Title: Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hall

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

681 So. 2d 126 (1996)
UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY
v.
Jackie Darryl HALL.
1921945.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 3, 1996.
Rehearing Denied September 6, 1996.
G. Rick Hall of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Huntsville, for Appellant.
K. Rick Alvis and Roger L. Lucas of Lucas, Alvis, Kirby & Wash, P.C., Birmingham, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company appeals from a judgment awarding Jackie Darryl Hall $1,025,000 in compensatory damages on Hall's claim that he was injured as a result of an explosive rupture of a tire manufactured by B.F. Goodrich Company. We reverse and remand.
On August 8, 1991, Jackie Darryl Hall and several co-workers were using a gooseneck trailer to haul cattle; the trailer experienced a blowout of one of the trailer tires. They drove a short distance to a shop, where they removed the tire and attempted to replace it with a 16-inch light truck tire. It is undisputed that the wheel rim, manufactured by the Budd Company and distributed by Ford Motor Company, did not have its size stamped on it; however, it was a 16.5-inch wheel rim. A 16-inch tire should be mounted on a 16-inch wheel rim. An attempt to *127 mount a tire of one size onto a wheel rim of a different size is known in the industry as a "mismatch." Not knowing that the wheel and rim were different sizes, Hall attempted to mount the mismatched tire onto the rim; the tire exploded. The tire had the following warning on the sidewall:
Apparently, upon inflating the tire, two or three inches of the tire "would not `pop out' or `bead out' against the flange of the wheel." Appellant's brief, page 9.
Appellant's brief, page 9. (Citations to the record omitted.) More air was added to the tire. The tire exploded, causing substantial injury to the plaintiff's left leg and left arm.
Hall sued the manufacturer of the wheel rim, the Budd Company; the distributor of the wheel rim, Ford Motor Company; and the tire manufacturer, B.F. Goodrich Company, alleging negligence and wantonness and claiming liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine. He later amended his complaint to add as defendants Steve Worscham, individually and d/b/a/ B & S Grocery, the operator of the shop where the accident occurred. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Worscham. Budd and Ford Motor Company settled with Hall for $450,000, and they are not parties to this appeal. The jury returned a verdict against B.F. Goodrich in the amount of $825,000. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement between the parties relating to several evidentiary and set-off issues, the trial court increased the award by $200,000, to $1,025,000.[1]
B.F. Goodrich appealed from the resulting judgment. It contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury that contributory negligence was not a defense to Hall's AEMLD claim. We agree. Because that error requires that we reverse and remand, we pretermit discussion of the appellant's other arguments.
The trial judge charged the jury as follows:
R.T. at 852. Later, the trial judge stated:
R.T. at 853-55; 859-61.
After the judge charged the jury, counsel for B.F. Goodrich objected, as follows:
R.T. at 890-91.
The plaintiff contends that the jury instructions on assumption of the risk and on product misuse encompassed the defense of contributory negligence, even though the jury was specifically charged that contributory negligence was not an available defense to the plaintiff's AEMLD claim. A similar argument was addressed by this Court in General Motors Corp. v. Saint, 646 So. 2d 564 (Ala.1994), and rejected. In Saint, we addressed the argument that a jury charge on product misuse basically constituted a charge on contributory negligence. We said:
General Motors Corp. v. Saint, 646 So. 2d  at 567-68.[2]
The distinctions between contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and product misuse were discussed in Justice Ingram's dissenting opinion in Campbell v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So. 2d 573 (Ala.1994), wherein he expressed the view that contributory negligence should not be a defense to an AEMLD claim. While his views on that point differed from that of the majority, for definitional purposes his dissent is instructive. He stated:
646 So. 2d 573, 577 (Ingram, J., dissenting). In examining the differences between contributory negligence and product misuse and then the differences between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, Justice Ingram stated:
646 So. 2d  at 577 (Ingram, J., dissenting).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury that contributory negligence was a defense to the plaintiff's AEMLD claim.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, and SHORES, JJ., concur.
ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur in the result.
KENNEDY, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., dissent.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring in the result.)
I concur in the result. I would reverse and remand on the authority of the majority opinions in General Motors Corp. v. Saint, 646 So. 2d 564 (Ala.1994), and Campbell v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1994).
COOK, Justice (dissenting).
I dissented in General Motors Corp. v. Saint, 646 So. 2d 564 (Ala.1994), and in Campbell v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So. 2d 573 (Ala.1994), because I was convinced that in those cases the majority of the Court "misapprehende[d] the rules set forth in Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala.1976), and Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala.1976)." Campbell v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So. 2d  at 578, citing General Motors Corp. v. Saint, supra. I continue to remain staunch in my view that Atkins and Casrell "established only two affirmative defenses that relate to the plaintiff's conduct, namely, (1) assumption of the risk, and (2) product misuse alias contributory negligence." Campbell v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So. 2d  at 578, citing my dissent in Saint. For a complete explanation of my views with regard to this issue, see my dissents in those cases. For the reasons set forth therein, I, again, respectfully dissent.
[1]  Before the trial, B.F. Goodrich had agreed that the jury would be told about the pro tanto settlement with Budd and Ford and that it would give up $200,000 of its right to set-off. Other evidentiary matters were also listed in the agreement.
[2]  We note that this case was tried before the Saint opinion was released.