Title: Attorney Grievance v. Harmon

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Anthony Maurice Harmon
Misc. Docket AG No. 83, September Term 2011
Attorney Discipline – Sanction - Indefinite Suspension
Attorney failed to represent clients with reasonable diligence, failed to communicate with
those clients adequately concerning the representation and his fees, and charged excessive
and unreasonable fees.  The attorney also failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful requests
for information.  In light of the attorney’s prior disciplinary record involving  similar
violations, and the lack of mitigating circumstances, the appropriate sanction is an indefinite
suspension. Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a) and 8.1(b).
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No.: CAE-12-07689
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 83
September Term 2011
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF
MARYLAND  
v.
ANTHONY MAURICE HARMON
Barbera, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts,
JJ.
Opinion by McDonald, J.
Filed: October 21, 2013
The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Commission”) charged Anthony Maurice
Harmon with violating several provisions of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct (“MLRPC”), including MLRPC 1.3 (duty to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness), MLRPC 1.4 (duty to inform and consult with client and comply with requests
for information), MLRPC 1.5(a) (prohibition against unreasonable fees), MLRPC 1.15 (duty
to keep safe funds of clients or third parties), MLRPC 8.1(b) (duty to respond to lawful
demand for information from disciplinary authority), and MLRPC 8.4(d) (prohibition against
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).  The alleged violations all arose during
Mr. Harmon’s representation of three clients.  
Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a) and 16-757, we referred the matter to Judge
Toni E. Clarke of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to conduct a hearing and to
provide findings of facts and recommended conclusions of law.  Based on the facts
concerning the violations that were deemed admitted and the evidence concerning mitigation
presented at the hearing, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Harmon had violated  MLRPC
1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), and 8.1(b), and that no mitigating circumstances existed.   No exceptions
1
were filed by either party to the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions.  
We cannot say that the hearing judge’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous; those
findings, though summary in nature, lead inexorably to the conclusion that Mr. Harmon
 Bar Counsel withdrew the allegation that Mr. Harmon violated MLRPC 1.15, and
1
the hearing judge made no findings as to that allegation.  Although the record before us does
not indicate explicitly that Bar Counsel abandoned the allegation that Mr. Harmon violated
MLRPC 8.4(d), it appears that Bar Counsel did not pursue that allegation and the hearing
judge did not address it in her findings of fact and conclusions of law.
committed the violations found by the hearing judge.  In the absence of any exceptions, our
task is to determine the appropriate sanction in this case.  Bar Counsel  recommends that Mr.
Harmon be indefinitely suspended for his violations, while Mr. Harmon urges us to consider
suspension for a definite period to run concurrently with the sanction that was recently
imposed for his prior violations.   For the reasons stated below, we agree with Bar Counsel
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that an indefinite suspension is in order.
Procedural History  
On August 9, 2012, pursuant to the parties’ request, the hearing judge postponed the
evidentiary hearing until October 18, 2012.    At the August proceeding, she also ruled that
3
the facts in Bar Counsel’s Request for Admission would be deemed admitted because Mr.
Harmon’s Answer to the Request for Admission was unresponsive, it was not filed within
30 days as required under Maryland Rule 2-424(b), and he did not file a request for an
extension of time.   See Maryland Rule 2-424(c) (“If the court determines that an answer
4
 Mr. Harmon has been a subject of a prior disciplinary action for mishandling his
2
attorney trust account and for his failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s resulting inquiries.  In
that case, this Court ordered that Mr. Harmon be indefinitely suspended with the right to
apply for reinstatement no sooner than six months.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harmon,
433 Md. 612, 72 A.3d 555 (2013).
 At the August 9, 2012 hearing, Mr. Harmon requested a postponement, stating that
3
he wanted to call character witnesses and witnesses regarding his state of mind at the time
of his violations.  The Commission joined Mr. Harmon’s request for the purpose of obtaining
an independent medical evaluation of Mr. Harmon. 
 Mr. Harmon was personally served with the petition on May 8, 2012.  On July 11,
4
2012, he filed his answer, generally denying and admitting to the factual averments in the
petition.  On May 8, 2012, Bar Counsel served Mr. Harmon with a Request for Admission
2
does not comply with the requirements of this Rule, it may order either that the matter is
admitted or that an amended answer be served.”). 
The evidentiary hearing on October 18, 2012 was devoted solely to the existence of
mitigating circumstances and the Commission’s allegation that Mr. Harmon had failed to
respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful requests for information during its investigations.  Jeffrey
Janofsky, M.D., an expert in the area of forensic psychiatry, and Investigator William
Ramsey testified on behalf of the Commission.  Mr. Harmon testified that difficulties in his
personal life and the resulting emotional turmoil constituted mitigating factors, but did not
call character witnesses or offer expert testimony or documentation.
Background
Mr. Harmon was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1999.  During the time period
relevant to this proceeding, he maintained an office in Prince George’s County.  The alleged
violations stem from the complaints of three clients concerning his representation of them. 
The hearing judge deemed the facts described below to be admitted as to those matters, and
made additional findings concerning Mr. Harmon’s failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel
and the lack of mitigating circumstances. 
of Facts and Genuineness of Documents, and a Request for Production of Documents.  Three
months later, on August 9, 2012, Mr. Harmon filed his Answer to the Request for Admission
of Facts and Genuineness of Documents.  
3
The Christian Complaint
In August 2008, Alexis Christian paid $2,500 to retain Mr. Harmon to represent her
in an uncontested divorce and a related marital property settlement.  Subsequently, she paid
additional funds for costs and filing fees.  
During his representation, Mr. Harmon failed to adequately inform Ms. Christian
concerning the terms of the fee agreement and the manner in which the fee would be
calculated; failed to keep her informed regarding the accrual of fees; and charged her an
unreasonable and excessive fee.  He also failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in obtaining service of process on her husband, pursuing the divorce on her
behalf, and responding to her requests for information.  After Ms. Christian filed a complaint
with the Commission, he failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s demands for information – in
particular, an accounting of the fees he charged Ms. Christian. 
The Lawrence Complaint
On or about July 20, 2007, Steven Lawrence retained Mr. Harmon to represent him
in a divorce and related child custody and support matter.  Mr. Lawrence signed a retainer
agreement, agreeing to pay a $2,500 retainer fee and $200 per hour for Mr. Harmon’s
services.  He paid the retainer fee in installments over the next two and one-half months.  Mr.
Harmon represented Mr. Lawrence until his divorce became final on April 21, 2009. 
During his representation, Mr. Harmon failed to provide Mr. Lawrence an accounting
for the use of the $2,500 retainer fee, and to keep him informed, including failing to answer
4
his requests for information concerning the fee accrual.  After the representation had ended,
Mr. Harmon failed to respond to Mr. Lawrence’s requests for information regarding the fees. 
Mr. Harmon also failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s demand for information during its
investigation. 
The Proctors’ Complaint
On or about August 13, 2009, Mr. Harmon agreed to represent Timothy and Natalie
Proctor (the “Proctors”) in an employment matter in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, even though he was not admitted to practice before that court. 
Furthermore, Mr. Harmon misrepresented to the Proctors that he was experienced in
employment law. 
During his representation, Mr. Harmon failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness and failed to respond to the Proctors’ demands for information concerning the
case.  In particular, Mr. Harmon failed to inform the Proctors about the time and location of
a scheduled mediation in a timely manner.  In addition, Mr. Harmon failed to keep the
Proctors informed about the accrual of attorney’s fees, and failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s
demand for information during its investigation. 
Bar Counsel’s Requests for Responses to Complaints
Bar Counsel sent a letter notifying Mr. Harmon of Ms. Christian’s complaint on July
16, 2010, and requesting a written response within 15 days.  Bar Counsel subsequently sent
a second letter, again requesting a written response within 10 days.  Approximately two
5
months later, on September 15, 2010, Bar Counsel received Mr. Harmon’s response, dated
July 31, 2010; Mr. Harmon represented that he had sent the response on August 1, 2010.
