Title: Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, Maryland

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, Maryland, No. 52, September 
Term, 2019, Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES – Maryland Reclamation 
Associates (“MRA”) was required to exhaust its administrative remedies by submitting all 
constitutional claims to the Board of Appeals (“Board”).  MRA’s unconstitutional takings 
claim was no exception to this settled principle.  Under our established case law, where a 
property owner is asserting an unconstitutional taking of its property arising from the 
application of a zoning regulation, as part of the administrative proceeding, the property 
owner is required to establish that he or she will be deprived of all beneficial use of the 
property. Whether a property owner will be deprived of all beneficial use of a property is 
an initial factual determination that is within the original jurisdiction of the Board of 
Appeals, subject to judicial review.  MRA could not circumvent the exhaustion 
requirement by withholding its takings argument from the Board’s consideration and later 
presenting the claim to a jury under the court’s original jurisdiction.  Because MRA never 
raised its takings claim in the administrative proceeding, the instant case should have been 
dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Harford County 
Case No.:  12-C-13-000509 
Argued: March 10, 2020 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 52 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARYLAND RECLAMATION 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 
 
v. 
HARFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: April 24, 2020 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-08-20 10:51-04:00
This case requires us to examine a property owner’s right to invoke the original 
jurisdiction of the courts by filing an inverse condemnation case pursuant to Article III, 
§ 40 of the Maryland Constitution, where the constitutional claim was not raised during 
the administrative agency proceeding before the Harford County Board of Appeals.   
We consider these principles against the backdrop of 30 years of litigation between 
the parties.  This is the fourth Court of Appeals case arising out of litigation between 
Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. (“MRA”), and Harford County, Maryland 
(“Harford County” or the “County”), in connection with MRA’s efforts to construct and 
operate a rubble landfill on approximately 62 acres of land (the “Property”) located on 
Gravel Hill Road, in Harford County.  See Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 
342 Md. 476 (1996) (“MRA II”);1 Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 382 Md. 
348 (2004) (“MRA III”); Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 414 Md. 1 (2010) 
(“MRA IV”).   
The earlier litigation between the parties concluded with this Court’s 2010 opinion 
in MRA IV, which rejected all of MRA’s substantive claims by upholding all the factual 
determinations and legal conclusions of the Harford County Board of Appeals (sometimes 
hereinafter referred to as the “Board”).  See MRA IV, 414 Md. at 65.  After losing on each 
substantive claim, including the constitutional and non-constitutional claims that were 
                                              
1 We refer to our first opinion as MRA II because there was an initial appeal to the 
Court of Special Appeals. See Holmes v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 90 Md. App. 120 
(1992), cert. dismissed sub nom. Cty. Council of Harford Cty. v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., 
Inc., 328 Md. 229 (1992).  The initial appeal has been referred to in our previous cases as 
“MRA I.”  
2 
raised in the context of the administrative hearing and upheld by this Court, MRA filed a 
separate inverse condemnation case alleging that Harford County’s actions constituted an 
unconstitutional taking of its Property in violation of Article III, § 40 of the Maryland 
Constitution.  Over the decades of litigation, conspicuously absent from the constitutional 
claims asserted by MRA was any allegation that the application of zoning regulations—
Bill 91-10—to its Property, and the denial of a variance, would deprive MRA of all 
beneficial use of the Property, thereby creating an unconstitutional taking without just 
compensation.  We must determine whether, under our exhaustion of administrative 
remedies jurisprudence, a landowner may withhold a claim alleging an unconstitutional 
taking arising from the application of a zoning regulation from the administrative agency’s 
consideration and present the claim to a jury in a separate action invoking the court’s 
original jurisdiction.   
For the reasons set forth more fully in this opinion, we hold that, under our 
abundance of case law applying the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine in the 
context of a constitutional takings claim arising from the application of a zoning regulation, 
the property owner must raise its takings claims within the administrative agency 
proceeding prior to seeking judicial review or filing a separate legal proceeding.  Our case 
law firmly establishes that under the Express Powers Act, Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. 
Vol., 2019 Cum. Supp.), Local Government Article (“LG”) § 10-101, et. seq., the Harford 
County Board of Appeals had original jurisdiction to make the initial factual determination 
of whether there were any other beneficial uses that could be made of the Property, and to 
grant relief in the form of a variance to avoid an unconstitutional taking, if MRA had, in 
3 
fact, established that under the Harford County Code, there were no other beneficial uses 
that could have been made of the Property, other than a rubble landfill.  By failing to raise 
these claims before the Board of Appeals, MRA did not exhaust its administrative remedies 
and dismissal of this case was required.   
I. 
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
On February 19, 2013, MRA filed a Civil Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in 
the Circuit Court for Harford County alleging one count, which it titled “Violations of 
Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution, Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”  Over two years later, on 
June 15, 2015, MRA filed an Amended Complaint for Inverse Condemnation and Demand 
for Jury Trial, again alleging one count for inverse condemnation titled “Violations of § 40 
of Article III of the Maryland Constitution and Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.” 
The First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) recites the same facts and procedural 
history concerning MRA’s attempt to obtain approvals to operate a rubble landfill on its 
property that were litigated by MRA in appellate proceedings before this Court.  The facts 
alleged in the Complaint—which formed the basis for the jury’s $45 million plus verdict—
were first summarized by Judge Eldridge on behalf of this Court in MRA II, 342 Md. at 
480–87.  We repeat those facts once again, as follows.  
In August 1989, MRA contracted to purchase the Property.  MRA intended to 
construct and operate a rubble landfill on the Property and began the process of obtaining 
a rubble landfill permit from the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) 
4 
pursuant to Maryland Code (1982, 1996 Repl. Vol), Environment Article §§ 9-204 through 
9-210.  MRA II, 342 Md. at 480.   
MRA first requested that Harford County include the Property in Harford County’s 
Solid Waste Management Plan (“SWMP”) as a rubble landfill.  Id.  By a vote of 4-3, the 
Harford County Council (the “Council”) amended its SWMP to include MRA’s Property 
as a rubble landfill.  The Property’s inclusion in the Harford County SWMP, however, was 
made subject to 27 conditions, including a minimum landscape buffer of 200 feet.  Id.  On 
November 16, 1989, Harford County advised MDE that MRA’s Property had been 
included in the County’s SWMP as a rubble landfill site.  Id. 
MRA next sought approval for its rubble landfill permit from MDE.  Id.  On 
November 20, 1989, MRA received Phase I permit approval from MDE.  Id.  MRA then 
filed with MDE the necessary reports and studies for Phase II and Phase III approvals.  Id. 
MRA had entered into a contract to purchase the Property in August 1989, before 
its inclusion in the SWMP.  Id. at 481.  Allegedly relying on the Property’s inclusion in the 
Plan, and on MDE’s Phase I approval, MRA consummated the purchase on February 9, 
1990, for $732,500.  Id.  The settlement occurred on the last possible day under the terms 
of the contract of sale.  Id. 
Four days after the settlement date, the newly appointed Harford County Council 
President and a Council member introduced County Resolution 4-90, which provided for 
the removal of the Property from the County’s SWMP.  Id.  In the litigation that ensued 
over this legislation, the Court of Special Appeals held that Resolution 4-90 was invalid 
because it was preempted by the State’s authority over solid waste management plans and 
5 
the issuance of rubble landfill permits.  Id.  (citing Holmes v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., 
Inc., 90 Md. App. 120, cert. dismissed sub nom. Cty. Council of Harford Cty. v. Md. 
Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 328 Md. 229 (1992) (“MRA I”)).   
While the litigation over Resolution 4-90 was pending, in February 1991, Bill 91-
10 was introduced by the Harford County Council as an emergency bill.  Id. at 482.  Bill 
91-10 proposed to amend the requirements for a rubble landfill by increasing the minimum 
acreage requirements, buffer requirements, and height requirements.  Id.  The Bill, inter 
alia, would establish a minimum rubble fill size of 100 acres and a buffer zone of 1,000 
feet.  Id.  After public hearings, the County Council passed the Bill in March 1991.  Id.  
In April 1991, Bill 91-16 was introduced by the Harford County Council.  Id.  This 
Bill authorized the County Council to remove a specific site from the County’s SWMP if 
the site did not comply with certain zoning regulations, if a permit had not been issued by 
MDE within 18 months of the site being placed in the County’s SWMP, or if the owner of 
the site had not placed the site in operation within the same 18-month period.  Id.  Bill 91-
16 was also passed by the County Council.  Id.   
That same month, the President of the Harford County Council sent a letter to MDE 
enclosing a copy of enacted Bill 91-10 and advising the Department that the provisions of 
the Bill could call into question the status of sites which were in the process of obtaining 
rubble landfill permits.  Id. at 483.  MDE advised the County Council in May 1991 that if 
a permit were to be issued to MRA, such issuance would not authorize MRA to violate any 
local zoning or land use requirements.  Id. 
6 
Also in May 1991, the County’s Director of Planning sent a letter to MRA informing 
it of Bill 91-10, indicating that MRA’s Property would apparently fail to meet the 
requirements of Bill 91-10, stating that MRA should submit documentation showing that 
the Property could meet the requirements of the zoning ordinances, and stating that, if the 
site could not meet such requirements, MRA would need a variance to operate a rubble 
landfill on the Property.  Id. at 483–84.  MRA did not file for a variance in response to the 
Director’s May letter; however, MRA did file an “appeal” to the Harford County Board of 
Appeals from the “administrative decision pursuant to Section 267-7E in a letter dated 
5/2/91,” requesting that the Board “review and reverse the decision of the Zoning 
Administrator interpreting that the standards of Council Bill 91-10 apply to the Applicant.”  
Id. at 484.  The “application” to the Board of Appeals asserted that Bill 91-10 was 
inapplicable to the Property and that, if it was applicable, it was invalid.  Id.   
In May 1991, Resolution 15-91 was introduced in the Harford County Council.  Id. 
at 485. This resolution purported to interpret Harford County law and determine that the 
Property was not in compliance with the county law.  Id.  The resolution purported to 
remove the site from the County’s SWMP.  Id.  The County Council passed Resolution 15-
91 in June 1991.  Id.  
A. The Prequel—MRA II, MRA III, and MRA IV—A Procedural Labyrinth of 
Zoning History  
 
This case is procedurally unique given the related, tortuous litigation history that 
preceded the instant matter, involving the same underlying zoning regulation—the 
enactment of Bill 91-10—and its application to MRA’s Property.  Because of the 
7 
relationship between the earlier cases and our analysis and holding in this case, it is 
necessary to summarize this “prequel.”  As discussed in the ensuing chapters of the prequel, 
the very issues that were presented to the jury in this case were decided, or should have 
been decided, in the proceedings before the Harford County Board of Appeals and were 
finally adjudicated by this Court in MRA IV.  
Chapter 1 – MRA II   
MRA filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County in June 1991, 
seeking a Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief against Harford County and the 
Harford County Council.  Id.  MRA requested, inter alia, the following: (1) a declaration 
that Bills 91-10 and 91-16 and Resolution 15-91 were “null and void” as to MRA’s 
Property; (2) an injunction preventing the County from enforcing Bills 91-10 and 91-16 
and Resolution 15-91 against MRA; and (3) an injunction staying all further action on 
MRA’s appeal to the Board of Appeals.  Id.  MRA advanced several legal theories to 
support its complaint for declaratory relief.  Id.   
In June 1991, the circuit court issued an interlocutory injunction preventing the 
enforcement of the local legislation against MRA.  Id.  The circuit court’s order expressly 
authorized MDE to continue its processing of MRA’s pending permit application.  Id.  The 
order also stayed the processing of MRA’s administrative “appeal” of the Planning 
Director’s “decision” contained in the Director’s May 2, 1991 letter.  Id.  Finally, the 
interlocutory order prohibited MRA from commencing any construction without court 
approval.  Id. at 485–86.  
8 
While the parties were litigating the matter in the circuit court, in February 1992, 
MDE issued to MRA a permit to operate a rubble landfill on its property.  Id. at 486.  The 
MDE permit was expressly conditioned upon compliance with local land use requirements.  
Id.  
After considering cross-motions for summary judgment, in May 1994, the circuit 
court filed an opinion and judgment, “declaring that Harford County was entitled to enact 
new zoning laws that may prevent MRA from operating a rubble landfill, and that Bills 91-
10 and 91-16 were not invalid on the grounds asserted by [MRA].”  Id.  The court declared 
that Resolution 15-91 was invalid on its face.  Id.  The circuit court determined that “the 
Harford County Council was acting as a legislative body when it passed the resolution” 
and that its passage “constituted an illegal attempt to interpret and apply the laws which 
the Council had previously enacted.”  Id.  MRA filed an appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals.  Id.  Before there were any further proceedings in that court, this Court issued a 
writ of certiorari.  Id.   
On appeal, MRA asserted state and federal constitutional challenges, as well as non-
constitutional arguments.  Id. at 486–87.  Two of MRA’s arguments were grounded upon 
the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Id. at 487.  The primary argument 
advanced by MRA was that “it had a ‘constitutionally protectable property interest in the 
Harford County Solid Waste Management Plan’ and had ‘vested rights in the permit 
process’. . . and that Harford County had ‘retroactively’ abrogated those rights in violation 
of due process principles.”  Id.  MRA’s second constitutional argument was that the two 
9 
Harford County ordinances violated MRA’s “substantive due process rights because the 
ordinances [were][] arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable.”  Id. (cleaned up).  With 
respect to the two non-constitutional arguments, MRA: (1) urged the Court to adopt the 
doctrine of zoning estoppel and hold that Harford County is estopped from applying the 
ordinances to MRA’s Property; and (2) argued that the two Harford County ordinances, as 
applied to MRA’s Property, were preempted by the provisions of state law relating to solid 
waste disposal and the state permit issued to MRA.  Id. at 488.   
In MRA II, we explained that during oral argument, MRA’s contentions were 
“clarified somewhat” with respect to any potential takings claims that MRA may have been 
asserting.  Id. at 488–90.  Notably, the Court clarified that MRA was not alleging in the 
context of this case that the ordinances were unconstitutional as applied to its Property.  Id. 
at 489.  Because the takings claim—and MRA’s failure to raise this claim in MRA II, MRA 
III, and MRA IV—is significant and relevant to our exhaustion analysis in this case, we 
reiterate Judge Eldridge’s summary and clarification of these matters as they appear in 
MRA II: 
Both in the circuit court and in its brief in this Court, [MRA]  
relied upon principles and cases relating to the question of 
whether particular governmental regulation of a landowner’s 
use of his property had gone so far as to constitute a “taking” 
of the property without just compensation in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment and/or Article III, § 40 of the 
Constitution of Maryland.  In light of this reliance, the Court 
inquired whether [MRA’s] counsel was making a “takings” 
argument, and counsel stated that he was not.  The following 
colloquy occurred:  
 
10 
“THE COURT: Mr. Grieber [Attorney for [MRA]], 
are you . . . one thing I’m not sure about, are you 
making . . . in addition to a substantive due process 
argument, are you making a takings argument under 
the [Just Compensation] Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, or. . .  
 
Mr. GRIEBER: No, I am not, your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: . . . under Article III, section 40, of the 
Maryland Constitution? 
 
Mr. Grieber: No, I am not, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Okay.   
 
MR. GRIEBER: That’s, that’s a viable option later 
should this Court not agree with me. But at this point 
in time, no, we are not.” 
 
In addition, counsel for [MRA] confirmed that [MRA] was 
“not making a facial attack” upon the ordinances, but was 
“arguing that [they are] invalid as applied to” the . . . 
[P]roperty.  Counsel for Harford County then argued that 
questions of validity as applied should initially be raised and 
decided in the appropriate administrative proceedings, and that 
[MRA] had failed to invoke and exhaust the administrative 
remedies available to it.  [MRA’s] counsel responded that, 
because the same persons who are members of the County 
Council are also members of the Board of Appeals in Harford 
County, it would be futile to invoke and exhaust administrative 
remedies.   
 
Id. at 489 (footnotes omitted).   
 
