Title: State v. Gaines

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: April 30, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
ARTISSA DEHONDA GAINES,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC 040343619; CA
A124872; SC S055031)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 7, 2008.
Harry R. Carson,
Metropolitan Public Defender, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs
for petitioner on review.
Anna M. Joyce,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
LINDER, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
*Appeal from Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Lewis B. Lawrence,
Judge. 211 Or App 356, 155
P3d 61, modified and adh'd to as modified on recons, 213 Or App 211, 159 P3d 1291 (2007).
LINDER, J.
Defendant was convicted of
obstructing governmental or judicial administration based on her oral refusal
to cooperate in being photographed after she was arrested and lodged in a
county jail.  Under ORS 162.235(1), a person commits the offense of obstructing
governmental or judicial administration if he or she "intentionally
obstructs, impairs or hinders the administration of law or other governmental
or judicial function by means of intimidation, force, physical or economic
interference or obstacle."  The issue that this case presents is whether
defendant's refusal to cooperate was a "means of * * * physical * * *
interference or obstacle" within the meaning of the statute.  The Court of
Appeals concluded that it was and affirmed defendant's conviction.   State
v. Gaines, 211 Or App 356, 361, 155 P3d 61, modified and adh'd to as
modified on recons, 213 Or App 211, 159 P3d 1291 (2007).  As we will
explain, we hold that a person's mere failure to act in compliance with a
lawful directive, without more, does not violate the statute.  We therefore
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of conviction.
Because this issue arises on
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, we state the facts in the light
most favorable to the state.  State v. Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 471, 111 P3d
1131 (2005).  In January 2004, defendant was arrested and lodged in a county
jail on an unrelated charge.  Defendant remained incarcerated at that facility
when, on March 7, 2004, Corrections Sergeant Jacobs reviewed prisoner booking
photographs and discovered that defendant's file contained only a profile
photograph and not also a frontal photograph of her.  Jacobs informed
defendant, who was in her cell, that she needed to proceed to the booking area (which
was in the basement) to take that photograph.  Defendant orally refused and became
teary-eyed and uncooperative.  Jacobs decided not to force the issue at that
time.  Instead, he told defendant that he would speak with her about it the next
time that he visited her housing unit in the jail.
One week later, Jacobs again approached
defendant and told her that she needed to go to the basement to have the
photograph taken.  Defendant again orally refused and, in addition, asked to
speak to her attorney.  To avoid using physical force, Jacobs again did not
press the issue.  Jacobs instead told defendant that she could first speak to
her attorney and that they would resolve the issue the next time that he was in
her housing unit.
 On March 20, 2004, Jacobs approached
defendant a third time.  Defendant told Jacobs that her attorney had advised
her that Jacobs could not lawfully take her photograph unless he produced the
relevant law in writing.  Jacobs informed defendant that he was not obligated
to produce policies or laws.  He then gave defendant a direct order to proceed
to the basement to have her photograph taken.  For a third time, defendant voiced
her unwillingness to comply.  In response, Jacobs informed defendant that he
was placing her on disciplinary status until she complied with his order.  He
then sent defendant to her cell.
After defendant's third refusal,
Jacobs checked the computer reports and discovered that defendant also had refused
to cooperate during the initial booking process.  According to those reports,
defendant had turned her head to the side each time that the officers had
attempted to take a frontal photograph of her.  The reports also indicated that
the officers had been required to resort to physical force to fingerprint
defendant and dress her in jail garments.  Due to defendant's resistance, the
booking process took 17 hours to complete, instead of the normal three hours or
so.
Given defendant's conduct during the
initial booking process, Jacobs concluded that defendant likely would respond
with physical resistance if Jacobs tried to force her to have her photograph
taken.  Rather than prompt a physical confrontation with defendant, Jacobs
charged defendant by information with obstructing governmental or judicial
administration, in violation of ORS 162.235(1).  The information alleged that
defendant, "on or about March 21, 2004," did "unlawfully and
intentionally obstruct, impair and hinder the administration of law by means of
physical interference and obstacle."(1)
Defendant was tried in a bench
trial.  Jacobs's testimony for the state established that defendant orally had refused
to go to the booking area to be photographed and took no action to cooperate. 
Beyond that oral refusal and her physical inaction, the state produced no
evidence of any physical resistance on defendant's part.  At the close of the
state's evidence, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that her
oral refusal to go to the booking area in the basement to have her picture
taken did not constitute a means of "physical * * * interference or
obstacle" within the meaning of ORS 162.235.  The trial court denied the
motion.  At the conclusion of the trial, the court found defendant guilty of the
charge.
On appeal, defendant challenged that
ruling, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that
"defendant's failure to move when ordered to do so obstructed Jacobs's
efforts to take her photograph 'by means of * * * physical [* * *] interference
[] or obstacle.'" Gaines, 211 Or App at 361.  We allowed
defendant's petition for review.
The question presented -- i.e.,
whether defendant's conduct, as described, constituted a "means of * * *
physical * * * interference or obstacle" within the meaning of ORS 162.235(1)
-- poses an issue of statutory interpretation.  The methodology that Oregon
courts follow in interpreting statutes is a distillation of settled interpretative
principles, some of which have been codified in Oregon statutes since early
statehood and others of which have been articulated in this court's case law
for many years.  Mastriano v. Board of Parole, 342 Or 684, 691, 159 P3d
1151 (2007).  The methodology, as outlined in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), entails three
sequential levels of analysis to determine the legislature's intent.  First,
the court examines the text and context of the statute.  Id. at 610-11. 
If the legislature's intent is obvious from that first level of analysis,
"further inquiry is unnecessary."  Id. at 611.  "If, but
only if," the legislature's intent is not obvious from the text and
context inquiry, "the court will then move to the second level, which is
to consider legislative history[.]"  Id. at 611.(2)
If the legislature's intent remains unclear after examining legislative history,
"the court may resort to general maxims of statutory construction to aid
in resolving the remaining uncertainty."  Id. at 612.
