Title: Robert Beeler Power v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1139 
____________ 
 
ROBERT BEELER POWER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[September 25, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Robert Beeler Power appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained 
below, we affirm the circuit court’s decision summarily denying relief.  
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE 
On June 2, 1990, Power was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual 
battery, kidnapping of a child under the age of thirteen, armed burglary of a 
dwelling, and armed robbery.  Power v. State (Power I), 605 So. 2d 856, 860 (Fla. 
1992).  On November 8, 1990, the circuit court followed the jury’s unanimous 
recommendation and sentenced Power to death finding no mitigating 
circumstances and four aggravating factors.  Id.1  On direct appeal, Power raised 
claims of error in his guilt and penalty phases, including error in finding that the 
murder was committed in a CCP manner.  Id. at 864.  Although we found that the 
application of the CCP aggravating factor was error, we concluded such error was 
harmless and affirmed Power’s convictions and sentences.  Id. at 864-65. 
 
In November 1998, Power filed a postconviction motion in which he raised 
numerous claims.  Power v. State (Power II), 886 So. 2d 952, 955 (Fla. 2004).  
This Court affirmed the denial for postconviction relief and denied his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 965.  In December 2006, Power filed a successive 
postconviction motion raising four constitutional challenges to Florida’s death 
penalty scheme, which the circuit court summarily denied in its entirety.  Power 
now appeals the summary denial of postconviction relief to this Court.   
ANALYSIS 
 
We have explained that “[c]laims in successive motions may be denied 
without an evidentiary hearing ‘[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case 
                                          
 
1.  The court found in aggravation that (1) the defendant was previously 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) the homicide was 
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the crimes of 
sexual battery, burglary, and kidnapping; (3) the homicide was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) the homicide was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification.  Power I, 605 So. 2d at 860.   
 
 
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conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ”  White v. State, 964 
So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)).  Because a 
court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is 
ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a 
pure question of law, subject to de novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 
120, 137 (Fla. 2003).  We address each of Power’s claims in turn. 
First, Power argued at the circuit court that section 922.105, Florida Statutes 
(2006), violates the separation of powers doctrine.  Power asserted that the 
Legislature’s exemption of lethal injection policies and procedures from the 
Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2006), without 
offering alternative procedures, gives the Department of Corrections (DOC) 
unfettered discretion to create a lethal injection protocol.  Power correctly 
acknowledges that in Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2006), we rejected this 
argument.  Specifically, we held, 
Even though the execution procedures may not be challenged through 
a chapter 120 proceeding, they can and have been challenged through 
postconviction proceedings under rule 3.851.  See, e.g., Hill v. State, 
921 So. 2d 579, 582-83 (Fla.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 126 S.Ct. 
1441, 164 L .Ed. 2d 141 (2006).  In light of the exigencies inherent in 
the execution process, judicial review and oversight of the DOC 
procedures is preferable to chapter 120 administrative proceedings.  
We conclude that the statutory exemption does not give DOC 
“unfettered discretion” as to lethal injection procedures. 
 
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Diaz, 945 So. 2d 1143-44; see also Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000) 
(“We likewise conclude that [sections 922.10 and 922.105, Florida Statutes 
(2000),] do[] not improperly delegate legislative authority to an administrative 
agency.”).  We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in summarily 
denying this claim.2   
Second, Power argued at the circuit court that Florida’s lethal injection 
procedures are unconstitutional because it violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  He asserted that the new procedures 
promulgated by the DOC, effective August 1, 2007 (August 2007 procedures), do 
not adequately address the deficiencies in the 2006 procedures.  Specifically, he 
argued that provisions for the administration of the drugs, the assessment of 
consciousness, and the monitoring of consciousness throughout the procedure 
remain inadequate.  We recently addressed and rejected the same constitutional 
challenge in Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007), wherein we 
held that “[i]n light of these additional safeguards [promulgated in the August 2007 
procedures,] . . . we conclude that Lightbourne has not shown a substantial, 
foreseeable or unnecessary risk of pain in the DOC’s procedures for carrying out 
the death penalty through lethal injection that would violate the Eighth 
                                          
 
 
2.  We also note that we have rejected this argument in Smith v. State, No. 
SC06-1903 (Fla. Sept. 25, 2008). 
 
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Amendment protections.”  Id. at 352-53, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2485 (2008); see 
also Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
2486 (2008).3  Power does not assert that he would have presented any additional 
testimony or other evidence regarding the lethal injection procedures than those 
presented in Lightbourne or Schwab.  Furthermore, Power relies upon no new 
evidence as to the chemicals employed since this Court’s previous rulings rejecting 
this challenge.  As this Court stated in Schwab, “Given the record in Lightbourne 
and our extensive analysis in our opinion in Lightbourne . . . we reject the 
conclusion that lethal injection as applied in Florida is unconstitutional.”  969 So. 
2d at 325.  We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in summarily 
denying this claim.  
Third, Power argued at the circuit court that he is exempt from execution 
under the Eighth Amendment because he suffers from severe mental illness.  The 
circuit court held that this claim was procedurally barred as untimely and 
successive.  Power unsuccessfully attempted to avoid the timeliness bar by citing, 
as newly discovered evidence, the August 8, 2006, American Bar Association 
(ABA) Resolution 122A.  As to the merits, the circuit court held that neither this 
                                          
 
 
3.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review in these cases 
following release of Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), in which a majority of 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol 
against an Eighth Amendment challenge.  Id. at 1534. 
 
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Court nor the United States Supreme Court has recognized mental illness as a per 
se bar to execution.   
To vacate a sentence based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A); Jones v. State, 709 
So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  First, the evidence must not have been known by the 
circuit court, the party, or counsel, and it must appear that the defendant or defense 
counsel could not have known of it by the use of due diligence.  Jones, 709 So. 2d 
at 521 (citing Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1994)).  
Second, the evidence must be of such nature that it would probably yield a less 
severe sentence.  See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991). 
Initially, we note that we have been reluctant to recognize ABA reports as 
newly discovered evidence because the reports are “a compilation of previously 
available information related to Florida’s death penalty system and consist [] of 
legal analysis and recommendations for reform, many of which are directed to the 
executive and legislative branches.”  Rutherford v. State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 1117 
(Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 465 (2006); see Schwab, 969 So. 2d 325-26 
(“[T]his Court has not recognized ‘new opinions’ or ‘new research studies’ as 
newly discovered evidence.” (citing Diaz, 945 So. 2d at 1144-45)); Rolling v. 
State, 944 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. 2006) (affirming summary denial of a newly 
discovered evidence claim based on an ABA report).  Nevertheless, as we stated in 
 
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Rutherford, “even if we were to consider the information contained in the ABA 
Report, nothing therein would cause this Court to recede from its decisions 
upholding the facial constitutionality of the death penalty.”  940 So. 2d at 1118.  
Similarly, Power has failed to demonstrate how ABA Resolution 122A sufficiently 
undermines this Court’s decisions upholding the facial constitutionality of the 
death penalty so as to cause this Court to recede from those decisions.  Thus, 
Power has failed to establish how ABA Resolution 122A would probably yield a 
less severe sentence under Florida law.   
Having failed to establish that ABA Resolution 122A constitutes newly 
discovered evidence, Power has also failed to demonstrate why he could not have 
timely challenged Florida’s death penalty scheme on the basis of the matters 
discussed in the ABA resolution in his direct appeal or even in his initial 
postconviction motion.  Muhammad v. State, 603 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992) 
(“Issues which either were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct 
appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.” (citing Smith v. State, 445 So. 
2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1983))); Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995).  
Indeed, his allegations refer to testimony regarding his mental illness presented at 
the 2001 evidentiary hearing for his initial postconviction motion.  We hold, 
therefore, that the circuit court did not err in summarily denying this claim as 
untimely.   
 
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In an abundance of caution, we also note that we have previously determined 
that Power’s claim has no merit.  In Diaz, the defendant cited ABA Resolution 
122A, arguing that his personality disorders were sufficiently akin to being 
mentally retarded so as to exempt him from execution.  945 So. 2d at 1151.  We 
held:  
[N]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental 
illness as a per se bar to execution.  Instead, mental illness can be 
considered as either a statutory mental mitigating circumstance if it 
meets that definition (i.e., the crime was committed while the 
defendant “was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance”) or a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.  See § 
921.141(6), Fla. Stat. (2006).  Such mental mitigation is one of the 
factors to be considered and weighed by the court in imposing a 
sentence. 
Id.  Although Diaz was not able to show that he suffered from mental illness, we 
held that “even if he could, this would not automatically exempt him from 
execution as there is currently no per se ‘mental illness’ bar to execution.”  Id. at 
1152; see also Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 867 (Fla. 2007) (“To the extent 
that Connor is arguing that he cannot be executed because of mental conditions 
that are not insanity or mental retardation, the issue has been resolved adversely to 
his position.” (citing Diaz, 945 So. 2d at 1151)).  We reaffirm our previous 
 
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declaration in Diaz and hold that the existence of mental illness standing alone 
does not automatically exempt Power from execution.4 
 
Finally, Power argued at the circuit court that the ABA report entitled 
Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in the State Death Penalty System: The Florida 
Death Penalty Assessment Report, published September 17, 2006, constitutes 
newly discovered evidence proving that imposition of the death penalty is cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Power correctly 
and candidly acknowledges that we rejected this argument in Rolling and 
Rutherford.  In both cases, we concluded that this very same ABA report did not 
constitute newly discovered evidence and that “nothing in the report would cause 
this Court to recede from its past decisions upholding the facial constitutionality of 
the death penalty.”  Rolling, 944 So. 2d at 181 (citing Rutherford, 940 So. 2d at 
1118).  Furthermore, as in Rolling and Rutherford, Power has “not allege[d] how 
any of the conclusions in the report would render his individual death sentence 
unconstitutional.”  Rolling, 944 So. 2d at 181; see also Rutherford, 940 So. 2d at 
1118.  For these same reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of 
Power’s claim.   
                                          
 
4.  To the extent that Power alleges that his mental illness renders him 
incompetent to be executed, this claim is not yet ripe, as he was told in his initial 
postconviction appeal.  Power II, 886 So. 2d at 958; see also Barnhill v. State, 971 
So. 2d 106, 118 (Fla. 2007); Coney, 845 So. 2d at 137 n.19; Jones v. State, 845 So. 
2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003); Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001). 
 
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Accordingly, for the reasons set out above we affirm the trial court’s 
summary denial of Power’s successive postconviction motion. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and BELL, JJ., and 
CANTERO, Senior Justice, concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Alice Blackwell White, Judge – Case No. CR89-1798 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Rachel Day, and Paul E. 
Kalil, Assistant CCR Counsel, and Anna-Liisa Nixon, Staff Attorney, CCRC – 
Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee