Title: Roe v. Replogle

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOHN ROE I, 
 
 
 
   ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ) 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
   ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
   ) 
No.  SC92978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ) 
COLONEL RON REPLOGLE, et al., 
   ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ) 
 
 
 
Respondents.  
   ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Peggy Stevens McGraw, Judge 
 
Opinion issued October 1, 2013 
 
 
John Roe petitioned the Jackson County circuit court for declaratory and 
injunctive relief from a requirement that he register as a sex offender under the federal 
sex offender registration act (“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. section 16901 to 16929.  After 
discovery, the law enforcement officials against whom Mr. Roe filed suit moved for 
summary judgment.  The circuit court granted the motion and entered judgment for the 
law enforcement officials.  Mr. Roe appeals from the circuit court’s entry of summary 
judgment, claiming the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) 
SORNA’s delegation of authority to the federal Attorney General violates the 
nondelegation doctrine, (2) SORNA violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws, 
(3) SORNA does not require Missouri to register a sex offender who has completed his 
involvement in the criminal justice system, (4) SORNA contemplates yielding to state 
constitutional law, (5) there was no basis to prosecute him for failure to register as he 
had not traveled in interstate commerce, and (6) SORNA violates his substantive due 
process rights.  Because several of Mr. Roe’s claims challenge the validity of a statute 
of the United States, this Court has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.   
This Court finds that SORNA does not violate the nondelegation clause, the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws, or Mr. Roe’s substantive due process rights.  It 
further finds that SORNA requires Mr. Roe to register, notwithstanding the fact that he 
completed his involvement in the criminal justice system before it was enacted, and 
that SORNA’s registration requirement does not violate the Missouri Constitution’s 
ban on retrospective laws.  Finally, the Court holds that the issue of whether there is a 
basis for prosecuting Mr. Roe is irrelevant in an action for a declaratory judgment in 
which he is requesting a ruling that he is not required to register.  Accordingly, this 
Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
In 1994, Mr. Roe was accused of inappropriately touching his stepdaughter, and 
he pleaded guilty to sodomy.  He completed sexual abuse counseling and obeyed court 
orders regarding contact with his stepdaughter and supervised probation.  After 
Missouri’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), section 589.400 et seq.,1 became 
effective on January 1, 1995, Mr. Roe registered as a sex offender.  He ceased to 
                                             
 
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2012, unless otherwise indicated. 
register in 2006 after this Court held that offenders who were convicted prior to 
SORA’s effective date need not register.  Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 852 (Mo. 
banc 2006).  Congress passed SORNA later in 2006, and in 2009, this Court ruled that 
SORNA created an obligation to register independent of SORA’s application.  Doe v. 
Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Mo. banc 2009). 
Before Mr. Roe registered under SORNA, a Cole County circuit court held that 
SORNA’s registration requirement was triggered only by a conviction.  Doe v. 
Keathley, Judg. No. 06-AC-CC01088.  Because Mr. Roe’s guilty plea did not result in 
a judgment of conviction under Missouri law,2 he filed a petition in Jackson County 
circuit court against law enforcement officials for declaratory relief requesting that he 
not be required to register.  See Swallow v. State, 398 S.W.3d 1, 5 n.4 (Mo. banc 
2013).  However, while his petition was pending, the court of appeals reversed the 
Cole County circuit court and held that federal law, rather than state law, controls the 
question of whether a guilty plea constitutes a conviction under SORNA.  Doe v. 
Keathley, 344 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Mo. App. 2011).  Because Mr. Roe’s guilty plea is 
considered a conviction under federal law, see id. at 765-66, he again was required to 
register.  Mr. Roe amended his petition to challenge SORNA’s constitutional validity 
as applied to him.  The law enforcement officials moved for summary judgment, and 
the circuit court granted the motion. 
                                             
 
2 Mr. Roe received a suspended imposition of sentence, which is not considered a 
“conviction” under Missouri law.  See Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 
195 (Mo. banc 1993). 
 
