Title: Catawba County ex rel. Rackley v. Loggins

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 152PA16   
Filed 29 September 2017 
CATAWBA COUNTY, by and through its CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY, ex rel. 
SHAWNA RACKLEY 
 
 
v. 
JASON LOGGINS 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 784 S.E.2d 620 (2016), affirming an order  
entered on 29 December 2014 by Judge Gregory R. Hayes in District Court, Catawba 
County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on (11 April 2017). 
David W. Hood for plaintiff-appellant.  
 
Blair E. Cody, III for defendant-appellee. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by John F. Maddrey, Solicitor General, 
Gerald K. Robbins, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Benjamin Kull, 
Assistant Attorney General, for North Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services, amicus curiae.   
 
MORGAN, Justice.   
 
I. 
Background and Procedural History  
In this appeal we consider whether a district court has jurisdiction to modify a 
child support order without a party filing a motion to modify asserting that there is 
a change in circumstances.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
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did not have jurisdiction because Catawba County, by and through its Child Support 
Agency, ex rel. Shawna Rackley (plaintiff) failed to comply with procedural mandates 
to file a motion to modify the child support order at issue as required by  N.C.G.S. § 
50-13.7(a) (2015).  We hold that the district court maintained continuing jurisdiction 
to modify the child support order and that plaintiff’s failure to file a motion to modify 
the child support order did not divest the district court of jurisdiction.  Accordingly, 
we reverse and remand the Court of Appeals decision.  
 On 15 February 1999, the District Court in Catawba County entered a 
Voluntary Support Agreement and Order (VSA) under which Jason Loggins 
(defendant) agreed to pay “$0.00” in child support for his two children with Shawna 
Rackley (Ms. Rackley).  Additionally, starting 1 March 1999, defendant was to 
reimburse the State $1,996.00 for public assistance paid on behalf of his children.  
Defendant was also required to provide health insurance for the minor children 
through his employer or when it was available at a reasonable cost.    
Defendant failed to reimburse the State as required, and on 19 October 2000 
plaintiff filed a motion to show cause.  The district court ordered defendant to appear, 
but he failed to do so.  Defendant was arrested and later released on a $500.00 cash 
bond that was allocated to his arrearage.  After hearing the matter in January 2001, 
the district court found that defendant was employed at Carolina Hardwoods earning 
$9.95 per hour, and was able to comply with the 1999 VSA.  The court ordered 
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defendant to make $50.00 monthly payments towards his then-arrearages of 
$1,165.12.   
Subsequently, a second VSA titled “Modified Voluntary Support Agreement 
and Order” was signed by defendant on 25 June 2001.  This agreement did not 
reference the original VSA or the 1999 order, nor did it show that the district court 
established defendant’s paternity in 1999.  The parties did attach a child support 
worksheet stating defendant had a monthly gross income of $1,724.66 and 
recommending $419.00 for his monthly child support obligation.1  The 2001 VSA was 
approved by the court and entered on 28 June 2001.  This order is the basis of all 
controversy on appeal.  In the 2001 VSA, defendant agreed to pay $419.00 per month 
in child support starting 1 July 2001 and to reimburse the State $422.78 for public 
assistance given to his children.  In addition, defendant agreed to provide health 
insurance to his children through his then-employer, Crown Heritage, Inc.  Unlike 
the 1999 VSA, the 2001 VSA contains no modification provision. 
Throughout the following years, defendant failed to comply with the 2001 VSA.  
Accordingly, the trial court entered consent contempt orders on 20 November 2003, 
21 July 2005 and 25 January 2007.  Each time defendant admitted to being in civil 
                                            
1 The parties attached “Work Sheet A,” Form “AOC-CV-627 Rev. 10/98” of the North 
Carolina Child Support Guidelines. This is the form used to calculate child support when one 
parent (or a third party) has sole physical custody of all children for whom support is being 
determined. This form does not contain a provision referencing a change in circumstances. 
Thus, in the 2001 Order, the trial court did not find that there were changed circumstances. 
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contempt for his failure to pay amounts due under the 2001 VSA.  By 2007, the 
amount defendant owed totaled $16,422.28.  In the 2007 consent order, the trial court 
ordered defendant to make monthly child support payments totaling $479.00 with 
$60.00 going towards arrears.  On 5 April 2007, the district court concluded defendant 
was in compliance with the 25 January 2007 order and determined that his 
arrearages were $15,572.80.  The district court ordered defendant to continue his 
monthly child support payments of $419.00 plus $60.00 towards arrears.  Eventually, 
defendant again failed to pay the child support ordered by the court.  
On 7 April 2011, defendant filed, pro se, a motion to modify the 2007 consent 
order. Defendant stated there was a change in circumstances because he “draw[s] 
unemployment, [and his] kids [ages 17 and 18] have quit school.”  The district court 
heard the matter on 11 August 2011.  Ms. Rackley failed to appear.  On 15 September 
2011 the district court found a change in circumstances, noting that “[d]efendant was 
drawing unemployment benefits, since has obtained fulltime employment.  Oldest 
child . . . has emancipated according to [N.C.G.S. § 50-13.4(c)].”  Based on the child 
support guidelines, the district court reduced defendant’s monthly child support 
obligation to $247.00 and found his arrears to be $6,640.75.   
 
