Title: Commonwealth v. Resende

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11981 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADMILSON RESENDE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 4, 2016. - July 25, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of 
government agents.  Due Process of Law, Plea, Disclosure of 
evidence, Presumption.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, New 
trial, Conduct of government agents, Disclosure of 
evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof.  Evidence, 
Guilty plea, Certificate of drug analysis, Presumptions, 
Disclosure of evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 9, 2006. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed on October 2, 
2012, and supplemented on March 20, 2014, was heard by Paul A. 
Chernoff, J., special judicial magistrate, and an order 
affirming the proposed order of the special judicial magistrate 
was entered by Frank M. Gaziano, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
2 
 
 
Laurie Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney (Lisa J. 
Jacobs, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The present case is the most recent in a series 
of cases concerning the egregious misconduct of Annie Dookhan, a 
chemist who was employed in the forensic drug laboratory of the 
William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton drug lab) 
from 2003 until 2012.  On January 23, 2007, the defendant, 
Admilson Resende, pleaded guilty on indictments charging 
distribution of a class B controlled substance (cocaine), G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32A (c) (five counts); violation of the controlled 
substances laws in proximity to a school or park, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32J (three counts); and possession of a class B controlled 
substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A (c) (one count).1  He completed service of his sentences.2  
On October 2, 2012, the defendant filed in the Superior Court a 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
 
1 An indictment charging unlawful possession of a class D 
controlled substance (marijuana), G. L. c. 94C, § 34, as amended 
through St. 1996, c. 271, § 1, was placed on file. 
 
 
2 With respect to the indictments charging distribution of 
cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the 
defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of a mandatory 
minimum sentence of one year in a house of correction.  G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32A (c), as amended through St. 1991, c. 391.  With 
respect to the school or park zone charges, the defendant was 
sentenced to concurrent terms of a mandatory minimum sentence of 
two years in a house of correction, to commence on and after the 
completion of his sentences for the underlying drug crimes.  
G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, as amended through St. 1998, c. 194, § 146. 
                     
3 
 
P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), based on Dookhan's 
malfeasance. 
 
Prior to the issuance of a ruling on the defendant's 
motion, this court decided Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 
(2014), in which we articulated, in reliance on Ferrara v. 
United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290-297 (1st Cir. 2006), a two-
prong framework for analyzing a defendant's motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea under rule 30 (b) in a case involving the misconduct 
of Dookhan at the Hinton drug lab.  Scott, supra at 346-358.  
Under the first prong of the analysis, a defendant must show 
egregious misconduct by the government that preceded the entry 
of the defendant's guilty plea and that occurred in the 
defendant's case.  Id. at 347-354.  We recognized that, given 
the breadth and duration of Dookhan's malfeasance, it might be 
impossible for a defendant to show the required nexus between 
government misconduct and the defendant's own case.  Id. at 351-
352.  Consequently, we established a special evidentiary rule 
whereby a defendant seeking to vacate a guilty plea under rule 
30 (b) as a result of the revelation of Dookhan's misconduct, 
and proffering a certificate of drug analysis (drug certificate) 
from the defendant's case signed by Dookhan on the line labeled 
"Assistant Analyst," would be entitled to "a conclusive 
presumption that egregious government misconduct occurred in the 
defendant's case."  Id. at 352.  Application of this conclusive 
4 
 
presumption in a particular case meant that a defendant's 
evidentiary burden to establish each element of the first prong 
of the Ferrara-Scott framework was satisfied.  Id. at 353-354.  
The defendant then had the burden under the second prong of the 
analysis of particularizing Dookhan's misconduct to his or her 
decision to tender a guilty plea.  Id. at 354-355.  That is to 
say, the defendant had to "demonstrate a reasonable probability 
that he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty had he [or she] 
known of Dookhan's misconduct."  Id. at 355.  A successful 
showing on this second prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework 
would warrant an order granting the defendant's motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea. 
 
In light of our decision in Scott, as well as new evidence 
concerning the Hinton drug lab's analyses of the samples in his 
case,3 the defendant filed supplemental pleadings on March 20, 
2014, in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  He 
pointed out that Dookhan had set up and operated the gas 
chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) machine for three out 
 
3 On April 1, 2013, defense counsel filed a motion in the 
Superior Court for the production of documentation from the 
forensic drug laboratory of the William A. Hinton State 
Laboratory Institute (Hinton drug lab) that supported the 
results set forth on each certificate of drug analysis (drug 
certificate) in the defendant's case.  Counsel sought, in 
particular, the reviewable data produced by the gas 
chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) machine that had 
performed the drug analyses.  The motion was allowed, and the 
office of the Inspector General produced the requested 
documentation. 
                     
5 
 
of the seven samples in his case (although her name did not 
appear on those drug certificates), and that she had been the 
confirmatory chemist for a fourth sample.  As a consequence, the 
defendant asserted that, with respect to these four samples, he 
was entitled to the conclusive presumption articulated in Scott, 
467 Mass. at 352, that egregious government misconduct occurred 
in his case.  He further argued that he would not have pleaded 
guilty had he known of Dookhan's misconduct at the time of his 
pleas. 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing, a special magistrate 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court Department 
of the Trial Court pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 47, 378 Mass. 
923 (1979), denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas.  See Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 89-90 (2013) 
(describing authority of special magistrate to conduct guilty 
plea colloquies in Hinton drug lab sessions).  The defendant 
appealed the special magistrate's proposed order dated May 12, 
2014, to the Regional Administrative Justice of the Superior 
Court, who denied the defendant's appeal and affirmed the 
decision of the special magistrate.  See id. at 66, 90-91.  The 
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in the Appeals Court, 
and we subsequently granted his application for direct appellate 
review.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 
defendant was not entitled to the conclusive presumption that 
6 
 
egregious government misconduct occurred in his case, and that 
his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was properly denied.4 
 
1.  Background.  On four divers dates in August, 2006, 
Detective Timothy Stanton of the Brockton police department 
conducted "controlled buys" of what appeared to be cocaine from 
the defendant.  Each purchase occurred in a similar manner.  
Stanton would telephone a number that had been provided by the 
defendant and would meet him (or, on the first occasion, a 
female associate) at a designated location in the "Village" 
section of Brockton.  Each of these locations was within 1,000 
feet of an elementary school or a park.  Stanton would purchase 
two "twenty" bags of an off-white rock-like substance from the 
defendant for forty dollars.  Before and after several of these 
controlled buys, the defendant was observed leaving and 
reentering a multifamily home on North Montello Street.  Field 
tests conducted on the substances indicated the presumptive 
presence of cocaine.  Based on these controlled buys, Stanton 
applied for and was granted a search warrant for the defendant's 
residence on the first floor of the North Montello Street 
address. 
 
4 Although our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Resende, 
474 Mass. 455 (2016), concerned the same defendant as in the 
present case, the issues raised in the two cases are entirely 
different. 
                     
7 
 
 
On August 22, 2006, Stanton engaged in a fifth controlled 
buy with the intention of executing the search warrant 
immediately thereafter.  He telephoned the defendant, who 
directed him to the corner of North Montello Street and King 
Avenue and advised him that he would have one "forty" bag 
instead of two "twenty" bags.  When Stanton arrived at the 
meeting place, he telephoned the defendant and subsequently 
observed him leaving the residence on North Montello Street.  
Stanton gave the defendant two twenty dollar bills with 
prerecorded serial numbers in exchange for a clear plastic bag 
containing an off-white rock-like substance.  A team of police 
officers then secured the defendant and took him into custody.  
The defendant was advised of the Miranda rights and acknowledged 
that he understood those rights.  Found on the defendant's 
person were a Nextel cellular telephone (on which Stanton's 
telephone call was still visible), three pieces of an off-white 
rock-like substance wrapped in clear plastic, a bag containing 
green vegetable matter, and two twenty dollar bills having the 
prerecorded serial numbers. 
 
The substances recovered from the five controlled buys and 
from the defendant's person were sent to the Hinton drug lab for 
analysis.  Seven drug certificates were issued.  As relevant to 
the present appeal, three of the drug certificates, stating that 
the substances seized from the defendant contained cocaine as 
8 
 
defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 31, were signed on the line labeled 
"Assistant Analysts" by Daniela Frasca and Michael Lawler.  
However, as will be explained in greater detail infra, Dookhan 
was the so-called "setup operator" for the substances (samples 
779099, 779110, and 779125) that were analyzed to generate these 
certificates.  A fourth drug certificate, stating that the 
substance (sample 810059) seized from the defendant contained 
cocaine as defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 31, was signed on the line 
labeled "Assistant Analysts" by Frasca and Dookhan.5 
 
In 2012, Dookhan admitted to tampering with evidence at the 
Hinton drug lab, failing to comply with quality control 
measures, forging the initials of an evidence officer, and "dry 
labbing."6  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 339-340.  It appeared that 
"the motive for her wrongdoing was in large part a desire to 
increase her apparent productivity."  Id. at 341.  Following a 
 
5 Two of the remaining drug certificates, stating that the 
substances (samples 810300 and 810301) seized from the defendant 
contained cocaine as defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 31, were signed 
on the line labeled "Assistant Analysts" by Kate Corbett and 
Della Saunders.  The final drug certificate, stating that the 
substance (sample 810302) seized from the defendant contained 
marijuana as defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 31, was signed on the 
line labeled "Assistant Analyst" by Saunders.  Because there is 
no evidence that Dookhan was involved in the analyses of the 
substances for which these three drug certificates were 
generated, we do not consider them further. 
 
