Title: Doe v. Doe

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Doe v. Doe (2000-031); 172 Vt. 533; 768 A.2d 1291

[Filed 01-Mar-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-031

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2000

J. Doe	                               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Washington Superior Court
                                       }	
                                       }
A., B., and C. Doe	               }	DOCKET NO. 39-1-99 Wncv

                                                Trial Judge: David A. Jenkins

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the State
  of Vermont on the basis  of sovereign immunity.  Because the trial court
  did not allow an adequate opportunity for plaintiff to  conduct discovery,
  we reverse.

       The following facts are not in dispute.   On December 13, 1991,
  defendant B. Doe, (FN1) a  former high ranking employee at the Vermont
  Department of Travel and Tourism, was convicted of  lewd and lascivious
  conduct with a child, for sexually abusing plaintiff.  The abuse began in
  the  summer of 1989, when plaintiff was thirteen and continued until
  September 1991.  On January 27,  1999, plaintiff filed a complaint against
  the State of Vermont, B. Doe, and his wife C. Doe, for  damages plaintiff
  suffered as a result of the sexual abuse.  Plaintiff has complained that
  the sexual  abuse took place at several locations, including B. Doe's State
  office and at a photo shoot for a State  travel poster for which plaintiff
  was paid to model.  Plaintiff has alleged that the State is liable for his 
  damages as a result of its: (1) failure to warn of the dangers presented by
  B. Doe; (2) negligent hiring  and supervision of B. Doe; (3) intentional
  infliction of emotional distress; (4) invasion of privacy; (5)  breach of
  its fiduciary duty to plaintiff; (6) violation of the Fair Employment
  Practices Act (FEPA),  21 V.S.A. § 495; and (7) violation of the Fair
  Housing and Public Accommodations Act (FHPAA), 9  V.S.A. § 4502(a).  With
  his complaint, plaintiff propounded written discovery to the State. 

 

       The State filed its answer on February 18, 1999.  Less than one month
  later, on March 15,  1999, the State moved for summary judgment and a stay
  of discovery.   On September 28, 1999, the  trial court granted the State's
  summary judgment motion, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims against  the
  State.  The court reasoned that the State was immune from suit because all
  of plaintiff's claims  arose out of B. Doe's assault on plaintiff, and
  therefore, the state had not expressly waived immunity  under 12 V.S.A. §
  5601(a).  See 12 V.S.A. § 5601(e)(6) (waiver of immunity from suit does not 
  apply to "[a]ny claim arising out of alleged assault").  Although the State
  had asserted that it was  immune from suit in this action, it had never
  relied upon 12 V.S.A. § 5601(e)(6), or the theory based  thereon, employed
  by the trial court.  The court never ruled on the State's motion to stay
  discovery,  and the State failed to respond to plaintiff's discovery
  requests in the time between the State's filing  of its summary judgment
  motion and the court's ruling thereon.  

       On appeal, plaintiff contends: (1) the State is not immune from suit
  for claims brought under  FEPA and FHPAA; and (2) the § 5601(e)(6)
  exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity for  claims arising out of
  assault does not bar plaintiff's negligence, intentional infliction of
  emotional  distress, invasion of privacy, and breach of fiduciary duty
  claims.  

       Plaintiff's claims were dismissed on summary judgment.  In reviewing a
  grant of summary  judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court. 
  In re Margaret Susan P., 169 Vt. 252, 257,