Title: WILSHIRE INSURANCE CO v CARRINGTO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13735 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA WILSHIRE INSURANCE COIqTANY a California Corporation, and GENE STREITZ, Petitioners and Respondents, and Cross-Appellant, JANICE S. CARRINGTON, Justice of the Peace, Missoula County, Montana, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presidinq. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert L. Deschamps 111, argued, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Skelton and Knight, Missoula, Montana Robert Skleton argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: October 3, 1977 Decided : OCT 2 4 1 9 i Q M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court: Petitioners, Wilshire Insurance Company (Wilshire) and Gene S t r e i t z , respondents herein, brought an action f o r a w r i t of mandamus seeking to require appellant Missoula County Justice of the Peace Janice S. Carrington, to accept respondents' b a i l bonds. Following a hearing the d i s t r i c t , Missoula County, granted the requested w r i t and i n addition awarded $175 in damages and attorney fees of $500 t o respon- dents. Appellant thereafter moved for an amendment of judgment seeking t o have the award of damages and attorney fees deleted. The court amended the judgment by deleting the award of attorney fees only. Appellant appeals from the amended judgment. ~espondents' crossappeal from that portion of the court's order denying attorney fees has been abandoned on t h i s appeal. Wilshire is a California Corporation authorized by the Montana State Commissioner of Insurance t o do business i n Montana as a commercial surety. S t r e i t z is a licensed agent of Wilshire. They have provided b a i l bonds for criminal defendants i n the court of Justice Carrington for some time. On a t l e a s t one occasion prior t o the present case, respondents were directed i n writing t o pay over a bond immediately upon the bonded defendant's failure t o appear, and were advised it was Justice Carrington's policy that t h i s be done i n future cases. On December 8, 1976, respondents supplied b a i l bonds i n the amount of $2000 on each of two criminal defendants. Before bonding out of j a i l , defendants were notified by the sheriff t o appear on the morning of December 9, 1976. Defendants failed t o appear. Justice Carrington immediately entered an order forfeiting the bonds and orally notified respondents the bonds were immediately due and payable. Respondents advised the money would be paid by 4:00 p.m. on December 10. However, no payment was made. Thereafter, Justice Carrington and William Monger, Missoula County Justice of the Peace, Division 2, entered orders directing the sheriff t o accept no further bonds from respondents. S t r e i t z received no written notice of the forfeiture u n t i l December 13. Later that day, he unsuccessfully attempted t o obtain Justice Carrington' s approval for two additional bonds, thereby failing t o collect a t l e a s t $175 i n bonding fees. This action f i l e d on December 14 ensued. Respondents have not yet paid the $4000 in forfeited bonds. The issues presented on t h i s appeal are: 1. May a Montana justice of the peace court order that forfeited surety bonds be paid immediately? 2. May such court refuse t o accept further bonds from a surety u n t i l its previously forfeited bonds are paid? Issue 1. Immediate payment upon forfeiture. The exclusive procedure t o be followed upon a failure of an accused t o appear i n court or otherwise comply with the conditions of the b a i l bond is prescribed by sections 95-1116 and 95-1117, R.C.M. 1947: "95-1116. Conditions of b a i l - when performed - when not performed. "(b) I f the accused does not comply with the conditions of the b a i l bond, the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the b a i l t o be forfeited. "If such forfeiture is declared by a d i s t r i c t court, notice of such order of forfeiture s h a l l be mailed forthwith by the clerk of the court t o the accused and h i s sureties a t t h e i r l a s t known address. "(c) I f a t any time within t h i r t y (30) days a f t e r the forfeiture the defendant or h i s b a i l appear and satisfactorily excuse h i s negligence or failure t o comply with the conditions of the b a i l , the court, i n its discretion, may direct the forfeiture of the b a i l t o be discharged upon such terms a s may be just. "If such forfeiture i s declared by a d i s t r i c t court and i f the forfeiture i s not discharged as provided i n t h i s section, the court s h a l l enter judg- ment for the s t a t e against the accused and h i s sureties for the amount of the b a i l and the costs of the pro- ceedings. 11 "95-1117. Disposition of judgment and execution. "(c) When judgment is entered i n favor of the state and against the sureties or the surety company or when the forfeiture has not been discharged, execu- tion may be issued against che sureties or the surety company in the same manner a s executions in c i v i l actions. I t Appellant takes the position the statutory scheme i s of dual application. That is, the statutes distinguish between d i s t r i c t courts and other courts, such as justice courts, holding the former t o a s t r i c t e r standard of written notification of forfeiture and a t h i r t y day "waiting period" during which the forfeiture may be discharged, prior t o automatic entry of judgment and an ensuing execution. Justice courts, she argues, are subject t o no such restrictions, and need only enter an order of forfeiture upon noncompliance a s a precondition t o immediate payment of the face amount of the bond. W e find such a position untenable. . I ' W e hold statutory procedures detailed i n sections %-I116 and 95-1117 are equally applicable t o bond forfeiture proceedings i n 3ustice courts. A n order requiring imrnedia k payment on the forfeited bond is tantamount t o an immediate and automatic judgment not provided for by statute. Such a procedure would afford justice courts broad powers and an unlimited range of discretion not enjoyed by d i s t r i c t courts. W e note i n t h i s regard that d i s t r i c t courts, a s contrasted with justice courts, are courts of record staffed by judges professionally trained i n the practice and principles of law and legal procedure. Such judges are, by virtue of sections 95-1116 and 95-1117, held t o a standard of accountability. Such a standard is no less 'applicable t o justice courts. Referring t o various principles and statutes pertaining t o contract law, appellant maintains a surety bond i s i n the nature of a contract. Contractual terms, i f capable of being performed instantly, must be so performed. While a bond is i n the nature of a contract, a procedure for forfeiture and en- forcement mandated by s t a t u t e i s exclusive and must be followed. See: 8 Am Jr 2d Bail and Recognizance, 5 5 139, et.seq. Appellant's argument in t h i s regard is without merit. Finally, appellant offers policy reasons i n support of her position. She argues the traditional procedure whereby de- fendants charged with minor offenses typically f o r f e i t bonds i n justice court, in l i e u of an appearance, would be frustrated and substantial delay i n the administration of justice would result from imposition of the requirements of sections 95-1116 and 95-1117. This argument is not compelling. The Revised Commission Comment t o section 95-1103, R.C.M. 1947, indicates the procedure for determination, acceptance and forfeiture of b a i l for certain minor offenses is t o be distinguished from the forfeiture procedures outlined in sections 95-1116 and 95-1117. The usually speedy forfeiture procedure advocated by appellant is in no manner impaired by our holding in t h i s case. Issue 2. Refusal to accept further bonds. Relying primarily upon broad textual authority, appellant asserts a justice court has the discretion t o refuse a surety's tendered bonds, although that surety is authorized t o do business by the s t a t e commissioner of insurance and has i n a l l other respects complied with statutes regulating the b a i l bond bus ine s s . Article 11, Section 21, 1972 Montana Constitution specifically provides : " A l l persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great. 1' (Emphasis added. ) I n addition, section 40-4501, R.C.M. 1947, provides, in part: "A surety insurer authorized as such under t h i s code s h a l l have the power t o b-ecome the surety on bonds and undertakings required by law * * *.I1 (Emphasis added.) W e hold that the above provisions, taken separately or together, mandate approval by courts of a l l bonds offered by those commercial sureties properly authorized t o do business i n t h i s state. Here, it is not disputed that respondents were i n com- pliance with the pertinent provisions of law and were authorized t o do business a s commercial sureties i n the s t a t e of Montana. W e conclude appellant's refusal t o accept respondents' bonds was error. Suchbonds should be approved in a l l similar cases. The amended judgment granting respondents ' requested writ of mandate i s affirmed. 1 \ ' . ~ h 1 7 f Justice