Title: State v. Bonnett

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 471A96
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
SHAWN DERRICK BONNETT a/k/a TYRONE WILLIAMS
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Everett, J.,
on 26 September 1996 in Superior Court, Martin County, upon a
jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.  Defendant’s
motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to an additional
judgment for robbery with a dangerous weapon was allowed by the
Supreme Court on 17 October 1997.  Heard in the Supreme Court
26 May 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jeffrey P.
Gray, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Rudolph A. Ashton, III, for defendant-appellant.
PARKER, Justice.
Defendant Shawn Derrick Bonnett was indicted on
22 January 1996 for the first-degree murder of Robert Stancil
Hardison (“victim”) and for robbery with a dangerous weapon. 
Three codefendants, Christopher Moore, Richard Smith, and Jimmy
Smith, were also indicted but were not tried together.  The jury
found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the bases of
premeditation and deliberation and the felony-murder rule. 
Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a
sentence of death; and the trial court entered judgment in
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accordance with that recommendation.  The jury also found
defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and the
trial court sentenced defendant to a consecutive sentence of 129
to 164 months’ imprisonment.
The State’s evidence tended to show the following. 
Between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m. on 4 January 1996, defendant and his
codefendants drove to Hardison’s General Merchandise, which was
owned and operated by the victim and his wife and located in the
Farm Life community of rural Martin County outside Williamston,
North Carolina.  Richard Smith (a/k/a “Joe Raggs”) drove a yellow
GEO Storm, Jimmy Smith (a/k/a “Little Jimmy”) was in the
passenger seat, and defendant and Christopher Moore sat in the
rear seats.  Moore and Little Jimmy went inside the victim’s
store to buy some beer.  They got back into the car and drove
around for five or ten minutes.  At approximately 6:30 p.m. they
stopped at the store again, and defendant and Moore went inside
to buy beer.  Another five to ten minutes later, they returned a
third time; and Joe Raggs bought some beer.  While riding around
some more, Little Jimmy said to the others, “we all have to stick
together whatever happen[s], because we’re, we’re about to go
ahead and hit this store.”  After they agreed to “stick
together,” Joe Raggs said, “We’re going to have to smoke the old
m-----f-----.”
They continued to drive past the store until there were
no customers inside.  At about 7:30 p.m. they pulled into the
store’s parking lot, and defendant handed a gun to Little Jimmy. 
Joe Raggs stayed in the car.  Moore and Little Jimmy went to the
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beer cooler, while defendant stood next to the counter.  Little
Jimmy placed a beer on the counter; and when the victim
approached in order to ring up the sale, Little Jimmy pulled out
the gun and shot the victim three or four times.  Then Moore took
the victim’s gun from the victim’s back pocket, and defendant
took the money box.
They drove to a motel in Greenville and divided up the
money.  They decided to return to Williamston, and on the way a
highway patrolman, who had been given a description and license
plate number of the yellow GEO Storm, pursued them.  Joe Raggs
pulled into the yard of a house, and they all entered the house. 
Joe Raggs and Little Jimmy decided to go out the front door and
were arrested.  Moore stayed inside, but he left the house when
the police instructed him to do so and was arrested.  Defendant
escaped through the back door.  On 8 January 1996 the police
discovered the whereabouts of defendant, and he was arrested
without incident.
Defendant presented no evidence at the guilt phase.
Additional facts will be presented as needed to discuss
specific issues.
PRETRIAL ISSUES
By his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that pretrial publicity surrounding the murder was so extensive
as to require a change of venue or a special venire from another
county.  He argues that this publicity made it impossible for him
to receive a fair trial by a Martin County jury.
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N.C.G.S. § 15A-957 provides that if there exists so
great a prejudice against the defendant in the county in which he
is charged that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial, the
court must either transfer the case to another county or order a
special venire from another county.  State v. Perkins, 345 N.C.
254, 275, 481 S.E.2d 25, 33, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 64 (1997).  The burden is on a defendant to establish that
“it is reasonably likely that prospective jurors would base their
decision in the case upon pretrial information rather than the
evidence presented at trial and would be unable to remove from
their minds any preconceived impressions they might have formed.” 
State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 255, 307 S.E.2d 339, 347 (1983). 
A defendant must “establish specific and identifiable prejudice
against him as a result of pretrial publicity . . . [by showing]
inter alia that jurors with prior knowledge decided the case,
that he exhausted his peremptory challenges, and that a juror
objectionable to him sat on the jury.”  State v. Billings,  ___
N.C. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, 1998 WL 237163, at *2 (May 8,
1998) (No. 216A96) (emphasis omitted).  The determination of
whether defendant has carried his burden lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.  State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184,
204, 481, S.E.2d 44, 54 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139
L. Ed. 2d 134, and cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___
(1998).
Our review of the record in this case reveals that the
trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a
change of venue or special venire.  While several jurors selected
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indicated that they had read or heard about the case, all but one
stated that they had not formed an opinion about the case, could
set aside any information, and could be fair and impartial. 
Juror Bullock, who had formed an opinion and knew the victim,
stated unequivocally that he could set his opinion aside and base
his decision in this case on the evidence.
However, our examination does not end here.  This Court
recognized in Jerrett that where the totality of the
circumstances reveals that a county’s population is so “infected”
with prejudice against a defendant that he cannot receive a fair
trial, the defendant has met his burden.  State v. Jerrett, 309
N.C. at 258, 307 S.E.2d at 349.  In Jerrett we noted that “the
crime occurred in a small, rural and closely-knit county where
the entire county was, in effect, a neighborhood.”  Id. at 256,
307 S.E.2d at 348.  The population of Alleghany County was 9,587
people, id. at 252 n.1, 307 S.E.2d at 346 n.1; the voir dire
revealed that one-third of the prospective jurors knew the victim
or some member of the victim’s family, and many jurors knew
potential State’s witnesses, id. at 257, 307 S.E.2d at 348-49. 
Furthermore, the jury was examined collectively on voir dire,
thus allowing prospective jurors to hear that other prospective
jurors knew the victim and the victim’s family, that some had
already formed opinions, and that some would not be able to give
the defendant a fair trial, id. at 257-58, 307 S.E.2d at 349.
This case is distinguishable from Jerrett.  Martin
County’s population at the time of the crime was over 25,000. 
North Carolina Manual 1995-1996, at 970 (Lisa A. Marcus ed.). 
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Further, the level of familiarity that the Jerrett jurors had
with the victim, the victim’s family, and witnesses is not
present in this case.  While a number of prospective jurors had
heard or read about the case, in viewing the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood
that pretrial publicity prevented defendant from receiving a fair
trial in Martin County and that the trial court did not err by
refusing to grant defendant’s motion for change of venue or a
special venire.
 Defendant further contends that included within the
totality of circumstances should be the fact that his
codefendants’ trial was transferred on account of pervasive
prejudice.  However, codefendants’ trial was subsequent to
defendant’s trial; and publicity from defendant’s trial most
likely created much of the prejudice against codefendants such
that they could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in Martin
County.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for individual voir dire of prospective
jurors.  Defendant argues that the pretrial publicity was so
great that it was reasonably likely that prospective jurors would
make a decision upon pretrial information instead of the evidence
presented at trial.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214 provides in pertinent part that
“[i]n capital cases the trial judge for good cause shown may
direct that jurors be selected one at a time, in which case each
juror must first be passed by the State.  These jurors may be
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sequestered before and after selection.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(j)
(1997).  The decision to deny individual voir dire of prospective
jurors rests in the trial court’s sound discretion, and this
ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of
discretion.  State v. Barnard, 346 N.C. 95, 101, 484 S.E.2d 382,
385 (1997).
Defendant has offered no convincing argument that the
trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing individual voir
dire.  “A defendant does not have a right to examine jurors
individually merely because there has been pretrial publicity.” 
State v. Burke, 342 N.C. 113, 122, 463 S.E.2d 212, 218 (1995).  A
careful examination of jury selection reveals no harm to
defendant resulting from the denial of his motion.  We hold that
the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion.
By his next assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to preclude
the State from seeking the death penalty in that, inter alia, the
death penalty would be disparate, disproportionate, excessive,
and cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and
North Carolina Constitutions.  Defendant acknowledges that this
issue has already been decided adversely to him, and we need not
consider it further.  See State v. Robinson, 342 N.C. 74, 88, 463
S.E.2d 218, 226 (1995) (holding that no Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), issue arises when defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder upon the theory of
premeditation and deliberation in addition to the felony-murder
theory), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1996).
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Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to bifurcate and his alternate motion to
continue so that defendant would not be tried or sentenced until
after Richard Smith and Jimmy Smith were tried.  The crux of
defendant’s concern is that if defendant was tried and sentenced
prior to the Smiths’ case he might receive a death sentence if
convicted; and Richard Smith and Jimmy Smith might receive life
sentences at a later trial, which is in fact what occurred. 
Defendant contends that he was less culpable than the Smiths and
that, if sentenced after them, he should be able to argue to his
sentencing jury the fact that the Smiths received life sentences.
Defendant concedes that this Court has previously held
that a defendant is not entitled to separate jury trials, one to
determine guilt or innocence and another to determine punishment,
State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 133, 362 S.E.2d 513, 520 (1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988); however,
he claims that the facts of this case are distinguishable and
warrant the particular relief he seeks.  We disagree.
In State v. Bond we held that, for purposes of
sentencing, the fact that a codefendant received a lesser
sentence “was not admissible as a mitigating circumstance because
such evidence did not pertain to ‘defendant’s character, record,
or the nature of his participation in the offense.’”  State v.
Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 34, 478 S.E.2d 163, 180 (1996) (quoting State
v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 104, 282 S.E.2d 439, 447 (1981)), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997).  Thus, this
assignment of error is overruled.
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By his next assignment of error, defendant argues that
by arraigning him in chambers and not in open court, the trial
court violated his constitutional right to an open and public
trial under Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina
Constitution.  Defendant acknowledges that this Court has
rejected the per se rule that failure to conduct a formal
arraignment on a capital charge constitutes reversible error. 
State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 50, 337 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d
373 (1988).  Further, we hold that defendant has not been
prejudiced by being arraigned in chambers, and thus we find no
merit to this assignment of error.
Next, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in
holding an unrecorded conference without defendant’s being
present, in violation of his state and federal constitutional
rights.  Following defendant’s arraignment in the judge’s
chambers, the trial judge stated, “All right.  Take the defendant
back out there[;] let me see counsel here just a minute.”  No
recording was made of the subsequent conference outside the
presence of defendant.
Under the North Carolina Constitution, a defendant in a
capital case has an unwaiveable right to be present at every
stage of his trial.  State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 227, 464
S.E.2d 414, 430 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d
47 (1996).  Further, under the United States Constitution, a
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defendant has a right to be present under the Confrontation
Clause as well as a due process right to be present.  Id.
However, “[n]ot every error caused by a defendant’s
absence requires reversal as these errors are subject to a
harmless-error analysis.”  Id. at 227-28, 464 S.E.2d at 431.  In
Buckner we held that no error, constitutional or otherwise,
existed when a conference took place prior to the commencement of
defendant’s trial.  Id. at 228, 464 S.E.2d at 431.  Since the
record clearly indicates that the conference about which
defendant complains took place prior to the start of his trial,
we likewise find no merit to this assignment of error.
JURY SELECTION ISSUES
Defendant next argues that the trial court violated his
constitutional rights by conducting ten bench conferences outside
his presence.  Defendant was present in the courtroom and
represented by counsel at these conferences but, nevertheless,
contends that his absence from the bench conference violated his
constitutional rights to be present at every stage of the
proceedings.
In State v. Speller, 345 N.C. 600, 481 S.E.2d 284
(1997), the trial court conducted ten unrecorded bench
conferences with defense counsel and counsel for the State. 
