Title: PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN V ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
ex rel WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR,  
Plaintiff,  
v 
No. 117689  
$176,598.00 UNITED STATES 
CURRENCY, MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS, 
THREE (3) FIREARMS, ONE (1) SAFE, 
AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF JEWELRY,  
Defendants,  
and  
NATHANIEL WILSON,  
Claimant-Appellee,  
v  
CITY OF DETROIT,  
Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
The issue raised in this appeal is whether statutory  
interest under MCL 600.6013 is owed when money that was the  
subject of a forfeiture proceeding under the controlled  
substances laws is ordered returned to the owner. The Court  
of Appeals held that statutory interest must be paid.  
We conclude that money ordered returned to its owner  
under the forfeiture procedure does not constitute a “money  
judgment recovered in a civil action,” and thus statutory  
interest is not payable.  
I  
In December 1986, Detroit police officers responded to a  
residential security alarm and entered the home of Nathaniel  
Wilson on Corbett Street on the suspicion that a burglary was  
in progress.  The officers found no intruders, but they did  
find $167,480 in cash.  Circumstances suggested that the money  
may have been related to drug trafficking.  It was taken to  
the police station, and dogs trained to detect controlled  
substances indicated the presence of such scent on the  
currency.  
The Wayne County Prosecutor brought a civil forfeiture  
action for the funds, as well as for $9,118 in cash that had  
been seized earlier from another house (on Chalmers Street)  
occupied by Wilson.  Wilson defended and asked that the money  
be returned to him.  
A bench trial followed, and the circuit court ordered the  
forfeiture. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding  
that the search of the house on Corbett had been illegal, and  
2  
 
   
that 
forfeiture 
proceedings 
regarding 
the 
property 
seized 
from  
the house on Chalmers had not been properly instituted.1  
However, we granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to  
appeal, and reversed, holding that the entry and search of the  
Corbett residence without a warrant2 was lawful because it was  
supported by probable cause and occurred under exigent  
circumstances.3
 We remanded to the Court of Appeals for  
further proceedings.  
On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the order  
of forfeiture, holding that the police had exceeded the scope  
of their authority by searching a trunk where most of the  
money was found.4  We denied leave to appeal.5  
Having prevailed in the forfeiture proceeding, Wilson  
brought a motion for return of the money, and asked for an  
award of statutory judgment interest.  There was some delay  
because of liens filed by the United States government and the  
Michigan Department of Treasury.6  Following a hearing, the  
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 7, 1991 
(Docket No. 101884).  
2 The prosecutor had not appealed the Court of Appeals 
ruling regarding the $9,118 seized from the house on Chalmers.  
3 443 Mich 261; 505 NW2d 201 (1993).  
4  (On Remand), unpublished opinion per curiam, issued 
May 23, 1994 (Docket No. 168073).  
5 447 Mich 980; 525 NW2d 451 (1994).  
6 
  Wilson had been sentenced to federal prison on a 1991 
drug conviction.  The United States lien was filed to recover  
3  
Wayne Circuit Court entered an order on February 25, 1997,  
requiring the city of Detroit to return the money involved in  
the forfeiture action, but denying Wilson’s claim for  
statutory judgment interest.  
Wilson filed a delayed application for leave to appeal,  
which the Court of Appeals granted.  It then reversed, holding  
that the decree directing return of the funds was a money  
judgment in a civil action, entitling Wilson to interest under  
§ 6013(1).  It directed the circuit court to calculate the  
amount of interest, explaining that interest should not be  
awarded for those periods of delay in the forfeiture  
proceeding that were not attributable to the city.7  
The city of Detroit has filed an application for leave to  
appeal to this Court.  
II  
Whether RJA § 6013 applies in the circumstances of this  
case is a question of statutory interpretation, which we  
review de novo. Brown v Michigan Health Care Corp, 463 Mich  
368, 374; 617 NW2d 301 (2000); Sands Appliance Services, Inc  
v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 238; 615 NW2d 241 (2000).  
the costs of his incarceration.  Eventually, $102,911.21 of 
the money was paid to the U.S. government.  The Michigan 
Department of Treasury’s lien concerned Wilson’s lawyer.  The  
Treasury sought a portion of the attorney fee to help satisfy 
a tax judgment against him, and $5,000 from the fund was paid 
to the state on that judgment.  
7 242 Mich App 342; 618 NW2d 922 (2000).  
4  
III  
RJA § 6013(1) provides that “[i]nterest shall be allowed  
on a money judgment recovered in a civil action,” as provided  
in that section.8  For the purpose of the judgment interest  
statute, a money judgment is one that orders the payment of a  
sum of money, as distinguished from an order directing an act  
to be done or property to be restored or transferred.  Stewart  
v Isbell, 155 Mich App 65, 80; 399 NW2d 440 (1986); Moore v  
Carney, 84 Mich App 399, 404; 269 NW2d 614 (1978).9  
The forfeiture statute itself is silent on the issue of  
interest.  However, its provisions make clear that an order  
returning 
seized 
currency following a drug forfeiture trial is  
not a money judgment, but rather an order for the return of  
specific personal property.10  For example, MCL 333.7521(1)(f)  
8 The remaining subsections specify the interest rates 
applicable to various periods, cover the effect of offers of 
settlement on entitlement to interest, and include specific 
provisions applicable to medical malpractice cases.  
9 This distinction reflects the purpose of § 6013, which 
is “to compensate the prevailing party for the expenses 
incurred in bringing an action and for the delay in receiving 
money damages.”  Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 541; 
564 NW2d 532 (1997).  
10  The Michigan drug forfeiture statute is drawn from the 
model of the federal drug laws, which treat seized currency in 
the same manner as other seized personal property.  In re  
Forfeiture of $11,800 US Currency, 174 Mich App 727, 729; 436 
NW2d 449 (1989).  Under the federal statute, forfeiture 
proceedings are in rem actions against the property. United  
States v One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F2d 415, 419 (CA 9, 1990); 
United States v Real Property Located at Incline Village, 47 
F3d 1511, 1519 (CA 9, 1995), rev’d on other grounds Degen v  
5  
 
