Title: Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. COA14-889 
Filed:  2 June 2015 
 
Moore County, No. 11-CVS-927 
 
BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiff, 
 
 
v. 
 
PEACOCK FARM, INC., RODOLPHE T. LYNCH AND WILLARD A. RHODES, 
Defendants. 
 
Appeal by defendant Rodolphe T. Lynch from order entered 5 June 2012 by 
Judge Anderson D. Cromer in Moore County Superior Court.  Heard in the Court of 
Appeals 21 January 2015. 
 
Howard, Stallings, From & Hutson, P.A., by Matthew M. Lawless and John N. 
Hutson, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee. 
 
Van Camp, Meacham & Newman, PLLC, by William M. Van O’Linda, Jr. and 
Michael J. Newman, for defendant-appellant Rodolphe T. Lynch. 
 
 
DAVIS, Judge. 
 
 
 
Defendant Rodolphe T. Lynch (“Lynch”) appeals from the trial court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Branch Banking & Trust Company 
(“BB&T”) in this action seeking to enforce a guaranty agreement.  After careful 
review, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
Factual Background 
Willard A. Rhodes (“Rhodes”) is a developer and the sole owner of Peacock 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Farm, Inc. (“Peacock Farm”).  Lynch operates a business that specializes in farm 
management and field preparation of horse farms.  In spring 2007, Lynch and Rhodes 
began discussing development of a residential horse farm in Southern Pines, North 
Carolina to be called Pelham Farms.  The two men entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding, which provided that Lynch would do the site work for the 
development at cost and receive 50% of the net profits from the development. 
According to Lynch, he understood that Peacock Farm would initially own the 
Pelham Farms property, but that it would ultimately transfer the property to a 
separate partnership between Lynch and Rhodes.  The Memorandum of 
Understanding, however, provided that Peacock Farm would hold title to the land 
and that Lynch’s interest would be limited to receiving 50% of the net profits from 
the sale of the property. 
On 15 May 2007, Peacock Farm and Lynch executed a loan agreement with 
BB&T, which provided that BB&T would loan Peacock Farm $2,250,000.00 and that 
Lynch and Rhodes would each personally guarantee Peacock Farm’s promissory note.  
On the same day, Lynch signed an agreement guaranteeing the loan.  The guaranty 
agreement provided, in part, that Lynch guaranteed the debts of Peacock Farm 
absolutely and unconditionally “at any time, now or hereafter” acquired and that his 
obligation would be a primary rather than a secondary obligation. 
On 9 August 2007, when BB&T made three additional loans to Peacock Farm, 
Lynch signed three corresponding personal guaranty agreements with virtually 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-3- 
identical language.  The loans were also secured by a deed of trust encumbering 
Pelham Farms. 
Sometime in early 2008, Lynch realized that he did not own half of the property 
that made up Pelham Farms and had no control over the development.  He contacted 
a loan officer with BB&T to inform him that it had been Lynch’s understanding that 
he would ultimately have an ownership interest in Pelham Farms.  On 24 April 2009, 
Lynch, through counsel, wrote BB&T a letter conveying this same information.  
Lynch indicated to BB&T that he would not participate in the renewal of the loan or 
execute any other notes.  
On 12 June 2009, an employee of BB&T inadvertently emailed Lynch a 
document prepared by BB&T’s in house counsel entitled “Problem Loan Review for 
Peacock Farm, Inc.”  This document reviewed the file materials concerning the loans 
and addressed possible concerns with the documentation, including concerns 
regarding what benefit Lynch was receiving as consideration for him serving as a 
guarantor, and ultimately recommended that BB&T confirm that proper 
consideration actually existed. 
Peacock Farm defaulted on the BB&T notes, and BB&T filed suit against 
Peacock Farm, Rhodes, and Lynch, seeking to hold them jointly and severally liable.  
Lynch filed a motion to dismiss, an answer, various counterclaims, and cross-claims 
against Rhodes and Peacock Farm seeking indemnity and contribution.  Peacock 
Farm and Rhodes also asserted cross-claims against Lynch for contribution. 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On 27 January 2012, BB&T filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice 
of its claims against Rhodes and Peacock Farm.  On 23 February 2012, BB&T moved 
for summary judgment with respect to its claims against Lynch and Lynch’s 
counterclaims against BB&T. 
Lynch moved to amend his answer on 30 May 2012 to add the defense of 
release.  Lynch alleged in the motion that BB&T had settled its claims with Peacock 
Farm and Rhodes and released their obligations under the notes and guaranty 
agreements.  Lynch contended that “BB&T’s release of Defendants [sic] Peacock 
Farm, Inc. operates as a discharge of Defendant’s [sic] Lynch’s obligations under his 
guaranty . . . .” 
The trial court entered an order on 5 June 2012 (1) granting Lynch’s motion to 
amend his answer; and (2) granting BB&T’s motion for summary judgment.  The 
order entered judgment in favor of BB&T and against Lynch in the amount of 
$3,749,255.85.  Lynch filed a notice of appeal and moved for a stay pending appeal.  
On 12 July 2012, the trial court granted Lynch’s motion for a stay on the condition 
that Lynch post an appeal bond in the amount of $25,000.00.  BB&T filed a notice of 
cross-appeal from the order granting the stay. 
 
On 6 August 2013, this Court issued an opinion dismissing Lynch’s appeal on 
the grounds that (1) it was interlocutory due to the fact that cross-claims between 
Lynch, Peacock Farm, and Rhodes were still pending; and (2) Lynch had failed to 
show that the 5 June 2012 order affected a substantial right.  Branch Banking & 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-5- 
Trust Co. v. Peacock Farm, Inc., __ N.C. App. __, 749 S.E.2d 111 (2013) 
(unpublished).1 
 
Over eight months later, Lynch obtained an order from the trial court on 16 
April 2014 purporting to certify its 5 June 2012 judgment in favor of BB&T for 
immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure.2  On 8 May 2014, Lynch filed a new notice of appeal seeking once again to 
appeal the trial court’s 5 June 2012 order. 
Analysis 
It is undisputed by the parties that the current appeal remains interlocutory 
given that the cross-claims between Lynch, Peacock Farms, and Rhodes remain 
unresolved.  Generally, there is no right of immediate appeal from an interlocutory 
order.  Paradigm Consultants, Ltd. v. Builders Mut. Ins. Co., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 
S.E.2d 69, 72 (2013). 
However, there are two avenues by which a party 
may immediately appeal an interlocutory order or 
judgment.  First, if the order or judgment is final as to some 
but not all of the claims or parties, and the trial court 
certifies the case for appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
1A–1, Rule 54(b), an immediate appeal will lie.  Second, an 
appeal is permitted under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1–277(a) and 
7A–27(d)(1) if the trial court’s decision deprives the 
appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent 
immediate review. 
                                            
1 This Court also dismissed BB&T’s cross-appeal.  Branch Banking & Trust Co., __ N.C. App. 
__, 749 S.E.2d 111, slip op. at 10-11. 
 
2 In its 16 April 2014 order, the trial court also lifted the stay it had previously entered, thereby 
allowing BB&T to proceed with execution on its judgment within 30 days. 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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N.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. Page, 119 N.C. App. 730, 734, 460 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1995) 
(internal citations omitted). 
In dismissing Lynch’s initial appeal,  we held that 
the [5 June 2012] summary judgment order contained no 
Rule 54(b) certification. . . . Lynch was, therefore, required 
to set forth sufficient facts and argument to show that the 
order affected a substantial right.  However, . . . Lynch’s 
statement of grounds for appellate review asserted in its 
entirety: 
 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A–27(b) as the 5 June 2012 
Judgment is a final judgment in favor of 
BB&T and against Defendant Lynch on his 
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. 
 
Thus, . . . Lynch’s brief implicitly acknowledged that 
the summary judgment order resolved only the claims 
pending between BB&T and . . . Lynch and not the other 
claims pending among the co-defendants.  Nonetheless, the 
brief does not argue and makes no showing that this order 
would affect a substantial right in the absence of an 
immediate appeal. 
 
Branch Banking & Trust Co., __ N.C. App. __, 749 S.E.2d 111, slip op. at 8 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 
After our dismissal of the appeal, over eight months passed before Lynch 
obtained the 16 April 2014 order from the trial court, which stated, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
[T]his Court finds that a money judgment in the amount of 
Three Million Seven Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty-Five Dollars and Eighty-Five Cents 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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($3,749,255.85) affects a substantial right under North 
Carolina law.  Wachovia Realty Inv. Housing, Inc., 292 NC 
93, 99 (N.C. 1977).  Further, the only remaining claims in 
this case are cross-claims between the Defendants Lynch 
and Rhodes for contribution or indemnity.  However, these 
cross-claims cannot be finally resolved until there is a 
determination of (a) the validity of BB&T’s judgment 
against Mr. Lynch, and (b) the amount BB&T is actually 
able to recover from Mr. Lynch.  Thus, pursuant to Rule 
54(b) this Court finds, in its discretion, that there is no just 
reason for the Defendant Lynch to delay appealing BB&T’s 
judgment herein. 
 
The 16 April 2014 order was not an amended judgment regarding BB&T’s 
claim against Lynch.  It did not set out the substantive basis for ruling that the 
granting of BB&T’s motion was proper under Rule 56.  Instead, it served as a “stand-
alone” order, simply making reference to its prior judgment in favor of BB&T and 
stating its belief that “in its discretion” an immediate appeal as to that judgment was 
appropriate. 
Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent 
part, that “[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether 
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim . . . the court may enter a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only if there is 
no just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment.  Such judgment shall 
then be subject to review by appeal or as otherwise provided by these rules or other 
statutes.”  N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added).  However, “the trial court’s 
determination that there is no just reason to delay the appeal, while accorded great 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-8- 
deference, cannot bind the appellate courts because ruling on the interlocutory nature 
of appeals is properly a matter for the appellate division, not the trial court.”  First 
Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 247, 507 S.E.2d 56, 60 
(1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. Am. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 491, 251 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1979) (affirming dismissal of 
interlocutory appeal where trial court’s use of certification language under Rule 54(b) 
was insufficient to establish appellate jurisdiction; “That the trial court declared it to 
be a final . . . judgment does not make it so.”). 
We conclude here that the trial court’s 16 April 2014 order fails to confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court to review the trial court’s 5 June 2012 order.  Had Lynch 
desired to take a proper appeal of the trial court’s 5 June 2012 interlocutory order, he 
had two options.  First, he could have noticed an appeal and then demonstrated in 
his appellate brief how the trial court’s order deprived him of a substantial right.  
Instead, while he did notice an appeal within 30 days of the 5 June 2012 order, he 
failed to even argue — much less make a valid showing — in his brief that he would 
be deprived of a substantial right absent an immediate appeal.  As a result, his appeal 
was dismissed by this Court.3  Lynch has failed to cite any caselaw suggesting that 
litigants are entitled to multiple “bites at the apple” to establish the existence of 
                                            
3 In the event Lynch believed that this Court erred in dismissing his initial appeal, he could 
have filed a petition for discretionary review with our Supreme Court.  However, he failed to do so. 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-9- 
appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal based on the “substantial right” 
doctrine. 
Alternatively, he could have obtained from the trial court the inclusion of 
appropriate language in the 5 June 2012 order itself certifying the case for immediate 
review pursuant to Rule 54(b) on the ground that there was no just reason to delay 
the appeal.  See Brown v. Brown, 77 N.C. App. 206, 208, 334 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1985) 
(“Rule 54(b) expressly requires that this determination be stated in the judgment 
itself.” (emphasis added)), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 389, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1986); 
see also Tridyn Indus., 296 N.C. at 490, 251 S.E.2d at 447 (holding that “Rule 54(b) 
permits the trial judge by determining in such a judgment that ‘there is no just reason 
for delay’ to release it for immediate appeal before the litigation is complete as to all 
claims or all parties.” (emphasis added)).  However, Lynch either did not seek the 
inclusion of such certification language in the order or was unsuccessful in 
persuading the trial court to add such language.  In any event, the 5 June 2012 order 
did not contain a Rule 54(b) certification. 
While, as explained above, Lynch ultimately obtained a separate order from 
the trial court on 16 April 2014 purporting to certify for immediate appeal the 5 June 
2012 order it had issued almost two full years earlier, the 16 April 2014 order is not 
the order from which Lynch seeks to appeal.  Neither Rule 54(b) itself nor the cases 
interpreting it authorize such a retroactive attempt to certify a prior order for 
immediate appeal in this fashion.  Therefore, because Rule 54(b) cannot be used to 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-10- 
create appellate jurisdiction based on certification language that is not contained in 
the body of the judgment itself from which appeal is being sought, dismissal of 
Lynch’s appeal is, once again, appropriate. 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the dissent neither cites any North Carolina 
caselaw supporting its interpretation of Rule 54(b) nor acknowledges the express 
language contained in the rule itself that certification language must be included “in 
the judgment.”  Notably, while the dissent cites our decision in Newcomb v. Cty. of 
Carteret, 207 N.C. App 527, 701 S.E.2d 325 (2010), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 212, 
710 S.E.2d 26 (2011), this Court held in Newcomb that it lacked appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) where — as here — the trial court’s attempt to retroactively 
certify its prior order failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court did not certify the issue of Carteret 
County’s right to control permanent structures in 
Marshallberg Harbor for immediate review in its initial 
summary judgment order.  However, in its amended 
summary judgment order, the trial court attempted to add 
a certification relating to this issue in apparent reliance on 
its authority to correct clerical errors under N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 1A–1, Rule 60(a).  A careful review of the relevant 
authorities establishes that the trial court lacked the 
authority to amend its summary judgment order in this 
fashion. 
 
Id. at 543, 701 S.E.2d at 337. 
This Court concluded that “the trial court lacked the authority to amend the 
original summary judgment order for the purpose of certifying additional issues for 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b).”  Id. at 545, 701 S.E.2d at 3384; see also 
Pratt v. Staton, 147 N.C. App. 771, 774-75, 556 S.E.2d 621, 624 (2001) (“[B]y adding 
the trial court’s Rule 54(b) certification and establishing grounds for immediate 
appellate review of an otherwise interlocutory order, the trial court’s 10 October 2000 
amended order . . . altered the substantive rights of the parties. . . . [T]he amended 
order in the instant case allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the established procedural 
rules governing the bringing of an appeal and secure appellate review of an otherwise 
unappealable order [pursuant to Rule 54(b)].” (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
Nor do we agree with the dissent’s alternative suggestion that we treat Lynch’s 
appeal as a petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, thereby granting a petition that Lynch did not actually file.  
“[O]ur courts have frequently observed that a writ of certiorari is an extraordinary 
remedial writ.”  N.C. Cent. Univ. v. Taylor, 122 N.C. App. 609, 612, 471 S.E.2d 115, 
117 (1996), aff’d per curiam, 345 N.C. 630, 481 S.E.2d 83 (1997). 
In our view, Lynch’s appeal fails to present a compelling basis for such 
extraordinary relief here.  Lynch has now failed on two separate occasions to properly 
bring an interlocutory appeal that complies with the rules governing the 
                                            
4 While the Newcomb court deemed it appropriate to treat the record and briefs as a petition 
for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and to grant the “petition” sua sponte, see Newcomb, 207 N.C. 
App. at 545, 701 S.E.2d at 338-39, we decline to do so here for the reasons set out below. 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-12- 
appealability of such orders.  See generally Tridyn Indus., 296 N.C. at 494, 251 S.E.2d 
at 449 (declining to exercise certiorari powers under Appellate Rule 21 where appeal 
was properly dismissed as interlocutory despite trial court’s inclusion of language 
purporting to certify it for immediate appeal). 
Indeed, it is appropriate to note that this case involves a straightforward 
commercial dispute that is unremarkable either factually or legally.  Neither the 
dissent nor the trial court’s 16 April 2014 order explain precisely why the pending 
cross-claims cannot be resolved in the trial court absent immediate appellate review 
of the 5 June 2012 order.  Lynch has failed to cite any North Carolina case for the 
proposition that cross-claims between a debtor and a guarantor are unable to be 
litigated until there has been final appellate review of a judgment in favor of the 
creditor on the guarantor’s liability for the underlying debt.  Moreover, the eight-
month delay between the dismissal of Lynch’s first appeal and the 16 April 2014 order 
— a delay the dissent ignores — belies the notion that there is an urgent need for 
immediate appellate review over the trial court’s 5 June 2012 order.  As such, we do 
not discern any basis for excusing Lynch from compliance with the same rules which 
every other appellant in this Court is bound to follow. 
Rather than deciding on an ad hoc basis whether or not an appellant should 
be held to strict compliance with the laws governing appellate jurisdiction over 
interlocutory appeals, we believe instead that consistent enforcement of the existing 
jurisdictional rules is more in keeping with the goal of North Carolina’s appellate 
BRANCH BANKING & TRUST CO. V. PEACOCK FARM, INC. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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courts to ensure the uniform application of the laws to all similarly situated litigants.  
As our Supreme Court has long held, “[w]hen litigants resort to the judiciary for the 
settlement of their disputes, they . . . should not forget that rules of procedure are 
necessary, and must be observed . . . .”  Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C. 788, 790, 156 S.E. 
126, 127 (1930). 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, Lynch’s appeal is dismissed. 
DISMISSED. 
Judge ELMORE concurs. 
Judge TYSON dissents in a separate opinion. 
No. COA14-889 – Branch Banking and Trust Company v. Peacock Farms, Inc. 
 
 
TYSON, Judge, dissenting. 
As the majority’s opinion notes, this is the second time this case has been 
brought before this Court. In the previous appeal, this Court did not address the 
merits due to the following grounds: (1) the 5 June 2012 order from which he appealed 
was interlocutory and did not contain the trial court’s Rule 54(b) certification; and, 
(2) Lynch failed to  argue or show the 5 June 2012 order affected a substantial right. 
Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Peacock Farms, Inc., __ N.C. App. __, 749 S.E.2d 111 
(2013) (unpublished).  
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding to dismiss Lynch’s appeal for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction.  I vote to address the merits pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  In the alternative, I vote to treat this 
notice of appeal and briefs as a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari pursuant 
to N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (2013) and to grant that petition for judicial economy. 
The trial court’s 16 April 2014 order stated the “cross-claims between the 
Defendants Lynch and Rhodes for contribution or indemnity . . . cannot be finally 
resolved until there is a determination of . . . the validity of BB&T’s judgment against 
Mr. Lynch.”  Upon review of the merits of Lynch’s appeal, the trial court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of BB&T should be affirmed. 
I. Interlocutory Appeal 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Our Supreme Court has stated: 
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
2 
Generally, a party cannot appeal from an interlocutory 
order unless failure to grant immediate review would affect 
a substantial right pursuant to N.C.G.S. sections 1-277 and 
7A-27(d). 
 
 
A party may appeal an interlocutory order under two 
circumstances.  First, the trial court may certify that there 
is no just reason to delay the appeal after it enters a final 
judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties in an 
action.  Second, a party may appeal an interlocutory order 
that affects some substantial right claimed by the 
appellant and will work injury to him if not correct before 
an appeal from the final judgment. 
 
Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 524-25, 631 S.E.2d 114, 119 (2006) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
B. Analysis 
 
The majority’s opinion holds “[n]either Rule 54(b) itself nor the cases 
interpreting it authorize such a retroactive attempt to certify a prior order for 
immediate appeal.”  I disagree. 
 
Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure enables review of 
interlocutory orders and judgments “when the trial court enters a final judgment as 
to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties and certifies there is no just 
reason for delay.” Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 161, 522 S.E.2d 577, 578 (1999) 
(citation omitted).  The final sentence of Rule 54(b) further provides “in the absence 
of entry of such a final judgment, any order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
3 
rights and liabilities of all the parties.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2013) 
(emphasis supplied).  Our Supreme Court held “[c]ertification under Rule 54(b) 
permits an interlocutory appeal from orders that are final as to specific portion of the 
case, but which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 
N.C. 544, 545, 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013). 
The majority’s opinion notes this Court dismissed Lynch’s prior appeal because 
the trial court’s summary judgment order did not contain a Rule 54(b) certification, 
nor did Lynch argue this order affected a substantial right which would be lost 
without immediate review. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Peacock Farms, Inc., __ 
N.C. App. __, 749 S.E.2d 111 (2013) (unpublished).  
 
After dismissal of the prior appeal, the trial court entered an order, which lifted 
the stay on enforcement of its 5 June 2012 judgment and granted Lynch’s motion to 
certify BB&T’s judgment as immediately appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b) on 16 
April 2014.  The trial court’s order states  
the only remaining claims in this case are cross-claims 
between 
the 
Defendants 
Lynch 
and 
Rhodes 
for 
contribution or indemnity.  However, these cross-claims 
cannot be finally resolved until there is a determination of 
(a) the validity of BB&T’s judgment against Mr. Lynch, and 
(b) the amount BB&T is actually able to recover from Mr. 
Lynch.  Thus, pursuant to Rule 54(b) this Court finds, in its 
discretion, that there is no just reason for the Defendant 
Lynch to delay appealing BB&T’s judgment herein. 
 
(emphasis supplied). 
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
4 
 
Based on the last sentence of Rule 54(b), and the absence of any case law to the 
contrary, the trial court properly certified its 5 June 2012 order as immediately 
appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b).  This Court has jurisdiction to address the merits 
of Lynch’s appeal.  
 
The parties at bar have been entangled in litigation since March 2011.  Unless 
and until this Court reaches the merits of this appeal, the parties cannot move 
forward or obtain any final resolution on their respective claims.   
 
Under judicial economy, this Court should resolve this issue on the merits.  Our 
decision will not only expedite the ultimate resolution of this case and, as the trial 
court stated in its order, doing so is essential for the parties to reach any finality in 
the case. Wilkins v. Safran, 185 N.C. App. 668, 671, 649 S.E.2d 658, 661 (2007) 
(electing to review interlocutory appeal “because there is no just reason for delay and 
our review will avoid both piece-meal litigation and the risk of inconsistent verdicts”).   
 
In addition, and in the alternative, I would treat Lynch’s notice of appeal and 
brief as a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari directed toward the issue of 
the validity of BB&T’s judgment against him pursuant to Rule 21(a)(1) and grant the 
petition. N.C.R. App. P. 21(a); see Newcomb v. Cty. of Carteret, 207 N.C. App. 527, 
545, 701 S.E.2d 325, 339 (2010) (electing to treat the record and briefs as a petition 
for the issuance of a writ of certiorari where consideration of the issue on the merits 
would expedite the ultimate disposition of case).   
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
5 
II. Summary Judgment in Favor of BB&T 
A. Issues 
Lynch argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of 
BB&T.  He asserts genuine issues of material facts exist concerning whether (1) the 
parties involved mistakenly believed Lynch was a 50/50 owner and partner in 
Peacock Farms; and (2) BB&T’s release from further liability of defendants Rhodes 
and Peacock Farms also released Lynch from his absolute guaranty.   
B. Standard of Review 
 
Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. 
Of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 211, 580 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2003) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted), aff’d per curiam, 358 N.C. 131, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004).   
 
A party moving for summary judgment may prevail by “(1) proving that an 
essential element of the [nonmoving party’s] case is nonexistent, or (2) showing 
through discovery that the [nonmoving party] cannot produce evidence to support an 
essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the [nonmoving party] 
cannot surmount an affirmative defense.” James v. Clark, 118 N.C. App. 178, 181, 
454 S.E.2d 826, 828, disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 187 (1995). 
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
6 
“In a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented to the trial court 
must be . . . viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Howerton v. 
Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 467, 597 S.E.2d 674, 692 (2004) (citation omitted).   
 
“Once the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating 
specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima 
facie case at trial.” Draughon, 158 N.C. App. at 212, 580 S.E.2d at 735 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment 
de novo. In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008). 
C. Guaranty 
A Guaranty of payment is an absolute promise by the 
guarantor to pay the debt at maturity if it is not paid by 
the principal debtor.  The obligation of the guarantor is 
separate and independent of the obligation of the principal 
debtor, and the creditor’s cause of action against the 
guarantor ripens immediately upon failure of the principal 
debtor to pay the debt at maturity. 
 
EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 145, 187 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1972) (citation 
omitted).  
 
Lynch argues BB&T should be estopped from enforcing the guaranties because 
they were obtained without consideration.  This argument misstates the well-settled 
law in North Carolina and does not present a genuine issue of material fact.   
 
This Court held “in a guaranty contract, a consideration moving directly to the 
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
7 
guarantor is not necessary.  The promise is enforceable if a benefit to the principal 
debtor is shown or if a detriment or inconvenience to the promisee is disclosed.” 
Investment Properties of Asheville, Inc. v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 196, 188 S.E.2d 342, 
345 (1972) (citation omitted).   
 
The evidence Lynch proffered tends to  show: (1) BB&T had a long-standing 
prior relationship with Rhodes and Peacock Farms; (2) BB&T loaned more than 100% 
of the appraised value of the project; (3) Lynch and Rhodes signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding, in which the parties allegedly agreed to a 50/50 share of net profits; 
(4) BB&T settled with and released Peacock Farms and Rhodes for $100,000.00; (5) 
Lynch was not a party to the settlement and release; and, (6) the property was 
conveyed by a quit-claim deed to a third party, purportedly leaving Lynch with no 
recourse on the original collateral. 
 
The arguments raised by Lynch are issues between Lynch and Rhodes, not 
Lynch and BB&T.  No genuine issue of material fact exists between Lynch and BB&T 
on his liability under the guarantees.  Lynch was unable to proffer any evidence to 
show BB&T was mistaken about whether Lynch had any ownership interest in 
Peacock Farms.   
 
The record also shows no proffer of evidence that BB&T extended the payment 
terms or issued any additional credit to Peacock Farms after Lynch gave notice to 
BB&T he would not participate in and guarantee further extensions of credit.  The 
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
8 
trial court properly granted summary judgment to BB&T.    
 
This record evidence suggests Lynch may have entered into an unfavorable 
business arrangement with Peacock Farms and Rhodes.  The evidence does not, 
however, raise genuine issues of material facts of whether BB&T had the right to 
enforce Lynch’s guaranties, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Lynch. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 26-3.1 provides where a guarantor pays the debt of his 
principal, the guarantor has a right to “either sue his principal for reimbursement or 
sue his principal on the instrument and may maintain any action or avail himself of 
any remedy which the creditor himself might have had against the principal debtor.” 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 26-3.1 (2013).  
 
Lynch’s loan agreements and his guaranty agreements with BB&T expressly 
incorporated the terms of Peacock Farms’ promissory notes.  Lynch agreed BB&T 
“shall have the unlimited right to release any person who might be liable hereon, and 
such release shall not affect or discharge the liability of any other person who is or 
might be liable hereon.” 
The remaining issues left for resolution concern Lynch’s rights of indemnity 
and contribution from Peacock Farms and Rhodes.  The trial court properly granted 
summary judgment on BB&T’s action to enforce Lynch’s guaranties.   
Conclusion 
 
This Court has jurisdiction to address the merits of Lynch’s interlocutory 
BB&T V. PEACOCK FARMS, INC. 
 
TYSON, J., Dissenting 
 
 
9 
appeal.  The trial court certified its 5 June 2012 order for immediate appeal under 
Rule 54(b). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2013).  The trial court also stated the 
case could not proceed further until Lynch’s liability to BB&T was resolved.  
Alternatively, this Court should treat the notice of appeal and briefs as a petition for 
writ of certiorari, and grant that petition to address the merits. Newcomb, 207 N.C. 
App. at 545, 701 S.E.2d at 339.  
 
Lynch did not proffer any evidence BB&T mistakenly believed he had an 
ownership interest in Peacock, or that BB&T extended any additional credit to 
Peacock Farms after Lynch notified BB&T he would not participate in further 
extensions of credit.   
 
The trial court correctly found no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of BB&T.  The uncontroverted evidence 
showed BB&T did not release Lynch when it settled and released defendants Rhodes 
and Peacock Farms.  I vote to affirm the decision of the trial court, which granted 
summary judgment to BB&T.  I respectfully dissent.