Title: Commonwealth v. Colas

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12701 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WESSON COLAS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 14, 2020. - February 22, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 13, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
Esther J. Horwich for the defendant. 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Mark T. 
Lee, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation in the 
shooting death of Dawn Jaffier, as well as armed assault with 
intent to murder and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
                     
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
weapon in connection with the nonfatal shooting of Lealah 
Fulton.  At trial, the Commonwealth alleged that the defendant 
and a companion had been involved in an altercation with a group 
of young men inside a convenience store.  The dispute continued 
outside the store, where the defendant's companion argued with 
the others, while the defendant left to retrieve a handgun.  
According to the Commonwealth, the defendant then pointed the 
handgun at the rival group, and one of them, codefendant Keith 
Williams, fired multiple rounds at the defendant.  Williams 
missed the defendant, but two of the bullets struck Jaffier and 
Fulton.  Although the defendant himself did not fire a shot, the 
Commonwealth proceeded on a theory that the defendant had 
initiated a gunfight with Williams with the intent to kill and 
therefore was liable for the harm to the innocent bystanders.  
See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 503-504 (1997), 
S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1003 (1998).2 
 
In this direct appeal, the defendant raises a number of 
asserted errors at trial.  He argues that the Commonwealth 
failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support his 
                     
 
2 Keith Williams and the defendant were tried jointly.  The 
jury convicted Williams of murder in the first degree, armed 
assault with intent to murder, assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm.  
Williams's appeal is pending before this court. 
3 
 
convictions of murder in the first degree, armed assault with 
intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon.3  In addition, he challenges certain of the 
jury instructions, arguing in particular that the jury should 
not have been informed that they could draw an inference of an 
intent to kill from the use of a dangerous weapon.  The 
defendant also contends that he is entitled to a new trial 
because of impermissible statements in the prosecutor's closing 
argument, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to portions of that argument, failing to object to 
certain testimony, and failing adequately to contest the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  Finally, the defendant asks us to 
exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
and to grant him a new trial or to reduce the conviction of 
murder to a lesser degree of guilt. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the verdicts 
of murder in the first degree and armed assault with the intent 
to murder cannot stand, but we affirm the conviction of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  The matter shall be 
remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial on the charge of 
murder in the second degree. 
                     
 
3 The Commonwealth does not contest the defendant's claim 
that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of 
armed assault with intent to murder. 
4 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
found, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), reserving 
some details for later discussion. 
In the morning of August 23, 2014, a crowd gathered on Blue 
Hill Avenue in the Dorchester section of Boston to watch a 
parade.  The defendant and a companion, Tevan Williams, were 
among the crowd.4  The defendant was wearing a dark hooded 
sweatshirt and a visible gold chain.  Tevan was dressed in a 
blue sweatshirt with the words "Blue Hill" printed on the front.  
Williams also was present, along with others, including Jordan 
Reed and Brian Joyce.  Williams was wearing a distinctive blue 
"Ninja Turtles" T-shirt and blue shorts.  All of the men were 
hanging out near a Blue Hill Avenue convenience store.5 
The defendant and Tevan entered the store at approximately 
8:20 A.M., followed a few minutes later by Reed and Joyce.6  The 
defendant and Tevan exchanged "looks" and "stares" with Reed, 
                     
 
4 To avoid confusion with Keith Williams, the codefendant, 
we refer to Tevan Williams by his first name. 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth introduced video recordings from 
surveillance cameras mounted inside the convenience store, which 
included a view of the sidewalk in front of the store. 
 
 
6 As he walked into the store, the defendant appeared to be 
carrying a cellular telephone.  At trial, counsel argued that 
the silver and black object later seen in the defendant's hand 
was a cellular telephone, and not a handgun. 
5 
 
