Title: David B. Snelgrove V. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC02-2242 
____________ 
 
 
DAVID B. SNELGROVE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[November 10, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
David Snelgrove was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one 
count of robbery with a deadly weapon, and one count of burglary of a dwelling 
with battery.  He was sentenced to death on both first-degree-murder convictions.  
He now appeals his convictions and his two death sentences.1  We affirm the 
convictions, but we reverse the death sentences and remand for a new penalty-
phase proceeding because the trial court erred in permitting the jury to render only 
a single, undifferentiated advisory sentence rather than individualized advisory 
sentences for each capital murder conviction. 
                                          
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.   
 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
On Sunday, June 25, 2000, Glyn and Vivian Fowler were found dead in their 
home.  The elderly couple had been brutally beaten and stabbed to death, as 
evidenced by multiple fractures and stab wounds spread throughout their bodies.  
Ultimately, Vivian died from a stab wound to the heart, and Glyn died of a brain 
injury caused by blunt force trauma to the head.   
Evidence at the crime scene and in the surrounding area linked David 
Snelgrove, the twenty-seven-year-old nephew of one of the Fowlers’ neighbors, to 
the murder.  Snelgrove had recently moved in with his aunt and his cousin, Jeff 
McCrae, after being expelled from a drug rehabilitation program.  Blood droplets 
matching Snelgrove’s DNA were found throughout the house, as were bloody 
fingerprints and footprints matching Snelgrove’s.  A trained bloodhound followed 
a scent from the blood on the Fowlers’ broken window to Snelgrove, and the police 
recovered a knife in the woods next to the Snelgrove home with blood matching 
Snelgrove’s DNA.   
 
Snelgrove denied any involvement with the murder.  On the day the 
Fowlers’ bodies were discovered, the Flagler County Sheriff’s Office questioned 
Snelgrove about his activities that weekend and the cause of the cut on his hand.  
Snelgrove claimed he and Jeff McCrae had spent Friday evening at Don Silva’s 
 
 
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home.2  Around 12:30 a.m., he and McCrae left Silva’s together, and Snelgrove 
claimed he spent the rest of the night at home.  He attributed the cut on his hand to 
an accident that occurred on Monday, June 19, the last day of his landscaping job.   
 
At trial, Jeff McCrae presented a different version of events.  He testified 
that he and Snelgrove arrived at Silva’s separately on Friday, June 23, and they left 
together at approximately 12:30 a.m.  On the way back to their house, they stopped 
to purchase crack cocaine.  He did not notice any cuts or bandages on Snelgrove’s 
hand at that time.  During the middle of the night, McCrae awoke to the sound of 
someone entering his house.  He arose to find Snelgrove in the bathroom cleaning 
a cut on his hand and wiping what appeared to be blood from his leg and foot.  
Snelgrove stated that he had been in a fight, but he refused McCrae’s offer to take 
him to the hospital.  Instead, he wrapped his hand in what was possibly a shirt,3 
and told McCrae that he wanted to get more cocaine.   The two went to purchase 
cocaine from a man named “Kimo” (Cornelius Murphy).  McCrae testified that the 
money used to buy the cocaine had blood on it.  Later that night, police stopped 
                                          
 
 
2.  Don Silva is a friend of Jeff McCrae.   
 
3.  In the attic of the Snelgrove home, the police discovered a bag with two 
bloody t-shirts.  The bag smelled of ammonia.  Blood samples from the t-shirts 
matched Snelgrove's DNA profile.  Two pairs of blood-stained shorts were also 
found in the Snelgrove home.  Blood samples from the shorts revealed a mixture of 
DNA:  Snelgrove was determined to be the primary contributor; the testing was 
unable to exclude Jeff McCrae as a possible secondary contributor.   
 
 
 
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“Kimo” at a Jiffy Food Store after he attempted to make a purchase with blood-
stained money.  DNA tests on one of the bills showed that the blood matched 
Snelgrove’s DNA.  
 
Two other witnesses also testified to the events of Friday night and the cause 
of the cut on Snelgrove’s hand.  Snelgrove’s supervisor at the landscaping job 
testified that he did not notice any injury when he paid Snelgrove for his last day of 
work on Monday, June 19.4  Snelgrove’s neighbor, Hans Reinholz, testified that 
when he met Snelgrove and shook hands with him, around 11:15 p.m. on Friday, 
June 23, he did not notice any cuts or bandages.   
 
McCrae also testified that on Saturday, June 24, he and Snelgrove visited a 
number of pawn shops in an attempt to get cash.  At one of the shops, McCrae 
waited in the car while Snelgrove allegedly went in to pawn an old fishing rod that 
a number of pawn shops had already rejected.  Snelgrove returned with the fishing 
rod, but later a clerk at Value Pawn testified that Snelgrove pawned a necklace 
belonging to Vivian Fowler.  Fingerprints on the necklace matched Snelgrove’s.   
                                          
 
 
4.  There was a disagreement at trial regarding whether the supervisor paid 
Snelgrove in cash or by a check.  Snelgrove first testified that he was paid in cash 
on Monday, June 19, but he later changed the story to claim he received a check 
that he cashed on Saturday, June 24.  Snelgrove’s supervisor claimed he paid 
Snelgrove in cash on his last day of work.  Hans Rheinholz, Snelgrove’s neighbor,  
testified that Snelgrove approached him around 11:15 p.m. on Friday, June 23, to 
ask him to cash a check for him, and Reinholz refused.     
 
 
 
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Additional testimony came from Gary Matthews, an inmate at the Flagler 
County Jail, where Snelgrove was detained when he was arrested on June 25.  
Mathews alleged that Snelgrove made critical admissions to him.  Hoping to secure 
a deal with the State on charges he faced, Matthews first wrote a letter to Irwin 
Connelly, the public defender representing him at the time Snelgrove was arrested.   
This letter informed Connelly that Matthews had information about a "certain 
case.”5  Connelly withdrew from representing Matthews on June 28, the day after 
receiving the letter.  Matthews also wrote two letters to the state attorney’s office.  
The first was written on June 28.  The State did not disclose this letter to the 
defense until after the guilt phase was complete.  However, this letter was 
substantively the same as a second letter written by Matthews on July 20, which 
the State did disclose to the defense before trial.  The July 20 letter informed the 
State that Matthews might have information that could save them “some legwork” 
and aid in Snelgrove's prosecution. 
 
At trial, Matthews testified to his jailhouse conversations with Snelgrove. 
Specifically, Matthews testified that Snelgrove told him of a cooperative effort 
                                          
 
 
5.  Matthews could not remember the date he sent this letter.  He denied 
sending it on June 25, the day Snelgrove was arrested and first held, because he 
claims Snelgrove did not open up on the first day.  He testified that “it had to be a 
couple days after [Snelgrove] entered the cell” before he wrote the letter.  Connelly 
responded to the letter by filing a motion to withdraw on June 28, and an attorney 
outside the public defender’s office was appointed to represent Matthews.   
 
 
 
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between him and McCrae to break into the Fowlers’ home and rob them of cash 
that the elderly couple kept in their bedroom.  According to Matthews, Snelgrove 
claimed he knew of this money because he had borrowed money from the Fowlers 
in the past, and he was in need of money because another neighbor had refused his 
request for a loan.  Snelgrove allegedly told Matthews that with McCrae acting as 
his lookout, Snelgrove broke a window with his hand and entered the house.  He 
found his way to the master bedroom, but Glyn Fowler startled him before he 
could find the dresser where the money was kept.  Glyn began to fight, and 
Snelgrove reported to Matthews that he beat and stabbed Glyn to death.   In the 
commotion, Vivian awoke, and he beat and stabbed her as well.  Matthews further 
testified that Snelgrove expressed remorse at his failure to look to the left when he 
entered the bedroom.  If he had done this, he would have seen Vivian’s purse, and 
he could have taken it without having to kill the victims.       
Defense counsel first responded to Matthews’ direct testimony by attempting 
to impeach him.  He established that Matthews had pled guilty to all three charges 
for which he was being held (i.e., burglary, petit theft, and assault).6  He also 
confronted Matthews with inconsistent statements made at deposition in which 
Matthews claimed he did not remember anything Snelgrove told him.  Matthews 
                                          
 
6.  Matthews denied this, claiming the assault charge had been dropped, but 
the court file indicated otherwise.  He also acknowledged that he initially raised 
this information in hopes of securing a deal, but he had not received one because 
the State “had thr[o]w[n] [him] to the dogs."     
 
 
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responded by acknowledging he had lied during deposition because he felt he “got 
messed around by the detectives and the State.”  
Defense counsel also offered a defense to the State’s case.  It admitted to the 
burglary, but denied the murders.  Specifically, the defense claimed that Snelgrove 
did, indeed, enter the Fowlers’ home through the broken window, but only after the 
Fowlers had been killed by someone else.  In the process of coming through the 
window, Snelgrove cut his hand.  Defense counsel claimed that the State’s failure 
to find the Fowlers’ blood mixed with Snelgrove’s affirmed this defense.  
Alternatively, defense counsel argued that if the jury were to find Snelgrove guilty 
of murder, the evidence did not support premeditation. 
The jury rejected both arguments.  It found Snelgrove guilty of two counts 
of first-degree murder, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, and one count 
of burglary of a dwelling with battery.  On the two counts of first-degree murder, 
the jury found Snelgrove guilty of both premeditated and felony murder.  In the 
penalty phase, the jury recommended the sentence of death by a vote of seven to 
five.7  However, this recommendation did not individually address the two capital 
murder convictions for which Snelgrove was to be sentenced.  Instead, the 
undifferentiated recommendation was: that “[a] majority of the jury, by a vote of 
                                          
 
7.  In light of our holding that Snelgrove is entitled to a new penalty-phase 
proceeding, we will not recount the evidence and testimony that was presented at 
the penalty phase.   
 
 
 
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7/5, advise and recommend to the court that it impose the death penalty upon 
David B. Snelgrove.” 
The circuit court sentenced Snelgrove to death on both capital murder 
convictions, and this appeal timely followed.  
II. ISSUES 
 
Snelgrove raises nine points on appeal:  (1) that the circuit court erred in 
denying his public defender’s motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest; 
(2) that the circuit court failed to conduct a Richardson8 inquiry into an alleged 
discovery violation by the State, and, relatedly, that the State violated Brady9 by 
withholding the information; (3) that the prosecuting attorneys made improper and 
inflammatory remarks that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair; (4) that the 
circuit court erred in denying his motion to briefly recess the penalty phase at the 
close of the jury-charge conference, prior to closing arguments, due to the mental 
and physical exhaustion of his counsel; (5) that his two death sentences are invalid 
because the jury rendered only a single, undifferentiated recommendation of death; 
(6) that his death sentences are unconstitutional because Florida's capital-
sentencing scheme puts a higher burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove 
that a life sentence is appropriate than it puts on the State to prove that a death 
                                          
 
8.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
9.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
 
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sentence is appropriate; (7) that his death sentences are unconstitutional and invalid 
because the circuit court considered improper aggravating factors, failed to 
consider or properly weigh highly relevant mitigating factors, and improperly 
found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors; (8) that his 
death sentences are unconstitutional and invalid because the jury was tainted by 
highly inflammatory and improper victim-impact evidence; and (9) that his death 
sentences are unconstitutional because Florida's capital-sentencing scheme violates 
the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
As explained below, we hold that Snelgrove’s claims relating to the guilt 
phase of his trial are without merit.  We therefore affirm his convictions.10  
However, the sentences cannot be affirmed.  We hold that the two death sentences 
are invalid because the jury returned only a single, undifferentiated advisory 
sentence.  Therefore, we reverse Snelgrove’s two death sentences and remand the 
case to the circuit court for a new penalty-phase proceeding at which the jury must 
render individualized sentencing recommendations for each capital murder 
conviction.  In light of this disposition, we do not address the other claims related 
to the penalty phase. 
                                          
 
 
10.  The only claim regarding the guilt-phase proceedings that had potential 
merit was the second, as the trial court should have considered whether the State’s 
suppression of the June 28 letter violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
By order dated April 14, 2005, we temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the trial 
court to consider this claim.  The trial court found that the suppression did not meet 
the standard in Brady, and we affirm.   
 
 
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III. DISCUSSION 
A.  Public Defender’s Motion to Withdraw 
 
Snelgrove’s contention that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s 
motion to withdraw is without merit.  The fact that the State’s key witness was, at 
one time, represented by the same public defender’s office as Snelgrove is not 
grounds for reversal in this case.  Of the three cases cited by the defendant, only 
Ortiz v. State, 844 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), actually considers whether 
such a situation creates a conflict of interest, and Ortiz is distinguishable.  The 
other cases hold that the trial court did not adequately consider the issue.   
Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence that a conflict actually manifested itself 
at trial.  Matthews expressly waived his attorney-client privilege, and defense 
counsel’s ability to aggressively cross-examine Matthews was unimpaired.  
Therefore, we find the defendant’s argument to be without merit.     
Ortiz is the only case cited in which an appellate court disagreed with the 
trial court’s substantive finding that a conflict did not exist.  The other cases cited 
by the defendant, i.e., Lee v. State, 690 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and 
Thomas v. State, 785 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), focus upon the procedural 
process.  They disapprove of a trial court’s failure to adequately inquire into 
whether a conflict existed.  In this case, the trial court conducted an in-camera 
 
 
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hearing to consider defense counsel’s motion to withdraw;11 therefore, there are no 
procedural concerns and these two cases do not apply.     
Moreover, Ortiz is distinguishable.  In Ortitz, the Fifth District recognized 
the potential conflict of interest that may arise when the public defender’s office 
represents both the defendant and the State’s key witness.  The court stated:  
To deny a motion for separate representation, where a risk of 
conflicting interest exists, is reversible error.  There exists a risk of 
conflicting interest in the instant case as the State's key witness 
against Ortiz, the confidential informant, was also being represented 
by the Office of the Public Defender.  It cannot be said that the 
apparent conflict created when defense counsel represented both 
appellant Ortiz and the State's key witness is not prejudicial to Ortiz 
so as to have denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel. 
844 So. 2d at 825-26 (internal quote marks and citations omitted).  In Snelgrove’s 
case, the public defender’s office did not represent Matthews at the time of trial.  In 
fact, Connelly, the assistant public defender who represented Matthews when 
                                          
 
11.  Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994), which would have 
required the trial court to grant a motion to withdraw upon certification from the 
public defender that a conflict of interest existed, is no longer good law.  Section 
27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), now allows the trial court to 
 
inquire or conduct a hearing into the adequacy of the public defender's 
representations regarding a conflict of interest without requiring the 
disclosure of any confidential communications.  The court shall deny 
the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal 
are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the 
indigent client. 
§ 27.5303(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004); see also Valle v. State, 763 So. 2d 1175, 
1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). 
 
 
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Snelgrove was first arrested withdrew almost immediately after learning Matthews 
had information about Snelgrove’s case.12   
Furthermore, the record does not support the appellant’s assertion that his 
trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest or was otherwise affected by his 
office’s prior representation of Matthews.  While trial counsel stated that he knew 
Matthews was facing more serious charges than those initially pled to because his 
office represented him in a prior case, there is no evidence that this knowledge 
compromised Snelgrove’s right to effective assistance of counsel.  As previously 
stated, the simultaneous representation in question lasted for a very short period of 
time at the outset of the case, and at trial, Matthews waived any attorney-client 
privilege before testifying.  Moreover, defense counsel was not impaired in his 
ability to aggressively question and impeach Matthews on cross-examination. 
B.  Richardson/Brady Claim 
Snelgrove’s allegation regarding the failure to conduct a Richardson hearing 
is also without merit.  Because this claim was raised at the Spencer13 hearing, we 
earlier determined that, procedurally, it should be analyzed under Brady v. 
                                          
 
12.  At oral argument, Snelgrove argued that a conflict of interest existed as 
to the public defender’s office’s representation of other inmates that were 
questioned by the State in connection with the Snelgrove investigation.  This 
argument, however, was briefed in a conclusory fashion, at best, and, in any event, 
unlike Matthews, none of these inmates testified against Snelgrove at trial. 
 
 
13.   Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), not Richardson.  Therefore, by order dated April 
14, 2005, we remanded the claim to the trial court to consider this issue under 
Brady.  The trial court held a hearing and found no Brady violation.  We affirm.  
Richardson mandates that once a discovery violation is revealed, the trial 
court must conduct an inquiry to determine the sanctions that should be imposed 
on the violating party.  See, e.g., C.D.B. v. State, 662 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1995).  While the State’s failure to disclose Matthews’ June 28 letter clearly 
violated its duty to disclose, this failure was not revealed until after the guilt phase 
was complete and the jury had issued its advisory recommendation in the penalty 
phase.  For this reason, Brady provides the more appropriate standard for 
analysis.14   
Brady requires the State to disclose material information within the State's 
possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant.  373 U.S. at 
87.  Establishing a Brady violation requires the defendant to show:  (1) that the 
evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it 
is impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
                                          
 
 
14.  Although Brady is usually applied in the postconviction context, we 
have in the past applied it on direct appeal.  See, e.g., Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 
105-106 (Fla. 2003) (noting that a posttrial Richardson inquiry was held on the 
allegation that the State failed to disclose that one of its testifying witnesses was 
the target of a federal investigation for Medicare fraud but analyzing the issue on 
direct appeal under Brady). 
 
 
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inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.  Rogers v. State, 
782 So. 2d 373, 378 (Fla. 2001) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-82 
(1999)).  
We affirm the trial court’s finding that the State’s failure to disclose the June 
28 letter does not warrant relief under Brady.  While this letter provided favorable 
evidence to the defense, in that it was impeaching, and the State erred in failing to 
disclose it, the defendant has failed to establish that this suppression prejudiced 
him.15  The June 28 letter presented evidence already known to the defendant.  
Before trial, defense counsel had the June 27 letter Matthews sent to the public 
defender’s office indicating his intent to testify against Snelgrove.  The State had 
also provided the defendant with the July 20 letter that Matthews had sent to the 
state attorney, and the substance of this letter was essentially the same as the June 
                                          
 
15.  We note that the same result would obtain if we were to analyze this 
issue under Richardson.  In State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1995), we 
rejected a rule of per se reversal for failures to conduct Richardson hearings.  We 
recognized that “there are cases . . . where a reviewing court can say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defense was not prejudiced by the underlying [discovery] 
violation and thus the failure to make [an] adequate [Richardson] inquiry was 
harmless error.”  Id. at 1020.  We went on to hold that “[i]n determining whether a 
Richardson violation is harmless, the appellate court must consider whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that the discovery violation procedurally prejudiced the 
defense,” that is, whether “there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant's trial 
preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not 
occurred.”  Id.  For the same reasons expressed above in denying the Brady claim, 
if Richardson applied, the trial court’s failure to conduct a Richardson hearing was 
harmless error. 
 
 
 
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28 letter.  Additionally, defense counsel used both the June 27 and the July 20 
letters to impeach Matthews at trial.  In fact, it used the June 27 letter for the same 
purpose appellant claims he would have used the June 28 letter––to question 
Matthews’ credibility by pointing out a discrepancy between his statements that 
Snelgrove did not immediately confide in him and the timing of the letter. 
   
 
C.  Improper Arguments and Statements by Prosecuting Attorneys 
 
Snelgrove also complains of a number of improper statements and 
arguments made by the prosecuting attorneys throughout the trial.16  First, we 
consider the improper arguments Snelgrove objected to at trial, and we find that 
even if the trial court improperly overruled defense counsel’s objection to these 
statements, this error was harmless.  Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 465 n.5 
(Fla. 2004) (“We recognize that the proper standard of review for an overruled 
defense objection is a harmless error standard.”).  Second, we analyze the 
arguments and statements that were not objected to at trial.  These require us to 
consider whether fundamental error warrants a reversal, and we find it does not.   
1.  Complained-of Comments Preserved for Review 
                                          
 
16.  Some of the comments were made during the penalty phase.  In light of 
our holding that Snelgrove is entitled to a new penalty phase, we will not address 
the prosecuting attorney’s penalty-phase comments.   
 
 
 
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During the guilt phase, Snelgrove objected to two arguments made by the 
state attorney during the State’s guilt phase closing argument.  The first alleged 
that Snelgrove was attempting to transfer blame to the victim:  
Hmm.  You know, it's funny.  No one ever wants to take 
responsibility even when they do the worst.  Shouldn't have happened 
that way.  Shouldn't have happened that way.  Oh, my gosh, look 
where I am.  If they had only stayed asleep, I'd have never killed 
them.  If I'd have only found the purse right away and snuck back out 
the window, I'd have never had to kill them. 
Defense counsel objected to this on the basis that it was irrelevant and unduly 
inflamed the jury.  The second argument also occurred during closing arguments, 
and it spoke to the truth of Matthews’ testimony: 
You know [Matthews] was telling the truth.  Hmm.  You can tell.  
You can tell better than I can, 12 of you can.  Take your 12 years of 
experience and pool it.  That man was telling the truth.  And he knew 
things that only the killer would know, the kind of stuff that doesn't 
show up in the paper. 
Defense counsel claimed these statements were unsupported by the facts as there 
was no evidence that Snelgrove’s admissions, as testified to by Matthews, did not 
appear in the newspaper.  The trial court overruled both objections.  
Even if these arguments were improper and defense counsel’s objections to 
them should have been sustained, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to do so 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 
1138 (Fla. 1986) (recognizing that an impermissible statement is harmless when, in 
 
