Title: LANDY LEE FERTIG v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LANDY LEE FERTIG v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 148146 P.3d 492Case Number: No. 04-56Decided: 11/17/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
LANDY LEE 
FERTIG,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

                                                                                                                        

THE STATE OFWYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

The Honorable Keith G. 
Kautz, Judge

 

Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Public Defender. 

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General (counsel); D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.                                  

 
 
                        
            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Landy Lee Fertig 
appeals from a judgment and conviction following his entry of a conditional 
guilty plea to one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine.  Mr. Fertig entered 
his conditional plea following the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence obtained after Mr. Fertig had been stopped for speeding by 
Wheatland police.  Mr. Fertig does 
not dispute that the traffic violation was observed by the law enforcement 
officer who initiated the stop.  He 
contends, however, that the stop was pretextual in nature and violated Article 
1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution because the primary motivation of the 
officer was to conduct a search for evidence of illegal drug activity.  We find no error in the district court's 
denial of the motion to suppress and affirm the conviction.  

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Does a traffic 
stop initiated by law enforcement after observing a traffic offense violate 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution when the primary purpose of the 
stop is to conduct a search for evidence of illegal drug 
activity?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On the evening of 
April 19, 2003, Officer Brian McPhillips received information from a 
confidential informant indicating that illegal drug activities were taking place 
at a specific residence in Wheatland.  
At the time, Officer McPhillips was a member of the Southeast Task Force 
of the Department of Criminal Investigation on assignment with the Wheatland 
Police Department.  He was advised 
that Mr. Fertig was at the residence and that Mr. Fertig "possibly" would be in 
possession of drugs.

 
 
[¶4]      Officer 
McPhillips established surveillance of the residence and observed Mr. Fertig's 
vehicle at the residence.  Officer 
McPhillips contacted Officer Willadsen of the Wheatland Police Department and 
advised Officer Willadsen and another Wheatland police officer of the situation 
and requested that they position their vehicles along the two most likely routes 
of travel between the residence and Mr. Fertig's house.  He asked the officers to keep a watch 
for the Fertig vehicle and requested that they stop the vehicle if they observed 
a traffic violation.  Officer 
McPhillips hoped that the traffic stop would provide an opportunity to search 
for evidence of illegal drug activity.  

 
 
[¶5]      At approximately 
2:40 a.m., Officer McPhillips observed Mr. Fertig leave the residence.  He notified the officers and provided a 
description of Mr. Fertig's vehicle.  
Officer Willadsen spotted the vehicle and, using his radar, recorded the 
speed of the vehicle at 38 mph.  Mr. 
Fertig was traveling in a 30 mph zone at the time.  Officer Willadsen initiated a traffic 
stop of the Fertig vehicle and notified dispatch of the stop and his 
location.  He then proceeded to the 
vehicle and requested that Mr. Fertig produce his driver's license, 
registration, and proof of insurance.  
Mr. Fertig provided his driver's license, but was unable to immediately 
locate the other documents.

 
 
[¶6]      Officer Willadsen 
returned to his vehicle.  In the 
meantime, Officer McPhillips arrived on the scene and positioned himself by the 
front passenger door of the Fertig vehicle.  While in that position, he observed Mr. 
Fertig searching his glove box for the documents.  Officer McPhillips observed a kitchen 
spoon with white crystalline rings on its surface in the glove box.  He recognized the spoon as a device used 
to heat powdered methamphetamine into a liquid for intravenous injection.  He concluded that he had probable cause 
to search the vehicle for illegal controlled substances and asked Mr. Fertig to 
exit the vehicle.  Mr. Fertig 
complied.  After exiting the 
vehicle, Mr. Fertig was placed in handcuffs and arrested for possession of drug 
paraphernalia in violation of a Wheatland ordinance.  Officer McPhillips retrieved a bag 
containing approximately ten grams of methamphetamine from Mr. Fertig's shirt 
pocket.

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Fertig was 
charged with felony possession of methamphetamine.  Prior to trial, he filed a motion to 
suppress evidence on the basis that the traffic stop was pretextual and violated 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  A hearing on the motion was held.  During the hearing, both officers 
testified that the primary purpose for the stop was to conduct a search for 
drugs.  The district court denied 
the motion stating:

 
 
Under the U.S. 
Constitution an officer's subjective intent i[s] unimportant to the validity of 
an arrest or detention.  If an 
officer validly stops a defendant for a traffic violation, the U.S. Constitution 
does not render that detention unreasonable simply because the officer thought 
or hoped the stop would render evidence of other criminal activity.  Whren v. United 
States , 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 13[5] L.Ed.2d 89 
(1996); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 149 L. Ed. 2d 994 (2001).  
In those holdings the U.S. Supreme Court said state constitutions may 
limit evidence obtained in such traffic stops even if the U.S. Constitution does 
not.

 
 
The Defendant claims that 
the Wyoming Constitution restricts officers who make traffic stops more than the 
U.S. Constitution does.  In support 
of this argument the Defendant points out that Article I, §4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution requires affidavits in support of search warrants, whereas the 4th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires only an "oath or 
affirmation."

 
 
The Court finds nothing 
in Defendant's argument, or in the Wyoming Constitution, to support his 
position.  Further, the Court finds 
nothing unreasonable about the detention of the Defendant in this case.  To the contrary, the officers acted very 
reasonably in stopping the Defendant.  
He violated a speeding ordinance and should have been 
stopped.

 
 
The Defendant's position, 
taken to its logical (and absurd) conclusion, is that police officers either 
should not make traffic stops of individuals suspected of other crimes, or, if 
they do make traffic stops, they should not observe evidence in plain 
view.

 
 
Mr. Fertig subsequently 
entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges, reserving his right to 
challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.  He was sentenced to a term of 48-84 
months in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  
The sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for seven 
years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      We will not 
disturb the factual findings of a district court in determining a motion to 
suppress unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  Whether an unreasonable search or 
seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question of 
law which we review de novo.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      The sole issue presented for our resolution 
is whether a pretextual traffic stop violates Article 1, Section 4 of the 
Wyoming State Constitution.  A 
pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the 
stop in order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an 
unrelated crime for which they did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary 
to support a stop.  United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).  

            

[¶10]   Mr. Fertig does not dispute that he 
was speeding or was clocked traveling 38 mph in a 30 mph zone.  He admits that Officer Willadsen had 
probable cause to initiate a traffic stop based upon personal observation of the 
speeding violation.  He asserts, 
however, that he was stopped for the infraction only because of the underlying 
motive of the officers to search for narcotics.  The underlying motive, according to Mr. 
Fertig, renders the stop unconstitutional at its inception.

 
 
[¶11]   The State concedes that the stop of 
Mr. Fertig's vehicle was pretextual.  
The primary purpose of the stop was to obtain evidence of illegal drug 
activity.1  The State contends, however, that the 
subjective intent of the officers for making the stop is irrelevant in 
determining whether the stop satisfies the requirements of Article 1, Section 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution.  
According to the State, because Officer Willadsen personally observed a 
traffic violation, he had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. The State 
succinctly sums up its position as follows: "While the officers involved 
acknowledged that they were hoping to stop [Mr. Fertig] for a traffic violation 
as a pretext to look for any drugs that might be in plain view, [Mr. Fertig] 
obliged them on both counts.  The 
stop of [Mr. Fertig's] vehicle was initiated because he was speeding, and [Mr. 
Fertig] was sufficiently careless to expose drug evidence to the officers' plain 
view.  As such, the encounter was 
constitutionally reasonable under Article 1, § 4 . . . ." 

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Fertig concedes that 
"pretextual stops" are permissible under the federal constitution.  In Whren v. United 
States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 
116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d. 89 (1996), the United 
States Supreme Court determined that a pretextual traffic stop did not violate 
the search and seizure protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  In Whren, the officers personally observed 
the traffic violation and had probable cause to initiate the stop.  The Court recognized that "[a]s a 
general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the 
police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 
occurred."  Id., 517 U.S.  at 810, 116 S. Ct.  at 1772.    Mr. 
Fertig contends, however, that the Wyoming Constitution affords greater 
individual protection and that a pretextual stop violates Article 1, Section 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution.

 
 
[¶13]   We have explained:  

 
 
Our state constitution 
provides protection of individual rights separate and independent from the 
protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it 
clear in that states at a minimum must comply with its interpretations of the 
federal constitution.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 
1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). However, it also has made clear that states may 
separately interpret and apply their own constitutions. Id. In 
interpreting their own constitutions, states generally have focused upon whether 
their particular state constitution provides greater protection than the federal 
constitution. Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, ¶ 
5, 32 P.3d 313, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2001). However, using federal law as a guide, states 
may also conclude that the scope of the protection provided by their 
constitution is the same as and parallel to that provided by the federal 
constitution. 

 
 
O'Boyle, ¶23, 117 P.3d  at 
408 (emphasis in original).

 
 
[¶14]   We have not previously analyzed 
whether a pretextual stop violates Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  We have applied the 
holding of Whren finding that, under 
the Fourth Amendment, an officer's subjective intent to search for drugs does 
not invalidate an otherwise lawful traffic stop.  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, 64 P.3d 700 
(Wyo. 2003).  However, we have 
expressed concerns regarding police conduct initiated upon pretext, suggesting 
that such conduct may be significant in an analysis under Article 1, Section 
4.  Damato, ¶¶ 11-12, 64 P.3d at 705-706; O'Boyle, ¶ 34, 117 P.3d  at 
411-412.

 
 
[¶15]   Taking the cue provided in Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 
(Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring), Mr. Fertig presents his argument that the 
Wyoming Constitution provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment in the 
context of pretextual traffic stops utilizing six factors identified in State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 
1986).  Those factors are: (1) the 
textual language; (2) the differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; 
(4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of 
particular state or local concern.  
Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 
308 (Wyo. 
1999).  Utilizing those factors, Mr. 
Fertig asserts that our decision in Damato paved the way for his claim and 
that compelling reasons exist to depart from Whren. 

 
 
[¶16]   Although the six Gunwall criteria provide an organized 
and logical framework for comparing a state constitutional provision to its 
federal counterpart, we have determined that several of these factors offer 
little assistance in the search and seizure context:  

 
 
[W]e concluded long ago 
that article 
1, § 4 is stronger than its federal counterpart in that it requires 
search warrants to be supported by an affidavit.  State v. 
Peterson, 27 Wyo. 
185, 194 P. 342, (1920). See also Hall v. 
State, 911 P.2d 1364 (Wyo. 1996).  With this exception, however, we have 
found the first three Saldana criteria to be of little assistance in 
analyzing claims brought specifically under our search and seizure provision. 
[Vasquez 
v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 (Wyo. 1999)]. Except for the affidavit 
requirement for search warrants, the text of Wyoming's search and seizure 
provision is substantially the same as the Fourth 
Amendment, and there is little in the way of Wyoming constitutional 
history to guide our analysis.

 
 
Looking at the fourth 
Saldana factor, preexisting state law, this Court historically has 
interpreted Wyoming's search and seizure provision as 
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures and has said the question of 
whether a search or seizure was reasonable was one of law to be decided from all 
the circumstances. Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 484, citing State v. 
George, 32 Wyo. 
223, 239, 231 P. 683, 688 (1924); State v. 
Crump, 35 Wyo. 
41, 51, 246 P. 241, 244 (1926). 

 
 

O'Boyle, ¶¶ 24-25, 117 P.3d  at 
408-409 (footnote omitted).  
Additionally, we have recognized that an analysis of the fifth factor, 
structural differences between the state and federal constitutions, does "not 
assist us one way or another in our determination."  Almada, 994 P.2d  at 309 (quoting Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 485).  In the context of this case, only two of 
the factors, pre-existing state law and matters of particular state or local 
concern, require discussion.  We 
note also that our analysis is not limited to the Gunwall factors.  They are merely a list of useful 
"non-exclusive neutral criteria."  
Almada, 994 P.2d  at 309 n.8; 
O'Boyle, ¶ 24, 117 P.3d  at 408.  

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Fertig devotes a substantial 
portion of his argument discussing case law from other states in an effort to 
persuade this Court that an individual state has a unique and legitimate 
interest in protecting the rights of its citizenry, and that such decisions do 
not always derive from textual or structural differences noted in a state's 
constitutional provisions.  We do 
not disagree with these tenets, but this general case discussion is not 
particularly helpful in this case.  
We have already rejected a blind adherence to federal precedent and have 
recognized that "protection of constitutional rights of the accused is not the 
peculiar province of the federal courts."  
Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1223 
(Wyo. 
1976).  We view the Wyoming 
Constitution as "a separate and independent source of protection" for Wyoming citizens.  O'Boyle, ¶ 23, 117 P.3d  at 408.  While we are empowered to depart from 
federal precedent, we may nevertheless find federal law helpful in providing 
guidance in interpreting our constitution.  
"Although we are not bound by the Fourth Amendment decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in this case, we may certainly follow its lead when 
we find its reasoning persuasive."  
Almada, 994 P.2d  at 309.  

            

[¶18]   In broad terms, our review under 
Article 1, Section 4 requires that searches and seizures be reasonable under all 
the circumstances. O'Boyle, ¶ 31, 117 P.3d  at 410; Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 
489.  This is similar to what we 
have noted concerning the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment:

 
 
The touchstone of our 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal 
security. Reasonableness, of course, depends on a balance between the 
public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from 
arbitrary interference by law officers.

Barch v. State, 
2004 WY 
79, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d 828, 831 (Wyo. 2004).   A traffic stop is a "seizure" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 704; Barch, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d  at 831.  The traffic stop of Mr. Fertig's vehicle 
is also a seizure within the meaning of Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, invoking the requirement that the stop be "reasonable under all of 
the circumstances."  O'Boyle, ¶¶ 31, 38, 117 P.3d  at 410, 
412.

 
 
[¶19]   In O'Boyle, we determined that the 
principles for assessing the reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth 
Amendment were not significantly different than those applicable separately 
under the Wyoming Constitution.  O'Boyle, ¶ 50, 117 P.3d  at 415.  This statement followed discussion of 
the two-pronged inquiry testing the reasonableness of investigative detentions 
stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), that is: 1) was the initial 
stop justified; and 2) were the officer's actions during the detention 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference 
in the first instance.  O'Boyle, ¶ 46, 117 P.3d  at 414; see also   Campbell  v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 11, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  In O'Boyle we tacitly endorsed the 
two-pronged Terry inquiry as 
providing an appropriate analytical framework for our reasonableness inquiry 
under Article 1, Section 4.  
Applying this framework to Mr. Fertig's argument, we conclude that his 
challenge rests within the first prong of the Terry test.  He argues that the stop was void at its 
inception and asks us to declare the use of pretext stops an impermissible law 
enforcement tactic.    

[¶20]   Mr. Fertig argues that pretextual 
stops should be deemed unreasonable in order to protect citizens from the 
specter of having every routine traffic stop transformed into a full-blown 
search by an officer motivated to seize narcotics.  We note the tension created by law 
enforcement efforts to curb drug trafficking.  As one commentator has observed:  

In recent years more 
Fourth Amendment battles have been fought about police activities incident[al] 
to a stopping for a traffic infraction, what the courts call a routine traffic 
stop, than in any other context. . . . [T]he renewed interest of the police in 
traffic enforcement is attributable to a federally-sponsored initiative related 
to the war on drugs. 

Wayne R. La Fave, Search and Seizure § 9.3, at 358-359 
(4th ed. 2004) (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).  While we have acknowledged the 
importance of drug interdiction activities, we have also expressed willingness 
to protect the privacy rights of citizens under Article 1, Section 4, if police 
conduct is unreasonable under all the circumstances.  O'Boyle, ¶ 34, 117 P.3d  at 
411.

[¶21]   We declined to undertake a state 
constitutional analysis regarding pretextual stops in Damato because the issue was not raised 
by the defendant.  In Damato, we upheld the validity of the 
traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment but alluded to the possibility of a 
different result had we not been constrained to follow the bright-line approach 
of the U.S. Supreme Court:

 
 
The Court has been 
unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual 
motivations of individual officers and has held unanimously that "[s]ubjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 
116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). Whren held that "a traffic-violation 
arrest . . . [will] not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was a mere 
pretext for a narcotics search.'" Id. 
(citing United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1, 94 S. Ct. 467, 470 n.1, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973)). The Court 
later confirmed the validity of Whren 
in Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878, 149 L. Ed. 2d 994 (2001) (per curiam), 
reversing the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision that a legitimate traffic stop 
was invalid when motivated for the purpose of conducting a search for drugs. A 
concurring opinion written by Justice Ginsburg in Sullivan noted that the Arkansas court feared the 
Whren decision would accord police 
officers disturbing discretion to intrude on individuals' liberty and privacy. 
Id. at 772-73, 
121 S. Ct.  at 1879 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Arkansas Court had expressed 
unwillingness "to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted 
vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver 
to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, 
and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity." 
Id. The 
concurring opinion also noted that the Court has held that such exercises of 
official discretion are unlimited by the Fourth Amendment and cited Whren and Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 
121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001).

 
 
The Court clarified that 
had the Arkansas Supreme Court decided that it could not apply Whren under its own state constitution, 
the Court would not interfere.  Sullivan, 532 U.S.  at 772, 121 S. Ct.  at 1878. The concerns of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court are also ours where, as here, the officer intended to use 
any traffic violation as a pretext to conduct a narcotics investigation; 
however, because Damato does not contend that the Wyoming Constitution provides 
greater protection in this area, we must follow the federal constitutional 
decisions in Whren and Sullivan.

            
In addition to pretextual reasons, we are concerned also that Damato had 
previously been stopped and released, and, in a "tag-team" fashion, was passed 
on to the next jurisdiction to be stopped in hopes the subsequent officer would 
be more successful in obtaining a canine sniff within a reasonable time. Limited 
to a federal constitutional analysis, we are constrained to say Whren is controlling in this particular 
case because Officer Bauer stopped Damato for an observed traffic violation. The 
officer activated his patrol car lights to stop Damato after observing on radar 
that Damato exceeded the maximum allowable speed limit by two miles per hour in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-301.  
Under Wyoming statute, exceeding the maximum 
allowable speed limit is a misdemeanor punishable by fines and/or 
imprisonment.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-1201 (LexisNexis 2001). Officer Bauer, therefore, had probable cause to 
stop Damato because he had observed a traffic violation. Whren, 517 U.S.  at 810, 116 S. Ct.  at 1772.

 
 
 
 

Damato,¶¶ 10-12, 64 P.3d  at 705-706 (emphasis added).  We expressed similar concerns in O'Boyle, ¶ 34, 117 P.3d  at 
411-12.

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Fertig argues that matters of 
state concern require a departure from Whren.  
He relies heavily upon the above-quoted language from Damato as an indication that, when 
pretext is involved, we will take a more expansive view of the protections 
afforded by the Wyoming Constitution.  
He asserts that Wyoming has a paramount interest in protecting 
the privacy and liberty interests of our state citizens traveling on state 
roads.  These interests, he 
contends, will be subverted by greater state intrusions if pretextual traffic 
stops are not constitutionally prohibited.  

 
 
[¶23]   We recognized the state interest 
identified by Mr. Fertig in O'Boyle 
and expressed our disapproval of citizens "being subjected to what have 
become routine requests to relinquish their privacy rights by detention, 
invasive questioning and searches--all without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity other than the offense giving rise to the stop."  O'Boyle, ¶ 34, 117 P.3d  at 411.  Significantly, however, in O'Boyle, the focus of our constitutional 
analysis involved an evaluation of police conduct after the stop.  We did not question an officer's 
authority to initiate a traffic stop after an observed traffic violation and in 
Damato, we recognized that an officer 
has probable cause to initiate a traffic stop when the officer personally 
observes a traffic violation.  Damato,¶ 12, 64 P.3d  at 706.  

 
 
[¶24]   While we recognize the privacy 
rights of those traveling our highways, we must also acknowledge that motorists 
should "reasonably expect that law enforcement officers may stop them for 
violating traffic laws." People v. 
Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 673 (Colo. 2001).  Instead of examining the reasonable 
privacy expectations of Wyoming motorists, Mr. Fertig focuses upon the 
officer's subjective intent.  He 
contends that allowing pretextual stops would encourage arbitrary exercise of 
police power and selective enforcement of traffic laws.  A similar argument was presented in Whren:

 
 
Petitioners accept that 
Officer Soto had probable cause to believe that various provisions of the 
District of 
Columbia traffic code had been violated. . . .  They argue, however, that "in the unique 
context of civil traffic regulations" probable cause is not enough. Since, they 
contend, the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total 
compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer 
will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical 
violation. This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of 
investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even 
articulable suspicion exists.  

Whren, 517 U.S.  at 
810, 116 S. Ct.  at 1772-1773 (internal citations omitted).  The United States Supreme Court flatly 
rejected the argument:  

[W]e are aware of no 
principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so 
expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the 
ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify 
such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or what right) we would 
decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions are 
sufficiently important to merit enforcement. 

Id., 517 U.S.  at 818-819, 
116 S. Ct.  at 1777.

[¶25]   Mr. Fertig does not identify a 
single decision from any state court that has rejected Whren.2   In nearly every state that has 
considered the issue, Whren has been 
followed or cited with approval.  See People v. 
Robinson, 767 N.E.2d. 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001) 
(collecting cases).  For 
those courts, probable cause arising from an observed traffic violation 
justifies a traffic stop.  See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (N.C. 1999) (adopting the reasoning of Whren and holding that an objective 
standard, rather than a subjective standard, must be applied to determine the 
reasonableness of police action related to probable cause); State v. Farabee, 22 P.3d 175, 181 
(Mont. 2000) (stating that the lawfulness of a traffic stop under the Montana 
Constitution depends on whether the officer had a particularized suspicion that 
an occupant of the vehicle has committed or is committing an offense); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 736 
(Tenn. 1997) (concluding that probable cause justifies a traffic stop under 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution regardless of the subjective 
motivations of police officers); and Dufries v. State, 133 P.3d 887, 889 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that if the officer had probable cause to 
believe a driver had violated some traffic law, stopping the driver's vehicle is 
lawful regardless of the officer's subjective motivation for the 
stop).

[¶26]   In encouraging us to depart from Whren, Mr. Fertig places particular 
emphasis on the language quoted in Damato 
and O'Boyle from Arkansas 
v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1879, 149 L. Ed. 2d 994 (2001) and State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 
(Ark. 2000).  Sullivan involved a pretextual 
arrest, not a traffic stop.  State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 219 
n.1 (Ark. 
2002).3  Subsequently, in State v. Harmon, 113 S.W.3d 75 (Ark. 
2003), the Supreme Court of Arkansas, interpreting the Arkansas constitution, 
refused to apply its Sullivan 
rationale to traffic stops, reasoning that a traffic stop does not present the 
heightened intrusiveness of an arrest.  
The court observed that "an otherwise valid stop does not become 
unreasonable merely because the officer has intuitive suspicions that the 
occupants of the car are engaged in some sort of criminal activity."  Harmon, 113 S.W.3d  at 
79.

[¶27]   We also find the rationale of Whren persuasive in that we are not in a 
position to identify which traffic laws should be enforced and which violations 
should be disregarded by law enforcement.  
Violations of the traffic code provide an objective standard by which to 
judge the reasonableness of a traffic stop seizure because an observed violation 
provides probable cause for a traffic stop seizure.  Whren, 517 U.S.  at 
818-819, 116 S.Ct. at 1776-1777; Damato, ¶12, 64 P.3d  at 706.  
Contrary to Mr. Fertig's assertion, efforts to enforce traffic laws 
are objectively reasonable:

Because the Vehicle and 
Traffic Law provides an objective grid upon which to measure probable cause, a 
stop based on that standard is not arbitrary in the context of constitutional 
search and seizure jurisprudence.  [P]robable cause stops are not based on the 
discretion of police officers. They are based on violations of law. An officer 
may choose to stop someone for a "minor" violation after considering a number of 
factors, including traffic and weather conditions, but the officer's authority 
to stop a vehicle is circumscribed by the requirement of a violation of a duly 
enacted law. In other words, it is the violation of a statute that both triggers 
the officer's authority to make the stop and limits the officer's 
discretion.

Robinson, 767 N.E.2d  at 
646-647.  We 
agree that in examining the justification for a traffic stop under 
the first prong of Terry, 
an officer's subjective intent does not vitiate the probable cause that would 
otherwise justify the stop.

[¶28]   We conclude that a traffic stop 
initiated by a law enforcement officer after personally observing a traffic 
violation is supported by probable cause and does not violate Article 1, Section 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution, regardless of the officer's primary 
motivation.  Our holding in this 
case addresses only the initial police action upon which the vehicular stop was 
predicated.  The scope, duration, 
and intensity of the seizure, as well as any search made by the police 
subsequent to that stop, remain subject to the strictures of Article 1, Section 
4, and judicial review.  The nature 
of the traffic offense remains relevant in determining whether the search and 
seizure was "reasonable under all of the circumstances" as required by Article 
1, Section 4.  O'Boyle, ¶ 31, 117 P.3d  at 410; Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.    

[¶29]   It is undisputed that Officer 
Willadsen personally observed the traffic violation and had probable cause to 
initiate the traffic stop.  The 
scope, duration, and intensity of the seizure, after the initial stop, are not 
contested by Mr. Fertig.  
Accordingly, the district court properly denied the motion to 
suppress.  

[¶30]   Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
State's concession that the stop was 
pretextual is premised upon its response to the motion to suppress.  As explained by the State in its 
brief:

 
 
. . . in 
spite of an abundance of almost "real time" information about the drug 
transaction supplied by the confidential informant to the police, the prosecutor 
specifically eschewed any reliance on probable cause to stop and search 
Appellant's vehicle based on information supplied by the informant.  Nor was it argued below that this was 
not a "pretext" stop in any event, based on Officer Willadsen's testimony that 
he typically initiates a stop for speeding when vehicles exceed the speed limit 
on South Street by five or more miles per hour, as Appellant 
had done.  See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 1.4(e) n. 49 (3rd 
ed. 1996 and Supp. 2004) (citing cases) (not a pretext stop where a reasonable 
officer would have made the stop in the absence of an invalid purpose).  On appeal, the State is therefore guided 
by the only theory offered by the State to the trial court and ruled onthat 
although this was a pretext stop, it was nevertheless permitted by Article 1, § 
4.  Paramo v. State, 896 P.2d 1342, 1345-46 
(Wyo. 1995) (citing Eckert v. State, 680 P.2d 478, 481 
(Wyo. 
1984)).

 
 
(Record cite 
and footnote omitted.)

 
 

2Although not 
cited by the parties, we note that the Washington Supreme Court has declared 
pretextual stops unconstitutional under its state constitution. State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 
(Wash. 
1999).  The dissenting opinion in Ladson criticizes the majority for 
"collapsing" the two prongs of the Terry analysis and for disregarding the 
import of probable cause as justification for a traffic stop.  According to the 
dissent:

 
 
The issue in 
this case is whether the fact that the officer has another motive in addition to 
the belief that a traffic infraction has occurred renders a traffic stop 
unconstitutional at its inception. Contrary to the majority's view, I would hold 
that the officer's motive does not turn a stop based upon probable cause that a 
traffic violation has occurred into an unlawful stop. Regardless of the 
officer's motive, the probable cause standard provides the reasonableness 
necessary to justify the warrantless stop.  Washington citizens who commit traffic 
infractions have privacy interests at issue when traveling in a vehicle, but 
those interests are not unreasonably intruded upon where the individual commits 
a traffic infraction in the presence of an officer and is therefore stopped for 
issuance of a citation and notice. Our expectations are that we will be stopped 
and cited for traffic infractions, and we cannot reasonably expect that we are 
protected from such a stop depending on the officer's other 
motives.

Ladson, 979 P.2d  at 845 (Madsen, J., 
dissenting).

 
 

3Likewise, we 
note a significant distinction between investigative detentions and arrests, and 
do not, by this opinion, intend to change what we previously stated about 
pretextual arrests in Brown v. State, 
738 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Wyo. 1987).