Title: Van Valkenburgh v. State Board of Social Welfare

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

211 Kan. 754 (1973)
508 P.2d 875
G. PAUL VAN VALKENBURGH, Appellant,
v.
STATE BOARD OF SOCIAL WELFARE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 46,669

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 7, 1973.
Scott E. Jarvis, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Woody D. Smith, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOTH, C.:
Appellant, plaintiff below, is a man of middle age who has been blind since the age of four. He brought this action against the state department of social welfare alleging a breach of an implied contract under which he claimed the department was obligated to assist him in a program of vocational rehabilitation and, more importantly, to assist him in finding suitable employment. His petition seeks damages for the alleged breach.
After securing plaintiff's deposition and answers to interrogatories the department moved for summary judgment. The motion was sustained and this appeal followed.
The history of plaintiff's relations with the department as well as the reasons for the trial court's order were contained in a letter opinion:
The plaintiff's argument that the district court was wrong has two steps. First, he says the statutory authorization for the department to be sued on its contracts, found in K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 39-708 (k), is broad enough to cover implied contracts. Second, he asserts that his relationship to the department, as one of its "clients" to whom it must by law provide benefits, is contractual in nature.
With plaintiff's first argument we might agee, as a general proposition. The cases he cites are those which hold that a governmental agency taking private property for public use has an obligation to pay for it, and this obligation is in the nature of an implied contract. E.g., Lux v. City of Topeka, 204 Kan. 179, 460 P.2d 541; Brock v. State Highway Commission, 195 Kan. 361, 404 P.2d 934. This is the proposition on which our inverse condemnation cases are bottomed. Suffice it to say, the department has not appropriated any of plaintiff's property, so that the type of implied contract which is based on appropriation does not exist in this case.
Which brings us to his argument that some other type of contract does exist  not express, mind you, yet not quite the conventional "implied" contract referred to above. He cites no cases to support his theory. Rather, he points to Rousseau's philosophical concept of "The Social Contract," which envisions mutual compacts, not only among the members of society, one with another, but between the members and their government. We are not disposed to quarrel with this concept as a philosophical proposition. Plaintiff, however, would have us promote a tacit agreement to *757 abide by society's rules into an enforceable, multilateral contract, for any breach of which an injured party may recover damages. This we are not prepared to do on the meager showing made here of either the existence of such contract or of any substantial recognition of its enforceability in the manner suggested by plaintiff.
Our analysis convinces us that contract law has no applicability to this case. The cases cited by the trial court are persuasive, as are its observations on the relevant statutory and policy considerations. The remedy for persons deprived by government officials of their rights under statutes designed for their benefit has always been thought to be the pursuit of any prescribed administrative remedy or, in the absence of an administrative remedy, a suit in equity to compel the performance of the officials' duty. Thompson v. Amis, 208 Kan. 658, 493 P.2d 1259, and cases cited therein. The social welfare act provides such an administrative remedy by way of a "fair hearing" by an appeals committee under K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 75-3306, coupled with appellate review by the courts under K.S.A. 60-2101. Powers v. State Department of Social Welfare, 208 Kan. 605, 493 P.2d 590.
It follows that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant department, and its judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
PRAGER, J., not participating.