Title: Commonwealth v. Fernandes

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11586 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSHUA FERNANDES. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 3, 2021. - July 1, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Jury, Equal protection 
of laws, Fair trial, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of 
constitutional rights by juvenile, Voluntariness of 
statement, Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Fair trial.  Fair 
Trial.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Witness, Expert.  
Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, 
Challenge to jurors, Instructions to jury, Fair trial, 
Admissions and confessions, Waiver, Voluntariness of 
statement, Severance, Trial of defendants together, 
Argument by prosecutor, Sentence, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 1, 2010. 
 
 
A motion to suppress evidence was heard by Patrick F. 
Brady, J., and the cases were tried before him. 
 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In May of 2010, when the defendant was sixteen 
years old, he shot and killed fourteen year old Nicholas Fomby-
Davis on a street in Boston.  At a joint trial, the defendant 
and his codefendant Crisostomo Lopes were both convicted of 
murder in the first degree.  In accordance with G. L. c. 265, 
§ 2, as the statute stood at the time of his trial, the 
defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.1 
 
In this direct appeal, the defendant argues that reversal 
of his convictions is required because of issues with jury 
empanelment, the statute requiring him to be tried as an adult, 
the exclusion of expert testimony on juvenile brain development, 
the jury instructions on extreme atrocity or cruelty, the denial 
of his motions to suppress and to sever, and certain statements 
in the prosecutor's closing argument.  After considering all of 
these issues, and reviewing the whole case as required by G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we affirm the defendant's convictions.  We remand 
for resentencing, however, in accordance with Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 658-659 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015), where we held that a life 
sentence for a juvenile defendant, without the possibility of 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm, for which he received a sentence of from four to five 
years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the life 
sentence. 
3 
 
parole, violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights. 
 
1.  Factual background.  We recite the facts the jury could 
have found, reserving some details for later discussion of 
specific issues. 
 
On a Sunday evening in May 2010, the victim and his older 
brother were riding around their neighborhood in Boston on a 
scooter; the brother was driving and both were wearing helmets.  
Near an intersection, the brother almost collided with a man on 
a bicycle as the man rode off the sidewalk into the street.  The 
brother stopped the scooter and was able to see the man, briefly 
but clearly, while the man rode away.  The brother later 
identified the man as Lopes.  A short time later, the brother 
stopped at their house to pick up some cash so they could go to 
a fast food restaurant, while the victim continued to do laps 
around the block on the scooter, wearing his brother's helmet. 
 
At around the same time, Anthony Williams, an off-duty 
Boston police officer and a member of the department's youth 
violence strike force, was driving through the neighborhood in 
his personal vehicle when he saw the defendant and Lopes walking 
on the street with a bicycle.  Their manner of walking, as 
though they were "on a mission," made Williams suspicious, so he 
pulled over to watch them.  Williams observed the two wait by an 
intersection, crouching down and appearing to be looking for 
4 
 
someone; the defendant had his hand in his pocket.  When the 
victim passed by on the scooter, Lopes darted out into the 
street, grabbed the victim, and beckoned to the defendant.  The 
defendant approached, removed a gun from his pocket, and shot 
the victim three or four times at close range. 
 
Williams had an unobstructed view of these events from 
inside his stopped vehicle, five to six feet away.  His 
testimony was corroborated, with minor variations, by another 
eyewitness, as well as by surveillance video footage.  The 
footage, however, did not capture the actual shooting. 
 
The victim stumbled from the middle of the street into a 
nearby store, where he fell to the ground and started shaking.  
He was gasping for air and had blood on his shirt.  He was 
carried outside to the sidewalk, where another police officer 
who arrived on scene attempted to revive him as he passed in and 
out of consciousness.  Paramedics arrived and treated the 
victim, but by that point he showed no signs of life, and he was 
pronounced dead on reaching the hospital.  The victim had 
suffered gunshot wounds to the chest, near his left armpit, and 
on his right thigh. 
The defendant meanwhile fled down the street and around a 
corner, holding a gun, with Williams driving after him and 
giving instructions to other officers over his radio, including 
one who arrived on the scene in a marked cruiser.  At some point 
5 
 
while he was running, the defendant slowed down and ducked near 
a Toyota Camry, parked along the street next to a pickup truck; 
thereafter, Williams no longer saw the gun in his hand.  
Williams eventually overtook and arrested the defendant with the 
assistance of one of the officers from the cruiser.  That 
officer observed that the defendant was smiling.  The defendant 
was pat frisked and no weapon was found.  After a brief search, 
a .25 caliber pistol was located under the Toyota Camry that was 
parked where the defendant had been seen to duck down as he was 
running.  Ballistics analysis later established that it was the 
weapon that had been used to kill the victim. 
Immediately after the defendant had been handcuffed, Lopes, 
on a bicycle, appeared behind the officers; Williams noticed 
that he was the same person who earlier had grabbed the victim 
from the scooter, so Williams arrested Lopes.  As he was being 
taken into custody, Lopes said to Williams, "What are you going 
to do, shoot me?  You can catch one, too" -- a threat that 
Williams understood to mean that he himself would get shot.  
Lopes then yelled, "Homes Ave., motherfuckers," and "that's 
right, bitches, Homes Ave. on the block," referring to a nearby 
street and a gang police knew to be based there. 
 
In a statement to police several hours after the shooting, 
the defendant disavowed any knowledge of how the killing 
6 
 
occurred.2  He said that he had been walking alone when the 
scooter "came at" him, trying to hit him, and that he then "just 
blacked out."  Sometime after 1 A.M., while the defendant and 
Lopes were in nearby cells at the police station awaiting 
booking, Lopes yelled to the defendant at least three times, in 
Cape Verdean Creole, that the defendant should "take the fault."  
The defendant responded, but neither the officers in the booking 
area nor Lopes were able to hear what he said. 
 
