Title: State ex rel. E. Cleveland Fire Fighters' Assn., Local 500, IAFF v. Jenkins

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. E. Cleveland Fire Fighters' Assn., Local 500, IAFF v. Jenkins, 96 Ohio St.3d 
68, 2002-Ohio-3527.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. EAST CLEVELAND FIRE FIGHTERS’ ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 
500, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, APPELLANT, v. 
JENKINS, FIRE CHIEF, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. E. Cleveland Fire Fighters’ Assn., Local 500, IAFF v. 
Jenkins, 96 Ohio St.3d 68, 2002-Ohio-3527.] 
Writ of quo warranto ordering ouster of individual from office of East Cleveland 
Fire Chief denied, when — Fire fighters’ association lacked standing to 
bring action — Claim time-barred by three-year period of R.C. 2733.35. 
(No. 2001-2091 — Submitted May 7, 2002 — Decided July 24, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 79253. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In 1996, East Cleveland Fire Chief Paul B. Blockson III retired, 
and Deputy Fire Chief LaValle Dorsey was appointed acting fire chief.  In April 
1997, the East Cleveland Civil Service Commission scheduled a promotional 
examination for the office of fire chief for June 1997 and ordered an application 
deadline of April 25, 1997.  Acting Fire Chief Dorsey and Deputy Fire Chief Jerry 
C. Kirchner submitted timely applications.  The commission later postponed the 
promotional examination. 
{¶2} 
Dorsey was thereafter removed as acting fire chief, and appellee, 
Bobby Jenkins, then a captain in the fire department, was appointed acting fire 
chief.  In November 1997, Jenkins was officially promoted from the position of 
captain to deputy chief, and the commission apparently granted Jenkins’s request 
that it waive the requirement that an individual serve one year in the rank of 
deputy chief before being eligible to take the examination for fire chief.  The 
commission then scheduled the fire chief promotional examination for December 
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17 and 18, 1997.  In November 1997, Jenkins applied to take the test.  In 
December 1997, after Jenkins indicated to Dorsey and Kirchner that any 
grievance filed regarding the promotional test would be denied, Dorsey and 
Kirchner withdrew their applications to take the test.  The president of appellant, 
East Cleveland Fire Fighters’ Association, Local 500, International Association of 
Fire Fighters, then requested that the commission open the promotional 
examination to the next lower rank to get the statutorily required number of 
candidates to take the test.  R.C. 124.45. 
{¶3} 
On December 16, 1997, the association and one of its members 
who held the position of captain in the fire department filed a complaint in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County against the commission and the 
then-mayor and moved for injunctive relief to delay the scheduled fire chief 
promotional examination until the examination was opened to those holding the 
rank of captain.  On December 17 and 18, 1997, the commission conducted the 
examination, and Jenkins was the only person to take it.  On December 29, 1997, 
the commission certified Jenkins for the office of fire chief, and the mayor 
promoted him to that rank. 
{¶4} 
On October 6, 1998, the association, without any additional 
plaintiffs, filed an amended complaint in the common pleas court against the 
commission and the mayor requesting the court to declare the rights of the parties 
and to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the commission to remove Jenkins 
from office and to administer a new fire chief examination. 
{¶5} 
In November 1999, the common pleas court entered judgment in 
favor of the commission and the mayor and denied the requested relief.  On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County reversed the common pleas 
court’s judgment regarding the association’s request for declaratory relief.  E. 
Cleveland Firefighters, Local 500 v. E. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm. (Dec. 19, 
2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77367, 2000 WL 1876394.  The court of appeals held 
January Term, 2002 
3 
that Jenkins was not eligible for examination, certification, and subsequent 
promotion to the office of fire chief.  Nevertheless, the court of appeals affirmed 
the judgment of the common pleas court denying the writ of mandamus to oust 
Jenkins from the office of fire chief because quo warranto, which the union did 
not plead in its common pleas court action, was the proper means to challenge 
Jenkins’s right to hold the office. 
{¶6} 
On February 23, 2001, the association filed a complaint in the 
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of quo warranto ordering the 
ouster of Jenkins from the office of fire chief and an order requiring that Jenkins 
repay an amount equal to the difference between the salary he received as fire 
chief and the salary of his previous rank as deputy chief.  The association claimed 
entitlement to the requested relief based on the court of appeals’ conclusion in the 
previous appeal that Jenkins was not eligible for certification and promotion to the 
office of fire chief.  Jenkins filed an answer in which he raised several affirmative 
defenses, including that the association lacked standing to bring the action and 
that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 
{¶7} 
The parties subsequently filed motions for summary judgment.  In 
October 2001, the court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of Jenkins 
and denied the writ.  The court of appeals held that the association lacked 
standing to bring the quo warranto action. 
