Title: Poteat v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
BRAHEEM POTEAT,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 238, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IN01-07-2086  
                      IN01-07-2088
 
Submitted: November 5, 2003  
   Decided:  December 19, 2003   
 
Before HOLLAND, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Direct Appeal of Convictions of Trafficking in Cocaine and Resisting 
Arrest.  AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant 
Braheem Poteat. 
 
 
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Appellee State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
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The defendant-appellant, Braheem Poteat, was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Trafficking in Cocaine and Resisting Arrest.1  He was sentenced to a 
total of 4 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 3 years for 
probation.  This is Poteat’s direct appeal.  Before the Court for consideration is the 
appellant’s brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion 
to withdraw, and the State’s response thereto.  
 
 
 
 
 
Rule 26(c) Brief 
 
Poteat’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to 
Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: a) the 
Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination 
of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) 
the Court must conduct its own examination of the record and determine whether 
the appeal is totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that can be 
decided without an adversary presentation.2  
 
                                                 
1 Poteat was found not guilty of Loitering, but was also convicted of Possession of 
Cocaine, a lesser-included offense of Trafficking in Cocaine.  Because the possession conviction 
merged into the trafficking conviction, Poteat was not separately sentenced for possession.  
Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 910 (Del. 2003).    
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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Issues on Appeal  
 
Poteat’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete examination 
of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, Poteat’s counsel 
informed Poteat of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of 
the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the complete trial transcript.  
Poteat was also informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  
Poteat responded with a brief that raises three issues for this Court’s consideration.3  
The State has responded to the position taken by Poteat’s counsel, as well as the 
issues raised by Poteat, and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
Poteat raises three issues for this Court’s consideration.  He claims: a) the 
Superior Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for acquittal; b) there 
was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him; and c) he was denied 
his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facts 
 
There were a number of delays before Poteat’s case went to trial.  Poteat’s 
final case review was moved from April 22, 2002 to June 3, 2002 at the request of 
the defense.  On July 12, 2002, trial was scheduled for September 24, 2002.  
However, trial was continued on that date because defense counsel had identified a 
                                                 
3 While Poteat’s counsel identifies a possible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
this appeal, Poteat states that he does not wish to pursue the claim at this time. 
 
 
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conflict of interest.  Trial was then re-scheduled for January 2, 2003, but did not 
proceed on that date.4  On January 31, 2002, the defendant, acting pro se, filed a 
speedy trial motion.  The Superior Court then scheduled the trial for March 20, 
2003.  The trial was continued at the request of the defense, however, and a new 
date was set for April 3, 2003.  Trial proceeded on that date. 
 
The evidence at trial established that, on July 16, 2001, Officer William 
Draper of the Wilmington Police Department and his partner, Officer Curtis 
Velleverde, were on routine patrol in the City of Wilmington when they noticed 
Poteat and two other men on the corner of 29th and Market Streets.  Officer Draper 
previously had warned Poteat not to loiter in the area and decided to issue him a 
ticket.   
 
As the officers approached Poteat, he attempted to flag down a passing car, 
without success.  Poteat then placed on the curb a styrofoam cup he was holding.  
As the officers patted down the men for weapons, one of them sat down on the 
curb and knocked over the cup.   
 
Several bags of crack cocaine spilled out of the cup.  Poteat attempted to flee 
but was subdued and placed under arrest.  Irshad Bajwa, Ph.D., a forensic chemist 
                                                 
4 The Superior Court docket does not indicate the reason for this. 
 
 
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with the Delaware Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that the cocaine seized 
from Poteat weighed 5.38 grams.    
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence Sufficient    
 
Poteat’s first two claims are grounded in his contention of insufficiency of 
the evidence.  In reviewing such a claim, this Court determines whether, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, “any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”5  
The evidence at trial regarding the styrofoam cup and its contents clearly 
established the elements of Trafficking in Cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.6  
The evidence of Poteat’s attempt to flee clearly established the elements of 
Resisting Arrest beyond a reasonable doubt.7  Because there was sufficient 
evidence presented at trial to support Poteat’s convictions, there was no legal error 
or abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s denial of Poteat’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal.   
                                                 
5 Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 618 (Del. 1997). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4753A(a) (2) a. (“Any person who . . . is knowingly in actual 
or constructive possession of 5 grams or more of cocaine . . . is guilty of . . . ‘trafficking in 
cocaine.’”). 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1257 (“A person is guilty of resisting arrest when the person . . 
. intentionally flees from a peace officer who is effecting an arrest.”). 
 
 
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Speedy Trial Claim 
 
Poteat’s third claim is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial.  In order to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial 
have been violated, this Court looks to four factors: a) the length of the delay; b) 
the reasons for the delay; c) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and d) prejudice 
to the defendant.8  We have concluded that claim is without merit. 
 
The record reflects that Poteat was arrested in July 2001, but was not tried 
until April 2003, resulting in a delay of 20 months between arrest and trial.  Most 
of this delay, however, was caused by continuances requested by the defense.  
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding Poteat’s assertion of the right undermine 
his claim of a speedy trial violation.  Although he asserted his right to a speedy 
trial on January 31, 2003, resulting in a new trial date of March 20, 2003, trial on 
that date was continued at the request of the defense.   
 
Poteat’s assertion that he was prejudiced by the delay because of the death of 
a witness is unavailing.  While it appears that a witness, who would have testified 
that Poteat was not loitering, died prior to the trial, there is no evidence that the 
testimony of this witness would have altered the outcome of the trial.  Finally, the 
                                                 
8 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
 
 
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record reflects that, during much of the time Poteat asserts he was incarcerated 
awaiting trial in this case, he was actually incarcerated on other charges.   
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that Poteat’s 
appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  We 
are also satisfied that Poteat’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine 
the record and has properly determined that Poteat could not raise a meritorious 
claim in this appeal.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.