Title: Commonwealth v. Villagran

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12239 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JONATHAN VILLAGRAN. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     March 7, 2017. - August 29, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Firearms.  Controlled Substances.  Disturbing the Peace.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable 
suspicion, Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Reasonable 
suspicion, Protective frisk, Probable cause.  Probable 
Cause. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of 
the District Court Department on March 26, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Diane 
E. Moriarty, J., and the cases were tried before Robert P. 
Ziemian, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Mathew B. Zindroski for the defendant. 
 
Laura A. McLaughlin, Assistant District Attorney (David M. 
Ringius, Assistant District Attorney, also present), for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury trial in the Quincy District Court, 
the defendant, Jonathan Villagran, was convicted of carrying a 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); carrying a 
dangerous weapon on school grounds, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (j); 
possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); disturbing a school, G. L. c. 272, § 40; 
and possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute, 
G. L. c. 94C, 32C.2  The complaint issued after a police officer, 
responding to a report of an unauthorized person on the property 
of Milton High School (school), searched the defendant's 
backpack and discovered a firearm, money, and marijuana. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
statements and physical evidence seized during the search of his 
backpack, arguing that the police officer lacked a 
constitutionally permissible basis for the patfrisk and the 
subsequent search.  A judge of the District Court denied the 
motion.  The defendant appealed, asserting that the denial of 
the motion to suppress violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.3  He also challenges the 
                     
 
2 The trial judge allowed the defendant's motion for a 
required finding of not guilty on a charge of minor in 
possession of alcohol, G. L. c. 138, § 34C. 
 
 
3 The defendant does not challenge the denial of the motion 
to suppress statements. 
3 
 
sufficiency of evidence to support the conviction of disturbing 
a school. 
 
We transferred the case to this court on our own motion and 
take this opportunity to reaffirm the distinction between the 
traditional standard applicable to a police officer's conduct 
implicating the Fourth Amendment and the less stringent standard 
applicable to a school official who does the same.  When a 
police officer conducts a patfrisk, the applicable standard for 
assessing its constitutionality is reasonable articulable 
suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), and when a 
police officer conducts a search, the Fourth Amendment requires 
a warrant based on probable cause unless the search is justified 
by probable cause and an exception to the warrant requirement.  
Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 684 (2010).  Although the 
question has not been presented directly, we previously have 
assumed that a police officer's conduct in a school setting is 
governed by the traditional Fourth Amendment standard.  
Commonwealth v. Carey, 407 Mass. 528, 535 n.4 (1990) (discussing 
distinction between standard applicable to police officers and 
school officials).  On the other hand, when a school official 
conducts a search, it is constitutionally permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment and art. 14 so long as it is "reasonable[] 
under all the circumstances."  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 341 (1985) (T.L.O.). 
4 
 
 
Applying the Terry standard to this case, we conclude that 
the police officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the defendant had committed a crime and that the circumstances 
of the encounter with the defendant did not warrant a reasonable 
belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous to the officer 
or others.  Nor was the search permissible under any exception 
to the warrant requirement.  Thus, because neither the patfrisk 
nor the search of the defendant's backpack was justified on any 
of these grounds, the denial of the motion to suppress was 
error.  Therefore, we vacate his convictions of the firearms and 
drug charges.  Because the conviction of disturbing a school was 
based, at least in part, on his possession of a firearm, which 
should have been suppressed, we vacate that conviction and 
remand for a new trial. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  a.  Standard of 
review.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress 
evidence, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error and leave to the judge the responsibility of 
determining the weight and credibility to be given . . . 
testimony presented at the motion hearing."  Commonwealth v. 
Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 234 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004).  "A finding is clearly 
erroneous if it is not supported by the evidence, or when the 
reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with the firm 
5 
 
conviction that a mistake has been committed."  Commonwealth v. 
Hilton, 450 Mass. 173, 178 (2007).  "We review independently the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found."  
Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016), quoting 
Wilson, supra. 
 
b.  Facts.  In the written order denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress, the judge found the following facts based on 
the testimony of two Milton police officers, Sergeant Kristen 
Murphy and a detective.4 
 
"On March 25, 2015, at approximately 2:00 P.M., 
[school] officials observed an unknown individual on the 
grounds of the school.  Later identified as [the 
defendant], he entered the facility and told school 
officials that he was a student and needed to get back into 
the building.  He eventually changed his story stating that 
he needed to use the restroom, after presenting an 
obviously fictitious name to the school official.  The 
[d]efendant then exited the building, but could be seen 
pacing around the school parking lot. 
 
 
"At this time, the principal and vice principal 
approached the [d]efendant and noticed a strong smell of 
marijuana.  The [d]efendant proceeded to tell them that he 
was waiting for a [sixteen] year old girl to meet him at 
the school.  At this point the principal and vice principal 
worried about the surrounding students filling the area and 
ushered the [d]efendant into a conference room in the 
school. 
 
