Title: State ex rel. Bayer Corp. v. Honorable Joan L. Moriarty

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
STATE ex rel. BAYER CORPORATION,  
) 
BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC,   
) 
BAYER ESSURE INC., and 
) 
BAYER HEALTHCARE   
) 
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 
 
) 
) 
Relators, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No.  SC96189 
) 
HONORABLE JOAN L. MORIARTY, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
Bayer Corporation, Bayer Healthcare LLC, Bayer Essure Inc., and Bayer Healthcare 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., (collectively, “Bayer”), seek a writ of prohibition directing the circuit 
court to dismiss nonresident Plaintiffs’ claims in a petition alleging personal injuries from 
Essure, a female contraceptive device Bayer manufactures and distributes.  Bayer alleges 
Missouri has no specific personal jurisdiction over 85 out of 92 Plaintiffs who are 
nonresidents of Missouri and who have not alleged their injury occurred in Missouri.  Bayer 
further alleges Missouri does not have general jurisdiction as Bayer is neither incorporated 
in nor has its principal place of business here, and Bayer is not “at home” in Missouri.  This 
Opinion issued December 19, 2017
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Court agrees the petition did not assert any recognized basis for personal jurisdiction over 
Bayer with respect to nonresident Plaintiffs and vacates the circuit court’s order overruling 
Bayer’s motion to dismiss.  
Plaintiffs assert the claims of nonresident Plaintiffs should not be dismissed because 
nonresident Plaintiffs will seek leave to file an amended petition asserting an additional 
basis of specific jurisdiction over Bayer based on its conduct of clinical trials and marketing 
of Essure in Missouri.  Plaintiffs allege they also will seek jurisdictional discovery on these 
issues.  Bayer counters these allegations are equally without merit to those in the initial 
petition as the proposed amended allegations simply will seek to exercise general 
jurisdiction under another name and, therefore, ask the circuit court be directed to grant the 
motion to dismiss.  Bayer further asserts the proposed discovery is abusive.   
This Court’s preliminary writ extended solely to the circuit court’s overruling of 
Bayer’s motion to dismiss.  The circuit court did not have the proposed amended petition 
before it when it made that ruling.  The circuit court’s order overruling the motion to 
dismiss, therefore, could not have been based on claims made in a petition not yet filed or 
on grounds for jurisdiction not yet proposed.  It is for the circuit court in the first instance 
to consider whether the amended petition provides a basis for specific jurisdiction and to 
evaluate whether the requested discovery is necessary, as well as whether and what sort of 
a protective order is appropriate as to the nature and extent of the discovery.   
Accordingly, without addressing the merits of Plaintiffs’ proposed amended petition 
or proposed discovery or Bayer’s assertions as to the merits of these matters, this Court 
makes its preliminary writ permanent and directs the circuit court to vacate its order 
3 
 
overruling the motion to dismiss.    
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
On August 13, 2016, Plaintiffs initiated an action against Bayer in the St. Louis 
circuit court to recover damages for personal injuries they allegedly experienced from their 
use of Essure, a medical device Bayer manufactures and distributes.  Of the 92 Plaintiffs, 
only seven are Missouri residents.  The remaining 85 Plaintiffs are not Missouri residents 
and do not allege they used Essure in this state or were injured in Missouri.  Moreover, 
none of the Bayer defendants is incorporated in or has its principal place of business in 
Missouri.  Bayer is also not “at home” in Missouri.   
Bayer moved to dismiss nonresident Plaintiffs’ claims or, alternatively, to sever and 
transfer those claims to appropriate venues, contending Bayer is not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Missouri with respect to nonresident Plaintiffs.  Bayer also argued Plaintiffs’ 
claims are preempted under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. sections 
360k(a) and 337(a), to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 
section 301 et seq.   
In opposition to Bayer’s motion to dismiss, nonresident Plaintiffs argued they had 
specific and general jurisdiction over Bayer on the grounds stated in their original petition, 
including that Bayer is subject to “both general and specific personal jurisdiction” in 
Missouri because Bayer “consented to jurisdiction in the State by way of registering to do 
business therein,” “engaged in substantial business activities in the State,” “conducted 
business in Missouri,” “derived substantial revenue in Missouri by marketing Essure to 
women” in Missouri, and allegedly “committed torts in whole or in part against Plaintiffs 
4 
 
