Title: State v. Joshua D. Conger

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP755-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
Honorable Peter L. Grimm, 
          Intervenor-Respondent, 
     v. 
Joshua D. Conger, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Peter L. Grimm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Anthony L. 
O’Malley and Zacherl, O’Malley & Endejan, S.C., Fond du Lac, and 
oral argument by Anthony L. O’Malley. 
 
For the plaintiff-co-appellant the cause was argued by 
James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent there was a brief by Brady C. 
Williamson, Katherine Stadler, Patricia L. Wheeler, and Godfrey 
& Kahn, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Patricia L. Wheeler. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ben Kempinen and the 
Frank J. Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, 
and oral argument by Ben Kempinen. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 56
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP755-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2007CF324) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
 
Honorable Peter L. Grimm, 
 
 
Intervenor-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Joshua D. Conger,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac 
County, Peter L. Grimm, Judge.  Order denying motion to amend 
affirmed; order denying motion to recuse affirmed; order of the 
court of appeals designating the circuit court an intervenor-
respondent remanded to the court of appeals for further 
proceedings.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
2 
 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2007-08).1  It centers on a plea agreement 
that the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court rejected, and it 
presents 
three 
related 
questions. 
 
First, 
under 
what 
circumstances may a circuit court reject a plea agreement?  
Second, what factors may a court consider when it reviews a plea 
agreement?  In answering the second question, we are asked to 
address whether the views of law enforcement may be among the 
factors considered. 
¶2 
Third, as a corollary to those two questions, we must 
determine whether a judge who has rejected a plea agreement must 
then automatically withdraw from further participation in the 
matter, and, if not, whether the circumstances of this case at 
this point require such a recusal. 
¶3 
The first two questions presented by this case are 
answered by Wis. Stat. § 971.292 (which permits amendment of the 
                                                 
1 "Bypass by certification of court of appeals or upon 
motion 
of 
supreme 
court. 
 
The 
supreme 
court 
may 
take 
jurisdiction of an appeal or other proceeding in the court of 
appeals upon certification by the court of appeals or upon the 
supreme court's own motion.  The supreme court may refuse to 
take jurisdiction of an appeal or other proceeding certified to 
it by the court of appeals."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 971.29 states,  
Amending the charge. (1) A complaint or information 
may be amended at any time prior to arraignment 
without leave of the court. (2) At the trial, the 
court may allow amendment of the complaint, indictment 
or information to conform to the proof where such 
amendment is not prejudicial to the defendant. After 
verdict the pleading shall be deemed amended to 
conform to the proof if no objection to the relevance 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
3 
 
charge without judicial approval only prior to arraignment) and 
established precedent concerning the circuit court's inherent 
authority to reject a plea that is not in the public interest.  
Thus, a circuit court must review a plea agreement independently 
and may, if it appropriately exercises its discretion, reject 
any plea agreement that does not, in its view, serve the public 
interest.  That review is analogous to the court's independent 
determination that a factual basis exists for the plea and its 
independent determination pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) 
that the plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; 
such independent determinations are safeguards built into our 
system to protect the integrity of the plea process.  When a 
court determines independently whether a plea is in the public 
interest, it is no more a reflection on the prosecutor's 
integrity or judgment than when it determines independently that 
a factual basis supports the plea.   
¶4 
As for the factors a court may consider when it makes 
that independent determination, we reiterate, as other courts 
have done, that the public interest is a consideration that is 
not capable of precise outlines.  Accordingly, the factors that 
a court may weigh when defining the public interest involved 
will vary from case to case.  One appropriate factor among many 
may well be the viewpoint of law enforcement; a court's 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the evidence was timely raised upon the trial. (3) 
Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint or 
indictment or information, the court may direct other 
amendments thereby rendered necessary and may proceed 
with or postpone the trial.   
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
4 
 
consideration 
of 
that 
factor 
in 
its 
analysis 
does 
not 
automatically invalidate its ultimate decision with regard to 
the plea.   
¶5 
Finally, in answer to the questions about required 
recusal, we conclude that a court's rejection of a plea does not 
in and of itself become a "personal interest in the outcome of 
the matter," and Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f)3  is not implicated 
here.4  We are unable to ascertain on this record whether in the 
course of the appeal Judge Grimm has become a party to this 
case,5 in which event it appears that Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(b)6 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f) provides, "Any judge shall 
disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action 
or 
proceeding . . . [w]hen 
a 
judge 
has 
a 
significant . . . personal interest in the outcome of the 
matter." 
4 Conger advances another argument for the circuit court's 
recusal as well: that the circuit court's consideration here of 
law enforcement's view of the plea was a violation of the rule 
set forth in State v. Matson, 2003 WI App 253, ¶27, 268 Wis. 2d 
725, 674 N.W.2d 51 (holding that a letter submitted to the court 
by the investigating detective recommending a sentence length 
constituted a breach of a plea agreement that had included a 
joint sentencing recommendation).  When the State breaches a 
plea agreement, the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea 
or to be resentenced before a different judge.  Id., ¶¶ 33-34.  
Because we conclude that views of law enforcement may be an 
appropriate factor in determining whether a plea serves the 
public interest, and that considering law enforcement views as 
one factor at a plea hearing is different from considering law 
enforcement views about the proper length of a sentence, we see 
no violation of Matson here and thus no grounds for recusal on 
that basis.   
5 The circumstances surrounding what may or may not be the 
circuit court judge's designation as a party in this case are 
explained more fully at ¶¶ 46-47, infra. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
5 
 
would now require his recusal from further participation in this 
case.  Because the record is undeveloped as to that question, we 
remand to the court of appeals the issue of whether, as a matter 
of law, Judge Grimm has now become a party or amicus.  We then 
expect a remand to the circuit court for a decision under Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2) in regard to recusal. 
¶6 
We therefore affirm the order of the circuit court 
denying the motion to amend the information pursuant to the plea 
agreement.  The order denying Conger's motion seeking the 
court's recusal was also properly denied.  However, we remand 
the issue of whether Judge Grimm has now become a party or 
amicus and whether recusal is now required.   
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Circuit Court 
¶7 
This case arises from the rejection by the Fond du Lac 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable Peter L. Grimm presiding, of 
a plea agreement that had been negotiated by the prosecutor and 
the defendant, Joshua D. Conger.  The court of appeals, in its 
certification of the appeal to this court, set forth the 
underlying facts: 
The defendant, Joshua D. Conger, was charged with 
possession with intent to deliver more than 200 grams 
but less than 1000 grams of marijuana within 1000 feet 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(b) 
states, 
"Any 
judge 
shall 
disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action 
or proceeding . . . [w]hen a judge is a party or a material 
witness, except that a judge need not disqualify himself or 
herself if the judge determines that any pleading purporting to 
make him or her a party is false, sham or frivolous." 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
6 
 
of a park, a Class H felony, Wis. Stat. ch. 961, and 
possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.573(1). 
 
The 
police 
found 
forty-eight 
individually wrapped baggies of marijuana totaling 774 
grams, hidden behind a ceiling tile in the home Conger 
shared with his girlfriend and a third person.  The 
officers also found a digital scale, a box of sandwich 
baggies, and “a large amount” of marijuana stems.  
Conger also apparently told a police officer that he 
owed $2900 to a drug supplier.   
The parties negotiated a plea agreement, which reduced 
the felony charge to three counts of misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and 
the drug paraphernalia charge was to be dismissed and 
read-in.  When the plea agreement was presented to the 
court, the State explained that the decision to reduce 
the charge was based on the facts that Conger was 
twenty-two at the time of the offense with no prior 
record, the drugs were found in the ceiling of a 
shared residence, his girlfriend was also being 
prosecuted, Conger had not admitted that the drugs 
were his, Conger had been doing well on bail and had 
participated in drug and alcohol counseling, and the 
State wanted to give him a chance to "clean up his 
act."7 
¶8 
The initial plea hearing was held on October 24, 2007; 
the hearing was adjourned twice to December 7, 2007, and 
February 18, 2008, for the specific purpose of having the State 
obtain additional information that the court requested before 
ruling on the motion to amend the charges as part of the plea 
agreement.  At the first hearing, the court expressed skepticism 
about the amendment of the charges——stating at one point that it 
was "wrestling with the motion to amend"——and made reference to 
                                                 
7 State 
v. 
Conger, 
No. 
2008AP755-CR, 
certification 
memorandum at 2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. July 2, 2009) (footnote 
omitted). 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
7 
 
its responsibility under State v. Kenyon,8 which authorizes a 
court to reject a plea agreement that does not serve the public 
interest.  At the conclusion of the first hearing, the court 
specified four facts it wanted to know: the correct weight of 
the marijuana seized in the case, its street value, the status 
of co-defendants' cases, and the drug unit's9 opinion of the 
agreement.  The court then stated: 
State v. Kenyon indicates the Court——Courts have a 
responsibility on the motion, and I appreciate the 
reasons 
submitted. . . . But 
in 
deference 
to 
the 
attorneys' recommendation, I will adjourn the matter, 
and I have asked a couple questions the lawyers didn't 
have answers to, and I think if we come back to court 
and the answers can be given that are all positive, 
while it's a very close case, I think if the answers 
come 
back 
positive, 
I 
will 
go 
along 
with 
the 
agreement, but if the answers come back negative, then 
I will have to exercise my discretion and make a 
decision under State v. Kenyon. 
¶9 
At the second plea hearing, having obtained the 
answers to three of its questions, the court stated, "If I had 
to decide right now based on what we have, the answer is still 
no, I'm not going to accept it . . . ."  The court made 
reference to the answers it had obtained from counsel, noting 
that "the quantity [of marijuana] [is] high, the dollar street 
value is high, so there [are] certainly uphill issues the Court 
has to address . . . ."  However, the court again adjourned the 
                                                 
8 State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 46-47, 270 N.W.2d 160 
(1978). 
9 The law enforcement unit in this case is the Lake 
Winnebago Area Metropolitan Enforcement Group, referenced in 
court transcripts as "the MEG Unit." 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
8 
 
hearing, saying that the agency's opinion of the plea bargain——
the still-unanswered question——would be "a factor [the court] 
would reconsider." 
¶10 At the third plea hearing, defense counsel informed 
the court that the MEG Unit "generally [is] not[] in favor of 
reductions from felonies to misdemeanors," and the prosecutor 
agreed.  The court reiterated concerns it had stated in both 
previous hearings——beginning by observing that "what really 
jumps out in this record is the nature of the facts within the 
Criminal Complaint and the preliminary hearing transcript" 
concerning 
the 
scale 
of 
the 
drug 
operation 
at 
Conger's 
residence.  The circuit court also expressed its concern about 
"send[ing] a message to like-minded people who allegedly 
maintain a drug trafficking place or allegedly possess large 
quantities with higher street values with intent to deliver."  
Among the factors cited by the circuit court was the fact that 
"the law enforcement unit of investigation and arrest is not 
agreeing to the plea bargain or the reduction from felonies to 
misdemeanors."  The court denied the motion. 
¶11 Following the denial of the motion, Conger moved the 
circuit court for an order of recusal on the grounds that in 
rejecting the plea agreement, the circuit court had "acted in an 
adverse capacity to a party in the same proceedings" by its 
"encouragement of the continued prosecution of the defendant" 
and 
therefore 
recusal 
was 
required 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
9 
 
§ 757.19(2)(c).10  Alternatively, he sought recusal on the 
grounds that the "appearance of justice" required by the Due 
Process Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g),11 the court's 
disqualification was necessary because the court's refusal of 
the plea "gives rise to an 'appearance of partiality.'"  The 
circuit court denied the motion. 
B. The Court of Appeals 
¶12 Conger petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, and the 
State joined Conger's petition. In its May 23, 2008, order 
granting the petition, the court of appeals noted "the unique 
situation presented" and "agree[d] with the State that input 
from the circuit court [would] be beneficial."  It therefore 
directed Judge Grimm "to arrange representation through the 
Director of State Courts and to file a response . . . ."  In a 
June 10, 2008, order setting forth a briefing schedule, the 
court of appeals stated, "Conger and the State have been 
designated as an appellant and a co-appellant respectively.  The 
                                                 
10 "Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding . . . [w]hen a judge 
previously acted as counsel to any party in the same action or 
proceeding."  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(c).  The statute does not 
use the language Conger uses about acting "adversely"; Conger, 
in his motion, appears to assume, without providing supporting 
citation, that the judge's decision was the equivalent of having 
"acted as counsel." 
11 "Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding . . . [w]hen a judge 
determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it appears 
he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(g). 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
10 
 
circuit court judge, the Honorable Peter L. Grimm, has been 
designated as an intervenor-respondent." 
¶13 The court of appeals then certified the appeal to this 
court under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. In its certification 
memorandum, the court of appeals described the State and Conger 
as "co-appellants" and Judge Grimm as "the respondent."  This 
court accepted the certification. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This 
court 
has 
not 
explicitly 
articulated 
the 
appellate standard for reviewing a circuit court's rejection of 
a plea agreement.  However, it is implicit in the court's 
analysis in State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 160 
(1978), that the rejection is reviewed as an exercise of 
discretion.  First, the court referenced the exercise of 
discretion in its analysis: "[W]hen the jurisdiction of the 
court is invoked by the commencement of a criminal proceeding, 
the court can exercise the discretion described in [Guinther et 
al. v. City of Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N.W. 865 (1935)]."  
Guinther established a court's authority to reject a dismissal 
of a charge.  Further, the court's analysis focused on the legal 
sufficiency of the lower court's rejection of the plea rather 
than a de novo review of the facts.  Id. at 47.  The court 
reversed the orders and remanded to the circuit court "for its 
reconsideration."  Id.  We will sustain a court's exercise of 
discretion if the court: (1) examined the relevant facts; (2) 
applied a proper standard of law; and (3) using a demonstrably 
rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
11 
 
could reach.  Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 
N.W.2d 175 (1982). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. When a Circuit Court May Reject a Plea Agreement 
¶15 Plea agreements occur routinely as part of the work of 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and courts.  Such agreements may 
include charges to be dismissed, charges to be amended, the type 
of plea to be entered, and sentencing recommendations to be made 
to the court.  The plea agreement at issue in this case involved 
a felony charge that was to be amended to three misdemeanors, 
another charge to be dismissed with the expectation that it 
would be read in at sentencing,12 and a recommendation by the 
prosecutor for specific sentencing terms. 
¶16 The legislature has defined the circumstances under 
which a prosecutor may amend charges.  "A complaint or 
information may be amended at any time prior to arraignment 
without leave of the court."  Wis. Stat. § 971.29(1).  It seems 
evident that the language "prior to arraignment" is most 
sensibly read to set the outer limit of when the prosecutor may 
make 
such 
an 
amendment in his or her sole discretion.  
Otherwise, the language is surplusage. 
                                                 