Defendant was present in the courtroom but was not included in
the conferences.  This Court concluded that since (i) “defendant
was in a position to observe the context of the conferences and
to inquire of his attorneys as to the nature and substance of
each one [and] . . . had a firsthand source as to what
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transpired,” (ii) “defense counsel had the opportunity and
obligation to raise for the record any matter to which defendant
took exception,” and (iii) defendant “failed to demonstrate that
the bench conferences implicated his constitutional right to be
present or that his presence would have substantially affected
his opportunity to defend,” the trial court “did not err in
conducting the bench conferences with the attorneys out of the
hearing of defendant.”  Id. at 605, 481 S.E.2d at 286-87; see
also State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 265, 439 S.E.2d 547, 557
(holding that defendant failed to meet his burden of showing how
his absence from the conferences caused him prejudice), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994).
In this case we note that of the ten bench conferences
about which defendant complains, nine were recorded; and the
transcript shows that eight of the recorded bench conferences
concerned questions of law.  In the remaining recorded
conference, the trial court inquired of counsel how best to
handle an incident where a reporter had talked to a juror.  The
only unrecorded conference occurred during voir dire of a
prospective juror who was excused for cause because her views
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her
duties as a juror.  Defendant was present in the courtroom and
was represented by counsel at each conference.  Further,
defendant gives no indication, and we cannot discern, how his
presence would have served any useful purposes.  For these
reasons we hold that defendant has failed to meet his burden of
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showing how he was prejudiced by his absence from these
conferences; therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.
By his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that his right to be tried by a jury selected without regard to
race was violated by the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges.  Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed.
2d 395, 405 (1991).
Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution of North
Carolina forbids the use of peremptory challenges for a racially
discriminating purpose, State v. Williams, 339 N.C. 1, 15, 452
S.E.2d 245, 254 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 833, 133 L. Ed. 2d
61 (1995), as does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 86, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 80 (1986).
In Batson the United States Supreme Court set out a
three-pronged test to determine whether a prosecutor
impermissibly excluded prospective jurors on the basis of their
race.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405. 
First, a criminal defendant must establish a prima facie case
that the peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race. 
Id. at 358, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405.  Second, once the prima facie
case has been established by the defendant, the burden shifts to
the State to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking
the juror in question.  Id. at 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405.  The
explanation must be clear and reasonably specific, but “‘need not
rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.’” 
State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990)
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(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88). 
Furthermore, “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral.”  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed 2d at 406; see
also Purkett v. Elam, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834,
839-40 (1995); State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. at 209-10, 481 S.E.2d at
57.  This Court also permits the defendant at this point to
introduce evidence that the State’s explanations are merely a
pretext.  State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 16, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296
(1991).
Third, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has satisfied his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at
405.  The trial court’s findings as to race neutrality and
purposeful discrimination depend in large measure on the trial
judge’s evaluation of credibility; hence, these findings should
be given great deference.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 90 L. Ed.
2d at 89 n.21.  The trial court’s determination will be upheld
unless the appellate court is convinced that the trial court’s
decision is clearly erroneous.  State v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 419,
434-35, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed.
2d 167 (1996).
In this case the prosecutor gave reasons for the
excusal of each juror defendant now challenges.  Therefore, “we
need not address the question of whether defendant met his
initial burden of showing discrimination and may proceed as if a
prima facie case had been established.”  State v. Harden, 344
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N.C. 542, 557, 476 S.E.2d 658, 665 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1997).
The prosecutor used seven of his peremptory challenges
to remove black venire members.  Defendant contends that the
reasons given by the prosecutor were a pretext and that the trial
court erred in finding no purposeful discrimination for the
dismissal of four black, prospective jurors--Mr. Carmon, Mr.
Morning, Mr. Williams, and Ms. Ossie Brown.  We disagree.
The prosecutor indicated that he excused Mr. Carmon for
the reasons that Mr. Carmon was equivocal about the effect on his
decision of a codefendant testifying pursuant to a plea
agreement, the prosecutor was unable to make eye contact with
him, and the prosecutor detected a smile or smirk when talking to
him.
Regarding Mr. Morning, the prosecutor gave as reasons
for his removal that Mr. Morning was equivocal about the death
penalty, that he was not paying attention when the prosecutor was
going through the issues related to the death penalty, that the
prosecutor was not able to make eye contact with him, and that a
lead investigator who would be a witness in the case had informed
the prosecutor that he had questioned Mr. Morning in a felonious
larceny case under investigation.
As to Mr. Williams, the prosecutor stated that his
answers concerning the death penalty were equivocal, that the
prosecutor had been informed by a law enforcement officer who had
known Mr. Williams for a number of years that one could not
depend on what he said, and that Mr. Williams had been
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investigated as a suspect in a larceny case several years
earlier.  See State v. Glenn, 333 N.C. 296, 303, 425 S.E.2d 688,
693 (1993) (holding that equivocation toward the death penalty is
a valid basis for using a peremptory challenge).
Finally, with respect to Ms. Ossie Brown, the
prosecutor indicated that from her tone of voice, facial
expression, and body language, the prosecutor perceived that Ms.
Brown had a belligerent attitude or air of defiance about her
which suggested to him that she would be antagonistic to the
prosecution; further, in answering the questionnaire, Ms. Brown
had emphasized that she had temporary custody of her
grandchildren, and this fact gave the prosecutor some concern.
After carefully reviewing the transcript and applying
the previously stated principles of law, we conclude that the
trial court’s findings that the prosecutor’s exercise of
peremptory strikes was not racially motivated and that the
prosecutor had not engaged in purposeful discrimination are not
clearly erroneous.  Defendant’s assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s challenge for cause of prospective juror
Bullock on the basis that juror Bullock had formed an opinion and
knew the victim.  We disagree.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212 provides, in pertinent part, that a
challenge for cause may be made on the ground that the juror
“[h]as formed or expressed an opinion as to guilt or innocence of
the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(6) (1997).  Further,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(9) allows a for-cause challenge if the juror,
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for any other cause, is unable to render a fair and impartial
verdict.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h) provides:
  (h) In order for a defendant to seek
reversal of the case on appeal on the ground
that the judge refused to allow a challenge
made for cause, he must have:
(1)
Exhausted the peremptory challenges
available to him;
(2)
Renewed his challenge as provided
in subsection (i) of this section;
and
(3)
Had his renewal motion denied as to
the juror in question.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h) (1997).
