Title: THE SAMUEL MARES POST NO. 8, AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF WYOMING v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF CONVERSE, WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THE SAMUEL MARES POST NO. 8, AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF WYOMING v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF CONVERSE, WYOMING1985 WY 47697 P.2d 1040Case Number: 84-167Decided: 04/08/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE SAMUEL MARES POST NO. 
8, AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF WYOMING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE BOARD OF 
COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF CONVERSE, WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
David D. Uchner 
of Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Craig Newman and 
Thomas F. Reese of Brown, Drew, Apostolos Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Board of County Commissioners 
(hereinafter County) in a quiet title action to the land where the Douglas airport is situate. The County initiated the 
action against appellant American Legion (hereinafter Legion) and all others 
claiming an interest in the land adverse to the County.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The Legion raises the 
following issues for our review:

"1. Whether or not the 
trial court erred in denying the Legion's request for trial by 
jury.

"2. The propriety of a 
summary judgment in light of the following considerations: (1) reformation of 
the 1933 Deed; (2) the specific language contained in the 1936 Deed; and (3) the 
claim of adverse possession."

[¶4.]     Since we hold summary 
judgment was proper, the Legion's first issue regarding the propriety of the 
trial court's denial of a jury trial need not be 
addressed.

I

[¶5.]     The facts reveal that 
title to the property at issue was conveyed by the Legion to the Town of 
Douglas by 
warranty deed dated May 11, 1933. This deed was recorded. On March 16, 1936, the 
Town of Douglas 
conveyed the mineral rights to the property back to the Legion under an 
instrument entitled "Mineral Deed," which was also recorded. Although the Legion 
contends this deed conveyed the entire interest in the property, the district 
court concluded that the 1936 deed conveyed only the mineral rights to the 
property. On March 29, 1959, the Town of Douglas conveyed the property to the County by 
way of quitclaim deed, which was recorded.

[¶6.]     In concluding summary 
judgment was proper, the trial judge stated:

"Summary judgment is 
granted on this basis: The 1933 deed is clear and unambiguous and I can find no 
reason for reformation.

"As to the 1936 deed it 
appears to me this was a mineral conveyance and was never intended to reconvey 
to the American Legion anything other than a mineral 
interest.

"Having disposed of these 
two questions I find it unnecessary to address the question of adverse 
possession."

[¶7.]     We hold the trial court 
was correct in finding no ambiguity in the 1933 deed and that the 1936 deed was 
only a conveyance of mineral rights.

II

[¶8.]     We begin by citing the 
rules of appellate review of a summary judgment. The scope of our review of a 
summary judgment is to examine the judgment "in the same light as the district 
court, using the same material and information as did the district court." Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 419, 421 (1983). The moving party has the burden of proving there exists no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 (1984); and Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Company, 
Wyo., 598 P.2d 20 (1979). A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the cause of action or 
defense asserted by the parties. Shrum v. 
Zeltwanger, Wyo., 
559 P.2d 1384 (1977). We review the record from the vantage point most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences which 
may be drawn from the facts. Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980). It is a trial court's 
obligation, nay duty, to render summary judgment in the absence of any genuine 
issue of material fact:

"* * * The judgment 
sought [by a motion for summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. * * *" Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

[¶9.]     The Legion claims 
summary judgment was improper in light of: "1) reformation of the 1933 Deed; 2) 
the specific language contained in the 1936 Deed; and 3) the claim of adverse 
possession." Since we find summary judgment was proper inasmuch as there was no 
ambiguity in either the 1933 or 1936 deeds, we need not address the issue of 
adverse possession.

A. Reformation of the 1933 
Deed.

[¶10.]  The Legion contends that the 1933 deed, 
wherein the property was conveyed by warranty deed to the Town of Douglas, should be 
reformed to express the intent of the parties when the deed was conveyed. The 
Legion claims the property was conveyed to the Town of Douglas to be used solely 
as an airport and if the property ever ceased to be used as such, the land would 
revert back to the Legion. However, to permit reformation at this time, some 50 
years since the execution of the deed, would be in clear violation of our 
ten-year statutes of limitation. Sections 1-3-103 and 1-3-109, W.S. 
1977.

[¶11.]  We were faced with a somewhat similar 
scenario in Town of Glenrock v. 
Abadie, 71 Wyo. 414, 259 P.2d 766 (1953), reh. denied 72 
Wyo. 111, 262 P.2d 393 (1953). In that case, the Town of Glenrock sought to have its title to a one-half 
mineral interest in certain property quieted against the grantors. The grantors 
cross-petitioned to have the mineral interest title quieted in them, and to have 
the deed reformed to reflect their intention at the time the deed was written. 
However, more than 30 years had elapsed since the deed was written. We held that 
the grantors were barred from seeking reformation under § 3-509, W.S. 1945, 
presently § 1-3-109, W.S. 1977. We found the responsibility for omission of the 
proper language in the deed showing the parties' intent was that of the 
grantors:

"Certainly, the 
responsibility for the difficulty in which [grantor] finds herself rests solely 
with her and her deceased husband. * * * It was the [grantors'] sole fault that 
they conveyed to the Town more than they intended. Being themselves responsible 
for the errors made, and having neglected for over thirty years to institute 
proceedings which would in all probability have given them relief, it is now too 
late to complain.

* * * * * 
*

"In the case at bar, more 
than thirty years had elapsed since the mistake - if any - was made. If the 
correction may be made at this time, it might be made fifty or a hundred years 
from now. That cannot be the law. Some force must be given to the statutes of 
limitation." Town of Glenrock v. 
Abadie, supra, 259 P.2d 771-772.

