Title: Keys v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

283 So. 2d 919 (1973) Robert KEYS, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 47419. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 15, 1973. *920 Fielding L. Wright, Jr., Pascagoula, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by T.E. Childs, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. RODGERS, Presiding Justice. This appeal came to this Court from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Mississippi. Appellant Robert Keys, Jr. has appealed from a judgment convicting him of the crime of possession of marijuana. He was sentenced to serve a term of six (6) months in the Jackson County jail and to pay a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00). Appellant assigned only one point of error alleged to have occurred in the trial court. He charges that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence six (6) matchboxes of marijuana obtained by the officers during an illegal search, and in the failure of the court to grant defendant's motion to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. The record shows that on October 15, 1971, state's witness, Officer Wayne Howard, received a telephone call from an anonymous informer concerning possession of marijuana by the defendant. On the basis of the information received from this anonymous informer, Mr. Howard obtained a search warrant allowing a search of defendant's apartment. The officer proceeded to the defendant's house and, as he approached the house, Mr. Howard saw the defendant and two other people driving away in defendant's car. Officer Howard then followed defendant's car until he caught up with it and pulled defendant over about one mile from defendant's house. Officer Howard testified that he had followed the defendant in order to stop him and serve the search warrant. Officer Howard also testified that at the time he stopped the defendant, the defendant was breaking no laws, and he stopped the defendant merely to serve the warrant. After the defendant had stopped his car, Officer Howard ordered the occupants out of the car. During a "patdown" of the defendant, Officer Howard found three matchboxes containing a substance which was subsequently determined to be marijuana. Upon searching the interior of the defendant's automobile, three additional boxes of marijuana were found. The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station where he was charged with possession of marijuana. Defendant was not served with the search warrant until he reached the police station, and he was not arrested until after the officer had discovered the boxes of marijuana in his possession. The appellant objected to the testimony of Officer Wayne Howard with reference to the search of the person of the defendant. The objection was overruled, and the testimony of the officers as to a "stop and frisk" situation was fully developed by the prosecution. At the end of the testimony offered by the state, the defendant Keys made a motion for a directed verdict. This motion was overruled. The defendant then took the witness stand in his own defense and testified that one E.J. Thomas wanted to catch a ride with him from Moss Point "back to home", and that after they reached his house, Thomas wanted to go to the bus station. The defendant said he noticed that Thomas had some matchboxes wrapped with a rubber band after they came out of the house to carry Thomas to the bus station. Ernestine, his female companion, noticed the matchboxes on the front seat, and defendant put two of them in his pocket. He testified that the officers drove up behind him, and when he stopped the car, the officers made him get out of the automobile and put his hands on the top of the automobile; thereupon, the officers *921 searched him and discovered the matchboxes. Defendant was then arrested, and taken to the police headquarters. The search warrant was later served upon the defendant. It seems that it is an unending task of this Court to repeatedly remind law enforcement officers that they have no authority to search the person of an individual because they may suspect that he is violating the law, or because they are desirous of physically searching the person of an individual to see if he has in his possession contraband so that he may be arrested and prosecuted. A physical search of a person is not only a violation of the freedom of a citizen, but it has sometimes been used as a method of actually violating the body of a person. See Robinson v. State, 143 Miss. 247, 108 So. 903 (1926). In Smith v. State, 240 Miss. 738, 128 So. 2d 857 (1961), we pointed out that the purpose of a search of a prisoner after he has been arrested is to take charge of weapons, evidence of crime, and tools that may be used as a means of escape. In Smith, we said: In the instant case, the arresting officers contended that "patting down" the defendant was not a search of his person. Their theory seems to be that they merely "frisked him", and they seem to believe that they had the right to do so without arresting him. We trust we will be understood when we say to "pat down" is to search a person, and an officer has no authority to search a person unless he is under arrest by authority of a warrant or for probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In Reed v. State, 199 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1967) an officer testified that he could very distinctly see the imprint of a gun in the right hip pocket of the defendant. Indeed, a search of defendant's person revealed that the object in defendant's hip pocket was a pistol. On an appeal from a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, this Court held that the officer had authority to arrest the defendant and said: In support of this proposition, we cited Daniels v. City of Gulfport, 146 Miss. 517, 112 So. 686 (1927). These cases, however, do not mean that the officers have authority to "stop and frisk" without probable cause for arrest. The authority to search an individual is based upon the authority of the officer to arrest the defendant. If the officer does not have the authority to make an arrest, he has no right to search the individual. Moreover, if he had no authority to arrest the defendant, evidence obtained by an illegal search cannot be used against the person illegally searched. Canning v. State, 226 So. 2d 747 (Miss. 1969); Lewis v. State 198 Miss. 767, 23 So. 2d 401 (1945). The search of the appellant was clearly an illegal search, and the contraband obtained as a result of the illegal search was inadmissible in evidence. The trial court should have granted a directed verdict at the close of the state's testimony, *922 since the only testimony offered was illegally obtained. This brings us to the real problem in this case. We have held for many years that one may waive his constitutional objection to illegally obtained evidence by admitting his guilt of the charge by his own testimony. There is a tremendous body of law in this state which indicates that the error of introducing improper evidence is cured by the defendant's admission in substance, the truth of everything which could have been proved by the evidence if it were admissible. That is to say, if evidence derived from an unlawful search is improperly introduced into evidence, there is no error if the defendant freely and voluntarily admits to having possessed the contraband obtained as a result of the search. In Goodman v. State, 158 Miss. 269, 130 So. 285 (1930), police officers conducted a warrantless search of defendant's person for intoxicating liquors. The search was supposedly incident to a lawful arrest, but the testimony presented tended to indicate that the officers lacked the probable cause to stop defendant's automobile and to conduct the search. In affirming the decision of the circuit court, Chief Justice Smith pointed out in his opinion that: Similarly, in Bowman v. State, 152 Miss. 195, 119 So. 176 (1928), this Court held: The prevailing viewpoint of this Court is likewise represented by the following excerpts from other cases in point: The foregoing cases were decided before the United States Supreme Court held that the first eight amendments to the United States Constitution were made applicable to the various states by operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Most recently, in Gann v. State, 234 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1970), this Court reaffirmed its acceptance of the above stated rule which has been called the "doctrine of curative admissibility". 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1724(b), at 954 n. 6 (1958). First, we consider the facts in the Gann case. An agent of the Mississippi Alcoholic Beverage Control Division made out an affidavit before a magistrate stating that he "had reason to believe and did believe" that the defendant had intoxicating liquors in his possession in his house. Subsequently, a warrant was issued, and ABC agents conducted a search of defendant Gann's house. In the course of the search, the agents discovered no intoxicating liquor, but did find 102 cans of beer in defendant's refrigerator. Since beer was contraband in Chickasaw County, the agents seized the beer and arrested the defendant on charges of its possession. The defendant was tried in Justice of the Peace court, convicted, and fined $500.00 for possession of beer. On appeal de novo to the circuit court, the defendant moved to exclude the state's evidence (at the close of the prosecution's case) on the grounds that the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were not in proper form. This motion was overruled. Following a jury verdict of guilty, the court sentenced the defendant to pay a $500.00 fine and to serve 90 days in jail with 60 days to be "held up pending good behavior." The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and he appealed to this Court. He asserted that the affidavit for the search warrant was invalid, because the warrant specified intoxicating liquor, and only beer was found in the search. The prosecution had failed to prove that the alcoholic content of the beer exceeded 4% as required by state statutes and the local option liquor election of Chickasaw County, District No. 2. In affirming the decisions of the court below, this Court in an opinion prepared by Judge Smith, answered the contentions of the appellant in the following manner: The Court then summarized its position on the legality of the search and the admissibility of its fruits as follows: There are, however, several United States Supreme Court decisions which hold that a defendant does not necessarily waive his constitutional objections to illegally obtained evidence by voluntarily testifying to the substance of what the prosecution's evidence would have proven had it been properly admitted. One such case is Lee v. State of Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 300, 92 L. Ed. 330 (1948). Here, the defendant, a 17-year-old Negro, was indicted by a grand jury in Mississippi on a charge of attemping to ravish a female of previous chaste character. During the course of the trial, the state offered the testimony of two city detectives as to an alleged oral confession obtained by them from the defendant. Objection was made that this confession had been secured as a result of duress, threats and violence, inflicted upon the defendant by two unidentified police officers several hours prior to the confession. The jury retired, and a preliminary hearing was held before the trial judge as to the voluntariness of this confession. After various witnesses appeared, including the petitioner himself, the judge concluded that the confession was voluntary, and that the testimony in relation thereto was admissible. This testimony proved be the crucial element leading to the jury's conviction of the defendant. His sentence was fixed at 18 years in prison. In reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Mr. Justice Murphy stated in his opinion: *925 Another United States Supreme Court decision which touches on the issue raised in the case now on appeal is Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1969). The facts in the Leary case are as follows. On December, 20, 1965, the defendant, Timothy Leary, left New York by automobile intending a vacation trip to Yucatan, Mexico. He was accompanied by his daughter and son, both teenagers, and two other persons. On December 22, 1965, the party drove across the international bridge between the United States and Mexico at Laredo, Texas. They stopped at the Mexican customs station and, after apparently being denied entry, drove back across the bridge. They halted at the American secondary inspection area, explained the situation to a customs inspector, and stated that they had nothing from Mexico to declare. The inspector asked them to alight, examined the interior of the car and saw what appeared to be marijuana seeds on the floor. The inspector then received permission to search the car and passengers. Small amounts of marijuana were found on the car floor and in the glove compartment. A personal search of petitioner's daughter revealed a silver snuff box containing semi-refined marijuana and three partially smoked marijuana cigarettes. The defendant was indicted and tried before a jury in the federal district court for the Southern District of Texas, on three counts involving smuggling marijuana, transporting marijuana, and failing to pay a transfer tax imposed on the importation of marijuana. The defendant was convicted on two of the above counts and was tentatively sentenced to the maximum punishment provided by law. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two questions, one of which involved the defendant's assertion of a self-incrimination defense. This particular problem is based upon defendant's objection to the introduction of any evidence as to his failure to pay the federal import tax on marijuana, claiming that to have done so would have been self-incriminatory. In the course of the trial, Leary took the stand and admitted not having paid the tax, which the government argued was a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights as to self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court held that his admission was consistent with his contention that the tax was self-incriminatory, and that he had not therefore waived his objections. Even though the defendant did not assert the self-incrimination defense until after his motion for a new trial, the United States Supreme Court held: Also, in Leary, the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say about the defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights: In Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1968), the defendant was brought to trial before a jury in the District of Columbia upon a charge of felony murder. At that trial, the prosecution introduced three confessions allegedly made by the petitioner while he was in the custody of the police. After these confessions had been admitted in evidence, the petitioner took the witness stand and testified to his own version of the offense leading to the victim's death. The jury found the petitioner guilty, but the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the first trial, holding that the petitioner's confessions had been illegally obtained and were therefore inadmissible in evidence against him. On a retrial, the defendant was again convicted and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. The substance of the confessions was that the petitioner and two othters, armed with a shotgun, had gone to the victim's house intending to rob him, and that the victim had been killed while resisting the entry into his home. In his testimony at the trial, the defendant said that he and his companions had gone to the victim's home hoping to pawn the shotgun, and that the victim was accidentally killed while the defendant was presenting the gun to him for inspection. The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Stewart, observed: The Supreme Court then went on to add: Finally, an analogous situation is presented in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968). Here, the defendant was convicted of the armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision of the court below was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the testimony given by the defendant to meet standing requirements in order to raise an objection that the evidence was the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure should not have been admissible against him at the trial on the question of his guilt or innocence. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking on behalf of the Court, stated: There is no question that the doctrine of curative admissibility is generally recognized by this Court in cases of the type now on appeal; nonetheless, the issues raised in the above United States Supreme Court decisions are binding on this Court. Art. VI, cl. 2, United States Constitution. In view of the opinions from the Supreme Court of the United States above mentioned, we have reached the conclusion that the appellant did not waive his objection to the illegally obtained testimony by testifying in his own behalf, although he admitted having the contraband in his possession. The judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed and the appellant discharged. Reversed and rendered. GILLESPIE, C.J., and PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH and BROOM, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, SUGG and WALKER, JJ., dissent.