On 13 March 2014, defendant, now represented by counsel, moved the district 
court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60, to set aside the 2001 VSA as void.  
Defendant contended that “prior to June 28, 2001 there was [sic] not any motions 
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filed by [Ms. Rackley] or on her behalf to modify the ‘then’ existing child support 
obligation [of $0.00 under the 1999 VSA].”  A hearing was held on 31 July 2014, 
during which defendant asserted that the 1999 VSA was a permanent order and that 
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify it without a motion in the cause by 
plaintiff and a showing of a change in circumstances.  He argued that the 2001 VSA 
was void and, as a result, unenforceable.  Plaintiff’s counsel conceded, “There’s no 
indication that [the 1999 VSA] was a temporary order.  We use the colloquial term 
‘permanent’ although every order can be modified, but I would agree that that’s what 
we normally refer to as a permanent order rather than a temporary order.”  Following 
the hearing, defense counsel tendered a draft order to the district court without 
serving it upon plaintiff’s counsel.  The district court entered an order on 18 December 
2014 granting defendant’s motion but a few days later set aside that order because it 
contained “errors and was not presented following approved procedure” in that 
defendant did not serve the proposed order on plaintiff before tendering it to the court.   
On 29 December 2014, the district court entered a second order granting 
defendant’s Rule 60 Motion.  The district court found that it did not have jurisdiction 
to enter the 2001 VSA because there was no precipitating motion filed by plaintiff or 
on her behalf, nor was there any proof of a change in circumstances; therefore, the 
order resulting from the 2001 VSA was void.  Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.   
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In the Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued, in pertinent part, that the district 
court erroneously concluded that a motion to modify a child support obligation must 
precede a modification order.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language 
of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) “requires a ‘motion in the cause and a showing of changed 
circumstances’ as a necessary condition for the [district] court to modify an existing 
support order.”  Catawba County ex rel. Rackley v. Loggins, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
784 S.E.2d 620, 625-26 (2016) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) (2015)).  The Court of 
Appeals recognized that a district court is without authority to sua sponte modify an 
existing support order.  Id. at ___, 784 S.E.2d at 626 (quoting Royall v. Sawyer, 120 
N.C. App. 880, 882, 463 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1995)).  Therefore, according to the Court of 
Appeals, it was “impossible to enforce the second [VSA] and order because the trial 
court did not have jurisdiction to accept the second [VSA] and enter the modified 
order.”  Id. at ___, 784 S.E.2d at 626 (citation omitted).   
II. 
Standard of Review  
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows for dismissal based upon a 
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.  N.C.G.S. § 1A-
1, Rule 12(b)(1) (2015).  We review the decision of a trial court to dismiss an action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.  Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 271, 
643 S.E.2d 566, 570 (2007); see Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 212 N.C. App. 137, 
139, 710 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2011) (applying a de novo standard of review to a district 
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court’s decision to dismiss a plaintiff’s claims for child support for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction).   
III. 
Analysis  
Plaintiff contends in the instant case that the trial court retained jurisdiction 
to modify the VSA notwithstanding plaintiff’s failure to file a motion to modify the 
VSA as addressed in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a).  We agree that the trial court retained 
jurisdiction to modify the VSA because: (1) the court maintained continuing 
jurisdiction over the child support issue; (2) the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.7(a) does not create a jurisdictional prerequisite that would divest the district 
court of jurisdiction; (3) the legislative history of this statutory provision suggests 
that the General Assembly did not intend to create a jurisdictional prerequisite; (4) 
the provision requiring a motion to modify a child support order to be filed so as to 
prompt a district court’s review of an existing child support order is directory rather 
than mandatory, and therefore did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction; and 
(5) the VSA filed by plaintiff satisfied the purpose of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a).   
A. District Court Maintained Continuing Jurisdiction 
  The district court maintained continuing jurisdiction to modify the VSA.  
“Jurisdiction is ‘[t]he legal power and authority of a court to make a decision that 
binds the parties to any matter properly brought before it.’ ”  In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 
588, 590, 636 S.E.2d 787, 789-90 (2006) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 
1999)).  The court must have personal jurisdiction and, relevant here, subject matter 
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jurisdiction “or ‘[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought,’ 
in order to decide a case.”  Id. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary at 596).  “The legislature, within constitutional limitations, can fix and 
circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.”  Bullington v. Angel, 220 
N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941).  “Where jurisdiction is statutory and the 
Legislature requires the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to 
follow a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the Court to certain limitations, an 
act of the Court beyond these limits is in excess of its jurisdiction.”  Eudy v. Eudy, 
288 N.C. 71, 75, 215 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1975) (citations omitted), overruled on other 
grounds by Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 457-58, 290 S.E.2d 653, 661 (1982).   
Without regard to the amount in controversy, the district court conducts “the 
trial of civil actions and proceedings for annulment, divorce, equitable distribution of 
property, alimony, child support, child custody and the enforcement of separation or 
property settlement agreements between spouses, or recovery for the breach thereof.”  
N.C.G.S. § 7A-244 (2015).  Subdivision 50-13.7(a) permits a child support order to be 
“modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed 
circumstances by either party.”  Id. § 50-13.7(a) (2015).  Additionally, “[a] judicial 
decree in a child custody and support matter is subject to alteration upon a change of 
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and, therefore, is not final in nature.”  
Stanback v. Stanback (Stanback II), 287 N.C. 448, 456, 215 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1975).  As 
a result, “the jurisdiction of the court entering such a decree continues as long as the 
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minor child whose custody is the subject of the decree remains within its jurisdiction.”  
Id. at 456, 215 S.E.2d at 36 (citing Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974), and Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 
S.E.2d 332 (1965)); see also N.C.G.S. § 50-13.5(f) (2015) (“An action or proceeding in 
the courts of this State for custody and support of a minor child may be maintained 
in the county where the child resides or is physically present or in a county where a 
parent resides . . . .”). 
Here, the district court in Catawba County ruled on the original VSA in this 
action.  According to the principles specified above, the district court thereafter 
retained jurisdiction over further proceedings, including modifications to the VSA.  
As reasoned by this Court in Stanback II, unless the district court “was somehow 
divested of its continuing jurisdiction, it was the only court which could modify the 
earlier judgment upon a motion in the cause and a showing of a change of 
circumstances.”  287 N.C. at 456, 215 S.E.2d at 36 (citations omitted).  At the time 
the 2001 VSA was approved, all parties resided in North Carolina.  As a result, “the 
jurisdiction of the [district court] continue[d] as long as the minor child whose custody 
is the subject of the decree remain[ed] within its jurisdiction.”  Id. at 456, 215 S.E. 2d 
at 36.  No circumstances are present here that would divest the district court of its 
jurisdiction to modify the VSA.  See id. at 456, 215 S.E. 2d at 36; Story v. Story, 221 
N.C. 114, 115-16, 19 S.E.2d 136, 137-38 (1942) (concluding that while an order 
requiring the husband to make monthly payments for child support was a consent 
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judgment, the court had jurisdiction to hear the wife’s subsequent motion for 
modification of the order, thereby allowing the court to award permanent custody of 
the child to the wife and to increase the husband’s monthly payments); Massey v. 
Massey, 121 N.C. App. 263, 273, 465 S.E.2d 313, 319 (1996) (“In view of our holding 
affirming the trial court’s voiding of the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal and because 
of the court’s continuing jurisdiction acquired in consequence of its rendering the 
original child custody and support order, . . .  we discern no abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court in its order of consolidation and no injury or prejudice suffered 
by [the] defendant.”); Jackson v. Jackson, 68 N.C. App. 499, 501-02, 315 S.E.2d 90, 
91 (1984) (holding that because the district court originally had jurisdiction over the 
child custody and support dispute, it had continuing jurisdiction to rule on a 
subsequent motion filed by the defendant for custody and support and sequestration 
of the marital home for the children’s use and benefit).  Thus, the district court 
maintained continuing jurisdiction to modify the 2001 VSA. 
B. Plain Meaning of the Statute Does Not Impose a Jurisdictional 
Prerequisite 
 
