Title: Commonwealth v. Andrade

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11529 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MANUEL ANDRADE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 7, 2021. - October 5, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault with Intent to Kill.  Evidence, Exculpatory, 
Third-party culprit, Admission by silence, Hearsay, 
Spontaneous utterance, Identification, Prior misconduct, 
Expert opinion, Absence of witness.  Identification.  
Witness, Expert.  Jury and Jurors.  Constitutional Law, 
Sentence, Public trial, Waiver of constitutional rights.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Verdict, Disclosure of 
Commonwealth's theory of case, Exhibits, Instructions to 
jury, Security measures, Sentence, Duplicative punishment, 
New trial, Empanelment of jury, Argument by prosecutor, 
Public trial. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 28, 2007. 
 
The cases were tried before Frank M. Gaziano, J., and a 
request for an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial, 
filed on July 10, 2018, was considered by Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for the defendant. 
Kathleen Celio, Assistant District Attorney (Edmond J. 
Zabin & Erin D. Knight, Assistant District Attorneys, also 
present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  In April 2009, the defendant was convicted 
of murder in the first degree in the March 2007 shooting death 
of twenty-two year old Chiara Levin, a bystander who was caught 
in the crossfire of a shootout between the defendant and 
Casimiro Barros.  The defendant also was convicted of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, assault with intent 
to kill, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and unlawful 
possession of a firearm. 
 
After entering his appeal, and before his appellate brief 
was filed, in July 2018, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial in this court.  The appeal was stayed, and the motion was 
remanded to the Superior Court for decision.  A Superior Court 
judge, who was not the trial judge, inexplicably declined to 
rule on the motion, other than to deny the defendant's motion 
for an evidentiary hearing on four of his claims.  The matter is 
now before us on the defendant's direct appeal, consolidated 
with the claims from his motion for a new trial.  After having 
carefully reviewed the numerous claims in both the appellate 
brief and the motion for a new trial, we discern no error and no 
reason to exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to reduce the verdict of 
murder in the first degree to a lesser degree of guilt.  
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 
3 
 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), reserving some details for 
later discussion, see Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 24 
(2017). 
 
At around 1:30 A.M. on March 24, 2007, after Levin and two 
friends left a club in Boston, they spoke with a group of men 
standing outside the club, including the defendant, his cousin 
Tony Andrade,1 and Samuel Ortiz.  The men, whom Levin and her 
friends had not met previously, invited them to a party in a 
private home; Levin's group accepted, and Tony drove them to the 
party. 
 
There were about twenty-five to thirty people at the party.  
One guest, Jessica Nunez, saw a man, inferentially the 
defendant, wearing a black fitted baseball cap, a black 
"hoodie," and glasses approach Barros and Jason Barbosa, and 
say, "Y'all Roxbury n****** are nothing but bitches," and also 
refer to Barbosa as a "bitch ass n*****."2 
 
 
1 Because he and the defendant share a last name, we refer 
to the defendant's cousin Manuel "Tony" Andrade by his nickname. 
 
2 Although Jessica Nunez did not identify the defendant, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the man 
she observed was the defendant.  Several guests identified the 
defendant, who was wearing glasses and a hat, and wearing 
"grills" on his teeth, as having been present at the party.  See 
Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 79 n.2 (2012), citing Mouth Jewelry 
Wearers Love Gleam of the Grill, South Florida Sun–Sentinel, 
4 
 
 
 
 
About an hour after Levin and her two friends first 
arrived, Tony offered to take the group home.  Tony, Levin, her 
two friends, Ortiz, and the defendant went outside, where Ortiz, 
and Levin and her group, got into Tony's Ford Escalade.  Before 
the defendant reached the vehicle, he said something to Tony and 
then turned and walked back toward the house.  Tony got into the 
driver's seat. 
 
Nunez, who was still inside, heard arguing.  She saw the 
defendant throw a plate of food at Barbosa and then pull out a 
gun.  Nunez and other guests reported that they heard gunshots, 
and that guests ran from the house after the shots.  A man ran 
into the kitchen yelling that "they were shooting" and everyone 
"needed to get out or we're going to die"; he added that "Spank 
was buggin',"3 and "They're shooting in there."  Barbosa was shot 
in the shoulder and fled through the front door.  Nunez saw the 
defendant point a gun at Barros and then run through the front 
door, with Barros following. 
 
The defendant walked quickly toward Tony's Escalade, 
looking behind him toward the house and smirking.  Ortiz heard 
 
Feb. 4, 2007, at 5 ("'Golds' are permanent or removable mouth 
jewelry, also referred to as 'grills'").  See also Smith, supra, 
citing A. Westbrook, Hip Hoptionary 59 (2002) ("defining a 
'grill' as a 'teeth cover, usually made of gold and diamonds'"). 
 
 
3 "Spank" was the defendant's nickname. 
5 
 
 
 
someone at the front of the house say, "Pop him," and screamed 
at the defendant to "watch his back." 
 
Barros, who was being restrained, broke free and moved 
toward the defendant.  By that point, the defendant was near 
Tony's vehicle.4  He got out his gun, and Barros did so as well.  
Both men opened fire.  A bullet from the defendant's gun struck 
a nearby vehicle.  Several of the bullets from Barros's gun hit 
Tony's vehicle; one of them traveled through the front 
passenger's side door as the defendant tried to flee, and struck 
him in the buttocks.  Another bullet from Barros's gun went 
through the rear passenger's side window, which shattered, and 
then hit Levin in the head. 
 
As Levin's friends yelled for Tony to drive Levin to the 
hospital, he sped away, with the defendant also in the vehicle.  
After about a minute, the defendant said that he had to get out.  
Tony stopped the vehicle, and the defendant and Ortiz left.  
Tony drove to a Boston hospital.  On arrival, Levin was 
unconscious and unresponsive.  After approximately two hours of 
effort, doctors determined that she was "brain dead" and there 
was nothing further they could do to assist her, so they 
terminated their efforts and she died. 
 
 
4 In contrast to Levin's friends, Benjamin Eichel and David 
Schiffrin, Samuel Ortiz testified that the defendant was already 
in the vehicle when the shots were fired. 
6 
 
 
 
 
Nunez drove Barbosa to the same hospital, where he was 
treated for a collapsed lung.  One of the guests who had been at 
the party when the shootings took place called the defendant.  
He told her, "You didn't see anything, right?" and said that she 
should tell the other people with whom she had been there that 
they had not seen anything either. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of murder in the first degree; aggravated assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon; two counts of armed 
assault with intent to murder; assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon; two counts of home invasion; and carrying a firearm 
without a license.5 
 
The defendant was tried in March and April of 2009.6  After 
two days of deliberation, the jury found him guilty of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation; 
aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; 
assault with intent to kill, as a lesser included offense of 
assault with intent to murder; assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon; and carrying a firearm without a license.  He was 
 
 
5 Barros also was indicted on a charge of murder in the 
first degree and other charges relative to this shootout.  In 
January 2009, the defendant's motion to sever his case from 
Barros's was allowed, and the two were tried separately. 
 
 
6 After the Commonwealth rested its case, the judge allowed 
the defendant's motion for required findings of not guilty on 
the charges of home invasion. 
7 
 
 
 
acquitted of assault with intent to murder with respect to 
Barbosa.7 
 
On July 10, 2018, after he had entered his appeal in this 
court, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in this 
court, and we ordered it remanded for disposition in the 
Superior Court.  On October 18, 2018, a Superior Court judge who 
was not the trial judge issued a written statement that she 
declined to act on the motion, as this court would be reviewing 
the record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  At the same time, 
she considered, and rejected, the defendant's request for an 
evidentiary hearing on four issues.  The defendant timely 
appealed from these rulings, and we consolidated that appeal 
with the defendant's direct appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant raises thirteen claims in 
his direct appeal, and twenty-one distinct claims in his motion 
for a new trial, a number of which also are made virtually 
identically in his direct appeal.  We first address the claims 
in the direct appeal, and then we turn to those arguments in the 
motion that were not included in the appellate brief. 
 
