Title: Wilson v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
BRIAN WILSON,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 201, 2020 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
  
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. N1901009072 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Submitted:  November 10, 2021 
Decided:     January 25, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, and 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices, constituting this Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware: AFFIRMED.  
 
Zachary A. George, Esquire (argued), Hudson Jones Jaywork & Fisher, Dover, 
Delaware, and Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire, Greto Law, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Defendant Below, Appellant Brian Wilson.   
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire (argued), Delaware Department of Justice, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Plaintiff Below, Appellee State of Delaware.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
SEITZ, Chief Justice:  
A Superior Court jury convicted Brian Wilson of first-degree murder for 
hiring someone to kill Allen Cannon.  On appeal, Wilson raises three claims of 
error—first, the court abused its discretion when it refused to allow testimony about 
a witness’s reputation as a snitch introduced to counter the witness’s incriminatory 
statement about Wilson and the murder; second, the court erred when it overruled a 
hearsay objection and admitted text messages that infer Wilson was the person 
responsible for Cannon’s murder; and third, the State committed a Brady violation 
when it failed to disclose a witness’s agreement with federal prosecutors to testify 
in Wilson’s trial in exchange for a possible lighter sentence.   
We affirm Wilson’s convictions.  The testimony about the witness’s 
reputation as a prison snitch was inadmissible character evidence not subject to any 
exceptions.  And while the State concedes that the text messages were inadmissible, 
the Superior Court’s error in admitting them was harmless.  Finally, we agree with 
the Superior Court that the impeachment evidence resulting from the alleged Brady 
violation was immaterial and does not undermine confidence in the verdict given the 
witness’s favorable testimony for the defense and the other evidence supporting 
Wilson’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
    
 
3 
I. 
According to the evidence at trial, in the early hours of June 25, 2016, an 
unidentified individual called 911 to complain about people gambling in front of her 
neighbor’s house.  When a Wilmington Police Department detective arrived, the 
group scattered.  They were involved in a high stakes dice game, and Wilson was 
part of this game with $10,000 in his pockets.  Before the game, Cannon asked Artie 
Pratt to steal the money from Wilson.  Wilson owed Cannon money, and Cannon 
wanted to collect.  Pratt attempted to take the money at the dice game but was 
unsuccessful.   
Wilson, frustrated that Cannon and Pratt tried to rob him, hired someone to 
kill Cannon.  Sometime between the dice game and the next morning, Wilson 
contacted Robert Shepard and asked if Shepard knew someone “that wanted to put 
some work in[.]”1  Shepard later testified this meant he was looking to hire someone 
to kill Cannon.  Shepard told him he did not know anyone.  Wilson contacted another 
man named Robert Teat, also known as Bobby Dimes, and asked the same question.  
Dimes arranged for an associate, Eric Ray, to kill Cannon for $10,000. 
The evening after the dice game, Cannon was in a car near the location of the 
dice game.  Tomika Tate, Pratt’s mother, saw Cannon crying in the car.  She walked 
over and asked Cannon to leave with her.  Cannon got out of the car but said he was 
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at A72–73. 
 
4 
waiting for something and could not leave.  About ten to fifteen minutes later, 
someone fatally shot Cannon from behind.  Tate was standing next to Cannon, so 
close that she fell to the ground when the gunshots started.  Tate testified that Ray 
was the one who shot Cannon.  Testimony and footage from security cameras 
showed that Dimes and Ray were standing around the scene of the shooting before 
it occurred, and Dimes was at the scene immediately after. 
In January of 2019, a New Castle County grand jury indicted Wilson for 
murder first-degree, conspiracy first-degree, and criminal solicitation first-degree.  
At trial, Wilson denied any involvement in the dice game or Cannon’s murder.  The 
State offered as witnesses several inmates who testified that Wilson told them that 
he had ordered Cannon’s murder.  One of the witnesses was Timothy Keyes.   
Keyes made a statement to Sergeant Robert Fox of the Wilmington Police 
Department three weeks before Wilson’s trial.  Keyes said Wilson admitted he had 
arranged Cannon’s murder by having Dimes hire Ray to kill Cannon in retaliation 
for the attempted theft.  But when the State called Keyes to testify at Wilson’s trial, 
he was uncooperative.  He did not comply with a subpoena, and only appeared as a 
witness after being served with a warrant.  At trial, Keyes said he had not been 
promised anything in exchange for his testimony.2  He then directly contradicted his 
prior statement to Sergeant Fox, stating “I don’t know anything about—[Wilson] 
 
