Title: AGC v. Jaseb

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 18
September Term, 2000
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND 
v.
SETAREH R. JASEB
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
  (retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed: June 8, 2001
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition for
disciplinary action against Setareh R. Jaseb (Respondent), alleging violations of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Commission (Petitioner), acting through Bar Counsel,
charged Respondent with violating Rules 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 4.1 (Truthfulness
in Statements to others), 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), 8.4(c) and
(d) (Misconduct), and 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters).  Pursuant to Maryland
Rule 16-709 et seq., we referred the charges to Judge Martha G. Kavanaugh of the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County to conduct a hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that Respondent
had violated Rule 5.3, but that Respondent had not violated Rules 3.3, 4.1, 8.4(c) and (d) and
8.1(a).  In this Court, Petitioner took exception to Judge Kavanaugh’s conclusion that
Respondent did not violate Rule 8.4(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent took no exceptions to Judge Kavanaugh’s findings of fact or conclusions of law,
but, instead, filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for disciplinary action.
I.
Following an evidentiary hearing held on October 16, 2000, Judge Kavanaugh filed a
memorandum opinion detailing her findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We set forth Judge
Kavanaugh’s memorandum opinion below:
“The issue before the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland, is whether or not Setareh R. Jaseb (hereinafter
[R]espondent), a 35-year-old Maryland attorney, violated the
following rules of [a] Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional
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Conduct:
“Rule 3.3
CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a)
A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1)
Make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal.
“Rule 4.1
TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO
OTHERS
(a)
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1)
Make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person.
“Rule 5.3
R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S  R E G A R D I N G
NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or
associated with a lawyer:
* * * * *
(b)
a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the
nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations
of the lawyer.
“Rule 8.4
MISCONDUCT
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It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * * * *
(c)
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; and 
(d)
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.
“Rule 8.1:
BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY
MATTERS
. . . a lawyer in connection with . . . a disciplinary matter, shall
not:
(a)
knowingly make a false statement of fact.
“On October 16, 2000, a hearing was held before this
Court.  Counsel for the Attorney Grievance Commission,
Raymond A. Hein, Esquire, was present.  Respondent, Setareh R.
Jaseb, was present with her counsel, Arthur G. Kahn, Esquire.
Cooper V. Coleman, Teresa Burke Wright, Esquire, and
Respondent testified.  The Court received the following exhibits
from the Petitioner:
1.
March 13, 1998 letter from [R]espondent to [B]ar
[C]ounsel, Mr. Hein;
2.
March 23, 1998 letter from Mr. Hein to [R]espondent;
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3.
April 7, 1998 letter from [R]espondent to Mr.
Hein;
4.
May 
12, 
1999 
Inquiry 
Panel 
testimony 
of
[R]espondent;
5.
Certified District Court [of Maryland, sitting in
Montgomery County] docket entries in Chinese Carpet Center,
Inc./Anetcom International v. Massoud Kowkabi (0602-
0022009-96);
6.
January 29, 1997 petition for bankruptcy filed for
Joe Kowkabi by [R]espondent;
7.
November 19, 1997 letter from Cooper V.
Coleman to Joel Zuckerman, Esquire, of Shaein and Shelton;
8. and 9.
Recording and transcript of hearing before
Judge Craven on January 28, 1998;
10. and 11.
Recording and transcript of phone message
left by [R]espondent on Ms. Burke Wright’s answering machine
on January 28, 1998.
“The Court received the following exhibits from the
[R]espondent:
1.
March 17, 1998 letter from Cooper V. Coleman to
Mr. Hein;
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2.
February 9, 1998 letter from Cooper V. Coleman
to Mr. Hein;
3.
January 29, 1998 petition for bankruptcy filed for
Joe Kowkabi by [R]espondent with December 10, 1997 affidavit.
FACTS
“In August, 1997, Anetcom International was assigned a
$20,000 judgment against Massoud Kowkabi.  The Director of
Anetcom International, Cooper V. Coleman, garnished the $3,800
monthly rental income of a condominium owned by Kowkabi.
