Title: In re Corey T.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 20 
Docket: 
Cum-17-394 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 11, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
February 1, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE COREY T. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother of Corey T. appeals from a judgment entered by the 
District Court (Portland, Eggert, J.) finding jeopardy as to the mother pursuant 
to 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2017).1  She contends that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the trial court’s finding of jeopardy.2  Because the record evidence 
supports the court’s finding and determination of jeopardy, we affirm the 
judgment. 
                                         
1  The court also found jeopardy as to the father.  The father filed an appeal that was later 
withdrawn.   
2  The jeopardy order included a provision, based on the court’s finding that continued 
reunification services were inconsistent with the permanency plan, relieving the Department of 
Health and Human Services of its obligation to provide the mother with reunification services 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041(2)(A-2)(2) (2017).  Although the mother challenges this finding and 
order, that part of her appeal is from an interlocutory order and we do not address it.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4006 (2017); In re Z.S., 2015 ME 110, ¶ 8, 121 A.3d 1286 (“[T]he disposition ordered by a court 
after it makes [a jeopardy] finding is not appealable.”) (second alteration in original) (quotation 
marks omitted); In re Johnna M., 2006 ME 46, ¶ 7, 903 A.2d 331. 
 
2 
 
[¶2]  The Department of Health and Human Services initiated a child 
protection proceeding, and the court (Dobson, J.) entered a preliminary 
protection order and placed the child in Department custody on April 22, 2017, 
the day the child was born.  After a contested hearing, by order dated 
September 14, 2017, the court (Eggert, J.) found jeopardy to the child’s health 
and welfare.  The court based its jeopardy determination on the following 
findings of fact: 
 
The mother . . . has been diagnosed with Schizoaffective 
Disorder, and she has been working with [a service provider] for at 
least the past year.  Based on the testimony, it is clear that the 
mother struggles with daily functioning and social interactions due 
to her mental health diagnosis.  According to her psychiatric nurse 
practitioner, the mother is only able to manage her own activities 
of daily living and there are no signs that she can do much more 
than that, preventing her from being able to appropriately care for 
an infant.   
 
 
[The mother] has been living at [a women’s homeless 
shelter] for the past seven years, but cannot live there with a child.  
She may soon be getting more permanent housing at a [supported 
housing] group home, which would provide her with 24-hour 
support and would be good for her.  The group home is only for 
adults.  There is no way to determine how long she would be a 
resident there, but estimates of six months to two years are too 
long to wait for permanency for this infant.   
 
[¶3]  Based on these findings, the court determined, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the child was in circumstances of “jeopardy to his health 
 
3 
and welfare in the absence of a Jeopardy Order.”  See 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2).  The 
mother timely appealed.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4006; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
[¶4]  Contrary to the mother’s contentions, the court’s findings are 
supported by competent evidence in the record that can rationally be 
understood to establish as more likely than not that the child was in 
circumstances of jeopardy to his health and welfare.3  See 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2); 
In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶¶ 9, 13, 140 A.3d 1226. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kristina Dougherty, Esq., Wise Old Law, LLC, Portland, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number PC-2017-39 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
3  The mother also made an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in her direct appeal from the 
jeopardy order.  Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in child protection proceedings are an “area 
of evolving jurisprudence.”  In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 19, 169 A.3d 914.  We need not reach the 
mother’s argument because, even assuming that the claim is cognizable on appeal from a jeopardy 
order, such a claim would require a prima facie showing of ineffectiveness.  See In re Aliyah M., 
2016 ME 106, ¶ 12, 144 A.3d 50.  Without deciding whether, and how, a parent may make a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel to challenge a jeopardy order, we conclude that the record does not 
support a genuine claim that counsel’s performance rose to the level of serious incompetency, 
inefficiency, or inattention, or that “the [mother] was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged failure[s].”  
In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶¶ 8, 12-14, 172 A.3d 916 (second alteration in original) (quotation 
marks omitted).