Title: Oahu Transit Services, Inc. v. Northfield Insurance Company.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

Uawuprary
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'r

=--000-

 

OAHU TRANSIT SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintift-Appel lant /Appellee,

 

 

NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant Appel lee/Appellee,

aqua

and

 

ALOHA STATE CAB, INC., JOHN DOES 1-5,
JOHN DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-5,

ROE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-5,

JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS
ROE NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 1-5
Defendants.

By oe 4

 

NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee/Appellee,

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
‘Third-Party Defendant-Appellee/Appellant-

 

No. 25704

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 011-2923)

MAY 31, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Plaintiff-appeliant Oahu Transit Services, Inc. (OTS)
and third-party defendant-appellant City and County of Honolulu

[hereinafter, “the City”) appeal from the Circuit Court of the
 

* FOR PUBLICATION ***

Firet Circuit’s March 18, 2003 first amended judgment.’ As
points of error, OTS and the City contend that the circuit court
erred in issuing ite March 28, 2002 order granting summary
Judgment in favor of defendant-appellee/third-party plaintiff
appellee Northfield Insurance Company (Northfield) and denying
summary judgment in favor of OTS and the City.

‘The main issue on appeal is whether an automobile
exclusion clause in a Commercial General Liability (CGL)
Insurance policy (providing that no coverage exists for
“*tplodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any. .
‘auto’ . . . owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any
insured”) applies so as to bar coverage in the instant case. We
hold that the circuit court correctly concluded that this
exclusion applies and that Northfield is not required to defend
or indemnify OTS or the City.

1. BACKGROUND
A, The Parties

OTS operates transit services, including paratransit

services, for the City. In addition to operating “TheBus” and

“TheHandi-Van,” OTS contracted with private corporations to

the Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall presided over this matter.

 
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provide supplemental services. One such private corporation was
Aloha State Cab, Inc. (Aloha State).
‘The Accident:

on May 27, 2000, Aloha State vas assigned the job of
transporting Roy Muramoto to a dialysis appointment. While in
transit to the appointment, Muramoto’s wheelchair tipped over and
Muramoto was pinned in the corner of the van. The driver stopped
the van and went to assist Muramoto; Muramoto was strapped into
his wheelchair by a belt connected to the chair, and -~ according
to the driver -- Muramoto asked the driver to disconnect the belt
because Muramoto was pinned in the corner and uncomfortable. The
driver complied, but when the belt was released, Muramoto
collapsed to the floor. Muramoto suffered a spinal cord injury
and paralysis of his diaphragm as a result. The record suggests

that most, if not all, of Muramoto’s injuries occurred when

 

Muramoto collapsed to the floor: the driver had indicated that,
when Muranoto was pinned in the corner prior to releasing the
belt, Muramoto did not appear to be in distress.

The GL Policy
AG the tine of the accident, Aloha State had a CGL

 

policy with Northfield. This

 

me CGL policy also listed OTS as
an additional insured party. However, although OTS was listed as

an additional insured, the CGL policy covered OTS “only with
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respect to liability arising out of (Aloha State’s] operations or
premises owned by or rented to (Aloha state] .”?
‘The CGL policy provided that Northfield “will pay those

sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages

 

because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this

insurance applies.”? The policy also contained the following
exclusion, which is the focus of the instant case:

‘This nsurance does not apply to:

“nodity injury” or “property damage” arising out of the
omership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any
Sireraft, “auto” or watercraft owned or operated by or
Eented of loaned to any insured. Use includes operation and
“loading or unloading”

 

 

# the CSL policy algo listed The state of Hawaii's Department of
‘Transportation, Department of iunan Services, and Department of Land and
Naturel Resources s¢ additional insureds.

) the CGL policy defined “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness or
Gisease sustained by a person, including desth resulting from any of these st
fany tine.” The policy's definition of “property damage” is not relevant to
the instant case.

