Title: Bailey v. Vaughn

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

375 So. 2d 1054 (1979) Mrs. Zader Mae BAILEY v. Opal Ruth VAUGHN, by and through her Conservator, Buster Vaughn. No. 51467. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 10, 1979. *1055 Steighner & Colom, Donald J. Steighner, Columbus, for appellant. Butler & Butler, Jan R. Butler, Eupora, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, SUGG and WALKER, JJ. WALKER, Justice, for the Court: The appellee, Opal Ruth Bailey Vaughn, daughter of deceased R.E.L. Bailey, by and through her conservator, Buster Vaughn, her husband, instituted this suit in the Chancery Court of Webster County, Mississippi, against Mrs. Zader Mae Bailey (wife of deceased) and her children as a bill for, inter alia, partition of 170 acres of land. The court was of the opinion that the 170-acre tract (Tract I) of land was subject to partition and specifically stated: The commissioners appointed by the chancellor, with the agreement of counsel, reported back to the court on December 9, 1977, and stated in part as follows: Based upon the commissioners' report, the court entered its second opinion covering this parcel of land and specifically stated, on the fourteenth day of June, 1978 that: It was then ordered, adjudged and decreed: It was ordered that said special commissioner, being J.D. Robertson, the Chancery Clerk of Webster County, be appointed the special commissioner and the title of the subject property was vested in him to make a sale of the land hereinbefore described for the division of the proceeds. On September 13, 1978, as a final order in this cause, the chancellor, in her decree, stated that: It is from that portion of the decree of the chancellor's finding that the land in question, 170 acres, was not subject to partition in kind and confirming the special commissioner's sale that appellant appeals. The appellant complains that the chancellor erred in ordering partition by sale when there was not sufficient evidence in the *1057 record to indicate that partition by sale would be in the best interest of all parties or that partition in kind was impossible. This Court, in addressing the above issue, has stated many times that the law governing partition of property requires that the party seeking to have the sale of land must bring his case clearly within the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-21-11 (1972).[1] In commenting on the burden of proof, this Court in Cox v. Kyle, 75 Miss. 667, 23 So. 518 (1898), as reaffirmed by Burley v. Kuykendall, 349 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1977), stated: In Burley, supra, citing Shorter v. Lesser, 98 Miss. 706, 54 So. 155 (1910), we stated affirmatively that: The great majority of cases in this area have stood for the proposition that a partition in kind is preferred. See Mathis v. Quick, 271 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1973); Dailey v. Houston, 246 Miss. 667, 151 So. 2d 919 (1963); Carter v. Ford, 241 Miss. 511, 130 So. 2d 852 (1961); Smith v. Stansel, 93 Miss. 69, 46 So. 538 (1908). That preference should be jealously guarded. After considerable research, we can only find three cases in which this Court affirmed the decree of the lower court ordering partition by sale of the property. In Jefcoat et al. v. Powell et al., 235 Miss. 291, 108 So. 2d 868 (1959), this Court found that the proof established in the lower court was overwhelming that a sale of the land and division of the proceeds would best promote the interest of all the parties. In support of this holding, the Court found that "subsequent to the death of John W. Powell, two of his children who were devisees in the will, died leaving children of their own and their share under the will descended to these children and some of them are entitled to a very small fraction of the [twenty] acres which they received and also the one-eighth interest of Mrs. Jefcoat in the entire 160 acres could not be set apart to her in a solid block because of the fact that the entire 160 acres is divided into smaller parcels which are spread over the entire 160 acres and what Mrs. Jefcoat would be entitled to is one-eighth of each of these several small parcels. Also [fifteen] acres of the land devised to Gwin Powell lie *1058 in the [forty] acres which were sold to satisfy debts, and he is entitled to a share in the 160 acres to make up for his [fifteen] acres which were sold." (235 Miss. at 300, 108 So.2d at 871). In the case of Stern v. Great Southern Land Company, 148 Miss. 649, 114 So. 739, 740 (1927), it was there decreed that certain lands jointly owned in respect to their mineral interest could only be sold for partition. The basis for affirmance, by this Court, was that "To partition the deposits of clay, oil and minerals here involved, if feasible, it seems could only be done through an expensive protracted mining scheme inaugurated and carried out by the chancery court." The court was concerned with the fact that it was not known where such deposits were located and that their existence or location "could not be ascertained positively without an expensive mining operation which might cover months, and possibly, years." The remaining case, Albright v. Flowers et al., 52 Miss. 256 (1876), wherein this Court stated the following in reply to appellant's argument, that a sale of land could not be taken against infants, without proof that said land could not be divided in kind: In the case at bar, however, the facts are readily distinguishable from those three holdings. Here, we have 170 acres of mostly hardwood timber interspersed with pine. There are only eight heirs-at-law, each holding a one-eighth undivided interest. Also, there are no mineral interests here involved which would require an expensive and protracted mining scheme. The trial court appeared to be influenced somewhat by the cost that might have accrued because of a partition in kind. The commissioners reported that if the land were to be partited in kind, it would necessitate nine or more surveys at approximately $300.00 per survey and in addition it would necessitate nine or more appraisals at an approximate cost of $200.00 to $500.00 per parcel. While cost of partition is a consideration, it is not necessarily controlling. Carter v. Ford, 241 Miss. 511, 519, 130 So. 2d 852 (1961). Further, the appellee did not put on any evidence as to why the property could not be divided and why the interest of all the parties would better be met by a sale. The only evidence offered by the appellee in support of the sale was the testimony by Robert E.L. Bailey, Jr., who testified that the property was pine timberland with gullies running through it. On cross-examination of Mr. Bailey, the witness was asked whether, if divided from north to south into eight equal parcels, each parcel would be of approximately the same value, to which the witness responded, "I think so, yes, sir." On redirect, appellee's counsel inquired as to whether, divided from east to west, eight parcels would be of equal value, to which the witness replied, "Well, I'd say yeah." The seven defendants in this cause did not join the appellee, so we have a situation where one individual with a one-eighth interest in the land seeks to divest the other seven cotenants of their title to the land by having it sold. It is very difficult for us to conceive that it is impossible to partite, in kind, one-hundred and seventy acres of land, when the owners of seven-eighths interest are willing to accept their land as a single unit as is the case here. While it is true the commissioners stated in their report to the court that in their opinion the land was not susceptible to division in kind, they failed to give any substantial reasons, based upon a recital of facts found by them to exist, why it could not be done. The facts recited fall far short of showing that the best interest of all *1059 parties will best be served by sale instead of a division in kind. We are therefore of the opinion that the lower court was manifestly in error in ordering a sale of the 170 acres of land and directing a division of the proceeds between appellant and appellee, according to their respective interests. We reverse the decree of the lower court as to the sale of the property and remand the case to the chancery court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur. [1] "If, upon hearing, the court be of the opinion that a sale of the lands, or any part thereof, will better promote the interest of all parties than a partition in kind, or if the court be satisfied that an equal division cannot be made, it shall order a sale of the lands, or such part thereof as may be deemed proper, and a division of the proceeds among the cotenants according to their respective interests. The court may appoint a special commissioner to make the sale, and may make all proper orders to protect the rights of the parties interested. The court may decree the sale of a part of the land and the partition in kind of the residue.