Title: GEORGE L. ARNOLD and GEORGE L. ARNOLD, P.C., a Wyoming Professional Corporation V. KRISTEEN DAY and MARK DAY, wife and husband

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GEORGE L. ARNOLD and GEORGE L. ARNOLD, P.C., a Wyoming Professional Corporation V. KRISTEEN DAY and MARK DAY, wife and husband2007 WY 86158 P.3d 964Case Number: 06-160Decided: 05/23/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
GEORGE 
L. ARNOLD and GEORGE L. ARNOLD, P.C., a Wyoming Professional 
Corporation,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
KRISTEEN 
DAY and MARK DAY, wife and husband,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

George 
L. Arnold of George L. Arnold, P.C.; and V. Anthony Vehar of Vehar Law Offices, 
P.C.; Evanston, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Mark W. 
Harris of Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, 
George L. Arnold and George L. Arnold, P.C. (Arnold), contend that the district 
court erred in granting a judgment in favor of the Appellees, Kristeen and Mark 
Day (Days).  The dispute in this 
case arose because the odor of permanent solution migrated from the Days' hair 
salon (Hair West), into the common areas of their condominium office spaces, as 
well as into Arnold's law offices.  Arnold developed and began marketing the 
condominium office space in 1985, and allowed the unit below his law offices to 
be sold to the Days in 1992, for use as a hair salon.  Arnold noticed the odor problem shortly after 
the Days occupied the building in 1992, and the problem continued through the 
day of trial.  In his complaint, 
Arnold sought 
relief on three theories:  (1) 
breach of contract; (2) nuisance; and (3) trespass.  The district court granted judgment in 
favor of the Days on all theories.  
In this appeal, Arnold challenges only that part of the 
judgment that dealt with breach of contract.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Arnold raises these 
issues:

 
 

I.          
[Day] 
waived the affirmative defense of impracticability of 
performance.

 
 
II.         
The trial court erred in sua 
sponte applying the affirmative defense of impracticability of performance 
without first affording [Arnold] notice and an opportunity to be heard 
concerning the affirmative defense.

 
 
III.        The 
district court erred in finding that [the Days] should be discharged from the 
performance of their promise and agreement to keep foul odors from [Arnold's] premises due to 
impracticability of performance.

 
 
The Days 
posit these issues for our consideration:

 
 
I.          
Should the appeal be dismissed for the failure of [Arnold] to bring a 
complete record to this Court for review?

 
 
II.         
Do the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial 
court, on their face, reveal any clear error of law?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Arnold filed his complaint 
in the district court on October 5, 2000.  
On October 23, 2000, the Days filed their answer and counterclaim.  On September 7, 2004, the case was 
dismissed without prejudice because no substantial or bona fide action had been 
performed in the case since September 30, 2003.  Arnold asked that the complaint be reinstated, 
and by order entered on October 1, 2004, it was reinstated to the district 
court's docket.

 
 
[¶4]      On March 15, 
2005, Arnold filed a one-page motion for partial 
summary judgment contending that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
with respect to the migration of odors from the Days' salon into the common 
areas used by both parties, as well as into Arnold's law offices.  Furthermore, he asserted that he was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claims for breach of contract, 
trespass, and nuisance.  That motion 
was supported by the affidavits of seven of Arnold's clients, who stated under oath that they could 
smell the odors in the common area and in Arnold's offices.  The summary judgment motion was not 
immediately taken up by the district court, and eventually it was supplemented 
by affidavits from Mr. Arnold and Britt C. Arnold.

 
 
[¶5]      The Days filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on April 4, 
2005.  Attached to that memorandum 
were the affidavits of the Days, in which they detailed the "extreme measures" 
they had employed over the years to remedy the problem with odors.  These efforts included:  (1) Replacing the existing windows with 
windows that could be opened; (2) installing exhaust fans; (3) adopting the use 
of a line of perm solutions that reduced the pungent smell associated with those 
products; (4) patching holes in walls and ceilings, replacing insulation, and 
sealing electric covers to prevent leakage of fumes through the electrical 
system; (5) replacing the heating system and repairing the vent work to the 
heating system; (6) placing commercial air fresheners in common areas (which 
were removed by Arnold because he did not like that smell); (7) placing door 
strips around their door and giving door strips to Arnold; (8)  hiring a contractor to run a bore scope 
(with fiber optic camera) through the ventilation system to look for holes and 
cracks (none were found); (9) replacing all filters in the ventilation system 
with charcoal filters and providing Arnold with charcoal filters to use (after 
consulting with other hair salons that operated in spaces similar to Hair West); 
(10) using an air ionizer and giving an air ionizer to Arnold (which he 
refused).  In summary, the Days 
asserted that their efforts to eliminate the perm smell "have been comprehensive 
and effective.  If Mr. Arnold and 
his clients are smelling odors from the salon it is through some fault of his 
own."

 
 
[¶6]      On June 14, 2005, 
the Days filed their amended answer and counterclaim generally denying Arnold's 
allegations and raising the defense of failure to mitigate damages, and the 
affirmative defenses of:  (1)  The Memorandum of Agreement was executed 
by [the Days] under duress and is null and void; (2)  The Memorandum of Agreement is 
unconscionable and void or voidable at [the Days'] instance; (3) [Arnold has] 
failed to act in good faith under the Memorandum of 
Agreement.

 
 
[¶7]      For the sake of 
clarity, we note here that the Memorandum of Agreement is a three-page document 
that Arnold and the Days used to spell out the "understanding" they reached at 
the time Arnold agreed, as a part of his consideration for the agreement, to 
"refrain from objecting to the issuance of a conditional use permit for Hair 
West and to submit a letter of recommendation to the Planning and Zoning Board 
on or before the scheduled time of its hearing Monday, February 3, 1992."  The Days were buying the condominium 
space from its current owner who was in bankruptcy.  Arnold asserts that, had he objected to the 
conditional use permit, it would have been denied.  In the first nine paragraphs of the 
agreement it is agreed that:  (1) 
Arnold will be responsible for the irrigation system, in season; (2) the Days 
will be responsible for plowing the parking lot, in season; (3)  the parties shared responsibility for 
spring and fall planting; (4) Arnold was to contribute a shed to the condominium 
association, and the Days a tractor mower with accessories; (5) the parties were 
to share mowing, trimming, application of herbicides, and watering; (6) the Days 
were to pay for lighting the signage from dusk to 10:30 p.m., and Arnold was to 
pay for cleaning the entry once a week and to keep a mat on the tile; (7) the 
parties were to share the expense of replacing a fence; (8) the placement of 
signage was detailed; and (9) bookkeeping responsibility for the association was 
to be alternated annually.  The 
following paragraphs wrapped up the agreement:

 
 
10.  Importantly, 
you will take such steps as are necessary to ensure that chemicals and other 
odors do not escape into the entry area or the upstairs unit.  Certain mandatory steps will be required 
at the outset including compliance with governmental rules and regulations and 
the installation of an adequate ventilation system.

 
 
11.  Importantly, 
you will take reasonable steps to control noise from children and boisterous 
patrons, and you will refrain from playing music at a volume level which will 
cause it to be heard in the upstairs unit.

 
 
[¶8]      A trial was held 
on February 28, 2006.  The trial was 
not reported so we have no transcript of those proceedings, nor do we have a 
substitute for the transcript.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Our review of 
this case is greatly restricted because we have no transcript of the trial.  W.R.A.P. 3.02(b) and 3.03 (and the 
annotations to those rules).  The 
record does include exhibits, but without a transcript the purport of some of 
them is not readily evident.  In Williams v. Dietz, 999 P.2d 642, 645 
(Wyo. 2000) we explained:

 
 
The 
record on appeal is fundamental to the exercise of appellate review because 
"[t]his court does not act as a fact finder."  Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 
(Wyo.1993).  Without a sufficient 
record, we must

 
 
accept 
"the trial court's findings as being the only basis for deciding the issues 
which pertain to the evidence."  Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget 
Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo.1995).  "In the absence of anything to refute 
them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings."  896 P.2d  at 
771-72.