 
6 Dookhan's admission to "dry labbing" meant that "she would 
group multiple samples together from various cases that looked 
alike and then test only a few samples, but report the results 
as if she had tested each sample individually."  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 339 (2014). 
                     
9 
 
criminal investigation into Dookhan's misconduct, the Attorney 
General's office indicted her on twenty-seven charges -- 
seventeen counts of tampering with evidence, eight counts of 
obstruction of justice, one count of perjury, and one count of 
falsely claiming to hold a degree from a college or university.  
See id. at 337 & n.3.  On November 22, 2013, Dookhan pleaded 
guilty to all of the charges.  See id.  She was sentenced to 
from three years to five years in the State prison, followed by 
a probationary term of two years. 
 
2.  Testing procedures at the Hinton drug lab.  At the 
April 22, 2014, hearing before the special magistrate on the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the parties 
presented, among other evidence, a report from the office of the 
Inspector General (report), dated March 4, 2014, describing its 
comprehensive investigation of the operation and management of 
the Hinton drug lab from 2002 to 2012.7  In addition, the 
defendant presented the testimony of Michael Lawler, the 
confirmatory chemist for samples 779099, 779110, and 779125, 
with respect to which Dookhan was the setup operator.8  Lawler, 
 
7 The report was issued one day before the release of our 
opinion in Scott and greatly enhanced public understanding of 
the details surrounding Dookhan's misconduct at the Hinton drug 
lab. 
 
 
8 On November 4, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to 
reconstruct the testimony given by Lawler at the hearing on the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  Due to an 
                     
10 
 
whom the special magistrate found to be credible, described the 
GC-MS machine, as well as the duties and responsibilities of a 
primary chemist, a confirmatory chemist, and a setup operator. 
 
When a law enforcement agency brought a substance to the 
Hinton drug lab for analysis, an evidence officer would accept 
the substance and assign it a sample number, which would be 
attached to the substance through all of the phases of the 
testing process.  The evidence officer would create a drug 
receipt, which included the sample number, and would give a copy 
of the receipt to the law enforcement agency that had requested 
the analysis.  Then, the evidence officer would generate a 
control card9 and place it, together with the substance, in a 
manila envelope labeled with the sample number.  Eventually, the 
substance would be assigned to a chemist for analysis. 
 
The special magistrate described the testing process used 
by the Hinton drug lab as a "two-phase system," rather than a 
equipment malfunction, a transcript of that hearing could not be 
produced.  The parties subsequently filed a joint statement 
regarding their recollections of Lawler's testimony, and the 
special magistrate accepted the statement. 
 
 
9 The control card would list information about the sample, 
including its number, its net weight, the identity of the 
primary and confirmatory chemists assigned to the sample, and 
the analytical results.  The control card stayed with the sample 
throughout the testing process. 
 
                                                                  
11 
 
"two-chemist system."10  During the preliminary phase, substances 
submitted by law enforcement agencies for analysis were assigned 
to a primary chemist.  That individual would be responsible for 
weighing the samples and conducting preliminary bench tests, 
which included color, microcrystalline, gas chromatography, 
infrared spectroscopy, ultraviolet spectroscopy, macroscopic, 
and microscopic tests.  The primary chemist would document the 
test results and make preliminary determinations as to the 
identities of the samples.  Then, the primary chemist would 
prepare the samples for the confirmatory testing process by 
making aliquots11 for analysis by the GC-MS machine.  In 
addition, the primary chemist would complete a GC-MS control 
sheet, setting forth the date, the identity of the primary 
chemist, the name of the submitting law enforcement agency, a 
list of samples in numerical order, the chemist's preliminary 
 
10 The special magistrate found that under a "two-chemist 
system," the primary chemist conducted the preliminary bench 
tests, and the confirmatory chemist received the samples for 
analysis by the GC-MS machine, operated the GC-MS machine, and 
confirmed the preliminary findings made by the primary chemist.  
In contrast, under a "two-phase system," one chemist was 
responsible for the preliminary testing phase, and one or two 
different chemists were responsible for the confirmatory phase 
(except in rare instances when a single chemist completed both 
phases).  When performing the confirmatory phase, one chemist 
would receive the samples and operate the GC-MS machine, and a 
different chemist would analyze the results generated by the GC-
MS machine. 
 
 
11 An aliquot is a small portion of the sample that the 
primary chemist places into a glass vial and dissolves with a 
solvent. 
                     
12 
 
findings, and any comments that would be helpful to the 
confirmatory chemist in the subsequent analysis.  Finally, the 
primary chemist would take the GC-MS control sheet, the control 
card, and the aliquots to the room where the GC-MS machines were 
located (GC-MS room) so that the confirmatory phase of the 
testing process could begin. 
 
With respect to the confirmatory testing process, the 
Hinton drug lab generally followed the protocol recommended by 
the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs, 
which relied on use of a GC-MS machine.  The GC-MS room was 
situated in the middle of the laboratory complex and was 
accessible by only one door.  Each machine was a large, box-
shaped piece of equipment with a robotic arm that had a syringe 
attached to the end of it.  Placed inside the GC-MS machine was 
a carousel which could be loaded with 100 to 120 vials, 
depending on the size of the machine.  When operational, the 
carousel would move the vials toward the syringe which would 
puncture the top of each vial to commence the testing process 
for that sample.  After the contents of a vial were analyzed, 
the GC-MS machine automatically purged the syringe by "spitting" 
its contents into a waste receptacle and then putting the 
syringe into a cleaning solution. 
 
The confirmatory phase involved three separate steps -- 
receipt of the samples in the GC-MS room, operation of the GC-MS 
13 
 
machine, and analysis of the results from the GC-MS machine to 
confirm the preliminary identification of the samples.  It was 
common practice at the Hinton drug lab for the setup operator to 
complete the first two steps, and for the confirmatory chemist, 
who signed the drug certificates, to complete the last step.12  
Chemists were assigned to work as the setup operator for week-
long shifts.  Although the setup operator had some level of 
autonomy because he or she was not directly supervised, a 
supervisor usually was present in the GC-MS room.  On some 
occasions, the setup operator would become the confirmatory 
chemist and would analyze the results produced by the GC-MS 
machine.  On other occasions, the GC-MS machine would run 
overnight, so the setup operator might not be the chemist who 
would interpret the results the following morning and sign the 
drug certificates. 
 
At the beginning of the confirmatory phase, the setup 
operator would receive the aliquots from the primary chemist and 
verify that the number on each vial matched the sample numbers 
on the accompanying GC-MS control sheet and control card.  The 
setup operator would inspect the vials and document any 
problems, including signs of contamination.  Then, he or she 
 
12 According to the special magistrate's findings and the 
report from the office of the Inspector General, chemists at the 
Hinton drug lab did not consider it to be a requirement that one 
chemist perform all three steps of the confirmatory phase of the 
testing process. 
                     
14 
 
would place the aliquots, along with vials containing 
standards,13 blanks,14 and a quality control standard mix,15 on 
the carousel of the GC-MS machine for analysis.  The setup 
operator would complete a "sequence" or "batch" sheet, an 
internal document that specified the order in which the various 
vials were arranged on the carousel, and enter the information 
from the sheet into the GC-MS machine.  The setup operator would 
not open the aliquots. 
 
Before the aliquots could be analyzed, the setup operator 
was required to confirm that the GC-MS machine was ready for 
operation.  This involved "tuning" the GC-MS machine to ensure 
that it was operating within acceptable parameters, ascertaining 
that the GC-MS machine correctly identified the quality control 
standard mix, and confirming that tests on the first few vials 
 
13 A standard was a known controlled substance against which 
the aliquots were compared.  In the present case, the standard 
was cocaine.  The aliquots being analyzed were bracketed by 
standards to ensure that the GC-MS machine was operating 
properly at the beginning, middle, and end of the testing 
sequence.  If the setup operator noticed that the GC-MS machine 
had not identified the standard correctly, the "run" of the 
assorted vials would be terminated, and another run would be 
prepared using a new standard. 
 
 
14 Blanks typically consisted of the solvent that had been 
used to dissolve the aliquots.  They were inserted on the 
carousel between the aliquots and the standards, and were used 
to ensure that there was no contamination during the testing 
process. 
 
 
15 The quality control standard mix was a combination of 
cocaine and codeine.  It was used to ensure that the GC-MS 
machine was operating properly. 
                     
15 
 
containing standards and blanks also correctly identified those 
substances.  In addition, the setup operator was responsible for 
other quality control measures, including ensuring that the 
standards were not contaminated, emptying the waste receptacle, 
lubricating the syringe, and replacing the injection seal, as 
necessary.16  If at any time the setup operator determined that 
the GC-MS machine was not fit for operation, the operator would 
terminate the "run" of a batch of vials and restart the analysis 
process. 
 
The GC-MS machine would produce reviewable data that the 
chemists referred to as "documentation."  Once the GC-MS machine 
had completed its analysis of the aliquots, the confirmatory 
chemist would check the placement of the vials against the 
sequence sheet to ensure that they were tested in the correct 
order.  The confirmatory chemist then would analyze the 
documentation and identify each sample without using the primary 
chemist's notes.  This identification would be added to the 
front of the GC-MS control sheet and the control card.  A sample 
would have to test positive in both the preliminary and 
confirmatory phases in order to be conclusively identified as 
the controlled substance at issue.  Finally, the primary and 
confirmatory chemists would sign the drug certificates.  If 
 
16 The location and purpose of the injection seal are 
unclear from the record. 
                     
16 
 
there was an inconsistency between the identification made by 
the primary chemist and that made by the confirmatory chemist, 
the samples would be returned to the primary chemist for further 
analysis or for the preparation of new aliquots. 
 
3.  Testing in the defendant's case.  As to samples 779099, 
779110, and 779125, Lawler testified that Daniela Frasca was the 
primary chemist, Dookhan was the setup operator, and he was the 
confirmatory chemist.  Frasca conducted the bench tests, 
prepared the aliquots for analysis by the GC-MS machine, and 
preliminarily identified the three samples as cocaine.  Dookhan 
then placed the assorted vials on the carousel of the GC-MS 
machine on Friday, October 6, 2006, and entered the sequence of 
their arrangement into the machine.  She initiated the analysis 
process that morning, it continued throughout the night, and it 
was finished the following morning, Saturday, October 7.  Lawler 
testified that Dookhan would have been responsible for 
performing any necessary quality control measures, and for 
ensuring that the GC-MS machine was operating properly prior to 
the run.  Once the analysis was completed on Saturday morning, 
Lawler reviewed the performance of and documentation from the 
GC-MS machine.  He testified that he would have checked the GC-
MS machine and would have examined the placement of the vials 
before he removed them from the carousel.  Based on his review 
of the documentation, Lawler confirmed that samples 779099, 
17 
 
779110, and 779125 contained cocaine, and he signed the drug 
certificates.17 
 
Lawler testified that although he had some concerns about 
Dookhan based on her productivity as a primary chemist, he did 
not have similar concerns regarding her work in the GC-MS room.  
Lawler stated that confirmatory testing on the GC-MS machine was 
"very static," meaning that it was not possible to increase or 
accelerate the process, and that it did not involve any 
"creativity."  When asked how a "rogue" person could influence 
the results of the GC-MS machine, Lawler testified that he did 
not see how it could be done without detection. 
 
4.  Decision of the special magistrate.  In a thorough and 
well-reasoned memorandum of decision denying the defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the special magistrate 
pointed out that Scott does not address whether the conclusive 
presumption of egregious government misconduct is available to a 
defendant in a case where Dookhan merely was the setup operator 
and did not sign the drug certificates.  The special magistrate 
found that the roles of setup operator and confirmatory chemist, 
while overlapping, were not so closely analogous or 
interchangeable that they should be treated as one, and that the 
language in Scott clearly limits the conclusive presumption to 
 
17 With respect to sample 810059, Dookhan signed the drug 
certificate on the line labeled "Assistant Analysts," certifying 
that the sample contained cocaine. 
                     
18 
 
those cases where Dookhan was the primary or confirmatory 
chemist.  Accordingly, he declined to expand the scope of Scott 
such that the defendant would be entitled to a conclusive 
presumption that egregious government misconduct occurred with 
respect to the analyses of samples 779099, 779110, and 779125. 
 
The special magistrate then considered whether, absent the 
conclusive presumption, the defendant nonetheless had 
demonstrated that Dookhan, while acting as the setup operator, 
had engaged in "particularly pernicious" misconduct, and that 
such misconduct was material to the defendant's decision to 
plead guilty.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 346-348, 354-355, citing 
Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290, 291.  The special magistrate found 
that there was no evidence that Dookhan had acted with 
purposeful malfeasance while serving as the setup operator for 
samples 779099, 779110, and 779125.  To the contrary, he 
continued, the evidence indicated that Dookhan had performed her 
duties as would have been expected.  That being the case, the 
special magistrate concluded that the defendant had failed to 
satisfy his burden of proof with respect to the first prong of 
the Ferrara-Scott framework.  Turning to the second prong of the 
framework, the special magistrate also concluded that the 
defendant had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that he 
would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Dookhan's 
misconduct.  He found that the factual bases for the defendant's 
19 
 
guilty pleas were not substantially weakened by Dookhan's 
purported misconduct in this case, and that the defendant's 
sentences after pleading guilty were considerably more favorable 
than the sentences that could have been imposed if he had 
proceeded to trial. 
 
Finally, with respect to sample 810059, the special 
magistrate stated that because Dookhan was the confirmatory 
chemist, the defendant was entitled to the conclusive 
presumption articulated in Scott that egregious government 
misconduct occurred with respect to the analysis of this 
particular sample.  However, he concluded that, for essentially 
the same reasons he already had articulated, the defendant had 
failed to satisfy his burden of proof under the second prong of 
the Ferrara-Scott framework.  Accordingly, the special 
magistrate denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas. 
 
5.  Standard of review.  A motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (b).  Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 
(2009).  "Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), a judge may grant a 
motion for a new trial any time it appears that justice may not 
have been done.  A motion for a new trial is thus committed to 
the sound discretion of the judge."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 344.  
We review the allowance or denial of a motion to withdraw a 
20 
 
guilty plea to determine whether the judge abused that 
discretion or committed a significant error of law.  Id.  We 
accept the judge's findings of fact if they are supported by the 
evidence because the judge who heard the witnesses testify is 
the "final arbiter [on] matters of credibility."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Schand, 420 Mass. 783, 787 (1995). 
 
