Title: Commonwealth v. Ruiz

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12404 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BERNIE RUIZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 7, 2018. - October 11, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Habitual Offender.  Practice, Criminal, Appeal by Commonwealth, 
Interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 10, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by Lenk, J. 
 
 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick A. Michaud for the respondent. 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Once again we have occasion to interpret G. L. 
c. 279, § 25 (a) (§ 25 [a]), which requires that a "habitual 
criminal" -- a defendant who has been convicted of a felony and 
has two prior convictions resulting in State or Federal prison 
sentences of three years or more -- be sentenced to the maximum 
term provided by law on the underlying conviction.  We conclude 
2 
 
 
that, although the predicate convictions must arise from 
separate incidents or episodes, Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 
Mass. 59, 66 (2017), the offenses need not be separately 
prosecuted.  We further conclude that Mass. R. Crim. P. 
15 (a) (1), as appearing in 474 Mass. 1501 (2016) (rule 15 [a] 
[1]), and G. L. c. 278, § 28E (§ 28E), grant the Commonwealth a 
right to appeal from the dismissal of the sentence enhancement 
portion of an indictment, and thus we overrule in part 
Commonwealth v. Pelletier, 449 Mass. 392, 395-396 (2007). 
Background.  In March, 2016, a grand jury returned eleven 
indictments against the defendant for a variety of charges, 
including armed assault with intent to murder, in connection 
with an incident alleged to have occurred on February 17, 2016.1  
All but two of these indictments carried sentencing enhancements 
under § 25 (a). 
                     
 
1 The details regarding the basis of the defendant's 
indictments are contained in grand jury testimony filed and 
maintained under seal pursuant to G. L. c. 268, § 13D (e).  The 
defendant was charged on two indictments of armed assault with 
intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); three indictments of 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15B; one 
indictment of unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a); one indictment of unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm, sawed off shotgun, or machine gun, G. L. c. 269, § 10 
(n); one indictment of unlawful possession of ammunition without 
a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); one 
indictment of discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a 
dwelling, G. L. c. 269, § 12E; one indictment of possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony, G. L. c. 265, § 18B; 
and one indictment of malicious damage to a motor vehicle, G. L. 
c. 266, § 28 (a). 
3 
 
 
 
The predicate convictions supporting the habitual criminal 
portions of the indictments were the result of guilty pleas 
tendered by the defendant in 2008.  The defendant pleaded guilty 
to separate charges of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon arising from two separate criminal episodes, 
which occurred in August and September of 2006. 
 
In 2008, the defendant was indicted for both offenses by 
the same grand jury and pleaded guilty to both charges in one 
proceeding.  The defendant was sentenced to a term of from four 
to six years in State prison on each charge of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, each sentence set to run 
concurrently.2 
 
Because the judge below concluded that the defendant's 
predicate convictions represented a single "incident" under 
§ 25 (a), he allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
§ 25 (a) sentence enhancement charges associated with the March, 
2016, indictments.3  The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of 
                     
 
2 The defendant also pleaded guilty to other charges during 
the aforementioned 2008 proceeding that are not relevant to our 
analysis in this case. 
 
 
3 The defendant also was indicted in October, 2014, for a 
number of other criminal offenses.  Several of the 2014 and 2016 
charges carried sentence enhancements pursuant to the armed 
career criminal act, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c).  The motion judge 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss these sentence 
enhancement charges; the Commonwealth did not appeal from those 
dismissals.  See Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455, 470 
 
4 
 
 
appeal in the Superior Court, but the Superior Court clerk's 
office would not compile a record for appeal under rule 15 (a) 
(1) in light of our decision in Pelletier, 449 Mass. at 396, in 
which we held that the Commonwealth may not take an 
interlocutory appeal from the dismissal of only the sentence 
enhancement portion of a complaint.  Thereafter, the 
Commonwealth filed a petition for relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  A single justice of this court denied the 
Commonwealth's petition, and the Commonwealth appealed to the 
full court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Applicability of G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a).  
In reviewing the single justice's determination to deny the 
Commonwealth's petition brought under G. L. c. 211, § 3, this 
court looks to whether "the single justice abused his or her 
discretion or made a clear error of law."  Rogan v. 
Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 376, 378 (1993).  Here, the Commonwealth 
asserts an error of law.  Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 
Mass. 88, 90 (2006).  Because the question for review is a 
matter of statutory interpretation, we review it de novo.  
Garvey, 477 Mass. at 61. 
General Laws c. 279, § 25 (a), provides: 
                                                                  
(2016).  The Commonwealth exercised its authority to enter a 
nolle prosequi on the 2014 charges in May, 2017. 
5 
 
 
"Whoever is convicted of a felony and has been previously 
twice convicted and sentenced to [S]tate prison or [S]tate 
correctional facility or a [F]ederal corrections facility 
for a term not less than [three] years . . . shall be 
considered a habitual criminal and shall be punished . . . 
for such felony for the maximum term provided by law." 
 
