Title: People v. Hoyt

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RYAN JAMES HOYT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S113653 
 
Santa Barbara County Superior Court 
1014465 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
January 30, 2020 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
and Groban concurred. 
___________________________________________________________ 
.
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
S113653 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Defendant Ryan James Hoyt was convicted of the kidnap 
and murder of Nicholas Markowitz and sentenced to death.  We 
affirm the judgment. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
 
On October 30, 2000, defendant was charged by grand jury 
indictment with kidnapping 15-year-old Nicholas Markowitz 
(who was known as Nick) for ransom or extortion and for 
murdering him, as well as a personal firearm use enhancement.  
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B), 209, subd. 
(a).)  Codefendants Jesse James Hollywood, Jesse Rugge, 
Graham Pressley, and William Skidmore were charged with the 
same crimes, but the cases were severed and defendant stood 
trial first.  A jury convicted defendant of one count of first degree 
murder in violation of Penal Code section 187 and one count of 
kidnapping committed with the personal use of a firearm in 
violation of Penal Code sections 207 and 12022.5, respectively.  
The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that 
the murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping 
under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(B).  The jury 
returned a verdict of death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Id., 
§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
A.  
Guilt Phase Prosecution Case  
 
The events that led to Nick’s kidnap and murder stemmed 
from a feud between Jesse James Hollywood and Nick’s half-
brother, Ben, over a drug debt.  Ben was supposed to have sold 
illegal drugs for Hollywood but failed to do so.  As a result, Ben 
owed Hollywood $1,200, and their relationship had soured over 
this debt.  On one occasion, Hollywood retaliated against Ben by 
running up a tab in the restaurant where Ben’s girlfriend 
worked and leaving a note saying Ben could pay the bill from 
the debt he owed Hollywood.  For his part, Ben took revenge on 
Hollywood by telling Hollywood’s insurance company that 
Hollywood had falsely reported a vehicle stolen.  Ben later broke 
windows in Hollywood’s home.  Although there was conflicting 
testimony about precisely when the windows were broken, one 
prosecution witness testified the event occurred on August 4, 
2000.  The next day, Hollywood would inform others that he 
needed to move because his windows had been “busted out” and 
people knew where he lived.  The day after that, Hollywood 
arranged to have Nick kidnapped.  A few days later, worried 
about the serious penal consequences if that crime was 
discovered, Hollywood decided to eliminate Nick.   
 
Hollywood enlisted defendant’s help.  Defendant, like Ben, 
sold drugs for Hollywood, and he also owed Hollywood money.  
Mutual friends described defendant as the “low man on the 
totem pole” in their circle.  To pay for the drugs he purchased 
from Hollywood for resale, defendant performed—and was often 
teased for doing—menial, odd jobs for Hollywood, including yard 
work, pet care, and housework.  According to Brian Affronti, a 
friend of both defendant and Hollywood, defendant did whatever 
Hollywood asked of him, without complaint.  Defendant agreed 
to carry out the killing, along with two accomplices, in exchange 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
 
for financial compensation including the forgiveness of his debt 
to Hollywood.   
 
Timeline 
 
 
1. 
August 5, 2000  
 
The events leading up to the crimes began on Saturday, 
August 5, 2000, when Casey Sheehan, who also sold marijuana 
for Hollywood, delivered a van to Hollywood’s West Hills home.1  
Hollywood had told Sheehan that Hollywood needed to move 
because people knew where he lived.  When Sheehan arrived at 
Hollywood’s home, defendant, Skidmore, and one other friend 
were there, drinking beer and smoking marijuana.  Some hours 
later, Sheehan, Hollywood, and Skidmore met again at 
Sheehan’s apartment, where Hollywood and Skidmore talked 
about driving to Santa Barbara for a local party known as 
Fiesta.   
 
That same evening, Nick returned home a half hour before 
his midnight curfew.  His parents noticed he looked “glazed,” his 
speech was slurred, and he had a bulge in his pocket.  When they 
confronted him, he ran out of the house and did not return for 
an hour.  When he returned, he agreed to speak with his parents 
in the morning.  Nick’s parents worried that he had been getting 
involved with drugs, in part because Ben was a drug user.   
 
 
2. 
August 6, 2000 
 
On the morning of Sunday, August 6, two passersby saw a 
dark-haired teenager being beaten by four other similar-aged 
boys in West Hills.  Both the assailants and their victim 
appeared to be Caucasian.  When the assailants were done 
                                        
1  
As the jury was informed, Sheehan testified under a grant 
of immunity, which would be void if he failed to be truthful. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
hitting and kicking the dark-haired boy, they threw him into a 
white van.   
 
Affronti testified that at about 2:00 that afternoon, 
Hollywood, Skidmore, and their friend Jesse Rugge picked him 
up in a white van to drive to Santa Barbara for Fiesta.  When 
Affronti entered the van, he saw Nick in the back.  Affronti knew 
Ben, but he did not initially realize Nick was Ben’s younger 
brother.  Affronti did not know anything was out of the ordinary 
until Hollywood told Nick “that his brother was going to pay up 
his money” and “for Nick not to run or anything like that, not to 
try and do anything irrational.”   
 
When the men arrived in Santa Barbara, they stopped at 
an apartment belonging to Richard Hoeflinger, a longtime 
friend of Rugge’s.  Hollywood asked Affronti to park the van and 
directed Rugge to make calls from Affronti’s cell phone to 
unknown recipients.  Telephone records also showed that two 
phone calls were placed that afternoon from Hoeflinger’s home 
to defendant’s home phone number.  Hollywood and Skidmore 
then went into the apartment with Nick.  When Affronti entered 
after parking the van, he saw Nick in a bedroom with his hands 
duct-taped in front of him and his shins also taped.  Hollywood 
and Rugge then left for a time; when Hollywood returned, 
Affronti and Skidmore left in the van.   
 
Hoeflinger, the apartment’s primary tenant, had not seen 
his friend Rugge for a while before Rugge stopped by on August 
6.  Rugge asked if he could come in and Hoeflinger readily 
agreed, but Hoeflinger was surprised when a group—which 
included Nick—came in with Rugge.  Emilio Jelez, Jr., 
Hoeflinger’s roommate at the time, and their friend Gabriel 
Ibarra were also at the house when Rugge and others arrived 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
with Nick.  Jelez and Ibarra saw Nick sitting in a bedroom of 
the house with his wrists and ankles bound with duct tape.  
Ibarra had never met Hollywood, but testified he did not call the 
police or tell anyone what he had seen because he was afraid of 
Hollywood after Hollywood walked up to Ibarra, intimated he 
had a gun, “and pretty much threatened [Ibarra], told [him] that 
[he] better keep [his] F’ing mouth shut.”   
 
At some point that evening, Hoeflinger walked into his 
bedroom and saw Rugge and Skidmore removing duct tape from 
Nick’s wrists.  Skidmore assured Hoeflinger that everything was 
“ ‘cool’ ” and they were “ ‘just talking’ ” to Nick.  Reassured, 
Hoeflinger left his house less than a half hour later to attend a 
barbecue.  Hoeflinger returned home at dusk to find Nick and 
Rugge drinking alcohol together in his living room with Nick 
still unbound.  Nick and Rugge then left Hoeflinger’s home 
together a few hours later.   
 
In the meantime, Affronti and Skidmore drove back to Los 
Angeles in the white van.  Affronti realized en route that he had 
forgotten his cell phone and returned to Hoeflinger’s home to 
retrieve it; there he saw Nick and Hollywood still spending time 
together.  Back in Los Angeles, Skidmore dropped Affronti off at 
home and continued to Hollywood’s house, where he met 
defendant.  Skidmore did not mention Nick.  Defendant and 
Skidmore returned the van to its owner.  Defendant and 
Skidmore walked back to Hollywood’s house, where defendant 
left Skidmore.   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
 
 
3. 
August 7, 2000 
 
  
a. 
Nick Spends the Day in Santa  
                    Barbara 
 
On the morning of August 7, Natasha Adams-Young, then 
age 17, met Nick at Rugge’s house in Santa Barbara.  Adams-
Young had been spending time with Rugge that summer.  After 
meeting Nick, Adams-Young spoke with Pressley, a mutual 
friend of hers and Rugge’s.  Pressley told her “that they, quote 
unquote, kidnapped this kid [Nick] and brought him back up 
here to Jesse Rugge’s house.”  The group then caravanned to 
Adams-Young’s house.  Adams-Young, feeling concerned for 
Nick’s welfare, spoke with Nick, and suggested he was free to 
leave.  Nick declined, explaining to Adams-Young that he 
planned “to stick around” “to help out his brother and that he 
was fine.”   
 
The group eventually returned to Rugge’s home.  
Hollywood and his girlfriend, Michele Lasher, met up with the 
group there.  Then-16-year-old Kelly Carpenter, another mutual 
friend of Adams-Young and Rugge, had met Hollywood the week 
before and knew that Hollywood, Rugge, and Pressley were 
involved with selling marijuana.  Adams-Young understood that 
Nick’s presence in Santa Barbara and at Rugge’s home was 
related to Hollywood in some fashion.   
 
At Rugge’s home, Nick remained in a separate bedroom 
talking to Rugge.  Carpenter overheard Hollywood speaking to 
his girlfriend about their plans that night and also heard 
Hollywood talking to others about what he would do with Nick.  
Hollywood said he might tie Nick up, throw him in the backseat 
of the car, and then get something to eat.  Although it was said 
in 
a 
joking 
manner, 
the 
comment 
made 
Carpenter 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
uncomfortable.  Carpenter and Adams-Young left Rugge’s house 
shortly thereafter.     
 
  
b. 
Hollywood Confesses the  
                    Kidnapping to Sheehan 
 
Sheehan testified that Hollywood and Lasher socialized at 
Sheehan’s apartment later on the night of August 7, drinking 
alcohol and smoking marijuana with him.  Sheehan conceded he 
was “probably” “pretty wasted” and did not recall whether 
Hollywood and Lasher spent the night.  Sheehan did recall 
Hollywood telling him he had taken Nick to Santa Barbara on 
Sunday, August 6.  Hollywood, Rugge, Affronti, and Skidmore 
“pulled over” and “picked up” or “grabbed” Nick while he was 
walking down the street.  Sheehan did not believe anyone other 
than those four men were involved in Nick’s capture.  Hollywood 
told Sheehan that Nick was still staying with Rugge in Santa 
Barbara on August 7.   
 
 
4. 
August 8, 2000 
 
Nick’s parents reported their son missing on Tuesday 
morning, August 8, after finally reaching Ben and realizing Nick 
was not with him.   
 
  
a. 
Nick’s Time in Santa Barbara 
 
Adams-Young testified that Nick was still at Rugge’s 
house when she returned there the morning of August 8.  
Adams-Young was concerned with Nick’s continued presence in 
Santa Barbara when “he wasn’t supposed to be” there and 
discussed the issue with Pressley and Carpenter.  Pressley told 
Adams-Young he was not sure what he planned to do “but that 
they weren’t going to hurt [Nick] in any way and that they were 
just waiting to get a call from Jesse Hollywood.”  Pressley also 
told Adams-Young that “Hollywood had called Jesse Rugge and 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
offered him money to kill Nick Markowitz.”  Adams-Young 
recalled “being shocked and appalled,” and Pressley assured her 
he had no plans to kill Nick but also confessed he was not sure 
what should be done with Nick.  Pressley believed they were all 
in danger. 
 
Adams-Young returned to Rugge’s home and confronted 
him.  Rugge told Adams-Young he was not sure what he should 
do, but “knew he was going to take Nick home” and planned to 
provide him with a bus ticket, though he feared Nick would tell 
someone about the kidnap when he returned home.  Rugge 
expressed concern about going to jail.  Nick, who was present 
during this conversation, assured Rugge he would not tell 
anyone when he got home.   
 
Shortly thereafter, Rugge suggested the group go to a 
motel for the evening.  Pressley’s mother drove Pressley, 
Carpenter, Rugge, and Nick to the Lemon Tree Inn, where the 
group stayed from 7:00 p.m. until 11:30 p.m.  Rugge selected and 
paid for the motel.  Once there, they were joined by a friend, 
Nathan Appleton, and Adams-Young met up with the group 
later.  The mood was celebratory, as Adams-Young and 
Carpenter believed Nick would be going home that evening.  
Nick spoke happily about what he would do once he returned 
home.  Around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., Rugge asked Adams-Young, 
Appleton, and Carpenter to leave for the night.   
 
  
b. 
Hollywood’s Activities on the  
                    Evening of August 8, 2000 
 
On August 8, Hollywood visited the home of Stephen 
Hogg, a criminal defense attorney who had a professional 
relationship with both Hollywood and his father, John.  
Hollywood explained to Hogg that acquaintances had picked up 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
the brother of the man who had damaged his home and had 
taken the brother to Santa Barbara.  Hollywood sought Hogg’s 
advice.  When Hogg suggested Hollywood go to the police, 
Hollywood said he could not do that.  Hogg described to 
Hollywood the penalties for kidnapping as eight years, or—if 
ransom was sought—life.  Hollywood made clear that this was 
something other people had done and that he was personally 
uninvolved.  Hollywood became agitated and left Hogg’s home 
within five minutes of Hogg’s explaining the potential penalties 
for kidnapping.  Hogg tried to page Hollywood several times 
after Hollywood left, but Hollywood did not respond.   
 
On the evening of August 8, Hollywood and Lasher went 
to Sheehan’s apartment to borrow Sheehan’s car.  Hollywood 
ran an errand in the car while Lasher stayed at the apartment.  
Hollywood then returned without the car, and all three went out 
to dinner to celebrate Lasher’s birthday.   
 
 
5. 
August 9, 2000–August 17, 2000 
 
  
a. 
Hollywood’s Father Rushes Home  
 
Hollywood’s father, John, testified that on the evening of 
August 8, he contacted Hogg and learned that Hollywood had “a 
problem” or was “in trouble.”  John was on vacation in Big Sur 
but left for home after learning his son might be in trouble.  John 
tried unsuccessfully to reach his son numerous times on his way 
home.  John finally reached Hollywood via Lasher, and 
Hollywood directed him to Lasher’s home.  John arrived at 
Lasher’s Calabasas home at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of August 
9 to find his son looking “nervous and rattled.”  John understood 
that Hollywood believed his life was in some danger, that 
Hollywood and Ben had been in a feud for some time, and that 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
 
Hollywood’s agitation was related to the kidnapping of Ben’s 
younger brother.   
 
  
b. 
Hollywood’s Father Contacts  
                    Defendant 
 
Later that day, John paged defendant and asked to meet 
at a park.  John asked defendant what was “ ‘going on with this 
situation, you know, this kid’ ” and suggested they go “ ‘find out 
where he is,’ ” “ ‘go get him and take him home.’ ”  Defendant 
told him that “he didn’t have control of the situation.  And he, 
you know he was trying to find out, but he wasn’t having any 
luck.”  John told defendant that when he asked his son where 
Nick was and who was holding him, Hollywood had not provided 
those details and instead told John to call defendant.  Defendant 
told John he did not know those details either, but “would see 
what he could find out.”  John and defendant agreed this was “a 
bad situation,” and defendant indicated that “he wasn’t involved 
in this thing from the start, and he was kind of irritated that he 
was even being dragged into it.”   
 
  
c. 
Sheehan and Defendant Spend  
                     Time Together 
 
When Sheehan came home from work on the afternoon of 
August 9, he noticed the car he had loaned to Hollywood the day 
before had been returned.  That evening, Hollywood, Affronti, 
Skidmore, Lasher, and defendant were at Sheehan’s home.  
Defendant told Sheehan that “a problem was taken care of.”  
Sheehan understood this to refer to Nick.  When Sheehan asked 
defendant to elaborate, defendant initially said it was “best that 
[he] left things unsaid,” but eventually confessed that “Nick had 
been killed.”    
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
 
After this conversation, Sheehan drove defendant to a 
store where defendant purchased shirts, pants, and shoes 
totaling a “couple hundred dollars,” paying in cash.  Sheehan did 
not believe defendant was working at the time, and he had 
known that defendant was in debt to Hollywood.  Defendant 
assured Sheehan that the debt to Hollywood “was taken care of.”  
In fact, Hollywood had given defendant “three or four hundred 
bucks” the day before his birthday and told defendant, “[W]e’re 
straight.  No more debt.”  Defendant spent the night at 
Sheehan’s house that evening and celebrated his 21st birthday 
the next day.  After enjoying a party with between 20 and 30 
guests at Sheehan’s home, defendant again spent the night 
there.    
 
A few days later, Sheehan and defendant again discussed 
Nick’s killing.  Defendant told Sheehan they killed Nick 
somewhere in Santa Barbara.  Defendant described picking 
Nick up from a motel and taking him to a site where they “shot 
him and put him in a ditch,” and covered him with a bush.  
Sheehan and defendant were together when defendant was 
arrested; Sheehan was also arrested and released that same 
evening.   
 
  
d. 
Nick’s Body Is Discovered 
 
On August 12, 2000, a group of hikers, including witness 
Darla Gacek, were hiking in the Los Padres National Forest in 
Santa Barbara County.  They were passing through an area 
known as Lizard’s Mouth, which is situated approximately three 
and one-half miles from Highway 154.  The hikers heard what 
they thought was a swarm of bees coming from a location 
approximately one-quarter mile beyond the point where vehicles 
can go no further.  The group saw brush piled high, and when 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
they began removing it, they realized a human might be buried 
beneath it.  The group of hikers left the site to find a cell phone 
to call the police.  They encountered a group filming nearby.   
 
Lars Wikstrom, a film video editor, had gone to the 
Lizard’s Mouth area that day to help friends film a music video.  
While Wikstrom was filming there, a man pointed out an area 
to him about 20 to 30 yards away.  Wikstrom followed the man, 
initially noting a strong odor similar to that of a dead animal by 
a roadside.  As the two got closer, Wikstrom could see and hear 
numerous flies near the ground.  Wikstrom saw fine powder on 
the ground, and then noted what appeared to be Levi’s denim 
jeans and part of a shirt.  Because Wikstrom was unsure 
whether what he saw was a person, he decided to call the police.  
Wikstrom waited for the police to come, directing hikers away 
from the area.   
 
Law enforcement arrived about an hour and a half after 
Wikstrom called.  Detective William Michael West, one of the 
first detectives at the scene, observed cut brush along the entire 
trail, from the trail head at West Camino Cielo all the way to 
the location of the shallow grave.  Detective West testified that 
“[i]t looked like somebody had cleared the trail,” both at the 
gravesite and all along the trail.   
 
Criminalist George Levine also responded to the scene.  
Nick’s body was only lightly and partially covered with dirt.  The 
weather that day and for a few days before was warm, resulting 
in significant decomposition.  Law enforcement officials 
removed cartridge casings and a bullet from the first few inches 
of the shallow grave.  After the body was removed from the site, 
a TEC-9 weapon, modified to be fully automatic, was found 
under the area where Nick’s feet had been resting.  Nick’s mouth 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
had been duct-taped.  Duct tape was also wrapped around Nick’s 
hands and head.2   
 
An autopsy revealed Nick had suffered a total of nine 
gunshot wounds.  Several of the gunshots would have 
independently been fatal, but due to the level of decomposition 
the medical examiner was unable to state which of the injuries 
caused Nick’s death.   
 
  
e. 
Pressley Confesses to Digging the  
                     Gravesite 
 
Detective Jerry Cornell testified that he interviewed 
Pressley on August 16, and Pressley admitted digging a grave 
in the trail area off San Marcos Pass known as Lizard’s Mouth 
in the early morning hours of August 9.   
 
  
f. 
Defendant Confesses to the Killing  
 
On August 16, defendant was arrested, taken to a Santa 
Barbara jail, and advised of his Miranda rights.3  According to 
Detective West, defendant said that he decided to speak to 
detectives after seeing a television broadcast regarding the case 
and speaking to his mother.  After defendant informed jail 
officials he wished to be interviewed, detectives met with 
defendant in the sheriff headquarters in Goleta, where they 
audio- and video-recorded their encounter with him.  Defendant 
                                        
2  
Once the tape was removed at the morgue, Nick was seen 
to be wearing a ring.  Nick also wore a distinctive belt buckle.  
The parties stipulated to the identification of the deceased at 
trial.   
3  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 
 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
was re-Mirandized and asked to explain why he was involved in 
the crime.  
 
Defendant told Detective West and Sergeant Ken 
Reinstadler, “I’m going down.  I, I just realized that.”  The 
detectives asked defendant to explain “how this went down,” and 
defendant asked if they would “mind if I go back to my cell and 
think about [it] tonight and talk to you guys tomorrow because 
I know my arraignment is Monday.”  Defendant expressed 
concern that what he said would be repeated in court, but then 
requested water and continued the conversation with the 
detectives, explaining, “I had nothing to do with the 
kidnapping.”  Defendant asked why he was charged with that 
crime.4  The detectives responded by urging defendant to tell his 
story. 
 
Defendant told them Ben owed Hollywood significant 
sums of money, as did he.  Defendant explained he was told he 
could erase his own debt in exchange for killing someone; the 
person was someone unknown to him.  Defendant told detectives 
                                        
4  
Defendant alleges the transcript used at trial contained 
two inaccuracies.  After his assertion to detectives that he had 
nothing to do with the kidnapping, the transcript given to jurors 
indicated that there was some whispering before defendant 
asked why he was charged.  A later-filed corrected transcript of 
the interview indicates that Reinstadler had responded to 
defendant’s initial assertion that he had nothing to do with the 
kidnapping by whispering, “We know that.”  Defendant also 
claims the transcript used at trial contained an error in an 
exchange during which defendant indicated he met someone at 
the Lemon Tree Inn.  At trial, the transcript read, “WEST:  You 
met someone there?  HOYT:  Nick.”  The corrected transcript 
reads, “WEST:  You met someone there?  HOYT:  Yeah.”  These 
discrepancies do not affect our evaluation of the issues in this 
case.   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
he drove Sheehan’s car to a motel in Santa Barbara.  When 
asked what happened next, defendant said, “You guys know 
what happened.  I think I’m going to stop there for now.”  He 
again requested water, then expressed concern for his family’s 
well-being.   
 
Sergeant Reinstadler reminded defendant that he had the 
right to stop speaking to them at any point.  Detective West 
offered to let defendant “collect [his] thoughts,” and defendant 
said he wished “more than anything” that he had a cigarette.  
Sergeant Reinstadler reminded defendant, “You wanted to talk 
to us, man.”  Defendant asked whether he had been helpful, and 
the detectives urged him to fill in more “piece[s] of the puzzle.”  
Reinstadler asked him, “Who are you ultimately concerned 
with?  Who, who do you feel sorry for here?”  Defendant replied, 
“Not me,” continuing, “That kid I buried.”  Reinstadler asked 
him if he was “[w]ak[ing] up thinking about someone saying, 
‘Please.  Please.’ ”  The detectives asked if that was what the 
duct tape around the victim’s mouth was for, and defendant 
replied, “Close.”     
 
Reinstadler asked defendant if he put the duct tape on 
Nick’s mouth, but defendant denied doing it.  Reinstadler then 
asked whether Jesse did it, and defendant said Hollywood was 
not in Santa Barbara.  Reinstadler clarified he meant Jesse 
Rugge, not Jesse Hollywood, and told defendant that Rugge had 
said that defendant placed the duct tape around Nick’s mouth.  
Defendant replied, “I love this one.  The only thing I did was kill 
him.”  Defendant added that he did not select the gravesite or 
dig the grave; Pressley, whom he had not previously known, 
handled both those tasks.  The detectives asked defendant if he 
had any moments of feeling what he was doing was wrong, and 
he said he did think that, for a moment, “right before.”   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
 
B. 
 
Defense Case 
 
 
1. 
Defendant’s Testimony 
 
Defendant testified on his own behalf.  He acknowledged 
that he was friends with, and sold drugs for, Hollywood.  He was 
indebted to Hollywood and did odd jobs, including yard work, to 
reduce his debt.   
 
On August 5, 2000, defendant helped Hollywood pack up 
his house.  Someone had broken the windows of the house, and 
Hollywood had received a voicemail that Ben, who sometimes 
sold marijuana for Hollywood, was the culprit.  Defendant 
finished cleaning up the broken glass and went to his 
grandmother’s home around 10:00 p.m. that evening.   
 
On August 8, 2000, at around 2:30 p.m., defendant went 
to Hollywood’s home.  He and Hollywood drove around for a 
while, and Hollywood seemed excited.  Hollywood asked if 
defendant would like to work off the last $200 of his debt by 
delivering a package to Rugge in Santa Barbara.  Defendant 
testified that Hollywood told him if he delivered the package, his 
debt would be “clear” by his birthday a few days later.  
Defendant was to drive Sheehan’s car.  Defendant assumed 
Hollywood was not going himself because he was celebrating his 
girlfriend’s birthday.  Defendant agreed, and Hollywood told 
him where Rugge was staying and gave him a phone number to 
reach Rugge.  Defendant testified he then waited at Hollywood’s 
home for about three or four hours, at which point Hollywood 
picked up defendant and took him to Sheehan’s home to pick up 
Sheehan’s car.  Hollywood gave defendant a bag to deliver to 
Rugge, and defendant testified that he did not look inside, 
presuming it to contain marijuana.  No one mentioned anything 
about Nick to defendant.   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
 
 
Defendant drove to Santa Barbara.  He called Rugge from 
a mini-market off the highway, and Rugge directed him to a 
room at the Lemon Tree Inn.  Defendant delivered the bag, 
annoyed that Pressley was in the room because defendant had 
asked that Rugge be alone.  Rugge asked defendant to drive him 
back to the San Fernando Valley in the morning, and defendant 
agreed.  Rugge and Pressley borrowed the car for several hours, 
returning to the room about 2:30 a.m.  Once they returned, 
defendant and Rugge drove back toward Los Angeles.  
Defendant dropped Rugge off at Rugge’s mother’s home.  
Defendant then drove to his grandmother’s house, where he was 
then living.   
 
Defendant testified that he did not hear of Nick’s death 
until the evening of August 12, when Skidmore told him that 
“Ben’s brother had been found murdered.”  Several days later, 
defendant learned Skidmore had been arrested.  Defendant 
began calling mutual friends, including Sheehan, who told 
defendant “he didn’t want [him] at his house.”  Defendant did 
not heed Sheehan’s request.  Defendant received several pages 
from a number he did not recognize, and believed police were 
trying to reach him.  Defendant asked Sheehan to take him to a 
pay phone so he could call the police.  He was arrested shortly 
thereafter.   
 
Following his arrest, he was eventually taken to Santa 
Barbara, although he did not recall events with specificity.  He 
recalled throwing up and knew he called his mother but claimed 
to have no memory of the content of the phone call.  In fact, 
defendant testified that he recalled nothing from the time of his 
arrest on August 16 until he woke up alone in a jail cell four 
days later.  He did not remember his confession to detectives on 
August 17.  
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
 
Defendant’s taped confession was played for the jury.  
Defendant testified that none of the statements indicating he 
was responsible for Nick’s death were true.   
 
 
2. 
Dr. Kania’s Testimony  
 
The defense proposed to call Dr. Michael Kania to testify 
that defendant’s confession was false.  Following an Evidence 
Code section 402 hearing, the trial court ruled that Dr. Kania 
could testify in response to hypothetical questions that assumed 
defendant suffered from amnesia, including the characteristics 
of amnesia.  But the court ruled that Dr. Kania would not be 
permitted to “testify as to circumstances, the things that he was 
told by the defendant.  The defendant can testify to those 
things.”   
 
Following the trial court’s ruling, Dr. Kania testified that 
he believed defendant’s claim of amnesia concerning his 
confession was credible.  Defendant told Dr. Kania the only 
thing he recalled from the interrogation was walking into the 
room, being told to calm down, and to wait.  Defendant told him 
the next thing he remembered was leaving the interrogation.   
 
C. 
 
Guilt Phase Rebuttal Case 
 
Dr. David N. Glaser and Dr. Dana Chidekel testified for 
the prosecution in rebuttal.  Dr. Glaser testified that after 
examining defendant and reviewing a great deal of case 
information, he concluded defendant suffered from “no current 
major mental illness.”  Dr. Glaser opined that defendant 
suffered from an avoidant personality disorder “with dependent 
features.”  He had low self-esteem, was willing to endure 
“unpleasant conditions” to remain near the person on whom he 
was dependent, and was uncomfortable acknowledging his 
feelings.  None of these features, in Dr. Glaser’s opinion, made 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
defendant more likely to falsely confess.  Dr. Glaser also 
evaluated defendant for amnesia.  Because defendant was 
unable to recall anything about his interview with police based 
upon cues given from the transcripts, and because total amnesia 
absent a traumatic event or general anesthesia is very 
uncommon, 
Dr. Glaser 
concluded 
that 
defendant 
was 
malingering.   
 
Dr. Chidekel testified that she evaluated defendant and 
administered numerous psychological tests to determine 
whether defendant had a psychological disorder rendering him 
susceptible to falsely confessing.  Dr. Chidekel determined 
defendant suffered from “avoidance [sic] personality disorder, 
with self-defeating and dependent features.”  Based on the tests 
administered, Dr. Chidekel was unable to diagnose defendant 
with any other neuropsychological condition that interfered 
with his “ability to see, to understand, or to be able to 
communicate effectively.”   
 
D. 
Penalty Phase 
 
 
1. 
Aggravation 
 
Nick’s mother, Susan Markowitz, testified about the 
impact the loss of her son had on her and on her relatives and 
friends.  Nick was one of three children, and his sister had the 
comfort of knowing Nick held his niece before his death, but not 
his sister’s second child, who was not yet born at the time Nick 
died.  Susan testified that she twice tried to commit suicide, 
“only to succeed in accumulating a twenty thousand dollar 
hospital bill.”  She told the jury, “There is no meaning to life 
without Nick.”   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
 
 
2. 
Mitigation 
 
Victoria, defendant’s mother, testified about defendant’s 
dysfunctional upbringing.  Victoria was 19 years old when she 
married defendant’s father, James Hoyt, and 21 when she gave 
birth to defendant.  Victoria testified that her husband was 
“extremely abusive” to her, and not nice or attentive to the 
children.  James grabbed her by the hair and threw her against 
a car and to the ground when she was eight months pregnant 
with defendant, nearly resulting in miscarriage.  When 
defendant was four years old, James threw Victoria to the 
ground in front of her children and beat her with a pipe wrench.  
James had to be physically restrained by Victoria’s brother.  The 
couple divorced when defendant was five years old and, despite 
the physical abuse, James was awarded custody.  Following 
their divorce, Victoria began using cocaine and drinking heavily.     
 
Victoria’s sister, Anne Stendel Thomas, testified that 
defendant’s father and mother verbally abused and threatened 
defendant throughout his childhood.  Thomas testified that 
Victoria abused drugs and alcohol from an early age, and her 
alcohol abuse continued and worsened throughout defendant’s 
childhood.  Her family was dysfunctional, and Victoria had been 
a depressed child who would spend hours or days alone in her 
room without moving or talking.  Thomas testified that 
defendant was a “sweet kid,” and she viewed him—the middle 
child—as a mediator.   
 
Victoria’s mother, Carol Stendel, testified about Victoria’s 
early childhood.  When Victoria was in fourth grade, she would 
stand in class and walk around without being aware of her 
behavior, despite performing at or above grade level in her 
coursework.  At age 14, Victoria began seeing a psychiatrist, who 
recommended she be hospitalized due to depression.  The family 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
decided against treatment.  Defendant’s grandfather also 
suffered from depression.   
 
Stendel made efforts to make her grandchildren feel 
welcome in her home.  She worried the children would feel 
abandoned or abused by their parents.  She testified that “in 
their young lifetime, nobody, I mean nobody really helped them 
to have safety and comfort.”  Her eldest grandchild—defendant’s 
sister, Christina—was a heroin addict.  Stendel testified that 
she loved defendant very much.   
 
At the time of defendant’s trial, his younger brother, 
Jonathan, was serving a 12-year prison sentence for armed 
robbery and conspiracy to commit home invasion.  Jonathan 
committed the crimes as a 16 year old but was tried as an adult.  
Jonathan testified about their abusive family, particularly their 
abusive stepmother, and the physical abuse defendant suffered 
at their father’s hands.  When asked how he would feel if 
defendant were to receive the death penalty, Jonathan 
responded that he could “hardly take him being in jail period.”  
He continued, “As far as putting him . . . on death row . . . , that’s 
pretty awful.”  James, defendant’s father, was asked about the 
effect on him if his son was sentenced to death.  He responded 
that “[i]t would be a living nightmare you can’t wake up from.”   
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
A.  
Jurisdictional Claim  
 
Defendant’s first claim on appeal concerns the superior 
court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.  The evidence indicates that 
the murder took place at or near the location where Nick’s body 
was found in the area known as Lizard’s Mouth, which is 
situated within the boundaries of the Los Padres National 
Forest.  Defendant contends that because the murder took place 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
in a national forest, the case falls within the exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and thus outside 
the jurisdiction of the superior court.   
 
Defendant did not raise this argument in the trial court, 
which would ordinarily bar him from raising it on appeal.  (See 
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881.)  But if, as 
defendant contends, the superior court lacked territorial 
jurisdiction, then it was without authority to act in the matter 
and should not have entered judgment in the case.  (People v. 
Betts (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1039, 1050.)  A claim of fundamental 
jurisdictional defect is not subject to forfeiture or waiver.  
(People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 225.)  We are therefore 
obligated to address the claim.  It is, however, without merit. 
 
The fact the murder was committed within the boundaries 
of a national forest does not necessarily mean that the federal 
government, and the federal government alone, was empowered 
to prosecute the crime.  As this court explained more than a 
century ago, federal ownership of land does not necessarily 
establish “federal jurisdiction over crimes committed upon it, as 
that fact does not oust the jurisdiction of the state . . . .”  (People 
v. Collins (1895) 105 Cal. 504, 509.)  “[F]or many purposes a 
State has civil and criminal jurisdiction over lands within its 
limits belonging to the United States,” including the 
punishment of “public offenses, such as murder or larceny, 
committed on such lands.”  (Utah Power & Light Co. v. United 
States (1917) 243 U.S. 389, 404; see People v. Rinehart (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 652, 660.)  Whether the federal government has 
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on federal lands 
depends on the terms on which the lands were acquired from the 
states.  (See Kleppe v. New Mexico (1976) 426 U.S. 529, 542–543 
[under enclave clause of the federal Constitution (U.S. Const., 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
art. I, § 8, cl. 17), state may cede either exclusive or limited 
jurisdiction to federal government].)  Defendant points to no 
authority indicating that the federal government acquired the 
Los Padres National Forest on terms establishing exclusive 
federal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed therein. 
 
Defendant’s argument against state criminal jurisdiction 
is rooted in an apparent misreading of California history.  The 
Los Padres National Forest was first created by presidential 
proclamation in 1903, when it was known as the Santa Barbara 
Forest Reserve.  (Pres. Proc. No. 14, 33 Stat. 2327, Dec. 22, 
1903.)5  As defendant notes, the national forest is made up of 
lands that had been ceded by Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, under which title to lands not privately held passed to 
the United States.  (Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922; see Thompson v. 
Doaksum (1886) 68 Cal. 593, 596.)  Defendant claims that 
Congress asserted exclusive jurisdiction over these lands when 
California was admitted to the Union two years later.  (Act for 
the Admission of the State of Cal. into the Union, Sept. 9, 1850, 
ch. 50, § 3 (Act for Admission) 9 Stat. 452.) 
 
Defendant is incorrect.  The Act for Admission contains no 
provision reserving to the federal government exclusive 
jurisdiction over all public lands ceded by Mexico in the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  (See Coso Energy Developers v. County 
of Inyo (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522–1523; accord, Martin 
v. Clinton Construction Co. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 35, 46; see 
generally Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe (1885) 114 U.S. 
525, 539.)  Defendant relies on the noninterference clause of the 
Act for Admission:  “That the said State of California is admitted 
                                        
5 
The Los Padres National Forest took its present name in 
1936.  (Exec. Order No. 7501 (Dec. 3, 1936).) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
into the Union upon the express condition that the people of said 
State, through their legislature or otherwise, shall never 
interfere with the primary disposal of the public lands within its 
limits, and shall pass no law and do no act whereby the title of 
the United States to, and right to dispose of, the same shall be 
impaired or questioned.”  But this noninterference clause is not 
unique to California (see Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee 
(1886) 117 U.S. 151, 164), and it offers no support for 
defendant’s argument.  Suffice it to say, a prohibition on 
interfering with federal title is not the same as a prohibition on 
prosecuting crime.  (See Coso Energy, at pp. 1522–1523, citing 
U.S. v. Bateman (N.D.Cal. 1888) 34 F. 86, 88–90.) 
 
In the alternative, defendant argues that California 
relinquished its prosecutorial power to the federal government 
in an 1891 act ceding “exclusive jurisdiction over such piece or 
parcel of land as may have been or may be hereafter ceded or 
conveyed to the United States, during the time the United 
States shall be or remain the owner thereof, for all purposes 
except the administration of the criminal laws of this State and 
the service of civil process therein.”  (Stats. 1891, ch. 181, § 1, 
p. 262.)  That statute was reenacted in 1943 as Government 
Code section 113, subsequently repealed, and eventually 
reenacted in its current form to provide for the state’s 
acceptance of the retrocession of jurisdiction from the federal 
government of “land within this state.”  (Gov. Code, § 113; see 
Stats. 1943, ch. 134, p. 898 [1943 version].)   
 
The difficulty with this argument is that the cession 
provision on which defendant relies contains an explicit 
exception for “the administration of the criminal laws of this 
State.”  (Stats. 1891, ch. 181, § 1, p. 262.)  Defendant asserts 
that this exception “has been uniformly interpreted as limited 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
to the right to serve process,” but that is not what the statute 
says, and defendant offers no support for his unlikely 
interpretation.  Nor is there any evidence that Congress 
declined the terms of California’s partial cession of jurisdiction.  
(See S. R. A., Inc. v. Minnesota (1946) 327 U.S. 558, 563.)  As 
particularly relevant here, only a few years later Congress 
explicitly recognized the states’ authority to reserve jurisdiction 
over national forest lands:  In Title 16 United States Code 
section 480, enacted in 1897, Congress provided that the states’ 
jurisdiction “over persons within national forests shall not be 
affected or changed by reason” of the creation of national forests.  
“By this enactment Congress in effect . . . declined to accept 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction over forest reserve lands . . . .”  
(Wilson v. Cook (1946) 327 U.S. 474, 487, italics added.) 
 
