Title: Empfield v. Kimbrough

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Empfield v. Kimbrough1995 WY 127900 P.2d 1153Case Number: 94-249Decided: 08/09/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Don 
M. EMPFIELD, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Harry 
L. KIMBROUGH and Robert A. Sieveke, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Robert 
J. O'Neil of Legal Clinic of Robert J. O'Neil, Gillette, for 
appellant.

Michael 
N. Patchen, Gillette, for appellee Kimbrough.

Paul 
J. Drew of Drew & Carlson, Gillette, for appellee Sieveke. 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Don 
Empfield appeals from the district court's order which granted a summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees Harry Kimbrough and Robert Sieveke and which 
decreed that the parties' oral lease agreement was void under the statute of 
frauds.

[¶2]  We affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      Empfield presents 
two issues for our review:

A. 
The trial court erroneously decided certain issues of fact during the hearing on 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of 
frauds.

1. 
It misread the complaint and plaintiff's affidavit; from this, it determined 
that the amount of damages sought by the plaintiff was half the actual amount 
sought and insufficient to raise the claim to the court's jurisdictional level; 
and

2. 
It determined that the plaintiff had partially performed under a verbal 
agreement, when the undisputed facts were that the plaintiff had fully 
performed.

B. 
The trial court erroneously determined in a summary judgment hearing that the 
plaintiff's case rested upon the principles of estoppel, rather than the 
doctrine of full performance by one of the parties to a verbal 
agreement.

Facts

[¶4]      On March 12, 
1993, the parties discussed the possibility of Kimbrough and Sieveke leasing two 
offices from Empfield. Four days later, the appellees orally agreed that they 
would lease the two offices for a period of three years at a rate of $450 for 
each office per month if Empfield were to complete certain remodeling by April 
15, 1993. Empfield asked Kimbrough and Sieveke to give him a letter of intent 
with regard to the terms of the oral agreement, but the appellees never 
delivered such a letter.

[¶5]      Even though 
Empfield had not received a written agreement, he commenced with the requested 
remodeling. On April 9, 1993, Empfield sent a letter to Kimbrough and Sieveke, 
informing them that the remodeling was nearing completion and that the premises 
would be ready for them to occupy on April 15th. He completed the remodeling on 
time; however, neither Kimbrough nor Sieveke ever occupied those offices. On 
April 19th, Empfield sent another letter to the appellees, in which he informed 
them that he was assuming their oral agreement was not going to be honored and 
that he was going to advertise for renters for the offices.

[¶6]      On December 23, 
1993, Empfield filed a complaint in the district court against Kimbrough and 
Sieveke, alleging that they had breached their agreement and seeking monetary 
damages. Sieveke and Kimbrough each filed a motion for a summary judgment, and 
the district court entered an order which granted their motions. The case is now 
before this Court for consideration.

Discussion

[¶7]      Empfield contends 
that the district court erred when it granted a summary judgment in favor of 
Kimbrough and Sieveke because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether or not Empfield had partially performed the oral agreement. We 
disagree.

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Sandstrom v. 
Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994). See also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We review a 
summary judgment from the viewpoint favorable to the party who opposed the 
judgment. Smith, Keller & Associates v. Dorr & Associates, 875 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶9]      Empfield argues 
that the district court erred when it erroneously decided certain issues of fact 
in the hearing on the motions for summary judgments. We have considered the 
record in the light most favorable to Empfield in determining whether a genuine 
issue as to any material fact exists which would preclude the resolution of this 
case as a matter of law. The facts which Empfield claims were decided 
erroneously are not material to the disposition of this case; therefore, we must 
determine whether Kimbrough and Sieveke were entitled to have a judgment as a 
matter of law. Christensen v. Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 229 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶10]   Generally, an oral agreement to 
lease real estate for a period of more than one year is void under Wyoming's 
statute of frauds.1 Empfield contends, however, that 
Kimbrough and Sieveke cannot rely on this statute to avoid their agreement 
because the remodeling of the offices for them constituted full performance and 
removed the oral agreement from the operation of the statute.

[¶11]   The statute of frauds is an 
expression of the "fixed legislative policy of the state" and is "`absolutely 
necessary to preserve the title to real property from the chances, the 
uncertainty, and the fraud attending the admission of parol testimony.'" 
Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 464 (Wyo. 1978) (quoting Crosby v. Estate of 
Strahan, 78 Wyo. 302, 313-14, 324 P.2d 492, 496 (1958)). Unless this case falls 
within one of the recognized exceptions to the statute of frauds, the summary 
judgment was properly entered as a matter of law. We restrict, rather than 
expand, the exceptions to the plain provisions of the statute, even when a 
hardship will result in a particular case. Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 346 
(Wyo. 1993). If the mere failure to perform an oral agreement were sufficient to 
remove the agreement from the reach of the statute of frauds, the statute would 
be rendered vain and nugatory. Id. The agreement, if any, comes within the 
statute of frauds and is voidable on that basis.

[¶12]   When performance on one side of an 
oral agreement has been fully or substantially performed, the agreement is not 
within the statute of frauds. Id.; Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1143 (Wyo. 
1976). "This common law exception to the statute of frauds is a version of 
equitable estoppel. It prevents a party to a contract from perpetrating a fraud 
or injustice on the other party when the latter has fully performed under the 
terms of the oral contract." Wyoming Realty Company v. Cook, 872 P.2d 551, 554 
(Wyo. 1994). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 
(1981).

[¶13]   In determining whether equity 
defeats the statute of frauds, this Court looks to several factors such as the 
relations of the parties to a parol agreement, the nature of the parol 
agreement, and the relative benefit and detriment derived by the parties. Davis, 
855 P.2d  at 346. Applying the equitable estoppel analysis to the facts of this 
case, we conclude that Empfield did not suffer a substantial detriment and that 
the appellees did not receive a benefit from the broken oral agreement. Neither 
Kimbrough nor Sieveke occupied the premises at any time or used the offices for 
business purposes. The remodeling performed by Empfield enhanced the value of 
his property. The record reveals that Empfield mitigated his losses by renting 
the offices in a timely fashion. In light of the facts, we have difficulty 
accepting the argument that Empfield suffered a financial injury and conclude 
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel will not aid Empfield under these 
circumstances.

Conclusion

[¶14]   We hold that the district court did 
not err when it granted a summary judgment in favor of Kimbrough and 
Sieveke.

[¶15]  Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
WYO. STAT. § 1-23-105(a) (1988) provides in pertinent part:

(a) 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or 
some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:

(i) 
Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year 
from the making thereof;

. 
. . . .

(v) 
Every agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, 
for more than one (1) year[.]