Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Roger G. Merry

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP3009-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Roger G. Merry, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Roger G. Merry, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MERRY  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 4, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 18, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., concur/dissent. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
respondent-appellant, 
there 
were 
briefs 
by 
Christopher T. Kolb and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Christopher T. Kolb.  
 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief by 
Kim M. Kluck, Sun Prairie, and oral argument by Kim M. Kluck.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 30
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP3009-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Roger G. Merry, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Roger G. Merry, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 4, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.  Complaint dismissed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Roger G. Merry appeals a 
referee's report recommending that he be publicly reprimanded 
for failing to cooperate with an Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) investigation.  We conclude the record does not support a 
failure to cooperate that warrants discipline.  We therefore 
dismiss the complaint. 
¶2 
Attorney Merry was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin on June 4, 1981.  He has been disciplined on five 
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
2 
 
prior occasions.1   This matter arose following Attorney Merry's 
representation of plaintiffs in a neighborhood property dispute.  
The underlying controversy involved a private road that crossed 
the backyards of adjacent residential properties in the Village 
of New Glarus.  J.F., the eventual defendant, lived near the 
midpoint of the road.  J.F. partially blocked the private drive 
where it crossed his property.  His neighbors, the eventual 
plaintiffs, wanted to be able to use the full length of the 
drive.  They retained Attorney Merry. 
¶3 
On October 4, 2007, Attorney Merry filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of the plaintiffs seeking a declaration of their rights 
to 
the 
drive. 
 
Foster 
v. 
Fabish, 
Green 
County 
Case 
No. 2007CV342.  The width of the easement became important in 
the case.  Attorney Merry's clients asserted that an easement 
width of 14 feet was needed to accommodate fire department and 
                                                 
1 In 1990 Attorney Merry was privately reprimanded for 
engaging in a conflict of interest.  Private Reprimand, 
No. 1990-26.  In 1993 Attorney Merry was publicly reprimanded 
for client fund and trust account violations, as well as making 
at least six intentional misrepresentations to the former Board 
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, the OLR's predecessor.  
Public Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 1993-3.  In 1994 
Attorney Merry was privately reprimanded for failing to keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.  
Private Reprimand, No. 1994-8.  In 1999 Attorney Merry was 
publicly reprimanded for a conflict of interest.  Public 
Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 1999-1.  In 2008 Attorney Merry 
was publicly reprimanded for making a false statement to a 
tribunal; offering false evidence; and engaging in conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation.  
Public Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 2008-OLR-09.   
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
3 
 
emergency medical service (EMS) vehicles and personnel.  The 
plaintiffs eventually lost their case on summary judgment. 
¶4 
On January 23, 2009, the defendant, J.F., filed a 
grievance with the OLR.  He alleged that Attorney Merry had 
misrepresented facts to the court regarding the purported 
requirement of a 14-foot easement for EMS vehicles. 
¶5 
During the OLR's ensuing investigation, Attorney Merry 
refuted the claim that he offered false testimony.  He provided 
a copy of a letter he received from the New Glarus EMS during 
the underlying litigation.  The New Glarus EMS letter described 
a dirt pile and barricades on the road in question that, in the 
opinion of the New Glarus EMS, needed to be removed to increase 
accessibility.  The letter made no explicit reference to a 14-
foot easement requirement. 
¶6 
Attorney Merry also met with the OLR's district 
committee.  At a meeting on November 11, 2009, he was asked 
about the source of the information for the purported requests 
from the fire department and EMS for a 14-foot easement.  
Attorney Merry claimed he did not recall any specific individual 
who provided this information.  In other responses, he stated 
that "everyone knew" that the EMS and fire department requested 
14-foot wide easements. 
¶7 
On December 29, 2011, the OLR filed a complaint 
alleging that Attorney Merry knowingly made a false statement of 
fact or law to a tribunal or failed to correct a false statement 
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal in 
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
4 
 
violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)2 (Count One), and that he violated 
SCR 22.03(6)3 and SCR 20:8.4(h)4 by failing to cooperate with the 
OLR's investigative committee (Count Two).  The OLR sought a 60-
day suspension and full costs, which total $13,727.71 as of 
September 27, 2013.5 
¶8 
Referee John Decker conducted a one-day evidentiary 
hearing on September 11, 2012, and rendered a report on 
January 2, 2013.6 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) states a lawyer shall not knowingly "make 
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer; . . . ." 
3 SCR 22.03(6) provides: 
 
In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
4 SCR 20:8.4(h) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by 
SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or 
SCR 22.04(1); . . . ." 
5 The OLR has advised the court that it does not seek 
restitution.  Attorney Merry filed objections to the OLR's costs 
on February 14, 2013, and October 3, 2013.  We need not address 
those objections in light of our disposition of this case. 
6 We appointed Referee Decker on February 20, 2012.  
Attorney Merry, initially proceeding pro se, moved for judgment 
on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.  
Both parties submitted affidavits, discovery responses, and 
briefs. 
 