 
Rules of statutory construction confirm the district court’s jurisdiction.  “It is 
well settled that ‘[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there 
is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using 
its plain meaning.’ ”  In re Estate of Lunsford, 359 N.C. 382, 391-92, 610 S.E.2d 366, 
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372 (2005) (emphases added) (quoting Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 
N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)).  
 
In In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184, 185, 694 S.E.2d 758, 759 (2010) the defendant, a 
fifth-grade student, was charged as a juvenile for touching a classmate “multiple 
times on her buttocks and between her legs with a straw-like candy, known as Pixy 
Stix.”  A juvenile court counselor filed a juvenile delinquency petition against the 
defendant alleging simple assault.  Id. at 185, 694 S.E.2d at 759.  Over a month later, 
the juvenile court counselor filed a second petition alleging that the defendant had 
also committed sexual battery during the same incident.   Id. at 185-86, 694 S.E.2d 
at 759.  On appeal the defendant argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the 
second petition was not filed within the time period mandated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703, 
the pertinent statute, and therefore the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the sexual battery allegation.  Id. at 186, 694 S.E.2d at 759-60.  In 
reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, this Court reasoned that 
[o]n its face section 7B-1703 does not mention 
jurisdiction, nor does it indicate that a [juvenile court 
counselor’s] failure to meet the timing requirements 
contained therein divests the district court of subject 
matter jurisdiction. We believe that had the legislature 
intended section 7B-1703 to implicate subject matter 
jurisdiction, the legislature would have either included 
these requirements in Chapter 7B, Article 16 or expressly 
stated so in section 7B-1703 itself.  Because the legislature 
did neither, we conclude that it did not intend for the 
section 7B-1703 timelines to function as prerequisites for 
district court jurisdiction over allegedly delinquent 
juveniles. We note that this decision is consistent with the 
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conclusions reached in prior North Carolina appellate 
decisions that have addressed Chapter 7B timeline 
requirements and jurisdiction, particularly in the contexts 
of abuse, neglect, and dependency and termination of 
parental rights. 
 