{¶8} 
In the association’s appeal as of right, it asserts that the court of 
appeals erred in denying the writ based upon a lack of standing.  The association’s 
assertion, however, is meritless. 
{¶9} 
R.C. 2733.01(A) provides that a quo warranto action may be 
brought in the name of the state “[a]gainst a person who usurps, intrudes into, or 
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office * * * within this state * * *.”  R.C. 
2733.04 and 2733.05 authorize the Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney to 
initiate quo warranto actions.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Huron Cty. Prosecutor v. 
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Westerhold (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 392, 394, 650 N.E.2d 463.  R.C. 2733.06 
authorizes “person[s] claiming to be entitled to a public office unlawfully held 
and exercised by another” to bring quo warranto actions. 
{¶10} Consequently, as we have consistently held, for persons other than 
the Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney, “ ‘an action in quo warranto may 
be brought by an individual as a private citizen only when he personally is 
claiming title to a public office.’ ”  State ex rel. Coyne v. Todia (1989), 45 Ohio 
St.3d 232, 238, 543 N.E.2d 1271, quoting State ex rel. Annable v. Stokes (1970), 
24 Ohio St.2d 32, 32-33, 53 O.O.2d 18, 262 N.E.2d 863; see, also, State ex rel. 
Paluf v. Feneli (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 138, 145, 630 N.E.2d 708; Reisig v. 
Camarato (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 479, 483, 676 N.E.2d 594.  Because the 
association did not claim title to the office of fire chief and, in fact, could not hold 
that office, the association lacked standing to bring the quo warranto action.  See 
Coyne, 45 Ohio St.3d at 237-238, 543 N.E.2d 1271; Paluf, 69 Ohio St.3d at 145, 
630 N.E.2d 708; State ex rel. Freeman v. Hayes (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 344, 345, 
23 O.O.3d 314, 432 N.E.2d 199. 
{¶11} The association claims that it has standing in quo warranto based 
upon Sierra Club v. Morton (1972), 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636.  
It relies upon the statement in Sierra Club that “[w]here the party does not rely on 
any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of 
standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a ‘personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy,’ * * * as to ensure that ‘the dispute sought to be 
adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically 
viewed as capable of judicial resolution.’ ”  Id. at 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 
636, quoting Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 
663, and Flast v. Cohen (1968), 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947.  
But, as Jenkins aptly notes, the United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club, 405 
U.S. at 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, further observed that “[w]here, 
January Term, 2002 
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however, Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain functions 
according to law, and has provided by statute for judicial review of those actions 
under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standing must begin with a 
determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of 
the plaintiff.”  The General Assembly enacted the pertinent statutes here, see, e.g., 
R.C. 2733.04, 2733.05, and 2733.06, which do not permit the association to 
institute a quo warranto action. 
{¶12} The association next claims that it has standing based upon a 
public policy exception to the statutory standing requirement.  The association, 
however, waived this claim by failing to raise it in the court of appeals.  State ex 
rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 678, 680, 710 
N.E.2d 1129; State ex rel. Porter v. Cleveland Dept. of Pub. Safety (1998), 84 
Ohio St.3d 258, 259, 703 N.E.2d 308.  In addition, “ ‘[j]udicial policy preferences 
may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General 
Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’ ”  In re Wieland (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 535, 538, 733 N.E.2d 1127, quoting State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio 
St.3d 222, 223, 553 N.E.2d 672. 
{¶13} Finally, even assuming that the association had standing to raise its 
quo warranto claim, its action was barred because it was not brought within the 
applicable statute of limitations.  “No action in quo warranto shall be brought 
against an officer to oust him from his office, unless it is brought within three 
years after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose.”  R.C. 
2733.35; see, also, State ex rel. Wilmot v. Buckley (1899), 60 Ohio St. 273, 54 
N.E. 272.  In general, a cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful act is 
committed.  Harris v. Liston (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 205, 714 N.E.2d 377.  
The alleged wrongful act challenged here occurred, at the latest, when Jenkins 
was certified and promoted to the office of fire chief on December 29, 1997.  
There is no evidence here that the association discovered the basis for its claim 
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after that date.  Because the association did not institute its quo warranto action 
within three years after the cause of action accrued, its quo warranto claim was 
barred by R.C. 2733.35. 
{¶14} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly denied the 
writ.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph W. Diemert Jr. & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert Jr. 
and Thomas H. Hanculak, for appellant. 
 
Abdoul Rahim Abdoulkarim, East Cleveland Director of Law, and Ronda 
Curtis, Assistant Director of Law; Forbes, Fields & Associates Co., L.P.A., Helen 
Forbes Fields, Scott H. Schooler and Tahseen F. Ali, for appellee. 
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