Title: State v. Leslie Nelson

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This is an appeal by defendant, Leslie Nelson, from a sentence of death following her conviction of capital murder based on the entry of guilty pleas to the killing of two law-enforcement officers and the aggravated assault of a third officer. The officers, Investigator John McLaughlin of the Camden County Prosecutor's Office and Detective Richard Norcross and Officer John Norcross of the Haddon Heights Police Department, were shot on April 20, 1995, while attempting to execute a search warrant for guns defendant kept in her room in her parents' home. McLaughlin and Officer Norcross were killed and Detective Norcross was severely injured. The morning of the shootings, McLaughlin and an investigator from the State's Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) had gone to defendant's home to investigate a complaint that defendant had fondled her niece and had threatened her with a shotgun. Defendant reluctantly let the men into the home and became very upset when she heard of the sexual accusation. The investigators learned defendant had a knife and that she kept the shotgun locked in her upstairs bedroom closet. She refused to let them search her bedroom, but her mother permitted them to search the rest of the house. No evidence of any crime was found. After McLaughlin asked defendant again about her knife, she let the men into her bedroom, where they saw her four-inch lock-blade knife and a number of bullets.In response to defendant's question about plans for further investigation, the DYFS investigator said his part was over, but McLaughlin told her he would have to discuss the matter with his superiors. Defendant replied that she would kill herself if she had to go to jail. Detective Norcross, who had been present outside the house during the visit, decided a search warrant for the weapons should be obtained. Armed with the warrant, McLaughlin, Detective Norcross, and three other police officers, including Officer John Norcross, the brother of Detective Norcross, returned to the Nelson residence that afternoon. Defendant's mother let McLaughlin and Detective Norcross in and the other officers remained outside. When she heard that the officers were there to ask more questions and to search her room, defendant, who was upstairs, began to run and entered her room. McLaughlin was fatally shot by defendant as he ran after her toward her room. Defendant also shot and wounded Detective Norcross as he pursued her, but he managed to escape from the house. Officer Norcross was killed ten or fifteen minutes later when struck by gunfire from defendant, who was shooting at the officers from an upstairs window. Because she pled guilty to the capital murder and aggravated assault charges against her, defendant proceeded to trial only as to the penalty for these convictions. The three mitigating factors defendant asserted to counter the aggravating factors claimed by the State in seeking to obtain a death sentence revolved around defendant's mental illness and her sexual identity. (Defendant had been diagnosed as severely depressed and as having schizoid and antisocial tendencies. She had been born male but had had sex-change surgery in 1992.) Defendant also asserted as the basis for the catch-all mitigating factor that the officers who came to her house had been inadequately trained, prepared and supported for dealing with a disturbed person, especially one known to be armed. With regard to the killing of Officer Norcross, the jury was unanimous in finding the existence of the three aggravating factors advanced by the State and in rejecting defendant's emotional disturbance and impaired capacity mitigating factors. The jury rejected the catch-all factor by a nine-to-three vote. The jury declared unanimously that the aggravating factors, together and individually, outweighed the mitigating factors. For the McLaughlin murder, however, the jury found three of four aggravating factors and the emotional disturbance mitigating factor. The jury, by split votes, rejected the other mitigating factors and was unable to agree unanimously that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. In accordance with the results of the jury's weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced defendant to death for the murder of Officer Norcross and to life in prison with thirty years of parole ineligibility for the murder of Investigator McLaughlin. The court imposed a consecutive ten-year term with five years of parole ineligibility for the second-degree assault of Detective Norcross. After the sentencing, defendant learned that during the penalty-phase trial, Detective Norcross had filed a civil lawsuit against defendant, the Borough of Haddon Heights, and the Camden County Prosecutor's Office, alleging, among other things, that he was injured by defendant because of " improper hiring, screening, training, and supervision " of the Haddon Heights police officers. A notice of claim against the public entities had been served in July 1995. Defendant asserted the State's failure to reveal this information to her during trial as a basis for a motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then appealed her death sentence to the Supreme Court as of right. HELD: Because of the State's failure to reveal to defendant favorable evidence material to the jury's determination whether defendant deserved the death penalty, defendant's sentence of death is vacated and the matter is remanded for a new sentencing trial on the murder of Officer John Norcross. 1. Evidence that Detective Norcross, the chief prosecution witness and the brother of a slain officer, had filed a lawsuit based on the very theory asserted by defendant as the basis for the catch-all mitigating factor would have been favorable to the defense and would have profoundly altered the jury's perspective on the case. It is at least reasonably probable that an additional juror or jurors would have found the existence of one or more of the mitigating factors and that greater weight would have been given to the mitigating factors, with the result that the jury would not have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating ones. (pp. 10-16) 2. The trial court's explanation to the jury that the likely non-death sentences for the murders would be life in prison with a sixty-year period of parole ineligibility comported with Loftin's directive in that regard and the instruction that the jury should not consider that likelihood as a basis for a decision to impose the death penalty was similar to the limiting instructions in Martini I and Bey III. In future cases, when instructing the jury regarding sentencing consequences, the trial court should emphasize that the jury should not find a capital defendant more worthy of a life sentence because of the lengthier term of confinement. (pp. 16-22) 3. The State's use of defendant's