Title: FORREST MYLES BROMLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FORREST MYLES BROMLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 133219 P.3d 110Case Number: S-08-0254Decided: 11/04/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
FORREST 
MYLES BROMLEY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Jason 
M. Tangeman of Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1]     
The 
appellant killed Jason Voss with a shotgun on April  25, 2007.  He was charged with second-degree 
murder, but convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of 
manslaughter.  He now challenges 
that conviction on evidentiary, procedural, and constitutional grounds.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]     
1.   Whether the district court's sua sponte revision of the trial 
transcript violated W.R.A.P. 3.02 and 3.04, violated the constitutional 
separation of powers, and violated the appellant's constitutional right to the 
due process of law?

 
 
2.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion by admitting evidence of the appellant's alleged use of 
methamphetamine?

 
 
            
3.   Whether Wyoming's 
second-degree murder statute is facially unconstitutional?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]     On April 25, 2007, the 
appellant and his friend Jason Voss decided to go out and "do some 
shooting."  After finishing some 
chores at Voss's grandmother's house, the two men went to their residences, 
where they picked up several guns, including the appellant's 12-gauge Model 870 
Remington shotgun.  They then drove 
to another friend's house, where they smoked marijuana.  At about 4:00 p.m., they drove to a local 
restaurant and liquor store where they purchased cheeseburgers, french fries, 
and an 18-pack of beer.  Eventually, 
they drove out of Encampment toward Saratoga, and turned onto a county dirt 
road, eating food, drinking beer, and shooting prairie dogs along the 
way.

 
 

[¶4]     Around 6:00 p.m., the 
appellant called Luke Munson, who was the appellant's friend and Voss's cousin, 
and asked Munson to join them.  When 
Munson arrived, he obtained a beer, and then took an old oil container out and 
set it up as a target.  As Munson 
was walking back, the appellant shot at the target while Munson was still "down 
range," which scared Munson.

 
 

[¶5]     The three men began to 
throw rocks into the air and shoot at them, and then shot at a sage chicken, 
which they followed over a ridge, believing they had hit it.  When they could not find the sage 
chicken, the appellant began shooting at a nearby rock with his shotgun.  What happened next is the focus of this 
case.  Munson testified that the 
appellant "[c]hambered a round and turned to his right, shouldered the gun and 
aimed at my cousin and shot him."  The appellant, to the contrary, testified 
that he shot at the rock three times, then reloaded three shells, and shot twice 
more at the rock.  Thinking he had 
shot all three rounds, he turned and, "[w]hen I was turned before I could really 
bring my eyes around to [Voss], the gun discharged and hit [Voss]."  The shotgun blast hit Voss in the chin 
and neck, and he died within minutes.

 
 

[¶6]     The appellant was 
charged with second-degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2009).  After a 
preliminary hearing in circuit court, he was bound over to district court for 
trial on the charged crime.  The 
State's theory of the case was that the appellant was a heavy user of 
methamphetamine who became volatile and violent when under the influence of the 
drug.  Consequently, the State 
pursued evidence both of the appellant's historic use of methamphetamine, and 
his alleged use of the drug on the day of the killing.

 
 
[¶7]      It was not 
contested that the appellant used marijuana during the afternoon of the 
shooting.  In addition to 
eye-witness testimony, preliminary tests of the appellant's blood and urine 
yielded "presumptive positive" results for the presence of marijuana. The blood 
test was also presumptive positive for the presence of amphetamine, but the 
urine test was negative in that regard.1  Confirmation testing of both blood and 
urine by AIT Laboratories in Indiana produced negative results for amphetamine 
in both the blood and urine.

 
 

[¶8]     The appellant's 
pretrial attempt to prevent introduction of his alleged methamphetamine use took 
the form of a demand for notice of the State's intent to introduce uncharged 
misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), which motion was heard on October 9 and 
11, 2007.  After the hearing, the 
district court issued a decision letter and an order allowing the State to 
introduce the marijuana testimony and the marijuana test results, but denying 
admission of the presumptive positive blood test results for 
amphetamine.

 
 

[¶9]     At a subsequent 
pretrial hearing on March 24, 2008, defense counsel informed the district court 
that he had just learned from the State that two new witnessesJoseph Cheek and 
Theodore Saulswould be called by the State to testify that the appellant had 
admitted to them that he was using methamphetamine on the day of the killing. 
 After repeating the intent of the 
decision letter and order governing the methamphetamine evidence mentioned above 
(see supra ¶ 8), the district court 
told defense counsel to "bring it up just as quickly as you can" if a hearing 
was necessary regarding the new witnesses.

 
 

[¶10]   On April 10, 2008, the State filed 
an amended pretrial memorandum adding Theodore Sauls to its witness list.  Eighteen days later, a similar document 
added Michael Evans, "CEO of Toxicology" for AIT Laboratories.  The appellant responded with three 
motions in limine, filed on the first 
day of trial, seeking to preclude the testimony of Cheek, Sauls, and Evans. 
 Noting that Cheek and Sauls would 
testify about the appellant's supposed admission to using methamphetamine, and 
that Evans would testify, among other things, that the State's delay in sending 
the blood sample to AIT may have caused the negative test results to be invalid, 
the appellant's primary complaint was that, based upon the district court's 
decision letter and order, the appellant had prepared for trial under the 
assumption that the issue of alleged methamphetamine use would not be raised, 
and need not be defended.

 
 

[¶11]   The trial began without any 
resolution of the defense motions.  
During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor said the 
following:

 
 
[The 
appellant] also gave a statement to his cellmate when he was incarcerated in 
Carbon County Jail.  And his 
cellmate, who is in jail for a reason  and we've gone over that a little bit in 
voir dire  will testify that the [appellant] indicated that he had indeed 
killed Mr. Voss, and the reason for it was he was coming down from drugs.  That is the testimony he will give you. 
. . .

 
 
Defense 
counsel immediately moved for a mistrial.  The motion was heard at the beginning of 
the second day of trial.  Defense 
counsel argued first that, as a result of the district court's earlier rulings, 
he had prepared for trial under the belief that no methamphetamine evidence 
would be admitted.  Second, he 
argued that he had prepared for trial under the belief that, even if Sauls' and 
Cheek's allegations somehow got into evidence, he could impeach their testimony 
with the negative AIT test results.  
Now, at the eleventh hour, the State intended to call Evans to undermine 
his own laboratory's reports, thereby destroying those reports' impeachment 
value.  The State countered with the 
contention that its proposed evidence was not the "old" blood and urine test 
results that the court had earlier disallowed, but was "new" evidence provided 
directly by the appellant as a statement against interest.2

 
 

[¶12]   Without giving any reason for its 
ruling, the district court denied the mistrial motion, allowed the admission of 
Sauls' and Cheek's testimony, disallowed any evidence of the presumptive 
positive blood test for amphetamine, and allowed defense counsel to impeach 
Sauls and Cheek with Evans' testimony.  The appellant characterizes this ruling 
as the reversal of W.R.E. 404(b) rulings that had been in effect for six 
months.

 
 

[¶13]   Cheek did not testify at trial, but 
Sauls was called as a witness in the State's case-in-chief.  Sauls testified that he had been 
convicted of reckless endangerment for brandishing a knife during a fight with 
his brother, that he had been incarcerated in the Carbon County jail, part of 
the time with the appellant as his cellmate, and that the appellant had told him 
about shooting Voss.  The gravamen 
of Sauls' testimony, as that testimony was originally set forth in the official 
court reporter's transcript, was as follows:

 
 
He 
told me, and he said that he had shot his friend, and that he didn't mean to do 
it.  He don't know why he did it, 
but he was all drugged up at the time, and those were his exact words that came 
out of it his mouth so  I mean, those came from his 
mouth.

 
 

[¶14]   As its final witness, the State 
called Dr. Evans, AIT Laboratories' "CEO of Toxicology."  Evans testified as to the effect of 
methamphetamine on the human body and mind, both during use and during 
withdrawal from use, and testified as to the detectability of methamphetamine in 
the human body through chemical analysis.  The appellant twice moved for a mistrial 
during Evans' testimony, on the ground that the testimony violated the district 
court's pretrial order governing W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  Both motions were 
denied.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
the district court's sua sponte revision of the trial transcript violated 
W.R.A.P. 3.02 and 3.04, violated the constitutional separation of powers, and 
violated the appellant's constitutional right to the due process of 
law?

 
 

[¶15]   The guilty verdict was rendered on 
May 9, 2008.  The appellant was 
sentenced on August 12, 2008.  The 
Notice of Appeal was filed on August 15, 2008.  After receiving an extension of time for 
completion of the trial transcript, the official court reporter certified the 
same to be "true, correct and complete" on November 14, 2008.  Ten days later, the Clerk of the 
District Court provided notice to this Court, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.05, that 
the trial transcript had been completed for purposes of the appeal and had been 
filed with the district court.

 
 

[¶16]   By February 12, 2009, defense 
counsel's appellate brief was largely completed.  On that date, in an out-of-court informal 
conversation, defense counsel mentioned to the district court's law clerk that 
witness Sauls' testimony did not contain any reference to methamphetamine.  The law clerk then contacted the district 
court judge, who contacted the official court reporter, in order to review the 
transcript.  The court reporter, and 
then the district court judge, compared the original notes with the transcript 
and determined that the transcript filed as part of the court record did not 
accurately reflect Sauls' testimony.  
Relying upon W.R.A.P. 3.04, the district court informed counsel after 
brief telephonic contact on February 12 and 13, 2009, that it intended to 
correct that portion of Sauls' testimony quoted supra ¶ 13, to read as 
follows:

 
 
He 
didn't know why he did it, but he was all drugged up at the time.  He was drugs at the time. (sic)  I think the exact words that came out of 
his mouth were I was all methed out.  
I mean, those came from his mouth.

 
 

[¶17]   Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 5-3-403 through 5-3-406 (LexisNexis 2009) require the official 
court reporter to produce the official transcript of criminal proceedings, 
including trials, and to file the transcript as part of the official court 
record.  W.R.A.P. 2.05 and 2.06 
provide the process whereby, concurrently with the filing of a notice of appeal, 
the appellant arranges with the court reporter for pertinent portions of the 
transcript to be made part of the appellate record.  W.R.A.P 3.02 lists the portions of the 
transcript that must be included in the appeal of a criminal proceeding.  Especially pertinent to the present 
issue is W.R.A.P. 3.04, which allows for the correction or modification of the 
record:

 
 
            
If any difference arises as to whether the record discloses what occurred 
in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that 
court and the record made to conform to the truth.  If anything material to either party is 
omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by 
stipulation, or the trial court either before or after the record is transmitted 
to the appellate court, or the appellate court on motion or its own initiative, 
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that 
a supplemental record be certified and transmitted.  All other questions as to the form and 
content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court by 
motion.

 
 
The 
district court specifically referred to, and relied upon, W.R.A.P. 3.04 in 
amending the transcript as set forth above.  See supra ¶ 16.

 
 

[¶18]   The appellant urges this Court to 
consider this to be a matter of the admissibility of evidence, and to review the 
district court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard, with the 
"constitutional dimensions" reviewed de 
novo.  The State, on the other 
hand, considers this to be an interpretation of a rule of procedure, which 
interpretation should be reviewed de 
novo.  We have said, however, 
that "[w]hen this Court construes court rules that are virtually identical to 
their federal counterparts, relevant federal authority is persuasive."  Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, 
¶ 13, 197 P.3d 1273, 1277 (Wyo. 2008).  The federal standard for reviewing 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e), which is substantially similar to 
W.R.A.P. 3.04, is to treat the trial court's reconstruction of the record as 
conclusive, absent a showing of intentional falsification or plain 
unreasonableness.  United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 93 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Keskey, 863 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240, 246 
(5th Cir. 1971); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review § 463 (2007).

 
 

[¶19]   Preliminarily, we will note that, 
on its face, W.R.A.P. 3.04 allows the district court to settle the record 
whenever any difference arises as to whether the record is accurate; it does not 
require the district court to await a motion from one of the parties.  In the instant case, a difference arose 
as to the accuracy of the transcript when defense counsel voiced a translation 
of the transcript that did not comport with the memory of the district 
court.  We would propose that, once 
that difference became apparent to the district court, a duty arose for the 
district court to settle the difference.  
Furthermore, W.R.A.P. 3.04 contemplates such a correction by the district 
court either before or after the record has been transmitted to this 
Court.

 
 

[¶20]   The appellant has never suggested 
that the district court engaged in intentional falsification in having the 
transcript corrected.  That leaves 
only the question of whether the district court's determination was "plainly 
unreasonable."  Other portions of 
the transcript, itself, belie that suggestion.  During his cross-examination, the 
appellant testified as follows:

 
 
            
Q.    Did you hear 
the testimony from your cellmate?

 
 
            
A.    Which 
one?

 
 
            
Q.    Did you hear 
the testimony of your cellmate as far as methamphetamine?

 
 
            
A.    Yes, I 
did.

 
 
            
Q.    And you heard 
him testify that he told you what he had done, and you told him what you had 
done.  You heard that testimony; 
isn't that correct?

 
 
            
A.    That's 
correct, I heard that.

 
 
            
Q.    And you heard 
that you were sorry for shooting your friend.  Did you hear that?

 
 
            
A.    Yes, I heard 
that.

 
 
            
Q.    But you were 
under the influence of methamphetamine.  
Did you hear him say that?

 
 
            
A.    Yes, I heard 
him say that.

 
 

[¶21]   These statements clearly reference 
the testimony of Theodore Sauls that is at issue here.  We would be hard-pressed to find 
"plainly unreasonable" the district court's recollection of Sauls' testimony as 
having mentioned methamphetamine, when the appellant, contemporaneously and 
under oath, stated that such was the testimony.  Furthermore, during closing argument, 
both the prosecutor and defense counsel used the phrase "meth'd out" or "meth'd 
up" in referring to Sauls' testimony about the appellant's jailhouse statement. 
 Clearly, there was no doubt at the 
time what Sauls had said.  Beyond 
that, the district court did not just order the transcript amended.  Instead, it tested its own recollection 
against the original transcript, the official court reporter's notes, and the 
audio backup.

 
 

[¶22]   We will spend little time 
discussing the appellant's additional arguments that correction of the 
transcript violated the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers or 
his constitutional right to the due process of law.  As to the former, the appellant presents 
no cogent argument and no citation to supportive authority.  As to the latter, the record reflects 
that the district court offered the appellant the opportunity to review the 
court reporter's notes and the audio backup, and offered to hold a hearing on 
the issue of whether the transcript could or should be corrected, but the 
appellant declined those opportunities.

 
 

[¶23]   There is one other matter involved 
in this issue that we will mention, but not resolve.  In his brief, the appellant contends 
that the district court responded to the jury's complaint that it had been 
unable to hear Sauls' testimony by having the court reporter read the testimony 
for the jury.  Because the court 
reporter was reading, and was not reporting, the transcript does not reveal what 
was read back to the jury, and the tape is inaudible.  However, the appellant argues that it is 
fair to assume that the reporter read back to the jury the version of the 
transcript that existed before it was corrected, meaning that the jury was told 
that Sauls did not mention methamphetamine.  The fundamental problem with this 
argument is that the record says not that Sauls' testimony was read back to the 
jury, but that a "particular question and answer" were read back for the jury. 
 Inasmuch as we do not know what 
that question was, or what the answer was, there is no way that we can evaluate 
the impact, if any, upon the present issue.  Therefore, we decline to address 
it.

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the 
appellant's alleged use of methamphetamine?

 
 

[¶24]               
            
Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  We 
afford considerable deference to the trial court's rulings and will uphold them 
if we find they have a legitimate basis.  
On review, our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the trial 
court's decision.  If we conclude 
the trial court erred in admitting evidence, we then must determine if the error 
was prejudicial, requiring reversal, or whether it was harmless.  An error is prejudicial if there is a 
reasonable possibility the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
appellant if the error had never occurred.  
The burden of proving prejudicial error rests with the 
appellant.

 
 

Callen 
v. State, 
2008 WY 107, ¶ 5, 192 P.3d 137, 141 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted).  We have defined reasonableness in this 
context as "sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without being arbitrary or capricious."  Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 35, 199 P.3d 1052, 1063 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 15, 
166 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2007)).

 
 

[¶25]   Although not fully treated as a 
separate issue, the appellant raises as part of this argument the district 
court's denial of his mid-trial motion for a mistrial, based upon admission of 
this evidence.  The denial of a 
motion for a mistrial is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Drury v. State, 2008 WY 130, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 1017, 1019 (Wyo. 2008).  
"Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be 
resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not 
be served by proceeding with trial."  
Id. (quoting Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 
1995)).  The appellant has the 
burden of proving such prejudice.  
Id.

 
 

[¶26]   This 
issue can only be understood in the context of the year-long pretrial wrangling 
over the admissibility of evidence that the appellant used methamphetamine.  Such evidence is what is known as 
"uncharged misconduct evidence," and its admissibility is governed by W.R.E. 
404(b):

 
 
            
(b)   Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, 
provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the 
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

 
 

[¶27]   We have well-established procedures 
for trial courts to follow in determining the admissibility of evidence under 
W.R.E. 404(b).  First, they are to 
determine (1) whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose; (2) whether 
the evidence is relevant; and (3) whether the probative value of the evidence is 
not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.  Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 35, 141 P.3d 106, 118 (Wyo. 2006).  Upon 
request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the evidence is to be 
considered only for the purpose for which it was admitted.  Id.  
The record also must "reflect the trial court's identification of the 
purpose or purposes for admission of the evidence, the findings and conclusions 
establishing relevance and probative value, and the factors considered in 
balancing probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice."  Leyva v. State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 31, 165 P.3d 446, 455 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 
Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 30, 57 P.3d 332, 343 (Wyo. 2002)).  Uncharged misconduct evidence that is 
"intrinsic" to the facts surrounding the crime is not thereby insulated from 
analysis under W.R.E. 404(b).  Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶ 11, 176 P.3d 647, 651 (Wyo. 2008); Leyva, 
2007 WY 136, ¶ 23, 165 P.3d  at 453.  
And finally, an appellant's filing of a pretrial demand for notice of the 
State's intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) shall be treated as a 
timely objection to the admission of such evidence.  Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶28]   With those rules in mind, we will 
look at what happened in this case.  
On June 11, 2007, the appellant filed a discovery motion that contained a 
demand for notice of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  Ten days later, based upon the 
stipulation of the parties, an order was entered requiring the giving of such 
notice.  On September 14, 2007, the 
State filed its notice of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), 
including, among other things, evidence that, upon his return from Colorado in 
2006, the appellant's personality had changed, in that he became explosive and 
violent, probably from the use of methamphetamine.

 
 

[¶29]   This notice of intent was followed 
by a second notice, filed September 26, 2007, indicating that the State intended 
to offer evidence of drug analysis that revealed the presence of marijuana and 
methamphetamine in the appellant's blood and urine.  On that same day, the State filed its 
notice of intent to introduce the testimony of a witness who was smoking 
marijuana with the appellant "only hours before" the shooting.  These notices were followed by the 
appellant's motion to strike all of the evidence, alleging that it was not 
properly supported by legal analysis.

 
 

[¶30]   On October 2, 2007, the appellant 
filed a motion in limine specifically 
contesting the introduction of evidence concerning the blood and urine tests for 
amphetamine, the witness testimony concerning his use of marijuana, and the 
chemical tests revealing his blood alcohol content.  The motion pointed out the 
inconsistencies in the blood and urine tests, and questioned the relevance of 
the marijuana and alcohol evidence to an allegation of second-degree murder. 
 On October 4, 2007, the State filed 
a response to both the motion to strike and the motion in limine.  After soundly berating this Court for its 
opinion in Leyva, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 23, 
165 P.3d  at 453, wherein we held that "intrinsic" uncharged misconduct evidence 
was subject to analysis under W.R.E. 404(b), the State argued that the 
appellant's historic drug use, psychological problems, and recklessness with 
guns were relevant to his state of mind at the time of the shooting, which is an 
element of the crime charged.  In 
addition, the State contended that evidence of the appellant's drug and alcohol 
use at the time of the shooting, as well as his shooting in the direction of 
Munson, were admissible under the theory alternatively known as res gestae, course of conduct, same 
transaction, complete story, history of the event, context, or enhancing the 
natural development of the facts.  In another response filed one day later, 
the State notified the district court that the blood sample had been submitted 
to AIT for confirmation testing, and repeated its arguments as to the 
deficiencies of Leyva and the 
admissibility of the alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine evidence as history 
of the event, or enhancing the natural development of the facts, course of 
conduct, or same transaction, or complete story evidence.3 

 
 

[¶31]   The appellant replied to the 
State's responses on October 9, 2007, generally contesting not only the validity 
of the drug and alcohol evidence, but also its relevancy in a second-degree 
murder prosecution.  All pretrial 
motions, including the ones involving uncharged misconduct evidence, were heard 
on October 9 and 11, 2007.  The 
district court characterized that portion of the hearing as "a Gleason hearing under 404(b)."4  The State called six witnesses, with 
their testimony focusing on the appellant's alcohol and drug history, a recent 
change in his personality toward hatred and violence, and recklessness with 
firearms. The district court and counsel agreed that the parties' closing 
arguments would be submitted in writing.

 
 

[¶32]   The State's closing argument was 
filed on October 26, 2007, with its position outlined in this brief 
sentence:

 
 
Evidence 
of [the appellant's] use of illegal controlled substances, his propensity to 
lose his temper and fly into angry rages, his reckless and negligent use of 
firearms, and statements made by him of his intent to cause others serious 
bodily harm and/or death, is offered to show the following: 1) [The appellant's] 
State of Mind at the Time of Alleged Murder; 2) Lack of Mistake or Accident; 3) 
Motive and malice; and 4) Course of conduct.

 
 
This 
outline is fleshed out with the following arguments:  to find the state of mind of "purposely 
and maliciously," the jury will need to be aware of the appellant's history of 
drug use and the fact that the appellant was using drugs and alcohol at the time 
of the shooting; to find that the shooting was not an accident, the jury will 
need to be aware of the appellant's history of recklessness with firearms; to 
find motive and malice, the jury will need to be aware of the appellant's 
changed personality and his repeated threats of violence toward others; and, to 
understand the appellant's course of conduct and to get a complete picture, the 
jury will need to be aware of the appellant's drug use, his propensity for 
violence, his recklessness with firearms, and his threats of violence toward 
others.  Finally, the State argued 
that all of the evidence was clearly probative of the facts noted, and that it 
was more probative than prejudicial.

 
 

[¶33]   The appellant's closing argument, 
in the form of another motion in 
limine, was filed on November 6, 2007.  
The motion is quite lengthy, because the appellant analyzed in detail 
many different pieces of proposed evidence.  He did not object to the testimony of 
the witness who saw the appellant drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana prior 
to the shooting.  He did, however, 
object to the proposed testimony of the same witness that, in the past, she used 
methamphetamine or cocaine with the appellant, on the ground that the latter 
testimony was highly prejudicial, while probative of nothing.  He also argued that evidence of past 
instances where he may have become angry or threatened violence simply did not 
prove that he shot Voss in a methamphetamine-induced rage, rather than by 
accident, and are exactly the type of prejudicial character evidence that W.R.E. 
404(b) is meant to keep from the jury.

 
 

[¶34]   The district court issued a 
decision letter on November 21, 2007, in which, among other things, it addressed 
the uncharged misconduct issues raised by the appellant.  Strictly following our Gleason requirements, the district court 
separately analyzed each piece of evidence proferred by the State under W.R.E. 
404(b), finding some to be admissible, and some to be inadmissible.  In relevant part, the district court 
made the following rulings, as clarified by a later order:

 
 
            
1.    The witness's 
testimony about previous drug use with the appellant was not admissible to prove 
the appellant's mental state at the time of the killing because the evidence was 
too remote and tenuous, meaning it did not fall within the course of conduct 
purpose.  Furthermore, the inference 
that prior drug use somehow proved the malice element of second-degree murder 
was an improper inference.

 
 
            
2.    The blood and 
urine tests with contradictory results for the presence of methamphetamine were 
not admissible.5

 
 

[¶35]   It is in this context that we will 
examine what happened at trial, and the appellant's complaints in regard 
thereto.  During his opening 
statement, the prosecutor quoted the anticipated testimony of Mr. Sauls that the 
appellant "indicated that he had indeed killed Mr. Voss, and the reason for it 
was he was coming down from drugs."  This statement resulted in defense 
counsel's motion for a mistrial.  In 
arguing the motion, defense counsel essentially contended that admission of 
Sauls' statement would reverse the district court's prior rulings denying 
admission of any methamphetamine evidence.  In addition, the appellant would not be 
able to impeach Sauls on the basis of the negative AIT test results, because Dr. 
Evans now claimed that those results were not trustworthy.  As mentioned earlier herein, the State 
then proceeded to argue for admission of Sauls' rendition of the appellant's 
statement, not under W.R.E. 404(b), but as an admission by a party opponent, 
presumably under W.R.E. 801(d)(2).6  See supra ¶¶ 10-11.  Also as indicated above, the district 
court then ruled that Sauls' testimony was admissible, and that the appellant 
could impeach that testimony via Dr. Evans.  See supra ¶ 12.

 
 

[¶36]   Subsequently, Sauls testified about 
his jailhouse conversation with the appellant, with the most significant portion 
of that testimony being that the appellant said he "was all methed out" at the 
time of the shooting.  After several 
intervening witnesses, the State called Dr. Evans to the stand.  During his direct examination, Dr. Evans 
made no mention of the AIT test results involving the appellant, but testified 
instead at considerable length about methamphetamineits use, its effects 
(during use and during withdrawal from use), and how its presence is detected by 
chemical testing.  Defense counsel 
twice objected and moved for a mistrial during the direct examination, with both 
motions being denied.  Only during 
cross-examination did Dr. Evans testify that the appellant's blood sample tested 
negative for the presence of methamphetamine.  During redirect examination, Dr. Evans 
testified that a normal dose of methamphetamine would be undetectable under 
standard testing if 22 to 40 hours had passed between the time of use and the 
time of testing.

 
 

[¶37]   The prosecutor made use of this 
methamphetamine testimony in his closing argument.  First, in suggesting that there were 
several versions of the shooting incident, he commented as 
follows:

 
 
            
The second story is a story that [the appellant] gives while he is in 
jail.  It's a story he tells his 
bunkmate, how methamphetamine has taken over his life, how methamphetamine is 
the reason he killed his friend, Jason Voss.

 
 
Later 
in his closing, using words more like those used by Sauls, the prosecutor 
repeated what Sauls said the appellant had told him:

 
 
He 
said that he shot his friend.  He 
didn't know why he did it.  He was 
all drugged up at the time.  And 
then I think [Sauls] turned to the jury and said I think the exact words were, I 
was all meth'd out.  And then he 
said those words came from his mouth.

 
 

[¶38]   Finally, the prosecutor emphasized 
the purported role of methamphetamine in the shooting by reminding the jury of 
Dr. Evans' testimony:

 
 
            
Dr. Evans talked about methamphetamine.  He talked about the life of 
methamphetamine being a drug which remains just a short time in the body, about 
30 to 40 hours.  The problem with 
methamphetamine is not when it's in your system; it's when it's going out of 
your system.  And I think it's a 
fair characterization to say that Dr. Evans said it's a drug that can suck 
whatever is good out of a person and replace it with torment, anger, hostility, 
and anxiety.  And then I want you to 
think about the confession that [the appellant] made to his roommate in jail 
when he said he was spinning out on meth.

 
 

[¶39]   Finally, we will note that defense 
counsel impeached the State's methamphetamine evidence by questioning Dr. Evans 
as to the negative test results, and with two crucial observations during 
closing argument:  first, that no 
witness testified  the appellant had 
used methamphetamine in the days leading up to the shooting incident, and 
second, that the appellant's blood sample tested negative for the presence of 
methamphetamine.

 
 

[¶40]   We conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Sauls and Evans.  Our first observation is that admission 
of this evidence did not violate the district court's prior rulings governing 
uncharged misconduct evidence.  
Sauls was a newly discovered witness, upon whose testimony the court had 
not previously ruled, and about whom defense counsel was timely notified.  Moreover, the district court gave defense 
counsel an opportunity to request a hearing if one was necessary in regard to 
Sauls' testimony.  Defense counsel 
made no such request, and did not request a continuance of the trial.7

 
 

[¶41]   The appellant's statements to Sauls 
were clearly admissions by a party opponent under W.R.E. 801(d)(2), and were, 
therefore, not hearsay.  While they 
also may have related to uncharged misconduct, they were relevant to prove the 
appellant's state of mind at the time of the shooting, they were more probative 
of his state of mind than any other available evidence, and they were not unduly 
prejudicial.  Even without the 
methamphetamine evidence, there was sufficient evidence presented for the jury 
to have found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of involuntary 
manslaughter, the basis for which lies in reckless behavior (marijuana use, 
alcohol consumption, and unsafe firearms practices such as the indiscriminate 
firing of a firearm in the vicinity of others, and pointing a loaded firearm at 
others).

 
 

[¶42]   Once Sauls testified about the 
appellant's admission that he was "methed out" at the time of the shooting, the 
foundation was laid for Evans' testimony about the effects of methamphetamine 
use.  Defense counsel's impeachment 
of Evans, including the negative chemical test results and the lack of any other 
testimony about methamphetamine use, properly went to the weight to be given 
Evans' testimony, not its admissibility.  
One oddity about this case is that the State's own closing argument, 
including its attention to controlled substance use, appears to have been 
intended to encourage the jury to find the appellant guilty of reckless conduct 
(manslaughter), rather than purposeful and malicious conduct (second-degree 
murder).  Thus, the State's own 
arguments contributed to the lack of prejudice resulting from the 
methamphetamine evidence.  
Furthermore, the jury appears to have rejected Evans' testimony that 
methamphetamine withdrawal causes anxiety, anger, irritation, irritability, and 
aggressive behavior, characterized by "a paranoid-schizophrenic type of 
approach" and "get[ting] into fights," because the jury rejected the charge of 
second-degree murder, which requires malice (hatred, ill will, hostility toward 
anothera wicked condition of mind), and found the appellant guilty only of 
manslaughter.

