Title: JOHN LEWIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN LEWIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 81137 P.3d 909Case Number: 05-42Decided: 07/11/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JOHN 
LEWIS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Nancy D. Conrad, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Conrad.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In December 2004, 
a jury found Appellant, John Lewis (Lewis) guilty of first-degree sexual assault 
and incest in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Carbon County, Wyoming.  
Lewis appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a 
guilty conviction for first-degree sexual assault and that the prosecutor 
committed prosecutorial misconduct.  
We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Lewis 
presents two issues on appeal:

 
 
Whether 
there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for first degree sexual 
assault[.]

 
 
Whether 
the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      In November of 
2003, Lewis was living with his wife, their two-year-old son, and two of Lewis's 
stepchildren, a fifteen-year-old stepson and a four-year-old stepdaughter.  Lewis's friend, Kenneth Meadwell, was 
also living with the family at that time.  
One night, Mr. Meadwell and Lewis were at the Lewis residence, drinking 
and watching movies.  Mrs. Lewis 
left for work about 10:00 p.m., leaving Lewis, Mr. Meadwell, and the three 
children at the residence.  Lewis 
and the four-year-old stepdaughter, CF, went to bed shortly after Mrs. Lewis 
left, while Mr. Meadwell continued to watch movies and drink in the living 
room.

 
 
[¶4]      At trial, Mr. 
Meadwell testified that later that night he wanted to smoke a cigarette, but he 
could not find his cigarette lighter.  
Thinking that Lewis might have a lighter in his room, he opened Lewis's 
bedroom door and saw Lewis and CF naked on the bed and Lewis performing oral sex 
on CF. 

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Meadwell 
retreated to the living room, grabbed a bottle of whiskey and took a drink, then 
returned to confront Lewis.  On the 
way back to the bedroom, Mr. Meadwell saw CF in the kitchen wearing a dress and 
told her that she had done nothing wrong.  
He then went back to the bedroom where Lewis was talking on the phone to 
Mrs. Lewis.  Mr. Meadwell picked up 
a baseball bat that was laying in the room.  Lewis handed the phone to Mr. Meadwell, 
who spoke with Mrs. Lewis, asking her if she wanted him to kill Lewis then or 
wait.  Mrs. Lewis told Mr. Meadwell 
to wait.  Mr. Meadwell threw down 
the phone, left the bedroom, grabbed the bottle of whiskey, and left the 
trailer.

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Meadwell 
walked around Rawlins for the rest of the night and returned to the residence 
the next morning.  He found Lewis 
and his wife talking in their bedroom. Mrs. Lewis told Mr. Meadwell that she and 
Lewis were going to work things out between themselves.  Mr. Meadwell eventually reported what he 
saw to the Rawlins Police Department.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
A.        
Insufficiency of the Evidence to Support First Degree Sexual Assault 

 
 
[¶7]      Wyoming case law clearly 
establishes the standard of review for a claim of insufficient evidence to 
support a jury verdict: 

 
 
When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 
(Wyo. 1991) (quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 
(Wyo. 
1989).  We do not consider 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful 
party's evidence.  Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 
(Wyo. 
1996).  We have consistently held 
that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  Id. (citing Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 
(Wyo. 1993)). 
"We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, . . . our only duty 
is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, 
or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did." 
Id. 
(citing Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 
1995)). 

 
 

Tanner 
v. State, 
2002 WY 170, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 
(Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 
B.        
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶8]      Wyoming law also 
establishes the standard an appellant must meet in order to succeed on a claim 
of prosecutorial misconduct:

 
 
Allegations 
of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed by referring to the entire record to 
determine whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced that he has been 
denied a fair trial.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶22, 63 P.3d 875, ¶22 (Wyo. 2003).  Whether 
or not any comment within a closing argument is improper is measured in the 
context of the entire argument.  
Id.  Reversal is warranted only if a 
reasonable probability exists that without the error the appellant may have 
enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  
Id.  The defendant has the burden of proof to 
prove this issue.  Id.

 
 

Moore v. 
State, 2003 
WY 153, ¶ 29, 80 P.3d 191, 198-199 (Wyo. 2003). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

A. 
Insufficiency of the Evidence to Support First Degree Sexual 
Assault

 
 
[¶9]      Appellant argues 
that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a verdict of first degree 
sexual assault. The relevant statute states:

 
 
(a)  Any 
Actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the 
first degree if:

 
 
(i)   
the actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, 
reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or 
forcible confinement.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).  
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury received the following 
instruction with respect to the first degree sexual assault 
charge:

 
 
1.         
On or about November, 2003

 
 
2.         
In Carbon County, 
Wyoming

 
 
3.         
The Defendant, John Lewis

 
 
4.         
Inflicted sexual intrusion on CF, and

 
 
5.         
The Defendant caused submission of CF

 
 
6.         
Through the actual application of physical force or forcible 
confinement

 
 
7.         
Which the Defendant reasonably calculated would cause submission of 
CF.

 
 
[¶10]   Because part 6 of the instruction 
was presented to the jury with the alternative "force or forcible confinement" 
and the jury returned a general guilty verdict, we must determine if there is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Lewis caused submission of CF 
through application of physical force and that he caused submission of CF 
through application of forcible confinement.  See May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 
(Wyo. 2003); Tanner v. State 2002WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002); and Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 
1995).

 
 
[¶11]   The evidence presented at trial 
established that CF was four years old at the time of the assault.  Lewis is CF's stepfather, an adult 
male.  Lewis and CF were in the 
bedroom with the door closed.  When 
Mr. Meadwell opened the bedroom door, he saw Lewis and CF lying on the bed, both 
naked, and Lewis had his head between CF's legs, performing oral sex.  Mr. Meadwell described the look on CF's 
face as "saying help."  At trial, 
evidence was presented that it was the custom in the Lewis household to have the 
bedroom door closed, sometimes with children sleeping in bed with Mr. and Mrs. 
Lewis.  Lewis essentially argues 
that because of this, the fact that the door was closed on the night in question 
does not show forcible confinement of CF.

 
 
[¶12]   After considering the evidence 
presented at trial, we conclude that a jury could find that Lewis used force and 
forcible confinement to cause CF to submit to the sexual intrusion.  Regardless of the custom of the 
household, the fact remains that the door was closed on the night in question, 
confining CF to the bedroom.  CF was 
a four-year-old child, Lewis an adult male and CF's stepfather.  We hold that a reasonable jury could 
find that CF submitted to Lewis's intrusions due to the fact that he was 
physically forcing her to do so, and that he was forcibly confining her to the 
bedroom during the intrusion.  See 
Seeley v. State, 715 P.2d 232, 
240-241 (Wyo. 1986); and 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 17.3(a) at 
620-24, and 17.4(c) at 648-651 (2003 & Supp. 2006).1

 
 
[¶13]   Our conclusions are bolstered by 
the inherent use of physical force or forcible confinement, or both, within 
every parent-child or caregiver-child relationship.  The force or confinement used is most 
often gentle and loving and applied to protect or benefit the child.  If a child resists having his diaper 
changed or being buckled into a car seat, a loving parent will use physical 
force or forcible confinement, or both, to change the diaper or secure the child 
in the seat.  After experiencing 
this dynamic, the child soon learns that it is useless to resist because the 
adult will apply physical, albeit gentle, force or forcible confinement to cause 
the child to submit.  Considering 
the relationship between CF and Lewis along with the evidence presented at 
trial, an inference that Lewis used physical force and forcible confinement is 
supported by the totality of the evidence.

 
 
[¶14]   Lewis makes an additional argument 
urging this Court to follow case law in other jurisdictions, holding that the 
fact that an assailant is positioned "over" the victim during a sexual intrusion 
is not sufficient to show the element of forcible confinement.  Because we find that the closed door, 
the discrepancy in age, size and strength, and the dynamics of the parent-child 
relationship are sufficient to uphold the jury's verdict in this case, we 
decline to address this issue.

 
 

B. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶15]   During trial, a pediatrician from 
Rawlins who examined CF for physical evidence of sexual abuse testified that CF 
told her that Lewis put his finger in her private area while they were in the 
living room of the Lewis house.  During closing argument, the prosecutor 
stated: 

 
 
So, what 
did they get him for?  Contact?  Absolutely.  Intrusion?  Let's talk about intrusion.  Penetration, however slight.  Now, what do we get that tells us there 
was any penetration whatsoever?  We 
get the consistent statement of that little girl, it hurt, Daddy hurt me, it 
hurt.  However slight.  Doesn't take enough to leave scarring or 
bleeding or any of this, but it hurt.  
That's the description for intrusion.  He put his finger in me, "in" being the 
key word.

 
 
Lewis 
argues that this statement by the prosecutor misled the jury as to what evidence 
could be considered as they came to a verdict, in effect creating a fatal 
variance by asking the jury to judge Lewis's guilt with respect to an incident 
separate from the incident with which he was charged. 

 
 
[¶16]   Adhering to the standard of review, 
in order to find that the prosecutor did commit prosecutorial misconduct, we 
must review the entire record and conclude that but for this statement by the 
prosecutor, Lewis would have received a more favorable verdict.  Taking this statement by the prosecutor 
in the context of the entire record, we find that it did not so influence the 
jurors.  Instead, the statement, 
although perhaps inartful, was the prosecutor's attempt to illustrate to the 
jury that a sexual intrusion consists of any contact, however slight. 

 
 
[¶17] In 
support of our finding, we consider defense counsel's response to the 
prosecutor's remark during the defense's closing argument:

 
 
Basically, 
was there oral sex or was there not.  
That's where the primary issue lies.

                                    
. . . .

One of 
the contradictions I heard  what was their explanation as to why there is a 
different story with Dr. Ching?  The 
State said it's because there were two incidents.  It's okay that they  the information 
doesn't match up because there were two incidents.

 
 
So when 
they're explaining how they're different they need to use the explanation 
they're different incidents.  But 
when they need to say there was intrusion, they need to adopt the incident that 
they say is another one because they're saying that the incident with Dr. Ching 
involved digital penetration.  There 
is no charge of digital penetration here. 

 
 
[¶18]   These remarks by defense counsel 
ably demonstrate to the jury that they are to make their decision as to the 
facts of the case based only on the charge of oral sex, not the digital 
penetration.  Indeed, throughout the 
trial, the evidence presented made it clear that Lewis was charged with sexual 
assault for the incident of oral sex with CF.  Given the clear message presented to the 
jury regarding the nature of the case, the prosecutor's remarks were not so 
prejudicial that without them Lewis might have enjoyed a more favorable 
verdict.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   We find that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a verdict of first-degree sexual assault, and that the 
prosecutor's statements during closing argument did not rise to the level of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We acknowledge that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-303(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2005) appears to more precisely define the crime that 
was committed here.  However, we 
also recognize that the Legislature appears to have carefully worded these 
statutes so as to not preclude an application such as that which occurred 
here.  Section 6-2-303(a) begins 
with the admonition that, "(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting 
sexual assault in the first degree; ..." [the actor commits any 
one of the enumerated acts].  
Although it is a close question, we will not second guess the prosecutor 
and the jury under these circumstances where the jury was informed not only of 
the second degree sexual assault statute, but also the third degree sexual 
assault statute.  Thus, in light of 
all the evidence presented and the comprehensive instructions given the jury, we 
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict.