Title: State v. Gwen

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Gwen, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5046.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5046 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GWEN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Gwen, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5046.] 
Criminal law—Domestic violence—Method of proving prior convictions for 
purposes of elevating level of offense under R.C. 2919.25(D)(4)—R.C. 
2945.75(B)(1)—Judgment entry showing prior conviction is not exclusive 
method of proof—Judgment entry of prior conviction must comply with 
Crim.R. 32(C). 
(No. 2011-0632—Submitted May 8, 2012—Decided November 1, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
No. 25218, 2011-Ohio-1512. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. The method set forth in R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) is not the exclusive method for 
proving a prior conviction. 
2. When, pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), the state offers a judgment entry to 
prove  the element of a prior domestic-violence conviction in order to 
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increase the offense level of  a later domestic-violence charge under R.C. 
2919.25(D)(4), the judgment entry must comply with Crim.R. 32(C). 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} We accepted this case to resolve a conflict between the Ninth and 
Sixth Appellate Districts regarding the proper method for proving prior 
convictions for purposes of elevating the degree of the offense of domestic 
violence.  State v. Gwen, 129 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2011-Ohio-3244, 949 N.E.2d 
1003.  The question certified to us is “[w]hether, for purposes of enhancing the 
offense level in a domestic violence case, the State is required to prove the prior 
domestic violence convictions by providing a judgment of conviction executed in 
conformity with Crim.R. 32(C).”  State v. Gwen, 130 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2011-
Ohio-5477, 955 N.E.2d 1018.  The certified question contains an ambiguity, for it 
may be read to ask either (1) whether the state must use only certified judgment 
entries to prove prior offenses or (2) whether, when certified entries are offered as 
proof of prior convictions, they must comply with Crim.R. 32(C).  We answer 
both questions as follows.  We hold that while R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) permits the 
state to prove a prior conviction by submitting a judgment entry of the conviction, 
the statute does not restrict the manner of proof to that method alone.  We hold 
further that when the state chooses to prove a prior conviction by using a 
judgment entry, that entry  must comply with Crim.R. 32(C). 
{¶ 2} We also affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, including the 
remand for resentencing on Gwen’s conviction of domestic violence as a felony 
of the fourth rather than the third degree.  The appellate court was correct in 
holding that the state proved only one, not two, prior convictions, and therefore 
the offense may be elevated only to a fourth-degree felony.  But as we will 
explain, we disapprove of the court of appeals’ statement that a journal entry of 
conviction need not comply with Crim.R. 32(C).  Id. at ¶ 35-37. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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I. Background 
{¶ 3} Appellant, Jeffrey Gwen, was arrested on March 24, 2009, after his 
girlfriend called 9-1-1 alleging an incident of domestic violence.  The state 
charged Gwen with one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 
2919.25(A), and one count of  illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, in 
violation of  R.C. 2925.14(C)(1).  The domestic-violence charge was enhanced to 
a third-degree felony under the statute applicable to third-time offenders, R.C. 
2919.25(D)(4).  Gwen pled not guilty; a jury found him guilty on both counts.  He 
was sentenced to one year of incarceration for domestic violence and 30 days for 
the drug offense, to be served concurrently. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, Gwen challenged the two items that were admitted as 
evidence of prior domestic-violence convictions, arguing that they did not comply 
with Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 803 
N.E.2d 163.  One item, State’s Exhibit 4, is a certified journal entry from the 
Summit County Court of Common Pleas, showing that Gwen pled guilty in 2002 
to domestic violence as a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).  
This was erroneous, however, because domestic violence does not exist as a 
minor misdemeanor, and under R.C. 2919.25(A) is a misdemeanor of the first 
degree, R.C. 2919.25(D)(2).  Gwen was sentenced to six months, which was 
suspended, and placed on probation for one year. 
{¶ 5} The second item, State’s Exhibit 3, consists of a series of 
documents relating to a charge of domestic violence prosecuted against Gwen in 
the Akron Municipal Court during 2000 to 2001.  It includes a docket statement, a 
police incident report, a criminal complaint charging Gwen with domestic 
violence under R.C. 2919.25(A), a temporary protection order, and a journal 
entry.  The certified journal entry is a printed form with spaces provided for the 
