Title: DAYELLE FARGEY BRADLEY V. ROBERT H. BRADLEY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAYELLE FARGEY BRADLEY V. ROBERT H. BRADLEY2005 WY 107118 P.3d 984Case Number: 04-139Decided: 08/31/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
DAYELLE 
FARGEY BRADLEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROBERT 
H. BRADLEY,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Jessica 
Rutzick, Jackson, Wyoming

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Kenneth 
S. Cohen, Jackson, 
Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Dayelle Fargey Bradley (Wife), seeks review of an order of the district court 
that denied her petition to modify a divorce decree, as well as the denial, in 
effect, of her motion to enforce the existing divorce decree's terms.  Appellee, Robert H. Bradley (Husband), 
contends that the district court acted properly in denying Wife's petition and 
motion.  We will reverse and remand 
with directions that the district court modify its decree of divorce to grant 
the divorce and reserve ruling on any decision with regard to the equitable 
distribution of marital property until a hearing can be held pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 55(b).

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Wife raises these 
issues:

 
 
            
1.  Did the District Court commit reversible error when it 
granted [Husband's] Decree of Divorce as a default judgment in violation of 
[Wife's] right of due process under Article 1, § 6 of the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States, when such Decree of Divorce granted relief beyond that requested by 
[Husband's] complaint and without further notice to 
[Wife]?

 
 
            
2.  Did the District Court commit reversible error when it 
denied [Wife's] Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce where the Decree was based 
upon a substantive mistake of law?

 
 
            
3.  Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying 
[Wife's] Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce where [Wife] established 
sufficient grounds for modification pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 1-16-401 and 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, §§ 55(c) and 60(b)?

 
 
            
4.  Did the District Court commit reversible error by refusing 
to grant [Wife's] Motion to Enforce Divorce Decree where [Husband] did not seek 
relief from the Decree and did not submit any evidence supporting grounds for 
relief from the Decree or grounds to contravene the obligations set forth in the 
Decree?

 
 
Husband 
responds with a substantially different and much longer list of proposed 
issues:

 
 
            
1.  When the parties had a prenuptial agreement providing that 
its validity, execution, enforcement and construction should be governed by 
Minnesota law but that it shall be subject to modification by mutual agreement 
made in writing and executed and acknowledged by the parties, and when the 
parties subsequently signed a handwritten agreement modifying the prenuptial 
agreement, should the enforceability of that handwritten amendment be struck 
down as an improper modification under Minnesota law or be upheld as a proper 
modification complying with the explicit provision in the prenuptial agreement 
governing modification?

 
 
            
2.  Should W.S. § 1-16-401 be interpreted as allowing the 
reopening of a judgment under circumstances not justified under Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P.?  Does such an 
interpretation raise serious issues of separation of 
powers?

 
 
3.  Should 
a divorce decree granting relief different than that requested in the Complaint 
be barred by Rule 54(c), W.R.C.P., when the complaint asked for a decree 
enforcing the terms of the parties' prenuptial agreement, but subsequently the 
parties changed the agreement and [Husband] was requesting relief consistent 
with the change?

 
 
4.  Did 
the trial court err in refusing to reopen a default judgment when [Wife] failed 
to enter an appearance or even to retain counsel for over six months after being 
served with a copy of the complaint, and when [Wife] did not have a meritorious 
defense?

 
 
5.  Is 
[Wife] entitled to reopen the divorce decree based on an alleged mistake by the 
trial court under Rule 60(b)(1), W.R.C.P., when [Wife's] motion to reopen the 
judgment was filed more than thirty days after entry of the 
judgment?

 
 
6.  When 
the parties had a prenuptial agreement under which [Wife] was entitled to 
$100,000.00 upon divorce, and when [Wife] signed a handwritten amendment to the 
prenuptial agreement agreeing that she would not be entitled to the $100,000.00 
if she engaged in adultery, and when [Husband] subsequently confronted [Wife] 
with his knowledge that she was engaging in adultery and she acknowledged it, 
and when [Wife] never entered an appearance or took any action to defend her 
interests for over six months after being served with the divorce complaint 
seeking enforcement of the terms of the parties' premarital agreement, did the 
district court deny [Wife] due process of law by entering a divorce decree 
enforcing the premarital agreement as amended by the parties' handwritten 
agreement?

 
 
7.  When 
the parties had a prenuptial agreement defining the amounts to which each party 
was entitled in case of divorce, did the district court have to hold a hearing 
to determine damages after entry of default against 
[Wife]?

 
 
8.  Does 
this Court have any basis for reviewing the [district] court's decision denying 
[Wife's] motion to enforce the divorce decree, when that motion was based on 
[Wife's] assertion that she was not cohabiting with a third party, and when no 
transcript or statement of the evidence is available?

 
 
In her 
reply brief, Wife poses these additional matters:

 
 
            
1.  Are the requirements of both Article 14 (Modification) and 
Article 15 (Interpretation) of the Antenuptial Agreement applicable to a 
purported post nuptial amendment to the Agreement?

                        
a.  Is the purported post nuptial amendment valid when it does 
not conform to the requirements of either of those two 
Articles?

 
 
            
2.  Must a motion under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) seeking to set aside 
a default judgment based upon mistake of substantive law be filed within thirty 
days of the entry of the judgment?  

 
 
3.  Is 
the record sufficiently complete for purposes of considering the propriety of 
the Trial Court's denial of [Wife's] Motion to Enforce Divorce 
Decree?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      On January 28, 
2003, Husband filed a complaint for divorce.  The complaint is notable for its 
brevity.  It informed the district 
court that the parties were married on July 29, 2001, that irreconcilable 
differences had arisen between the parties to the marriage, and that the parties 
had entered into a prenuptial agreement dated July 24, 2001, that governed the 
rights, responsibilities, and obligations of the parties in the event of 
divorce, legal separation, or death.  
Husband asked the district court to approve and adopt the terms of the 
prenuptial agreement and incorporate them into the divorce decree.  The prenuptial agreement was not 
attached to the complaint.

 
 
[¶4]      Wife accepted 
service of the complaint for divorce in a document prepared by Husband's 
attorney.  She signed the acceptance 
of service on February 25, 2003, and it was filed in the district court on March 
6, 2003.1  The acceptance of service also included 
these provisions:

 
 
2.  I 
understand that I have the right to be formally served with a copy of the 
Summons and Complaint in this civil action, and I expressly waive any right I 
may have to be served in such manner.

3.  I 
understand that I am required to file and serve an Answer to the Complaint 
within thirty (30) days from the above date or otherwise formally respond in the 
civil action commenced against me in the Teton County District Court.  I understand that if I fail to answer or 
otherwise plead, a judgment by default will be taken against me for the relief 
demanded in the complaint, and I will be prohibited from protecting or enforcing 
any rights I have in connection with the divorce 
proceeding.

 
 
[¶5]      Wife did not 
answer the complaint, and Husband filed a request for entry of default on April 
23, 2003.  Default is governed by 
W.R.C.P. 55:

 
 
(a) Entry. 
-- When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is 
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's 
default.

            
(b) Judgment. -- Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows:

            
(1)  By the Clerk. -- When the plaintiff's claim against a 
defendant is for a sum certain, or for a sum which can by computation be made 
certain, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the 
amount due shall enter judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, 
if the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear and is not a minor or 
an incompetent person;

(2)  By 
the Court. -- In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default 
shall apply to the court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered 
against a minor or an incompetent person unless represented in the action by a 
guardian, guardian ad litem, trustee, conservator, or other such representative 
who has appeared therein.  If the 
party against whom a judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action 
the party (or, if appearing by representative, the party's representative) shall 
be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three 
days prior to the hearing on such application.  If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or 
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by 
evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct 
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper and 
shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by any 
statute.

            
(c) Setting aside default. -- For good cause shown the court 
may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b).

            
(d) Plaintiffs; counterclaimants; cross-claimants. -- The 
provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by 
default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or party who has pleaded a 
cross-claim or counterclaim.  In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶6]      The clerk of the 
district court filed an Entry of Default on April 23, 2003.  On September 4, 2003, Husband filed an 
"affidavit" in the district court that mirrored his complaint in many respects, 
but added that the parties had reconciled to some degree in the interim.  Further, he averred that during the 
brief period of reconciliation, the parties had amended their prenuptial 
agreement on May 18, 2003.  The 
affidavit also alleged that the prenuptial agreement provided for an initial 
payment of $100,000.00 from Husband to Wife, but the amendment deleted that 
obligation if "the reinstatement of the divorce proceeding" was caused by an act 
of adultery committed by Wife.  
Husband alleged that Wife had committed adultery.  It is apparent that Husband intended 
this affidavit to be a "reinstatement" of the original divorce proceedings but 
with some additional matters thrown in.  
The affidavit was not served on Wife.  Neither the prenuptial agreement, nor 
the amendment to the prenuptial agreement, was attached to the affidavit, nor 
were they otherwise of record at this stage of the case.