 
Prior to reaching the merits of MRA’s substantive arguments, the Court explained 
that the “threshold issue in this case is whether, and to what extent, [MRA] was required 
to invoke and exhaust administrative remedies available under the Harford County Code 
and the Express Powers Act, Maryland Code . . . , Art. 25, § 5(U) (setting forth the 
11 
jurisdiction and procedural requirements with respect to boards of appeals in chartered 
counties).”  Id. at 490.  
 
After discussing the applicable provisions of the Harford County Code and the 
Express Powers Act, we held that MRA had not exhausted its administrative remedies, 
including appealing the Zoning Administrator’s ruling to the Board of Appeals, and 
applying to the Zoning Administrator for variances.  Id. at 492.  This Court then considered 
the consequence of MRA’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to 
each legal argument.  Id.   
Concerning any due process claim arising from the United States Constitution, we 
explained that such an action, which would arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would not be 
subject to the state law requirements that administrative remedies must first be exhausted.  
Id.  We noted that the “Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a state court without having exhausted available 
administrative remedies.”  Id. (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146–47 (1988)).  
Although we determined that the federal constitutional claims were not subject to the 
exhaustion requirement, we held that any potential federal takings claims were not ripe for 
judicial consideration until MRA applied for a variance and received a final decision from 
the Board.  Id. at 505.   
Turning to the remaining claims arising under the state constitution, as well as 
MRA’s non-constitutional claims, we held that the circuit court erred in considering the 
merits of MRA’s claims.  Id. at 497.  We cited several of our cases for the holding that 
“[w]here a legislature has provided an administrative remedy for a particular matter, even 
12 
without specifying that the administrative remedy is primary or exclusive, this Court has 
‘ordinarily construed the pertinent [legislative] enactments to require that the 
administrative remedy be first invoked and followed’ before resort to the courts.”  Id. at 
492 (quoting Bd. of Educ. for Dorchester Cty. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 786 (1986)) 
(collecting cases).2   
MRA argued that any exhaustion requirement under the circumstances would be 
futile because the Board of Appeals was comprised of the same members of the Harford 
County Council who opposed the rubble landfill on policy grounds.  Id. at 495.  We rejected 
MRA’s contention, stating that “[t]his argument . . . furnishes no sound basis for a judicially 
created exception to the exhaustion requirement set forth in Art. 25A, § 25(U).”  Id.  We 
noted that in Turf Valley Associates v. Zoning Board, 262 Md. 632, 643–44 (1971), we 
“held that ‘there is no fundamental barrier to conferring on the legislative branch of a 
chartered county the right to constitute itself a zoning body,’ and to delegate to that zoning 
body both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial zoning functions.”  MRA II, 342 Md. at 495–
96.  We also pointed out that in Klein v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 285 Md. 76, 82–83 (1979), 
“this Court held that constituting the Harford County Council as the Harford County Board 
                                              
2 In describing the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies, we noted 
that we recognized a limited “constitutional” exception, where the exhaustion principle 
does not apply “where the constitutionality of a statute on its face is challenged, and where 
there exists a recognized declaratory judgment or equitable remedy.”  Md. Reclamation 
Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 342 Md. 476, 494 (1996) (“MRA II”) (quoting Ins. Comm’r 
v. Equitable, 339 Md. 595, 621 (1995)).  We did not consider this exception because 
counsel for MRA conceded that it was not making a facial challenge to the ordinances.  Id. 
at 495.  Rather, all four of MRA’s arguments related to the validity of the ordinances as 
applied to MRA’s Property.  Id. 
13 
of Appeals was valid, and that the Harford County Board of Appeals was a board of appeals 
pursuant to [the Express Powers Act], and that the language of [the Act] expressly provides 
that a decision by the Harford County Board of Appeals is a prerequisite to an action in the 
circuit court.”  MRA II, 342 Md. at 496.  We explained that that it would undermine the 
holdings in these cases to adopt MRA’s reasoning “that the Harford County Board of 
Appeals can be by-passed whenever a case involves Harford County ordinances reflecting 
a policy which is arguably inconsistent with the plaintiff’s position, simply because the 
members of the County Council also constitute the Board of Appeals.”  Id.  We explained 
that: 
If [MRA] were to seek a decision or decisions by the Harford 
County Board of Appeals, the Board would be considering the 
issues raised by [MRA] in a quasi-judicial capacity, and its 
decision would be fully subject to judicial review in the Circuit 
Court for Harford County.  If the Board of Appeals commits 
an error of law, if its rulings are arbitrary or capricious, or if 
critical factual findings are unsupported by substantial 
evidence, the Board’s decision will be reversed.  Nevertheless, 
under [the Express Powers Act], the Board’s decision-making 
function cannot be circumvented.  
 
Id. at 496–97.  
 
We held that the circuit court below should not have considered the merits of MRA’s 
state law and state constitutional challenges to the application of Bills 91-10 and 91-16 to 
the Property and vacated the judgment of the circuit court.  Id. at 497. 
Chapter 2 - MRA III 
 
Following just one part of this Court’s directive in MRA II, MRA filed requests for 
an interpretation of Bills 91-10 and 91-16 from the Zoning Administrator.  MRA III, 382 
14 
Md. at 350.  After receiving unfavorable rulings, MRA appealed to the Board of Appeals.  
Id.  However, MRA did not seek a variance from the strict application of the legislation 
which had been incorporated into the zoning provisions of the Harford County Code.  Id. 
at 360.  The Board, through its Hearing Examiner, conducted a hearing and issued a 
decision in April 2002 that the application of Bill 91-10 to the proposed rubble landfill did 
not violate federal, state, or local laws.  Id. at 359.  As summarized by Judge Harrell writing 
for this Court in MRA III, the Hearing Examiner’s findings and conclusions underlying this 
decision were as follows: 
1. Bill 91-10 applies to MRA’s property on Gravel Hill Road.  
 
2. The requirements of Bill 91-10 can be validly applied to MRA’s 
property on Gravel Hill Road under the circumstances of this case 
and in light of the Environmental Article of the Maryland Code as 
well as other principles of Maryland law.  
 
3. MRA’s operation of a rubble landfill on its property at Gravel Hill 
Road pursuant to its state permit will violate applicable Harford 
County Zoning law . . . . Moreover, the Hearing Examiner 
questions whether the permit issued to MRA by MDE is validly 
issued as it was based on misinformation provided to the State by 
MRA regarding the conformance of the property and use with 
Harford County Zoning law.   
 
4. MRA cannot obtain a grading permit unless it can meet the 
requirements of Harford County Zoning law. To the extent MRA 
does not meet specific standards it must seek a variance and obtain 
a variance from provisions with which it cannot comply.  MRA’s 
reliance on site plan approvals that pre-date the enactment of Bill 
91-10 is without merit.   
 
5. MRA’s operation of a rubble landfill on its property at Gravel Hill 
Road pursuant to its State-issued Refuse Disposal Permit No. 91-
12-35-10-D and as renewed by Refuse Disposal Permit 1996-
WRF-0517 will violate applicable Harford County zoning law.   
 
15 
6. Harford County is not prohibited by the principles of estoppel 
from applying the provisions of Harford County Bill 91-10 . . .  to 
MRA’s property and specifically, to MRA’s operation of a rubble 
landfill on its property.   
 
7. MRA’s rubble landfill did not acquire vested rights in its use that 
would insulate it from the application of Bill 91-10 to that use.  It 
is the vested rights doctrine itself that allows a landowner to raise 
issues of constitutional protections.  There is no constitutional 
infringement on the rights of MRA because a vested right was not 
established.  Applying the provisions of Bill 91-10 to MRA’s 
Gravel Hill Road property is, therefore, not prohibited by the 
United States Constitution and/or the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights.   
 
8. Harford County is not preempted by the Environmental Article of 
the Maryland Code, particularly sections 9-201 et seq. and 9-501 
et seq., from applying Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Gravel Hill Road 
property.   
 
9. MRA’s operation of a rubble landfill on its Gravel Hill Road 
property is not a valid non-conforming use pursuant to Harford 
County Zoning Code.   
 
MRA III, 382 Md. at 359–60 (emphasis added). 
 
In June 2002, the Board of Appeals adopted the Hearing Examiner’s decision.  
Thereafter, Harford County refused to issue MRA a grading permit or zoning certificate.  
Id. at 360.  MRA did not file a request for a variance—either in response to the Board of 
Appeals’ final decision, or on a parallel course to its request for interpretation by the Zoning 
Administrator to its nine questions presented.  Id. at 361. 
 
MRA filed a petition for judicial review to the Circuit Court for Harford County.  Id. 
at 360.  In October 2003, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals, 
concluding that “all nine requests for interpretation were answered correctly . . . in 
16 
accordance with the law, and based on substantial evidence, and the decision was also correct 
when it upheld the zoning administrator’s denial of [MRA’s] request for a zoning 
certificate.”  Id. at 357–58.  MRA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  Id. at 351.  Prior 
to any proceedings before the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a writ of certiorari.  Id.   
Once again, we held that MRA had not exhausted its available administrative 
remedies.  Id. at 361.  We reiterated that “[a] fundamental precept of administrative law is 
the requirement that exclusive or primary administrative remedies ordinarily be exhausted 
before bringing an action in court.”  Id. at 361–62 (collecting cases).  We explained that, 
“[e]ight years ago in MRA II, this Court instructed MRA that before it may obtain judicial 
review in the Circuit Court for Harford County of any adverse administrative decisions in 
this case, it must exhaust its available administrative remedies under the applicable laws.”  
Id. at 363 (citing MRA II, 342 Md. at 497) (emphasis added).  We stated our directive in 
MRA II, that “this Court identified the administrative remedies available to MRA: (1) 
request an interpretive ruling from the Zoning Administrator and, if that ruling were 
adverse to MRA’s interests, appeal to the Board of Appeals; (2) if the Board of Appeals’ 
decision was adverse to MRA, it should apply for zoning variances or exceptions.”  Id. at 
363 (citing MRA II, 324 Md. at 501).   
MRA argued that the “proper application to its situation of the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies principle should permit a ‘two-step process’ by which it may 
pursue in turn judicial review of each discrete adverse administrative decision.”  Id.  We 
rejected MRA’s interpretation of the exhaustion requirements stating: 
17 
MRA believes that this Court must decide the issues it advances 
in the present case and, if decided adversely to MRA’s position, 
it retains “the option of seeking a variance from the application 
of Bill 91-10 and other Harford County regulations to its 
property.” We do not subscribe to this inefficient and piecemeal 
approach.  Seeking zoning variances is not, as MRA contends, 
merely an “option.” The right to request zoning interpretations 
and a zoning certificate and, if denied, the right to seek variances 
are two parallel or successive remedies to be exhausted, not 
optional selections on an a la carte menu of administrative 
entrees from which MRA may select as it pleases. 
 
Id. at 363–64 (emphasis added).  We noted that “Judge Eldridge, speaking for this Court, 
pellucidly explained the doctrine of administrative remedies, as applied to the 
circumstances of this dispute, in MRA II.  As MRA appears not to have appreciated 
completely the directions of MRA II, we can only reiterate the reasoning here.”  Id. at 365 
(emphasis added).  Once again, we restated that: 
MRA’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, before bringing 
this judicial review action, applies to the federal constitutional 
issues as well as state constitutional and non[-]constitutional 
issues . . . .  For the reasons extensively discussed in MRA II, 
supra., 342 Md. at 497–506, . . . we hold that the federal 
constitutional issues raised by [MRA] also are not now ripe for 
judicial decision. 
 
Id. at 366–67 (emphasis added).   
 
We also explained the process whereby a circuit court should stay final 
consideration of the merits of one matter where the resolution of said matter may depend 
upon the exhaustion of administrative remedies:  
Under the circumstances, a stay by the Circuit Court of final 
consideration of the merits of this petition for judicial review is 
the correct disposition for the present, rather than dismissal of 
the petition.  When a litigant is entitled to bring two separate 
legal proceedings in an effort to obtain relief in a particular 
18 
matter, when the litigant institutes the first of those proceedings 
and the case is pending in a trial court, and when the trial court 
is unable to decide the merits of that case because of primary 
jurisdiction or exhaustion principles associated with the second 
proceeding, the trial court ordinarily should stay the first 
proceeding for a reasonable period of time.  During that period, 
the litigant may pursue and obtain a final administrative decision 
in the second proceeding.  If still aggrieved, the litigant will be 
able to file an action for judicial review in the second 
proceeding, and the trial court may hear the two cases together.   
 
Id. at 367.   
By the conclusion of MRA II and MRA III, several legal principles should have been 
clear.  First, that MRA had to exhaust all its administrative remedies, including seeking a 
zoning variance from the application of Bill 91-10 prior to judicial review of the merits of 
any legal claims.  Second, that the exhaustion requirement applied to MRA’s constitutional 
and non-constitutional claims.  In other words, before proceeding with any judicial review 
or filing a separate judicial proceeding asserting that Bill 91-10 was unconstitutional as 
applied to MRA’s Property, MRA had to apply for a zoning variance and raise any 
constitutional and non-constitutional claims within the administrative agency proceeding.  
Chapter 3 - MRA IV 
 
In the final chapter of this prequel, once again, MRA proceeded to follow just one 
part of the Court’s directives enunciated in MRA II and MRA III.  
 
In May 2005, MRA finally requested from the Harford County Hearing Examiner 
several variances from the provisions of Bill 91-10, which had been incorporated into the 
Harford County Zoning Code.  MRA IV, 414 Md. at 15.  The variances sought were to permit:  
•the disturbance of the 30-foot buffer yard; 
  
19 
•the disturbance within the 200-foot buffer from adjoining 
property lines; 
 
•the operation of a rubble landfill on less than 100 acres;  
 
•the operation of a landfill without satisfying the buffer 
requirement;  
 
•the deposit of solid waste less than 500 feet from the flood 
plain district; 
 
•the disturbance of the 1,000-foot buffer from a residential or 
institutional building; 
 
•the use of a landfill within a Natural Resource District, to 
permit the disturbance of the Natural Resources District buffer, 
and to disturb the minimum 75-foot wetlands buffer in the 
Agricultural District;   
 
Id.  
Over the period of 10 months, the Hearing Examiner presided over 17 hearings, and 
heard testimony from MRA’s 11 witnesses, eight of whom were experts; six experts 
offered by a group of individuals who live in the neighborhood surrounding the proposed 
rubble landfill and who were opposed to its development (“Opponents”); 16 residents from 
the community and parishioners of the St. James African Methodist Episcopal (“AME”) 
Church; and the acting director of the Harford County Department of Planning and Zoning.  
MRA IV, 414 Md. at 16–17.  The Hearing Examiner issued a 78-page decision dated 
February 28, 2007 recommending that the Board deny MRA’s variance requests.  Id.   
Notably, although MRA applied for a variance and argued that it satisfied the variance 
standards under the Harford County Code, it did not allege or assert before either the 
Hearing Examiner, or the Board of Appeals, that the application of Bill 91-10 to its Property, 
20 
and the denial of a variance, would deprive MRA of all beneficial uses of the Property, 
thereby creating an unconstitutional taking of its Property without just compensation.  
The Hearing Examiner applied the variance factors under the Harford County Code3 
and, inter alia, made the following findings:  
The proposed rubble landfill has the potential of causing a great 
impact on the neighbors who reside on Gravel Hill Road, and on users 
of Gravel Hill Road.   
 
*  *  *  * 
[T]he disturbance of the 200-foot buffer during the rubble landfill 
operation would increase the disturbance to be seen and experienced 
by adjoining owners and residents.  As a result, they would suffer an 
adverse impact.   
 
*  *  *  * 
MRA’s parcel is 55 acres in size.  Section 267-40.1(A) requires that the 
site be at least 100 acres.  Obviously, the Applicant will not have a 
rubble-fill regardless of the finding on the other variances, unless it is 
granted a variance to the 100-acre requirement.  The variance requested 
is substantial, with the Applicant suggesting that an area of just slightly 
more than one-half of the minimum acreage requirement is sufficient for 
approval . . . .  [T]he Applicant’s argument in favor . . .  is that[,] 
“[e]nlarging the site to 100 acres would serve no purpose and would be 
a practical difficulty.”  Again, no statutory or case authority exists which 
                                              
3 Under the provisions of the Harford County Code, § 267-11(A), to obtain a 
variance from an applicable zoning provision of the Harford County Code, the applicant 
was required to demonstrate, and the Board was required to find, that: 
 
(1) By reason of the uniqueness of the property or 
topographical conditions, the literal enforcement of [the 
provisions of the Code] would result in practical difficulty 
or unreasonable hardship.  
 
