Title: Chorniak v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Chorniak v. State1986 WY 71715 P.2d 1162Case Number: 85-208Decided: 03/17/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GARY CHORNIAK, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Julie Naylor, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program, and Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, and Kate L. Mead, Student Intern, 
Wyoming Defender Aid Program, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael Barrash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant pled guilty 
to arson in the first degree under § 6-3-101, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). 
At the time of sentencing, he moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied 
the motion and sentenced appellant to six to eight years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On December 31, 1984, 
appellant was having a party at his parents' home in Casper, Wyoming. As the evening progressed and the 
consumption of alcohol continued, appellant went downstairs and, using his 
cigarette lighter, started a cardboard box underneath the stairs on fire. He 
then returned to the party upstairs. Within moments one of his friends smelled 
smoke. He and appellant went back to the basement, opened the door underneath 
the stairs, and discovered the room engulfed in flames. They ran to the kitchen 
and called the fire department. After determining that they could not stop the 
fire, they awakened a friend who was sleeping upstairs and fled from the 
house.

[¶4.]     Later, appellant signed 
a statement in which he admitted intentionally setting the fire in the hope that 
his parents would be too upset about the damage to notice that he had taken 
seventy or eighty dollars from them.

[¶5.]     On February 5, 1985, 
appellant entered his pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency to the charge of first-degree arson. The trial court 
ordered appellant to undergo a physical and mental examination at the WyomingStateHospital. The report issued by the 
WyomingStateHospital following that examination 
concluded that appellant was not then, nor was he at the time of the alleged 
offense, mentally ill or deficient.

[¶6.]     On April 25, 1985, 
after receiving the report from the WyomingStateHospital, appellant moved 
to change his plea to guilty. A Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P.,1 proceeding was held during which 
the trial court questioned appellant to determine whether the plea was voluntary 
and whether there was a factual basis for accepting the plea. During that 
proceeding, appellant stated that he maliciously started the fire with the 
intent to damage his parents' home. Based on this statement and others by 
appellant, the trial court concluded that the plea was voluntary and accurate 
and granted appellant's motion.

[¶7.]     During the presentence 
investigation, appellant informed the parole officer that he wanted to withdraw 
his plea of guilty. Upon being informed of appellant's desire to withdraw his 
plea, his court-appointed attorney moved to withdraw as counsel, at which time 
the trial court deferred appellant's motion pending consultation with his newly 
appointed attorney.

[¶8.]     At the commencement of 
the sentence hearing on June 13, 1985, the trial court denied appellant's 
renewed motion to withdraw the guilty plea and sentenced 
appellant.

[¶9.]     Appellant contends that 
the trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw the guilty plea under 
the standard enunciated in Hanson v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 832, 835 (1979). That 
standard is as follows:

"* * * [W]ithdrawal of a 
guilty plea before sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial court 
unless there is presented a plausible reason for withdrawal. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)2

Appellant 
contends that, because a plausible reason for withdrawal was presented, the 
trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion. In support of his 
assertion that a plausible reason was presented, appellant points to a statement 
which he made during the hearing on the court-appointed attorney's motion to 
withdraw as counsel: "Well, I will tell the reason why I first said that at 
first becasue [sic] a buddy of mine * * * he said he had accidentally dropped 
his cigarette." Appellant also points to the following statement by his newly 
appointed attorney during the sentencing proceedings:

"* * * He has informed me 
that he feels that his plea was not completely voluntarily entered. He entered 
the plea of guilty only to protect a friend. He no longer wishes to do that. He 
would like the Court to allow him to withdraw that plea and proceed to trial. At 
this time we move the Court to allow him to withdraw his plea of 
guilty."

The attorney 
made no showing by way of oral testimony or documentary evidence that the fire 
was caused by accidental means. As indicated previously, appellant had, on two 
prior occasions, admitted setting the fire with the intent to damage his 
parents' home.

[¶10.]  The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is not 
an absolute right, and the right to do so is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Hanson v. State, supra; Schmidt v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 656 
(1983). Appellant has the burden of establishing a plausible reason for the 
withdrawal of his guilty plea, and his unsupported contention that he pled 
guilty to protect a friend does not satisfy this burden. In support of this 
holding, we point to Wright v. State, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1985), in which 
we said that "[a]ppellant did not satisfy his burden of establishing good 
grounds or a valid reason for withdrawal of the plea" where he contended "that 
he entered the plea because of a desire to protect his son from prosecution," 
and where the "contention is not supported by the record or the actual 
proceedings before the court." In this instance, the proffered plausible reason 
for withdrawal of the guilty plea, like that asserted in Wright v. State, is not 
supported by the record or the actual proceedings before the trial court. Under 
the circumstances, it does not amount to a plausible reason for withdrawing the 
plea.

[¶11.]  Appellant also complains that (1) the 
trial court should have ordered a full evidentiary proceeding patterned after 
the federal procedural standards; (2) the failure to do so resulted in a summary 
denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty; and (3) such was an abuse 
of the trial court's discretion. A trial judge does not abuse his discretion in 
refusing withdrawal of a guilty plea when he carries on a careful and complete 
hearing under Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. Osborn v. State, Wyo., 672 P.2d 777 (1983), 
cert. denied 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 
(1984).

[¶12.]  Appellant acknowledges that the trial 
judge complied with the requirements of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., and we are satisfied 
from an examination of the record on appeal that he did so. If appellant wanted 
a full evidentiary hearing, he should have advised the trial court that he 
wanted to introduce evidence to support his motion. Appellant has no justifiable 
reason to now complain that the judicial system did not adequately protect his 
rights.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., 
provides in pertinent part:

"(d) Insuring that the plea is voluntary. - 
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by 
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is 
voluntary and not the the [sic] result of force or threats or of promises apart 
from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the 
defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior 
discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or his 
attorney.

* * * * * 
*

"(f) Determining accuracy of plea. - 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a 
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that 
there is a factual basis for the plea."

2 This Court notes that in 
the process of citing Ecker v. State, Wyo., 545 P.2d 641, 642 (1976), for 
authority for this standard, the Court, in Hanson, inadvertently substituted the 
word "unless" for the word "and."