Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN EMMANUEL THOMAS, Deceased; MARGARET DICKSON v. KRIS THOMAS, Persona Representative of the Estate of John Emmanuel Thomas

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN EMMANUEL THOMAS, Deceased; MARGARET DICKSON v. KRIS THOMAS, Persona Representative of the Estate of John Emmanuel Thomas2009 WY 10199 P.3d 1090Case Number: No. S-08-0109Decided: 01/29/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN EMMANUEL THOMAS, Deceased:MARGARET 
DICKSON,Appellant(Respondent),v.KRIS THOMAS, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Emmanuel 
Thomas,Appellee(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

William 
L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Russell 
E. Rauchfuss, Casper, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Margaret Dickson (Dickson), seeks review of a district court order which quieted 
title to the property at issue in this appeal, to Dickson and the Appellee, the 
Estate of John Emmanuel Thomas (Thomas), "in equal shares as tenants in 
common."  Thomas was Dickson's 
brother.  Dickson contends that the 
quiet title action should have resulted in recognition that the two siblings 
held title to the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and that 
the occurrence of Thomas's death left Dickson as the sole owner of the 
property.  We will affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand to the district court with directions that the 
district court enter summary judgment in favor of Dickson with respect to the 
property described in the Exhibit 1 Deed.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Dickson frames 
the issue thus:

 
 
            
Does a deed granting property to two unmarried persons as "tenants by the 
entireties with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common" create a 
joint tenancy or a tenancy in common?

 
 
Thomas 
did not provide a statement of the issue; however he recites this as a summary 
of his position:

 
 
The 
trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous.  The Exhibit 1 Deed was ambiguous.  The trial court properly considered the 
Exhibit 2 Deed to determine grantors' intent.  The trial judge did not commit a 
mistake, nor was he erroneous as a matter of law in going outside the four 
corners of the deed to determine intent.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The facts that 
must be used to resolve this case are set out in the district court's order 
settling and approving the parties' stipulated statement of the evidence, as 
provided for by W.R.A.P. 3.03.  The 
outcome of this case turns solely on a construction of the language of two 
deeds, as noted below.  Thus we are 
presented with only questions of law, which we review de novo.

 
 
            
A Petition to Quiet Title and for Determination of an Interest in Land 
was filed on May 29, 2007.  An order 
for Notice and Hearing was signed by the District Court Judge on May 30, 2007, 
setting the matter for hearing on August 1, 2007 and delivered, which [Dickson] 
signed for on July 16, 2007.

 
 
            
At the hearing on August 1, 200[7], Margaret Dickson appeared in person, 
together with the representative of the estate, Kris Thomas, and attorney for 
the estate, R.E. Rauchfuss, as well as attorney Frank Jones, who made a special 
appearance on behalf of Jason Thomas, one of the heirs, who was unable to 
attend.  [Dickson] inquired to the 
Court whether she should get an attorney.  
The Honorable Wade E. Waldrip informed [Dickson] and all present [that] 
he would continue the hearing so that [Dickson] or heirs could seek counsel if 
they so chose, and to have their attorney[s] make an Entry of Appearance prior 
to the next hearing, which was continued to February 14, 2008.  Notice of Hearing on Petition to Quiet 
Title and for Determination of Interest of Land in the above-named estate was 
sent via certified mail which was delivered and [Dickson] signed for on January 
29, 2008, as appears from Exhibit 3 attached hereto.

 
 
            
A hearing on the Petition to Quiet 
Title and for Determination of an Interest in Land filed by Kris Thomas, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Emmanuel Thomas, was held on 
February 14, 2008.  Ms. Thomas 
appeared in person with her attorney, R.E. Rauchfuss, appearing by phone.  Ms. Dickson also appeared in person 
after having received a copy of the Order 
for Notice and Hearing.

 
 
            
At the hearing the following facts were presented by the Personal 
Representative:

 
 
      On 8/19/1999 Mike G. Thomas and Dorothy J. 
Thomas, husband and wife, parents of decedent, transferred the real estate 
located in [detailed legal description] to "John E. Thomas and Margaret E. Dickson, 
only children of Mike G. Thomas and Dorothy L. Thomas, as tenants by the 
tntireties (sic) with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common" 
by way of a Warranty Deed, filed at B-975, P-162 in the Carbon County Clerk's 
office and attached hereto as Exhibit 
1.  Emily Thomas, Widow, 
previously transferred the real property described in Exhibit 1 to Mike G. 
Thomas and Dorothy Thomas on 12/15/1965.  
(Bk. 472, Pg. 190, Carbon Co. Clerk)

 
 
      On 9/23/1999 Mike G. Thomas and Dorothy J. 
Thomas transferred the adjacent property located in [detailed legal description] 
to "John E. Thomas and Margaret E. 
Dickson, children" by way of a Warranty Deed filed at B-976, P-398 in the 
Carbon County Clerk's Office, and attached hereto as Exhibit 2.  The [E]xhibit 2 Deed also reserved 
mineral rights, which was meaningless as there were no minerals to reserve 
because the prior Grantor Gooldy had already reserved them.  The Exhibit 1 Deed was for and in 
consideration of $10, whereas the Exhibit 2 Deed was for and in consideration of 
gift.

 
 
      The Thomas family 
home was built on or near the property line of the Exhibit 1 Deed.  The residence and surrounding curtilage 
are therefore located on both properties described in Exhibits 1 and 2.  This is why the approximate one acre 
described in Exhibit 2 was purchased from John S. Gooldy, the prior owner, by 
Mike G. Thomas and Dorothy Thomas, Husband and Wife.  (Bk. 363, Pg. 410, Carbon Co. 
Clerk).  Mike and Dorothy Thomas 
lived in the residence described in Exhibits 1 and 2 until approximately 
2005.  Jason Thomas, decedent's son, 
has lived in the home for about one 1 ½ years (sic), as a tenant, paying rent to 
Dorothy J. Thomas, under an agreement between Margaret Dickson, Kris Thomas, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of John Emmanuel Thomas, and Dorothy 
Thomas.

 
 
      John E. Thomas 
died on 1/1/2006, and an Estate was opened with Kris Thomas appointed Personal 
Representative on July 26 of 2006.  
Mike G. Thomas died on 4/28/2006 and no estate on his behalf has been 
opened.  Margaret E. Dickson has not 
filed an affidavit of survivorship on the property described in Exhibit 
1.

 
 
            
Margaret Dickson admitted that John E. Thomas was her brother, not her 
spouse.  Ms. Dickson also admitted 
that the facts stated above were true or at least beyond her ability to dispute 
them.

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court issued an Order Quieting Title which was entered of record on March 12, 
2008:

 
 
            
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came before the Court at 11 A.M. on the 
14th day of February 2008 upon the Petition of the Estate of John 
Emmanuel Thomas to Quiet Title and determine the ownership of the below 
described real property, with Margaret Dickson, co-owner of the real property 
described herein, and Kris Thomas, Personal Representative of the Estate, the 
other co-owner of the real estate described herein, being present.  The Court reviewed the brief and heard 
argument of the Attorney for the Estate, R.E. Rauchfuss, and also took testimony 
and heard argument of Margaret Dickson.

 
 
      After being fully 
informed in the premises the COURT FINDS:

 
 
1.  That 
the Warranty Deed in Exhibit 1 of the Estate's Brief from Mike G. Thomas and 
Dorothy J. Thomas, husband and wife, to "John E. Thomas and Margaret E. Dickson, 
only children of Mike G. Thomas and Dorothy L. Thomas, as tenants by the 
tntireties (sic) with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common" filed 
at B-975, P-162 in the Carbon County Clerk's office, defectively designates 
grantees as tenants by the entireties with rights of 
survivorship.

 
 
2.  That 
as a legal result of the defective designation of grantees in Exhibit 1, the 
co-ownership designation defaults to tenants in common with no right of 
survivorship.

 
 
3.  That 
Margaret Dickson and the Estate of John Emmanuel Thomas were co-owners of the 
real property described in Exhibit 1 and Parcel 1 as Tenants in 
Common.

 
 
4.  That 
the real property described in Exhibit 2 and Parcel 2 was owned by John Emmanuel 
Thomas and Margaret Dickson as Tenants in Common.

 
 
[¶5]      Based upon those 
findings the district court quieted ownership of the disputed property "in the 
names of, and all right title and interest in the above described property is 
set over to Margaret Dickson and the Estate of John Emmanuel Thomas in equal 
shares as Tenants in Common."

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶6]      Because this was 
a trial to court, we apply this standard of review:

 
 
We 
review a district court's decision following a bench trial according to the 
following standards:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  

 
 

Mullinnix 
LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 
2006 WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo.2006) (citations omitted).  Further, with regard to the trial 
court's findings of fact,

 
 
[W]e 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law.  

 
 

Id. 
The district court's conclusions of law however are subject to our de novo 
standard of review.  Id.

 
 

Addison 
v. Dallarosa-Handrich, 
2007 WY 110, ¶ 8, 161 P.3d 1089, 1091 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Did 
the District Court Err in Construing the Deeds

 
 
[¶7]      In Ecosystem Resources v. Broadbent Land & 
Resources, 2007 WY 87, ¶¶ 9-10, 158 P.3d 685, 688 (Wyo. 2007) we 
summarized the deed interpretation process:

 
 
Our 
deed interpretation rules focus on deriving the intentions of the parties.  Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 22, 126 P.3d 909, 919 (Wyo.2006); Caballo Coal Co. v. Fid. Exploration & 
Prod.  Co., 2004 WY 6, 
¶ 11, 84 P.3d 311, 314 (Wyo.2004).  
We start with the language utilized by the parties to the deed, giving 
that language its plain and ordinary meaning.  Hickman v. Groves, 2003 WY 76, ¶ 6, 
71 P.3d 256, 258 (Wyo.2003).  If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, we look only to the "four corners" of the 
deed in ascertaining the parties' intent. Caballo Coal, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d  at 
314.

 
 
            
However, we have also recognized that, even if a contract is unambiguous, 
we can examine evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
deed to arrive at the parties' intent.  
Hickman, ¶¶ 6-11, 71 P.3d  
at 257-58.  Relevant considerations 
may include the relationship of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, 
and the parties' purpose in making the contract. Id.

 
 
[I]t 
has long been the law that we look to the meaning of terms at the time of 
execution of an unambiguous deed.  
In 1899, we stated in Balch, 9 
Wyo. at 29, 59 P. at 436:  "The rule 
in such cases [involving deed interpretation] is that the intention of the 
parties is to be ascertained by considering all the provisions of the deed, as 
well as the situation of the parties, and then to give effect to such intention 
if practicable."  (emphasis 
added).  Understanding the 
importance of the use of "surrounding circumstances" evidence is not difficult 
when you take into account the definition of "plain meaning" as used in contract 
interpretation cases.  The "plain 
meaning [of a contract's language] is that meaning which [the] language would 
convey to reasonable persons at the time and place of its use.' "  Newman, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d  at 544, 
quoting Moncrief v. Louisiana Land and 
Exploration Company, 861 P.2d 516, 524 (Wyo.1993) (emphasis 
added).

 
 

Mullinnix, 
¶ 23, 126 P.3d  at 919.

 
 
[¶8]      Here, the 
grantor, apparently acting without legal advice, attempted to create a tenancy 
by the entireties in his son and daughter, but he also used the words "with 
right of survivorship and not as tenants in common."  It is apparent that the grantor made a 
mistake and not a mistake such as is contemplated by a technical view of the 
term "mistake."  See 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds §§ 184-191 (2002 and 
Supp.2008).  Rather, we think the 
deed on its face evidences a "mistake" as that term is used in common 
parlance:  "mistake," "2: a wrong 
action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or 
inattention: an unintentional error."  
Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, 1446 (1986).  
Moreover, a joint tenancy can only be created by an act of the parties, 
but a joint tenancy may also be the result of an attempt to create an impossible 
tenancy by the entirety.  20 Am.Jur. 
2d. Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 
11 (2005 Supp. 2008).  Furthermore, 
41 Am.Jur.2d Husband and Wife § 41 
(2005 and Supp. 2008) explains:

