Title: Clark v. Clark

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Clark v. Clark (99-028); 172 Vt. 351; 779 A.2d 42

[Filed 22-Jun-2001]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 02-Aug-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-028

Alison M. Clark	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Chittenden Family Court

Thomas B. Clark	                                 June Term, 2000

Linda Levitt, J.

Mary P. Kehoe of Saxer Anderson Wolinsky & Sunshine, P.C., Burlington, for 
  Defendant-Appellant.

Kathleen B. Hobart of Fitzpatrick & Hobart, Jeffersonville, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

PRESENT: Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Toor, Supr. J., 
         Specially Assigned.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Father appeals from an order of the Chittenden Family
  Court granting  mother's motion to modify child support.  He argues that
  the court had no jurisdiction to modify the  award because mother failed to
  meet her burden of showing a real, substantial and unanticipated  change of
  circumstances, see 15 V.S.A. § 660(a) & (b); and, even if the court had
  jurisdiction, it  incorrectly determined the amount of the modified award. 
  We affirm.

       The following facts are not in dispute.  Mother and father were
  married in 1980.  Their son  Justin was born in 1982 and their daughter
  Mattie was born in 1986.  Justin suffers from moderate 

 

  cerebral palsy and, developmentally, is about five years behind his
  chronological age.   He also  suffers from attention deficit disorder and,
  as a result, has problems with his peers and with authority  figures. 
  Mattie is healthy and has no special needs.

       During the marriage, the parties resided in Charlotte, and Justin
  attended Charlotte  Elementary School, where he received special education
  services.  The parties were divorced in  1993.  Pursuant to the parties'
  stipulation, the court, in its final divorce order, awarded mother 
  parental rights and responsibilities for Justin and Mattie, awarded father
  visitation, and provided that  child support would be determined by the
  magistrate.  Over father's objection, the court awarded  mother sole
  possession of her interest in her father's estate and the Alison Clark
  Trust, a testamentary  trust established by her father.  The magistrate
  subsequently set child support at $944.92 per month,  pursuant to the
  parties' stipulation.

       Father appealed the portion of the family court's decision that
  awarded mother the estate and  trust.  In March 1994, the magistrate issued
  a child support order in the amount of $1,287.00 per  month, in accordance
  with the child support guidelines.  Father agreed to dismiss his appeal
  when  mother agreed to stipulate to a child support order of $600.00 per
  month.  In November 1994, the  parties stipulated to child support of
  $600.00 per month, and in December 1994, the magistrate  amended the order
  accordingly.  The amended order deviated from the child support guidelines
  by  more than ten percent.

       In the spring of 1994, mother moved to South Burlington because she
  found Charlotte too  isolating, and because she had heard positive things
  about the South Burlington school system's  program for special-needs
  children.  Justin, however, had difficulty in the school system.  In March 
  1995, mother visited Crotchet Mountain Rehabilitation Center and
  Preparatory School in New 

 

  Hampshire, determined it was appropriate for Justin, and enrolled him there
  in June 1995, at a cost of  $88,349.00 per year.  In September 1995, mother
  filed a motion to modify child support; in June  1998, the magistrate
  granted mother's motion and set child support at $1,707.00 per month.  The 
  family court affirmed.  Father appeals.

       I.  Real, Substantial and Unanticipated Change of Circumstances

       Father first argues that the court had no jurisdiction to modify the
  award.  According to  father, because Justin's needs were apparent from an
  early age, the fact that he required special  schooling was not a real,
  substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances. (FN1)

     15 V.S.A. § 660(a) provides, in pertinent part:

        On motion of either parent . . . and upon a showing of a real, 
        substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances, the court may 
        annul, vary or modify a child support order, whether or not the order 
        is based upon a stipulation or agreement.

     15 V.S.A. § 660(b) provides, in pertinent part:

        A child support order . . . [that] varies more than ten percent from the 
        amounts required to be paid under the support guideline, shall be 
        considered a real, substantial and unanticipated change of 
        circumstances.

       Under § 660(b), because the child support order mother sought to
  modify deviated from the  guidelines by more than ten percent, the court
  had jurisdiction to modify the order.  See Grimes v.  Grimes, 159 Vt. 399,
  406, 621 A.2d 211, 214 (1992) (declining to reach issue of whether decrease 

 

  in father's income was real, substantial and unanticipated change in
  circumstances under § 660(a),  citing § 660(b), and stating:  "Because it
  is undisputed that the 1987 order set the child support  obligation more
  than 10% above the guideline amount, the court did not err in modifying the 
  order."). 

                            II.  Amount of award

       Father argues that the court incorrectly determined the amount of the
  modified award because  the court failed to impute income to mother for
  stocks that father contends are performing poorly,  stocks that were not
  generating any income at the time of the hearing, expenses the trust incurs 
  annually, and the increase in value of the trust corpus.  Further, father
  argues, the court erroneously  imputed $600 per month in income to him
  based upon the monthly rental value of a cottage that  father's employer
  allows him to live in for free.

       In Vermont, child support obligations are based upon the gross incomes
  of the parties.  See  Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 154 Vt. 103, 107, 574 A.2d 772, 775 (1990).  The language of 15 V.S.A. §  653(5) defines "gross
  income," in the context of child support calculations, as the "actual gross 
  income of the parent,"  including "income from any source, including, but
  not limited to, . . . trust  income."  15 V.S.A. § 653(5)(A)(i).
  Furthermore, the definition of gross income provides that  "[i]ncome at the
  current rate for long-term United States Treasury Bills shall be imputed to 
  nonincome producing assets with an aggregate fair market value of
  $10,000.00 or more."  Id.  (emphasis added).  

       The magistrate declined to impute income to mother for stocks that
  father contended were  performing poorly because he concluded that mother's
  investments were income-producing assets.   The family court affirmed. 
  Here, it is undisputed that mother's investments are income producing 

 

  assets.  Thus, because the statute only applies to nonincome producing
  assets, father's argument fails.  See Tarrant v. Department of Taxes, 169
  Vt. 189, 197,