As a preliminary matter, defendant argues
that this court's so-called "PGE methodology" for interpreting
statutes has been legislatively changed.  Specifically, relying on amendments
to ORS 174.020, defendant asserts that the court now must consider legislative
history at the outset of the analysis and must give that history the same weight
as the court gives to text and context.  In other words, according to
defendant, the court is statutorily bound to consider a statute's legislative
history on equal footing with its text and context, whether or not the statute
is ambiguous.  We begin with that issue.
ORS 174.020 codifies -- as it has for
many years -- the "cardinal rule" of statutory construction that a
court "shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible."  See
Holman Trf. Co. et al v. Portland et al, 196 Or 551, 564, 249 P2d 175
(1952) (so characterizing the rule when it was codified at OCLA § 2-217).  In
2001, the legislature added provisions directed specifically to the court's
consideration of legislative history.  As amended (and with the 2001 additions
italicized), the statute provides:
"(1)(a) In the construction of a statute, a
court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.
"(b) To assist a court in its
construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the
statute.  
"(2) When a general and particular provision
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular
intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular
intent.       
"(3) A court may limit its consideration
of legislative history to the information that the parties provide to the
court.  A court shall give the weight to the legislative history that the court
considers to be appropriate."
ORS 174.020 (emphasis added).
A threshold question for our
resolution, then, is:  What did the legislature intend with the addition of
those provisions?  That question, paradoxically, requires us to interpret the 2001
amendments, which we ordinarily would do using the PGE methodology that
defendant asserts the amendments have changed.  We thus are faced with a
conundrum -- if we follow the settled PGE methodology to determine
whether the 2001 amendments changed that methodology, and if the text and
context are sufficiently plain to preclude consideration of legislative
history, we run afoul of what ORS 174.020 requires, if defendant's argument is
correct.  For the limited purpose of resolving the meaning of the amendments to
the statute, therefore, we begin with text and context, as we ordinarily would do. 
We then also consider, regardless of any lack of ambiguity in that text, the
legislative history pertaining to what the legislature intended with the 2001
amendments to the statute.
Textually, paragraph (1)(b) of ORS
174.020 provides that a party "may" offer legislative history to the
court to assist in the construction of a statute.  Subsection (3) complements that
provision.  It states that the court "may" limit its consideration of
legislative history to what the parties have offered and declares that the
court "shall" give the legislative history the weight that the court
"considers to be appropriate."  Those 2001 amendments to the statute
are reasonably straightforward and provide, in effect, for three things.  First,
a party is statutorily entitled, but not obligated, to offer the court
legislative history.  Second, the court permissibly may limit its consideration
to that history; the court is not obligated to independently research
legislative history.  Third, the court may give whatever weight it deems
appropriate to the legislative history that a party offers.
In those respects, the 2001
amendments would seem to work little change to preexisting practices.  No
procedural rule or practice in the past has limited a party's ability to present
legislative history to a court, ambiguity or no ambiguity.  Nothing has ever
compelled the court -- other than its own resolve to correctly discern legislative
intent -- to go beyond the legislative history proffered by the parties.  And,
the use that the courts have made of legislative history traditionally has been
for the courts to decide.
Relying on legislative history, however,
defendant argues that the 2001 amendments require a court to consult
legislative history at the first level -- that is, along with text and context,
and to give that legislative history "weight equal to the weight given to
text and context."  For the reasons that we have already identified, we
have reviewed that legislative history in this case.(3) 
The legislative history provides three insights that are consistent with the
statute's plain text.  
First, the legislature intended that,
if a party proffered legislative history, a reviewing court not only would be
free to consult that history together with text and context, but that the court
in fact would do so.  In that regard, a key sponsor of the bill, Representative
Max Williams, testified that the 2001 amendments were intended to overcome the
"harsh and limiting construct" of the PGE methodology of
interpretation, which that legislator (and perhaps others) viewed as precluding
the court's consideration of legislative history unless and until the court
identified an ambiguity in a statute's text.  Tape Recording, Senate Committee
on Judiciary, HB 3677, May 15, 2001, Tape 139, Side A (statement of Rep Max
Williams).  Williams specifically stated that the amendments were intended to
"rais[e] the court's ability to consider legislative history to the same
level, not above, but to the same level as text and context."  Id.;
see also Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3677, Apr 18,
2001, Tape 77, Side A (statement of Rep Max Williams) (similarly explaining
that the bill would require a court to consider legislative history "at
the same level as text and context").  In that respect, the amendments were
intended to "effectuate some minor change to PGE[.]"  Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Apr 18, 2001, Tape 77, Side A (statement
of Rep Max Williams).(4)
Second, and equally important, the
legislative history confirms that the legislature intended the courts to retain
full discretion to determine what weight -- if any -- to give to proffered legislative history in analyzing a
statute's meaning.  Instead, "the weight to be given to the legislative
history will be what the court considers to be appropriate."  Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3677, Apr 18, 2001, Tape 77, Side A
(statement of Rep Max Williams); see also Tape Recording, Senate
Committee on Judiciary, May 15, 2001, Tape 139, Side A (statement of Rep Max
Williams).  "To mandate more," Williams cautioned, "would be
both problematic and imprudent.  We want judges to judge."  Id.  The
legislative history thus makes it clear that the legislature specifically intended
not to mandate or intrude on that traditional province of the
judicial branch.  The history therefore refutes, rather than supports,
defendant's position that the 2001 amendments were intended to mandate that
equal weight be given to text, context, and legislative history.  
