Title: Jackson County v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2582 & 2005AP545 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jackson County, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, Jackson County Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc. and Thomas McNulty, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert De Chambeau 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by Brian E. 
Butler, Richard C. Yde, Daniel P. Gustafson, and Stafford 
Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Brian E. Butler. 
 
For the defendant-respondent State of Wisconsin Department 
of Natural Resources, the cause was argued by Thomas J. Dawson, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs (in the 
court of appeals) was Peggy A. Lautenschlager.  
 
For the defendants-respondents Jackson County Sanitary 
Landfill, Inc., and Thomas McNulty, there was a brief by Eric M. 
McLeod, Roisin H. Bell, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Eric M. McLeod. 
 
 
2006 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV3513) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jackson County, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, Jackson County Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc. and Thomas McNulty, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Robert A. DeChambeau, Judge.  Affirmed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes to us 
on certification from the court of appeals.  We have accepted 
the certification and decide only one issue:  whether Jackson 
County 
(County) 
can 
rescind 
the 
County's 
tax 
deed 
that 
transferred ownership of property containing a landfill to the 
County, thereby unilaterally returning ownership to the prior 
owner, Jackson County Sanitary Landfill (JCSL), without the 
prior owner's consent.  We conclude that the County lawfully 
issued the tax deed.  We also conclude that when the County 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
2 
 
accepted the tax deed, all property rights vested in fee simple 
in the County.  Because the County has no statutory authority to 
rescind a tax deed that was lawfully issued and thereby 
unilaterally impose property ownership on a third party, its 
attempted rescission has no effect on ownership of the property 
containing the landfill.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit 
court's conclusion in that regard, and, as suggested in the 
certification,1 we remand to the court of appeals to decide the 
remaining issues this case presents. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  JCSL owned and 
operated a landfill in Jackson County.  JCSL was licensed by the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to operate a solid waste 
facility.  The DNR's plan for the care of the landfill included 
the establishment of an escrow account into which JCSL made 
payments for the long-term care and maintenance of the landfill.   
¶3 
In 1998, JCSL stopped paying real estate taxes on the 
property that contains the landfill.  In June of 2000, the 
landfill reached its authorized capacity and JCSL began closure.  
The County pursued tax delinquency proceedings against JCSL by 
issuing a tax certificate for unpaid taxes on the property.  
                                                 
1 The certification provides, "If the supreme court . . . 
concludes that the County is the owner of the landfill, the 
court may wish to address the proper disposition of the County's 
claims regarding its responsibility for landfill costs and 
liabilities, or it may remand those issues to this court for 
disposition."  Certification by Wisconsin Court of Appeals 4 
(Oct. 13, 2005).  We have accepted the second of those two 
suggestions by the court of appeals.  
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
3 
 
Because JCSL continued in its nonpayment of real estate taxes 
and did not redeem the tax certificate, in 2002 the county clerk 
issued a tax deed to the County.  The County accepted, recorded 
and re-recorded the tax deed.  Therefore, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 75.14(1) (2001-02), the County's actions had certain legal 
consequences.2 
¶4 
Wisconsin Statute § 75.14(1) states: 
If any land subject to a tax certificate shall 
not be redeemed the county clerk shall, after the 
expiration 
of 
time 
prescribed 
by 
law 
for 
the 
redemption 
thereof, 
on 
presentation 
of 
the 
tax 
certificate and proof of service of notice, execute in 
the name of the state and of the county, as such 
officer thereof, under the clerk's hand and the seal 
of the county, to the county and its assigns, a deed 
of the land so remaining unredeemed, and shall 
acknowledge the same which shall vest in the county an 
absolute estate in fee simple in such land subject, 
however, to recorded restrictions and redemption as 
provided in this chapter; and such deed duly witnessed 
and acknowledged shall be presumptive evidence of the 
regularity of all the proceedings, from the valuation 
of the land by the assessor up to and including the 
execution of the deed, and may be recorded with the 
like effect as other conveyances of land.  No deed may 
be issued under this section until the county board, 
by resolution, orders issuance of the deed. 
¶5 
In September and October of 2003, the County's board 
of supervisors resolved to rescind the tax deed, having realized 
that the responsibilities associated with the landfill could 
                                                 
2 The 2001-02 version of Wis. Stat. § 75.14(1) does not 
differ materially from the 2003-04 version.  All additional 
references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2003-04 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
4 
 
place a financial burden on the County.  Resolution 50-9-03 
provides: 
RE:  Rescind Tax Delinquency Action 
 
Whereas, 
a 
tax 
deed 
of 
certain 
property 
("Property") 
which 
has 
tax 
parcel 
number 
010-
0717.0000, and which is described in the attached 
description, was recorded in the office of the Jackson 
County Register of Deeds in Volume 415 at page 839 as 
document number 311612, and a correction deed was 
recorded in Volume 416 at page 216 as document number 
311730, and a correction affidavit was recorded in 
Volume 423 at page 825 as document number 314134; and 
 
Whereas, the actions taken to authorize and 
record the tax deed were inadvertent, improvident and 
contrary to the public interest; 
 
