Title: Sullivan v. Sleepy's LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12542 
 
LAURITA SULLIVAN1 & another2  vs.  SLEEPY'S LLC & another.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 4, 2019. - May 8, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Labor, Wages, Overtime compensation, 
Minimum wage.  Minimum Wage. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
Stephen S. Churchill (James D. Livingstone also present) 
for the plaintiffs. 
 
Diane M. Saunders for the defendants. 
 
Joshua D. Nadreau, Joseph W. Ambash, & Jeffrey A. Fritz, 
for Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers Association & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
2 Carlos Bryant, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated. 
 
 
3 Mattress Firm, Inc. 
2 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The issue presented is whether retail 
salespeople who are paid entirely in commissions or draws (i.e., 
advances on commissions) are entitled to additional overtime or 
Sunday pay pursuant to G. L. c. 151, § 1A (overtime statute), 
and G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50) (Sunday pay statute).  More 
particularly, we consider whether the defendant employers 
satisfied their obligations under these statutes when they paid 
draws or commissions that always equaled or exceeded the minimum 
wage for the plaintiff employees' first forty hours of work and 
one and one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked 
over forty hours or on Sunday.  We conclude that draws and 
commissions cannot be retroactively allocated as hourly and 
overtime wages and Sunday pay even if these draws and 
commissions equaled or exceeded the minimum wage for the 
employees' first forty hours of work and one and one-half times 
the minimum wage for all hours worked over forty hours or on 
Sunday.  Rather, the employees are entitled to separate and 
additional payments of one and one-half times the minimum wage 
for every hour the employees worked over forty hours or on 
Sunday.4 
                                                          
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted in support of 
the defendants by the Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers 
Association and the Retailers Association of Massachusetts. 
3 
 
 
 
This case comes to us in the form of the following 
certified questions of first impression from the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts: 
"1.  If a [one hundred percent] commission inside sales 
employee[5] works more than forty hours in a given work 
week, is the employee entitled to any additional 
compensation specifically for overtime hours worked when 
the employee's total compensation (through draws[6] and 
commissions) for that workweek is equal to or greater than 
1.5 times the employee's regular rate or at least 1.5 times 
the minimum wage for all hours worked over [forty] hours in 
a workweek?  If additional compensation is due, what is the 
employee's regular rate for purposes of calculating 
overtime pay?" 
 
 
We answer this question "yes."  We further explain that the 
employee is entitled to one and one-half times the minimum wage 
times the number of hours over forty that the employee works in 
a work week. 
"2.  If a [one hundred percent] commission inside sales 
employee works on a Sunday in a given workweek, is the 
employee entitled to any additional compensation for Sunday 
premium pay when the employee's total compensation (through 
draws and commissions) for that workweek compensates the 
employee in an amount equal to or greater than 1.5 times 
the employee's regular rate or at least 1.5 times the 
minimum wage for all Sunday hours worked?  If additional 
compensation is due, what is the employee's regular rate 
for purposes of Sunday premium pay?" 
 
                                                          
 
 
5 An "inside sales employee" refers to an employee who makes 
sales at the employer's place of business (i.e., a shop or 
store).  M. Snyder, Compensation and Benefits § 16:66 (2005). 
 
 
6 "A 'draw' is a type of salary advance or loan intended to 
cover a salesperson's living costs."  Snyder, Compensation and 
Benefits, supra at § 3:5. 
4 
 
 
 
We answer this question "yes."  We further explain that the 
employee is entitled to one and one-half times the minimum wage 
times the number of hours the employee works on Sunday. 
"The court also welcomes the advice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court on any other questions of Massachusetts law it deems 
material to the present action." 
 
 
Any additional guidance is provided in the course of 
answering the two questions presented. 
 