 
"Sergeant [Murphy] of the Milton Police Department 
arrived and smelled an overpowering scent of marijuana on 
the defendant.  Sergeant [Murphy] was informed that the 
[d]efendant had lied about his identity and his reason for 
being there, and that the [d]efendant tried to sneak into 
                     
 
4 None of the school officials who interacted with the 
defendant on March 25, 2015, testified at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress. 
6 
 
the school.  Both school and law officials were suspicious 
of the [d]efendant's strange demeanor as well as his 
blatant lying and reasonably agreed that he may have 
contraband on him.  Sergeant [Murphy] then conducted a pat-
frisk on the [d]efendant and found marijuana in his 
sweatshirt, in addition to a wad of money in the amount of 
$2,964.88 in his pants pocket.  After searching the 
[d]efendant's person Sergeant [Murphy] pat-frisked the 
exterior of the backpack, despite the defendant's 
objections, and felt a hard object.  Sergeant [Murphy] then 
opened the bag, as she feared the hard object may be a 
weapon.  In the bag Sergeant [Murphy] discovered a bottle 
of alcohol, another bag of marijuana, a scale, and a loaded 
handgun.  [Murphy] immediately removed the gun from the 
[d]efendant's reach and read him his Miranda rights.  The 
school was then placed on lockdown. . . ." 
 
 
The defendant contends, and the Commonwealth concedes, that 
portions of these findings, central to the judge's ruling 
denying the motion to suppress, were not supported by the 
evidence and, thus, are clearly erroneous.5  See Hilton, 450 
Mass. at 178-180.  Specifically, the evidence does not support 
the judge's findings that: 
(1) At the time of the frisk, Murphy knew the defendant 
"entered the facility and told school officials that he was 
a student and needed to get back into the building.  He 
eventually changed his story stating that he needed to use 
the restroom, after presenting an obviously fictitious name 
to the school official.  The [d]efendant exited the 
building but could be seen pacing around the school parking 
lot." 
 
(2) "Sergeant [Murphy] was informed that the [d]efendant 
had lied about his identity and his reason for being there, 
and that the [d]efendant tried to sneak into the school." 
 
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth conceded at oral argument and in its 
brief that the judge's findings regarding what Sergeant Murphy 
knew when she initiated the frisk lacked support in the 
evidence. 
7 
 
(3) The sergeant was "suspicious of the [d]efendant's 
strange demeanor as well as his blatant lying and 
reasonably agreed that he may have contraband on him." 
 
(4) "Sergeant [Murphy] then opened the bag, as she feared 
the hard object may be a weapon." 
 
Instead, Murphy described in unequivocal terms the extent of her 
knowledge of the events that occurred prior to her entry into 
the conference room where the defendant had been brought by 
school officials.  "The call was given out that . . . a male 
party was trying to gain entry into the high school.  That's 
what I knew.  When I got there [the vice-principal] told me we 
have a kid in the conference room, he's not a student here.  
Basically, that's what I knew." 
 
In addition to the findings that survive the clear error 
standard, the evidence at the motion to suppress hearing also 
established the following.  On her arrival, Murphy observed that 
the vice-principal, whom she had known for over twenty years, 
was "excited" and that both the vice-principal and the principal 
appeared to be "rattled."  Once inside the building, the 
sergeant and the vice-principal proceeded to the conference room 
where the principal was waiting with the defendant, who was 
seated at a table.  The principal told Murphy, "Something's 
wrong.  Something's not right with this kid.  Something's not 
right.  He has something on him.  I know he has something on 
him."  The principal did not, however, explain the basis for his 
8 
 
"hunch" that the defendant had contraband in his possession or 
express a concern that the contraband might be a firearm.  
Murphy did not inquire further to determine the basis of the 
principal's suspicion that the defendant "had something on him."  
Nor was Murphy told of the defendant's interactions with school 
officials or the substance of his lies to gain entry into the 
school6 before she commenced the patfrisk that culminated in the 
search of the backpack. 
 
c.  Analysis.  The judge concluded that Murphy conducted a 
lawful patfrisk of the defendant's person and his backpack based 
on Murphy's "reasonable apprehension of fear, danger and unknown 
factors present during the period of [the d]efendant's 
interaction with the school and law officials" and, therefore, 
all of the evidence seized from the defendant was admissible.  
In reaching this conclusion, the judge expressly relied on the 
finding that Murphy was aware of the defendant's "blatant lies" 
to gain entry into the school.  We consider the 
constitutionality of the patfrisk and the search of the 
backpack, omitting the clearly erroneous findings related to 
Murphy's knowledge of the circumstances of the defendant's entry 
into the school but taking cognizance of those facts supported 
                     
 
6 Murphy learned that the defendant had lied to school 
officials but she became aware of that fact only after she had 
initiated the patfrisk during which the defendant admitted, 
without specificity, that he had lied. 
9 
 
by the evidence and supplemented by uncontroverted evidence that 
was implicitly credited by the judge.  Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 
Mass. 278, 286 (2015). 
 
