Title: State v. Munir A. Hamdan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 113 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0056-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Munir A. Hamdan,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 14, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert C. Crawford   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCURED/DISSENTED: CROOKS, J., concurs/dissents (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Gordon P. 
Giampietro, Eric M. McLeod, Amy V. Kossoris and Michael Best & 
Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Chris J. 
Trebatoski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 113 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0056-CR   
(L.C. No. 
99 CM 11570) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Munir A. Hamdan,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Robert Crawford, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case involves an incident 
that occurred in the city of Milwaukee on the evening of 
November 26, 1999.  The defendant, Munir Hamdan (Hamdan), owned 
and operated a grocery store on West Capitol Drive.  As time 
came to close the store, Hamdan removed a handgun that he kept 
under the counter near the cash register and carried it into a 
back room for storage.  At some point he wrapped the gun in a 
plastic bag. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
2 
 
¶2 
While Hamdan was in the back room, two plain clothes 
Milwaukee police officers entered the store.  Hamdan's son 
pressed a buzzer, summoning his father, and Hamdan shoved the 
wrapped gun into his trouser pocket and went out to meet the 
visitors.  
¶3 
The officers explained that they were conducting a 
license check.  Hamdan led one of the officers to a glass-
enclosed area where he kept the cash register and showed him the 
licenses.  During the ensuing conversation, the officer asked 
Hamdan if he kept a gun in the store and, if so, where it was 
located.  Hamdan answered affirmatively and then pulled the 
wrapped gun from the front pocket of his trousers.  The officers 
confiscated the gun but did not arrest Hamdan or charge him with 
an offense.  
¶4 
Hamdan was subsequently charged with 
carrying a 
concealed weapon, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1999-
2000),1 and convicted at a jury trial.  He appealed his 
conviction and his case is before this court on bypass of the 
court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60. 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 provides: "Any person except a 
peace officer who goes armed with a concealed and dangerous 
weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."  A "peace officer" 
is defined as "any person vested by law with a duty to maintain 
public order or to make arrests for crime, whether that duty 
extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes."  
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(22).  A Class A misdemeanor is punishable by 
a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 9 
months, or both.  Wis. Stat. § 939.51(3)(a). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
3 
 
¶5 
We are asked to determine what effect, if any, a new 
amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution has on the State's 
ability to prosecute and punish the carrying of concealed 
weapons.  The new amendment, Article I, Section 25, declares 
that the people have the right to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes.2 
 
While 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
(the 
CCW 
statute) 
withstands a facial challenge to its constitutionality under the 
amendment, see State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶27, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___, we recognize that there are now circumstances in 
which a strict application of the CCW statute may result in an 
unreasonable limitation of the new constitutional right.  In 
Hamdan's case, we must determine whether the constitutional 
right to keep and bear arms for security or defense permitted 
Hamdan to carry a concealed weapon in his store under the 
circumstances of this case, notwithstanding the CCW statute. 
¶6 
We 
conclude 
that 
it 
was 
unreasonable 
and 
unconstitutional to apply the CCW statute to punish Hamdan on 
the facts as we understand them.  Strict application of the CCW 
statute effectively 
disallowed the 
reasonable 
exercise of 
Hamdan's constitutional right to keep and bear arms for the 
lawful purpose of security.  Considering the diminished public 
interest in applying the CCW statute in the context of Hamdan's 
conduct, we hold that the State's police power must yield in 
                                                 
2 Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution  
provides in its entirety:  "The people have the right to keep 
and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any 
other lawful purpose." 
No. 01-0056-CR    
4 
 
this case to Hamdan's reasonable exercise of the constitutional 
right to keep and bear arms for security.  This right, when 
exercised within one's own business and supported by a factual 
determination that no unlawful purpose motivated concealment of 
the weapon, will usually provide a constitutional defense to a 
person who is charged with violating the CCW statute.  Because 
Hamdan was not permitted to assert this defense, his challenge 
to the CCW statute was not fully addressed by the circuit court 
and his conviction under Wis. Stat. § 941.23 was not proper. 
I. BACKGROUND FACTS 
¶7 
Munir Hamdan had owned and operated the Capitol Foods 
grocery and liquor store since 1987.  The store was a family-run 
business, open 365 days a year and operated from 9:00 a.m. until 
8:00 or 9:00 p.m., depending on the time of year.  Hamdan's wife 
and 15-year-old son were present in the store on the evening of 
November 26, 1999.  The family had just completed a meal in a 
back room that functions as a kitchen and dining quarters for 
family members who congregate and work at the store.  It was 
after 8:00 p.m., the night after Thanksgiving, when the officers 
came in.  The front door of the store was not locked, but Hamdan 
insisted that he had begun the process of closing up.  
¶8 
This is the contextual information the jury was 
permitted to hear.  Most of Hamdan's proffered evidence was not 
admitted.  See infra ¶14.  For instance, the jury was not told 
that Hamdan's store is located in a high-crime neighborhood.  
According to Milwaukee police data, there had been at least 
three homicides, 24 robberies, and 28 aggravated batteries 
No. 01-0056-CR    
5 
 
reported that year in the small census tract that included 
Hamdan's store.3  There had been violent criminal episodes both 
inside and immediately outside Hamdan's store.  Between 1993 and 
1999, the store was the target of four armed robberies——three of 
which were successful——and the site of two fatal shootings.  
Hamdan claims that on one occasion an armed assailant held a gun 
to his head and actually pulled the trigger.  The weapon 
misfired and Hamdan survived.  In February 1997 Hamdan engaged 
in a struggle with an armed assailant who was attempting to rob 
the store.  In the course of this attack, Hamdan shot and killed 
the robber in self-defense.  The other homicide at the store 
occurred in April 1998.  Incidents of violent crime continued in 
and around the store after Hamdan's prosecution, including 
shootings that resulted in bullets striking the store.  
¶9 
As a result of these general and specific concerns for 
the safety of himself, his family, and his customers, and for 
the security of his property, Hamdan kept a handgun under the 
store's front counter next to the cash register during store 
hours.  The jury was not told the basis of Hamdan's motivation 
for possessing this weapon or that the handgun seized was the 
same handgun Hamdan used to defend himself from the February 
1997 attacker.  The jury was told that Hamdan kept the handgun 
in a locked area closed off from the public and that local law 
enforcement knew that Hamdan kept a gun for protection.  
                                                 
3 To put this in perspective, the 1990 census tract in which 
Hamdan's store is located (Census Tract 47) is one of 218 tracts 
in the city of Milwaukee.  
No. 01-0056-CR    
6 
 
¶10 The jury also learned from the State's only witness, 
Officer Bodo Gajevic, that "the majority of the store owners [in 
the area] have some type of weapon on the premises based on my 
experience."  In fact, Officer Gajevic explained that he often 
checked these weapons to see if they were operating properly. 
II. LITIGATION HISTORY 
¶11 Six days after being visited by the officers, Hamdan 
met with an assistant district attorney for Milwaukee County to 
discuss the incident.  After this conference, he was charged 
with carrying a concealed weapon.  Hamdan filed a motion to 
dismiss the charge, challenging the enforcement of the CCW 
statute on constitutional grounds.  He contended that prior 
court decisions broadly construing the phrase "goes armed" are 
no longer valid given the right to keep and bear arms conferred 
by Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Hamdan 
argued that his prosecution under the CCW statute would 
impermissibly infringe upon his rights under the newly enacted 
amendment.  Hamdan also contended that no presumption of 
constitutionality should be accorded the CCW statute because it 
significantly predated the constitutional amendment.4  
¶12 After the parties had briefed this issue, the circuit 
court denied Hamdan's motion.  Milwaukee County Circuit Judge 
Robert Crawford concluded that Wisconsin's ban against carrying 
                                                 
4 This court has rejected this argument regarding the 
presumption of constitutionality in State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 
¶¶12-18, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, which is also decided 
today. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
7 
 
concealed weapons is not an overly broad infringement of 
Hamdan's state constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  The 
court reasoned that, as part of the legislature's inherent 
police power, it could reasonably require that a storeowner 
openly display a handgun——for instance, by placing it in a 
holster——if the storeowner kept a handgun for security at his or 
her place of business.  
¶13 In preparation for trial, Hamdan and the State 
submitted competing motions in limine regarding the admission of 
evidence to support a defense of privilege.  The State contended 
that Hamdan should be prohibited from introducing evidence of 
crime statistics and prior robberies at the store, as well as 
Article I, Section 25, arguing that there is no privilege, as a 
matter of law, under the privilege statute (Wis. Stat. § 939.45) 
in these circumstances.  Hamdan argued to allow such evidence.  
He theorized that a privilege to carry a concealed weapon——a 
privilege relating to the defense of property and protection 
against retail theft or to necessity——was grounded in the new 
amendment.  Hamdan also submitted a proposed modified jury 
instruction for jury consideration of these matters.  
¶14 The circuit court denied Hamdan's motion to admit this 
evidence.  The court determined that there is no statutory 
privilege under § 939.45 allowing a person to go armed with a 
concealed weapon no matter what the threats to that person might 
be.  In reaching this conclusion, the court denied that the 
Wisconsin Constitution supports any common law privilege to 
carry concealed weapons in certain circumstances.  As a result, 
No. 01-0056-CR    
8 
 
the evidence was excluded and the final jury instructions 
contained no mention of Article I, Section 25, the history of 
crimes in and around Hamdan's store, or any defense of 
privilege.  
¶15 After a jury trial on July 11, 2000, Hamdan was found 
guilty of carrying a concealed weapon.  At sentencing, the court 
noted a need to clarify the reach of state gun laws and also 
remarked upon the jury's consternation in finding Hamdan guilty 
for violating the statute in this case.  The court ultimately 
fined Hamdan one dollar.  Hamdan sought appellate review, and we 
granted his petition to bypass the court of appeals. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 This case, along with the companion case of Cole, 
decided today, represents our first opportunity to interpret 
Wisconsin's new right to "keep and bear arms."5  Article I, 
Section 25 became part of the Wisconsin Constitution on November 
30, 1998.  It provides in its entirety: "The people have the 
right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, 
recreation or any other lawful purpose."   
¶17 We are asked to interpret this provision in the 
context of a challenge to Wisconsin's sweeping prohibition on 
                                                 
5 Article I, Section 25 was previously addressed by this 
court in State v. Gonzales, 2002 WI 59, 253 Wis. 2d 134, 645 
N.W.2d 264.  However, the sole issue in that case, as ultimately 
decided by this court, was whether Article I, Section 25 was in 
effect on November 6, 1998, the date when the offense at issue 
was committed.  We determined that it was not applicable at that 
time.  Id., ¶30. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
9 
 
the carrying of concealed weapons.  This prohibition is codified 
in Wis. Stat. § 941.23 as follows: "Any person except a peace 
officer who goes armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." 
¶18 Hamdan 
presents 
three 
related 
theories 
why 
his 
conviction under the CCW statute must be reversed.  First, he 
argues that the adoption of Article I, Section 25 requires a new 
construction of the CCW statute.  He contends that, properly 
construed, the statute no longer reaches his conduct.  Second, 
he argues that the adoption of Article I, Section 25 alters the 
defense of privilege and gives him a privilege defense on these 
facts.  Third, he argues that his conviction under the CCW 
statute impairs constitutional rights protected by Article I, 
Section 25 and cannot stand.  All three theories have at their 
core certain suppositions regarding the effect of the Article I, 
Section 25 on the CCW statute.  The first two theories claim 
that adoption of the amendment invalidates elements of prior 
case 
law 
interpreting 
both 
the 
CCW 
statute 
and 
its 
susceptibility 
to 
defenses 
of 
common 
law 
and 
statutory 
privilege.  Hamdan's third argument is a constitutional assault 
on the CCW statute based on an alleged need to reconcile the 
statute with the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. 
¶19 These 
theories 
present 
questions 
of 
law.  
Interpretation of the state constitution and interpretation of a 
state statute are questions of law that this court decides de 
novo, benefiting from the analysis of the circuit court.  State 
v. Gonzales, 2002 WI 59, ¶10, 253 Wis. 2d 134, 645 N.W.2d 264.   
No. 01-0056-CR    
10 
 
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
¶20 To convict a person of carrying a concealed weapon in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23, the State must prove three 
elements.  First, the State must show that a person who is not a 
peace officer went armed with a dangerous weapon.  State v. 
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 661, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999) (citing 
State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 433-34, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977)).  
Second, the State must show that the defendant was aware of the 
presence of the weapon.  Id. (citing Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 433).  
Third, the State must show that the weapon was concealed.  Id. 
(citing Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 432, 230 N.W. 76 
(1930)).  Over the years, every element of the statute has been 
vigorously litigated.   
¶21 Hamdan asks the court to withdraw a series of 
appellate decisions interpreting the first element, which is 
based on the statutory phrase "goes armed."  For more than 70 
years, Wisconsin courts have defined the phrase "goes armed" in 
the CCW statute to mean that "the weapon was on the defendant's 
person or that the weapon must have been within the defendant's 
reach and that the defendant was aware of the presence of the 
weapon."  Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 433-34 (citing Mularkey, 201 
Wis. at 432); see also State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 183-84, 
388 N.W.2d 565 (1986); Wis JI——Criminal 1335.   
¶22 One of the leading cases in the interpretation of the 
"goes armed" element is State v. Keith, 175 Wis. 2d 75, 498 
N.W.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1993).  In Keith, the court of appeals 
upheld the CCW conviction of a woman who was carrying a 
No. 01-0056-CR    
11 
 
concealed weapon while she was standing on the front porch of 
the duplex where she was living.  Id. at 77.6  Rejecting the 
defendant's argument that the "goes armed" language requires a 
finding of locomotion, the court held that "there is no separate 
element requiring that a person actually go somewhere, and, 
therefore, carrying a concealed weapon 'does not necessarily 
import the idea of locomotion.'"  Id. at 79 (quoting 94 C.J.S. 
Weapons § 8a (1956)). 
¶23 Hamdan contends that Keith was wrongly decided.  He 
argues that the CCW statute's use of the term "goes armed" 
necessitates a requirement of some locomotion on the part of a 
defendant.  Comparing CCW statutes from other states that merely 
prohibit "carrying" concealed weapons, Hamdan reasons that the 
"goes armed" language of Wis. Stat. § 941.23 represents an 
implied exception for a person's residence or place of business.  
                                                 
6 In Keith, police officers came into contact with the 
defendant after she set off a burglar alarm while trying to gain 
access to her friend's house where she had been staying.  State 
v. Keith, 175 Wis. 2d 75, 77, 498 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1993).  
When the officers ran a routine check on her name, they 
discovered that there were two outstanding warrants for her 
arrest.  Id.  Keith was arrested and she voluntarily informed 
the police that she had a gun in her purse.  Id.   
The facts are clear that the defendant did not step out 
onto the porch from inside the duplex.  She was present on the 
porch after returning from a drive-in theater.  Id.  According 
to the State's brief, she told police that she had carried the 
gun in her purse during her evening out because "you know how 
men are."  Thus, the facts underlying the opinion do not make 
the Keith case an ideal vehicle for interpreting a homeowner's 
right to possess a firearm. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
12 
 
