Title: Rolf v. Tri State Motor Transit Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Rolf v. Tri State Motor Transit Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 380, 2001-Ohio-44.] 
 
 
ROLF ET AL. v. TRI STATE MOTOR TRANSIT COMPANY ET AL. 
[Cite as Rolf v. Tri State Motor Transit Co. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 380.] 
Torts — Emancipated children seek to recover damages for the loss of 
consortium they suffered as a result of injuries to their father — Adult 
emancipated children may recover for loss of parental consortium. 
(No. 00-1329 — Submitted January 31, 2001 — Decided April 25, 2001.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, No 3:99CV7687. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Adult emancipated children may recover for loss of parental consortium. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  This matter is before us as a certified 
question of state law from the United States District Court, Northern District, 
Western Division.  In its certification order the federal district court states: 
 
“Kenneth Martin, father of plaintiffs Bonnie L. Rolf and David Martin 
(both emancipated adults living apart from their parents), was seriously and 
permanently injured on October 8, 1996, in Allen County, Ohio, when his vehicle 
was struck from behind by a semi-trailer truck being operated by Dallas K. 
Pelcher, in the course and scope of his employment for the defendant Tri State 
Motor Transit Company.  As a result of the accident, Kenneth Martin’s cognitive 
functions and ability to control basic bodily functions have been seriously 
impaired.  For the rest of his life he will require convalescent care and continuing 
medical treatment. 
 
“* * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“Plaintiffs Bonnie L. Rolf and David Martin filed the instant proceeding in 
the certifying Court on November 8, 1999.  Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for 
the loss of consortium that they have suffered as a result of the injuries to their 
father.” 
 
Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII, the federal district court has certified the 
following question of law to this court for our determination: 
 
“Can emancipated adult children maintain a claim under Ohio law for the 
loss of consortium caused by injuries to a parent?” 
 
For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the 
affirmative. 
 
This court has previously recognized a minor child’s cause of action for 
loss of parental consortium.  Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052, paragraph two of the syllabus.  We are now 
asked to extend the holding of Gallimore to allow adult children to pursue a 
similar cause of action for parental loss of consortium. 
 
The rationale advanced in favor of recognizing a minor child’s loss-of-
parental-consortium claim in Gallimore was taken, in large part, from Justice 
Resnick’s dissenting opinion in High v. Howard (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 82, 86-96, 
592 N.E.2d 818, 821-827, a decision that Gallimore overruled.1  These policy 
arguments can be summarized as follows:  (1) since a minor child can recover 
similar damages under the wrongful death statute, R.C. 2125.02, when a parent 
dies, he or she should also be allowed to recover for loss of parental consortium 
when a parent is injured but not killed; (2) since Ohio already recognizes spousal 
and filial consortium claims, it should likewise recognize a minor’s loss-of-
                                                          
 
1.  The primary issue in Gallimore was whether Ohio should recognize a cause of action for filial 
consortium, i.e., an action brought by parents to recover damages arising out of their minor child’s 
injuries.  67 Ohio St.3d 244, 246, 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1053-1054.  In recognizing such an action, id. 
at paragraph one of the syllabus, we then addressed the corresponding cause of action for a minor 
January Term, 2001 
3 
parental-consortium claim since the claimant’s loss consists of many of the same 
elements in each type of consortium claim, including the loss of love, affection, 
and companionship.  Therefore, to deny a loss-of-parental-consortium claim 
would relegate the parent-child relationship to second-class status behind spousal 
consortium claims or filial consortium claims; and (3) a minor child should be 
allowed to recover for loss of parental consortium because the child suffers a very 
real and debilitating loss when a parent is injured and deserves to be compensated 
for that loss. 
 
Petitioners argue that these policy reasons apply to adult children as well 
as minors.  Consequently, they maintain that they should not be denied their right 
to recovery simply because they are adults.  Respondent Tri State, however, 
rejects these arguments and instead contends that there are more persuasive 
reasons for refusing to extend loss-of-parental-consortium claims to adult, 
emancipated children.2 
 
The primary reason why respondent urges us to limit the holding of 
Gallimore to minor children is its belief that while minors suffer a compensable 
loss when a parent is injured, this loss is compensable only because minors are 
dependent upon a parent for their care and emotional guidance.  By contrast, 
respondent maintains that the loss is so much less severe with adult children 
because they are no longer reliant upon a parent for financial or emotional 
support.  Based upon this inherent difference, respondent concludes that we 
should not extend loss-of-parental-consortium claims to adult children. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
child’s claim of loss of parental consortium.  Since the only issue before this court concerns loss 
of parental consortium, we are limiting our discussion to that issue. 
2.  Respondent contends that the fact that an adult child may recover damages under the wrongful 
death statute is irrelevant and does not create an anomaly.  However, in Gallimore, we found this 
incongruity to be a relevant consideration in recognizing a parent’s claim of loss of consortium of 
a minor child.  Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 249-250, 617 
N.E.2d 1052, 1056.  We adhere to that rationale in this case as well. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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We reject the reasoning advanced by respondent.  The fact that an adult 
child’s relationship with a parent differs from that of a minor child does not 
provide us with justification for refusing to recognize an adult child’s loss-of-
parental-consortium claim. In Gallimore, we held that consortium may include 
services, society, companionship, comfort, love, guidance, and solace.  Id., 67 
Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052.  The essence of a parental-consortium claim is 
that a child is compensated for a harm done or for losses suffered as a result of 
injury to the parent and to the parent-child relationship.  Mogill, And Justice For 
Some:  Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child’s Action for Loss of Parental 
Consortium (1992), 24 Ariz.St.L.J. 1321, 1324-1325.  Certainly, both minor and 
adult children whose parent has been injured have suffered a loss that fits within 
this definition.  In that regard, we agree with the sentiment expressed by the court 
in Nelson v. Four Seasons Nursing Ctr. (Okla.App.1996), 934 P.2d 1104, 1105, 
when it stated: 
 