1.  Facts.  We take the following facts from the parties' 
stipulated facts and other uncontested material in the record.  
The plaintiff employees worked as salespeople at retail stores 
operated by the defendant employers between 2014 and 2016.  The 
parties have stipulated that the employees were paid on a "[one 
hundred percent] commission" basis:  their wages took the form 
of a recoverable draw of $125 per day, and any sales commissions 
in excess of the draw.7  In other words, as their daily pay the 
employees received the greater of (1) the $125 recoverable draw 
or (2) earned commissions in excess of $125.  On at least one 
occasion, the employees worked more than forty hours in a week, 
and they also worked on at least one Sunday.  On these 
                                                          
 
7 Although the parties stipulated that the employees worked 
on a "[one hundred percent] commission" basis, they were not 
paid on a "commission-only" plan, in which a "salesperson's 
entire income is derived through commissions."  Snyder, 
Compensation and Benefits, supra at § 3:4.  Rather, they were 
paid on a "commission-plus-draw" plan involving a "recoverable 
draw," which is an advance that the employee must pay back once 
he or she has earned sufficient commission.  Id. at § 3:5. 
5 
 
 
occasions, the employers did not pay the employees any 
additional compensation beyond the recoverable daily draw and 
any commissions.  The amount of compensation the employees 
received, however, always equaled or exceeded the minimum wage 
times the number of hours they worked up to forty hours, plus 
one and one-half times the number of hours they worked over 
forty hours or on Sunday. 
 
In September 2017, the employees brought suit in the 
Superior Court, alleging that the employers' payment policies 
violated G. L. c. 149, § 148 (Wage Act), as well as the overtime 
and Sunday pay statutes.  The employers argued as affirmative 
defenses that the employees had received all compensation to 
which they were entitled and specifically that their claims were 
offset by other compensation that they had received.  The 
employers removed the case to Federal court based on the 
diversity of citizenship of the parties. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Relevant statutes and regulations.  We 
begin with the text of the relevant statutes.  With exceptions 
not relevant here, G. L. c. 151, § 1A, the overtime statute, 
provides: 
"[N]o employer in the commonwealth shall employ any of his 
employees in an occupation . . . for a work week longer 
than forty hours, unless such employee receives 
compensation for his employment in excess of forty hours at 
a rate not less than one and one half times the regular 
rate at which he is employed.  Sums paid as commissions, 
drawing accounts, bonuses, or other incentive pay based on 
6 
 
 
sales or production, shall be excluded in computing the 
regular rate and the overtime rate of compensation under 
the provisions of this section." 
 
 
The overtime statute further provides that "[i]n any work 
week in which an employee of a retail business is employed on a 
Sunday or certain holidays at a rate of one and one-half times 
the regular rate of compensation at which he is employed as 
provided in [G. L. c.] 136, the hours so worked on Sunday or 
certain holidays shall be excluded from the calculation of 
overtime pay as required by this section, unless a collectively 
bargained labor agreement provides otherwise."  Additionally, 
G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50), the Sunday pay statute, provides that 
"[a]ny store or shop . . . which employs more than a total of 
seven persons, including the proprietor, on Sunday or any day 
throughout the week, shall compensate all employees engaged in 
the work performed on Sunday . . . at a rate not less than one 
and one-half times the employee's regular rate." 
 
"Regular rate" is not defined in the overtime statute, but 
454 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.02 (2015), a regulation issued by the 
Department of Labor Standards (department),8 offers the following 
definition of an employee's "regular hourly rate": 
                                                          
 
 
8 This regulation was promulgated by the Department of Labor 
Standards (department) "[t]o clarify practices and policies in 
the administration and enforcement of [G. L. c. 151]" and 
"applies to any employer who employs any person in an occupation 
7 
 
 
"Regular Hourly Rate.  The amount that an employee is 
regularly paid for each hour of work.  When an employee is 
paid on a piece work basis, salary, or any basis other than 
an hourly rate, the regularly hourly rate shall be 
determined by dividing the employee's total weekly earnings 
by the total hours worked during the week.  Regardless of 
the basis used, an employee shall be paid not less than the 
applicable minimum wage each week.[9] 
 
"The regular hourly rate shall include all remuneration for 
employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee, but 
shall not include: 
 
"(a) sums paid as commissions, drawing accounts, bonuses, 
or other incentive pay based on sales or production; or (b) 
sums excluded under 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)." 
 
