Title: Duff-Kareores v. Kareores

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11975 
 
 
ELLEN DUFF-KAREORES  vs.  CHRISTOPHER KAREORES. 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 10, 2016. - June 15, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Division of property. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on June 19, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Peter C. DiGangi, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
James P. Hall (Jaclyn Martin with him) for Christopher 
Kareores. 
 
John Foskett for Ellen Duff-Kareores. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  Ellen Duff-Kareores and Christopher Kareores 
were first married to each other in May, 1995; two children were 
born of the marriage before the parties divorced in 2004.  The 
parties' divorce agreement, which was incorporated in the 
divorce judgment, obligated Christopher to, among other things, 
2 
 
pay Ellen alimony in the amount of $7,600 per month.  Beginning 
in 2007, Christopher resumed living with Ellen and the children 
in what had been the marital residence.  In December, 2012, the 
parties remarried.  In June, 2013, Ellen filed a complaint for 
divorce on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage and served the complaint on Christopher the following 
month.  Following trial on that complaint, a judge of the 
Probate and Family Court concluded that, under the Alimony 
Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act or 
act), the length of the parties' marriage for purposes of 
calculating the durational limits of a general term alimony 
award to Ellen was eighteen years, the period from the date of 
the parties' first marriage through the date that Christopher 
was served with the complaint in the second divorce.  
Christopher appealed, and we transferred the case to this court 
on our own motion. 
This case requires us to decide whether the judge correctly 
construed G. L. c. 208, § 48, which provides that "the court may 
increase the length of the marriage if there is evidence that 
the parties' economic marital partnership began during their 
cohabitation period prior to the marriage."  We conclude that 
the judge's findings do not support a determination that the 
parties had an economic marital partnership, within the meaning 
of G. L. c. 208, § 48, during the period following the service 
3 
 
on the husband of the divorce complaint in the first marriage in 
April, 2003, until the parties began cohabiting in May, 2007.  
The findings do, however, support a determination that the 
length of the marriage includes the period during which the 
parties were cohabiting before they remarried, and the period of 
the parties' first marriage.  Thus, the over-all length of the 
marriage here should be calculated by adding together the period 
of the first marriage, the period of cohabitation beginning in 
May, 2007, and the period of the second marriage.  Accordingly, 
the matter must be remanded to the Probate and Family Court for 
recalculation of the amount and duration of alimony.  Because of 
the change in the length of the parties' marriage, in the course 
of the proceedings on remand, Christopher also may seek 
reconsideration of the judge's orders as to property division 
and allocation of the children's education expenses. 
 Background.  We summarize the judge's findings of fact, 
supplemented by undisputed facts in the record and reserving 
certain facts for later discussion.  See Pierce v. Pierce, 455 
Mass. 286, 288 (2009).  The parties first married on May 20, 
1995.  Ellen was employed full time as a registered nurse, and 
Christopher was working as a medical resident.  Their first 
child, a daughter, was born in 1997; their son was born in 2001.  
Soon after the birth of their first child, at around the time 
that Christopher completed his medical training and began 
4 
 
employment as a fully qualified physician, Ellen left her 
position as a registered nurse to attend to raising their 
daughter and running the household.  Although she worked part 
time in the years that followed, Ellen did not return to full-
time employment. 
In March, 2003, Ellen served Christopher with a divorce 
complaint, and in 2004, a divorce judgment nisi issued that 
incorporated the parties' separation agreement.  The agreement 
included merged provisions relating to their minor children, 
alimony, and life and medical insurance, as well as provisions 
related to property division that did not merge.  The agreement 
required Christopher to pay alimony to Ellen in the amount of 
$7,600 per month.1  As provided under the terms of the agreement, 
the parties refinanced their mortgage so that Ellen could 
purchase Christopher's interest in the family home, and she 
continued to live there with the children. 
In May, 2007, Christopher moved back into the family home 
and the parties began a period of cohabitation, which continued 
until they were remarried in December, 2012.  The judge found 
that, after Christopher returned to living in the family home, 
"the parties functioned exactly as they had during their 
                                                 
1 Under the terms of the agreement, Ellen had primary 
physical custody of the children.  Because the agreement does 
not contain a separate provision for child support, we presume 
that the amount of the alimony award includes payments for the 
support of the children. 
5 
 
previous marriage," with Christopher acting as the primary wage 
earner and Ellen as the primary caretaker of the children and 
the home.  During this period, and throughout the second 
marriage, Christopher continued to pay Ellen a monthly amount 
that was consistent with the alimony order under the first 
divorce judgment.  Six weeks after the second marriage, at 
Ellen's request, Christopher moved out of the family residence.  
On July 18, 2013, Ellen served Christopher with a complaint for 
divorce. 
The judge who conducted the second divorce trial concluded 
that, throughout their eighteen-year relationship, the parties 
enjoyed an upper-middle income lifestyle.  At the time of trial 
on the second divorce, Ellen was fifty-three years old and 
Christopher was fifty-one.  Christopher was in good health and 
Ellen suffered from fibromyalgia and sarcoidosis.2  The judge 
found that Ellen "testified credibly that these [illnesses 
cause] symptoms [that] affect her work as a registered nurse."  
She worked part time and earned weekly income in the amount of 
$450.  Christopher was employed full time as an emergency room 
physician and held an additional part-time position at another 
                                                 
2 The judge found that Ellen "was diagnosed with sarcoidosis 
seventeen years ago," which causes her to suffer from "shortness 
of breath, cough, fatigue, myalgia, and arthralgia."  When her 
symptoms flair up, she "must undergo treatments, including 
chemotherapy, medication and physical therapy."  She also 
suffers from fibromyalgia, which causes muscle pain that can be 
"debilitating." 
6 
 
hospital, earning a total gross weekly income of $7,867.48.3  The 
judge found that Christopher had the opportunity to acquire 
future assets and income through his employment, while Ellen's 
opportunities were limited because of "significant health 
issues," having left full-time work to raise the children, and 
having bypassed employment opportunities to focus on the 
children in the period of the parties' cohabitation between the 
two marriages. 
The judge found that the length of the second marriage was 
six months.  However, the judge found that 
"the parties' economic marital partnership began 
during their cohabitation period prior to the marriage.  
The parties began living together in May, 2007 (6.17 
years).  Additionally, the parties were married for 7.83 
years prior to their first divorce.  The parties have been 
in a relationship, with only a brief period of separation, 
for eighteen years (i.e. the number of years between the 
parties' first marriage and the date of service on the 
current Complaint for Divorce)." 
 
The judge concluded that "[b]oth parties contributed to their 
financial success throughout the course of their relationship," 
but Ellen contributed "more" because she "worked part-time and 
was, for the most part, fully responsible for the child care and 
homemaking responsibilities."4 
                                                 
3 The judge determined that Christopher did not disclose on 
his financial statement the sum of $9,180.00 that he had 
contributed to a retirement account, or that he had received an 
additional $44,440.00 in profit sharing from his medical 
practice. 
4 The judge found that Ellen was responsible for the "vast 
7 
 
 
A judgment nisi was entered on the parties' second divorce 
on December 5, 2014.  Under the terms of the judgment, 
Christopher was ordered to pay Ellen weekly general term alimony 
in the amount of $1,106 for a period of fourteen years.  In 
making this determination, the judge considered the required 
factors under G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a), including "the length of 
the marriage; age of the parties; health of the parties; income, 
employment and employability of the parties . . . ; economic and 
non-economic contribution of both parties to the marriage; 
marital lifestyle; . . . [and] lost economic opportunity as a 
result of the marriage."  The judge also ordered Christopher to 
make weekly child support payments to Ellen in the amount of 
$917.  Concerning education expenses for the two children, the 
judge ordered Christopher to continue paying private secondary 
school expenses for the younger child.5  The older child was a 
senior in high school when the judgment entered; the judge 
ordered Christopher to pay eighty per cent and Ellen to pay 
                                                                                                                                                             
majority of the cleaning, shopping, cooking, and laundry," and 
was "primarily responsible for the child care responsibilities," 
including, among other things, preparing meals, bathing, and 
transporting the children to and from school. 
 
5 The judge found that, "[b]y agreement of the parties, the 
children have been raised Catholic and have always attended 
Catholic private school.  The prior divorce judgment provides 
that the children will attend private school if [Christopher] 
pays the cost, an acknowledgment that [Ellen] was not in a 
financial position to contribute to same." 
8 
 
twenty per cent of the costs of that child's college education.6  
As to the only substantial marital asset,7 Christopher's 
retirement accounts, the judge awarded fifty-five per cent to 
Ellen because she "contributed more to the financial success of 
the parties throughout their relationship."  In making this 
division of the marital property, the judge stated that he had 
considered, among the other factors listed in G. L. c. 208, 
§ 34, the length of the marriage and the alimony award. 
Discussion.  Christopher contends that the judge exceeded 
his authority in the amount and duration of alimony awarded, in 
the division of the marital assets, and in the allocation of the 
children's educational expenses.  The thrust of Christopher's 
argument is that the judge's erroneous calculation of the length 
of the parties' marriage, based on their economic marital 
relationship, "clearly controlled" all of the judge's findings. 
Because the parties' second marriage lasted only six 
months, the question we confront is whether the judge properly 
                                                 
6 No provision was made for the payment of the younger 
child's college expenses.  See Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. 
52, 54 (1998) ("as a general rule, support orders regarding the 
future payment of post-high school educational costs are 
premature and should not be made"). 
 
7 Neither party disputes the judge's finding that 
Christopher's retirement accounts are the only substantial 
marital asset.  The record reflects that Ellen owns the marital 
home, which has a fair market value of $435,000, but at the time 
of the parties' second divorce, was subject to a first and a 
second mortgage, together totaling $418,200. 
9 
 
included within the "length of the marriage" all or any portion 
of the following:  the period of approximately five and one-half 
years during which the parties lived together after the first 
marriage ended and before they remarried; the slightly more than 
four-year period that they were neither married to each other 
nor living together; and the approximately eight-year period of 
their first marriage.8  In making this determination, we consider 
whether the judge's calculation of the parties "length of the 
marriage" is consistent with the meaning of that term under the 
alimony reform act.  This involves a question of statutory 
interpretation, which we review de novo.  See Chin v. Merriot, 
470 Mass. 527, 531 (2015).  "Although we look first to the plain 
language of the provision at issue to ascertain the intent to 
the Legislature, we consider also other sections of the statute, 
and examine the pertinent language in the context of the entire 
statute.  Id. at 532.  See Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 659 
(2014) ("we look first to the language of the relevant statute, 
which is generally the clearest window into the collective mind 
of the Legislature"). 
General Laws c. 208, § 48, enacted as part of the alimony 
reform act, defines the "[l]ength of the marriage" as 
"the number of months from the date of legal marriage to 
the date of service of a complaint or petition for divorce 
                                                 
8 Ellen served Christopher with a complaint for divorce in 
the first marriage on March 12, 2003. 
10 
 
or separate support duly filed in a court . . . ; provided, 
however, that the court may increase the length of the 
marriage if there is evidence that the parties' economic 
marital partnership began during their cohabitation period 
prior to the marriage." 
 
The terms "economic marital partnership" and "cohabitation" are 
not defined in G. L. c. 208, § 48, nor anywhere else within the 
alimony reform act.  But a related provision addressing general 
term alimony9 states that general term alimony "shall be 
suspended, reduced or terminated upon the cohabitation of the 
recipient spouse when the payor shows that the recipient spouse 
has maintained a common household . . . with another person for 
a continuous period of at least [three] months."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (d).  See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 410 Mass. 279, 
284 (1991) (in construing statutory term, "we may also look to 
relevant provisions of other parts of the statute").  In order 
to ascertain whether a former spouse who is cohabiting with 
another is maintaining a "common household," a judge may 
consider any of the following factors: 
"(i) oral or written statements or representations made to 
third parties regarding the relationship of the persons; 
 
"(ii) the economic interdependence of the couple or 
economic dependence of [one] person on the other; 
 
"(iii) the persons engaging in conduct and collaborative 
roles in furtherance of their life together; 
                                                 
9 "'General term alimony' . . . [is] the periodic payment of 
support to a recipient spouse who is economically dependent."  
G. L. c. 208, § 48. 
 
11 
 
 
"(iv) the benefit in the life of either or both of the 
persons from their relationship; 
 
"(v) the community reputation of the persons as a couple; 
or 
 
"(vi) other relevant and material factors." 
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1). 
Viewing the statute as a whole, we conclude that the 
Legislature intended to use the terms cohabitation, economic 
marital partnership, and common household to describe a 
relationship that, if established, would affect a court order 
for alimony, either by increasing the amount and duration of 
alimony ordered or by reducing, suspending, or eliminating the 
award.  As explained, G. L. c. 208, § 48, permits a judge to 
increase the "length of the marriage" based on a period of 
cohabitation prior to a marriage where there is evidence of an 
"economic marital partnership," which in turn permits the judge 
to increase the duration of an alimony award.  See G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (b).  See also G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a) (governing both 
amount and duration of alimony and requiring consideration of 
length of marriage among other factors).  General Laws c. 208, 
§ 49 (d), permits a judge to suspend, reduce, or terminate a 
general alimony award based on a recipient spouse's period of 
cohabitation with another where the recipient spouse maintains a 
"common household" for at least three months.  The definition 
12 
 