“There is simply no good reason to afford the personal right of 
companionship and the parent-child relationship less protection in cases involving 
adult children who seek to recover for injury to the parent-child relationship.  In 
cases where the parent-child relationship is destroyed or nearly destroyed by the 
tort of the defendant, the affected children, both minors and adults alike, should 
be allowed to maintain a cause of action for loss of parental consortium.” 
 
Furthermore, while it is true that minor children are more dependent upon 
their parents to satisfy their basic needs, as noted by one law review article, many 
adults actually renew their reliance on their parents when they reach middle age.  
Hammar, Breaking the Age Barrier in Alaska:  Including Adult Children in Loss 
of Filial Consortium Actions (1995), 12 Alaska L.Rev. 73, 85.  Therefore, just as 
minor children look to their parents for emotional support, those adult children 
who continue to enjoy a close relationship with their parents still depend upon 
their parents for affection, advice, and guidance as they become older.  
January Term, 2001 
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Consequently, when a parent is seriously injured, the adult child suffers an injury 
in being deprived of that parent’s love and guidance.  Therefore, regardless of the 
age of the child, the loss to the parent-child relationship is real and should not be 
minimized. 
 
Therefore, we find that it is irrational to deny recovery for loss of parental 
consortium simply because the child has reached the age of majority.  The fact 
that a child turns eighteen does not erase the need for parental guidance.  As one 
commentator so aptly notes:  “The parent-child relationship does not end when 
the child becomes eighteen.  It endures throughout life and can be characterized 
by love, care and affection for the duration.”  Id., 12 Alaska L.Rev. at 83.  In that 
regard, it is important to recognize that “ ‘[e]ven adult and married children have 
the right to expect the benefit of good parental advice and guidance.’ ”  Audubon-
Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf RR. Co. (Iowa 1983), 335 N.W.2d 
148, 150, quoting Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc. (Iowa 1969), 170 N.W.2d 
632, 665. 
 
The Arizona court in Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Maricopa Cty. 
Superior Court (1986), 150 Ariz. 228, 232, 722 P.2d 955, 959, reiterated this 
rationale when recognizing a filial consortium claim (brought by parents to 
recover for injuries sustained by their adult child), when it stated: 
 
“Surely nature recoils from the suggestion that the society, companionship 
and love which compose filial consortium automatically fade upon 
emancipation[,] while common sense and experience teach that the elements of 
consortium can never be commanded against a child’s will at any age.  The filial 
relationship, admittedly intangible, is ill-defined by reference to the ages of the 
parties and ill-served by arbitrary age distinctions.  Some filial relationships will 
be blessed with mutual caring and love from infancy through death while others 
will always be bereft of those qualities.  Therefore, to suggest as a matter of law 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that compensable consortium begins at birth and ends at age eighteen is illogical 
and inconsistent with common sense and experience.” 
 
This rationale applies with equal force in the context of an adult 
emancipated child’s cause of action for loss of parental consortium.  The facts of 
this case demonstrate how great this loss is and why adult children deserve to be 
compensated.  Here, the petitioners’ father suffered a traumatic brain injury, is 
physically and mentally impaired, and will require custodial care for the 
remainder of his life.  Petitioners have, for all practical purposes, lost the essence 
of the relationship they once enjoyed with their father.  Because of his debilitating 
injuries, they can no longer enjoy life experiences with their father nor can they 
turn to him for advice, guidance, or emotional support.  Certainly, these adult 
children deserve to be compensated for the tragic losses sustained just as minor 
children do. 
 
In conclusion, we find no legitimate reason to limit recovery for loss of 
parental consortium to minor children.  Consequently, we hold that adult 
emancipated children may recover for loss of parental consortium.  As we have 
now recognized an emancipated adult child’s loss-of-consortium claim, these 
individuals, who were previously denied compensation due to an artificial age 
barrier, may now seek the legal redress they are entitled to for the losses they have 
suffered. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., and W. Craig Bashein; Paul W. Flowers 
Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for petitioners. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, and William H. Heywood III, for 
respondent. 
 
Calhoun, Kademenos & Heichel Co., L.P.A., and Janet L. Phillips, in 
support of petitioners for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
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