Joyce, and another customer.  While no words were spoken, this 
behavior created "a lot of tension in the store" during the 
brief encounter. 
At 8:22 A.M., the defendant and Tevan left the store, 
followed by Reed and Joyce.  The defendant walked away for a 
moment, while Tevan remained outside the store, drinking a soda.  
Joyce and Reed paused, turned toward Tevan, glared, and 
exchanged "aggressive" words with him.  Williams and his group 
then headed towards McLellan Street.  The defendant rejoined 
Tevan on Blue Hill Avenue, and the two began walking in the 
direction of Williams and his group. 
Three witnesses observed the defendant during the ensuing 
altercation, and saw him produce a handgun from his waistband.  
The first witness, an off-duty Boston police detective, Arthur 
Hall-Brewster, had been waiting for the barbershop next to the 
convenience store to open.  He stood on the sidewalk, against a 
wall, and intently watched the group of young men gathered 
nearby.  The defendant passed by on the sidewalk within a few 
inches of Hall-Brewster.  Hall-Brewster noticed that the 
defendant kept his fingertips flat against his stomach inside 
his belt.  Watching the defendant from behind, Hall-Brewster 
observed him pull an object from his waist while continuing 
towards McLellan Street.  At first, the detective thought that 
the shiny object the defendant had pulled from his waistband 
6 
 
might be a knife.  As the defendant turned, Hall-Brewster saw 
that the defendant was holding a silver handgun with a five-inch 
long barrel.  The defendant kept the weapon by his side as he 
faced a group of four to five men who had gathered on the 
sidewalk and the street.  Hall-Brewster did not see him raise or 
aim the firearm. 
The second witness, Troy Souto, who lived nearby, was 
outside with his teenaged son to watch the parade.  After Souto 
noticed a group of men, who had been inside the convenience 
store, arguing on the street near the corner of the barbershop, 
he ordered his son to return home.  Souto then saw the defendant 
produce a handgun from the back of his pants.  Souto was unable 
to describe the weapon, but was certain that the defendant did 
not point or fire it. 
The third witness, Michael Turner, entered the convenience 
store at the same time as Reed and Joyce.  While purchasing a 
drink, Tevan twice bumped into Turner and "stared him down."  
Although no words were exchanged, Turner felt that there was "a 
lot of tension in the store."  To avoid any involvement in a 
potentially escalating situation, Turner waited for the men to 
go before he left the store.  The hostilities between the two 
groups of men continued on Blue Hill Avenue.  In particular, 
Turner saw Tevan arguing with Reed and others in that group. 
7 
 
Turner then noticed the defendant and Tevan walking down 
the street behind him.  Turner overheard Tevan tell the 
defendant, "Just keep calm, this will all be over in a second."  
Turner turned around when he heard a commotion, and ended up 
facing the defendant.  He saw the defendant, who was holding a 
"pistol" by his side, raise it and point it in the direction of 
McLellan Street (which was also in the direction toward where 
Turner was standing).  Turner described the weapon as "long" and 
"dark."  He froze for a moment, before he turned and ran to the 
middle of the street, and then continued running home; he heard 
shots fired from a distance. 
After the initial altercation, Williams, Reed, and Joyce 
left the area in front of the convenience store and gathered 
near the corner of Blue Hill Avenue and McLellan Street.  The 
largest man in the group (by inference, Williams) was holding a 
firearm.  One of the men in Williams's group yelled "blast them, 
blast them," or words to that effect.  Williams then fired four 
or five shots at the defendant, who was farther along Blue Hill 
Avenue. 
The defendant was not hit, but one of the bullets struck 
and killed a bystander, Jaffier.  Jaffier had been walking 
across the intersection of Blue Hill Avenue and Charlotte Street 
with two friends when gunfire erupted and she fell to the 
ground.  She had been shot in the head.  Another bullet struck 
8 
 
Fulton, who had been watching the parade from a median strip 
near American Legion Highway, in the leg. 
A neighborhood resident heard the shots and looked out her 
third-floor window.  Her house was approximately 500 feet from 
the intersection of Blue Hill Avenue and McLellan Street.  She 
saw three men walking down the street acting "nervous."  She 
described one of the men, who was wearing a blue shirt and 
shorts (by inference, Williams), as "fat, heavyset," and the 
other two as "skinny."  One of the skinny men, dressed in a 
white shirt and black pants, said, "Get rid of it.  They're 
coming."  The fat man rummaged through bushes and dropped 
something near the corner of the house across the street.  Upon 
hearing police sirens, the men ran from the area.  Alerted by 
neighbors, the police searched the area and recovered a .357 
revolver from under a porch.  Tests later revealed that the 
revolver, which contained six empty shell casings, was the 
weapon that fired the shots that killed Jaffier and injured 
Fulton. 
Police stopped and handcuffed three men -- Williams, Reed, 
and Joyce -- approximately one to two blocks away from the 
location where the firearm was found.  Shortly thereafter, based 
on dispatches over the police radio describing the clothing worn 
by three suspects, they were brought to police headquarters. 
9 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence of murder 
in the first degree.  The defendant contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of murder in the first 
degree.  His argument is premised on the Commonwealth's 
purported inability to establish that he either possessed an 
operable and loaded handgun, or pointed a handgun at Williams.  
In light of this argument, coupled with the undisputed fact that 
he never fired a round at Williams, the defendant maintains that 
the jury could not have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
he acted with the requisite intent to prove murder in the first 
degree.7 
In determining whether the Commonwealth met its burden to 
establish each element of the offense charged, we apply the 
                     
 
7 The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove 
that he possessed a firearm based on discrepancies in the 
evidence.  For instance, Hall-Brewster described the object as a 
shiny, silver handgun with a long barrel, while Turner testified 
that the defendant raised a "long and dark" pistol, that 
"definitely wasn't shiny silver."  On cross-examination, Souto 
testified that he assumed the object had been a firearm, but it 
could have been a cellular telephone.  Unlike Turner, Hall-
Brewster and Souto testified that the defendant kept the object 
by his side the entire time.  "If the evidence lends itself to 
several conflicting interpretations," however, "it is the 
province of the jury to resolve the discrepancy" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 484 Mass. 211, 215 (2020).  To 
the extent that the trial record contains conflicting versions 
of events, it is the function of the jury, and not an appellate 
court, to resolve those conflicts, "for the weight and 
credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province."  
See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 
Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011). 
10 
 
familiar Latimore standard.  See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678.  
"[The] question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  Although a conviction may be based 
entirely on circumstantial evidence, and the inferences drawn 
need only be reasonable, not inescapable, see Commonwealth v. 
Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32, 45 (2017), a "conviction may not rest 
on the piling of inference upon inference or on conjecture and 
speculation," Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), 
S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011), citing 
Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 339–343 (2004). 
 
i.  Intent to kill.  "In order to have committed murder in 
the first degree with deliberate premeditation, a defendant must 
have had or shared an intent to kill or cause death, which was 
the product of cool reflection" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 434-435 
(2015).  See Commonwealth v. Tejada, 484 Mass. 1, 4-5, cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 441 (2020).  Establishing an intent to kill 
requires proof that the defendant "consciously and purposefully 
intended" to cause the victim's death (citation omitted).  Id. 
at 5.  Specific intent, in turn, requires that a defendant "not 
only . . . consciously intended to take certain actions, 
11 
 
but . . . also consciously intended certain consequences."  See 
Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 269 (1998).  An 
individual's specific intent is "rarely susceptible of direct 
proof and must usually be inferred from all the facts and 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Eppich, 342 Mass. 487, 493 (1961). 
 
If a defendant intends to kill one person, and mistakenly 
kills another, under the doctrine of transferred intent the 
defendant is treated as though he or she intended to kill the 
other individual.  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 
(2012).  See Commonwealth v. Shea, 460 Mass. 163, 172-173 
(2011).  In this case, the shooting of the two bystanders raised 
the issue of transferred intent, and the judge instructed on 
transferred intent as follows: 
"If a defendant intends to kill or injure someone and in 
attempting to do so mistakenly kills or injures someone 
else instead . . . such as a bystander the defendant is 
treated under the law as is if he intended to kill or 
injure the actual victim.  This is referred to as 
transferred intent under the law.  For example if I aim and 
fire a gun at one person intending to kill him, but instead 
mistakenly kill another person, the law treats me as if I 
intended to kill the actual victim.  My intent to kill the 
intended victim is transferred to the actual victim." 
 
Thus, the jury were required to decide whether the Commonwealth 
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
consciously and purposefully intended to kill Williams. 
12 
 
 
The act of pointing a firearm at someone is not, standing 
alone, sufficient "use" of that firearm to infer an intent to 
kill.  See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 126 (2013).  In 
Lewis, for example, we considered whether the Commonwealth had 
established that the defendant, who twice pointed a loaded 
firearm at a police officer, had possessed a specific intent to 
kill.  Id.  We determined that, in the circumstances there, the 
evidence equally supported conflicting views, and could have 
indicated either "an intent to kill" or "an intent to frighten 
and deter."  Id.  The Commonwealth was unable to prove that the 
defendant intended to kill the officer the first time the 
defendant pointed a loaded firearm at him.  Id.  The question 
was different the second time, because, at that point the 
officer had shot the defendant, and "the jury reasonably could 
infer that the defendant's intentions changed after [the police 
officer] shot him.  Having failed to deter [the police officer] 
in his pursuit, having failed to avoid apprehension by pointing 
a gun at [the police officer], and having been shot twice, the 
defendant's persistence in pointing a loaded gun at the man who 
just wounded him with lethal force" was circumstantial evidence 
of an intent to kill.  Id. 
 
In other cases, courts have concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence of an intent to kill because of facts 
leading to an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that, in the 
13 
 
circumstances of the particular case, a defendant actually 
pulled the trigger.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 459, 463-464 (1996) (observation that defendant's hand 
recoiled upon firing handgun, in conjunction with other 
evidence, supported inference of intent to kill); Wright v. 
Bergeron, 769 F. Supp. 2d 3, 6 (D. Mass. 2011) (discharged shell 
casings inside revolver supported conclusion that defendant had 
fired it and thus had intended to kill). 
 
The court's analysis in Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, is 
instructive with respect to the types of inferences that 
properly may be drawn from evidence that a defendant pointed a 
gun at a rival but did not pull the trigger.  In Tavares, supra 
at 432-433, the defendant got into an argument with the victim 
that devolved into a barroom brawl.  While the defendant's 
friend (the codefendant) and the victim were fighting inside, 
the defendant left the bar, and returned outside armed with a 
handgun.  Id.  He waited nearby until the victim, the 
codefendant, and others who had been involved in the altercation 
left the bar.  Id. at 433.  The defendant then pointed the gun 
at the victim, and attempted to chamber a round by "racking" the 
slide backward.  Id.  The codefendant grabbed the gun from him 
and shot at the victim.  Id.  The jury convicted the defendant 
as an aider and abettor to the killing.  Id. at 434.  The court 
concluded that the defendant's acts of going to get the gun, 
14 
 
"lying in wait" near the entrance to the bar, pointing the gun 
at the victim, attempting to chamber a round "so that the gun 
could be fired at any moment," allowing the codefendant to grab 
the gun, and then running behind the codefendant as he chased 
and shot the victim were sufficient to establish that the 
defendant participated in the killing by "obtaining the murder 
weapon" and "allow[ing] or encourag[ing the codefendant] to 
follow through with the murder."  Id. at 435-436.  The court 
affirmed the conviction because the defendant's knowledge of the 
circumstances, and his participation in the crime, supported an 
inference that he shared his codefendant's intent to kill.  Id. 
 
In discussing whether the facts in Tavares supported an 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter, the court emphasized 
that evidence that the defendant pointed the firearm at the 
victim was not sufficient, standing alone, to establish an 
intent to kill.  Id. at 438.  Had the defendant in Tavares acted 
as he did, but done nothing further after pointing the gun, the 
jury reasonably might have believed "that the defendant's 
actions of returning to the area outside the bar and pointing 
the gun at [the victim] were meant only to scare or intimidate 
him and not to kill him."  Id. 
 
ii.  Defendant's intent toward Williams.  In this case, the 
Commonwealth recognizes that "more was needed," see Lewis, 465 
Mass. at 126, to prove the defendant's intent to kill beyond 
15 
 
evidence that he pointed a firearm at Williams.  The 
Commonwealth argues, however, that the defendant's specific 
intent to kill Williams reasonably may be inferred from "the 
circumstances under which [the defendant] drew and aimed" the 
weapon.  In support of its argument, the Commonwealth points to 
the following circumstances.  The defendant had been involved in 
a "tense situation" inside the convenience store with Williams's 
companions, Reed and Joyce, and the dispute escalated when the 
men went outside, where Tevan exchanged "hostile words" with 
Reed and Joyce.  The defendant then left the area to retrieve a 
firearm.  He returned and, while armed, walked with Tevan 
towards the corner where Williams and his group stood; while 
they were walking, Tevan told the defendant, "Just keep calm, 
this will all be over in a second."  The defendant "then raised 
his arm and pointed it in the direction of Williams's group, 
which was less than [one hundred] feet away." 
 
We do not agree that the evidence here was sufficient for 
the jury to have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant intended to kill Williams.  In this case, unlike in 
Tavares, 471 Mass. at 435-436, there is no evidence that the 
defendant possessed a loaded firearm, did anything "so that the 
gun could be fired at any moment," id., or chased down the 
intended target to finish him off.  There also is no evidence 
that the defendant fired the gun either before or after Williams 
16 
 
fired at him.  The fact that, in the midst of an argument, the 
defendant pointed a firearm at an opponent is not enough to 
carry the Commonwealth's burden.  See Lewis, 465 Mass. at 126. 
 
The remaining potential evidence of intent consisted of 
Tevan's statement, "Just keep calm, this will all be over in a 
second."  It is possible, as the Commonwealth suggests, that 
Tevan's remark implied killing Williams as a means of quickly 
settling the dispute.  It also is possible, however, that the 
comment referred to publicly running the Williams group off the 
crowded street where the parade was to take place, or some other 
less sinister alternative.  While we recognize that this is a 
close call, the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to prove 
that the defendant consciously and purposefully intended to kill 
Williams.  See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 414 
(2016). 
 
Because the evidence of the defendant's intent to kill was 
insufficient, his conviction of murder in the first degree 
cannot stand.  This conclusion, however, does not mean that the 
defendant is entitled to an acquittal.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 457 Mass. 461, 481-482 (2010).  A careful review of 
the entire record shows that, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, a reasonable juror could 
have found the defendant had an intent to commit an act that, in 
the circumstances known to him, created a plain and strong 
17 
 
likelihood of death.  Thus, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the jury could have determined that there was 
sufficient evidence of third prong or "depraved heart" malice to 
convict the defendant of murder in the second degree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 161 n.8 (2007); 
Commonwealth v. Semedo, 422 Mass. 716, 720 (1996). 
 
In particular, a reasonable juror could have concluded from 
the evidence introduced at trial that the act of pointing a 
firearm at a rival, on a crowded street, likely would provoke a 
deadly response, thereby demonstrating an indifference to human 
life.  See Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 331-332 
(2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Jenks, 426 Mass. 582, 585 (1998) 
(absent evidence that defendant's knowledge was impaired, act of 
shooting into crowd created plain and strong likelihood death 
would follow).  See also Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 507 
& n.10 (D.C. App. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1162 (2006) 
(defendant's participation in "gun battle" represented depraved 
indifference to human life); State v. Spates, 779 N.W.2d 770, 
777 & n.5 (Iowa 2010) (same).  See generally State v. Young, 429 
S.C. 155, 160-165 (2020) (discussing theories of liability for 
harm resulting from mutual combat, including depraved-
indifference murder). 
 
The same evidence also could have supported a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter as an unintentional, unlawful killing 
18 
 
caused by wanton and reckless conduct.  See Tavares, 471 Mass. 
at 437-438 (discussing "fine line" that distinguishes murder in 
second degree based on third prong malice from involuntary 
manslaughter).8  "The difference between the elements of the 
third prong of malice and . . . involuntary manslaughter lies in 
the degree of risk of physical harm that a reasonable person 
would recognize was created by particular conduct, based on what 
the defendant knew.  The risk for the purposes of third prong 
malice is that there was a plain and strong likelihood of death 
[whereas] [t]he risk that will satisfy the standard for . . . 
involuntary manslaughter 'involves a high degree of likelihood 
that substantial harm will result to another'" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lyons, 444 Mass. 289, 293 (2005).  
See Braley, 449 Mass. at 331; Jenks, 426 Mass. at 585. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence of assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon.  The defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support 
a conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon.  He contends that the jury heard no evidence that he 
intended to shoot anyone, or that he caused any injury to 
Fulton.  The Commonwealth responds that the defendant's 
                     
 
8 After discussing the matter "at length" with the 
defendant, the defendant's trial counsel declined the judge's 
offer to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
19 
 
intentional actions caused Williams to fire, and thus "the 
defendant is liable for the injuries that the victims incurred 
at Williams'[s] hand." 
 
"An assault and battery is the intentional and unjustified 
use of force upon the person of another, however slight . . ." 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 306 
(1980).  Assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon is a 
general intent crime.  See id. at 307, and cases cited.  "Under 
[G. L. c. 265, § 15A], the battery must be accomplished by means 
of the dangerous weapon, and not merely while possessing the 
weapon."  Id. at 306, citing Salemme v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 
421, 424 (1976).  The Commonwealth need not prove specific 
intent to injure; it is only required to prove a general intent 
to do the act causing the injury.  Appleby, supra at 307.  See 
Commonwealth v. McNulty, 458 Mass. 305, 325 (2010). 
 
With respect to causation, the Commonwealth may establish 
that a defendant caused the touching "by proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant either directly caused or 
directly and substantially set in motion a chain of events that 
produced the serious injury in a natural and continuous 
sequence" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 119 (2013). 
 
Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish the 
defendant's general intent to point the firearm at Williams, the 
20 
 
act that caused the battery to Fulton.  Thus, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence 
established that the defendant set in motion a chain of events 
that culminated in Fulton's injury.  Accordingly, the evidence 
was sufficient to allow the jury to convict the defendant of the 
offense of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. 
 
c.  Jury instructions.  i.  Inference to be drawn from use 
of dangerous weapon.  The defendant contends that a new trial is 
necessary because the judge erred in instructing the jury on the 
inference they could draw from the use of a dangerous weapon.  
The defendant argues that the evidence concerning the manner of 
his alleged use of a dangerous weapon did not support the 
instruction.  Because counsel did not object to any of the 
judge's instructions, we review this claim to determine whether 
there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Serino, 436 Mass. 408, 419 (2002). 
In instructing the jurors on the elements of murder in the 
first degree, the judge said, "As a general rule you are 
permitted, but not required, to infer that a person who 
intentionally uses a dangerous weapon on another person, intends 
to kill that person."  Similarly, the instructions on murder in 
the second degree informed the jury that, "As a general rule you 
are permitted but not required to infer that a person who 
intentionally uses a dangerous weapon on another person intends 
21 
 
to kill that person or cause him grievous bodily harm or intends 
to do an act which in the circumstances known to him a 
reasonable person would know creates a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would result." 
These instructions were erroneous.  As a general rule, the 
jury are permitted to infer an intent to kill from the use of a 
dangerous weapon.  See Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 
784 nn.12, 13 (2011).  The reasonableness of this inference 
depends, as set forth in the model jury instructions on 
homicide, upon "the nature of the dangerous weapon and the 
manner of its use."  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 105 
(2018).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 456 Mass. 476, 487-
488 (2010) (jury were permitted to infer intent to kill from 
evidence that defendant shot victim); Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 
445 Mass. 837, 845 (2006) (jury were permitted to infer intent 
to kill from evidence that defendant stabbed victim with knife). 
This was not, however, a typical case involving someone 
alleged to have shot, stabbed, or clubbed a victim.  The phrase 
"the manner of its use" logically implies that a defendant used 
the dangerous weapon to attack another person, i.e., fired a 
gun, stabbed with a knife, or clubbed someone with a baseball 
bat.  In Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 250 (2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018), we relied upon a reasonable 
inference that "one who attacks another with an item that is 
22 
 
capable of causing serious injury intends to kill that person."  
Notably, in applying the inference to be drawn from the use of a 
dangerous weapon, courts in other jurisdictions have required 
evidence that a defendant used the weapon "in a manner 
reasonably likely to cause death," see State v. Rokus, 240 Neb. 
613, 622 (1992), and cases cited, or "serious bodily injury," 
see Chapman v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1999).  See 
generally 2 W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.2(b) (3d 
ed. 2017) (under deadly weapon doctrine, "one who intentionally 
uses a deadly weapon on another human being and thereby kills 
him [with the deadly weapon] presumably intends to kill him"). 
Here, the manner of the defendant's use of the firearm did 
not support instructing the jury on the inference to be drawn 
from the use of a deadly weapon.  Contrary to the Commonwealth's 
argument, it is not enough that the defendant's use of the 
firearm -- by pointing it at Williams -- ultimately led to the 
harm to the victims.  As discussed, the instruction contradicts 
our holding in Lewis, 465 Mass. at 126.  Thus, it was error to 
instruct the jury that they were permitted to infer malice from 
the defendant's use of the deadly weapon. 
 
We turn to whether the error in the jury instructions 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
"In deciding, under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, whether an error in a 
jury instruction created a substantial likelihood of a 
23 
 
miscarriage of justice, a new trial is called for unless we are 
substantially confident that, if the error had not been made, 
the jury verdict would have been the same."  Commonwealth v. 
Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n.3 (1998).  One significant factor 
in this assessment is the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 431 Mass. 30, 42 (2000).  
As discussed, here the jury were required to resolve a difficult 
question -- the defendant's state of mind at the moment he 
pointed the firearm at Williams.  Based on the disputed and 
highly critical nature of this evidence, we cannot be confident 
that the verdict would have been the same absent the erroneous 
instruction.  Accordingly, a new trial would be required on that 
basis alone. 
 
ii.  Instructions on causation.  The defendant also argues 
that the instructions on causation, based on Santiago, 425 Mass. 
at 503-504, was erroneous.  With respect to the cause of 
Jaffier's death, the judge instructed as follows: 
"The first element is that the defendant caused the death 
of [the victim].  The defendant's act is the cause of the 
victim's death where the act in a natural and continuous 
sequence results in death and without which death would not 
have occurred.  The Commonwealth alleges that . . . 
Williams shot the bullets from the gun that killed [the 
victim].  The Commonwealth alleges that [the defendant] 
removed a gun [and] raised it as if to fire which caused 
the gunfire from . . . Williams which then caused the death 
of [the victim].  In other words the Commonwealth alleges 
here . . . that [the defendant] chose to engage in a gun 
battle with another with the intent to kill and that [the 
victim] died as a proximate result. 
24 
 
 
"The Commonwealth is not required by law to prove that [the 
defendant] fired the fatal shot.  Rather the Commonwealth 
is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each 
defendant took [an] act or acts, which were a proximate 
cause of [the victim]'s death.  To be proximate a cause 
cannot be too remote in the chain of events leading to a 
victim[']s death.  But a proximate cause need not be the 
sole or exclusive cause of that death. 
 
"Proximate cause is a cause, which in a natural and 
continuous sequence produces a death and without which the 
death would not have occurred.  Our law recognizes that the 
death of a bystander is a natural result of a shootout and 
that a shootout cannot occur without participation from 
more than one side.  Here the Commonwealth is required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . Williams and 
[the defendant] each took acts on August 23, 2014, which 
proximately [caused the victim]'s death." 
 
The flaw in these instructions, the defendant argues, is that 
the jury were permitted to convict on insufficient evidence.  
More specifically, the defendant maintains that the judge should 
have defined the words "acts" and "participation" to clarify 
that the defendant had to have engaged in mutual combat in order 
for his conduct to be encompassed in these terms.  The defendant 
contends that, relying on these instructions, the jury could 
have convicted him based on evidence that he pointed "something" 
in the direction of Williams, the actual shooter. 
 
We discern no error in the judge's instructions.  The 
instructions adequately convey the concept of proximate 
causation set forth in Santiago, 425 Mass. at 503-504.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 878 (1987) ("judges are 
not required to deliver their instructions in any particular 
25 
 
form of words, so long as all necessary instructions are given 
in adequate words").  In Santiago, we considered the scope of 
criminal liability for combatants in a shootout that results in 
the death of an innocent bystander.  In such circumstances, the 
Commonwealth is not required to prove that the defendant 
actually fired the fatal shot.  Santiago, supra at 503.  The 
defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of a shooting "by 
either side because the death of a bystander is a natural result 
of a shootout, and the shootout could not occur without 
participation from both sides."  Id. at 504. 
 
Here, the judge explained that the defendant was liable for 
the Jaffier's death based on the theory that he "chose to engage 
in a gun battle with another . . . and that [the victim] died as 
a proximate result."  The judge instructed that the Commonwealth 
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant's actions were the proximate cause of Jaffier's death.  
She then provided a detailed instruction on proximate cause, 
which informed the jury that "[t]he defendant's act must be a 
cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces 
the death, and without which death would not have occurred" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  See Santiago, 425 Mass. 
at 503-504.  The judge concluded by instructing, consistent with 
our holding in Santiago, that a shootout, and the death of a 
26 
 
bystander, can happen only by participation from "more than one 
side."  See id. at 504. 
 
We do not agree with the defendant that the jury were left 
with the impression that he could be convicted if he pointed 
"something" in Williams's direction.  Properly viewed in its 
entirety, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant's 
liability rested on a finding that he participated in a shootout 
with Williams.  See Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 232-
233 (1980).  Accordingly, there was no error.9 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions of murder in 
the first degree and armed assault with intent to murder are 
vacated and set aside.  The conviction of assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon is affirmed.  The case is remanded 
to the Superior Court for a new trial on so much of the 
indictment as alleges murder in the second degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
9 Our disposition of the case renders it unnecessary to 
address the remaining issues raised by the defendant.