(2) The variance will not be substantially detrimental to 
adjacent properties or will not materially impair the 
purpose of [the provisions of the Code] or the public 
interest.  
21 
would justify the granting of a variance based on a perceived lack of need 
for the requirement for which the variance is requested . . . .  Furthermore, 
the Applicant cannot allege a disproportionate impact of the 100 acres 
requirement upon it.  All properties of less than 100 acres in size are 
similarly impacted by the prohibition against rubble-fills on parcels of 
less than that size.  The Applicant is treated no differently than any other 
similarly situated property owner[s]. 
 
Id. at 16–21 (italics in original omitted). 
With respect to the request for a variance to allow for the disturbance of the 1,000-foot 
buffer requirement from residential or institutional buildings, the Hearing Examiner noted that 
relaxing this requirement would have a severe impact upon the St. James AME Church and 
its congregation.  Id. at 22.  There was considerable testimony in the record before the 
Hearing Examiner that the St. James AME Church and its graveyard had significance to 
the African-American community.  Id. at 19.  The Hearing Examiner stated that, “[b]eing 
the final resting place of African[-]American soldiers who fought in the Civil War is itself 
a factor sufficient to mandate that the Church and its graveyard be given all possible 
protections to help preserve their historical significance and the prominent place they 
continue to play in the history of our County and State.”  Id.  The Hearing Examiner found 
that MRA’s operations, including the use of the trucks operating five-and-a-half days a 
week, would have an adverse impact on the historic church, its congregation, and the 
surrounding residential properties.  Id. at 22.   
MRA appealed the Hearing Examiner’s decision to the Board.  Id. at 23.  On June 
5, 2007, the Board voted 7-0 to deny the requested variances and adopted the Hearing 
Examiner’s decision.  Id.  
22 
MRA noted an appeal to the circuit court, which affirmed the findings of the Board 
of Appeals by order filed on July 11, 2008.  Id.  With the denial of the variance in hand, 
MRA also renewed its 2003 appeal in the circuit court.  Id.  On September 3, 2008, the 
circuit court affirmed its October 2003 decision.  Id.  MRA filed an appeal of the denial of 
the variance and the circuit court’s affirmance of its 2003 decision to the Court of Special 
Appeals.  Id.  Once again, on our own initiative, we granted certiorari on both matters.  Id. 
On appeal, Judge Adkins, writing for this Court, addressed separately MRA’s 
claims related to the denial of the variance (“Case No. 143 Issues”) and its substantive 
claims associated with the Zoning Administrator’s determination, which were affirmed by 
the circuit court in its 2003 decision (“Case No. 144 Issues”).   
Case No. 143 Issues – Denial of the Variances 
Consistent with the presentation of its testimony and argument below, MRA failed 
to argue that it was entitled to a variance from the provisions of the Harford County Code 
because the effect of a denial would constitute an unconstitutional taking of its Property 
without just compensation.  Because the takings claim was not part of the case, this Court, 
in MRA IV, proceeded to determine only whether the Board erred in determining that MRA 
had not satisfied the requirements for a variance as set forth in Harford County Zoning 
Code, Chapter 267, Section 267-11(A).  Id. at 24.   
After reviewing the testimony and evidence presented to the Hearing Examiner, we 
held that the Board did not err in finding that the requested variances would be substantially 
detrimental to adjacent properties.  Id.  
23 
A. Proposed Rubble Landfill Adverse Impacts on St. James AME Church 
and its Historic Graveyard 
 
Our analysis of the Board’s denial of the variances began with the review of the 
variance factors under the Harford County Code, and the Hearing Examiner’s application 
of the factors to the evidence presented at the hearings.  Id. at 25.  Under the Harford 
County Code, the Board’s denial of MRA’s requested variances “shall be upheld if the 
proposed rubble landfill will be ‘substantially detrimental’ to adjacent properties.”  Id. 
(citing Harford County Code, Chapter 267, § 267-11(A)(2)).4  We concluded that the Board 
“did not err in denying the requested variances because there was sufficient evidence that 
MRA’s proposed rubble landfill will ‘adversely affect the public health, safety, and general 
welfare,’ will ‘jeopardize the lives or property of people living’ [in the surrounding area] 
and result [in] ‘dangerous traffic conditions’ in the Gravel Hill and St. James 
communities.”  Id. 
In finding substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings, we noted that the 
Board had relied upon the expert testimony establishing the use of heavy equipment 
between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., and the adverse impacts that the rubble 
landfill operation would have on the historic African-American church site, which lies 25 
feet from the outer boundary of MRA’s property.  Id. at 26.  The graveyard is a Harford 
County historic place because it serves as a resting place of soldiers who served in the 
United States Colored Troops (“U.S.C.T.”) during the Civil War.  Id. at 28.  We pointed 
                                              
4 The Harford County zoning regulations are set forth in Chapter 267 of the Harford 
County Code.  For purposes of brevity, we omit additional Chapter references and shall 
cite only to the applicable section reference.   
24 
out that the Hearing Examiner’s findings of fact referenced the testimony that was provided 
by Carl Westmoreland, an expert in the preservation of historic African-American sites, to 
discuss the potential adverse effect that the rubble landfill would have on the historic 
preservation of the St. James site.  Id. at 26.  Mr. Westmoreland testified that:  
The imposition or the activation of a dump site would create 
an industrial environment that would be in conflict with the 
18th and 19th century environment that predominates at this 
point and would compromise the historical integrity and the 
cultural legitimacy of this community that has existed for over 
150 years and that has attempted to function within the mores 
and the cultural traditions of Maryland.   
 
To me, when you arrive there, if you didn’t know that it was a 
black church, it’s just a little modest church.  When you see the 
Civil War monuments, the only reason you know they’re black is 
because it says USCT, but it’s typical of what you would see in 
the Maryland landscape.  And I think that’s what people in Havre 
de Grace and in Gravel Hill have struggled for, to become part of 
the American mainstream and this documents their efforts.  
 
Id. at 27.   
 
 
 
The Opponents also presented the testimony of an expert archeologist, Dr. James 
Gibb, who testified concerning the potential adverse impacts that a rubble landfill would 
have on the Church and its historic cemetery.  Id. at 28.  Dr. Gibb, who holds a doctorate 
in anthropology, and had experience as an instructor in anthropology and archeology, 
“testified that dust will be permitted to blow onto the cemetery, which will destroy the 
historic setting of the cemetery.  [Dr.] Gibb also testified that the slopes around the existing 
graves are stabilized with vegetation and that destabilizing the vegetation could be 
detrimental to the graves.”  Id.   
25 
 
MRA argued that the Board should have relied upon its archeological expert, 
Michael Clem, who “opined that the proposed rubble fill would not adversely affect the 
historic cemetery located on the Church property and that the ‘graves will actually be better 
protected from erosional forces by filling.’”  Id. at 29.  We rejected MRA’s argument, 
explaining that “when there are differing opinions of two well-qualified experts and a 
zoning issue is fairly debatable, then the County Board could ‘quite properly’ accept the 
opinion of one expert and not the other.”  Id. (citing Dundalk Holding Co. v. Horn, 266 
Md. 280, 292 (1972)).  We reiterated our previous holding “that ‘[c]ourts, under these 
circumstances, should not substitute their judgment on a fairly debatable issue for that of 
the administrative body.’”  Id. (quoting Dundalk Holding Co., 266 Md. at 292).  We 
explained that, “[t]he Board was in the best position to evaluate the credible position of 
these two experts and it was within its bailiwick to give greater weight to the appellee’s 
expert’s opinion.”  Id.   
We also rejected MRA’s contention that Dr. Gibb’s testimony was “devoid of 
substantial supporting facts,” noting that “he discussed the detrimental effects that would 
result from construction and operating the rubble fill”:  
So in order to use that quarry again, it will have to be 
deforested.  You have to remove the trees before you can get 
the trucks in; and that’s just logical.  And that will be fairly 
extensive deforestation.   
 
So that will affect the setting.  And as far as physical effects on 
the site, we’ve got dust, which is unavoidable in cases where 
any kind of clearing goes on.  And I presume . . . that problem 
will be exacerbated with trucks moving large quantities of 
rubble.   
 
26 
So dust is going to affect the fabric of the building, the church. 
It may [affect] the gravestones too.  I haven’t really looked at 
it in those terms, but the dust will affect the building.  Dust gets 
into all the cracks and crevices.  We’ve had a temperate winter, 
but sooner or later we’re going to have a cold, wet winter.  
That dust, once it gets into the crevices, will absorb water.  It 
will expand and contract and cause deterioration of the 
building.   
 
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).  We also pointed out that Dr. Gibb refuted Dr. Clem’s 
testimony that the filling activities associated with the proposed rubble landfill would 
create a positive impact by a better view shed and grave protection:  
[Gibb]:  In the present condition of the land, I would say no 
because you would have to clear those slopes before you can 
fill them.  Right now the slopes down from the cemetery, the 
quarry face, have stabilized.  They’ve revegetated.  There must 
be 30, 40 years of growth there at least.   
 
Id. at 31.  Accordingly, we concluded “that there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support the Board’s finding that the rubble landfill activities will be ‘substantially 
detrimental’ to the St. James church and graveyard.”  Id.  
B. Detrimental Impacts on the Health and Welfare of the People in the 
Gravel Hill Community. 
 
 
In the proceedings before the Board, the Opponents averred that the rubble landfill 
would adversely affect the property in the surrounding area.  Id.  We described testimony 
before the Hearing Examiner, concluding that “[t]he evidence of decreased vegetation and 
increased diesel fumes is sufficient to support a finding that the rubble landfill would 
negatively affect the health and welfare of the individuals in the surrounding area.”  Id. at 
33.  Concerning the testimony from 14 individuals who live or attend church in the area of 
Gravel Hill Road, we found the Opponents’ characterization to be accurate: “[t]he 
27 
individuals who testified explained how permitting a rubble landfill to operate in their 
community will interfere with the enjoyment of their homes and yards through the 
introduction of increased traffic, noise, dust, vermin, and general unpleasantness of having 
a landfill in close proximity to their homes.”  Id.  
C. Traffic Conditions Along Gravel Hill Road. 
 
Concerning traffic impacts, we commented that “[a]ccording to the parties’ 
stipulation of facts, ‘MRA anticipates that approximately 50 trucks per day will enter 
Gravel Hill Road[,]’” which, according to the County, represented “virtually a 50-fold 
increase from the non-existent [traffic] that presently exists on the road.”  Id.  We noted 
that although MRA’s traffic expert, Jeffrey Lawrence, testified that the increased truck 
traffic “would only add a 12.5 second increase to time spent at the traffic intersection and 
would not jeopardize the safety of the community[,]” Mr. Lawrence admitted that he did 
not know how many children lived along the road, did not know where and how many 
school buses stopped along the road, and testified that in reaching his conclusion, he did 
not take into consideration any activities that take place at the public park, St. James AME 
Church, or graveyard.  Id. at 33–34.  
 
From the testimony, we discerned that the “school bus issue—rather than the sheer 
number of vehicles passing through— . . . formed a key component of the hearing.”  Id. at 
34.  We commented that one resident testified that “four different school buses stop along 
Gravel Hill Road” at least twice a day, and that parents and grandparents testified that “they 
fear for the safety of their children crossing the street in light of the 50 additional trucks 
crossing their road.”  Id. at 34.  We noted that MRA failed to address the child safety 
28 
concerns, and we determined that “there was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s 
findings and conclusion in favor of the Appellees.”  Id.  
D. Conclusions with Respect to the Variance Standards. 
 
In conclusion, we noted that the “Board rested its decision to deny all of these 
requested variances because [MRA] did not meet the second requirement of [the Harford 
County Code][] Section 267-11(A)(2) that each ‘variance will not be substantially 
detrimental to adjacent properties.’”  Id.  We concluded “that there was sufficient evidence, 
with respect to each requested variance, to support the Board’s conclusion.”  Id.  
Accordingly, we upheld the Board’s denial of the variances.  Id.  
Case No. 144 Issues – Preemption, Constitutional Claims, and Estoppel Claims 
 
In Case No. 144, MRA advanced several legal theories as to why, under the 
circumstances, Bill 91-10 could not be applied to the Property.  Id. at 35.  We summarize 
each argument presented by MRA in MRA IV, and our analysis and holdings, as follows.5  
A. Preemption.   
 
First, MRA contended that Harford County was preempted from enacting zoning 
laws that conflict with the state’s comprehensive statutory scheme for permitting rubble 
landfills.  Id. at 36–37.  We rejected this contention, explaining that MRA’s argument 
conflates zoning with permitting.  Id. at 37–41.  We explained that although state law gives 
                                              
5 We have not summarized MRA’s contentions that the rubble landfill use 
constituted a valid non-conforming use, that it was entitled to a grading permit, or that its 
1989 site plan approval caused its rights to vest. These arguments were summarily 
discussed and rejected (see Md. Reclamation Assocs. v. Harford Cty., 414 Md. 1, 63–64 
(2010) (“MRA IV”)) and are not germane to the issues presented in this case.   
29 
the State government the authority to issue permits for rubble landfills, the Express Powers 
Act “clearly contemplates zoning as an activity that exists in a sphere separate from the 
operations of State level regulation.”  Id. at 38.  We concluded that MRA’s preemption 
argument failed because it did not account for the dual nature of the zoning and permitting 
processes.  Id. at 40–41 (citing Ad + Soil, Inc. v. Cty. Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s Cty., 307 
Md. 307 (1986)).  We recognized that zoning and permitting “perform different functions 
and can occur in tandem and with different results.”  Id. at 44.  We concluded that the 
“County’s right to enact and enforce zoning regulations is not preempted by the state statute 
governing landfills.”  Id.   
B. Constitutional Issues. 
 
1. Vested Rights. 
 
MRA contended that Harford County was precluded by the United States 
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, from applying county zoning regulations enacted or revised after 
MDE began processing Phase II of MRA’s rubble landfill permit application for its 
Property.  Id. at 35.  MRA’s contention rested on its argument that it had a vested right in 
its prior county zoning approval to proceed with Phases II and III of MDE’s rubble landfill 
permitting process.  Id. at 45–46.   
Based upon the facts that were established in the record, we held that the Board 
applied the correct principles of law in determining that MRA had not established a vested 
right to use its property for a rubble landfill under the applicable zoning laws when the 
permitting process had commenced.  Id. at 45–50.  Writing for this Court, Judge Adkins 
30 
noted that the Court has set forth a “clear standard for determining when a person has 
obtained a vested right in an existing zoning use:” 
Generally, in order to obtain a vested right in an existing zoning 
use that will be protected against a subsequent change in a 
zoning ordinance prohibiting that use, the owner must initially 
obtain a valid permit.  Additionally, in reliance upon the valid 
permit, the owner must make a substantial beginning in 
construction and in committing the land to the permitted use 
before the change in zoning ordinance has occurred.   
 
Id. at 44–45 (citing Powell v. Calvert Cty., 368 Md. 400, 411–12 (2002)) (quoting 
O’Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 508 (1981)).  MRA argued that it had a vested right to 
use its property for a rubble landfill because it: (1) “made a substantial change of position 
in relation to the land (i.e., it purchased the land after it received zoning and [SWMP] 
approval)”; (2) “made substantial expenditures (it spent over a million dollars in land 
acquisition, engineering and legal fees)”; and (3) “incurred substantial obligations [by] 
proceed[ing] with the engineering development plans for Phases II and III of the State’s 
permitting process[].”  Id. at 45.   
 
