Title: Shannon E. T. v. Alicia M. V.M.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP77 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Paternity of C.A.V.M.: 
 
 
Shannon E. T., 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Bye, Goff, & Rohde, Ltd., 
          Appellant, 
     v. 
Alicia M. V.M. an individual, by her guardians, 
Patricia N. and Brian V.M., 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 104 
Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 718 N.W.2d 729 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 9, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. McAlpine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Moses J. Zimmerman and Murphy & Prachthauser, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Moses J. Zimmerman. 
 
For the respondents-respondents there was a brief by 
Michael J. Roman and Zalewski, Klinner & Kramer, LLP, Wausau, 
and oral argument by Michael J. Roman. 
 
 
2007 WI 29
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP77  
(L.C. No. 
2004PA59) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Paternity of C.A.V.M.: 
 
 
 
Shannon E. T., 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Bye, Goff, & Rohde, Ltd., 
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Alicia M. V.M. an individual, by her guardians, 
 
Patricia N. and Brian V.M., 
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 9, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 affirming an order 
                                                 
1 Shannon E.T. v. Alicia M. V.M., 2006 WI App 104, ___ Wis. 
2d ___, 18 N.W.2d 729. 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
2 
 
of the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Judge Michael J. 
McAlpine, dismissing Shannon E.T.'s paternity action against 
Alicia M. V.M. and her legal guardians, Patricia N. and Brian 
V.M. 
¶2 
Shannon 
E.T. 
(Shannon) 
seeks 
to 
establish 
his 
paternity of C.A.V.M., who was stillborn as a result of a motor 
vehicle accident involving Alicia M. V.M. (Alicia), the mother 
of 
C.A.V.M. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
held 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1)(2003-04)2 does not permit Shannon to bring 
an action under that section solely for the purpose of 
establishing paternity of the stillborn, in order to bring an 
action for the stillborn's wrongful death. 
¶3 
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.45(1)3 provides in relevant part: 
The following persons may bring an action or motion, 
including 
an 
action 
or 
motion 
for 
declaratory 
judgment, for the purpose of determining the paternity 
of a child or for the purpose of rebutting the 
presumption 
of 
paternity 
under 
s. 
891.405 
or 
891.41(1): 
(a) 
The child. 
(b) 
The child's natural mother. 
(c) 
Unless s. 767.62(1) applies, a man presumed 
to 
be 
the 
child's 
father 
under 
s. 
891.405 
or 
891.41(1). 
                                                 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.  
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.45(1) was amended and renumbered as 
Wis. Stat. § 767.80, by 2005 Wis. Act 443, § 184 (effective 
January 1, 2007).   
No. 
2005AP77   
 
3 
 
(d) 
A man alleged or alleging himself to be the 
father of the child. 
¶4 
In the petition for review, we are asked to answer the 
question of whether Shannon, as an unmarried man alleging 
himself to be the father of a stillborn, may bring a paternity 
action under Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) to establish paternity for 
purposes of bringing a claim for the wrongful death of a viable 
fetus that was stillborn.  We answer this question in the 
negative.  However, we hold that, under such circumstances, 
Shannon, who is alleging that he is the father, may bring a 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 885.23 to determine his parentage in 
the pending wrongful death action. 
¶5 
The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed, but 
on the grounds set forth herein. 
I 
¶6 
Alicia was 27 weeks pregnant when she was involved in 
a motor vehicle accident that caused her son, C.A.V.M., to be 
stillborn.  As a result of the accident, Alicia, herself, became 
legally incompetent. 
¶7 
Shannon alleges that he is C.A.V.M.'s father.  Shannon 
claims that he resided with Alicia during periods of her 
pregnancy and assisted with prenatal care. 
¶8 
Following 
the 
motor 
vehicle 
accident, 
Shannon 
initiated a wrongful death action in Wood County Circuit Court 
before the Honorable Edward F. Zappen, Jr., alleging that he was 
the father of C.A.V.M., that C.A.V.M. had been a viable fetus, 
and that the stillbirth was due to the negligence of Alicia 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
4 
 
and/or the other driver.  The circuit court stayed the wrongful 
death action, holding that Shannon could not proceed without a 
determination that he was the father of C.A.V.M.4  Shannon then 
commenced this paternity action in Monroe County. 
¶9 
Alicia's legal guardians filed a motion to dismiss on 
behalf of Alicia, arguing that Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) does not 
provide a basis for determining the paternity of a stillborn, 
and that Shannon, therefore, failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.  Shannon argued that § 767.45 does not 
define "child" and does not require a live birth, in order for a 
court to adjudicate paternity. 
¶10 The Monroe County Circuit Court, Judge Michael J. 
McAlpine, granted Alicia's motion to dismiss.  The court 
concluded that a paternity action brought under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.45(1) requires the birth of a child and that stillbirth 
did not qualify as a birth.  In its analysis, the circuit court 
cited State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 
138, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997), in which this court held that the 
term "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2)(1993-94) meant a human 
being born alive, and did not include a viable fetus. 
¶11 In its analysis, the Monroe County Circuit Court also 
discussed 
Wis. Stat. §§ 767.51(3)(b), 
(c), 
and 
(d), 
which 
require that "[a] judgment or order determining paternity shall 
contain" orders for legal custody, physical placement, and 
                                                 
