Title: Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

BEAUFORT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BEAUFORT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS
No. 106PA08 
FILED: 28 AUGUST 2009
1.
Schools and Education–funding–dispute with county–resolution by
court–constitutional
N.C.G.S. § 115C-431 (which provides an eventual judicial resolution of disputes
between school boards and county commissioners over the amounted needed to operate the
school system) does not impermissibly delegate legislative authority and is constitutional. The
statute does no more than invite the courts to adjudicate a disputed fact: the annual cost of
providing a countywide system of education under the policies chosen by the legislature and the
State Board of Education.  This is within the historic and proper role of the judiciary.
2.
Schools and Education–funding–judicial determination of minimum–county
authority not infringed
N.C.G.S. § 115C-431 does not deprive the county commissioners of funding
discretion granted by the State Constitution.  The requirement that the commissioners provide the
minimum level of funding required by state law does not abrogate their discretionary authority to
contribute more.
3.
Schools and Education–funding–judicial resolution of disputed amount–jury
instruction
The Supreme Court exercised its general supervisory authority to promptly
resolve a novel issue of great import, despite the lack of an objection or assignment of error, in a
case involving the amount needed to operate a county school system.  The instruction given to
the jury on the word “needed” was too expansive, and was remanded for application of the more
restrictive definition articulated herein.
4.
Schools and Education–funding–responsibility for operating expenses
The statutes concerning school funding explicitly contemplate the funding of
current school expenses by county commissioners when state funding is insufficient rather than
local governments having responsibility for capital expenses only.
5.
Schools and Education–funding–judicial dispute–denial of continuance–not a
denial of due process
A county claiming a due process violation in a school funding case for the denial
of a continuance had ample opportunity to communicate with the board of education and to
request information, and the trial court did not err by denying the motion for a continuance.  The
legislature intended that the statutory process for resolving school funding disputes be carried out
promptly.
Justice NEWBY concurring.
Justice HUDSON dissenting.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in the dissenting opinion.
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  Section 431(c) allows school boards to sue county
1
commissions when other resolution procedures fail.  At trial, the
court, via a jury if either party so requests, “find[s] the facts
as to the amount of money necessary to maintain a system of free
public schools, and the amount of money needed from the county to
make up this total.”  Id.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 188 N.C. App. 399,
656 S.E.2d 296 (2008), finding no error in a judgment entered 9
August 2006 by Judge William C. Griffin, Jr. in Superior Court,
Beaufort County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 9 September 2008.
Schwartz & Shaw, P.L.L.C., by Brian C. Shaw and Richard
Schwartz, for plaintiff-appellee.
Garris Neil Yarborough and Jonathan V. Maxwell for
defendant-appellant.
James B. Blackburn, III, General Counsel, for North 
Carolina Association of County Commissioners, amicus
curiae. 
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Ann Majestic and Robert 
M. Kennedy Jr.; and Allison B. Schafer, General
Counsel, for North Carolina School Boards Association,
amicus curiae.
MARTIN, Justice.
This action arises out of a dispute between the
Beaufort County Board of Education (the School Board) and the
Beaufort County Commissioners (the County Commission) over the
amount of funding necessary to operate the local school system
for the 2006-2007 fiscal year (FY 2006–2007).  The School Board
requested $12,106,304 and the County Commission allocated
$9,434,217.  After complying with the negotiation and mediation
procedures set forth in N.C.G.S. § 115C-431 (2007) (section 431),
the School Board sued the County Commission.   At trial, a jury
1
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found that the School Board needed $10,200,000 for FY 2006-2007
school operations.  The trial court entered a judgment requiring
the County Commission to appropriate that amount to the School
Board. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found no error. 
Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 188
N.C. App. 399, 416, 656 S.E.2d 296, 307 (2008).  We allowed
discretionary review to determine whether “the statutory
framework for resolving school funding disputes between the
county board of education and the county board of commissioners
[is] constitutional” and, if so, whether “the statutory framework
[has] been properly applied in this case.”   
[1] The County Commission first contends that section
431 is unconstitutional on its face.  We observe that a facial
challenge to a statute is a “‘most difficult challenge to mount
successfully.’”  State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 564, 614 S.E.2d
479, 485 (2005) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745 (1987)).  A party must show that there are no circumstances
under which the statute might be constitutional.  See id. at 564,
614 S.E.2d at 486.  We seldom uphold facial challenges because it
is the role of the legislature, rather than this Court, to
balance disparate interests and find a workable compromise among
them.  See Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 491, 340 S.E.2d 720,
731 (1986).  This Court will only measure the balance struck in
the statute against the minimum standards required by the
constitution.  See id.
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The County Commission alleges that by allowing the
court system to play a role in deciding the level of funding for
public education, section 431(c) impermissibly delegates the
legislature’s constitutional duty to “provide . . . for a general
and uniform system of free public schools.”  N.C. Const. art. IX,
§ 2(1).  The County Commission argues that the statutory
procedure in section 431(c) thus violates the constitutional
requirement that “[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme
judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate
and distinct from each other.”  Id. art. I, § 6.  Like the United
States Supreme Court, however, we acknowledge that our separation
of powers clause does not prevent the General Assembly “from
seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate
Branches.”  Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991)
(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
In analyzing the role of the judiciary under section
431(c), we begin by examining the statutory procedures preceding
litigation.  The local school board first creates a budget
setting out its estimate of the cost of providing education
within its locale for the upcoming year and submits that budget
to the county commission.  See N.C.G.S. § 115C-429(a) (2007). 
The county commission then determines the amount of funds to be
appropriated to the school board.  See N.C.G.S. § 115C-429(b)
(2007).  If there is a dispute between the school board and the
county commission, the two boards meet with a mediator in an
effort to negotiate a compromise.  See § 115C-431(a).  If there
is still no agreement, representatives from the two boards enter
-5-
  For a mere partial listing, see, for example, N.C.G.S. §§
2
115C-81(a1) (mandating that the Basic Education Program adopted
by the State Board be offered to every child); 115C-81(a3)(1)
(mandating availability of alcohol and drug use prevention
programs); 115C-81(b1) (requiring two full years of instruction
on North Carolina history and geography); 115C-81(g) (requiring
that the major principles of the nation’s founding documents be
taught); 115C-81(h) (requiring instruction in character traits of
courage, good judgment, integrity, kindness, perseverance,
respect, responsibility, and self-discipline); 115C-84.2
(mandating calendar); 115C-102.6C (mandating technology plan in
accord with State Board’s plan); 115C-166 (requiring industrial-
quality eye protection while participating in certain
activities); 115C-216 (requiring a course of training in the
operation of motor vehicles); 115C-245(a) (prescribing minimum
a formal mediation.  See § 115C-431(b).  If no agreement can be
reached at the mediation, the school board may file an action in
superior court.  See § 115C-431(c).  In any such action, the
trial court is charged to 
find the facts as to the amount of
money necessary to maintain a
system of free public schools, and
the amount of money needed from the
county to make up this total. . . . 
. . .  When the facts have
been found, the court shall give
judgment ordering the board of
county commissioners to appropriate
a sum certain to the local school
administrative unit, and to levy
such taxes on property as may be
necessary to make up this sum when
added to other revenues available
for the purpose.
Id.
Because the trial court must determine the amount
necessary to fund “a system of free public schools,” id., we look
to other provisions of Chapter 115C to determine the meaning of
that phrase.  The Chapter contains copious provisions setting
standards, often in minute detail, to which local schools must
adhere.   The State Board of Education (the State Board) is given
2
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qualifications for school bus drivers); 115C-264 to -264.3
(governing provision of food service, including a decrease in
foods high in trans-fatty acids, restrictions on vending machine
sales, and a preference for high-calcium foods and beverages);
115C-301 (governing allowable class sizes); 115C-364 (setting
minimum age for admission); 115C-375.4 (2007) (requiring that
parents be informed about meningococcal meningitis and influenza
vaccines annually).
  To list only a few examples from that section, the duties
3
assigned to the State Board include setting policy regarding the
following areas:  regulation of salaries, adoption of textbooks,
adoption of rules requiring implementation of the Basic Education
Program (defined elsewhere), development and enforcement of the
School-Based Management and Accountability Program, development
of content standards and exit standards, promulgation of
transportation regulations, and adoption of model guidelines for
closing the academic achievement gap.  See § 115C-12(9), (9c),
(16), (17), (30). 
the general administrative and supervisory role over public
education and is responsible for “establish[ing] policy for the
system of free public schools.”  N.C.G.S. § 115C-12 (2007).   The
3
statutory provisions enacted by the legislature and guidelines
adopted by the State Board, when viewed together, comprehensively
define the phrase “a system of free public schools” used in
section 431(c).  
Since the General Assembly has so exhaustively defined
its desired system, the section 431(c) procedure does no more
than invite the courts to adjudicate a disputed fact:  the annual
cost of providing a countywide system of education under the
policies chosen by the legislature and the State Board.  Such
fact-finding falls within the historic and proper role of the
judiciary.  See, e.g., N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13 (discussing
civil actions:  “[T]here shall be a right to have issues of fact
tried before a jury.”).  After finding the facts, the trial court
enters judgment against the county commission as directed by the
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legislature.  See § 115C-431(c).  It is the legislature, not the
judiciary, which has assigned responsibility to local government
by requiring that judgment be entered against the county
commission if the court finds the cost of schooling is greater
than the amount appropriated.  The legislature has therefore
neither assigned policy-making power to the courts nor otherwise
delegated its authority, and the judiciary is at all times
exercising a function traditionally assigned to it under our
tripartite system of government.  
Furthermore, we have previously considered and upheld a
provision nearly identical to section 431(c).  Chapter 33,
section 8, Laws of 1913, provided, just as section 431 does, for
judicial fact-finding as to the cost of schools in the event of
disagreement between a county school board and the county
commission.  See Act of Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 33, sec. 8, 1913 N.C.
Pub. [Sess.] Laws 58, 60.  As in this case, the county commission
challenged the resolution scheme as unconstitutional.  See Bd. of
Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 174 N.C. 469, 474, 93 S.E. 1001,
1003 (1917).  In response to that argument, we held, just as we
do now, that the scheme “only empowers the courts to ascertain
and determine a disputed fact relevant to a pending issue between
the two boards, and thereupon command that the tax be levied
accordingly, both the finding of the fact and the judgment
thereon being, in our opinion, judicial in their nature.”  Id. 
The provisions of section 431(c) thus comport with the State
Constitution, and any complaints about the policy or wisdom of
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the challenged procedures must necessarily be directed to the
General Assembly.
[2] The County Commission next asserts that section
431(c) deprives it of funding discretion granted by the State
Constitution.  Our Constitution provides:
(2) Local responsibility.  The
General Assembly may assign to
units of local government such
responsibility for the financial
support of the free public schools
as it may deem appropriate.  The
governing boards of units of local
government with financial
responsibility for public education
may use local revenues to add to or
supplement any public school or
post-secondary school program.
N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(2).  The County Commission maintains
that allowing the court to ascertain “the amount of money
necessary to maintain a system of free public schools,” § 115C-
431(c), is counter to the second sentence of the constitutional
provision, which states that the local government “may . . . add
to or supplement” the amount for which the legislature has
assigned responsibility, N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(2) (emphasis
added).
In interpreting our Constitution, we are bound to “give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it.”  Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75
S.E.2d 512, 514 (1953).  Moreover, “where one of two reasonable
constructions will raise a serious constitutional question, the
construction which avoids this question should be adopted.”  In
re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1977)
(citations omitted). 
-9-
We now consider the meaning of the terms “necessary”
and “needed,” as used in section 431(c), in light of Article IX,
Section 2(2) of the State Constitution.  We acknowledge that
these terms are susceptible to reasonable interpretations of
varying strictness, about which there has been argument from the
earliest days of our republic.  See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 207, 212-13, 4 Wheat. 316, 323-25 (1819).  If a fact-
finder were to interpret “necessary” or “needed” in section
431(c) expansively, there is a danger that the resulting verdict
could intrude on a county commission’s funding discretion under
Article IX, Section 2(2) by requiring the appropriation of a
greater amount of money than that for which the legislature has
assigned responsibility.  Accordingly, in order to reconcile the
statute with Article IX, Section 2(2), we accord a restrictive
interpretation to the terms “necessary” and “needed” within
section 431(c).     
So construed, section 431(c)’s requirement that county
commissions provide the minimum level of funding required by
state law does not abrogate their discretionary authority to
contribute more.  As discussed above, the legislature has deemed
it appropriate to assign responsibility to local government to
provide funding to maintain the system of public schools.  County
commissions are thus required to furnish that amount.  See N.C.
Const. art. IX, § 2(2).  Our State Constitution protects a local
government’s discretionary authority to provide more funding than
legally required, not less.  Consequently, section 431(c) does
not encroach on local governments’ discretion to contribute
-10-
additional funds to schools beyond their minimum legal
responsibility.
[3] We next consider the trial court’s charge to the
jury in the present case.  Although counsel did not object or
assign error to the trial court’s instructions, “‘[t]his Court
will not hesitate to exercise its rarely used general supervisory
authority when necessary to promote the expeditious
administration of justice,’ and may do so to ‘consider questions
which are not properly presented according to [its] rules.’” 
State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 205, 639 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2007)
(quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 26, 215 S.E.2d 589, 594
(1975)).  We invoke our general supervisory authority mindful
that because the trial court “did not have the legal standard
which we articulate today to guide him in his consideration of
the case, . . . it is not reasonable to expect him to have
applied it without the benefit of this opinion.”  State v.
McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1165 (1986).  The instant case is analogous to
other situations wherein this Court has invoked its general
supervisory authority to promptly resolve a novel issue of great
import.  See In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 548, 272 S.E.2d 861,
870 (1981) (stating that the Court’s general supervisory
authority may be invoked when “[t]he novelty of the issues
presented, coupled with the potential liability of the counties
of North Carolina, serves to emphasize the proper role of the
judiciary in securing a prompt resolution” (emphasis added)). 
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The trial court instructed the jury that the word
“needed” in section 431(c) means “that which is reasonable and
useful and proper or conducive to the end sought.”  Rather than
conveying a restrictive definition of “needed,” which is
necessary to preserve the discretionary authority of county
commissions under Article IX, Section 2(2), the instruction
conveyed an impermissible, expansive definition of this statutory
term.  Because the instruction was in error, we must remand for a
new trial.  At that trial, the trial court should instruct the
jury that section 431(c) requires the County Commission to
provide that appropriation legally necessary to support a system
of free public schools, as defined by Chapter 115C and the
policies of the State Board.  The trial court should also
instruct the jury, in arriving at its verdict, to consider the
educational goals and policies of the state, the budgetary
request of the local board of education, the financial resources
of the county, and the fiscal policies of the board of county
commissioners.  See N.C.G.S. § 115C-426(e) (2007).  Anything
beyond this measure of damages impermissibly infringes upon the
discretionary authority of the County Commission under Article
IX, Section 2(2) of the State Constitution and may not be awarded
by a jury.
[4] The County Commission next asserts that the trial
court erred in its interpretation of the statutory framework. 
Specifically, the Commission alleges that the legislature has
assigned to local governments responsibility only for capital
expenses and not current expenses.  The statutes explicitly
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contemplate the funding of current expenses by county commissions
when state funding is insufficient.  See, e.g., § 115C-426(e)
(stating that the local current expense fund shall include
appropriations sufficient, when added to state funds, to conform
to the educational goals of the state; and stating that these
appropriations shall be funded by, among other sources, “moneys
made available to the local school administrative unit by the
board of county commissioners”).  Moreover, as we have already
discussed, section 431(c) itself assigns to the local government
responsibility for funding “a system of free public schools,” not
merely the capital expense component.  We therefore reject the
argument that the General Assembly has not assigned
responsibility for current expenses to local governments.
[5] Finally, the County Commission alleges that its due
process rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of its
motion to continue.  The legislature intended that the statutory
resolution process be carried out promptly.  See § 115C-431(c)
(“When a jury trial is demanded, the cause shall be set for the
first succeeding term of the superior court in the county, and
shall take precedence over all other business of the court.”). 
Assuming, without deciding, that the County Commission is a
“person” for due process purposes, it had ample opportunity to
communicate with and request information from the School Board
after its budget proposal was submitted, including the time
during which the boards were engaged in negotiation and mediation
leading to the instant suit.  See N.C.G.S. § 115C-429(c) (2007)
(“The board of county commissioners shall have full authority to
call for . . . all books, records, audit reports, and other
information bearing on the financial operation of the local
school administrative unit.”); § 115C-431(a), (b).  Therefore,
the trial court did not err by denying the motion to continue.
In sum, we reject the County Commission’s facial
challenge and uphold section 431(c) as constitutional. 
Nonetheless, because the trial court’s instructions invited the
jury to step beyond its role of determining necessary funding and
intrude upon the County Commission’s constitutional discretion,
we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to
that court for further remand to the trial court for a new trial. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Justice NEWBY concurring.
I agree with the majority that N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c)
can be read narrowly such that it withstands a facial challenge
based on Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina
Constitution.  I also agree that, in order to ensure section
115C-431(c) is applied in a constitutional manner, limiting jury
instructions are necessary in suits brought under that provision. 
I write separately because, although this case does not appear to
present any constitutional violations, the paramount importance
of educational funding compels me to address the interplay
between section 115C-431 and the General Assembly’s
constitutional duty to ensure equal opportunities for a sound
basic education for all of North Carolina’s public school
students.
The right to education is safeguarded in our State
Constitution.  Article I, Section 15 of the North Carolina
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Constitution establishes:  “The people have a right to the
privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard
and maintain that right.”  Our Constitution goes on to require: 
“Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”  N.C. Const.
art. IX, § 1.  Article IX, Section 2 of our Constitution, which
is entitled “Uniform system of schools,” provides:
(1) General and uniform system:  term. 
The General Assembly shall provide by
taxation and otherwise for a general and
uniform system of free public schools, which
shall be maintained at least nine months in
every year, and wherein equal opportunities
shall be provided for all students.
(2) Local responsibility.  The General
Assembly may assign to units of local
government such responsibility for the
financial support of the free public schools
as it may deem appropriate.  The governing
boards of units of local government with
financial responsibility for public education
may use local revenues to add to or
supplement any public school or
post-secondary school program.
By its plain language, Section 2(1) imposes solely on
the General Assembly the duty to provide for the State’s “uniform
system of free public schools . . . wherein equal opportunities
shall be provided for all students.”  In Leandro v. State, we
concluded that this subsection “requires that access to a sound
basic education be provided equally in every school district.” 
346 N.C. 336, 349, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256 (1997) (emphasis added). 
In so doing, we noted that the requirement of equal opportunities
for all public school students is part of the General Assembly’s
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constitutional duty to provide for the public schools.  Id. at
348, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
The first sentence of Section 2(2) enables the General
Assembly to require units of local government to bear some of the
cost of maintaining their local public schools.  However, no
school budget “may be funded in such a fashion that it fails to
provide the resources required to provide the opportunity for a
sound basic education.”  Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358
N.C. 605, 634, 599 S.E.2d 365, 388 (2004).
The second sentence of Section 2(2) permits local
governing boards, if they so choose, to use local revenues to
exceed the educational financing requirements placed on them by
the General Assembly.
Because the North Carolina Constitution
expressly states that units of local
governments with financial responsibility for
public education may provide additional
funding to supplement the educational
programs provided by the state, there can be
nothing unconstitutional about their doing so
or in any inequality of opportunity occurring
as a result.
Leandro, 346 N.C. at 349-50, 488 S.E.2d at 256.
Read together, the North Carolina Constitution and this
Court’s opinions in Leandro and Hoke County lead to the
conclusion that, while the General Assembly may require local
governments to contribute to the cost of maintaining their local
public schools, and the local governments may choose to exceed
that basic cost by contributing more than the General Assembly
requires, the minimum definition of a sound basic education must
be the same throughout the state.  Along with the minimum
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substantive requirements of a sound basic education, see id. at
347, 488 S.E.2d at 255, there must be a corresponding minimum
level of funding that is required for every student.  While the
legislature may delegate the authority to establish educational
funding levels, it may not do so in a manner that allows the per-
student financial aspect of a sound basic education to vary
substantially by county.  Otherwise the General Assembly will
have unconstitutionally abdicated its duty to ensure “equal
opportunities . . . for all students.”  N.C. Const. art. IX, §
2(1).
The General Assembly has codified the responsibilities
for educational funding in section 115C-426 of the General
Statutes, entitled “Uniform budget format.”  Three funds are
identified:  the State Public School Fund, the local current
expense fund, and the capital outlay fund.  N.C.G.S. § 115C-
426(c) (2007).  The State Public School Fund includes
“appropriations for the current operating expenses of the public
school system from moneys made available to the local school
administrative unit by the State Board of Education.”  Id. §
115C-426(d) (2007).  The capital outlay fund is used for
facilities and capital improvements.  Id. § 115C-426(f) (2007).
The parties to this case stipulated at trial that the
only issue in controversy is the portion of the county’s
education budget known as the local current expense fund. 
Section 115C-426(e) defines this fund as follows:
The local current expense fund shall
include appropriations sufficient, when added
to appropriations from the State Public
School Fund, for the current operating
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expense of the public school system in
conformity with the educational goals and
policies of the State and the local board of
education, within the financial resources and
consistent with the fiscal policies of the
board of county commissioners.
Id. § 115C-426(e) (2007).  This provision must be read in light
of Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution and
our holdings in Leandro and Hoke County.  Thus, at a minimum, the
funding must be sufficient to provide a sound basic education. 
Likewise, the funding cannot interfere with the discretion of the
local governing board to provide additional educational funding
as established by Article IX, Section 2(2).  Between these
parameters, the statute envisions an amount,
when added to appropriations from the State
Public School Fund, for the current operating
expense of the public school system in
conformity with the educational goals and
policies of the State and the local board of
education, within the financial resources and
consistent with the fiscal policies of the
board of county commissioners.
Id.  This is referred to in section 115C-431(c) as the “amount of
money . . . needed from sources under the control of the board of
county commissioners to maintain a system of free public
schools.”  N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c) (2007).  It is this amount
which is in controversy.
The counties’ discretion under Article IX, Section 2(2)
regarding whether (and by how much) to exceed the funding
responsibility assigned to them by the State belongs to the
counties alone, and the General Assembly cannot delegate that
discretion away from “[t]he governing boards of units of local
government with financial responsibility for public education.” 
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N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(2).  I therefore agree with the majority
opinion’s conclusion that, in a suit under N.C.G.S. § 115C-
431(c), the fact finder may only determine the amount of funding
that is statutorily required and may not decide the amount of
discretionary county funding.  As noted by the majority, in this
case, the court must instruct the jury that the amount of money
“needed from sources under the control of the board of county
commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools,”
N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c), is only the amount necessary to fulfill
“the educational goals and policies of the State” as they are set
forth in Chapter 115C.  Id. § 115C-426(e).
Unlike the majority, I believe that even when the
statutes are read narrowly, resolving a dispute under section
115C-426(e) through the procedure of section 115C-431(c) still
raises constitutional concerns.  Under the statutes, the many
factors to be considered in reaching a funding decision include
“the educational goals and policies of the State,” “the
educational goals and policies of . . . the local board of
education,” and “the financial resources and . . . fiscal
policies of the board of county commissioners.”  Id.  It concerns
me that requiring judicial actors to weigh such policy
considerations may be at odds with our Constitution’s requirement
that “[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers
of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct
from each other.”  N.C. Const. art. I, § 6.  Similarly, I worry
that section 115C-431(c) requires the courts to address
nonjusticiable political questions.  See Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C.
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696, 717, 549 S.E.2d 840, 854, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 975, 122 S.
Ct. 22, 150 L. Ed. 2d 804 (2001).  The majority opinion maintains
that section 115C-431(c) has not “assigned policy-making power to
the courts,” but I believe the determination of the amount of
funding needed to support the public school system is fraught
with political implications.  Budgetary decisions by nature
reflect policy considerations.  Local priorities can shift over
time, and those priorities are sure to affect the funding
decisions of local governments and courts, especially when jury
trial is available.  If the constitutional guarantee of a sound
basic education is to be realized throughout North Carolina, the
funding decision should be left to a body like the General
Assembly, which is in the best position to consider the full
range of evidence and balance the competing objectives.
I acknowledge, however, that this Court has held it
permissible for the General Assembly to delegate to the courts
the task of determining school funding levels.  In Board of
Education v. Board of County Commissioners, this Court upheld a
law that required the superior court division to resolve disputes
regarding the amount of tax needed to be levied to maintain a
county’s public schools for a four month period.  174 N.C. 469,
474, 93 S.E. 1001, 1003 (1917).  In accordance with the principle
of stare decisis, I adhere to this precedent despite my strong
reservations about courts’ ability to properly address the myriad
policy considerations that attend educational funding.
I am also concerned that the extent of discretion
assigned to the counties under section 115C-431 leaves open the
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possibility that counties could establish educational funding at
a level below that which is required to provide a sound basic
education.  To be sure, the General Assembly has to a large
extent acknowledged its duty to ensure that all public school
students receive an equally sound basic education.  Section 115C-
408(b) of the General Statutes provides in pertinent part:
To insure a quality education for every
child in North Carolina, and to assure that
the necessary resources are provided, it is
the policy of the State of North Carolina to
provide from State revenue sources the
instructional expenses for current operations
of the public school system as defined in the
standard course of study.
It is the policy of the State of North
Carolina that the facilities requirements for
a public education system will be met by
county governments.
N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(b) (2007).  These statements of policy
recognize the significant variations in the counties’ educational
needs (due to differences in population, for example) and that
those variations will be most manifest in the counties’
“facilities requirements.”  Id.  The General Assembly has
therefore expressed a preference to permit the counties to tend
to their capital needs as their individual circumstances dictate. 
“[T]he instructional expenses for current operations of the
public school system,” meanwhile, should be substantially equal
on a per-student basis, especially since all students are
provided the same “standard course of study.”  Id.  Thus, by
opting against county-based funding of instructional expenses for
current operations in order “[t]o insure a quality education for
every child in North Carolina,” this statute underscores the
constitutional policy that a sound basic education should be
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funded equally throughout the State.  Id.  The only reason
adherence to that policy might not be fully ensured is that the
lack of a statewide determination of the amount needed for a
sound basic education potentially enables the counties to fund
public education below the constitutionally required level. 
While I recognize the possibility that such a statewide
determination is already being made, the record before the Court
does not reflect that this is the case.
In summation, I believe the natural consequence of the
General Assembly’s constitutional duty to ensure an equally sound
basic education for all public school students in North Carolina
is a need for a statewide determination of the amount of money
that must be expended per student to achieve that constitutional
minimum.  I further believe N.C.G.S. § 115C-431 delegates
discretion over educational funding in a manner that does not
fully guarantee adherence to the constitutional mandate that
“equal opportunities shall be provided for all students” across
our state.  N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1).  Although this
particular case does not appear to present any violations of that
mandate, I believe the funding of our public schools is important
enough to warrant consideration of this issue.  Within the
context of the instant case, while I believe that a court of law
is not the proper mechanism for resolving the political questions
associated with educational funding, stare decisis constrains me
to concur with the majority.