relevant data, such as plea entered, disposition, sentence, and the like.  The spaces 
provided for recording whether Gwen had been found guilty or not guilty are 
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blank.  The entry does show that Gwen pled not guilty, that he was sentenced to 
30 days, with credit for three days served, fined $50, and ordered to pay costs on 
the domestic-violence charge.  The 30-day sentence was apparently suspended on 
the condition that Gwen complete a “Time Out” program.  On the left margin of 
the entry appears a handwritten note that says, “2/01 [illegible word] D.V—M4 
Menacing.” 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals rejected Gwen’s argument that State’s Exhibit 
4 was fatally defective because it misidentified the offense as a minor 
misdemeanor, finding  no authority that such an error renders the evidence of 
conviction inadmissible.  Nevertheless, the court held that even if it was error to 
rely on this entry as proof of a prior conviction, that error was harmless because 
Gwen had testified that he had been convicted of domestic violence.  State v. 
Gwen, 9th Dist. No. 25218, 2011-Ohio-1512, ¶ 39.  But on State’s Exhibit 3, the 
court found the Akron Municipal Court’s disposition of that case to be unclear, 
and there was no other evidence that Gwen had been convicted of or previously 
pled guilty to domestic violence in that case. 
{¶ 7} The Ninth District therefore affirmed Gwen’s domestic-violence 
conviction, but as a fourth-degree rather than a third-degree felony, because the 
state had not presented evidence of at least two prior domestic-violence 
convictions. Id. at ¶ 28. The court also held that compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) 
was not a prerequisite to proving a prior offense for purposes of increasing a 
subsequent charge.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 8} Gwen filed a motion to certify a conflict between districts, arguing 
that the Ninth District’s opinion conflicts with the Sixth District’s decision in 
State v. Finney, 6th Dist. No. F-06-009, 2006-Ohio-5770, which held that the state 
was required to prove a prior conviction by providing a judgment of conviction 
that was executed in conformity with Crim.R. 32(C).  We recognized the conflict 
as certified. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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{¶ 9} We revise the question into two parts.  The first part, which asks 
whether a judgment of conviction is the exclusive method of proving a prior 
conviction under R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), is answered “no.”   The second part, which 
asks whether the judgment entry must comply with Crim.R. 32(C) when the state 
elects to use it to prove a prior conviction, we answer “yes.” 
II. Analysis 
A. Proving Prior Convictions of Domestic Violence—“Pleaded Guilty to” or 
“Convicted of” 
{¶ 10} The offense of domestic violence is defined by R.C. 2919.25(A), 
(B), and (C).  A first-time offense is either a misdemeanor of the fourth degree or 
a misdemeanor of the first degree, depending upon the section of the statute under 
which the defendant is charged.  R.C. 2919.25(D)(2).  A second offense is either a 
felony of the fourth degree or a second-degree misdemeanor.  R.C. 
2919.25(D)(3).  If the offender has “pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or 
more offenses of domestic violence,” a subsequent domestic-violence offense is 
elevated to either a felony of the third degree or a first-degree misdemeanor.  R.C. 
2919.25(D)(4).  Because the state contended that he had already been convicted 
twice of domestic violence, Gwen was charged with a third-degree felony. 
{¶ 11} When the existence of a prior conviction affects the degree of the 
offense and not just the punishment available upon conviction, it is an essential 
element of the offense. See State v. Allen, 29 Ohio St.3d 53, 54, 506 N.E.2d 199 
(1987) (an element elevates the degree of the offense; an enhancement provision 
increases only the penalty).  Thus, the state was required to prove that Gwen had 
“pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more offenses of domestic 
violence.”  By using the phrase “pleaded guilty to” as an alternative to “convicted 
of,” in R.C. 2919.25(D)(4), the General Assembly has allowed the state to offer 
evidence of a defendant’s guilty plea as proof of a prior offense of domestic 
violence.  And no matter how the state chooses to prove this element, it must be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the level of the offense may be 
increased. State v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d 171, 173, 389 N.E.2d 494 (1979). 
{¶ 12} In Gwen’s case the state’s offer of State’s Exhibit 3 as proof of a 
prior conviction is the only point requiring analysis.  State’s Exhibit 4 referred to 
“minor misdemeanor” domestic violence, which is a nonexistent offense, making 
the use of the exhibit improper.  But Gwen admitted that he had been convicted, 
so Gwen’s admission served as proof of the prior offense to which Exhibit 4 
referred. Any reliance on the document was therefore harmless error. 
B. Proof under R.C. 2945.75(B) 
{¶ 13} The General Assembly has enacted a statute specifically 
addressing proof of a prior conviction.  R.C. 2945.75(B) provides: 
 