In sum, although California ceded the lands comprising 
the Los Padres National Forest to the United States, California 
also retained jurisdiction to administer its criminal laws on the 
ceded lands.  Defendant points to nothing in the history of the 
Los Padres National Forest to suggest it was an exception to this 
reservation of criminal jurisdiction.  The superior court did not 
err in exercising jurisdiction in this matter. 
 
B. 
 
Jury Selection Claims 
1. 
Adequacy of Voir Dire  
Defendant argues the trial court committed several errors 
that resulted in inadequate voir dire of prospective jurors.  
Defendant’s claims lack merit. 
 
  
a. 
Denial of Request for Sequestered  
                    Voir Dire 
 
Defendant first points to the trial court’s decision to deny 
defendant’s request for sequestered voir dire.  Before jury 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
selection began, defendant had filed a motion seeking 
sequestered voir dire concerning prospective jurors’ attitudes 
toward the death penalty and regarding the extent of pretrial 
publicity.  Defense counsel argued that sequestration would 
avoid the potential contamination of prospective jurors who 
might learn what others had seen or heard in the media.  
Defense counsel also argued sequestered voir dire was necessary 
to determine prospective jurors’ attitudes toward the death 
penalty “alone, separately,” and “face-to-face” with counsel.  The 
prosecution 
opposed 
the 
motion 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
sequestration was unnecessary; jurors’ attitudes and exposure 
to pretrial publicity could be explored through juror 
questionnaires.  The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with 
the prosecution that juror questionnaires would adequately 
respond to defendant’s concerns.   
 
Although defendant now asserts that the trial court erred 
in denying the motion, he offers no substantive argument to 
support the claim and has therefore forfeited it.  But even if the 
claim were properly presented for review, we would find no 
error.  “ ‘[I]n reviewing a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s 
motion for individual sequestered jury selection, we apply the 
“abuse of discretion standard,” under which the pertinent 
inquiry is whether the court’s ruling “falls outside the bounds of 
reason.” ’ ”  (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 443, quoting 
People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 34.)  We remain mindful 
that 
“ ‘[i]ndividual 
sequestered 
jury 
selection 
is 
not 
constitutionally required, and jury selection is to take place 
“where practicable . . . in the presence of the other jurors in all 
criminal cases, including death penalty cases.” ’ ”  (Perez, at 
p. 443, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)  Here, defendant has not 
shown that group voir dire was impracticable.  He sought 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
sequestered voir dire because of concerns about potential juror 
bias, but he has not shown that group voir dire resulted in any 
actual juror bias.  (Cf. People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288 
[“group voir dire may be determined to be impracticable when, 
in a given case, it is shown to result in actual, rather than 
merely potential, bias”].)  The trial court acted within its 
discretion in concluding defendant’s concerns could be 
adequately addressed by means other than individual 
sequestered voir dire. 
 
  
b. 
Exclusion of Questions from  
                    Juror  
Questionnaire 
Defendant next complains that the trial court erred in 
excluding certain questions from the juror questionnaire.  The 
parties exchanged proposed juror questionnaires in early 
October 2001.  The trial court warned the defense that its 
proposed questionnaire, which was twice as long as the 
prosecution’s, ran the risk of alienating prospective jurors.  The 
court explained that the questionnaire “looks pretty formidable 
. . . and the [jurors] may get in a hurry to finish, and you don’t 
really get the kind of answers you want; whereas, if they see 
they’ve got a more limited question[naire] then they’ve got some 
time.”  The parties eventually settled on a questionnaire, which 
was provided to four panels of prospective jurors.  Before 
distribution, a number of questions, including four that had 
been proposed by the defense to examine jurors’ attitudes 
toward an intentional kidnap murder of a minor (proposed 
questions 78, 79, 98, and 120), were excluded from the 
questionnaire.   
 
Excluded question number 78 inquired, “What was your 
first reaction when you heard this was a ‘kidnapping murder’ 
case?”  Question number 79 inquired whether a prospective 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
juror’s “feelings about the issue of kidnapping and murder 
[were] such that” the juror “could not be fair and impartial in 
relation to the defendant” or “to [a] complaining witness,” or 
alternatively if “[n]either statement applie[d].”  Question 
number 98 inquired, “During the course of the trial, the 
prosecution may present evidence that includes pictures of 
Mr. Markowitz after he died, and a gun that was used in the 
killing.  The prosecution may even display the gun itself.  How 
do you think this type of evidence would affect your judgment of 
the case as a whole?”  Question number 120 inquired, “During 
this trial you may hear detailed descriptions of kidnapping and 
murder.  Would that effect [sic] your ability to be fair and 
impartial?” followed by a short blank line.  The question 
continued, “If so, please explain.”   
 
Defendant argues it was error to exclude these questions.  
Without the ability to question jurors about their attitudes 
toward the death penalty in a case involving the intentional 
kidnap murder of a minor, he argues, the defense had no 
adequate means of determining whether the jurors harbored 
disqualifying biases concerning the commission of such a crime.  
We disagree. 
A trial court has “ ‘wide latitude’ ” in the conduct of voir 
dire, including with respect to the questions to be asked and 
their format.  (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 83; see Code 
Civ. Proc., § 223.)  Voir dire must be “ ‘ “ ‘reasonably sufficient 
to test the jury for bias or partiality.’ ” ’ ”  (Landry, at p. 83.)  But 
“[i]t is not the purpose of voir dire to ‘ “educate the jury panel to 
the particular facts of the case, to compel the jurors to commit 
themselves to vote a particular way, to prejudice the jury for or 
against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate the 
jury, or to instruct the jury in matters of law.” ’ ”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
Here, although defendant suggests otherwise, the 
prospective jurors were informed of the nature of defendant’s 
alleged crime.  Before adjourning for one week on October 17, 
2001, the court briefly described the case to the prospective 
jurors.  The court explained that the crime involved “the alleged 
kidnapping of the 15 year old Nicholas Markowitz, and resulted, 
allegedly, in the killing of Mr. Markowitz.”  The court explained 
that the series of events at issue occurred over a period of four 
days and that defendant was charged with kidnapping, first 
degree murder, and a special circumstance allegation that the 
murder occurred during the commission of a kidnapping.  The 
juror questionnaire then sought to evaluate prospective jurors’ 
attitudes toward the death penalty in such a case, by asking 
jurors whether they would always vote guilty as to first degree 
murder and true as to the special circumstance, so as to 
guarantee a penalty phase, and whether jurors would 
automatically vote for death.   
The additional questions on the subject proposed by 
defendant—which asked, for example, for the jurors’ “first 
reaction” to hearing “this is a ‘kidnapping murder case’ ”—were 
not well-tailored to meaningful further exploration of the jurors’ 
views on the death penalty in this context.  And to the extent 
defendant sought the jurors’ predictions about how their 
judgment would be affected by “detailed account[s]” of the crime 
or other prosecution evidence, it is well established that a 
defendant has “no right to ask specific questions that invite[] 
prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue . . . [or] to 
educate the jury as to the facts of the case.”  (People v. Burgener 
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 865, citations omitted.) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
 
  
c. 
Conduct of Voir Dire 
Defendant next argues that voir dire was inadequate 
because the questioning was insufficient to determine whether 
any of the jurors held disqualifying views concerning the 
automatic application of the death penalty for the intentional 
kidnap murder of a minor.  Defendant argues:  “Six jurors, fully 
half the panel, were not questioned at all except [as to] whether 
they could volunteer a basis for their own disqualification.”  
Defendant contends, “Such general inquiries are insufficient 
under long-standing United States Supreme Court case law.”  
(See Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 734–735.)  In 
Morgan, the high court held that the petitioner “was entitled, 
upon his request, to inquiry discerning those jurors who . . . had 
predetermined . . . whether to impose the death penalty.”  (Id. 
at p. 736.)   
As an initial matter, defendant’s claim that these six 
jurors were not questioned “at all” is inaccurate.  The court 
questioned these jurors with some care and permitted the 
parties to do the same.  To the extent defendant took issue with 
the nature of the trial court’s questioning, he made no mention 
of it before the court.  It is now too late to complain that the 
court’s questioning was inadequate.  (People v. Salazar (2016) 
63 Cal.4th 214, 236 [“We have held that ‘a defendant may not 
challenge on appeal alleged shortcomings in the trial court’s voir 
dire of the prospective jurors when the defendant, having had 
the opportunity to alert the trial court to the supposed problem, 
failed to do so.’ ”].)  
Defendant contends that the questioning of four 
individual jurors raised “particular concerns about impartiality” 
that were not adequately explored in voir dire because the trial 
court impermissibly restricted questioning.  But contrary to 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
defendant’s contention, the trial court’s decision to remove the 
four defense-proposed questions from the juror questionnaire is 
not reasonably interpreted as precluding counsel from asking 
follow-up questions regarding prospective jurors’ attitudes 
toward the death penalty in a kidnap-murder case.  It appears 
from the record that the defense could have asked additional 
questions of the prospective jurors but did not do so.   
Nor, in any event, does the record support defendant’s 
assertion that the prospective jurors’ answers raised particular 
concerns about impartiality that were not adequately explored 
in voir dire.  Defendant asserts that Juror No. 9184’s 
questionnaire suggests she was biased against defendant 
because she responded affirmatively to the question, “Do you 
have any feelings against the defendant solely because the 
defendant is charged with this particular offense?”  She also 
responded affirmatively to the question inquiring whether “the 
mere fact that an information was filed against the defendant 
cause[d her] to conclude that the defendant is more likely to be 
guilty than not guilty.”  But during voir dire, defense counsel 
asked her to explain these responses.  She indicated that she 
initially made a “natural” or “snap judgment” but after “sitting 
here for a while, [she] believe[d] that there’s a due process that 
people should go through now, and [she] underst[ood] a little bit 
more about the situation.”  Defense counsel probed further 
whether she meant that her position on these two questions had 
“changed somewhat” in that she “now . . . realize[d] that just 
because someone is charged with an offense, or [had] been 
arrested for an offense that isn’t evidence of anything.”  Juror 
No. 9184 agreed with defense counsel that she had “changed 
[her] feelings somewhat on that.”  Juror No. 9184 also confirmed 
to the trial court that she had “no reason to think” she could not 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
 
give both sides a fair trial, that she was prepared to follow the 
law, and that she would accord defendant the presumption of 
innocence.   
Defendant argues that Juror No. 8919’s questionnaire 
responses raised particular concerns because Juror No. 8919 
“[d]isagree[d] somewhat” with the statement, “ ‘Anyone who 
intentionally kills another person should always get the death 
penalty.’ ”  Juror No. 8919 added that “self defense can be seen 
as ‘intentional.’ ”  Juror No. 8919 also “[d]isagree[d] somewhat” 
with the statement, “ ‘Anyone who intentionally kills another 
person should never get the death penalty,’ ” adding, “should vs. 
shall.”  Taken together, these responses do not indicate, as 
defendant argues, that Juror No. 8919 would vote for the death 
penalty for all intentional murders other than self-defense.  Nor 
did voir dire raise such concerns; on the contrary, the juror 
responded affirmatively to questions as to whether he could deal 
“fairly and impartially” with the question of penalty.    
Defendant similarly argues that Juror No. 0555’s 
questionnaire responses raised concerns because she indicated 
she “[a]gree[d] somewhat” with the statement, “Anyone who 
intentionally kills another person should always get the death 
penalty” and “[s]trongly disagree[d]” with the statement, 
“Anyone who intentionally kills another person should never get 
the death penalty.”  But Juror No. 0555 also stated she would 
consider both possible penalties if the case reached the penalty 
phase and that she would vote for life imprisonment in an 
appropriate case.  Defendant elected not to question Juror 
No. 0555 on these subjects, and he points to nothing in her voir 
dire responses to indicate that the juror would not be impartial.   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
 
Finally, defendant asserts that Juror No. 6619 raised 
particular concerns because, among other things, she wrote in 
her juror questionnaire that, philosophically, she was strongly 
in favor of the death penalty and “agreed somewhat” that 
anyone who kills intentionally should always receive the death 
penalty.  But Juror No. 6619 also said she was amenable to 
either punishment, depending on the evidence, and affirmed 
that she would vote for life imprisonment in an appropriate case.  
During voir dire, defense counsel probed some of Juror No. 
6619’s responses concerning her views on the death penalty.  
Although Juror No. 6619 had initially offered “self-defense” and 
“automobile accidents” as examples of intentional killings where 
the death penalty would not be warranted, counsel then clarified 
that the question was whether there would be a situation in 
which the juror could envision reaching the penalty phase of a 
trial, after finding defendant “guilty of first-degree murder,” and 
determining “life imprisonment without parole to be the most 
appropriate sentence.”  Juror No. 6619 responded affirmatively, 
at which point defense counsel passed for cause, thereby 
waiving any claim of juror bias.  (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 21, 59.)  To the extent defendant now argues voir dire 
was inadequate to determine whether Juror No. 6619 was 
capable of serving as an impartial juror, we see no merit to the 
claim. 
 
 
2. 
Excluding Prospective Juror F.G. for  
                Cause  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding 
Prospective Juror F.G. for cause.  We hold the court acted within 
its discretion. 
 
F.G. was a musician who had performed at many prisons 
and who had also worked on antidrug programs with the health 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
department and the county sheriff’s department.  During voir 
dire, the trial court asked F.G. whether any of these experiences 
would preclude him from being a fair juror, “knowing what the 
juror’s job is.”  F.G. replied, “No, I don’t think so.  The only caveat 
I would put on that is that I have . . . witnessed firsthand the 
results of the sentencing.  And I have spoken with people who 
have been, for instance, sentenced for life, with no chance of 
parole and stuff like that.  And that—it’s a very heavy burden 
to judge someone.  So that’s all I can say.”  The trial court 
explained to F.G. that the concept of punishment and penalty 
had no place in the determination of a defendant’s guilt and 
asked whether F.G. understood those distinctions.  F.G. 
indicated his assent.   
 
The court inquired whether, in light of F.G.’s experience 
working with people who had received life sentences, he “would 
be inclined to consider the potential sentence in determining the 
issue of guilt or innocence” and whether those experiences 
“would influence [his] view of the facts.”  F.G. replied that he 
“would like to think it wouldn’t, but it hangs on me very heavily, 
morally.”  The court clarified that “the question is, if you wind 
up on this jury, are you going to deliberate with the other jurors, 
consider the facts, decide the facts based on the evidence, 
without consideration of any potential sentence that may be 
imposed, if you get to that phase of the case.  That’s the 
question.”  F.G. responded, “I would have to say that no matter 
what I did, that would be a factor.”  The court excused the 
prospective juror.   
 
Criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to a trial 
before an impartial jury.  (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 16; see Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 
149–150; see also Turner v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 466, 471; 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
 
People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 916.)  But the state also 
has a vital interest in ensuring cases are tried before juries able 
to make decisions concerning punishment “within the 
framework state law prescribes.”  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 
551 U.S. 1, 9.)  “[I]n determining whether the removal of a 
potential juror would vindicate the State’s interest without 
violating the defendant’s right, the trial court makes a judgment 
based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed 
deference by reviewing courts.”  (Ibid.)  “When the prospective 
juror’s answers on voir dire are conflicting or equivocal, the trial 
court’s findings as to the prospective juror’s state of mind are 
binding on appellate courts if supported by substantial 
evidence.”  (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 10.)  A trial 
court has the power, though not the obligation, to excuse biased 
prospective jurors on its own motion.  (People v. Cunningham 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 981 [upholding sua sponte excusal of a 
prospective juror for cause]; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
297, 315–316 [no duty to excuse on court’s own motion].)   
Although this was a capital trial, here it was F.G.’s views 
toward a life sentence, not the death penalty, that raised 
concerns about his ability to serve as a juror.  The court engaged 
in a colloquy with F.G., probing his responses to questions 
suggesting an inability to put aside considerations of 
punishment in determining guilt.  F.G. unequivocally explained 
that the potential penalty of life imprisonment “would be a 
factor” in determining guilt.  The trial court concluded F.G. 
would be unable to follow the trial court’s instructions and 
evaluate the evidence of defendant’s guilt without considering 
the potential penalty, and for that reason determined dismissal 
was warranted.  Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
determination.  (People v. Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 10.)   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
 
 
Defendant raises several challenges to this conclusion, but 
none is persuasive.  First, defendant argues it was improper for 
the trial court to excuse F.G. absent a request from one of the 
parties.  Our cases, however, do not forbid a trial court from 
excusing a juror for cause on its own motion (see People v. 
Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 981), and defendant offers 
no persuasive reason for us to create such a bar. 
 
Defendant next argues the excusal was improper under 
Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, which held that the federal 
Constitution prohibits the exclusion for cause of a potential 
juror because he or she is unable to state under oath that the 
mandatory sentence of death or life imprisonment “ ‘will not 
affect his [or her] deliberations on any issue of fact.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 42, quoting Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.31.)  The court explained 
the effect of the requirement was to exclude from the jury pool 
those who stated “they would be ‘affected’ by the possibility of 
the death penalty, but who apparently meant only that the 
potentially lethal consequences of their decision would invest 
their deliberations with greater seriousness and gravity or 
would involve them emotionally.”  (Adams, at pp. 49–50.)   
This case presents no comparable circumstances.  
Although defendant argues otherwise, in this case the trial court 
reasonably understood F.G. to say not merely that his prior 
experiences and views would cause him to perform his duties as 
a juror with a particular sense of seriousness and gravity, but 
that they would undermine his ability to impartially evaluate 
the evidence of defendant’s guilt.  Adams does not bar the 
excusal of such a juror.  (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 
932, 963 [Adams does not forbid excusal of juror who admitted 
that his views on the death penalty would cause him to apply a 
standard of proof higher than proof beyond a reasonable doubt].)   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
 
 
Defendant also attempts to analogize this case to People v. 
Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, in which we held that a 
prospective juror was dismissed without adequate basis after 
assuring the court he would be able to follow the law.  (Id. at 
p. 964.)  The analogy is inapt; here, F.G.’s responses to voir dire 
indicated he would be unable to perform the duties of a juror 
insofar as he informed the court he could not follow the court’s 
instructions to determine guilt without taking into account the 
possible penalty.  Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
dismissal, and we are presented with no reason to upset that 
decision on appeal.  (People v. Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 
p. 10.) 6 
 
C. 
 
Guilt Phase Claims 
 
 
1. 
“Second Kidnap” Theory  
 
Defendant contends there was a material variance 
between the kidnap alleged in the indictment and the 
prosecutor’s argument regarding his actual offense, rendering 
him unable to defend against the charge in violation of his rights 
                                        
6  
At oral argument, defense counsel also contended 
Prospective Juror F.G.’s responses to the questionnaire 
indicated his willingness to follow the court’s instructions in 
general.  He contended that dismissal was not warranted 
because, in their oral exchange, the court did not specifically 
advise F.G. that the court’s instructions would include an 
instruction to decide guilt based on the evidence presented, 
without allowing the potential penalty to factor into the jurors’ 
evaluation of the facts of the case.  Based on our review of the 
record, we see no genuine potential for confusion on this point.  
It was not necessary for the trial court to explicitly advise F.G. 
that a juror’s determination of the facts should be based solely 
on the evidence presented. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  We reject the argument. 
 