6.  Egregious misconduct by the government in the 
defendant's case.  The defendant first contends that, although 
Dookhan did not sign the drug certificates pertaining to samples 
779099, 779110, and 779125, she nonetheless effectively acted as 
a confirmatory chemist for those samples because she tuned the 
GC-MS machine, verified that it was functioning properly, placed 
the vials on the carousel, and initiated the analysis process.  
The defendant points out that Dookhan's admitted misconduct 
while serving as a confirmatory chemist included the failure to 
verify the proper functioning of a GC-MS machine and the 
falsification of reports to hide her wrongdoing.  See Scott, 467 
Mass. at 339-341, 353 n.9.  In light of this malfeasance, the 
defendant argues that he was entitled to the conclusive 
presumption articulated in Scott, 467 Mass. at 352, that 
egregious government misconduct occurred in his case.  We 
disagree. 
 
We stated in Scott, supra at 339-341, 353 n.9, that Dookhan 
appeared to have engaged in misconduct during the confirmatory 
21 
 
phase of the analysis process at the Hinton drug lab.  However, 
the present case is not one in which Dookhan was performing the 
dual roles of setup operator and confirmatory chemist with 
respect to samples 779099, 779110, and 779125.  Contrary to the 
defendant's assertions, Dookhan's work as the setup operator did 
not involve the "testing" of drugs.  Testing was performed first 
by the primary chemist (Frasca), who completed bench tests and 
made a preliminary identification of each sample based on her 
subjective interpretation of the results, and then by the GC-MS 
machine, which produced documentation that was reviewed and 
interpreted by the confirmatory chemist (Lawler).  Notably, 
Dookhan did not prepare the aliquots for analysis by the GC-MS 
machine because that task was the responsibility of Frasca.  
Dookhan's role was simply to receive the aliquots, prepare the 
GC-MS machine, and initiate the analysis process.  Once the 
analysis process had been completed, Lawler checked the GC-MS 
machine, verified the proper placement of the vials on the 
carousel, and reviewed the documentation.  If there had been any 
inconsistency between the identification made by Frasca and that 
made by Lawler, the samples would have been returned to Frasca 
for further analysis or for the preparation of new aliquots.  In 
the opinion of Lawler, whom the special magistrate found to be 
credible, tampering with the GC-MS machine would have been 
detectable. 
22 
 
 
Significantly, the office of the Inspector General found no 
evidence that Dookhan tampered with drug samples that were 
assigned to other chemists, such as Frasca and Lawler in the 
present case.  When Dookhan tampered with her own samples, it 
appeared that she was motivated, in large part, by her desire to 
increase her apparent productivity.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 
341, 352.  Given that there was no way to increase or accelerate 
the analysis process on a GC-MS machine, Dookhan would have had 
no reason to tinker with its operation while serving as the 
setup operator.  Any such tinkering would not have enhanced her 
productivity.  Indeed, based on its comprehensive investigation 
of the Hinton drug lab from 2002 to 2012, the office of the 
Inspector General did not suggest treating with increased 
suspicion those cases where Dookhan served as the setup 
operator.  We conclude that the special magistrate did not abuse 
his discretion or otherwise err in determining that the 
defendant was not entitled to the conclusive presumption 
articulated in Scott, supra at 352, that egregious government 
misconduct occurred in his case with respect to the analyses of 
samples 779099, 779110, and 779125.18 
 
18 Given that Dookhan signed the drug certificate for sample 
810059 on the line labeled "Assistant Analysts," the special 
magistrate properly concluded that the defendant was entitled to 
the conclusive presumption that egregious government misconduct 
occurred with respect to the analysis of this particular sample. 
                     
23 
 
 
Absent this conclusive presumption, a defendant who moves 
to withdraw his guilty pleas has the evidentiary burden of 
establishing, as an initial matter, each element of the first 
prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework.  See Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 
290; Scott, 467 Mass. at 346-354.  Here, the defendant was 
required to show that Dookhan engaged in "egregiously 
impermissible conduct" in his case, and that such misconduct 
preceded the entry of his guilty pleas.19  Ferrara, supra.  See 
Scott, supra.  Based on the report, the timing and the scope of 
Dookhan's misconduct during the confirmatory phase of the 
analysis process at the Hinton drug lab do not suggest that she 
engaged in malfeasance with respect to samples 779099, 779110, 
and 779125, which were analyzed in October, 2006. 
 
