Title: State v. Dorsey

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP648-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Anton R. Dorsey, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 308, 895 N.W.2d 103 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 25, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 23, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul J. Lenz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs, joined by KELLY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Frederick A. Bechtold, Taylors 
Falls, Minnesota. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed and 
an oral argument by Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general. 
 
 
2018 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP648-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF204) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Anton R. Dorsey, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 25, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Dorsey, 
No. 2015AP648-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 
2016) (per curiam), affirming the Eau Claire County circuit 
court's1 judgments of conviction for Anton R. Dorsey ("Dorsey") 
for three crimes related to his domestic violence toward C.B. 
¶2 
In a criminal action by the State, Dorsey was charged 
with four crimes relating to his domestic violence toward his 
then-girlfriend, 
C.B.: 
one 
count 
of 
strangulation 
and 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Paul J. Lenz presided. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
2 
 
suffocation under Wis. Stat. § 940.235(1) (2013-14)2;3 one count 
of misdemeanor battery under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1); one count 
of disorderly conduct under Wis. Stat. §§ 947.01 and 973.055(1); 
and one count of aggravated battery under §§ 940.19(6) and 
973.055(1).  All counts were charged with repeater enhancers.   
¶3 
In the circuit court, the State filed a motion to 
admit other-acts evidence.  Ruling on this motion required the 
circuit court to interpret, as a matter of first impression, the 
recently amended language in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.  After 
colloquy with the parties, the circuit court held that the new 
language allowed the admission of other acts of a defendant in a 
domestic abuse case with greater latitude under the Sullivan4 
analysis.  Given this interpretation, the circuit court admitted 
the testimony of R.K., a former girlfriend of Dorsey's, who 
testified to other acts of physical violence committed by Dorsey 
against her when they were dating in 2011.  Postconviction, 
Dorsey appealed. 
¶4 
The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds.  It 
held that the greater latitude rule did not apply because the 
text, not the title ("Greater latitude"), controls, and that the 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-
14 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 The jury found Dorsey not guilty of count one and his 
appeal here involves only the judgments of conviction entered 
for counts two through four.  Thus, we will limit our discussion 
and analysis to counts two through four. 
4 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
3 
 
text of subd. (2)(b)1. did not indicate any clear legislative 
intent to adopt the greater latitude rule with regard to other 
acts of domestic abuse.  The court of appeals then evaluated 
admission of the other-acts evidence under a straight Sullivan 
analysis and concluded that it was admissible, even without 
applying greater latitude.   
¶5 
There are two issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider what standard for admission of other-acts evidence 
applies under the recently amended language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1.  Second, we consider whether the evidence of 
Dorsey's other acts was properly admitted under § 904.04(2)(b)1.  
As to the first issue, we conclude that the recently amended 
language allows admission of other-acts evidence with greater 
latitude under a Sullivan analysis.  As to the second issue, we 
conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in admitting evidence of Dorsey's other acts because 
the circuit court applied the proper legal standard and 
admission was a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach 
based on the facts of the record. 
¶6 
Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
on other grounds. 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
The State charged Dorsey with the following four 
crimes: (1) strangulation and suffocation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.235(1), for intentionally impeding normal breathing by 
applying pressure on the throat or neck of another person; (2) 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
4 
 
misdemeanor battery under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1), for intending 
to cause bodily harm to C.B., without her consent and with the 
knowledge that she did not consent; (3) disorderly conduct under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 947.01(1) and 973.055(1), for engaging in violent, 
abusive, or otherwise disorderly conduct, under circumstances in 
which such conduct tended to cause a disturbance; and (4) 
aggravated battery 
under §§ 940.19(6) and 973.055(1), for 
intentionally causing bodily harm to C.B. by conduct that 
created a substantial risk of great bodily harm.5  Dorsey entered 
pleas of not guilty and the case was set for a jury trial. 
¶8 
Before trial, the State filed a motion to introduce 
evidence of Dorsey's two convictions for domestic battery from 
2011 for other acts of domestic violence toward a former 
girlfriend, R.K., arguing that such evidence was admissible to 
prove intent to cause bodily harm under the recently amended6 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.,7 which states as follows: 
                                                 
5 The criminal complaint was filed on March 18, 2014, and 
Dorsey waived his right to a preliminary hearing on April 15, 
2014.  On May 2, 2014, Dorsey pled not guilty and the case was 
set for trial. 
6 See 2013 Wis. Act 362, §§ 20-22, 38; see also id., § 38 
(amending and renumbering Wis. Stat. § 944.33(3) as Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1.). 
7 Prior to this motion, Dorsey had filed a motion in limine, 
requesting, in part, that the State be "prohibited from 
introducing any evidence concerning alleged acts of criminal or 
other misconduct by the defendant either prior to or following 
the date of the alleged offense charged in the Complaint."  In 
support of this request, Dorsey argued that "[t]he probative 
value of such other misconduct evidence, if any, is out-weighed 
by its prejudicial effect . . . ."  The State also filed a pre-
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
5 
 
(b)  Greater 
Latitude.  1.  In 
a 
criminal 
proceeding alleging a violation of s. 940.302(2) or of 
ch. 948, alleging the commission of a serious sex 
offense, as defined in s. 939.615(1)(b), or of 
domestic abuse, as defined in s. 968.075(1)(a), or 
alleging an offense that, following a conviction, is 
subject to the surcharge in s. 973.055, evidence of 
any similar acts by the accused is admissible, and is 
admissible without regard to whether the victim of the 
crime that is the subject of the proceeding is the 
same as the victim of the similar act. 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.8  The State argued that this other-
acts evidence was admissible under the now-familiar three-step 
analysis promulgated in State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998): other-acts evidence is admissible if (1) it is 
offered for a permissible purpose under § 904.04(2)(a),9 (2) it 
                                                                                                                                                             
trial motion in limine, requesting, in part, that Dorsey be 
prohibited from introducing "any witness' criminal record, or 
other crimes, wrongs or acts, if any, unless a proper hearing is 
held under Wis. [Stat.] § 904.04."  
8 In Wisconsin, the admissibility of prior convictions for 
substance 
is 
governed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04 
and 
the 
admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment is governed 
by Wis. Stat. § 906.09. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) states as follows:  
Except as provided in par. (b)2., evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.  This subsection does 
not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.   
§ 904.04(2)(a).  This list is nonexclusive.  See State v. 
Shillcut, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 236, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983) 
("[This list] of circumstances . . . for which the evidence is 
relevant and admissible is not exclusionary but, rather, 
illustrative."). 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
6 
 
is relevant under § 904.01,10 and (3) its probative value is not 
substantially11 outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice under 
§ 904.03.12  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 states as follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
§ 904.01. 
11 "The term 'substantially' indicates that if the probative 
value of the evidence is close or equal to its unfair 
prejudicial effect, the evidence must be admitted."  State v. 
Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶80, 320 Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832 
(emphasis 
in 
original) 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Speer, 
176 
Wis. 2d 1101, 1115, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993)). 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 states as follows:  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
§ 904.03.  As this language demonstrates, unfair prejudice is 
not the only reason that evidence which is relevant may 
nonetheless be excluded.  See also Wis. Stat. §§ 904.06-904.16.  
Here, however, unfair prejudice was alleged and we limit our 
review to that issue.  "Unfair prejudice" is prejudice that 
results  
when 
the 
proffered 
evidence 
has 
a 
tendency 
to 
influence the outcome by improper means or if it 
appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise 
causes a jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions in the case.  
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789-90. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
7 
 
