Title: In re Pohl

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In re Pohl1999 WY 68980 P.2d 816Case Number: 97-349Decided: 05/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF CHERYL L. POHL,

 

AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BAILEY COMPANY: CHERYL L. POHL, 
Appellant

(Employee-Petitioner),

 

v.

 

THE BAILEY COMPANY and STATE OF 
WYOMING,

ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION, Appellees (Respondents).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court 
of Albany County, the Honorable

Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge.

  

Michael K. Kelly and S. L. 
Tiger Adolf of Michael K. Kelly Law Offices, Laramie, WY. Argument by Ms. Adolf, 
Representing Appellant.

 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. 
Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Haggerty, Representing 
Appellee Workers' § Safety and Compensation Div.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

   * Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument; retired November 2, 
1998.

 

    
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

   
[¶1]      Cheryl L. Pohl (Pohl) claims that the 
Worker's Compensation Medical Commission was without jurisdiction to hear her 
claim because she was injured prior to the date the Medical Commission came into 
effect. Because the legislature has clearly announced its intent that the 
Medical Commission hear all medically contested cases regardless of the date of 
the injury, we reject this contention. Further, we conclude the Worker's 
Compensation Division acted in accordance with the law when it employed a case 
review physician to review Pohl's disputed impairment 
ratings.

 

  [¶2]      We affirm.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

  [¶3]      Appellant Pohl presents two issues for 
our review:

 

1. Whether the Worker's Compensation Division 
(Division) erred in determining the Office of the Medical Commission, Division 
of Workers' Safety and Compensation (Commission) had subject matter jurisdiction 
when the injury at issue occurred in 1992, the Act creating the Commission (Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-616 [Supp. 1994] [the Act]) was not passed until 1994, and this 
Court has previously determined the 
Act does not apply retroactively.

 

2. Whether, as a matter of law, the Division violated 
the statutory requirement in Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-405(e) (Supp. 1986) now (m) 
(1997), (as amended), which mandates the procedure to be followed by the 
Division in its determination of an award of permanent partial disability when 
the percentage of physical impairment is disputed.

 

  [¶4]      Appellee, State, ex rel., Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division (Division) states the issues in this 
manner:

 

The Division denied the Employee's application to 
modify her permanent physical impairment award. The Workers' Compensation 
Medical Commission found she failed to prove an increase in incapacity due 
solely to her injury.

  

A. The Employee raised her legal arguments for the 
first time on appeal. Should the court summarily affirm?

 

B. Was the retroactive application of the Medical 
Commission's enabling legislation in accordance with law?

 

C. Did the Medical Commission violate the Act by 
considering all of the Employee's conflicting impairment 
ratings?

 

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶5]      Pohl suffered a work-related back injury 
on July 22, 1992, when she reached for a clipboard and experienced pain on the 
left side of her lower back. She reported the incident to her employer but 
continued working. On September 30, 1992, Pohl experienced an increase in her 
lower back pain, which included pain radiating into her left buttock. A few days 
later, Pohl went to an emergency room, where she was diagnosed with an acute 
lumbar strain and a herniated lumbar disc with radiculopathy (disease of the 
spinal nerve roots).

 

  [¶6]      Pohl originally followed a non-surgical 
course of treatment, but she continued to suffer pain. Another examination in 
February of 1993 confirmed disc degeneration and inflammation between lumbar 
vertebrae 4 and 5. In June of 1993, Pohl underwent spinal fusion surgery. After 
this surgery and recuperation, Pohl accepted a 20 percent permanent partial 
impairment award.

 

  [¶7]      Pohl moved to Oregon in 1995 and 
continued to receive therapy and treatment. In June of 1995, Pohl requested an 
impairment rating from her Oregon physician. Although the physician told Pohl 
that "Oregon physicians don't do [impairment] ratings," the physician supplied a 
rating. Without including any explanation of how the rating was calculated, 
Pohl's physician concluded that Pohl's whole body impairment rating had 
increased to 32 percent. Relying on the 32 percent rating, Pohl petitioned the 
Division for an award for an increase in permanent partial disability pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann  § 27-14-605(a) 
(Michie Rpl. June 1991).1 The Division disputed the 32 
percent rating and arranged for an independent medical evaluation (IME) with a 
second Oregon physician.  After 
examination and testing, the IME examiner concluded that Pohl's impairment 
rating was 35 percent.

 

  [¶8]      Before rendering a final determination, 
the Division employed a physician, Dr. Anne MacGuire, to conduct a review of 
Pohl's claim. After reviewing Pohl's history and both impairment ratings, Dr. 
MacGuire concluded that both impairment ratings were invalid under the AMA Guide 
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fourth Edition (AMA Guide). The 
Division denied Pohl's claim for an increase in her impairment rating, stating 
that the "Medical Adjudicator for the Division has reviewed the Impairment 
Rating and has indicated that you have no additional impairment, therefore, 
additional Permanent Partial Disability benefits will not be awarded." Pohl 
filed a timely request for a hearing, and the Division referred the case to the 
Workers' Compensation Medical Commission (Medical 
Commission).

 

  [¶9]      The Medical Commission denied Pohl's 
claim. Like Dr. MacGuire, the Medical Commission determined that both the 32 
percent and 35 percent ratings were invalid. The Medical Commission found that 
the measurements made by the IME examiner were generally consistent with the 
measurements used in determining Pohl's original 20 percent impairment rating 
and, thus, generally consistent in documenting Pohl's level of impairment. 
Because neither the invalid impairment ratings nor any other evidence 
established an increase in incapacity, the Medical Commission concluded that 
Pohl had not established an increase in impairment (above her original 20 
percent rating) due solely to her work-related injury. Pohl petitioned for 
review of the Medical Commission's decision to the district court, which 
affirmed. This appeal follows.

 

                         
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶10] 
  When considering an appeal 
from a district court's review of an agency's decision, we accord no special 
deference to the district court's conclusions. French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1998); Manning v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation 
Div., 938 P.2d 870, 872-73 (Wyo. 1997). Instead, we review the case as if it had 
come to us directly from the administrative agency. Id. Our review is limited to 
a determination of the matters specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(Michie 1997), which mandates that the reviewing court 
shall:

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

                        
* * *

 

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 
limitations or lacking statutory right;

 

                        
* * *

 

                        
(D) Without observance of procedure required by 
law[.]

 

This appeal presents two 
questions of statutory interpretation, questions of law. We review questions of 
law de novo. Haagensen v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo. 1997).

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  [¶11] 
  Before addressing Pohl's 
claims, we must dispose of the Division's contention that we should summarily 
affirm because Pohl did not raise her issues with the Medical Commission.  "As we have consistently stated over 
many years, Wyoming appellate courts do not review issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. This rule is equally 
applicable to appeals from administrative decisions as to those from district 
courts."  Shaffer v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 960 P.2d 504, 507-08 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting 
Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 1997)). We will, however, 
consider two types of issues raised for the first time on appeal:  jurisdictional issues and "issues of 
such a fundamental nature that they must be considered." WW Enterprises, Inc. v. 
City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998); Ricci v. New Hampshire Ins. 
Co., 721 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wyo. 1986); State Tax Comm'n v. BHP Petroleum Co. 
Inc., 856 P.2d 428, 437-38 (Wyo. 1993). Because Pohl's first issue presents a 
jurisdictional question, it is subject to our review.

 

  [¶12] 
  Her second claim presents a 
more difficult question. However, because Pohl had no opportunity to present the 
issue to the Medical Commission hearing panel, we will also consider the second 
issue. In its scheduling order, the Medical Commission requested that the 
parties provide a disclosure statement setting forth contested medical issues to be determined at 
the hearing.  "Thus, the Medical 
Commission clearly limited its review to medical issues, giving no indication 
that legal issues would be reviewed. Pohl relied on the scheduling order and did 
not raise her legal contentions with the Medical Commission. Because Pohl raised 
her second issue at the first available opportunity (in her petition for review 
with the district court), we will entertain the issue on 
appeal.

 

  
Referral to the Medical Commission

 

  [¶13] 
  Pohl claims that the 
Medical Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear her claim because her 
injury occurred before the Medical Commission was established. Relying on Starr 
v. Sunlight Ranches, 890 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1995), Pohl claims she has a vested, 
substantive right to a hearing before a hearing examiner from the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Division argues that the Starr decision has 
been vitiated by subsequent legislative action.

 

  [¶14] 
  In 1993, the Wyoming 
legislature created the Workers' Compensation Medical Commission to hear 
medically contested cases. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-616(b)(iv) (effective January 
1, 1994). In Starr v. Sunlight Ranches, 890 P.2d 1096, we were presented with 
the question of whether the Medical Commission possessed jurisdiction to hear a medically contested 
case that arose from an injury that occurred prior to the Medical Commission's 
effective date.  In answering a 
certified question, we held that the Medical Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
Starr's claim because Starr's right to a hearing before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings is a substantive right and was fixed at the time of his 
injury." Id. We also stated that we would not give retroactive effect to the 
Medical Commission statute or the rules and regulations adopted pursuant 
thereto. Id.

 

  [¶15] 
  After our decision in Starr 
was released, the legislature promulgated the following:

 

(a) In response to the order of the Wyoming supreme 
court in the matter of Steven B. Starr v. Sunlight Ranches, et al., February 21, 
1995, it was the intent of the legislature that the medical commission 
established under W.S. 27-14-616(a) pursuant to 1993 Wyoming Session Laws, 
Chapter 229, was to have subject matter jurisdiction over medically contested 
cases commencing on or after January 1, 1994, regardless of the date of 
injury.

 

(b) The legislature therefore declares that the 
medical commission shall have subject matter jurisdiction over all medically 
contested cases commencing on or after January 1, 1994, regardless of the injury 
date.

 

1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 
82, § 3. Given this expository2 legislation, the question becomes 
whether Starr remains controlling.

 

  [¶16] 
  This court recognizes the 
well-established rule that "statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless 
so provided therein, and this is especially true when substantive rights of 
parties are involved." Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529, 530 (Wyo. 1965). 
Therefore, this court will not apply a statute retrospectively in the absence of 
clear legislative intent.  Edgcomb 
v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 859 (Wyo. 1996); Wyoming 
Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647, 650 (Wyo. 1985); Johnson v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 914-15 (Wyo. 1977). Here, the legislature's intent 
that the Medical Commission statute apply retrospectively could not be clearer. 
Our decision in Starr simply reflects our general rule that a statute will not 
be applied retrospectively in the absence of clear legislative intent. Now that 
the legislature has announced its intent, we no longer have reason to abide by 
the general rule. Therefore, Pohl's reliance on Starr is misplaced, and we will 
follow the legislature's intent that the statute creating the Medical Commission 
be applied retrospectively.

 

  [¶17] 
  We also conclude that the 
expository legislation outlined above controls over prior, general legislation 
in the area. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(b) (Michie 1997), the 
legislature has codified our general rule that a worker's compensation claim is 
governed by the laws in effect at the time of the injury. See Wright v. State ex 
rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 212 n. 1 (Wyo. 1998); 
Matter of Workers' Compensation Claim of Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982, 984 (Wyo. 1996). 
The above-quoted expository legislation conflicts with this general rule. When 
two legislative pronouncements conflict, we give effect to the most recent 
pronouncement in a given area of law.  
Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Shipley, 
579 P.2d 415, 417-18 (Wyo. 1978). In addition, specific legislation controls 
over more general legislation. Id.; Matter of Lyles, 957 P.2d 843, 846 (Wyo. 
1998); Cf. Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. v. Transportation Comm'n, 970 P.2d 858, 864 
(Wyo. 1998).  Applying these 
principles, we conclude that the later, specific expository legislation cited 
above is controlling, and the Medical Commission had jurisdiction to hear Pohl's 
medically contested case.

 

  
Disputed Impairment Ratings

 

  [¶18] 
  Pohl complains that the 
Division did not comply with the Worker's Compensation Act when it evaluated her 
claim for an increase in incapacity under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(a) (Michie 
Rpl. June 1991). She contends that the 
Division acted contrary to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(m) (Michie 1997) 
(formerly-405(e) (Rpl. June 1991)) when it employed a physician to perform a 
"paper review" of Pohl's conflicting impairment ratings and later relied on the 
physician's review in denying benefits. We reject these 
contentions.

 

    
        
Section 27-14-405(m) provides

 

If the percentage of physical impairment is disputed, 
the division shall obtain a second opinion and if the ratings conflict, shall 
determine the physical impairment award upon consideration of the initial and 
second opinion.  Any objection to 
the final determination pursuant to this subsection shall be referred to the 
medical commission for hearing by a medical hearing panel acting as hearing 
examiner pursuant to W.S. 
27-14-616.

 

  [¶19] 
  In Pohl's case, the 
Division disputed the percentage of physical impairment and arranged for an IME. 
After the IME was completed, the Division employed a case review physician, Dr. 
MacGuire, to assist in "determin[ing] the physical impairment award upon 
consideration of the initial and second opinion." Clearly, the Division was 
within its authority in engaging a medical professional, Dr. MacGuire, to assist 
in evaluating the case before it. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-801(d) (Michie 
Rpl. June 1991).  Moreover, when 
Pohl's Oregon physician indicated in a report that "Oregon physicians don't do 
ratings," closer consideration of the ratings from both Oregon physicians was 
warranted. After reviewing the impairment ratings, Dr. MacGuire concluded that 
both ratings were invalid due to inaccurate applications of the AMA 
Guide.

 

  [¶20] 
  In her brief, Pohl concedes 
that it is appropriate for the Division to reject evidence which is invalid or 
erroneous.  Nevertheless, she 
maintains that the Division erred by disregarding the ratings from the Oregon 
physicians. We disagree.  With the 
accuracy of the impairment ratings challenged, the Division properly denied 
Pohl's claim and left its resolution to the expertise of the Medical Commission. 
We conclude that the Division's acted in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(m) when it employed Dr. MacGuire to evaluate Pohl's impairment 
ratings.

 

                             
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶21] 
  We affirm the district 
court's Order Affirming Administrative Order, which affirmed the decision of the 
medical commission hearing panel.

 

            

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(a) (Michie Rpl. June 1991) provides in pertinent 
part:

 

(a) If a 
determination is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits 
under this act, an application may be made to the division by any party within 
four (4) years from the date of the last payment for additional medical and 
disability benefits or for a modification of the amount of benefits on the 
ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon 
grounds of mistake or fraud.

  

2 Black's 
Law Dictionary 580 (6th ed. 1990) defines "expository statute" 
as:

 

A law 
that is enacted to explain the meaning of a previously enacted law. Such 
statutes are often expressed thus: "The true intent and meaning of an act passed 
* * * be and is hereby declared to be"; "the provisions of the act shall not 
hereafter extend"; or "are hereby declared and enacted not to apply," and the 
like. This is a common mode of legislation.