Id. at 193-94, 694 S.E.2d at 764 (internal citation omitted).  
 
While the subject matter of In re D.S. is distinguishable, the essence of this 
Court’s reasoning is applicable in the case sub judice.   Subsection 50-13.7(a) states 
that a child support order can be “modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in 
the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party.”  N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.7(a).  Just as with the controlling statute in In re D.S., subsection 50-13.7(a) does 
not indicate that a party’s failure to file a motion divests the court of jurisdiction.  
There is no language in either law establishing jurisdictional consequences for failure 
to follow the statutory provisions; the statutory language is clear and unambiguous 
and the plain meaning of each statute imposes no jurisdictional prerequisites.  As we 
reasoned in In re D.S. regarding the statute at issue there, the legislature here could 
have set forth requirements that would affect jurisdiction in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a).  
Compare In re A.R.G., 361 N.C. 392, 398-99, 646 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2007) (holding that 
while the county department of social services failed to comply with the applicable 
statute requiring a juvenile’s address to be included in a petition alleging  that a child 
was a neglected and dependent juvenile, “[n]othing in the statute suggests that the 
information required is jurisdictional” and stating that to hold otherwise “would 
elevate form over substance”), with In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 591, 636 S.E.2d at 790-
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91 (concluding that a petition filed by the county department of social services 
alleging that a child was a neglected juvenile was not verified as required by statute 
and therefore, rendered the judgment void because “verification of the petition in an 
abuse, neglect, or dependency action . . . is a vital link in the chain of proceedings 
carefully designed to protect children at risk on one hand while avoiding undue 
interference with family rights on the other”).   We decline to create a jurisdictional 
prerequisite in this statute where one cannot be originally found.  Thus, the district 
court had jurisdiction to modify the child support order.2  
C. The Legislative History Suggests that the General Assembly Did Not 
Intend to Create a Jurisdictional Prerequisite  
 
 
While the plain meaning of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) is sufficient for us to 
determine that the district court had jurisdiction to modify the VSA, the legislative 
history of the statute indicates that the legislature did not intend for the statute to 
create a jurisdictional prerequisite to modify child support orders.   To determine 
legislative intent, this Court can also consider “the legislative history of an act and 
the circumstances surrounding its adoption.”  In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239-40, 244 
                                            
2 Defendant also argues that a district court’s jurisdiction “is limited to the specific 
issues properly raised by a party or interested person in their motion in the cause.”  
Defendant cites Court of Appeals case law suggesting that it is improper for courts to address 
issues other than those properly raised, namely, Van Nynatten v. Van Nynatten, 113 N.C. 
App. 142, 147, 438 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1993), and  Smith v. Smith, 15 N.C. App. 180, 183, 189 
S.E.2d 525, 526 (1972).  Here the only issue addressed by the district court was modification 
of the VSA, a child support issue over which the court had continuing jurisdiction; therefore, 
this case is distinguished from the cases cited above in which the district court addressed 
child support when the only issue before the court was alimony and vice versa.  Van Nynatten, 
113 N.C. App. at 147, 438 S.E.2d at 419; Smith, 15 N.C. App. at 183, 189 S.E.2d at 526. 
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S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978) (citation omitted).  The legislative history of N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.7(a) and other domestic relations statutes yields critical insight regarding the 
General Assembly’s intent here.   
As early as 1859, judges had statutory authority in certain cases to “make all 
needful rules and orders concerning [child] custody, as shall best promote the welfare 
of the children.”  Act of Feb. 15, 1859, ch. 53, sec. 1, 1858-59 N.C. Sess. Laws 91, 92.  
Dissatisfied parties could appeal to the Supreme Court.  Id., sec. 2, at 92.  In 1872, 
the General Assembly enacted a law regarding child support and custody in divorce 
actions: 
After the filing of a complaint in any proceeding for 
divorce, whether from the bonds of matrimony, or from bed 
and board, both before and after final judgment therein, it 
shall be lawful for the judge of the court, in which such 
application is or was pending, to make such orders 
respecting the care, custody, tuition and maintenance of 
the children of the marriage as may be proper, and from 
time to time to modify or vacate such orders:  Provided, [sic] 
That no order respecting the children, shall be made on the 
application of either party without five, [sic] days notice to 
the other party, unless it shall appear that the party 
having the possession or control of such children, [sic] has 
removed or is about to remove the children or himself, 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court. 
 
Act of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 193, sec. 46, 1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 343 (consequences 
of divorce upon the right to custody of the children).  Unlike the current statute, in 
the original version of the law the legislature restricted the court’s authority by 
expressly stating that, except in exigent circumstances, an order to vacate or modify 
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could not be entered if the other party was not given five days notice.  The same 
language regarding the establishment and modification of support orders—including 
the mandatory five-day notice requirement—survived various revisions of the law.  
See 1 N.C. Cons. Stat. § 1664 (1919); 1 N.C. Rev. § 1570 (1905); 1 N.C. Code § 1296 
(1883).  The same language was later incorporated in N.C.G.S. § 50-13 (1943) along 
with additional provisions regarding custody; however, in 1967 N.C.G.S. § 50-13 
(1943) was repealed and replaced with the original version of the current statute, 
N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) (1967).  Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1153, secs. 1, 2, 1967 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 1772-73, 1777.  The five-day notice requirement was conspicuously removed 
from the latest version of the law.   
 
