Title: Thounsavath v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2018 IL 122558 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket No. 122558) 
PHOUNGEUN THOUNSAVATH, Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. 
Opinion filed March 22, 2018. 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
Plaintiff Phoungeun Thounsavath sought underinsured motorist coverage from 
defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), 
stemming from an automobile accident that occurred while she was a passenger in a 
vehicle driven by Clinton Evans. State Farm denied plaintiff’s claim for 
underinsured motorist coverage based upon a driver exclusion endorsement in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
plaintiff’s automobile liability insurance policies with State Farm. The driver 
exclusion endorsement named Clinton Evans as an excluded driver. 
¶ 2 
Both parties filed complaints for declaratory judgment. On cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
The appellate court affirmed. 2017 IL App (1st) 161334. This court allowed State 
Farm’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2017). 
¶ 3 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
State Farm issued two policies of motor vehicle insurance to plaintiff. One 
policy insured a 1998 Pontiac Grand Am, and one policy insured a 2004 Pontiac 
GTO. Each policy provided liability, uninsured motorist, and underinsured 
motorist coverage in the amounts of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per 
accident. Both policies contained a “Driver Exclusion Endorsement” that excluded 
Clinton M. Evans. Driver exclusion endorsements are also referred to as named 
driver exclusions. Specifically, the driver exclusion endorsement provided: 
“IT IS AGREED WE SHALL NOT BE LIABLE AND NO LIABILITY OR 
OBLIGATION OF ANY KIND SHALL ATTACH TO US FOR BODILY 
INJURY, LOSS OR DAMAGE UNDER ANY OF THE COVERAGES OF 
THIS POLICY WHILE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE IS OPERATED BY: 
CLINTON M. EVANS.” (Emphases in original.) 
¶ 5 
On June 17, 2012, plaintiff was a passenger in a 2007 Hyundai automobile that 
was owned and operated by Clinton Evans when Evans’s vehicle was involved in 
an accident with another automobile. Plaintiff was injured in the accident. Plaintiff 
made a claim for damages against Clinton Evans for her personal injuries. Evans’s 
insurer, American Access Insurance Company, paid plaintiff’s claim in the amount 
of $20,000, the policy limit. Plaintiff then filed a claim for underinsured motorist 
coverage with State Farm for the June 17, 2012, accident. State Farm denied 
plaintiff’s claim based upon the driver exclusion endorsement. 
¶ 6 
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit 
court of Cook County, seeking a declaration that she was entitled to underinsured 
motorist coverage under her State Farm policies. Plaintiff alleged that she 
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purchased automobile insurance policies from State Farm that included 
underinsured motor vehicle coverage for bodily injury. Plaintiff noted that she was 
involved in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle owned by 
Clinton Evans and sustained over $30,000 in medical bills related to the accident. 
Clinton Evans was at fault for the accident, and his insurer tendered the full policy 
limits of $20,000 to plaintiff. Plaintiff then sought to recover pursuant to the 
underinsured motorist coverage of her State Farm policies, but State Farm denied 
the claim, citing the named driver exclusion stating that Clinton Evans was an 
excluded driver. Plaintiff asserted that section 143a-2 of the Illinois Insurance Code 
(215 ILCS 5/143a-2 (West 2012)) required all policies of insurance to provide 
underinsured motorist coverage to the named insured, so that State Farm’s denial of 
plaintiff’s underinsured motorist coverage violated the statute, as well as Illinois 
public policy. Plaintiff therefore sought a declaration that State Farm must provide 
her with underinsured motorist coverage under her State Farm policies. 
¶ 7 
State Farm filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint for declaratory judgment, 
denying that section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code required all policies of insurance 
to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the named insured. State Farm also 
filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, noting that it had issued two policies 
of automobile insurance to plaintiff. Both policies contained a driver exclusion 
endorsement, signed by plaintiff, which excluded coverage for bodily injury, loss, 
or damage under the policies while any motor vehicle is operated by Clinton Evans. 
