Title: State v. Tronnie M. Dismuke

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tronnie M. Dismuke,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 198 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 577, 617 N.W.2d 862 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 28, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 31, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Richard D. Martin, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 75 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1734-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tronnie M. Dismuke,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  The issue in this case is whether 
a circuit court may properly impose as costs against a criminal 
defendant the expenses associated with executing orders to 
produce the defendant from prison for court appearances in the 
case.  Defendant Tronnie M. Dismuke was on parole when he was 
charged with armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a 
felon.  His parole was revoked, and he was sent to Dodge 
Correctional Institution in Waupun, Wisconsin, to begin serving 
the remainder of his sentence on the parole offense while 
awaiting trial in Milwaukee County Circuit Court on the two new 
crimes. 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 During the intervening 19 or so months, Dismuke was 
repeatedly transported by Milwaukee County sheriff's deputies 
from prison in Waupun to the Milwaukee County jail on orders to 
produce for various court appearances.  He was eventually 
convicted and sentenced to prison, and the circuit court imposed 
"applicable . . . costs."  The judgment of conviction set costs 
at $957.20; most of this total was attributable to sheriff's 
department costs for executing the orders to produce. 
¶3 
Dismuke moved for a reduction in the award of costs, 
contending that the expenses associated with executing the 
orders to produce were not taxable against him under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.06(1)(a) (1997-98).1  He also raised a constitutional 
challenge to the taxation of these costs.  The circuit court 
denied the motion, and Dismuke appealed.  The court of appeals 
affirmed, concluding that the expenses associated with executing 
the orders to produce were "fees of officers allowed by law" 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a), because they were collectible 
as "sheriff's fees" for service of process under Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.70(1) and (4).  The court of appeals also rejected 
Dismuke's constitutional claims. 
¶4 
We reverse.  Our decision in State v. Ferguson, 202 
Wis. 2d 233, 549 N.W.2d 718 (1996) interpreted the term "fees" 
in a related subsection of the criminal costs statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 973.06, to include only those sums "ordinarily charged 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.    
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
3 
to and payable by another," not internal operating expenses of a 
governmental unit.  The record in this case contains conflicting 
information 
and 
no 
evidence 
about 
whether 
the 
expenses 
associated with executing orders to produce are generally 
"charged to and payable by another," or are merely internal 
operating expenses of the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Department. 
The record is similarly underdeveloped and murky on the specific 
amounts assessed in this case, and there is no record at all on 
the constitutional issues.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶5 
The record in this case is inadequate in many 
respects, through no fault of the defendant.  We do know that on 
June 12, 1996, Tronnie M. Dismuke was charged with one count of 
armed robbery and one count of possession of a firearm by a 
felon.  Dismuke was on parole for another offense at the time 
the charges were issued.  His parole was revoked, and he was 
transferred to Dodge County Correctional Institution in Waupun, 
Wisconsin, to begin serving the remainder of his sentence on the 
parole offense. 
¶6 While the new case was pending, Dismuke was ordered 
produced from Dodge to the Milwaukee County jail for various 
court dates in the case.  The record reflects eight orders to 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
4 
produce.2  Most of these were for jury trial.  The case was 
repeatedly adjourned, sometimes for reasons attributable to the 
defendant and sometimes for reasons attributable to the state or 
the court. 
¶7 On the reverse side of seven of the eight orders to 
produce there are notes from the Milwaukee County Sheriff's 
Department indicating roundtrip mileage costs of $193.20 and a 
"service" fee of $20, for a total of $213.20.  The remaining 
order only reflects a "service" fee of $20.  These sums combine 
for a total of $1,512,40.  
¶8 Dismuke's trial began on January 5, 1998, but was halted 
on its second day when Dismuke agreed to plead guilty to the 
armed robbery charge.  The firearm possession charge was 
dismissed and "read in" for sentencing purposes.  The Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable Timothy G. Dugan, sentenced 
Dismuke to 15 years in prison, consecutive to the sentence he 
was then serving, and also imposed "applicable . . . costs." 
¶9 The judgment of conviction set costs at $957.20.  The 
record does not reflect the precise factual basis for these 
costs, but the parties agree that all but $20 of the total is 
attributable in some way to the orders to produce.  (The clerk 
of circuit court's fee under Wis. Stat. § 814.60(1) is $20.)  
Assuming this to be true, there is no explanation for the 
                     
2 The record shows the following eight orders to produce: 
September 4, 1996 (Jury Trial); December 16, 1996 (Jury Trial); 
February 24, 1997 (Jury Trial); March 13, 1997 (Status); August 
27, 1997 (Jury trial); December 2, 1997 (Pre-Trial); January 5, 
1998 (Jury Trial); February 5, 1998 (Sentencing). 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
5 
discrepancy between the amount of $937.20 ($957.20 minus the $20 
clerk's fee) and the amount of $1,512.40, which is the combined 
total of the amounts reflected on the orders to produce.     
¶10 On February 26, 1999, Dismuke moved to reduce the 
court costs from $957.20 to $20, claiming that only the clerk's 
fee under Wis. Stat. § 814.60(1) was taxable against him.  
Dismuke claimed that the expenses associated with executing the 
eight orders to produce were not taxable court costs under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.06.  He also raised a constitutional challenge to 
the taxation of these costs. 
¶11 The circuit court requested a "response from the state 
and/or county," and established a briefing schedule, which was 
supposed to conclude with the defendant's reply brief on May 7, 
1999.  The record contains an April 21, 1999, letter from an 
attorney in the Milwaukee County Corporation Counsel's office; 
an April 28, 1999, letter from an accountant in the Criminal 
Division of the Milwaukee County Clerk of Circuit Court's 
office; and two letters, dated August 26, 1998, and March 7, 
2000, from an accountant in the Milwaukee County Sheriff's 
office.  The state did not respond. 
¶12 
The 
letters 
from 
the 
various 
interested 
county 
departments offered conflicting explanations about the county's 
practice regarding orders to produce and the source of the 
authority to tax expenses related to them as costs in a criminal 
case.  The clerk's office characterized the expenses associated 
with the orders to produce as bench warrant returns, and noted 
the 
discrepancy 
between 
the 
original 
amount 
assessed 
in 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
6 
Dismuke's case and the actual amounts reflected on the orders to 
produce.  The sheriff's department said that it sometimes cross-
charged the clerk's office for orders to produce, but only when 
the order identified the defendant as indigent; otherwise, no 
one is billed. 
¶13 The corporation counsel's letter noted the practice of 
cross-charging a special fund in the clerk's office when the 
defendant is indigent and the defense attorney prepares the 
order to produce rather than the district attorney.  However, 
the letter also stated that "the Sheriff's Department is not 
routinely reimbursed for transporting prisoners pursuant to an 
Order to Produce and [the corporation counsel] takes no position 
on the authority of the criminal judge to assess these costs."  
The second letter from the sheriff's department said that unless 
fees are waived by the court, the amounts reflected on the 
orders to produce are "put in the Case file" and "the Court 
makes the order for the inmate to pay this fee." 
¶14 The circuit court denied Dismuke's motion by written 
order, concluding that, despite the contradictory information 
from the various county departments, Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a) 
authorized it to assess the expenses associated with the orders 
to produce as costs against the defendant, because "the bottom 
line is that the county expended these amounts for the 
production of the defendant and that the defendant, not the 
county, should absorb these charges."  In addition, the circuit 
court noted that the actual amounts reflected on the orders to 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
7 
produce totaled $1,512.40, not $937.20, and therefore ordered 
the clerk's office to recalculate costs.   
¶15 Dismuke moved for reconsideration because the court 
decided the motion before the briefing schedule had expired, 
before receiving his reply and without an evidentiary hearing, 
and because the court had ordered an upward amendment to the 
costs in the judgment without notice.  The circuit court denied 
the motion for reconsideration, but vacated its order requiring 
recalculation of costs to reflect the higher amount.  The 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
address 
Dismuke's 
constitutional 
arguments.  Dismuke appealed. 
¶16 The court of appeals affirmed, noting the muddled 
record but nonetheless concluding that expenses associated with 
executing an order to produce were "necessary disbursements and 
fees of officers" under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a) because they 
were collectible "sheriff's fees" under Wis. Stat. §  814.70(1) 
and (4).  State v. Dismuke, 2000 WI App 198, ¶¶5, 12-13, 238 
Wis. 2d 577, 617 N.W.2d 862.  The court of appeals found our 
decision in Ferguson inapplicable, but held that, even if the 
case did apply, the expenses associated with orders to produce 
would satisfy its interpretation of "fees" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.06(1).  Dismuke, 2000 WI App 198 at ¶¶6-23.  Finally, the 
court of appeals rejected Dismuke's equal protection and due 
process arguments, noting, however, that the circuit court had 
conducted no factfinding on these issues.  Id. at ¶¶24-29.  We 
accepted review.  
II 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
8 
 