 
 
states:  
The following property is subject to forfeiture:  
Any thing of value that is furnished or 
intended to be furnished in exchange for a  
controlled substance . . . including, but not  
limited to, money, negotiable instruments, or  
securities. . . .  Any money that is found in close 
proximity to any property that is subject to 
forfeiture under subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d) or 
(e) shall be presumed to be subject to forfeiture 
under this subdivision.  This presumption may be 
rebutted 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence.  
[Emphasis added.]  
Likewise, MCL 333.7523(1) decrees that “forfeiture  
proceedings shall be instituted promptly” and sets forth the  
“procedure (that) shall be used” where “property is seized  
pursuant 
to 
section 
7522.” 
(Emphasis 
added.)  
Section 7523(1)(c) instructs an owner of seized property how  
to seek recovery of the “property” in forfeiture proceedings.  
Perhaps 
most 
significant is MCL 333.7523(2), which equates the  
statutory recovery of anything seized as part of a drug  
forfeiture 
with 
a 
civil action to recover “personal property”:  
Property taken or detained under this article 
or pursuant to section 17766a shall not be subject 
to an action to recover personal property, but is 
deemed to be in the custody of the seizing agency 
subject only to this section or an order and 
judgment of the court having jurisdiction over the 
forfeiture proceedings. . . . [Emphasis added.]  
United States, 517 US 820; 116 S Ct 1777; 135 L Ed 2d 102  
(1996).  The return of seized property is treated as an act of 
restoration, rather than as an award of monetary compensation 
for damages suffered by a party. See, e.g., United States v  
One 1979 Cadillac, 833 F2d 994, 998 (CA Fed, 1987).  
6  
  
In addition, the language of § 6013 itself indicates that  
the proceeding here does not constitute a “civil action” for  
the purpose of that rule.  Subsections (2) through (6) suggest  
that a complaint must be filed with the court by the person  
who has recovered the money judgment. Each subsection begins  
with the phrase, “for complaints filed,” or contains other  
language referencing the filing of a “complaint.”  Wilson did  
not file any such complaint in this proceeding.  Therefore,  
rather than being the prevailing claimant in a civil action,  
Wilson was merely the owner of property that the prosecutor  
unsuccessfully sought to seize in a forfeiture action  
initiated by the latter. The trial court’s order was not an  
adjudication of an action for money damages, but rather one  
for the delivery of property that had been the subject of a  
forfeiture action.11  
In other contexts, the case law has denied interest under  
§ 6013 in proceedings that, like drug forfeitures, are not  
typical civil actions preceding an award of a money judgment.  
See, e.g., Reigle v Reigle, 189 Mich App 386, 392-393; 474  
NW2d 297 (1991) (the statute does not apply to money awards in  
divorce judgments); Oliver v State Police, 132 Mich App 558,  
11 If Wilson thought that the police had behaved 
unlawfully here (as opposed merely to having not prevailed), 
he 
was 
free 
to 
bring 
a 
civil 
action 
for 
damages. 
Alternatively, he had the option of suing in federal court 
under 42 USC 1983.  
7  
572-577; 349 NW2d 211 (1984) (no statutory interest on an  
award of back pay in a circuit court review of an employee  
discharge under civil service laws); In re Cole Estate, 120  
Mich App 539, 548-551; 328 NW2d 76 (1982) (an order awarding  
a forced share in an estate is not a “money judgment recovered  
in a civil action” entitling a spouse to an award of judgment  
interest).12  
The Court of Appeals decision also creates the danger of  
what the trial court called “imposing a penalty on the seizing  
agency.”  
Michigan 
law prohibits law enforcement agencies from  
depositing currency seized pursuant to a warrant into an  
interest bearing bank account until the currency no longer is  
needed as evidence in any trial.  See MCL 780.655; In re  
Forfeiture of $25,505 US Currency, 220 Mich App 572, 577; 560  
NW2d 341 (1996). The decision of the Court of Appeals could  
result in police departments being compelled to pay judgment  
interest on money that they were statutorily prohibited from  
depositing into an interest bearing account.  
12 There are some cases that award the prevailing party 
the interest which the seizing governmental unit actually  
earned on the property while it was in the governmental unit’s 
possession.
 See, e.g., United States v $515,060.42 in US  
Currency, 152 F3d 491, 504-506 (CA 6, 1998); In re Forfeiture  
of $30,632.41, 184 Mich App 677, 678-680; 459 NW2d 99 (1990). 
Those awards are based on the court’s traditional equity 
powers to avoid a windfall to the governmental agency from its 
possession of property. 
In this case, the funds were 
deposited in an interest-bearing account for part of the time 
they were in the city’s possession, and this interest earned 
was, in fact, paid to Wilson under the circuit court’s order.  
8  
 
 
 
 
We conclude that the order directing return of the seized  
funds to Wilson was not a money judgment in a civil action  
under § 6013.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and reinstate the Wayne Circuit Court’s  
February 25, 1997, order denying interest.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
9