Title: State v. Hoffman

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 313A97
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOHNATHON GREGORY HOFFMAN
Appeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a
judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Helms (William
H.), J., on 14 November 1996 in Superior Court, Union County,
upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree
murder.  Defendant's motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to
an additional judgment was allowed 5 December 1997.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 26 May 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Mary D.
Winstead, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Staples Hughes,
Staff Attorney, for defendant-appellant.
WHICHARD, Justice.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show that
between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on 27 November 1995, defendant entered
a jewelry store in Marshville, North Carolina, wearing a ski mask
and carrying a sawed-off shotgun.  Danny Cook, the victim, was
behind the store's display counter when he saw defendant enter. 
When defendant entered, the victim told two customers in the
store to get down.  Defendant shot the victim in the chest from a
distance of about three feet.  Defendant then broke three glass
display cases and took various items of jewelry, including some
gold rings and necklaces.  Defendant also stole two pistols.
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On 22 January 1996 defendant was indicted for the
first-degree murder of Danny Cook and robbery with a dangerous
weapon.  Defendant was tried capitally, and the jury returned
verdicts finding him guilty of robbery with a firearm and first-
degree murder on the theory of premeditation and deliberation and
under the felony murder rule.  Following a capital sentencing
proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended
that defendant be sentenced to death.  The trial court sentenced
defendant accordingly and further sentenced him to 101 to 131
months’ imprisonment for the robbery with a firearm conviction.
Defendant presents fourteen issues for review.  Because
we find Batson error in the selection of defendant's jury, we
discuss only that issue.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by overruling
his objections to the State's use of peremptory challenges to
remove four black prospective jurors from the venire.  Defendant
argued to the trial court that the peremptory challenges were
racially motivated in violation of the equal protection
principles recognized in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
A three-step process has been
established for evaluating claims of racial
discrimination in the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges.  First, defendant must
establish a prima facie case that the
peremptory challenge was exercised on the
basis of race.  Second, if such a showing is
made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
offer a racially neutral explanation to rebut
defendant's prima facie case.  Third, the
trial court must determine whether the
defendant has proven purposeful
discrimination.
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State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 307-08, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560
(1997) (citations omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 873 (1998).  Here, each time defendant objected to the
State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove a black
prospective juror from the venire, the trial court ruled that
defendant had not made a prima facie showing of discrimination. 
Therefore, the trial court did not proceed to either step two or
step three of the Batson analysis.  We must decide whether the
trial court erred when it concluded that defendant had not made a
prima facie showing of discrimination.
Several factors are relevant to this determination.  
Those factors include the defendant's race,
the victim's race, the race of the key
witnesses, questions and statements of the
prosecutor which tend to support or refute an
inference of discrimination, repeated use of
peremptory challenges against blacks such
that it tends to establish a pattern of
strikes against blacks in the venire, the
prosecution's use of a disproportionate
number of peremptory challenges to strike
black jurors in a single case, and the
State's acceptance rate of potential black
jurors.
State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 145, 462 S.E.2d 186, 189 (1995). 
In addition "the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’"  Batson, 476
U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559, 562, 97 L. Ed. 1244, 1247-48 (1953)).
The first black prospective juror questioned by the
State was Loma Mungo.  She was excused for cause based on her
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opposition to the death penalty.  Letitia Brown was the second. 
She was peremptorily challenged by the State.  Defendant objected 
on Batson grounds, arguing that defendant was black, this
prospective juror was black, and the victim was white.  Defendant
also pointed out that of the first thirty veniremen to be called,
only two were black, and both were excused -- one for cause, and
the other peremptorily.  Defendant further argued that the
State's questioning of prospective juror Brown differed from that
of the other prospective jurors by focusing on her extended
family.
The trial court ruled that defendant had not made a
prima facie showing of racial discrimination.  It stated that the
questions concerning Brown's extended family were appropriate
because she stated that she lived with her grandmother.  The
court also stated that no pattern of peremptory challenges
against black prospective jurors had been established. 
