Title: Pridgeon v. License Commissioners

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:  Pridgeon v. Board of License Commissioners, No. 97, September           
              Term, 2007
                                                                                                                                             
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DUTY OF PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY BOARD
OF LICENSE COMMISSIONERS TO HOLD A HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER A LIQUOR LICENSE SHOULD BE RENEW ED IF A PROTEST
AGAINST RENEWAL HAS BEEN FILED; EFFECT OF THE “WITHDRAWAL”
OF A PROTEST AGAINST RENEWAL:   The Prince George’s County Board of
License Commissioners was correct in interpreting Art. 2B § 10-302(g)(2) to require a
hearing if a protest is filed, regardless of whether the protest is “withdrawn” prior to the
hearing.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 97
September Term, 2007
                                                                              
FRANK G. PRIDGEON, SR., et al.
v.
BOARD OF LICENSE COMMISSIONERS
FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
                                                                              
Bell, C.J.
        *Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Cathell, Dale, R.
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Murphy, J. 
Filed:   October 9, 2008
* Raker, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of these cases while an active member of this
Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, she also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
This appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County presents the question
of whether that county’s Board of License Commissioners (the Board) erroneously refused
to renew a liquor license on the ground that the Board (in the words of appellants’ brief)
“ignored the withdrawal of the protest by the sole Protest Group and[,] contrary to its
practices and policies, conducted the protest hearing while taking testimony from politicians
and persons who otherwise have no standing to protest the Appellants’ application for
renewal of the alcoholic beverage license.”  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the
Board’s decision was not erroneous.  We shall therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit
Court.
Background
In a letter dated February 26, 2006 and signed by its president, the Hillside Civic
Association of Capitol Heights, Maryland, advised the Board that the association “wishes to
protest to the renewal of liquor license for Senate Liquor Store located at 5000 Marlboro
Pike, Capitol Heights, Maryland.”  Attached to that letter was an “opposition to the renewal
of the liquor license for Senate Liquors” signed by twelve persons, including the Civic
Associations’ president, who signed this document in her individual capacity.  
In a six page ruling dated May 24, 2006, the Board (1) refused to renew the Class B+,
Beer, Wine & Liquor license that had been issued to appellant Frank Pridgeon, Sr., for the
use of a corporation operating the Senate Inn, and (2) ordered that the proprietors of the
Senate Inn “cease the sale and service of alcoholic beverages as of 12:00 midnight, May 31,
2006.”  The Board’s ruling included the following findings and conclusions:
2
The Board finds that a valid protest of the renewal of this
license was timely and legally filed by ten or more citizens.
Prior to the hearing the licensees came to an agreement with a
local citizens’ association that, in return for certain operating
concessions, that particular association would not oppose the
renewal of the license.  During the hearing the licensee argued
that this agreement made the protest moot.  The Board finds that
the matter of renewal is controlled by Article 2B, Section 10-
302(g)(2) of that statute states unequivocally that “. . .  If a
protest is filed the license shall not be renewed without a
hearing before the Board of License Commissioners.”  The
Board finds that this proceeding is not one between two private
parties who can settle the matter before a disinterested
magistrate.  The Board is not a disinterested party.  It is charged
with the responsibility of regulating the sale of alcoholic
beverages.  This license is not one, which is controlled in any
way by the protesting parties.  They cannot issue, suspend or
revoke a license.  That function is reserved to the Board.  The
Board finds that once a legitimate protest is filed it must conduct
a hearing on the question of renewal.  While conducting the
hearing in this matter the Board received evidence from a
number of persons who opposed the renewal.  The Board finds
and concludes that the agreement between the licensees and the
citizens association does not preclude the Board from holding a
hearing and making an independent finding on the question of
renewal.
Appellants’ PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW of the Board’s decision included
the following assertions:
1.  On or about February 27, 2006, Hillside Civic Association
submitted a letter to [the Board] protesting Senate Inn
Restaurant and Liquors’ (“Senate Inn”) Application for Renewal
of its Class B+, BWL License.
2.  Up to the protest hearing scheduled for May 10, 2006, the
[appellants’] counsel and [] counsel to Hillside Civic
Association negotiated, prepared and obtained signatures to a
Voluntary Agreement. . . .  The Voluntary Agreement was
3
signed by [appellants] and the President of Hillside Civic
Association.
3.  Prior to the protest hearing scheduled on May 10, 2006, the
parties submitted and filed the Voluntary Agreement with  [the
Board].
4.  In spite of the Voluntary Agreement, [the Board] held a
hearing without Hillside Civic Association’s protest.
***
8.  With the submission of the Voluntary Agreement and the
lack of [a] protestant, [the Board] should have accepted Senate
Inn’s Application for Renewal.
9.  With the submission of the Voluntary Agreement and
withdrawal of Hillside Civic Association’s protest, there cannot
be a protest hearing and [the Board] should not have proceeded
with the protest hearing.
10.  Furthermore, [the Board] failed to follow its own rules and
procedures in conducting the protest hearing.
The circuit court affirmed the ruling of the Board in an eleven page OPINION that
included the following analysis:
On appeal the Appellants do not contest the Board’s
findings of fact, its reasoning, or its ultimate conclusions of law.
They do, however, challenge the Board’s power to conduct a
full protest hearing once all duly lodged protests have been
withdrawn.
***
Md. Ann. Code of 1957, Art 2B §10-302(g) provides:
(1) A protest against the renewal of a license may
be filed with the Prince George’s County Board
of License Commissioners.
4
(2) If a protest is filed, the license shall not be
renewed without a hearing before the Prince
George’s  
County 
Board 
of 
License
Commissioners.
(3) All protests shall be filed with the Board no
later than March 1 of the year in which the license
expires.
(4) The protest shall:
(i) Be signed by not less than 10 residents,
commercial tenants who are not holders of
or applicants for any license issued under
this article, or real estate owners in the
immediate vicinity in which the licensed
place of business is located;
(ii) Be instituted by the Board of License
Commissioners on its own initiative; or
(iii) Be instituted by the municipality in
which the licensed place of business is
located subsequent to a public hearing
being held by that municipality concerning
the license renewal protest.
(5) The Board of License Commissioners shall
hold a hearing on the protest as in the case of an
original application.
***
Discussion
This case appears to be one of first impression.  It
involves the general question regarding the effect of the Protest
Group’s withdrawal of its protest -- whether the protest hearing
was rendered moot by the withdrawal, or whether there
remained viable issues for the Board’s consideration even after
5
Senate Inn and the Protest Group resolved their dispute.  This,
in turn, involves a question of standing -- whether on the
evening of the protest hearing, the Protest Group was the only
entity with standing to challenge the renewal of the license.  It
also involves a question of due process -- whether the Board’s
entertaining challenges from others outside the Protest Group
put Senate Inn in a position where it had to argue a case without
proper notice.
* * *
Under the plain language of the statute, it would have
been error for the Board not to conduct a full protest hearing
once a protest had been filed.  “If a protest is filed, the license
shall not be renewed without a hearing before the Board of
License Commissioners.” §10-302(g)(2).
However, as Appellants point out, the law does not
address the effect of the withdrawal of the protest by the sole
protestant.  
* * *  
In determining the effect of the withdrawal of a protest,
it is important to keep in mind that the question of renewal is not
a matter between the licensee and the protestant.  It is a matter
between the licensee and the Board, which, in order to issue or
renew a license, must, inter alia, determine that the licensee and
the licensed premises meet certain requirements.  See §10-
202(a)(2).  Once a protest hearing is instituted, the Board must
evaluate the licensee and licensed premises in light of these
requirements, and if the requirements are not met, no action by
the protestant can serve to waive them.
A protest filed under §10-302(g)(1) serves as a signal to
the Board that the licensed establishment may not be meeting
the standards set under §10-202(a)(2).  At that point, the Board
is required to look into any possible problems that would require
the denial of a renewal.  This is done through a hearing, “as in
the case of an original application.” §10-302(g)(5).  The filing
6
of a protest does not confer any special standing upon the
protestant; its effect is solely on the Board, which is then
required to make an inquiry by way of hearing.
* * *
In sum, once the protest was filed, the Board was
compelled to make further inquiry into the renewal of Senate
Inn’s license and the withdrawal of the specific protest was a
circumstance that did not compel a cessation of Board
examination of the application for renewal.  Like any protestant
under § 10-302(g)(4), the Protest Group was never a party to the
case, so the withdrawal of its protest was without effect on the
jurisdiction of the Board to conduct the protest hearing.  In other
words, while timely filing of the protest vested the Board with
jurisdiction to hold a protest hearing, the withdrawal of that
protest did not divest the Board of its jurisdiction.  Despite
withdrawal of the protest, the Board was still responsible for
making the same § 10-202(a)(2) determinations that it was
required to make at the time the protest was filed.  Withdrawal
of the protest did not render any of these issues moot.
Standing and Due Process
At a protest hearing, “any person shall be heard on either
side of the question.” § 10-202(a)(1)(iv) (emphasis added).  In
order words, at a protest hearing the Board may consider
evidence submitted by anyone in attendance -- not just the
licensee and the protestants.  Though not every person or group
has the standing to file a protest, once a protest is filed, any
person may be heard at the protest hearing.  The Protest Group’s
act of withdrawing its protest meant only that the Protest Group
itself voluntarily declined to present a case against Senate Inn.
Withdrawal of the protest was without effect on the Board’s
jurisdiction to conduct the hearing, and it was without effect on
the right of the others[] attending the hearing to be heard on the
matter.
A protest hearing is conducted in the same way as is a
hearing for original application. § 10-302(g)(5).  In a hearing for
7
original application, there is, of course, no protest group, yet the
Board hears from interested persons opposing the issuance of
the license, even though they do not have standing as
protestants.  Neither then, is the act of filing a protest a
prerequisite for putting on evidence at a protest hearing, and a
person or group may be heard at a protest hearing even if that
person or group would not have had standing to file a protest.
Once a protest hearing is scheduled, the applicant for
renewal is put on notice that it may have to present a case before
the Board.  Even if, as in this case, the applicant reaches an
agreement with all protestants, the applicant should be aware
that this may not prevent the protest hearing from going
forward, especially if the hearing happens to be attended by
others who are opposed to the license’s renewal.  Those who
come to be heard at a protest hearing are not required to notify
in advance either the Board or the applicant of their intention to
appear.  Therefore, the Board’s decision to proceed with the
protest hearing based on the evidence and arguments of
individuals outside the Protest Group was not a violation of due
process.
Appellants noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and filed a brief in
which they presented three arguments:  
1.
The Board erred in the interpretation and application of
Article 2B, Section 10-302(g) of the Annotated Code of
Maryland.
2.
The Board’s changes to the practices and policies in
handling protest hearings should have been revised by
adoption of appropriate Rule or Regulation.
3.
Other Administrative Agencies permit protests to be
withdrawn by agreement of the parties to the case.
1 Because no prior appellate decision has been rendered in the case at bar, the
designation of the parties is controlled by Md. Rule 8-111(a)(1).  
8
Before these arguments were presented to a panel of the Court of Special Appeals,1
this Court issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative.  402 Md. 352, 936 A.2d 850
(2007).  
Discussion
I.
Appellants argue that the Board has no authority to hold a renewal hearing if a protest
is withdrawn.  The Board, not surprisingly, has a different interpretation of the applicable
statute.  The record shows that the following transpired during the May 10, 2006 hearing: 
[BOARD CHAIR]:   Two things.  One is this protest was made
by signatures of ten community members.  Is that how this
protest was initiated?
[APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL]:   Well, it was submitted under
Hillside Civic Association.
[BOARD CHAIR]: But when the ten community members who
submitted this --  that these people no longer wish to protest and
they submit it to us as a Board and it’s really authorized by those
people who submitted the request for a protest, then I don’t
know how you would withdraw a protest otherwise.  And the
second thing is even if there’s been a negotiation, if there’s a
scheduled hearing for a protest and anybody in the county can
come and testify with regard to this scheduled hearing for the
protest, then anybody who would want to protest can come and
offer whatever they want to offer with regard to whether or not
this license should be protested or not protested.  And so that
means that even if you have an agreement with the Hillside
Civic Association, there still would be a protest hearing where
we would listen to testimony from any resident of Prince
9
George’s County with regard to the issues -- with regard to the
renewal of this particular license. 
* * *
[BOARD CHAIR]: Now, once that protest hearing is requested
and the conditions are met for the protest hearing, then any
citizen of Prince George’s County can come in and participate
in the protest hearing.  Now, that group that requested the
protest hearing can subsequently say that we no longer want to
protest, but this document doesn’t even really say that.  I mean,
in all honesty, it just establishes conditions that it would expect
the licensee to maintain if, in fact, the licensee has a license.
But it doesn’t even say that it supports the licensee request for
a new license.  It just says that this is what it -- now, I
understand the second part of that and the second part of it, they
seem to be holding true.  They’re not protesting.
It is well settled that “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the
statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by
reviewing courts.”  Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172, 783 A.2d 169, 177 (2001).  In the
case at bar, the Board’s interpretation of §10-302(g)(2) -- “if a protest is filed, we must hold
a hearing” -- is entirely consistent with the words of the statute.  
It is also well settled that “[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and
unambiguous statute[.]”  Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654
(2001).  To accept appellants’ argument, we would be adding the words “unless the protest
is withdrawn” to §10-302(g)(2).  Moreover, as pointed out by the Board Chair and by the
Circuit Court, the protest against renewal was filed by twelve citizens rather than by the
2 Before the Board, appellants had the opportunity to -- but did not -- challenge
the validity of the protest on the ground that the persons who signed the protest were not
authorized to do so by §10-302(g)(4)(i), which requires that the protest “[b]e signed by
not less than 10 residents, commercial tenants who are not holders of or applicants for any
license issued under this article, or real estate owners in the immediate vicinity in which
the licensed place of business is located[.]” Because appellants did not raise this issue
before the Board, this issue could not be raised for the first time during judicial review. 
MVA v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 128-29, 887 A.2d 1042, 1050 (2005).  
10
Hillside Civic Association.2  Under these circumstances, appellants were not entitled to a
renewal of their license on the ground that they had settled their differences with the
members of the Hillside Civic Association.  
II.
Appellants next argue that they should have been granted a renewal of their
application on the ground that the Board’s denial of the application resulted from (in the
words of appellants’ brief) “changes to the practices and policies in handling protest hearings
[that required] adoption of appropriate Rule[s] or Regulation[s].”  From our review of the
record, however, we agree with the Board’s assertion that (in the words of its brief) “[t]he
Board has never adopted a policy, either formal or informal, obviating the need for a
statutorily mandated hearing on a protested renewal for any reason.”  
III.
According to appellants, if the Administrative Procedure Act were applicable to the
case at bar, (in the words of appellants’ brief) “administrative agencies would declare the
protest hearing before the Agency to be moot upon withdrawal of the protest by Hillside
3  See Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code (2004, 2006 Supp.) State Gov’t
Article §§ 10-201 0 10-206. 
11
Civic Association.”  The Administrative Procedure Act,3 however, is not applicable to
proceedings before the liquor boards.  Valentine v. Board of License Commissioners, 291
Md. 523, 530, 435 A.2d 459, 463 (1981).  
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED;
APPELLANTS TO PAY THE COSTS.