Title: Matter of Adoption of SLS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Adoption of SLS1991 WY 38808 P.2d 207Case Number: C-90-5Decided: 03/29/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
ADOPTION OF SLS and CRS.

CAS, Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

EWM and LMM, Appellees 
(Petitioners). No. C-90-5

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Reversed and remanded 
with directions. 

John A. Masterson, 
Casper, for 
appellant.

Eric Distad, Casper, for 
appellees.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE 
and GOLDEN, JJ., and RAPER and BROWN, Ret. JJ.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     In this appeal, we 
review an order of the district court which terminated the parental rights of 
the natural father of two minor children. The termination was based upon his 
failure to have provided support for those children for a period of one 
year.

[¶2.]     We will vacate the 
order of the district court which terminated the parental rights of the natural 
father and remand to the district court with directions that the petition filed 
in this case be dismissed.

[¶3.]     This matter was 
initiated by the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights and 
petition for adoption on November 7, 1989. The prospective adoptive father and 
the children's mother alleged that the father had willfully failed or refused to 
contribute to the support of his minor children for a period of one year or more 
immediately prior to the filing of the petition. The petition did note a payment 
of $50.00 in February 1989 and a payment of $182.43 in October 1989. The 
petition was premised upon W.S. 1-22-110 (1977) (1988 Repl.)1, W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iv) (1977)2 and "other applicable Wyoming 
Statutes." The natural father objected to the petition; however, an order was 
entered which had only the effect of terminating the natural father's parental 
rights. No decree of adoption was entered.

[¶4.]     W.S. 1-22-110(a) 
provides in pertinent part:

     (a) In addition to the 
exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, the adoption of a child may be ordered 
without the written consent of the parents or putative father if the court finds 
that the nonconsenting parent or putative father is unknown and the affidavit 
required by W.S. 1-22-109(a)(iv) has been filed with the petition to adopt or if 
the court finds that the nonconsenting parent or putative father 
has:

* * * * * *

     (iv) Willfully failed 
to contribute to the support of the child for a period of one (1) year 
immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt[.]

[¶5.]     W.S. 14-2-309(a)(i) 
provides:

     (a) The parent-child 
relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is 
established by clear and convincing evidence:

     (i) The child has been 
left in the care of another person without provision for the child's support and 
without communication from the absent parent for a period of a least one (1) 
year. In making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications[.]

[¶6.]     We will not set out the 
arguments of the parties in detail. Suffice it to say that the issues raised 
dealt with sufficiency of the evidence, the best interests of the children, and 
the discretion of the district court to grant or deny the termination of 
parental rights. Because we have identified a fatal procedural flaw, it will not 
be necessary to address these issues.

[¶7.]     The district court's 
order was not clear as to which of the above-cited statutes it relied upon. In a 
matter as important as the termination of a parent's rights to his natural 
children, at least a degree of clarity which identifies the statute employed to 
terminate those rights is expected by this court. It would appear that the 
district court could not have relied on W.S. 14-2-309(a)(i) because, even though 
there was evidence that the natural father had not made child support payments 
for some time, the record also reflected that he visited his children regularly. 
During those regular visits the father and mother discussed the father's failure 
to make child support payments. W.S. 14-2-309(a)(i) requires a tandem finding of 
lack of support and lack of communication. See Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212, 1214 
(Wyo. 1990). 
Moreover, the petition filed was one that sought termination of the natural 
father's rights to his children and adoption by the prospective adoptive father. 
Such an adoption could only be achieved through W.S. 1-22-110. Thus, we conclude 
the district court relied upon W.S. 1-22-110 for the source of his jurisdiction 
to terminate the natural father's parental rights. W.S. 1-22-110 does not 
provide for termination of parental rights; rather, it provides for adoption 
without consent under the conditions set forth in that section. However, the 
final order is not at all consistent with that statute, or W.S. 1-22-111, 
because no disposition of the petition for adoption is made. Moreover, the 
evidence shows that the father paid child support with absolute regularity from 
April 1986 until November of 1988. The petition alleges, and W.S. 1-22-110 
requires, that the father failed to provide support for "one (1) year 
immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt." The father first 
became delinquent on December 1, 1988 or a reasonably short time thereafter. One 
year of failure to contribute to the support of the children did not occur until 
December 1, 1989. Thus, the petition filed on November 7, 1989, was premature.3 Adoption statutes are strictly 
construed and strict adherence to statutory procedures is required. Matter of 
Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d 550, 552-53 (Wyo. 1988). Under these circumstances, we must 
vacate the order of the district court and remand with directions that the 
petition be dismissed.

[¶8.]     Reversed and remanded 
with directions that the petition be dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1 This statute was amended 
effective July 1, 1990 (see 1990 Supp.), but the version in effect at the time 
the petition was filed governs in this case.

2 We must assume this to 
be a mistaken citation and that the mother and adoptive father intended to rely 
on W.S. 14-2-309(a)(i) (1977) (Jul. 1986 Pamp.).

3 Appellees' argument with 
respect to the timeliness of their petition is superficial. Apparently, their 
theory is that since appellant's last full payment was made November 4, 1988, 
and the petition to terminate was filed November 7, 1989, their petition was 
timely - it having been filed one year and three days after the last support 
payment. The flaw in appellees' theory is that the November 4, 1988 support 
payment satisfied appellant's support obligation until December of 1988. The 
one-year period of nonsupport did not begin to run against appellant until 
December of 1988. The filing of the petition to adopt without consent was at 
least three weeks premature.