Title: Nic J. Eichenseer v. Madison-Dane County Tavern League, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1063 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Nic J. Eichenseer, 
          Plaintiff, 
 
Brian Dougherty and Eric B. Stener on behalf of 
themselves and all other similarly situated 
persons, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Madison-Dane County Tavern League, Inc., Amy's 
Cafe, Inc., The Angelic Brewing Company, LLC, 
Brothers of Wisconsin, Inc. d/b/a Brothers, 
Oscar, Inc. d/b/a Buffalo Wild Wings Grill & 
Bar, Bull Feathers, Inc., Zapel, Inc. d/b/a City  
Bar, Wisconsin Ventures, Inc. d/b/a Club Amazon 
and The Church Key, Kollege Klub, Inc., 
Schooners Bar & Grill d/b/a Lava Lounge, The 
Church Key d/b/a Mad Dog's Pub & Pizzeria, 
B.A.T., Inc. d/b/a Madhatters, Orbut of State 
Street, Inc. d/b/a Mondays, Nitty Gritty, LLC, 
Paul's Club, Inc., Plaza Tavern and Grill, Inc., 
The Pub, Inc., The Red Shed, Inc., Spices 
Restaurante, Inc., State Bar & Grill, LLC, State 
Street Brats, Stillwaters, Inc., Vintage LLC 
d/b/a Vintage Spirits & Grill, Wando Ventures, 
Inc., The Bull Ring of Madison, Inc. d/b/a the 
Irish Pub and Does 1-50, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Secura Supreme Insurance, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 226 
Reported at: 297 Wis. 2d 495, 725 N.W.2d 274 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 6, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Angela B. Bartell   
 
 
2 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BUTLER, Jr., J., dissents.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY and CROOKS, JJ., did not participate. 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., withdrew from participation.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by 
Kay Nord Hunt, Reid R. Lindquist, Brent R. Johnson, Steven E. 
Uhr (of counsel), and Lommen, Abdo, Cole, King & Stageberg, 
P.A., Minneapolis, Minn., and oral argument by Kay Nord Hunt. 
 
For defendants-respondents there was a brief by Kevin J. 
O’Connor, Kendall W. Harrison, Patricia L. Wheeler, and Godfrey 
& Kahn, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Kevin J. O’Connor. 
 
An amicus curiae brief on behalf of the University of 
Wisconsin - Madison, and oral argument by Eric J. Wilson, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Peter C. Carstensen, on 
behalf of the American Antitrust Institute. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Catherine M. Rottier 
and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP; Attorney Michael P. May; 
and Claire Silverman, on behalf of the City of Madison and the 
League of Municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1063   
(L.C. No. 
2004CV923) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Nic J. Eichenseer, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
Brian Dougherty and Eric B. Stener on behalf of 
themselves and all other similarly situated 
persons, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Madison-Dane County Tavern League, Inc., Amy's 
Cafe, Inc., The Angelic Brewing Company, LLC, 
Brothers of Wisconsin, Inc. d/b/a Brothers, Oscar, 
Inc. d/b/a Buffalo Wild Wings Grill & Bar, Bull 
Feathers, Inc., Zapel, Inc. d/b/a City Bar, 
Wisconsin Ventures, Inc. d/b/a Club Amazon and The 
Church Key, Kollege Klub, Inc., Schooners Bar & 
Grill d/b/a Lava Lounge, The Church Key d/b/a Mad 
Dog's Pub & Pizzeria, B.A.T., Inc. d/b/a 
Madhatters, Orbut of State Street, Inc. d/b/a 
Mondays, Nitty Gritty, LLC, Paul's Club, Inc., 
Plaza Tavern and Grill, Inc., The Pub, Inc., The 
Red Shed, Inc., Spices Restaurante, Inc., State 
Bar & Grill, LLC, State Street Brats, Stillwaters, 
Inc., Vintage LLC d/b/a Vintage Spirits & Grill, 
Wando Ventures, Inc., The Bull Ring of Madison, 
Inc. d/b/a the Irish Pub and Does 1-50, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Secura Supreme Insurance, 
 
          Intervenor. 
FILED 
 
MAY 6, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
No.  2005AP1063 
2 
 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is an antitrust case.  The 
plaintiffs1 accuse 24 taverns in the immediate vicinity of the 
University of Wisconsin campus in Madison and the Madison-Dane 
County Tavern League, Inc. (collectively, the defendants) of 
horizontal price-fixing violations under Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1)2 
because, in response to pressure from city government to ban all 
drink specials after 8 p.m. in the city, the 24 taverns agreed 
to eliminate drink specials at their establishments on Friday 
and Saturday nights after 8 p.m.  We review here a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Eichenseer v. Madison-Dane 
County Tavern League, Inc., 2006 WI App 226, 297 Wis. 2d 495, 
725 N.W.2d 274, affirming the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment to the defendants. 
¶2 
In the procedural posture of this case, we do not 
address whether the defendants' conduct constituted violations 
of antitrust law.  We assume antitrust violations for purposes 
of determining whether the defendants have immunity for their 
actions.  The defendants contend that their conduct is immune 
                                                 
1 Nic J. Eichenseer, Brian Dougherty, and Eric B. Stener 
filed their complaint in Dane County Circuit Court as parties 
and representatives of a class of persons who patronize the 24 
Madison taverns after 8 p.m. on Friday and/or Saturday nights.  
Nic J. Eichenseer elected not to appeal the circuit court's 
decision.  Only Dougherty and Stener are participating in this 
appeal.  Accordingly, reference to "the plaintiffs" indicates 
only Dougherty and Stener. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2005AP1063 
3 
 
from Wisconsin antitrust law under: (1) the so-called "implied 
repeal doctrine" articulated in Town of Hallie v. City of 
Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N.W.2d 321 (1982) (Hallie 
I); (2) the Noerr-Pennington government petitioning doctrine 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court;3 and (3) the 
Local Government Antitrust Act (LGAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36.  
¶3 
We conclude that the defendants' challenged actions 
are immune from state antitrust law under the implied repeal 
doctrine of Hallie I.  Because of this conclusion, we determine 
that it is not necessary to decide the validity of the 
defendants' second and third defenses.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
This case was filed in Dane County Circuit Court on 
March 24, 2004.  It was assigned to Circuit Court Judge Angela 
B. Bartell.  The parties engaged in some discovery and filed 
documents with the court.  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment in December 2004, and the plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment in February 2005.  The effect of counter-motions for 
summary judgment, together with the various filings in this 
case, is an assertion by the parties that the facts are 
                                                 
3 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 
365 
U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).   
No.  2005AP1063 
4 
 
undisputed, that in effect the facts are stipulated, and that 
only issues of law are before the court.4 
¶5 
In this opinion, we closely follow the circuit court's 
written account of the undisputed background facts, with 
supplementation from the summary judgment record. 
¶6 
In 1999 the City of Madison (City) began to address 
issues of high-risk drinking.  The City was concerned that 
alcohol issues, especially over-consumption, were increasing in 
the area of the University of Wisconsin-Madison (University) 
campus, leading to more frequent conveyances of students and 
others 
to 
detoxification 
facilities 
in 
life-threatening 
circumstances and increased need for expensive police response 
services to the campus area.  The City focused on how over-
consumption of alcohol reduced the health, welfare, and quality 
of life of people in the campus area.  Mayor Sue Baumann 
appointed a Work Group on Downtown Alcohol Issues to address 
these concerns.  The group included representatives from the 
Madison-Dane County Tavern League, Inc. (Tavern League), the 
University, the mayor's office, the city attorney's office, and 
the Madison Police Department.  In April 2000 the work group 
issued a report making suggestions related to the perceived 
"over-saturation" of downtown taverns, capacity violations at 
                                                 
4 See Powalka v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 53 
Wis. 2d 513, 518, 192 N.W.2d 852 (1972) (citing Wiegand v. 
Gissal, 28 Wis. 2d 488, 137 N.W.2d 412 (1965), rehearing denied, 
28 Wis. 2d 488, 495a-b, 138 N.W.2d 740 (1966)); Lucas v. 
Godfrey, 161 Wis. 2d 51, 57, 467 N.W.2d 180 (Ct. App. 1991). 
No.  2005AP1063 
5 
 
the taverns, and the need for greater enforcement of existing 
ordinances. 
¶7 
The City's concerns were shared, and to some extent 
inspired, by the University.  On March 1, 2000, then Provost of 
the University John Wiley wrote a letter to local tavern keepers 
in which he said that "high-risk drinking is clearly the primary 
health risk of our students and a major threat to their academic 
success."  Several years earlier, the University had received a 
grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to fund multi-year 
research, political action, and monitoring to try to reduce 
"binge" drinking in the campus area.5  Thus, by early 2000, the 
                                                 
5 Problem drinking, related crimes, and related injuries 
plague college campuses across the United States.  A March 2007 
report by The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
(CASA) at Columbia University found: 
From 1993 to 2005, there has been no significant 
reduction in the levels of drinking and binge drinking 
among college students.  In 2005, 67.9 percent of 
students (approximately 5.3 million students) reported 
drinking 
in 
the 
past 
month 
and 
40.1 
percent 
(approximately 3.1 million students) reported binge 
drinking.*  However, from 1993 to 2001 rates of 
riskier 
drinking——frequent 
binge 
drinking, 
being 
intoxicated, drinking to get drunk——have increased.  
. . . .  
Between 1993 and 2001, there has been a 37.6 
percent increase in the proportion of college students 
hurt or injured as a result of their alcohol use (9.3 
percent vs. 12.8 percent).  In 2001, 1,717 college 
students 
died 
from 
unintentional 
alcohol-related 
injuries——up six percent from 1998.  
. . . .  
No.  2005AP1063 
6 
 
University had begun to involve itself actively in the City's 
decisions on retail liquor licenses near the campus. 
¶8 
The University took the position that drink specials——
that is, advertised promotions offering either: (1) special 
high-potency drinks containing multiple shots of liquor; or (2) 
multiple drinks for the price of one regular drink——were 
encouraging 
high-risk, 
high-volume 
drinking 
by 
University 
students. 
¶9 
The University applied pressure to the City; and the 
City, in turn, began to flex its regulatory muscle.  It imposed 
special conditions on the license of a tavern called Luther's 
Blues, and thereafter imposed the "Luther's Blues conditions"6 on 
                                                                                                                                                             
The average number of alcohol-related arrests per 
campus increased 21 percent between 2001 and 2005.  In 
2005, alcohol-related arrests constituted 83 percent 
of campus arrests.  
[FN*: Binge drinking is defined as five or more drinks 
on any one drinking occasion in the past two weeks.]   
The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia 
University, Wasting the Best and the Brightest: Substance Abuse 
at America's Colleges and Universities 3, 4-5 (March 2007), 
http://www.casacolumbia.org/absolutenm/articlefiles/380-
College%20II%20Final-Revised.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2008).   
6 The 
"Luther's 
Blues 
conditions," 
requested 
by 
the 
University and imposed by the City, include the following: 
• 
Not to increase the volume contained in a serving 
without increasing proportionately the price charged 
for such serving. 
• 
Not to give away any drink or sell at a price 
that is different from the usual price for the drink 
for any period of time less than one full week. 
No.  2005AP1063 
7 
 
virtually all liquor licenses issued to new or relocating liquor 
establishments near the campus.  These conditions did not limit 
or set alcohol prices but were designed to discourage price 
reduction "specials" that the City believed encouraged high-
volume and dangerous drinking. 
¶10 The 
"Luther's 
Blues 
conditions" 
were 
sometimes 
characterized as "voluntary."  They were, however, required for 
new licensees7 and existing licensees who relocated or attempted 
to make significant changes to their businesses.8  The circuit 
                                                                                                                                                             
• 
Not to give away any drink or reduce the price of 
any drink conditioned upon the purchase of any drink 
or number of drinks. 
• 
Not to sell or give away an unlimited number of 
drinks during a set period of time for a fixed price. 
7 The record indicates that the following new licensees were 
subject to the "Luther's Blues conditions": Hawk's, Crave, Dotty 
Dumpling's, Kimia Lounge, and Nam's Noodles. 
8 The City of Madison, Wisconsin Code of Ordinances provides 
that an application for a Class B liquor license (which 
authorizes retail sales of intoxicating liquor for consumption 
on the premises licensed) must be filed with the City Clerk 
before it is referred to the Common Council for ultimate 
approval.  Madison, Wis., Code §§ 38.03(2)(b), 38.05(3)(a), 
38.05(11) (2007).  However, before Council approval, the City 
Clerk must refer the application to the Alcohol License Review 
Committee (ALRC), which conducts an "investigation as to the 
advisability of granting such license" and then makes "a 
recommendation to the Common Council as to whether or not such 
application should be granted."  Id., § 38.05(3)(a)11.   
No.  2005AP1063 
8 
 
court pinpointed two taverns in the second category, namely, 
Regent Street Retreat and Buck's.  None of the taverns with the 
"Luther's Blues conditions" imposed by the City is a defendant 
in this suit.  By contrast, the Nitty Gritty was threatened with 
"conditions" at the time of a planned expansion, but avoided 
them after intense negotiations.  The Nitty Gritty is now a 
defendant in this suit. 
¶11 The City committee charged with making recommendations 
on liquor licenses is the Alcohol License Review Committee 
(ALRC), which was then chaired by Madison Alder Tim Bruer.  The 
circuit court said of the ALRC: 
ALRC's 
recommendations 
regarding 
whether 
licenses 
should or should not be granted and the various 
conditions that should be attached to those licenses 
were so powerful that they were almost inevitably 
followed 
by 
the 
City 
Council. 
 
ALRC 
and 
its 
chairman[,] 
[Alder] 
Bruer[,] 
functioned 
as 
the 
powerful face and voice of the City's formal and 
informal regulation of alcohol sold in the City of 
Madison. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The City Clerk must also give notice of the application to 
the Director of the Neighborhood Preservation and Inspection 
Division, the Chief of the Police Department, the Chief of the 
Fire Department, and the Director of Public Health, all of whom 
inspect the premises sought to be licensed and report to the 
Common Council in writing.  Id.  The City Clerk must schedule 
public hearings before the ALRC and Common Council before a 
Class B license is granted.  Id., § 38.05(3)(e). 
The ALRC, through its recommendations, clearly influences 
the Common Council's decision to grant or deny a license.  In 
this case, ALRC Chair Bruer and Alder Verveer, who represented 
the campus area, influenced the "Luther's Blues conditions" 
placed upon new and existing licensees in the downtown campus 
area. 
No.  2005AP1063 
9 
 
¶12 In the summer of 2001 the ALRC created a "Sub-
Committee on Comprehensive Alcohol Issues" (subcommittee) to 
continue its efforts to address problems associated with high-
risk drinking.  The subcommittee held public hearings at which 
University representatives, tavern owners, and the public stated 
their views on drink specials and other drinking issues.  
¶13 The subcommittee's final report recommended that the 
ALRC seek an ordinance regulating drink specials.  That report, 
issued on April 25, 2002, contained draft ordinance language 
banning all drink specials at all Madison taverns seven days per 
week after 8 p.m.9  Madison taverns and the downtown business 
                                                 
9 The draft ordinance stated: 
38.07(14) Drink Specials Regulated.   
Between 8:00 p.m. and closing on any day with 
regard to the advertising, sale or service of alcohol 
beverages, licensee shall: 
(a) Not increase the volume contained in a 
serving without increasing proportionately the price 
charged for such serving. 
(b) Not give away any drink or sell at a price 
that is different from the usual price for the drink 
for any period of time less than one full week. 
(c) Not give away any drink or reduce the price 
of any drink conditioned upon the purchase of any 
drink or number of drinks. 
(d) Not sell or give away an unlimited number of 
drinks during a set period of time for a fixed price. 
(e) Not 
advertise 
in 
any 
manner 
the 
availability, pricing or dispensing of drinks or 
alcohol in a manner to lead a reasonably prudent 
person to conclude that alcohol is available contrary 
to paragraphs a.-d. above. 
No.  2005AP1063 
10 
 
community opposed this report and the concept of a drink 
specials ban because the bar owners believed that the ban was 
overbroad and that drink specials contributed little to high-
risk drinking behavior around campus.  Notwithstanding this 
opposition, the ALRC received the subcommittee report by a 
unanimous vote on May 21, 2002.  The report was then referred to 
the Common Council, which also accepted it.  Once the report was 
received by the Council, its recommendations went back to the 
ALRC for the development of an ordinance for a citywide drink 
specials ban. 
¶14 On July 10, 2002, the ALRC held a meeting at the 
University Memorial Union at which John Wiley, who had become 
University Chancellor, expressed his strong support for a 
comprehensive drink specials ban.  Richard Lyshek, a campus 
tavern owner, and Barbara Mercer, president of the Tavern 
League, continued to express opposition.  At the end of the 
meeting, ALRC Chair Bruer told Lyshek and Mercer that he 
believed there were sufficient votes on the Common Council to 
pass an ordinance banning drink specials.  The circuit court 
later found that Alder "Bruer specifically directed Lyshek and 
the Tavern League to come up with a solution to the City's drink 
special concerns and explained that if they didn't[,] the City 
would take care of the issue itself."  Lyshek and Mercer 
conferred with one another about the need to respond to the 
City's demands, and Lyshek offered to coordinate outreach to the 
bar owners in the campus area and develop a response to the 
pressure on the tavern owners to self-regulate drink specials. 
No.  2005AP1063 
11 
 
¶15 Lyshek became the point person in negotiations because 
he was not only a tavern owner but also a member of the ALRC.  
He held numerous meetings with Alder Bruer and Alder Mike 
Verveer, who represented most of the campus area on the Common 
Council.  Alders Bruer and Verveer also met with other 
interested persons to express the City's concerns and its 
developing policy against drink specials.  Again, the circuit 
court found as fact that: 
Despite opposition of tavern owners to any type of ban 
on drink specials, [Alder] Bruer told Lyshek and 
Barbara Mercer that the bars needed [to] come up with 
their own solutions to the excessive drinking problems 
caused by drink specials or the City would do it for 
them.  ALRC member Lyshek believed that any bar that 
did not take steps to address the City's concerns on 
drink specials would be subject to increased police 
scrutiny and would have difficulties with the ALRC at 
the time of liquor license renewal. (Emphasis added.) 
¶16 As a result of his outreach efforts among campus bar 
owners, Lyshek identified a number of bar owners who were 
willing to announce that they would "voluntarily" discontinue 
drink specials on Friday and Saturday nights after 8 p.m. to 
head off enactment of a citywide all-week drink specials ban.  
Lyshek presented the idea to Alder Verveer, who agreed that it 
might be acceptable to the City.  Lyshek also spoke directly 
with Alder Bruer, who reportedly liked the idea as well. 
¶17 A press conference was organized for September 12, 
2002, at which various downtown bar owners would announce that 
they were acceding to the City's demands.  Several days prior to 
the press conference, Alder Bruer contacted Lyshek and asked 
No.  2005AP1063 
12 
 
whether 
any 
of 
the 
bars 
would 
extend 
the 
voluntary 
discontinuance of drink specials after 8 p.m. to Thursday 
nights.10  Lyshek resisted, telling Alder Bruer that he did not 
think that any bars would be willing to extend their policy to 
Thursdays. 
¶18 At the September 12, 2002, news conference, various 
tavern owners, surrounded by Alder Verveer and University 
representatives, publicly announced that they were "giving in" 
to the City's demands and would not offer drink specials on 
Friday and Saturday nights after 8 p.m.  The tavern keepers' 
principal spokesman, Marsh Shapiro, a former local television 
personality, delivered the following prepared statement: 
News Release 
For release after 2:00 p.m. Thursday September 12, 
2002 
Good afternoon. . . .  
My name is Marsh Shapiro, owner of the Nitty Gritty 
Restaurant and Bar, . . . With me are Dick Lyshek, 
owner of Bullfeathers and the [Dane] County Tavern 
League representative on the Alcohol License Review 
Committee of which he is a non-voting member, and 
Kelly Meuer owner of State Street Brats. . . .  
We thank you all for coming. . . .  
This afternoon . . . I am acting as a spokesperson 
representing over 35 bar owners in the campus area. 
                                                 
10 These reported statements of ALRC Chair Bruer were cited 
by the circuit court as "verbal acts" and not regarded for their 
truth.  As such, the statements were considered by the circuit 
court on the parties' motions for summary judgment. 
No.  2005AP1063 
13 
 
UW Chancellor Wiley and City officials have repeatedly 
expressed 
the 
opinion 
that 
drink 
specials 
are 
promoting binge drinking and are the main cause of 
problems that occur at bartime specifically on week-
ends in the campus area. 
First and foremost, we strongly disagree with that 
opinion, and hold to our belief that drink specials 
are not the cause of the late night problems.  We see 
drink specials as a legitimate marketing strategy 
designed 
to 
get 
customers 
to 
come 
to 
our 
establishments.  They are the same marketing and 
promotion techniques that are employed in every other 
type of business to get customers in the door. 
We are a little puzzled about the mixed messages being 
sent by the A.L.R.C. and the City Council.  We all 
believe in the free enterprise system, but the ALRC 
continues to saturate our downtown area by approving 
more new licensed establishments, yet now they want us 
to eliminate the drink specials which is a way of 
competing with each other and with all the new 
establishments in order for us to stay in business. 
Furthermore, we want to go on record today stating 
that [we] do not encourage binge drinking nor do we 
condone it in our bars.  We would like all of our 
patrons to drink responsibly and to know when to say 
when. 
It is our purpose and intent to provide clean and safe 
environments for our patrons for the purpose of 
socializing and for the responsible consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. 
With these facts in mind, and without acknowledging 
that drink specials are indeed causing this problem, 
we as a group, have agreed that we will voluntarily 
and immediately end all drink specials on Fridays and 
Saturday nights after 8 p.m. in our establishments. 
Furthermore, a majority of us agree that we will do no 
new 
advertising 
or 
promoting 
of 
week-end 
drink 
specials on local radio, TV, or in the newspapers 
after current and existing contracts expire. 
As concerned owners and businessmen, we want to be 
part of the solution, not part of the problem. 
No.  2005AP1063 
14 
 
In trying to build bridges and mend fences with 
Chancellor Wiley and City officials, we feel today we 
are taking this first solid step toward trying to end 
a problem that we all agree exists. 
If it is found that late night trouble in the campus 
area 
on 
week-ends 
decreases 
significantly 
or 
disappears, then we will be the first to admit that 
drink specials were a part of the problem and we will 
be pleased and happy that we took this action today. 
However, if after a period of time it is determined 
that nothing has changed, and the number of police 
calls has stayed the same or gone up, then we can 
probably conclude that drink specials were not the 
cause of the problems, and we will all have to 
continue to work together to look elsewhere to 
satisfactorily resolve this issue. 
We do not feel that pending legislation before the 
A.L.R.C. to ban all drink specials at all bars and 
restaurants in the City of Madison is necessary. 
On a 
related 
topic, we do not feel that new 
legislation is needed regarding the banning of smoking 
in our bars and restaurants in the city.[11] 
These two issues have occupied a great deal of our 
time in recent months, and although these are hot 
button items right now, we as bar and restaurant 
owners feel it's time for all people to start taking 
the responsibility for their own actions and make 
solid choices relating to their drinking and smoking 
habits. 
We do not need more legislation or controls that will 
adversely affect our businesses. 
In 
summary, 
we 
are 
responsible 
alcohol 
license 
holders, honorable businessmen, community leaders, 
taxpayers, and good citizens of Madison, and we would 
like both University and City officials to treat us as 
such. 
                                                 
11 An ordinance banning smoking in Madison taverns went into 
effect on May 11, 2004. 
No.  2005AP1063 
15 
 
Thank you. . . . We will be happy to answer any 
questions you may have. . . .  
¶19 When the tavern owners were asked whether drink 
specials could be discontinued on Thursday nights, Lyshek 
answered that there should be one busy night of the week, 
Thursday, as a "control," to test whether the absence of drink 
specials really had any effect on problems associated with high-
risk drinking. 
¶20 The September 12, 2002, press conference was designed 
to signal the tavern owners' compliance with the City's 
regulatory demands and policies.  The circuit court later found 
that the news conference was also "political puffery" in an 
effort to get maximum press exposure to make the reported group 
of cooperating bar owners look as large as possible——all 
designed to have the maximum political impact on the ALRC and 
the City, so that no further steps to enact a citywide drink 
specials ban would appear to be necessary.  The Tavern League 
simultaneously issued a supportive press release,12 but it 
                                                 
12 The following is an excerpt from this press release: 
The Down Town Tavern Working Group (DTWG) is 
sponsored by the Dane County Tavern League and 
consists of the majority of taverns and restaurants 
with alcohol service in the University Avenue/State 
Street 
Corridor 
as 
well 
as 
the 
local 
[b]eer 
wholesalers.  The DTWG was formed to provide a 
proactive and substantive response to the hysteria 
surrounding 
student 
drinking 
habits, 
and 
the 
regulatory proposals that have been directed at campus 
area taverns.  Following are our proposals for dealing 
with some of the issues being raised time and time 
again by the University and City. 
Drink Specials: 
No.  2005AP1063 
16 
 
specifically reserved the right of individual tavern owners to 
determine their own participation based on their independent 
business needs.13 
¶21 The circuit court found that the press conference and 
press releases had the desired effect.  At the next ALRC 
meeting, the committee placed its previously stated intent to 
draft and pursue a citywide drink specials ban ordinance on 
hold.  Thereafter, the Common Council never debated, voted on, 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is the position of the DTWG that there is no 
statistically 
significant 
correlation 
between 
the 
existence 
of 
[d]rink 
[s]pecials 
and 
disorderly 
behavior. 
 The truly significant drink specials 
exist on 
weeknights 
when 
disorderly 
behavior 
is 
minimal. . . .  
. . . [M]ost of the downtown taverns . . . have 
voluntarily agreed to eliminate late night drink 
specials on Friday and Saturday nights beginning 
September 20, 2002 and continuing for at least the 
next year.  We have our reservations about engaging in 
what 
could 
be 
considered 
illegal 
"collusion 
in 
restraint of trade", but we feel this proactive 
position can cut through the fog and confusion 
surrounding the role of drink specials and disorderly 
behavior. 
 
13 The following taverns were listed in the Tavern League's 
press 
release 
as 
"Fully 
confirmed 
participation 
as 
of 
9/12/2002": "Amy's Cafe, Angelic, Blue Velvet, Buffalo Wild 
Wings, Bull Feathers, Brothers, City, Club Amazon, Irish Pub, 
Kollege Klub, Mad Dogs, Madhatters, Nitty Gritty, Plaza, State 
Bar, State Street Brats, Stillwaters, Vintage Spirits, Wandos." 
Other taverns were listed in the same press release as 
"Willingness indicated but confirmation not received as of 
9/12/2002": "Spices, Paul's Club, Lava Lounge, Red Shed, [The] 
Pub, Mondays."  These six taverns are named as defendants in 
this suit. 
No.  2005AP1063 
17 
 
or passed any ordinance banning drink specials in the downtown 
area.   
¶22 Throughout 2003, at approximately six-month intervals, 
the ALRC received detailed reports from University officials 
active in monitoring campus drinking issues. These reports 
tracked detoxification runs and the utilization of police 
services in the campus area.  A May 2003 University press 
release stated that "a voluntary effort by 25 downtown Madison 
bars to limit weekend drink specials coincides with declines in 
liquor-law violations and disorderly-conduct incidents during 
the first six months of the program, according to new data from 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Madison's 
PACE 
[Policy, 
Alternatives, Community, and Education] Project." 
¶23 On March 10, 2004, however, the University issued a 
press release stating that the voluntary drink specials ban "has 
been inconclusive and serious alcohol-related crime continues to 
rise."  The press release cited a University PACE Project study 
of downtown police calls that found that downtown disorderly 
conduct violations increased 38 percent on Friday nights and 
38.4 percent on Saturday nights from August 2002 to August 2003, 
at a time when the voluntary drink specials ban was in place.  
Despite these findings, PACE continued to advocate voluntary 
limits on drink specials. 
¶24 Throughout 2004, and continuing through the time frame 
giving rise to the present litigation, the Madison Common 
Council did not enact any ordinance or other regulation banning 
drink specials.   
No.  2005AP1063 
18 
 
¶25 On March 24, 2004, the plaintiffs filed this antitrust 
class action lawsuit against the Tavern League and the 24 
downtown taverns.  The suit sought damages and injunctive relief 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 133.03 and 803.08.  The complaint 
alleged that the defendants entered into an agreement on 
September 12, 2002, to "voluntarily and immediately end all 
drink 
specials 
on 
Friday 
and 
Saturday 
nights 
after 
8 
p.m. . . . for the express purpose of increasing prices in order 
to reduce output (i.e., consumption)."  The plaintiffs described 
the defendants' conduct as a "naked, per se price-fixing 
conspiracy." 
 
The 
complaint 
stated 
that 
damages 
were 
"anticipated to be in the tens of millions of dollars." 
¶26 In December 2004 the defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which was countered in February 2005 by the 
plaintiffs' own motion.  The defendants argued that their 
challenged conduct was immune from Wisconsin antitrust law under 
any of three legal rationales: (1) the so-called "implied repeal 
doctrine" of Hallie I; (2) the Noerr-Pennington government 
petitioning doctrine; or (3) the LGAA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36.  
¶27 On April 7, 2005, the circuit court issued an order 
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding 
that the defendants were immune from antitrust liability under 
both the implied repeal and Noerr-Pennington doctrines.  The 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
decide 
whether 
the 
LGAA 
provided 
additional grounds for immunity.  The circuit court stated: 
Call it what you will (implied repeal, home rule, 
state action), when a Wisconsin municipality acts out 
No.  2005AP1063 
19 
 
of public health and safety concerns in its regulation 
of 
alcohol 
sales, 
antitrust 
and 
anti-competitive 
policies are swept away by the fundamental and near-
plenary 
nature 
of 
the 
governmental 
authority 
exercised. . . .  
The evidence is overwhelming that the regulatory 
pressure on campus bar owners generated by City and 
[University] officials was enormous.  "Luther's Blues" 
style conditions prohibiting drink specials had been 
placed on new licenses issued in the campus area.  
Current license holders who relocated or remodeled 
their premises were subjected to similar conditions, 
unless they could convince the ALRC that their 
business 
practices 
were 
not 
a 
part 
of 
the 
problem . . . .  Direct demands were made to campus 
bar owners and to the [] Tavern League by the longtime 
Chair of the ALRC for a solution to the drink special 
concerns of the City. . . .  The Chair of ALRC was 
directly threatening existing bar licensees that the 
City would enact . . . an ordinance [banning drink 
specials] 
if 
the 
bar 
owners 
did 
not 
"police 
themselves," "clean up their acts," and address the 
drink special concerns of the City.  In this context, 
the City, by its duly authorized ALRC representative, 
unilaterally decided that the bar owners should 
voluntarily 
ban 
drink 
specials 
at 
least 
on 
weekends. . . .  
After 
the 
announcement 
of 
the 
voluntary limits on drink specials, the ALRC took no 
further action to advance a drink special ban by 
ordinance, unequivocally showing its approval and 
ratification of the negotiated voluntary ban. . . .  
The conclusion from this scenario, is that but for the 
intense demands of the City through its ALRC, there 
would have been no voluntary ban on weekend drink 
specials by campus bar owners. 
¶28 The plaintiffs appealed this summary judgment and the 
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the implied repeal 
doctrine of Hallie I immunized the defendants' actions from 
antitrust liability.  Eichenseer, 297 Wis. 2d 495, ¶¶16, 22-24.  
In doing so, the court of appeals also analyzed federal case law 
interpreting 
the 
federal 
"state 
action" 
doctrine 
as 
an 
No.  2005AP1063 
20 
 
instructive analogue when applying the state law implied repeal 
doctrine.  Id., ¶¶19-21.  The court of appeals did not address 
whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine or LGAA immunized the 
defendants' actions from state antitrust law.  Id., ¶25.   
¶29 The plaintiffs petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on March 15, 2007. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶30 This case requires us to review a grant of summary 
judgment to the defendants.  Whether summary judgment has been 
properly granted is a question of law, which we review de novo, 
applying 
the 
same 
methodology 
as 
the 
circuit 
court 
but 
benefiting from the analyses of both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Butler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 2006 
WI 102, ¶17, 294 Wis. 2d 397, 717 N.W.2d 760.  The summary 
judgment statute provides that the judgment sought shall be 
rendered when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Whether a party's actions are 
immune from antitrust liability is a question of law that we 
review de novo. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶31 Some of the most contentious policy battles in the 
history of the United States have involved government regulation 
of alcohol beverages.  The Nation approved the Eighteenth 
Amendment in 1919 prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and 
transportation of intoxicating liquors, but it repealed that 
amendment 
in 
1933 
by Section of 1 of the Twenty-first 
No.  2005AP1063 
21 
 
Amendment.14  Section 2 of that Amendment gave the States 
"virtually complete control over whether to permit importation 
or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution 
system."15  324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 346 (1987) 
(quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).  Because Section 2 has been 
interpreted not to override other provisions of the United 
States Constitution, however, there is continuing tension 
between anticompetitive action by state authorities in the 
regulation of intoxicating liquor and federal antitrust law.   
¶32 This case presents a variation on that tension: an 
alleged dispute between local authorities and tavern keepers, on 
the one hand, and Wisconsin antitrust law, on the other.   
¶33 The applicable statute is Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1), 
which is based on the federal Sherman Act.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.  
Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 2005 WI 121, ¶42, 284 Wis. 2d 224, 
700 N.W.2d 139.  In considering this statute, we acknowledge the 
importance of competition in our free enterprise system.  The 
Wisconsin Legislature, in a statement of intent for our 
antitrust statutes, indicates that "It is the intent of the 
legislature to make competition the fundamental economic policy 
                                                 
14 "The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States is hereby repealed."  U.S. Const. amend. 
XXI, § 1. 
15 "The transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or 
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws 
thereof, is hereby prohibited."  U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. 
No.  2005AP1063 
22 
 
of this state[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 133.01.  Regulatory agencies are 
admonished that the public interest requires the "preservation 
and promotion of the maximum level of competition in any 
regulated industry consistent with the other public interest 
goals established by the legislature."  Id. (emphasis added).   
¶34 This statement of intent acknowledges that the "public 
interest" can pull regulators in opposite directions.  The 
present case requires us to examine when a conflicting public 
interest will prevail over the "maximum level of competition."   
¶35 We 
begin 
with 
a 
recitation 
of 
the 
plaintiffs' 
allegations of conspiracy in restraint of trade.  The plaintiffs 
allege that the defendants entered into a "naked, per se price-
fixing conspiracy" in violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03,16 and 
that their public agreement to "voluntarily and immediately end 
all drink specials on Friday and Saturday nights after 8 
p.m. . . . for the express purpose of increasing prices in order 
to reduce output (i.e., consumption)" establishes the factual 
basis for the complaint.  Defendants respond, in part, that 
their actions are immune from antitrust liability on grounds of 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 133.03 reads in part:   
Unlawful contracts; conspiracies.  (1) Every 
contract, 
combination 
in 
the 
form 
of 
trust 
or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce is illegal. Every person who makes any 
contract or engages in any combination or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade or commerce is guilty of a Class 
H felony, except that, notwithstanding the maximum 
fine specified in s. 939.50(3)(h), the person may be 
fined not more than $100,000 if a corporation, or, if 
any other person, may be fined not more than $50,000. 
No.  2005AP1063 
23 
 
the "implied repeal doctrine" articulated in Hallie I and the 
other grounds stated in ¶¶2 and 26 above. 
¶36 To resolve the issue of immunity, we presume a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03.  Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 536 
(assuming for purposes of appeal that the plaintiff would be 
able to prove facts in support of its antitrust allegations); 
see also 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
¶224a, at 94 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that antitrust immunity is 
usually decided before the substantive antitrust issue, even 
though many challenged government activities very likely do not 
violate antitrust laws) (hereinafter Antitrust Law).  Although 
we do not address the legal merits of the plaintiffs' antitrust 
claim, we note that the validity of the claim is not conceded by 
the defendants. 
¶37 Assuming arguendo that the defendants' actions violate 
Wis. Stat. § 133.03, we are asked to decide whether these 
actions are immune from liability and the defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment.  The defendants assert three 
grounds for immunity with respect to their actions, and we 
address their first two defenses in this opinion. 
A. 
Implied Repeal Doctrine17 
                                                 
17 The court of appeals adopted the label "implied repeal 
doctrine," which was used by the parties throughout their 
briefs, to describe the antitrust immunity doctrine of Town of 
Hallie 
v. 
City 
of 
Chippewa 
Falls, 
105 
Wis. 2d 533, 
314 
N.W.2d 321 (1982) (Hallie I).  See Eichenseer v. Madison-Dane 
County 
Tavern 
League, 
Inc., 
2006 
WI 
App 
226, 
¶8, 
297 
Wis. 2d 495, 725 N.W.2d 274.  We also adopt this label. 
No.  2005AP1063 
24 
 
¶38 There are explicit statutory exceptions to some of the 
antitrust provisions in Wis. Stat. ch. 133.  For instance, Wis. 
Stat. § 133.03(4) provides that "This section [§ 133.03] does 
not apply to ambulance service contracted for under ss. 
59.54(1), 60.565, 61.64 and 62.133."  By exceptions of this 
nature and exceptions contained within statutory definitions, 
the legislature has effectively excepted or "repealed" antitrust 
law with respect to certain actors and actions.   
¶39 The "implied repeal doctrine" addresses situations in 
which there is no explicit statutory exception to antitrust law 
but it is reasonably clear that the legislature intended to 
allow 
municipalities 
to 
undertake 
an 
action 
that 
is 
anticompetitive. 
 
If 
the 
legislature 
intends 
to 
allow 
municipalities to undertake an action that is anticompetitive, 
then that action is immune from antitrust enforcement under 
state law. 
¶40 The leading case in Wisconsin for the implied repeal 
doctrine is Hallie I, in which we held that the City of Chippewa 
Falls was not liable under state antitrust law for conditioning 
its provision of waste treatment services to an adjacent town on 
the acceptance of other municipal services.  Hallie I, 105 
Wis. 2d at 542.   
¶41 In Hallie I, the plaintiff Town of Hallie had no 
sewage treatment or collection facilities.  Id. at 534.  The 
defendant City of Chippewa Falls owned and maintained a sewage 
treatment plant with excess capacity.  Id.  The town proposed to 
construct its own treatment plant and to connect it to the 
No.  2005AP1063 
25 
 
city's system.  Id.  The city rejected this proposal and 
countered with an offer to tie the use of its treatment plant 
with the town's agreement to allow the city to provide certain 
municipal services such as fire and police protection.  Id.  
When the town did not agree to the city's offer, the city passed 
an ordinance annexing a portion of the town.  Id.  The town 
objected to the annexation in court and also complained that the 
city's tie-in scheme violated Wis. Stat. § 133.03 because it 
prevented the town from competing for sewer collection services.  
Id. at 535-36. 
¶42 On review, we held that the town's complaint failed to 
state a cause of action because the city's actions, pursuant to 
its home rule authority and statutory annexation powers, were 
exempt from state antitrust law.  Id. at 540.   
¶43 The Hallie I test to determine antitrust immunity for 
municipal actions is "whether the legislature intended to allow 
municipalities to undertake such actions."  Id. at 539.  In 
other words, a court must look to see if the legislature 
intended a conflicting statutory scheme to override state 
antitrust law under a given set of facts.  We noted three 
factors to consider in making this determination: (1) an 
analysis of the home rule powers of cities; (2) the type of 
conduct undertaken by a city in a particular instance; and (3) 
the general statutory framework set up by the legislature in a 
particular field.  Id.   
¶44 Applying these factors, we first noted the broad home 
rule powers that some municipalities are granted pursuant to 
No.  2005AP1063 
26 
 
Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5) (1979-1980)18 and Article XI, Section 3 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.19  Next, we characterized the city's 
conduct in annexing the town's land "as a reasonable quid pro 
quo that a city could require before extending sewer services to 
the area."  Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 540-41.  Finally, we 
concluded that the specific statutory scheme dealing with 
annexation 
power 
and 
joint 
sewer 
systems, 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), indicated that the 
legislature viewed "annexation as an appropriate prerequisite to 
the provision of sewage service outside the limits of a city."  
                                                 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.11(5), both the 1979-80 and 2005-06 
versions, provides: 
Powers.  Except as elsewhere in the statutes 
specifically provided, the council shall have the 
management and control of the city property, finances, 
highways, navigable waters, and the public service, 
and shall have power to act for the government and 
good order of the city, for its commercial benefit, 
and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, 
and may carry out its powers by license, regulation, 
suppression, 
borrowing 
of 
money, 
tax 
levy, 
appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and 
other necessary or convenient means.  The powers 
hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other 
grants, and shall be limited only by express language. 
19 Article XI, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in part:   
(1) Cities and villages organized pursuant to 
state law may determine their local affairs and 
government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such 
enactments of the legislature of statewide 
concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or 
every village.  The method of such determination shall 
be prescribed by the legislature. 
No.  2005AP1063 
27 
 
Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 542.  Therefore, we held that "the 
legislature did not intend that a city should be liable under 
the state antitrust law for the kinds of acts" done by the City 
of Chippewa Falls.  Id. at 542. 
¶45 The court revisited the issue of municipal immunity in 
American Medical Transport of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Curtis-
Universal, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 135, 452 N.W.2d 575 (1990) (AMT).  
In AMT, three private ambulance service providers alleged that 
the City of Milwaukee adopted a citywide emergency ambulance 
system that violated antitrust law.  Id. at 138-39.  Their 
complaint alleged that the city divided the Milwaukee area into 
four sections designated as service areas and assigned primary 
responsibility for each area to a single ambulance company.  Id. 
at 
139. 
 
The 
system 
benefited 
four 
different 
ambulance 
companies, but it relegated three other qualified companies to 
providing back-up service when a primary provider was not 
available.  Id.  The city also assumed control over the dispatch 
of emergency service to either the Milwaukee Fire Department or 
a private ambulance service, and it set all fees and rates for 
such service.  Id. at 139-40.  The plaintiffs described this 
system as a conspiracy to restrain trade in ambulance service——a 
conspiracy in which the four defendant ambulance companies fully 
participated with the city.  Id. at 140-41.   
¶46 This court paid homage to Hallie I but appeared to 
tighten 
the 
requirements 
for 
municipal 
immunity 
when 
it 
concluded that neither the city's actions nor the private 
providers' actions were immune from state antitrust law.  Id. at 
No.  2005AP1063 
28 
 
153-54.  The court said the question was whether the legislature 
had "impliedly authorized an exception from the antitrust laws 
in respect to certain types of conduct."  Id. at 148.  It said 
that a city's home rule powers to determine local affairs are 
broad but do not supersede legislative enactments of statewide 
concern, such as Wisconsin antitrust law.  Id. at 152.  To 
override state antitrust law, the court said, a city must look 
to other statutory enactments——beyond home rule——that create a 
legislative 
scheme 
that 
at 
least 
impliedly 
authorizes 
anticompetitive conduct by the city.  Id. at 148.   
¶47 The gist of these cases is that a municipality may 
pursue the familiar objectives of home rule power, but if the 
tactics it chooses are anticompetitive and tend to restrain 
trade, 
the 
municipality 
will 
usually 
need 
to 
rely 
on 
supplementary authority if it expects immunity for its actions.  
Antitrust immunity will depend upon the legislative framework in 
a particular field of government activity as well as the type 
and purpose of the actions the municipality initiates.  In the 
absence of explicit exceptions from antitrust statutes, such as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 133.03(4), 
immunity 
for 
government-related 
anticompetitive action will require examination of all relevant 
circumstances. 
¶48 Although the City is not a defendant in this case, the 
City's regulation of Madison taverns is at the heart of this 
dispute.  It is undisputed that the City imposed "Luther's Blues 
conditions" on the following taverns by explicit action of the 
Common Council:  Luther's Blues, Regent Street Retreat, Buck's, 
No.  2005AP1063 
29 
 
Hawk's, Crave, Dotty Dumpling's, Kimia Lounge, and Nam's 
Noodles.  It is our understanding that the city-imposed 
conditions on these eight establishments were more stringent in 
curtailing drink specials than the agreement announced by other 
establishments on September 12, 2002.  Consequently, we begin 
our Hallie I analysis by focusing on what the City did 
officially and directly. 
¶49  The first factor to consider in the implied repeal 
analysis is "the home rule powers of cities."20  Hallie I, 105 
Wis. 2d at 539.  The City of Madison possesses the broad home 
rule powers outlined by Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5) and Article XI, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  This power allows the 
City to act for the "health, safety, and welfare of the public," 
and to carry out its policy goals by "license, regulation, 
suppression . . . and other necessary or convenient means."  
Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).  These powers are subject to "enactments 
of the legislature of state-wide concern," such as antitrust 
laws.  See Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3; Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 
540.  However, if we were to construe the exercise of "general 
charter" home rule powers as constitutionally defective whenever 
they deal with a matter of statewide concern, we would render 
Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5) a nullity.  Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 540 
                                                 