Likewise, our alimony statutes are derived from the same Act of 1872 that 
originated the child support and custody statute under present review.  Two of these 
alimony laws are relevant here.  The first of them allowed alimony pendente lite.  The 
language in this alimony enactment is similar to that used to establish and modify 
child support and custody orders, stating that “such order may be modified or vacated 
at any time, on the application of either party or of any one [sic] interested:  Provided, 
That no order allowing alimony pendente lite shall be made unless the husband shall 
have had five days’ notice thereof.”  Ch. 193, sec. 38, 1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws at 340 
(alimony pendente lite).  The laws were later codified, with the modification and 
mandatory notice provisions surviving in subsequent versions of the pendente lite 
alimony law.  See 1 N.C. Code § 1291 (1883); 1 N.C. Cons. Stat. § 1666 (1919); N.C.G.S. 
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§ 50-15 (1943).  The second of the alimony laws allowed alimony without divorce.  
While this edict did not originally have the language concerning modifications or 
notice, such wording was later added in 1919 and survived several revisions of the 
law.  See Ch. 193, sec. 39, 1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws at 341; 1 N.C. Cons. Stat. § 1667 
(1919); N.C.G.S. § 50-16 (1943).  
Later, this Court addressed whether the five-day notice provision was 
jurisdictional with respect to the alimony laws.  Barnwell v. Barnwell, 241 N.C. 565, 
566, 85 S.E.2d 916, 916-17 (1955), involved a civil action for alimony without divorce 
under N.C.G.S. § 50-16 in which a district court entered an order for alimony pendente 
lite without notice to the defendant.  This Court determined that the failure to comply 
with the five-day notice requirement in N.C.G.S. § 50-16 rendered the order void.3  
                                            
3 The Court did not expressly use the term “jurisdictional prerequisite,” but after 
stating that the order was “void,” the Court cited Collins v. N.C. State Highway & Pub. Works 
Comm’n, 237 N.C. 277, 281, 74 S.E.2d 709, 713 (1953), in which this Court stated that a lack 
of jurisdiction renders a judgment “void.”  Moreover, we have consistently used the terms 
“void” and “nullity” to describe a lack of jurisdiction.  See In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590, 636 
S.E.2d at 790 (“A judgment is void, when there is a want of jurisdiction by the court over the 
subject matter . . . .” (quoting Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 
673, 678 (1956))); Ridge Cmty. Inv’rs, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 696, 239 S.E.2d 566, 571 
(1977) (“[T]he clerk having undertaken to enter a kind of judgment which she had no 
jurisdiction to enter [,] the judgment so entered is void and is a nullity, and may be so treated 
at all times.” (quoting Moore v. Moore, 224 N.C. 552, 555, 31 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1944))); Ellis v. 
Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 421, 130 S.E. 7, 9 (1925) (“If a judgment is void, it must be from one or 
more of the following causes: 1. Want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter; 2. Want of 
jurisdiction over the parties to the action, or some of them; or 3. Want of power to grant the 
relief contained in the judgment. In pronouncing judgments of the first and second classes, 
the court acts without jurisdiction, while in those of the third class it acts in excess of 
jurisdiction.” (quoting 1 A.C. Freeman, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments § 116 at 176 (4th 
ed. 1892))).  
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Id. at 567-68, 85 S.E.2d at 918.  In 1967 both alimony statutes were repealed and the 
statutory framework that exists today was enacted as evidenced in N.C.G.S. §§ 50-
16.1A through 50-16.10.  The notice provision remained intact until it was repealed 
in 1995.  Act of June 21 1995, ch. 319, sec. 6, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 646-47 
(changing the laws pertaining to alimony) (codified at N.C.G.S. § 50-16.8 (1995)).  In 
its present form, the relevant alimony statute includes the same language as appears 
in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a)  and which is at issue here: “An order of a court . . . for alimony 
. . . may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing 
of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested.”  N.C.G.S. § 50-16.9(a) 
(2015).  Moreover, both the child support modification statute at issue here and the 
alimony statute cited for purposes of instructive comparison were enacted by the 
General Assembly on the same day in successive acts.  Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1152, 
1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1766 (alimony); Ch. 1153, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1772 (child 
custody and support).  As stated above, the notice provision was removed from the 
child support statute in 1967, but remained in the alimony statute until 1995.  This 
comprehensive analysis of the legislative history of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a), the 
governing statute in the case at bar, establishes that the legislature did not intend 
that subsection 50-13.7(a) create a jurisdictional prerequisite.  
D. The Provision in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) Is Directory Rather than 
Mandatory 
 