State Farm denied that either of plaintiff’s automobile insurance policies provided 
underinsured motorist coverage for the June 17, 2012, accident because all 
coverages were excluded while Clinton Evans operated any motor vehicle. State 
Farm sought a declaratory judgment in its favor declaring that there was no 
underinsured motorist coverage available to plaintiff under either policy for the 
June 17, 2012, accident, that State Farm had no duty to arbitrate any claim for 
underinsured motorist coverage made by plaintiff under either policy, and that there 
was no coverage of any kind available to plaintiff under either policy for the 
accident of June 17, 2012. 
¶ 8 
The circuit court ordered both parties to file cross-motions for summary 
judgment. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the driver 
exclusion endorsement in both automobile policies issued to plaintiff did not 
violate the Insurance Code or the public policy of the state of Illinois. The circuit 
- 3 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
court denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff then filed her 
motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. 
¶ 9 
State Farm appealed, arguing that its driver exclusion endorsement did not 
violate section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code or Illinois public policy. The appellate 
court affirmed the circuit court. 2017 IL App (1st) 161334. 
¶ 10 
The appellate court noted that, under section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Safety and 
Family Financial Responsibility Law (Financial Responsibility Law) (625 ILCS 
5/7-601(a) (West 2012)), a part of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code), no one 
may operate a motor vehicle or allow a vehicle to be operated without obtaining 
sufficient insurance. 2017 IL App (1st) 161334, ¶ 16. In addition, sections 143a and 
143a-2 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a, 143a-2 (West 2012)) require 
automobile liability insurance policies to include uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage. 2017 IL App (1st) 161334, ¶ 17. The appellate court 
acknowledged that, in general, named driver exclusions in automobile liability 
insurance policies are permitted in Illinois. Id. ¶ 22. However, the cases cited by 
State Farm in support of its named driver exclusion were distinguishable, as the 
named driver exclusions in those cases were enforced as to parties other than the 
named insured. Id. ¶ 23. 
¶ 11 
The appellate court stated that the issue in this case was whether the named 
driver exclusion violated Illinois’s mandatory insurance requirements and public 
policy where the exclusion barred coverage for the named insured. Although none 
of the cases cited by either party addressed that precise issue, the appellate court 
found the analysis in American Access Casualty Co. v. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, to 
be instructive. 
¶ 12 
The issue in Reyes was whether an automobile liability policy could exclude the 
only named insured and owner of the vehicle without violating public policy. Reyes 
noted that the plain and unambiguous language of section 7-317(b)(2) of the 
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2010)) mandated that an automobile 
liability policy cover the “person named therein.” Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 11. 
Because Reyes was the only person “named therein,” Reyes could not be excluded 
from coverage through a contractual provision. Id. 
- 4 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 13 
Similar to Reyes, the appellate court held that a named driver exclusion in an 
insured’s automobile liability insurance policy that bars liability, uninsured, or 
underinsured coverage for the named insured violates Illinois’s mandatory 
insurance requirements and Illinois public policy. 2017 IL App (1st) 161334, ¶ 34. 
Accordingly, the appellate court held that the named driver exclusion endorsements 
in plaintiff’s automobile liability policies with State Farm were not enforceable 
against plaintiff, the named insured. 
¶ 14 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 15 
As noted, this case was decided based upon the parties’ motions for summary 
judgment. Summary judgment motions are governed by section 2-1005 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2012)). Pursuant to section 2-1005, 
summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The construction of the 
terms of an insurance policy and whether the insurance policy comports with 
statutory requirements present questions of law that are properly decided on a 
motion for summary judgment. Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 237 Ill. 
2d 391, 399 (2010). 
¶ 16 
The granting of a summary judgment motion is subject to de novo review. Id. at 
399-400. In addition, the determination of whether a provision in a contract, 
insurance policy, or other agreement is invalid because it violates public policy also 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. 
Rosen, 242 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (2011). 
¶ 17 
An insurance policy is a contract, so the rules applicable to contract 
interpretation govern the interpretation of an insurance policy. Founders Insurance 
Co. v. Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (2010). A court’s primary function is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intention of the parties, as expressed in the policy language. 
Id. If the insurance policy terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be enforced 
as written, unless doing so would violate public policy. Schultz, 237 Ill. 2d at 400. 
