Title: Thomas v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All Justices 
 
JEFFREY ALLEN THOMAS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record Nos. 012253 & 012254   JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
March 1, 2002 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY 
Colin R. Gibb, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction 
and death penalty imposed upon Jeffrey Allen Thomas, along 
with his convictions for attempted rape and use of a firearm 
in the commission of a murder. 
I.  PROCEEDINGS 
On June 26, 2000, Jeffery Allen Thomas was indicted by a 
Pulaski County grand jury for capital murder in the commission 
of or subsequent to rape or attempted rape, Code § 18.2-31(5); 
for rape1 or attempted rape, Code §§ 18.2-61 and 18.2-67.5; and 
for the use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.2  At the conclusion of the first stage of a 
bifurcated jury trial conducted pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-264.3 
and -264.4, the jury convicted Thomas of all offenses.  At the 
penalty phase of the trial, the defendant chose not to present 
                     
1 The charge of rape was struck by the trial court on 
March 8, 2001. 
2 Thomas was also indicted for possession of a firearm 
after having been previously convicted of a felony, Code 
§ 18.2-308.2, but the trial court granted the defendant's 
motion to sever that indictment on the grounds that justice 
required separate trials pursuant to Rule 3A:10. 
mitigation evidence.  The jury fixed Thomas' punishment at 
death for capital murder, based upon a predicate finding of 
"vileness," at ten years imprisonment for attempted rape, and 
at three years imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony.  Thomas elected to present evidence in 
mitigation at the sentencing hearing.  After reviewing this 
evidence and the post-sentence report, the trial court entered 
a final order on July 16, 2001 confirming the convictions and 
imposing the sentences recommended by the jury. 
We have consolidated the automatic review of Thomas' 
death sentence with his appeal of the capital murder 
conviction in Record No. 012253, Code §§ 17-110.1(A) and -
110.1(F), and have given them priority on the docket, Code 
§ 17-110.2.  We have also certified from the Court of Appeals 
of Virginia Thomas' appeal of his non-capital convictions, 
Record No. 012254, and have consolidated the two records for 
consideration. 
II.  EVIDENCE 
Pursuant to established principles of appellate review, 
we will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 
S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990).  Tara Rose Munsey was a 16-year-old 
sophomore at Radford High School.  On the morning of January 
25, 2000, the defendant Thomas had unsuccessfully tried to 
 
2
reach Tara by telephone.  He eventually talked with her and 
invited her to join him and another friend, James Moede, at 
Moede's apartment.  Tara, some of her friends, Moede, and 
Thomas were at Moede's apartment smoking marijuana until about 
2:30 p.m. when Tara left to go to work.  When Tara drove away 
from the apartment, her friends observed Thomas follow Tara's 
car. 
After Tara left Moede's apartment, she went to the bank 
and withdrew $5.00 from her savings account before reporting 
to work at a fast food restaurant.  While at work, she 
received a telephone call from her father who asked her to 
meet him at a basketball game later that evening.  Tara agreed 
to meet him.  Around 8:00 p.m., on the way to the arranged 
meeting place, Tara's father saw her car in the restaurant's 
parking lot.  He went into the restaurant only to learn that 
Tara had "clocked out" approximately 30 minutes earlier.  Tara 
never met her father that evening. 
Sixteen days later, on February 10, 2000, her snow-
covered body was found below a railroad access road in a 
wooded ravine along the western bank of the New River near 
Parrott.  Tara had been shot three times in the head and once 
in the chest.  She was nude from the waist up.  Forensic 
evidence established that the muzzle of the murder weapon, a 
.22 caliber Marlin rifle, had been held against her left 
 
3
temple for one shot, in front of her left ear for another, and 
against the center of her chest for a third, but was unable to 
specify the muzzle placement of the third shot to her head.  
In addition to gunshot wounds, Tara had bruises on the left 
side of her jaw, her left arm, right leg, and upper left 
thigh. 
At an interview on February 10, which had been scheduled 
before Tara's body was discovered, Thomas told the police that 
he had spent the night of January 25 at Kevin Williams' house.  
When asked if he had been to the railroad tracks lately, 
Thomas replied that he had not "killed nobody." 
When Pulaski Police interviewed Kevin Williams on 
February 12, 2000, Williams said Thomas did not spend the 
night at Williams' house on January 25.  Williams also told 
the police that he owned a .22 caliber Marlin rifle that he 
had left in Thomas' car some time between December 6, 1999 and 
January 30, 2000.  Williams said that he did not want to carry 
the gun up his icy driveway and that Thomas offered to "take 
care of it."  Although Thomas promised to return the rifle, he 
never did.  When asked about Williams' rifle in his February 
10, 2000 interview, Thomas stated that he had given the rifle 
to a mutual friend, Leonard Dalton, to return to Williams. 
Using evidence collected from the crime scene in 
conjunction with the interviews of Williams and Thomas, the 
 
4
police obtained a warrant on February 15, 2000 to search 
Thomas' car and to recover blood, clothing, saliva, and hair 
samples from his person.  The police executed the search on 
February 16, 2000 and collected ten loose hairs from Thomas' 
car, various other physical samples, and Thomas' shoes. 
The physical evidence recovered from the crime scene 
included cigarette butts, Tara's coat and shirt, her car keys, 
and a .22 caliber shell casing.  A firearms expert determined 
that two of the bullets recovered in the autopsy of Tara had 
been fired from a .22 caliber rifle manufactured by Marlin.  
Comparison of the shell casing with shell casings found near 
Kevin Williams' porch showed that they had been fired from the 
same rifle.  Two partial shoe impressions found on Tara's 
shirt matched the pattern on the sole of the right shoe 
recovered from Thomas. 
A trace evidence expert testified that three of the hairs 
recovered from Thomas' car were consistent with Tara's hair.  
Expert testimony also established that the DNA markers of the 
hair were consistent with Tara's genetic markers and that the 
genetic material found on the partially smoked cigarette 
matched Thomas' DNA.  DNA consistent with Thomas' DNA was also 
found on the bottom sole of Tara's right shoe, in the blood 
stains on Tara's clothes, in semen found on the front of 
Tara's underwear, and underneath her fingernails. 
 
5
 
On February 15, 16, and 17, 2000, the police interviewed 
Barbara E. Helton.  Thomas had been staying at Helton's house  
"intermittently" since the morning of January 26, 2000.  In an 
interview on February 17th, Helton told police that Thomas 
confessed to her that he had killed Munsey.  She stated that 
Thomas came to her house at 6:30 a.m. on January 26, 2000 and 
woke her up.  Thomas's clothes were wrinkled and his shoes 
muddy.  He was nervous and asked Helton not to tell anyone he 
was there.  Helton testified that Thomas told her that he "had 
just f----- up" and that he "wished he had done it a different 
way; that he didn't mean to do it."  Continuing, Thomas told 
her that he had met Tara "at her job, and they went down the 
road to party a little bit, and he assumed she wanted sex."  
Thomas told Helton that they got into an argument near "a 
deserted spot . . . [t]hat had a ditch."  During the argument, 
Tara "pushed" Thomas and "he pushed her, and she fell down."  
According to Helton, Thomas said that Tara "was on her hands 
and knees," when "he grabbed the gun from his side and shot 
her three times in the head."  Thomas told Helton that he 
threw the gun "in some water." 
On February 17, 2000, Thomas was served with two arrest 
warrants for capital murder and use of a firearm while 
committing capital murder.  During a post-arrest interview 
with Pulaski County Sheriff A.J. Davis, Thomas stated that, 
 
6
after leaving Moede's home on the afternoon of January 25, he 
followed Tara because she wanted to buy some marijuana from 
him, which he sold to her after she got some money from the 
bank.  When Tara went to work, Thomas said he drove around.  
After making a statement that he had telephoned Williams, but 
Williams was not home, Thomas invoked his right to counsel and 
terminated the interview. 
III.  ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
Thomas raises 38 assignments of error.  In Assignment of 
Error 11, Thomas advances a number of arguments regarding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty statutes and their 
application.  The arguments raised by Thomas have been 
previously considered and rejected by this Court.  Thomas 
presents no new arguments sufficient to warrant a change in 
our prior holdings:  
(1)  The penalty phase instructions adequately 
instructed the jury on the vileness 
aggravating factor and on consideration of 
mitigation evidence.3  Watkins v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 490-91, 331 S.E.2d 
422, 438 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 
(1986). 
(2)  Consideration of hearsay evidence by the trial 
court in a post-sentencing report is not 
unconstitutional.  Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 
                     
3 We do not address Thomas' arguments that the "future 
dangerousness" aggravating factor and the use of unadjudicated 
conduct on this point violated his federal and state 
constitutional rights because the jury verdict was limited to 
a finding of vileness, thereby rendering Thomas' arguments 
moot. 
 
7
Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76, cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994). 
(3) The discretion granted a trial court to impose 
a sentence of life is constitutional.  Goins 
v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 S.E.2d 
114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996). 
 
IV.  BILL OF PARTICULARS 
 
Thomas filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking 
that the trial court order the Commonwealth to provide the 
following information:  (1) the exact date, time and location 
of the alleged murder; (2) the aggravating factors upon which 
the Commonwealth would rely in seeking the death penalty; (3) 
if "vileness" was to be a basis for seeking the death penalty, 
the components of that factor upon which the Commonwealth 
intended to offer evidence; (4) if "future dangerousness" was 
to be a basis for seeking the death penalty, any unadjudicated 
allegations of the defendant's misconduct upon which the 
Commonwealth intended to offer evidence; and (5) 
identification of the evidence upon which the Commonwealth 
would rely to support the aggravating factors and all evidence 
which the Commonwealth will introduce and rely upon to support 
its contention that death is the appropriate punishment.  The 
Commonwealth responded by providing the information requested 
under items 2, 3, and 4, but maintained that it was not 
required to provide the remaining information.  We agree with 
the Commonwealth. 
 
8
 
A defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a 
matter of right.  Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 
372, 402 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).  
Code § 19.2-220 requires that the indictment identify the 
accused, describe the offense charged and where it occurred, 
and recite the date on or about which the offense occurred.  
This information was contained in the indictment at issue and 
Thomas does not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment.  
Accordingly, a bill of particulars was not required as to the 
first item requested.  Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 
490, 404 S.E.2d 227, 233, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). 
 
We have previously considered a request for a bill of 
particulars in which the defendant sought identification of 
evidence identical to that Thomas seeks in item 5 above.  In 
Quesinberry, we concluded that identification of all evidence 
upon which the Commonwealth would rely in support of its 
contention that death was an appropriate penalty was not 
required because such a request was an improper attempt to 
expand the scope of discovery in a criminal case.  241 Va. at 
372, 402 S.E.2d at 223.  We find nothing in this record to 
support a different conclusion in this case. 
 
For the above reasons, we reject this assignment of 
error. 
V.  MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
 
9
 
 
Thomas assigns error to the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
search warrants issued on February 16, 2000.  The evidence 
obtained included hairs from Thomas' car, samples of his 
blood, hair and saliva, a pair of his tennis shoes, and some 
of his clothes. 
 
The Affidavit for Search Warrant and the supporting 
attachment were executed by Captain Anthony R. Webb of the 
Pulaski County Sheriff's Office.  The affidavit recited that 
Thomas was seen with Tara the afternoon of her disappearance 
and that she was killed by gunshot wounds from a .22 caliber 
firearm.  Included in the affidavit was a statement that "[a] 
Commonwealth witness, Kevin Williams, has informed law 
enforcement that Thomas had borrowed a .22 caliber Marlin 
rifle from him in the fall of 1999" and that although Thomas 
"originally denied" that he had a firearm, when told of 
Williams' statement, "Thomas admitted that Williams had loaned 
him a .22 caliber Marlin rifle."4
                     
4 The affidavit in its entirety follows: 
 
PROBABLE CAUSE
 
Jeffrey Allen Thomas, hereafter Thomas, is the 
suspect in the homicide of Tara Rose Munsey, 
hereafter Munsey.  Thomas knew Munsey and her 
family.  Thomas was seen by several witnesses with 
Munsey in the afternoon of her disappearance on the 
 
10
 
Thomas first argues that the affidavit was deficient 
because the references to a "borrowed" and "loaned" firearm 
                                                                
day she is believed by investigators to have been 
killed, which is around or about the 25th day of 
January in the year 2000.  On that day Thomas was 
driving a Gold colored 1991 Nissan Stanza 
registered through Virginia's DMV in his, Thomas', 
name. 
 
Munsey's body was found in the Parrott area of 
Pulaski County.  Her jacket was not on her body, 
and a T-shirt had been ripped and found a short 
distance away from her body.  The outside 
temperature on January 25, 2000 was below freezing.  
Preliminary reports from the Forensic Science lab 
indicate Munsey was killed by more than one gunshot 
wound produced by a .22 caliber firearm.  A shell 
casing from a Marlin .22 caliber firearm was found 
at the scene.  Also, found at the scene is what 
appeared to investigators as footwear impressions 
appearing to be made by a tennis shoe, located on a 
particular piece of Munsey's clothing. 
 
A Commonwealth witness, Kevin Williams, has 
informed law enforcement that Thomas had borrowed a 
.22 caliber Marlin rifle from him in the fall of 
1999.  A distinguishing characteristic of this 
particular firearm was a gold trigger.  Thomas 
originally denied on several occasions that he had 
a firearm.  When confronted with the information 
provided by Kevin Williams, Thomas admitted that 
Williams had loaned him a .22 caliber Marlin rifle. 
 
Kevin Williams advised investigators that he had 
fired the .22 caliber Marlin rifle with a gold 
trigger from his porch/deck prior to his having 
loaned the firearm to Thomas.  Investigators 
searched that area and found two shell casings 
between two planks of the deck.  These shell 
casings were turned over to the forensic lab.  It 
was determined that the shell casings recovered 
from the porch/deck of the Williams' residence, and 
the shell casing recovered from the crime scene 
were fired from the same firearm.   
 
11
were false and misleading.  Williams told the police officers 
that he had "left" the rifle in Thomas' car and that Thomas 
had said he would "take care of it."  In his February 10, 2000 
interview, Thomas told law enforcement officers that Williams 
had left the gun in Thomas' car but that he no longer had it 
because he had given it to Leonard M. Dalton, a friend, to 
return to Williams. 
 
At an evidentiary hearing on Thomas' motion to suppress, 
Captain Webb testified that the affidavit was based upon his 
own interview with Williams and reports of other interviews by 
officers involved in the investigation.  Captain Webb stated 
that he believed that the statements he made in the affidavit 
were accurate, and that he did not intend to deceive the 
magistrate.  Major Mike Alderman testified that when he 
interviewed Thomas, Thomas stated that Williams had left the 
gun in Thomas' car and that Thomas had given the gun to Dalton 
to return it to Williams.  Alderman testified that he had 
informed Captain Webb of Thomas' statement prior to the time 
Webb prepared the affidavit. 
 
Following the hearing, the trial court refused to 
suppress the evidence, finding that the affidavit "contained 
no deliberately false statements, nor was it the product of a 
reckless disregard for the truth."  Thomas asserts that this 
holding was error. 
 
12
 
Thomas posits that because neither he nor Kevin Williams 
used the words "borrow" or "lend" in their reported interviews 
with law enforcement personnel and because Captain Webb knew 
they had used no such language in their interviews, Captain 
Webb's inclusion of these words in the affidavit constituted 
an intentional misrepresentation or reckless disregard for the 
truth. 
The affidavit, apart from the disputed language, 
established that a shell casing found at the scene of the 
murder matched a shell casing fired from a gun owned by 
Williams.  The sentences at issue addressed Thomas' access to 
that gun.  While the words chosen by Captain Webb to describe 
how Thomas came into possession of Williams' gun did not 
accurately reflect the specific events leading to Thomas' 
possession of the gun as related by Thomas and Williams, the 
manner in which Thomas came into possession of the gun was not 
material to the fact that Thomas had access to and possession 
of the gun within a time period corresponding to the murder of 
Tara Munsey.  Whether the gun was "borrowed" or "lent" was not 
relevant to Thomas' access to nor possession of the gun for 
purposes of determining probable cause to issue a search 
warrant. 
 
Similarly, Thomas' complaint that he possessed the gun 
during a period from December 1999 through January 2000 and 
 
13
not sometime "in the fall" of 1999 as contained in the 
affidavit, does not alter the relevant fact of Thomas' 
possession of the gun at the time of Tara Munsey's murder. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that there is no reversible error 
in the trial court's determination that there were no 
"deliberately false statements" in the affidavit and that the 
affidavit was not the "product of a reckless disregard for the 
truth."  
 
Thomas next asserts that the affidavit was deficient 
because it omitted material information known to Captain Webb 
which would have defeated a finding of probable cause and 
because Webb received substantial portions of the information 
in the affidavit from an informant whose reliability was not 
adequately established.  The record does not show the extent 
to which these arguments were before the trial court; however, 
neither has merit. 
 
The information Thomas asserts was purposely omitted from 
the affidavit was evidence that shell casings from a .22 
caliber rifle found at Thomas' former residence did not match 
the shell casings found at the scene of the crime or the shell 
casings fired from Williams' gun.  This information was 
significant, Thomas claims, because law enforcement officers 
originally believed Williams' gun fired all three sets of 
shell casings.  However, shell casings unrelated to the crime 
 
14
are irrelevant to the determination that Thomas had access to 
the murder weapon and information about other such shell 
casings would not have defeated a finding of probable cause.  
 
Finally, according to Thomas, the affidavit cannot 
support a finding of probable cause because the affidavit did 
not give the magistrate any information concerning the 
reliability of the "informant" Kevin Williams.  Kevin 
Williams, however, was identified in the affidavit and, 
therefore, was not a confidential or anonymous informant whose 
reliability had to be demonstrated.  See, generally, Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v. Khounsavanh, 
113 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 
F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 
1578 (4th Cir. 1993). 
Williams' information that Thomas had possession of the 
.22 caliber rifle was consistent with the statements of Thomas 
himself regarding possession of the rifle.  The only other 
information provided by Williams was that he had fired the .22 
caliber rifle at a place where police found shell casings that 
matched those found at the crime scene.  There was little 
basis for suspecting that Williams' statement that he shot his 
gun at his home was unreliable.  Finally, Williams' statement 
connected him to the murder weapon.  Such potentially 
incriminating statements are normally considered as enhancing 
 
15
the reliability of the statement.  See, e.g., Chandler v. 
Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 279, 455 S.E.2d 219, 224 (1995). 
In summary, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
denying Thomas' motion to suppress the evidence because the 
affidavit accompanying the request for a search warrant was 
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause and did not 
contain deliberately misleading or false information, did not 
omit information which if included would have defeated a 
finding of probable cause, and was not based on information 
from a source not shown to be reliable. 
VI.  MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 
 
Thomas filed a pretrial motion seeking to change venue 
arguing that the "barrage" of publicity surrounding his trial 
made it reasonably certain that he could not receive a fair 
trial in Pulaski County.  In support of his motion, Thomas 
produced over 111 articles appearing in the three newspapers 
serving the area and video tapes or transcripts of over 188 
television reports relating to the crime.5  At the hearing on 
this motion, the trial court commented that Thomas had 
"provided the [c]ourt with plenty of material on which the 
                     
5 Pulaski County is served by three newspapers:  The 
Roanoke Times, which serves 17 counties in southwest Virginia 
and has a daily circulation of 99,691; The Radford News 
Journal, which serves the City of Radford and has a daily 
circulation of 10,000; and The Southwest Times, which serves 
 
16
[c]ourt could grant a change [in] venue" but that the motion 
was premature.  Relying on the presumption that an impartial 
jury could be impaneled, the trial court entered an order 
taking the motion under advisement pending the court's attempt 
to seat a jury. 
 
Over 142 persons were summoned for voir dire which, 
although originally scheduled to take three days, lasted five 
days and delayed the scheduled start of the trial.  To produce 
a venire of 29, the trial court questioned 104 persons in 
panels of three.  Of those questioned, 95% of the potential 
jurors and all of the jurors ultimately seated were aware of 
the pretrial publicity and knew about the case.  While 73 
persons were struck for cause, the reasons for the strikes 
were varied.  The record shows that in a number of instances a 
strike for cause was sustained on more than one ground.  For 
example, more than one potential juror indicated a lack of 
impartiality as well as a fixed opinion that the death penalty 
should or should not be imposed.  Nevertheless, 47 of those 
interviewed, or 45%, indicated that they could not be 
impartial and 33 of these had a fixed opinion that Thomas was 
guilty. 
                                                                
Pulaski County, east Wythe County, the City of Radford, and 
west Montgomery County and has a daily circulation of 7,500. 
 
17
 
On the fourth day of voir dire, the trial court excused 
an individual who earlier had been interviewed and placed on 
the venire.  During the intervening period, counsel and the 
trial court became aware that this individual had lied about 
his impartiality and had told a fellow worker that he would 
find Thomas guilty and, in his words, he would "fry the 
bastard." 
 
Following voir dire, Thomas again moved for a change of 
venue.  The trial court denied the motion, stating that "the 
law seems to indicate that what the court should do in 
situations like this is attempt to seat a jury, and if a jury 
can be seated or chosen, then that answers the question."  
Thomas assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion 
to change venue. 
 
We begin our review by reciting the principles which we 
apply when reviewing a challenge to the denial of a motion for 
a change of venue in a criminal case.  First, there is a 
presumption that a defendant will receive a fair trial in the 
jurisdiction where the offense occurred and the defendant 
bears the burden of overcoming "this presumption by 
demonstrating that the feeling of prejudice on the part of the 
citizenry is widespread and is such that would 'be reasonably 
certain to prevent a fair trial.' "  Mueller v. Commonwealth, 
244 Va. 386, 398, 422 S.E.2d 380, 388 (1992) (citing Stockton 
 
18
v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 314 S.E.2d 371, 380 
(1984)). 
 
In considering evidence of community prejudice based on 
pretrial publicity, widespread knowledge of the case alone is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption.  Jurors need not be 
ignorant of the crime.  Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 
(1961); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 406, 384 S.E.2d 
757, 767 (1989).  In addition to the volume of publicity, 
factors identified as relevant in determining the impact of 
pretrial publicity on the defendant's ability to obtain a fair 
trial are whether the publicity is accurate, temperate, and 
non-inflammatory, and the timing of the publicity.  Id. at 407, 
384 S.E.2d at 769; Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 
717, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419-20 (1974).  Thus, publication of 
matters concerning the crime, the accused's prior criminal 
record, and even a confession of the accused, if factually 
accurate and non-inflammatory, is not improper and will not 
alone support a change of venue.  Id., 204 S.E.2d at 420. 
 
A potential juror who has knowledge of the case, even if 
such person has formed an opinion about the case, is entitled 
to sit on the jury if that opinion can be set aside.  Irvin, 
366 U.S. at 722-23.  But the difficulties that the trial court 
encounters when finding jurors who, despite having advanced 
knowledge of the case and, perhaps, even preformed opinions, 
 
19
can impartially judge the case are relevant to deciding a 
motion to change venue.  The ease with which an impartial jury 
can be selected is a critical element in determining whether 
the prejudice in the community stemming from pretrial publicity 
is so wide-spread that the defendant cannot get a fair trial in 
that venue.  Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 342, 468 
S.E.2d 98, 109 (1996); Mueller, 244 Va. at 398, 422 S.E.2d at 
388.  Thus, generally it will be necessary for a trial court to 
undertake the task of attempting to seat the jury.  Coppola v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 248, 257 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1979).6  
 
We now apply these principles to the instant case.  As 
the trial court acknowledged, the amount of publicity 
surrounding this case was significant. While Thomas does not 
challenge the accuracy of any of these reports, he does cite 
three specific reports that he asserts were intemperate or 
inflammatory.  In two of these televised interviews Thomas was 
described as "obsessive and unbalanced" and the interviewee 
stated that the end of Thomas' relationship with his former 
girlfriend just before Tara's disappearance, "may have pushed 
him over the edge."  The interviewee also stated that Thomas 
                     
6 There are circumstances in which the pretrial publicity 
" 'involves such a probability that prejudice will result that 
it is deemed inherently lacking in due process,' " and the 
defendant is not required to establish identifiable prejudice.  
Wansley v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 462, 468-69, 171 S.E.2d 678, 
 
20
had a motive to harm Tara Munsey because she was engaged to the 
son of Thomas' former girlfriend. 
 
In the other television interview, the reporter 
identified a woman who claimed that Thomas "had threatened her 
life."  The reporter went on to state that "Thomas' temper and 
short fuse kept [the woman] in fear of her life.  A fear that 
isn't completely gone even though Thomas remains behind bars."  
 
Thomas also asserts that there were inaccuracies in some 
of the 111 newspaper articles reporting on the crime and trial 
that were prejudicial to Thomas.  One article reported that a 
search warrant for Thomas' person and car led to the discovery 
of a .22 caliber Marlin rifle, "which authorities believe was 
used in the murder."  Similarly one headline stated "Police tie 
bullet to murder suspect" when in fact the bullets found could 
not be linked to Thomas.  Retractions of these statements were 
subsequently published. 
 
Certainly the volume of the pretrial publicity was 
extensive.  The tenor of the publicity went beyond 
dispassionate reporting of the events surrounding the crime, 
the victim, and the accused, even though it did not declare the 
accused guilty or call for his conviction or for a specific 
punishment.  Compare Irvin, 366 U.S at 725.  Further, the 
                                                                
683 (1970) (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 
(1965)). 
 
21
inaccuracies are additional persuasive evidence of the 
existence and development of community prejudice against 
Thomas. 
 
Even in light of the volume and nature of the pretrial 
publicity in this case, the trial court was correct in 
proceeding to engage in voir dire.  Such publicity was not so 
inaccurate, inflammatory or extensive that the trial would be 
deemed inherently lacking in due process.  Accordingly, the 
trial court correctly took the matter under advisement until 
the voir dire process.  However, when it finally denied the 
motion to change venue, the trial court concluded that the only 
relevant fact remaining to be considered was that it had 
ultimately seated an impartial jury.  The record contains no 
indication that the trial court considered any other factor 
when making its decision to deny the motion to change venue.  
This is an improper test. 
 
While this Court has included statements regarding the 
impartiality of the jury actually seated when discussing the 
relative ease of seating the jury, it is the ease of seating 
the jury that is the relevant factor, not the ultimate result 
of that process.  Never has this Court held the impartiality 
of the seated jury to be a factor in considering whether a 
motion for a change of venue should be granted, much less 
found it dispositive.  See, e.g., Mueller , 244 Va. at 398-99, 
 
22
422 S.E.2d at 388-89; Greenfield, 214 Va. at 717, 204 S.E.2d 
at 420; Wansley v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 462, 468, 171 S.E.2d 
678, 683 (1970). 
 
This principle is consistent with that announced by the 
United States Supreme Court.  In Irvin v. Dowd, although a 
significant percentage of jurors were struck for cause and had 
pre-formed opinions of the defendant's guilt, the trial court 
was able to seat a jury that it judged would be impartial.  
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727.  The United States Supreme Court 
reversed, however, holding that given the difficulty of 
impaneling the jury and the evident influence of publicity on 
the jury pool, the trial court's finding of impartiality 
failed to make it reasonably certain that the defendant would 
get a fair trial and, therefore, a change of venue was 
necessary.  Id. at 727-28. 
 
Measuring the ease of impaneling a jury is an important 
tool in considering a request for change of venue.  It allows 
the trial court to take into account a cross section of the 
community so as to understand the pervasiveness of prejudice.  
It also allows the trial court to keep in mind that justice 
must not only be fair, it must also be above suspicion, 
Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298, 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 
(1976) (citing Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 
943 (1879)), because the more difficult it is to seat a jury, 
 
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the more likely it is that the public will believe the 
judicial process to be tainted by prejudice.  While both 
victims and society have an interest in punishing those 
individuals who violate our criminal statutes, no one's 
interests are served when the process by which a defendant is 
found guilty is not above suspicion.  The fairness of a 
criminal proceeding cannot be sacrificed because of the 
"heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the 
offender or the station in life which [the defendant] 
occupies."  Irving v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred, as a 
matter of law, by failing to apply the proper test and failing 
to consider the necessary factors when making its decision to 
deny Thomas' motion to change venue.  Consequently, because 
the trial court used an improper legal standard in exercising 
its discretionary function, we are unable to apply the 
appellate review standard of abuse of discretion.  In light of 
this holding, the judgment of conviction must be vacated.  
While this disposition eliminates the need for us to address 
many of Thomas' remaining assignments of error, we will 
address one assignment of error that is likely to arise again 
in the event of retrial. 
VII.  VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY 
 
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In Assignment of Error 33, Thomas asserts the trial court 
erred in allowing Ella Buchanan, a cousin of the victim, and 
Nicholas Ryan Zaroba, the victim's fiancé, to testify in the 
penalty phase of the trial because such testimony violated the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-264.4.  Thomas failed to object to 
the introduction of such testimony until July 9, 2001, four 
months after the penalty hearing.  The trial court noted that 
Thomas failed to comply with the contemporaneous objection 
requirement, Rule 5:25, but addressed the matter nevertheless, 
concluding that the testimony of these two witnesses did not 
violate the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.4.  Because the 
trial court considered the matter on its merits, we will 
address the issue. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.4 allows victims to testify regarding the 
impact of the offense upon them.  The General Assembly has 
defined "victim" to include "a spouse, parent, sibling or 
legal guardian" of the murder victim.  Code § 19.2-11.01(B). 
 
In Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 484 S.E.2d 898 
(1997), we considered whether the trial court erred in 
considering written communications from persons who where not 
family members of the victims in conjunction with the 
sentencing of the defendant in a capital murder bench trial.  
The defendant argued that victim impact evidence in a capital 
murder case was limited to persons defined as "victims" by 
 
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Code § 19.2-11.01.  We rejected this argument finding that the 
statutes at issue, Code §§ 19.2-11.01, -264.5, and -299.1, did 
not limit evidence of victim impact to that received from the 
victim and family members.  The reference to the definition of 
"victim" in Code § 19.2-299.1 served only to identify the 
individuals whose consent was required for the inclusion of a 
victim impact statement in the presentence report prepared in 
non-capital cases.  Code § 19.2-264.4. 
 
In 1998, subsequent to our decision in Beck, the General 
Assembly amended Code § 19.2-264.4 by adding the subsection at 
issue in this case, subsection (A1).  That subsection 
provides: 
 
In any proceeding conducted pursuant to 
this section, the court shall permit the 
victim, as defined in § 19.2-11.01, upon the 
motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, 
and with the consent of the victim, to testify 
in the presence of the accused regarding the 
impact of the offense upon the victim.  The 
court shall limit the victim's testimony to the 
factors set forth in clauses (i) through (vi) 
of subsection A of § 19.2-299.1. 
 
Unlike the statutes considered in Beck, this subsection 
specifically limits a "victim" to one meeting the definition 
contained in Code § 19.2-11.01 and specifically limits the 
testimony of such individuals to those items enumerated in 
subsection A of Code § 19.2-299.1.  The issue now before us 
then is whether the enactment of subsection (A1) of Code 
 
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§ 19.2-264.4 precluded all persons not coming within Code 
§ 19.2-11.01's definition of "victim" from testifying in a 
capital murder proceeding regarding the crime's impact on 
their lives.  We conclude that this subsection does not so 
limit victim impact testimony in capital cases. 
 
In Beck, we observed that the Victim Witness Rights Act, 
Code §§ 19.2-11.01 through -11.4, preserves the victims' right 
to have the impact of a crime considered in the sentencing 
proceeding.  253 Va. at 384, 484 S.E.2d at 905.  However, 
prior to 1998, the statutes only addressed this right in terms 
of the pre-sentence or written report.  See Code §§ 19.2-
11.01(A)(4)(a), -264.5, -299.1.  The 1998 General Assembly 
added the subsection at issue in this case along with Code 
§ 19.2-295.3 and subsection (c) of Code § 19.2-11.01(A)(4).7  
                     
 
7 Code § 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(c): 
 
On motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, 
victims shall be given the opportunity, pursuant to 
§§ 19.2-264.4 and 19.2-295.3, to testify prior to 
sentencing of a defendant regarding the impact of 
the offense. 
 
Code § 19.2-295.3: 
 
In cases of trial by jury or by the court, upon a 
finding that the defendant is guilty of a felony, 
the court shall permit the victim, as defined in 
§ 19.2-11.01, upon motion of the attorney for the 
Commonwealth, to testify in the presence of the 
accused regarding the impact of the offense upon 
the victim.  The court shall limit the victim's 
testimony to the factors set forth in clauses (i) 
 
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These amendments specifically addressed testimony by a victim 
and preserved the victim's right to present oral testimony.  
While the written statements were generally available only to 
the judge in the sentencing process, these amendments allowed 
the victim testimony to be presented to and considered by the 
jury in its sentencing deliberations.  This right to testify 
is, by statute, restricted to persons meeting the definition 
of "victim" in Code § 19.2-11.01. 
 
Nothing in the subsection, however, supports the theory 
that other persons who may have relevant victim impact 
testimony may not testify.  While such persons do not have a 
statutorily protected right to testify, their testimony is not 
automatically barred by Code § 19.2-264.4(A1).  As we said in 
Beck, the statutes 
do not limit evidence of victim impact to that 
received from the victim's family members.  Rather, 
the circumstances of the individual case will 
dictate what evidence will be necessary and 
relevant, and from what sources it may be drawn.  In 
a capital murder trial, as in any other criminal 
proceeding, the determination of the admissibility 
of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion 
                                                                
through (vi) of subsection A of § 19.2-299.1.  In 
the case of trial by jury, the court shall permit 
the victim to testify at the sentencing hearing 
conducted pursuant to § 19.2-295.1 or in the case 
of trial by the court, the court shall permit the 
victim to testify before the court prior to the 
imposition of a sentence.  Victim impact testimony 
in all capital murder cases shall be admitted in 
accordance with § 19.2-264.4.  
 
 
28
of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of 
that discretion. 
 
253 Va. at 384-85, 484 S.E.2d at 905. 
 
Accordingly we reject Thomas' assertion that the trial 
court violated Code § 19.2-264.4(A1) when it allowed Buchanan 
and Zaroba to testify in the penalty phase of Thomas' capital 
murder trial. 
Because Thomas does not assign error to the admission of 
this testimony on the ground that the testimony was not 
relevant, and because the substance of such testimony may be 
different in the event of retrial, we need not address Thomas' 
arguments regarding the substance of the challenged testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the conviction of 
the defendant and remand the case for further proceedings, 
should the Commonwealth be so advised, consistent with this 
opinion. 
Record No. 012253 – Reversed and remanded. 
Record No. 012254 – Reversed and remanded.
 
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