Title: Commonwealth v. Richardson

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11472 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TARI RICHARDSON. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 6, 2014. - August 7, 2014. 
 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Execution of sentence, 
Investigation of jurors, Voir dire.  Evidence, Firearm, 
Prior violent conduct, Identity.  Jury and Jurors.  
Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 27, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and a 
posttrial motion to inquire of jurors or for alternative relief 
was heard by him. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
William W. Adams for the defendant. 
 
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Michael J. Fellows, for Committee for Public Counsel, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                     
1 Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, J.  In Bynum v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 707, 
709 (1999), we declared that, where the Legislature enacts a 
sentencing enhancement statute that provides for a longer 
sentence where a defendant convicted of the crime has one or 
more specified prior convictions, "[t]he prior offense is not an 
element of the crime for which a defendant is charged but 
concerns the punishment to be imposed if he is convicted . . . 
and the prior offense is proved."  We, therefore, concluded that 
the Legislature did not intend that two sentences be imposed, 
one for the underlying offense and a second for having committed 
the offense after a prior conviction of the same offense.  Id. 
at 709.  Here, the defendant was convicted of a firearms offense 
for which there were two applicable sentencing enhancement 
statutes, and the Commonwealth proved convictions of separate 
prior offenses for each.  The primary issue on appeal is whether 
the defendant may be sentenced under both sentencing enhancement 
statutes.  We conclude that, unless the Legislature has 
explicitly declared its intent to permit multiple sentencing 
enhancements, a defendant may be sentenced under only one 
sentencing enhancement statute.2 
                     
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
 
Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence at trial in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  After midnight on 
March 4, 2007, the defendant, an African-American man wearing a 
white T-shirt, entered a night club in Brockton, along with 
another African-American man wearing a white T-shirt.  The club 
manager, Aldo Fernandes, recognized the defendant from a prior 
incident at the club, and pointed the defendant and his 
companion out to two security staff members, Andy Alerte and 
Aaron Crutchfield.  After the club closed at 1 A.M., and the 
staff ushered patrons outside, Brockton police Officer Francis 
Czarnowski, who was working on paid security detail at the club 
and was walking toward Main Street to direct vehicles exiting 
its parking lot, heard gunshots coming from the direction of 
Forest Avenue.  Officer Czarnowski proceeded in the direction of 
the shots, where he observed two groups arguing in the 
intersection.  Moments later, he saw an African American man 
wearing a white T-shirt pick up a firearm from the ground, and 
fire three shots into the larger group.  Officer Czarnowski 
yelled for the shooter to stop, whereupon the shooter and 
another African-American man, who was wearing a brown shirt, 
fled down Forest Avenue, with Officer Czarnowski in pursuit. 
 
Fernandes, who was observing the departing patrons in the 
parking lot, heard a gunshot from the intersection of Main 
4 
 
Street and Forest Avenue, followed by more gunshots coming from 
further down Forest Avenue.  He then saw the defendant running 
down Forest Avenue alone, with Officer Czarnowski close behind 
him in hot pursuit.  From where he was standing in the club 
parking lot, Fernandes had an unobstructed and well-lit view of 
the defendant being chased by Officer Czarnowski.3 
 
Alerte was standing outside the club around closing time 
when he saw one of the two men Fernandes had earlier pointed out 
to him at the corner of Forest Avenue and Main Street, and heard 
a loud bang, followed by another loud bang, coming from that 
area.  He saw one of the two men bend over, grab something from 
the bushes, hold an object the way one would hold a firearm, and 
then start running down Forest Avenue, with Officer Czarnowski 
running behind him. 
 
Officer Czarnowski pursued the two individuals into a 
driveway of a nearby house.  The man who had shot earlier fired 
at Czarnowksi four times; the officer took cover behind two 
barrels and returned fire.  Thereafter, the shooter and his 
companion jumped over the fence into the back yard of an 
adjacent house and escaped. 
 
The next day, Fernandes identified the defendant from an 
array of photographs as the person he had seen at the night club 
                     
3 The defendant's expert testified that Aldo Fernandes was 
222 feet away from the person he claimed to have identified as 
the defendant. 
5 
 
just after midnight, and who he later observed being chased down 
the street by Officer Czarnowski.  Alerte identified two 
photographs from the array, including a photograph of the 
defendant, stating both resembled the person Fernandes pointed 
out to him, whom he later saw pick up an object from the bushes.  
While being shown the array, he did not favor one photograph 
over the other, but at trial he testified that he favored the 
photograph of the defendant.  Crutchfield also identified the 
defendant as the person Fernandes had asked him to keep an eye 
on, and whom he had later asked to move along in the parking 
lot. Officer Czarnowski was unable to select the defendant's 
photograph from the array. 
 
The defendant was questioned by police two days after the 
shooting.  After waiving the Miranda rights, he initially denied 
being at the club on the night of the shooting, then admitted 
that he arrived late and alone.  He stated that he heard a shot 
go off when he was in the middle of Main Street and ducked down, 
fearful of being hit by a stray bullet.  He denied that he had 
been on Forest Avenue, stating that he later ran down another 
street to escape from the shooting. 
 
The defendant was indicted on charges of armed assault with 
intent to murder, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), and 
unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
6 
 
§ 10 (a).4  The latter indictment incorporated three counts, the 
first alleging only the unlawful possession itself; the second 
alleging unlawful possession by a person previously convicted of 
a like firearms offense, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d);5 
and the third alleging unlawful possession by a person 
previously convicted of a violent crime or serious drug offense, 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a).6  A Superior Court jury 
found the defendant guilty of armed assault with intent to 
murder and unlawful possession of a firearm, and after a jury-
waived trial, the judge found under the sentencing enhancement 
provisions of § 10 (d) that the defendant previously had been 
convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, and under the 
sentencing enhancement provisions of § 10G (a) that the 
                     
4 The defendant was also indicted on a charge of assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15B 
(b), but the judge at trial concluded that this offense was a 
lesser included offense of assault with intent to murder and 
entered a required finding of not guilty. 
 
5 General Laws c. 269, § 10 (d), provides, "Whoever, after 
having been convicted of any of the [unlawful possession of a 
firearm] offenses set forth in paragraph (a). . . commits a like 
offense . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for not less than five years nor more than seven years . 
. . ." 
 
6 General Laws § 269, § 10G (a), provides, "Whoever, having 
been previously convicted of a violent crime or of a serious 
drug offense, both as defined herein, violates the provisions of 
paragraph (a) . . . of section 10 shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not less than three years 
nor more than [fifteen] years . . . ." 
7 
 
defendant previously had been convicted of assault and battery 
on a police officer. 
 
The judge sentenced the defendant to from eighteen to 
twenty years in State prison on the conviction of armed assault 
with intent to murder.7  With respect to the sentencing 
enhancements on the conviction of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, the judge imposed a sentence of from six to seven years 
in the State prison on the repeat offender count under § 10 (d), 
and a sentence of from six to ten years in the State prison on 
the prior violent offender count under § 10G (a),8 both to run 
concurrently with each other and with the sentence on the 
conviction of armed assault with intent to murder.9 
 
In an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to Appeals 
Court rule 1:28, a panel of that court affirmed the defendant's 
                     
7 The Appellate Division of the Superior Court amended the 
sentence on this conviction to from fifteen to twenty years in 
State prison. 
 
8 We characterize a person who is subject to sentencing 
under § 10G after being convicted of the unlawful carrying of a 
firearm as an "armed career criminal" only where the defendant 
has three prior convictions of a violent crime or serious drug 
offense.  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 626 n.10 
(2011).  The defendant was found to have only one prior 
conviction of a violent crime, so we characterize him as a prior 
violent offender. 
 
9 The trial judge initially ordered the sentences for the 
two counts to run concurrent with each other, but from and after 
the sentence on the conviction of assault with intent to murder; 
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court amended the 
sentences to run concurrent both with each other and with the 
sentence on the conviction of assault with intent to murder. 
8 
 
convictions of assault with intent to murder and unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  However, the panel vacated the two 
sentences imposed pursuant to the sentencing enhancement 
statutes, and remanded the matter for "resentencing pursuant to  
a single sentencing enhancement provision, whereupon the count 
under the remaining sentencing enhancement provision shall be 
dismissed and the finding set aside."  Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2011).  We granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Multiple sentencing enhancements.  
Statutes providing for enhanced sentencing based on a 
defendant's prior convictions "do not create independent crimes, 
but enhance the sentence for the underlying crime."  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 447 Mass. 1018, 1019-1020 (2006), 
citing Bynum, 429 Mass. at 708-709.  Therefore, the violations 
of § 10 (d) and § 10G (a) are not separate crimes; instead, they 
are separate sentencing enhancements for the same underlying 
crime of unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 
§ 10 (a). 
 
The Legislature has "broad power to define crimes, and to 
create punishments for them."  Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 
Mass. 224, 231 (1992).  This power includes the authority to 
require that a defendant be sentenced under multiple sentencing 
enhancements where his prior convictions subject him to enhanced 
9 
 
punishment under multiple statutes.  Id.  See Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) ("[s]imply because two criminal 
statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct . . . 
does not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the 
imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments 
pursuant to those statutes"). 
 
The limitation on the imposition of multiple sentencing 
enhancements is not legislative authority, but legislative 
intent.  "Where the Legislature has specifically authorized 
cumulative punishment under two statutes, even if the two 
statutes proscribe the same conduct . . . , a court's job of 
statutory construction is terminated, and the intent of the 
Legislature is to be enforced."  Alvarez, supra at 232.  Here, 
neither § 10 (d) nor § 10G, nor any other statutory provision, 
describes what is to happen when a defendant is convicted of a 
crime and is found to have prior convictions that subject him to 
sentencing under more than one enhancement.  The Commonwealth 
asserts, without citation to the statutory text or legislative 
history, that, where multiple sentencing enhancements apply, the 
Legislature intended to mandate a penalty between the highest 
minimum and the highest maximum possible sentences under both 
enhancements.  As applied here, because § 10 (d) provides for a 
minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of seven 
years, and § 10G (a) provides for a minimum sentence of three 
10 
 
years and a maximum sentence of fifteen years, the Commonwealth 
contends that the judge should be able to impose a sentence of 
no less than five years and no more than fifteen years, in one 
"consolidated" judgment under both sentencing enhancements.10 
 
It would certainly be permissible for the Legislature to so 
provide, and we recognize that it is arguable that the 
Legislature intended that a defendant with a prior conviction of 
a drug charge or a crime of violence who unlawfully possesses a 
firearm be required to serve no less than five years in State 
prison, and that a defendant who has also been convicted of a 
prior firearms offense be subject to a prison term of up to 
fifteen years.  But, where there is nothing in the statutory 
language or the legislative history to suggest that the 
Legislature intended to combine the minimum and maximum terms of 
multiple sentencing enhancement provisions in this manner, we 
must conclude that the legislative intent regarding this 
question is ambiguous.  See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 
398, 407 (1980) (statutes ambiguous where they "fail[ed] to 
address . . . whether Congress intended . . . to provide a 
duplicative enhancement [for] the underlying felony" which 
already contained firearm enhancement), superseded by statute as 
recognized by United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1997) 
                     
10 The Commonwealth concedes that, pursuant to Bynum v. 
Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 707, 709 (1999), the defendant's 
sentence must consist of a single judgment. 
11 
 
(statutory amendment clarified congressional intent to authorize 
enhanced penalties under both statutes). 
 
Under the rule of lenity, "if we find that the statute is 
ambiguous or are unable to ascertain the intent of the 
Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any 
rational doubt."  Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 
524 (2005).  "This principle applies to sentencing as well as 
substantive provisions."  Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 
569 (1982).  Based on this well-established principle of 
statutory construction, we will not presume, absent a clear 
statement, that the Legislature intended to impose multiple 
sentencing enhancements to a single underlying offense.11  
Because neither of the enhancement provisions at issue in this 
case contains a clear statement of legislative intent regarding 
the imposition of multiple sentencing enhancements, the 
defendant may only be sentenced pursuant to one of the 
enhancement statutes. 
 
We briefly discuss the procedure to be followed when a 
defendant is charged with multiple sentencing enhancement 
provisions applicable to a single underlying offense.  The 
                     
11 Cf. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 769-
770 (1986), citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14 
(1978) (absent clear statement from Legislature, no extra 
enhancement for use of firearm during commission of felony when 
underlying felony -- armed robbery -- already contains 
aggravating factor). 
12 
 
Commonwealth may charge a defendant under multiple sentencing 
enhancement statutes, especially where it may be unsure which of 
a defendant's prior convictions it will be able to prove at 
trial.  It may then exercise its prosecutorial prerogative to 
decide which enhancement provision will apply at sentencing by 
entering a nolle prosequi of all but one sentencing enhancement 
count, provided it does so before sentencing.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 16, 378 Mass. 885 (1979) ("prosecuting attorney may 
enter a nolle prosequi of pending charges at any time prior to 
the pronouncement of sentence. . . .  After jeopardy attaches, a 
nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the defendant 
shall have the effect of an acquittal of the charges contained 
in the nolle prosequi").  Where, as here, the Commonwealth did 
not exercise its authority to enter a nolle prosequi of one of 
the enhancement counts before sentencing, the decision regarding 
which sentence will survive on remand rests with the sentencing 
judge.  See Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 190-191 & n.9 
(2013). 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant claims that 
the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to identify him 
as the person who possessed the firearm and fired multiple times 
at Officer Czarnowski.  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must in evaluating such 
claims, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
13 
 
(1979), we conclude that the evidence described earlier in this 
opinion was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts. 
 
3.  Postverdict inquiry of jurors.  The defendant contends 
that the judge abused his discretion by failing to order a 
postverdict inquiry of female jurors.  Ten days after the jury's 
verdict, the defendant's brother signed an affidavit in which he 
attested that, during a recess in trial proceedings, he 
overheard a woman, who was between twenty-five and thirty years 
of age, say during a telephone call that her boss was the 
brother or cousin of the prosecutor who was trying the case.  
The defendant's brother was not certain that the woman he 
overheard was a juror, but he had seen her in the court room and 
had also seen her speaking with a juror when she was outside the 
court room.  The defendant requested the trial judge either to 
conduct a voir dire of the jurors or to show jurors' photographs 
to the witness to determine whether the woman he saw was a 
juror.  The judge, over the Commonwealth's objection, allowed 
the defendant's motion to the extent that he permitted defense 
counsel to obtain copies of juror photographs through the 
registry of motor vehicles so that they could be shown to the 
defendant's brother.12 
                     
12 The Commonwealth appealed the judge's decision to the 
single justice, and then to the full court, claiming that the 
order subjected the jurors to an unwarranted risk to their 
14 
 
 
As a result of the order, photographs of five of the seven 
female jurors were provided to defense counsel,13 and were 
included in an array of nineteen photographs that was shown to 
the defendant's brother.  He did not recognize anyone depicted 
in the photographs.  Notwithstanding this failure, the defendant 
renewed his motion for a judicially supervised voir dire of the 
female jurors.  The judge denied the motion.  The judge noted 
that the claim was not juror exposure to extraneous information, 
see Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 251 (2001), but 
rather possible juror bias based on an undisclosed connection to 
the prosecutor.  The judge concluded, based on all the 
circumstances, that the defendant had "failed to make a 
reasonable or colorable showing that there was a possible juror 
bias that would warrant further inquiry."  We agree with the 
Appeals Court that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying the renewed motion. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's convictions of armed 
assault with intent to murder and unlawful possession of a 
firearm.  We remand the case to the Superior Court with 
instructions that the judge vacate the sentence, as revised by 
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, of one of the two 
                                                                  
safety.  The judge's order was affirmed.  Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 454 Mass. 1005 (2009). 
13 The other two female jurors, according to their juror 
questionnaires, were fifty-six and sixty-five years of age. 
15 
 
sentencing enhancement counts under G. L. c. 269, §§ 10 (d) and 
10G (a), leaving the sentence on the other count in effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.