 
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light of all the evidence presented, there is no reasonable probability that the 
statement contributed to the verdict).   
2.  Complained-of Comments Not Preserved for Review 
Three non-penalty phase comments that Snelgrove complains of on appeal 
were not properly preserved for review.  These comments warrant reversal only if 
Snelgrove establishes that admitting them constituted “fundamental error” that 
leads us to question the “validity of the trial itself.”  Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613,  
622 (Fla. 2001).  We find no such error; therefore, we find no merit in these 
complaints.  
First, Snelgrove complains of an improper interjection by the state attorney 
during defense counsel’s closing arguments.  In response to hypothetical questions 
defense counsel posed to the jury, the state attorney interjected:  "Your Honor, I'd 
be glad to offer a scenario if you would like."  The court immediately told the state 
attorney that that would be out of order.  No objection or request for a mistrial was 
made. 
 
Second, Snelgrove argues that the State improperly “coached” Matthews 
while making a “speaking objection.”  During his cross-examination of Matthews, 
defense counsel asked Matthews if his testimony was that Snelgrove “went out . . . 
the back door.”  Matthews responded affirmatively and then said, “He went out the 
way he came in as far as I know.”  Defense counsel then asked, “So he . . . came in 
 
 
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the back door.”  Matthews again responded affirmatively, and the State objected 
that defense counsel was “trying to put words in the mouth of the witness.  What 
Mr. Snelgrove said is he went out the way he came in.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Matthews then responded:  “That's what I was fixing to say.”   
Lastly, Snelgrove argues that the State made an improper argument about 
facts not in evidence during the State’s closing argument.  In response to the 
defense argument that none of the victims’ blood had been found on the knife, the 
State made the following statement:  
I'd like to answer [defense counsel’s] assertions that the fact that there 
did not appear to be any mixture of the victims' blood with their killer 
is reason to believe he didn't kill them. 
A considerable amount of blood was sampled, a considerable amount 
of DNA was collected, but I think one of the––probably the best 
examples is the knife.  They took a small scraping, and they found 
David Snelgrove's blood on it.  That was it. 
Does anyone here not believe that this was the murder weapon?  This 
weapon was plunged into the heart of Mrs. Fowler, and it was plunged 
into Mr. Fowler five times or more.  Their blood wasn't on it, 
according to the Defense, but that's not what the evidence said. 
The evidence says that David Snelgrove's blood was on it in the 
sample they took, the scraping.  It doesn't say that no one else's blood 
was on it.  And the fact that they didn't scrape the entire knife and take 
every piece of blood off of it doesn't mean that this wasn't the murder 
weapon. 
 
 
- 19 -
This statement was not followed by an objection, and so we review it only for 
fundamental error.17   
 
Whether viewed individually or collectively, none of these statements or 
arguments was so fundamentally improper that their utterance “reache[d] down 
into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty . . . could not 
have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  See Card, 803 So. 
2d at 622.  Snelgrove, therefore, is not entitled to relief on this claim.   
D.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Although Snelgrove has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in 
this case, we independently review the evidence to determine whether sufficient 
evidence exists to support a first-degree murder conviction.  See Mansfield v. 
State, 758 So. 2d 636, 649 (Fla. 2000).  After reviewing the record, and 
particularly the facts set out in part I of this opinion, we conclude that Snelgrove’s 
first-degree murder convictions are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
E.  Single Advisory Sentence 
 
While substantial evidence supports Snelgrove’s conviction in the guilt 
phase, we find that the single, undifferentiated death recommendation in this case 
                                          
 
17.  Snelgrove argues that he did object to this statement, but the transcript 
reveals that he actually objected later when the State argued that the knife broke 
when it was plunged “through the breast bone of a living human being in a 
struggle.”  The trial court overruled the objection, and Snelgrove has not pressed 
this point on appeal. 
 
 
- 20 -
warrants a new penalty-phase proceeding.  In Pangburn v. State, 661 So. 2d 1182, 
1188 (Fla. 1995), we held that Florida’s death penalty scheme requires a separate 
jury recommendation for each count of first-degree murder.  Contrary to the State’s 
arguments, the harmless-error rule does not apply.18  Since Snelgrove received a 
single, undifferentiated death recommendation for two counts of first-degree 
murder, we reverse and remand for a new penalty-phase proceeding.  
In Pangburn, 661 So. 2d at 1190, we reversed the defendant's death sentence 
and remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding because the jury rendered a 
single, undifferentiated death recommendation in a case where the defendant had 
been convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.19  We noted that Florida's 
capital-sentencing statute “clearly addresses [the jury's] advisory sentence as it 
pertains to a single murder,” and that juries frequently render different 
recommendations for different counts.  Id. at 1188 (citing § 921.141(1), (2), Fla. 
Stat. (1991)).  While we did not directly address the State’s argument that the 
                                          
 
 
18.  The State argues that Snelgrove would not be entitled to relief under the 
harmless-error test because all of the aggravating and mitigating factors found by 
the jury and submitted to the judge applied equally to both murder counts.   
 
19.  In Pangburn, the parties recognized the problem with the jury 
recommendation after it was rendered.  Noting that it was impossible to determine 
whether the jury's seven-to-five death recommendation was for each murder or 
only one (and, if so, which one), the parties stipulated that the recommendation 
would be accepted as death for one of the murders and life for the other.  661 So. 
2d at 1185.  The defendant later attempted to withdraw from this stipulation, but 
the trial court refused to allow it.  Id.   
 
 
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harmless-error rule should apply, the language of the opinion suggests that it does 
not.  Pangburn speaks in absolute terms, holding that it "would undermine our 
sentencing procedure" to allow a jury to render a single recommendation in a case 
like this.  Pangburn, 661 So. 2d at 1188.   
The potential for unreliability in the imposition of the death penalty is too 
great to subject general jury recommendations of death to harmless-error analysis.  
This is true for several reasons.  First, as we explained in Pangburn, aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances that apply to one count may not apply to another, 
leading jurors on occasion to recommend death for one murder and life for another.  
See id.  Second, in Florida, the judge and jury are considered cosentencers, see 
Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 54 (Fla. 2003), and a recommendation of life 
must be accorded great weight by the sentencing judge.  See Tedder v. State, 322 
So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).  Third, general sentences that do not distinguish 
between individual counts are prohibited in Florida.  See Dorfman v. State, 351 So. 
2d 954, 957 (Fla. 1977).  General sentences create uncertainty because it cannot be 
determined that the same sentence would have been imposed if one of the crimes 
had not been committed.  Therefore, if one conviction that is part of a general 
sentence is reversed, the entire sentence must be vacated.  See id.  This is a 
particularly trenchant concern in capital cases, in which a new penalty phase can 
be expensive and time-consuming.  With an individual recommendation on each 
 
 
- 22 -
count, one death sentence may be affirmed even if another is reversed.  See, e.g., 
Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 386 (Fla. 1998) (affirming death sentence on one 
count and reversing death sentence on second count).  Lastly, juries sometimes 
recommend the death penalty for multiple murders by a different vote on each 
count.  The vote breakdown can be a useful consideration in determining whether 
error during the penalty phase is harmful and therefore reversible.  See Mahn v. 
State, 714 So. 2d 391, 398 (Fla. 1998) (noting that death recommendation was by 
eight-to-four vote in holding error in finding cold, calculated, and premeditated 
aggravator was not harmless); Preston v. State, 564 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1990) 
(observing that jury recommended death by one-vote margin in reversing death 
sentence after prior conviction relied upon for aggravating factor was vacated).  
With no count-by-count vote breakdown, this aspect of our analysis is impossible. 
Because the potential for unreliability is so great in general 
recommendations for the imposition of the death penalty, we hold that a Pangburn 
violation is not subject to a harmless-error test.  Rather, such an error requires per 
se reversal. 
Therefore, Snelgrove is entitled to a new penalty-phase proceeding at which 
the jury must make individualized recommendations on each capital count for 
which he is to be sentenced. 
 
 
 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Snelgrove’s convictions but 
reverse his two death sentences.  We remand the case to the circuit court to 
conduct a new penalty-phase proceeding at which the jury must render separate 
advisory sentences for each of Snelgrove’s capital murder convictions.20 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,  
Kim C. Hammond, Judge - Case No. 00-00323-CFA 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, James R. Wulchak, Chief Appellate Division, 
Assistant Public Defender and Larry B. Henderson, Assistant Public Defender, 
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Scott A. Browne, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
                                          
 
20.  We also remind the trial court that its sentencing order should conform 
to the requirements of Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990), and Fennie v. 
State, 855 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2003).