Title: City of Kansas City v. Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC95368 
 
) 
KANSAS CITY BOARD OF ELECTION ) 
COMMISSIONERS, ET AL., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Defendants, 
) 
 
 
) 
REV. SAMUEL E. MANN, ET AL., 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellants. 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Justine E. Del Muro, Judge 
 
The City of Kansas City (the “City”) filed this action seeking to have the trial 
court order the Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners and other local election 
authorities serving the City (collectively, the “Local Election Authorities”) to remove 
from the November 3, 2015, ballot a proposed ordinance establishing a minimum wage 
for Kansas City.  The City claims that the ordinance – if enacted – would contradict a 
state statute.  Reverend Samuel Mann and other individuals (collectively, the 
“Committee”) had proposed this ordinance using the initiative petition provisions of the 
Kansas City Charter.  The Committee intervened in the City’s action to argue that the 
Opinion issued January 17, 2017
 
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proposal should remain on the ballot and now appeals the trial court’s judgment ordering 
that the measure be removed.  The Committee claims that the statute cited by the City is 
unconstitutional.  This Court has jurisdiction over the Committee’s appeal under article 
V, section 3, of the Missouri Constitution.  The trial court’s judgment is reversed on the 
ground that the City’s claim and the Committee’s claim are premature.  Accordingly, the 
City is ordered to take all steps necessary to have the Committee’s proposed ordinance 
placed before City voters in accordance with the City Charter. 
Background 
 
Utilizing the initiative petition process set forth in the City Charter, the Committee 
gathered signatures for a proposed ordinance establishing a minimum wage for Kansas 
City and submitted that proposal to the Kansas City Council (the “City Council”).  See 
Kansas City Charter §§ 701-02.  When the City Council failed to adopt the proposed 
ordinance, the Committee exercised its right under the Charter to insist that the proposal 
be submitted to City voters.  Id. §§ 702-03.  On August 20, 2015, the City Council 
directed the city clerk to give notice to the Local Election Authorities that the proposed 
minimum wage ordinance should be submitted to City voters on November 3, 2015, at a 
special election to be called for that purpose. 
 
On September 18, 2015, the City filed a “Petition for Removal of a Ballot 
Question Pursuant to § 115.127.3 [RSMo Supp. 2013],” seeking a court order directing 
the Local Election Authorities to remove the proposed minimum wage ordinance from 
the ballot.  In support of this petition, the City argued that – if adopted – the proposed 
 
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ordinance would be invalid because it would conflict with section 285.055,1 which 
prohibits local governments from enacting (after August 28, 2015) local minimum wage 
requirements greater than those imposed by state and federal laws.  The validity of the 
proposed minimum wage ordinance under section 285.055 is the sole basis asserted in the 
City’s petition for removing the proposal from the ballot. 
On September 22, the Committee sought and was granted leave to intervene.  In its 
answer, the Committee asserted an affirmative defense that section 285.055 would not 
render the minimum wage ordinance (assuming the voters approved it) invalid because 
House Bill 722, by which the General Assembly had enacted section 285.055, was 
unconstitutional.  On September 24, a bench trial was held.  Because the facts were not 
disputed, the proceedings focused on the parties’ legal arguments. 
The City argued that, if the local minimum wage proposal were approved by City 
voters, the resulting ordinance would be invalid because it would conflict with section 
285.055.  The Committee responded that section 285.055 is invalid – not the proposed 
minimum wage ordinance – because section 285.055 was enacted as part of House 
Bill 722, which it claims violated the single subject and clear title requirements (and the 
change of purpose prohibition) in article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri 
Constitution.  But the Committee argued that the trial court should reject the City’s 
petition without reaching the Committee’s constitutional challenge to section 285.055 
because that challenge, and the City’s challenge to the validity of the proposed minimum 
                                              
1   Section 285.055 took effect following the General Assembly’s override of the governor’s veto 
of House Bill 722 (2016). 
 
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wage ordinance, are not ripe unless and until the City voters approve that ordinance.  
Only then, the Committee argued, would it be proper for a court to consider whether the 
ordinance was preempted by section 285.055 and whether section 285.055 had been 
enacted in violation of the various bill passage requirements in the Missouri Constitution. 
On September 22, the trial court entered judgment for the City.  The trial court 
declared that the proposed minimum wage ordinance “is inconsistent with [section 
285.055] and is therefore unconstitutional, on its face.  See, Missouri Constitution, article 
VI, § 19(a).”2  Accordingly, the trial court ordered the Local Election Authorities to 
“strike or remove [the proposed minimum wage ordinance] from the November 3, 2015, 
ballot[.]”  The Committee timely appeals. 
Analysis 
I.  
This Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
 
Under article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity of a state statute.  The Committee  
contends that its appeal is properly before this Court because it timely and properly raised 
a constitutional challenge to the validity of section 285.055 in its answer.  The City 
concedes that the Committee properly raised a constitutional challenge to the validity of 
                                              
2   The trial court’s judgment also declares that the proposed ordinance (if approved by the 
voters) would conflict with section 67.1571, RSMo 2000, which provides:  “No municipality … 
shall establish, mandate or otherwise require a minimum wage that exceeds the state minimum 
wage.”  But the City did not invoke this statute in its petition, and the Committee did not 
challenge the constitutionality of this statute in its answer.  More importantly, as explained 
below, even if section 67.1571 had been asserted by the City and challenged by the Committee, 
those issues – like the issues relating to section 285.055 – are premature unless and until the 
City’s voters approve the proposed ordinance. 
 
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section 285.055 as an affirmative defense but argues that this Court does not have 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction because the trial court did not explicitly address the 
Committee’s challenge in its judgment. 
The City is correct that the trial court did not explicitly address and reject the 
Committee’s affirmative defense in its judgment.  But, by entering judgment for the City, 
the trial court is deemed to have reached – and rejected – the Committee’s affirmative 
defenses, including its defense that section 285.055 was unconstitutional.  See State ex 
rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Wiggins, 454 S.W.2d 899, 901-02 (Mo. banc 1970) 
(holding that “in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a general judgment for one 
party involves a finding in that party’s favor on all issues properly before the court”).  
Therefore, this case properly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court.  
Boeving v. Kander, 496 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Mo. banc 2016) (“[W]here any party properly 
raises and preserves in the trial court a real and substantial (as opposed to merely 
colorable) claim that a statute is unconstitutional, this Court has exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over any appeal in which that claim may need to be resolved.”).  The fact that 
this Court does not, in resolving the appeal, reach the merits of the Committee’s 
constitutional claim does not remove its appeal from this Court’s exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction.  Id.  
II. 
Substantive challenges to the validity of the proposed ordinance  
are premature 
 
Even though the Committee raised a constitutional challenge to the validity of 
section 285.055 in the trial court, it argues here, as it did below, that it was premature for 
 
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the trial court to address either: (a) the City’s argument that the proposed minimum wage 
ordinance would – if approved by the voters – be invalid because it would conflict with 
section 285.055; or (b) the Committee’s argument that section 285.055 is invalid because 
House Bill 722 (which enacted section 285.055) violated article III, sections 21 and 23 of 
the Missouri Constitution.  Instead, the Committee contends that both of these arguments 
must remain hypothetical – and, therefore, any judicial ruling on them would be merely 
advisory – unless and until the proposed ordinance is submitted to and approved by the 
City voters.  If the voters reject the proposed minimum wage ordinance, these arguments 
never will need to be addressed.  On the other hand, if the voters approve the proposal, a 
party with proper standing can then sue to enjoin its operation on the ground that the 
ordinance is invalid under section 285.055, and the City (or proper intervenor) can then 
assert that section 285.055 – not the new ordinance – is invalid because House Bill 722 
was enacted in violation of article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution.   
To support its argument that preelection substantive challenges are premature, the 
Committee relies upon State ex rel. Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1983).  
There, this Court refused to consider preelection constitutional challenges to the 
substance of a proposed amendment to a city charter because it “could effectively enjoin 
the amendment from being placed on the ballot because of conjecture that it would be 
found unconstitutional if passed and adopted by the voters.”  Id. at 8.  In response, the 
City contends that substantive challenges to a ballot proposition can be litigated prior to 
the election if the substantive defect – here, the conflict with section 285.055 – is clear on 
the face of the initiative proposal.  See Craighead v. City of Jefferson, 898 S.W.2d 543, 
 
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545 (Mo. banc 1995) (Preelection substantive challenges are proper where the issue of 
law raised is “so clear or settled as to constitute matters of form.”).  
In Boeving, however, this Court rejected the approach exemplified by Craighead 
and adopted a bright-line test prohibiting preelection challenges to what a ballot proposal 
would do, if approved by the voters.  Instead, after Boeving, preelection challenges are 
limited to claims that the procedures for submitting a proposal to the voters were not 
followed.  Boeving, 496 S.W.3d at 511 (quoting Brown v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637, 
645 (Mo. banc 2012) (“[T]his Court [will not] issue an advisory opinion as to whether a 
particular proposal, if adopted, would violate a superseding law of this state or the United 
States Constitution.”) (emphasis omitted), and Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 
12 (Mo. banc 1981) (“[A]t no place in either the Missouri Constitution or in the 
implementing statutes is any court granted the power to enjoin an amendment from being 
placed on the ballot upon the ground that it would be unconstitutional if passed and 
adopted by the voters.”)).   
This Court should no more presume that the people will pass an 
unconstitutional measure than that their general assembly would do so but, 
where such issues arise with respect to a law enacted by the general 
assembly, they are given the full benefit and careful consideration that strict 
enforcement of issues such as ripeness and standing can produce, and only 
after (and if) it is enacted. Measures enacted through the initiative process 
deserve no less. To do otherwise is to “sacrifice the democratic process to 
the interest of judicial economy.” 
 
Boeving, 496 S.W.3d at 511 n.8 (quoting Dahl, 661 S.W.2d at 8). 
There is no reason to adopt a different approach where the ballot measure 
concerns a proposed local ordinance or charter amendment rather than a proposed state 
 
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statute or constitutional amendment.  Courts should no more prohibit City voters from 
considering this proposed minimum wage ordinance on the ground that it would (if 
approved) conflict with section 285.055 than they should enjoin the City Council from 
considering a bill addressing the same subject.  Instead, in both cases, the proper course is 
to wait and see if the proposal is enacted before considering challenges to an ordinance’s 
substance or effect. 
The City does not contend that the Committee failed to meet all of the procedural 
requirements imposed by the City Charter for putting a proposed ordinance before the 
City voters by initiative petition.  The City does not challenge the form of the 
Committee’s petition, the sufficiency of the signatures gathered, the procedure used to 
submit the proposal to the City Council for its consideration, or the Committee’s election 
to place its proposal before the City voters rather than accept the alternative approved by 
the City Council.  Because all of the Charter’s initiative petition provisions were followed 
(or, at least, because the City raised no challenges with respect to the Committee’s 
compliance with them), there is no basis on which a court may prohibit the City voters 
from considering the proposed minimum wage ordinance.  Challenges as to whether that 
ordinance – if approved by the voters – would be invalid under section 285.055, as well 
as constitutional challenges to the validity of section 285.055 itself, remain hypothetical 
unless and until the voters have adopted the measure.  Then, but only then, may courts 
entertain such challenges. 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the 
City is ordered to take all steps necessary to have the Committee’s proposed ordinance 
placed before City voters in accordance with the City Charter. 
 
 
  
 
_____________________________    
 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
 
 
 
Breckenridge, C.J., Fischer, Stith, Draper and Russell, JJ., concur.