The statute requires that a defendant be sentenced to the 
maximum sentence if found guilty of the underlying felony 
provided that he or she has at least two qualifying prior 
convictions; however, § 25 (a) does not indicate whether those 
predicate convictions must have stemmed from separate 
prosecutions and sentencings. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge properly dismissed the 
sentence enhancements because, as he pleaded guilty to a set of 
charges that were combined and prosecuted together, the 
convictions cannot be counted separately for the purposes of 
§ 25 (a).  Conversely, the Commonwealth contends that § 25 (a) 
does not require that the predicate convictions arise from 
charges separately prosecuted.  See Commonwealth v. Hall, 397 
Mass. 466, 468-469 (1986) (defendant may be convicted under 
statute where two predicate convictions arise out of unrelated 
incidents disposed of on same date with identical concurrent 
sentences). 
As the statute is "simply silent" on this matter, "we 
consider that section in the context of the over-all objective 
the Legislature sought to accomplish."  National Lumber Co. v. 
6 
 
 
LeFrancois Constr. Corp., 430 Mass. 663, 667 (2000).  Our review 
of § 25 (a)'s historical development supports the conclusion 
that the legislative objective of § 25 (a) is to punish all 
offenders who have prior convictions stemming from two or more 
separate and distinct criminal episodes, and that the 
Legislature specifically rejected the requirement of separate 
and sequential prosecutions for predicate offenses. 
 
The "Legislature developed a series of incarnations of 
repeat offender statutes, beginning in 1818, before enacting 
what is now § 25 (a)."  Garvey, 477 Mass. at 62.4  In 
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 11 Pick. 28, 34 (1831), this court 
concluded that, under the 1818 incarnation of the statute (which 
was also silent as to whether charges or indictments must have 
been separately prosecuted to count as individual convictions), 
two predicate convictions associated with two prior distinct 
criminal episodes that were brought and tried during the same 
term of the same court were "two convictions, within the meaning 
of the statute."  See Ex Parte Seymour, 14 Pick. 40, 40-41 
(1833) (period of liberty between predicate convictions not 
required). 
                     
 
4 See St. 1817, c. 176, §§ 5-6; St. 1827, c. 118, §§ 19-20; 
St. 1832, c. 73, § 1; St. 1833, c. 85, §§ 1-2; St. 1836, c. 4, 
§§ 17, 20-22; St. 1843, c. 80; St. 1853, c. 375 (repealing 
statute); St. 1887, c. 435, § 1; St. 2012, c. 192, § 47. 
7 
 
 
 
In the following year, the Legislature amended the statute, 
superseding this court's opinion in Phillips by expressly 
requiring that there should be two separate convictions and 
sentences, and two distinct discharges from prison, to bring a 
defendant within the scope of the statute.  See St. 1832, c. 73, 
§ 1.5  See also St. 1833, c. 85, §§ 1-2 (reenacting statute with 
substantiality of 1832 requirements);6 Phillips v. Commonwealth, 
3 Met. 588, 591 (1842) (1831 interpretation "probably gave rise 
to the statute passed at the next session of the legislature"); 
Commonwealth v. Mott, 21 Pick. 492, 500 (1839) ("One great 
object of the [1832] statute undoubtedly was, to declare that by 
two convictions, should thereafter be understood, sentences and 
commitments at two distinct times and discharges therefrom . . . 
instead of two sentences at the same term of a court"); Ex Parte 
                     
 
5 The 1832 statute specifically required proof that a 
convict subject to the statute "has at two several times before 
been sentenced by competent authority to [prison]." (emphasis 
added).  St. 1832, c. 73, § 1.  At the time, "several" was 
defined as "[a] state of separation or partition.  A several 
agreement or covenant, is one entered into by two or more 
persons separately, each binding himself for the whole; a 
several action is one in which two or more persons are 
separately charged; a several inheritance, is one conveyed so as 
to descend, or come to two persons separately by moieties.  
Several is usually opposed to joint."  2 Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary 394 (1st. ed. 1839). 
 
 
6 The 1833 statute was reenacted with the express 
requirement of two distinct discharges from prison for predicate 
offenses, but without the express requirement of two several 
convictions contained in the 1832 statute.  See St. 1832, c. 73, 
§ 1; St. 1833, c. 85, §§ 1-2. 
8 
 
 
Stevens, 14 Pick. 94, 96 (1833) (explaining intent and purpose 
of 1832 statute); Ex Parte Seymour, 14 Pick. at 41 note (noting 
that statutory revision added requirement that charges be 
sequential). 
 