The provision of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) requiring a motion to be filed is directory rather 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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than mandatory; consequently, the absence of a motion to modify a child support 
order does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to act under the purview of the 
statute.  With the empirical subject of jurisdiction substantively questioned, 
defendant argues that “a motion in the cause by an interested party pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) [must be filed].  Without a motion in the cause the trial court is 
without authority/jurisdiction to modify the existing order.”  This Court has 
previously held that a provision in a statute that is directory rather than mandatory 
is not jurisdictional.  See In re D.S., 364 N.C. at 193-94, 694 S.E.2d at 763-64 (citing 
In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 443-45, 615 S.E.2d 704, 707-08 (2005)) (concluding 
that various statutory timelines governing the filing of a petition to terminate 
parental rights, the scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing 
and the filing of permanency planning orders under cited provisions of the juvenile 
code are “directory, rather than mandatory and thus, not jurisdictional” (quoting In 
re B.M., 168 N.C. App. 350, 354, 607 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2005)), aff’d per curiam in part 
and disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006)).  “ 
‘Directory’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘[a] provision in a statute, 
rule of procedure, or the like, which is a mere direction or instruction of no obligatory 
force, and involving no invalidating consequence for its disregard, as opposed to an 
imperative or mandatory provision, which must be followed.’ ”   State v. Fulp, 355 
N.C. 171, 176, 558 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2002) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 460 (6th 
ed. 1990)).  We have reasoned that: 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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In determining the mandatory or directory nature of a 
statute, the importance of the provision involved may be 
taken into consideration. Generally speaking, those 
provisions which are a mere matter of form, or which are 
not material, do not affect any substantial right, and do not 
relate to the essence of the thing to be done so that 
compliance is a matter of convenience rather than 
substance, are considered to be directory. 
 
State v. House, 295 N.C. 189, 203, 244 S.E.2d 654, 661-62 (1978) (quoting 73 Am. Jur. 
2d, stat. § 19, at 280 (1974) (footnote call numbers omitted)).  This Court has 
determined that “[t]he meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern; and 
these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also 
by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from 
construing it in the one way or the other.”  Spruill v. Davenport, 178 N.C. 364, 368-
69, 100 S.E. 527, 530 (1919) (citation omitted).     
 
We conclude that failure to follow the directory requirements of N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.7(a) regarding the filing of a motion in the cause does not divest the district court 
of jurisdiction.  The provision requiring a motion to be filed for a child support order 
to be modified is directory, not mandatory, in nature.  The provision concerns a matter 
of form, rather than a matter of substance as defendant contends, and merely 
addresses the procedural aspects of modifying a child support order.  This Court has 
issued consistent determinations to this effect, even under varying circumstances.  
See House, 295 N.C. at 200-03, 244 S.E.2d at 660-62 (concluding that while a grand 
jury foreman signed an indictment that failed to explicitly indicate that at least 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
twelve jurors concurred in the finding but stated that the jury found the indictment 
to be a true bill, such omission violated only a directory provision); State v. Rogers, 
275 N.C. 411, 422-23, 168 S.E.2d 345, 351-52 (1969) (concluding that statutory 
provisions requiring county commissioners making up a jury list to use, in addition 
to a tax list, “a list of names of persons who do not appear upon the tax list,” are 
“directory and not mandatory in the absence of bad faith or corruption”), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 1024 (1970); N.C. State Art Soc’y., Inc. v. Bridges, 235 N.C. 125, 130, 69 
S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1952) (concluding that a statute requiring one of two particular 
individuals to appraise art selected to be purchased by the State Art Commission was 
directory and the decision to have a different qualified person to appraise the art 
constituted substantial compliance with the statute).  Thus, the provision stating that 
a child support order may be modified “upon” a motion in the cause is merely 
directory; therefore, plaintiff’s failure to do so does not divest the district court of 
jurisdiction.   
E. The VSA Satisfied the Purposes of the Provisions in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) 
 
While N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) does not create a jurisdictional prerequisite and 
does not contain a mandatory requirement that a party or interested person file a 
motion for child support modification in order for a district court to exercise 
jurisdiction over such a matter, defendant nonetheless asserts that a trial court must 
construe the statute in such a fashion to abide by the procedural requirements of 
N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a).  According to defendant, to hold otherwise will encourage 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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parties to disregard other procedural requirements such as filing complaints, issuing 
summonses and observing other mandatory provisions.  This Court is not persuaded 
by defendant’s “snowball effect” argument.  Here, plaintiff filed a VSA, which was 
sufficient to satisfy the purposes of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a).  A primary purpose of a 
requirement to file a motion in order to modify child support is to make the court 
aware of “important new facts unknown to the court at the time of the prior custody 
decree.”  Tank v. Tank, 2004 ND 15, ¶ 10, 673 N.W.2d 622, 626 (2004) (citations 
omitted).  When a VSA is filed to modify an earlier court order on child support, the 
VSA is customarily a request to modify the child support order because circumstances 
have changed.  Thus, a VSA submitted to the district court without such a motion 
still serves the purpose highlighted in Tank, a case from the State of North Dakota 
that is instructive for this analysis.  Thus, our decision also harmoniously aligns with 
the statutory provision requiring a showing of a change in circumstances in order for 
a child support order to be modified.  
IV. 
Conclusion  
In light of a VSA’s inherent satisfaction of the purposes of N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.7(a), coupled with the analysis employed regarding statutory construction, 
previous case law application and legislative history review, this Court concludes that 
plaintiff’s failure to file a motion to modify defendant’s child support obligation did 
not divest the district court of jurisdiction to modify the VSA at issue here under 
N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a).  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the COA affirming the 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-22- 
trial court’s order declaring the 2001 VSA void and remand this case to that court for 
further remand to the District Court, Catawba County for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
 
 
Chief Justice MARTIN concurring in the result only. 
 
In this case, we must decide whether the district court had the power to modify 
a child support order even though no party had filed a motion in the cause.  Under 
subsection 50-13.7(a) of our General Statutes, “an order of a court of this State for 
support of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the 
cause and a showing of changed circumstances.”  N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) (2015) 
(emphasis added).  Here, the district court acted only after defendant had entered 
into a proposed Modified Voluntary Support Agreement and Order (the consent 
order), which the parties then submitted to the district court for approval.  Because 
the consent order served as the functional equivalent of a joint motion, I concur in 
the result that the majority opinion reaches. 
But I do not concur in the majority’s reasoning, as the majority’s rationale 
seems to extend much further than the context of this case.  Because it holds that the 
“motion in the cause” language of subsection 50-13.7(a) is directory rather than 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
MARTIN, C.J., concurring 
 
 
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mandatory, the majority seems to allow a district court to modify a child support 
order—and thus to alter the legal rights and duties of the parties involved—sua 
sponte, without any party invoking the court’s power.  This rule, if the majority is 
indeed establishing it, ignores the plain language of the very statutory provision that 
gives district courts the power to modify these kinds of orders.  It also potentially 
subverts the customary role that courts play in our adversarial system: to rule on the 
issues actually raised and argued by the parties.  This seems imprudent at best, and 
may raise serious jurisdictional concerns as well.  I therefore write separately to 
express my opinion that the majority’s reasoning should be read narrowly.  
This Court said in State v. House that, “[i]n determining the mandatory or 
directory nature of a statute, the importance of the provision involved may be taken 
into consideration.”  295 N.C. 189, 203, 244 S.E.2d 654, 661 (1978) (quoting 73 Am. 
Jur. 2d Statutes § 19, at 280 (1974)).  “Generally speaking, those provisions which are 
a mere matter of form, or which are not material, do not affect any substantial right, 
and do not relate to the essence of the thing to be done so that compliance is a matter 
of convenience rather than substance, are considered to be directory.”  Id. at 203, 244 
S.E.2d at 661-62 (quoting 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 19, at 280).  Under this standard, 
a provision that requires a motion in order for a district court to modify an existing 
support order should be viewed as mandatory for several reasons. 
 
First of all, the motion requirement in subsection 50-13.7(a) is not “a mere 
matter of form.”  It defines both the role of the parties and the role of the court in 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
MARTIN, C.J., concurring 
 
 
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child support proceedings.  If a party wishes to have a child support order modified, 
that party must file a motion in the cause and serve it on the opposing party.  That 
gives the opposing party notice of the motion and the chance to present arguments 
opposing it.  And that is how our adversarial system normally operates.  But parties 
have no opportunity to contest a potential modification when a court acts sua sponte.  
Granting a court the power to act sua sponte in this context, as the majority appears 
to do, both destabilizes already concluded agreements and affects the substantial 
rights of parties who rely on those agreements.  Parties also have an interest in the 
finality of judgments and the repose that they provide.  Under the majority’s apparent 
rationale, though, cases once resolved could be reopened even though neither party 
wants to continue litigating. 
 
In re T.R.P. is an analogous case.  There, we held that a statutory provision 
requiring a verification signature on a juvenile petition—the lack of which would in 
many cases be a simple oversight—was mandatory.  360 N.C. 588, 598, 636 S.E.2d 
787, 794-95 (2006).  Requiring the verification procedure “respect[ed] both the right 
to family autonomy and the needs of the child.”  Id. at 598, 636 S.E.2d at 794.  A 
similar logic motivates the language of subsection 50-13.7(a).  A district court can 
always modify a support order on request of a party who shows a change in 
circumstances and good reason to modify the order.  But if the majority ruling is read 
to permit even sua sponte modifications, it would disturb several decades of Court of 
Appeals precedent that domestic relations parties and social services agencies 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
MARTIN, C.J., concurring 
 
 
-25- 
throughout North Carolina have presumably come to rely on.  See Royall v. Sawyer, 
120 N.C. App. 880, 882, 463 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1995) (concluding that a child support 
agreement could not be modified without a motion to modify the agreement); Kennedy 
v. Kennedy, 107 N.C. App. 695, 703, 421 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1992) (noting that a district 
court may modify a custody order only upon a motion by either party or by anyone 
interested); Smith v. Smith, 15 N.C. App. 180, 182-83, 189 S.E.2d 525, 526 (1972) 
(holding that it was error for the trial court to modify a custody and support order 
when the only question before the trial court at the time was alimony). 
 