includes the sharing of a primary residence with the other 
person, as well as the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (d) (1) (i)-(vi).  What each of these provisions has in 
common is a definition of a relationship that resembles, but is 
not equivalent to, a legal marriage.  Cf. Charron v. Amaral, 451 
Mass. 767, 770-771 (2008) (distinguishing between cohabitation 
and legal marriage).  The existence of such a relationship has 
an effect on the spousal obligation of alimony. 
Given the use of the term "cohabitation" in each of these 
provisions, and their similar purpose to permit an adjustment of 
the duration or amount of an alimony award, we conclude that the 
Legislature intended that it is only where parties share a 
common household, and are engaged in an economic marital 
partnership, that a judge has discretion to increase the length 
of a marriage, or to suspend, reduce, or terminate a general 
alimony award.  We therefore conclude that a judge must consider 
the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1), which are 
determinative of whether the parties share a "common household," 
in order to ascertain whether the parties were participating in 
an economic marital partnership.  These factors, which include a 
consideration of the parties' relationship as a couple and 
"economic interdependence of the couple or economic dependence 
of [one] person on the other," must be considered to ascertain 
whether the parties were engaged in an economic marital 
13 
 
partnership for the purpose of the alimony reform act. 
 
Further, the act also establishes presumptive termination 
dates for general term alimony, which are calculated based on 
the length of the marriage.10  A judge determining the 
appropriate duration of alimony payments may make a deviation 
beyond the time limits only if "the judge makes a written 
finding that deviation . . . is required in the interest of 
justice."  Holmes v. Holmes, supra at 654.  See G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (b).  Although a "judge has broad discretion when awarding 
alimony under the [alimony reform act],"11 see Zaleski v. 
                                                 
10 The presumptive time limits for payment of general term 
alimony for a marriage of twenty years or less are set forth in 
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) (1)-(4): 
 
"(1) If the length of the marriage is [five] years or 
less, general term alimony shall continue for not longer 
than one-half of the number of months of the marriage.   
 
"(2) If the length of the marriage is [ten] years or 
less, but more than [five] years, general term alimony 
shall continue for not longer than [sixty] percent of the 
number of months of the marriage.   
 
"(3) If the length of the marriage is [fifteen] years 
or less, but more than [ten] years, general term alimony 
shall continue for not longer than [seventy] per cent of 
the number of months of the marriage.   
 
"(4) If the length of the marriage is [twenty] years 
or less, but more than [fifteen] years, general term 
alimony shall continue for not longer than [eighty] per 
cent of the number of months of the marriage." 
 
11 The Alimony Reform Act of 2011 did not alter the broad 
discretion historically accorded to judges in making awards of 
alimony.  See Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 235 n.13 (2014) 
14 
 
Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 235 (2014), the judge must consider all 
relevant, statutorily specified factors, such as those set forth 
in G. L. c. 208, §§ 49 (d) and 53 (a).  See Zaleski v. Zaleski, 
supra at 235-236. 
Here, the judge concluded that the length of the marriage 
was eighteen years, and awarded general term alimony to Ellen 
for a durational period of fourteen years, a period consistent 
with a marriage of between fifteen to twenty years.  See G. L. 
c. 208, § 49 (b).  In determining that the length of the 
parties' marriage was eighteen years, the judge plainly rejected 
Christopher's assertion that he was nothing more than "a renter 
of sorts" during the period of the parties' cohabitation. 
The testimony before the judge in this regard included 
statements of both parties that, during the period of 
cohabitation, they presented to their community as an "intact 
family"; Ellen called Christopher her "husband" and Christopher 
conceded that he "may" have called Ellen his "wife"; they gave 
each other rings to wear in place of their wedding bands; 
Christopher was able to see and have daily interaction with his 
children; he could participate in their activities within and 
outside of the home; and the family planned and took vacations 
together.  Christopher also testified that, during the period of 
cohabitation, he and Ellen engaged in a "joint effort . . . to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(discussing legislative history). 
15 
 