The public policy of this state is reflected in its constitution, statutes, and judicial 
decisions. Id. If the terms of an insurance contract conflict with a statute, those 
- 5 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
terms are void and unenforceable. Id. Terms of an insurance policy also cannot 
circumvent the underlying purpose of a statute in force at the time the policy is 
issued. Id. 
¶ 18 
With some exceptions not at issue in this case, section 7-601(a) of the Financial 
Responsibility Law requires liability insurance coverage for all motor vehicles 
designed to be used on a public highway. 625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 2012). The 
liability insurance policy must provide certain minimum liability amounts. Those 
amounts, both currently and at the time of the accident at issue in this case, are 
$20,000 for bodily injury or death to one person as a result of any one accident, 
$40,000 for bodily injury or death of all persons as a result of any one accident, and 
$15,000 for damage to the property of others as the result of any one accident. See 
Id. §§ 7-203, 7-317(b)(3). The liability insurance policy must also comply with 
specific coverage requirements, insuring not only the persons named in the policy 
but also “any other person using or responsible for the use” of the subject vehicle 
with the express or implied permission of the insured. Id. § 7-317(b)(2). The main 
purpose of the mandatory liability insurance requirement is to protect the public by 
securing payment of their damages. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 8. 
¶ 19 
In addition to motor vehicle liability insurance coverage, the Insurance Code 
requires automobile liability insurance policies to also include uninsured motorist 
coverage. 215 ILCS 5/143a (West 2012). If the limits for the insured’s liability 
coverage exceed the minimum amounts required by law, the uninsured motorist 
provisions must provide the same higher coverage amounts unless the excess 
amount is specifically rejected by the insured. Id. § 143a-2(1). The uninsured 
motorist coverage must extend to all who are insured under the policy’s liability 
provisions. Schultz, 237 Ill. 2d at 403. 
¶ 20 
If the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage limit exceeds the minimum 
liability limit required by the Financial Responsibility Law, the policy must also 
include underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the uninsured 
motorist coverage. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2012). As with uninsured motorist 
coverage, the underinsured motorist coverage must extend to all those who are 
insured under the policy’s liability provisions. Schultz, 237 Ill. 2d at 401. In 
contrast to the uninsured motorist provision, the underinsured motorist provision 
does not include a right of rejection. 
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¶ 21 
As noted, in this case plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident while a 
passenger in Clinton Evans’s automobile. Plaintiff sought to recover underinsured 
motorist benefits pursuant to her automobile liability policies with State Farm 
because the policy limits in Clinton Evans’s automobile liability insurance policy 
were not sufficient to compensate plaintiff for her injuries. As in the lower courts, 
State Farm claims that plaintiff is not entitled to recover under her policies because 
Clinton Evans was excluded from coverage under the driver exclusion endorsement 
in plaintiff’s policies. State Farm argues that named driver exclusions are permitted 
in Illinois and that plaintiff knew when she signed the driver exclusion 
endorsements in her policies that State Farm would not pay any liability of any 
kind, under any coverage, when Clinton Evans operated any automobile. 
Accordingly, State Farm maintains that plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
underinsured benefits under her policies with State Farm. 
¶ 22 
State Farm is correct that, in general, named driver exclusions are permitted in 
Illinois. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 15. We also agree with State Farm that it was 
entitled to identify Clinton Evans as an individual for whom it would not provide 
insurance coverage. However, Clinton Evans is not seeking insurance coverage 
from State Farm under plaintiff’s policies. It is plaintiff who is attempting to collect 
under her policies with State Farm. 
¶ 23 
In finding that the exclusion in this case was unenforceable against plaintiff, the 
appellate court found the Reyes decision to be instructive. State Farm distinguishes 
this case from Reyes on the basis that the exclusion in Reyes was directed at the sole 
named insured and owner, an exclusion which conflicted with the plain language of 
section 7-317(b)(2) of the Financial Responsibility Law. In contrast to Reyes, 
plaintiff in this case, the sole named insured and owner, was not excluded from 
liability coverage for her operation of any vehicle. State Farm also notes that Reyes 
dealt only with liability coverage, while plaintiff’s claim here is for underinsured 
motorist coverage. Finally, State Farm observes that Reyes did not hold that a 
named driver exclusion per se violates the Financial Responsibility Law. 