I would also observe that the General Assembly has not amended the motion 
requirement in subsection 50-13.7(a) in response to this longstanding Court of 
Appeals precedent.  That suggests that the Court of Appeals correctly understood the 
General Assembly’s intent, or, at a minimum, that the General Assembly has 
acquiesced to the Court of Appeals’ reading.  “The legislature’s inactivity in the face 
of the [judiciary’s] repeated pronouncements [on this issue] can only be interpreted 
as acquiescence by, and implicit approval from, that body.”  In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 
594, 636 S.E.2d at 792 (alterations in original) (quoting Rowan Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. 
U.S. Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 9, 418 S.E.2d 648, 654 (1992)). 
The majority holds that a district court’s failure to observe subsection 
50-13.7(a)’s motion requirement is not jurisdictional, but I believe that it may very 
well be.  At the very least, the majority does not establish that it is not.  The majority’s 
discussion of jurisdiction establishes only that the district court here had continuing 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
MARTIN, C.J., concurring 
 
 
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jurisdiction over this case and these parties.  That is clear.  But by focusing on 
continuing jurisdiction, the majority ducks the real issue: whether, in the absence of 
a motion or its functional equivalent, a district court has the power to modify a child 
support order, or instead lacks the power to do so unless and until it receives a request 
from an interested party to modify the order.   
The term “[j]urisdiction” refers to “[a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a 
decree.”  In re M.I.W., 365 N.C. 374, 379, 722 S.E.2d 469, 473 (2012) (second set of 
brackets in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 927 (9th ed. 
2009)).  “[H]aving jurisdiction is simply a state of being that requires, and in some 
cases allows, no substantive action from the court.”  Id. at 379, 722 S.E.2d at 473.  
Put another way, in our adversarial system of justice, a court with jurisdiction 
sometimes cannot act—at least not until a party has asked it to.  A court that has 
subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and personal jurisdiction over the parties may 
thus still lack the “power to grant the relief contained in [its] judgment.”  Ellis v. 
Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 421, 130 S.E. 7, 9 (1925) (quoting 1 A. C. Freeman, Freeman on 
Judgments § 116 (4th ed. 1892)).  And a court that enters a judgment without the 
power to do so “acts in excess of jurisdiction.”  Id. (quoting 1 A. C. Freeman, Freeman 
on Judgments § 116 (4th ed. 1892)).  That judgment is therefore void and “may be 
impeached collaterally or by direct attack.”  Id. at 421-22, 130 S.E. at 9; see also State 
ex rel. Hanson v. Yandle, 235 N.C. 532, 535, 70 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1952) (“If the court 
was without authority, its judgment . . . is void and of no effect.  A lack of jurisdiction 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
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or power in the court entering a judgment always avoids the judgment . . . .”).  Hence 
the concern here: a district court that ignores a mandatory motion requirement in 
issuing an order may well be acting in excess of its jurisdiction, and its order may 
well be void. 
Defending its position, the majority notes that “the jurisdiction of the court 
entering . . . a [child support] decree continues as long as the minor child whose 
custody is the subject of the decree remains within its jurisdiction,” quoting Stanback 
v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 456, 215 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1975).  But again, the issue here 
is not whether the district court had continuing jurisdiction, but whether the district 
court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction. 
A court can, of course, dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, see N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), but that is 
one of the few exceptions that proves the rule.  Many other things, including personal 
jurisdiction, are waivable and should not be raised sua sponte.  See N.C. R. Civ. 
P. 12(h)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). Courts always have jurisdiction to 
determine subject-matter jurisdiction, but they do not always have—in fact, they 
usually do not have—the power to determine other matters unless asked to do so by 
a party. 
By ignoring the possibility that a district court that modified a support order 
sua sponte may be acting in excess of its jurisdiction, and by reading the standard for 
CATAWBA COUNTY EX REL. RACKLEY V. LOGGINS 
 
MARTIN, C.J., concurring 
 
 
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directory versus mandatory statutes in a way that strongly favors the “directory” 
label, the majority raises several troubling questions.  What must the General 
Assembly do to make a procedural rule actually binding on the courts?  Does the 
magic word “jurisdictional” now have to be in the statute’s text?  Would a court with 
both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction have the power to issue a summary 
judgment order when no party had moved for summary judgment?  Would a court be 
able to issue a final judgment in a case that had disputed material facts in the absence 
of settlement or trial?  These last two questions show the error in the majority’s 
thinking, and the inconsistency of its reasoning with foundational principles of our 
adversarial system: a district court can plainly have jurisdiction over a case but lack 
the power to issue a certain decree. 
The consent order satisfied subsection 50-13.7(a)’s motion requirement, so the 
district court here did not act sua sponte.  We therefore do not have to decide whether 
a district court that did act sua sponte in this context would be exceeding its 
jurisdiction.  It is important, however, that we distinguish in future cases between a 
court’s jurisdiction over a case, on the one hand, and a court’s power to issue a 
particular order or remedy, on the other.  Those two things are not the same.  
Accordingly, I concur in the result only. 
Justice ERVIN joins in this concurring opinion.