The first garnishment mistakenly named the tenant rather than the
actual lessee, Bank of Japan.  The Bank’s attorney, Teresa Burke
Wright, placed the November rent in its trust account pending a
District Court ruling.  On October 31, 1997, [R]espondent on
behalf of her pro bono client,  Kowkabi, filed a motion to quash
garnishment of the rent because the wrong tenant was named.  On
November 4, 1997, Mr. Coleman filed an opposition to
Kowkabi’s motion to quash garnishment.  Mr. Coleman noted that
the Bank of Japan was named in his second writ of garnishment
filed on October 31, 1997.  Mr. Coleman offered a compromise,
which would allow Kowkabi to retain 50% of all future rental
payments under the lease until the $24,224 judgment was paid in
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full.
“Around November 12th, [R]espondent and Mr. Coleman
spoke by telephone.  During that conversation, Mr. Coleman
agreed to release the $3,800 November rent because the
[R]espondent accepted his proposal about future rents.  The
[R]espondent denies reaching a final agreement with Mr.
Coleman, however, because her client was out of the country.
Mr. Coleman was concerned because the [R]espondent never sent
a confirming fax.  He wrote to her prior law firm outlining his
understanding of the agreement.
“There 
was 
no 
further 
communication 
between
[R]espondent and Coleman until January 28, 1998, at the District
Court for Montgomery 
County 
in 
Silver 
Spring, 
where
[R]espondent and Mr. Coleman were before the Honorable
Thomas Craven for a motions hearing.  Before the hearing, the
[R]espondent told Coleman her client was in Chapter 7
bankruptcy and gave him #95-15772 as the case number.  The
[R]espondent told Judge Craven ‘. . . Mr. Kowkabi is in
bankruptcy proceedings and as such we ask that the motion to
quash the garnishment  be granted since he is in bankruptcy
proceedings.  And I have that case number.  The bankruptcy case
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-7-
. . .’  Judge Craven interrupted and, at his request, the
[R]espondent filed a suggestion of bankruptcy.
“After the hearing the [R]espondent insisted that the
December and January rent escrow should be released because
the proceedings were ‘Stayed.’  Mr. Coleman disagreed.
“Ms. Teresa Burke Wright testified that she returned
[R]espondent’s call after receiving the following voice mail
message:
‘Ms. Burke Wright, hi, this is Setareh Jaseb calling
on behalf of the Kowkabis.  This is the case
regarding Anetcom International v. Kowkabi.  I am
sure you are familiar with that case.  You have two
months worth of, ah, rent payments in escrow.  We
were in court today and the District Court of
Maryland, Judge Craven ordered, ah that the
escrow account be handed over to the Kowkabis.
So if you would please, ah, go ahead and send the
amount of the escrow accounts to the address that
you had before as soon as possible because we do
need that money before, ah, the beginning of next
month – before February first.  Mr. Cooper
Coleman said that he would call you as well so that
we can get this done as soon as possible.  Ah, if he
does not call you please I would ask you to call
him.  I am sure you have his number.  Ah, if you
don’t have his number.  I, I’m afraid I don’t have it
in front of me but my phone number is 3-0-1-2-7-
9-9-6-6-3 – if you would like to contact me
regarding any questions you may have.  Otherwise,
I would appreciate, ah, your immediate attention to
this matter.  Thank you, bye-bye.’
During the conversation, the [R]espondent specifically stated that
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the Court ordered the release of the funds.  Ms. Wright
subsequently called Mr. Coleman who told her that the court did
not order the release of the funds.  The actual court order stated
that the case was ‘stayed.’
“Mr. 
Coleman’s 
suspicions 
about 
the 
[R]espondent
became increasingly heightened.  On January 29, 1998, he
searched the Bankruptcy Court files and learned that the case
number  the [R]espondent gave him was a 1995 filing for
Kowkabi’s business.  He notified the [R]espondent who on
January 29, 1998, filed a Chapter 7 Petition for Kowkabi with his
affidavit, dated December 11, 1997.  The [R]espondent told Mr.
Coleman that she had not filed the petition on December 11th, but
that another attorney had done so.