 
 

Weiss v. 
Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 498 (Wyo.1997).  
Additionally, in cases where a transcript of the hearing does not exist, 
W.R.A.P. 3.03 allows the appellant to settle the record by preparing a statement 
of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means.  Barela v. State, 936 P.2d 66, 69 
(Wyo.1997).  The hearing in this 
case was not recorded, and Williams did not take advantage of this rule and 
prepare or provide this Court with a statement of the evidence.  

 
 
[¶10]   Failure to provide a transcript of 
evidence does not necessarily require dismissal of the appeal, but we are 
restricted in our review to those allegations of error not requiring an 
inspection of the transcript.  Stadtfield v. Stadtfield, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
[¶11]   In his reply brief, Arnold contends that the 
district court's decision letter, and its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, constitutes special findings as contemplated by W.R.C.P. 52(a), which 
provides:

 
 
(a)  General and special findings by court. 
-- Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, or with an advisory jury, 
it shall not be necessary for the court to state its findings, except generally 
for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties requests it before the 
introduction of any evidence, with the view of excepting to the decision of the 
court upon the questions of law involved in the trial, in which case the court 
shall state in writing its special findings of fact separately from its 
conclusions of law;  provided, that 
without such request the court may make such special findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as it deems proper and if the same are preserved in the 
record either by stenographic report or by the court's written memorandum, the 
same may be considered on appeal.  
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review.  The findings of a master, to the extent 
that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court.  Findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 
or any other motion except as provided in subdivision (c) of this 
rule.

 
 

Arnold 
contends that a transcript is, therefore, not required.  This assertion is not supported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority.  
Our perspective is that no request was made by a party for special 
findings, special findings were not made, and special findings are, in any 
event, not a substitute for a transcript.

 
 
[¶12]   The district court issued a 
decision letter, as well as detailed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  It is evident from those 
documents that the evidence at trial included testimony to the effect that 
"whoever built the FranklinBuilding for [Arnold] did not install a cold air duct that services 
[Arnold's] 
unit.  Evidently, there is only an 
open space between the floor joists (looking at it from [Arnold's] perspective) or 
ceiling joists (looking at it from [the Days'] perspective)."  The district court concluded that that 
was the cause of the odor migration and that it was not possible to remedy 
it.  In addition, the district court 
concluded that the Memorandum of Agreement assigned responsibility for salon 
odors to the Days, but assigned responsibility for the air ducts to Arnold.  As noted above, under the circumstances 
of this case, we must accept the trial court's findings as being the only basis 
for deciding the issues which pertain to the evidence.  In the absence of anything to refute 
them, we will sustain the trial court's findings of fact, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those 
findings.

 
 
[¶13]   We also take note that W.R.C.P. 
15(b) provides:

 
 
(b)  Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
-- When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings.  Such 
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues.  If 
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended 
and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party's 
action or defense upon the merits.  
The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence.

 
 
Here, we 
have no transcript from which to assess the application of this rule.  However, we indulge the assumption that 
the evidence presented was sufficient to support the district court's 
findings.

 
 
[¶14]   Furthermore, we may affirm the 
district court upon any valid basis appearing in the record.  Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan Aerie No. 186, 
Inc. v. State, 2006 WY 4, ¶ 38, 126 P.3d 847, 861-2 (Wyo. 2006).  Arnold claims that he was surprised by the 
district court's disposition; however, his concerns were not addressed to the 
district court in any post judgment motions.  We have carefully examined the record 
extant, as well as the arguments presented in the briefs, and we conclude that 
the district court's judgment should be affirmed because the evidence supports 
the district court's conclusion that the Days did not breach the contract 
between the parties.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed in all respects.