Title: Attorney Grievance v. Lee

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Norman Joseph Lee, III
Misc. Docket AG No. 68, September Term, 2004
DEFAULT ORDER – MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT ORDER – An attorney’s failure
to answer  a Petition For Disciplinary Action may result in the hearing court’s entry of a
default judgment.  In the exercise of discretion the hearing court may vacate the default order
upon receipt of a motion to vacate the order of default filed withing 30 days after entry.  The
motion shall state the reasons for the failure to plead and the legal and factual basis for the
defense to the claim.  The court shall vacate the order of default if the court finds that there
is a substantial and sufficient basis for an actual controversy as to the merits of the action and
that it is equitable to excuse the failure to plead.  Here, the court did not abuse its discretion.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS – An attorney, upon
acceptance of representation of a client, is required pursuant to the M RPC, to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, Rule 1.3.  Under the
circumstances of this case, the attorney violated Rule 1.3 in taking almost one year after
accepting payment of the retainer to visit his client who was then incarcerated and in failing
to file some sort of pleading or indicate that there was no basis to do so and to make an
accounting to the client of the monies that had been spent out of the retainer and then refund
any remainder.  In addition, it was a violation of Rule 1.4 for an attorney to fail to keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to fail to promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.  Although, the MRPC do not mandate that the attorney
of record must respond to inquires on behalf of a client from his or her relatives, under the
circumstances of this case, a prompt response from the attorney to the relative acting as a
conduit for the client would have been reasonable.  At the very least, the attorney was
obligated to communicate to the client that all communication concerning his case would be
direct and not through any third party.   
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-05-000772-OC
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
 MARYLAND
 Misc. Docket AG No. 68
September Term, 2004
____________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
NORM AN JOSEPH LEE, III
_____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
_____________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
______________________________________
Filed: January 12, 2006
1Maryland Rule 16-751, in relevant part, provides:
(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1)
Upon approval of Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the
Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals. 
2Rule 1.3 requires “[a] lawyer [to] act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”
3Rule 1.4 provides, in relevant part:
(a)  A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the
status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information.
Effective July 1, 2005, the format of Rule 1.4(a) was modified as follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall:
*    *    *    *
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information
. . . .
4Rule 1.16 provides, in relevant part:
(d)  Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to
(continued...)
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Counsel
acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1  filed a Petition For Disciplinary Or Remedial
Action against Norman Joseph Lee, III, the respondent.  The petition charged that
respondent violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence),2 1.4 (Communication),3 and 1.16 (Declining or
terminating representation)4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), as
4(...continued)
which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of
fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.  The lawyer
may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by
other law.
5Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
(a) Order.  Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order
designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the
clerk responsible for maintaining the record.  The order of
designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar
Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of
discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 
2
adopted by Rule 16-812.
We referred the case, pursuant to Rule 16-752 (a),5 to the Honorable Lawrence R.
Daniels, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, to conduct a hearing and to make
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  When respondent did not answer the petition, an
order of default was entered against him on April 14, 2005.  Pursuant to the Order of Default,
a hearing was set for June 30, 2005, at 9:30 a.m.  Prior to the June hearing, respondent filed
a motion to vacate the Order of Default and an answer to the Petition for Disciplinary Action.
Petitioner responded to the motion to vacate and respondent’s answer to the Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action, requesting that the court deny the motion to vacate the
Order of Default and permit the case to proceed, as scheduled, upon the default order on June
30, 2005.  The court agreed with petitioner and denied respondent’s motion.  At the hearing
on June 30, 2005, respondent argued that the court should vacate the order of default.  He
6Maryland Rule 16-757(c) provides:
(c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and file or
dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of fact,
including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action,
and conclusions of law.  If dictated into the record, the statement
shall be promptly transcribed.  Unless the time is extended by the
Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed
with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after
the conclusion of the hearing.  The clerk shall mail a copy of the
statement to each party. 