 
7 On July 28, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to reduce 
the verdict pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as 
amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995).  The motion was denied.  The 
defendant filed a notice of appeal from the denial, but did not 
perfect his appeal.  The assembly of the record was not 
completed until September 2013, and there are no further entries 
in the docket until 2017, when the defendant filed motions for 
jury contact information. 
8 
 
 
 
 
a.  Asserted inconsistencies.  i.  Inconsistency of 
verdicts.  The defendant maintains that because he was not 
convicted of assault with intent to murder Barros, but rather of 
the lesser included offense of assault with intent to kill, due 
to mitigating factors, the verdict of murder in the first degree 
is inconsistent, as both charges stem from the same act of 
shooting toward Barros.  In essence, the defendant argues that 
if mitigating factors applied to his conduct toward Barros, 
those factors also must apply with respect to his responsibility 
for Levin's death. 
 
Verdicts are factually inconsistent when, "considered 
together, [they] suggest inconsistent interpretations of the 
evidence presented at trial."  Commonwealth v. Resende, 476 
Mass. 141, 147 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 452 
Mass. 142, 151 n.8 (2008).  Legally inconsistent verdicts are 
"verdicts of guilt involving mutually exclusive crimes, where it 
is impossible for the Commonwealth to prove the elements of both 
offenses with respect to a particular defendant."  Resende, 
supra.  Here, the jury's differing factual conclusions with 
respect to different victims do not require a new trial.  See 
id., quoting Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 456 Mass. 52, 57-58 
(2010) ("While legally inconsistent verdicts may not stand, 
factually inconsistent verdicts may").  The jury evaluate each 
indictment independently.  See Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 
9 
 
 
 
Mass. 517, 523 (2010).  It is "not necessary that the verdicts 
be consistent on the separate indictments."  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 475 (1969).  Depending on their view of 
the evidence, the jury properly could have convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree for Levin's death, and 
acquitted him of assault with intent to murder Barros.  See 
Commonwealth v. Walsh, 255 Mass. 317, 320 (1926). 
 
To find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the jury necessarily 
found that he purposefully caused Levin's death after 
reflection.  See Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 836 
(2021).  In situations involving a shootout, "[t]he Commonwealth 
need not prove an intent to kill the victim[,] because intent 
could be transferred from the intent to kill [the opponent]."  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 502 (1997), S.C., 427 
Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  
The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, however, 
that the defendant caused the victim's death.  See Colas, supra 
at 842, and cases cited ("With respect to causation, the 
Commonwealth may establish that a defendant caused the touching 
'by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either 
directly caused or directly and substantially set in motion a 
chain of events that produced the serious injury in a natural 
and continuous sequence" [citation omitted]).  In order to prove 
10 
 
 
 
that the defendant acted with malice (the intent to kill), the 
Commonwealth must prove the absence of mitigating circumstances.  
See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 353 (2016) ("malice 
and mitigating circumstances are mutually exclusive"); 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 368, 373 (1992) (mitigating 
circumstances reduce degree of criminal liability). 
 
The jury reached their determination after having been 
instructed on the mitigating factors of heat of passion upon 
reasonable provocation and heat of passion induced by sudden 
combat.  On the evidence before them, the jury could have found 
that the defendant instigated the shootout that caused Levin's 
death when he deliberately and with no evident provocation shot 
Barbosa at close range and then threatened Barros with his gun, 
provoking Barros to fire in return.  While the Commonwealth need 
not prove who fired the first shot, it must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-
defense.  See Santiago, 425 Mass. at 503.  Nothing in the 
defendant's acts of leaving the house and heading toward Tony's 
vehicle, stopping and talking to Tony, turning around, and 
heading back to the house, picking up and throwing a plate of 
food at Barbosa, who was inside, pulling out a gun and shooting 
Barbosa at close range, and then pointing the weapon at Barros 
suggests self-defense.  To the contrary, the evidence supports a 
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted 
11 
 
 
 
with deliberate premeditation and malice.  Moreover, in finding 
that the defendant started this chain of events, with 
premeditation, the jury could have determined that no mitigating 
factors applied with respect to the shooting of Levin.  See, 
e.g., id. at 503-504. 
 
To sustain a conviction of assault with intent to kill 
requires the Commonwealth to prove an "assault, specific intent 
to kill, and [a] mitigating factor" with respect to the offense 
of assault with intent to murder.  Commonwealth v. Johnston, 446 
Mass. 555, 558 n.3 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 
Mass. 123, 131 (1989).  Here, the jury could have considered the 
defendant's gunshots at Barros outside the house to be mitigated 
by the heat of passion in mutual combat, as at that point there 
was evidence that Barros had displayed his weapon or already had 
fired it in the direction of the defendant. 
 
ii.  Inconsistencies between defendant's trial and Barros's 
trial.  The defendant contends that the Commonwealth relied upon 
inconsistent theories at his trial and at Barros's trial, in 
violation of his rights to due process.  Specifically, he 
maintains that, at Barros's trial, the Commonwealth argued that 
the defendant fired the first shot inside the house, but that 
Barros began the shooting outside, while the defendant fled.  
The defendant asserts, on the other hand, that, at his trial, 
the prosecutor argued that the defendant fired first inside, and 
12 
 
 
 
then goaded Barros outside, where he shot at Barros, and Barros 
responded. 
 
"For a due process violation to occur, 'an inconsistency 
must exist at the core of the prosecutor's cases against 
defendants for the same crime.'"  Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 
25, 36 (2014), quoting Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1047, 
1051–1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gammon v. Smith, 531 
U.S. 985 (2000).  The Commonwealth's theories at both the 
defendant's and Barros's trials centered on a series of events 
beginning with the defendant shooting Barbosa and confronting 
Barros inside the house, a confrontation that, moments later, 
spilled out onto the street and caused Levin's death.  The 
prosecutor at each trial argued consistently that two men were 
responsible for Levin's death, based on the individual actions 
of each.  With respect to whether the prosecutor argued that 
Barros or the defendant fired the first shot when both were 
outside the house, there was no due process violation; the 
identity of the first shooter outside was irrelevant to the 
theory of a shootout and transferred intent.  See Santiago, 425 
Mass. at 503. 
 
The defendant also asserts that the Commonwealth's theory 
changed with respect to its presentation of Nunez's testimony.  
At Barros's trial, in response to Nunez's statement that there 
had been "crossfire" between Barros and the man in the black 
13 
 
 
 
hat, the prosecutor impeached Nunez with a statement to the 
grand jury in which she said that she had not seen a gun.8  At 
the defendant's trial, Nunez testified that she saw the man in a 
black hat, standing in the street, "pull[] out a gun."  Neither 
party impeached her with her prior inconsistent statement. 
 
The alleged inconsistency was not so "core" to the case as 
to constitute a violation of due process.  See Keo, 467 Mass. at 
42-43.  As discussed, there was evidence at both trials that the 
defendant started the shootout with his conduct inside the 
house.  Moreover, Nunez testified that, in addition to what she 
saw, she heard gunshots "from both sides."  Any inconsistency as 
to whether Nunez saw the defendant's gun did not go to the core 
of the issues at trial -- whether the defendant engaged in the 
shootout. 
 
The defendant also argues, based on differences in 
testimony by a ballistics expert, that the Commonwealth's theory 
concerning whether Tony's Escalade was moving at the time the 
bullets hit it was inconsistent between the two trials.  At 
Barros's trial, in response to a hypothetical question posed by 
the prosecutor, the expert testified that, assuming the shooter 
had been standing in the location the prosecutor suggested, the 
 
 
8 In response to the prosecutor's question at Barros' trial, 
"Did you actually see the person in the black fitted hat fire a 
weapon?" Nunez replied, "I'm not sure." 
14 
 
 
 
vehicle would have had to have been in motion when the bullets 
hit.  At the defendant's trial, in response to a similar 
hypothetical question, the same expert testified that either the 
vehicle or the shooter would have had to have been moving.  The 
defendant maintains that this difference goes to the heart of 
whether the defendant could be liable in connection with the 
shootout because, if the vehicle had been in motion, the 
defendant would have had to have been inside it, and therefore 
fleeing the scene rather than instigating a shootout by firing 
with deliberate premeditation. 
 
Significantly, these responses were to hypothetical 
questions.  They were not evidence of the defendant's or the 
Escalade's actual locations at the time of the shooting.  In 
addition, regardless of the order of events outside, the 
evidence at both trials was that the defendant initiated the 
shootout after he decided to return to the house, where he threw 
objects at Barbosa, who was inside, shot and seriously wounded 
Barbosa, and then brandished his loaded weapon at Barros.  
Whether the Escalade was moving as the defendant fired or fled 
the scene had no bearing on whether he fired the first shot in 
the series of events that led to the shootout.  The defendant's 
focus on identifying the relative position of the vehicle at the 
time of the fatal shot also disregards the theory, discussed in 
Santiago, that by choosing to engage in a shootout, with an 
15 
 
 
 
intent to kill, a defendant may be the cause of the death of a 
bystander, regardless of which side fired the fatal bullet, 
because the death of a bystander is a natural result of a 
shootout.  See Santiago, 425 Mass. at 503-504 ("[W]here the 
defendant chooses to engage in a gun battle with another with 
the intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm and a third party 
is killed, the defendant may be held liable for the homicide 
even if it was the defendant's opponent who fired the fatal 
shot.  Thus, the inability to prove who fired the fatal shot 
would not be ground for a directed verdict. . . .  The 
defendant's act must be a cause, which, in the natural and 
continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the 
death would not have occurred" [quotation, citation, and 
footnote omitted]). 
 
The ballistics expert testified at both trials that two 
weapons were used, one firing from the street near the vehicle, 
where two of Levin's friends saw the defendant, and another 
firing from the front of the house.  Although the defendant 
suggests otherwise, a finding of deliberate premeditation does 
not require a plan formulated well in advance of the murder.  
Rather, "no particular period of reflection is required, 
and . . . a plan to murder may be formed in seconds" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 733 (2010).  
The jury could have found, for instance, that the defendant shot 
16 
 
 
 
at Barros and then reached and began to enter the moving vehicle 
before the bullets from Barros's subsequent firing struck it.  A 
determination whether the vehicle or the shooter was in motion 
does not resolve whether the defendant was already inside the 
vehicle, shot first, or acted with premeditation; it also begs 
the question whether, by shooting Barbosa, the defendant set in 
motion the chain of events that led to the bullet hitting Levin 
in the heard.  In sum, the inconsistencies in the responses to 
the hypothetical questions did not violate due process.9 
 
b.  Evidentiary issues.  i.  Excluded evidence.10  The 
defendant argues that certain evidence he sought to introduce 
 
 
9 The defendant argues that the lack of disclosure of the 
changes in Nunez's and the expert's testimony were Brady 
violations.  Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), 
"[t]he Commonwealth must disclose to the defense any material, 
exculpatory evidence over which the prosecution has control."  
See Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 476 (2018).  The 
expert's testimony as to the vehicle's and the shooter's 
movements, however, was presented as hypothetical scenarios.  
Therefore, it did not constitute "exculpatory evidence."  With 
respect to Nunez's statement that she saw a gun in the 
defendant's hand, the defendant does not argue that the 
prosecutor had information that Nunez would make this statement.  
Brady applies to material, exculpatory evidence only where that 
evidence is in the Commonwealth's possession or control.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. 171, 177 (2021). 
 
 
10 The defendant's claims concerning the "destruction" of 
the vehicle in which Levin was seated (that was returned to its 
owner after forensic examination), thus precluding the defendant 
from conducting his own examination of the trajectory of the 
bullets through the shattered windows, an examination that he 
never requested, and the inability to cross-examine a witness as 
to why she deleted from her cellular telephone a photograph of 
17 
 
 
 
was excluded improperly.  This evidence, he asserts, would have 
constituted exculpatory third-party culprit evidence, see 
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800 (2009), or 
would have served as evidence of an inadequate police 
investigation, see Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-
486 (1980). 
 
"A defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence 
that another may have committed the crime," Commonwealth v. 
Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008), 
citing Commonwealth v. Tague, 434 Mass. 510, 515–516 (2001), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1146 (2002), although introduction of 
such evidence is subject to ordinary considerations of 
relevance.  To be admissible, the evidence "must have a rational 
tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and [it] cannot 
be too remote or speculative" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Scott, 470 Mass. 320, 327 (2014).  A defendant must 
demonstrate that "the acts of the other person are so closely 
connected in point of time and method of operation as to cast 
doubt upon the identification of [the] defendant as the person 
who committed the crime."  Conkey, supra, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Hunter, 426 Mass. 715, 716-717 (1998). 
 
the defendant she purportedly took on the evening of the 
shooting, warrant no further discussion. 
18 
 
 
 
 
The defendant unsuccessfully sought to introduce ballistics 
evidence that the Integrated Ballistics Identification System 
(IBIS) database of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives showed a match between a .380 caliber 
shell casing found at the scene and a shell casing found at the 
scene of an unsolved 2006 murder of an individual who was 
affiliated with a gang that, the defendant asserts, was involved 
in a feud with Barros's gang at that time.  The defendant argues 
that the match was relevant to a third-party culprit defense 
because it suggested that someone linked to Barros and Barbosa 
was responsible for the .380 casing found at the scene, rather 
than the defendant. 
 
There was no error in the judge's decision to exclude this 
evidence as establishing a third-party culprit defense.  Indeed, 
the ballistics match could have suggested to the jury that the 
defendant, rather than a third party, had been responsible for 
the unsolved killing.  Evidence of the match could have confused 
the jury, absent further information about an unsolved killing 
and its connections to the individuals involved in the 
defendant's case; the introduction of such evidence, even if 
available, would have created a "trial within a trial," see 
Greenspun v. Boghossian, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 335, 341 (2019), 
distracting the jury from the determinations that were before 
them. 
19 
 
 
 
 
The defendant also sought to introduce evidence that rival 
gang members, who had motives to kill Barros or Barbosa, lived 
in the area.  He argued that evidence that individuals who lived 
near the house where the party was held were involved in a feud 
with Barros and Barbosa was relevant to motive, and that the 
evidence had sufficient connection to the shooting because of 
the proximity of these individuals' homes to the scene. 
 
"Evidence of a third party's ill will or possible motive is 
insufficient alone to support a defense under the third-party 
culprit doctrine."  Scott, 470 Mass. at 328, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 466 (2014).  The theory 
that possible rival gang members lived in the general vicinity 
of the shooting and might have shot at Barros was speculative at 
best.  See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801 ("feeble third-party 
culprit evidence . . . inevitably diverts jurors' attention away 
from the defendant on trial and onto the third party, and 
essentially requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the third-party culprit did not commit the 
crime").  There was no evidence, for example, that the rival 
gang members had been at the party, or anywhere nearby, during 
the shootout.  Moreover, there was no evidence that anyone other 
than the defendant and Barros had been seen holding a gun. 
 
The defendant also sought to introduce evidence that 
Barbosa and another guest had been arrested in the months prior 
20 
 
 
 
to the shootout and had been found in possession of .380 caliber 
ammunition, the same caliber that had been shot in the direction 
of Barros.  The defendant argues that their arrests suggested 
that it was more likely that Barbosa or the other guest, as 
allies of Barros, were the source of the ammunition found at the 
scene, rather than the defendant. 
 
Evidence that these individuals had been in possession of 
the same caliber of ammunition, which was not suggested to be 
rare or unique, several months prior to the shooting, lacked 
probative value, was unduly prejudicial, and was likely to 
divert the jury's attention.  Excluding this evidence was not 
error.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 
420-421 (1998). 
 
The defendant argues also that this evidence should have 
been introduced because it was relevant to a Bowden defense.  
Evidence may be admissible to show "[t]he failure of the 
authorities to conduct certain tests or produce certain 
evidence."  See Bowden, 379 Mass. at 485-486.  "[I]nformation 
regarding a third-party culprit . . . may be admissible under a 
Bowden defense even though it may not otherwise be admissible 
under a third-party culprit defense" because, for purposes of a 
Bowden defense, the evidence is not offered for its truth, but 
rather to demonstrate that "the police knew of the possible 
21 
 
 
 
suspect and failed to take reasonable steps to investigate it."  
See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802. 
 
Although the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to 
introduce evidence of a third-party culprit defense, he allowed 
extensive cross-examination concerning possible gang rivalries 
and the .380 caliber ammunition for purposes of a Bowden 
defense.  The jury thus heard evidence that Barbosa and another 
witness had been arrested for unlawful possession of .380 
ammunition, as well as the extent to which the lead investigator 
relied upon that information.  The jury also heard evidence 
concerning the purported gang memberships of Barros, Barbosa, 
and another witness; trial counsel cross-examined the lead 
investigator about his investigation of the rivalries between 
these individuals and other gangs (or the lack of such 
investigation).11 
 
ii.  Admitted evidence.  The defendant challenges the 
admission of evidence that, he contends, was unduly prejudicial.  
First, the defendant challenges the use of exhibits during his 
trial that bore the numbered exhibit stickers from Barros's 
 
11 As discussed, the evidence concerning the match between 
the .380 caliber shell casing found at the scene and a casing 
found at the scene of an unrelated murder was excluded for 
purposes of a third-party culprit defense.  The judge indicated 
that he would reconsider his ruling denying introduction of the 
evidence to establish a third-party culprit if counsel later 
moved to introduce the evidence to challenge the adequacy of the 
police investigation; counsel did not do so. 
22 
 
 
 
earlier trial.12  When the defendant sought to exclude the 
stickers from the evidence at trial, the judge determined, over 
trial counsel's objection, that the stickers need not be 
removed.  The judge instructed the jury that they should 
disregard the stickers and that a list of numbered exhibits 
would be provided to them during deliberations.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 737 (2019) (best practice 
is to give limiting instruction at time evidence is admitted).  
Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 520 (2017).  Thus, there 
was no error in the judge's decision to permit the admission of 
the exhibits with the stickers, and the instruction cured any 
possible prejudice to the defendant. 
 
In individual questioning of prospective jurors, the judge 
asked, "Mr. Barros has been tried for his role in the events you 
heard me describe.  Do you have any knowledge of the first trial 
in this case?"  The defendant maintains that the combination of 
the information that Barros already had been tried for his 
"role" in the shooting, and the exhibits with stickers from 
Barros's trial, violated his rights to due process and a fair 
trial because it conveyed to the jury that more than one person 
should be punished for Levin's death, thereby shifting the 
 
12 The exhibits were required, as marked, for the appellate 
record in the Barros trial. 
23 
 
 
 
burden to the defendant to prove that he had had no role in the 
shootout. 
 
Conducting voir dire concerning a prior related trial in 
order to ensure that the jury are impartial generally is 
permissible.  See Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 462, 
466-467 (2011).  Here, the judge's question served to explain 
that a key actor in the case was being prosecuted separately, 
and to discern potential bias from prior exposure; the question 
properly was confined to the purpose of identifying jurors who 
might have such bias.  Notably, before empanelment, defense 
counsel (as well as the prosecutor) submitted written requests 
asking the judge to question the members of the venire 
specifically to ferret out such bias, given the extensive media 
coverage of Barros's trial that had taken place approximately 
one month earlier, and the widespread publicity concerning that 
case.  After a hearing on the requests, when the judge informed 
defense counsel that he would ask a more "open-ended" version of 
the questions she had proposed, but then would allow her to 
request follow-up questions, she responded, "Thank you, your 
honor."  There was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
decision to ask the members of the venire about any prior 
knowledge. 
 
The defendant also argues that certain hearsay statements 
were erroneously admitted at trial, in violation of his rights 
24 
 
 
 
to due process and a fair trial.  "[T]he rule against hearsay 
prohibits the admission of out-of-court statements offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted."  Commonwealth v. 
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 462 (2019), citing Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(c)(2) (2019).  We review the admissibility of such 
statements to determine first whether the statement would be 
admissible under our rules of evidence, and, if so, whether 
introduction of the statement nonetheless would be precluded by 
the confrontation clause.  See Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 
534, 548 (2010), S.C., 483 Mass. 227 (2019). 
 
The defendant maintains that the admission, over his 
objection, of statements relayed by Nunez and attributed to the 
defendant was error because Nunez did not identify the defendant 
as the declarant.  The introduction of statements by a defendant 
as a party opponent requires a showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant was the declarant.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 431 (2012), citing Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
 
Here, Nunez testified that she heard a man in a black hat 
and glasses make derogatory statements to Barbosa to the effect 
that Barbosa did not belong at the party.  Although Nunez was 
shown a photograph of the defendant, she did not identify him as 
the man she heard making the statements.  Nonetheless, other 
evidence that had been introduced supported a conclusion that 
25 
 
 
 
the defendant was the man Nunez identified as having made the 
statements to Barbosa.  Nunez's descriptions of the man, in 
terms of his appearance, his location within the house, and his 
actions in throwing a plate at and arguing with Barbosa, were 
corroborated by other witnesses who identified the defendant.  
Because a preponderance of the evidence indicated that the 
defendant was the declarant, the judge did not err in allowing 
the statements to be introduced as statements by a party 
opponent. 
 
The defendant also maintains that the judge erred in 
permitting Levin's friend David Schiffrin to testify, over the 
defendant's objection, that, in the vehicle after Levin had been 
shot, Tony said to the defendant, "I can't believe you did that.  
Why did you do that?  You shouldn't have done that, especially 
with, you know, with them here."  Schiffrin did not remember the 
defendant as having responded. 
 
"Where a party is confronted with an accusatory statement 
which, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would 
challenge, and the party remains silent or responds equivocally, 
the accusation and the reply may be admissible on the theory 
that the party's response amounts to an admission of the truth 
of the accusation."  Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 498, 
506 (1992).  See Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 430 Mass. 700, 705, 
707 (2000).  The party must have heard and understood the 
26 
 
 
 
question, and must have had an opportunity to respond, and the 
context must be one in which the party would have been expected 
to do so.  See Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 719 
(1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 (1994).  Here, there was 
evidence that the defendant and Tony were seated next to each 
other in the front seat, supporting the reasonable inference 
that they would have heard each other.  Tony's statement was 
clear, and plainly solicited a response.  See id. 718-719 
(question, "Why did you do it?" followed by silence was 
admissible as admission by silence). 
 
Thus, the defendant has not shown any error in the judge's 
decision to allow the introduction of his lack of response to 
Tony's question as evidence of an admission by silence.  See 
Keo, 467 Mass. at 32, quoting Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 
477, 484 (2000) ("Whether evidence is relevant . . . and whether 
the probative value of relevant evidence is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect, are questions within the sound discretion of 
the judge . . . .  [T]he judge's determination of these 
questions will be upheld on appeal absent palpable error"). 
 
The defendant also claims error in the admission of 
testimony by one of the guests that, after she heard gunshots, a 
man with braids ran into the kitchen and yelled, "Spank was 
27 
 
 
 
buggin'" and "They were shooting in the room."13  Over the 
defendant's objection, and following a voir dire of the witness, 
the judge ruled that the statement was admissible as an excited 
utterance.  See Commonwealth v. Correa, 437 Mass. 197, 201-202 
(2002).  "Under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule, a declarant's out-of-court statements are admissible where  
the utterance was made [(1)] under the influence of the exciting 
event it qualifies, characterizes, or explains, and [(2)] before 
the declarant has had time to contrive or fabricate."  Id.  
Hearsay that is admitted as an excited utterance, even where the 
declarant is unknown, does not violate the confrontation clause.  
See id. at 202, citing Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 29 
(1998), overruled in part on another ground by Commonwealth v. 
Grady, 474 Mass. 715 (2016). 
 
Here, the witness testified that the speaker was 
"hysterical" and came "running" into the room, shortly after 
gunshots had been fired inside the house, describing what had 
happened in the other room.  There was no error in the judge's 
decision to allow this statement to be introduced as an excited 
utterance.  See Correa, 437 Mass. at 201-202 (statement by 
 
 
13 The witness explained that the latter had been said in 
Creole and that she was "translating" the statements into 
English. 
28 
 
 
 
unknown person in crowd immediately after shooting properly was 
admitted as excited utterance).14 
 
c.  In-court identifications.  The defendant also 
challenges the in-court identifications by three witnesses, to 
which he did not object at trial, as improper.  At the time of 
the defendant's trial in 2009,15 in-court identifications were 
permissible unless an identification was "tainted by an out-of-
court confrontation . . . that [was] 'so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.'"  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 238 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 
855, 877 (2013). 
 
The first witness testified that he was introduced to the 
defendant at the party by the defendant's cousin.  He was told 
that the defendant's name was "Manet," and described him as 
wearing "grill[s]" on his teeth."  The witness identified the 
defendant in court, again using the name "Manet."  The witness 
 
 
14 The defendant also argues that there was insufficient 
evidence that the witness was sober or reliable; "spontaneous 
utterances[, however,] are, by their very nature, considered 
reliable."  Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass. 312, 319 (2020).  
Moreover, the question whether the speaker was sober goes to the 
weight of the spontaneous utterance, not its admissibility.  Id. 
 
 
15 In 2014, this court limited, prospectively, the admission 
of in-court identifications by witnesses who did not identify a 
defendant pretrial or made an equivocal identification to 
situations where there is "good cause" for admission.  See 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241-242 (2014). 
29 
 
 
 
did not see the defendant shoot anyone.  Likewise, the second 
witness identified the defendant as having been at the party, 
with Tony, but did not see him shoot anyone.  The third witness, 
one of Levin's friends, identified the defendant as a person he 
met outside the night club, knew as "Spank," and spent time with 
at the party over the course of the evening.  The witness 
confirmed that a photograph taken that night showed him with the 
defendant and friends.  The defendant's objection to this 
testimony appears to be that the witness was intoxicated and 
under stress that evening.  The witness's intoxication was made 
clear to the jury, who were able to assess the credibility of 
his testimony.  There was no error in the admission of these in-
court identifications. 
 
d.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues that a number 
of the jury instructions were erroneous and require a new trial. 
 
i.  Santiago instruction.  The judge instructed the jury on 
all three elements of murder in the first degree necessary to 
establish the theory of deliberate premeditation:  an unlawful 
killing; committed with malice; and with premeditation.  See 
Colas, 486 Mass. at 836.  In elaborating on the element of an 
unlawful killing, the judge gave the so-called "Santiago 
instruction," see Santiago, 425 Mass. at 503-504: 
"An act which in a natural and continuous sequence results 
in death, and without which death would not have occurred, 
is the cause of death.  The defendant's acts need not be 
30 
 
 
 
the sole or exclusive cause of death.  The Commonwealth is 
not required to prove that the defendant fired the fatal 
shot in order to find the defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree.  By choosing to engage in a shootout, a 
defendant may be the cause of a shooting by either side 
because the death of a bystander is a natural result of a 
shootout, and the shootout could not occur without 
participation from both sides." 
The judge then instructed on the elements of malice and 
deliberate premeditation.  He also instructed on murder in the 
second degree and voluntary manslaughter.  He explained that, in 
order to convict the defendant of murder, the jury would have to 
find an absence of mitigating circumstances, which could reduce 
the offense of murder to manslaughter.  The judge told the jury 
that, in this case, they were required to consider the 
mitigating circumstances of heat of passion upon reasonable 
provocation or sudden combat.  At the request of the defendant's 
counsel, the judge did not instruct on transferred intent. 
 
The defendant maintains that the instructions were 
unconstitutionally vague, the judge erred in failing to define 
"shootout," the instructions permitted a conviction of murder in 
the first degree without proof of premeditation, and the 
instructions directed a verdict of murder in the first degree if 
the jury found that the defendant fired one shot. 
 
"Establishing an intent to kill requires proof that the 
defendant 'consciously and purposefully intended' to cause the 
victim's death."  Colas, 486 Mass. at 837, quoting Commonwealth 
31 
 
 
 
v. Tejada, 484 Mass. 1, 5, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 441 (2020). 
"Specific intent, in turn, requires that a defendant 'not 
only . . . consciously intended to take certain actions, 
but . . . also consciously intended certain consequences.'"  
Colas, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 269 
(1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010) and 459 Mass. 480, cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).  "If a defendant intends to kill 
one person, and mistakenly kills another, under the doctrine of 
transferred intent the defendant is treated as though he or she 
intended to kill the other individual."  Colas, supra, citing 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 (2012).  "In 
Santiago, we considered the scope of criminal liability for 
combatants in a shootout that results in the death of an 
innocent bystander.  In such circumstances, the Commonwealth is 
not required to prove that the defendant actually fired the 
fatal shot."  Colas, supra at 845, citing Santiago, 425 Mass. at 
503.  A defendant's conduct "is the proximate cause of a 
shooting 'by either side because the death of a bystander is a 
natural result of a shootout, and the shootout could not occur 
without participation from both sides.'"  Colas, supra, quoting 
Santiago, supra at 504. 
 
Thus, contrary to the defendant's argument, the instruction 
did not remove from the jury's consideration the necessity of 
finding the elements of malice and premeditation.  Compare 
32 
 
 
 
Colas, 486 Mass. at 845 (Santiago instruction did not convey to 
jury that they could convict solely on basis of finding 
defendant pointed "something" at opponent in shootout).  Rather, 
the instructions, as a whole, explained that the jury not only 
had to determine the cause of the unlawful death, but also 
specifically had to find malice and premeditation.  There was no 
error. 
 
The defendant also contends that the Santiago instruction 
improperly relieved the Commonwealth of the need to prove that 
the defendant fired the first shot, or that he fired a weapon at 
all.  "While the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defense, . . . 
it need not prove that the defendant fired the first shot."  
Santiago, 425 Mass. at 503. 
 
The evidence, however, supported a finding that the 
defendant fired first, inside the house.  The chain of events, 
all within minutes, was sufficient to constitute one shootout, 
which was begun by the defendant.  Levin's death was a direct 
result of this chain of events.  The defendant's argument that 
the instructions relieved the jury of having to determine 
whether he fired a weapon at all is unsupported by the trial 
record; the judge informed the jury that they had to find 
"participation from both sides" in the shootout. 
33 
 
 
 
 
ii.  Instruction on absence of self-defense.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred in instructing the jury that self-
defense was not at issue because such a statement interjected 
the judge's own opinion and "likely left the jury with the 
impression that the [judge had] made the determination that it 
was [the defendant] and not Barros who fired the first shots."  
Notably, trial counsel requested that no instruction on self-
defense be given. 
 
Having instructed the jury that not all killings are 
unlawful, such as if done in self-defense, it was appropriate 
for the judge to clarify that self-defense did not apply in this 
case, before going on to instruct the jury on mitigation, which 
he told the jury could apply.  That there was no question of 
self-defense did not, as the defendant now contends, communicate 
to the jury that the defendant must have fired the first shot 
once he and Barros were outside.  The judge did not state that 
self-defense is unavailable to a first aggressor.  There was no 
error in the instruction that the evidence raised no question of 
self-defense. 
 
e.  Court room security.  Before trial, the Commonwealth 
requested that additional court officers be present in the court 
room, and that spectators be required to sign in and provide 
identification.  The Commonwealth maintained that these measures 
were necessary in light of an incident at the Barros trial in 
34 
 
 
 
which two women purportedly spoke to a witness who also was to 
testify in the defendant's trial, and told the witness that if 
he had seen the defendant do bad things, he was not to tell the 
judge; other witnesses also had indicated that they were fearful 
of retribution for their cooperation with the investigation.  
The defendant objected to the additional security measures on 
the ground that there was no proof the interaction with the 
witness had taken place.  The judge decided that the requested 
measures were minimally invasive and allowed the motion. 
 
On appeal, citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 
(1984), the defendant argues that these measures amounted to a 
court room closure, and thus structural error requiring a new 
trial.  In Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 746, 751, 
cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1125 (2014), however, this court 
determined that requiring spectators to produce identification 
in order to enter a court room does not constitute a court room 
closure in the constitutional sense, and does not violate the 
right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Because the requirement of producing 
identification documents did not amount to a closure of the 
court room, the factors set forth in Waller, supra at 48, with 
respect to a determination whether the closure was 
constitutionally permissible are not applicable.  In order to 
impose a requirement that identification be provided, however, 
35 
 
 
 
"there must be an articulable risk of witness intimidation or 
court room disruption (or a comparable reason) that warrants the 
imposition of this condition on entry."  Maldonado, supra 
at 752. 
 