(1) Whenever in any case it is necessary to prove a prior 
conviction, a certified copy of the entry of judgment in such prior 
conviction together with evidence sufficient to identify the 
defendant named in the entry as the offender in the case at bar, is 
sufficient to prove such prior conviction. 
(2) Whenever in any case it is necessary to prove a prior 
conviction of an offense for which the registrar of motor vehicles 
maintains a record, a certified copy of the record that shows the 
name, date of birth, and social security number of the accused is 
prima-facie evidence of the identity of the accused and prima-facie 
evidence of all prior convictions shown on the record. The accused 
may offer evidence to rebut the prima-facie evidence of the 
accused's identity and the evidence of prior convictions. Proof of a 
prior conviction of an offense for which the registrar maintains a 
record may also be proved as provided in division (B)(1) of this 
section. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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(3) If the defendant claims a constitutional defect in any 
prior conviction, the defendant has the burden of proving the 
defect by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) sets forth one way to provide “sufficient” 
proof of a prior conviction, but does not provide the only method to prove it.  For 
example, an offender may, and often does, stipulate to a prior conviction to avoid 
the evidence being presented before a jury. 
{¶ 15} The question is whether certified entries, when offered as proof, 
must comply with Crim.R. 32(C) before they may prove a prior conviction. 
C. The Conflict Between the Ninth and Sixth Districts 
{¶ 16} The Ninth District relied on an earlier decision of its own to say 
that the state is not required to offer judgment entries that comply with Crim.R. 
32(C).  State v. McCumbers, 9th Dist. No. 25169, 2010-Ohio-6129.  In 
McCumbers, the defendant had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, an offense elevated to a felony when the 
defendant “previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to” five or more 
similar violations within the last 20 years.  R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d).  To prove the 
five previous offenses, the state offered McCumbers’s previous sentencing 
entries, traffic citations, and BMV records into evidence. R.C. 2945.75(B)(2) 
specifically provides that in cases where the prior offense is one for which the 
registrar of motor vehicles maintains a record, a certified copy of the record is 
prima facie evidence of the identity of the accused and of all convictions shown 
on the record. The state’s evidence was unrebutted.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
{¶ 17} On appeal, McCumbers contended that three of the entries offered 
to prove prior convictions were defective under Crim.R. 32(C).  R.C. 
2941.1413(A).  The Ninth District held that the statutory reference to pleas of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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guilty or convictions meant that the General Assembly intended “the word 
‘convicted’ to refer only to a determination of guilt and not a judgment of 
conviction.” Id. at ¶ 13.  In other words, the state would not have to offer a 
judgment entry of conviction to prove a prior offense.  Thus, compliance with 
Crim.R. 32(C) was not required. 
{¶ 18} In the case certified as being in conflict with Gwen’s, the Sixth 
District considered whether the state had provided sufficient evidence of five 
prior DUI offenses to raise later charges to  felonies of the fourth degree under 
R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d). State v. Finney, 6th Dist. No. F-06-009, 2006-Ohio-5770. 
The statutory language under review was the same as in McCumbers, i.e., a DUI 
offense being elevated to a felony if, within 20 years of the offense, the defendant 
previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more equivalent 
offenses. R.C. 2941.1413(A) and 4511.19(G)(1)(d).  The Sixth District did not 
analyze the phrase “or pleaded guilty to” but merely  held that because the prior 
convictions are “an element of the offense, the state was required to prove the 
prior convictions by providing a judgment of conviction executed in conformity 
with Crim.R. 32(C).” Id. at ¶ 18. 
D. Resolution—Proving a Prior Conviction to Raise the Level of an Offense 
{¶ 19} The state would rewrite the statute to say that if court records show 
that a defendant has either entered a guilty plea or been found guilty of a 
domestic-violence offense in two prior instances, he or she is subject to being 
charged with an increased level of domestic violence.  But as noted above, R.C. 
2919.25(D)(4) requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant “previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of  two or more 
offenses of domestic violence” before being subject to a penalty for a third-degree 
felony. When the state chooses to prove a prior offense not through a guilty plea, 
but via a conviction, and the defendant does not stipulate to the fact of the 
conviction, the judgment entry of conviction offered must contain the four 
January Term, 2012 
 