figure out the children's schedule," although at times his work 
schedule took priority because he was the primary breadwinner.  
During this period, Christopher continued to pay Ellen $7,600 
per month, the amount of the award under the first judgment, and 
Ellen paid the majority of the expenses of running the parties' 
combined household.  At some point, around 2010, Christopher 
paid for certain improvements to the family home and began 
contributing towards the utilities.  He did not pay an 
additional amount to Ellen designated as rent.  The parties 
maintained separate bank accounts during both the period of 
cohabitation and their second marriage. 
Based on the above, the judge concluded that, during the 
period of cohabitation, "the parties functioned exactly as they 
had during their previous marriage," with Christopher in the 
role of "the primary wage earner" and Ellen in the role of "the 
primary homemaker and caretaker for the children."  The judge's 
findings of fact support his conclusion, based on the statutory 
factors, that the parties were engaged in an economic marital 
partnership and maintained a common household during their 
period of cohabitation.  See G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1) (i)-
(vi).  The parties presented themselves to third parties as a 
traditional family with a husband, wife, and two children; they 
were economically interdependent, with Christopher earning the 
majority of the income and Ellen primarily taking care of the 
16 
 
household and caring for the children; and they planned their 
lives together, in terms of both daily schedules and annual 
vacations.  The judge did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that the parties' relationship during the period of 
cohabitation before their second marriage was an economic 
marital partnership, rather than a landlord-tenant relationship. 
Christopher argues that the judge's finding that an 
economic marital partnership existed was erroneous because 
Christopher continued to pay alimony to Ellen during the period 
of cohabitation, as required by the terms of the first divorce 
judgment.  He contends, in essence, that an economic marital 
partnership cannot be a product of a court order.  This argument 
misses the mark.  A judgment requiring payment of alimony does 
not contemplate a shared life; rather, alimony payments make it 
possible for a spouse to support himself or herself and the 
parties' children in a lifestyle similar to that which had been 
enjoyed by the family during the marriage, even though the 
spouse who had been the breadwinner is no longer part of the 
household.  See Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 296 (2009) ("If 
a supporting spouse has the ability to pay, the recipient 
spouse's need for support is generally the amount needed to 
allow that spouse to maintain the lifestyle he or she enjoyed 
prior to termination of the marriage"). 
While it often may be the case that there is some measure 
17 
 
of mutual dependence and benefit enjoyed by formerly married 
parties where one party is paying the other court-ordered 
alimony, that alone would not convert court-ordered payments 
into an economic marital partnership.  But the situation is 
different where a party continues to make such payments after he 
or she returns to live in the former marital home with the 
former spouse and enjoys the benefits of daily family 
interaction and connection, and the parties present themselves 
to the community as married, as was the case here.  We conclude 
that there was no error in the judge's decision to include in 
the length of the parties' marriage the approximately five and 
one-half years that the parties lived together and maintained a 
common household.  This conclusion is supported by the judge's 
findings that the parties both "contributed to the economic 
marital partnership" during that time period.  The determination 
also is consistent with the Legislature's manifest intent to 
include within the length of a marriage that period of 
cohabitation during which the parties are engaged in an economic 
marital partnership.  See G. L. c. 208, § 48 ("the court may 
increase the length of the marriage if there is evidence that 
the parties' economic marital partnership began during their 
cohabitation period prior to the marriage"); G. L. c. 208, 
§ 53 (a) (requiring consideration of, among other things, length 
of marriage, in determining appropriate form, amount, and 
18 
 
duration of alimony). 
We turn to the length of the parties' first marriage.  The 
alimony reform act does not provide direct guidance on the 
calculation to be used where two individuals previously were 
married to each other, subsequently were divorced, remarried, 
and then were divorced a second time.12  As discussed above, 
however, the act expressly provides a judge with discretion to 
increase the length of a marriage for purposes of calculation of 
alimony where there is evidence that the parties' economic 
marital partnership began prior to the marriage during a period 
of the parties' cohabitation.  See G. L. c. 208, § 48.  Nothing 
in the act requires that the period of cohabitation that results 
in a "legal marriage" and "the parties' economic marital 
partnership" must directly precede the date of the marriage.  
Id.  The Legislature could not have intended to exclude from the 
length-of-a-marriage calculation a previous period of time 
during which the parties were legally married (and thus 
presumably engaged in an economic marital partnership and 
                                                 
12 We note that G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (2), provides that if 
alimony is reduced or suspended as a result of a recipient 
spouse maintaining a common household with another person, 
"alimony . . .  may be reinstated upon termination of the 
recipient's common household relationship."  The next section 
provides:  "Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit 
alimony reinstatement after the recipient's remarriage, except 
by the parties' express written agreement."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (e).  It appears from their context that these provisions 
do not implicate remarriage or cohabitation of the recipient and 
payor spouse. 
19 
 
maintaining a common household), while including a period of 
cohabitation that involves participation in an economic marital 
partnership.  Such a result would be absurd.  See Flemings v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 375-376 
(2000) ("If a sensible construction is available, we shall not 
construe a statute . . . to produce absurd results").  
Therefore, we conclude that the judge properly included the 
length of the first marriage in the calculation of the over-all 
length of the parties' marriage.13 
Nothing in the act, however, supports a conclusion that a 
judge may include, as part of the over-all length of marriage, 
the time during which the parties neither were legally married 
nor engaged in an economic marital partnership.  Here, the 
judge's only stated rationale for including in the over-all 
length of the marriage the period between the parties' first 
                                                 
13 We reject Christopher's argument that a provision of the 
parties' 2004 separation agreement, whereby both parties agreed 
to "waive, renounce and relinquish . . . all and every interest 
of any kind of character which either may now have or may 
hereafter acquire in or to any real or personal property of the 
other, whether now owned or hereafter acquired by either," 
prevents the judge from including the time of the first marriage 
as part of the length of marriage.  The 2004 separation 
agreement resolved claims arising out of the first marriage and 
divorce; it did not, and could not, contemplate claims arising 
from subsequent events, such as their second marriage and a 
second divorce.  For the purpose of the second divorce, which 
occurred after the passage of the alimony reform act, the terms 
of the statute control the length of marriage.  See Chin v. 
Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 534 (2015) (discussing prospective 
application of alimony reform act). 
20 
 
divorce and the date they began cohabiting was the observation 
that "[t]he parties have been in a relationship, with only a 
brief period of separation, for eighteen years."  Even accepting 
the judge's description of this fifty-month period as "brief" 
within the context of a relationship spanning eighteen years, it 
was improper to extend the length of the marriage by this period 
in the absence of any evidence that the parties were 
participating in an economic marital partnership during that 
time. 
There was no evidence introduced that the parties' 
relationship during this period was different from any other two 
individuals who previously had been married and thereafter 
shared custody of their children, with one former spouse 
obligated to make family support payments to the other.  
Immediately following the first divorce, unlike their subsequent 
period of cohabitation, the parties did not share a primary 
residence, did not present themselves to their community or 
otherwise refer to each other as husband and wife, and did not 
plan their daily activities and schedules together.  Merely 
paying court-ordered support, and having amicable arrangements 
for care of the children, does not, without more, define an 
economic marital partnership.  We conclude that the judge erred 
in including this period as part of his calculation of the 
length of the marriage.  For purposes of calculating alimony in 
21 
 
this case, the length of the parties' marriage does not include 
the time from the date of service of the divorce complaint in 
the first marriage in April, 2003, until the period of 
cohabitation began in May, 2007. 
Ellen contends that, even if this period is excluded, the 
alimony award nonetheless may be affirmed because the judge was 
permitted to make a deviation from the presumptive duration of, 
as well as the presumptive limits on the amount of, a general 
term alimony award.  See G. L. c. 208, § 53 (e).  We recognize 
that the act authorizes a judge to make deviations in setting an 
alimony award based on factors including age, health status, 
inability to work full time in the future, and "any other factor 
that the court deems relevant and material."  See id.  The act, 
however, contemplates a deviation in the duration and amount of 
the alimony award, not a deviation in the calculation of the 
length of the marriage.  See id.  Although the length of a 
marriage is the central factor in establishing the limits of an 
alimony award, it remains a distinct concept that must be 
calculated independently from the duration or amount of alimony.  
See G. L. c. 208, § 48.  Other than including a period of 
cohabitation during which the parties maintained an economic 
marital partnership, the alimony reform act affords no 
discretion to a judge in calculating the length of a marriage 
based on the factors listed in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (e), which 
22 
 
apply only to the amount and duration of alimony payments. 
 
Moreover, while a judge has discretion to deviate from a 
presumptive alimony award, such a deviation must be made "upon 
written findings that deviation is necessary."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 53 (e).  See G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b); Holmes v. Holmes, 467 
Mass. 653, 658 (2014).  Here, the judge made no written findings 
in support of a deviation, and did not state that he was 
adopting such a deviation.    
 
Conclusion.  Because the alimony award was based on an 
incorrect calculation of the length of the parties' marriage, 
the judgment establishing the amount and duration of alimony is 
vacated.  The matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On 
remand, in light of the revised length of marriage, Christopher 
may seek reconsideration of the division of marital property and 
the allocation of educational expenses for the children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.