expressions of her views on the Second Amendment and the Founders' concern about future bloody revolution violated defendant's First Amendment rights. Because of the retrial required by the Brady violation, the Court need not consider whether this constitutional violation, to which defense counsel did not object, constituted plain error. On retrial, if the State seeks to have such evidence admitted, the State first must prove that defendant desired or advocated violent attacks on government. (pp. 22-28) 4. The other trial errors asserted by defendant do not provide a basis for retrial. (pp. 28-34) The sentence of death is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for a new penalty trial. JUSTICE HANDLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurs with the Court's opinion that the Brady due process violation requires a new penalty trial (Part II), but dissents from Part III because of his view that a capital jury should be instructed to consider the other sentences a defendant could receive as a mitigating factor. He believes also that the court's informing the jury it should not consider the practical consequences of defendant's other sentences was reversible error. Finally, Justice Handler would hold the State's cross-examination of defendant's psychiatrist regarding her political beliefs to be reversible error and so dissents from Part IV of the opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins, agrees in all regards with the Court's opinion except for the conclusion that there was a Brady violation requiring a retrial. He disagrees that evidence of the filing of the Norcross suit was material to the jury's determination, being unpersuaded that the jury's decision whether to impose the death penalty would, to a reasonable probability, have been affected by knowledge of the complaint. JUSTICES POLLOCK and STEIN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICE COLEMAN filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LESLIE A NELSON, a/k/a GLEN NELSON, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 3, 1998 -- Decided July 30, 1998 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County. Stephen W. Kirsch and Michael B. Jones, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Deborah C. Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. This is a capital murder case. There must be a new sentencing because the State withheld evidence favorable to the defense and material to the jury's determination whether defendant deserved the death penalty. [Id. at 438, 115 S. Ct. at 1568, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 508-09 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 109 (1972)).] In Giglio, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for the passing of forged money orders because the Government did not disclose that its key witness testified in exchange for a promise that he would not be prosecuted. The promise was made by one of the trial prosecutor's colleagues in the United States Attorney's Office. As in Kyles and the present case, the trial prosecutor was unaware of the promise. The Court held the prosecution was constructively aware of the promise to the witness. Chief Justice Burger wrote, "the prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government." Giglio, supra, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S. Ct. at 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 109 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency 272); see also State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 111 (1982) ("The prosecutor is charged with knowledge of evidence in his file, `even if he has actually overlooked it.'") (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 349 (1976)). The Tenth Circuit has stated that "the `prosecution' for Brady purposes encompasses not only the individual prosecutor handling the case, but also extends to the prosecutor's entire office . . . , as well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state involved in investigative aspects of a particular criminal venture." Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 824 (citation and footnote omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Mondragon v. Smith, 516 U.S. 905, 116 S. Ct. 272, 133 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1995). In this case, the complaint was filed by one of the "law enforcement personnel" involved in the investigation of defendant's "particular criminal venture," and it was brought against the "prosecutor's entire office." Smith, supra, 50 F.3d at 824. In fact, after receiving Richard Norcross' tort claim notice in July 1995, the Camden County Prosecutor notified County Counsel, in a letter dated August 7, 1995, that the Prosecutor would discuss the complaint with the assistant prosecutor handling defendant's trial. It appears that discussion never took place. Under either Kyles or Giglio, we must impute awareness of the Norcross complaint to the trial prosecutor and hold that the evidence was suppressed for Brady purposes. The materiality element of the Brady rule is also satisfied. Undisclosed evidence is material for Brady purposes if there is a "reasonable probability" that a different result would have obtained had the evidence been disclosed. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985). "A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ibid. For these purposes, the "outcome" of the trial may refer to either the determination of guilt or the imposition of punishment. Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 218. For an appellant, the materiality standard is not difficult to achieve. "[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal." Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S. Ct. at 1565, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 506. Rather, the question is whether in the absence of the undisclosed evidence the defendant received a fair trial, "understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. at 434, 115 S. Ct. at 1566, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 506. In order to disregard the suppression of favorable evidence, we would have to be confident that the jury would have chosen the death penalty over a term of imprisonment had the State made defendant aware of Norcross' complaint. It is not for us to assess the merits of Richard Norcross' complaint or to judge thereby the conduct of the police. It suffices to observe that the allegations would have profoundly altered the jury's perspective of the case. Norcross was the State's key witness to defendant's conduct during the standoff. He testified about her vicious assault on him as well as the murder of Investigator McLaughlin. Had the jury been aware that this crucial witness, the brother of one of the dead police officers, agreed with defendant that inadequate police training had sparked defendant's violent reaction, it is at least reasonably probable that an additional juror or jurors would have found the existence of one or more of defendant's mitigating factors. Not only did the prosecution dispute the existence of the mitigating factor concerning the inadequate training of the police officers, it excoriated the defendant for daring to question the conduct of deceased police officers. (Defense counsel referred to the prosecutor's discussion on this point as the "pinnacle" of his summation.) It is also reasonably probable that the jury would have given greater weight to the mitigating factor(s) thus substantiated and would not have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones. The Brady violation requires a retrial of defendant's sentence. Because the non-disclosure of the Norcross complaint requires us to order a new sentencing trial, we address only briefly the other issues in the case. Defendant asserts that the court did not accurately inform the jury that it could legitimately consider the cumulative consequence of two non-death verdicts. The court told the jury that for each non-death verdict that it returned, defendant would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty years to life and would spend at least thirty years in prison. The court added that if it were imposing sentence on both murder charges, there was a reasonable likelihood that the sentences would run consecutively, creating a minimum prison term of sixty years. However, the court admonished the jury not to consider in its deliberations the likelihood that the sentences would run consecutively. The consequences of the jury's decision whether to vote in favor of the death penalty were explained as follows: If the answer is yes, the defendant shall be sentenced to death. If the answer is no or the jury is unable to reach a unanimous conclusion after due deliberation, I shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment of between thirty years and life which the defendant shall serve at least thirty years before being considered for parole. If separate sentences are to be imposed by me, the reasonable likelihood is they will run consecutive to one another so the defendant will have to serve at least sixty years before being considered for parole . . . . Please note that throughout the explanation of the verdict sheet and otherwise during the course of the charge at the request of the parties I have instructed you and told you that if I do not impose - if you do not impose -- if the result of your decision is the defendant does not get the death penalty, you do not impose the death penalty and the decision is one of incarceration, the reasonable likelihood is that I will impose or give consecutive sentences, which mean[s] that the defendant would have to serve sixty years before being considered eligible for parole. Now, remember, that's not an aggravating factor, it's not a mitigating factor, [I] went over all the aggravating factors, I've gone through all the mitigating factors. Therefore, you shall not consider the likelihood, that likelihood as a basis for your decision to impose the death penalty or a sentence of imprisonment because simply put it's not an aggravating factor and simply put it's not a mitigating factor, but I do bring it to your attention because you should be aware of all the potential consequences of your decision. That's why I bring it to your attention. The defendant relies upon the general proposition codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3f, that "[p]rior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if the defendant is not sentenced to death." Defendant's argument is that the consequence of a non-death verdict in this case would have been two sentences of thirty years to life that would probably run consecutively. Therefore, the jury should have been asked to weigh death against the likelihood that a non-death verdict on both murder counts would result in a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for sixty years. (Because defendant was thirty-seven years of age at the time of the crime, this effectively meant that she would die in prison.) Instead the jury was told to weigh death against a prison term of thirty years to life, and was, in effect, told to disregard the likelihood that the sentences would run consecutively. A penalty-phase jury in a capital case, prior to the start of its deliberations, must be informed of the sentencing consequences of its decision. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3f. In State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987), the Court stated, "To hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options, thus permitting its decision to be based on uninformed and possibly inaccurate speculation, is to mock the goals of rationality and consistency required by modern death penalty jurisprudence." Id. at 311. In State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557 (1992) (Bey III), the Court considered whether to inform a penalty-phase jury of the length of a sentence the defendant is serving for a prior crime, there a prior murder that was an aggravating factor in the capital case. The Court held that the jury should be told (1) the amount of time being served under the prior sentence, (2) whether the prior sentence is final or up on appeal, (3) that the decision of whether a non-capital sentence in the present case will be concurrent or consecutive with respect to the sentence already being served is solely up to the court, and (4) not to consider the prior sentence in its decision to impose life or death. Id. at 603. The Bey III Court explained that jurors should not be permitted to consider prior sentences as aggravating or mitigating factors. It reasoned as follows: The focus of the Capital Punishment Act is on individualized sentencing, requiring that the jury determine whether death is the appropriate punishment based on the circumstances of the offense and the aggravating and mitigating factors. To permit consideration of pending sentences for prior crimes might lead to the incongruous result that first-offenders would be more likely to be sentenced to death than would repeat-offenders. The proper balance is struck by informing a jury of pending sentences on request, but instructing the jury to base its life or death decision only on the aggravating and mitigating factors presented by the evidence. In State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176 (1993) (Martini I), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 699, 136 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1997), the Court adopted a prospective rule that required analogous instructions on sentences to be imposed for non-capital counts prosecuted in the same case as the capital count being considered by the jury. Id. at 313. The Court held that in the future when defense counsel or the jury requests instructions on the potential sentences a defendant will receive for convictions arising from the same trial as his capital-murder conviction, such information should be provided by the trial court. The jurors should be informed of the sentencing options available to the judge, and that the determination of sentence had not yet been made. In addition, the trial court should explain that the sentence may or may not run consecutively to that for murder, but that the determination is left to the court. Finally, the court should inform the jury that defendant's possible sentence for the other convictions should not influence its determination regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence on the murder count. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996), added the further requirement that when courts know that it is likely that non-capital sentences will be consecutive, the jury should have that information. The Court held that "in future cases, if the court, based on the evidence presented[,] believes that there is a realistic likelihood that it will impose a sentence to be served consecutively to any of defendant's prior sentences, in the event the jury does not return a death sentence, the jury should be so informed." Id. at 372. The trial court complied with the mandate of Loftin by informing the jury on multiple occasions that the likely non-death sentences for the murder would be life in prison with a sixty-year period of parole ineligibility. Then, in a manner analogous to the limiting instructions of Martini I and Bey III, the court instructed the jury not to consider that likelihood as a basis "for your decision to impose the death penalty." In his summation, defense counsel had urged that the most appropriate sentence was life in prison. In the defense view, the court's instruction undercut the defense's summation and told the jurors to ignore the reality that defendant would have died in jail before even being considered for parole. The defense further asserts that the court's instruction wrongly conveyed to the jury that its choice was between death and parole eligibility in thirty years. The jury was not simply instructed to disregard the sixty years of parole ineligibility. Instead, the jury was instructed in effect to treat the case as if the period of parole ineligibility would be thirty years. We understand the logic of the defendant's argument but disagree with its reality. It is inescapable to us that the jury knew that it was choosing between death and a life in prison without the possibility of parole. The verdict sheet clearly referred to sixty years as the non-death sentence that the court was likely to impose. At the same time, we should clarify the meaning of our rulings. When a jury is choosing between life and death, it should not be misled into treating the case as one that it is not. The jury should not be told that in choosing between life and death it may not consider the fact that a forty-year-old defendant is likely to spend the next sixty years in prison if its verdict is life. Such an instruction would conflict with our Ramseur holding and impermissibly "hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options." Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 311. In future cases, courts should explain to jurors what we mean when we say that the length of the possible sentences other than death should not influence the jury's determination concerning the appropriateness of a death sentence on a murder count. Something along these lines (as refined by the Trial Judges' Committee on Capital Causes) would suffice: What I intend to convey when I tell you that your determination of the appropriateness of a death sentence should not be influenced by the sentences that I may impose on other convictions, or in the event you determine that death is not an appropriate punishment for this defendant, is simply that a capital defendant is not more worthy of life because he or she may face a longer confinement in prison than another. A defendant's worthiness for life should depend only on the circumstances of the offense and the aggravating and mitigating factors that have been presented. I have informed you of the potential non-capital sentences only so that you may be fully informed of the effect of your decision. Did the prosecution violate defendant's constitutional rights by alluding to defendant's views of the Second Amendment and a "bloody revolution"? Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated her due process and free speech rights by using her views of the Second Amendment and "bloody revolution" to suggest to the jury that defendant had pursued a personal goal of killing police officers. Because the evidence, as presented, was not probative of any disputed issue in the sentencing phase, we agree. In the penalty phase, defendant called Doctor Kenneth Weiss as an expert in forensic psychiatry. Doctor Weiss had examined defendant on several occasions and had evaluated her mental condition. During the State's cross-examination, the following exchange took place: Q. Doctor, on October 10th, 1995, Leslie Nelson told you, and I quote, I'm just a person who loves guns and thinks the Second Amendment is sacrosanct, correct? A. Yes. Q. She also told you in that same interview, and this is another quote, the Founding Fathers had in mind that there might be another bloody revolution. A. Yes. She said that to me. Q. And she talked to you a number of times about the Constitution and her love of guns, correct? A. Oh, she certainly talked about her love of guns on a number of occasions. I was more interested, of course, in her attachment to them than I am about her thoughts on the Constitution. Q. Well, Doctor, if the Founding Fathers as Ms. Nelson interpreted it, her right, and if there were going to be another bloody revolution and if Leslie Nelson were to be a revolutionary, against whom would she be focusing her violence? A. I really don't know, Mr. Lynch [the prosecutor]. My imagination didn't go that far. Q. Well, if you're in revolt, sir, you're in revolt against the government, against the authorities, correct? A. I suppose that would be so. Q. Well, you don't just suppose that, you know that, sir, if you're talking about revolution, you're talking about revolution against a government, correct, isn't that what revolution means? A. I believe that's right. Q. Okay. So the persons in government that represent the interests of government among other people are police officers; isn't that right? A. That could be interpreted certainly as an authority figure representing the structure of society. The State pursued this theme in its closing argument. Downplaying the evidence relating to defendant's failures in life, the prosecutor said, "Well, here, here on the twentieth of April, 1995, she found something she could be successful at. She found success because she clearly wanted to kill police officers and she did it. She was successful and she did it. She was successful and killed them." No one may be punished in this country for merely espousing particular political beliefs or for associating with others who share those beliefs. U.S. Const. amends. I and XIV. Evidence relating to a criminal defendant's beliefs or associations is admissible at trial if it is relevant to material issues or witness credibility; United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52-53, 105 S. Ct. 468, 469, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450, 457-58 (1984); but if evidence of those beliefs does not make the truth of a material proposition any more or less probable, the admission of that evidence is unconstitutional. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1099, 117 L. Ed. 2d 309, 319 (1992). The facts of this case are similar to those presented in Dawson. There, the submission of evidence of a defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was held to violate free speech and fair trial rights. Ibid. A jury convicted David Dawson of first-degree murder, which made him eligible for Delaware's death penalty. During the penalty phase, the State sought to introduce evidence relating to Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. The parties stipulated that "[t]he Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960s in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware." Id. at 162, 112 S. Ct. at 1096, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 315. The Supreme Court acknowledged ways in which evidence relating to the prison gang might have been relevant and thus permissible, but it concluded that the stipulated facts concerning the gang were too narrow to have any relevance to Dawson's sentencing. The Court noted that evidence of racial intolerance and subversive advocacy may be considered when relevant to disputed issues. Id. at 164, 112 S. Ct. at 1097, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 316 (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1134 (1983)). It recalled that Aryan Brotherhood membership was held admissible to impeach a witness when it was shown that members of the gang take oaths to lie for other members. Id. at 164, 112 S. Ct. at 1097, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 317 (citing Abel, supra, 469 U.S. 45, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450, 105 S. Ct. 465 (1984)). However, the Court examined Dawson's stipulation and realized that Delaware had proven only that the Aryan Brotherhood originated in California in the 1960s, that that gang espoused white racist beliefs, and that there is a gang in Delaware's prisons that refers to itself by the same name. Id. at 165, 112 S. Ct. at 1097, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 317. According to the Court, the evidence surrounding the gang was irrelevant to Dawson's sentencing for three reasons. First, the stipulation did not state that Delaware's version of the gang is a racist organization. And even if it were, the Court reasoned that the murder of which Dawson was convicted, unlike the murder in Barclay, was not racially motivated because Dawson and his victim were of the same race. Id. at 166, 112 S. Ct. at 1098, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 317-18. Second, Delaware did not establish "that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts." Had Dawson been a member of a gang that endorsed the killing of an "identifiable group," the Court reasoned, that membership "might be relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future." Id. at 166, 112 S. Ct. at 1098, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 318. "But the inference [that] the jury was invited to draw in [Dawson's] case tended to prove nothing more than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter." Ibid. The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the use of evidence that proves nothing more than a defendant's possession of such abstract beliefs. Id. at 167, 112 S. Ct. at 1099, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 319. Third, the Dawson Court acknowledged that prosecutors must have the leeway to rebut a capital defendant's mitigating evidence. Id. at 167, 112 S. Ct. at 1098-99, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 318. The opinion further suggested that once a capital defendant offers positive character evidence in mitigation, a State may offer whatever "bad" character evidence it has, even if it does not specifically contradict the defendant's mitigating evidence. Id. at 168-69, 112 S. Ct. at 1099, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 319. But Delaware's evidence concerning the prison gang did not even serve that "principle of broad rebuttal" because "the Aryan Brotherhood evidence presented . . . [could not] be viewed as relevant `bad' character evidence in its own right." Id. at 169, 112 S. Ct. at 1099, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 319. The State's evidence relating to defendant's thoughts on the Second Amendment are in the same category as Delaware's evidence concerning Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. The testimony the State elicited from Doctor Weiss established nothing more than defendant's beliefs that the Second Amendment is "sacrosanct" and that the Founders "had in mind that there might be another bloody revolution." Without explaining why the witness, qualified as an expert in psychiatry, would have any knowledge of who the victims of such a bloody revolution might be, the State had Doctor Weiss speculate, in response to leading questions, that "if Leslie Nelson were to be a revolutionary," she would "focus her violence" against the government, and possibly against the police as "authority figure[s] representing the structure of society." (Emphasis added.) Had the State proved that defendant desired or advocated violent attacks on the government (such as in the Oklahoma City or World Trade Center bombings), that evidence would have been relevant to rebut defendant's mitigating contentions that the lack of police training, her emotional disturbance, and her impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct caused the deaths of the two officers. However, the State never established that defendant was actually a revolutionary. It established nothing more than defendant's "abstract belief" in the importance of the Second Amendment and the Founders' concern about a future revolution. According to Dawson, the admission of such "abstract beliefs," without more, violated defendant's First Amendment rights. Id. at 167, 112 S. Ct. at 1099, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 318. Defense counsel did not object to the State's questioning of Doctor Weiss concerning defendant's political beliefs. Because the Brady violation requires a retrial, we need not decide whether the improper pursuit of the "Bloody Revolution" theory constituted plain error under Rule 2:10-2 requiring a new penalty trial. At a retrial, the State shall be