Accordingly, State Farm argues that the appellate court erred in relying on Reyes to 
find the driver exclusion endorsement in this case unenforceable. 
¶ 24 
State Farm’s focus in distinguishing Reyes is misplaced. The appellate court 
discussed Reyes because it found the analysis in Reyes instructive. That analysis 
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addressed whether an exclusion directed to a mandatory statutory provision was 
enforceable. Whether an exclusion directed to a mandatory statutory provision is 
enforceable is also at issue in this case, albeit in the context of underinsured 
motorist coverage rather than liability coverage. 
¶ 25 
The main purpose of the mandatory liability insurance requirement is “to 
protect the public by securing payment of their damages.” Progressive Universal 
Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 129 
(2005). To further that end, the legislature requires uninsured motorist coverage to 
place the policyholder in substantially the same position he would occupy if the 
tortfeasor had the minimum liability insurance required by the Financial 
Responsibility Law. Rosen, 242 Ill. 2d at 57. Thus, while mandatory liability 
insurance attempts to ensure that all drivers carry at least $20,000 of bodily injury 
coverage, mandatory uninsured motorist coverage protects a driver who has 
complied with the liability coverage requirement when she is injured by a driver 
who has not. Id. at 68. Moreover, the legislative purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage is the same as that of uninsured motorist coverage, which is “ ‘to place the 
insured in the same position he would have occupied if the tortfeasor had carried 
adequate insurance.’ ” Id. at 57 (quoting Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 
147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992)). If the tortfeasor is insured, but for an amount less than 
the claimant has bargained for and paid for with her own insurer, mandatory 
underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to her uninsured motorist 
coverage ensures that the claimant will still be compensated up to the limits of her 
own uninsured motorist policy. Id. at 69. 
¶ 26 
Therefore, under Illinois law, liability, uninsured motorist, and underinsured 
motorist coverage are “ ‘inextricably linked.’ ” Id. at 58 (quoting Schultz, 237 Ill. 
2d at 404). Liability, uninsured motorist, and underinsured motorist coverages all 
“serve the same underlying public policy: ensuring adequate compensation for 
damages and injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents.” Id. 
¶ 27 
The court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Villicana, 181 Ill. 
2d 436, 444-45 (1998), recognized that “[b]oth the underinsured and uninsured 
motor vehicle provisions contemplate that consumers will select the total ‘package’ 
of coverage, i.e., liability, uninsured and underinsured, in amounts they themselves 
deem adequate for their own protection.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, 
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underinsured motorist coverage protects the insured from the risk that a negligent 
driver of another vehicle “(i) will cause injury to the insured *** and (ii) will have 
inadequate liability coverage to compensate the injuries caused by his or her 
negligence.” Id. at 445. Underinsured motorist coverage guarantees the protection 
of an injured insured against the possibility that a tortfeasor, over whom the insured 
has no control, purchases inadequate amounts of liability coverage. Id. 
¶ 28 
That is exactly the situation in the instant case. Plaintiff purchased liability, 
uninsured motorist, and underinsured motorist coverage in an amount she deemed 
adequate for her own protection. Plaintiff had no control over the amount of 
liability insurance coverage that Clinton Evans purchased for his own vehicle. The 
liability insurance coverage that Clinton Evans purchased for his own vehicle was 
inadequate, so plaintiff sought the protection of the underinsured motorist coverage 
that she purchased from State Farm. 
¶ 29 
State Farm argues, however, that because plaintiff signed the driver exclusion 
endorsement naming Clinton Evans, plaintiff was precluded from recovering 
underinsured motorist coverage for an accident where Clinton Evans was the 
tortfeasor. State Farm claims that plaintiff was free to make her own contract with 
State Farm and chose to sign a contract with a driver exclusion endorsement 
naming Clinton Evans. State Farm also argues that plaintiff did have control over 
Evans and his decision to purchase minimal liability coverage because plaintiff had 
control over her choice to ride as a passenger in Evans’s vehicle or in any vehicle 
operated by Evans. 
¶ 30 
An insurance policy is a contract, but the terms of an insurance contract must 
comport with the statutory requirements in effect when the policy is issued. Schultz, 
237 Ill. 2d at 408. Insurers have no right to depart from valid statutory requirements 
in their policies. Id. Therefore, the fact that plaintiff signed the driver exclusion 
endorsement is not dispositive. We must determine whether that exclusion is 
consistent with the relevant statutes and underlying purpose of the statutes. 
¶ 31 
Neither the statute nor the case law places any restriction on the right of the 
parties to an insurance contract to agree on which persons are to be the “insureds” 
under an automobile insurance policy. Heritage Insurance Co. of America v. 
Phelan, 59 Ill. 2d 389, 395 (1974). However, once a person qualifies as an insured 
for purposes of the policy’s bodily injury liability provisions, she must be treated as 
- 9 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
an insured for purposes of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage as well. 
Schultz, 237 Ill. 2d at 404. Consequently, just as the governing statutes prohibit an 
insurance company from directly or indirectly denying uninsured motorist 
coverage to someone who qualifies as an insured for purposes of liability coverage, 
the statutes prohibit companies from directly or indirectly denying underinsured 
coverage to such a person when the basic liability coverage exceeds the statutory 
minimum. Id. 
¶ 32 
In this case, State Farm and plaintiff agreed that Clinton Evans was not an 
“insured” under plaintiff’s automobile liability insurance policies. However, the 
parties agreed that plaintiff was an insured. Once plaintiff was designated an 
“insured” under her policies with State Farm, then, State Farm was prohibited from 
either directly or indirectly denying her underinsured motorist coverage. 
¶ 33 
Section 143a of the Insurance Code is plain and unambiguous in mandating that 
each policy must contain the specified uninsured coverage. Squire v. Economy Fire 
& Casualty Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167, 176 (1977). Squire recognized that the public policy 
of this state concerning uninsured motorist coverage is that no automobile liability 
insurance policy shall be issued unless coverage is provided therein against 
damages caused by uninsured motorists. Id. The “statutory coverage is mandatory, 
and it may not be whittled away by an unduly restrictive definition.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Barnes v. Powell, 49 Ill. 2d 449, 453 (1971). In addition, 
section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code is plain and unambiguous in mandating that 
where uninsured motorist coverage in a policy exceeds the limits set forth in section 
7-203 of the Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-203 (West 2012)), each 
policy must include underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the total 
amount of uninsured motorist coverage. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2012). 
¶ 34 
In this case, plaintiff and State Farm contracted for liability insurance in the 
amounts of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident, which exceeded the 
minimum statutory limits. Pursuant to section 143a of the Insurance Code, State 
Farm was required to include uninsured motorist coverage in those amounts in 
plaintiff’s policies unless plaintiff specifically rejected the higher coverage 
amounts. Plaintiff did not reject the higher coverage amounts. Accordingly, section 
143a-2 required plaintiff’s policies to also include underinsured motorist coverage 
- 10 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
in amounts equal to her uninsured motorist coverage. The uninsured and 
underinsured amounts are mandated by statute. 
¶ 35 
Because the underinsured motorist coverage was mandated by statute, State 
Farm’s driver exclusion endorsement could not exclude that coverage through a 
contractual provision. Under the facts of this case, application of the driver 
exclusion to bar plaintiff, the named insured, from recovering underinsured 
motorist coverage pursuant to her policies with State Farm violates section 
143a-2(4) and, therefore, public policy. 
¶ 36 
In so holding, we note that the cases cited by State Farm in support of its 
position are distinguishable from the instant case. For example, in Phelan, 59 Ill. 2d 
389, the court held that the excluded driver was not an insured under his father’s 
policy, so that the excluded driver could not collect uninsured motorist coverage 
pursuant to that policy. Phelan would be controlling if it was Evans, the excluded 
driver, seeking to recover under plaintiff’s policies with State Farm. Phelan, 
however, is inapposite under the facts of this case. Here, it is the named insured, 
and not the excluded driver, who is seeking underinsured motorist coverage. 
¶ 37 
State Farm also relies on Rockford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & 
Casualty Co., 217 Ill. App. 3d 181 (1991). In that case, a passenger was killed 
while riding in a vehicle driven by an excluded driver. When the insurer of the 
vehicle driven by the excluded driver denied coverage for the death of the 
passenger based upon the named driver exclusion, the mother of the passenger 
sought uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to her own automobile insurance 
policy. The mother’s insurer filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, claiming 
that, to the extent the named driver exclusion barred uninsured motorist coverage 
with respect to the passenger, the exclusion violated the public policy of section 
143a and was unenforceable and void. Id. at 183-84. 
¶ 38 
The appellate court disagreed, noting that if a passenger is injured while riding 
in an uninsured vehicle, the passenger must look to his own policy for recovery 
under its uninsured motorist provision. Id. at 187. The court explained that it did not 
violate public policy to recognize the named driver exclusion endorsement, which 
rendered an otherwise insured vehicle uninsured, because the intention and purpose 
of section 143a was to provide recovery for insureds under their own uninsured 
motorist provisions. Id. 
- 11 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 39 
State Farm cites Rockford Mutual in support of its claim that enforcing its 
named driver exclusion does not violate the public policy of section 143a-2. 
Rockford Mutual, however, actually supports plaintiff’s position in this case. As 
discussed, Rockford Mutual held that if a passenger is injured while riding in an 
uninsured vehicle, the passenger must look to his own policy for recovery under its 
uninsured motorist provision. Id. Like section 143a concerning uninsured motorist 
coverage, the intention and purpose of section 143a-2 is to provide recovery for 
insureds under their own underinsured motorist provisions. Here, plaintiff was 
injured while a passenger in a vehicle that was underinsured. Plaintiff therefore 
sought recovery under her own policy under its underinsured motorist provision. 
¶ 40 
State Farm also claims that the decisions in Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d 436, and 
Fuoss v. Auto Owners (Mutual) Insurance Co., 118 Ill. 2d 430 (1987), support its 
argument that policy exclusions do not become unenforceable merely because the 
named insured is the person seeking the coverage. Those decisions, however, also 
are inapposite. 
¶ 41 
In Villicana, the insured had two separate policies insuring two vehicles, one of 
which had higher policy limits than the other. The insured’s daughter was injured 
while riding as a passenger in the vehicle insured with lower limits. Because the 
damages incurred by the insured’s daughter exceeded the amounts she recovered 
from the driver of her father’s car and from the liability policy on that car, she filed 
a claim for underinsured benefits pursuant to the policy insuring her father’s other 
vehicle. That policy contained a “family car exclusion.” The family car exclusion 
prevented an automobile, which is furnished for the regular use of the insured, the 
insured’s spouse, or any relative who lives with the insured, from being deemed an 
underinsured motor vehicle. The issue before the court was whether an 
underinsurance policy could exclude benefits to a family member who is injured in 
a different family automobile. Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d at 438-41. 
¶ 42 
Villicana held that, under the circumstances of the case, the exclusion could be 
enforced. Id. at 441. The court noted that the underinsured motorist statute was 
enacted to afford consumers the means with which they could protect themselves 
from the choices of other drivers over whom they had no control. In the case before 
it, the amount of liability and underinsured coverage selected for the vehicle 
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involved in the accident was within the control of the insured, who chose lower 
limits for that vehicle than for his other vehicle. Id. at 446-47. 
¶ 43 
Here, in contrast, plaintiff had no control over the amount of liability insurance 
purchased by Clinton Evans for his own vehicle. As plaintiff observes, the law 
allows State Farm to refuse liability coverage to Clinton Evans, and once Evans 
was named as an excluded driver in plaintiff’s policies, plaintiff was obligated to 
make sure that Evans did not drive her vehicles. The accident in this case did not 
occur while Evans was driving one of plaintiff’s vehicles. The accident occurred 
when plaintiff was riding as a passenger in Evans’s vehicle. 
¶ 44 
The named driver exclusion did not prevent Clinton Evans from driving his 
own, separately insured vehicle. The Financial Responsibility Law required Evans 
to obtain liability insurance in at least minimum liability amounts, which he did. 
Although State Farm argues that plaintiff had control over choosing whether to ride 
as a passenger in Clinton Evans’s vehicle, we do not read the underinsured motorist 
statute as requiring an insured to determine a driver’s limits of liability coverage 
before riding in his vehicle in order to recover underinsurance benefits. 
¶ 45 
Fuoss also is distinguishable from this case. The insured in that case purchased 
liability coverage in the amounts of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident 
and uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $15,000 per person and $30,000 
per accident. The insurer, however, failed to offer the insured underinsured 
motorist coverage.1 The insured was injured in an automobile accident and settled 
with the tortfeasor for $100,000, the maximum amount payable under the 
tortfeasor’s liability policy. The insured then sued his insurer, asking the court to 
reform his original insurance policy to include sufficient amounts of underinsured 
motorist coverage to compensate him for all the damages from the accident, which 
he claimed exceeded the $100,000 that he recovered from the tortfeasor. Fuoss, 118 
Ill. 2d at 431-32. 
¶ 46 
The Fuoss court noted that section 143a-2(4) provided that an insured may elect 
to purchase limits of underinsured motorist coverage in an amount up to the 
1The statute in effect at the time of the Fuoss decision stated that when an offer of uninsured 
motorist coverage was made to the insured, that offer should also include an offer of underinsured 
motorist coverage. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 73, ¶ 755a-2(3). 
- 13 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
uninsured motorist coverage on the insured vehicle, which under the insured’s 
policy was $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. Id. at 433-34. Even if the 
insured’s policy was reformed to increase his uninsured motorist coverage to the 
amount of his bodily injury liability limits, and thereby also increase his 
underinsured motorist coverage, that amount would be $25,000 per person and 
$50,000 per accident, less than the $100,000 that the insured received from the 
tortfeasor. Id. The court found the insured’s claim that he would have purchased a 
sufficient amount of underinsurance to cover his loss, had the insurance been 
offered, was too speculative. Id. The court stated that permitting the insured to 
choose underinsured motorist coverage after the fact, in an amount greater than he 
originally selected for bodily injury liability coverage, would be “ ‘repugnant to our 
system of justice’ ” because the insured would be providing more protection for 
himself than he was willing to extend to the general public. Id. at 435 (quoting 
Fuoss v. Auto Owners (Mutual) Insurance Co., 148 Ill. App. 3d 526, 535 (1986)). 
¶ 47 
State Farm suggests that plaintiff in this case is attempting to secure more 
protection for herself than she was willing to extend to the general public when she 
agreed to and signed the named driver exclusion. This is incorrect. The accident in 
this case happened while Clinton Evans was driving his own vehicle, insured under 
his own policy. If a member of the general public was injured in an accident with 
Clinton Evans, he or she could recover from Evans under Evans’s liability policy. If 
that individual’s underinsured motorist policy provided higher limits than Evans’s 
liability policy, they could seek underinsured motorist coverage under their policy, 
as plaintiff is doing in this case. A member of the general public has the same right 
as plaintiff to obtain higher limits of underinsured motorist coverage from their 
insurer. 
¶ 48 
None of the cases cited by State Farm support its claim that the driver exclusion 
endorsement in plaintiff’s policies could deny plaintiff underinsured motorist 
coverage under the facts of this case. Section 143a mandates that every automobile 
liability insurance policy provide uninsured motorist coverage in at least the 
minimal amounts required under the Vehicle Code. If the insured’s uninsured 
motorist coverage limit exceeds the minimum liability limit required by the 
Financial Responsibility Law, as plaintiff’s did, section 143a-2 mandates that the 
policy also include underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the 
uninsured motorist coverage. Because section 143a-2 mandated that plaintiff’s 
- 14 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
policy include underinsured motorist coverage, excluding plaintiff from 
underinsured motorist coverage through a contractual provision violates section 
143a-2 and, therefore, public policy, under the facts of this case. The driver 
exclusion endorsement in plaintiff’s policies with State Farm was not enforceable 
to exclude underinsured motorist coverage to plaintiff for the June 17, 2012, 
accident. Accordingly, the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on her complaint for declaratory 
judgment. 
¶ 49 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 50 
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, 
which affirmed the trial court’s order denying State Farm’s motion for summary 
judgment and granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 
¶ 51 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
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