Justice HUDSON dissenting.
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I agree entirely with the bulk of the reasoning and
analysis outlined in the majority opinion and particularly with
its conclusion that N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c) is constitutional on
its face.  However, I would decline to revisit the trial court’s
charge to the jury, an issue to which the majority concedes that
“counsel did not object or assign error.”  There is no showing in
the record or briefs before us that N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c) was
not properly applied in this case.  For that reason, I would
affirm the Court of Appeals decision finding no error in the
trial court’s entry of judgment based upon the jury’s verdict. 
As such, I respectfully dissent.
In our order allowing the County Commission’s petition
for discretionary review, we specifically limited our review to
whether “the statutory framework for resolving school funding
disputes between the county board of education and the county
board of commissioners [is] constitutional,” and, if so, whether
it was properly applied in this case.  Likewise, as noted by the
County Commission in its brief to this Court, “Legal error is
presented; the relevant facts are not disputed.”  None of the
arguments presented on appeal--before the Court of Appeals or
this Court, by the County Commission, the School Board, or any of
the amici curiae who submitted briefs--challenged, contested, or
otherwise found fault with either the trial court’s instructions
to the jury or with the “amount of money necessary to maintain a
system of free public schools” in Beaufort County, as determined
by the jury.  The sole basis of the appeal was the
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constitutionality of section 115C-431(c), both facially and as
applied.
I recognize that this Court does have “rarely used
general supervisory authority” to “consider questions which are
not properly presented according to our rules.”  State v.
Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 26, 215 S.E.2d 589, 594 (1975) (citations
omitted); compare Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 158 n.2, 540
S.E.2d 313, 323 n.2 (2000) (recognizing the Court’s
“constitutional supervisory powers over inferior courts” but
declining to exercise that authority to allow a nonparty’s
petition to be heard, as the issue presented was not an
“exceptional circumstance,” nor was the nonparty subjected to
“financial obligations imposed by order of a trial court” as in
other cases) with In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 547-48, 272
S.E.2d 861, 870-71 (1981) (electing to “treat the papers which
have ben filed [sic] . . . as a motion calling upon the court to
exercise its supervisory powers” and allow a county to appeal the
order in a juvenile proceeding because of the county’s
“significant interest in the outcome,” including possible future
expenditures).  However, I disagree that the trial court’s
instructions to the jury here constitute the type of “exceptional
circumstance” that calls for such action.  
As noted by the majority opinion, we “will not hesitate
to exercise . . . [that] authority when necessary to promote the
expeditious administration of justice.”  Stanley, 288 N.C. at 26,
215 S.E.2d at 594 (emphasis added).  In State v. Ellis, we
exercised the authority to review a Court of Appeals decision on
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a motion for appropriate relief in a noncapital case, finding
that such action “to review upon appeal any decision of the
courts below,” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12, was “particularly
appropriate when . . . prompt and definitive resolution of an
issue is necessary to ensure the uniform administration of North
Carolina criminal statutes,” 361 N.C. 200, 205, 639 S.E.2d 425,
428-29 (2007) (emphases added).  Likewise, although the majority
points to In re Brownlee as an analogous case presenting “a novel
issue of great import,” we invoked our authority in Brownlee to
allow the county to be a party to an appeal from a judgment that
compelled the county to spend tens of thousands of dollars even
though it was not a party to the case.  301 N.C. at 548, 272
S.E.2d at 870.  We did not, however, create the county’s
arguments for it; rather, we simply reviewed the arguments the
county had already presented to the Court.
Here, by acting ex mero motu to consider the trial
judge’s instructions to the jury and, by extension, the amount of
the award fixed by the jury, the majority acts contrary to our
own admonition that “[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts
. . . to create an appeal for an appellant,” as doing so leaves
“an appellee . . . without notice of the basis upon which an
appellate court might rule.”  Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359
N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005) (per curiam) (citation
omitted); see also Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp.
Co., 362 N.C. 191, 200, 657 S.E.2d 361, 366-67 (2008) (holding
that one factor to consider with respect to noncompliance with
appellate rules is “whether and to what extent review on the
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merits would frustrate the adversarial process” (citations
omitted)).  A thorough review of this record and the briefs and
arguments presented by all parties to this appeal clearly
illustrates that, not only has the County Commission never
objected to either the trial judge’s instructions to the jury or
to the amount awarded by the jury, neither has the School Board
ever articulated an argument in support of the same.  To step in
and set aside a jury verdict that has not been challenged is
indeed to “frustrate the adversarial process” through this
decision.