20 Our analysis of the Hallie I factors will proceed in a 
different order (i.e., first factor, third factor, second 
factor) from the order established by the Hallie I court.  This 
reordering is intentional, to emphasize the impact that the 
second Hallie I factor, "the type of conduct undertaken by a 
city in a particular instance," has on our ultimate conclusion. 
No.  2005AP1063 
30 
 
(citing Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 
533, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978)).  Therefore, the City of Madison's 
home rule powers under Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5) allow it to provide 
for the public health, safety, and welfare by regulating alcohol 
using "necessary or convenient means," including the means 
employed here. 
¶50 A municipality may not disregard the state's antitrust 
laws simply because it possesses broad home rule authority.  At 
the same time, not every exercise of home rule authority that 
tends to restrain trade must pass antitrust scrutiny.  The type 
of action may have been excepted from antitrust law explicitly, 
or the action——because it is unilateral——may not constitute a 
"contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy" in restraint of 
trade.  Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1).  The non-party brief of the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison directs our attention to Fisher 
v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986), in which the Supreme 
Court said:   
A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does 
not become concerted action within the meaning of the 
[antitrust] statute simply because it has a coercive 
effect upon parties who must obey the law. The 
ordinary relationship between the government and those 
who must obey its regulatory commands whether they 
wish 
to 
or not is not enough to establish a 
conspiracy. 
Similarly, 
the 
mere 
fact 
that 
all 
competing [business] owners must comply with the same 
provisions of the Ordinance is not enough to establish 
a conspiracy among [the business owners]. 
Id. at 267.   
¶51 There is no dispute that the City imposed "Luther's 
Blues conditions" unilaterally on eight Madison taverns. 
No.  2005AP1063 
31 
 
¶52 Next, we turn to an evaluation of the regulation of 
alcohol beverages in Wisconsin to ascertain the "general 
statutory framework set up by the legislature" in this field for 
purposes of the implied repeal analysis.  See Hallie I, 105 
Wis. 2d at 539.   
¶53 We have observed that "the states, under the broad 
sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment, are endowed with 'something 
more than the normal' police power in regulating the sale of 
liquor in the interests of the public health, safety, morals, 
and general welfare." State ex rel. Grand Bazaar Liquors, Inc. 
v. City of Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 2d 203, 217, 313 N.W.2d 805 
(1982) (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)).   
¶54 In Odelberg v. City of Kenosha, 20 Wis. 2d 346, 122 
N.W.2d 435 (1963), this court reiterated the justifications for 
the near-plenary police power that a unit of government has to 
regulate alcohol sales: 
The justification for the exercise of the police 
power in restraining or prohibiting the sale of 
intoxicating liquors has been stated and restated by 
the courts time and again. It may be summed up as 
resting upon the fundamental principle that society 
has an inherent right to protect itself; that the 
preservation of law and order is paramount to the 
rights of individuals or property in manufacturing or 
selling 
intoxicating 
liquors; 
that 
the 
sobriety, 
health, peace, comfort, and happiness of society 
demand 
reasonable 
regulation, 
if 
not 
entire 
prohibition, of the liquor traffic. Unrestricted, it 
leads to drunkenness, poverty, lawlessness, vice, and 
crime of almost every description. Against this result 
society has the inherent right to protect itself——a 
right which antedates all constitutions and written 
laws——a 
right 
which 
springs 
out 
of 
the 
very 
foundations upon which the social organism rests; a 
No.  2005AP1063 
32 
 
right which needs no other justification for its 
existence or exercise than that it is reasonably 
necessary in order to promote the general welfare of 
the state. 
Id. at 350 (quoting Zodrow v. State, 154 Wis. 551, 555, 143 N.W. 
693 (1913)).21  To serve these policy goals, the statutory scheme 
governing alcohol in Wisconsin is pervasive, sweeping, and 
restrictive.   
¶55 Chapter 125 of the Wisconsin Statutes regulates 
"Alcohol Beverages."  The chapter's statement of legislative 
intent "provides this state regulatory authority over the 
production, storage, distribution, transportation, sale, and 
consumption of alcohol beverages by and to its citizens, for the 
benefit of the public health and welfare and this state's 
economic stability."  Wis. Stat. § 125.01.  Chapter 125 covers 
approximately 34 pages of the Wisconsin Statutes. This shows 
that the manufacture and sale of alcohol beverages is one of the 
most heavily regulated trades in our state.  Here are some 
familiar examples.  
¶56 Persons under age 21 cannot purchase alcohol.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 125.02(8m), (20m), and 125.07.  Consequently, an 
underage person "not accompanied by his or her parent, guardian 
or spouse who has attained the legal drinking age may not enter, 
knowingly attempt to enter or be on any premises for which a 
license or permit for the retail sale of alcohol beverages has 
                                                 
21 The lengthy quote from Odelberg v. City of Kenosha, 20 
Wis. 2d 346, 122 N.W.2d 435 (1963), appears at ¶15 of the court 
of appeals decision in this case.  Eichenseer, 297 Wis. 2d 495, 
¶15. 
No.  2005AP1063 
33 
 
been issued," subject to certain exceptions.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 125.07(3)(a); 125.07(3)(a)1.—14.  An underage person who 
procures or attempts to procure alcohol, possesses or consumes 
alcohol, knowingly enters or attempts to enter a licensed 
premises, or falsely represents his age to receive alcohol from 
a licensee or permittee, may be fined, required to complete 
community service, or temporarily lose his driver's license.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 125.07(4)(a); 125.07(4)(bs).  Those who sell 
liquor to an underage person or a person of age who is 
intoxicated also are subject to substantial fines, or even 
imprisonment.  Wis. Stat. §§ 125.07(1)(b)2.a.—d.; 125.07(2). 
¶57 No 
person 
may 
sell 
alcohol 
without 
a 
license, 
Wis. Stat. § 125.04(1), 
and 
the 
statutes 
list 
numerous 
requirements 
to 
obtain 
such 
a 
license. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 125.04(5).  Consumption of alcohol on premises open 
to the public is also prohibited unless the lessee, owner, or 
person 
in 
charge 
of 
the 
operation 
possesses 
a 
license.  
Wis. Stat. § 125.09(1).  Most license holders must be at least 
21 years old, Wis. Stat. § 125.04(5)(a)3., and successfully 
complete a "responsible beverage server training course" before 
being granted a license.  Wis. Stat. § 125.04(5)(a)5. 
¶58 Significantly, some of the state's vast power to 
regulate 
alcohol 
has 
been 
delegated 
to 
municipalities.  
Municipal authority to regulate alcohol sales and consumption, 
including licensing, is outlined in several sections of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 125.  General municipal authority to regulate alcohol 
is outlined in Wis. Stat. § 125.10(1): 
No.  2005AP1063 
34 
 
(1) Authorization. Any municipality may enact 
regulations incorporating any part of this chapter and 
may prescribe additional regulations for the sale of 
alcohol beverages, not in conflict with this chapter. 
The municipality may prescribe forfeitures or license 
suspension or revocation for violations of any such 
regulations. 
Regulations 
providing 
forfeitures 
or 
license suspension or revocation must be adopted by 
ordinance.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶59 Licensing the sale of alcohol beverages is the 
exclusive province of municipalities, so long as it does not 
conflict with state standards. 
¶60 Licensing 
is 
the 
primary 
tool 
available 
to 
municipalities to regulate alcohol sales and consumption.  Most 
notably, any municipality may put to a vote "whether the 
municipality shall issue retail licenses for the sale of 
fermented 
malt 
beverages 
or 
intoxicating 
liquor[.]"  
Wis. Stat. § 125.05(1).  In other words, municipalities have the 
right to ban alcohol sales within their borders.  See Johnson v. 
Town Bd. of Wyocena, 239 Wis. 461, 465, 1 N.W.2d 796 (1942).22  
If a municipality chooses to issue licenses, it "may grant and 
issue 'Class A' and 'Class B' licenses for retail sales of 
                                                 
22 A case in point is the Village of Ephraim in Door County.  
Ephraim is the only municipality in Wisconsin that has chosen to 
go "dry"——alcohol is not allowed to be sold in the Village.  A 
statement from the Village's website proudly proclaims:  
We're the only community in all of Wisconsin that is 
dry.  There have been two referendums to ask the 
citizens if they wanted liquor allowed to be sold 
within the Village——in 1934 and in 1992——59% voted no 
in 1934, 74% voted no in 1992.  Ephraim remains dry.   
A 
Brief 
History 
of 
Ephraim, 
http://www.ephraim-
wisconsin.com/ephraim/ephraim+history/default.asp (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2008). 
No.  2005AP1063 
35 
 
intoxicating liquor, and 'Class C' licenses for retail sales of 
wine, from premises within the municipality to persons entitled 
to a license under this chapter as the issuing municipal 
governing 
body 
deems 
proper[.]" 
Wis. Stat. § 125.51(1)(a) 
(emphasis added).   
¶61 Alcohol sales licenses are issued on an annual basis 
by the municipality; they are considered privileges rather than 
vested property rights.  See State ex rel. Ruffalo v. Common 
Council of City of Kenosha, 38 Wis. 2d 518, 523, 157 N.W.2d 568 
(1968).  Both "Class A" and "Class B" licenses may be revoked by 
the municipality if the terms of the license are not honored.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 125.25(3), 125.26(3).   
¶62 Some "Class B" retail licenses are limited in number——
a quota has been placed on their issuance by the legislature.  
Wis. Stat. § 125.51(4).  This is anticompetitive. 
¶63 "Class B" sellers are not permitted to remain open 
between the hours of 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. during weeknights and 2:30 
a.m. to 6 a.m. on Saturday and Sunday nights, subject to certain 
exceptions.  Wis. Stat. §§ 125.32(3); 125.68(4)(c).  This is 
anticompetitive. 
¶64 Alcohol may not be sold by "Class A" retailers after 9 
p.m. and before 8 a.m.  Wis. Stat. § 126.68(4)(b).  This is 
anticompetitive. 
¶65 The preceding analysis describes only a few of the 
many regulations in Wis. Stat. ch. 125.  The legislature's 
regulatory scheme in this field does not intend or permit 
unbridled competition.  In fact, the regulatory scheme in place 
No.  2005AP1063 
36 
 
is 
overtly 
anticompetitive 
and 
intentionally 
gives 
municipalities leeway to place significant barriers in the way 
of alcohol sales and consumption. 
¶66 We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
Wis. Stat. ch. 125 "contemplates——and expressly directs——that 
regulation is to supersede competition in the retail sale of 
alcohol beverages in Wisconsin."  Eichenseer, 297 Wis. 2d 495, 
¶15.  Unlike the statutes in AMT, the regulatory scheme in 
question here indicates a legislative intent to make state 
antitrust law "not applicable . . . by authorizing contrary or 
inconsistent conduct" by the City.  See AMT, 154 Wis. 2d at 148.  
Within reason, municipalities have broad statutory authority to 
prescribe or orchestrate anticompetitive regulation in the sale 
and consumption of alcohol if that regulation serves an 
important public interest.  The statutory licensing scheme gives 
municipalities the power to do what the City did in this case——
impose anticompetitive "Luther's Blues conditions" on new 
licenses and license renewals as a means of discouraging over-
consumption.  See Wis. Stat. § 125.51(1)(a) ("Every municipal 
governing body may grant and issue 'Class A' and 'Class B' 
licenses for retail sales of intoxicating liquor . . . from 
premises within the municipality to persons entitled to a 
license under this chapter as the issuing municipal governing 
body deems proper"). 
¶67 This brings us to the third and final Hallie I factor, 
"the type of conduct undertaken by a city in a particular 
instance."  Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 539.  The City was 
No.  2005AP1063 
37 
 
concerned about binge drinking by students and others at 
establishments near the University of Wisconsin campus.  It was 
concerned in general because binge drinking and over-consumption 
were creating life-threatening conditions for some drinkers, as 
well as vandalism, disorder, and sexual assault affecting 
innocent third parties.  The City was also concerned about the 
expensive police services it was required to provide.   
¶68 The City believed that "Luther's Blues conditions" 
limiting drink specials would respond to potential binge 
drinking at specific licensed establishments, and it imposed 
those conditions on at least eight Madison taverns.  The City's 
actions also served as warning to other taverns. 
¶69 The City's imposition of conditions on taverns it 
licensed was commonplace; its imposition of "Luther's Blues 
conditions" on eight taverns was an official exercise of 
legislative judgment by the Common Council.  Invalidating the 
City's action on antitrust grounds would severely undermine a 
municipality's authority to regulate the sale of alcohol 
beverages within its borders and represent a sea change in 
Wisconsin law. 
¶70 To sum up, insofar as the City is concerned, we 
believe 
the 
City's 
action 
in 
imposing 
"Luther's 
Blues 
conditions" on eight tavern licensees is immune from antitrust 
liability under the implied repeal doctrine of Hallie I. 
¶71 We acknowledge that the issue in this case is not 
whether the City is immune for its actions but whether the 
defendants are immune for their "voluntary" agreement to 
No.  2005AP1063 
38 
 
eliminate alcohol drink specials in their establishments after 8 
p.m. on Friday and Saturday nights.  In reality, we must 
determine whether private parties are eligible for antitrust 
immunity when they act in concert, in an anticompetitive manner, 
in direct response to pressure bordering on compulsion from a 
municipality with the power to condition or non-renew their 
licenses. 
¶72 As noted above, the material facts are not in dispute.  
In her comprehensive, well-reasoned decision, Circuit Judge 
Angela Bartell found that the evidence was overwhelming that the 
pressure on campus bar owners from the City and University 
officials was "enormous."  The longtime chair of the ALRC 
threatened that the City would enact a citywide ban on drink 
specials if the bar owners did not "police themselves," "clean 
up their acts," and devise a solution to the City's concerns.  
"In this context, the City, by its duly authorized ALRC 
representative, unilaterally decided that the bar owners should 
voluntarily ban drink specials at least on weekends."  After the 
bar owners acceded to the City's demands, the ALRC took no 
further 
action 
to 
ban 
drink 
specials 
by 
ordinance, 
"unequivocally showing its approval and ratification of the 
negotiated voluntary ban."  "But for" the intense demands of the 
City through its ALRC, there would have been no voluntary ban on 
weekend drink specials by campus bar owners.  See ¶27, above. 
¶73 The circuit court's factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous.  On the contrary, they appear to be inescapable.  The 
question remaining is whether private tavern keepers acquire the 
No.  2005AP1063 
39 
 
immunity from antitrust enforcement that a municipality would 
enjoy because of the City's intense involvement in these 
circumstances. 
¶74 The court of appeals turned to federal precedents 
discussing the "state action" doctrine to help answer this 
question.23 
 
Eichenseer, 
297 
Wis. 2d 495, 
¶19. 
 