‘the CGL policy defined “Loading or unloading” as follows:
“uoading or unloading” means the handling of property:
After it is moved from the place where it is accepted

for novenent into or anto an aircraft, watercraft or

 

nile it ds in or on an aircraft, watercraft or
Sauter? oF

c.  Wadle it s being moved from an aircraft, watercraft
oF “autor to the place where it is finally delivered:

 

 

but “loading or unloading” does not include the movement of
Property by means of a mechanical device, other than @ hand
Ervck, thet Se not attached to the aircraft, watercraft or

 

(Emphasis added.) The applicebility of this definition to the instant case is
inka.
 

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(This exclusion will hereinafter be referred to as “the CGL
automobile exclusion.)
D. Procedural History

On August 30, 2001, Muramoto filed his Second Amended
Complaint against the City, OTS, and Aloha State. Muramoto’s
Second Amended Complaint brought claims for relief based on
negligence; respondeat superiors agency; breach of duty owed by
common carrier; the Americans with Disabilities Act; breach of
duty to comply with federal and state law; negligent selection,
supervision, and training; breach of express or implied warranty?
and ratification.

OTS tendered its defense of Muramoto’s suit to
Northfield pursuant to the terms of Aloha State’s CGL policy.
Northfield denied coverage, stating that the CGL automobile
exclusion applied (such that neither Aloha State nor OTS was
entitled to coverage).

On October 5, 2001, OTS filed a declaratory judgment
action against Northfield, seeking a declaration that the CGL
policy provided OTS with coverage for Muranoto’s suit. On
November 15, 2001, Northfield filed a counterclaim against OTS, a
cross-claim against Aloha State, and a third-party complaint
against the City, each of which sought a judicial declaration

don

 

that Northfield was not obligated to defend or indemnify ba
the CGL policy. The City then filed a counterclaim against

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Northfield, OTS filed a motion for summary judgment on December
26, 2001, arguing that Northfield had a duty to defend and
indemnify OTS with respect to Muranoto’s lawsuit; the City joined
this motion on February 15, 2002. Northfield filed a counter-
motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2002.

on March 28, 2002, the circuit court granted
Northfield’ s motion for summary judgment and denied OTS's motion
(which had been joined by the City) for summary judgment. The
circuit court entered final judgment in favor of Northfield, and
OTS and the City filed timely notices of appeal.*

IT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the circuit court's grant or denial of

unary Jucgment de nova.

Union 2 Keka, 9¢ Havas 213, 221; 11 F301, 9 (2000).
ard for granting ® motion for summary judgment is

 

{Slummary judgment is appropriate if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
[nterrogatories; and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
Entre is ho genuine issue as to any material
fact and thet the moving party ie entitied to
Sodgeont as s matter of low. A fact is material
if"frovt of that fact would have the effect of
Eblishing or refuting one of the essential

 

 

 

 

Geserted by the partion. The evidence most be
wed in the 1ight most favorable to the non=
Soving party. Jn other words, we must view all
bf the evidence and the inferences drawn

Gherefron in the Light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion
a. (cltations end internal quotation marks omitted) «

 

 

* in the meantime, however, Aloha State failed to respond to any of the
complaints against ite Both OFS and Northfield requested entry of defeult
Ggeinst Aloha state as to their respective complaints, and the requests were
geented.

 

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Goon v. City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 244-45, 47
P.3d 348, 359-60 (2002) (alte:

 

tion in original).

IIT. DISCUSSION

A. OTS And The City Are Subject To The CGL Automobile
Exclusion.

As an initial matter, both OTS and the City are subject
to the CGL policy's restrictions, including the CGL automobile
‘exclusion.

