Title: Knox v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DECHANTA KNOX, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 685, 2010 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0807040237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 14, 2011 
Decided: October 07, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker (argued) of the Office of the Public Defender, for 
appellant. 
 
 
Kevin M. Carroll (argued) and Gregory E. Smith of the Department of 
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
2 
 
 
Police arrested Dechanta Knox on August 5, 2008 and charged her with 
three counts of issuing a bad check greater than $1,000.  After a jury convicted 
Knox of all offenses, the trial judge learned that Juror No. 8 was a victim in a 
pending criminal trial being prosecuted by the same Deputy Attorney General.  
Without examining the juror in court, the trial judge denied Knox’s motion for a 
new trial.  When a juror serving on a criminal trial is an alleged victim of a crime 
and is contemporaneously represented by the Attorney General’s office in the 
prosecution of the alleged perpetrator of the crime against the juror “victim,” a 
mere inquiry by deposition into whether the jury knew the prosecutor or anyone in 
his office insufficiently probes the ability of that “juror/victim” to render a fair and 
objective verdict as a matter of law.  Therefore, we reverse and remand. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 2, 2008, a grand jury indicted Dechanta Knox on three counts 
of issuing a bad check greater than $1,000.  Jury selection for the trial began on 
March 17, 2009.  During voir dire, the trial judge directed the following question 
to the potential jurors: “The State is represented by Kevin M. Carroll, a Deputy 
Attorney General, and the defendant is represented by Raymond D. Armstrong.  
Do you know the attorneys in this case or any other attorney or employee in the 
3 
 
office of the Attorney General or the defense counsel?”  None of the potential 
jurors, including Juror No. 8, responded positively.   
The trial judge did not ask whether any of the venire members were victims 
of a crime, and the parties did not uncover Juror No. 8’s status as an alleged victim 
in a pending criminal trial during voir dire.  As a result, the judge seated Juror No. 
8.  On March 18, 2009 the jury convicted Knox of all three charges.  Five days 
after Knox’s convictions, Deputy Attorney General Carroll spoke with Juror No. 8 
to discuss the juror’s pending criminal trial.  When they met face to face on March 
25, 2009, Carroll realized that the victim had been one of the jurors in Knox.  
Carroll immediately notified the judge of his connection with the juror and 
withdrew from the pending case. 
Further investigation revealed that Nickolas Dawkins-McMillian robbed 
Juror No. 8 in 2008.  Soon after the incident, the Department of Justice Victim 
Services Unit sent Juror No. 8 a letter, and the Department assigned Deputy 
Attorney General Kevin Carroll to the case.  After case review, the court scheduled 
the State v. Dawkins-McMillian trial for March 31, 2009—only 14 days after the 
Knox trial. 
On April 6, 2009, Knox filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that 
Juror No. 8 was a victim in a pending case being prosecuted by the same Deputy 
Attorney General who prosecuted her.  Rather than questioning the juror herself, 
4 
 
the trial judge ordered both defense counsel and the State to take Juror No. 8’s 
deposition.  The deposition covered whether Juror No. 8 knew the attorney general 
or anyone in his office but not whether he was influenced by his experience as a 
victim of a crime.  For reasons unclear in the record, one-and-a-half years after the 
conviction, the trial judge denied Knox’s motion for a new trial.  Knox appealed.   
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Knox contends that the trial judge erred by failing to grant a motion for a 
new trial after discovering that Juror No. 8 was a victim in a pending criminal case 
and by failing to conduct a sufficient post trial inquiry.  The integrity of the judicial 
process can be adversely affected when a juror seated on a criminal case is on 
notice and therefore conscious that the Attorney General’s Office will represent his 
interests in a pending trial.1  Here, we are concerned with juror bias and whether 
the trial judge performed a sufficient inquiry during voir dire and after the trial to 
determine the impartiality and fairness of Juror No. 8. 
A. As a victim in a pending criminal case, Juror No. 8 was biased. 
Customarily we would review a trial judge’s determination that a juror can 
fairly and objectively render a verdict for abuse of discretion.  Trial judges have 
discretion to make credibility determinations, but “the exercise of this discretion is 
                                                 
1 It is of little moment that the juror may not be able to recognize a particular deputy attorney 
general by name.   
 
5 
 
limited by the essential demands of fairness.”2  When the trial judge fails to 
conduct a sufficient inquiry into juror bias, the appellate court may be required to 
evaluate independently the fairness and impartiality of the juror.  In this case, 
judicial inquiry for juror bias was limited to a deposition taken outside the presence 
of the trial judge.  Therefore, the trial judge eschewed the opportunity to evaluate 
the juror’s demeanor and credibility, a crucial element in the determination of 
impartiality.3  To our knowledge, a decision to inquire into juror bias solely by 
deposition is without precedent and should not happen again.  In effect, the unique 
circumstances of this case suggest that our inquiry here can be analogized to 
summary judgment scrutiny, and therefore we review the trial judge’s 
determination of the juror’s objectivity de novo.  
Knox argues that Juror No. 8’s bias originated from his experience as an 
alleged robbery victim.  When a victim seeks justice for the crimes committed 
against him, the victim’s interests align with the Attorney General’s interests.  The 
victim has a personal appreciation for the role of prosecutors in bringing justice to 
criminals.  The Department of Justice’s focus on pursuing cases for “victims” 
through “victims’ services” reinforces the identification of “victims” with the 
Attorney General.  It would be irrational to ignore the influence of the pending 
                                                 
2 Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1041 (Del. 1985). 
3 Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 137 (1982). 
6 
 
joint endeavor on the juror’s objectivity in the Knox trial.  Even in factually 
unrelated cases, the victim’s experience with the Department of Justice, whether 
good or bad, previous or ongoing, will affect the victim’s perspective.  In these 
situations, courts must be wary of the victim’s ability to be fair and impartial in the 
role of a juror. 
Other courts have expressed concern regarding a victim’s bias in favor of the 
prosecution while serving on a jury.  This case bears a striking similarity to the 
situation analyzed in Mobley v. Florida.4  In Mobley, a juror denied that he had 
been a victim of a crime during voir dire but later remembered and notified the 
judge during trial.  On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal held that 
defense counsel’s motion to strike the juror from the panel and substitute an 
alternate should have been granted.5  Although the opinion did not explicitly 
discuss why having been a victim biased the juror, we can readily infer that the 
appellate court found sufficient bias to reverse the trial judge’s denial of defense 
counsel’s motion to strike the juror.   
On the other hand, Knox can be distinguished from cases where a juror was 
merely a potential witness for the prosecution.  In Commonwealth v. Frye,6 a juror 
                                                 
4 Mobley v. State, 559 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
5 Id. 
6 Commonwealth v. Frye, 909 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
7 
 
was scheduled to testify as Pennsylvania’s sole eyewitness in a different criminal 
case scheduled to begin the next day.  The defendant claimed that a situational 
relationship between the juror and the prosecutor’s office could be inferred from 
appearing as a prosecution witness, but the court held that the defendant did not 
present particularized evidence of juror bias.7  Unlike a witness who is indifferent 
to the resolution of a case and has no formal relationship with the prosecution, a 
victim is emotionally invested in the outcome and personally dependent on the 
attorney general to bring the person the victim perceives to be the wrongdoer to 
justice.  Therefore, Knox presents a case where the question of a juror’s objectivity 
poses a serious issue. 
An added layer of complexity involves Juror No. 8’s status as a victim in a 
pending criminal case.  Because the victim inevitably forms an impression, either 
positive or negative, about the attorney general’s handling of his case, that 
awareness clouds the victim’s judgment as a fair and impartial juror.  This problem 
intensifies when the Deputy Attorney General is the same in both cases.  As a 
victim of a robbery in a pending case, Juror No. 8 was conscious that the Attorney 
General’s Office would represent him and present evidence intended to convict a 
perpetrator in another case.  The fact that Juror No. 8’s case would go to trial only 
                                                 
7 Id. at 860. 
8 
 
14 days after Knox suggests an inference that the pending trial would be at the 
forefront of the juror’s mind. 
In violent crime cases, trial judges commonly ask venire members whether 
they or a family member have ever been a victim of a violent crime.8  The logic 
supporting this practice is based on a belief that the victims would be unable to 
separate their personal experiences with violent crime when adjudicating the 
current case.  A victim in a pending robbery trial may have a similar tendency 
when adjudicating a case about writing bad checks.  Both crimes involve the intent 
to permanently deprive another of property.  Although one is theft by force and the 
other is theft by deception, they both constitute malum prohibitum.  Furthermore, 
this policy rests not only on the similarity of the crimes but also on the victim’s 
personal experience with the criminal justice system and the prosecution.  Whether 
the victim believes that justice would be performed or that the defendant might 
escape punishment in his case, can impact the victim’s ability to serve as an 
impartial juror in a contemporaneous proceeding.   
This case is unique because the trial judge neither uncovered Juror No. 8’s 
status during voir dire nor conducted a post trial, in court hearing to ask the juror 
whether he was impartial despite his connection with the Attorney General’s 
Office.  If the trial judge had made those determinations, those findings would 
                                                 
8 See Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 484 (Del. 2003). 
9 
 
have been given deference.  With no questions on the record directed to Juror No. 
8’s ability to be impartial despite his experience, we find that Juror No. 8, a victim 
in a pending criminal trial, lacked the capacity to render a fair and impartial verdict 
in the Knox trial. 
B. Failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry into juror bias during voir dire and 
after the trial constitutes plain error. 
 
Defense counsel did not object to the Juror No. 8’s deposition9 nor request 
that the Superior Court judge conduct an evidentiary hearing in court.  Failure to 
make an objection at trial constitutes a waiver of the defendant's right to raise that 
issue on appeal, unless the error is plain.10  Plain error exists when the error was 
“so clearly prejudicial to [a defendant's] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very 
fairness and integrity of the trial process.”11  We apply the plain error standard to 
evaluate the denial of the motion for a new trial.  A precise statement of the plain 
error standard was set forth in Wainwright v. State: 12 
                                                 
9 Knox argues that the trial judge’s delegation of the inquiry to a deposition by the attorneys was 
inappropriate under Criminal Rule 24(a) which states that “The court shall itself conduct the 
examination of prospective jurors.”  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 24(a).  However, Criminal Rule 24(a) 
does not apply to post trial inquiries of juror misconduct and bias because the rule specifically 
references prospective jurors.  This implies that the rule is only applicable to voir dire.  
Therefore, Knox’s argument fails under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 24(a). 
10 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Goddard v. State, 382 A.2d 238 
(Del. 1977)). 
11 Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Del. 2001) (citing Dutton, 452 A.2d at 146). 
12 By way of example, the plain error standard of review articulated in the prosecutorial 
misconduct cases can be applied here because the policy of protecting against error that 
10 
 
Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must 
be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the 
fairness and integrity of the trial process. Furthermore, the doctrine of 
plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the 
face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their 
character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, 
or which clearly show manifest injustice.13 
 
In Baker v. State, we held that Wainwright helps us “determine whether instances 
of misconduct to which defense counsel did not object, and which the trial judge 
did not address sua sponte, are nonetheless so facially egregious that they require 
reversal of the defendant's convictions.”14 
Allowing Juror No. 8 to be empanelled in this case was so prejudicial that it 
jeopardized the fairness and integrity of the trial process.  In Jackson v. State, this 
Court held that juror impartiality must be maintained not only in the interest of 
fairness to the accused but also to assure the integrity of the judicial process.15  
Furthermore, as stated in Banther v. State, “jury bias, either actual or apparent, 
undermines society's confidence in its judicial system.”16  Not only was Juror No. 8 
                                                                                                                                                             
“adversely affects the integrity of the judicial process” is the same.  Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 
730, 738 (Del. 2002) (quoting Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 864 (Del. 1987)).  Although 
we review the judge’s holding for plain error, this case involves juror bias, not prosecutorial 
misconduct.   
 
13 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1986) (citations omitted). 
14 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 151 (Del. 2006). 
15 Jackson v. State, 374 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1977). 
16 Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 482 (Del. 2003). 
11 
 
conscious of the fact that the Attorney General’s Office would represent his 
interests as a victim two weeks after the Knox trial, but the trial judge did not 
conduct a sufficient inquiry during voir dire to determine whether any of the venire 
members were victims of a crime.  This question would have allowed the trial 
judge to follow up with whether Juror No. 8 could be fair and impartial given his 
connection to the Department of Justice.  Afterwards, the trial judge could strike 
the juror for cause, or defense counsel would, as a matter of certainty, exercise a 
peremptory challenge to strike Juror No. 8.   
Material defects apparent on the face of the record demonstrate plain error.  
First, Nickolas Dawkins-McMillian robbed Juror No. 8 in September of 2008.  
Second, the Victim Services Unit of the Attorney General’s office sent Juror No. 8 
a letter about their representation, and the Department of Justice assigned Deputy 
Attorney General Kevin Carroll to the case.  Third, the trial judge did not ask 
whether any of the venire members were victims of a crime.  Fourth, the trial judge 
did not conduct a post trial inquiry in court to determine whether Juror No. 8’s 
experience as a victim in a pending trial influenced or biased him during 
deliberations.  These facts create serious questions about Juror No. 8’s ability to be 
objective during the Knox trial.   
12 
 
This error deprived Knox of a substantial right.  Under the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution17 and Article I, §7 of the Delaware 
Constitution,18 all defendants have a fundamental right to trial by an impartial jury.  
The impartiality and indifference of jurors is essential to the proper functioning of 
the jury.19  This Court has held that “if only one juror is improperly influenced, a 
defendant in a criminal case is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury.”20  Juror No. 8’s awareness that the Attorney General’s Office represented 
him in a separate, pending trial, deprived Knox of the inalienable right to an 
impartial jury.  
Juror No. 8 did not respond affirmatively to the rather narrow voir dire 
question21 asking whether he knew Deputy Attorney General Carroll, the defense 
attorney, or anyone in their office.22  Furthermore, the trial judge did not ask Juror 
                                                 
17 U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury…”). 
18 Del. Const. art. I, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to…a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury…”). 
19 Banther, 823 A.2d at 481; see Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Del. 1985) (citing 
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). 
20 Hall v. State, 12 A.3d 1123, 1127 (Del. 2010) (quoting Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 951–52 
(Del. 1980)). 
21 State v. Knox, 2009 WL 2621078, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 24, 2009) (ORDER) (“Do you 
know the attorneys in this case or any other attorney or employee in the offices of the Attorney 
General or the defense counsel?”). 
22 Note, however, that the trial judge held that Juror No. 8’s voir dire answer was accurate 
because he had only received a letter from the Attorney General’s office at the time.  State v. 
13 
 
No. 8 during voir dire whether he could be impartial given his status as a victim in 
a pending criminal case for the rather obvious reason that there was no information 
to suggest that any member of the venire was a victim; or, for that matter that any 
practice in Superior Court existed to ask the question as a matter of routine in the 
trial of a nonviolent crime.  Because the trial judge failed to ask the venire 
members whether they were victims of a crime, Knox did not have a chance to 
probe Juror No. 8’s potential bias during voir dire.  Even if the trial judge had 
questioned Juror No. 8 and determined that Juror No. 8 could serve, any rational 
defense counsel would be alerted to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 
No. 8. 23 
After discovery of Juror No. 8’s role, the trial judge should have conducted 
an in court inquiry into the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial and should not 
have relied solely on a deposition conducted out of court by counsel limited to a 
single question; therefore, we must conclude that the inquiry into Juror No. 8’s 
objectivity was inadequate as a matter of law.    We hold that, in the future, all post 
trial inquiries into juror bias must be conducted in a proceeding before the judge. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Knox, No. 0807040237 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2010) (ORDER).  Although neither party nor 
the trial judge sought to place the Department of Justice Victims’ Services letter in the record, 
the record suggests that at least, in regard to the Deputy Attorney General’s name, the response 
was accurate.   
23 App. to Op. Br. at 49-56 (demonstrating that Knox did not use any of her peremptory 
challenges). 
14 
 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Juror No. 8 was conscious that the Attorney General’s Office would 
represent him in a pending trial and the unusual circumstances prevented Knox 
from exercising a preemptory challenge to strike Juror No. 8 from the jury, we 
hold the denial of the motion for a new trial without sufficient inquiry by the trial 
judge to constitute plain error.  The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.