The 
referee 
conducted 
a 
hearing 
and 
denied 
Attorney Merry's motion.  Attorney Merry then retained counsel 
and the matter proceeded to the evidentiary hearing. 
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
5 
 
¶9 
The referee found that Attorney Merry did not make a 
misrepresentation to the court when he stated that his clients 
wanted an easement width of 14 feet for necessary access for 
fire department and EMS vehicles and equipment.7  The referee 
recommended dismissal of Count One.  The OLR did not appeal this 
recommendation 
and 
we 
accept 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
recommendations relating to this count.  Count One is therefore 
dismissed. 
¶10 The referee, however, determined that Attorney Merry 
willfully failed to provide relevant information and answer 
questions fully in the course of the OLR investigation, in 
violation of SCRs 22.03(6) and 20:8.4(h), as alleged in Count 
Two.  He recommended a public reprimand and costs. 
¶11 Attorney Merry appeals.  The issue before us is 
whether Attorney Merry failed to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation into his alleged misconduct and, if so, what 
sanction is appropriate. 
                                                 
7 For example, on July 18, 2008, Attorney Merry filed a 
brief in the circuit court in which he wrote the following: 
In this case, the easement is established for ingress 
and egress to the lands in question. Ingress and 
egress 
include 
the 
necessity 
of 
accommodating 
emergency services such as fire trucks and ambulances. 
Accordingly, the easement should be established 14' 
wide as the stated measure for efficiently conveying 
ambulances and fire trucks into the neighborhood. 
The referee found that this and other such statements were 
made as a matter of Attorney Merry's belief at the time the 
statement was made, and were based upon reasonably diligent 
investigation.  
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
6 
 
¶12 The OLR complaint alleged that Attorney Merry gave 
four different answers when he was asked to identify the source 
of the 14-foot easement request.  Attorney Merry maintains that 
he simply did not remember who told him that 14 feet was the 
required width for EMS vehicles. 
¶13 At the evidentiary hearing, the OLR presented the 
telephone testimony of a district committee member who was 
present 
at 
the 
November 
2009 
meeting. 
 
He 
recalled 
Attorney Merry's failure to furnish a name in response to 
questions about the source of the information pertaining to a 
14-foot requirement for EMS vehicles and also recalled Attorney 
Merry saying that "everyone knows" about the 14-foot easement 
requirement.  He stated that he thought Attorney Merry was 
"evasive" when he failed to provide the name of any individual. 
¶14 When asked whether Attorney Merry's responses to this 
repeated question were "consistent with each other," the witness 
answered, "No. On occasion they would vary from one question to 
the next. That's about all I can remember with regard to whether 
they varied or not."8 
                                                 
8 When pressed to explain how Attorney Merry's statements 
were inconsistent, the witness testified: 
A. 
The inconsistent statements were, one, 
he didn't provide us with the names of 
the 
persons 
who 
provided 
the 
information to him, and then he made a 
statement that everybody knows that the 
easement is 14 feet wide.  Those I 
believe were inconsistent. 
Q. 
So he could not remember the name of 
particular people and everybody knows 
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
7 
 
¶15 The referee acknowledged that the evidence offered in 
support of this charge was "not extensive."  He noted the OLR 
had failed to show with any specificity that Attorney Merry had, 
in fact, given "four different answers" during his meeting with 
the committee, as alleged in the complaint.  The referee deemed 
Attorney 
Merry 
"generally 
cooperative" 
and 
"credible 
and 
reliable" with respect to other testimony. 
¶16 However, the referee stated, "I have not found 
[Attorney] Merry's claim of a memory lapse to be credible, where 
[as became apparent during the evidentiary hearing] his own 
client in the underlying litigation was a principal source of 
his information," pertaining to the need for a 14-foot easement.  
Attorney Merry's client, K.F., had spent 17 years on the 
New Glarus Fire Department.  Accordingly, the referee concluded 
                                                                                                                                                             
it's 14 feet.  How are those two 
statements inconsistent? 
A. 
I believed that he was being evasive in 
not providing the names of the people. 
Q. 
I 
understand 
what 
your 
conclusions 
were.  I'm looking for testimony about 
the specific statements made by Mr. 
Merry so that the Referee can determine 
whether in fact he made inconsistent 
statements.  So I'm asking you in what 
way were the two statements that you 
ascribe to Mr. Merry inconsistent: One 
being that he could not remember names 
and the other being everybody knows 
that 14 feet is required?  How are 
those inconsistent? 
A. 
I think they were inconsistent in that 
if everybody knows, then he would have 
a name of a person who provided that 
information to him. 
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
8 
 
that "[Attorney] Merry willfully failed to provide relevant 
information, and [willfully] failed to answer questions fully in 
the course of an OLR investigation" and "failed to cooperate in 
the investigation of a grievance filed with the OLR," thereby 
violating SCRs 22.03(6) and 20:8.4(h). 
¶17 We review a referee's findings of fact subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 
2004 
WI 
14, 
¶5, 
269 
Wis. 2d 43, 
675 
N.W.2d 747.  We review the referee's conclusions of law de novo.  
Id. 
¶18 Our rules require an attorney being investigated for 
professional misconduct to fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and 
circumstances 
pertaining 
to 
the 
alleged 
misconduct.  
SCR 22.03(6).  This obligation exists "regardless of the merits 
of the matters asserted in the grievance."  Id.  The fact that 
Attorney Merry is exonerated of the claim that he made a false 
statement to the court does not excuse him of his obligation to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
OLR's 
inquiries. 
 
Cooperation 
with 
disciplinary investigations conducted by district grievance 
committees and the OLR is essential to the effectiveness of such 
investigations, and a lawyer's failure to cooperate constitutes 
serious misconduct. 
¶19 Attorney Merry suggests that the referee's credibility 
determination is clearly erroneous because it was based on an 
inference derived from the fact that Attorney Merry's own client 
had told him about the easement widths such that he must have 
known the source of the information.  He maintains that he 
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
9 
 
responded to the district committee's questions as best as he 
was able. 
¶20 Ordinarily, we defer to a referee's findings of fact.  
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 
¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  While a close call, we 
will not deviate from that practice here.  The referee 
unequivocally determined that Attorney Merry's explanation was 
not credible.  The referee inferred that Attorney Merry was 
disinclined to aid the investigative committee with claims he 
had deemed "absurd."  We will not deem the referee's findings 
clearly erroneous. 
¶21 We remind Attorney Merry that our rules require 
lawyers to cooperate with the OLR in its investigations, even 
when, as here, the underlying grievance turns out to lack merit.  
Frustration with an investigation the lawyer believes lacks 
merit does not excuse noncooperation. 
¶22 However, as the referee observed, this was a weak case 
in many respects.  There is evidence the district committee 
thought the grievant, J.F., was not credible.  At oral argument 
to this court we pressed counsel for the OLR to explain why it 
was so important to know who, specifically, told Attorney Merry 
that a 14-foot easement was needed when, apparently, that 
assertion was entirely correct, as confirmed by deposition 
testimony of each of the chiefs of the New Glarus Fire 
Department and New Glarus EMS in April 2012.  The OLR's 
explanation, that it pursued prosecution of Count One because 
only one specific individual was authorized to communicate this 
No. 
2011AP3009-D   
 
10 
 
information to Attorney Merry, strikes us as hyper-technical and 
unconvincing. 
¶23 The weakness of the OLR's case makes it an outlier.  
The OLR typically pursues claims of failure to cooperate in 
cases where there is little dispute that the lawyer failed to 
cooperate. 
 
Typically, 
the 
failure 
to 
cooperate 
charge 
accompanies a determination that the lawyer engaged in some 
underlying misconduct.  Here, however, Attorney Merry is 
exonerated of any underlying misconduct and the information he 
allegedly withheld from the OLR——the name of the specific person 
who told him an apparently correct piece of information——appears 
to be of dubious relevance.  While the referee correctly 
concluded that a violation of SCRs 22.03(6) and 20:8.4(h) 
occurred, we deem it a de minimis one, insufficient to warrant 
imposing the recommended discipline with its attendant costs of 
$13,727.71.  We therefore dismiss the complaint. 
¶24 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary complaint filed 
against Roger G. Merry, is dismissed.  No costs. 
No.  2011AP3009-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶25 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the referee and the per 
curiam opinion that Count 1 of the complaint should be 
dismissed.   
¶26 The referee concluded that the OLR proved a violation 
of Count 2, failing to cooperate with the OLR investigation.  In 
contrast, the per curiam opinion dismisses Count 2.  I agree 
with the referee.  I part company with the per curiam opinion on 
Count 2.   
¶27 Attorney Merry is essentially asking this court to 
believe him although the referee who saw and heard Attorney 
Merry did not.  Credibility is a finding of fact.  The referee 
said he didn't find Attorney Merry credible.  The court must 
accept the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See per curiam op., ¶17.   
¶28 Nothing in the record or the referee's report warrants 
disregarding the referee's carefully analyzed and carefully 
articulated credibility determination.   
¶29 Consequently, the per curiam opinion must and does 
accept the referee's finding that Attorney Merry is not 
credible.  To avoid this factual finding, the per curiam opinion 
declares the violation to be "de minimis" and "hyper-technical."  
It dismisses the complaint.   
¶30 A "de minimis" or "hyper-technical" violation is, in 
my opinion, still a violation (whatever the meaning of these 
No.  2011AP3009-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
terms that appear to set gradations of violations or shades of 
credibility).   
¶31 I am persuaded that a public reprimand, recommended by 
the referee, is appropriate in the present case (even though 
Attorney Merry has been disciplined on five prior occasions).  
The extent, nature, and circumstances of the violation are, as I 
see it, relevant in determining the discipline to be imposed.  
The 
referee 
has 
provided 
a 
thoughtful 
analysis 
and 
recommendation.  I would follow it.   
¶32 For the reasons stated, I write separately.   
¶33 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP3009-D.ssa 
 
 
 
1