted).  We cited 
Hall in State v. Bryant when this Court held that "the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the revocation hearing.  
The 
trial 
court's 
judgment 
that 
defendant 
violated 
the 
conditions of her probation for the conviction of obtaining 
property by false pretenses is arrested and the order activating 
her sentence is vacated."  State v. Bryant, 176 N.C. App. 190, 
625 S.E.2d 916, 2006 WL 389639 (unpublished opinion), aff’d, 361 
N.C. 100, 636 S.E.2d 532 (2006).  Our Supreme Court affirmed our 
decision in Bryant, stating: 
In State v. Camp, this Court considered 
-16- 
similar issues and applied N.C.G.S. § 15A–
1344(f) to the facts of that case.  299 N.C. 
524, 263 S.E.2d 592 (1980).  After noting 
the defendant appeared before the superior 
court approximately twenty-three times for a 
revocation hearing, although the hearing was 
always continued and a revocation hearing 
was never conducted, our Court held, inter 
alia: "Moreover, [the trial court] did not 
find, as indeed [it] could not, that the 
State had 'made reasonable effort . . . to 
conduct the hearing earlier,'" id. at 528, 
263 S.E.2d at 595.  Because the probationary 
period 
had 
expired 
and 
there 
was 
no 
requisite finding of fact by the trial 
court, "jurisdiction was lost by the lapse 
of time and the court had no power to enter 
a revocation judgment."  Like Camp, the 
trial court in the instant case was without 
jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation 
and to activate defendant's sentence because 
it failed to make findings sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of the statute. 
 
Bryant, 361 N.C. at 103-04, 637 S.E.2d at 535 (some citations 
omitted). 
This 
Court 
cited 
Bryant 
in 
reaching 
the 
same 
conclusion in Reinhardt: 
"'When 
the 
record 
shows 
a 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction 
in 
the 
lower 
court, 
the 
appropriate action on the part of the 
appellate court is to arrest judgment or 
vacate 
any 
order 
entered 
without 
authority.'"  Applying the holdings of prior 
case law and the binding precedent of 
Bryant, 
the 
subsequent 
revocation 
of 
defendant's probation and activation of his 
suspended sentence was in error because the 
trial court was without jurisdiction. 
 
Reinhardt, 183 N.C. App. at 294, 644 S.E.2d at 28 (citations 
omitted); accord State v. Colman, __ N.C. App. __, 722 S.E.2d 
-17- 
14, 2012 WL 538938 (2012) (unpublished); State v. Black, 197 
N.C. App. 373, 677 S.E.2d 199 (2009); State v. High, 183 N.C. 
App. 443, 645 S.E.2d 394 (2007); State v. Surratt, 177 N.C. App. 
551, 629 S.E.2d 341 (2006); State v. Burns, 171 N.C. App. 759, 
615 S.E.2d 347 (2005).  
 
This Court, in Reinhardt, explained why we should address 
the defendant's sole argument that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation, stating: 
A trial court must have subject matter 
jurisdiction over a case in order to act in 
that case.  In this case, defendant did not 
raise 
the 
issue 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
before 
the 
trial 
court. 
However, a defendant may properly raise this 
issue at any time, even for the first time 
on appeal. 
 
Reinhardt, 183 N.C. App. at 292, 644 S.E.2d at 27 (citations 
omitted).2 
This Court, in unpublished opinions, has applied the above 
jurisdictional analysis to situations where, like in the case 
                     
2 We are aware of the following footnote in State v. Absher: 
"While 
it 
is 
true 
that 
a 
defendant 
may 
challenge 
the 
jurisdiction of a trial court, such challenge may be made in the 
appellate division only if and when the case is properly pending 
before the appellate division."  State v. Absher, 329 N.C. 264, 
265 n. 1, 404 S.E.2d 848, 849 n. 1 (1991).  Absher does not cite 
any authority for this proposition, and we note that our Supreme 
Court has addressed jurisdictional issues following probation 
revocation when there was no statutory right of appeal.  See, 
e.g., Ray, 212 N.C. at 748, 194 S.E. at 473-74. 
-18- 
before us, the defendant challenged jurisdiction based upon an 
allegedly fatal defective indictment or information: 
Defendant . . . 
contends 
that 
the 
trial 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because 
the 
indictment 
was 
fatally 
defective[.]  . . .   
The State contends that Defendant's argument 
is an impermissible collateral attack on his 
underlying conviction, and that this Court's 
review is limited to "whether there is 
evidence to support a finding of a breach of 
the conditions of the suspension, or whether 
the condition which has been broken is 
invalid[.]"  State v. Noles, 12 N.C. App. 
676, 678, 184 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1971).  . . . 
 
However, it is well-established that the 
trial court does not acquire subject-matter 
jurisdiction when an indictment is fatally 
defective, 
and 
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
sufficiency of an indictment may be asserted 
at any time, including for the first time on 
appeal.  . . . .  Accordingly, we find that 
this issue is properly before this Court. 
 
State v. Shepard, 199 N.C. App. 756, 687 S.E.2d 540 (2009) 
(unpublished opinion) (some citations omitted). 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter 
judgment upon an invalid information. 
 
The State argues this issue is not properly 
before this Court because on appeal the 
review of an order activating a suspended 
sentence is limited to two areas: (1) the 
factual and evidentiary basis for finding 
that a violation occurred; and (2) the 
validity of the condition that was violated.  
However, as with any challenge to subject 
matter jurisdiction, a challenge to the 
sufficiency 
of 
an 
indictment 
cannot 
be 
waived and may be asserted at any time, 
-19- 
including for the first time on appeal. 
Thus, this matter is properly before us. 
 
State v. Moore, 170 N.C. App. 197, 613 S.E.2d 531, 2005 WL 
1018152 (2005) (unpublished opinion) (citation omitted); see 
also State v. McMurrin, 196 N.C. App. 178, 674 S.E.2d 480 (2009) 
(unpublished opinion). 
 
Most importantly, our Supreme Court has addressed a 
defendant's argument, in an appeal from the revocation of a 
suspended sentence, that the indictment for the underlying 
sentence was defective.  Ray, 212 N.C. 748, 194 S.E. 472.  In 
Ray, our Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument on the 
basis that he had pleaded guilty to, and been sentenced on, a 
different offense.  Id. at 750, 194 S.E. at 473-74 ("The 
defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, on account of defect 
in the bill of indictment for embezzlement, cannot be sustained, 
since he was neither tried nor sentenced under that bill nor for 
that offense.").  It is important to note that, in Miller, the 
first opinion in which our Supreme Court included limiting 
language concerning appeal from activation of a suspended 
sentence, Ray is cited.  Miller, 225 N.C. at 215, 34 S.E.2d at 
145.  It would appear our Supreme Court in Miller did not intend 
to limit jurisdictional challenges. 
 
Notwithstanding this extensive history of our appellate 
courts addressing issues not covered in Caudle, Caudle and 
-20- 
related 
opinions 
have 
been 
cited 
as 
precedent 
requiring 
dismissal 
of 
appeals 
from 
orders 
revoking 
probation 
and 
activating sentences.  Two recent opinions from this Court have 
dismissed 
appeals 
that 
have 
attempted 
to 
challenge 
the 
jurisdiction of the trial court to revoke probation. 
 