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(i) provides:
  (i) A party who has exhausted his
peremptory challenges may move orally or in
writing to renew a challenge for cause
previously denied if the party either:
(1)
Had peremptorily challenged the
juror; or
(2)
States in the motion that he would
have challenged that juror
peremptorily had his challenges not
been exhausted.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(i).
We agree with defendant that he has complied with the
requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214 and thus has properly
preserved this assignment of error for appellate review. 
However, the decision to deny a challenge for cause rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed
absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.  State v.
Hartman, 344 N.C. 445, 458, 476 S.E.2d 328, 335 (1996), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1997).  In this case
Bullock stated unequivocally that he could set aside his opinion
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and base his decision in this case on the evidence.  Bullock’s
responses do not suggest that he would not be a fair and
impartial juror or that he could not return a verdict according
to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(6) and (9).  See State v. Perkins, 345
N.C. at 275, 481 S.E.2d at 33 (concluding that the trial court
did not err in denying the challenge for cause when prospective
juror unequivocally stated he would follow the law).  We hold
that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s for-cause
challenge.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
denying his challenge for cause to alternate juror Wynn, who was
related within the sixth degree to the victim in this case.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(5).  Alternate juror Wynn did not serve as
one of the twelve jurors who decided defendant’s case.  Thus,
even if the trial court’s denial of defendant’s challenge for
cause was error, it was harmless.  State v. Carter, 335 N.C. 422,
428, 440 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1994).
GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
permitting the prosecutor and State’s witnesses to refer to
defendant as “Homicide” during the guilt-innocence and sentencing
stages of the trial.  Judge William C. Griffin, Jr. signed a
pretrial order which allowed “defendant’s Motion in Limine to
strike the alias ‘Homicide’ from the Court’s records and to
prohibit the use of said alias by Court officers and law-
enforcement personnel.”  Defendant argues, inter alia, that the
repeated use of the nickname “Homicide” violated the order
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granting his motion in limine and resulted in the jury’s
recommendation of a death sentence.
In State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 521, 453 S.E.2d 824,
845, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995), we
held that “[a] motion in limine is insufficient to preserve for
appeal the question of the admissibility of evidence if the
defendant fails to further object to that evidence at the time it
is offered at trial.”  We held further that “[a] criminal
defendant is required to interpose at least a general objection
to the evidence at the time it is offered.”  Id. at 521, 453
S.E.2d at 846.  See also State v. Hill, 347 N.C. 275, 293, 493
S.E.2d 264, 274 (1997) (holding that a party objecting to an
order granting a motion in limine must attempt to introduce the
evidence at the trial), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d
___, 66 U.S.L.W. 3758 (1998).
At trial on direct examination by the prosecutor of
codefendant Christopher Moore, defense counsel objected when the
witness stated that defendant told him his name was “Homicide”;
however, the trial court expressly found that this witness was
not a court officer or law enforcement personnel and thus that
his testimony did not violate the order.  Subsequently, the
prosecutor referred to defendant as “Homicide”; but defense
counsel failed to object to this violation of the order granting
the motion in limine.
A thorough reading of the transcript reveals that the
prosecutor referred to defendant as “Homicide” three times on
direct examination of codefendant Moore:  once during redirect
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examination, once during his closing argument at the guilt-
innocence phase in reference to Moore’s testimony, once during
direct examination of a sentencing proceeding witness for
clarification, and once during his closing argument at the
sentencing proceeding.  Defendant did not object to the
prosecutor’s use of the term “Homicide.”
The transcript further reveals that during cross-
examination of Moore and cross-examination of two sentencing
proceeding witnesses, counsel for the defense referred to
defendant as “Homicide” other than to impeach the witness’
testimony on this point.  Additionally, when defendant took the
stand during the sentencing proceeding, he himself referred to
his name as “Homicide.”
On this record, even assuming arguendo that the trial
court erred in permitting the witness to refer to defendant as
“Homicide,” defendant cannot show prejudice in that he lost the
benefit of any objection by failing to object when the prosecutor
referred to defendant as “Homicide,” by his counsel using the
term on cross-examination, and by referring to himself as
“Homicide” during the sentencing proceeding.  State v. Swift, 290
N.C. 383, 390, 226 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1976).  Moreover, this Court
has stated that “it would [not be] error to refer to defendant by
the name which he was generally known.  The fact that his
nickname may have been demeaning does not create error per se.” 
Id.  This assignment of error is overruled.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
allowing codefendant Moore to testify to certain statements made
-20-
by codefendants Richard and Jimmy Smith.  Defendant argues that
these statements constituted inadmissible hearsay.  We disagree.
“Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(d)(E), a hearsay
statement of a defendant’s coconspirator is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule if the statement was made during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  State v.
Williams, 345 N.C. 137, 141, 478 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1996).  For the
statements to be admissible, there must be a showing that a
conspiracy existed and that the statements were made by a party
to the conspiracy, after it was formed and before it ended, and
in pursuance of its objectives.  Id.  Further, the State must
establish a prima facie case of conspiracy.  Id.  In so doing the
State is afforded wide latitude, and the evidence is considered
in the light most favorable to the State.  Id. at 142, 478 S.E.2d
at 784.
In this case the evidence shows that defendant and his
three codefendants went to the victim’s store three times to buy
beer.  The next time they went there, Richard Smith stayed in the
car while defendant and the other two went inside, shot the
victim, took his gun, and stole the money box.  Then they drove
to a motel, divided up the money, and attempted to take refuge in
someone’s house when pursued by the police.  This evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to
meet the State’s burden of showing that a conspiracy existed. 
Further, we find that the statements of codefendant Moore in
which the codefendants agreed to “hit this store,” “stick
together whatever happen[s],” and to “smoke the old
-21-
m-----f-----,” along with statements made during the robbery and
murder, fall well within the hearsay exception for statements
made during the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy.  Thus,
the trial court properly admitted these statements.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
denying his request to instruct the jury on second-degree murder
as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.