Federal 
precedents are often instructive and persuasive in analyzing 
Wisconsin antitrust law.  Conley Publ'g Group Ltd. v. Journal 
Commc'ns, 
Inc., 
2003 
WI 
119, 
¶17, 
265 
Wis. 2d 128, 
665 
N.W.2d 879; AMT, 154 Wis. 2d at 152-53.   
¶75 The federal "state action" antitrust immunity doctrine 
originated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  Parker 
established an exemption from federal antitrust law for "state 
action or official action directed by a state."  Id. at 351.  In 
this early decision, the Court added a caveat that "a state does 
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their 
                                                 
23 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  As the court 
of appeals noted, the conceptual underpinnings of the federal 
"state action" doctrine differ from those of the implied repeal 
doctrine.  Eichenseer, 297 Wis. 2d 495, ¶19 n.9.  
We have previously stated that Wis. Stat. § 133.01 was 
intended as a reenactment of the first two sections of the 
federal Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.  
See Conley Publ'g Group Ltd. v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 2003 WI 
119, ¶18, 265 Wis. 2d 128, 665 N.W.2d 879 (citation omitted).  
The question of what acts constitute a combination or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act is controlled by 
federal court decisions.  Federal decisions construing federal 
exemptions under the Sherman Act are thus persuasive authority 
in construing state exemptions under Wisconsin antitrust law.   
No.  2005AP1063 
40 
 
action is lawful."  Id. (citing Northern Sec. Co. v. United 
States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-347 (1904)). 
¶76 In time, however, the Court revised its position.  In  
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 
471 U.S. 48 (1985), the Court stated:   
Although Parker involved an action against a 
state official, the Court's reasoning extends to suits 
against private parties.  The Parker decision was 
premised on the assumption that Congress . . . did not 
intend to compromise the States' ability to regulate 
their domestic commerce.  If Parker immunity were 
limited to the actions of public officials, this 
assumed congressional purpose would be frustrated, for 
a State would be unable to implement programs that 
restrain 
competition 
among 
private 
parties. 
 
A 
plaintiff could frustrate any such program merely by 
filing suit against the regulated private parties, 
rather than the state officials who implement the 
plan. We decline to reduce Parker's holding to a 
formalism . . .  
Id. at 56-57 (footnote omitted). 
¶77 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 
(1985) (Hallie II) was decided the same day as Southern Motor 
Carriers.  In the course of defining when local municipalities 
are exempt from federal antitrust law, the Hallie II Court 
observed 
that 
"[w]here 
a 
private 
party 
is 
engaging 
in . . . anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that 
he is acting to further his own interests, rather than the 
governmental interests of the State."  Hallie II, 471 U.S. at 
47.  To address this concern, the Court has established a two-
prong test to determine whether "state action" antitrust 
immunity extends to the actions of private parties: "First, the 
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and 
No.  2005AP1063 
41 
 
affirmatively expressed as state policy.'  Second, the State 
must supervise actively any private anticompetitive conduct."  
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57 (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. 
at 105 and quoting City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). This two-prong test is 
used to determine whether private action, closely linked to 
government action, should be protected from antitrust law, 
inasmuch as the success of an antitrust action should "depend 
upon the nature of the activity challenged, rather than on the 
identity of the defendant."  See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 
U.S. at 58-59 (citations omitted). 
¶78 The instant case does not involve "state action," and 
technically it does not involve municipal action.  But we think 
it makes sense to apply the Southern Motor Carriers analysis——
first adopted in Midcal and City of Lafayette——to our third 
Hallie I factor ("the type of conduct undertaken by a city in a 
particular instance,"  Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 539) to 
determine whether the City's immunity extends to the defendants. 
¶79 With regard to the "clear articulation" test, state 
law empowers municipalities to "prescribe additional regulations 
for the sale of alcohol beverages, not in conflict with [Chapter 
125]."  Wis. Stat. § 125.10(1).  The imposition of "Luther's 
Blues conditions" on eight licensees is an exercise of this 
power.  As one authority notes, "[a] state policy to displace 
competition can be inferred if the challenged restraint is a 
foreseeable consequence of the municipality's engaging in state–
authorized activities, or if the statutory provision empowering 
No.  2005AP1063 
42 
 
the municipality's action plainly shows that the legislature 
contemplated the kind of action complained of." Melissa K. 
Stull, Annotation, What constitutes "state action" rendering 
public official's participation in private antitrust activity 
immune from application of federal antitrust laws, 109 A.L.R. 
Fed. 758 (1992).  See also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1991) (observing that the 
purpose of the zoning regulation in question was to displace 
unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly had the 
effect of preventing normal acts of competition); Hallie II, 471 
U.S. at 42 (noting that anticompetitive effects would logically 
follow from statutes authorizing a city to refuse to provide 
sewage services to unannexed areas). 
¶80 "Luther's 
Blues 
conditions" 
represented 
the 
University's 
goal 
for 
campus 
taverns. 
 
"Luther's 
Blues 
conditions" were formally received by the ALRC on May 21, 2002.  
The ALRC's report recommending "Luther's Blues conditions" was 
subsequently "accepted" by the Madison Common Council.  The ALRC 
drafted an ordinance imposing on all taverns the conditions that 
the council had imposed on eight taverns, and it repeatedly 
threatened to push for the enactment of that ordinance.  The 
record before us is bereft of evidence that Alder Bruer and 
Alder Verveer were rogue regulators acting without the approval 
of the Council and the Mayor.  We think the "clearly articulated 
policy" prong has been satisfied because the defendants' 
agreement was a scaled-down version of the "Luther's Blues 
conditions," first demanded, then ratified, by the ALRC Chair.   
No.  2005AP1063 
43 
 
¶81 With regard to the second prong of the Midcal/Southern 
Motor Carriers test, the Court has stated that "the active state 
supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which 
the actor is a municipality."  Hallie II, 471 U.S. at 46.  Thus, 
the "basic question in antitrust cases that involve municipal 
and private actors is whether the municipality or the regulated 
party 
made 
the 
effective 
decision 
that 
resulted 
in 
the 
challenged anticompetitive conduct."  Mich. Paytel Joint Venture 
v. City of Detroit, 287 F.3d 527, 537-38 (6th Cir. 2002).  See 
also Vartan v. Harristown Dev. Corp., 661 F.Supp. 596, 604 (M.D. 
Pa. 1987) ("The crucial question [is] which entity [is] the 
effective decisionmaker."), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1988); 
City Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 660 F.Supp. 932, 935 
(E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1081 (1988). "Active 
encouragement" is also viewed as a hallmark of whether a private 
party was "supervised" by the municipality for purposes of 
antitrust immunity.  See Cine 42nd St. Theater Corp. v. 
Nederlander Org., 790 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1986).   
¶82 In this case, the City was the effective decision 
maker with regard to the defendants' agreement to eliminate 
drink specials on Friday and Saturday nights after 8 p.m.  It is 
undisputed that the defendants entered into their agreement as a 
direct response to the City's increasing regulatory pressure.  
Without this pressure, the defendants would have had no 
motivation to voluntarily ban weekend drink specials after 
8 p.m.  As the circuit court correctly noted, the City's 
No.  2005AP1063 
44 
 
actions, through Alder Bruer, were the "but for" cause of the 
voluntary ban. 
¶83 The plaintiffs allege that the defendants entered into 
an agreement to voluntarily end all drink specials on Friday and 
Saturday nights after 8 p.m. "for the express purpose of 
increasing 
prices 
in 
order 
to 
reduce 
output 
(i.e., 
consumption)."  At this point, we must accept that allegation as 
true.  However, it should be obvious that the purpose stated in 
the complaint is a purpose that would be sought primarily by the 
City and the University, not the defendants.  The defendants 
would have understood that if drink specials were an effective 
way to market their taverns, they would be placing themselves at 
a competitive disadvantage with those Madison taverns that were 
not limiting weekend drink specials.24 
¶84 "Active supervision" can be interpreted in a more 
conventional way:  the degree of monitoring by the City.  The 24 
defendant taverns are reviewed annually for license renewal.  
The ordinance establishing the ALRC provides that the ALRC has 
the responsibility and duty to view the triennial "Alcohol 
License Problem Report" submitted by the Chief of Police and may 
                                                 
24 After the circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, 
Alder Mike Verveer commented that if the result had been 
different, campus taverns would have faced "seven-day-a-week 
drink-special bans."  He added: "This [lawsuit] already affected 
their livelihoods, and if it had been successful, a lot of 'Ma 
and Pa' operations would have gone out of business."  Megan 
Costello, Judge dismisses drink special suit, The Badger Herald, 
Apr. 
8, 
2005, 
available 
at 
http://badgerherald.com/news/2005/04/08/judge_dismisses_drin.php 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2008). 
No.  2005AP1063 
45 
 
conduct additional review of problems reported with the licenses 
affected.  Eichenseer, 297 Wis. 2d 495, ¶3 n.4.  The University 
submits periodic reports to the ALRC with the results of its own 
monitoring of the campus bar scene. 
¶85 In short, we think the active supervision prong has 
been satisfied. 
¶86 The undisputed facts suggest that the City compelled 
the defendants' actions through threat and coercion.  The facts 
suggest that the City thereafter approved the defendants' 
actions.  The facts suggest that the City is closely monitoring 
the defendants' actions and would not tolerate an end to those 
actions.   
¶87 "[A] 
private 
party 
should 
not 
be 
induced 
to . . . comply with regulatory regimes at the risk that later 
invalidity of those . . . regimes will leave the part[y's] 
active compliance naked to antitrust scrutiny as if there had 
been no official action."  Antitrust Law, supra, ¶228d, at 222.  
Furthermore, "where the private defendant had no discretion but 
to obey the [regulation] or challenge it in court, one can 
rightfully say that the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries is not 
the defendant's act but the government's compulsion."  Id. at 
223.  The City was the effective decision maker with regard to 
the alleged anticompetitive actions at issue and has actively 
supervised them; therefore, its immunity should extend to the 
defendants.  See Mich. Paytel, 287 F.3d at 537-38; City 
Commc'ns, Inc., 660 F.Supp. at 935. 
No.  2005AP1063 
46 
 
¶88 As we look at the "conduct undertaken . . . in a 
particular instance," we note that neither the City nor the 
defendants is directly setting the price of alcohol beverages in 
the campus area.  The defendants may compete with each other and 
must compete with other taverns in the City——on overall price.  
There is no effort by anyone to allocate markets or market 
share.  There are many, many options available to consumers who 
respond solely to price.  We are influenced in this decision by 
the inextricable link between the City's objectives and the 
defendants' actions, as well as the transparency of this link.  
The cause and effect relationship between the City's threats and 
the defendants' response to those threats sets this case apart 
from most cases we are likely to see.   
¶89 Accordingly, we conclude that Hallie I should be 
extended to recognize that the actions of the defendants, under 
the intense pressure of the City, were intended by the 
legislature to be immune from antitrust liability when the 
legislature granted municipalities broad authority to regulate 
the sale and consumption of alcohol beverages.  To conclude 
otherwise would enshrine theory over practical reality. 
B. 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Immunity and the Local Government 
Antitrust Act 
¶90 The 
defendants also argue that their challenged 
actions in persuading the City not to enact an ordinance banning 
drink specials seven days per week were efforts to influence 
public officials and therefore immune from plaintiffs' antitrust 
No.  2005AP1063 
47 
 
claims 
under 
the 
Noerr-Pennington 
government 
petitioning 
doctrine. 
¶91 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine establishes a means of 
protecting the First Amendment rights of private parties to 
petition government in the face of antitrust law.  In Eastern 
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 
127 (1961), the United States Supreme Court held that railroad 
operators were immune from liability for a federal antitrust 
claim brought by truckers because antitrust laws were never 
intended to interfere with the ordinary political process.  Id. 
at 135-37.  The railroads had allegedly petitioned state 
government officials through "a publicity campaign against the 
truckers designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws 
and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking 
business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers 
among the general public, and to impair the relationships 
existing between the truckers and their customers."  Id. at 129.  
The Court held that the railroads were immune from federal 
antitrust law because such law "does not prohibit two or more 
persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the 
legislature or the executive to take particular action with 
respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly."  
Id. at 136.   
¶92 Four 
years 
later, 
in 
United 
Mine 
Workers 
v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the Court reiterated its Noerr 
decision and held that "[j]oint efforts to influence public 
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended 
No.  2005AP1063 
48 
 
to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either 
standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative 
of [antitrust law]."  Id. at 670.   
¶93 Although we have never recognized the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine as providing immunity to state antitrust law, we have 
signaled that the doctrine might apply.  See AMT, 154 Wis. 2d at 
156 ("There may, of course, come a time that, under the facts, 
the state equivalent of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may be re-
asserted . . . .").  In AMT, we noted that "the basic premise of 
Noerr-Pennington [is] to protect the citizens' right to free 
speech and to petition government."  Id. at 155.   
¶94 This right to petition extends to public appeals to 
all departments of government, including cities and their 
legislative bodies.  See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("Certainly the right to 
petition extends to all departments of the Government.").  The 
Seventh 
Circuit 
applied 
the 
Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine 
to 
immunize a petition to the Chicago City Council by private 
taxicab companies.  Campbell v. City of Chicago, 823 F.2d 1182 
(7th Cir. 1987).   
¶95 In Campbell, the plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago, 
Yellow 
Cab 
Company, 
and 
Checker 
Taxi 
Company, 
asserting 
violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 1183.  
Their claims were premised upon the enactment of an ordinance 
regulating the manner of acquiring and holding taxicab licenses 
and creating a quota of 4,600 available licenses.  Id.  The 
ordinance arose out of the lobbying efforts of Yellow Cab and 
No.  2005AP1063 
49 
 
Checker Taxi.  Id.  The ordinance allegedly "erected a barrier 
to entry into the taxicab market."  Id. 
¶96 The defendants' petitioning activities were related to 
a litigation settlement with the City.  In 1963 Yellow Cab and 
Checker Taxi sought damages arising from the City's alleged 
violation of a 1937 taxicab ordinance.  Id. at 1186 (citing 
Campbell v. City of Chicago, 639 F.Supp. 1501, 1510 (N.D. Ill. 
1986)).  As part of an agreement to drop the suit, Yellow Cab 
submitted a proposed draft ordinance.  The City's Committee on 
Local Transportation held public hearings on the ordinance, and 
the full Chicago City Council eventually enacted it.  Id.  The 
ordinance became the subject of the antitrust claim at issue. 
¶97 The Seventh Circuit held that this activity, seeking a 
favorable ordinance, was immunized petitioning activity under 
Noerr-Pennington.  Id. at 1186-87.  In doing so, the court also 
addressed the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
which bars immunity when "a publicity campaign, ostensibly 
directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham 
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to 
interfere 
directly 
with 
the 
business 
relationships 
of 
a 
competitor."  Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.  In rejecting the 
plaintiffs' argument that the "sham" exception applied, the 
Seventh Circuit cited favorably Premier Electrical Construction 
Co. v. National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 376 
(7th Cir. 1987): 
If the injury is caused by persuading the government, 
then the antitrust laws do not apply to the squelching 
No.  2005AP1063 
50 
 
