Title: Attorney Grievance v. Atkinson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 27
September Term, 1998
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
RENA VAUGHN ATKINSON
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge and Cathell, JJ.  dissent
Filed:   February 14, 2000
The Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), through Bar Counsel, charged Rena
Vaughn Atkinson, Respondent, with several violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct, arising out of her failure to pay federal and state income taxes for the years 1986
through 1996.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(b), we referred the charges to Judge E.
Allen Shepard, of the Circuit Court for Princes George’s County, to conduct a hearing and
make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.  After hearing evidence, Judge
Shepherd filed a memorandum opinion in which he made detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  He concluded that Respondent had violated Maryland Rules 8.4(b), (c)
and (d).  Rule 8.4 Misconduct reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
*         *          *          *          *          *
(b)  commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice . . . .
Respondent filed exceptions to Judge Shepherd’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, all
of which we shall overrule.
I.
Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Shepherd, being persuaded by the clear and
convincing evidence presented at the hearing, filed the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
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  Respondent later discovered that although she prepared her tax returns for 1986 and
1
1987, she failed to mail them.
FINDINGS OF FACT
 Respondent is a member of the bar in both the state of
Maryland and the District of Columbia.  She is a 1983 graduate
of the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America, where she took courses in income tax law.
After she was admitted to the bar of Maryland in 1984,
Respondent worked as an associate with the law firm
Deckelbaum, Ogens, and Fisher.  While employed with the firm,
Respondent filed her tax returns  and paid any tax liability
1
which exceeded the amount the firm had already withheld on
her behalf.
Respondent left the firm in 1988, and has been a sole
practitioner ever since.  Her practice consists mostly of estate
and probate work.  Her principal office is in the District of
Columbia, however, she sometimes works out of her home in
Hyattsville, Maryland.  She has no employees.
From 1988 to 1996, Atkinson failed to file joint federal
and state income tax returns for herself and her husband.  With
each passing year, Respondent’s tax arrearages grew until  they
had a “snowballing” effect.  Respondent knew that she could not
afford to pay the back taxes, and therefore did not file the
returns.  Instead, Respondent allowed the arrearages to mount,
and simply avoided the situation.  At all times, Respondent was
aware that she had a legal obligation to file tax returns.
In 1994, Respondent and her husband went to the
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) Office in Largo, Maryland.
They received several forms pamphlets from the I.R.S. help desk
assistant, but they did not speak with an agent.  Nor did
Respondent make any other arrangements to meet with an agent
at a later date.
Instead, it was the I.R.S. that brought this matter to light.
In early 1997, I.R.S. Agent Bill Rush contacted Respondent.
Upon Rush’s request, Respondent attempted to gather
information so that she could prepare tax returns for the years
1988 through 1996.  As she went through her papers,
Respondent discovered tax returns for the years 1986 and 1987
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that had been prepared, but never mailed.  In April of 1997,
Rush notified the Attorney Grievance Commission of
Respondent’s failure to file returns and pay taxes.  Respondent
has since filed [a] return for each year from 1986 through to the
present, except for 1988.  Respondent was unable to find
sufficient documentation to file her return for that year.
The I.R.S. has determined that Respondent owes
approximately $93,000 in back taxes and penalties.  Respondent
has made one payment of $15,546.61 toward that balance.
Respondent has made no other payments toward her federal or
state tax arrearages.
During the years in which she failed to file tax returns,
Respondent earned as much as $61,000 a year.  Due to the
nature of her probate and estate practice, however, Respondent’s
cash flow was irregular.  While evidence showed that
Respondent has two mortgages on her home and is the primary
bread-winner for her family of four, there was no evidence
presented that Respondent suffered any extraordinary financial
hardship during the years in question.  Nor was there any
evidence that Respondent suffered from any debilitating
physical or mental illnesses or conditions that would have
affected her ability to file tax returns or make payments.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
finds that Respondent willfully, knowingly, and purposely failed
to file income tax returns from 1986 to 1996.  The willful failure
to file timely income tax returns is a crime.  The Court need not
find that Respondent actually intended to defraud the
government; willful failure is sufficient to constitute a crime.
Additionally, willful failure to file income tax returns adversely
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  Therefore,
Respondent clearly violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct. 
