Title: Bottoms v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM DONALD BOTTOMS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092498 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
January 13, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in failing to permit William D. Bottoms to withdraw a 
guilty plea to two counts of construction fraud.1  Bottoms 
contends that the court abused its discretion by applying an 
incorrect standard to determine whether he should be permitted 
to withdraw his plea pursuant to Code § 19.2-296. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 14, 2007, the Dinwiddie County Grand Jury indicted 
Bottoms for two counts of construction fraud in violation of 
                     
1 Bottoms was also indicted for felony failure to appear 
in violation of Code § 19.2-128.  Although the plea agreement 
Bottoms entered into with the Commonwealth required him to 
plead guilty to all three offenses, in addressing whether 
Bottoms would be permitted to withdraw his plea the parties 
limited their arguments to the two charges of construction 
fraud.  Bottoms did not assert that he could offer any defense 
to the charge of failure to appear, nor was there any proffer 
of evidence supporting that charge by the Commonwealth.  On 
appeal, neither Bottoms nor the Commonwealth addresses whether 
Bottoms should be permitted to withdraw the guilty plea to the 
failure to appear offense, though Bottoms does request that 
all his convictions be vacated.  We conclude that, as the plea 
agreement required Bottoms to plead guilty to all three 
offenses, his motion to withdraw that plea, if proper, would 
permit him to withdraw the plea in its entirety. 
 
Code § 18.2-200.1.  On January 10, 2008, Bottoms was arraigned 
on these indictments in the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County.  
At the outset of the hearing, the Commonwealth advised the 
circuit court that there was “a plea agreement in th[is] 
case.”  Bottoms then entered a plea of guilty to each charge, 
and the court acknowledged that the “plea agreement has been 
offered for [the court] to consider.” 
The circuit court conducted a guilty plea colloquy in 
which Bottoms stated that he understood the charges against 
him, though the specific elements of the offense of 
construction fraud were not recited at that time.  Bottoms 
stated that he had committed the offenses for which he was 
charged, and that he was in fact guilty of these offenses.  
Bottoms further stated that he had consulted with his attorney 
for “[a]bout two or three hours” and that he had determined to 
plead guilty based upon his “conference with her.” 
After a discussion with the Commonwealth concerning the 
range of sentencing for the offenses, the circuit court 
indicated that the plea agreement required that Bottoms be 
released on bond pending the preparation of the presentence 
report, ostensibly so that he could attempt to arrange for 
restitution to the victims, but it contained no recommendation 
concerning sentencing.  The court then continued with the 
guilty plea colloquy, asking Bottoms if he understood that the 
 
2
court would be able to impose any sentence within the 
available statutory range for the offenses.  Bottoms stated 
that he understood this and further understood that by 
pleading guilty he was waiving his right of appeal.  Bottoms 
stated that he did not “have a mental or physical disorder,” 
was not presently taking any medications, and that he felt 
“alright.”  He further stated that he was entering his plea 
voluntarily and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s 
services. 
The Commonwealth then proffered the evidence it would 
have adduced in support of the construction fraud offenses.  
That proffer showed that Bottoms had entered into two separate 
contracts to renovate a home and a church in Dinwiddie County.  
With regard to the home renovation, the proffered evidence was 
that Bottoms had undertaken the work but performed it poorly, 
and as a result the homeowner was “out” $1,642.  With regard 
to the church renovation, the proffered evidence was that 
Bottoms had begun work on the project by purchasing materials 
and hiring laborers, but before the project was complete the 
building inspector determined that Bottoms did not have the 
proper class of contractor’s license to perform work of that 
scale and that the work done to that point did not meet the 
requirements of the building code.  A qualified contractor was 
hired to supervise the work, but Bottoms “disappeared from the 
 