 
 
[¶7]      On September 8, 
2003, the district court entered a Decree of Divorce that had been prepared by 
Husband's attorney and which was consistent with Husband's supplemental pleading 
("affidavit") of September 4, 2003.  
Wife was not given notice that this proceeding was scheduled, nor was the 
proposed form of decree offered to her for her approval.  The decree recited some of the pertinent 
terms of the prenuptial agreement, including that Husband was to transfer to 
Wife the parties' real property in Indio, California (as well as much personal 
property located at that site), that Husband was to pay Wife $100,000.00 upon 
dissolution of the marriage, and that Husband was to pay Wife $10,000.00 per 
month for a period of two years.  
Both parties agree that these provisions accurately reflect the original 
prenuptial agreement.

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court purported to have reviewed the prenuptial agreement and found it fair and 
reasonable.  Still, the record does 
not reflect that the agreement was a part of the record at this point in the 
proceedings, other than that Husband quoted portions of it in the proposed form 
of divorce decree that he submitted to the district court and which the district 
court signed and entered.  The 
decree also made reference to the amendment to the prenuptial agreement, i.e., 
that Wife would not receive the $100,000.00 payment if she committed adultery, 
and that based upon Husband's affidavit, Wife waived or forfeited that payment 
by committing adultery.  The 
complete amendment itself was still not of record at this point in the 
proceedings either.  The divorce 
decree was not provided to Wife upon its entry. 

 
 
[¶9]      On November 3, 
2003, Wife filed a motion to modify the divorce decree.  Attached to this motion was Wife's 
affidavit giving her side of the story, copies of the prenuptial agreement 
(without attachments) and the amendment to it, as well as a copy of an October 
2, 2003 letter in which Husband informed Wife that a divorce decree had been 
entered to the effect that she would not receive the $100,000.00 payment 
contemplated by the original prenuptial agreement.

 
 
[¶10]   On December 17, 2003, Wife filed a 
motion to enforce the divorce decree, alleging in pertinent part that Husband 
had not made the $10,000.00 a month payments to her as required by the decree 
that was entered on September 8, 2003.2  On January 6, 2004, Husband filed a 
response to that motion, stating in pertinent part that he refused to make the 
$10,000.00 per month payments because Wife was cohabiting with a third party, 
and the premarital agreement did not require him to make those payments if she 
was so cohabiting.

 
 
[¶11]   By order entered on January 16, 
2004, the district court set Wife's petition to modify the divorce decree for 
hearing on March 1, 2004.  Each 
party filed a brief prior to the hearing.  
The matter was heard on March 1, 2004, but was not reported.  Neither a transcript of the hearing, nor 
a statement of the evidence or proceedings contemplated by W.R.A.P. 3.03, is 
included in the record.  By order 
entered on March 12, 2004, the district court denied Wife's petition to modify 
the divorce decree.  It appears from 
the record that the district court did not rule on, or specifically dispose of, 
Wife's motion to enforce the provisions of the September 8, 2003, divorce 
decree.  Although Wife sought 
clarification on that issue, the district court did not further address it, 
apparently because it believed it did not have jurisdiction to do so because a 
notice of appeal had been filed.  On 
April 5, 2004, Wife filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the district 
court's March 12, 2004 order denying modification of the divorce decree, as well 
as seeking review of her motion to enforce the decree that had by then been 
deemed denied by the district court's inaction.

 
 

 
 
[¶12]   We begin our analysis by addressing 
Wife's contention that the proceedings in the district court denied her rights 
to due process of law.  We agree 
with Wife's contentions, and we do so for reasons that can be stated fairly 
simply and directly.  Wife does not 
challenge the entry of default.  
Indeed, it was clear from the outset that she anticipated that default 
would be entered against her and that a decree of divorce would be entered in 
conformity with Husband's complaint upon her failure to answer the complaint, 
i.e., that the terms of the original prenuptial agreement would govern the terms 
of the decree of divorce.  Husband 
filed a pleading on September 4, 2003, that was entitled "Affidavit of Robert H. 
Bradley Regarding Factual Basis for a Decree of Divorce."  In reality, that document was a 
supplemental pleading as contemplated by W.R.C.P. 15(d):

 
 
            
(d)  Supplemental pleadings. -- Upon motion of a party 
the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit 
the party to serve[3] a supplemental pleading setting 
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sought to be supplemented.  
Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective 
in its statement of a claim for relief or defense.  If the court deems it advisable that the 
adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying 
the time therefor.

 
 
[¶13]   The principal function of Husband's 
affidavit was to allege that the original prenuptial agreement had been amended 
by the parties and to apply to the court to enter a default judgment consistent 
with the amended agreement.  The 
district court treated the affidavit as a request that a default judgment/decree 
be entered, as provided for in W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), even though Wife had not been 
served with the supplemental pleading or otherwise been given notice of the 
proceedings and the relief requested went beyond that sought in the original 
complaint.  Because the affidavit 
was not served on Wife, we conclude that the district court could not consider 
it in entering the divorce decree,4 nor can we consider it in resolving 
this appeal.

 
 
[¶14]   We dealt with a similar situation 
in Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587 
(Wyo. 
1989).  In that case, the district 
court entered a default judgment in a divorce action because the husband had 
refused to comply with the court's discovery orders.  However, it also awarded the wife 
certain real and personal property which went beyond the general relief sought 
in the complaint without any evidentiary proceedings.  This Court held "Only in those 
situations where the damages sought are liquidated and claimed in the complaint 
may the court grant relief without further proceedings."  Id. 
at 592.  Where damages or relief are 
unliquidated or not specified with certainty in the complaint, further 
proceedings are indicated pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).  See also Halbertstam v. Cokeley, 872 P.2d 109 (Wyo. 
1994).  Specifically, in issuing a 
divorce decree pursuant to a default judgment, we held the district court was 
required to comply with statutory criteria applicable to the distribution of 
marital property.  Spitzer, 777 P.2d  at 593.  In order to accomplish its function of 
making a just and equitable distribution, the district court must have an 
evidentiary basis to support the exercise of its 
discretion.

 
 
[¶15]   As we have noted above, the record 
was barren of much in the way of evidentiary material.  The only thing that was certain and 
properly before the district court at the time the decree was entered was that 
Husband and Wife agreed to the entry of a divorce decree that was in conformity 
with their prenuptial agreement.  
However, the agreement itself had not been provided to the court although 
its order recited that it had reviewed the agreement and found it to be "fair 
and reasonable and that it was entered into voluntarily and after full 
disclosure of financial assets."  
Husband's improper and immaterial affidavit, which was not consistent 
with Husband's complaint, should have alerted the district court that the relief 
requested was unliquidated and different from that claimed in the original 
complaint and should not have been granted without notice to the Wife and 
without further proceedings.

 
 
[¶16]   In large part, Wife premised her 
motion to modify the divorce decree on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 (LexisNexis 
2005).  That statute permits a 
district court to modify its own judgment if any of the statutory grounds are 
met.  Here, the principal ground for 
modification was that the judgment was a mistake.  W.R.C.P. 60(b), which provides for 
relief from a judgment or order, serves many of the same purposes as does the 
above-cited statute.  It 
provides:

 
 
(b)  Other 
Reasons. -- On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons:  
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;  (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b);  (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct of an adverse party;  
(4) the judgment is void;  
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;  or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment.  
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), 
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken.  A motion under 
this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation.  This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from 
a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided by statute, or to grant relief to a 
party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service 
than by publication as provided by statute.   Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, 
audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, 
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall 
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action.

 
 
[¶17]   Although Husband contends that § 
1-16-401 is a legislative invasion of the court's power to establish rules of 
procedure for the district court, we perceive that the statute, at least so far 
as Wife seeks its application here, does not conflict in any way with Rule 60, 
and Rule 60 specifically provides that:  
"This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding as 
provided by statute."  We conclude 
that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Wife's petition to modify the divorce 
decree because the mistake that the district court was required to correct was 
readily evident from the record, i.e., the relief granted by the default 
judgment was not consistent with that requested in the original 
complaint.

 
 
[¶18]   Moreover, we have 
held:

 
 
An 
antenuptial agreement is a contract entered into between two people in 
contemplation and consideration of marriage.  The marriage provides the requisite 
consideration to bind both parties.  
The primary purpose of such agreements is to define and fix the 
respective property rights of the spouses before the marriage.  Challenges to such agreements generally 
arise upon the death of one of the parties or upon dissolution of the marriage, 
as in this case.  Most jurisdictions 
now view antenuptial agreements favorably, and validity usually is upheld upon 
this policy analysis:

 
 
[A]ntenuptial contracts entered into 
between an adult husband and an adult wife in contemplation of marriage are 
favored by the law in that they tend to promote domestic happiness and adjust 
property questions which might otherwise become the source of much 
litigation.