¶9 
Under the first prong, the State argued that the 
evidence was offered "to establish the defendant's intent and 
motive to cause bodily harm to his victim and to control her 
within the context of a domestic relationship."  Under the 
second prong, the State argued that the evidence was relevant 
because it established Dorsey's intent and motive, which were 
facts of consequence, and that the other acts were near enough 
in time, place, and circumstances to have a tendency to make the 
facts of intent and motive more probable.  Under the third 
prong, the State noted that the defendant bore the burden to 
show that the probative value is substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice and argued that a cautionary jury instruction 
would ensure that the jury only considered the evidence for the 
proffered purpose, thereby avoiding any unfair prejudice. 
¶10 On August 26, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing 
on the State's motion.  During the hearing, the court heard 
arguments from the parties as to the proper interpretation of 
the new language in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.  The circuit 
court ultimately held that the amended language "provid[es] 
greater latitude . . . similar . . . to the serious sex offense 
business and making it available more to be able to be used in 
the case in chief than [the court] would provide."   
¶11 The circuit court then allowed the evidence to be 
admitted, holding that "using that greater latitude[,] the 
three-prong analysis of Sullivan is met."  Under the first 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
8 
 
prong, the court held that intent and motive to control were 
permissible purposes.13  Under the second prong, the court held 
that the other acts were relevant "because [] the similarity, 
the motive to control," which although "not very, very, very 
near in time, [was] within two years and in a period of time in 
which the clock kind of stops ticking a little bit because the 
defendant [was] on probation for a period of that time."  
Additionally, the court held that "the clear statutory language 
indicates that it does not need to involve the same victim."  
Under the third prong, the court held that the probative value 
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, and that a cautionary instruction would ensure that 
this information goes "only to evaluate the defendant's motive 
and intent."   
¶12 On August 28, 2014, trial began.  At trial, the 
State's primary witness was C.B., the victim.  C.B. testified 
that she and Dorsey started dating in June of 2013.  As to count 
one, for strangulation and suffocation, C.B. testified that, on 
the night of October 11-12, 2013, she and Dorsey got into an 
argument about money on their way home from a bar after a night 
                                                 
13 In its analysis under Sullivan, the circuit court did not 
specifically hold that the purposes offered by the State were 
permissible under the first prong, but its discussion of the 
second and third prongs rests on a holding that intent and 
motive were permissible purposes.  In this regard, we note that 
the circuit court had "read the motion so [it had] an 
understanding of what the State is looking to do," and 
acknowledged the State's arguments on motive and intent in 
discussing how to tailor the cautionary jury instruction. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
9 
 
out with friends.  She felt that "all [she was] good for [was] 
money" and told him "[t]his is done.  This isn't a healthy 
relationship.  I'm not happy."  He then pulled the car over, 
locked the doors, pushed her head against the window, and 
demanded to know "is there someone else?  Do you have someone 
else?  Is that why you don't want me here?"  She testified that 
she was able to get out of the car and that she had started 
walking toward her house when he came up behind her, but she did 
not remember anything else until waking up on the ground with 
him saying, "[y]ou aren't F-ing doing this to me."   
¶13 As to count two, for misdemeanor battery, C.B. 
testified that, in December of 2013, she could not remember 
exactly what had started the argument and caused Dorsey to be 
upset with her, but she remembered telling him that she "didn't 
want to talk to him . . . right now" and rolled over in the bed 
to face away from him.  He responded by saying "[n]o, we're 
going to talk about this," and turned her back to face him by 
grabbing her hip; he then flicked her lip with his finger, 
splitting it open and causing it to bleed.  C.B. testified that 
Dorsey then threw a tissue box at her for her bloody lip.  He 
was saying, "I don't know why you lie to me, why you 
lie . . . to me all the time," to which C.B. responded that she 
did not know what he was upset about.  He then grabbed her by 
the waist, bringing her toward him, pulled her hair to make her 
look up at him because "he likes to have eye contact," and spit 
in her face. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
10 
 
¶14 As to counts three and four, for disorderly conduct 
and aggravated battery, C.B. testified that on March 11, 2014, 
she and Dorsey were in the parking lot of a bar when Dorsey got 
upset after he saw that she had been texting a man he did not 
like.  (Dorsey had grabbed C.B.'s phone from her during an 
argument about her talking to her ex.)  She testified that 
Dorsey accused her of sleeping with this other man and that she 
just kept telling him "[n]o, it's not like that.  He's just a 
friend."  She got out of the car and tried to catch the 
attention of someone in an office next to the bar because she 
was afraid of getting hit.  Dorsey got out saying, "[d]on't you 
dare, don't you dare," and came up behind her, grabbed her, and 
pushed her up against the side of the building demanding to know 
"[w]hy are you doing this?"  A few people then came out into the 
parking lot and Dorsey told her to get back in the car.  
¶15 Nothing more happened that night, but C.B. testified 
that when she woke up the next morning, Dorsey was leaning over 
her just inches from her face and said, "I can't believe you're 
doing this, that you keep doing this."  She started getting 
ready for work, but before she could leave, Dorsey told her to 
sit down, that they "were going to talk about this."  She 
testified that she sat down on the bed and that right away he 
hit her and said, "I don't believe that you're doing this."  
When she tried to move away, he grabbed her hair, pulled her 
back, and hit her in the head again.  C.B. testified that her 
head was ringing and she felt sick to her stomach, that she told 
him she had to go to work, but that he kept hitting her.  Dorsey 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
11 
 
relented when C.B. told him that she had a meeting and that if 
she was not there "they're going to wonder what's going on, and 
they will send someone to the house."  He then threw her phone 
at her chest; she took it, ran down the stairs, grabbed her 
keys, and got out the door and into her car. 
¶16 The State also called R.K., a former girlfriend of 
Dorsey's.  R.K.'s testimony regarding Dorsey's violent acts 
toward her is the focus of Dorsey's appeal.  At trial, R.K. 
testified about two incidents that took place in 2011.14  The 
first was in June of 2011, when R.K. was six months pregnant.  
R.K. testified that she had asked Dorsey to take a paternity 
test so that he could not later claim that their child was not 
his.  He became upset, thinking that the real reason she wanted 
the test was that she was not sure who the father was.  He left, 
but when he came back later that night he was yelling and 
swearing and calling her names; he flicked a lit cigarette butt 
at her and tried to leave in her car.  When she got in the 
passenger side to stop him from taking the car, he pushed her 
out while backing out of the driveway.  She then testified that, 
when Dorsey came back later, he yelled some more, dragged her 
out of the house by her feet, causing bruising to her abdomen, 
and locked her out of her house.  
                                                 
14 Although Dorsey was convicted of domestic battery for 
both of these incidents, the circuit court did not allow the 
State to elicit the fact of Dorsey's convictions at trial 
because it "[didn't] see that it adds anything." 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
12 
 
¶17 The second incident was in November of 2011.  R.K. 
testified that Dorsey had become upset because he felt she did 
not respect him.  He asked her to leave, and R.K. testified that 
she was going to go because he was sitting on the couch feeding 
their daughter and she "didn't want things to escalate."  As she 
was walking out the door, he took the bottle out of their 
daughter's mouth and threw it at R.K., and then threw a shoe at 
R.K.  He then asked R.K. to come back in the house, and when she 
came back in, he locked the door, began yelling at her, pushed 
her down to the ground, and started hitting her in the head with 
a shoe and kicking her in the back repeatedly.  R.K. testified 
that when Dorsey stopped "after a while" and went into the 
kitchen, she took their daughter, ran out to the car, and drove 
to her mother's house. 
¶18 Dorsey's defense was that these witnesses were making 
false allegations and that the acts never happened.  As to C.B., 
he testified that he did not remember having a physical 
altercation where he grabbed her around the neck; that he had 
never tried to prevent C.B. from leaving the house; and that her 
injuries in March were because she had slipped in the shower.  
As to R.K., Dorsey initially testified that he never spat on 
her; that he never threw a shoe or baby bottle at her; and that 
he never dragged her out of the house when she was six months 
pregnant.  Outside the presence of the jury, the State then 
sought to introduce his convictions for these incidents to 
impeach his testimony; the circuit court denied the request, 
accepting Dorsey's explanation that "he misunderstood exactly 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
13 
 
how he was supposed to respond."  When asked again (in the 
presence of the jury), Dorsey admitted that, in June of 2011, he 
spat on R.K. and dragged her out of the house when she was six 
months pregnant because he had been upset that the baby was 
possibly not his; and that, in November of 2011, he threw a shoe 
and a baby bottle at R.K., prevented her from leaving their 
apartment, and hit her because he felt that R.K. had not been 
respecting him.  
¶19 At the close of evidence, the circuit court instructed 
the jury.  As pertains to the issue here, the court gave a 
cautionary jury instruction regarding other acts: 
Evidence 
has 
been 
presented 
regarding 
other 
conduct of the defendant for which the defendant is 
not on trial. 
Specifically, evidence has been presented that 
the defendant committed a battery of [R.K.] in June 
and November of 2011.  If you find that this conduct 
did occur, you should consider it only on the issue of 
motive and intent.   
You may not consider this evidence to conclude 
that the defendant has a certain character or certain 
character trait and that the defendant acted in 
conformity with that trait or character with respect 
to the offense charged in this case. 
Evidence was received on the issues of motive, 
that is, whether the defendant had the reason to 
desire the result of the offense charged, and intent, 
that is, whether the defendant acted with the state of 
mind that is required for the offense charged. 
You may consider this evidence only for the 
purposes I have described, giving it the weight you 
determine it deserves.  It is not to be used to 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
14 
 
conclude that the defendant is a bad person and for 
that reason is guilty of the offense charged.[15] 
¶20 On August 28, 2014, the jury found Dorsey not guilty 
on count one,16 but found Dorsey guilty on counts two through 
four.17  The circuit court sentenced Dorsey on October 24, 2014,18 
and entered the judgments of conviction on October 27, 2014. 
¶21 On March 30, 2015, Dorsey filed notice of appeal. On 
December 6, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court on other grounds.  Contrary to the circuit court, the 
court of appeals held that the greater latitude rule did not 
                                                 
