Title: Ex parte Brandon Washington. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Brandon Washington v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 04/15/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1071607
____________________
Ex parte Brandon Washington
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Brandon Washington
v.
State of Alabama)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-05-1757;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-1297)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Brandon Washington was convicted by a Jefferson County
jury of murder made capital because it was committed during a
robbery, see Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(2), and was
sentenced to death.  On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals
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2
rejected several of Washington's arguments, but determined
that the presentence report did not comply with Ala. Code
1975, § 13A-5-47(b), or with Rule 26.3(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.
That court then remanded the case for the trial court to hold
a new sentencing hearing.  Washington v. State, [Ms. CR-05-
1297, January 12, 2007] ___ So.  3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2007). 
On remand, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing,
at which a new presentence report was presented.  Washington
timely objected to the adequacy of this report.  The trial
court overruled Washington's objections and again sentenced
Washington to death.  On return to remand, the Court of
Criminal 
Appeals 
affirmed 
Washington's 
conviction 
and
sentence.  Washington v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1297, May 30, 2008]
___ So.  3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (opinion on return to
remand). 
This Court granted Washington's petition for a writ of
certiorari with respect to three issues relating to his
sentence:  whether the trial court committed plain error in
admitting victim-impact testimony during the penalty phase of
the trial, whether the presentence report introduced at the
sentencing hearing held on remand to which Washington objected
was inadequate, and whether the Court of Criminal Appeals
1071607
3
failed to conduct the requisite independent appellate review
of 
the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
and 
the 
mitigating
circumstances pursuant to Ala.  Code 1975, § 13A-5-53.  This
Court denied certiorari review as to all the issues raised by
Washington relating to the guilt phase of the trial and all
the other issues raised by Washington relating to the penalty
phase.
I.  Facts and Additional Procedural History
The State's evidence tended to show the following.  On
January 16, 2005, the victim, Justin Campbell, was shot and
killed while working at the Radio Shack electronics retail
store in Huffman.  The weapon was not recovered.  In
investigating the murder, police discovered that $1,050 had
been stolen from the store and that Campbell's wallet had been
taken.
Washington, who was 18 years old at the time of the
murder, had been a sales associate at the Huffman Radio Shack
store for several months, but his employment had been
terminated in early January 2005 after he failed to report to
work.  Forensic tests of the evidence recovered at the store
and at Washington's apartment did not connect Washington to
the crime.  Two of Washington's friends testified, however,
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4
that Washington had admitted to them that he killed a person
while he was robbing a Radio Shack store.
During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury heard
testimony from Campbell's parents in which they offered
opinions about Washington's character and urged the jury to
recommend the death penalty.  Campbell's father testified:
"My son's life was taken from him in a brutal, evil,
terrible way, by someone without a conscience.  I
think if you take a life, you should pay with a life
and I ask the jury to sentence Brandon Washington to
death.  I think it is the fair thing to do."
Campbell's mother testified:
"My son felt a fear that no person on this earth
should feel, and he had a death that no person
should have to go through, and I think that Mr.
Washington should have to suffer death as my son has
suffered death."
Also during the penalty phase of the trial before the
jury, Washington presented mitigation evidence from his
maternal grandmother, his sister, and his aunt.  Washington's
grandmother testified that Washington's mother had drug
problems and that his mother had abandoned Washington when he
was about 13 years old.  The grandmother testified that she
adopted Washington at that time and that Washington also spent
time during his teenage years in two foster homes and in a
group home.  Washington graduated from high school in 2004,
and he was enrolled at Miles College at the time of the
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Washington testified that he underwent daily counseling
1
and therapy sessions while at Hillcrest Hospital.
5
murder.  Washington's aunt and sister also testified on his
behalf.  They testified that Washington was not a bad person,
and they pleaded with the jury to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole.
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of 11 to
1.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court followed the
jury's recommendation and imposed the death penalty.  As noted
above, Washington appealed, and on appeal the Court of
Criminal Appeals, because of the inadequacy of the presentence
report, remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.
At the sentencing hearing on remand, Washington testified
that he had suffered from mental problems, that he had been
treated for approximately six months at Hillcrest Hospital for
those mental problems (apparently on an inpatient basis), and
that he had been placed for a time in a therapeutic foster
home, 
apparently 
after 
his 
treatment 
at 
Hillcrest.1
Washington's treatment at Hillcrest Hospital apparently began
when he was 13 years old, or approximately five years before
the murder.  Washington testified that he was given various
psychological and neurological tests at Hillcrest Hospital,
but, according to him, he was not told his diagnosis or the
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6
exact nature of his problems.  The record does not include the
dates of his treatment or the dates of, or any details about,
his placement in the various foster and group homes.  The new
presentence report submitted at the sentencing hearing on
remand stated "No" to the questions about "Mental Disability"
and "Psychological Report"; it makes no other reference to any
mental-health 
or 
psychological 
problems. 
 
On 
remand,
Washington's counsel did not present any psychological records
or mental-health records or any medical testimony concerning
Washington's mental-health condition.
In its sentencing order on remand, the trial court found
the existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance: that
the murder was committed during the course of a robbery.  The
trial court found the existence of two statutory mitigating
circumstances: that Washington was only 18 years old at the
time he committed the crime and that Washington had no
significant history of criminal activity.  The trial court
found no nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to exist.  It
again sentenced Washington to death.
II.  Admission of Victim-Impact Testimony
During the Penalty Phase of the Trial
Washington contends that his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated because, he says, the jury and
the trial judge improperly considered testimony from the
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7
victim's parents containing their opinions about Washington,
the crime, and the appropriate punishment.  Washington did not
present this issue to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and he
did not object to the introduction of this evidence at trial.
Accordingly, we review this issue under the plain-error
standard.
 
"Plain error" has been defined as
"'error that is so obvious that the failure to
notice it would seriously affect the fairness or
integrity of the judicial proceedings.  Ex parte
Taylor, 666 So. 2d 73 (Ala. 1995).  The plain error
standard applies only where a particularly egregious
error occurred at trial and that error has or
probably has substantially prejudiced the defendant.
Taylor.'"
Ex parte Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 742 (Ala. 2007) (quoting
Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 167 (Ala. 1997)).  See also
Ex parte Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936, 948 (Ala. 2003) (plain-error
review is to be used "sparingly, solely in those circumstances
in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result"). 
In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987), the
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's Eighth
Amendment rights were violated by the sentencing authority's
consideration of any victim-impact evidence.  In Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the United States Supreme
Court partially overruled Booth to allow the sentencing
authority to consider evidence of the effect of the victim's
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8
death upon family and friends.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2
("Our holding today is limited to the holdings of [Booth] ...
that evidence and argument relating to the victim and the
impact of the victim's death on the victim's family are
inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing.").
In Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. 1993), this
Court noted that Payne had only partially overruled Booth and
that it had left intact the proscription against victim-impact
statements containing "characterizations or opinions of the
defendant, the crime, or the appropriate punishment."  640
So. 2d at 1017.  The Court in McWilliams held that a trial
court errs if it "consider[s] the portions of the victim
impact statements wherein the victim's family members offered
their characterizations or opinions of the defendant, the
crime, or the appropriate punishment."  Id.
In Wimberly v. State, 759 So. 2d 568, 573-74 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1999), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that plain
error occurred when victim-impact evidence similar to that at
issue here was presented to the jury during the penalty phase
of the trial.  In Wimberly, the victims' parents read a
statement to the jury that, among other things, referred to
the defendant as a "predator," a "murdering thief," and a
"coward."  The statement also speculated on the defendant's
1071607
9
future in prison and his possible execution and asked the jury
to impose the death penalty.  The court noted that it was
reviewing the issue for plain error and stated:
"[R]eviewing the remarks made by the family member
to the jury during the sentencing hearing, we find
the cumulative effect of these improper comments to
be plain error. Had the prosecutor made these same
comments in argument, we would find them to be a
textbook example of prosecutorial misconduct. The
fact that the these same comments were read to the
jury by a bereaved family member only magnifies the
impact such comments surely had on the jury as it
closed to deliberate on its sentence recommendation.
We find that these comments were calculated to
incite an arbitrary response from the jury and that
they should have been excluded." 
Wimberly, 759 So. 2d at 573-74.  See also Gissendanner v.
State, 949 So. 2d 956, 962 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) ("[V]ictim
impact evidence may be presented during the penalty phase of
a capital-murder trial so long as the witness does not
recommend an appropriate punishment or characterize the crime
or the defendant.").
In this case, the victim's parents told the jury that
Washington's 
crime 
was "brutal, evil, terrible," that
Washington was "someone without a conscience," and that death
was the appropriate punishment.  The State concedes that it
was error for the trial court to allow the victim's parents to
testify in this manner.  Despite this concession, the State
contends that reversal is not required in this case because
1071607
10
(1) there is no indication that the trial judge or the jury
considered 
this 
testimony 
in 
determining 
Washington's
sentence, and (2) because any error was harmless. 
The State argues that the trial court did not consider
the victim-impact evidence, an argument we find to be without
merit.  The State's brief to this Court addresses only the
trial judge's consideration of the evidence; it offers no
argument or citation to the record tending to show that the
jury did not consider this admittedly improper evidence.  We
note that it does not appear that the jury was given any
instruction 
specifically 
addressing 
the 
victim-impact
testimony.
Further, the State's assertion that the trial judge did
not consider the parents' testimony is factually incorrect.
At the sentencing hearing on remand, the State asked that the
testimony of the victim's parents be adopted and made a part
of the new presentence report in lieu of a formal written
victim-impact statement.  The trial judge stated in response:
"I have reviewed their testimony and will consider it as part
of the presentence report."  (Emphasis added.)  There is
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The State's reliance on McWilliams and Ex parte Land, 678
2
So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1996), is misplaced.  In McWilliams, this
Court remanded the case for the trial judge to state whether
the judge did or did not consider victim-impact statements
when deciding on a sentence.  In the present case, the jury
heard the victim-impact testimony at issue, and the trial
judge stated that she would consider it.  In Ex parte Land,
this Court found no reversible error where the trial judge
read letters from members of the victim's family and from
members of the defendant's family, some of which expressed
opinions as to the appropriate punishment.  As in McWilliams,
however, the letters were not read to a jury; they were read
only by the judge and only "out of a respect for the families
and for the limited purpose of possibly establishing a
mitigating factor ...."  Land, 678 So. 2d at 237.  In the
present case, no such limitations are involved and the
testimony of the victim's parents was presented to the jury.
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)
3
(holding that "before a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
11
nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge did not
consider this testimony.   
2
The State also argues that the admission of the victim-
impact testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3
This argument also fails.  The argument presented to us by the
State is based on a single case, Whitehead v. State, 777
So. 2d 781 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).  Whitehead, however, is
factually distinguishable from the present case.  
In Whitehead, the trial court found the existence of four
aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances.
The defendant in Whitehead was a previously convicted felon;
1071607
Eighteen years is the minimum age at which the death
4
penalty can be imposed.  See  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
574 (2005).
12
he was on parole at the time of the murder that was the
subject of Whitehead.  The evidence in Whitehead indicated
that the defendant had shot and killed a police officer to
prevent the officer from testifying against him in another
criminal case involving a theft.  The defendant directed his
attorney not to present any mitigation evidence.  The trial
court nonetheless looked for, but did not find, any mitigating
circumstances.  The Whitehead court stated:
"Although 
we 
have 
concluded 
that 
the
victim-impact 
testimony was improper, we also
conclude that its admission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Juxtaposed against the strong
evidence 
of 
aggravating circumstances and the
absence of any statutory or nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, it is clear that the victim-impact
testimony 
did 
not 
contribute 
to 
the 
jury's
sentencing recommendation."
Whitehead, 777 So. 2d at 848-49.
In contrast to the facts in Whitehead, the present case
involves only a single aggravating circumstance and two
statutory mitigating circumstances, i.e., that Washington had
no prior criminal history and that he was only 18 years of age
at the time of the offense.   Further, there was evidence in
4
the record indicating that Washington had a history of
psychological problems (including several months of treatment
1071607
13
in a psychiatric hospital) and that his family life had been
unstable.  Had an adequate presentence investigation and
report been made with respect to these matters (see discussion
in Part III, infra), it is possible that the trial court would
have 
found 
the 
existence 
of 
additional 
mitigating
circumstances.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-51 (nonexclusive
list of statutory mitigating factors).  
Under the particular circumstances presented in this
case, we are unable to conclude that the trial court's error
in admitting the victim-impact testimony here was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  We conclude that the admission of
the victim-impact testimony was plain error and requires
reversal of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
III.  The Adequacy of the Presentence Report
Although we are reversing the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals based on the erroneous admission of the
victim-impact testimony, we deem it advisable to address an
issue that is likely to recur on remand, if not addressed
here: the adequacy of the presentence report that was
presented at the sentencing hearing on remand.  
Section 13A-5-47(b), Ala. Code 1975, states that, in
capital cases,  "[b]efore making the sentence determination,
the trial court shall order and receive a written pre-sentence
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The Committee Comments to Rule 26.3(b) refer to that rule
5
as one that "sets forth what information the presentence
report should contain."
14
investigation 
report. 
 
The 
report 
shall 
contain 
the
information prescribed by law or court rule for felony cases
generally and any additional information specified by the
trial court."  Rule 26.3(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., states, in
pertinent part, that "[t]he presentence report may contain:
"(5) A statement of the defendant's social
history, including family relationships, marital
status, 
interests, 
and 
activities, 
residence
history, and religious affiliations;
"(6) A statement of the defendant's medical and
psychological history, if available ...." 
Rule 26.3(b)(5) and (6).5
In Ex parte Hart, 612 So. 2d 536, 539-40 (Ala. 1992),
this Court stated: 
"The purpose of the presentence investigation
report is to aid the sentencing judge in determining
whether the jury's advisory verdict is proper and if
not, what the appropriate sentence should be.
Clearly, this Court, in adopting the temporary rule
[Rule 3, Ala.  R.  Crim.  P.  Temp., the predecessor
of Rule 26.3(b)], considered the psychological
history of a defendant an important part of
sentencing. In determining the sentence, the trial
judge must consider the presentence investigation
report and any evidence submitted in connection with
it, in addition to the evidence presented at trial
and during the sentencing hearing."
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
1071607
15
In Guthrie v. State, 689 So. 2d 935 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
"In 
preparation 
for 
Guthrie's 
sentencing 
hearing
before the trial court, it ordered and received a
written 
presentence 
investigation 
report, 
as
required by § 13A-5-47(b).  We are concerned about
the perfunctory nature of this presentence report.
The 
presentence 
report 
is 
divided 
into 
four
sections, entitled:  'Present Offense,' 'Record of
Arrests,' 'Personal/Social 
History,' 
and 
'Evaluation
of Offender.'  The first section quotes the facts of
the case from our opinion in Guthrie's first trial
on this charge.  Guthrie [v.  State], [616 So. 2d
914] at 916 [(Ala.  Crim.  App.  1993)].  The second
section contains a complete list of Guthrie's prior
criminal charges, including traffic offenses and
juvenile offenses.  The third section, which was
Guthrie's personal and social history, was taken
from an interview with Guthrie at least five years
before 
this 
sentencing 
hearing. 
 
The 
report
indicates that no effort was made to conduct a more
recent interview.  In sum, this portion of the
report indicates that Guthrie's father, a retired
farmer and school bus driver, died in 1986; that
Guthrie's mother was living and employed; and that
Guthrie is the youngest of four children, unmarried,
in good physical health (at the time of the
interview), used occasionally alcohol and marijuana,
had a 9th grade education, owned no property, and
supported himself by performing manual labor.  The
final section, 'Evaluation of Offender,' contains no
information.  In its entirety, this section states,
as follows:
"'Psychological Reports:
"'N/A
"'Reputation on Community Activities:
"'N/A
"'Probation and Parole Officer's Remarks:
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16
"'N/A'
"This report indicates that no psychological reports
were available for the purpose of evaluating
Guthrie; however, elsewhere, the report states that
Guthrie was incarcerated at Taylor Hardin Secure
Mental Facility in 1988.  The lack of information in
this section implies little, if any, attempt to
subjectively evaluate Guthrie.  Surely, a report or
file in connection with Guthrie's stay at Taylor
Hardin exists, and should be made a part of this
report.
"This 
presentence 
report's 
cursory 
and
incomplete treatment of Guthrie troubles us, because
it 
may 
have 
hamstrung 
the 
trial 
court's
consideration of the full mosaic of Guthrie's
background and circumstances before determining the
proper sentence.  As such, this presentence report
risked foiling the purpose of § 13A-5-47(b).  We
find that the insufficiency of this report requires
a remand for the trial court to reconsider Guthrie's
sentence with a sufficient presentence report."
Guthrie, 689 So. 2d at 947 (some emphasis omitted and some
emphasis added; footnote omitted).
The presentence report presented on remand in this case
is, like the report in Guthrie, perfunctory and inadequate and
"implies little, if any, attempt to subjectively evaluate [the
defendant]."  Guthrie, 689 So. 2d at 947.  The presentence
report here contains almost no information about Washington's
troubled adolescence and unstable family life and its effect
on him.  The "Personal Relationships" section of the report
reads: 
"Relationship w/father:  Bad 
"Relationship w/ mother:  Bad 
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In response to the objection by Washington's counsel in
6
the trial court that the presentence report was "almost
worthless," the Court of Criminal Appeals "agree[d] with
defense counsel that the report is not the most thorough
presentence report to come before us." ___ So.  3d at ___
(opinion on return to remand).
17
"Relationship w/ siblings:  Good" 
The final portion of the report reads:
"Officer Remarks:  None 
"Recommendations to Court:  None"  
Among other things, the report did not discuss his mother's
abandonment of her children, Washington's residence in a
series of foster and group homes, or the absence of his father
for most of his life.  This is information that should have
been included under Rule 26.3(b)(5)(social history and family
relationships).   
6
Furthermore, the report also discloses no information
about 
Washington's 
history 
of 
mental-health 
problems
(Rule 26.3(b)(6)).  Further, it asserts that no psychological
reports were available.  In its "Written Re-Sentencing Order,"
the trial court obviously relied upon this assertion, as well
as on the absence of any discussion of Washington's history of
treatment at mental-health facilities.  The trial court
specifically noted:  "[N]or is there any history of mental
illness in the Pre-sentence Report."  This finding is
contradicted by Washington's testimony at the sentencing
1071607
18
hearing that he suffered from mental problems, that he had
undergone various neurological and psychological testing
related to those problems, and that he had been treated at a
psychiatric hospital and a therapeutic foster home for at
least six months.  The presentence report should have
investigated 
these 
sources 
and 
should 
have 
presented
information 
regarding 
Washington's 
mental 
health.
Rule 26.3.(b)(6).
The deficiencies of the presentence report appear to make
it as much of a perfunctory presentence report as the report
criticized in Guthrie, if not more so.  It appears likely that
the deficiencies in the report may indeed have "hamstrung the
trial court in considering the full mosaic of [Washington's]
background and circumstances."  689 So.  2d at 947.
We 
are 
not 
suggesting 
that 
the 
adequacy 
of 
the
presentence report should be evaluated in isolation.  See
Hart, 612 So. 2d at 540 (noting that the "trial judge must
consider the presentence investigation report and any evidence
submitted in connection with it, in addition to the evidence
presented at trial and during the sentencing hearing").  The
presentence report is only part, albeit an important and
required part, of the information on which the trial court
should base its sentencing decision.  In the present case, the
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Because of our disposition of this case on the victim-
7
impact-testimony issue, we pretermit consideration of the
adequacy of the Court of Criminal Appeals' review of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Chief Justice Cobb and Justice Shaw and Justice Wise were
8
members of the Court of Criminal Appeals when that court
considered this case.
19
presentence report failed to address Washington's troubled
adolescence, his unstable family life, and his mental-health
problems.  It is apparent that the trial court relied at least
in part on the presentence report in not finding the existence
of any nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and, ultimately,
in deciding that death was the appropriate sentence in this
case.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.7
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Woodall, Stuart, Parker, and Main, JJ., concur.
Bolin, J., dissents in part and concurs in the result.
Cobb, C.J., and Shaw and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.8
1071607
20
BOLIN, Justice (dissenting in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur only in the result as to Part II of the opinion,
and I dissent as to Part III, because it addresses an issue
that would not necessarily, or likely, recur after a new
presentence report is prepared following this remand.