3
Mr. Roe appeals.  He claims that the circuit court erred in entering summary 
judgment because (1) Congress impermissibly delegated its authority to the federal 
Attorney General to implement SORNA, (2) applying SORNA to Mr. Roe violates the 
federal constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto criminal laws, (3) SORNA does 
not require states to register offenders who, like Mr. Roe, have completed their 
involvement with the criminal justice system, (4) SORNA contemplates yielding to 
state constitutions when it may violate a provision of a state constitution, (5) neither 
SORA nor SORNA provides a jurisdictional basis for prosecuting Mr. Roe for failing 
to register, and (6) registering would violate Mr. Roe’s right to substantive due 
process. 
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews the constitutional validity of a statute de novo.  Doe v. 
Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165, 166 (Mo. banc 2012).  A statute is presumed valid and will 
not be held unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision, 
and this Court resolves all doubt in favor of the statute’s validity.  Id. 
 
Likewise, this Court reviews summary judgment de novo.  Roberts v. BJC 
Health System, 391 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Mo. banc 2013).  The record is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.  Id.  
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party has demonstrated, on 
the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Id. 
 
4
SORNA Does Not Violate Nondelegation Doctrine 
Mr. Roe claims that SORNA unconstitutionally violates the separation of 
powers by impermissibly granting the federal Attorney General power to determine 
SORNA’s retroactivity.  The provision at issue provides: 
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability 
of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before 
the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular 
jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex 
offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to 
comply with subsection (b) of this section.   
 
42 U.S.C. Section 16913(d). 
 
The constitution grants Congress exclusive federal lawmaking authority.  U.S. 
Const. art. I, sec. 8.  “Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to 
others the legislative functions with which it is vested.”  Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).  This “nondelegation doctrine” is “rooted in the principle of 
separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of government.”  Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).  The doctrine has been recognized expressly 
as early as 1892, when the United States Supreme Court described the principle “[t]hat 
[C]ongress cannot delegate legislative power to the president” as “vital to the integrity 
and maintenance of the system of the government ordained by the constitution.”  
Marshal Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S.649, 692 (1892).  The Supreme Court later 
clarified that, under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may delegate legislative 
power so long as it provides an “intelligible principle to which the person or body 
 
5
authorized to [exercise that authority] is directed to conform.”  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).  
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court used the nondelegation doctrine to 
invalidate statutes in two cases because the delegation lacked an intelligible principle.  
See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  In one case, the Supreme Court found that 
Congress failed to provide any guidance for the exercise of discretion, while in the 
other it found that Congress granted authority to regulate an entire economy based on 
the vague standard of “fair competition.”  See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 430 
(“Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no 
rule.”); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 541-42 (“In view of the scope of 
that broad declaration and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the 
discretion . . . is virtually unfettered.”).     
 
After those decisions, the Supreme Court expounded on the “intelligible 
principle” test.  A delegation meets the “intelligible principle” test if it clearly 
delineates the general policy, the public agency that is to apply it, and the boundaries 
of the delegated authority.  Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S. 
90, 105 (1946).  Using this test, the Supreme Court consistently has held that broad 
declarations of policy are sufficient to avoid nondelegation issues, acknowledging that 
“Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives.”  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371; see, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United 
 
6
States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (upholding a delegation to regulate radio 
communication for the “public interest, convenience, or necessity”); Lichter v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (upholding delegation of authority to determine 
excessive profits).  Since handing down Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schecter 
Poultry Corp. in 1935, the Supreme Court has not struck down any other statute as 
violating the nondelegation clause. 
 
Mr. Roe claims that Congress articulated no intelligible principle whatsoever 
when it delegated to the Attorney General the question of SORNA’s applicability to 
offenders convicted before the act became effective.  He points specifically to the lack 
of any limitations in section 16913(d).  While the provision delegating the Attorney 
General authority does not itself contain limitations, several federal courts have found 
SORNA, when taken as a whole, satisfies the intelligible principle test. 
In particular, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth and 
Sixth circuits have held that “SORNA includes specific provisions delineating what 
crimes require registration; where, when, and how an offender must register; what 
information is required of registrants; and the elements and penalties for the federal 
crime of failure to register.”  United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations omitted).  Though SORNA gives the Attorney General authority to 
determine the act’s application to pre-act offenders, it grants only the “highly 
circumscribed” authority to apply certain means to certain individuals as specified by 
the act.  Id.  See also United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012) 
 
7
(SORNA contains particular delegations of authority that are well within the limits of 
nondelegation precedents); United States v. Burns, 418 Fed. Appx. 209, 211-12 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (describing the Attorney General’s authority as substantially bound by 
SORNA’s requirements and elements in the failure-to-register statute). 
Additionally, the First, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh circuits of the Courts of 
Appeals have held that the act’s general statement of purpose, “to ‘establish[ ] a 
comprehensive national system’ of sex offender registration to ‘protect the public from 
sex offenders and offenders against children,’” is sufficient to satisfy the 
nondelegation doctrine.  United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. section 16901); see also United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 920 
(8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2009) (SORNA’s express statement of 
Congress’ purpose is a sufficient intelligible principle).  The Seventh Circuit also has 
found expressly SORNA does not violate the separation of powers principle but 
provided little insight into its reasoning.  United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 
(7th Cir. 2008) abrogated on other grounds by Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 
(2010), (“It is commonplace and constitutional for Congress to delegate to executive 
agencies the fleshing out of criminal statutes by means of regulations.”).  To date, no 
federal court has sustained a nondelegation challenge to SORNA’s constitutional 
validity. 
 
8
 
Mr. Roe argues that these decisions are not persuasive because they do not 
address specifically how the Attorney General should treat pre-act offenders.  In 
Reynolds v. United States, however, the Supreme Court noted that SORNA provides 
that the “Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the 
requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this 
chapter.”  132 S.Ct. 975, 981 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. section 16913).  According to 
the Supreme Court, that statement gives the Attorney General authority to specify the 
act’s applicability to prior offenders, resolving the issue of whether SORNA, by its 
implementation and without any action by the Attorney General, applies to prior 
offenders.  Id. at 981.   In reaching its holding that SORNA does, in fact, delegate 
authority to the Attorney General, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress 
intended the delegation to resolve practical problems arising when the act attempted to 
integrate diverse state registration systems.  Id. at 981.  It also noted that the delegation 
could have been intended to provide a single, clear authority for pre-act offenders to 
consult when seeking to determine what the act required of them.  Id. at 982.  While 
the Supreme Court declined to address the nondelegation claim made in Reynolds, it 
concluded that “Congress [has] filled potential lacunae (created by related Act 
provisions) in a manner consistent with basic background principles of criminal law.”  
Id at 982. 
 
Guided by the Supreme Court’s statements in Reynolds, this Court determines 
that the act includes an intelligible principle to guide the Attorney General’s 
 
9
application of the act to pre-act offenders.  SORNA states a general policy of creating 
a national registry to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against 
children.  See Whaley, 577 F.3d at 264-65; see also Reynolds, 132 S.Ct. at 981-2 
(describing the various practical considerations that may have prompted Congress to 
seek the Attorney General’s assistance).  SORNA also specifies the public agency to 
which limited authority is delegated.  42 U.S.C. section 16913(d).  Finally, it binds 
clearly the Attorney General’s authority to apply the law by limiting the population of 
previous offenders subject to the registration requirement and the registration methods 
the Attorney General may use to accomplish the law’s purpose.  See Reynolds, 132 
S.Ct. at 982; Guzman, 591 F.3d at 93.  SORNA, therefore, satisfies the Supreme 
Court’s intelligible principle test. 
 
Mr. Roe argues that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Reynolds shows that Justice 
Scalia would apply the nondelegation doctrine to find SORNA is unconstitutional.  
Justice Scalia wrote that SORNA “[sails] close to the wind with regard to the principle 
that legislative powers are nondelegable.”  Id. at 986 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  However, 
Justice Scalia applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to find that Congress did 
not delegate its power impermissibly to the Attorney General.  Id.  Mr. Roe argues that 
the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Reynolds ruled that Congress did give such 
authority to the Attorney General; therefore, Justice Scalia must believe the act is 
unconstitutional.  To interpret Justice Scalia’s opinion in this way is to read into it 
language that is not present because Justice Scalia expressly declined to state that he 
 
10
would find SORNA unconstitutional.  Moreover, even if Justice Scalia did believe 
SORNA was unconstitutional, his opinion in Reynolds, as a dissent, would not be 
binding on this Court.  Mr. Roe’s argument as to Reynolds, therefore, is unpersuasive.3 
 
The nondelegation doctrine does not prohibit all delegations of Congress’ 
authority but, instead, requires that Congress specify an intelligible principle to guide 
the party to whom authority is delegated.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73.  The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates that this bar to congressional delegation is not a 
substantial one to meet.  Moreover, while the nondelegation doctrine is still viable, the 
Supreme Court’s “application of [it] principally has been limited to the interpretation 
of statutory texts, and more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory 
delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 373, n7.   
All of the federal courts that have considered the issue have found that 
Congress provided a sufficient intelligible principle in its delegation of authority to the 
Attorney General in SORNA.  Considering the policy declaration and the limitations 
on SORNA’s general applicability as well as the low threshold for a constitutional 
delegation, this Court finds that SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.  
Mr. Roe’s nondelegation claim, therefore, fails. 
                                             
 
3 Since Reynolds, federal courts and a court of this state have continued to impose 
SORNA’s registration requirements on pre-act offenders.  See United States v. 
Whitlow, 714 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 
566 (6th Cir. 2012); Vaughan v. Dept. of Corrections, 385 S.W. 465, 468 (Mo. App. 
2012). 
 
 
 
11
Registration Requirement Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto or Due Process 
 
Mr. Roe raises two other constitutional claims: that SORNA violates the federal 
constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto criminal laws and his Fifth and 
Fourteenth amendment rights to substantive due process.  His claims fail under 
previous rulings of this Court and federal courts. 
 
The federal constitution provides that “[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto 
Law shall be passed.”  U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9.  An allegedly ex post facto law that is 
intended as punishment may violate the ban and render the law void.  Smith v. Doe, 
538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003).  However, if such a statute is intended “to enact a regulatory 
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive,” that statute does not violate the ban and may 
stand.  Id.  The United States Supreme Court has held that a sex offender statute 
requiring pre-act offenders to register does not violate the ban on ex post facto laws 
because registration is civil and regulatory in nature.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 95-96.  
Likewise, this Court already has determined that requiring pre-enactment offenders to 
register does not violate the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto 
laws because the registration requirement is civil and not punitive.4  Doe v. Phillips, 
194 S.W.3d at 842; R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69-70 (Mo. banc 2005). 
                                             
 
4 The United States Supreme Court, in Smith v. Doe, utilized a two-part test to 
determine whether a particular statute is civil or criminal in nature.  538 U.S. 84, 92 
(2003).  Under that test,   
We must “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to 
establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”  If the intention of the legislature was to 
impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was 
to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must 
 
12
 
This Court also has addressed Mr. Roe’s substantive due process claim.  
Substantive due process rights may be violated if a law restricts liberty interests so 
fundamental that a state may not interfere with them unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  Id. at 842; see also Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  Judicial restraint requires courts “to exercise the 
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”  Phillips, 194 
S.W.3d at 842 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 
(1992)).  Generally, protected substantive due process rights are those concerning 
marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.  Albright v. Oliver, 510 
U.S. 266, 272 (1994).  If a law does not impinge on a fundamental liberty, it will 
withstand substantive due process scrutiny so long as it is rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.  Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 844-45.  
In analyzing SORA, Missouri’s analogous registration requirement, this Court 
found that the registration requirement did not violate substantive due process 
principles because it did not implicate a fundamental right and because it rationally 
was related to a legitimate state interest.  Id.  Similarly, SORNA’s registration 
requirement does not implicate such fundamental rights as are protected by substantive 
                                                                                                                                             
further examine whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it ‘civil.’”  
Id.  This Court adopted and applied that test in R.W. to determine that the registration 
requirement of Missouri's sex offender registration statute was nonpunitive in nature. 
168 S.W.3d at 68-70.   
 
 
 
13
due process.  Further, it bears a rational relation to the legitimate government interest 
in protecting the public from sex offenders and, hence, does not violate due process.  
Mr. Roe’s ex post facto and substantive due process claims, therefore, fail. 
SORNA Complies With Principles of Federalism 
 
Mr. Roe raises two other claims related to the interaction between SORNA and 
Missouri law.  He claims that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment 
because SORNA does not require states to register offenders who, like Mr. Roe, 
completed their involvement with the criminal justice system before SORNA was 
enacted.  He also claims that SORNA contemplates yielding to the Missouri 
Constitution on the question of whether pre-act offenders must register because 
Missouri’s constitution prohibits the passage of laws retrospective in their operation.   
 
The Attorney General’s modified guidelines for SORNA permit a state to 
require registration only of pre-act offenders who still are involved in the criminal 
justice system.  76 Fed. Reg. 1630, 1639 (Jan. 11, 2011).  The guidelines state that “it 
will be deemed sufficient for substantial implementation if jurisdictions register sex 
offenders with [pre-act convictions] who remain in the system as prisoners, 
supervisees, or registrants, or who reenter the system through a subsequent criminal 
conviction.”  Id.  Mr. Roe argues that, under these guidelines, he should be exempt 
from registering under SORNA because he completed his involvement in the criminal 
justice system before SORNA became effective.   
 
14
 
Mr. Roe’s argument fails to recognize, however, that the guidelines merely 
describe when a state is deemed to “substantially comply” with SORNA to be eligible 
for federal funding.  They address the adequacy of a state’s effort to implement and 
enforce SORNA, rather than the obligation of offenders to register.  It is irrelevant 
whether SORNA mandates Missouri to register pre-act offenders because SORNA’s 
registration requirement applies to all individuals convicted of a sex offense.  Sections 
16911(1), 16913.  Accordingly, an offender who completed his involvement with the 
criminal justice system before the enactment of SORNA, such as Mr. Roe, still may be 
required to register.  Doe v. Keathley, 344 S.W.3d at 770. 
Mr. Roe also asserts that section 16925(b) of SORNA contemplates 
circumstances when the act must yield to a state’s constitution.  Section 16925(b) 
provides: 
(1) When evaluating whether a jurisdiction has substantially 
implemented this subchapter, the Attorney General shall consider 
whether the jurisdiction is unable to substantially implement this 
subchapter because of a demonstrated inability to implement certain 
provisions that would place the jurisdiction in violation of its 
constitution, as determined by a ruling of the jurisdiction’s highest court. 
 . . . 
 
(3) If the jurisdiction is unable to substantially implement this subchapter 
because of a limitation imposed by the jurisdiction’s constitution, the 
Attorney General may determine that the jurisdiction is in compliance 
with this chapter if the jurisdiction has made, or is in the process of 
implementing reasonable alternative procedures or accommodations, 
which are consistent with the purpose of this chapter. 
 
15
41 U.S.C. section 16925(b).  According to Mr. Roe, SORNA’s retroactive application 
must yield to the Missouri Constitution in so much as it violates the Missouri 
Constitution’s ban on retrospective laws. 
Like the Attorney General’s guidelines, section 16925(b) addresses when a 
state is deemed to have “substantially implemented” SORNA.  It permits a state to 
receive federal funding even if a constitutional limitation prevents it from fully 
implementing SORNA.  Id.  The statute does nothing to affect SORNA’s registration 
requirement, namely, that all individuals convicted of a sex offense must register.  
Sections 16911(1), 16913.        
Furthermore, any claim that SORNA must yield to the Missouri Constitution’s 
prohibition against retrospective laws fails because the registration requirement under 
SORNA does not violate the Missouri Constitution.  The Missouri Constitution forbids 
the enactment of ex post facto laws or laws retrospective in their operation.  Mo. 
Const. art. I, sec. 13.  However, this prohibition only restricts the Missouri legislature 
from passing such laws and does not affect federal legislation.  See Keathley, 290 
S.W.3d at 720.  Article I, section 13 is not implicated when, as in this case, the state 
registration requirement is based on an independent federal registration requirement 
and not based solely on a past conviction.  Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167.  As such, 
section 16925(b) provides no relief to Mr. Roe because Missouri may require him to 
register under SORNA without violating its own constitution. 
 
 
16
 
17
Validity of Future Prosecution Not Addressed Here 
 
Finally, Mr. Roe claims that the circuit court erred in granting summary 
judgment because neither SORA nor SORNA provides a basis for prosecuting him.  
This claim misunderstands the nature of the present case.  Mr. Roe’s petition is an 
action for declaratory judgment.  In it, he requested a ruling that he not be required to 
register as a sex offender.  The law’s requirements for registration are clear, and under 
the Attorney General’s properly promulgated rule, Mr. Roe is required to register.  
That requirement is independent from any questions of whether and by what authority 
he may be prosecuted for failing to register.  Such questions are not before this Court.  
Mr. Roe’s claim, therefore, fails. 
Conclusion 
Contrary to Mr. Roe’s claim, SORNA does not violate the nondelegation 
doctrine because Congress articulated an intelligible principle to guide the Attorney 
General’s discretion in applying the act to pre-act offenders.  It also does not violate 
Mr. Roe’s right to substantive due process nor the prohibition in the United States 
Constitution against ex post facto criminal laws.  Finally, SORNA does not need to 
yield to the Missouri Constitution because requiring pre-act offenders to register 
pursuant to a federal requirement is constitutional.  Accordingly, this Court affirms the 
circuit court’s judgment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
All concur.