Title: Neidert v. Portland Stages, Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed November 21, 1962.
*515 William A. Babcock, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Ben T. Gray, Portland.
Charles S. Crookham, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Vergeer & Samuels, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY, GOODWIN and DENECKE, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
PERRY, J.
This is an action brought by plaintiff against the defendant to recover for personal injuries. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
The admitted facts are that plaintiff, an elderly woman, was a passenger on defendant's motor bus; that the bus was stopped in a place where it was safe for passengers to alight; that the plaintiff fell and suffered injuries.
The plaintiff's assignments of error are all based upon a ruling of the trial court, that as a factual question, the relationship of carrier and passenger had terminated at the time of defendant's alleged negligence, if any, and therefore the rule of law that a public carrier owes its passengers, while they are passengers, the duty to exercise the highest degree of care for their safety did not apply, but the general duty of reasonable care was applicable.
The extent of defendant's duty toward the plaintiff, therefore, depends upon the particular facts from *516 which the deductions are to be drawn as to whether the plaintiff was a passenger or that relationship had ceased at the time of the alleged negligence and injury.
1, 2. The carrier-passenger relationship exists by reason of contract, express or implied. Fels v. East St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., CCA Mo, 275 F 881 (1921); Todd v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 274 Ill 201, 113 NE 95; Roberts v. Northwest Airlines, 201 Minn 89, 275 NW 410. When this relationship exists there is imposed upon the carrier the duty of the highest degree of care, as long as the passenger is traveling in its conveyance and until the passenger has alighted in a place of safety. Corrigan v. Portland Traction Co., 157 Or 496, 73 P2d 378; Lewis v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 147 Or 588, 34 P2d 616. A place of safety is not reached if the place of disembarkation is such that the passenger may be struck and injured by a resumption of the movement of the conveyance. Lilley v. Key System Transit Lines, Inc., 136 Cal App2d 737, 289 P2d 517; Houston v. Lynchburg Traction & Light Co., 119 Va 136, 89 SE 114; Mayor v. St. Louis Public Service Co., (Mo 1959), 269 SW2d 101. With these rules of law before us, we will examine the evidence.
The plaintiff testified that she boarded the bus, and carried onto the bus a small sack of fruit and fruit juices. She seated herself near the front on a bench that ran lengthwise of the bus, and deposited her sack behind the driver's seat. When she arrived at her destination she paid her fare and the door was opened to permit her to leave the bus. The point selected for her disembarking by the operator of the bus was a level concrete walk. On direct examination she described the occurrence of her falling, as follows:
And on cross-examination:
She did not know whether the bus moved or not. A boy, nine years of age, who was playing near by, was called by the plaintiff, and testified of the occurrence, as follows:
And, on cross-examination:
The driver of the bus testified as follows:
A passenger on the bus, called by the defendant, testified as follows:
This witness testified the door was never closed nor did the bus move.
3. There is not a scintilla of evidence that plaintiff was deposited in an unsafe place or in a position where she would be injured by the starting of the bus. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that after plaintiff had alighted from the bus, she remembered her package and attempted to retrieve it before the bus departed. It therefore clearly appears that the contractual obligation of the carrier of safe carriage ceased when the plaintiff had departed from the bus and reached a place of safety. Thus, at this point, the relationship of carrier and passenger ceased.
4. The question of whether the defendant was or was not negligent under all of the circumstances then existing in failing to anticipate that the plaintiff might attempt to re-enter the bus for the purpose of retrieving her package commenced after the contract of safe carriage had terminated, and could only require the exercise by the carrier and its agents of reasonable care. As previously stated, this issue as to reasonable care was submitted to the jury.
Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.