4 The decision of the Wood County Circuit Court requiring 
that Shannon obtain a paternity determination has not been 
appealed. 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
5 
 
support of a child, as well as a determination as to which 
parent has the right to claim the child for tax exemption 
purposes.  The court concluded that the language contained in 
these provisions would be rendered absurd, if the meaning of the 
term "birth" were to include stillbirth, because none of the 
provisions therein applied in the case of a stillbirth. 
¶12 Shannon appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed 
the decision of the Monroe County Circuit Court, but on somewhat 
different 
grounds. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
held 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) does not permit a man alleging he is the 
father to bring a paternity action for the sole purpose of 
establishing paternity of a stillborn, so that he may bring an 
action for the stillborn's wrongful death.  Shannon E.T. v. 
Alicia M. V.M., 2006 WI App 104, ¶24, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 718 
N.W.2d 729. 
¶13 The court of appeals noted that the parties to this 
action agreed that the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) is 
ambiguous.  Id., ¶8.  Alicia argued that "child" should be read 
to require a live birth.  Shannon argued that § 767.45(1) should 
be construed to include a stillborn fetus within the meaning of 
the word "child."  Shannon further argued that if the term 
"child" excludes a stillborn, then he would be deprived of the 
right to bring a wrongful death action.   
¶14 In support of his position, Shannon cited Kwaterski v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 15, 22, 
148 N.W.2d 107 (1967), in which this court concluded that the 
term "person" in the wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
6 
 
(1965),5 includes a viable fetus.  In Kwaterski, the parents of a 
viable fetus that was stillborn alleged that the stillbirth was 
caused by another driver's negligence in a motor vehicle 
accident.    This court held that the parents of the stillborn 
had a cause of action for wrongful death against the driver of 
the other vehicle.  Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 22. 
¶15 The court of appeals considered Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) 
within 
the 
context 
of 
the 
entire 
paternity 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 767.45-767.62, and concluded that the language of 
§ 767.45(1) is ambiguous, in regard to this matter.  The court 
of appeals noted that the paternity statute includes detailed 
procedures for making a paternity determination, as well as for 
issuing orders related to the care of a "child" and expenses 
associated with a "child."  Shannon E.T., 2006 WI App 104, ¶11.  
Section 767.50(1) states that a paternity trial shall consist of 
two parts: "The first part shall deal with the determination of 
paternity.  The 2nd part shall deal with child support, legal 
custody, periods of physical placement, and related issues."   
¶16 The court of appeals noted that the paternity statute 
does not expressly provide that a paternity action may be 
brought only if the adjudication of paternity is for the 
purposes of determining child support, legal custody, physical 
placement, and related issues.  Id.  However, the court of 
appeals stated that it is reasonable to conclude that the 
                                                 
5 The language of Wis. Stat. § 895.03 (1965) is identical to 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 895.03 (2003-04).  
No. 
2005AP77   
 
7 
 
legislature intended, through Wis. Stat. § 757.51(3), to require 
that any paternity judgment must contain provisions regarding 
the support, care, and custody of the child.  Id., ¶12.  In its 
analysis, the court considered other sections of the paternity 
statute, including Wis. Stat. §§ 767.46(2) and 767.463, which 
deal with the best interest of the child, and § 767.51(3),6 which 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.51(3) provides: 
A judgment or 
order determining paternity shall 
contain all of the following provisions: 
 
(a) An adjudication of the paternity of the 
child. 
 
(b) Orders for the legal custody of and period of 
physical placement with the child, determined in 
accordance with s. 767.24. 
 
(c) An order requiring either or both of the 
parents to contribute to the support of any child of 
the parties who is less than 18 years old, or any 
child of the parties who is less than 19 years old if 
the 
child 
is 
pursuing 
an 
accredited 
course 
of 
instruction leading to the acquisition of a high 
school diploma 
or its equivalent, determined in 
accordance with s. 767.25. 
 
(d) A determination as to which parent, if 
eligible, shall have the right to claim the child as 
an exemption for federal tax purposes under 26 USC 151 
(c)(1)(B), or as an exemption for state tax purposes 
under s. 71.07(8)(b). 
 
(e) An order requiring the father to pay or 
contribute to the reasonable expenses of the mother's 
pregnancy and the child's birth, based on the father's 
ability to pay or contribute to those expenses.  
 
(f) An order requiring either or both parties to 
pay or contribute to the costs of the guardian ad 
litem fees, genetic tests as provided in s. 767.48(5) 
and other costs. 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
8 
 
deals with the contents of a judgment or order of paternity.  
Id. 
¶17 The court disagreed with Alicia's argument that Wis. 
Stat. § 757.51(3) requires every paternity judgment or order to 
contain all of the items listed in that section and that, 
therefore, the legislature intended that "child" requires a live 
birth.  Id.  The court of appeals noted that, in cases where a 
child is born alive, but later dies, the provisions of 
§ 757.51(3) that contemplate decisions regarding a live child 
are inapplicable, just as they are inapplicable in the case of a 
stillbirth.  The court also reasoned that, even in the case of a 
live child, some of the orders listed in § 757.51(3) may not be 
necessary.  Id. 
¶18 After 
concluding 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) 
was 
ambiguous, the court of appeals then looked to the legislative 
history of the paternity statute, §§ 767.45-767.62, and noted 
its policies and purposes.  The original predecessor to today's 
paternity statute was Wis. Stat. Chapter 31 (1849), which served 
the purpose of allowing the town in which a child was born to an 
unmarried mother to obtain money from the father for the child's 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(g) An order requiring either party to pay or 
contribute to the attorney fees of the other party. 
Section 767.51(3) was renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 767.89 and 
amended, by 2004 Wis. Act 443, § 218 (effective January 1, 
2007).   
 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
9 
 
support and expenses.7  Id., ¶15.  The court of appeals noted 
that subsequent changes to the statute provided that a paternity 
action, previously referred to as an illegitimacy action or 
prosecution for bastardy, could be brought only by the district 
attorney.8  Id., ¶16.   
¶19 In 
1963, 
the 
legislature 
adopted 
Wis. Stat. § 52.21(2),9 which authorized the court in a paternity 
action to make orders for the care, custody, support, and 
maintenance of a child.  Id.  Then, with the enactment of § 25, 
Chapter 352, Laws of 1979, the legislature listed the child, the 
mother, or a man presumed or alleged to be the father as persons 
authorized 
to 
bring 
a 
paternity 
action. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1)(1981-82).  The enactment of Chapter 352, 
Laws of 1979 made orders in paternity actions similar to orders 
in divorce actions for the care, custody, and support of 
children.  The court of appeals noted that the paternity statute 
at that time was placed within Wis. Stat. Chapter 767 (1981-82), 
entitled "Actions Affecting the Family."  Shannon E.T., 2006 WI 
App 104, ¶18.   
¶20 The court of appeals noted that material in the 
legislative record shows that the changes brought about by 
Chapter 352, Laws of 1979 were intended to ensure that children 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. ch. 31, §§ 3,7,13 (1849).  
8 See Wis. Stat. ch. 166 (1929). 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 52.21(2) was created by § 2, ch. 426, 
Laws of 1963. 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
10 
 
of unmarried parents were given the same treatment as children 
of married parents who were no longer living together or who 
were divorced.  Id.   
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.45(1)(1985-86) was amended by 
1987 Wis. Act 413, § 68, to state that the persons listed 
therein were authorized to bring a paternity "motion" as well as 
an "action."  The introductory note to that Act stated that it 
is "in the interest of each child to identify the child's father 
for reasons including medical information and financial support 
 . . . it is the policy of this state to promote the interest of 
children in knowing the identity of both parents." 1987 Wis. Act 
413, § 1. 
¶22 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
noted 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1)(1991-92) was again amended by 1993 Wis. 
Act 481, § 127, at which point the language "including an action 
or motion for declaratory judgment" was added.  Shannon E.T., 
2006 WI App 104, ¶20.  The same act also made a number of 
changes to other statutes that were intended to improve child 
support collection.10     
¶23 From the legislative history of the paternity statute, 
the court of appeals determined that the statute served a number 
of policies and purposes.  Those policies and purposes include: 
ensuring that mothers and other entities who incur expenses 
related to pregnancy, birth, and childcare have a procedure to 
                                                 
10 See Fiscal Estimate of May 11, 1994, on Child Support 
Enforcement, prepared by DHSS, 1994 Spec. Sess. S.B. 2, located 
in the drafting records for 1993 Wis. Act 481, part 1, LRB-6036. 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
11 
 