15 The circuit court also instructed the jury regarding 
impeachment by prior conviction: 
Evidence has been received that the defendant in 
this trial has been convicted of crimes.  This 
evidence was received solely because it bears upon the 
credibility of the witness.  It must not be used for 
any other purpose, and in particular a criminal 
conviction at some previous time is not proof of guilt 
of the offense now charged. 
This was in reference to Dorsey's testimony on cross-examination 
that he had been convicted of crimes on ten occasions. 
16 Count 
one 
was 
for 
Strangulation 
and 
Suffocation, 
Repeater, under Wis. Stat. §§ 940.235(1) and 939.62(1)(b). 
17 Count two was for Misdemeanor Battery, Repeater, under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19(1) and 939.62(1)(a); count three was for 
Disorderly Conduct, Repeater, Domestic Abuse, under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 947.01(1), 939.62(1)(a), and 973.055(1); and count four was 
for 
Aggravated 
Battery, 
Repeater, 
Domestic 
Abuse, 
under 
§§ 940.19(6), 939.62(1)(b), and 973.055(1). 
18 Dorsey was sentenced as follows: on count two, to one 
year imprisonment; on count three, to one year imprisonment; and 
on count four, to two years, nine months imprisonment and two 
years, three months extended supervision.  These sentences were 
to be served concurrently. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
15 
 
apply because the "text must control over [the] title" and 
"[t]he text of Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1. does not indicate any 
clear legislative intent to make the greater latitude rule, as 
developed through our state's case law, now applicable to 
domestic abuse cases."  Dorsey, unpublished slip op., ¶22.  
Instead, the court of appeals held that the other acts were 
admissible under a straight Sullivan analysis:  first, the 
evidence was offered for the permissible purpose of proving 
intent and motive "to control [C.B.] within the context of a 
domestic relationship," id., ¶¶25-27, 29; second, the evidence 
was relevant because intent is an element of any crime and is 
thus "of consequence," even if undisputed, and the other acts 
were similar enough in time,19 place, and circumstances that they 
had probative value, id., ¶¶34-37; third, Dorsey did not satisfy 
his burden to show that the probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice because Dorsey 
conceded there were similarities, the evidence was "highly 
probative of intent," and "any prejudicial effect could be 
mitigated by the use of [a] cautionary instruction," id., ¶43. 
¶22 On January 3, 2017, Dorsey filed a petition for review 
in this court.  On April 10, 2017, we granted the petition. 
 
                                                 
19 As in the circuit court, the court of appeals found that 
the two-year gap in time did not sever the connection because 
Dorsey "may have purposefully waited until his probation expired 
to engage in further domestic abuse, so as to avoid probation 
revocation."  State v. Dorsey, No. 2015AP648-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶40 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2016) (per curiam). 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
16 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 Determining what standard for admission of other-acts 
evidence applies under the recently amended language in Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1. requires us to interpret the statute.  
"The interpretation and application of a statute present 
questions of law that this court reviews de novo while 
benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 
Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  
¶24 Determining whether the evidence of Dorsey's other 
acts was properly admitted under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1. 
requires us to review an exercise of discretion by the circuit 
court.  See State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶43, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 
841 N.W.2d 791 ("This court will not disturb a circuit court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.").  "A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies an improper 
legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably supported by 
the facts of record."  Id.  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶25 There are two issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider what standard for admission of other-acts evidence 
applies under the recently amended language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1.  Second, we consider whether the evidence of 
Dorsey's other acts was properly admitted under § 904.04(2)(b)1.  
As to the first issue, we conclude that the recently amended 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
17 
 
language allows admission of other-acts evidence with greater 
latitude under a Sullivan analysis.  As to the second issue, we 
conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in admitting evidence of Dorsey's other acts because 
the circuit court applied the proper legal standard and 
admission was a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach 
based on the facts of the record. 
 
A.  What Standard For Admission Of Other-Acts Evidence  
Applies Under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.  
¶26 We consider first what standard for admission of 
other-acts evidence applies under the recently amended language 
in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.  Dorsey argues that a straight 
Sullivan analysis applies, that is, that the statute does not 
afford circuit courts greater latitude to admit other-acts 
evidence of domestic abuse.  The State argues that the amended 
language should be interpreted one of two ways: one, under the 
common law greater latitude rule, as affording circuit courts 
greater latitude to admit other, similar acts of domestic abuse 
in a Sullivan analysis; or two, under a plain language 
interpretation, as allowing circuit courts to admit other, 
similar acts of domestic abuse without requiring a permissible 
purpose (which is required under the first prong of Sullivan).  
We conclude that the recently amended language allows for the 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
18 
 
admission of other, similar acts of domestic abuse with greater 
latitude under a Sullivan analysis.20   
¶27 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 904.04(2), entitled "Other crimes, wrongs, or acts," 
states, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
(a)  General admissibility.  Except as provided 
in par. (b)2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts, is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith.  This subsection does not 
exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
 
(b)  Greater 
latitude.  1.  In 
a 
criminal 
proceeding alleging a violation of s. 940.302(2) or of 
ch. 948, alleging the commission of a serious sex 
offense, as defined in s. 939.615(1)(b), or of 
domestic abuse, as defined in s. 968.075(1)(a),[21] or 
                                                 
20 Although we discuss the statute in the context of 
domestic abuse, our interpretation here applies with equal force 
to the other circumstances listed in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1. 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.075(1)(a) states as follows: 
"Domestic abuse" means any of the following 
engaged in by an adult person against his or her 
spouse or former spouse, against an adult with whom 
the person resides or formerly resided or against an 
adult with whom the person has a child in common: 
 
1.  Intentional 
infliction 
of 
physical 
pain, 
physical injury or illness. 
 
2.  Intentional impairment of physical condition. 
 
3.  A violation of s. 940.225(1), (2) or (3). 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
19 
 
alleging an offense that, following a conviction, is 
subject to the surcharge in s. 973.055, evidence of 
any similar acts by the accused is admissible, and is 
admissible without regard to whether the victim of the 
crime that is the subject of the proceeding is the 
same as the victim of the similar act. 
§ 904.04(2)(a), (b)1. (footnote added). 
¶28 "If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  As argued by 
the State, under a plain language interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1., the court could hold that evidence of other, 
similar22 acts by the accused is admissible, even if the acts 
relate to a different victim, if the similar acts are offered in 
a criminal proceeding that alleges (1) a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.302(2); (2) a violation of Wis. Stat. ch. 948; (3) the 
commission of a serious sex offense, as defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.615(1)(b); (4) the commission of domestic abuse, as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a); or (5) an offense that, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4.  A physical act that may cause the other 
person reasonably to fear imminent engagement in the 
conduct described under subd. 1., 2. or 3. 
Wis. Stat. § 968.075(1)(a).  The parties do not dispute that 
Dorsey's acts qualify as domestic abuse under this definition. 
22 We note that subd. (2)(b)1. specifically requires that 
the other acts be "similar acts by the accused."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1.  This specific requirement of similarity 
distinguishes subd. (2)(b)1. from para. (2)(a), but this 
requirement is nonetheless satisfied when applying greater 
latitude under a Sullivan analysis——the standard that we adopt 
below——because the second prong of Sullivan directs circuit 
courts to examine the similarity of the acts when evaluating 
probative value.  We discuss this issue of similarity more 
below.  See infra ¶¶45, 49. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
20 
 
following conviction, is subject to the surcharge in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.055.  The plain meaning interpretation would thus allow 
circuit courts to admit evidence of other, similar acts without 
regard to its purpose, even if the purpose is to show "that the 
person acted in conformity therewith," (i.e., propensity).  
§ 904.04(2)(a).23 
                                                 
23 The concurrence argues that this isolated plain meaning 
of subd. (2)(b)1. should be the end of a circuit court's 
analysis, that is, that "evidence of 'similar acts' in sensitive 
crimes cases [is] admissible without requiring the State to 
establish a permissible purpose."  Concurrence, ¶73.  This 
conclusion is problematic for at least two reasons.  First, it 
ignores the context of surrounding provisions within Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  As concluded 
below, such an isolated interpretation creates a conflict in the 
plain language of the statute in the context of para. (2)(a).  
See infra ¶29.  Such an isolated interpretation also creates a 
conflict in the plain language of the statute in the context of 
subsec. (1), which embodies the general purpose of rule 904.04 
"to exclude use of other misdeeds to prove character in order to 
prove guilt."  See State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 94, 252 
N.W.2d 94 (1977).  Subsection (1) states in relevant part as 
follows: 
Character evidence generally.  Evidence of a 
person's 
character 
or 
a 
trait 
of 
the 
person's 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
that the person acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion . . . . 
§ 904.04(1).   
Second, and relatedly, this isolated interpretation would 
effectively repeal the exclusionary purpose of the rule, which 
is supported by four long-standing and oft-cited rationales:  
(1) [t]he overstrong tendency to believe the defendant 
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person 
likely to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn 
not because he is believed guilty of the present 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
21 
 
¶29 Subdivision (2)(b)1. must, however, be interpreted "in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  And this plain language 
                                                                                                                                                             
charge but because he has escaped punishment from 
other offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking one who 
is not prepared to demonstrate the attacking evidence 
is fabricated; and (4) the confusion of issues which 
might result from bringing in evidence of other 
crimes. 
Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).  
Thus, the concurrence would have us overturn decades of common 
law construction by this court and by lower courts.  But see 
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
The 
Interpretation 
of 
Legal 
Texts 
327 
(2012) 
("Repeals 
by 
implication are disfavored——'very much disfavored.'"); id. at 
318 ("A statute will be construed to alter the common law only 
when that disposition is clear."). 
 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the concurrence 
does not provide any practical guidance to circuit courts 
because it does not offer a standard for admission of other, 
similar acts.  Under its isolated interpretation, could a court 
admit acts as "similar" because they were committed in the same 
month?  Is a court compelled to admit similar acts without any 
assessment of reliability?   How would the court instruct the 
jury regarding such other-acts evidence, or is that rendered 
unnecessary because a jury can use the evidence for any purpose 
it sees fit?  In other words, without a standard for admission, 
how could courts guarantee a fair trial?  Such an aimless 
interpretation would result in appeal after appeal, and would 
require opinion after opinion explaining what we did not mean to 
say.  Thus, although the concurrence is unpersuaded by our 
position, see Concurrence, ¶72, its skepticism reveals a 
troubling lack of recognition of the practical effect that such 
a simplistic interpretation will have in courtrooms across the 
state.  See also infra note 25.  We conclude that utilizing the 
time-tested analytical framework of Sullivan, but with greater 
latitude, as called for by the plain meaning of the statute, is 
the more prudent approach in light of our duty to provide 
meaningful guidance to those who are confronted with such issues 
in litigation. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
22 
 
interpretation of subd. (2)(b)1. contradicts the plain language 
of para. (2)(a).  Paragraph (2)(a) only excepts subd. (2)(b)2.——
not subd. (2)(b)1.——from its general prohibition on the use of 
other acts "to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that the person acted in conformity therewith."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a).  Where a specific exception is made, it implies 
that no other exceptions are intended.  See Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
107-11 (2012) ("The expression of one thing implies the 
exclusion of others (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).").  
Thus, we cannot read subd. (2)(b)1. as an exception to 
para. (2)(a)'s general prohibition on propensity. 
¶30 This results in ambiguity with regard to the meaning 
of subd. (2)(b)1.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 ("[A] statute 
is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses.").  If the plain 
language of a statute is ambiguous as to meaning, we consider 
the scope, context, and purpose of the statute.  Id., ¶¶48-49.  
In this regard, the title of subd. (2)(b)1., "Greater latitude," 
is instructive.  As a preliminary matter, we note that 
"[t]itles . . . are not part of the statutes," Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(6), 
but 
are 
"permissible 
indicators 
of 
meaning . . . for the purpose of . . . relieving [] ambiguity,"  
Scalia & Garner, supra ¶29, at 221-22.  See also Aiello v. Vill. 
of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996) 
("Although titles are not part of statutes, . . . they may be 
helpful in interpretation.").  As noted above, there is 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
23 
 
ambiguity with regard to the meaning of subd. (2)(b)1., thus, 
reference to its title is appropriate here. 
¶31 In the context of its title, "Greater latitude," we 
interpret subd. (2)(b)1. as adopting the common law greater 
latitude rule to permit the admission of other, similar acts of 
domestic abuse with greater latitude.  "All words and phrases 
shall be construed according to common and approved usage; but 
technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar 
meaning in the law shall be construed according to such 
meaning."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1); see also Scalia & Garner, 
supra ¶29, at 320 ("A statute that uses a common-law term, 
without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning.")  Here, 
"greater latitude" is a technical term defined in the common law 
that deals with admission of other-acts evidence, thus it "shall 
be construed according to such meaning."  § 990.01(1). 
¶32  Under the common law, the greater latitude rule 
allows for more liberal admission of other-acts evidence.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶59, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 
N.W.2d 174.  It has traditionally been applied in cases of 
sexual abuse, particularly those involving children.  See, e.g., 
id.  Its application in this context dates back to 1893, and it 
has been so-applied in hundreds of cases since.  See Proper v. 
State, 85 Wis. 615, 630, 55 N.W. 1035 (1893) ("A greater 
latitude of proof as to other like occurrences is allowed in 
cases of sexual crimes.").  Thus, the term "greater latitude" is 
a term of art in the context of other-acts evidence and its 
application is well-established in the common law. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
24 
 
¶33 The greater latitude rule has been described as 
operating to "facilitate[] the admissibility of the other acts 
evidence under the exceptions set forth in [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 904.04(2)[(a)]."  State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶23, 236 
Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629 (citing Hendrickson v. State, 61 
Wis. 2d 275, 279, 212 N.W.2d 481 (1973)).  And indeed, after 
Sullivan, which set out the standard for admission of other-acts 
evidence under para. (2)(a), we clarified that the greater 
latitude rule is to be applied within the Sullivan analysis 
(which requires a (2)(a) permissible purpose under the first 
prong).  See State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶51, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606.  Application of the greater 
latitude rule, however, is not limited to any one prong.  See 
id.  Thus, for the types of cases enumerated under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1., circuit courts should admit evidence of other 
acts with greater latitude under the Sullivan analysis to 
facilitate its use for a permissible purpose.24 
¶34 Before concluding our interpretation of the statute, 
we note that adopting Dorsey's interpretation would render 
                                                 
24 This conclusion is further supported by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau analysis that accompanied the assembly bill: 
"This bill states that, in a prosecution alleging . . . a crime 
of domestic abuse . . . evidence of similar acts is generally 
admissible . . . ."  Drafting File for 2013 Wis. Act 362, 
Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 2013 A.B. 620, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 ("[L]egislative history need not be and is not 
consulted except to resolve an ambiguity in the statutory 
language . . . ."). 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
25 
 
subd. (2)(b)1. superfluous.  Dorsey argues that a straight 
Sullivan analysis applies, that is, that circuit courts are not 
permitted greater latitude to admit evidence of other acts in 
domestic abuse cases.  A straight Sullivan analysis, however, is 
what circuit courts apply when a party seeks to introduce other-
acts evidence under para. (2)(a).  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-
73.  Before the statute was amended, this was the proper 
standard for admission of other acts of domestic abuse, and, in 
fact, before the amendment, the State did seek to introduce 
other acts of domestic abuse under para. (2)(a).  See, e.g., 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768.  But the addition of subd. (2)(b)1. 
provided a specific standard for admission of other acts of 
domestic abuse.  Thus, to hold that a straight Sullivan analysis 
is still the proper standard for admission would render the 
legislature's enactment of subd. (2)(b)1. meaningless.  This we 
cannot do.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language 
is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, 
in order to avoid surplusage."); Scalia & Garner, supra ¶29, at 
174-79 ("If possible, every word and every provision is to be 
given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda).  None should 
be ignored.  None should needlessly be given an interpretation 
that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no 
consequence." (Footnote omitted.)). 
¶35 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1. 
permits circuit courts to admit evidence of other, similar acts 
of domestic abuse with greater latitude, as that standard has 
been defined in the common law, under Sullivan, because it is 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
26 
 
the most reasonable interpretation in light of the context and 
purpose of the statute.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used . . . and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results.").  As a practical matter, not only does our analysis 
afford due respect to the words of this legislation, but 
maintaining the well-established Sullivan analysis, with greater 
latitude in domestic abuse cases, also provides a framework for 
litigants and our courts to create a thorough record of the 
arguments and rulings concerning other-acts evidence.25 
                                                 
25 We note that the concurrence does not take issue with 
applying steps two and three of the Sullivan analysis.  Sullivan 
defines its "three-step analytical framework" in relevant part 
as follows:  
(2) Is the other acts evidence relevant, considering 
the two facets of relevance set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01? . . .  
(3) Is the probative value of the other acts evidence 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence 
[under Wis. Stat. § 904.03]?   
216 Wis. 2d at 772-73.  The concurrence agrees that "subsec. 
(2)(b)1 . . . permits 
the 
admission 
of 
'similar 
acts' 
evidence . . . as long as the proffered evidence satisfies Wis. 
Stat. § 904.01's relevance test and is not excluded under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03's unfair prejudice test."  Concurrence, ¶62.  The 
§ 904.03 balancing test, however, subsumes permissible purpose: 
the danger of unfair prejudice is exactly the rationale which 
underlies 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04's 
general 
prohibition 
of 
propensity.  See supra note 23.  Thus, it is not clear how a 
party could establish relevance under Wis. Stat. § 904.01, or 
pass the balancing test under § 904.03, without proffering a 
"purpose" (relevance) that is "permissible" (not substantially 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
27 
 
 
B.  Whether Admission Of Dorsey's Other Acts  
Was An Erroneous Exercise Of Discretion. 
¶36 We consider second whether the evidence of Dorsey's 
other 
acts 
was 
properly 
admitted 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1.  The arguments of the parties on this issue are 
outlined in detail below.  In this regard, we note that our 
review on this issue is limited to the arguments presented to 
the circuit court at the time the circuit court made its 
admissibility determination.  Thus, although the parties raised 
additional arguments on appeal, we limit our analysis to the 
arguments they raised in the circuit court.  We conclude that 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
admitting evidence of Dorsey's other acts because the circuit 
court applied the proper legal standard and admission was a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach based on the 
facts of the record. 
¶37 Our analysis "begins with the understanding that the 
circuit court's decisions to admit or exclude evidence are 
entitled to great deference."  Jackson, 352 Wis. 2d 249, ¶45.  
We will uphold a circuit court's evidentiary ruling if it 
"examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
used a demonstrated rational process and reached a conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).  See also State 
v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶62, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174 
("Identifying a proper purpose for other-acts evidence is not 
difficult and is largely meant to develop the framework for the 
relevancy examination.").   
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
28 
 
that a reasonable judge could reach."  Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 
¶28. 
¶38 As explained above, the proper standard for admission 
of other acts of domestic abuse is one of greater latitude.  See 
supra ¶35.  Here the record reflects that the circuit court 
applied this legal standard: at the hearing on the State's 
motion to introduce other-acts evidence, the circuit court held 
that 
the 
recently 
amended 
language 
"provid[es] 
greater 
latitude . . . similar . . . to the serious sex offense business 
and making it available more to be able to be used in the case 
in chief than [the court] would provide."  
¶39 The circuit court also reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach using a demonstrated, rational 
process.  The lodestar of admissibility of other-acts evidence 
is the three-prong analysis promulgated in Sullivan: other-acts 
evidence is admissible if (1) it is offered for a permissible 
purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a); (2) it is relevant 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.01; and (3) its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73. 
 
1.  Whether the other acts were offered  
for a permissible purpose. 
¶40 Under the first prong, the State offered Dorsey's "two 
Battery convictions and his conduct of June 2011 through 
November 2011 . . . to establish [his] intent and motive to 
cause bodily harm to [C.B.] and to control her within the 
context 
of 
a 
domestic 
relationship." 
 
Dorsey 
did 
not 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
29 
 
meaningfully argue that these were not permissible purposes; 
rather, he focused on relevancy, which we discuss in detail 
below.  
¶41 The transcript of the motion hearing reflects that the 
circuit court understood the purposes for which the State 
offered the evidence.  See supra note 13.  Thus, the court was 
within its discretion in holding that intent and motive to 
control were permissible purposes.  See, e.g., State v. Veach, 
2002 WI 110, ¶58, 255 Wis. 2d 390, 648 N.W.2d 447. 
¶42 Moreover, this was a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge could reach.  Under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), "motive" 
and "intent" are listed as permissible purposes.  Thus, the 
evidence was offered for a permissible purpose.  See State v. 
Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶63, 320 Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) (2007-08)) ("As long as the proponent 
identifies one acceptable purpose for admission of the evidence 
that is not related to the forbidden character inference, the 
first step is satisfied.  Consequently, this first step is 
hardly demanding." (Footnote omitted.) (Citations omitted.)); 
see also State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶29, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 
N.W.2d 399 (noting that permissible purposes under Sullivan are 
not limited to those listed in the statute or to those 
recognized in previous cases).   
¶43 Thus, especially given greater latitude in this 
domestic abuse case, the circuit court did not err in concluding 
that Dorsey's other acts were offered for a permissible purpose.   
 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
30 
 
2.  Whether the other acts were relevant to  
the permissible purposes. 
¶44 Under the second prong, the relevance inquiry is two-
fold: first, "[t]he evidence must relate to a fact or 
proposition of consequence"; second, the evidence must have 
probative value, that is, "a tendency to make a consequential 
fact more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Veach, 255 Wis. 2d 390, ¶59; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01.  
¶45 With regard to the first, the State argued that intent 
is of consequence because it is an element of the charged 
crimes; it argued that motive is of consequence because 
"[m]otive is always relevant," in part because it is related to 
intent.  With regard to the second, the State argued that the 
other acts were near in time because, although two years had 
passed, Dorsey was on probation for a portion of that time.  The 
State further argued that the other acts were similar in 
circumstance because: 
• The arguments that preceded the assaults concerned 
Dorsey's allegations that his partners did not show him 
sufficient respect; 
• The assaults occurred when the victims were in their home 
or vehicle; 
• In both the November 2011 (R.K.) and March 2014 (C.B.) 
incidents, the assaults happened in the midst of Dorsey 
accusing the victims of lying to him; and 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
31 
 
• In both the November 2011 (R.K.) and March 2014 (C.B.) 
incidents, Dorsey restricted his victims' movements. 
¶46 With regard to the first, Dorsey argued that intent 
and motive were not of consequence in this case because he 
planned to deny that the alleged crimes ever happened, and thus, 
he was not directly disputing the issue of intent and motive.  
Dorsey also argued that, to the extent that the other-acts 
evidence bolstered C.B.'s credibility, admission was improper.  
With regard to the second, Dorsey argued that, although the 
charges were similar, the victims were different people, and 
that "one prior offense doesn't make the allegation of another 
one more or less probable."  
¶47 The circuit court found 
that using [] greater latitude . . . [the evidence] 
does have probative value in that it does go to, 
because of the similarity, the motive to control.  
Although it is not very, very, very near in time, it's 
within two years and in a period of time in which the 
clock kind of stops ticking a little bit because the 
defendant is on probation for a period of that time.  
And while they're similar, they do not involve the 
same victim, there is some case law that it doesn't 
need to involve the same victim, but the clear 
statutory language indicates that it does not need to 
involve the same victim. 
This record reflects that the court applied the proper legal 
standard to the relevant facts using a demonstrated, rational 
process. 
¶48 Moreover, this was a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge 
could 
reach. 
 