This Court has considered similar situations.  In State
v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357 (1998), the Court noted
that "[d]efendant has shown only that he is black and that the
State peremptorily struck one black prospective juror."  Id. at
462, 496 S.E.2d at 362.  The Court held that "[t]his is
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination."  Id.  Likewise, in Quick we held that the
State's peremptory excusal of two of four black prospective
jurors was insufficient to establish a prima facie case.  Quick,
341 N.C. at 146, 462 S.E.2d at 189.  This was so even though the
defendant in Quick was black and the victims were white.  Id. 
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When prospective juror Brown was peremptorily challenged here,
defendant had shown only that he was black, the victim was white,
and the State had peremptorily challenged a single black
prospective juror.  As in Smith and Quick, this does not rise to
the level of a prima facie case of discrimination.  The trial
court thus did not err with regard to prospective juror Brown.
Defendant argues that because the trial court also
asked the State to articulate its reasons for excusing Brown for
the record, step one of the Batson analysis became moot, and the
trial court was required to determine whether the reasons offered
by the State were race neutral.  We disagree.  This Court has
explained:
If the prosecutor volunteers his reasons for
the peremptory challenges in question before
the trial court rules whether the defendant
has made a prima facie showing or if the
trial court requires the prosecutor to give
his reasons without ruling on the question of
a prima facie showing, the question of
whether the defendant has made a prima facie
showing becomes moot, and it becomes the
responsibility of the trial court to make
appropriate findings on whether the stated
reasons are a credible, nondiscriminatory
basis for the challenges or simply pretext.
That rule does not apply in this case
because the trial court made a ruling that
defendant failed to make a prima facie
showing before the prosecutor articulated his
reasons for the peremptory challenges. . . . 
Thus, our review is limited to whether the
trial court erred in finding that defendant
failed to make a prima facie showing.
State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 359, 471 S.E.2d 379, 386-87
(1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1997).  Here, the trial court
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clearly ruled there had been no prima facie showing of
discriminatory intent before the State articulated its reasons. 
Because we have concluded that the trial court's ruling was not
erroneous, we do not consider whether the State offered proper,
race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenge.
The next black prospective juror to be questioned by
the State was Josephine McLemire.  After questioning, the State
expressed its satisfaction with her and passed the panel to
defendant for questioning.  Before defendant finished questioning
the prospective jurors in McLemire's panel, the court excused the
prospective jurors and adjourned for the day.  Defendant
continued his questioning of these jurors the next day.  When
defendant asked McLemire how long she had held her belief in
favor of the death penalty, she replied, "Well, I really don't
believe in it.  I slept on it last night and I'm still
undecided."  After a period of questioning by defendant, the
State, and the trial court, McLemire, the third black prospective
juror, was excused for cause.
The fourth black prospective juror, Anita Cox, was
peremptorily challenged by the State.  This was the State's
second peremptory challenge of a black prospective juror. 
Defendant objected on Batson grounds, arguing that the peremptory
excusal of two out of four black prospective jurors established a
pattern tending to show discriminatory intent.  The trial court
ruled that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of
discrimination in the State's use of its peremptory challenges. 
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The court noted that no pattern had been established, the State's
selection of jurors was being done in a racially neutral manner,
and the State had previously passed a black prospective juror,
McLemire, to defendant for questioning.  
This situation is similar to State v. Quick, 341 N.C.
141, 462 S.E.2d 186, where two of four black prospective jurors
were peremptorily excused by the State.  The cases differ,
however, because the two black prospective jurors passed by the
State in Quick actually served, id. at 146, 462 S.E.2d at 189,
while the two black prospective jurors not peremptorily
challenged by the State here were excused for cause.  In its
consideration of defendant's arguments, the trial court here
appropriately noted that the State had originally expressed its
satisfaction with one of these prospective jurors by passing the
panel to defendant for questioning.  This prospective juror,
Anita Cox, also stated that she had been represented by
defendant's trial counsel on two previous occasions.  Thus, the
State may have feared a bias in favor of defendant.  Taking all
of these matters into consideration, we hold that the trial court
did not err when it ruled that defendant had failed to make the
requisite prima facie showing at this juncture.  
In his brief, defendant states that "apparently" the
fifth black prospective juror was excused for cause.  The record
is not clear as to whether this is an accurate statement.  For
purposes of our analysis, however, it is irrelevant.
The next black prospective juror to be peremptorily
challenged by the State was James Rorie.  At this point, eleven
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jurors, all white, had been seated.  Defendant objected on Batson
grounds, arguing that Rorie was the last black veniremen in the
original pool and that the State had no reason to excuse him
except race.  The trial court observed that "[a]ll of the
questions to all of the jurors exhibited primarily the same sorts
and types of questions" and ruled that "[t]here's been no prima
facie showing that the juror has been selected . . . in any other
than a racially neutral manner."  We disagree.
At this point eleven white jurors had been seated in a
case involving a black defendant and a white victim.  The State
had peremptorily challenged every black juror who was not excused
for cause, for a total of three peremptory challenges against
black prospective jurors, or one-quarter of the total number of
seats in the jury.  Step one of the Batson analysis, a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination, is not intended to be a
high hurdle for defendants to cross.  Rather, the showing need
only be sufficient to shift the burden to the State to articulate
race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenge.  That too is
not a heavy burden.  The State’s race-neutral explanation need
not be persuasive or even plausible; it will be deemed
race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in it. 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 839
(1995).  We therefore hold that the trial court erred as a matter
of law when it ruled that defendant had failed to make a prima
facie showing that the State's peremptory challenge of
prospective juror Rorie was exercised on the basis of race.
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The next black venireman to be considered was Lori
Black.  She was peremptorily challenged by the State during the
selection of the two alternate jurors.  Again, defendant objected
on Batson grounds, arguing that the State had excused every black
prospective juror and that there were no racially neutral reasons
for excluding this prospective juror.  In response, the State
contended that defendant had not made a prima facie showing.  The
trial court stated, "they're getting close," but ultimately ruled
that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing.  For the
reasons stated above, this too was error as a matter of law.
Each time the trial court ruled that defendant had
failed to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination,
the court, in an attempt to facilitate appellate review, had the
State articulate for the record its reasons for challenging the
prospective juror.  For reasons hereinafter stated, however, this
does not obviate the need for a remand.  
First, we have stated that "[w]hether the prosecutor
intended to discriminate against the members of a race is a
question of fact," and as a result "the trial court's ruling
. . . must be accorded great deference by a reviewing court." 
State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 104, 468 S.E.2d 46, 48, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996).  This is because
"often there will be little evidence except the statement of the
prosecutor, and the demeanor of the prosecutor can be the
determining factor.  The presiding judge is best able to
determine the credibility of the prosecutor."  Id.  Thus, we must
leave this question of fact for the trial court.  Second, we have
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held that when a trial court makes "a ruling that defendant
failed to make a prima facie showing before the prosecutor
articulated his reasons for the peremptory challenges . . .[,]
our review is limited to whether the trial court erred in finding
that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing."  Williams,
343 N.C. at 359, 471 S.E.2d at 386-87.  We do not proceed to step
two of the Batson analysis when the trial court has not done so. 
Finally, although the State was given an opportunity to
articulate its reasons for its peremptory challenges, defendant
was not given an opportunity to respond.  Defendant must be
accorded this opportunity; we have held that "[t]he defendant
. . . has a right of surrebuttal to show that the explanations
are pretextual."  State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176, 472
S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996).
Accordingly, we remand the case to the Superior Court,
Union County, for a hearing on the Batson issue with regard to
prospective jurors James Rorie and Lori Black.  The trial court
is directed to hold this hearing, make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and certify its order to this Court within
sixty days of the filing date of this opinion.  We shall then
pass upon defendant's other assignments of error if it remains
necessary to do so.
REMANDED.