In 1836, however, the Legislature again amended the repeat 
offender statute, eliminating the requirements that had been 
added in 1832 requiring separate convictions and a period of 
liberty between the imprisonment for one offense and the 
commission of the next.  St. 1836, c. 4, §§ 17, 20.7  Although 
the Legislature repealed the repeat offender statute in 1853, 
see St. 1853, c. 375, it enacted a version substantially similar 
to the earliest version of the statute in 1887, again omitting 
the 1832 requirements that predicate offenses occur as a result 
of separate convictions and occur with a period of liberty 
between them.  St. 1887, c. 435, § 1.  We have concluded that 
the Legislature's modifications to the statutory requirements of 
what is now § 25 (a) in light of our decisions are highly 
                     
 
7 Although the 1833 statute appears to have eliminated the 
express requirement of separate convictions and sentences for 
predicate offenses, separate convictions would have still been 
implicit in the requirement that there be two discharges from 
prison.  The express requirement of separate convictions was 
nonetheless included in the codification of the statute in 1835.  
See St. 1833, c. 85, §§ 1-2; R.S. c. 133, § 13; R.S. c. 144, 
§ 34.  In any case, the 1836 statute expressly repealed the 
requirement of separate convictions and two discharges from 
prison that were included in the revised statutes.  See 
St. 1836, c. 4, §§ 17, 20. 
9 
 
 
germane to determining its intent.  See Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 175 Mass. 202, 207 (1900). 
 
The Legislature's decision to enact a statute expressly 
requiring separate prosecutions of predicate offenses with a 
period of liberty between those prosecutions, followed by the 
repeal and replacement of that statute with a version that does 
not contain those requirements, "reflect[s] a conscious decision 
by the Legislature to deviate from the standard embodied in the 
[previous] statute."  Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455, 
466 (2016), quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement 
Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 433 (1983).  Thus, here the Legislature has 
rejected the theory that more severe punishment is only 
appropriate when there have been two separate and distinct 
encounters with the criminal justice system that have failed to 
result in the theoretically beneficial effects of penal 
discipline.  See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 
519, 533-535 (2013) (examining statutory history to determine 
statute's meaning). 
 
In 2012, the Legislature reenacted § 25 (a) as part of 
criminal justice reform legislation, also inserting new 
subsections removing the possibility of parole for "habitual 
10 
 
 
offenders"8 of particular offenses enumerated in the statute.  
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b)-(d), inserted by St. 2012, c. 192, § 47.  
Under those newly inserted provisions, unlike in § 25 (a), the 
Legislature expressly required that predicate offenses have been 
"separately brought and tried."  See G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b) 
(§ 25 [b]).  That the Legislature reenacted the same statute in 
2012 without including the requirement that the predicate 
offenses be separately brought and tried under § 25 (a), yet 
included that requirement under § 25 (b), provides further 
support that the Legislature did not intend to modify prior 
assumptions about this statute to include this requirement.9  See 
People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 407-408 (1930) (where 
Legislature required predicate convictions to be "separately 
                     
 
8 After the 2012 amendments, certain individuals statutorily 
identified as "habitual criminals" are subject to the provisions 
of subsection (a) and certain individuals statutorily identified 
as "habitual offenders" are subject to the provisions of 
subsection (b).  See G. L. c. 289, § 25, as appearing in 
St. 2012, c. 192, § 47. 
 
 
9 In Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 65-66 (2017), we 
rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the Legislature's 
decision to include an express "separate and distinct incident" 
element in G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), implied its exclusion in 
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a) (§ 25 [a]).  However, our conclusions 
both here and in Garvey contemplate that by reenacting § 25 (a) 
without making any significant modifications, the Legislature 
did not intend to "negate this court's . . . prior assumptions 
about § 25 (a)."  Id. at 66.  Based on the statutory history and 
our case law, the prior assumption here is that the Legislature 
did not require predicate offenses to be separately brought and 
tried. 
11 
 
 
brought and tried" for one sentence enhancement scheme but not 
another, "legislature may have considered . . . prior 
convictions [in latter scheme] to have been sufficient to have 
constituted a man a[] habitual criminal, whether or not they 
were upon charges separately brought and tried").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Wimer, 480 Mass. 1, 5 (2018) (interpreting 
statutory language requiring sequential convictions). 
 
The defendant suggests that we should construe § 25 (a) 
consistently with our interpretation of G. L. c. 269, § 10G 
(§ 10G), the armed career criminal act.  That statute also 
requires sentence enhancements under particular conditions, and 
is similarly silent as to whether the prior convictions must 
have stemmed from separate prosecutions and sentences.10  In 
                     
 
10 General Laws c. 269, § 10G, provides in relevant part: 
 
"(a) Whoever, having been previously convicted of a violent 
crime or of a serious drug offense, both as defined herein, 
violates the provisions of paragraph (a), (c) or (h) of 
[§] 10 shall be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate 
prison for not less than three years nor more than 
[fifteen] years. 
 
