Title: State v. Reinwand

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP850-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Joseph B. Reinwand, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 18, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory J. Potter 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
DALLET, J. concurs, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. and 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).  
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Philip J. Brehm, Janesville. There was an oral argument by 
Philip J. Brehm. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sopen B. Shah, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
is Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, and Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general. There was an oral argument by Amy Catherine 
Miller, assistant solicitor general. 
 
 
2019 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP850-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF196B) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph B. Reinwand, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Wood County.  
Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This appeal comes 
before us on certification from the court of appeals.1  On 
October 30, 2014, Joseph B. Reinwand was convicted of first-
degree intentional homicide for shooting Dale Meister, the 
father of his granddaughter.  He was sentenced to life in prison2 
without the possibility of release to extended supervision.3   
                                                 
1 State 
v. 
Reinwand, 
No. 2017AP850-CR, 
unpublished 
certification (Wis. Ct. App. July 26, 2018). 
2 The Honorable Gregory J. Potter of Wood County presided. 
3 The parties and the sentencing court stated that Reinwand 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court to answer two questions: 
[W]hether the 'forfeiture by wrongdoing' doctrine 
applies at a homicide trial where the declarant is the 
homicide victim, but where the defendant killed the 
declarant to prevent him or her from testifying at a 
separate proceeding. 
. . . . 
[W]hether preventing the declarant from testifying 
must be the defendant's primary purpose for the 
wrongful 
act 
that 
prevented 
the 
declarant 
from 
testifying in that separate proceeding. 
State v. Reinwand, No. 2017AP850-CR, unpublished certification 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 26, 2018). 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
the 
following:  first, 
Meister's 
statements to family and friends about Reinwand were not 
testimonial; 
therefore, 
they 
do 
not 
implicate 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause.  Accordingly, we do not reach 
the certified questions regarding the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception to the right of confrontation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
could potentially have been eligible for "parole" after 20 
years.  Under Wisconsin's truth-in-sentencing laws, parole 
eligibility is not an option for any person who has committed a 
felony in Wisconsin on or after December 31, 1999.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.01(1) & (6), 973.014.  However, a person sentenced to 
life in prison after December 31, 1999 may, in the discretion of 
the sentencing court, become eligible for release to extended 
supervision after serving a minimum of 20 years.  § 973.014(1g).  
We assume all involved were aware of this distinction, and were 
simply using the word "parole" as colloquial shorthand to refer 
to this sentencing scheme.  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Second, the "other acts" evidence of Reinwand's prior 
burglary was properly admitted for the purpose of challenging 
his asserted memory problems.  Third, Reinwand's counsel was not 
ineffective either at trial or at sentencing.  For these 
reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Reinwand's daughter Jolynn and the victim, Dale 
Meister, were the parents of Reinwand's granddaughter, E.M.  The 
couple ended their relationship in December 2007.  Meister 
requested mediation in Wood County Family Court in January 2008 
in an effort to seek periods of placement with E.M.  The 
mediation occurred on February 25, 2008, and Meister was awarded 
placement every other weekend and on two partial days per week.  
Jolynn was unhappy with this placement decision and indicated 
that she wanted to go back to court to challenge it.   
¶6 
In the days leading up to the mediation, Reinwand had 
told Meister multiple times that he would harm or kill him if he 
continued to seek placement time.  In discussions of these 
threats with friends and family members, Meister said he feared 
for his life.  He repeatedly told friends and family that if 
anything happened to him, people should look to Reinwand. 
¶7 
Meister was found dead in his trailer home on March 4, 
2008.  He was shot three times at close range, twice in the face 
and once in the chest.  He had been dead for several days by the 
time his body was discovered.  The State interviewed Reinwand 
soon afterward but did not file its criminal complaint in this 
case until May 2013.   
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
The case proceeded to jury trial in October 2013.  The 
evidence presented to the jury included, but was not limited to, 
the following:  (1) bullets used to kill Meister fired from a 
.22 pistol, "most likely" a Bryco-Jennings pistol; (2) Reinwand 
owned a pistol matching this description; (3) law enforcement 
found 
a 
.22-caliber 
bullet 
in 
Reinwand's 
garage 
with 
characteristics matching those of the bullets used to kill 
Reinwand; (4) law enforcement found a grip from a .22 Bryco-
Jennings pistol under the front seat of Reinwand's truck that 
appeared to be cut with a "band saw," and there was a band saw 
in Jolynn's basement where Reinwand had been staying; (5) Jolynn 
said the saw belonged to her father; (6) another inmate 
testified that Reinwand confessed to committing the homicide; 
(7) Reinwand told police he was not "really arguing about" 
whether he killed Meister, but said that he could not remember 
it because he had memory problems; (8) Reinwand had choked 
Meister and threatened to kill him before; (9) witnesses saw a 
silver pickup truck matching the description of Reinwand's truck 
at Meister's trailer around the time Meister is thought to have 
been killed; and (10) the trailer showed no signs of forced 
entry, and the only other key was located at Jolynn's house 
where Reinwand had been staying. 
¶9 
In addition to all this evidence, the State introduced 
the testimony of Meister's family members and friends regarding 
the statements Meister made to them about Reinwand.  A friend of 
Meister testified that Meister had come over to her house for 
coffee, and had told her that Reinwand said he "had guns" and 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
5 
 
"could kill him if he wanted to."  Another close friend 
testified about a conversation with Meister during one of 
Meister's frequent visits to his home.  He stated that according 
to Meister, Reinwand had told Meister "he was going to shoot him 
in the temple and he could get away with it."  Meister also told 
him that if anything happened to Meister, he should tell 
Meister's brother Ray that Reinwand did it.  After this 
conversation, he allowed Meister to stay at his home, because 
Meister was "fearful of being at [his] trailer" due to 
Reinwand's threats.   
¶10 Meister's pastor testified that Meister was "concerned 
for his life" and had told him that "if he came up dead, that 
the police should dig deeper" because "[Reinwand] would be 
behind it."  Reinwand's son stated that Meister met with him at 
Arby's to ask his opinion on whether Reinwand would kill him, 
and added that "I don't think [Meister] was at ease at all."  
Meister's sister-in-law testified that Meister had discussed 
Reinwand's threats with her during two separate phone calls, and 
that he sounded frightened on both occasions.  A total of 15 
witnesses offered similar statements regarding Meister's fear 
that Reinwand would hurt or kill him.  These hearsay statements 
were admitted over Reinwand's hearsay objection based on the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. 
¶11 The circuit court also admitted "other-acts" evidence 
of a prior burglary Reinwand committed.  When law enforcement 
interviewed Reinwand after the homicide, he told them he was not 
"really arguing" that he had killed Meister, but could not 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
6 
 
remember the homicide or a prior burglary he had committed.  To 
challenge this asserted lack of memory, the State introduced a 
letter Reinwand had written to his granddaughter in 2012, in 
which he admitted to the burglary and described his motive.  The 
letter also was admitted over Reinwand's objection. 
¶12 Additionally, the circuit court had ruled before trial 
that the State's DNA expert could not provide expert testimony 
based on 2008 testing standards, but must instead rely on the 
updated standards that had been in effect since 2014.  Under the 
2014 standards, the expert could not conclusively state whether 
the DNA on the gun grip found under the seat of Reinwand's truck 
belonged to Reinwand.  On cross-examination, Reinwand's attorney 
asked the DNA expert for her opinion as to whether Reinwand's 
DNA was present on seven other items found in Meister's trailer 
after the homicide.  It was not.  However, the expert's opinion 
on these items was based on the 2008 testing standards.  The 
circuit court held that by asking questions about items tested 
under the 2008 standards, Reinwand's attorney had opened the 
door to the results of the 2008 DNA test on the gun grip.  The 
jury was therefore allowed to hear that under the outdated 2008 
testing 
standards, 
Reinwand 
was 
included 
as 
a 
possible 
contributor to the DNA found on the gun grip, and that the 
probability of randomly selecting an individual who may be 
included as a possible contributor was 1 in 61,000.   
¶13 Reinwand was convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide, and filed postconviction motions.  He alleges that the 
evidence of his prior burglary was improperly admitted and that 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
7 
 
his counsel was ineffective at trial for opening the door to the 
DNA evidence.  He has requested a new trial.  Alternatively, he 
argues that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing for 
failing 
to 
request 
a 
presentence 
investigation 
(PSI) 
or 
introduce more mitigating evidence, and he requests a new 
sentencing hearing.   
¶14 The circuit court denied Reinwand's motions.  The 
circuit court first concluded that Meister's statements about 
Reinwand were testimonial, but that they were admissible under 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation 
Clause.  Under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, a 
defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a 
witness when the defendant wrongly procures that witness's 
unavailability by conduct designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying.  See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).  The 
circuit court found that Reinwand had killed Meister to prevent 
him from testifying in his possible future custody proceeding 
with Jolynn, and that he had therefore forfeited his right to 
confront Meister at his own trial.  The circuit court also held 
that the other-acts evidence was properly admitted, and that 
counsel's performance was not deficient either at trial or at 
sentencing. 
¶15 The court of appeals grouped Meister's statements 
about Reinwand into two categories:  "(1) statements indicating 
that if Meister was found dead, Reinwand should be 'looked 
into'; and (2) statements telling the listener that Reinwand had 
threatened to harm or kill Meister and that Meister was afraid 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
8 
 
that Reinwand was going to harm him."  Reinwand, No. 2017AP850-
CR at *1.  The court of appeals explained that the circuit court 
had explicitly determined that the statements in the first 
category were testimonial, implicitly determined that the 
statements in the second category were testimonial, and admitted 
both categories of statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine.  The court of appeals then certified the appeal to 
this court to address the forfeiture by wrongdoing issue. 
¶16 We accepted the certification, and without reaching 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing issue, we affirm the decision of 
the circuit court denying Reinwand's postconviction motions. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶17 This case requires us to determine whether Reinwand's 
Confrontation Clause right was violated by the admission of 
Meister's statements, determine whether other-acts evidence was 
properly admitted, and analyze an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  Whether the admission of a statement violates 
the defendant's Confrontation Clause right is "a question of 
constitutional law subject to independent review."  State v. 
Nieves, 2017 WI 69, ¶15, 376 Wis. 2d 300, 897 N.W.2d 363 
(citations omitted).  "'We generally apply United States Supreme 
Court precedents when interpreting' the Sixth Amendment and the 
analogous Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution."  
Id. 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
Other 
decisions 
about 
the 
admissibility of evidence are discretionary decisions of the 
circuit court, and are reviewed under the erroneous exercise of 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
9 
 
discretion standard.  State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, ¶6, 270 
Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276.     
¶18 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims "present 
mixed questions of fact and law."  State v. Alexander, 
2015 WI 6, ¶15, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662.  "We uphold a 
circuit court's factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous." 
 
Id. 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
"However, 
whether 
counsel's performance was deficient and whether a defendant was 
prejudiced thereby, present questions of law that we review 
independently."  Id. (citation omitted).   
B.  Testimonial and Nontestimonial Statements 
¶19 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution states that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him."4  As the United 
States Supreme Court has explained, understanding how this 
clause operates requires an understanding of the context 
surrounding its creation.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 38 (2004).   
¶20 Under English common law, "[j]ustices of the peace or 
other officials examined suspects and witnesses before trial.  
These examinations were sometimes read in court in lieu of live 
testimony."  Id. at 43.  When defendants demanded to confront 
                                                 
4 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution makes 
substantially the same guarantee.  As mentioned earlier, we 
generally apply United States Supreme Court precedent when 
interpreting these clauses. 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
10 
 
these witnesses in court, they often were refused.  Id.  The 
inability to challenge a witness's incriminating statements 
raised serious concerns about their reliability, which called 
into question the legitimacy of some trials.  See, e.g., id. at 
44 (discussing the notorious treason conviction and execution of 
Sir Walter Raleigh based on unconfronted hearsay testimony). 
¶21 The Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent this 
type of abuse, prohibiting "the use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused."  Id. at 36.  The clause's purpose 
is to ensure the reliability of testimony by allowing the 
accused to challenge a witness's statements "in the crucible of 
cross-examination."  Id. at 61; State v. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, 
¶42, 374 Wis. 2d 220, 892 N.W.2d 637.   
¶22 On the basis of this history and purpose, the Supreme 
Court has clarified that the Confrontation Clause applies only 
to statements that are testimonial in nature.  See, e.g., 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 354 (2011).  Testimonial 
hearsay statements are admissible against a criminal defendant 
only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
59. 
¶23 Statements that are not made as substitutes for trial 
testimony, such as "casual remark[s] to an acquaintance," do not 
raise 
similar 
concerns 
about 
reliability 
and 
legitimacy.  
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 354.  Such statements therefore do not 
implicate the Confrontation Clause, id., and are admissible so 
long as the rules of evidence permit their admission.  See, 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
11 
 
e.g., Nieves, 376 Wis. 2d 300, ¶29 ("'the admissibility of a 
[non-testimonial] statement is the concern of state and federal 
rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause'") (quoting 
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 359).5   
¶24 A statement is testimonial only if "in light of all 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, the 'primary purpose' of 
the conversation was to 'create an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony.'"  Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) 
(citations omitted).  This "primary purpose" test is an 
objective test.  "[T]he relevant inquiry is not the subjective 
or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular 
encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants 
would have had, as ascertained from the individuals' statements 
and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter 
occurred."  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360. 
¶25 The Supreme Court has set forth four relevant factors 
used to determine whether a statement is testimonial:  "(1) the 
formality/informality of the situation producing the out-of-
court statement; (2) whether the statement is given to law 
enforcement or a non-law enforcement individual; (3) the age of 
                                                 
5 Reinwand does not suggest any grounds other than the 
Confrontation Clause for excluding Meister's statements.  For 
this reason, our review regarding Meister's statements is 
limited to whether their admission violated the Confrontation 
Clause.  See State v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶4 n.3, 373 Wis. 2d 
122, 890 N.W.2d 256 (limiting review to whether admission of 
evidence violated the Confrontation Clause when defendant raised 
no other grounds for exclusion). 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
12 
 
the declarant, and (4) the context in which the statement was 
given."  State v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶32, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 
N.W.2d 256 (interpreting Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180-82).  In this 
case, an analysis of these four factors demonstrates that 
Meister's statements to his friends and family regarding 
Reinwand were nontestimonial. 
¶26 The first factor to consider is the formality or 
informality of the situation in which the out-of-court statement 
was made.  The more formal the situation, the more likely it is 
to 
be 
testimonial. 
 "'A 
formal 
station-house 
interrogation' . . . is 
more 
likely 
to 
provoke 
testimonial 
statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to 
reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial 
evidence against the accused."  Id. at 2180 (citations omitted).   
¶27 In this case, Meister's statements all were given in 
informal situations.  He expressed his fears to his friends and 
family in living rooms, kitchens, dining rooms, and even at an 
Arby's.  In stark contrast to the "formal station-house 
interrogation" contemplated in Clark, Meister's conversations 
with family and friends were not interrogations at all.  Even 
his conversation with his pastor occurred in the pastor's office 
at his church, where Meister regularly visited after attending 
services to discuss what was going on in his life.  The 
informality of the situations that gave rise to Meister's 
statements about Reinwand suggest that they were not made for 
the 
primary 
purpose 
of 
creating 
a 
substitute 
for 
trial 
testimony. 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
13 
 
¶28 The second factor is whether the statement is given to 
law enforcement or a non-law enforcement individual.  While the 
United States Supreme Court has "stopped short of adopting a 
'categorical rule'" that only statements made to law enforcement 
officers can be testimonial, the Court has held that "statements 
to persons other than law enforcement officers were 'much less 
likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement 
officers.'"  Mattox, 373 Wis. 2d 122, ¶34 (citing Clark, 135 
S. Ct. at 2181).  In this case, none of Meister's statements 
about Reinwand were made to law enforcement officers, nor did he 
seek to contact law enforcement about his concerns.  This factor 
suggests that his statements were not made for the primary 
purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony. 
¶29 The third factor is the declarant's age.  This factor 
was relevant in Clark because the declarant was three years old.  
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2177.  "Statements by very young children 
will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause," 
because very young children "'have little understanding of 
prosecution'" and would not likely "intend [their] statements to 
be a substitute for trial testimony."  Id. at 2182.  While a 
statement is unlikely to be testimonial if it is made by a young 
child, it does not follow that a statement is likely to be 
testimonial simply because it is made by an adult.  Rather, that 
the declarant is an adult is a neutral factor, making the 
statement neither more nor less likely to be testimonial.  Here, 
the declarant was an adult, so that factor does not help us 
determine the statement's primary purpose.  See Mattox, 373 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 122, ¶32 n.7 (explaining that because the declarant in 
that case was an adult, the age of the declarant was not helpful 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
declarant's 
statements 
were 
testimonial). 
¶30 The fourth and final factor is the context in which 
the statement was given.  "Courts must evaluate challenged 
statements 
in 
context," 
which 
includes 
evaluating 
the 
questioner's identity, the relationship between the parties to 
the 
conversation, 
and 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
conversation.  See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.  In this case, 
Meister's statements all were made during conversations with his 
family and friends.  The witnesses reported that Meister was 
concerned, stressed, and agitated during these conversations, 
and that he appeared to be genuinely frightened.  This demeanor 
suggests that he was expressing genuine concern and seeking 
advice, rather than attempting to create a substitute for trial 
testimony.   
¶31 Additionally, Meister spoke to at least 15 friends and 
family members about Reinwand's threats, but chose not to speak 
with any law enforcement officers.  Further, when one of his 
friends suggested that he go to the police, he explicitly 
refused and said "I'm a Meister . . . we can handle things."  He 
told multiple witnesses that if anything happened to him, they 
should tell his brother, rather than the police, that it was 
Reinwand.  The only statement in which he brought up law 
enforcement was during the conversation with his pastor, when he 
said that the police should "dig deeper" if he died, because it 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
15 
 
would "look staged."  The mere mention of law enforcement is not 
enough to make this statement testimonial given the informality 
and overall context of the conversation.  The context in which 
Meister's statements were made suggests that their primary 
purpose was not to create a substitute for trial testimony. 
¶32 For the foregoing reasons, an analysis of the Clark 
factors demonstrates that all of Meister's statements about 
Reinwand to his friends and family were nontestimonial.  Because 
these statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause, we 
do not address the certified questions regarding the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing exception to the right of confrontation.  
C.  Other Acts Evidence 
¶33 Reinwand next argues that the circuit court improperly 
admitted "other-acts" evidence when it permitted the State to 
introduce a letter he had written to his granddaughter, in which 
he 
admitted 
to 
committing 
a 
prior 
non-violent 
burglary.  
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the 
defendant is admissible at trial only if it satisfies three 
requirements:  (1) "it is offered for a permissible purpose," 
(2) "it is relevant," and (3) "its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of unfair 
prejudice."  State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶57, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 
861 N.W.2d 174 (citations omitted).   
¶34 Regarding the permissible purpose requirement, Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a) 
contains 
a 
non-exhaustive 
list 
of 
permissible purposes for introducing evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant.  We have recognized 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
16 
 
that pursuant to this statute, "[t]he purposes for which other-
acts evidence may be admitted are 'almost infinite.'"  State v. 
Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶25, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399.  
There is a notable limitation, however:  evidence "is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that the person acted in conformity therewith."  § 904.04(2)(a).  
In other words, the State may not seek to prove a defendant's 
propensity to commit crimes by showing that the defendant has 
committed crimes before. 
¶35 In this case, the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion by concluding that the evidence was 
offered for a permissible purpose.  When he was interviewed by 
law enforcement officers after Meister's death, Reinwand was 
asked about his involvement in the killing and was made aware of 
Meister's statements to his friends and family members.  He 
admitted that he was not "really arguing about" whether he had 
killed Meister, but claimed that he could not remember the 
homicide, nor a prior burglary he had committed, due to his 
memory problems.   
¶36 In order to rebut his claim of lack of memory, the 
State introduced a letter he had written to his granddaughter in 
2012.  In the letter, he explains that the victim "owed him 
money and did not pay it back," so he "got pissed off and broke 
into his house and stoled (sic) some stuff."  The letter was 
introduced to challenge his asserted lack of memory.  An attack 
on credibility is a permissible purpose.  The letter was not 
introduced as character or propensity evidence in violation of 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
17 
 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a); the State did not introduce it for 
the purpose of showing that because he previously burglarized 
his neighbor's house, he is more likely to have killed Meister.   
¶37 The second requirement, relevance, is satisfied if the 
proffered evidence has "any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  In this case, the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by concluding 
that the evidence was relevant to Reinwand's credibility.  
Stated otherwise, it tends to cast doubt on Reinwand's claimed 
lack of memory by suggesting that he did remember his prior 
burglary.   
¶38 The third and final requirement is that the evidence's 
"probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the risk or danger of unfair prejudice."  Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d, 
¶58; Wis. Stat. § 904.03.   
Offered evidence runs the risk of unfair prejudice 
when it has a tendency to influence the outcome by 
improper means or if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instinct to punish, or otherwise causes a jury to base 
its decision on something other than the established 
propositions in the case.  
State v. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, ¶33, 298 Wis. 2d 553, 725 
N.W.2d 930.  In this case, the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion by concluding that the probative value 
of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk or 
danger of unfair prejudice.  The crime he admitted in his letter 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
18 
 
was a non-violent burglary of an unoccupied home.  The circuit 
court reasonably concluded that the letter would not unfairly 
arouse a jury's sense of horror or provoke its instinct to 
punish Reinwand.  For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion by admitting 
evidence of Reinwand's prior burglary. 
D.  Ineffective Assistance at Trial 
¶39 Next, Reinwand claims his counsel was ineffective at 
trial for opening the door to the results of a DNA test 
conducted under the now-outdated 2008 testing standards, which 
identified him as a possible contributor to a DNA mixture on the 
gun grip found under the front seat of his truck.  The right to 
effective assistance of counsel is implicit in the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel.  See, e.g., 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("'[T]he 
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.'" (citation omitted)).   
¶40 We use the two-prong "Strickland test" to determine 
whether counsel was ineffective.  State v. Maday, 2017 WI 28, 
¶54, 374 Wis. 2d 164, 892 N.W.2d 611.  "Under the first prong, 
the 
defendant 
must 
show 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient."  Id.  This requires the defendant to prove that his 
counsel 
"'made 
errors 
so 
serious 
that 
counsel 
was 
not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.'"  State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶54, 349 
Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687).   
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
19 
 
¶41 In 
determining 
whether 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, 
we 
must 
make 
every 
effort 
to 
"eliminate 
the 
distorting 
effects 
of 
hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate 
the 
conduct 
from 
counsel's 
perspective 
at 
the 
time."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  For this reason, we are "'highly 
deferential' to counsel's strategic decisions" such that "where 
a lower court determines that counsel had a reasonable trial 
strategy, 
the 
strategy 
'is 
virtually 
unassailable 
in 
an 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
analysis.'" 
 
State 
v. 
Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶65, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 
(citations omitted).   
¶42 To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, 
"the defendant must show that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
deficient 
performance." 
 
Maday, 
374 
Wis. 2d 
164, 
¶54; 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Prejudice requires the defendant 
to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different."  Id. at 694.  "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome."  Id.   
¶43 A defendant must prove both elements to succeed in an 
ineffective assistance claim.  Id. at 687.  Therefore, "[i]f the 
defendant fails to prove one element, it is unnecessary to 
address the other."  State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶37, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560.  
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
20 
 
¶44 Assuming without deciding or implying that counsel's 
performance was deficient with regard to the DNA testimony, we 
conclude that Reinwand was not prejudiced by counsel's alleged 
error. 
 
First, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
expert 
could 
conclusively state that Reinwand's DNA was found on the gun 
grip, the grip was found under the front seat of Reinwand's 
truck.  Further, the grip came from a pistol identified by at 
least one witness as belonging to Reinwand.  A jury reasonably 
could have concluded that the grip belonged to Reinwand without 
the DNA evidence. 
¶45 Second, the jury heard that the 2008 methods used to 
test the DNA on the gun grip were outdated.  Reinwand's counsel 
elicited an admission from the State's DNA expert that the 2014 
methods, which produced an inconclusive result as to the 
presence of Reinwand's DNA on the gun grip, were better methods 
to use in this situation. 
¶46 Third, as previously discussed, the evidence of 
Reinwand's guilt was overwhelming even in the absence of the DNA 
testimony.  The strength of the State's case led Reinwand to 
make the following admission regarding his counsel's alleged 
trial error: 
Defendant Reinwand does not contend this error in 
itself is sufficient to warrant a new trial.  However, 
this error, coupled with the errors outlined above, 
provides further support for Reinwand's motion for a 
new trial.  
We have already concluded, however, that all of the other 
evidence challenged by Reinwand was properly admitted.  There is 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
21 
 
therefore no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged error regarding the DNA testimony, the result of the 
trial would have been different.  For this reason, Reinwand's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial fails.  See 
Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶37 ("If the defendant fails to prove 
one element, it is unnecessary to address the other.").   
E.  Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing 
¶47 Reinwand alternatively argues that he is entitled to a 
new sentencing hearing because his attorney was ineffective at 
sentencing.  Reinwand's conviction for first-degree intentional 
homicide required a mandatory life sentence; the only potential 
issue involves extended supervision, for which he could have 
become eligible within 20 years.  He argues that counsel 
performed deficiently by providing only a cursory argument for 
extended supervision eligibility, by failing to include evidence 
of mitigating circumstances6 such as his post-traumatic stress 
disorder or his love of his grandchildren, and by failing to 
request a PSI.  Assuming without deciding or implying that 
counsel's performance at sentencing was deficient, we conclude 
that Reinwand was not prejudiced by counsel's alleged errors.  
                                                 
6 A mitigating circumstance is "[a] fact or situation that 
does not bear on the question of a defendant's guilt but that 
may bear on a court's possibly lessening the severity of its 
judgment."  Circumstance, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014).  An example of a mitigating circumstance is a defendant's 
lack of a prior criminal record.  See State v. Lewandowski, 122 
Wis. 2d 759, 764, 364 N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1985). 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
22 
 
¶48 Regarding the PSI, there is no reasonable probability 
that requesting a PSI would have resulted in a different 
sentence.  The sentencing court had already reviewed a 2011 PSI 
from Reinwand's prior burglary conviction.  Additionally, 
counsel pointed out that a new PSI in this case would elicit 
unfavorable testimony and would not help Reinwand's cause.   
¶49 Likewise, there is no reasonable probability that the 
recitation of Reinwand's suggested mitigating evidence would 
have resulted in a different sentence.  The sentencing court was 
aware of much of this allegedly mitigating evidence.  The same 
sentencing court previously had presided over two "John Doe" 
investigations 
involving 
Reinwand, 
had 
reviewed 
the 
aforementioned 2011 PSI, and had presided over the trial that 
gave rise to this conviction.  Reinwand's counsel stated that 
"the court knew more about my client in that case than any other 
case I've handled because of the length and breadth of the John 
Doe investigation, the pretrial litigation, the trial."  The 
sentencing court already knew, for example, the full extent of 
Reinwand's criminal history, his claimed memory issues, and his 
love for his family.  Repeating this information at sentencing 
would not have affected the outcome. 
¶50 Additionally, some of Reinwand's proffered mitigating 
factors were not considered by the sentencing court to be 
mitigating factors at all.  Regarding his memory issues, the 
sentencing court stated that he "appeared to use the memory 
issue as an excuse" and that it was "not a mitigating factor."  
The alleged post-traumatic stress disorder was not a mitigating 
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
23 
 
factor.  While Reinwand claimed it was caused by his wife's 
suicide, the sentencing court knew from a John Doe investigation 
that Reinwand was going to be charged with first-degree 
intentional homicide for killing his wife.  The sentencing court 
explained that "[t]o argue that you have a mental disorder from 
the death of your wife, the death that you caused is not a 
mitigating 
factor 
but 
rather 
an 
aggravating 
one." 
 
The 
sentencing court also considered Reinwand's love for his family, 
but concluded that it was outweighed by the fact that he had 
killed Meister.  That is, he had intentionally deprived his 
grandchild of her father. 
¶51 Finally, the facts of the case were horrific——the 
sentencing court described it as "a premeditated, thought 
out . . . [a]lmost an execution-type" killing.  The sentencing 
court made clear that due to the nature of the crime, Reinwand 
would have been sentenced to life without the possibility of 
release 
to 
extended 
supervision 
regardless 
of 
counsel's 
performance at sentencing: 
When a person shoots another human being three times, 
two at point-black range, it's obvious that they are 
doing so with a cold and depraved heart and that type 
of person cannot be put back out into the community at 
any time. 
. . . . 
I would like to conclude by stating based upon the 
facts of this case, more specifically how the victim 
was killed, there was nothing the defendant's trial 
attorney could have argued that would have swayed me 
into not ordering life without parole.   
No. 
2017AP850-CR   
 
24 
 
For all these reasons, Reinwand was not prejudiced by counsel's 
alleged errors at sentencing.  His claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel at sentencing therefore fails.  See Floyd, 
377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶37 ("If the defendant fails to prove one 
element, it is unnecessary to address the other."). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶52 We 
conclude 
the 
following. 
 
First, 
Meister's 
statements to family and friends about Reinwand were not 
testimonial; 
therefore, 
they 
do 
not 
implicate 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause.  Accordingly, we do not reach 
the certified questions regarding the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception to the right of confrontation. 
¶53 Second, the "other acts" evidence of Reinwand's prior 
burglary was properly admitted for the purpose of challenging 
his asserted memory problems.  Third, Reinwand's counsel was not 
ineffective either at trial or at sentencing.  For these 
reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶54 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that the "other acts" evidence of Joseph Reinwand's 
prior burglary was properly admitted and that Reinwand's counsel 
was not ineffective at trial or at sentencing.  However, I write 
separately on the issues surrounding Reinwand's Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation.   
¶55 The majority concludes that all of the statements made 
by Dale Meister were not testimonial and therefore does not 
reach the certified questions.  I agree with the majority that 
almost all of the statements are nontestimonial.  However, the 
statement Meister made to Pastor Martin Baur is testimonial and 
therefore 
implicates 
Reinwand's 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
confront the declarant.  I therefore reach the issues certified 
by the court of appeals:  (1) "whether the 'forfeiture by 
wrongdoing' doctrine applies at a homicide trial where the 
declarant is the homicide victim, but where the defendant killed 
the declarant to prevent him or her from testifying at a 
separate proceeding"; and (2) "whether preventing the declarant 
from testifying must be the defendant's primary purpose for the 
wrongful act that prevented the declarant from testifying in 
that separate proceeding."  State v. Reinwand, No. 2017AP850-CR, 
unpublished 
certification 
(Wis. 
Ct. 
App. 
July 
26, 
2018) 
(emphasis in original).   
¶56 I conclude that for the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine to apply, the defendant must intend to prevent the 
declarant from testifying at a proceeding against the defendant, 
whether that proceeding is separate or otherwise.  Because 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
Meister, the declarant in this case, would not have testified in 
a proceeding against Reinwand, the defendant, the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine does not apply.  I further conclude that in 
light of the overwhelming evidence against Reinwand, including 
14 other witnesses who testified regarding Meister's fear that 
Reinwand would harm or kill him, the circuit court's error in 
admitting Meister's statement to Pastor Baur was harmless.   
A. Testimonial Statements 
¶57 I begin with the question of whether the statements 
made by Meister were testimonial.  The Sixth Amendment to the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
provides: 
 
"In 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ."  The United 
States Supreme Court has clarified that the Confrontation Clause 
applies to statements that are testimonial in nature.  See, 
e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 354 (2011).  Statements 
are considered testimonial when the "primary purpose" of the 
conversation was to "creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony."  Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) 
(quoted source omitted).  The Confrontation Clause generally bars 
the use of testimonial statements unless the witness is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).  
The Crawford court articulated three classes of "testimonial 
statements," only one of which is applicable to the statements 
at issue here:  "'statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.'"  
Id. at 52 (quoted source omitted).1   
¶58 In Clark, the United States Supreme Court recently 
affirmed that statements to persons other than law enforcement 
officers are subject to the Confrontation Clause.  Clark, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2180.  The United States Supreme Court held that for a 
statement to fall within the Confrontation Clause, the "primary 
purpose" of the statement must be testimonial.  Id.  The Court 
emphasized that in determining the "primary purpose" of a 
statement, 
a 
court 
must 
consider 
all 
of 
the 
relevant 
circumstances.  Id. (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369).  Factors 
the circuit court must consider include the formality or 
informality of the situation and the context in which the 
statement is made, including whether the statement is made to 
someone 
who 
is 
"principally 
charged 
with 
uncovering 
and 
prosecuting criminal behavior."  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.  The 
question at the heart of the inquiry is whether an ordinary 
person in the position of the declarant would have anticipated 
that the statement would be used to establish evidence to 
prosecute the defendant.  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 357, n.3.   
¶59 Almost all of the statements Meister made were 
nontestimonial:  they were made to family and friends, in 
informal settings, and related generally to Meister's fears that 
                                                 
1 The two other classes of statements are "ex parte in-court 
testimony or its functional equivalent" and "extrajudicial 
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials."  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).   
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
Reinwand would harm or kill him.  However, one statement stands 
apart from the rest.  At trial, Pastor Baur testified about a 
statement Meister made in the time leading up to the mediation 
between Meister and Reinwand's daughter over visitation with 
their daughter, Reinwand's granddaughter.  Pastor Baur testified 
that during a visit at the church, Meister told him "that if he 
[Meister] came up dead, that the police should dig deeper 
because it would look staged."  Pastor Baur said Meister 
provided the name "Joe Reinwand" and said that "Joe would be 
behind it."   
¶60 In determining the primary purpose of the conversation 
at issue in Clark, the United States Supreme Court focused on 
whether the declarant knew that the statement would be used to 
arrest or punish the defendant and whether the declarant 
intended his statement to be used by the police or prosecutors.  
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.  Unlike the other statements Meister 
made that expressed fear of death or bodily injury at the hands 
of Reinwand, Meister told Pastor Baur to go to the police so 
that they could investigate and subsequently prosecute Reinwand 
for Meister's murder.  Meister also instructed Pastor Baur to 
tell the police it would look staged so that they would 
investigate fully and "dig deeper."  Although it was not a 
formal complaint to the police, Meister sought out his pastor, 
someone who could be trusted to deliver a message to law 
enforcement.  The statement had a primary purpose——to be used as 
evidence to prosecute Reinwand for Meister's death.  The fact 
that Meister himself did not go to police is inapposite.  It is 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
clear from the numerous statements made to family and friends 
that Meister genuinely feared that Reinwand would harm or kill 
him.  As in Jensen, where this court determined that a letter 
and voicemail messages intended for the police were testimonial, 
the statement made to Pastor Baur was a statement intended to be 
repeated to the police for future prosecution.  State v. Jensen, 
2007 WI 26, ¶¶30-31, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518.  Meister 
instructed Pastor Baur to go to the police and tell them that 
Reinwand had committed homicide.   
B. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing 
¶61 Having determined that the statement to Pastor Baur is 
testimonial, I next turn to whether Reinwand's Sixth Amendment 
rights were violated by the admission of Meister's statement to 
Pastor Baur.  In Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008), 
the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant forfeits 
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when he not only 
prevents a witness from testifying but also intended to prevent 
that witness from testifying.  See also State v. Baldwin, 2010 
WI App 162, ¶¶37-39, 330 Wis. 2d 500, 794 N.W.2d 769.   
¶62 The issue here involves the requirement that the 
defendant intended to prevent the witness from testifying.  The 
State cites to United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 241 (4th 
Cir. 2005), for the general proposition that the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing exception applies "without regard to the nature of 
the charges at the trial in which the declarant's statements are 
offered."  The State further asserts that several federal courts 
of appeals have applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
in cases where the murder that made the witness unavailable 
occurs before the other proceedings have begun.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 672 (2d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996).  
¶63 Even if this court accepts the premise that the 
mediation between Meister and Reinwand's daughter would result 
in future court proceedings, those proceedings would be between 
Meister and Reinwand's daughter.  Reinwand would not be a party 
in those proceedings.  The State provides no support for the 
proposition that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applies 
where the proceeding in which the declarant is made unavailable 
is not one where the declarant would testify against the 
defendant.  In Gray, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applied when the defendant's 
wrongdoing "was intended to, and did, render the declarant 
unavailable as a witness against the defendant."  Gray, 405 F.3d 
at 241 (emphasis added).  "The common-law forfeiture rule was 
aimed 
at 
removing 
the 
otherwise 
powerful 
incentive 
for 
defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against 
them——in other words, it is grounded in 'the ability of courts 
to protect the integrity of their proceedings.'"  Giles, 554 
U.S. at 372 (emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 834 (2006)).  Because Meister would not have testified 
in a proceeding against Reinwand, the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine does not apply.  Therefore, the admission of Meister's 
statement to Pastor Baur violated Reinwand's Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation. 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
¶64 Because I conclude that the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine does not apply, I decline to reach the second certified 
issue.  However, I note that the United States Supreme Court has 
never required that preventing a declarant from testifying in a 
separate proceeding be the primary purpose for the wrongful act 
that prevented the declarant from testifying, and there is no 
support for that assertion in the case law. 
C.  Harmless Error 
¶65 The determination that the admission of Meister's 
statement to Pastor Baur violated Reinwand's constitutional 
right to confrontation does not end the inquiry.  State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI 118, ¶2, 256 Wis. 2d 56, 652 N.W.2d 391.  
Instead, I apply a harmless error analysis.  Id.  "[B]efore a 
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967).  This court has articulated several factors to aid in 
the harmless error analysis, including:  the frequency of the 
error; the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence; 
whether 
other 
evidence 
corroborates 
or 
contradicts 
the 
erroneously admitted evidence; whether other untainted evidence 
duplicates the erroneously admitted evidence; the nature of the 
defense; and the nature and overall strength of the State's 
case.  See State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶41, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 
695 N.W.2d 259.   
¶66 The evidence presented against Reinwand at trial 
included nontestimonial statements that Meister made to 14 other 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
individuals regarding threats that Reinwand had made and 
Meister's fear that Reinwand was going to harm or kill him.  
These statements duplicated the inadmissible statement that 
Meister made to Pastor Baur.  Moreover, there was overwhelming 
evidence to convict Reinwand, including physical evidence 
linking him to the murder weapon and a similar bullet, as well 
as Reinwand's confession to the police.  In light of all of the 
evidence admitted at trial, I conclude that the erroneous 
admission of Meister's statement to Pastor Baur was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
¶67 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2017AP850-CR.rfd 
 
 
 
1