First, the report found that around March, 2011, chemist 
Kate Corbett reported to the supervisor of the GC-MS room that 
Dookhan had forged her initials on a batch sheet, falsely 
indicating that Corbett had been the operator of the GC-MS 
machine for the particular run of samples indicated on the 
sheet.  Apart from the fact that this incident occurred nearly 
four and one-half years after the defendant's samples were 
analyzed, there was no evidence to suggest that Dookhan had 
 
19 It is well established that Dookhan's work at the Hinton 
drug lab, including her service as the setup operator for 
samples 779099, 779110, and 779125, was conduct "by the 
government."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 348-350. 
                     
24 
 
tampered with the actual operation of the GC-MS machine, 
notwithstanding her forgery of Corbett's initials on the batch 
sheet.  Next, the report found that between May 10, 2011, and 
May 14, 2011, Dookhan falsified four days of reports pertaining 
to the quality control standard mix runs on the GC-MS machine.  
See note 15, supra.  Dookhan completed these reports as if the 
GC-MS machine had performed satisfactorily, when it had not, and 
then she signed the reports as the "quality control reviewer," 
thereby approving her own falsified test results.20  After 
discovering this misconduct, the office of the Inspector General 
reviewed 3,930 quality control standard mix results from 2005 to 
2012.  It did not find any additional falsified reports or 
evidence of other wrongdoing with respect to the quality control 
standard mixes.  Finally, the report found that in June, 2011, 
Dookhan forged the initials of chemist Nicole Medina on a so-
called "tune report."  During the course of its comprehensive 
investigation, the OIG reviewed tune reports from 2009 to 2012.  
It did not find any reports indicating that the GC-MS machines 
were operating outside acceptable parameters.  We conclude that 
 
20 According to the report, the job of the "quality control 
reviewer" was "to collect the quality control record from the 
chemists and various areas of the lab, ensure that the chemists 
had filled in the records, sign them, and present them" to the 
"quality assurance reviewers."  The signature of the "quality 
control reviewer" documented that "the reviewer had looked at a 
list of checkmarks on a completed form created by a chemist 
indicating he or she had performed one of the necessary quality 
control tasks." 
                     
25 
 
the defendant did not establish that Dookhan engaged in 
egregious misconduct while serving as the setup operator for 
samples 779099, 779110, and 779125.  Accordingly, the special 
magistrate properly determined that the defendant could not 
withdraw his guilty pleas where he failed to satisfy each 
element of the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework. 
 
As discussed, the analysis of a defendant's motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) in a case 
involving the misconduct of Dookhan at the Hinton drug lab 
proceeds under a two-prong framework.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 
346-358, citing Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290, 291.  Given our 
conclusion that the defendant here has failed to satisfy the 
first prong of the framework with respect to the testing of 
samples 779099, 779110, and 779125, we need not further consider 
whether, under the second prong, the defendant demonstrated "a 
reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had 
he known of Dookhan's misconduct."  Scott, supra at 355.  See 
Ferrara, supra at 290, 294.  However, the second prong is 
relevant with respect to sample 810059 because the drug 
certificate pertaining to that one sample, stating that it 
contained cocaine as defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 31, was signed 
on the line labeled "Assistant Analysts" by Frasca and Dookhan.  
As to that one sample, the defendant was deemed to have 
satisfied each element of the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott 
26 
 
framework.  See Scott, supra at 353-354.  We therefore proceed 
to consider the second prong as it relates to sample 810059.21 
 
7.  Material influence on the defendant's decision to plead 
guilty.  Under the second prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework, 
the defendant had the burden of particularizing "Dookhan's 
misconduct to his decision to tender a guilty plea."  See Scott, 
467 Mass. at 354.  That is to say, the defendant had to 
demonstrate, based on a totality of the circumstances, "a 
reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had 
he known of Dookhan's misconduct."  Id. at 355.  In reliance on 
Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 294, this court identified in Scott a 
number of factors that could be relevant to a defendant's 
showing under this second prong, including "(1) whether evidence 
of the government misconduct could have detracted from the 
factual basis used to support the guilty plea, (2) whether the 
evidence could have been used to impeach a witness whose 
credibility may have been outcome-determinative, (3) whether the 
evidence was cumulative of other evidence already in the 
defendant's possession, (4) whether the evidence would have 
influenced counsel's recommendation as to whether to accept a 
particular plea offer, and (5) whether the value of the evidence 
was outweighed by the benefits of entering into the plea 
 
21 Sample 810059 pertained to indictments charging 
distribution of cocaine and violation of the controlled 
substances laws in proximity to a school. 
                     
27 
 
agreement."  Scott, supra at 355-356.  Additional factors for 
consideration under the second prong might include, but are not 
limited to, "whether the defendant was indicted on additional 
charges," id. at 357, as well as "whether the defendant had a 
substantial ground of defense that would have been pursued at 
trial," id. at 356, and whether other special circumstances, 
such as collateral immigration consequences arising from 
conviction of a particular crime, were present.  Id. at 356 & 
n.13, citing Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47-48 (2011). 
 
"Ultimately, a defendant's decision to tender a guilty plea 
is a unique, individualized decision, and the relevant factors 
and their relative weight will differ from one case to the 
next."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 356.  We emphasized in Scott that 
"the full context of the defendant's decision to enter a plea 
agreement will dictate the assessment of his claim that 
knowledge of Dookhan's misconduct would have influenced the 
defendant's decision to plead guilty."  Id. at 357.  "Because a 
multiplicity of factors may influence a defendant's decision to 
enter a guilty plea, a court attempting to answer this question 
must use a wide-angled lens."  Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 294. 
 
The defendant contends that the special magistrate erred in 
concluding that knowledge of Dookhan's misconduct likely would 
not have been material to the defendant's decision to plead 
guilty.  The defendant points out that he did not have a prior 
28 
 
criminal record, and he contends that he pleaded guilty only 
because he believed that he had no viable trial strategy in 
light of the Commonwealth's presentation of the drug 
certificates.  The defendant emphasizes that there was no plea 
bargain in this case because not only did the Commonwealth 
refuse to dismiss any of the charges against him, but the 
prosecutor also urged the judge to impose an aggregate sentence 
of from four to six years in State prison, rather than three 
years in a house of correction, as the defendant requested.  In 
the defendant's view, he did not receive a substantial benefit 
from pleading guilty.  Had he known of Dookhan's malfeasance, 
the defendant continues, he would have had "nothing to lose but 
everything to gain" by proceeding to trial and challenging the 
reliability of her work at the Hinton drug lab.  We disagree. 
 
Apart from the drug certificates, the evidence against the 
defendant was strong.  Stanton conducted five controlled buys, 
each of which involved a hand-to-hand exchange of cash for two 
"twenty" bags or one "forty" bag of an off-white rock-like 
substance.  Not only could a rational jury have inferred that 
Stanton received what he had requested from the defendant, but 
field tests conducted on the substances indicated the 
presumptive presence of cocaine.22  See Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 
 
22 Although it does not appear that field tests were 
performed on the substances recovered from the defendant when he 
                     
29 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 136, 139-142 (2013) (presumptively positive field 
tests having requisite foundation, together with other 
corroborative circumstantial evidence, may carry persuasive 
weight in identifying substances).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Dawson, 399 Mass. 465, 467 (1987) ("Proof that a substance is a 
particular drug need not be made by chemical analysis and may be 
made by circumstantial evidence").  Notwithstanding the fact 
that all but one of the drug certificates were signed by 
chemists other than Dookhan, evidence of her misconduct would 
not have detracted from the factual bases supporting the 
defendant's guilty pleas.  Furthermore, apart from Dookhan's 
malfeasance, there is no evidence that the defendant had a 
substantial ground of defense that he would have pursued at 
trial. 
 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, he did receive a 
significant benefit from pleading guilty instead of proceeding 
to trial.  With respect to six counts of distribution of cocaine 
and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the judge 
sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of one year in a 
house of correction.  Had the defendant gone to trial, he could 
was taken into custody on August 22, 2006, the drug certificates 
pertaining to those substances, stating that they contained 
cocaine, were signed on the line labeled "Assistant Analysts" by 
Kate Corbett and Della Saunders, and there is no evidence that 
Dookhan was the setup operator for the analyses of those 
substances. 
                                                                  
30 
 
have been sentenced to from two and one-half years to ten years 
in State prison, or from one year to two and one-half years in a 
house of correction, on each count.  G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c), as 
amended through St. 1991, c. 391.  With respect to three counts 
of violating the controlled substances laws in proximity to a 
school or park, the judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent 
terms of two years in a house of correction, to commence on and 
after the completion of his sentences for the underlying drug 
crimes.  Had the defendant gone to trial, he could have been 
sentenced to from two and one-half years to fifteen years in 
State prison, or from two years to two and one-half years in a 
house of correction, from and after his sentences on the 
underlying drug crimes, on each count.  G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, as 
amended through St. 1998, c. 194, § 146.  In addition, with 
respect to the marijuana charge, which was placed on file, the 
defendant could have been sentenced to six months in a house of 
correction.  G. L. c. 94C, § 34, as amended through St. 1996, 
c. 271, § 1.  Regardless of the fact that the defendant did not 
have a prior criminal record, his decision to plead guilty 
resulted in the imposition of a far more lenient aggregate 
sentence than the judge could have imposed following the 
defendant's likely convictions after trial, given the strength 
of the Commonwealth's evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 
Mass. 387, 400 n.9 (2002) (judge may consider defendant's 
31 
 
willingness to admit guilt as factor in more lenient 
sentencing).  We conclude that the special magistrate did not 
abuse his discretion or otherwise err in determining that the 
defendant had failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating a 
reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had 
he known of Dookhan's misconduct. 
 
8.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty pleas is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.