Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP3087-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Scott M. Hambly, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 7, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Faragher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs. 
PROSSER and BUTLER, JR., JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner a brief was filed by 
Martha K Askins, Office of the State Public Defender, Madison, 
and oral argument by Martha K. Askins. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2005AP3087-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2003CF380) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott M. Hambly, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 7, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, Scott M. 
Hambly, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
affirming a judgment of conviction entered by the Circuit Court 
for Washington County, Patrick J. Faragher, Judge.1  The 
defendant was convicted of one count of delivering cocaine 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm) (2001-02).  We affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals refusing to suppress the 
defendant's inculpatory statements and affirming the conviction. 
                                                 
1 State v. Hambly, 2006 WI App 256, 297 Wis. 2d 851, 726 
N.W.2d 697. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The issue on review is whether the circuit court erred 
in denying the defendant's motion to suppress inculpatory 
statements he made to a law enforcement officer while he was in 
custody.  The defendant contends that the inculpatory statements 
were obtained in violation of his invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda2 right to counsel.  More specifically, the 
defendant raises three arguments supporting suppression of his 
statements: (1) He effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel by requesting counsel after being taken 
into custody and before he was interrogated; (2) The law 
enforcement officer's statements to him after he invoked his 
right to counsel constituted interrogation; and (3) In signing 
the Miranda waiver form he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel.   
¶3 
We conclude as follows:  
(1) 
The 
defendant effectively invoked his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel when he requested 
counsel while he was in custody and before the law 
enforcement officer interrogated him under both a standard 
requiring only that a suspect be in custody when the 
request for counsel is made and a standard requiring that 
interrogation be "imminent or impending when the request 
                                                 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" 
and 
is 
applicable 
to 
the 
states 
through 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
3 
 
for counsel is made."  An invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel is a defendant's request for the 
assistance of an attorney "in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police."3     
(2) The law enforcement officer's statements to the 
defendant after he effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel and before he was given the 
Miranda warnings did not constitute interrogation by the 
officer.  
(3) After the defendant effectively invoked his Fifth 
Amendment 
Miranda 
right 
to 
counsel, 
he 
initiated 
communication with the law enforcement officer and then 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right 
to 
counsel, 
rendering 
the 
inculpatory 
statements 
admissible. 
¶4 
The court is divided on the question whether to adopt 
a temporal standard to determine whether a suspect in custody 
has effectively invoked his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda right 
to counsel.  Three justices, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Butler, adopt the standard that a suspect may effectively invoke 
the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel when a suspect is 
in custody and has made "an unequivocal request to speak with an 
                                                 
3 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) (emphasis in 
original).  
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
4 
 
attorney" even before interrogation is imminent or impending.  
Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶106.4    
¶5 
Three justices, Justices Bradley and Crooks and the 
author of this opinion, conclude that they need not, and do not, 
address whether the appropriate temporal standard to adopt is 
the "anytime in custody" standard or the "imminent or impending 
interrogation" standard.  Justice Ziegler did not participate in 
this case. 
 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's order refusing to suppress 
the 
defendant's 
inculpatory 
statements 
and 
affirming 
the 
conviction.   
I 
¶7 
We briefly summarize the facts relating to the 
defendant's inculpatory statements to the officer.  Detectives 
Rindt and Clausing, both of the Washington County Sheriff's 
Department, approached the defendant in a parking lot outside 
his apartment and attempted to convince him to speak to them 
without their taking him into custody.   
¶8 
The defendant repeatedly refused to speak with the 
detectives.  Detective Rindt first requested that the defendant 
meet with the detectives at the police station to discuss 
several drug transactions in which he was involved.  The 
                                                 
4 This concurring opinion refers "to an in-custody request 
for counsel invoked to protect the Fifth Amendment's right 
against compelled self-incrimination as the Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel."  Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶105 n.1. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
5 
 
defendant said he did not want to go to the station.  Rindt then 
asked whether they could talk inside the defendant's residence.  
The defendant refused this request as well.  Rindt then told the 
defendant 
that 
he 
and 
Clausing 
were 
investigating 
drug 
transactions and informed the defendant that they wanted to 
speak with him about options available to him.  Rindt again 
asked the defendant if he would converse with the detectives 
somewhere.  The defendant refused this final request, telling 
the detectives to come back another day.   
¶9 
Rindt then told the defendant that he was under 
arrest, handcuffed him, and began leading him to the squad car. 
As Rindt and the defendant walked to the squad car, the 
defendant said that he wanted to speak with an attorney.   Rindt 
put the defendant in the back of the car and told him that he 
could call an attorney once they arrived at the Washington 
County Jail.  Rindt then waited with the defendant in the car 
while Clausing searched the defendant's vehicle incident to 
arrest.  No evidence was produced at trial from this search. 
¶10 While in the squad car, the defendant told Rindt that 
he did not understand why he was under arrest.  Rindt responded 
that the defendant had sold cocaine to an informant, Mychal 
Meyer, on three occasions and that Meyer had been cooperating 
with the police during those transactions.  The defendant again 
stated he did not understand what was going on and told Rindt 
that he wanted to speak to him and to find out what his options 
were. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 Rindt read the defendant his Miranda warnings.  Rindt 
testified that the defendant said he understood his rights, did 
not have any questions, and wanted to speak with Rindt about the 
drug transactions.  Rindt then removed the defendant's handcuffs 
and placed him in the front seat of the squad car.  Rindt asked 
the defendant to review the Miranda waiver of rights form, which 
the defendant did.  The defendant then signed a Miranda waiver 
form. 
¶12 Rindt interviewed the defendant for approximately one 
hour.  During the interview, the defendant admitted to Rindt 
that he had sold cocaine to Meyer on several occasions.  Rindt 
spent most of the interview determining whether the defendant 
would cooperate with the police.  Deciding that the defendant 
would not cooperate, Rindt once again handcuffed the defendant, 
placed him in the back of the squad car, and took him to jail.   
¶13 The State charged the defendant with three counts of 
delivering cocaine to Meyer.  The defendant moved to suppress 
the statements he made to Rindt in the squad car.  The circuit 
court denied this motion after a hearing.  The circuit court 
concluded that the defendant had unequivocally invoked his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel and that under Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), all questioning of the defendant 
had to cease.  In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held 
that once an accused has "expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
7 
 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."5  
Nevertheless, even though the defendant requested counsel, the 
circuit court refused to suppress the defendant's inculpatory 
statements 
because 
the 
defendant 
initiated 
a 
substantive 
discussion with the law enforcement officer.  The circuit court 
also found that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was 
knowing and intelligent.   
¶14 The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of 
delivering five grams or less of cocaine and not guilty of one 
charge of delivering one gram or less of cocaine.  The jury 
divided on a second charge of delivering one gram or less of 
cocaine. 
¶15 The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that 
the circuit court had erred in denying his motion to suppress 
the statements he made to Rindt.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's order denying suppression and affirmed the 
conviction.   
II 
¶16 We consider first the State's argument that the 
defendant's request for counsel did not constitute an effective 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.  
Whether the defendant effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel is a question of constitutional fact 
that this court decides under a two-part test.6  This court will 
                                                 
5 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 
6 State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶20, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 
N.W.2d 142 (citation omitted).   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
8 
 
uphold a circuit court's findings of historical or evidentiary 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.7  This court determines 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
those 
evidentiary facts independently of the circuit court and court 
of appeals but benefits from the circuit court's and court of 
appeals' analyses.8  
¶17 The State contends that the instant case raises the 
question whether a suspect can anticipatorily invoke his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel.  The State answers this 
question in the negative and asserts that a criminal defendant 
does not effectively invoke his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel unless he is both in custody and is being interrogated.9   
¶18 The State rests its position on language in a footnote 
in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991), in which 
the United States Supreme Court declared, "We have in fact never 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) (2005-06).  The "clearly 
erroneous" standard of review for findings of fact made by a 
circuit court is essentially the same as the "great weight and 
clear preponderance" test.  Noll v. Dimiceli's, Inc., 115 
Wis. 2d 641, 643, 340 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing 
Robertson-Ryan & Assocs., Inc. v. Pohlhammer, 112 Wis. 2d 583, 
591 n.*, 334 N.W.2d 246 (1983) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
8 Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶20.   
9 As an alternative position, the State argues that if a 
suspect is in custody, an invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel is effective so long as interrogation 
is imminent. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
9 
 
held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, 
in a context other than 'custodial interrogation' . . . ."10 
¶19 A tension may be perceived between the McNeil language 
about a suspect not anticipatorily invoking Fifth Amendment 
                                                 
10 The McNeil Court held that invocation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not act as an invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.  The suspect in McNeil 
had never invoked his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.  
He had instead invoked his Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing on a charge 
unrelated to the one for which he was later interrogated in 
custody.  See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 173. 
While not reaching any conclusion on the issue of an 
anticipatory invocation of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel, the United States Supreme Court declared in McNeil that 
"[i]f the Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a 
preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical 
reason why it could not be invoked by a letter prior to arrest, 
or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect. . . . The 
fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once 
asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial 
interrogation does not mean that we will allow it to be asserted 
initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with 
similar future effect."  McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3.   
Compare Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97 n.6 (1984) 
(rejecting as "plainly wrong" the position "that the authorities 
need not stop their questions if an accused requests counsel 
prior to or during the Miranda warnings," reasoning that "[a] 
request for counsel coming at any stage of the process requires 
that questioning cease until counsel has been provided.") 
(quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
The defendant in Smith requested the assistance of counsel 
while in a police interrogation room and just after a law 
enforcement officer had informed the defendant that he had a 
right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present with 
him during questioning.  469 U.S. at 92-93.  The holding in 
Smith therefore does not contradict the McNeil Court's later 
assertion that the Court had never held that a person can invoke 
his or her Miranda rights in a context other than custodial 
interrogation.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
10 
 
Miranda rights and the Miranda Court's statement that "a pre-
interrogation request for a lawyer . . . affirmatively secures 
[the] right to have one."11  The Miranda Court did not, however, 
explicitly address what is meant by a "pre-interrogation 
request" for counsel during custody and did not address at what 
point prior to custodial interrogation a suspect may effectively 
invoke the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.  Likewise, 
the McNeil Court did not address the question whether a suspect 
may be in the "context" of custodial interrogation before actual 
interrogation begins. 
¶20 Indeed, case law acknowledges that the United States 
Supreme Court has not resolved the effect of a suspect's request 
for an attorney while in custody but prior to interrogation.12   
¶21 McNeil not only raised the question of the timing of a 
suspect's request for counsel as an effective invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel but also stated that 
under Edwards an effective invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel "requires, at a minimum, some statement 
that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire 
for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police."13  The timing of the request for 
                                                 
11 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.  See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
444-45. 
12 See, e.g., Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160 (1995); People v. Villalobos, 
737 N.E. 2d 639, 642 (Ill. 2000); Russell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 
531, 536 (Tex. App. 2007). 
13 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (emphasis in original). 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
11 
 
counsel may help determine whether the request is for the 
assistance 
of 
an 
attorney 
in 
dealing 
with 
custodial 
interrogation by the police, as the cases demonstrate. 
¶22 Case 
law 
supports 
the 
State's 
position 
that 
a 
suspect's Fifth Amendment Miranda rights are specific to 
custodial 
interrogation. 
 
The 
facts 
in 
Miranda 
involved 
custodial interrogation.14  "It is the premise of Miranda that 
                                                 
14 The Miranda Court described its holding as follows: 
"[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory 
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant 
unless 
it 
demonstrates 
the 
use 
of 
procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  See also Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 478. 
The 
Miranda court defined custodial interrogation as 
follows: 
"By 
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
The Miranda Court drew upon its prior decision in Escobedo 
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), a Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel case.  The Miranda Court considered Escobedo relevant in 
part because law enforcement officers in Escobedo "took the 
defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station 
for the purpose of obtaining a confession" and because "[d]uring 
this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to 
his attorney."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
12 
 
the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody 
and official interrogation."15  The procedural safeguards set 
forth in Miranda's protection of Fifth Amendment rights "are 
required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but 
rather 
where 
a 
suspect 
in 
custody 
is 
subjected 
to 
interrogation."16 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Escobedo Court stated the issue before the Court as 
follows: "The critical question in this case is whether, under 
the 
circumstances, 
the 
refusal 
by 
the 
police 
to 
honor 
petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the 
course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of 'the 
Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution . . . ."  Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479 (emphasis 
added).  During the course of his interrogation at police 
headquarters, Escobedo "repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer" 
and was told that "his lawyer 'didn't want to see' him."  
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 481.  Escobedo also made an initial 
request for counsel while being transported to the police 
station.  Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479. 
Professor LaFave summarizes Escobedo as follows: 
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself ultimately came to 
treat Escobedo as nothing more than a "false start" 
toward the new approach to the confessions problem 
undertaken 
later 
in 
Miranda. . . . The 
Court 
in 
retrospect concluded [in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972)] that the "'prime purpose' of Escobedo 
was not to vindicate the constitutional right to 
counsel as such, but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full 
effectuation 
of 
the 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination'."  Moreover, added the Kirby Court [406 
U.S. 
at 
689], 
Escobedo 
is 
now 
limited 
in 
its 
"holding . . . to its own facts." 
2 LaFave et al., supra note 14, § 6.4(c) at 665-66.  See also 
id. at 664-65. 
15 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990).   
16 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
13 
 
¶23 The State argues that in the present case when the 
defendant asked for an attorney he was not subject to custodial 
interrogation.  The State concludes that the defendant was in 
custody but was not being interrogated, that the defendant's 
request for an attorney was thus anticipatory, and that the 
defendant did not effectively invoke his Fifth Amendment Miranda 
right to counsel. 
¶24 The federal and state cases the State cites do not, 
however, support its position that a request for counsel before 
interrogation cannot anticipatorily constitute an effective 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel even 
if 
the 
request 
was 
for 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
during 
                                                                                                                                                             
The third circuit federal court of appeals has concluded 
that allowing a suspect in custody "to invoke the right to 
counsel outside of the context of custodial interrogation, would 
diminish the 'bright line' nature of the Supreme Court's Miranda 
jurisprudence, often cited by the Court as one of the qualities 
of that body of law."  Alston, 34 F.3d at 1249 n.11.  
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
14 
 
interrogation.17  We are persuaded by the case law that the 
State's position is incorrect and do not adopt the State's 
position.  Rather, the case law the State cites recognizes that 
a suspect in custody may request counsel and effectively invoke 
the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel when faced with 
"impending interrogation" or when interrogation is "imminent" 
                                                 
17 The State's brief relies on Alston, 34 F.3d at 1244-48 
(no invocation of Fifth Amendment right to counsel when the 
suspect signed a letter ostensibly invoking the right to counsel 
three days after police interrogated him and three days before 
his next custodial interrogation); United States v. LaGrone, 43 
F.3d 332,  337-39 (7th Cir. 1994) (no invocation of Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel when, after police had 
questioned him and some time before police questioned him again, 
the suspect in custody asked to speak with his attorney 
specifically for the purpose of deciding whether to consent to a 
search of his store); United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 
1348-50 (11th Cir. 1998) (no invocation of Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel when the suspect signed a "claim of rights form" more 
than a month before he was interrogated; interrogation not 
imminent); People v. Nguyen, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 392-95 (Ct. 
App. 2005) (no invocation of Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel when the suspect attempted to telephone her attorney 
before police had finished arresting her and before they 
attempted to interrogate her; request short of clear expression 
for attorney's assistance; custodial interrogation was not 
imminent); Russell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 531, 534-36 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2007) (no invocation of Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel when the suspect asked to call his attorney in response 
to a police search and confiscation of his cell phone;  
interrogation not imminent; "[W]e do not believe the existing 
case law supports the right of an accused to invoke his Miranda 
rights in any context other than a custodial interrogation."); 
and Villalobos, 737 N.E. 2d at 642-45 (no invocation of Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel when the suspect filed a 
claim of rights form asserting right to refrain from making any 
statements without counsel two days before being interrogated in 
reference 
to 
an 
unrelated 
charge; 
interrogation 
was 
not 
imminent).  
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
15 
 
and the request for counsel is for the assistance of counsel 
during interrogation.18  
¶25 For example, in United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332 
(7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared 
that LaGrone's request for counsel was not an effective Fifth 
Amendment Miranda invocation of counsel for two reasons.  First, 
interrogation was not impending.  Relying on McNeil, the court 
of appeals explained that "in order for a defendant to invoke 
his 
Miranda 
rights 
the 
authorities 
must 
be 
conducting 
interrogation, or interrogation must be imminent."19  The court 
of appeals concluded that this rule "advances the twin goals of 
Miranda: providing an opportunity for the defendant to dissipate 
the compulsion and allowing law enforcement the ability to 
conduct investigations."20  LaGrone had not requested an attorney 
"immediately before, in response to, or during custodial 
interrogation."21   
                                                 
18 For additional cases cited for the proposition that the 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel may be validly asserted 
only when the authorities are conducting custodial interrogation 
or such interrogation is imminent and the request for counsel is 
for the assistance of counsel during interrogation, see 2 LaFave 
et al., supra note 14, § 6.9(g) at 869, n.200. 
19 LaGrone, 43 F.3d at 339.   
20 Id. at 339-40. 
21 Id. at 339.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
16 
 
¶26 Second, while in custody,22 LaGrone answered some 
questions and then asked to consult with his attorney "about 
whether to consent to [a] search of his [grocery] market."23  The 
LaGrone court held that the defendant did not effectively invoke 
his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel because the matter 
at 
issue 
was 
a 
search 
warrant 
and 
did 
"not 
concern 
[interrogation,] 'the particular sort of lawyerly assistance 
that is the subject of Miranda.'"24  The LaGrone court concluded 
that Edwards requires "at a minimum, some statement that can 
reasonably be construed to be expression of a desire for the 
assistance 
of 
an 
attorney 
in 
dealing 
with 
custodial 
interrogation by the police."25   
¶27 The LaGrone case makes clear that a suspect in custody 
can invoke the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel when (1) 
interrogation is imminent, and (2) the request for counsel  
relates to assistance of counsel during interrogation.   
¶28 Other cases the State cites also recognize that an 
effective invocation of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel may be made by a suspect in custody requesting counsel 
                                                 
