Title: Delgado v. Strong

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

360 So. 2d 73 (1978)
Hortensio DELGADO and Nellie Geraldine Delgado, His Wife, Petitioners,
v.
Robert R. STRONG and Julie Y. Strong, His Wife, Respondents.
No. 52304.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 8, 1978.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1978.
Kenneth G. Stevens of Dale & Stevens, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioners.
James W. Knight, Jr. of Huebner, Shaw & Bunnell, and Nancy Little Hoffmann, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents.
SUNDBERG, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 348 So. 2d 56, which is alleged to be in conflict with Westerman v. Shell's City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1972), the latter case setting forth the rule that an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of a trial court by reevaluating the evidence. Jurisdiction vests in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
*74 For the reasons hereinafter enunciated we quash the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District.
The facts of this case are reflected in the trial judge's recitation of the evidence introduced at a hearing on petitioners' complaint to foreclose a mortgage against respondents:
Accordingly, the trial judge entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of petitioners.
It is well-established that courts of equity may refuse to foreclose a mortgage when an acceleration of the due date would render the acceleration unconscionable and the result would be inequitable and unjust. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla.2d DCA 1970); Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Schechtman v. Grobbel, 226 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). Consistent with this principle, courts have denied foreclosure of a mortgage where breach of the mortgage was merely a technical one and such breach did not place the security in jeopardy. See Martin v. McGee, 82 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1955); Schechtman v. Grobbel, supra. However, the presumption of correctness which surrounds a final judgment on review, Cohen v. Mohawk, Inc., 137 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1962); Williams v. Williams, 85 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1955); Staton v. Staton, 231 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970); American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Clark, 174 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), compels the conclusion that the trial judge in the case sub judice properly applied this principle in determining the propriety of a judgment of foreclosure in favor of petitioners. Our conclusion is buttressed by the foregoing findings of the trial judge: Although he determined that "[a] technical default occurred by failure of the [respondents] to insure the subject property," he further found that petitioners "were justified in believing that the security for their mortgage was in jeopardy, and they were justified in accelerating the balance due on the mortgage... ." The effect of these findings of fact, coupled with entry of final judgment of foreclosure in favor of petitioners, is a determination that despite the technical nature of respondents' default, the security was in fact placed in jeopardy and, accordingly, foreclosure was proper. In short, the chancellor exercised his discretion based on his assessment of the testimony and evidence and based on an application of the correct rule of law.
On appeal, however, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the final *76 judgment and remanded the cause. An obvious reevaluation of the evidence in a de novo consideration thereof, contrary to the rule of Westerman v. Shell's City, Inc., supra, is apparent in the district court's holding that "the trial judge erred in entering final judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage on a harmless technical breach for it would be inequitable and unjust." This holding necessarily involves a finding, in clear contradiction of that of the trial court, that the security was not in fact placed in jeopardy as a result of respondents' breach. There being no express or apparent finding of an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the action of the appellate court is not justified.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, is quashed, and this cause is remanded to that court with instructions to reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.