 
Bar Counsel sent a letter notifying Mr. Harmon of Mr. Lawrence’s complaint on
November 12, 2010 and requesting a written response within 15 days.  Mr. Harmon failed
to respond to the request.
Bar Counsel sent a letter notifying Mr. Harmon of the Proctors’ complaint on October
6, 2010, and requesting a written response within 15 days; this letter was followed by a
second letter on November 3, 2010, and a third letter on January 5, 2011.   Mr. Harmon
finally replied to the third letter on January 25, 2011. 
Bar Counsel’s Requests for Production of Files and Financial Records
On November 22, 2010, Investigator Ramsey interviewed Mr. Harmon in regard to
Ms. Christian’s complaint, and asked Mr. Harmon to produce the financial records of the fees
he received from Ms. Christian in 2008.  Mr. Harmon did not comply with this request.  
On December 14, 2010, Assistant Bar Counsel and Investigator Ramsey met with Mr.
Harmon and asked him to provide records of the payments he received from both Ms.
Christian and Mr. Lawrence.  This request was followed by Bar Counsel’s letters of
December 16, 2010 and January 31, 2011, requesting Mr. Harmon to either provide the
records or specify what records he was unable to provide.  Mr. Harmon never responded.
On April 5, 2011, Investigator Ramsey met with Mr. Harmon and requested that he
provide a copy of the Proctors’ file.  Because Mr. Harmon did not comply with this request,
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Investigator Ramsey scheduled a meeting at Mr. Harmon’s office on June 27, 2011. 
Investigator Ramsey arrived at Mr. Harmon’s office for the scheduled meeting but left after
Mr. Harmon failed to appear more than a half-hour after the appointed time.  
On July 14, 2011, Mr. Harmon finally delivered the copies of the files of the three
complaining clients, but he never produced the requested financial records of the payments
he received from Ms. Christian and Mr. Lawrence. 
Bar Counsel’s Requests for Production of Medical Records
On August 17, 2012, Bar Counsel sent a letter informing Mr. Harmon that he should
contact the Commission’s expert psychiatrist, Dr. Jeffrey Janofsky, on or before August 30,
2012 to arrange an appointment.  Bar Counsel asked Mr. Harmon to provide “medical
records from [his] primary care physician, any other physicians who treated [him] within the
last 4 years and any hospitalizations within the last 4 years,” as well as “records, including
treatment notes,” from Dr. Raymond Carnegie and Mr. Lloyd Williams.    
5
Dr. Janofsky met with Mr. Harmon on September 11, 2012.  However, Mr. Harmon
did not bring the requested records for Dr. Janofsky’s review.  During the session, Dr.
Janofsky again requested that Mr. Harmon provide him with any past psychiatric treatment
records and, when Mr. Harmon did not comply, Dr. Janofsky left him a phone message
repeating the request.  Mr. Harmon never provided the requested records.  The only
 In his Answers to Bar Counsel’s Interrogatories, filed August 9, 2012, Mr. Harmon
5
stated that he was in counseling with Dr. Raymond Carnegie, a psychologist, and Mr. Lloyd
Williams, a “spiritual counsel” who is also a member of his church.
7
document Dr. Janofsky received as to Dr. Carnegie was a letter by Dr. Carnegie dated
November 3, 2011, which stated that Mr. Harmon had been undergoing therapy with Dr.
Carnegie, that a number of personal issues had “taken a toll on Mr. Harmon,” but that Dr.
Carnegie had “not seen any evidence that [Mr. Harmon] is incapable of performing the duties
of his profession.”6
At the October 2012 evidentiary hearing, Mr. Harmon testified that he had asked Dr.
Carnegie, by telephone and in person during a counseling session in late August 2012, to
provide his records and notes to Bar Counsel.  However, Mr. Harmon was unable to explain
why Dr. Carnegie never provided them.
