Title: Groninger v. Village of Mamaroneck

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 85  
Margaret Groninger,
            Appellant,
        v.
Village of Mamaroneck,
            Respondent.
Arnold E. DiJoseph, III, for appellant.
Anna J. Ervolina, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
Plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against
the Village of Mamaroneck after she slipped and fell on ice in a
parking lot owned and maintained by the Village.  The Village
moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, asserting
that it had neither received prior written notice of the defect
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No. 85
(see CPLR 9804; Village Law § 6-628) nor created the icy
condition.  Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting, as relevant
to this appeal, that the written notice requirement does not
apply to publicly-owned parking lots.  
Supreme Court granted the Village's motion and the
Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's contention,
and holding that the Village met its burden of demonstrating that
it had not received such notice (67 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2009]). 
The court further held that plaintiff failed to meet her burden
of showing that either exception to the written notice
requirement applied (id. at 734) and certified to this Court the
question of whether its decision and order was properly made. 
Village Law § 6-628, which is nearly identical to CPLR
9804, provides, in pertinent part, that: 
"No civil action shall be maintained against
the village . . . for damages or injuries to
person or property sustained solely in
consequence of the existence of snow or ice
upon any sidewalk, crosswalk, street,
highway, bridge or culvert unless written
notice of the defective, unsafe, dangerous or
obstructed condition or of the existence of
the snow or ice, relating to the particular
place, was actually given to the village
clerk and there was a failure or neglect
within a reasonable time after the receipt of
such notice to repair or remove the defect,
danger or obstruction complained of, or to
cause the snow or ice to be removed, or the
place otherwise made reasonably safe." 
Such notice is obviated where the plaintiff demonstrates that the
municipality "created the defect or hazard through an affirmative
act of negligence" or that a "special use" conferred a benefit on
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No. 85
the municipality (Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471, 474
[1999]).  
Plaintiff, relying on our holding in Walker v Town of
Hempstead (84 NY2d 360 [1994]), argues that because a publicly-
owned parking lot does not fall within any of the six
specifically enumerated locations in the written notice statutes,
it is not subject to the written notice requirement.  We reject
this argument and affirm the Appellate Division's order.
In Walker, the plaintiff brought a negligence action
against the town for injuries he sustained on a municipal
paddleball court in the town's "beach area."  The town code
required prior written notice of defects existing in, among other
things, "parking field[s]," "beach area[s]" and "playground
equipment."  This Court concluded that the town's written notice
requirement ran afoul of General Municipal Law § 50-e (4)'s
directive that "[n]o other or further notice . . . shall be
required" concerning defects on municipal property that fall
outside the statutorily delineated locations (i.e., sidewalk,
crosswalk, street, highway, bridge or culvert).  In reaching that
conclusion, we stated that "we can only construe the
Legislature's enumeration of six, specific locations in the
exception . . . as evincing an intent to exclude any others not
mentioned" and therefore constituting "a prohibition of any
notice of defect enactment pertaining to locations beyond the six
specified," meaning that the town could not rely on the lack of
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No. 85
prior written notice as a defense to a paddleball court accident
(Walker, 84 NY2d at 367-368 [citation omitted]).  It is this last
point of law upon which plaintiff relies in asserting that,
because a publicly-owned parking lot is not listed as one of the
locations in which defects require prior written notice, such
notice was not a condition precedent to suit.  
For nearly thirty years, the courts of this state have
consistently found that a publicly-owned parking lot falls within
the definition of a "highway" and therefore prior notice of
defect is required (see e.g. Peters v City of White Plains, 58
AD3d 824, 825 [2d Dept 2009]; Walker v Incorporated Vil. of
Freeport, 52 AD3d 697, 697 [2d Dept 2008]; Healy v City of
Tonawanda, 234 AD2d 982, 982 [4th Dept 1996]; Lauria v City of
New Rochelle, 225 AD2d 1013, 1013-1014 [3d Dept 1996]; Stratton v
City of Beacon, 91 AD2d 1018, 1019 [2d Dept 1983]). 
Plaintiff asserts that the post-Walker cases directly
conflict with our statement in Walker that the town's local law
requiring prior written notice as to "parking field[s]" and
"beach area[s]" was "flatly inconsistent with" GML § 50-e(4)'s
plain language excluding the written notice requirement for
locations outside the delineated six (Walker, 84 NY2d at 366). 
That argument ignores our holding in the post-Walker decision
Woodson v City of New York (93 NY2d 936 [1999]).
In Woodson, the plaintiff sued for injuries arising out
of his fall on a stairway that led from a sidewalk to a municipal
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No. 85
park.  This Court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that prior
written notice of the defect was not a prerequisite to suit
because a "stairway" was not listed as one of the six named
locations in the statute.  Specifically, this Court noted that
the New York City Administrative Code's definition of "sidewalk"
included the term "stairway," and concluded that the
Administrative Code's notice requirement did not run afoul of GML
§ 50-e (4) because a stairway "functionally fulfills the same
purpose" as a standard sidewalk, save for the fact that the
former is "vertical instead of horizontal" (Woodson, 93 NY2d at
937, 938).  
The parking lot here serves the "functional purpose" of
a "highway," which Vehicle and Traffic Law § 118 broadly defines
as "[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of every way
publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of
the public for purposes of vehicular travel."  It was owned and
maintained by the Village and was accessible to the general
public for vehicular travel.  As a result, the Village was
entitled to notice and an opportunity to correct any defect
before being required to respond to any claim of negligence with
respect thereto.  This holding recognizes that municipalities,
which are "not expected to be cognizant of every crack or defect
within [their] borders, will not be held responsible for injury
from such defect unless given an opportunity to repair it"
(Gorman v Town of Huntington, 12 NY3d 275, 279 [2009]). 
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No. 85
The Village, through the testimony of its
representative, met its burden of establishing that it did not
receive prior written notice of the icy condition, thereby
shifting to plaintiff the burden of demonstrating either that a
question of fact existed in that regard or that one of the
Amabile exceptions applied.  Plaintiff never contested the
Village's proof that it had not received prior written notice of
the defect, asserting, instead, that such notice was unnecessary. 
Moreover, plaintiff never raised the "special benefit" exception
and, to the extent that plaintiff contends that the Village's
snow removal operations created the icy condition that caused
plaintiff to fall (see San Marco v Village/Town of Mount Kisco,
16 NY3d 111, 118 [2010]), the Appellate Division properly
concluded that the opinion of plaintiff's expert engineer was
speculative, as it was premised on an inspection conducted, and
photographs taken, of the parking lot over two years after
plaintiff's fall.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question should not be
answered upon the ground that it is unnecessary.  
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Groninger v Village of Mamaroneck
No. 85 
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge (dissenting):
In Walker v Town of Hempstead (84 NY2d 360 [1994]),
this Court, after extensive briefing1 and careful consideration,
unanimously decided that the Town of Hempstead's supersession
powers did not permit its enactment of a Town Code provision
imposing a prior-notice-of-defect requirement for actions seeking
damages sustained by reason of "any defective parking field,
beach area, swimming or wading pool or pool equipment, playground
or playground equipment, skating rink or park property" (Town of
Hempstead Code § 6-2).  To decide the case as it did, the Court
necessarily addressed two principal issues: 1) whether section 
6-2 was inconsistent with State law enumerating the locations to
which prior notice requirements could apply (i.e., General
Municipal Law § 50-e [4]2); and 2) whether parts of the subject
1In addition to the parties' briefs, there were lengthy
amici submissions by the New York State Conference of Mayors and
Municipal Officials and the New York State Trial Lawyers
Association.
2That statute, the focus of the ensuing discussion, provides
in relevant part: 
"No other or further notice, no other or further
service, filing or delivery of the notice of claim, and
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Code provision inconsistent with State law were nonetheless
permissibly enacted by the Town in the exercise of its
supersession authority under section 10 of the Municipal Home
Rule Law -- an inquiry turning upon whether a provision in
addition to being inconsistent was expressly prohibited by State
law (see Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 74 NY2d 423, 429-430 [1989]). 
Only if a local enactment is expressly prohibited by State law,
is the locality's supersession authority exceeded.
As to the first of these inquiries, we found, as an
essential part of our analysis, that
"Town of Hempstead Code § 6-2 is in fact
inconsistent with General Municipal Law §
50-e (4). The local law-to the extent that it
requires prior notice of defect for accidents
at a Town “parking field, beach area”, etc.,
as a condition precedent to the commencement
of an action against the Town-is flatly
inconsistent with the plain language of
section 50-e (4) mandating that '[n]o other
or further notice * * * shall be required as
a condition to the commencement of an
action', subject to an exception for notices
of defect for six specific kinds of
locations, none of which is applicable here"
(Walker, 84 NY2d at 366 [emphasis supplied]).
We explained that this conclusion was compelled by the canons of
no notice of intention to commence an action or special
proceeding, shall be required as a condition to the
commencement of an action or special proceeding for the
enforcement of the claim; provided, however, that
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to dispense
with the requirement of notice of the defective,
unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition of any
street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or
crosswalk, or of the existence of snow or ice thereon .
. ."
