Title: In the Matter of Madeline Acosta v. New York City Department of Education

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 36  
In the Matter of Madeline Acosta,
            Respondent,
        v.
New York City Department of 
Education, et al.,
            Appellants.
Matthew J. Minero, for appellant Cooke Center for
Learning Development. 
Jane Gordon, for appellants New York City Department of
Education, Klein and Becker.
Carolyn E. Coffey, for respondent.
Community Service Society et al.; New York City Bar
Association; Senator Bill Perkins; Neil D. Breslin et al., amici
curiae.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
We conclude that the New York City Department of
Education (DOE) failed to comply with the requirements of the
Correction Law and thus acted arbitrarily in denying petitioner's
application for security clearance.
- 1 -
- 2 -
No. 36
  
I.
As a general matter, it is unlawful in this state for
any public or private employer to deny any license or employment
application "by reason of the individual's having been previously
convicted of one or more criminal offenses" (Correction Law §
752; see Executive Law § 296 [15]).  This general bar was enacted
to further certain goals that the Legislature has identified as
among the "general purposes" of the Penal Law, namely, "the
rehabilitation of those convicted" and "the promotion of their
successful and productive reentry and reintegration into society"
(Penal Law § 1.05 [6]).  As Governor Hugh L. Carey's memorandum
approving the legislation that codified this general prohibition
noted, "the key to reducing crime is a reduction in recidivism,"
and "[t]he great expense and time involved in successfully
prosecuting and incarcerating the criminal offender is largely
wasted if upon the individual's return to society his willingness
to assume a law-abiding and productive role is frustrated by
senseless discrimination" (Governor's Approval Mem, Bill Jacket  
L 1976, ch 931, 1976 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2459
["Providing a former offender a fair opportunity for a job is a
matter of basic human fairness, as well as one of the surest ways
to reduce crime."]).    
There are, however, two significant exceptions to this
general prohibition.  The first exception arises where "there is
- 2 -
- 3 -
No. 36
a direct relationship between one or more of the previous
criminal offenses and the specific license or employment sought
or held by the individual" (Correction Law § 752 [1]).  The
Legislature has clarified that a "'[d]irect relationship' means
that the nature of criminal conduct for which the person was
convicted has a direct bearing on his fitness or ability to
perform one or more of the duties or responsibilities necessarily
related to the license, opportunity, or job in question"
(Correction Law § 750 [3]).  This "direct relationship" exception
is not at issue on this appeal.
It is the Correction Law's second exception to the
general rule barring the adverse treatment of an application for
a license or employment based on an applicant's prior criminal
conviction that concerns us here.  The second exception allows
for the adverse treatment of such applications where "the
issuance or continuation of the license or the granting or
continuation of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk
to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals
or the general public" (Correction Law § 752 [2]).  We have
previously noted that the Legislature has not provided a
statutory definition of the phrase "unreasonable risk" in this
context "for the obvious reason that a finding of unreasonable
risk depends upon a subjective analysis of a variety of
considerations relating to the nature of the license or
employment sought and the prior misconduct" (Matter of Bonacorsa
- 3 -
- 4 -
No. 36
v Van Lindt, 71 NY2d 605, 612 [1988]).
Although the "unreasonable risk" analysis under the
second exception is a subjective one, section 753 (1) of the
Correction Law provides that, "[i]n making a determination" as to
whether either the "direct relationship" exception or the
"unreasonable risk" exception applies, "the public agency or
private employer shall consider" the following eight factors:
"(a) The public policy of this state, as
expressed in this act, to encourage the
licensure and employment of persons
previously convicted of one or more criminal
offenses.
"(b) The specific duties and responsibilities
necessarily related to the license or
employment sought or held by the person.
"(c) The bearing, if any, the criminal
offense or offenses for which the person was
previously convicted will have on his fitness
or ability to perform one or more such duties
or responsibilities.
"(d) The time which has elapsed since the
occurrence of the criminal offense or
offenses.
"(e) The age of the person at the time of
occurrence of the criminal offense or
offenses.
"(f) The seriousness of the offense or
offenses.
"(g) Any information produced by the person,
or produced on his behalf, in regard to his
rehabilitation and good conduct.
"(h) The legitimate interest of the public
agency or private employer in protecting
property, and the safety and welfare of
specific individuals or the general public." 
- 4 -
- 5 -
No. 36
A failure to take into consideration each of these factors
results in a failure to comply with the Correction Law's
mandatory directive (see Matter of Arrocha v Board of Educ. of
City of N.Y., 93 NY2d 361, 364 [1999] ["the Board must consider"
the Correction Law § 753 [1] factors (emphasis added)]).
