Title: People v. Terrell

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Terrell, No. 79312 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 79312-Agenda 19-March 1998.
Opinion filed December 31, 1998.
JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Drew Terrell, was convicted in the circuit court of 
Cook County of the murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of 15-month-old 
Laura Hampton. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder conviction and to 
a 60-year prison term for the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction. On 
appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions but vacated his sentences 
and remanded to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing. People v. 
Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178 (1989). The specific facts pertaining to 
defendant's conviction are set forth in detail in our prior opinion. Therefore, 
only the facts necessary for understanding and adjudicating the issues in the 
present appeal will be repeated.
At the resentencing hearing, a jury found defendant eligible 
for the death penalty based on two statutory aggravating factors: (1) the 
defendant had been found guilty of murdering a victim under 12 years of age and 
the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of 
wanton cruelty (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7)); and (2) the 
defendant murdered the victim in the course of another felony, that of 
aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 
9-1(b)(6)). The jury found no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude 
imposition of the death penalty and the circuit court sentenced defendant to 
death. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(g). Defendant's death sentence 
was stayed pending direct appeal to this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 
§4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a).
ISSUES
In this direct appeal, defendant raises 24 separate issues as 
grounds for vacating his death sentence. These contentions essentially raise 
claims of error occurring in the: (1) jury selection; (2) eligibility stage of 
sentencing; (3) aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing; and (4) sentencing. 
Defendant additionally raises 10 separate challenges to (5) the 
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute.
DISCUSSION
1. Jury Selection
Defendant contends three errors occurred during the jury 
selection process which deprived him of the right to be sentenced by an 
impartial jury (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV). First, defendant maintains that 
the trial court erred when it refused to ask potential jurors whether the age of 
the victim would make a difference in their ability to be fair. Defendant argues 
that the trial court's conduct violated the mandates of Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), because 
it prevented him from being able to ascertain whether potential jurors would 
consider all the mitigating evidence. Defendant further argues that his case is 
analogous to cases in which it was held to be error to refuse voir dire 
questions regarding racial bias (see Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986)) and prejudice against criminal street 
gangs (see People v. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d 908 (1996)).
The purpose of voir dire is to assure the selection of 
an impartial panel of jurors who are free from bias or prejudice. People v. 
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1994). The primary responsibility of 
conducting the voir dire examination lies with the trial court and the 
manner and scope of such examination rests within that court's discretion. 
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 16; 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 234, 431. Indeed, the 
trial court possesses great latitude in deciding what questions to ask during 
voir dire. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493, 505, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1904 (1991). On review, an abuse of the court's 
discretion will be found only when the record reveals that the court's conduct 
"thwarted the selection of an impartial jury." Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 
16.
Initially, we observe that this court recently rejected an 
argument similar to the one advanced by defendant here. In People v. 
Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1 (1996), the trial court disallowed the defendant's 
supplemental voir dire question which would have asked potential jurors 
whether they would consider not imposing the death penalty if the defendant was 
convicted of killing two young children and their mother. On review, this court 
found no error in the trial court's refusing to ask the proposed voir 
dire question. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 29-31. This court observed 
that the mandates of Morgan do not require questioning potential jurors 
about how they would act given the particular aggravating circumstances of the 
victim's murder. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 31.
Similarly, in the instant case, we find that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask defendant's proposed voir 
dire question. In its initial statements, the trial court informed the 
venire that the victim involved was a child. The trial court also educated the 
venire that the purpose of the voir dire examination was to select fair 
and impartial jurors who would decide the matter based solely on the evidence 
and the law. In addition, during the individual examination, the trial court 
asked each venireperson whether he or she would automatically vote to impose 
death without consideration of the mitigating evidence. A thorough review of 
this record reveals that the trial court did nothing to frustrate the selection 
of an impartial jury.
The other cases defendant relies upon are inapposite. In 
Turner, the United States Supreme Court held that a capital defendant 
accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors 
questioned on the issue of racial bias. Turner, 476 U.S.  at 36-37, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 37, 106 S. Ct.  at 1688. The instant case does not involve an 
interracial crime. In Jimenez, the defendant was convicted of murdering 
a man who opposed defendant's gang activities. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 
3d at 910-11. On review, the appellate court recognized a widespread prejudice 
against street gangs. In reversing defendant's conviction, the appellate court 
determined that, under those individual circumstances, fundamental fairness 
required the trial court to question potential jurors regarding their biasness 
towards gang members. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 912-13. We find that 
the circumstances and fairness concerns involved in Turner and 
Jimenez are not present in defendant's case. To be constitutionally 
compelled, it is not enough that a voir dire question be helpful, 
rather, the trial court's failure to ask the question must render the 
defendant's proceedings fundamentally unfair. Mu'Min, 500 U.S.  at 
425-26, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 506, 111 S. Ct.  at 1905. We find that defendant's 
proceedings were not rendered fundamentally unfair by the trial court's failure 
to ask defendant's proposed voir dire question.
Defendant next contends that certain comments the trial court 
made to potential jurors during voir dire denigrated the mandates of 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 
(1968), and Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court set forth guidelines 
under which the court may exclude for cause prospective jurors because of their 
views on the death penalty. Witherspoon, 391 U.S.  at 520-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 784-85, 88 S. Ct. at 1776-77; People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 99 
(1996). Subsequently, in Morgan, the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant is entitled to have potential jurors questioned as to whether they 
would automatically vote to impose the death penalty upon a finding of guilt, 
without regard to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in the 
case. Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 734-39, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 506-09, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2232-35; People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1995).
Defendant cites instances during the examination of seven 
venirepersons when the trial court commented on voir dire questions, 
characterizing the questions as silly, unnecessary, or repetitious. Defendant 
describes the trial court's comments as flippant and disparaging and argues 
that, through these comments, the trial judge expressed his personal opinion to 
the jury. The result, defendant argues, is that the jury empaneled for his 
sentencing proceeding was not impartial.
In order to satisfy the mandates of Witherspoon and 
Morgan, the trial court here asked each potential juror these two 
questions:
A review of the record reveals that the two voir dire questions were 
typically asked by the trial court consecutively. In addition, the two questions 
were preceded by general questions as to whether the potential juror possessed 
any scruples or religious concerns against the imposition of the death penalty. 
Following are examples typical of the comments challenged by defendant:
We agree with defendant that the trial court should not have made such 
comments during the examination of potential jurors. As this court has 
previously observed, trial judges maintain great influence upon jurors. The 
judge's slightest word is received with deference and may prove controlling. 
Accordingly, a trial judge should exercise restraint over his or her utterances 
and refrain from unnecessary disparagement of issues. See People v. 
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 466-67 (1993), citing 1 Standards for Criminal 
Justice §6-3.4 (2d ed. 1980).
While we agree with defendant that the venirepersons should not have heard 
the trial court's comments regarding the voir dire questions, we 
nevertheless cannot say that the remarks prejudiced defendant. This court has 
previously reviewed cases where the venire heard remarks which were more likely 
to affect a jury's impartiality than the remarks in the present case. See 
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 464-68 (trial judge's disparaging comment that 
rules of evidence prevent jury from hearing all of the State's evidence); 
People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 292-93 (1987) (venireperson 
quoting prosecutor that only a " `locked solid case' " goes to trial); 
People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill. 2d 414, 428-29 (1985) (venireperson's 
comment that defendant should not be walking the streets). In those instances, 
this court did not consider the trial court's comments to be so prejudicial as 
to preclude the juries from reaching verdicts based solely on the evidence 
presented to them.
Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court's comments were not so 
prejudicial as to damage the impartiality of defendant's jury. The trial court 
advised the potential jurors that the persons selected to serve on the jury 
would be relied upon to decide the issues based solely on the evidence and the 
law. Moreover, in its written instructions, the trial court admonished the jury 
that it did not intend, by any ruling or remark, to indicate an opinion as to 
the evidence or what the verdict should be. We find that these jury instructions 
rendered this particular error harmless. See Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 
467-68.
Defendant's final contention regarding jury selection is that the trial court 
erred in excusing for cause one venireperson, David Rose. Defendant argues that 
Rose was excused because of his opposition to the death penalty in violation of 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 105 S. Ct. 844 
(1985). In Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court clarified that a 
potential juror may be excluded for his views on capital punishment only when 
those views prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror in accordance with his instructions and oath. Wainwright, 469 U.S.  at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 851-52, 105 S. Ct.  at 852. Because the 
Wainwright standard is inapplicable to the instant situation, we reject 
defendant's contention. The record clearly indicates that venireperson Rose was 
not excluded because of his views on capital punishment but, rather, was 
excluded because of his predisposition towards police testimony.
During the trial court's initial examination, Rose generally stated that he 
could be fair and impartial. Thereafter, the trial court indicated that police 
officers would be testifying and specifically asked Rose whether he was 
predisposed towards believing a police officer's testimony. In response, Rose 
stated: "Well, other than the fact that they're professionals and do this job 
for a living, I think I'd have a little more belief because of that." At the end 
of the trial court's examination, the State moved to excuse Rose for cause. 
Rather than ruling on the State's motion, the trial court, sua sponte, 
excused Rose for cause. The trial court repeatedly indicated that it was doing 
so because of Rose's predisposition towards police testimony.
The trial court is granted wide discretion in determining whether to exclude 
a potential juror for cause based upon that person's voir dire. 
Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 31. Upon review, the entire voir dire of 
the potential juror must be considered, rather than selected statements. 
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 462-63. Moreover, the trial court's ruling is 
entitled to substantial deference because it is in the best position to 
interpret the meaning of the potential juror's remarks. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 31. In the instant case, the testimony of several police officers was 
offered during defendant's sentencing hearing. Rose expressed doubt as to his 
ability to be impartial regarding police testimony and, thus, was "not prepared 
to stand indifferent, and to be guided only by law and the evidence." 
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 463. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding Rose from the jury.
2. Eligibility Stage
Defendant next raises several issues regarding the eligibility stage of his 
capital sentencing hearing. First, defendant contends he was denied a fair 
sentencing hearing because the State, in order to prove defendant's eligibility 
for the death sentence, presented "more evidence than was proper" in order to 
"relitigate" the issue of defendant's guilt. Specifically, defendant challenges 
the trial court's admission into evidence: (1) the 26-count indictment returned 
against defendant; (2) a certified copy of conviction showing defendant had been 
found guilty of all 26-counts; (3) Marketta Hampton's observations of Laura in 
the hospital and her identification of various objects in her apartment; (4) 
testimony regarding defendant's initial noninculpatory statement; and (5) police 
testimony regarding the sequences of the criminal investigation. Defendant 
believes that this evidence had no relevance to his eligibility for the death 
penalty and that its inflammatory nature improperly influenced the jury.
The purpose of the first stage of a capital sentencing hearing is to allow 
the jury to determine a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty free from 
any potentially inflammatory evidence that could improperly influence this 
decision. People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 224 (1993). Following 
this principle, only evidence having a direct bearing on the statutory 
prerequisites should be admitted during the eligibility stage. People v. 
Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1996). However, the determination of whether to 
admit evidence at the first stage of a capital sentencing hearing is for the 
trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 224.
In the instant case, the State relied upon two separate statutory aggravating 
factors as its basis for invoking the death penalty. First, the State sought to 
prove that defendant had been found guilty of murdering a victim under 12 years 
of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior 
indicative of wanton cruelty. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7). 
In addition, the State sought to prove that defendant murdered the victim in the 
course of the felony of aggravated criminal sexual assault. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c). In order to find defendant eligible for the 
death penalty pursuant to this felony-murder factor, the sentencing jury had to 
determine that the victim was killed by defendant or was physically injured by 
defendant substantially contemporaneously with the injuries that caused her 
death. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(a). Moreover, the 
sentencing jury had to determine that defendant killed the victim intentionally 
or with the knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a strong 
probability of death or great bodily harm. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, 
par. 9-1(b)(6)(b). The State had the burden of establishing the existence of all 
the elements of both statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(f).
Despite defendant's assertion otherwise, we find that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the specified evidence. Initially, we observe 
that, as to most of the allegedly improper evidence, defendant failed to either 
object during the sentencing hearing or raise the issue in his post-sentencing 
motion. Therefore, unless deemed to be plain error, defendant has waived his 
challenge to most of the specified evidence. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). Nevertheless, because defendant raises general 
allegations of plain error (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), we address his particular 
evidentiary challenges.
Defendant disputes the admissibility of police testimony regarding the 
investigation leading to his arrest. A police detective testified about 
interviewing defendant's mother, Elizabeth Terrell, who stated that she left 
Laura Hampton alone with defendant while she went to a currency exchange to pick 
up a public aid check. When Elizabeth returned to the apartment, she found Laura 
had been injured so she took her to the hospital, accompanied by defendant. The 
detective also testified about verifying Elizabeth's story with the manager of 
the currency exchange.
Defendant now asserts that testimony regarding his mother's "alibi" was both 
irrelevant and inadmissible under the hearsay rule. However, because the 
sentencing jury here was not the same jury that heard the evidence presented at 
defendant's trial, it was within the trial court's discretion to allow general 
testimony describing the circumstances of the crimes. Moreover, Elizabeth's 
statements to police established the duration of time defendant had to commit 
the crimes, contemplate a cover story, and then take actions to effectuate that 
story. All of these details are probative of defendant's mental state at the 
time of the acts. Although police testimony of Elizabeth's interview might have 
been hearsay, defendant did not object to this testimony or oppose it in his 
post-sentencing motion and, therefore, his hearsay challenge is waived. 
Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 322. In addition, any error in admitting this 
testimony does not rise to the level of plain error. Overwhelming evidence was 
presented establishing defendant's eligibility for the death penalty under two 
aggravating factors. Evidence of Elizabeth's actions prior to the crime only 
established how defendant came to be alone with the victim, a fact which 
defendant corroborated himself in his confession. Accordingly, any error in 
admitting the police detective's hearsay testimony was harmless.
The State also presented police testimony that during the early stages of the 
investigation, defendant gave a noninculpatory statement. Initially, defendant 
told police that he was in the bathroom when he heard a loud crash in the 
bedroom. When defendant investigated, he found Laura injured on the floor with 
stereo components lying on her head and legs. Defendant told the police that he 
was in the process of washing Laura's wounds when his mother arrived home and 
took Laura to the hospital. Defendant now contends that evidence of his initial 
noninculpatory statement is not relevant to any of the statutory prerequisites 
of eligibility for the death penalty. However, evidence that defendant lied to 
the police and attempted to cover up the real source of Laura's injuries was 
relevant to establish his state of mind at the time of the murder. See 
Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 226; People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487, 516-17 (1988). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing 
testimony regarding defendant's initial statement.
Another police detective testified that, during the initial stages of his 
investigation, he spoke with a doctor who told him Laura's injuries could not 
have been caused by a radio falling upon her. Defendant argues that the police 
detective's testimony was not relevant to any matter at issue during the 
eligibility stage. However, establishing the actual cause of Laura's injuries 
was clearly required in order to prove that defendant's behavior was brutal or 
heinous. Moreover, we have already determined that evidence of defendant's 
attempts to cover up the incident was probative of his state of mind. 
Accordingly, this testimony was properly admitted.
Regarding Marketta Hampton's testimony, defendant argues that her testimony 
was irrelevant and designed to evoke sympathy from the jury. Marketta testified 
about observing Laura's injuries at the hospital. Her testimony established that 
Laura had not sustained any injuries prior to being left in defendant's care 
that day. Evidence of a victim's injuries are relevant to show the deliberate 
nature of the defendant's actions in killing that person. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 42. Thus, the trial court properly admitted such testimony. In her 
direct testimony, Marketta also identified various objects that were found in 
her apartment, including a hair brush, tooth brush, and metal rod. The State 
subsequently argued that these objects may have been used to sexually assault 
Laura and may have caused the internal injuries which contributed to her death. 
Evidence of the weapon used during the crimes is clearly relevant to establish a 
defendant's intent at the time of the incidents. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d  at 
516-17. Moreover, the use of such an object in the present case would clearly be 
probative of whether defendant's behavior was exceptionally brutal or heinous. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing Marketta Hampton's 
testimony.
Defendant also takes issue with the trial court's admission into evidence of 
the indictment returned against him and the certified copy of convictions 
showing that he had been found guilty of all 26 counts of the indictment. 
Defendant argues that the underlying indictment in this case was not relevant to 
any eligibility factor. In addition, defendant argues that the certified copy of 
convictions was inadmissible because certain convictions were for felonies not 
included in the felony-murder aggravating factor. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 
38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c). Initially, we observe that defendant has waived his 
challenge to the admissibility of the certified copy of convictions. Not only 
did defendant fail to contemporaneously object to its admission, defendant 
specifically stated that he had no objections to the certified copy of 
convictions. In addition, we do not believe that any error in admitting the 
certified copy of convictions would be plain error. In order to sustain its 
burden in showing defendant's eligibility under the felony-murder aggravating 
factor, the State had to show that defendant had been found guilty of murder 
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)) and that the victim was killed 
during the course of one of the statutory listed felonies (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, 
ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c)). The certified copy of defendant's convictions was 
relevant to establish these prerequisites. Because the State presented 
overwhelming evidence to establish defendant's death eligibility under both 
statutory aggravating factors, we find that any error caused by the admission of 
the indictment or the evidence of defendant's other felony convictions was 
harmless.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
allowed the jury to view several photographs taken during Laura Hampton's 
autopsy. Specifically, defendant argues that the photographs that depict 
examination of the victim's internal injuries are disgusting and any probative 
value they had was outweighed by their potentially prejudicial effect. Whether 
or not a jury is allowed to view photographs depicting a victim's injuries rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such decision will not be 
reversed unless it represents an abuse of discretion. People v. Harris, 
182 Ill. 2d 114, 151 (1998); People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 319 
(1990). If photographs are relevant to prove any fact at issue, they are 
admissible and can be shown to the jury unless their nature is so prejudicial 
and so likely to inflame the jurors' passions that their probative value is 
outweighed. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 319. However, if a photograph has 
sufficient probative value, it may be admitted in spite of its gruesome or 
disgusting nature. People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 546 (1992); 
People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 439 (1989). Photos of a deceased 
victim may be utilized to prove the nature and extent of the injuries, the force 
necessary to inflict the injuries, the position, location, and condition of the 
body, and the manner and cause of death; to corroborate a defendant's 
confession; and to aid in understanding the testimony of a pathologist or other 
witness. People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 37-38 (1996); 
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 319-20.
During the eligibility stage of the instant defendant's sentencing 
proceeding, the State was required to prove, among other things, that Laura 
Hampton's death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior 
indicative of wanton cruelty (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7)), 
that defendant acted with intent to kill the victim or with the knowledge that 
his acts created a strong probability of her death or great bodily harm (Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(b)), and that the killing occurred in 
the course of an aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 
38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c)). The photographs were relevant to show the location, 
nature, and extent of the victim's wounds and also the great amount of force 
necessary to inflict such injuries. Moreover, the photographs were relevant in 
that they assisted the jurors in determining whether the physical evidence was 
consistent with defendant's confession. Finally, the photographs would have 
assisted the jurors in understanding the medical examiner's testimony. All of 
these facts were probative in showing that defendant's conduct satisfied the 
elements of the statutory aggravating factors. Accordingly, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view the autopsy 
photographs.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting police detective Jim Clemons to testify that he had never before seen 
injuries like those suffered by the victim. Defendant argues that the trial 
court erroneously determined that Clemons was an expert witness and, therefore, 
Clemons improperly testified to his opinion of an ultimate issue of fact: the 
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior of the crime. Initially, we note that 
it is now well settled that a witness, whether expert or lay, may provide an 
opinion on the ultimate issue in a case. Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill. 2d 98, 107 (1997) (and cases cited therein). This is so because the trier 
of fact is not required to accept the witness' conclusion and, therefore, such 
testimony cannot be said to usurp the province of the jury. Richardson, 
175 Ill. 2d at 107-08; Zavala v. Powermatic, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 542, 545 
(1995).
Further, we find it unnecessary to determine whether Clemons was properly 
qualified as an expert witness because Clemons' testimony was an appropriate lay 
opinion. To be admissible, a lay opinion must be based upon the witness' 
personal observation and recollection of concrete facts; and such facts cannot 
be described in sufficient detail to adequately convey to the jury the substance 
of the testimony. See Freeding-Skokie Roll-Off Service, Inc. v. 
Hamilton, 108 Ill. 2d 217, 221-22 (1985). Here, Clemons testified that he 
had been a violent crimes detective for five years and had previously 
investigated cases involving the sexual assault of children. Clemons testified 
that he was present at the hospital and personally observed the injuries to 
Laura Hampton's vagina and anus. In response to the prosecutor's question, 
Clemons stated that he had never before seen injuries like those suffered by 
Hampton. Clemons' testimony was based on his personal observations and was 
helpful to the jury to clearly understand the extent of Hampton's injuries and 
the amount of force required to inflict them. Therefore, the admission of 
Clemons' testimony was not error. Defendant next asserts that he was denied a 
fair sentencing hearing because the trial court impermissibly limited his 
cross-examination of two of the State witnesses: the victim's mother, Marketta 
Hampton, and James Sullivan, a former assistant State's Attorney. On direct 
examination, Marketta Hampton testified to her living arrangements with 
defendant and his mother. She testified to the events of the day of the murder 
and her observation of Laura in the hospital. Marketta also gave limited 
testimony regarding the layout of the apartment, identifying rooms and certain 
objects depicted in photographs taken inside the apartment. During 
cross-examination, the trial court sustained the State's objection on relevancy 
grounds to a question regarding the use of the apartment's rear entrance. James 
Sullivan testified for the State that he interviewed defendant the day of the 
murder and witnessed defendant give a court-reported inculpatory statement. On 
cross-examination, the trial court precluded defendant's questions regarding the 
specific circumstances of defendant's giving the statement.
Defendant now argues that the trial court erred in denying him the 
opportunity to confront the witnesses and, consequently, he is entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing. Generally, cross-examination is limited in scope to the 
subject matter of direct examination of the witness and to matters affecting the 
credibility of the witness. See People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 78 
(1998); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §611.11, 
at 418 (5th ed. 1990). However, this limitation is construed liberally to allow 
inquiry into whatever subject tends to explain, discredit, or destroy the 
witness' direct testimony. See People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 247 
(1988). Nevertheless, the trial court's determination that an area of inquiry 
falls outside the proper scope of cross-examination should not be disturbed 
unless it is a clear abuse of discretion which results in manifest prejudice to 
the defendant. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 79. With these principles in 
mind, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting 
the scope of cross-examination of these two witnesses.
Marketta's testimony on direct examination regarding the apartment 
established a general understanding of the layout of the crime scene and the 
location of certain foreign objects possibly used to sexually assault the 
victim. The trial court determined that defendant's questions regarding the 
frequency of use of the apartment's back entrance was not relevant to any 
eligibility factor. We cannot say that the trial court's determination was a 
clear abuse of discretion.
James Sullivan testified on direct examination that he witnessed defendant 
make an inculpatory statement. During cross-examination, the trial court 
sustained the State's objections to defendant's questions regarding whether 
defendant had been in contact with his family prior to making the statement. We 
cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that such questions were 
beyond the scope of direct examination. During the direct appeal of defendant's 
conviction, this court reviewed the circumstances of defendant's inculpatory 
statement, including his claims that he was not allowed to see his family 
members. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, including 
defendant's admission at the suppression hearing that he had not asked to see 
his family, this court determined that defendant's statement was voluntary. See 
Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d  at 199-201. During the eligibility stage of 
defendant's remand sentencing hearing, the relevant issues were whether 
defendant's conduct satisfied the elements of the statutory aggravating factors. 
The specific circumstances of defendant's voluntary statement were not probative 
of any relevant issue. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in limiting cross-examination on such details.
Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because 
the trial court prevented him from arguing during his opening statement at the 
eligibility stage that a reasonable doubt existed as to his guilt. In addition, 
defendant argues that the trial court erred by preventing him from presenting 
evidence that someone other than he had committed the murder; defendant aimed to 
argue that his mother also had the opportunity to commit the murder. 
Nevertheless, a trial court should exclude a defendant's evidence that someone 
else committed the crime with which he is charged when the evidence is too 
remote or too speculative. People v. Morgan, 142 Ill. 2d 410, 466 
(1991), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). Defendant has never before offered the theory that his mother 
committed these crimes. Rather, defendant admitted that it was his actions which 
caused Laura's injuries. In addition, on direct appeal, defendant did not 
contend that he did not injure Laura, rather he claimed that he did not act with 
the requisite intent. Therefore, we find the trial court properly found 
defendant's evidence too remote and speculative. Further, as we have already 
observed, only evidence having a direct impact on the statutory prerequisites 
for the death penalty should be admitted at the eligibility stage of a capital 
sentencing hearing. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d  at 73. Defendant's argument 
goes to the question of whether or not he actually committed the crimes, which 
is not probative of the relevant issue-whether any aggravating factors for the 
death sentence exist. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in precluding defendant's argument and evidence at the eligibility stage of 
sentencing. See People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 453-54 (1995); 
Morgan, 142 Ill. 2d  at 466-67.
In a related issue, defendant contends that the trial court's preclusion of 
such evidence violated his constitutional right to demonstrate that a "residual 
doubt" existed as to his guilt for these crimes. Nevertheless, this court has 
repeatedly rejected defendant's contention that a capital defendant has a right 
to present residual doubt evidence during either stage of the sentencing 
hearing. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 454-56; Edgeston, 157 
Ill. 2d at 244-46; Morgan, 142 Ill. 2d  at 467; People v. 
Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 66-68 (1990); see also Franklin v. 
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-75, 101 L. Ed. 2d 155, 165-66, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 
2327-28 (1988) (holding that capital defendant is not entitled to present 
residual doubt over guilt as mitigating evidence). In addition, we reject 
defendant's argument that, because his jury at resentencing was different from 
his jury at the guilt phase, he should be entitled to present residual doubt 
evidence. The Franklin Court contemplated procedural circumstances like 
defendant's, where a penalty-only proceeding is held on remand, and rejected the 
argument that such a defendant should be allowed to present residual doubt 
evidence to the new sentencing jury. Franklin, 487 U.S.  at 173 n.6, 101 L. Ed. 2d  at 165 n.6, 108 S. Ct.  at 2327 n.6.
Defendant next contends that the State violated the principles of collateral 
estoppel when it presented and argued a different set of facts than that proved 
at defendant's trial. Defendant asserts that at his bench trial, the trial court 
found that defendant inserted his fingers and a Q-tip into Laura Hampton's 
vagina and anus. During defendant's present sentencing proceedings, the State 
offered evidence that defendant may have used a hair brush, tooth brush, or 
metal rod to penetrate the victim. Defendant argues that the State was barred 
from relitigating the factual issues of the crimes which had already been 
determined by the guilt-phase trial court.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue of ultimate 
fact that has been determined by a valid and final judgment. See People v. 
Williams, 59 Ill. 2d 557, 560 (1975), quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 475, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194 (1970). The primary 
purpose of the doctrine is to protect an accused from the unfairness of having 
to relitigate, in a second proceeding, an issue which has once been decided in 
his favor by a verdict of acquittal. People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270, 281 (1996). Therefore, the essence of defendant's argument is that his 
conviction of killing the victim with only his hand and a Q-tip is equivalent to 
a verdict of acquittal. Nevertheless, we refuse to consider defendant's 
contention because he has waived this issue.
At sentencing, the State presented evidence of the presence of a hair brush, 
a tooth brush, and a metal rod in the location where the victim was assaulted. 
The State also offered the testimony of Dr. Nancy Jones, who opined that it was 
possible that Laura's injuries to her vagina and rectum could have been caused 
by the insertion of either adult fingers or a foreign object. Dr. Jones also 
testified that the patterned bruises on Laura's face could have been caused by 
being hit with the back of a hair brush. Defendant failed to object to any of 
the evidence he now challenges. In addition, defendant did not object to any 
portion of the State's argument referring to this evidence. Further, defendant 
failed to raise his collateral estoppel issue in his post-sentencing motion. 
Because we find that the alleged error does not constitute plain error, the 
issue is waived. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 322; People v. 
Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1995).
Defendant next contends that section 9-1(b)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961, 
under which he was found eligible for the death penalty, is unconstitutional. 
Section 9-1(b)(7) provides that a defendant who has been found guilty of murder 
may be sentenced to death if "the murdered individual was under 12 years of age 
and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative 
of wanton cruelty." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7). Citing 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372, 108 S. Ct. 1853 
(1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980), defendant argues that the phrase "exceptionally brutal or 
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" fails to sufficiently guide or 
limit the discretion of the sentencer and, consequently, is unconstitutionally 
vague under the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII).
Defendant acknowledges that this court has previously upheld section 
9-1(b)(7) against similar vagueness challenges pursuant to both Godfrey 
and Maynard. See Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d at 62-64; People v. 
Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 80-82 (1994); Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 443-46; 
People v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 454-56 (1989); People v. 
Odle, 128 Ill. 2d 111, 138-41 (1988). In Odle, this court first 
held that section 9-1(b)(7) is constitutional on its face. Odle, 128 Ill. 2d  at 140. We will not reconsider the facial constitutionality of section 
9-1(b)(7) here. Defendant does not challenge the application of section 
9-1(b)(7) to his case, as he does not contend that any of the qualifying 
requirements of the statute were omitted. See Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d at 
63-64; Odle, 128 Ill. 2d  at 140-41. Therefore, we need not consider 
whether the application of section 9-1(b)(7) to this defendant was 
unconstitutional.
Defendant next contends that the jury improperly found him eligible for a 
death sentence based on the felony-murder aggravating factor because the verdict 
form omitted the required mental state for eligibility and failed to specify 
what other felony had been committed. Defendant cites People v. Mack, 
167 Ill. 2d 525, 537-38 (1995), in support of his contention that he is entitled 
to a new sentencing hearing because of the insufficient verdict.
The State responds that the verdict was not defective because the jury was 
properly instructed on both the requisite intent and the underlying felony. 
However, we need not resolve the issue here because defendant's eligibility 
finding is not impaired.
In addition to the felony-murder aggravating factor, the jury found defendant 
eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(7) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, 
ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7) (victim under the age of 12 murdered and the death 
resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton 
cruelty). This court has repeatedly held that the Illinois death penalty statute 
does not place special emphasis on any aggravating factor and does not accord 
any added significance to multiple aggravating factors as opposed to a single 
factor. See People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 157 (1997); People 
v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 164 (1996); People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 345 (1989). Once the sentencer determines a single statutory aggravating 
factor is applicable, the defendant is eligible for the death penalty regardless 
of whether other aggravating factors have been proved as well. 
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 157. Accordingly, when a defendant is found 
eligible for the death penalty based upon two or more statutory aggravating 
factors, the fact that one of those factors may later be invalidated will not 
generally impair the eligibility finding as long as a separate, valid 
aggravating factor supported eligibility. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 157; 
Cole, 172 Ill. 2d at 102-03; People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 
69 (1995). In the present case, the jury's verdict on section 9-1(b)(7) 
independently established defendant's eligibility for the death penalty 
regardless of the validity of the verdict on the felony murder aggravating 
factor.
3. Aggravation/Mitigation Stage
a. Evidentiary Issues
Defendant raises several contentions that the trial court erred at the 
aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing by allowing the jury to hear 
inadmissible evidence. Initially we observe that the Illinois death penalty 
statute allows the introduction of evidence during the sentencing hearing which 
would not ordinarily be admissible during the guilt phase of the trial. See Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(e). Moreover, the ordinary rules of evidence 
are relaxed at the aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing. 
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 158. At this stage, the only requirements for 
admissibility are that the evidence be relevant and reliable. People v. 
Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 449 (1993). This is necessary because, in order to 
determine the appropriate sentence, the sentencing authority must possess the 
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life, character, 
criminal record, and the circumstances of the particular offense. 
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 158. The determination of admissibility of 
evidence at the aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing lies within the 
discretion of the trial court. People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 282 
(1997). With these principles in mind, we review each of defendant's alleged 
evidentiary errors.
Defendant first asserts that the trial court allowed the State to introduce 
hearsay testimony from four witnesses who testified in aggravation. Defendant, 
in essence, contends that such testimony violates his constitutional right to 
confront witnesses against him (U.S. Const., amend. VI). However, defendant 
failed to specify any particular testimony he claims is hearsay. In addition, 
defendant failed to raise this contention in his post-sentencing motion. 
Therefore, the issue is waived. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d  at 27. Even if 
defendant had properly preserved this issue, we would find it meritless. It is a 
well-established rule that hearsay evidence may be admitted without 
cross-examination in death sentencing hearings so long as it is relevant and 
reliable. People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 246 (1997); People v. 
Holman, 132 Ill. 2d 128, 155 (1989). Because defendant failed to indicate 
the testimony he challenges, we are unable to test its relevance and 
reliability. Furthermore, this court has held that hearsay testimony will not be 
deemed per se inadmissible at a sentencing hearing as denying a 
defendant's right to confront witnesses. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 331; 
People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 416-17 (1986). Accordingly, we reject 
defendant's contention.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing a records supervisor from the Department of Corrections to testify 
regarding various disciplinary infractions recorded in defendant's inmate file. 
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly relied on the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule to admit the testimony (see 725 ILCS 5/115-5 (West 
1994)). Defendant also asserts that such testimony, gleaned solely from a 
defendant's prison records, should be deemed per se unreliable unless 
testified to by the correctional officer who actually witnessed the infraction 
and prepared the disciplinary report.
Initially we note that defendant's argument regarding the application of the 
business records exception is misplaced. During the aggravation/mitigation stage 
of sentencing, the ordinary rules of evidence are relaxed (Cloutier, 
178 Ill. 2d at 158) and the introduction of certain evidence is allowed which 
would not ordinarily be admitted during the guilt phase of the trial (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(e)). Accordingly, like other evidence introduced at 
this stage, defendant's prison records are properly admissible if they are 
deemed to be relevant and reliable. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 
328-29 (1992).
We find defendant's contention that the prison records, which detailed his 
disciplinary problems while incarcerated, were inadmissible to be without merit. 
Evidence of a defendant's behavior in prison is clearly relevant to show his 
character and rehabilitative potential, which are valid considerations in 
determining whether the death sentence is proper in a particular case. See 
People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 358 (1994); Ward, 154 Ill. 
2d at 328-30; see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6-7, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1671 (1986). This court has also previously 
rejected the contention that testimony, gleaned solely from a defendant's prison 
records, should be deemed per se inadmissible because of the unreliable 
nature of these records. See, e.g., Fair, 159 Ill. 2d  at 
89-90. In addition, we find defendant's particular prison records were reliable. 
The Department of Corrections official testified that the records were kept in 
the ordinary course of business and maintained during and after defendant's time 
of confinement in that penitentiary. In addition, it was during defendant's 
cross-examination of the witness that it was brought out that defendant admitted 
his involvement in all the incidents which resulted in disciplinary action. See 
Hall, 114 Ill. 2d  at 417. Therefore, we conclude that defendant's 
contention is without merit.
Next, defendant contends that the opinion testimony of Dr. Demetrius Soter 
was improperly admitted because the witness went beyond the scope of her 
expertise when she testified that Laura Hampton's injuries were the worse she 
had ever encountered in the course of her medical practice. Defendant has waived 
this challenge to Dr. Soter's testimony. Although defendant did object to this 
testimony and challenge it in his post-sentencing motion, he did so on relevancy 
grounds. An objection to evidence on specified grounds waives on appeal any 
alternative objections not specified. People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 230 (1991). Moreover, this alleged error does not warrant application of 
the limited exception to the waiver rule. Although defendant's evidence in 
mitigation was not insubstantial, the evidence at sentencing cannot be regarded 
as closely balanced. Further, the alleged error was not substantial and, thus, 
we decline to apply the exception to the waiver rule. See Brown, 172 
Ill. 2d at 54-55; People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 406-07 
(1995).
Defendant next complains that he was denied the right to present mitigating 
evidence when the trial court excluded testimony he offered to impeach an 
aggravation witness. Rigoberto Gaytan testified for the State regarding an 
incident where he was robbed by defendant. Gaytan stated that he had just 
boarded a public bus when a woman asked him for change. When Gaytan took out his 
wallet to give the woman a dollar, defendant left his bus seat and grabbed the 
wallet. At the same time, the woman attacked Gaytan, scratching him on the face. 
Gaytan was then pushed by defendant and pulled by a second man waiting outside 
the bus. As a result, Gaytan was thrown to the ground. All three offenders beat 
and kicked Gaytan as he lay on the ground. Subsequently, the three escaped with 
Gaytan's wallet.
During cross-examination, defense counsel identified the female attacker as 
defendant's mother. Gaytan denied defense counsel's assertion that it was 
defendant's mother who started the fight and pulled Gaytan off the bus. In an 
attempt to impeach Gaytan's testimony, defendant offered the testimony of Edward 
Chopski, a police officer who originally interviewed the driver of the bus about 
the incident. Because Chopski had since died, defendant offered the transcript 
of Chopski's testimony from defendant's original sentencing hearing in 1986. The 
trial court excluded the testimony, finding that it did not impeach Gaytan's 
testimony.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the transcript of 
Chopski's testimony. Defendant asserts that the testimony was relevant because 
it impeached Gaytan's assertion that defendant was the "primary aggressor" 
during the robbery and demonstrated the criminal influence of defendant's 
mother. The purpose of impeaching evidence is to destroy the credibility of a 
witness. People v. Bradford, 106 Ill. 2d 492, 499 (1985). Generally, 
any permissible kind of impeaching matter may be developed on cross-examination. 
People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 269 (1985). However, extrinsic 
evidence, such as evidence of testimony from someone other than the witness 
himself, may be used to impeach a witness only on noncollateral matters. See M. 
Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §607.2, at 336-37 
(5th ed. 1990).
Initially we note that the defendant did not make the required formal offer 
of proof to demonstrate the entire nature and substance of Chopski's testimony. 
See Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 457-58. Consequently, the only testimony 
which we can review are the few lines read to the trial court by defense 
counsel. These scant lines reveal that Chopski was told by the bus driver that 
Gaytan was first pulled from the bus by defendant's mother and then beaten and 
robbed by all three offenders. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing the proffered testimony. The bus driver's account was consistent with 
Gaytan's testimony that defendant actively participated in the beating and 
robbery. The minor deviation in the bus driver's account that defendant's 
mother, rather than defendant, was responsible for removing Gaytan from the bus 
had negligible impeachment value. Further, we find that, because the State 
showed that defendant pleaded guilty to the robbery charge resulting from this 
incident, any error in excluding the Chopski testimony was so insignificant that 
defendant was not denied a fair sentencing hearing.
Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair sentencing proceeding when 
the trial court allowed an assistant State's Attorney to read to the jury a 
transcript of a preliminary hearing involving a robbery charge against 
defendant. Defendant relies on People v. Sexton, 162 Ill. App. 3d 607 
(1987), and People v. Valdery, 65 Ill. App. 3d 375 (1978), in support 
of his argument that the State's tactic improperly enhanced the credibility of 
the unavailable witness by attaching to it the integrity of the State's 
Attorney's office.
Defendant has waived this issue. Although defendant objected to the State's 
publication of the transcript, the record reveals that the objection was based 
on the inability to cross-examine the robbery victim. Defendant made no 
objection to the particular witness who read the transcript. Moreover, defendant 
failed to include this issue in his post-sentencing motion. Therefore, the issue 
is waived. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d  at 27. We also do not believe that the 
question rises to the level of plain error. Application of the plain error 
exception is proper when the evidence is closely balanced or the error is so 
substantial that it denied the defendant a fair proceeding. People v. 
Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363 (1996); Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d  at 
27.
We have already determined that the evidence at the second stage of 
defendant's sentencing hearing was not closely balanced. Moreover, the alleged 
error was not substantial. The witness who read the transcript was a former 
assistant State's Attorney who participated in the subject preliminary hearing. 
The witness' testimony of his personal involvement laid the foundation for the 
publication of the hearing transcript to the jury. Then, the witness simply read 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing into the record.
Defendant's reliance on Sexton and Valdery is misplaced. In 
Sexton, the State's Attorney testified that he personally investigated 
the case and found sufficient evidence to charge defendant. In addition, the 
State's Attorney testified that he ran an honest office and would not lie under 
oath because he could lose his license. Sexton, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 
611. In reversing, the appellate court found the testimony highly prejudicial 
because, in essence, it allowed the State's Attorney's office to state its 
opinion that defendant was guilty. Sexton, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 611, 
614-15. In Valdery, the appellate court reversed the defendant's 
conviction because the prosecutor, during closing argument, vouched for the 
credibility and integrity of the State's witnesses. Valdery, 65 Ill. 
App. 3d at 378. In contrast, in the present case, the former assistant State's 
Attorney who testified did not comment on the credibility or integrity of the 
preliminary hearing witness. Nor did the assistant State's Attorney state his 
opinion on the evidence or defendant's guilt. This alleged error was not so 
substantial that it denied defendant a fair sentencing proceeding.
Defendant next contends he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the 
prosecutor asked defense witnesses inflammatory and irrelevant questions during 
the mitigation portion of the proceedings. Defendant cites to three occasions 
when the prosecutor asked separate witnesses whether they recalled how precious 
their own daughters were at the age of 15 months. Defendant argues that the 
questions were not designed to yield any relevant information, but instead were 
intended to inflame the jury.
Defendant did not include this argument in his post-sentencing motion and, 
therefore, the issue is waived. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d  at 251; 
Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d  at 27. Moreover, this alleged error was not 
substantial and, therefore, we decline to review it under the limited exception 
to the waiver rule. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 54-55; Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 406-07. First, we note that the trial court promptly sustained 
defendant's objections to the questions posed to witness Elouise Chambers. Thus, 
any prejudicial impact these particular questions may have had was cured. See 
People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1996); People v. Hobley, 
159 Ill. 2d 272, 315 (1994). Although the trial court overruled defendant's 
objections to similar questions asked of the other two mitigating witnesses, we 
find that any resulting error was not of such magnitude as to deny defendant of 
a fair sentencing hearing.
b. Closing Arguments
In his next series of arguments, defendant raises several challenges to the 
prosecutor's closing arguments at the conclusion of the second stage of the 
capital sentencing hearing. First, defendant complains that the prosecutor made 
inflammatory appeals to the jurors' emotions by getting them to identify with 
the victim. Defendant cites People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 38 
(1988), in support of his contention that such argument was an improper 
invitation to the jury to enter into an "empathetic identification" with the 
victim. Specifically, defendant challenges this comment made by the 
prosecutor:
The trial court overruled defendant's objection to the argument. The 
prosecutor continued on to recount the circumstances of the assault and describe 
the resulting injuries. Defendant did not object to the balance of the 
argument.
Arguments of counsel must be evaluated in the context in which they were made 
and the parties are allowed a wide latitude during closing argument. People 
v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 319 (1997). In addition, because the trial 
court is able to observe the proceedings and gauge the potential prejudicial 
effect of the parties' arguments, the control of closing arguments is left 
largely to the discretion of the trial court. People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 168 (1991). Considering these principles, we find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to make such an 
argument. Evaluating the statements in the context in which they were made, we 
do not believe that the prosecution attempted to get the jury to improperly 
empathize with the victim. Rather, the prosecutor was simply reviewing the facts 
and circumstances of the crime with the jury.
Defendant next challenges prosecutorial remarks regarding the effect of the 
crimes on the victim's parents, which defendant argues was an improper appeal to 
the jury's emotions. In the argument defendant cites, the prosecutor stated:
This court has previously held that the specific harm and impact of the 
offense on the murder victim's survivors is relevant to the determination of the 
appropriate punishment for a capital defendant. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d at 
156-58; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735-36, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608-09 (1991). Although we have also indicated 
that it may be improper for the State to dwell upon the victim's family for too 
long in its argument (see, e.g., People v. Griffith, 158 Ill. 2d 476, 484-85 (1994)), such was not the case here.The prosecutor's comments 
regarding the effect of the murder on Laura's parents were brief and isolated 
and, accordingly, were not so inflammatory as to constitute reversible error. 
See Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 171-72.
Defendant's final challenge to the State's argument in summation involves 
prosecutorial remarks about what the victim may have accomplished with her life 
had she not been murdered. Defendant asserts that such argument impermissibly 
focused on the victim's characteristics rather than the appropriate factors of 
defendant's character and record. We note that of the large portion of the 
prosecutor's argument defendant challenges, defendant objected to only one 
comment. Accordingly, defendant's present contention is waived. See 
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 164. Further, we do not believe this alleged 
error rises to the level of plain error. The evidence in aggravation/mitigation 
was not closely balanced and the prosecutor's brief comments about the victim 
were not so inflammatory as to deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing.
Defendant next complains of a portion of the prosecutor's arguments made in 
rebuttal. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comments asked the jury to 
improperly ignore both the circumstances of the offense and defendant's 
character and to impose a death sentence on the prohibited speculation of 
defendant's future dangerousness. Defendant cites the following comments:
Initially, we observe that the trial court immediately sustained defendant's 
objection to the prosecutor's last comment regarding the crimes defendant would 
commit but for his arrest. In addition, the jury was instructed that closing 
arguments are not evidence. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, 
No. 1.03 (2d ed. 1981). These circumstances lead us to conclude that any 
prejudice injected by this particular comment was cured. See Henderson, 
142 Ill. 2d  at 326.
Regarding the remainder of the cited argument, we find that the prosecutor's 
comments were fair response to defense counsel's own statements in summation. 
Defense counsel argued that defendant's young age and impressionability were 
mitigating factors which reduced defendant's responsibility for these crimes. In 
addition, defense counsel argued that, with only two felony robbery convictions, 
defendant did not have a significant criminal history. The State responded by 
highlighting that although defendant was only 18, he had committed three violent 
felonies in a short span of time. The State's comments were made in the context 
of explaining defendant's age and past criminal record as an aggravating factor. 
Contrary to defendant's contention, we find the State's argument a fair comment 
on the evidence of defendant's character, record, and the circumstances of this 
offense.
In his last challenge involving closing arguments, defendant contends that he 
was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the State was allowed to give both 
opening and rebuttal closing arguments at the close of evidence. Defendant 
concedes that this court has repeatedly rejected this particular argument. See, 
e.g., Fair, 159 Ill. 2d  at 95; People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 159-61 (1992); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 301-03 
(1983). Because defendant provides no justification for reconsidering these 
prior decisions, we need not address his contention.
c. Jury Instructions
Next, defendant raises four alleged errors regarding the jury instructions 
utilized at the aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing. First, defendant 
contends that the trial court erred by refusing a nonpattern jury instruction he 
tendered which would have informed the jury that, if not sentenced to death, 
defendant could be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant 
relies on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), in support of his argument that the trial court was 
required to instruct the jury on alternative sentences defendant could receive 
because the State raised the issue of defendant's prior criminal record and that 
defendant committed this crime while serving probation.
Defendant did not raise the issue of the jury instructions given at the 
second stage of sentencing with any specificity in his post-sentencing motion 
and, therefore, the issue is waived. Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d  at 27; 
People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 337 (1992). In addition, defendant 
concedes that this court has previously rejected his argument, holding that a 
defendant is not entitled to have the jury informed that if he is not sentenced 
to death, he is eligible for a range of possible alternate sentences, including 
natural life imprisonment. See People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 
150-52 (1996); People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 180-82 (1991).
Although a natural life jury instruction is required in cases involving 
multiple murders where natural life is the only available alternative to the 
death sentence (see Gacho, 122 Ill. at 260-63), this court has 
repeatedly declined to extend that rule to cases such as this where the 
defendant is statutorily eligible for a sentence less than natural life 
imprisonment (see, e.g., Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d at 150-51; 
People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 70-71 (1994)). As we have previously 
observed, the Simmons decision does not require a departure from this 
court's previous holdings. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 152. The holding in 
Simmons involved a situation where the defendant's future dangerousness 
was at issue and state law mandated that if the defendant was not sentenced to 
death, the only alternative sentence was natural life imprisonment. 
Simmons, 512 U.S.  at 156, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 138, 114 S. Ct.  at 2190.
Here, defendant's case does not involve the circumstances present in 
Simmons, for if defendant had not received the death penalty, the trial 
court could have imposed any sentence within the permissible statutory range for 
the crime of murder. Moreover, in Simmons, the prosecution made 
repeated mention of the defendant's future dangerousness and urged the jury to 
impose the death penalty as an act of "self-defense." Simmons, 512 U.S. 
at 157, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 139, 114 S. Ct.  at 2190-91. A careful review of the 
record in the present case reveals that defendant's future dangerousness was not 
at issue during the aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing. The State's 
arguments regarding defendant's prior convictions and the fact that this crime 
was committed while he was serving probation were made in the context of 
explaining defendant's past criminal record as an aggravating factor. Unlike 
Simmons, here the State did not argue that society needed to be 
protected from defendant. See People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 24-25 
(1995). Therefore, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on alternative 
sentences and, accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's 
tendered non-IPI jury instruction. See Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d at 151-52; 
Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at 181-82.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct 
the jury that nonstatutory mitigating factors could include the fact that "the 
defendant was youthful." Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that 
mitigating factors include "[a]ny other reason supported by the evidence why the 
defendant should not be sentenced to death." See Illinois Pattern Jury 
Instructions, Criminal, No. 7C.06 (2d ed. Supp. 1989). The jury was also 
instructed that "[m]itigating factors may be found in any evidence presented 
during *** the death penalty hearing." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 
Criminal, No. 7C.04 (2d ed. Supp. 1989). Defendant argues that, without an 
instruction specifically informing them of the mitigating factor of his young 
age, the jury was not adequately guided. This lack of guidance, defendant 
argues, renders his death sentence constitutionally unacceptable.
It is well established that at the aggravation/mitigation stage of 
sentencing, the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not 
refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. 
E.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. ___, ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 702, 709-10, 118 S. Ct. 757, 761 (1998); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10-11, 102 S. Ct. 869, 876-77 (1982). The standard 
for determining whether jury instructions violate the protections of the eighth 
and fourteenth amendments is " `whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the 
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.' " Buchanan, 
522 U.S. at ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 710, 118 S. Ct.  at 761, quoting Boyde v. 
California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316, 329, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 
1198 (1990).
Here, the jury instructions did not violate these constitutional principles. 
The instructions did not preclude the jury's consideration of any mitigating 
evidence, including defendant's age. The instructions informed the jurors that 
they could base their decision on any evidence and consider any reason a 
mitigating factor. Although the trial court refused the defendant's tendered 
instruction which specifically identified defendant's age as a mitigating 
factor, it advised defense counsel that he could make such an argument. During 
closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly referred to defendant's youth and 
susceptibility as mitigating circumstances. There is no reasonable likelihood 
that the jury applied the instructions in a way that prevented the consideration 
of defendant's age.
In a related issue, defendant contends that the pattern jury instructions 
used at the second stage of sentencing fail to adequately guide the jury's 
discretion, allowing the jury to arbitrarily and capriciously impose a sentence 
of death. Defendant acknowledges that this court has previously rejected this 
same argument. See People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 199-200 (1996); 
Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 55-57. However, defendant urges us to reconsider 
our prior decisions, referring to studies performed separately by Professor Hans 
Zeisel and Professor Shari Diamond as support for his request.
