Title: State ex rel. Bell v. Court of Common Pleas (Pfeiffer)

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-54.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-54 
THE STATE EX REL. BELL, APPELLANT, v. PFEIFFER, JUDGE, ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-54.] 
Judicial notice—Objection to magistrate’s decision constitutes sufficient 
opportunity to be heard—Prohibition—Improper assignment of judge not 
cognizable in prohibition. 
(No. 2011-1242—Submitted January 3, 2012—Decided January 12, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 10AP-490, 2011-Ohio-2539. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a judge, a magistrate, and certain attorneys and entities from proceeding 
in a case.  Because the prohibition action lacks merit, we affirm. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Facts 
Madison Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Bell 
{¶ 2} In February 2003, the Madison County Board of Commissioners 
filed an appropriation action in the Madison County Court of Common Pleas 
against appellant, Greg A. Bell, and his wife, Marcia C. Bell, according to the 
subsequent opinion of the court of appeals in the case, Madison Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. Bell, 12th Dist. No. CA2005-09-036, 2007-Ohio-1373.  In August 
2005, the common pleas court entered judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of 
the board of commissioners, which had found that the board was entitled to an 
easement on the Bells’ property and that the Bells were not entitled to any 
compensation for the easement. 
{¶ 3} The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.  Id.  
We did not accept the Bells’ discretionary appeal for review.  Madison Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. Bell, 114 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2007-Ohio-4285, 872 N.E.2d 953. 
Bell v. Nichols 
{¶ 4} According to Greg Bell’s complaint in the prohibition case now on 
appeal, in April 2008, the Bells filed a civil action against various defendants in 
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.  The defendants included the 
Madison County Board of Commissioners, Madison County Common Pleas 
Court Judge Robert D. Nichols, and the County Risk Sharing Authority, Inc. 
(“CORSA”)—an Ohio nonprofit corporation operating a county government joint 
self-insurance pool.  Attorneys Timothy S. Rankin and Craig J. Spadafore 
represented the board of commissioners and certain other Madison County 
defendants, and CORSA paid the legal fees to the attorneys for their 
representation.  Attorneys Linda L. Woeber and Lisa M. Zaring represented Judge 
Nichols, and their legal fees were paid by Columbia Casualty Company 
(“Columbia”), a private insurance company. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 5} In July 2008, Judge John P. Bessey recused himself from the case, 
and the administrative judge of the common pleas court transferred the case to 
Judge Beverly Y. Pfeiffer. 
{¶ 6} In April 2009, the common pleas court entered judgment in favor 
of the defendants.  The court determined that res judicata barred the Bells’ action 
challenging the Madison County Common Pleas Court’s judgment in Madison 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs.  On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  
Bell v. Nichols, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-438, 2009-Ohio-4851.  We did not accept 
the Bells’ discretionary appeal.  Bell v. Nichols, 124 Ohio St.3d 1445, 2010-Ohio-
188, 920 N.E.2d 375. 
{¶ 7} In February 2010, several of the defendants filed a joint motion to 
reactivate the case so that the court could address their motion for sanctions.  
Judge Pfeiffer reactivated the case, which had previously been stayed due to the 
Bells’ appeal, and referred the motion for sanctions to Magistrate Edwin L. 
Skeens. 
Prohibition Case 
{¶ 8} In May 2010, appellant, Greg A. Bell, filed a complaint in the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals against appellees, Judge Pfeiffer, Magistrate 
Skeens, attorneys Rankin, Spadafore, Woeber, and Zaring, CORSA, and 
Columbia.  Bell sought a writ of prohibition (1) to prevent Judge Pfeiffer and 
Magistrate Skeens from issuing any further orders in Bell v. Nichols, (2) to stop 
attorneys Rankin, Spadafore, Wober, and Zaring from filing any further 
proceedings on behalf of the Madison County Board of Commissioners or any 
Madison County employee in Bell v. Nichols until they complied with the 
applicable legal requirements for representation, and (3) to prevent CORSA and 
Columbia from usurping the authority of the Madison County Board of 
Commissioners in appointing legal counsel to represent the Madison County 
defendants in Bell v. Nichols.  Appellees filed motions to dismiss. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 9} The court of appeals magistrate issued a decision recommending 
that the court grant appellees’ motions to dismiss Bell’s complaint for a writ of 
prohibition.  Bell submitted objections to the magistrate’s decision, and in June 
2011, the court of appeals overruled the objections, adopted the magistrate’s 
decision with additional clarification and reasoning, and denied the writ. 
{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court upon Bell’s appeal as of right. 
Legal Analysis 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Standard 
{¶ 11} In his appeal as of right, Bell asserts that the court of appeals erred 
by failing to apply the proper standard of review in determining appellees’ Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
{¶ 12} Dismissal of Bell’s prohibition complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
was appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint were presumed 
true and all reasonable inferences were made in his favor, it appeared beyond 
doubt that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of 
prohibition.  State ex rel. DeGroot v. Tilsley, 128 Ohio St.3d 311, 2011-Ohio-231, 
943 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 5; State ex rel. CNG Financial Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio St.3d 
149, 2006-Ohio-5344, 855 N.E.2d 473, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 13} Notwithstanding Bell’s argument, the court of appeals magistrate 
cited the correct standard of review in her decision, which was later adopted by 
the court. 
Opportunity to Be Heard 
{¶ 14} Bell claims that he was denied due process of law because the 
court of appeals ignored his timely request to be heard on the propriety of taking 
judicial notice of the facts in the underlying Bell v. Nichols case as well as the 
facts in Madison Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Bell, the Madison County appropriation 
case that Bell and his wife sought to contest in Bell v. Nichols. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 15} “A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be 
heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter 
noticed.”  Evid.R. 201(E).  Bell was given the opportunity to be heard on this 
issue when he raised it in his objections to the magistrate’s decision.  No oral 
hearing was required.  See Davenport v. Big Brothers & Big Sisters of the Greater 
Miami Valley, Inc., 2d Dist. No. 23659, 2010-Ohio-2503, ¶ 26 (party requesting 
judicial notice was heard on the propriety of judicial notice through written 
briefs); cf. State v. Raymond, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-78, 2008-Ohio-6814, ¶ 20 
(defendant may file supplemental brief to take judicial notice of fact at appellate 
level). 
{¶ 16} Moreover, as the court of appeals concluded, because Bell 
acknowledged that the Bell v. Nichols case must be reviewed in the context of his 
prohibition case and that case directly challenged the Madison Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. Bell Madison County appropriation case, Bell waived his objection to 
the findings of fact that related to those cases because he invited any error in the 
court of appeals considering the prior litigation.  “ ‘[A] party is not permitted to 
take advantage of an error that he himself invited or induced the court to make.’ ”  
Webber v. Kelly, 120 Ohio St.3d 440, 2008-Ohio-6695, 900 N.E.2d 175, ¶ 7, 
quoting Davis v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 549, 552, 751 N.E.2d 1051. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, Bell’s claim lacks merit. 
Prohibition—Judicial Appellees 
{¶ 18} Bell next contends that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his 
prohibition claim against Judge Pfeiffer and Magistrate Skeens.  To be entitled to 
the requested writ of prohibition, Bell had to establish that the judge and 
magistrate were about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, the exercise of 
that power was unauthorized by law, and denying the writ would result in injury 
for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex 
rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7.  The judge and magistrate were exercising judicial power in the 
underlying case of Bell v. Nichols by considering appellees’ motion for sanctions. 
{¶ 19} For the remaining requirements, without a patent and unambiguous 
lack of jurisdiction, a court possessed of general subject-matter jurisdiction can 
determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an 
adequate remedy by appeal.  State ex rel. Pruitt v. Donnelly, 129 Ohio St.3d 498, 
2011-Ohio-4203, 954 N.E.2d 117, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 20} Bell argues that because Judge Pfeiffer was improperly assigned to 
preside over the Bell v. Nichols case when Judge Bessey recused himself, she and 
the magistrate patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the 
case.  A claim of improper assignment of a judge, however, cannot be cured in an 
extraordinary-writ action, and the party raising the claim has an adequate remedy 
by appeal.  State ex rel. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111, 2010-Ohio-2467, 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36; Keith 
v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470, 2008-Ohio-1443, 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14.  The 
common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the Bell v. Nichols case, 
including appellees’ motion for sanctions, so any meritorious challenge to 
whether a particular judge or magistrate of the common pleas court could rule in 
the case would merely make any judgment in that case voidable and thus subject 
to remedy by appeal rather than extraordinary writ.  See In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 
205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16. 
{¶ 21} Therefore, Bell’s prohibition claim against Judge Pfeiffer and 
Magistrate Skeens lacks merit. 
Prohibition—Nonjudicial Appellees 
{¶ 22} Finally, Bell asserts that the court of appeals erred in rejecting his 
prohibition claim against the nonjudicial appellees—attorneys Rankin, Spadafore, 
Woeber, and Zaring, CORSA, and Columbia. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 23} Bell’s claim lacks merit because none of these appellees exercised 
judicial or quasi-judicial power.  That is, Bell did not allege that any statute or 
other applicable law authorized these nonjudicial appellees to hear and determine 
controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling 
a judicial trial when the attorneys represented the Madison County defendants in 
Bell v. Nichols and CORSA and Columbia paid the attorneys for the 
representation.  State ex rel. Janosek v. Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency, 
123 Ohio St.3d 126, 2009-Ohio-4692, 914 N.E.2d 404, ¶ 1. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} The court of appeals did not err in denying Bell’s request for 
extraordinary relief in prohibition.  It appeared beyond doubt from his complaint 
that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of 
prohibition.  Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Phillip Wayne Cramer, for appellant. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and A. Paul Theis, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Judge Beverly Pfeiffer and 
Magistrate Edwin Skeens. 
 
Onda, LaBuhn, Rankin & Boggs Co., L.P.A., and Timothy S. Rankin, for 
appellees County Risk Sharing Authority, Inc., Timothy S. Rankin, and Craig J. 
Spadafore. 
 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, Linda L. Woeber, and Lisa M. Zaring, for 
appellees Linda L. Woeber, Lisa M. Zaring, and Columbia Casualty Agency. 
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