“Based upon the preceding scenario, Mr. Coleman filed a
Complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission. 
Respondent’s Testimony
“The [R]espondent was born in Oklahoma in 1965.  She
graduated from Widener University School of Law in 1992 and
was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 23, 1994.  Her first
position as an attorney was in June, 1996, with the Rockville firm
of Shein and Shelton.  Her pay was $1,000 per month.  She
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engaged in research, collection of the firm’s past due accounts,
answering the phones, filing, scheduling of hearings and typing.
Her time was evenly divided between secretarial work and
solicitation of her own clients for which she could retain 60% of
the fees.  Her total client base consisted of three uncontested
divorces, two domestic violence matters, three bankruptcy
petitions, drafting a consignment contract and a personal injury
case.  The [R]espondent received no supervision from the other
lawyers at the firm.  She relied on her own research at the
Courthouse library.
“The 
[R]espondent 
handled 
minor 
legal 
matters 
for
Kowkabi before she agreed to file his bankruptcy claim pro
bono.  Kowkabi gave her a money order payable to the
Bankruptcy Clerk for $175.00.  On December 10th, Kowkabi
signed the Bankruptcy Petition in duplicate, i.e., two signature
pages.
“The [R]espondent left the firm October 31, 1997,
because of a host of family problems.  She is currently a single
mother.
“Before the January 28th hearing, [R]espondent did not
examine Kowkabi’s file.  She saw a post-it note with her law
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clerk’s handwriting, indicating the old Bankruptcy number and the
filing date of December 11th.  There was no date-stamped copy in
the file.
“The [R]espondent’s law clerk, Ali Pournader, worked only
twice a week for three weeks.  He organized her files and filed
pleadings in court.  Mr. Pournader left on a ‘sour note’ as he
resented ‘running around.’
“The [R]espondent testified that despite Judge Craven’s
ruling she, at the time, believed that he meant the funds should be
released to her client.  She ‘thought she had won’ even though
Judge Craven said ‘I will not quash anything.’  On cross
examination, the [R]espondent said she did not receive any notice
from the Bankruptcy Court after December 11th even though she
knew notice was due within 30 days.  The lack of notice did not
concern her and she never notified Mr. Coleman or Ms. Wright
about the December bankruptcy petition.
“Bar counsel in his closing remarks acknowledged that it
is for this Court to assess [R]espondent’s credibility and to
evaluate her handling of the cases as either negligent or as
fraudulent.  Respondent’s counsel argued that his client’s
behavior was a result of her inexperience, lack of supervision, and
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family problems.
“This Court is suspicious of the [R]espondent’s course of
dealing with Mr. Coleman.  Respondent was wrong in her
representations of fact and law to Judge Craven, Mr. Coleman and
Ms. Wright.  This Court is not convinced by clear and convincing
evidence that the [R]espondent engaged in intentional deceit.
Implicit in the court’s reasoning in Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 443, 635 A.2d 1315,  [1316 (1994)] is
the notion that to be a violation of Rule 8.4, a misrepresentation
must be intentional.  In Myers, the court remanded ‘the case to
the hearing court for factual determination of whether the
statements, which [it] found were false and misleading, were
negligently uttered or constituted intentional misrepresentations.’
Id.  It appears that the [R]espondent here was negligent, which
resulted in a ‘tangled web.’ 
“Specifically, the [R]espondent acknowledged that she did
not know in 1997 and 1998 the definitions of basic legal terms,
i.e. ‘stay’.  She did not adequately supervise her law clerk in that
she never discussed nor confirmed with him the December 11th
bankruptcy filing.  Respondent was negligent in not informing Mr.
Coleman and Ms. Wright of the December 11th filing, and in not
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following up with the Bankruptcy Court after 30 days had elapsed.
The evidence that convinces this Court that [R]espondent’s
actions were not intentionally misleading is that she told Mr.
Coleman on January 28th that the escrow funds should be released
even though Mr. Coleman heard the clear ruling of Judge Craven
which denied [R]espondent’s motion to quash the garnishment.
Moreover, [R]espondent told Mr. Coleman that she was planning
to call Ms. Wright to release the escrow and she told Ms. Wright
to verify her representations with Mr. Coleman.  Such naïve
behavior does not amount to fraud.  It does, however, show her
lack of competence.
“The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
[R]espondent violated the following rule:
1.
Rule 5.3: Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants.
“Since the evidence shows that the [R]espondent’s conduct
was negligent rather than intentional in dealing with Mr. Coleman,
Judge Craven, Ms. Wright and Bar Counsel, this Court cannot find
a violation of Rules 3.3, 4.1, 8.4(c) and (d), and 8.1.
This Court recommends that if the [R]espondent continues
to practice law, she should attend C.L.E. classes and work under
the supervision of an experienced member of the Bar.”
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II.
A.  Petitioner’s exception.
We note that this Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary
proceedings.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448,470, 671 A.2d 463,
473 (1996).  From our independent review of the record, we must determine whether the
relevant findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing evidence.  The “hearing
court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown
to be clearly erroneous.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 354, 731 A.2d
447, 452 (1999), (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d
465, 469 (1997)).
Petitioner excepts to Judge Kavanaugh’s conclusion that Respondent did not violate
Rule 8.4(d) in that Respondent did not engage in fraud or intentional deceit when she
represented to Judge Craven that her client had filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy.  Petitioner
submits that the Respondent’s conduct, even when viewed as negligent rather than intentionally
fraudulent, constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
Rule 8.4(d) is violated when “the conduct which forms the basis of the Attorney
Grievance Commission’s charge was prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Clark, 363 Md. 169, 183, 767 A.2d 865, ___ (2001).  The conduct
which Petitioner regards as a violation of Rule 8.4(d) was Respondent’s representation in the
District Court that a bankruptcy case had been filed when, at the time of the representation, it
had not been filed in fact.  For a finding that Respondent’s misrepresentation was “prejudicial
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to the administration of justice,” the misrepresentation must have been intentional.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 78, 753 A.2d 17, 29 (2000) (citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572 A.2d 174, 179 (1990))
(finding it necessary “to establish that the dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is
intentional” to prove a violation); see e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md.
346, 363, 731 A.2d 447, 457 (1999) (stating that perjury committed by an attorney admitted
to practice in this state constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and
violates Rule 8.4(d)). 
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 443, 635 A.2d. 1315, 1316
(1994), an attorney was found to have violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct when he misrepresented his driving record in response to a question
posed by a District Court judge.  A hearing was held at which the Respondent testified that he
did not deliberately intend to deceive the trial judge when he misrepresented his driving record.
The hearing court, however, found the Respondent’s testimony to be different from his prior
testimony and concluded that “based on clear and convincing evidence, [Respondent] did
deliberately misrepresent his record” to the District Court judge.
While in the case at hand the Respondent did misrepresent both fact and law to Judge
Craven, Mr. Coleman and Ms. Wright, Judge Kavanaugh did not find by clear and convincing
evidence that Respondent engaged in intentional deceit.  Respondent indicates in her Motion
to Dismiss that her testimony in the District Court was based on her mistaken belief that the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, which she had prepared and given to her law clerk for filing in
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December 1997, had been filed at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.  Respondent supports that belief
by stating that the law clerk had made a notation in her office file that he had in fact filed for
Respondent’s clients, the Kowkabis.  The evidence that seemingly convinced Judge Kavanaugh
that Respondent’s misrepresentations were not intentionally misleading was the fact that
Respondent subsequently told Mr. Coleman on January 28th that the escrow funds should be
released even though Mr. Coleman heard the clear ruling of Judge Craven when he denied
Respondent’s Motion to Quash the Garnishment.  Furthermore, Respondent told Mr. Coleman
that she was planning to call Ms. Wright to release the escrow and she told Ms. Wright to
verify her representations with Mr. Coleman.  Judge Kavanaugh considered these later
statements and found them to be inconsistent with the conduct of one who intended to mislead.
Judge Kavanaugh concluded that it is inconceivable that Respondent would have alerted
opposing counsel of her plans to have the escrow funds released when these same counsel had
full knowledge and cognizance of the court’s ruling denying her Motion to Quash.  We
conclude that the hearing judge’s findings are not clearly erroneous.