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No. 85
statutory construction:
"we can only construe the Legislature's
enumeration of six, specific locations in the
exception (i.e., streets, highways, bridges,
culverts, sidewalks or crosswalks) as
evincing an intent to exclude any others not
mentioned (see, McKinney's Cons. Laws of
N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 240 ['where a
statute creates provisos or exceptions as to
certain matters the inclusion of such
provisos or exceptions is generally
considered to deny the existence of others
not mentioned'])" (id. at 367). 
With respect to the second step of the analysis,
necessitated by our finding that the challenged Town Code notice
provision was inconsistent with General Municipal Law § 50-e (4),
we found 
"the conclusion inescapable . . . that
General Municipal Law § 50-e(4) . . . does
indeed contain an express prohibition against
the adoption of the provisions of Hempstead
Code § 6-2 requiring prior notice of defects
at municipal locations other than the
enumerated streets, highways, bridges,
culverts, sidewalks or crosswalks. This
express prohibition precludes the exercise of
the Town's supersession authority" (id. at
367-368).
We observed in this connection that,
"General Municipal Law § 50-e(4) contains
clear, prohibitory language strictly limiting
deviations from the notice requirements
specifically set forth in that section,
excepting only notice of defect provisions
pertaining to the six enumerated locations.
The statute does not merely omit a grant of
authority to localities to require notice of
defect at locations beyond the six specified
(cf., Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, supra), but
rather in unmistakable terms provides that
“[n]o other or further notice * * * shall be
required” beyond those permitted by its
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No. 85
terms. The statute must be construed,
therefore, as a flat prohibition not only of
the Town's enactment of any notice of claim
provision other than that provided for in the
statute, but also a prohibition of any notice
of defect enactment pertaining to locations
beyond the six specified" (id. at 368
[emphasis added]). 
Obviously, Walker was not, as the majority suggests, an
appeal simply about whether the Town could rely on the lack of
prior written notice as a defense to a paddleball court accident. 
Such a characterization trivializes the appeal's scope of concern
and ignores the analysis and findings upon which the Court's
particular conclusion -- that a town paddleball court was not
among the locations to which a prior written notice requirement
might apply -- was based.  We did not merely determine that the
Town could not "rely" (majority opn at 3) upon a lack of prior
notice defense with respect to paddleball courts, but much more
fundamentally that the Town had no authority to impose any prior
notice requirement respecting defects at locations beyond the six
specifically enumerated in General Municipal Law § 50-e (4).  It
was only in light of our construction of General Municipal § 50
(e) (4) as an express prohibition upon the enactment of any prior
notice requirement other than those the limiting statute
specifically allowed, that we concluded as we did respecting the
validity of the Town Code provision requiring prior notice of
"beach area" defects.3  Our construction of § 50-e (4) left no
3The paddleball court was at a public beach.
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No. 85
doubt as to the invalidity of other portions of Town Code § 6-2,
most notably its requirement of prior written notice of "parking
field" defects.  Indeed, we were explicit that that requirement,
like the requirement respecting "beach area" defects, was "flatly
inconsistent with" and expressly prohibited by the limiting State
statute. 
Our construction of General Municipal Law § 50-e (4) in
Walker is entitled to be viewed as authoritative.  The majority
declines to give it effect, not because after close consideration
and attention to the principles of stare decisis it has concluded
that the construction is wrong or unworkable -- manifestly, it is
not -- but because the intermediate appellate courts of this
State have, in a handful of dubiously reasoned decisions
perpetuated the pre-Walker notion that a parking lot is a kind of
"highway" as to which the prohibition of General Municipal Law §
50-e (4) does not apply.  But, of course, we held with great
clarity in Walker that a "parking field" is not a location within
the statute's dispensational enumeration, from which it follows
ineluctably that a parking field cannot be a "highway" within the
meaning of section 50-e (4).  It is not an impressive ground for
a contrary conclusion by this Court that the Appellate Division
has persisted in adhering to an utterly inconsistent definitional
equation.  High regard for the work of the Appellate Division
cannot alter the obvious circumstance that it is not in the
nature of this Court's role for it to defer to the intermediate
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No. 85
appellate courts of this State in a matter of statutory
interpretation, particularly when we have carefully and
authoritatively construed the governing provision to require a
result exactly contrary to the one they have reached.
Only somewhat less dubious as a basis for the Court's
decision, is our memorandum in Woodson v City of New York (93
NY2d 936 [1999]), in which we allowed that a staircase in a
municipal park simply connecting lengths of sidewalk at either of
its ends could be understood to be a "sidewalk" within the
meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (4) and thus permissibly
the subject of a locally enacted prior written notice
requirement.  Key to our decision was our observation that "[t]he
stairway in this case functionally fulfills the same purpose that
a standard sidewalk would serve on flat topography" (id. at 938
[emphasis supplied]).  Even if it were supposed that we intended
in Woodson to make a doctrine of functional equivalence generally
available in discerning the range of reference of section 50-e
(4)'s relevant terms -- a large enough assumption given our
decision in Walker construing the statute principally as a
limitation on local legislative power -- it is inconceivable that
Woodson's very narrow holding, that "[t]he stairway in this case"
(emphasis added), i.e., the stairway simply connecting two parts
of a sidewalk, was intended to sanction the utterly promiscuous
doctrine of functional "equivalence" now employed under which a
parking lot is deemed to be a "highway."  Quite apart from the
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circumstance that our construction of section 50-e (4) in Walker
was expressly preclusive of such an equivalence, Woodson, which
never purported to impair Walker's validity, does not by its
terms allow it either.
It is so obvious as hardly to merit serious discussion
that a parking lot does not fullfill the same function as a
"highway."  As everyone knows, the dominant purpose of a parking
lot is to accommodate stationary, i.e., parked, vehicles.  By
contrast, the precisely opposite dominant purpose of a highway is
to enable vehicles to move with a degree of expedition.  While a
parking lot may be entered and exited by public roads the two
types of facilities are notable for their essentially
discontinuous purposes.  Completely absent in the relationship
between highways and parking facilities is the continuity, indeed
virtual identity of purpose, upon which we justified the
particular equivalence drawn in Woodson.  Moreover, in Woodson
the equivalence, even though not obsure, had been made explicit
in section 7-201 of the New York City Administrative Code,
whereas here the relied upon, far from evident equivalence does
not appear to have been expressly articulated anywhere, raising a
profound question as to whether adequate notice of the prior
notice requirement was provided.
The extension of the doctrine of functional equivalence
to the present facts is not made more viable by the capacious
definition of "highway" found in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 118. 
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No. 85
That definition, although doubtless appropriately employed in
construing statutes having to do with highway maintenance and
use, was never intended to have relevance in the construction of
General Municipal Law § 50-e (4), and, indeed, its
superimposition upon the statute is highly problematic.  This is
not only because it facilitates an equivalence that Walker
construed section 50-e (4) to prohibit.  There are other
problems, among them that there would be no need for the
statute's enumeration of the six location categories as to which
prior notice could be required if the operative definition of
"highway" was the virtually all-inclusive one contained in
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 118.  Nor is the use of the definition
in this context compatible with the basic maxim that statutory
provisions in derogation of the common law, such as those in
section 50-e (4) permitting prior notice requirements as to the
six specified, contextually exceptional location types, are to be
strictly construed (see Gorman v Town of Huntington, 12 NY3d 275,
279 [2009]).
It is true as the majority observes that
"municipalities . . . are not expected to be cognizant of every
crack or defect within [their] borders" (majority opn at 5,
quoting Gorman, 12 NY3d at 279 [internal quotation marks
omitted]), but it does not follow that there can be no crack or
defect about which a municipality may be reasonably expected to
acquire either actual or constructive notice in the ordinary
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No. 85
course of discharging its proprietary responsibilities.  The
Legislature has quite reasonably permitted localities to enact
prior notice requirements relieving themselves of the unusually
onerous responsibility of frequently monitoring their ordinarily
extensive "street[s], highway[s], bridge[s], culvert[s],
sidewalk[s] [and] crosswalk[s]" (General Municipal Law § 50-e
[4]).  But, as we held in Walker, the Legislature has not
permitted, and, in fact, has prohibited, a similar dispensation
as to parking lots.  Even if it were inconsistent, or from a
policy perspective questionable, to treat parking lots
differently from the statutorily enumerated locations, the scope
of the statute's prohibition would not be a matter for judicial
adjustment.  If it were, though, the case for expanding the scope
of General Municipal Law § 50-e's dispensational clause, would
not be particularly compelling.  Plainly, the statute's omission
of parking lots from that clause was entirely reasonable. 
Municipal parking lots, in distinction to extended road systems,
are spatially contained; they may, particularly given the nature
and frequency of their use, reasonably be expected to be
regularly maintained and monitored by their municipal
proprietors.  The Legislature could, then, quite sensibly have
concluded that, when it came to the parking lots within their
borders, municipalities should, like landowners generally, be
responsible for premises defects of which they have notice,
either actual or constructive.
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No. 85
  
What is at issue is a legislative policy judgment that
we have previously recognized and enforced in a controlling
decision.  A mere judicial aversion to municipal liability is not
a ground upon which either should now be disturbed.
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Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question not answered
upon the ground that it is unnecessary.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.
Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur.  Chief Judge Lippman
dissents in an opinion in which Judges Ciparick and Jones concur.
Decided June 2, 2011
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