 
 
Whether 
Wyoming's second-degree murder statute is facially 
unconstitutional?

 
 

[¶43]   In the district court, the 
appellant filed a motion alleging the second-degree murder statute to be 
facially unconstitutional.  He now 
appeals the denial of that motion.  Because the appellant was acquitted of 
second-degree murder, however, we find the issue to be moot and we decline to 
address it.  See State v. Blinzler, 599 P.2d 349, 352 
(Mont. 1979); People v. Webb, 542 P.2d 77, 78-79 (Colo. 1975); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §§ 596-99 (2007).  As we have noted previously, "[a] court 
should not hear a case where there has been a change in circumstances occurring 
either before or after a case has been filed that eliminates the 
controversy."  Merchant v. State Dep't of Corr., 2007 
WY 159, ¶ 15, 168 P.3d 856, 862-63 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting KO v. LDH (In re Guardianship of MEO), 2006 WY 87, 
¶ 27, 138 P.3d 1145, 1153 (Wyo. 2006)).  
Because of the constitutional double jeopardy protections, one such 
change in circumstances is an acquittal in a criminal case.  Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1066 
(Wyo. 1992); Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 94 (Wyo. 1988).  A decision 
that can have no effect upon the parties before the court is nothing but an 
advisory opinion.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶44]   There is no suggestion that the 
district court intentionally falsified the case record, and the appellant has 
failed to prove that the district court acted unreasonably in ordering the trial 
transcript to be amended.  All 
available information indicates that the transcript was made to comport with the 
actual testimony.  The appellant has 
also failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
the testimony of Sauls about the appellant's jailhouse confession, or the 
testimony of Evans as to methamphetamine.  
Sauls' testimony was admissible as a non-hearsay admission by a party 
opponent, it was directly relevant to the appellant's state of mind at the time 
of the crime, it was probative as to the appellant's state of mind, and it was 
reasonable for the district court to find it more probative than unfairly 
prejudicial.  Furthermore, once the 
appellant's admission of methamphetamine use was admitted, there existed a 
foundation for Evans' testimony about methamphetamine use.  Finally, the appellant's argument that 
Wyoming's second-degree murder statute is unconstitutional was rendered moot 
when the jury acquitted him of that charge.

 
 

[¶45]   We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We 
assume there is no distinction between amphetamine and methamphetamine for 
purposes of this testing.

 
 

2W.R.E. 
804(b)(3) declares that certain statements made against the declarant's 
interests are not excluded by the hearsay rule.  However, inasmuch as W.R.E. 804(b)(3) 
requires the declarant to be unavailable, it may be that the prosecutor meant to 
refer to an "admission by a party-opponent" which admission is not hearsay 
according to W.R.E. 801(d)(2).

 
 

3We 
caution the State's prosecutors and trial judges that utterance of phrases such 
as "course of conduct" and "enhancing the natural development of the facts" is 
not a substitute for thoughtful analysis of intrinsic uncharged misconduct 
evidence.  That was the point made 
in Leyva and Reay.

 
 

4In 
Gleason, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 17-33, 57 P.3d  at 339-44, we reviewed W.R.E. 404(b), and then set forth in detail the 
procedures we expected trial courts to follow in analyzing uncharged misconduct 
evidence under the Rule, and further set forth what we expected to appear in the 
record revealing that analysis.

 
 

5Confusion 
over whether it was the intent of the decision letter and original order to deny 
introduction of only the presumptively negative urine test, or both the blood 
and urine tests, resulted in a clarifying order keeping both out of 
evidence.

 
 

6W.R.E. 
801(d) reads in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
(d)  Statements which are not hearsay. 
--  A statement is not hearsay 
if:

. 
. . .

(2)  Admission by Party-Opponent.  The 
statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement . . . 
.

 
 

7The 
appellant did, on the first day of trial, file a motion in limine asking the district court to 
preclude Sauls from testifying.  The 
motion, which complained largely of Sauls' questionable credibility because he 
was a "jailhouse snitch," was not heard before the prosecutor's mention of Sauls 
during his opening statement resulted in defense counsel's first motion for a 
mistrial.