 
 

Samuel 
Green & John V. Long, Marriage and Family Law Agreements § 2.06, 
at 114 (1984) (citing Estate of Gillilan v. Estate of Gillilan, 406 N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ind.Ct.App.1980).  
See Charles W. Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. 
MIAMI L.REV. 692 
(1972).

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
We hold 
that, in effecting a property settlement pursuant to § 20-2-114, a trial court 
is obligated to enforce the agreements of the parties to the marriage, 
particularly the antenuptial agreement, since they are entitled to that 
certainty.  If the trial court does 
not enforce such agreements, a cogent rationale justifying the failure to 
enforce them and explaining why the court ignored such agreements must be 
encompassed in the record.  We 
conclude that the disposition by the trial court manifests an abuse of 
discretion because it presents an error of law under the circumstances.  We reverse and remand for a new trial 
relative to the property division, and for a determination that the property 
should be divided according to the parties' agreements, or an explanation as to 
why the agreement should not be enforced that is sufficiently explicit to permit 
us to review it in the light of our standards.

 
 

Lund v. 
Lund, 849 P.2d 731, 739-40 (Wyo. 1993) (footnote 
omitted).

 
 
[¶19]   In this case, unlike the Lund case, we are 
compelled to direct the district court to revise its decree of divorce.  Thus, we remand the matter to allow the 
district court to conduct such further proceedings as may be necessary to 
determine a just and equitable distribution of the marital property.  If that distribution differs from that 
provided in the parties' original prenuptial agreement, an explanation must be 
provided as to why that agreement should not be enforced.  Neither party contests the entry of a 
decree of divorce, and, thus, the decree of divorce is affirmed to the extent 
that it granted a divorce to the parties.

 
 
[¶20]   Wife also requested that the 
district court enforce that portion of both the original agreement and the 
modified agreement that was incorporated into the decree that required Husband 
to make the 24 monthly payments of $10,000.00 to Wife.  Wife's contention is that Husband has 
made a unilateral determination (and one that is not supported by any competent 
evidence of record) that he was relieved of that obligation, even though it had 
been ordered by the district court, because he claimed Wife "cohabited" in 
violation of the terms of the prenuptial agreement.  It is apparent from the record that the 
district court did not rule on this issue.  
If, after further proceedings as contemplated by Rule 55(b)(2) the final 
decree incorporates that portion of the prenuptial agreement, the district court 
shall consider Wife's request for enforcement thereof.

 
 

 
 
[¶21]   The divorce decree entered by the 
district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this matter is 
remanded to the district court with direction to enter a modified decree 
granting the divorce and to conduct such further hearings as may be required to 
determine a just and equitable distribution of the marital 
property.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

   1W.R.C.P. 3(b) 
provides that:  "The voluntary 
waiver, acceptance or acknowledgment of service, or appearance by a defendant 
shall be the same as personal service on the date when such waiver, acceptance, 
acknowledgment or appearance is made."

 
 
   2Wife also 
asserted that Husband had refused to transfer the Indio, California home to Wife.  However, we are advised from the briefs 
and the oral argument that the transfer has subsequently taken 
place.

 
 
   3W.R.C.P. 5(a)(1) 
provides:

 
 
(a) Service; when required. 
--

 
 
            
(1)  Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order 
required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original 
complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, 
every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the 
court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard 
ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
designation of record on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of 
the parties.  No service need be 
made on parties in default for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting 
new or additional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them in 
the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
  
4Husband's 
failure to serve Wife with the supplemental pleading fully establishes that Wife 
was denied due process of law (notice) with respect to the entry of the 
September 8, 2003, divorce decree.  
As an aside, we take note that Husband contends that Wife was not 
entitled to notice of that hearing because she had not "appeared."  Although we need not address this 
contention dispositively, even though Wife did not answer the complaint, her 
acceptance of service very likely constituted an "appearance" and, therefore, 
she was entitled to notice of the September 8, 2003, proceedings in any 
event.  See MROP v. 
Design-Build-Manage, Inc., 2002 WY 67, ¶¶17-18, 45 P.3d 647, 653 (Wyo. 
2002); 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §2686 at 43 (1998) ("Defendant need not respond 
directly to the complaint in order to be deemed to have made an appearance.  An appearance may arise by implication 
from defendant's seeking, taking, or agreeing to some step or proceeding in the 
cause beneficial to himself or detrimental to plaintiff other than one 
contesting only the jurisdiction * * * .'"); 6 C.J.S. 
Appearances, §§ 18 and 19 (2004).