"(b) Whoever, having been previously convicted of two 
violent crimes, or two serious drug offenses or one violent 
crime and one serious drug offense, arising from separate 
incidences, violates the provisions of said paragraph (a), 
(c) or (h) of said [§] 10 shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the [S]tate prison for not less than ten years nor more 
than [fifteen] years. 
 
"(c) Whoever, having been previously convicted of three 
violent crimes or three serious drug offenses, or any 
 
12 
 
 
Resende, 474 Mass. at 469, we concluded that § 10G requires 
separate and sequential prosecutions in order to count prior 
convictions individually; however, § 25 (a) and § 10G stand on 
very different footing. 
 
Section 10G, the Massachusetts analog to the Federal armed 
career criminal act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was enacted relatively 
recently (in 1998), and its legislative roots are not nearly as 
extensive as those of § 25 (a).  See St. 1998, c. 180, § 71, 
inserting G. L. c. 269, § 10G.  As we noted in Resende, the 
legislative history of § 10G is not particularly helpful on the 
issue whether the statute requires each previous conviction to 
be separately prosecuted to count as a predicate offense.  Id. 
at 463-464.  Instead we looked to "the Legislature's departure 
from the language used in the Federal [statute],[11] the analysis 
of cases from other jurisdictions, and the rule of lenity" to 
determine that § 10G requires separate and sequential 
prosecutions of predicate offenses.  Id. at 464. 
                                                                  
combination thereof totaling three, arising from separate 
incidences, violates the provisions of said paragraph (a), 
(c) or (h) of said [§] 10 shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the [S]tate prison for not less than [fifteen] years nor 
more than [twenty] years." 
 
 
11 We noted that the Legislature chose to depart from 
language in the Federal statute in its description of what makes 
a violent crime a predicate offense.  Resende, 474 Mass. at 464-
465 (comparing "incidences" in Massachusetts statute with 
"committed on occasions different from one another" in Federal 
statute). 
13 
 
 
In contrast, the purpose of § 25 (a), as made clear from 
the statutory history, is to punish all repeat offenders, and to 
require prior convictions merely as proof of guilt of prior 
crimes rather than proof that a defendant's prior penal 
treatment has not been effective at reforming a criminal 
offender.12  See Richardson, 175 Mass. at 207 (describing 
statute's purpose); Ex Parte Seymour, 14 Pick. at 41-42 (same).  
See also Mott, 21 Pick. at 498 (purpose of period of liberty in 
1833 statute was to ensure sentence enhancement occurs only 
"after the salutatory and reforming influence of two separate 
commitments to the penitentiary, and two discharges therefrom by 
pardon or execution of the whole sentence, had been tried in 
vain"). 
The Commonwealth's sentence enhancement statutes vary in 
language, structure, and intent.13  Here, a review of the 
statutory history of what is now § 25 (a) confirms that 
predicate convictions arising from separate qualifying criminal 
                     
 
12 A similar understanding of this statute, and how its 
purposes may differ from other repeat offender statutes with 
sentence enhancements in this and other States may be found in 
Note, Habitual Criminal Statutes:  The Requirement of Prior 
Convictions, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 345-346 (1937). 
 
13 There are many sentence enhancement statutes.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 279, § 8B (commission of crime while released on 
personal recognizance); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (firearm offenses); 
G. L. c. 266, § 40 (common and notorious thief); G. L. c. 94C, 
§§ 32-32E (drug offenses); G. L. c. 90, § 24 (driving while 
under influence). 
14 
 
 
incidents or episodes need not be separately prosecuted in order 
for a person to be considered a habitual criminal pursuant to 
§ 25 (a).  Hall, 397 Mass. at 468-469. 
2.  Right of appeal.  As discussed supra, when the 
Commonwealth sought to appeal from the dismissal of the sentence 
enhancement portions of the indictments, the Superior Court 
clerk's office indicated that it would take no action without an 
order from the county court. 
Together, § 28E14 and rule 15 (a) (1)15 establish the right 
of the Commonwealth to appeal from the decision of a judge 
granting a motion to dismiss an indictment or complaint (among 
other things).  However, neither the statute nor the rule 
specifies whether the Commonwealth may appeal from the dismissal 
                     
 
14 General Laws c. 278, § 28E (§ 28E), permits the 
Commonwealth to appeal from "a decision, order or judgment" of a 
judge in the Superior Court to the Appeals Court in three 
circumstances:  (1) where the judge "allow[s] a motion to 
dismiss an indictment or complaint," (2) where the judge 
"allow[s] a motion for appropriate relief under the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure," and (3) provided 
that a single justice of this court grants an application for 
leave to appeal, where the judge "determine[s] a motion to 
suppress evidence prior to trial."  See Commonwealth v. Friend, 
393 Mass. 310, 314 (1984) (notwithstanding text in § 28E, "an 
appeal by the Commonwealth from an order or decision dismissing 
an indictment in the Superior Court must first be entered in the 
Appeals Court"). 
 
 
15 Rule 15 (a) (1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (rule 15 [a] [1]), which implements § 28E, provides:  
"The Commonwealth shall have the right to appeal to the Appeals 
Court a decision by a judge granting a motion to dismiss a 
complaint or indictment . . . ." 
15 
 
 
of a portion of an indictment (e.g., a sentence enhancement) as 
opposed to the dismissal of an indictment in its entirety. 
In Pelletier, 449 Mass. at 395-396, we determined that the 
Commonwealth may not proceed as a matter of right under § 28E 
and rule 15 (a) (1) where it seeks to appeal from only the 
dismissal of subsequent offense charges.  Pelletier involved a 
charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, third offense, under G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1).  Pelletier, supra at 393.  The Commonwealth 
filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review 
of a judge's decision to sentence the defendant as a first-time 
offender despite the subsequent offense portion of the 
indictment.  Id. at 394. 
In concluding that the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition was 
proper,16 we stated that it was "uncertain" whether the 
Commonwealth could have appealed the trial judge's ruling 
pursuant to § 28E and rule 15 (a) (1).  Id. at 395.  Next, we 
noted that the subsequent offense portion of a charge "does not 
create an independent crime," that it "concerns only the 
                     
 
16 "Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is available only in 
extraordinary circumstances."  Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 436 Mass. 
1010, 1011 (2002), quoting Victory Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. 
of the Dist. Court Dep't, 435 Mass. 136, 137 (2001).  "It is not 
available where the petitioning party has or had 'adequate and 
effective avenues other than G. L. c. 211, § 3, by which to seek 
and obtain the requested relief.'"  Jaynes, supra, quoting 
Lanoue v. Commonwealth, 427 Mass. 1014, 1015 (1998). 
16 
 
 
punishment to be imposed if a defendant is convicted of the 
underlying crime and the prior offenses are proved," and that 
"[t]he defendant's sentence on the underlying charge in the 
complaint is . . . 'inextricably bound' with the plea judge's 
treatment of the subsequent offense portion of the complaint" 
(citations omitted).  Id. at 395-396.  We then concluded that 
"an appeal from a 'dismissal' of only that portion of the 
complaint charging a subsequent offense may not lie."  Id. at 
396. 
The Commonwealth argues that this holding is incorrect.17  
It contends that, because rule 15 (a) (1) is the only procedural 
mechanism by which the Commonwealth may appeal from a dismissal, 
prohibiting the appeal from the dismissal of subsequent offense 
charges undermines the purpose of § 28E.  In revisiting the 
matter, we agree with the Commonwealth and conclude that, 
notwithstanding the reasoning in Pelletier, the Commonwealth may 
take an appeal from the dismissal of the sentence enhancement 
portion of an indictment pursuant to § 28E by way of rule 
15 (a) (1). 
                     
17 Because the Commonwealth is able to obtain relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, in this case, the question whether it should 
be allowed to proceed pursuant to rule 15 (a) (1) is moot.  
Nevertheless, we address the question because "the situation 
presented is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"  
Boelter v. Selectmen of Wayland, 479 Mass. 233, 238 (2018), 
quoting Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 61 (2014). 
17 
 
 
We have highlighted the important jurisprudential interests 
served generally by a right to appeal, including consistent 
treatment of similar cases and the orderly development of a body 
of law.  See Burke v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 157, 160 (1977).  
Appellate review also ensures the proper administration of 
justice in individual cases.  See, e.g., Swift v. American Mut. 
Ins. Co. of Boston, 399 Mass. 373, 375 n.5 (1987). 
These interests apply with equal force not only to a review 
of the proceedings once a trial has concluded, but also to the 
review of pretrial decisions that terminate criminal proceedings 
prior to a trial being held.  An appeal from a trial judge's 
dismissal of an indictment pursuant to § 28E and rule 15 (a) (1) 
"allow[s] the Commonwealth to reinstitute proceedings terminated 
because of an incorrect ruling in the trial court, . . . but, on 
the other hand, . . . allow[s] [appellate courts] to affirm 
preliminary rulings which, in effect, put an end to a particular 
prosecution."  Burke, 373 Mass. at 160.  The absence of a 
mechanism to appeal from a decision that terminates a criminal 
proceeding could "leave a class of cases, many of which involve 
serious crimes, lost either to further prosecution or any 
appellate review."  Id. 
A sentence enhancement charge cannot be brought alone; 
instead, it must accompany a substantive criminal charge.  See 
Bynum v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 709-710 (1999).  However, 
18 
 
 
like the underlying felony charges they accompany, sentence 
enhancements must be included in charging documents and voted on 
by a grand jury.  See G. L. c. 278, § 11A.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 441 Mass. 783, 789 (2004) (indictments 
including repeat offender charges must adequately notify 
defendant of crime charged and jeopardy faced); Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517, 521-522 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 
1281 (2000) (repeat offender component should appear in 
indictment).  Subsequent offense charges are prosecuted in a 
separate proceeding, only if and after the defendant has been 
convicted of the underlying substantive offense.  G. L. c. 278, 
§ 11A.18  Thus, when a judge dismisses the sentence enhancement 
portion of an indictment, he or she is terminating that 
                     
 
18 General Laws c. 278, § 11A, provides that when a 
defendant is charged with being a repeat offender, his or her 
guilt as to the underlying charge is first determined, 
 
"then before sentence is imposed, the defendant shall be 
further inquired of for a plea of guilty or not guilty to 
that portion of the complaint or indictment alleging that 
the crime charged is a second or subsequent offense.  If he 
pleads guilty thereto, sentence shall be imposed; if he 
pleads not guilty thereto, he shall be entitled to a trial 
by jury of the issue of conviction of a prior offense, 
subject to all of the provisions of law governing criminal 
trials. . . .  The court may, in its discretion, either 
hold the jury which returned the verdict of guilty of the 
crime, the trial of which was just completed, or it may 
order the impanelling of a new jury to try the issue of 
conviction of one or more prior offenses.  Upon the 
return of a verdict, after the separate trial of the issue 
of conviction of one or more prior offenses, the court 
shall impose the sentence appropriate to said verdict." 
19 
 
 
particular proceeding.  See Pelletier, 449 Mass. at 396 (G. L. 
c. 278, § 11A, requires defendants charged with sentence 
enhancements "to be tried in a two-step, bifurcated procedure").  
See also Miranda, 441 Mass. at 788 (§ 11A requires defendant "to 
be tried . . . first, on the underlying substantive crime and, 
then, in a separate proceeding, on that component of the charge 
referring to the crime as a second or subsequent offense"). 
Because an unrestrained right to pretrial appeals by the 
Commonwealth may be burdensome on defendants (and the courts), 
G. L. c. 278, § 28E, limits such appeals to circumstances in 
which the trial judge's decision forecloses the Commonwealth's 
opportunity to go forward with the prosecution altogether.  
Burke, 373 Mass. at 160.  See Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 366 
Mass. 277, 279 (1974) ("interlocutory appeals and reports should 
not be permitted to become additional causes of the delays in 
criminal trials which are already too prevalent").19  As a motion 
judge who grants a motion dismissing the subsequent offense 
portion of a charge terminates a separate proceeding 
                     
19 Section 28E expressly authorizes the Commonwealth to 
appeal from certain interlocutory decisions granting motions to 
suppress, as such decisions "so often . . . in practical effect, 
terminate the proceedings."  Commonwealth v. Yelle, 390 Mass. 
678, 685 (1984).  See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 401 Mass. 133, 
135 (1987) (decisions excluding Commonwealth's evidence only 
appealable under Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 "if, as a practical 
matter, that ruling [if permitted to stand] would terminate the 
prosecution"). 
20 
 
 
adjudicating the issue of conviction of prior offenses that was 
included in an indictment, there is no reason that an appeal 
should not lie under § 28E.  See G. L. c. 278, §§ 11A, 28E.  If 
the Commonwealth is denied the ability to seek an appeal from 
the dismissal of subsequent offense charges, those charges might 
be "lost either to further prosecution or any appellate 
review."20  Burke, 373 Mass. at 160. 
Finally, the right to appeal from decisions interpreting 
these statutes helps to ensure that they are enforced uniformly, 
and that the Legislature's penological goals are realized.21 
 
"Adherence to the principle of stare decisis provides 
continuity and predictability in the law, but the principle is 
not absolute.  No court is infallible, and this court is not 
barred from departing from previous pronouncements if the 
                     
 
20 The Commonwealth has sometimes been successful obtaining 
review of the dismissal of sentence enhancement portions of 
indictments under G. L. c. 211, § 3, as in this case.  We note, 
however, that "[o]ur general superintendence power under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not 
as a substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to 
provide an additional layer of appellate review after the normal 
process has run its course."  Scott v. Attorney Gen., 448 Mass. 
1002, 1003 (2006), quoting Scott v. District Attorney for the 
Norfolk Dist., 445 Mass. 1022, 1022 (2005).  For that reason, it 
does not provide the right of appeal that the Commonwealth is 
entitled to under § 28E and rule 15 (a) (1). 
 