2 Id. at A54–55. 
 
5 
never expressed anything to me about his case.”3  Keyes also said his prior statement 
to Sergeant Fox was based on what he read in the papers.4  As a result, the State 
introduced Keyes’ prior statement to demonstrate that Keyes’ story had changed 
dramatically.5   
Wilson’s counsel then attempted to introduce character evidence through the 
testimony of Thomas Wisher.  Wilson’s counsel asked Wisher, who had been in 
prison with Keyes, about Keyes’ reputation.  The State objected on the grounds that 
Wisher would testify that other people in prison viewed Keyes as a snitch, and this 
would be inadmissible hearsay and improper character evidence.  The trial court 
sustained the objection.6 
The State also offered text messages from Pratt’s cell phone relevant to 
Wilson’s guilt.  Wilson’s counsel objected, arguing that, because Pratt was 
unavailable to testify, the text messages were inadmissible hearsay.  The State 
claimed they were admissible under the business records exception to the rule 
against hearsay.  The Superior Court agreed and admitted the text messages.7 
The jury found Wilson guilty of all charges.  The Superior Court sentenced 
him to a mandatory life sentence at Level V for the murder charge, along with 
 
3 Id. at A57. 
4 Id. at A56. 
5 Id. at A57–60.  The statement was introduced as a prior, voluntary, out-of-court statement 
under 11 Del. C. § 3507. 
6 Id. at A76–77. 
7 Id. at A38; App. to Answering Br. at B31–32; B92. 
 
6 
additional Level V time for the remaining charges.8  Wilson timely appealed his 
conviction.   
Shortly after filing an appeal, new information came to light.  On October 21, 
2020, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Delaware informed the 
State that an Assistant United States Attorney told Keyes the Office would consider 
his cooperation in Wilson’s case when recommending a sentence for federal charges.  
The State informed Wilson’s counsel, and the parties sought a stay of Wilson’s 
appeal and a remand to the Superior Court to consider the implications under Brady 
v. Maryland,9 which we granted. 
On remand, Wilson moved for a new trial or dismissal on the basis that the 
State’s failure to disclose the offer to Keyes was a Brady violation.  The Superior 
Court held that, while the offer was evidence that could be used to impeach Keyes, 
no Brady violation occurred because the State did not suppress the evidence.10  It 
also found that the State was not aware of the offer until October 2020 and the State 
disclosed the evidence as soon as it learned of it.11   
The court also ruled that, even if the U.S. Attorney’s Office offer should have 
been disclosed to the defense, it was immaterial as impeachment evidence.12  Keyes’ 
 
8 State v. Wilson, 2021 WL 1056769 at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 19, 2021). 
9 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
10 2021 WL 1056769 at *3. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at *3–5. 
 
7 
testimony at trial contradicting his statement to Sergeant Fox was helpful to the 
defense and impeachment of his prior statement to Sergeant Fox was unnecessary 
and counterproductive.13  Finally, the court ruled that, even if the offer should have 
been disclosed to the defense before trial, the other evidence at trial strongly 
supported Wilson’s convictions.14   
II. 
On appeal, Wilson challenges two of the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings 
and raises a constitutional claim.  We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for 
abuse of discretion,15 and we review constitutional claims de novo.16 
A. 
Wilson argues first that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it 
sustained the objection to the admission of Wisher’s testimony.  He contends that 
Wisher’s testimony was admissible character evidence because Keyes’ character for 
truthfulness became relevant when the State introduced Keyes’ prior statement.  
According to Wilson, the testimony that Keyes was viewed among prison inmates 
as a snitch would show that Keyes has a reputation for untruthfulness and call into 
question the credibility of his prior statement. 
 
13 Id. at *5. 
14 Id. at *6. 
15 Edwards v. State, 925 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del. 2007). 
16 Waters v. State, 242 A.3d 778, 782 (Del. 2020). 
 
8 
The State counters that, because the testimony was based on what Wisher 
heard from inmates that were not testifying, it was inadmissible hearsay.  The State 
also argues that Wisher’s testimony does not show that Keyes has a character for 
untruthfulness.  At most, a reputation as a snitch demonstrates that the witness is 
willing to cooperate with the State. 
Character evidence is generally inadmissible, but “[e]vidence of a witness’s 
character may be admitted under [Delaware Rules of Evidence] 607, 608, and 
609.”17  Rule 608 provides that a witness’s credibility may be attacked “by testimony 
about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness,” but “only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been 
attacked.”18 
Even if we accept that Keyes’ character for truthfulness had been attacked by 
the State when it introduced Keyes’ prior inconsistent statement, Wilson has failed 
to show that Wisher’s testimony relates to Keyes’ character for truthfulness.  A 
“snitch” in this context is an inmate who informs the government of what other 
inmates have said or done, usually in exchange for preferential treatment.  But a 
snitch is not necessarily an untruthful person.   
 
