Title: Worley v. Moore

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 310A16   
Filed 8 December 2017 
DENNIS WORLEY, STERLING KOONCE, FLYING A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
L.P., JOSEPH W. FORBES JR., KENNETH CLARK, JAMES BOGGESS, JOEL 
WEBB, JAIMIE LIVINGSTON, JAMES E. BENNETT JR., DAVID MINER, 
RONALD ENGLISH, and MDF, LLC 
 
 
v. 
ROY J. MOORE, PIERCE J. ROBERTS, DAVID BROWN, MICHAEL ADAMS, 
CHRISTOPHER BAKER, JAMES KERR, FRANK McCAMANT, NEIL KELLEN, 
GINI COYLE, JOSEPH MOWERY, TOSHIBA CORPORATION, ALAMO 
ACQUISITION CORP., and STEPHENS, INC. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(3) from an order dated 13 May 2016 
by Judge Gregory P. McGuire, Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business 
Cases appointed by the Chief Justice under N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4, in Superior Court, 
Columbus County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 29 August 2017. 
Nexsen Pruet, PLLC, by R. Daniel Boyce and David S. Pokela; and Ganzfried 
Law, by Jerrold J. Ganzfried, pro hac vice, for plaintiff-appellees.  
 
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, by Adam H. Charnes and John M. Moye, 
for defendant-appellants. 
 
NEWBY, Justice. 
 
In this case we consider whether the trial court properly disqualified 
defendants’ counsel under North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a).  This 
rule balances an attorney’s ethical duties of confidentiality and loyalty to a former 
client with a party’s right to its chosen counsel.  The rule permits disqualification of 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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an attorney from representing a new client if there is a substantial risk that the 
attorney could use confidential information shared by the client in the former matter 
against that same client in the current matter.  This analysis requires the trial court 
to determine whether confidential information that would normally have been shared 
in the former matter is also material to the current matter.  To do so, the trial court 
must objectively assess the scope of the representation and whether the matters are 
substantially related.  Rather than applying an objective test, here the trial court 
disqualified defendants’ counsel based on the former client’s subjective perception of 
the past representation as well as the now replaced “appearance of impropriety” test.  
As a result, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this matter to that court 
for application of the appropriate legal standard. 
The factual background leading to the instant litigation involves three other 
disputes, all relating to plaintiff Joseph W. Forbes’s former employer Consert, Inc. 
(Consert):  a patent dispute between Forbes and Consert (the patent dispute), 
Forbes’s 220 shareholder inspection rights action against Consert (the 220 action), 
and a contract dispute between Itron, Inc. (Itron) and Consert (the Itron litigation).  
Plaintiff Forbes is one of thirteen named plaintiffs in the present action, all 
former shareholders of Consert.  Beginning in 2008, Forbes was a shareholder and 
member of the Board of Directors of Consert and served as Chief Operating Officer.  
In the fall of 2011, Forbes was removed as an officer and director but remained a 
significant shareholder.  Soon after his removal, Forbes and Consert disagreed about 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Forbes’s unpaid compensation and ownership of certain patents (the patent dispute), 
but the dispute never resulted in direct litigation even though Forbes was 
represented by counsel.  
Sometime in 2012, Toshiba, a technology company, expressed interest in 
purchasing Consert.  Concerned about the proposed sale, Forbes sued Consert in 
December 2012 under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation statutes (the 
220 action), asserting his shareholder rights and requesting certain corporate records 
regarding the sale.  In the 220 action, Forbes referenced, inter alia, the ongoing patent 
dispute in his allegations concerning Consert’s mismanagement.   
At the same time, Consert was also defending a lawsuit filed by Itron, a 
licensee and successor in interest to a development agreement with Consert, over 
certain payment terms under that agreement (the Itron litigation).  Based on Forbes’s 
allegations in the 220 action, Itron amended its complaint to include claims based on 
Consert’s failure to disclose the ongoing patent dispute with Forbes.   
Amidst the Itron litigation, Toshiba acquired Consert on 5 February 2013 as a 
wholly owned subsidiary.  Following the Consert–Toshiba merger, Consert engaged 
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Kilpatrick) to represent it in the Itron 
litigation.  Itron sought to depose Forbes regarding the Consert–Toshiba merger, the 
220 action, and primarily the patent dispute with Consert.1  By mid-February 2013, 
                                            
1 Forbes produced requested documents during the Itron litigation while represented 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Forbes and Consert settled the 220 action, and by May 2013, Forbes and Consert 
resolved the patent dispute, leaving only the Itron litigation unresolved. 
In October 2013, counsel from Winston & Strawn, LLP, who represented 
Forbes at the time, communicated with Joe Bush of Kilpatrick (Bush),2 counsel to 
Consert, about Forbes’s deposition.  Bush disclosed to Forbes’s counsel that, in 
addition to his primary representation of Consert, he also represented former 
employees and shareholders of Consert in the Itron litigation.  Bush later offered 
limited representation to Forbes at Consert’s expense as long as Forbes agreed to the 
proposed engagement terms.  Forbes eventually agreed that Bush would represent 
him in the Itron litigation regarding his role as a former Officer and Director of 
Consert.   
On 23 January 2014, Forbes signed an engagement letter that outlined the 
terms of Bush’s limited representation of Forbes (the engagement letter), which 
began by stating, “As you are aware, this firm is outside litigation counsel to [Consert] 
in connection with the [Itron litigation].”  The engagement letter then explained that 
the representation of Forbes would “be limited to legal services associated with 
discovery efforts (such as depositions, witness statements, factual development, and 
                                            
by Winston & Strawn, LLP.  Kilpatrick did not assist Forbes with document production.   
2 Plaintiff seeks to disqualify both Bush and Kilpatrick, his law firm, from 
representing defendants.  For simplicity, references hereinafter to “Bush” include both him 
and his law firm as counsel. 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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document analysis), [Forbes’s] potential testimony at trial, and specifically in 
connection with [Forbes’s] former role as Chief Operating Officer of Consert.”  Forbes 
agreed that he would be “willing to permit Kilpatrick Townsend to disclose to Consert, 
to any related entities, and to the employees of these entities, any of the information 
it learns in its communications with [him] if, in [counsel’s] discretion, it becomes 
necessary or appropriate to the defense of this lawsuit.”  Forbes also agreed that he 
would “not object to Kilpatrick Townsend continuing to represent Consert and its 
related entities in this lawsuit” should a conflict of interest arise.  Winston & Strawn 
negotiated the terms of the limited representation on behalf of Forbes.  
Forbes’s counsel from Winston & Strawn initially prepared him for his 
deposition and communicated with Forbes via teleconference two to three times for 
approximately an hour on each occasion.  In final preparation, Forbes met with Bush 
once for approximately two to three hours the night before the deposition.  Forbes’s 
privately retained counsel from Winston & Strawn attended approximately an hour 
of that meeting.   
During the deposition the next day, Itron’s counsel asked Forbes about his 
relationship with Consert, the 220 action, the Consert–Toshiba merger, and 
primarily the patent dispute.  Twice during the deposition, Forbes requested a break 
and spoke with his privately retained counsel from Winston & Strawn, even though 
Bush was present at the deposition.  When asked about the Consert–Toshiba merger, 
Forbes stated, “I have not read the agreement of the merger between [Toshiba] and 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Consert.  That might come as a surprise to you, but I have not read it.”  The Itron 
litigation settled on 1 February 2015.   
At some point on or before 5 February 2015, Forbes and counsel at Winston & 
Strawn recognized Forbes’s potential claims at issue in the present action.  As a 
result, on 5 February 2015, Winston & Strawn sent a litigation hold letter to Bush, 
based on his representation of Toshiba affiliates, informing him that Forbes and other 
former Consert shareholders were considering filing the present action.  On 9 
November 2015, Forbes and other former Consert shareholders filed the present 
action against Toshiba (as the parent company of Consert) and former officers, 
directors, and shareholders of Consert, some of whom were jointly represented by 
Bush in the Itron litigation.3  Defendants retained Bush to represent them against 
plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs allege that, through the Consert–Toshiba merger agreement, 
defendants engaged in a “collusive scheme” to “benefit themselves and to defraud 
Plaintiffs out of millions of dollars that Plaintiffs should have received for the shares 
of stock they had purchased and held in Consert.”4  The merger agreement included 
“earn out” provisions that obligated Toshiba to pay certain future proceeds directly to 
                                            
3 On 16 November 2016, the Chief Justice designated this case as a complex business 
case.  
4 Specifically, plaintiffs assert the following claims against defendants:  (1) breach of 
fiduciary duty, (2) common law fraud, (3) constructive fraud, (4) conspiracy to defraud, (5) 
fraudulent inducement, (6) violation of the North Carolina Securities Act, (7) unlawful 
taking, conversion, and unjust enrichment under common law, and (8) violation of the North 
Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.   
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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a “Shareholders Fund” for distribution to Consert stockholders.  Two post-merger 
events, including resolution of the Itron litigation, would fund this account.  
Plaintiffs, however, contend that the earn out provisions were “illusory and a sham” 
because defendants knew at the time of the agreement that the triggering events 
required to generate the proceeds at issue would never occur, thus precluding any 
payment to the shareholders.   
Before the trial court, plaintiffs moved to disqualify Bush from the present 
action based on his past representation of Forbes during the Itron litigation.  In 
support of the motion, Forbes filed a declaration stating his views of the prior 
relationship and outlining his communications with Bush.  Defendants responded 
that the communications between Forbes and Bush were not confidential because the 
engagement letter expressly limited the nature of Bush’s representation of Forbes 
and specifically authorized Bush to disclose, in his discretion, “any of the information” 
he learned in his communications with Forbes to “Consert,” “any related entities,” 
and their “employees” during the Itron litigation.  
Recognizing that the facts here presented a “close case,” the trial court noted:  
In considering a motion to disqualify counsel, the Court 
considers 
the 
professional 
obligations 
imposed 
on 
attorneys by the North Carolina Rules of Professional 
Conduct . . . , as well as the goal of preventing the 
appearance 
of 
impropriety 
in 
the 
profession. 
Disqualification of counsel is a serious matter . . . and the 
moving party has a high standard of proof to meet in order 
to prove that counsel should be disqualified.  Nevertheless, 
a motion to disqualify counsel . . . . should succeed or fail 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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on the reasonableness of a client’s perception that 
confidences it once shared with its lawyer are potentially 
available to its adversary. 
 
(Second ellipsis in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
 
The trial court found that an attorney–client relationship existed between 
Bush and Forbes in the past representation and that defendants’ position is 
materially adverse to Forbes’s position in the present action, thus leaving unresolved 
only whether the current matter is “substantially related to the matter in which Bush 
and Kilpatrick previously represented Forbes.”  In particular, quoting Plant Genetic 
Systems, N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, 933 F. Supp. 514, 518 (M.D.N.C. 1996), the trial court 
sought to answer whether “there is a reasonable probability that confidences were 
disclosed in the prior representation which could be used against the former client in 
the current litigation.”   
In its analysis the trial court resolved this issue by trying to discern what 
actually occurred during the past representation as stated by Forbes and Bush.  The 
trial court relied on Forbes’s declaration, which included his characterizations of the 
attorney–client relationship.  The trial court quoted portions of the declaration 
detailing Forbes’s impressions of the nature of his communications with Bush and 
conversely observed that Bush had not refuted Forbes’s “descriptions or 
characterizations of the information he shared with Bush during the prior 
representation.”   
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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In reviewing the engagement letter, the trial court focused on the absence of 
evidence showing that Bush actually disclosed any confidential information provided 
by Forbes while the Itron litigation was ongoing.  Moreover, by the terms of the 
engagement letter, Forbes’s permission to disclose ended with the Itron litigation, 
thereby limiting future disclosure by Bush.  Absent evidence of actual disclosure, the 
trial court found the engagement letter had little bearing on its analysis.  The trial 
court gave substantial weight to Forbes’s “perception” that the prior disclosures could 
be used to his disadvantage, which the trial court found was not “unreasonable.”  
Ultimately, the trial court determined that “the significant areas of overlap between 
the issues in the two representations strongly suggest that the two matters are 
‘substantially related.’ ”  
 Notably, the trial court determined, “Even if the matters are not substantially 
related within the strict meaning of Rule 1.9(a), however, the Court would 
nonetheless conclude, in its discretion, that Bush and Kilpatrick should be 
disqualified in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety.”  As a result, the trial 
court disqualified Bush because his “continued representation of Defendants in this 
matter creates an appearance of impropriety that the Court cannot allow.”  
Defendants appealed.   
“Decisions regarding whether to disqualify counsel are within the discretion of 
the trial judge,”  Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Nat. Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 295, 420 
S.E.2d 426, 430 (1992), but a trial court’s exercise of discretion is subject to reversal 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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when the court orders disqualification based on a misunderstanding of the law, see 
In re Estate of Skinner, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 804 S.E.2d 449, 457 (2017); see also Cooter 
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359, 
382 (1990) (noting that the “[trial] court would necessarily abuse its discretion [in 
deciding a Rule 11 motion] if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law”).  
The movant seeking to disqualify his former counsel must meet a particularly high 
burden of proof.  See Gov’t of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(“[T]here is a particularly trenchant reason for requiring a high standard of proof on 
the part of one who seeks to disqualify his former counsel . . . .”). 
Rule 1.9(a), governing the disqualification of counsel for a conflict of interest 
relating to a former client, balances the prevented use of confidential information 
against a former client with a current client’s right to choose his counsel freely.  See, 
e.g., N.C. St. B. Ethics Op. RPC 48 (Oct. 28, 1988), reprinted in North Carolina State 
Bar Lawyer’s Handbook 2016, at 217 (2016) (recognizing, inter alia, “the right of 
clients to counsel of their choice”).  The rule prevents an attorney from using 
confidential material information received from a former client against that client in 
current litigation.  See N.C. St. B. Rev. R. Prof’l Conduct r. 1.9 cmt. 1 (“After 
termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent 
another client except in conformity with this Rule.”).5 
Rule 1.9(a) provides: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same 
or a substantially related matter in which that person’s 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the 
former client unless the former client gives informed 
consent, confirmed in writing.   
 
N.C. St. B. Rev. R. Prof’l Conduct r. 1.9(a).  Under Rule 1.9(a), a party seeking to 
disqualify opposing counsel must establish that (1) an attorney–client relationship 
existed between the former client and the opposing counsel in a matter such that 
confidential information would normally have been shared; (2) the present action 
involves a matter that is the same as or substantially related to the subject of the 
former client’s representation, making the confidential information previously shared 
material to the present action; and (3) the interests of the opposing counsel’s current 
client are materially adverse to those of the former client.   
In applying Rule 1.9(a), the trial court considers the circumstances 
surrounding each representation to objectively assess what would “normally” have 
occurred within the scope of that representation.6  See id. r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (“A conclusion 
                                            
5 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168-70, 106 S. Ct. 988, 994-96, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123, 
135-37 (1986) (relying on the guidance offered in the commentary of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to interpret the Rules). 
6 See Normal, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“According to a regular pattern; 
. . . In this sense, its common antonyms are unusual and extraordinary. . . .  According to an 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services 
the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice 
be learned by a lawyer providing such services.”).  The test is whether, objectively 
speaking, “a substantial risk” exists “that the lawyer has information to use in the 
subsequent matter.”  Id.; see id. r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (“The underlying question is whether 
the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be 
justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.”).   The test does not 
rely on the subjective assessment provided by the former client or the attorney.  See 
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 132A cmt. d(iii) (Am. Law Inst. 
2017) (“[It] would be self-defeating if, in order to obtain its protection, the former 
client were required to reveal in a public proceeding the particular communication or 
other confidential information that could be used in the subsequent representation.”). 
Here it is undisputed that the third prong of the test under Rule 1.9(a) is 
satisfied:  the interests of Forbes and defendants in the present action are “materially 
adverse.”  For the two remaining prongs, the trial court must consider the scope of 
the past representation to determine whether the former client would normally have 
shared confidential information in the course of that representation and, if so, 
whether that information is material to the present action.  See N.C. St. B. Rev. R. 
                                            
established rule or norm . . . .”); Objective, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“Of, 
relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual’s 
perceptions, feelings, or intentions . . . .”).  
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Prof’l Conduct r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (“The scope of a ‘matter’ for purposes of this Rule depends 
on the facts of a particular situation or transaction.  The lawyer’s involvement in a 
matter can also be a question of degree.”). 
The first prong of Rule 1.9(a) explores the existence and scope of an attorney–
client relationship between the attorney and the former client.  “[A]n attorney-client 
relationship is formed when a client communicates with an attorney in confidence 
seeking legal advice regarding a specific claim and with an intent to form an attorney-
client relationship.”  Raymond v. N.C. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 365 N.C. 94, 98, 721 
S.E.2d 923, 926 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  The scope of such a 
relationship, however, is a matter of contract, and a lawyer may reasonably limit the 
scope and expectations of the representation “by agreement with the client or by the 
terms under which the lawyer’s services are made available to the client.”  N.C. St. 
B. Rev. R. Prof’l Conduct r. 1.2 cmt. 6. 
The commentary to Rule 1.9(a) anticipates the use of engagement letters that 
outline both the scope of representation and limitations on confidentiality at the time 
the former client engaged counsel.  See id. r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (describing a lawyer’s 
involvement in a “matter” as dependent “on the facts of a particular situation or 
transaction” and the “degree” of engagement).  For example, a common 
representation agreement could provide for the sharing of confidential information 
among the co-parties represented by the same attorney but keep the information 
confidential as to third-parties.  Likewise, a former client’s concurrent representation 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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by another attorney also informs as to the degree of the contested counsel’s 
involvement and the confidences normally shared by a client in that situation.  Thus, 
under the rule, the emphasis is not on the traditional notions of the formation of an 
attorney–client relationship, but on the scope of that relationship, when ascertaining 
the reasonable expectation of confidentiality under the circumstances.  See Allegaert 
v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977) (Disqualification is not warranted unless 
“the attorney was in a position where he could have received information which his 
former client might reasonably have assumed the attorney would withhold from his 
present client.”).     
Here the trial court erred by trying to determine whether Forbes actually 
shared confidential information with Bush that Bush did not share with the other 
parties to the common representation agreement.  Instead, the trial court should 
apply the objective test of whether a client in Forbes’s position would normally have 
shared confidential information given the terms of the engagement letter and the 
type of disclosure that usually occurs within that common representation 
arrangement.  Further, the trial court failed to consider the normal implications of 
simultaneous and ongoing representation of Forbes by other counsel.  On remand, 
the trial court should objectively consider what confidential factual information 
“would normally have been obtained” within the scope of the past representation.  
N.C. St. B. Rev. R. Prof’l Conduct r. 1.9 cmt. 3.   
If the trial court determines that confidential information would normally have 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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been shared within the scope of the past representation, it must then consider 
whether that information is material to the present action by deciding if the two 
matters are “substantially related.”  A former client must objectively demonstrate “a 
substantial risk that [confidential] information as would normally have been obtained 
in the prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in the 
subsequent matter.”  Id.  Through an objective, fact-intensive inquiry, the trial court 
is best suited to determine whether such a substantial risk exists.  See id. (considering 
“the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that 
would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services”); see also 
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 132A cmt. d(iii) (Am. Law Inst. 
2017) (“The substantial-relationship test . . . focus[es] upon the general features of the 
matters involved and inferences as to the likelihood that confidences were imparted 
by the former client that could be used to adverse effect in the subsequent 
representation.” (emphasis added)). 
In assessing whether two matters are “substantially related,” the trial court 
should consider, inter alia, the following illuminative factors: (1) the initial 
engagement letter, including the scope of the representation and any limitations on 
confidentiality; (2) the factual background leading to the past representation, 
including common representation of others and any concurrent representation of the 
former client; (3) the amount of time spent with the attorney; (4) the subject matter 
of the two representations; and (5) all of the facts and circumstances of the current 
WORLEY V. MOORE 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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litigation, particularly as compared with those of the past representation.  A former 
client’s subjective perception or conclusory allegations that he shared confidential 
information during the past representation should not be considered.  See, e.g., Silver 
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975). 
Here the trial court erred by concluding that the matters appeared to be 
“substantially related” based on Forbes’s conclusory belief that he had shared 
confidential information with Bush “directly related to the claims . . . against 
Defendants in this case.”  Thus, the trial court improperly determined 
disqualification in reliance on the former client’s subjective judgment, which Rule 
1.9(a) prohibits, rather than objectively comparing the facts and circumstances of 
both representations.   
In its final rationale, the trial court mistakenly applied the now replaced 
“appearance of impropriety” test as a consideration in favor of disqualification.  
Unlike its predecessor, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct do not recognize “appearance of impropriety” as a basis for 
disqualification, having deleted any reference to this standard in the 2002 revisions.7    
                                            
7 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, of which Rule 1.9 is a part, replaced the 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, which dated back to canons first promulgated in 
1908.  See Monroe H. Freedman, The Kutak Model Rules v. the American Lawyer’s Code of 
Conduct, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 1165, 1165 (1981).  Under the ABA Code, parties generally moved 
for disqualification under Canon 4, “A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets 
of a Client,” and Canon 9, “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional 
Impropriety.”  Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Canons 4, 9 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1980).  By 1986 
North Carolina had adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as its governing 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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The tendency of the old test to lean towards a subjective, rather than objective, 
analysis rendered it “no longer helpful.”8  As a result, the “appearance of impropriety” 
test is no longer an appropriate legal standard for determining whether to disqualify 
counsel. 
In sum, the trial court applied the incorrect standard under Rule 1.9(a) in 
disqualifying defendants’ counsel.  In making its determination upon remand, the 
trial court must objectively assess the facts surrounding the motion to disqualify 
counsel without relying on the former client’s subjective perception of his prior 
representation.  The trial court should avoid the outmoded “appearance of 
impropriety” test.  We reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this case to that 
court for application of the correct legal test. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
 
                                            
standard.   
8 See A Legislative History 242 (Art Garwin ed., 2013) (noting that the Ethics 2000 
Commission Reporter’s Explanation of Proposed Changes included the statement that 
comment 5, referencing the appearance of impropriety standard, was “deleted as no longer 
helpful to the analysis of questions arising under this Rule”).