3
conceded that there is no court record acknowledging the timely receipt of his  response to
the petition for disciplinary action.  Respondent contended, however, that his office records
reveal that he sent the court a timely response.  Notwithstanding the absence of a timely
response, respondent reargued that the court should vacate the Order of Default.  The hearing
court responded by pointing out that any motion to vacate should have been filed within
thirty days after entry of the Order of Default and was not, and that respondent did not,
pursuant to Rule 2-613(d), “state the reasons for the failure to plead and the legal and factual
basis for the defense of the claim.”  The hearing court further stated:
Again, I just interrupt because I want the record to be clear
that though Mr. Lee did in fact enter his motion to set aside
the default or vacate the default, he did not give a reason why
there was failure to plead, he did not offer any legal or factual
basis.
In addition, pursuant to Rule 16-757 (c),6 the court found facts by the clear and convincing
standard and concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.3 of the Maryland Rules of
4
Professional Conduct.  
The record shows that Norman Joseph Lee, III, was admitted to the Maryland Bar on
March 31, 1981.  Bobby D. Coleman, complainant, retained respondent to seek post-
conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Washington County.  The retainer agreement was
dated July 8, 2002, and signed by respondent and witnessed by his secretary.  Respondent
accepted a fee of $3,500, paid by Mr. Coleman’s mother on behalf of her son, as a retainer
for services to be rendered in the matter.  Thereafter, on August 2, 2002, Mr. Lee entered his
appearance in the Circuit Court for Washington County on behalf of Mr. Coleman.  In Mr.
Coleman’s letter to the Attorney Grievance Commission, dated July 10, 2003, he complained
that, “as yet he had never met [Mr. Lee] nor had the ability to discuss the job I’m hiring him
to perform.”   Following Mr. Coleman’s complaint to the Commission, Mr. Lee scheduled
an appointment to interview Mr. Coleman at the prison facility and met with Mr. Coleman
on August 23, 2003.  This meeting occurred more than a year after Mr. Coleman retained
respondent to represent him. 
Specifically, the hearing court found that it took respondent almost one year after he
received payment of the retainer to visit Mr. Coleman, who was then incarcerated in
Washington County.  Further the hearing court noted, from the evidence, that “there’s no
indication that [respondent] either took action on Mr. Coleman’s behalf to file some sort of
pleading or indicate that there was no basis to do so and make an accounting to Mr. Coleman
of the monies that had been spent out of the retainer and then refund anything that remained
5
if there was a remainder.”  Based upon these findings of fact, the hearing court concluded
that respondent displayed a lack of diligence in violation of Rule 1.3 of the MRPC. 
With respect to the violation of Rule 1.4, the hearing court found that respondent
attempted to keep in contact with his client and his client’s mother.  The hearing court made
no other specific findings, even though the testimony and documentary evidence in the record
shows that Mr. Coleman wrote, approximately in July or early August 2002, to Mr. Lee and
had requested that his attorney communicate about any new developments or discoveries in
his case and asked Mr. Lee to advise as to what the chances were of having his “conviction
reversed in the post-conviction proceeding.”  In addition, Mr. Coleman pointed out that “he
had been experiencing difficulties getting the respondent’s phone number on the prison’s
institutional phone list and that’s why he did not call him personally” (Paragraph 10.  Petition
For Disciplinary Action).  This additional information was offered, apparently, to explain
why Mr. Coleman’s mother was acting as a conduit for her son with regard to specific
questions to Mr. Lee about the progress on her son’s case.  On August 21, 2002, she wrote
to respondent and inquired “as a matter of a status report on any research and legal
preparation conducted for Bobby’s case.”  Within her letter she made reference to her own
legal research in New York, and inquired whether her son’s case involved issues relating to
wrongful conviction, mistaken eye-witness testimony, admissibility of any prior crimes,
search and seizure violations, and evidence disclosure and warrants.  Mr. Coleman’s mother
also “questioned respondent about the pre-sentence report containing false or misleading
6
statements that it would have otherwise impacted the sentence imposed as well as whether
or not Maryland Rule 4-342 could apply to her son’s case.”  Moreover, she wanted to know
whether “Bobby’s case [was] effected [sic] by the recent Supreme Court rulings applying
Apprendi?”  Further, she questioned how much time she could expect Mr. Lee to take in
performing research and copied the letter to Mr. Coleman. 
Approximately 2 months later, by letter dated October 16, 2002, Mr. Lee wrote to Mr.
Coleman and apologized to Mr. Coleman and his mother “for the delay in the prosecution
of your case.”  Additionally, “[h]e acknowledged that Mrs. Coleman’s August 21 letter
referenced four cases but that he had ‘not had the benefit of reviewing these cases but [was]
in the process of reviewing same and [would] advise her accordingly.’”  There is no evidence
in the record, however, that Mr. Lee ever followed up on his promise either to review the
cases referenced or to give any advice.  Averment number 12 of the petition for disciplinary
action was that, “[o]ther than th[e] meeting [with Mr. Coleman at the prison facility in
August 2003, Mr. Lee] performed no substantive legal services on behalf of Bobby D.
Coleman.”
In finding no violation of Rule 1.4, the hearing court observed that
the court notes that the client is Mr. Coleman and not his
mother.  I don’t believe there is any requirement under the
Canons of Professional Ethics that the lawyer keep in touch with
the person who paid the fee.  It’s the client who is and should be
the centerpiece of all the attorney’s efforts.
           Petitioner takes exception to the hearing court’s failure to find a violation of Rule 1.4.
7
The respondent did not file exceptions either to the hearing court’s findings of facts or
conclusions of law.  Because exceptions were filed by Bar Counsel, we determine whether
the findings of fact have been proven in accordance with the applicable burdens of proof.
See Rules 16-759 (b) (2) (B) and 16-757 (b).  
In the present case, the hearing court entered a default order.  The court should have
treated the averments as established pursuant to Rules 16-754(c) and 2-323 (e).  Rule 16-
754(c) permits the court to treat failure to file a timely answer as a default, and  Rule 2-323
(e) permits the court to treat the averments in a pleading as admitted unless denied.  Because
the averments were not denied,  we treat them as admitted.  
Further, in the exercise of our supervision over attorney disciplinary proceedings, we
conduct an independent review of the record, accepting the hearing judge’s findings of fact
unless clearly erroneous.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797
A.2d 757, 763-64 (2002).  We review de novo the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  See
Rule 16-759 (b) (1); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813
A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002). 
The hearing judge concluded that there was no violation of Rule 1.4 because “there
is [no] requirement under the [MRPC] that the lawyer keep in touch with the person who
paid the fee.”  We disagree as to the judge’s factual findings and conclusion of law as to Rule
7The transcript of the disciplinary hearing conducted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County contains eighty-eight pages.  The hearing court’s findings are reflected in pages 61
through 87.  That portion of the transcript was incorporated as the court’s Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in its Order dated July 15, 2005, and numbered, as “Findings,”
pages 2 through 28 inclusive.
 
Initially, the hearing judge disagreed with petitioner’s position that the averments
contained in the Petition For Disciplinary Action were deemed admitted by operation of
Rules 2-613(f) and 2-323(e).  The result of the hearing judge’s disagreement required
petitioner to expend considerable effort to establish a factual basis for the court to act upon
and draw its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  Although, the matter proceeded by
default, the hearing court did not recognize until late in the proceeding that it could find “that
th[e] allegations [of the Petition For Disciplinary Action] having not been joined at issue by
way of an answer are to be considered as true for purposes of the court’s decision in making
Conclusions of Law in this case.”  
Rule 2-613(f) provides, in pertinent part: “[A] judgment by default . . . includes a
determination as to liability and all relief sought . . . .”  
Rule 2-323 (e) provides, in pertinent part: “[a]verments in a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is required . . . are admitted unless denied in the responsive pleading or
covered by a general denial.” 
Moreover, for purposes of appellate review, the transcript was unnecessarily difficult
to follow because of the hearing court’s failure to “prepare and file . . .  a statement of the
judge’s findings of  fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and
conclusions of law.”  Rule 16-757(c).  Although, Rule 16-757(c) permits dictation of oral
findings and conclusions, the transcript of those findings was extremely difficult to follow
for purposes of appellate review.
8
1.4.  After an unnecessarily protracted evidentiary hearing,7 it appears that the court
eventually adopted the averments contained in the petition for disciplinary action as
established facts.  The hearing judge, however, did not consider those facts in making his
conclusion of law with respect to Rule 1.4.  The unchallenged facts, which the hearing court
apparently overlooked, are that after execution of the retainer agreement and payment of the
9
fee, Mr. Coleman notified respondent that he (Mr. Coleman) “had been experiencing
difficulties getting the respondent’s phone number on the prison’s institutional phone list and
that’s why he did not call him personally.”  Previously, respondent replied to Mr. Coleman
about inquires made by Mr. Coleman’s mother.  In addition, respondent acknowledged, in
his letter dated October 16, 2002, that he had received communication from Mrs. Coleman
concerning four cases she had researched.  That letter was copied to Mr. Coleman’s mother,
as well as other correspondence.  By letter dated August 21, 2002, Mrs. Coleman requested
a status report on legal research and legal preparation conducted for her son’s case.  She
raised specific questions to Mr. Lee within her letter and copied the letter to her son.