This case is distinguishable from Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 319 Md. 305,
572 A.2d 501 (1990), a case upon which Petitioner relies.  In that case, this Court held that a
single failure to appear in court violates both the rule prohibiting lawyers from neglecting legal
matters entrusted to them and the rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The circumstances in Ficker, however, are quite
different from those under review here and included a pattern of negligence and “habitual”
violation(s) of Disciplinary Rule 1-102, the predecessor to Rule 8.4(d).  Patterns of
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negligence and habitual misconduct are not present in the instant case.  In Ficker, the record
reflected that the attorney knew precisely when court appearances were scheduled, but
negligently failed to be present.  Such a level of knowledge cannot be shown here.  The facts
credited by Judge Kavanaugh support her conclusion that Respondent was mistaken in her
belief that a bankruptcy petition had been filed on behalf of her client at the time she
represented a petition had been filed, but such mistake and the subsequent misrepresentation
to the court and to opposing counsel were not made with knowledge of the falsity of the
statement. 
The evidence supports Judge Kavanaugh’s finding that Respondent did not deliberately
misrepresent both fact and law to Judge Craven, Mr. Coleman and Ms. Wright, nor did she
engage in a pattern of negligence.  
B.  Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
We now turn to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.  Respondent argues that “[i]t is
reasonable to infer the Inquiry Panel would not have ‘directed that Bar Counsel file charges
against the Respondent as set forth in this petition,’ . . . if it had found only a violation of Rule
5.3.”  Respondent continues that because the petition should never have been filed, Respondent
should not be sanctioned in any form.  
As Petitioner states in his response to the Motion to Dismiss: “[t]his speculative theory
ignores the fundamental principle that formal charges of misconduct do not exist against an
attorney until a complaint is docketed in this Court . . . . Once formal charges have been
instituted . . . it is immaterial to speculate about whether an Inquiry Panel or the Review Board
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may have acted differently had those bodies known how this Court’s designated hearing judge
was going to assess the Respondent’s credibility.”  
Judge Kavanaugh’s finding that Respondent violated Rule 5.3 is supported by the record
and our prior cases.  Respondent did not supervise adequately her law clerk in that she never
discussed nor confirmed with him the assumed December 11th bankruptcy filing and thereby
violated the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.3(b).  The issue of the lack of
supervision of Respondent’s law clerk is heightened by the fact that the law clerk was a new
employee who worked only twice a week and terminated his employment with Respondent
after a mere three weeks.  In Glenn, we stated that “Maryland Rule 5.3(b) requires an attorney
to make reasonable efforts to ensure that employees’ conduct is compatible with the lawyer’s
professional obligations.”  341 Md. at 479, 671 A.2d at 478.  This Court went on to state that
“an attorney may not escape responsibility to his clients by blithely saying that any
shortcomings are solely the fault of his employee.  An attorney must ascertain that his or her
employees perform their responsibilities in a competent manner.” Id. at 479, 671 A.2d at 479
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldberg, 292 Md. 650, 655, 441 A.2d 338, 341
(1982)).  See also, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dacy, 313 Md. 1, 5, 542 A.2d 841, 843
(1988) (stating that “had the [R]espondent exercised a reasonable degree of supervision over
[employee], he might have detected her error before any ethical proscriptions had been
violated.”)  
We turn now to Respondent’s proposition that she should be exonerated of all charges
because she was found to have violated only one Rule.  The number of charges is not
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dispositive.  The basis of the charge to which the attorney must defend is the factual allegation
underlying the charges filed.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 445,
635 A.2d 1315, 1317 (1994). 
The Rules do not require a minimum number of factual allegations and charges that
must be filed and sustained.  If a “complaint that an attorney has committed an act of
misconduct” is filed, the only requirement to file the complaint is that “the charges . . . be
sufficiently clear and specific reasonably to inform the attorney proceeded against of any
misconduct charged . . . .”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keister, 327 Md. 56, 68-69, 607
A.2d 909, 915 (1992)(emphasis added) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McBurney,
282 Md. 116, 383 A.2d 58 (1978)).  In short, this Court considers complaints alleging “an act
of misconduct” and “any misconduct” without first considering the number of violations.  Such
terminology as “an” and “any” supports this Court’s history considering a single violation or
multiple violations as opposed to only considering complaints involving multiple violations.