determine paternity, so that the father contributes to those 
expenses; ensuring that unmarried fathers have a procedure for 
establishing paternity, so that they can participate in the 
child's parenting; giving courts the same authority as to orders 
regarding the care of children in their best interest as courts 
have in other actions affecting the family; and providing 
procedures, so that a child of unmarried parents can determine 
who his or her father is and obtain any related benefits.  Id., 
¶21. 
¶24 Based on its analysis of the paternity statute and its 
legislative history, the court of appeals held that the 
legislature did not intend that a man should be able to bring a 
paternity action under Wis. Stat. Chapter 767 solely to 
determine paternity, for the purpose of bringing another action, 
such as the wrongful death action in the present case.  Id.   
¶25 The court of appeals asked for supplemental briefs 
addressing the question of how, if at all, Wis. Stat. § 885.23 
related 
to 
the 
issue 
of 
whether 
Shannon 
may 
obtain 
a 
determination of paternity, in order to pursue a wrongful death 
action.  Wisconsin Stat. § 885.23 provides: 
Genetic tests in civil actions.  Whenever it is 
relevant in a civil action to determine the parentage 
or identity of any child, person or corpse, the court, 
by order, shall direct any party to the action and any 
person involved in the controversy to submit to one or 
more genetic tests as provided in s. 767.48.11  The 
                                                 
11Wisconsin Stat. § 767.48 
was 
renumbered 
as 
Wis. Stat. § 767.84 pursuant to 2005 Wis. Act 443, §§ 210-212C, 
249, 250 (effective January 1, 2007).  
No. 
2005AP77   
 
12 
 
results of the tests shall be receivable as evidence 
in 
any 
case 
where 
exclusion 
from 
parentage 
is 
established or where a probability of parentage is 
shown to exist.  Whenever the court orders the genetic 
tests and one of the parties refuses to submit to the 
tests that fact shall be disclosed upon trial. 
(Footnote added.) 
¶26 Shannon took the position that, although he might have 
the right to bring an action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 885.23 to 
determine his parentage in the wrongful death action, he also 
has 
a 
right 
to 
bring 
a 
paternity 
action 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1). 
 
Alicia 
argued 
that 
§ 885.23 
is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether Shannon may bring an action 
to determine the parentage of the stillborn.  The court of 
appeals stated that it viewed § 885.23 as related to §§ 767.45-
767.62, and disagreed with Alicia's assertion that § 885.23 is 
irrelevant to the present case.  Shannon E.T., 2006 WI App 104, 
¶10.  From the plain language of § 885.23, the court of appeals 
concluded that a paternity action under Wis. Stat. Chapter 767 
is not the only action in which a determination of paternity may 
be made.  Id., ¶22. 
¶27 The court of appeals construed Wis. Stat. § 885.23 to 
mean that the legislature did not intend that a separate action 
be initiated solely for the purpose of determining paternity, 
when paternity or parentage is relevant in another action.  Id.  
The court of appeals then examined the legislative history of 
§ 885.23.  Id., ¶23.   
¶28 The court of appeals stated that procedures for 
determining paternity within a civil action, when paternity is 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
13 
 
relevant to that action, have existed since 1935.  Id.  In 1935, 
the legislature enacted § 1, Chapter 351, Laws of 1935, the 
predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 885.23.  Id.  The court noted that 
when the legislature enacted § 25, Chapter 32, Laws of 1979, it 
expanded the list of persons eligible to bring a paternity 
action pursuant to Wis. Stat. Chapter 767 (1981-82).  Id.  The 
court 
reasoned 
that, 
because 
procedures 
for 
determining 
parentage within a civil action existed prior to the enactment 
of § 25, Chapter 32, Laws of 1979, there is no reason to think 
that the legislature intended that Chapter 767 be the vehicle 
for bringing a separate paternity action, in those situations 
where parentage is a relevant issue in a civil action.  Id. 
¶29 The 
court 
of 
appeals, 
therefore, 
held 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) does not permit a man such as Shannon, 
who is alleging he is the father, to bring a paternity action 
for the sole purpose of establishing the paternity of a 
stillborn, so that he may then bring an action for the 
stillborn's wrongful death.  Id., ¶24.  The court of appeals 
thus affirmed the decision of the Monroe County Circuit Court.   
¶30 Shannon proceeded to file a petition for review with 
this court, which we granted. 
II 
¶31 Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief 
may be granted is a question of law that we determine 
independently, but with the benefit of the analyses of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  Scott v. Savers Prop. & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶6, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715.  
No. 
2005AP77   
 
14 
 
On a motion to dismiss, we take as true the allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences from those allegations.  
Id., ¶5.  Statutory interpretation presents an issue of law, 
which this court reviews de novo.  Maciolek v. MERS, 2006 WI 10, 
¶10, 288 Wis. 2d 62, 709 N.W.2d 360.       
¶32 The paternity of a child is a factual issue for the 
trier of fact, such as a jury.  In re C.A.K., 159 Wis. 2d 224, 
228, 464 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1990).  See also Suckow v. State, 
122 Wis. 156, 99 N.W.2d 440 (1904). 
III 
¶33 Considering judicial economy, it makes sense that a 
determination of parentage under Wis. Stat. § 885.23, for the 
purpose of pursuing a wrongful death action on behalf of a 
stillborn, should be brought in the court where the wrongful 
death action is pending.  When both the wrongful death action 
and the determination of parentage are brought in the same 
court, the parties are more likely to obtain a swift resolution 
of the issues.   
¶34 Wisconsin law clearly provides for a claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.03 for the wrongful death of a viable fetus 
that was stillborn.  This court held in Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 
22, that a viable fetus who receives injury that results in 
stillbirth is a "person" within the meaning of that term in the 
wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03 (1965), so as to 
give rise to a wrongful death action by the parents of the 
viable 
fetus 
that 
was 
stillborn. 
 
Furthermore, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1) and (1)(a), which describe what causes 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
15 
 
of action survive, state that "[i]n addition to the causes of 
action that survive at common law," several other causes of 
action survive, including "[c]auses of action to determine 
paternity." 
¶35 It is well-established under Wisconsin law, since 
Kwaterski,12 that a parent may bring a wrongful death action on 
behalf of a viable fetus that was stillborn.   A determination 
of parentage must be permitted, where it is needed in order to 
proceed with the wrongful death action.  Otherwise, the right to 
bring such a claim would, often, be rendered meaningless.  
However, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
correctly 
concluded 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) 
should 
not 
be 
used 
under 
the 
circumstances set forth herein to obtain a determination of 
paternity or parentage, in order to proceed with a wrongful 
death action. 
¶36 Shannon 
argues 
that 
he 
should 
be 
permitted 
to 
establish paternity under Wis. Stat. §§ 885.23 or 767.45(1).  
Both the circuit court and the court of appeals held that, under 
                                                 
12 In Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 34 
Wis. 2d 14, 15, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967), we held that 
Wis. Stat. Chapter 895 (1967-68) applied to a viable fetus that 
was stillborn; therefore, we do not find it significant that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(a) uses the word "paternity," rather than 
the word "parentage," as used in Wis. Stat. § 885.23. 
The dissent's claim that our decision represents "a retreat 
from the clear decision in Kwaterski" (Dissent, ¶55), and that 
it 
creates 
"apprehension 
about 
the 
future 
of 
Kwaterski" 
(Dissent, ¶64) flies in the face of any fair reading of our 
opinion.  Not only do we cite Kwaterski repeatedly, but we 
clearly rely on that case in reaching our holding in the case 
before us. 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
16 
 
the circumstances set forth, Shannon could not bring a paternity 
action pursuant to § 767.45(1).  We agree.  As the court of 
appeals noted, the policies and purposes behind the paternity 
provisions in §§ 767.45-767.62 relate to the care and support of 
a mother during pregnancy and the birth, care, and custody of a 
child.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 767.46(2), 767.463, 767.51(3).  
Shannon E.T., 2006 WI App 104, ¶21.  None of the policies and 
purposes contemplate a parent's right to bring a paternity 
action for the sole purpose of then bringing a separate wrongful 
death action.  Id.  
¶37 We are satisfied that Wis. Stat. § 885.23 is the 
proper statute under which Shannon may proceed to attempt to 
obtain a determination of his parentage, for the purpose of 
continuing with his wrongful death action.  In its decision, the 
Monroe County Circuit Court did not address § 885.23.  We agree 
with the court of appeals, however, that § 885.23 is not 
irrelevant under these circumstances. 
¶38 Although Wis. Stat. § 885.23 uses the word "parentage" 
rather than paternity, our case law indicates that the two words 
are used interchangeably.  See, e.g., In re R.W.L., 116 Wis. 2d 
150, 160, 341 N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("Paternity proceedings were 
designed to enable the child to establish parentage and to 
protect the child's financial well-being."); In re J.M.K., 160 
Wis. 2d 429, 431, 465 N.W.2d 833 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Because two 
different sets of blood tests with conflicting statistical 
results as to the probability of parentage were presented at 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
17 
 
trial, we hold that the . . . presumption of paternity is 
inapplicable . . . ."). 
¶39 On points where statutory language is plain, we apply 
the statutory language without resorting to extrinsic materials 
to determine legislative intent.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
The language of Wis. Stat. § 885.23 plainly states that a court 
may order genetic tests "[w]henever it is relevant in a civil 
action to determine the parentage or identity of any child, 
person or corpse. . . ."  A determination of parentage is 
relevant in Shannon's civil action for the wrongful death of 
C.A.V.M.  We, therefore, hold that the proper vehicle for 
determining parentage, under the facts and circumstances herein, 
is § 885.23, which allows for a determination of Shannon's 
parentage of C.A.V.M. within the pending wrongful death action. 
¶40 Determination of parentage is a factual issue.  In re 
C.A.K., 159 Wis. 2d at 228.  Genetic testing is not the sole 
type of evidence available for determination of parentage.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.87 (2005-06), as created by 2005 Wis. Act 
443, §§ 207, 258 (effective January 1, 2007), lists genetic test 
results under Wis. Stat. § 885.23 as one of several different 
types of evidence that may be presented in a hearing on 
paternity.  Section 767.87 states: 
(1) 
Generally. 
 Evidence relating to paternity, 
whether given at the trial or the pretrial hearing, 
may include, but is not limited to: 
(a) Evidence of sexual intercourse between the mother 
and alleged father at any possible time of conception 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
18 
 
or evidence of a relationship between the mother and 
alleged father at any time. 
(b) An expert's opinion concerning the statistical 
probability of the alleged father's paternity based 
upon the duration of the mother's pregnancy. 
(c) Genetic test results under s. 49.225, 767.84, or 
885.23. 
(cm) Genetic test results under s. 48.299(6)(e) or 
938.299(6)(e). 
(d) 
The 
statistical 
probability 
of 
the 
alleged 
father's paternity based upon the genetic tests. 
(e) Medical, scientific or genetic evidence relating 
to the alleged father's paternity of the child based 
on tests performed by experts. 
(f) All other evidence relevant to the issue of 
paternity of the child, except as provided in subs. 
(2), (2m) and (3). 
¶41 In the present case, genetic testing may not be 
practical or possible.  A jury (or the court as finder of fact) 
may, therefore, need to consider other evidence in order to make 
a determination of parentage in accord with Wis. Stat. § 885.23.  
Shannon's Petition for Paternity Determination alleged several 
facts that appear to be relevant to determining whether he is 
the father of C.A.V.M.  Shannon alleged that he had sexual 
relations with Alicia resulting in the pregnancy, that he 
resided with Alicia during periods of time during her pregnancy, 
that he assisted with Alicia's prenatal care, that Alicia has 
never disputed that Shannon is the father of C.A.V.M., and that 
C.A.V.M.'s birth announcement lists Shannon as the father.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.87 makes it clear that genetic testing 
under § 885.23 is only one of several types of evidence that may 
No. 
2005AP77   
 
19 
 
be presented in a hearing on paternity.  The facts alleged in 
Shannon's Petition for Paternity Determination, and other facts 
as well, may be relevant, if admissible, to a determination of 
parentage in this case.   Section 885.23 is the proper vehicle 
for such a determination.  The determination of parentage in 
relation to Shannon's wrongful death action under § 885.23 
properly belongs in the Wood County Circuit Court, where the 
wrongful death action is pending. 
IV 
¶42 In the petition for review, we are asked to answer the 
question of whether Shannon, as an unmarried man alleging 
himself to be the father of a stillborn, may bring a paternity 
action under Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) to establish paternity for 
purposes of bringing a claim for the wrongful death of a viable 
fetus that was stillborn.  We answer this question in the 
negative.  However, we hold that, under such circumstances, 
Shannon, who is alleging that he is the father, may bring a 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 885.23 to determine his parentage in 
the pending wrongful death action.   
¶43 The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed, but 
on the grounds set forth herein. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶44 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Shannon E.T. 
seeks to establish his paternity of a stillborn child in order 
to bring an action for the alleged wrongful death of the child.  
This court permits Shannon to use Wis. Stat. § 885.23 to support 
his claim, but it precludes him from using Wis. Stat. § 767.45 
for this purpose. 
¶45 I agree with the court's decision to permit Shannon to 
establish paternity, but I disagree with the court's analysis 
and its affirmance of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶46 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04 provide for 
wrongful death actions in Wisconsin.  In 1967 this court 
interpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 331.03 
(1963) 
(now § 895.03) 
to 
determine that a "viable unborn child, whose later stillbirth" 
was caused by a wrongful act, was a "person" within the meaning 
of the statute, so as to give rise to a wrongful death action 
"by the parents of the stillborn infant."  Kwaterski v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 15, 148 N.W.2d 107 
(1967). 
¶47 In Kwaterski, the unborn child's parents were married.  
Id. at 15.  As a result, the eligibility of the two parents to 
make a wrongful death claim was not at issue.  But if the 
parents had not been married, some party might have challenged 
the eligibility or standing of the alleged father, and a 
determination of the man's paternity would have been necessary 
as part of the wrongful death suit.   
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
2 
 
¶48 In the present case, the court permits Shannon to 
use Wis. Stat. § 885.23 to support his claim ("[W]e hold that, 
under such circumstances, Shannon . . . may bring a motion under 
Wis. Stat. § 885.23 to determine his parentage in the pending 
wrongful death action.")  Majority op., ¶4. 
¶49 This decision is suspect.  Wisconsin Stat. § 885.23 
authorizes genetic tests in a civil action (like a wrongful 
death or probate action) to determine the parentage or identity 
of "any child, person or corpse," whenever such evidence is 
relevant.1  This statute grants a party the right to obtain a 
genetic test, governs admissibility of the test results, and 
states the consequence of a party's refusal to submit to a test.  
By its terms, however, § 885.23 does not help a party who is not 
seeking to obtain a genetic test, which is likely to be the 
situation here. 
¶50 Nothing in § 885.23 provides an independent basis for 
a party to establish paternity.  The section speaks of genetic 
tests as evidence in an already initiated civil action in which 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.23 reads: 
Genetic tests in civil actions. Whenever it is 
relevant in a civil action to determine the parentage 
or identity of any child, person or corpse, the court, 
by order, shall direct any party to the action and any 
person involved in the controversy to submit to one or 
more genetic tests as provided in s. 767.84. The 
results of the tests shall be receivable as evidence 
in 
any 
case 
where 
exclusion 
from 
parentage 
is 
established or where a probability of parentage is 
shown to exist. Whenever the court orders the genetic 
tests and one of the parties refuses to submit to the 
tests that fact shall be disclosed upon trial. 
 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
3 
 
parentage is an issue.  It does not suggest that parentage may 
not be established by testimony or other evidence——in the 
absence of a genetic test——but the section does not itself 
authorize a party to initiate a proceeding to prove paternity or 
to present other kinds of evidence to prove paternity.  In sum, 
the majority's reliance on § 885.23 as the statutory basis for a 
party to establish paternity is shaky at best. 
II 
¶51 If the court were determined to bar recovery by an 
unmarried father for the wrongful death of an unborn child, I 
could understand a strategy in which the court would exclude 
every possible means for the father to establish paternity.  But 
that does not appear to be the goal of the majority opinion.  
Thus, it is hard to fathom why the court spends many pages 
trying to show that a man "alleging himself to be the father of 
the child" cannot bring a motion under § 767.45(1) "for the 
purpose 
of 
determining 
the 
paternity 
of 
the 
child."  
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) (2003-04).  The language in § 767.45(1) 
is clearly broad enough to cover the facts of the case.2 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.45(1) provides in relevant part: 
 
The following persons may bring an action or 
motion, including an action or motion for declaratory 
judgment, for the purpose of determining the paternity 
of a child or for the purpose of rebutting the 
presumption 
of 
paternity 
under 
s. 
891.405 
or 
891.41(1): 
 
(a) The child. 
 
(b) The child's natural mother. 
 
(c) Unless s. 767.62(1) applies, a man presumed 
to 
be 
the 
child's 
father 
under 
s. 
891.405 
or 
891.41(1). 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
4 
 
¶52 In addition, § 767.45(3) provides: 
 
If an action under this section is brought before 
the birth of the child, all proceedings shall be 
stayed until after the birth, except that service of 
process, service and filing of pleadings, the first 
appearance and the taking of depositions to preserve 
testimony may be done before the birth of the child. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45(3).  This subsection specifically approves 
the filing of an action before an unborn child is born.  Under 
other law, if the unborn child dies, the cause of action to 
determine 
paternity 
survives 
the 
death. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(a). 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.51(3) does, of course, state 
that a judgment or order determining paternity shall contain 
certain provisions.  But there need not be a "judgment or order" 
of paternity in the course of another proceeding such as a 
wrongful death action, only a determination of fact. Cf. Max T. 
v. Carol O., 174 Wis. 2d 352, 497 N.W.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1993).  
In a jury trial, the court could instruct the jury or provide a 
special verdict with the question of parentage answered by the 
court.  If a judgment or order were absolutely necessary, the 
world would not end if the court simply stated in the judgment 
or order that the provisions of § 767.51(3) are inapplicable 
because the child was stillborn. 
III 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(d) A man alleged or alleging himself to be the 
father of the child.  (Emphasis added.) 
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.45 was converted by 2005 Wis. Act 443 
to Wis. Stat. § 767.80 as part of a comprehensive revision 
of chapter 767, effective January 1, 2007. 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
5 
 
¶54 Inasmuch as Shannon is given permission to establish 
his "parentage" of the stillborn child, it might appear 
frivolous to quibble over which statute he is entitled to use.  
But the court's decision has implications for the future. 
¶55 First, this case appears to represent a retreat from 
the clear decision in Kwaterski.  In 1967 this court said: 
 
We 
recognize 
that 
up 
to 
1949 
no 
American 
jurisdiction permitted wrongful-death proceedings for 
a stillborn infant.  In that year, the Minnesota court 
first permitted such a suit in Verkennes v. Corniea[, 
38 N.W.2d 838 (Mn. 1949)].  Since the Verkennes 
opinion, ten jurisdictions have expressly permitted 
suits on facts precisely equivalent to the case at 
bar. 
Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 18.3  The unanimous court went on to 
assert that there were at least four basic reasons to support 
recovery: 
 
(1) A viable child is capable of independent 
existence and therefore should be recognized as a 
separate entity entitled to the protection of the law 
of torts.  In Puhl [v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance 
                                                 
3 The court cited State v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964); 
Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. 1964); Gorke v. Le 
Clerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. 1962); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 
(Kan. 1962); Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1959); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957); Worgan 
v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del. 1956); Mitchell v. 
Cough, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So.2d 434 
(Miss. 1954); Valence v. La. Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 
(La. Ct. App. 1951).  See Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 18-19, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967). 
In 1995 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
determined that the term "person" used in wrongful death 
statutes encompasses a nonviable unborn child.  Farley v. 
Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W.Va. 1995).  The court cited one 
decision prior to Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Mn. 
1949), namely, Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 
1946), and collected multiple additional cases after Kwaterski. 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
6 
 
Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959)] we have 
already recognized that an unborn child is a separate 
legal entity. 
 
(2) As stated in Puhl, the law recognizes an 
unborn child by protecting its property rights and 
rights of inheritance and also protects the unborn 
child against the crimes of others. 
 
(3) If no right of action is allowed, there is a 
wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy.  Denying 
a right of action for negligent acts which produce a 
stillbirth 
leads 
to 
some 
very 
incongruous 
results. . . .  
[A]n unborn child who was badly 
injured by the tortious acts of another, but who was 
born alive, could recover while an unborn child, who 
was more severely injured and died as the result of 
the tortious acts of another, could recover nothing. 
 
(4) A family who loses a child before it is born 
suffers a very grievous loss for which money damages 
are really inadequate.  It is only equitable that a 
family should receive some compensation from a tort-
feasor whose negligence caused the loss of a child. 
Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 19-20. 
 
¶56 Six years after Kwaterski, the United States Supreme 
Court held that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not include the unborn."  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 158 (1973).  Although this part of the Roe decision was not 
unexpected, the Court went on unnecessarily to criticize 
decisions like Kwaterski: 
In a recent development, generally opposed by the 
commentators, some States permit the parents of a 
stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful 
death because of prenatal injuries.  Such an action, 
however, would appear to be one to vindicate the 
parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view 
that 
the 
fetus, 
at 
most, 
represents 
only 
the 
potentiality of life. . . .  In short, the unborn have 
never been recognized in the law as persons in the 
whole sense. 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
7 
 
¶57 Ten years ago in State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. 
Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997), this court 
concluded that the legislature did not intend to include a fetus 
within the Children's Code definition of "child," and thus a 
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to confine a pregnant, drug-
consuming mother so that the court could protect the fetus.  Id. 
at 137-38. 
¶58 In the present case, the circuit court cited Angela 
M.W. as one reason for denying Shannon the right to proceed 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.45.  The court of appeals discussed both 
§ 767.45 and Wis. Stat. § 885.23 and denied Shannon the right to 
proceed under § 767.45 and avoided making a clear determination 
under § 885.23. 
¶59 What is obvious is that our courts are reluctant to 
interpret the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 767.45(1) to include 
a "stillborn infant."  See Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 15.  This 
timidity is not justified and comes very close to repudiating 
Kwaterski, which has been part of Wisconsin law for four 
decades.  
¶60 Second, in relying entirely on Wis. Stat. § 885.23 as 
the statute under which to proceed, the court is needlessly 
confusing litigants.  Once again, this statute by its terms does 
not provide a separate vehicle for establishing paternity.   
¶61 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.45(1) was created by § 25, 
Chapter 352, Laws of 1979, which took effect July 1, 1981.  
Section 767.45(1) substantially increased the number of persons 
authorized to establish paternity and should, therefore, be 
viewed as codifying broad authority to effect this objective. 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
8 
 
¶62 Now, however, when the court precludes the use of the 
broadly worded Wis. Stat. § 767.45, it undermines the use of 
anything in Chapter 767 to establish paternity on these facts.  
This 
is 
very 
troublesome 
because 
the 
statute 
the 
court 
ultimately relies on, Wis. Stat. § 885.23, is (1) explicitly 
linked to Chapter 767; and (2) applies only to genetic tests.  
In other words, the court relies on a statute that was designed 
to facilitate one means of proving paternity, not authorize that 
end.  It relies on a statute that will be viewed as inapplicable 
when a litigant seeks to prove paternity by some means different 
from a genetic test. 
¶63 If the court is determined to preclude the use of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.45 to establish the paternity of a stillborn 
child, it ought to give litigants a clear explanation of how to 
establish paternity in a case where the litigant is not seeking 
a genetic test.  I would rely on Wis. Stat. § 806.04 as 
supplementary 
authority 
for 
an 
independent 
action 
and 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.02 as the controlling evidentiary rule. 
¶64 Because I see the court's decision as creating 
apprehension 
about 
the 
future 
of 
Kwaterski, 
as 
well 
as 
uncertainty and confusion, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP77.dtp 
 
 
1