Title: Adams v. Schneider Electric USA

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13352 
 
MARK A. ADAMS  vs.  SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 8, 2023. - June 21, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Anti-Discrimination Law, Age, Termination of employment, Prima 
facie case, Burden of proof.  Employment, Discrimination, 
Termination.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Burden of 
proof. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 11, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by William M. White, Jr., J., on a 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Robert S. Mantell (Ilir Kavaja & Paul L. Nevins also 
present) for the plaintiff. 
Dawn Reddy Solowey (Christopher W. Kelleher also present) 
for the defendant. 
Monica R. Shah, Lucie Gulino, & Michaela C. May, for 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Mark Adams sued his former employer, Schneider 
Electric USA (Schneider Electric), for age discrimination after 
he was laid off in a 2017 reduction in force.  Schneider 
Electric was granted summary judgment by the Superior Court, and 
the Appeals Court, in a divided decision, reversed.  We granted 
further appellate review to clarify the summary judgment 
standards in employment discrimination cases, including the 
correct application of the "cat's paw" theory of liability and 
the "stray remarks" doctrine.  
Adams was fifty-four years old at the time of the layoff.  
He had been an electrical engineer in the research and 
development (R&D) group of the home and business networks (HBN) 
division of the company in Andover since 2007, when Schneider 
Electric acquired his previous employer. 
Adams produced evidence that officials at Schneider 
Electric wanted to increase "age diversity" in the company in 
general, and the HBN R&D group in particular, by hiring recent 
college graduates and reducing the number of older employees.  
Consistent with this policy, Adams's R&D group in Andover was 
targeted for reductions in force while a younger R&D group in 
India was not.  Human resources (HR) executives also stressed 
the need for age diversity and referenced making budget 
reductions to make room for such diversity.  After Adams was 
laid off, his name appeared on a list exemplifying this policy.  
3 
 
Finally, statistical evidence, albeit contested, demonstrated 
that the layoffs had a disparate impact on those over fifty 
years of age.  
 
HBN R&D's director of engineering in Andover, Kenneth 
Colby, who had selected employees for the reduction in force, 
denied knowledge of any such personnel policy and claimed that 
he did not use employees' ages to determine whom to lay off.  He 
explained that his primary criterion was who would have the 
least impact on the group's work.  Thus, he claimed, Adams was 
selected because much of his time was spent working for other 
Schneider Electric divisions. 
 
The motion judge granted summary judgment to Schneider 
Electric.  The judge determined that Adams could not show that 
Colby's stated justification for his termination was pretextual, 
because Colby acted alone in selecting employees for the 
reduction in force, and all comments suggesting age 
discrimination came from other officials at Schneider Electric.  
The Appeals Court reversed.  Adams v. Schneider Elec. USA, 101 
Mass. App. Ct. 516, 531 (2022).  It determined that there were 
two bases on which Adams could show pretext.  First, he could 
show that Colby was an "innocent pawn" of a discriminatory 
corporate strategy, or second, he could show that Colby himself 
acted with age-based animus and that his description of his 
process was false.  Id. at 528-529.  The Appeals Court further 
4 
 
stated that Colby's claim that he did not consider age must be 
disregarded at this stage, because "[o]n summary judgment, a 
court 'must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party 
that the jury is not required to believe.'"  Id. at 531, quoting 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 
(2000). 
 
We conclude that the grant of summary judgment was 
improper.  It is possible, and consistent with liability under 
the employment discrimination statute, for a mid-level manager 
directed to lay off employees in his or her division to be found 
to further a discriminatory corporate policy without knowingly 
doing so.  See Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 688 
(2016).  This is an example of the so-called cat's paw or 
innocent pawn theory of liability.  There was also sufficient 
evidence, and not just stray comments by those outside of the 
decision-making process, to create a genuine issue of material 
fact whether Schneider Electric had such a corporate policy to 
replace older employees with younger recent college graduates.  
Multiple corporate executives, including those involved in the 
layoffs, made remarks to this effect.  In addition, there is 
sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to dispute 
whether Colby did not in fact consider age.  He met with 
representatives from HR during the selection process who gave 
him information on the ages of employees, and he was aware of 
5 
 
the desire to improve HBN R&D's age diversity, at least in the 
period shortly after the layoffs.  In fact, he participated in 
college recruiting trips in 2017 and dissuaded a subordinate 
manager from hiring more experienced engineers. 
Finally, although we reach the same conclusion as the 
Appeals Court, we nonetheless emphasize that the Appeals Court's 
statement that on summary judgment courts are required to 
disregard all testimony of a moving party that a jury is not 
required to believe was an incorrect, or at least incomplete, 
statement of summary judgment law.  On summary judgment, courts 
must determine whether the undisputed facts entitle the movant 
to judgment as a matter of law.  See Le Fort Enters., Inc. v. 
Lantern 18, LLC, 491 Mass. 144, 148-149 (2023) (Le Fort).  As 
the dissent in the Appeals Court noted, "potential disbelief in 
Colby's testimony" alone does not a dispute of fact make.  
Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 535-536 (Meade, J., dissenting).  
Rather, Adams must point to specific material in the record that 
could lead a jury to doubt Colby's credibility -- a burden of 
production that Adams has satisfied here.1 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, Fair Employment 
Project, Inc., and Lawyers for Civil Rights.  
6 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence in the summary 
judgment record in the light most favorable to Adams, the 
nonmoving party.  See Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149. 
a.  Corporate age diversity goals.  Schneider Electric 
appeared to have a corporate strategy of hiring younger 
employees and reducing the number of older employees to improve 
"age diversity" at the company.  Significant evidence in this 
regard is associated with Amanda Arria, the global vice-
president of HR with responsibility for HBN at the time of the 
relevant events.  As she described her job, "I am responsible 
for partnering with the leadership team to ensure we have the 
right people strategies in place for . . . business success." 
In a 2015 e-mail message regarding a potential new hire, 
the then-head of HBN R&D globally said to Arria:  "Business 
Power team [which contained the HBN R&D group] in Andover needs 
age diversity.  The embedded system team leader recognizes this 
and has been stocking his team with young talent.  I'd like to 
encourage this more."  Subsequently, the company appeared to do 
just that. 
Schneider Electric implemented a hiring freeze in 2016 
(still in effect during the litigation).  It conducted 
reductions in force in April and May of 2016, in addition to the 
one in 2017 in which Adams was terminated.  In the April layoff, 
six of the seven terminated employees were over forty, and five 
7 
 
were over fifty.  In May, all nine were forty-eight or older, 
and six of the nine were over fifty.  In the January 2017 
layoff, discussed more infra, all eight terminated employees 
(including Adams) were over fifty.  Despite the hiring freeze 
and these layoffs, Schneider Electric continued its ongoing 
recruiting program to hire recent college graduates.  Arria 
explained in a deposition that this was because recent graduates 
"brought fresh skills," not because they were younger, but she 
also said that the company was attempting to achieve a "diverse 
workforce" through hiring, "whether that's age" or other 
employee attributes. 
In addition, in a 2016 HR presentation, Arria indicated 
that one of HBN's goals was to improve "age/gender 
demographics," and a recent achievement, perhaps relating to 
that goal, was the April 2016 reduction in force.  A recruitment 
policy from 2016 stated:  "The maximum employment age with 
Schneider Electric is 58 or 60 years as per the respective legal 
entity guidelines."2 
b.  Budget reductions.  Around October 2016, leadership at 
Schneider Electric determined that they needed to make further 
budget reductions in the HBN division:  there was, as Arria 
termed it, a "cost take-out challenge globally."  Arria 
 
2 No such legal entity guidelines appear in the record. 
8 
 
explained that Pankaj Sharma, the senior vice-president of 
engineering, made the decision to reduce costs and "gave cost 
take-out targets to each of his leaders" in the groups he 
oversaw. 
In December 2016, Sharma told Colby that he would need to 
cut his group's budget by twenty-two percent.  Colby inferred 
from this that he would need to reduce headcount, as labor costs 
were the majority of the budget.  Arria confirmed:  "it was 
understood that, yes, we had to make some cuts in personnel 
costs."  In contrast, the HBN R&D group in Bangalore, India, was 
given a budget reduction target that did not require layoffs.  
Their lower target could instead be met by eliminating "travel, 
supplies and things like that."  The employees in India were 
younger than those in Andover:  the majority were in their 
thirties, whereas in Andover, the majority were over fifty. 
Also in December 2016, Arria met with Michelle Gautreau, an 
HR director working under her, to discuss the budget reductions.  
Gautreau's handwritten notes from the meeting included the line 
"deeper cuts for college grads."  It is not clear whether that 
meant that the college recruiting program would be curtailed as 
part of the budget reductions (as Gautreau explained in her 
deposition), or that the layoffs they were discussing were being 
done to make room in the budget to hire recent college 
graduates. 
9 
 
In any case, after Sharma gave him his marching orders, 
Colby set out to determine whom to cut.  He stated that based on 
advice from his supervisor, Jim Munley, he selected employees 
for the reduction in force by looking at (1) which employees 
were working outside his division; (2) whose termination would 
have the least impact on the division's goals; and (3) whether 
management roles could be consolidated.  Colby stated that age 
was not a factor and that he was not aware that company 
leadership was concerned with the age of employees or that there 
was a policy of regularly laying off older employees to create 
space for young talent. 
According to Colby, he alone made the initial decisions 
about whom to lay off, although he exchanged a few drafts of his 
list with HR.  Gautreau stated that she discussed the layoffs 
with Colby, provided advice, and gave him a list of employee 
details that included their ages, saying, "It's just one tool 
that will help you make the decision."  Colby cleared the final 
list with a small group of executives and HR personnel, 
including Sharma, Munley, Gautreau, and Arria.  Sharma asked for 
one employee, a recently widowed sixty-six year old, to be 
excluded from the layoff.  Ultimately, seven employees who 
reported directly to Colby were laid off, all of whom were over 
fifty, out of forty-three in the R&D group supervised by Colby 
and seventy-four total in the HBN division in Andover. 
10 
 
Colby explained in his deposition that Adams was included 
on the layoff list because he did not spend much time on the 
division's projects:  "the majority of his time was spent doing 
work, very good work, but for another division, field quality 
and global supply chain. . . .  [B]y selecting Mark, along with 
other individuals, it had less of an impact on the projects that 
I was responsible for."  Colby had worked with Adams since 1998, 
and he considered Adams "extremely hard working," "a great 
problem solver," and "a very good friend"; in Adams's 
deposition, Adams stated that he did not believe that Colby bore 
discriminatory animus toward him.  Colby suggested transferring 
Adams to the field quality division, but that team lacked the 
budget.  Adams was notified by telephone of his layoff on 
January 27, 2017, sometime after the other employees were laid 
off, as he had been traveling on company business. 
Colby apparently did not suggest transferring Adams to 
global supply chain, the other division for which he had been 
working at Schneider Electric.  Christopher Granato, the vice-
president of that division, was not informed in advance about 
the layoff.  About one month after Adams was laid off, Granato 
asked Colby about potentially hiring Adams as a contractor.  
Colby discouraged Granato from doing so, explaining that "HR may 
not want that to happen for a couple reasons."  Granato replaced 
11 
 
Adams with part-time work from a field quality division employee 
and by hiring two new employees in the Philippines. 
The parties introduced dueling statistical evidence 
regarding whether the layoffs had a disparate impact on older 
employees.  The plaintiff's expert stated that "there was a 
clear indication of age bias in the selection of those laid off 
by Schneider [Electric]," determining that there was a disparate 
impact on employees who were fifty and older.  Schneider 
Electric's expert identified several deficiencies in the 
plaintiff's expert's analysis:  the plaintiff's expert compared 
the laid off employees to the entire division, rather than only 
those who reported directly to Colby, and he did not control for 
job function, which Colby testified had factored into the 
selection criteria.  The defendant's expert found that employees 
over forty were not selected for terminations at higher-than-
expected rates.  While he also found, like the plaintiff's 
expert, that employees over fifty were terminated at higher 
rates when not controlling for job function, he explained that 
this finding was highly sensitive to minor tweaks to the data, 
which "casts doubt on whether the data allows for reliable and 
robust statistical findings."  The defendant's expert also 
pointed out that the average age of employees declined only 
slightly after the reduction in force (from 48.9 to 47.1) and 
12 
 
that the five oldest employees were retained, casting doubt on 
Adams's age discrimination theory. 
c.  Post-layoff evidence.  Evidence from after Adams was 
laid off also supported his claim that his layoff had been part 
of a discriminatory policy.  Jiri Cermak, Arria's boss and the 
senior vice-president of HR, suggested in several presentations 
that the company needed to hire "[m]ore early career talents," 
although they might "need to create the space" to do so through 
"restructuring" or "[w]orkforce planning."  In an e-mail message 
to the head of HBN R&D globally, Arria suggested that to solve 
the "age demographic challenges" the division faced in Andover,  
"we could potentially encourage a few employees to retire 
and make some budget reductions/room to hire in some of the 
college talent we have been discussing.  There are some 
legal cautions we would need to take to run a program like 
this, but if we are careful with our wording and execution 
we can pull this off effectively in a way that our 
employees would feel like it was a benefit to them, and 
benefit the R&D organization as well." 
 
A jury could interpret "budget reductions" subject to "legal 
cautions" to be a euphemism for required "layoffs," as Colby 
did.   
Arria reiterated this strategy in several e-mail messages 
to Cermak later in 2017, including commenting that "[we] have a 
few creative ideas we are fl[e]shing out around early retirement 
packages to continue to make room for more early career talent."  
In a subsequent e-mail message to Cermak in July 2017, she 
13 
 
wrote:  "As you are aware most of our action[s] have already 
occurred earlier this year and are noted here, but we do have 
some ideas around offering an early retirement package which 
would also help us make some room for some additional early 
career hires"; the attached document contained a list of 
"involuntary departures" that included Adams.  A reasonable 
interpretation of this communication is that Arria viewed 
Adams's "involuntary departure" as one "action" from earlier in 
the year that helped make "room for . . . early career hires." 
Colby also was involved in "age diversity" strategies, at 
least after the January 2017 reduction in force.  He 
participated in college recruiting trips in 2017 and told a 
subordinate manager to "hold off" on "hiring people with 
experience" until after a meeting about college recruiting.  
Colby's updated 2017 goals from his superiors included 
"[i]mprov[ing] [Andover] team talent demographics mix th[r]ough 
early retirement program and university fresh talent 
recruiting."  In addition, in Colby's deposition, he indicated 
that he was aware of the company's need for "a good succession 
plan," that he had been told to focus his hiring on "recent 
college graduates," and that he knew that diversity was one of 
the HBN division's goals. 
Other evidence indicated pejorative attitudes toward the 
ability of older workers.  A 2017 presentation listed weaknesses 
14 
 
of the HBN R&D Andover office, as opposed to HBN R&D's other 
locations (including the India office), which included an 
"[a]ging workforce" and "[l]ow energy level and speed."  During 
the same year, Cermak suggested in an e-mail message that 
"people over 50y" should probably not be included in a talent 
development program, as they "should be oriented rather on the 
other side of [their] career stage." 
d.  Procedural history.  Adams sued Schneider Electric in 
the Superior Court for age discrimination, alleging disparate 
treatment in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1B).3  The trial 
judge granted summary judgment, explaining that Adams conceded 
that Colby "harbored no discriminatory animus toward him" and 
produced no evidence to rebut Colby's testimony that he alone 
made the decision to select Adams for the reduction in force. 
A split panel of the Appeals Court reversed the grant of 
summary judgment.  Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 531.  The 
Appeals Court majority explained that, taking the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Adams, there were two possible bases 
on which a fact finder could find that Adams's layoff was 
 
3 Adams also brought additional discrimination claims 
against Schneider Electric, including one that alleged disparate 
impact; claims against other Schneider Electric employees for 
aiding and abetting discrimination; and a claim that he was 
wrongfully terminated for reporting safety hazards.  All of 
these claims either were voluntarily dismissed or have been 
waived on appeal.  Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 517 n.2. 
15 
 
discriminatory.  First, Adams could show that even if Colby 
"implemented the [reduction in force] neutrally," it was 
"tainted" -- that is, the decision to implement a layoff in the 
first place was a deliberate corporate strategy to shed older 
workers.  Id. at 527.  Second, Adams could show that, 
notwithstanding Colby's deposition testimony, "Colby was aware 
of management's age animus and therefore selected workers over 
age fifty . . . in accordance with company policy."  Id. at 529.  
The Appeals Court further explained: 
"Colby's testimony that he did not consider age in the 
layoff is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment.  At 
this stage, we must disregard Colby's claim that he used 
only neutral criteria to select employees for the 
[reduction in force].  On summary judgment, a court 'must 
disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that 
the jury is not required to believe.'" 
 
Id. at 531, quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.  
 
The dissent would have affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment.  Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 532 (Meade, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent viewed evidence of an ageist corporate 
policy as mere "stray remarks" from nondecision makers "culled 
from over 9,000 pages of discovery materials."  Id. at 535 
(Meade, J., dissenting).  In addition, the dissent rejected the 
proposition that Colby's testimony should be disregarded on 
summary judgment because a jury might not believe it.  See id. 
at 535-536 (Meade, J., dissenting) ("A potential disbelief in 
Colby's testimony is not a 'specific fact' for purposes of Mass. 
16 
 
R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 [1974]").  Thus, there was no basis 
on which to disregard Colby's testimony for the purposes of 
summary judgment. 
 
This court granted Schneider Electric's application for 
further appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Adams contests 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Schneider 
Electric.  We review a decision to grant summary judgment de 
novo.  See Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149.  "'Summary judgment is 
appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in dispute 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.' . . .  'We review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the party against whom summary judgment entered,'" in this 
case, Adams.  Id. at 148-149, quoting HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. 
Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 326-327 (2022).  Summary judgment is "a 
disfavored remedy in the context of discrimination cases based 
on disparate treatment . . . because the ultimate issue of 
discriminatory intent is a factual question."  Bulwer, 473 Mass. 
at 689, quoting Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, 
Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 439 (1995). 
b.  McDonnell Douglas framework.  General Laws c. 151B, 
§ 4 (1B), bars age discrimination in employment:  it is unlawful 
"[f]or an employer in the private sector, by himself or his 
agent, because of the age of any individual, . . . to discharge 
17 
 
from employment such individual."  To prove a claim of 
employment discrimination under the statute, a plaintiff must 
show "that he or she is a member of a protected class; that he 
or she was subject to an adverse employment action; that the 
employer bore 'discriminatory animus' in taking that action; and 
that that animus was the reason for the action (causation)."  
Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 680, quoting Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 
Mass. 493, 502 (2001).  It is undisputed that Adams was a member 
of a protected class, as he was over forty years old,4 and that 
his layoff constituted an adverse action.  Therefore, the 
question is whether he can show animus and causation.  See 
Bulwer, supra. 
Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases often rely on 
indirect or circumstantial evidence to prove these two elements.  
See Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, 
P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 396 (2016), citing Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 39-40 (2005).  See also Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003) (in discrimination 
cases, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but 
may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct 
evidence" [citation omitted]).  In determining whether a 
 
4 In the antidiscrimination statute, "[t]he term 'age' 
unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context, 
includes any duration of time since an individual's birth of 
greater than forty years."  G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (8). 
18 
 
plaintiff can survive summary judgment, we use "the familiar 
three-stage, burden-shifting paradigm first set out in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973) (McDonnell 
Douglas)."  Verdrager, supra, quoting Sullivan, supra. 
In the framework, first, the plaintiff must make out a 
"prima facie case of discrimination"; second, "the employer can 
rebut the presumption created by the prima facie case by 
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
[employment] decision"; and third, the employee must provide 
evidence that the articulated reason is pretextual.  Bulwer, 473 
Mass. at 681, quoting Blare, 419 Mass. at 441, 443.  McDonnell 
Douglas does not set out the elements of the claim or the burden 
of proof:  it is simply "a method of organizing evidence" "in 
the context of summary judgment" (citation omitted).5  Lipchitz, 
434 Mass. at 508.  Although the plaintiff bears a burden of 
production in steps one and three, "the burden of persuasion at 
summary judgment remains with the defendants."  Bulwer, supra at 
683. 
Here, Adams produced sufficient evidence to make out a 
prima facie case.  In a reduction-in-force case, the plaintiff 
 
5 The McDonnell Douglas test is not used at trial.  Instead, 
"[w]e encourage trial judges to craft instructions that will 
focus the jury's attention on the ultimate issues of harm, 
discriminatory animus and causation."  Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at 
508. 
19 
 
"establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by producing 
evidence that she is a member of a class protected by G. L. 
c. 151B; she performed her job at an acceptable level; she was 
terminated"; and "her layoff occurred in circumstances that 
would raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."6  
Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 41, 45.  "[T]he plaintiff's initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case is not intended to be 
onerous."  Id. at 45.  The first three of these elements are 
uncontested:  Adams was over forty, and Colby characterized him 
as a "great problem solver" who did "very good work," despite 
selecting him for the layoff.  As to the fourth element, the 
apparent desire of Schneider Electric's management to clear 
space for younger workers, described supra, constitutes 
circumstances that could raise an inference of discrimination.  
Moreover, some statistical evidence suggests that employees over 
fifty were terminated at higher-than-expected rates.  See id. at 
46 n.16 (statistical evidence may help prove prima facie case). 
For the second prong of McDonnell Douglas, it is 
uncontested that Schneider Electric articulated a "legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason" for its decision to lay off Adams.  
 
6 The fourth element is typically framed as whether the 
employer replaced the plaintiff with someone similarly 
qualified.  Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 41.  However, this would be 
"nonsensical in a reduction in force case," because "the very 
purpose of a workforce reorganization is generally to reduce the 
number of employees."  Id. 
20 
 
Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 681.  Colby explained that he had to 
implement a reduction in force for budgetary reasons.  Following 
advice from his supervisor, he selected Adams because "the 
majority of his time was spent doing work . . . for another 
division."  Adams's work outside of the R&D group had nothing to 
do with his protected class. 
The question therefore becomes whether Adams has produced 
enough evidence to create a material dispute of fact regarding 
whether Schneider Electric's stated nondiscriminatory reason was 
pretextual.  Adams presented two theories that the Appeals Court 
determined satisfied this burden:  first, under the so-called 
"cat's paw" theory, Colby could have been an "innocent pawn" of 
a discriminatory corporate strategy to shed older workers, or 
second, Colby himself could have attempted to lay off older 
workers in furtherance of a discriminatory policy.  Adams, 101 
Mass. App. Ct. at 528-529 & n.23.  We take each theory in turn. 
c.  Discriminatory corporate strategy.  There was 
sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to create a 
genuine issue of material fact whether Schneider Electric had a 
corporate policy to remove older staff to make room for younger 
workers.  On numerous occasions, corporate executives expressed 
concern about the age of their workforce, particularly in the 
division in which Adams worked.  They also expressed a 
preference for "more early career talents" and complimented a 
21 
 
manager in Adams's division who was "stocking his team with 
young talent."  They also stressed the need to make room for 
this younger talent.  Various strategies were discussed to 
achieve this goal, including budget reductions and voluntary and 
involuntary terminations of older workers.  In a series of e-
mail messages, for example, Arria, the global vice-president of 
HR, suggested "budget reductions" could make "room" for new 
younger hires.   
Consistent with this strategy, budget reduction 
requirements were selectively enforced, with voluntary and 
involuntary terminations appearing to target older workers.  The 
younger R&D office in India, for example, was given a budget 
reduction target that did not require layoffs, while the older 
Andover office was given one that did require layoffs.  Despite 
mandatory budget reductions and required layoffs, hiring younger 
employees via college recruiting continued to be encouraged, 
including in Adams's group.  Finally, Adams's statistical 
expert's findings were consistent with the theory of replacing 
older workers with younger ones, as the data, in the light most 
favorable to Adams, indicated that the layoffs had a 
disproportionate effect on employees over fifty. 
The dissent in the Appeals Court considered much of this 
evidence, particularly the suggestive e-mail messages, to be 
mere stray remarks by "nondecision makers" that do not support a 
22 
 
finding of a prohibited motive.  See Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 535 (Meade, J., dissenting).  We disagree.  Although "stray" 
ageist remarks by those in the company not involved in the 
relevant employment decision may not, at least alone, be 
probative of discrimination against a particular plaintiff, 
there was more than that here.  See generally Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333-338 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (critically reviewing history and practice of stray 
remarks doctrine).7 
Multiple high ranking corporate executives, including 
those, such as Arria, involved in the layoffs, sounded a 
consistent theme.  The corporate executives, including those in 
HR responsible for educating the workforce on discrimination, 
expressed a preference for younger workers, observed that there 
were too many older workers, and suggested ways to change the 
"demographics mix" through voluntary and involuntary termination 
of older workers while hiring new and younger college graduates.  
 
7 As suggested by the Appeals Court dissent, Adams, 101 
Mass. App. Ct. at 535 n.7 (Meade, J., dissenting), we take this 
opportunity to clarify that any ageist, sexist, or racist 
remarks by those involved in the decisional process may be 
considered probative of discrimination against a particular 
plaintiff.  Cf. Blare, 419 Mass. at 447 n.9, quoting Fontaine v. 
Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 314 n.7 (1993) ("[I]solated or 
ambiguous remarks [by a decision maker], tending to suggest 
animus based on age, are insufficient, standing alone, to prove 
an employer's discriminatory intent"). 
23 
 
See Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 314 n.7 (evidence sufficient for jury 
to find that top executive's remarks indicated "that he thought 
that the managers of these companies were too old and that 
younger managers should be found to take their places").  See 
also Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 667 (2000), overruled on other 
grounds by Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549 (2004), cert. denied sub nom. 
Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 (2004) ("The statements by [the 
managing partner] . . . were not stray remarks.  They were made 
by a person with the power to make employment decisions"). 
Adams's division was also the focal point of these remarks, 
and all eight of the employees selected in the January 2017 
layoff, including Adams, were over fifty.8  Consistent with the 
corporate strategy of replacing older workers with younger ones, 
in September 2017, after the forced layoffs, Colby told a 
 
8 The Appeals Court dissent accurately points out that the 
five oldest employees in the group were retained and that the 
statistical evidence as a whole may be challenged in a variety 
of ways.  Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 533 (Meade, J., 
dissenting).  While the jury will have the opportunity to 
consider this evidence as well, and the reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from it, such evidence is not sufficient to 
support an award of summary judgment for Schneider Electric on 
this record as a whole.  To the contrary, it shows that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists when viewed in light of 
the plaintiff's competing evidence. 
24 
 
manager under him to "hold off" on "hiring people with 
experience" until after a meeting regarding an "upcoming 
recruiting trip."  The next month, Colby was given an explicit 
annual performance goal along the same lines -- to improve the 
"demographics mix" of his team through college recruiting and 
early retirements. 
All of this evidence was sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact whether Adams's group of older employees, 
and thus Adams, were targeted for layoffs to make room for 
younger hires.  
Under this theory, Colby's knowledge of the strategy or 
lack thereof is unnecessary.  It would constitute unlawful 
discrimination if executives at the company targeted the HBN R&D 
group for layoffs in the first place because of the age of the 
employees in that group, even if Colby himself was ignorant of 
the larger scheme when he selected individual employees for 
termination.  "Even if Colby were the sole decision maker for 
which particular employees would be [laid off] and the innocent 
pawn of an undisclosed corporate strategy tainted by unlawful 
discriminatory animus, a rational fact finder could conclude 
that the [reduction in force] was unlawful."  Adams, 101 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 527-528. 
This type of fact pattern has been called a "cat's paw" 
case, after a fable in which a monkey convinces a cat to roast 
25 
 
chestnuts, and then makes off with the finished product, leaving 
the cat with a burned paw and no chestnuts to show for it.  See 
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011).  See also 
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2350 
(2021), quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 425 (2d 
ed. 1934) ("A 'cat's paw' is a 'dupe' who is 'used by another to 
accomplish his purposes'").  Although this court has not used 
that evocative terminology, it is clear that the employment 
discrimination statute supports liability for such "monkey 
business."  The statute makes it illegal "[f]or an employer in 
the private sector, by himself or his agent" to subject an 
individual to an adverse employment action on the basis of age.  
G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1B).  A corporate employer acts through 
multiple agents.  See Staub, supra at 420 ("An employer's 
authority to reward, punish, or dismiss is often allocated among 
multiple agents," not just "[t]he one who makes the ultimate 
decision").  A discriminatory corporate decision is not 
insulated from liability just because it is implemented by 
managers with limited decision-making authority, unaware that 
they are being used as "pawns" or "paws." 
Our employment cases have recognized the issue of corporate 
responsibility, although generally in the context of an ultimate 
decision maker relying on biased input from lower rungs of the 
26 
 
corporate ladder.9  For example, in Bulwer, a hospital's decision 
not to renew the plaintiff doctor's contract was made by an "ad 
hoc committee" that relied on allegedly racially biased 
performance evaluations and testimony from other physicians at 
the hospital.  Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 686-688.  We explained: 
"Where 'the decision makers relied on the recommendations 
of supervisors [whose motives have been impugned], the 
motives of the supervisors should be treated as the motives 
for the decision. . . .  An employer [may not] insulate its 
decision by interposing an intermediate level of persons in 
the hierarchy of decision, and asserting that the ultimate 
decision makers acted only on recommendation.'" 
 
Id. at 688, quoting Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 569-570 (1981), overruled on 
other grounds by Wynn & Wynn, P.C., 431 Mass. at 669.  See 
Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 403 ("adverse employment decisions . . . 
were made by individuals who were acting independently from the 
plaintiff's immediate supervisors and who were not accused of 
harboring the discriminatory views alleged to have been held by 
those supervisors," but decisions were "based . . . on the 
opinions" of those supervisors); Trustees of Forbes Library, 384 
Mass. at 570 (library trustees fired employee based on 
 
9 This is consistent with the origins of the doctrine.  In 
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990), in 
which Judge Richard Posner brought the "cat's paw" language into 
antidiscrimination law, the plaintiff employee's biased manager 
recommended to the "Career Path Committee" that the employee be 
fired.  In Staub, 562 U.S. at 415, likewise, the HR department 
fired the employee based on his biased supervisors' reports. 
27 
 
recommendations from supervisors who intended to retaliate 
against employee for protected union activity). 
Although the discrimination may have taken place at a 
different level of decision-making in the instant case, that is 
to say among top managers rather than mid-level managers or 
supervisors, the result is still the same:  the company remains 
responsible for the discrimination.  Corporate liability is 
perhaps even more clear-cut, as the allegedly discriminatory 
action that resulted in termination was taken further up the 
corporate hierarchy. 
Federal courts have found employment discrimination in 
situations similar to that in this case.  For example, a 
corporation was liable for a discriminatory firing where it was 
found to have a long-standing practice of age discrimination 
"under the stewardship of its president," even though the 
employee's "immediate supervisor," the "key" decision maker, did 
not appear to be biased.  Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 
1331, 1334, 1342 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The battle plan of the 
admiral is a valid datum in assessing the intentions of the 
captain of a single ship in the flotilla").  Likewise, summary 
judgment was improper where a company's chief executive officer 
had indicated that he wanted to fire the plaintiff in 
retaliation for a wage-related lawsuit, although the plaintiff 
was ultimately fired by someone else.  Travers v. Flight Servs. 
28 
 
& Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 144, 145 (1st Cir. 2013).  "[T]he 
retaliatory animus resided at the apex of the organizational 
hierarchy. . . .  A rational juror could conclude that such 
strongly held and repeatedly voiced wishes of the king, so to 
speak, likely became well known to those courtiers who might rid 
him of a bothersome underling."  Id. at 147.  See Cravens vs. 
Pact, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:19-cv-01357 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 
2020) (company could be liable under cat's paw theory where 
chief executive officer allegedly had sexist attitudes that 
influenced corporate actions).  Similarly, this court has 
affirmed corporate liability where a law firm's biased managing 
partner instructed the management committee not to hire the 
plaintiff.  Wynn & Wynn, P.C., 431 Mass. at 667 n.24. 
d.  Colby's credibility.  The Appeals Court also concluded 
that a "rational fact finder could find that Colby was aware of 
management's age animus and therefore selected workers over age 
fifty . . . in accordance with company policy."  Adams, 101 
Mass. App. Ct. at 529.  We agree with this conclusion, but we 
disagree in part with the court's analysis, particularly its 
suggestion at the end of its opinion that it must disregard all 
of Colby's testimony at the summary judgment stage, simply 
because he is an interested witness and a jury might not find 
him credible. 
29 
 
As the dissent explained, a fact is not disputed just 
because it has been put forth by the moving party.  Rather, the 
nonmoving party bears a burden of production:  it is "required 
to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of 
material fact."  Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149, quoting Haverty v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. 737, 759 n.28 (2002), 
S.C., 440 Mass. 1 (2003).  See Barron Chiropractic & 
Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group, 469 Mass. 800, 
804 (2014) ("If the moving party . . . asserts the absence of 
any triable issue, the nonmoving party must respond and make 
specific allegations sufficient to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact").  See also Sullivan v. Lawlis, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 
409, 415 (2018).10 
Reeves, the United States Supreme Court case cited by the 
Appeals Court, is not to the contrary.  The Appeals Court 
 
10 The summary judgment standard is no different in an 
employment discrimination case.  See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 
quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) 
("trial courts should not 'treat discrimination differently from 
other ultimate questions of fact'"); Yee v. Massachusetts State 
Police, 481 Mass. 290, 302 (2019) ("Yee may satisfy this 
[summary judgment] burden by offering evidence which, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to Yee, is sufficient to 
convince a reasonable jury that the reasons the State police 
offered . . . were not the real reasons"); Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 
680.  Indeed, under the Appeals Court's standard, step two of 
the McDonnell Douglas test would be pointless:  courts could 
simply disregard an employer's proffered legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason because a jury is not required to 
believe it. 
30 
 
majority appears to have taken the phrase "disregard all 
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not 
required to believe" out of context.  The full context from 
Reeves shows that the Supreme Court simply meant that when 
deciding judgment as a matter of law, courts should avoid 
weighing evidence: 
"[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility 
determinations or weigh the evidence. . . .  'Credibility 
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the 
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 
functions, not those of a judge.'  [Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).]  Thus, although the 
court should review the record as a whole, it must 
disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that 
the jury is not required to believe.  See [9A C.A. Wright & 
A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529, at 299 
(2d ed. 1995)].  That is, the court should give credence to 
the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that 
'evidence supporting the moving party that is 
uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that 
that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'  Id." 
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-151.  See LaFrenier v. Kinirey, 550 F.3d 
166, 168-169 (1st Cir. 2008) (clarifying meaning and application 
of Reeves and stating that on "summary judgment we need not 
exclude all interested testimony, specifically testimony that is 
uncontradicted by the nonmovant" [citation omitted]); Lauren W. 
ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 271-272 (3d Cir. 
2007) ("in considering a motion for summary judgment the court 
should believe uncontradicted testimony unless it is inherently 
implausible even if the testimony is that of an interested 
31 
 
witness"); Luh v. J.M. Huber Corp., 211 Fed. Appx. 143, 146 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (to be disregarded, "testimony must display some 
indicia that it is not credible"); Stratienko v. Cordis 
Corp., 429 F.3d 592, 597-598 (6th Cir. 2005).  In other words, a 
court must determine judgment as a matter of law based on all 
uncontested evidence, that is, evidence favoring the nonmovant 
and "uncontradicted and unimpeached" evidence favoring the 
movant.  Uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence, even from 
interested witnesses favoring the moving party, is to be 
considered on summary judgment.  In evaluating evidence favoring 
the moving party, the Supreme Court did not say "only" evidence 
from a disinterested party should be given credence.  Rather, it 
explained that uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence shall be 
given credence, "at least to the extent" that it is provided by 
disinterested parties.  Indeed, in Reeves, supra at 144, an age 
discrimination case, the Supreme Court specifically stated that 
the plaintiff had "made a substantial showing that [the 
employer's] explanation" for his firing "was false."  Such 
analysis figured prominently in the Court's decision.  See id. 
at 151. 
Thus, to survive summary judgment, Adams could not simply 
state that Colby was an interested witness and thus his 
testimony could be disregarded.  Adams was required instead to 
identify specific material in the record that would support a 
32 
 
jury finding that Colby relied on age in selecting employees for 
the reduction in force, despite his testimony to the contrary. 
 Although the Appeals Court may have confused this 
requirement, the record, which we review de novo, establishes 
that Adams met his burden.  Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149.  As 
reasons to doubt Colby's assertion, the summary judgment record, 
as highlighted by the Appeals Court, includes (1) the statements 
made by corporate executives demonstrating discriminatory animus 
against older employees; (2) that Colby had met with Sharma and 
Arria, who had articulated such views, while formulating the 
layoff list, and thus "a rational jury could infer that the 
wishes of senior management were expressed in those meetings"; 
(3) everyone on Colby's layoff list was over fifty; and (4) 
Colby's efforts to dissuade Granato from rehiring Adams for 
another division.  Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 529-531.  To 
that, we would add that Colby stated shortly after the layoffs 
that he knew that age diversity was a goal of the division and 
that he had been asked to focus his hiring on recent college 
graduates.  
The fact that Adams admitted that he did not believe that 
Colby bore discriminatory animus toward him does not change this 
analysis.  Adams's statement was not a legal conclusion that 
Colby did not select him for the reduction in force for a 
proscribed reason.  It merely reflected his belief that Colby 
33 
 
was not personally biased against him.  Indeed, like his view 
that Colby was unbiased, other parts of Adams's deposition 
testimony about the mechanics of the reduction in force proved 
to be inconsistent with what was learned in discovery and could 
be disregarded by a jury if introduced at trial -- for example, 
Adams stated that his layoff was entirely HR's decision. 
In sum, on these facts, a jury could find that Colby 
inferred (or was directly told) that his managers wanted him to 
select older employees for the reduction in force to improve the 
demographic balance of the R&D team, and that he did so.  In 
other words, Adams has produced circumstantial evidence that 
satisfies his burden of production to show a dispute of fact 
regarding Colby's testimony.  See Yee v. Massachusetts State 
Police, 481 Mass. 290, 302 (2019); Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 682.  
3.  Conclusion.  Because corporate decisions involve 
multiple actors, an innocent decision maker can further a 
discriminatory purpose.  Here, Adams produced evidence from 
which a jury could find that he was selected for the reduction 
in force as part of a corporate strategy to lay off older 
workers.  Although this theory does not require that Colby knew 
about the strategy, a jury could also find that he did and that 
he selected Adams in accordance with it.  As Adams produced 
sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact regarding 
whether he was terminated due to discriminatory animus, the 
34 
 
grant of summary judgment is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.