Initially, we observe that defendant failed to submit copies of the studies 
or cite to any other relevant authority as support for his contention and, 
therefore, the issue is waived. 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. 
Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d 248, 254 (1990). Nevertheless, we note that our prior 
decisions which rejected defendant's contention also found the Zeisel and 
Diamond studies unpersuasive. See, e.g., Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 
55-57. Further, we observe that the United States Supreme Court recently 
emphasized that, at the second stage of sentencing, guiding the jury's 
discretion is not required and, in fact, complete jury discretion at this stage 
is constitutionally permissible. See Buchanan, 522 U.S. at ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 709-10, 118 S. Ct.  at 761. Accordingly, we also find defendant's 
contention to be without merit.
In his final challenge to the jury instructions, defendant argues that the 
use of the plural in the phrase "no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude 
the imposition of the death sentence" prevents the sentencer from finding that a 
single mitigating factor is sufficient to preclude death. See Illinois Pattern 
Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 7C.05, 7C.06 (2d ed. Supp. 1989); Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(g). Defendant asserts that a reasonable juror would 
interpret the instructions as requiring the existence of at least two mitigating 
factors before he or she could vote for a sentence other than death. Defendant 
did not raise a specific objection to the jury instructions on this basis. In 
addition, defendant did not tender a truly alternative instruction at trial, as 
his tendered instructions utilized the exact same phrase. Therefore, we find the 
alleged error waived. See Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 406-07. Contrary to 
defendant's contention, we find that defendant's claim does not fall within the 
limited exception to the waiver rule, as the evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation was not closely balanced and the alleged error was not substantial. 
Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 54-55; Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 
406-07.
4. Sentencing
Defendant contends that, due to the significant and compelling factors in 
mitigation, his sentence of death is excessive. Specifically, defendant cites 
his young age at the time of the offense and his "abusive and unstable 
upbringing" by his drug-addicted mother. This court has held that the decision 
of a capital sentencing jury will not be overturned lightly, particularly where 
that decision is amply supported by the record. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d  at 
77. The evidence here establishes that the 15-month-old victim was brutally 
beaten by defendant and then subjected to a savage sexual assault to her vagina 
and rectum; the injuries she sustained from both the beating and the sexual 
assault contributed to her death. Moreover, the State's evidence revealed that 
defendant had two prior convictions for violent felonies and was serving 
probation at the time of this murder. Further, much of defendant's evidence 
could be deemed aggravating by the sentencing jury. See, e.g., 
Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 339 (evidence of an upbringing which causes a 
defendant to become violent and aggressive can be considered in aggravation). On 
this record, we cannot say that defendant's sentence is excessive or 
inappropriate. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the jury's determination. See, 
e.g., Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 170-71.
5. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
As a final matter, defendant raises 10 separate challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, 
ch. 38, par. 9-1). Defendant concedes that this court has previously considered 
and rejected each of his contentions. See People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 283-84 (1993); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 537-39 (1990); 
People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 59-60 (1989); People v. Evans, 
125 Ill. 2d 50, 98-99 (1988); People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 
378-79 (1988); People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 45-46 (1988); 
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 202-03 (1988); People v. 
Orange, 121 Ill. 2d 364, 390-91 (1988); People v. Guest, 115 Ill. 2d 72, 110-12 (1986); People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 144-46 (1981). 
Because defendant provides no justification for reconsidering these prior 
decisions, we will not address these issues here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm defendant's sentence of death. We 
hereby direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Wednesday, May 
12, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit 
court of Cook County is to be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the 
manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1994)). The clerk of this court 
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of 
Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of 
the institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court, and I join most of the majority 
opinion. I am troubled, however, by what I perceive to be the majority's 
nonchalant and, at times, inconsistent treatment of several of the arguments 
defendant has procedurally defaulted. I, therefore, write separately to express 
these concerns.
I
Before I address the specific portions of the majority opinion with which I 
disagree, an overview of our precedents that deal with the issue of waiver is 
necessary. This court has long required that, in order to raise an issue as a 
ground for reversal on appeal, a defendant both object 
contemporaneously at trial to the matter and include it in a written post-trial 
motion. The failure to do so results in the waiver, or more appropriately the 
procedural default, of the issue on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988); People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978). This 
rule applies to constitutional issues as well as to nonconstitutional issues. 
People v. Pickett, 54 Ill. 2d 280 (1973).
In capital cases, this court has recognized only three bases for excusing a 
procedural default on direct review and reaching the substantive aspects of 
defendant's assertions of error. The first basis encompasses those errors for 
which a timely trial objection was made, but which were not included in the 
post-trial motion. Under this exception, the procedural bar will be excused if 
the claims could be asserted later in a petition filed under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act. People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1995); People v. 
Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 284-85 (1992); Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 
190. The second category consists of challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 10; Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 190. 
The third category encompasses "plain" errors. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 
10, Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 190. With respect to plain error, Supreme 
Court Rule 615(a) provides the following:
This court has consistently interpreted Rule 615(a) to allow a court of 
review to consider substantively an error that has not been properly preserved 
when (i) the evidence is closely balanced or (ii) the purported error is of such 
magnitude so as to deny defendant a fair and impartial trial. People v. 
Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363 (1996) (and cases cited therein). In sum, once 
a reviewing court holds that an issue has been procedurally defaulted, one the 
above exceptions must be present in order for that court to pass upon the 
substantive aspects of the claim.
II
As today's opinion clearly demonstrates, defendant failed to preserve 
properly several of the errors he now contends necessitate reversal. In most 
instances, the court agrees with the State that the issue has been waived and 
that one of the above exceptions to the waiver doctrine-the plain error rule-has 
not been met. See slip op. at 22, 25, 27, 32. However, in three other instances, 
the court departs from this well-established practice and embarks on what I 
consider to be an analysis which is either internally contradictory or contrary 
to our previous case law. I address each instance in turn.
The first instance to which I refer occurs during the court's discussion of 
the eligibility phase of defendant's capital sentence hearing. As the court 
notes, defendant specifically challenges the circuit court's admission of (i) 
the 26-count indictment returned against defendant, (ii) the certified copy of 
conviction showing defendant had been found guilty of all 26 counts, (iii) 
Marketta Hampton's observations of Laura in the hospital and her identification 
of various objects in her apartment, (iv) police testimony regarding defendant's 
initial noninculpatory statement, and (v) police testimony regarding the 
sequences of the criminal investigation. After reviewing the purpose of the 
eligibility phase of the hearing and its attendant evidentiary standards, the 
court then states:
Notwithstanding the fact that, in the above-quoted paragraph, the court has 
already held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the complained-of evidence, the court goes on to discuss each piece of evidence 
individually, noting at times that defendant did not object to the evidence at 
trial. See, e.g., slip op. at 9-11.
The majority's treatment of this claim is inherently contradictory. First, 
the court begins its discussion by specifically holding that the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the specified evidence. This, of 
course, constitutes a ruling on the merits of defendant's claims in their 
entirety. Despite this initial, substantive holding, the court in the next two 
sentences states that defendant failed to preserve properly most of these 
challenges and that unless deemed to be "plain error," defendant has "waived" 
his challenge to these claims. The court then explains that because defendant 
has raised "general allegations of plain error," it will address the particular 
challenges. Thus, under the majority's analysis, the words "plain error" appear 
to have talisman-like effect-they serve to transform claims which have been 
otherwise procedurally defaulted into claims which are automatically subject to 
substantive review. However, as I noted previously, in order to reach the merits 
of a procedurally defaulted claim under the plain error rule, one of the two 
prongs of the rule must first be present. See Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d  at 
363. After reading the majority's analysis, I have trouble identifying which of 
defendant's five specific challenges were procedurally defaulted and which were 
properly preserved. This, in turn, makes it difficult to discern whether the 
majority has rendered its judgment with respect to this issue on "waiver" 
principles or on the merits of the claim. Moreover, because the court initially 
holds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting any of 
the evidence, I am confused as to why is it necessary to continue on with a 
discussion of each piece of evidence. The subsequent individualized treatment of 
each claim appears to contradict the first sentence in the above-quoted 
paragraph.
In my opinion, the better approach would be to refrain from holding, at 
the outset, that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the five pieces of evidence. Indeed, I would simply discuss each of 
the five pieces of evidence individually, noting, where appropriate, whether 
defendant procedurally defaulted the challenge and, if so, whether a basis 
exists upon which to excuse the procedural bar. My review of the record 
indicates that defendant failed to object at trial to the admission of (i) the 
26-count indictment and (ii) the certified copy of conviction. Moreover, 
defendant failed to include these contentions in his post-sentencing motion. As 
a result, the contentions have been procedurally defaulted. None of the bases 
for excusal of the default as set forth in Enoch are present with 
respect to these evidentiary challenges. The claim is not based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 190. Moreover, 
plain error cannot be used as a basis for excusing the default because neither 
is the evidence closely balanced nor is the error of such magnitude as to deny 
defendant a fair and impartial trial. Of course, "[b]efore plain error can be 
considered as a means of circumventing the general waiver rule, it must be 
plainly apparent from the record that an error affecting substantial rights was 
committed." People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 17 (1978). I note that, in 
undertaking the plain error analysis contemplated by Rule 615(a), it is 
necessary to consider the underlying merits of the claims on only a rudimentary 
level. See People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 54 (1989). In so doing, it 
becomes readily apparent that an error affecting a substantial right has not 
been committed in this case. See People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235 
(1989) (finding no reversible error where redundant multiple convictions were 
admitted into evidence). Plain error being absent, no basis exists to excuse the 
procedural bar with respect to the admission of the indictment and certified 
convictions. As for the remaining three evidentiary challenges which were 
properly preserved, I agree with the court that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion by admitting them into evidence. See slip op. at 9-10. Under my 
analysis, the majority's internally inconsistent holding of both "waiver" and 
"no abuse of discretion" is avoided. The claims which have been procedurally 
defaulted are resolved in accordance with Enoch and its progeny, and 
the claims which were properly preserved are given substantive review.
I also disagree with the court's treatment of defendant's contention that the 
circuit court erroneously allowed into evidence certain hearsay testimony from 
four of the State's witnesses during the aggravation/mitigation phase of the 
hearing. See slip op. at 20. According to my colleagues in the majority, because 
defendant failed (i) to specify the particular testimony he deems hearsay and 
(ii) to include the issue in his post-sentencing motion, "the issue is waived." 
Slip op. at 20. The court then notes that "[e]ven if defendant had properly 
preserved this issue, we would find it meritless." The reason that my colleagues 
would find this issue "meritless" is because this court has long held that 
hearsay evidence may be admitted during the aggravation/mitigation phase of a 
capital sentence hearing so long as it is relevant and reliable. See slip op. at 
20. However, given the fact that defendant has not identified the portions of 
the testimony about which he now complains, I am somewhat at a loss to 
understand how the court can say that this claim would be "meritless" if 
addressed substantively. If defendant has not bothered to identify to either 
this court or the circuit court the precise testimony complained of, how then 
can it be determined that the testimony is, in fact, reliable and relevant? For 
this reason, I would hold that defendant has procedurally defaulted this claim 
and that no basis exists to excuse the bar. More importantly, I would refrain 
from commenting on the relative strengths of its merits.
I must also take issue with the majority's substantive discussion of 
defendant's contention that the circuit court erred by refusing a nonpattern 
jury instruction that would have informed the jury that defendant could be 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole if he was not sentenced to death. 
See slip op. at 29. The majority first begins its analysis of this issue by 
holding that because defendant did not raise the claim with any specificity in 
his post-sentencing motion, it is waived. Slip op. at 29. Nevertheless, the 
majority then proceeds to reject defendant's claim on substantive grounds. See 
slip op. at 29-30. I, for one, cannot discern the basis for this substantive 
discussion. If the claim is waived, as the court states, our case law, as set 
forth above, dictates that one of the three exceptions must be satisfied before 
the claim can be addressed in this manner. Under Enoch, defendant's 
claim need not rise to the level of plain error in order for this court to 
excuse the procedural bar if defendant made a contemporaneous trial 
objection and the error is such that it could be asserted later in a 
post-conviction proceeding. I note that defendant did, in fact, object at 
trial-he tendered his own instruction to the circuit court-and he has framed 
this claim as a fourteenth-amendment-based due process deprivation, as well as 
an eighth amendment violation against cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, 
defendant's constitutionally based claim is one that may be entertained under 
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). Because the 
purported error is one which can be accommodated under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act, this court may, under both Enoch and Keene, 
excuse the procedural bar. The contention, however, fails substantively for the 
reasons stated in the opinion. Under my analysis, the principles of procedural 
default, as well as the exceptions to them, are properly applied in accordance 
with this court's own precedent. More importantly, the analysis actually allows 
the court to reach, substantively, the merits of defendant's constitutional 
claim and gives the reason for doing so.
I, of course, acknowledge that the concept of waiver in Illinois serves as a 
limitation on the parties and not on the court. For this reason, a court of 
review is always free to refrain from invoking the doctrine of waiver in order 
to reach the merits of a given issue. This court, in fact, has in the past often 
chosen to do just that. See, e.g., People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 200 (1995); People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 506 (1994). In 
such cases, we refrained from stating that the claim was, indeed, 
waived. In today's opinion, however, the court does not do this with respect to 
several of the issues I have discussed in this concurrence. Rather, the court, 
at times, holds that the claims are waived and then, without any explanation 
whatsoever, goes on to discuss the substantive merits of each claim. The court 
cannot have it both ways. If the court wants to reach the merits of these 
issues, then it should refuse, from the outset, to invoke the waiver doctrine. 
If the court wishes to apply the bar, then it should do so, subject only to the 
exceptions established in Enoch. But the court cannot, and should not, 
do both. By its actions today, the court inadvertently diminishes the role of 
the waiver doctrine in appellate review and creates confusion for application of 
the doctrine in future cases.
I must note that my concern in this area is not just an academic one. Nor 
does it relate to matters of mere "tidiness" in opinion-writing style. The 
manner in which a state court expresses the reasons for its judgment affects the 
scope of review in later federal proceedings. The federal judiciary has 
continually struggled with the ambiguity created by the type of unclear 
state-court pronouncements concerning procedural default which I identify in 
this case, particularly in the area of habeas corpus. See, 
e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 
111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989). State-court judgments which rest on an independent 
and adequate state ground are outside the scope of habeas corpus 
review. See Coleman, 501 U.S.  at 729-32, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 655-57, 111 S. Ct.  at 2553-55. For example, a federal claim which has been procedurally 
defaulted in state court will only be subject to habeas review if the 
prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 
of the alleged violation of federal law, or else demonstrate that failure to 
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 2497 
(1977). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the above "cause and 
effect" standard serves to eliminate any inconsistency between the respect 
federal courts show for state procedural rules and the respect they show for 
their own procedural rules. Coleman, 501 U.S.  at 751, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 
670, 111 S. Ct.  at 2565 (recognizing that " `[n]o procedural principle is 
more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in 
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the 
right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it' "), quoting 
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 88 L. Ed. 835, 859, 64 S. Ct. 660, 677. A federal court in habeas proceedings, however, cannot 
properly apply the foregoing principles if the underlying state-court judgment 
is abstruse. The ambiguity leaves the federal court with the unenviable task of 
having to decipher whether the state court resolved the issue on the independent 
and adequate state ground, i.e., procedural default, or on substantive 
principles grounded in or interwoven with federal law. Although the United 
States Supreme Court has acknowledged that it has "no power to tell state courts 
how they must write their opinions," the Court has nonetheless attempted to 
alleviate the very real problem caused by ambiguous language by specifically 
"encourag[ing] state courts to express plainly, in every decision potentially 
subject to federal review, the grounds upon which their judgments rest." 
Coleman, 501 U.S.  at 739, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 662, 111 S. Ct.  at 2559. 
Under the analyses I offer in this concurrence, all ambiguity is avoided, and a 
clear statement of the grounds for the resolution of each of defendant's claims 
is readily apparent.
III
To be sure, many state-court opinions include within their analyses the same 
imprecise language contained in today's opinion. Nevertheless, the fact that 
other courts may have been indiscriminate in their examinations should not guide 
our own review, nor should it cause us to ignore our own precedent. In this 
respect, I must iterate a point made throughout this concurrence: if an issue is 
indeed "waived," then our case law clearly dictates that one of the three bases 
for excusing the procedural bar must exist in order for the court to reach the 
substantive merits of the defaulted claims. These exceptions, as established in 
this court's capital jurisprudence, work to ensure that mechanical application 
of the waiver doctrine will not allow serious errors that relate to either 
constitutional violations or fundamental fairness to go unnoticed and 
uncorrected in capital cases. In other words, the exceptions temper the 
potential harshness which attends the waiver doctrine. In my view, the proper 
application of this doctrine to the defaulted claims I discuss here not only 
would harmonize the court's treatment of all of the procedurally defaulted 
claims that are raised in this appeal, but would also allow the court to 
accommodate the suggestion made to us in Coleman by our colleagues on 
the United States Supreme Court.
In all other respects, I join in the court's opinion.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, No. 81578 
(November 10, 1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. 
VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2). Accordingly, we should vacate Terrell's sentence of death and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence other than 
death.