Title: In re A.B.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re A.B., 110 Ohio St.3d 230, 2006-Ohio-4359.] 
 
 
 
IN RE A.B. ET AL.; SUMMIT COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD, APPELLANT; 
BROWN ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as In re A.B. 110 Ohio St.3d 230, 2006-Ohio-4359.] 
Children – Custody – R.C. 2151.353(A)(5) – Juvenile court not authorized to 
order  planned permanent living arrangement unless  public children 
services agency or  private child placing agency requests such an 
arrangement. 
(No. 2005-1966 – Submitted May 9, 2006 – Decided September 6, 2006.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 22659, 2005-Ohio-4936. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
After a public children services agency or private child placing agency is granted 
temporary custody of a child and files a motion for permanent custody, a 
juvenile court does not have the authority to place the child in a planned 
permanent living arrangement when the agency does not request this 
disposition.  (R.C. 2151.353(A)(5), applied.) 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} The Ninth Appellate District has certified the following question to 
us after determining that its decision conflicts with a decision from the Eighth 
District: “After a child agency is granted temporary custody of a child and files a 
motion for permanent custody, does a juvenile court have the authority to place 
the child in a planned permanent living arrangement when the agency does not 
request this disposition?”   
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{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we answer this question in the 
negative.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the trial court. 
I. Facts and Procedural History of the Case 
{¶ 3} Appellee Charles Brown and Rebecca Brown are the parents of 
appellees A.B. (born November 10, 1992), J.B. (born September 21, 1994), T.B. 
(born September 29, 1996), and C.B. (born February 17, 1998).  In May 2003, the 
juvenile court granted emergency temporary custody of the children to appellant, 
Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB”), finding that the children were 
dependent and neglected, after the CSB had received referrals alleging general 
and medical neglect, supervisory issues, domestic violence, and parental drug 
abuse.  Both of the parents agreed to waive the time limit for disposition, and both 
parents agreed that the children would be placed in the temporary custody of 
CSB. 
{¶ 4} On October 18, 2004, CSB filed a motion for permanent custody, 
indicating that the mother had relinquished her parental rights.  Attorney Richard 
A. Reece Jr. was appointed to represent the children, and on October 25, 2004, he 
filed a motion for a six-month extension of the order of temporary custody.  On 
March 2, 2005, attorney Reece filed a motion for a planned permanent living 
arrangement. 
{¶ 5} On March 24, 2005, a hearing was held on both motions.  The 
witnesses testifying were Jerita Williams, the CSB caseworker assigned to this 
case, Walter Crawford, a chemical-dependency counselor who worked with the 
father, Kimberly Nelson, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the father. 
{¶ 6} Williams testified that the goal of the original case plan was 
reunification of the children with the parents.  The case plan required that (1) the 
parents find and maintain stable housing, (2) the father undergo anger-
management counseling, (3) both parents complete a drug and alcohol assessment 
January Term, 2006 
3 
and follow all recommended treatment, (4) both parents follow up on medical 
care for their children, and (5) the father become employed. 
{¶ 7} Williams stated that the father completed a residential drug 
treatment program in October 2003.  However, between October 2003 and March 
2004, CSB did not have contact with him because his whereabouts were 
unknown.  In March 2004, the father contacted CSB to inquire about the status of 
his case.  During the five-month period in which his whereabouts were unknown, 
he did not visit his children and made no attempt to inquire with the agency about 
their welfare.  When the father reinitiated contact with CSB, he first told CSB that 
his father was ill and he had to go take care of him, and then he said that he “just 
had to leave.”  Finally, the father admitted that he had relapsed. 
{¶ 8} Williams testified that in March 2004, she referred the father for 
outpatient treatment due to his relapse.  However, he did not comply.  He later 
enrolled himself in the Salvation Army treatment facility, but did not successfully 
complete the program because he tested positive for crack cocaine during a 
random drug screen in June 2004.  Once discharged from the Salvation Army 
program, in August 2004, the father enrolled himself in New Destiny Treatment 
Center, an inpatient facility, for a nine-month program.  At the time of the hearing 
in March 2005, Williams testified that to her knowledge, the father had been 
compliant with the treatment program and had not testified positive during that 
time.  In the time leading up to the hearing, the father did not provide any proof of 
employment, nor did he have stable housing. 
{¶ 9} In March 2004, CSB resumed visitation between the father and his 
children, and he complied with the one-hour-per-week schedule.  Between March 
2004 and the time of the hearing in May 2005, the father was consistent with his 
visits, and the children appeared to be happy to see him. 
{¶ 10} From 2003 to this time, the Brown children have been in a foster 
home.  The three eldest children have resided together since the onset of the case, 
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and the youngest was relocated there in August 2003 after he entered 
kindergarten.  The caseworker testified at the hearing that the foster home was a 
good environment, and the children and the foster mother had bonded.  Although 
the foster mother was unwilling to adopt the children due to her age, she was 
willing to foster them until they were adopted or returned to their father. 
{¶ 11} At the time of the hearing on March 24, 2005, the temporary-
custody order was set to expire on May 7, 2005, see R.C. 2151.353(F), and 
Williams testified that the father would not be able to obtain employment or 
suitable housing or provide for the basic needs of his children by that time.  
Williams testified that CSB had investigated other relatives with respect to 
permanent placement of the children.  However, there were none available at the 
time. 
{¶ 12} Williams testified that permanent custody was in the best interest 
of the children rather than a planned permanent living arrangement because of the 
children’s young ages and because there were no relatives to take custody.  
Williams conceded that the children expressed a desire to be returned to their 
father.  However, she testified that once a case reaches planned-permanent-living 
arrangement status, it is not guaranteed that the children will be able to remain in 
the current foster home.  She testified that if the agency is granted permanent 
custody with adoption as a goal, the children would stay where they are while 
awaiting adoption and not be moved from foster home to foster home. 
{¶ 13} The father testified in favor of the motion for the planned 
permanent living arrangement, stating that it would give him time to get his life 
together and prove to the court and the state that he is a productive person and a 
good parent.  He also testified that he loved his children a great deal, that they 
loved him, and that he was working on finding housing, a job, and suitable 
daycare for his children if and when they were reunited. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 14} Crawford, a counselor at the New Destiny Treatment Center, 
testified that the father is cocaine dependent and alcohol dependent.  He also 
testified that the father completed an anger-management course at New Destiny in 
2005. 
{¶ 15} Attorney Kimberly Nelson testified as the guardian ad litem for the 
Brown children that she did not think it was in the children’s best interests to be 
placed with their father.  She said that the foster mother is excellent but did not 
want to adopt.  Nelson testified that her first recommendation would be to leave 
the children in the custody of the foster mother until they reach the age of 18.  If 
that is not possible, Nelson recommended that CSB be granted permanent custody 
so the children could be placed for adoption. 
{¶ 16} At the conclusion of the hearing, CSB asserted that a planned 
permanent living arrangement was not an alternative in this case because CSB had 
not made the request, and this family did not meet the requirements of such an 
arrangement.  The juvenile court denied CSB’s motion for permanent custody and 
granted the motion to have the children placed in a planned permanent living 
arrangement, finding that the court had the authority to make that placement 
under R.C. 2151.353(A).  CSB appealed that decision to the Ninth District Court 
of Appeals, and that court affirmed the juvenile court’s decision.   
{¶ 17} The court of appeals also certified a conflict between its decision 
and that of the Eighth Appellate District in In re M.W., Cuyahoga App. No. 
83390, 2005-Ohio-1302.  The cause is now before this court upon our 
determination that a conflict exists.  107 Ohio St.3d 1694, 2005-Ohio-6763, 840 
N.E.2d 201. 
II. History of Response to “Foster Care Drift” 
{¶ 18} Allowing children to languish in foster care rather than 
establishing permanent homes for them has become so pervasive that a term has 
been coined to describe it: “foster care drift.”  “Drift occurs when children in 
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placement lose contact with their natural parents and fail to form any significant 
relationship with a parental substitute.”  Garrison, Why Terminate Parental 
Rights? (1983), 35 Stan.L.Rev. 423, 426.  In response to foster care drift, 
legislatures at both the national and state levels enacted new laws designed to 
shorten the length of time children spend in foster care and find permanent homes 
for foster children more quickly. 
{¶ 19} The passage of the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(“ASFA”), Pub.L. No. 105-89, Sections 673b, 679b, and 678, Title 42, U.S. Code, 
marked a shift toward focusing on a child’s need for safety and permanency.  65 
F.R. 4020-01.  “The impetus for the ASFA was a general dissatisfaction with the 
performance of State[s]' child welfare systems in achieving these goals for 
children and families. The ASFA seeks to strengthen the child welfare system's 
response to a child's need for safety and permanency at every point along the 
continuum of care.  In part, the law places safety as the paramount concern in the 
delivery of child welfare services and decision-making, clarifies when efforts to 
prevent removal or to reunify a child with his or her family are not required, and 
requires criminal record checks of prospective foster and adoptive parents. To 
promote permanency, ASFA shortens the time frames for conducting permanency 
hearings, creates a new requirement for States to make reasonable efforts to 
finalize a permanent placement, and establishes time frames for filing petitions to 
terminate the parental rights for certain children in foster care.”  Id. 
{¶ 20} Around the time the federal legislation was enacted, there were 
520,000 children in foster care.  United States Department of Health & Human 
Services Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (“AFCARS”) 
Report No. 1 (Jan.1999).  Length of stay was a mean of 33 months and a median 
of 21 months, with 40 percent of children in foster care there for more than two 
and one-half years, including 16 percent for three to four years and 18 percent for 
January Term, 2006 
7 
five years or more. See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars 
/tar/report1/ar0199a.htm. 
{¶ 21} By comparison, according to the most recent preliminary estimates 
for FY 2003, AFCARS reports that the mean length of stay has been reduced to 
31 months and the median to 18 months.  A third of all children in foster care 
have been there for more than two and one-half years, with 28 percent in foster 
care for three to four years and 16 percent in foster care for five years or more.  
AFCARS Report No. 10 (Apr.2005).  See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/ 
stats_research/afcars/tar/report10.htm  
{¶ 22} In accordance with the intent of the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act, the average length of stay has shortened for a significant number of children.  
Ohio’s own attempt to ensure that children would not stay in foster care 
indefinitely began in 1988 with the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 89 (“S.B. 89”).  
142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 198.  “These provisions were enacted in response to the 
problem of ‘foster care drift.’  They are aimed at preventing a child from 
foundering in foster care under a temporary custody order.”  In re Watson (May 
31, 1994), Butler App. No. 93-06-114. 
III. Legal Analysis 
{¶ 23} As part of S.B. 89, R.C. 2151.353(A) provides for the disposition 
of children who have been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent after the 
initial complaint is filed, giving the juvenile court six options: temporary custody, 
permanent custody, legal custody, protective supervision, a planned permanent 
living arrangement, and removal of the child pending further order of the court. 
{¶ 24} A “planned permanent living arrangement” is defined as a 
placement that gives legal custody to an agency without terminating parental 
rights and that allows the agency to make an appropriate placement, including 
foster care or other placement.  R.C. 2151.011(A)(36).  Pursuant to R.C. 
2151.353(A)(5), the court can order a planned permanent living arrangement “if a 
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public children services agency or private child placing agency requests the court 
to place the child in a planned permanent living arrangement and if the court 
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a planned permanent living 
arrangement is in the best interest of the child and that one of the following exists:    
{¶ 25} “(a) The child, because of physical, mental, or psychological 
problems or needs, is unable to function in a family-like setting and must remain 
in residential or institutional care. 
{¶ 26} “(b) The parents of the child have significant physical, mental, or 
psychological problems and are unable to care for the child because of those 
problems, adoption is not in the best interest of the child, as determined in 
accordance with division (D) of section 2151.414 of the Revised Code, and the 
child retains a significant and positive relationship with a parent or relative. 
{¶ 27} “(c) The child is sixteen years of age or older, has been counseled 
on the permanent placement options available to the child, is unwilling to accept 
or unable to adapt to a permanent placement, and is in an agency program 
preparing the child for independent living.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 28} The father in this case contends that after the initial disposition 
under R.C. 2151.353, all further motions for disposition are governed by R.C. 
2151.415, which does not require CSB to request a planned permanent living 
arrangement before one can be granted by the trial court.  The father bases this 
argument on a reading of R.C. 2151.415(F), which provides: 
{¶ 29} “The court, on its own motion or the motion of the agency or 
person with legal custody of the child, the child’s guardian ad litem, or any other 
party to the action, may conduct a hearing with notice to all parties to determine 
whether any order issued pursuant to this section should be modified or 
terminated or whether any other dispositional order set forth in divisions (A)(1) to 
(5) of this section should be issued.” 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 30} The case certified to be in conflict with the instant case is In re 
M.W., Cuyahoga App. No. 83390, 2005-Ohio-1302.  We find the analysis of the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals in M.W. persuasive:  
{¶ 31} “It is longstanding law that the interpretation of a statute rests on 
the legislature’s intent.  State ex rel. Francis v. Sours (1944), 143 Ohio St. 120, 
124 [28 O.O. 53], 53 N.E.2d 1021.  The intent of the legislature resides first in the 
words used in the statute.  Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 
105 [65 O.O.2d 296], 304 N.E.2d 378.  If those words are unambiguous, we need 
go no further.  State v. Tuomala, 104 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004-Ohio-[6239, 818 
N.E.2d 272] at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 32} “The wording of R.C. 2151.353(A)(5) is so unambiguous that we 
would be hard-pressed to find a clearer indication of intent.  The statute states in 
no uncertain terms that the court may order a planned permanent living 
arrangement if (1) the county requests it, (2) [if] the planned permanent living 
arrangement would be in the best interests of the child, and (3) [if] one of the 
factors in subsections (A)(5)(a)-(c) exist[s].  While we understand that the best 
interests of the child are paramount in any custody case and that we are to 
liberally interpret the statutes to provide for the care and protection of the child, 
R.C. 2151.01(A), we cannot override unambiguous statutory language.  Indeed, 
the juvenile courts derive their jurisdiction solely by grant from the General 
Assembly; thus, they do not have inherent equitable jurisdiction to determine a 
child’s best interests.  See In re Gibson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 172, 573 
N.E.2d 1074.  We therefore restate the law in this district to be that a court may 
not order a planned permanent living arrangement unless it is requested by a 
‘public children services agency or private child placing agency.’ ”  In re M.W., 
2005-Ohio-1302, 2005 WL 678111, ¶ 24-25. 
 
{¶ 33} Indeed, it is our duty to give meaning and effect to the plain 
language of the statute as set forth by the General Assembly.  R.C. 1.42.  A 
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planned permanent living arrangement places a child in limbo, which can delay 
placement in a permanent home.  Because the General Assembly intended to 
encourage speedy placement, R.C. 2151.353 places limitations upon the use of 
planned permanent living arrangements. 
{¶ 34} It appears that the juvenile judge’s intent in placing the children in 
a planned permanent living arrangement was partly to keep the parental 
relationship intact so the children could perhaps be later reunited with their father.  
However, the children were first placed in the care of CSB in 2003 and as of the 
date of the permanent custody hearing in March 2005, the father still had not 
complied with the case plan, and there was no indication when compliance would 
occur. 
{¶ 35} Moreover, although life with the foster mother in this case appears 
to be a loving and enriching one, the relationship lacks the permanency 
envisioned by the legislature.  The foster mother could return the children at any 
point to the custody of children services.  Even assuming that the children would 
be able to live with the foster mother until they reach the age of majority, they 
will “age out” of foster care.  Children who age out of foster care lack the 
emotional support system and the financial stability of a permanent custody or 
adoptive relationship.  Children who age out of foster care have no place to return 
for holidays, no permanent family to lean on as they enter the adult world.  Thus, 
the General Assembly’s grant of authority to request a planned permanent living 
arrangement, a temporary fix for foster children, solely to the CSB is in line with 
creating permanency and stability for these children. 
{¶ 36} In addition, if the juvenile court were able to place the children in a 
planned permanent living arrangement without a request from the CSB, then R.C. 
2151.415(C)(1) would be meaningless. R.C. 2151.415(C)(1) states that if an 
agency requests that the court place the child in a planned permanent living 
arrangement, the agency “shall present evidence to indicate why a planned 
January Term, 2006 
11 
permanent living arrangement is appropriate for the child, including, but not 
limited to, evidence that the agency has tried or considered all other possible 
dispositions for the child.”  This language indicates that a planned permanent 
living arrangement is to be considered as a last resort for the child, more evidence 
that the General Assembly’s goal is to avoid allowing children to languish 
indefinitely in foster care. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 37} R.C. 2151.353(A)(5) is unambiguous and does not authorize the 
trial court to consider a planned permanent living arrangement unless the children 
services agency has filed a motion requesting such a disposition.  Accordingly, we 
hold that after a public children services agency or private child placing agency is 
granted temporary custody of a child and files a motion for permanent custody, a 
juvenile court does not have the authority to place the child in a planned 
permanent living arrangement when the agency does not request this disposition.  
We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause 
to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} R.C. 2151.01 states that R.C. Chapter 2151 “shall be liberally 
interpreted and construed so as to effectuate the following purposes: 
{¶ 39} “(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical 
development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, whenever 
possible, in a family environment, separating the child from the child’s parents 
only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety; 
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{¶ 40} “(B) To provide judicial procedures through which Chapters 2151. 
and 2152. of the Revised Code are executed and enforced, and in which the 
parties are assured of a fair hearing, and their constitutional and other legal rights 
are recognized and enforced.” 
{¶ 41} To read the majority opinion is to believe that Chapter 2151. of the 
Revised Code has a third purpose:  (C)  To ensure that no planned permanent 
living arrangement – no matter how reasonable and no matter whether it is 
determined by the juvenile court to be in the best interests of the child – is to be 
made without the express approval of the children services agency. 
{¶ 42} To be fair, the result reached by the majority is reasonable – if you 
read only R.C. 2151.353(A)(5), and out of context at that.  You must ignore the 
fact that R.C. 2151.353(A)(5) applies only upon the initial adjudication that a 
child is abused, dependent, or neglected, which is not the case here.  And you 
must ignore R.C. 2151.01, 2151.414, and 2151.415. 
{¶ 43} As already suggested, R.C. 2151.01 does not state that children 
services agencies have paramount interests, but that children do.  See In re 
Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 105, 13 O.O.3d 78, 391 N.E.2d 1034 
(“the primary consideration in questions of possession or custody of children” is 
the best interests of the child). 
{¶ 44} R.C. 2151.414 and 2151.415(F) apply to modifications and 
terminations of initial dispositional orders.  R.C. 2151.415 states that “[t]he court, 
on its own motion [or the motion of any party to the action] may conduct a 
hearing * * * to determine whether any order issued pursuant to this section 
should be modified or terminated or whether any other dispositional order set 
forth in divisions (A)(1) to (5) of this section should be issued.  After the hearing 
and consideration of all the evidence presented, the court, in accordance with the 
best interest of the child, may modify or terminate any order issued pursuant to 
January Term, 2006 
13 
this section or issue any dispositional order set forth in divisions (A)(1) to (5) of 
this section.” 
{¶ 45} Among the dispositional orders permitted by R.C. 2151.415(A) is 
“(5) An order that the child be placed in a planned permanent living 
arrangement.”  Important to me, but apparently not to the majority, R.C. 
2151.415(F), which authorizes a court to order a planned permanent living 
arrangement, does not require the court to receive a request from a children 
services agency.  This omission makes sense.  When a child is initially 
adjudicated abused, dependent, or neglected, when R.C. 2151.353(A)(5) controls, 
a children services agency is often in the best position to determine whether a 
permanent placement is necessary.  By the time modifications or terminations of 
initial orders are necessary, when R.C. 2151.415(F) is supposed to control, the 
court is in the best position to determine whether a permanent placement is in the 
best interests of the child. 
{¶ 46} Unfortunately, the majority opinion ignores the sensible, cohesive 
nature of the statutory scheme.  Instead it has focused on a specific statutory 
provision, though not the one most relevant to the situation before us, and has 
determined, contrary to the intent of the General Assembly, that the interests of a 
public children services agency are paramount to those of the children.  As the 
court of appeals stated, “Reading R.C. 2151.353(A) in isolation would give a 
children services agency more authority and discretion than the juvenile court to 
determine the appropriate placement of a dependent or neglected child.  The 
overall scheme of the dependency and neglect statutes clearly demonstrates that 
the juvenile court, which is subject to appellate review, makes the ultimate 
decision regarding the disposition of each neglected and dependent child, not the 
children services agency.”  In re A.B., Summit App. No. 22659, 2005-Ohio-4936, 
¶ 26.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  I dissent.  
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
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__________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Phillip D. 
Bogdanoff, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Charles J. Altwies, for appellee Charles Brown. 
Katherine Hunt Federle and Jason A. Macke, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae, Justice for Children Project. 
______________________