Whether 
other-acts 
evidence 
is 
"of 
consequence" asks whether it is logically related to an element 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
32 
 
of the offense, that is, whether, under the substantive law, it 
is related to "the ultimate facts and links in the chain of 
inferences that are of consequence to the case."  Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 786.   Intent and motive are "of consequence."  Wis. 
Stat. § 904.01.  Intent is an element of two of the three 
charged crimes at issue here.26  "[A]n element of a crime 
constitutes a consequential fact that the State must prove even 
if the defendant does not dispute the element."  Veach, 255 
Wis. 2d 390, ¶¶61, 77 (characterizing and upholding Davidson, 
                                                 
26 The second charge was for Misdemeanor Battery under Wis. 
Stat. § 940.19(1): 
Whoever causes bodily harm to another by an act 
done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person 
or another without the consent of the person so harmed 
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
See also Wis JI——Criminal 1220 (2015).  The fourth charge was 
for Aggravated Battery under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(6): 
Whoever 
intentionally 
causes 
bodily 
harm 
to 
another by conduct that creates a substantial risk of 
great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H felony. 
See also Wis JI——Criminal 1226 (2015).  The jury was also 
instructed on intent for each of these charges as follows: 
"Intent to cause bodily harm" means that the defendant 
had the mental purpose to cause bodily harm to another 
human being or was aware that his conduct was 
practically certain to cause bodily harm to another 
human being. . . . 
You cannot look into a person's mind to find intent 
and knowledge.  Intent and knowledge must be found, if 
found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and 
statements, if any, and from all the facts and 
circumstances in this case bearing upon intent.  
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
33 
 
236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶65); see also Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶25 
(citing State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 594-95, 493 
N.W.2d 376 (1992)) ("If the state must prove an element of a 
crime, then evidence relevant to that element is admissible, 
even if a defendant does not dispute the element.").  Similarly, 
although motive is not specifically an element of a crime that 
the State must prove, here it is logically related to the 
element of intent.  "Intent" is defined as having a requisite 
"mental purpose."  See, e.g., Wis JI——Criminal 1220 (2015); 
supra note 26.  Motive is relevant to establishing purpose.27  
See, e.g., Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶65 (quoting Plymesser, 
172 Wis. 2d at 594-95).  "Evidence relevant to motive is 
therefore admissible, whether or not defendant disputes motive."  
Id.   
¶49 Whether other-acts evidence has probative value asks 
whether the other acts are similar, that is, whether they are 
                                                 
27 Dorsey argues that his cause is distinguishable from the 
considerable precedent applying the greater latitude rule and 
holding that motive is relevant to establish purpose because 
that precedent exclusively evaluates the relevance of motive in 
the context of sexual abuse crimes, where the purpose of "sexual 
gratification" is an element of the crime.  See, e.g., State v. 
Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629 ("[The] 
testimony was properly admitted to prove motive because purpose 
is an element of sexual contact.").  If we were considering a 
pure question of common law, extension of the greater latitude 
rule might not be a perfect analogy for domestic abuse cases but 
we are not; instead, we are considering the legislature's 
statutory extension of the common law greater latitude rule to 
domestic abuse contexts.  Thus, Dorsey's argument that evidence 
of motive should not be admitted under our greater latitude 
cases fails.  
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
34 
 
near "in time, place, and circumstance[,] to the alleged crime 
or to the fact or proposition sought to be proved."  Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d at 786 (citing Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 294, 
149 N.W.2d 557 (1967)).28  Here, the other acts tend to make the 
facts of intent and motive more probable because they are 
similar as to intent and motive, namely that, in both instances, 
Dorsey 
became 
violent 
when 
he 
felt 
like 
he 
was 
being 
disrespected or lied to, and he isolated his victims and 
restricted their movements immediately prior to the assaults.  
See supra ¶45. 
¶50 Furthermore, to the extent that R.K.'s testimony 
operated to bolster C.B.'s credibility, we have held that "[a] 
witness's credibility is always 'consequential' within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 904.01."  Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶34.  
And we have held that credibility is particularly probative in 
cases that come down to he-said-she-said.  Id.  Moreover, the 
difficult proof issues in these kinds of cases "provide the 
rationale behind the greater latitude rule.  . . . [I]t follows 
that the greater latitude rule allows for the more liberal 
admission of other-acts evidence that has a tendency to assist 
the jury in assessing [credibility]."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶51 Thus, especially given greater latitude in this 
domestic abuse case, the circuit court did not err in concluding 
                                                 
28 As noted above, see supra note 22, subd. (2)(b)1. 
explicitly requires that the other acts be similar.  This 
requirement is satisfied by the similarity analysis under this 
second prong of Sullivan. 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
35 
 
that Dorsey's other acts were relevant to the purposes of intent 
and motive. 
 
3.  Whether the probative value was substantially outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
¶52 Under the third prong, the State noted that it was 
Dorsey's 
burden 
to 
show 
that 
the 
probative 
value 
was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and 
argued that he would not be able to do so: the probative value 
of Dorsey's other acts "could not be substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice" because of the similarities of 
the incidents.  The State also argued that "a cautionary 
instruction [would] ensure that the jury uses the evidence [] 
only to evaluate the defendant's motive [and] intent."  Dorsey 
argued 
that 
the 
other 
acts 
would 
unfairly 
bolster 
the 
credibility of C.B. because "when you have a female who's 
alleging abuse in a domestic type situation, the jury is 
automatically . . . already more toward the female who's making 
the allegations."  Dorsey also argued that admitting R.K.'s 
testimony would result in a trial within a trial, confusing the 
issues the jury must decide. 
¶53 The circuit court found   
that using [] greater latitude . . . is the probative 
value substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence, and then the 
court's consideration of delay and waste of time, I do 
not find that it is.  That with a cautionary 
instruction, it can be provided that this information 
goes only to evaluate the defendant's motive and 
intent elements.  There's going to be no claim of 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
36 
 
mistake or what have you.  So for those reasons, I'll 
allow it in.  
This record reflects that the court applied the proper legal 
standard to the relevant facts using a demonstrated, rational 
process. 
¶54 Moreover, this was a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge could reach.  "Because the statute provides for exclusion 
only 
if 
the 
evidence's 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, [t]he bias is [] 
squarely 
on 
the 
side 
of 
admissibility." 
 
Marinez, 
331 
Wis. 2d 568, 
¶41 
(first 
alteration 
in 
original). 
 
"The 
evidence's probative value largely turns on the relevancy 
analysis 
from 
step 
two 
under 
Sullivan." 
 
Payano, 
320 
Wis. 2d 348, ¶81.  "If the probative value is close to or equal 
to 
its 
unfair 
prejudicial 
effect, 
the 
evidence 
must 
be 
admitted."  Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶87.  And "[t]o limit the 
possibility that the jury will convict based on 'improper 
means[,]' circuit courts may . . . edit the evidence."  Id., 
¶89. 
¶55 As noted above, the circuit court found that the prior 
acts and the charged acts were near in time and similar in place 
and circumstance.  Additionally, the circuit court limited any 
unfair prejudice by precluding admission of the fact of Dorsey's 
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
37 
 
convictions for the other acts29 and by planning to give a 
cautionary instruction at the close of evidence.  We presume 
that jurors follow the instructions given by the court.  See, 
e.g., Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶41.  Where a cautionary 
instruction is not tailored to the facts of the case, "its 
cautionary effect [may be] significantly diminished."  Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d 791; cf. id. (quoting State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 
17, 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988)) ("[A] cautionary instruction, 
even if not tailored to the case, can go 'far to cure any 
adverse effect attendant with the admission of the [other-acts] 
evidence.'").  Here, the cautionary instruction was tailored to 
the facts particular to this case——intent and motive——and was 
therefore in its most effective form.  See supra ¶19. 
¶56 Thus, especially given greater latitude in this 
domestic abuse case, the circuit court did not err in concluding 
that the probative value of Dorsey's other similar acts was not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
¶57 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court's admission 
of the other-acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1. was 
not an erroneous exercise of discretion because the circuit 
court properly applied greater latitude under a Sullivan 
                                                 
29 The circuit court did not decide the admissibility of the 
fact of Dorsey's convictions for his other acts toward R.K. at 
the motion hearing on December 22, 2014; rather, it reserved 
decision on whether the convictions were relevant for when R.K. 
was testifying.  Ultimately, the circuit court did not allow in 
the fact of Dorsey's convictions.  
No. 
2015AP648-CR   
 
38 
 
analysis, considered the relevant facts using a demonstrated, 
rational process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge could reach.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 There are two issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider what standard for admission of other-acts evidence 
applies under the recently amended language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1.  Second, we consider whether the evidence of 
Dorsey's other acts was properly admitted under § 904.04(2)(b)1.  
As to the first issue, we conclude that the recently amended 
language allows admission of other-acts evidence with greater 
latitude under a Sullivan analysis.  As to the second issue, we 
conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in admitting evidence of Dorsey's other acts because 
the circuit court applied the proper legal standard and 
admission was a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach 
based on the facts of the record. 
¶59 Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
on other grounds. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Instead of 
adopting 
a 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(b)1, the majority chose to squeeze the new language 
of subsec. (2)(b)1 back into the Sullivan1 analysis under subsec. 
(2)(a) and declares that its only substantive effect arises from 
its statutory title by affording greater latitude in domestic 
abuse cases when admitting other-acts evidence.  By doing so, 
the majority renders the actual text of subsec. (2)(b)1 
meaningless.  Under the majority's holding, admission of similar 
acts evidence at specifically enumerated sensitive crimes trials 
remains bound by the same three-step Sullivan analysis used 
before the legislature added subsec. (2)(b)1 to the statute.  I 
disagree with the majority's interpretation. 
¶62 I 
write 
separately 
to 
apply 
a 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.  A plain meaning 
analysis establishes that Sullivan does not apply to subsec. 
(2)(b)1; rather, subsec. (2)(b)1 operates independently from 
subsec. (2)(a) and permits the admission of "similar acts" 
evidence at the enumerated sensitive crimes trials, as long as 
the proffered evidence satisfies Wis. Stat. § 904.01's relevance 
test and is not excluded under Wis. Stat. § 904.03's unfair 
prejudice test.  Applying this interpretation to the challenged 
evidence in Dorsey's case, I conclude the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the evidence; 
                                                 
1 See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1988). 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
therefore, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶63 This 
case 
presents 
the 
court 
with 
the 
first 
opportunity 
to 
interpret 
the 
newly 
revised 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2), which added an entirely new subsection titled 
"Greater latitude."  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) reads: 
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. 
(a) General 
admissibility. Except 
as 
provided 
in par. (b)2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith.  This subsection does not 
exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
(b) Greater latitude.  
1.  In a criminal proceeding alleging a 
violation 
of s. 
940.302(2) 
or 
of ch. 
948, 
alleging the commission of a serious sex offense, 
as defined in s. 939.615(1)(b), or of domestic 
abuse, 
as 
defined 
in s. 968.075(1)(a), 
or 
alleging an offense that, following a conviction, 
is subject to the surcharge in s. 973.055, 
evidence of any similar acts by the accused is 
admissible, and is admissible without regard to 
whether the victim of the crime that is the 
subject of the proceeding is the same as the 
victim of the similar act. 
2.  In a criminal proceeding alleging a 
violation of s. 940.225(1) or 948.02(1), sub. (1) 
and par. (a) do not prohibit admitting evidence 
that a person was convicted of a violation 
of s. 940.225(1) or 948.02(1) 
or 
a 
comparable 
offense in another jurisdiction, that is similar 
to the alleged violation, as evidence of the 
person's character in order to show that the 
person acted in conformity therewith. 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
¶64 The majority correctly sets forth the court's standard 
for reviewing statutes.  Majority op., ¶¶27-28.  It goes astray, 
however, when it concludes that interpreting para. (b)1 in 
context means it is subject to the language of para. (a).  
Majority op., ¶29.  In a plain meaning analysis, the court 
examines the language in the statute and if "the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The language used in para. (b)1 is 
plain and its meaning should be applied as written.  
¶65 The language of para. (b)1 plainly instructs:  (1) in 
certain specified sensitive crime proceedings; (2) "evidence of 
any similar acts by the accused is admissible"; (3) even when 
the victim of the similar act is different than the victim in 
the case being prosecuted.  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)1.  Nothing 
in this paragraph requires that the "similar acts" be admitted 
for a particular purpose, and nothing says the similar acts 
cannot be admitted to prove a person acted in conformity 
therewith. 
¶66 This language arguably conflicts with para. (a), which 
directly precedes para. (b)1, but only if one assumes the 
legislature cannot create an exemption from para. (a) unless it 
places the text of that exemption in para. (a) and nowhere else.  
Paragraph (a) prohibits the admission of "evidence of other 
crimes, 
wrongs 
or 
acts" 
to 
prove 
propensity, 
with 
two 
exceptions.  Such "other acts" evidence is admissible in 
criminal prosecutions alleging the crimes set forth in para. 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
(b)2 and such evidence is admissible for a purpose other than 
propensity in any proceedings.  By contrast, para. (a) does not 
explicitly except para. (b)1 from its provisions.  The pivotal 
question then is whether para. (a)'s prohibition against 
propensity evidence and its requirement of a permissible purpose 
apply to para. (b)1.  I conclude they do not. 
¶67 "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
when a general and a specific statute relate to the same subject 
matter, the specific statute controls and this is especially 
true when the specific statute is enacted after the enactment of 
the general statute."  Martineau v. State Conservation Comm'n, 
46 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 175 N.W.2d 206 (1970) (citing Raisanen v. 
City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 504, 516, 151 N.W.2d 129 (1967)); 
City 
of 
Wauwatosa 
v. 
Grunewald, 
18 
Wis. 2d 83, 
87, 
118 
N.W.2d 128 (1962); Pruitt v. State, 16 Wis. 2d 169, 173-74, 114 
N.W.2d 148 (1962); Maier v. Racine Cty., 1 Wis. 2d 384, 388, 84 
N.W.2d 76 (1957); see also State v. Wilson, 2017 WI 63, ¶35, 376 
Wis. 2d 92, 896 N.W.2d 682 ("[W]here a specific statutory 
provision leads in one direction and a general statutory 
provision 
in 
another, 
the 
specific 
statutory 
provision 
controls." (quoted source omitted)); State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 
25, ¶47, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457.2  Here, paras. (a) and 
                                                 
2 The majority does not apply the well-established "specific 
statute controls over a general statute" rule, which has been 
repeatedly adopted by this court in prior statutory construction 
cases.  See, e.g., Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶17, 352 
Wis. 2d 359, 842 N.W.2d 373; Emjay Inv. Co. v. Vill. Of 
Germantown, 2011 WI 31, ¶38, 333 Wis. 2d 252, 797 N.W.2d 844; 
Kramer v. City of Hayward, 57 Wis. 2d 302, 311, 203 N.W.2d 872 
(1973).  Instead, the majority applies the "expressio unius est 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
(b)1 both relate to the admission of evidence.  Paragraph (a) 
broadly covers any civil or criminal action, applies to the 
defendant as well as any witness who testifies, and addresses 
"crimes, wrongs, or acts."  Paragraph (b) specifically covers 
only particular sensitive crimes, applies only to "similar 
acts," and is limited to evidence against the defendant.  There 
can be no dispute that para. (b)1 is the more specific statute.  
Thus, the admission of the challenged evidence should be 
analyzed only under para. (b)1. 
¶68 The majority says the statute is ambiguous because the 
plain language of para. (a) conflicts with para. (b)1.  It then 
concludes that para. (b)1's only meaning is to give greater 
latitude to the admission of other-acts evidence in domestic 
violence cases.  The majority gives two reasons for its 
conclusion:  (1) the explicit exception referenced in para. (a) 
means para. (b)1 cannot operate as an exception; and (2) the 
title "Greater latitude" resolves the ambiguity and gives 
meaning to (b)1.  Majority op., ¶¶29-33. 
                                                                                                                                                             
exclusion alterius" canon ("The expression of one thing implies 
the exclusion of others.") by citing exclusively to Reading Law:  
The Interpretation of Legal Texts.  Majority op., ¶29 (citing 
Antonin 
Scalia 
& 
Bryan 
A. 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
 
