Title: JORDAN v. BRACKIN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JORDAN v. BRACKIN2003 WY 15179 P.3d 536Case Number: 02-260Decided: 11/21/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

LENÉ 
JORDAN,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

CHRIS 
ALLEN BRACKIN,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Len© 
Jordan, Pro se

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Mark 
W. Harris, Evanston, Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and JAMES, 
D.J.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Appellant 
Len© Jordan (Jordan) appeals the district court's determination that Appellee 
Chris Allen Brackin (Brackin) could properly cease child support payments on 
each son's eighteenth birthday.  
Jordan contends that because the age of majority was nineteen when the 
divorce decree was entered, the district court erred by not ruling that the 
child support obligation should continue until the nineteenth 
birthday.

 

[¶2]           
We 
hold that the district court properly determined that the current statutory age 
of majority was applicable, and Brackin was entitled to cease payments when the 
parties' sons turned eighteen.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Jordan 
presents the following issue for our review:

 

Did 
the trial court err when it determined that Father's obligation to pay child 
support for the benefit of his sons . . . terminates at the new age of 
majority?

 

Brackin 
restates the issue as:

 

Did 
the trial court err when it determined that the age of majority for an on-going 
child support obligation was 18 years of age?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
Jordan 
and Brackin first married in 1981 and had two sons, one born on May 24, 1984, 
and one born on March 7, 1986.  The 
parties divorced in 1988 but remarried in February of 1992.  The couple divorced again in October of 
1992.  As part of that divorce 
decree, a separation agreement was incorporated stating that the parents would 
share equally in the physical custody, support and maintenance of the children 
so long as parents lived within 100 miles of each other.  No child support was awarded or ordered 
for either party. 

 

[¶5]           
Two 
years later, when Brackin planned to move over 100 miles away to Evanston, the 
parents negotiated an amendment to the settlement agreement that Brackin would 
begin paying child support to Jordan.  
That amendment was never filed with the court.  Later, the parties did petition to 
modify child support, and an order was entered in 1996 that was later modified 
in 2000.  Under that later order, 
Brackin began paying $548 per month in child support. 

 

[¶6]           
Our 
review of the separation agreement and the court's child support orders 
indicates that none addressed the duration of the payment of child support nor 
the continuation of the court's jurisdiction after the children reached age 
eighteen.  The district court held a 
hearing on Brackin's motion to reduce his child support when his eldest son 
turned eighteen and granted the motion based upon statutory requirements that 
terminate the child support obligation at age eighteen unless certain 
circumstances exist.  Jordan filed a 
motion for reconsideration contending that the district court should apply the 
statutory age of majority that existed when the separation agreement was 
executed and the divorce decree was final. The district court denied 
reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]           
In 
1993, the Wyoming legislature changed the age of majority from nineteen to 
eighteen.1  Thomas v. Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 
855 (Wyo. 1996).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-313 (LexisNexis 2003) provides for the cessation of a child-support 
obligation when the child reaches the age of majority.2   The child support obligation may 
continue under some circumstances such as when the child is disabled or still 
attending high school; however, none of those circumstances apply in this 
case.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204 
(LexisNexis 2003).  

 

[¶8]           
At 
the hearing, Jordan clarified that she was seeking the additional year of 
support because her son planned to attend college and she asserted that it was 
in his best interests that Brackin continue to pay child support to assist with 
college expenses.  The district 
court determined that the statutory language deprived it of jurisdiction to 
order continued child support payments beyond the eighteenth year.  On appeal, Jordan does not challenge 
this determination, but instead points to our decision in Thomas as 
permitting the prospective application of the 1993 statutory change in the age 
of majority.  She contends that 
because the separation agreement and the divorce decree were final in 1992, the 
district court had jurisdiction to apply the 1992 statute and allow the child 
support obligation to continue until her sons' nineteenth 
birthdays.

 

[¶9]           
The 
precise issue considered in Thomas was:

 

Where 
before the effective date of a statute changing the age of majority from 
nineteen (19) to eighteen (18) years a child support order specified 19 years as 
the age at which the divorced father's duty to make support payments would end, 
was the district court in error in terminating the duty of support at the new 
age of majority?

 

913 P.2d  at 854.

 

[¶10]      
The 
issue in Thomas questioned an existing child support order that did not 
specify when the child support obligation was to cease.  Id. at 856.  Thomas held that the legislature 
intended that this change would apply prospectively and, thus, the district 
court should not apply the statutory change to an existing child support order. 
Id.  Thus, in Thomas, 
the father was required to support his children until the age of 
nineteen.  
Id.

 

[¶11]      In 
this case, the existing child support order entered in 1992 did not specify any 
child support obligation for either party and did not discuss duration for any 
matter except to specify that Brackin would provide medical insurance "until 
each child became emancipated."  
When it became necessary to determine a child support amount, the parties 
went to court and the first court-ordered child support obligation for Father 
was entered in 1996.  We find that 
the holding in Thomas applies only to those court orders that specify a 
child support obligation for at least one of the parents and which was entered 
before 1993 when the statutory change in age became effective.  In 1992, neither Brackin nor Jordan was 
ordered by the court to pay monthly support for the children, and we find this 
distinction from Thomas sufficient to uphold the district court's 
order.

 

[¶12]      
Brackin, 
however, contends that further statutory amendments have overruled Thomas 
and all child support obligations must cease at the age of eighteen 
regardless of when the child support was ordered.  Having already determined that Jordan's 
argument fails, we need not consider this contention in this case and its 
resolution must wait another day.  
Affirmed.

 

       

     FOOTNOTES

       

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-101(a) (LexisNexis 2003) reads: 

§ 14-1-101. Age of majority; rights on 
emancipation.

            
(a) Upon becoming eighteen (18) years of age, an individual reaches the 
age of majority and as an adult acquires all rights and responsibilities granted 
or imposed by statute or common law, except as otherwise provided by 
law.

 

2(a) An on-going child support obligation terminates when 
the:

(i) Parents marry or remarry each other;

(ii) Child dies;

(iii) Child is legally emancipated; or

(iv) Child attains the age of majority.