Title: Matter of Estate of Fulmer

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Estate of Fulmer1988 WY 112761 P.2d 658Case Number: 86-324Decided: 09/14/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF HARRY B. FULMER, DECEASED. HENRY A. BURGESS, ACTING TRUSTEE UNDER THE 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF HARRY B. FULMER, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

FIRST WYOMING BANK, 
SHERIDAN, SUCCESSOR CORPORATE CO-TRUSTEE OF THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SHERIDAN, 
WYOMING, AND FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, APPELLEES 
(RESPONDENTS).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Henry A. Burgess 
and Robert James Wyatt, Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellant.

David F. 
Palmerlee, Omohundro & Palmerlee, Buffalo, for appellee, First Wyoming Bank, Sheridan. 

Tom C. Toner, 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for 
appellee, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J.*, 
Retired.

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The dispositive 
question in this case is whether the probate court had jurisdiction to consider 
matters relating to a testamentary trust after the entry of a decree of final 
distribution. Henry A. Burgess, the appellant, presented for resolution the 
question of whether the probate court erred in appointing a successor corporate 
co-trustee, over the objection of the remaining co-trustee, after the corporate 
co-trustee, which had been appointed originally, ceased to do business. Other 
intriguing questions were argued by the parties including the abuse of 
discretion by the district court in selecting the successor co-trustee; the 
scope of the appeal in view of a limited notice of appeal; and jurisdiction over 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assuming subject matter jurisdiction 
of the probate court. In the exercise of appropriate judicial restraint, the 
court will not address any of the substantive questions raised because the court 
is satisfied that the probate court had no jurisdiction to act in the case. This 
court, for that reason, has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The appeal 
must be dismissed.

[¶2.]     In his Last Will and 
Testament, Harry B. Fulmer established a trust called "The Fulmer Library Fund" 
and appointed Henry A. Burgess and the First National Bank of Sheridan (First 
National) as co-trustees. The Fulmer will was admitted to probate in the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Sheridan County on June 27, 
1972. On September 12, 1973, the probate court entered its Decree Approving 
Accounting of Administration of Estate and of Distribution, and, on October 11, 
1973, the Decree of Final Discharge was entered.

[¶3.]     Thereafter, the 
management of the estate went along smoothly until 1986. By June of 1986, First 
National was in severe financial difficulty, and, on June 11, 1986, Henry 
Burgess petitioned the probate court to enter an order requiring First National 
to provide him with correct financial statements for several years and all 
documents relating to the financial condition of the bank at that time to 
facilitate a determination as to whether "The Fulmer Library Fund" should retain 
its investment in the stock in First National. The financial situation of First 
National deteriorated further. Subsequently, on July 19, 1986, the United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming entered an order approving the sale 
of certain assets and the transfer of certain liabilities of First National to 
First Wyoming Bank by the FDIC, which by then had been appointed the receiver of 
First National pursuant to federal law. This transfer was pursuant to a purchase 
and assumption agreement entered into on July 17, 1986. The pertinent paragraph 
of the purchase and assumption agreement provided for the transfer, with certain 
exceptions, of the trust business of First National, and the Fulmer trust was 
transferred to First Wyoming in accordance with the 
agreement.

[¶4.]     In August of 1986, 
Henry Burgess filed another petition in the probate court requesting that the 
court require the delivery of the assets of The Fulmer Library Fund to him as 
the sole trustee. He asserted that the failure of First National had terminated 
its co-trustee status and that he had been informed orally by the FDIC that the 
Fulmer trust assets would be delivered to him. The probate court entered an 
order to show cause requiring First Wyoming and FDIC to appear and show cause 
why the assets of the Fulmer trust should not be delivered to Henry Burgess. 
Despite the objection of FDIC to the court's jurisdiction, a hearing was held on 
September 10, 1986. The court addressed the matter upon the merits and, 
subsequently, entered an order finding that: Harry B. Fulmer had intended that 
there be a corporate co-trustee; there had been no wrongful appropriation of 
assets by either the FDIC or First Wyoming Bank; and it had the sole discretion 
to appoint the successor co-trustee, keeping before it the testator's intent and 
the preferences of the beneficiaries of the trust as well as the preferences of 
the co-trustee. No appeal was taken from that order.

[¶5.]     Instead, on October 23, 
1986, Henry Burgess filed a motion requesting the court to appoint First 
Interstate Bank as the successor co-trustee. On the next day, another motion was 
filed requesting the court to deny any petition or motion by either FDIC or 
First Wyoming for reimbursement of fees or expenses, although no such 
application or petition appears in the record. The court heard those motions on 
October 24, 1986 and considered the views of Mr. Burgess as well as the Board of 
Directors of the Fulmer Library, the principal beneficiary of the trust. It also 
received information from representatives of First Wyoming as to its 
qualifications to continue to serve as co-trustee. The court, after listening to 
the presentations, made it clear to all that it was deciding solely the issue of 
who would be the successor co-trustee. On November 5, 1986, it entered an order 
designating First Wyoming as the successor corporate co-trustee of the Fulmer 
trust and denying both of the Burgess motions. This appeal then was attempted 
from that final order of November 4, 1986 (the order was signed on November 4 
but entered on November 5).

[¶6.]     The question of 
jurisdiction is continually present in any case and can be raised at any time. 
It is a matter which the court has a duty to raise upon its own motion. 
Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Development Company, Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1985); 
Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 569 (Wyo. 1979); White v. Board of Land Commissioners, 
595 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1979); Merritt v. Merritt, 586 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1978); Pritchard 
v. State, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Department of Health and Social 
Services, 540 P.2d 523 (Wyo. 1975); Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's 
Compensation Department v. Niezwaag, 444 P.2d 327 (Wyo. 1968). Our rule is that 
if the lower court is without jurisdiction, then this court also lacks 
jurisdiction. Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975); Pritchard v. State, Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, Department of Health and Social Services, supra; Ginn v. 
Parrish, 362 P.2d 824 (Wyo. 1961).

[¶7.]     It is clear from 
precedent of this court that the jurisdiction of the district court sitting in 
probate was separate and distinct from its general jurisdiction. The cases 
treated the matter as one in which a district judge was invested with two robes 
- one labeled "probate judge" and the other labeled "district judge;" the judge 
could not wear both robes at the same time. Matter of Frederick's Estate, 599 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1979). When the 
court was exercising its probate jurisdiction, that jurisdiction was limited and 
special; it could consider only those matters relating to the marshaling, 
distribution and settlement of decedents' estates. If the court attempted to 
resolve issues which were not necessary to the exercise of its probate 
jurisdiction, or acted beyond the powers conferred by statutes, such 
determinations were not afforded any binding effect and were subject to 
collateral attack. In re Scott's Estate, 642 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1982), appeal after 
remand 657 P.2d 361 (1983); First Wyoming Bank, N.A. Cheyenne v. First National 
Bank and Trust Company of Wyoming, 628 P.2d 1355 (Wyo. 1981); Matter of Frederick's Estate, 
supra; Matter of Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508 (1959), reh. denied 80 
Wyo. 426, 345 P.2d 786 (1959); Denver Joint 
Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Preston, 52 
Wyo. 132, 70 P.2d 584 (1937); Poston v. 
Delfelder, 39 Wyo. 163, 270 P. 1068 (1928); 
Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073 (1924). We have noted, 
specifically, that a probate court cannot determine title to trust property when 
a third party claims title against the representative of the estate. Wayman v. 
Alanko, 351 P.2d 100 (Wyo. 1960); 
Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. 
King, 46 Wyo. 
59, 23 P.2d 851, 90 A.L.R. 125 (1933).

[¶8.]     This line of authority 
in Wyoming is 
consistent with the general rule found in 4 Bancroft's Probate Practice, § 1191 
at 519 (2d ed. 1950): 

"In the absence of 
statute a probate court has no jurisdiction, after distribution, to appoint or 
control trustees of a trust created by will."

Wyoming has no such statute. 
According to State v. Underwood, 54 Wyo. 1, 86 P.2d 707 (1939), that jurisdiction 
is ascribed to the district court in the exercise of its superior and general 
jurisdiction.

[¶9.]     After the decisions 
cited above, the legislature did amend § 2-2-101, W.S. 1977, to provide 
ancillary jurisdiction in the probate court "co-extensive with the jurisdiction 
over subject matter of the district court in any civil action." The statute goes 
on to provide, however, that:

"As to all other parties, 
an action may be brought and maintained at any time prior to the entry of final 
decree of distribution under W.S. 2-7-813, by or against the personal 
representative in the district court, sitting in probate, seeking any legal or 
equitable remedy as to any interest in property, real or personal, in which the 
estate asserts or claims any interest. In addition, all causes cognizable in the 
district court in any civil action may be brought and maintained at any time 
prior to the entry of final decree of distribution under W.S. 2-7-813, by or 
against a personal representative in the district court sitting in probate which 
granted the letters to the personal representative." Section 2-2-101, W.S. 1977 
(Cum. Supp. 1986).

While these 
statutory provisions do extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the probate 
court to those cases concerned with the property of the estate, the expanded 
jurisdiction is available only during the time in which the probate court is 
adjudicating the administration of the estate. The statute obviously 
contemplates that the period of time ends upon the entry of a final decree of 
distribution. That period long since had passed when the instant controversy 
arose, and, of course, the amendment of § 2-2-101, W.S. 1977, would have no 
effect in this instance because "statutes governing the administration of an 
estate are those in effect at the time of the testator's death." Pike v. 
Markman, 633 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶10.]  While we hold that the probate court had 
no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of Mr. Burgess in this instance, the 
lack of jurisdiction is doubly clear with respect to the FDIC. As to that 
entity, any action must be brought in a court having proper subject matter 
jurisdiction, and it must be initiated in the appropriate manner, usually by 
means of a complaint and summons, not simply a petition to require delivery of 
the trust assets. See Freeling v. Sebring, 296 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1961); G. 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 869 at 87-90 (rev. 2d ed. 1982). Furthermore, the 
rule that would pertain in this instance is that a purchase and assumption 
agreement involving the FDIC which, as in this case, has been approved in the 
federal court is not subject to collateral attack. Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation v. American Bank Trust Shares, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.C. 1978), 
aff'd 629 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1980); Read v. Elliott, 94 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 
1938).

[¶11.]  Application of the foregoing principles 
and proper judicial restraint require that we notice the question of 
jurisdiction of our own motion. It is clear that, under Wyoming law, which has 
not been abrogated by statute but adjusted only during the period while the 
estate is in probate, the district court sitting in probate had no jurisdiction 
to consider the matters presented by the petition and motion, the denial of 
which was the subject of this attempted appeal. Clearly, those matters were 
presented to the district court seeking to invoke its probate jurisdiction, and 
no attempt was made to comply with the usual rules of civil procedure nor to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. Under these circumstances, this 
court is vested with no greater jurisdiction than that vested in the trial 
court, which was nil.

[¶12.]  The appeal is dismissed.