17 D.R.E. 404. 
18 D.R.E. 608. 
 
9 
The distinction was made clear in the Ohio case State v. Spence.19  There, the 
defense offered testimony that the prosecution’s witness had a reputation as a prison 
snitch.  The Court of Appeals of Ohio held that this testimony was inadmissible 
character evidence to impeach a witness’s credibility because it would require the 
court to “accept the notion that cooperation with authorities in the criminal 
prosecution of fellow inmates equates to being untruthful.”20   
We agree with this reasoning.  A reputation as a snitch could arise because an 
inmate truthfully informs the government of what other inmates say.  While other 
inmates might not tell that individual the truth, this does not mean that the inmate is 
an untruthful person, just that he cannot be trusted to withhold incriminating 
information from the government.  Because Wisher’s testimony would have shown 
only that Keyes had a reputation as a snitch and this does not directly relate to Keyes’ 
character for truthfulness, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
refused to admit the testimony. 
B. 
Next, Wilson argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it 
admitted text messages between Pratt and another person under the business records 
 
19 2006 WL 3438668 at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006). 
20 Id. at *12.  The court in Spence relied on Rule 608 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence to reach this 
conclusion.  Both D.R.E. 608 and Rule 608 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence are identical to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 608.    
 
10 
exception to the evidentiary rule against admission of hearsay.21  The State concedes 
that the text messages should not have been admitted under this exception.22  While 
the error is clear, we find that it was harmless.   
We have held that “[a]n error in admitting evidence may be deemed 
‘harmless’ when ‘the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .’”23  Here, the other evidence is extensive, and 
supports Wilson’s conviction.  At trial, Tate confirmed the illegal dice game that 
night, and that Cannon and Pratt tried to rob Wilson at the game.24  Shepard testified 
that Cannon and Pratt tried to rob Wilson, that Wilson was upset about the attempted 
robbery and wanted to retaliate, and that Wilson asked Shepard if he knew someone 
Wilson could hire to kill Cannon.25  The State also presented evidence of extensive 
contacts between Wilson and Dimes, and Dimes and Ray.26  Additionally, the State 
offered security camera footage showing that Dimes and Ray were near the scene of 
the crime immediately before the murder occurred.27  Tate testified that she was 
standing next to Cannon when he was shot,28 and that Ray was the one who shot 
 
21 D.R.E. 803(6).  Neither individual testified at trial. 
22 Answering Br. at 18 (“The State acknowledges that the text messages were not admissible 
pursuant to DRE 803(6), the business record exception to the rule against hearsay.”).  
23 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 597 (Del. 2001) (quoting Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 77 (Del. 
1993)). 
24 App. to Answering Br. at B24–26. 
25 App. to Opening Br. at A70–73. 
26 App. to Answering Br. at B105–07. 
27 Id. at B12–13. 
28 Id. at B22–23. 
 
11 
Cannon.29  The State also offered admissible text messages from Dimes’ phone sent 
the day after Cannon’s murder that include a picture of Dimes holding a large 
amount of cash.30  There was also testimony from other inmates who heard Wilson 
admit he hired Dimes and Ray to kill Cannon.31  Finally, Tate testified that she sent 
Pratt to North Carolina out of fear for Pratt’s life.32  Because this evidence was more 
than sufficient to sustain Wilson’s conviction, the court’s admission of the text 
messages was harmless error. 
C. 
Finally, we address Wilson’s argument that the State improperly suppressed 
material impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland.33  He claims the 
Superior Court erred because the State was aware of the offer to Keyes by the federal 
government weeks before Wilson’s trial and failed to disclose it.  He also argues that 
the impeachment evidence would impact the credibility of Keyes’ prior recorded 
statement, which was offered by the State as affirmative evidence that Wilson 
committed the alleged crimes.  Wilson contends his inability to attack the credibility 
of part of the State’s evidence undermines confidence in Wilson’s conviction and 
makes the non-disclosure material to the defense.   
 