The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law
Based on the admissions, the hearing judge held that Mr. Harmon failed to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing all three clients in violation of MLRPC
1.3 and, in particular, failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in serving the
complaint on Ms. Christian’s husband and pursuing her divorce.  The hearing judge also
concluded, based on the admissions, that Mr. Harmon violated MLRPC 1.4 with respect to
his representation of all three clients.  In particular, she determined that Mr. Harmon failed
to respond to Ms. Christian’s requests for information, that he failed to keep Mr. Lawrence
informed about the accrual of attorney’s fees, and that he failed to respond to Mr. Lawrence’s
 The letter had been submitted by Mr. Harmon in connection with his prior
6
disciplinary action.  See footnote 2 above.
8
request for information regarding the fees both during and after the representation. 
Furthermore, Mr. Harmon failed to respond to the Proctors’ demands for information about
the representation, and failed to keep them informed concerning the time and location of the
mediation and the accrual of attorney’s fees.  The hearing judge concluded, based on the facts
admitted, that Mr. Harmon attempted to charge Ms. Christian an unreasonable or excessive
fee in violation of MLRPC 1.5(a). 
Based on evidence presented by Bar Counsel, the hearing judge concluded that Mr.
Harmon knowingly failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful requests for information from
July 2010 to June 2011 in violation of MLRPC 8.1(b), which requires an attorney to respond
to requests from the disciplinary authority for information without need for a subpoena.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 253, 760 A.2d 1108 (2000).
Finally, the hearing judge found that Mr. Harmon did not prove by a preponderance
of evidence that mitigating circumstances existed.  She noted that, even though Mr. Harmon
testified that he suffered from numerous personal problems and depression, he did not offer
any expert testimony or medical records to corroborate his testimony.  Relying on Dr.
Janofsky’s expert opinion that Mr. Harmon did not suffer from a physical or mental disability
that could have caused the misconduct, and Mr. Harmon’s own testimony that his personal
problems did not cause him to neglect his responsibilities to his clients, the hearing judge
found that the violations were not caused by any physical or mental disorder.  Instead, she
found aggravating circumstances, stating that Mr. Harmon intentionally failed to cooperate
9
in Bar Counsel’s investigations of the three complaints, committed multiple violations, and
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct. 
Discussion
MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5(a)
We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that Mr. Harmon violated MLRPC 1.3,
1.4, and 1.5(a).  The hearing judge’s conclusions were based on facts deemed admitted, and
Mr. Harmon has not filed any exceptions to her findings of fact or conclusions of law.  There
is no need for extended analysis of the application of the above rules to Mr. Harmon’s
conduct.
MLRPC 8.1(b)
MLRPC 8.1(b) prohibits attorneys from “knowingly fail[ing] to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority....”  MLRPC 8.1(b). 
This Court has held that evidence of repeated failures to respond to Bar Counsel’s
investigative requests can establish a violation of Rule 8.1.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 530-31, 876 A.2d 79 (2005) (attorney violated Rule
8.1(b) when she failed to respond to three written requests from Bar Counsel); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 174, 994 A.2d 928 (2010) (attorney violated
Rule 8.1(b) by failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s numerous requests for information and
failing to provide the requested documents until pre-trial proceedings).  
10
 We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Harmon violated MLRPC
8.1(b).  The record indicates that Mr. Harmon never responded to Bar Counsel’s letter, dated
November 12, 2010, informing him of Mr. Lawrence’s complaint.  In addition, he did not
respond to the July 12, 2010 letter in regard to Ms. Christian’s complaint until two months
later on September 15, 2010,  and he did not respond to the October 6, 2010 letter regarding
7
the Proctors’ complaint until more than three months later on January 25, 2011.  
8
Furthermore, Mr. Harmon never provided the financial records of payments he
received from Ms. Christian and Mr. Lawrence despite Bar Counsel’s repeated requests –
first at the November 22, 2010 and December 14, 2010 meetings, and subsequently, in letters
dated December 16, 2010, and January 31, 2011.  Mr. Harmon also failed to appear for the
June 27, 2011 meeting with Investigator Ramsey at his own office.  Even though Mr.