12 Under the read-in procedure, "the defendant does not 
plead to any charges and therefore is not sentenced on any of 
the read-in charges but such admitted uncharged offenses are 
considered in sentencing him on the charged offense."  State v. 
Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶24, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155 (quoting 
Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 732, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971)). 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
12 
 
¶17 All of the parties agree that there is a requirement 
of "leave of the court" for any post-arraignment amendment.  
Conger and the State argue,13 rather, that the standard by which 
a court reviews a plea agreement requires a high degree of 
deference to reasonable exercise of the prosecutor's discretion, 
and that under the facts presented here, the prosecutor's 
recommendation was not so unreasonable that it reached the level 
where the court needed to step in.  Stated differently, the 
argument is that a plea agreement endorsed by a prosecutor 
enjoys a strong presumption that it serves the public interest, 
and that failing to respect that presumption constitutes error 
on the part of the court.  Though they frame their arguments in 
slightly different terms, both the State and Conger suggest 
                                                 
13 As noted above, the State joined Conger's petition for 
interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals designated the State 
and Conger "co-appellants."  The two make similar but not 
identical arguments for the reversal of the circuit court's 
decision. Both argue that, where, as here, a prosecutor can 
state a reasonable basis for the plea agreement, the court is 
obligated to defer to the prosecutor's exercise of his or her 
discretion. Both argue that the circuit court's consideration of 
law enforcement's view of the plea was improper under State v. 
Matson (see ¶5, n.4, supra).   
However, Conger makes the additional argument that the 
court's rejection of the plea agreement is improper on the 
grounds that it puts the court in the role of the prosecutor and 
thus deprives Conger of his due process rights under the United 
States Constitution to a neutral magistrate. On the question of 
recusal, the co-appellants differ. Conger argues that recusal is 
required here because the court has assumed the role of 
prosecutor and therefore there is an appearance of partiality 
which makes continued participation in the case unconstitutional 
and contrary to statute; the State argues that there are no 
grounds for recusal under these circumstances. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
13 
 
setting 
a 
high 
standard 
of 
deference 
to 
a 
prosecutor's 
recommendation. They would require the court to find that a 
prosecutor had, in recommending a plea agreement, failed to use 
a "logical reasoning process . . . [to] come to a reasoned 
conclusion" (Conger brief at 15) or "wholly failed to consider 
the interests of the victim . . . or has shown some improper 
discriminatory motive" (State brief at 16).  Both argue that in 
this case, deference to the prosecutor's recommendation is 
warranted, 
because 
the 
recommendation 
was 
made 
after 
consideration of all of the relevant facts, and constituted a 
reasonable exercise of a prosecutor's inherent power and well-
established discretion with regard to the prosecution of cases. 
¶18 Counsel for Judge Grimm argues that neither the 
statute nor case law provides a basis for such a standard.  The 
test for evaluating a plea14 is whether it serves the public 
interest, and, while other jurisdictions have taken other 
approaches, Wisconsin law has not wavered.  For at least 75 
years it has been the law in this state that a trial court is 
empowered to make that determination. 
¶19 We begin by noting that in their respective spheres, 
the prosecutor and the court are afforded necessarily wide 
deference to do their jobs.  "The discretion resting with the 
                                                 
14 We 
note that other relevant factors for a court 
evaluating a plea agreement, such as whether a factual basis 
exists for the plea and whether the defendant has entered the 
plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, are not at issue 
here. See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1); State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 
74, ¶34, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
14 
 
district 
attorney 
in 
determining 
whether 
to 
commence 
a 
prosecution is almost limitless . . . ."  Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d at 
45.  Indeed, the prosecutor's role has been called "'quasi-
judicial' in the sense that it is his or her duty to administer 
justice rather than simply obtain convictions."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶28, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Further, matters that are within a 
circuit court's exercise of discretion are reversible only where 
it can be shown that relevant facts were ignored or the law was 
incorrectly or unreasonably applied.  We will sustain a court's 
exercise of discretion if the court: (1) examined the relevant 
facts; (2) applied a proper standard of law; and (3) using a 
demonstrably rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach.  Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d at 
414-15. 
¶20 There are clearly weighty and difficult decisions 
early in a prosecution that are left to the sole discretion of 
the prosecutor, as well as decisions following conviction that 
are left to the sole discretion of the court.15  The cases that 
                                                 
15 Compare, e.g., State v. Kramer, 2001 WI 132, ¶14, 248 
Wis. 2d 1009, 637 N.W.2d 35 (a prosecutor has wide discretion in 
determining if he or she will prosecute a particular case) and 
State v. Krueger, 224 Wis. 2d 59, 67-68, 588 N.W.2d 921 (1999) 
(prosecutor has discretion to choose whether to bring one charge 
or multiple charges) with Bubb v. Brusky, 2009 WI 91, ¶31 n.9, 
321 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 903 (circuit court has broad 
discretion in instructing the jury) and State v. Grady, 2007 WI 
81, ¶31, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364 (circuit court has broad 
discretion in determining relevant factors to a sentencing 
decision). 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
15 
 
address 
matters 
of 
judicial 
and 
prosecutorial 
discretion 
repeatedly 
acknowledge 
the 
broad 
discretion 
vested, 
respectively, in a judge and in a prosecutor.  However, the 
cases have not been fully harmonized on the question presented 
here, which is how, in a given case, to reconcile the "limited 
judicial supervision of prosecutorial motions to dismiss,"16 with 
"the independent authority of the trial court to grant or refuse 
a motion to dismiss [charges]," id. at 45, and how those 
principles fit together with the district attorney's "great 
discretion 
in 
[the] 
decision 
to 
charge . . . [and 
the] 
negotiation of plea bargains,"17 and the fact that "[n]either of 
these discretions[] . . . is unfettered."18  For example, with 
respect to district attorneys, this court stated in State ex 
rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 
(1969), 
The district attorney in Wisconsin is a constitutional 
officer 
and 
is 
endowed 
with 
a 
discretion 
that 
approaches the quasi-judicial.  It is clear that in 
his functions as a prosecutor he has great discretion 
in determining whether or not to prosecute.  There is 
no obligation or duty upon a district attorney to 
prosecute all complaints that may be filed with him.  
While it is his duty to prosecute criminals, it is 
obvious that a great portion of the power of the state 
has been placed in his hands for him to use in the 
furtherance of justice, and this does not per se 
require prosecution in all cases where there appears 
                                                 
16 Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d at 43. 
17 State ex rel. White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 29, 203 
N.W.2d 638 (1973). 
18 Id. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
16 
 
to be a violation of the law no matter how trivial.  
In general, the district attorney is not answerable to 
any other officer of the state in respect to the 
manner in which he exercises those powers. 
Id. at 378 (footnotes and citation omitted). 
¶21 Conger argues here that a court having the power to 
reject a plea agreement usurps the prosecutor's role.  He 
contends that it is solely the prosecutor's decision whether to 
prosecute and how to proceed with a prosecution.  In rejecting 
the plea agreement, Conger argues, the circuit court in essence 
decided that the prosecution would have to go forward——a 
decision that is within the sole purview of the prosecutor.19   
¶22 Under Kenyon and its predecessor, Guinther, however, 
we reconcile the apparent tension between powers within the 
prosecutor's realm and those within the court's realm with 
reference to the point in time that marks the boundary between 
the two in any given case: the point at which the court's 
jurisdiction is invoked.  As we said in Kenyon, 
The discretion resting with the district attorney in 
determining whether to commence a prosecution is 
almost 
limitless . . . ; 
however, 
when 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
court 
is 
invoked 
by 
the 
commencement of a criminal proceeding, the court can 
exercise the discretion described in Guinther . . . .   
                                                 
19 This characterization is not consistent with the record, 
which indicates that the circuit court explicitly left to the 
prosecutor the decision of how to proceed in the case.  (At the 
end of the final plea hearing, the court stated, "So the case 
will continue. The parties are certainly free or welcome to 
submit a revised plea bargain, but, if not, the case will be 
given a trial date.")  
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
17 
 
Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d at 45.  This court in Kenyon also described 
another check on the power of the district attorney——the 
legislature: 
[T]he 
position 
of 
district 
attorney, 
though 
constitutional, was not one of inherent powers, but 
was 
answerable 
to 
specific 
directions 
of 
the 
legislature.  
It appears settled, therefore, in 
Wisconsin at least, that the prosecutor is subject to 
the enactments of the legislature . . . . 
Id. at 42 (quoting State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 
2d 368, 380, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969)).  Thus, both the fact that 
the court's jurisdiction is "invoked by the commencement" of a 
case and that the legislature has granted prosecutors sole 
discretion to amend a charge only prior to arraignment20 mean 
that the prosecutor's unchecked discretion stops at the point of 
arraignment. 
¶23 Kenyon makes clear that Wisconsin is not alone in this 
respect; it cites a case in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that "more than thirty 
states had, by statute or judicial decision, modified the common 
law to give courts a responsible role in the dismissal of a 
pending criminal proceeding by requiring an 'order' or 'leave' 
or 'consent' of court."  Id. at 44 (citing United States v. 
Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
¶24 Thus, deciding whether to reject a plea agreement is 
squarely within the court's authority; to hold otherwise would 
                                                 
20 "A complaint or information may be amended at any time 
prior to arraignment without leave of the court."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.29(1). 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
18 
 
permit encroachment by the executive branch into the realm that 
has historically, in Wisconsin, been that of the judicial 
branch.  It is true that some other jurisdictions21 have created 
different standards than Wisconsin's.  While the language of our 
case law has emphasized the discretion of both the prosecutor 
and the court in various ways, our courts have been unfailingly 
consistent in holding that we do not impose such a limitation on 
a court when it is determining whether a plea agreement is in 
the public interest.  In that regard, it is worth noting as well 
that our approach is consistent with that of the federal courts.  
The language of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure makes clear that a court's review of a plea agreement 
is an independent one: 
(3) Judicial Consideration of a Plea Agreement.  
(A) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type 
specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may 
accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision 
until the court has reviewed the presentence report.  
 . . .  
(4) Accepting a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts 
the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that 
to the extent the plea agreement is of the type 
specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the agreed 
disposition will be included in the judgment.  
(5) Rejecting a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects a 
plea agreement containing provisions of the type 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[T]rial judges are not free to withhold 
approval of guilty pleas on [public interest grounds] merely 
because their conception of the public interest differs from 
that of the prosecuting attorney.") 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
19 
 
specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must 
do the following on the record and in open court (or, 
for good cause, in camera):  
(A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea 
agreement;  
(B) advise the defendant personally that the court is 
not required to follow the plea agreement and give the 
defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea; and  
(C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea 
is not withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case 
less favorably toward the defendant than the plea 
agreement contemplated. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) (emphasis added).  Federal courts have 
made clear that rejecting a plea does not, in itself, constitute 
becoming involved in plea negotiations.22   
                                                 
22 See, e.g., U.S. v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 
1998): 
The court's authority vis à vis the plea agreement 
extends beyond the obligation to ensure that it is not 
the 
result of 
coercion or ignorance . . . . The 
defendant has no absolute right to have his guilty 
plea accepted by the court.  On the contrary, “[a] 
court may reject a plea in [the] exercise of sound 
judicial discretion.”  Thus, where the parties have 
agreed to a particular sentence pursuant to Rule 
11(e)(1)(C), for example, the court has the power——and 
under 
the 
Sentencing 
Guidelines, 
the 
explicit 
obligation——to 
consider 
whether 
that 
sentence 
is 
adequate and to reject the plea agreement if the court 
finds it not to be. U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(c).  Yet, a court 
may not act arbitrarily; if it elects to reject a plea 
agreement, it must be able to “articulate a sound 
reason” for doing so.  Requiring the court to state on 
the record its reasons for rejecting a plea agreement 
“is the surest way to foster the sound exercise of 
judicial 
discretion.” . . . So 
long 
as 
the 
court 
speaks in the context of "actively evaluating a plea 
agreement" and its remarks are confined to the 
agreement before it, the court does not become a 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
20 
 
¶25 That said, as we noted in Kenyon and explain herein, 
consideration of the views of the prosecutor as well as the 
defense attorney certainly enter into that determination. 
¶26 Our approach vests authority in the circuit court to 
determine what pleas are in the public interest without 
permitting the court to intrude on the authority of the 
prosecutor to decide what charges to file or whether to file 
charges in the first instance.  As we stated in Kenyon,  
[I]n all cases some finding should be made with 
respect to the impact of the ruling on the public 
interest in proper enforcement of its laws and the 
public interest in allowing the prosecutor sufficient 
freedom to exercise his legitimate discretion, to 
employ to the best effect his experience and training, 
and to make the subjective judgment implicit in the 
broad grant of authority under sec. 59.47, Stats. 
. . . [Here] the trial court . . . failed to make any 
determination concerning how granting or refusing the 
motion would affect the public interest. . . . [T]here 
must . . . be some concern with the public's right to 
have the crimes actually committed fairly prosecuted 
and to the protection of the rights of third persons. 
The court should consider the various elements as they 
appear and then exercise its discretion. 
Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d at 47. 
¶27 Our approach has thus required a circuit court to 
"consider 
the 
various 
elements" 
and 
then 
"exercise 
its 
discretion" when evaluating a plea agreement.  When the court 
rejects a plea, the record must reflect an exercise of 
                                                                                                                                                             
participant in the plea negotiations in violation of 
Rule 11.   
(citations omitted). 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
21 
 
discretion.  We are not persuaded that departing from it would 
be an improvement.  We therefore hold that a circuit court may, 
in an appropriate exercise of discretion, reject a plea 
agreement that it deems not to be in the public interest.   
¶28 Turning to the facts of this case, we must apply the 
proper standard of review to the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion.  If the court considered the relevant facts and made 
no mistake of law, we will affirm. 
B. Factors to Consider When Evaluating a Plea 
¶29 That brings us to the second question presented by 
this case, which concerns what factors are appropriate for a 
court to consider in deciding whether to reject a plea 
agreement. It is true, as this court noted in Kenyon, that the 
public interest standard is "admittedly broad," and that 
"Guinther sheds little light on the various factors and 
considerations which may legitimately be included under this 
rubric."  Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d at 46.   It is also true that 
Kenyon did not ameliorate that problem.  Rather, this court 
simply noted that "[i]t would be impossible to make an 
exhaustive list of just what to take into account in this 
regard."  Id. at 47.  We agree that it would be impossible to 
set forth an exhaustive list that would apply to the variety of 
facts and charges that face circuit courts every day.  However, 
we can identify some of the factors that could apply depending 
on circumstances. 
¶30 To begin, Kenyon sketched the broad outlines of the 
appropriate inquiry into whether a plea is in the public 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
22 
 
interest.  In that case, we noted that the circuit court should 
take into account "the public's right to have the crimes 
actually committed fairly prosecuted and to the protection of 
the rights of third persons," Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d at 47, as well 
as "the public interest in proper enforcement of its laws and 
the public interest in allowing the prosecutor sufficient 
freedom to exercise his legitimate discretion, to employ to the 
best effect his experience and training, and to make the 
subjective judgment implicit in the broad grant of authority 
under sec. 59.47, Stats."  Id. 
¶31 Given those contours, a sensible——and important——
starting point for a circuit court evaluating a plea is to 
consider the reasons stated by the prosecutor and defense 
counsel for recommending the plea agreement.  Giving weight to 
the 
prosecutor's 
recommendation 
and 
supporting 
reasoning 
reflects the court's interest in honoring the public interest in 
providing a prosecutor freedom to exercise the discretion that 
his 
or 
her 
position 
authorizes. 
 
Likewise, 
the 
court's 
evaluation 
of 
the 
defense 
attorney's 
reasoning 
and 
recommendations reflects a balancing consideration of the public 
interest in a fair prosecution.23 
                                                 
23 For example, during the plea and sentencing hearing in 
this case, the district attorney explained her reasoning for 
making the plea offer to the circuit court: 
I was the original attorney who made the plea offer in 
this case.  I made that offer based on the fact that 
Mr. Conger has no prior juvenile record, no prior 
adult record.  CCAP indicates that he has two previous 
convictions for FO citations:  one for an underage 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
23 
 
¶32 A 
review 
of 
other 
sources 
yields 
additional 
considerations that could be relevant and, thus, useful in 
particular cases.  In Myers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d 782, 790  (W. 
Va. 1984), the list of factors relevant to the public interest 
includes:  whether a defendant has voluntarily and intelligently 
entered into a plea bargain; whether a factual basis exists for 
his or her guilty plea; the general public's perception that 
crimes should be prosecuted; the interests of the victim; the 
                                                                                                                                                             
alcohol violation, one for a snowmobile violation.  
Other than that, Mr. Conger has no previous record. 
 . . . [T]he drugs were found in a house that Mr. 
Conger shared with his girlfriend as well as another 
individual who lived in that house.  Mr. Conger never 
did admit that they were his. 
I do feel that it is a serious case.  It was a large 
amount of drugs.  However, based on the fact that Mr. 
Conger has no prior history, no misdemeanors, no FO 
possessions, no——other than the one underage drinking 
citation, no prior history with drugs or alcohol, that 
three misdemeanors is an appropriate resolution. 
Likewise, Conger's defense attorney submitted a memorandum 
in support of the plea agreement in this case: 
The 
district 
attorney 
in 
this 
matter 
properly 
exercised its discretion.  The discovery does not show 
direct possession of the contraband by the defendant.  
The attention to the defendant's address was related 
to activities of his girlfriend, who lived with him.  
The defendant did not admit his possession of the 
contraband, which was found above ceiling tiles in his 
and his girlfriend[']s apartment.  Another person with 
access 
to 
the 
premises 
and 
location 
where 
the 
contraband was found was not charged, even though he 
lived there.  The defendant is youthful and is a first 
offender.  All of these reasons provide a proper basis 
for leniency in charging.  The plea bargain should be 
approved. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
24 
 
court's ability to dispose of the case in a manner commensurate 
with the seriousness of the criminal charges and the character 
and background of the defendant; and the plea's usefulness in  
securing a legitimate and important prosecutorial interest 
(e.g., critical testimony needed to convict an accomplice).  
¶33 It has also been observed that "[t]here may be 
situations in which the public interest might better be served 
by having a case tried rather than by having it disposed of by 
means of a guilty plea."24  
¶34 In Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶32, we discussed factors a 
prosecutor may consider when deciding whether to file charges, 
and these factors overlap with determining the public's interest 
with regard to a plea: 
• the extent of harm caused by the offense;  
• the threat posed to the public by the suspect;  
• the ability and willingness of the victim to participate;  
• the disproportion between the authorized punishment and 
the particular offense or offender;  
• possible improper motives of a complainant;  
• cooperation of the suspect with the arrest/prosecution of 
others; and 
• the possibility or likelihood of prosecution by another 
jurisdiction.  In Kalal, we adopted those factors from the 
                                                 
24 U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Plea 
Agreements——Considerations 
to 
Be 
Weighed 
§9-27.420 
(1997), 
available 
at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ 
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/title9.htm. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
25 
 
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice.  
Similarly, ABA Standard 14-1.8 provides factors for a court to 
consider in assessing a plea agreement: 
Consideration of plea in final disposition 
(a) . . . It is proper for the court to grant charge  
 . . . concessions to defendants who enter a plea of 
guilty . . . when consistent with the protection of 
the public, the gravity of the offense, and the needs 
of the defendant, and when there is substantial 
evidence to establish that: 
(i) the defendant is genuinely contrite and has shown 
a willingness to assume responsibility for his or her 
conduct;  
(ii) the concessions will make possible alternative 
correctional measures which are better adapted to 
achieving protective, deterrent, or other purposes of 
correctional treatment, or will prevent undue harm to 
the defendant from the form of conviction;  
(iii) 
the 
defendant, 
by 
making 
public 
trial 
unnecessary, has demonstrated genuine consideration 
for the victims of his or her criminal activity, by 
desiring either to make restitution or to prevent 
unseemly public scrutiny or embarrassment to them; or  
(iv) the defendant has given or offered cooperation 
when such cooperation has resulted or may result in 
the successful prosecution of other offenders engaged 
in equally serious or more serious criminal conduct.   
Am. Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 14-1.8 
(2d ed. 1980). 
¶35 We are satisfied that a court's consideration of any 
of those factors, in evaluating a plea agreement, could be 
appropriate, depending on the factual circumstances of the case.  
We emphasize that the evaluation process is more of an art than 
a science.  In other words, the factors we list herein are not 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
26 
 
to be construed as a mechanical, multi-element test.  Rather, we 
simply have identified factors that could be relevant and 
helpful to a court in evaluating a plea agreement. 
¶36 In 
this 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court 
discussed 
the 
following factors on the record: 
- 
the 
amount 
of 
marijuana 
and 
dealer-related 
items 
recovered from defendant's bedroom; 
- the fact that the recovered marijuana had a large street 
value; 
- the defendant admitted owing $2900 to a supplier; 
- the MEG unit did not "in general" agree with plea 
agreements that involved charge reductions; 
- at 22, the defendant was "old enough" to make better 
decisions; 
- the defendant acted with other people; 
- the consequences of a felony conviction is a better 
deterrent for future criminal activity; and 
- the prosecutor's given reasons for recommending the plea 
agreement to the court were more relevant to sentencing than to 
plea negotiations.  
The court also expressed the sentiment that reducing felony 
charges to misdemeanors decreases the morale of law enforcement. 
¶37 One specific factor was the focus of one of the 
questions certified to us by the court of appeals:  "whether a 
trial court may take into account the view of law enforcement 
when considering the public's interest in a plea agreement."   
The State and Conger argue that to consider the view of law 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
27 
 
enforcement, as the circuit court did here, runs afoul of State 
v. Matson,25 which held that a plea agreement between the State 
and a defendant that included a joint sentencing recommendation 
was breached by a letter written by a law enforcement officer 
asking the court to disregard the joint recommendation and 
instead impose the maximum sentence.  The question in Matson was 
whether the defendant, having entered a plea pursuant to the 
plea agreement, was entitled to resentencing before a different 
circuit court judge as a result of the breach. 
¶38 The State and Conger invoke Matson for the proposition 
that a court may not properly consider the view of law 
enforcement when determining whether to reject a plea pursuant 
to a plea agreement.  The State quotes the following language in 
Matson 
as 
support 
for 
this 
proposition: 
"Because 
an 
investigative 
officer 
is 
the 
investigating 
arm 
of 
the 
prosecutor's office, principles of fairness and agency require 
us to bind the investigating officer to the prosecutor's 
bargain."  Matson, 268 Wis. 2d, ¶23.  
¶39 The focus of the analysis in Matson was on whether the 
request by the investigating officer that the court impose a 
maximum sentence should be imputed to the State, which had 
represented 
in 
its 
negotiations 
with 
the 
defendant 
and 
statements to the court its intent to recommend a much lesser 
sentence.  The circuit court in Matson had followed the 
                                                 
25 State v. Matson, 2003 WI App 253, ¶¶2-3, 268 Wis. 2d 725, 
674 N.W.2d 51. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
28 
 
recommendation 
advocated by the investigating officer and 
imposed the maximum penalty.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court, noting that "had the letter in this case been 
written, or the sentiments contained therein uttered, by the 
district attorney's office, a breach of the plea agreement would 
have occurred."  Id., ¶22.  The court of appeals reasoned that 
"the State is obligated to comply with any promises it makes" to 
induce a guilty plea from a defendant.  Id., ¶23.   
¶40 It is possible to draw comparisons between the facts 
of Matson with Conger's situation only by characterizing the 
facts in the broadest possible terms:  both cases involve 
consideration 
by 
a 
circuit 
court 
of 
law 
enforcement 
representatives' views on a plea agreement.  Such an analysis is 
not helpful because it strips all of the relevant facts from 
both cases.  Matson did not stand for the proposition that law 
enforcement views can never be properly considered by a court; 
rather, it dealt with a specific situation where a plea 
agreement had been reached, a plea had indeed been entered, and 
the expectations of both the State and the defendant were that 
the court would be presented a joint sentencing recommendation.  
The overarching question before the court of appeals was whether 
the 
sentencing 
was 
fair 
given 
the 
competing 
sentencing 
recommendations and the defendant's much different expectation 
when the plea had been entered; the specific question on which 
that determination turned was one of agency:  in other words, 
was the investigating officer in effect an agent of the State? 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
29 
 
¶41 When the issues addressed in these cases are stated 
precisely, the differences become apparent.  Most significantly, 
considering law enforcement representatives' views as a factor 
in determining whether to reject the proposed plea agreement is 
quite a different matter from allowing law enforcement to slip a 
harsher 
sentencing 
recommendation 
to 
a 
court 
while 
the 
prosecutor uses a lesser sentencing recommendation to procure a 
plea from the defendant.  Here, the consideration of law 
enforcement's views was only one factor, of several noted in the 
record, in the circuit court's decision, and it was not obtained 
after the prosecution had secured the defendant's plea.  Matson 
is good law, but it has no application here.  
¶42 The court in this case did a very thorough job of 
examining the facts.  As noted above, over the course of 
multiple hearings, the court questioned the parties closely and 
carefully in order to have a complete understanding of the 
facts.  While it would be inappropriate for a court to deny a 
motion to amend as part of a plea agreement on the grounds that 
it gives law enforcement veto power over plea agreements or on 
the grounds that it followed a policy that amendments from 
felonies 
to 
misdemeanors 
were 
never 
approved, 
those 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
30 
 
circumstances are not in the record before us in this case.26  
The record shows that the circuit court was troubled by the 
facts of this particular case from the first plea hearing.  This 
was not a situation where a plea agreement to which the court 
was initially receptive was nixed by law enforcement; rather, 
here, it was clear that the circuit court was going to reject 
the plea agreement on all the facts before it even before it 
knew the view of the law enforcement unit.  The view of the law 
enforcement unit was one of four facts the circuit court sought 
to learn about before ruling on the motion; after three of those 
questions were answered, but before the question about the MEG 
Unit was answered, the court said its answer was "still no."   
¶43 As we have discussed, the circuit court properly 
applied the law as set forth in Kenyon, which was cited in the 
circuit court's ruling.  Given that the court made a detailed 
record over the course of three hearings as to the factors it 
considered significant, and given that those factors were 
                                                 