3
job.”  At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court 
found Bottoms “guilty . . . pursuant to the plea agreement.”  
The court ordered the preparation of a presentence report and 
continued the case for sentencing. 
During the continuance, Bottoms retained new counsel who 
filed a motion on May 15, 2008 seeking to permit Bottoms to 
withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Code § 19.2-296.  In that 
motion, Bottoms contended that on the date of the plea hearing 
he was suffering from depression and had been prescribed 
medication for that condition.  Bottoms further contended that 
he had not received this medication while he was being held in 
jail and that “[t]he failure to receive this medication may 
have inhibited [him] from fully understanding and 
comprehending the proceedings.” 
On June 25, 2008, the circuit court convened a hearing to 
receive the presentence report and evidence concerning 
sentencing.  At the outset of the hearing, Bottoms’ counsel 
indicated that he was not ready to proceed because of the 
pending motion to withdraw the guilty plea.  Although the 
mental health counselor from the jail was present and 
available to testify, counsel maintained that another witness, 
the psychiatrist who had treated Bottoms while he was in jail, 
was not present.  Counsel maintained that the testimony of the 
psychiatrist was necessary to establish that Bottoms had not 
 
4
received his medication prior to the plea hearing and how that 
would have affected Bottoms’ mental state.  Bottoms’ counsel 
asserted that Bottoms had complained while in jail of “memory 
issues, memory loss,” and that the court should receive 
evidence from the psychiatrist to determine whether this would 
have affected Bottoms’ ability to enter a plea.  The court, 
after reviewing the motion, responded that it did not need to 
hear from any witnesses because Bottoms had stated 
affirmatively during the guilty plea colloquy that he was not 
taking any medications and was not suffering from any mental 
or physical disability. 
Bottoms’ counsel then asserted that “after subsequent 
research I think that Mr. Bottoms has some very real 
defenses.”  The circuit court observed, “Maybe he has all 
kinds of defenses, but he waives those when he comes to court 
and announces ready and pleads guilty.”  Counsel responded 
that the procedure under Code § 19.2-296 permitted a defendant 
to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing if he avers that 
he has substantial defenses.  Counsel further contended that 
the evidence proffered at the plea hearing demonstrated that 
Bottoms lacked the necessary intent to defraud because he had 
actually undertaken to perform the contracts, but had only 
failed to perform that work properly or had not obtained the 
 
5
proper permits and license requiring him to stop work until a 
qualified contractor could oversee the work. 
The Commonwealth opposed the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea, contending that Bottoms had already received the 
benefit of the plea agreement in that he had been allowed to 
post bond pending sentencing, but that he had failed to make 
restitution during the time the case had been continued.  The 
Commonwealth further contended that Bottoms’ responses during 
the guilty plea colloquy had been “clear[,] concise[, and] not 
confused.”  Bottoms’ counsel responded that the plea agreement 
had not really provided any benefit as it did not provide for 
any agreed or recommended sentence.  He further reiterated his 
position that there were “real defenses” to the charges 
because the evidence would show a lack of intent to defraud. 
The circuit court overruled the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea, finding that Bottoms had failed to establish “any 
good cause.”  The court opined that in its view “[t]his is 
just a case where the defendant has changed his mind and wants 
to back pedal and undo that which has been done.”  However, 
the court agreed to continue the sentencing hearing, stating 
that it would permit Bottoms “to have the psychiatrist . . . 
testify about what is wrong with him and why it should 
mitigate the punishment.” 
 
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On August 5, 2008, Bottoms filed a motion to reconsider 
the ruling denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.  
Bottoms contended that at the time he entered his plea he was 
suffering from “major depression” and had not been provided 
with medication to treat that condition by jail officials.  He 
further contended that it had been reported to jail officials 
that Bottoms also required “bipolar medication.”  Bottoms 
contended that “[t]he failure to receive his proper medication 
prior to [the plea hearing] inhibited [him] from fully 
understanding and comprehending the proceedings.” 
In the motion for reconsideration, Bottoms further 
contended that “there was no factual basis for the [circuit 
c]ourt to accept the guilty plea[].”  Bottoms contended that 
the proffer of evidence by the Commonwealth showed that he 
lacked the requisite intent to defraud at the time he entered 
into the two renovation contracts and received advance payment 
for the purchase of supplies and labor.  Relying upon Justus 
v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 153, 645 S.E.2d 284, 288 (2007), 
Bottoms contended that he had satisfied the criteria for being 
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea under Code § 19.2-296. 
At a hearing on September 4, 2008, Bottoms’ counsel 
indicated that he was prepared to go forward with sentencing, 
but asked the circuit court first to rule on the motion for 
reconsideration.  Because the court was unaware that the 
 
