Title: Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Robert B. Kliesmet

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2292 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Robert B. Kliesmet, Sheriff of Milwaukee  
County and Milwaukee County,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 25, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 29, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
John E. McCormick 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Robert D. Repasky, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by John R. Decker and Decker & Gunta, S.C., Milwaukee, and Robert 
G. Ott, Corporation Counsel, Milwaukee, and oral argument by John 
R. Decker. 
 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2292 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Robert B. Kliesmet, Sheriff of Milwaukee 
County and Milwaukee County, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, John E. McCormick, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The court of appeals, by 
certification, asks us to review an order of the circuit court
1 
vacating a permanent injunction against the Sheriff of Milwaukee 
County (Sheriff).  The issue presented is whether the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections (DOC) can place its detainees in a 
county jail over the safety objection of the sheriff.  The DOC 
asserts that it is statutorily authorized to place its detainees 
in the Milwaukee County Jail (Jail) and that the Sheriff cannot 
refuse such placement.  Because we conclude that this authority 
of the DOC is limited by the Sheriff's duty and authority to 
                     
1 Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, John E. McCormick, 
Judge. 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
2 
preserve the safety of the Jail, we affirm the order of the 
circuit court.  In addition, in order to allow sufficient time 
for our legislature to consider and allocate the cost of locally 
incarcerating DOC detainees, we delay for one year the effect of 
today's decision.  
¶2 
At its core, this case presents a question of 
statutory interpretation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 302.31 (1995-96)
2 
provides in relevant part: 
 
Use of jails.  The county jail may be used . . . for 
the temporary detention of persons in the custody of 
the department.
3 
The authority under this section to detain alleged violators of 
probation or parole in the Milwaukee County Jail first became 
the subject of litigation over 20 years ago. 
¶3 
In 1975, Sheriff Michael S. Wolke announced that 
pursuant to his constitutional and statutory role as custodian 
of the Milwaukee County Jail, alleged violators of probation or 
parole in the custody of the Department of Health and Social 
Services (DHSS) would no longer be detained in the Jail for 
periods exceeding five days.
4  According to the Sheriff, this 
action was necessitated by the dangerous overcrowding situation 
                     
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all future references are to 
the 1995-96 volume. 
3 The "department" referred to is the Department of 
Corrections.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.01(1).  Section 302.31 is the 
statutory successor to Wis. Stat. § 53.31.  For purposes of our 
inquiry, the language at issue is identical in both versions of 
the statute, and the statute will be cited throughout the 
opinion as "§ 302.31."   
4 The Department of Corrections has since succeeded the 
Department of Health and Social Services in the administration 
of the probation and parole programs. 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
3 
then prevailing at the Jail.  The DHSS commenced a declaratory 
judgment action in the Circuit Court for Dane County, which 
issued a temporary injunction requiring the Sheriff to continue 
housing alleged violators of probation or parole. 
¶4 
In 1980, after a change in venue, the Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County dissolved the temporary injunction.  The 
court of appeals summarily reversed, reinstated the temporary 
injunction, and remanded to the circuit court for construction 
of the statutory phrase "temporary detention."  See § 302.31. 
¶5 
After several years of inactivity, the circuit court 
again addressed the case in 1987.  In its decision and order, 
the circuit court concluded that the detentions for alleged 
violation of probation or parole were "temporary," and that the 
Sheriff was therefore obligated to keep the detainees pursuant 
to § 302.31.  On that basis, the court permanently enjoined the 
Sheriff from refusing to keep DOC detainees for longer than five 
days. 
¶6 
The permanent injunction stood unchallenged until 
1995, when the circuit court denied the Sheriff's Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(g)
5 motion to vacate the 1987 permanent injunction. 
The 
circuit 
court 
reasoned 
that 
the 
Sheriff 
failed 
to 
                     
5 Section 806.07 provides in relevant part: 
Relief from judgment or order. (1) On motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
or legal representative from a judgment, order or 
stipulation for the following reasons . . .  
(g) It is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application 
. . . . 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
4 
demonstrate a change in law or circumstances which would justify 
lifting the injunction.
6  The Sheriff appealed, and the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded, determining that the passage of 
time, among other things, warranted "a new and full airing of 
the facts underlying the controversy."  Wisconsin Dep't of 
Corrections v. Artison, No. 95-1420, unpublished slip. op. at 8 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1995). 
¶7 
On remand to the circuit court, the case was assigned 
to Judge John E. McCormick, who granted the Sheriff's motion for 
summary judgment, vacating the permanent injunction.  The DOC 
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the following 
issues for our consideration: 
 
1) Does § 302.31, Stats., which provides that a 
"county jail may be used for . . . the temporary 
detention of persons in the custody of the [Department 
of Corrections]" (DOC), give DOC sole discretion to 
determine if a county jail is to be used for the 
temporary detention of persons in its custody? 
 
2) If so, are there nonetheless equitable principles 
grounded 
in 
a 
county 
sheriff's 
constitutional 
authority to control and maintain the jail that can 
override the authority afforded DOC by § 302.31, 
Stats.?               
¶8 
Our review of a circuit court's ruling on a motion for 
relief 
under 
§ 806.07 
is 
limited 
to 
whether 
the 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  Cynthia M.S. v. Michael 
F.C., 181 Wis. 2d 618, 624, 511 N.W.2d 868 (1994).  The 
authority of the DOC to keep its detainees at the Jail presents 
a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. 
 State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 121, 
                     
6 At the time of the circuit court's ruling in 1995, Richard 
E. Artison held the office of Sheriff.  Artison was succeeded by 
the named defendant, Sheriff Robert B. Kliesmet. 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
5 
561 N.W.2d 729 (1997).  Finally, we review summary judgment 
rulings de novo, Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 327, 517 
N.W.2d 503 (1994), using the same methodology as that used by 
the circuit court.  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 
N.W.2d 473 (1980); Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶9 
A circuit court may grant relief from a judgment or 
order when "[i]t is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application."  § 806.07(1)(g).  The DOC argues 
that there has not been a sufficient showing of changed 
circumstances justifying relief from the permanent injunction.  
According to the DOC, the present dangerous overcrowding at the 
Jail cannot support the Sheriff's § 806.07(1)(g) motion, because 
similar overcrowding existed at the time that the permanent 
injunction was issued.  We disagree.  
¶10 Section 806.07(1)(g) is the Wisconsin equivalent to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).  Because the federal and state rules 
dealing with relief from judgments are analogous, we have relied 
in the past on federal case law as persuasive authority when 
interpreting § 806.07.  See State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 
Wis. 2d 536, 542, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985).  In surveying federal 
law, we find instructive the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 
367 (1992). 
¶11 The Rufo case arose from unconstitutional conditions 
prevailing in 1971 at the Suffolk County Jail in Massachusetts. 
 As part of a consent decree, Suffolk County agreed to build a 
new jail facility with several hundred single-occupancy rooms.  
After inmate population increases outpaced projections, Suffolk 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
6 
County filed a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify the consent decree 
in order to allow double bunking of inmates.
7  The district court 
denied 
the 
motion, 
reasoning 
that 
the 
increased 
inmate 
population was neither a new nor an unforeseen problem.   
¶12 The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
 Initially, the Court concluded that while Rule 60(b)(5) is 
traditionally applied to injunctions, the rule also applies to 
consent decrees.  Under Rule 60(b)(5), the party seeking 
modification of the underlying order "bears the burden of 
establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants 
revision of the decree."  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383.  The court may 
consider granting a Rule 60(b)(5) motion "when changed factual 
circumstances 
make 
compliance 
[with 
the underlying 
order] 
substantially more onerous"; when the underlying order "proves 
to 
be 
unworkable 
due 
to 
unforeseen 
obstacles"; 
or 
when 
enforcement of the underlying order "would be detrimental to the 
public interest."  Id. at 384.      
¶13 We conclude that the present overcrowding situation at 
the Milwaukee County Jail constitutes a changed circumstance 
warranting renewed consideration of the permanent injunction.  
The present Jail was opened in 1993 and was completed at a cost 
in excess of $100 million.  It was designed to provide 744 
residential beds and 54 special use beds.  A study conducted in 
1994 concluded that double bunking would increase the Jail's 
capacity to a maximum of 1,032 inmates.  Between 1993 and 1995 
                     
7 Double bunking is the practice of placing an additional 
bed and inmate in a cell that was designed for one bed and one 
inmate. 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
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the average daily population of the Jail increased 42.5%, and 
the inmate population reached 1,448 in April 1996.
8 
¶14 The overcrowding which currently exists at the Jail is 
substantially greater in degree than that existing when this 
suit was commenced over 20 years ago.  In 1975, Sheriff Wolke 
stated that the Jail at that time had a maximum capacity of 380 
persons, and that it "has been daily at capacity, or even in 
excess of capacity."  The overcrowding in 1975 pales in 
comparison to that currently experienced at the Jail.  Not only 
is the design capacity of the new Jail twice that of the old 
Jail, but the number of inmates currently housed at the Jail 
stands at nearly 200% of design capacity.
9  We conclude that the 
increase in the degree of overcrowding at the Jail constitutes a 
substantial change in circumstances, and that the circuit court 
was therefore justified in reexamining the 1987 permanent 
injunction. 
¶15 We turn next to a consideration of the circuit court's 
determination that § 302.31 "provides no authority for DOC to 
compel the Sheriff to keep probation and parole detainees where 
such action contributes to dangerous overcrowding of the jail." 
                     
8 Under Wis. Stat. § 302.315, Milwaukee County Jail inmates 
may be held at the County House of Correction (HOC).  The HOC 
has 
received 
extensive 
use 
in 
an 
effort 
to 
alleviate 
overcrowding at the Jail.  However, the HOC lacks sufficient bed 
space to accommodate enough Jail inmates to reduce the Jail 
population to a safe level.  
9 In May 1996, the average daily population of the Jail was 
1,272.  As of May 29, 1996, nearly 400 of the Jail's inmates 
were DOC detainees, with an additional 500 detained at the House 
of Correction.  Approximately one-half of the 900 DOC detainees 
kept at Milwaukee County facilities did not have other criminal 
charges pending against them.    
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
8 
 Our sole purpose when interpreting a statute is to give effect 
to the legislature's intent.  Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 
202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996).   We first look to 
the language of the statute, and if the language is unambiguous, 
we need not look further.  If the language of the statute is 
ambiguous, we will ascertain and carry out the legislature's 
intent by examining the history, context, subject matter, scope, 
and object of the statute.  Id. at 220.  Statutory 
language 
is 
ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning.  
Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 
(1995). 
¶16 Section 302.31 provides that "[t]he county jail may be 
used . . . for the temporary detention of persons in the custody 
of the department."  The use of the word "may" generally 
connotes a discretionary element.  See Swatek v. County of Dane, 
192 Wis. 2d 47, 59, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995); Miller v. Smith, 100 
Wis. 2d 609, 616, 302 N.W.2d 468 (1981).  Thus, it is apparent 
from § 302.31 that the legislature has granted one or more 
entities the discretion to keep DOC detainees at the Jail.  
However, the statute is utterly silent as to the identity of the 
party or parties empowered with the authority to keep DOC 
detainees at the Jail.  Because one might reasonably infer from 
§ 302.21 that either or both the DOC and the Sheriff could 
exercise the discretion granted in the statute, we conclude that 
the statute is ambiguous. 
¶17 We disagree with the DOC's assertion that even if 
§ 302.31 
is 
ambiguous, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 302.33 
and 
302.335 demonstrate a legislative intent to grant the DOC alone 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
9 
the discretion to keep its detainees at the Jail.  Section 
302.33 requires the DOC to reimburse counties for the costs of 
maintaining its detainees at the county jail.  This requirement 
provides little, if any, assistance in our effort to ascertain 
the meaning of § 302.31.  The fact that the DOC must pay for 
keeping its detainees at the Jail does not mean that the DOC has 
an absolute right to demand such detention.  Similarly, 
§ 302.335 fails to illuminate our inquiry, as it merely provides 
time limits on the detention of DOC detainees at the Jail.     
¶18 Our reading of § 302.31, in conjunction with statutory 
and common law authority, leads us to determine that while the 
DOC may be vested with authority to temporarily keep its 
detainees in the county jails, that authority is not without 
bounds.  Instead, the DOC's ability to keep its detainees at the 
Jail is limited by the well-established duty of sheriffs to 
vigilantly guard the safety of the jail.      
¶19 The sheriff is under a statutory duty to "[t]ake the 
charge and custody of the jail maintained by the county and the 
persons in the jail, and keep the persons in the jail personally 
or by a deputy or jailer."  Wis. Stat. § 59.27; see also Wis. 
Stat. § 302.37 (describing sheriff's duty to maintain jail and 
care for prisoners).  As custodian of the jail, the sheriff is 
under a duty to safely keep and protect the prisoners in his 
charge.  See Walter H. Anderson, 1 A Treatise on the Law of 
Sheriffs Coroners and Constables § 269-271 (1946). 
¶20 The duty of sheriffs to maintain a safe jail was 
recognized at common law.  Blackstone noted that the sheriff 
"may, and is bound ex officio to pursue and take all traitors, 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
10
murderers, felons, and other misdoers, and commit them to gaol 
for safe custody."  1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *343 
(emphasis added).  The sheriff is ultimately responsible for 
safely keeping all persons committed to the jail.  Id. at *346; 
see also A.E. Gwynne, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Sheriff 
and Coroner 539 (1849) ("It is the duty of the sheriff to take 
charge of all persons committed to jail, and see that they are 
safely kept and supplied with necessary sustenance, according to 
law.  He must, at all times, by himself or deputy, attend to the 
jail of the county, for these purposes"). 
¶21 Sheriffs have a duty to provide reasonable protection 
to jailed persons, and that duty extends to protection from 
others in custody.  Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
§ 132, at 1063 (5th ed. 1984).  Furthermore, "[t]he majority of 
courts hold that the sheriff or other officer, owes a duty to 
the prisoner to keep him safely and to protect him from 
unnecessary harm and it has also been held that the officer must 
exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the life and health of 
the prisoner."  Annotation, Civil Liability of Sheriff or Other 
Officer Charged with Keeping Jail or Prison for Death or Injury 
of Prisoner, 14 A.L.R.2d 353, 354 (1950).  "Beyond statutory 
requirements a sheriff is bound to exercise in the control and 
management of the jail the degree of care requisite to the 
reasonably adequate protection of the prisoners or inmates."  
O'Dell v. Goodsell, 30 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Neb. 1948). 
¶22 Overcrowded jails operate not only to the detriment of 
inmates, but also imperil the safety of deputies and jail staff. 
 As the circuit court noted: 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
11
 
The current overcrowding threatens the safety of 
inmates 
and 
deputies 
in 
a 
direct 
supervision 
environment in numerous ways: (1) it threatens the 
ability to evacuate inmates in a safe area in the 
event of a fire or other emergency; (2) it increases 
tension and hostility in what is already an anxious 
environment, which can lead to fights or assaults on 
deputies; (3) it frustrates the ability to classify 
inmates, e.g., to avoid placing rival gang members in 
the same dayroom, and to separate inmates if there are 
signs of trouble brewing, or to classify inmates based 
upon the severity of their offenses; (4) it prevents 
deputies from getting to know and establishing a 
rapport 
with 
inmates, 
which, 
under 
the 
direct 
supervision method, is critical to maintaining order 
and avoiding trouble; (5) it increases the likelihood 
that a deputy might be attacked and overpowered; (6) 
it increases the likelihood that an inmate might be 
injured in a fight or that stronger inmates may 
otherwise prey upon weaker inmates; and (7) it causes 
a 
processing 
backlog, 
resulting 
in 
dangerous 
overcrowding in less secure areas of the jail. 
¶23 We conclude that the legislature intended by § 302.31 
to grant the DOC discretion to keep alleged violators of 
probation or parole in jails.  However, considering the 
statutory and common law authority establishing a sheriff's duty 
and authority to act in the interest of jail safety, we also 
discern a legislative intent to limit the DOC authority under 
§ 302.31 in those instances in which a sheriff determines that 
taking 
additional 
DOC 
detainees 
would 
result 
in 
such 
overcrowding as to constitute an unacceptable risk of harm to 
inmates, deputies, and jail staff.
10     
                     
10 Because we have determined from other sources that the 
legislature did not intend by § 302.31 to deprive sheriffs of 
the authority necessary to maintain a safe jail, we need not 
reach the issue whether the duty and authority to maintain a 
safe jail is of a constitutional dimension.  See Ziegler Co. v. 
Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 612, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987); 
Labor and Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 
N.W.2d 177 (1984).  Furthermore, today's decision is strictly 
limited to the Sheriff's authority to refuse to keep DOC 
detainees. 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
12
¶24 The DOC notes the several difficulties that it will 
encounter in administering its probation and parole functions if 
its authority to keep its detainees in the Jail is limited.  
This court is aware of the administrative difficulties that the 
DOC faces.  However, in the absence of a clear directive to the 
contrary, we will not conclude that the legislature intended 
that the DOC's authority to keep its detainees should trump the 
Sheriff's duty to maintain safety at the Jail.   
¶25 We recognize that there will be costs associated with 
the provision of additional facilities for the detention of 
alleged violators of probation or parole.  However, the 
allocation of those costs between the DOC and local governments 
is an issue reserved to the sound discretion of our legislature. 
 We are also mindful of the constitutional requirement under 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), that persons accused 
of parole violations be detained in proximity to the alleged 
violation area.  However, the local detention mandated by 
Morrissey does nothing to further our inquiry into the DOC's 
statutory authority to keep its detainees in the County Jail 
over the safety objections of the Sheriff.  Rather, it is a 
consideration that the legislature must take into account when 
determining the best means of housing DOC detainees. 
¶26 Because of the need to give the legislature sufficient 
time to address the administrative difficulties that the DOC 
would face if it were unable to utilize the Jail to house its 
detainees, we delay the effective date of today's decision by 
one year.  See, e.g., Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 
26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)(delaying for 40 days the effective 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
13
date of this court's decision abrogating the doctrine of 
governmental tort immunity); Pascucci v. Vagott, 362 A.2d 566 
(N.J. 1976)(delaying for 60 days the effective date of its 
decision invalidating a general assistance benefit schedule); 
Hellerstein v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 332 N.E.2d 279, 287 
(N.Y. 1975)(delaying for 18 months the effective date of its 
decision invalidating real estate assessment technique); Bond v. 
Burrows, 690 P.2d 1168 (Wash. 1984)(delaying for 15 days the 
effective date of its decision invalidating a sales tax 
differential between counties). 
¶27 In sum, the degree of the present overcrowding 
situation 
at 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Jail 
warrants 
a 
reconsideration of 
the permanent 
injunction 
requiring the 
Sheriff to keep DOC detainees.  After considering the law and 
undisputed facts in this case, we conclude that the DOC has been 
granted the discretion under § 302.31 to keep its detainees in 
county jails.  However, we also conclude that the legislature 
intended that the sheriffs, in their capacity as custodians of 
the jails, have the authority to refuse to keep DOC detainees 
when doing so would endanger jail safety.  The circuit court 
therefore properly vacated the permanent injunction issued in 
1987.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  96-2292 
 
 
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1