Finally, the legislative history
demonstrates the complementary aspects of the legislature's dual objectives of
raising consideration of legislative history to the first level of PGE,
but not intruding on the court's role in evaluating the worth of that legislative
history.  The 2001 amendments, in their final form, were viewed as striking a
delicate balance between the legislature's role in ensuring that its enactments
are interpreted in the way that the legislature intended and the court's
independent role in performing that interpretative exercise.  To that end, the
legislature intended, on the one hand, to ensure that the court would not turn
a blind eye to pertinent legislative history if a party proffered it.  On the
other hand, the legislature in no way intended to dictate what consideration
or weight would attach to that history.(5)
The legislative history supporting
the 2001 amendments to ORS 174.020 does not alter our understanding of the
statute's meaning, as informed by the text itself.  The legislative history does,
however, illuminate the problem that the legislature intended the amendments to
ORS 174.020 to solve -- i.e., those amendments would remove the barrier
that the PGE methodology placed on the consideration of legislative
history and instead place legislative history on a par with text and context.  The
legislature thus intended to ease the unyielding "if, but only if"
constraint that PGE appeared to have placed on the court's ability to
even review and consider otherwise pertinent legislative history.  See PGE,
317 Or at 611 ("If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not
clear from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second
level, which is to consider legislative history[.]"); see also Owens v.
Maass, 323 Or 430, 449, 918 P2d 808 (1996) (Unis, J., dissenting) (majority
errs in finding an ambiguity in the statutory text; because there is no
ambiguity, the analysis must stop at the first level of PGE, and
legislative history should not be considered).  Beyond that, the legislature
left it to judicial discretion to decide what value to place on legislative
history proffered by a party.
To be sure, in practice, this court may
not always have adhered strictly to the unyielding sequential methodology that PGE
announced.  At least some of this court's cases have reviewed and
considered the legislative history, without identifying an ambiguity, and
sometimes after concluding affirmatively that there was none.(6) 
Even so, PGE said what it said, and the methodology that it announced
generally has been understood to foreclose any review and consideration of
legislative history in the absence of an ambiguity in a statute's text.  The legislature
clearly intended that, by declaring that a party may offer the court
legislative history, the 2001 amendments to ORS 174.020 would have the
practical effect of eliminating that bar.  Equally important, however, the legislature
also intended the court to retain the authority to determine, as a
discretionary matter, what weight, if any, to give that legislative history.  A
court need only consider legislative history "for what it's worth" --
and what it is worth is for the court to determine.
This court remains responsible for
fashioning rules of statutory interpretation that, in the court's judgment,
best serve the paramount goal of discerning the legislature's intent.  In that
regard, as this court and other authorities long have observed, there is no
more persuasive evidence of the intent of the legislature than "'the words
by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.'"  State
ex rel Cox v. Wilson, 277 Or 747, 750, 562 P2d 172 (1977) (quoting U. S.
v. American Trucking Ass'ns., 310 US 534, 542-44, 60 S Ct 1059, 84 L Ed
1345 (1940)).  Only the text of a statute receives the consideration and
approval of a majority of the members of the legislature, as required to have
the effect of law.  Or Const, Art IV, § 25.  The formal requirements of
lawmaking produce the best source from which to discern the legislature's
intent, for it is not the intent of the individual legislators that governs,
but the intent of the legislature as formally enacted into law: 
"[N]ot only is it important that the will of the
law-makers be expressed, but it is also essential that it be express in due
form of law; since nothing is law simply and solely because the legislators
will that it shall be, unless they have expressed their determination to that
effect, in the mode pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the
power, and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered
essential."  
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations 130 (1868).  For those reasons, text and context remain
primary, and must be given primary weight in the analysis.  Nothing in the 2001
amendments to ORS 174.020 purports to require the courts to retreat from that
long-standing recognition.
We therefore conclude that, in light
of the 2001 amendments to ORS 174.020, the appropriate methodology for
interpreting a statute is as follows.  The first step remains an examination of
text and context.  PGE, 317 Or at 610-11.  But, contrary to this court's
pronouncement in PGE, we no longer will require an ambiguity in the text
of a statute as a necessary predicate to the second step -- consideration of
pertinent legislative history that a party may proffer.  Instead, a party is
free to proffer legislative history to the court, and the court will consult it
after examining text and context, even if the court does not perceive an
ambiguity in the statute's text, where that legislative history appears useful
to the court's analysis.(7) 
However, the extent of the court's consideration of that history, and the
evaluative weight that the court gives it, is for the court to determine. The third, and final step, of the interpretative methodology is unchanged.  If the legislature's intent remains unclear after examining text, context, and legislative history, the court may resort to general maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving the remaining uncertainty.
With regard to this changed methodology, we clarify that a
party seeking to overcome seemingly plain and unambiguous text with legislative
history has a difficult task before it.  Legislative history may be used to
confirm seemingly plain meaning and even to illuminate it; a party also may use
legislative history to attempt to convince a court that superficially clear
language actually is not so plain at all -- that is, that there is a kind of
latent ambiguity in the statute.(8) 
For those or similar purposes, whether the court will conclude that the particular
legislative history on which a party relies is of assistance in determining
legislative intent will depend on the substance and probative quality of the
legislative history itself.(9)
 We emphasize again that ORS 174.020 obligates the court to consider proffered
legislative history only for whatever it is worth-- and what it is worth is for
the court to decide.  When the text of a statute is truly capable of only one
meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history that suggests -- or even
confirms -- that legislators intended something different.(10)
With that understanding of ORS
174.020, and the role it gives -- and does not give -- to legislative history
in the court's task of interpreting statutes, we turn to the merits of defendant's
challenge to her conviction.  ORS 162.235(1), which defines the offense of
obstructing governmental administration, provides:  
"A person commits the crime of obstructing
governmental or judicial administration if the person intentionally obstructs,
impairs or hinders the administration of law or other governmental or judicial
function by means of intimidation, force, physical or economic interference or
obstacle."
The principal dispute between the parties is over the meaning
of the terms "physical interference or obstacle."(11) 
On review in this court, the parties renew the arguments that they made to the
Court of Appeals.(12)
Defendant, for her part, does not
dispute that, when she refused to accompany the officer to the booking area, she
obstructed, impaired, or hampered the performance of a governmental function. 
In defendant's view, however, she did not do so through a physical means. 
Defendant urges that the statute requires some form of affirmative physical
action by a defendant and that it is not enough that a defendant "verbally"
refuses to comply with an order to take physical action.
The state counters that defendant did
more in this case than merely verbally refuse to do something; she in fact did
not move her body from one place to another.  The state emphasizes that
defendant could have said nothing or could have agreed to go to the booking
area and, under the state's theory, she still would have violated the statute
based on her failure to physically go to the booking area when told to do so.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the
state's line of argument, reasoning that "[a] failure to move one's body
can fairly be said to 'relate to the body.'"  Gaines, 211 Or App at
360.  The court explained:
"In State v. Mattilla, 77 Or App 219, 712 P2d
832, rev den, 301 Or 77 (1986), sheriff's deputies charged with evicting
the defendant from the premises ordered him to remove the crutch blocking their
way into the home, and defendant refused.  The defendant argued that his
conduct was not 'physical interference,' and we held that evidence of the
defendant's refusal to remove the crutch and intent to block the deputies from
entering could support a conviction under the statute.  As in the present case,
the defendant did not thwart the deputies' efforts by means of bodily movements. 
Rather, in Mattilla, the defendant verbally refused to use his body to
move something (a crutch), thereby impeding the deputies' performances of their
lawful duties.  We see no meaningful distinction between the facts of Mattila
and the facts of this case.  Here, defendant verbally refused to move something
(her body), thereby impeding Jacobs's performance of his lawful duties.  We
therefore conclude that defendant's failure to move when ordered to do so
obstructed Jacobs's efforts to take her photograph 'by means of * * * physical
[* * *] interference [] or obstacle.'"
Id. at 360-61.
We begin -- as exercises in statutory
interpretation always should begin -- with the text of the statute.  The
legislature did not define any of the terms in the phrase "physical
interference or obstacle."  They are, however, terms of common usage.  See
PGE, 317 Or at 611 (court ordinarily presumes that legislature intended terms
to have plain, natural, and ordinary meaning).  "Interference" commonly
means an act that meddles in or hampers an activity or process.(13) 
Similarly, "obstacle" commonly is something that hampers or halts
action or progress by standing in the way of that action or progress.(14) 
Finally, "physical," as used in this context, commonly means
something material, including things of or related to the body.(15)
 The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant's
failure to move was "of the body" -- in other words, defendant's inaction
was physical in nature.  That reasoning, however, emphasized the term
"physical" in isolation, rather than as an adjective that modifies the
words interference and obstacle.  What the statute requires is a physical interference
or obstacle.  As a phrase, "physical interference or obstacle"
connotes a material or bodily act or means of standing or blocking or otherwise
physically interposing someone or something in the way of an activity or
process, and thereby halting or hampering that activity or process.
 So understood, mere inaction, without
more, would not seem to qualify.  More to the point for purposes of this case,
a person who takes no action to assist a governmental official by moving from
point A to point B, under circumstances where that person is not physically
blocking or in the way of the official, would not be a "physical
interference or obstacle," as those words are ordinarily understood.  It
runs counter to the common and natural meaning of those words to conclude that
something or someone is a "physical interference or obstacle" to a
governmental function because that someone or something is not where the
government needs someone or something to be, rather than because the someone or
something is tangibly in the government's way.
We thus initially conclude, based on
our examination of the text of ORS 162.235(1), that defendant has the better of
the argument -- that is, for a defendant to obstruct a governmental function by
means of a "physical interference or obstacle" requires some conduct
or act on a defendant's part that results in a bodily or material obstruction
to a governmental activity or process.  The text does not support a conclusion
that mere inaction or mere lack of cooperation is within the statute's scope.
The state, however, cites two other
criminal statutes that, the state argues, provides contextual support for its
position.  The first is ORS 162.247(1)(b), which prohibits "[i]nterfering
with a peace officer" and provides, in part, "A person commits the crime
of interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer if the
person, knowing that another person is a peace officer * * * [r]efuses to obey
a lawful order by the peace officer * * *."  The other statute is ORS
162.315(1), which prohibits "[r]esisting arrest," and provides, in
part, "A person commits the crime of resisting arrest if the person
intentionally resists a person known by the person to be a peace officer or
parole and probation officer in making an arrest."  In both statutes, the
legislature expressly enacted an exception for "passive resistance"
and provided that such resistance does not violate the statute.  ORS
162.247(3)(b); ORS 162.315(2)(c).  Relying on those express exceptions, the
state urges that the legislature's failure to include a similar express
exclusion in ORS 162.235 must be viewed as a purposeful omission, with the
result that passive resistance falls within the conduct that the statute
proscribes.
The state's reliance on those other statutes
is misplaced, however.  Neither statute is limited to "physical"
conduct.  The offense of interfering with an officer requires only that the
person refuse to obey a lawful order, not that he or she disobey in a
physical way.  Likewise, the offense of "resisting arrest" requires
only that someone intentionally "resists" arrest, and
"resists" is defined to include "physical force or any other
means * * * includ[ing] behavior clearly intended to prevent being taken into
custody * * *."  ORS 162.315(2)(c).  Because of their greater breadth in
terms of proscribed conduct, those statutes more naturally might be understood
to encompass passive or otherwise nonphysical resistance or disobedience, and
an express exemption for "passive resistance" was one way for the
legislature to narrow their reach.  In other words, those statutes, because they do
not use the "physical" qualifier that ORS 162.235 includes, are not
analogues to ORS 162.235.(16)
Consistently with ORS 174.020(1)(b), as
we earlier explained, we do not end our analysis at text and context, however. 
We next consider the legislative history that the parties have proffered, along
with any pertinent legislative history that we  independently have examined. 
We again caution that, in considering legislative history, we will not lightly
disregard our understanding of the statute based on the common and natural meaning
of its text and context.  Stated another way, highly probative and persuasive
legislature history would have to inform our understanding of the meaning of
the words for us to conclude that "physical interference or obstacle"
includes someone's failure, without more, to cooperate by physically assisting
a governmental official.   In this instance, as we will explain, the
legislative history neither reveals a latent ambiguity in the words nor
contradicts our understanding of the import of the words themselves.  To the
contrary, the legislative history corroborates the meaning that the text itself
conveys.
ORS 162.235 was enacted as part of the
1971 Legislative Assembly's comprehensive revision of Oregon's criminal code.  That
revision began with the creation, in 1967, of the Criminal Law Revision
Commission.  State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 416, 605 P2d 671 (1980)
(describing history of 1971 criminal code revision).  As this court most
recently has explained:
"The Commission divided responsibility for drafting the
revised criminal code among three subcommittees.  Those subcommittees produced
drafts of the code and submitted those drafts, together with commentaries on
them, to the Commission, which produced a final draft of the proposed code and
presented the final draft and commentary to the legislature.  This court has
looked to both the commentary and the discussions that preceded the adoption of
the final draft as legislative history for the resulting laws." 
State v. Lonergan, 344 Or 15, 25 n 3, 176 P3d 374
(2008) (Kistler, J., dissenting; citation omitted); see also State v. Woodley, 306 Or 458,
462, 760 P2d 884 (1988) (unless a contrary indication exists, court assumes
that the legislature accepted the Commission's explanations for its drafting
choices); State v. Knowles, 289 Or 813, 822, 618 P2d 1245 (1980) (the
extensive Commission minutes, including the commentaries to the preliminary
drafts, are a rich source of legislative history); Garcia, 288 Or at 416
(same).
The commentary to the preliminary
draft of what would later become ORS 162.235 explained that the statute was based
on a composite of the parallel provisions of Michigan, New York, and the Model
Penal Code.  Criminal Law Revision Commission, Article 24,  Preliminary Draft
No. 1, June 1969, p 11 ("Preliminary Draft No. 1").  The statute was
intended to be a "general provision directed at suppression of the unlawful
obstruction of governmental functions," id. at 5, which would serve
as a residual provision that would reach the obstruction of governmental
functions not covered by more specific sections of the criminal code (e.g.,
resisting arrest and bribery).  Id. at 7; Model Penal Code § 242.1,
comment 2 at 203 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Model Penal
Code").  To that end,  the word "obstructs" was intended to have
an expansive meaning consistently with its accepted judicial meaning -- i.e.,
"to impede, to interpose impediments, to the hindrance or frustration of
some act or service; as to obstruct an officer in the execution of his
duty."  Preliminary Draft No. 1 at 6 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
1228 (4th ed 1951)).  Also, the provision does not require that the governmental
function be completely frustrated or prevented.  Rather, the provision is
concerned equally with conduct that makes a governmental function more
difficult or slow to accomplish.  Id. at 6-7; Model Penal Code, comment
2 at 203-04.
To temper the provision's breadth, however,
the drafters incorporated significant limitations as well.  As the commentary
to the Model Penal Code characterized it, the provision was intended to be an
"amalgam of generality and constraint."  Model Penal Code, comment 2
at 203.  One significant constraint is that the provision requires a person to
have acted intentionally and with a conscious objective to obstruct a
governmental function.  Also, the provision requires success -- that is, a
governmental function actually must be hindered or impeded to some degree.  Preliminary
Draft No. 1 at 11; Model Penal Code, comment 2 at 204.  Finally, and most
significantly for purposes of this case, the provision specifies and limits the
means by which the obstruction is created.  Those prohibited means include,
among others, "physical interference or obstacle."  The comments to
the Model Penal Code explain that the point of that wording was to ensure that
the provision included more than violence and force, but was still limited to
some form of physical action:  "[T]he section [through the phrase
"physical interference or obstacle"] reaches any affirmative act
of physical interference not explicitly excepted, whether or not
violence is involved."  Model Penal Code, comment 3 at 204.(17) 

In some tension with that observation,
the drafters of Oregon's provision suggested that, in the right circumstance,
the necessary "physical" act might be a "passive indirect, or
circuitous" one.  Preliminary Draft No. 1 at 7.  Specifically, the
preliminary draft quoted 48 ALR 749 (1927), a legal annotation that made the
following observation about the reach of statutes around the country that
prohibited resisting or obstructing a police officer in the line of duty:
"[Obstruction] includes any passive, indirect, or
circuitous impediments to the service or execution of process; such as
hindering or preventing an officer by not opening a door or removing an
obstacle, or concealing or removing property.  So that, although, to establish
a case of resistance, it must appear that the party was personally present and
personally resisting, liability to the charge of obstructing may be established
by showing that the party has willfully caused any impediment or hindrance to
be interposed, though not personally present and actively co-operating in the
direct act of obstructing.  It should appear, however, that such party, in some
manner and at some stage, aided or abetted the act of obstructing." 
As that passage indicates, however, the "physical
interference or obstacle" still must entail a material or tangible barrier
or impediment that physically impedes a governmental function or activity.  In
the examples given, inaction or passive conduct potentially violates the
statute not because inaction is itself a physical act, but because the inaction
leaves a physical impediment in the way of a government function, under
circumstances where the person bears some responsibility for having placed it
in government's way.  Nothing in that quoted passage suggests that a mere
failure of a person to move from point A to point B, without more, would
qualify as a physical interference or obstacle.
