Title: RALPH E. PLATT V. ALICE A. CREIGHTON and MURRAY C. CREIGHTON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RALPH E. PLATT V. ALICE A. CREIGHTON and MURRAY C. CREIGHTON2007 WY 18150 P.3d 1194Case Number: 06-62Decided: 01/31/2007Modified: 02/09/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RALPH E. 
PLATT,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
ALICE A. CREIGHTON andMURRAY C. CREIGHTON,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants) 
.

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

William 
D. Bagley of Bagley, Karpan, Rose & White, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Stephen 
H. Kline of Kline Law Office, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
            
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Ralph E. Platt 
(Platt) filed a Complaint alleging that the Defendants, his niece Alice A. 
Creighton and her husband Murray C. Creighton, held over 151 cows with calves 
and cows due to calve owned by him in a constructive trust as part of a "joint 
venture" in conjunction with a lease with the Platt Ranch Trust (the Trust). 
 Platt alleged that the Defendants 
had failed to account for the joint venture cattle operation and sought an 
accounting of funds, termination of the constructive trust, and a return of the 
cattle or their value.  The 
Defendants timely filed a motion for summary judgment.  Pursuant to an oral agreement with 
counsel for the Defendants, Platt filed his response and substantive materials 
after the deadline established by the district court's scheduling order.  The district court ruled that Platt's 
response to the motion for summary judgment was untimely, that no cause had been 
shown for the failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the court's scheduling order and, therefore, Platt had no materials properly 
before the court subject to consideration in ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment.  The court proceeded to 
grant the motion concluding that Platt's Complaint was barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) (LexisNexis 2005) 
(four-year statute of limitations for suits to recover an interest in personal 
property) and Cox v. City of 
Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 28, 79 P.3d 500, 509 (Wyo. 2003) (four-year 
statute of limitations for suits in equity), because the last transaction 
concerning the disputed cattle occurred on April 1, 1998 and Platt did not file 
his Complaint until June 6, 2005, which was outside the four-year limitation 
period.  Platt appeals the district 
court's ruling.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In his brief, 
Platt sets forth the following issues:

 
 
Issue 
No. 1: Did the District Court err in refusing to accept the agreement of counsel 
allowing Plaintiff additional time to respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when the response was complete and the agreed extension did not 
interfere with the time table in the Scheduling Order?

 
 
Issue 
No. 2: In the alternative, did the District Court err in refusing to recognize 
that Plaintiff's reliance on such an agreement was, at worst, excusable neglect 
as defined by W.R.C.P. Rule 6(b)?

 
 
Issue 
No. 3: Did the District Court err in making its determination based on the 
Statute of Limitations based on the record before the Court on January 20, 
2006?

 
 
Issue 
No. 4: The legal system; bench, bar and client.

 
 
In 
reply, the Defendants frame the issues as:

 
 

1.      
Did the 
District Court commit error in finding that Plaintiff's failure to file a timely 
Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was inexcusable and in 
finding that Plaintiff thus had no response before the Court relating to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment?

 
 

2.      
Did the 
District Court properly determine that the Statute of Limitations for this 
action ran prior to the action being filed?

 
 

FACTS

[¶3]      On June 6, 2005, 
Platt filed a Complaint containing the following allegations and requests for 
relief:

 
 
On 
October 10, 2001, Ralph E. Platt and his brother Wayne W. Platt, as 
tenants-in-common owning the Platt Ranch, formed the Platt Ranch Trust for the 
purpose of holding the ranch lands.

 
 
On or 
about April 1, 1998, Platt Ranch Trust leased the ranch and related assets to 
Alice A. Creighton and Murray C. Creighton, husband and wife.  The Ranch Lease Agreement provides 
that:

 
 
the 
leased property includes all of Lessor's deeded land, leased land, Forest 
Service permits, machinery, equipment, water and water rights, and improvements. 
All parts, furnishings, inventory, hay upon the premises, seed, furniture, 
fixtures, current inventory of supplies, are included in the 
lease.