In State v. Long, the defendant argued on appeal from 
revocation of his probation that the underlying indictments upon 
which he was convicted were fatally defective.  State v. Long, 
__ N.C. App. __, __, 725 S.E.2d 71, 72, disc. review denied, __ 
N.C. __, 726 S.E.2d 836 (2012).  This Court in Long held: 
When appealing from an order activating a 
suspended 
sentence, 
"inquiries 
are 
permissible only to determine [(1)] whether 
there is evidence to support a finding of a 
breach of the conditions of the suspension, 
or [(2)] whether the condition which has 
been 
broken 
is 
invalid 
because 
it 
is 
unreasonable 
or 
is 
imposed 
for 
an 
unreasonable length of time."  State v. 
Noles, 12 N.C. App. 676, 678, 184 S.E.2d 
409, 410 (1971) (citing State v. Caudle, 276 
N.C. 550, 553, 173 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1970)). 
"'[W]hile it is true that a defendant may 
challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court, 
such challenge may be made in the appellate 
division only if and when the case is 
properly 
pending 
before 
the 
appellate 
division.'"  State v. Jamerson, 161 N.C. 
App. 527, 529, 588 S.E.2d 545, 547 (2003) 
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Absher, 
329 N.C. 264, 265 n. 1, 404 S.E.2d 848, 849 
n. 1 (1991) (per curiam)).  Thus, "[a] 
defendant on appeal from an order revoking 
probation may not challenge his adjudication 
of guilt," as "[q]uestioning the validity of 
the original judgment where sentence was 
-21- 
suspended on appeal from an order activating 
the 
sentence 
is 
. . .  an 
impermissible 
collateral attack."  Noles, 12 N.C. App. at 
678, 184 S.E.2d at 410. 
 
Long, __ N.C. App. at __, 725 S.E.2d at 72 (some citations 
omitted). 
 
Recently, in State v. Hunnicutt, __ N.C. App. __, __ S.E.2d 
__, 2013 WL 1296740 (2013), this Court relied on Long, holding 
that, 
on 
appeal 
from 
revocation 
of 
his 
probation, 
the 
defendant's 
jurisdictional 
challenge 
based 
upon 
allegedly 
fatally defective indictments constituted "'an impermissible 
collateral attack.'  State v. Noles, 12 N.C. App. 676, 678, 184 
S.E.2d 409, 410 (1971)." Hunnicutt, __ N.C. App. at __, __ 
S.E.2d at __, 2013 WL 1296740 at *3; see also State v. Wiggins, 
__ N.C. App. __, 708 S.E.2d 215, 2011 WL 378828 (2011) 
(unpublished) 
(holding 
the 
defendant 
could 
not 
challenge 
indictment for underlying conviction on appeal from revocation 
of probation and activation of sentence). 
 
Noles is applied in both Long and Hunnicutt in a manner 
inconsistent with our Supreme Court precedent.  In Noles, the 
defendant challenged the revocation of his probation based upon 
his contention that his guilty plea for the underlying judgment 
was not entered understandingly and voluntarily.  Noles, 12 N.C. 
App. at 678, 184 S.E.2d at 410.  This Court held that the 
defendant should have appealed the entry of his guilty plea when 
-22- 
judgment was entered, and that attempting to challenge his 
guilty plea only after probation had been revoked and sentence 
activated constituted "an impermissible collateral attack."  Id. 
at 678, 184 S.E.2d at 410.  Our Supreme Court adopted this 
reasoning in State v. Holmes, 361 N.C. 410, 412, 646 S.E.2d 353, 
354 (2007).  In Holmes, 
[t]he sole question before [the Supreme 
Court was] whether defendant can attack the 
aggravated sentences imposed and suspended 
in the 11 March 2004 trial court judgments 
based on [Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 159 L. Ed. 2d. 403 (2004)] by appealing 
from the 9 March 2005 trial court order 
revoking his probation and activating his 
sentences. 
 
Id. at 412, 646 S.E.2d at 355.  Our Supreme Court stated:  
Although this Court has not addressed this 
specific issue, the Court of Appeals has 
done so on at least two occasions.  Over 
thirty-five years ago, in State v. Noles, 
the 
defendant, 
while 
appealing 
the 
revocation 
of 
his 
probation, 
challenged 
aspects of his original conviction.  The 
Court of Appeals held: "Questioning the 
validity of the original judgment where 
sentence was suspended on appeal from an 
order 
activating 
the 
sentence 
is, 
we 
believe, 
an 
impermissible 
collateral 
attack."  More recently, in State v. Rush, 
158 N.C. App. 738, 582 S.E.2d 37 (2003), the 
Court of Appeals found that by failing to 
appeal from the original judgment suspending 
her sentences, the defendant waived any 
challenge to that judgment and thus could 
not attack it in the appeal of a subsequent 
order activating her sentence. 
 
Id. at 412-13, 646 S.E.2d at 355 (some citations omitted). 
-23- 
 
By "specific issue[,]" our Supreme Court meant a collateral 
attack on the underlying judgment on appeal from revocation of 
probation, as neither Noles nor Rush dealt with Blakely issues.  
Although our Supreme Court stated that it had never addressed 
"this specific issue," it did specifically reject the Noles 
collateral attack argument as a reason to dismiss a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel argument in Neeley, as noted 
above.  Neeley, 307 N.C. at 249, 297 S.E.2d at 391.  As our 
Supreme Court in Holmes did not address Neeley in its analysis, 
we do not know how the Court distinguishes between a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel argument, and a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury argument, when applying 
the rule against collateral attack as enunciated in Noles. 
Nonetheless, unlike in Noles and Holmes, the challenge in 
the present case, as in Long and Hunnicutt, is jurisdictional.  
A judgment imposed by a court without jurisdiction is void. 
Stroupe v. Stroupe, 301 N.C. 656, 661, 273 S.E.2d 434, 438 
(1981). 
A void judgment is not a judgment at all, 
and it may always be treated as a nullity 
because it lacks an essential element of its 
formulation.  
 
In Carter v. Rountree, 109 N.C. 29, 32, 13 
S.E. 716, 717 (1891), Chief Justice Merrimon 
aptly observed that 
 
A void judgment is one that has 
-24- 
merely 
semblance, 
without 
some 
essential element or elements, as 
when 
the 
court 
purporting 
to 
render it has not jurisdiction. 
 
A void judgment is without life or 
force, and the court will quash it 
on 
motion, 
or 
ex 
mero 
motu. 
Indeed, when it appears to be 
void, it may and will be ignored 
everywhere, and treated as a mere 
nullity.  
 
It 
follows, 
therefore, 
that 
in 
such 
instances, 
collateral 
attack 
is 
a 
permissible manner of seeking relief. 
 
Stroupe, 301 N.C. at 661-62, 273 S.E.2d at 438 (some citations 
omitted) (final emphasis added); see also State v. Sams, 317 
N.C. 230, 235, 345 S.E.2d 179, 182 (1986) ("An order is void ab 
initio only when it is issued by a court that does not have 
jurisdiction. Such an order is a nullity and may be attacked 
either directly or collaterally, or may simply be ignored."); 
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 290, 93 S.E.2d 617, 622 
(1956) ("Unquestionably, when it appears on the face of the 
record that a court has no jurisdiction, either of the person or 
of the subject matter, any judgment it attempts to render is a 
nullity and so may be attacked by any person adversely affected 
thereby, at any time, collaterally or otherwise."); see also 
Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 676, 360 
S.E.2d 772, 777 (1987) and cases cited. 
 
We are constrained to apply long-standing Supreme Court 
-25- 
precedent allowing collateral attack when lack of jurisdiction 
is alleged, and must disregard the portions of this Court's 
opinions that indicate a void judgment may not be attacked 
collaterally.  Andrews v. Haygood, 188 N.C. App. 244, 248, 655 
S.E.2d 440, 443 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted) 
("Moreover, this Court has no authority to overrule decisions of 
our Supreme Court and we have the responsibility to follow those 
decisions 
'until 
otherwise 
ordered 
by . . . [our] 
Supreme 
Court.'").  Further, when an indictment is fatally defective, 
the actions of any court proceeding on that indictment are void 
for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Carpenter, 
244 N.C. at 290, 93 S.E.2d at 622.  In the present case, 
Defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to 
revoke probation and activate sentence based upon a void 
judgment.  Defendant's appeal is not a collateral attack on the 
underlying conviction, but a direct attack on the jurisdiction 
of the trial court that entered the judgment and commitment upon 
revocation of probation.  
Both our Supreme Court and this Court, in opinions pre-
dating Long and Hunnicutt, have addressed issues concerning the 
jurisdiction of the trial court in appeals from probation 
revocation.  See, e.g., Ray, 212 N.C. at 748, 194 S.E. at 473-
74; Black, 197 N.C. App. at 379, 677 S.E.2d at 203; High, 183 
-26- 
N.C. App. at 444, 645 S.E.2d at 395; Reinhardt, 183 N.C. App. at 
292, 644 S.E.2d at 27 ("In his sole argument on appeal, 
defendant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
revoke his probation and activate his suspended sentence on 21 
April 2005.  Based upon the clear language of the statute and 
binding case authority, we are compelled to agree.").  We are 
bound by precedent of our Supreme Court and, because this Court 
may not overrule its own opinions, we are also bound by the 
earlier opinions of this Court that conflict with Long and 
Hunnicutt.  Boyd v. Robeson Cty., 169 N.C. App. 460, 470, 621 
S.E.2d 1, 7 (2005); In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 
324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989).  We hold that 
Defendant may, on appeal from revocation of probation, attack 
the jurisdiction of the trial court, either directly or 
collaterally.   
 
A closer look at Caudle, and cases upon which it relies, 
supports this holding.  First, the relevant language in Caudle, 
when read in full, only applies when the underlying sentence is 
"otherwise valid." 
A defendant, having consented, expressly or 
by implication, to the suspension, upon 
specified conditions, of an otherwise valid 
sentence to imprisonment, may not thereafter 
attack the validity of an order putting such 
sentence into effect, entered after due 
notice and hearing, except: (1) On the 
ground that there is no evidence to support 
-27- 
a finding of a breach of the conditions of 
suspension; or (2) on the ground that the 
condition which he has broken is invalid 
because it is unreasonable or is imposed for 
an unreasonable length of time. 
 
Caudle, 276 N.C. at 553, 173 S.E.2d at 781 (emphasis added).  A 
sentence based upon a conviction supported by a fatally 
defective indictment is a nullity and, therefore, not a valid 
sentence.  McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 
17-18 (1966).  The language in Caudle itself does not exclude 
appeal in the present case.   
 
Caudle cites to State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576, 86 S.E.2d 203 
(1955); State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E.2d 495 (1950); and 
Miller, 225 N.C 213, 34 S.E.2d 143 in support of this 
proposition.  Cole cites Smith and Miller.  Cole, 241 N.C. at 
582, 86 S.E.2d at 207.  Smith cites Miller; State v. Shepherd, 
187 N.C. 609, 122 S.E. 467 (1924); and State v. Johnson, 169 
N.C. 311, 84 S.E. 767 (1915).  Smith, 233 N.C. at 70, 62 S.E.2d 
at 496.  Miller cites Shepherd and Johnson, stating: 
When [a defendant] sits by as the order 
[suspending sentence and imposing conditions 
of probation] is entered and does not then 
appeal, he impliedly consents and thereby 
waives or abandons his right to appeal on 
the 
principal 
issue 
of 
his 
guilt 
or 
innocence and commits himself to abide by 
the stipulated conditions.  He may not be 
heard 
thereafter 
to 
complain 
that 
his 
conviction was not in accord with due 
process of law.  He is relegated to his 
right to contest the imposition of judgment 
-28- 
or the execution of sentence, as the case 
may be, for that there is no evidence to 
support 
a 
finding 
that 
the 
conditions 
imposed 
have 
been 
breached, 
State 
v. 
Johnson, 169 N.C. 311, 84 S.E. 767, or the 
conditions 
are 
unreasonable 
and 
unenforceable, or are for an unreasonable 
length of time.  State v. Shepherd, 187 N.C. 
609, 122 S.E. 467. 
 