21 As pointed out in the concurrence, many sentence 
enhancement statutes, such as this one, are indeed harsh; but, 
unless constitutionally infirm, it is the duty of the judicial 
branch to interpret statutes passed by the Legislature, no more 
and no less. 
21 
 
 
benefits of so doing outweigh the values underlying stare 
decisis."  Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 562, cert. denied sub nom. 
Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 (2004).  See Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (considerations in favor of stare 
decisis are at nadir in cases involving procedural rules).  
Although we concluded otherwise in Pelletier, we now conclude 
that § 28E and rule 15 (a) (1) permit an appeal as of right from 
a dismissal of sentence enhancement charges.22 
One additional consideration merits discussion.  The 
Commonwealth's inability to review the dismissal of habitual 
criminal portions of indictments under Mass. R. Crim. P. 15, yet 
ability to obtain review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, as in this 
case, undermines the intent of Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (d), which 
"authorize[s] awards of appellate fees and costs to defendants 
in those situations where the Commonwealth is entitled to 
appeal, or seek leave to appeal, from trial court rulings in a 
defendant's favor."  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 470 Mass. 837, 
                     
22 Because we conclude that a motion to dismiss an 
indictment or complaint includes the portion of the indictment 
related to a sentence enhancement, we need not consider the 
scope of the meaning of the words "allowing a motion for 
appropriate relief under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure" in G. L. c. 278, § 28E.  See Commonwealth v. 
Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 533 (1981). 
22 
 
 
840 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Phinney, 448 Mass. 621, 622 
(2007).  The purpose of this rule is "'to equalize the resources 
of the defendant with those of the Commonwealth' in cases where 
a defendant does not have court-appointed counsel but is forced 
to defend against a Commonwealth appeal; and to prevent a 
defendant's privately retained counsel from being placed 'in the 
untenable position of either volunteering his services on appeal 
or abandoning the defendant.'"  Augustine, supra, quoting 
Phinney, supra at 622 n.2.  See Gonsalves, 432 Mass. at 616-617 
(discussing at length origin and purposes of rule 15 [d]).  
Where the Commonwealth seeks review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
there is no appeal under rule 15, but instead a collateral 
proceeding in the county court.  Therefore, the defendant is not 
entitled to reimbursement for costs and attorney's fees 
associated with defending the Commonwealth's claim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 353 (2009).  In cases 
involving the dismissal of sentence enhancement charges, we do 
not believe that this result is consistent with the intent of 
rule 15 (d). 
3.  Timeliness of Commonwealth's G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition.  The defendant contends that the single justice abused 
her discretion by failing to deny the Commonwealth's motion to 
enlarge the time to file a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
This argument has no merit.  The Commonwealth's application was 
23 
 
 
based on the erroneous concern that the time limits of Mass. R. 
A. P. 4, as amended, 430 Mass. 1603 (1999), apply generally to 
superintendence petitions filed before a single justice of this 
court under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Because such a petition is not 
an appeal governed by the rules of appellate procedure, the time 
limits set forth in rule 4 of those rules do not apply.  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 1 (a), 365 Mass. 844 (1974) (defining scope of 
rules as applying to "procedure in appeals to an appellate 
court").  Although there may be circumstances in which a single 
justice might deny such a petition as untimely, the decision 
would not be governed by rule 4.  The single justice did not 
abuse her discretion in considering the Commonwealth's petition 
in this case. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
single justice is vacated, and the case is remanded to the 
county court for entry of an appropriate order by the single 
justice consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lowy, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court that, given the legislative evolution of 
the habitual criminal statute, G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a), we can 
discern that the Legislature did not intend to require the 
separate prosecution of predicate offenses, and that we must 
respect that legislative intent.  I write separately only to 
make a few observations that suggest that § 25 (a) warrants 
revisiting by the Legislature. 
 
First, the legislative intent that we effectuate today is 
that of the Legislature in 1887.  As the court explains, the 
Legislature that year chose to reenact a version of the habitual 
criminal statute that did not require the separate prosecution 
of predicate offenses, as opposed to an earlier version that did 
include that requirement, thus reflecting a "conscious decision" 
not to require separate prosecutions.  Ante at    , quoting 
Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455, 466 (2016).  This 
decision has remained undisturbed since then, even though our 
understanding of what is wise and just in a criminal justice 
system has changed dramatically in the past 131 years.  In 1887, 
the punishment for a capital offense entailed "hanging the 
convict by the neck until he is dead."  Pub. St. 1882, c. 215, 
§ 37.  Those convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment 
could be sentenced to solitary confinement -- in which case they 
would be fed "bread and water only" -- and hard labor.  See Pub. 
2 
 
 
St. 1882, c. 215, § 3; Pub. St. 1882, c. 220, § 39; Pub. St. 
1882, c. 221, § 29.  Needless to say, attitudes about crime and 
punishment have changed significantly since then. 
 
Second, the sanction imposed by the habitual criminal 
statute has become considerably more severe:  whereas the 1887 
statute provided that habitual criminals "shall be punished by 
imprisonment . . . for twenty-five years," St. 1887, c. 435, 
§ 1, the current statute provides that they "shall be punished 
by imprisonment . . . for the maximum term provided by law."  
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a).  For many offenses, the maximum term 
provided by law is life.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 265, § 17 (armed 
robbery); G. L. c. 265, § 18A (armed assault in dwelling); G. L. 
c. 265, § 18C (armed home invasion); G. L. c. 266, § 14 (armed 
or assaultive burglary).  This means that a habitual criminal 
who in 1887 would have faced twenty-five years of imprisonment 
could today face the far harsher punishment of imprisonment for 
life. 
 
Third, significant changes in other sentencing laws have 
caused the habitual criminal statute to operate more harshly 
today than it has in the past.  For example, in 1993 the 
Legislature enacted the so-called Truth in Sentencing Act, 
St. 1993, c. 432, which modified sentencing laws in 
Massachusetts such that, among other things, prisoners could no 
longer obtain early release as a result of statutory good time, 
3 
 
 
St. 1993, c. 432, § 10, and judges no longer had the option of 
imposing "reformatory" sentences (commonly referred to as 
"Concord" sentences).1  St. 1993, c. 432, §§ 14-15, 17-20.  See 
Commonwealth v. Russo, 421 Mass. 317, 319 n.2 (1995).  In 
addition, in 2012 the Legislature amended the law governing 
parole eligibility for habitual criminals; habitual criminals 
are now eligible for parole only upon serving two-thirds of 
their maximum sentence, G. L. c. 127, § 133B, as opposed to one-
half of their maximum sentence, as had been the case under prior 
law.  Compare St. 2012, c. 192, § 40, with St. 1955, c. 770, 
§ 70.  As a result of these changes, habitual criminals who may 
in the past have had an opportunity to obtain early release 
                     
 
1 Prior to its abolition, the "Concord" sentence was "a 
sentencing option widely used by Superior Court judges in the 
1980's."  Commonwealth v. Thurston, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 554 
(2002).  Defendants who received Concord sentences -- typically 
those who were "deemed capable of rehabilitation" -- would be 
sentenced not to State prison at the Massachusetts Correctional 
Institution (M.C.I.) at Walpole (now M.C.I., Cedar Junction) but 
to M.C.I., Concord (for male defendants) or M.C.I., Framingham 
(for female defendants).  Id. at 555.  These defendants would 
receive apparently long sentences, ranging up to the maximum 
term provided by law, but would become eligible for parole after 
serving only "a small fraction . . . of the stated sentence."  
Id.  See Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, Survey of 
Sentencing Practices:  Truth-in-Sentencing Reform in 
Massachusetts 6 (Oct. 2000).  The Concord sentence was available 
as a sentencing option even where the defendant was convicted of 
an offense with a mandatory minimum sentence.  See Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 778 (2000) (Concord sentence "was a 
general sentencing option" that was "not incompatible" with 
mandatory minimum sentence). 
4 
 
 
through statutory good time or to become eligible for parole at 
an earlier time are no longer able to do so. 
 
Fourth, while I agree with the court's interpretation of 
the habitual criminal statute because it comports with the 
Legislature's intent, I also note that this interpretation does 
not comport with the common understanding of what constitutes a 
"habitual criminal."  A "habitual criminal" is commonly 
understood to be someone who has engaged in recidivism -- that 
is, an individual who, after having been punished for his or her 
crimes, nevertheless goes on to commit further crimes.  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 827 (10th ed. 2014) (referencing 
definition of "recidivist" under definition of "habitual 
criminal"); id. at 1461 (defining "recidivist," also termed 
"habitual criminal," as "[a] criminal who, having been punished 
for illegal activities, resumes those activities after the 
punishment has been completed").  Under this common 
understanding of the term, an individual is considered a 
habitual criminal only if he or she continues to commit serious 
crimes after repeatedly being punished for those crimes.  
Generally, habitual criminal statutes, such as G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (b), impose severe punishment only after it is apparent 
that repeated sentences to prison failed to deter or 
rehabilitate the defendant, because the defendant continued to 
commit serious crimes after having twice served prison time for 
5 
 
 
earlier crimes.2  The habitual criminal statute in § 25 (a) is at 
odds with this common understanding.  Because it does not 
require the separate and sequential prosecution of predicate 
offenses, it applies even where the predicate offenses both 
occurred before any punishment.  Thus, for instance, if an 
individual struggling with drug addiction and desperate for 
money to purchase oxycodone robs one convenience store in August 
and another in September, serves a concurrent three-year prison 
sentence for each of those robberies, and then commits a new 
felony after his or her release from custody, he or she would be 
considered a habitual criminal under § 25 (a) -- even though we 
generally would not label this individual as such -- and would 
have to receive the maximum sentence permitted by law for the 
new offense. 
 
For these reasons, I believe that it is time to reconsider 
the wisdom and fairness of the habitual criminal statute.  I 
encourage the Legislature to do so. 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 279, § 25 (b), imposes the maximum 
sentence without the possibility of probation or parole for 
"habitual offenders."  In order to be considered a habitual 
offender, an individual must have been convicted two times 
previously of certain enumerated violent offenses, "arising out 
of charges separately brought and tried, and arising out of 
separate and distinct incidents that occurred at different 
times, where the second offense occurred subsequent to the first 
conviction."