26 It is true that the circuit court made the statement, at 
the third plea hearing, "The Court believes that the public 
interest is not served by the reduction from felonies to 
misdemeanors."  This statement, standing alone, can not be an 
appropriate standard for evaluating plea agreements.  However, 
given the full context of the transcripts of the three hearings, 
we are satisfied that the circuit court was not in actuality 
applying such a blanket rule about amendments from felonies to 
misdemeanors, because it focused repeatedly on several facts in 
the case.  We note that applying a blanket rule would not 
require three hearings; the circuit court could easily have 
denied the agreement at the first hearing as soon as it was 
informed of the nature of the amendment sought, if it indeed had 
such a blanket rule. 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
31 
 
appropriate to the analysis, we determine that the circuit court 
had the power to reject the plea agreement on its holding that 
it was not in the public interest.  The circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion. 
C. 
Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Denying  
Conger's Motion to Recuse 
¶44 As noted above, Conger moved to recuse the circuit 
court after it denied his motion to amend the charges.  The 
circuit court denied that motion as well.  Conger asks on appeal 
that the circuit court's denial of that motion be reversed.  We 
conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Conger's 
motion to recuse because rejecting a plea agreement on the 
grounds that it is not in the public interest does not fall 
under any of the rules that automatically require a court's 
recusal from further participation in a case.   
¶45 Conger argues that the court's recusal was necessary 
once it rejected the plea agreement for the following reasons.  
First, Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(b) requires recusal when a judge 
is a party to a case, and Conger contends that the court, in 
rejecting the plea, essentially placed itself in the role of 
prosecutor, representing a party adverse to the defendant.  
Second, Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f) requires recusal when a judge 
has "a significant . . . personal interest" in the outcome of a 
case, and Conger argues that the circuit court, in rejecting the 
plea, has stated such an interest.  The State disagrees, as does 
counsel for Judge Grimm, and each argues that rejecting a plea 
agreement neither constitutes becoming a party nor states a 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
32 
 
significant personal interest in a case.  The presumption that 
judges are free from bias and prejudice is well established.  
State v. Santana, 220 Wis. 2d 674, 684, 584 N.W.2d 151 (Ct. App. 
1998).  Counsel for Judge Grimm rightly points out that given 
that the circuit court has a duty under the law to supervise 
plea agreements, it would put courts in an untenable position to 
create a rule that rejecting a plea automatically creates 
grounds for recusal.  We see nothing in a court's rejection of a 
plea in general, and nothing in this particular record, that 
persuades us that in rejecting the plea agreement the court 
relinquished its ability to be the impartial and detached 
magistrate to which Conger is constitutionally and statutorily 
entitled.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err when it 
denied Conger's motion to recuse; that denial was entirely 
proper. 
¶46 There is, however, a twist in this case that gives us 
some concern.  The configuration of parties in this case was 
altered when the court of appeals granted the petition for 
interlocutory appeal.  As noted above, in its May 23, 2008, 
order granting Conger's petition for interlocutory appeal, the 
court of appeals noted "the unique situation presented" and 
"agree[d] with the State that input from the circuit court 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
33 
 
[would] be beneficial."27  It therefore directed Judge Grimm "to 
arrange representation through the Director of State Courts and 
file a response  . . . ."  In a June 10, 2008, order setting 
forth a briefing schedule, the court of appeals stated, "Conger 
and the State have been designated as an appellant and a co-
appellant respectively.  The circuit court judge, the Honorable 
Peter 
L. 
Grimm, 
has 
been 
designated 
as 
an 
intervenor-
respondent."   
¶47 This designation has raised the potential for a new 
motion for recusal to be made on remand on the grounds that 
Judge Grimm has, in the course of the appeal, become a party.  
If Judge Grimm has become a party to this action, then his 
recusal would appear to be governed by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(b) 
(requiring disqualification from any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding when a judge is a party).  On the record before us, 
we are unable to dispose of the question of Judge Grimm's status 
as a party in this matter.  The record before us does not 
include any motions filed by any party requesting that Judge 
                                                 
27 Because the State and Conger are allies rather than 
adversaries on this issue, the court did not have the benefit of 
the ordinary testing of arguments by opposing parties. See 
Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) 
("[O]ur adversary system presupposes[] [that] accurate and just 
results are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest 
of opposed interests . . . ."). 
 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
34 
 
Grimm be permitted to intervene in this matter.28  We do not know 
whether the court of appeals made the designation on the basis 
of Wis. Stat. § 803.03, Wis. Stat. § 803.09, or some other 
statute.29  Nor does the court of appeals explain its rationale 
for its decision to order Judge Grimm to obtain representation 
and for its designation of the respective parties as appellant, 
co-appellant, and intervenor-respondent in the certification of 
appeal to this court.  Of course, the fact that Judge Grimm is 
represented by counsel does not necessarily make him a party. As 
the State suggests in its reply brief to this court, "Judge 
Grimm's position may be better construed as an 'amicus curiae' 
rather than as 'a party' in a case over which the judge 
presided," citing analogous cases from the United States Supreme 
Court.  This argument bears developing both because it is 
relevant to the immediate question of recusal and because it is 
                                                 
28 The State, in its reply brief, says, "In its response to 
Defendant Conger's petition for leave to appeal, the State 
suggested that because both the State and Defendant Conger 
sought reversal of Judge Grimm's rejection of the proposed plea 
agreement, Judge Grimm's position should be represented by 
counsel outside the Department of Justice."  Conger's petition 
for leave to appeal is in the record, but the State's response 
to it is not. 
29 Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(a) states that "[a] person who is 
subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the 
action if . . . in the person's absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties[.]" 
Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2) states in part that "[u]pon timely 
motion anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action when a 
movant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of 
law or fact in common." 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
35 
 
a question that may arise again in the future.  Because the 
record 
before 
us 
is 
incomplete, 
we 
cannot 
make 
that 
determination.  We therefore remand to the court of appeals the 
issue of whether, as a matter of law, Judge Grimm has now become 
a party or amicus.  We then expect a remand to the circuit court 
for a decision under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) in regard to 
recusal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶48 The first two questions presented by this case are 
answered by Wis. Stat. §  971.29 (which permits amendment of the 
charge without judicial approval only prior to arraignment) and 
established precedent concerning the circuit court's inherent 
authority to reject a plea that is not in the public interest.  
Thus, a circuit court must review a plea agreement independently 
and may, if it appropriately exercises its discretion, reject 
any plea agreement that does not, in its view, serve the public 
interest.  That review is analogous to the court's independent 
determination that a factual basis exists for the plea and its 
independent determination pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) 
that the plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; 
such independent determinations are safeguards built into our 
system to protect the integrity of the plea process.  When a 
court determines independently whether a plea is in the public 
interest, it is no more a reflection on the prosecutor's 
integrity or judgment than when it determines independently that 
a factual basis supports the plea.   
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
36 
 
¶49 As for the factors a court may consider when it makes 
that independent determination, we reiterate, as other courts 
have done, that the public interest is a consideration that is 
not capable of precise outlines.  Accordingly, the factors that 
a court may weigh when defining the public interest involved 
will vary from case to case.  One appropriate factor among many 
may well be the viewpoint of law enforcement; a court's 
consideration 
of 
that 
factor 
in 
its 
analysis 
does 
not 
automatically invalidate its ultimate decision with regard to 
the plea.   
¶50 Finally, in answer to the questions about required 
recusal, we conclude that a court's rejection of a plea does not 
in and of itself become a "personal interest in the outcome of 
the matter," and Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(f) is not implicated 
here.  We are unable to ascertain on this record whether in the 
course of the appeal Judge Grimm has become a party to this 
case, in which event it appears that Wis. Stat. §  757.19(2)(b) 
would now require his recusal from further participation in this 
case.  Because the record is undeveloped as to that question, we 
remand to the court of appeals the issue of whether, as a matter 
of law, Judge Grimm has now become a party or amicus and whether 
recusal is now required.  We then expect a remand to the circuit 
court for a decision under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2). 
¶51 We therefore affirm the order of the circuit court 
denying the motion to amend the information pursuant to the plea 
agreement.  The order denying Conger's motion seeking the 
court's recusal was also properly denied.  However, we remand to 
No. 
2008AP755-CR   
 
37 
 
the court of appeals the issue of whether Judge Grimm has now 
become a party or amicus.  We then expect a remand to the 
circuit court for a decision under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) in 
regard to recusal. 
By the Court.—Order denying motion to amend affirmed; order 
denying motion to recuse affirmed; order of the court of appeals 
designating the circuit court an intervenor-respondent remanded 
to the court of appeals for further proceedings.   
 
 
 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I write separately for two reasons:   
¶53 First, to 
underscore that although the majority 
opinion affirms a circuit court's de novo determination whether 
to reject a plea agreement involving amendment or dismissal of 
initial charges, the majority opinion appropriately stresses the 
significant weight a circuit court should give to the district 
attorney's recommendation and evaluation of the public interest, 
as encompassed in the plea agreement. 
¶54 Second, to respond to the dissent, which laments that 
the court has expanded the power of the judiciary and has 
crossed "a well understood[] line separating a core power of the 
executive branch——the power to prosecute criminal actions——from 
the power of the judiciary to adjudicate those actions."  
Dissent, 
¶97. 
 
Somewhat 
contradictorily, 
the 
dissent 
acknowledges that the line separating judicial and executive 
powers is "indistinct."  Id.   
¶55 The 
dissent acknowledges that courts may review 
amendments to initial charges to protect defendants from 
prejudice.  Dissent, ¶141.  Beyond this, the dissent offers no 
standard of review to guide circuit courts in deciding whether 
to reject a proposed plea agreement involving the amendment or 
dismissal of charges.  The only answer that can be deciphered 
from the dissent is that there is no court review of a district 
attorney's decision to amend or dismiss a charge.  According to 
the dissent, district attorneys have the exclusive authority to 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
determine whether a plea agreement involving amendment or 
dismissal of initial charges is in the public interest.   
¶56 How can that be?  Once charges are filed in court, the 
district attorney is the attorney for the State, which is a 
party to the criminal proceedings.1  Placing unlimited, non-
reviewable, exclusive power in the district attorney to amend or 
discharge charges, as the dissent proposes, undermines the 
deliberative process of the circuit court in deciding cases and 
circumvents 
the 
judiciary's 
duty 
to 
administer 
justice 
impartially and independently. 
¶57 Wisconsin's 
constitutional 
history, 
the 
statutory 
history, and long-standing precedents of this court demonstrate 
that a circuit court's evaluation of a plea agreement involving 
amendment or dismissal of initial charges is not in derogation 
of the separation of powers doctrine but rather maintains proper 
checks and balances between government branches and protects the 
public interest.  
I 
¶58 I conclude, like the majority opinion and in contrast 
to the dissent, that courts have the power to review the 
discretion of district attorneys in amending or dismissing a 
charge.  Indeed no one disputes this rule of law——not the State, 
not the defendant, not the amicus.2  Only the dissent disputes 
                                                 
1 See State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶106, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 
697 
N.W.2d 769 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring 
in 
part 
& 
dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
2 Non-party brief of Ben Kempinen, Clinical Professor and 
Director, 
Prosecution Project, Frank J. Remington Center, 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, Wisconsin. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the rule of law.  Yet judicial review is a safety valve needed 
to assure fairness and to promote trust in the legal system.  
¶59 The question before the court is what standard a 
circuit court should use in deciding whether to reject a 
proposed plea agreement involving the amendment or dismissal of 
charges.3  
¶60 My initial view was that the circuit court should 
review the plea agreement to determine whether the prosecutor 
erroneously exercised his or her discretion.4  In other words, I 
thought that the circuit court should review the prosecutor's 
decision about changing the charges in a plea agreement by 
asking whether the prosecutor erroneously exercised his or her 
discretion.  Allowing the prosecutor substantial independence in 
amending or dismissing charges once the case is before the court 
is proper because the prosecutor has investigated the offense 
and has more information than the circuit court. 
¶61 Nevertheless, I join the majority opinion because 
although the majority opinion does not adopt the erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard, the majority stresses the 
                                                 
3 As stated by the court of appeals certification, the first 
issue presented for review is "What is the trial court's scope 
of review when deciding whether to accept or reject a plea 
agreement?" 
4 As this court has explained, prosecutors have great 
discretion in determining whether to commence a prosecution and 
are generally accountable to the people, and not to courts, for 
how they exercise that power, but that power has bounds; the 
power must be balanced against the need to avoid arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or oppressive results.  State v. Karpinski, 92 
Wis. 2d 599, 607-08, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
significant 
weight 
a 
circuit 
court 
should 
give 
to 
the 
prosecutor's recommendations as encompassed in a plea agreement.   
¶62 Wisconsin law has long recognized, and the majority 
opinion here maintains, that district attorneys are "quasi-
judicial" officers, engaged in sharing responsibility with the 
courts to assure that justice is done.  Majority op., ¶19 
(quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶28, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  The majority 
opinion 
calls 
attention 
to 
the 
fact 
that 
"prosecutor[s] . . . are afforded necessarily wide deference to 
do their jobs."  Majority op., ¶19.  The majority opinion 
underscores "the public interest in allowing the prosecutor 
sufficient 
freedom 
to 
exercise 
his 
[or 
her] 
legitimate 
discretion, to employ to the best effect his [or her] experience 
and training, and to make the subjective judgment implicit in 
the broad grant of authority under sec. 59.47, Stats."  Majority 
op., ¶26 (quoting State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 47, 270 
N.W.2d 160 (1978)). 
¶63 Thus the majority opinion is sufficiently deferential 
to the district attorney to preserve the office's necessary 
autonomy and is flexible enough to allow a circuit court to 
reject a plea agreement that is not in the public interest.  The 
majority recognizes that the prosecutor's free exercise of 
authorized discretion is in itself a valuable public interest.5   
                                                 
5 See 
majority 
op., 
¶31 
(proper 
weighting 
of 
the 
prosecutor's recommendation and reasoning "reflects the court's 
interest in honoring the public interest in providing a 
prosecutor freedom to exercise the discretion that his or her 
position authorizes.").   
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶64 Thus, contrary to the dissent's anxiety that the 
majority opinion will lead to second-guessing of circuit courts' 
approval of plea agreements by unspecified "third parties,"6 and 
that the majority's weighting of the prosecutor's recommendation 
is a "fig leaf,"7 I take the majority seriously and at its word 
when it credits the recommendation and reasoning of prosecutors 
entering into plea agreements.8  Today's decision maintains the 
circuit court's established and constitutional role. 
II 
¶65 Simply put, it is peculiarly the province of all 
Wisconsin courts, and especially this Court, to interpret our 
state constitution and to "say what the law is."9  The majority 
decision in this case preserves the respective roles of the 
                                                 
6 Dissent, ¶158. 
7 Id., ¶157. 
8 In addition to the American Bar Association's Standard 14-
1.8, which the majority cites with approval at ¶34 for its 
discussion of factors bearing on the circuit court's evaluation 
of the public interest, the majority's determination is in 
keeping with the ABA's Standard 14-1.1(b), regarding receiving 
and acting on a plea: "[A]ppropriate consideration should be 
given to the views of the parties, the interests of the victims 
and the interest of the public in the effective administration 
of justice."   
9 State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 
436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) ("We deem it to be this court's duty 
to resolve disputes regarding the constitutional functions of 
different branches of state government; we may not avoid this 
duty simply because one or both parties are coordinate branches 
of government.").  
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
courts and the district attorney.  The dissent's anxiety about a 
violation of the separation of powers is unfounded.10   
¶66 The present case involves the power of a circuit court 
to reject a district attorney's request to amend or dismiss a 
charge that has been filed. 
¶67 Stridently objecting to the majority opinion as a 
judicial usurpation of executive power, the dissent spins a 
long, winding tale about the powers of district attorneys and 
courts, citing constitutional, statutory, and case law.  And 
where does the dissent wind up?  Agreeing with the majority!   
¶68 The dissent concludes that "the majority decision is 
foreshadowed in previous cases."  Dissent, ¶162.   
¶69 The dissent takes several approaches (explicit and 
implicit) in an attempt to refute the majority opinion and the 
numerous Wisconsin decisions that recognize the power of a trial 
judge to refuse to accept a proposed plea agreement that 
                                                 
10 The Wisconsin Constitution vests executive power in the 
governor and legislative power in the two houses of the 
legislature.  The judicial power rests in a unified court 
system. This division of responsibility evinces the separation 
of 
powers 
doctrine 
in 
our 
government. 
 
Stenklyft, 
281 
Wis. 2d 484, ¶88 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in part & 
dissenting in part). 
Although the principles of the separation of powers are 
easily stated, "the boundaries that separate the powers of the 
three branches are shadowy and not well defined.  It is the duty 
of the court to define them, and see that they are respected."  
Stenklyft, 281 Wis. 2d 484, ¶88 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part) (citing Thoe v. Chicago, Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Ry. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W. 407 (1923) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
involves a reduction or dismissal of charges.  None of the 
dissent's approaches is persuasive. 
1.  The dissent asserts that there exists an "indistinct" 
but "well understood line separating a core power in the 
executive branch—the power to prosecute criminal actions 
from the power of the judiciary to adjudicate those 
actions."  Dissent, ¶97. 
¶70 Response:  The dissent fails to cite to any authority 
establishing this "well understood line" or establishing a "core 
executive power to prosecute criminal actions."  Indeed, the 
well-accepted law is that the district attorney has no "core" 
powers, or any other powers, other than what the statutes 
provide. 
¶71 The district attorney is mentioned in the Wisconsin 
Constitution in Article VI, Section 4, (1)(a), (1)(c), and (5).  
The method of selection (election), term of office, and 
procedures to fill vacancies are set forth; nothing more.  
Absent constitutional provisions, the powers of the office of 
district attorney have been set forth by the legislature and 
have evolved over the years.   
¶72 The court has stated that "the position of district 
attorney, though constitutional, was not one of inherent powers, 
but was answerable to specific directions of the legislature."11 
                                                 
11 State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 
380, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶73 Circuit courts, on the other hand, have the power to 
adjudicate and have inherent and implicit power in performing 
their functions.12 
2.  The dissent asserts that the district attorney has 
broad discretion to determine whether to file charges, that 
is, to initiate a prosecution.  Dissent, ¶¶116, 132-35. 
¶74 Response:  True.  See dissent, ¶¶116-17 (describing 
State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 
N.W.2d 255 (1969) (no writ of mandamus lies to compel district 
attorney to conduct an inquest)). 
¶75 But this case does not involve the district attorney's 
power to decide whether to file a charge.  The majority opinion 
does not interfere with the district attorney's decisionmaking 
regarding whether and what to charge.   
¶76 The present case involves the power of the court and 
district attorney once the district attorney has decided whether 
and what to charge.  When charges are filed, the State is a 
party to the action and is represented before the court by the 
district attorney.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly, 
the 
powers 
of 
the 
attorney 
general 
are 
circumscribed by statute, although he or she is a constitutional 
officer.  State of Wisconsin v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, 
¶¶15-16, 20, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526.  "[U]nless the 
power to [bring] a specific action is granted by law, the office 
of the attorney general is powerless to act."  Id. at ¶22 
(second brackets in original).  This is settled law that does 
not gravely undermine the separation of powers; neither does 
maintaining 
long-established 
checks 
and 
balances 
on 
the 
discretionary authority of district attorneys around the state. 
12 See State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603 (1928). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶77 More importantly, however, the power to file charges, 
to initiate prosecution, is not the exclusive power of the 
district attorney.  Rather, it is a power shared by the district 
attorney and the judiciary, as the dissent must concede.  
Dissent, ¶135.  
¶78 When the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted, and until 
the present day, the district attorney did not have exclusive 
power to determine whether to file charges, that is, whether to 
initiate prosecution.  A trial court has power to initiate a 
charge when the district attorney does not. 
¶79 Twenty-first 
century 
lawyers 
view 
the 
district 
attorney as the public prosecutor, but historically the victim, 
not the state, was the prosecutor.13  Before the adoption of the 
Constitution (and thereafter),14 judges were authorized to 
                                                 
13 For a history of district attorneys  and their powers in 
Wisconsin, see State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 
Wis. 2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987) (overruled by State v. 
Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 365-67, 441 N.W.2d 696 
(1989)); State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 441 
N.W.2d 696 (1989); Frank J. Remington & Wayne A. Logan, Frank 
Miller and the Decision to Prosecute, 69 Wash. U.L.Q. 159 
(1991); Wayne A. Logan, Comment, A Proposed Check on the 
Charging Discretion of Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 
1695; 
Samuel 
Becker, 
Judicial 
Scrutiny 
of 
Prosecutorial 
Discretion in the Decision Not to File a Complaint, 71 Marq. L. 
Rev. 749 (1988).   
14 The early statutory history is relevant because in 
interpreting the Wisconsin constitution courts examine (1) the 
plain meaning of the words in the context used; (2) the 
historical analysis of the constitutional debates and the 
practices 
in 
existence 
in 
1848; 
and 
(3) 
the 
earliest 
interpretations of the section by the legislature as manifested 
in the first law passed following adoption of the constitution.  
State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984).   
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
initiate criminal prosecutions.15  "Doubtless, at the time of the 
state's origin . . . magistrates played a central role in 
initiating prosecutions, in contrast to the ambiguous role of 
district attorneys."16  
                                                                                                                                                             
For state constitutional interpretation, see also Borgnis 
v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 349-50, 133 N.W. 209 (1911) ("Where 
there is no express command or prohibition, but only general 
language or policy to be considered, the conditions prevailing 
at the time of [the constitution's] adoption must have their due 
weight; but the changed social, economic, and governmental 
constitutions and ideals of the time, as well as the problems 
which the changes have produced, must also logically enter into 
the consideration, and become influential factors in the 
settlement of problems of construction and interpretation.").  
See also B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 
202 N.W. 324 (1927); In re Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. 163, 
171, 221 N.W. 856 (1928). 
15 Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 363. 
16 Wayne A. Logan, Comment, A Proposed Check on the Charging 
Discretion of Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1695, 
1710. 
1878 Rev. Stat. Section 4653 granted the district attorney 
the power not to file an information, but the power was subject 
to the trial court’s approval.  The trial court could direct the 
district attorney to file the proper information and bring the 
case to trial: 
The district attorney of the proper county shall 
inquire into and make full examination of all facts 
and 
circumstances 
connected 
with 
any 
case 
of 
preliminary examination, as provided by law, touching 
the commission of any offense whereon the offender 
shall 
have 
been 
committed 
to 
jail, 
or 
become 
recognized or held to bail, and to file an information 
setting forth the crime committed, according to the 
facts ascertained on such examination, and from the 
written testimony taken thereon, whether it be the 
offense 
charged 
in 
the 
complaint 
on 
which 
the 
examination was had or not; but if the district 
attorney shall determine in any such case that an 
information ought not to be filed, he shall make, 
subscribe and file with the clerk of the court, a 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶80 It was not until 1945 that district attorneys were 
given explicit statutory authority, coextensive with the powers 
of the courts, to issue criminal complaints.17  Only in 1969 did 
the legislature give district attorneys the primary (but not 
exclusive) statutory authority to charge criminal offenses.18   
¶81 While the 1969 revision of the criminal code gave the 
district attorney "a greater voice in the initiating of criminal 
proceedings,"19 circuit courts retained a role in the charging 
function.  Wisconsin Stat. § 968.02(3) (1969)20 permits circuit 
court judges to initiate prosecutions if the district attorney 
is unavailable or refuses to issue a complaint.  Similarly, Wis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
statement in writing, containing his reasons, in fact 
and in law, for not filing an information in such 
case; such statement shall be filed at and during the 
term of the court at which the offender shall be held 
for appearance for trial; and in such case the court 
shall 
examine 
such statement, together with the 
evidence filed in the case, and if, upon such 
examination, the court shall not be satisfied with 
such 
statement, 
the 
district 
attorney 
shall 
be 
directed by the court to file the proper information 
and bring the case to trial (emphasis added). 
For a discussion of the origin and early history of 
magistrates 
issuing 
criminal 
complaints 
and 
exercising 
a 
judicial, rather than an administrative or ministerial function, 
see State ex rel. Long v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 44 N.W. 13 (1889). 
17 Wis. Stat. § 361.02(1) (1945); see also Samuel Becker, 
Judicial Scrutiny of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Decision 
Not to File a Complaint, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 749, 756, 766. 
18 Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 363. 
19 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.02, Comments—L. 1969, c. 255 (West 
2007). 
20 See also Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3) (2007-08). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
Stat. § 968.26 (1969) permits circuit court judges to issue 
criminal complaints.21   
¶82 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the 
powers of the district attorney increased, but the power of the 
courts in initiating prosecutions has continued to be recognized 
by the legislature and the courts as a judicial function.22   
¶83 Thus initiating criminal charges is not an exclusive 
function of the district attorney.  The district attorney shares 
the power to initiate criminal charges with the judiciary. 
3.  The dissent discounts our prior cases that conclude a 
trial court may reject a plea and may reject a plea agreement 
that does not serve the public interest. 
¶84 Response:  Case law recognizes that a trial court has 
inherent and statutory power to reject a plea and in particular 
to reject a plea agreement that does not serve the public 
interest.  The dissent asks this court to overturn precedent.  
¶85 At least as early as 1945, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
has declared that "[t]he right of the court to refuse to accept 
a plea is an inherent power of all criminal courts."  State v. 
La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 308, 19 N.W.2d 289 (1945). 
                                                 
21 See also Wis. Stat. § 968.26 (2007-08).  See also § 2, 
ch. 369, Territorial Stats. of Wis. (1839). 
22 The "John Doe" statute authorizing courts to issue a 
complaint upon finding probable cause has been in force since 
1849.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.26 (2007-08); Unnamed Defendant, 150 
Wis. 2d at 363; Frank Remington & Wayne A. Logan, Frank Miller 
and the Decision to Prosecute, 69 Wash. U.L.Q. 159, 164 (1991). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶86 A recurring theme of Wisconsin cases is that a trial 
judge may refuse to accept a proposed plea agreement that 
involves a reduction or dismissal of charges. 
¶87 The dissent urges that the court not abide by these 
cases.  The dissent at ¶125 objects that "Guinther23 represents 
nearly open-ended authority for courts to pursue prosecution 
over the opposition of executive branch officials."  The dissent 
further seeks to marginalize and avoid the law of Guinther on 
historical and ideological bases.  See dissent, ¶¶101-115, 125.  
¶88 The dissent does not want to follow State v. Kenyon, 
85 Wis. 2d 36, 44-45, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978).  See dissent, 
¶¶118-125.  The Kenyon court, after examining prior cases 
(including Guinther), concluded that once a case is filed, the 
trial court has the duty to consider the public interest in 
determining whether to grant or deny a district attorney's 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
case. 
 
The 
district 
attorney's 
determination whether to initiate a criminal prosecution is 
"almost limitless," but once the "jurisdiction of the court is 
invoked by the commencement of a criminal proceeding, the court 
can exercise the discretion described in Guinther, supra."24  If, 
as Kenyon holds, a trial court has the power to deny a district 
attorney's motion to dismiss a case, the trial court surely has 
the lesser power to deny a district attorney's motion to amend 
or dismiss a charge.  
                                                 
23 Guinther v. City of Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 339-40, 258 
N.W. 865 (1935). 
24 State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 160 
(1978). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶89 The dissent is dismissive of State v. Comstock, 168 
Wis. 2d 915, 927 & n.11, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992).  See dissent, 
¶¶149-50.  The Comstock court stated that a circuit court must 
satisfy itself that the amendments to a charge are in the public 
interest: "A circuit court may, as this court has written, ask 
sufficient questions, including the prosecutor's reasons for 
entering the plea agreement, to satisfy itself of the wisdom of 
accepting the plea to reduced charges.  This is the law of 
longstanding in this state" (citations omitted).  Comstock, 168 
Wis. 2d at 927.   
¶90 The dissent is critical of the majority's adhering to 
State v. Lloyd, 104 Wis. 2d 49, 310 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1981).  
See dissent, ¶154.  In Lloyd, the court of appeals approved the 
circuit court's rejection of a joint motion by the prosecutor 
and defendant to dismiss the information; the circuit court 
appointed a special prosecutor to prosecute the case. 
¶91 The dissent's examination of Wis. Stat. § 971.29(1) 
and related statutes yields no plain text interpretation or 
legislative history that contravenes the majority opinion's 
interpretation of § 971.29(1) as requiring court approval for a 
prosecutor's amendment or dismissal of a charge.  See dissent, 
¶¶136-142.  So, the dissent resorts to conclusory statements 
about the statutes to support its view.  See dissent, ¶142.  An 
underlying premise of Wis. Stat. § 971.29, which the majority 
identifies, is that the circuit court retains authority to 
approve 
or 
disapprove 
amendments, 
limited 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
§ 971.29(1), which allows amendments without leave of the court 
when they are brought "prior to arraignment."25   
¶92 Even a brief review of the history of the relative 
powers of the district attorney and trial court in criminal 
cases 
thus 
demonstrates 
the 
basic 
point 
that 
there 
are 
historically shared powers between the executive and judicial 
branch relating to charging and amending or dismissing charges.  
The present decision does not, as the dissent claims, embody a 
novel departure from past cases, impose a new balance of power 
between prosecutors and trial courts, or cross an "indistinct," 
unidentified threshold altering the well-established allocation 
of powers and duties of the district attorney and judiciary. 
¶93 In 
light 
of 
the 
constitutional 
and 
legislative 
histories and the precedents of this court interpreting the 
respective powers of the district attorney and the trial court, 
the majority opinion's conclusion that a circuit court may 
reject a district attorney's amendment or dismissal of a charge 
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine as it has 
existed in this state for over 162 years. 
¶94 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
 
                                                 
25 Wagner v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 722, 726, 211 N.W.2d 449 
(1973), which the dissent cites, supports this proposition:  
"the trial court may allow amendment" or "may reject a proposed 
amendment."   
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶95 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  From time to 
time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is required to address the 
proper role of the judiciary in our system of government.  The 
issue may arise in cases or rules.  When it does, the court may 
face profound questions about the separation of powers. 
¶96 It should come as no surprise that the court, 
operating without an effective check, has often decided these 
questions by expanding the power of the judiciary at the expense 
of other branches of government.  This case is the latest 
example of that phenomenon. 
¶97 In 
my 
view, 
the 
present 
decision 
crosses 
an 
indistinct, but well understood, line separating a core power of 
the executive branch——the power to prosecute criminal actions——
from the power of the judicial branch to adjudicate those 
actions.  I fear that what today may be viewed as a popular 
pronouncement that is "tough on crime," will tomorrow lead to 
consequences that compromise the impartiality of circuit courts.  
For these and other reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶98 The court reaches the following conclusions: 
(A) "[A] circuit court must review a plea agreement 
independently and may, if it appropriately exercises its 
discretion, reject any plea agreement that does not, in its 
view, serve the public interest."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 48. 
(B) "[D]eciding whether to reject a plea agreement is 
squarely within the court's authority; to hold otherwise would 
permit encroachment by the executive branch into the realm that 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
2 
 
has historically, in Wisconsin, been that of the judicial 
branch."  Id., ¶24. 
(C) "Our approach vests authority in the circuit court to 
determine what pleas are in the public interest without 
permitting the court to intrude on the authority of the 
prosecutor to decide what charges to file or whether to file 
charges in the first instance."  Id., ¶26. 
(D) "We . . . hold that a circuit court may, in an 
appropriate exercise of discretion, reject a plea agreement that 
it deems not to be in the public interest."  Id., ¶27. 
¶99 The court bases these conclusions on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.29 and "the circuit court's inherent authority to reject a 
plea that is not in the public interest."  Id., ¶3. 
¶100 These bases should be carefully examined, beginning 
with the court's "inherent authority." 
II 
¶101 On September 27, 1933, Dr. Hans Luther, the German 
ambassador to the United States, was scheduled to appear at the 
Milwaukee Club on North Jefferson Street in downtown Milwaukee, 
directly across from the Pfister Hotel.1  Luther, who had 
recently been named to his post by German Chancellor Adolf 
Hitler, was expected to arrive at the Club at 1:00 pm. 
¶102 Several hours before the ambassador's arrival, groups 
of people representing various organizations opposed to German 
                                                 
1 The facts set out in paragraphs 101-115 are taken from 
Koss v. State, 217 Wis. 325, 258 N.W. 860 (1935); Guinther v. 
City of Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N.W. 865 (1935); and the 
briefs in both cases located at the Wisconsin State Law Library, 
Madison, Wisconsin. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
3 
 
Fascism began to gather near the entrance to the Club.  The 
organizations included The German United Front Against Fascism, 
The Jewish Committee Against Fascism, the International Defense, 
The John Reed Club, the Communist Party, and the Young Communist 
League.  A number of persons in the crowd carried signs, one 
bearing the inscription, "Luther, agent of the bloody Hitler."  
Another read: "Roosevelt, where is the unemployment insurance 
you promised the workers?" 
¶103 The assemblage was called to order by Lillian Husa, 
who introduced Ivan Koss, Frederick Bassett, and Harry Yaris, 
who spoke to the crowd of approximately 200 that had spilled 
into the street and effectively obstructed entry to the Club.  
All four were later prosecuted criminally for unlawful assembly 
and riot.  See Koss v. State, 217 Wis. 325, 327-28, 258 N.W. 860 
(1935). 
¶104 In time, police officers began efforts to disperse the 
crowd.  They met with resistance.  According to one account, the 
crowd formed a tight circle, with interlocked arms, to protect 
the speakers.  After one of the speakers was arrested, a fight 
broke out that lasted about 25 minutes.  Police arrested at 
least 16 additional persons, including Walter Guinther, who were 
engaged in the commotion and melee.  The 16 were taken into 
custody, charged with disorderly conduct under a city ordinance, 
and brought before the district court the following day.  Upon 
motion of the defendants, the case was continued until October 
5. 
¶105 On that day, the assistant city attorney, Max Raskin, 
moved to dismiss the action and discharge the defendants.  A 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
4 
 
"friend of the court," Attorney Walter Bender, asked the court 
to adjourn the case for two weeks to enable the Milwaukee Common 
Council to decide whether the action should be prosecuted or 
dismissed.2 
¶106 The district court denied Raskin's motion and set a 
trial for October 19.  When that date arrived, the city 
attorney's 
office 
declined 
to 
participate, 
whereupon 
the 
district court asked Attorney George Affeldt to prosecute the 
action in place of the city attorney.  The case proceeded to 
trial.  The defendants refused to take part and were convicted. 
¶107 The defendants then appealed to municipal court.  
Circuit Judge G.N. Risjord of Ashland3 was brought in to preside.  
On the day of trial, an assistant city attorney moved to dismiss 
the case and discharge the defendants.  After the court denied 
the motion, Attorney Affeldt was again called upon to prosecute 
the case.  The court impaneled a jury, which convicted all 16 
defendants of disorderly conduct.  After unsuccessful post-
conviction motions, the defendants appealed. 
¶108 In this court, the city and the defendants were 
aligned against Attorney Affeldt, amicus curiae, whom Judge 
Risjord had described as, "in a sense . . . a representative of 
the court."  "It may be irregular," the judge added, "but we 
will thresh that out afterwards." 
¶109 On appeal, the parties agreed that the disorderly 
conduct prosecution was a civil case.  They also agreed that 
                                                 
2 The Council did not act. 
3 State of Wisconsin Blue Book, p. 402 (1933). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
5 
 
dismissal of the case could not be effected without an order of 
the court.  The pivotal issues were whether a court could carry 
forward a prosecution that the city attorney had not started and 
had moved to dismiss, and whether the court had authority to 
appoint its own counsel to prosecute the case in lieu of a city 
attorney who refused to act. 
¶110 This court said the following: 
 
The city attorney is an important official, but 
the people, through their representatives in the 
legislature and the common council, have not placed 
the fate of efforts to maintain law and order entirely 
in his hands.  Where a public interest is involved, or 
the interest of a third party, it is the duty of the 
court to consider those interests in determining 
whether or not to dismiss an action.  In this 
particular, and for the purpose of the accomplishment 
of peace and safety, the people have placed upon the 
police department a considerable responsibility as 
well as upon the city attorney.  Each have a duty.  
The history of the affairs of the city, as disclosed 
by the record in the court, shows that ordinarily the 
different departments coincide in their views, have a 
common purpose, and that each has a due appreciation 
of its responsibilities.  When it does happen that a 
prosecution begun by the police department is sought 
to be terminated by the city attorney, the law places 
upon the court the duty of deciding whether or not the 
welfare of the people, the public interest, will be 
served by sustaining a motion on the part of the city 
attorney to dismiss, or whether the court should 
retain jurisdiction and proceed with the trial. 
 
The district court is a court of record.  It is 
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to examine, try, 
and sentence all offenders against the ordinances of 
the city.  When the people placed this exclusive 
jurisdiction in the court for the purposes referred 
to, they necessarily and certainly included with the 
responsibility, the full and complete power to take 
all 
steps 
necessary 
to 
make 
their 
requirement 
effective.  This would seem to answer the contentions 
of the city attorney and the attorney for the 
plaintiffs in error.  But in this connection it may be 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
6 
 
well to point out a little more specifically that in 
the enforcement of the city ordinances the police 
official is required by the people "to cause the 
public peace to be preserved, and to see that all the 
laws and ordinances of the city are enforced, and 
whenever any violation thereof shall come to his 
knowledge, he shall cause the requisite complaint to 
be made, and see that the evidence is procured for the 
successful prosecution of the offender or offenders."  
Sec. 9771, Milwaukee Code (1914). 
 
The district court as well as the municipal court 
complied with the requirements exacted of them by the 
people as expressed in their legislation.  The denial 
of the motion to dismiss is sustained. 
Guinther v. City of Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 339-40, 258 N.W. 
865 (1935) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
¶111 In his argument to the court, the Milwaukee city 
attorney conceded that in Wisconsin the "plaintiff has no 
absolute right to the discontinuance of an action once begun."  
Nonetheless, he explained, Wisconsin developed a rule contrary 
to common law to meet three well defined situations: (1) cases 
in which the defendant objected to the dismissal; (2) cases in 
which the defendant and plaintiff agreed to the dismissal but 
the rights of third parties would be foreclosed; and (3) cases 
in which the plaintiff moved for dismissal after a trial had 
been held and the court was fully apprised in the premises. 
 
¶112 Upon examination, it is clear that in Guinther, the 
city attorney did not initiate the civil prosecution; it was 
commenced by the police.  In addition, the dismissal motion was 
not one objected to by any defendant or considered after a 
trial. 
 
¶113 Thus, the case was one, at best, in which the rights 
of third parties [the people] would be foreclosed, although the 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
7 
 
state could have sought criminal charges against the 16 
defendants, as it did against others. 
¶114 In reality, the district court, the municipal court, 
and the supreme court substituted their view of the "public 
interest" for the view of the elected socialist government of 
Milwaukee.  The court did not rely on statute for its authority.4  
By the circuit court's own words, the court's appointed 
prosecutor became "the representative of the court."   
¶115 The city attorney contended that: 
 
The people of the city of Milwaukee elect the 
officers to conduct their business.  These officers 
have certain specified duties.  The acts of these 
officers are always subject to criticism and their 
policies to disagreement.  The differences that arise 
from such disagreements are properly determined on the 
political field. 
The Guinther court rejected this contention.  It is Guinther 
upon which the majority builds its doctrine of inherent 
authority. 
¶116 In 1969 this court decided State ex rel. Kurkierewicz 
v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969).  The court was 
asked to review a circuit court writ of mandamus directing 
Milwaukee County District Attorney David Cannon to conduct an 
inquest, as provided in Wis. Stat. § 966.01 (1967-68).  The 
court ultimately ruled that Cannon had acted within the bounds 
of his discretion in not ordering an inquest, and it reversed 
the circuit court.  The court, in an opinion by Justice 
Heffernan, made these observations: 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 355.17 (1933) required a district 
attorney to prosecute a criminal case if the court did not 
approve the district attorney's motion to dismiss. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
8 
 
 
The 
district 
attorney 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
a 
constitutional 
officer 
and 
is 
endowed 
with 
a 
discretion that approaches the quasi-judicial. 
 
It is clear that in his functions as a prosecutor 
he has great discretion in determining whether or not 
to prosecute.  There is no obligation or duty upon a 
district attorney to prosecute all complaints that may 
be filed with him.  While it is his duty to prosecute 
criminals, it is obvious that a great portion of the 
power of the state has been placed in his hands for 
him to use in the furtherance of justice, and this 
does not per se require prosecution in all cases where 
there appears to be a violation of the law no matter 
how trivial.  In general, the district attorney is not 
answerable to any other officer of the state in 
respect to the manner in which he exercises those 
powers.  True, he is answerable to the people, for if 
he fails in his trust he can be recalled or defeated 
at the polls.  In the event he wilfully fails to 
perform his duties or is involved in crime, he may be 
suspended from office by the governor and removed for 
cause.  These, however, are political remedies that go 
not to directing the performance of specific duties 
but rather go to the question of fitness for office. 
 
The district attorney's function, in general, is 
of a discretionary type, the performance of which is 
not compellable in mandamus.  27 C.J.S., p. 648, sec. 
10, District and Prosecuting Attorneys, summarizes, 
correctly 
we 
believe, 
the 
broad 
nature 
of 
the 
discretion conferred upon the district attorney: 
 
"The prosecuting attorney has wide discretion in 
the manner in which his duty shall be performed, and 
such discretion cannot be interfered with by the 
courts unless he is proceeding, or is about to 
proceed, without or in excess of jurisdiction.  Thus, 
except as ordained by law, in the performance of 
official acts he may use his own discretion without 
obligation to follow the judgment of others who may 
offer 
suggestions; 
and 
his 
conclusions 
in 
the 
discharge 
of 
his 
official 
liabilities 
and 
responsibilities are not in any wise subservient to 
the views of the judge as to the handling of the 
state's case." 
Kurkierewicz, 42 Wis. 2d at 378-79 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
9 
 
¶117 The court identified an exception to the district 
attorney's broad discretion, namely, "where the legislature has 
spoken and directed the performance of duties under particular 
facts."  Id. at 379 (emphasis added).  The court said that Wis. 
Stat. § 966.01 provided one of those directives.  Id. at 380.  
Nonetheless, the court recognized discretion in a district 
attorney's application of the statute——discretion that District 
Attorney 
Cannon 
had 
exercised. 
 
Consequently, 
the 
court 
reversed, remanding the case to the circuit court with direction 
to quash the writ.  Id. at 385. 
¶118 Kurkierewicz did not cite Guinther.  State v. Kenyon, 
85 Wis. 2d 36, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978), did.  Kenyon involved a 
felony prosecution for criminal damage to property.  The 
defendant was accused of deliberately driving his car in such 
manner as to hit and damage two groups of motorcycles parked on 
opposite sides of the street.  Id. at 38. 
¶119 At the time the complaint was filed, the defendant was 
in Texas.  He voluntarily returned to Wisconsin for a combined 
initial appearance and preliminary examination.  At the hearing, 
the court sustained objections to testimony by four motorcycle 
owners as to the dollar value of the damage.  Id. at 39.  The 
effect of the court's ruling——in the absence of other witnesses 
who could testify authoritatively as to the value of the damage—
—was to jeopardize the felony prosecution, and eventually the 
court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor.  Thus, the district 
attorney moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.  Id. 
¶120 The court denied the motion, contending that a 
dismissal, permitting a new charge to be filed after additional 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
10 
 
witnesses could be rounded up, would be inconvenient and unfair 
to the Texas defendant.  Id. at 40. 
¶121 In 
reviewing 
these 
facts, 
this 
court 
quoted 
extensively from Kurkierewicz.  It also wrote: 
 
The general rule regarding nolle prosequi has 
been summarized as follows: 
 
"Sec. 514.  Power of prosecuting attorney. 
 
In the absence of a controlling statute or rule 
of court, the power to enter a nolle prosequi before 
the jury is impaneled and sworn lies in the sole 
discretion of the prosecuting officer.  This is true 
regardless of the attitude of the court."  21 Am. 
Jur.2d, Criminal Law, p. 504, sec. 514 (1965). 
Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d at 43. 
 
¶122 The court then observed that Wisconsin has "departed 
from the general rule and has retained in the courts some 
limitation on the discretion of the district attorney in nolle 
prosequi" cases.5  The court cited Guinther and quoted several 
passages including the statement that "the law places upon the 
court the duty of deciding whether or not the welfare of the 
people, the public interest, will be served by sustaining a 
motion . . . to dismiss, or whether the court should retain 
jurisdiction 
and 
proceed 
with 
this 
trial." 
 
Kenyon, 
85 
Wis. 2d at 44 (emphasis added). 
 
¶123 The court summed up the law as follows: "[W]e believe 
the holding in Guinther is clear and conclusive.  Prosecutorial 
discretion to terminate a pending prosecution in Wisconsin is 
subject to the independent authority of the trial court to grant 
                                                 
5 Black's defines "nolle prosequi" as "To abandon (a suit or 
prosecution); to have (a case) dismissed by a nolle prosequi."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1070 (7th ed. 1999). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
11 
 
or refuse a motion to dismiss 'in the public interest.'"  Id. at 
45 (emphasis added). 
¶124 In a footnote, the Kenyon court withdrew its once 
enthusiastic citation of 27 C.J.S., p. 648, sec. 10, explaining 
that it was "dicta."   Id. at 45 n.4.  Nonetheless, the Kenyon 
court vacated the decision of the circuit court, remanding the 
case for an explanation of "the public interest."  Id. at 47, 
52-53.   
¶125 These three cases are cited by the majority as 
precedent for the court's decision.  Guinther and Kenyon involve 
requests by prosecutors to dismiss cases, albeit for different 
reasons.  The city attorney in Guinther did not wish to pursue a 
prosecution, 
perhaps 
for 
ideological 
reasons, 
after 
the 
defendants had spent time in jail.  The district attorney in 
Kenyon clearly wished to continue a felony prosecution and 
sought dismissal without prejudice in order to do so.  As 
written, Guinther represents nearly open-ended authority for 
courts to pursue prosecution over the opposition of executive 
branch officials.  Neither Guinther nor Kenyon relied on a 
statutory directive to support its analysis.  In fact, these 
cases place very little reliance on statutes as authority for 
the court's actions. 
¶126 The concurrence written by Chief Justice Abrahamson 
attempts to bolster the majority opinion by asserting that the 
charging function in criminal cases has always been a power 
shared by the judicial branch.  Although there is historical 
basis for this assertion, the judicial role in charging 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
12 
 
decisions has traditionally been grounded in statute,6 not in a 
court's "inherent authority."  That is why the Guinther decision 
represented a significant break from past precedent. 
¶127 Before the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 
1848 and in the years following adoption until 1945, local 
judges were vested by statute with the exclusive authority to 
file complaints in criminal cases after examining complainants.  
See Wis. Stat. ch. 369, § 1-2 (1839); Wis. Stat. ch. 145, § 1-2 
(1849). 
¶128 The law was codified, in part, in section 4776 of 
Sandborn & Berryman Annotated Statutes of Wisconsin 1889: 
 
Complaint and warrant.  Section 4776.  Upon 
complaint made to any such magistrate that a criminal 
offense has been committed, he shall examine, on oath, 
the complainant, and any witness produced by him, and 
shall reduce the complaint to writing, and shall cause 
the same to be subscribed by the complainant; and if 
it shall appear that any such offense has been 
committed, the magistrate shall issue a warrant, 
reciting 
the 
substance 
of 
the 
accusation, 
and 
requiring the officer to whom it shall be directed 
forthwith to take the person accused, and bring him 
before the said magistrate, or before some other 
magistrate of the county, to be dealt with according 
to law; and in the same warrant may require the 
officer to summon such witnesses as shall be therein 
named, to appear and give evidence on the examination.7 
Wis. Stat. ch. 195, § 4776 (1889). 
                                                 
6 In State ex rel. Long v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 292, 44 N.W. 
13 (1889), the court said: "the powers and duties of said judge 
in the matter of . . . examination are exclusively statutory, 
and . . . the 
statute 
must 
be 
pursued 
with 
the 
utmost 
strictness."  See Wis. Stat. § 4776 (1889). 
7 See also Wis. Stat. ch. 194, § 4740 (1889), dealing 
specifically with justices of the peace. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
13 
 
¶129 Under section 4776, a complainant such as a police 
officer or constable would bring a complaint to a magistrate, 
seeking approval for the filing of a criminal complaint and the 
issuance of an arrest warrant for the accused.  This was 
conceptually similar to a present-day request that a judge issue 
a warrant for a person's arrest.  Although courts unquestionably 
played a much greater role in the past in the filing of criminal 
complaints, this fact does not mean that courts had "inherent 
authority" to perform a truly prosecutorial function.  Rather, 
courts had statutory authority to approve the formal initiation 
of criminal cases. 
¶130 The judicial role in prior times is illuminated by 
section 4809 of the 1889 statutes: 
 
Change of venue.  Section 4809.  Whenever any 
person, charged with having committed any offense, 
shall be brought before any justice of the peace, or 
other magistrate, for examination, in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter, if such person, before 
the commencement of the examination, shall make oath 
that, from prejudice or other cause, he believes that 
such justice or other magistrate will not decide 
impartially in the matter, then said justice or other 
magistrate shall transmit all the papers in the case 
to the nearest justice or other magistrate, qualified 
by law to conduct the examination, who shall proceed 
with the examination in the same manner as though said 
defendant had first been brought before him; but no 
case shall be so removed after a second adjournment 
had therein, and only one removal shall be allowed in 
the same case; but the provisions of this section 
shall not apply to cities where police justices have 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 195, § 4809 (1889). 
 
¶131 Section 4809 signaled that the court was expected to 
decide probable cause impartially.  This expected impartiality 
was inconsistent with the adversarial role of the prosecutor, 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
14 
 
and it shows why magistrates were not performing a real 
prosecutorial function.  Nonetheless, section 4809 was a 
precursor of Wis. Stat. § 971.20, the substitution of judge 
statute.  More than a century ago the legislature recognized 
that a court's initial involvement in authorizing a complaint 
could compromise the court's impartiality. 
 
¶132 Whatever role courts played in the past in the 
initiation of criminal proceedings, that role was significantly 
changed by the 1969 legislature.  See § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 
1969. 
 
¶133 In 1969 Wis. Stat. § 968.02(1) was created to read: 
 
Issuance and Filing of Complaints.  (1) Except as 
otherwise 
provided in this section, a complaint 
charging a person with an offense shall be issued only 
by a district attorney of the county where the crime 
is alleged to have been committed.  A complaint is 
issued when it is approved for filing by the district 
attorney.  The approval shall be in the form of a 
written indorsement on the complaint.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Judicial Council Note to the section read in part: 
 
Note: This is a change from the present law 
designed to give the district attorney a greater voice 
in the initiating of criminal proceedings.  Since his 
is the obligation of conducting the prosecution it is 
believed that he should have a voice in the screening 
out of unfounded complaints and in determining if 
there was sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution. 
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1969, Wis. Stat. § 968.02. 
¶134 Subsection (3) of Wis. Stat. § 968.02 reads: 
 
If a district attorney refuses or is unavailable 
to issue a complaint, a county judge may permit the 
filing of a complaint, if he finds there is probable 
cause to believe that the person to be charged has 
committed an offense after conducting a hearing.  
Where the district attorney has refused to issue a 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
15 
 
complaint, he shall be informed of the hearing and may 
attend.  The hearing shall be ex parte without the 
right of cross-examination.   
Wis. Stat. ch. 255, § 968.02(3) (1969). 
 
¶135 Subsection (3) authorizes the judiciary to check the 
district attorney in specific circumstances and, in a sense, its 
present existence validates the assertion that the charging 
decision is a power the judiciary continues to share with the 
executive.  However, the concurrence misses the larger point 
that this shared power is (1) grounded in statute; and (2) 
limited by statute.  If the judiciary had "inherent authority" 
to initiate prosecutions, the limiting statutes that have been 
in place since 1969 would invade judicial power and might be 
unconstitutional. 
III 
¶136 The majority points to Wis. Stat. § 971.29(1) as 
statutory authority for a circuit court to "reject any plea 
agreement that does not, in its view, serve the public 
interest."  Majority op., ¶3.  Section 971.29(1) reads as 
follows: "(1) A complaint or information may be amended at any 
time prior to arraignment without leave of the court." 
¶137 Section 971.29 contains two additional subsections 
which give subsection (1) context.  Subsections (2) and (3) 
read: 
 
(2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment 
of the complaint, indictment or information to conform 
to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial 
to the defendant.  After verdict the pleading shall be 
deemed amended to conform to the proof if no objection 
to the relevance of the evidence was timely raised 
upon the trial. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
16 
 
 
(3) Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint 
or indictment or information, the court may direct 
other amendments thereby rendered necessary and may 
proceed with or postpone the trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2), (3) (1969). 
¶138 Section 
971.29 
was 
enacted 
as 
part 
of 
the 
comprehensive revision of the criminal procedure code in 1969.  
See § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969 (effective July 1, 1970).  The 
Judicial Council Note to the section reads: 
 
NOTE: This section is a restatement of existing 
law except that it provides that prior to arraignment 
the district attorney may amend a complaint or 
information without leave of the court or notice to 
the other party.  Since the district attorney is in 
charge of the prosecution he should be permitted to 
amend his pleadings prior to the time that the 
defendant has been required to plead. 
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1969, Wis. Stat. § 971.29.8 
 
¶139 "Existing 
law" 
was 
embodied 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 955.14(4), 955.37, and 957.16(1) and (2).9  These provisions 
                                                 
8 The Council's extensive introductory comment on the 
revisions did not touch on this section. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 955.14(4) (1967-68) reads:  
The 
indictment, 
information 
or 
complaint 
is 
sufficient after verdict if it describes the crime in 
the words of the statute, but other words conveying 
the same meaning may be used. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 955.37 (1967-68) reads: 
 
Mistake in charging crime.  When it appears 
before judgment that a mistake has been made in 
charging the proper crime, the defendant shall not be 
discharged if there appears to be good cause to detain 
him in custody to answer to the crime, and the 
district attorney may forthwith file an information 
charging said crime.  If the defendant has been 
charged or arraigned on a complaint, the complaint may 
be amended. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
17 
 
deal with amendments to correct technical deficiencies in the 
complaint or subsequent documents, or amendments to reflect "the 
proofs in all cases where the variance is not material to the 
merits of the action."  Wis. Stat. § 957.16(1) (1967-68). 
¶140 The Judicial Council Note does not explain the import 
of subsection (1) of § 971.29, but the purpose of the subsection 
was addressed in Wagner v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 722, 211 N.W.2d 449 
(1973): 
Wisconsin has adopted a more flexible approach to the 
amending of informations prior to arraignment without 
leave of the court, and by the court at the trial and 
even after verdict.  In this state no information is 
to be invalid by reason of any defect or imperfection 
in matters of form which do not prejudice the 
defendant.  As to even errors or mistakes in an 
information, the trial court is given authority to 
order an amendment to cure such defects.  The rule in 
this state is then that the trial court may allow 
amendment of an information at any time in the absence 
of prejudice to the defendant.  It follows that the 
trial court may reject a proposed amendment to an 
information. 
Id. at 726 (emphasis added). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin Stat. § 957.16 (1967-68) reads: 
 
Variances disregarded; amendment.  (1)  The trial 
court may allow amendments in case of variance between 
the complaint or indictment or information and the 
proofs in all cases where the variance is not material 
to the merits of the action.  After verdict the 
pleading shall be deemed amended to conform to the 
proof if no objection based on such variance was 
timely raised upon the trial. 
 
(2) Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint 
or indictment or information, the court may direct 
other amendments thereby rendered necessary and may 
proceed with or postpone the trial. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
18 
 
¶141 The court's ability to reject an amendment to an 
information has been explained historically as a means to 
protect the defendant from prejudice.  See State v. Duda, 60 
Wis. 2d 431, 440-42, 210 N.W.2d 763 (1973); Whitaker v. State, 
83 Wis. 2d 368, 374, 265 N.W.2d 575 (1978); State v. Gerard, 189 
Wis. 2d 505, 517 n.9, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995) ("Prejudice has 
always been a consideration with regard to amending a charging 
document."); State v. Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d 117, 123, 536 
N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶142 The 
majority 
opinion 
puts 
a 
different 
spin 
on 
§ 971.29, changing subsection (1) from a shield to protect 
defendants to a sword that may be used against them.  In truth, 
subsection (1) says nothing about "the public interest."  It was 
never intended as potent statutory authority for circuit judges 
to inject themselves into plea agreements. 
IV 
¶143 The present case presents important issues about the 
separation of powers, but it also exposes an inconsistency in 
the court's view of the judicial role. 
¶144 Plea bargaining is an essential component of the 
administration of criminal justice.  State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 
107, ¶26, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14 (citing Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)).  "Plea bargaining is an 
accepted and necessary part of the process whereby a good many 
criminal prosecutions are terminated as a result of a guilty 
plea."  State ex rel. White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 21, 203 
N.W.2d 638 (1973) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970)). 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
19 
 
¶145 "A 
trial 
judge 
should 
not 
participate 
in 
plea 
bargaining." 
 
State 
v. 
Wolfe, 
46 
Wis. 2d 478, 
487, 
175 
N.W.2d 216 (1970) (citing American Bar Association Project on 
Minimum 
Standards 
for 
Criminal 
Justice——Pleas 
of 
Guilty 
(approved draft, 1968), p. 71, sec. 3.3).  In Rahhal v. State, 
52 Wis. 2d 144, 150, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971), the court observed 
that "if a trial judge interjects himself into plea bargaining 
he may become a material witness or otherwise disqualify 
himself." 
¶146 The judge cannot be a witness and a finder of fact, 
too.  Id.  "Trial judges should be careful to abstain from 
injecting themselves into plea bargaining or influencing the 
making of a plea.  A trial judge may accept a plea bargain, but 
he should not do the bargaining."  Id. 
¶147 In State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 481, 192 
N.W.2d 872 (1972), the court said:  
Whatever may be the policies or procedures elsewhere, 
this court has firmly stated that a trial judge is not 
to participate in plea bargaining.  Without repeating 
the reasons for this court banning what it termed 
"[t]he vice of judicial participation in the plea 
bargaining," 
it 
is 
by 
now 
crystal 
clear 
that . . . "this state has rejected the suggestion 
that 
plea 
bargaining 
can 
invade 
or 
affect 
the 
sentencing process . . . ." 
Id. 
(quoting 
Farrar 
v. 
State, 
52 
Wis. 2d 651, 
655, 
191 
N.W.2d 214 (1971)). 
¶148 The majority opinion emphasizes a different, arguably 
inconsistent, theme in Wisconsin decisions, namely, the power of 
a trial judge to refuse to accept a proposed plea bargain that 
involves a reduction or dismissal of charges. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
20 
 
¶149 In State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 927, 485 
N.W.2d 354 (1992), the court said: 
 
Circuit courts in this state may not involve 
themselves in the plea agreement process and are not 
bound by any plea agreement between a prosecutor and a 
defendant.  Before permitting a prosecutor to amend 
charges to allege a less serious offense and before 
accepting a defendant's guilty or no contest plea to 
the amended charges, the circuit court must satisfy 
itself that the amended charges fit the crime and that 
the amendments are in the public interest.  A circuit 
court may, as this court has written, ask sufficient 
questions, including the prosecutor's reasons for 
entering the plea agreement, to satisfy itself of the 
wisdom of accepting the plea to reduced charges. 
¶150 The court added: "A circuit court has the power to 
accept or reject a plea agreement reducing or amending charges; 
it should consider the public interest in making its decision 
about the plea agreement and should make a complete record of 
the plea agreement."  Id. at 927 n.11. 
¶151 In a plea colloquy, the court must: "Establish 
personally that the defendant understands that the court is not 
bound 
by 
the 
terms 
of 
any 
plea 
agreement, 
including 
recommendations from the district attorney, in every case where 
there has been a plea agreement."  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 
¶35, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (citing Hampton, 274 
Wis. 2d 379, ¶¶20, 69, and White, 57 Wis. 2d at 24).   
¶152 When the court accepts a defendant's plea to a reduced 
charge or charges but retains complete authority to determine an 
appropriate sentence for the defendant on the charges, the court 
is not participating in the plea bargaining process in any 
sense.  When, however, a court rejects on policy grounds a plea 
agreement that involves the reduction or dismissal of a charge 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
21 
 
or charges, the court necessarily becomes involved in the 
prosecution.  It is no longer a neutral and detached magistrate.  
It tips its hand——and the scales of justice——by taking on some 
of the role of the district attorney in prosecuting the case. 
¶153 The majority quotes a passage in United States v. 
Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973): "[T]rial judges 
are not free to withhold approval of guilty pleas on [public 
interest grounds] merely because their conception of the public 
interest differs from that of the prosecuting attorney."  
Majority op., ¶24 n.21.  The majority then rejects this 
principle.  Id., ¶24.  If this dialectic produces an accurate 
statement of Wisconsin law, the result is not consistent with 
our ardent proscriptions against judicial participation in plea 
bargaining. 
¶154 The majority's decision appears to be a complete 
vindication of State v. Lloyd, 104 Wis. 2d 49, 310 N.W.2d 617 
(Ct. App. 1981).  In Lloyd, the court of appeals applauded 
Guinther and Kenyon, approved the circuit court's rejection of a 
joint motion by the prosecutor and defendant to dismiss the 
information, approved the circuit court's appointment of a 
special prosecutor under inherent authority to prosecute the 
case, and approved the circuit court's continued participation 
in the trial and in sentencing.  So much for separation of 
powers.  Id. at 56-65. 
V 
¶155 Against 
this 
background, 
I 
look 
again 
at 
the 
majority's conclusions. 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
22 
 
(A) "[A] circuit court must review a plea agreement 
independently and may, if it appropriately exercises its 
discretion, reject any plea agreement that does not, in its 
view, serve the public interest."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 48. 
COMMENT: The majority's use of the word "must" imposes a 
duty 
upon 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
evaluate 
proposed 
plea 
agreements, especially those involving a charge reduction or 
dismissal, in light of the circuit court's conception of the 
public interest.  This is grounded on the Guinther court's 
references to a court's "duty."  Guinther, 217 Wis. at 339.  
This revised formulation of a circuit court's authority and duty 
is quite different from the court's comment in Salters v. State, 
52 Wis. 2d 708, 715, 191 N.W.2d 19 (1971): "In cases in which 
the prosecutor has moved to reduce the charge in the complaint 
it is . . . proper, although not mandatory, for the court to 
ascertain why the charge was reduced." (Emphasis added.) 
¶156 The imposition of this new duty upon the circuit court 
is likely to lead to several adverse consequences. 
¶157 First, 
independent 
review 
of 
negotiated 
plea 
agreements may become normative judicial behavior.  This court's 
use of the adverb "independently" to modify "review" signals de 
novo 
review. 
 
The 
majority's 
allusions 
to 
judicial 
"consideration of the views of the prosecutor" and giving 
"weight to the prosecutor's recommendation" are a fig leaf 
hiding the real import of the court's decision. 
¶158 Second, if circuit courts have inherent power to 
reject proposed reduction or dismissal of the prosecutor's 
charges, there is reason to believe that circuit courts may also 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
23 
 
claim the power to reduce or dismiss charges with prejudice in 
"the public interest."  A circuit court's power to dismiss 
charges with prejudice was rejected by only one vote in State v. 
Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 569, 297 N.W.2d 808 (1980). 
¶159 Third, the new duty imposed upon circuit courts will 
expose judges to criticism from third parties when plea 
agreements are controversial or do not play out as expected.  
After all, the court now has a "duty" to evaluate each plea 
agreement in terms of "the public interest."  This is a virtual 
invitation for third parties to second-guess the circuit court's 
approval after an unsatisfactory outcome. 
¶160 Fourth, the majority's opinion will put circuit judges 
in the middle of disputes between district attorneys and law 
enforcement.  Law enforcement agencies may seek to turn circuit 
judges into allies against district attorneys they don't like. 
(B) "[D]eciding whether to reject a plea agreement is 
squarely within the court's authority; to hold otherwise would 
permit encroachment by the executive branch into the realm that 
has historically, in Wisconsin, been that of the judicial 
branch."  Majority op., ¶24. 
COMMENT: Deciding whether to reject a plea agreement goes 
well beyond "deciding whether or not the . . . public interest, 
will be served by sustaining a motion on the part of the city 
attorney to dismiss."  Guinther, 217 Wis. at 339 (emphasis 
added).  By this decision the court expands its "inherent 
authority." 
(C) "Our approach vests authority in the circuit court to 
determine what pleas are in the public interest without 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
24 
 
permitting the court to intrude on the authority of the 
prosecutor to decide what charges to file or whether to file 
charges in the first instance."   Majority op., ¶26. 
COMMENT: The historical fact is that the prosecution in 
Guinther was initiated by police, not the Milwaukee city 
attorney.  The court's appointment of a private attorney to 
prosecute the case permitted the action to go forward.  The 
effect of the decision in this case is to order the district 
attorney to prosecute the original charges or withdraw in favor 
of a court-appointed special prosecutor. 
¶161 This decision, like Guinther, cannot reasonably rely 
on any statutory directive to the court.  Compare State v. 
Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 363-64, 441 N.W.2d 696 
(1989).  It relies solely upon judicial power. 
(D) "We . . . hold that a circuit court may, in an 
appropriate exercise of discretion, reject a plea agreement that 
it deems not to be in the public interest."   Majority op., ¶27. 
COMMENT: The court first establishes de novo review of 
plea agreements and then affords circuit courts "discretion" to 
"reject a plea agreement that it deems not to be in the public 
interest."  Id.  The majority's standard of review will make it 
difficult to overturn a circuit court's decision to reject a 
plea agreement.  This result will systematically undermine the 
authority of district attorneys. 
CONCLUSION 
¶162 The majority's decision is foreshadowed in previous 
cases, but it makes new law.  I believe the change is not 
desirable and will undermine the authority of district attorneys 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
25 
 
and compromise the impartiality of circuit courts.  For the 
reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP755-CR.dtp 
1