Title: ISRAEL SANCHEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ISRAEL SANCHEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 18694 P.2d 726Case Number: 84-69Decided: 01/31/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming

ISRAEL SANCHEZ, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl and Martin J. McClain, Appellate 
Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Patrick J. Crank, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
by a jury of second-degree murder in violation of § 6-2-104, W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement).1 He appeals from that conviction, 
stating the issues on appeal as follows:

"1. Whether the trial 
court erred in failing to give Appellant's proposed Instruction No. 
D.

"2. Whether the 
prosecutor's comments in closing argument regarding flight as evidence of guilt 
were improper."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The circumstances of 
this case are briefly as follows. The victim, Rudy Espinoza, married one of 
appellant's daughters, and they had a brief and stormy marriage; the daughter 
eventually moved back to her parent's home. Rudy made numerous threats against 
appellant's family, and a few days before his death he broke a car window at 
appellant's residence. On the day of the shooting, appellant was riding in 
Casper with 
another son-in-law, Perry, on business. They saw Rudy, who was also driving 
through town. At approximately 12:00 noon, they encountered each other again, 
near the Rialto Barbershop on Center Street. Rudy's Camaro was traveling 
the wrong way in a one-way alley; appellant's car came to a stop several feet 
away from the Camaro, with the two cars facing each other. There were numerous 
witnesses.

[¶4.]     The testimony at trial 
was that appellant jumped out of his car with a .22 caliber pistol, fired one 
shot through the front window of Rudy's car, and then ran to the driver's side 
of the Camaro and fired five more shots through that window. At the same time, 
Rudy was rolling up his window and holding his arm in front of his face to 
protect himself.

[¶5.]     After the shooting, 
appellant ran back to his car, and Perry drove off. Appellant testified that he 
dropped Perry off and went to his home to get an interpreter to contact the 
police. The police, having been contacted by observers, arrived at the Sanchez 
home before appellant could have someone call them. Appellant was arrested and 
charged with first-degree murder. Rudy Espinoza, after being transported to the 
hospital, died as a result of the gunshot wounds.

I

[¶6.]     Appellant raised the 
issue of self-defense at trial. He testified that he knew Rudy kept a loaded gun 
between the front seats of his car, and that when he saw Rudy's car he saw Rudy 
reach between the seats and, consequently, he thought that Rudy was reaching for 
his gun. Appellant testified further that he had acquired a gun to protect his 
family from Rudy and that, fearing for his life, he took that gun from under the 
car mat and shot Rudy before Rudy could shoot him.2

[¶7.]     At the instructions 
conference during trial, counsel for appellant objected to the refusal to give 
Instruction No. D, saying:

"In regard to Refused 
Instruction Number D, the Defendant submits that again the Court should have 
instructed the Jury in a separate instruction that under the circumstances [sic] 
of this case the time element involved was such that the Defendant could not 
have had an ample amount of time to judge precisely how much force was 
necessary, and that the Jury should have been so 
instructed."

Refused 
Instruction No. D reads as follows:

"If you find that the 
initial use of deadly force was justified you must not then find that the 
defendant's claim of self-defense is negated because a shot was fired after the 
apprehended danger was over. A person in imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury, or one who has reasonable grounds to believe he is in such peril, 
is not expected to have perfect judgment. A person who has reasonable grounds to 
believe himself to be threatened by another person may not have time to reason 
out every response he should make or to judge precisely how much force he has to 
use to ensure his safety."

[¶8.]     Appellant claims that 
it was error to refuse this instruction because it was a concept pertinent to 
appellant's asserted theory of the case, that being self-defense. We have said 
before that the defendant in a criminal case has the right to have his defense 
affirmatively presented to the jury. Goodman v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400, 408 
(1977). The right to an instruction on the defendant's theory of the case rests 
on two conditions precedent, namely, the offered instruction must be sufficient 
to inform the court of the defendant's theory and there must be competent 
evidence in the record to support the theory. Goodman v. State, supra, 573 P.2d  at 
408; Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287, 1292-1293 (1977); Blakely v. State, Wyo., 474 P.2d 127, 129 (1970); State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119, 
131 (1947). However, it is equally true that when the principles of a requested 
instruction, even if correct, have been properly and sufficiently covered by 
other instructions, its refusal is not error. Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445, 453 (1977); Goodman v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 178, 183 
(1979). When, as here, an instruction or instructions on the defendant's theory 
are given, even though not the one or ones requested by defendant, the question 
is the sufficiency and correctness of such instruction or instructions. The 
trial court did give five instructions on defendant's theory of 
self-defense.

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
18

"If the defendant had 
reasonable grounds to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he could save himself only by 
using deadly force against his assailant, he had the right to use deadly force 
in order to defend himself. `Deadly force' means force which is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily harm.

"The circumstances under 
which he acted must have been such as to produce in the mind of a reasonably 
prudent person, similarly situated, the reasonable belief that the other person 
was about to kill him or do him serious bodily harm. The danger must have been 
apparent, present and imminent or must have appeared to be so under the 
circumstances.

"If the defendant 
believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and 
that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, and if a reasonable person 
in a similar situation seeing and knowing the same facts would be justified in 
believing himself in similar danger, he would be justified in using deadly force 
in self-defense. He would be justified even though the appearance of danger 
later proved to be false and there was actually neither purpose on the part of 
the other person to kill him or do him serious bodily harm nor imminent danger 
that it would be done, nor actual necessity that deadly force be used in 
self-defense. If the person so confronted acts in self-defense upon such 
appearances of danger from honest belief, his right of self-defense is the same 
whether the danger is real or merely apparent."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
19

"Even if the defendant 
had reasonable ground to believe and actually did believe that he was in 
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, he was justified in using 
deadly force to repel the danger only if he retreated as far as he safely could 
before doing so. The law requires a person to retreat rather than to take the 
life of his adversary if there was a convenient mode of retreat without 
increasing his peril or apparent peril. To excuse a failure to retreat, it is 
necessary that defendant's peril would be increased, or that it reasonably 
appeared that it would be increased by retreat. If you find that the defendant 
could have safely retreated but failed to do so, the defendant cannot rely on 
the justification of self-defense."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
20

"Generally, the right to 
use self-defense is not available to one who is the aggressor or provokes the 
conflict. However, if one who provokes a conflict thereafter withdraws from it 
in good faith and informs his adversary by words or actions that he desires to 
end the conflict, and he is thereafter pursued, he then has the same right of 
self-defense as any other person."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
21

"The right of 
self-defense ceases to exist when there is no longer any apparent danger of 
further violence on the part of an assailant. Thus where a person is attacked 
under circumstances which justify his exercise of the right of self-defense, and 
thereafter he uses such force upon his attacker as to render the attacker 
incapable of inflicting further injuries, the law of self-defense then ceases to 
work in favor of the person attacked." 

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
22

"One who has reasonable 
grounds to believe that another will attack him, and that the anticipated attack 
will be of such a character as to endanger his life or limb, or to cause him 
serious bodily harm, has a right to arm himself for the purpose of resisting 
such attack.

"If the defendant armed 
himself in reasonable anticipation of such an attack, that fact alone does not 
make the defendant the aggressor or deprive the defendant of the right of 
self-defense."

[¶9.]     In Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981), an instruction very similar to Refused Instruction No. D was also 
requested and refused. Also there the court gave its own instruction on the 
defendant's theory of self-defense. We held there that the refusal of the 
instruction was not error since the instruction given need not be "couched in 
the precise words requested by a party." Id. 
at 1112. Further, a trial court may refuse requested instructions which are 
correct, as long as the principles embodied therein are covered by other 
instructions. Scheikofsky v. State, 
supra; Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358, 369 (1979); Benson v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 595, 597 
(1977); State v. Hickenbottom, supra, 
178 P.2d  at 127. It is within the court's discretion to present its own 
instruction or instructions covering the defendant's theory of the case. Scheikofsky v. State, 
supra.

[¶10.]  We hold that the instructions given in 
this case were a correct statement of the law regarding self-defense, 
defendant's theory of the case, and, therefore, defendant's Instruction No. D 
was correctly refused as the matter was covered by the instructions 
given.

II

[¶11.]  During closing arguments, the prosecutor 
made a statement equating flight with evidence of guilt. Appellant claims this 
was error. We must look at the arguments of counsel in their entirety so as not 
to "take sentences and phrases out of the context of the complete picture being 
presented by the prosecution." Hopkinson 
v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 166 (1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127, 131 
(1980).

[¶12.]  Of course, the first evidence of flight 
in this case came from the numerous witnesses who testified at trial. Appellant 
does not contend that this evidence should not have been admitted. Rather, he 
contends that error was committed by allowing the prosecution to comment to the 
jury on how to judge such evidence when the court had not instructed the jury 
with regard to flight. However, even though appellant's counsel was the first to 
raise the issue of flight in closing arguments, appellant did not request an 
instruction on flight. In her closing argument, appellant's counsel 
said:

"* * * Now, after he did 
that and got back in the car, he headed home. He didn't stay there because he 
told you, I was nervous, I was excited, I was scared, and I wasn't thinking, but 
he headed home, Ladies and Gentlemen, because he wanted to call the police. 
Israel doesn't speak English, so he 
needed some assistance to call the police."

[¶13.]  Up to that point, the prosecutor had not 
mentioned appellant's flight. He did, in rebuttal closing, 
say:

"Counsel said that the 
Defendant fled the scene because he couldn't speak English. His interpreter from 
the insurance company was his driver at the scene of the shooting. Israel 
Sanchez wasn't worried about interpreters and speaking English, Israel Sanchez 
didn't need to go home to call the police. Ed Heatherington was on the phone 
with the police already. The Defendant went back to his car, went back and said, 
vamoose, let's go. He told his daughters when he got home, he was going to jail. 
Now this flight is evidence of his guilt."

[¶14.]  The prosecutor was simply offering 
another way to view the substantial evidence that the defendant left the scene 
immediately after firing the shots. That is the purpose of closing arguments. Wheeler v. State, Wyo., 691 P.2d 599, 605 (1984); Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889, 893 (1982); Hopkinson v. State, supra, 632 P.2d  at 
145; Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 P. 924 
(1899). Prosecutors are not any more limited in their closing arguments than are 
defense counsel. They both may review the evidence and suggest inferences 
thereon to the jury. Browder v. State, 
supra. Defense counsel had offered one way to view the evidence and the 
prosecutor simply gave an alternative. As we said in Freeze v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 415, 418 
(1983), "[t]he appellant opened the door and the prosecutor merely closed 
it."

[¶15.]  Furthermore, we have held that evidence 
of flight is admissible as evidence which may be considered along with other 
circumstances in the case as tending to show a consciousness of guilt. Jones v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 837 
(1977). "`"[T]he wicked flee, even when no man pursueth; but the righteous are 
bold as a lion."'" Id. at 845, n. 10, quoting Professor Wigmore, 
II Wigmore on Evidence, (3rd ed. 1940), § 276(4), pp. 
111-119.

[¶16.]  If appellant had wanted an instruction on 
flight given to the jury, he should have proposed one. However, appellant cannot 
now be heard to complain that the jury was not instructed on a matter when he 
was the first to comment on it and the prosecutor merely responded. There was no 
error in the prosecutor's remarks.

[¶17.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 6-2-104 
provides:

"Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any 
term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life."

2 A gun was found in 
Rudy's Camaro, in a locked compartment of the car. The gun was not within Rudy's 
reach as he sat in the driver's seat.