In all events, later in the
preliminary draft, the drafters made clear that a mere refusal to act or to obey
an order would not suffice to violate the obstruction statute.  The drafters made
that policy choice by following Michigan's lead in not including, contrary to
the approach of the Model Penal Code and New York, an "unlawful act"
as an additional means of obstructing a governmental function.  The drafters
explained:
"The Model Penal Code extend[s] coverage
also to 'any other unlawful act.'  This language was incorporated into the New
York Revised Penal Code section 195.05 as 'any independently unlawful act.' 
The term was not included in Michigan Revised Criminal Code section 4505.  The
rationale for the Michigan revisor's rejection of this extension of coverage is
stated in their committee commentary:
"'This provision would, of course, bar such
acts of non-physical obstruction as the impersonation of another in taking a
civil service examination on his behalf.  But many such independently unlawful
acts are already made illegal by special provisions dealing with the particular
matter involved * * * moreover, many others are of minor significance * * * the
failure to file a report required by law, for example, is an unlawful act which
may obstruct government operations, but it hardly belongs on par with
obstruction by physical interference.  The same can be said for the failure to
perform various other legal obligations, including, perhaps, the failure to pay
a parking ticket.'  (See Michigan Revised Criminal Code, Committee Commentary,
p 328).
"Your reporter concurs with the rationale
behind the Michigan approach."
Preliminary Draft No. 1 pp 10-11 (omissions in original).
Those parts of the legislative
history are, in our view, the most informative for purposes of the issue before
us.(18) 
And, they confirm for us that the legislature intended what the words most
naturally convey.  To violate the statute by means of a "physical
interference or obstacle," a person must engage in some act that results
in a bodily or material obstruction to a governmental activity or process.   The
act may not always have to be an affirmative and direct one.  The legislative
history suggests that inaction will suffice, if the inaction results in leaving
a physical object or barrier in the way of a governmental activity, under
circumstances in which the person is responsible for it being there or
responsible for removing it.  Barricading a door in advance of the police
arriving, and then refusing to remove the barricade once they are there, should
suffice just as much as would barricading the door the moment that police try
to enter.  Likewise, hiding or securing property so that officials cannot seize
it, and then refusing to lead officials to it or to otherwise release it to
them, also would suffice.  Those examples, however, involve more than a
person's mere lack of cooperation with police in moving one's own body; rather,
they involve failing to take action to remove a physical barrier that the
person has placed in the way of a governmental activity or function.
We therefore hold that mere inaction,
as a matter of law, does not amount to "physical interference or
obstacle" within the meaning of ORS 162.235(1).   The statute is not
designed to compel people to cooperate with government any time that government
needs them to physically move their body from one locale to another for
government to most efficiently do its job.(19) 
That is not to conclude that individuals are free to disobey a lawful official
order or other command without consequence.  However, the consequences that
follow for their refusal, and the circumstances in which those consequences
will follow, are the subject of other statutes or administrative regulations.  This
statute is concerned with tangible barriers and obstacles that are placed or
left in the way of a governmental activity or process.
In this case, defendant passively
refused to accompany the officer from her cell to the booking area; she did nothing
more.  That mere refusal was not enough to convict her of a violation of ORS
162.235(1).
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. The
state relied on only defendant's third refusal (which occurred on March 20,
2004) as the basis for the charge.  The state introduced the earlier refusals
into evidence only for their bearing on defendant's intent at the time of her
third refusal. 
2. As
we discuss below, this court has not always applied the sequential PGE
test strictly.  
3. The
original bill that would have amended ORS 174.020 was House Bill (HB) 3677. 
That original bill met with significant opposition and was substantially
amended in its second hearing in the House Committee on Judiciary on April 18,
2001.  Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 3677, Apr 18, 2001,
Tape 77, Side A.  The bill that emerged from that hearing, HB 3677 A-engrossed,
passed both the House and the Senate and was the source of what became the 2001
amendments to ORS 174.020.  In reviewing the pertinent legislative history, we
have reviewed the legislative history proffered by defendant, which includes
the minutes of the pertinent hearings and a transcript of one of those
hearings.  We also have reviewed the bill file and the audio recordings of all
committee hearings on the bill.
4. In
its original form, HB 3677 expressly declared that the court must consider
"all relevant information about a statute, without regard to whether the
statute is ambiguous, including but not limited to" records of the
legislative proceedings, and also such things as "[p]ublic statements
about the purpose or meaning of the statute that were made before enactment of
the statute[.]"  Opposition to that bill led to the formation of an
informal and small workgroup, which included Williams and Justice W. Michael
Gillette (in his personal capacity and not as a representative of the Oregon
Supreme Court).  That informal workgroup drafted the alternative form of the
bill, (HB 3677-A Engrossed) that passed both the House and the Senate.  Gillette, during the April 18, 2001 hearing, described the amendments as
"far more narrowly tailored to the concern [that prompted the original
bill], which was simply to ensure that legislative history would be consulted
by a reviewing court at the first level of review, along with the wording of
the statute, the context in which the statute appears, the history of the
statute, former versions of the statute, and case law."   Testimony, House
Committee on Judiciary, HB 3677, Apr 18, 2001, Tape 77, Side A (statement of
Justice W. Michael Gillette).