 
 
 
a. 
Background 
 
Defendant, along with Skidmore, Rugge, Pressley, and 
Hollywood, was charged by indictment with kidnapping for 
purposes of ransom or extortion.  Specifically, the charging 
document stated that “[o]n or about August 6, 2000 through 
August 9, 2000, in the county of Santa Barbara, the said 
defendants . . . did willfully, unlawfully, and forcibly detain, 
take, 
carry 
away, 
and 
kidnap 
NICHOLAS 
SAMUEL 
MARKOWITZ, age 15, for purposes of ransom or to commit 
extortion, or to extract money from another person, in violation 
of Penal Code section 209(a).”  Five special allegations were 
charged along with the kidnapping count, including that the 
victim suffered death in the course of the kidnapping and that 
defendant intentionally discharged a firearm resulting in Nick’s 
death.7   
 
During his closing argument, defense counsel maintained 
that defendant had taken no part in the charged kidnapping, 
because that kidnap, which began on August 6, had ended before 
defendant drove to Santa Barbara.  Specifically, counsel argued 
that the kidnap ended when the victim could have fled his 
captors—but did not—at several points during his captivity.  
“[T]his kidnapping . . . ended before Mr. Hoyt ever spoke with 
Jesse Hollywood on the 8th [of August, 2000] to take a bag up to 
Santa Barbara.  The kidnapping was done.”  In response, the 
                                        
7  
Of the three remaining special allegations, two related to 
Pressley’s age and the last stated that Skidmore, Rugge, 
Pressley, and Hollywood were principals in a felony in which a 
coprincipal, defendant, possessed an assault weapon. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
 
prosecutor argued that even if the defense was correct that the 
kidnap concluded when Nick could have fled, defendant was 
guilty of kidnap because “independent of the kidnapping that 
took place on the 6th where [the victim] was brought from Los 
Angeles County to Santa Barbara, there is as well the 
kidnapping that took place in the late evening hours of the 8th, 
into the early morning hours of the 9th of August, where he’s 
taken from the motel, perhaps taken as well to Rugge’s house at 
some point, we’ll never know, and then taken up to the location 
on West Camino Cielo and there he was killed.  That we know 
is an independent kidnapping.  And certainly, he would be guilty 
of that offense.”   
 
The prosecutor pointed out before the jury that defense 
counsel’s argument never addressed whether defendant would 
be guilty of the kidnap based on movement of the victim from 
the motel to the murder site.  Defense counsel objected at this 
point, noting that only one count of kidnapping was charged.  
The following colloquy occurred: 
 
“THE COURT:  He said the count, the kidnapping for—
count, relates only to the incident of the—I’ll have to look.  Isn’t 
that your point? 
 
“MR. CROUTER [Defense]:  That there is only one count 
charged. 
 
“MR. ZONEN [Prosecution]:  Well, you have to look at the 
date on the pleading there, and the time, and whether or not it 
governs an entire period of time.  And I believe in an Indictment 
you’ll find that it covers the period of time from the 6th through 
the 9th. 
 
“THE COURT:  Let’s see.  That’s the way the count is 
drawn.  August 6th through August 9th. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
 
 
“MR. ZONEN:  See, a kidnapping can go over a period of 
time, and in this case it did.  That kidnapping took place from 
the 6th through the 9th.  It is one count, but it’s one count that 
covers the entirety of his movement from the time he left at the 
location near his residence in that area, I think near Ingomar 
and Platt in San Fernando Valley, to the point where he was 
killed up in Santa Barbara County.  That’s all covered in the 
pleading in that one count as a kidnapping.”   
 
Defense counsel raised no further argument or objection, 
and the prosecutor continued his rebuttal.   
 
 
 
 
b. 
Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
i. 
Material Variance 
 
“ ‘Both the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution 
and the due process guarantees of the state and federal 
Constitutions require that a criminal defendant receive notice 
of the charges adequate to give a meaningful opportunity to 
defend against them.’ ”  (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
630, 681.)  Notice is supplied in the first instance by the 
accusatory pleading.  (E.g., People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 
317.)  But a variance between the pleading and proof at trial will 
be disregarded if it is not material.  (People v. LaMarr (1942) 20 
Cal.2d 705, 711.)  “The test of the materiality of a variance is 
whether the indictment or information so fully and correctly 
informs the defendant of the criminal act with which he is 
charged that, taking into consideration the proof which is 
introduced against him, he is not misled in making his defense, 
or placed in danger of being twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense.”  (Ibid.; accord, People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 
427–428; People v. Arras (1891) 89 Cal. 223, 226.)  
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
 
 
Here, 
the indictment alleged defendant 
and his 
codefendants committed an aggravated kidnap (Pen. Code, 
§ 209, subd. (a)) by forcibly abducting Nick on August 6, 2000, 
and detaining him until he was murdered on August 9, 2000.  
The jury was instructed on the elements of aggravated kidnap 
and on the lesser included offense of simple kidnap.  The 
aggravated kidnap statute provides in pertinent part, “Any 
person who . . . kidnaps or carries away another person by any 
means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain . . . that person 
for ransom, reward or to commit extortion or to exact from 
another person any money or valuable thing, or any person who 
aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony . . . .”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 209, subd. (a).)  Simple kidnap, in turn, requires proof of three 
things:  “that (1) the defendant took, held, or detained another 
person by using force or by instilling reasonable fear; (2) using 
that force or fear, the defendant moved the other person, or 
made the other person move a substantial distance; and (3) the 
other person did not consent to the movement.  ([Pen. Code,] 
§ 207, subd. (a).)”  (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 232.) 
 
Defendant argues the prosecution crafted a new theory of 
kidnap during the rebuttal phase of closing argument for the 
dual purposes of surprise and to have the last word.  This new 
theory was that there were two distinct kidnap offenses in this 
case, the first one commencing on August 6, 2000, and the 
second on August 8, 2000.  Defendant argues that because he 
was charged with a single kidnap offense in the indictment, the 
“second” kidnap constitutes a material variance from the 
charged offense in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights.   
 
The argument lacks merit.  As the prosecution correctly 
explained in the trial court, the indictment charged defendant 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
 
and his codefendants with a continuing kidnapping offense that 
extended over a period of time.  That period included the time 
the victim left his home and was taken to Santa Barbara, the 
time he spent in Santa Barbara, and the time he was taken from 
locations within Santa Barbara to the site of his murder.  True, 
defense counsel theorized that the kidnapping was interrupted 
by a period during which Nick could have eluded his captors at 
some point before defendant became involved on August 8, 2000.  
But the indictment put defendant on notice that the prosecution 
intended to prove kidnapping based on the events of August 8 
and 9, 2000, as well.  Defendant could not have been misled by 
his own “interruption” theory into believing otherwise.  There 
was no fatal variance between indictment and proof, and cases 
finding fatal variances under dissimilar circumstances do not 
help defendant’s case.  (Cf. U.S. v. Adamson (9th Cir. 2002) 291 
F.3d 606, 615–616; U.S. v. Tsinhnahijinnie (9th Cir. 1997) 112 
F.3d 988, 990.)   
 
 
 
 
 
ii. 
Alleged Hearsay 
 
A corollary of defendant’s “two kidnap” theory is that there 
were also two distinct conspiracies, the first involving the 
August 6 to 8 kidnapping of Nick and the second involving a 
separate and unrelated agreement to kidnap and murder Nick.  
Under this theory, defendant argues that the trial court erred 
by admitting various out-of-court statements by Hollywood, 
Rugge, Skidmore, and Pressley, as testified to by various 
witnesses at trial, because the statements were not admissible 
as statements of coconspirators in the only conspiracy and 
kidnapping defendant participated in, and therefore constituted 
inadmissible hearsay.   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
 
 
Coconspirators’ hearsay statements may be admitted if 
there is independent evidence of a conspiracy and the party 
seeking to admit the hearsay shows the speaker was involved in 
the conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, the 
statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the 
person against whom the statement is being offered either was 
participating in, or later would participate in, the conspiracy.  
(Evid. Code, § 1223; In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 995–
996.)  Here, the trial court permitted introduction of hearsay 
statements testified to by Affronti, Hoeflinger, Carpenter, 
Adams-Young, Sheehan, and Hogg regarding Nick’s time in 
Santa Barbara.  As generally set forth above, these witnesses 
testified about Nick’s kidnap and captivity.  Although defendant 
alleges these statements were not in furtherance of the 
conspiracy to kidnap Nick, the trial court reasonably concluded 
otherwise.  We find no error. 
 
As an initial matter, it is unclear that defendant has 
preserved his objections to the introduction of the statements:  
When the statements in question were introduced, defendant 
generally failed to object on the bases he now raises on appeal.  
For example, although he raised a “hearsay upon hearsay” 
objection at trial to Adams-Young’s testimony regarding a 
statement made by Pressley after she had expressed concern to 
him about Nick’s continued presence in Santa Barbara, defense 
counsel stated, “And I don’t disagree with the . . . in furtherance 
of the conspiracy” theory of admission, “but I still have the 
problem that there appears to be a second level of hearsay.”  The 
court overruled defendant’s objection. 
 
“Because the question whether defendant[] . . . preserved 
the[] right to raise this issue on appeal is close and difficult, we 
assume that defendant[] . . . preserved the[] right, and proceed 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
 
to the merits.”  (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, 
fn. 6.)  Having done so, we conclude the trial court committed no 
error in admitting the hearsay statements recounted by these 
witnesses.  Defendant argues that the conspiracy he entered 
into with Hollywood to murder Nick was a wholly separate 
enterprise from the one Rugge and others entered into to kidnap 
Nick, and the statements admitted regarding Nick’s capture 
were therefore inadmissible with regard to Nick’s murder and 
defendant’s involvement therewith.  The trial court was not 
compelled to so finely parse this case.  The evidence showed that 
Hollywood, the mastermind, had his friends kidnap Nick to 
exact a ransom from Nick’s brother.  When Hollywood learned 
that the potential penalty for Nick’s kidnap was too high a price 
for him to pay, he asked defendant to kill Nick.  The hearsay 
statements that were admitted, which tell the story of Nick’s 
initial capture and subsequent captivity, were relevant to 
demonstrating this overarching conspiracy, and were made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
iii. 
Jury Questions 
 
Defendant also argues the court’s responses to juror 
inquiries regarding whether one or two kidnaps were alleged, 
and the relevance of conspiracy, ultimately worked to direct a 
verdict on the kidnap count and kidnap-murder special-
circumstance charges.   
During the second day of deliberations, the jury posed a 
question about whether one or two kidnapping events occurred 
and asked about the relevance of the conspiracy instruction.  
The jury asked whether “the kidnapping [is] a continuous, single 
event” and “what are the correct dates” of the kidnapping.  The 
court explained, “[T]hat was one of the issues in the case that I 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
 
gave you an instruction when a kidnapping terminates, and 
there was some, the defense—there was some argument that the 
initial kidnapping had already terminated and he was free to go, 
remember that, and then there was some subsequent argument 
that the facts supported a second kidnapping based upon what 
you found there, and so that’s really one of the issues that you 
have to decide.  I can’t answer that question for you.  I can just 
point out to you that that was one of the disputed issues in the 
case.  One, was the kidnapping that happened in the San 
Fernando Valley still ongoing when this happened.  And there 
was argument about that.  And then, even if it wasn’t, was there 
another kidnapping.  Those were the issues that were presented 
to the jury.  And I can only remind you of what those issues were.  
I can’t answer that question for you, because I’d be stepping in 
and I’d have to send all of you home because I’d be taking over 
your responsibility.”  The foreperson responded, “[T]hat’s 
helpful in itself.”  Defense counsel was present and raised no 
objection.   
 
The court also responded to the jury’s question regarding 
the dates of the kidnapping offense, noting that the dates the 
jury had to keep in mind were August 6 and 9, 2000.  The court 
noted, “[A]gain, whether or not the kidnapping was ongoing 
through that period or there were two kidnappings or there was 
only one that had terminated, those are the dates that you have 
to keep in mind, the 6th through the 9th.”   
 
The jury also asked about the lesser included offense of 
simple kidnap under Penal Code section 207.  The court 
reminded the jury to consider defendant’s involvement only 
when considering the elements of the offense.  The jury then 
asked, “So being a coconspirator has nothing to do with it?”  The 
court reminded the jury that defendant was not charged with 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
 
conspiracy, 
and 
the 
jury 
was 
instructed 
regarding 
coconspirators to give context to certain statements made.  The 
jury thanked the court and indicated its question had been 
resolved.   
 
Defendant argues the trial court’s responses were faulty 
insofar as they instructed the jury they could convict on the 
basis of the prosecution’s “second kidnap” theory; failed to 
clarify that the jury could not convict defendant of the kidnap if 
the movement of the victim during this kidnapping was 
incidental to the murder (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 
612); and failed to clarify that defendant could not be held 
“strictly liable” for an earlier kidnap by other participants.  To 
the extent, if any, the court’s response caused confusion, 
defendant’s failure to object forfeits any claim of error on appeal.  
(See People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1061.)  In any event, 
there was no significant risk of confusion.  The trial court 
correctly advised the jury it could convict defendant of 
kidnapping based on his own involvement in the transportation 
of the victim to the site where he was murdered.  Under the 
circumstances of the case, there was no danger the jury would 
misunderstand the trial court as advising that it could hold 
defendant “strictly liable” for the earlier abduction of Nick on 
August 6; no such argument was raised at trial.  Defendant’s 
argument that the trial court’s responses worked to direct a 
verdict on the kidnap count and kidnap-murder special-
circumstance charges is without merit. 
 
 
 
 
 
iv. 
Instructional Issues 
 
Defendant argues that a unanimity instruction was 
warranted or could have cured whatever error the court created 
through its responses to juror questions.  Such instructions 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
 
“generally appl[y] to acts that could have been charged as 
separate offenses, and . . . must be given ‘ “only if the jurors 
could otherwise disagree which act a defendant committed and 
yet convict him of the crime charged.” ’ ”  (People v. Seaton (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 598, 671.)  Here, for reasons already explained, there 
was no realistic possibility of disagreement.  The indictment 
charged a continuous course of conduct—albeit one involving 
various actors at different times—that began with Nick’s 
abduction on August 6, 2000, and culminated with his murder 
on August 9, 2000.  The evidence at trial showed that 
defendant’s involvement began on August 8 when he took and 
transported Nick to the location where he was killed.  The trial 
court advised the jury that it was to evaluate only defendant’s 
involvement when determining defendant’s guilt.  The trial 
court was not obligated to give a unanimity instruction.   
Finally, we note that while defendant argues the jury 
should have been instructed with CALJIC No. 9.56,8 setting 
forth the asportation-by-fraud defense, he neither requested the 
instruction nor objected to the trial court’s failure to give the 
instruction.  The trial court had no sua sponte duty to give the 
instruction because the instruction was inconsistent with the 
                                        
8  
CALJIC No. 9.56 provides:  “When one consents to 
accompany another, there is no kidnapping so long as the 
condition of consent exists.  [¶]  To consent, a person must:  [¶]  
1. Act freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of 
threats, force, or duress;  [¶]  2. Have knowledge that [he] [she] 
was being physically moved; and  [¶]  3. Possess sufficient 
mental capacity to make an intelligent choice whether to be 
physically moved by the other person [or persons].  [¶]  [Being 
passive does not amount to consent.]  Consent requires a free 
will and positive cooperation in act or attitude.” 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
 
theory of the defense.  There was thus no error in connection 
with this instruction. 
 
 
2. 
Admission of Custodial Confession at  
                Trial  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting the 
audio and videotapes of his custodial confession to killing Nick, 
which he claims were involuntary and were obtained in violation 
of his Miranda rights.  The trial court did not err in admitting 
defendant’s confession. 
 
  
a. 
Background 
 
While housed at the Santa Barbara jail, defendant spoke 
twice with his mother.  Evidently believing her son to be 
innocent and taking the blame for someone else’s crime, she 
suggested he talk to the detectives to “spill [his] guts and get 
out.”  Defendant apparently heeded her advice and asked to 
speak with a detective.   
 
Defendant then spoke with Detective West and Sergeant 
Reinstadler, who began by confirming that defendant had 
initiated the conversation and reminding him of his Miranda 
rights.  Defendant waived his Miranda rights orally and in 
writing.  After conversing back and forth about the crime, Hoyt 
told the detectives that he had asked to speak with them to “say 
that this picture that everybody’s painting of me is not me.”  
Detective West responded, “Well, tell us who you are.  Tell us 
how this went down.”  Hoyt told them he could not do that and 
instead asked, “Do you mind if I go back to my cell and think 
about tonight and talk to you guys tomorrow because I know my 
arraignment is Monday?”  The detectives responded by telling 
defendant, “Once you’re arraigned, we can’t talk to you.  That’s 
the bottom line.  I mean, if you want to tell us something, I’m 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
 
being honest with you, this is your opportunity to do it.  This is 
it.”  Defendant replied, “There’s no way I can talk to you 
tomorrow?”  Sergeant Reinstadler explained, “No.  I know why,” 
continuing, “you won’t want to talk to us tomorrow because 
somebody’s gonna get to you, telling you not to talk to us.”   
 
When the detectives asked if he was okay, defendant 
responded:  “I mean, I’m going down for life.”  Sergeant 
Reinstadler replied:  “There’s a difference between life and the 
death penalty.  And everything else in between.  All we want is 
the truth.”  The interview continued, and after additional 
discussion, defendant explained how he had become involved in 
the crimes.  Defendant explained to the detectives he was 
indebted to Hollywood and was told by an intermediary (whom 
defendant did not name) that he could erase his debt if he went 
to “take care of somebody,” which defendant understood to mean 
killing him.  The intermediary did not tell defendant the name 
of his intended victim but relayed a location—Santa Barbara.  
Defendant drove Sheehan’s car to the Lemon Tree Inn in Santa 
Barbara, where he found a gun waiting.   
 
When the detectives asked what happened next, 
defendant said, “I think I’m going to stop there for now,” and 
asked for a glass of water.  The detectives complied with the 
request for water and asked defendant whether he was asking 
to take a break or “telling us you don’t want to talk anymore, 
period.”  Defendant replied that he would like an overnight 
break.  The detectives responded that that would be “[t]oo late,” 
and told defendant that “[o]nce a lawyer contacts you, we are 
precluded from speaking with you anymore, period.”  Defendant 
asked whether a lawyer would be contacting him the next day, 
and the detectives replied, “Oh, I’m sure.  It’s normal.  It’s their 
job.”  Defendant told the detectives his mom was unable to afford 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
 
an attorney for him, so he would have to work with a public 
defender.  While the detectives assured him “[t]hat’s fine,” 
defendant worried aloud, “[A] public defender, I’m going 
nowhere with that one.”  The detectives then reminded 
defendant, “You wanted to talk to us, man.”  Defendant 
responded, “And have I helped you out at all?”  The detectives 
told him that there were still pieces of the puzzle to fill in, and 
the conversation continued.   
 
Defendant admitted to feeling sorry for “[t]hat kid that I 
buried.”  He told the detectives he had not put the duct tape on 
Nick’s mouth.  When the detectives said Rugge had told them 
otherwise, defendant responded:  “I love this one.  The only thing 
I did was kill him.”   
 