Miller, 225 N.C. at 215-16, 34 S.E.2d at 145 (some citations 
omitted).  In Johnson, the defendant "pleaded guilty to three 
bills of indictment charging her with retailing, and prayer for 
judgment was continued on condition of good behavior, and so 
ordered to be further continued from term to term for three 
years."  Johnson, 169 N.C. at 311, 84 S.E. at 768.  Upon a 
finding "that the defendant had been engaged in maintaining a 
bawdy-house in the town of Kinston[,]" the trial court activated 
the sentence.  Id.  Our Supreme Court affirmed the order, 
rejecting the defendant's argument that operating a "bawdy-
house" could not support activation of her sentence because it 
was not the same behavior that led to the underlying judgment.  
Id.   
In Shepherd, it was "the position of the defendant that the 
first condition of the suspended judgment, requiring him 'to 
abstain personally, entirely, from the use of intoxicating 
liquors,' [was] unreasonable and hence he should not [have been] 
held to answer for its violation."  Shepherd, 187 N.C. at 611, 
-29- 
122 S.E. at 467.  Our Supreme Court simply held that this 
condition was not unreasonable, as it was a specific, definite, 
and integral term of the agreement originally allowing the 
sentence to be suspended.  Id.  Neither Johnson nor Shepherd 
limit right of appeal from a probation revocation in any way. 
Though, as discussed above, we do not believe we need to 
apply a Caudle analysis when addressing a jurisdictional claim 
on appeal from revocation of probation, a Caudle analysis, when 
applied, counsels addressing the merits of a jurisdictional 
argument.  Appeal from revocation of probation is appropriate 
under Caudle and similar opinions when "(1) there is no evidence 
to support a finding that the conditions imposed have been 
breached, 
or 
(2) 
the 
conditions 
are 
unreasonable 
and 
unenforceable or for an unreasonable length of time."  State v. 
Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 70, 62 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1950) (citations 
omitted).  First, when the conditions imposed are void, common 
sense dictates that there cannot be evidence to support a 
finding that they have been breached.  Second, void conditions 
are unenforceable and when conditions have been imposed for a 
sentence that is a nullity, they are also unreasonable.  See 
State v. Culp, 30 N.C. App. 398, 400, 226 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1976) 
("The special condition [of probation] . . . was beyond the 
power of the court to inflict and is void[.]").  If a condition 
-30- 
of probation that is beyond the power of the trial court to 
impose is void, then, in the opinion of this Court, the reverse 
is true: a void condition is beyond the power of the trial court 
to impose.  Finally, void conditions, imposed pursuant to a void 
judgment, must necessarily be for an unreasonable length of 
time, no matter the duration. 
Though the language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1347 would seem to 
have expanded the right of appeal from revocation of probation, 
and thus superseded the framework and limitations articulated in 
Miller and Caudle, review of North Carolina appellate opinions 
suggests the enactment of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1347 did not alter the 
manner in which the appellate courts of this State address 
appeals from revocations of probation. 
 
We hold that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1347, and the greater weight of 
the precedent of our Supreme Court, allow appeal from revocation 
of probation to be based solely upon a challenge, either direct 
or 
collateral, 
to 
the 
trial 
court's 
jurisdiction. 
 
The 
contradictions exhibited in the current law regarding appeal 
from revocation of probation are best addressed by either our 
Supreme Court or the General Assembly.  Even if we assume, 
arguendo, that Defendant had no right to directly challenge 
jurisdiction in this appeal, we hold that, because there can 
exist no evidence to support violation of conditions of a 
-31- 
probation that does not legally exist, and because any sentence 
imposed on a void judgment is unreasonable, Miller, Caudle, and 
related opinions do not serve to prevent Defendant's appeal in 
this case. 
III. 
 
Defendant also argues that the underlying indictment for 
his conviction of larceny after breaking or entering in 09 CRS 
53255 was fatally defective.  The "'essential elements of 
larceny are that [the] defendant (1) took the property of 
another; (2) carried it away; (3) without the owner's consent; 
and (4) with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the 
property.'"  State v. Justice, __ N.C. App. __, __, 723 S.E.2d 
798, 801 (2012) (citation omitted).  In State v. Ingram, 271 
N.C. 538, 157 S.E.2d 119 (1967), our Supreme Court held, 
concerning the description of property: 
"'The description in an indictment must be 
in the common and ordinary acceptation of 
property and with certainty sufficient to 
enable the jury to say that the article 
proved to be stolen is the same, and to 
enable the court to see that it is the 
subject of larceny and also to protect the 
defendant by pleading autre fois convict or 
autre fois acquit in the event of future 
prosecution for the offense, so that there  
may be no doubt of its identity; and the 
evidence must substantially correspond with 
the description in the indictment.   . . . 
The description must still be in a plain and 
intelligible manner and must correspond to 
the different forms of existence in which 
-32- 
the same article is found.  In its raw or 
unmanufactured state it may be described by 
its ordinary name, but if it be worked up 
into some other forms, etc., when stolen, it 
must be described by the name by which it is 
generally known.'" 
 
Id. at 542, 157 S.E.2d at 122-23 (citation omitted).  Ingram 
goes on to say:  
The proof offered by the State showed that 
the personal property alleged to have been 
stolen and carried away consisted of eleven 
rings with a total value of approximately 
$878.00.  The description of this property 
by the general and broadly comprehensive 
words, 
'merchandise, 
chattels, 
money, 
valuable 
securities 
and 
other 
personal 
property' is not sufficient.  The property 
was not described in the name generally 
applied to it in the trade, and in common 
language. 
 
Nor 
was 
the 
description 
sufficient to enable the jury to say that 
the article proved to be stolen is the same, 
or such that the defendant could avail 
himself of his conviction or acquittal as a 
bar to subsequent prosecutions for the same 
offense. 
 
Id. at 543, 157 S.E.2d at 123-24.  See also Justice, __ N.C. 
App. at __, 723 S.E.2d at 801 ("As in Ingram, the description 
'merchandise' is too general to identify the property allegedly 
taken by [d]efendant.  As such, the indictment is fatally 
defective, and deprives the superior court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case."). 
 
In the case before us, Defendant was convicted of larceny 
based upon the following indictment in count II of 09 CRS 53255: 
-33- 
And the jurors for the State upon their oath 
present that on or about the date of offense 
shown and in the county named above the 
defendant named above unlawfully, willfully, 
and feloniously did steal, take, and carry 
away 
various 
items 
of 
merchandise, 
the 
personal 
property 
of 
Computer 
Shop 
of 
Statesville, Inc., DBA Haven Skate Shop, 
having a value of more than $1,000.00 
dollars, pursuant to the commission of the 
felonious breaking and entering described in 
count I above. 
 
The term "merchandise" in the indictment in the present case 
does not describe the property alleged to have been taken any 
better than did the term "merchandise" in Ingram or Justice.  
The allegations that the "merchandise" had a value of over 
$1,000.00, and that the "merchandise" was taken during a 
breaking or entering do not serve to clarify what was taken from 
Computer Shop of Statesville, Inc., DBA Haven Skate Shop, which 
may have sold computers, skates, skateboards, or other unknown 
items.  This is in contrast to the indictment in 10 CRS 57417 in 
which Defendant was alleged to have taken "12 violins, 3 cellos, 
a viola, a USB flashdrive, an IBM laptop computer, a surround 
sound system, a classroom skeleton and weather ball, the 
personal property of Iredell/Statesville School System, such 
property having a value of $28,335 dollars[.]" 
 