 
 
            
A Tenancy in common may be the end result of error or mistake, or of an 
ineffective attempt to create a tenancy by the entireties.  Thus, it is generally held that a 
conveyance to parties mistakenly believed to be husband and wife, presumably as 
tenants by entirety, results in the creation of a tenancy in common, although a 
joint tenancy is sometimes held to have been created.

 
 
[¶9]      We conclude that 
the deed at issue here was not ambiguous when all of its language is read 
together because tenancy in common is forthrightly eliminated.  See Wendy Evans Lehmann, Annotation, 9 
A.L.R.4th 1189, Estate Created by Deed to Persons Described 
as Husband and Wife but not Legally Married, esp. § 4[b] and [c](1981 and 
Supp. 2008); Morgan v. Morgan, 111 A.D.2d 790, 490 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (1985); Wood v. Wood, 264 Ark. 304, 571 S.W.2d 84, 85 (1978); Beaton v. LaFord, 79 
Mich.App. 373, 261 N.W.2d 327, 328 (1978); Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98, 99-103 
(D.C. Cir. 1960).  For these 
reasons, we hold that the district court erred in treating the Exhibit 1 Deed as 
creating a tenancy in common.  That 
portion of the district court's judgment is reversed, and we remand to the 
district court to enter a judgment reflecting that after the death of her 
brother, Dickson is now the sole owner of the land described in the Exhibit 1 
Deed.

 
 
[¶10]   We begin our further analysis by 
noting that Wyo. Stat. Ann § 34-1-140 (LexisNexis 2007) 
provides:

 
 
A 
joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety as to any interest in real or 
personal property may be established by the owner thereof, by designating in the 
instrument of conveyance or transfer, the names of such joint tenants or tenants 
by the entirety, including his own, without the necessity of any transfer or 
conveyance to or through a third person.

 
 
[¶11]   With respect to the Exhibit 2 Deed 
we think the circumstances are different.  
That deed does not describe the sort of tenancy that was intended.  The statute cited above reflects a 
legislative intention that "joint tenancies" and "tenancies by the entireties" 
are created by the use of one or the other of those phrases.  Of course, there may be circumstances 
where such silence as to the nature of the tenancy could be further explained by 
other words, or other circumstances, but here there is nothing more for us to 
consider but the words that actually are in the Exhibit 2 Deed.  Since there is no apparent intention to 
create a tenancy by the entireties (which would fail in any event), and no 
apparent intention to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, by 
default we must assume that a tenancy in common was intended.  See generally, W.W. Allen, Annotation, 
What Constitutes a Devise or Bequest in 
Joint Tenancy Notwithstanding Statute Raising a Presumption Against Joint 
Tenancy, 46 A.L.R.2d 523 (1956 and Blue Book 2005).  Thus, we affirm the district court's 
order to the extent that it settled the ownership of the Exhibit 2 Deed property 
in Dickson and Thomas's estate as tenants in common.

 
 
[¶12]   It would be speculation to attempt 
to divine why Dickson's and Thomas's parents opted for such an arrangement.  However, we see no readily apparent 
reason to treat those dispositions as illogical.  In Thomas's brief it is suggested that 
the Exhibit 2 Deed, which describes an approximately one-acre parcel that 
included the "family home" and its curtilage, may divide the family home, with 
part of the house in the larger parcel (the Exhibit 1 Deed) and the other half 
in the smaller parcel (the Exhibit 2 Deed).  If that is indeed the case, it would be 
our hope that the family can work that out amicably and without further judicial 
intervention so that the ancestral home can be enjoyed by all entitled to its 
use and possession.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   The district court's order is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter is remanded to the 
district court for entry of a revised order consistent with this 
opinion.