Title: State ex rel. Rawls v. Miami Margarine Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. RAWLS, APPELLANT, v. MIAMI MARGARINE COMPANY; 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Rawls v. Miami Margarine Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 357.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in 
finding that no credible medical evidence supported an award of accrued 
compensation, when. 
(No. 95-680 — Submitted September 9, 1997 — Decided December 3, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD01-26. 
 
On February 28, 1988, decedent, James Rawls, broke his hip in an accident 
unrelated to his employment with Miami Margarine Company (“MMC”).  On 
August 17, 1988, his attending physician, Dr. Michael D. O’Brien, released him to 
return to work.  Wanting to ensure that decedent’s return was not premature, 
MMC scheduled decedent for a return-to-work physical with Dr. James R. 
Donovan, Jr. on August 26, 1988.  Dr. Donovan questioned decedent’s readiness 
to return, and sent the decedent for a strength testing examination at a local 
hospital. 
 
During the test, decedent felt a pop in his low back.  He was immediately 
examined by Dr. Donovan and diagnosed with a low back strain.  Over the next 
three weeks, decedent continued to complain of low back pain.  Dr. Donovan 
never saw claimant again after September 23, 1988. 
 
Decedent filed a workers’ compensation claim, alleging that his back injury 
arose in the course of and arising from his employment.  This claim was allowed. 
 
At some point, decedent moved appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio, 
for temporary total disability compensation.  A district hearing officer heard his 
claim on June 12, 1992  and issued an order.  That order denied temporary total 
disability compensation, since: 
 
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“* * * [C]laimant has not provided sufficient documentation of his 
inability to return to and perform his former position of employment as a ‘Capper’ 
due to the work-related injury on 8/23/88 [sic].  Claimant had been off work since 
2/88 with a non-related condition and had been found unable to return to his 
former position of employment due to the non-industrial injury.  Therefore, 
temporary total disability compensation is denied.  
 
“This order is based on the reports [sic] of Dr. Donovan.” 
 
On July 30, 1992, decedent died of nonindustrial causes.  The widow-
claimant, Patricia Rawls, appellant herein, pursuant to R.C. 4123.60, filed a C-6 
“Application for Payment of Compensation Accrued at Time of Death.” A district 
hearing officer denied the C-6, stating: 
 
“* * * [T]here is no accrued compensation as the issue of temporary total 
disability compensation was denied by District Hearing Officer order on 6-12-92.  
The claimant died on 7-30-92, and thus the claim is abated. 
 
“This order is based upon the medical report(s) of Dr. O’Brien, the evidence 
in the file and the evidence adduced at hearing.” 
 
A regional board of review modified the order: 
 
“* * * [T]he District Hearing Officer’s order dated 1-19-93 is modified to 
the extent that the Regional Board finds that there was no compensation accrued 
for the reasons stated in the District Hearing Officer’s order of 6-12-92.  The order 
is affirmed in all other respects.” 
 
Staff hearing officers, on October 25, 1993, in turn, modified the board’s 
order: 
 
“* * * [T]he order of the Dayton Regional Board dated 8/10/93 is modified 
to the following extent: 
 
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“The Staff Hearing Officers find there was no accrued compensation due 
and owing at time of claimant’s death on 7/30/92.  The Staff Hearing Officers find 
no credible medical evidence that claimant was unable to return to his former 
position of employment as a capper from 8/24/88 to 1/25/91 due to allowed 
conditions in the claim.  Therefore, the application for accrued compensation is 
denied. 
 
“In all other respects the order of the Regional Board is affirmed. 
 
“The finding and order herein [are] based on the application, evidence in the 
file, and/or evidence adduced at the hearing.” 
 
Reconsideration was denied. 
 
Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying 
accrued compensation.  The appellate court found that the order was supported by 
“some evidence” and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Butkovich, Schimpf, Schimpf & Ginocchio Co., L.P.A., Stephen P. Gast and 
James A. Whittaker, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  R.C. 4123.60 at the time of the decedent’s death provided: 
 
“Benefits in case of death shall be paid to such one or more of the 
dependents of the decedent, for the benefit of all the dependents as may be 
determined by the industrial commission. * * * 
 
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“In all cases of death * * * for which an award had theretofore been made 
on account of temporary, or permanent partial, or total disability, in which there 
remains an unpaid balance, representing payments accrued and due to the decedent 
at the time of his death, the commission may, after satisfactory proof has been 
made warranting such action, award or pay any unpaid balance of such award to 
such of the dependents of the decedent, or for services rendered on account of the 
last illness or death of such decedent, as the commission determines in accordance 
with the circumstances in each such case.  If the decedent would have been 
lawfully entitled to have made application for an award at the time of his death 
the commission may, after satisfactory proof to warrant an award and payment, 
award and pay an amount, not exceeding the compensation which the decedent 
might have received, but for his death, for the period prior to the date of his death, 
to such of the dependents of the decedent, or for services rendered on account of 
the last illness or death of such decedent, as the commission determines in 
accordance with the circumstances in each such case, but such payments may be 
made only in cases in which application for compensation was made in the manner 
required by sections 4123.01 to 4123.94 of the Revised Code, during the lifetime 
of such injured or disabled person, or within one year after the death of such 
injured or disabled person.”  (136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1169-1170.) 
 
Appellant seeks the temporary total disability compensation to which she 
claims decedent was entitled prior to his death.  The parties do not contest 
decedent’s inability to return to his former position of employment over the period 
at issue.  They instead debate the cause of that disability.  The litigants dispute 
whether “some evidence” supports the conclusion that decedent’s nonallowed hip 
problems prevented a return to the former position of employment.  This question 
is, however, irrelevant, since temporary total disability compensation could still be 
 
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paid if decedent’s allowed back condition independently prevented his return.  
State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 452, 619 N.E.2d 1018. 
 
The commission found “no credible medical evidence” that the decedent’s 
allowed condition was independently disabling.  We do not find that conclusion to 
be an abuse of discretion. 
 
Dr. O’Brien did not address decedent’s allowed back condition, so it cannot 
support the payment of temporary total disability compensation.  Likewise, Dr. 
Donovan’s September 23, 1988 exam — his last contact with the decedent — did 
not generate an opinion as to decedent’s back-related disability.  Dr. Donovan 
simply related that, according to an outside source, decedent had been unable to 
return to his job.  This is not a credible certification of disability. 
 
The record also contains two C-84 “Physician’s Reports Supplemental” 
from Dr. Stephen M. Scott, who examined decedent on October 27, 1989, and 
certified him as temporarily and totally disabled due to his low back condition 
from August 21, 1988 through January 25, 1991.  Scott, however, certified this 
twenty-nine-month period of disability based on a one-time exam that elicited no 
objective findings of impairment.  Moreover, Dr. Scott certified decedent as 
disabled for a period part of which was prior to his October 27, 1989 exam.  This 
fact renders that portion of the certification invalid under State ex rel. Case v. 
Indus. Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 383, 28 OBR 442, 504 N.E.2d 30.  Equally 
important, without the benefit of any additional examination that might have 
revealed the existence of new and changed circumstances, Dr. Scott, without 
explanation, later changed decedent’s return-to-work date from January 1, 1990 to 
January 25, 1991.  Viewing these factors together, it was within the commission’s 
prerogative to reject Dr. Scott’s certification. 
 
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We find, therefore, that the commission did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that no credible medical evidence supported an award of accrued 
compensation.  For this reason, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.