The jury deliberated for less than one day before finding 
the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories 
of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty; 
further, the jury convicted him of possession of a firearm.  
Lopes also was found guilty of murder in the first degree on 
both theories; in 2018, we affirmed his conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 607 (2018). 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that reversal of his 
convictions is required because the use of peremptory challenges 
to exclude younger members of the venire from the jury violated 
his constitutional rights; the statute requiring him to be tried 
as an adult is unconstitutional; he was improperly precluded 
from offering expert testimony on juvenile brain development; 
 
 
2 The interview was conducted in English, with an officer 
who spoke Cape Verdean Creole present to assist the defendant's 
parents, who spoke little English.  See part 2.e.i, infra. 
7 
 
the jury should not have been instructed on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty; statements he made to police should 
have been suppressed; his trial should have been severed from 
that of his codefendant; and the prosecutor's closing argument 
was improper. 
 
a.  Jury empanelment.  The defendant argues that his right 
to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights was impaired by the prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to keep younger members of the venire from being 
seated on the jury.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
881 (1979).3  Of the Commonwealth's thirty-two peremptory 
challenges, the prosecutor used twenty-one on college students, 
 
3 The defendant also suggested in passing in his brief, 
without citation to any authority, that the jury selection 
procedure violated his due process rights, beyond those of the 
established Batson-Soares framework.  In a postargument letter, 
the defendant supplied a citation to Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 
493, 502 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court held 
that "a State cannot, consistent with due process, subject a 
defendant to indictment or trial by a jury that has been 
selected in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner."  That case, 
however, concerned racially discriminatory jury lists; it did 
not involve peremptory challenges.  In addition, the Court's 
reliance on due process grounds in that case is not material 
here; the case was decided before the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial was held to apply to the States, see Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 479 n.15 & 480 n.19 (1979). 
8 
 
and an additional five on nonstudents under the age of thirty.  
The prosecutor told the judge that 
"the Commonwealth has tried to exclude or to use 
challenges on the individuals who are less than 
[twenty-five] or college students.  It is the 
Commonwealth's position, based upon experience, that 
individuals who are in college, not to disparage, but 
they often times have difficulties in deciding what 
classes to take, never mind whether or not somebody is 
guilty of first-degree murder." 
 
Counsel for the defendant objected to these challenges 
strenuously and repeatedly.  Eventually, one college student was 
seated, after the prosecutor had exhausted the Commonwealth's 
peremptory challenges. 
 
Article 12 protects a "defendant's right to be tried by a 
fairly drawn jury of his or her peers."  Commonwealth v. Jones, 
477 Mass. 307, 319 (2017).  Peremptory challenges thus may not 
be used "to exclude members of discrete groups, solely on the 
basis of bias presumed to derive from that individual's 
membership in the group."  Soares, 377 Mass. at 488.  "Discrete 
groups that are protected include groups defined by potential 
jurors' sex, race, color, creed, or national origin."  
Commonwealth v. Obi, 475 Mass. 541, 551 (2016).4  In Soares, 
 
 
4 "A prima facie violation of the fair cross-section 
requirement is made out by a showing that (1) the group 
allegedly discriminated against is a 'distinctive' group in the 
community, (2) that the group is not fairly and reasonably 
represented in the venires in relation to its proportion of the 
community, and (3) that underrepresentation is due to systematic 
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process."  
9 
 
supra at 488–489, we said that art. 1 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 106 (Equal Rights 
Amendment), was "definitive" as to the "generic group 
affiliations which may not permissibly form the basis for juror 
exclusion," namely, sex, race, color, creed, and national 
origin.  See Commonwealth v. Aponte, 391 Mass. 494, 507 (1984). 
 
Federal constitutional jurisprudence reaches a similar 
result by focusing on how the use of peremptory challenges to 
target members of certain protected groups violates the equal 
protection rights of both the defendant and the excluded juror.  
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 493 (2020).  See J.E.B. 
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994).  Federal 
decisions have focused on ensuring "jury selection procedures 
that are free from [S]tate-sponsored group stereotypes rooted 
in, and reflective of, historical prejudice."  Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 407, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008), 
quoting J.E.B., supra at 128. 
 
We considered constitutional challenges to the jury 
selection process at issue here when deciding the codefendant's 
appeal.  There, we stated that "young adults are not considered 
a discrete protected group for the purposes of Batson–Soares 
peremptory challenges," and noted in support of this view both 
 
Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 96–97 (1980), quoting 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 356, 364 (1979). 
10 
 
our own prior decisions, as well as a wide consensus among 
courts in other jurisdictions.  Lopes, 478 Mass. at 597.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 544-545 (2017) 
(upholding judge's denial of peremptory challenge by defendant, 
because "age is not a discrete grouping defined in the 
[Massachusetts] Constitution, and therefore a peremptory 
challenge may permissibly be based on age"); Commonwealth v. 
Samuel, 398 Mass. 93, 95 (1986) (rejecting Soares challenge to 
prosecutor's exclusion of unspecified number of "young women" 
from jury).  See also United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 545 
(1st Cir. 1987) ("young adults" are not "cognizable group" for 
purposes of equal protection clause).  While we have not 
entirely foreclosed reexamination of what is encompassed in 
art. 1's "distinctive" groups,5 our cases make clear that age is 
 
 
5 In Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 405-407 (2008), 
we declined to decide whether a peremptory challenge based on 
sexual orientation or being transgender would violate art. 12 or 
the equal protection clause.  The court noted that the assertion 
of bias in juror selection was made only on appeal, defense 
counsel did not object to the prosecutor's challenge, and no 
reason for the challenge was given.  Id.  These absences, in 
conjunction with the lack of a factual record concerning the 
potential juror's "sex, transgender[] status, and sexual 
orientation . . . impeded the trial judge's ability to draw an 
inference that purposeful discrimination had occurred."  Id. 
at 407. 
 