Respondent acknowledged receiving the August 21, 2002, letter and, in his delayed response,
promised to follow up with an answer.  There is no evidence in the record that as of the date
of the hearing in this matter – June 30, 2005 – respondent ever communicated a response to
the inquires made by Mrs. Coleman on behalf of her son other than his letter dated October
16, 2002.
Certainly, if respondent did not wish to communicate with Mrs. Coleman that was his
prerogative.  There is no evidence that Mr. Lee ever told Mr. Coleman that he would not
communicate with Mrs. Coleman regarding her son’s case.  In accordance with the MRPC,
respondent’s obligation is to keep Mr. Coleman reasonably informed about the status of his
case and to promptly comply with his reasonable requests for information.  Thus, the focus
is on what, if anything, Mr. Lee did to carry out this obligation under the circumstances of
10
this case.  
Respondent did not meet with his client until almost one year after payment of the fee.
He acknowledged receipt of the trial transcripts of Mr. Coleman’s criminal case, copied
them, and returned the originals to the client.  After execution of the retainer agreement and
payment of the retainer fee, all communication on the part of Mr. Lee essentially stopped.
There were inquiries from Mrs. Coleman on behalf of her son, but the only response from
Mr. Lee was a delayed response that was not very meaningful.  If Mr. Lee did not intend to
communicate with his client through his mother, he could have explained that to the client.
Having failed to do so, the course of dealings with Mr. Coleman suggested that Mr. Lee
would respond to Mr. Coleman through his mother.  Therefore, we sustain the petitioner’s
exceptions and conclude that violation of Rule 1.4 was proven by clear and convincing
evidence.  
With respect to the Rule 1.3 violation, neither the petitioner nor the respondent has
taken exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  As to the
appropriate sanction petitioner recommends a reprimand, while respondent recommends that
we dismiss the disciplinary proceedings.  We agree with petitioner that a reprimand is the
appropriate sanction.  All that is required of respondent is that he act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing his client.  Under the circumstances of this case,
respondent’s representation of his client was unreasonable in that for almost one year
respondent neglected his client’s legal matter.  The hearing judge found no mitigating factors
8Petitioner, apparently, abandoned any other charges because no other exceptions were
filed and no argument was presented in support of a Rule 1.16 (d) violation.  Therefore, we
will not address the charge involving allegations that respondent violated Rule 1.16 (d).  
11
and, likewise, we find no mitigating factors.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tolar, 357
Md. 569, 585, 745 A.2d 1045, 1054 (2000) (holding that a public reprimand would “serve
the purpose of protecting the public just as well as a short suspension”).  Consistent with our
view that Mr. Lee’s violation of Rule 1.4 warrants a public reprimand, we conclude that his
violation of Rule 1.3 also warrants a public reprimand.8  Our goal is not to punish the
respondent, but to impose a sanction that will deter other attorneys from engaging in similar
misconduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 96, 753 A.2d 17, 38
(2000) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ober, 350 Md. 616, 631-32, 714 A.2d 856,
864 (1998) (citations omitted)).  In this case, a reprimand will serve the purpose of protecting
the public.  It serves as notice to the respondent and other attorneys that this Court considers
an attorney’s lack of diligence and lack of communication with his or her client, serious
matters.  
Because the fee paid to Mr. Coleman has not been returned and Mr. Lee remains
counsel of record, it appears that he intends to continue his representation of Mr. Coleman.
This opinion is limited to the allegations of misconduct which predated the petition for
disciplinary action filed in this case.  If respondent continues his representation in this case
and wishes to avoid any further disciplinary action, he is duty bound to follow the MRPC.
 
12
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL  PAY
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS
COURT; 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND
RULE 16-715, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST NORMAN
JOSEPH LEE, III.