The willful failure to file timely income tax returns also
violates Rule 8.4(c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct.  The rule states that an attorney cannot engage in any
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or
misrepresentation.  In the case at bar, Respondent knew that she
had failed to file tax returns when she went to the I.R.S. office
-4-
  Although not disputing the general accuracy of the hearing court’s findings of fact,
2
Respondent is not entirely happy with them and excepts to certain omissions which she
believes are critical to reaching the proper disposition in this case.  Specifically, Respondent
excepts to Judge Shepherd’s omission in his factual findings that Respondent worked her
way through law school as a legal secretary to the firm that eventually hired her as an
associate.  Also important, but excluded from the findings of fact, she asserts, is the fact that
the firm submitted character letters on her behalf, indicating her “honest[y], trustworth[iness]
and dependab[ility],” her “great character and integrity,” her “reliab[ility], forthright[ness]
and [absence of] guile or affectation” and that she is “a hard worker and highly competent
attorney.”
Also of concern to Respondent is that it be clearly understood that her total tax
liability, including fines and penalties related to late filing, as opposed to the actual taxes,
(continued...)
in Largo in 1994.  She received information on how to handle
the situation, and then again failed to act.  Her failure to contact
an I.R.S. agent to remedy the situation was, at best, dishonest.
Had she been more forthcoming, the “snowballing” effect could
have been avoided, or at the very least diminished.  The Court
finds that Respondent’s inaction violated Rule 8.4(c) of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Finally, the Court finds that Respondent violated Rule
8.4(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent’s willful failure to file her federal and state tax
returns was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  [All
footnotes but first omitted.]
II.
Bar Counsel took no exceptions to Judge Shepherd’s findings of fact or conclusions
of law, offering only a recommendation as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  Bar
Counsel recommends that Respondent be suspended for a period of three years.
Respondent excepts to two of the hearing court’s conclusions of law, specifically that
her failure to file and pay income taxes violated both subsections (b) and (c) of Rule 8.4.2
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(...continued)
2
was estimated at $93,000.  She notes additionally that her offer to the I.R.S. in compromise
has been accepted and that she has entered into a payment plan to pay the balance of the
settlement amount due.
Respondent takes issue with the hearing court’s characterization of her income and
financial hardship.  She points out that the highest annual income she ever earned was
$61,000, a sum that she achieved in the last year she failed to file federal and state returns.
Acknowledging the accuracy of the hearing court’s finding that she was the primary
breadwinner in the family, Respondent wants to make clear that often she was the only
breadwinner during the subject period.  Moreover, Respondent excepts to the finding that she
suffered no extraordinary financial hardship during the years in question.  On the contrary,
she maintains:
There was evidence, through Respondent’s testimony,
that just when she began to plan on taking measures to correct
her failures to file income tax returns, she became pregnant.
Respondent worked through both pregnancies and was also
solely responsible for considerable daycare expenses
immediately after the birth of each child.  These factors,
combined with her two mortgages, irregular cash flow, and
escalating debt to the federal government in back taxes and
penalties did, in fact, amount to enormous financial hardship for
Respondent.
Our view of these contentions is twofold.  We find no fault in the absence from the
hearing court’s findings of those “facts” Respondent has highlighted before this Court:  they
are neither dispositive of nor are they crucial to a proper resolution of the present matter.
Secondly, the hearing court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Respondent did not
suffer extraordinary financial hardship during the period of Respondent’s malfeasance.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 292, 614 A.2d 102, 110 (1992).  While
her role as the family breadwinner, childbearer and primary caretaker is admirable, it is a role
played by many a modern attorney, the vast majority of whom has managed to avoid running
afoul of the Attorney Grievance Commission.  Quite simply, the sharing or even singular
bearing of family and professional burdens and enjoyments did not, nor would it now, suffice
to excuse Respondent of her tax-filing and tax-paying duties.
Respondent concedes that failure to file is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
and, therefore, that she violated Rule 8.4(d).  Respondent maintains, however, that the
hearing court incorrectly found that she violated Rule 8.4(b) merely because she failed to file
-6-
  There were underlying criminal charges against Walman, concerning his failure to
3
file federal tax returns for three consecutive years, specifically 1967-1969.  He pled guilty
only to the 1968 offense and thus was convicted only of that offense; the United States
Attorney nol prossed the remaining charges.  See  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walman,
280 Md. 453, 454, 374 A.2d 354, 355-56 (1977).
income tax returns.  In this regard, she relies primarily on our decision in Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 710 A.2d 935 (1998).  As we shall explain, we find Post to be
significantly distinguishable from the present case.
We first point out that this Court, by Order dated April 15, 1986, adopted the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 1987, along with the comment
to each Rule.  With respect to failure to file an income tax return, the Comment to Rule 8.4
begins:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness
to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense
of willful failure to file an income tax return.
Moreover, this Court had previously held, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walman, 280
Md. 453, 374 A.2d 354 (1977),
That the crime of which respondent stands convicted
[—wilfully and knowingly failing to file his federal income tax
return for the year 1968  —] represents conduct prejudicial to
3
the administration of justice and, under the particular
circumstances of this case, reflects upon his fitness to practice
law is beyond debate.
Id. at 463, 374 A.2d at 360 (citations omitted).  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Baldwin, 308 Md. 397,407, 519 A.2d 1291, 1296-97 (1987) (noting existence of tax cases
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involving failure to file that reveal type of disorganized behavior with regard to continuing
responsibilities that would alarm any client whose affairs demanded systematic attention).
Turning to our decision in Post, the attorney’s misconduct there was that he had failed
to file withholding income tax returns in a timely manner, to remit the taxes withheld, and
to hold the withheld taxes in trust, resulting in his being charged with a violation of Rule
8.4(b).  The hearing court, having noted that it did not believe, and that Bar Counsel did not
contend, that Post intended to defraud the State Comptroller or the federal authorities, and
being unconvinced that Post’s conduct adversely reflected on his honesty or trustworthiness,
nevertheless concluded that the conduct reflected adversely on his fitness as an attorney, in
violation of Rule 8.4(b).  Post, 350 Md. at 94, 710 A.2d at 939.  This Court sustained Post’s
exception to this conclusion by the lower court.  Distinguishing the facts in Post from the
circumstances in Walman, we found it significant that the hearing court found Post’s actions
not to have compromised his honesty or trustworthiness, instead identifying the attorney’s
problem as involving office management skills rather than his performance or abilities as a
lawyer.  We explained:
We do not believe that, under the circumstances of this case,
that the respondent’s conduct “reflects adversely on his fitness
as a lawyer.”  The only basis for the court’s conclusion that it
does reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer is that failure to
practice what one preaches undermines one’s credibility as a
provider of legal counsel. But that is simply another way of
saying that the administration of justice may be prejudiced.  The
court was specific in rejecting any suggestion that, by his
actions, the respondent’s honesty or trustworthiness was
compromised, the conclusion that one could most logically be
expected to draw.  Moreover, the court also diagnosed the
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problem as one involving the respondent’s office management
skills rather than “his performance or abilities as an attorney.”
Id. at 99, 710 A.2d at 942 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
What could be said for Post, however, cannot be said for Atkinson.  While frequently
failing to pay the withholding taxes due, Post nonetheless had not steered himself completely
clear of the taxing authorities.  Post continued to withhold taxes from employee wages, kept
the necessary records, filed withholding tax returns intermittently, and at times submitted the
withheld taxes.  Atkinson, on the other hand, purposefully avoided almost all contact with
both the state and federal income taxing authorities and at no point exhibited, over a period
of eleven years, any real intention to fulfill her duties of filing the required returns and
paying the taxes due, until the authorities discovered her delinquency and contacted her.
Secondly, contrary to “the conclusion that one could most logically be expected to
draw,” id., 710 A.2d at 942, the hearing judge in Post’s case concluded that Post’s
misconduct did not represent any lack of honesty or trustworthiness on his part.  In stark
contrast, both the hearing judge and the inquiry panel which initially reviewed the present
case drew that most logically expected conclusion:  Atkinson’s misconduct did in fact exhibit
a dishonest character.  Judge Shepherd concluded that “[Atkinson’s] failure to contact an
I.R.S. agent to remedy the situation was, at best, dishonest.”  Likewise, the inquiry panel
determined that Atkinson’s conduct “constitutes a criminal act and given the length of time
over which this conduct occurred it reflects adversely upon the respondent’s honesty, and
trustworthiness.”  Report and Recommendation of Inquiry Panel, March 19, 1998 at 4.
-9-
While the hearing court did not make a finding that Respondent intended to defraud the
taxing authorities, Judge Shepherd found that she “willfully, knowingly, and purposefully
failed to file income tax returns from 1986 to 1996,” again the willful failure to file being a
crime that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  See Walman, 280 Md. at
463, 374 A.2d at 360.  Accordingly, Respondent’s exception to the hearing court’s
conclusion that she violated Rule 8.4(b) is overruled.
Respondent also excepts to the conclusion drawn by the hearing court that her failure
to file income tax returns violated Rule 8.4(c).  To arrive at that conclusion, the court relied
upon the fact that Respondent, having already failed to file income tax returns for a period
of several years, obtained information as to how to correct the situation, but then failed to
act on that information.  Again, as the hearing judge summed up, “[Respondent’s] failure to
contact an I.R.S. agent to remedy the situation was, at best, dishonest.”  In contrast,
Respondent contends that a mere failure to file tax returns is not enough to trigger the
application of subsection (c); rather, an actual dishonest or fraudulent intent on the part of
the deficient taxpayer must be shown.  We need not address Respondent’s specific
contention as to whether such intent need be shown.  We think the hearing court correct in
characterizing Respondent’s particular misconduct as dishonest, if only because of the
substantial duration in time over which she failed to pay both state and federal income taxes.
The repeated failure to file tax returns--particularly when it spans an uninterrupted period
of over ten years--is not a minor criminal offense, is a dishonest act, and reflects adversely
on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law.  A conviction for tax
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evasion is not a necessary predicate to support a finding of dishonesty.  We conclude that the
hearing court correctly determined that Respondent’s failure to fulfill her income tax duties
constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(c).
Because we conclude that Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(b), (c) and (d),
we shall overrule her exceptions.
IV.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction to be imposed in this case.  Bar Counsel
recommends an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after three years.  Respondent
counters that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction.  In mitigation, her counsel presents the
following:
[S]he has been forthcoming and honest during all stages of this
investigation and proceedings, showing her respect for the
courts.  Although her conduct does reflect poorly on the
profession, she is committed to resolving her difficulties and
continuing her diligent efforts to maintain her growing practice.
A suspension of her license will only serve to impair her ability
to repay her debts to the federal and state governments.
If, on the other hand, this Court deems a suspension to be appropriate, Respondent suggests
that it be “a short finite, or indefinite suspension, with the right to reapply for reinstatement
upon settling and paying her tax liabilities.”
We are mindful that the purpose of sanctions is to protect the public, to deter other
lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain
the integrity of the legal profession.   Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hess, 352 Md.  438,
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453, 722 A.2d 905, 913 (1999).  The appropriate severity of a sanction depends upon the
facts and circumstances of each particular case.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kandel, 317
Md. 274, 281, 563 A.2d 387, 390 (1989).  In addition to the facts underlying the misconduct,
the attorney’s prior grievance history, as well any mitigating factors, are part of the equation.
 An important consideration in fashioning a sanction for failure to file income tax returns is
the intention and motive of the attorney. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md.
176, 197-98, 711 A.2d 193, 204 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md.
590, 601, 667 A.2d 659, 665 (1995). 
There is little, if any, mitigating evidence in this record.  Judge Shepherd found that
during the years in which Respondent failed to file state and federal tax returns, she earned
$61,000 in at least one year.  At the time of oral argument before this Court, she apparently
still owed the I.R.S. tens of thousands of dollars in back taxes and penalties.  And, although
she may have been the family breadwinner during the majority if not the entire period of her
tax delinquency, the hearing judge found that she did not suffer from any debilitating
physical or mental illnesses or condition that would have affected her ability to file tax
returns or to make payments. 
Respondent’s practice consisted mostly of estate and probate matters, a practice
heavily weighted to taxes.  We note that Respondent did not file state or federal tax returns
for eleven years.  By our calculation, considering the requirement of filing quarterly returns,
she failed to file over one hundred returns.   During this entire period of time, Respondent
was aware of the obligation to pay her taxes, but she ignored it.  Although the hearing court
-12-
observed that  perhaps one of the reasons Respondent allowed the situation to fester was her
knowledge that she could not pay the taxes that were due, such knowledge, while perhaps
negating a fraudulent intent, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walman, 280 Md. 453, 462,
374 A.2d 354, 360 (1977), is hardly a legitimate excuse or mitigation.  Nor does it diminish
the seriousness of the conduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474,
480, 408 A.2d 719, 723 (1979).  As we noted earlier, “‘By willfully failing to file his tax
returns, a lawyer appears to the public to be placing himself above [the] law.’”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v.  Baldwin, 308 Md. 397, 408, 519 A.2d 1291, 1297 (1987) (quoting
Walman, 280 Md. at 465, 374 A.2d at 361).
