Title: In Re Advisory Opinion of Governor Civil Rights

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

306 So. 2d 520 (1975)
In re ADVISORY OPINION OF the GOVERNOR CIVIL RIGHTS.
No. 45808.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 6, 1975.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Baya M. Harrison III, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth M. Myers, Miami, for intervenors.
Dear Governor Askew:
We have the honor to acknowledge your communication of June 28, 1974, requesting our advice pursuant to Section 1(c), Article IV, Constitution of Florida, relating to certain executive powers and duties.
Upon receipt of your request for advisory opinion relative to your executive powers and duties, this Court entered an interlocutory order finding that the questions propounded were answerable and requesting that briefs be filed by interested parties.
We respond to the first question in the affirmative and find that the questioned portion of the Florida Correctional Reform Act does constitute a clear infringement upon the constitutional power of the Governor to restore civil rights. Conviction of a felony removes many civil rights of a *522 person. Article VI, Section 4, Florida Constitution (1968), provides:
Article IV, Section 8(a), pertaining to executive clemency, pardons and restoration of civil rights, provides:
The provision of Section 28, Chapter 74-112, Laws of Florida, questioned herein provides:
As early as 1896, this Court committed itself to the proposition that the power of pardon is reposed exclusively in the chief executive and with the approval of three members of his cabinet. In Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21 (Fla. 1896), this Court struck down an act of the legislature purporting to restore civil rights to a convicted felon for the reason that the power to commute punishment and grant pardons for crimes after conviction had been conferred upon the governor and cabinet "... and it is not competent for the legislature to exercise such power." Therein, this Court succinctly explicated:
We find that the well established principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies sub judice. The people of this state through adoption of Article IV, Section 8, Florida Constitution expressed their will that the power of pardon and restoration of civil rights vest in the executive. As aforestated, this Court has previously determined that this method is exclusive. As this Court expressly declared in Weinberger v. Board of Public Instruction, 93 Fla. 470, 112 So. 253, 256 (Fla. 1927):
See also: State ex rel. Jones v. Wiseheart, 245 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971); In re Investigation of a Circuit Judge, 93 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1957); Board of Public Instruction, etc. v. Wright, 77 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1955); State ex rel. Ellars v. Board of County Commissioners of Orange County, et al., 147 Fla. 278, 3 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1941); Amos v. Matthews, 99 Fla. 115, 126 So. 308 (1930); Leonard v. Franklin, 84 Fla. 402, 93 So. 688 (Fla. 1922).
An advisory opinion to the Governor as authorized in Section 1(c), Article IV, Constitution of Florida, is an advisory appraisal for the benefit of the chief executive and, therefore, does not carry with it a mandate of the Court. However, it is our opinion that any court having jurisdiction of the legal question presented should and would enter its order holding Section 28 of Chapter 74-112, Laws of Florida, as *524 an unconstitutional invasion of the authority given exclusively to the Executive Branch of the government under our constitution. In view of this pronouncement, we find it unnecessary to reach the second question.
Respectfully,
ERVIN, Justice (dissenting).
Dear Governor:
Because Section 8, Article IV, of the Florida Constitution uses the word "may", I do not believe you and the other executive officers named in this constitutional provision have exclusive authority to restore civil rights. It is to be recalled the constitution is a limitation upon and not a grant of powers to the Legislature. The Legislature is free to enact laws in all areas except where it is clearly manifest in the constitution that its power to enact is restricted.
I see no express or implied limitation upon the Legislature insofar as restoration of civil rights are concerned.
Restoration of civil rights is not to be confused with the granting of pardons or commutations. Ordinarily, it is held that the granting of a pardon is exclusively an executive function. See 50 Am.Jur.2d, Pardon and Parole, § 20, p. 15. But civil rights spring from the Bill of Rights  from the 13th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They involve equality of citizenship. It is generally recognized under modern concepts of the law that the Congress and the State Legislatures are within their powers to enact laws to enforce and vindicate such rights  and in the process to restore them where they have been shorn or deprived.
After a citizen who was convicted of crime has paid his debt to society, I think it lies within the inherent reserved power of the Legislature as a constitutional responsibility to formally restore his civil rights. It should be done speedily, automatically and routinely. Actually, the right to restoration of civil rights in such cases is not a matter of grace. To deny one citizen restoration when others of the same class are not denied would be invidious discrimination. One should not be attainted of crime further after serving his sentence fully. It is necessary to equality of citizenship that there be prompt restoration of civil rights after conviction sentences are completed.
It is pro forma and routine for the Pardon Board now to restore civil rights when applied for and the applicant is entitled to them. The Legislature thought it more expeditious and salutary in its enactment to blanketly restore civil rights when they were so entitled rather than require the individual to go through the delay and expense and red tape of applying for and securing them with the concomitant bureaucratic routine and expense to the state in granting them.
I would answer your question as indicated above.
Respectfully submitted,