Title: ALPINE CLIMATE CONTROL, INC. v. DJ'S, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALPINE CLIMATE CONTROL, INC. v. DJ'S, INC.2003 WY 13878 P.3d 685Case Number: 02-213Decided: 10/30/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 
ALPINE 
CLIMATE CONTROL, INC.,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

DJ'S, 
INC., d/b/a DJ'S THRIFTWAY; and

DENNIS 
DOBBIN,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Johnson County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Brian 
N. Beisher of Hart & Beisher, Sheridan, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Timothy 
J. Kirven and Robert E. Pfister II of Kirven and Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, 
Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
In 
this breach of contract action, Appellant Alpine Climate Control, Inc., appeals 
from a jury verdict for the Appellee DJ's Inc., contending that the trial court 
improperly refused to instruct the jury on its theory that DJ's had breached the 
contract by actions that had prevented complete performance.  Alpine claimed that performance was 
prevented when DJ's would not permit Alpine to perform warranty work to correct 
deficiencies.  After reviewing the 
evidence and the instructions as a whole, we find that Alpine has failed to show 
any prejudice from the trial court's failure because the evidence adduced at 
trial did not support giving the instruction.  

 

[¶2]           
We 
affirm the order of judgment for DJ's. 

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Alpine 
presents the following issue for our review:

 

A.  Did prejudicial error result from the 
District Court's refusal to give Appellant's proposed jury instruction regarding 
preventative performance? 

 

DJ's 
presents two issues for our review:

 

A.  Has Appellant failed to properly 
preserve its claim of prejudicial error by the District Court in refusing to 
give Appellant's proposed jury instruction? 

 

B.  Did the District Court properly refuse 
to give Appellant's proposed jury instruction regarding preventive performance 
of a contract where Appellant had completed its work and tendered its invoice? 

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
Alpine 
is a corporation based in Sheridan, Wyoming, with the primary purpose of 
installing and maintaining heating and cooling equipment.  DJ's operates a retail grocery store 
known as DJ's Thriftway that is located in Buffalo, Wyoming.  Alpine had performed service work for 
DJ's for a long period of time, and in October of 2000, the parties agreed that 
Alpine would install freezers and compressors at DJ's on a time and materials 
basis.  Alpine's service manager had 
indicated that the cost of installation might be as low as $15,000.00, but a 
written contract price was not set.  
Between October 24, 2000, and December 28, 2000, Alpine was at the store 
on an almost daily basis, incurring 441.75 hours of labor for which it submitted 
an invoice in the amount of $22,087.50.  
After materials and other services were included, Alpine billed DJ's for 
an amount totaling $29,339.45. 

 

[¶5]           
DJ's 
paid $15,000.00 but refused to pay the remainder, and Alpine filed suit on June 
22, 2001, for the unpaid balance.  
DJ's counterclaimed, and, at trial, the jury was instructed that DJ's 
contended that Alpine breached the contract and breached the warranty by failing 
to properly install the equipment. At trial, DJ's contended that Alpine had 
essentially completed installation the week after Thanksgiving, but was called 
numerous times to service the malfunctioning equipment during November and 
December. On December 25, 2000, the equipment failed completely, and although 
the record shows that Alpine returned for fifteen hours on December 27 and 28, 
DJ's contacted another company which discovered significant deficiencies with 
Alpine's work. Between December 26, 2000, and January 30, 2001, DJ's incurred 
expenses of over $13,000.00 to have the other company correct those deficiencies 
so that the equipment operated properly.  

 

[¶6]           
Alpine 
contended that it was ready, willing and able to perform warranty work and 
correct any problems with the equipment but that DJ's banned it from the 
premises, preventing it from performing the warranty work.  Alpine requested a jury instruction 
regarding prevented complete performance that was refused by the trial 
court.  The jury rendered a verdict 
for DJ's, and the trial court entered judgment against Alpine in the amount of 
$9,347.77.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]           
Alpine 
contends that the trial court erred when it refused an instruction regarding its 
theory of the case. That instruction stated:

 

Where 
one party to a contract prevents complete performance of the contract by the 
other party, the party preventing performance has breached the 
contract.

 

Alpine 
contends that it was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal because the jury 
found that it had breached the contract although DJ's refused to allow warranty 
work to correct problems with the system.  
DJ's contends that this issue was not preserved for review under the 
requirement of W.R.C.P. 51(b)1 that Alpine objected to the refusal 
and provided the grounds for its objection.  It further contends that the instruction 
was not supported by the evidence, and, therefore, its refusal was not 
prejudicial.  

 

 

 

[¶8]           
"[A] 
party is entitled to have a jury instruction upon its theory of the case but 
only if such theory is supported by competent evidence and a proper request for 
the instruction is made."  Short 
v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Wyo. 1987).   
The record does not indicate that Alpine objected to the trial court's 
refusal of the instruction; however, its contention that the refusal was 
prejudicial because it deprived Alpine of an instruction on its theory of the 
case requires that we apply our plain error standard of review.  

 

[¶9]           
That 
standard requires (1) that the record reflects clear and unequivocally the fact 
complained of;  (2) that the facts 
prove a transgression of a clear rule of law;  and (3) that the error affects a 
substantial right that is materially prejudicial.  Triton 
Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 511 (Wyo. 1990).  The 
plain error doctrine is infrequently applied in our cases where a party has 
failed to object to a jury instruction.  
Id.  Unless 
an instructional error can be said to have plainly caused a fundamental 
prejudice to the defendant's legal rights, we will not overturn a verdict on 
appeal unless the instruction was objected to during the trial and a proper 
instruction was offered in its place.  
Id. 
at 
512 (citing Gore 
v. State, 
627 P.2d 1384, 1388-89 (Wyo. 1981)).

 

[¶10]      
We 
review the propriety of jury instructions by reviewing all as a whole to see if 
they adequately and clearly advise the jury of the applicable law.  Sellers 
v. Dooley Oil Transport, 2001 
WY 44, ¶9, 22 P.3d 307, 309 (Wyo. 2001).  
The function of jury instructions is to give guidance regarding the 
applicable law.  Id.  The 
trial court is not obligated to give an instruction offered by a party as long 
as the jury is adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to that 
case.  Id. 
The trial court's ruling on an instruction must be prejudicial to constitute 
reversible error.  Prejudice results 
when the instructions confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper 
principles of law.  Id.

 

[¶11]      In 
reviewing the evidence, we will assume the evidence in favor of the successful 
party is true, leave out of consideration entirely evidence of the unsuccessful 
party in conflict with it, and give to the evidence of the successful party 
every favorable inference which may fairly be drawn from it.  Moberly 
Asphalt Maintenance, Inc. v. Royal Associates, Ltd., 618 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Wyo. 1980).  
 

Jury 
Instructions

 

[¶12]      
Building 
and construction contracts contain a warranty either express or implied that the 
work will be sufficient for a certain purpose and will be performed in a 
skillful, careful, diligent, and workmanlike manner.  Matheson 
Drilling, Inc. v. Padova, 5 P.3d 810, 812 (Wyo. 2000); Arch 
Sellery, Inc. v. Simpson, 360 P.2d 911, 912 (Wyo. 1961).  The 
contract is not performed until the work accomplishes the agreed result.  Arch 
Sellery, 360 P.2d  at 912; see 
also Kansas 
Turnpike Authority v. Abramson, 275 F.2d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 1960) (where the 
principal object of the contract is to obtain a result, the builder is required 
to accomplish that purpose or result).  
Complete 
performance of a contract is proved by substantial performance that will exist 
even though there are minor defects that must be corrected at the expense of the 
contractor.  Pacific-Wyoming 
Oil Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 31 
Wyo. 314, 328-29, 226 P. 193, 198 (1924); Finley 
v. Pew, 28 
Wyo. 342, 361-62, 205 P. 310, 317 (1922).  

 

[¶13]      When 
a party prevents performance by the other party, the nonperformance is excused, 
and the party preventing performance is in breach of contract. Chandler-Simpson, 
Inc. v. Gorrell, 464 P.2d 849, 852 (Wyo. 1970); Sturgeon 
v. Phifer, 390 P.2d 727, 730 (Wyo. 1964); Thatcher 
v. Darr, 27 
Wyo. 452, 479, 199 P. 938, 947 (1921); see 
also 9 
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts 
§ 947, at 722 (int. ed. 2002) (performance that was prevented or substantially 
hindered is a defense); 17B C.J.S. Contracts 
 § 529, at 189 (1999).  The 
excuse of nonperformance by prevention does not apply when the contractor's own 
performance is insufficient to achieve the contract's purpose.  See 
Sturgeon, 390 P.2d  at 729-30.  Whether a party has 
prevented performance is a question of fact for the jury.  Chandler-Simpson, 
464 P.2d  at 852.

 

[¶14]      Alpine's 
owner testified that he considered the project complete at the end of November 
because the equipment was up and running.  
He acknowledged that Alpine continued to return in December; however, he 
contended the services provided were to finish tasks not critical to the 
functioning of the equipment.  
Because the December invoice did not provide a breakdown of charges, a 
revised invoice was sent on January 9, 2001.  It showed that Alpine returned to DJ'S's 
numerous times between December 1 and December 28, 2000, and expended about 104 
hours on the contract.  The invoice 
stated that eleven hours of warranty work were performed after October 24, 2000, 
but did not specify on which dates the warranty work occurred.  The only express terms of the warranty 
stated that Alpine's workmanship warranty extended for one year from the date of 
the invoice.  Nothing in the record 
indicates any evidence of an agreement that Alpine would not be liable for 
defective workmanship if notice and an opportunity to correct the defects were 
not given by DJ's.  

 

[¶15]      Despite 
Alpine's completion of installation and performance of warranty work, testimony 
at trial indicated that the system experienced significant problems in November 
and December and failed on Christmas Day of 2000.  Alpine was called but did not show up, 
and another contractor began working on the system on December 26, 2000, and 
continued to work on it until January 30, 2001.  Alpine's invoice stated that fifteen 
hours of labor was provided on December 27 and 28.  The second contractor testified that his 
work was to remedy Alpine's defective workmanship and provided detailed 
descriptions of many problems requiring correction.  His invoice for work and parts to 
correct the defective workmanship totaled over $13,000.00.  

 

[¶16]      This 
record shows that the jury had evidence that Alpine believed that it had 
completed its performance on the contract at least by early December when it 
submitted an invoice to DJ's.  
Despite this belief, the evidence indicates that Alpine continued to work 
on the system, that Alpine's owner believed that some of this work was for 
warranty purposes, that beginning December 26, another contractor began working 
on the system, and that Alpine returned on December 27 and 28 to work on the 
system.  These facts show that 
Alpine was not prevented from any performance by DJ's.  Without evidence to support giving an 
instruction about prevented performance, the trial court properly refused 
it.

 

[¶17]      The 
evidence, however, did require instructions regarding defective 
workmanship.  A cause of action for 
defective workmanship is available against a contractor either as breach of 
contract or negligence or both.  
Cline 
v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 732 (Wyo. 1979).   
The following instructions were provided to the 
jury:

 

Warranty 
- In General

A 
warranty is defined as an affirmation of fact or promise by the seller of items 
possessing certain characteristics.  
A warranty may be made expressly and in so many words by the seller 
either in writing or orally or it may be implied by law from the circumstances 
of the contract.

 

Breach 
of Warranty

In 
construction contracts, there is an implied warranty that the work will be 
performed in a skillful, careful, diligent and workmanlike 
manner.

 

Measure 
of Damages - Warranty

If 
you find that Alpine Climate Control, Inc. breached the implied warranty, DJ's 
Inc. is permitted to recover those reasonably foreseeable damages that directly 
resulted from the breach  that is, such an amount as would place it in the 
condition it would have been in if Alpine Climate Control, Inc. had adequately 
installed the refrigeration equipment.

 

 

[¶18]      Instructions 
provided to this jury also defined contract formation, breach of contract, and 
explained contract damages.  
Regarding performance, the jury was instructed that if Alpine performed 
"as required by the terms and conditions of the contract, and DJ's, Inc. failed 
to perform as required by the contract," then Alpine could recover any damages 
that it suffered.  The jury was 
instructed that if Alpine failed to properly install the refrigeration equipment 
as agreed to by the parties, then DJ's could recover the damages that it 
suffered.  Reviewed as a whole, 
these instructions adequately describe the law as it pertains to the evidence 
presented in this case.    

 

[¶19]      By 
its judgment, the jury determined that DJ's did not breach the contract by 
failing to pay Alpine the balance due on the invoice.  The jury also determined that Alpine's 
performance did breach the contract and awarded DJ's damages.  The evidence supports this 
verdict.

 

[¶20]      The 
order of judgment is affirmed.

 

      FOOTNOTES

 

 1(b) 
Further instructions; objections. -- At the close of the evidence or at 
such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party 
may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in the requests.  The court 
shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their 
arguments to the jury.  Before the 
argument of the case to the jury has begun, the court shall give to the jury 
such instructions on the law as may be necessary and the same shall be in 
writing, numbered and signed by the judge, and shall be taken by the jury when 
it retires.  No party may assign as 
error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.  Opportunity shall be given to make the 
objection out of the hearing of the jury.