Both Aloha State and OTS were listed as insured

 

parties, and the exclusion applied to any automobile “owned or
operated by or rented or loaned to any insured” (emphasis added) .
OTS is a named insured, such that the exclusion applies to OTS
even if OTS itself did not own or operate the automobile.*
Similarly, the City is subject to the CGL automobile
exclusion as well. In its contract with the City, Aloha state
agreed to indemnify the City against any claims brought against
the City arising from Aloha State’s negligence. The CGL policy
insured Aloha State against this type of contractual Liability,

but only to the extent that Aloha State “becomes legally

 

* S00, g.g., Travelers Indem. co, v, Citao Petzoleun Comps, 166 F.3d 761
(sth cir. 1998).”' in Citag, Citgo’s franchisee had a Col policy and Citgo was
hhaned as an additicnal insured; however, just like in the instant case, Citgo
was only an insured to the extent that it was held liable for the franchise's
Sets or omissions. i, at 169 4 n.10. Alehough Citgo argued that the
Sutenobile exclusion did not apply to it because it did not own oF operate the
Yehicle in question, the court disagreed: the court held that if the
automobile exelusion applied to the franchises, it also applied to citgo
even though Citgo itself did not cnn or operate the vehicle in question
Because the exciveion applied to automobiles owed or operated By "any
insured.” Ig. at 769-70.

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

obligated to pay . . . damages because of ‘bodily injury or
‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” In other
words, if Aloha State was entitled to coverage for a particular
occurrence of bodily injury or property damage, Aloha State would
be entitled to coverage for its contractual obligation to
Andemnify a third party for liability arising from that
occurrence as well. If the CGL policy did not apply to Aloha
State (L.e., if one of the exclusions in the CGL policy barred
coverage for Aloha State), then the indemnitee (the City) would
not be entitled to coverage either. Additionally, the CGL policy
specifically excluded coverage for any damages arising from the
sole negligence of the indemnitee. Consequently, if we conclude
that the automobile exclusion applies to Aloha State, the
exclusion also bars the City from recovering from Northfield.

In sum, if the CGL automobile exclusion in the instant
case applies at all, it applies equally to Aloha State, OTS, and
the City.

B. The CGL Automobile Exclusion Applies In The Instant Case.

The circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of Northfield because all of Muramoto’s injuries arose from
the use or operation of an automobile. Subsection 1, infra,
discusses the phrase “arising from the use or operation of an
automobile” and concludes that this unambiguous phrase should be
accorded the same interpretation in the context of a CGL policy
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exclusion and in the context of an automobile insurance coverage
clause, Subsection 2, infza, applies this principle to the facts
of the instant case and concludes that OTS and the City are not
entitled to coverage because Muranoto’s injuries arose from the
use or operation of an automobile. Subsection 3, intra, rejects
OTS's and the City’s arguments that coverage exists based on
Muramoto’s allegations of negligent hiring, supervision, and
training; where Liability stems solely from an auto-related
cause, the CGL automobile exclusion will not be negated simply
because the injured party's complaint alleges various theories of
Adabinity.

1. Because the phrase “arising from the use or operation

of an automobile” is unambiguous, it has the same
meaning regardless of whether the phrase appears in an
automobile insurance coverage clause or a CGL policy
exclusion.

 

 

While the applicability of the phrase “arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, [or] use” is not entirely clear in
every case, the phrase itself is unambiguous. As this court
stated in Zortune v. Wong, 68 Haw. 1, 11, 702 P.24 299, 306
(1985):

‘The honsowner’# policy declared in unanbiqusus language that
it'aid not apply to bodily injury afising from the operation
of S motor vehicle by sn insured. The complaint in the
Personal injury action charged that Ronald wong drove 3
moter vehicle in negligent fashion, his negligence resulted
in bodily injury, and his parents were liable for the
Ganages.” Inasmuch se 2 court “cannot rewrite the contract
of the parties,” 12 G. Couch, Cyclonedia of Insurance Law
(2aed.) § 44A:2 (1981) (footnote omitted), we cannot sey
Lssbility for Ronald Wong's negligence wae’ within the
intendaewt of the parts

 

 

 

 
 

