Title: Arbuckle Simpson Aquifier Protection Federation of Okla. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd.

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

ARBUCKLE SIMPSON AQUIFER PROTECTION FEDERATION OF OKLA., INC. v. OKLA. WATER RESOURCES BD.2013 OK 29Case Number: 111381Decided: 04/23/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

ARBUCKLE SIMPSON AQUIFER PROTECTION FEDERATION OF OKLAHOMA, 
INC., Petitioner,v.THE OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, J.D. STRONG, 
EMILY MEAZELL, FORD DRUMMOND, LINDA LAMBERT, TOM BUCHANAN, BON DRAKE, ED FITE, 
MARILYN FEAVER, RUDOLF JOHN HERMANN, JASON HITCH, and RICHARD SEVENOAKS, 
Respondents.
APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISDICTION AND PETITION FOR 
WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION
¶0 Petitioner Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Protection Federation of Oklahoma, 
Inc. (Petitioner), filed an original action seeking writs of prohibition and 
mandamus to disqualify a hearing officer in an administrative proceeding 
conducted by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to restart the 
proceeding with a new hearing officer, and to prohibit ex parte communications 
between the hearing officer and the OWRB and other agencies. We hold that 
Petitioner is entitled to an administrative hearing that is, and appears to be, 
a fair and impartial proceeding. While we do not find the hearing officer to be 
biased and will not order her disqualification, in the interest of fairness and 
in order to remedy any appearance of impropriety we issue a writ of mandamus 
compelling the hearing officer to notify the parties to the administrative 
proceeding of any and all ex parte communications that occurred between her and 
federal agencies and to include those communications in the record, so that the 
parties may have an opportunity to respond.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS ASSUMED;PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
PROHIBITON DENIED;PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 
IN PART.
Michael C. Wofford, James R. Barnett, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
Petitioner.Jerry Barnett, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondents.
COMBS, J.: 
I.PROCEDURE FOR MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD DETERMINATIONS
¶1 The proceedings in question concern the Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Maximum 
Annual Yield (MAY) determination, made by OWRB on March 13, 2012. Pursuant to 
82 O.S. 2011 § 
1020.6, once the OWRB has set a tentative maximum annual yield for a 
groundwater basin or subbasin, it is required to call and hold hearings at 
centrally located places where any interested parties shall have the right to 
present evidence in support or opposition to the determination of the OWRB.1 These hearings are to be 
conducted pursuant to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and 
Title 785, Chapter 4 of the Oklahoma Administrative Code.2 
¶2 Pursuant to OAC § 785:4-3-4, the OWRB may appoint a hearing examiner, as 
it did in this case, to supervise, direct, preside over and conduct the hearing 
proceedings.3 After the hearings are completed the hearing examiner 
makes a recommendation to the OWRB, which then proceeds to make a final 
determination as to the maximum annual yield by issuing a final order containing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.4 This final order is then subject to judicial review 
pursuant to Article II of the APA.5 
¶3 Pursuant to 75 O.S. 2011 
§318, any party aggrieved by a final agency order in an individual proceeding 
is entitled to certain, speedy, adequate and complete judicial review of the 
decision.6 The reviewing court may set aside or modify the order 
or reverse and remand for further proceedings if it determines that the 
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the agency 
findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are made upon unlawful 
procedure.7 
II.ENSURING A FAIR HEARING
¶4 Article II of the APA specifically prohibits ex parte 
communications by members or employees of an agency assigned to render a 
decision or make findings of fact or conclusions of law in an individual 
proceeding. Title 75 O.S. 2011 
§313 provides:
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, 
members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in an individual proceeding shall not 
communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, with 
any person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with any party or 
his representative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to 
participate. An agency member (1) may communicate with other members of the 
agency, and (2) may have the aid and advice of one or more personal 
assistants.
Participants in hearings governed by Article II of the APA are also 
guaranteed a fair and impartial hearing or consideration. Title 75 O.S. 2011 §316 governs disqualification 
of a hearing examiner and provides in pertinent part:
A hearing examiner or agency member shall withdraw from any individual 
proceeding in which he cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing or 
consideration….
