Title: Maryland v. Tejada

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Emanuel Tejada, No. 103, September Term 2009
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – TRIAL PROCEDURE – JURY SELECTION –
OBJECTION TO JURY SELECTION PROCESS – PRESERVATION FOR APPEAL:
Pursuant to King v. State Roads Comm’n, 284 Md. 368, 396 A.2d 267 (1979), an objection
to the number of prospective jurors in the venire at the peremptory challenge phase is timely
for purposes of preserving the objection for appeal if it is made before the jury is impaneled.
Neither Maryland Rule 4-312 nor Rule 4-323(c) requires that such an objection be made
prior to the use of any peremptory challenges.  In addition, a party’s continued use of its
peremptory challenges after lodging such an objection to the size of the venire does not
waive appellate review of the objection.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 107528
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 103
September Term, 2009
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
EMANUEL TEJADA
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
               JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Filed:   April 26, 2011
1 Respondent’s co-defendant is not involved in this appeal. 
2 The number of peremptory challenges available to each party is based on the flagship
(continued...)
Respondent, Emanuel Tejada, was convicted by a jury of two counts of attempted
murder, armed robbery, and related offenses.  He appealed the judgments of conviction,
arguing, inter alia, that the bifurcated jury selection process denied him the right to an
informed and comparative rejection of prospective jurors.  The Court of Special Appeals held
that Respondent preserved that claim for appellate review and the trial court erred in
bifurcating the jury selection process.
We granted the State’s petition to review the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals.  The State has opted not to challenge that court’s judgment on the merits and argues
only that Respondent failed to preserve his objection for appellate review.  For the reasons
that follow, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals did not err in finding the issue to be
preserved for review.  
I.
In October 2007, Respondent and a co-defendant stood trial in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, on various charges stemming from an attempted robbery of an armored
truck in Silver Spring, Maryland.1  The trial was scheduled to take seven days.   
The jury selection process began with a venire of 60 prospective jurors.  The trial
court dismissed 17 of them for cause, leaving 43 venirepersons for the peremptory challenge
phase of the process.  Respondent and his co-defendant were each entitled to exercise 20
peremptory challenges and the State, 20 (10 per defendant).2  
2(...continued)
charge and its potential penalty.  See Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 8-420 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; Md. Rule 4-313.  In this case, both Respondent and
his co-defendant were charged with attempted first degree murder, which carries the
possibility of a life sentence upon conviction. See Md. Code (2002), § 2-205 of the Criminal
Law Article.  In that  circumstance, “[e]ach defendant who is subject on any single count to
a sentence of death or life imprisonment . . . is permitted 20 peremptory challenges and the
State is permitted ten peremptory challenges for each defendant.”  Md. Rule 4-313(a)(2).
3  As shall be seen, the State raises a number of arguments in support of its position
that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that Respondent preserved for
appellate review his claim that the trial court erred in conducting the process of jury
selection.  Those arguments are best understood only if it is known precisely what was said,
when, and by whom.  We therefore detail the numerous discussions among the court and
counsel throughout the two days during which jury selection took place.
-2-
Midway through the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court noted that the parties
were “going to run out of jurors.”  By that time, Respondent had used 14 challenges, his co-
defendant 12, and the State 6.  The parties and the court discussed the situation3:
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I know that I have strikes left, and I
know that --
[The Court]: You’ve got more strikes than we have jurors left.
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Well, that’s what I was going to raise.
[The State]: We’re going to have to do another panel.  
[The Court]: Oh, yes, we’re going to have to do it when I get back [later
today].
 
The trial court then asked the clerk to inform the jury commissioner that the court
would “need another panel, but not until later this afternoon, 3:30.”  The parties exercised
several more challenges.  The court then recessed for lunch, noting at that time that
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Respondent had four challenges remaining, his co-defendant eight, and the State five. 
When proceedings resumed after the luncheon recess, the court instructed the lawyers
of “a problem” with the new jurors requested from the jury commissioner: 
[The Court]: We got a little problem, Houston.  The jurors that we have, first
of all most of them down there have already been through, they were not
screened for seven days.  In fact, the jury commissioner knows that these
jurors that they have left cannot stay five days.  And so [there is no] point in
us going through that exercise in futility because that’s going to be a problem.
So there are two proposals . . . we can either start all over tomorrow. [The
commissioner can bring in] about 100 jurors and maybe we’ll even be able to
get the bigger courtroom, and . . . just start all over, or we can, which is the
proper procedure[,] keep the seven or eight or whatever we have and then just
select the rest of them tomorrow morning.  
Now, understand something, finishing the selection today is not an option.  We
don’t have enough in the venire. 
Counsel for Respondent’s co-defendant indicated that she was “inclined to start over”
with the entire jury selection process.  The State opposed that proposal, stating:   “I don’t
know why we would start again and excuse [the jurors already selected].  We’ve been
through the process with them,” and selecting an entirely new jury would “knock [the State]
a half a day or a day behind [schedule].”  The State was willing  to hear defense counsel’s
reasons for “start[ing] fresh” but did not know of a reason requiring the court to do so.   The
court responded:
[The Court]: I’m not so sure you can -- I suppose anything that the parties
agree to, you could do it, but I’m not sure that . . . you can do that, start over
unless you all agree.  
[The State]: I don’t know why we would.
[The Court]: Because we’re basically in the middle of the jury selection
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process.  If we were carrying it on today and just had a group of jurors come
up, we would never get rid of the ones we’ve already picked.
After a short discussion regarding a possible break to allow the parties to review the
relevant law on jury selection, the exchange continued:
[The Court]: . . . I’m not so sure that there’s any real choice, Mr. State.  I
mean, I suppose as long as it’s not anything that’s illegal or against any rule,
the parties could agree to anything, but absent an agreement we’re still
basically in the middle of selecting a jury, and we would never start over in the
middle of that process simply because --
[The State]: I agree.
[The Court]: Right, go ahead.
[The State]: The only thing I’ve stated is if the Defense believes there is
prejudice because of this, that they put it on the record now so we know what
it is, and then we can address that now.  
[The Court]: You’re not going to find a lot of help in the rules.  I know you’ve
already looked at that.  Well [Md. Rule 4-312(f)] addresses the question of
additional jurors.  “When the number of jurors of the regular panel may be
insufficient to allow for selection of a jury, the Court may direct that additional
jurors be summoned at [] random from the qualified jury wheel and thereafter
[] at random in a manor [sic] provided by the statute.”  So the rule provides
that we can do exactly what I’m going to do, and that’s summons additional
jurors.  I don’t know that we can --
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: I just maintain my objection for the record, Your
Honor.
[The Court]: Sure.  Now if you come up with some reason overnight why we
can do anything different, then we can still, we can still, dismiss this group.
The discussion then diverted briefly towards determining the appropriate time for the
venirepersons to return the follow morning, and then continued:
[Respondent’s Counsel]: And at this particular point, I would just join in the
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general objection and look at things tonight and let Your Honor know if
anything is different.  
[The Court]: I think the State’s Attorney makes a good point.  If there’s some
specific objection to sending the jury home and bringing in extra jurors, I’m
sure that counsel would put it on the record, but there is no real specific
objection available, but I will give you the opportunity to look over the issue
in the evening.  
The court then dismissed the jurors for the evening.  
At the outset of proceedings the following morning, the court stated:  “We didn’t have
enough people in [yesterday’s] panel to complete the selection process.  And so we are
bringing some more in this morning to see if we can get the 12, or probably 16 jurors that we
need.”  After logistical discussions, Respondent’s counsel addressed the court regarding his
objection to the bifurcated jury selection:
[Respondent’s Counsel]: We have just a quick matter here and that is, Your
Honor, we, having thought more about the issue about what’s happening here,
is I would just like to renew my objection to the procedure.  
[The Court]: Very well, so noted.
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: And my original objection -- 
[The Court]: So noted. 
[Respondent’s Counsel]: And it has to do --
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]:   -- is just continuing – 
[The Court]: So noted.
[Respondent’s Counsel]: Right, it has to do with what [co-defendant’s counsel]
was about to say yesterday, which is that the idea of comparative striking --
looking at who we’re striking and seeing what is left on the panel. 
-6-
[The Court]: So noted. Okay?  
After the court began  voir dire of  the new panel of prospective jurors, co-defendant’s
counsel again raised the issue of the bifurcated selection process:
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: And I raise again my original objection with regard
to -- I just want to make sure it’s ongoing -- about [] doing the supplemental
jury selection, Your Honor.
[The Court]: There’s really not a supplemental jury.  It’s just a continuation of
--
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Right, a continuation. 
[The Court]: If we had the people yesterday --
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Right. 
[The Court]: -- we would’ve continued it yesterday.  We simply didn’t have
the people.  And, notwithstanding counsel’s objection, you were given the
option of starting all over from zero as if we never started and you declined
and decide[d] that because --
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: No, no, no.  I asked for --
[The Court]:  -- you have extra strikes -- 
[Respondent’s Counsel]: Your Honor, we both --
[The Court]: -- you would use those.
[Respondent’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I respectfully disagree. Both of us
lodged --
[The Court]: You want me to excuse the people, the nine?  I can do that.
And your objection goes away.
[Respondent’s Counsel]: That was our request yesterday. 
[The Court]: Well, do you want me to do it today?
-7-
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: We don’t have enough jurors again.
[The Court]: Oh, yes, we do. 
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: We have 50.
[The Court]: Okay, well --
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: But we had 65 yesterday.
[The Court]: I’ll reserve ruling on your objection and if you want to
excuse the nine that we have picked today, I’ll do it.
[Respondent’s Counsel]: You’ll reserve ruling on that.
[The Court]: Uh-huh.  
(Emphases added.)
The court resumed the voir dire.  Shortly thereafter, the court and parties discussed
how long the selection process was taking.  The court noted:
[The Court]: Now, the option of starting over is not a real option unless
you want to do this again tomorrow because guess what? We don’t have
any more jurors.
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: -- have any -- yes.
[The Court]: That is it.
[The State]: (Unintelligible) Mr. [Respondent’s Counsel] and Ms. [Co-
defendant’s Counsel] -- 
[The Court]: But I’m not depriving you [of the option to start over].  If
that’s what you want to do, we’ll just have to bring some people in
tomorrow, but you think about that at lunch.  
[Respondent’s Counsel]: Your Honor, given Your Honor’s statement just
now, my client would waive that objection. 
-8-
[The Court]: Okay, that’s fine.
(Emphases added.)
The parties returned after a recess, at which time counsel for Respondent’s co-
defendant renewed her objection to the jury selection process.  
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, you, before the break, gave me
until after lunch to decide whether I wanted to waive, like [Respondent’s
Counsel] did, on the objection of the - - the selection of the jury and
having a second panel to supplement the panel that we had already
selected yesterday.  
I’m going to stand by my objection and elect to request that a new panel -
- I would ask for 150 jurors to be brought tomorrow to select a new jury,
with exercising all the strikes and do it tomorrow. 
[The Court]: Very well.
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: -- from scratch.
[The Court]: Yes?
[The State]: Briefly, the -- 
[The Court]: Objection is overruled.
[The State]: All right, then I -- we should proceed then with finishing the voir
dire process.  
[The Court]: Just for the record, this is not a supplemental panel; this is -
- if we had the jurors present yesterday, we would have simply had more
brought up except that there were no further jurors and we had to wait
until this morning to continue the jury selection process.
So it isn’t that we have selected a panel and now we’re selecting another
one; we never did complete the selection process.  We got nine jurors, I
believe, out of the 12 that we need.
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Eight, Your Honor.  One of them called, remember
-9-
118 called and --
[The Court]: Well, but he was selected.
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Oh, yes.
[The Court]: But today he was excused because he has -- and I excused him
for cause because -- 
[Co-defendant’s Counsel]: Yes.
[The Court]: -- quite frankly, it wouldn’t be fair to make counsel use a strike.
The juror neglected to tell us yesterday that he wasn’t able to be here on
Thursday, tomorrow.  So, anything else?
[Respondent’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.  I misunderstood Your
Honor’s position.  I apologize to the Court.  I think my words at the bench
were “having heard what Your Honor just said, I waive my objection.”
Now that I understand Your Honor’s position that you are overruling her
request, then I would enjoin [sic] in her request because I had waived with
the understanding that Your Honor was going to say “whatever you two
decide, I, the Judge, will grant,” and I’m not saying that’s what you said,
I’m just saying that was my understanding.
And now that I know that Your Honor had overruled the objection, I
think I misunderstood Your Honor and I made it clear that what my
waiving was based on -- and now that I clearly understand Your Honor’s
position, I would join in [co-defendant’s counsel’s] objection.
[The Court]: Very well. Overruled.  
(Emphases added.)
The parties resumed jury selection, during which Respondent exercised the remainder
of his peremptory strikes.  On the eighth day of trial, the jury found Respondent guilty of
4  The court sentenced Respondent as follows: attempted second degree murder
(victim 1), 25 years; attempted second degree murder (victim 2), 25 years, consecutive;
robbery with a dangerous weapon, 20 years, consecutive; conspiracy to commit robbery with
a deadly and dangerous weapon, 10 years, consecutive; use of a handgun in the commission
of a crime of violence, 20 years, consecutive; armed carjacking, 20 years, concurrent with
the use of a handgun sentence.  
5  In so holding, the Court of Special Appeals followed Booze v. State, 347 Md. 51,
698 A.2d 1087 (1997).  We held in Booze that the provisions of then-Rule 4-312 “need to be
read together, and, when so read, they communicate clearly this Court’s intent that, to the
extent possible, the parties should have before them the entire pool of prospective jurors
before being required to exercise any of their peremptory challenges. . . .  By adopting Rule
4-312(g), we have made that intent a mandate of State judicial policy, and, in the absence of
a waiver or other compelling circumstance, we insist that it be followed.”   347 Md. at 69,
698 A.2d at 1096. 
The version of Rule 4-312(g) in effect when we decided Booze was still in effect when
Respondent was tried and provided in pertinent part:
(g) Designation of List of Qualified Jurors. – Before the exercise of
peremptory challenges, the court shall designate from the jury list those jurors
who have qualified after examination.  The number designated shall be
(continued...)
-10-
multiple offenses.  Sentencing followed in due course.4 
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Respondent raised a number of claims
including that the trial court erred in its conduct of the jury selection process.  The State
countered that Respondent had failed to preserve the claim for appellate review and, even if
the claim was properly before the appellate court, it had no merit.  The Court of Special
Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, held that Respondent had preserved the claim for
appellate review and that the trial judge erred by conducting a bifurcated jury selection
process, because it had the effect of denying Respondent his right of informed and
comparative rejection.5  The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgments and remanded
5(...continued)
sufficient to provide the number of jurors and alternates to be sworn after
allowing for the exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 4-313.
The court shall at the same time prescribe the order to be followed in selecting
the jurors and alternate jurors from the list.  
This Court rewrote Maryland Rule 4-312 by Order dated December 4, 2007 (effective
January 1, 2008).  Current Rule 4-312(e) contains substantially the same language as did
former Rule 4-312(g).  Our analysis is governed by the Rule as it was codified at the time of
Respondent’s trial.
-11-
Respondent’s case for a new trial. 
The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted to consider the
following questions:
(1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in determining that a complaint that
there was not a sufficient number of prospective jurors designated prior to the
beginning of the exercise of peremptory challenges, as required by Maryland
Rule 4-312, is preserved as long as a defendant who had not exhausted all of
his or her peremptory challenges objects before the jury is sworn in?
(2) Even if an objection before the beginning of the exercise of peremptory
challenges is not required, does a party waive appellate review of the issue by
continuing to exercise strikes after the issue is raised by the trial court or
another party?
(3) Even if an objection before the beginning of the exercise of peremptory
challenges is not required, does the trial court have discretion to reject a
party’s attempt to retract a waiver of the objection?
II.
The State does not challenge the holding of the Court of Special Appeals concerning
the merits of this case—that the trial court violated then-Rule 4-312(g) by commencing the
peremptory challenge phase of jury selection without a sufficient number of prospective
-12-
jurors to allow all peremptory challenges to be exercised.   Rather, the State asks us to decide
only whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in reaching the merits of Respondent’s
claim that the trial court improperly bifurcated the jury selection process.  Each of the three
questions presented raises a different theory as to why, in the State’s view, that claim was not
properly before the Court of Special Appeals for review.  We address each theory in turn. 
A.
The State first contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that
Respondent’s objection before the jury was sworn sufficed to preserve for appellate review
his claim of error in the trial court’s handling of the jury selection process.  The State argues
that Respondent was required to object to the size of the venire before exercising any
peremptory challenges because it was clear by then—i.e, after the court excused for cause
15 venirepersons, leaving only 45 prospective jurors—that there remained an insufficient
number of venirepersons to accommodate the parties’ exercise of all their allotted peremptory
challenges (and to select alternate jurors). 
This Court’s decision in King v. State Roads Comm’n, 284 Md. 368, 396 A.2d 267
(1979), informs the issue.  In King, the trial court produced a venire of 25 potential jurors at
the beginning of the peremptory challenge phase of jury selection, instead of the 20 required
under (then-applicable) Maryland Rule 543 a.  That Rule called for 20 venirepersons and
provided that each party had four peremptory challenges, leaving 12 persons to be sworn as
the jury.  King, 284 Md. at 372, 396 A.2d at 270.  A panel of 28 venirepersons was subjected
to voir dire by the court.  Three venirepersons were struck for cause, leaving 25 prospective
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jurors.  The court allowed each of the parties to exercise the right to strike four prospective
persons, then struck five of the remaining jurors to create the 12-person jury.  Id. at 369-70,
396 A.2d at 268.  We held that process to be erroneous because it violated the procedure
outlined in Maryland Rule 543 a and left the judge in the position of “hav[ing] more to say
about who would not sit on the panel than either of the parties.”  Id. at 372, 396 A.2d at 270.
Of relevance to the case at bar, King also presented the issue of whether the petitioners
had preserved their appellate objections by timely challenging the jury selection process in
the trial court.  In discussing that issue, we emphasized that,
when, as here, a rule clearly sets forth the jury selection procedure to be
followed, any dissatisfaction with the technical procedure actually utilized
must be expressed for the record before the jury is sworn unless it can be
shown that the complaining party both did not know and, with reasonable
diligence, could not have known of the irregularity.  Here, with a knowledge
of Rule 543 a, which all parties and their counsel are charged with having, and
being furnished with a list that contained more than twenty names from which
they were to exercise their peremptory strikes, petitioners necessarily were
cognizant of the irregularity so as to require that, if they wished to register an
objection, they do so before the jury was impaneled.    
Id. at 372-73, 396 A.2d at 270 (emphases added). 
Because, through no apparent fault of the parties, we could not discern whether the
petitioners had objected to the selection process before the jury was sworn, we vacated the
judgments and ordered a remand “for certification by the trial court as to what occurred.” 
Id. at 375, 396 A.2d at 271.  Then, “if the court finds the petitioners did not make a timely
objection, as specified by this opinion, the judgments previously recorded . . . should be re-
entered; however, if it finds such an objection was registered before the jury was impaneled,
6  It is evidently for this reason that the State does not rely on Maryland Rule 8-131(a)
in support of its non-preservation argument.  That rule provides in pertinent part that,
“ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the
record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”  Plainly, the issue of how to deal
with the insufficient number of prospective jurors for the peremptory challenge phase was
“raised” by both Respondent and “decided by” the trial court.  See Bundy v. State, 334 Md.
131, 138, 638 A.2d 84, 88 (1994).
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a new trial should be provided.”  And, “if the trial judge is unable to reach a conclusion as
to whether a timely objection was made, then, in that event, a new trial should be conducted.”
Id., 396 A.2d at 271.  Notably, in identifying the time before which an objection to the jury
selection process must be made, we did not require, though we certainly could have on the
facts presented, that the objection be made as soon as the objecting party knew, or should
have known, of the erroneously conducted jury selection process.  We were satisfied with a
rule that deems such an objection to be timely so long as it is made before the jury is
impaneled.  
In the present case, the Court of Special Appeals applied the preservation rule that we
announced in King, and we discern no good reason why it should not have done so.  The
State nevertheless raises several arguments for why the King rule should be abandoned in
favor of a more stringent preservation rule, at least for purposes of the claimed error in this
case.  All of those arguments, the State points out, relate “primarily to the timing of the
objection, rather than its substance.”6  We are not persuaded by any of the State’s arguments.
The State first argues that Respondent was obligated, pursuant to Rule 4-312(g), to
complain about the process the court was contemplating—calling for additional
7  In that regard the State points out that Respondent should have known as soon as
the venire was assembled in the courtroom that its size was insufficient, after strikes for
cause, to accommodate the full exercise of the parties’ peremptories.  The State does not
insist, though, that Respondent was required to lodge his objection at the very outset of the
entire process. 
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venirepersons—no later than at the outset of the exercise of peremptory challenges.7  At the
time of trial, Rule 4-312(g) stated:  “Before the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court
shall designate from the jury list those jurors who have qualified after examination.”  The
State points to the time described in the opening clause of the Rule—“Before the exercise
of peremptory challenges”—and argues that Respondent was required to object at that point.
By that time, the State explains, Respondent knew that too few potential jurors remained to
produce a full jury after accounting for all the peremptory challenges afforded to the parties.
The State therefore argues that Respondent waived any objection to the size of the venire by
not objecting before the exercise of any peremptory challenges. 
We disagree with the State that Rule 4-312(g) is to be read as including a timing
requirement for objections.  The same rules used in statutory interpretation are used to
interpret the Maryland Rules.  Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 738, 4 A.3d 976, 982 (2010).  We
have often repeated that “‘[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the Legislature.’”  Bd. of Educ. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 214,
973 A.2d 233, 241 (2009) (quoting Kushell v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 385 Md. 563,
576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005)).  We must read any of our rules of procedure “as a
whole to ensure that none of its provisions are rendered meaningless.”  Lonaconing Trap
8  Rule 4-323(c) provides in full:
(c) Objections to other rulings or orders. For purposes of review by the trial
court or on appeal of any other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at
the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the court the
action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of
the court. The grounds for the objection need not be stated unless these rules
expressly provide otherwise or the court so directs. If a party has no
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of
an objection at that time does not constitute a waiver of the objection.
-16-
Club, Inc. v. Md. Dept. of the Env’t, 410 Md. 326, 339, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (citation
omitted).  
When read in its entirety, Rule 4-312 does not require that an objection to the number
of qualified jurors designated by the court be made before the exercise of any peremptory
challenges.  Had we intended such a requirement, we would have said so explicitly as we did
elsewhere in the Rule.  For example, sections (a) and (e) of Rule 4-312, as they existed at the
time of trial, specified respectively that a “challenge to the array [of jurors] shall be made and
determined before any individual juror from that array is examined,” and “a challenge for
cause shall be made and determined before the jury is sworn, or thereafter for good cause
shown.”  No similar explicit provision addresses the issue here.
Neither are we persuaded by the State’s contention that Rule 4-323(c) required
Respondent to object to the jury selection process before the parties began to exercise their
peremptory challenges.  That Rule states, in relevant part, that a party must object to a court
ruling or order “at the time the ruling or order is made or sought.”8  The “ruling . . . made or
sought” in the present case came, at the soonest, when the court announced that the parties
9  We are reminded that, in Booze, this Court made clear the mandate of then-Rule 4-
312(g) that, “[b]efore the exercise of peremptory challenges the court shall designate from
the jury list those jurors who have qualified after examination[,]” (emphasis added), and “the
number designated shall be sufficient to provide the number of jurors and alternates to be
sworn after allowing for the exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 4-313.”
Booze, 347 Md. at 58–59, 698 A.2d at 1091 (quoting Rule 4-312(g)).
-17-
were “going to run out of jurors.”  By that time the parties had exercised 32 peremptory
challenges.  At the outset of the peremptory challenge phase of jury selection there was but
a possibility (albeit a highly likely one) that the parties would run out of prospective jurors
before exercise of peremptory strikes and, if that did occur, only a chance the court would
address the problem in a manner objectionable to Respondent. 
Certainly it would have been far better had one of the parties or, for that matter, the
court itself9 recognized and addressed prophylactically the looming problem at the outset of
the peremptory challenge phase.  But no fair reading of Rule 4-323(c) obligated Respondent
to raise the concern at that time, lest he waive any claim of error attendant to whatever action
the court subsequently might take to remedy the problem.  Beyond that, Respondent, of
course, “made known to the court his objection to the ruling at the time the ruling was made,”
which is all that Rule 4-323(c) requires.  See Bundy v. State, 334 Md. 131, 138, 638 A.2d 84,
88 (1994) (quoting Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 411, 601 A.2d 131, 137 (1992)).
For much the same reason, Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978),
to which the State also directs us, does not assist its cause.  We stated in Covington that “it
is incumbent upon a litigant to make known to the court an objection to the action of the
court at the earliest practicable opportunity.” 383 Md. at 543, 386 A.2d at 337.  Respondent
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correctly points out that “Covington, unlike King and the instant case, did not involve an
objection to a jury selection procedure[,]” but rather a claim on appeal that defense counsel
was foreclosed, at trial on an agreed statement of facts, from making closing argument.  The
trial court had found the defendant guilty before inviting defense counsel to make any
comments he had before sentencing.  We held that the matter was more properly resolved at
a post conviction hearing.  282 Md. at 544, 386 A.2d at 338.  
Notably, we decided King eight months after Covington, without any mention of the
‘‘earliest practical opportunity” statement in Covington.  Moreover, we cited this same
principle from Covington in Bundy, in which we considered whether the appellant had
preserved for appellate review the claim that the trial court erred in allowing the State to
exercise more than four peremptory challenges. We concluded, in the context of determining
the timeliness of a challenge to the court’s ruling allowing the State to use excess peremptory
challenges, that a timely objection to such error was required under Rule 4-323(c) to “be
lodged at the time an excess peremptory challenge is exercised because the trial judge may
wish to remedy any error by recalling and seating the juror who was improperly stricken.”
Bundy, 334 Md. at 139, 638 A.2d at 89.   That conclusion flowed from the recognized need
to give the court the opportunity to correct the wrong, i.e., seat the improperly stricken juror
before the juror is excused and has left the courthouse.  See id. at 140, 638 A.2d at 89.
The situation in the present case is not at all the same as in Covington or Bundy.  Here,
the court and counsel, including counsel for Respondent, debated the proper course of action
as soon as the problem with the inadequate venire became obvious, and at that early juncture
10 We are not alone in applying a King-like rule that permits objections to irregularities
in jury selection until the jury is sworn.  See Jones v. State, 437 So. 2d 628, 629 (Ala. 1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 634 (Lexis 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-113(1) (2011); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-352 (2011). 
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Respondent made known to the court his view that starting the entire process anew was the
correct course of action.  Equally important, the court made no final ruling about how to
proceed until the second day of jury selection.  At that time, after further debate about the
proper course of action, the court rejected the request of Respondent and his co-defendant
to start anew the entire jury selection process and, only then, overruled their respective
objections to proceeding with the bifurcated selection process.  Further, unlike in Bundy, the
nature of the error was such that, at any time before the jury was sworn, the court was able
to reconsider its ruling and remedy the error by striking the prospective jurors remaining in
the courtroom and starting the process anew.
In sum, the State has given us no good reason not to apply the general rule from King
that an objection to the jury-selection process must be made before the jury is sworn.10
Accordingly, we hold that Respondent preserved his objection by raising it before the jury
was impaneled.  
B.
We turn next to the State’s contention that Respondent waived appellate review by
continuing to exercise peremptory challenges after he and his co-defendant raised the issue
of the insufficient venire.  The State argues that Respondent’s use of challenges after his
initial objection was “directly inconsistent” with his claim that he desired to have a
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sufficiently large venire for jury selection.  We disagree.  The exercise of peremptory
challenges is not inconsistent with a request for a venire containing a sufficient number of
jurors.
Like the Supreme Court, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (peremptory
challenges “traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a
qualified and unbiased jury” (citation omitted)), this Court long ago recognized that “[t]he
right of peremptory challenge is deemed a most essential one to a prisoner, and is highly
esteemed and protected in the law.”  Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 464 (1881) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. King, 284 Md. at 370, 396 A.2d at 269 (noting that
“a reasonable peremptory challenge right plays a vital role because it permits a party to
eliminate a prospective juror with personal trials or predilections that, although not
challengeable for cause, will, in the opinion of the litigant, impel that individual to decide the
case on a basis other than the evidence presented”).  The right to peremptory challenges in
criminal trials is codified currently at Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 8-420 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”).  See Md. Rule 4-313 (describing the
procedure for exercising peremptory challenges in criminal trials).   
There is no case in Maryland stating that a party’s continued exercise of peremptory
challenges waives appellate review of earlier phases of the jury-selection process.  Indeed,
such a rule would undermine the purpose of CJ § 8-420 and Rule 4-313, which is to
recognize the “ancient,” Booze, 347 Md. at 59, 698 A.2d at 1091, and “highly esteemed,”
Turpin, 55 Md. at 464, right of peremptory challenge. 
11 Batson set forth the general proposition that “[p]eremptory challenges cannot be
exercised to exclude members of a cognizable racial group from a jury.”  Edmonds v. State,
372 Md. 314, 328, 812 A.2d 1034, 1042 (2002).  We have noted that “[t]he underlying
purpose of Batson and its progeny is to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, to protect
the venireperson’s right not to be excluded on an impermissible discriminatory basis, and to
preserve public confidence in the judicial system.”  Id. at 329, 812 A.2d at 1042.
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The only case the State cites to support its contention is Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md.
606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995).  There, the primary issue was whether the prohibition against
race-based peremptory challenges, described in Batson, applied to challenges aimed at
Caucasian venirepersons based on their race.11  The trial court had dismissed the first jury,
on Batson grounds, because defense counsel only exercised peremptory challenges against
Caucasian jurors.  The defense objected to the dismissal of the jury.  When the second jury
was chosen, defense counsel answered affirmatively when the court asked if the jury was
acceptable.  That jury later convicted Gilchrist.   340 Md. at 616-17, 667 A.2d at 880-81.
Gilchrist argued on appeal that Batson did not apply to peremptory challenges against
Caucasian prospective jurors.  In addition to advocating that Batson applied to Caucasian
venirepersons as well as those who are African American, the State argued that Gilchrist
waived his objection to the dismissal of the first jury by explicitly calling the second jury
acceptable.  In rejecting the State’s waiver argument, we recognized that “a defendant’s
claim of error in the inclusion or exclusion of a prospective juror or jurors is ordinarily
abandoned when the defendant or his counsel indicates satisfaction with the jury at the
conclusion of the jury selection process.”  Id. at 617, 667 A.2d at 881 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).   The Gilchrist Court explained further:
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When a party complains about the exclusion of someone from or the
inclusion of someone in a particular jury, and thereafter states without
qualification that the same jury as ultimately chosen is satisfactory or
acceptable, the party is clearly waiving or abandoning the earlier complaint
about that jury.  The party’s final position is directly inconsistent with his or
her earlier complaint.
Nevertheless, where the objection was not directly “aimed at the
composition of the jury ultimately selected,” we have taken the position that
the objecting party’s “approval of the jury as ultimately selected . . . did not
explicitly or implicitly waive his previously asserted . . . [objection, and his]
objection was preserved for appellate review.” 
Id. at 618, 667 A.2d 881-82 (citation omitted).   
The State contends that Gilchrist stands for the proposition that “inconsistency results
in a waiver.”  The State then argues that, “[s]ince continuing to exercise strikes is ‘directly
inconsistent’ with a claim that a party wants to have a full panel before exercising any strikes,
the same waiver principle should apply.”  We disagree with such a generalization of the
Gilchrist rule.  Even if that rule applies beyond objections to the inclusion or exclusion of
particular jurors, the State’s argument is flawed because the continued use of peremptory
challenges by Respondent was not “directly inconsistent” with his objection to the inadequate
number of prospective jurors in the pool.  The “directly inconsistent” circumstances
described in Gilchrist involve a party’s objection to the inclusion of venirepersons in, or
exclusion from, a jury and a subsequent affirmative acceptance of the same jury by the
objecting party.  340 Md. at 617, 667 A.2d at 881.  The analogous “directly inconsistent”
circumstances in this case would be Respondent objecting to the inadequate number of
prospective jurors in the pool, but then later pronouncing his acceptance of either the pool
or the final jury, as selected. 
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Of course, that did not occur.  Rather, Respondent objected, early on, to the size of
the venire and then continued to exercise peremptory strikes after the trial court indicated that
it would bring in an additional panel of jurors later that same day.  After learning that the jury
commissioner no longer had enough prospective jurors available for another panel that day,
the court advised the parties that they could keep the selected jurors and continue the next
day, or start anew the entire selection process.  Respondent and his co-defendant objected to
continuing the next day, wishing instead to have the process started anew.  The court
overruled that objection.  The next day, Respondent exercised his remaining challenges.
Respondent, we note, never stated that the final jury, as chosen, was acceptable.
Once the selection process began, Respondent  was required to engage in that process;
it was not incumbent upon Respondent to discontinue the exercise of peremptory challenges
in order to preserve for appellate review his objections to the jury selection process.  Neither
Gilchrist nor any other authority cited by the State requires a party to choose between, on the
one hand, exercising all of his or her peremptory challenges and thereby waiving appellate
review of deficient jury selection procedures, and, on the other hand, not exercising all of his
or her challenges and thereby facing a potentially less desirable jury at trial.  Forcing that
dilemma upon a party would be akin to requiring that, in order to preserve an objection to the
admission of a witness’s testimony, a party must refrain from cross-examination.  Such a
result is absurd.  We therefore reject the State’s theory of “waiver by exercise of peremptory
challenge.”  We hold that Respondent did not waive his right to appeal the bifurcated jury
selection process by continuing to exercise the peremptory challenges available to him.
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C.
Finally, the State presents the question:  “[D]oes the trial court have discretion to
reject a party’s attempt to retract a waiver of the objection?”  The “waiver” at issue is that
of Respondent, from the second day of jury selection, regarding the trial court’s decision not
to begin anew the entire jury selection process.  
Respondent initially objected to the bifurcated selection process and requested the
process start over.  On the second day of jury selection, the court explained that the option
of starting anew was still available, to which Respondent’s counsel replied, “my client would
waive that objection.”  Following that, the court recessed.  After the break, counsel for
Respondent retracted the waiver:
[Respondent’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.  I misunderstood Your Honor’s
position.  I apologize to the Court.  I think my words at the bench were
“having heard what Your Honor just said, I waive my objection.”  Now that
I understand Your Honor’s position that you are overruling [co-defendant’s
counsel’s] request, then I would enjoin [sic] in her request because I had
waived with the understanding that Your Honor was going to say “whatever
you two decide, I the Judge, will grant,” and I’m not saying that’s what you
said, I’m just saying that was my understanding.
And now that I know that Your Honor had overruled the objection, I think I
misunderstood Your Honor and I made it clear that my waiving was based on -
- and now that I clearly understand Your Honor’s position, I would join in [co-
defendant’s counsel’s] objection.
[The Court] Very well. Overruled. 
 
There is nothing in the record that hints at the motivation underlying the judge’s
ruling: Did he believe he was required to accept Respondent’s retraction?  Did he believe he
had the discretion to accept or reject the retraction, and exercised his discretion to accept it?
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All we know is that, when Respondent sought to retract his waiver, the judge simply said:
“Very well.  Overruled.”  We thus have no way to know the basis for the trial court’s ruling.
In short, the State seeks to introduce an issue now that was not generated at trial.
Moreover, answering the State’s question presented, whether in the affirmative or the
negative, would not change the outcome here.  If we were to hold that trial judges, in the
position of the trial judge here, have discretion to reject a retraction like the one made by
Respondent’s counsel, then the judge must abuse that discretion for an appellate court to
reverse the outcome.  Respondent does not allege that any abuse of discretion occurred, so
no relief could be granted on that basis.  Likewise, if we were to hold that a trial court does
not have discretion to reject the retraction, then the trial court acted properly here by
accepting the retraction and ruling on the underlying objection.  By opining on the State’s
question presented, we would be “rendering [a] purely advisory opinion [], a long forbidden
practice in this State.”  Smith v. State, 412 Md. 150, 176, 985 A.2d 1204, 1220 (2009)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  We therefore shall not answer the third question the
State has presented.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID
BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY.