Title: Zeigler v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-696 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM THOMAS ZEIGLER, JR.,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 21, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
William Thomas Zeigler, Jr., appeals an order of the circuit court denying a 
motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.853 and section 925.11, Florida Statutes.1
I.  BACKGROUND 
  For the reasons set forth 
below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the motion. 
“In 1976, Zeigler was convicted of the first-degree murders of Eunice 
Zeigler, his wife, and Charlie Mays, a friend, and the second-degree murders of his 
in-laws, Perry and Virginia Edwards.”  Zeigler v. State, 654 So. 2d 1162, 1163 
                                         
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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(Fla. 1995).  The facts are set forth in the Court’s opinion on direct appeal.  See 
Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 367-68 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 
(1982).  Zeigler pursued postconviction relief in numerous state court 
proceedings,2
Subsequently, Zeigler filed another postconviction motion and a motion 
requesting the re-examination and DNA testing of certain evidence.  See Zeigler, 
654 So. 2d at 1163.  We affirmed the trial court’s denial of Zeigler’s 
postconviction motion and the trial court’s decision that Zeigler’s DNA claim was 
procedurally barred.  Id. at 1164.  We then stated the following regarding Zeigler’s 
DNA claim: 
 and we ordered resentencing in Zeigler v. Dugger, 524 So. 2d 419 
(Fla. 1988).  Zeigler’s resentencing occurred in 1989, and we affirmed Zeigler’s 
two death sentences on appeal.  Zeigler v. State, 580 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 946 (1991). 
Even if there were no procedural bar, we do not believe that 
Zeigler has presented a scenario under which new evidence resulting 
from DNA typing would have affected the outcome of the case.  
Zeigler admitted that he was at the scene of the crime, and there is no 
dispute that his blood as well as the blood of the four victims was 
present at the crime scene.  The State’s case was not entirely 
circumstantial, and in order to accept Zeigler’s theory of the case, the 
                                         
2.  See Zeigler v. State, 452 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1984) (remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claim of judicial bias); Zeigler v. State, 
473 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1985) (affirmed denial of judicial bias claim); State v. Zeigler, 
494 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1986) (reversed the trial court’s order granting an evidentiary 
hearing on postconviction claim that the trial judge failed to consider nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances).   
 
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jury would have had to disbelieve at least three witnesses who 
testified at the trial.  Zeigler’s request for DNA typing is based on 
mere speculation and he has failed to present a reasonable hypothesis 
for how the new evidence would have probably resulted in a finding 
of innocence.  See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) 
(The standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is 
whether the evidence “would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.”).  Acknowledging that the issue before us is whether Zeigler 
should be allowed to subject the evidence to DNA testing rather than 
whether he should be granted a new trial based on newly discovered 
DNA evidence, we find that even if the DNA results comported with 
the scenario most favorable to Zeigler, he still would not have been 
able to show that the evidence would have probably produced an 
acquittal
Id. (second emphasis added).   
. 
 
Subsequently in 2001, Zeigler filed a motion for DNA testing for the 
purposes of clemency proceedings and argued that:  (1) identifying the source of 
the blood on Mays’ clothing as the blood of Eunice or Perry could show that Mays 
was the perpetrator; (2) testing could reveal Ziegler’s blood throughout the store, 
which would discredit the State’s claim that he was not shot in the store; (3) 
identifying the source of the blood on Zeigler’s clothes could cast doubt on the 
State’s claim that he had the blood of the victims on his clothing and was therefore 
involved in the murders; and (4) identifying the source of several hairs found in the 
store might reveal whether Felton Thomas was in the store on the night of the 
murders, contradicting his testimony at trial.  This time Zeigler’s motion for DNA 
testing was granted.   
 
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After testing was completed, Zeigler filed a motion to vacate his sentences 
based on the newly discovered evidence and a motion to authorize (nunc pro tunc) 
DNA testing under rule 3.853.  Zeigler argued that the DNA results demonstrated 
that Perry’s blood was not on Zeigler’s shirt, which allegedly contradicted the 
State’s theory that Zeigler murdered Perry, and that whoever murdered Perry 
murdered the others.  Furthermore, he argued that the DNA results revealed 
Perry’s blood was on Mays’ pants, which corroborated Zeigler’s trial testimony 
that Mays was a perpetrator rather than a victim.  The trial court denied the motion, 
and we affirmed.  See Zeigler v. State, 967 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2007).   
Specifically, in 2007, we agreed with the trial court’s findings that the 
presence of Perry’s blood on Mays’ clothing did not conclusively establish that 
Mays was the perpetrator and Zeigler was the victim because Mays and Perry were 
found near each other and, “if Mays were involved in a struggle with [Zeigler] 
while in close proximity with Perry’s bloodied body, it would not be surprising 
that Perry’s blood ended up on Mays’ shoes and pants during the altercation.”  Id. 
at 130.  Additionally, we agreed with the trial court’s finding that “the presence of 
Mays’ blood, and the absence of Perry’s, on [Zeigler’s] t-shirt does not 
conclusively show that [Zeigler] did not hold Perry in a headlock and beat him.”  
Id.  Furthermore, we noted that “in 1995 this Court came to the same conclusion as 
 
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the trial court while assuming that the DNA evidence would prove more favorable 
to Zeigler than it actually did.”  Id. at 131.   
 
Then, in 2009, Zeigler filed a motion for DNA testing under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.853, requesting to test his shirts; Mays’ shirts and shoes; 
Perry’s shirt, pants, tie, tie clip, and fingernails; and Eunice Zeigler’s clothing.  
Zeigler argued that DNA testing of these items will show (1) that Perry’s blood is 
not on his clothing, which will demonstrate that he did not kill Perry; (2) that 
Perry’s blood is on Mays’ clothing, which demonstrates that Mays was the 
perpetrator and renders the trial testimony of Felton Thomas unreliable; and (3) 
that the blood spatter on his shirt is not attributable to the beating of Mays.  
Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Zeigler’s motion. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Zeigler now appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction DNA testing 
to this Court.  Although the circuit court’s failure to make the findings specifically 
required by rule 3.853(c)(5) was improper, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of 
Zeigler’s motion.  Zeigler’s claims are procedurally barred by collateral estoppel, 
and, even if Zeigler’s claims were not procedurally barred, he would not be entitled 
to relief on the merits.3
                                         
 
3.  We agree with Zeigler that his motion for postconviction DNA testing 
was not barred because it was successive.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(b)(2), (d) 
(stating that rule 3.853 motions “may be filed or considered at any time following 
   
 
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A.  Collateral Estoppel 
Zeigler argues that his rule 3.853 motion is not barred by the principle of 
collateral estoppel, and furthermore that collateral estoppel, even if applicable, 
cannot be applied because it would result in a manifest injustice.  We disagree.   
In Florida, collateral estoppel prevents the same parties from relitigating 
issues that have already been fully litigated and determined.  See State v. McBride, 
848 So. 2d 287, 290-91 (Fla. 2003).  In his present motion, Zeigler is seeking 
additional DNA testing based on variations of the same arguments he made in his 
previous motion for DNA testing in 2001, and we already affirmed the circuit 
court’s decision of these issues against him in Zeigler, 967 So. 2d at 125. 
Specifically, in his current motion, Zeigler argues that (1) additional testing 
of his shirts will show that Perry’s blood is not on his clothing and, therefore, he 
was not the assailant; (2) additional testing on Mays’ clothing will reveal Perry’s 
blood, which demonstrates that Mays was the actual perpetrator; and (3) additional 
testing on Zeigler’s shirts will show whether the blood spatter on them is really 
from Mays.  However, we previously addressed these claims and held that the 
absence of Perry’s and the presence of Mays’ blood on Zeigler’s clothing did not 
establish that Zeigler was not the perpetrator.  Id. at 130-31.  Likewise, we also 
                                                                                                                                   
the date that the judgment and sentence in the case becomes final” and noting the 
possibility of additional DNA testing).  
 
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held that the presence of Perry’s blood on Mays’ clothing did not establish that 
Mays was the perpetrator rather than a victim.  Id.  Thus, we already decided these 
same issues against Zeigler.   
Accordingly, Zeigler’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel, and we 
affirm the circuit court’s denial of his motion for postconviction DNA testing.   
B.  The Merits 
Additionally, on the merits, we conclude that, even if Zeigler’s claims were 
not barred by collateral estoppel, Zeigler would still not be entitled to relief 
because he has failed to demonstrate how the results of the additional DNA testing 
would give rise to a reasonable probability of acquittal or a lesser sentence. 
Under rule 3.853, the motion must include, “a statement that the movant is 
innocent and how the DNA testing requested by the motion will exonerate the 
movant of the crime for which the movant was sentenced, or a statement how the 
DNA testing will mitigate the sentence received by the movant for that crime.”  
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(b)(3).  “It is the defendant’s burden to explain, with 
reference to specific facts about the crime and the items requested to be tested, how 
the DNA testing will exonerate the defendant of the crime or will mitigate the 
defendant’s sentence.”  Consalvo v. State, 3 So. 3d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 1259, 1265 (Fla. 2004)); Willacy v. State, 
967 So. 2d 131, 145 (Fla. 2007); Hitchcock v. State, 866 So. 2d 23, 27-28 (Fla. 
 
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2004); see also Scott v. State, 46 So. 3d 529, 533 (Fla. 2009) (affirming denial of 
DNA testing because the defendant could not show how the requested DNA testing 
“would give rise to a reasonable probability that he did not commit the crime”); 
King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1247-49 (Fla. 2002) (affirming denial of DNA 
testing when defendant could not show that the result would raise a reasonable 
probability of acquittal or a life sentence).  In order to determine whether DNA 
testing is warranted, the court must determine “[w]hether there is a reasonable 
probability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have received a 
lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.853(c)(5)(C).   
In this case, Zeigler has not met his burden of showing how the results of the 
DNA testing would give rise to a reasonable probability of a different outcome.  
First, he fails to present any viable arguments why more testing that shows more 
absence of Perry’s blood on Zeigler’s clothing would negate our previous 
conclusion that the absence of Perry’s blood on Zeigler’s clothing does not 
establish that he was not the perpetrator.  Additionally, although Mr. Kish, a 
bloodstain expert, testified at the 2011 evidentiary hearing that he believed the six 
spatter samples he had selected on Zeigler’s clothing for additional testing would 
reveal whether Zeigler was in close proximity to Perry when he died, we conclude 
that the absence of Perry’s blood in these areas would not prove that Zeigler was 
 
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not the perpetrator.  Kish acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that, even 
though the areas he selected for additional testing on Zeigler’s clothing were 
intended to result in a representative sampling of all the blood spatter stains on the 
garment, there was no way to know for sure that all of the contributors to the blood 
on Zeigler’s clothing would be identified unless every single bloodstain was tested.  
And Mr. Weiss, an expert in DNA identification, testified at the previous 
evidentiary hearing in 2004, that “it was possible to miss blood on the shirt, due to 
deterioration and improper storage” and that “[i]t was also possible to have a 
mixed stain, from multiple contributors, in the same area.”  Zeigler, 967 So. 2d at 
130 (quoting trial court order).  Therefore, even if additional testing on the six 
areas again revealed the absence of Perry’s blood, it still would not give rise to a 
reasonable probability of acquittal or a lesser sentence.   
Second, Zeigler has failed to explain how further testing of Mays’ clothing 
and the discovery of more of Perry’s blood on Mays’ clothing would give rise to a 
reasonable probability of acquittal or a lesser sentence.  We previously stated that 
the presence of Perry’s blood on Mays’ clothing did not prove that Zeigler was not 
the perpetrator because, “if Mays were involved in a struggle with [Zeigler] while 
in close proximity with Perry’s bloodied body, it would not be surprising that 
Perry’s blood ended up on Mays’ shoes and pants during the altercation.”  Id. at 
130 (quoting trial court order).  Moreover, the bloodstain expert testified at the 
 
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2011 evidentiary hearing that he had examined Mays’ clothing and shoes and did 
not believe that additional testing needed to be performed on these items.   
Third, Zeigler has failed to explain how further testing on his shirts and the 
discovery of more of Mays’ blood on his shirt will give rise to a reasonable 
probability of acquittal or lesser sentence when the prior testing already determined 
that Mays’ blood is on Zeigler’s shirt, and we found this was not exculpatory.  See 
id.  Furthermore, Zeigler completely fails to address how DNA testing of Perry’s 
clothing, tie, tie clip, and fingernails, and Eunice Zeigler’s clothing will exonerate 
him or mitigate his sentence.   
Accordingly, because Zeigler has failed to present an argument giving rise to 
a reasonable probability that he would be acquitted or would have received a lesser 
sentence, he is not entitled to the requested DNA testing. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Zeigler’s 
motion for postconviction DNA testing. 
It is so ordered.  
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only. 
CANADY, J., recused. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
 
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Reginald Karl Whitehead, Judge - Case Nos. 1998-CF-5355, 1998-CF-5356 
 
 
John Houston Pope of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., New York, New York,  
Dennis H. Tracey, III and Joanna F. Wasick of Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, 
New York, 
 
 
for Appellant  
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Kenneth Sloan 
Nunnelley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee