Title: Echterling Et Ux. v. Kalvaitis Et Ux.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

235 Ind. 141 (1955)
126 N.E.2d 573
ECHTERLING, ET UX
v.
KALVAITIS, ET UX.
No. 29,294.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 18, 1955.
Rehearing denied January 27, 1956.
*142 William L. Travis, Palmer C. Singleton, Jr. and Travis & Tinkham (of counsel), all of Hammond, for appellants.
Hanley & Hanley, of Rensselaer, and Roberts & Roberts, of Lowell, for appellees.
*143 LEVINE, J.
This cause was submitted to this court on a petition to transfer from the Appellate Court, where the judgment of the trial court was reversed. (Echterling v. Kalvaitis [1955], 123 N.E.2d 465.)
The facts are set forth correctly in the opinion of the Appellate Court, supra, as follows:
The Appellate Court considered only the evidence of adverse possession from 1906 to 1927, because of the 1927 act (Acts 1927, ch. 42, § 1, p. 119, being § 3-1314, Burns' 1946 Replacement). This act provides as follows:
It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the effect of the statute when applied to the facts before us. To do this, we must examine the language of the act and look to the intention of the Legislature in that enactment. Historically in Indiana, the adverse possessor's rights are acquired in twenty years under the statute of limitation, § 2-602, Sixth, Burns' 1946 Replacement (1953 Supp.). The 1927 act was enacted to halt the pernicious effect of squatters upon lands where title holders had paid taxes on lands owned by them, but where possession of parts of the land was usurped by squatters for long years without claim of title or payment of taxes. These squatters eventually claimed they became seized with title through adverse possession. Philbin v. Carr (1921), 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N.E. 19, 706.
Quoting from Commentaries on the Public Acts of Indiana, 1927  II, the Adverse Possession Act, by G.A. Farabaugh and Walter R. Arnold, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 113, 114:
See Philbin v. Carr (1921), 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N.E. 19, 706, supra, and Craven v. Craven (1914), 181 Ind. 553, 103 N.E. 333, 105 N.E. 41.
As to reason for adverse possession, see Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.), Vol. 4, § 1134, p. 406, Theory of Legislation.
The Indiana view of adverse possession is set out in Craven v. Craven, supra, where the court said (p. 560 of 181 Ind., p. 41 of 105 N.E.):
See Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 216, March, 1941, Commentary by James H. Neu.
The act of 1927 must be construed as being supplemental to the statute of limitations, and not as superseding it.
The court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that complete legal descriptions of real estate are not present on the tax duplicates issued by county or city treasurers. They are usually sketchy and inaccurate. 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, § 71 (2), p. 588; Hawley et al. v. Zigerly et al. (1893), 135 Ind. 248, 34 N.E. 219; Marley v. State ex rel. Chenoweth, Auditor of Martin County (1897), 147 Ind. 145, 46 N.E. 466.
*147 It would seem to us that, in view of the foregoing, where continuous, open, and notorious adverse possession of real estate has been established for twenty years to a contiguous and adjoining strip of land such as that here in question, and where taxes have been paid according to the tax duplicate, although said duplicate did not expressly include that strip, adverse possession is established to that strip even though the taxes were not paid by the adverse claimant. An example might be where one has record title to Lot No. 1 and has erected a building on that lot, which, twenty years later, is found by some surveyor to be one foot over on an adjoining lot, No. 2  the fact that the owner of Lot No. 1 was assessed for improvements (the building) and real estate (Lot No. 1) would be sufficient to comply with the statute as to payment of taxes.
In the case at hand there was ample evidence of open, adverse possession of this strip of land indicated by the old fence, especially when evidence after 1927 is considered.
It is well established that this court will not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, and where there is any substantial evidence of probative value to sustain the decision of the trial court it will be sustained. Perrin National Bank et al. v. Thompson (1898), 20 Ind. App. 649, 50 N.E. 410; Elkhart Paper Co. v. Fulkerson (1905), 36 Ind. App. 219, 75 N.E. 283; Associates Investment Co. v. Shelton (1952), 122 Ind. App. 384, 105 N.E.2d 354; McHenry v. Foutty (1945), 223 Ind. 335, 60 N.E.2d 781.
Substantial evidence shows that appellees and their predecessors in title had continuous, open, and notorious, *148 adverse possession of land up to an established boundary-line fence for a period of twenty years, which conferred fee-simple title to the strip in question by operation of law, and the original title of appellants was thereby extinguished. Wingler v. Simpson (1884), 93 Ind. 201; Riggs v. Riley (1888), 113 Ind. 208, 15 N.E. 253; Dyer et al. v. Eldridge et al. (1894), 136 Ind. 654, 36 N.E. 522; Palmer v. Dosch et al. (1897), 148 Ind. 10, 47 N.E. 176; Wood v. Kuper (1898), 150 Ind. 622, 50 N.E. 755; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Stickley (1900), 155 Ind. 312, 58 N.E. 192; Helton v. Fastnow (1904), 33 Ind. App. 288, 71 N.E. 230; Logsdon v. Dingg (1904), 32 Ind. App. 158, 69 N.E. 409; Rosenmeier v. Mahrenholz (1913), 179 Ind. 467, 101 N.E. 721; Grim v. Johns (1916), 61 Ind. App. 514, 112 N.E. 13; Scheigert v. Boyer (1919), 69 Ind. App. 674, 122 N.E. 670; Cooper v. Tarpley (1942), 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N.E.2d 640; Norling v. Bailey (1951), 121 Ind. App. 457, 98 N.E.2d 513, 99 N.E.2d 439.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Henley, C.J., and Achor, Bobbitt, and Emmert, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 126 N.E.2d 573.