7
motion for reconsideration had been filed, the case was 
continued.  On October 10, 2008, the court issued an opinion 
letter addressing the motion for reconsideration.  Therein, 
the court stated that based upon Bottoms’ responses during the 
guilty plea colloquy “[t]he record reveals a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea with knowledge of the consequences.”  
Accordingly, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. 
At a sentencing hearing on January 7, 2009, the 
Commonwealth called various witnesses including the building 
inspector who had directed Bottoms to stop work on the church 
project that was the subject of one of the construction fraud 
charges, representatives of the church, and the owner of the 
home that was the subject of the other construction fraud 
charge.  During his examination of these witnesses, without 
objection from the Commonwealth, Bottoms’ counsel elicited 
testimony establishing that Bottoms had purchased materials, 
hired laborers, and performed work on both projects, 
completing all of the work on the home and approximately half 
of the work on the church, though the witnesses maintained 
that the quality of the work was unsatisfactory. 
Bottoms also called Dr. Vernon Choudhary, the 
psychiatrist who had treated him while he was incarcerated.  
Although Dr. Choudhary had no current recollection of his 
treatment of Bottoms, he was permitted to testify based upon 
 
8
his records that Bottoms had been seen by the mental health 
counselor in the jail and that “it was her impression that 
[Bottoms’] diagnosis was major depression.”  Based upon this 
report and a brief examination, Dr. Choudhary agreed that 
Bottoms was “suffering depressive episodes” and prescribed an 
antidepressant. 
In an order dated February 4, 2009, the circuit court 
sentenced Bottoms to ten years imprisonment for each of the 
construction fraud offenses to run concurrently, with eight 
years suspended from each concurrent sentence.  Bottoms was 
also required to make restitution in the amount of $26,150 and 
pay $1,130 in court costs. 
Bottoms subsequently filed a petition for appeal to the 
Court of Appeals, contending that the circuit court erred in 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Bottoms also 
maintained that the court had applied an incorrect standard by 
finding that the guilty plea colloquy established that his 
plea had been knowing and voluntary, thus waiving any later 
claim of a defense.  Bottoms contended that in applying this 
standard, the court failed to follow this Court’s holding in 
Justus, which required the court to weigh the defendant’s 
responses in the guilty plea colloquy against the assertion 
that the plea had been entered into under a misapprehension of 
the nature of the proceedings, or even an assertion that the 
 
9
plea was made inadvisedly, and to permit the plea to be 
withdrawn if the defendant wished to present any defense other 
than one that was merely dilatory or formal in nature. 
By an unpublished per curiam order dated September 9, 
2009, the Court of Appeals denied Bottoms’ petition for 
appeal.  Without directly addressing Bottoms’ contention that 
the circuit court had applied an incorrect standard in denying 
his motion to withdraw his plea, the Court reasoned that 
Bottoms “invited the very error of which he complains” by 
failing to advise the circuit court during the guilty plea 
colloquy that he was suffering from depression.  Bottoms v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0117-09-2, slip. op. at 2 (September 
9, 2009).  The Court concluded that by subsequently asserting 
that he had not fully comprehended the nature of the plea 
hearing because of his depression and the failure of the jail 
personnel to provide him with medication, Bottoms was 
attempting to “approbate and reprobate.”  Id., slip op. at 3. 
The Court of Appeals further concluded that even if 
Bottoms could establish that he had been under a disability 
when he entered his guilty plea, he had not established that 
he could present a defense that was not merely dilatory or 
formal in nature.  Distinguishing Justus, where the defendant 
had asserted “strong, specific arguments” in support of a 
defense of legal impossibility because she had been charged 
 
10
with breaking and entering a home in which she resided, the 
Court found that Bottoms’ asserted defense of a lack of 
necessary intent was “vague.”2  Id.   
DISCUSSION 
 
Code § 19.2-296 provides: 
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere may be made only before sentence is 
imposed or imposition of a sentence is suspended; 
but to correct manifest injustice, the court within 
twenty-one days after entry of a final order may set 
aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw his plea. 
 