The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 107-11 (2012)).  However, Reading 
Law also instructs, consistent with well-established Wisconsin 
law, that "[i]f there is a conflict between a general provision 
and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails."  
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 183.  Particularly pertinent to 
reconciling Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) with § 904.04(2)(b)(1), 
"[u]nder this [general/specific] canon, the specific provision 
is treated as an exception to the general rule."  Id. 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶69 The majority's interpretation, however, results in the 
newly enacted para. (b)1 being swallowed by para. (a).  Before 
the enactment of para. (b)1, all "other acts" evidence in the 
specifically enumerated crimes in para. (b)1 was subject to 
already-existing para. (a).  In other words, in a domestic 
violence case like this one, if the State wanted to introduce 
evidence of Dorsey's prior similar bad acts toward R.K., it 
would need to clear the three-part Sullivan analysis.  The 
majority holds that despite the legislature's revision to Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2), admission of other-acts evidence in sensitive 
crimes cases remains subject to a Sullivan analysis. 
¶70 The 
majority 
holds 
Sullivan 
still 
controls 
the 
admission of evidence under the newly-enacted para. (b)1.  It 
determines the only effect of this statutory paragraph was to 
give greater latitude when admitting other-acts evidence in 
domestic abuse cases.  Under this construction, all of the other 
statutory language of para. (b)1 is rendered superfluous.  The 
legislature might as well have limited para. (b)1 to say "courts 
shall give greater latitude under the Sullivan test in domestic 
violence cases."  After all, the greater latitude rule already 
applied to sexual assault crimes before the enactment of 
para. (b)1. See State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶44, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606.  The majority's interpretation 
violates 
the 
fundamental 
rule 
of 
statutory 
construction 
requiring courts to give effect to all statutory provisions "so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous."  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; see also Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
2242, 2248 (2014) (quoted source omitted).  Statutes should be 
"read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.       
¶71 This can be done quite simply in this case by adopting 
a plain meaning interpretation.  Under that interpretation, 
admission of other-acts evidence in cases not specifically 
enumerated in para. (b)1 will continue to be governed by the 
Sullivan three-part analysis.  Those cases are confined to the 
limitations set out in the language of para. (a) and evidence is 
inadmissible unless a party proffers a permissible purpose (and 
clears the second and third part of the Sullivan analysis).  In 
the 
specifically 
identified 
criminal 
actions 
prosecuting 
sensitive crimes under para. (b)1, the admission of evidence 
will not require a particular purpose to secure admission.  
Rather, it will be admitted if it constitutes a "similar act."  
Its admission, like all proffered evidence, is subject to Wis. 
Stat. § 904.01's relevancy requirement and may be excluded even 
if relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.03's unfair prejudice test.  
See Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶34 (noting that to be admitted, 
all evidence "must be relevant under" Wis. Stat. § 904.01 and 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
must clear Wis. Stat. § 904.03's unfairly prejudicial balancing 
test.).3 
¶72 I am not persuaded by the majority's position that 
because para. (a) specifically excepts para. (b)2, this means 
that para. (b)1 cannot operate independently from para. (a).  
Paragraph (b)1's own language operates to except it from 
para. (a) and this is the only interpretation of the statute 
that 
gives 
effect 
to 
every 
provision. 
 
And 
under 
the 
general/specific 
canon, 
the 
specific 
provision——here, 
para. (b)1——is treated as an exception to the general rule, 
embodied here in para. (a).  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012).  
¶73 I am also not persuaded that the only meaning given to 
para. (b)1 arises from its title——"Greater latitude."  The title 
                                                 
3 The majority says it does not know how the plain meaning 
of this statute would work in conjunction with the "relevance" 
and "unfair prejudice" tests: "[I]t is not clear how a party 
could establish relevance under Wis. Stat. § 904.01, or pass the 
balancing test under § 904.03, without proffering a 'purpose' 
(relevance) that is 'permissible' (not substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice)."  Majority op., ¶35 n.25. 
The permissible purpose, of course, is to establish that the 
defendant acted in conformity with the character established by 
the "similar acts" evidence.  That is the same permissible 
purpose the legislature authorized in subsec. (2)(b)2 (evidence 
of conviction on comparable offenses admissible as "evidence of 
the person's character in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith.").  There is nothing the majority can say 
on this score with respect to subsec. (2)(b)1 that would not 
apply with equal force to subsec. (2)(b)2.  The majority is 
obviously uncomfortable with this policy change, but our role is 
not to judge the wisdom of a legislative choice.  It is only to 
apply it insofar as it is consistent with the Wisconsin and 
United States Constitutions. 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
of the statute is not part of the statute.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(6) ("titles to subchapters, subsections, paragraphs 
and subdivisions of the statutes and history notes are not part 
of the statutes.").  Although titles may be helpful in 
interpreting a statute, the "text must control over title."  
Aiello v. Vill. of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556 
N.W.2d 697 (1996).  "[A] title or heading should never be 
allowed to override the plain words of a text."  Scalia & 
Garner, supra ¶12, at 222.  Here, the text of the statute itself 
expresses the meaning of para. (b)1, and it is the text itself, 
rather than its title, that makes evidence of "similar acts" in 
sensitive crimes cases admissible without requiring the State to 
establish a permissible purpose.  "[The] heading is but a 
shorthand reference to the general subject matter involved."  
Scalia & Garner, supra ¶12, at 221 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 529-29 (1947)).  
Here, the title "Greater latitude" is an apt description of the 
text that follows, because in certain criminal proceedings, 
evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible without clearing 
the Sullivan hurdles is made admissible, period.  However, the 
majority misapplies the title to read into subsec. (2)(b)1 
evidentiary preconditions wholly absent from the text. 
¶74 The majority says we must ignore the plain meaning of 
subsec. (2)(b)1 because it "creates a conflict . . . in the 
context of subsec. (1), which embodies the general purpose of 
rule 904.04 'to exclude use of other misdeeds to prove character 
in order to prove guilt.'"  Majority op., ¶28 n.23.  In one 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
sense, this arguably creates a "conflict" because the scope of 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1) after adoption of subsec. (2)(b)1 is not 
as great as before.  But when the legislature adopts a new 
provision that is inconsistent with an existing provision, we 
don't call it a "conflict," we call it an amendment.  Yes, 
adoption of subsec. (2)(b)1 limited the general purpose of 
proscribing 
the 
use 
of 
"other 
acts" 
evidence 
to 
prove 
propensity.  But on what authority does the majority reject this 
valid legislative choice?   
¶75 The majority objects to the legislature's change 
because it "would effectively repeal the exclusionary purpose of 
the rule, which is supported by four long-standing and oft-cited 
rationales . . . ."  Majority op., ¶28 n.23.4  It is true that 
the rationales are long-standing and oft-cited.  But so what?  
Do we really propose a pitched battle between our rationales and 
the legislature regarding a subject on which it has the 
authority to legislate?  Even if our rationales had enjoyed 
universal acclamation from the beginning of time, still they 
would have no standing against the legislature's decision to 
change this policy.  This discussion suggests the court rejected 
the plain meaning of subsec. (2)(b)1 simply because it altered 
the status quo ante that had obtained in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1).   
                                                 
4 This 
significantly 
overstates 
the 
reach 
of 
subsec. 
(2)(b)1, which is limited to the identified types of cases.  But 
within those types of cases, the majority is correct that it 
would repeal the exclusionary purpose of the general rule.  But 
this repeal is accomplished by the legislature's pen, not ours, 
and it is the legislature's prerogative to do so. 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
¶76 The majority replaces the legislature's policy choices 
with what it characterizes as its own "more prudent approach."  
Majority op., ¶28 n.23.  This method of interpretation, 
sometimes termed consequentialism, rejects the statutory text in 
favor of a construction that will "produce sensible, desirable 
results, since that is surely what the legislature must have 
intended.  But it is precisely because people differ over what 
is sensible and what is desirable that we elect those who will 
write our laws——and expect courts to observe what has been 
written."  Scalia & Garner, supra ¶12, at 22.  Our "duty to 
provide meaningful guidance[,]" see majority op., ¶28 n.23, to 
the bench and bar cannot override our duty to say what the law 
is and not what we may wish it to be.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
¶77 The majority also shies away from the plain meaning of 
subsec. (2)(b)1 because it does not contain a comprehensive set 
of interpretive aids to help the bench, bar, and juries 
understand the meaning of "similar acts."  Majority op., ¶28 
n.23.  It worries this "would result in appeal after appeal, and 
would require opinion after opinion" to determine the proper 
application of this provision.  That may be true.  But that's 
also the reason we are here.  And "similar acts" is not so 
ethereal or exotic that we should struggle with it more than, 
say, the meaning of "comparable offenses" (subsec. (2)(b)2) that 
are "similar to the alleged violation," id., or "pertinent 
trait" (subsec. (1)(a) & (b)), or the purposes for which "other 
acts" 
evidence 
may 
be 
admitted 
under 
subsec. 
(2)(a).  
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
Ultimately, this objection is a category error——the judiciary 
may not refuse a statutory enactment because it will require too 
much future interpretative work. 
¶78 Applying the plain meaning of the text to the 
challenged evidence here, I conclude the trial court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in allowing its admission.  
For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP648-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
1