obliged to prove the defendant desired or advocated violent attacks on government as a condition to the admission of such evidence. Had the jury known that in the "cool of the evening" Officer Richard Norcross had also come to "criticize those officers," the jury's perception of that mitigating factor might have been much different. In this posture of the case, we cannot turn our backs on constitutional obligation. "Of course society must protect itself. But surely it is not self-protection for society to take life without the most careful observance of its own safeguards against the misuse of capital punishment." Fisher, supra, 328 U.S. at 477, 66 S. Ct. at 1325, 90 L. Ed. at 1391 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The sentence of death is vacated. We remand the matter to the Law Division for a sentencing retrial on the John Norcross murder in accordance with this opinion. JUSTICES POLLOCK and STEIN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICES COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 151 September Term 1997 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LESLIE NELSON, Defendant-Appellant. COLEMAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the Court's opinion in all respects except its holding that defendant's death sentence must be vacated because of a Brady violation. The three elements of a Brady violation are: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused, (2) it must be suppressed by the prosecution, and (3) it must be material. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S. Ct. at 2562, 2568, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706, 713 (1972). I agree with the majority that the first two elements are satisfied. My disagreement with the majority concerns the materiality element. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that evidence of the Norcross civil complaint "would have profoundly altered the jury's perspective of the case." Ante at ___ (slip op. at 15). I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that it is "reasonably probable that the jury would have given greater weight to the mitigating factor(s) thus substantiated and would not have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones." Ante at ___ (slip op. at 15). I dissent because I am not persuaded that evidence of the Norcross civil complaint would have, based on a reasonable probability, affected the jury's decision to impose the death penalty for the murder of Officer Norcross. The jury's verdict is worthy of the confidence of this Court. During the penalty phase, defendant sought to prove the following mitigating factors: (1) that defendant was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(5)(a); (2) that defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct and conform to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(5)(d); and (3) the catch-all factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(5)(h). As part of the catch-all factor, defendant's major contention was that the law enforcement officers who sought to execute the search of defendant's bedroom had inadequate training, preparation, and support from the Camden County Prosecutor's Office and the Haddon Heights Police Department for dealing with a mentally disturbed person, especially one known to have a firearm. In support of defendant's mitigating argument that both the Camden County Prosecutor's Office and the Haddon Heights Police Department had inadequately trained their officers, defendant offered the testimony of Theodore Novak, Esq., of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health and Guardianship Advocacy. Novak testified that the police should have taken defendant to a mental health screening center immediately after she made the threat to kill herself, rather than attempting to arrest her. In addition, defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Paul McCauley, professor of criminology at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Dr. McCauley testified, agreeing with Novak, that there were errors that occurred before the police left the Nelson home. Dr. McCauley testified that, based on the facts known to the officers before returning to the Nelson residence, the search warrant was clearly a high risk warrant and neither the Camden County Prosecutor's Office nor the Haddon Heights Police Department had any formal grading system for the risk involved in the execution of warrants; nor did they have any formalized protocol for dealing with the execution of a dangerous warrant. According to Dr. McCauley, if such a plan were in place, the actions of the police would have been very different. He suggested an assortment of various techniques that the police could have used. It was Dr. McCauley's opinion that the police badly mishandled the execution of the warrant, and that the lack of formalized procedures for warrant service substantially contributed to the deaths of Investigator McLaughlin and Officer Norcross. For the State, Detective Norcross was the second witness to testify on April 29, 1997, the first day of the penalty trial. He was not questioned concerning the appropriateness of the officers' actions when executing the warrant. He testified that it was Investigator McLaughlin's decision regarding the procedure to be used in executing the warrant. On cross-examination, defense counsel did not explore the issue further with Detective Norcross. As the majority opinion accurately reflects, it was discovered after the trial had ended that Detective Norcross had filed a civil complaint against defendant, her parents, the Camden County Prosecutor's Office, and the Haddon Heights Police Department. The complaint, which was not verified, was filed on April 18, 1997, just two days before it would have been barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint alleged that the Camden County Prosecutor "was negligent in the performance of his duties by failing to provide proper training and instruction to ensure the safety of the Haddon Heights Police Officers; failing to instruct his staff to so warn the officers of the Haddon Heights Police Department; and was otherwise negligent." Detective Norcross's complaint also alleged that defendant's physician negligently provided pre-operative and post-operative treatment for "gender identity confusion." Although the complaint was served on the Camden County Prosecutor five days before the jury returned with its verdict, defendant was not served until after the jury returned its verdict. With respect to the murder of Officer Norcross, a single interrogatory was listed on the verdict sheet regarding the lack of proper training and supervision of the officers executing the search warrant. It stated: any other factor which any juror finds relevant to Leslie Nelson's prospects of rehabilitation or to the circumstances of the offenses, including, but not limited to the defendant's contention that the law enforcement officers, who on the 20th of April, 1995 were trying to carry out an investigation and search for illegal firearms in Leslie Nelson's bedroom, had inadequate training, preparation, and support from the Camden County Prosecutor's Office and from the Haddon Heights Police Department for dealing with a disturbed person, particularly one known to possess a firearm. The jury was instructed that it could find any mitigating factor from any reliable evidence, that there was no burden of proof, and that unanimity was not required. Although the same three mitigating factors were submitted to the jury regarding each of the two murders, the jury voted differently on the factors for each murder. In the case of Investigator McLaughlin, the jury unanimously found extreme mental or emotional disturbance, two jurors found that defendant did not appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, and four jurors found that the catchall factor was established. In contrast, in the case of Office Norcross, the jury voted unanimously to reject the first two mitigating factors, and three jurors voted for the catchall factor. The focus now shifts to an analysis of whether suppression of the civil complaint satisfies the Brady materiality element. As the majority makes clear, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the materiality standard can be satisfied "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985). The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 353 (1976). New Jersey has adopted the Bagley standard of materiality. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 155-56 (1997); State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 247 (1996). The reviewing court should assess the possibility that [error] might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances . . . . Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S. Ct. at 3384, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494. Defendant claims that with knowledge of the lawsuit, she would have vigorously cross-examined Detective Norcross about his claim of inadequate training, and also prevented the State from attacking defense experts in summation. I find those arguments to be unpersuasive. I am confident that defense counsel's knowledge of the civil complaint would not have changed the verdict. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the suppressed complaint itself is not substantive evidence. The unverified complaint was signed by counsel for plaintiff and represented mere allegations made by counsel on behalf of Detective Norcross. See R. 1:4-5. The complaint was signed and filed April 18, 1997. The fact that the complaint may be deemed to constitute hearsay insofar as Detective Norcross is concerned does not mean that defense counsel could not have used the document to assist with questioning him. Given what defense counsel knew about the case, however, the same questions could have been asked without the complaint. Strategic choices made by defense counsel as to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 357 (1989). Defense counsel knew that the two murders occurred on April 20, 1995 and that Detective Norcross was shot in the same incident. Defense counsel served notice that improper training and supervision of the law enforcement officers executing the search warrant were included in the catchall mitigating factor. Indeed, they urged the trial court to treat that allegation as a separate mitigating factor. They also knew that the Borough of Haddon Heights and the Camden County Prosecutor were the public entities that they alleged in the notice of mitigating factors to have negligently trained and supervised the persons executing the warrant. They also knew that Detective Norcross was one of those who went into the house to execute the warrant and was severely injured when he, too, was shot. Defense counsel are presumed to have known that because Detective Norcross was injured, he had ninety days to serve notice on any public entity of intent to file suit, N.J.S.A. 59:8-8a, and two years from April 20, 1995 to file a complaint. N.J.S.A. 59:8-8b. Given the state of defense counsel's knowledge, it was clear that when Detective Norcross testified on April 29, 1997, if no civil complaint had been filed by then it was time barred. In addition, counsel should have anticipated that the detective would have been motivated to enhance, not hurt, his civil claim. Any answer that would have been damaging to defendant's alleged mitigating factor would be equally damaging to the detective's civil claim. Statements made under oath that are contrary to the declarant's pecuniary interest would be admissible against that person in a civil action pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). The fact that one of the murder victims was the detective's brother would not have increased the risk that his answers might have been against defendant's best interest. When the law enforcement officers left defendant's home to obtain the search warrant, they had already concluded that she was very unstable. She was described as being paranoid. Under the circumstances, the officers created the strong potential for concurrent causes of Detective Norcross's brother's death. The allegations in the complaint were that the police were improperly trained, but there were no allegations that the officers whom defendant killed were negligent. Defendant cannot demonstrate how the complaint was material, or how knowledge of the complaint would have affected the result of the trial. Although the majority assumes that the allegations would have profoundly altered the jury's perspective of the case, ante at ___ (slip op. at 15), the jury would not have reached a different conclusion even if presented with the complaint because it held that each aggravating factor alone outweighed the mitigating factors. The majority claims that evidence of the complaint could have led the jury to find the existence of one or more of defendant's mitigating factors. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 15). However, negligent supervision was a part of only one of defendant's mitigating factors, the catch-all factor. Even if the jury accepted defendant's factor in mitigation, the sum of the aggravating factors would still have outweighed that single mitigating factor related to Officer Norcross's murder. There is no likelihood that the jury would have reached a different conclusion if defendant had knowledge of the complaint. The facts in the case compellingly establish why the jury imposed the death sentence for the murder of Officer Norcross and not for the murder of Investigator McLaughlin. Investigator McLaughlin went into the house to execute the warrant and was shot inside the house. All of the jurors agreed that defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when she killed McLaughlin. Two jurors found that defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct at that time. Four jurors found that the catchall mitigating factor had been established. In contrast, Officer Norcross did not arrive at the scene until after the shooting in the house had ended. He responded as part of a backup team. He was shot by a rifle while he was standing across the street in a driveway. The jurors unanimously rejected the first two mitigating factors. Three jurors, as opposed to four, voted that the catchall mitigating factor had been established. The circumstances surrounding the two murders were so different that I am confident that the suppressed complaint does not meet the materiality standard. In addition, defendant informed the jury through her expert, Dr. McCauley, that not only was there improper training and supervision of the officers executing the warrant, but that subsequent to the murders, the Camden County Prosecutor and the Borough of Haddon Heights had instituted written procedures "relating to the execution of high risk warrants." Although presentation of that evidence to show improvements in operational procedures subsequent to the murders to infer an admission by the public entities that they were previously negligent would have violated N.J.R.E. 407 in a non-capital case, the impact of that evidence was much more helpful to defendant than the suppressed complaint would have been. Finally, the failure to question Detective Norcross about a potential or pending civil complaint was a matter of strategy. Defendant's trial strategy was to rely on experts to establish improper training and supervision. To do that, defendant had to concede that the preconditions for the admission of expert testimony had been met. Generally, there are three basic requirements for the admission of expert testimony: "(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony." State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 337 (1998) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984)). The allegations in the suppressed complaint did not make the detective an expert or affect any potential of qualifying him as an expert. Not only was the complaint not material under Brady, but it was cumulative to other evidence presented at trial. The subject of negligent police training was fully litigated through the presentation of defense experts, including Dr. McCauley. Evidence that is merely cumulative does not create a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been affected. State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 114 (1982). [T]here [is] no reasonable possibility that a different verdict would have arisen had the [complaint] been disclosed. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 207 (1991). For unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S. Ct. at 2399, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 352. I would affirm the imposition of the death penalty. Justice Garibaldi joins in this dissent. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LESLIE A. NELSON, A/K/A GLEN NELSON, Defendant-Appellant. HANDLER, J., concurring and dissenting. On April 20, 1995, defendant, Leslie Nelson, shot and killed two police officers and severely wounded another as the police attempted to serve and execute a search warrant for guns she kept in her apartment. The two officers who died were Investigator John McLaughlin and Officer John Norcross. Detective Richard Norcross, John's brother, was severely injured. The Camden County Grand Jury indicted defendant for two counts of knowing or-purposeful murder by her own conduct, eight counts of first-degree attempted murder, third-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. The Camden County Prosecutor's Office served notice of the following four aggravating factors for each capital murder offense: (1) the murders created a grave risk of death to Detective Norcross, (2) each murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment, or confinement for the unlawful possession of a firearm, (3) each murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the murder of the other officer, and (4) each murder occurred while the officers were engaged in the performance of their official duties. Defendant did not contest her guilt for the murders. She pled guilty to two counts of murder for the murders of Investigator McLaughlin and Officer Norcross, and she pled guilty to the lesser included count of second degree aggravated assault of Detective Norcross. The only issue that was tried was whether she should be executed for her crimes. A jury was empaneled to consider whether to impose the death penalty, and defendant asked the jury to consider three mitigating factors: (1) she was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution, (2) her capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired as the result of a mental disease or defect, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute defense to prosecution, (3) and the catch-all factor. The primary focus of the catch-all factor was that the police were inadequately trained to serve a search warrant for weapons in the possession of a person with her degree of emotional and psychological disturbances and that, as a result, their action was needlessly and dangerously threatening and confrontational, thereby provoking rather than averting a violent reaction. After hearing eight days of evidence and arguments from counsel, the jury voted to sentence defendant to death for the murder of Officer Norcross, but they could not unanimously agree on the sentence for the murder of Investigator McLaughlin. The Court rules in Part II, III, and IV of its opinion respectively, that the non-disclosure of mitigating evidence requires reversal, ante at __ (slip op. at 16), the failure to permit the jury to consider the practical consequences of its decision was error but harmless, ante at __ (slip op. at 21-22, and the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense psychiatric expert about defendant's political beliefs was error, but the Court does not address whether it was reversible error, ante at __ (slip op. at 28). I join Part II of the Court's opinion, and I agree with the findings of error in Parts III and IV. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that these errors, each significant, substantial and highly prejudicial, do not warrant a reversal of defendant's death sentence. I disagree, and therefore dissent from Parts III and IV of the Court's opinion. Unbeknownst to the defense, at the time the prosecutor was making those very arguments to the jury and stressing that the police were beyond criticism, the State's chief witness, Detective Norcross had filed a lawsuit blaming his injuries at the hands of defendant on the police department's failure to provide adequate supervision and training. NO. A-151 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LESLIE A. NELSON, a/k/a GLEN NELSON, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED