Title: Burk v. Burzynski

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Burk v. Burzynski1983 WY 117672 P.2d 419Case Number: 5819, 5820Case Number: 5819, 5820Decided: 11/09/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN BURK, P.C., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v. LAWRENCE F. 
BURZYNSKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A PINETOP CONSTRUCTION, THE CARRIAGE 
CORPORATION, A WYOMING CORPORATION, AND PARK DEVELOPMENT LTD., A WYOMING 
CORPORATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

LAWRENCE F. 
BURZYNSKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A PINETOP CONSTRUCTION, THE CARRIAGE 
CORPORATION, A WYOMING CORPORATION, AND PARK DEVELOPMENT LTD., A WYOMING 
CORPORATION, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

JOHN BURK, P.C., A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). Nos. 5819, 5820

Appeal from the 
District Court of Natrona County, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Jerry A. 
Yaap of Bishop, Bishop & Yaap, Casper, for appellant in Case No. 5819 and appellee 
in Case No. 5820.

C.M. Steve 
Aron of Aron & Hennig, Laramie, Eldon E. Silverman, Denver, Colo., for appellees in Case No. 5819 and 
appellants in Case No. 5820.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER* THOMAS, 
ROSE and BROWN, JJ.

* Retired June 13, 
1983, but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case 
pursuant to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]      John Burk, P.C., 
a professional corporation of practicing attorneys, initiated this action 
against Lawrence F. Burzynski, individually and doing business as Pinetop 
Construction, The Carriage Corporation and Park Development Ltd. to recover 
past-due legal fees plus accrued interest. The defendants answered that they 
were entitled to an offset in the amount claimed by John Burk, P.C., based on 
their assignment of a cause of action to it and on Burk's failure to conform 
with various disciplinary rules of the Wyoming State Bar. The defendants 
counterclaimed for damages incurred as a result of the manner in which Burk 
represented them in various lawsuits.

[¶2.]      The trial court 
determined that John Burk, P.C. was entitled to a judgment for its legal fees 
and costs, subject, however, to an offset in the amount of the potential 
recovery in the claim assigned to it. The court found the evidence to be 
insufficient to support any of the defendants' counterclaims. The defendants 
have appealed the award of legal fees and the denial of one counterclaim. The 
plaintiff has cross-appealed the offset and the denial of prejudgment 
interest.

[¶3.]      We will affirm 
those portions of the judgment which award recovery of past-due legal fees, and 
will deny prejudgment interest and defendants' counterclaim. We will reverse 
that portion of the judgment which allows defendants an offset based on the 
assignment of a claim. We will remand the case to the lower court to apportion 
liability among the defendants and to correct an error in 
computation.

FACTS

[¶4.]      John Burk began 
representing Lawrence Burzynski and his business enterprise, Pinetop 
Construction, in August of 1978. Sometime later a decision was made to 
incorporate the business, and Burk performed the necessary legal services to 
form The Carriage Corporation. The name of the corporation was subsequently 
changed to Park Development Ltd.

[¶5.]      After the 
incorporation, Burk continued to represent Burzynski and his business. Pursuant 
to Burzynski's instructions, Burk billed The Carriage Corporation for all legal 
services, whether rendered for Burzynski personally or for the corporation. 
Apparently, all amounts which had been billed to Pinetop Construction before the 
incorporation were paid. The Carriage Corporation, however, became delinquent in 
paying the legal fees billed to it, and by March 4, 1981, when this suit was 
filed, the amount owed to John Burk, P.C. was $30,028.98.

[¶6.]      Prior to the 
incorporation, Burzynski and his wife had obtained two bank loans, which were 
secured by mortgages on separate parcels of land. This land was subsequently 
transferred to The Carriage Corporation. In December of 1979, the bank commenced 
foreclosure proceedings against the properties and Burzynski sought legal advice 
from Burk regarding the foreclosure process. The sales on the two notes took 
place on two different dates. The bank's attorneys claimed $5,890 in legal fees 
for the first foreclosure sale and $21,700 in fees for the second 
sale.

[¶7.]      Following the 
sales, Burk advised Burzynski of his belief that the bank attorneys had charged 
excessive fees to conduct the foreclosure sales and had failed to file an 
affidavit with the sheriff's office regarding fee sharing. Burk informed 
Burzynski that there was a strong chance of recovering these fees under the 
Wyoming statute which conditions compensation to the attorney upon his filing of 
an affidavit disclaiming any division of fees and which permits payment only 
"for services actually rendered in the foreclosure proceeding."1

[¶8.]      At the time of 
the foreclosure proceedings, The Carriage Corporation and Burzynski owed John 
Burk, P.C. approximately $19,000 in legal fees. When it appeared that an 
opportunity existed to recover close to $28,000, Burk requested that the cause 
of action against the bank's attorneys be assigned to the professional 
corporation. On February 28, 1980, Burzynski executed the following 
instrument:

"ASSIGNMENT

"I, Lawrence 
Burzynski, as president of the Carriage Corporation, in consideration of good, 
valuable and sufficient considerations, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, hereby sell, assign, transfer, set over and deliver to John Burk, 
P.C., (Assignee) of Suite A, The Wyoming Building, Casper, Natrona [County], 
Wyoming, and its assigns, for its use and benefit, claims, demands and cause of 
or causes of action against the First National Bank of Casper, Casper, Wyoming, 
or its assigns to recover $7,000 and $35,000.00[2] improperly 
received by said First National Bank arising out of, or relating to or connected 
with the foreclosure sale of lot 10-71 and balance of the lots sold on sheriff 
certificate on 2/8/80 in Paradise Valley which are or were property of the 
undersigned.

"This assignment is 
to secure the statutory attorney's lien rights of the Assignee and shall be 
interpreted as securing and protecting such lien rights and not as an absolute 
conveyance.

"CARRIAGE 
CORPORATION

"[/s/ Lawrence F. 
Burzynski] 

"President"

[¶9.]      Burk then 
initiated proceedings against the bank, with The Carriage Corporation as the 
named plaintiff. On December 15, 1980, the trial judge granted the bank's motion 
for summary judgment. Burk did not appeal this ruling.

[¶10.]    The trial court in the 
present case interpreted the transfer to John Burk, P.C., of The Carriage 
Corporation's cause of action to be an absolute assignment, rather than an 
assignment to secure payment of fees. As a result, the court reduced its award 
to John Burk, P.C. of $30,028.98 in legal fees by the potential value of the 
claim against the bank's attorneys at the time of the assignment.3 
Additional facts which are pertinent to this appeal will be developed during our 
discussion of the issues presented by the parties.

ISSUES

[¶11.]    The following issues are 
before the court in this appeal:

1. Whether the 
assignment of the cause of action to John Burk, P.C., was an absolute assignment 
in lieu of attorney's fees or whether the assignment created an interest in the 
cause of action to secure payment of attorney's fees;

2. Whether, as a 
matter of law, John Burk, P.C. is entitled to prejudgment interest on the 
past-due legal fees;

3. Whether there were 
instances of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted 
by the Wyoming Supreme Court, which bar recovery of any legal fees claimed by 
John Burk, P.C.; 

4. Whether Burzynski 
is personally liable for the legal fees claimed by John Burk, P.C.; 
and

5. Whether the 
defendants are entitled as a matter of law to damages arising out of Burk's 
failure to file a cross-appeal in Keith v. Burzynski, Wyo., 621 P.2d 247 
(1980).

I

[¶12.]    The trial court relied on 
extrinsic evidence to conclude that the assignment of the cause of action to 
John Burk, P.C. was absolute and in lieu of attorney's fees to the extent of 
potential recovery at the time of the assignment. The court based its conclusion 
primarily on a letter in which Burzynski questioned Burk's failure to credit the 
defendants' account as a result of the assignment. Apparently, Burk never 
objected to this interpretation of the assignment by 
Burzynski.

[¶13.]    This court has often said 
that the meaning of an instrument is to be deduced solely from its language if 
the terms are plain and unambiguous. Bowen v. Korell, Wyo., 587 P.2d 653, 656 
(1978); Craig v. Gudim, Wyo., 488 P.2d 316, 319 (1971); Barlow v. 
Makeeff, 74 Wyo. 171, 284 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1955). The intent of the parties 
may be determined by resort to extrinsic evidence only when the language is 
ambiguous. Amoco Production Company v. 
Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980); Bowen v. Korell, supra. An ambiguous 
writing is one which is obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness of 
expression or because more than one meaning is possible. Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, supra. Whether an ambiguity exists is a 
question of law to be determined by this court. Schacht v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. - 
Rawlins, Wyo., 620 P.2d 561, 563 (1980); Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, supra.

[¶14.]    Here the language of the 
document is exceedingly clear:

"This assignment is 
to secure the statutory attorney's lien rights of the Assignee and shall be 
interpreted as securing and protecting such lien rights and not as an absolute 
conveyance."

