Title: Hooten v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hooten v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation1988 WY 45751 P.2d 1323Case Number: 87-275Decided: 03/29/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES H. HOOTEN, 
APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE AND TAXATION, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT).

Robert J. Reese, 
Green River, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and David Mark Quiner, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant/petitioner 
James H. Hooten (Hooten) challenges the order of an independent hearing examiner 
suspending his driver's license under the Wyoming implied consent statutes, §§ 
31-6-101 through 31-6-106, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1986), for failure to submit to 
a chemical sobriety test following his arrest for driving while under the 
influence. He raises one issue:

"Whether a license 
suspension is valid when based solely on documents submitted contrary to 
District Court Rules."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     At about 2:45 a.m. on 
the morning of May 22, 1987, Hooten was arrested and charged with driving while 
under the influence (DWUI) in violation of § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1986). The arresting officer indicated in a signed statement and attached arrest 
report that she had observed Hooten driving his truck without his headlights on. 
Following Hooten, the officer noticed that Hooten was weaving and jerking his 
truck from one side of the road to the other. The officer attempted to stop 
Hooten by activating her overhead lights. Hooten failed to stop and continued 
weaving down the middle two lanes of traffic crossing over the middle line 
several times. The officer, and an assisting officer in another patrol car, 
attempted to stop Hooten by activating their sirens and overhead lights. The 
assisting officer even placed his vehicle in the path of Hooten's oncoming 
truck, but Hooten still failed to stop his truck and missed the officer's 
vehicle by only a foot. Traveling several blocks, Hooten finally came to a stop 
with the passenger-side tires of his truck on the 
sidewalk.

[¶4.]     The arresting officer 
approached Hooten's truck, requested his driver's license and asked if he knew 
why he had been stopped. Hooten responded that he was going about ten miles per 
hour over the speed limit. The officer noted that Hooten's speech was "real low 
and slurred" and that there was an "odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from 
his breath." The officer asked Hooten to exit his vehicle and go to the back of 
the truck. Hooten complied with some difficulty, having to hold on to the door 
and bed of the truck to maintain his balance. The officer inquired if Hooten was 
hurt or sick, to which he replied that he was not.

[¶5.]     The arresting officer 
administered several field sobriety tests which Hooten failed to complete 
successfully. Hooten was then arrested for DWUI and transported to jail. At the 
jail, Hooten was booked and read the implied consent law. While at first 
indicating that he would take a breathalyzer test, Hooten ultimately refused to 
submit to the test. His driver's license was retained by the police department. 

[¶6.]     On May 28, 1987, 
appellee/respondent the State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue and Taxation 
(Department), sent Hooten notification of the suspension of his driver's license 
for a six month period for his failure to submit to the breathalyzer test 
pursuant to the implied consent law, § 31-6-102. Hooten requested a hearing 
before an independent hearing examiner which was held on July 9, 1987. At the 
hearing, the Department was not represented by counsel, nor were any witnesses 
subpoenaed in its behalf. Instead, the Department submitted its case based 
entirely on the arrest documentation as a certified record. The arresting 
officer appeared and testified on her own initiative, but not at the request of 
either party. Hooten objected to the presence and testimony of the officer, and 
to the admission of her report and the suspension file's contents without an 
attorney representing the Department to present or review the contents or to 
attest to their accuracy.

[¶7.]     After reviewing the 
evidence, the hearing examiner found that "[t]here was probable cause to believe 
the Licensee [Hooten] was driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle on a public street or highway while under the influence of alcohol * * 
*." The examiner further found that Hooten was informed of his rights under 
Wyoming's 
implied consent law and that he was requested to submit to a chemical test, but 
that he refused. Finding that all the requisite elements of the implied consent 
law were met, the hearing examiner upheld the suspension of Hooten's driver's 
license on August 7, 1987.

[¶8.]     Hooten petitioned the 
district court for a review of the hearing examiner's proceedings, which 
petition was certified to this court on November 4, 1987, pursuant to Rule 
12.09, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

[¶9.]     This case concerns 
whether the presence of an attorney is required to present evidence on behalf of 
the Department at implied consent hearings, or whether the certified suspension 
record alone is sufficient to support a license suspension. This identical issue 
was considered recently in Drake v. State ex rel. Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, Wyo., 751 P.2d 1319 (1988). In Drake, supra, we upheld the suspension 
of the driver's license based entirely on the submission of the certified 
records of the Department in the absence of a representing attorney. Pursuant to 
Chapter 1, § 6(e) of the Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State Tax 
Commission concerning the procedures for a hearing before an independent hearing 
examiner, the Department is allowed to present evidence at an implied consent 
hearing "* * * by direct evidence or certified record, whichever they so desire. 
* * *" Drake v. State ex rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, supra, at 
1322. See also State of Wyoming, Department of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Hull, Wyo., 
751 P.2d 351 (1988) (upholding suspension under similar 
circumstances).

[¶10.]  Hooten contends that the Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming are generally applicable to contested 
cases under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act. We held in Drake that "* 
* * the Uniform District Court Rules apply to this type of hearing only insofar 
as § 16-3-107(c), (f) and (g) expressly say they do. * * *" Drake v. State ex 
rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, at 1322. The presence of an attorney is 
not required at implied consent hearings to support the license suspension of 
one arrested and charged with driving while under the influence who refuses to 
submit to chemical sobriety testing. As required by our decisions in Drake and 
Hull, and by the 
doctrine of stare decisis, we affirm.