Under this view, Hamdan did not "go armed" while carrying his 
weapon because he never left his own store.   
¶24 We reject Hamdan's proposed construction of the CCW 
statute and continue to adhere to prior interpretations of the 
"goes armed" language.  While Hamdan emphasizes definitions of 
the verb "go" that discuss movement from point to point and the 
act of departure, other definitions of "go" or "goes" are more 
germane to the conduct intended to be prohibited.  These 
definitions equate the act of going armed with the state or 
condition of performing an action.7  To illustrate, if Hamdan 
were to come out of the back room without wearing shoes and 
socks, he could not deny that he was "going" barefoot.   
¶25 Even 
if 
we 
were 
to 
accept 
"locomotion" 
as 
a 
requirement, we fail to see how Hamdan's act of moving around 
his store would not be an act of "locomotion" under a common 
understanding of the term.8  We would certainly have no problem 
finding that a customer was "going armed" if the customer moved 
around Hamdan's store with a pistol concealed in his trousers.  
More problematic is the fact that Hamdan's "locomotion" theory 
could limit application of the CCW statute in public areas where 
                                                 
7 We note the definitions of "go" that include "To pursue a 
certain course," "To be in a certain condition," and "To 
continue to be in a certain condition or continue an activity."  
The American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language 775 (3d 
ed. 1992).   
8 "Locomotion" is defined as: "The act of moving from place 
to place" or "[t]he ability to move from place to place."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language 1056 (3d 
ed. 1992).   
No. 01-0056-CR    
13 
 
the weapon or the person was not moving.  Hamdan contends 
otherwise.  While the concept of locomotion requires movement 
from place to place, it does not delineate what spatial 
dimension is required of a "place."  Hamdan defines "place" as 
being a particular structure (namely, one's home or place of 
business), and he suggests that only movement outside of that 
structure is "locomotion" or the act of "going."  We find no 
support for this construction of "goes armed" in the text of the 
statute.   
¶26 Finally, we note that at least one state with a CCW 
statute that similarly prohibits a person from "going armed" 
with a concealed weapon has exceptions for those who carry 
concealed weapons in their own home or place of business.  See 
Iowa Code Ann. §§ 724.4(1), (4)(a) (West 1993).  If the concept 
of going armed precluded application of a CCW law while a person 
was in or on the person's own property, these exceptions would 
be superfluous. 
¶27 We decline to adopt a new construction of the CCW 
statute based on a revised characterization of the phrase "goes 
No. 01-0056-CR    
14 
 
armed."  We will not rewrite the CCW statute in the troublesome 
manner Hamdan advocates.9   
¶28 During the time that Hamdan came from the back room 
and engaged in conversation with the police officers, he was 
going armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon.  Because the 
jury concluded that Hamdan was aware of the weapon's presence 
and that the weapon was hidden or concealed from ordinary view, 
we conclude that Hamdan violated the CCW statute. 
V. DEFENSE OF PRIVILEGE 
¶29 Hamdan's second argument is that his conduct was 
privileged under Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1), (2), and (6).  Hamdan 
maintains that this court's holdings in State v. Dundon, 226 
Wis. 2d 654, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999), and State v. Nollie, 2002 WI 
4, 249 Wis. 2d 538, 638 N.W.2d 280, which significantly limited 
the defense of privilege for CCW offenses, are now suspect by 
virtue of the adoption of Article I, Section 25. 
¶30 Hamdan's 
reliance 
on § 939.45(1) 
and 
(2) 
clearly 
fails.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.45(1) permits a defendant charged 
                                                 
9  Interpreting the "goes armed" language in the manner 
suggested by Hamdan would, arguably, avoid the constitutional 
problems with the CCW statute discussed in this opinion.  Of 
course, it is a cardinal rule that courts should avoid 
interpreting 
a 
statute 
in 
a 
way 
that 
would 
render 
it 
unconstitutional when a reasonable interpretation exists that 
would render the legislation constitutional.  See Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 667, 
586 N.W.2d 872 (1998).  However, the prerequisite of this rule 
is that the second possible interpretation is reasonable.  We do 
not find Hamdan's offered interpretation to be reasonable; 
therefore, it cannot be used to cure a possible constitutional 
defect in the statute. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
15 
 
with a crime a defense of privilege "[w]hen the actor's conduct 
occurs under circumstances of . . . necessity so as to be 
privileged under s. . . . 939.47."  Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1).10  
Hamdan claims that the unpredictable nature of violence in the 
neighborhood immediately surrounding his store subjects him and 
his family to risks that make it necessary for him to keep a 
concealed weapon in his store.  This may be true.  However, the 
defense of necessity, by its plain language, exists only when a 
defendant acts in response to "natural physical forces," not 
human forces that pose potential dangers.  See State v. Olsen, 
99 Wis. 2d 572, 576, 299 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1980); see also 
Drane v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 208, 211 n.4, 138 N.W.2d 273 (1965).  
The existence of random, albeit frequent, criminal conduct in 
one's vicinity does not qualify as a "natural physical force" 
under the law.  See Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 666-67. 
¶31 Similarly, § 939.45(2), 
which 
incorporates 
by 
reference the privileges of self-defense, defense of others, 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.47 provides: 
Pressure of natural physical forces which causes 
the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is 
the only means of preventing imminent public disaster, 
or imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or 
another and which causes him or her so to act, is a 
defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that 
act, except that if the prosecution is for first-
degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime 
is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. 
Hamdan relies only on the necessity defense permitted under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1); he does not advance a defense premised 
on coercion, which is also recognized under § 939.45(1). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
16 
 
defense of property, and protection against retail theft, is not 
available to Hamdan.11  In Nollie, we refused to recognize a 
privilege to carry a concealed weapon without satisfying the 
stringent requirements of statutory self-defense.12  Nollie, 249 
Wis. 2d 538, ¶27.  We held that the defendant's assertions that 
he was in a high crime neighborhood, that he was in a vulnerable 
position while changing his tire, and that he was faced with a 
potential threat (four young men were allegedly nearby, being 
loud and profane) were insufficient to constitute an imminent 
and specific threat under the self-defense privilege statute.  
Nollie, 249 Wis. 2d 538, ¶23-25. 
¶32 Hamdan argues that the concerns that inspired him to 
carry a concealed weapon in his store were specific and 
                                                 
11 These defenses are located within Wis. Stat. §§ 939.48 
and 939.49. 
12 In Nollie, the defendant alleged that he took a gun out 
of the trunk of his car, loaded it, and put it in his waistband 
when he got out of the car to change his tire in a dangerous 
neighborhood, because he was worried that four men standing on 
the corner might try to rob him.  State v. Nollie, 2002 WI 4, 
¶8, 249 Wis. 2d 538, 638 N.W.2d 280.  Nollie had been the victim 
of several crimes in the neighborhood, including an armed 
robbery in which he had been physically assaulted.  Id., ¶7.  We 
held that to sustain a claim of self-defense the defendant must 
show that: 
(1) the defendant had an actual and reasonable belief 
that 
there 
was 
an 
actual 
or 
imminent 
unlawful 
interference with the defendant's person; (2) the 
defendant had the actual and reasonable belief that 
the threat or use of force was necessary; and (3) that 
the defendant used only such threat or force as he 
actually and reasonably believed was necessary. 
Id., ¶19 (citing Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1)). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
17 
 
imminent, based on his past experiences with crime and the high 
incidence of crime in the neighborhood, thus making his actions 
privileged.  Nollie made it clear, however, that such general 
assertions are insufficient to support a defense of privilege.  
As we stated, "To allow an individual to claim self-defense 
under such circumstances would essentially allow anyone walking 
in a 'high crime neighborhood' to conceal a weapon——a situation 
that . . . would eviscerate the legislature's intent in making 
carrying a concealed weapon a crime."  Id., ¶26.13 
¶33 We have little doubt that the dangers facing Hamdan 
while operating his store were genuine.  However, he did not 
face specific and imminent threats on the night of November 26, 
1999, merely because of the location of his store in a high-
crime neighborhood and his past victimization by criminal 
activity.  The statutory elements of sections 939.48 and 939.49 
contemplate the actual presence of an unlawful interference, 
which was absent in this case.14 
                                                 
13 The incident at issue in Nollie occurred on April 1, 
1999, after the enactment of Article I, Section 25.  Nollie, 249 
Wis. 2d 538, ¶3.  However, no constitutional argument was raised 
by the parties and, thus, there was no discussion of the 
amendment's effect on the statutory privilege of self-defense 
relative to the CCW statute. 
14 We 
need 
not 
speculate 
on 
the 
possible 
factual 
circumstances under which the offense of carrying of a concealed 
weapon would justify a privilege defense under § 939.45.  See 
Nollie, 249 Wis. 2d 538, ¶21.  We merely note that the facts of 
Hamdan's case are not amenable to any defense of privilege under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
18 
 
¶34 Finally, 
Hamdan 
relies 
upon § 939.45(6), 
which 
provides for a defense when "the actor's conduct is privileged 
by the statutory or common law of this state."  He asserts 
either a common law privilege, such as the one this court 
recognized in State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 556 N.W.2d 701 
(1996),15 or a "statutory" privilege based upon Article I, 
Section 25.  
¶35 In Coleman we recognized a narrow common law privilege 
to the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  This 
privilege requires a defendant to prove multiple factors.  
Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 210-211.16  However, in Dundon, 226 Wis. 
                                                 
15 The defendant in Coleman was arrested as a felon in 
possession of a firearm, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), 
when police discovered him with a firearm subsequent to a raid 
on 
his 
girlfriend's 
apartment. 
 
State 
v. 
Coleman, 
206 
Wis. 2d 199, 204, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996).  The defendant claimed 
that on a prior occasion armed robbers invaded the apartment and 
the defendant had escaped through the window to call the police.  
Id.  The defendant argued that, when the police came through the 
door on the day of his arrest, he believed that history was 
repeating itself and so he grabbed a gun in self-defense.  Id.  
The court held that Coleman was privileged in his actions.  Id. 
at 210. 
16 The Coleman test for a defendant wishing to invoke the 
common law privilege for felons in possession of a firearm is: 
[t]he defendant must prove: (1) the defendant was 
under an unlawful, present, imminent, and impending 
threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded 
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury, or the 
defendant reasonably believes he or she is under such 
a threat; (2) the defendant did not recklessly or 
negligently place himself or herself in a situation in 
which it was probable that he or she would be forced 
to possess a firearm; (3) the defendant had no 
reasonable, legal alternative to possessing a firearm, 
or 
reasonably 
believed 
that 
he 
or 
she 
had 
no 
No. 01-0056-CR    
19 
 
2d at 671, we declined to apply the Coleman test to the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon.  In Dundon, the manager of a gas 
station was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon after he 
placed a handgun in his waistband while transporting money from 
his station to a bank.  Id. at 657-58.  The defendant asserted 
that he was privileged to carry a concealed weapon based upon 
his prior experiences as a victim of assault.  The court 
declined to link the privilege under Coleman to the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon or to find any common law privilege 
to CCW offenses.  Id. at 677.  In doing so, we noted that, in 
1878, the legislature repealed the exact type of privilege 
sought by Dundon.  Id. at 671-72.  It is now recognized that the 
holding 
in 
Dundon 
forecloses 
application 
of 
the 
Coleman 
privilege to CCW offenses.  See Nollie, 249 Wis. 2d 538, ¶18.  
The adoption of a constitutional amendment recognizing the right 
to keep and bear arms does not affect the soundness of the 
preceding analysis. 
¶36 Notwithstanding the absence of a common law privilege, 
Hamdan maintains that Article I, Section 25 provides a basis in 
                                                                                                                                                             
alternative; in other words, the defendant did not 
have a chance to refuse to possess the firearm and 
also to avoid the threatened harm, or reasonably 
believed that he or she did not have such a chance; 
(4) a direct causal relationship may be reasonably 
anticipated between possessing the firearm and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm; (5) the defendant 
did not possess the firearm for any longer than 
reasonably necessary.  
Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 210-211. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
20 
 
law to support a "statutory" privilege.  If we assumed that the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
could 
serve 
as 
the 
basis 
for 
a 
"statutory" privilege under § 939.45(6), we would still conclude 
that the constitution would have to spell out the scope of the 
privilege——the nexus between the privilege and the specific 
criminal conduct——to be applicable.  Article I, Section 25 
recognizes a right to keep and bear arms generally, but it does 
not express a privilege to exercise that right in a particular 
manner 
or 
particular 
circumstance. 
 
These 
are 
essential 
attributes of a statutory privilege.  Article I, Section 25 does 
not create a "statutory" privilege to the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon. 
¶37 Under the facts of this case and in the context of the 
CCW statute, we do not believe that modifying the principles 
underlying 
the 
law 
of 
privilege, 
as 
codified 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45 and interpreted in prior decisions of this 
court, is the appropriate method of effectuating the rights 
guaranteed under Wisconsin's right to keep and bear arms 
amendment. 
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY "AS APPLIED" 
 
¶38 The adoption of Article I, Section 25 did not affect 
prior judicial interpretations of the CCW statute or the 
availability of privilege defenses for CCW crimes, but it did 
create an obligation to protect rights guaranteed by the 
amendment. 
¶39 The State's broad police power to regulate the 
ownership and use of firearms and other weapons continues, 
No. 01-0056-CR    
21 
 
notwithstanding Article I, Section 25.  Nonetheless, the 
amendment's broad declaration of the right to keep and bear arms 
inevitably impacts the exercise of that power.  In this state, 
constitutional rights do not expand the police power; they 
restrict the police power.  See Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 
564, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); see also Robert Dowlut & Janet A. 
Knoop, State Constitutions and The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 
7 Okla. City U. L. Rev 177, 185 (1982) (describing the general 
application of this principle).  Thus, courts may limit the 
broad application of the CCW statute in those circumstances 
where limitation is necessary to narrowly accommodate the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes.17 
¶40 The nature of this limitation is well established.  
Faced 
with 
similar 
challenges, 
other 
states 
applying 
a 
reasonableness standard in the context of regulating firearms 
have recognized that "[t]he police power cannot [ ] be invoked 
in such a manner that it amounts to the destruction of the right 
to bear arms."  State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Wyo. 
                                                 
17 See Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 173 (Ohio 1993) 
("[There] must be some limitation on the right to bear arms to 
maintain an orderly and safe society while, at the same time, 
moderating restrictions on the right so as to allow for the 
practical availability of certain firearms for purposes of 
hunting, recreational use and protection."). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
22 
 
1986) (emphasis added).18  Some states have employed language 
less demanding than "destruction," assuring that "regulations or 
restrictions [on a constitutional right to bear arms for 
defensive purposes] do not frustrate the guarantees of the 
constitutional provision."  City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 
S.E.2d 139, 145 (W. Va. 1988) (emphasis added);19 see also State 
v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Or. 1980) (stating that regulations 
                                                 
18 See also Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 564 (1882) (holding 
that the legislature may regulate the mode of carrying any arms 
that the citizens have the constitutional right to keep and bear 
as long as it is done "in a reasonable manner, so as, in effect, 
not to nullify the right, nor materially embarass [sic] its 
exercise"); Trinen v. City & County of Denver, 53 P.2d 754, 757 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2002) ("A city or state may not, in the name of 
police power, enact legislation that renders constitutional 
provisions nugatory.") (citing People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 
(Colo. 1975)); People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245, 246-47 (Mich. 
1931) (holding that police power to regulate weapons is "subject 
to the limitation that its exercise be reasonable, and it cannot 
constitutionally result in the prohibition of the possession of 
those arms which, by the common opinion and usage of law-abiding 
people, are proper and legitimate to be kept upon private 
premises for the protection of person and property"); State v. 
Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 530 (1881); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 
595, 598 (Neb. 1989); State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 11 (N.C. 
1968) ("any statute or construction of a common-law rule, which 
would amount to a destruction of the right to bear arms would be 
unconstitutional"); State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D. 
1987) (state constitution's protection of the right to keep and 
bear arms, while not absolute and subject to reasonable 
regulation under the State's police power, "prevents the 
negation of the right to keep and bear arms"). 
19 The Buckner opinion also described the reasonableness of 
any impairment of the right to bear arms by stating that "the 
legitimate governmental purpose in regulating the right to bear 
arms cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle the exercise 
of this right where the governmental purpose can be more 
narrowly achieved."  State v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 146 (W. 
Va. 1988). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
23 
 
restricting the possession or manner of carrying personal 
weapons are valid "if the aim of public safety does not 
frustrate the guarantees of the state constitution"); State v. 
Boyce, 658 P.2d 577, 579 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a 
limitation on the right to bear arms is permissible when the 
means chosen to protect the public "do[es] not unreasonably 
interfere with the right").  Case law reveals that while the 
right to bear arms for lawful purposes is not an absolute, 
neither is the State's police power when it eviscerates this 
constitutionally protected right. 
¶41 Article I, Section 25 does not establish an unfettered 
right to bear arms.  Clearly, the State retains the power to 
impose reasonable regulations on weapons, including a general 
prohibition on the carrying of concealed weapons.  However, the 
State may not apply these regulations in situations that 
functionally disallow the exercise of the rights conferred under 
Article I, Section 25.  The State must be especially vigilant in 
circumstances where a person's need to exercise the right is the 
most pronounced.  If the State applies reasonable laws in 
circumstances that unreasonably impair the right to keep and 
bear arms, the State's police power must yield in those 
circumstances to the exercise of the right.  The prohibition of 
conduct that is indispensable to the right to keep (possess) or 
bear (carry) arms for lawful purposes will not be sustained. 
¶42 Hamdan insists that enforcement of the CCW statute on 
the facts of his case unreasonably impaired his constitutional 
rights.  He contends that, even if the CCW statute technically 
No. 01-0056-CR    
24 
 
prohibited his conduct and even if his conduct was not 
privileged, it was still unconstitutional to apply the statute 
in the circumstances of his case.  Hamdan argues that the right 
to bear arms provision guarantees, at a minimum, the right to 
carry a concealed weapon on one's own business property for 
defense or security when there is a compelling need to do so.  
The State, on the other hand, maintains that the addition of 
Article I, Section 25 has had little, if any, impact on the 
constitutional validity of applying the CCW statute.  It argues 
that while Hamdan may have the right to possess a weapon in his 
store for the lawful purposes of security and defense, he must 
continue to possess that weapon openly. 
¶43 We 
assess 
the 
merits 
of 
Hamdan's 
"as 
applied" 
challenge by considering the facts of his case, not hypothetical 
facts in other situations.  See State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, 
¶12, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90; State v. Janssen, 219 
Wis. 2d 362, 371, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  The State prosecuted 
Hamdan for carrying a handgun in his trousers pocket, in his own 
small store, at the time he did, and around the persons he did.  
The issue is whether the State may restrict the carrying of a 
concealed firearm in these circumstances without unreasonably 
infringing Hamdan's rights under Article I, Section 25. 
¶44 As we explained in Cole, when an exercise of the 
State's police power implicates the constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms, the validity of the exercise is measured by the 
reasonableness of the restriction on the asserted right.  Cole, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶26 (citing Jeffrey Monks, The End of Gun 
No. 01-0056-CR    
25 
 
Control or Protection Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the New 
Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on State Gun Control 
Laws, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 275 n.147).  This same analytical 
approach guides judicial determination of whether a particular 
application of an otherwise reasonable restriction on the right 
to bear arms is still constitutionally valid. 
¶45 In analyzing reasonableness, one must balance the 
conflicting rights of an individual to keep and bear arms for 
lawful purposes against the authority of the State to exercise 
its police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens.  See Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1990); People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (Colo. 
1975); 
Rawlings 
v. 
Ill. 
Dep't 
of 
Law 
Enforcement, 
391 
N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (balancing the sufficiency 
of the individual's interest in possessing arms with the 
legislation restricting exercise of that interest); City of 
Seattle v. Montana, 919 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Wash. 1996); Buckner, 
377 S.E.2d at 148-49; see also Michael D. Ridberg, The Impact of 
State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun 
Control Legislation, 38 U. Chic. L. Rev. 185, 202-03 (1970) 
("The scope of permissible regulation in states with arms 
provisions is dependent upon a balancing of the public benefit 
to be derived from the regulation against the degree to which it 
frustrates the purposes of the provision.").  In State v. 
McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1986), the Wyoming Supreme Court 
explained this need for balance as follows: 
No. 01-0056-CR    
26 
 
[A] balance must be struck between the individual's 
right to exercise each constitutional guarantee and 
society's right to enact laws which will ensure some 
semblance 
of 
order. 
 
As 
these 
interests 
will 
necessarily conflict, the question then becomes which 
party should accept the encroachment of its right.  
The solution to the conflict is judicial in nature.  
Courts must be and are, whether willingly or not, the 
ultimate arbiters as to whether or not there is, in a 
particular 
case, 
an 
unwarranted 
invasion 
of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.   
Id. at 1237-38.  We agree with this characterization of the 
constitutional inquiry, including the indispensable role of 
courts in determining whether enforcement of the CCW statute has 
unreasonably impaired the constitutional right. 
¶46 Under its broad police power, Wisconsin may regulate 
firearms.  It may regulate the time, place, and manner in which 
firearms are possessed and used.  The concealed weapons statute 
is a restriction on the manner in which firearms are possessed 
and used.  See State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, 244 Wis. 2d 582, 628 
N.W.2d 820.  It is constitutional.  We hold that only if the 
public benefit in this exercise of the police power is 
substantially outweighed by an individual's need to conceal a 
weapon in the exercise of the right to bear arms will an 
otherwise valid restriction on that right be unconstitutional as 
applied. 
¶47 We begin by examining the manner in which the State 
prohibits the carrying of concealed weapons and whether its 
reasons for doing so are strong in the context of Hamdan's 
conduct.  This inspection will reveal the comparative burden the 
No. 01-0056-CR    
27 
 
CCW statute imposes upon the rights declared in Article I, 
Section 25. 
¶48 Wisconsin's current CCW statute is very broad.  It is 
essentially a strict liability offense.20  The legislature has 
not authorized any statutory defenses or exceptions (other than 
peace officers) to the broad prohibition found in the statute.  
As presently construed, the statute prohibits any person, except 
a peace officer, from carrying a concealed weapon, regardless of 
the circumstances, including pursuit of one of the lawful 
purposes enumerated in Article I, Section 25.  In addition, the 
statute reaches unloaded firearms as well as loaded ones, see 
Wis. Stat. § 939.22(10) (defining a "dangerous weapon" under the 
CCW statute), and applies to any weapon within a individual's 
reach, see Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 433-34, if the person knows the 
weapon is present. 
¶49 The breadth of § 941.23 is better appreciated by 
comparing it with the law in other jurisdictions.  In 1998 
Wisconsin joined 43 other states that have established a 
                                                 
20 The only mens rea element of the offense is that the 
defendant must be aware of the weapon's presence.  See State v. 
Nollie, 2002 WI 4, ¶13 n.3, 249 Wis. 2d 538, 638 N.W.2d 280. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
28 
 
constitutional right to bear arms.21  However, Wisconsin remains 
one of only six states that generally disallow any class of 
ordinary citizens to lawfully carry concealed weapons.  See J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 523, 525 n.4 (2001).22  Each of the five other states 
                                                 
21 Compare Ala. Const. art. I, § 26; Alaska Const. art. I, 
§ 19; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 26; Ark. Const. art. II, § 5; 
Colo. Const. art. II, § 13; Conn. Const. art. I, § 15; Del. 
Const. art. I, § 20; Fla. Const. art. I, § 8(a); Ga. Const. art. 
I, § 1, para. VIII; Haw. Const. art. I, § 17; Idaho Const. art. 
I, § 11; Ill. Const. art. I, § 22; Ind. Const. art. I, § 32; 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 4; Ky. Const. Bill of Rights § 1, 
para. 7; La. Const. art. I, § 11; Me. Const. art. I, § 16; Mass. 
Const. Part the First, art. xvii; Mich. Const. art. I, § 6; 
Miss. Const. art. III, § 12; Mo. Const. art. I, § 23; Mont. 
Const. art. II, § 12; Neb. Const. art. I, § 1; Nev. Const. art. 
I, § 11(1); N.H. Const. art. Part First, art. 2-a; N.M. Const. 
art. II, § 6; N.C. Const. art. I, § 30; N.D. Const. art. I, § 1; 
Ohio Const. art. I, § 4; Okla. Const. art. II, § 26; Or. Const. 
art. I, § 27; Pa. Const. art. I, § 21; R.I. Const. art. I, § 22; 
S.C. Const. art. I, § 20; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 24; Tenn. 
Const. art. I, § 26; Tex. Const. art. I, § 23; Utah Const. art. 
I, § 6; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 16; Va. Const. art. I, § 13; 
Wash. Const. art. I, § 24; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22; Wyo. 
Const. art. I, § 24.  
As of 2002, six states do not have a constitutional 
provision affording residents a right to bear arms: California, 
Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York. 
22 In addition to Wisconsin, the only other states that 
disallow the opportunity to obtain permits to lawfully carry 
concealed weapons are Illinois (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1 
(2000)), Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030 (West 1995)), 
Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1202 (1995)), Kansas (Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-4201 (1995)), and Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.12 
(West 1997)).  Wilkinson includes the District of Columbia in 
his list of jurisdictions, along with New Mexico. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
29 
 
(Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Ohio) also has a 
constitutional provision granting the right to keep and bear 
arms. 
¶50 Upon 
closer examination, 
however, 
there are few 
similarities between Wisconsin's CCW law and the CCW laws of 
these other five states.  First, the Kansas right to bear arms 
amendment is one of only two state right to bear arms provisions 
that has been interpreted to confer a collective right, as 
opposed to an individual right, to bear arms.23  Under such an 
interpretation, there would appear to be no constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                             
New Mexico recently enacted a concealed carry permitting 
system.  See 2003 N.M. S.B. 23.  However, even before this 
permitting was allowed, New Mexico's concealed carry prohibition 
exempted violations of the law in certain circumstances.  See 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-2(A)(1) (Michie Supp. 2002) (stating that 
it is not unlawful to carry a concealed loaded firearm "in the 
person's residence or on real property belonging to him as 
owner, lessee, tenant or licensee"). 
Vermont does not have a statute expressly authorizing the 
carrying of concealed weapons, but the Vermont Supreme Court has 
expansively read the state's right to bear arms amendment, 
Chapter I, Article 16 of the Vermont Constitution, as requiring 
the ability to carry concealed firearms.  State v. Rosenthal, 55 
A. 610, 610 (Vt. 1903).  Vermont currently prohibits both the 
open and concealed carrying of a weapon only if an individual 
has "the intent or avowed purpose of injuring a fellow man."  
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4003 (1998). 
23 Some commentators suggest that the Kansas right to bear 
arms provision was construed to confer an individual right to 
bear arms in Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145 (Kan. 1979).  
See David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the 
Second Amendment, 29 N. Ky. L Rev. 823, 846-847 (2002) 
(discussing how Kansas and Massachusetts are the only two states 
to have interpreted their state constitution right to bear arms 
provisions as only a collective right). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
30 
 
impediment to a comprehensive CCW prohibition.  In each of the 
other four "no-permit" states with a right to bear arms 
amendment,24 Hamdan's conduct likely would have been exempted 
from punishment.  For example, in Ohio, the state's CCW statute 
contains broad affirmative defenses, including the right of 
business owners and homeowners to lawfully carry a concealed 
weapon 
in 
certain 
circumstances. 
 
Ohio 
Rev. 
Code 
Ann. 
§ 2923.12(C) (West 1997).25  Similar defenses are provided in the 
                                                 
24 Unlike the other four states, only Illinois' right to 
bear arms provision does not enumerate, in some manner, defense 
and security as a purpose for which people may bear arms.  See 
Ill. Const. art. I, § 22 ("Subject only to the police power, the 
right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not 
be infringed."); Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 4 ("The people 
have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but 
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and 
shall not be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict 
subordination to the civil power."); Mo. Const. art. I, § 23 
("That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in 
defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully 
summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but 
this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons."); Neb. 
Const. art. I, § 1 ("All persons are by nature free and 
independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; 
among these are . . . the right to keep and bear arms for 
security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for 
lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other 
lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or 
infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof."); Ohio 
Const. art. I, § 4 ("The people have the right to bear arms for 
their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of 
peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and 
the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power.").  Only the Missouri constitutional provision expressly 
reserves for the state the restriction on carrying concealed 
weapons. 
25 The Ohio statute provides: 
No. 01-0056-CR    
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(C) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under 
this section of carrying or having control of a weapon 
other than dangerous ordnance, that the actor was not 
otherwise prohibited by law from having the weapon, 
and that any of the following apply: 
(1) The weapon was carried or kept ready at hand by 
the actor for defensive purposes, while the actor was 
engaged in or was going to or from the actor's lawful 
business or occupation, which business or occupation 
was of such character or was necessarily carried on in 
such manner or at such a time or place as to render 
the actor particularly susceptible to criminal attack, 
such as would justify a prudent person in going armed. 
(2) The weapon was carried or kept ready at hand by 
the actor for defensive purposes, while the actor was 
engaged in a lawful activity and had reasonable cause 
to fear a criminal attack upon the actor or a member 
of the actor's family, or upon the actor's home, such 
as would justify a prudent person in going armed. 
(3) The weapon was carried or kept ready at hand by 
the actor for any lawful purpose and while in the 
actor's own home. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.12(C) (West 1997) (emphasis added). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
32 
 
other three states (Illinois, Missouri, and Nebraska) that do 
not presently have concealed carry permit laws.26 
¶51 As a result of our legislature's decision to prohibit 
the carrying of concealed weapons under any circumstance,27 the 
                                                 
26 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(a)(4) (2000) (excepting 
persons "when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of 
business" from prohibition of "carr[ying] or possess[ing] in any 
vehicle or concealed on or about his person . . . any pistol, 
revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm"); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 571.030.3 (West 1995) ("[State concealed weapon prohibition] 
does not apply when the actor . . . is in his dwelling unit or 
upon business premises over which the actor has possession, 
authority or control, . . . ."); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1202(2) 
(1995) ("It shall be an affirmative defense [to carrying a 
concealed weapon] that the defendant was engaged in any lawful 
business, calling, or employment at the time he or she was 
carrying any weapon or weapons and the circumstances in which 
such person was placed at the time were such as to justify a 
prudent person in carrying the weapon or weapons for the defense 
of his or her person, property, or family."). 
Numerous other states also have specific exemptions from 
prosecution under a carrying a concealed weapon prohibition 
based on a person being on their own premises.  See, e.g., Cal. 
Penal § 12026 (West 2000); Fla. Stat. ch. 790.25(3)(n) (2002) 
(see French v. State, 279 So.2d 317, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1973), which states that ch. 790.25(3)(n) applies to Fla. Stat. 
ch. 790.01(2) (Florida's CCW statute)); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-
126(c) (1999); Iowa Code § 724.4(4)(a) (West 1993); Md. Code, 
Ann. Crim. Law § 4-203(b)(6) (Michie 2002); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 750.227 (Supp. 2002); Minn. Stat. § 624.714(9)(a) (2002); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-269(a1)(1) (2001). 
To be sure, some state courts have held, usually many years 
ago, that the offense of carrying a concealed weapon applies 
even to those on their own premises.  See Dunston v. State, 27 
So. 333, 334 (Ala. 1900); Commonwealth v. Puckett, 125 S.W.2d 
1011, 1012 (Ky. 1939); State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 665 (Ohio 
1920)(over a vigorous dissent). 
27 The decision over whether to require the permitting of 
those who wish to carry concealed weapons in any circumstance 
fully remains with the legislature.   
No. 01-0056-CR    
33 
 
interaction between Wisconsin's CCW statute and the state 
constitution's right to bear arms is anomalous, if not unique.  
It 
appears 
that 
no 
other 
state, 
except 
perhaps 
Kansas, 
completely bans the carrying of concealed weapons by all 
citizens in all circumstances while simultaneously recognizing 
the right of individuals to own, possess, and carry firearms for 
lawful purposes.  Hence, these other states provide little 
guidance on the particular issue of whether Hamdan's conduct, 
which violated the CCW law, may still be constitutionally 
protected. 
¶52 We 
have 
described 
Wisconsin's 
exceptionally 
restrictive scheme to show how it heightens the conflict between 
the CCW statute and the rights in Article I, Section 25.  The 
issue is whether and when this conflict requires us to limit the 
outer reaches of the CCW statute, in order to avoid unreasonable 
impairments on the right to bear arms. 
¶53 We turn now to the public benefits underlying the CCW 
statute and how they apply in the circumstances of this case.  
As we explained in Cole, Wisconsin's prohibition of the carrying 
of concealed weapons is, as a general matter, a reasonable 
exercise of the police power, Cole, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶40, and 
serves many valuable purposes in promoting public safety.   
¶54 In State v. Walls, 190 Wis. 2d 65, 526 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. 
App. 1994), the court of appeals described the inspiration for 
CCW laws as follows:  
The reason for these statutes, it has been said, is 
"because persons becoming suddenly angered and having 
No. 01-0056-CR    
34 
 
such a weapon in their pocket, would be likely to use 
it, which in their sober moments they would not have 
done, and which could not have been done had not the 
weapon been upon their person." 
Id. at 71 (quoting from Williams v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 
807, 807-08 (Ky. 1953), with citations in Williams omitted).  In 
short, carrying a concealed weapon permits a person to act 
violently on impulse, whether from anger or fear, and that is a 
prospect the law may discourage. 
¶55 Another rationale for prohibiting concealed weapons is 
to put people on notice when they are dealing with an individual 
who is carrying a dangerous weapon.  Notice of the presence of a 
dangerous weapon permits people, including law enforcement 
officers, to act accordingly.  See Ross v. State, 566 S.E.2d 47, 
49 (Ga. App. 2002); Anderson v. State, 614 A.2d 963, 965 (Md. 
1992); 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 21 (2001).  This objective is perhaps 
the most significant inspiration for CCW laws.  A related 
concern is that concealed weapons facilitate the commission of 
crime by creating the appearance of normality and catching 
people off guard.   
¶56 One 
additional 
rationale 
for 
the 
statute 
was 
recognized many years ago when this court stated that CCW laws 
promote "the preservation of life, by affixing the stigma of the 
law of the land to him who carries a concealed pistol, loaded or 
unloaded, 
except 
in 
the 
cases 
allowed 
by 
the 
statute."  
Mularkey, 201 Wis. at 431 (quoting from State v. Bollis, 19 So. 
99, 100 (Miss. 1895)).  These insightful words are a reminder 
No. 01-0056-CR    
35 
 
that one of the purposes of criminalizing conduct is to 
stigmatize socially malfeasant behavior.   
¶57 None of these rationales is particularly compelling 
when applied to a person owning and operating a small store.  
Although a shopkeeper is not immune from acting on impulse, he 
or she is less likely to do so in a familiar setting in which 
the safety and satisfaction of customers is paramount and the 
liability for mistake is nearly certain.  There is less need in 
these circumstances for innocent customers or visitors to be 
notified that the owner of a business possesses a weapon.  
Anyone who enters a business premises, including a person with 
criminal intent, should presume that the owner possesses a 
weapon, even if the weapon is not visible.28  A shopkeeper is not 
likely to use a concealed weapon to facilitate his own crime of 
violence in his own store.  The stigma of the law is 
inapplicable when the public expects a shopkeeper to possess a 
weapon for security.   
¶58 As one court recently observed, "the criminality of 
gun possession is mitigated in the two places where an otherwise 
law-abiding person is likely to spend most of his time and to 
deserve the greatest expectation of personal security: his home 
and his workplace."  People v. Buckmire, 638 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).  We agree. 
                                                 
28 Cf. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895) 
(concluding that a person who is attacked "[i]s entitled to 
stand his ground, and meet any attack made upon him with a 
deadly weapon"). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
36 
 
¶59 The purposes of a concealed carry prohibition are 
often less compelling in settings in which the person bearing 
the concealed weapon is an owner of the property on which he or 
she goes armed.  Although the considerations discussed above are 
not determinative of the reasonableness of prohibiting a 
shopkeeper from carrying a concealed weapon, they weigh against 
the need for applying the CCW statute in such circumstances if 
the shopkeeper had a substantial interest in exercising a right 
under Article I, Section 25. 
¶60 Strict application of the CCW statute in instances 
when the public interest in enforcing the statute is weak may 
unreasonably impair a person's right to keep and bear arms when 
the person's interest in exercising that right through the use 
of a concealed weapon is substantial.  Our primary concern is 
examining the CCW prohibition in a circumstance in which the 
bearing of arms for the purpose of security is the most 
reasonable and the most necessary. 
¶61 As alluded to above, many states have recognized, 
either by case law or statute, a special intersection between 
the right to bear arms and the protection of one's own property.  
For example, one state court has held that a citizen enjoys a 
common law right to carry a concealed weapon in the citizen's 
own home.  See Gilio v. State, 33 P.3d 937, 941 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2001).  Other courts have recognized either a right to conceal 
weapons in one's own residence (as opposed to "carry" a 
concealed weapon in one's own premises), see In re Colby H., 766 
A.2d 639, 646-50 (Md. Ct. App. 2001), or a more general right to 
No. 01-0056-CR    
37 
 
keep weapons in one's home, see, e.g., Matthews v. State, 148 
N.E.2d 334, 338 (Ind. 1958) (holding that provisions of a state 
law against carrying of a pistol without a license "do not 
restrict nor prohibit appellant or any other person from having 
a pistol in his home or 'fixed place of business' for the 
defense of himself . . .").  As the Ohio Supreme Court stated, 
"The right of defense of self, property and family is a 
fundamental part of our concept of ordered liberty.  . . .  For 
many, the mere possession of a firearm in the home offers a 
source of security."  Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169-
70 (Ohio 1993). 
¶62 In State v. Stevens, 833 P.2d 318 (Or. App. 1992), the 
Oregon Court of Appeals, in determining that the defendant could 
not be convicted for carrying a concealed switchblade within his 
own home, held that the state's CCW statute applies only to the 
carrying of concealed weapons outside one's own home.  Id. at 
319.  The court reached this decision despite the absence of any 
express exception in Oregon's CCW statute to this effect, See 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.240 (2001), and despite Oregon's permit 
system under which persons may apply to carry a concealed 
weapon, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.291 (2001).  The court 
explained two rationales for this conclusion: 
First, 
the 
simple 
act 
of 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
switchblade within one's own home is not the type of 
unrestrained rights-exercising that "poses a clear 
threat" to public safety and that can therefore be 
regulated.  Second, the state's interpretation would 
restrict the manner in which one could carry a legal 
weapon from room to room within one's home and would 
No. 01-0056-CR    
38 
 
inhibit an act that is so intrinsic to ownership and 
self-defense that it would unreasonably interfere with 
the exercise of one's constitutional right to possess 
the switchblade.   
Stevens, 833 P.2d at 319 (citation omitted).  Excepting the 
reference to switchblades, which are per se illegal under 
Wisconsin 
law 
(Wis. Stat. § 941.24), 
we 
adopt 
Oregon's 
reasoning, appreciating its resonance in a state where a person 
has no option for pursuing official permission to lawfully carry 
a concealed weapon on his or her own premises. 
¶63 The 
unreasonableness 
of 
applying 
certain 
gun 
regulations when they prohibit sensible conduct on one's own 
property 
is 
commonly 
recognized. 
 
As 
explained 
by 
one 
commentator: 
[T]he purpose of statutes prohibiting the carrying of 
a weapon or the carrying of a concealed weapon except 
upon one's own premises or at his place of business 
[is] to allow persons to defend those areas in which 
they have a possessory interest, yet restrict the 
right to carry weapons to persons in such a position 
that they are not likely to be thrown into contact 
with the public and thus perhaps tempted, in a sudden 
quarrel, to use the weapon to the detriment of 
another. 
Ruby B. Weeks, Annotation, Scope and Effect of Exception, in 
Statute Forbidding Carrying of Weapons, as to Person on His Own 
Premises or at His Place of Business, 57 A.L.R. 3d 938, § 2(a) 
(1974) (emphasis added).  We also note the following analysis of 
the reasonableness of place and manner restrictions on the use 
of firearms, such as prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons: 
[I]t might be argued that these laws impede the 
purpose of self-defense if they deny an individual the 
right to carry a weapon when he is most likely to be 
No. 01-0056-CR    
39 
 
attacked. 
 
This 
argument 
is 
countered 
by 
two 
considerations: the danger of widespread presence of 
weapons in public places and police protection against 
attack in these places.  Thus, in view of the benefit 
to be derived from these laws, place and manner 
regulations which do not restrict possession in homes 
or businesses do not seem to subvert unduly the self-
defense purpose. 
Ridberg, supra, at 204 (emphasis added). 
¶64 The importance of being able to exercise the right to 
bear arms in the setting of one's own property is implied by the 
language of Article I, Section 25.  The amendment enumerates 
several lawful purposes for which one can exercise the right to 
bear arms.29  Although Hamdan's conduct could arguably be 
                                                 
29 This 
court 
generally 
examines 
three 
sources 
in 
determining a constitutional provision's meaning: "the plain 
meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional 
debates and the practices in existence at the time of the 
writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of 
the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law 
passed 
following 
adoption." 
See 
Thompson 
v. 
Craney, 
199 
Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996). 
We focus our attention on the plain language of the term 
"security" because the last two factors are not particularly 
helpful to ascertaining the intended meaning of the term 
"security."  There is presently no relevant interpretation of 
Article I, Section 25 that has been provided by the legislature.  
As to the debates contemporaneous with the passage of the 
amendment, there is very little discussion as to the meaning of 
the term "security."  In fact, according to one legislative 
source, it was freely admitted that "[u]nless there is further 
clarification in the language of the Constitution, courts will 
be compelled to interpret the term 'security.'"  Memorandum from 
Shaun Hass, Senior Staff Attorney, Wis. Legis. Council, entitled 
Analysis of 1995 Assembly Joint Resolution 53 and 1995 Senate 
Joint Resolution 7, Relating to the Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
(First Consideration) to Wisconsin State Representative David 
Travis and Interested Legislators (Oct. 11, 1995), at 7 
(hereinafter the LCS Memo). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
40 
 
construed as undertaken for the purpose of "defense," we think 
the circumstances logically point to the purpose of "security." 
¶65 The term "security" is not defined by the amendment, 
nor is it given any specific meaning elsewhere under Wisconsin 
law.  The relevant legal definition of "security" is "[t]he 
state of being secure, esp. from danger or attack."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1358 (7th ed. 1999).  The applicable definitions of 
"security" 
in 
lay 
dictionaries 
are 
enlightening. 
 
Some 
definitions include: "1. freedom from danger, risk, etc.; 
safety. . . .  
3. 
something 
that 
secures 
or 
makes 
safe; 
protection; defense. . . .  
5. 
precautions 
taken 
to 
guard 
against crime, attack, sabotage, espionage, etc."  Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary 1731 (2d ed. 1993).30  Security is also 
                                                                                                                                                             
Both the 1995 Legislative Council Staff memo and the 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafter's Note to the resolution 
that became the amendment recommended that the meaning of 
"security" 
be 
clarified 
with 
additional 
language 
in 
the 
amendment, but no such clarification was included.  See 1995 LCS 
Memo, at 7; Wis. Legis. Reference Bureau, Drafter's Note for 
1995 Assemb. Joint Res. 53, at 2, reprinted in Wis. Legis. 
Reference Bureau, Drafting Record to 1995 Assemb. J. Res. 53.  
The LCS memo noted that "security" could mean "security of the 
state" or it could refer to the general security of one's home 
or business.  1995 LCS Memo, at 7.  The authors of these 
documents failed to reach a conclusion regarding what "security" 
means, with both stating that the meaning would have to be 
decided by the judiciary.  See Jeffrey Monks, The End of Gun 
Control or Protection Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the New 
Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on State Gun Control 
Laws, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 271-72 n.140. 
30 Similarly, "secure" is defined as "1. free from or not 
exposed to danger or harm; safe.  . . .  3. affording safety, as  
a place[.]"  Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1731 (2d ed. 
1993). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
41 
 
defined as "Something that gives or assures safety, as: . . . c. 
Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a 
crime such as burglary or assault[.]"  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of The English Language 1632 (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis 
added). 
¶66 The 
common understanding 
of 
"security" 
does not 
implicate an imminent threat.  Rather, it connotes a persistent 
state of peace.  We believe the domain most closely associated 
with a persistent state of peace is one's home or residence, 
followed by other places in which a person has a possessory 
interest.  A person is less likely to rely on public law 
enforcement for protection in these premises and is more likely 
to supply his own protection.  In fact, a person who takes no 
initiative to provide security in these private places is 
essentially leaving security to chance.  Firearms ownership has 
long been permitted in Wisconsin.  We infer that the inclusion 
in the amendment of the right to bear arms for security was 
intended "to include a personal right to bear arms to protect 
one's person, family, or property against unlawful injury and to 
secure from unlawful interruption the enjoyment of life, limb, 
family, and property," Dowlut & Knoop, supra, at 190, subject to 
reasonable regulation. 
¶67 Based on the foregoing considerations, we conclude 
that a citizen's desire to exercise the right to keep and bear 
arms for purposes of security is at its apex when undertaken to 
No. 01-0056-CR    
42 
 
secure one's home or privately owned business.31  Conversely, the 
State's interest in prohibiting concealed weapons is least 
compelling in these circumstances, because application of the 
CCW statute "has but a tenuous relation to alleviation" of the 
State's acknowledged interests.  Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).  As stated 
recently by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, "If the restriction 
of a private right is oppressive, while the public welfare is 
enhanced only [to a] slight degree, the offending statute is 
void as an invalid exercise of the police power."  Kennedy v. 
Town of Sunapee, 784 A.2d 685, 688 (N.H. 2001) (internal 
quotations omitted).  We believe that the CCW statute, by virtue 
of its application under the facts of this case, suffers from 
this infirmity. 
¶68 If the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for 
security is to mean anything, it must, as a general matter, 
                                                 
31 Our decision today recognizes that the reasonableness of 
enforcing general gun regulations becomes uniquely suspect in 
certain settings, but Article I, Section 25 does not transform 
the right to bear arms in these locations into an absolute 
right. 
The State retains the ability regulate gun ownership, use, 
possession, and transportation of firearms even with respect to 
matters occurring in one's home or place of business.  See, 
e.g., Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1997) 
(rejecting 
defendants' 
as-applied 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of their convictions for possessing a firearm 
while impaired by intoxicating liquor, stating that "[p]eople 
who handle firearms while intoxicated, even in their own homes, 
pose a significant threat to the health and safety of their 
family members, their neighbors and themselves."). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
43 
 
permit a person to possess, carry, and sometimes conceal arms to 
maintain the security of his private residence or privately 
operated business, and to safely move and store weapons within 
these premises. 
¶69 In addition to weighing the public interest in 
enforcing the CCW statute against an individual's interest in 
exercising the right to keep and bear arms by carrying a 
concealed weapon, a court must assess whether an individual 
could have exercised the right in a reasonable, alternative 
manner that did not violate the statute. 
¶70 We faced a similar inquiry in Brandmiller v. Arreola, 
199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 894 (1996).  Applying intermediate 
scrutiny to an "as applied" constitutional challenge, we stated 
that, under this level of scrutiny, the test for whether 
statutes or ordinances that restrict a fundamental right are 
constitutional is whether they leave "open ample alternative 
channels by which the citizen may exercise" the affected right.  
Id. at 541. 
¶71 In 
circumstances 
where 
the 
State's 
interest 
in 
restricting the right to keep and bear arms is minimal and the 
private interest in exercising the right is substantial, an 
individual needs a way to exercise the right without violating 
the law.  We hold, in these circumstances, that regulations 
limiting a constitutional right to keep and bear arms must leave 
some realistic alternative means to exercise the right. 
¶72 For instance, in order to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of securing one's own property, a weapon must be kept 
No. 01-0056-CR    
44 
 
somewhere and may need to be handled or moved, all within the 
weapon owner's property.  During these times, the firearm will 
be either visible or concealed.  The State argues that even 
under the strictest enforcement of the CCW statute, a person 
lawfully in possession of a firearm will always retain the 
ability to keep the firearm in the open——holding the weapon in 
the open, keeping the weapon in a visible holster, displaying 
the weapon on the wall,32 or otherwise placing the weapon in 
plain view.  Relying on this reasoning, the State quarrels with 
any legal conclusion that application of the CCW statute to 
                                                 
32 The State points to State v. Mata, 199 Wis. 2d 315, 544 
N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1996), as authority for the proposition 
that there may be some effectiveness to requiring storeowners to 
openly display handguns they possess.  In Mata, two tavern 
owners were charged with carrying a concealed weapon under the 
CCW statute.  Mata, 199 Wis. 2d at 318.  The court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's holding that the exemption for 
tavern owners under Wis. Stat. § 941.237(3)(d), which permits a 
tavern owner to go armed with a handgun in the owner's tavern, 
precluded prosecution of the tavern owner under § 941.23.  Id.  
The court held that a tavern owner carrying a handgun is 
required to openly display the handgun in order to carry it 
lawfully under § 941.237(3)(d).  Id. at 321.  The court answered 
the defendants' argument that this requirement is absurd by a 
counterargument that openly displaying a handgun may deter 
crime, while concealment probably would not.  Id.  
In light of Article I, Section 25, this analysis in Mata is 
suspect.  It is incomplete because it predates the adoption of 
Wisconsin's constitutional right to bear arms amendment and, 
therefore, did not attempt to reconcile the CCW statute with the 
tavern owner's constitutional right to bear arms for security.  
The countervailing policy arguments relied on in Mata take on a 
different gloss in the shadow of this provision.  We believe, 
for the reasons expressed in the body of this opinion, that the 
Mata opinion is now incorrect in its assessment of the 
reasonableness of requiring the open display of guns. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
45 
 
Hamdan in his circumstance rendered his rights illusory.33  See, 
e.g., State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 664 (Ohio 1920) ("[CCW] 
statute does not operate as a prohibition against carrying 
weapons, but as a regulation of the manner of carrying them.  
The gist of the offense is the concealment"). 
¶73 We cannot agree.  Requiring a storeowner who desires 
security on his own business property to carry a gun openly or 
in a holster is simply not reasonable.  Such practices would 
alert criminals to the presence of the weapon and frighten 
friends and customers.  Likewise, requiring the gun owner to 
leave a handgun in plain view in his or her store so that he or 
she avoids a CCW charge fails the litmus test of common sense.  
We do not think it is necessary to spell out the dangers created 
by making firearms more accessible to children, to assailants, 
to strangers, and to guests.  In fact, leaving a firearm in the 
open could expose a gun owner to other liability, both criminal 
and civil.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.55 (prohibiting the leaving of 
a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a child) and 
947.01 (prohibiting disorderly conduct). 
                                                 
33 The 
State 
selectively 
recounts 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding Hamdan's CCW conviction to minimize his interests in 
providing security to his store.  According to the State, 
"Hamdan carried a pistol in his pocket in a retail establishment 
accessible to the public and continued to do so while he spoke 
with the police officers who were inspecting his store.  The 
State's interest in enforcing the CCW law is sufficiently great 
under these circumstances that the requirement that Hamdan carry 
his gun openly is a modest and reasonable limitation on his 
right to bear arms, one that survives [] the reasonableness 
standard . . . ." 
No. 01-0056-CR    
46 
 
¶74 There is no dispute that most storeowners have the 
right to possess a firearm.  As a practical matter, the 
storeowner who keeps a firearm for security must have the gun 
within easy reach.  Requiring a storeowner to openly display 
weapons as the only available means of exercising the right to 
keep and bear arms for security is impractical, unsettling, and 
possibly dangerous.  If the State prosecutes a storeowner for 
having a concealed weapon within easy reach, it is strongly 
discouraging the use of firearms for security and is practically 
nullifying the right to do so.  Such a prosecution is very 
likely to impair the constitutional right to bear arms for 
security.34 
¶75 Overall, we believe that requiring the continuous, 
open carrying of a firearm in one's business would effectively 
eviscerate Article I, Section 25 and lead to undesirable 
consequences.  Under the view of the State and the Chief 
                                                 
34  In her dissent, the Chief Justice concludes that, in all 
instances, the "right to bear arms 'is not impaired by requiring 
individuals to carry weapons openly.'"  Dissent, ¶124 (quoting 
Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)).  
In reaching this conclusion, she questions this opinion's "views 
about human psychology."  Dissent, ¶127-129.  The dissent also 
concludes implicitly, if not explicitly, that no enforcement of 
the CCW statute, as presently written, will unreasonably 
infringe upon a broadly worded constitutional right to keep and 
bear arms. 
Under the CCW statute, it is technically unlawful for a 
homeowner to conceal a weapon in a nightstand within reach of 
the homeowner's bed.  The law is simply not enforced in this 
situation, just as it is not enforced in many places when a 
storekeeper conceals a weapon near a cash register. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
47 
 
Justice, a storeowner either must sacrifice the exercise of his 
right to use arms for security or must put himself and others at 
risk by openly displaying the weapon. 
¶76 There is a final element to a constitutional challenge 
of an application of the CCW statute.  Article I, Section 25 
expressly limits the right to keep and bear arms to "lawful 
purposes."  Therefore, a defendant is not entitled to assert a 
constitutional defense to a CCW charge if he or she carried a 
concealed weapon for an unlawful purpose.35  Carrying a concealed 
weapon for an unlawful purpose, even if a defendant were able to 
satisfy the two other tests for an unreasonable restriction, is 
not protected by the amendment. 
¶77 Whether a defendant carried a concealed weapon for an 
unlawful purpose is a question of fact, as it may involve a 
state of mind for which competing evidence is necessary.  This 
inquiry requires a determination of the individual's purpose for 
carrying the concealed weapon.  In this inquiry, carrying a 
concealed weapon for an unlawful purpose means carrying a 
concealed weapon in furtherance of the commission of a crime. 
¶78 To overcome a constitutional defense that has been 
approved by the court, the State has the burden of alleging that 
a defendant had a specific criminal purpose and of presenting 
evidence that the defendant carried the concealed weapon for 
                                                 
35 Cf. State v. Schelin, 55 P.3d 632, 639 (Wash. 2002) 
(holding that constitutionally protected right to bear firearms 
in his home ceases when the purpose of bearing firearms is to 
further the commission of a crime). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
48 
 
that unlawful purpose.  If the court determines that the alleged 
intent is criminal in nature and if the State meets its burden 
of producing evidence sufficient to raise the issue of that 
intent, then the court will instruct the trier of fact to 
determine if the particular unlawful purpose was actually held 
by the defendant while he or she carried the concealed weapon.  
If the trier of fact determines such an allegation to be true, a 
defendant will be precluded from successfully availing himself 
or herself of any constitutional challenge to a CCW conviction.  
If it determines otherwise, then the unconstitutionality of 
enforcing the CCW statute against the defendant remains, and no 
further verdict regarding the elements of the CCW offense need 
be answered.36 
VII. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES 
                                                 
36 If a court determines as a matter of law that an "as 
applied" challenge would fail (even assuming that a defendant 
did not carry a concealed weapon for an unlawful purpose), then 
there is no need to submit to the trier of fact a question on 
the defendant's unlawful purpose.  While a lawful purpose is a 
necessary predicate for these challenges, it is not a sufficient 
condition. 
Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent confuses the role of the 
inquiry into an unlawful purpose.  See dissent, ¶134-137 & 
accompanying footnotes.  Of course, there will be instances when 
a defendant has multiple purposes for carrying a concealed 
weapon.  The dispositive issue is whether the defendant had an 
unlawful purpose, irrespective of whether he or she had a 
concurrent lawful purpose.  For example, a convicted felon who 
carries a weapon, concealed or not, for his security is acting 
in furtherance of a crime and may not avail himself of a 
constitutional defense.  
No. 01-0056-CR    
49 
 
¶79 Having examined the principles involved in an "as 
applied" challenge to the prosecution of a CCW violation, we now 
apply those principles to Hamdan's case.  We acknowledge that 
the State proved all three elements of the CCW statute.  Hamdan 
went armed with a dangerous weapon when he carried a gun in his 
trousers pocket.  He was aware of the presence of the weapon.  
Because the weapon was in his pocket and not visible, it was 
concealed. 
¶80 In determining whether, under the circumstances of 
this case, it was unreasonable for the State to impair Hamdan's 
right to bear arms by punishing him for carrying a concealed 
weapon, we reach two legal conclusions.37 
                                                 
37 Both the dissent and Justice Crooks' concurrence/dissent 
consider it odd that we assess the merits of a constitutional 
challenge as a legal question, versus one of fact.  However, 
this court has previously developed tests for determining 
whether prosecution of a defendant under an otherwise-valid 
statute 
impermissibility 
infringes 
upon 
a 
constitutionally 
protected right.  For example, in State v. Miller, 202 
Wis. 2d 56, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996), we addressed an as applied 
challenge to a statutory requirement to display a red and orange 
triangular, slow-moving vehicle emblem on horse-drawn buggies 
used by members of the Old Order Amish.  We stated: 
We will apply the compelling state interest/least 
restrictive alternative test to our review of this 
claim that Wis. Stat. § 347.245(1), as applied to the 
eight Amish respondents, violates freedom of exercise 
and freedom of conscience under Art. I, § 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Succinctly stated, under this 
analysis, the challenger carries the burden to prove: 
(1) that he or she has a sincerely held religious 
belief, (2) that is burdened by application of the 
state law at issue.  Upon such proof, the burden 
shifts to the State to prove: (3) that the law is 
based on a compelling state interest, (4) which cannot 
be served by a less restrictive alternative. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
50 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id. at 66.  The court treated these as matters to be determined 
by 
the 
court. 
 
To 
be 
sure, 
challenges 
to 
the 
state 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms amendment involve a 
"reasonable restriction" test and not strict scrutiny, but they 
are still challenges based on a constitutional right. 
Furthermore, as Miller itself indicated, the second legal 
element in the test that we adopt——the issue of whether some 
reasonable alternative means for exercising the right exists——is 
a legal question.  In Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 
544 N.W.2d 894 (1996), this court asked whether a cruising 
ordinance left open ample alternative channels for exercising 
the right at issue (right to travel) and framed this issue as a 
legal question that it (this court) resolved. 
The Chief Justice also opines that, by addressing Hamdan's 
constitutional challenge as primarily a legal question, we "turn 
our precedent on its head" by permitting "a court, not the jury, 
to 
reach 
substantive 
conclusions 
about 
the 
merits 
of 
a 
defendant's constitutional defense . . . ."  Dissent, ¶135.  The 
cases that the Chief Justice offers to support this position 
deal with First Amendment issues of obscenity and "true 
threats."  Dissent, ¶¶133-134.  In the obscenity cases, courts 
define the legal parameters of "obscenity," and therefore the 
constitutional limits of the right to free speech.  See Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  In the context of 
Wisconsin's constitutional right to bear arms, the issue is not 
whether a community standard, such as the "prurient interest," 
is met as a prerequisite to finding "obscenity."  Rather, the 
only issue is the reasonableness of a restriction on the right.  
Furthermore, with regards to our "true threat" cases, this court 
has concluded, without submitting the determination to a jury, 
that a defendant's statement constituted a "true threat" as a 
matter of law.  State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶¶23-25, 243 
Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712.  
As Justice Bablitch correctly notes in his concurrence, 
"constitutional facts are determined by the court."  Justice 
Bablitch's concurrence, ¶96; see also State v. Dixon, 177 
Wis. 2d 461, 466-67, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993) (stating in the 
Fourth Amendment context that "[w]hether the facts give rise to 
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the space 
or area which was the subject of the search is a question of 
constitutional law which we review independently"). 
No. 01-0056-CR    
51 
 
¶81 First, under the circumstances, Hamdan's interests in 
maintaining a concealed weapon in his store and carrying it 
personally 
during 
an 
unexpected 
encounter 
with 
visitors 
substantially outweighed the State's interest in enforcing the 
concealed weapons statute. 
¶82 Hamdan exercised the right to keep and bear arms under 
circumstances in which the need to exercise this right was 
substantial.  He owned a grocery store in a high crime 
neighborhood and his store had been the site of past robberies 
and homicides.  Hamdan himself had been a crime victim at the 
store.  Hamdan had concerns not only for himself but also for 
his family and customers.  He had good reason to anticipate 
future crime problems at the store and a need to provide his own 
security to deal with the problems.  Acting on this need, Hamdan 
kept a handgun under the counter near the cash register but 
safely stored the weapon when the business was closed.  Hamdan's 
transport of the weapon in his pocket on the night in question 
was incidental to his normal safe handling and storage of the 
firearm in his store.  Meanwhile, the State's interests in 
prohibiting Hamdan from carrying a concealed weapon in his small 
store, under the circumstances on the night the police officers 
visited his store, were negligible.  The police knew that 
Hamdan's store was a crime target and that Hamdan kept a weapon 
for protection.  There is no evidence that Hamdan was prone to 
act irresponsibly or impulsively, and he was unlikely to do so 
in his own store.  Therefore, enforcement of the CCW statute on 
these facts would seriously frustrate the constitutional right 
No. 01-0056-CR    
52 
 
to keep and bear arms for security but advance no discernible 
public interest. 
¶83 Second, Hamdan had no reasonable means of keeping and 
handling the weapon in his store except to conceal it.  In the 
normal course of business, Hamdan concealed the weapon in an 
area that was accessible to him but inaccessible to the public.  
It would have been dangerous and counterproductive to openly 
display the weapon during business hours, and requiring him to 
do so would have seriously impaired his right to bear arms for 
security.  When Hamdan was unexpectedly summoned to come to the 
front of the store at a time when he was closing up for the 
night, he had the option of putting the handgun in his pocket or 
leaving the handgun in the back room without knowing who had 
come into the store and whether his security was threatened.  
Carrying the handgun openly when he went back into the store 
would have shocked his visitors, seriously threatened his 
safety, and was not a reasonable option. 
¶84 Because we determine that Hamdan prevails on both of 
these issues, we conclude that he had a constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of security at the 
time he carried his concealed weapon, that his conviction for 
carrying a concealed weapon was unconstitutional, and his 
conviction must be reversed.  He was never allowed to present 
this defense.  We remand the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The case 
should be dismissed unless the State can show probable cause 
that Hamdan had an unlawful purpose when he was carrying the 
No. 01-0056-CR    
53 
 
concealed weapon.  Hamdan asserted that he was exercising his 
constitutional right to bear arms for only lawful purposes and, 
at this time, there is no evidence that Hamdan had any unlawful 
purpose nor has the State asserted such an intent. 
VIII. COMMENTARY 
¶85 The approval of a state constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation, and 
any other lawful purpose will present a continuing dilemma for 
law enforcement until the legislature acts to clarify the law.  
We 
urge 
the 
legislature 
to 
thoughtfully 
examine 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 in the wake of the amendment and to consider 
the possibility of a licensing or permit system for persons who 
have a good reason to carry a concealed weapon.  We happily 
concede that the legislature is better able than this court to 
determine public policy on firearms and other weapons.38 
                                                 
38 Justice 
Crooks 
would 
declare 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
unconstitutional but delay the effective date of the ruling to 
permit the legislature to make alterations in the CCW statute.  
Justice Crooks' concurrence/dissent, ¶110.  This suggestion is 
not tenable. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
54 
 
¶86 In 
the 
meantime, 
we 
must 
give 
effect 
to 
the 
constitutional right embodied in Article I, Section 25.39  A 
defendant who challenges on constitutional grounds a prosecution 
for carrying a concealed weapon will be required to secure 
affirmative answers to the following legal questions before he 
or she is entitled to raise a constitutional defense.  First, 
under the circumstances, did the defendant's interest in 
concealing the weapon to facilitate exercise of his or her right 
to keep and bear arms substantially outweigh the State's 
interest in enforcing the concealed weapons statute?  The State 
generally has a significant interest in prohibiting the carrying 
of concealed weapons.  Thus, to satisfy this element, the 
defendant must have been exercising the right to keep and bear 
arms under circumstances in which the need to do so was 
substantial.  Second, did the defendant conceal his or her 
weapon because concealment was the only reasonable means under 
the circumstances to exercise his or her right to bear arms?  
Put differently, did the defendant lack a reasonable alternative 
to concealment, under the circumstances, to exercise his or her 
                                                 
39 Contrary to assertions in the dissent and Justice Crooks' 
concurrence/dissent, we have not read exceptions into the CCW 
statute. 
 
See 
dissent, 
¶115; 
Justice 
Crooks' 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶100, 101, 107, 113.  As explained in 
Parts IV and V of this opinion, the interpretation of the CCW 
statute and the statute's relation to statutory privilege 
defenses remain unchanged by the adoption of Article I, Section 
25.  Our analysis has merely fleshed out the parameters of the 
constitutional 
rights 
in 
Article 
I, 
Section 
25 
and 
has 
articulated the constitutional defense that protects those 
rights. 
No. 01-0056-CR    
55 
 
constitutional right to bear arms?  The invocation of this 
possible defense must be raised by motion of the defendant 
before trial, and resolution of these legal questions must be 
made by the court prior to trial.  Affirmative answers to these 
questions will require a court to conclude that the State's 
enforcement of the CCW statute constituted an unreasonable and 
unconstitutional impairment of the right to keep and bear arms 
as 
granted 
in 
Article 
I, 
Section 
25 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶87 The issue of unlawful purpose is relevant only when 
the court approves a constitutional defense.  The State can 
overcome a court-approved constitutional defense only if it 
asserts, and then proves at trial, that the defendant had an 
unlawful purpose at the time he or she carried the concealed 
weapon.  Whether the defendant had an unlawful purpose, defined 
as an intent to use the weapon in furtherance of the commission 
of a crime, is a question of fact. The question should be 
submitted to the trier of fact along with separate, traditional 
instructions on the crime of carrying a concealed weapon. 
¶88 If a jury answers that the defendant did not intend 
the unlawful purpose specifically alleged by the State, then it 
will not need to reach the questions posed in the jury 
instructions for a CCW offense as the defendant's conduct 
remains constitutionally protected.  If any unlawful purpose is 
proven, then the defendant can be found guilty of carrying a 
concealed weapon upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
No. 01-0056-CR    
56 
 
elements of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.  See Wis 
JI——Criminal 1335. 
¶89 These principles should provide some guidance to 
counsel and the courts until the legislature takes further 
action. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No.  01-0056-CR.wab 
 
1 
 
¶90 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion and write only to answer Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent.  
¶91 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent would find Mr. 
Hamdan guilty, notwithstanding that Mr. Hamdan carried the gun 
in his pocket at night, in his own store, located in a high 
crime neighborhood, which had been the subject of past robberies 
and homicides, and had himself been the subject of an attempted 
murder in the store.  I could not disagree more.   
¶92 The Chief Justice's dissent, in its attempt to save 
the Carrying a Concealed Weapon statute, eviscerates the 
constitutional 
amendment. 
 
It 
renders 
the 
constitutional 
amendment 
a sham 
by reading 
into 
it 
the words "unless 
concealed." 
 
The 
inevitable 
and 
logical 
result 
of 
that 
interpretation is to create absurdities neither the legislature 
nor the voters could have intended.   
¶93 Based on the Chief Justice's interpretation, it is 
lawful to have a gun on top of your night table or bureau, but 
not in a drawer; it is lawful to have a gun case in the home if 
the guns inside can be seen, but unlawful if the guns are behind 
a solid door and cannot be seen.  With all due respect, that 
just doesn't make sense. 
¶94 The majority is absolutely correct in concluding that 
this could not have been the result intended by the legislators 
who wrote the constitutional amendment nor the voters who 
ratified it.  The dissent by Justice Crooks, who would find the 
statute unconstitutional, by implication quite obviously agrees 
No.  01-0056-CR.wab 
 
2 
 
that 
this 
could 
not 
have 
been 
the 
intent 
behind 
the 
constitutional amendment.   
¶95 The very difficult task confronted by the majority was 
to conform the statute to the newly enacted constitutional 
amendment, if possible.  It is well-established that statutes 
are presumed constitutional; thus, our first responsibility is 
to preserve the statute if possible.  State v. McManus, 152 
Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).  I conclude that the 
majority did exceedingly well in accomplishing that task, and 
that is why I join the majority.   
¶96 The framework set out by the majority for the circuit 
courts to follow in deciding these very fact-specific cases is 
not at all unlike the framework these courts have used for 
decades in deciding 4th Amendment cases, which are themselves 
very fact-specific.  In 4th Amendment cases, the court is 
confronted with historical facts and constitutional facts.  
Constitutional facts, i.e., whether the facts are in conformity 
with the constitutional demands, are determined by applying the 
historical facts to the constitution, which is a question of law 
determined by the court.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶20, 
252 
Wis. 2d 228, 
647 
N.W.2d 142. 
 
The 
touchstone 
is 
"reasonableness."  So too here.  The constitutional facts are 
determined by the court, applying the historical facts to the 
constitutional 
amendment, 
and 
"reasonableness" 
is 
the 
touchstone.  Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the Chief 
Justice's dissent and join the majority.  
 
No.  01-0056-CR.awb 
1 
 
¶97 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that Hamdan's conviction for carrying a concealed 
weapon was unconstitutional and his conviction must be reversed.  
Majority op., ¶84.  However, I do not join the majority's 
discussion in Part VIII regarding the procedural aspects of 
future constitutional challenges to prosecutions for carrying a 
concealed weapon.  See id., ¶¶85-88. 
¶98 I am not convinced that the procedural mechanism 
created by Part VIII is consistent with established methods of 
raising constitutional defenses.  I am also concerned that some 
unique aspects of these procedures may prove to be unworkable 
and create confusion.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
1 
 
¶99 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  (concurring/dissenting).  For 
the reasons set forth below, I respectfully concur/dissent, 
since 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority's 
result 
that 
Hamdan's 
conviction should be reversed, but I dissent on the majority's 
action in remanding this matter. 
¶100 The majority in this case improperly reads exceptions 
into Wis. Stat. § 941.23 in order to hold that it is 
constitutional.  Such exceptions to the statute should not be 
made by this court, but by the legislature.  Looking at the 
statute itself, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 has become 
unconstitutional with the passage of Article I, Section 25 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  I agree with Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent that the majority erroneously assigns to a 
court, rather than a jury, the task of determining factual 
issues involving whether a defense to a charge of carrying a 
concealed weapon is available to a defendant. 
¶101 I agree with her dissent that this court should not 
attempt to engraft exceptions onto Wis. Stat. § 941.23, in order 
to try to make it conform to constitutional strictures.  Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶115.  If the statute does not 
conform to the Wisconsin Constitution, as amended, then the 
statute is unconstitutional.  See State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 
116, 139-140, 569 N.W.2d 370 (1999); State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 
54, 82, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997). 
¶102 I strongly disagree, however, with Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
statute 
survives 
the 
constitutional amendment and remains constitutional.  In light 
of Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution, I 
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
2 
 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional because it 
is unnecessarily broad and rigid now and provides no exceptions 
as it is written.  The statute is not a reasonable exercise of 
the state's police power.  If the majority were to refrain from 
attempting to find exceptions in the statute where none exist, 
it too would presumably find it unconstitutional.   
¶103 The breadth of the statute is incompatible with the 
broad constitutional right to bear arms.  Its prohibition 
extends to anyone at any time and, therefore, improperly and 
unnecessarily impinges on a person's right to bear arms "for 
security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful 
purpose."40  The statute has been held to prohibit a gun placed 
on the front seat of a car,41 in a glove compartment,42 or on a 
shelf behind the driver's seat.43  One "goes armed" even when 
going nowhere with the concealed weapon.44 
¶104 It may be argued that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 withstands 
the constitutional test, as a reasonable exercise of the state's 
police power.  A state may permissibly exercise its police power 
                                                 
40 Wis. Const. art. I, § 25. 
41 State v. Walls, 190 Wis. 2d 65, 73, 526 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  
42 State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 182, 388 N.W.2d 565 
(1986).  
43 Mularky v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 432, 230 N.W. 76 (1930).  
44 State v. Keith, 175 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 498 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that the elements of the offense do not 
"requir[e] that a person actually go somewhere, and, therefore, 
carrying a concealed weapon 'does not necessarily import the 
idea of locomotion.'") (citing 94 C.J.S. Weapons sec. 8a 
(1956)); Majority op., ¶ 24. 
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
3 
 
in order to promote the general welfare.  Reginald D. v. State, 
193 Wis. 2d 299, 308, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995).  However, the 
state's police power is subject to limitations, and is not to be 
used in an unreasonable or excessive fashion, and, as such, is 
limited by the state and federal constitutions.  State v. 
Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d 482, 490, 222 N.W.2d 912 
(1974).  Other Wisconsin weapons laws have been more narrowly 
tailored, and, thus, do not suffer the same constitutional 
vulnerability as the one at hand here.45  The state's police 
power cannot save a prohibition that sweeps as broadly as Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23. 
¶105 Notwithstanding the majority's exceptions engrafted 
onto the statute, it logically extends to such a wide variety of 
scenarios that it leaves no "'open ample alternative channels by 
which 
the 
citizen 
may 
exercise 
the 
right 
at 
issue.'"  
Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 541, 544 N.W.2d 894 
(1996) (quoting Lutz v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 899 F.2d 255 
(3d Cir.1990)).  Logically extended, as the State conceded at 
oral argument, it prohibits a gun owner from storing his weapons 
out of plain sight, such as in a gun cabinet, closet, or drawer 
in his home.  If such reasonable actions are foreclosed by the 
statute, owners of firearms and other dangerous weapons have 
been effectively, and significantly, deprived of the means by 
which they may exercise the constitutional right to bear arms 
for any lawful purpose. 
                                                 
45 Wis. Stat. §§ 941.26 (machine guns), 941.28 (short-
barreled shotguns and rifles), 941.29 (possession by a felon), 
948.60 (possession by a minor), and 948.605 (possession in a 
school zone).  
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
4 
 
¶106 Since, in my opinion, the statute is unconstitutional 
in light of the constitutional amendment, then making changes to 
it, so that the statute will be constitutional in the future, is 
the province of the legislature.  Policy decisions affecting the 
statute's 
constitutionality 
should 
be 
made 
in 
typical 
legislative fashion.  Public hearings and vigorous debate by 
members of the legislature are appropriate methods to employ 
when developing a law that is appropriate for the citizens of 
Wisconsin and within constitutional mandates.  By its approach 
of attempting to engraft its exceptions onto the statute, the 
majority squelches this process. 
¶107 The majority is correct in pointing out that among the 
six states that have a constitutional provision guaranteeing the 
right to bear arms, but do not allow any class of citizens to 
carry concealed weapons legally, Wisconsin is unique in the 
strictness of its prohibition.  Majority op., ¶50.  Wisconsin's 
carrying concealed weapons (CCW) law contains no exceptions.  
The other five states mentioned above have CCW laws that contain 
significant exceptions, the most common exception being for 
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
5 
 
one's home or place of business.46  The constitutional approach 
in Wisconsin that is proposed by the majority, rewriting the 
Wisconsin CCW law by this court, is not the way to adopt 
exceptions that allow Wisconsin citizens to exercise their 
rights reasonably. 
¶108 Other state courts have recognized the state's police 
power to regulate the constitutional right to bear arms, but 
have also held that "the legitimate governmental purpose in 
regulating the right to bear arms cannot be pursued by means 
that broadly stifle the exercise of this right where the 
governmental purpose can be more narrowly tailored."  City of 
Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988).  In many 
cases, courts have held a CCW statute or ordinance to be 
unconstitutional because it was unnecessarily broad.  See, e.g., 
City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1972) (holding 
ordinance that prohibited possession or carrying of dangerous 
weapon violated right to bear arms); Junction City v. Mevis, 601 
P.2d 1145 (Kan. 1979) (striking down gun-carrying ordinance as 
                                                 
46 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/24-1(a)(4) (2000) (" . . . except 
when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of 
business . . . ."); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4201(a)(4) (1995) 
(" . . . except when on the person's land or in the person's 
abode or fixed place of business."); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.030(3) 
(1995) (" . . . in his dwelling unit or upon business premises 
over which the actor has possession . . . ."); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 
28-1202(2) (1995) (providing exception for when "the defendant 
was engaged in any lawful business, calling, or employment at 
the time he or she was carrying any weapon or weapons and the 
circumstances in which such person was placed at the time were 
such as to justify a prudent person in carrying the weapon or 
weapons for the defense of his or her person, property, or 
family."); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.12(C) (1997) (providing 
exception for "going to or from the actors lawful business or 
occupation" and "while in the actor's own home.").  
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
6 
 
too broad); State v. Delgado, 614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1984) (holding 
statute prohibiting the carrying of a switchblade too broad); 
State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1980) (holding possession of 
a 
billy 
club 
in 
defendant's 
home 
protected 
by 
state 
constitution); Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 11 S.W.2d 678 
(Tenn. 1928) (holding ordinance prohibiting carrying of pistol 
unconstitutional). 
¶109 As an examination of other jurisdictions facing the 
same question shows, Wisconsin must modify its statutes in order 
that it does not, in effect, bar its citizens from legally 
exercising their right to bear arms, as described in Article I, 
Section 25 of our state constitution.  This might be done by 
either: (1) Creating a licensing system by which certain 
qualified individuals are certified to carry concealed weapons; 
or (2) creating exceptions to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 that narrow 
the scope of the law to cover only certain reasonable time, 
manner and place restrictions on the carrying of concealed 
weapons.  Only then will Wisconsin's CCW statute be insulated 
from the legitimate constitutional attack that it is too broad. 
¶110 If this court were to strike down the current 
Wisconsin CCW statute, there would be legitimate concerns about 
the state of the law in this state during the interim, until the 
legislature could amend the statute to conform with the 
Wisconsin Constitution, as amended.  However, the effective date 
of such a decision could be delayed, in order to provide the 
legislature sufficient time to enact the necessary amendments to 
the present law.  See Dep't of Corr. v. Kliesmet, 211 Wis. 2d 
254, 267, 564 N.W.2d 742 (1997) (delaying, for one year, the 
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
7 
 
effective date of this court's decision limiting the authority 
of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections to house inmates in 
county jails over sheriffs' objections); Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (delaying, 
for 40 days, the effective date of this court's decision 
abrogating the doctrine of governmental tort immunity). 
¶111 The decision in the companion to this case, State v. 
Cole,47 also includes a constitutional analysis of Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.23, concluding that the statute is constitutional.  I join 
the majority in that case, but only as to the mandate.  I 
conclude 
that 
in 
Cole, 
the 
constitutional 
analysis 
is 
unnecessary because the defendant knowingly and intelligently 
entered a plea of guilty, thus waiving any claim of a 
constitutional violation.  Mack v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 287, 293, 
286 N.W.2d 563 (1980); Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 231, 186 
N.W.2d 193 (1971); State v. Biastock, 42 Wis. 2d 525, 532, 167 
N.W.2d 231  (1969).  Thus, there was no need to consider the 
constitutional issue because of the waiver.  State v. Thomas, 
2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 726, 605 N.W.2d 836 (2000).  
See also, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 714, 726, 605 N.W.2d 
836.  See also State v. Minniescheske, 127 Wis. 2d 234, 378 
N.W.2d 283 (1985). 
¶112 Lastly, I agree, also, with Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
determination 
that 
the 
majority 
improperly 
gives 
factual 
determinations to the judge to decide, as a matter of law, and 
not to the jury, concerning whether a defense is available to a 
                                                 
47 State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___.  
No.  01-0056-CR.npc 
8 
 
defendant in a concealed weapon case.  Majority op., ¶85, and 
Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶132.  It is for a jury to 
determine whether to believe defendant's version of events.  
State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 214, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996).  
The majority here requires the court, inappropriately, to weigh 
the 
evidence 
and 
make 
factual 
decisions 
relating 
to 
a 
constitutional defense against a CCW charge.   
¶113 The majority in this case erroneously reads exceptions 
into Wis. Stat. § 941.23 rather than allowing the legislature to 
determine how to make the statute conform to the requirements of 
the constitution, as amended.  I conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.23 is unconstitutional now, because of the constitutional 
amendment adopted by Wisconsin's citizens.  I would, in a 
delayed holding allowing time for the legislature to act, find 
the 
present 
statute 
unconstitutional, 
and, 
therefore, 
I 
respectfully concur since I agree with the majority's result 
that Hamdan's conviction should be reversed.  However, I dissent 
on the majority's action in remanding this matter.   
 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶114 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 941.23, prohibiting people from 
going armed with a concealed weapon, is constitutional as 
written and as applied.  The Wisconsin constitution provides 
that "[t]he people have the right to keep and bear arms for 
security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful 
purpose."48  I therefore dissent.   
¶115 The court should not rewrite Wis. Stat. § 941.23 to 
include exceptions for owners of "privately operated businesses" 
and 
persons 
in 
their 
"private 
residences."49 
 
If 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional because it is too broad, 
needing exceptions to render it constitutional, the court should 
strike the statute down and allow the legislature to enact a 
more narrow prohibition.  We have often said that "courts cannot 
go beyond the province of legitimate construction to save [a 
statute], and where the meaning is plain, words cannot be read 
into it or out of it for the purpose of saving one or other 
possible alternative."50  Moreover, "defining the contours of 
                                                 
48 Wis. Const. art. I, § 25. 
49 Majority op., ¶68. 
50 State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 82, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997). 
As this court has explained:  
[W]ere we to rewrite a statute whenever it failed 
constitutional muster in order to save it, using any 
means possible, the legislature would soon realize 
that it need not be concerned with constitutional 
limitations: the judiciary could always be relied upon 
to 
mend 
and 
mold 
its 
language 
to 
fit 
within 
constitutional constraints. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
laws subjecting a violator to criminal penalty is a legislative, 
not a judicial, function."51 
¶116 The 
first 
part 
of 
this 
dissent 
explains 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
is 
constitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
defendant here because it is a reasonable exercise of the 
State's police power, and it does not eviscerate the defendant's 
right to keep and bear arms for security.  The second part of 
this dissent explains why the majority opinion errs when it 
gives courts the authority to determine, as a matter of law, 
that a given defendant may have a valid constitutional defense 
to a charge of carrying a concealed weapon, subject to a 
determination of lawful purpose by the finder of fact.  Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                             
"While a statute should be held valid whenever by any 
fair interpretation it may be construed to serve a 
constitutional purpose, courts cannot go beyond the 
province of legitimate construction to save it, and 
where the meaning is plain, words cannot be read into 
it or out of it for the purpose of saving one or other 
possible alternative."  It is well-established that 
"[w]here the language used in a statute is plain, the 
court 
cannot 
read 
words 
into 
it 
that 
are 
not 
found . . . even 
to 
save 
its 
constitutionality, 
because 
this 
would 
be 
legislation 
and 
not 
construction." 
Finally, "'[a]lthough this Court will often strain to 
construe 
legislation 
so 
as 
to 
save 
it 
against 
constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry 
this to the point of . . .' judicially rewriting it".  
"Otherwise, there would be no such thing as an 
unconstitutional statute." 
State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 139-140, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) 
(citations omitted). 
51 State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 177, 332 N.W.2d 750 
(1983). 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
I comment on the majority opinion's failure to appreciate the 
extent to which it has frustrated the ability of the legislature 
to set public policy on concealed weapons in Wisconsin.   
 
 
I 
¶117 Under State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, we are to presume that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is 
constitutional, and we impose the heavy burden of proving that 
it is unconstitutional on the challenger, the defendant in this 
case.52  Any reasonable doubts about the statute must be resolved 
in favor of constitutionality.53   
¶118 Furthermore, because the statute is an exercise of the 
State's police power, judicial review is limited to whether the 
exercise of that power is reasonable.54  In reviewing the 
reasonableness of the statute, it is not for this court to pass 
judgment on the wisdom of the legislation.  "Where legislative 
action is within the scope of the police power, fairly debatable 
questions as to reasonableness, wisdom, and propriety of action, 
                                                 
52 See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.  I disagree with this court's conclusion in Cole 
that a statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality when it 
is enacted before adoption of the constitutional amendment in 
issue. 
 
Cole, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
¶52 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring).  I would say instead that no presumption of 
constitutionality applies and the defendant in this case carries 
the burden of showing that the statute is inconsistent with the 
constitutional amendment. 
53 Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶10, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141 (citing Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849).    
54 State v. Jackman, 60 Wis. 2d 700, 705, 211 N.W.2d 480 
(1973).  
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
are not for the determination of the court but for the 
legislative body."55   
¶119 To 
determine 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
is 
constitutional on the facts of this case we must ask two 
questions.  The first question is whether the regulation on 
concealed weapons is a reasonable exercise of the police power, 
namely, does the statute promote public safety, health, or 
welfare and bear a reasonable relation to accomplishing those 
purposes.56  The second question is whether the reasonable 
exercise 
of 
the 
state's 
police 
power 
eviscerates 
the 
constitutional right to bear arms.   
¶120 No one disputes that the prohibition on carrying a 
concealed weapon is a reasonable exercise of the State's police 
power.57  Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 promotes public safety.  The 
primary justification for the prohibition on carrying concealed 
weapons is that it protects the public by preventing an 
individual from having a deadly weapon on hand of which the 
public (including a law enforcement officer) is unaware, which 
may be used in the sudden heat of passion.58  The public is 
                                                 
55 State v. Dried Milk Prods. Co-op, 16 Wis. 2d 357, 363, 
114 N.W.2d 412 (1962). 
56 In Interest of Reginald D., 193 Wis. 2d 299, 308, 533 
N.W.2d 181 (1995). 
57 As the majority opinion explains, Wisconsin's prohibition 
of the carrying of concealed weapons is not only a reasonable 
exercise of police power but also serves many valuable purposes 
in promoting public safety.  Majority op., ¶53. 
58 Majority op. ¶¶54-56; see also State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 
1236, 1238 (Wyo. 1986). 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
safer, the argument goes, if it is able to take notice of those 
people who are carrying weapons and proceed accordingly.  
Indeed, in a case similar to the present case, State v. Mata, 
199 Wis. 2d 315, 321, 544 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1996), the court 
of appeals concluded that a persuasive argument can be made that 
"a tavern owner's display of a handgun may deter crime while 
concealment of the gun probably would not."59   
¶121 Moreover, by making it a misdemeanor to carry a 
concealed weapon, Wis. Stat. § 941.23 bears a reasonable and 
substantial relationship to the end of promoting public safety.  
Criminalizing conduct stigmatizes conduct and deters people from 
doing it, a conclusion the majority opinion agrees with as 
well.60   
¶122 The second question in the present case is whether the 
reasonable exercise of the State's police power eviscerates the 
constitutional right to bear arms.61  As the majority opinion 
explains, an otherwise reasonable exercise of police power 
cannot be invoked in a way that "eviscerates," "destroys," 
"frustrates," or "nullifies" the constitutional right to bear 
arms.62  Short of that, however, as the majority opinion further 
                                                 
59 The majority opinion dismisses this analysis as suspect 
in light of Article I, Section 25, see majority op., ¶72 n.32, 
yet nothing about the constitutional amendment changes the 
reasonableness or persuasiveness of the bald argument that 
openly displaying a handgun may deter crime while concealment 
probably would not.     
60 Majority op., ¶56. 
61 Majority op., ¶39. 
62 Majority op., ¶¶40-41. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
explains, the right to bear arms is not absolute and is subject 
to reasonable regulation.63 
¶123 In order to determine whether a statute eviscerates a 
constitutional 
right 
or 
merely 
reasonably 
regulates 
a 
constitutional right we must examine the "degree" to which the 
regulation frustrates the purpose of the constitutional right.64  
For example, in City of Seattle v. Montana, 919 P.2d 1218 (Wash. 
1996), the Washington Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance 
regulating the carrying and possession of "dangerous knives" in 
the face of a constitutional amendment granting the right to 
bear arms.  The court reasoned that the police power was 
reasonably exercised to "promote public safety and good order," 
and that the city did not enact a "complete prohibition on 
possession and carrying knives" but merely "regulated the 
                                                 
63 Majority op., ¶45. 
64 City of Seattle v. Montana, 919 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Wash. 
1996) (citing Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 668 
P.2d 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)); see also State v. Boyce, 658 
P.2d 577, 579 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (regulation requiring people 
on a public street or in a public place to remove ammunition 
from their firearms is constitutional because it only regulates 
manner and does not unreasonably hinder right to bear arms); 
State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99-100 (Or. 1980) (total 
prohibition on possession of billy clubs in all places is 
unconstitutional). 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
carrying, transport, and use of knives."65  Therefore, the 
statute was constitutional.66      
¶124 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 is similarly constitutional 
when applied to the defendant because it does not eliminate the 
right of an owner of a privately operated business to bear arms 
for security or defense but simply limits the manner in which he 
or she may exercise the right to bear arms.  That is, § 941.23 
does not prevent anyone from carrying a firearm for security, 
defense, hunting, recreation, or other lawful purposes.  Rather, 
it limits the manner of carrying weapons, by requiring that a 
weapon that is on a person or within a person's reach not be 
concealed.67  The gist of the offense is the concealment.  Thus, 
nothing about Wis. Stat. § 941.23 comes close to eviscerating, 
destroying, frustrating, or nullifying the right to bear arms in 
                                                 
65 Seattle, 919 P.2d at 1225. 
66 Similarly, in People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975), 
the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a statute making it a 
felony for ex-offenders to possess, use, or carry a weapon was a 
reasonable exercise of the State's police power despite a state 
constitutional right to bear arms.  The Court explained: (1) the 
statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power; (2) the 
legislature cannot enact laws in the name of police powers that 
"render nugatory [the] Bill of Rights and other constitutional 
protections"; but (3) a statute that "simply limits the 
possession of guns and other weapons by persons who are likely 
to abuse such possession" does not eviscerate a constitutional 
protection.  Id. at 391. 
See also Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 173 (Ohio 
1993) (legislation survived constitutional scrutiny because the 
regulation achieved its goal of protecting the public by 
"limit[ing] the accessibility of certain generally recognized 
dangerous firearms"). 
67 See majority op., ¶46. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
Wisconsin for the defendant here or any other person.  The right 
to bear arms "is not impaired by requiring individuals to carry 
weapons openly."68   
¶125 The majority opinion reaches a different answer to 
this second question.  The majority opinion concludes that 
prohibiting an owner of a privately operated business from 
carrying concealed weapons for purposes of security renders 
meaningless the right to bear arms.69   
¶126 The majority opinion's contrary conclusion results 
from the fact that it goes beyond an examination of the degree 
to which the right is restricted and instead weighs the merits 
of the policy supporting Wis. Stat. § 941.23 as a reasonable 
exercise of the State's police power when applied to the owner 
of a privately operated business.  The majority opinion 
concludes, for example, that a person is less likely to "act on 
impulse" or in the heat of passion "in a familiar setting in 
which the safety and satisfaction of customers is paramount and 
the liability for mistake is nearly certain."70  The majority 
                                                 
68 Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990).  
See also Cole, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶49 ("[T]he right to bear 
arms is clearly not rendered illusory by prohibiting an 
individual from keeping a loaded weapon hidden either in the 
glove compartment or under the front seat in a vehicle.").  The 
distinction between as applied and facial challenges is a 
difficult one to make.  The distinction apparently arose in 
First Amendment cases, and its usefulness in other cases has 
troubled courts and scholars.  See Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 
125, ¶20 n.19, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266. 
69 Majority op., ¶68. 
70 Majority op., ¶57. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
also concludes that "[a] shopkeeper is not likely to use a 
concealed weapon to facilitate his own crime of violence in his 
own store."71  Finally, the majority opinion asserts that there 
is less need in these circumstances for innocent customers to be 
notified that the owner of a business possesses a weapon——anyone 
who enters a business premises "should presume that the owner 
possesses a weapon, even if the weapon is not visible."72 
¶127 In short, the majority opinion engages in its own 
consideration of public policy and promulgates its own views of 
human 
psychology 
to 
reach 
its 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional as applied to an owner 
of a privately operated business without the benefit of any 
facts or reasoned debate on the matter or giving credence to the 
legislature's determination of public policy or views about 
human psychology.73 
¶128 The majority opinion's consideration of policy and 
psychology is in error.  First, the majority's conclusions are 
unpersuasive.  It seems equally plausible to argue that a person 
will act less rationally and more impulsively in defending his 
or her own privately owned business (a familiar place) because 
the person's interest in security is so strong and the feeling 
of violation from any breach in that security is so great.  
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See majority op., ¶74 ("Requiring a storeowner to openly 
display weapons as the only available means of exercising the 
right to keep and bear arms for security is impractical, 
unsettling, and possibly dangerous."). 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
Likewise, there is no evidence that a crime of violence is less 
likely for a shop owner in his own store.  A shop owner who has 
a gun and is frightened, intimidated, or threatened is more 
likely to use it, and as the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded in 
upholding its own concealed weapon law, "it is not always 
necessary, nor is it always lawful, to use deadly force in one's 
own defense."74  Finally, it is equally plausible to conclude 
that the privately operated business is a "public place," that 
customers will be exposed to the danger of a concealed weapon in 
public places, and a business owner's right to carry a concealed 
weapon for security is outweighed by the needs of public 
safety.75 
¶129 Second, and more importantly, the majority's dubious 
conclusions 
are 
irrelevant. 
 
The 
statute 
is 
presumed 
constitutional and the burden on the challenger is heavy.  By 
                                                 
74 McAdams, 714 P.2d at 1238 (quoting Garcia v. State, 667 
P.2d 1148 (Wyo. 1983)) (emphasis added). 
75 See majority op., ¶63 (quoting Ruby B. Weeks, Annotation, 
Scope and Effect of Exception, in Statute Forbidding Carrying of 
Weapons, as to Person on His Own Premises or at His Place of 
Business, 57 A.L.R. 3d 938, § 2(a) (1974) (recognizing the 
danger of a concealed weapon in place where there is contact 
with the public)).  
The majority opinion's conclusion that everyone should 
presume an owner of a privately operated business is carrying a 
concealed weapon is also dubious in the face of the majority 
opinion's contrary conclusion that carrying a gun openly is 
unreasonable since it "would alert criminals to the presence of 
the weapon and frighten friends and customers."  Majority op., 
¶73.  Why is it reasonable and not frightening for customers to 
presume that all owners of a privately operated business are 
carrying a concealed weapon but frightening and unreasonable to 
permit the owner to carry that weapon openly? 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
enacting the statute the legislature has determined that public 
safety is advanced when owners of privately operated businesses, 
like all other individuals, are required to carry their guns 
openly.  Although the majority opinion has set forth counter-
arguments to the legislature's determination that concealed 
weapons are hazardous to public safety, neither the majority 
opinion nor the challenger has carried the heavy burden of 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
legislative 
determination 
is 
unconstitutional because the degree to which it restricts the 
right to bear arms for owners of privately operated businesses 
eviscerates the constitutional right. 
II 
¶130 While 
I 
conclude 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 941.23 
is 
constitutional as applied, I write further because I believe 
that the majority also errs when it parcels out between judge 
and jury the questions necessary for determining whether its 
newly created constitutional defense to a charge of carrying a 
concealed weapon is available to a defendant. 
¶131 The majority opinion concludes that a defendant who 
challenges a prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon on 
constitutional grounds will be required to secure affirmative 
answers to two "legal questions" for the circuit court before he 
is entitled to raise a constitutional defense and one question 
of fact for the fact finder at trial before he may prevail.76  
The two legal questions for the circuit court are: (1) did the 
defendant's interest in concealing the weapon substantially 
                                                 
76 Majority op., ¶86. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
outweigh the State's interest in enforcing the concealed weapons 
statute; and (2) was concealment the only reasonable means under 
the circumstances to carry the gun.77  Then, according to the 
majority opinion, if the defendant receives affirmative answers 
to these two questions the trier of fact must determine by means 
of a separate verdict question whether the defendant had a 
lawful purpose for carrying the weapon.78 
¶132 It is unclear to me why the questions are so divided.  
First, it is well established in Wisconsin law that a court 
commits error 
by 
refusing 
to 
give 
a theory 
of defense 
instruction to the jury when a defendant presents sufficient 
evidence in support of the defense.  When deciding whether a 
defendant is entitled to assert a defense, a court does not 
weigh the evidence.  It asks only whether a reasonable 
construction of the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
defendant supports the alleged defense.  A court may refuse the 
defendant's request for an instruction only when there is no 
evidence to support it. 
¶133 Moreover, in cases involving claims that a criminal 
prosecution impermissibly infringes upon a constitutionally 
protected right, it is typically the jury that determines 
whether 
the 
constitutional 
defense 
is 
available 
to 
the 
defendant. 
 
For 
example, 
a 
person 
is 
prosecuted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 944.21(4) 
(1995-96) 
for 
distributing 
obscene 
materials.  The statute defines obscene material to exclude 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id., ¶¶78, 86-87. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
materials protected by the First Amendment.  The court instructs 
the jury, defining what is protected First Amendment free 
speech, and the jury decides whether the constitutional defense 
is available.79 
¶134 In 
addition, 
Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2) 
(1997-98) 
penalizes a person who threatens a judge.  To render the statute 
constitutional against a First Amendment challenge, the court 
defined the threat in the statute to cover only "true threats" 
in order to render the statute constitutional.  A jury is 
instructed regarding the definition of "true threat" so that the 
jury can decide whether the facts fall within the statute or the 
prosecution is barred by the First Amendment.80   
¶135 On the basis of these cases, which are, in my opinion, 
substantially similar to the case at bar, I question the 
majority opinion's excluding the jury from decision-making 
regarding guilt in the present case.  Here we have a statute 
prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon.  The court has 
read in a constitutional limitation.  The majority opinion 
appears to turn our precedent on its head when it permits a 
court, not the jury, to reach substantive conclusions about the 
merits of a defendant's constitutional defense to a charge of 
carrying a concealed weapon when reasonable people might 
                                                 
79 See 
County 
of 
Kenosha 
v. 
C&S 
Mgmt., 
Inc., 
223 
Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999); see also McCauley v. Tropic 
of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 137, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963) (a jury 
trial on issue of obscenity under the statute). 
80 State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 
N.W.2d 762. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
disagree.  It seems to me that the majority opinion reverses 
well-established law when it concludes that a defendant must 
persuade a court as a matter of law that his defense is 
meritorious before his defense is presented to the jury.  Under 
the majority opinion, when reasonable people could differ about 
the availability of the defense on the basis of the facts 
presented, a court is able to bar a defendant's defense. 
¶136 A court may direct only an acquittal as a matter of 
law.  Indeed, this court determines in the present case not just 
that the defendant was entitled to raise a constitutional 
defense in the present case but that he prevails in his defense 
as a matter of law.  The majority opinion concludes that the 
defendant's conviction was unconstitutional and must be reversed 
unless the State can prove that the defendant carried a 
concealed weapon for an unlawful purpose.81   
¶137 Second, assuming for the sake of argument that these 
two questions are properly questions of law for the court, it is 
unclear why the remaining question of lawful purpose is left to 
the jury.82  The majority opinion concludes that whether a 
defendant has an unlawful purpose for bearing a concealed weapon 
                                                 
81 Majority op., ¶84. 
82 It is also unclear what it means to have a lawful 
purpose.  The majority opinion explains that "carrying a 
concealed weapon for an unlawful purpose means carrying a 
concealed weapon in furtherance of the commission of a crime.  
Majority op., ¶77.  What if there are two purposes for a person 
to conceal his weapon, one criminal and the other "for 
security"?  What if the purpose is lawful but some other fact 
makes the concealment unlawful, such as the fact that the weapon 
carrier is an ex-felon? 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
is a question of fact because "it may involve a state of mind 
for which competing evidence is necessary."83  Will there not be 
competing 
evidence 
going 
to 
the 
defendant's 
interest 
in 
concealing the weapon, the State's interest in enforcing the 
statute,84 or whether concealment was the only reasonable means 
under the circumstances to carry the gun?  I recognize that a 
person's state of mind is typically a factual determination, but 
so is reasonableness.  The majority opinion does not explain why 
lawful purpose (question three) is for the jury but not whether 
there is a reasonable alternative to concealing the weapon 
(question two).85   
¶138 As an aside, I am puzzled about where the majority 
finds the requirement in the constitutional amendment that the 
purpose be lawful if the individual satisfies the circuit court 
that he had the weapon for security purposes.  The majority 
opinion reads the constitutional amendment as requiring a person 
to carry the concealed weapon for security and for a lawful 
purpose.  In so doing, the majority opinion is using the 
catchall in the constitution, "and any other lawful purpose" to 
                                                 
83 Majority op., ¶76. 
84 The majority opinion never addresses whether the State's 
interests in enforcing the statute are established conclusively 
by this opinion or will vary from case to case. 
85 Justice Bablitch's concurrence analogizes the circuit 
court's role under the majority opinion's framework to the 
circuit court's role in determining constitutional facts under a 
Fourth Amendment case.  Justice Bablitch's concurrence, ¶96.  In 
the Fourth Amendment context, however, as the concurrence 
admits, all questions regarding reasonableness are for the 
court.   
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
restrict the word "security" preceding it.  This requirement of 
"lawful purpose" seems to unduly restrict the constitutional 
amendment's application contrary to its terms.  "There is no 
purpose for the presence of [the catchall phrase] except to 
expand the list of potential qualifying" purposes.86   
¶139 Third, a court's determinations that the defendant's 
interest in concealing a weapon substantially outweighs the 
State's interest in enforcing the concealed weapons statute 
(question one) and that concealment is the only reasonable means 
under the circumstances to carry a weapon (question two) are 
necessarily intertwined with a determination that the defendant 
carried a concealed weapon for a lawful purpose.  Thus, when a 
court determines that a constitutional defense may be raised it 
effectively nullifies the remaining question that the majority 
opinion reserves for a jury. 
¶140 In 
the 
present 
case, 
for 
example, 
the 
court's 
conclusion that the defendant's interest in maintaining a 
concealed weapon substantially outweighs the State's interest in 
prohibiting concealed weapons is expressly premised on the fact 
that the defendant possessed and carried his weapon "for 
purposes of security."87  The majority opinion holds: "If the 
                                                 
86 State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
87 Majority op., ¶67.  In the same vein, the majority 
recites the facts of the case as follows: "As a result of these 
general and specific concerns for the safety of himself, his 
family, and his customers, and for the security of his property, 
[the defendant] kept a handgun under the store's front counter 
next to the cash register during store hours."  Majority op., 
¶9. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
constitutional right to bear arms for security is to mean 
anything, it must, as a general matter, permit a person to 
possess, carry, and sometimes conceal arms to maintain the 
security 
of 
his 
private 
residence 
or 
privately 
operated 
business, and to safely move and store weapons within these 
premises."88  A jury finding that the defendant carried a 
concealed weapon for an unlawful purpose plainly contradicts the 
applicability of this legal conclusion to the present case.  
III. COMMENTARY 
¶141 The majority opinion suggests that the legislature 
needs to "clarify the law" on carrying concealed weapons in 
light of the new constitutional right to keep and bear arms for 
security, defense, hunting, recreation, and any other lawful 
purpose.89 
 
At 
the 
same 
time, 
it 
adopts 
principles 
of 
constitutional law for courts to use in determining whether a 
person has a constitutional defense to a charge of carrying a 
concealed weapon "until the legislature takes further action."90 
¶142 In so doing, the majority opinion fails to appreciate 
two important points.   
¶143 First, the legislature's intent in the statute to 
prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons in all places is 
clear.  The history of the constitutional amendment is replete 
with evidence that the amendment was not intended to abrogate 
existing statutory regulation of firearms.  As this court 
                                                 
88 Majority op., ¶68 (emphasis added). 
89 Majority op., ¶85. 
90 Majority op., ¶89. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
acknowledged in Cole, the legislative history behind the 
constitutional amendment granting the right to bear arms in 
Wisconsin "clearly suggests that the legislature did not intend 
to repeal reasonable gun laws such as the CCW statute."91       
¶144 The intent of the amendment was to prevent further 
erosion of the rights of gun owners, referring to local 
ordinances regulating guns.92  In addition, according to a public 
opinion poll at the time of the amendment, almost 80% of 
Wisconsinites opposed legalizing the carrying of concealed 
weapons.93 
¶145 Second, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
has 
erected 
constitutional roadblocks to any further action the legislature 
might take to determine public policy on concealing firearms and 
other weapons.  The constitutional right to bear arms in 
Wisconsin now includes a right not only for all owners of 
privately owned and operated businesses and persons in their 
private residences to carry concealed weapons for purposes of 
security, but for many others as well.  The majority not only 
concludes that for the right to bear arms to mean anything it 
must mean that a person can conceal arms to "maintain the 
security 
of 
his 
private 
residence 
or 
privately 
operated 
                                                 
91 Cole, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶39. 
92 Cole, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶64 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
93 Cole, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶44 (citing Jeffrey Monks, The End 
of Gun Control or Protection Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the 
New Wisconsin Constitutional Right To Bear Arms on State Gun 
Control Laws, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 284).  
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
business,"94 but also that the constitutional right to bear arms 
in Wisconsin further protects the right of any other person to 
carry a concealed weapon if a court determines that the person's 
interest 
in 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
weapon 
"substantially 
outweighs" the State's interest in enforcing the concealed 
weapons statute.95  The number of individuals who can fit under 
the umbrella is large.   
                                                 
94 Majority op., ¶68.  Despite its attempts to limit the 
present holding to the defendant's precise circumstances, the 
language in the majority opinion is much broader.  For example, 
the majority opinion concludes, "[I]f the State prosecutes a 
storeowner for having a concealed weapon within easy reach, it 
is strongly discouraging the use of firearms for security and is 
practically nullifying the right to do so."  Majority op., ¶74.  
This language is hardly limited to the facts of this case. 
95 The two questions the majority opinion establishes for 
determining whether a constitutional defense is available are 
broad sweeping and potentially apply to countless individuals 
under any number of circumstances.   
For example, an owner of a privately operated business 
caught carrying a concealed weapon while walking to deposit the 
store's earnings in a bank can certainly argue that he is 
exercising his right to keep and bear arms under circumstances 
in which the need to exercise the right is substantial and that 
concealment, while walking to and upon entering the bank, is the 
only reasonable means for exercising the right to bear arms 
under the circumstances.  So too can a store manager in charge 
for an absentee owner argue that she is exercising her right to 
keep and bear arms under circumstances in which the need to 
exercise the right is substantial and that concealment is the 
only reasonable means for exercising the right.  Indeed, what is 
to stop any person from claiming this right in his or her 
workplace? 
Similarly, anyone who must walk home from a bus stop every 
night after work through a high crime neighborhood can surely 
argue that his or her need to exercise the right to bear arms is 
high, concealment is necessary, and that his or her interests in 
self-protection substantially outweigh the State's interest in 
regulating concealed weapons.   
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶146 More importantly, when any court concludes that an 
individual is exempted from the prohibition on carrying a 
concealed weapon under this "substantially outweighs" test, the 
court 
is 
determining 
that 
the 
constitution 
demands 
the 
exception. 
 
The 
legislature 
may 
not 
undo 
the 
court's 
determination absent another constitutional amendment.   
¶147 The majority opinion concludes, "We happily concede 
that the legislature is better able than this court to determine 
public policy on firearms and other weapons."96  Unfortunately, 
the majority's recognition of its inferior ability did not 
dissuade it from reading two exceptions into the carrying 
concealed weapons statute and setting forth criteria for reading 
additional exceptions into the statute, effectively blocking the 
legislature from determining public policy concerning concealed 
weapons. 
¶148 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
96 Majority op., ¶85. 
No.  01-0056-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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