Title: Kennedy v. Department of Public Safety

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Kennedy v. Department of Public Safety  (97-535); 168 Vt. 601; 719 A.2d 405

[Filed 24-Aug-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-535

                               JUNE TERM, 1998

                                      
Stephen L. Kennedy                    }     APPEALED FROM:
                                      }
                                      }
     v.                               }     Washington Superior Court
                                      }
Vermont Department of Public Safety   }
                                      }     DOCKET NO. 502-9-95Wncv

  In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff, formerly a Vermont State Police officer, appeals from an
  order of the Washington Superior Court granting defendant Department of
  Public Safety, summary judgment on his Vermont Fair Employment Practices
  Act (VFEPA) suit.  We find there are no issues of material fact and that
  defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We affirm.

       Plaintiff was a Vermont state trooper from 1977 to October 1993.  In
  December 1987, he was suspended for operating a cruiser while under the
  influence of alcohol.  In 1991, he was again suspended for operating his
  personal vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and for fraudulently
  obtaining a Massachusetts license while under suspension in Vermont. 
  Following a conviction for DUI on April 26, 1993, he was charged by the
  Commissioner of Public Safety with conduct unbecoming a state police
  officer and with lying during the investigation.  Acting pursuant to 20
  V.S.A. § 1922, the State Police Advisory Commission found that both charges
  were proven.  On October 7, 1993, the commissioner fired plaintiff. 
  Plaintiff appealed his firing to the Vermont Labor Relations Board which
  found that defendant had just cause for dismissal. Plaintiff then brought
  this action.

       Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of an affidavit of
  the commissioner, the findings and conclusions of the State Police Advisory
  Commission, and a copy of the applicable code of conduct.  Plaintiff
  objected, relying primarily on his own affidavit, which stated:  (1) he was
  an alcoholic at the time of the 1993 incident, but has now recovered; (2)
  he did not lie during the investigation, and to the extent he misstated
  facts, it was due to an alcoholic blackout; and (3) he knows of at least
  one other state police officer who was only suspended for DUI.  The
  superior court granted summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed.

       Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact exist which
  prevented the superior court from granting summary judgment.  On appeal of
  summary judgment:

     [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court:  summary
     judgment is appropriate when the record clearly indicates there is
     no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
     entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  In determining whether
     a genuine issue of material fact exists, we regard as true all
     allegations of the nonmoving party supported by admissible

 

     evidence, and we give the nonmoving party the benefit of all
     reasonable doubts and inferences.

  Lane v. Town of Grafton, 166 Vt. 148, 150,