 
 
                        
The lease also provides that:

 
 
Lessees 
agree during each lease term to pay, when due, all property taxes and liability 
insurance premiums upon the property.  [Lessees] agree to pay all utility 
charges, fuel, labor, maintenance and repairs of equipment, veterinary expenses, 
BLM lease charges, Forest Service permit charges, and normal ranch operation 
costs consistent with their ranching practices.

 
 
As part 
of the ranch operation on or about April 1, 1998, Plaintiff Ralph E. Platt 
entered into a venture with Alice A. Creighton and Murray Creighton whereby he 
set over to them one hundred and fifty one cows with calves and cows due to 
calve having a value of $120,000.00 for use in the ranch operation, and 
Defendants agreed to pay related veterinary expenses, forest service permit 
charges and related costs and to provide a fair return on the 
investment.

 
 
Defendants 
hold Plaintiff's cattle, and Plaintiff's replacement cattle in a constructive 
trust.

 
 
Defendants 
have refused to account for the joint venture cattle operation and are unjustly 
enriched.

 
 
Plaintiff 
now seeks an accounting of funds and increase in the venture together with a 
termination of the resulting trust and a return of said cattle and normal 
increase, less venture costs, or the value thereof.

 
 
The 
Defendants answered and generally denied the allegations of the Complaint and 
asserted, among other affirmative defenses, that Platt's claims were barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations.  
On September 12, 2005, the district court issued a scheduling order 
allowing for discovery and setting a deadline of December 1, 2005 for the filing 
of any dispositive motions and giving the opposing party twenty days after 
filing to respond.

 
 
[¶4]      On November 30, 
2005, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with supporting 
materials including excerpts from the deposition of Platt and his brother Wayne, 
a sworn affidavit from Alice Creighton, and documentation relating to the 
operation of the Ranch and the Trust.  
The Defendants alleged the following facts: 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
[¶5]      The filing of the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on November 30, 2005, triggered a 
twenty-day response period pursuant to the court's scheduling order and W.R.C.P. 
6(c).  Citing seasonal difficulties 
and travel conflicts, counsel for Platt contacted opposing counsel before the 
December 20, 2005, filing deadline and requested an extension through January 4, 
2005.  Defense counsel agreed to the 
extension. Platt duly served his Resistance to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Defendants on January 4.  
Plaintiff's counsel did not file a motion with the district court 
requesting an extension of the filing deadline or otherwise provide notice of 
the parties' agreement to the court.  The Defendants filed a Reply to 
Plaintiff's Resistance to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on January 10, 
2006 and Platt filed an additional response on January 23.

 
 
[¶6]      On January 20, 
2006, without holding a hearing, the district court issued a decision letter 
granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Preliminarily, the court found that 
Platt had not filed a timely response to the motion for summary judgment, that 
no cause had been shown for that failure and, therefore, "Platt [had] no 
materials properly before the Court nor subject to consideration by the Court 
with respect to Defendants' motion."  
The court then concluded that the statute of limitations barred Platt's 
claim:

 
 
The 
parties agree that the last transaction at issue here, and the transaction upon 
which Plaintiff primarily bases his Complaint, occurred on April 1, 1998. All of 
the events for which Platt seeks relief occurred no later than that date. In 
fact, the record indicates that the last of the cattle at issue were transferred 
to Defendants on that date. Platt is seeking an accounting of the cattle, 
termination of the asserted constructive trust, and a return of the cattle (or 
their value). His claims are either legal (for a return of his cattle) and 
governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(4)(i)(B) or equitable (for unjust 
enrichment) and subject to a four-year statute of limitations, see Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 79 P.3d 500, 509 (Wyo. 2003).  That said, 
under either scenario, Platt had, at the longest, until April 1, 2002 in which 
to commence litigation.  Here, Platt 
filed his Complaint on June 6, 2005, 
more than four years after April 1, 1998.  Accordingly, Platt's claims are barred by 
the statute of limitations.

 
 
On 
January 27, 2006 Platt filed a motion stylized as Verified Request for Extension 
in Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Set 
Aside Default and Petition to Reconsider wherein he asked the district court to 
set aside the "default", approve counsels' agreement to extend the time for 
Platt to reply to the motion for summary judgment, and to consider its filed 
responses to that motion.  On 
February 3, the court issued an order denying Platt's motion, finding that no 
excusable neglect as defined under W.R.C.P. 6(b) existed for the failure to 
timely file a response and rejecting an argument by Platt that an "informal or 
common practice" of the bar excused compliance with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure.1  The court's order granting the 
Defendants summary judgment was issued on February 22, 2006 and Platt's appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]                              
When we review the granting of a summary judgment, we employ the same 
standards and use the same materials as were employed and used by the trial 
court.  We examine the record from 
the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn 
from the record.  Summary judgment 
is appropriate only when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the 
parties have asserted.  We review a 
grant of summary judgment deciding a question of law de novo and afford no 
deference to the trial court's ruling.

 
 

Black v. 
William Insulation, Co., 2006 
WY 106, ¶ 7, 141 P.3d 123, 126-27 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Burnett v. Imerys Marble, Inc., 2005 WY 
82, ¶ 10, 116 P.3d 460, 462 (Wyo. 2005) and Act I, LLC v. Davis, 2002 WY 183, 
¶ 9, 60 P.3d 145, 148 (Wyo. 2002)).  "We will affirm a grant of summary 
judgment if it can be sustained on any legal ground appearing in the record." 
 Lever v. Community First Bancshares, 
Inc., 989 P.2d 634, 637 (Wyo. 1999) 
(quoting Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 
903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1995)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Initially, Platt 
contests the district court's refusal to consider the materials he filed in 
response to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.  He argues that the district court should 
have accepted the agreement between the parties' counsel allowing for extra time 
in which to respond to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Platt contends that such "informalities" 
are a "common practice" in Wyoming and were entered into by the parties 
in good faith.  Platt suggests that 
under the circumstances, the court should have treated the failure to file a 
timely reply as "excusable neglect" under W.R.C.P. 6(b) and considered the 
materials he filed.

 
 
[¶9]      We have said that 
"[e]xcept as may be permitted by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, time limits permitted or required by rules 
or court order may not be extended or modified by agreement of counsel, but only 
by order."  Multiple Resort Ownership Plan, Inc. v. 
Design-Build-Manage, Inc., 2002 WY 67, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 647, 652 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Rule 202 of the Wyoming Uniform Rules for District 
Courts).

 
 
The 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to promote an orderly and 
efficient means for the handling and disposing of litigation. Compliance with 
these rules of procedure in summary judgment matters is mandatory. 

 
 

Hickey 
v. Burnett, 707 P.2d 741, 745 (Wyo. 1985) (citing Larsen v. Roberts, 676 P.2d 1046 
(Wyo. 1984)). 
 Motions for summary judgment are 
governed by W.R.C.P. 56, which in subsection (c) provides that the motion or any 
responses are to be served pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(c).  That rule, in turn, provides, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
Except 
as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), or unless the court by order permits 
service at some other time, a party affected by the motion may serve a response, 
together with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing on 
the motion or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is 
earlier.

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
6(c)(1).  In this case, the district 
court's scheduling order mirrored the twenty-day time frame for responses set 
out in Rule 6(c).  Subsection (b) of 
W.R.C.P. 6 provides a mechanism by which a party desiring to enlarge the time in 
which to file a response can proceed:

 
 
When by 
these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court, or a 
commissioner thereof, for cause shown may at any time in its discretion: (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
by a previous order; or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect[.]

 
 
Since 
Platt did not move to enlarge the time before the expiration of the prescribed 
time period, he must show "excusable neglect," which we have defined as "being 
that behavior which might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the 
circumstances."  Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 553 
(Wyo. 1997) (citing Whitney v. McDonough, 892 P.2d 791, 794 
(Wyo. 
1995)).

 
 
[¶10]   We cannot agree with Platt's 
characterization of the informal agreement between the parties' counsel to 
enlarge the prescribed time for reply to the motion for summary judgment as 
"excusable neglect" for the failure to file a motion with the court as required 
by our rules of procedure.  Given 
our precedent, a reasonably prudent person would not simply have relied upon an 
informal agreement with opposing counsel but would have filed the necessary 
motion with the court.  As the 
district court put it:

 
 
This 
Court is not familiar with the "informality" and "common practice" that counsel 
alleges is apparently so prevalent in his practice.  However, it is not the "common practice" 
of this Court to permit its orders and the Rules of Civil Procedure to be 
ignored and/or vacated by virtue of some "informality" or "common practice." 
 Rather, it is the "common practice" 
of this Court to conduct its business in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and its expectation is and always has been that counsel do the 
same.  Counsel's decision to do 
otherwise was taken at his own peril, but it most certainly was not a matter of 
excusable neglect.

 
 
Platt 
failed to show "excusable neglect," and the district court did not commit any 
error when it declined to consider his response to the Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment.

 
 
[¶11]   Even if we were inclined to 
consider the materials filed by Platt, we would still conclude that the district 
court properly granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Wyoming is a discovery jurisdiction "in which 
the statute of limitations is triggered when a plaintiff knows or has reason to 
know of the existence of a cause of action."  Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Followill, 
2004 WY 80, ¶ 14, 93 P.3d 238, 243 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Amoco Production Co. v. EM Nominee 
Partnership Co., 2 P.3d 534, 542 (Wyo. 2000)).  Platt does not dispute that a four-year 
statute of limitations is applicable to all of his claims; instead, he argues 
that he had no reason to believe that his ownership interest in the cattle was 
claimed by the Defendants until he asked them for an accounting in the spring of 
2004.  It is from that date that 
Platt insists the statute of limitations began to run.

 
 
[¶12]   In his affidavit contained within 
his filings opposing the motion for summary judgment, Platt contended that the 
parties' arrangement was for the Defendants to run Platt's cattle and to take a 
share of the profits.  According to 
Platt, the Defendants held the cattle in trust, and ownership remained with him. 
 In support of his claim, Platt 
alleged that when the Defendants entered into the lease in 1998, they were also 
supposed to enter into a mortgage of the cattle with him to prevent the 
Defendants from selling the cattle or using them for collateral.  Platt claimed that he refused to sign the 
mortgage because the place to enter the number of cattle to be mortgaged was 
blank, and that while the Defendants promised to get a count of the cattle, they 
never got back to Platt and the mortgage was never 
executed.

 
 
[¶13]   Platt's claim is predicated on a 
contention that he possessed an ownership interest in the cattle on the Ranch. 
 In his deposition, Platt's brother 
Wayne testified 
as follows (emphasis added):

 
 
Q:  Was 
there actually money given to the trust for the cattle that were left in 1998 
that had not previously been transferred by wage or 
purchase?

 
 
A:  No.

 
 
Q:  Do 
you remember how many cattle there were at that time that were transferred from 
the trust to Alice and Murray Creighton?

 
 
A:  That 
total was approximately 280 head, but I couldn't say who owned them for sure 
because they had interest in the cattle.  And they were all branded IK as undivided 
interest.

 
 
Q:  There 
were 280 head in 1992?

 
 
A:  Yeah.

 
 
Q:  Had 
some died?

 
 
A:  Some 
died.

 
 
Q:  Had 
some been sold?

 
 
A:  They 
were replaced by calves, or such a matter, because you keep so many replacements 
so you keep your herd at static level.

 
 
Q:  The 
ones that had been sold  There were some sold to Murray and Alice Creighton; is 
that correct?

 
 
A:  Only 
the culled cattle through the feedlots.

 
 
Q:  And 
the money that you got  the money that was received for culled cattle that was 
sold, what happened to that money?

 
 
A:  It 
went into the trust.  In fact, all 
the cattle were sold by the trust, went back into the trust, and it went to pay 
off the loans at the bank.  We wound 
up  when we turned it all over and sold all the cattle we owned interest in, we 
still owed the bank 40,000 bucks.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Q:  When 
[the Defendants] took calves at branding, is there any record of how many and 
what this was worth for tax purposes or otherwise?

 
 
A:  No 
record or written record, no.

 
 
Q:  Do 
you have any recollection as to how many calves they were to take at branding, 
all of them, half of them, part of them?

 
 
A:  I 
don't know how many they were promised.  I couldn't say.

 
 
Q:  You 
don't know what they were promised?

 
 
A:  I 
couldn't say what the number they were promised or what, 
no.

 
 
Q:  Is 
it all they could brand?

 
 
A:  No, 
not all they could brand, just only the number that we had 
promised.

 
 
Q:  But 
you don't 

 
 
A:  I 
don't know the number.

 
 
Q:  Was 
it a number like a hundred or a number like half or a number like a 
third?

 
 
A:  It 
was a number like four or five or eight or ten.

 
 
Q:  Four 
or five or eight or ten each year.

 
 
A:  So 
many each year.

 
 
Q:  Four 
to ten calves branded for supplement to wages?

 
 
A:  Yeah. 
 Then they kept their half for 
calves, and consequently their herd increased.

 
 
Q:  So 
maintaining didn't work after that?

 
 
A:  Well, 
it didn't maintain.  We 
wasn't trying to maintain our herd.  I was trying to build up their 
herd.

 
 
Q:  Didn't 
you feel that would reduce your obligation to your brother, 50/50 
partner?

 
 
A:  Well, 
when you're starting to trade steer for heifers, you're getting the better end 
of the deal.  That's what we were 
doing, and those steers that we traded from them and they took heifers in place, 
the steers were worth more on the market than the heifers for the main reason 
they weigh more.

 
 
Q:  But 
your emphasis changes now from maintaining 

 
 
A:  We 
were not trying to maintain Platt Ranches Trust cattle.  We were transferring our cattle to 
them.

 
 
Q:  To 
your daughter?

 
 
A:  Through 
their purchase and branding and what they earned.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Q:  So 
you're letting them work into the ranch that you and Ralph 
owned?

 
 
A:  The 
ranch numbers are staying the same, but the cattle is under different 
ownerships.

 
 
Q:  And 

 
 
A:  So 
eventually we will phase out what we own, and they will own 
it.

 
 
Q:  When 
you say they, you mean your heirs, not Ralph's heirs?

 
 
A:  My 
heirs.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Q:  And 
when you transferred up all the cattle to Murray and Alice Creighton in 1998, 
they were actually transferred from the trust to them; is that 
correct?

 
 
A:  That's 
right.

 
 
Q:  And, 
in fact, when the cattle sold from '92 to '98, the income from that cattle went 
into the Platt Ranch Trust; is that right?

 
 
A:  That's right.

 
 
In his 
deposition, Platt admitted to being aware of that agreement to transfer cattle 
to the Defendants.  Furthermore, he 
signed the documents transferring the remaining cattle and the Ranch brand to 
the Defendants on April 1, 1998.  As 
the district court noted, the April 1, 1998 transactions were the last acts 
underlying Platt's cause of action.  If Platt had retained an ownership 
interest in those cattle, then there is no question that he knew or should have 
known that he had a cause of action at that time.  The district court correctly held that 
the four-year statute of limitations had been triggered and that Platt had, at 
the latest, until April 1, 2002, to commence litigation.  Platt's Complaint was not filed until 
June 6, 2005, and, accordingly, his claims are barred.

 
 
[¶14]   In passing, we note that even if we 
had accepted Platt's argument regarding commencement of the statute of 
limitations, even then the Defendants were still entitled to summary judgment. 
 "When the party moving for summary 
judgment has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to 
the opposing party who then is obliged to marshal admissible evidence, as 
opposed to general or conclusory allegations, establishing continuing viability 
of an issue of material fact."  Estate of Coleman by and through Coleman v. 
Casper Concrete Co., 939 P.2d 233, 236 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Hanna v. Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 
534 (Wyo. 
1995)).  The Defendants produced 
evidence showing that ownership of the trust cattle had been transferred to 
them.  It was incumbent upon Platt 
to respond with admissible evidence rebutting the Defendants and showing that 
Platt retained an ownership interest in the cattle.  The record contains no such evidence, 
only allegations.  No matter how the 
record is viewed, the Defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The district court order granting 
the Defendants' summary judgment is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1To the 
extent that Platt's motion was deemed a "Motion for Reconsideration," the 
district court properly noted that it was a nullity under the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, 
¶¶ 5-7, 125 P.3d 1022, 1023-24 (Wyo. 2006).  The court also noted that there was no 
"default" entered; it had granted summary 
judgment.