No ambiguity 
exists as to the extent of the interest that the defendants intended to assign 
to John Burk, P.C. Therefore, any reliance on evidence other than the document 
itself to determine the intent of the parties is not permitted. We conclude that 
the purpose of the assignment was to create a security interest in a cause of 
action owned by The Carriage Corporation for the payment of legal fees owed to 
John Burk, P.C.

[¶15.]    Notwithstanding the foregoing 
rules of construction and the plain language of the written document, defendants 
would have us look to extrinsic evidence in this case to find an absolute 
assignment. They argue that an examination of extrinsic evidence is appropriate 
since any contract between an attorney and his client is inherently suspect and, 
therefore, subject to the closest scrutiny by the courts.

[¶16.]    We agree that were we to hold 
that the writing in this case effected an absolute assignment, it might be 
inherently suspect and subject to invalidation. However, we see nothing wrong 
with an assignment which creates a security interest in specified collateral in 
favor of an attorney for payment of his fees. The Code of Professional 
Responsibility,4 in DR 5-103(A) provides as 
follows:

"A lawyer shall not 
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of 
litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he 
may:

`           
"(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses; * * 
*"

By statute, 
Wyoming grants to attorneys a lien for payment of their fees. Section 29-1-102, 
W.S. 1977, provides: 

"(a) For professional 
services performed on behalf of a client, an attorney shall have a lien for 
compensation due him from the time of giving notice of the lien. The attorney's 
lien attaches upon:

"(i) Any papers or 
money of his client which have come into his possession;

"(ii) Money due his 
client and in the possession of an adverse party."

The statute 
expressly states that the lien attaches to sums due a client and in the 
possession of an adverse party.

[¶17.]    In Anderson v. Star-Bair Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 
332, 243 P. 394 (1926), this court held that, by virtue of the statute, an 
attorney holds a lien upon a judgment obtained by his efforts. This court 
considered the question of a lien upon a cause of action in Enos v. Keating, 39 Wyo. 217, 271 P. 6, 
67 A.L.R. 430 (1928). While the contingency-fee arrangement at issue there did 
not establish a lien upon a claim, the case implied that such liens would be 
valid if created in properly drafted contracts. Enos v. Keating, supra, 271 P.  at 7-8. 
The statutory lien upon a claim is not limited to securing payment of the fees 
attributable to that particular claim. Rather, the extent of the lien depends 
upon the nature of the contract between the attorney and the client. See Stearns v. Wollenberg, 51 Or. 88, 92 P. 1079, 1081 (1907); In re Heinsheimer, 
214 N.Y. 361, 108 N.E. 636, 638 (1915). We conclude that the assignment, in 
plain terms, created a security interest for payment of past-due legal fees and 
that such an agreement is valid under the Code of Professional Responsibility, § 
29-1-102, supra, and our prior decisions. As we said in Morfeld v. Andrews, Wyo., 579 P.2d 426, 
433 (1978), a case in which the client questioned her attorney's right to assert 
a lien for payment of fees:

"We do not know how 
there can be a breach of fiduciary duty in the assertion of a legal 
right."

[¶18.]    In view of our holding that 
the assignment created a security interest, we do not reach defendants' argument 
that an absolute assignment of a cause of action is inimical to the 
attorney-client relationship and a bar to recovery of legal 
fees.

II

[¶19.]    This court considered the 
prerequisites to a recovery of prejudgment interest in Rissler & McMurry Company v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company, Wyo., 559 P.2d 25 (1977). There we said 
that

"interest is 
recoverable on liquidated but not on unliquidated claims [and] a claim is 
considered liquidated when it is readily computable by simple mathematical 
computation." 559 P.2d  at 31.

We said 
further that even though the existence of an unliquidated counterclaim or setoff 
put the amount owed in doubt, it did not render the claim itself uncertain. The 
debt would be deemed liquidated so long as it could be calculated from accurate 
statements submitted by the claimant. Furthermore, there need not be a contract 
between the parties which establishes the rate of interest to be awarded. In the 
absence of such a contract the court may award prejudgment interest payable at 
the statutory rate of seven percent.5

[¶20.]    In this case a series of 
charges were assessed against The Carriage Corporation account during August, 
1980, for unnecessary legal services. The charges were for work done by Burk to 
obtain a default judgment after he had agreed to give opposing counsel an 
extension of time. As a result of these erroneous charges, totaling 
approximately $700, the defendant-obligors were unable to compute from the 
submitted statements the precise amount owed to John Burk, P.C. Therefore, we 
hold that the claim for legal fees was unliquidated and recovery of prejudgment 
interest must be disallowed. 

III

[¶21.]    Defendants argue that there 
were several instances of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
by Burk, which should bar any recovery of attorney's fees by him. Specifically, 
defendants direct our attention to (1) a failure to preserve the confidential 
attorney-client relationship; (2) the continued representation of the defendants 
when the attorney's independent professional judgment was impaired; and (3) a 
failure to represent the client competently and zealously.

[¶22.]    The trial court made no 
express findings as to these affirmative defenses raised below. However, we have 
said in the past that a general finding and judgment for the successful party 
carries with it every finding of fact which can reasonably and fairly be drawn 
from the evidence. Peters Grazing 
Association v. Legerski, Wyo., 544 P.2d 449, 455 (1975), reh. denied 546 P.2d 189 (1976). It is our duty as an appellate court to examine the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the prevailing party and to resolve all conflicts in 
the testimony and exhibits in his favor. True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, 
Inc., Wyo., 577 P.2d 991, 996 (1978). Unless clearly erroneous, the findings 
of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal. True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, 
Inc., supra, 577 P.2d  at 996, and cases cited therein. Keeping in mind these 
basic rules which define the appellate court's role when reviewing findings of 
fact, we will consider separately the violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility which defendants contend should bar 
recovery.

Breach of the 
Confidential Attorney-Client Relationship

[¶23.]    It is undisputed that after 
representation of the client had ceased, Burk filed an affidavit in the action 
of Linda Sue Irvine v. R.F. Crotteau, Lawrence Burzynski, and Park Developments 
Ltd. a Wyoming limited corporation, Civil Action No. 52493 in the District 
Court, Seventh Judicial District, Natrona County, State of Wyoming. In the 
affidavit, Burk stated that Burzynski had transferred real property to his 
stepdaughter, R.F. Crotteau, to avoid his creditors. The record reveals, 
however, that Burzynski himself made the same statement to Linda Irvine, who 
filed an affidavit a month earlier than the Burk affidavit. In addition, Burk 
testified that he received the information from public records and sources other 
than his client.

[¶24.]    The Code of Professional 
Responsibility, DR 4-101, provides in pertinent part:

"Preservation of 
Confidences and Secrets of a Client.

"(A) `Confidence' 
refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under 
applicable law, and `secret' refers to other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the 
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental 
to the client.

"(B) Except when 
permitted under DR 4-101(C) [not applicable in the present case], a lawyer shall 
not knowingly:

"(1) Reveal a 
confidence or secret of his client;

"(2) Use a confidence 
or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client;

"(3) Use a confidence 
or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, 
unless the client consents after full disclosure; * * *"

Defendants 
contend that Burk violated his ethical obligation to guard the secrets and 
confidences of his client.6 This ethical precept, in contrast to the 
evidentiary attorney-client privilege, exists without regard to the source of 
the information or the fact that others share the knowledge and continues after 
termination of the employment relationship. Code of Professional Responsibility, 
EC 4-4 and EC 4-6.

[¶25.]    It appears that Burk, by 
submitting in a civil action an affidavit which was detrimental to Burzynski, 
violated his ethical duty to refrain from revealing secrets concerning his 
former client. We believe, however, that Burzynski, by revealing the damaging 
information to others, waived any right he may have had to withhold payment of 
legal fees. We do not hold that an attorney may disclose confidences and secrets 
of his client with impunity and still expect to recover his fees. We merely hold 
that recovery is not barred in this case, where the client himself revealed the 
same information that his attorney subsequently revealed and where the client's 
disclosure resulted in an affidavit duplicative of the one filed by the 
attorney.

[¶26.]    Counsel for the defendants 
cite to us a number of cases in support of their contention that an attorney who 
breaches his ethical duties to his client will be denied recovery of fees. These 
cases are readily distinguishable from the instant situation on their facts. In 
In re Thomasson's Estate, 355 Mo. 
274, 196 S.W.2d 155, 162, 170 A.L.R. 1170 (1946), the Missouri Supreme Court 
denied recovery of fees where the attorney was involved in an unlawful 
conspiracy to obtain his client's property by fraud, undue influence, force and 
duress. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Duffy v. Colonial Trust Co., 287 Pa. 
348, 135 A. 204, 205, 49 A.L.R. 406 (1926), determined that an attorney, who 
attempted to obtain a continuance by suggesting that a material witness feign 
illness, acted in bad faith toward the court as well as toward his client. Had 
the client known of such conduct, it would have had a duty to discharge the 
attorney. Therefore, recovery of legal fees was denied.

[¶27.]    In oral argument, counsel for 
defendants relied on Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614 (1975). In that case, a former corporate attorney, who held confidences and 
secrets of the corporation, entered into a contract to provide legal services on 
behalf of a minority shareholder and director in a proxy fight designed to gain 
control of the same corporation. The California Court of Appeals held that, 
under the circumstances, the contract was void for reasons of public policy. In 
another case cited to us by defendants, the court awarded the attorney 
reasonable compensation even though the employment contract was "champertous" 
and "against public policy," Donaldson v. Eaton & Estes, 136 Iowa 650, 114 N.W. 19, 21 (1907). Finally, in a recent California case, the court permitted an 
attorney to recover fees for his services rendered up to the point at which a 
conflict of interest developed, Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376-377, 67 Cal. App. 3d 6 (1977). We conclude that the foregoing cases, involving voidable 
employment contracts, fraud, and conflict of interest, do not adequately address 
the attorney's revelation of a client's secret following disclosure by the 
client. Therefore, these cases will not control our decision 
here.

Impairment of 
Professional Judgment

[¶28.]    Defendants argue that Burk 
violated DR 5-101(A) and DR 2-110(B)(2) by continuing to represent them despite 
the opposition of his office staff and despite his own inclination to withdraw. 
DR 5-101(A) provides:

"Except with the 
consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept 
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client 
will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, 
or personal interests."

DR 
2-110(B)(2) mandates withdrawal when an attorney

"knows or it is 
obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary 
Rule."

[¶29.]    We do not believe that the 
above disciplinary rules prescribe an attorney's conduct when his office staff 
objects to representing a client who is not paying his bill. As to Burk's own 
inclinations, the record indicates that he attempted to withdraw, contingent 
upon arranging substitute counsel. Such conduct comports with the standards of 
the legal profession designed to protect the client. See DR 
7-101(A)(2).

Competent and Zealous 
Representation

[¶30.]    The defendants fault Burk for 
the manner in which he pursued the action against the bank's attorneys to 
recover the fees which they asserted in connection with the foreclosure sales. 
Defendants argue that Burk's handling of the case constituted a violation of his 
duty to represent his client competently and zealously. The testimony of Burk 
and the exhibits support the trial court's rejection of this 
argument.

IV

[¶31.]    The trial court awarded a 
judgment for payment of legal fees against Burzynski as well as against the 
corporate client. We are unable to discern any basis for holding Burzynski 
personally liable for payment for legal services provided to the corporate 
client. There is no indication that Burzynski agreed to be responsible for the 
fees generated by these services. Burk has not urged this court or the trial 
court to disregard the corporate veil in order to hold Burzynski liable, and we 
do not address that question.

[¶32.]    In a similar fashion, we find 
no basis for holding the corporation liable for legal fees attributable to 
services rendered to Burzynski personally or to Pinetop Construction, his 
unincorporated business. The record indicates that charges for a will, a 
criminal action, and Pinetop Construction litigation were billed to The Carriage 
Corporation account pursuant to Burzynski's instructions. In view of the fact 
that fees for distinct entities were charged to a single account, we will remand 
to the trial court with instructions to apportion liability between The Carriage 
Corporation and Burzynski.

V

[¶33.]    The trial judge stated in his 
opinion letter concerning this case:

"The Court does not 
find sufficient evidence to find for the Defendant on any counterclaim. In some 
cases handled by Mr. Burk he may have made errors in judgment, but in retrospect 
it is easy to second guess Mr. Burk or surmise what another attorney may or may 
not have done under similar circumstances. The Defendant did not produce any 
expert witness with which to compare or set a standard of conduct to assist the 
Court in assessing the Plaintiff's competence in his handling of the various 
cases set out in the counterclaims. Certainly, there was an area of contributory 
negligence on the part of the Defendant who in case after case continued to use 
the services of Mr. Burk and accepted his legal advice."

Defendants 
contend that they are entitled as a matter of law to damages in the amount of 
$2,700, incurred as a result of Burk's failure to file a cross-appeal in Keith v. Burzynski, supra, 621 P.2d 247. 
Burk testified that it was his best professional judgment not to cross-appeal 
because to do so would have meant impeaching the line of cases that he relied on 
at trial and during the appeal. Burk also testified that the expense of 
cross-appealing would have exceeded the amount involved.

[¶34.]    We agree with the courts in 
other jurisdictions which have declined to find a cause of action against an 
attorney arising out of the manner in which he honestly chooses to present his 
case. Gonzalez y Barredo v. Schenck, 
D.C.N.Y., 287 F. Supp. 505, 523 (1968); Stricklan v. Koella, Tenn. App., 546 S.W.2d 810, 814, cert. denied (1976). The record supports a finding that Burk's 
decision not to cross-appeal was based on his honest assessment of the merits of 
such an appeal. We refuse to disturb this 
finding.7

[¶35.]    Finally, defendants contend 
that the trial court erred in computing the amount of the offset attributable to 
the unnecessary legal services performed by Burk. See n. 3, supra. This issue is 
not contested on appeal. All parties agreed in the proceedings below that 
Burzynski should receive a credit for those erroneous charges assessed during 
August, 1980, which were itemized in Defendants' Exhibit B. Therefore, we 
instruct the trial court on remand to correct the amount of offset 
accordingly.

[¶36.]    To summarize our disposition 
of this appeal, the award to John Burk, P.C. of $30,028.98 in legal fees will be 
allowed to stand. Since we have interpreted the assignment of the claim against 
the bank's attorneys as creating a security interest, and since the claim was 
unsuccessful, the assignment has no effect on the judgment. The award shall be 
reduced, however, by the sums paid by defendants, but not credited to their 
account, and by the erroneous charges assessed in August, 
1980.

[¶37.]    Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 34-4-112, 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"Whenever an 
attorney's fee is provided for in any real or chattel mortgage, or the note or 
notes secured thereby, such attorney's fee shall not be allowed or added to the 
mortgage debt in any foreclosure by public advertisement and sale, unless it 
shall appear by the affidavit of an attorney admitted generally to practice in 
this state representing the mortgagee or his assigns in such foreclosures, or 
the party instituting such foreclosure, which affidavit shall be filed with the 
sheriff or person who shall conduct the sale under such foreclosure, and said 
affidavit shall state therein that there has been and is no agreement, express 
or implied, between such attorney and his client, nor between him and any other 
person except a practicing attorney of this state engaged with him as an 
attorney in the foreclosure proceeding, for any sharing or division of said fee 
so to be allowed or added to the debt involved, and said fee when so allowed or 
added to the debt shall be only as compensation for services actually rendered 
in the foreclosure proceeding by an attorney admitted to practice in this state 
and residing therein. Provided, however, that in the foreclosure of real estate 
mortgages, this section shall in no wise affect the title to the real estate 
involved in such a foreclosure."

2 The source of these 
figures is not clear from the record. The testimony at trial indicated that the 
bank's attorneys claimed $5,890 and $21,700 to conduct the two foreclosure 
sales.

3 The court reduced 
the amount awarded to John Burk, P.C. by $21,700, which represented the fees 
claimed by the bank's attorneys in the second foreclosure sale. Apparently, the 
court's failure to deduct $5,890, the amount claimed by the attorneys in the 
first sale, was an oversight. The court reduced the award by an additional 
$2,200 to reflect an amount paid by the defendants, but not credited to their 
account. This offset is not contested on appeal. A further reduction of $7.50 
for unnecessary legal services resulted in a net award to John Burk, P.C. of 
$6,121.48.

4 By Rule 20 of the 
Amended Rules Providing for the Organization and Government of the Bar 
Association of the Attorneys at Law of the State of Wyoming, this court adopted 
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

5 Section 
40-14-106(e), W.S. 1977, of the Wyoming Uniform Consumer Credit Code provides as 
follows:

"If there is no 
agreement or provision of law for a different rate, the interest of money shall 
be at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum."

6 Defendants do not 
argue that Burk violated the attorney-client evidentiary privilege which is 
created by § 1-12-101, W.S. 1977, and precludes, with certain exceptions, an 
attorney from testifying concerning communications made to him by his 
client.

7 We do not agree with 
defendants' contention that the absence of an expert witness improperly 
controlled the court's decision as to this counterclaim for damages. Defendants 
had requested a third continuance six days before trial to locate an expert 
witness. Their request was denied. Even if this denial were an abuse of the 
court's discretion, which it was not, the trial judge appears to have made an 
independent finding of fact, supported by the record, that Burk's decision not 
to cross-appeal reflected an honest exercise of professional 
judgment.