 
Title 454 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.03(3) (2015) further 
provides: 
"Overtime Rate.  One and one half times an employee's 
regular hourly rate, such regular hourly rate not to be 
less than the basic minimum wage, for work in excess of 
[forty] hours in a work week, except as set forth in 
[G. L.] c. 151, § 1A. . . .  Whether a nonexempt employee 
is paid on an hourly, piece work, salary, or any other 
basis, such payments shall not serve to compensate the 
employee for any portion of the overtime rate for hours 
worked over [forty] in a work week, except that this 
limitation only applies to the 'one-half' portion of the 
overtime rate (one and 'one-half' times an employee's 
regular hourly rate) when overtime is determined on a bona 
fide fluctuating workweek basis."10 
                                                          
 
in accordance with" that statute.  454 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.01 
(2015). 
 
 
9 The previous version of this sentence stated:  "Regardless 
of the basis used, whether time rate, commission basis or piece 
rate, an employee shall be paid not less than the applicable 
minimum wage each week."  455 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (2003). 
 
10 "[T]he so-called 'fluctuating work week' method of 
calculating overtime," as we explained in Goodrow v. Lane 
Bryant, Inc., 432 Mass. 165, 176 (2000), refers to "salaried 
8 
 
 
 
 
Finally, two opinion letters11 issued by the department 
specifically considered the applicability of the overtime 
statute to one hundred percent commission employees.12  In a 
March 14, 2003 opinion letter (2003 letter), the department 
concluded that an "inside sales employee who is paid on a [one 
hundred] percent commission basis" is "subject to the state 
overtime law."13  The 2003 letter, relying on 455 Code Mass. 
                                                          
 
employees whose hourly work week varies, and who have an 
understanding with their employers that their fixed salary 
constitutes straight-time pay for whatever hours they are called 
on to work in a work week."  This method is not at issue in this 
case. 
 
 
11 An opinion letter interpreting a statute or regulation 
"does not have the binding force attributable to a full-blown 
regulation."  Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 
371 Mass. 705, 707 (1977).  We will generally defer, however, to 
an agency's interpretation contained in an opinion letter if it 
is not contradicted by the text or purpose of the underlying 
statute.  See Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 450 (2004) 
(explaining, with respect to department opinion letter, that 
"[i]n general, we grant substantial deference to an 
interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged 
with its administration," unless that interpretation is 
"contrary to plain language of the statute and its underlying 
purpose" [citations omitted]).  See also Niles v. Huntington 
Controls, Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 22 (2017) (judge erred in 
failing to give deference to department opinion letters). 
 
 
12 As explained in note 7, supra, the parties in this case 
stipulated that the payment method used by the employers 
resulted in the employees being paid on a one hundred percent 
commission basis. 
 
 
13 The March 14, 2003 opinion letter is available at https: 
//www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/26/MW%20Opinion%2003-14-
03.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ6S-DYM6]. 
9 
 
 
Regs. § 2.01 (2003), further explained that "Massachusetts law 
requires that [a one hundred percent commission] employee be 
paid at least the equivalent of minimum wage for the first 
[forty] hours, and time and one-half minimum wage for all hours 
worked over [forty] in a given workweek."  A December 21, 2009 
opinion letter (2009 letter) reiterated that "inside 
salespersons are subject to the state overtime law" and must "be 
paid at least the equivalent of minimum wage . . . for the first 
[forty] hours, and time and one-half minimum wage . . . for all 
hours worked over [forty] in a given workweek."14  The 2009 
letter also included an example:  "If an employee paid on a [one 
hundred] percent commissions basis works [fifty] hours in a 
given work week, the employee's total compensation for that week 
must equal or exceed $450.00 ($320.00 [$8 x 40 hours] + $120.00 
[$12 x 10 hours]) [sic]."  Neither letter addressed whether 
these calculations were required to be broken down and included 
in the wage statements, or otherwise explained to the employees, 
or whether a lump sum equaling or exceeding these amounts was 
sufficient. 
 
b.  Entitlement to overtime compensation.  i.  Whether 
draws and commissions may be credited against overtime wages. 
                                                          
 
 
 
14 The December 21, 2009 opinion letter is available at 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/06/12-21-
09%20MW%20opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8C3-YEPX]. 
10 
 
 
 
To answer the first certified question, we consider whether 
an employer may retroactively allocate draws and commissions as 
hourly wages and overtime pay in order to comply with the 
premium pay requirements of the overtime statute.  The employees 
argue that, under the overtime statute and applicable 
regulations, such crediting is not allowed and that they are 
entitled to separate and additional overtime pay beyond their 
draws and commissions.  The employers do not dispute that one 
hundred percent commission employees are subject to the overtime 
statute.  They ask us to conclude, however, that they satisfied 
this requirement by providing draws and commissions that equaled 
or exceeded one times the minimum wage times the number of hours 
worked up to forty, plus one and one-half times the minimum wage 
for any hours worked beyond forty.  They rely in particular on 
the two opinion letters and the calculations they contain.  We 
recognize that the opinion letters are less than a model of 
clarity and may have misled the employers.  We nonetheless agree 
with the employees that such retroactive allocation and 
crediting is impermissible and that separate and additional 
overtime is owed.  We reach this conclusion based on the 
language and purposes of the overtime statute, the regulatory 
guidance, and our previous case law establishing that, in most 
circumstances, employers may not retroactively reallocate and 
11 
 
 
credit payments made to fulfill one set of wage obligations 
against separate and independent obligations. 
 
The purposes of the overtime requirement, as we explained 
in Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 531 
(2008), are "to reduce the number of hours of work, encourage 
the employment of more persons, and compensate employees for the 
burden of a long workweek."  In Mullally, supra at 529, an 
employer used a payroll formula founded on a fluctuating "base 
pay rate" that reflected the number of overtime hours an 
employee actually worked.15  Nonetheless, the employee would 
receive "approximately the same hourly wage regardless [of] 
whether [he or she] work[ed] overtime."  Id. at 532.  We 
concluded that, because the employee was paid at the same hourly 
rate "regardless of whether the employee worked forty or fifty 
hours," this payroll system undermined the three purposes of the 
overtime statute.  Id. at 531-532.  Specifically, the employer 
lacked "the economic disincentive intended by [the overtime 
statute]," was not encouraged "to hire additional employees," 
                                                          
 
 
15 The employer in Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 
452 Mass. 526, 528 (2008) was required by G. L. c. 149, § 27F, 
to compensate its employees at the "prevailing wage rate."  The 
base rate was set at less than the prevailing wage rate, but the 
employer averaged the employees' overtime and nonovertime hours 
so that the average hourly rate exceeded the prevailing wage 
rate.  Id. at 529 & n.7.  If the average hourly rate fell below 
the prevailing wage rate in a given week, the employer would 
provide a "buffer check" to make up the difference.  Id. at 529-
530. 
12 
 
 
and did "not compensate employees for longer work weeks."  Id. 
at 532. 
We relied on Mullally in deciding Somers v. Converged 
Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 589 (2009), which involved a 
plaintiff who claimed his employer had misclassified him as an 
independent contractor, when in fact he was an employee who 
"f[e]ll within the protection of . . . G. L. c. 151, § 1A."  A 
judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim "because [the employer] 
had presented unrefuted evidence that [the employee] had been 
paid more as an independent contractor than he would have been 
paid in wages and benefits had he been hired as an employee."  
Id. at 583.  We reversed, explaining that employers "may not 
. . . reduce their obligation to make overtime payments based on 
the argument that, had they known they were obliged to pay 
overtime, they would have paid the employee a lower wage for the 
first forty hours worked in a week."  Id. at 594.  We 
specifically stated that "[t]his argument is analogous to (and 
as unpersuasive as)" the employer's argument in Mullally that, 
"despite the clear mandate of G. L. c. 151, § 1A, it should not 
be obliged to pay its employees one and one-half times the 
regular rate for overtime work, because, had it realized that it 
had this obligation, it would have paid its employees a lower 
base wage."  Id. at 591, citing Mullally, 452 Mass. at 531-532. 
13 
 
 
We elaborated on the reasons why employers may not 
retroactively reallocate or "credit" payments in the context of 
a Wage Act claim in Dixon v. Malden, 464 Mass. 446 (2013).  That 
case involved a plaintiff who brought suit against his municipal 
employer under the Wage Act for failing to pay him his accrued 
vacation days at the time of his termination.  Id. at 448.  The 
employer had made "undifferentiated gratuitous weekly payments" 
following the employee's termination that exceeded the amount 
owed for the unpaid vacation time, leading the judge to dismiss 
on the theory that the plaintiff ultimately received more money 
than he was owed.  Id. at 446-449.  As in Somers, we reversed, 
holding that the "city's payment of salary and benefits after 
the plaintiff's termination . . . does not provide a substitute 
for payment for accrued vacation time."  Id. at 451.  In support 
of this conclusion, we explained that the "city did not 
characterize the continued salary payments as payment for 
vacation accrual, and the city did not communicate in any way 
that the salary continuation was payment for accrued vacation 
time. . . .  Gratuitous salary payments, and the benefits 
associated with salary payments, do not constitute payment for 
earned and accrued vacation time."  Id. at 451-452. 
 
The Mullally, Somers, and Dixon decisions all demonstrate 
that the overtime statute requires separate and additional 
overtime compensation to be provided to a one hundred percent 
14 
 
 
commission employee regardless of whether that employee receives 
a recoverable draw or commissions that equal or exceed one and 
one-half times the minimum wage for any hours worked beyond 
forty.16  As the court in Mullally, 452 Mass. at 531, emphasized, 
an employer must respect the purposes of the overtime law, and 
thus pay "time and a half" for overtime, because such payments 
are necessary to "reduce the number of hours of work, encourage 
the employment of more persons, and compensate employees for the 
burden of a long workweek" in conformity with the purposes of 
the overtime statute.  In the instant case, the $125 daily 
recoverable draw likewise functions as a flat rate payment that 
does not change based on whether an employee works overtime.  
Here, as in Mullally, the employees are not compensated at a 
premium rate for additional hours worked over forty, while the 
employers have an incentive to have the employees work more than 
forty hours in a week and conversely lack an incentive to hire 
                                                          
 
 
16 As discussed infra, G. L. c. 151, § 1A (overtime 
statute), and G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50) (Sunday pay statute), 
"require an employer to do the same thing," and therefore an 
employer is not required to make separate and independent 
overtime and Sunday payments.  Swift, 441 Mass. at 446.  Unless 
otherwise indicated, we conclude that the "time-and-a-half" 
premium pay provision of the Sunday pay statute has a similar 
purpose of creating an "economic disincentive" for employers and 
providing additional compensation to employees with respect to 
work done on Sunday.  Mullally, 452 Mass. at 532.  See Ciardi v. 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 436 Mass. 53, 62 (2002) ("Statutes 
addressing the same subject matter clearly are to be construed 
harmoniously so as to . . . give rise to a consistent body of 
law"). 
15 
 
 
additional employees.  The employers' payment scheme thus 
contravenes the purposes of the overtime statute and is not 
permissible absent separate and additional overtime payments. 
 
This analysis is not altered by the fact that the payments 
that the employees received always equaled or exceeded one and 
one-half times the minimum wage for all overtime hours worked.  
The Somers and Dixon decisions likewise involved employees who 
received more money than they otherwise would have received had 
their wage payments been properly classified in the first place.  
In Somers, 454 Mass. at 592, we nonetheless explained that the 
Wage Act does not contain a "safe harbor" for such payments on 
the grounds that employers would just otherwise lower hourly 
payments.  And as we confirmed in Dixon, 464 Mass. at 452, 
employers may not retroactively allocate payments made for one 
purpose to a different purpose.  If employers could undertake 
such retroactive reallocation of payments, they would similarly 
lack an incentive to comply with the wage and overtime statutes 
in the first place.  The Dixon decision also makes clear the 
importance of an upfront communication of the breakdown of the 
amounts to the employees. 
 
We further agree with the employees that 454 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 27.03 should be read to prohibit retroactive "crediting" 
of payments against an employer's overtime obligations when 
those payments were made for a different purpose.  That 
16 
 
 
regulation provides that "[w]hether a nonexempt employee is paid 
on an hourly, piece work, salary, or any other basis, such 
payments shall not serve to compensate the employee for any 
portion of the overtime rate for hours worked over [forty] in a 
work week."  We interpret this regulation according to the 
"plain and ordinary meaning" of its words.  Ingalls v. Board of 
Registration in Med., 445 Mass. 291, 294 (2005).  Here, the 
plain language of the regulation prohibits crediting payments 
made on "any . . . basis" against an employer's overtime 
obligations.17  Although a regulation must be invalidated if it 
"is contrary to the plain language of the statute and its 
underlying purpose," the regulation is thus consistent with the 
case law discussed above.  Duarte v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
451 Mass. 399, 408 (2008).  In short, the regulation entitles 
the employees to separate and additional overtime payments 
beyond their draws and commissions.18 
                                                          
 
 
17 Admittedly, some confusion is introduced by the reference 
to a "portion of the overtime rate" as opposed to a "portion of 
the employee's wages paid at the overtime rate."  But as 
discussed, the phrase "regular hourly rate" in the regulation is 
simply being used as a variable in a formula for calculating the 
hourly overtime rate of pay.  There is no indication that, 
because commissions and drawing accounts are excluded from the 
calculation of this variable, the Legislature intended to allow 
employers to credit commissions against overtime obligations. 
 
 
18 The employers claim that this interpretation of 454 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 27.03 (2015) conflicts with the department's March 
14, 2003 and December 21, 2009 opinion letters and that the 
17 
 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we answer "yes" to the question 
"[i]f a [one hundred percent] commission inside sales employee 
works more than forty hours in a given work week, is the 
employee entitled to any additional compensation specifically 
for overtime hours worked when the employee's total compensation 
(through draws and commissions) for that workweek is equal to or 
greater than 1.5 times the employee's regular rate or at least 
1.5 times the minimum wage for all hours worked over [forty] 
hours in a workweek?" 
                                                          
 
department interpreted the overtime statute such that separate 
and additional overtime compensation is not due to one hundred 
percent commission employees.  Specifically, the 2003 letter 
concluded that "compensation paid as a recoverable draw may 
reduce future commissions provided the employee always receives 
at least minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime 
compensation" and gave two hypothetical "recoverable draw pay 
arrangements" involving employees who work fifty hours per week 
and receive recoverable draws that equal or exceed the minimum 
wage for the first forty hours and the overtime rate of one and 
one-half times the minimum wage for the remaining ten hours. 
 
 
As discussed in note 11, supra, we will disregard agency 
guidance such as an opinion letter if it is contradicted by the 
text or purpose of the underlying statute.  If the employers' 
interpretation were correct, that interpretation would conflict 
with the purpose of the overtime statute discussed supra.  Here, 
however, there is confusion but no direct conflict.  The 2003 
letter presumed that a one hundred percent commission employee 
paid with a recoverable draw receives "at least minimum wage for 
all hours worked and overtime compensation" (emphasis added).  
In other words, the department correctly identified minimum wage 
and overtime pay as separate and independent obligations, even 
though the former sometimes may be used as a variable in 
calculating the latter.  What is left unclear by the opinion 
letters is whether this can all be allocated retroactively.  We 
conclude it cannot. 
18 
 
 
 
ii.  Employees' regular rate for purposes of calculating 
overtime pay.  The Federal District Court also certified the 
question: "If additional compensation is due, what is the 
employee's regular rate for purposes of calculating overtime 
pay?"  We have explained that the term "regular rate" is the 
"hourly rate actually paid the employee for the normal, 
nonovertime workweek for which he is employed" (citation 
omitted).  Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 432 Mass. 165, 175 
(2000).  The overtime statute states, however, that "[s]ums paid 
as commissions" or "drawing accounts . . . shall be excluded in 
computing the regular rate" at which an employee is 
compensated.19  Title 454 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.02 provides that 
"[r]egardless of the basis used, an employee shall be paid not 
less than the applicable minimum wage each week."  Furthermore, 
as the department explained in its 2003 and 2009 opinion 
letters, one hundred percent commission employees must receive 
overtime pay at a rate of no less than one and one-half times 
the minimum wage.20  We generally defer to an agency's 
                                                          
 
 
19 Title 454 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.02 (2015), tracking the 
language of G. L. c. 151, § 1A, also states that the employee's 
"regular hourly rate" excludes "sums paid as commissions, 
drawing accounts, bonuses, or other incentive pay based on sales 
or production." 
 
 
20 As the department explained in its 2009 letter, "in 
computing the overtime rate for an employee who is paid on a 
[one hundred] percent commission basis, the employee's total 
19 
 
 
interpretation of a statute it administers unless this 
interpretation is contradicted by the text or purpose of the 
underlying statute.  See Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 
450 (2004).  We agree that the agency's interpretation here is 
reasonable.  In response to the question, "[W]hat is the 
employee's regular rate for purposes of calculating overtime 
pay?" we thus answer, "at least the equivalent of minimum wage."  
The overtime rate is thus one and one-half times the minimum 
wage for one hundred percent commission employees. 
 
c.  Entitlement to Sunday pay.  For similar reasons to 
those set forth supra, we conclude that the employees are 
entitled to separate and additional Sunday pay even though the 
employer paid them a recoverable draw that equaled or exceeded 
one times the minimum wage times the number of hours they worked 
up to forty hours plus one and one-half times the minimum wage 
for hours worked on Sunday.  The Sunday pay statute "require[s] 
an employer to do the same thing" as the overtime statute, 
                                                          
 
earnings for purposes of overtime calculation must exclude 
commissions.  However, pursuant to 455 [Code Mass. Regs. 
§] 2.03(3), the employee's regular hourly rate must not be less 
than the minimum wage.  These two provisions must be read 
harmoniously to effectuate a consistent body of law. . . .  A 
plain reading of the two provisions compels the conclusion that 
such an employee be paid at least the equivalent of minimum wage 
. . . for the first [forty] hours, and time and one-half minimum 
wage . . . for all hours worked over [forty] in a given 
workweek." 
20 
 
 
namely to provide pay at "not less than one and one-half times 
the employee's regular rate" for hours worked on a Sunday. 
Swift, 441 Mass. at 446, quoting G. L. c. 136, § 6 (50).  
Furthermore, as we held in Swift, supra at 445–446, these 
statutes are sufficiently similar that an employer may "credit[] 
Sunday premium rate payments toward overtime payments" because 
"an employer who credits premium rate payments for Sunday hours 
against overtime wages in fact satisfies the express language of 
both statutes."  "Statutes addressing the same subject matter 
clearly are to be construed harmoniously so as to give full 
effect to all of their provisions and give rise to a consistent 
body of law."  Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 436 Mass. 
53, 62 (2002).  We thus ascribe similar purposes to the premium 
pay provision of the Sunday pay law.  See note 16, supra.  
Accordingly, we provide the same answers to the second certified 
question as we provided to the first one. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the certified questions in the 
affirmative, with overtime or Sunday pay for a one hundred 
percent commission employee to be calculated at one and one-half 
times the minimum wage.  The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish 
attested copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The 
clerk in turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of the 
court, to the clerk of the United States District Court for the 
21 
 
 
District of Massachusetts, as the answer to the questions 
certified, and will also transmit a copy to each party.