Harmon eventually delivered the client files on July 14, 2011, the files did not include the
requested financial records.  
At the October 2012 evidentiary hearing, Mr. Harmon contended that he did not
produce the records because he believed that Bar Counsel had already obtained the records
by subpoenaing his bank.  This explanation, as the hearing judge noted, is unpersuasive given
that the subpoena directed to his bank only called for the production of bank records
 Bar Counsel sent another letter on August 20, 2010.  The letter warned Mr. Harmon
7
about his obligations under MLRPC 8.1.
 Bar Counsel sent two more letters on November 3, 2010 and January 5, 2011.  A
8
warning regarding MLRPC 8.1 appeared in those two letters. 
11
beginning in March  2009 and the request directed to Mr. Harmon called for payments made
prior to 2009.  Even if he mistakenly believed that Bar Counsel had already obtained the
records, Mr. Harmon should have notified Bar Counsel of his understanding as the letters
requested that he either produce the records or indicate which records he could not provide.
Lastly, Mr. Harmon never provided the medical records from his primary physician
or Dr. Carnegie despite numerous requests from Bar Counsel and Dr. Janofsky.  His
explanation that he was not aware that Bar Counsel sought records from his primary
physician is unconvincing, as the hearing judge pointed out, given that Bar Counsel’s letter
explicitly asked for “medical records from [his] primary care physician.”
Sanction
The Commission recommends that Mr. Harmon be suspended indefinitely for his
violation of MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), and 8.1(b), while Mr. Harmon recommends a
suspension for a definite period of time to run concurrently with the sanction imposed  in his
prior case.  Given his prior disciplinary history, his apparent inability to appreciate the
seriousness of his misconduct, the absence of mitigating circumstances, and the existence of
aggravating factors, we agree that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction in this
case. 
Mr. Harmon has proffered various circumstances in mitigation, including that, at the
time of the conduct at issue, he was suffering from depression due to problems in his
personal life, including a recent divorce, the death of his grandfather, the foreclosure on a
12
home, and his son’s arrest.  The hearing judge, however, declined to find mitigating
circumstances, stating that Mr. Harmon did not prove by a preponderance of evidence that
he suffered from mental or physical impairments that caused the misconduct – a finding that
appears unassailable on the record before us.  Mr. Harmon did not offer any character
witnesses or expert testimony to corroborate his claim that depression caused his misconduct. 
In fact, despite repeated requests by Dr. Janofsky, Mr. Harmon never produced the medical
records from his primary physician or his therapist, Dr. Carnegie.  The hearing judge’s
finding is further supported by Dr. Janofsky’s testimony that Mr. Harmon did not suffer from
any mental or physical disorder that may have affected his ability to represent his clients or
respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information.
While there are no mitigating circumstances, there are several aggravating
circumstances.  The hearing judge found, and we agree, that three aggravating factors are
implicated:  multiple violations, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, and refusal
to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  Mr. Harmon committed multiple
violations with respect to all three clients, and he intentionally failed to cooperate in Bar
Counsel’s investigations by withholding client files and financial records from Bar Counsel
and by withholding his medical records from Dr. Janofsky.  In addition, while Mr. Harmon
admitted that his depression affected his ability to perform administrative functions such as
keeping track of bills, he maintained that it did not affect his representation of his clients. 
Mr. Harmon does not appear to appreciate the wrongful nature, or the seriousness, of his
13
misconduct.  He denies that his representation fell below acceptable standards of care,
downplays the seriousness of his failure to keep his clients informed about the accrual of fees
as mere “administrative mistakes,” and contends that the three clients filed the complaints
because they “didn’t like their final bill.” 
In addition to the three aggravating factors that the hearing judge found, we find
additional aggravating factors:  a pattern of misconduct and prior discipline.  The record in
this proceeding demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.  Mr. Harmon’s representation of his
three complaining clients between 2007 and 2009 was marked by neglect and inattention. 
In each of the three cases, he failed to perform even the most rudimentary tasks – in the case
of Ms. Christian, failing to promptly serve her husband; in the case of the Proctors, failing
to inform them of the correct time and location of a scheduled mediation; and in the case of
Mr. Lawrence, failing to respond to his inquiries concerning fees.  See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 340, 68 A.3d 862 (2013) (finding a pattern of misconduct
where an attorney neglected four clients); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dominguez, 427
Md. 308, 326, 47 A.3d 975 (2012) (finding a pattern of misconduct where an attorney
neglected at least five clients).
Lastly, Mr. Harmon has been the subject of a prior disciplinary action.  At the time
of the oral argument in this case, Mr. Harmon had already been indefinitely suspended with
the right to apply for reinstatement no sooner than six months.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Harmon, 433 Md. 612, 72 A.3d 555 (2013).  It is particularly disturbing that the two cases
14
involve a common violation – the failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful demands for
information.  In fact, at the oral argument in that prior action, held on November 8, 2011, this
Court demanded an explanation for Mr. Harmon’s failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s
requests and he admitted that his response was “not perfect.”  Even after that argument,
however, Mr. Harmon remained unresponsive to Bar Counsel’s requests for information in
the present case.  He continued to withhold his records of payments from Ms. Christian and
Mr. Lawrence or, if he simply did not possess the records, failed to inform Bar Counsel that
he did not possess them. 
Mr. Harmon’s conduct demonstrates a disregard for the importance of attorney
cooperation with disciplinary authorities.  This Court has stated that “[t]he practice of law
carries with it special responsibilities of self-regulation, and attorney cooperation with
disciplinary authorities is of the utmost importance to the success of the process and the
integrity of the profession.”  Fezell, 361 Md. at 255.  Accordingly, indefinite suspension is
the proper sanction when an attorney has violated various provisions of the MLRPC coupled
with a violation of MLRPC 8.1.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pawlak, 408 Md. 288,
304, 969 A.2d 311 (2009) (attorney who violated MLRPC 1.3, 8.1(a), 8.4(a) and (d) was
given an indefinite suspension even though there were mitigating circumstances, including
the fact that he had never been accused of any misconduct during his prior 38 years of
practice); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rose, 391 Md. 101, 111-13, 892 A.2d 469 (2006)
(attorney who violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 3.2, 1.4(a), 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b) and
15
8.4(d) was given indefinite suspension even though the hearing judge found that mitigating
circumstances existed because the attorney suffered from “debilitating psychiatric disorder”
and “depression”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kovacic, 389 Md. 233, 240, 884 A.2d 673
(2005) (attorney who violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4 and 8.1(b) was given indefinite suspension).
Kovacic, in particular, informs our analysis.  In Kovacic, the respondent was found
in violation of MLRPC 1.3, 1.4 and 8.1(b) for failing to act diligently in arranging for an
appraisal of marital property and preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, failing to
send a copy of the judgment of divorce to her client until over a month after it was entered,
and failing to timely respond to Bar Counsel’s numerous phone calls and letters requesting
her response to a complaint.  Kovacic, 389 Md. at 235-36.  Despite the respondent’s claim
that she was suffering from a medical condition that caused her to stop practicing law, this
Court did not find any mitigating factors, pointing out that she had failed to submit
documentation to confirm its existence even though she had agreed to do so.  Id. at 240.  This
Court ordered that she be suspended indefinitely.  Id. 
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Harmon’s case are similarly serious.  Not only are
mitigating circumstances absent, but there are aggravating circumstances, including prior
disciplinary violations.  Although Mr. Harmon has experienced some struggles in his
personal life, the primary concern in this context is the protection of the public, which
compels us to impose an indefinite suspension.
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IT IS SO ORDERED: RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761.  JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
AGAINST
ANTHONY MAURICE HARMON IN THE
SUM OF THESE COSTS.
17