The defendant's trial involved a witness who reportedly had 
been approached in an intimidating manner during the Barros 
trial.  The security conditions imposed were minimally invasive 
and were tailored to the issue of witness intimidation.  See 
Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 752 ("When spectators must first 
identify themselves before entering a court room, they lose 
their anonymity and therefore become more accountable for their 
conduct in the court room . . .").  That some spectators who 
were unable to produce identification were barred from entry, as 
the defendant contends, does not change the analysis.  The 
additional, nonintrusive security requirements were further 
limited when, on the defendant's request, the judge had the 
sign-in table moved away from the jury's view so as not to 
influence them. 
 
f.  Consecutive sentences.  The defendant argues that his 
consecutive sentences, in which the sentence for the conviction 
of murder in the first degree is followed by "from and after" 
sentences on the other convictions, constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment and violate due process because the crimes flowed 
from one chain of events, and thus resentencing is required.  
36 
 
 
 
The defendant contends, in particular, that the consecutive 
sentences for murder and assault with intent to kill violate the 
protections against double jeopardy because the offenses were 
based on the firing of the same bullet. 
 
That a shootout may support convictions of multiple 
distinct crimes, however, is not equivalent to multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  The "same evidence rule" 
prohibits consecutive sentences for crimes that do not require 
proof of different facts.  See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 375 
Mass. 380, 391 (1978).  The rule derives from the prohibition in 
the double jeopardy clause on imposing two punishments for the 
same offense.  Thus, consecutive sentences for two offenses, one 
of which is a lesser included offense of the other, are 
impermissible.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 476 Mass. 367, 
371 (2017).  Two offenses, however, "are not the 'same' within 
the meaning of the double jeopardy clause merely because they 
stem from the same conduct" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 350, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993). 
 
The defendant was sentenced for five offenses that, 
although related, consisted of distinct elements; no conviction 
was a lesser included offense of any other.  Assault with intent 
to kill, for example, requires an assault, see Rodriguez, 476 
Mass. at 371, an element that is not an element of the offense 
of murder in the first degree.  Similarly, murder in the first 
37 
 
 
 
degree requires a finding of premeditation, see G. L. c. 265, 
§ 1, whereas assault with intent to kill does not.  Because the 
convictions have separate elements, there was no violation of 
double jeopardy in the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
 
g.  Sufficiency of the evidence of assault with intent to 
kill.  The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict him of assault with intent to kill Barros because it 
did not support a finding of an immediately threatened battery.  
In evaluating a claim of sufficiency, we "determine whether, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, any rational finder of fact could have found each 
of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 316 (2017), citing 
Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-677.  "Assault with intent to kill 
consists of assault, specific intent to kill, and the mitigating 
factor of heat of passion induced by sudden combat or reasonable 
provocation."  Nardone, 406 Mass. at 131.  "Under the common 
law, an assault may be perpetrated in either of two ways.  The 
crime may consist of an attempted battery or an immediately 
threatened battery."  (Quotations, citation, and footnote 
omitted.)  Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 294 (2002).  
Thus, a conviction of assault with intent to kill is supported 
by sufficient evidence so long as there is sufficient evidence 
38 
 
 
 
of either an attempted battery or an immediately threatened 
battery. 
 
To establish an attempted battery, the Commonwealth must 
"prove that the defendant intended to commit a battery, took 
some overt step toward accomplishing that intended battery, and 
came reasonably close to doing so" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 530 (2010).  A 
battery is "[a]ny touching with such violence that bodily harm 
is likely to result" (quotation and citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Vieira, 483 Mass. 417, 423 (2019).  Where an 
assault involves a threatened battery, "the Commonwealth must 
prove that the defendant engaged in 'objectively menacing' 
conduct with the intent to put the victim in fear of immediate 
bodily harm" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 432 
Mass. 244, 248 (2000). 
 
The evidence at trial was sufficient to support the 
defendant's conviction of assault with intent to kill.  The 
evidence that the defendant fired a gun in Barros's direction 
supported a finding that the defendant attempted a battery.  See 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 615-616 (2011) (attempt 
to shoot victim was sufficient to establish attempted battery).  
The jury also heard evidence of the defendant's specific intent 
to kill Barros, as the defendant had fired the gun moments 
earlier, shooting and severely injuring Barbosa and then 
39 
 
 
 
brandishing the loaded weapon at Barros.  See, e.g., Tejada, 484 
Mass. at 5 ("the use of a firearm at close range provides strong 
evidence of an intent to kill"); Commonwealth v. Buttimer, 482 
Mass. 754, 772 (2019) (fact that defendant had used weapon 
earlier to kill victim supported finding of specific intent to 
kill police officer when defendant pointed weapon at officer).  
Finally, there was evidence of the presence of the mitigating 
factors of heat of passion induced by sudden combat or 
reasonable provocation, where testimony indicated that Barros 
also pulled out a gun and fired in the direction of the 
defendant. 
 
Because the jury need not have indicated, and did not 
indicate, which theory they found, contrary to the defendant's 
assertion, we need go no further in determining that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish an immediately threatened 
battery.  See Porro, 458 Mass. at 534; Commonwealth v. Arias, 78 
Mass. App. Ct. 429, 432-433 (2010) (jury need not be unanimous 
in theory of assault they found nor must jury indicate theory on 
verdict slip). 
 
h.  Motion for a new trial.  We turn to the remaining 
claims in the defendant's motion for a new trial that were not 
raised in his direct appeal.  Many of these are closely related 
to claims previously discussed. 
40 
 
 
 
 
Confronted with an order by this court to decide the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, the motion judge inexcusably 
declined "to entertain the defendant's motion"; she stated that 
this court would resolve the issues under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
and it would not advance the interests of justice for her to 
"pre-judge legal issues that are made frequently by appellate 
courts."  The only issues that the judge considered on the 
merits were the defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing on 
several issues, which she denied.  A remand for disposition by a 
different Superior Court judge (the motion judge having retired) 
would serve only to add further delay to a case that has been 
pending for more than twelve years.  We therefore review the 
claims in the motion for a new trial, not raised in the 
defendant's direct appeal, de novo, under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). 
 
i.  Sufficiency of evidence of murder in the first degree.  
The defendant contends that a new trial is necessary because the 
evidence was insufficient to show that he engaged in a shootout 
with Barros.  He argues that Barros, alone, "caused" Levin's 
death because it was the bullet from Barros's gun that hit her 
in the head.  This argument is unavailing.  See Colas, 486 Mass. 
at 845, quoting Santiago, 425 Mass. at 504 (when defendant 
engages in shootout, defendant's conduct "is the proximate cause 
of a shooting 'by either side because the death of a bystander 
41 
 
 
 
is a natural result of a shootout, and the shootout could not 
occur without participation from both sides'"); Santiago, supra 
at 502 ("The Commonwealth need not prove an intent to kill the 
victim because intent could be transferred from the intent to 
kill one of the [other] men . . ." [citations omitted]). 
 
Here, there was evidence that the defendant initiated the 
altercation inside the house, where he shot Barbosa, pointed his 
weapon at Barros, and walked outside; Barros followed.  Once 
outside, the defendant exchanged fire with Barros.  Guests at 
the party heard shots "from both sides", and shell casings 
recovered at the scene indicated that two weapons had been 
fired.  The defendant and Barros were the only people seen 
holding firearms.  This evidence "formed a mosaic of evidence 
such that the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt," 
that the defendant engaged in the shootout, and thus caused the 
death of Levin (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Ayala, 
481 Mass. 46, 53 (2018). 
 
ii.  Newly discovered evidence.  The defendant maintains 
that newly discovered evidence -- the ballistics match with a 
cartridge found at an unrelated crime scene, discussed supra, 
and a 2016 report by the President's Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology on forensic science in criminal courts 
suggesting that ballistics comparisons as were done in this case 
are unreliable -- requires a new trial. 
42 
 
 
 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that this evidence qualifies as "newly 
discovered," it relates to the expert's credibility, see 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 383 (2017), on an issue 
that would not have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations.  There was no evidence of error concerning the 
IBIS match of the cartridge casings at issue in this case, no 
other reason to challenge the expert's credibility, and no 
indication that the undisputed evidence concerning those 
cartridge casings weighed more heavily in the jury's thinking 
than did the witness testimony about the defendant holding a gun 
and shooting.  Consequently, the defendant also has not shown 
that his motion for postconviction testing, in the form of "3D" 
imaging of the ballistics evidence here, is likely to produce 
evidence "that is material to the moving party's identification 
as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case."  See 
Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Mass. 54, 56 n.2 (2016), quoting G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4). 
 
iii.  Evidentiary rulings.  In addition to the evidence the 
introduction of which he challenged in both his motion for a new 
trial and his direct appeal, the defendant also challenges 
several other rulings by the trial judge to allow the 
introduction of specific evidence, or to deny his motions to 
admit evidence.  The defendant contests the judge's decision to 
allow the Commonwealth's motion to exclude evidence of prior bad 
43 
 
 
 
acts by Barros, which the defendant argues would have been 
relevant to the identification of the first aggressor.  See 
Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 664 (2005).  It is 
unclear what prior violent conduct of Barros the defendant is 
referencing.  In any event, the evidence that the defendant 
fired the first shot inside the house was uncontradicted, and as 
discussed, the conviction based on participation in a shootout 
did not rely on a determination of who fired the first shot.16 
 
iv.  Expert testimony.  The defendant argues that the trial 
judge erred in allowing the introduction of numerous statements 
by expert witnesses.  The defendant challenged the reliability 
of purported expert testimony by a detective who testified to 
his "test" of the window of the vehicle in which Levin was shot, 
with respect to the likely position of the window when it was 
shattered;17 testimony by a ballistics expert that, based on a 
hypothetical question posed by the prosecutor that the shooter 
 
 
16 The defendant also argues that the judge erred in 
allowing the introduction of a transcript of the defendant's 
statement to police that contained a one-word scrivener's error.  
After the parties agreed that there was an error in the 
transcription, the judge instructed the jury with respect to the 
error and informed them that that the correct word was "heard" 
rather than "had."  There was no prejudice to the defendant from 
the introduction of the transcript containing a single one-word 
error, which the judge addressed with a curative instruction. 
 
17 The judge determined that the detective's testimony about 
the "test" of the windows was not offered as expert opinion, but 
rather as the detective's personal observations and "logical, 
commonsense conclusions."  We agree. 
44 
 
 
 
was in a certain spot, the vehicle would have had to have been 
in motion at that time; and a trajectory expert's testimony that 
a shooter's action in twisting a gun when the gun is fired 
alters the angle at which the shell casing is ejected.  The 
defendant also challenged the admission of testimony by two 
experts, on fingerprints and trajectories, that relied upon 
measurements taken by others, which the defendant asserted was 
in violation of the confrontation clause. 
 
We review a judge's decision to allow the introduction of 
expert testimony as reliable under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  See Commonwealth v. Camblin, 478 Mass. 469, 475 
(2017).  Expert testimony "must be based on facts of which the 
expert has direct personal knowledge or on facts in evidence 
which the expert has assumed pursuant to a hypothetical 
question, or on some combination of these sources."  Assessors 
of Andover v. Innes, 396 Mass. 564, 565-566 (1986).  These 
requirements were met in this case. 
 
The defendant has not established an abuse of discretion in 
any of the judge's rulings on the introduction of the expert 
testimony, or that, had the testimony been excluded, the result 
would have been different.  See Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 
Mass. 529, 545 (1989) ("The scope and fullness of hypothetical 
questions must be left to [the] discretion of the trial judge" 
[citation omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 
45 
 
 
 
Mass. 773, 791 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011) 
(although expert "did not have personal knowledge of how [the 
analyst] conducted the testing, she was familiar with the 
protocols [the analyst] was taught to employ, [the analyst's] 
documentation of her work, and [the analyst's] work history"; 
defendant had adequate opportunity to cross-examine expert on 
reliability of data). 
 
v.  Errors in jury selection.  The defendant contends that 
the judge erred in several respects during empanelment of the 
jury.  An adequate voir dire is part of a criminal defendant's 
right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment and art. 12 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Commonwealth v. 
Espinal, 482 Mass. 190, 194 (2019); Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 
Mass. 839, 848, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 127 (2018).  "The judge 
has broad discretion as to the questions to be asked, and need 
not put the specific questions proposed by the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 383 Mass. 637, 641 (1981). 
 
The defendant argues that it was error for the judge to 
decline to ask potential jurors, "Would you hold it against [the 
defendant] if he didn't testify to prove his innocence?"  The 
judge told members of the venire, 
"[T]he Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.  A failure 
to meet this burden of proof must result in a finding of 
not guilty; 
 
46 
 
 
 
"And lastly, the defendant is not required to present any 
evidence in his behalf and is under absolutely no 
obligation to testify in this trial." 
 
There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
The defendant also argues that the judge abused his 
discretion in questioning potential jurors as to whether they 
had any feelings about the Boston police department that would 
interfere with their ability to serve as jurors, and whether 
they would be able to assess the evidence fairly without 
deoxyribonucleic acid or fingerprint evidence.  We have upheld 
such instructions where they were "tailored to ensure that 
seated jurors were capable of deciding the case without bias and 
based on the evidence," Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 
340, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1014 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 691 (2011), and would not "automatically 
vote to acquit due to lack of scientific evidence," see Gray, 
supra at 339, quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
479, 485 (2009).  There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
Finally, we decline the defendant's suggestion that we 
again revisit our ruling that age is not a protected class for 
purposes of jury selection.  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 
Mass. 593, 597-598 (2018); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 409 Mass. 689, 
692 (1991), S.C., 419 Mass. 815 (1995).  To the extent that the 
prosecutor tended to challenge young jurors, there was no 
constitutional violation. 
47 
 
 
 
 
vi.  Instruction on self-defense.  In addition to his 
argument regarding the judge's instruction to the jury that 
self-defense was not at issue in this case, see part 2.d.ii, 
supra, the defendant asserts that the judge erred in not 
providing an instruction on self-defense, notwithstanding that 
trial counsel specifically requested that such an instruction 
not be given and told the judge she agreed that the evidence did 
not support a claim of self-defense, and the judge confirmed 
that position directly with the defendant in open court.18 
 
18 The colloquy with trial counsel proceeded as follows: 
 
The judge:  "And you do not want me to give an instruction 
on self-defense, correct." 
 
Trial counsel:  "I believe the Court said we didn't have 
the evidence for self-defense, and I understand that 
ruling." 
 
The judge:  "All right.  Well, do you wish me to instruct 
on self-defense?" 
 
Trial counsel:  "No, your Honor." 
 
The judge:  "All right.  Have you discussed that issue with 
[the defendant]?" 
 
Trial counsel:  "Yes, your Honor." 
 
The judge:  "And, Mr. Andrade, please rise." 
[The defendant complies.] 
 
The judge:  "Have you discussed that issue about self-
defense with [your attorney]?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yes." 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
"Self-defense is generally not available to a defendant who 
provokes or initiates an attack . . . ," Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 100, 110 (2011), unless the initial 
aggressor "withdraws [from the fight] in good faith and 
announces his intention to retire" and "the other party 
continues to attack," Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 
857 (2020), quoting Rodriguez, supra.  "This is so because 
someone who provokes or initiates an attack cannot be said to be 
taking advantage of every opportunity to avoid the combat."  See 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 464 Mass. 425, 435 (2013).  As 
discussed, see part 2.d.ii, supra, the evidence supports the 
judge's determination that the defendant was not entitled to an 
instruction on self-defense. 
 
vii.  Exclusion of missing witness defense.  The defendant 
argues that he was precluded from developing a missing witness 
defense and having the jury receive a missing witness 
instruction concerning a witness (Kenneth Lopes) who had been 
with Barros at the party. 
 
"The decision whether to provide a missing witness 
instruction to the jury is within the discretion of the trial 
judge, and will not be reversed unless the decision was 
 
The judge:  "Do you agree with her request not to give that 
instruction?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yes." 
49 
 
 
 
manifestly unreasonable."  Commonwealth v. Saletino, 449 Mass. 
657, 667 (2007).  Because the inference with respect to a 
missing witness "can have a seriously adverse effect on the 
noncalling party -- suggesting, as it does, that the party has 
wilfully attempted to withhold or conceal significant evidence -
- it should be invited only in clear cases, and with caution" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 411 Mass. 279, 
282 (1991). 
 
In any event, "it has been frequently held that where a 
witness is equally available to either party no inference may be 
drawn against either for not calling him [or her]."  
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 366 Mass. 284, 293 (1974).  Such is 
the case here, where the defendant was as capable of calling 
Lopes as was the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 
380 Mass. 513, 524 (1980). 
 
viii.  Other asserted errors in instructions.  The 
defendant objects to the lack of an eyewitness identification 
instruction that would have told the jury that the Commonwealth 
must prove the identity of the shooter beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth must 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  This was sufficient 
to inform them that, in order to find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, they would have to believe beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the 
50 
 
 
 
crimes.  As to all the other instructions that the defendant now 
asserts should have been given (such as on honest but mistaken 
identification, issues with eyewitness identification, and 
inaccuracy in cross-racial identifications) or should not have 
been given (such as that the jury have a duty to find a 
defendant guilty of the most serious offense the Commonwealth 
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt) or that should have been 
worded differently, the defendant has made no showing of an 
abuse of discretion in the judge's rulings on these 
instructions, and has shown no reason why a new trial is 
warranted on this basis. 
 
ix.  Improper remarks by prosecutor.19  The defendant 
contends that numerous assertions in the prosecutor's closing 
argument were improper.  In particular, he argues that the 
prosecutor misstated the evidence and sought to inflame jury 
sympathy.  Only two of the defendant's current nine claims with 
respect to improper statements in the prosecutor's closing were 
raised at trial. 
 
While prosecutors are entitled to argue "forcefully for the 
defendant's conviction," closing arguments must be limited to 
 
 
19 The defendant's arguments concerning the "threatened" 
prosecution of his cousin Tony, who invoked his right under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and declined 
to testify at trial, and the absence of any instruction on the 
Santiago theory at the grand jury, do not suggest any reason to 
grant a new trial. 
51 
 
 
 
facts in evidence and the fair inferences that may be drawn from 
them.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998).  A 
prosecutor must not misstate the evidence or refer to facts not 
in evidence, interject personal belief in the defendant's guilt, 
or play upon the jury's sympathy.  See Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 
486 Mass. 617, 630 (2021); Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 
577, 580 (2005). 
 
Most of the statements to which the defendant objects were 
permissible inferences drawn from evidence introduced at trial.  
See Teixeira, 486 Mass. at 631.  There are a few exceptions, 
such as the statements that the defendant had "malice in his 
heart" at the party and that, as a result of the shootout, the 
defendant received "exactly what he wanted."  These few improper 
comments, however, did not result in a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  They were limited, not repeated, and 
the judge properly instructed the jury that closing arguments 
are not evidence. 
 
The defendant argues that the prosecutor impermissibly 
inflamed juror sympathy by arguing that the road where the 
shooting occurred is a "street not unlike the streets many of 
you live in," and a place where people live their daily lives.  
The defendant also challenges the prosecutor's statement that it 
is "immoral, illegal and it's unacceptable" to open fire on a 
52 
 
 
 
crowded city street, and that the defendant was defending his 
"turf." 
 
The jury should not be asked to "put themselves 'in the 
shoes' of the victim" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 646 (2017).  To the extent that the 
prosecutor asked the jury to imagine the events occurring in a 
neighborhood like their own, such an appeal to sympathy was 
inappropriate.  At the same time, the remark was not overly 
inflammatory, and did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Compare id. at 645 (closing argument 
that victim was "crawling away to die," "after giving up any 
hope of survival," was impermissible and speculative play upon 
juror sympathy). 
 
The defendant also asserts that the prosecutor argued 
inappropriately that trial counsel was accusing investigators of 
manufacturing trajectory evidence.  The prosecutor, in essence, 
told the jury that if they believed trial counsel's view of the 
reliability of the trajectory evidence, then the police experts 
"belong[ed] in handcuffs."  While a prosecutor of course may 
dispute trial counsel's attempts to discredit the Commonwealth's 
experts, the prosecutor should not have attacked trial counsel 
personally for arguing that there were weaknesses in the 
trajectory evidence, and should not have suggested, even in 
jest, the inappropriate alternative of the experts being put "in 
53 
 
 
 
handcuffs."  See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 143 
(2001) (prosecutor should not have attacked trial counsel for 
challenging truthfulness of police).  Nonetheless, this 
statement likewise did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  The strengths and weaknesses of the 
experts' testimony were thoroughly drawn out at trial, and we 
presume the jury are able to understand that the prosecutor is 
an advocate.  See, e.g., Wilson, 427 Mass. at 350 (statements 
that are "[e]nthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and 
excusable hyperbole" do not require new trial [citation 
omitted]). 
 
Trial counsel did object to two statements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument that the defendant continues to 
challenge in his motion for a new trial.  The first was a 
statement that Nunez had identified the defendant as the 
shooter.  The judge clarified to the jury that this was an 
inference; thus, there was no prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 194 (2017) ("We presume, as we must, 
that a jury understand[] and follow[] limiting instructions" 
[citation omitted]).  Counsel also objected to the prosecutor's 
statement that there was no evidence of a third-party culprit; 
the defendant contends that this argument impermissibly shifted 
the burden to him, where the third-party culprit evidence he had 
54 
 
 
 
sought to present was excluded.  The judge overruled the 
objection. 
 
As discussed supra, the third-party culprit evidence was 
properly excluded; thus, there was no error in the judge's 
decision.  Moreover, defense counsel argued in closing that the 
investigators failed to investigate other possible suspects who 
might have wanted to harm Barros.  Drawing the jury's attention 
to the lack of another suspect was permissible argument.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mattei, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 583 (2016) 
(prosecutor's statement that there was "only one person" to whom 
evidence pointed was proper where statement constituted 
permissible inference and was responsive to defense argument). 
 
x.  Court room closure during jury empanelment.  In his 
motion for a new trial, the defendant maintains that the court 
room was closed during jury empanelment, in violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; he seeks an evidentiary 
hearing on this issue. 
 
At one point during empanelment, trial counsel responded to 
a question by the court room clerk as to whether she knew where 
the defendant's family was with the comment, "They were right 
outside.  I'm sure they were removed," and then the two 
proceeded with setting up the court room for individual voir 
dire.  The transcript also indicates that a number of potential 
55 
 
 
 
jurors, but apparently not all of them, also were removed to the 
hallway. 
 
Denial of the right to a public trial is a structural error 
requiring reversal.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 
Mass. 94, 105-106 (2010), citing Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 
209, 212-213 (2010).  This court has determined, however, that 
objections to that denial may be waived.  See Commonwealth v. 
Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 101-102, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 933 
(2014).  Indeed, counsel may choose to waive that right without 
informing the defendant.  Id. at 102, citing Commonwealth v. 
Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, 88-89, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 981 (2013).  
Here, the transcript indicates that trial counsel did not object 
to the removal of the defendant's family from the court room, 
and counsel does not argue otherwise.  The defendant also does 
not aver that he sought to have friends or family members in the 
court room and was precluded from doing so, and does not 
challenge trial counsel's effectiveness.  See Morganti, supra 
("where defense counsel was aware that the court room was closed 
to the public to facilitate jury empanelment and did not object, 
we conclude that the defendant's right to a public trial during 
that portion of the proceedings has been waived").  Accordingly, 
any claim of error in the purported closure of the court room 
during empanelment, as was common in some court houses at the 
time of the defendant's trial, see id. at 103-104, is waived. 
56 
 
 
 
 
xi.  Denial of an evidentiary hearing.  The defendant 
argues that an evidentiary hearing is required on his claims for 
withheld evidence, newly discovered exculpatory evidence, newly 
available scientific evidence, and public trial violations.  The 
motion judge determined that none of these claims warranted an 
evidentiary hearing.  We agree.  An evidentiary hearing is 
required if the motion and affidavits raise a "substantial 
issue" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 
Mass. 398, 404 (2015).  For the reasons discussed, the 
defendant's motion for a new trial does not do so. 
 
i.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have considered 
the case as a whole, as is our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
and we discern no reason to exercise our extraordinary authority 
to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction and the order 
denying the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on 
his motion for a new trial are affirmed.  The motion for a new 
trial is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.