in Missouri.”  They further argued in their response to the motion to dismiss that Bayer is 
subject to “piggyback” specific jurisdiction with respect to nonresident Plaintiffs’ claims 
because “Bayer does not challenge personal jurisdiction as to the Missouri Plaintiffs’ 
claims” and “the non-Missouri Plaintiffs alleged[] [they] were implanted with the same 
product the Defendants marketed and sold in Missouri and were injured by the same 
conduct allegedly injuring the Missouri Plaintiffs.”   
The circuit court overruled Bayer’s motion to dismiss in December 2016 on the 
ground Bayer “is present or has consented to jurisdiction” in Missouri because “[a] 
corporation has long been considered ‘present’ within the state when its agent is served 
with process in the state.”  In response to the circuit court’s order, Bayer sought a writ of 
prohibition in the court of appeals, which was denied.  Bayer then sought a writ of 
prohibition from this Court.  This Court issued its preliminary writ in July  2017, ordering 
the circuit court to show cause “why a writ of prohibition should not issue prohibiting [it] 
from doing anything other than vacat[ing] the December 20, 2016, order” that had 
overruled Bayer’s motion to dismiss.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court has discretion to issue and determine original remedial writs.  Mo. Const. 
art. V, § 4.1.  “Prohibition is an original proceeding brought to confine a lower court to the 
proper exercise of its jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Lebanon Sch. Dist. R-III v. Winfrey, 183 
S.W.3d 232, 234 (Mo. banc 2006).  “The extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition is 
available: (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when the trial court lacks authority 
or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion 
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where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer 
irreparable harm if relief is not granted.”  State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 
S.W.3d 41, 45 (Mo. banc 2017), quoting, State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 
370 S.W.3d 592, 603 (Mo. banc 2012).  Therefore, “[p]rohibition is the proper remedy to 
prevent further action of the trial court where personal jurisdiction of the defendant is 
lacking.”  Id., quoting, State ex rel. William Ranni Assocs., Inc. v. Hartenbach, 742 S.W.2d 
134, 137 (Mo. banc 1987).  “However, prohibition is only proper ‘when usurpation of 
jurisdiction ... is clearly evident.’”  Id., quoting, State ex rel. Tarrasch v. Crow, 622 S.W.2d 
928, 937 (Mo. banc 1981).   
III. 
THE ORIGINAL PETITION DOES NOT STATE A BASIS FOR PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER BAYER WITH RESPECT TO NONRESIDENT 
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS 
 
“[P]ersonal jurisdiction refers quite simply to the power of a court to require a 
person to respond to a legal proceeding that may affect the person’s rights or interests.”  
J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. banc 2009).  It is a due 
process requirement limiting the power of courts over litigants.  Id.  “The basis of a court’s 
personal jurisdiction over a corporation can be general – that is, all-purpose 
jurisdiction – or it can be specific – that is, conduct-linked jurisdiction.”  Norfolk, 512 
S.W.3d at 46.  A “defendant [can also] waive jurisdictional objections by consenting to 
personal jurisdiction.”  Id.  But “[w]hen personal jurisdiction is contested, it is the plaintiff 
who must shoulder the burden of establishing that defendant’s contacts with the forum state 
were sufficient.”  Bryant v. Smith Interior Design Grp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. 
banc 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
6 
 
This Court issued a preliminary writ based on the circuit court’s overruling of 
Bayer’s motion to dismiss.  In the original petition, Plaintiffs alleged Bayer was subject to 
general jurisdiction in Missouri based on Bayer’s substantial business in the state and 
consent jurisdiction due to the fact some Bayer defendants had authorized registered agents 
within the state.  They also asserted Missouri had specific jurisdiction over the claims of 
nonresident Plaintiffs because Bayer allegedly “committed torts in whole or in part against 
Plaintiffs in Missouri,” and because nonresident Plaintiffs’ claims were similar to the 
claims of in-state Plaintiffs as to which jurisdiction was uncontested.  Therefore, Plaintiffs 
argued nonresident Plaintiffs could “piggyback” on the jurisdiction of in-state Plaintiffs.  
Bayer argues none of these three theories provides a basis for personal jurisdiction over 
Bayer.   
A. 
Missouri Does Not Have General Jurisdiction Over Bayer  
“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising 
out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be 
exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”  Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984).  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 
746, 761 n.19 (2014), held a defendant cannot be subject to general jurisdiction in a state 
where it is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business, unless it is an 
“exceptional case” rendering the corporation “essentially at home in the forum.”  Id. at 
754.  
A state may have general jurisdiction over a corporation not incorporated there and 
that has not located its principal place of business there if the state is a “‘surrogate for place 
7 
 
of incorporation or home office’ such that the corporation is ‘essentially at home’ in that 
state.”  Norfolk, 512 S.W.3d at 48, quoting, Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 756 n.8, 761 n.19.  But 
to find a corporation is “essentially at home” in the state requires “an appraisal of a 
corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide,” because a 
“corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”  
Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20.  “Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing 
business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States,” id., which 
would “destroy the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction,” Norfolk, 512 
S.W.3d at 48.  Accordingly, “when a corporation is neither incorporated nor maintains its 
principal place of business in a state, mere contacts, no matter how ‘systematic and 
continuous,’ are extraordinarily unlikely to add up to an ‘exceptional case.’”  Id. (citation 
and quotations omitted).   
Norfolk concluded that for these reasons:  
Norfolk’s contacts are not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. Only if 
the instant suit arises out of Norfolk’s contacts with Missouri does Missouri 
have specific jurisdiction. Parker pleaded no facts alleging that the injury 
arose from Norfolk’s Missouri activities. Therefore, the fact that he could sue 
in Missouri in a case in which the injury arose out of his contacts with 
Missouri does not support finding general personal jurisdiction here. 
 
Id. at 49.   
In May 2017, the Supreme Court held in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 
1549, 1559 (2017), as had this Court in Norfolk, that having “in-state business, [as] clarified 
in Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction 
over claims like [the nonresident plaintiffs’] that are unrelated to any activity occurring in 
8 
 
[the forum state].”  In that case, a BNSF employee from North Dakota sued BNSF in 
Montana, alleging injuries sustained outside of the state.  Id.  BNSF was neither 
incorporated in nor had its principal place of business in Montana, and although BNSF had 
more than 2,000 miles of railroad tracks and more than 2,000 employees in Montana, the 
Supreme Court held its activities in Montana were not “so substantial and of such a nature 
as to render the corporation at home in that State.”  Id. at 1558 (citation omitted).  Any 
decision to the contrary would render BNSF at home in each of the 28 states in which it 
did business.  Id. 
Similarly, Bayer’s contacts with Missouri do not give rise to general personal 
jurisdiction.  Bayer is not incorporated in nor does it have its principal place of business in 
Missouri.  And although Plaintiffs allege Bayer does substantial business in the state, 
Daimler, BNSF, and Norfolk held this insufficient to provide general jurisdiction in 
Missouri; it is simply not enough to render Bayer “at home” here.  In light of the principles 
set out in these cases, Plaintiffs have failed to show Missouri has general jurisdiction over 
Bayer. 
B. 
Consent Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over Bayer 
Norfolk was decided after the circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss on the 
basis that Bayer had consented to personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in this 
state.  In addition to circumscribing the basis for asserting general jurisdiction to those 
grounds for jurisdiction set out in Daimler, Norfolk explicitly rejected the notion that, by 
registering to do business in Missouri and appointing registered agents here, a company 
consents to personal jurisdiction in this state even over unrelated claims.  512 S.W.3d at 
9 
 
