Title: ERMINA L. ROBERTS, F/K/A ERMINA L. ISBELL v. FRANK THOMAS VILOS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ERMINA L. ROBERTS, F/K/A ERMINA L. ISBELL v. FRANK THOMAS VILOS1989 WY 138776 P.2d 216Case Number: 88-301Decided: 06/22/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ERMINA L. ROBERTS, F/K/A 
ERMINA L. ISBELL, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

FRANK THOMAS VILOS, 
APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

Appeal from the District 
Court, WashakieCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

John P. Worrall 
of Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, for appellant.

G. Albert Sinn, 
Worland, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
BROWN, Ret. J.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     The district court 
denied appellant's petition for modification of a custody decree regarding 
primary custody of two of the parties' minor children. Appellant appeals and 
states the issue to be:

Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion and thus err as a matter of law by failing to consider the best 
interests of the children and by considering instead only the circumstances of 
the mother in a child custody modification proceeding?

We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     On March 2, 1979, the 
parties were divorced and appellant (mother) was awarded the primary care, 
custody and control of the parties' children, with appellee (father) being 
awarded rights of visitation.1 At the request of appellant in June 
1985, the children went to reside with appellee. On April 24, 1986, appellee 
filed a Petition for Modification of Divorce Decree seeking primary custody of 
the parties' children. After a hearing the court found a substantial change in 
the circumstances and modified the divorce decree to give appellee primary 
custody of the two youngest children, FV and BV. The order was dated March 4, 
1987.

[¶3.]     At the beginning of the 
summer of 1987, FV and BV went to Washington to visit appellant. At the end of 
the summer, appellant refused to return the children to appellee in Wyoming. Appellee and 
appellant both agreed to enroll the children in school in Washington. In January 
1988, appellee informed appellant that he was coming to Washington to get the 
children at the end of the school semester. Before appellee left for Washington, he was served with a temporary restraining 
order from a Washington court preventing him 
from going to Washington to take the children. Appellee 
contested the Washington court action. The trial court in 
Wyoming and the Washington court agreed that neither state 
would make any determinations in this case during the school year. In August of 
1988, the children were returned to appellee's custody in Wyoming.

[¶4.]     Appellee resides in 
Worland, Wyoming with his father and the two children. 
Other relatives of appellee in the Worland area include a brother and his family 
and a sister and her family. Appellee's sister, an older woman, has taken a 
special interest in FV and is someone with whom the child feels she can talk. 
Appellee has been employed for five years at Imperial Holly Sugar Corporation in 
Worland with the possibility of advancement. The children attend school in 
Worland, are involved in sports and have friends who are involved in many 
activities with them. The guardian ad litem stated that the children could 
survive very well with either parent. Appellant does not contend that appellee 
provides a bad home for the children.

[¶5.]     Certain basic rules of 
appellate review are applicable here. The reviewing court examines the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, presumes it is true, and 
leaves out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party that conflicts with the successful party's evidence. Furthermore, the 
reviewing court may make every favorable inference that may reasonably and 
fairly be drawn from the evidence produced by the successful party. We will not 
interfere with the decision of the district court and accord its factual 
determinations great deference unless there is a procedural error or a clear 
abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of 
law committed by the court under the circumstances. In determining whether there 
has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court 
could reasonably conclude as it did. A reviewing court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court, whose judgment must be sustained unless 
clearly erroneous, manifestly wrong, or totally against the evidence. The 
appellate court will not set aside the trial court's findings merely because it 
might have reached a different result. See Pancratz Company, Inc. v. 
Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, 720 P.2d 906 (Wyo. 1986); Wangler v. 
Federer, 714 P.2d 1209 (Wyo. 1986); Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1985); 
Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1985); Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805 (Wyo. 1984); State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. 
Colvin, 681 P.2d 269 (Wyo. 1984); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1984); Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1983); Ayling v. Ayling, 
661 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1983); City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection 
Association, 610 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1980); Arch Sellery, Inc. v. Simpson, 360 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1961).

[¶6.]     In Kreuter v. Kreuter, 
728 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Wyo. 1986) (footnote omitted), we 
said:

Section 20-2-113(a), W.S. 
1977, Cum. Supp. 1986, provides for modification of provisions for custody and 
support in divorce decrees but the "circumstances" there referred to must be a 
substantial or material change of circumstances which outweigh society's 
interest in applying the doctrine of res judicata to a final decree of divorce. 
There must be an end to litigation at some point, or the legal system would 
become bogged down so that nothing would ever remain decided. Mentock v. 
Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981). The burden of proof 
lies with the party seeking the modification that a substantial or material 
change has occurred subsequent to the decree. Nuspl v. Nuspl, Wyo., 717 P.2d 341 
(1986); Cubin v. Cubin, Wyo., 685 P.2d 680, 684 
(1984).

Decisions regarding child 
support and custody rest largely with the district court which we will not 
disturb in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion or violation of some legal 
principle. Nuspl v. Nuspl, supra; Harrington v. Harrington, Wyo., 660 P.2d 356, 360 
(1983).

[¶7.]     The only changes that 
occurred between the court's March 1987 order and the October 3, 1988, hearing, 
other than the fact that the children are older, are that appellant has 
remarried, her income has increased, and she can obtain and has obtained 
insurance for the children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that appellant failed to show a substantial change in 
circumstances.

[¶8.]     The main thrust of 
appellant's appeal is that the court did not consider the best interests of the 
children and did not honor the children's preference regarding custody. The 
trial court's decision letter dated October 7, 1988, which is incorporated into 
its order of October 18, 1988, sets out W.S. 20-2-113(a) which provides in 
pertinent part:

[T]he court may make such 
disposition of the children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the 
well-being of the children. * * * On the petition of either of the parents, the 
court may revise the decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and 
maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit 
of the children requires.

It is undisputed 
that the trial court must always consider the best interests of the children in 
custody matters. Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1986); Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 1981); Wilson v. 
Wilson, 473 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1970); Taylor v. 
Taylor, 388 P.2d 192 (Wyo. 1964); Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1963). It is obvious 
here that the trial court was aware of, and did consider, the best interests of 
the children. This is demonstrated by the court's recital of the controlling 
statute in his decision letter.

[¶9.]     The trial court applied 
the correct law; there was no procedural error nor any clear abuse of 
discretion. Basing its decision on the evidence before it, the court did not act 
in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason under the circumstances, and the 
conclusion it reached was arrived at reasonably. Therefore, the trial court did 
not err in denying appellant's petition.

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that the custody award 
was made contrary to the preference of the children. In Yates, 702 P.2d  at 1256 
(citation omitted), this court said:

The preference of a child 
of sufficient age and maturity is a factor to be considered by a court in 
ascertaining what is in the child's best interests. In Tytler v. Tytler, 15 
Wyo. 319, 338, 
89 P. 1, 6 (1907), the court stated:

"* * * Such we think is 
the general rule; for, if the happiness and welfare of the infant is to be 
consulted, nothing could be more potent upon that question than the expression 
of its preference based upon kindness or unkindness, care or want of care, love 
and affection or want thereof, and, as to the surrounding conditions, either 
with one or the other."

"It appears to be the 
almost universal rule that at least when a child is of sufficient age, 
intelligence, and discretion to exercise an enlightened judgment as to its 
future welfare, based upon facts and not mere whims, its wishes are one factor 
which may be considered by the court in determining custody, in doubtful cases 
in any event, usually not because of any legal right in the child to have its 
wishes granted, but because the consideration of such wishes will aid the court 
in making a custodial decree which is for the best interests and welfare of the 
child. * * *" 4 A.L.R.3d 1396, 1402 Custody-Child's Wishes 
(1965).

[¶11.]  Courts in other jurisdictions have taken 
into consideration the wishes of children when determining custody. duPont v. 
duPont, 59 Del. 206, 216 A.2d 674 (1966); State 
ex rel. Waslie v. Waslie, 274 Minn. 564, 143 N.W.2d 634 (1966); In re Marriage of Kramer, 177 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439 (1978). In Kramer the 
court held:

"We are committed to the 
view that the welfare of the children is the paramount consideration in awarding 
custody. [Citations.] We believe the welfare of the children, particularly 
children of the ages involved here [the ages of the children involved were 11, 
13, and 15] is not being served if their wishes are not considered by the trial 
court." Id., 
at 444.

* * * In addition, the 
preference which has a stated basis and is expressed in a plain manner should be 
accorded greater weight than one whose basis cannot be described. This is not to 
say that the preference of a minor child is controlling upon the 
court.

In determining the weight 
to be given a child's preference several factors should be considered: the age 
of the child; the reason for the preference; the relative fitness of the 
preferred and non-preferred parent; the hostility, if any, of the child to the 
non-preferred parent; the preference of other siblings; and whether the child's 
preference has been tainted or influenced by one parent against the 
other.

Although custodial 
preference is not conclusive, the court here was entitled to give more 
consideration to a fifteen-year old girl's preference than say, the preference 
of a six-year old child. * * *

* * * We accord great 
deference to a trial judge's factual determination. The judge hearing a 
modification petition is in a better position to determine the credibility of a 
witness and the value of the testimony. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 P. 1 
(1926).

[¶12.]  Bill Shelledy, guardian ad litem, 
reported to the court in chambers regarding the children's preferences with 
respect to custody. Mr. Shelledy interviewed the children on or about September 
14, 1988, less than a month after they returned from Washington. Mr. Shelledy 
stated to the court:

I asked, at first I just 
asked [the children], who would you prefer to live with. Neither one of the 
children wanted to state, you know, there wasn't anything immediately jumping 
out, I want to be here, I want to be there. So, I asked them, ok[ay], where 
would you want to live. They all said Washington. Both of them said Washington. The reasons 
for Washington, [FV] was the mall and [BV] was his paper route and 
friends.

* * * * * 
*

I tried to get around to 
- they said that they wanted to live in Washington. The next question I asked, well, I 
said, if your dad lived in Washington and your mom lived in Worland, 
where would you want to live? And then they changed it around. They wanted to 
live in Worland. Basically, when it got around to - the way they answered the 
questions, though, they would not come out and say specifically, I want to live 
with my mother rather than my father. There were - the answers to the questions 
turn to the fact that I had the feeling that they wanted to live with their 
mother.

I asked 
questions about what they like, what they dislike of each. After being sitting 
here in Court, I find it very interesting because there was more conversation 
about their mother, likes and dislikes, just as she was in court more talkative 
than Frank. They couldn't think of any dislikes or likes immediately about 
Frank, in fact had very little discussion about Frank. They were more discussing 
their mother and a different relationship. But it appears to me that it's the 
same type of thing that it appeared to me, that Frank is very inward and quiet 
and Ermina is more of an outgoing person, and that's the way the kids discussed 
it.

My end feeling was that 
the children could survive and survive very well from dealing with them in 
either place. The kids to me seem extremely well adjusted, and, of course, they 
had been through this procedure before. But they haven't been disrupted by 
moving back and forth, and they said, you know, I've got friends in Washington, 
I've got friends in Worland, I can, you know, in fact can and do move back quite 
a bit and did not seem to be upset about moving back and 
forth.

I guess the bottom line 
is if the Court would ask, or the kids would ask I think if I could get them to 
come out and specifically say, they would prefer to live with their 
mother.

[¶13.]  If the children had actually been in 
court, the court would have been able to witness their demeanor and ask more 
searching or specific questions. With the benefit of seeing and hearing the 
children, the court might have been able to give their testimony greater weight 
and better evaluate such testimony. The children's stated custodial preference 
is rather tenuous and equivocal.2 This is understandable because 
likely the children did not want to offend either parent. Also, some of their 
reasons for favoring their mother's custody were insubstantial. We cannot say 
that the court abused its discretion in declining to change 
custody.

[¶14.]  Were we to reverse the trial court, we 
would necessarily have to weigh and evaluate the evidence differently than did 
that court. We also would be substituting our judgment for that of the trial 
court. This is contrary to our appellate rules.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 There were four children 
born of the parties' marriage. Only the two youngest children are involved here. 
The eldest is emancipated. The next eldest resides with her 
mother.

2 W.S. 3-2-107 pertains to 
preference for appointment of guardian of a minor. Understandably, this statute 
was not urged by appellant at trial nor on appeal.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶16.]  Contested custody decisions for children, 
as a search for their best interest, cannot be extricated from a computer 
program nor elicited like a mechanical exercise by weight in application of 
factors, facilities and protection of parental ego. At the same time, decisions 
must be made when parents choose to live apart, which is more than conventional 
in this country today. It is in analysis of the probabilities of all intangibles 
attendant to raising children that sound discretion and judicial decision are 
addressed. It never can be easy and, assuredly, cannot be expected to be 
certain.

[¶17.]  I first disagree with the trial court 
decision from a different perspective of the record in some material regard for 
exercised discretion and not reweighing the evidence which bears upon the 
likelihood of the father's parental success, both financial and historical.1 Cf. Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 
1989). More directly, I dissent in contending for a higher character of 
decisional use of the effect of the children's choice for custody. Two reasons 
are advanced why heightened consideration should be given to the parental choice 
by the children after their attainment of the reasoning age for knowing, 
believing and choosing of a statutory fourteen years of 
age.

[¶18.]  In first regard is the established 
knowledge that a court order cannot successfully and satisfactorily surmount the 
custody desires of teenage children for any extended time. Court orders today 
simply cannot hold these young people "down at the farm" if that is not where 
they want to be with the other parent.

[¶19.]  In a major research analysis found in a 
recent review, Professor Cloud demonstrates, to my satisfaction, that there 
cannot be a successful control of cocaine usage unless we reduce the number of 
addicts.2 He demonstrates with detail and 
logic that nothing else, including death penalty and otherwise, will work until 
or unless product marketability is reduced by sheer reduction in the number of 
addicts as a matter of participative choice as members of that class. Likewise, 
and equally to be justified by experience and logic, is the thesis that self 
decision is also required of young people involved to make custody arrangements 
workable. The supposition that individualized decision is required to cure one 
national problem of substance addiction may afford logic even if a broad 
comparison to the self-determinant criteria required to resolve another major 
national concern addressing the best interest of young people who are the 
product of broken homes. See Michael R. v. Sandra E., 378 S.E.2d 840, 843 (W. 
Va. 
1989).

[¶20.]  My second application of the efficiency 
of teenager choice has a historical precedent which seems to have fallen into 
disregard in current time and clearly in this case was neither argued in trial 
court nor briefed on appeal. In 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 21, § 2, the Wyoming legislature 
provided that "[i]f the minor is under the age of fourteen years, the court or 
judge may nominate and appoint his guardian. If he is fourteen years of age he 
may nominate his own guardian who, if approved by the court or judge, must be 
appointed accordingly." That statutory provision continues essentially unchanged 
as presently found in W.S. 3-2-107:

(a) The order of 
preference for the appointment of a guardian of a minor is as follows providing 
the persons are qualified and suitable:

* * * * * 
*

(iii) The person 
requested by a minor who is fourteen (14) years of age or 
over.

[¶21.]  In Tytler v. Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 338-39, 89 P. 1 
(1907), as extensively quoted by the majority in this case, this predecessor 
statute was expressly applied to a custody decision:

In the case before us the 
children are with their mother. At the time of hearing, Muriel, who was just 
approaching the age of fourteen, expressed her wish to remain and live with her 
mother. She has now reached the age of fourteen, and her wish at this time as to 
who shall be her guardian is expressly recognized by statute. She may nominate 
her own guardian, "who, if approved by the court or judge, must be appointed 
accordingly." (Sec. 4867, R.S.) While the supervisory power of the court or 
judge goes to the fitness and suitability of the person so nominated, the 
statute assumes that the minor having reached the age of fourteen can act 
intelligently in the matter of selecting her guardian.

[¶22.]  Recognition of the guardianship 
designation statute for custody purposes was followed in Gill v. Gill, 363 P.2d 86, 89 (Wyo. 
1961), which stated:

In determining whether a 
change in custody should be ordered by this court at this time, consideration 
may be given to the fact that the older boy will be fourteen years of age in 
another six months, and the younger boy will be fourteen years of age in another 
eighteen months, at which age minors become entitled to nominate their own 
guardians, subject to the approval of the court or judge. Section 3-5, W.S. 
1957. [Now restated as W.S. 3-2-107]

[¶23.]  Unless we determine this case on a 
compulsive analysis of res judicata, I would find a best interest discretionary 
decision should more expressly account for the age of the children and their 
right of choice when old enough to reasonably decide as set by the general 
statute at age fourteen for guardianship. Although consideration of the effect 
of a child's choice under the statutory and case precedent was not included in 
present briefing, I remain concerned with further omission of any consideration 
in this majority's decision. Silence should not imply disavowal of the 
individual choice perspective which was developed by statutory application in 
Tytler and Gill for long standing precedent.

[¶24.]  Consequently, I dissent from the order of 
custody entered.

FOOTNOTES

1 The parties were 
divorced in 1979 by stipulated settlement of child custody, support obligation 
and debt allocation. Custody of the four children went to the mother, present 
appellant. During the next eight years, the pervasive problems of non-support 
payment, mutually agreed changes of custody and unpaid indemnity responsibility 
occurred and re-occurred. The oldest daughter, T.V., last living with her 
father, became pregnant in Worland and went to Florida. The second oldest daughter, D.V., 
remained with her mother who presently has custody. And, the youngest two 
children, F.V., now fourteen, and B.V. age thirteen, remain the subject of the 
1987-1988 custody controversy. At appeal date, the father, employed at Imperial 
Holly Sugar Corporation, was subject to a $9,500 continuing garnishment in favor 
of the mother, as well as a previous debt for unpaid child support included in a 
URESA action in the amount of approximately $2,700. The mother, now remarried a 
second time, lives in Olympia, Washington and the father lives with his retired father in 
Worland, Wyoming, where these proceedings have 
occurred. Evidence in the record reveals that these two children want to live 
with their second oldest sister and mother in Olympia, Washington.

2 Cloud, Cocaine: Demand 
and Addiction, A Study in the Possible Convergence of Rational Theory and 
National Policy, 42 Vand.L.Rev. 725 (1989).