Title: Volvo Trucks North America v. Wausau Truck Center, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1385 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Volvo Trucks North America, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
and Wisconsin Division of  Hearings and Appeals, 
          Respondents, 
Wausau Truck Center, Inc., 
          Interested Party-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 11, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 7, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory E. Grau   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Anthony Tomaselli, Andrew M. Norman, and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Madison, and Billy M. Donley and Baker & Hostetler, LLP, 
Houston, Tex., and oral argument by Billy M. Donley. 
 
For the interested party-respondent there was a brief by 
Paul R. Norman, Andrew N. DeClercq, and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & 
Field LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Paul R. Norman. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2008AP1385  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV1138) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Volvo Trucks North America, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation 
and Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, 
 
          Respondents, 
 
Wausau Truck Center, Inc., 
 
          Interested Party-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 11, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished order of the court of appeals summarily affirming 
the order of the Circuit Court for Marathon County, Greg Grau, 
Judge, affirming an order of the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals.1  
                                                 
1 Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. DOT, No. 2008AP001385, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009). 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The dispute arises under chapter 218, §§ 218.0101-
.0172 of the statutes, governing motor vehicle dealers.  Volvo 
Trucks North America issued a termination notice to Wausau Truck 
Center, canceling Wausau Truck's Volvo franchise.  Wausau Truck 
filed a complaint of unfair cancellation pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0114(7)(d) (2007-08).2  The Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, which is charged by the legislature with hearing such 
disputes under Wis. Stat. §§ 218.0114(7)(d) and 227.43(1)(bg), 
issued an order requiring Volvo to rescind its termination 
notice.  Volvo sought judicial review of the Division's order 
under 
chapter 
227 
of 
the 
statutes. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 227.46(2m), 227.52. 
¶3 
Volvo argues that the Division's order to rescind 
Volvo's termination notice is based on the erroneous conclusion 
that although Wausau Truck materially breached its dealer 
agreement with Volvo, the breach was subsequently cured within a 
reasonable 
time, 
as 
required 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(1)(i)1.b.  The Division determined that the relevant 
cure period ended on December 31, 2003, and that Wausau Truck 
had cured the material breach within that time. 
¶4 
The issue presented for judicial review here, as 
before the circuit court and the court of appeals, is whether 
Wausau Truck cured its breach within the "cure period."  If 
Wausau Truck's breach of the dealer agreement was not cured, 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
3 
 
then Volvo had "just provocation" allowing it to cancel the 
dealer agreement under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(1)(i)2.3 
¶5 
This issue in turn presents two questions: (1) What is 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
word 
"cure" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(1)(i)1.b.? (2) After being given notice by Volvo, did 
Wausau Truck cure its breach of the dealer agreement?  If Wausau 
Truck cured the breach, then Volvo's franchise termination was 
not lawful and the Division's order to rescind the termination 
notice will be affirmed. 
¶6 
For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Volvo did 
not show that its proposed interpretation of the statutory word 
"cured" (or any other proposed interpretation of "cured") was 
more 
reasonable 
than 
the 
Division's 
interpretation.  
Accordingly, given our posture in review of administrative 
decisions, the Division's interpretation of the word "cured" is 
accepted as the correct interpretation of the statute. 
¶7 
We need not resolve whether in the instant case the 
Division's determination that Wausau Truck had cured its breach 
of the dealership agreement is a finding of fact or a conclusion 
of law.  That determination does not alter the result that the 
Division's order is affirmed.  If the Division's determination 
that Wausau Truck cured the breach is a finding of fact, there 
is substantial evidence to support the finding.  If the 
Division's application of its interpretation of "cured" to the 
                                                 
3 "Just 
provocation" 
is 
defined 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(1)(i), quoted at ¶29, infra. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
4 
 
undisputed facts is a conclusion of law, the Division's 
rationale was reasonable and no more reasonable application of 
the definition of "cure" to the facts has been established.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals that 
affirmed the order of the Division requiring Volvo to rescind 
the termination notice it issued to Wausau Truck. 
I 
¶8 
We turn first to the applicable standard of review.  
This court reviews the order of the Division rather than the 
order of the circuit court or the decision of the court of 
appeals, although we benefit from the analyses of those courts.4 
¶9 
The role of the Division of Hearings and Appeals in 
the instant case is the same as in Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. 
v. Division of Hearings and Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶8 n.4, ¶¶21-
25, 
292 
Wis. 2d 549, 
717 
N.W.2d 184. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.43(1)(bg).  Accordingly, we look to Racine Harley-Davidson 
for the standard of review. 
¶10 Unless a court finds a ground for setting aside, 
modifying, remanding, or ordering agency action or ancillary 
relief, the court shall affirm the agency's action.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(2).  
¶11 Volvo argues that a question of law is presented, 
namely the meaning of "cure" in Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(1)(i)1.b.  
An agency's "interpretation and application of a statute is a 
                                                 
4 Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & 
Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶8 n.4, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
5 
 
question of law to be determined by a court,"5 as we have 
discussed numerous times.  Erroneous interpretation of law 
provides a ground to set aside or modify an agency decision.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(5).  A reviewing court may, however, give 
deference to an agency's interpretation and application of a 
statute.6  
¶12 Deference 
to 
an 
agency's 
determination 
of 
law 
recognizes the comparative institutional qualifications and 
capabilities of the courts and the agency.7  Granting deference 
to an agency's statutory interpretation does not abdicate the 
court's own authority and responsibility to interpret statutes.  
Even 
when 
granting 
deference 
to 
an 
agency's 
statutory 
interpretation, 
the 
court 
does 
not 
accept 
the 
agency's 
interpretation without a critical eye.  The court itself must 
always interpret the statute to determine the reasonableness of 
the 
agency 
interpretation; 
only 
reasonable 
agency 
interpretations are given any deference.8     
¶13 Our case law has established three levels of deference 
to be accorded to an agency interpretation and application of 
the 
law, 
depending 
on 
the 
circumstances: 
"great 
weight 
deference," "due weight deference," or "no deference."9  
                                                 
5 Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶14. 
6 See, e.g., id., ¶¶11-20. 
7 Id., ¶14. 
8 Id., ¶15. 
9 Id., ¶¶11, 13-14. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
6 
 
¶14 "Great weight" deference is warranted when (1) the 
agency is charged by the legislature with administering the 
statute in question; (2) the agency interpretation is of long 
standing; (3) the agency employed its specialized knowledge or 
expertise in interpreting the statute; and (4) the agency's 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the 
application of the statute.  When courts apply "great weight" 
deference, an agency's reasonable statutory interpretation will 
be 
sustained 
even 
if 
the 
court 
concludes 
that 
another 
interpretation is equally reasonable or even more reasonable.10   
¶15 Courts give lesser, "due weight" deference when the 
agency is charged by the legislature with enforcement of the 
statute and has experience in the area, but has not developed 
expertise that necessarily places the agency in a better 
position than the court to interpret the statute.  Courts 
applying "due weight" deference will sustain an agency's 
statutory interpretation if it is not contrary to the clear 
meaning of the statute and no more reasonable interpretation 
exists.11  Applying "due weight" deference, a reviewing court 
will not set aside the agency's interpretation in favor of 
another equally reasonable interpretation, but will replace it 
with a more reasonable interpretation if one exists.12 
                                                 
10 Id., ¶¶16-17. 
11 Id., ¶18. 
12 Id., ¶¶18, 20. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
7 
 
¶16 Reviewing courts give no deference to an agency's 
statutory interpretation when any of the following conditions 
are met: (1) the issue presents a matter of first impression; 
(2) the agency has no experience or expertise relevant to the 
legal issue presented; or (3) the agency's position on the issue 
has been so inconsistent as to provide no real guidance.13  A 
court giving no deference to an agency's interpretation of a 
statute benefits from the agency's analysis but interprets the 
statute independent of the agency's interpretation and in effect 
adopts an interpretation the court determines is the most 
reasonable interpretation.14 
¶17 Here, we give "due weight" deference to the Division's 
interpretation of the statute, as did the court of appeals and 
the circuit court.  Due weight deference is accorded in the 
instant case because the Division is charged with hearing and 
deciding complaints of unfair cancellation of a motor vehicle 
dealer franchise.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0114(7)(d).  The Division 
has experience in applying the franchise termination provision 
of the Wisconsin Motor Vehicle Dealer Law, even though no cases 
on the particular issue in the instant case, namely "cure" of a 
breach, have been presented.  Under these circumstances, the 
Division's 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
warrants due weight deference.15  "A reviewing court accords an 
                                                 
13 Id., ¶19. 
14 Id., ¶¶19, 20. 
15 Id., ¶18.  
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
8 
 
agency's statutory interpretation due weight deference when the 
agency has some experience in an area but has not developed the 
expertise that necessarily places it in a better position than a 
court to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the 
statute."16 
¶18 Thus the Division's interpretation and application of 
the statute in the instant case will be upheld if it is "not 
contrary to the clear meaning of the statute" and no more 
reasonable interpretation exists.17 
¶19 With regard to the Division's findings of fact, we 
review those findings by applying a "substantial evidence" 
standard, 
affording 
significant deference to the agency's 
findings.18  Substantial evidence does not mean a preponderance 
of evidence.  It means whether after considering all the 
evidence of record, reasonable minds could arrive at the 
conclusion reached by the trier of fact.19  "The weight and 
credibility of the evidence are for the agency, not the 
reviewing court, to determine."20  An agency's findings of fact 
may be set aside only when a reasonable trier of fact could not 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).   
19 Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners' Ass'n  v. DNR, 2006 WI 
84, ¶¶16, 25, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166. 
20 Id., ¶25 (quoted source omitted). 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
9 
 
have reached them from all the evidence before it, including the 
available inferences from that evidence.21 
II 
¶20 The historical facts are not in dispute.  Volvo is a 
manufacturer and distributor of heavy duty trucks and parts.  
Wausau Truck is a dealer in heavy duty trucks.  Wausau Truck is 
a dealer for both Volvo and Peterbilt trucks.  The relationship 
between Volvo and Wausau Truck is governed by their dealer 
agreement.  A dealer agreement is defined in the statutes as "a 
contract that describes the franchise relationship between 
manufacturers, distributors, importers and dealers."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0101(1).   
¶21 The genesis of the dispute occurred in 2001 when 
Wausau Truck decided it would sell its Volvo dealership and 
focus exclusively on Peterbilt trucks.  As part of that business 
decision, Wausau Truck outlined a set of proposed actions it 
labeled the "Volvo Elimination Plan."  The goal of the Plan was 
to promote sales of Peterbilt trucks at the expense of Volvo 
trucks.  Not all proposed actions were taken, but some of the 
changes that were implemented included changing the business 
name to "Peterbilt Wisconsin—Wausau"22; not using the Volvo logo 
on business cards; attempting to convince longtime Volvo 
customers to switch to Peterbilt; giving Volvo quotes only upon 
                                                 
21 Id., ¶¶16, 25. 
22 This name follows the convention of other Peterbilt 
dealerships owned by the same parent company, which do not sell 
Volvo trucks. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
10 
 
request; requiring that all Volvo quotes be accompanied by a 
Peterbilt quote; and focusing marketing efforts on Peterbilt. 
Under the Plan, Volvo truck sales dropped significantly.23   
¶22 The Division found, and the parties agree, that Wausau 
Truck's conduct under the Plan constituted a material breach of 
the dealer agreement.  Specifically, Wausau Truck does not 
dispute that during the time period when it intended to sell its 
Volvo franchise, it had a policy of attempting to convert 
customer fleets in its sales area, including Volvo fleets, to 
Peterbilt trucks.  This conduct breached provisions of the 
dealer agreement that obligate Wausau Truck to aggressively 
promote Volvo trucks. 
¶23 Following its earlier actions anticipating the sale of 
the Volvo franchise, by the end of 2002, Wausau Truck asserted 
that it decided not to sell its Volvo franchise and that it 
ended the measures taken to shift its Volvo customers to 
Peterbilt.  Nevertheless, Wausau Truck's Volvo sales for 2002 
showed a dramatic decrease. 
¶24 That decrease, along with actions taken by Wausau 
Truck, led Volvo to send a notice of breach to Wausau Truck on 
May 20, 2003.  Volvo was not aware that Wausau Truck had 
developed a "Volvo Elimination Plan" until this proceeding 
                                                 
23 The Division recognized that sales of Volvo trucks also 
fell nationally beginning in 2000, corresponding to a slump in 
the trucking industry.  The Division determined, however, that 
Wausau Truck's decision to promote Peterbilt at the expense of 
Volvo trucks resulted in a substantial decline in its sales 
during 2001-2003.  
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
11 
 
began, but its 2003 termination letter highlighted, as breaches 
of the dealer agreement, many of the actions Wausau Truck had 
undertaken as part of the Plan. 
¶25 A notice of breach is not sufficient to cancel a 
dealer agreement.  Under Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(l)(i)2., Volvo 
was prohibited from canceling Wausau Truck's dealer agreement 
"without just provocation."  "Just provocation" existed if "the 
breach [was] not cured within a reasonable time" after Wausau 
Truck received written notice of the breach from Volvo.  Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0116(l)(i)1.b. 
¶26 Volvo initially gave Wausau Truck 60 days to cure its 
breach, but in subsequent discussions, extended the period for 
Wausau Truck to cure the breach to the end of 2003.  The 
Division therefore identified December 31, 2003, as the relevant 
deadline by which Wausau Truck was required to cure its breach 
of the dealer agreement. 
¶27 The dispute now before the court centers on whether 
Wausau Truck's conduct after Volvo's notice of the breach cured 
the breach by December 31, 2003.   
¶28 On January 30, 2004, dissatisfied with Wausau Truck's 
actions, Volvo issued a notice of termination based on its 
determination that Wausau Truck had not cured its breach.  In 
response, Wausau Truck filed a complaint alleging unfair 
cancellation.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0114(7)(d).  The Division found 
that Wausau Truck's actions under the Volvo Elimination Plan had 
constituted a material breach of the dealer agreement but that 
Wausau Truck had cured the breach.  In summary, the Division 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
12 
 
determined that "the most egregious elements of the Volvo 
Elimination Plan were abandoned prior to the issuance of the 
Notice of Breach and, except for a few minor examples relating 
to 
the 
change 
in 
the 
operating 
name . . . the 
remaining 
components of the Volvo Elimination Plan were abandoned during 
the cure period."  The Division concluded that Wausau Truck had 
"recommitted itself to promoting Volvo products."  
III 
¶29 Volvo's primary argument raises a question of law, 
namely the meaning of the word "cured" within Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0116(1)(i)1.b.  According to the statute, once the 
Division found that Wausau Truck had materially breached its 
dealer agreement, it then had to determine whether Wausau Truck 
cured the breach.  If the breach was cured, then Volvo lacked 
"just provocation" to cancel the dealer agreement.  Section 
218.0116(1)(i)1.b. defines "just provocation" to be a material 
breach by the dealer of a reasonable or necessary provision of 
the agreement and the breach is not cured within a reasonable 
time 
after 
the 
written 
notice 
of 
the 
breach 
from 
the 
manufacturer.  Section 218.0116(1)(i)1.b. provides as follows: 
"Just provocation" means a material breach by a motor 
vehicle dealer . . . , due to matters within the 
dealer's . . . control, of a reasonable and necessary 
provision of an agreement and the breach is not cured 
within a reasonable time after written notice of the 
breach has been received from the manufacturer, 
importer or distributor (emphasis added).      
¶30 The statute does not define the word "cured."  The 
parties agree that the Division has not explicitly defined the 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
13 
 
word "cured" in the instant case.  No other cases decided by the 
Division give definition to the statutory word "cured" within 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(1)(i)1.b.   
¶31 The word "cured" may have different meanings in 
different contexts.  Volvo contends that the word "cured" in the 
statute should be accorded its common, ordinary dictionary 
meaning, citing In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1984), 
which used a dictionary definition of "cure" in a case involving 
a default on a residential mortgage loan.   
¶32 Volvo argues that "cure" means to restore matters to 
the status quo ante, that is, to restore matters to the way they 
were before the breach.  Volvo asserts that the Division should 
have required Wausau Truck to undo the effects of its breach and 
return to the conditions existing before Wausau Truck breached 
the dealer agreement by its actions under the Plan.  
¶33 According to Volvo, Wausau Truck has not restored 
matters to the way they were before the breach:  Wausau Truck 
continued to follow the Volvo Elimination Plan; Wausau Truck 
still used the name Peterbilt in its corporate name; and Wausau 
Truck failed to re-establish communication with some customers 
who previously purchased Volvo trucks from Wausau Truck and have 
established relationships with other Volvo dealerships or with 
other manufacturers.  Consequently, Volvo contends that Wausau 
Truck has not cured the breach of the dealer agreement.   
¶34 In sum, Volvo argues that the Division did not follow 
the dictionary definition of "cured" when it determined that 
Wausau 
Truck 
had 
"recommitted" 
itself 
to 
fulfilling 
its 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
14 
 
obligations under the dealer agreement.  Volvo asserts that the 
Division therefore took an erroneous approach to the statutory 
requirement that the breaching party had to cure the breach. 
¶35 In contrast, Wausau Truck argues that the statutory 
word "cured" should be defined according to its usage in 
contract law.  
¶36 We agree with Wausau Truck.  Technical words or 
phrases in a statute should be given their technical or 
specialized meaning.  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, 
¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656. 
¶37 The dealership law relates to and governs a particular 
kind of contract, a dealer agreement.  A dealer agreement is 
defined 
by 
statute 
as 
a 
contract 
between 
manufacturers, 
distributors, or importers and dealers.  The statutory provision 
for "cured" relates to a breach of a dealer agreement, to a 
breach of a contract.  Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0116(1)(i)1.b. 
codifies a motor vehicle dealer's right to "cure" breaches of 
the dealer agreement.  In this regulatory context, it would make 
little sense to use the "common and ordinary" meaning of 
"cured," even if there were only one such meaning.  It makes 
more sense to refer to terms and concepts established in 
contract law when we interpret the meaning of "cured" in Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0116(1)(i)1.b., which governs breach of a contract. 
¶38 The concept that a breach of contract is "cured" 
exists in contract law, but relatively few cases give specific 
guidance on what constitutes a "cure" of a breach of contract. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
15 
 
¶39 We are informed about the meaning of "cured" by a 
contract case cited by Wausau Truck, Anacapa Technology, Inc. v. 
ADC Telecommunications, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Minn. 
2002).  In Anacapa, arbitrators found a material breach of a 
licensing agreement.  The breaching party was given 30 days to 
cure the breach or the agreement would be terminated.  The 
parties disputed the definition of "cure," and whether the 
culpable party had cured the breach.  
¶40 The Anacapa court turned to the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts and commentary on contract law to determine the 
meaning of "cure."    
¶41 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. b 
(1981) states that "[e]ven if the failure is material, it may 
still be possible to cure it by subsequent performance without a 
material failure."   
¶42 Professor 
Farnsworth, 
2 
E. 
Allan 
Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.17 at 521 (3d ed. 2004), explains 
that a breach can be cured by "correcting the deficiency in 
performance."   
¶43 Corbin on Contracts explains that allowing for a 
"cure" of the breach gives a party "another chance to perform 
substantially" and "a second chance to perform according to the 
contract."  The cure is performance to the level of substantial 
performance.24   
                                                 
24 8 Catherine M.A. Mc Cauliff, Corbin on Contracts, § 36.7 
at 349 (1999). 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
16 
 
¶44 Another commentator explains a cure of a breach of 
contract as follows: 
A cure that completely remedies the breach does not 
pose a problem; but a less than complete cure raises 
the issue of whether there is still a material breach 
or whether the breaching party has now substantially 
performed, thus making the breach nonmaterial.  If the 
breach is upgraded to nonmaterial, the constructive 
condition is satisfied by cure just as it would have 
been if substantial performance had been rendered 
initially.25      
¶45 The Anacapa court concluded that "to cure a material 
breach means to engage in subsequent conduct that substantially 
performs or performs without a material failure."  Anacapa, 241 
F. Supp. 2d at 1020.  Perfect performance is not required to 
effectuate a cure.  "Only if the breach is not cured to the 
level of substantial performance may the injured party terminate 
the contract."  Anacapa, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1020 (2002).   
¶46 This meaning of "cured" focuses in the present case on 
the performance of the breaching party, rather than on matters 
beyond the control of the breaching party, such as the conduct 
of third parties or on the effects of an economic recession.  
The Anacapa court rejected the argument, similar to the one 
Volvo makes in the instant case, that to cure a material breach, 
the breaching party must not only stop the offending conduct but 
must also "repair the harm done by the breach."  Anacapa, 241 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1020.  
                                                 
25 William H. Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: An Analytical Comparison 
with the Uniform Commercial Code, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 713, 747 
(1986). 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
17 
 
¶47 In the present case, the Division did not explicitly 
define "cured," but the meaning of "cured" is implicit in its 
decision.  The Division did not apply Volvo's dictionary 
definition of the statutory word "cured."  The Division's 
statement that Wausau Truck had "recommitted" itself to the 
dealer agreement and was using its best efforts to promote Volvo 
products demonstrates that the Division was interpreting the 
statutory word "cured" to encompass the meaning of "cured" in 
contract law: the breaching party had to stop the offending 
conduct and to substantially perform the contract.26  
                                                 
26 Numerous authorities focus on the meaning of "cure" as 
adopted in Section 2-508 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
codified in Wisconsin as Wis. Stat. § 402.508, "Cure by seller 
of improper tender or delivery; replacement."  As Professor 
Farnsworth observes, "[a]lthough the concept of cure was known 
before the Uniform Commercial Code, the Code must be credited 
with giving a seller of goods a clear right to cure and with 
popularizing the word cure in this context."  E. Allan 
Farnsworth, 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.17 at 522 (2004); see 
also William H. Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: An Analytical Comparison 
with the Uniform Commercial Code, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 713, 714 
("The cure concept originated in the traditional common law, but 
it did not receive widespread attention until it was adopted in 
Article 2 of the UCC.").   
The dealer agreement is not a contract for the sale of 
goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.  We are not 
interpreting or applying Wis. Stat. § 402.508.  We draw on 
sources that address the Uniform Commercial Code only to the 
extent that they reflect on a more widely recognized meaning of 
"cured" in contract law.  Here, Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(1)(i)1.b. 
specifically allows the dealer to "cure" a breach of a dealer 
agreement.  See William H. Lawrence, Cure After Breach of 
Contract Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: An 
Analytical Comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code, 70 Minn. 
L. Rev. 713, 717 (stating that at common law, "[i]n the absence 
of a contractual provision allowing a party to cure, most courts 
traditionally did not acknowledge such a right").   
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
18 
 
¶48 We reject Volvo's argument that "cured" requires 
restoration to the status quo ante or repair of all harm done by 
the breach.27  This is not a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.  A reasonable interpretation of the statutory word 
"cured" means the breaching party is to stop the offending 
conduct and to substantially perform the contract.  No other 
interpretation of the word "cured" is more reasonable.   
IV 
¶49 We next review the Division's determination that 
Wausau Truck cured the defect within the cure period.  In 
holding that Wausau had cured its breach, the Division stated 
that Wausau Truck "has successfully recommitted itself to its 
Volvo franchise and is using its best efforts to promote Volvo 
products."   
¶50 The parties disagree whether the determination that 
Wausau 
Truck's 
breach 
has 
been 
cured 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0116(1)(i)1.b. is a finding of fact or a conclusion of 
law.  Ordinarily, in contract law, whether the breaching party's 
                                                 
27 In certain circumstances, contract law may provide that 
the non-breaching party recovers damages from the breaching 
party to repair past harm.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 237, cmt. b. (1981).  This issue is not before the court. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
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conduct has cured the breach is a question of fact.28  But in 
contract law, if no material facts are in dispute and only one 
conclusion is to be drawn from the facts, whether the breaching 
                                                 
28 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.18 
at 526-27 (3d ed. 2004) ("Whether a material breach has remained 
uncured for long enough to justify termination is a question of 
fact, much like whether the breach is material in the first 
place."); 8 Catherine M.A. Mc Cauliff, Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 36.5 at 340 (1999) (substantial performance is a question of 
fact); see also Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 715 (7th 
Cir. 1985) ("[I]t would be a question of fact whether a 
franchisee who repeatedly defaulted on a particular duty and 
'corrected' each default only long enough to escape termination 
had even 'corrected' the default"). 
Some contend that because the question of whether a breach 
is material is a question of fact, it is therefore a fact 
question whether the steps taken to cure the breach are 
substantial and material.  In other words, whether the breach 
has been cured effectively is the same question as whether a 
material breach continues to exist, ordinarily a question of 
fact.  Whether a material breach of contract has occurred is a 
question of fact to be determined by the fact finder.  See 
Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 358, 
377 N.W.2d 593 (1985) ("[T]he issue of whether Schlitz was in 
breach of the contract is a factual determination for the 
jury."); Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Wis. 2d 751, 755, 177 
N.W.2d 899 (1970) ("[F]or the purpose of the exercise of the 
common-law right of nonperformance for a material breach[,] 
[t]he question . . . is one of fact to be determined as in this 
case by the jury."); Kieckhefer Box Co. v. John Strange Paper 
Co., 180 Wis. 367, 395, 193 N.W. 487 (1923) ("Whether or not the 
breach of a contract to deliver goods by installment is . . . so 
material as to justify the buyer in refusing to proceed further, 
is a question of fact."); State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d 163, 
169, 404 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Whether a breach of 
contract exists involves a question of fact.").   
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
20 
 
party's conduct has cured the breach may be viewed as a question 
of law.29  
¶51 The Division treated the question of cure as a 
question of law and concluded as a matter of law that Wausau 
Truck "cured the material breaches of the Dealer Agreement 
within a reasonable time period after Volvo Trucks of North 
America notified it of the breaches." 
¶52 We 
need 
not 
decide 
whether 
the 
Division's 
determination that Wausau Truck had cured its breach is a 
finding of fact or a conclusion of law.  If the Division's 
determination that Wausau Truck cured the breach is a finding of 
fact, there is substantial evidence to support the finding.  If 
the Division's application of its interpretation of "cured" to 
the facts is viewed as a conclusion of law, the Division's 
interpretation and application of the statute were reasonable 
and no more reasonable interpretation or application of the 
statute has been brought forth. 
                                                 
29 "The determination whether a material breach has occurred 
is generally a question of fact.  The materiality of a breach of 
contract is not always a question of fact, even if the issue is 
disputed; thus, if there is only one reasonable conclusion, a 
court must address what is ordinarily a factual question as a 
question of law."  23 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts 
§ 63:3 at 440-41 (4th ed. 2007). 
See also Anacapa Tech., Inc. v. ADC Telecomms., Inc., 241 
F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 (D. Minn. 2002) (observing that the 
question of cure of a material breach "is usually one of fact," 
but "the court may determine whether a party has cured its 
material breach . . . where there are no material facts in 
dispute and only the legal conclusions to be drawn from the 
facts remain in doubt"). 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
21 
 
¶53 Here 
are 
the 
historical 
facts 
relevant 
to 
the 
Division's determination that Wausau Truck had cured its breach 
of the dealer agreement.   
¶54 The Division found that by the end of 2002, Eric 
Jorgenson, 
president 
and 
CEO 
of 
Wausau 
Truck's 
parent 
corporation, JX Enterprises, had decided not to sell the Volvo 
franchise at Wausau Truck.   
¶55 The Division identified several actions taken by 
Wausau Truck as demonstrating its recommitment to Volvo.  
Specifically, Wausau Truck: (1) sent a postcard in January 2003 
to 296 Volvo customers intended to counter rumors that Wausau 
Truck would no longer be a Volvo dealer; (2) participated in a 
Volvo demo program; (3) participated in a special Volvo sales 
program; (4) conducted a "ride and drive" demonstration of new 
Volvo models at a Highway 29 truck stop; (5) used the name 
"Wausau Truck Center" instead of "Peterbilt Wisconsin-Wausau" 
when dealing with Volvo customers; (6) ended its policy of 
requiring sales representatives to provide Peterbilt quotes with 
every Volvo quote; (7) attempted to hire a dedicated Volvo sales 
representative; 
(8) 
re-established 
regular 
contact 
with 
important 
Volvo 
customers; 
(9) 
targeted 
several 
accounts 
specifically for Volvo; and (10) generally increased its Volvo 
quote activity. 
¶56 Volvo's argument that Wausau Truck's conduct did not 
cure the breach boils down to its contention that Wausau Truck 
did not actually end the Volvo Elimination Plan and that any 
steps it had taken to "cure" the breach either furthered the 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
22 
 
Plan or were undertaken merely to bolster Wausau Truck's 
litigation position.  Volvo's arguments are almost entirely 
directed to the Plan. 
¶57 For example, Volvo takes umbrage with Wausau Truck's 
continued use of the corporate name Peterbilt Wisconsin-Wausau.  
Volvo attempts to portray the postcard sent to customers by 
Wausau Truck as a continuation of the Plan, arguing that as 
such, it cannot possibly be viewed as part of the cure.  Volvo 
makes much of the fact that the postcard refers to Wausau Truck 
as "Peterbilt Wisconsin—Wausau."  That name appears in small 
print on the back side of the postcard, as part of the return 
address; it appears directly below the name "Wausau Truck 
Center."  More significantly, the name "Wausau Truck Center" is 
featured prominently on the front side of the postcard, which 
also features images of five Volvo heavy trucks and the Volvo 
logo, along with the message "We're still here."  Eric Jorgenson 
testified that the "We're still here" slogan was intended to 
dispel rumors that Wausau Truck would no longer be a Volvo 
dealer.  It was not unreasonable for the Division to consider 
this postcard mailing as evidence that Wausau Truck cured the 
breach.30 
                                                 
30 Volvo argues that the Division relied on  Wausau Truck's 
conduct after the cure period as part of the cure effort.  The 
particular conduct was Wausau Truck hiring a dedicated Volvo 
salesperson after the end of the cure period.  The Division did 
not base its determination on Wausau Truck's hiring a dedicated 
Volvo salesperson.  Rather, the Division pointed out that 
attempting to hire a dedicated Volvo sales representative was 
one of the factors that indicated Wausau Truck had cured its 
breach within the cure period.      
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
23 
 
¶58 Similarly, 
Volvo's 
other 
factual 
arguments 
are 
unavailing.  It is not enough for Volvo to point to evidence in 
the record that supports its argument; it would not even be 
enough for Volvo to show that the greater weight of the evidence 
was against the Division's findings.  Volvo would have to show 
that no reasonable person, evaluating and drawing reasonable 
inferences from all of the evidence in the record, could view 
the evidence in this case and reach the conclusion reached by 
the Division.  Here, the record amply supports the Division's 
finding that Wausau Truck cured the breach, and Volvo's focus on 
other facts in the record has not met the burden of showing that 
the Division's finding was not supported by the record before 
it.  
¶59 Rather, Volvo's arguments are invitations for the 
court to reweigh the evidence and to reach a different factual 
finding than the Division.  The court's function on review of a 
fact issue is not to determine whether the court would make the 
same findings as the Division.  Nor do we reweigh the evidence.  
Rather, we need only determine whether the Division erred in 
making its factual finding.  The Division did not err.  In 
holding that Wausau Truck cured its breach, after listing the 
steps Wausau Truck took regarding the sales of Volvo trucks, the 
Division noted, "Wausau Truck has successfully recommitted 
itself to its Volvo franchise and is using its best efforts to 
promote Volvo products." 
¶60 Alternatively, 
if 
the 
Division's 
conclusion 
that 
Wausau Truck's conduct "cured" the breach is viewed as a 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
24 
 
conclusion of law, we conclude that the Division's application 
of the definition of "cured" to the facts is a reasonable 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
the 
statute; 
no 
more 
reasonable interpretation or application of the statute has been 
proposed to replace the Division's. 
¶61 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Volvo did 
not show that its proposed interpretation of the statutory word 
"cured" (or any other proposed interpretation of "cured") was 
more 
reasonable 
than 
the 
Division's 
interpretation.  
Accordingly, given our posture in review of administrative 
decisions, the Division's interpretation of the word "cured" is 
accepted as the correct interpretation of the statute. 
¶62 We need not resolve whether in the instant case, the 
Division's conclusion that Wausau Truck had cured its breach of 
the dealership agreement is a finding of fact or a conclusion of 
law.  That determination does not alter the result that the 
Division's order is affirmed.  If the Division's determination 
that Wausau Truck cured the breach is a finding of fact, there 
is substantial evidence to support the finding.  If the 
Division's application of its interpretation of "cured" to the 
undisputed facts is a conclusion of law, the Division's 
rationale was reasonable and no more reasonable application of 
the definition of "cure" to the facts has been established.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals that 
affirmed the order of the Division requiring Volvo to rescind 
the termination notice it issued to Wausau Truck. 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
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¶63 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No. 
2008AP1385   
 
 
 
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