Title: Creek v. Town of Hulett

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Creek v. Town of Hulett1983 WY 5657 P.2d 353Case Number: 5769Case Number: 5769Decided: 01/21/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CLAIMS OF HELEN L. CREEK, WIDOW OF DARWIN CREEK, APPELLANT 
(CLAIMANT),

v.

TOWN OF HULETT, APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT),

v.

WYOMING STATE TREASURER, EX REL. 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT). No. 
5769

Appeal from the District 
Court, CrookCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

R. Douglas 
Dumbrill of Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for appellant.

Steven F. 
Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Carl J. Hildebrand, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Steven R. 
Czoschke, Legal Intern, for appellee 
Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Div.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**] and BROWN, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellant in this 
case urges the court to apply our adaptation of the unusual exertion rule which 
focuses upon exertion which is unusual for the particular employee who is 
seeking compensation to a worker's compensation case in which a police officer 
suffered a fatal heart attack. The unusual exertion relied upon by the appellant 
was stress attributed to a role conflict arising out of the necessity to perform 
law enforcement functions with respect to an individual who was in the company 
of the police officer's daughter. The district court concluded that the 
circumstances did not manifest any unusual or abnormal stress for this peace 
officer, and held that the application for worker's compensation benefits on 
behalf of the widow and minor child of the deceased officer must be denied. We 
shall affirm the district court.

[¶2.]     Darwin Creek died on 
September 13, 1981, from a myocardial infarction accompanied by a fatal 
arrhythmia. He was then 53 years old, and had been employed by the Town of 
Hulett as its 
town marshal for approximately two years. He previously had served for 17 years 
as a game warden for the Wyoming State Game and Fish Commission, and he had 
retired from that position. Witnesses described him as an even-tempered 
individual who counted among his highest priorities in life his family and his 
work. There is no evidence indicating that he had experienced any cardiac 
difficulties prior to September 13, 1981.

[¶3.]     The critical events 
commenced around 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. on September 12, 1981, when he left for work. 
His agreement with the Town of Hulett called for him to work four hours per 
day, but he usually worked longer hours particularly on Friday and Saturday 
nights. On this particular night there was a dance at the civic center in 
Hulett. At the dance at the civic center Darwin Creek saw one of his daughters 
in the company of an individual whom Creek did not then know but whom he 
perceived to be disreputable, and apparently he thought the conduct of the 
individual and his daughter at the dance was 
inappropriate.

[¶4.]     Later in the evening, 
about 11:30 p.m., he was called to a disturbance in a bar. The individual who 
was accompanying Darwin Creek's daughter was hollering and making an excessive 
amount of noise in the bar. Creek warned him to desist from this activity, but 
the warning was not heeded, and instead, immediately after Creek left the bar, 
the individual reinstituted his noisy activities. Creek then returned to the 
bar, asked the individual to accompany him outside, and at that time threatened 
him with arrest if he did not discontinue the objectionable 
noisemaking.

[¶5.]     Witnesses quoted Darwin 
Creek as saying he felt something come over him after this last confrontation as 
he went from the bar to the car. Sometime later he concluded to end his 
evening's work, and he arrived at his home about 2:30 a.m. Again witnesses 
quoted Darwin Creek as saying that the pain hit him about half way from town to 
his home, which was some eleven miles from Hulett and about a fifteen to twenty 
minute drive.

[¶6.]     Darwin Creek's wife 
testified that he had a disturbance call about every Saturday night or Friday 
night at one of the bars. Other witnesses testified that quelling disturbances 
was a part of the employment activities of a police officer, and that such 
incidents were not unusual or abnormal.

[¶7.]     The primary expert 
witness on behalf of the claimants testified that in his opinion law enforcement 
is the most stressful occupation that can be found. He stated his opinion that 
in some ways what Darwin Creek faced on the night on which he died was typical 
and that in other aspects it was not. This witness defined stress as the body's 
response to a perceived threat. He further stated that threats are 
idiosyncratically defined, apparently intending that they are peculiar to the 
individual. This witness went on to say that in his opinion the stress level 
that Darwin Creek suffered that night was definitely excessive and abnormal, 
although he conceded that in his work as a police department psychologist he had 
frequently encountered police officer stress based upon how members of the 
officer's family appeared in public. In explaining his opinion that the stress 
level was definitely excessive and abnormal, he testified that the areas of 
primary concern were the fact that Darwin Creek had to return to the same bar to 
deal with the same individual; that his daughter was present; and that he saw 
his daughter leaving the bar on a motorcycle with someone he felt to be 
intoxicated. Other testimony indicates that this last factor was a conjectural 
matter based upon the daughter's testimony that when she and her escort left the 
bar she had seen the patrol car and believed that her father was in it. The 
expert witness emphasized that the stress involved a concept which he called 
role conflict which emanated from the duty of Darwin Creek to handle the 
disturbance as a law enforcement officer while at the same time acting 
responsibly as a parent so far as his daughter's interests were concerned. 

[¶8.]     In his remarks at the 
close of the evidence the trial judge stated that in his opinion the event in 
question did not exceed the normal and usual tasks of Darwin Creek as a law 
enforcement officer. He stated that his conclusion was that this was not an 
unusual or abnormal stress period for this peace officer but instead he found 
that it was the usual and normal thing expected of a peace officer in the Town 
of Hulett. 
Thereafter the district court entered its Order containing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law pursuant to which the court ordered that the application for 
worker's compensation benefits be denied.

[¶9.]     In her appeal from the 
order of the district court the appellant states the issues to 
be:

"1. Did the trial court 
by refusing to accept uncontroverted, unimpeached testimony, reach a decision in 
this case that was against the clear weight of the 
evidence?

"2. Did the trial court 
deny benefits based on an elevated standard of unusualness or abnormality that 
is not required by the plain language of W.S. § 
27-12-603(b)?"

The appellees' 
brief would phrase the issue in this way:

"WAS THE EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE DISTRICT COURT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT STRESS CLEARLY 
UNUSUAL TO, OR ABNORMAL FOR, THE CLAIMANT-DECEDENT, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 
27-12-603(b), W.S. 1977?"

We conclude that 
the correct response to each statement of the issues is a negative answer, and 
that the decision of the district court should be 
affirmed.

[¶10.]  No question is raised as to the inclusion 
of a myocardial infarction within the definition of injury found in § 
27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977, and we take it to be settled as the law in Wyoming 
that cardiac conditions can be injuries within that definition. The issue here 
posed arises within the provisions of § 27-12-603(b), W.S. 1977, which provides 
as follows:

"(b) Benefits for 
employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused 
by an injury or disease are not payable unless the employee establishes by 
competent medical authority that there is a direct causal connection between the 
condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition, and then 
only if the causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment 
stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular 
employment, and further that the acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are 
clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative 
exertion."

This court 
summarized the requirements imposed upon a claimant by this statute in coronary 
condition cases as follows in State ex 
rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. McCarley, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1333, 
1335-1336 (1979):

"(1) The claimant must 
establish a period of employment stress unusual or abnormal for employees in 
claimant's occupations;

"(2) Claimant must show 
that he or she engaged in some exertion during the period of unusual or abnormal 
employment stress;

"(3) Claimant must 
establish by competent medical evidence a direct causal connection between such 
exertion and the myocardial infarction; and

"(4) Claimant must show 
that the acute symptoms of the cardiac difficulty were clearly manifested within 
four hours after the alleged causative exertion."

[¶11.]  The parties here agree that the appellant 
met her burden at the trial of this case, by proof or by stipulation, with 
respect to the second, third and fourth requirements. The district court so 
determined in its Conclusions of Law in the following 
language:

"2. The decedent did 
engage in exertion during a period of employment stress.

"3. From the testimony of 
the medical doctor the court finds that there was a direct causal connection 
between the condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac 
condition. 

"4. The court finds that 
the acute symptoms of the cardiac condition were clearly manifested within four 
hours after the alleged causative exertion."

[¶12.]  The question then to be addressed is 
whether the appellant did establish a period of employment stress unusual or 
abnormal for employees in the occupation of appellant's decedent. While the 
language of the statute has been adjusted and the period within which acute 
symptoms must manifest themselves has been lengthened, the construction given to 
this statute by the court in Mor, Inc. v. 
Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219 (1977), still is applicable. There the court 
said at 566 P.2d 222:

"Whether the exertion of 
work was clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, the individual worker in his 
particular employment is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court, 
and its findings will be upheld where supported by substantial competent 
evidence. [Citations.] It should be emphasized, however, that the exertion in 
question must only be unusual to the 
employee - it need not necessarily be unusual to others engaged in the same 
employment. [Citations.] To sustain his burden of proof, as to legal causation, 
the statute requires that the employee show that the causative exertion was 
clearly something beyond his normal routine - something more than the worker's 
usual work."

[¶13.]  In applying the unusual exertion rule in 
Wyoming we 
discover a dichotomization of factual situations, which must be considered in 
turn in resolving this case. We first of all identify those situations in which 
the actual work activities were different in kind or greater in degree than 
those normally required of the employee. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, supra, and Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1346 
(1979), are examples of such cases. We emphasize that in examining such 
situations we look at the activities which are usual for the particular 
employee, and note that this is the rule in other jurisdictions which have 
adopted the unusual exertion rule even though the statutory requirements are 
different. City and County of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 195 Colo. 431, 579 P.2d 80 (1978); Chapman v. Wilkenson Co., 222 Kan. 722, 567 P.2d 888 (1977); Herbert v. Sharp Brothers Contracting 
Company, Mo. App., 467 S.W.2d 105 (1971); 
and Hamilton v. Procon, 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 
(1969).

[¶14.]  We then have the second category of cases 
in which the work activities are neither different in kind nor degree, but in 
which we have held the work activities to be deemed unusual or abnormal exertion 
by virtue of the condition of the workman. In Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division v. Schwilke, Wyo., 649 P.2d 218 (1982), and 
Yost v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 654 P.2d 137 (1982), this 
court held that the existence of employment stress clearly unusual to or 
abnormal for the employee was present because the particular employee was 
suffering from a prior cardiac problem. In essence, we have said that the stress 
became unusual or abnormal not because of a difference in the work activities 
but because of a difference in the employee. The thrust of our application of 
the unusual exertion rule leads to the conclusion that the award of worker's 
compensation benefits results because at the time of the critical event the 
employee was different as compared to his prior and usual 
condition.

[¶15.]  As we previously have noted we are 
dealing with a question of fact. Wyoming 
State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Schwilke, 
supra; Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 
supra; and Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 
supra. Other jurisdictions have considered the question raised to be an issue of 
fact in specific instances involving a policeman or other law enforcement 
officer and the necessity of demonstrating an unusual exertion or job situation. 
City and County of Denver v. Industrial 
Commission, supra; Hall v. City of 
Hugoton, 2 Kan. App. 2d 728, 587 P.2d 927 (1978); Sokness v. City of Virginia, 231 Minn. 
215, 42 N.W.2d 551 (1950); Shea v. Board 
of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, Division of Pensions, 
116 N.J. Super. 348, 282 A.2d 415 (1971); Borough of Aliquippa v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board, 18 Pa. Commw. 340, 336 A.2d 450 (1975); and 
Walker v. City of Columbia, 247 S.C. 241, 146 S.E.2d 856 
(1966).

[¶16.]  In this case, in its Conclusion of Law 
Number 5, the district court stated as follows:

"5. In the court's 
opinion we do not have stress in excess of that caused by the normal and usual 
tasks of the employee. The court does not feel that the facts showed an unusual 
or abnormal stress period for this peace officer. The court finds that this was 
the usual thing expected of a police officer in the town of Hulett."

It is our 
conclusion that by this language the district court rejected both possibilities 
for the application of the unusual exertion rule, i.e., there was nothing 
different about the work activities, and there was nothing different about the 
employee.

[¶17.]  The appellant urges upon the court, 
however, the proposition that the district court reached its conclusion by 
refusing to accept the uncontroverted and unimpeached testimony of the expert 
witness. The appellant relies upon the following language from Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Association 
v. Cross, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1280, 1284-1285 
(1977):

"While the trier of fact 
should be accorded considerable freedom in evaluating the testimony of 
witnesses, uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony cannot be arbitrarily 
disregarded. A litigant is entitled to assume unattacked evidence, properly 
presented, will receive consideration. * * *"1

The appellant's 
argument is that the testimony throughout the entire trial uniformly leads to a 
conclusion that Darwin Creek was subjected to a period of unusual or abnormal 
employment stress while on his job the night before he suffered the fatal heart 
attack.

[¶18.]  The testimony in this record may be 
subject to varying interpretations, but we will not usurp the function of the 
trial court in making factual findings with respect to this case. It is the duty 
of the trier of fact to weigh and evaluate the testimony of the witnesses, 
including that given by experts. Mitchell 
v. Vondra, Wyo., 
448 P.2d 313 (1968). Recognizing the rule relied upon by the appellant, "The 
trial court was not in a strait jacket which required it to accept without 
question any of the testimony as to fact. It was the sole judge of the 
credibility of the witnesses and was entitled to interpret the evidence." 
Ward v. Yoder, Wyo., 
355 P.2d 371, 374 (1960). From what we have said heretofore we conclude that 
there is no reason in this case to accept the argument that testimony was 
arbitrarily disregarded. The trial court only adopted a different but 
appropriate interpretation of the evidence. Under those circumstances this court 
should not invade the province of the trier of fact by reaching a different 
conclusion.

[¶19.]  We wish to add that we, like the trial 
court, have a good deal of sympathy for law enforcement personnel who do their 
work under incredible stress.2 This sympathy, however, does not 
permit the court to construe the language of the statute to extend the benefits 
of worker's compensation to those who do not reasonably fall within the language 
used by the legislature. Mor, Inc. v. 
Haverlock, supra. This case reflects a most unfortunate and regrettable 
occurrence, and one which the trial court found causally was connected to the 
police officer's employment. Still it is not one for which, under our law, the 
benefits of worker's compensation are available. Perhaps it would be appropriate 
for the legislature to adopt a special statute for law enforcement officers who 
suffer from cardiac conditions, or alternatively to invoke in our worker's 
compensation statute only a causal connection test. The legislature must decide 
whether this state should adopt either of those measures.

[¶20.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 For similar holdings see 
Ward v. Yoder, Wyo., 
355 P.2d 371, reh. denied 357 P.2d 180 (1960); Twing v. Schott, 80 
Wyo. 100, 338 P.2d 839 (1959); and Beck v. Givens, 77 Wyo. 176, 309 P.2d 715, 
reh. denied 77 Wyo. 776, 313 P.2d 977 
(1957).

2 Perhaps in recognition 
of this fact several states have enacted special legislation for policemen who 
suffer heart attacks. See 1B Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 41.70 
(1980).

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring with whom RAPER, Justice, joins.

[¶21.]  In concurring with the majority in this 
case, I maintain the position taken by me in Yost v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 654 P.2d 137 (1982), to the 
effect that § 27-12-603(b) requires the causative exertion to be "clearly 
unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment," and that 
it does not authorize recovery when the exertion is only unusual to, or abnormal 
for, the particular employee.