Title: G4S Technology LLC v. Massachusetts Technology Park Corp.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12397 
 
 
 
G4S TECHNOLOGY LLC  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS 
TECHNOLOGY PARK CORPORATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 5, 2018. - June 13, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Contract, Public works, Construction contract, Performance and 
breach, Subcontractor, Damages.  Public Works, Delay, Extra 
work.  Damages, Breach of contract, Quantum meruit, Fraud.  
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Damages.  Fraud. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 22, 2014.  
 
 
The case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., on motions for 
summary judgment, and entry of separate and final judgment was 
ordered by her.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Christopher Weld, Jr. (Megan C. Deluhery & Joel Lewin also 
present) for the plaintiff. 
 
Robert J. Kaler (Edwin L. Hall also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Carol Chandler, Brendan Carter, David E. Wilson, Shannon A. 
Reilly, & Mark Keough Molloy, for Associated Builders and 
Contractors, Massachusetts Chapter, & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & James A. Sweeney & 
Cassandra H. Arriaza, Assistant Attorneys General, for the 
Attorney General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  At issue is a construction contract dispute 
between G4S Technology LLC (G4S) and Massachusetts Technology 
Park Corporation (MTPC) arising out of a State- and federally 
funded project to design and build a fiber optic network in 
western and north central Massachusetts.  On summary judgment, a 
judge in the Superior Court concluded that G4S was barred from 
seeking recovery on the contract or under quantum meruit because 
it intentionally filed false certifications of timely payments 
to subcontractors.  The judge also concluded that MTPC could not 
maintain a fraud action against G4S, in which it sought damages 
in addition to the $4 million payment MTPC already had withheld 
from G4S, because any recovery would be duplicative.   
 
On appeal, G4S argues that MTPC was not damaged by the 
false certifications, and that the Commonwealth should replace 
the common-law rule that "in relation to building contracts, 
. . . a contractor cannot recover on the contract itself without 
showing complete and strict performance of all its terms," Andre 
v. Maguire, 305 Mass. 515, 516 (1940), with a materiality rule 
as provided in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 237, 241 
(1981).  Alternatively, G4S contends that, even if recovery on 
the contract is disallowed, it should be able to pursue an 
3 
 
 
equitable recovery under the doctrine of quantum meruit.  G4S 
argues that MTPC, and not G4S, was responsible for the delays in 
construction and the $10 million in increased costs G4S assumed.  
MTPC cross-appealed from the dismissal of its claim of fraud 
against G4S. 
 
We conclude that complete and strict performance is still 
required for all construction contract terms relating to the 
design and construction itself.  We also conclude, however, that 
ordinary contract principles, including the traditional 
Massachusetts materiality rule, apply for breaches of other 
provisions, such as the one at issue governing payment 
certifications.  We hold that G4S's numerous false 
certifications and intentional subcontractor payment delays 
constitute a material breach of the contract and, standing 
alone, preclude recovery for breach of contract. 
 
Summary judgment was not, however, properly granted on 
G4S's quantum meruit theory of recovery.  A party seeking to 
recover under quantum meruit must prove both substantial 
performance and good faith.  Substantial performance is not at 
issue here, as the project was completed as specified, albeit 
delayed.  The issue is whether a party that has intentionally 
committed a breach of a provision in the contract can still have 
acted in good faith for quantum meruit purposes and whether 
there has been a windfall for the other party.  Overruling an 
4 
 
 
older line of cases, we now hold that good faith applies to the 
contract as a whole, and that the intentional commission of 
breaches of individual contract provisions must be considered in 
the over-all context, including the value of the uncompensated 
work, the damage caused by the breach, the total performance of 
both parties, and the balancing of equities to accomplish a just 
result.  Here, there are material disputed facts regarding which 
party caused the delays, whether G4S performed $10 million of 
uncompensated work, and whether there is any causal connection 
between the intentional misrepresentations regarding payments to 
subcontractors and the damages assessed against G4S.  We thus 
reverse the award of summary judgment on the quantum meruit 
claim for further fact finding. 
 
We further conclude that the dismissal of MTPC's fraud 
claim against G4S was error.  The undisputed facts establish 
fraudulent certifications.  The motion judge dismissed the count 
as duplicative, concluding that the fraudulent certifications 
provided the basis for damages under all the different claims 
presented and recovery under the fraud claim would be far less 
than the amount MTPC was allowed to retain for breach of 
contract.  Where separate recoveries are based on the same act 
and injury, duplicative recovery is precluded.  Here, however, 
further fact finding is required to discern whether there could 
be factually separable and distinguishable acts resulting in 
5 
 
 
separable quantifiable injuries.  We therefore reverse the 
allowance of summary judgment on the fraud claim.1 
 
1.  Background.  MTPC is a State development agency created 
and organized under G. L. c. 40J.  In 2010, MTPC received 
funding from both the Commonwealth and the Federal government to 
build a 1,200-mile fiber optic network connecting 123 
communities in western and north central Massachusetts to high-
speed Internet (project).  An approximately $89.7 million 
construction project, it connects "[o]ver 1,100+ public safety 
entities, schools, libraries, medical facilities, and town 
halls[,] . . . serve[s] as a backbone for over 400,000 
households and businesses over a geographic area covering over 
one-third of Massachusetts, with more than one million 
residents[,] . . . [and] [p]rovides necessary broadband 
infrastructure to foster economic growth, improve health care 
and education, and strengthen public safety."  Of the $89.7 
million project, $45.4 million was funded by the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 111th Cong., Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (Recovery Act).  In the wake of the 
"Great Recession," the funds were to be used "in a manner that 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Associated 
Builders and Contractors, Massachusetts Chapter; Associated 
General Contractors of Massachusetts; Associated Subcontractors 
of Massachusetts, Inc.; Construction Industries of 
Massachusetts, Inc.; and Utility Contractors' Association of New 
England, Inc.; and by the Attorney General. 
6 
 
 
maximize[d] job creation and economic benefit" and was intended 
to "provide a one-time injection of funds for the purpose of 
stimulating the American economy." 
 
