Title: State v. Pilette

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_PILETTE.92-401; 160 Vt. 509; 630 A.2d 1296


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                 Nos. 92-401, 92-422, 92-423, 92-454, 92-556


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

 Raymond Joseph Pilette, Jr.                  May Term, 1993



 David T. Suntag, J.

 Robert Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Johnsbury,
   for plaintiff-appellee

 William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, Montpelier, for defendants-appellants


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   In these five consolidated cases, defendants entered
 conditional pleas of guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicating
 liquor as a third offense.  They appeal on the ground that convictions
 entered on pleas of guilty before July 1, 1991 could not be considered in
 applying the recidivism provisions of the DUI law that became effective on
 that date.  We affirm.
      Effective July 1, 1991, { 1210(d) of Title 23 was amended to provide
 that "[a] person convicted of violating section 1201 of this title
 [operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor] who has
 twice been convicted of violation of that section shall be fined not more
 than $2,500.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."  Each of
 
                                

 the defendants has been convicted twice of violating { 1201, and each
 conviction was based on a plea of guilty.  In each of the prior cases, the
 court did not inform defendants that, under the amended statute, the DUI
 convictions could be used to enhance future similar convictions to a felony
 level.  Indeed, the court could not have given defendants such information
 because the penalty enhancement provision for third offenses had not yet
 been passed by the Legislature.  Also, we have no indication as to how
 defendants' counsel may have advised their clients regarding the effect of a
 DUI conviction in relation to future charges; again, counsel could not have
 specifically advised about the current law because it had not yet been
 enacted.
      Defendants contend that application of the recidivism provision of the
 DUI statute to guilty pleas entered prior to the effective date of the new
 law renders those pleas involuntary.  The trial court disagreed, stating
 that prior to accepting a guilty plea a judge need advise a defendant of
 only the direct consequences of the plea to make it voluntary.  It concluded
 that the potential use of a criminal conviction to enhance the sentence of a
 possible future conviction is not a sufficiently direct consequence to
 require specific advice prior to acceptance of a guilty plea.
      A guilty plea is not voluntary unless the defendant knows and
 understands the consequences that attach to the plea.  In re Hall, 143 Vt.
 590, 595,