Therefore, be it RESOLVED by the Jackson County 
Board of Supervisors and by the County Tax Deed and 
Land Committee as follows: 
1. 
All actions taken to authorize the tax deed 
of the Property are rescinded. 
2. 
The tax deed, correction deed and affidavit 
of correction recorded in volume 415 at page 839 as 
document number 311612, in volume 416 at page 216 as 
document number 311730, and in volume 423 at page 825 
as document number 314134 are declared null, void and 
of no effect.  Jackson County has no right, title or 
interest in or to the Property as a result of the tax 
deed, correction deed and affidavit of correction. 
3. 
The County Clerk is authorized and directed 
to record a certified copy of this Resolution in the 
office of the Jackson County Register of Deeds.  
Notwithstanding the County's resolution, JCSL continued to claim 
the County owned the landfill and was responsible for its care, 
maintenance and any subsequent liability.  As a result, the 
County filed a declaratory judgment action in the Dane County 
Circuit Court.   
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
5 
 
¶6 
In its complaint, the County alleged that it is 
inequitable to permit JCSL to escape its obligations for the 
landfill by refusing to pay taxes.3  The County asked the court 
to declare that the County is not and never has been the owner 
of the landfill and that the County has no responsibility for 
the landfill under Wis. Stat. chs. 289 and 292, which address 
solid waste facilities and remedial action for such facilities.  
The County asserted that it was never involved in the operation 
of the landfill and received no financial benefit from its 
operation.  It claimed that the clerk had mistakenly issued the 
tax deed without considering the nature of the property and had 
done so without authorization from the county board contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 75.14.  It contended that the county board of 
supervisors' resolution rescinding the tax deed had properly 
nullified County ownership of the property.4  As an alternative, 
the County asked the circuit court to rule that even if it owns 
the 
property, 
it 
is 
not 
responsible 
for 
the 
long-term 
maintenance 
of 
the 
landfill 
because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
3 The County's complaint actually alleges this and other 
claims against JCSL and its president and sole shareholder, 
Thomas 
McNulty; 
however, 
we 
refer 
to 
JCSL 
and 
McNulty 
collectively as JCSL. 
4 The County originally disputed the authority of the county 
clerk to issue the tax deed without express approval of the 
county board in regard to this specific property.  It alleged 
that the clerk was without the statutory authority required by 
Wis. Stat. § 75.14(1):  "No deed may be issued under this 
section until the county board, by resolution, orders issuance 
of the deed."  However, the County now acknowledges that a 1905 
County Resolution granted the clerk continuing authority to 
issue tax deeds to the County. 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
6 
 
§ 292.11(9)(e)1m.a. exempts the County from such liability.  The 
County moved for summary judgment. 
¶7 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, JCSL and the DNR.  It concluded:  (1) Pursuant to 
Hayes v. Adams County, 15 Wis. 2d 574, 581, 113 N.W.2d 407 
(1962),5 the county clerk had continuing authority as established 
by the county board to issue tax deeds; (2) there was no express 
or implied repeal of that authority; (3) the tax deed issued for 
the property is valid; (4) the county board has no authority to 
rescind the tax deed; (5) the County owns the property; and (6) 
to grant the County the relief it requests would be inequitable.  
It also dismissed the remainder of the County's claims.6  The 
County filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit 
court denied. 
¶8 
The County appealed, arguing that it had the authority 
to rescind the tax deed, under the broad statutory authority 
granted by Wis. Stat. § 59.03(1), which the County claims allows 
                                                 
5 Hayes v. Adams County, 15 Wis. 2d 574, 113 N.W.2d 407 
(1962) held:  
The law is settled in Wisconsin that a separate 
resolution is not necessary every time the county 
clerk issues a tax deed to the county if a resolution 
granting continuing authority to issue tax deeds has 
been passed by the county board. 
Id. at 581 (citations omitted).  
6 The circuit court also granted the DNR's request for a 
declaration that the DNR could transfer the landfill license to 
the County pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 289.46(1).  We do not 
address this issue because we decide only the question for which 
we accepted certification. 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
7 
 
it to "exercise any organizational or administrative power, 
subject only to the constitution and to any enactment of the 
legislature."  The County's position is that absent a statute 
barring its rescission of the tax deed, its actions resulted in 
effective rescission. 
¶9 
The court of appeals certified the issue of whether "a 
county, after taking a tax deed to assume ownership of property 
on which taxes had not been paid, may rescind the tax deed and 
return the property to the original owner, without that owner's 
consent."  We address only the certified question. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶10 This case requires us to interpret and to apply 
statutes to undisputed facts.  The interpretation of statutes 
and their application to facts are questions of law, subject to 
our independent review.  Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 
158, 166, 361 N.W.2d 673 (1985).  However, we benefit from the 
analysis of the previous court's decision.  State v. Cole, 2003 
WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.   
B. 
Summary Judgment Principles 
¶11 The certified question formed the basis for the 
circuit court's order granting summary judgment that dismissed 
the County's request for declaratory judgment in its favor.  
Every decision on a motion for summary judgment begins with a 
review of the complaint to determine whether, on its face, it 
states a claim for relief.  Westphal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 
WI App 170, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 569, 669 N.W.2d 166.  If it does, we 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
8 
 
examine the answer to see if issues of fact or law have been 
joined.  Id.  After we have concluded that the complaint and 
answer are sufficient to join issue, we examine the moving 
party's affidavits to determine whether they establish a prima 
facie case for summary judgment.  Id.  When they do so, we 
review the opposing party's affidavits to determine whether 
there are material facts in dispute, or inferences from 
undisputed material facts, that would entitle the opposing party 
to a trial.  Id.  "We will affirm a grant of summary judgment 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Baumeister 
v. Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, ¶11, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 
N.W.2d 1 (citation omitted). 
¶12 There were no affidavits filed that bear on the 
certified question.  The affidavits filed by the County relate 
to whether the county clerk had authority to issue the tax deed.  
The County now agrees the clerk had lawful authority to do so.7  
The facts material to the question of whether the County had the 
power to rescind the tax deed are not in dispute.   
 
