Title: Williams v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MELVIN L. WILLIAMS, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 76, 2014 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
Cr. ID No. 0406005054 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§  
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 31, 2014 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: May 12, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 12th day of May 2014, upon consideration of the opening brief filed by 
the appellant and the motion to affirm filed by the appellee, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) In 2006, Williams was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Murder 
in the First Degree and related weapons offenses.  The Superior Court sentenced 
Williams to life imprisonment and a term of years followed by probation.  On 
appeal, this Court affirmed Williams’ convictions and sentence.1 
                                          
 
1 Williams v. State, 2007 WL 914579 (Del. Mar. 28, 2007).    
2 
 
(2) In March 2008, Williams, with the assistance of counsel, moved for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  
After consideration of the motion, an affidavit filed by Williams’ trial counsel, and 
the State’s response, the Superior Court denied the motion,2 and on appeal this 
Court affirmed.3 
(3) In January 2014, Williams filed a pro se motion for postconviction 
relief under Rule 61 and a motion for appointment of counsel.  By order dated 
February 4, 2014, the Superior Court summarily dismissed the postconviction 
motion and denied the appointment of counsel.4  This appeal followed. 
(4) It is well-settled that when reviewing a denial of postconviction relief, 
this Court will address any procedural bars before considering the merits of any 
claim for relief.5   Having considered the Rule 61(i) procedural bars, the Court has 
determined that Williams’ second postconviction motion is procedurally barred as 
untimely,6 repetitive,7 defaulted,8 and formerly adjudicated.9  In the absence of a 
                                          
 
2 State v. Williams, 2009 WL 6529205 (Del. Super. Ct. May 28, 2009). 
3 Williams v. State, 2009 WL 4351700 (Del. Dec. 2, 2009). 
4 State v. Williams, 2014 WL 1302998 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2014).  
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(1) (barring claim filed more than one year after judgment 
of conviction is final). 
7 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in a prior 
postconviction proceeding). 
3 
 
constitutional violation,10 a newly recognized retroactively applicable right,11 or 
any indication that consideration of Williams’ claims is warranted in the interest of 
justice,12 we conclude that Williams’ second postconviction motion was properly 
subject to summary dismissal under Rule 61(d)(4).13  We further conclude that, 
under the circumstances of this case, wherein Williams was represented by counsel 
on his first motion for postconviction relief and raises claims in his second 
postconviction motion that are procedurally barred, the Superior Court’s denial of 
Williams’ motion for appointment of counsel was not an abuse of discretion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the appellee’s motion to affirm 
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice 
                                                                                                                                        
8 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3) (barring a claim not previously raised absent cause for 
relief from the procedural default and prejudice). 
9 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(4) (barring formerly adjudicated claim). 
10 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(5) (providing in pertinent part that the procedural bar of 
(i)(1) and (2) shall not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because 
of a constitutional violation). 
11 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that an untimely motion may be considered 
when the movant asserts a retroactively applicable right that has been newly recognized). 
12 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(2), (4) (barring claim unless consideration is warranted in 
the interest of justice). 
13 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(d)(4) (providing for summary dismissal of postconviction 
motion where “it plainly appears” the movant is not entitled to relief).