29 Id. at B30; App. to Opening Br. at A34. 
30 Id. at B107. 
31 Id. at B47–48; B62–70; B83. 
32 Id. at B26–27. 
33 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
12 
The State responds that the record supports the Superior Court’s finding that 
the State disclosed the impeachment evidence to the defense immediately after the 
State became aware of it.  The State also argues that Wilson’s testimony on direct 
already discredited Keyes’ prior recorded statement, and further impeachment would 
have been cumulative.  And even if the State suppressed the impeachment evidence, 
it was not material and does not undermine confidence in the trial record full of other 
evidence supporting Wilson’s conviction.   
As we said recently in Risper v. State, under the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brady, “the prosecution has a constitutional obligation to 
disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence within its possession to the defense 
when that evidence might be material to the outcome of the case.”34  There are three 
elements of a Brady violation:  “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, 
because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the 
state; and (3) its suppression prejudices the defendant.”35   
The Delaware United States Attorney’s Office offer to Keyes was potentially 
impeaching.  An offer of possible sentencing leniency in exchange for testifying 
during Wilson’s trial could have undermined Keyes’ trial testimony if he had 
testified that Wilson was implicated in the killing.  It is also unclear when 
 
34 250 A.3d 76, 90 (Del. 2021). 
35 Risper, 250 A.3d at 90 (quoting Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2003)). 
 
13 
representatives of the State had knowledge of the offer.36  But even if the State 
should have disclosed the offer earlier, it was immaterial to the trial and Wilson’s 
convictions.   
Impeachment evidence is material if the failure to disclose the evidence 
“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”37  “The question is not whether 
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the 
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial 
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”38  In Kyles v. Whitley, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held this is not a “sufficiency of the evidence test[;]” rather, a Brady violation 
is shown when “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole 
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”39   
Here, the possible impeachment evidence was not material to a fair trial.  
During his trial testimony Keyes “retracted his prior statements made to [Sergeant] 
Fox” and “unequivocally stated, in response to a question from [Wilson’s counsel], 
 
36 After Wilson’s trial, the United States Attorney’s Office sent a letter to the State to inform it of 
the potential impeachment evidence for Keyes.  App. to Opening Br. at A90–92.  The letter said 
that Keyes and his lawyer met with Sergeant Fox, an Assistant United States Attorney, and two 
other federal agents on December 6, 2019.  Id. at A91–93.  Keyes discussed Wilson at this meeting, 
and “[p]ortions of Keyes’ statement were recorded by [Sergeant Fox] . . . .”  Id. at A91.  The letter 
also said that “[p]rior to that recording, [the Assistant United States Attorney] told Keyes that if 
he testified in Wilson’s state trial, his cooperation would factor into the government’s ultimate 
sentencing recommendation in Keyes’ federal case.”  Id. at A91–92.  The letter does not clarify 
whether Sergeant Fox was present when this statement was made or aware of the offer presented 
to Keyes.  Id. at A92.     
37 U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). 
38 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  See also Risper, 250 A.3d at 92–93.   
39 Id. at 434–35. 
 
14 
that [Wilson] never admitted to hiring anyone to kill the victim in this case.”40  It 
would have been counterproductive to impeach Keyes’ out of court statement when 
the defense wanted to rely on Keyes’ credibility and his in-court testimony.  As 
explained by the Superior Court: 
During cross examination, Defense Counsel did inquire into Keyes’ 
motivation for testifying, but he quickly realized that Keyes testimony 
was helpful to Defendant’s case and pivoted from that line of 
questioning. At that point, it would have been unfruitful to impeach 
Keyes since his testimony served to benefit Defendant.  Instead, 
Defendant argued to the jury that Keyes’ in-court testimony was to be 
believed, thereby thwarting the benefit to be derived by the State from 
its cooperating witness.41 
 
Finally, as discussed earlier, we agree with the Superior Court that the 
evidence of Wilson’s guilt in the trial record supports his convictions beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  But more important to our Brady analysis is our conclusion that 
the prosecution’s disclosure to the defense of the offer to Keyes in the federal case 
would not have put Wilson’s case in such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the jury’s verdict.  As the Superior Court held: 
the jury had available to it overwhelming, well corroborated, credible 
evidence in the forms of text messages, police testimony, and a 9-1-1 
call that established that an attempted robbery of [sic] high-stakes dice 
game occurred on the East Side of Wilmington, just days before the 
murder at issue.  Multiple sources and witnesses were presented against 
Defendant for the purpose of demonstrating his involvement in the 
alleged crimes.42   
 
40 Wilson, 2021 WL 1056769, at *4. 
41 Id. at *5. 
42 Id. at *6. 
 
15 
III. 
We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.