As mitigation, Respondent points to her cooperation with the I.R.S. to settle the
amount due and to reach a payment plan to discharge the obligation.  While we have said that
an offending attorney’s after-the-fact cooperation with authorities is commendable,
nonetheless we have consistently refused to treat such cooperation as a mitigation of the
underlying conduct.  See Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Callanan, 271 Md.  554, 557, 318 A.2d
809, 810 (1974); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Casalino, 335 Md.  446, 452, 644 A.2d 43,
46 (1994).  In Casalino, we reaffirmed the principle “that a lawyer’s cooperation with the
authorities subsequent to his criminal activity, and then only because it was detected, would
not ‘serve to palliate the evil of his [or her] offense.’” Id., 644 A.2d at 46 (quoting Callanan,
271 Md.  at 557, 318 A.2d at 810).  As it stands, Respondent and her husband went to the
I.R.S. in 1994 and picked up forms, yet she did nothing to rectify the problem and, indeed,
never went to the tax authorities voluntarily.
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Under the circumstances, we reject Respondent’s request that she be reprimanded,
believing instead that a period of suspension is required.  We also find Bar Counsel’s
recommendation based on Walman inappropriate because we find Walman to be
distinguishable.  Walman had two prior disciplinary actions against him, as well as a criminal
prosecution and conviction for the charges underlying the attorney grievance action.  Along
similar lines, we stated in Baldwin the following as our rationale in imposing an eighteen
month suspension:
Although Baldwin’s flouting of the law with respect to
withholding did not result in a criminal prosecution, it does
involve six years within a period of seven consecutive years.
Moreover, Judge Fader found that there were no extenuating
circumstances in Baldwin’s case.  For example, Baldwin’s
alcoholism did not cause him to fail to file returns and pay
taxes.
In Walman’s case there was a criminal conviction, the
failure to file, involving three years, [which] was not fraudulent,
and there were no mitigating circumstances.  We suspended
Walman for three years.  In  Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Gilland, 293 Md. 316, 443 A.2d 603 (1982), the attorney was
convicted of failing to file federal income tax returns for three
years for which he was sentenced to two months imprisonment,
a one year suspended sentence, and a fine of $10,000.  Gilland
had no fraudulent intent but it was found that he had violated
DR 1-102(A)(5).  There were mitigating circumstances.  We
suspended Gilland for two years.  If the failure to file is
accompanied by an intention to cheat the government and fellow
citizens by avoiding the payment of substantial taxes justly due,
and absent extenuating circumstances, the proper sanction is
disbarment.  See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Woodward,
299 Md. 429, 474 A.2d 208 (1984) and Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474, 408 A.2d 719 (1979).
 
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Baldwin, 308 Md. at 408, 519 A.2d at 1297.  In contrast,  this proceeding is Respondent’s
first disciplinary action, and Respondent was not charged in a criminal prosecution.
Weighing all of these factors, we conclude that the appropriate sanction is an
indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after the expiration of one year, accounting
from thirty days from the filing of this opinion.  Atkinson shall stand suspended beyond that
date unless and until all costs incurred in connection with this proceeding are paid in full.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS
OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(c), FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND AGAINST RENA VAUGHN
ATKINSON.  RESPONDENT’S SUSPENSION
SHALL COMMENCE THIRTY DAYS FROM
THE FILING OF THIS OPINION.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.:
I dissent.  In overruling the respondent’s exceptions to the hearing court’s finding that
she violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 (b) and (c), the majority has taken
an act of omission - the failure to file personal income taxes - and held, without any evidence
that the act of omission has impacted the respondent’s practice of law, that it also reflects
adversely on her fitness to practice law and was conduct involving dishonesty.  
Notwithstanding the majority’s protestations characterizing its action as distinguished from
the present case, to reach the result it does requires overruling part of the recent case of
-1-
The majority cites Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Baldwin, 308 Md. 397, 407-08, 519
1
A.2d 1291, 1296-97 (1987) for the propositions, “existence of tax cases involving failure to
file ... reveal type of disorganized behavior with regard to continuing responsibilities that
would alarm any client whose affairs demanded systematic attention” and “‘By willfully
failing to file his tax returns, a lawyer appears to the public to be placing himself above [the]
law.” (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Walman, 280 Md. 453, 464-65, 374 A.2d 354,
361 (1977)). ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2000) [slip op. at __, __].   Neither is
apposite or assists the majority’s analysis.    Both address perception.  An unfavorable
perception prejudices the administration of justice.   It does not, however, prove that the
conduct giving rise to the perception  involves dishonesty or adversely affects the fitness of
the person engaging in it to practice law.   That inquiry is a more narrowly focused one and
requires facts addressing those specific circumstances.   No such focus or facts were
presented, or even attempted, in this case.  All that the petitioner showed in this case, or
attempted to show, for that matter, is that the respondent did not file her personal income tax
returns. 
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 710 A.2d 935 (1998),which  addressed Rule
8.4 (b) and  found it to be inapplicable.   Moreover, the majority must rely on Attorney
Griev. Comm’n v. Walman, 280 Md. 453, 374 A.2d 354 (1977) and give it a significance it
does not have.    Finally, the result the majority mandates in this case creates the anomalous
1
situation in which a failure to file  that has, and, indeed, could have no adverse impact on
anyone except the taxpayer is treated more harshly than one, often occuring without
considering its impact on innocent third parties, that  affects, and potentially could adversely
impact, such persons .
In maintaining that the hearing court incorrectly found that she violated Rule 8.4 (b)
merely because she failed to file income tax returns, the respondent relies primarily on our
decision in  Post.   In that case, Post had failed timely to file withholding income tax returns,
to remit the taxes withheld, and to hold the withheld taxes in trust, as required by § 10-906,
-2-
As relevant, § 10-906 provides:
2
“(a) Except as provided in § 10-907 of this subtitle, each employer or payor
shall:
“(1) withhold the income tax required to be withheld under §
10-908 of this subtitle;  and
“(2) pay to the Comptroller the income tax withheld for a period
with the withholding return that covers the period.
“(b) Any income tax withheld is deemed to be held in trust for the State by the
employer or payor who withholds the tax.
“(c) An employer or payor who withholds income tax shall keep a separate
ledger account for withholdings that indicates clearly:
“(1) the amount of income tax withheld;  and
“(2) that the income tax withheld is the property of the State.”
 
Maryland Code (1957, 1999 Replacement Volume) of the Tax General Article,  resulting in
2
his being charged with a violation of Rule 8.4 (b).   The hearing court, having noted that it
did not believe, and Bar Counsel did not contend, that Post intended to defraud the
Comptroller or the federal authorities, and being unconvinced that the conduct adversely
reflected on his honesty or trustworthiness, nevertheless concluded that the conduct reflected
on his fitness as an attorney, reasoning:
"[o]ne of the most fundamental of a lawyer's functions is to give sound legal
counsel to his or her clients, meaning that he or she must, when called upon
to do so, advise the clients of their various lawful rights and duties, and
concomitantly is bound to urge them to comply with those legal duties.  An
attorney, almost without regard to his reasons therefor, who does not 'practice'
what he or she is required to 'preach' surely diminishes the stature and fitness
-3-
of his role as a provider of legal counsel.  Therefore, notwithstanding a degree
of sympathy which Respondent's quandary may create, it cannot be doubted
that his conduct reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer and,
consequently, that he is in violation of Rule 8.4(b)".
Id. at 94, 710 A.2d at 939.    This Court sustained Post’s exception.   We explained:
“We do not believe that, under the circumstances of this case, that the
respondent's conduct ‘reflects adversely on his fitness as a lawyer.’ The only
basis for the court's conclusion that it does reflect adversely on his fitness as
a lawyer is that failure to practice what one preaches undermines one's
credibility as a provider of legal counsel.  But that is simply another way of
saying that the administration of justice may be prejudiced.  The court was
specific in rejecting any suggestion that, by his actions, the respondent's
honesty or trustworthiness was compromised, the conclusion that one could
most logically be expected to draw.  Moreover, the court also diagnosed the
problem as one involving the respondent's office management skills rather than
‘his performance or abilities as an attorney."’ 
Id. at 99, 710 A.2d at 942 (footnote omitted).    We had earlier addressed what was required
to be shown to prove a violation of Rule 8.4 (b):
“Rule 8.4(b) recognizes, by its reference to character traits, rather than
enumerating specific crimes, that commission of some crimes evidence[s] or
demonstrate[s] a character flaw that, were the person committing them
applying for admission to the bar, would constitute a significant impediment,
if not outright prohibition, to his or her admission or, having been admitted,
could result in his or her disbarment.  The rule identifies two such traits.  In
addition to those traits, however, it includes as a catchall object, ‘fitness as a
lawyer in other respects.’   Since the Rule is specific in the requirement that
the criminal act reflect adversely on the character traits or fitness as a lawyer,
it follows that what the Rule contemplates is that the criminal act evidence
another character trait, which, like honesty and trustworthiness, is relevant or
critical to the practice of law.”
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Id. at 97, 710 A.2d at 941.  