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(Emphasis added.) If the CGL automobile exclusion were
ambiguous, this court would construe this phrase in favor of the
insured; if this same ambiguous phrase also appeared in a
coverage clause in an automobile policy, this court would still
interpret this phrase in favor of the insured. Thus, if the
phrase were ambiguous, this court could afford differing
interpretations to the phrase depending on whether the phrase
appeared in a coverage clause or an exclusionary clause.’
However, because the phrase “arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, [or] use” is unambiguous, this court need not
interpret the phrase differently depending on whether the phrase

or an exclusionary claw:

 

appears in a coverage claui
See Havaiian Ins, ¢ Guar, Co. Ltd, v, chief Clerk of Firat
Circuit Court, 68 Haw. 336, 342, 713 P.2d 427, 432 (1986)

 

(holding that the plain language of the insured’ s homeowner's

as this court stated in Hawaiian Insurance ¢ Guaranty Cou tide ws,
ghiet Clore of First Giscust Coust, 60 Raw. 336, 38l-42, 113 Ped G27, 31
(isee7=

‘reve, we have said more than once that insurance policte:
are Contracts of adhesion prenised on standard forms
prepared by the insurer's attorneys, . « « (and) they mst
be*Gonserued lizerally in favor of the insured and the
ambiguities reesived against the insurer. But the rule of
construction urged upon us is not fer application whenever
Insurer and inevred simply disagree over the interpretation
of the terms of a policy and there is an assertion of
Gnbiguity. Ambiguity exists and the rule is followed only
hen the [policy] taken #8 a whole, 19 reasonably subject to
Giftering interpretation. Absent sn ambiguity, the terms of
the policy should be interpreted according to their plain,
oraihery, and accepted sense in conaon speech.

 

 

    

    

Lanternal quotation signals and citations omitted.) (Alterations in original.)

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policy excluded coverage for injuries arising out of an
automobile accident); see also i. Ins. Co, of MY. vs Ekstrom,
784.24 320, 323 (Colo. 1989) (declining to give the phrase
“arising out of” different meanings depending on whether the
phrase appeared in a coverage clause or an exclusionary clause).
Therefore, this court may look to its interpretations of the
phrase “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, (or) use” in
the context of automobile insurance coverage clauses and apply
these interpretations to the CGL automobile exclusion at issue in
the instant case.

2. te

case because Muramoto’s injuries arose from the u:
operation of an automobile."

tomobile exclusion bars coverage in the instant

 

 

In the context of an automobile insurance coverage

clause, this court has applied the following three-factor test to

 

+ This section addresses the applicability of the CGL automobile
exclusion," n ite answering briefs, Northfield argues that Muramoto's
injuries all arise fron the use of an automobile and are therefore excluded.
In so arguing, however, Northfield makes repeated references to the “Loading
land unloading” of the HandiVan. For example, in its Answering Brief to the
City’s Opening Brief, tortntield states: "the alleged inproper training of
the driver leading to improper seating and securing is, in essence, negligent
loading of the van. The alleged improper disengagement of Marumoto [sic] from
his wheelchair is, in essence, negligent unloading of the van.” Similarly, in
its Answering Brief to OfS's Opening Brief, Northfield argues that “Mramoto’s
Mnjuries’ are all rooted in the operation, use, losding or unloading of the
‘Wandi-Van' and are therefore excluded under the auto exclusion.”

Northfield’s repeated references to “loading and unloading” stem from
‘the CGL automobile exclusion, which provides in relevant part that "Us
includes operation snd “loading or unloading’.” This policy provision is
inapplicable in the instant case, however. The CGL policy defines “loading
and Unloading” as "the handling of property” under certain circumstances:
(Emphasis added.) A passenger is not property, such thet this additional
Fefinenent of the term “use in the Col policy ss not helpful to Northfield.

