Title: Freeman v. Town of Lusk

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Freeman v. Town of Lusk1986 WY 88717 P.2d 331Case Number: 85-151Decided: 04/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Howard L. FREEMAN, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

TOWN 
OFLUSK, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, NiobraraCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Howard L. 
Freeman, pro 
se.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ. and ROONEY,* J., 
Retired.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The essence of the 
claim of error in this case as we perceive it, is that an unsworn traffic 
citation which was issued and which charged a violation of a town ordinance is 
insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The consequence 
of the failure to verify the complaint according to the appellant is that he was 
deprived of constitutional due process. There are collateral claims of error set 
forth in the appellant's brief, and we will quote those hereafter. We conclude 
that there was no error in connection with the appellant's conviction. That is 
the conclusion which the district court reached upon review of the finding of 
guilty in the municipal court. We affirm the conviction.

[¶2.]     Appellant recites the 
following issues in his brief:

"I. DID THE 10TH 
AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZE SECTION 7-16-101 WYOMING STATUTES 
1977 TO BE APPLIED IN A MANNER THAT MUNICIPAL COURTS MAY IGNORE ALL TIMELY 
CLAIMED RIGHTS OF NATURAL CITIZENS, ALL SEPARATION OF POWER DOCTRINES OF STATE 
AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND ALSO EVEN THE WYOMING RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, SO LONG AS THE PUNISHMENT FOR SAID CRIMINAL ACT DOES NOT EXCEED 
$750.00?

"II. DOES SECTION 
7-16-101, W.S. 1977 AUTHORIZE UNSWORN COMPLAINTS IN CRIMINAL 
CASES?

"III. DOES A COURT, WHICH 
DECLARES ON THE RECORD THAT IT IS HEARING AN ACTION BROUGHT IN THE NAME OF THE 
PEOPLE, HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO THEN IGNORE LEGAL DEFENSES, AND SUMMARILY TRY THE 
CRIME UPON THE LETTER OF AN ORDINANCE?

"IV. DID APPELLANT HAVE 
HIS FIRST TRIAL BY AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER EMPOWERED TO PERFORM EXECUTIVE AND 
JUDICIAL OFFICES, WHERE THE PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME WAS $40.00, AND THEN A 
TRIAL DE-NOVO IN MUNICIPAL COURT ON THE SAME OFFENSE, WHERE THE ONLY CHANGE WAS 
THAT THE PUNISHMENT WAS INCREASED TO $200.00 PLUS $10.00 COURT 
COSTS?

"V. DID THE 10TH 
AMENDMENT AUTHORIZE GUILT TO BE WRITTEN INTO STATE STATUTES AND MUNICIPAL 
ORDINANCES?"

[¶3.]     As appellee, the State 
of Wyoming, 
suggests the following questions are involved in the claims of error and 
arguments of the appellant:

"I. WHETHER TOWN OF 
LUSK ORDINANCE 
12-207 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

"II. WHETHER THE 
INITIATION OF THE ACTION AGAINST APPELLANT BY THE ISSUANCE OF A CITATION WAS 
PROPER.

"III. WHETHER THE 
MUNICIPAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE."

[¶4.]     It is the 
responsibility of an appellant to present relevant authority and cogent 
argument, and it is not enough to identify potential issues and expect this 
court to flesh them out. Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 (1980). There are many 
precedents for the proposition that this court will not consider issues which 
are not supported with cogent argument or pertinent authority. E.g., Capshaw v. 
State, Wyo., 
714 P.2d 349 (1986). In the past this court has not hesitated to invoke this 
rule against pro se litigants. Skurdal v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1241 (1985). The appellant in 
this case does appear pro se, but no special consideration is to be given a 
litigant who presents his own case. Osborn v. Manning, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1121, 1125 (1984); Annis v. Beebe and 
Runyan Furniture Company, Wyo., 685 P.2d 678, 680 (1984); Matter of GP, Wyo., 679 P.2d 976 
(1984).

[¶5.]     In an expansion of the 
first issue that he has articulated, appellant has the following in his 
brief:

"Appellant argues `No.' 
Appellee argues `Yes.' To declare that the authorized police power under the 
10th Amendment does away with the rest of the Constitution, and the rest of the 
substantive organic Law of the Land, or that it allows Amendment, or alteration 
to the U.S. Constitution by State Statutes not pursuant thereto, provided the 
statute does not affect a property interest above $750.00, is to Appellant prima 
facie evidence of unlawful usurpation by public servants, who are sworn 
`juristic persons' to obey the Organic Law of the Land, and not to bend it by 
far fetched legalese."

The entire 
argument of this issue by the appellant in his brief is as 
follows:

"There is no 
authorization in the legal contract, which binds every public servant to obey 
and to support the Constitution of the United 
States and the State of Wyoming, to set an arbitrary figure of $750.00 
at which figure Constitutional protection of natural rights is said to begin. 
Lusk Town Ordinance # 12-207 is unenforceable upon natural citizens as it is 
written and administered."

In light of the 
precedents cited we do not address the appellant's first issue.1

[¶6.]     Turning to the second 
and third issues presented which we will address together, the appellant's 
essential argument is that the citation which was issued to him on June 6, 1984, 
never was signed under oath by the arresting officer. He contends it could not 
serve as a valid complaint to invoke the jurisdiction of the municipal court. 
That citation charged him with driving the wrong way on a one-way street. We 
find no dispute in the record about the fact that Mr. Freeman on that day did 
drive south for one block along Maple Street in the Town of Lusk, and that Maple 
Street is a 
one-way street for those traveling north.

[¶7.]     The appellant 
mistakenly relies upon § 7-16-101, W.S. 1977, which addresses jurisdiction of 
justices of the peace. It does provide for misdemeanor jurisdiction "on 
information or complaint, under oath, saving to the defendant the right of 
appeal to the district court." The relevant provisions in rules and statutes 
pertaining to this case are as follows:

"The complaint is a 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It 
shall be made upon oath * * *." Rule 3(a), W.R.Cr.P.J.C. "As provided by law * * 
* citations may issue for offenses violating * * * any traffic ordinance of any 
city or town." Rule 24(b), W.R.Cr.P.J.C.

"These rules shall also 
apply to police justice proceedings relating to trial of offenses against the 
ordinances of cities and towns." Rule 1(a)(2), W.R.Cr.P.J.C. "In the event the 
form of citation * * * includes information and is sworn to as required under 
the general laws of this state * * * when filed * * * shall be deemed to be a 
lawful complaint for purposes of prosecution under this act [Regulation of 
Traffic on Highways]." Section 31-5-1213, W.S. 1977.

[¶8.]     These provisions 
establish that a citation should be subscribed and sworn to by the officer who 
issues it. This is the regular way to constitute it a lawful complaint for 
purposes of prosecution. The officer in this case did sign the citation in the 
proper place, but that portion of the citation indicating that the officer had 
sworn to the contents never was executed. It is a better practice in all 
instances to assure that the complaint is made upon oath, and the statutes do 
furnish guidance with respect to the proper manner of converting a citation into 
a formal complaint. The municipal judge could have easily set the matter 
straight when it was first brought to his attention.

[¶9.]     Be that as it may, in 
Cisneros v. City of Casper, 
Wyo., 479 P.2d 198, 200-201 (1971) 
this court said:

"The verification is not 
a substantial part of the complaint and is merely to ensure good faith in 
instituting the proceedings. Absence of the required verification is only a 
simple defect in the complaint and does not render the complaint void or deprive 
the court of jurisdiction."

[¶10.]  In Cisneros, the defendant did enter a 
plea without objecting to the lack of verification, but the court also 
emphasized that the defendant knew who the complaining witnesses were; that he 
never had any misapprehension as to the charge; and that he was not surprised or 
misled. In the later case of State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368, 370 
(1983), this court invoked Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., with respect to a complaint in 
the county court when the complaint served the same function as an indictment or 
information. Rule 9(a), W.R. Cr.P., provides in pertinent 
part:

"* * * any * * * defect * 
* * which does not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant upon 
the merits or to mislead the defendant to his prejudice shall not be grounds for 
the dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction. 
* *"

The citation in 
this case was sufficient to serve as a charging document in a similar 
fashion.

"An indictment to be 
legally sufficient must fairly indicate the crime charged, must state the 
essential elements of the alleged crime and be sufficiently definite so that the 
defendant can prepare his defense, and definite enough so that the indictment 
will grant protection from further prosecution for the same offense." State v. 
Faltynowicz, supra, 660 P.2d  at 371.

[¶11.]  Technically, it could be said to have 
been error for the court to proceed to try the appellant without requiring a 
verified citation. Under the circumstances any such error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because there was absolutely no prejudice to any substantial 
right of the appellant. The citation apprised the appellant of the charge 
against him and furnished him all the protection he needed. The statute upon 
which the appellant relies in order to demonstrate a jurisdictional defect does 
not apply in the municipal court. Instead the rule of Cisneros v. State, supra, 
that the lack of verification on the complaint does not affect the jurisdiction 
of the court must be applied.

[¶12.]  There is no merit to the contention of 
the appellant that it was improper for the officer who issued the citation to 
set bail for him. That argument is premised upon the assertion that the officer 
is a member of the executive branch of government and was exercising judicial 
functions. Appellant then rests a claim that his later trial resulted in an 
improper enhancement of the punishment imposed by the officer upon the first 
assertion.

[¶13.]  The citing officer set an appearance bond 
under the schedule then in effect. Appendix I, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. That appendix 
provides for a bond of $30.00 for going the wrong way on a one-way street 
although the officer erroneously set the bond at $40.00. The schedule appears in 
Appendix I, Rule 44, W.R.Cr.P.C.C., effective January 1, 1985. Article 1, § 14, 
Wyo. Constitution, specifically authorizes bail. Appearance bonds are addressed 
in Rule 8(c)(1), W.R.Cr.P. Rule 7(a), W.R.Cr.P.J.C., provides for the instance 
of an appearance bond being executed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 8(c), 
W.R.Cr.P., and that it should substantially conform to the provisions of the 
form in the appendix. Except for the error in the amount of the bond, the 
officer did not do anything wrong nor did he violate the constitution. In any 
event, Mr. Freeman did not attempt to post the bond, and for that reason he has 
no standing to attack the bond or the manner in which bail was 
set.

[¶14.]  As a final proposition the appellant 
contends that "strict liability" crimes such as driving the wrong way on a 
one-way street, are not constitutional. It is well established that the 
legislature may adopt statutes defining crimes which are malum prohibitum, and 
which require no showing of any criminal intent beyond that encompassed in the 
conduct which violates the statute. See, e.g., United 
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1971), reh. denied, 403 U.S. 912, 91 S. Ct. 2201, 29 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1971); Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 
(1952); Armijo v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864, 869 
(1984).

[¶15.]  We hold that there were no errors in 
charging the appellant with driving the wrong way on a one-way street in an 
unsworn citation, nor in his conviction for that offense. The judgment of the 
municipal court, which was affirmed by the district court, is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 We find in the record in 
this case two letters to the district court from the appellant. On both of them 
the letterhead reads: "The Committee to Save the Judges From Hanging Even Though 
They Deserve It." At the bottom of the stationery the following matter 
appears:

"The Bible and history 
tell us that an oppressed people have never once regained their freedom until 
they had hung the `judges' and stoned the tax collectors to death; it is the 
fervent wish of the Committee that we can reason with the `judges' to quit 
interfering with our common law protections. Then we will have only the tax 
collectors to deal with. Redloh 2:25."

While these 
warnings are dire, it well may be that cases such as the one before us 
constitute a far more severe punishment. Our rules of appellate practice were 
designed, at least in part, to protect judges from such consequences.