Time was of the essence with respect to the dates for 
substantial completion and final completion of the project.2  
According to the initial procurement documents, the Recovery Act 
award placed "significant time constraints on the construction 
of the Project."  The design-builder thus was contractually 
                     
 
2 The contract provided that "substantial completion" was 
 
"the date on which either (a) the Work required by the 
Contract Documents has been completed except for Work 
having a Contract Price of less than one per cent (1%) of 
the then adjusted total Contract Price, or (b) the Network, 
or an agreed upon segment of the Network, is sufficiently 
complete and connected to the Internet that Owner can use 
it for its intended purposes except for minor incomplete or 
unsatisfactory Work items that do not materially impair the 
usefulness of the Work required by the Contract Documents.  
To meet these conditions, all fiber optic cable and all 
equipment must have been installed and tested successfully 
and passed pre- and post-construction testing and ready to 
begin the conditional Network acceptance testing period, 
and all operating manuals, warranties, and as-built 
documents pertaining to that portion of the Work have been 
delivered to the Owner." 
 
"Final Completion" was 
 
"the date on which the Network, and all equipment and fiber 
supplied by or made available to the Design-Builder for 
installation in the Network, all Work is successfully 
completed, has been handed over to and accepted by Owner, 
no Work items required by the Contract Documents remain 
incomplete or unsatisfactory, and Owner has received and 
accepted all documentation and Project close-out 
deliverables required under the Contract Documents." 
7 
 
 
obligated to meet mandatory milestones:  complete fifty-five per 
cent of the value of the work by June 30, 2012; achieve 
substantial completion by April 15, 2013; and achieve final 
completion by June 30, 2013. 
 
MTPC put the project out to public bid, and a design-build 
contract with G4S was executed on June 30, 2011.  After 
adjustments, the total contract value was $45.5 million.  G4S 
agreed to the mandatory milestones and acknowledged that if "any 
Date for a Mandatory Milestone, after adjustment for any 
extensions of time . . . is not attained as a result of any 
failure of [G4S] to perform, then [G4S] shall pay [MTPC], as 
part of compensatory delay damages . . . for each Day . . . that 
achievement of the Mandatory Milestone" is not met as damages 
are "difficult to determine and specify accurately."3 
Damages for failure to attain substantial completion by 
April 15, 2013, was $7,500 per day and escalated to $9,500 per 
day after June 30, 2013.  Failure to attain final completion by 
June 30, 2013, was $3,000 per day; daily rates additive for any 
periods of overlap.  The contract, however, also contemplated a 
remedy should there be excused delays to the project.  Articles 
8.2.1 and 8.2.2 provided that, "[i]f [G4S] is delayed in the 
                     
 
3 The contract provided that "[t]he compensatory delay 
damages . . . shall be [MTPC's] sole remedy for any failure of 
[G4S] to meet the above dates." 
8 
 
 
performance of the Work due to acts, omissions, conditions, 
events, or circumstances beyond its control and due to no fault 
of its own, . . . the Contract Time(s) for performance shall be 
reasonably extended by Change Order . . . [and G4S] shall also 
be entitled to an appropriate adjustment of the Contract Price." 
 
MTPC's contract with G4S set forth additional provisions, 
at issue here.  They included (1) procedures for obtaining a 
change order to adjust the contract price and time in the event 
of delay to the work; (2) MTPC's right to stop and suspend the 
work and terminate G4S for cause should G4S, among other 
reasons, fail to "timely pay, without cause . . . 
subcontractors"; (3) MTPC's obligation to facilitate timely and 
efficient performance of the work, submit conduit and pole 
attachment applications for licenses and leases, and perform any 
"Make-Ready work" necessary to permit G4S to perform its 
construction and installation work; and (4) G4S's right to, 
within ten working days of awareness of excused work delay, 
request an equitable adjustment to the contract price or an 
equitable extension of time for the reasonable costs of excused 
delays or differing site conditions. 
 
Following the June 30, 2011, execution of the design-build 
contract and the subsequent notice to proceed, G4S commenced the 
work.  On September 21, 2012, MTPC notified G4S of nonconforming 
9 
 
 
work and requested corrective action.4  On December 10, 2012, 
MTPC notified G4S a second time of nonconforming work and gave 
notice that G4S had failed to cure the prior nonconforming work.5  
At various times, change orders were executed throughout the 
performance of the work.  The dates to achieve substantial and 
final completion of the project were adjusted to July 31, 2013, 
and October 31, 2013, respectively.  The parties reserved their 
respective rights, stating that "[n]othing in . . . Change 
Order[s] shall be taken as a waiver of any rights or defense of 
[MTPC] and [G4S] with respect to any other request for change, 
equitable adjustment or other claim." 
 
On March 7, 2014, over seven months past the contractual 
substantial completion date, substantial completion of the 
                     
 
4 Among other things, the notice of nonconforming work that 
Massachusetts Technology Park Corporation (MTPC) sent to G4S 
Technology LLC (G4S) alleged that G4S had been performing work 
with insufficiently skilled labor, resulting in poor 
workmanship; that G4S failed to follow industry standards with 
the installation of certain project parts; and that G4S's work 
generally suffered from a lack of planning, poor leadership, and 
poor quality.  The notice acknowledges that G4S had made 
improvements over time, but it stated that more corrective 
action on behalf of G4S was needed.  The notice requested a 
conference between G4S and MTPC as well as a plan of action to 
resolve the issues. 
 
 
5 MTPC sent G4S a second notice.  This notice alleged that 
G4S failed to take corrective action in accordance with the plan 
laid out by the parties following the first notice.  The notice 
also restated several of the issues MTPC had with G4S, including 
a general lack of planning, poor performance, and poor 
leadership. 
10 
 
 
network was achieved.  On March 21, 2014, G4S submitted a 
request for equitable adjustment (REA) seeking additional 
compensation and an extension of time for the dates of 
substantial completion and final completion.  On April 1, 2014, 
MTPC responded to G4S's REA and asserted that G4S was not 
entitled to additional time or money and that G4S was the reason 
for the delay.6  On August 15, 2014, MTPC issued a "Notice of 
Withholding" to G4S claiming damages in the amount of 
approximately $4 million resulting from the delays and failure 
to perform required tasks.7 
 
On September 10, 2014, G4S submitted an amended REA to MTPC 
for approximately $10 million.  G4S asserted that, because of 
MTPC's "failure to timely complete the necessary predecessor 
Make-Ready work," G4S incurred substantial additional time and 
                     
 
6 Neither G4S's March 21, 2014, request for equitable 
adjustment nor MTPC's April 1, 2014, letter was in the submitted 
record. 
 
 
7 In accordance with the August 15, 2014, notice of 
withholding, MTPC withheld approximately $2 million, based on 
the liquidated damage rate of $9,500 per day for 219 days, on 
account of G4S's failure to achieve substantial completion of 
the project by July 31, 2013, the date established for 
substantial completion.  Additionally, MTPC withheld $864,000, 
based on the liquidated damages rate of $3,000 per day for 288 
days, on account of G4S's failure to achieve final completion by 
October 31, 2013, the date established for final completion.  
Lastly, MTPC withheld the additional sum of approximately $1.3 
million for reimbursements due and extra cost and expenses 
incurred on account of G4S's failure to perform or complete 
required tasks. 
11 
 
 
costs in completing the project.  It explained, "The failure of 
[MTPC] to timely complete the predecessor activities to G4S 
installation work resulted in the work often being performed 
with different crew configurations, out-of-sequence, in smaller 
non-contiguous distances, utilizing premium time/extended work 
days, and often in different climatic conditions than what was 
contemplated under the baseline schedule."  The amended REA 
referenced provisions in the contract that permitted G4S to 
recover increased costs due to circumstances that were no fault 
of the design-builder.  G4S also stated that it had filed the 
necessary change orders required by article 8.2.1 and that the 
parties had reserved their rights regarding those change orders.8  
Contending that MTPC's failure was thus the "root cause of 
delays and impacts to the Project," G4S also requested another 
adjustment to the dates to achieve substantial and final 
completion of the project.  The response, if any, to the REA, is 
not in the submitted record. 
 
On January 20, 2015, MTPC issued a Certificate of Final 
Completion of the Work, over one year after the contractual 
final completion date.  On February 11, 2015, MTPC issued a 
recalculated and updated "Notice of Withholding" of 
approximately $4 million, to account for subsequent delays, 
                     
 
7 The change orders referenced in G4S's amended REA were not 
in the submitted record. 
12 
 
 
costs, and expenses. 
 
G4S brought an action in the Superior Court against MTPC 
for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and quantum meruit.  
G4S asserted that MTPC's withholding of $4 million was improper 
and contended that MTPC wrongfully denied its $10 million REA.  
MTPC, in turn, brought counterclaims against G4S alleging fraud 
and violations of G. L. c. 93A.  By the start of litigation, 
MTPC had paid G4S approximately $41 million of the original $45 
million total contract value.   
 
During discovery, evidence revealed that, unbeknownst to 
MTPC, G4S engaged in a pattern of submitting inaccurate 
"progress payment releases" (certifications) when sending its 
applications for payment.9  As previously explained, the contract 
expressly stated that subcontractors were to be paid on time and 
that a failure to do so, without cause, was grounds for 
terminating the contract with G4S.  G4S certified to MTPC that 
it had timely paid its subcontractors, but this was not true.  
                     
 
9 Through the "progress payment releases" (certifications), 
G4S represented and warranted that 
 
"all subcontractors, suppliers and equipment providers of 
the undersigned have been paid in full all amounts due to 
them up to the date of this Certification, and that the 
sums received in payment for the Amount Requested shall be 
used to forthwith pay in full all amounts due to such 
subcontractors, suppliers and equipment providers up to the 
date hereof." 
 
13 
 
 
Spanning more than one year, G4S, a publicly traded company, 
repeatedly and continuously delayed payments to its 
subcontractors until after its fiscal quarters closed, so it 
could show a more favorable cash flow in its quarterly reports.10   
 
In sum, G4S received $38.6 million in progress payments 
through sixty false certifications.  The work had been 
performed, but the subcontractors had not been paid prior to the 
certifications. 
 
The delayed payments did not go unnoticed by the 
subcontractors.  At various times, subcontractors strongly 
objected and threatened to shut down work or remove crews from 
the project if G4S continued to withhold payments, even as G4S 
was getting paid by MTPC.11  Despite such protests, there was no 
                     
 
10 G4S's contract manager, who was responsible for paying 
subcontractors, acknowledged in contemporaneous electronic mail 
(e-mail) messages as well as in her later deposition that there 
remained past due invoices for significant sums that were 
outstanding at the time the certifications were executed.  The 
certifications were nevertheless submitted to MTPC.  One 
internal e-mail message from a G4S project manager criticized 
this practice stating, "How can we tell sub[contractors] that 
they aren't getting paid so our books look better?  There's 
something wrong with that." 
 
 
11 For example, in an e-mail message to G4S, one 
subcontractor wrote, "I think it is extremely unfair that you 
are not honoring our contract. . . .  The issue that bothers me 
the most is that you are not making payment [in order] to better 
your books but don't care about the books of the companies that 
support you."  Another subcontractor wrote to G4S that they were 
owed $358,275, which presented a "significant problem" for the 
subcontractor as it sought to pay its work crews.   
14 
 
 
indication from the submitted record that any of the 
subcontractors demanded direct payment of balances due from 
MTPC, as was the subcontractors' statutory right under G. L. 
c. 30, § 39F,12 nor did they shut down work or remove crews.   
 
MTPC moved for summary judgment, and in March, 2016, the 
judge granted summary judgment to MTPC as to G4S's complaint.  
The judge concluded that G4S intentionally committed a breach of 
the contract and thus, without complete and strict performance 
of all of the contract's terms, could not recover on the 
contract.  The judge, relying on an older line of cases that we 
overrule today, also concluded that G4S could not recover under 
a theory of quantum meruit because an intentional violation of a 
contract provision was inconsistent with a finding of good faith 
and barred all such recovery unless the violation was deemed "so 
trifling as to fall within the rule de minimis."  See Andre, 305 
Mass. at 516.  G4S's payment delays and false certifications 
were inconsistent with the good faith requirement.  In January, 
2017, in a subsequent decision, the judge dismissed MTPC's 
counterclaims of fraud and G. L. c. 93A.  The judge reasoned 
                     
 
 
12 General Laws c. 30, § 39F (d), provides:  "If, within 
seventy days after the subcontractor has substantially completed 
the subcontract work, the subcontractor has not received from 
the general contractor the balance due under the subcontract 
. . . , the subcontractor may demand direct payment of that 
balance from the awarding authority." 
15 
 
 
that permitting additional compensation to MTPC under a theory 
of fraud would be improperly duplicative because the underlying 
conduct forming the basis of MTPC's fraud claim was the same as 
the contract claim.  The judge also noted that MTPC, as a public 
entity acting pursuant to a legislative mandate, was not acting 
in a business context and therefore was not engaged in trade or 
commerce for the purposes of G. L. c. 93A.  G4S appealed from 
the Superior Court decision, and we granted its application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Our review of a motion judge's decision 
on summary judgment is de novo, because we examine the same 
record and decide the same questions of law."  Kiribati Seafood 
Co. v. Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 (2017).  "The standard of 
review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 
material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (citation omitted).  
Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 792 (2018).  Here, we 
affirm the decision to grant summary judgment on the contract 
claim, but conclude that there are material disputed facts 
precluding summary judgment on the quantum meruit and fraud 
claims.  
 
a.  Complete and strict performance of all construction 
contract terms.  "The law has long been settled in this 
16 
 
 
Commonwealth, in relation to building contracts, that a 
contractor cannot recover on the contract itself without showing 
complete and strict performance of all its terms . . . ."  
Andre, 305 Mass. at 516.  See Peabody N.E., Inc. v. Marshfield, 
426 Mass. 436, 441 (1998); United States Steel v. M. DeMatteo 
Constr. Co., 315 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2002).  G4S claims that 
the complete and strict performance requirement is outdated and 
asks us to adopt instead the "materiality rule" set forth in 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra at §§ 237, 241.13  We 
                     
 
13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (1981) provides:  
"[I]t is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render 
performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that 
there be no uncured material failure by the other party to 
render any such performance due at an earlier time." 
 
 
Section 241 presents five factors to consider whether a 
failure is material: 
 
"In determining whether a failure to render or to offer 
performance is material, the following circumstances are 
significant: 
 
 
"(a) the extent to which the injured party will be 
deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; 
 
 
"(b) the extent to which the injured party can be 
adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of 
which he will be deprived; 
 
 
"(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform 
or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; 
 
 
"(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform 
or to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking 
account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances; 
17 
 
 
decline this invitation.  We do, however, interpret the complete 
and strict performance requirements in construction contracts as 
being limited to the design and construction itself, as 
explained infra.  All of our previous holdings imposing complete 
and strict performance have concerned breaches of the actual 
design and construction of the project. 
 
Our construction law cases have emphasized the importance 
and need for strict compliance with construction law contracts 
to ensure that the construction itself is done safely and 
correctly according to design specifications.  See, e.g., Russo 
v. Charles I. Hosmer, Inc., 312 Mass. 231, 233-234 (1942) 
(failure to follow design requirements in guard rails posed 
public safety problems).  This is particularly true as defects 
are difficult to identify and expensive to fix in a finished 
project.  See id. at 233 (deviation from number of steel rods 
cast in concrete to provide support for highway guard rail 
unknown to owner); Bowen v. Kimbell, 203 Mass. 364, 368 (1909) 
(cost to cure deviation from building specification after 
building's construction disproportionately high).  Thus, we have 
not tolerated any breaches that relate to whether the 
                     
 
 
"(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party 
failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with 
standards of good faith and fair dealing." 
 
18 
 
 
construction was completed according to design specifications.  
See Peabody N.E., Inc., 426 Mass. at 437, 441 (failure to 
substantially complete construction of septage and grease waste 
facility by terms of agreement not complete and strict 
performance); J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 
789, 790 (1986) (failure to complete itemized list of finish 
work, corrections, repairs, and services for construction of 
public college building not complete and strict performance); 
Albre Marble & Tile Co. v. Governman, 353 Mass. 546, 549-550 
(1968) (failure to ensure satisfactory surfaces before tile 
installation not complete and strict performance); Russo, supra 
(failure to install highway guard rail in accordance with terms 
specifying number of steel rods not complete and strict 
performance); Andre, 305 Mass. at 516-517 (failure to comply 
with plans and specifications of house construction not complete 
and strict performance); Bowen, supra (failure to use correct 
ratio as provided in specifications for making plaster not 
complete and strict performance); Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 
181, 185 (1828) (failure to build house to specifications not 
complete and strict performance). 
 
In the instant case, design and construction provisions 
that would require strict and complete performance would 
include, for example, the following:  
"The fiber optic cable and infrastructure system shall be 
19 
 
 
designed and installed for a minimum life expectancy of 30 
years[.]" 
 
"All fiber strands and buffer tubes shall be color coded 
with highly distinguishable, vibrant colors[.]" 
 
"The fiber cable shall have a circular cross section so 
that aerial installation can be done with standard sheaves 
and tensioning equipment[.]" 
 
"The . . .Fiber Optic Network will consist of a core fiber 
backbone with extensions to two (2) major . . . regional 
network centers located at One Summer Street in Boston, MA 
and One Federal Street in Springfield, MA." 
 
 
We recognize, however, that construction contracts can be 
thousands of pages long, containing all types of different 
provisions.14  We have not considered in our cases the 
consequences of breaches of construction contract provisions 
that are subsidiary to or supportive of the design and 
construction, but do not directly involve the design and 
construction itself.  We clarify today that the complete and 
                     
 
14 Here, the 1,400-page contract between MTPC and G4S 
provided many provisions unrelated to the actual construction 
work.  Examples of such provisions include (1) G4S was to submit 
printed copies of required manuals in "heavy-duty, commercial-
quality, durable, 3-ring, vinyl covered, loose-leaf binders, in 
thickness necessary to accommodate contents, sized to receive 8-
1/2" by 11" paper.  The binder spine shall provide a clear 
plastic sleeve to hold labels identifying the contents"; (2) G4S 
was to ensure that the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
logo emblem was at least six inches or larger in diameter and 
ensure clear space surrounding the logo equal to one-half of the 
logo's radius; and (3) G4S was required to provide, for MTPC 
field inspectors, offices with a "minimum of 200 square feet of 
usable space with . . . a [d]esk, desk chair, visitor chair and 
plan table[,] . . . [p]ortable radio with contractor frequencies 
and charger[,] . . . [and] [w]eekly office cleaning services." 
20 
 
 
strict performance requirements in construction contracts apply 
only to the design and construction work itself.  Other 
provisions should be analyzed pursuant to ordinary contract 
principles, including the materiality standard applied under 
Massachusetts contract law.  See EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness, 
473 Mass. 540, 546 (2016), quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. 
HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 470 (1991); Buchholz v. Green Bros., 
272 Mass. 49, 52 (1930), S.C., 290 Mass. 350 (1935).15 
The question then becomes what is the legal status of the 
contractual violations here.  The construction contract at issue 
was to "design, furnish, build and equip a complete fiber optic 
network system . . . for a fully implemented, functional and 
tested system" in accordance with the project construction 
schedule.  The "Work" was defined broadly as comprising 
"all Design-Builder's design, construction and other 
services required by the Contract Documents, including 
procuring and furnishing all materials, equipment, services 
and labor specified by or reasonably inferable from the 
Contract Documents, to develop, install, and test the 
Network, and including the submission and delivery of all 
documents and other things as required or reasonably 
inferable from the Contract Documents." 
 
The contractual violations at issue did not concern the actual 
                     
 
15 We decline to adopt the materiality standard of the 
Restatement (Second) as argued by G4S.  We recognize, however, 
that many of the different elements of the Restatement 
materiality standard are considered in either our contract or 
our quantum meruit analysis. 
 
21 
 
 
design and construction of the project.  Instead, they were 
about the timing of payments to subcontractors and the 
documentation concerning those payments.16  G4S delayed payments 
and filed false certifications to allow it, a public company, to 
report inflated revenues for its quarterly reports.  We thus 
analyze these violations under a materiality standard, not 
complete and strict performance. 
 
In the Commonwealth, a material breach of a contract occurs 
when the breach concerns an "essential and inducing feature of 
the contract."  See EventMonitor, Inc., 473 Mass. at 546, 
quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., 411 Mass. at 470.  Essential 
and inducing features of a contract are provisions that are "so 
serious and so intimately connected with the substance of the 
contract[]" that a failure to uphold the provision would justify 
                     
 
16 Contract terms defining payment or reporting requirements 
may have an impact on construction but they are not design and 
construction contract terms analyzed pursuant to the complete 
and strict performance requirement.  Rather they are analyzed 
according to the materiality standard.  For example, payment 
delays or disputes may cause subcontractors to stop or slow down 
work by temporarily pulling crews or reducing the number of 
workers.  That would result in delays in the construction, but 
even delays in the construction are different from the design 
and construction itself.  If, however a subcontractor, having 
not received timely payments, installs an insufficient amount of 
highway guard rails, uses plastering of inferior quality, or 
does not complete the project, such breaches would be analyzed 
under complete and strict performance.  See Peabody N.E., Inc. 
v. Marshfield, 426 Mass. 436, 441 (1998); Russo v. Charles I. 
Hosmer, Inc., 312 Mass. 231, 233-234 (1942); Bowen v. Kimbell, 
203 Mass. 364, 368 (1909).  
22 
 
 
the other party walking away from the contract and no longer 
being bound by it.  See Buchholz, 272 Mass. at 52 (failure to 
make monthly payments as agreed to in contract material breach 
because payments "essential and inducing feature"). 
 
There can be little doubt that paying subcontractors on 
time was an essential and inducing feature of the contract 
between MTPC and G4S.  See Buchholz, 272 Mass. at 52 (in 
contract to paint and maintain signs, payment of wage "essential 
and inducing feature").  The "[p]rompt payment of subcontractors 
on public works is a consistent legislative purpose."  Manganaro 
Drywall, Inc. v. White Constr. Co., 372 Mass. 661, 664 (1977).  
This is particularly true here, where a significant portion of 
the project funding came from the Recovery Act, the purpose of 
which was to "maximize[] job creation and economic benefit" and 
"provide a one-time injection of funds for the purpose of 
stimulating the American economy." 
 
The contract itself also stressed the importance of timely 
payments to subcontractors.  As provided in article 10.2 of the 
contract's general conditions, MTPC could walk away from the 
contract and no longer be bound by its terms if G4S failed to 
timely pay subcontractors.  G4S's repeated instances of 
intentionally failing to timely pay subcontractors in accordance 
with the agreed-upon contract was therefore a material breach of 
the contract, barring G4S from recovering breach of contract 
23 
 
 
damages.  See Buchholz, 272 Mass. at 55.17 
 
G4S not only delayed the payments but also falsely 
certified that it had made the payments, thereby magnifying and 
multiplying the number of material breaches.  The contract here 
independently required proper certification of payments.  Those 
provisions were intentionally violated.  Intentional 
misrepresentations to the government for financial gain are 
significant breaches of contract in and of themselves and can be 
serious civil and criminal offenses.18  In the words of Justice 
Holmes, contractors "must turn square corners when they deal 
with the Government."  Rock Island, Ark. & Louisiana R.R. v. 
United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).  G4S did the opposite, 
cutting those corners for improper purposes.  In sum, the 
delayed payments and the false certifications here were material 
                     
 
17 G4S argues that the subcontractors were eventually paid 
and thus the breach was cured.  Given the importance of timely 
payment, we do not consider the delayed payments a cure for the 
contractual violation.  They do, however, have an impact on the 
equities and the quantum meruit analysis. 
 
 
18 We note that persons or corporations who make a 
fraudulent claim for payment to a State government entity are 
subject to civil penalties under the Massachusetts False Claims 
Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 5A-5O.  When any funding for a public 
contract is provided by the Federal government, civil and 
criminal sanctions may also be pursued under the civil or 
criminal False Claims Act.  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (civil); 
18 U.S.C. § 287 (1986) (criminal).  Additionally, the Division 
of Capital Asset Management and Maintenance may suspend or debar 
persons who wilfully supply materially false information while 
performing a public contract.  G. L. c. 29, § 29F. 
24 
 
 
breaches of the contract precluding recovery on G4S's contract 
claim. 
 
b.  Recovery under quantum meruit.  G4S contends that even 
if it is not entitled to pursue its contract claim, it should be 
allowed to recover under a quantum meruit theory.  We conclude 
that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute on the 
quantum meruit claim.  To recover under quantum meruit in a 
construction case, a contractor must prove both substantial 
performance of the contract and an endeavor in good faith to 
perform the work fully.  J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397 Mass. at 796; 
Albre Marble & Tile Co., 353 Mass. at 550; Andre, 305 Mass. at 
516.  "The underlying basis for [recovery under quantum meruit] 
is derived from principles of equity and fairness, to prevent 
unjust enrichment of one party . . . at the expense of another 
. . . ."  Malonis v. Harrington, 442 Mass. 692, 697 (2004).  
Although "clean hands" are important in determining equitable 
relief, we also have recognized that this is not an absolute 
proposition, as the purpose of the doctrine is to allow courts 
to produce a just result.  Walsh v. Atlantic Research Assocs., 
321 Mass. 57, 62 (1947).  The proper focus is on the value of 
the benefit conferred.  In a construction contract, "[t]he 
amount of recovery on a claim based in quantum meruit is the 
fair and reasonable value of material and labor supplied to the 
benefiting party."  J.A. Sullivan Corp., supra at 797.  "It is 
25 
 
 
not the policy of our law to award damages which would put [the 
nonbreaching party] in a better position than if the [breaching 
party] had carried out [its] contract."  Ficara v. Belleau, 331 
Mass. 80, 82 (1954).  The nonbreaching party is "entitled to be 
made whole and no more."  Id.  See J.A. Sullivan Corp., supra at 
794 (principle of equity and fairness cautions against 
"produc[ing] a windfall"). 
 
In the instant case there was, without dispute, substantial 
performance by the contractor.  A critical and complex project 
providing a fiber optic network for western and north central 
Massachusetts has been completed according to its design.  The 
project was, however, delayed.  The cause of those delays is 
bitterly disputed in the record.  G4S has raised a genuine issue 
of material fact that MTPC is responsible for those delays due 
to its failure to complete the make-ready work on time. 
 
More complicated is the good faith requirement.  The motion 
judge concluded that it was undisputed that G4S did not act in 
good faith given its numerous delayed payments to contractors 
and false certifications.  She held that intentional violation 
of these contract provisions precluded a finding of good faith 
fully to perform.  Support for this holding and the short-
circuiting of the rest of the equitable analysis certainly 
exists, in a line of older cases that the judge properly cited.  
For example, in J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397 Mass. at 797, quoting 
26 
 
 
Andre, 305 Mass. at 516, we reiterated that "[g]enerally, '[i]n 
the absence of special exculpating circumstances an intentional 
departure from the precise requirements of the contract is not 
consistent with good faith in the endeavor fully to perform it, 
and unless such departure is so trifling as to fall within the 
rule de minimis, it bars all recovery."  The simplicity and 
severity of this approach, which dates back to Sipley v. 
Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 46 (1906), and Homer v. Shaw, 177 Mass. 
1, 5 (1900), has, however, been criticized in leading treatises 
on contract law.  See 8 C.M.A. McCauliff, Corbin on Contracts 
§ 36.8, at 354 (J.M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1999); S. Williston, 
Contracts § 842, at 2364 n.4 (rev. ed. 1936).  This rule also 
has been questioned, and even distinguished by this court, but 
this older line of cases has not been overruled.  See Walsh, 321 
Mass. at 62 (describing Sipley doctrine as rigid rule of law 
that has been criticized as "too severe").  We expressly 
overrule this line of cases and rearticulate the doctrine of 
quantum meruit today. 
 
We conclude that intentional breaches, even those involving 
material breaches, alone are not dispositive of the right to 
equitable relief, at least when such breaches do not relate to 
the construction work itself.  Good faith is a requirement for 
recovery under quantum meruit, but ruling in equity, this 
requirement is not one that is "too rigid and unyielding for the 
27 
 
 
practical accomplishment of justice."  J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397 
Mass. at 797, quoting Morello v. Levakis, 293 Mass. 450, 453 
(1936).  We have emphasized that "[t]he doctrine of clean hands 
is not one of absolutes and should be so applied as to 
accomplish its purpose of promoting public policy and the 
integrity of the courts."  Walsh, 321 Mass. at 66 (allowing 
recovery in quantum meruit even for plaintiff who intentionally 
committed breach of employment contract provision).  There is no 
simple formula to apply here, but rather numerous factors to 
analyze.  We thus conclude that in evaluating the contractor's 
good faith and right to recover under quantum meruit, we must 
consider the contract performance as a whole, taking into 
account both parties' actions, the different contractual 
breaches and the damages they caused, and most importantly the 
value of the project provided as compared to the amount paid for 
that work.   We must, in the end, balance the equities and 
produce a just result.  See id. (in quantum meruit case, court 
declined to deprive plaintiff of all earnings during employment 
despite bad faith material breach of employment contract).  See 
also Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 438-439 (1989) 
(departing law firm partner did not forfeit accrued profits 
despite intentional breach of partnership contract and fiduciary 
duties because there was no causal connection between law firm's 
claimed losses and breaches). 
28 
 
 
 
Here, G4S completed the project as specified, albeit with 
delays.  MTPC deducted $4 million, of which a significant sum 
was damages for delay.  Whether one party or the other or both 
were responsible for the delays remains disputed on this record.  
Resolution of this issue has an impact on the over-all balancing 
of the equities in the instant case.  If MTPC was responsible 
for some or all of those delays and nevertheless withheld the 
amount, MTPC's own contractual violations would need to be 
considered in the equitable analysis.  If those violations were 
intentional, that would also be a factor in the balancing of 
equities.  Furthermore, G4S has introduced evidence to support 
its claim that it has performed $10 million in uncompensated 
work because of MTPC's failure to perform make-ready work.  If 
G4S's $10 million REA has merit, this represents a significant 
amount of value supplied to MTPC without cost and may constitute 
a windfall.  See J.A. Sullivan Corp., 397 Mass. at 794; Ficara, 
331 Mass. at 82.  It would thus "work great hardship to deprive" 
G4S of compensation for extra work conferred over the three-year 
project given that the design and construction of the network 
was satisfactory.  See Walsh, 321 Mass. at 66. 
 
Finally, although there was not good faith and clean hands 
in the context of prompt payments to subcontractors or truthful 
certifications to MTPC, it is unclear from the submitted record 
whether there is any causal connection between these contractual 
29 
 
 
violations and any damages to MTPC.  It is undisputed that the 
work had been done prior to the certifications.  It also appears 
from this record that the subcontractors, not MTPC, suffered the 
consequences of the delayed payments by continuing to work 
despite the payment delays.  The record before us, as the motion 
judge recognized, contains no evidence that the delayed payments 
or false certifications had an impact on or affected the 
construction, the delays in the completion of the project 
resulting in the withholding of liquidated damages, or the $10 
million of extra work alleged in the REA.19  See Meehan, 404 
Mass. at 438-439 (no causal connection between breach and 
damages claimed). 
 
We conclude that resolution of these disputed factual 
questions is necessary to determine whether equitable relief is 
appropriate in the instant case.  The responsibility for the 
delay, the amount of extra uncompensated work, and the presence 
or absence of any causal connection between the intentional 
breaches and any damage to MTPC are all relevant to a just 
resolution of the quantum meruit claim.  If the delays were 
caused by MTPC, G4S has performed and paid for $10 million in 
                     
 
19 The lack of impact on the construction appears to be 
because of the patience and accommodation of the subcontractors 
that put up with, and even suffered from, G4S's misconduct, 
without complaining to MTPC or demanding direct payment as was 
their right.  
30 
 
 
extra work to complete the project, and the payment delays to 
subcontractors and false certifications had no impact on the 
project's construction or completion date, it would be 
inequitable for MTPC to withhold compensation from G4S for the 
reasonable value of its labor and materials in excess of the 
amounts already paid to G4S.  Meehan, 404 Mass. at 447.  See 
Harness Tracks Sec., Inc., v. Bay State Raceway, Inc., 374 Mass. 
362, 367-368 (1978). 
 
c.  Fraud.  MTPC contends that its counterclaim against G4S 
for fraud was improperly dismissed.  The motion judge sua sponte 
dismissed MTPC's fraud claim against G4S.  She relied on Szalla 
v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 454 (1995), in which this court held:  
"Where the same acts cause the same injury under more than one 
theory, duplicative damage recoveries will not be permitted."  
Applying Szalla, the motion judge reasoned that "the conduct 
that forms the basis of MTPC's fraud claim is precisely the same 
as that which caused this Court to conclude that G4S had 
necessarily forfeited its affirmative claims against MTPC.  As a 
consequence . . . , [MTPC] no longer had to justify the $4 
million it retained of the Contract balance; the upshot was that 
it was effectively provided with an award that more than covered 
any loss that it suffered as a result of paying G4S 
prematurely." 
 
 We agree that summary judgment on the fraud claim may be 
31 
 
 
appropriate only under a duplicative damages analysis.  However, 
"where the acts complained of . . . are factually separable and 
distinguishable . . . , there is no error in permitting separate 
recoveries for separable injuries."  Calimlim v. Foreign Car 
Ctr., Inc., 392 Mass. 228, 236 (1984).  "Permitting awards under 
several counts where claims and injuries are factually 
distinguishable, but disallowing such recovery where they are 
not, will serve to avoid over or under compensation."  Id. 
 
Here, there may be separable and distinguishable acts 
forming the basis of recovery under the breach of contract and 
fraud claims.  A fact finder could determine that the delayed 
completion of the project could be the basis for the breach of 
contract claim and the false certifications that subcontractors 
were timely paid could be the basis for the fraud claim.  MTPC 
withheld $4 million as separable recovery for the breach of 
contract because of the delay, using the liquidated damages 
provision to calculate the amount of the withholding.20  MTPC 
additionally claims that the false certifications caused it to 
                     
 
20 The fact that the fraudulent certifications and delayed 
payments to subcontractors also provide a basis for breach of 
contract is not dispositive.  If G4S was responsible for the 
delays, an issue that cannot be decided on summary judgment, 
those delays provided a much more straightforward basis for 
calculating damages for breach of contract than the false 
certifications. 
 
32 
 
 
pay G4S prematurely, resulting in the loss of $1.67 million, 
which it asserts is another injury for which it thus is entitled 
to separable recovery.21  Whether this claim has merit and 
whether such calculations of damages are correct require further 
fact finding, but some recovery, at least for the loss of the 
time value of money, may be justified. 
Whether the monetary loss for MTPC due to fraud is less 
than the monetary loss due to breach of contract also should be 
determined.  This appears to depend on who was responsible for 
the delays; G4S's recovery, if any, under quantum meruit; and 
whether the losses due to fraud claimed by MTPC have been 
grossly inflated.  Whether the damages, if any, caused by the 
false certifications are duplicative thus cannot be determined 
on this record.  We therefore reverse the allowance of summary 
judgment on the fraud claim. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we affirm the 
summary judgment decision on the breach of contract claim and 
reverse the summary judgment decision on the quantum meruit and 
                     
 
21 MTPC and G4S also dispute the amount of loss, asserting 
it to be $1.67 million and $1,757.48, respectively.  MTPC 
calculated $1.67 million based on lost interest accrued at the 
prime rate of 3.25 per cent per annum interest from the date of 
each payment until June, 2, 2014, the date of MTPC's last 
payment to G4S.  G4S, in turn, asserts that lost interest based 
on alleged late subcontractor payments would result only in 
$1,757.48 based on a thirty-day yield of 0.22 per cent interest 
calculated for only the period that the payment was late. 
33 
 
 
fraud claims.  We remand the matter to the Superior Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.