                                                 
7 Before the circuit court in support of its motion for 
summary judgment, the County filed three affidavits from the 
county clerk, Kyle Deno.  All related to whether the county 
board of supervisors had passed an ordinance authorizing the 
county clerk to issue a tax deed on the landfill property.  
Since the county clerk's authority to issue the tax deed is no 
longer in dispute, those affidavits are not material to our 
consideration of the circuit court's decision on the certified 
question. 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
9 
 
C. 
Parties' Arguments 
¶13 The County contends that the county clerk made a 
mistake in issuing the tax deed.  It argues that under its home 
rule powers, Wis. Stat. § 59.03, it is able to correct that 
mistake by rescission of the tax deed.  The County argues that 
it would be unfair to the taxpayers of Jackson County to bear 
the burden of the landfill and the expenses associated with its 
ownership.  The County emphasizes that rescission would return 
JCSL to exactly the same position it would have been in had the 
tax deed never been issued.  The County's position depends 
entirely on its theory that it had the power to rescind the tax 
deed.   
¶14 JCSL, on the other hand, contends that the County's 
position has no support in the law.  JCSL contends that 
established legal principles governing the powers of counties 
and the rights, interests, and obligations associated with real 
property dictate that the County does, indeed, own the property.  
JCSL focuses on the lack of a statute that gives the County the 
power to rescind a tax deed, the statutory limitation on 
cancellations of tax deeds set out in Wis. Stat. § 75.22, and 
the effect on property ownership that Wis. Stat. § 75.14 
provides.  It asserts that all rights and interests in the 
property passed to the County as a result of the tax deed and 
that when the incidents of ownership passed to the County, JCSL 
was divested of them. 
 
 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
10 
 
D. 
Home Rule 
1. 
County power  
¶15 The County relies heavily on its home rule power set 
out in Wis. Stat. § 59.03(1) as support for its use of other 
statutes in ways not explicitly set out in those statutes, e.g., 
its attempt to use Wis. Stat. § 75.22.  Before we address the 
County's home rule power, a review of the source of county power 
is helpful.  
¶16 A county is a creature of the legislature and as such, 
it has only those powers that the legislature by statute 
provided.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 22.  For more than a century, 
Wisconsin courts consistently have interpreted counties' powers 
as arising solely from the statutes: 
Counties are, at most, but local organizations, which, 
for the purposes of civil administration, are invested 
with a few functions characteristic of a corporate 
existence.  . . .  [T]he statutes confer upon them all 
the powers they possess. 
Frederick v. Douglas County, 96 Wis. 411, 416-17, 71 N.W. 798 
(1897) (citations omitted).  We have held that counties exist 
for, 
and 
derive 
their 
powers 
from, 
the 
state, 
through 
legislation.  State ex rel. Conway v. Elvod, 70 Wis. 2d 448, 
450, 234 N.W.2d 354 (1975) (explaining that a "county is totally 
a creature of the legislature, and its powers must be exercised 
within the scope of authority ceded to it by the state"); Kyncl 
v. Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 555, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968) 
(citation omitted) (explaining that a county "exists not by 
virtue of its own will or consent, but as a result of the 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
11 
 
superimposed will of the state"); Douglas County v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 275 Wis. 309, 313-14, 81 N.W.2d 807 (1957) (citations 
omitted) (pointing out that "[c]ounties, like other municipal 
corporations, are mere instrumentalities of the state, and 
statutes confer upon them their powers, prescribe their duties, 
and impose their liabilities"); Spaulding v. Wood County, 218 
Wis. 
224, 
226, 
260 
N.W. 
473 
(1935) 
(citations 
omitted) 
(explaining that a county has "only such powers as are conferred 
upon [it] by statute, or such as are necessarily implied 
therefrom").   
¶17 A county's home rule power is more limited than the 
home rule power that is afforded to cities; as we explained, 
"contrary to the direct and expansive delegation of power to 
municipalities under Wis. Const. art. XI, sec. 3, the authority 
of county boards is limited."  State ex rel. Teunas v. County of 
Kenosha, 142 Wis. 2d 498, 504, 418 N.W.2d 833 (1988) (footnote 
omitted).  Accordingly, the County's power to rescind a tax deed 
under the circumstances presented by this case must be found in 
a statute or necessarily be implied from a statute, in order for 
that power to exist. 
2. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.03 
¶18 The County asserts its authority is grounded in Wis. 
Stat. § 59.03(1), which provides: 
Administrative home rule.  Every county may 
exercise any organizational or administrative power, 
subject only to the constitution and to any enactment 
of the legislature which is of statewide concern and 
which uniformly affects every county.   
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
12 
 
¶19 The County correctly asserts that Wis. Stat. § 59.03 
is a broad grant of power to counties.  The County also asserts 
that its home rule power is complimented by Wis. Stat. § 75.22, 
wherein it asserts it has the implied, if not the expressed, 
power to rescind this tax deed.  When exercising home rule 
power, a county must be cognizant of the limitation imposed if 
the matter has been addressed in a statute that uniformly 
affects every county as such legislation shows the matter is of 
statewide concern.  Mommsen v. Schueller, 228 Wis. 2d 627, 635, 
599 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1999).  Wisconsin courts have previously 
recognized that while some subjects are exclusively a statewide 
concern, others may be entirely a local concern and some 
subjects are not exclusively within the purview of either the 
state or of a county.  Id. at 636.  For those subjects where 
both the state and a county may act, the county's actions must 
"complement rather than conflict with the state legislation."  
State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 
2004 WI 23, ¶37, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.  
¶20 Four factors assist us in determining how a county's 
action is to be analyzed: 
(1) whether 
the 
legislature 
has 
expressly 
withdrawn the power of municipalities to act; 
(2) whether the ordinance logically conflicts 
with the state legislation; 
(3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of 
the state legislation; or 
(4) whether 
the 
ordinance 
goes 
against 
the 
spirit of the state legislation. 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
13 
 
Mommsen, 228 Wis. 2d at 636-37 (citing Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. EOC, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 397, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984); U.S. Oil, 
Inc. v. City of Fond Du Lac, 199 Wis. 2d 333, 345, 544 N.W.2d 
589 (Ct. App. 1996)).  If any one of the four factors set out in 
Mommsen is met by a county's action, that action is without 
legal effect.  Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶38 (citation 
omitted).  We conclude that the second Mommsen factor, whether 
the County resolution logically conflicts with a state statute, 
must be evaluated because Wis. Stat. § 75.22 specifically 
addresses cancellation of tax deeds.  
3. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 75.228  
¶21 The County implies that it has the power to cancel a 
tax deed that it has issued due to Wis. Stat. § 75.22, which 
provides: 
If after the issuance of a tax certificate or 
conveyance to the county of any lands subject to a tax 
certificate and within the time hereinafter prescribed 
it shall be discovered that the certificate was 
invalid, the county board shall make an order, briefly 
stating the reason 
therefor, 
directing 
that the 
certificate, as it applies to the affected lands, or 
deed be canceled.  But no certificate or conveyance 
shall be deemed invalid within the meaning of this 
section by reason of any mistake or irregularity in 
any 
of 
the 
tax 
proceedings 
not 
affecting 
the 
groundwork of the tax; nor shall any county be liable 
to pay or refund any moneys by reason of any such 
mistake or irregularity.   
The County asserts that § 75.22 was enacted to protect the 
counties; and therefore, it cannot be used as a sword by JCSL.  
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 75.22 has not changed materially since 
the tax deed was issued by the Jackson County clerk in 2002.  
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
14 
 
Rather, it evidences power delegated to the County.  The County 
asserts that because the landfill property is worthless to the 
County, a fact of which it was unaware before it took the tax 
deed, the mistake of the clerk affects the "groundwork of the 
tax," as that phrase is used in § 75.22.  The JCSL agrees that a 
tax deed may be cancelled under § 75.22 when there is a defect 
in the deed that affects "the groundwork of the tax."  However, 
it contends that no such defect is present here.  Therefore, 
§ 75.22 does not permit rescission under the facts of this case. 
¶22 In order to address the parties' arguments, we must 
interpret and apply the phrase "groundwork of the tax" found in 
Wis. Stat. § 75.22.  When we interpret a statute, we rely on the 
criteria set out in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In 
Kalal, we explained that: 
[T]he 
purpose 
of 
statutory interpretation 
is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be 
given its full, proper, and intended effect. 
Id., ¶44.  Context is also important when determining the plain 
meaning of a statute, as is the purpose of the statute and its 
scope, if those qualities can be ascertained from the language 
of the statute itself.  Id., ¶¶46-48.  These are all intrinsic 
sources for statutory interpretation.  Id.   
¶23 The phrase "groundwork of the tax" was added to 
"[s]ection 1184 of the Revised Statutes of 1878" during the 1897 
legislative session.  Foster v. Sawyer County, 197 Wis. 218, 
220-21, 221 N.W. 768 (1928).  Section 1184 was renumbered 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
15 
 
subsequently to become Wis. Stat. § 75.22.  In Sawyer, we 
interpreted the phrase "groundwork of the tax" as an effort by 
the legislature to maintain the validity of tax deeds when there 
had been a technical irregularity in the proceeding by which the 
tax deed was issued.  Id. at 222-23.  We did so by explaining 
what had been raised as defects in tax deeds in the past and 
pointing out that the "groundwork of the tax" did not include 
such defects as failing to post a notice or failing to file an 
affidavit in regard to the sale, nor did it include other 
technicalities of the sales.  Id. at 222.  When we have 
interpreted 
terms 
identical 
to 
those 
currently 
under 
consideration, we rely on those past interpretations.  See 
Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980).   
¶24 We have employed the phrase "groundwork of the tax" in 
more recent decisions than Foster.  For example, in Bauermeister 
v. Town of Alden, 16 Wis. 2d 111, 113 N.W.2d 823 (1962), we 
interpreted statutory language, "unless it shall appear that the 
plaintiff has paid more than his equitable share of such taxes," 
found in Wis. Stat. § 74.73(2) (1961-62), as requiring a showing 
of a defect in the assessment that affected "the groundwork of 
the tax."  Id. at 114.  We explained that such a defect in the 
groundwork of the tax means "a defect or irregularity that 
necessarily affects the principle of the tax and shows that it 
must be unjust and unequal . . . [or an] illegality or 
irregularity that results in an inequitable burden."  Id. 
(citing Barker Lumber Co. v. Genoa City, 273 Wis. 466, 469, 78 
N.W.2d 893 (1956)).   
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
16 
 
¶25 Among other concerns, Wis. Stat. § 75.22 addresses the 
validity of tax deeds made in reliance on a tax certificate, and 
it establishes that tax deeds will not be set aside for a 
"mistake or irregularity."   A defect in "the groundwork of the 
tax," the same phrase as used in Bauermeister and in Foster, 
requires that the tax deed be set aside.  The defect to which 
the phrase "groundwork of the tax" was tied in Bauermeister and 
in Foster is a defect that caused the property owner to bear an 
unequal 
tax 
burden. 
 
Bauermeister, 
16 
Wis. 2d 
at 
114.  
Therefore, in order for the County to argue that it has the 
authority to set aside the tax deed under § 75.22, it would be 
required to show the property was inequitably taxed resulting in 
the property owner paying more than its equitable share of the 
tax.    
¶26 This seems an odd position for a county to take, which 
the County recognizes as it has never alleged a defect in the 
tax proceedings that caused the tax assessment on the property 
to be unjust or unequal.  Instead, the mistake the County 
alleges is the clerk's lack of prudence in issuing a tax deed on 
property that contains a landfill.  Nevertheless, the County 
argues that its mistake is related to the groundwork of the tax 
because the clerk did not anticipate that the property would 
have no value to the County at the time when the tax deed was 
issued.   
¶27 The County's argument misses the mark set by the 
legislature in Wis. Stat. § 75.22.  First, there is nothing in 
the record on which we could base the conclusion that the 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
17 
 
property is worthless.  However, even if that were true, it is 
not a defect that causes the taxation of the property to be 
unfair to the County.  Furthermore, if a mistake about the value 
of the property to a county were sufficient to set aside a tax 
deed, whenever a county took title to a property that ended up 
being worth less than the county anticipated, the county would 
be able to cancel the tax deed.  Such a broad reading of § 75.22 
is 
contrary 
to 
the 
restrictive 
wording 
chosen 
by 
the 
legislature, as it attempted to provide certainty to title held 
under a tax deed.  Foster, 197 Wis. at 222. 
¶28 Second, there is nothing in the record in regard to 
any taxes that will be assessed against the property.  A clerk's 
mistake in failing to accurately ascertain the value of the 
property to a county is not the equivalent of an irregularity in 
the tax proceedings that causes the property to be inequitably 
taxed.  Therefore, there is nothing to show that the clerk's 
mistake affects the groundwork of the tax, either as it affected 
the taxation of the property when JCSL owned it or when the 
County held title.   
¶29 In addition, the County's attempt at returning the 
property to JCSL is also complicated by Wisconsin common law.  
For example, we have held that when a county takes a tax deed, 
Wis. Stat. § 75.14 vests fee ownership in the county.  Oosterwyk 
v. Milwaukee County, 31 Wis. 2d 513, 518, 143 N.W.2d 497 (1966).  
Furthermore, it has been the law in Wisconsin for more than 140 
years that in order to transfer title by deed, the deed must be 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
18 
 
accepted by the grantee.  Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 270, 292-95 
(1860)9.  As we have explained: 
[A] delivery by the donor to a third person, for the 
use of the donee, and an acceptance by the latter, are 
two very different things.  By the former, the donor 
signifies his willingness to part with the property, 
whilst by the latter the donee makes known his assent 
to receiving it, and both must concur before the title 
is changed or affected.  
Id. at 293 (emphasis added).  Here, JCSL has expressly refused 
to accept reconveyance of fee ownership of the property.  
Although the County has not attempted to quit claim the property 
to JCSL, its attempted rescission of the tax deed would produce 
the same result, if it were valid.  That is, JCSL would be 
forced to accept ownership of property.  Forcing one to accept 
ownership of property against that party's wishes is contrary to 
the common law.  See Miles v. Mackle Bros., Division Deltona 
Corp., 73 Wis. 2d 84, 89, 242 N.W.2d 247 (1976).  Therefore, 
without statutory authority that permits a county to force 
ownership of property on another, the common law cuts against 
the County's position.   
¶30 However, the County also contends that even if it was 
not given the power to rescind the tax deed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 75.22, it nevertheless has the authority to do so under its 
                                                 
9 See also Miles v. Mackle Bros., Division Deltona Corp., 73 
Wis. 2d 84, 89, 242 N.W.2d 247 (1976) (concluding that the 
plaintiffs could have refused to accept the deed); Clifford v. 
City of Hartford, 204 Wis. 217, 220, 235 N.W. 407 (1931) 
(concluding 
that 
purchase 
"would 
not 
and 
could 
not 
be 
consummated until and unless the intention [to transfer title] 
was followed up by acceptance of a deed"). 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
19 
 
generalized home rule power.  We recently revisited home rule 
authority in Ziervogel, where we examined a Washington County 
zoning ordinance.  In Ziervogel, we reviewed a county board of 
adjustment's denial of homeowners' requests for an area zoning 
variance.  The denial was based on a county ordinance.  We 
concluded that the county's ordinance adopting a "'no reasonable 
use of the property' definition for unnecessary hardship in area 
variance cases [] conflict[ed] with the statutory grant of 
discretion to local boards of adjustment pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.694(7)(c)."  Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶39.  On that 
basis, we concluded that the ordinance was unenforceable.  Id., 
¶40. 
¶31 Therefore, as Ziervogel points out in the context of 
the home rule power of a county, Wis. Stat. § 59.03 grants 
counties the right to act and decision-make on local affairs.  
However, counties must do so in a manner that does not conflict 
with the state's interest in uniformly treating those questions 
that arise in many counties across the state.  The test employed 
in Ziervogel in analyzing an ordinance is the same four-factor 
test we employed in Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n and Mommsen, set 
out above.  
¶32 As we have explained, the second factor, whether the 
exercise of power by the County conflicts with legislation that 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
20 
 
has a statewide impact, is at issue.10  Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 
549, ¶38; Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 120 Wis. 2d at 397.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 75.22 is uniformly applicable to every county 
in the state.  In it, the legislature expressly limited the 
circumstances under which a tax deed can be cancelled.  The 
legislature has decided that no certificate or tax deed "shall 
be deemed invalid . . . by reason of any mistake or irregularity 
in any of the tax proceedings not affecting the groundwork of 
the tax."  Section 75.22 (emphasis added).  The home rule power 
granted to the county by Article IV, Section 22 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 59.03 do not override that 
legislative directive.  Despite the general authority of a 
county to act and decision-make over local matters, counties 
must act in conformity with the letter and spirit of statewide 
law.  Teunas, 142 Wis. 2d at 503 (concluding that a county does 
not have authority to enact an obscenity ordinance).  Section 
75.22 is a statute that has statewide impact on the stability of 
title taken under a tax deed, and it would be logically 
inconsistent with the statute's attempt to provide stability to 
such title were we to adopt the County's position. 
                                                 
10 One could argue that the State has withdrawn a county's 
power to rescind a tax deed because Wis. Stat. § 75.22 provides 
that "no certificate or conveyance shall be deemed invalid" if 
the groundwork of the tax is not affected.  This argument 
implicates the first factor under Mommsen v. Schueller, 228 
Wis. 2d 627, 636, 599 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1999).  However, 
because Wisconsin common law requires acceptance of ownership of 
property before ownership can vest, the county never had such 
authority for the legislature to withdraw by enacting § 75.22. 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
21 
 
¶33 Furthermore, any ability a county has to rescind an 
action earlier taken is limited by whether vested rights are 
affected by the county action.  For example, in Edwards Realty & 
Finance Co. v. City of Superior, 250 Wis. 472, 27 N.W.2d 370 
(1947), Edwards Realty commenced an action to cause the city to 
provide it with certain tax certificates.  Pursuant to a 
contract and resolution of the city council, the city sold 
Edwards Realty tax certificates issued under certain conditions.  
Id. at 473.  Edwards Realty agreed to pay for the certificates 
in monthly installments.  Id.  Subsequent to the initial 
agreement, the city council adopted a resolution to amend the 
contract, at the request of Edwards Realty.  Id. at 474.  
Several months later, the city council adopted a resolution 
rescinding and annulling the resolution that had amended the 
contract between the parties.  Id.   
¶34 In our review of Edwards Realty's claim, we held that 
Edwards Realty's rights were established in the original 
contract; that the subsequent resolution had not granted it any 
additional rights; and therefore, the city council's rescission 
of the resolution did not change either party's position or 
upset any reliance upon the resolution.  Id. at 477.  We 
concluded that "a municipal corporation, like other legislative 
bodies, has a right to reconsider under parliamentary law its 
vote and action upon questions properly pending before it, and 
[to] rescind its previous action provided vested rights are not 
violated and such rescission is in conformity with the law 
applicable to the government of the body."  Id.  Because no 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
22 
 
vested rights were established by the ordinance that was 
rescinded, the rescission was proper.  Id.  
¶35 Both parties contend that Edwards Realty supports 
their position.  However, we conclude that two of the three 
conditions established by Edwards Realty as necessary to a valid 
rescission, (1) that no vested rights are abrogated and (2) that 
the rescission is in conformity with the law, are not met by the 
County's attempted rescission.11  First, the County's alleged 
rescission, if valid, would most certainly abrogate vested 
rights, even if the "rights" are those that the County now tries 
to escape.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 75.14, the taking of a tax 
deed "vest[s] in the county an absolute estate in fee simple."  
Oosterwyk, 31 Wis. 2d at 518 (concluding that when it took the 
tax deed under the statutory process of ch. 75, the county 
became the fee simple owner of the property pursuant to 
§ 75.14).  Whether the County values these rights, the County's 
acceptance of the tax deed most certainly vested all rights of 
ownership in the County, which according to Edwards Realty, the 
County cannot now divest by rescission.  Second, we have 
concluded that the alleged "rescission" is not in conformity 
                                                 
11 The Edwards Realty requirement that the reconsideration 
be done "under parliamentary law" is to ensure that the 
municipal body consider an issue under some kind of formal 
procedure, and that the will of a single person or group of 
people, without the approval of the governing body at large, not 
form the foundation of a decision to rescind.  In the case at 
bar, there is no indication that the county board's decision to 
rescind did not occur under the usual procedure employed by that 
body.   
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
23 
 
with the law because it is contrary to the limiting provisions 
of Wis. Stat. § 75.22, which permit the cancellation of tax 
deeds only if specifically described circumstances are present.  
Third, we have also concluded that permitting the County to 
rescind the tax deed is equivalent to requiring JCSL to accept 
ownership of real estate, which under Wisconsin common law JCSL 
has a right to refuse.  Therefore, without statutory authority 
that changes the common law, we see no authority for the 
County's attempted rescission of the tax deed.  
¶36 In addition, Kenosha County v. Town of Paris, 148 
Wis. 2d 175, 434 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1988), applied the Edwards 
Realty holding.  It supports our conclusion that the County did 
not validly rescind the tax deed.  Kenosha involved a county-
wide zoning plan that was not adopted or approved by one of the 
towns in the county.  Id. at 177.  The town developed its own 
ordinance and petitioned the county for approval.  Id.  The 
county originally granted approval, but later reconsidered and 
withdrew its approval pending a revised county ordinance.  Id. 
at 177-78.  The court of appeals upheld the county's withdrawal 
of approval for the zoning plan, reviewing and relying on 
Edwards Realty, in regard to the ability of a municipal 
corporation to rescind a decision.  Id. at 181-82.  The court of 
appeals concluded that "no vested rights were violated by the 
reconsideration of the town's ordinance"; therefore, it was 
permissible.  Id. at 183.  For guidance on that issue, the court 
in Kenosha turned to a Maryland case, Dal Maso v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Prince George's, 34 A.2d 464 (Md. 1943).  
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
24 
 
The Dal Maso court held that because there was no change in the 
status of the appellants or their property in the week between 
the original decision and its reconsideration, no vested rights 
had been disturbed.  Id. at 467.  The Kenosha court applied the 
same reasoning, holding: 
We likewise can find nothing in the record which 
indicates a change in the status of property located 
in the town from the time of the ordinance's approval 
to its reconsideration a month later.  The town board 
acted swiftly after the initial approval to post the 
ordinance, install a town board of zoning appeals, and 
make 
substantial 
amendments 
to 
the 
zoning 
map.  
However, none of these actions created any vested 
rights or changed the status of the property and its 
owners.  We therefore conclude that the county's 
reconsideration was lawful.   
Kenosha, 148 Wis. 2d at 183.   
¶37 When we apply this rationale to the case before us, we 
conclude that the County's attempt to rescind the tax deed 
cannot be effective.  First, the County held ownership of the 
property for more than a year and recorded the tax deed and 
clarifying affidavits in the public records, thereby affirming 
its ownership.  Second, the status of fee simple ownership 
changed from JCSL to the County.  Third, JCSL has objected to 
having ownership placed back upon its shoulders, and the County 
has shown no statutory authority for its assertion that it has 
the power to unilaterally impose ownership of real property on a 
third party, contrary to Wisconsin common law.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the position of JCSL, not that of the County, must 
prevail.   
 
Nos. 2004AP2582 & 2005AP545   
 
25 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 We conclude that the County lawfully issued the tax 
deed.  We also conclude that when the County accepted the tax 
deed, all property rights vested in fee simple in the County.  
Because the County has no statutory authority to rescind a tax 
deed that was lawfully issued and thereby unilaterally impose 
property ownership on a third party, its attempted rescission 
has no effect on ownership of the property containing the 
landfill.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's conclusion 
in that regard, and, as suggested by the certification, we 
remand to the court of appeals to decide the remaining issues 
this case presents.12 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed 
and remanded. 
 
 
                                                 
12 We advise the court of appeals that on remand, all of the 
issues raised by the DNR are properly before the court because 
the DNR prevailed before the circuit court and had no obligation 
to file a cross-appeal.  See Garcia v. Regent Ins. Co., 167 
Wis. 2d 287, 291 n.2, 481 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the conclusion in the 
majority opinion that Jackson County cannot rescind the tax 
deed.   
¶40 I would not, however, remand the remaining issues to 
the court of appeals even though this court has the power to do 
so.  In addition to the issue that is addressed by the majority 
opinion, the parties briefed two issues that the majority 
opinion declines to address.  These issues involve the extent of 
the county's responsibilities as the present owner of a former 
landfill.1 
¶41 Perhaps the court (including me) erred in not limiting 
the issues on accepting certification in the instant case.  
Perhaps!  Nevertheless, I would not remand the issues.  I would 
have this court decide these fully briefed issues in the 
interest of judicial economy, speedy resolution of appeals, 
reduced costs to the litigants, and finality of decisions.  
Remand is a wasteful duplication of efforts.  
                                                 
1 Jackson County Sanitary Landfill, Inc. raised and briefed 
the following significant state-wide issue: 
As the owner of real property that was used as a solid 
waste facility, does a county have responsibility for 
the long-term care and maintenance of the property? 
Jackson County raised and briefed the following related 
issue: 
Did the Circuit Court err when it dismissed the 
declaratory judgment action in its entirety, depriving 
Jackson County of the opportunity to conduct discovery 
and present its case on the remaining issues? 
No.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶42 When this court grants certification it acquires 
jurisdiction of the case including all issues, not merely the 
issues certified by the court of appeals or the issue upon which 
the court accepts certification.  Wis. Stat. §§ 808.05(2); 
(Rule) 809.61; see Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(3).  The order 
granting certification in the instant case is the standard 
certification order used by this court, asserting jurisdiction 
over all issues in the matter before the court.2  The court's 
standard practice in certification cases is to decide all issues 
raised by the briefs.  See, e.g., Schwister v. Schoenecker, 2002 
WI 132, ¶1 n.1, 258 Wis. 2d 1, 654 N.W.2d 852; State v. Stoehr, 
134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986). 
¶43 A certification by the court of appeals bringing up 
the entire appeal to this court is very different from this 
court's answering a certified question of law submitted to this 
court by the United States Supreme Court, a federal court of 
appeals, or the supreme court of another state.3   The court of 
                                                 
2 The certification order states in pertinent part: 
IT IS ORDERED that certification is granted and the 
appeal is accepted for consideration of all issues 
raised before the court of appeals.  When this court 
grants direct review upon certification, it acquires 
jurisdiction of the case, Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 3(3), that is, the entire appeal, which includes all 
issues, not merely the issues certified or the issue 
for which the court accepts certification.  State v. 
Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986); 
Wis. Stat. § 808.05(2) and (Rule) 809.61.  Further, 
the court has jurisdiction over issues not certified 
because the court may review an issue directly on its 
own motion.  Wis. Stat. § 808.05(3) . . . . 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (2003-04), which states: 
No.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545.ssa 
 
3 
 
appeals does not certify, and this court does not take 
jurisdiction over, discrete legal questions within the appeal.4  
Certification is not and should not become the practice of the 
court of appeals certifying questions of law.   
¶44 Having limited experience with certified questions, I 
can say that I have a high level of discomfort deciding a 
question of law in the abstract, stripped of facts.  Facts 
influence the statement of and application of a question of law.   
¶45 Having substantial experience with certification and 
petitions for review, I am often hesitant to limit the issues 
before this court because often, not always, several legal 
issues 
are 
so 
intertwined 
that 
they 
cannot 
be 
decided 
separately. 
¶46 In any event, in the instant case the time for this 
court to have determined whether it was going to decide all 
issues or was going to limit the issues and remand some to the 
court of appeals was in the order accepting the certification.  
                                                                                                                                                             
821.01 Power to answer. 
The 
supreme 
court 
may 
answer 
questions 
of 
law 
certified to it by the supreme court of the United 
States, a court of appeals of the United States or the 
highest appellate court of any other state when 
requested by the certifying court if there are 
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law 
of this state which may be determinative of the cause 
then pending in the certifying court and as to which 
it appears to the certifying court there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme 
court and the court of appeals of this state. 
4 See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. 
No.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545.ssa 
 
4 
 
That procedure would have allowed the parties to know which 
issues to spend their time and resources briefing and arguing.     
¶47 The standard certification order in the instant case 
advised the parties that all issues would be addressed.  
Accordingly, the parties briefed all the issues and presented 
them at oral argument.  The parties thus used their resources 
and those of this court.  By remanding issues of law to the 
court of appeals that are properly before this court, that were 
fully briefed and argued by the parties, and that could be 
decided by the court, the majority opinion imposes unnecessary 
expenses on the parties, imposes additional work on the court of 
appeals, fosters the possibility of another review in this 
court, and delays the administration of justice.   
¶48 Although I might have joined my colleagues in limiting 
the issues on acceptance of the certification, I am persuaded 
that remand now is inefficient appellate practice and procedure.5  
I write because I do not want the bench and bar to think this 
case 
sets 
a 
precedent 
for 
future 
appellate 
practice 
or 
procedure.  It does not.  For these reasons, I write separately. 
                                                 
5 For my prior objections to remand to the court of appeals 
in certification cases, see State v. Stuart, 2003 WI 73, ¶¶44-
55, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 
111 Wis. 2d 26, 45-46, 330 N.W.2d 201 (1983) (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
No.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶49 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
This 
case 
exposes a vexing problem in the financing of local governments. 
¶50 Counties, like school districts and other municipal 
governments, obtain most of their operating revenue from the 
property tax.  To assure the funding of public services, the 
cooperation of taxpayers is essential.  When a taxpayer makes 
timely payments to a taxation district, the treasurer of that 
district distributes a proportionate share of the proceeds to 
each eligible taxing jurisdiction on a regular schedule.  This 
is called settlement.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 74.23, 74.24, 74.27, 
74.30. 
¶51 When a taxpayer fails to make timely payments, the 
problem eventually falls to the county.  By August 20 of each 
year, the county treasurer is required to settle in full with 
other taxing jurisdictions for all real property taxes and 
special taxes.  In essence, the county "buys out" the delinquent 
taxes by advancing to all other taxing jurisdictions their share 
of unpaid property taxes.  See Rick Olin, Wisconsin Legislative 
Fiscal 
Bureau, 
Informational 
Paper 
No. 
14, 
Property 
Tax 
Administration, 11 (Jan. 2001); Wis. Stat. § 74.29.  If the 
county 
treasurer 
does 
not 
settle 
with 
the 
other 
taxing 
jurisdictions by August 20, the county is subject to interest 
charges and penalties.  Wis. Stat. § 74.31.  Thus, in a very 
real sense, when a taxpayer fails to pay property taxes, the 
county is left holding the bag. 
¶52 Of course, the counties have remedies.  In time, a 
county may take ownership of the taxpayer's property by issuing 
No.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545.dtp 
 
2 
 
a tax deed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 75.14(1).  The county may 
also file a civil action under Wis. Stat. § 74.53 against 
persons who own the property to recover delinquent taxes. 
¶53 The 
question 
arises 
whether 
these 
remedies 
are 
adequate to protect the public interest, particularly in 
situations where the taxpayer's property is so undesirable that 
the taxpayer wants to unload it to the county, where it may 
become a major liability. 
¶54 In this case, the Jackson County Sanitary Landfill 
ceased paying property taxes in 1998.  In 2000 it stopped 
accepting waste and closed down.  In 2002 the county took the 
property in an effort to recoup the money it had already paid 
out in settlement as well as its own share of delinquent taxes. 
¶55 One might argue that the county should have known 
better than to take ownership of this albatross.  But one can 
also argue that the county was euchred into doing so by a clever 
but conniving landfill owner. 
¶56 The majority is not much troubled by the county's 
dilemma, or by the blueprint it is creating for future tax 
cheats.  I am very troubled and would exercise this court's 
equitable power to cancel the tax deed to undo this scam.  In 
any event, I urge the legislature to address the problem. 
 
 
No.  2004AP2582 & 2005AP545.dtp 
 
 
 
1