Title: Ex Parte Durbin

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

818 So. 2d 404 (2001)
Ex parte Marshall B. DURBIN, Jr.
(In re Jackie McNeal Durbin v. Marshall B. Durbin, Jr.)
1000775.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 7, 2001.
Bruce L. Gordon of Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, P.C., Birmingham; and L. Drew Redden of Redden, Mills & Clark, Birmingham, for petitioner.
Randall W. Nichols and Anne Lamkin Durward of Massey & Stotser, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent.
*405 WOODALL, Justice.
Marshall B. Durbin, Jr. ("the husband"), and Jackie McNeal Durbin ("the wife") were divorced by the Jefferson Circuit Court. The wife appealed from the divorce judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in its division of the marital property and in its award of periodic alimony.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case "with instructions for the trial court to treat all of the husband's personal Compass [Bancshares, Inc.] stock as marital property and to reconsider its division of the marital assets." Durbin v. Durbin, 818 So. 2d 396, 402 (Ala.Civ.App.2000)(footnote omitted). The Court of Civil Appeals overruled the husband's application for rehearing on January 12, 2001.
The husband petitioned for certiorari review, which we granted on April 17, 2001. In his petition, he argues that the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals conflicts with this Court's decision in Ex parte Drummond, 785 So. 2d 358 (Ala.2000). We have determined that it does conflict. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the case.
The trial court's judgment followed a lengthy trial. The facts of the case were summarized in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion:
818 So. 2d  at 397-98 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
On appeal before the Court of Civil Appeals, the wife argued that the trial court erred by treating the husband's interest in Marshall Durbin Food Corporation ("MDFC") as his separate estate and not considering it in the division of marital assets. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court correctly determined that the corporation itself was not marital property, and therefore that the trial court did not err in refusing to treat the MDFC stock as marital property, because the husband had acquired all of that stock by inheritance or gift before the parties' marriage and it had not been used for the common benefit of the parties during the marriage.
As the Court of Civil Appeals noted, the trial court awarded some of the Compass stock to each party. The husband had acquired the Compass stock before the marriage:
818 So. 2d  at 401. The trial court awarded the husband all of the Compass stock that had been acquired before the marriage.
The husband acquired additional Compass shares during the marriage:
The Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court should have considered as marital property the Compass stock that was obtained before the marriage ("the non-MIP Compass stock"):
818 So. 2d  at 401. In reversing the trial court's judgment and instructing it to treat all of the Compass stock as marital property when it reconsiders its division of the marital assets, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
818 So. 2d  at 401-02.
In Ex parte Drummond, we described the relevant standard of review:
785 So. 2d  at 360-61.
The dispositive issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding the wife a portion of the non-MIP Compass stock or other assets of comparable value. We hold that the wife has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital assets, including the non-MIP Compass stock.
In claiming that she is entitled to a portion of the non-MIP Compass stock, the wife claims that the trial court did not consider that stock to be an asset of the marriage and, therefore, that it did not consider the stock in its division of marital property. The Court of Civil Appeals agreed that "[i]t appears that the trial court did not consider the non-MIP Compass stock in its division of marital property." 818 So. 2d  at 401. However, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court did not consider that stock when it made its ruling, even though it was not required to do so.
The relevant statute is § 30-2-51(a), Ala.Code 1975. The statute reads:
(Emphasis added.) Although the income produced by the stock acquired by the husband before the marriage was "used regularly for the common benefit of the parties during their marriage," the statute did not require the trial judge to consider the stock in making the property division. Instead, such a determination was left to the discretion of the trial judge, as we discussed in Ex parte Drummond:
785 So. 2d  at 362. Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it held that "the trial court erred in applying the law to the facts" if "the trial court did not consider the non-MIP Compass stock in its division of marital property." 818 So. 2d  at 401.
"`[P]roperty divisions are not required to be equal, but must be equitable in light of the evidence, and the determination as to what is equitable rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Morgan v. Morgan, 686 So. 2d 308, 310 (Ala. Civ.App.1996) (quoting Duckett v. Duckett, *409 669 So. 2d 195, 197 (Ala.Civ.App.1995)). The wife contends that "the award of the trial court, while objectively generous, is inequitable in light of" its failure to award to her a portion of the non-MIP Compass stock. Brief of Respondent, at 21. The Court of Civil Appeals agreed that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding to the wife a portion of the non-MIP Compass stock or other assets of comparable value. However, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. The wife was awarded assets worth at least $2.2 million; $4,500 in monthly alimony; an attorney fee of $145,000; and the payment of her health-insurance premiums for three years. We must remember that "[w]e are authorized to disturb the trial court's decision only if it is unsupported by the evidence and, therefore, is unjust and palpably wrong." Grimsley v. Grimsley, 545 So. 2d 75, 76 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). It is not for an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. We conclude that the trial court did not plainly or palpably abuse its discretion in dividing the parties' property as it did. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as that judgment reversed a portion of the trial court's judgment, and we remand the case to the Court of Civil Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.