[of competition] (Parker v. Brown) or the persuasion 
(Noerr-Pennington).  If the injury flows directly from 
the "petitioning"——if the injury occurs no matter how 
the government responds to the request for aid——then 
we have an antitrust case. 
¶98 Like the taxicab operator defendants in Campbell, the 
defendants in the instant case were seeking a favorable 
regulatory outcome——here, to avoid an ordinance banning all 
drink specials citywide after 8 p.m.  Their petitioning was not 
a "sham" because the alleged anticompetitive "injury" caused by 
their actions (in voluntarily banning only weekend drink 
specials) would not have occurred had the government enacted its 
threatened ban on all drink specials.  The City's all-week ban 
would have caused the anticompetitive "injury."  In other words, 
the City would have been enacting the all-week ban ordinance of 
its own volition, not as a response to the defendants' requests 
for an ordinance aimed at harming competitors. 
¶99 The difference between this case and the traditional 
Noerr-Pennington fact pattern is that the anticompetitive result 
here derives from self-regulation to head off government 
regulation, 
not 
government 
regulation 
in 
a 
direct 
form.  
Plaintiffs contend that antitrust immunity does not extend to 
self-regulation, irrespective of what prompted it, even when the 
self-regulation is less restrictive and less inclusive than 
proposed government regulation.  They insist that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protects advocacy, including advocacy of 
blatantly anticompetitive regulation, even when that advocacy 
actually produces anticompetitive regulation, but it does not 
protect action, even when that action is wholly defensive and 
No.  2005AP1063 
51 
 
preserves a greater measure of competition than proposed 
government regulation.  If the plaintiffs have correctly 
summarized the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, they seem to have lost 
the spirit of it. 
¶100 In any event, because we have concluded that the 
defendants' 
actions 
are 
immunized 
by 
the 
implied 
repeal 
doctrine, we need not decide this issue.  We also do not reach 
the issue of whether the LGAA provides immunity for the 
defendants' actions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶101 We conclude that the defendants' actions are immune 
from state antitrust law under the implied repeal doctrine of 
Hallie I.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals granting summary judgment to the defendants. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶102 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., and N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., did 
not participate.   
¶103 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
 
 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶104 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  Since the 
beginning of our nation's history, our constitutional democracy 
"has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of 
men."  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  
The profound importance of honoring this principle cannot be 
overstated.  As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we are entrusted 
to preserve the rule of law in all we do, whether in our role of 
safeguarding against the violation of laws by others or in 
taking care to never ourselves go outside the boundaries of 
authority which have been established for the judiciary as for 
every branch of the government. 
¶105 The majority has lost sight of this most fundamental 
principle, shunning the rule of law in favor of giving the force 
of law to informal threats from municipal officers, according 
coercive threats legal weight equal to that of democratically 
approved law.  Although the majority acknowledges that to reach 
such a result, it must apply and extend law in unprecedented 
ways, it again shrugs off the rule of law, by refusing to be 
constrained by the pertinent controlling precedent.  
¶106 The law and issues in this case are not nearly as 
complicated as the majority paints them.  At issue is the 
agreement of competing taverns to engage in behavior which, it 
is assumed, constitutes price-fixing in violation of Wisconsin's 
antitrust laws.  Although the tension between city officials and 
the defendant taverns is contextually relevant to understanding 
the events leading up to the defendants' actions, the majority 
grossly overstates the legal significance of such tension.  The 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
2 
 
legal issue before us is the legality of the defendants' 
conduct, considered in light of any potentially applicable 
antitrust exemptions, not the legality of municipal officials' 
conduct or applicability of antitrust laws to them.1  
¶107 The law is quite clear on when a private party is 
exempt from antitrust laws.  First, we must heed the general 
rule that implied exemptions to antitrust laws are strongly 
disfavored, and exemptions are to be narrowly construed.  See 
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982).  
Then, we look at the specific rule articulated in Town of Hallie 
v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N.W.2d 321 
(1982)(Hallie I) governing antitrust exemptions for private 
parties.  Hallie I clearly establishes that the test for whether 
private parties are exempted from antitrust laws is different 
from the test for whether municipalities are exempted.  Hallie 
I, 105 Wis. 2d at 538-39.  In the case of private parties, 
exemptions apply only where the private party's conduct is 
supported by the legislatively stated purpose of a statute 
conflicting with the antitrust statute and where the private 
party's conduct is within the express provisions of the 
conflicting statute.  Id. at 538.  In this case, the defendants 
have pointed to no conflicting statute that expressly authorized 
their anticompetitive conduct.  As such, the analysis could end 
at that point, with the law in this case being straightforward. 
                                                 
1 Nobody in this case argues that the City or any municipal 
actors violated any antitrust law, despite the implication to 
the contrary created by the majority opinion's primary focus on 
the applicability of antitrust laws to municipalities. 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
3 
 
¶108 However, without any explanation, the majority utterly 
fails to even begin to apply these well-established rules of 
law.  Rather than apply the correct private party antitrust 
exemption test, the majority engages in sleight-of-hand tactics 
which divert the focus away from what the defendants did in this 
case, focusing instead on what the City of Madison could have 
done and on the legality of what the majority describes as the 
City's actions.  The troubling implication permeating the 
majority opinion is that the actual actions of the defendants 
are interchangeable with the threatened actions of certain 
municipal officials.  Under the majority's analysis, it appears 
that 
any 
antitrust 
exemption 
for 
municipalities 
can 
be 
transferred to the defendants even in the absence of formal 
regulations explicitly allowing the defendants' conduct. 
¶109 To get to this result, the majority engages in a 
series of analytical missteps, including:  (1) misidentifying 
Hallie I as an "implied repeal" case, ignoring the dozens of 
supreme court cases in which we have clearly established the 
implied repeal doctrine as something quite distinct from the 
antitrust exemption rules applied in Hallie I; (2) applying the 
wrong Hallie I exemption test, without even acknowledging that 
Hallie I contains completely separate tests for private and for 
municipal actors; and (3) acknowledging that although Hallie I's 
exemption test for municipalities does not, on its own, create 
an exemption for the defendants, it could still do so by 
incorporating elements of yet another inapplicable doctrine——the 
state action doctrine.  
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
4 
 
¶110 The manner in which the majority justifies applying 
the 
state 
action 
doctrine 
is 
particularly 
audacious:  
immediately after acknowledging that this is not a state action 
case, the majority claims that it is acceptable to treat this as 
a state action case anyway, simply because "we think it makes 
sense" to do so.  Majority op., ¶78.  The majority then proceeds 
to discuss the state action doctrine, arguing that by analogy, 
the doctrine somehow justifies its conclusion that Hallie I's 
test for municipal immunity extends antitrust immunity to the 
private party defendants after all.   
¶111 At the end of the majority opinion, one is left 
wondering how one inapplicable doctrine can suddenly become 
applicable merely by reference to yet another inapplicable 
doctrine.  One must also wonder why such novel and creative 
readings of the law, even if they made sense, are necessary, 
when there was a perfectly good, applicable test for private 
party antitrust immunity all along, the existence of which the 
majority never even acknowledges.  Finally, one is struck by the 
complete illogic of the majority's apparent conclusion that 
because taverns are more highly regulated than other industries, 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
5 
 
there is some state policy of granting them greater, not less, 
immunity than other industries.2  
                                                 
2 Another doctrine which the majority incorrectly describes 
in passing is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  The majority seems 
to suggest, without so holding or deciding the issue, that this 
doctrine might provide another possible source of immunity for 
the defendants by virtue of their actions being "wholly 
defensive," despite those actions going beyond mere petitioning 
the government.  See majority op., ¶¶90-100.  It seems that the 
majority fails to grasp that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does 
not extend beyond petitioning, i.e., allowing individuals to 
lobby 
legislators 
for 
the 
passage 
of 
anticompetitive 
legislation.  See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 
U.S. 657, 669 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138, 140 (1961); Am. Med. Transp. 
v. Curtis-Universal, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 135, 154-55, 452 N.W.2d 
575 (1990)(AMT).  The doctrine has never been applied to allow 
individuals to actually participate in anticompetitive conduct 
beyond the mere exercise of free speech rights in advocating for 
legislation; as this court explained in AMT:  
The court of appeals correctly stated the applicable 
law 
when 
it 
said 
that 
the 
"Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine . . . protects 
advocacy 
and 
not 
participation." 
Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 521 F. Supp. 
568, 584 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 
1982), capsulized the limits of the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine when it stated: 
Private 
parties 
attempting 
to 
influence 
public officials to engage in commercial 
activities which may later be found to 
violate the antitrust law do not thereby 
become themselves liable.  For liability to 
be 
imposed 
upon 
them, 
they 
must 
be 
participants in the scheme.  
Thus, it is clear that, if a scheme or enterprise that 
has been merely petitioned or lobbied for by private 
persons is found to violate antitrust laws, liability 
will not be imposed on those private persons for that 
conduct 
alone. 
 
See, 
P. 
Areeda, 
H. 
Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law, para. 201, p. 21 (Supp. 1989). 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
6 
 
I 
¶112 The majority acknowledges the critical role antitrust 
law plays in the protection of competition in our free 
enterprise system and that the unambiguous legislative policy 
underlying antitrust statutes is "to make competition the 
fundamental economic policy of this state."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.01.  See majority op., ¶33.  However, the majority then 
fails to abide by the well-established rule that implied 
exemptions to antitrust laws are disfavored and must be 
construed narrowly.  See Union Labor Life Ins., 458 U.S. at 126 
(1981). 
¶113 Instead, the majority employs a novel approach which 
creates a confusing hybrid of various doctrines and blurs the 
distinctions between exemption and repeal; between state and 
municipality; between state and private actor; between coercion 
and regulation; between actual past regulations and potential 
future regulations; and, ultimately, between adhering to the 
rule of law and rationalizing a series of legally indefensible 
                                                                                                                                                             
There have been no cases brought to our attention or 
which we have discovered in the course of this court's 
research where a private party who has participated in 
an anticompetitive scheme is exonerated by Noerr-
Pennington.  This absence of authority fully accords 
with the basic premise of Noerr-Pennington——to protect 
the citizens' right to free speech and to petition 
government.  It goes no further than that. 
AMT, 154 Wis. 2d at 154-55 (emphasis added).  The majority 
quotes AMT out of context to arrive at a description of Noerr-
Pennington which utterly contradicts the above AMT passage.  
Compare majority op., ¶¶93-99 with above quotation from AMT, 154 
Wis. 2d at 154-55. 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
7 
 
positions by compounding and obfuscating each misapplication 
with another dizzying misapplication of the law until one 
seeking to discern a single applicable rule of law in the 
majority opinion is left to only wonder, upon getting to the end 
of the opinion, what just happened.  Rather than addressing each 
such distortion made by the majority, I will focus on the two 
primary misapplications of the law and facts which appear to be 
the foundation of the majority opinion:  the majority's "so-
called 'implied repeal'"3 analysis, and its state action doctrine 
analysis. 
A 
¶114 In 
its 
"implied 
repeal" 
analysis, 
the 
majority 
describes Hallie I as the "leading case in Wisconsin for the 
implied repeal doctrine," and a case which allows a general 
statutory "scheme" or even mere "intense pressure" from a 
municipality to repeal and override a state antitrust law.  
Majority op., ¶¶40, 43, 89.  It is profoundly puzzling how the 
majority could describe Hallie I in such terms, when the case 
never once uses the phrase "implied repeal" or describes a 
statutory 
scheme 
or 
municipal 
pressure 
"repealing" 
or 
"overriding" a specific antitrust statute.   
¶115 This is no small semantic quibble:  Hallie I does not 
use the phrase "implied repeal" because it is not an implied 
                                                 
3 See majority op., ¶2 ("The defendants contend that their 
conduct is immune from Wisconsin antitrust law under: (1) the 
so-called 'implied repeal doctrine' articulated in Town of 
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N.W.2d 
321 (1982) (Hallie I) . . .").  
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
8 
 
repeal case.  "Implied repeal" is a highly disfavored concept in 
our state, and is completely distinct from the antitrust 
exemption tests described in Hallie I.   
¶116 "Repeal" has a distinct meaning, long recognized by 
this court as meaning: 
"The abrogation or annulling of a previously existing 
law by the enactment of a subsequent statute which 
declares that the former law shall be revoked and 
abrogated, (which is called 'express' repeal), or 
which 
contains 
provisions 
so 
contrary 
to 
or 
irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only 
one of the two statutes can stand in force, (called 
'implied' repeal)."  
Heider v. City of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 478, 155 N.W.2d 17 
(1967)(quoting Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951)(emphasis 
added)); State v. Dairyland Power Coop., 52 Wis. 2d 45, 51, 187 
N.W.2d 878 (1971).  Furthermore, nothing in Hallie I contravenes 
the well-established rule of law that it is the role of the 
legislature to repeal statutes; where the legislature intends to 
repeal a law, it should do so expressly.  See Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶80, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  
Consequently, 
this 
court 
has 
consistently 
rejected 
the 
application of "implied repeal" in a number of past cases, using 
it only in the rarest of circumstances, as a last resort, when 
conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled.   
¶117 In Ward v. Smith, 166 Wis. 342, 344, 165 N.W. 299 
(1917), this court explained that even where a latter statute 
might appear to be in conflict with an earlier statute, "it must 
not be supposed that the legislature intended, by the later 
statute, to repeal the prior one, unless the last statute is so 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
9 
 
broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to 
show that it was intended to cover the whole subject and 
therefore displace the prior statute."  Since that 1917 
decision, this court has consistently treated the concept of 
"implied repeal" with great disfavor, refusing to apply it in a 
variety of contexts unless an irreconcilable conflict between 
statutes was demonstrated to be so repugnant as to require one 
of them to be implicitly repealed.   
¶118 In a 1941 decision, this court explained that "[t]he 
law does not favor a repeal of an older statute by a later one 
by mere implication," and that when such a conflict between 
statutes exists, "it is the duty of the court to construe the 
acts if possible that both shall be operative."  McLoughlin v. 
Malnar, 237 Wis. 492, 496-97, 297 N.W. 370 (1941).  Similarly, 
in a 1971 decision, this court quoted with approval a Black's 
Law Dictionary definition of implied repeal as existing where 
there are "'provisions so contrary to or irreconcilable with 
those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can 
stand 
in 
force,'" 
and 
this 
court 
concluded 
that 
"[t]he 
'irreconcilability' referred to in the above quote is not 
lightly or quickly found by this court.  This is because the 
cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not 
to destroy.  Moreover, repeal by implication is not a favored 
concept in the law."  Dairyland Power Coop., 52 Wis. 2d at 51 
(citations omitted).  This decision was in accord with dozens of 
other cases in which we have consistently used similar language 
describing the strong presumption against implied repeal, which 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
10 
 
can only occur where two utterly repugnant conflicting statutes 
cannot be reconciled.4  
¶119 Unlike these actual implied repeal cases, it is clear 
that Hallie I does not speak in such terms or employ an implied 
repeal framework.  Were Hallie I an implied repeal case, it 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 645, 526 
N.W.2d 132 (1994) (holding that passage of statute imposing 
restrictions on abortion did not impliedly repeal feticide 
statute, explaining "[n]othing persuades us that the legislature 
intended to impliedly repeal sec. 940.04(2)(a) when it enacted 
sec. 940.15.  Implied repeal of statutes by later enactments is 
not favored in statutory construction."); State v. Zawistowski, 
95 Wis. 2d 250, 264, 290 N.W.2d 303 (1980)("Implied repeal of 
statutes by later enactments is not favored in statutory 
construction. 
 
All 
statutes 
passed 
and 
retained 
by 
the 
legislature should be held valid unless the earlier statute is 
completely repugnant to the later enactment."); Milwaukee Fed'n 
of Teachers, Local No. 252 v. WERC, 83 Wis. 2d 588, 599, 266 
N.W.2d 314 (1978)("'[A]s to changing statutory law, there is a 
presumption against the implied repeal or amendment of any 
existing statutory provision.'"); Jicha v. Karns, 39 Wis. 2d 
676, 680, 159 N.W.2d 691 (1968)(holding that the argument that a 
later statute superceded an earlier statute "would prevail if 
the two statutes were in conflict and could not be reconciled.  
However, repeal or amendment by implication is not favored if 
they can be reconciled."); Burris v. Karns, 14 Wis. 2d 431, 436, 
111 N.W.2d 509 (1961)("[I]n Wisconsin the doctrine of implied 
repeal is not favored.  In Milwaukee County v. Milwaukee Western 
Fuel Co., 204 Wis. 107, 112, 235 N.W. 545, 547 (1931), we held 
that 'an earlier act will be considered to remain in force 
unless it is so manifestly inconsistent and repugnant to the 
later act that they cannot reasonably stand together.'"); State 
ex rel. Peterson v. County Court of Clark County, 13 Wis. 2d 37, 
40-41, 108 N.W.2d 146 (1961)("[I]t is fundamental that implied 
repeals are not favored and an earlier act will be considered to 
remain in force if the same may be construed in harmony with the 
later one.  This principle is well established."); Union 
Cemetery v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 64, 71, 108 N.W.2d 180 
(1961)("Repeals by implication are not favored in the law.  The 
earlier act will be considered to remain in force unless it is 
so manifestly inconsistent and repugnant to the later act that 
they cannot reasonably stand together.").  
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
11 
 
would have mentioned "implied repeal" by name, and it would have 
applied the traditional presumption against implied repeal, a 
presumption which was been reaffirmed in case after case deeming 
implied repeal inapplicable in the absence of specific statutes 
so in conflict with and repugnant to each other that they cannot 
be reconciled.   
¶120 Rather, 
Hallie 
I 
speaks 
in 
terms 
of 
antitrust 
exemptions, never once describing the antitrust laws at issue in 
that case as "impliedly repealed" or "overridden."  This 
distinction is critical, and the majority misses it completely 
by labeling Hallie I as an "implied repeal" case. 
¶121 On some level the majority appears to recognize that 
Hallie I is not an implied repeal case.  See majority op., ¶¶2, 
26 (describing the "so-called 'implied repeal doctrine' of 
Hallie I"); majority op., subheading A n. 17 (seeming to explain 
that it is merely because the court of appeals and parties 
describe Hallie I as an "implied repeal" case that "[w]e also 
adopt this label").  This makes it even all the more puzzling 
why the majority is determined to designate Hallie I an implied 
repeal case.  
¶122 It does not even serve the majority's ends to follow 
the steps of the parties and lower courts in this case which 
have mistakenly identified Hallie I as an implied repeal case 
rather than treating it as the antitrust exemption case it is.  
Even if the majority could point to a specific statute which 
conflicts 
with 
antitrust 
laws 
in 
such 
a 
repugnant 
and 
irreconcilable manner as to bring that statute within the 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
12 
 
parameters of the implied repeal doctrine, it could not reach 
the result it wants.  Not only has the majority failed to 
identify two irreconcilable statutes which are repugnant to one 
another, enabling implied repeal, but it is well-established 
that when such a conflict between statutes addressing the same 
subject matter does exist, as between a more specific and more 
general statute, the more specific statute prevails.  See Union 
Cemetery v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 64, 71, 108 N.W.2d 180 
(1961); Estate of Miller v. Naze, 261 Wis. 534, 536, 53 N.W.2d 
172 (1952).  In this case, the antitrust statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.03(1), is more specific in addressing the anticompetitive 
behavior of the defendants than any of the statutes mentioned by 
the defendants, which describe general police powers or address 
alcohol in various ways but not in the specific context at issue 
here.  See infra, ¶27. 
¶123 Regardless of the majority's intent in labeling this 
an "implied repeal" case, one thing seems clear:  the majority's 
failure to read our state's extensive implied repeal precedent 
as requiring that statutes be directly and irreconcilably in 
conflict before the implied repeal doctrine applies.  The 
majority's transformation of the phrase "implied repeal" into 
something more vague, amorphous, and undefined gives me pause.  
It makes me wonder if I could just end my dissent with a 
similarly conclusory statement that because my description of 
the law conflicts with the majority's, then my later statement 
of the law "impliedly repeals" the majority's earlier statement, 
with the majority opinion effectively overridden the moment 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
13 
 
tension is created by my dissent.  After all, under the 
majority's approach, it appears that there need not be two 
statutes directly and irreconcilably in conflict with each other 
for "implied repeal" to occur, a century of precedent to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
¶124 But surely this is not what the majority means.  And 
so I proceed with the remainder of my dissent. 
B 
¶125 Describing Hallie I as an implied repeal case rather 
than recognizing its true nature as an antitrust exemption case 
is not the majority's only mischaracterization of Hallie I.  The 
majority's creative reading of Hallie I, even more critically, 
fails to acknowledge the explicit and emphatic distinction 
Hallie I makes between private parties and municipalities.   
¶126 While the majority seems to conclude that Hallie I 
sets forth rules which are as applicable to private parties as 
to municipalities, Hallie I actually does the opposite.  This 
court was careful in Hallie I to expressly differentiate between 
the "legislative intent" test which applies to municipalities 
and 
the 
more 
stringent 
"legislative 
intent 
plus 
express 
authorization" test which applies to private parties.5  The 
                                                 
5 It is worth emphasizing that were Hallie I actually an 
"implied repeal" case, a completely different legislative intent 
test would apply.  In implied repeal cases, the party seeking to 
have 
a statute repealed must show that, in enacting a 
conflicting statute, the legislature intended to have that 
statute repealed.  Kienbaum v. Haberny, 273 Wis. 413, 420, 78 
N.W.2d 888 (1956).  Such a hurdle could clearly not be passed in 
this case, as the majority cites no statute indicating any 
legislative intent to repeal Wisconsin's antitrust laws in whole 
or in part. 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
14 
 
pertinent 
passage 
of 
Hallie 
I, 
which 
the 
majority 
only 
selectively, and inaccurately, quotes, clearly sets forth the 
difference between the two tests: 
This court has dealt with conflicts between the state 
antitrust law and other state statutes in Reese v. 
Associated Hospital Service, 45 Wis. 2d 526, 173 
N.W.2d 661 (1970), and in Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 
332, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  These cases established 
the rule that an entity cannot be exempted from the 
state antitrust statute unless the conduct of the 
entity is within the express provisions of the 
conflicting statute and then only if its conduct is in 
furtherance of the conflicting statute's legislatively 
stated purpose.  Reese at 532-33, and Grams at 342.  
We reiterate this rule for private entities, but we 
believe this rule may be overly restrictive if applied 
to municipalities.  When dealing with actions by 
municipalities, we hold that the test as to the 
applicability of the state antitrust law is whether 
the legislature intended to allow municipalities to 
undertake such actions. 
Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 538-39 (emphasis added).  The 
unambiguous language of this passage clearly explains that 
different rules apply depending on whether the anticompetitive 
conduct is by private entities or by municipalities.   
¶127 However, this distinction is lost on the majority.  
The majority inexplicably cites only the end of the quote 
describing the municipal exemption ("legislative intent") test, 
which 
the 
majority 
then 
misrepresents 
as 
the 
applicable 
exemption test in this case.  See majority op., ¶¶43-48.  In so 
doing, the majority ignores the clear language of the same 
Hallie I passage which explicitly describes a separate and more 
stringent test for private actors (i.e., a "legislative intent 
plus express authorization" test exempting only a private party 
which establishes that its conduct was "within the express 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
15 
 
provisions of [a] conflicting statute and then only if its 
conduct 
is 
in 
furtherance 
of 
the 
conflicting 
statute's 
legislatively stated purpose."  Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 538 
(emphasis added)).  It is hard to fathom how the majority could 
have missed the sentences that immediately precede the one it 
selectively quoted, not noticing that this passage of Hallie I 
explicitly describes the private party antitrust exemption test 
as distinct from and more stringent than the municipal exemption 
test.  
¶128 While never acknowledging that it quoted the wrong 
Hallie I test or that a separate test for private parties even 
exists, the majority does concede in a later passage that the 
issue in this case is not about whether the City is granted 
antitrust immunity, but is about whether the defendants, as 
private parties, are exempt from antitrust immunity under Hallie 
I.  Majority op., ¶¶70-71.  However, rather than apply the 
correct exemption test for private parties, the majority instead 
appears to create a new compulsion-based test, seemingly 
concluding that under Hallie I, an exemption could apply if 
private actors demonstrate that their anticompetitive conduct 
was in direct response to municipal "pressure bordering on 
compulsion."  Majority op., ¶71.  The majority never explains 
(1) how its various articulations of the Hallie I test relate to 
each other; (2) why any of these tests should be considered an 
"implied repeal" test; or (3) why it does not even mention the 
test Hallie I sets forth for evaluating whether private parties, 
as opposed to municipalities, are exempt from antitrust laws.  
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
16 
 
C 
¶129 Because the majority never applied the correct private 
party antitrust exemption test in the first place, its ensuing 
analysis which is based on the inapplicable municipal antitrust 
exemption test is also necessarily wrong as a result.  However, 
even if the majority had been correct in applying the municipal 
instead of the private party exemption test under Hallie I, its 
application of Hallie I is flawed in additional respects.  
¶130 First, the majority has failed to identify the 
requisite conflict between statutes required under either Hallie 
I or the actual implied repeal doctrine.  For all its general 
references to statutes allowing municipalities to enact alcohol 
regulations and to protect public health and safety, the 
majority has not identified a single statute which is in 
conflict with state antitrust prohibitions of price-fixing by 
private parties such as the defendants, or which contains a 
legislative purpose specifically thwarted by such antitrust 
restrictions on price-fixing by private businesses.  The 
majority frequently invokes ch. 125 and the statutes contained 
therein, but there is no direct conflict between any statute 
within ch. 125 and Wis. Stat. § 133.03 price-fixing prohibitions 
that would bring this case within the reach of Hallie I.  
Although various provisions of ch. 125 relate to alcohol, none 
address voluntary agreements by taverns to set prices in an 
anticompetitive manner or otherwise conflict with the text of 
§ 133.03 prohibiting individual businesses from contracting, 
combining or conspiring in restraint of trade or attempting to 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
17 
 
monopolize any part of trade or commerce.  The one statute 
highlighted by the defendants at oral argument and emphasized as 
well by the majority, Wis. Stat. § 125.10(1), only serves to 
underscore the fact that regulation of alcohol by the City 
requires 
formalization 
through 
statutorily 
established 
democratic procedures.6  None of the other provisions of ch. 125 
cited by the defendants contains any language authorizing the 
violation of § 133.03 through creation of unlawful monopolies or 
"contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" in restraint of 
trade.  To the contrary, each cited provision only serves to 
illustrate this state's general policy of favoring comparatively 
greater regulation of taverns, not greater immunity from 
statutes and other legal regulations.  
¶131 Second, 
the 
majority's 
description 
of 
"municipal 
action bordering on compulsion" has no bearing on a proper 
antitrust exemption analysis.  After conceding that the issue in 
this case is the immunity of the defendants, not the City, the 
majority immediately backpedals from this concession, adding 
that "[i]n reality, we must determine whether private parties 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.10(1) provides: 
Authorization. Any municipality may enact regulations 
incorporating any part of this chapter and may 
prescribe additional regulations for the sale of 
alcohol beverages, not in conflict with this chapter. 
The municipality may prescribe forfeitures or license 
suspension or revocation for violations of any such 
regulations. 
Regulations 
providing 
forfeitures 
or 
license suspension or revocation must be adopted by 
ordinance. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
18 
 
are eligible for antitrust immunity when they act in concert,[7] 
in an anticompetitive manner, in direct response to pressure 
bordering on compulsion from a municipality with the power to 
condition or non-renew their licenses."  Majority op., ¶71.  The 
majority's description of the "reality" of this case in such 
terms not only deviates from the applicable Hallie I test but 
also requires the acceptance of a debatable premise: that there 
was direct pressure from a municipality in this case which 
bordered on compulsion.  
¶132 Even the tavern owners' press release emphasizes that 
their decision to end drink specials on weekends was voluntary; 
the press release bolded and underlined the word "voluntarily" 
in the below passage: 
We are a little puzzled about the mixed messages being 
sent by the A.L.R.C. and the city council.  We all 
believe in the free enterprise system, but the 
A.L.R.C. continues to saturate our downtown area by 
approving more new licensed establishments, yet now 
they want us to eliminate the drink specials which is 
a way of competing with each other and with all the 
new establishments in order for us to stay in 
business. 
 . . . . 
                                                 
7 Although the majority probably intends to describe only 
the defendants as acting in concert with each other in this 
passage, elsewhere the majority comes close to describing a 
similar type of collusion between the defendants and the City 
for the purpose of equating the defendants' conduct with 
municipal action.  It is worth noting on that point that "[i]n 
analogous contexts, the Court has held that an exempt entity 
forfeits antitrust exemption by acting in concert with nonexempt 
parties."  Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 
U.S. 205, 231 (1979).  
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
19 
 
With these facts in mind, and without acknowledging 
that drink specials are indeed causing this problem, 
we as a group, have agreed that we will voluntarily 
and immediately end all drink specials on Friday and 
Saturday nights after 8 p.m. in our establishments 
[and advertising of such specials]. 
 . . . . 
As concerned owners and businessmen, we want to be 
part of the solution, not part of the problem. 
In trying to build bridges and mend fences with 
Chancellor Wiley and City officials, we feel today we 
are taking the first solid step toward trying to end a 
problem that we all agree exists. 
 . . . . 
We do not feel that pending legislation before the 
A.L.R.C. to ban all drink specials at all bars and 
restaurants in the City of Madison is necessary. 
 . . . . 
We do not need more legislation or controls that will 
adversely affect our businesses. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶133 Not only does this undisputed and clear language from 
the press release indicate that the taverns' decision to limit 
their drink specials was voluntary, the pressure it describes 
leading up to their decision is not described in terms of either 
borderline compulsion or actual regulation.  Rather, the press 
release describes receiving mixed messages, not coercion, from 
two different government bodies.  The press release also 
describes the taverns as wanting to be a part of the solution, 
and to end a problem they agreed existed.  Further, the press 
release makes it clear that any regulatory pressure felt was 
merely the pressure of potential legislation being considered 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
20 
 
that would ban all drink specials, not any formal regulation 
that had already been democratically approved and promulgated.   
¶134 Even more striking is the warning in the Tavern 
League's simultaneously issued press release that "while an 
attempt will be made to eliminate weekend drink specials, we are 
all independent businesses and economic pressures may prevent 
some from participating in this experiment" (emphasis added).  
This passage of the press release reveals that the taverns felt 
free to choose whether or not to participate in the agreement to 
limit drink specials, and that the more compelling pressure some 
of the taverns felt was the economic pressure not to engage in 
the drink specials limitations.  As such, any pressure from the 
City was neither binding on all the taverns, nor, by the 
taverns' own undisputed words, did it necessarily outweigh 
economic pressures on the taverns to continue with their drink 
specials. 
¶135 To 
support 
its 
own 
description 
of 
"borderline 
compulsion" 
put 
on 
the 
defendants, 
the 
majority 
relies 
extensively on the circuit court's description of enormous 
pressure placed on defendants by certain city and university 
officials.  However, we owe no deference to the court's legal 
conclusion that such pressure was regulatory in nature for 
purposes of creating an antitrust exemption.  Informal coercion 
by politicians does not have the same force of law as 
democratically 
promulgated 
regulations. 
 
By 
concluding 
otherwise, the circuit court and the majority effectively 
condone and add legitimacy to coercive tactics by individual 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
21 
 
municipal officials by elevating such tactics to the level of 
binding democratically enacted statutes, such as those creating 
antitrust exemptions.8 
¶136 As 
an 
alternative 
means 
of 
characterizing 
the 
defendants' conduct as mere compliance with binding regulatory 
action, the majority mischaracterizes and exaggerates the role 
of the "Luther's Blues conditions" in this case, inappropriately 
describing them as a "regulation . . . at the heart of this 
dispute."  Majority op., ¶48.  This description is extremely 
misleading.  As a preliminary matter, a regulation, whether 
past, present, or future, does not by itself create an antitrust 
exemption absent the elements of Hallie I's private party 
antitrust 
exemption 
test 
being 
met. 
 
Additionally, 
the 
threatened drink specials ban which was the admitted motivating 
force behind the defendants' voluntary agreement is distinct 
from the previous "Luther's Blues conditions," which predated 
the key events in this case and did not even apply to the 
defendant-taverns which were existing or non-renewing bars.  In 
contrast, the regulation that City officials threatened to apply 
to the defendant-taverns in this case was never democratically 
approved by vote or formally promulgated into an actual 
regulation 
as 
defined by Wis. Stat. § 125.02(17)(defining 
                                                 
8 The majority opinion echoes the tone of the defendants' 
argument that "[t]he only wrinkle presented by this case is the 
City did not formalize its regulation in the form of an 
ordinance."  In response, Eichenseer issued the following strong 
rebuke:  "Whether or not a regulation is to be found in the 
written law may be considered a mere 'wrinkle' in certain 
totalitarian nations, but not in the United States."  I concur 
with this statement. 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
22 
 
"regulation" as "any rule or ordinance adopted by a municipal 
governing body").  
¶137 To allow coercive tactics of individual aldermen, even 
coupled with the threat of potential future regulation, to rise 
to the level of democratically approved regulatory action is to 
strip from this country the fundamental protections that 
distinguish us from a tyrannical system of government.  Ours is 
a country of laws, not of men.  It is anathema to our 
constitutional 
democracy 
to 
allow 
coercive 
behavior 
by 
individuals claiming to be acting on behalf of a city, state, or 
even higher, to dictate what the law is without going through a 
democratic legislative process to formally enact such laws.  If 
the rule of law means anything, mere threats, no matter how 
enormous the pressure that accompanies them, cannot be given 
equal legal weight to democratically promulgated regulations.  
¶138 Finally, even if the City had enacted a regulation 
that was expressly authorized by statute (satisfying Hallie I's 
express authorization requirement) and that not only limited 
drink specials but also authorized the defendants to engage in 
price-fixing 
schemes 
among 
themselves 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
conflicted with antitrust laws, it is not a given that such 
regulation would have effectively exempted the defendants from 
the antitrust laws.  
¶139 In an opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that even the 
existence 
of 
conflicting 
statutes 
does 
not, 
by 
itself, 
automatically result in exemption.  Addressing a scenario 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
23 
 
analogous to that in this case, the Seventh Circuit held that 
agreements among business rivals to fix prices are not exempt 
from antitrust prosecution by virtue of special interest laws 
enacted to allow such price fixing.  Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. 
P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 
1992).  The court explained that "[r]ecognition that special 
interest legislation enshrines results rather than principles is 
why courts read exceptions to the antitrust laws narrowly, with 
beady eyes and green eyeshades."  Id. (citing Group Life & 
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979); 
Nat'l Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827-29 
(1978)).  Consequently, even if there had been such legislation 
or formal regulation authorizing the defendants' conduct in this 
case, it would be debatable whether they were automatically 
entitled to an antitrust exemption.  
¶140 Rejecting 
the 
"beady 
eyes 
and 
green 
eyeshades" 
approach as unflattering to its objectives, however, the 
majority refuses to follow the well-established rule of law that 
exemptions to antitrust laws must be construed narrowly and 
given out sparsely.  The majority neither applies this correct 
standard of review, nor applies the correct test established by 
Hallie I for private party antitrust immunity. 
D 
¶141 The next inexplicable move the majority makes is to 
merge its Hallie I analysis with an application of yet another 
doctrine which does not generally apply to private actors:  the 
"state action" doctrine.  Majority op., ¶¶74-89.  While 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
24 
 
conceding that the conceptual underpinnings of the federal 
"state action" doctrine are distinct from what it designates as 
the 
"implied 
repeal" 
doctrine, 
the 
majority 
nonetheless 
concludes 
that 
state 
action 
cases 
are 
"instructive 
and 
persuasive."  Id., ¶74 & n. 23.  
¶142 In an even more astounding concession, the majority 
admits, just before applying the state action doctrine, that 
this is not "technically" a state or municipal action case.  
Majority op., ¶78.  So how does the majority justify treating 
private actors the same as government actors for purposes of 
granting them some kind of "state action" immunity which morphs 
into a Hallie I exemption?  It simply follows the concession 
that this is not a state action case with the conclusory 
statement, "But we think it makes sense to apply the [state 
action] analysis . . . to determine whether the City's immunity 
extends to the defendants."  Majority op., ¶78 (emphasis added). 
¶143 We think it makes sense?  We think it makes sense?  
Surely this cannot stand as justifiable grounds or authority for 
extending a legal doctrine in directions never before taken by 
this court, in lieu of applying the applicable test explicitly 
affirmed in Hallie I for determining the existence of private 
actor antitrust immunity.   
¶144 Even in Hallie I, this court realized that it does not 
make sense to apply the state action doctrine in cases not 
involving a conflict between two different sovereigns——the 
federal government and the sovereign states——which implicates 
the 
limits 
on 
federal 
power 
under 
the 
United 
States 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
25 
 
Constitution.  Hallie I, 105 Wis. 2d at 537-38.  In Hallie I, 
this court concluded that state action principles were not 
present in that case involving tensions between states and 
municipalities because "[t]he relationship between the federal 
government and the states is not parallel to the relationship 
between the state government and the cities.  Cities are 
creatures of the state, derive their power from it, and are not 
recognized as independent sovereigns."  Id.   
¶145 It makes even less sense to apply the state action 
doctrine in this case.  Regardless of whether one accepts the 
majority's descriptions of the tension in this case as between 
the defendants and the City or as between the City and some 
broad statutory scheme, neither such tension brings this case 
within the purview of the state action doctrine as explained in 
Hallie I, i.e., a conflict between two sovereigns.  Id. 
¶146 The purpose of the state action test is to determine 
"whether state regulation of private parties is shielded from 
the federal antitrust laws."  Southern Motor Carriers Rate 
Conference, 
Inc. 
v. 
United 
States, 
471 
U.S. 
48, 
57 
(1985)(emphasis added).  The majority acknowledges that the 
first prong of the state action test, as described by Southern 
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57, requires those seeking to extend 
state action antitrust immunity to private parties to show that 
the challenged anticompetitive conduct is conduct which is 
"clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state 
policy."  See majority op., ¶77.  However, the majority then 
fails to explain how the defendants' voluntary agreement to 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
26 
 
limit 
drink 
specials 
reflects 
"clearly 
articulated 
and 
affirmatively expressed" state policy.  The only argument the 
majority 
makes 
is 
that 
"[w]ith 
regard 
to 
the 
'clear 
articulation' 
test, 
state 
law 
empowers 
municipalities 
to 
'prescribe additional regulations for the sale of alcohol 
beverages, not in conflict with [Chapter 125]" and that "[t]he 
imposition of 'Luther's Blues conditions' on eight licensees is 
an exercise of this power."  Majority op., ¶79. 
¶147 This argument, like the others, makes no sense.  The 
cases cited by the majority unambiguously provide that the state 
action doctrine is inapplicable absent clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed state policy allowing the restraint at 
issue.  
In this 
case, the challenged restraint is the 
defendants' conduct, which consisted of privately owned taverns 
voluntarily entering into a price-fixing agreement with each 
other.  The majority has completely failed to point to a single 
statute which clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses 
state policy allowing private taverns to enter into price-fixing 
agreements with each other.  The majority points only to the 
City's statutory authority to enact certain regulations, begging 
the question of whether the defendants have the right to engage 
in illegal price-fixing without regulation or statute expressly 
authorizing them to do so.  By pointing to the "Luther's Blues 
conditions," which are not at issue in this case and did not 
require the steps the defendants took in this case, the majority 
once 
again 
attempts 
to 
reach 
a 
desired 
result 
through 
obfuscation, rather than accomplish the impossible:  find a 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
27 
 
regulation, statute, or any other law which expressly authorizes 
private taverns to engage in price-fixing.9   
¶148 In the end, it does not make sense to equate private 
tavern owners with state actors or with the municipalities that 
have the authority to regulate the taverns.  It is neither good 
law nor good public policy to conclude that because taverns are 
more heavily regulated than other businesses, they should 
therefore be more exempt from the law. 
II  
¶149 Rather than apply well-established rules of law 
applicable to this case, the majority plays a creative game of 
hide-the-ball which attempts to fuse principles of various 
doctrines, none of which is directly applicable to this case, to 
concoct a hybrid under which all the doctrines combined 
magically create immunity for private parties after all.  As 
creative as it is, the majority opinion is simply unsupported by 
legal authority.  
¶150 While the majority does not have the law on its side, 
it does have some sympathetic policy concerns.  Although 
preserving 
a 
competitive 
free 
market 
is 
central 
to 
our 
capitalist society, the policy concerns related to alcohol abuse 
raised by the majority are also serious.  However, "[i]t is 
nevertheless well settled that good motives will not validate an 
                                                 
9 Having explained why the majority's failure to establish 
the requisite elements of the first prong of the state action 
test renders the test inapplicable, I will not address the 
"active state supervision" prong of the test. 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
28 
 
otherwise anticompetitive practice."  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n. 23 (1984). 
¶151 Remedying such policy problems is a legislative, not 
judicial function.  To that end, there is already, as the 
majority has pointed out, an abundance of legislation regulating 
alcohol, and the City certainly has the authority to enact 
further regulatory reform through ordinances and regulations 
enacted 
through 
the 
correct 
democratically 
established 
processes.  Furthermore, our legislature has already enacted 
laws prohibiting taverns from serving alcohol to intoxicated 
persons and to underage university students.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 125.07.    
¶152 I applaud the defendants for wanting to take further 
affirmative steps to reduce excessive alcohol consumption.  
However, instead of engaging in price-fixing without express 
statutory authorization, a better way for taverns to address 
alcohol abuse problems would be to work toward full compliance 
with laws already on the books prohibiting taverns from selling 
alcohol to intoxicated persons and to underage drinkers.  If 
limitations on drink specials are a necessary step in reducing 
binge drinking, the parties do not appear to dispute that the 
City has the ability to formally promulgate a regulation 
limiting drink specials, and indeed has done so in the past, as 
evidenced by the majority's frequent references to the "Luther's 
Blues conditions."  If the City could set such conditions 
before, it can do so again.  Nor do antitrust laws prevent any 
individual tavern from choosing to end its own drink specials on 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
29 
 
its own terms, so long as such a decision is not an agreement 
made collaboratively with other taverns in violation of price-
fixing laws.  In sum, if the overriding policy concern in this 
case is truly the reduction of excessive alcohol consumption, 
solving that problem does not require the defendants to engage 
in collaborative price-fixing in violation of antitrust laws.   
¶153 For all the doctrines and cases mentioned by the 
majority, and for all its concessions that no single doctrine, 
standing on its own, creates an antitrust exemption for the 
petitioners, it remains unclear how, whether, or to what extent 
the majority means to change the course of antitrust law in 
Wisconsin.  This is the first time this court has embraced a 
result 
allowing 
private 
parties 
to 
engage 
in 
antitrust 
violations without express statutory authorization.  
¶154 This court has a solemn obligation to adhere to 
precedent and to the rule of law.  We must be cautious before 
creating new doctrines, particularly in the face of contrary 
precedent and authority.  To engage in such a broad extension 
and unprecedented deviation from basic state action doctrine, 
antitrust exemption, and implied repeal principles, misapplying 
elements of each of these doctrines to create a new hybrid form 
of antitrust immunity for private actors, requires a bit more 
than merely shrugging off the rule of law with the empty 
statement that we just "think it makes sense." 
¶155 What does make sense is the body of law preceding this 
decision which in no unclear terms sets forth different 
standards for the treatment of private and government actors 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
30 
 
under antitrust laws.  What does make sense is that the state 
action exemption applies to state actors, not private actors.  
What does makes sense is the language in the very case relied 
upon throughout the majority opinion, Hallie I, which clearly 
states the test for extending antitrust immunity to private 
actors, a test that the majority never even attempts to apply.  
Rather, the majority rejects applicable precedent and long-
standing principles as mere technicalities that get in the way 
of its result, proclaiming that even if a case does not 
"technically" involve municipal action, for example, that should 
not stop an opinion from being framed nearly entirely in terms 
of such municipal action.  See majority op., ¶78. 
¶156 The majority ultimately holds that because of its 
state action analysis, Hallie I should be extended to grant 
private parties antitrust immunity vis-à-vis a municipality 
exemption.  This final conclusion blurs the clear distinction 
this court was careful to make in Hallie I between the two types 
of exemptions, as well as blurring the distinction between the 
state action doctrine and the narrow private party exemption 
test set forth in Hallie I.  Most troubling is the majority's 
final swipe, adding insult to the injury it inflicts on the rule 
of law, as it follows its holding with the bold proclamation, 
"[t]o conclude otherwise would enshrine theory over practical 
reality."  Majority op., ¶89.  This rejection of the rule of law 
as mere technicality and theory does a grave injustice to our 
legal system.   
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
31 
 
¶157 While limiting binge drinking may be a sympathetic 
policy goal, the most critical policy goal worthy of this 
court's affirmative protection——the rule of law itself——should 
never be sacrificed for the expedient achievement of any 
particular 
policy-driven end.  Consequently, the majority 
decision should not be read as itself "repealing" or overruling 
the long-standing precedents which describe the antitrust laws 
in quite different terms.  Nor does the majority overrule the 
express language of Hallie I precluding the extension of 
antitrust exemptions to a private party absent the existence of 
both a statute expressly authorizing anticompetitive conduct and 
a legislatively stated purpose also clearly supporting such 
anticompetitive conduct. 
¶158 For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1063.lbb 
 
1