The indictment in count II of 09 CRS 53255 was fatally 
defective and, therefore, the trial court never obtained subject 
matter jurisdiction over that charge.  Justice, __ N.C. App. at 
-34- 
__, 723 S.E.2d at 801.  Defendant's conviction for larceny, and 
the sentence, based upon the indictment in 09 CRS 53255, were a 
nullity.  McClure, 267 N.C. at 215, 148 S.E.2d at 17-18 (holding 
that absent a valid indictment, any "trial or conviction are a 
nullity").  The trial court, having no jurisdiction to convict 
or sentence Defendant for this larceny charge, was equally 
without jurisdiction to revoke probation on a conviction that 
did not legally exist, or to activate a sentence never legally 
imposed.  Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
activate any sentence imposed pursuant to count II of the 
indictment in 09 CRS 53255, activation of that sentence is also 
a nullity.  We vacate all actions of the trial court based upon 
count II of the indictment in 09 CRS 53255, and arrest the 5 
June 2012 "Judgment and Commitment upon Revocation of Probation 
– Felony" for the 09 CRS 53255 larceny after breaking or 
entering. 
IV. 
 
It is also clear that the trial court could not activate a 
sentence that Defendant had already served.  Defendant had 
already served the active sentence imposed for larceny after 
breaking or entering in 10 CRS 57417 at the time the trial court 
erroneously entered judgment and commitment upon revocation of 
probation on that same charge on 5 June 2012. 
-35- 
 
Defendant states in his brief, and we agree, that: 
It is clear from the record the [the trial 
court] 
intended 
to 
revoke 
[Defendant's] 
probation for 10 CRS 57417 (breaking and 
entering), not 10 CRS 57417 (larceny after 
breaking and entering).  The judgment and 
commitment upon revocation of probation for 
10 CRS 57417 (larceny after breaking and 
entering) was the result of clerical error 
and must be vacated. 
 
Defendant asks this Court to vacate that judgment and remand "to 
the trial court to correct clerical mistakes in the judgments."   
 
We remand the judgment and commitment in 10 CRS 57417 for 
the trial court to correct its clerical error and make the 
judgment reflect that Defendant's probation in 10 CRS 57417 was 
revoked on the first count, breaking or entering.  See State v. 
Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 202-03, 535 S.E.2d 875, 878-79 
(2000).   
 
Defendant does not challenge the revocation of probation 
and activation of the sentences for his other convictions, and 
those are affirmed. 
 
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part; judgment 
arrested in 09 CRS 53255, larceny after breaking or entering. 
Judge DAVIS concurs. 
 
Judge GEER concurs in part and concurs in the result only 
in 
part 
by 
separate 
opinion.
NO. COA12-1269 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 6 August 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Iredell County 
Nos. 09 CRS 53255 
WILLIAM HERBERT PENNELL, IV, 
     Defendant. 
     09 CRS 53992 
     10 CRS 57417 
 
 
GEER, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the 
result only in part. 
 
 
I concurred in State v. Hunnicutt, ___ N.C. App. ___, 740 
S.E.2d 906 (2013), discussed by the majority opinion.  It is, of 
course, well established that "[w]here a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, 
a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, 
unless it has been overturned by a higher court."  In re Civil 
Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989).  
Nevertheless, if an opinion of a panel is clearly inconsistent 
with earlier opinions of this Court or the Supreme Court, we are 
obligated to follow those earlier opinions. 
I am persuaded by the majority opinion that Hunnicutt and 
State v. Long, ___ N.C. App. ___, 725 S.E.2d 71, disc. review 
denied, 366 N.C. 227, 726 S.E.2d 836 (2012), are inconsistent 
with prior opinions of the Supreme Court and this Court allowing 
-2- 
 
 
collateral attacks on judgments that are void for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Since, as the majority concludes, count II of the 
indictment in 09 CRS 53255 was fatally flawed and could not 
bestow jurisdiction on the trial court, the judgment imposed 
based on that indictment was void and subject to collateral 
attack.  I, therefore, concur in the majority opinion's decision 
to vacate all actions of the trial court based upon count II of 
the indictment in 09 CRS 53255 and to arrest the 5 June 2012 
judgment for the 09 CRS 53255 larceny after breaking and 
entering.  I concur fully in section IV of the majority opinion.