Conceding, in this case, that the hearing court did not make a finding that the
respondent intended to defraud the “government,” to the majority, as to the hearing court,
it is enough that the respondent “willfully, knowingly, and purposefully failed to file income
tax returns from 1986 to 1996,” the willful failure to file being a crime that adversely reflects
on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  The majority relies on Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Walman, 280 Md. 453, 374 A.2d 354 (1977), which to be sure,  does stand for the
proposition for which the hearing court cited it, i.e. “Willful failure to file income tax returns
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law,” see id. at 463, 374 A.2d at 360
("the crime of which respondent stands convicted represents conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice and, under the particular circumstances of this case, reflects upon
his fitness to practice law is beyond debate").    It must be remembered, however, that
Walman was prosecuted for, and convicted, of a crime, 26 U.S.C. §7203, which, although
not requiring  proof of intent to defraud and to evade payment of taxes, required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty and
that the failure to file was not through accident or mistake or other innocent cause. Id. at 461,
374 A.2d at 359.   While the hearing court may have concluded by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent failed to file, it is to me significant that the respondent has
neither been prosecuted nor convicted of any such crime.   In that regard, I think it quite
telling that, although referring quite specifically  to “the particular circumstances of this
case,” Walman identified only the conviction, and no other circumstance, to explain the
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As the majority points out, Walman was charged with three counts of failure to file
3
and pled guilty to one of those counts.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Walman, 280 Md. 453,
454, 374 A.2d 354, 355-56 (1977).   As a result of the guilty plea, he was sentenced to
imprisonment for 1 month and placed on 23 months probation.   Id.  Shortly thereafter, he
was disbarred by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.  Certainly, the
sentence he received adversely impacted, at least for the period of the sentence, Walman’s
fitness to practice law.  See, in the Matter of the Application of Dortch, 344 Md. 376, 687
A.2d 245 (1997).   So too could his disbarment.
 
Court’s conclusion that failing to file adversely reflected on Walman’s fitness to practice
law.   
3
Noting a distinction between Post and Walman - “while frequently failing to pay the
withholding taxes due, Post nonetheless had not steered himself completely clear of the
taxing authorities.   Post continued to withhold taxes from employee wages, kept the
necessary records, filed withholding taxes intermittently, and at times submitted withheld
taxes” - the majority asserts that there is no such distinction between the respondent and
Walman, stating that the respondent “purposefully avoided almost all contact with both the
state and federal income taxing authorities.”   To the majority, it is also significant that this
Court in Post commented that the hearing court in that case did not conclude “that, by his
action, the  respondent’s honesty or trustworthiness was compromised, the conclusion that
one could most logically be expected to draw,” while, in this case, both the hearing court and
the Inquiry Panel did.
I have already responded to the first point, that the respondent, unlike Walman, has
neither been prosecuted nor convicted of any crime, not even the wilful failure to file and,
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thus, in that respect this case is in fact distinguishable from Walman.   As to the second
point, the majority fails to appreciate the context in which the statement was made.    The
failure to file withholding tax returns or pay employee withholding taxes is "directly related
to the operation of [a] law practice,” Matter of Discipline of Johnson, 414 N.W.2d 199, 202
(Minn.1987), but more than that, may be directly relevant to a lawyer’s honesty and
trustworthiness.    Because withholding taxes  are paid on behalf of the lawyer’s employees
and is an obligation placed on the employer,  how the lawyer handles that responsibility is
an important consideration in assessing his fitness; it “may well reflect upon the seriousness
with which [a lawyer] regards his professional obligation in handling other people's money."
Id.  In the context of withholding tax returns and taxes, one could much more likely conclude
from the circumstances surrounding their payment and the filing of the returns that the
lawyer’s honesty and trustworthiness had been compromised, than from the failure of the
lawyer to file or pay his or her personal returns.  
I remain satisfied that Post enunciates the proper standard.  Applying the Post
rationale - the conduct must involve a character trait which, like honesty and trustworthiness,
is relevant to the practice of law - produces a clear result.   While it is true that the
respondent failed to file the income tax returns, there are no circumstances other than that
failure from which it can be determined that the respondent’s conduct adversely reflected
upon her fitness as a lawyer; the only basis upon which it could be inferred that the
respondent’s fitness as a lawyer is compromised is her failure to file the returns and pay the
taxes due.   In the absence of evidence of something more than a failure to file and in the face
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of evidence attesting to the respondent’s fitness to practice law, there simply is no basis for
the hearing court’s conclusion that the respondent violated Rule 8.4 (b).       
    The  hearing court, relying on the fact that the respondent, having already failed to
file, obtained information as to how to correct the situation, but then failed to act on that
information, also concluded that the respondent’s failure to file income tax returns likewise
violated Rule 8.4 (c).   As the court put it, “[h]er failure to contact an IRS agent to remedy
the situation was, at best, dishonest.”  The majority overrules the respondent’s exception,
asserting that “the substantial duration in time over which she failed to pay both state and
federal income taxes” suffices as justification for the hearing court’s conclusion.
Neither Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Casalino, 335 Md. 446, 644 A.2d  43 (1994) nor
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Clinton, 308 Md. 701, 521 A.2d 1202 (1987), which the hearing
court cited as authority, supports that conclusion.   As the respondent points out, neither
Casalino nor Clinton held that the failure to file tax returns is conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.   Indeed, in both cases, the respondent had been convicted
of tax evasion.   It is well settled that, while tax evasion is a crime involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, it is distinguishable, and has been distinguished, from
willful failure to file.   See Walman, 280 Md. at 359, 374 A.2d at 460.    The respondent
argues that “Judge Shepherd’s statement that ‘[the respondent’s] failure to contact an IRS
agent to remedy the situation was, at best, dishonest’ is a conclusion not supported by the
facts or the statutory scheme, which makes failure to file a crime.   Dishonesty is not an
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element of the failure to file at the state or the federal level.”   I agree and, thus, I would
sustain the respondent’s exception. 
As the appropriate sanction to be imposed, the majority settles upon an indefinite
suspension with the right to apply for readmission after one year.   Believing that sanction
to be unduly harsh, even punitive, under the circumstances, I dissent from the sanction as
well. 
It is well settled  that: “‘conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,’ delegates
or confirms to the courts the power and duty to consider particular conduct of one who is an
officer of the court, in relation to the privileges and duties of a public calling that specially
invites complete trust and confidence.”   Rheb v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore, 186 Md. 200, 205,
46 A.2d 289, 291 (1946).   Moreover, the purpose of attorney discipline is the protection of
the public and not punishment of the attorney.  See Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Gittens, 346
Md. 316, 697 A.2d 83 (1997);  Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 431 A.2d
1336 (1981);  Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Bailey, 286 Md. 630, 408 A.2d 1330 (1979).  And
the “severity of sanctions depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”
 Attorney Griev.  Comm'n v. Kandel, 317 Md. 274, 281, 563 A.2d 387, 390 (1989).  The
attorney's prior grievance history, as well as facts in mitigation, constitute part of those facts
and circumstances.   Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Franz, 355 Md. 752, 762-63, 736 A.2d 339,
344 (1999); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561
(1975).  “One of the most relevant considerations in determining a sanction for failure to file
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income tax returns is the intention and motive of the respondent.”  Attorney Griev. Comm’n
v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 601, 667 A.2d 659, 665 (1995).    
The length of time during which the respondent failed to file tax returns and pay the
taxes due is very troublesome.   So, too, is the fact that, during the entirety of that time, the
respondent was aware of the obligation, but simply let things continue to snowball. 
Although indicating that the respondent did not have any extraordinary financial hardships
during the period in question, the hearing court acknowledged that perhaps one of the
reasons the respondent allowed the situation to fester was her knowledge that she could not
pay the taxes due.  That fact negates a fraudulent intent, although it does not diminish the
seriousness of the conduct.  Walman, 280 Md. at 462, 374 A.2d at 360.   See Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474, 480, 408 A.2d 719, 723 (1979)(“Unlike
Walman, Barnes did not attribute his failure to file to an inability to pay his taxes, although
notwithstanding his substantial income in 1969 and 1970, he did say, without elaboration,
that he was under a financial strain during those years.”).   Also, as in Walman,  no evidence
has been presented to show that the respondent’s failure to file the returns was accompanied
by a fraudulent or dishonest intent or an intent to avoid the ultimate payment of taxes.
Indeed, as the respondent points out, “[her] behavior in response to the investigation reveals
that she had no intention to conceal, or misrepresent her obligation to file or pay taxes.”
Moreover, the respondent was, for the entire period, the primary, and at times, the sole,
breadwinner for the family, even when pregnant with her two children.
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Although the obligation has not been discharged, the respondent has cooperated with
the IRS to settle the amount due and to reach a payment plan to discharge the obligation.
That has now been accomplished and the respondent professes to be prepared to meet her
responsibility under that agreement.   It is also significant that neither the IRS nor the
Maryland Comptroller has prosecuted her for the failure to file.   Finally, the respondent has
not previously been disciplined and has had no  prior disciplinary complaints lodged against
her.
Under the circumstances, I believe the appropriate sanction to be an indefinite
suspension with the right to apply for readmission within 60 days.
Judges Eldridge and Cathell join in the views herein expressed.