After answering additional questions about Pressley’s 
involvement, defendant said:  “All right.  You guys I think I want 
to stop there.  I think you guys got a pretty good picture.”  
Detective West agreed:  “Yeah, I’ve got a good picture, and it’s 
pretty grim for you . . . .  I’m sorry, uh, that that’s what you 
painted for me.”  Sergeant Reinstadler asked defendant whether 
there was “ever a time when right before you pulled the trigger 
that you just thought, you know, I shouldn’t do this?  This is 
wrong.”  Defendant replied:  “Hell, yes.  Right before.”  The 
conversation ended not long thereafter. 
 
Before trial, defendant sought to suppress the confession, 
arguing that it was coerced and obtained in violation of 
Miranda.  Defense counsel argued that Sergeant Reinstadler 
and Detective West threatened defendant with the death 
penalty and urged him to correct the impression that he was a 
“stone-cold killer.”  The trial court concluded the confession was 
not coerced, explaining the detectives’ reference to the death 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
 
penalty “was actually in response to the defendant’s initiation of 
the subject of penalty.  He said something about the fact that he 
was looking at life and then the detective said, ‘Well, that’s 
better than death or what’s in-between,’ or something like that, 
this was not a subject that was pursued after that.  And it 
doesn’t appear to me that that reference was anything that 
resulted or led to Mr. Hoyt’s confession.”     
 
The trial court also examined whether defendant’s 
admission was coerced because he was called “a stone-cold 
killer” during the interrogation.  The court reasoned that use of 
that phrase, “in and of itself” was not sufficient to conclude his 
admission was coercively obtained.  The court acknowledged the 
argument’s logic:  that if a person is truly a killer, that person 
would receive the death penalty and would be required to 
demonstrate facts in mitigation in order to avoid that 
consequence.  The court did not find the detectives’ use of the 
phrase “stone-cold killer” to have been used as a threat.  Rather, 
the court concluded, it was somewhat factual and therefore was 
not coercive.   
 
The superior court next examined defendant’s invocation 
of his right to remain silent, concluding that the transcript as a 
whole reflected defendant’s desire to continue talking.  The court 
explained that defendant “was not expressing a wish to 
terminate the interview, to terminate his colloquy with the 
police, he was temporizing it.  He didn’t quite know what he 
wanted to do, and he was sort of postponing the inevitable, but 
he didn’t really want to stop talking because he didn’t quit 
talking.”  (Italics added.)  The court continued, “I don’t think the 
officers ever tried to coerce [defendant] into further discussions.  
I don’t think they attempted to question him until after it was 
obvious that he wanted to resume the discussion.  So, I don’t find 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
 
that there’s been any violation of Miranda as far as [defendant] 
is concerned.”   
 
The court concluded that defendant’s statement to the 
detectives was admissible because he did not “ever vent[] any 
real interest in terminating [his] interview.”  The court noted 
that when defendant sought an overnight break, the detectives 
correctly informed him that he would be provided with an 
attorney, and that attorney might advise him not to continue 
speaking to the detectives.  Because defendant continued 
talking despite having a basis to cease doing so and because 
nothing the detectives told defendant was misleading, the court 
concluded defendant’s Miranda rights were not violated.  Later 
in the colloquy, the parties acknowledge that defendant says, 
“Yeah, I think I want to stop there, I think you guys got a pretty 
good picture.”  The court did not explicitly rule on whether any 
statement 
made 
following 
defendant’s 
invocation 
was 
admissible because the prosecution agreed to terminate the tape 
at that point, and the court acknowledged this evidence, the so-
called “Side-B” evidence, was not going to be admitted unless 
defendant elected to testify, which had not yet been determined 
at the time the court evaluated this statement.  Accordingly, the 
trial court did not expressly rule on whether the statement that 
followed this third invocation was admissible under Miranda.   
 
  
b. 
Discussion 
 
The Fifth Amendment provides, “No person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 
. . . .”  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)  “To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the 
‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation 
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467), the high court adopted a 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
 
set of prophylactic measures requiring law enforcement officers 
to advise an accused of his right to remain silent and to have 
counsel present prior to any custodial interrogation (id. at 
pp. 444–445).”  (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 338–
339.)  During such an interrogation, if a defendant invokes 
either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, “ ‘ “the 
interrogation must cease.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 339.)  “ ‘[A]n accused . . . 
having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused 
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police.’  (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 
U.S. 477, 484–485.”  (Jackson, at p. 339.)  “[W]hen, as in this 
case, a defendant has waived his Miranda rights and agreed to 
talk with police, any subsequent invocation of the right to 
counsel or the right to remain silent must be unequivocal and 
unambiguous.”  (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 49 
(Sanchez).)     
 
“An involuntary confession may not be introduced into 
evidence at trial.”  (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 
169 (Carrington).)  It is the prosecution’s burden to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s confession 
was voluntary.  (Ibid.)  “In determining whether a confession is 
involuntary, we consider the totality of the circumstances to see 
if a defendant’s choice to confess was not ‘ “ ‘ “essentially 
free” ’ ” ’ because his will was overborne by the coercive practices 
of his interrogator.”  (People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 
672.)  A “confession [is] not ‘essentially free’ when a suspect’s 
confinement was physically oppressive, invocations of his or her 
Miranda rights were flagrantly ignored, or the suspect’s mental 
state was visibly compromised.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
 
 
A confession obtained in violation of Edwards and 
Miranda is likewise inadmissible during the prosecution’s case-
in-chief.  (People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1204–1205.)  It 
is the prosecution’s burden to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights 
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  (People v. Jackson, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 339.)  In reviewing a trial court’s denial of 
a suppression motion, we accept its resolution of factual 
disputes when supported by substantial evidence and determine 
independently whether, on those facts, a challenged statement 
was obtained illegally.  (Ibid.) 
 
Defendant raises several challenges to the admission of 
his confession to the detectives.  Preliminarily, he argues that 
the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing 
before denying his motion to suppress his confession.  Defendant 
concedes the trial court asked if he wanted such a hearing and 
he declined.  The trial court accordingly decided the suppression 
issue based on the transcripts and tapes the parties had 
submitted to the court.  We find no abuse of discretion on this 
score. 
Defendant argues that his confession is inadmissible 
under Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477, because he 
requested counsel on arrest and did not voluntarily initiate 
further contact with the detectives.  The record is to the 
contrary:  It shows defendant did initiate further contact by 
requesting an audience with Detective West and Sergeant 
Reinstadler, who then renewed Miranda warnings before 
proceeding with the interview.  Indeed, West reminded 
defendant before the interview began in earnest that defendant 
had initially asked to speak with an attorney and confirmed that 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
 
he now wanted to make a statement to law enforcement.  
Defendant said he did.   
Defendant claims, however, that police coerced him into 
reinitiating contact through the medium of his mother, who had 
cajoled him over the phone to talk to detectives to secure his 
release.  This claim is utterly devoid of merit.  Defendant points 
to no evidence suggesting that the police had anything to do with 
the conversation with defendant’s mother, except insofar as they 
facilitated the conversation by allowing defendant to make a 
collect call.  There is nothing coercive about allowing a detained 
suspect to call his mother.   
 
Defendant also contends he did not act knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily when he waived his Miranda and 
Edwards rights, due to substantial memory deficits as well as 
his limited experience, education, young age, and below average 
intelligence.  Defendant did not present any evidence of mental 
or other impairments at the suppression hearing, so he cannot 
now claim the trial court erred in failing to consider them.  And 
defendant points to nothing else in the record, including his age 
(21 at the time of the interview), that would have raised 
questions about his ability to understand his rights as they had 
been explained to him.  The state satisfied its burden of 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
(See People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375; People v. 
Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425, 428.) 
 
Defendant contends that even if he voluntarily reinitiated 
contact with the detectives and waived his Miranda rights, the 
detectives later improperly failed to honor his requests to cut off 
questioning.  Defendant points to two episodes in particular.  
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
 
The first episode occurred when defendant asked detectives:  
“Do you mind if I go back to my cell and think about tonight and 
talk to you guys tomorrow . . . .”  Defendant contends that at this 
point, detectives should have stopped questioning him.  But 
after a suspect has waived his Miranda rights, officers are not 
required to cease questioning unless the suspect invokes his 
rights unambiguously and unequivocally.  (Sanchez, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 49.)  Defendant’s question did not amount to an 
unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to cut off 
questioning.  Nor did the colloquy that followed.  Sergeant 
Reinstadler told defendant that once he was “arraigned, we can’t 
talk to you.  That’s the bottom line.  I mean, if you want to tell 
us something, I’m being honest with you, this is your 
opportunity to do it.  This is it.”  Defendant reiterated his 
request to speak with the detectives the next day and was told 
“No.  I know why.  [¶]  [Y]ou won’t want to talk to us tomorrow 
because somebody’s going to get to you, telling you not to talk to 
us.  Play the games that we know people play.  And then, the 
next thing you know, you’re looking at you being triggerman.”  
Defendant asked clarifying questions of the detectives about 
whether he could speak to them with anonymity, and they 
answered his questions.  The conversation continued from there.  
Because defendant never unambiguously invoked his right to 
stop the interview, the detectives were under no obligation to do 
so. 
Defendant invokes People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63 in 
support of his argument, but that case is easily distinguished.  
There, the defendant repeatedly and clearly invoked his rights 
to silence and counsel without waiving his rights under 
Miranda, only to be ignored by the questioning officer, who 
hoped to obtain evidence for impeachment purposes.  (Id. at 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
 
p. 74.)  Here, by contrast, defendant voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights at the outset of the conversation and did not 
unambiguously invoke his right to stop the interview. 
 
The second episode occurred after defendant had spoken 
to the detectives for some time about how he had learned he 
could erase his debt to Hollywood in exchange for traveling to 
Santa Barbara to kill a person unknown to him.  When the 
detectives asked defendant what happened next, defendant 
said, “You guys know what happened.  I think I’m going to stop 
there for now.  Can I get some more water, please?”  Defendant 
argues that even if the detectives were not obligated to stop 
before, they were obligated to stop questioning him at this point.  
But once again, defendant never unambiguously invoked his 
right to silence.  The detectives accommodated his request for 
water, and defendant told them a number of things:  He thought 
the quality of water he had been given was poor; he described 
the love he had for his eight-year-old brother; he discussed his 
mother and her dependency upon him, his incarcerated brother, 
and his drug-addicted sister, all to justify his hesitancy to add 
to the story he had thus far provided to the detectives regarding 
the crime.  Sergeant Reinstadler reminded defendant about his 
right to remain silent.  Detective West offered to let defendant 
“collect [his] thoughts,” and then, to clarify defendant’s 
meaning, asked whether defendant wanted only a short break 
or to cut off the conversation altogether.  Defendant asked for a 
cigarette, saying, “I’d love just to take a break.  Do some more 
thinking.”  The detectives and defendant discussed whether 
defendant wanted a break overnight or just for a few moments, 
and defendant indicated the break he had in mind would be 
overnight.   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
58 
 
Sergeant Reinstadler told defendant a break between 
“now and tomorrow” would be “too late” because “[o]nce the 
lawyer contacts you, we are precluded from speaking with you 
anymore, period.”  Defendant asked whether a lawyer would 
contact him the next day, and the detective explained it was 
“normal” and “their job” to do so.  Defendant then asked the 
detectives whether he had been helpful to them, and Reinstadler 
explained that defendant had an opportunity to be of more help, 
to fill in more “pieces of the puzzle.”  The conversation 
continued.  At no time did defendant unambiguously signal a 
desire to end the interview, even though the detectives gave him 
ample opportunity to do so. 
Defendant contends that the detectives improperly 
coerced him into continuing the conversation when they told 
him they would be “precluded” from talking to him again if he 
chose to take a break until the next day.  Defendant contends 
that the detectives’ statements were deceptive and that their 
deception undermined the voluntariness of his statements.  
“While the use of deception or communication of false 
information to a suspect does not alone render a resulting 
statement involuntary [citation], such deception is a factor 
which weighs against a finding of voluntariness.”  (People v. 
Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 840–841.)  Here, it was certainly 
an exaggeration for the detectives to tell defendant they would 
not be able to speak with him again, “period,” if he took a break 
and spoke with a lawyer; represented suspects can, of course, 
speak with law enforcement officials if they choose.  It is unclear 
whether the detectives intended to deceive defendant on this 
point; what the detectives may have meant to convey is that a 
lawyer would likely advise against speaking with detectives—
meaning that, from their perspective, they almost certainly 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
59 
 
would not have another opportunity to speak with defendant.  
But in any event, insofar as they spoke in absolutes, the 
detectives overstated the case.  Regardless, we are not 
persuaded the statements rendered defendant’s statement 
involuntary.  Just before the challenged exchange, the 
detectives had reminded defendant that he had the right to 
remain silent and the right to speak with a lawyer.  Defendant 
responded to the exchange by asking for clarification about 
when a lawyer would contact him, then went on to ask whether 
he had been helpful to the detectives, and the conversation 
continued from there.  The record does not support defendant’s 
claim that he was coerced into continuing to speak with 
detectives after he had asked for a break. 
 
Defendant next contends the detectives employed other 
coercive interrogation tactics that rendered his confession 
involuntary.  (See People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 340 
[“ ‘ “A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by 
threats or violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or 
secured by the exertion of improper influence.” ’ ”].)  In 
particular, he argues that Detective West and Sergeant 
Reinstadler impliedly threatened him by mentioning the death 
penalty and that they improperly induced his confession by 
exaggerating the evidence against him.   
 
“ ‘In assessing allegedly coercive police tactics, “[t]he 
courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys which, 
under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to 
produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable.” ’ ”  
(People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 436.)  As the trial 
court found, there was nothing coercive about the detectives’ 
brief—and accurate—acknowledgment that the death penalty 
was a potential punishment for the crimes with which defendant 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
60 
 
was charged, and it does not appear that the mention of the 
death penalty prompted defendant’s confession.  Nor is urging a 
defendant to tell his story before matters go any further an 
impermissible law enforcement tactic.  (Id. at pp. 438–439, 443; 
Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 171.)   
 
As for defendant’s claim that the detectives improperly 
exaggerated the strength of the evidence against him, defendant 
points to an exchange in which detectives said others had told 
them that defendant gagged and shot the victim and dug the 
grave, which caused defendant to blurt out, “[T]he only thing I 
did was kill him.”  As defendant acknowledges, however, “the 
use of deceptive comments does not necessarily render a 
statement involuntary.  Deception does not undermine the 
voluntariness of a defendant’s statements to the authorities 
unless the deception is ‘ “ ‘of a type reasonably likely to procure 
an untrue statement.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
at p. 443.)  Defendant fails to explain why, in his view, the 
detectives’ questioning fits that description.  The only element 
of deception in the relevant exchange was the detectives’ 
assertion that others had told them defendant had dug Nick’s 
grave, but defendant fails to explain how the assertion 
undermined the voluntariness of defendant’s claim to have 
“only” killed Nick.   
 
Defendant’s final challenge to the admission of his 
confession concerns the introduction of the last exchange that 
took place between the detectives and defendant after defendant 
told the detectives, “I think I want to stop there.  I think you 
guys got a pretty good picture.”  In the colloquy that followed, 
Reinstadler asked defendant if “there ever [was] a time when 
right before you pulled the trigger that you just thought, you 
know I shouldn’t do this?  This is wrong.  Because I haven’t 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
61 
 
heard that from you.”  Defendant asked if the detectives wanted 
his “honest[]” response and when they answered in the 
affirmative, he told them, “Hell, yes.  Right before.”  Defendant 
now argues that this exchange—what he refers to as “side B”9 
evidence—should have been excluded, or an effective limiting 
instruction should have been given.   
 
The Attorney General does not dispute that defendant had 
unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent before this 
exchange.  Nonetheless, we conclude defendant’s claim lacks 
merit.  As the high court made clear in Harris v. New York 
(1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225–226, “although statements elicited in 
violation of Miranda are generally not admissible, statements 
that are otherwise voluntarily made may be used to impeach the 
defendant’s trial testimony.”  (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 
18.)  Defendant argues that the trial court should have excluded 
the evidence altogether as a sanction for the detectives’ 
deliberate violation of defendant’s right to remain silent.  But 
even if defendant’s characterization were correct, the “side B” 
evidence would nevertheless be admissible as impeachment 
evidence.  (People v. Peevy, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1188; People 
v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1076.)   
As for defendant’s argument about jury instructions, the 
jury was, in fact, instructed that it was to consider the “side B” 
evidence only for purposes of impeachment, and not as evidence 
of guilt.  To the extent defendant would have preferred for the 
instruction be phrased differently to make it more effective, it 
was his obligation to request a correction of the instruction given 
                                        
9  
This exchange was captured on the second side, or “side B” 
of the audiotape used to record Detective West’s and Sergeant 
Reinstadler’s interview with defendant. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
62 
 
or seek a new, more specific instruction.  (People v. Chism (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 1266, 1308.)  Having done neither, defendant has 
forfeited the claim on appeal.  Accordingly, we conclude no error 
arose from the introduction of the “side B” evidence for 
impeachment purposes. 
 
 
3. 
Defendant’s Testimony  
 
Defendant argues the court violated his rights under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
by compelling him to testify as a foundation for testimony by his 
expert, Dr. Michael Kania, that his confession was false.  We 
conclude his claim is forfeited and lacks merit in any event. 
 
The defense proposed calling Dr. Kania to testify that 
defendant’s confession was false.  The trial court held a hearing 
under Evidence Code section 402 to determine the admissibility 
of that testimony.10  During the hearing, the court and parties 
discussed the possibility of defendant testifying before 
Dr. Kania to provide a foundation for Dr. Kania’s testimony.  
Specifically, the court indicated its assumption that “defendant 
is going to testify that he doesn’t remember giving that 
interview” to police to contextualize Dr. Kania’s opinion about 
anxiety causing amnesia of the sort defendant alleges he 
suffered.  The defense did not object at this juncture or indicate 
                                        
10  
Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (a) provides:  
“When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its 
existence or nonexistence shall be determined as provided in 
this article.”  Subdivision (b) provides:  “The court may hear and 
determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the 
presence or hearing of the jury; but in a criminal action, the 
court shall hear and determine the question of the admissibility 
of a confession or admission of the defendant out of the presence 
and hearing of the jury if any party so requests.” 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
63 
 
there was uncertainty about whether or when defendant 
planned to testify.  The court “made it clear that I don’t believe 
that [Dr. Kania] can get on the stand and testify to things that 
he was told [while interviewing defendant] and, in effect, 
present the defendant’s defense, the defendant’s own testimony 
through the interview, I’ve said he can’t do that.”  Defendant 
raised no objection to the court’s characterization.  The court 
informed counsel that Dr. Kania’s testimony would be limited to 
his opinion about defendant’s anxiety and amnesia, not the 
content of Dr. Kania’s interview with defendant.  The court 
explained, “I’m not going to let him [Dr. Kania] testify as to 
circumstances, the things that he was told by the defendant.  
The defendant can testify to those things and he [defendant] can 
be asked questions about it.”  The court further rejected defense 
counsel’s argument that Dr. Kania should be permitted to 
testify as to whether or not defendant gave a false confession, 
concluding the issue was one for the jury to decide.  Defense 
counsel responded:  “We understand your ruling.  We object to 
it on state and federal due process grounds, but we accept it.”   
 