9 
 
elements described in Crim.R. 32(C) and in State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 
2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus.  A finding of 
guilt is not enough. 
{¶ 20} We do not agree with the Ninth District’s acceptance of the 
argument that the word “convicted” refers only to a determination of guilt and not 
a judgment of conviction.  In State v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d at 178, 389 
N.E.2d 494, this court held that a sentence must have been imposed before an 
offender may be regarded as having a prior conviction,  “ ‘Conviction’ includes 
both the guilt determination and the penalty imposition.”  State v. Poindexter, 36 
Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 520 N.E.2d 568 (1988).  A judgment of conviction does not exist 
without a sentence.  State v. Robinson, 187 Ohio App.3d 253, 2010-Ohio-543, 
931 N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.).  And we have determined that a judgment entry 
of conviction must follow Crim.R. 32(C) to be appealable.  State v. Baker, 119 
Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163.  A final appealable judgment 
entry of conviction must contain (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, 
(3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the 
journal by the clerk. State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 
N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus.  When the state chooses to provide a 
judgment of conviction pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), the entry must comply 
with Crim.R. 32(C).  This will be “sufficient” proof of the conviction. 
{¶ 21} Gwen objects to the admission of State's Exhibits 3 and 4, arguing 
that the entries do not meet the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Baker.  
The court of appeals agreed that State’s Exhibit 3 was insufficient, and we agree 
on that point.  However, we do not agree that Exhibit 3 need not comply with 
Crim.R. 32(C).  As to State’s Exhibit 4, we also agree with the court of appeals 
that although the entry is not technically correct in stating the level of offense, 
Gwen’s own admission that he had been convicted of domestic violence in the 
case to which that entry referred proves at least one prior offense.  Id. at ¶ 39. 
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III. Conclusion 
{¶ 22} We answer the certified question, as modified, in the following 
way.  First, the method set forth in R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) is not the exclusive 
method for proving a prior conviction.  We agree with those appellate courts that 
have held that other methods may exist to prove the element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See, e.g., State v. Frambach, 81 Ohio App.3d 834, 843, 612 N.E.2d 424 
(1992); State v. Chaney, 128 Ohio App.3d 100, 105-106, 713 N.E.2d 1118 
(1998); In re R.B., 6th Dist. Nos. H-10-018 and H-10-019, 2011-Ohio-5042, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 23} Secondly,  we hold that when, pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), the 
state chooses to offer judgment entries to prove the element of prior domestic-
violence convictions in order to increase the offense level of a later domestic-
violence charge under R.C. 2919.25(D)(4), the judgments must comply with 
Crim.R. 32(C).  In that event, the judgment entry must set forth (1) the fact of a 
conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge's signature, and (4) the time stamp 
indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk. State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 
303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus, explaining 
Crim.R. 32(C), and modifying State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-
3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. 
{¶ 24} For the reasons stated, while we disapprove of part of the 
reasoning contained in the court of appeals’ opinion, we affirm its judgment.  See 
State ex rel. Denton v. Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861, 784 
N.E.2d  99,  ¶ 18 (this court will not reverse a correct judgment merely because 
the reasoning is flawed). 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2012 
 
11 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 25} In this appeal, we confront two issues: one, whether R.C. 
2945.75(B)(1) provides the exclusive method by which the state must prove a 
prior conviction for purposes of enhancing the level of a subsequent domestic-
violence offense and two, whether an entry of judgment offered for that purpose 
must comply with the finality requirements of Crim.R. 32(C).  Although I concur 
in the holding of the majority that the state is not restricted to the method for 
proving a prior conviction set forth in R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), I respectfully dissent 
from the determination that an entry of judgment offered for that purpose must 
comply with Crim.R. 32(C). 
Enhancement of a Subsequent Offense for Domestic Violence 
{¶ 26} Domestic violence is a third-degree felony if the offender 
“previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more offenses of 
domestic violence.”  R.C. 2919.25(D)(4).  A prior conviction is an essential 
element of a crime when it enhances the level of the subsequent offense, State v. 
Allen, 29 Ohio St.3d 53, 54, 506 N.E.2d 199 (1987), and the state is required to 
prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d 
171, 173, 389 N.E.2d 494 (1979).  Thus, to sustain a conviction for domestic 
violence as a third-degree felony in accordance with R.C. 2919.25(D)(4), the state 
assumed the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gwen “previously 
has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more offenses of domestic 
violence.” 
{¶ 27} Regarding such proof, R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) provides: 
 
 
Whenever in any case it is necessary to prove a prior 
conviction, a certified copy of the entry of judgment in such prior 
conviction together with evidence sufficient to identify the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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defendant named in the entry as the offender in the case at bar, is 
sufficient to prove such prior conviction. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 28} Following this framework, the first issue is whether R.C. 
2945.75(B)(1) provides the exclusive method by which the state must prove a 
prior conviction for purposes of enhancing a subsequent domestic-violence 
offense, and its resolution requires interpretation of the statute.  The goal of 
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  
State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11.  
When analyzing a statute, we first examine its plain language and apply the 
statute as written when the meaning is clear and unambiguous.  State v. Lowe, 112 
Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 29} R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) provides that a certified copy of an entry of 
judgment and identification of the defendant named in the entry constitute 
sufficient evidence of a prior conviction.  The language of that statute is plain and 
its meaning is unambiguous; when the state needs to prove a prior conviction to 
enhance a subsequent offense, specific evidence offered to identify the defendant 
together with the judgment of conviction is sufficient proof.  R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), 
however, does not contain any language suggesting that this method is the 
exclusive method of proof; it merely identifies evidence that is sufficient proof. 
{¶ 30} Therefore, I agree with the determination that R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) 
provides one method by which the state may prove a prior conviction, but it is not 
the only method by which the state must do so, and, thus, I concur in this holding 
of the majority. 
{¶ 31} The second issue we confront is whether an entry of judgment 
offered by the state as proof of a prior conviction must comply with the finality 
requirements of Crim.R. 32(C).  Resolution requires that we construe R.C. 
January Term, 2012 
 
13 
 
2919.25(D), which provides for enhancement of a subsequent domestic-violence 
offense if the offender “previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two 
or more offenses of domestic violence.” 
{¶ 32} The terms “pleaded guilty” and “convicted” are at the core of this 
controversy and provide the starting point for analysis, which requires that we 
read these terms in context and construe them according to the ordinary rules of 
grammar and common usage.  R.C. 1.42.  The language here is plain and its 
meaning is unambiguous; these terms connote past action, identifying the means 
by which an offender possesses a prior conviction for domestic violence, and read 
together in context denote a determination of guilt. 
{¶ 33} Further, R.C. 2919.25(D) does not mention or contain any 
reference to Crim.R. 32(C), and it contains no language suggesting that an entry 
of judgment offered by the state to prove a prior conviction must include the 
technical requirements for finality, which has developed in the context of 
appealable orders for the purpose of providing a date certain from which the time 
for appeal begins to run, and which shares neither context nor purpose with 
offense enhancement.  Thus, in my view, reading R.C. 2919.25(D) as requiring 
compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) adds an element that does not exist in the statute.  
As such, that reading violates the rule of construction that we give legal effect to 
the words of a statute, as well as the principle that an unambiguous statute may 
not be modified by adding or deleting words.  State v. Teamer, 82 Ohio St.3d 490, 
491, 696 N.E.2d 1049 (1998). 
{¶ 34} Interpreting R.C. 2919.25(D) in this manner is inconsistent with 
our decision in State ex rel. Watkins v. Fiorenzo, 71 Ohio St.3d 259, 643 N.E.2d 
521 (1994), which construed language in former R.C. 2921.41(C)(1) providing 
that any official who is “convicted of or pleads guilty to” theft in office is forever 
disqualified from holding any public office.  This court concluded that the statute 
required only a determination of guilt, because its plain language allowed for a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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guilty plea to invoke disqualification.  Id. at 260.  In Watkins, the court further 
explained that in so wording the statute, “the General Assembly placed 
‘convicted’ on equal footing with a guilty plea.” 
{¶ 35} The rationale of State ex rel. Watkins v. Fiorenzo is applicable and 
supports interpreting R.C. 2919.25(D) in the same manner.  Here, too, the General 
Assembly placed “pleaded guilty to” and “convicted of” on equal footing because 
either can serve as the basis for enhancing a subsequent domestic-violence 
offense.  The context in which those terms are used in both cases is also similar, 
further buttressing that determination. 
{¶ 36} A careful reading of State v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d 171, 389 
N.E.2d 494 (1979), discloses that it likewise lends support for this construction.  
There, the defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 
2913.51.  However, before the trial court imposed sentence, in a separate 
indictment, the state alleged that the offense to which the defendant had pled 
guilty was grand theft pursuant to former R.C. 2913.02(B), which enhanced the 
offense from a misdemeanor to a fourth-degree felony.  The statutory language 
provided that if the offender had “previously been convicted of a theft offense, 
then violation of this section is grand theft, a felony of the fourth degree.”  1972 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1927.  Guided by the mandate of 
R.C. 2901.04(A) to construe definitions of criminal offenses against the state and 
in favor of the accused, as well as by the fact that a prior conviction constituted an 
element of the crime of grand theft, this court concluded that the term “convicted” 
in the statute meant a final judgment of conviction.  In addition, our analysis 
expressed agreement with “the reasoned conclusion” of the appellate court that “if 
the allegation of a plea of guilty is legally insufficient to charge an offense of 
which a prior conviction is a requisite element, then the proof of such plea is 
necessarily insufficient to establish this element of the charged offense.”  Id. at 
177. 
January Term, 2012 
 
15 
 
{¶ 37} The syllabus paragraphs of Henderson appear to support a contrary 
result, but the differences in statutory language and purposes between that case 
and this make Henderson irrelevant.  Unlike former R.C. 2913.02(B) in 
Henderson, R.C. 2919.25(D) does not limit enhancement to past convictions.  It 
includes guilty pleas, which expresses a legislative intent to lessen the state’s 
burden of proof.  Instead, the majority increases the state’s burden by requiring 
compliance with Crim.R. 32(C). 
{¶ 38} Notably, the author of the majority dissented in State v. Whitfield, 
and advanced arguments similar to those expressed in this dissent.  124 Ohio 
St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 31-34 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).  
{¶ 39} In my view, the language of R.C. 2919.25(D) is plain and its 
meaning is unambiguous, and it contains no language suggesting that an entry of 
judgment must comply with Crim.R. 32(C).  Thus, reading R.C. 2919.25(D) to 
mandate that an entry of judgment include all the elements of finality adds a 
requirement that is not found in the statute.  Such a construction violates the duty 
to apply a statute as written and not to read words into a statute that the legislature 
did not place there.  State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 
N.E.2d 149, ¶ 37. 
{¶ 40} Accordingly, an entry of judgment offered by the state pursuant to 
R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) to prove a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing a 
subsequent domestic-violence conviction need not comply with Crim.R. 32(C); 
enhancement in R.C. 2919.25(D) is premised on a determination of guilt and not 
on a judgment containing all the requisites of finality, which developed in an 
unrelated context and for a different purpose. 
{¶ 41} The purpose and legislative history of R.C. 2919.25 remove any 
doubt as to legislative intent.  First, the General Assembly’s concern with the 
special nature and seriousness of domestic violence is reflected in its decision to 
allow the state more leeway in proving prior offenses.  A plea of guilty is 
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sufficient.  The legislature could have limited enhancement to cases in which 
there is a judgment entry of conviction but it did not do so. 
{¶ 42} Further, in 2002 the 124th General Assembly in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
327 amended R.C. 2919.25(D), adding the phrase “pleaded guilty to” and placed 
it next to “convicted of,” joined by the disjunctive “or.”  149 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
7548.  The Act Summary of the Final Bill Analysis sets forth the intent of the 
legislature: 
 
Under preexisting law retained by the act, generally, a violation of 
the third prohibition is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and a 
violation of either of the first two prohibitions is a misdemeanor of 
the first degree.  But under former law, if the offender previously 
had been convicted of domestic violence, * * * a violation of the 
third prohibition was a misdemeanor of the third degree, and a 
violation of either of the first two prohibitions was a felony of the 
fifth degree.  (R.C. 2919.25.) 
 
* * * 
 
The act expands the circumstances in which former law 
enhanced the penalty for the offense of domestic violence.  Under 
the act, the penalty also is enhanced when the offender previously 
pleaded guilty to any of the offenses described above in 
“Formerly.”  Under former law, the statutory language provided 
for enhancement of the penalty only when the offender previously 
had been convicted of any of those offenses.  The act also expands 
the list of offenses that is relevant in determining the enhancement.  
Under the act, the penalty also is enhanced when the offender 
previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of 
a law of the United States or another state, or a municipal 
January Term, 2012 
 
17 
 
ordinance of a municipal corporation in another state that is 
substantially similar to the violations described above in 
“Formerly.”  (R.C. 2919.25(D).) 
 
(Emphasis and boldface sic.)  
{¶ 43} The above demonstrates that the legislature added “pleaded guilty” 
to expand the circumstances for enhancement, and in doing so, placed guilty pleas 
and convictions on an equal footing.  Requiring an entry of judgment offered as 
proof of a prior conviction to comply with Crim.R. 32(C) narrows the 
circumstances for enhancement by disqualifying entries that, coupled with 
evidence of identification, would otherwise constitute sufficient evidence of a 
prior conviction. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 44} The language of R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) is plain and its meaning 
unambiguous: when the state needs to prove a prior conviction to enhance a 
subsequent domestic violence offense, R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) identifies evidence that 
constitutes sufficient proof without restricting the state to this method of proof 
exclusively. 
{¶ 45} I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority requiring an 
entry of judgment offered as proof of a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing 
a subsequent domestic-violence offense to comply with Crim.R. 32(C), as such a 
construction imposes a new requirement not in the statute and contravenes 
expressed legislative intent. 
{¶ 46} For these reasons, I would resolve the conflict by holding that a 
certified copy of an entry of judgment offered by the state pursuant to R.C. 
2945.75(B)(1) to prove a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing a subsequent 
domestic-violence offense need not comply with Crim.R. 32(C).  I would reverse 
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that portion of the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven 
DiMartino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Neil P. Agarwal, for appellant. 
______________________