Title: Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee

State: georgia

Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court

Document:

516 S.E.2d 785 (1999) 271 Ga. 154 ASHKOUTI et al. v. CITY OF SUWANEE et al. No. S99A0334. Supreme Court of Georgia. June 1, 1999. Anthony O.L. Powell, Webb, Tanner & Powell, LLP, Lawrenceville, for Albert M. Ashkouti et al. Gregory David Jay, Chandler & Britt, LLC, Buford, for the City of Suwanee et al. THOMPSON, Justice. Plaintiffs, who are developers, sought to amend the zoning ordinance and zoning map of the City of Suwanee to change the zoning *786 of 25.307 acres of land from R-100 (single family residential) to RM-8 (multi-family). During the public hearing, the plaintiffs' representative told the city council: After the city council unanimously denied the application for rezoning, plaintiffs filed suit and asserted that the property's R-100 zoning classification was unconstitutional. The city moved for summary judgment. Relying upon DeKalb County v. Post Properties, 245 Ga. 214, 217, 263 S.E.2d 905 (1980), the trial court granted the city's motion on the ground that plaintiffs did not give adequate notice that they were challenging the constitutionality of the city's zoning ordinance. This Court granted plaintiffs' application for discretionary appeal and posed this question: What constitutes sufficient notice to the zoning authority of a challenge to the constitutionality of an existing zoning classification as applied to particular property? DeKalb County v. Bembry, 252 Ga. 510-511, 314 S.E.2d 900 (1984). Thus, notice to a zoning authority concerning the constitutionality of an existing zoning classification does not have to meet a high standard of particularity. All that is required is that the zoning authority be given "fair notice that a constitutional challenge is being raised." Id. at 511, 314 S.E.2d 900. The plaintiffs' attack on the constitutionality of the zoning classification meets this test. It put the council on notice that plaintiffs were challenging the constitutionality of the existing zoning classification, and it focused the council's attention upon the factors which might have rendered the classification unconstitutional. Unlike Bembry, plaintiffs used the word "constitutional," and they proceeded to set forth factors which might affect the constitutionality of the R-100 classification. That is all that they were required to do. Id. at 511, 314 S.E.2d 900. Relying upon O S Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 438 S.E.2d 907 (1994), the city asserts the notice was insufficient because it failed to specify: (1) the ordinance to be challenged with fair specificity; (2) the provision of the constitution allegedly violated; and (3) how the ordinance violates the provision of the constitution. Id. at 764, 438 S.E.2d 907. This assertion is without merit because, although those factors are apposite when one questions the constitutionality of a statute in a judicial forum, they are inapplicable in the legislative forum. Cobb County Bd. of Commrs. v. Poss, 257 Ga. 393, 395(2), 359 S.E.2d 900 (1987). To the extent that O S Advertising holds otherwise, it is hereby overruled. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.