Moreover, while the majority maintains that the trial
judge “did not have the legal standard which we articulate today
to guide him in his consideration of the case,” State v.
McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1165, 90 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1986), I disagree.  In
McDowell, a capital case, we undertook extensive analysis of
existing case law to determine the proper standard on which to
review the State’s failure to disclose nonrequested evidence,
noting that the disclosure requirement turned on the
“materiality” of the evidence, a “somewhat elusive gauge” on
which the leading United States Supreme Court case, United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), was less than
clear as to the meaning of the term, and silent as to whether the
trial judge or the jury should decide the question.  McDowell,
310 N.C. at 69-73, 310 S.E.2d at 306-09.  Both defendant and the
State focused their arguments on appeal on the materiality
standard, and whether it was properly applied by the trial judge. 
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After articulating in plain terms what the standard should be, we
remanded to the trial court to reconsider defendant’s motion for
appropriate relief in light of that standard--one that had not
previously existed in our case law.  Id. at 75, 310 S.E.2d at
310.
By contrast, the legal standard applied by the trial
judge here clearly existed at the time of the trial and jury
verdict:  the plain language of section 115C431(c) itself
articulates the standard to determine “what amount of money is
needed from sources under the control of the board of county
commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools.”  Had
the County Commission found the instructions to the jury on the
definition of the word “needed” objectionable, the County
Commission could have made that issue part of its
“unconstitutional as applied” challenge to the statute.  Instead,
in its arguments on appeal, the County Commission focused
primarily on its facial challenge and relied on Board of
Education v. Board of County Commissioners, 240 N.C. 118, 81
S.E.2d 256 (1954), a case that is inapposite to the issue
presented here.  Even more telling, the County Commission did not
object to the jury instructions at trial and, under our appellate
rules, thereby waived any objections.  See N.C. R. App. P.
10(b)(2) (“A party may not assign as error any portion of the
jury charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly that to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection[.]”).
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There has been no showing by the County Commission or
any other party that the amount awarded by the jury here was
excessive or that it went beyond the restrictive definition of
“needed” articulated in the majority opinion.  Indeed, the amount
awarded by the jury, $10,200,000, was ultimately less than the
$12,106,304 requested by the School Board, and much closer to the
$9,434,217 originally budgeted by the County Commission.  This
amount is not the type of “runaway verdict” that suggests the
jury somehow overstepped its role, or disregarded the trial
judge’s instructions, but one indicating that the jury took
seriously its responsibilities and awarded a seemingly reasonable
figure that comports with the cost and expense projections
presented by the parties at trial.
The County Commission failed to present any persuasive
argument or evidence that section 115C-431(c) is unconstitutional
as applied here, and this Court should not unilaterally act to
create its case.  Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361.  In
my view, the majority’s decision to remand for a new trial
unnecessarily delays and prolongs the dispute between the
parties, already ongoing since the 2006-07 fiscal year, in a
manner contrary to the stated purpose of invoking our general
supervisory authority to contribute to “prompt and definitive
resolution of an issue.”  Ellis, 361 N.C. at 205, 639 S.E.2d at
428-29.  Perhaps even more significantly, this disposition runs
entirely counter to the clear intention of the General Assembly
that the statutory resolution process outlined in section 115C-
431(c) be carried out promptly.  See N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c) (in
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addition to other provisions for an immediate hearing, specifying
that, “When a jury trial is demanded, the cause shall be set for
the first succeeding term of the superior court in the county,
and shall take precedence over all other business of the
court.”). 
This case does not present the type of “unusual [or]
exceptional circumstance[]” in which we should invoke our “rarely
used general supervisory authority” to “consider questions which
are not properly presented according to our rules.”  Stanley, 288
N.C. at 26, 215 S.E.2d at 594.  Nor does setting aside the jury
award address any important constitutional questions or otherwise
“prevent manifest injustice to a party.”  N.C. R. App. P. 2; see
State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 332, 572 S.E.2d 108, 120 (2002)
(invoking Rule 2 to “address defendant’s contentions” “because
these issues raise important constitutional questions in the
context of a capital case), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 155 L.
Ed. 2d 1074 (2003).
For these reasons, I would follow the majority
opinion’s rationale as to the facial constitutionality of
N.C.G.S. § 15C-431(c) and further hold that the statute is
constitutional as applied in this case.  I would decline to
suspend the rules and consider an argument not before us on
appeal, and I would affirm in its entirety the Court of Appeals
decision finding no error in the trial court’s entry of judgment
on the jury verdict.  I respectfully dissent.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting
opinion.