Title: STATE DEPT OF REV v WILSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-369 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL REHABILITIVE SERVICES, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, vs . ALFRED J. WILSON, Respondent and Respondent. No. 80-423 STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, VS . ROBERT JAMES FATZ, Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana James, Gray & McCafferty, Great Falls, Montana Fausto Turrin argued, Great Falls, Montana Asselstine & Cruikshank, Great Falls, Montana Brett C. Asselstine argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: June 10, 1981 Decided: August 11-, 1981 Filed: AU6 11 1 9 W Clerk Honorable Mark P. S u l l i v a n , D i s t r i c t Judge, d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s is an appeal from judgments g r a n t e d respondents by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s brought a g a i n s t them by t h e Department of Revenue and t h e Department of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s (SRS) . Respondents had moved f o r judgments contending t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p a t e r n i t y , s e c t i o n 40-6-108, MCA, had run a t t h e time a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e p e t i t i o n s . I n g r a n t i n g t h e motions, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i s m i s s e d t h e p e t i t i o n s f i l e d by t h e S t a t e . A p p e l l a n t s a l l e g e t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and should be s t r u c k down. A male c h i l d was born o u t of wedlock t o E.F.L.R. on March 22, 1976. A t approximately t h e same time, t h e mother a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t e f o r p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e , i n c l u d i n g s u p p o r t f o r t h e c h i l d , and gave SRS s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n which would be enough t o s t a r t a p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n a g a i n s t A l f r e d J . Wilson 11. The S t a t e a l s o o b t a i n e d an assignment of t h e m o t h e r ' s c l a i m f o r s u p p o r t from t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r when t h e baby was born. The S t a t e brought a c t i o n a g a i n s t Wilson on May 22, 1979, more t h a n t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r t h e b i r t h of t h e c h i l d . The D i s t r i c t Court dismissed t h e a c t i o n on motion of t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r . On August 11, 1972, M.L. gave b i r t h t o a male c h i l d . Sometime t h e r e a f t e r t h e S t a t e of Montana became an i n t e r - e s t e d p a r t y because t h e mother a s s i g n e d her r i g h t s t o s u p p o r t t o SRS. On August 4 , 1980, e i g h t y e a r s a f t e r t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h , SRS f i l e d a p e t i t i o n a g a i n s t Robert James F a t z t o e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i t y and o b t a i n s u p p o r t moneys. T h e r e a f t e r , on August 2 7 , 1 9 8 0 , counsel f o r Robert James F a t z f i l e d a motion t o quash t h e o r d e r t o show cause r e q u i r i n g blood tests and a motion t o d i s m i s s t h e p e t i t i o n . On September 5, 1980, o r a l arguments were heard by t h e Honorable J o e l G. Roth and on September 23, 1980, t h e c o u r t g r a n t e d r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s . The i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Court is whether t h e three-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y i n s e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA, v i o l a t e s t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n p r o v i s i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . An equal p r o t e c t i o n i s s u e is p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e . A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock, a s a c l a s s , a r e t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from c h i l d r e n born i n wedlock because t h e f i r s t c l a s s l o s e s r i g h t s d u r i n g i n f a n c y f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y and c h i l d s u p p o r t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e c h i l d born o u t of wedlock may n o t m a i n t a i n a s u p p o r t a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e p a t e r n a l p a r e n t a f t e r t h r e e y e a r s from t h e d a t e of b i r t h of t h e c h i l d . S e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA. C h i l d r e n born i n wedlock, whose p a t e r n a l p a r e n t is presumed, do n o t f a c e a s t a t u t e t h a t b a r s such a c t i o n s . C h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock a r e n o t t h e s o l e p a r t i e s t h a t concern t h i s Court. W e a l s o must c o n s i d e r t h e power of t h e S t a t e t h r o u g h i t s a g e n c i e s t o b r i n g a c t i o n s o f p a t e r n i t y under s e c t i o n 40-6-107, MCA. S t a t e a g e n c i e s d e r i v e t h e i r power t o b r i n g p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s by way of t h i s s t a t u t e . The Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t a l l p e r s o n s a r e guaranteed t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws. A r t . 11, Sec. 4, 1972 Mont. Const. Children Born Out Of Wedlock As to children born out of wedlock, we find that section 40-6-108, MCA, does create an unfair burden and unfairly discriminates against these children. The statute of limitations, as applied, is unconstitutional with respect to children born out of wedlock. The statute prevents any guardian, guardian ad litem or next friend of the child from maintaining an action for support from the paternal parent three years after birth of the child. Classifications of this nature are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, if they are not substantially related to a permissible state interest. Mathews v. Lucas (1976), 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651. The limitations statute constitutes an overly-broad restriction on the rights of children born out of wedlock. The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed this same issue recently in County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson (1980), 46 N.C.App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816. The court's statement has application here: "In the case sub judice, defendant argues that [the statute] bears a substantial relationship to the State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. We disagree. As we stated previously, a child is entitled to support from its father throughout its minority. Therefore, a child's claim for such support at any time during its minority can never be said to be stale. Nor is [the statute] substantially related to the State's interest in preventing the litigation of fraudulent claims. We have no reason to believe that the mere passage of time bears a direct relation to the truth of the claim asserted. Moreover, the need of a child to r e c e i v e adequate s u p p o r t m a n i f e s t l y outweighs t h e r e l a t i o n t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s may have t o t h e p r e v e n t i o n of f r a u d u l e n t c l a i m s . . . . " 264 S.E.2d a t 821. The r i g h t s of t h e c h i l d cannot be so compromised d u r i n g its infancy. The c h i l d born o u t of wedlock cannot be b a r r e d a c c e s s t o our c o u r t s d u r i n g i n f a n c y . A r t . 11, Sec. 13, 1972 Mont. Const. Recently, we examined t h e s c i e n t i f i c advances i n blood t e s t i n g i n determining p a t e r n i t y and t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y power of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Rose v. D i s t . Court of Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t . ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont. , 628 P.2d 662, 38 St.Rep. 830. The newly-developed, g r e a t e r p e r c e n t a g e of accuracy i n determining p a t e r n i t y a l l o w s g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n s f o r t h e a l l e g e d f a t h e r from f r a u d u l e n t c l a i m s . I n l i g h t of t h e s e advances, t h e s t a n d a r d of proof r e q u i r e d i n p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s and t h e d i s c r e t i o n g r a n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g s , i t is concluded t h a t t h e purpose of s e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA, a s a p p l i e d t o t h e c h i l d through a g u a r d i a n ad l i t e m or o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , is minimal or n o n e x i s t e n t compared t o t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e c h i l d i n o b t a i n i n g s u p p o r t from h i s p a t e r n a l p a r e n t . S t a t e Aqencies T h i s Court does uphold t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e where a s t a t e agency, such a s t h e Depart- ment of Revenue or t h e Department of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a - t i o n S e r v i c e s , d e r i v e s a r i g h t from t h e mother of t h e c h i l d born o u t of wedlock t o b r i n g a c l a i m f o r reimbursement f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t through p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s . The i n t e r e s t of t h e S t a t e i n t h e s e m a t t e r s is economic, and t h e power of t h e S t a t e t o c o n t i n u a l l y t h r e a t e n its c i t i z e n s i n p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s must always be thoroughly examined and n o t taken 1 i g h t l y . The S t a t e is n o t a c h i l d . I n r e a l i t y , it c a r e s n o t so much about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of f a t h e r and c h i l d b u t more about economic reimbursement f o r w e l f a r e and o t h e r dependent a i d . The r i g h t s g i v e n t o t h e S t a t e a r e n o t e q u a l t o t h e r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d o r t h e r e a s o n s o r n e c e s s i t y f o r f i n d i n g t h e c h i l d ' s f a t h e r . The s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , p r o v i d e s a p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i n a d v e r t e n c e and d e l a y o f t h e S t a t e i n a c t i o n s f o r p a t e r n i t y . The p a t e r n a l p a r e n t p r o t e c t i o n o f f e r e d by t h e s t a t u t e a s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e has a s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e intended purpose and, t h e r e f o r e , is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . W e n o t e t h a t t h e t o l l i n g s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 25-1-102, MCA, by its terms, h a s n o t been made a p p l i c a b l e t o Uniform Parentage Act c a s e s . The m a t t e r of p r o v i d i n g a proper t o l l i n g s t a t u t e f o r minors, a t l e a s t , is c a l l e d t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f o r f u t u r e a c t i o n . The judgments of t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s t o t h e s t a t e a g e n c i e s a r e a f f i r m e d . D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of Mr. J u s t i c e John C . Harr i s o n W e c o n c u r : J u s t i c e s M r . Chief J u s t i c e Haswell, d i s s e n t i n g : I would r e v e r s e . I a g r e e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s is u n c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l as t o an i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d by t h e m a j o r i t y . In m y view it is e q u a l l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e whose claims a r e d e r i v e d through and e q u a l to t h o s e of t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d to whom it h a s f u r n i s h e d s u p p o r t . The s t a t u t e s of t h i s S t a t e p r o v i d e : "40-5-109. Remedies o f state - o r p o l i t i c a l - sub- d i v i s i o n f u r n i s h i n g s u p p o r t . I f a s t a t e o r a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n f u r n i s h e s s u p p o r t t o an i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e , it h a s t h e same r i g h t to i n i t i a t e a proceeding under t h i s p a r t as t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e f o r t h e purpose of s e c u r i n g reimbursement f o r s u p p o r t f u r n i s h e d and of o b t a i n i n g c o n t i n u i n g s u p p o r t ." Here t h e S t a t e took an assignment of t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d ' s claim a g a i n s t h i s a l l e g e d f a t h e r . T h i s Court s t a t e d a l m o s t 50 y e a r s ago: " . . . The r u l e is e l e m e n t a r y t h a t a n a s s i g n - ment t r a n s f e r s t o t h e a s s i g n e e a l l t h e r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t of t h e a s s i g n o r i n t h e pro- p e r t y a s s i g n e d . . ." 91 Mont. 493, 506, 11 P.2d 782. The same p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s t o s u b r o g a t i o n which is s i m p l y a d e v i c e of e q u i t y to compel u l t i m a t e payment of a d e b t by one who i n j u s t i c e and good c o n s c i e n c e should pay it. Skauge v. Mountain S t a t e s T e l . & T e l . Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Mont . I 565 P.2d 628, 34 St.Rep. 450. Accordingly, a l l t h e r i g h t s and remedies of t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d were t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e S t a t e . Where, as h e r e , t h e r i g h t s of t h e S t a t e and t h e i l l e g i t i - mate c h i l d are i d e n t i c a l , how can t h e b a r of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i - t a t i o n s d e f e a t t h e S t a t e ' s claim b u t n o t t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d I s ? Chief J u s t i c e