We held that the Hearing Examiner correctly rejected MRA’s contention that its 
previous expenditures created a vested right, and that the Examiner relied upon “clear 
Maryland precedent on the issue.”  Id. (citing Ross v. Montgomery Cty., 252 Md. 497, 506–
07 (1969) (holding that expenditures on architectural planning do not create vested rights) 
and Cty. Council for Montgomery Cty. v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 707 (1975) 
(holding that one million dollars in expenditures and a valid building permit did not create 
a vested right in a previous zoning classification of the land at issue)).   
31 
 
We observed that MRA “attempts to carve out a new category of use that will grant 
it ‘a vested right in a County zoning approval in the context of a State-controlled permitting 
process,’” which is in essence, a vested right in zoning approval.  Id.  Rejecting MRA’s 
argument that it had a vested right in the zoning in effect at the time that it sought its initial 
permit, “[w]e follow[ed] many decades of Maryland law in holding that MRA needs more 
than a state permit and site plan approval in order to have a vested right.”  Id. at 46.   
We concluded that the Hearing Examiner’s findings, which were subsequently 
adopted by the Board, were supported by substantial evidence in the record, and both 
applied the correct principles of law to determine that MRA had no vested right to use its 
Property as a rubble landfill.  Id. at 49–50.   
2. Whether the Application of Bill 91-10 to MRA was Arbitrary and 
Capricious.  
 
MRA contended that Bill 91-10 unfairly targeted MRA and that Harford County’s 
application of Bill 91-10 to MRA was arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 50.  We rejected this 
argument, holding that there was “sufficient evidence on the record to support the Board’s 
factual findings under the ‘substantial evidence’ standard.”  Id.  We noted that there were 
four other proposed landfill projects at the time Bill 91-10 passed, some of which were also 
negatively affected.  Id. at 50–51.  We observed that “the record is replete with complaints 
of residents who lived near these [other] landfills.  It is not surprising that the result of this 
public outcry was a tightening of the zoning laws with respect to rubble landfills.”  Id. at 51.   
MRA argued that “because of the animus towards the proposed rubble landfill, the 
County singled out MRA’s proposal when passing Bill 91-10 and point[ed] to testimony 
32 
indicating that the County was poised to stop MRA in its efforts.”  Id.  We pointed out that 
we had previously rejected this argument in MRA II and brought cases to MRA’s attention 
regarding the motivation of legislators.  Id.  (citing MRA II, 342 Md. at 505 n.15).  We 
reiterated that “‘a judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which may have 
determined legislators’ votes.  We cannot undertake a search for motive.’” Id. (quoting 
Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949)).  We also pointed out that: 
“It is well-settled that when the judiciary reviews a statute or other governmental 
enactment, either for validity or to determine the legal effect of the enactment in a particular 
situation, the judiciary is ordinarily not concerned with whatever may have motivated the 
legislative body or other governmental actor.”  Id. (quoting Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. 
Driver, 336 Md. 105, 118 (1994)).  Based upon established case law, we repeated that “we 
shall not delve into the motives of legislators when there is ample evidence that Bill 91-10 
was directed at landfills in general and was emergency legislation because of the great 
public concern over all of the proposed landfills at the time.”  Id.   
C. Estoppel. 
MRA argued that Harford County was estopped from applying Bill 91-10 to its 
Property, resting its argument both on principles of equitable estoppel and zoning estoppel.  
Id. at 52.   
1. Equitable Estoppel. 
 
Turning to MRA’s equitable estoppel contention, we noted that in Hill v. Cross 
Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 309 (2007), we provided the general definition of 
equitable estoppel:  
33 
Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a 
party whereby he is absolutely precluded both at law and in 
equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have 
otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, 
as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon 
such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position 
for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding 
right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.  
 
MRA IV, 414 Md. at 52.  We observed that, although there are cases where estoppel may 
be applied to a municipal corporation, such “examples are scarce.”  Id.  We further 
determined that MRA’s reliance on Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 
266 Md. 117 (1972), was misplaced.  MRA IV, 414 Md. at 52.  We explained that the 
Court’s primary analysis in that case was that the “doctrine of estoppel would appear 
applicable to this case only if . . . Plaintiff had a vested right . . . .”  Id. at 53 (quoting 
Rockville Fuel, 266 Md. at 135) (emphasis in original).  Once again, we reiterated our 
vested rights holding that “with only a permit, land purchase, and engineering studies, MRA 
has no vested rights in the property at issue.  As such, Rockville Fuel does not support the 
notion that the county is estopped under the circumstances of this case.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  We explained that Rockville Fuel did not stand for the proposition that “the mere 
purchase of land in reliance on existing zoning is itself  sufficient to create an estoppel that 
would preclude a change in the zoning, regardless of whether the zoning authority knew of 
the landowner’s plans. Indeed, . . . we consider such a proposition unwise.”  Id.   
2. Zoning Estoppel.  
MRA urged us to hold that specific principles of zoning estoppel applied thereby 
preventing Harford County from applying Bill 91-10 to its Property.  Id. at 54.  We noted 
34 
that in Sycamore Realty Co. v. People’s Counsel of Baltimore County, 344 Md. 57, 64 
(1996), we acknowledged the application of the doctrine of zoning estoppel in some other 
states, without recognizing it in Maryland:  
A typical zoning estoppel scenario arises when the government 
issues a permit to a citizen that allows him or her to develop 
property in some way.  Commonly, after the citizen has 
incurred some expense or has changed his or her position in 
reliance upon the permit, the property for which the permit was 
granted is rezoned so that the citizen’s intended use is illegal.  
In such a situation, many courts allow the citizen to assert 
zoning estoppel as a defense to the government’s attempt to 
enjoin the property use that violates the new zoning scheme.   
 
The traditional, “black-letter” definition of zoning estoppel is:  
 
“A local government exercising its zoning powers will be 
estopped when a property owner, 
 
(1) relying in good faith,  
 
(2) upon some act or omission of the government,  
 
(3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurred 
such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be 
highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights which he 
ostensibly had acquired.” 
 
Id. at 54 (quoting David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of 
Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 Urb. Law Ann. 63, 66 
(1971)).   
 
Although we recognized that there may be a circumstance for which the application 
of zoning estoppel is warranted, we declined to adopt the doctrine in MRA IV:  
We have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of zoning estoppel, 
but we recognize that as zoning and permitting processes 
become more complex, the need for such a doctrine grows.  
35 
Today, land use is much more highly regulated than it was fifty 
years ago—environmental concerns abound, and vehicular 
traffic demands seem to mushroom every year.  Thus, a 
property owner who seeks to build or develop may well incur 
sizable expenses for experts in engineering, various 
environmental fields, traffic flow, archeology, etc., before 
putting a spade into the ground.  With increasing public 
appreciation for open space and environmental protection 
causing apprehension about new construction, the likelihood a 
developing landowner will face serious opposition is high.  
Indeed, a developer faces quite a tortured process. . . .  
 
But we also cannot ignore a local government’s responsibility 
to its residents, and thus, Maryland courts should not apply the 
doctrine casually.  As open space disappears, and scientific 
knowledge about the adverse environmental impact from 
people’s use of land grows, local governments struggle to 
balance the legitimate interests and rights of land owners 
wishing to develop against equally legitimate environmental 
and community concerns.  Due to the delicacy of this balancing 
act, and the overriding need to protect the public, local 
government cannot always chart a steady course through the 
Scylla and Charybdis of these disparate interests.  Land 
developers must understand that, to a limited extent, the local 
government will meander, and before they incur significant 
expense without final permitting, they must carefully assess the 
risk that the government will shift course.  On the other hand, 
there may be situations in which the developer’s good faith 
reliance on government action in the pre-construction stage is 
so extensive and expensive that zoning estoppel is an 
appropriate doctrine to apply.   
 
Id. at 56–57 (emphasis in original).   
 
 
Despite our recognition that there may be circumstances where we would apply the 
doctrine, we stopped “short of adopting zoning estoppel in this case as the facts set forth in 
this record do not support its application.”  Id. at 57–58.  We noted that “[f]or decades 
Maryland has maintained a stricter stance than most states in protecting government’s right 
to downzone in the face of planned construction.”  Id. at 57–58 (citing 9-52D Patrick J. 
36 
Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 52D.03 (2009)).  We 
explained that “[a]lthough we may sometimes adopt a new principle of law in a case in 
which the facts do not fit the doctrine, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is so fact-specific 
that it would be imprudent to depart from this history before we are faced with a case 
presenting circumstances for its application.”  Id. at 58.  We stated that “zoning estoppel 
must be applied, if at all, sparingly and with utmost caution . . . .  Squaring with this 
cautious approach, we conclude that the burden of establishing the facts to support that 
theory must fall on the person or entity claiming the benefit of the doctrine.”  Id. 
 
Reviewing the facts in the record, we concluded that “zoning estoppel does not fit 
these facts because there was no substantial reliance by MRA.”  Id.  We noted that “[u]nder 
the theory of zoning estoppel, if the developer ‘has good reason to believe, before or while 
acting to his detriment, that the official’s mind may soon change, estoppel may not be 
justified.’”  Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Robert M. Rhodes, et al, Vested Rights: 
Establishing Predictability in a Changing Regulatory System, 13 Stetson L. Rev. 1, 4 
(1983)).  “At the heart of establishing ‘good faith’ is proof that the claimant lacked 
knowledge of those facts that would have put it on sufficient notice that it should not rely 
on the government action in question.”  Id. (citing Heeter, 1971 Urb. Law. Ann. at 77–82).   
 
We determined that “[m]any facts were available to MRA at the time of its February 
1990 purchase of the Property that should have alerted them to the real possibility that its 
plans for a rubble landfill would not come to fruition.”  Id. at 59.  Specifically, we pointed 
out that, on November 14, 1989, when the County Council voted for the inclusion of the 
Property into the SWMP by a favorable vote of four council members, two members 
37 
abstained because they felt that they had inadequate information, and one member 
abstained because his son was the president of MRA.  Id.  We noted that the inclusion in 
the SWMP “was achieved by a fragile majority, and MRA knew, as did the Council when 
it voted, that MRA had no permit from MDE and many additional steps had to be taken 
before MRA could actually construct the rubble landfill.”  Id.  We commented that 
“[i]nclusion of the Property in the County SWMP was a necessary, but not a sufficient step 
in the process of obtaining a state rubble fill permit from MDE.”  Id.  Indeed, we noted that 
at the November 14 hearing, the Council President told MRA that “what we are doing 
tonight is approving a process.  We are not exactly approving the landfill site.  We are 
approving a step in a process.”  Id.  
 
We pointed out that MRA’s president acknowledged that at the public hearing 
before the Hearing Examiner “there was ‘strong’ public opposition to the rubble landfill 
by ‘hundreds’ of persons at the November 7 and 14, 1989 hearings.”  Id.  We observed that 
the composition of the Council changed, and that these events occurred before MRA closed 
on its purchase on February 9, 1990.  Id.  We also noted that the Hearing Examiner found 
that the inclusion of the Property in the SWMP was debated further at a County Council 
meeting on February 6, 1990—three days prior to MRA’s settlement.  Id. at 60.   
Additionally, we explained that “the closing on MRA’s purchase of the Property is 
not the definitive mile-marker in a zoning estoppel analysis.  Generally, purchase of land, 
by itself, is insufficient to constitute substantial reliance.”  Id at 60–61 (internal citations 
omitted).  We reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would mean that a purchaser could lock 
38 
in the zoning of any parcel simply by the act of purchasing property and asking for a 
permit.”  Id. at 61.  We stated that: 
For us to decide that the good faith reliance element of zoning 
estoppel is established by proof that an entity purchases land 
for the purpose of constructing a highly controversial rubble 
landfill based on a vote by the County Council approving one 
step in the State permitting process, while knowing that the 
new membership of [the] County Council likely opposes that 
use, would disregard the caution with which we approach such 
a doctrine.   
 
Id.   
We concluded that MRA “must prove substantial reliance by something other than 
its purchase of the [Property].”  Id.  MRA attempted to do so by “focusing on the expenses 
it incurred for engineering fees during the period of its alleged good faith reliance.”  Id.  
We noted that “[a]lthough MRA asserts in its brief that, relying on the County’s action, it 
‘proceeded to spend over a million dollars on the purchase of the property and on 
engineering fees[,]’ it gives us no extract references to support this statement.”  Id.  
Specifically, we pointed out that the land purchase cost of $732,500 was insufficient to 
prove detrimental reliance, and that MRA “gives us no specifics about the balance of the 
alleged costs.”  Id.  Indeed, we added that we had “searched the record extract ourselves,” 
and could only definitely point to $25,000 that had been spent on engineering fees between 
August 1989 and November 20, 1989, and that the record “does not suggest, let alone 
prove, that the $25,000 was spent in reliance on the vote for inclusion in the SWMP at the 
November 14 hearing.”  Id. at 61–62.  
39 
We stated that: 
In short, all we glean from the record is that MRA closed on 
the land on February 6, 1990, after the [C]ouncil’s November 
14, 1989 vote to include the Property in the SWMP.  There was 
insufficient evidence to show how much, if any, of the 
engineering fees were incurred after and in good faith reliance 
upon the results of the November 14 hearing.  Bald allegations 
and general testimonial statements that MRA spent $300,000 
on engineering fees are simply insufficient to meet MRA’s 
burden to prove the fact and extent of its reliance on the County 
Council’s action. 
 
Id. at 63.  Accordingly, we held that “MRA has failed to establish the necessary good faith 
reliance on the County Council’s vote to include the Property in its SWMP either through 
purchase of the property or engineering expenses, or both.”  Id.  Therefore, we concluded 
that “MRA has not proven zoning estoppel against the County according to the criteria 
used in states that have adopted that doctrine.”  Id. 
The Epilogue to Our Prequel 
 
To summarize our holdings in MRA IV on MRA’s substantive claims, we held that: 
(1) Harford County was not preempted from enacting zoning laws addressing rubble 
landfills; (2) MRA did not have a constitutionally protected vested right to operate a rubble 
landfill based upon prior county zoning approval; (3) the application of Bill 91-10 to 
MRA’s Property was not arbitrary or capricious, and MRA did not have any substantive or 
procedural due process right in a rubble fill operation under the Maryland Constitution, the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) the County was not estopped 
from applying Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Property because MRA had no vested right.  
Additionally, we declined to adopt the zoning estoppel doctrine, and further determined 
40 
that, even if we were inclined to adopt the doctrine, MRA had not proven the zoning 
estoppel elements according to the criteria used in states that had adopted the doctrine.  
MRA IV, 414 Md. at 36–64.  This Court also upheld the Board’s denial of the variance 
requests, under the variance standards set forth in the Harford County Code.  Id. at 24–35.   
As first noted by Judge Eldridge in MRA II, conspicuously absent from the host of 
claims asserted by MRA was any claim that the application of Bill 91-10, and a denial of 
a variance to operate a landfill, would deprive MRA of all beneficial use of its Property, 
thereby creating an unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of § 40 
of Article III of the Maryland Constitution.  MRA II, 342 Md. at 489. 
B. 
Proceedings in this Case  
Almost six years after the denial of its variance by the Board of Appeals and over 
two-and-one-half years after this Court’s decision in MRA IV, in February 2013, MRA filed 
suit against Harford County.  The Complaint alleges a “cause of action for inverse 
condemnation” arising from the County’s actions precluding MRA from operating a 
landfill.  MRA sought just compensation from a jury pursuant to Article III, § 40 of the 
Maryland Constitution, based upon “the deliberate actions of the County Council and the 
County which unlawfully deprived MRA of the beneficial use of its Property by precluding 
it from utilizing its MDE permit to operate a rubble landfill on its Property in Harford 
County.”   
A review of MRA’s Complaint, and the testimony, evidence, and arguments 
presented to the jury over the course of a two-week trial, reflect that the building blocks of 
MRA’s “takings” claim arise out of the same operative facts and legal arguments, which 
41 
this Court specifically rejected in MRA IV.  In a nutshell, MRA’s “takings theory” is that: 
(1) MRA had a constitutionally protected right to operate a rubble landfill and the County’s 
adoption of Bill 91-10 interfered with that right, thereby entitling MRA to compensation 
for its “investment-backed expectation to build a rubble fill on the property”; and (2) the 
County’s actions in adopting Bill 91-10 were undertaken with an express intention to 
deprive MRA of its protected interest in operating a rubble landfill.  Below, we point out a 
few examples of MRA’s claims, testimony, and argument presented in this case that are in 
direct contrast with our express holdings in MRA IV.   
MRA’s Theory Submitted to the Jury was that Bill 91-10 was Arbitrary and 
Capricious 
 
MRA alleged in its Complaint that Bill 91-10 was “made applicable to the Property 
for the purpose of depriving MRA of the beneficial use of its Property” and that the 
“County’s actions over many years constituted arbitrary and capricious post hoc zoning 
changes specifically and intentionally targeted and aimed at MRA to prevent MRA from 
operating a rubble landfill on its Property.”   
MRA further alleged that the County violated its due process rights arising under 
the Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, asserting that:  
The County’s actions and inactions . . . were outrageous, 
egregious, callous, irrational, arbitrary[,] capricious[,] and 
deliberately indifferent governmental acts in violation of the 
due process clauses of the Maryland Constitution and the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, which assure MRA, as a 
property owner, the right to be free from arbitrary or irrational 
zoning and government actions. 
 
42 
At trial, MRA called its expert Robert Lynch, a former Harford County employee 
and a practicing attorney, to testify that in his view, he considered the adoption of Bill 91-
10 as “targeting MRA.”  During closing arguments, counsel for MRA argued to the jury 
that the adoption of Bill 91-10 “was a devious scheme concocted by the County to make 
sure that [MRA’s President,] Mr. Schaefer, and MRA would never have a rubble fill on 
this property.  But the County was careful.  They were trying to cover it up.  But we figured 
it out.”   
The allegations in MRA’s Complaint, as well as testimony, and arguments presented 
at trial, which included its characterization of the County’s application of Bill 91-10 to 
MRA’s Property, and its assertions of improper legislative motives, were unequivocally 
rejected by this Court and were inconsistent with our holding in MRA IV.  MRA IV, 414 
Md. at 50–51 (upholding the Board’s rejection of MRA’s argument that the application of 
Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Property was arbitrary and capricious, or was enacted to target MRA, 
noting that the record reflected that the Bill applied to several other rubble landfills in the 
County).  We rejected—not once, but twice—MRA’s argument that the County singled 
out MRA’s Property when it passed Bill 91-10.  See MRA IV, 414 Md. at 51 (noting that 
in MRA II, we brought cases to MRA’s attention regarding the motivation of legislators 
and reiterated that this Court would not delve into the “motives of legislators when there is 
ample evidence that Bill 91-10 was directed at landfills in general . . . and the great public 
concern over all of the proposed landfills at that time.”).  Given our holding in MRA IV, it 
was improper for MRA to present evidence and argument that the application of Bill 91-
43 
10 was arbitrary or capricious, or that the County had “devious motives” and was engaged 
in a “cover up.”  However, this was the bread and butter of MRA’s case. 
MRA’s Testimony and Arguments Related to a Vested or Constitutionally Protected 
Property Right to Operate a Rubble Landfill  
 
Although MRA’s Complaint does not use the phrase “vested right,” MRA’s takings 
theory was premised upon MRA having a vested right6 or constitutionally protected interest 
in the operation of a rubble landfill.  During closing, counsel for MRA repeatedly argued 
to the jury that MRA had presented “overwhelming [evidence] that we had a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation in this property to build and operate a rubble fill,” and that 
the County interfered with that right by enacting Bill 91-10.  These legal arguments directly 
contradict our holding in MRA IV that MRA did not have a vested right (i.e., a 
constitutionally protected interest) in a rubble fill operation, thereby giving MRA a due 
process or takings claim arising from such a right.7  MRA IV, 414 Md. at 44–50, 52–63.  It 
                                              
6 A “vested right” has been described as  
 
the right to initiate or continue the establishment of a use or 
construction of a structure which, when completed, will be 
contrary to the restrictions or regulations of a recently enacted 
zoning ordinance.  If a vested right to initiate the use or 
complete construction is found to exist, the use or structure will 
generally be allowed to continue as a protected nonconforming 
use. 
 
4 Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 70:2 (4th ed. Rev. 2019) (hereinafter 
“Rathkopf”).  
 
7 Throughout this case, MRA has combined two legally separate and distinct 
constitutional takings theories.  First, MRA claimed that it had a legally compensable 
vested right to operate a rubble landfill under the Harford County Code arising from the 
Property’s inclusion in the SWMP and its Phase I permit, and MRA’s alleged reliance on 
44 
was error for the circuit court to allow a jury to determine just compensation where this 
Court previously held that no such constitutionally protected right existed.  See Neifert v. 
Dep’t of Env’t, 395 Md. 486, 522 (2006); 4 Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning 
§ 70:3 (4th ed. Rev. 2019) (“Rathkopf”) (explaining that “[w]hether a vested right exists 
under a particular state’s law is often an important issue in court adjudication of 
constitutional due process and takings claims.  If a court finds under the facts of a 
particular case that a vested right does not exist, the plaintiff owner or developer may be 
held not to have secured under state law a ‘property interest’ protected by these 
constitutional guarantees”) (emphasis added).  
With respect to the damages arising from the alleged unlawful taking of its Property, 
MRA was permitted, over the County’s objection, to present valuation testimony based 
entirely on the proposed landfill’s projected revenues and capitalized profits, which MRA’s 
expert asserted the landfill purportedly would have generated.  MRA offered no expert 
testimony on the fair market value of the Property.  As reflected on the verdict sheet, the 
                                              
those conditions when it acquired the Property and incurred additional professional 
expenses and fees in connection with permitting activities.  Second, if MRA had no legally 
compensable or vested right to operate a rubble landfill, then MRA claims that the 
application of Bill 91-10 as applied to its Property denied it of all beneficial use, thereby 
entitling MRA to just compensation under Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution.  
MRA’s blending of these constitutional theories under a general takings umbrella was 
legally incorrect, given our holding in MRA IV that MRA had no vested or constitutionally 
protected interest in a rubble landfill operation.  See Neifert v. Dep’t of Env’t, 395 Md. 486, 
522 (2006) (explaining that “[i]n order to make a successful claim under the Takings 
Clause, appellants must first establish that they possess a constitutionally protected 
property interest”); Rathkopf § 70:3 (explaining that where no vested right is found to exist, 
dismissal of constitutional claims is appropriate).  However, we will not address this point 
further, given our holding that MRA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.   
45 
jury found that “MRA’s inability to operate a rubble landfill” was a “regulatory taking” 
and awarded MRA damages in the amount of $45,420,076. 
Harford County filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  On appeal, the 
intermediate appellate court held that MRA exhausted its administrative remedies, but that 
MRA’s takings claim is barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed more than 
three years after it accrued on June 5, 2007, the date of the Board’s final decision denying 
MRA’s variance requests.  Harford Cty. v. Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 242 Md. App. 
123 (2019).   
MRA petitioned for writ of certiorari, and Harford County filed a conditional cross-
petition for writ of certiorari.  Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 466 Md. 309 
(2019).  We granted certiorari to consider the questions presented in the petition and 
conditional-cross petition, which we have reordered: 
1. Should MRA’s takings claim be dismissed based on MRA’s failure to 
raise this constitutional issue in any administrative proceeding?  
 
2. Is MRA’s takings claim barred by the statute of limitations when it was 
filed more than three years after the final administrative agency decision 
denying MRA’s variance requests?  
 
3. Did the Board’s decision prohibiting a proposed rubble landfill to protect 
the public constitute a taking for which compensation is due?  
 
4. Did the jury’s damages award of more than $45 million as compensation 
for an unconstitutional taking contravene Maryland law when the 
damages are not the fair market value of MRA’s Property but are, instead, 
the capitalized profits of a hypothetical business?   
 
We answer question 1 in the affirmative.  Given our holdings concerning question 
1, we shall not reach questions 2 through 4.  
46 
II. 
 DISCUSSION 
A. Parties’ Contentions8 
The County argues that MRA’s takings claim is subject to and barred by the same 
administrative exhaustion requirement which resulted in the dismissal of MRA’s constitutional 
and non-constitutional claims in MRA II and MRA III.  The County contends that under this 
Court’s jurisprudence, including MRA II and MRA III, this Court has consistently taken the 
position that constitutional issues, including an allegation that the application of statute or 
legislation is unconstitutional as applied to a particular property, must be raised and initially 
decided in the same statutorily prescribed administrative proceedings.  The County asserts that, 
because MRA never raised its constitutional takings claims as part of the Board of Appeals’ 
administrative proceeding, it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and therefore cannot 
bring a separate action raising these arguments in this matter.  
In response to the County’s exhaustion argument, MRA contends that its takings 
claim was not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and argues that there is no case law which 
supports the proposition that a landowner must bring a takings claim for just compensation 
in, as opposed to after, an administrative proceeding.   
B. Standard of Review 
The issue presented involves a pure question of law.  To determine whether the trial 
court’s decision was legally correct, “we give no deference to the trial court findings and 
review the decision under a de novo standard of review.”  Lamson v. Montgomery Cty., 
                                              
8 Because we do not reach questions 2 through 4, we shall not discuss the parties’ 
contentions related to those questions.  
47 
460 Md. 349, 360 (2018).  “Whether a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies prior 
to bringing suit . . . is a legal issue on which no deference is due to the lower court and 
which an appellate court may address even if a lower court did not.”  Falls Road Cmty. 
Ass’n v. Baltimore Cty., 437 Md. 115, 134 (2014).  Therefore, we review the merits of the 
question presented concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies de novo.   
C. Analysis  
We shall first address the County’s assertion that MRA failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies because issues concerning primary jurisdiction and exhaustion are 
treated like jurisdictional questions.  Bd. of Educ. for Dorchester Cty. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 
774, 787 (1986).  Indeed, “[t]his Court has pointed out, time after time, that because of the 
important public policy involved, the Court will address sua sponte the related issues of 
primary jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative remedies, [and] finality of administrative 
decisions . . . .”.  Renaissance Centro Columbia, LLC v. Broida, 421 Md. 474, 487 (2011).  
The County alleges that MRA was required to raise its takings claim in an 
administrative proceeding before it could seek just compensation in the circuit court.  For 
the reasons set forth herein, we agree. 
Takings Claims—They Aren’t All the Same 
 
Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution provides: “The General Assembly 
shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without just 
compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid 
or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.”  Section 40 “has been determined 
to ‘have the same meaning and effect in reference to an exaction of property, and [] the 
48 
decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct 
authorities.’”  Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 266 (2016) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Bureau of Mines v. George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156 (1974)).  
Although this constitutional provision covers eminent domain actions, it also applies to 
inverse condemnation claims.  Id.  
 
An inverse condemnation claim is “characterized as a shorthand description of the 
manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when 
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.”  Id. (quoting Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor 
& City Council of Baltimore, 394 Md. 482 (2006) (additional citations omitted)).  
“Essentially, a plaintiff may ‘recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by 
the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain 
has been attempted by the taking agency.’”  Id. (quoting Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 489).   
 
An inverse condemnation claim may arise in a number of ways:  
[T]he denial by a governmental agency of access to one’s 
property, regulatory actions that effectively deny an owner the 
physical or economically viable use of the property, conduct 
that causes a physical invasion of the property, hanging a 
credible and prolonged threat of condemnation over the 
property in a way that significantly diminishes its value, or . . . 
conduct that effectively forces an owner to sell.   
 
Coll. Bowl, Inc., 394 Md. at 489 (citing Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 
1983)).9  
                                              
9 In addition to the above-described governmental conduct, we have held that an 
inverse condemnation claim may arise through governmental inaction in the face of an 
affirmative duty to act.  See Litz v. Dep’t. of Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 273 (2016). 
49 
 
Because every governmental action underlying an asserted takings claim is not the 
same, it is critical that we analyze the takings claim within our jurisprudence specific to 
the type of government action that is alleged to create a constitutional taking.  Here, MRA 
is asserting a non-possessory regulatory taking arising from the adoption and application 
of a zoning regulation.  Accordingly, we examine MRA’s takings claim under our case law 
specific to regulatory takings claims arising out of the application of zoning regulations.  
Regulatory Takings Claims Arising from the Application of Zoning Regulations 
The United States Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held that zoning 
regulations are a valid exercise of a government’s police power so long as the limitations 
imposed are in the public interest and are substantially related to the health, safety, or 
general welfare of the community.  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 125–26 (1978) (“[I]n instances in which a state tribunal reasonably 
concluded that ‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by 
prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, [the Supreme Court] has upheld land-use 
regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests. . . . 
Zoning laws are, of course, the classic example, . . . which have been viewed as permissible 
governmental action even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the property.”) 
(citations omitted); Casey v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville, 400 Md. 259, 279 (2007) 
(“It is well-settled that the adoption and administration of zoning procedures are an exercise 
of police power delegated to specific individual political subdivisions and municipalities 
50 
of the State.”); Anne Arundel Cty. Comm’rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 338 (1946) (“[Z]oning, 
in general, is a valid exercise of the police power.”). 
As part of the exercise of its police powers, it is appropriate for a local government 
to adopt comprehensive zoning regulations addressing, inter alia, the types of uses that it 
will permit in a particular zoning district, and bulk, size, area, and height restrictions to 
ensure compatibility of such proposed uses with the surrounding areas.  Zoning matters, 
such as the adoption of a text amendment applicable to all properties within a zoning 
district, are legislative functions.  See White v. Spring, 109 Md. App. 692, 697 (1996) 
(Cathell, J.), cert. denied, 343 Md. 680 (1996) (“The creation of zoning policy is a matter 
reserved for the legislative body of government; it is neither normally an administrative 
nor a judicial function.”).  Here, the specific exercise of police powers involved the Harford 
County Council’s legislative enactment of zoning regulations to govern rubble landfills.  
Bill 91-10—A Valid Exercise of Police Powers   
 
Bill 91-10 consisted of a text amendment to the Harford County Code, which 
established, among other things, a minimum parcel size of 100 acres for a property 
proposing to be used as a rubble landfill, and a 1,000-foot buffer from the nearest residence.  
The Bill applied uniformly to all rubble landfills in the County.  In the Hearing Examiner’s 
April 2002 decision, the Hearing Examiner stated that between 1988 and 1991, five rubble 
landfills were operational or in the planning stages in Harford County.  The Hearing 
Examiner explained that the law was “modeled in large part on zoning legislation that had 
been enacted the prior year in Anne Arundel County.”  The Harford County Council had 
51 
the authority to enact Bill 91-10, which constituted a valid exercise of its police powers.10  
In MRA IV, we upheld the County’s right to enact Bill 91-10 and to apply it to MRA’s 
Property.  MRA IV, 414 Md. at 50–51.  The legitimacy of Bill 91-10 having been 
established by this Court in MRA IV, and not subject to further judicial proceedings, we 
turn to whether MRA could maintain an independent takings claim arising from the 
application of Bill 91-10 to its Property.   
When Does the Exercise of Police Powers Go Too Far and Create a Regulatory 
Taking? 
 
As we explained in Casey v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville, 400 Md. 259 
(2007), “[the] exercise of the local legislature’s police power [to adopt zoning regulation] 
is not absolute . . . and, if it goes too far, may constitute a regulatory taking of the land.”  
Id. at 306 (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127 (“[A] use restriction on real 
property may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a 
substantial public purpose, or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner’s 
use of the property.”)). 
The difficulty arises in deciding whether a restriction is an exercise of the police 
power, or whether the governmental action constitutes an exercise of its eminent domain 
power.  “What constitutes a ‘taking of property’ under the eminent domain power and what 
is a reasonable curtailment of the use and enjoyment of one’s property not requiring 
payment of compensation depends upon the facts in each individual case.”  Stanley D. 
                                              
10 In Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 342 Md. 476, 489 (1996) 
(“MRA II”), we explained that MRA was not making a facial attack of Bill 91-10, and its 
arguments arose solely from the application of the Bill to its Property.   
52 
Abrams, Guide to Maryland Zoning Decisions, § 10.01 (5th ed. 2012).  “It is an accurate 
statement to say that every restriction upon the use and enjoyment of property is a ‘taking’ 
to the extent of such restriction; but every ‘taking’ is not a ‘taking’ in a constitutional sense 
for which compensation need be paid.”  City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 357 Md. 484, 497 
(2000) (citing Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 562–63 (1965)).11   
 
In City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 622 (1965), we summarized the 
applicable test for takings where zoning regulations are involved:  
The legal principles whose application determines whether or 
not the restrictions imposed by the zoning action on the 
property involved are an unconstitutional taking are well 
established.  If the owner affirmatively demonstrates that the 
legislative or administrative determination deprives him of all 
beneficial use of the property, the action will be held 
unconstitutional.  But the restrictions imposed must be such 
that the property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose.  It 
is not enough for the property owners to show that the zoning 
action results in substantial loss or hardship. 
 
(emphasis added); see also Casey, 400 Md. at 307 (collecting cases); State v. Good 
Samaritan Hosp. of Md., Inc., 299 Md. 310, 324–25 (1984) (“For government restriction 
upon the use of property to constitute a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense, so that 
compensation must be paid, the restriction must be such that it essentially deprives the 
owner of all beneficial uses of the property.”); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 
                                              
11 Of course, a takings claim only arises where there is a constitutionally protected 
property interest.  See Neifert, 395 Md. at 522.  Because this Court held in MRA IV that 
MRA did not have a constitutionally protected vested right to operate a rubble landfill, the 
only way MRA could have established a constitutional taking was to prove that the 
application of Bill 91-10 to its Property would deny MRA of all beneficial use of the 
Property.  Because MRA never raised this issue in its decades of litigation, it was not 
considered by the Board or this Court. 
53 
34 (1980) (“To constitute a taking in the constitutional sense . . . the state action must 
deprive the owner of all beneficial use of the property . . . .  [I]t is not enough for the 
property owner to show that the state action causes substantial loss or hardship.”);  Pallace 
v. Inter City Land Co., 239 Md. 549, 558 (1965) (“If an owner affirmatively demonstrates 
that the zoning action deprives him of all reasonable beneficial use of his property, the 
action will be held unconstitutional, but the restriction upon the property imposed by the 
zoning action must be such that the property cannot be used for any purpose to which it is 
reasonabl[y] adapted.”) (emphasis added). 
 
Stanley Abrams summarizes Maryland law governing takings claims arising from 
the application of zoning regulations and the precipitous hurdle which the property owner 
must overcome:  
The applicability of these principles with respect to judicial 
review of zoning decisions is now firmly established in 
Maryland. Simply stated, unless a physical taking has 
occurred, the contention by a property owner that the action of 
a local zoning authority is confiscatory and thereby constitutes 
an unconstitutional “taking” of his property will fail unless it 
can be demonstrated by substantial evidence that the 
governmental action, decision or requirement deprives him of 
all beneficial use of the property and that the property cannot 
be used for any other reasonable purpose under its existing 
zoning. 
 
Abrams, Guide to Maryland Zoning Decisions, § 10.01 (emphasis added).   
Applying our long-settled jurisprudence specific to takings claims arising from the 
application of zoning regulations, for MRA to assert a successful takings claim, MRA was 
required to prove that the application of Bill 91-10 to its Property deprives it of all 
54 
beneficial use of the Property and that the Property cannot be used for any other purpose 
under the existing zoning established in the Harford County Code.   
Having established the legal standard that MRA was required to satisfy for a 
successful takings claim, before we consider whether MRA had the right to present a 
takings claim to a jury, we must first answer a threshold question—who makes the initial 
factual  determination that a rubble landfill is the only beneficial use that can be made of 
the Property under the zoning provisions in the Harford County Code?  The Hearing 
Examiner and the Harford County Board of Appeals?  Or a jury?  Without a factual 
determination that there are no other beneficial uses that can be made of the Property aside 
from a rubble landfill under the Harford County Zoning Code, there can be no regulatory 
taking, and consequently, no right to a jury determination of damages under Article III, 
§ 40 of the Maryland Constitution.  Our analysis of this threshold issue takes us full circle 
to Chapter 1 of our prequel—MRA II, where this Court first explained the requirement that 
MRA exhaust administrative remedies in connection with the application of Bill 91-10 to 
its Property. 
The Exhaustion Doctrine Applies to All Constitutional Claims Arising from the 
Application of Zoning Legislation to Property 
 
This case requires us to examine MRA’s asserted right to bring a takings claim 
arising out of the application of a zoning regulation, in the context of our settled and long-
standing jurisprudence developed over many decades that requires a litigant to exhaust his 
or her administrative remedies where the General Assembly has vested original jurisdiction 
with an administrative agency—in this instance, the Board of Appeals.   
55 
Generally, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, under 
circumstances where a party’s claim “is enforceable initially by administrative action,” the 
party must “fully pursue administrative procedures before obtaining limited judicial 
review.”  Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena, 282 
Md. 588, 602 (1978) (internal citations omitted); see also Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard 
Cty., 381 Md. 646, 661 (2004) (explaining that “[t]he exhaustion of administrative 
remedies doctrine requires that a party must exhaust statutorily prescribed administrative 
remedies . . . before the resolution of separate and independent judicial relief in the 
courts.”) (emphasis in original).   
As we explained in MRA II, 342 Md. at 494, Harford County is a chartered county, 
and therefore, is subject to the Express Powers Act, LG § 10-101, et. seq.12  The Express 
Powers Act, in LG §§ 10-305 and 10-324, provides the zoning authority for all charter 
counties except Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties.13  Section 10-305 authorizes 
a charter county to establish a board of appeals and provides that a board of appeals shall 
                                              
12 Given our volumes of jurisprudence explaining the Express Powers Act, 
particularly, our discussion of a board of appeals’ exclusive appellate jurisdiction arising 
out of Article 25, § 5(U), it is worth noting that Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol, 2019 
Supp.), Local Government Article (“LG”) § 10-305 was previously codified as Article 25, 
§ 5(U).  See, e.g., Holiday Point Marina Partners v. Anne Arundel Cty., 349 Md. 190, 198–
99 (1998); MRA II, 342 Md. at 476, 491–92; Prince George’s Cty. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 
275, 292–94 (1980).  Article 25A, § 5(U) was re-codified without substantive change, in 
LG § 10-305.  See 2013 Md. Laws, Chap. 119.   
 
13 The zoning authority to Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties is set forth in 
the Maryland-Washington Regional District Act (“RDA”), previously codified in Article 
28 of the Maryland Code, and codified now in Md. Code (2012, 2019 Supp.), Land Use 
Article (“LU”) § 20-101, et. seq.   
56 
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia, a variety of adjudicatory zoning 
matters.  Specifically, under the Express Powers Act, LG § 10-305(b), the Legislature has 
given the chartered counties the authority to establish a board of appeals with 
original jurisdiction or jurisdiction to review the action of an 
administrative officer or unit of county government over 
matters arising under any law, ordinance, or regulation of the 
county council that concerns: (1) an application for a zoning 
variance or exception . . .; (2) the issuance, renewal, denial, 
revocation, suspension, annulment, or modification of any 
license, permit, approval, exemption, waiver . . ., or other form 
of permission or of any adjudicatory order . . . . 
 
When issuing its decision, the Board of Appeals is required to “file an opinion that shall 
include a statement of the facts found and the grounds for the decision.”  LG § 10-305(c).  
Any person aggrieved by that decision may seek judicial review by the circuit court for the 
respective county, with a further right to appeal the decision of the circuit court to the Court 
of Special Appeals.  LG § 10-305(d).   
Consistent with the authority granted by the Express Powers Act, Harford County 
has established the Harford County Board of Appeals.  Harford County Code § 267-9.  The 
Board is vested with the authority to, inter alia, “hear and decide any zoning case brought 
before the Board and to impose such conditions or limitations as may be necessary to 
protect the public health, safety, and welfare.”  Harford County Code § 269-9(B)(1).  The 
Board “may employ Hearing Examiners to hear zoning cases within the jurisdiction of the 
Board.”  Harford County Code § 269-9(C).  “The Hearing Examiner shall have the 
authority, duty and responsibility to render recommendations in all cases, subject to final 
approval of the Board.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[p]roceedings before the Hearing Examiner and 
57 
the Board shall be quasi-judicial in nature and conducted in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the Board in such a manner as to afford the parties due process of law.”  
Harford County Code § 269-9(E).  In accordance with the requirements of the Express 
Powers Act, “[t]he decision of the Board shall be in writing and shall specify findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.”  Harford County Code § 269-9(H).  
We have repeatedly held in MRA II, 342 Md. at 492, and MRA III, 382 Md. at 363, 
as well as numerous other cases, that under the Express Powers Act, where a litigant is 
attempting to challenge, in a court proceeding, the application of a zoning regulation to his 
or her property, the litigant must first exhaust administrative remedies.  See, e.g., Holiday 
Point Marina, v. Anne Arundel Cty., 349 Md. 190, 198–99 (1998); Prince George’s Cty. v. 
Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 292–294 (1980).   
As we explained in MRA II, the application of Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Property was 
subject to the exhaustion requirements under the Express Powers Act.  MRA II, 342 Md. at 
491.  We held that prior to MRA filing a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief against Harford County challenging the application of the 
Bill to its Property, it was required to seek a variance and to exhaust its administrative 
remedies before the Harford County Board of Appeals.  Id. at 491–93.  In connection with 
its variance request, we explained that: “under Maryland law, the Harford County Board 
of Appeals would be authorized and required to consider any of the constitutional and 
other issues raised by [MRA] to the extent that those issues would be pertinent in the 
particular proceeding before the Board.”  Id. at 491–492 (emphasis added). 
58 
After this Court issued its second directive to MRA in MRA III, MRA finally applied 
for a variance.  However, it did not present any evidence, nor did it make any legal 
argument before the Hearing Examiner or the Board of Appeals, that a failure to grant a 
variance would deprive it of all beneficial use of its Property, which would thereby entitle 
it to just compensation under Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution.14  This was a 
fatal flaw, which prevented any court from considering the matter further.  We explain.   
                                              
14 The only whiff of evidence that MRA presented during any administrative agency 
proceeding that comes close to a takings assertion came in the form of expert testimony 
from Robert S. Lynch, an attorney and former Director of Planning and Zoning in Harford 
County.  Mr. Lynch did not testify in the variance proceeding—he testified in the 2001 
hearing which challenged the Zoning Administrator’s interpretation of Bill 91-10 and its 
application to MRA’s property. During the hearing, Mr. Lynch testified that because of the 
Property’s physical condition, which he described as “likening it to a moonscape,” his 
opinion was that the Property would have to be reclaimed by utilizing it as a rubble landfill.  
Mr. Lynch testified that the Property “does not have any economically beneficial use other 
than as a landfill.”  This testimony was refuted by testimony of Arden McClune, a Harford 
County employee.  As summarized in the Hearing Examiner’s Decision dated April 2002, 
Ms. McClune testified that she believed there were many other permitted uses that could 
be made of the property, as well as additional uses that could be permitted by special 
exception. Ms. McClune testified that some of the other uses “could include: construction 
services and suppliers, open space, parkland, residential or institutional uses, golf and 
driving range, [and] shooting range.”  She “also disagreed with [Mr. Lynch’s] earlier 
testimony that the [P]roperty needed to be reclaimed through rubble.” Ms. McClune further 
testified that she “was in agreement with the affidavit of former Planning Director William 
Carroll that there were other types of uses that could be made of the MRA site.”  Although 
this testimony concerning alternative uses was provided at the initial administrative 
hearing, MRA never made a takings claim in that proceeding.  Accordingly, neither the 
Zoning Administrator, Hearing Examiner nor the Board made any findings concerning a 
takings claim.  See Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford Cty., 382 Md. 348, 357–68 
(2004) (“MRA III”) (summarizing the Hearing Examiner’s nine findings and legal 
conclusions).  Additionally, MRA never presented any evidence or legal argument during 
the variance proceeding that the denial of a variance would create an unlawful taking.  
Accordingly, the claim was not presented to the Hearing Examiner or the Board as part of 
the variance case, and therefore, was not considered by this Court in MRA IV.  
59 
Under our zoning jurisprudence, few legal tenets have received greater acceptance 
than the principle that where a landowner alleges that the application of a zoning regulation 
to his or her property is invalid or unlawful, all constitutional and non-constitutional claims 
must be raised within the context of the administrative proceeding.  MRA III, 382 Md. at 
366; MRA II, 342 Md. at 490–92; see also Prince George’s Cty. v. Ray’s Used Cars, 398 
Md. 632, 651 (2007) (dismissing a landowner’s declaratory judgment action alleging 
constitutional violations arising from the application of a zoning regulation to its property 
on the ground that the landowner was required to invoke and exhaust its administrative 
remedies, explaining that “[n]ot only are administrative agencies fully competent to decide 
constitutional issues, but this Court has consistently held that exclusive or primary 
remedies must be pursued and exhausted, before resort to the courts, in cases presenting 
constitutional issues.”); Holiday Point Marina, 349 Md. at 199 (“This Court has 
consistently held over the past fifty years that the question of a zoning ordinance’s validity, 
as applied to the property involved, is an appropriate issue for an administrative zoning 
agency.”); Ins. Comm’r v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 339 Md. 596, 619 (1995) 
(explaining that “where a party is not challenging the validity of the statute as a whole, but 
is arguing that the statute as applied in a particular situation is unconstitutional, and where 
the legislature has provided an administrative remedy, this Court has regularly held that 
the constitutional issue must be raised and decided in the statutorily prescribed 
administrative and judicial review proceedings”); Arnold v. Prince George’s Cty., 270 Md. 
285, 294–99 (1973) (requiring a property owner, asserting that a zoning ordinance was 
unconstitutional as applied to his property, to exhaust his administrative remedy); Hartman 
60 
v. Prince George’s Cty., 264 Md. 320, 323–25 (1972) (reviewing numerous cases holding 
that constitutional arguments must be made in the statutorily prescribed administrative 
proceedings); Gingell v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 249 Md. 374, 376–77 (1968) (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s argument that she need not exhaust her administrative remedy on the theory that 
only a court may declare the statute unconstitutional); Mayor of Balt. v. Seabolt, 210 Md. 
199, 207 (1956) (holding that the zoning appeals board was authorized to grant 
“‘exceptions’ . . . by holding the [zoning] ordinance pro tonto invalid”); Hoffman v. Mayor 
of Balt., 197 Md. 294, 305–06 (1951) (“Application for an ‘exception’ is an appropriate 
way to raise” the issue of whether a zoning ordinance is invalid).   
Nor do our cases carve out any “takings exception” from the exhaustion 
requirement.  In Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275 (1980), this Court 
reversed a trial court’s judgment entered against Prince George’s County in favor of the 
property owners in the amount of $3.6 million because the property owners did not exhaust 
their administrative remedies under the Express Powers Act and the Prince George’s 
County Code.  Id. at 282–94.  With respect to the property owners’ claim that the 
exhaustion requirements did not apply to takings claims, we explained that: “This Court 
has held on many occasions, when faced with a claim of an agency’s unconstitutional 
taking of property, that such issues must still go through the administrative process, 
particularly when judicial review is provided.”  Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
It is also clear from our jurisprudence concerning unconstitutional takings claims 
arising from the application of zoning regulations that the Board makes the initial factual 
61 
determination of whether a property owner can use its property for any other beneficial 
use, not the courts.  See Poe v. City of Balt., 241 Md. 303, 311 (1966) (explaining that 
where a landowner is not attacking the constitutionality of a statute as a whole, but only its 
validity as applied to his property, “the determination of the basic fact—whether the 
property can be used, under existing circumstances, for any reasonable purpose under the 
zoning classification—is left for primary determination to the expertise of the Board, with 
full right of appeal to the courts on the questions of law involved.”) (emphasis added); see 
also Gingell, 249 Md. at 376 (affirming the dismissal a property owner’s constitutional 
attack on an ordinance because the property owner failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies, explaining that one of “[t]he reasons for requiring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies before resorting to the courts are that it is within the expertise of the 
administrative agency involved to hear and consider the evidence brought before it and 
make findings as to the propriety of the action requested . . . .”); Spaid v. Board of Cty. 
Comm’rs for Prince George’s Cty., 259 Md. 369 (1970) (board making initial 
determination of takings claims arising from zoning regulation, subject to court’s judicial 
review); City of Balt. v. Borinsky 239 Md. 611 (1965) (board making the initial 
determination on the property owner’s takings claim, subject to court’s judicial review). 
There are several reasons for this exhaustion requirement.  
First, the types of uses that can be made of a property involve the application of 
local zoning regulations to a specific property.  Each governmental jurisdiction with 
planning and zoning authority has the authority to adopt a zoning ordinance, which 
includes land uses permitted within a particular zoning district, as well as the authority to 
62 
establish conditions applicable to the particular use designed to protect adjacent properties 
from potential adverse effects.  Maryland appellate courts have repeatedly held that “[i]n 
zoning matters, the zoning agency is considered to be the expert in the assessment of the 
evidence, not the court.”  Bowman Grp. v. Moser, 112 Md. App. 694, 698 (1996); see also 
Gingell, 249 Md. at 375 (noting that one reason for “requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts [is] [] that it is within the expertise 
of the administrative agency involved to hear and consider the evidence brought before it 
and make findings as to the propriety of the action requested”); Poe, 241 Md. 307–08 
(explaining that “[i]t is particularly within the expertise of an administrative body such as 
the Board to marshal and sift the evidence presented in a hearing upon an application for a 
special exception and to make an administrative finding as to whether . . . the application 
of the ordinance to the property involved deprives the owner of any reasonable use of it”).  
Second, the zoning administrative agency—not the court—is vested with the 
authority to grant the necessary relief on either constitutional or non-constitutional 
grounds.  As discussed in more detail below, where the application of a zoning regulation 
will deny the landowner of all beneficial use of its property, the Board of Appeals has the 
authority to grant an administrative remedy in the form of a variance—a constitutional 
“relief valve”—to avoid a takings claim.  
The Use of a Variance in Zoning Regulations—A Constitutional Relief Valve for 
Takings Claims 
 
In the context of a validly enacted legislative zoning amendment, a variance is an 
essential tool that can be utilized to address a potential unconstitutional taking.  “A variance 
63 
refers to administrative relief which may be granted from the strict application of a 
particular development limitation in the zoning ordinance (i.e., setback, area and height 
limitations, etc.).”  Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enter., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 537 
(2002) (quoting Stanley D. Abrams, Guide to Maryland Zoning Decisions, § 11.1 (3d ed. 
1992)); see also Rathkopf § 58:1 (“A variance is the right to use or to build on land in any 
way prohibited by strict application of a zoning ordinance.  It is permission given to a 
property owner to depart from the applicable zoning requirements by constructing or 
maintaining a building or structure or establishing or maintaining a use of land that 
otherwise would not be allowed.”).15   
Although different jurisdictions use slightly different standards for granting a 
variance, there is a common purpose behind allowing variances:  The variance is a means 
of correcting occasional inequities that may be created under general Euclidean16 zoning 
                                              
15 “A ‘use’ variance generally permits a land use other than the uses permitted in the 
particular zoning ordinance  . . . while an ‘area’ variance generally excepts an applicant 
from area, height, density, setback or sideline restrictions.” Belvoir Farms Homeowners 
Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 275 n.10 (1999).  Here, a rubble landfill is a permitted 
use in the AG (Agricultural) Zoning District.  MRA was seeking an area variance for relief 
from the minimum parcel size and setback requirements. 
   
16 For a thorough description of “Euclidean” zoning, see County Council of Prince 
George’s County v. Zimmer Development Co., 444 Md. 490, 511 (2015) (Harrell, J.) and 
Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, at 534–35 (2002) 
(Harrell, J.).  As discussed in Rylyns, “Euclidean zoning is a fairly static and rigid form of 
zoning named after the basic zoning ordinances upheld in Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 [] (1926).”  Id. at 534.  We summarized the rationale behind 
Euclidean zoning in Zimmer: 
 
Early zoning ordinances sought to separate incompatible land 
uses through a method that would become known as 
“Euclidean” zoning.  Under a Euclidean zoning scheme, a 
64 
ordinances.  Specifically, the variance is an administrative zoning tool that can act as a 
“safety valve” to avoid the application of an otherwise valid zoning regulation in a manner 
that could create an unconstitutional taking.  See, e.g., Bacon v. Town of Enfield, 840 A.2d 
788, 799 (N.H. 2004) (Nadeau, J., dissenting) (noting that the variance standard “was 
designed to loosen the strictures which have made it essentially impossible for a [zoning 
agency] [], honoring the letter of the law . . . to afford the relief appropriate to avoid an 
unconstitutional application of an otherwise valid regulation”) (internal citations omitted); 
Mustang Run Wind Project, LLC v. Osage Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 387 P.3d 333 (Okla. 
2016) (“A zoning variance . . . granted by a local government entity [is a] [] historic 
procedure[] designed to . . . act as a safety valve when applying a zoning regulation to 
prevent governmental restrictions from operating in such a manner that the burden on an 
individual landowner amounts to a taking.”) (cleaned up); Rathkopf § 58:1 (explaining that 
the variance “is a kind of ‘escape hatch’ or ‘safety valve’ of zoning administration”); 
                                              
zoning authority divides geographically an area into use 
districts.  Certain permitted uses are specified by local 
ordinance and allowed in particular geographic areas . . . and 
the zoning assigned to them are then recorded on an official 
zoning map.  The number of classifications that are available 
to be applied within a district has increased exponentially since 
the early schemes, but Euclidean zoning remains a basic 
framework for implementation of land use controls at the local 
level.  Euclidean Zoning aimed to provide stability and 
predictability in land use planning and zoning . . . .  A school 
of thought evolved that the stability and predictability of 
Euclidean zoning amounted sometimes to undesirable rigidity.  
 
444 Md. at 511–13 (cleaned up) (internal citations and paragraph breaks omitted).  Special 
exceptions and variances give Euclidean zoning some flexibility.  Id. at 513–14.   
65 
Jonathan E. Cohen, Comment, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and 
Land-Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 307, 330 (1995) 
(explaining how the variance was originally conceived as a means to ensure the 
constitutionality of zoning ordinances adopted under traditional Euclidean zoning by 
operating as a “comprehensive zoning’s constitutional ‘safety valve’” where the 
application of a zoning regulation would impose an undue hardship on a landowner).  
Likewise, this Court has held that a variance is an appropriate land use tool that can 
be applied by an administrative zoning agency to alleviate a constitutional violation arising 
out of the application of an otherwise valid zoning regulation.  In Holiday Point Marina, 
we explained that under our exhaustion jurisprudence relating to assertions of 
governmental takings arising out of zoning regulations, “[w]e have held that, if a restriction 
under a zoning ordinance cannot constitutionally or validly be applied, this is a proper 
ground for the administrative agency to grant an exception or a variance.”  349 Md. at 199 
(collecting cases).17 
In Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association v. North, 355 Md. 259 (1999), we 
explained the difference in Maryland between the “unwarranted hardship” or 
“unreasonable hardship” variance standard used in local zoning codes18 and the 
                                              
17 A “special exception” is another land use tool “that adds flexibility to a 
comprehensive zoning scheme by serving as a ‘middle ground’ between permitted uses 
and prohibited uses in a particular zone.” People’s Counsel for Balt. Cty. v. Loyola Coll., 
406 Md. 54, 71 (2008). 
 
18 Different local zoning codes and ordinances adopt similar, but slightly different 
language when describing the “hardship” prong of the variance standard.  In Belvoir Farms 
Homeowners Association v. North, 355 Md. 259, 275 (1999), we considered whether the 
66 
unconstitutional takings standard.  Id. at 275–82.  Writing for this Court, Judge Cathell 
undertook an extensive analysis of the variance tool in administrative zoning proceedings.  
Id.  After examining the various judicial interpretations of the “unwarranted” or 
“unreasonable” hardship standard adopted by other states in the application of their 
respective variance standards, we explained that “[a]uthorities throughout the country . . . 
define the unnecessary, unreasonable, unwarranted, or similarly-worded hardship standard 
to be either the denial of beneficial or reasonable use or the denial of all viable economic 
use, the unconstitutional taking standard.”  Id. at 281.  We stated that “[i]t is important to 
note here that the purpose of a variance is to protect the landowner’s rights from the 
unconstitutional application of zoning law.”  Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  We 
explained, however, that the fact that “a variance may [] be granted in cases in which [the] 
application of a particular zoning ordinance would result in an unconstitutional taking of 
property” does not mean that a variance could not be used to grant relief where the 
applicable local zoning variance standard required proof of something less than an 
unconstitutional taking.  Id.  
We held that the “unwarranted hardship” standard, or similar standard, is less 
restrictive than the unconstitutional taking standard, and determined that the unwarranted 
hardship standard, and its similar manifestations, are equivalent to the “denial of reasonable 
                                              
“unwarranted hardship” standard required for a critical area variance was less restrictive 
than the “unnecessary hardship” or “undue hardship” standard generally applied to “use” 
variances.  We determined that these terms were indistinguishable.  Id. Similarly, for 
purposes of our discussion in this case, we find no substantive distinction between the 
“unwarranted hardship” standard described in Belvoir Farms, and the “unreasonable 
hardship” standard described in the Harford County Code, Chapter 267, § 267-11(A)(2). 
67 
and significant use of the property.”  Id. at 282.  We also held that “whether a property 
owner has been denied reasonable and significant use of his property is a question of fact 
best addressed by the expertise of the Board of Appeals, not the courts.”  Id.  
Our holding in Belvoir Farms is significant because although we held that the 
“unwarranted hardship” or similar standard is not as restrictive as the unconstitutional 
takings standard, we nonetheless reiterated that a variance is a device that may be used to 
alleviate an unconstitutional taking.  355 Md. at 281.  In other words, simply because a 
board has the authority to grant a variance where the applicant proves something less than 
an unconstitutional taking under an “unwarranted hardship” or “unreasonable hardship” 
standard, it does not follow that a variance cannot be used to grant relief when the property 
owner proves a greater hardship consisting of an unconstitutional taking of property 
arising from the application of facially valid zoning regulation.  See, e.g., Holiday Point 
Marina, 349 Md. at 199 (collecting cases).  
City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611 (1965), is instructive on the manner in 
which takings claims are presented to a board of appeals when a property owner asserts 
that the application of zoning regulations will deny him or her the right to any beneficial 
use of their property.  In Borinsky, the property owner filed a special exception seeking to 
permit the construction of a warehouse on the property.  Id. at 618.  The property had been 
improved by the property owner’s deceased parents by 53 garages, which were rented to 
neighbors for the storage of automobiles in the 1920s.  Id. at 617.  The property had fallen 
into disrepair.  Id. at 618.  The property was located in a residential zoning district, but was 
surrounded by commercial uses, with the exception of row houses along one boundary.  Id.  
68 
As part of its application before the board of appeals, the property owner testified that the 
property could not be feasibly used for residential purposes.  Id. at 618–19.  The property 
owner called an architect, who testified that the irregularly shaped lot was not feasible for 
residential construction.  Id. at 619.  The property owner also presented a developer/real 
estate expert, who testified that it would be economically unsound to build houses on the 
lot, which was irregularly shaped, that the surrounding uses had been transformed from 
residential to commercial uses, and that in his opinion, “it would be ‘most difficult’ to 
secure financing for the construction of residential dwellings on the property.”  Id.  
The board considered the property owner’s takings arguments and denied the 
requested relief.  Id. at 620.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the board’s decision.  Id. at 
627.  We noted that “[t]he legal principles whose application determines whether or not 
the restrictions imposed by the zoning action on the property involved are an 
unconstitutional taking are well-established.”  Id. at 622.  We reiterated the takings 
standard when the underlying governmental action involves the application of zoning 
regulations:  
If the owner affirmatively demonstrates that the legislative or 
administrative determination deprives him of all beneficial use 
of the property, the action will be held unconstitutional.  But 
the restrictions imposed must be such that the property cannot 
be used for any reasonable purpose.  It is not enough for the 
property owners to show that the zoning action results in 
substantial loss or hardship. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).   
This Court reviewed the testimony of the property owner’s witnesses that, in their 
opinion, the property could not be used economically or feasibly for residential purposes.  
69 
Id.  However, we also recognized that the “facts adduced by the evidence must also be 
considered.”  Id. at 623.  In evaluating the evidence, we observed that some of the garages 
on the property were being rented for storage of building materials and personal property.  
Id.  This Court further noted that although many uses in the surrounding area were 
commercial, there were residential areas in the immediate proximity of the property.  Id.  
We recognized that there were “material gaps” in the experts’ testimony and reiterated that 
the burden is on the property owner to show that the “property cannot be used for any 
reasonable purpose.”  Id.  We also explained that the property owner had not presented any 
evidence that the property could not be used for other permitted uses under the present 
zoning, such as an apartment building, church, or synagogue.  Id. at 623–24. 
We distinguished this case from other cases, where we found that the expert 
testimony presented to the board, did, in fact, support a conclusion that the zoning action 
constituted a taking.  Id. at 624 (distinguishing City of Balt. v. Sapero, 230 Md. 291 (1962) 
(upholding a board’s determination of a taking where the overwhelming commercialization 
of the area was undisputed, including an adjacent service station and shopping area across 
from the lot), and Frankel v. City of Balt., 223 Md. 97, 103 (1960) (upholding the board’s 
determination of a taking where the expert opinion was supported by uncontroverted 
physical facts)).  We explained that “when the expert opinion testimony was not supported 
by substantial factual evidence, we have held that general claims of economic unfeasibility 
are not sufficient to prove an unconstitutional taking.”  Id.  Based upon our review of the 
evidence presented by the property owner, we held that “[o]n the record and the authorities, 
we find that the [landowner] has not sustained the burden of demonstrating that the present 
70 
zoning of her property and the refusal of the Board to allow an exception constitute an 
unconstitutional taking.”  Id. at 625. 
After considering and denying the property owner’s takings claim, the Court 
proceeded to consider whether the Board erred in denying the requested exception under 
the standards set forth in the Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance.  Id. at 625–27.  We held 
that the question of whether to grant or deny the exception was fairly debatable, and that 
the Board’s denial was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory.  Id. at 627.  We held 
that the trial court erred in reversing the Board’s action.  Id.   
Where a property owner asserts that the application of a zoning regulation will 
create a takings claim, Borinsky demonstrates how a landowner should present his or her 
evidence and legal arguments asserting an unconstitutional taking to the board of appeals, 
in addition to presenting evidence on the variance or special exception standards adopted 
by the local jurisdiction.  As part of the administrative agency proceeding, the landowner 
is required to submit evidence and testimony to satisfy his or her heavy burden that the 
application of the zoning regulation and the denial of a variance will deny the landowner 
all beneficial use of the property.  This evidence will necessarily include “substantial 
factual evidence” that there are no other permitted uses that can be made of the property, 
instead of “general claims of economic unfeasibility” which we have held “are not 
sufficient to prove an unconstitutional taking.”  Id. at 624.   
MRA claims that “no case has ever held that a landowner must bring its takings 
claim for just compensation in (as opposed to after) an administrative proceeding.”  MRA 
also argues that requiring MRA to present its takings evidence and arguments to the Board 
71 
of Appeals will interfere with its constitutional right to a jury trial because the Hearing 
Examiner and Board of Appeals are not empowered to award just compensation.  MRA 
contends that “only a jury may decide a takings claim under Article III, Section 40 of the 
Maryland Constitution.”  MRA’s argument is inconsistent with our wealth of exhaustion 
jurisprudence, which conclusively establishes the following. 
First, all constitutional claims arising out of the application of a zoning regulation 
must be exhausted at the administrative agency level before a court may consider the claims 
as part of a petition for judicial review or in a separate proceeding filed under the original 
jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., MRA III, 382 Md. at 361; Ray’s Used Cars, 398 Md. at 
651 (collecting cases); MRA II, 342 Md. at 492; Holiday Point Marina, 349 Md. at 199–
200 (collecting cases); Equitable Life, 339 Md. at 619; Hartman, 264 Md. at 323–25 
(collecting cases).  Our jurisprudence carves out no exception from this requirement for 
takings claims.  To the contrary, our case law requires that takings claims be raised in the 
administrative proceeding.  See Blumberg, 288 Md. at 293 (collecting cases). 
Second, as part of the administrative proceeding, the administrative agency has 
original jurisdiction to make the initial determination of whether the application of a zoning 
regulation to a property, and the denial of a variance to permit the use, will deprive the 
property owner of all beneficial use of the property.  See, e.g., Gingell, 249 Md. at 375; 
Poe, 241 Md. at 311; Borinsky, 239 Md. at 622–25; Bowman, 112 Md. App. at 698.19   
                                              
19 In rejecting the County’s assertion that MRA had not exhausted its administrative 
remedies, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 737 (1997).  See Md. Reclamation Assocs., 242 Md. App. at 144.  
The intermediate appellate court concluded that once MRA’s variance request was denied, 
72 
Third, where a property owner establishes before the administrative agency that the 
application of a zoning regulation will deprive the property owner of all beneficial use of 
its property, the administrative agency has the authority to grant relief in the form of a 
variance.  See Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 281; Holiday Point Marina, 349 Md. at 199.  If 
                                              
MRA’s takings claim became “justiciable” and quoted Suitum for the proposition that a 
takings claim is justiciable once “the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive 
position regarding how it will apply the regulations to the particular land in question.” Id. 
(quoting Suitum, 520 U.S. at 737).  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the 
County’s position was “final [] when the Board denied MRA’s requested variances in June 
2007.” Id. at 145.  We find Suitum to be inapposite to the exhaustion issue presented in this 
case.  In Suitum, the “sole question [was][] whether the claim [was] ripe for adjudication.” 
Id. at 729.  Ripeness and exhaustion of administrative remedies principles often overlap, 
but they are nonetheless distinct.  See Renaissance Centro Columbia, LLC v. Broida, 421 
Md. 474, 485–86 (2011); MRA II, 342 Md. at 502–06 (explaining the practical differences 
between exhaustion of administrative remedies and ripeness and concluding that a zoning 
ordinance does not deprive the landowner of any concrete property interests when the 
ordinance does not decide finally the permitted uses of a particular parcel of land).  In 
Suitum, the property owner’s takings claim arose from a planning agency’s determination 
that her property was ineligible for development under development regulations, but she 
was entitled to receive Transferable Development Rights (“TDRs”). Id. at 731.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the property owner’s takings claim 
was “final” because there was no question that the regulations applied to the property 
owner’s property, and because the agency had no discretion concerning how the 
regulations would be applied.  Id. at 739.  The Court noted that the regulations in question 
did “not provide for the variances and exceptions of conventional land use schemes” Id. at 
730, and that because the planning agency had no discretion as to how the regulations 
would be applied, the takings claim was final and ripe for adjudication. Id. at 739–40.  
Unlike the facts of Suitum, here, the Board had discretionary authority to grant a variance 
to alleviate a potentially unconstitutional taking. Moreover, under our exhaustion 
jurisprudence, the Board was required to make the initial determination of whether there 
were any other beneficial uses that could be make of the Property.  See Poe v. City of Balt., 
241 Md. 303, 311 (1966).  Although MRA sought a variance under the Harford County 
Code, it did not seek a variance to alleviate a takings claim, nor did it present evidence or 
argument that the denial of the variance would deprive it of all beneficial use of the 
Property.  These claims were required to be presented to the Board.  The Board was not 
able to consider these issues because MRA withheld these claims from the Board’s 
consideration.  
73 
the administrative agency grants this relief and permits the use by granting a variance, the 
property owner no longer has a takings claim and the right to alternative relief in the form 
of just compensation.   
Fourth, the fact that an administrative agency does not have the ability to award just 
compensation if a regulatory taking is established and relief in the form of a variance is not 
granted, does not negate the requirement that the landowner first address grievances 
through the Board of Appeals.  See Blumberg, 288 Md. at 292–93 (explaining that the 
property owner’s requirement to exhaust his administrative remedies was not excused 
where the Prince George’s County Board of Appeals only had the ability to grant partial 
relief over the alleged county violation and did not have the power to grant relief over the 
landowner’s assertion of error by the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission); Bits 
“N” Bytes Comput. Supplies, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 97 Md. App. 557, 
570 (1993) overruled on other grounds by Bell Atl. of Md., Inc. v. Intercom Sys. Corp., 366 
Md. 1, 28 (2001) (holding that the fact that the Public Service Commission was unable to 
grant money damages “does not necessarily mean that the agency lacks jurisdiction over 
the matter or that the administrative remedy need not be invoked and exhausted”) (internal 
citations omitted).   
Turning to MRA’s argument that our above-described exhaustion jurisprudence is 
inconsistent with MRA’s constitutional rights, MRA’s contention overstates the scope of 
its right to a jury trial.  Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution (often referred to as 
the “Just Compensation Clause”) provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall enact no Law 
authorizing private property to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as 
74 
agreed upon by the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party 
entitled to such compensation.”  The constitutional right to a jury under the Just 
Compensation Clause consists of a right to a jury determination of just compensation, 
nothing more.   
In The Maryland State Constitution, Judge Dan Friedman explains that in the 
context of a physical takings case arising under the Maryland Constitution, Article III, § 40, 
as well as takings claims arising under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, there are “four principal questions: (1) is there a ‘taking’?; (2) is it 
‘property’?; (3) is the taking for ‘public use’?; and (4) is ‘just compensation paid’?”  Dan 
Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution, at 181 (Oxford University Press 2011) 
(quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Principles and Policies, 504–05 (1997) 
(describing federal law)).  Judge Friedman notes that “[u]nlike the first three issues, which 
are decided by the court, just compensation is a jury issue.”  Id. (emphasis added) (citing 
J.L. Mathews, Inc. v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 368 Md. 71, 88 (2002) 
(“In a condemnation case, a jury is responsible for determining the amount of just 
compensation due to the property owner, while issues relating to other possible elements, 
such as the right to condemn, public purpose, or necessity, are exclusively for the judge.”)).  
Just as the only issue presented to a jury in a condemnation or physical takings case 
is the issue of just compensation after a judicial determination that a taking has occurred, 
the same principles control here.  Applying our decades of exhaustion jurisprudence 
involving assertions of unconstitutional takings in the context of the application of zoning 
regulations, MRA had a constitutional right to a determination of just compensation by a 
75 
jury under the Just Compensation Clause, Article III, § 40, only after MRA raised all its 
constitutional challenges to the application of a zoning regulation within the Board of 
Appeals proceeding, including the assertion that the denial of a variance will deny MRA 
of all beneficial use of its Property.  In the context of a claim asserting an unconstitutional 
taking of property arising from the application of a zoning regulation, a court is only 
permitted to consider the claim after the zoning agency makes an initial factual 
determination of whether the property owner has been denied all beneficial use of its 
property.20   
 
Finally, MRA argues that if the above sequence is followed, and MRA is required 
to submit its constitutional takings claim to the Board of Appeals as part of its exhaustion 
of administrative remedies, a takings claim arising from the application of a zoning 
regulation would never get to a jury.  To be sure, such cases will be rare, given: (1) the 
very steep burden a landowner bears to demonstrate that application of a zoning regulation 
and associated denial of a variance to permit a particular use of a property will deny the 
                                              
20 In its brief and at oral argument, MRA advanced a “procedural chaos” theory, 
asserting that if a court finally adjudicated all of MRA’s claims as part of a judicial review 
proceeding, it could result in an unfair application of res judicata with respect to any 
separate takings claim filed under the court’s original jurisdiction. MRA’s theory is 
premised on its incorrect assumption that it has a right to a jury determination of the factual 
question of whether a government taking has occurred.  As set forth supra, in zoning 
regulations cases, the Board has original jurisdiction to make the initial factual 
determination of whether an unconstitutional taking has been established.  Such a factual 
determination is not within the province of a jury.  Accordingly, a circuit court’s 
simultaneous consideration of a petition for judicial review and a takings claim will not 
lead to the improper application of res judicata, or otherwise interfere with a property 
owner’s right to a jury determination of just compensation after a judicial determination of 
whether the property owner established a compensable taking before the Board of Appeals.  
See City of Balt. v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 622 (1965).   
76 
landowner of all beneficial use of a property; and (2) the administrative agency’s ability to 
grant relief in the form of a variance if an unconstitutional taking is established.  However, 
as demonstrated below, it is possible.  
The Application of the Exhaustion Doctrine to Constitutional Claims Arising from the 
Application of a Zoning Regulation —A Road Map 
 
We demonstrate below the procedural path that MRA should have followed under 
our exhaustion jurisprudence, including our holdings in MRA II and MRA III, to highlight 
the correct means for challenging the application of Bill 91-10, against the complicated 
procedural morass created by MRA in its 30 years of litigation. 
After Harford County adopted Bill 91-10, in 1991, MRA should have presented all 
its evidence and legal arguments to the Board of Appeals.  In either parallel or successive 
proceedings before the Board, MRA could have: (1) appealed the Zoning Administrator’s 
determination that Bill 91-10 applied to its property; and (2) applied for a variance, seeking 
relief from the provisions of Bill 91-10.21  As part of either one parallel or two successive 
                                              
21 This is precisely the format that Judge Harrell outlined in MRA III, when the Court 
rejected MRA’s argument that exhaustion principles should permit a “two-step process” 
by which MRA “may pursue in turn judicial review of each discrete adverse decision.”  
382 Md. at 363.  MRA argued that it should be permitted to have judicial review of the 
Zoning Administrator’s decision, and, if it was adversely decided against MRA, then seek 
a variance.  Id.  We rejected this “inefficient and piecemeal approach.”  Id.  We explained 
that the right to seek a zoning interpretation and zoning certificate from the Zoning 
Administrator, and, if denied, the right to seek a variance “are two parallel or successive 
remedies to be exhausted, not optional selections on an a la carte menu of administrative 
remedies from which MRA may select as it pleases. Once both administrative remedies are 
pursued to completion, MRA, if still feeling itself aggrieved, may pursue judicial review 
of the County agencies’ adverse actions.”  Id. at 363–64 (emphasis added) (internal 
citations omitted).   
77 
proceedings before the Board, MRA could have raised all (instead of some of) its 
constitutional arguments before the Board of Appeals.   
Once the Board denied MRA’s claims and upheld the Zoning Administrator’s 
determination, MRA should have then pursued its variance application, presenting 
evidence and arguments not only on the variance standards set forth in the Harford County 
Code, but also presenting its evidence and legal arguments on its constitutional takings 
claim—that the denial of a variance would deprive MRA of all beneficial use of its 
Property.   
The Board of Appeals was the administrative agency charged with making the initial 
factual determination of whether there were other beneficial uses that could be made of 
MRA’s Property under the Harford County Code, and whether the denial of the variances, 
would, in fact, create a condition under which there was no other beneficial use that could 
have been made of the Property under the zoning regulations.  Utilizing its zoning 
expertise, the Hearing Examiner and Board would have been able to consider all of the 
evidence in the context of the applicable zoning regulations, and make findings of fact 
regarding what, if any, reasonable and beneficial uses could have been made of the Property 
other than a rubble landfill.   
Had MRA presented substantial evidence to the Board that a variance was required 
because a rubble landfill was the only beneficial use that could be made of its Property 
under the Harford County Code, and the Board agreed, the Board had the authority to grant 
relief from a potential unconstitutional taking by granting a variance to enable the Property 
to be used as a rubble landfill.  In granting such relief, the Board also had the authority to 
78 
establish any reasonable restrictions or conditions in connection with the use to mitigate 
any adverse impacts on surrounding properties.  If the variance was granted on that basis, 
MRA would have been entitled to operate a rubble landfill, and it would not have been 
necessary for MRA to seek further judicial review.   
If, on the other hand, the Board had made factual findings based upon substantial 
evidence that there were other beneficial and reasonable uses that could be made of the 
Property, and consequently, no taking had occurred, MRA would have had the right to 
appeal this determination to the circuit court, and ultimately, the appellate courts.  See Poe, 
241 Md. at 311.  The court could then determine whether the Board’s factual 
determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and whether the Board applied the 
correct legal standards, with the benefit of a fully developed record of the evidentiary 
hearing.  Id. 
If the court determined that there was substantial factual evidence of other beneficial 
uses that could be made of the Property under the Harford County Zoning Code, MRA 
would not have established a taking, and would not have been entitled to a determination 
by a jury on the issue of just compensation.   
If, however, the court determined that MRA had satisfied its burden of 
demonstrating that there were no other beneficial uses that could be made of its Property 
under the Harford County Zoning Code, and that the application of Bill 91-10 would create 
a taking of MRA’s Property, the court could reverse and remand the case to the Board with 
instructions that the Board consider granting a variance to allow the use.  See Belvoir 
Farms, 355 Md. at 271–72 (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, courts cannot either grant or deny 
79 
variances[,]” and in circumstances where the court would have the power to overrule the 
denial of a variance, “it would have to remand the matter to the agency for further 
consideration using the proper standard”).   
If the court remanded the case to the Board for consideration of the application of a 
variance after a judicial determination that MRA had established a taking, the variance 
could be granted.  Utilizing its zoning expertise, the Board would have the ability to 
establish reasonable conditions to limit any adverse effects that the operation would have 
on adjacent or nearby properties.  If the Board granted the variance relief to permit the 
Property’s use as a rubble landfill, MRA would no longer have a takings claim for just 
compensation arising under Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution.  
If, however, the Board determined that the site is simply not suitable for a rubble 
landfill, and declined to grant the variance, MRA would then have the right to proceed with 
a jury determination of just compensation of its Property under the Just Compensation 
Clause, Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution.  In other words, simply because the 
Board has the authority to alleviate what would otherwise be an unconstitutional taking by 
granting a variance, it is not required to grant it.   
Indeed, there may be instances in which, when faced with a takings claim, a local 
jurisdiction reasonably determines that a particular land use creates such a conflict with 
adjacent uses or other legitimate land planning objectives, that it does not want to permit a 
land use through the application of a variance at that particular location.  In such an 
instance—where a taking is established by the application of a zoning regulation (i.e. a 
factual determination is made that there is no other beneficial use that can be made of the 
80 
property)—and the administrative agency declines to grant a variance for reasons such as 
competing land use conflicts, a governmental taking will have been established.  The matter 
of just compensation can then be submitted to a jury under Article III, § 40 of the Maryland 
Constitution.22    
III. 
 CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that MRA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by withholding its 
takings claim from consideration by the Board of Appeals when it applied for a variance 
from the strict application of Bill 91-10 to its Property.  Under our exhaustion 
jurisprudence, all constitutional claims arising from the application of a zoning regulation 
to a property must be presented as part of the administrative agency proceeding.  There is 
no exception to this requirement for takings claims.  Under our established case law 
applicable to takings claims arising from the application of zoning regulation, the initial 
factual determination of whether there are additional beneficial uses that can be made under 
a zoning ordinance is made by the zoning administrative agency—the Board of Appeals in 
this case.  The Board has the authority to grant relief in the form of a variance where the 
property owner can establish an unconstitutional taking arising from the application of the 
zoning regulation.  It was error for MRA to circumvent the Board of Appeals’ original 
                                              
22 Although we do not reach the statute of limitations question given our holding 
that MRA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, we agree with the Court of Special 
Appeals’ well-reasoned analysis on that issue.  Specifically, we agree with the Court of 
Special Appeals that our holding in Arroyo v. Board of Education of Howard County, 381 
Md. 646 (2004) controls.  Had MRA presented its takings claim within the variance 
proceeding, under Arroyo, the three-year statute of limitations would have commenced 
from the date that the Board of Appeals issued its final decision denying MRA’s variance 
in June 2007.   
81 
jurisdiction by withholding its takings claim and presenting such a claim to a jury in a 
separate judicial proceeding.  Because MRA had not exhausted its administrative remedies, 
the instant case should have been dismissed.  
 
  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.  
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE 
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE 
PAID BY PETITIONER.