II.
When petitioner was seventeen years old, she was
convicted of the serious crime of first degree robbery.  After
serving over three years in prison she was granted parole in
December 1996.  The record reflects that, since then, she has
become a productive and law-abiding member of society.  She
earned a bachelor's degree in 2001 from The City University of
New York (CUNY), and, while working and attending classes at
CUNY, volunteered with an organization that provides assistance
to inmates in developing skills that will help them reintegrate
into society upon being released.  After earning her college
degree, in addition to starting a family, she worked in positions
of responsibility at two law firms.  
Desiring employment that would allow her to spend more
time with her family, in 2006 petitioner left her law firm
position and took a part-time position at the Cooke Center for
Learning and Development (the Cooke Center).  The Cooke Center is
a not-for-profit private corporation that provides, among other
things, pre-school special education services in New York City
through a contract with the DOE.  The record reflects that
- 5 -
- 6 -
No. 36
petitioner worked four days per week and was engaged primarily in
clerical activities with no responsibility for providing any
instruction to the Cooke Center's pre-school students.  
In August 2006, three months after she started working
for the Cooke Center, petitioner's supervisor asked her to be
fingerprinted for DOE security clearance purposes (she had
previously disclosed her 1993 conviction to the Cooke Center). 
The DOE subsequently notified petitioner that, in light of her
prior criminal conviction, she would be interviewed at the DOE's
offices on September 28, 2006.  At the bottom of the notice
petitioner received, in underlined and bold typeface, she was
advised that she could "submit a written personal statement
explaining the events and circumstances surrounding your
conviction(s) record," and, "[i]n addition, you may also submit
the following: current employment verification (on company
letterhead) verifying title/dates of service, references from
friends/neighbors/church and any achievements you have made
either before or after your conviction(s)."
At the interview with the DOE's investigator,
petitioner provided the DOE with two letters of reference from
the Cooke Center.  She also provided a number of other documents
evidencing her education, rehabilitation and volunteer work over
the thirteen years since her conviction, including her diploma,
various certificates of achievement, and various letters of
appreciation.  Of particular relevance on this appeal, one of the
- 6 -
- 7 -
No. 36
letters of reference from the Cooke Center specified that
petitioner was hired, in part, on the basis of "her model
references from past employers and colleagues."
At the September 28, 2006 interview, petitioner was
advised that three people at the DOE would be reviewing her file,
but the investigator she was meeting with that day would be the
only one meeting with her in person.  He stated that the two
other reviewers "do not have time to review the stack of
documents" petitioner submitted because "they have numerous other
files to look at"; thus, he suggested she revise her "personal
statement to include more information summarizing the documents"
she submitted "since they will not be looking at all the
documents," only her personal statement.  The interviewer asked
no questions concerning the details surrounding her conviction,
no questions concerning her former employment at the two law
firms, and no questions concerning her job duties at the Cooke
Center.  Petitioner states that "[t]he whole interview lasted no
more than five minutes."  The record contains an affidavit from
the investigator who interviewed petitioner, but the only aspect
of her description of the interview that he specifically
challenges is its length, estimating, in part on the basis of the
relevant sign-in sheet, that he met with petitioner for
approximately thirty minutes.
By letter dated October 12, 2006, the DOE notified
petitioner that her application was denied.  The DOE's letter
- 7 -
- 8 -
No. 36
acknowledged that New York law generally prohibits the denial of
employment on the basis of prior criminal convictions, but then
referenced the "unreasonable risk" exception to that general
prohibition.  The letter explained that petitioner's "application
is denied due to the serious nature of your convictions" because,
"[i]n light of these convictions, granting employment will pose
an unreasonable risk to the safety and welfare of the school
community."  The Cooke Center subsequently terminated
petitioner's employment because, as petitioner acknowledges on
this appeal, the Cooke Center's contractual relationship with the
DOE necessitated her termination in the event the DOE denied her
application for security clearance.
This petition against the DOE and the Cooke Center,
among others, followed.  Supreme Court dismissed the petition. 
The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed,
concluded that the DOE acted arbitrarily in denying petitioner's
application, granted the petition and remanded the matter to
Supreme Court to fashion an appropriate remedy (62 AD3d 455 [1st
Dept 2009]).  The Appellate Division subsequently certified a
question to this Court concerning the propriety of its order.  We
agree with the Appellate Division that the DOE acted arbitrarily
in this matter.
III.
It is, of course, improper for courts to "engag[e] in
essentially a re-weighing" of the Correction Law § 753 factors
- 8 -
- 9 -
No. 36
(Arrocha, 93 NY2d at 367), but, on this record, it is plain that
the DOE failed to consider all of the factors in making its
determination as to whether the "unreasonable risk" exception
applied to petitioner's application, rendering its denial of that
application arbitrary and capricious.  
We first note that this conclusion is not mandated by
the fact that the DOE did not state with specificity its detailed
analysis with respect to each of the eight factors in its denial
letter to petitioner, as it was not required to do so in the
letter notifying her of its decision (but see Correction Law §
754 [providing that, if requested, a public agency or private
employer that denies a person's application for a license or
employment on the basis of that person's prior criminal
conviction "shall provide, within thirty days of a request, a
written statement setting forth the reasons for such denial"]). 
Nor does the DOE's apparent inability to point to any
contemporaneously created record that demonstrates that it
considered each of the eight factors in reviewing petitioner's
application necessarily require a finding that the DOE acted
arbitrarily, though, of course, such documentation, if it
existed, might tend to show that the DOE had fulfilled its
obligation under the Correction Law.
Rather, on this record, the DOE's own statements
demonstrate that it failed to comply with the statute and acted
in an arbitrary manner.  An affidavit from the DOE's Director for
- 9 -
- 10 -
No. 36
Employee Relations for the Division of Human Resources, prepared
by the DOE in connection with this proceeding, provides
"considerations and observations" relevant to the DOE's decision
to deny petitioner's application.  Among the considerations
listed in this affidavit is that petitioner "did not provide
references from any previous employers."  However, the interview
notice petitioner received from the DOE did not state that she
should provide references from previous employers, and her
interviewer did not ask her to provide those references. 
Moreover, one of the Cooke Center references that she did provide
to the DOE mentioned the "model references from past employers"
that the Cooke Center had reviewed and relied upon in hiring her. 
Thus, had the DOE reviewed this reference letter, it would have
known that the letters from past employers it now says were
missing were not only available but were highly favorable to
petitioner.
This illuminates a larger, more serious issue regarding
the DOE's consideration of petitioner's application.  The
Correction Law requires the DOE to "consider" "[a]ny information
produced by the person, or produced on his [or her] behalf, in
regard to his [or her] rehabilitation and good conduct" in
determining whether the "unreasonable risk" exception applies to
an application (Correction Law § 753 [1] [g]).  Yet, on this
record, it is plain that, other than her personal statement, the
DOE did not consider the documentation that petitioner submitted
- 10 -
- 11 -
No. 36
in support of her application.  
The arbitrary nature of the DOE's action here becomes
even more evident given the "general policy" the DOE Director's
affidavit states that the DOE follows with respect to first-time
applicants.  The Director's affidavit notes that this application
was petitioner's "first application for security clearance from
the DOE," and, as a matter of "general policy, the DOE takes a
closer review of first-time applicants with criminal histories
who have not worked with children in order to emphasize to the
applicant that the DOE takes the safety and welfare of its
students very seriously."  We have no doubt that the DOE takes
the safety and welfare of the entire school community very
seriously, and its efforts in that regard are laudable.  However,
in light of the DOE's failure to comply with the statutorily
mandated minimum requirement of reviewing all of the
documentation petitioner submitted (see e.g. Correction Law § 753
[1] [g]), it is difficult to conclude on this record that the
"closer review" purportedly applied here amounted to anything
more than a pro forma denial of petitioner's application on the
basis of her prior criminal conviction.  Such a denial, without 
consideration of each of the Correction Law § 753 factors, is
precisely what the statute prohibits.  
The Legislature has determined that, as a general rule,
it is unlawful for a public or private employer to deny an
application for a license or employment on the ground that the
- 11 -
- 12 -
No. 36
applicant was previously convicted of a crime.  This general
prohibition advances the rehabilitation and reintegration goals
of the Penal Law.  Furthermore, barring discrimination against
those who have paid their debt to society and facilitating their
efforts to obtain gainful employment benefits the community as a
whole.  The "direct relationship" exception and the "unreasonable
risk" exception to this general rule may be resorted to only upon
a consideration of each of the eight factors enumerated in
Correction Law § 753 (see Arrocha, 93 NY2d at 364).   
IV.
Finally, we note that petitioner does not dispute that,
in light of the Cooke Center's contract with the DOE, the DOE's
denial of petitioner's application for security clearance
obligated the Cooke Center to terminate her employment.  The
Cooke Center's motion to dismiss the petition as against it,
therefore, should have been granted.
***
       Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be
modified, without costs, by granting the motion of Cooke Center
for Learning and Development to dismiss the petition against it,
and, as so modified, affirmed.  The certified question should be
answered in the negative.
- 12 -
Matter of Madeline Acosta v New York City Department of
Education, et al.
No. 36
SMITH, J. (dissenting):
It is easy to sympathize with this petitioner, and to
be dismayed by the decision of the Department of Education (DOE)
to deny her security clearance.  From what we know, petitioner's
achievement in overcoming her very troubled youth is impressive,
and could be inspiring to others.  But I would not give in to the
temptation to second-guess the DOE, which has the duty to protect
not only the public's money and property, but also the children
committed to its charge.
The question for the DOE -- not the courts -- to decide
was whether granting petitioner a security clearance "would
involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or
welfare of specific individuals or the general public"
(Correction Law § 752 [2]).  Considering the interests at stake,
the DOE could reasonably believe that anything more than a very
small risk would be "unreasonable," and that there might be more
than a very small risk here.  In 1993, petitioner was arrested on
two separate occasions, and charged with crimes including two
first degree robberies involving the use or threatened immediate
use of a dangerous instrument (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]).  She
- 1 -
- 2 -
No. 36
pleaded guilty and received a sentence of 4 to 12 years.  She was
paroled in 1997 and discharged from parole in 2000.  These events
were history, but not ancient history, when she applied for a
security clearance in 2006.  The DOE could have reasonably wanted
to know more about them.
Petitioner chose to tell them very little.  Invited to
"submit a written personal statement explaining the events and
circumstances surrounding your conviction(s) record," she
responded, and later expanded her response.  This is all that her
expanded statement says about the crimes:
"I was 17 years old at the time of my
incarceration.  Before my incarceration I
attended school full time.  I was a senior at
John Jay High School when I became involved
in an abusive relationship.  He was
physically abusive and he forced me to
participate in the robberies he wanted to
commit and at the time I thought for my own
safety I would go along with it.  We were not
arrested committing a crime.  I was on my way
home from school when I attempted to board
the train with train pass that had someone
else's name on it.  The officer at the
station requested for me to produce
identification to match the train pass.  I
didn't have identification.  The officer ran
a check on the name and found out it was
reported stolen.  We were both arrested.  I
soon severed all ties with him.  I take
responsibility for my part and honestly feel
remorseful for allowing for those things to
happen in my presence.  I was sentenced to 4-
12 years.  He was sentenced to 6-18 years
because he was accused of having a weapon."
Among the facts petitioner did not disclose is how many
robberies there were; what weapon was used; what was done to
intimidate the victims; and what petitioner did to help.  Reading
- 2 -
- 3 -
No. 36
petitioner's statement, one cannot learn why a judge thought that
she deserved a 4 to 12 year sentence.  I can hardly blame
petitioner for not wanting to dwell on these very unpleasant
details; but I also cannot blame the DOE for deciding that it
should not give petitioner clearance without knowing more than it
did.
It seems to me that, despite its disclaimer, the
majority has done what it acknowledges courts should not do: It
has reweighed the relevant factors, and decided that it disagrees
with the DOE's evaluation of them.  The majority quibbles with
the DOE over a minor point -- whether the absence of references
from previous employers is significant, where petitioner was
apparently able to provide such references at an earlier time
(majority op at 9-10).  Stretching to find a "larger, more
serious issue,"  the majority asserts that the DOE's procedure
was flawed because it failed "to consider the documentation that
petitioner submitted in support of her application" (majority op
at 10).  I find it extremely hard to believe that either the
DOE's decision or the majority's here would be different if a DOE
employee had turned over every page of the considerable stack of
certificates of recognition that petitioner submitted.
It seems obvious that the majority's real difference
with the DOE is substantive, and not procedural -- the majority
thinks the DOE made a mistake.  Perhaps it did, but it did not
act so arbitrarily that we are justified in annulling its ruling.
- 3 -
- 4 -
No. 36
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order modified, without costs, by granting the motion of Cooke
Center for Learning and Development to dismiss the petition as
against it, and, as so modified, affirmed. Certified question
answered in the negative. Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Pigott and Jones concur. Judge Smith
dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge Read
concurs.
Decided March 24, 2011
- 4 -