11 
 
not included.  To the extent that the defendant asks us to 
revisit these past holdings, we decline to do so.6 
 
b.  Trial in adult court.  The defendant argues that G. L. 
c. 119, § 74, which required him to be tried in the Superior 
Court, rather than in the Juvenile Court, violates the 
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.  
Specifically, at the time of the shooting, G. L. c. 119, § 74, 
as amended through St. 1996, c. 200, § 15, provided that charges 
of murder in the first or second degree against "a person who 
had at the time of the offense attained the age of fourteen but 
not yet attained the age of seventeen" should be brought "in 
accordance with the usual course and manner of criminal 
 
6 Historically, the exercise of peremptory challenges has 
been "viewed as the right to reject jurors legally qualified to 
sit," possibly on no greater basis than the "sudden impressions 
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the 
bare looks and gestures of another."  Soares, 377 Mass. at 484, 
quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *353 (1807).  We have 
noted the need for "a balance between the goal of diffused 
impartiality in the petit jury and the limitations inherent in a 
feasible and fair process of jury selection," of which the 
peremptory challenge has long been a cornerstone.  Soares, supra 
at 485.  Criterion beyond those enumerated in art. 1, including 
age, as well as income, educational level, and occupation, among 
others, also could be used to delineate a meaningfully distinct 
group within society.  Were all of these to become impermissible 
grounds for the exercise of peremptory challenges, however, the 
result would be "to transmute peremptory challenges into 
challenges for cause."  Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 367 Mass. 419, 
420 (1975).  Indeed, peremptory challenges themselves are not 
essential to the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial by an 
impartial jury, and some have advocated for their outright 
elimination.  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
12 
 
proceedings," i.e., in the Superior Court rather than in the 
Juvenile Court.7  The defendant urges us to apply strict scrutiny 
to this statute, and to hold that it is not the least 
restrictive means by which to achieve a compelling government 
interest.  Because no suspect class is at issue, and no 
fundamental rights are impinged by the statue, we are unable to 
do so. 
 
We apply strict scrutiny "[w]here a statute implicates a 
fundamental right or uses a suspect classification."  
Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 30 (2009), quoting 
Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 
(2003).  "All other statutes, which neither burden a fundamental 
right nor discriminate on the basis of a suspect classification, 
are subject to a rational basis level of judicial scrutiny."8  
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 506 (2015), quoting 
Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 459 Mass. 
655, 668–669 (2011), S.C., 461 Mass. 232 (2012). 
 
 
7 The statute since has been amended to apply to juveniles 
up to the time of their eighteenth birthdays, see St. 2013, 
c. 84, §§ 25, 26, but still requires those who are at least 
fourteen years old to be tried as adults in the Superior Court. 
 
8 Where constitutional questions are at issue, we also use a 
standard of heightened scrutiny -- "intermediate scrutiny" -- 
that falls between these two categories.  See, e.g., Chief of 
Police of Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845, 857-859 (2015); 
Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 246-247 (2006), 
and cases cited; Mendoza v. Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 
Mass. 188, 197-198 (2005). 
13 
 
 
Although "[t]he differences between being tried in the 
Superior Court and in the Juvenile Court are considerable," 
Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 827 (2012) (Lenk, J., 
concurring), a fundamental right such as would trigger strict 
scrutiny is not at stake, see Freeman, 472 Mass at 506–507.  
While "[l]aws that directly infringe on fundamental rights, such 
as liberty from constraint, are subject to strict scrutiny," 
Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 309 (2020), no such direct 
infringement arises solely from the fact of being tried in the 
Superior Court rather than in a different court.  Due process 
protections, for example, and the right to a fair trial apply in 
both the Juvenile and the Superior Courts.  Furthermore, 
"[j]uveniles [who have been] charged with murder are not a 
suspect class."  Charles C. v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 58, 69 
(1993).  To review under strict scrutiny therefore would be 
inappropriate here. 
 
Under rational basis review, we do not "consider the 
expediency of an enactment or the wisdom of its provisions."  
Freeman, 472 Mass. at 508, quoting Commonwealth v. Henry's 
Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 544 (1974).  Rather, we examine only 
whether "an impartial lawmaker . . . logically [could] believe 
that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose 
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged 
class." Freeman, supra, quoting English v. New England Med. 
14 
 
Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 429 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1056 (1990). 
 
We previously have held that the Legislature reasonably 
could have concluded that proceedings in the juvenile justice 
system were not "sufficient to protect the public from the risk 
of harm posed by juveniles who commit murder."  Charles C., 415 
Mass. at 69.  We therefore discern no grounds on which to 
overturn a clear legislative decision that "juveniles charged 
with murder are not entitled to the benefit of a juvenile 
justice system that is 'primarily rehabilitative, cognizant of 
the inherent differences between juvenile and adult offenders, 
and geared toward the correction and redemption to society of 
delinquent children.'"  See Commonwealth v. Soto, 476 Mass. 436, 
439 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 
814 (2013).  Thus, the fact that the defendant was tried in the 
Superior Court did not violate his constitutional rights. 
 
c.  Expert testimony.  The defendant argues that the judge 
erred in declining to allow expert testimony on juvenile brain 
development and the differences between juveniles and adults, as 
relevant to whether the defendant had the requisite intent to 
kill.  The defendant contends that this error was a violation of 
his due process rights.  We conclude that there was no error in 
the judge's decision to exclude the testimony. 
15 
 
 
i.  Standard of review.  "Where a party in a criminal trial 
seeks to offer an expert opinion, the judge, as gatekeeper, must 
first determine whether the proponent of the evidence has met 
the five foundational requirements for admissibility:  (1) that 
the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact because the 
information is beyond the common knowledge of jurors; (2) that 
the witness is qualified as an expert in the relevant area of 
inquiry; (3) that the expert's opinion is based on facts or data 
of a type reasonably relied on by experts to form opinions in 
the relevant field; (4) that the theory underlying the opinion 
is reliable; and (5) that the theory is applied to the 
particular facts of the case in a reliable manner."  
Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 31 (2012).  "The decision to 
exclude expert testimony rests in the broad discretion of the 
judge and will not be disturbed unless the exercise of that 
discretion constitutes an abuse of discretion or other error of 
law."  Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 104 (2006), citing 
Commonwealth v. Pike, 430 Mass. 317, 324 (1999).  See 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 182 (1996). 
 
Both the Sixth Amendment and art. 12 guarantee a criminal 
defendant's right to present a defense by calling witnesses on 
his or her own behalf.  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 
784 (2004).  In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
16 
 
"The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms 
the right to present a defense, the right to present the 
defendant's version of the facts as well as the 
prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth 
lies. . . . [T]he right to present [the defendant's] own 
witnesses to establish a defense . . . is a fundamental 
element of due process of law." 
 
"This right, embodied in the Sixth Amendment and applicable to 
the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, has long 
been recognized as 'an essential and fundamental requirement for 
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional 
goal.'"  Commonwealth v. Francis, 375 Mass. 211, 213-214 (1978), 
quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).  Likewise, 
art. 12 also guarantees a criminal defendant the "right to 
produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him," which implies 
a right "to call witnesses on behalf of the defense."  Pixley v. 
Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 834 (2009), quoting Freeman, supra.  
Although the right to present a defense "is not absolute," 
Pixley, supra, "[w]hen relevant expert testimony is entirely 
excluded by a trial judge, any resulting ruling is suspect," 
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 429 Mass. 60, 66 (1999). 
 
ii.  Nature of the proposed testimony.  On June 1, 2012, 
three days before empanelment began, the defendant filed a 
"motion in limine to present evidence of mitigation of intent," 
seeking to present evidence of "diminished capacity to form the 
intent necessary to commit first-degree murder."  During 
17 
 
empanelment, the judge conducted a sidebar hearing on the 
defendant's motion.  Counsel told the judge that she wanted "to 
introduce evidence not specific to [the defendant] but in 
general about the whole concept of adolescent brain development 
and the underdeveloped frontal cortex," and "whether or not 
there's even a capacity to deliberately premeditate with respect 
to first-degree murder."  She explained, "The only evidence that 
I've notified the Commonwealth about, and the only evidence that 
I'm seeking to offer, isn't evidence of my client's brain 
activity, anything to do specifically with [him]. . . .  [W]e 
don't have any evidence specific to [him] that says that he has 
anything other than a normal adolescent brain.  What I'm saying 
is a normal adolescent brain is different"9 
 
Counsel said that she sought to introduce the evidence in 
anticipation of the United States Supreme Court's then-pending 
 
 
9 The Commonwealth's contention on appeal that no timely or 
adequate proffer was made is not supported by the record.  In 
March 2011, almost fifteen months before trial, the defendant 
filed a motion seeking funds for an expert on adolescent brain 
development; that motion was allowed, and the expert's name was 
included on the defendant's list of witnesses read to the 
venire.  The substance of the expert testimony sought to be 
introduced was clearly presented in the motion and at a sidebar 
hearing.  When he filed that motion, the defendant also filed an 
unsuccessful motion to dismiss his indictment, in which he 
argued that juvenile brains are not fully developed.  This was 
not a case of "trial by ambush."  See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 
429 Mass. 388, 398 (1999).  The prosecutor did not object on the 
ground of an inadequate proffer, nor did the judge base his 
ruling on that issue. 
18 
 
decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory 
life sentences without parole for those under age of eighteen at 
time of crime violate Eighth Amendment to United States 
Constitution).  After a discussion of the anticipated ruling in 
Miller, as well as this court's ruling in Commonwealth v. 
Ogden O., 448 Mass. 798, 805-806 (2007), upon which the 
Commonwealth relied, the judge reserved decision on the motion 
but stated that he was inclined to agree with the Commonwealth 
that Ogden O. governed, notwithstanding that a decision in 
Miller might be imminent, until such time as the Miller decision 
issued.  The judge accordingly told defense counsel not to 
mention juvenile brain development in her opening statement, 
given that the proffered expert would not be able to address any 
condition specific to the defendant, and thus the testimony 
would be inadmissible under Ogden O., supra at 804 ("While a 
delinquent child may not have the maturity to appreciate fully 
the consequences of his wrongful actions, as has been explicitly 
recognized by our Legislature, that does not mean that a 
delinquent child lacks the ability to formulate the specific 
intent to commit particular wrongful acts"). 
 
iii.  Admissibility of testimony.  "Whether a defendant, 
because of youth, was incapable of forming the requisite intent, 
or possessing the requisite knowledge, or committing murder with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, is a question of fact" for the 
19 
 
jury.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 589 (2016).  As a 
general matter, expert testimony may be admissible "whenever it 
will aid the jury in reaching a decision, even if the expert's 
opinion touches on the ultimate issues that the jury must 
decide."  Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 66 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Federico, 425 Mass. 844, 847 (1997).  On 
the other hand, because "the Legislature has clearly indicated 
that youth in the defendant's age group are considered capable 
of committing murder," an expert may not testify that it is 
"impossible for anyone the defendant's age to formulate the 
necessary intent" for the crime.  Okoro, supra at 65. 
 
As stated, the trial judge relied, in part, on our decision 
in Ogden O., 448 Mass. at 805-806.  In that case, we held that a 
juvenile defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to present 
expert testimony on his ability to form the specific intent 
required for the crime of mayhem.  We stated in dicta in that 
case that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, it might be possible 
for a particular juvenile to present expert testimony based on 
scientific evidence demonstrating that the juvenile was unable 
to form the specific intent to commit a crime because of a 
mental deficiency, brain injury, or the like."  Id. at 805 n.6.  
Our reasoning was informed by the fact that the defendant had 
not been charged with murder and already had the benefit of a 
juvenile justice system founded on an appreciation of the 
20 
 
differences between children and adults.  Id. at 807.  We also 
noted, however, that "[m]ore generally, as to evidence that 
children between the ages of seven and fourteen years are 
incapable of committing criminal acts because of insufficient 
brain development, we point out that 'respect for the 
legislative process means that it is not the province of the 
court to sit and weigh conflicting evidence supporting or 
opposing a legislative enactment.'"  Id. at 895 n.6, quoting 
Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL–CIO v. Board of Educ., 
436 Mass. 763, 772 (2002). 
 