It should be noted, moreover, that the Petitioner is prudent to include all charges in the
complaint that reflect the factual basis for which authorization by the Review Panel is given,
because extraneous charges cannot be “added” at a later date.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. McBurney, 282 Md. 116, 383 A.2d 58 (1978) the Respondent successfully argued that only
one of the violations charged was properly before the court because the other charges had not
been before the Inquiry Panel, nor were they forwarded to the Review Board for its
consideration.  In the instant case, the Petitioner identified those Rules, which conceivably
could have had application to the facts of the particular case, “because he becomes limited in
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the disciplinary action by such rules as he selects.”  Id at 124, 383 A.2d at 63.  That
Respondent was only found to be in violation of one Rule does not mean that only one or none
should have been charged initially, nor does it mean that the subsequent charge for which she
was found in violation should be dismissed.  Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.
III.
We now turn to the issue of the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s violation of Rule
5.3(b).  The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public rather than to punish
the erring attorney.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624
A.2d 503, 513 (1993).  This Court imposes sanctions to protect the public from harm, to
uphold the integrity of the Maryland legal profession, and to deter other members of the
profession from acting in a similar manner.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Webster, 348
Md. 662, 678, 705 A.2d 1135, 1143 (1998).  The facts and circumstances of each case will
determine the appropriate sanction.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tolar, 357 Md. 569,
585, 745 A.2d 1045, 1053 (2000). 
The fact that the Respondent was found to have violated only one of the five charges
Petitioner brought against her is material in determining an appropriate sanction.  As this Court
stated in Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 347 A.2d 556 (1975) “[w]here
an attorney has been shown to have been negligent, or inattentive to his client’s interests . . .
in violation of the canons . . . the imposition of some disciplinary sanction against him may
be warranted; the extent of the discipline to be applied, however, is generally dependent upon
the severity of the conduct and the particular facts and circumstances surrounding it.” Id. at
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362, 347 A.2d at 561 (emphasis added).
In this case, Respondent argues that her client neither complained nor was prejudiced
by the bankruptcy petition not being filed earlier than it was.  Indeed, Respondent and the legal
community are fortunate that the client was not prejudiced by Respondent’s negligent conduct.
That fact alone, however, does not define an appropriate sanction. 
Rather, some of the factors that this Court has considered in determining an appropriate
sanction include:
“absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary 
proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.”
Glenn, 341 at 488-89, 671 A.2d at 483 (citations omitted).
This case is similar to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stancil, 296 Md. 325, 463 A.2d
789 (1983), where this Court took into consideration that no other complaints previously had
been filed against the attorney and the client suffered no harm as a result of the attorney’s
violations. Id. at 332, 463 A.2d at 792; see also, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Heinze, 293
Md. 193, 442 A.2d 570 (1982) (where an attorney made a misrepresentation indicating that
he had filed suit when in fact he had not, the court, in determining the appropriate sanction to
be imposed, took into account the number of years the attorney had practiced law; that, at the
time of his transgressions, the attorney had many personal problems; and, that the client was
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not harmed because the attorney had provided full compensation for any possible financial
loss).  In both cases, we ordered that a reprimand was the appropriate sanction. 
Here, 
Respondent’s 
inexperience, 
coupled 
with 
her 
lack 
of 
prior 
misconduct
complaints, and the fact that the client was not prejudiced, must be weighed against her
behavior, her inaccurate representations to Mr. Coleman, Mr. Wright and Judge Craven, and
her negligent supervision of her recently hired law clerk.  We conclude that the appropriate
sanction is a reprimand. 
IT IS SO ORDERED: RESPONDENT
SHALL RECEIVE A  REPRIMAND;
C O S T S  
T O  
B E  
P A I D  
B Y
RESPONDENT.