Title: Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman, ET Al. v. Tony Parker, Et Al.  (Dissenting)

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

FILED

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE noe
AT NASHVILLE cpus Coure

 

 

October 3, 2018 Session
ABU-ALI ABDUR’RAHMAN Er AL. v. TONY PARKER Er AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No, 18-183-111 Ellen H. Lyle, Chancellor

 

No. M2018-01385-SC-RDO-CV

 

SHARON G. Leé, J. dissenting,

“The Petitioners, who have been sentenced to death, contend that the State's
recently adopted lethal injection protocol violates their federal and state constitutional
Tights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. On this important issue, the
Petitioners are entitled to a fair and meaningful opportunity to be heard at trial and on
appeal without regard to 1) the constitutionality of other lethal injection protocols the
Sate has no plans to use; 2) the execution dates previously set by this Court for
Petitioners Billy Ray Irick (already executed), Edmund Zagorksi, and David Earl Miller!
‘and 3) the length of the Petitioners’ briefs or the extra minutes granted for oral argument,

 

   

The constitutionality of the State's current lethal injection protocol isa
ted issue, involving extensive expert testimony. Several factors, over which the
Petitioners had little or no control, combined to deprive them of @ fundamentally fair
process. One significant factor is the Court's unfortunate rush to execute based on the
perceived need to end this case before the executions of Petitioners Irick, Zagorski, and
Miller. With the stroke of @ pen and in the interest of fairness and justice, the Court could
have reset these executions.

   
    

 

" Zagora is set to be exceuted on October 11, 2018, and Miller on December 6, 2018, rick was
‘exccuted on August 9, 2018, afer this Court and the United States Supreme Court denied him a stay of
Execution, See ick w. Tennessee, SES US. (2018) (Sotomayor, J, dissenting) (“In refusing 0
fant ick aay, the Coort today ts a blind eye Toa proven likelihood that the State of Tennessee ison
the verge of inflicting several minvtes of torturous pai en an inmate in its custody, while shrouding his
Suffering behind veneer of paralysis, I cannot in good conscience join inthis ‘rush to execute” without
Tint seeking every assurance that ow precedent pemits such a result, No. M1987-00131-SC-DPE-DD
(oes, Jy dissenting). at 1. Ifthe law pemits this execution to go forward in spite of the horfic final
Ininutes that Irck may well experience, then we bave stopped being a civilized nation and accepted
barbasen)

 
BBy putting this case on a rocket docket, the Court denied the Petitioners a fair and
‘meaningful opportunity to be heard and jeopardized the public’s confidence and trust in
the impartiality and integrity of the judicial system. Today, the Court meets its
selF-imposed deadline by deciding this case before Zagorski’s October 11 execution and
Miller's December 6 execution—but at great cost, I cannot go along with the Court's
decision because these proceedings have not been fundamentally far to the Petitioners.

 

 

For many years, the State's lethal injection protocol has been @ moving target,
with the Tennessee Department of Correction frequently changing its lethal injection
protocols. On January 8, 2018, the Department adopted # new lethal injection protocol
Consisting of two options: 1) Protocol A, using compounded pentobarbital; 2) Protocol B,
Using midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. Ten days aller the
Department announced these protocols, this Court set Irick’s execution date for August 9,
2018"

 

On February 20, 2018, the Petitioners filed a declaratory judgment action in the
trial court, challenging the constitutionality of Protocol B, the ‘new midazolam-based
protocol. ‘The Petitioners claimed that the midazolam-based protocol would cause them to
suffer intolerable pain and that execution by Protocol A, pentobarbital, was an available,
less painfull execution altemative, The Petitioners, at the close of proof, moved to amend
their pleadings to conform to the evidence to allege that a two-drug cocktail of
midazolam and potassium chloride was an altemative method of execution. ‘The trial
court denied this request

 

   

‘4 steep uphill battle in their efforts to have the
‘midazolam-based protocol declared unconstitutional. Their obstacles, which ultimately
proved insurmountable, included 1) inconsistent and unworkable requirements imposed
by Glossip v. Grass, 135 8. Cl. 2726 (2015) and the cloak of secrecy regarding Tennessee
executions; 2) the extraordinary and unnecessary time constraints imposed by this Court;
‘and 3) the State’s evasiveness and last-minute decision about its lethal injection protocol

   

 

   

To begin with, Glossip, a split $-4 decision by the United States Supreme Court,
required the Petitioners to prove 1) that the State’s execution protocol was likely to eause
fn intolerable risk of severe pain or needless suffering, and 2) an alternative feasible,
readily implemented, available method of execution that would significantly reduce a
substantial risk of severe pain. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2736-37 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553
USS. 35, 50, 52 (2008)). The Petitioners presented expert testimony that the State's
‘execution protocol of midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride will
‘cause the inmate being executed (o feel severe pain and terror. This is because midazolam

 

 

 

 

‘On March 15,2018, the Court so the execution dates for Zagorsk and Miller.

2
has no analgesic effects and will not render the inmate insensate to pain; vecuronium
bromide causes great anxiety, noxious stimulus, paralysis, and the feeling of
‘suffocation —all “quite horrific"—and potassium chloride, which stops the heart, causes
the inmate to have very painful feclings of burning upon injection,

 

Despite this evidence, the trial court dismissed the Petitioners’ case because they
failed to prove the second Gossip prong of an available ultemnative execution method that
‘would have reduced a substantial risk of severe pain. This Glossip requirement has been
aptly described as * ‘because it replaces the Eighth Amendment's categorical
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment with a conditional one,* ‘Thus, under
Glossip, even if the Petitioners establish that the State’s execution method will cause
n to exper less suffering or intolerable pain, the State may still earry out the
tunless the Petitioners also prove an available alternative method for their own

 

 

 

   
  

Considering the Eighth Amendment's clear prohibition on “crue! and unusual
punishments, joners proved thatthe
State's execution method was likely to cause needless suffering and pain. Yet the
Petitioners’ claims and evidence of intolerable pain and torture were not the basis of the
tial court's decision and thus not reviewed on appeal.

  

Not only is Glossip's available alternative requirement perverse, it is also
‘unworkable. In Tennessee, executions are cloaked in seerecy, which makes it difficult—if
hot impossible—for the Petitioners to establish an available altemative to the State's
method of execution, Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504(h) (Supp. 2017)
protects the identity of individuals or entities directly involved in the execution process,
The trial court here prohibited identification of the Department's agents who were
involved in procuring execution drugs, such as pentobarbital, and of its potential
suppliers.

 

 

 

In addition to the heavy burden imposed by Glossip and the cloak of scerecy
surrounding executions, the Petitioners were operating under extraordinary time
constraints because of the Court's scheduling of Irick’s execution on August 9. After the
Petitioners filed their challenge, the starting pistol was fired and the race to execute
began. The trial court had (0 fast-track the case so that the parties could present the
evidence and the trial court could prepare and file findings of fact, conclusions of law,
‘and its decision before the August execution date. The trial court set the trial to begin on
July 9, 2018, giving the parties less than five months to effectively conduct written
discovery, litigate discovery disputes, take discovery depositions, locate and retain expert

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

> MeGehoe » Hutchinson, 137 8.Ct, 1275, 1276 2017) (Sofomayor, dissenting).
* See Gloss, 1358. Ct 92793 (Solomayor. J, dissenting).
witnesses, research legal issues, file trial briefS, and prepare for trial. The discovery
schedule was so compressed that the trial court eliminated summary judgment as an
‘option because the Petitioners lacked the time to complete discovery and respond to a
motion for summary judgment, Sufficient time for investigation, research, and discovery
‘Was out of the question because of the looming execution date,

 

 

The mush to execute here is in stark contrast to the measured way previous
challenges to the State's lethal injection protocols have been handled. This case was
pending in the trial court only 156 days. Yet the 2002 challenge to the State's protocol
using sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride took twice as
long. It was pending in the trial court for 311 days.’ See Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181
'S.W.3d 292 (Tenn, 2008), cert. denied, $47 U.S. 1147 (2006). The 2013 challenge to the
State's protocol using compouncled pentobarbital took four times as long, lasting 64S
days in the trial court, which included an appeal of a discovery dispute.” See West v,
Schofield, 519 8.W.34 550 (Tenn. 2017), cert. denied sub nom, West v. Parker, 138 8, Cl.
476 (2017), cert. denied sub nom. Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, 138 S, Ct. 647 (2018), reh'g
denied, 138 8. CL. 1183 (2018).

 

‘The Petitioners, already shouldering the heavy burden imposed by Glossip, the
cloak of secrecy surrounding executions, and the fast pace of the proceedings, were also
impeded by the State's evasiveness about the availability of pentobarbital until the eve of
trial and by its last minute decision to eliminate pentobarbital as an execution protocol
‘The parties took discovery depositions throughout June, with the Petitioners reasonably
assuming that Protocol A (pentobarbital) was an available altemative execution method
under Glossip. Just a few hours before the parties filed their trial briefs on July 5, 2018,
the Department adopted a revised execution protocol that abandoned Protocol A, leaving
only Protocol B. But the Department, according to testimony from its Commissioner, had
known that pentobarbital was unavailable for executions for about two months before it
retained pentobarbital as a lethal injection method in January 2018. Even so, the State
failed to notify the Petitioners and failed to take a consistent position on the availability
of pentobarbital until the eve of trial

 

 

 

For example, at the first pretrial hearing on April 11, 2018, counsel for the State
dodged the trial court’s questions about the availability of pentobarbital. The trial court,
tely aware of the time constraints, zeroed in on the problem and repeatedly questioned
‘counsel about the availability of pentobarbital. ‘The trial court emphasized that the
availability of Protocol A was “essential for the case,” and if that question could not be

 

   

 

5 im Abdur Rahman v, Bredesen, te plains Filed thie petition on July 26, 2002, andthe tial
‘court issued its decision on June 2, 2003,

“In West w,Schofleld, the plants fied thee petition on November 20, 2013. The tral began on
July 7, 2015, snd the ial cour issued its decison on Aust 26,2015.

 

4
answered, the trial court proceedings would be “futile and useless,” putting the court as
well as the partis in an “untenable position.” The State's response to the trial court's
direct question ~ “will [Protocol A] be available for the August 9th execution?” — was “I
ccan’t answer that question, Your Honor.” ‘The trial court then correctly observed that “if
you can’t answer [that question] then our proceedings here are really meaningless” and
that it created a “Catch 22” dilemma for the court and the litigants

 

  

‘The Department's Commissioner testified on June 5, 2018, that the Department
‘would “search out all options to obtain pentobarbital,” but the Department's records tell a
different story, Those records show that the Department's designated drug procurer only
looked for pentobarbital over a four-month period from March 2017 through July 2017.
There appears to have been no activity after July 2017 until June 20, 2018, when the drug
procurer emailed a potential supplier, stating that the Department was “still searching for
USP grade pentobarbital” and “circling back around with folks” to check on availability
for purchase. That said, Texas officials used pentobarbital on July 17, 2018, to execute
Christopher Young; on June 27, 2018, to execute Danny ‘on May 16, 2018, to
execute Juan Castillo; on April 25, 2018, to execute Erick Daniel Davila; on March 27,
2018, to execute Rosendo Rodriguez Ill; on February 1, 2018, to execute John David
Battaglia; on January 30, 2018, to exceute William Rayford; and on January 18, 2018, to
‘execute Anthony Shore,’ And in Georgia, officials used pentobarbital to execute Carlton
Michael Gary on March 15, 2018, and Robert Butts, Jr.on May 4, 2018.* Most recently,
pentobarbital was used in Texas on September 26, 2018, to execute Troy Clark; and on
September 27, 2018, to execute Daniel Acker.”

 

 

  

 

 

 

The State's retention of pentobarbital as an execution protocol until July 5, 2018,
and its refusal to take a firm position on the availability of pentobarbital for Irick’s
August execution refutes the State’s argument that the Petitioners had li
‘early as February 2018 that pentobarbital was not avai
reasonably inferred the availability of pentobarbital from the Department's adoption of
in January 2018, the Department's retention of it until July 5, 2018, and the State's
representations in the trial court

 

 

   

 

 

As the trial court accurately observed, the availability of pentobarbital was
essential to the case, and without the State answering the question as to the availability of
pentobarbital, the trial court proceedings were meaningless. For the State to provide the
Answer on the eve of trial while effectively evading the question for months was patently
unfair to the Pet

 

 

ioners.

 

Death Penalty _laformation Center (DPIC), Execution List 2018,
hupssdesthpenaliyinfoorgfenceution-His2018.

i

oid
For all these reasons, the Petitioners were denied due process in the form of a
fundamentally fair process. “At its core, the right {o due process reflects a fundamental
value in our American constitutional system.” Boddie v, Connecticut, 401 US. 371, 374
(1971), An essential requirement of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard
Phillips v. State Ba. of Regents, 863 S.W.24 45, 50 (Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted). The
purpose of notice is to give the affected party the opportunity to marshal its proof. Id.
(Citation omitted), “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as,
the particular situation demands."” Id, (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. $45, $52
(1965)), The factors we consider in determining whether a party has been deprived of due
process are 1) the private interest affected; 2) the risk that the procedures in place would
erroneously deprive the affected party of that private interest; and 3) the government's
interest, including any fiseal or admit bbe caused by additional
‘of substitute procedural requirements Id.

 

   

 

  

There could hardly be a more substantial private interest at stake than making sure
that the Petitioners are not made to suller intolerable pain when the State puts them to
death and that their federal and state constitutional rights to be free from cruel and
‘unusual punishment are protected. Resetting the scheduled execution dates would have
gone « long way in giving the Petitioners a fair and meaningful opportunity to be heard
and would not have placed any appreciable fiscal or administrative burdens on the State.

In the end, the difficulties of meeting the inconsistent and unworkable Glossip
requirements and the cloak of secrecy surrounding Tennessee executions; the
extraordinary and unnecessary time constraints imposed by the Court due to the
impending, and seemingly unalterable, execution dates; and the State's evasiveness about
its execution method and its last-minute changes to the lethal injection protocols
combined to deny the Petitioners due process in the form of a fundamentally fair process.

    

0.

 

This is the Coun’s frst opportunity to review a trial court decision on the
constitutionality of the midazolam-based protocol. ‘The Petitioners, faced with the
prospect of suffering needlessly while being put to death by the State, deserve meaningful
‘appellate review of the trial court's ruling. Meaningful review includes giving counsel
‘adequate time to review trial testimony, research and brief the issues, and effectively
‘advocate for their clients in their appellate briefs and at oral argument, Only then ean the
‘Coutt, alter reviewing the record from the trial court, reading the parties" briefs, listening,
to the oral arguments, and studying applicable legal authorities, render its decision. The
Court should not make its decision in haste, but after thoughtful and careful deliberation.
the parties and the public deserve no less. Here, the super-expedited schedule imposed
by the Court denied the Petitioners meaningful appellate review.

 

  

 

 

   

 
To begin with, the Court unreasonably reduced the time for the Petitioners to file
the record with the appellate court clerk from a minimum of 108 days (or more if an
“objection to the record is filed or if the record needs to be supplemented) to nine days,
(seven days excluding a weekend). This was rather extraordinary given that the trial
lasted ten days, with twenty-three witnesses testifying and 139 exhibits admitted into
evidence. The record filed with the appellate court clerk consisted of twenty-nine
volumes of court filings, thirty-two volumes of trial transcripts, and nineteen volumes of
trial exhibits, totaling well over 10,000 pages. In reducing the Petitioners’ time for filing
the record, the Court failed to consider that filing the record is a three-part process,
involving the parties, the trial court clerk, and the trial coutt judge."° The trial court had
‘no opportunity to review and approve the record, and the parties had no chance to point
out any errors in the record. Not surprisingly, the reeord-—prepared in. great haste—is not
‘completely accurate, The Lead Petitioners" noted that their counsel “corrected apparent
transcription errors,” but that they did “not have the physical ability to correet all of the
‘errors in this record prior to September 6, 2018.” Likewise, the Miller Petitioners pointed
to specific “transcription errors [that] changefd] the substance of testimony."

 

 

 

 

 

  

Next, the Court cut in half the parties" briefing period from seventy-four days to
thiny-seven days (twenty-six days, excluding weekends and Labor Day). Abdur Rahman
v. Parker, No, M2018-01385-SC-RDO-CV (Tenn. Aug 13, 2018) (Lee, J. dissenting)
‘The Lead Petitioners had only fifleen days to review the record and to prepare and file
their brief, while the Miller Petitioners had just ten days to review the record and 10
prepare and file their brief and the State had fifteen days to brief the case. Abdur Rahman
, Parker, No, M2018-01385-SC-RDO-CY (Tenn. Aug 27, 2018) (Lee, J, dissenting).

 
 

 

‘The detrimental effects of the limited briefing schedule are evident from the
parties’ briefs. ‘The Miller Petitioners admitted in their brief that they did not have time to
brief fully the trial court’s errors:

     

See Abdur Ralonan v. Parker, No. M2018-01385-$C-RDO-CV (Tenn. Aug 13,2018) (Lee. Jy
dissenting) (reviewing the tine fames afforded each participant to fli her roe, inclding sixty days
for the Petitioners to file a cerifiedwanserit of the proceedings withthe trial court clerk, forty-five days
for the tral court ck to assemble and transmit the record 0 the appellate court clerk afte the ling of
the transcript and approval of the transcrits and exhibits by the rial court judge within tity days ater
the expiration ofthe time for fling objections).

 

"Lead Petitioners” refers to the twenty-nine orginal petitioners who ied a Notice of Appeal in
ine Court of Appetis on July 30,2018, “Millor Petitioners” refers to he four remaining petitioners, David
Earl Miller, Nicholas Tod! Suton, Stephon Michosl West, and Larry MeKay, who fled a Notice of
‘Appel in the Court of Appeals and in this Court on August 23,2018.

 

° For instance, om page thee oftheir brief, the Miller Petitioners called the Couns attention to
cor in Volume XL, pge 1798 ofthe transcripts of proceedings ("It was a very fim decision that
because there was no memory ereted does [sie- doesnt] mean thatthe suffering was not occurring”)

 

7
Due to the “compressed super-expedited” briefing schedule, the Miller
Plaintiffs primarily raise in this brief due process violations because those
terrors undermine the integrity of the entire proceeding below. Undersigned
counsel acknowledges the rule on waiver that usually applies when an issue
is not fully briefed on appeal, however, counsel does not have the time or
resources to brief all significant errors which occurred in the proceedings
below and are reflected in the Chancery Court's final order.

 

 

smphasis added). The Miller Petitioners also noted in their reply brief that it was
“prepared under an extreme time limitation anc! likely contains errors,” and that it lacked
‘an introduction, all relevant facts, legal authority, record cites and an exhaustive analysis.
Predictably, given the time constraints, the Lead Petitioners had to late-file their briet's
table of authorities, The State even had to file a substitute brief to correct erroneous page
references in the table of contents, in the table of authorities, and in its response to the
issues raised by the Miller Petitioners, as well as citation errors.

   

  
 

Previous appeals of constitutional challenges 10 the State's lethal injection
protocols have not been rushed or decided hastily. This case was pending only fifty-six
‘days from the time the Court reached down and assumed jurisdiction on August 13, 2018,
until it released its opinion today. Yet the appeal of the 2002 challenge to the State's
protocol using sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride was
pending in this Court for 231 days." See Abdu''Rahnan v. Bredesen, 181 S.W3d 292
(Tenn, 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1147 (2006). The appeal of the 2013 challenge to the
State's protocol using compounded pentobarbital lasted 391 days in this Court."* See
West v. Schofield, 519 8.W.3d 550 (Tenn. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. West v. Parker,
138 S. Ct, 476 (2017), cert. denied sub nom. Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, 138 8. Ct. 647
(2018), reh'g denied, 138 8. Ct. 1183 (2018).

 

‘The Court dacs not cure the unfaimess of this super-expedited appeal by allowing
the Lead Petitioners to file a brief with an argument section that exceeded the fifly-page
limit in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and by granting both parties fifteen
‘more minutes for oral argument

 

 

 

Given the gravity of the issues in this appeal, the extensive record, and the
required legal analysis, the Court’s accelerated schedule deprived the Petitioners of
‘meaningful appellate review. This mad dash to the finish line was unnecessary. Nothing

tn Abdur Rahman v. Bredesen, this Court granted the plaintfs application for permission to
appeal on February 28, 2005, and filed is pinion on October 17,2005.

 

"tn teat» Schofield, this Cour ranted the State's motion 1 assume jurisdiction on March 2,
2016, an filed its opinion on March 28,2017.
prevented the Court from giving the Petitioners, who are facing possible torture during
their upcoming executions, appellate review that is fair and meaningful

 

ml.

Because these proceedings have not been fundamentally fair o the Petitioners, I
dissent