Subsequently, in Okoro, a case involving a juvenile charged 
with murder, we held that a trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in allowing an expert (the same expert sought by the 
defense here) to testify about how adolescent brain development 
"could inform an understanding of this particular juvenile's 
capacity for impulse control and reasoned decision-making," but 
not about "how the incomplete developmental maturity of the 
adolescent brain relates to the ability of a teenager to form 
the required intent for malice" (emphasis added).  Okoro, 471 
Mass. at 65-66.  The ability of an expert to testify with 
respect to the individual defendant specifically is critical.  
See Brown, 474 Mass. at 590 (describing decision in Okoro as 
permitting expert testimony "regarding the development of 
adolescent brains and how this could inform an understanding of 
21 
 
this particular juvenile's capacity for impulse control and 
reasoned decision-making on the night of the victim's death" 
where "expert testimony or other evidence of mental impairment 
specific to the defendant at the time of the killing" also was 
before jury).  See also Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 480 Mass. 
334, 341 (2018) (no error in denying continuance to hire expert 
on adolescent brain development where defendant did not support 
motion with "any evidence specific to him"). 
 
While the expert in Okoro did testify in general terms 
about the adolescent brain, his focus on the specific condition 
of the defendant, who had "borderline deficient" cognitive 
functioning and a history of "exposure to chronic and severe 
domestic violence," ensured that the testimony did not cross the 
line of contradicting the legislative determination that 
juveniles can be liable for murder.  Okoro, supra at 53-54, 64.  
The court emphasized that the expert testimony "regarding the 
development of adolescent brains and how this could inform an 
understanding of this particular juvenile's capacity for impulse 
control and reasoned decision-making on the night of the 
victim's death . . . did not amount to an opinion that the 
defendant (or any other fifteen year old) was incapable of 
forming the intent required for murder in the first or second 
degree simply by virtue of being fifteen."  Id. at 66. 
22 
 
 
A judge thus may allow the introduction of expert testimony 
solely with respect to "general principles and characteristics 
of the undeveloped adolescent brain" only when it is accompanied 
by other evidence, such as testimony by a different expert, or 
medical or school records, specific to the defendant;10 without 
this additional evidence, the expert's testimony would present 
the jury with the impermissible situation discussed in Okoro, 
471 Mass. at 65-66.  See Brown, 474 Mass. at 590.  In this 
respect, we treat evidence of juvenile brain development 
differently from evidence about the effects of intoxicating 
substances, where generalized expert testimony is permitted.  
See Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 305 & n.9 (2016) 
(expert testified to general effects of alcohol intoxication); 
Commonwealth v. Banuchi, 335 Mass. 649, 655–656 (1957) (error to 
exclude testimony on effect of heavy drinking on mental 
condition merely because expert had not examined defendant). 
 
Here, the proffered expert testimony explicitly was 
restricted to evidence concerning adolescent brain development 
"in general."  Defense counsel emphasized that the testimony 
 
 
10 Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Mass. 352, 371 (2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020).  To the extent that we suggested 
in Carter, supra at 370–371, that Okoro granted a judge the 
discretion to admit evidence of the "general principles and 
characteristics of the undeveloped adolescent brain," we clarify 
that such evidence, without other evidence pertaining to a 
particular juvenile, is inadmissible. 
23 
 
would not show that the defendant had "anything other than a 
normal adolescent brain," but instead would relate to "whether 
or not there's even a capacity to deliberately premeditate" by a 
juvenile.  The proffered testimony thus not only was not 
particular to the defendant, but also clearly risked touching on 
the "legislatively resolved issue" of whether anyone the 
defendant's age could formulate the necessary intent for murder.  
See Okoro, 471 Mass. at 65.  In sum, there was no abuse of 
discretion in the judge's decision to exclude the expert 
testimony. 
 
d.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant argues that 
the jury should not have been instructed on extreme atrocity or 
cruelty as a theory of murder in the first degree.  The 
defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, 
but rather argues, as he did in seeking to introduce expert 
testimony on general adolescent brain development with respect 
to the question of intent, that the factors that tend to 
establish that a murder was committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty should not be applied to juveniles. 
 
Here, the defendant also was convicted of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation.  "[I]f the 
jury convict a defendant on two theories of murder in the first 
degree, the verdict 'will remain undisturbed even if only one 
theory is sustained on appeal.'"  Commonwealth v. Lee, 483 Mass. 
24 
 
531, 548 n.14 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 
207, 220 (2007). 
 
e.  Statements to police.  The defendant argues that 
statements he made to police should have been suppressed because 
he did not have a meaningful opportunity to consult an informed 
adult before waiving his Miranda rights, because his invocation 
of his right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored, and 
because his statements were not voluntary.  "In our review of 
the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, we accept the 
motion judge's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and 
independently apply the law to those findings to determine 
whether actions of the police were constitutionally justified."  
Commonwealth v. Manha, 479 Mass. 44, 45 (2018), citing 
Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 Mass. 65, 72 (2014).  We conclude 
that there was no error in the judge's decision to deny the 
motion to suppress. 
 
i.  The interrogation.  We summarize the findings of fact 
by the motion judge (who was also the trial judge) in his ruling 
on the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress, supplemented by 
other undisputed evidence introduced at the hearing that is not 
contrary to the judge's findings.  See Commonwealth v. Alexis, 
481 Mass. 91, 93 (2018). 
 
After the defendant was taken into custody, a detective 
telephoned both of the defendant's parents and told them that 
25 
 
they should come to the station because their son had been 
arrested for a "serious matter."  As it was obvious during this 
brief call that English was not the parents' native language, 
the detective asked a police officer who spoke Cape Verdean 
Creole to be present at the interrogation.11 
 
The interrogation began at 10:56 P.M.  Present were two 
detectives, the officer who spoke Cape Verdean Creole (but who 
was not formally trained as an interpreter), the defendant, and 
his father.  One detective read the Miranda warnings in English, 
while the officer who spoke Creole translated them for the 
benefit of the defendant's father.  The defendant and his father 
were directed to initial next to the rights on a list after each 
was explained, and they did so. 
 
 
11 The defendant himself seemed to speak and understand 
English well; the judge found, based on testimony by one of the 
interrogating officers, that the defendant's English was "good," 
his mother spoke "broken" English and did not appear to 
understand what the officer was explaining to her, and his 
father's English was "more fluent" but "obviously not his first 
language."  The judge also added that, in his own observation, 
the defendant spoke English "very well."  He noted that the 
defendant was a student at a Boston high school, and that, the 
previous year, the defendant had appeared and testified as a 
witness, in English, before a grand jury.  The prosecutor 
reported that the defendant's father accompanied him and seemed 
to understand all of the discussion and spoke English well.  
During the defendant's interrogation, his father at times spoke 
in English, and also reminded the defendant of certain 
statements that one of the interrogating officers had made with 
respect to gunshot residue, although that statement had not been 
translated. 
26 
 
 
The first two rights were translated to the defendant's 
father as "you have the right to remain silent" and "anything he 
says, they can use it against him in court."  The next right, 
articulated in English as "you have the right to talk to a 
lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have 
him or her with you during questioning," was translated as "you 
have the right to an attorney before answering any question."  
At that point, the defendant's father appeared to have become 
confused; when asked to initial the form, he said in Creole, 
"I . . . he said if I want to remain silent."  After some 
clarification of the right to remain silent, the fourth Miranda 
right was translated as "if you don't have the money for a 
lawyer they will give you a lawyer for free." 
 
Finally, the detective said, in English, "If you decide to 
answer any question now without a lawyer present, you will still 
have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a 
lawyer."  This so-called "fifth" Miranda warning, see 
Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 271 (2004), was translated 
as "If any question before a lawyer being here, you can stop at 
any time, if he wants."  When the defendant's father indicated 
that he did not understand, the officer explained the fifth 
warning again, saying, "If he decides to answer any question, 
before having a lawyer here with you, because, here, if you 
start, you can stop any time, if you want." 
27 
 
 
Both the defendant and his father then were asked (in 
English and in Creole, respectively) if they had understood; 
both responded affirmatively.  One of the detectives then said 
to the defendant, "Okay, so if you understand all those things 
and you're willing to speak to us without a lawyer present, you 
just have to sign right here and then the officer will witness 
it."  The defendant responded, "I'm all set."  The detective 
asked, "You don't want to sign it?"  The defendant responded, 
"No."  The detective interpreted this as the defendant 
exercising "his right not to sign the form," and not his right 
to remain silent.12  The motion judge found that the officer 
"reasonably" interpreted the defendant's response "as meaning 
that the defendant did not want to sign the form."  The judge 
found that the statement "I'm all set" "was not an invocation" 
of either the right to silence or the right to an attorney, and 
that the defendant "at no time ever stated that he wished to 
assert" either of these rights. 
 
The defendant's father was then asked to sign the form, 
which stated that he had understood the Miranda rights and had 
 
12 The detective testified at the hearing, "In my own mind I 
thought that I he just didn't want to sign it, which I've had 
plenty of people that don't want to sign it.  The signature is a 
requirement of the Boston Police Department not the law.  The 
law just says you have to give the Miranda.  So that's our 
requirement within the Boston Police Department.  And I've had 
plenty of people that haven't wanted to sign the form that have 
sat and talked with us for hours." 
28 
 
had a "meaningful consultation" with the defendant.  After the 
gist of the form was translated for him, the father said, in 
Cape Verdean Creole, "But, I didn't speak to him . . . nothing," 
and then, in English, that he did not know what had happened.  
At that point the defendant and both of his parents were 
permitted to speak privately in the interrogation room; after 
approximately ten minutes, the defendant's father opened the 
door and waved the officers back into the room. 
 
The detective leading the interview explained that the 
officers were "just seeing if either one of you want to talk to 
us.  You don't want to talk to us, you don't want to tell us 
what happened."  The judge found that the detective had 
"continued to make clear to the defendant that he did not have 
to speak if he did not want to," and that the defendant "at no 
time ever stated that he wished to assert his right to silence 
or his right to an attorney."  In response to the detective's 
explanation, the defendant said, "Nothing happened."  The 
detective replied, "Just to be fair to you I will give you an 
opportunity [to talk,]" and then explained that a police officer 
had seen the shooting, that there was some "pretty good 
evidence" against the defendant, and that the person on the 
scooter had died and the defendant could be facing a murder 
charge and possible life imprisonment.  At that point, the 
defendant volunteered that the person on the bicycle "came at 
29 
 
him" and had been trying to hit him.  When the officers asked 
twice about a gun and the defendant's response was inaudible, 
his father told police that he and his son had talked, and the 
defendant did not know anything about the shooting.  Over the 
course of the interview, the defendant maintained that he had 
been by himself, that he had not recognized the victim, that he 
had "blacked out" when the scooter came toward him, and that he 
did not remember holding or firing a gun.  The interview was 
concluded at 11:25 P.M., then briefly resumed nine minutes later 
for a further five minutes, involving questions about the 
defendant's medical condition, including his seizures. 
 
ii.  Meaningful consultation with an interested adult.  
Although the defendant does not argue that the warnings given to 
him in English were deficient, juveniles between the ages of 
fourteen and eighteen must be "afforded the opportunity to 
consult with an interested adult" before making a voluntary 
waiver of their Miranda rights.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 
Mass. 161, 165-166 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Berry, 410 
Mass. 31, 35 (1991).  If such an opportunity is not given, a 
waiver is invalid unless "the circumstances . . . demonstrate a 
high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or 
sophistication on the part of the juvenile."  Commonwealth v. 
A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134 (1983).  While a "genuine 
opportunity" must be given, there is no requirement that the 
30 
 
opportunity for consultation actually be taken.  Commonwealth v. 
MacNeill, 399 Mass. 71, 78 (1987).  Crucially, "the adult who is 
available to the juvenile must be informed of and understand the 
juvenile's constitutional rights."  Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 
438 Mass. 372, 381–382 (2003). 
 
As the defendant clearly was afforded time to confer 
(privately) with his parents, the three spoke privately in an 
interview room, and they themselves chose how long they would 
speak together, the only question at issue here is whether the 
defendant's father13 adequately understood the Miranda warnings, 
as translated to him, so as to make the consultation a 
meaningful one.14  The four pieces of substantial information 
that the warnings must transmit are that a defendant "has the 
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used 
against him in a court of law, that [the defendant] has the 
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if [the 
 
 
13 The defendant's mother was not present when the warnings 
were read. 
 
 
14 As the defendant points out, no consultation took place 
before the defendant and his father were asked to sign the form 
indicating that the defendant was waiving his Miranda rights.  
Nonetheless, although a private consultation "clearly is the 
most conducive means to the unconstrained and thorough 
discussion between the adult and child contemplated by our 
rule," the police "are not required to give a juvenile and an 
interested adult an unsolicited opportunity" to talk alone.  
Commonwealth v. Philip S., 414 Mass. 804, 812 (1993).  Here, the 
police did readily offer such an opportunity when the father 
told a detective that he did not know what had happened. 
31 
 
defendant] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for 
[the defendant] prior to any questioning if [the defendant] so 
desires."  Commonwealth v. Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 357–358 (2013), 
quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
 
No particular words are required adequately to convey the 
necessary information; what matters is whether the warnings 
given "reasonably convey" these rights to the suspect.  See 
Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran, 471 Mass. 179, 185 (2015), 
quoting Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010).  When the 
Miranda warnings are translated for someone who does not 
understand English, the rendering accordingly need not be 
verbatim, but "cannot be so 'misstated to the point of being 
contradictory' or equivocal."  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 
Mass. 850, 864 (2019), quoting Bins, 465 Mass. at 363. 
 
The translated warnings here were adequate.  The only 
specific point on which they arguably fell short was with 
respect to the defendant's right to have a lawyer present during 
questioning.  But the fact that the defendant had a right to a 
lawyer at no cost "before answering any question" was clearly 
conveyed; additionally, the father was told twice that if the 
defendant answered questions without a lawyer, he could stop at 
any time until a lawyer was "here."  This was enough reasonably 
to convey that the defendant had the right to have an attorney 
present during the interview.  See Commonwealth v. Lajoie, 95 
32 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 10, 15 (2019) (warning that defendant could have 
attorney "prior to any questioning" was sufficient, despite 
absence of mention of attorney "during" questioning).  "Although 
the warnings were not the clearest possible formulation of 
Miranda's right-to-counsel advisement, they were sufficiently 
comprehensive and comprehensible when given a commonsense 
reading."  Powell, 559 U.S. at 63.  A "meaningful consultation" 
thus took place between the defendant and his father.  See A 
Juvenile, 389 Mass. at 134. 
 
iii.  Invocation of right to remain silent.  As noted, the 
defendant responded to the detective's statement, "if you 
understand all those things and you're willing to speak to us 
without a lawyer present, you just have to sign right here," 
with "I'm all set," and then answered the further question, "You 
don't want to sign it?" with "No."  The defendant contends that 
this constituted an invocation of his right to remain silent, 
which should have been, but was not, "scrupulously honored."  
See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 343 (2012), quoting 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).  We agree with the 
motion judge's determination that the defendant did not invoke 
his right to remain silent. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that defendants 
"unambiguously" must invoke their right to remain silent during 
a police interrogation.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 
33 
 
381 (2010).  While we have declined to adopt this heightened 
standard in a prewaiver context (that is, as here, before a 
subject has indicated that he or she is waiving the Miranda 
rights) under art. 12, we nonetheless have required that a 
defendant "act[] with sufficient clarity" to invoke the right.  
See Clarke, 461 Mass. at 343, 350 (invocation of right was 
sufficiently clear where defendant shook his head when asked if 
he wished to speak).  Moreover, we have said that when a subject 
makes an ambiguous invocation of his or her rights, the 
interrogating officer should "stop questioning on any other 
subject and ask the suspect to make his [or her] choice clear," 
a practice that "has the benefit both of ensuring protection of 
the right if invoked and of minimizing the chance of suppression 
of subsequent statements at trial if not."  Id. at 351–352.  
Even assuming that the defendant's initial words ("I'm all set") 
were ambiguous, his straightforward negative response to the 
clarifying question, "So you don't want to sign it?" confirmed 
that he was refusing to sign the form, rather than refusing to 
speak. 
 
iv.  Voluntariness.  The defendant also argues that his 
statements to police were not voluntary, regardless of whether 
he waived his Miranda rights.  In determining if a statement to 
police was voluntary, we examine "whether, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
34 
 
statement, the will of the defendant was overborne to the extent 
that the statement was not the result of a free and voluntary 
act."  Commonwealth v. Hammond, 477 Mass. 499, 502–503 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 207 (2011).  
Factors to be considered in making this determination include 
"promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the 
defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional 
stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, 
physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion 
of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and 
the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of 
Miranda warnings."  Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 
(1986), S.C., 403 Mass. 93 (1988). 
 
On appeal, the defendant offers essentially no reason, 
other than the fact that he was sixteen years old at the time of 
the interrogation, to think that his statements were not 
voluntary.  We agree with the motion judge that, once the 
defendant began speaking, there was "no indication whatsoever 
that [the] defendant's will was overborne." 
 
f.  Severance.  The trial judge denied a joint motion from 
the defendant and his codefendant to sever their trials.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that severance was necessary due to 
prejudice from the introduction of certain evidence that was 
admissible only against Lopes.  We disagree. 
35 
 
 
Trying multiple defendants together when the indictments 
against them arise from the same events "expedites the 
administration of justice, reduces the congestion of trial 
dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden upon 
citizens who must sacrifice time and energy to serve upon 
juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses to 
successive trials."  Commonwealth v. Smith, 418 Mass. 120, 125 
(1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 
(1982).  Nonetheless, "when the prejudice resulting from a joint 
trial is so compelling that it prevents a defendant from 
obtaining a fair trial," severance is required, Moran, supra, as 
a matter of constitutional law, United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 
438, 446 n.8 (1986).  One situation in which severance can be 
necessary is where codefendants' defenses are "mutually 
antagonistic and irreconcilable," such that the acceptance of 
one would preclude the acceptance of the other.  Commonwealth v. 
Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 836–837 (2012).  "Absent a 
constitutional requirement for severance, joinder and severance 
are matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge."  Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 485 (1999). 
 
In this case, the defendant does not claim that he and his 
codefendant presented defenses that were actually "mutually 
antagonistic and irreconcilable."  See Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 
836–837.  Rather, he argues that he was prejudiced by the 
36 
 
introduction of statements by Lopes at the time of his arrest, 
including his later urging the defendant to "take the fault," 
and evidence of Lopes's affiliation with a gang.  The 
Commonwealth maintains that all of these statements would have 
been admissible under the joint venturer exception to the 
hearsay rule, even if the trials had been severed. 
 
We conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced in any 
meaningful way by the denial of his motion to sever.  The gang 
evidence and the statement by Lopes that the defendant should 
"take the fault," while clearly inculpatory of Lopes, were not 
necessarily inculpatory for the defendant.  To the contrary, the 
latter statement arguably could be understood to suggest that 
Lopes was urging the defendant to claim responsibility even 
though Lopes had been the one to do the shooting.  More 
importantly, "[w]here the jury were warranted in finding each 
defendant guilty on the basis of 'eyewitness testimony and other 
evidence,' we have concluded that any prejudice resulting from a 
joint trial was not so compelling that it prevented such 
defendants from obtaining a fair trial."  See Commonwealth v. 
Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 257 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Siny 
Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 543 n.13 (2011).  Such was the case 
here, where multiple eyewitnesses testified to the participation 
of both the defendant and his codefendant.  In these 
37 
 
circumstances, we cannot say that the judge abused his 
discretion in denying the motion to sever. 
 
g.  Closing argument.  The defendant argues that certain 
aspects of the prosecutor's closing argument constitute 
reversible error, including improper appeals to sympathy, 
shifting of the burden of proof, and aggressive denigration of 
the defendant's case.  Defense counsel objected five times 
during the prosecutor's closing argument, and immediately moved 
for a mistrial at the end of the argument, raising all of the 
issues presented on appeal.  Because the defendant objected, we 
review for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 482 
Mass. 596, 603 (2019).  We discern no grounds for reversal. 
 
The defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly 
appealed to the jurors' sympathy by referring to the victim's 
age some nine times and calling him an "innocent boy."  A 
prosecutor is "entitled to tell the jury something of the person 
whose life had been lost in order to humanize the proceedings," 
but must refrain, when "personal characteristics are not 
relevant to any material issue, . . . from so emphasizing those 
characteristics that it risks undermining the rationality and 
thus the integrity of the jury's verdict."  Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 495 (1997).  We note that "the theory 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty was an issue in this trial, 
making relevant and permissible some of the prosecutor's 
38 
 
references to the victim's age."  Commonwealth v. Kent K., 427 
Mass. 754, 759 (1998) (no new trial required after improper 
references to victim's age in closing argument).  Moreover, when 
"guilt is clear, improper appeals to sympathy, although 
troubling, are less crucial."  Id. at 761.  Any prejudice to the 
defendant was sufficiently cured by the judge's instructions to 
the jury that "[r]eason, logic, common sense must govern you, 
not emotion, not sympathy, not sentiment," and that closing 
arguments are not evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 
Mass. 403, 419 (2020). 
 
The defendant also argues that the prosecutor shifted the 
burden of proof when he said, "Ladies and gentlemen, consider 
that one key point on cross-examination.  Did you notice 
something missing in the cross examination of Officer Anthony 
Williams?  Did one of those attorneys even ask one single 
question about the execution?"  Although worded infelicitously, 
this was acceptable commentary on the defendant's tactics, which 
focused on calling attention to peripheral inconsistencies in 
testimony by the witnesses.  See Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 
Mass. 639, 644 (2017).  "[I]t is not improper per se for a 
prosecutor to point out to the jury that cross-examination did 
not produce factual inconsistencies in the testimony of 
prosecution witnesses, even if such remarks imply that the 
defendant left material elements of the Commonwealth's evidence 
39 
 
uncontested."  Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787–788 
(2011), citing Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 117 
(2010).  Even if the prosecutor did cross a line here, it was a 
"brief, isolated statement" that "was not egregious enough to 
infect the whole of the trial."  Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 
Mass. 105, 118 (2018).  The judge properly instructed the jury 
that the burden of proof was on the Commonwealth and that the 
defendant had no obligation to produce any evidence. 
 
The defendant also challenges asserted personal attacks on 
defense counsel and on his case in general.  Specifically, the 
prosecutor said, "[Defense counsel] is a tremendously talented 
lawyer.  But I suggest to you that the defense that she puts 
forward should be an insult to your intelligence, to your common 
sense."  The prosecutor then characterized aspects of counsel's 
argument as a "farce" and a "distraction."  We addressed this 
issue in Lopes, 478 Mass. at 607, where we said that the 
prosecutor's words were "overly aggressive . . . but not grounds 
for reversal."  We noted that the judge gave a specific curative 
instruction as part of the final charge, which included the 
following: 
"There was some reference to arguments of defense 
counsel being insulting or a farce or a distraction.  
Well, those are hard words, and you have to remember, 
keep in mind that attorneys sometimes engaged in 
rhetoric.  But I want you to remember this.  There is 
nothing wrong with a defendant in any trial 
challenging the government's proof." 
40 
 
 
That the same aggressive language was directed specifically at 
an argument put forward by trial counsel for the defendant here 
does not change the view we expressed in Lopes.  See 
Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 703 (2001). 
 
h.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In his reply brief, 
the defendant requests that we reduce his conviction to 
manslaughter based, essentially, on the fact that he was a 
juvenile at the time of the offense.  Because the defendant was 
a juvenile at the time of the offense, we are ordering that he 
be resentenced so that he will be eligible for parole on his 
life sentence, pursuant to Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 665, which 
precludes, as the United States Supreme Court has held that the 
Eighth Amendment does not, Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, a sentence 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
juveniles.  We discern no reason to provide any further relief 
pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions are affirmed.  
The sentence of life in prison is vacated and set aside, and the 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing on the 
murder conviction in accordance with Diatchenko, 466 Mass. 
at 665. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.