 

 

 

 

 

cy
 

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ee

determine whether injuries arose from the use or operation of a
motor vehicle:

‘the first factor (48) whether the . . . motor vehicle was an
active accessory in causing [the] plaintiff's injuries

‘he second factor (is) whether there was an.
independent act breaking the causal Link between “use” of
the Wehiele and the injuries inflicted :

‘The third factor [1s] whether the injuries resulted
trom use of the vehicle for transportation purposes.

 

Chock v. Gov't Emplovees Ins, Co., 103 Hawai'i 263, 267-68, 61
P.3d 1178, 1182-83 (2003) (citing AIG Hawaii Ins, Co, v. Estate
of Caraang, 74 Haw. 620, 640-41, 851 P.2d 321, 330-31 (1993)
(citing Cont’1 W. Ins, Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 877-79 (Minn.
1987))). See also HRS § 431:10C-103 (Supp. 2004) (providing in
relevant part that, for purposes of Hawaii's Motor Vehicle
Insurance Law, “*Operation, maintenance, or use with respect to a
motor vehicle’ includes occupying, entering into, and alighting
from it, but does not include . . . [cJonduct in the course of
loading or unloading the vehicle, unless the accidental harm

occurs in the immediate proximity of the vehicle[.]”).” Because

 

* Additionally, a8 one tre

 

rt

 

explained:

tn determining whether on accident arose out of the
use of the automobile, the totality of the circumstances

‘ding op to the accident should be
examined. Uh arises out of the
{anerent nature of the sutonobile. Thus, whether an injury
[orone arising cut of the use of an insured vehicle may De
determines by whether the vse is reasonably consistent with
the inherent nature of the vehicle, and it does not matter
whether the insured’ act takes plsce in actual operation of
The vehicle or in sone other use!

 

 

 

 

8 tee R. uss and Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d, § 119:37 at 119-56
(1997) (footnotes omitted).

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ee
the phrase “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or
entrustment to others of any . . . ‘auto’” has the same meaning
in the context of an automobile coverage clause as it does in a

CGL automobile exclusion clause, we use this same three-factor

 

test to determine whether injuries arose from the use of an
automobile for purposes of applying the CGL automobile exclusion.

Applying this three-factor test to the instant case,

 

conclude that Nuramoto’s injuries arose from the use or operation
of an automobile and are therefore excluded from coverage. The
first factor -- whether the van in which Muramoto was traveling
was an “active accessory” in causing his injuries -- weighs in
favor of Northfield. Muramoto’s wheelchair tipped over while the
van was moving, causing him to be pinned in the corner of the
van; he was injured when the driver tried to assist him from this
position. As this court has stated, “The use of an automobile
naturally includes getting in and out of it.” long Chee v. Yee
Wo Chan Co., 26 Haw. 785, 801 (1923), overruled on other grounds,
Chung v, Animal Clinic, Inc., 63 Haw. 642, 647-49, 636 P.2d 721,
724-26 (1981). See also 8 Lee R. Russ and Thomas F. Segalla,

 

“ after making this statement, the court states: “That one does 20
negligently may constitute contributory negligence. But contributory
Resligence ia no defense to a claim for compensaticn.” Wong Chee v. Yes Wo
Chan Go.,26 How. 785, 801 (1923). Wong Chee involved a claim for workers’
Eonpensation benefite/ the employee died after falling from an automobile
Ghile cn his way to collect an account for his employers, and this court held
That the employee's widow was entitled to benefits because the accident erose
fut of the decedent’s employment

 

 

 

 

 
   

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Couch on Insurance 3d, § 119:47 at 119-68 (1997) (“The insuring
term ‘use or operation’ encompasses more than just driving a

vehicle, and includes all activities ne

 

jarily part of driving
the vehicle, such as getting in and getting out.”).!" Even
‘though Muramoto was injured after the van had stopped moving, the
van was an active accessory in causing his injuries.

The second factor

 

whether there was an independent
act breaking the Link between “use” of the vehicle and Muramoto’s
injuries -- does not clearly weigh in favor of either party. The
van was stopped, such that the driver's negligence in unbuckling
Muramoto could be seen as an independent act that was separate
from the use of the van for transportation purposes (particularly
because Muranoto appears to have suffered all of his injuries
from his fall, rather than being injured by the tipping of his
wheelchair and having those injuries exacerbated by the driver's

subsequent actions). However, Aloha State was in the business of

 

» purthermore, as explained in 68 Appleman, Insurance Lau and Practice
(Buckley ed.) § 4316, Supp at 103 (Supp. 2004):

Automobiie coverage exists for injuries arising out of the
Use of an insured vehicle when the use of the venicle has
sone. cavsal connection to the injuries. The causal
Eequirenent has been held to be more than "bot=for”
Gaueation, but less then legal, proximate cause. That is,
Eo prove causation under a policy covering losses arising’
Eron "ose" of 8 covered vehicle, the plaintiff need only
Show that the injury originated in, grew out of, oF flowed
fron the use of the vehicle, not that the vehicle itself was
the source of the injury.

 

 

 

(Footnotes omitted.)

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transporting passengers in automobiles, and Muranoto’s injuries
occurred while he was being transported in an automobile:
therefore, the driver's act in releasing Muramoto’s buckle is not
particularly “independent” from the use of an automobile.

The third factor -~ whether Nuramoto’s injuries
resulted from use of the van for transportation purposes ~~
clearly weighs in favor of Northfield as well, as Muramoto vas
injured while traveling as a passenger in an Aloha State van.
‘See Wong Chee, 26 Haw, at 801 (“The use of an automobile
naturally includes getting in and out of it.”); 8 Couch on
Insurance 3d, § 119:47 at 119-68.

applying these three factors, we conclude that
Muramoto’'s injuries arose out of the use or operation of an
automobile. Consequently, the CGL automobile exclusion bars
coverage in the instant case and the circuit court correctly

granted summary judgment in favor of Northfield.

 

‘The theories of liability presented in Muramoto’s
complaint do not determine the existence of coverage.

Muramoto’s complaint alleges, inter alia, that OTS and
the City were negligent in hiring, training, and supervising

Muramoto’s driver. These seemingly non-auto-related allegations
are insufficient to require Northfield to defend or indemnify OTS

or the City, however, because OTS's and the City’s liability for

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Muramoto’s injuries arises solely from the use of a motor
enicle.

Tn County of Kaua'i v, Scottsdale Insurance Co. Inc.,
90 Hawai's 400, 978 P.2d 838 (1999), we held that a comprehensive
law enforcement insurance policy, which contained an automobile
exclusion, did not cover the insured against a claim for
negligent supervision because the insured’s liability stemmed
from an automobile accident. In that case, an on-duty police
officer was driving his patrol car outside the lined portion of
the road and in excess of the speed limit when he struck and
killed Gilbert Moniz. Id. at 402, 978 P.2d at 840. Moniz’s
family sued the County of Kaua'i based on the theory of negligent
supervision: the officer had worked the previous day from 8:00
a.m, until 4:00 p.m. and then again from 11:00 p.m. until the
accident at 3:30 a.m., and Moniz’s family claimed that the
County’s negligence in scheduling the officer for too many work
hours caused the officer to be fatigued, thereby causing the
accident. Id, at 402-03, 978 P.2d at 840-41. We held that the
County was not entitled to insurance coverage for Moniz’s
family’s suit because “the County’s liability, if any, ‘arises
out off the ‘use’ of a motor vehicle [such] that the automobile
exclusion applies.” Id, at 407, 978 P.2d at 845.