Bottoms contends that the circuit court’s conclusion that 
the guilty plea colloquy “reveal[ed] a knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea with knowledge of the consequences” and, thus, 
barred him from seeking to withdraw his plea and assert any 
                     
2 Bottoms also contended that the circuit court erred in 
not granting a motion for an evidentiary hearing, made after 
the court had issued the opinion letter indicating that it 
would deny his motion for reconsideration, to adduce evidence 
concerning his basis for seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.  
The Court of Appeals held that Bottoms had not established the 
need for such a hearing, as the record showed that the circuit 
court had accepted his proffer of evidence and had based its 
judgment thereon.  Bottoms, slip op. at 3.  Bottoms has 
assigned error to this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment.  However, because Bottoms was permitted to adduce 
evidence during the sentencing hearing that corresponded in 
almost every respect to the proffer made in support of the 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and this evidence permits 
us to resolve the issue of whether Bottoms should have been 
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, we conclude that the 
issue of whether a separate hearing was required is moot, and 
we need not address it further. 
 
 
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defenses to the charges shows that the court misapprehended 
the standard to be applied in considering a motion under Code 
§ 19.2-296.  He contends that the standard applied by the 
court, which is the same as applied to a post-conviction 
review in a habeas corpus proceeding in which ineffective 
representation of counsel is asserted to establish that the 
defendant did not enter a constitutionally valid guilty plea, 
was found by this Court in Justus to be inapplicable to Code 
§ 19.2-296 motions.  Rather, Bottoms contends that the proper 
standard requires the court to determine only whether, based 
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is being made in good faith 
and is premised upon a reasonable basis that the defendant can 
present substantive, and not merely dilatory or formal, 
defenses to the charges.  Justus, 274 Va. at 155-56, 645 
S.E.2d at 290.  We agree. 
In Justus, we said that reliance upon “admissions made by 
a defendant in a guilty plea and the attendant colloquy . . . 
is misplaced in the context of a Code § 19.2-296 motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing.”  Id. at 154, 645 
S.E.2d at 289.  This is so because “when the case remains 
within the jurisdiction of the trial court to permit the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea, the presumptions that would favor 
the Commonwealth in a habeas proceeding,” where the plea is 
 
12
presumed to be valid and is not to be lightly set aside, 
“simply do not apply.”  Id.  Moreover, “when a defendant files 
a motion under Code § 19.2-296, he is necessarily seeking to 
repudiate the admission of guilt and some, if not all, of the 
admissions made in the guilty plea colloquy.”  Id. 
In this case, it is manifest that the circuit court’s 
analysis of Bottoms’ Code § 19.2-296 motion was based upon an 
improper application of the law as set out by this Court in 
Justus.  Similarly, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the 
concept that a party will not be permitted to “approbate and 
reprobate” is misplaced in the context of a Code § 19.2-296 
motion, which by its very nature requires the defendant to 
repudiate the prior assertion of guilt and any attendant 
admissions supporting that assertion. 
Rather, as we explained in Justus, 
 
in exercising its discretion to grant or deny a 
Code § 19.2-296 motion made prior to the entry of a 
final sentencing order, the trial court is to make 
that determination based on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.  And, 
generally, the withdrawal of a guilty plea should 
not be denied in any case where it is in the least 
evident that the ends of justice will be subserved 
by permitting not guilty to be pleaded in its 
place.  Thus, the motion should be granted even if 
the guilty plea was merely entered inadvisedly when 
the evidence supporting the motion shows that there 
is a reasonable defense to be presented to the 
judge or jury trying the case. 
 
 
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Thus, ‘the 
accused should be permitted to withdraw a plea of guilty 
entered [i]nadvisedly when application thereof is duly 
made in good faith and sustained by proofs, and a proper 
offer is made to go to trial on a plea of not guilty.’ ”  
Id. at 153-54, 645 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting Parris v. 
Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 325-26, 52 S.E.2d 872, 874 
(1949) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Our decision in Justus was based upon our holding 
in Parris, 189 Va. at 324, 52 S.E.2d at 873, in which w
explained that “the motion should not be denied, if timely 
made, and if it appears from the surrounding circumstances 
that the plea of guilty was submitted in good faith under an 
honest mistake of material fact or facts, or if it was induced 
by fraud, coercion or undue influence and would not otherwise 
have been made.”  We further explained that “ ‘[t]he least 
surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when 
he has any defense at all should be sufficient grounds for 
permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty.’ ”  
e 
Id. 
at 325 (quoting 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, § 287 at 961 
(1938)).  Thus, a timely motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
should be granted if there is good cause to believe that “ ‘it 
was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature 
of the charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; 
 
14
through fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation; was made 
involuntarily for any reason; or even where it was entered 
inadvisedly, if any reasonable ground is offered for going to 
the jury.’ ”  Id.  (emphasis added). 
Bottoms’ motion to withdraw the guilty plea was clearly 
filed in a timely manner, over one month before his scheduled 
sentencing hearing.  The record in this case amply 
demonstrates that Bottoms’ plea of guilty was, at the very 
least, entered inadvisedly.  Under the proper standard from 
Justus, 274 Va. at 154, 645 S.E.2d at 289, we held that the 
defendant seeking to withdraw a plea of guilty entered 
inadvisedly must assert that he will be able to present a 
“reasonable defense” to the trier of fact, id., while 
recognizing that the trial court should not use the discretion 
granted by the statute “in aid of an attempt to rely upon a 
merely dilatory or formal defense.”  Id. at 153, 645 S.E.2d at 
288 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The 
circuit court in this case did not consider whether Bottoms’ 
proffered defense was reasonable, and not “merely dilatory or 
formal.”  However, the Court of Appeals implicitly found that 
the proffered defense was not reasonable because it was 
“vague.”  We disagree with this characterization of Bottoms’ 
proffered defense, especially in light of the testimony 
received during the sentencing hearing with regard to the 
 
15
manner in which the contracts were entered into and Bottoms’ 
subsequent efforts to perform the renovation work on the 
church and the home. 
Code § 18.2-200.1 provides in pertinent part:  “If any 
person obtain from another an advance of money, . . . with 
fraudulent intent, upon a promise to perform construction 
. . . of any building or structure permanently annexed to real 
property . . . and fail or refuse to perform such promise, and 
also fail to substantially make good such advance, he shall be 
deemed guilty of the larceny of such money.”  It is well 
established that to be guilty of construction fraud, the 
defendant must have the intent to defraud at the time the 
advance of money is received.  See, e.g., Holsapple v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 602, 587 S.E.2d 561, 566 (2003); 
Klink v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 815, 818-19, 407 S.E.2d 5, 
7 (1991). 
We recognize that a defendant may possess the requisite 
intent to commit construction fraud even though he begins to 
perform on the contract after receiving the advance payment, 
but later abandons the work.  Holsapple, 266 Va. at 601, 587 
S.E.2d at 566.  Such intent may even be shown where the 
contract is actually completed, but the quality of the work is 
so poor that the trier of fact may infer that the defendant 
entered into the contract with the deliberate, fraudulent 
 
16
intent to render inferior performance.  Id. at 602, 587 S.E.2d 
at 566.  However, it is equally clear that where the 
Commonwealth seeks to establish that the defendant had the 
requisite fraudulent intent in such cases, the matter presents 
a question of fact to be resolved by the judge or the jury 
upon a full presentation of the evidence in a trial. 
Bottoms asserted in the circuit court that he could rebut 
the Commonwealth’s allegation that he was guilty of 
construction fraud by showing that at the time he entered into 
the contracts, he fully intended to perform the work, he fully 
performed the contract for renovation of the home, and he 
stopped work on the renovation of the church when it was 
approximately half complete merely because it was determined 
that he was not properly licensed to perform the work and was 
not following the proper building code requirements.  There is 
nothing “vague” or merely “formal” in the asserted defense of 
lack of intent to defraud.  Nor does the record support that 
Bottoms was dilatory in making this claim, as there is no 
clear indication that at the time of the guilty plea colloquy 
Bottoms actually understood the specific elements of the 
offense of construction fraud.  Rather, there was an 
affirmative averment that he learned of the availability of 
this defense only after his new counsel had performed 
additional research.  The asserted defense, if proven, would 
 
17
not affirmatively establish that Bottoms was not guilty as a 
matter of legal impossibility, as was the case in Justus.  
However, the defense was sufficient under the circumstances of 
this case to permit Bottoms to assert that he had “a 
reasonable defense to be presented to the judge or jury trying 
the case.”  Justus, 274 Va. at 154, 645 S.E.2d at 289. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred 
in not permitting Bottoms to withdraw his guilty plea in order 
to have the case to go forward to trial.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming that judgment will 
be reversed.  The case will be remanded to the Court of 
Appeals with instruction to remand to the circuit court where 
Bottoms shall be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and the 
case shall proceed to trial if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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