Title: State v. Blish

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Blish (99-373); 172 Vt. 265; 776 A.2d 380

[Filed 13-Apr-2001]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 15-May-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-373

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

Robert William Blish	                         January Term, 2001

Paul F. Hudson, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney 
  General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.   Defendant Robert William Blish appeals the Windsor
  District Court's  entry of his guilty plea to the charge of second degree
  murder.  Defendant contends that: (1) the  crime described to him in the
  trial judge's Rule 11(c) colloquy during his plea hearing was voluntary 
  manslaughter, not second degree murder, and therefore the colloquy cannot
  support his conviction  for second degree murder; (2) as a result of this
  defect, the judge was unable to establish a factual  basis for his plea, as
  required by V.R.Cr.P. 11(f); and (3) as a result of these errors, his plea
  was  involuntary and the court's acceptance of it was therefore in
  violation of his due process rights.  As  the plea colloquy was sufficient
  to satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(c), we affirm.

 

       It is uncontested that on October 12, 1996, defendant shot and killed
  Plinio Raphael Diaz.   The pertinent evidence, for purposes of this appeal, 
  pertaining to the circumstances surrounding this  killing is as follows. 
  In the early morning on the date in question, defendant, Diaz, and Debra
  Secord  were traveling together in Diaz's car, en route from Claremont, New
  Hampshire to Ascutney,  Vermont.  The car was driven by Secord, with
  defendant riding in the front seat and Diaz alone in the  left rear seat.
  While driving along State Route 131 in Ascutney, defendant and Diaz
  exchanged  insults.  Defendant referred to Diaz as "nigger," and Diaz
  responded by calling defendant "fat boy."   When Diaz called defendant "fat
  boy," defendant pulled out a handgun, turned around to face Diaz,  and shot
  him in the face, killing him.  Defendant stated immediately thereafter
  "[t]here, call me fat  boy again."   

       The information, entered on October 15, 1996, charged defendant with
  first-degree murder.   At that time, defendant pled not guilty, and
  remained in custody.  On February 5, 1997, after  defendant underwent two
  separate competency evaluations, a competency hearing was held, and 
  defendant was found competent to stand trial.  In the following months, the
  case proceeded towards  trial.  On November 3, eleven days before the jury
  trial was scheduled to begin, defendant entered  into a plea agreement. 
  Under the agreement, the State would dismiss separate charges of aggravated 
  assault, unlawful mischief, and attempt to elude, and in exchange defendant
  would plead guilty to  second degree murder, with the State recommending a
  sentence of fifteen years to life.

       At the plea hearing on the same date, with his counsel present,
  defendant replied  affirmatively to the judge's inquiries about whether he
  had been accorded an opportunity to review  the amended charge of second
  degree murder, and if he was ready to enter a plea at that time.  He  then
  pled guilty as agreed, and the judge engaged him in a V.R.Cr.P. Rule 11(c)
  colloquy concerning 

 

  the nature of the crime charged, attempting to establish that he understood
  each of the elements of  the crime of second degree murder.  After
  acknowledging his understanding of the first two elements  of the
  crime-that, as the judge characterized these elements, there was an
  unlawful killing of the  victim, and that defendant's conduct had caused
  this unnatural death-the judge proceeded to discuss  the three possible
  states of mind which can satisfy the mens rea requirement for second degree 
  murder.

       The judge first asked defendant if he had intended to kill the victim,
  to which defendant  responded that he both understood the meaning of intent
  to kill and had not so intended. (FN1)  Defendant was next asked if he had
  intended to do great bodily harm to the victim.  He responded  that he had
  never intended to do bodily harm.

       The judge then presented the third mens rea possibility, that he
  "knowingly created a very  high risk of death or great bodily harm."  The
  judge further described this third possible mental state  as "[i]n other
  words, your shooting of the weapon created a very high risk that the man
  would die or  he would receive serious bodily injury that would cause
  protracted use of a bodily member or organ  or might result in his death." 
  Defendant agreed that this type of mens rea for second degree murder  could
  be satisfied in this case.  The judge concluded that the court was
  satisfied with the factual basis  for the third element of the offense, and
  continued on with the colloquy.

       At the end of the colloquy, the judge stated that "based on the plea
  of guilty to the amended  charge of second degree murder and the discussion
  I've had with Mr. Blish, I will find that the plea 

 

  is knowing, voluntarily and intelligently made, with knowledge and
  understanding of its  consequences and that there is a fact basis for the
  plea."  The judge again asked the prosecution and  defense counsel whether
  there was "anything else," and both said no.

       Defendant first argues that the colloquy between himself and the judge
  violated Rule 11(c)(1)  because the judge did not adequately explain the
  nature of the charge to which the plea was offered.   See V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)
  ("The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by
  addressing the  defendant personally in open court, informing him of and
  determining that he understands the  following: (1) the nature of the
  charge to which the plea is offered.").

       Before an examination of the substantive argument presented by
  defendant, we must first  address the standard of review applied to a claim
  of a violation of Rule 11(c) when such claim is, as  here, made in a direct
  appeal to this court.  It is well established in Vermont that "an issue
  under Rule  11(c), alleging violations in taking a plea, absent plain
  error, demands a factual record and  opportunity for the trial court to
  grant relief before this Court may properly review it."  State v. 
  Thompson, 162 Vt. 532, 534,