[¶12.]  In this case, more than fifty years have 
elapsed since the 1933 deed was written. To allow reformation would be a clear 
violation of the statutes of limitation and generally recognized principles of 
equity and sound reasoning. It is further noted that even if the Legion were 
allowed to seek reformation, it would be difficult at best to produce competent 
evidence of the parties' intent when so many years have passed since the deed's 
inception. There must be a finality to such actions to give deeds a certain 
degree of credence.

[¶13.]  The 1933 deed is clear on its face; there 
is no ambiguity. It is a warranty deed that clearly conveyed the land in 
question with no reservations whatsoever. Inasmuch as the trial court found no 
ambiguity in the 1933 deed, summary judgment was proper.

B. The Language in the 1936 
Deed.

[¶14.]  The Legion claims the 1936 deed, from the 
Town of Douglas 
to the Legion, effectively reconveyed the land back to the Legion. The County 
contends the instrument was merely a mineral deed and, as such, only conveyed 
the mineral rights to the Legion. The trial court agreed with the County and 
found the instrument to be a mineral deed.

[¶15.]  When the language of the 1936 deed 
entitled "Mineral Deed" is considered as a whole, as it must be, we find that 
only the mineral rights were conveyed back to the Legion. The following language 
is found in the deed:

"* * * With the right, 
privilege and easement of entering upon said lands in searching for, drilling 
wells, and carrying away the oil and gas or other 
minerals.

"IT IS FURTHER COVENANTED 
AND AGREED:

"THAT in the event oil, 
gas or other minerals conveying hereon are found on said premises in commercial 
quantities and that as a result thereof it was impossible and hazardous to use 
said premises for an airport. Then, in that event, the said Samuel Mares Post 
No. 8, American Legion, shall by way of damage to the surface herein provided, 
secure and acquire and have on behalf of said Town of 
Douglas, Wyoming, other lands 
suitable and satisfactory to the said Town of Douglas for airport 
purposes.

"IT IS ALSO COVENANTED 
AND AGREED BY THE PARTIES:

"THAT should oil, gas or 
other valuable minerals be discovered in commercial quantities in some place on 
the land above described within a period of twenty (20) years from the date of 
this deed it shall thereupon become null and void without further act on the 
part of any party hereto and that any title conveyed herein thereupon vested 
upon the Town Council of the Town of Douglas, Wyoming, and this provision is 
agreed upon for the sole purpose of clearing the title."

[¶16.]  We look to the instrument itself to 
determine the intent of the parties. If this is not evident from the language in 
the deed, resort must be made to extrinsic evidence to determine intent. We 
stated in Knadler v. Adams, 
Wyo., 661 P.2d 1052, 1053 
(1983):

"If the intention of the 
grantor does not readily appear in a deed, a question of fact is presented and 
circumstances surrounding the language used may be resorted to in order to 
ascertain such intention. [Citations.] But, if the intent of the parties can be 
gathered from plain and unambiguous language in the deed considered as a whole, 
such should be done as a matter of law without reference to extrinsic evidence. 
[Citations.] The issue of whether or not an ambiguity exists in an instrument is 
one of law. [Citation.]"

[¶17.]  Even if we were to find the 1936 deed 
ambiguous, thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence, our conclusion that the deed 
only conveys mineral rights would be the same. The minutes from the meeting of 
the Douglas Town Council on March 16, 1936, clearly show that only the mineral 
rights were intended to be transferred:

"The matter of the 
mineral rights on the airport was taken up and a committee from the American 
Legion met with the Town Council and upon motion duly made, seconded and 
unanimously carried all rules prohibiting passage of a resolution were suspended 
and upon motion duly made, seconded and unanimously carried the following 
resolution was unanimously adopted:

"RESOLUTION

"THAT WHEREAS it 
appearing that on the 11th day of May, A.D. 1933, the Samuel Mares Post No. 8, 
American Legion Department of Wyoming, State of Wyoming, did by warranty deed 
transfer certain lands known as the Douglas Airport to the Town Council of the 
Town of Douglas for airport purposes.

"THAT at the time of the 
transfer it was the intent of said Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, 
that the oil and mineral rights under said land should be reserved to the said 
Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion.

"NOW THEREFORE be it 
resolved that the Mayor and Town Clerk be, and they are hereby authorized to 
execute a mineral deed covering said premises to Samuel Mares Post No. 8, 
American Legion, Department of Wyoming, State of Wyoming, and that said mineral 
deed be in the word and form as follows, to-wit: * * *"

The exact 
language of the 1936 deed follows. We find the 1936 deed conveyed only mineral 
rights to the Legion and the trial court was correct in so holding. 

[¶18.]  We have held summary judgment proper in 
contract cases where the language of a contract is clear. Dudley v. East Ridge Development 
Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 
(1985).

"Summary judgment may be 
utilized and is appropriate in contract cases; and if the language of a contract 
is plain and unequivocal, that language is controlling and the construction of 
its provisions is for the court as a matter of law. [Citations.]" Kuehne v. Samedan Oil Corporation, 
Wyo., 626 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1981).

See also 
Madison v. Marlatt, 
Wyo., 619 P.2d 708 (1980); and Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980). The concepts stated 
in the above cited cases also apply to the interpretation of a 
deed.

[¶19.]  We find the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment was proper in this case.