Title: Smith v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Tyrone L. Smith v. State of Maryland, No. 76, September Term, 2011
BURDEN OF PROOF—TRANSPORTATION: To convict a defendant of driving without
a license under Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article, the State need only prove
part (1), that the defendant was driving without a license, as part of its case-in-chief.  If a
defendant wishes to assert that he is either expressly exempt from the licensing requirement
or otherwise is specifically authorized to drive under the statute, he must raise such a claim
as an affirmative defense.
Circuit Court for Carroll County
Case No. 06-K-09-38696
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 76
September Term, 2011
                                                                             
TYRONE L. SMITH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, Specially Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   March 21, 2012
1Unless otherwise provided, all statutory references are to Maryland Code,
Transportation Article.
In this case, we must pull over and decide a narrow legal issue that emerged from a
routine traffic stop.  Petitioner Tyrone L. Smith was convicted of driving without a license
in 2009.  He appealed, claiming that the State’s evidence was insufficient to convict him
under Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article.  That section reads:
In general. — An individual may not drive or attempt to drive
a motor vehicle on any highway in this State unless:
(1) The individual holds a driver’s license issued under
this title; 
(2) The individual is expressly exempt from the licensing
requirements of this title; or 
(3) The individual otherwise is specifically authorized by
this title to drive vehicles of the class that the individual is
driving or attempting to drive.
Md. Code (1977, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article.1  
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction, finding the evidence sufficient.
The statute that defines driving without a license contains three parts, and Petitioner argues
that the State must prove all three as part of its case.  The State counters that the latter two
parts are merely affirmative defenses, either of which a defendant must raise himself to avoid
conviction.
We granted certiorari to clarify the statutory ambiguity and to answer the following
question, which we have summarized and restated:
To convict a defendant of driving without a license in violation
of Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article, must the
State prove all three parts of the statute, as elements of the
2The question was presented to us by Petitioner in this form:
To convict a defendant of violating Transportation Article § 16-
101(a), which provides that an individual may not drive a motor
vehicle unless he or she (1) holds a driver’s license issued under
Title 16 of the Article, (2) is expressly exempt from the
licensing requirements of that title, or (3) is specifically
authorized by the title to drive vehicles of the class he or she is
driving, is the State required to prove, as elements of the
offense, that the defendant was not expressly exempt from the
licensing requirements and was not specifically authorized to
drive the relevant class of vehicle?
2
offense, beyond a reasonable doubt?2
We shall hold that the State need only prove the first part of the statute, and that the
second and third parts are affirmative defenses that must be raised by a defendant.
Facts and Legal Proceedings
The facts in this case are not disputed.  On January 30, 2009, Petitioner was stopped
by the Westminster City police.  The police ran checks on Petitioner with the Maryland
Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”), revealing that his registration had been suspended
and had expired.  Additional checks revealed that Petitioner’s driver’s license had been
suspended in 2002 for failing to perform a driving improvement program and in 2003 for
child support violations.  His license was never reinstated, and his expired license was
deleted from MVA records in 2005.  Although Petitioner had an MVA-issued photo
identification, he did not have a valid driver’s license when stopped in 2009.
The Circuit Court for Carroll County found Petitioner guilty of driving without a
license and entered a nolle prosequi to the remaining traffic counts against him.  The Circuit
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Court sentenced Petitioner to 60 days at the Carroll County Detention Center.  Petitioner
then timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
In that Court, Petitioner raised the question: “Was the evidence insufficient to convict
[Petitioner] of violating Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article?”  In an unreported
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals found no error and affirmed the Circuit Court.  It  held
that the evidence sufficiently supported Petitioner’s conviction, because the State needed
only to prove part (1) of Section 16-101(a):
The exceptions to the license requirement set forth in subsection
(2) and (3) are not constituent elements of the offense itself, but
rather affirmative defenses to be raised by a defendant should
they apply.
A petition for certiorari to this Court followed, which we granted on October 24,
2011.  See Smith v. State, 422 Md. 353, 30 A.3d 193 (2011).  
Discussion
Petitioner asks us to interpret the language of Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation
Article.  He argues that the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1)
he did not have a Maryland driver’s license, (2) he was not expressly exempt from the
licensing requirements, and (3) he was not specifically authorized to drive vehicles of the
class that he was driving.  The State counters that the offense is defined by Section 16-
101(a)(1), and the subsequent exceptions must be raised by a defendant as affirmative
defenses. 