¶5 Petitioner in this cause contends that the hearing examiner appointed by 
the OWRB, Emily Meazell, was involved in several post-hearing ex parte 
communications with adverse parties, including representatives of the OWRB and a 
federal agency, the United States Geological Survey (USGS). In an affidavit 
included in Respondent's Appendix, the hearing officer admitted to speaking by 
phone with the OWRB's general counsel to inquire about assistance from the OWRB 
staff in locating evidence contained in the record on certain issues.8 She further admitted to 
communicating with the OWRB's Staff Attorney to obtain assistance in locating 
the evidence mentioned above.9 The hearing officer further acknowledged she received 
information from the USGS, which was forwarded to her by the OWRB's General 
Counsel, concerning a hydrology study of the area in question.10 That she did not solicit this information does not 
change the fact that an ex parte communication occurred indirectly 
between employees of USGS, who appeared as witnesses in the proceedings, and the 
hearing officer.
A. The OWRB is not a "party" to the MAY proceeding, and thus 
ex parte communications between it and the hearing officer are not 
prohibited.
¶6 The OWRB is not a party to the MAY proceeding, and thus communication by 
the hearing officer with the OWRB is not covered by the ex parte 
communication prohibitions of 75 O.S. 2011 §313. This interpretation is 
supported by an analysis of relevant statutory provisions. Title 
82 O.S. 2011 § 
1020.6, which is the statutory provision governing MAY proceedings generally, 
specifically distinguishes the OWRB, the agency holding the hearing, from other 
interested persons or parties, who are entitled to present evidence in support 
or opposition to the OWRB's tentative MAY determination.11 
¶7 Holding that the OWRB is not a party for purposes of the MAY proceeding is 
also consistent with 75 O.S. 2011 § 250.3, which provides 
definitions for the APA. Title 75 O.S. 2011 § 250.3(12) provides:
Party" means a person or agency named and participating, or properly seeking 
and entitled by law to participate, in an individual proceeding…
The OWRB is not named and participating in the MAY proceeding, because it is 
the agency holding the proceeding. Nor would it seek to participate in the 
proceeding, because again, it is holding the proceeding. Other agencies or 
persons entitled by law to participate with an interest in the outcome could 
seek to participate. Further, this interpretation is consistent with the 
definition of individual proceeding found in 75 O.S. 2011 § 250.3(8), which provides:
"Individual proceeding" means the formal process employed by an agency having 
jurisdiction by law to resolve issues of law or fact between parties and which 
results in the exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.
The agency conducting an individual proceeding resolves issues of fact and 
law between parties, and is not a party itself.
¶8 Title 75 O.S. 2011 
§310, is the section of the APA which governs procedures in individual 
proceedings before agencies. It also maintains clear distinctions between the 
agency holding the proceeding and the interested parties presenting evidence. 
Title 75 O.S. 2011 
§310(4), specifically, provides:
Notice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts. In addition, notice may 
be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the 
agency's specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or 
during the hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the 
material noticed, including any staff memoranda or data, and they shall be 
afforded an opportunity to contest the material so noticed. The agency's 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge may be utilized in 
the evaluation of the evidence.
Agencies may take notice of facts within their specialized knowledge, and 
then must notify parties (distinguishable from the agency) that it has done so. 

B. Ex parte communications between the hearing officer and other 
agencies serving as witnesses, passed to the hearing officer through the 
OWRB, create the impression of partiality.
¶9 In addition to communications with the OWRB, the Petitioner also alleges 
that the hearing officer, through the OWRB, received ex parte 
communications from federal agencies that appeared as witnesses during the 
hearing process and that the hearing officer failed to notify the parties of 
these communications. Regardless of whether ex parte communications 
between the agency and its hearing officer in the context of the MAY proceeding 
are permissible, and we hold they are, these communications with outside federal 
agencies such as the USGS are another matter. 
¶10 The MAY proceeding in question is an adjudicative proceeding, as opposed 
to a rulemaking proceeding. Texas County Irr. & Water Res. Ass'n v. 
Oklahoma Water Res. Bd., 1990 OK 121, ¶9-11, 80 P.2d 1119. 
When an administrative board acts in an adjudicative capacity, it functions much 
like a court. Bowen v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Real Estate Appraiser 
Bd., 2011 OK 
86, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 133; Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum,1986 OK 16, ¶ 10, 732 P.2d 438, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 3232, 97 L. Ed. 2d 738 and 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S. Ct. 3265, 97 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1987). 

¶11 Because they function much like a court when conducting adjudicative 
proceedings, agencies and their representatives are bound by minimum standards 
of due process. In Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists of 
State of Oklahoma, 1996 OK 41, ¶32, 913 P.2d 1339, we noted:
[we have] consistently held and due process requires every litigant receive a 
decision that is the result of "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 
Sadberry v. Wilson, 441 P.2d 381, 382, 384 (Okla.1968); Craig v. 
Walker, 824 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Okla.1992). Likewise, the Oklahoma Statutes require an agency 
member to "withdraw from any individual proceeding in which [the member] cannot 
accord a fair and impartial hearing or consideration." Okla.Stat. tit. 75, § 316 
(1991). "When circumstances and conditions surrounding litigation are of such a 
nature that they might cast doubt and question as to the impartiality of any 
judgment the trial judge may pronounce, said judge should certify his 
disqualification." Sadberry, 441 P.2d  at 384 (quoting Callahan v. 
Childers, 186 Okla. 504, 99 P.2d 126, 128 (1940)). This is an objective standard and is not dependent on the 
judge's belief. Merritt v. Hunter, 575 P.2d 623, 624 (Okla.1978).
Even though a judge personally believes themselves to be unprejudiced, 
unbiased and impartial, they should nevertheless certify their disqualification 
when there are circumstances of such a nature to cause doubt as to their 
partiality, bias or prejudice. Merritt v. Hunter, 1978 OK 18, ¶5, 575 P.2d 623. This rule applies equally to 
administrative boards acting in an adjudicatory capacity as it does to judges. 
Johnson, 1996 OK 
41 
at ¶33. 
¶12 It is readily apparent from the record that the OWRB's hearing officer 
received communications and information relating to factual matters from 
employees of the USGS, who had appeared as witnesses for the OWRB in the 
proceedings, under the aegis of communications with the OWRB. These post-hearing 
communications were not disclosed by the hearing officer to various other 
parties to the adjudicative action, including the petitioner, until the filing 
of various open records requests. 
¶13 These communications give rise to questions about the hearing officer's 
neutrality in the underlying proceeding. Title 82 O.S. 2011 §1020.6 requires the hearing not 
only so that the OWRB can present evidence in support of its tentative maximum 
annual yield determination, but also so that any interested party may present 
evidence in support or opposition to the determination. The hearing presents the 
OWRB with an opportunity to defend its decision from challengers. To then have 
the OWRB, which is not a party to the proceeding and thus permitted to 
communicate with the hearing officer, acting as a conduit for favorable 
witnesses to present further unchallenged testimony to the hearing officer 
without notice to the other parties allows one to question the hearing officer's 
impartiality. The goal of the proceedings should be to ensure that all parties 
receive a fair hearing from a neutral hearing officer, avoiding even the 
appearance of impropriety. If post-hearing communications from the USGS and 
other agencies about the record were necessary, then notice and an opportunity 
for all parties to participate should have been provided. 
III.A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
¶14 Pursuant to the Okla. Const. art.7, § 4, this Court possesses original 
jurisdiction over all agencies, commissions, and boards created by law. Before a 
writ of mandamus may be issued there must be: 1) a clear legal right vested in 
the petitioner; 2) refusal to perform a plain legal duty which does not involve 
the exercise of discretion; and 3) adequacy of the writ and inadequacy of other 
relief. Draper v. State, 1980 OK 117, ¶13, 621 P.2d 1142; Witt v. Wentz, 1930 OK 116, ¶7, 1930 OK 116. 
¶15 Our case law and the applicable statutes collectively illustrate that the 
parties to the MAY proceeding have a clear legal right to a hearing that is not 
only fair and impartial, but also avoids the appearance that fairness and 
impartiality are lacking. Johnson, 1996 OK 41 at ¶32; Merritt, 1978 OK 18 at ¶5; 75 O.S. 2011 §§313, 316. Providing a fair 
and impartial hearing is the plain legal duty of the OWRB, and by extension, its 
appointed hearing officer, and is not something subject to discretion. 
75 O.S. 2011 §§313, 316. The mandate in 
75 O.S. 2011 §316 requiring that a hearing 
officer "shall withdraw from any individual proceeding in which he cannot 
accord a fair and impartial hearing or consideration" is a clear indication that 
providing a fair and impartial hearing is an affirmative duty of the hearing 
officer, and if they are unable to do so, they are required to withdraw. 
75 O.S. 2011 §316 (emphasis added).
¶16 We do not hold that the hearing officer failed to provide a fair and 
impartial hearing during the MAY proceeding in question, and will not require 
her disqualification and a restart of the proceedings. However, her unsolicited 
ex parte communications with other agencies favoring one interpretation 
of the evidence lend the proceedings the appearance of not being as fair and 
impartial as they should be, even if those communications did nothing to 
actually influence the hearing officer's actions and decisions. The proper 
course of action to avoid even the appearance of impropriety would have been for 
the hearing officer to provide notice to all parties to the MAY proceeding of 
her ex parte communications, and to add the information she received to 
the record along with responses, if any, from the other interested parties. 
¶17 A writ of mandamus compelling the hearing officer to provide notice of 
her ex parte communications to all parties to the MAY proceedings, and to 
include those communications in the record, as well as the responses of 
interested parties, will remedy the appearance that the hearing officer is 
giving undue weight in making her final recommendation to the desires of the 
USGS and OWRB. The lack of due process resulting from a biased tribunal cannot 
be corrected on appeal. Johnson, 1996 OK 41 at ¶14; Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 
Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1972). Other relief, such 
as an appeal after the MAY proceedings have concluded, will therefore be 
insufficient. The time to address allegations of bias, or the appearance of 
bias, on the part of the hearing officer is now. Petitioner has satisfied the 
necessary requirements for a writ of mandamus, and so we hereby issue a writ 
compelling the hearing officer to provide notice of her ex parte communications 
to all parties to the MAY proceeding, to disclose the contents of those 
communications to the parties, and incorporate those communications and 
responses to them into the record. 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS ASSUMED;PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
PROHIBITION DENIED;PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 
IN PART.
COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., 
concur.
WATT, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part.
TAYLOR, J., with whom WINCHESTER, J., joins, dissenting.
I would deny all relief sought by the Petitioner. This administrative 
proceeding is in its early stage and should continue in its regular order. 
Lowrey v. Hodges, 1976 OK 132; United Airlines v. State Bd. Of 
Equalization, 1990 OK 
29; Estes v. ConocoPhillips, 2008 OK 21; Umholtz v. Tulsa, 1977 OK 98.
FOOTNOTES
1 Title 82 O.S. 2011 § 1020.6.A. provides:
A. Once the Board has set a tentative maximum annual yield for the 
groundwater basin or subbasin, the Board shall call and hold hearings at 
centrally located places within the area of the major groundwater basin or 
subbasin or in the county for minor groundwater basins or subbasins. Prior to 
such hearings being held, the Board shall make copies of such hydrologic survey 
available for inspection and examination by all interested persons and, at such 
hearings, shall present evidence of the geological findings and determinations 
upon which the tentative maximum annual yield has been based. Any interested 
party shall have the right to present evidence in support or opposition thereto. 
The hearings shall be conducted pursuant to Article II of the Administrative 
Procedures Act.
2 Title 82 O.S. 2011 § 1020.6.A.; OAC 785:30-9-3, 
concerning Annual Yield Hearings, provides in pertinent part:
…. (d) Such hearings, if requested, will be held in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedures Act and Chapter 4 of this Title. …. 
3 OAC 785:4-3-4 provides:
(a) Who may be Hearing Examiners. Hearings may be conducted by 
authorized and designated Hearing Examiners. Any Board member, the Board 
Executive Director or Assistant Director, any authorized Board staff member, 
staff attorneys, the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General or any other 
Board authorized person may serve as Hearing Examiner.
(b) General authority of Hearing Examiners. Hearing Examiners are 
authorized to supervise, direct, preside over and conduct the hearing 
proceedings; to make and enter interlocutory rulings; to make and enter rulings 
on procedural or evidentiary questions or objections; to make and enter rulings 
on any other motions or objections arising during the course of the hearing; 
and, generally, to do all things necessary and incidental to conducting and 
completing the hearing and all other acts authorized under this Chapter.
(c) Assistance. Where deemed necessary, the Hearing Examiner may 
designate any Board staff member to assist the Hearing Examiner in the conduct 
of the proceedings or to aid the Hearing Examiner in an advisory capacity.
4 OAC 785:4-9-1(a) provides:
(a) As expeditiously as possible after completion of the hearing, the Hearing 
Examiner shall review, consider and evaluate all matters presented and relevant 
to the hearing issues, and, based thereon, the Hearing Examiner shall prepare a 
proposed Final Order containing necessary findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.
Title 82 O.S. 2011 § 
1020.6.C. provides:
C. After such hearings are completed, the Board shall then proceed to make 
its final determination as to the maximum annual yield of groundwater which 
shall be allocated to each acre of land overlying such basin or subbasin by 
issuing a final order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, which 
order shall be subject to judicial review pursuant to Article II of the 
Administrative Procedures Act.
5 Title 82 O.S. 2011 § 1020.6.C.
6 Title 75 O.S. 2011 § 318.A. provides:
A. 1. Any party aggrieved by a final agency order in an individual proceeding 
is entitled to certain, speedy, adequate and complete judicial review thereof 
pursuant to the provisions of this section and Sections 319, 320, 321, 322 and 
323 of this title.
7 Title 75 O.S. 2011 § 322 provides:
(1) In any proceeding for the review of an agency order, the Supreme Court or 
the district or superior court, as the case may be, in the exercise of proper 
judicial discretion or authority, may set aside or modify the order, or reverse 
it and remand it to the agency for further proceedings, if it determines that 
the substantial rights of the appellant or petitioner for review have been 
prejudiced because the agency findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions, 
are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; 
or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and 
substantial competent evidence, as defined in Section 10 of this act, including 
matters properly noticed by the agency upon examination and consideration of the 
entire record as submitted; but without otherwise substituting its judgment as 
to the weight of the evidence for that of the agency on question of fact; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious; or
(g) because findings of fact, upon issues essential to the decision were not 
made although requested.
(2) The reviewing court, also in the exercise of proper judicial discretion 
or authority, may remand the case to the agency for the taking and consideration 
of further evidence, if it is deemed essential to a proper disposition of the 
issue.
(3) The reviewing court shall affirm the order and decision of the agency, if 
it is found to be valid and the proceedings are free from prejudicial error to 
the appellant.
8 Respondent's Appendix, Affidavit of Emily Meazell, 3.g. 

9 Respondent's Appendix, Affidavit of Emily Meazell, 3.h. 

10 Respondent's Appendix, Affidavit of Emily Meazell, 
3.k.; Exhibit 2.
11 Title 82 O.S. 2011 § 1020.6(A) provides:
A. Once the Board has set a tentative maximum annual yield for the 
groundwater basin or subbasin, the Board shall call and hold hearings at 
centrally located places within the area of the major groundwater basin or 
subbasin or in the county for minor groundwater basins or subbasins. Prior to 
such hearings being held, the Board shall make copies of such hydrologic 
survey available for inspection and examination by all interested persons and, 
at such hearings, shall present evidence of the geological findings and 
determinations upon which the tentative maximum annual yield has been based. Any 
interested party shall have the right to present evidence in support or 
opposition thereto. The hearings shall be conducted pursuant to Article II 
of the Administrative Procedures Act. (Emphasis added) .

WATT, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶1 I agree with the majority that the petitioner is entitled to an 
administrative hearing that is fair and impartial. Nevertheless, I depart from 
its conclusion that any appearance of such a proceeding can occur absent the 
disqualification of the hearing officer.
¶2 In circumstances not unlike those presented here, we ordered the 
disqualification of the trial judge in Miller Dollarhide, 
P.C. v. Tal, 2007 OK 58, ¶20, 163 P.3d 548. In that cause, there were allegations 
that ex parte communications occurred with the trial judge through a 
third-party clerk. The Court determined that there were sufficient facts 
presented to cause doubt as to the trial court's impartiality. Consequently, we 
held that "error, if any, should be made in favor of disqualification" and that 
failure to disqualify "was an abuse of discretion." 
¶3 In Tal, we stated that parties are entitled to have their causes 
heard by a fair and impartial judge, in a due process situation where all 
parties find themselves on a level playing field. Here, the "appearance" is that 
the communications at issue created favor of one party over the other. 
Therefore, I dissent to the portion of the opinion allowing the hearing officer 
to continue participation in the cause.