5. The
complementary aspect of the amendments to ORS 174.020 is exemplified in an
exchange between the Chair of Senate Judiciary, Senator John Minnis, and the
key sponsor of the bill, Representative Max Williams.  In the Senate Judiciary
Committee's final hearing on HB 3677-A Engrossed before passing it to the
floor, Minnis described it as "a very delicate little bill."  He
asked Williams to confirm his understanding that the legislative intent behind
the bill was just to say to the Oregon Supreme Court: "[G]ee whiz,
honorable justices, should you have a case before you, would you please consider
legislative history and please take it into consideration in your deliberations
to the extent that you see it."  Tape Recording, Senate Committee on
Judiciary, HB 3766, May 15, 2001, Tape 139, Side A (statement of Sen John
Minnis).   Williams confirmed that that was "an accurate way to describe
it."  He explained that he considered it important for the court to
"determine the weight that it ought to give the legislative history,"
and he recognized that not all legislative history "is equal."  The
bill was intended to change only the PGE methodology, pursuant to which
the court would "never turn" to legislative history unless the text
was ambiguous.  Williams emphasized: "[T]his simply says that the court
shall consider [legislative history.]  Doesn't tell them the weight they have
to give it but they at least have to consider it.  * * * So I think it strikes
the very delicate balance that is necessary[.]"  Id. (statement of
Rep Max Williams).
6. In
several cases, the court has reviewed the pertinent legislative history to
confirm the meaning of the terms in the statute, without determining the terms
to be ambiguous, and sometimes after declaring them to be unambiguous.  See
Ware v. Hall, 342 Or 444, 452 n 6, 154 P3d 118 (2007) (to the extent that
text and context left any doubt about statute's meaning, legislative history
removed it); Roberts v. SAIF, 341 Or 48, 53, 136 P3d 1105 (2006) (after
examining the text of statute, and without declaring whether its meaning was in
doubt, court reviewed legislative history to confirm conclusions about the
meaning of the text); Trendwest Resorts, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 340 Or
413, 420-21 n 3, 134 P3d 932 (2006) (text of statute was sufficiently clear to
preclude consideration of legislative history; nevertheless, court reviewed history
submitted by taxpayer and found nothing in it to negate court's reading of
statutory text); Mabon v. Wilson, 340 Or 385, 391, 133 P3d 899 (2006)
(after declaring that the court was satisfied that the text, considered in
context, was not ambiguous, the court considered legislative history to
determine "whether that history undercuts in any way our preliminary
assessment of the meaning of the [statute's] wording"); Bobo v.
Kulongoski, 338 Or 111, 117-18, 107 P3d 18 (2005) (considering legislative
history without concluding that statute is ambiguous); State ex rel
Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 606, 932 P2d 1145 (1997) (court reviewed
legislative history and concluded that, "if" text and context left
any doubt as to statute's meaning, legislative history "quiets that
doubt"); Nolan v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 335, 856
P2d 305 (1993) (where text of statute suggested a particular interpretation,
court looked to legislative history for confirmation; court did not identify
any competing interpretation also suggested by the statute).
The court has also consulted the
legislative record, without first declaring the text to be ambiguous, to
determine whether the legislature modeled the statute on another jurisdiction's
legislation.  See Nakashima v. Board of Education, 344 Or 497, 512 n 18,
185 P3d 429 (2008) (court examined legislative history to confirm that federal
law was the source of distinctive terminology in statute); O'Donnell-Lamont
and Lamont, 337 Or 86, 105, 91 P3d 721 (2004), cert den, 543 US 1050
(2005) (addressing legislative history of statute, without identifying a
textual ambiguity, to consider amendments made by the legislature to conform to
federal case law developments).
7. In
his comments to the House Judiciary Committee, Gillette described the
net effect of the 2001 amendments to ORS 174.020 in these terms:
"[T]he message that is contained in [the amendments]
is: to any court, to any single trial judge, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court, please guys, don't just look at the words, look at what happened
when the words were put together in the statute, and if those assist you in
understanding what the words mean, will you please make use of it.  And if they
don't, don't."
Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3677, Apr 18,
2001, Tape 77, Side A (statement of Justice W. Michael Gillette).
8. Use
of legislative history to establish an ambiguity in a statute is analogous to
the principle in contract interpretation that, in deciding whether an ambiguity
exists, the court is not limited to mere text and context, but may consider
parol and other evidence extrinsic to the contract.  See Abercrombie v.
Hayden Corp., 320 Or 279, 292, 883 P2d 845 (1994) (articulating that
principle).
9. Justice
Graber, in a dissenting opinion in Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills,
Inc., 320 Or 509, 539 n 4, 888 P2d 544 (1995), identified only some of the
pitfalls of relying too greatly on legislative history:
"In general, an examination of legislative history is
most useful when it is able to uncover the manifest general legislative intent
behind an enactment. By contrast, an examination of legislative history is most
fraught with the potential for misconstruction, misattribution of the beliefs
of a single legislator or witness to the body as a whole, or abuse in the form
of 'padding the record' when the views of only a small number of persons on a
narrow question can be found."
10. The
legislative history suggests that at least the key sponsor of the 2001
amendments, Representative Max Williams, expected nothing different from the
courts:  "We still have to mean what we say when we say it.  We can't say,
black, and then * * * all agree that black meant white.  That's not going to
work."  Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB 3677, May 15,
2001, Tape 139, Side A (statement of Rep Max Williams).
11. In
its current form, the statute refers to "physical or economic interference
or obstacle."  Originally, however, the statute's reach was limited to
"physical interference or obstacle"; the words "or
economic" were added to the statute in 1981.  Or Laws 1981, ch 902, § 1.  We
therefore frequently quote the key terms as they were originally enacted --
that is, without "or economic" inserted in the middle of the phrase
-- because that is the text that best reflects the legislature's intent in the
original enactment, as that intent pertains to this case.  
12. Defendant
also renews her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that
she had the requisite intent to commit the crime -- i.e., that, in
refusing to be photographed, she intended to obstruct the officer's effort to
photograph her.  We need not reach that issue, given our ultimate conclusion
that defendant's failure to accompany the officer did not amount to a
"physical interference or obstacle" within the meaning of the
statute.
13. The
dictionary defines "interference" as "the act of meddling in or
hampering an activity or process * * * :  OBSTRUCTION,
INHIBITION."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1178 (unabridged
ed 2002).
14. Webster's
defines obstacle as "something which hampers or stops action or
progress.  OBSTACLE applies to anything which stands in one's way or stops
passage[.]"  Webster's at 1558.  
15. Webster's
contains two definitions that apply to the term "physical" as it is
used in this context:  (1) "of or relating to natural or material things
as opposed to things mental, moral, spiritual or imaginary" and (2)
"of or relating to the body[.]"  Webster's at 1706.   The
second is a subset of the first: something of or relating to the body is also
something natural or material.  
The legislature frequently uses the
term "bodily" when it intends to describe only acts of or relating to
the body.  See, e.g., ORS 161.085(2) ("voluntary act"
includes a "bodily movement" performed consciously); ORS
167.062(5)(a) ("Live public show"  means a public show in which human
beings, animals, or both "appear bodily" before spectators or
customers).  The context in which the term "physical" is used here --
i.e., obstructing governmental functions -- would be an odd one for the
legislature to intend to give a narrow meaning to the term
"physical."  That is, it would seem to all but frustrate the purpose
of the statute for the legislature to prohibit acts in which a person uses his
or her body to obstruct a governmental function, but not prohibit the use of a
material object or other tangible means to accomplish the same end (and indeed,
to accomplish it as well or possibly better).  As the legislative history that
we later examine confirms, the legislature intended the term
"physical" to have a broad meaning in this statutory context, rather
than be limited to "bodily" interferences.  
16. Worth
noting, as well, is that both statutory exclusions that the state relies on
were enacted after ORS 162.235, which, as we later discuss, was enacted in 1971
as part of the comprehensive overhaul of Oregon's criminal code.  See Or
Laws 1989, ch 877, § 1(2) (adding exclusion for "passive resistance"
to the resisting arrest statute); Or Laws 1997, ch 719, § 1(3) (enacting
offense of interfering with a peace officer).  Ordinarily, only statutes
enacted simultaneously with or before a statute at issue are pertinent context
for interpreting that statute.  See Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 79-80, 948
P2d 722 (1997) (so observing).  It may be that later enacted statutes can be of
some aid in interpreting an earlier one for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the legislature's adherence to certain conventions in legislative
drafting or word usage.  In all events, here, the statutes on which the state
relies are distinguishable, because they do not include the limiting term
"physical" in describing the means by which the offenses are
committed.
17. The
Model Penal Code comments, the Commission's preliminary draft of the Oregon
statute, and the commentary to the Michigan statute (which, as we later
discuss, we know was reviewed by the Oregon drafters) all use the terms
"interference" and "obstacle" interchangeably, with the
term "physical" modifying both.  The Michigan commentary contains the
only explicit mention of why both terms, "interference and obstacle,"
were used:
"[The Michigan obstruction statute] applies only to
obstruction through the use or threat to use 'violence, force, or physical
interference or obstacle.'  The key here is the reference to 'physical
interference.'  Force and violence, of course, are only forms of physical
interference; therefore, the references to these terms add nothing in and of
themselves to the scope of the statute.  They are included primarily as a way
of emphasizing that 'interference' encompasses more than obstruction by
assault.  The reference to physical 'obstacle' serves a similar function. 
Creation of a physical obstacle would of course constitute use of physical interference,
and the specific reference to obstacles is included only to re-emphasize that
[the statute] goes beyond obstruction by force."
Michigan Revised Criminal Code, § 4505 (1967) 326.
18. The
state places particular reliance on a part of the preliminary draft that
summarized a law review survey of related laws from around the country.  The
preliminary draft set out a "topic outline" from the law review
article of the fact patterns in the cases surveyed, which listed under the
topic "Physical Acts" the subtopic "Refusal to follow an
officer's order."  Preliminary Draft No. 1 at 8 (citing "Types of
Activity Encompassed by the Offense of Obstructing a Public Officer," U of
Pa L Rev 108, 388-413 (1960)).  The state reads that as a "list of
activities [that the drafters] believed to fall within [ORS 162.235]" and
evidence that the drafters "expressly intended to cover refusal to follow
officer's orders" as a means of violating the statute.  The topic outline
was immediately followed by a representative sampling of "a number of fact
situations that have been judicially construed to be either within or beyond
the ambit of kindred obstruction statutes."  Preliminary Draft No. 1 at
9.  That list included cases holding both ways -- that is, cases holding that
particular statutes had been violated by a refusal to follow an officers order
and cases in which courts had found no violation on such facts.  Id. at
9-10.  We view the discussion in the preliminary draft at that point to be
background about the law generally, rather than a discussion that was in any
way specific to the statute being proposed.  
19. To
be sure, the context of a jail setting, where inmate compliance with orders and
directives are important to the safety of other inmates and the orderly conduct
of the facility, raises particular concerns if officials have no means to
enforce their directives short of physical force or confrontation.  But, of
course, jail and prison officials have such means in the form of their
significant disciplinary authority.  See, e.g., ORS 169.076(12)
(counties to have and provide to inmates written rules for inmate conduct and
disciplinary procedures); ORS 421.105 (prison superintendents may impose
"appropriate punishment" for disobedience with prison rules); ORS
421.180 (Department of Corrections to adopt disciplinary procedures for persons
committed to its physical and legal custody).  The state's proposed
interpretation of the statute -- which would criminalize a citizen's mere
physical nonmovement when that nonmovement impairs government's efficiency --
is particularly concerning in the context of ordinary interactions of citizens vis-a-vis
their government, to which the offense of obstructing governmental or judicial
administration broadly applies.