Although the police conduct at issue here occurred in a 
public school, the less stringent standard of T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 341 -- "reasonableness[] under all the circumstances" -- does 
not apply.  In T.L.O., the United States Supreme Court 
emphasized that its holding applied only to "searches carried 
out by school authorities acting alone and on their own 
authority" and not to searches carried out by police officers or 
school officials acting in conjunction with police officers.  
Id. at 341 n.7.  The less stringent standard for the school 
setting was necessary to accommodate both "the privacy interests 
of schoolchildren [and] the substantial need of teachers and 
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools."  
Id. at 341.  However, when a police officer rather than a school 
official engages in conduct that implicates the Fourth Amendment 
and art. 14, we apply the traditional standard as articulated in 
Terry and followed by our cases.  Thus, the patfrisk at issue 
here must be justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion 
that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity and that the 
defendant was armed and dangerous.  Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 
457 Mass. 1, 9 (2010).  The subsequent search of the defendant's 
backpack must be justified by probable cause and an exception to 
10 
 
the warrant requirement.  See Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 
891, 901 (1990). 
 
i.  The frisk.  Because the "stop" in this case was 
conducted by school officials, we need not address the propriety 
of the stop.  Rather, our inquiry is whether the frisk was 
justified by a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
engaged in criminal activity and that he was armed and 
dangerous.  Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 9.  Whether the facts as 
found by the judge established reasonable articulable suspicion 
that the defendant was committing a crime presents a close 
question, but we are persuaded they do not. 
 
We acknowledge that the defendant, a nonstudent, was on 
school property surrounded by school officials who believed he 
possessed contraband of some sort.  When Murphy arrived, 
however, she knew only that school officials had a male 
nonstudent detained in the conference room and that the police 
had been called for assistance in the matter.  See Commonwealth 
v. Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 515 (2017).  The principal voiced his 
strong suspicions of the defendant, but neither he nor the vice-
principal reported any conduct suggestive of criminal activity.  
The odor of marijuana, which Murphy appreciated upon her entry 
into the conference room, also was not sufficient to support 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 775 (2015) ("[W]here the only factor 
11 
 
leading an officer to conclude that an individual possesses 
marijuana is the smell of . . . marijuana, this factor supports 
a reasonable suspicion that that individual is committing the 
civil offense of possession of a small quantity of marijuana").  
See also Commonwealth v. Meneide, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 451 n.4 
(2016) (smell of burnt or unburnt marijuana insufficient basis 
for either reasonable suspicion or probable cause). 
 
What is left then is the defendant's mere presence, a 
possible criminal trespass in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 120.  
However, reasonable suspicion of a criminal trespass did not 
arise where none of the information available to Murphy 
suggested that the defendant "remain[ed] in or upon the building 
. . . of another . . . after having been forbidden so to do by 
the person in lawful control of said premises."  Id.  Murphy was 
not told that the defendant had been asked to leave the 
premises.7  For these reasons, we discern no basis for reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
 
Even if the defendant's conduct led to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, the frisk was not justified.  
When Murphy pat frisked the defendant, she had no information 
from school officials to suggest that the defendant was armed.  
                     
 
7 The evidence at trial, which revealed that the defendant 
had attempted to leave but was detained by school officials to 
await the arrival of the police, explains the unlikely inference 
of a criminal trespass at the time of the encounter in the 
school's conference room. 
12 
 
The principal's unsubstantiated hunch that the defendant "had 
something on him," alone, was insufficient for a reasonable 
belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous, especially 
where the principal had invited the defendant to return to the 
school, the defendant had already emptied his pockets at the 
principal's direction, and the reasonable inference was that the 
principal believed that the defendant had marijuana or some 
other controlled substance on his person based on the strong 
odor of marijuana present in the room.  See Wilson, 441 Mass. at 
394.  See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 
740-741 (2017) (possession of marijuana, without more, 
insufficient for reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed). 
 
Moreover, the principal's hunch combined with Murphy's 
observations of the defendant's nervousness and Murphy's 
testimony that both the principal and the vice-principal 
appeared to be "rattled" still did not establish a reasonable 
belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous where the 
defendant was compliant and did not make any furtive gestures or 
reach into his pockets in a manner that would suggest that he 
was carrying a weapon.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 75 Mass. App. 
Ct. 528, 534 (2009) ("nervous or anxious behavior in combination 
with factors that add nothing to the equation will not support a 
reasonable suspicion that an officer's safety may be 
compromised").  Also, Murphy's testimony is devoid of any 
13 
 
reference to her suspicion that the defendant was armed or her 
fear for her safety or for the safety of the school.  Therefore, 
nothing in the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress 
established the specific and articulable facts required to show 
that Murphy's patfrisk was the result of her reasonable belief 
that the defendant was armed and dangerous.  See DePeiza, 449 
Mass. 367, 374 (2007), citing Wilson, 441 Mass. at 394. 
 
ii.  The search of the backpack.  As is well established, 
the search of the backpack must be justified by probable cause 
and an exception to the warrant requirement.  See Tyree, 455 
Mass. at 684.  The Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to 
justify the search of the backpack on this basis. 
 
First, the facts fall far short of the showing necessary 
for probable cause.  Because the patfrisk was not justified, 
Murphy's observation that a "hard object" was present in the 
backpack cannot be considered in the probable cause analysis.  
Nor was the presence of a "hard object" sufficient to establish 
that it was a firearm.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Flemming, 76 Mass. 
App. Ct. 632, 638 (2010) (search under defendant's clothing 
unreasonable where there was no evidence that hard object felt 
like weapon).  Second, a search incident to a lawful arrest, the 
only plausible exception that fits the circumstances of this 
14 
 
case,8 does not apply.  Under our law, Murphy could have searched 
the backpack for the "fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and 
other evidence of the crime . . .  and remov[ed] any weapons 
that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect his 
escape."  G. L. c. 276. § 1.  See Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 
Mass. 156, 160 (1988) (search incident to arrest under art. 14 
permissible to retrieve weapon or evidence of crime).  This 
exception fails, however, because as discussed above, there was 
no crime for which the defendant lawfully could have been 
arrested. 
 
The dissent rejects the bedrock constitutional principles 
that a patfrisk of a suspect must be justified by reasonable 
articulable suspicion of both criminal activity and 
dangerousness and that a warrantless search must be justified by 
probable cause and an exception to the warrant requirement as 
dictated by Terry and its progeny.  Terry, 329 U.S. at 20.  See, 
e.g., Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 6-7; Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 
Mass. 46, 71 (2004); Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 672 
(2001).  Instead, the dissent contends that a person who enters 
upon school property, where public access is restricted, lacks 
the same expectation of privacy as one in a public place and, as 
a consequence, a patfrisk and search need not be justified by 
                     
 
8 Consent is eliminated as a possibility based on the 
judge's finding that the defendant explicitly objected to Murphy 
touching the backpack. 
15 
 
reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.  Post at    
.  Without citing case law supporting this alternative view of 
the protections inherent in the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, or 
articulating the contours of this diminished expectation of 
privacy, the dissent relies instead on highly publicized 
examples of school violence as support for the proposition that 
the very nature of the place, a school, justifies a less 
rigorous constitutional standard.  Post at    .  We discern no 
such limitation in the protections guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment or art. 14. 
 
We acknowledge that our cases have taken judicial notice of 
"the actual and potential violence in our public schools."  
Commonwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 156 (2001).  See id. at 
156-157 & n.8; Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 134, 
138-139 (2014) (reciting instances of school shootings as basis 
for "heightened sensitivity" and reasonable suspicion for 
patfrisk and search of backpack where defendant was dressed in 
camouflage attire, openly displayed weapons, and affixed 
threatening decals to vehicle).  However, that fact alone has 
not been used to limit a defendant's constitutional rights.  In 
Milo M., supra at 150-151, the court's reference to school 
violence arose in the context of a juvenile's challenge to a 
delinquency finding based on a violation of the Massachusetts 
threat statute, G. L. c. 275, § 2.  The juvenile argued that the 
16 
 
judge focused on the apprehension of the teacher, who was the 
recipient of the threat, and that her subjective state of mind 
was insufficient to establish that he had the intent and ability 
to carry out the threat.  Milo M., supra at 151-152.  The court 
rejected this argument.  Relying on the judicially noticed fact 
of "actual and potential violence in our public schools," the 
court concluded that the teacher's apprehension was objectively 
reasonable where the threats could come to fruition.  Id. at 
156-158.  Thus, the recognition of school violence served an 
evidentiary purpose only; it was accorded no constitutional 
significance as the dissent suggests it should have in this 
case. 
 
As a second basis for rejecting the traditional Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 analytical framework, the dissent contends 
that in the school setting, the defendant had a diminished 
expectation of privacy such that neither reasonable articulable 
suspicion for the patfrisk nor probable cause for the search 
were required.  Post at    .  In reaching this conclusion, the 
dissent applies the test for determining whether a defendant has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched such 
that he or she may invoke the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 against unreasonable searches.  In that 
analysis, the inquiry is whether the defendant has a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the place searched and, if so, whether 
17 
 
society is willing to recognize that expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 
(1986).  See also Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 
(1991).  The dissent then summarily concludes that society would 
be unwilling to recognize a nonstudent's expectation of privacy 
in the school setting as reasonable.  Post at    . 
 
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment or our art. 14 
jurisprudence supports such limitations on a person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Even in T.L.O., the Supreme Court did 
not tie its less stringent standard to an assumption that a 
student had a diminished expectation of privacy in the school 
setting.  Rather, the court's holding reflects a judgment that a 
balancing of the student's privacy interests and the school's 
interest in maintaining order could be fairly accomplished 
without offending the fundamental Fourth Amendment requirement 
of reasonableness.  See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-343. 
 
Last, the dissent, quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454 
Mass. 159, 164 (2009), reasons that "[w]here a warrantless 
search is based on a reasonable suspicion that an individual 
presents a danger, '[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain 
that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably 
prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the 
belief that his [or her] safety or that of others was in 
danger.'"  Post at    .  This is not our law.  We have never 
18 
 
held that a warrantless search may be justified on this basis.  
As noted earlier, a police officer may initiate a patfrisk if 
she has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that the 
suspect is armed and dangerous.  Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 9.  A 
search, however, requires probable cause and a warrant unless 
the circumstances excuse the warrant requirement.  The search in 
this case, lacking both, was not lawful. 
 
We do not underestimate the threat of violence in schools 
and other public places.  Recent history bears out the folly of 
doing so.  Nonetheless, our task is to respect the jurisprudence 
that has developed under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14.  And 
we do so with confidence that public safety and constitutional 
rights are not inherently incompatible.  We acknowledge that 
school officials, likely cognizant of other incidents where 
unauthorized persons entered school property and engaged in 
conduct with tragic consequences, are pressed to exercise 
caution in circumstances where they lack control of the person 
or the situation.  The school officials in this case were 
appropriately cautious of the defendant and did what was 
expected of them to insure the safety of the students in their 
charge; they called the police.  Thus, it is important to 
emphasize here that our ruling does not bear on what school 
officials themselves can and should do to insure the safety of 
students.  Nor does our ruling handicap school officials in 
19 
 
responding to behavior that presents a potential or real threat 
to student safety.  What we have said here relates only to 
conduct of police officers, who as the Supreme Court noted in 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343, are "school[ed] . . . in the niceties 
of probable cause" and other constitutional requirements.  Where 
school officials who engage in protective activity are "not 
acting 'in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement 
agencies,'" their actions are governed by a less stringent 
constitutional standard.  Commonwealth v. Lawrence L., 439 Mass. 
817, 820-821 (2003), quoting T.L.O., supra at 341 n.7. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence at trial.  The defendant 
argues that the evidence -- possession of a concealed firearm in 
the absence of disruptive, violent, or threatening behavior -- 
is insufficient to support the conviction for disturbing a 
school, G. L. c. 272, § 40,9 and that the conviction must be 
reversed.  We disagree.  In determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we consider "the evidence in its entirety, including, 
not excluding, that admitted [at] trial but found inadmissible 
on appeal."  Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 46 
(1992), quoting Glisson v. Georgia, 192 Ga. App. 409, 410 
(1989).  See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34 (1988).  
Considering the entirety of the evidence, we reject the 
                     
 
9 The issue is preserved, as the defendant filed a motion 
for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the 
evidence. 
20 
 
defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient and that 
the conviction must be reversed.  Nonetheless, we conclude that 
because the conviction was based, at least in part, on the 
defendant's possession of a firearm which should have been 
suppressed, we vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial. 
 
a.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found 
based on the evidence presented at trial.  On March 25, 2015, 
the defendant approached the entrance of the school, carrying a 
backpack.  He arrived at the school approximately five minutes 
before dismissal.   The school is a "lockdown" facility; it 
employs a double door entry system, requiring visitors to the 
school to ring the office to gain entry through two sets of 
locked doors.  When the defendant rang the buzzer, the 
administrative assistant on duty viewed him on video 
surveillance and then allowed him into the office.  He first 
told the assistant that he needed to use the bathroom, however, 
when she replied that the bathrooms were not for public use, the 
defendant told her that he was a student whose last name was 
"Cruz" and that he needed to get back into the school to access 
his locker.  The assistant was suspicious; as she began to walk 
back to her desk to verify his identity in the school database, 
the defendant asked to be let back out of the building, because 
he had left his automobile running. 
21 
 
 
The assistant became alarmed as she viewed the defendant on 
the surveillance monitors quickly leave the building but not the 
property.  She contacted the principal and the vice-principal to 
communicate her concerns that someone was trying to gain entry 
into the school.   The principal and the vice-principal asked for 
a description of the defendant and immediately went outside the 
school to locate him.  They did so in the school parking lot, 
just after classes had been dismissed.  They approached the 
defendant, noting the odor of unburnt marijuana10 and the 
defendant's red, glassy eyes.  They asked the defendant what he 
was doing at the school, why he misrepresented his identity, and 
his purpose for being on the premises.  The defendant replied 
that he was there to meet a girl.  He complied with their 
request to follow them back into the school "to discuss a little 
more as to what he was doing [at the school] and . . . why he 
tried to gain access to the building." 
 
They brought the defendant into a conference room, adjacent 
to the main office.  Milton police were alerted.  The principal 
questioned the defendant, asking him why he was at the school, 
why he lied about being a student, and whether he had been 
drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana.  The defendant replied 
that he was at the school to meet a girl, but did not know her 
                     
 
10 The vice-principal also noticed a faint odor of alcohol 
on the defendant's person. 
22 
 
name.  He denied drinking or smoking and apologized for lying 
about his identity.  At the principal's request, the defendant 
emptied the pockets of his pants.  The defendant was apologetic 
and asked whether he could leave, but he was not allowed to do 
so. 
 
When Murphy arrived at the school, the vice-principal, who 
appeared to be upset, greeted her at the front entrance to the 
school.  She was led into a conference room where the defendant 
and the principal were waiting.  Murphy noticed the strong odor 
of marijuana as she entered the room.  The defendant was seated 
at the head of the conference table; a black backpack and items 
from his pockets were on the table.  Murphy noted that the 
principal also appeared to be upset. 
 
The defendant appeared to be nervous; he was seated, but 
his legs were shaking.  Murphy asked for the defendant's name 
and the principal gave her the defendant's Massachusetts 
identification card.  She then asked the defendant to stand up 
and pat frisked his person. 
 
As a result of the patfrisk, Murphy recovered a large bag 
of what appeared to be marijuana and a "wad" of money from the 
pocket of his hooded sweatshirt.  Murphy asked about the 
backpack; the defendant replied that it was his backpack but 
that she did not have the right to look inside.  Murphy "patted 
down" the outside of the backpack and felt something hard 
23 
 
inside, so she opened it and removed the contents, including a 
bottle of alcohol, more money, a pair of sneakers, and a small, 
silver firearm with a pearl-colored handle.  Murphy immediately 
slid the firearm away from the defendant, placed him in 
handcuffs, read him the Miranda warnings, and sat the defendant 
back down at the table. 
 
Murphy alerted Milton police that the high school was on 
lockdown and requested that all available officers respond.  
When a detective arrived, the school was already in lockdown.  
As the detective entered the conference room, he noticed the 
strong odor of marijuana.  Murphy informed the detective that 
she had read the defendant the Miranda warnings and left the 
room.  The detective secured the firearm and placed it in his 
pocket.  He then asked the defendant whether he understood the 
Miranda warnings and whether he would agree to speak with him.  
The defendant told the detective that he understood the Miranda 
warnings and agreed to speak with him.  He told the detective 
that he arrived in Milton from Watertown and was meeting a 
female student at the high school at her request.  The defendant 
admitted that he did not have a license to carry a firearm or a 
firearm identification card.  After the lockdown was lifted, the 
detective drove the defendant to the police station where he was 
booked. 
24 
 
 
b.  Analysis.  In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we consider whether the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to allow any 
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the 
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  General Laws c. 272, 
§ 40, provides, in pertinent part, "Whoever wilfully interrupts 
or disturbs a school or other assembly of people met for a 
lawful purpose shall be punished . . . ."  To sustain a 
conviction under the statute, the Commonwealth must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct was willful and 
"create[d] an interruption or disturbance of the normal 
functioning of a school."  Commonwealth v. Bohmer, 374 Mass. 
368, 372 (1978). 
 
The parties urge starkly different interpretations of the 
evidence necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.  
The defendant argues that the possession of a concealed firearm 
in the absence of disruptive, violent, or threatening behavior 
does not meet the Latimore standard.  The Commonwealth counters 
that the evidence was sufficient, where the lockdown was a 
"disturbance of the normal functioning of a school" and was the 
natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wilful act 
in bringing a loaded firearm onto school property.  The 
Commonwealth argues further that notwithstanding the lockdown, 
25 
 
the defendant's conduct prior to the arrival of police officers 
was sufficiently alarming to disrupt the school's function.  
Thus, the essential questions we must answer here are (1) 
whether the defendant's conduct was wilful and (2) whether a 
lockdown of the school's campus is a "disturbance of the normal 
functioning of a school."  Bohmer, supra at 372. 
 
i.  Wilful conduct.  "The wilfulness requirement of G. L. 
c. 272, § 40, demands . . . only that the acts of the 
defendant[] be wilfully performed; so long as the acts were 
intentional and not due to accident or inadvertence, the 
requirement is satisfied."  Id. at 377.  The specific intent to 
cause a disturbance is not an essential element of the crime.  
Id.  Here, the defendant does not challenge the wilfulness 
element of the crime.  We consider, therefore, only his claim 
that the act of bringing a loaded, concealed firearm onto the 
school campus, while he was in possession of marijuana and under 
the influence of alcohol, was not unreasonably disruptive within 
the meaning of the statute. 
 
ii.  Disturbance of the school's normal functioning.  We 
analyze disruptive conduct using a two-prong standard:  first, 
whether the conduct is such that "most people would find to be 
unreasonably disruptive," and second, whether the conduct "did 
in fact infringe someone's right to be undisturbed."  
Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734-735 (1977).  The 
26 
 
first prong is objective and "protects potential defendants from 
prosecutions based on individual sensitivities"; the second 
prong "requires that the crime have a victim," and only punishes 
activities that "have detrimental impact."  Id. at 735. 
 
Disruptive conduct is context specific and is necessarily 
dependent on its location and timing; therefore, conduct that 
would be acceptable in one situation may be disruptive in 
another.  See id.  In Bohmer, 374 Mass. at 370, we upheld the 
defendant's convictions under G. L. c. 272, § 40, where the 
defendant, in two separate incidents, interrupted classes in 
progress at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to address 
the students in the classes after the professors asked him to 
leave.  Although classroom announcements in some situations may 
not be objectively disruptive, in Bohmer, the defendant did not 
have permission to make the announcements, interrupted the 
classes in session, and had to be forcibly removed.  See id.  
The possession of a loaded, concealed firearm in certain 
situations may not be objectively unreasonably disruptive, but 
where, as here, that possession results in the lockdown of a 
high school, the jury reasonably could conclude that "most 
people would find [a school lockdown] unreasonably disruptive."  
Orlando, supra. 
 
In addition, the defendant's conduct had a measurable 
impact on those present in the school.  After Murphy discovered 
27 
 
the firearm in the defendant's backpack, the school was placed 
in lockdown for approximately two hours.11  Although the 
defendant was brought into the school shortly after school 
dismissal, many people, both students and nonstudents, were 
present, as many afterschool and community activities are 
conducted there.  When the school is placed in lockdown, all 
staff members are trained to get into the first lockable room 
that they are near.  The doors are locked and faculty and 
students are told to barricade themselves in the room so that no 
one can gain entrance.  Movements are restricted in the 
building; no one is allowed to move freely through the hallways 
except for police personnel, the principal, and the vice-
principal.  Parents are restricted from picking up their 
children, and no one may leave until the lockdown is lifted.  As 
a result of the lockdown on March 25, 2015, approximately twenty 
Milton police officers were dispatched to the school and some 
school officials were not able to leave until hours after the 
lockdown ended.12 
 
Based on the totality of the facts that could have been 
found by the jury, the sufficiency of the evidence is not a 
                     
 
11 A lockdown occurs at the school when there has been a 
breach of security.  An indication is given to those in the 
building that they need to lock their doors and follow 
protocols, such as barricading the doors and restricting 
movement, to ensure that all the students and adults are safe. 
 
12 The vice-principal testified that he was unable to leave 
the school until 6 P.M. or 7 P.M. as a result of the lockdown. 
28 
 
close question.  Thus, the defendant's claim that retrial is 
barred lacks merit.  See Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 456 Mass. 
411, 434-435 (2010), S.C., 460 Mass. 723 (20110), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kater, 421 Mass. 17, 18 (1995) ("If the evidence 
admitted at the trial was sufficient to send the case to the 
jury, but is insufficient to send the case to the jury if all 
improperly admitted evidence is disregarded, double jeopardy 
principles nevertheless do not bar a retrial").  Because, 
however, the conviction was based, at least in part, on the 
defendant's possession of a firearm which should have been 
suppressed, we vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons set forth above, we conclude 
that the police lacked a reasonable belief that the defendant 
was armed and dangerous and, therefore, the patfrisk and search 
of the backpack was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and 
art. 14.  Therefore, we vacate the convictions of carrying a 
firearm without a license, carrying a dangerous weapon on school 
grounds, possession of a firearm without a FID card, and 
possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute, and 
remand those matters to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We vacate the 
conviction of disturbing a school and remand for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  (dissenting, with whom Cypher, J., joins).  I 
disagree with the court's conclusion that it was unreasonable 
for Sergeant Murphy of the Milton police department to search 
the defendant's bag in the circumstances.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the defendant's convictions, including his conviction of 
wilful disturbance. 
 
The "touchstone" of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights is reasonableness (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Blais, 428 Mass. 294, 297 (1998).  Where a warrantless search is 
based on a reasonable suspicion that an individual presents a 
danger, "[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the 
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent 
[person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his [or her] safety or that of others was in danger."  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454 Mass. 159, 164 (2009), quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  In determining the 
reasonableness of a search, "we have consistently eschewed 
bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature 
of the reasonableness inquiry."  Blais, supra at 297, quoting 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).  See Commonwealth v. 
Sanborn, 477 Mass. 393, 396 n.3 (2017) (acknowledging 
possibility that warrantless seizures to serve domestic abuse 
prevention orders may be reasonable).  See also id. at 396-397 
2 
 
(Gants, C.J., concurring) (same, even where facts do not satisfy 
existing exception to warrant requirement). 
 
Considering the totality of circumstances in this case, I 
conclude that the defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy 
and that Murphy's search of the defendant's backpack was 
reasonable, based on the potential danger to students.  Cf. New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (T.L.O.) (in "certain 
limited circumstances neither [probable cause nor reasonable 
suspicion] is required" [citation omitted]). 
 
An individual who attempts to gain entry to a school, where 
public access is restricted, does not have the same expectation 
of privacy as an individual in a home, on a street corner, or 
even in a motor vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 
Mass. 290, 301 (1991) (search in "constitutional sense" takes 
place where police intrude on constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy).  Determining whether such a 
reasonable expectation exists is a two-step inquiry:  "(1) 
whether the defendant has manifested a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the search, and (2) whether society is 
willing to recognize [the reasonableness of] that expectation."  
Id. 
 
Although the defendant manifested a subjective expectation 
of privacy, I conclude that society would not be willing to 
accept the reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of 
3 
 
privacy in the circumstances of this case.1  The government has a 
vital interest in ensuring the safety of our schools and the 
children who attend them.  In T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, it was 
the "school setting" itself that required "some modification of 
the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a 
search."  See id. at 352-353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
("Indeed, because drug use and possession of weapons have become 
increasingly common among young people, an immediate response 
frequently is required not just to maintain an environment 
conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of 
students and school personnel"). 
 
Even dating back to 2001 -- well before the highly 
publicized tragedies at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University (Virginia Tech) and in Newtown, Connecticut -- 
we had taken judicial notice of the danger of violence in 
schools.  Commonwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass 149, 156-157 & n.8 
                     
 
1 I do not dispute that students have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their schools.  The reasonableness of 
that expectation, however, is lesser than the expectations of 
privacy that are typically applicable in other contexts, because 
students may be subject to search in the absence of either 
probable cause of criminality or reasonable suspicion that they 
are armed.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
The question here, however, is what expectation a person with no 
apparent relationship to a school, its students, or its faculty 
should have when attempting to enter school grounds.  I agree 
with the court that the analytical framework from T.L.O is not 
applicable.  The lesser expectation of privacy possessed by 
students, at least with respect to searches by school officials, 
is a helpful point of reference in analyzing the defendant's 
expectation of privacy. 
4 
 
(2001).  See Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 134, 
138 (2014) (taking judicial notice of school shootings in 
Columbine, Colorado; Santee, California; and Newtown, 
Connecticut).  Given this widely-known backdrop, individuals 
attempting to enter a school -- particularly without any 
apparent relationship to the school or the people there -- have, 
at best, an expectation of privacy to their persons and their 
belongings that is significantly less than their expectation of 
privacy in their homes or motor vehicles, or while on a street 
corner.  See Commonwealth v. Pina, 406 Mass. 540, 545, cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990) (nature of location of search is 
relevant to its reasonableness).  See also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 
340 (school setting reason for reducing "level of suspicion").  
Rather, such an individual attempts to gain entry into a place 
where safety is of paramount importance and must be vigilantly 
safeguarded. 
 
Further, the circumstances of this case differ from those 
involving searches of students, such that the distinction 
between searches conducted by law enforcement and those 
conducted by school officials does not bear the same import.  
Although school officials may face dangers when searching 
students, they are searching individuals with whom they have 
some familiarity.  Ostensibly, school officials are generally 
equipped to deal with problems stemming from students.  To 
5 
 
conclude that, on these facts, a search by officials at Milton 
High School (school) of a nonstudent would have been subject to 
reduced Fourth Amendment and art. 14 scrutiny could have the 
undesirable effect of encouraging school officials to confront 
potentially dangerous individuals, rather than encouraging them 
to seek assistance from law enforcement with the appropriate 
training to handle such scenarios. 
 
Murphy's own knowledge at the time of the search 
established a reasonable basis to search the defendant in the 
circumstances.2  She knew that school officials had requested 
police assistance to deal with a nonstudent who, by duplicity, 
had tried to gain entry to the school.3  Murphy arrived in the 
conference room where the school officials were with the 
                     
 
2 Murphy may well have had probable cause to believe the 
defendant had committed trespass or attempted criminal trespass, 
in which case the defendant may have been subject to a search 
incident to arrest for that crime.  See Commonwealth v. 
Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 481-482 (2007) (search incident to 
arrest may take place before arrest as long as search and arrest 
are "substantially contemporaneous").  This issue, however, is 
not argued on appeal, and in any event, I would affirm based on 
the defendant's reduced expectation of privacy. 
 
 
3 As the court concludes, the facts did not support the 
judge's findings that Murphy had actual knowledge of the 
defendant's specific lies.  The parties did not argue, and thus 
the court does not address, whether the "collective knowledge" 
doctrine, which generally imputes the knowledge of one police 
officer to other police officers who are engaged in a 
cooperative effort, could be extended to apply to school 
officials in this case. See Commonwealth v. Gullick, 386 Mass. 
278, 283-284 (1982) (evaluating probable cause based on 
collective knowledge of officers). 
6 
 
defendant, and it was thus reasonable for her to believe that 
the defendant was the nonstudent about whom she had been called.  
Murphy knew the school officials from previous interactions, and 
she observed that they were visibly distraught throughout this 
ordeal.  Murphy also noticed the defendant appeared to be 
nervous, and she noted the smell of marijuana and alcohol in the 
school conference room.  Finally, Murphy arrived shortly after 
classes had ended for the day, making it likely that students 
would be out and about the school grounds, increasing their 
likelihood of exposure to the potentially intoxicated defendant, 
should he have been released. 
 
I conclude that the combination of the defendant's reduced 
expectation of privacy, the heightened government interest in 
school safety, and Murphy's knowledge made frisking4 the 
defendant's person and backpack reasonable.  Even without 
specific facts to suggest that he was armed, the location, the 
timing, the suspicious nature of the defendant's conduct, and 
his potential intoxication warranted the officer's concern for 
the safety of students at the school.  See Johnson, 454 Mass. at 
                     
 
4 Because Murphy felt the exterior of the bag and felt a 
hard object before she opened it, it is unnecessary to address 
whether the sergeant could have simply opened the bag.  Although 
Murphy did not explicitly testify that she believed the hard 
object was a weapon, the judge inferred that Murphy opened the 
bag because she suspected the object was a weapon.  This 
inference was reasonable considering Murphy's testimony as a 
whole, in which she described moving the bag out of the 
defendant's reach and hearing a "clank" when she did so. 
7 
 
164.  The only alternative -- apart from potentially arresting 
the defendant for trespass, which would have allowed for a 
search incident to arrest -- would have been to return the 
backpack and release him, without knowing what the bag 
contained, at a time students were likely to be milling about 
the school grounds.  I believe it was eminently reasonable -- 
and prudent -- in these circumstances for Murphy to feel the bag 
for weapons before potentially returning it to the defendant and 
allowing him to leave. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.