Title: State v. Camolli

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-224


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Thomas Camolli                               Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

                                             September Term, 1990


Robert Grussing III, J.

Gary S. Kessler, Supervising Appellate Prosecutor, and Pamela Hall Johnson,
Appellate Prosecutor (On the Brief), Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

Hertz and Wesley, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.   The State of Vermont appeals, pursuant to 23 V.S.A. {
1205(i), from a district court decision dismissing the State's civil-
license-suspension proceeding against Thomas A. Camolli.  We reverse.
                                    I.
     The relevant facts are as follows.  On January 21, 1990, defendant was
stopped by a state trooper and processed for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.  A breath sample was collected by means of
a gas chromatography (crimper) testing device.  Analysis of the sample on
February 15, 1990 by the Department of Health revealed a blood-alcohol
content of 0.15 percent.  The trooper received the lab report on February
28, 1990, and completed the affidavit required by { 1205(a) that same day.
The next day he mailed defendant a notice of intention to suspend driver's
license.
     Defendant timely requested a hearing before the district court.  At
the hearing, defendant orally moved to dismiss the proceeding.  The court
granted the motion, holding that { 1205 was intended to be used only with
infrared testing equipment and not with a crimper device, and that the State
had not complied with { 1205(b)'s requirement that notice of intent to
suspend be mailed immediately.  On appeal, the State contends that the
district court erred on both grounds.  Defendant has moved to dismiss the
appeal on grounds that the State is not allowed to appeal from the district
court's decision.
                                    II.
     We turn first to defendant's threshold argument, that 23 V.S.A. {
1205(i) does not authorize the State's appeal.  Section 1205(i) provides
that "[a] decision of the district court under this section may be appealed
as a matter of right to the supreme court.  The suspension shall not be
stayed pending appeal unless the defendant is reasonably likely to prevail
on appeal."  Defendant asserts that the State may not appeal because (1) the
trial court's decision was not a decision "under this section," and (2) any
right of appeal under { 1205(i) is limited, by implication, to a motor
vehicle operator.
     With respect to his first point, defendant contends that the right of
appeal found in { 1205(i) is limited to the issues delineated in { 1205(f) (FN1)
and that the trial court never reached the merits of those issues.  Section
1205(i) does not, however, limit the right of appeal to the issues set forth
in subsection (f).  Instead, it grants a right of appeal from any decision
made "under this section."  As defendant concedes, the word "section"
ordinarily refers to the entire section, not just one of its subsections.
The hearing held by the district court was convened pursuant to { 1205.  The
fact that the decision was based on what the court considered to be juris-
dictional and procedural irregularities did not take the proceeding out
from under the section.  The statute's meaning is plain on its face; the
term "section" encompasses all of { 1205, and the district court's decision
was therefore one made "under" { 1205.
     Nor are we convinced by defendant's argument that the reference in the
second sentence of subsection (i) to "[t]he suspension" necessarily implies
that the Legislature intended to afford only the defendant the right to
appeal an adverse decision.  Instead, we think that the two sentences may be
read independently.  The first sentence authorizes an appeal from any
adverse decision made by the district court under { 1205.  The second
sentence addresses the distinct issue of obtaining a stay in the event the
defendant loses before the district court and is reasonably likely to pre-
vail on appeal.  Defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal is accordingly
denied.
                                   III.
                                    A.
     The State's first argument on the merits is that the district court
erroneously decided that { 1205's summary suspension procedure is not
available when the crimper device is used.  Defendant counters that the
express terms of { 1205 support the district court's conclusion.
     Section 1205(a) does not distinguish between types of tests.  Rather,
the statute speaks generally in terms of "a test."  23 V.S.A. { 1205(a)
(emphasis added). (FN2) While { 1200(3) defines "evidentiary test" to include
both breath and blood tests, (FN3) the statute does not define the word "test."
"Words used in a statute which have not been specifically defined in that
statute are to be given their plain and commonly accepted meaning."  Vincent
v. Vermont State Retirement Bd., 148 Vt. 531, 535-36,