Defendant now claims that he testified at trial only 
because the court compelled him to do so on pain of forfeiting 
the ability to present Dr. Kania’s expert testimony.  This 
compulsion, he argues, violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights.  The record does not support the claim.  It is true that 
the trial court observed that an adequate foundation would need 
to be laid for the expert’s testimony.  It is also true that the trial 
court 
at 
various 
times 
appeared 
to 
assume—without 
contradiction from defense counsel—that defendant would 
supply the necessary foundation through his testimony.  But the 
trial court did not rule that Dr. Kania’s testimony would be 
permitted if and only if defendant took the stand, nor did 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
64 
 
defendant object on the ground that the trial court had, in effect, 
issued such a ruling.  Nor has defendant established it would 
have been futile to raise such an objection; had he objected, the 
court could have considered whether, as he now claims, 
defendant’s testimony was in fact unnecessary to lay the 
foundation for Dr. Kania’s opinion.  By failing to object in the 
trial court, defendant has forfeited the claim on appeal.   
 
To the extent defendant argues it was error for the court 
to make admission of Dr. Kania’s testimony contingent on the 
introduction of foundational evidence, the claim lacks merit.  
Defendant sought to present expert testimony that he suffered 
anxiety-induced amnesia and did not recall confessing.  But 
without some foundational evidence that defendant did not 
remember the confession, Dr. Kania’s opinion would lack 
relevance.  Dr. Kania could not be the source of the evidence that 
defendant did not remember his confession because that 
information would be the product of inadmissible hearsay, 
having originated from Dr. Kania’s interviews with defendant.  
(Evid. Code, § 1200.)  An adequate foundation was, in fact, 
required. 
 
Despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary, nothing in 
that conclusion contradicts the high court’s teachings in Crane 
v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 689.  In that case, the high 
court held that when the prosecution’s case was based on the 
defendant’s confession, it was error to preclude the defendant 
from introducing evidence about the manner in which his 
confession was obtained as part of his defense.  (Id. at p. 691.)  
But Crane does not require the admission of any and all defense-
proffered evidence about the circumstances of a confession, 
without regard to the ordinary rules of evidence. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
65 
 
 
Defendant also argues that the trial court violated his 
constitutional rights by effectively requiring him to testify 
before Dr. Kania.  Defendant relies on Brooks v. Tennessee 
(1972) 406 U.S. 605, in which the United States Supreme Court 
struck down a Tennessee statute requiring a defendant to testify 
first or not at all because it deprived “the accused and his 
lawyer” of the “opportunity to evaluate the actual worth of their 
evidence” and make tactical decisions after observing the 
testimony of other defense witnesses.  (Id. at p. 612.)  Here, the 
trial court placed no comparable restrictions on defendant.  The 
court and parties both appear to have simply assumed that 
defendant would testify before Dr. Kania, so that Dr. Kania’s 
testimony could be properly contextualized.  But defendant 
never gave any indication that he planned or hoped to testify 
after Dr. Kania.  Because defendant raised no concerns, we 
conclude this objection is forfeited on appeal.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 371 
(Bryant).)  
 
Defendant also claims that the court improperly limited 
his own direct testimony in a few instances.  In some of these 
instances, review of the record reveals defendant is simply 
incorrect.  For example, he claims he was not permitted to 
answer whether he would have been willing to go to prison for 
life in Hollywood’s place at the time he was arrested.  Although 
there was an objection, the question was rephrased, and 
defendant was given an opportunity to, and did, respond.  As for 
the claim that defendant was improperly precluded from 
explaining what he meant by certain words he used in his 
confession, there was nothing improper in this ruling.  The trial 
court permitted defendant to testify as to the truthfulness of his 
incriminating statements, but not what he meant at the time he 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
66 
 
said them, since he claimed not to recall having uttered the 
words in the first place.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by ruling that defendant could not speculate about 
what he might have meant by words he claimed not to remember 
saying.  (See People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 289 [trial 
court has discretion to determine the relevance of evidence].)  
Defendant claims the ruling violates People v. Webb (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 494, 535, in which we said that “a defendant’s absolute 
right to testify cannot be foreclosed or censored based on 
content.”  But Webb concerns a defendant’s right to testify 
against the advice of counsel, where such testimony will have a 
deleterious effect necessitating special jury instructions.  Webb 
neither holds nor suggests that a testifying defendant is entitled 
to speculate about matters of which he or she claims no direct 
knowledge.   
 
 
4. 
Expert Witness Testimony  
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by limiting 
Dr. Kania’s and Dr. Glaser’s testimony.  With regard to 
Dr. Kania, defendant contends the trial court categorically 
excluded testimony regarding defendant’s statements during 
certain interviews, which defendant claims was admissible for 
nonhearsay purposes.  He alleges the court erred by prohibiting 
Dr. Kania from explaining that accepting telephone calls from 
his mother provoked anxiety in defendant.  He also alleges 
Dr. Kania was prohibited from describing the effects of 
defendant’s personality disorders, his relationship with 
Hollywood, his sleep deprivation, and drug intoxication on his 
alleged false confession.  Defendant fails to provide any citation 
to the record for these alleged prohibitions and makes no 
assertion that he made contemporaneous objections, and we 
have not located any passage showing that defendant attempted 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
67 
 
to offer this testimony but was precluded from so doing.  Both 
by failing to interject contemporaneous objections and by failing 
to support his appellate arguments with record citations, 
defendant has forfeited any claim of error on appeal.  (See People 
v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1061; People v. Stanley (1995) 
10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)  In any event, whatever errors defendant 
now claims occurred could not have affected the outcome of the 
case; Dr. Kania testified at length about defendant’s alleged 
anxiety-inducted amnesia based on his evaluation of defendant.   
 
Defendant also claims the trial court erred by permitting 
Dr. Glaser to testify for the prosecution whether, in his opinion, 
defendant’s claimed amnesia was a fabrication, while 
“Dr. Kania was not permitted to share his opinion that 
[defendant’s] confession was false in most respects.”  There is, 
however, no inconsistency in the court’s treatment of the two 
experts.  Dr. Kania was permitted to offer his opinion on 
precisely the same subject as Dr. Glaser, testifying that he 
believed defendant’s claim of amnesia was credible.   
 
Finally, defendant contends the court erred by denying his 
request to recall Dr. Kania for purposes of responding to the 
prosecutor’s experts’ reports and their testimony.  We review for 
abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to exclude surrebuttal 
evidence, and we see none here.  (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 799, 836.)  Defendant does not explain what it was, 
precisely, about the experts’ reports or testimony that required 
a further response via additional testimony from Dr. Kania, nor 
did defendant offer such an explanation to the trial court.  The 
claim is therefore forfeited on appeal.  Defendant also argues 
that Dr. Kania should have been permitted to testify in 
surrebuttal as to the content of defendant’s interviews with him 
in order to respond to the prosecution’s evidence that 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
68 
 
defendant’s claimed amnesia was a fabrication.  The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in ruling that this was largely 
territory that had already been covered and did not require 
additional surrebuttal evidence.  If any error occurred, it was 
not prejudicial.  (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 
24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837 (Watson).) 
 
 
5. 
Psychiatric Examination  
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by compelling him 
to undergo a prosecution-conducted psychiatric examination.  
The Attorney General concedes the compelled examination was 
error but argues it did not prejudice defendant.  We agree.  
 
Before trial, the prosecution moved to compel defendant to 
undergo a psychiatric examination by prosecution experts.  In 
support of the motion, the prosecution argued defendant had 
placed his mental state at issue by claiming he gave a false 
confession induced by various psychological factors.  The defense 
objected.  After hearing argument, the court granted the motion.  
The court opined that when “a defendant presents expert 
psychological or psychiatric evidence” explaining his conduct, 
“the prosecution is entitled to rebut that evidence, and the only 
realistic manner in which the prosecution can do that is to be 
entitled to have a psychiatric evaluation of its own in order to 
prepare an expert to testify.”   
 
The prosecution retained Drs. Glaser and Chidekel, both 
of whom testified for the prosecution in rebuttal.  Dr. Glaser 
testified that after examining defendant and reviewing a great 
deal of case information, he concluded defendant suffered from 
“no current major mental illness,” but had low self-esteem, was 
uncomfortable acknowledging his feelings, and was willing to 
suffer “unpleasant conditions” to remain near the person on 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
69 
 
whom he was dependent.  Defendant had no disorders rendering 
it more likely that he would falsely confess.  Dr. Glaser also 
evaluated defendant for amnesia and concluded defendant was 
malingering because he recalled nothing even after being given 
cues from the transcripts.    
 
Dr. Chidekel 
evaluated 
defendant, 
administering 
numerous psychological tests, and determined defendant 
suffered from “avoidance [sic] personality disorder, with self-
defeating and dependent features.”  Based on the tests 
administered, Dr. Chidekel was otherwise unable to diagnose 
defendant with any neuropsychological condition that interfered 
with his “ability to see, to understand, or to be able to 
communicate effectively.”   
 
We have previously described the shifts in the law 
governing court-ordered psychological examinations like the one 
ordered in this case.  “At the time of defendant’s trial in [2001], 
decisional law authorized trial courts to order a defendant who 
placed his or her mental state in issue to submit to mental 
examination by prosecution experts.  [Citation.]  This court later 
held that after the 1990 passage of Proposition 115 (the Crime 
Victims Justice Reform Act), which resulted in the enactment of 
the criminal discovery statutes, the courts ‘are no longer free to 
create such a rule of criminal procedure, untethered to a 
statutory or constitutional base.’  (Verdin v. Superior Court 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1116 (Verdin).)  We have applied Verdin 
retroactively.”  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 939, fn. 
omitted (Clark).) 
 
“Shortly after Verdin, the Legislature amended [Penal 
Code] section 1054.3 to expressly authorize courts to compel a 
mental examination by a prosecution-retained expert.  (See 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
70 
 
[Pen. Code,] § 1054.3, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2009, ch. 
297, § 1.)”  (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1193.)  But 
in Banks, we concluded that Verdin continues to apply to cases 
predating that amendment.  (Banks, at p. 1193.)  This is such a 
case.  For that reason, the Attorney General concedes that 
“Verdin compels the conclusion that it was error under state law 
to require [defendant] to submit to mental examinations by 
prosecution experts.”  It follows that it was also error for the 
trial court to admit testimony by the prosecution’s experts based 
on their interviews with defendants.  (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at p. 940.)  The Attorney General urges, however, that these 
errors were harmless under the relevant standard articulated in 
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836.  We agree. 
 
In Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at page 940, we rejected the 
argument that errors in mandating examination by prosecution 
experts are subject to review under the more demanding 
standard for federal constitutional error set forth in Chapman 
v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.  We explained that we were 
aware of no decision “holding that the Fifth Amendment or any 
other federal constitutional provision prohibits a court from 
ordering a defendant who has placed his or her mental state in 
issue to submit to a mental examination by a prosecution 
expert.”  (Clark, at p. 940.)  “We thus assess the errors for 
prejudice under the standard for state law error, inquiring 
whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
trial would have been more favorable to defendant had the court 
not ordered him to submit to examinations by” prosecution-
retained experts.  (Id. at pp. 940–941.) 
 
We conclude it is not reasonably probable that the outcome 
of the trial would have been more favorable had defendant not 
undergone examinations conducted by prosecution-retained 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
71 
 
experts.  Defendant gave his friend Casey Sheehan a detailed 
confession to Nick’s murder and confessed to the detectives that 
“the only thing he did was kill” Nick.  The details of defendant’s 
confession to Sheehan were corroborated by witnesses who 
spent time with Nick at the Lemon Tree Inn before he was killed 
and those who found his body in a shallow grave covered by a 
bush.  On the other hand, defendant’s claim of amnesia was a 
highly selective one:  He claimed that although he remembered 
enough of the events surrounding the crimes to exonerate 
himself and shift blame to his codefendants, he experienced a 
brief lapse in memory that happened to coincide with the period 
during which he confessed to police detectives.  It is not 
reasonably probable that, had the prosecution’s experts not 
testified to their findings based on their examination of 
defendant, the jury would have discredited defendant’s 
confessions and instead credited his claim of amnesia.  Under 
the circumstances, we conclude there is no reasonable 
probability that the jury would have reached a result more 
favorable to defendant had the court not issued an order 
requiring him to submit to mental examination by Drs. Glaser 
and Chidekel and had these experts not testified against 
defendant based on those examinations. 
 
 
6. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct During the  
                Guilt Phase Closing Argument  
 
Defendant alleges the prosecutor engaged in numerous 
instances of misconduct during his closing argument.  He failed 
to object to nearly all such instances and has therefore forfeited 
these claims on appeal.  In any event, no misconduct occurred. 
 
As we have explained, to preserve a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct for appeal, “ ‘ “a criminal defendant must make a 
timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
72 
 
the jury to disregard the impropriety.” ’  [Citation.]  The lack of 
a timely objection and request for admonition will be excused 
only if either would have been futile or if an admonition would 
not have cured the harm.”  (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 
136, 171.)  “ ‘ “A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it ‘infects 
the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial 
of due process.’  [Citations.]  In other words, the misconduct 
must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.’  [Citation.]  A prosecutor’s 
misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair 
nevertheless violates California law if it involves ‘the use of 
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 
either the court or the jury.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 172.)  To the extent 
the alleged instances of misconduct were not forfeited by 
defendant’s failure to object, we conclude none infected the trial 
with unfairness or deceived the court or jury. 
 
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor argued “facts 
not in evidence” when he stated in closing argument that 
defendant did “ ‘considerably more’ ” than shoot the victim and 
was “ ‘probably involved in the taping and the burial process, if 
not digging the grave.’ ”  Defendant did not object to this 
argument at trial and does not argue that objection would have 
been futile.  The claim is therefore forfeited.  (See People 
v. Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 171.) 
 
But the claim lacks merit in any event.  Defendant’s 
argument presumes that the only basis for the prosecutor’s 
argument was certain statements conveyed by Pressley to 
Detective Jerry Cornell.  Detective Cornell testified to some of 
Pressley’s out-of-court statements at trial, but because Pressley 
himself did not testify, Detective Cornell was not permitted to 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
73 
 
relay certain statements implicating defendant in the grave-
digging and burial.  When Detective Cornell nevertheless 
testified that Pressley had said “they”—presumably meaning 
both Pressley and defendant—had buried the victim, the trial 
court admonished the jury to ignore the use of the pronoun 
“they” and to consider only that portion of Detective Cornell’s 
statement relaying that Pressley went to Lizard’s Mouth and 
dug the grave.  Defendant argues that the prosecution violated 
the court’s ruling by referring to Pressley’s statements in closing 
argument. 
 
Pressley’s statements were not, however, the only basis for 
the argument.  Sheehan told the jury that defendant came to 
him asking for advice and told him Nick had been shot 
“somewhere in the middle of nowhere.”  Defendant also told 
Sheehan that after shooting the victim, he put a bush over him.  
This testimony was consistent with the evidence of where and 
how hikers found Nick’s body.  The prosecutor’s reference to 
defendant “probably” doing more than shooting the victim was 
a reasonable commentary on the evidence and does not 
constitute misconduct.  (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
107, 168.) 
 
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by telling the jury that none of the experts, including 
Dr. Kania, testified that defendant gave a false confession.  
Defendant objected to the argument on the ground that the 
prosecution was “arguing the Court’s restriction on the 
evidence.”  In response, the trial court clarified for the jury that 
none of the experts had so testified because the court had 
previously ruled that no expert would be permitted to give an 
opinion as to whether or not a false confession was given in this 
case; the question was instead one for the jury to decide.  Both 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
74 
 
the prosecutor and defense counsel thanked the court for the 
clarification, and the prosecutor resumed the closing argument.   
To the extent defendant now believes the trial court’s 
clarification was insufficient, he has forfeited the objection.  
(People v. Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 171.)  But even were his 
claim preserved, we would find no error.  The prosecutor’s 
remarks were accurate, if susceptible to misunderstanding.  The 
court cleared up any possible misunderstanding with its 
clarification.  (See ibid.) 
 
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor referred in 
closing argument to “side B” of defendant’s confession, during 
which defendant was asked whether it occurred to him that 
what he was doing was “wrong” and defendant replied, 
“Honestly?  [¶]  Hell yes.  Right before.”  Defendant has forfeited 
any challenge to the prosecutor’s argument regarding “side B” 
of defendant’s confession by failing to object.  (People v. Powell, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 171.)   
 
Defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
committed 
misconduct during the guilt phase closing argument by making 
improper remarks about witness Sheehan, who had testified 
under a grant of immunity.  First, the prosecutor argued the jury 
could be assured that Sheehan would be even more truthful 
than other witnesses because he was subject to greater 
consequences for lying.  Second, the prosecutor argued the jury 
could infer that Sheehan would not have needed immunity if 
defendant were innocent because otherwise Sheehan would 
have been harboring a friend, not a fugitive.  Defendant 
objected, claiming the prosecution’s argument was speculative.  
The court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to 
disregard the prosecutor’s remarks.  Defendant now renews his 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
75 
 
objection to the prosecutor’s remarks, arguing the prosecutor 
impermissibly vouched for Sheehan based on the prosecutor’s 
own personal beliefs (and decisions about how and why to grant 
witness immunity), rather than evidence in the record.  (See 
People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 958.)  But defendant 
offers no persuasive reason to believe the trial court’s 
admonition to disregard the prosecutor’s brief, passing remarks 
was insufficient to cure any unfairness.  We see no basis for 
reversal.  
 
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by spending six transcript pages describing the 
“original” kidnap, in which defendant was not involved.  In fact, 
the prosecutor spent less than two transcript pages describing 
the kidnapping, and some of the events described involved 
defendant.  The prosecutor referred to the victim’s abduction 
from West Hills, his time in Santa Barbara, and his murder, 
arguing “there is a kidnapping at the very beginning, there’s a 
kidnapping at the very end.  Is there a kidnapping in between?  
Okay.”  The defense did not object to this discussion.  Assuming 
for the sake of argument that this claim is not forfeited despite 
the lack of specific, contemporaneous objection (see People v. 
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1339), we find no misconduct 
because the prosecutor has “wide latitude to comment on the 
evidence during closing argument.”  (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 
Cal.4th 718, 797.)  Discussion of a significant aspect of the 
criminal endeavor that culminated in the victim’s death during 
closing argument constitutes a reasonable comment.  (Ibid.) 
 
 
7. 
Instructional Error Concerning  
                Accomplices and Immunity  
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to modify 
CALJIC No. 3.16, concerning accomplice testimony, and 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
76 
 
CALJIC No. 2.20, concerning witness credibility.  Defendant 
also argues the court erred by failing to give CALJIC No. 3.19, 
concerning the determination whether a corroborating witness 
is an accomplice.  We find no grounds for reversal. 
  
 
a. 
CALJIC No. 3.16 
 
Penal Code section 1111 provides that an accomplice’s 
testimony cannot support a conviction without corroboration by 
other evidence “as shall tend to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient 
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof.”  The statute defines an accomplice as 
“one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged 
against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the 
testimony of the accomplice is given.”  (Ibid.; People v. Gomez 
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 307; see id. at p. 308.) 
 
On November 2, 2001, defendant submitted his list of 
proposed jury instructions, which included CALJIC No. 3.16, 
Witness Accomplice as Matter of Law.  Defendant listed Rugge, 
Pressley, Hollywood, Sheehan, and Affronti among the 
witnesses to be included in the instruction.  But when the jury 
was 
ultimately instructed with CALJIC 
No. 3.16, the 
instruction named only two of these individuals:  “If the crimes 
charged were committed by anyone, Jesse Rugge and Graham 
Pressley were accomplices as a matter of law and their 
testimony is subject to the rule requiring corroboration.”     
 
The record does not reveal why the instruction named only 
Rugge and Pressley.  Defendant explains that the trial court 
conducted an “ ‘informal’ ” conference with the attorneys to 
address jury instructions, and the content of that conference was 
not settled or recorded.  Defendant argues he should not be 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
77 
 
faulted for the lack of recorded proceedings and contends the 
denial of his request to name Skidmore, Hollywood, and 
Sheehan in CALJIC No. 3.16 should be deemed preserved for 
appeal.   
 
Even assuming the claim has been adequately preserved, 
the claim lacks merit.  Although the informal conference may 
not have been recorded, defense counsel conceded on the record 
that Sheehan was not an accomplice and was therefore not an 
appropriate person to include among those listed in CALJIC 
No. 3.16.  And although Skidmore and Hollywood “meet [Penal 
Code] section 1111’s definition of an accomplice” in that “[e]ach 
was liable to prosecution . . . for the identical offenses charged 
against defendant” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 
682), neither Skidmore nor Hollywood provided statements 
requiring corroboration, which is the concern of CALJIC 
No. 3.16. 
 
“A court must instruct on the need for corroboration only 
for accomplice testimony ([Pen. Code,] § 1111); ‘ “ ‘testimony’ 
within the meaning of . . . [Penal Code] section 1111 includes all 
oral statements made by an accomplice or coconspirator under 
oath in a court proceeding and all out-of-court statements of 
accomplices and coconspirators used as substantive evidence of 
guilt which are made under suspect circumstances.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 682.)  “ ‘The most obvious 
suspect circumstances occur when the accomplice has been 
arrested or is questioned by the police.’  [Citation.]  ‘On the other 
hand, when the out-of-court statements are not given under 
suspect circumstances, those statements do not qualify as 
“testimony” and hence need not be corroborated under . . . 
section 1111.’ ”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 245.) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
78 
 
 
Here, neither Skidmore nor Hollywood testified at trial, 
but defendant identifies various out-of-court statements they 
made that were admitted through other witnesses.  For 
example, defendant himself testified Skidmore had told him 
“Ben’s brother had been killed” several days before Nick’s body 
was found.  Other witnesses testified to statements Hollywood 
made to his fellow codefendants and others about Nick’s kidnap.  
And witnesses reported statements Hollywood made to his 
father and Hogg in which Hollywood described the crime 
without owning up to his role in it.  But none of these statements 
were made under “suspect circumstances” undermining their 
reliability.  (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 682 
[“[S]tatements made in the course of and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy were not made under suspect circumstances and 
therefore 
were 
sufficiently 
reliable 
to 
require 
no 
corroboration.”].)  Accordingly, we find no error in the trial 
court’s decision not to name Skidmore and Hollywood in the jury 
instruction concerning corroboration of accomplice testimony.  
  
 
b. 
CALJIC No. 3.19 
 
Defendant also requested that the jury be instructed with 
CALJIC No. 3.19, entitled “Burden to Prove Corroborating 
Witness Is an Accomplice.”  The instruction states:  “You must 
determine whether the witness [blank] was an accomplice as I 
have defined that term.  [¶]  The defendant has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [blank] was an 
accomplice in the crime[s] charged against the defendant.”  
(CALJIC No. 3.19.)  Defendant now says he proposed filling the 
blank with witness Casey Sheehan and argues that whether 
Sheehan was an accomplice constituted a question of fact the 
jury should have been permitted to determine. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
79 
 
 
We conclude the claim of error fails because, as noted 
above, defense counsel agreed on the record that Sheehan—who 
was not charged with any of the same offenses as defendant or 
his codefendants—was not an accomplice.  In any event, any 
error would have been harmless because the jury was 
adequately instructed concerning the definition of accomplices 
pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.10, which states that “[a]n 
accomplice is a person who [is] . . . subject to prosecution for the 
identical offense charged . . . against the defendant on trial by 
reason of . . . [being a member of a criminal conspiracy],” and the 
need for corroboration of accomplice testimony.  It is not 
reasonably probable the jury would have returned a more 
favorable result had it also been instructed with CALJIC 
No. 3.19.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837 [setting forth 
standard for evaluating harmlessness of state law error]; see 
People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393 [“Mere 
instructional error under state law regarding how the jury 
should consider evidence does not violate the United States 
Constitution”].)   
  
 
c. 
CALJIC No. 2.20 
 
At trial, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.20 
concerning the “believability of a witness.”  The instruction told 
jurors to “consider anything that has a tendency reasonably to 
prove or disprove the truthfulness” of witness testimony and 
listed numerous factors, including “demeanor,” whether the 
witness had “bias, interest, or other motive” to testify, and 
“[w]hether the witness is testifying under a grant of immunity.”  
Defendant argues that, unbeknownst to the jury, a number of 
witnesses in addition to Sheehan—namely, Adams-Young, 
Affronti, Carpenter, Hogg, John Hollywood, and Lasher—
received immunity in exchange for their testimony.  He contends 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
80 
 
the court should have modified CALJIC No. 2.20 to specifically 
identify all of the witnesses testifying under a grant of immunity 
and to advise the jury to view their testimony with “ ‘care and 
caution.’ ”   
 
At trial, defendant made no request to identify any 
declarant other than Sheehan who testified under a grant of 
immunity and thus forfeited that claim.  But the claim fails 
regardless.  There is no duty to instruct a jury that the testimony 
of immunized witnesses must be viewed with care and caution.  
(People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 867, fn. 20 [“Defendant 
points to no authority requiring the court to instruct the jury 
that immunized-witness testimony is to be viewed with distrust.  
We have held that the court has no such duty to instruct sua 
sponte.”]; see also People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 106.)  It 
follows that the trial court did not err by failing to convey to the 
jury, via modification of CALJIC No. 2.20, which witnesses were 
testifying under a grant of immunity. 
Finally, and in any event, the trial court’s failure to modify 
CALJIC No. 2.20 could not have prejudiced defendant.  The role 
these six witnesses played in the prosecution’s case was minimal 
when compared with the substantial evidence of guilt presented 
at trial unrelated to their testimony, including defendant’s own 
detailed confession and Sheehan’s testimony that defendant 
killed the victim.  Moreover, the jury was instructed to consider 
the witnesses’ “bias, interest, or other motive” for testifying.  
(CALJIC No. 2.20.)  It is not reasonably probable defendant 
would have achieved a more favorable result if jurors viewed the 
testimony of these six peripheral witnesses with somewhat 
greater caution.  (See People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 371; 
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
81 
 
 
D. 
Special Circumstances Claim  
At one time, proof of the kidnap-murder special 
circumstance required that the prosecution show a defendant 
had an independent felonious purpose, “ ‘that is, the commission 
of the [kidnapping] felony was not merely incidental to an 
intended murder.’ ”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 62–63; 
id. at p. 117; see People v. Brents, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 608–
609.)  The statute was amended to eliminate this independent 
felonious purpose requirement in 1998, five months before the 
crimes at issue here.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(M), 
added by Stats. 1998, ch. 629, § 2, p. 4165, and approved by 
voters, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000); Brooks, at p. 63, fn. 8; 
Brents, at pp. 608–609, fn. 4.)11  Nonetheless, the jury in this 
case was instructed to find an independent felonious purpose to 
kidnap.  Defendant now argues the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury’s finding.  And although he acknowledges that 
the statute then in force did not, in fact, require the jury to make 
such a finding, defendant contends that without the 
independent felonious purpose requirement, the kidnap-murder 
special circumstance is unconstitutional.  We reject the first part 
of this argument, which makes it unnecessary to address the 
second:  Because the jury was instructed on the independent 
felonious purpose requirement and because the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the requirement was 
                                        
11  
As amended in 1998, Penal Code section 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(17)(M) provides, 
“To 
prove the 
special 
circumstance[] of kidnapping[,] . . . if there is specific intent to 
kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of 
th[at] felon[y].  If so established, [the] special circumstance[] [is] 
proven even if the felony of kidnapping . . . is committed 
primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder.”  
(Italics added.) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
82 
 
satisfied, we need not decide here whether the kidnap-murder 
special circumstance is constitutional in the absence of an 
independent felonious purpose requirement.  (See, e.g., Loeffler 
v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1102 [“Our jurisprudence 
directs that we avoid resolving constitutional questions if the 
issue may be resolved on narrower grounds.”]; see id. at p. 1103.) 
 
The jury here was instructed that, to find the special 
circumstance of kidnap felony murder true, “it must be proved, 
one, the murder was committed while the Defendant was 
engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; or, two, the murder 
was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission 
of the crime of kidnap, or to facilitate the escape therefrom, or 
to avoid detection.  In other words, the special circumstance 
referred to in these instructions is not established if the kidnap 
was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.”12   
“ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must 
determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
                                        
12  
At oral argument, defendant argued for the first time that 
this instruction was defective because the “or” in the first 
sentence of the instruction would have conveyed to the jury that 
it could find the special circumstance true so long as it concluded 
that “the murder was committed while the Defendant was 
engaged in the commission of a kidnapping,” even if it did not 
find that defendant had an independent purpose to kidnap Nick.  
While it does appear the disjunctive “or” in the first sentence 
was included in error, we see no likelihood that the jury was 
confused by it.  The second sentence of the instruction 
unambiguously informed the jury that “the special circumstance 
. . . is not established if the kidnap was merely incidental to the 
commission of the murder.”  The instruction thus expressly told 
the jurors that they must find an independent felonious purpose 
to find the special circumstance true. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
83 
 
found [this] element[] of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’  
[Citation.]  ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence which is 
‘ “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 613–614.) 
Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument depends 
on the premise that the evidence established two separate 
kidnappings, only the second of which involved defendant.  
Defendant argues that “the jury may have applied an incorrect 
theory if it believed [defendant] committed the murder in order 
to assist Hollywood in avoiding detection for the August 6th 
completed kidnap.”  And to the extent the jury instead focused 
on defendant’s later act of moving Nick to the gravesite at 
Lizard’s Mouth, defendant argues there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding that defendant had an 
independent purpose to kidnap Nick:  “[N]o properly-instructed 
rational trier of fact could have found that this ‘second kidnap’ 
(if it were a ‘kidnap’) was not merely incidental to the murder, 
with the murder being the defendant’s primary purpose.”   
 
Defendant’s argument suffers from an overly narrow view 
of the kidnap, one inconsistent with our duty to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  As 
already noted, the indictment charged defendant and his 
codefendants with a continuing kidnapping offense that 
extended over the period of time from when the victim left his 
home and was taken to Santa Barbara, to the time he spent in 
Santa Barbara, and the time he was taken from locations within 
Santa Barbara to the site of his murder.  As previously 
discussed, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude 
defendant moved Nick against his will as part of that single, 
continuous kidnapping.  In addition, there was evidence from 
which the jury could conclude the murder was committed to 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
84 
 
“advance the commission of the crime of kidnap, or to facilitate 
the escape therefrom, or to avoid detection.”  The jury could 
conclude that Nick was murdered to silence him and eliminate 
the risk the kidnappers—including defendant, who belatedly 
joined in the kidnapping—would be caught and that defendant 
shared that purpose.  In short, there was substantial evidence 
from which the jury could conclude the kidnap was more than 
incidental to the murder—indeed, that the kidnap was the 
reason for the murder and not the other way around.   
 
E. 
 
Penalty Phase Claims 
 
 
1. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct During the  
                 Penalty Phase Closing Argument 
 
Defendant argues his rights to due process, a fair trial, 
and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution were 
violated by the prosecutor’s prejudicial misconduct during 
penalty phase closing argument.  We hold defendant’s claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct are forfeited and lack merit in any 
event. 
  
 
a. 
Background 
 
During penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor 
described the various factors in aggravation and mitigation 
under Penal Code section 190.3, including factor (k).  
Specifically, the prosecutor explained that factor (k) evidence 
included “ ‘[a]ny other circumstances which extenuate[] the 
gravity of the crime.’ ”  The prosecutor continued, “This is the 
part where you can really consider just about anything you 
want, and this is the part where the defense will ask you to 
consider the fact that he had a childhood that was less than 
stellar, that that would be considered a matter in mitigation for 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
85 
 
your consideration.”  The prosecutor described defendant’s 
“dysfunctional family,” including defendant’s sister, a 23- or 24-
year-old “life-long heroin addict”; defendant, the second child, 
who “manages to commit a horrific murder before the age of 21”; 
and defendant’s younger brother who, at age 16 “commits a 
crime so scary and so horrible that he’s not only tried as an adult 
in this home invasion armed robbery at age 16, but he’s given a 
sentence of 12 years in state prison.  I mean, that’s a remarkable 
sentence for a teenager to receive, that is to believe that there’s 
nothing redeemable about this person at all.”  The prosecutor 
also described defendant’s home as “dysfunctional,” his mother 
as neurotic, his father as heavy-handed, and argued “they 
batted zero with the accomplishments of all three of the children 
in this family.”   
 
The prosecutor suggested to the jury that the defense was 
“effectively saying,” with the Penal Code section 190.3, factor (k) 
evidence, “that the consequence of this childhood has created 
somebody who really lacks any notion of empathy at all for other 
people.  And aren’t they really saying that that is in effect a 
violent person?”  The prosecution described defendant as “a 
person whose childhood was so completely lacking in morality 
that he’s missed that part of his education and his development,” 
which “speak[s] to his dangerousness.”  The prosecutor asked 
how that could be considered “a matter in mitigation as against 
any matter in aggravation,” leaving it for the jury to “consider 
during your deliberation.”  Defendant raised no objection to 
these characterizations.  The prosecutor also addressed Penal 
Code section 190.3, factor (i), “[t]he age of the defendant at the 
time of the crime,” explaining that if defendant had been 17 as 
had been “one of the co-defendants, Mr. Pressley, then maybe 
that would be a factor to give a lot of consideration to.”  Because 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
86 
 
defendant was 20 years old, within days of turning 21, at the 
time he committed the offense, the prosecutor argued, the 
amount of consideration owed his age was “minimal.”  The 
prosecutor noted that defendant’s age was the same as most 
college seniors and “among the older ones” of “our fighting force 
currently in Afghanistan.”  Defendant raised no objection.   
 
Finally, the prosecutor focused heavily on the alternative 
to a death sentence, urging the jury to conclude that “three 
meals every single day” was better than the life defendant had 
prior to imprisonment, other than the “freedom of movement 
like he had before.”  If defendant faced a life sentence, he would 
be given a warm bed, friends, possibly a girlfriend, hot meals 
every day, and the ability to play basketball, “to feel the rush of 
running to a basket and being able to score.”  The prosecutor 
urged the jury to conclude this was insufficient punishment for 
“the worst” type of crime, an “intentional killing of a child for no 
more reason than because it improved his temporary status, his 
moment of comfort at that moment in time,” committed with 
“planning and preparation and premeditation and thought and 
deliberation.”  Defendant did not object.     
  
 
b. 
Discussion 
 
Defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
committed 
prejudicial misconduct by suggesting that defendant’s family 
history and age were factors in aggravation.  As an initial 
matter, the claim is forfeited because defendant failed to object.  
“In order to preserve any claim of prosecutorial misconduct, 
there must be a timely objection and request for admonition. 
[Citation.]  ‘ “[O]therwise, the point is reviewable only if an 
admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the 
misconduct.” ’ ”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 786.)  
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
87 
 
Although defendant alleges that an objection would have been 
futile, he fails to demonstrate there were prior efforts to object 
that were overruled. 
The claim lacks merit in any event.  The prosecutor argued 
that defendant’s age and family background must be considered 
under Penal Code section 190.3, factors (i) and (k), read the 
language of those factors, and described the relevant facts.  The 
prosecutor referenced defendant’s family history, questioning 
how “a childhood . . . completely lacking in morality” was “a 
matter in mitigation against any matter in aggravation,” and 
urged the jury to consider that question while deliberating.  How 
the jury ultimately weighed these facts is of no moment provided 
the jury was properly instructed, and here they were.  
(Cf. People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 464 [where prosecutor 
“did not imply that the jury should disregard the evidence of 
[the] defendant’s background, but rather that, in relation to the 
nature of the crimes committed, it had no mitigating effect,” 
prosecutor’s remarks “fall within the bounds of proper 
argument”].)  The prosecutor urged the jury not to consider 
defendant’s age as a factor in mitigation, explaining that were 
defendant 17 years old like codefendant Pressley, the jury might 
give greater weight to his age.  At the time of trial, defendants 
as young as 16 could receive the death penalty.  (Stanford 
v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361; contra, Roper v. Simmons 
(2005) 543 U.S. 551 [declaring the death penalty for 16- and 17-
year-olds 
unconstitutional].) 
 
A 
jury 
could 
rationally 
differentiate between the culpability of a 17 year old and 
someone nearly 21.  It was not misconduct for the prosecutor to 
urge the jury to give defendant’s age little weight as a factor in 
mitigation.  (See People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 787.) 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
88 
 
 
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by presenting evidence concerning conditions of 
confinement under a life sentence.  Defendant contends such 
evidence is not relevant under Penal Code section 190.3, factor 
(k).  “[E]vidence concerning conditions of confinement for a 
person serving a sentence of life without possibility of parole is 
not relevant to the penalty determination because it has no 
bearing on the defendant’s character, culpability, or the 
circumstances of the offense under either the federal 
Constitution or [Penal Code] section 190.3, factor (k).”  (People 
v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 963.)  But defendant failed 
to object to the prosecutor’s argument concerning conditions of 
confinement; accordingly, any claim of error is forfeited.  (Ibid.)  
Even if preserved, any error in admitting the statement was 
harmless, as the prosecutor’s comment did not so “infect[] the 
trial with . . . unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of 
due process.”  (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) 
 
 
2. 
Challenges to California’s Death Penalty  
                 Statute  
 
Defendant raises a number of challenges to California’s 
death penalty law, each of which we have previously rejected.   
 
“ ‘[T]he 
California 
death 
penalty 
statute 
is 
not 
impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as 
interpreted by this court.’ ”  (People v. Edwards (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 658, 767, quoting People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th 
at p. 813.) 
 
Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which permits a jury 
to consider the circumstances of the offense in sentencing, does 
not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death 
penalty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
89 
 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (People v. 
Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 149.) 
 
The “death penalty statute ‘is not invalid for failing to 
require . . . unanimity as to aggravating factors [and] proof of all 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”; Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 
U.S. 584, do not alter that conclusion.  (People v. Lopez (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 339, 370; see People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 
533 [aggravating factors need not be found beyond a reasonable 
doubt].)  Nor is the death penalty statute unconstitutional for 
“permitting jury consideration of a defendant’s unadjudicated 
violent criminal activity under [Penal Code] section 190.3, factor 
(b).”  (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 469.) 
 
Defendant’s claims concerning the burden of proof are 
identical to those we considered and rejected in People v. 
Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1096:  “ ‘ “The death penalty 
scheme is not unconstitutional because it fails to allocate the 
burden of proof—or establish a standard of proof—for finding 
the existence of an aggravating factor.” ’ ”  “Nor was the trial 
court required to instruct the jury that there is no burden of 
proof at the penalty phase.  [Citation.]  The federal Constitution 
does not require that the state bear some burden of persuasion 
at the penalty phase, and the jury instructions were not 
deficient in failing to so provide.”  (Ibid.)   
 
CALJIC No. 8.88 provides the jury with sufficient 
guidance 
to 
administer 
the 
death 
penalty 
and 
meet 
constitutional minimum standards.  “More specifically, CALJIC 
No. 8.88’s use of the . . . term ‘warranted’ . . . does not render the 
instruction impermissibly vague or ambiguous.  [Citations.]  
Where, as here, the jury is instructed in the language of CALJIC 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
90 
 
No. 8.88, the court need not further instruct that life without 
parole is mandatory if mitigation outweighs aggravation, or that 
life without parole is permissible even if aggravation outweighs 
mitigation.”  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1097, 
fn. omitted.) 
 
“The failure to instruct the jury that the prosecution bears 
some burden of persuasion regarding the jury’s penalty 
determination does not violate the Sixth, Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 662.)  
“Nor does the failure to instruct jurors they must unanimously 
agree on the existence of particular aggravating factors, but not 
on the existence of any mitigating factors, violate the Sixth, 
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment.”  (Ibid.)  “There is no 
constitutional requirement that a trial court instruct the jury on 
the 
‘ “presumption 
of 
life.” ’ ” 
 
(Ibid., 
quoting 
People 
v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 228.) 
 
The lack of written jury findings during the penalty phase 
does not violate due process or the Eighth Amendment, nor does 
it “deprive a capital defendant of meaningful appellate review.”  
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 490, citing People v. 
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1216.) 
 
“Intercase proportionality review, comparing defendant’s 
case to other murder cases to assess relative culpability, is not 
required by the due process, equal protection, fair trial, or cruel 
and unusual punishment clauses of the federal Constitution.”  
(People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.)  “ ‘California’s 
death penalty law does not violate equal protection by treating 
capital and noncapital defendants differently.’ ”  (People 
v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 425.)  California’s death 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
91 
 
penalty statute does not violate international law.  (Ibid; 
see also People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 488.) 
 
F. 
 
State Bar Motion to Quash Defendant’s 
         Subpoena  
 
On February 13, 2002, defendant’s retained counsel, Cheri 
A. Owen, submitted a tender of resignation, with charges 
pending, from the State Bar.  She resigned from the State Bar, 
again with charges pending, on April 17, 2002.  In July of that 
year, defendant subpoenaed Owen’s records from the State Bar.  
The State Bar moved to quash the subpoena, and the trial court 
granted the motion.  Defendant contends this was error.  We 
disagree. 
 
Defendant’s subpoena sought “ ‘[a]ny and all documents 
pertaining to attorney CHERI A. OWEN, who was admitted to 
the California State Bar on June 9, 1999, with state bar number 
201893.  The documents should include but are not limited to all 
notes, reports, complaints, and investigative notes and 
reports.’ ”  The State Bar moved to quash the subpoena on 
grounds that the request for “any and all” records was overbroad 
and that the information sought was privileged and confidential.  
In response, defendant’s counsel argued that in camera review 
of all State Bar complaints related to Owen was necessary to 
ascertain whether Owen performed deficiently for clients other 
than defendant while defendant’s trial was ongoing.  This 
would, he claimed, help determine whether Owen performed 
adequately during defendant’s trial.   
 
The trial court granted the State Bar’s motion to quash on 
grounds that the documents were privileged.  And while the 
court acknowledged that due process might nevertheless require 
release if the requested information met a certain standard of 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
92 
 
relevance, defendant had not made such a showing.  The court 
explained the best lens through which to view whether or not 
Owen competently performed her duties while representing 
defendant was “looking at what Miss Owen did or did not do in 
connection with this case.  If she didn’t make the proper 
investigation, if she didn’t talk to the witnesses she should have 
talked to, if she didn’t properly prepare her briefs or the legal 
issues in the case, if she didn’t properly present the case in trial, 
that’s what you look at, and that’s the proof of the pudding.”  
Looking at a complaint made by someone else would have no 
bearing on the adequacy of her performance in defendant’s case.  
The trial court also denied defendant’s request that the 
requested documents be produced to the court and sealed.13   
 
Contrary to defendant’s arguments, we see no error in the 
trial court’s ruling.  Numerous provisions of law establish the 
privileged and confidential status of the information defendant 
sought from the State Bar. For example, Business and 
Professions Code section 6086.1, subdivision (b) provides that 
State Bar disciplinary investigations are confidential until 
charges are filed.  Business and Professions Code section 6094 
further provides that complaints made to a disciplinary agency 
regarding attorney misconduct issues or incompetence are 
privileged.  The State Bar Rules of Procedure, rules 2301 and 
2302(a), likewise state, respectively, “the files and records of the 
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel are confidential” and, with 
                                        
13  
In record augmentation proceedings that took place in 
2009 in anticipation of briefing before this court, defendant’s 
counsel argued Owen’s State Bar records might have relevance 
to an eventual habeas corpus proceeding before this court.  With 
that in mind, the trial court ordered the State Bar to preserve 
the records.   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
93 
 
exceptions, “information concerning inquiries, complaints or 
investigations is confidential.”   
 
Nor has defendant established that the ruling violated his 
due process rights.  Defendant invokes the high court’s decision 
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 57–58, in which 
the court ruled that a defendant accused of child sexual abuse 
was entitled to have a court conduct an in camera review of 
confidential case reports that might have contained evidence 
relevant to his defense.  But here, by contrast, the information 
defendant sought to obtain from the State Bar was not relevant 
to defendant’s case.  Defendant sought information about 
complaints made by others about Owen’s performance as a 
lawyer but failed to show how complaints made by others would 
bear on whether she committed prejudicial errors in her 
representation of defendant.  (See Strickland v. Washington 
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)  Accordingly, we conclude the trial 
court’s decision granting the State Bar’s motion to quash 
defendant’s subpoena for Owen’s records was not in error.  
 
G. 
Denial of Motion for New Trial  
 
Defendant also filed a motion seeking a new trial on 
numerous grounds, including, as relevant here, Owen’s deficient 
performance as defense counsel.  The trial court denied the 
motion without holding a hearing.  Defendant contends this was 
error.  We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in 
disposing of the new trial motion. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
94 
 
 
 
1. 
Background 
 
On March 19, 2002, defendant filed motions for new guilt 
and penalty phase trials via Keenan14 counsel Richard V. 
Crouter.  Numerous declarations and memoranda of points and 
authorities followed, and the motion, initially set to be heard on 
March 25, 2002, was not heard until February 7, 2003.  In the 
meantime, defendant retained new counsel, Robert Sanger, and 
Crouter was relieved.  Sanger made supplemental arguments in 
support of the new trial motion, largely focused on the adequacy 
of defense counsel’s performance at trial.  In support of the 
motion, counsel contended that Attorney Owen—who had been 
admitted to the State Bar just two years before the trial began 
and who would resign from the Bar before the proceedings were 
over—was “woefully inexperienced and fell short of the 
minimum standards of competence required of defense counsel 
in a capital case.”   
 
The trial court addressed and rejected each of the claims 
of error raised in the new trial motion, including the claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 
 
2. 
Discussion 
 
Defendant raises several challenges to the trial court’s 
denial of the new trial motion.  “ ‘ “ ‘We review a trial court’s 
ruling on a motion for a new trial under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.’  [Citations.]  ‘ “A trial court’s ruling on a 
motion for new trial is so completely within that court’s 
discretion that a reviewing court will not disturb the ruling 
                                        
14 
Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424.  In Keenan, 
we held Penal Code section 987.9 funds may be used to appoint 
a second attorney for a defendant in a capital case.  (Keenan, at 
p. 434.)   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
95 
 
absent 
a 
manifest 
and 
unmistakable 
abuse 
of 
that 
discretion.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 
1108.)  We find no such abuse of discretion here. 
 
As a procedural matter, defendant contends the trial court 
erred by ruling on the new trial motion without holding an 
evidentiary hearing that would have permitted him to adduce 
new evidence in support of his ineffective assistance claims.  He 
further contends the trial judge’s consideration of the motion 
was rushed and inadequate due to the trial judge’s imminent 
retirement.  These procedural arguments lack merit.  The trial 
court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the new 
trial motion; the court’s “only obligation is to ‘ “ ‘make whatever 
inquiry is reasonably necessary’ ” to resolve the matter.’ ”  
(People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 517.)  And the 
record does not support defendant’s claim that the trial court 
rushed to dispose of the motion without thoroughly considering 
its merits.  On the contrary, the court granted numerous 
extensions to allow defense counsel the opportunity to augment 
the new trial motion and to allow the prosecutor an opportunity 
to respond.  The motion, initially set to be heard in March 2002, 
was not heard until almost one year later, in February 2003.  
The trial court thereafter issued a thoroughly reasoned denial 
of the motion; its order alone comprises 23 pages of transcript, 
and the discussion spans dozens of pages on top of that.  There 
is no basis for defendant’s suggestion that the trial court cut 
corners in considering the motion.   
 
On the merits, defendant contends that the trial court 
erred in rejecting his claim that he did not receive the effective 
assistance of trial counsel guaranteed by the United States and 
California Constitutions.  Usually, “ineffective assistance [of 
counsel claims are] more appropriately decided in a habeas 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
96 
 
corpus proceeding.”  (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
264, 266–267.)  But we have also held that a defendant may 
raise the issue of counsel’s effectiveness as a basis for a new 
trial, and, to expedite justice, a trial court should rule “[i]f the 
court is able to determine the effectiveness issue on such 
motion.”  (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582–583.)  
To make out a claim that counsel rendered constitutionally 
ineffective assistance, “the defendant must first show counsel’s 
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.  Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, 
i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)  To make 
out an ineffective assistance claim on the basis of the trial 
record, the defendant must show “(1) the record affirmatively 
discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the 
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason 
and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no 
satisfactory explanation.  All other claims of ineffective 
assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus 
proceeding.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Here, in support of his new trial claim, defendant 
emphasizes 
Owen’s 
remarkable 
lack 
of 
professional 
experience—she was a new lawyer who had never before worked 
on a capital case—and the cloud under which she abruptly 
exited the representation of defendant (and the profession as a 
whole).  He notes that Owen did not satisfy the criteria for 
appointed trial counsel in a capital case.  (See Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 4.117.)   
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
97 
 
 
But Owen was not appointed by the court; she was 
privately retained.  And although defendant’s appellate counsel 
suggested otherwise at oral argument, Owen’s brief history as a 
lawyer and the circumstances of her resignation from the bar do 
not establish that defendant was totally deprived of counsel 
during trial, requiring automatic reversal of the judgment.  
(United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 658–659.)  
Although defendant alleges Owen was absent for portions of 
jury selection and guilt phase testimony because she was 
meeting with a State Bar investigator, Owen was, in fact, 
present during most of the trial (as was Keenan counsel, who 
was present during those portions of trial when Owen was 
absent).  Owen made arguments and objections; she presented 
witnesses.  The question before us, at this juncture, is whether 
the trial record alone establishes that her performance fell below 
professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability 
that her deficient performance affected the result.  Defendant 
has not made the necessary showing.  The trial court therefore 
did not err in concluding it could not determine counsel was 
ineffective in the context of defendant’s new trial motion.  
(People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 582–583.)   
 
Defendant contends that Owen did not adequately prepare 
a defense.  This lack of preparation was demonstrated by Owen’s 
failure to interview witnesses and to develop a guilt phase case 
because she felt the police investigation was adequate and 
because defendant had confessed.  But defendant’s primary 
argument regarding Owen’s deficient performance concerns her 
failure to develop and present evidence that defendant suffered 
from brain damage or a similar impairment.  In support of the 
argument, defendant introduced the opinion of Dr. Albert 
Globus, a psychiatrist.  Based on a social and medical history 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
98 
 
including an infantile skull fracture and febrile seizures, as well 
as postverdict neuropsychological testing, Dr. Globus opined 
that defendant suffered from organic brain syndrome.  
Defendant contends Owen was deficient for failing to develop 
and present such evidence of defendant’s impairments because 
such evidence was “the best defense” to charges that defendant 
killed Nick with premeditation and deliberation, as is required 
for first degree murder, as well as “the most compelling showing 
of mitigation” at the penalty phase. 
 
The trial court reasonably ruled that defendant’s 
postverdict brain damage evidence was not a sufficient basis for 
granting a new trial.  As to defendant’s first point, after hearing 
defendant’s evidence, the trial court concluded that competent 
counsel would not have presented a brain damage defense at the 
guilt phase “since it’s inconsistent with what the defense 
actually 
presented, 
which 
seems 
to 
me, 
under 
the 
circumstances, was a better shot,” given defendant’s confession 
to police. “That defense was that this was a false confession and 
somebody else was the killer.”  The trial court noted that it had 
been presented with no cogent argument that the choice of this 
false confession strategy was itself the product of deficient 
performance. 
 
Defendant criticizes the trial court’s reasoning but fails to 
grapple with the court’s central point:  There are plausible 
reasons why competent counsel would choose not to present a 
brain damage defense in an attempt to negate the prosecution’s 
showing of premeditation and deliberation.  By defendant’s own 
account to police, he accepted Hollywood’s assignment to kill 
Nick; traveled from Los Angeles to Santa Barbara armed with a 
handgun; picked up Nick from the Lemon Tree Inn and 
transported him to a remote location where a grave had already 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
99 
 
been dug; then shot Nick several times and buried him.  This 
account strongly points to a conclusion that defendant acted 
with premeditation and deliberation when he killed Nick.  As 
the trial court noted, competent counsel might reasonably 
determine that defendant’s “better shot” was to convince the 
jury that the entire confession was false, rather than attempting 
to argue that defendant did in fact commit the crime but without 
premeditating or deliberating.  Further, as we have previously 
noted, “presenting expert mental health testimony inherently 
risks inviting damaging cross-examination.”  (People v. 
Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 624, fn. 5.)  At least on this 
record, we cannot say the choice not to pursue a brain damage 
defense was incompetent.  Nor has defendant shown that the 
presentation of such a defense would likely have changed the 
outcome of the trial. 
 
Insofar as defendant argues that competent counsel would 
have presented the brain damage evidence to bolster his claim 
that his confession was false, the trial court reasonably rejected 
that argument as well.  Defendant argued that brain damage 
evidence would have neutralized the prosecution’s rebuttal 
witness, who opined that an individual would not falsely confess 
and claim amnesia without suffering serious mental illness or 
brain damage.  But, the trial court noted, defendant’s own 
expert had not agreed that brain damage was an “essential 
precondition to the person’s predilection to give a false 
confession under certain circumstances,” and had not relied on 
evidence of brain damage in offering his opinion in support of 
the defense.  Under the circumstances, we cannot say there is 
no plausible reason why competent counsel would choose not to 
develop a brain damage defense and instead to rely on the 
opinion of the defense expert.  And once again, defendant has 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
100 
 
not shown that the presentation of his brain damage evidence 
would likely have altered the jury’s view of whether to believe 
defendant’s confession or instead to believe that he gave the 
confession while suffering from temporary amnesia, as he 
testified at trial. 
 
Turning to the question of mitigation, the trial court 
concluded that defendant’s newly presented evidence of mental 
defect or brain damage, even if available, would not have made 
a difference at the penalty phase.  In making an independent 
determination of the propriety of the penalty, the trial court 
reweighed the mitigating circumstances that had been 
presented, including defendant’s lack of criminal record, lack of 
violent history, peacemaking role among his friend group, 
excessive use of alcohol and marijuana, dependent personality, 
and obedience to Hollywood.  The court concluded that no 
mitigating circumstance “appear[ed] to significantly extenuate 
the crime.”  The court concluded defendant’s newly presented 
evidence of brain damage would not likely have altered the 
relevant balance of factors.  We see no error in the court’s 
determination. 
 
Defendant’s next claim of ineffective assistance centers on 
a set of two agreements executed in February 2002, in which 
defendant agreed to give Owen an “exclusive grant” to the media 
and literary rights to his background and story and to waive 
attorney-client privilege to permit Owen to speak and write 
about his criminal case.  Defendant contends that these 
agreements created a conflict of interest that “tainted the 
representation ab initio,” and that establish grounds for a new 
trial.  The trial court disagreed, and we do as well. 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
101 
 
 
As the trial court acknowledged, these agreements 
“grant[ed] [Owen] exclusive rights to exploit her client’s story 
for her benefit,” creating the potential for a conflict of interest.  
But to establish a deprivation of his constitutional right to 
counsel, defendant must show more than a “ ‘theoretical division 
of loyalties’ ”; he must show that counsel “labored under an 
actual conflict of interest ‘that affected counsel’s performance.’ ”  
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417.)  Or as the trial 
court put it, to succeed on the conflict claim, “there has to be 
some showing of cause and effect, in other words, that the act or 
omission of the lawyer in seeking the benefits of the agreement 
has placed her client’s defense in jeopardy.”  As the trial court 
explained, no such showing had been made here.  Indeed, the 
agreements were made some two months after the jury rendered 
its penalty verdict and just one day before Owen tendered her 
resignation to the State Bar.  And contrary to defendant’s 
argument, nothing in the record shows that the parties had been 
operating under any comparable agreement previously, while 
Owen was still representing defendant at trial. 
 
The case before us thus differs in critical respects from 
People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 684, on which defendant 
relies.  In that case, the record showed that trial counsel agreed 
to represent the defendant, who was facing 25 counts of first 
degree murder, in exchange for exclusive literary rights to the 
defendant’s life story, including the criminal proceedings 
against him.  (Id. at p. 703.)  Trial counsel went on to make 
decisions in the interests of “his own pocketbook” rather than 
“the best interests of his client” (id. at p. 720), including the 
abandonment of mental defenses central to the case (id. at 
pp. 721, 727).  No comparable circumstances are present here.  
The record neither shows that Owen labored under a potential 
PEOPLE v. HOYT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
102 
 
conflict of interest during the course of her representation of 
defendant, nor shows that “the conflict of interest . . . resulted 
in obvious prejudice” to defendant’s case, as it had in Corona.  
(Id. at p. 720, fn. omitted.) 
 
Finally, defendant asks us to compel the trial court to 
reconsider its handling of various other claims in the motion for 
new trial, including a claim that Owen was acting as an 
informant for the Los Angeles District Attorney and a claim that 
Owen instructed defense investigators not to investigate the 
case and instead diverted investigation funds to satisfy other 
obligations.  The trial court rejected these arguments on the 
grounds that the claims were unsupported by the record and, 
even if true, would not have established that defendant was 
prejudiced by Owen’s deficient performance.  The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that none of these claims 
constituted a basis for granting defendant’s new trial motion. 
III. DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Hoyt  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S113653 
Date Filed: January 30, 2020 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Santa Barbara 
Judge:  William L. Gordon 
 
________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Roger Teich, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and David F. Glassman, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
 
Roger Teich 
290 Nevada Street 
San Francisco, CA 94110 
(415) 948-0045 
 
David F. Glassman 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 897-2355