Both parties cite Mackall v. State, in which this Court discussed the test for whether
4
a statutory exception to a crime is an essential element of the offense that the State must
negate or an affirmative defense that a defendant must raise:
[W]hen a penal act contains an exception so incorporated with
the substance of the clause defining the offense as to constitute
a material part of  the description of the acts, omission or other
ingredients which constitute the offense, the burden is on the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offense
charged is not within the exception.  In other words, when an
exception is descriptive of the offense or so incorporated in the
clause creating it as to make the exception a part of the offense,
the State must negate the exception to prove its case.  But, when
an exception is not descriptive of the offense or so incorporated
in the clause creating it as to make the exception a part of the
offense, the exception must be interposed by the accused as an
affirmative defense.  (Citation omitted.)
Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100, 110–11, 387 A.2d 762, 767–68 (1978).  The statute in
question in Mackall governed deadly or dangerous weapons:
(a) Carrying concealed or openly with intent to injure; carrying
by persons under eighteen at night in certain counties. — Every
person who shall wear or carry any dirk knife, bowie knife . . .
or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind,
whatsoever (penknives without switchblade and handguns,
excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person
who shall wear or carry such weapon openly with the intent or
purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
* * *
(c) Exceptions. — Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent the carrying of any of the weapons mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section by an officer of this State, or of
any county or city therein, who is entitled or required to carry
such weapon as part of his official equipment, or by any
conservator of the peace, who is entitled or required to carry
5
such weapon as part of his official equipment, or by any officer
or conservator of the peace of some other state temporarily
sojourning in this State, or by any special agent of a railway or
by any person to whom a permit to carry a concealed weapon
has been issued under § 36E of this article, or by any person
who shall carry such weapon as a reasonable precaution against
apprehended danger . . . .
Id. at 103–06, 387 A.2d at 763–65.
The Mackall Court concluded:
[I]t is manifest that the weapons exception in subsection (a), set
out in the enacting clause defining the offense, is an essential
ingredient of the offense.  The offense defined is committed
only if certain weapons are carried.  What those weapons are
can be determined only in terms of those which are proscribed
and those which are excepted.  The weapons excepted are as
necessary to the description of the offense as are the weapons
proscribed.
Id. at 111, 387 A.2d at 768.  The exceptions in subsection (c), however, were in a subsection
that followed the enacting clause and were thus not incorporated within the definition or
description so as to constitute a part of it.  See id.  The State therefore had to negate the
exceptions in subsection (a) only.
The parties disagree how the rule in Mackall should be applied to Petitioner’s case.
The State argues that Section 16-101(a)(1) defines the proscribed act, whereas (a)(2) and
(a)(3) “are not necessary to the description of the offense because . . . they do not define any
conditions under which an individual may drive a motor vehicle.”  The State asserts that,
3Section 16-102(a), for example, defines twelve classes of individuals to whom the
licensing requirements do not apply.  Excerpts from this section are presented below. 
6
because (a)(2) and (a)(3) “refer to conditions that are defined elsewhere,”3 they do not fit
within Mackall’s definition of the elements of an offense, as they are neither within the
“enacting clause” nor “so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as
to constitute a part thereof.”  Id. at 110–11, 387 A.2d at 768.
Petitioner synthesizes Mackall and the legislative history to argue that all three parts
of Section 16-101(a) must be proved as part of the State’s case.  Since 1969, all statutory
versions of this section have used the same three-part structure.  See Chapter 159 of the Acts
of 1969.  Before that, the statute provided, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person except those
hereinafter expressly exempted shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State
unless such person has a valid license as an operator or chauffeur under the provisions of this
article.”  Md. Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.), Art. 66½, § 86(a).  In 1969, the statute was
revamped, and that version is substantially the same as the current statute.  See Chapter 159
of the Acts of 1969.
Without explicitly saying so, Petitioner implies that this 1969 revision transformed
the exemptions into a part of the offense that must be proved by the State.  The title to
Chapter 159 indicates that the Legislature did intend to “revamp and consolidate” the entire
licensure law in Maryland.  See id.  Petitioner’s implication that this “substantive revision”
of the statute somehow transformed the exemptions into elements of the offense, however,
is unpersuasive.  Petitioner can cite no further legislative history supporting this
4See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 247, 932 A.2d 571, 587 (2007) (“[L]egislative
bill files were not retained systematically by the General Assembly’s Standing Committees
or the Department of Legislative  Reference (now known as the Department of Legislative
Services) until 1975.”).
7
interpretation, as the 1969 revision predates comprehensive legislative record-keeping.4
Instead, Petitioner states that the statute’s “plain language . . . compels the conclusion that
to establish a violation, the State must prove” all three parts of the statute.
Although cited and discussed by both parties, the legislative history of Section 16-101
offers little help in interpreting the statute.  Instead, we turn to one of our well-established
canons of statutory interpretation: In every case, a statute must be given “a reasonable
interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.”  See
Robinson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 424 Md. 41, 51, 33 A.3d 972, 978 (2011); State v. Johnson,
415 Md. 413, 422, 2 A.3d 368, 373 (2010).  This principle applies even when the statute is
ambiguous, as we explained in Allen v. State:
Legislative purpose is critical, that purpose must be discerned
in light of context, and statutes are to be construed reasonably
with reference to the purpose to be accomplished.  The purpose,
in short, determined  in light of the statute’s context, is the key.
And that purpose becomes the context within which we apply
the plain-meaning rule.  Thus results that are unreasonable,
illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided
with the real legislative intention prevailing over the intention
indicated by the literal meaning.  (Citations omitted.)
Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 75, 935 A.2d 421, 430 (2007).  
The State argues that interpreting parts two and three as affirmative defenses
comports with common sense.  Petitioner responds that if we adopt the State’s interpretation,
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consonant with our “common sense” jurisprudence, then the Legislature would never have
to grapple with and solve the enforcement problem that its statute created, and thus we
would “never know whether the Judiciary’s solution is the one the Legislature would have
adopted.”  Furthermore, Petitioner believes that the State’s interpretation would
undermine the guidance that a case like Mackall could give
legislative drafters, and it would send the message that the
Legislature does not need to grapple with these policy questions
in the first place because the Judiciary will do so if necessary to
make a poorly drafted statute easier for the State to enforce.
This idea directly conflicts with our jurisprudence calling for us to interpret a statute
in a common-sense, logical manner if its language is ambiguous or if the plain meaning of
the statute does not lend itself to facile interpretation.  See, e.g., Briggs v. State, 413 Md. 265,
275, 992 A.2d 433, 439 (2010) (“Where a statute is ambiguous, we also consider the
consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction
which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common
sense.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning &
Plumbing, Inc. v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336, 342, 783 A.2d 691, 694 (2001) (“[T]he court, in
seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one
meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or
unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” (citation omitted)).
In this case, requiring the State to prove all three parts of Section 16-101(a) would
surely be illogical.  Neither party disputes that the State must prove part (1), that the
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defendant does not hold a Maryland driver’s license.  See § 16-101(a)(1).  Part (2) permits
an individual to drive a motor vehicle in Maryland if “the individual is expressly exempt
from the licensing requirements” of the statute.  Section 16-101(a)(2).  These exemptions are
listed in Section 16-102(a), which says that the licensing requirements do not apply to:
(1) An officer or employee of the United States while driving on
official business a motor vehicle other than a commercial motor
vehicle owned or operated by the United States;
(2) Except for members elected from this State, a member of the
United States Congress . . . ;
(3) An individual while driving any road machine, farm tractor,
or farm equipment . . . ;
(4) An individual who, while driving a mobile crane on a
highway to or from a construction site in this State, has with
him a valid Class A, B, or C license . . . ;
(5) A nonresident student enrolled in an accredited school,
college, or university of this State or of a bordering state or
serving a medical internship in this State . . . ;
(6) A new resident of this State during the first 60 days of
residency . . . ;
(7) A member of the armed forces of the United States or of the
United States Public Health Service who is serving on active
duty and any dependent of the member . . . ;
(8) For not more than 30 days after he returns to the United
States, a member of the armed forces of the United States who
is returning from active duty outside the United States and any
dependent of the member . . . ;
(9) A nonresident of this State if:
(i) He has with him a license to drive issued to
him by the state of his residence;
(ii) His license authorizes him to drive in that
state vehicles of the class he is driving in this
State; and
(iii) He is at least the same age as that required of
a resident for the vehicle he is driving in this
State;
(10) A nonresident of the United States if:
10
(i) The individual has a valid license to drive
issued to the individual by the country of
residence;
(ii) The individual’s license authorizes him to
drive in that country vehicles of the class he is
driving in this State;
(iii) The individual is at least the same age as that
required of a resident for the vehicle he is driving
in this State; and
(iv) Except as provided for in Subtitle 8 of this
title, the vehicle is not a commercial motor
vehicle;
(11) A member of the Maryland National Guard or a National
Guard military technician . . . ; and
(12) A member or employee of a fire department, rescue squad,
emergency medical services unit, or volunteer fire company
while driving an emergency vehicle . . . .
Many of the exemptions in this section would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant, and this Court has held that “when the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge
of the defendant . . . the burden is on him to prove that he comes within one or more of the
exceptions.”  Spurrier v. State, 229 Md. 110, 112, 182 A.2d 358, 359 (1962); see also
Gibraltar Constr. & Eng’g Inc. v. State Nat’l Bank, 265 Md. 530, 535, 290 A. 2d 789, 792
(1972) (“The facts in regard to the doing of intrastate business in Maryland are particularly
within Gibraltar’s knowledge and the burden of coming forward with evidence to indicate
a change in this regard was upon it.”).
Petitioner argues that this principle did not survive Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975). In Mullaney, the State of Maine required a defendant charged with
murder to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce
5The full footnote reads:
Many States do require the defendant to show that there is
“some evidence” indicating that he acted in the heat of passion
before requiring the prosecution to negate this element by
proving the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that requirement.
(Citations and quotation marks omitted.)
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.28, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1891 n.28 (1975).
11
a homicide charge to manslaughter.  See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684–85, 95 S. Ct. at
1882–83.  The Supreme Court held that this Maine law violated the due process requirement
that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged.  Id. at 703–04, 95 S. Ct. at 1892.  Petitioner argues that Mullaney means our
rule in Spurrier no longer applies, for Mullaney said that “although intent is typically
considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, this does not, as the
Court has long recognized, justify shifting the burden to him.”  Id. at 702, 95 S. Ct. at 1891.
This is a misreading of Mullaney. 
A more careful reading of Mullaney reveals that the Supreme Court carefully
preserved the right of a state to require a defendant to put forth “some evidence” to indicate
that “he acted in the heat of passion before requiring the prosecution to negate this element
by proving the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 702 n.28, 95 S. Ct. at
1891 n.28.5  Here, Petitioner put forth absolutely nothing to suggest that he was licensed to
drive in another state or that he fell within any of the other exemptions listed in Section 16-
102(a).
12
It is also significant that Mullaney involved proof of intent in committing a homicide.
In such a case, the facts involved in proving the defendant’s intent are often the very
circumstances of proof of the homicide.  As the Supreme Court said, “in this case . . . the
State has affirmatively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.  The result in a case such
as this one where the defendant is required to prove the critical fact in dispute, is to increase
further the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction.”  Id. at 701, 95 S. Ct. at 1890.
Here, the exemptions from this licensure requirement are not the “critical fact[s] in dispute.”
There is nothing that remotely suggests they are in dispute at all. 
 The Court of Special Appeals has also adhered to keeping such a burden on the
defendant.  See, e.g., Herd v. State, 125 Md. App. 77, 102–03, 724 A.2d 693, 706 (1999).
In Herd, the Court of Special Appeals went to some length to distinguish Mullaney:
Maryland has traditionally placed upon a defendant, by the
device of giving the State the benefit of a presumption to the
contrary, the obligation to see that there is produced sufficient
evidence to generate a jury question on such issues as
intoxication, self-defense, and entrapment.
We are persuaded that nothing in Mullaney v. Wilbur adversely
affects in any way the status of presumptions in this limited
function of requiring that there be produced sufficient evidence
to generate a jury issue. The holding of Mullaney v. Wilbur was
very careful to add a qualifying clause:
We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of
passion on sudden provocation when the issue is
properly presented in a homicide case.
6Furthermore, part (3) of Section 16-101(a) permits an individual to drive a motor
vehicle in Maryland if “the individual otherwise is specifically authorized” by the statute to
drive such a vehicle.  Section 16-101(a)(3).  As the Petitioner acknowledges, it is “unclear”
what exactly this third part refers to.  The State seizes upon this point, correctly flagging the
illogical result that would ensue under Petitioner’s interpretation, as Petitioner “cannot even
specify what his own interpretation of the statute would require the State to prove[.]” As
such, if a defendant is to avoid conviction under part (3), he must raise it as an affirmative
defense.
13
(Emphasis, citations, and quotation marks omitted.)
Id. at 102–03, 724 A.2d at 706; see also 5 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence § 300:1 (2d
ed. 2001) (“The party who has peculiar knowledge of certain facts bears the burden of
proving them.”); Sproates v. State, 58 Md. App. 547, 568, 473 A.2d 1289, 1299 (1984)
(“There is nothing inherently unconstitutional about requiring a defendant to come forward
with information particularly within his knowledge to show that he comes within one or
more of the statutory exceptions.  In fact, it is to his advantage to produce such evidence.”).
For these reasons, the exemptions in part (2) are affirmative defenses that must be
raised by a defendant.6
Conclusion
We  hold that, consistent with Mackall, the logical interpretation of this statute is that
Section 16-101(a)(1) defines the offense, and Sections 16-101(a)(2) and (a)(3) are not so
incorporated into the offense as to constitute part of it.  The exceptions outlined in the latter
two parts are affirmative defenses that a defendant must raise.  Petitioner failed to do so, and
the State’s evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
14
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.