Scottsdale Insurance followed this court’s decision in
Hawaiian Insurance & Guaranty Co, v, Chief Clerk of the First

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Circuit court, 68 Haw. 336, 713 P.2d 427 (1986) [hereinafter,
HIG}, in which this court held that a claim for negligent

entrustment of an automobile was not covered by a homeowner’

 

insurance policy. In HIG, the insured had entrusted her car to
an unlicensed minor driver, The unlicensed minor driver was
involved in an accident with two other cars, resulting in the
deaths of five minors and serious injury to another, and the
survivor and the decedents’ estates brought actions against the
owner for negligent entrustment. HIG, 68 Haw. at 336-39, 713
P.2d at 429. This court held that the insured’s homeowner’ s
policy, which contained an automobile exclusion, did not entitle
the insured to a defense or indemnification:

[n)t may be negligence to entrust an automebile to an
incompetent driver, age Restatenent (Second) of Torts $ 308
(ise5), and the enteustent + - - saa an act separal
[the driver's] operation of the Gar-. Still, the conduct of
[the Owner] and her son relative to the fatal accident was
separate “only in the fact that it preceded the collision.”
4 Cals Apps Se $24, 527,
[oocal- aper. 425, 427 (1983). for it is clear “that (the)
negligent entrustment (of an autoncbile) is irrelevant
Unless the person to whom [it] is entrusted acts in a
Regligent manner (creates an unreasonable risk) and in fact
inflicts injury ae the result of such conduct.” Bankert v
‘Thrsshermen's Mutuel Insurance Cou, 110 Wis. 24 465, 476,
S25 Heweza 150, 153 (1983) 26 Haw. 145,
Lge (i924). Or as the Suprene Judictal Court of
Maseachsseite has put it, the “*negligent entrustment’ [of
eonebile] at a distinct and specific cause of action is
clusive of, but, rather, is derived from the nore
General concepts of oumership, operation, and use of a notor
venscle." noursnee Coy 2,
LALLY, 374 Hoses 602, 08-06, 373 WE.2d 966, 969° (1578).

 

 

 

 

      

 

Id, at 340-41, 713 P.2d at 430-31. (footnotes omitted) (some
alterations in original and some added). Just as in Scottsdale
Insurance, the cause of the underlying accident in HIG was

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negligent use of an automobile, such that the automobile

exclusion barred covera

 

See also Fortune v. Hong, 68 Haw.
12, 102 P.2d 299, 307 (1985) (holding that a homeowner’s policy
did not provide coverage for the insured’s vicarious parental
Liability where that liability arose from the negligent operation
of a motor vehicle by the insured’s minor child).

In this case, all of Muramoto’s injuries arose from the

use of an automobile and all liability faced by OTS and the City

stems from that use. Therefore, based on Scottsdale Insurance,
HIG, and Fortune v, Wong, OTS and the City are not entitled to

indemnification. Similarly, Northfield owed no duty to defend
OTS or the City. Although the duty to defend is broader than the
duty to indemnity, ne. we 0. of
Hawai'i, Ltd., 76 Hawai'i 277, 287, 875 P.2d 894, 904 (1994),
Muramoto’s complaint alleges that his injuries arose from the use
of an automobile; the complaint does not even mention the
driver's unbuckling of Murancto’s wheelchair belt, but rather
alleges that Muramoto’s wheelchair moved and tipped while on
route to the dialysis appointment and that Muramoto was injured
as a result. Because the allegations contained in the complaint
do not even raise the possibility of coverage, Northfield owed no

duty to defend.

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TV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

March 18, 2003 first amended judgment.

on the briefs:

Wesley H.H. Ching

and Sheree Kon-Herrera
(of Fukunaga Matayoshi
Hershey & Ching, LLP)
for plaintiff-appellant/
appellee Oahu Transit
Services, Inc.

Kevin P. H. Sumida
(of Mataui Chung Sumida

& Tsuchiyana) for third-
party defendant-appellee/
appellant City and County
of Honolulu

Gregory K. Markham,
Keith K. Kato, and

Jeffrey S. Masateugu

(of Chee & Markham) for
defendant -appellee/appellee
Northfield Insurance Company

 

19

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