22 "At the time LaGrone asked to talk to his attorney, he 
was not in a custodial interrogation atmosphere." LaGrone, 43 
F.3d at 337.   
23 Id.  
24 Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178).  The Indiana 
Constitution affords a suspect the right to a lawyer before 
consenting to a warrantless search of property.  
25 LaGrone, 43 F. 3d at 336 (emphasis in original). 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
17 
 
when 
the 
suspect 
is 
faced 
with 
impending 
or 
imminent 
interrogation.26  None of the decisions the State cites specifies 
the standard to be used in determining whether an interrogation 
is impending or imminent.  It appears to us from the cases that 
an interrogation is impending or imminent if a reasonable person 
in 
the 
defendant's 
position 
would 
have 
believed 
that 
interrogation was imminent or impending.27  
¶29 Under 
LaGrone 
and 
other 
cases 
a 
suspect 
may 
effectively invoke his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel by requesting counsel when a reasonable person in the 
suspect's position would believe that interrogation is imminent.  
These cases impose a temporal limit on a request for counsel as 
well as the requirement that the request for counsel must relate 
to assistance of counsel during interrogation.  
                                                 
26 See Nguyen, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 395 ("[A] suspect may 
invoke Miranda's protections if custodial interrogation is 
impending or imminent."); Grimes, 142 F.3d at 1348 ("Miranda 
rights may be invoked only during custodial interrogation or 
when interrogation is imminent."); Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d at 646 
("[T]he suspect must invoke the right to counsel during 
custodial interrogation or when custodial interrogation was 
imminent."). 
27 The objective standard of the reasonable person in the 
defendant's position to determine whether interrogation is 
imminent or impending is the same objective reasonable person  
standard used to determine whether the person is in custody for 
purposes of Miranda warnings.  See State v. Swanson, 164 
Wis. 2d 437, 446-47, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991).  See also Nguyen, 33 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 394 ("[D]efendant reasonably could conclude 
interrogation was imminent if the arresting officer began 
questioning defendant's companion immediately after placing them 
in custody.").  
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
18 
 
¶30 Another possible standard for Miranda and Edwards 
purposes is that a suspect may effectively invoke his or her 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel by requesting counsel 
any time the suspect is in custody, even before Miranda warnings 
or 
the 
onset 
of 
questioning.28 
 
State 
v. 
Collins, 
122 
Wis. 2d 320, 363 N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1984), may be read as 
adopting such a standard.29   
¶31 Collins requested counsel immediately after he was 
arrested at 2:35 p.m. at his home.  He made incriminating 
statements 
after 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
initiated 
interrogation at 4:05 p.m. at the police station.  The court of 
appeals rejected the State's argument that Collins' request for 
counsel was an ineffective invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel because the invocation was made before 
custodial interrogation had begun and the Miranda rights had not 
yet attached.  The court of appeals decided that "Collins' 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d at 650 (Heiple, J., 
dissenting) (focus should not be on when the defendant made the 
request for counsel but on the type of assistance of counsel 
that 
defendant 
requested; 
thus 
when 
suspect 
clearly 
and 
unambiguously requests the assistance of an attorney in dealing 
with custodial interrogation, that request must be honored; "the 
fifth amendment right to counsel attaches and may be invoked by 
a defendant at any time after he is taken into custody.").  
29 The Collins court quotes Miranda for the rule that an 
invocation of counsel is effective if it comes "at any stage of 
the process."  State v. Collins, 122 Wis. 2d 320, 329, 363 
N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-
45).  Neither Collins nor Miranda states precisely what is 
denoted by the term "process" or when that "process" begins or 
ends.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
19 
 
request to talk to his attorney, made after he was in custody 
but before he was advised of his rights, was sufficient to 
trigger the protection of the Edwards rule."30  The Collins court 
of appeals does not use the phrase "impending or imminent 
interrogation" to describe the situation in which Collins found 
himself when he requested counsel.31  
¶32 The court is divided about whether to adopt a temporal 
standard to determine whether a suspect in custody who requests 
counsel has effectively invoked his or her Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel.  Three justices, Justices Prosser, 
Roggensack, and Butler, adopt the standard that a suspect may 
                                                 
30 Collins, 122 Wis. 2d at 329.  The Collins court rejected 
the State's argument that Collins' invocation could not be 
effective "because no custodial interrogation had yet begun":  
There is no indication in either Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), or Edwards that a request for 
counsel must be made after the warnings are given in 
order to be valid.  On the contrary, the Miranda Court 
said: "If . . . [the suspect] indicates in any manner 
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to 
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be 
no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45.  The Court also 
said that a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer 
"affirmatively secures [a suspect's] right to have 
one. . . . "  Id. at 470.  The Court emphasized that 
an effective waiver of the right to counsel can occur 
only after warnings are given. Id. It did not 
indicate, however, that the same rule applies to an 
effective assertion of the right to counsel. 
Id. at 328-29. 
 
31 See State v. Torres, 412 S.E. 2d 20, 25 (N.C. 1992) 
(characterizing Collins as involving a suspect who "invoked his 
right 
to 
have 
counsel 
present 
during 
his 
impending 
interrogation"). 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
20 
 
effectively invoke the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel 
when a suspect is in custody and has made "an unequivocal 
request to speak with an attorney" even before interrogation is 
imminent or impending.  Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶106.  
They conclude that the LaGrone line of cases adopting a temporal 
requirement of impending or imminent interrogation contravenes 
Miranda.  These three justices conclude that the defendant's 
request for an attorney in the present case constituted an 
effective invocation of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel under the "anytime in custody" temporal standard. 
¶33 Three justices, Justices Bradley and Crooks and the 
author of this opinion, conclude that they need not, and do not, 
address whether the appropriate temporal standard to adopt to 
determine whether a suspect in custody has effectively invoked 
his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel is the "anytime in 
custody" standard or the "imminent or impending interrogation" 
standard.  These three justices conclude that the defendant's 
request for an attorney in the present case constituted an 
effective invocation of his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel under the temporal standard of "imminent or impending" 
interrogation.  Because the defendant met this standard, these 
three justices conclude that the defendant's request for an 
attorney in the present case also constituted an effective 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel under 
the "anytime in custody" standard. 
¶34 Concerned that this court might adopt the "imminent or 
impending interrogation" temporal standard, the State argues 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
21 
 
that the defendant has not met this temporal standard for two 
reasons:  First, the defendant had no reason to assume that 
custodial interrogation was imminent because the drive to the 
jail would take between fifteen and twenty minutes and Rindt 
told the defendant he could call a lawyer when they got there.  
Second, the defendant's simply stated request for counsel was a 
request for counsel to secure his release from police custody, 
not to help him in interrogation.  We are not convinced by the 
State's reasoning.   
¶35 The record does not reveal when Rindt initially 
intended to subject the defendant to custodial interrogation.  
In the minutes leading up to the defendant's request for 
counsel, Detective Rindt made it clear that he intended to 
question the defendant.  The defendant could have reasonably 
surmised that because Rindt was persistent in wanting to 
interrogate him, Rindt would continue to attempt to interrogate 
him in a custodial setting after he refused to speak with Rindt 
in a noncustodial setting.  The defendant had no reason to 
believe that Rindt's eagerness to question him dissipated once 
Rindt took him into custody. 
¶36 The State's contention that the defendant's request 
for counsel was directed to secure his release from police 
custody and that the defendant's request for counsel was not for 
counsel to help him in dealing with custodial interrogation by 
the police is unconvincing.  When the defendant in the present 
case requested an attorney, his entire discussion with Rindt had 
thus far focused on whether the defendant would permit Rindt to 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
22 
 
interview him.  Unlike in LaGrone, the defendant in the present 
case did not invoke his right to counsel in response to a police 
officer's request for a consent to search.  The defendant 
instead requested an attorney after Rindt had already made it 
evident that he wished to interrogate the defendant and had 
taken the defendant into custody when the defendant rebuffed 
several of Rindt's offers to conduct a noncustodial interview.32  
¶37 The circumstances in the present case of impending 
interrogation 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
defendant, 
unlike 
the 
suspects in McNeil or LaGrone, expressed a desire for the 
assistance 
of 
an 
attorney 
"in 
dealing 
with 
custodial 
interrogation by the police."33 
¶38 The State cites several cases in addition to McNeil 
and LaGrone in support of its position that the defendant's 
request for counsel was not timely, but these cases are easily 
distinguished from the one at hand.   
¶39 In State v. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, 294 Wis. 2d 780, 
720 N.W.2d 459, for example, Kramer asked officers for an 
attorney to assist him in dealing with the police during an 
armed standoff.  Everyone agreed that Kramer was not in custody 
when he requested counsel.  Furthermore, ruled the court of 
appeals, the request for counsel was clearly not one for 
                                                 
32 The State's contention that the defendant's request for 
counsel was merely anticipatory because custodial interrogation 
does not normally take place in a squad car is also not 
convincing.  In numerous cases interrogation has taken place in 
a squad car.    
33 See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 179 (emphasis in original).   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
23 
 
assistance during a custodial interrogation.34  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals ruled that Kramer had no right to expect that 
any ensuing statements would not be used substantively against 
him at trial. 
¶40 In State v. Hassel, 2005 WI App 80, 280 Wis. 2d 637, 
696 N.W.2d 270, Hassel was not in custody at the time he asked 
to remain silent in response to questions from law enforcement 
officers; he was not taken into custody until the next day.35  
Hassel did not request counsel.  Hassel's request to remain 
silent 
related 
to 
interrogation 
but 
not 
to 
custodial 
interrogation.  The court of appeals concluded that Hassel's 
invocation of his right to remain silent was not a valid 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent 
"because 
he 
was 
not 
subject 
to 
custodial 
interrogation.  
Therefore, there is no prior invocation with which the police 
should have been concerned."36 
¶41 Kramer and Hassel govern a suspect who is not in 
custody during police interrogation.  The cases stand for the 
rule that a person who is not in custody cannot anticipatorily 
invoke a Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel or right to 
remain silent.  In the instant case, the defendant was in 
custody and his request for counsel was an expression of a 
                                                 
34 State v. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, ¶10, 294 Wis. 2d 780, 
720 N.W.2d 459.   
35 Hassel, 2005 WI App 80, ¶¶2-3, 280 Wis. 2d 637, 696 
N.W.2d 270.   
36 Id., ¶20. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
24 
 
desire "for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with 
custodial interrogation by the police."37 
¶42 United States v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 
1991), is similar to the present case and is instructive.  
Kelsey was in custody during a search of his home.  He "asked to 
see his lawyer three or four times."38  The court of appeals 
concluded that it was clear that "the police intended to 
question Kelsey at some point at his home, and that the police 
understood Kelsey to be invoking his right to counsel during 
questioning."39  Kelsey was facing impending interrogation.40 
Mindful of McNeil, the court of appeals ruled that Kelsey had 
made a statement that could "reasonably be construed to be [an] 
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in 
dealing with custodial interrogation by the police"41 and that 
"the fact that Kelsey invoked his right to counsel before the 
police 
were 
required 
to 
inform 
him 
of 
that 
right 
is 
irrelevant."42 
                                                 
37 See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 179 (emphasis in original).  
38 United States v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 
1991).  "Recognizing the import of Kelsey's request, the police 
stated that if they allowed him to see his lawyer they could not 
question him further." Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199.   
39 Id.   
40 In Alston, 34 F.2d at 1249, for example, the federal 
court of appeals characterized the suspect in Kelsey as facing 
impending interrogation. 
41 Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 
179) (emphasis in McNeil).   
42 Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
25 
 
¶43 Because the defendant was in custody and had a 
reasonable belief that interrogation was imminent or impending, 
his request for counsel was an effective invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel under both the "anytime in 
custody" standard and the "imminent or impending interrogation" 
temporal standard.   
¶44 The present case illustrates "the type of coercive 
atmosphere that generates the need for application of the 
Edwards rule."43  After the defendant effectively invoked his 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel, police interrogation, 
unless initiated by the defendant, would violate Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
III 
¶45 We now turn to the question whether Detective Rindt's 
statement to the defendant after the defendant invoked his right 
to counsel constituted interrogation. 
¶46 The 
seminal 
case 
interpreting 
the 
meaning 
of 
interrogation under Miranda is Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291 (1980).  The United States Supreme Court declared in Innis 
that "[t]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only 
to express questioning," but also to the functional equivalent 
of express questioning.44  The "functional equivalent of express 
questioning" (sometimes referred to in the cases and the 
literature as the "functional equivalent of interrogation") 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
26 
 
means "any words or actions on the part of the police (other 
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the 
police 
should 
know 
are 
reasonably 
likely 
to 
elicit 
an 
incriminating response."45  A law enforcement officer may thus be 
viewed as interrogating a suspect by a statement, without asking 
a single question, if the law enforcement officer's conduct or 
speech could have had the force of a question on the suspect.  
"Interrogation" "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and 
beyond that inherent in custody itself."46 
¶47 The Innis test for interrogation was summarized in 
State v. Cunningham 144 Wis. 2d 272, 278-79, 423 N.W.2d 862 
(1988), as follows: "[I]f an objective observer (with the same 
knowledge of the suspect as the police officer) could, on the 
sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks or observing the 
officer's conduct, conclude that the officer's conduct or words 
would be likely to elicit an incriminating response, that is, 
could reasonably have had the force of a question on the 
suspect, 
then 
the 
conduct 
or 
words 
would 
constitute 
interrogation."  The concept of interrogation thus reflects 
"both an objective forseeability standard and the police 
officer's specific knowledge of the suspect."47  The focus is 
                                                 
45 Id.   
46 Id. at 300. 
47 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 278.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
27 
 
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect but the intent of 
the police is not ignored.48 
¶48 In interpreting and applying the Innis test of what 
constitutes interrogation, a court must keep in mind the evils 
addressed by Miranda.  As this court explained in Cunningham, 
the purpose of Miranda and Innis is to prevent "'government 
officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to 
extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained 
environment.'"49  We must determine whether Rindt's conduct and 
words implicate this purpose. 
¶49 Whether a suspect was subject to interrogation by the 
government is a question of constitutional fact.  This court 
will not upset the circuit court's findings of evidentiary or 
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.50  The 
determination of whether the facts satisfy the legal standard is 
a question of constitutional law which this court decides 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.51 
¶50 The defendant asserts that the interaction between 
himself and Rindt was either an interrogation in the traditional 
                                                 
48 Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 & n.7; Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 
277. 
49 Cunningham, 
144 
Wis. 2d at 
280-81, 
283 
(citation 
omitted). 
50 Id. at 281-82; State v. Fischer, 2003 WI App 5, ¶28, 259 
Wis. 2d 799, 656 N.W.2d 503. 
51 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 282. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
28 
 
sense 
(a 
question 
and 
answer 
format) 
or 
the 
functional 
equivalent of express questioning.  
¶51 We 
reject 
the 
defendant's 
claim 
that 
Rindt's 
explanation of why the defendant was being arrested amounted in 
the present case to interrogation in the traditional sense.  
Detective Rindt asked no questions of the defendant.  A 
statement is not "express questioning."  
¶52 We therefore address the defendant's claim that 
Rindt's response was the functional equivalent of express 
questioning. 
¶53 The case law is instructive, although each case stands 
on its own facts.  In Innis, the Court found no interrogation 
had taken place when two officers conversed in front of Innis 
about their desire to locate a gun Innis had supposedly used and 
discarded, 
lest 
any 
students 
from 
a 
nearby 
school 
for 
handicapped children "find a weapon with shells and . . . hurt 
themselves."52  In response to the officers' colloquy, Innis 
revealed the gun's location.  
¶54 The United States Supreme Court in Innis determined 
that no interrogation had taken place, stating that "the entire 
conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a few 
offhand remarks"53 and that nothing in the record suggested that 
                                                 
52 Innis, 446 U.S. at 294-95.  A third officer, not party to 
the conversation, testified of one colleague: "He said it would 
be too bad if the little——I believe he said a girl——would pick 
up the gun, maybe kill herself."  Id. at 295.   
53 Id. at 303.  
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
29 
 
"the officers were aware that [Innis] was peculiarly susceptible 
to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of 
handicapped children" or that "the police knew that [Innis] was 
unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest."54   
¶55 In Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2006), the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the following 
did not rise to the functional equivalent of interrogation:  an 
investigator's 
advice 
to 
the 
suspect, 
a 
prisoner, 
that 
investigators already "had inmate testimony [indicating] that 
[the suspect] and another individual were the . . . perpetrators 
of [a] murder . . . and that if convicted [of the murder], [the 
suspect] could be subject to the death penalty."55  The court of 
appeals determined that the investigator's statement to the 
suspect did not amount to "anything more than a matter-of-fact 
communication of the evidence against him and the potential 
punishment he faced."56 
¶56 In 
State 
v. 
Cunningham, 
144 
Wis. 2d 272, 
144 
Wis. 2d 272, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988), in the course of searching 
Cunningham's home, a police officer showed Cunningham an 
unloaded revolver the officer had discovered in Cunningham's 
bedroom and remarked to another officer, "This was apparently 
what Mr. Cunningham was running into the bedroom for."57  The 
                                                 
54 Id. at 302-03.   
55 Easley, 433 F.3d at 971.   
56 Easley, 433 F.3d at 974.   
57 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 275.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
30 
 
Cunningham court concluded that the officer's words and conduct 
were not likely to elicit an incriminating response, that is, 
the officer's words and conduct could not reasonably have had 
the force of a question on the suspect.  The court explained 
that there was no indication in Cunningham that the suspect "was 
unusually susceptible to the officer's words and conduct in 
displaying the gun" or that "at the time he made the statements 
the [suspect] was unusually disoriented or upset."58  It also 
viewed the officer's words as "not as provocative as the 
officer's comments in Innis."59  Accordingly, the Cunningham 
court concluded that the officer's words and conduct did not 
constitute interrogation.   
¶57 As in the Cunningham case, Rindt made a matter-of-fact 
communication of the evidence the police possessed.  Rindt's 
comment was not as provocative as that at issue in Easley, in 
which the investigator not only spoke of evidence against the 
suspect but also warned the suspect that he could face the death 
penalty. 
 
Detective 
Rindt's 
comment 
may 
be 
favorably 
distinguished from the police conduct at issue in Innis, Easley, 
and 
Cunningham, 
because 
Rindt's 
comment 
was 
reasonably 
responsive to the defendant's own statement that he did not 
understand why he was under arrest.60  Confronting a suspect with 
                                                 
58 Id. at 282.   
59 Id. at 283.   
60 The defendant's confusion may have been justifiable, 
given that the defendant was taken into custody in September 
2003; the three transactions involving the defendant and Meyer 
occurred in November 2002, February 2003, and April 2003. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
31 
 
incriminating physical evidence, or verbally summarizing the 
State's 
case 
against 
the 
suspect, 
does 
not 
necessarily 
constitute the functional equivalent of express questioning.61  
¶58 Although Meyer, the informant, was a childhood friend 
of the defendant, nothing in the record supports the suggestion 
that Rindt knew or should have known that his brief response 
would result in the defendant's further statements.  An 
objective observer could not have concluded that Rindt's 
response to the defendant, who stated that he did not understand 
why he was under arrest, would likely elicit an incriminating 
response.  Rindt merely stated that the defendant had sold drugs 
to an informant who had been cooperating with police during 
those 
transactions. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
"[t]he 
compelling 
pressures of in-custody interrogation identified in Miranda as 
working 'to undermine the individual's will to resist and to 
                                                                                                                                                             
For cases holding that an officer's explanation of the 
reason for an arrest in response to a suspect's inquiry is not 
the functional equivalent of express questioning, see, e.g., 
United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).   
61 Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 282.  See also United States 
v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Innis 
definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within 
Miranda's reach all declaratory statements by police officers 
concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the 
evidence relating to those charges."); United States v. Jackson, 
863 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1989) (no interrogation when, in 
response to a suspect's questions about the reason for his 
arrest, a DEA agent named the person to whom police believed the 
suspect had sold cocaine); State v. Spencer, 826 A.2d 546 (N.H. 
2003) (no interrogation when a police officer responded to a 
suspect's protests that police had arrested the wrong person by 
showing the suspect bank surveillance photographs allegedly 
capturing her in the act of cashing forged checks). 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
32 
 
compel him to speak' were not present in the circumstances of 
this case."62  
¶59 The defendant relies heavily on State v. Bond, 2000 WI 
App 118, ¶15, 237 Wis. 2d 633, 614 N.W.2d 552, aff'd by an 
equally divided court, 2001 WI 56, 243 Wis. 2d 476, 627 
N.W.2d 484.  In Bond, the suspect was in custody but had not 
been given the Miranda warnings.  The court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court erred in failing to suppress 
Bond's statement made in response to a police officer's remark 
to Bond.   
¶60 The police arrested Bond on suspicion of making 
threatening phone calls to an undercover officer.  The speaker 
in the phone calls referred to himself as "the man behind the 
man."63  Upon being taken into custody, Bond repeatedly asked why 
he was under arrest, and one officer——apparently wanting first 
to remove Bond from the public corridor in which police had 
arrested him——told Bond that they would tell him why he was 
under arrest "in a minute."64  Bond replied, "Oh you're the 
man."65  Another officer then retorted, "No, you're the man 
                                                 
62 United State v. Crisco, 725 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
63 State v. Bond, 2000 WI App 118, ¶¶3-5, 237 Wis. 2d 633, 
614 N.W.2d 552, aff'd by an equally divided court, 2001 WI 56, 
243 Wis. 2d 476, 627 N.W.2d 484.   
64 Bond, 237 Wis. 2d 633, ¶4. 
65 Id., ¶¶4-5.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
33 
 
behind the man."66  Bond's answer——"Ah, so that's what this is 
about"——was produced as evidence at his trial.67 
¶61 The officer in Bond did not make "a matter-of-fact 
communication of the evidence" against Bond; he made a cryptic 
remark that made sense only to the person who committed the 
crime for which Bond was arrested.  Consequently, Bond's comment 
understanding the officer's words was an expected response, and 
thus the officer's words were the functional equivalent of 
interrogation.  One of the officers testified that the comment 
"was designed . . . to elicit a response from" Bond.68  The Bond 
court of appeals concluded that the officer's remark was the 
equivalent of interrogation in the absence of a Miranda warning 
and that Bond's incriminating response had to be suppressed. 
¶62 Bond is significantly different from the present case.  
Rindt's remarks were less provocative than the officer's pointed 
rejoinder in Bond.  Rindt's comments were clear in meaning, 
plain in form, and not designed to elicit a response from the 
defendant.  Bond therefore does not govern the present case.  
¶63 The defendant also rests on Hill v. United States, 858 
A.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  While in custody, Hill asked a 
detective whether Hill's friend, whom police had also taken into 
custody, was locked up.69  The detective answered, "No, but let 
                                                 
66 Id., ¶¶4-5 & n.4.   
67 Id., ¶¶5-6.  
68 Id., ¶18.   
69 Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 440 (D.C. Cir. 
2004).   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
34 
 
me tell you he told us what happened."70  The court of appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
detective's 
answer 
amounted 
to 
an 
interrogation.  It explained that "[t]he statement, 'he told us 
what happened,' was not responsive to [Hill's] preceding 
question asking whether [his friend] had been detained"71 and 
that "the unresponsive and postured nature of [the detective's] 
words is suggestive of a purposeful design likely to elicit an 
incriminating response."72 
¶64 The Hill court considered the context in which the 
conversations took place to be significant.  The detective had 
admonished his colleagues not to advise Hill of his Miranda 
rights and then had left Hill "incommunicado, handcuffed to a 
chair in an interview room for approximately three and one-half 
hours . . . ."73  The court of appeals determined that these 
actions 
"underscore[d] 
[a] 
plan 
to 
intimidate 
[Hill] 
by 
purposely 
withholding 
the 
advisement 
of 
rights 
meant 
to 
counteract 
the 
pressure 
inherent 
in 
custodial 
interrogation . . . ."74  When the detective finally returned to 
speak 
with 
Hill, 
the 
detective 
also 
"combine[d] 
classic 
interrogation techniques" by first establishing authority, then 
confronting the suspect with evidence against him, and finally 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 443-44, 447. 
72 Id. at 443. 
73 Id. at 447.   
74 Id. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
35 
 
"creat[ing] a verbal vacuum (ten to fifteen seconds of silence) 
in which the first person to break the silence constitutes the 
losing party."75  The detective entered the room, telling Hill, 
"I'm running the show and you are going to be charged with 
murder II."76  Under these circumstances the Hill court concluded 
that "the seemingly benign transmittal of information to 
[Hill] . . . resembles the kind of mental games that largely 
generated the Miranda decision itself."77   
¶65 Hill is significantly different from the present case.  
Rindt's 
comment 
to 
the 
defendant 
was 
responsive 
to 
the 
defendant's statement.  The record does not demonstrate that 
Rindt's reply was a planned interrogation strategy like the one 
considered in Hill.  
¶66 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Rindt's 
words and conduct did not constitute interrogation; Rindt did 
not engage in express questioning or the functional equivalent 
of express questioning after the defendant effectively invoked 
his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.  Rindt's statement 
would not be viewed by an objective observer as the type of 
comment that would encourage the defendant to make some 
incriminating remark.  A reasonably objective observer could not 
foresee 
that 
Rindt's 
conduct 
and 
words 
would 
elicit 
an 
incriminating response from the defendant.  
                                                 
75 Id. at 444.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 447.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
36 
 
IV 
¶67 Even after a suspect in custody asks to speak with a 
lawyer, thereby requiring that "all interrogation must cease 
until a lawyer is present,"78 a suspect may waive his or her 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.79 
¶68 In order to establish that a suspect has validly 
waived the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel after 
effectively invoking it, the State must meet two criteria:   
¶69 (A) First, the State has the burden to show as a 
preliminary 
matter 
that 
the 
suspect 
"initiate[d] 
further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."80  
This criterion does not go to the validity of the suspect's 
purported waiver but instead is "in effect a prophylactic rule, 
designed to protect an accused in police custody from being 
badgered by police officers . . . ."81  
¶70 (B) Second, the State has the burden to show that the 
suspect waived the right to counsel "voluntarily, knowingly and 
                                                 
78 Innis, 446 U.S. at 293 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). 
79 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,  485 (1981). 
80 Id. 
81 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983).  Eight 
justices agreed with this statement of the first criterion. 
See also Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 (explaining that 
whether a suspect initiated further discussion and whether the 
suspect validly waived her Miranda rights are separate inquiries 
and that "clarity of application is not gained by melding them 
together"). 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
37 
 
intelligently."82  That is, the waiver "of counsel must not only 
be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a 
matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused."83 
¶71 The standard of review on the questions whether the 
defendant initiated further communication with Rindt and whether 
the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived 
his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel is as follows:  
This court will uphold a circuit court's findings of historical 
or evidentiary fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  This 
court determines the application of legal and constitutional 
                                                 
82 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  The Bradshaw Court phrases the 
test as whether a waiver is "knowing and intelligent," omitting 
the word "voluntary."  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 (quoting 
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9).  The Court appears to have made 
this omission simply because the defendant in Bradshaw did not 
allege that the waiver was not voluntary.  We of course do not 
read the omission to alter the rule announced in Miranda. 
The defendant's brief sometimes articulates the test as 
whether a suspect "knowingly and intelligently" waived his or 
her rights but at other times uses the phrase "voluntarily and 
intelligently."  The circuit court also used different phrases.  
Both the defendant and the circuit court seem to be discussing a 
single test, only phrasing it differently at different points in 
the discussion.   
83 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.  See also State v. Turner, 136 
Wis. 2d 333, 347, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987) (quoting Edwards, 451 
U.S. at 481) ("An accused waives the right to counsel when there 
is a voluntary, 'knowing, and intelligent relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.'"); State v. Kramar, 
149 Wis. 2d 767, 790, 440 N.W.2d 317 (1989) (citing Turner).   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
38 
 
principles to those evidentiary facts independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefits from the circuit 
court's and court of appeals' analyses.84  
A 
¶72 The defendant asserts that the State has not shown 
that he initiated a discussion or conversation with Rindt.  
¶73 Tests for determining whether a suspect initiated a 
discussion or conversation with law enforcement officers were 
set forth in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).  The 
four-justice Bradshaw plurality concluded that a suspect's 
"inquiries or statements . . . relating to routine incidents of 
the 
custodial 
relationship" 
would 
not 
be 
sufficient 
to 
constitute "initiation," but that questions or statements that 
under the totality of circumstances "evinced a willingness and a 
desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation" 
would.85  
¶74 The four-justice Bradshaw dissent supplied its own 
competing test, arguing that when the "Court in Edwards spoke of 
'initiat[ing] 
further 
communication' 
with 
the 
police 
and 
'reopen[ing] the dialogue with the authorities,' it obviously 
                                                 
84 Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶20. 
See Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 343-49 (discussing the standard 
of review for questions of constitutional fact and implicitly 
applying this standard both to the question whether a suspect 
had initiated further communication with police and to the 
question whether the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived 
the Miranda right to counsel).   
85 Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46.  
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
39 
 
had in mind communication or dialogue about the subject matter 
of the criminal investigation."86   
¶75 Thus uncertainty persists about what constitutes a 
suspect's 
"initiating" 
further 
communication 
with 
law 
enforcement.  We are free to choose either the plurality's or 
the dissent's test.  We need not make the choice in the present 
case.  Our analysis and conclusion in the present case would not 
differ under either the plurality's or dissent's statement of 
the test for a suspect's "initiation" of further communication 
or dialogue.87    
¶76 The defendant asserts that for a suspect to "initiate" 
communication or dialogue there must be a break between the 
suspect's invocation of the right to counsel and the subsequent 
communication by the suspect to law enforcement that led to the 
inculpatory statements.  According to the defendant, the 
                                                 
86 Id. at 1053 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis and 
alterations in original).   
The ninth Bradshaw justice rejected the two-step approach 
and deemed the confession admissible because there was a knowing 
and intelligent waiver by Bradshaw of his rights.  Bradshaw, 462 
U.S. at 1049 (Powell, J., concurring). 
87 See State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301, 1318 (N.J. 1997) ("We 
have acknowledged that these are 'separate tests,' but have not 
flatly chosen one or the other [citation omitted].  We perceive 
little difference between the tests . . . .").  
For a discussion of the Bradshaw case, see 2 LaFave et al., 
supra note 14, § 6.9(f) at 849 (concluding that "an objective 
assessment of the circumstances in [Bradshaw] would seem to 
justify only one conclusion . . . . [The suspect's] question 
would 
not 
amount 
to 
'initiation' 
under 
either 
of 
the 
tests. . . . ").  
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
40 
 
dialogue that Rindt had initiated with the defendant had never 
ceased and no break in the dialogue occurred between the 
defendant's 
invocation 
of 
the 
right 
to 
counsel 
and 
the 
defendant's 
comment 
that 
supposedly 
initiated 
further 
communication. 
¶77 Whether 
a 
suspect 
"initiates" 
communication 
or 
dialogue does not depend solely on the time elapsing between the 
invocation of the right to counsel and the suspect's beginning 
an exchange with law enforcement, although the lapse of time is 
a factor to consider. 
¶78 The facts in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 
(1983), are instructive on the question whether the defendant in 
the present case "initiated" further communication with Rindt.     
¶79 Bradshaw inquired of a police officer, "[e]ither just 
before, or during," a trip from the police station to jail, 
"Well, what is going to happen to me now?"88  The Bradshaw 
plurality observed that in posing this question, Bradshaw 
"'initiated' further communication in the ordinary dictionary 
sense of that word."89   
¶80 The plurality opinion recognized, however, that the 
fact that Bradshaw initiated further communication in the 
ordinary dictionary sense was insufficient to establish that he 
"initiated" further communication evincing a willingness for a 
generalized discussion about the investigation.  The plurality 
                                                 
88 Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1042 (1983).  
89 Id. at 1045.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
41 
 
opinion acknowledged that some initial statements may be "so 
routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on 
the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion 
relating directly or indirectly to the investigation."90  
¶81 The plurality opinion concluded that Bradshaw had 
"initiated" communication under the circumstances of the case.  
Bradshaw's ambiguous question could have been interpreted by the 
officer as relating generally to the investigation.  That the 
officer so understood the question is apparent from the fact 
that the officer immediately reminded Bradshaw that he did not 
have to talk to the officer.  Bradshaw said he understood and 
then they conversed.91  The Court concluded that Bradshaw's 
"question . . . as to what was going to happen to him evinced a 
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the 
investigation" and "was not merely a necessary inquiry arising 
out of the incidents of the custodial relationship."92 
¶82 In contrast to Bradshaw's ambiguous question about 
what was going to happen to him, the defendant's statement here 
that he did not understand why he was under arrest was clearly 
seeking 
information 
and 
constituted 
an 
initiation 
of 
communication with Rindt in the most ordinary sense of the word.  
The defendant's statement did not merely relate "to routine 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1045-46. 
92 Id. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
42 
 
incidents of the custodial relationship."93  The context of the 
defendant's statement supports the conclusion that the statement 
evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion 
about the investigation.   
¶83 The cases the defendant cites do not persuade us 
otherwise.  The defendant's reliance on United States v. Gomez, 
927 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991), is misplaced.  Gomez was 
arrested and requested counsel.  A federal agent then told Gomez 
that he faced 10 years to life in prison and that cooperation 
might give him a lighter sentence.  Minutes later Gomez asked 
the federal agent why he had been arrested.  After the federal 
agent explained the reason for arrest, Gomez asked to speak to 
someone about cooperating. 
¶84 The 
Gomez 
court 
held 
that 
the 
federal 
agent's 
initiation of conversation with Gomez after Gomez invoked his 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel was likely to elicit an 
incriminating response and constituted interrogation.  That 
Gomez began conversation with the agent a few moments later 
about his arrest did not cure the agent's initiation of 
interrogation after a valid Fifth Amendment Miranda invocation 
of the right to counsel.94  Gomez thus stands for the proposition 
that once police illegally interrogate a suspect contrary to 
                                                 
93 See id. at 1045.  As examples of inquiries related to 
routine incidents of the custodial relationship, the Bradshaw 
plurality suggests "a request for a drink of water or a request 
to use a telephone."  Id.    
94 See United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530, 1538-39 (11th 
Cir. 1991). 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
43 
 
Miranda and Edwards, "no claim that the accused 'initiated' more 
conversation will be heard."95  Gomez presents very different 
facts from the present case. 
¶85 The defendant also errs in relying on McDougal v. 
State, 591 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. 2004).  After having invoked his 
right to counsel while in custody, 90 minutes later McDougal, 
sitting in a jail cell, sent word to detectives that he wished 
to see them.96   
¶86 In asking to see the detectives, McDougal had not 
indicated a waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel or 
the reason he was seeking out the detectives.  The court 
concluded 
that 
there 
was 
"no 
indication 
that 
[McDougal] . . . intended 
to 
initiate 
the 
conversation 
by 
engaging 
in 
a 
'generalized 
discussion 
about 
the 
investigation.'"97  Indeed, wrote the court, it was possible 
"that McDougal intended to inquire about when he would be 
allowed to contact his wife or an attorney, which he had not yet 
been permitted to do, or when he could see his daughter, which 
the 
police 
had 
promised 
to 
arrange 
during 
the 
initial 
interview."98   
                                                 
95 Id. at 1539.   
96 McDougal v. State, 591 S.E.2d 788, 794 (Ga. 2004).  
97 Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046).   
98 Id. at 794-95.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
44 
 
¶87 Before McDougal could speak, the detective confronted 
McDougal, stating that the person whom McDougal had implicated 
as a shooter had a strong alibi.   
¶88 The McDougal court held that the detective's statement 
constituted interrogation, that McDougal had not "reinitiated" 
communication with law enforcement by his mere request to see 
the detective, and that McDougal's statements were responses to 
police interrogation after McDougal effectively invoked his 
Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.   
¶89 In contrast to McDougal, in the present case, after 
the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to 
counsel, the detective did not make any provocative statements 
about the arrest or the crime.  Rather, the defendant began an 
exchange with Rindt with a comment to which the detective made a 
straightforward 
response. 
 
Under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances in the present case the defendant's comment 
evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion.  
¶90 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant "initiated" further communication with Rindt.  
B 
¶91 We now consider whether the defendant voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment Miranda 
right to counsel.  A Miranda waiver is voluntary if it is "the 
product 
of 
a 
free 
and 
deliberate 
choice 
rather 
than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception."99  For a Miranda waiver to 
                                                 
99 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
45 
 
be knowing and intelligent, it "must have been made with a full 
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and 
the consequences of the decision to abandon it."100  Resolving 
the waiver question requires a case-by-case examination of all 
the facts and circumstances, including the suspect's background, 
experience, and conduct.101 
¶92 A circuit court's determination of the waiver of 
Miranda rights is reviewed as follows:  A circuit court's 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact will not be disturbed 
unless clearly erroneous.  This court determines the application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
those 
evidentiary 
facts 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.102 
¶93 The defendant summarizes his argument that he did not 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to 
counsel, stating that at the time of his arrest, he was hungry, 
alone in the back seat of a squad car, handcuffed, and young and 
limited in intelligence and sophistication.    
¶94 This argument is not compelling on the facts of the 
present case.  The defendant was an adult at the time of his 
arrest.  While he casts himself as limited in intelligence and 
sophistication 
(and 
the 
circuit 
court 
acknowledged 
the 
                                                 
100 State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 18-19, 556 N.W.2d 687 
(1996) (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421).    
101 Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 348 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 
482). 
102 Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 17. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
46 
 
defendant's apparent limited intelligence and understanding), 
the defendant does not claim to be incompetent to exercise or 
waive his legal rights.  Although Detectives Rindt and Clausing 
did arrest the defendant before he had a chance to eat his 
breakfast, the defendant does not seem to claim that hunger had 
somehow deprived him of the ability to make decisions knowingly 
and intelligently.  The defendant was undoubtedly uncomfortable 
and scared.  Most people arrested on suspicion of delivering 
cocaine would probably be uncomfortable and scared.  
¶95 The circuit court found that "there was no indication 
that he was deprived of sleep or intoxicated or that anything in 
his general physical and emotional condition, as objectively 
viewed, made him unusually susceptible.  He had substantial 
previous experience with the police (although at the juvenile 
level)."  The circuit court observed that the time in custody 
and the length of the interrogation were relatively short.  The 
circuit court explained that the defendant was being questioned 
and interviewed with respect to possible cooperation.  According 
to the circuit court, no threats or promises were made except 
those relating to possible cooperation.  The defendant's claim 
that Rindt "subtly coerced" the defendant when he rewarded the 
defendant's decision to speak by removing the handcuffs and 
putting him in the front seat of the squad car does not 
challenge the circuit court's finding.  The circuit court's 
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. 
¶96 More pertinent is the defendant's allegation that 
either Detective Rindt or Detective Clausing told the defendant 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
47 
 
that it was not necessary for him to obtain legal assistance.  
The defendant asserts that the law enforcement officer's comment 
came when the detectives were trying to get him to talk to them 
prior to his arrest and prior to the defendant's effectively 
invoking 
his 
Fifth 
Amendment 
Miranda 
right 
to 
counsel.  
According to the circuit court's decision, Detective Rindt did 
not seem to recall this give and take, and the circuit court 
made no finding specific to the alleged exchange between the 
defendant and Rindt.   
¶97 The circuit court made clear that, as a general 
matter, 
it 
found 
the 
defendant's 
"version 
[of 
the 
arrest] . . . full of internal inconsistencies and self-serving 
statements" and that it "bolsters the State's case."  The 
circuit court also characterized the law enforcement officer's 
testimony as demonstrating a "'convenient'" lack of memory as to 
certain key issues" and characterized the memory lapses as 
"certainly troubling."  The circuit court found, however, that 
because 
Rindt 
was 
no 
longer 
employed 
by 
the 
sheriff's 
department, he had "no motivation to fabricate."103 
                                                 
103 Circuit court decision, Brief and Appendix of Defendant-
Appellant-Petitioner at App. 117.  The circuit court commented 
at sentencing that the State's witness "seemed to remember very 
well the things that protected the State's interest and then 
[had an] utter lack of memory as to virtually any other detail.  
It was very bizarre.  Not very credible."  The circuit court 
also viewed the police practices here as "not professional" and 
stated that the officers "created the offense" to get the 
defendant to give them some names. 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
48 
 
¶98 The circuit court's findings and analysis establish 
that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant's 
waiver of his right to counsel after he was given the Miranda 
warnings was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
¶99 We agree with the defendant that a court should be 
wary of viewing a suspect's every statement or question as an 
invitation to interrogation.  A suspect's invocation of the 
right to counsel should be meticulously honored and should not 
be set aside lightly.  We conclude, however, that in the present 
case the defendant "initiated" communication with the law 
enforcement officer after the defendant had invoked his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel and that the waiver of the 
right to counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
* * * * 
¶100 For the reasons set forth, we conclude as follows: 
(1) 
The 
defendant effectively invoked his Fifth 
Amendment Miranda right to counsel when he requested 
counsel while he was in custody and before the law 
enforcement officer interrogated him under both a standard 
requiring only that a suspect be in custody when the 
request for counsel is made and a standard requiring that 
interrogation be "imminent or impending when the request 
for counsel is made."  An invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel is a request for the assistance of 
an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the 
police.   
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
49 
 
(2) The law enforcement officer's statements to the 
defendant after he effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel and before he was given the 
Miranda warnings did not constitute interrogation by the 
officer.  
(3) After the defendant effectively invoked his Fifth 
Amendment 
Miranda 
right 
to 
counsel, 
he 
initiated 
communication with the law enforcement officer and then 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right 
to 
counsel, 
rendering 
the 
inculpatory 
statements 
admissible. 
¶101 The court is divided on the question whether to adopt 
a temporal standard to determine whether a suspect in custody 
has effectively invoked his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda right 
to counsel.  Three justices, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and 
Butler, adopt the standard that a suspect may effectively invoke 
the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel when a suspect is 
in custody and has made "an unequivocal request to speak with an 
attorney" even before interrogation is imminent or impending. 
¶102 Three justices, Justices Bradley and Crooks and the 
author of this opinion, conclude that they need not, and do not, 
address whether the appropriate temporal standard to adopt is 
the "anytime in custody" standard or the "imminent or impending 
interrogation" standard.  Justice Ziegler did not participate in 
this case.   
¶103 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's order refusing to suppress 
No. 
2005AP3087-CR   
 
50 
 
the 
defendant's 
inculpatory 
statements 
and 
affirming 
the 
conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶104 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2005AP3087-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶105 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   Although 
I agree that the court of appeals decision should be affirmed 
because Hambly's statements were given after he had invoked and 
then waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel,1 I write 
separately for two reasons:  (1) a test that the lead opinion 
establishes to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is 
contrary to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966); and (2) that test, i.e., that "a suspect may effectively 
invoke his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel by 
requesting counsel when a reasonable person in the suspect's 
position would believe that interrogation is imminent,"2 blurs 
Miranda's bright-line rule that law enforcement is to follow in 
fulfilling its obligations to a suspect who is in custody and 
unequivocally asks to see a lawyer.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶106 Scott Hambly requested the assistance of counsel after 
he was arrested, handcuffed and led to a squad car for transport 
to jail.  There is no question that he was in custody when he 
asked to see a lawyer before speaking to law enforcement any 
further.  However, instead of simply concluding that Hambly 
effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel because 
he was in custody and had made an unequivocal request to speak 
with an attorney, the lead opinion creates a test wherein "a 
                                                 
1 I refer to an in-custody request for counsel invoked to 
protect the Fifth Amendment's right against compelled self-
incrimination as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 
2 Lead op., ¶29. 
No.  2005AP3087-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
suspect may effectively invoke his or her Fifth Amendment 
Miranda right to counsel by requesting counsel when a reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
suspect's 
position 
would 
believe 
that 
interrogation is imminent."3  The majority opinion remarks that 
another "possible standard" is that any time a suspect is in 
custody and unequivocally requests counsel, even before Miranda 
warnings, the suspect invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel.4  In my view, this alternative standard is not a 
"possible standard."  It is the standard required by Miranda.  
Simply stated, any time a suspect is in custody, whether before 
or after Miranda warnings are given, whether before or after 
questioning is imminent or impending, an unambiguous request for 
counsel is always effective to invoke a suspect's Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel.5   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶107 The facts before us are undisputed.  With undisputed 
facts, we independently review whether a suspect has effectively 
invoked his right to counsel, as a question of constitutional 
fact.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶20, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 
N.W.2d 142. 
                                                 
3 Id. 
4 Id., ¶30. 
5 In my view, the court of appeals correctly applied Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in State v. Collins, 122 
Wis. 2d 320, 363 N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1984), when it concluded 
that Collins "invoked his right to counsel while at his home, 
immediately upon being arrested."  Id. at 328. 
No.  2005AP3087-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
B. 
Conditions on Timeliness of Invocation  
1. 
Conflict with Miranda 
¶108 The 
lead 
opinion 
sets 
out 
restrictions 
on 
the 
timeliness of a suspect's invocation of his or her Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel that I conclude are inconsistent with 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda.6   
¶109 The right to counsel pursuant to the Fifth Amendment 
was first described in Miranda.  There, the United States 
Supreme Court reviewed statements obtained from Miranda, who was 
subjected to custodial police interrogation.  The Court examined 
the procedures that it concluded would be necessary to accord 
Miranda his Fifth Amendment privilege7 against compelled self-
incrimination.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.  The Court concluded 
that this Fifth Amendment privilege could be protected only when 
the suspect "is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he 
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.'"  
Id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).  
¶110 In order to "guarantee" the Fifth Amendment right to 
remain 
silent, 
the 
Court 
in 
Miranda 
reasoned 
that 
the 
consequences that could follow custodial interrogation must be 
explained to a defendant before any questioning could commence.  
Id. at 471.  It also determined that only by according a suspect 
the opportunity to request the assistance of counsel could the 
                                                 
6 Lead op., ¶29.  
7 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part:  "No person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." 
No.  2005AP3087-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
intimidating atmosphere of custodial interrogation conform to 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
compelled 
self-
incrimination.  Id. at 466.  In so concluding, the Court relied 
on an earlier decision, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 
(1964).  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-66.  
¶111 Escobedo is relevant to the case before us for at 
least two reasons:  (1) the request for counsel in Escobedo was 
made before questioning was begun, before indictment, but after 
Escobedo was in custody, Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479, 485;8 and (2) 
Miranda relied on the constitutional concerns expressed in 
Escobedo for the development of the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-66.   
¶112 Escobedo was arrested and taken into custody as a 
suspect in a homicide case.  Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479.  When 
the arresting officer told Escobedo that "they had us pretty 
well, up pretty tight, and we might as well admit to this 
crime," Escobedo said, "I am sorry but I would like to have 
advice from my lawyer."  Id.  However, no lawyer was provided 
until after Escobedo had incriminated himself.  Id.  Based on 
                                                 
8 The lead opinion states that Escobedo's request for 
counsel came during, not before, police interrogation.  Lead 
op., ¶22 n.14.  While, as the lead opinion points out, Rhode 
Island 
v. 
Innis, 
446 
U.S. 
291 
(1980), 
established 
that 
statements, 
as 
well 
as 
questions, 
may 
constitute 
police 
interrogation, this view of interrogation was not contemplated 
by the Escobedo decision because Escobedo antedated the Innis 
decision by 16 years.  Therefore, according to the way in which 
the Supreme Court defined "interrogation" at the time Escobedo 
was decided, interrogation had not yet commenced when Escobedo 
first requested counsel.   
No.  2005AP3087-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
his request, the Supreme Court concluded that Escobedo had been 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Id. at 490-91.   
¶113 Escobedo's reasoning underlies Miranda's establishment 
of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
464-66.  The same concerns about the vulnerability of a 
defendant in custodial interrogation underlie both Miranda and 
Escobedo.  Escobedo used the Sixth Amendment to accord Escobedo 
the right to counsel because the Supreme Court had not yet 
established a Fifth Amendment right to counsel in order to 
protect the Fifth Amendment's proscription against compelled 
self-incrimination.  However, there was no hint that Escobedo's 
invocation of the right to counsel was premature because he 
exercised it when he was being taken to the police station, 
rather than when questioning was about to begin.  As the Court 
explained: 
[W]here . . . the suspect has been taken into police 
custody, 
the 
police 
carry 
out 
a 
process 
of 
interrogations 
that 
lends 
itself 
to 
eliciting 
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested 
and been denied an opportunity to consult with his 
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him 
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, 
the accused has been denied "the Assistance of 
Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by 
the Fourteenth Amendment," . . . and that no statement 
elicited by the police during the interrogation may be 
used against him at a criminal trial. 
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91 (quoted citations omitted). 
¶114 The protections accorded to Escobedo were clear and 
unambiguous.  That clarity was echoed in Miranda where the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel was first explained as being 
No.  2005AP3087-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
necessary to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent.  The Court stated, "Our holding  . . . is this:  The 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant 
unless 
it 
demonstrates 
the 
use 
of 
procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  The Court went on to 
explain that prior to any questioning, a defendant must be 
warned that he has the right to remain silent; that any 
statement he makes may be used against him; and that he has the 
right to have an attorney present during the time that he is 
questioned.  Id.   
¶115 The requirements Miranda outlined formed a bright-line 
rule.  It was not conditioned on the qualities of the individual 
suspect who was then the subject of a police investigation.  As 
the Court in Miranda explained: 
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental 
to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient 
of giving an adequate warning as to the availability 
of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to 
inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was 
aware of his rights without a warning being given.  
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, 
based on information as to his age, education, 
intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can 
never be more than speculation. 
Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added).  
¶116 Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), supports my 
conclusion about the requirements of Miranda.  In Smith, the 
State attempted to cast doubt on the validity of Smith's post-
custody, pre-arrest request for counsel through his responses to 
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questioning after he requested counsel.  Id. at 92-93.  In 
overturning Smith's conviction, the Supreme Court concluded: 
An accused in custody, "having expressed his 
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, 
is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available to 
him," unless he validly waives his earlier request for 
the assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 94-95 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 
(1981)).  The Supreme Court in Smith then described the 
requirement for counsel as a "'rigid' prophylactic rule" 
necessary to prevent compelled self-incrimination.  Id. at 95.  
The Supreme Court permitted no further condition on Smith's in-
custody request for counsel.  It was effective when made and 
must be honored.  Id. at 94-95.  This is consistent with my view 
that an unequivocal request for counsel made while in custody 
effectively invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.   
¶117 The lead opinion places conditions on a suspect's 
request for counsel by establishing a time before which the 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel may not be 
effective.  The lead opinion asserts that it is possible that 
invocation may not be effective until "a reasonable person in 
the 
suspect's 
position 
would 
[have] 
believe[d] 
that 
interrogation [was] imminent."9  Conditioning the right to 
counsel as the lead opinion has done is contrary to the express 
statement in Miranda:  "An individual need not make a pre-
interrogation request for a lawyer.  While such request 
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask 
                                                 
9 Lead op., ¶29. 
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for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver."  Id. at 470 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, I conclude that the lead 
opinion's conditions on the timeliness of an invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel is in direct conflict with 
Miranda and is therefore an impermissible interpretation of the 
rights accorded under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
2. 
Blurring Miranda's bright-line rule 
¶118 It is beyond dispute that Miranda attempted to "give 
concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow."  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 
(1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42).  As the Supreme 
Court has "stressed on numerous occasions, '[o]ne of the 
principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its 
application."  Id. (citations omitted).  The requirements of 
Miranda are a prophylactic to ward off violations of a suspect's 
constitutional right to remain silent.  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 
U.S. 171, 176 (1991).  Factors that condition the use of a 
prophylactic 
necessarily 
undermine 
its 
effectiveness.  
Statements in our opinions that are contrary to what the Supreme 
Court has instructed inject uncertainty into the law.10  
¶119 In addition, I do not know how a "reasonable person in 
the suspect's position" would know that "interrogation is 
                                                 
10 In my view, the conditions the lead opinion adds onto the 
way in which Miranda chose to protect the Fifth Amendment's 
right to remain silent provide no benefit for the State, for 
suspects in custody or for law enforcement.  They simply add 
uncertainty to what the Supreme Court expected would be clear. 
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imminent."11  Do the prior personal experiences of the suspect 
affect that test?  Does his or her age, education or 
intelligence inform whether he or she would believe that 
"interrogation is imminent or impending"?  Miranda teaches that 
such conditions are mere speculation and have no place in 
assuring that constitutional guarantees will be protected.  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69.    
¶120 The teaching of Miranda is simple:  once a suspect is 
in custody and makes an unequivocal request to speak with a 
lawyer, he or she has effectively invoked the Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel for the purpose of responding to police 
questioning.  Nothing more or less is needed.  A test that the 
lead opinion suggests blurs the bright-line rule that Miranda 
provides.  In addition, that test will be difficult to apply, 
thereby generating occasions when a suspect who is in custody 
and unequivocally asks for a lawyer will be denied that 
assistance by law enforcement who may rightly believe that 
questioning is not "imminent or impending."   
                                                 
11 Lead op., ¶29. 
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¶121 Accordingly, because I cannot join the conditions the 
lead opinion would permit to be placed on the constitutional 
right 
against 
compelled 
self-incrimination, 
I 
respectfully 
concur.  
¶122 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins in this concurrence and that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. 
joins in this concurrence, with the exception of its discussion 
of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).   
 
 
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¶123 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join 
Justice Roggensack's concurring opinion, with the exception of 
its discussion of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  
While Escobedo has, to date, never been overturned, the United 
State Supreme Court has since adopted the rule set forth in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with respect to 
custodial interrogation.  As it is not necessary to rely upon 
Escobedo now to reach the correct result, I would not bring it 
into the discussion.  In all other respects, I join Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence. 
 
 
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