¶17 Whether expenses associated with orders to produce a 
defendant from prison for court appearances are costs taxable 
against the defendant under Wis. Stat. § 973.06 is a question of 
statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Ferguson, 202 
Wis. 2d at 237.  The court of appeals held that the expenses 
associated with the orders to produce in this case are "fees of 
officers allowed by law" under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a) because 
they 
are 
collectible 
"sheriff's 
fees" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.70(1) and (4). 
¶18  Wisconsin Statute §  973.06 provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
(1) Except as provided in s. 93.20, the costs taxable 
against the defendant shall consist of the following 
items and no others: 
 
(a) The necessary disbursements and fees of officers 
allowed by law and incurred in connection with 
the arrest, preliminary examination and trial of 
the defendant, including, in the discretion of 
the court, the fees and disbursements of the 
agent 
appointed 
to 
return 
a defendant 
from 
another state or country. 
¶19 We have long held that "'in this state costs are 
regulated exclusively by statute as a matter of legislative 
discretion.'" Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d at 244 (quoting State ex 
rel. Korne v. Wolke, 79 Wis. 2d 22, 24-25, 255 N.W.2d 446 
(1977)).  In Ferguson, we held that costs taxable against a 
criminal defendant are limited to those specifically enumerated 
in Wis. Stat. § 973.06. Id. at 238.  Interpreting another 
subsection of the statute——Wis. Stat. § 973.06((1)(c) relating 
to "fees and disbursements" of expert witnesses——we concluded 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
9 
that a "fee" is "a sum which is ordinarily charged to and 
payable by another."  Id. at 241.  "Disbursements" under the 
statute are "those incidental and out-of-pocket expenses . . .  
ordinarily charged to and payable by another."  Id. 
¶20 The defendant in Ferguson had been ordered to pay $105 
to the State Crime Laboratory to cover the cost of testing the 
controlled substance found in his possession.  The State argued 
that the laboratory expense constituted a "fee or disbursement" 
of an expert witness under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).  We 
rejected the state's interpretation of the statute: 
 
[T]he State contends that because the lab expenses at 
issue are fixed, they are fees under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.06(1)(c). 
 
We 
disagree 
with 
the 
State's 
argument.  The fact that the cost of performing a 
governmental service can be established (fixed) does 
not ipso facto make the cost of performing that 
service a fee under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c).  To 
constitute a fee under  § 973.06(1)(c), the cost of 
performing a service must be more than an internal 
operating expense of a governmental unit which has 
been prorated or costed out; it must be chargeable to 
and payable by another. 
Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d at 242. 
¶21 Although we are interpreting a different subsection of 
the 
criminal 
costs 
statute 
in 
this 
case, 
Ferguson's 
interpretation of the phrase "fees and disbursements" for 
purposes of this statute is applicable.   Ferguson concerned 
subsection (1)(c) of the statute, which refers to "fees and 
disbursements" of expert witnesses; the state here invokes 
subsection (1)(a) of the statute, which refers to "disbursements 
and fees of officers."  Words or phrases appearing in the same 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
10
statute are given the same meaning.  State v. Charles, 180 Wis. 
2d 155, 159-60, 509 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶22 Accordingly, whether the expenses associated with the 
orders to produce in Dismuke's case are taxable "fees of 
officers" under the statute depends upon whether they are 
ordinarily charged to and payable by another or are merely 
internal operating expenses of a governmental unit.3  We cannot 
resolve this question as a factual matter on the basis of this 
record, and Wis. Stat. § 814.70 does not resolve it as a matter 
of law. 
¶23 Wisconsin Statute § 814.70 specifies that, unless a 
higher fee is established by the county under Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.705, the sheriff shall collect fees for: 
 
(1) SERVICE OF PROCESS.  For each service or 
attempted service of a summons or any other process 
for commencement of an action, a writ, an order of 
injunction, a subpoena or any other order, $12 for 
each defendant or person. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(4) TRAVEL; CRIMINAL PROCESS.  For travel in 
serving any criminal process: 
 
. . . . 
 
(b) In counties having a population of 500,000 or 
more, $4 for each person served within the county from 
which process issued, or 25 cents per mile if served 
outside the county. 
 
                     
3 The state does not contend that these are "disbursements" 
under the statute. 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
11
(c) The actual and necessary disbursements for 
board and conveyance of the prisoner. 
¶24 Assuming that the execution of an order to produce 
constitutes "service of process" within the meaning of this 
statute, the record, such as it is, conflicts with the fees 
allowed under the statute.  The statute allows a $12 "service" 
fee; the orders to produce reflect a $20 "service" fee, also 
variously called a "warrant" fee by the county departments that 
responded to the circuit court's request for information.4  The 
statute allows mileage at 25 cents per mile; the orders to 
produce reflect roundtrip mileage that apparently calculates to 
more than 25 cents per mile.  The record contains no found facts 
(because no factfinding was done), only conflicting information 
from several county departments about the sheriff's internal 
accounting practices regarding orders to produce. 
¶25 In short, whether the expenses associated with the 
orders to produce are "fees of officers allowed by law" within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a) and Ferguson, and 
whether they are collectible as "sheriff's fees" for service of 
process and travel under Wis. Stat. § 814.70(1) and (4), cannot 
be 
determined 
from 
this 
record. 
 
The 
record 
on 
the 
constitutional issues is nonexistent.    
                     
4 The court of appeals "assumed" from this discrepancy that 
Milwaukee County had authorized a higher fee under Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.705, and concluded that it was irrelevant anyway.  We make 
no such assumption, and it is not irrelevant.  Without an 
adequate record on the factual basis for the costs that were 
taxed 
we 
cannot 
resolve 
the 
defendant's 
statutory 
or 
constitutional challenges.   
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
12
¶26 Accordingly, because of the inadequacies in this 
record, we hold only that our decision in Ferguson applies to 
the determination of taxable "fees of officers allowed by law" 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(a).  This requires a determination 
of whether the expenses associated with the execution of orders 
to produce are ordinarily charged to and payable by another or 
are merely internal operating expenses of a governmental unit.  
If the former, they are taxable, provided they are "allowed by 
law," which requires a determination of whether the actual 
assessments were consistent with Wis. Stat. § 814.70.  The 
constitutional issues in this case cannot be resolved because 
there is no record upon which to resolve them.  Therefore, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand this case to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court.   
 
               
 
 
 
     
 
 
No. 
99-1734-CR 
 
 
1