Title: ALICE JO MORALES V AUTO OWNERS INSUR CO

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________ 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 30, 2003 
ALICE JO MORALES, as Guardian and
Conservator for ANTONIO MORALES, a
legally incapacitated person,
also known as ANTHONY MORALES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and 
JAMES W. BOYD, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Trustee, 
 
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122601 
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PER CURIAM 
AFTER REMAND 
At issue in this case is whether prejudgment interest 
awarded 
under 
MCL 
600.6013 
accrues 
during 
appellate 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
proceedings. On the authority of Dedes v Asch,1 the Court of 
Appeals held that it does not.2
 We disagree because the 
language 
of 
MCL 
600.6013 
unambiguously 
states 
that 
prejudgment interest is to be calculated from the date the 
complaint is filed. 
It contains no exception for periods 
of appellate delay. 
Accordingly, we overrule the 1998 
Court of Appeals decision in Dedes. 
We also reverse in 
part the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case and 
remand it to the trial court for recalculation of the 
prejudgment interest. 
I. Background 
Antonio Morales was left substantially disabled after 
an automobile accident in 1991. 
He had purchased no-fault 
insurance coverage from defendant Auto-Owners Insurance 
Company, but the company denied his claim on the ground 
that the policy had expired six days before the accident. 
Mr. Morales’s conservator, plaintiff Alice Jo Morales, 
filed suit against defendant. 
The trial court granted 
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed. 
This Court granted leave to appeal, 
reversed, and remanded the case for trial. 
458 Mich 288; 
582 NW2d 776 (1998). 
1233 Mich App 329, 340; 590 NW2d 605 (1998). 
2Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 4, 2002
(Docket No. 233826). 
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Thus, after about four years of appellate proceedings, 
this case was remanded to the Missaukee Circuit Court for 
trial. 
The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Morales, and 
the trial court awarded prejudgment interest to her under 
MCL 600.6013. 
Defendant argued that prejudgment interest 
should not accrue during the four-year period while the 
case was on appeal, because that delay was not its fault. 
The trial court rejected this argument and awarded full 
interest on the judgment. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. 
Relying on Dedes, it 
held that “[p]rejudgment interest does not continue to 
accrue during the appellate process.” It remanded the case 
to the trial court for a recalculation of prejudgment 
interest. 
Ms. Morales now seeks leave to appeal to this 
Court.3 
II. Standard of Review 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that 
this Court reviews de novo. Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc 
v City of Holland, 463 Mich 675, 681; 625 NW2d 377 (2001). 
The cardinal principle of statutory construction is that 
courts must give effect to legislative intent. 
Dressel v 
3On August 1, 2003, we granted two motions for leave to
file briefs amicus curiae and granted the motion to 
intervene filed by James W. Boyd, a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Trustee. 
We now grant Taco Bell Corporation’s and the
Michigan Defense Trial Counsel’s motions for leave to file
briefs amicus curiae. 
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Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 562; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). 
If the 
Legislature’s intent is clearly expressed, no further 
construction is permitted. 
Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 
99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000). Under such circumstances, a court 
is prohibited from imposing a “contrary judicial gloss” on 
the statute. 
In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes 
Special 
Projects 
Procurement 
v 
Continental 
Biomass 
Industries, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 119; 659 NW2d 597 (2003). 
III. Analysis  
 
MCL 600.60134 states:  
(1) Interest is allowed on a money judgment
recovered in a civil action . . . . 
* * * 
(6) For a complaint filed on or after 
January 1, 1987, but before July 1, 2002, if the
civil action has not resulted in a final,
nonappealable judgment as of July 1, 2002, and if
a judgment is or has been rendered on a written
instrument that does not evidence indebtedness 
with a specified interest rate, interest is 
calculated as provided in subsection (8). 
Subsection 8 confirms that interest accrues “from the date 
of filing the complaint” and that it “is calculated on the 
entire amount of the money judgment, including attorney 
fees and other costs.” MCL 600.6013(8). 
4This statute was amended after the trial court 
calculated the award of prejudgment interest. 
The most 
recent amendments apply to this case.
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In Dedes, the Court of Appeals held that prejudgment 
interest awarded under MCL 600.6013 may be disallowed for 
periods of delay that are neither the fault of, nor caused 
by, the judgment debtor. 
233 Mich App 340. 
The Dedes 
Court concluded that prejudgment appellate proceedings fell 
within this category, and it reversed the trial court’s 
grant of prejudgment interest for the period that the case 
was on appeal. It explained: 
To allow interest to continue to accrue 
during an appellate process would hinder parties
from asserting new and innovative arguments in
the trial court for fear that interest will 
continue to accrue on a claim that may be 
reversed during the appeal process. Id. 
Relying on Dedes, the Court of Appeals held here that 
defendant was not responsible for prejudgment interest 
during the four years that this case was on appeal. 
The Dedes decision is wholly inconsistent with MCL 
600.6013, 
which 
states 
that 
prejudgment 
interest 
is 
calculated “from the date of filing the complaint . . . .” 
MCL 600.6013(8). 
The statute makes no exception for 
periods of prejudgment appellate delay. In the face of the 
Legislature’s clearly expressed intent, this Court will not 
read such an exception into the statute. Dressel, 468 Mich 
562; In re Certified Question (Henes v Continental Biomass, 
468 Mich 119. 
Under MCL 600.6013, Ms. Morales is entitled 
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to an award of prejudgment interest that includes the four­
year period during which this case was on appeal.5 
IV. Conclusion 
Accordingly, we overrule the 1998 Court of Appeals 
decision in Dedes v Asch. 
We reverse part II of the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals concerning prejudgment 
interest in this case and remand the case to the circuit 
court for recalculation of the prejudgment interest. 
MCR 
7.302(G)(1). We otherwise deny plaintiff’s application for 
leave to appeal and defendant’s application to cross-appeal 
because we are not persuaded that this Court should review 
the other questions presented. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
5As a general rule, prejudgment interest runs from the
date the complaint is filed. 
Here, the judgment includes
an award of no-fault benefits that were not incurred until 
after the complaint was filed. 
In the trial court, Ms.
Morales agreed that prejudgment interest on those benefits
would run from the first date that the benefits were 
unpaid, not from when the complaint was filed. 
We do not 
intend our holding in this case to disturb the parties’
stipulation. 
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