A defendant is entitled to have a
lesser-included offense submitted to the jury
only when there is evidence to support that
lesser-included offense. . . .  If the
State’s evidence establishes each and every
element of first-degree murder and there is
no evidence to negate these elements, it is
proper for the trial court to exclude
second-degree murder from the jury’s
consideration.
State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 29, 489 S.E.2d 391, 407 (1997)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 L. Ed. 2d
150 (1998).
In this case evidence of the lesser-included offense of
second-degree murder is totally lacking.  Defendant argues that
the evidence that he and the codefendants had been drinking, that
he did not plan the murder and robbery, and that Christopher
Moore did not think the Smiths would kill the victim is
sufficient to support submission of second-degree murder.  To
satisfy his burden in establishing voluntary intoxication as a
defense to negate premeditation, defendant must show that the
intoxication rendered him incapable of forming the requisite
specific intent.  State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 492, 439 S.E.2d
589, 598 (1994).  Furthermore, Christopher Moore’s belief is not
-22-
pertinent to defendant’s guilt or innocence.  Defendant presented
no evidence.  The State presented evidence of each element of
first-degree murder that was positive and uncontroverted; hence,
the trial court did not err in declining defendant’s request to
submit the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.
By his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in its instruction on acting in
concert.  Specifically, defendant argues that the jury
instructions regarding acting in concert permitted the jury to
convict defendant of first-degree murder on the theory of
premeditation and deliberation without finding that defendant had
specific intent to commit the crime.
In State v. Blankenship this Court held that for each
charge of acting in concert related to a specific intent crime,
the State must prove each defendant’s intent to commit the
specified crime.  State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 558, 447
S.E.2d 727, 736 (1994).  We subsequently overruled Blankenship,
see State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44; however, we
explicitly stated that there would be no retroactive application
of the overruling of Blankenship, id. at 234, 481 S.E.2d at 72. 
Since the crime and judgment in this case occurred subsequent to
our decision in Blankenship and prior to our decision in Barnes,
the rule as stated in Blankenship applies to defendant’s case.
An examination of the instructions reveals that the
trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the law of
acting in concert.  On more than one occasion, the trial court
emphasized to the jury that in order to find defendant guilty of
-23-
premeditated and deliberate murder, the jury must find that
defendant specifically intended to kill the victim.  The trial
court stated, “First degree . . . murder is one of those crimes
requiring proof of specific intent. . . .  [O]ne may not be
criminally responsible as an accomplice under the theory of
acting in concert for a crime which requires a specific intent,
unless he himself is shown to have the requisite specific
intent.”  This assignment of error is overruled.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
allowing the prosecutor to argue “aiding and abetting” to the
jury when the trial court was not going to instruct on that
theory of guilt.  In State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 652, 656, 263
S.E.2d 774, 777 (1980), we held that “[t]he distinction between
[a defendant being found guilty of] aiding and abetting and
acting in concert . . . is of little significance.  Both are
equally guilty.”  Further, the record shows that the evidence
overwhelmingly supported jury instructions on both “aiding and
abetting” and “acting in concert”; therefore, defendant was not
prejudiced by the trial court’s allowing the prosecutor to so
argue.  We find no merit to this assignment of error.
Defendant next contends that the trial court
exacerbated the error in allowing the prosecutor to argue “aiding
and abetting” and committed plain error by failing to instruct
the jury on “mere presence.”  Defendant correctly notes that his
mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to
support a finding that he is an aider and abettor.  See State v.
Penland, 343 N.C. 634, 650, 472 S.E.2d 734, 743 (1996), cert.
-24-
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1997).  However, the
evidence overwhelmingly shows that defendant was not “merely
present” at the murder scene.  The evidence shows that defendant
agreed to the robbery and murder, and further that he supplied
the murder weapon and actively participated by stealing the money
box.  Therefore, the trial court correctly did not instruct the
jury on mere presence.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for directed verdict at the close of the
State’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence.  A
motion for a directed verdict should be denied if there is
substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime. 
State v. Rose, 335 N.C. 301, 326, 439 S.E.2d 518, 532, cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 883 (1994).  “[T]he trial
judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference
to be drawn from the evidence.”  Id.
The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, was clearly sufficient to withstand a motion for
directed verdict.  Without repeating all the evidence presented,
the transcript shows ample evidence that defendant committed
first-degree murder, under theories of both premeditation and
deliberation and felony murder, and robbery with a dangerous
weapon.
-25-
SENTENCING PROCEEDING
 Defendant next asserts that it was error for the trial
court to submit the aggravating circumstance that the murder was
committed during the course of a robbery.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(5) (1997).  The jury convicted defendant of
first-degree murder on the theories of premeditation and
deliberation and felony murder, with robbery with a dangerous
weapon serving as the underlying felony for the felony-murder
conviction.  Defendant argues that submission of the (e)(5)
aggravating circumstance during the capital sentencing proceeding
resulted in improper duplication of that circumstance.
Defendant concedes that the felony underlying a
conviction for felony murder may be submitted as an aggravating
circumstance under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e) if the defendant is
also convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation.  State v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233,
241, 485 S.E.2d 284, 289 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139
L. Ed. 2d 647 (1998).  Since the jury found defendant guilty of
first-degree murder under both theories, the trial court did not
err in submitting the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance.  This
assignment of error is meritless.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in submitting the (e)(3) aggravating
circumstance in that he had not been previously convicted of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3) allows a jury to consider as an
aggravating circumstance whether “defendant had been previously
-26-
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
the person.”  Defendant argues that this aggravating circumstance
cannot be introduced because his convictions for accessory after
the fact do not meet the statutory requirements of the (e)(3)
aggravating circumstance.
Defendant acknowledges that this Court has repeatedly
held that “[t]he (e)(3) prior violent felony aggravating
circumstance requires proof that the defendant was convicted of
either a felony in which the use or threat of violence to the
person is an element of the crime or a felony which actually
involved the use or threat of violence.”  State v. Flowers, 347
N.C. at 34, 489 S.E.2d at 410.  In support of the (e)(3) prior
violent felony aggravating circumstance, the State offered into
evidence certified copies of defendant’s 1991 judgments for one
count of accessory after the fact to murder and two counts of
accessory after the fact to assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill inflicting serious injury.  Two witnesses
testified that defendant’s convictions for accessary after the
fact involved defendant and others shooting guns into a nightclub
in 1991; one person was murdered.  This evidence supports the
(e)(3) aggravating circumstance.  Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in submitting the (e)(3) aggravating circumstance. 
This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
Defendant further assigns error to the trial court’s
submission of the (e)(4) aggravating circumstance that the murder
was committed “for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4).  Defendant contends that
-27-
this aggravating circumstance was not supported by the evidence. 
We disagree.
Before the trial court may instruct the jury on the
(e)(4) aggravating circumstance, there must be substantial,
competent evidence from which the jury can infer that at least
one of defendant’s purposes for the killing was the desire to
avoid subsequent detection and apprehension for his crime.  State
v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 224, 474 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1996).
In this case there is plenary evidence tending to show
that defendant’s motivation was based upon his desire to avoid
subsequent detection and apprehension.  Earlier on the day of the
murder, defendant and his codefendants had each been inside the
victim’s store to purchase beer.  After defendant and his
codefendants agreed to “hit the store,” they also agreed to
“smoke the old m-----f-----” because, as Richard Smith said to
Jimmy Smith, “you know that he know me and your face [sic].” 
Defendant then handed a gun to Jimmy Smith; and defendant, Jimmy
Smith, and Moore went inside the store, killed the victim and
robbed his store.  This evidence of defendant’s actions following
Richard Smith’s statement was substantial, competent evidence
from which the jury could find that defendant participated in the
killing to eliminate a potential witness against him.  We find no
merit to this assignment of error.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court should
have submitted the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance that “defendant
had no significant history of prior criminal activity.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000(f)(1).  Defendant contends that his history of
-28-
criminal activity is not significant and that, based on State v.
Jones, 346 N.C. 704, 487 S.E.2d 714 (1997), he is entitled to a
new sentencing hearing.
The trial court is required to submit to the jury any
statutory mitigating circumstance supported by the evidence
regardless of whether the defendant objects to it or requests it. 
State v. Quick, 337 N.C. 359, 361, 446 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1994). 
Before submitting the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance, the trial
court must determine whether a rational jury could conclude that
no significant history of prior criminal activity existed.  State
v. Jones, 346 N.C. at 715, 487 S.E.2d at 721.  A significant
history for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1) is one likely
to influence the jury’s sentence recommendation.  Id.
The evidence of defendant’s prior criminal history in
the instant case includes:  conviction for one count of accessary
after the fact of murder; conviction for two counts of accessory
after the fact of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill inflicting serious injury; conviction for felony possession
with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, felony conspiracy to
sell and deliver cocaine, and illegal usage of marijuana;
conviction for drug possession and possession of drug
paraphernalia in New York; and conviction of larceny of an
automobile in New York.  Based on this evidence, we hold that the
trial court properly determined that no reasonable juror could
have concluded that defendant’s criminal history was
insignificant.
-29-
In Jones, upon which defendant relies, the defendant
received a new sentencing proceeding for the trial court’s
failure to submit the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance.  Id. at
718, 487 S.E.2d at 723.  However, we noted that “[n]o evidence
presented at trial suggested that defendant had committed any
violent crimes prior to the killing of the victim.”  Id. at 716,
487 S.E.2d at 722.  By contrast, in this case, defendant had been
convicted of violent crimes prior to the victim’s murder. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in failing to submit to the jury the
statutory mitigating circumstance that defendant was under the
influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the
offense.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2).
The central question presented by the (f)(2)
circumstance is defendant’s mental and emotional state at the
time of the crime.  State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 102, 478 S.E.2d
146, 161 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43
(1997).  Although one of defendant’s experts testified that
testing showed defendant to be disturbed psychologically and to
be socially alienated with a poor self-image, insecurity, and
feelings of inadequacy, neither of defendant’s experts’ testimony
suggested any nexus between defendant’s personality
characteristics and the crimes he committed or any mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the killing.  See State v.
Hill, 347 N.C. at 301-02, 493 S.E.2d at 279.  Accordingly, we
find no merit to this assignment of error.
-30-
Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s
failure to submit the (f)(7) mitigator, “The age of the defendant
at the time of the crime.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7).  In
support of his argument, defendant relies upon the fact that he
was twenty-six years old at the time of the crime; the fact that
he was abandoned at birth by his mother and grew up in a
dysfunctional family; and the fact that he had an intelligence
quotient of 86, a learning disability, a lack of reading skills,
and a significant lack of stability and guidance.
Chronological age is not determinative of this
mitigating circumstance.  State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 522,
459 S.E.2d 747, 765 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L.
Ed. 2d 739 (1996).  Defendant introduced no substantial evidence
of his immaturity, youthfulness, or lack of emotional or
intellectual development at the time of these crimes.  See State
v. Bowie, 340 N.C. 199, 203, 456 S.E.2d 771, 773 (1995).  In
fact, the evidence here showed that defendant has only slightly
below-normal intelligence, with no major disturbance of mood or
thinking.  Considering this evidence, we conclude that the trial
court properly declined to submit the (f)(7) circumstance.  These
assignments of error are overruled.
By his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in refusing to submit four requested
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to the jury.
In order for defendant to succeed on his claim that the 
trial court erred by refusing to submit particular nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, he must establish that the jury could
-31-
reasonably find that the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
had mitigating value and that there was sufficient evidence of
the existence of the circumstances requiring them to be
submitted.  State v. Richmond, 347 N.C. 412, 438, 495 S.E.2d 677,
691 (1998).  This Court has held that it is not error for the
trial court to refuse to submit a nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance if it is subsumed by other statutory or nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances.  Id.
Defendant requested in writing that the trial court
submit sixty-eight mitigating circumstances, sixty-seven of which
were nonstatutory.  The judge instructed the jury on sixty-one of
them, and defendant contends that the judge erred by refusing to
submit the following four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
for consideration by the jury:
24.  The Defendant has not been antagonistic with
the therapists.
. . . .
59.  The Defendant was not heavily armed.
60.  The Defendant will benefit from the
structured environment in prison.
61.  The Defendant is an accomplice like
Christopher Moore who sat in the back seat with
Christopher Moore whenever they were in the car.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
refusing to submit the mitigating circumstance that “Defendant
has not been antagonistic with the therapists.”  The trial court
submitted the mitigating circumstance that “Defendant has been
cooperative with the therapists.”  At least one juror found this
circumstance to exist and deemed it to have mitigating value. 
-32-
The trial court found, and we agree, that the proposed mitigating
circumstance was subsumed by the mitigating circumstance that
“Defendant has been cooperative with the therapists.”
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
refusing to submit the mitigating circumstance that “Defendant
was not heavily armed.”  Assuming arguendo that the evidence in
this case was sufficient to support the submission of this
circumstance, that a reasonable juror could have found it to have
mitigating value, and that the trial court thus erred by refusing
to submit this nonstatutory mitigating circumstance to the jury,
we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.  See State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 183, 443 S.E.2d 14, 38,
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).
The trial court submitted the circumstance that
“Defendant was not the shooter” and the circumstance that
“Defendant did not encourage Little Jimmy to shoot the victim.” 
All of the jurors rejected the circumstance that “Defendant did
not encourage Little Jimmy to shoot the victim” as a circumstance
in mitigation of the crime, but at least one juror found that the
circumstance “Defendant was not the shooter” existed and deemed
it to have mitigating value.  Further, the evidence showed that
defendant supplied the gun used to commit the murder.  All the
evidence tending to support the requested nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance which was not submitted was considered by the jury
under these submitted mitigating circumstances as well as under
the catchall mitigating circumstance.  Hence, the trial court’s
error, if any, in failing to submit defendant’s requested
-33-
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt since it is clear that the jury was not
prevented from considering any potential mitigating evidence.
The proposed mitigating circumstance that “Defendant
will benefit from the structured environment in prison” was
subsumed by the submitted mitigating circumstance that “Defendant
will benefit from a structured environment.”
Finally, the proposed mitigating circumstance that
“Defendant is an accomplice like Christopher Moore who sat in the
back seat with Christopher Moore whenever they were in the car”
was subsumed by the submitted statutory mitigating circumstance
that “[t]his murder was actually committed by another person and
the defendant was only an accomplice in the murder and his
participation in the murder was relatively minor.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(4).  This circumstance, combined with the catchall
mitigating circumstance, provided an adequate vehicle for the
jury to consider the mitigating value of this evidence.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in
not giving peremptory instructions on certain of the mitigating
circumstances.  More specifically, defendant argues that the
judge agreed to give peremptory instructions on the one submitted
statutory mitigating circumstance and fifty-eight of the sixty
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, but failed to do so, thus
entitling him to a new sentencing hearing.
Defendant is entitled to a peremptory instruction when
a mitigating circumstance is supported by uncontroverted
-34-
evidence.  State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 683, 473 S.E.2d 291,
300 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1997). 
“Conversely, a defendant is not entitled to a peremptory
instruction when the evidence supporting a mitigating
circumstance is controverted.”  Id.
Defendant contends that the evidence concerning the
(f)(4) statutory mitigating circumstance that “[t]his murder was
actually committed by another person and the defendant was only
an accomplice in the murder and his participation in the murder
was relatively minor” was uncontroverted.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(f)(4).  He argues that all the evidence indicates that two
of his codefendants were the ringleader and triggerman.  Further,
he argues that the fact that the jury did not find the existence
of the (f)(4) mitigating circumstance shows that the trial court
committed error in failing to give the jury a peremptory
instruction.  We disagree.
Our review of the record shows that the evidence was
not uncontroverted as to each aspect of the (f)(4) mitigating
circumstance.  As the prosecutor argued, defendant was not a
minor participant in this crime.  In fact, the evidence tends to
show that defendant supplied the murder weapon and took the money
box.  Defendant left his house carrying the gun used to kill the
victim and handed it to the triggerman just before they entered
the victim’s store.  Although defendant testified that he did not
take the money box, codefendant Moore testified that he saw
defendant hand it to Jimmy Smith.  Therefore, although the trial
judge initially did agree to peremptorily instruct the jury on
-35-
this circumstance, we conclude that given the nature of
defendant’s participation in the crime, the evidence regarding
the (f)(4) mitigating circumstance was not uncontroverted and did
not warrant a peremptory instruction.  See State v. Bond, 345
N.C. at 39, 478 S.E.2d at 184 (holding that the trial court
properly denied defendant’s request for a peremptory instruction
where the evidence on the (f)(4) mitigating circumstance was
hotly contested).
Further, defendant asserts that the trial judge also
failed to peremptorily instruct the jury on various nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances.  However, upon a careful reading of the
transcript, we find that the trial judge did in fact give a
peremptory instruction on the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  With regard to fifty-eight of the sixty
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the trial judge instructed
the jury as follows:
[I]f one or more of you find the facts to be,
as all the evidence tends to show, as to each
of these mitigating circumstances[,] you
would find that each circumstance exists, and
further if one or more of you deems or
considers a circumstance to have mitigating
value, you would so indicate by having your
foreman write “Yes” in the space provided by
the mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error by instructing the jury that it needed to be
unanimous in order to answer “no” as to Issues One, Three, and
Four.  Defendant objected to none of these instructions at trial;
-36-
our review, therefore, is limited to review for plain error. 
N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).
During defendant’s sentencing proceeding, the judge
instructed the jury as follows:
On the other hand, if you unanimously find
from the evidence that none of the
aggravating circumstances existed, and if you
have so indicated by writing “No” in the
space after every one of them on that form,
you would answer Issue One “No.”
Defendant argues that this impermissibly shifts the burden of
proof to defendant.  We previously addressed this issue in State
v. McCarver.  In McCarver we held that “any issue which is
outcome determinative as to the sentence a defendant in a capital
trial will receive--whether death or life imprisonment--must be
answered unanimously by the jury.”  State v. McCarver, 341 N.C.
364, 390, 462 S.E.2d 25, 39 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110,
134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996).  We further stated that “the jury
should answer Issues One, Three, and Four on the standard form
used in capital cases either unanimously ‘yes’ or unanimously
‘no.’”  Id.  This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in
not instructing the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment
means a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  Defendant
concedes that the trial court initially instructed the jury that
“[i]f you unanimously recommend a sentence of life imprisonment,
the Court will impose a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole.”  However, he contends that since the judge later used
the term “life imprisonment” four times instead of “life
-37-
imprisonment without parole,” he is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing.  Defendant failed to object at trial; therefore, the
standard of review is plain error.  N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).
Effective 1 October 1994, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 mandates
that the trial court “instruct the jury, in words substantially
equivalent to those of this section, that a sentence of life
imprisonment means a sentence of life without parole.”  The
required instruction was given at the beginning of the judge’s
sentencing charge.  Further, defendant was not prevented from
informing the jury that life imprisonment means life without
parole; and his counsel so informed the jury during the trial. 
We hold that the trial judge, having complied with the statutory
mandate, did not commit error, much less plain error, by not
informing the jury that a life sentence means life without parole
every time he mentioned a life sentence.  This assignment of
error is overruled.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises four additional issues which he
concedes have been decided contrary to his position previously by
this Court:  (i) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
motion to strike the death penalty on the ground that it is
unconstitutional, (ii) the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion to require the State to reveal all evidence
regarding proportionality, (iii) the trial court erred in
requiring defendant’s expert to prepare a written report and
disclose that report to the State, and (iv) the trial court erred
-38-
in allowing the State’s challenges for cause of jurors opposed to
the death penalty.
Defendant raises these issues for the purpose of
permitting this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and also
for the purpose of preserving them for any possible further
judicial review.  We have considered defendant’s arguments on
these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our
prior holdings.  These assignments of error are overruled.
PROPORTIONALITY
Having found no prejudicial error in either the guilt-
innocence stage or the sentencing proceeding, it is now our duty
to determine (i) whether the record supports the jury’s findings
of the aggravating circumstances upon which the court based its
death sentence; (ii) whether the sentence was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
and (iii) whether the death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).
Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder under
theories of both premeditation and deliberation and felony
murder.  Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury
found the three submitted aggravating circumstances:  (i) that
defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(3); (ii) that this murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, N.C.G.S. §
-39-
15A-2000(e)(4); and (iii) that this murder was committed while
the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery with a
firearm, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5).  Two statutory mitigating
circumstances were submitted to the jury--that this murder was
actually committed by another person, and defendant was only an
accomplice in the murder, and his participation in the murder was
relatively minor, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(4); and the catchall,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(9)--but neither was found.  Of the sixty
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted, the jury found
eight to exist and have mitigating value.
After careful review we conclude that the record fully
supports the jury’s finding of the aggravating circumstances
submitted.  Further, we find no indication that the sentence of
death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or
any other arbitrary factor.  We must now determine whether the
sentence of death in this case is excessive or disproportionate.
We begin our proportionality review by comparing this
case to those cases in which this Court has determined that the
death penalty was disproportionate.  This Court has concluded
that the death sentence was disproportionate in seven cases. 
State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v.
Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316
N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321
N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373; State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325
S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163
-40-
(1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983);
State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  However,
we find that the instant case is distinguishable from each of
these seven cases.
First, we note that in none of the cases were three
aggravating circumstances found.  Moreover, in none of the seven
cases in which the sentence was found to be disproportionate was
the (e)(3) aggravating circumstance included.  State v. Lyons,
343 N.C. 1, 27-28, 468 S.E.2d 204, 217, cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___,  136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996).  “The jury’s finding of the prior
conviction of a violent felony aggravating circumstance is
significant in finding a death sentence proportionate.”  Id. at
27, 468 S.E.2d at 217.  Further, we reiterate the fact that the
jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder under theories
of both premeditation and deliberation and felony murder.
However, defendant argues that his case is as
compelling, if not more, than the defendant’s case in Stokes in
which this Court reversed a sentence of death.  We disagree.  In
Stokes this Court held that defendant Stokes did not appear more
deserving of death than his codefendant Murray, who received a
life sentence.  State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. at 21, 352 S.E.2d at
664.  In support of this conclusion, we noted that Stokes was
only seventeen years old, and Murray was considerably older;
Stokes suffered from impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct; and at the time of the murder, Stokes
was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance. 
Id.
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In the case sub judice, two codefendants (Richard Smith
and Jimmy Smith) were convicted of first-degree murder and each
received a sentence of life imprisonment, the other codefendant
(Christopher Moore) pleaded guilty to second-degree murder
pursuant to a plea agreement.  Here, defendant was twenty-six
years old at the time of the murder and was the same age as Jimmy
Smith and was only six years younger than Richard Smith. 
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on the theories of
premeditation and deliberation and felony murder; but Stokes was
convicted solely on a felony-murder theory, and there was little
evidence of premeditation, id. at 24, 352 S.E.2d at 666. 
Further, the evidence tended to show that defendant here supplied
the murder weapon and actually took the money box from the
victim’s store.  The jury in defendant’s trial found three
aggravating circumstances to exist; whereas, in the Smiths’ trial
the jury found only one aggravating circumstance to exist. 
Unlike Richard and Jimmy Smith, defendant had previously been
convicted of violent felonies.  On these facts we cannot say as a
matter of law that the sentence of death is disproportionate when
compared with other cases roughly similar with respect to the
crime and the defendant.
For the foregoing reasons we conclude that defendant
received a fair trial free from prejudicial error and that the
sentence of death imposed by the trial court is not excessive or
disproportionate.
NO ERROR.
Justice ORR did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.