52-53.  “The plain language of Missouri’s registration statutes does not mention consent to 
personal jurisdiction for unrelated claims, nor does it purport to provide an independent 
basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations that register in Missouri.”  Id. at 52.  Instead, 
“section 351.594.1 provides only that registration is consent to service of process that 
Missouri requires or permits to be served on foreign corporations.”  Id.  “[T]he registration 
statute does not provide an independent basis for broadening Missouri’s personal 
jurisdiction to include suits unrelated to the corporation’s forum activities when the usual 
bases for general jurisdiction are not present.”  Id. 
For the reasons stated in Norfolk, Bayer did not consent to personal jurisdiction 
merely because it registered to do business and appointed registered agents in Missouri.  
To otherwise hold would result in universal personal jurisdiction for corporations 
complying with registration statutes in many states and would be inconsistent with the 
holdings of Daimler and Norfolk.  
C. 
Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over Bayer as to Nonresident 
Plaintiffs’ Claims in the Original Petition  
 
“Specific jurisdiction requires consideration of the ‘relationship among the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”  Norfolk, 512 S.W.3d at 48, quoting, Andra v. 
Left Gate Prop. Holding, Inc., 453 S.W.3d 216, 226 (Mo. banc 2015).  It encompasses only 
those “cases in which the suit arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum.”  Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 749 (alterations in original).  “In other words, there must 
be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] 
activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’”  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
10 
 
v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cnty., 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017), quoting, 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).  “For this 
reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or 
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’”  Id., quoting Goodyear, 
564 U.S. at 919.    
This Court has, therefore, held, “Only if the instant suit arises out of [defendant’s] 
contacts with Missouri does Missouri have specific jurisdiction.”  Norfolk, 512 S.W.3d at 
49.  To say that “if a company is a national company that does the same ‘type’ of business 
in the forum state as in the rest of the country, it can be sued anywhere” “would be to turn 
specific jurisdiction on its head.” Id.  For this reason, Norfolk held merely doing business 
in a state or being subject to specific jurisdiction in a state with respect to different but 
similar suits arising out of activities in that state is not sufficient to give a court specific 
jurisdiction over similar causes of action not arising out of or related to activities in the 
state.  Id.  
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court utilized the same analysis this Court 
applied in Norfolk in rejecting an argument, identical to the one here asserted by Plaintiffs, 
that nonresident plaintiffs can gain “piggyback” jurisdiction by joining their claims with 
the claims of plaintiffs with a connection to the forum state.  137 S.Ct. at 1781.  In Bristol-
Myers Squibb, a group of plaintiffs brought a class action alleging personal injuries arising 
out of their use of a prescription drug Bristol-Myers Squibb manufactures.  Id. at 1778.  
The lawsuit was filed in California even though most of the plaintiffs were nonresidents 
and “all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere.”  Id. at 
11 
 
1782.  Nonetheless, the nonresident plaintiffs argued that, because their claims were similar 
in several ways to the claims of the California residents as to which specific jurisdiction 
was uncontested, California also had specific jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ 
similar claims.  Id. at 1779.   
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding the “mere fact that other plaintiffs were 
prescribed, obtained, and ingested [the drug] in California – and allegedly sustained the 
same injuries as did the nonresidents – does not allow the State to assert specific 
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims,” because “[w]hat is needed – and what is 
missing here – is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”  Id. at 
1781 (emphasis in original).  Any holding to the contrary, the Supreme Court indicated, 
would result in a “loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”  Id.  
Utilizing “settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction,” Bristol-Myers Squibb 
reaffirms Norfolk’s holding that Plaintiffs’ theory here, which relies on other plaintiffs’ 
experiences in Missouri as a predicate for all claims by anyone suffering the same injury, 
must be rejected.  Id.  Due process requires there be an affiliation between the forum and 
the underlying controversy.  In the original petition, nonresident Plaintiffs failed to plead 
facts showing their claims arose out of or relate to Missouri activities of Bayer or their 
injuries occurred here.   
In light of Norfolk, BNSF, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, Plaintiffs now concede they 
do not have general or consent jurisdiction over Bayer, and their specific jurisdiction theory 
also fails to give Missouri personal jurisdiction over nonresident Plaintiffs’ claims.  But 
Plaintiffs assert, although they have yet to do so, they will seek leave to file an amended 
12 
 
petition alleging a fourth jurisdictional theory asserting Missouri has specific jurisdiction 
over nonresident Plaintiffs on a different ground – that Bayer’s predecessor, Conceptus, 
conducted marketing and clinical trials for Essure in Missouri and nonresident Plaintiffs’ 
injuries allegedly arose out of and related to those trials and marketing.  Nonresident 
Plaintiffs assert this is sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction over their claims, 
although they concede they have cited no published decision finding such trials or 
marketing sufficient when it is not alleged the injuries arose out of those trials or marketing.  
Bayer notes the clinical trials in Missouri were just four of 27 clinical trials 
conducted across the country and its marketing of the drug in Missouri was part of a 
national marketing of the drug.  It says if these activities were sufficient to provide specific 
jurisdiction in Missouri over plaintiffs who did not use the product in Missouri and do not 
reside here, then these same activities would be sufficient to provide specific jurisdiction 
over it in the dozens of states in which Bayer conducted similar studies and marketing.  
This would simply be another way of gaining general jurisdiction over Bayer in the many 
states in which it does business, in contravention of Daimler’s and Bristol-Myers Squibb’s 
rejections of such a basis for general or specific jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs counter they need 
time for discovery on their new jurisdictional theory. 
The question of whether the new jurisdictional grounds set out in Plaintiffs’ 
proposed amended petition provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over Bayer was not 
before the circuit court at the time it overruled Bayer’s motion to dismiss – and indeed is 
not before the circuit court now, as the amended petition has not yet been filed nor has 
leave to file it been sought in the circuit court.  See Rule 67.06 (“On sustaining a motion to 
13 
 
dismiss a claim … the court shall freely grant leave to amend and shall specify the time 
within which the amendment shall be made or amended pleading filed.”).  The claims of 
jurisdiction in a proposed amended petition, therefore, were not and could not have been 
the subject of the overruling of the motion to dismiss.  And the petition for writ of 
prohibition sought relief only as to the overruling of the motion to dismiss, and that is the 
only order subject to this Court’s preliminary writ of prohibition.  
Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that issues to “confine a lower court to the 
proper exercise of jurisdiction.”  Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d at 234.  The circuit court could not 
have acted in excess of its jurisdiction in regard to the amended petition when it has not 
yet been filed and the court has yet to address its allegations of personal jurisdiction.  The 
same is true as to the discovery Plaintiffs say they need to conduct regarding jurisdictional 
issues to support their new jurisdictional claims.  The circuit court has not yet had an 
opportunity to consider this as-yet-unfiled discovery or to consider any motions for 
protective order Bayer may seek to file to limit its scope. 
For these reasons, this Court finds the proposed amended petition and the discovery 
Plaintiffs say they will seek on jurisdictional allegations contained in it are outside the 
scope of the issues before this Court at this time.  It is up to the circuit court in the first 
instance to consider whether the proposed amended petition should be filed, whether 
jurisdictional discovery requested by Plaintiffs is appropriate, and whether a protective 
order is necessary to limit its nature and extent.  Further, it is premature to address Bayer’s 
contention that nonresident Plaintiffs’ claims should be severed and transferred to 
appropriate venues or its allegation that all Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the FDCA 
14 
 
in light of the discovery that still may be undertaken on jurisdictional issues and until it is 
determined whether these claims will be dismissed outright. 
IV.  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons noted above, the circuit court erred in overruling the motion to 
dismiss the original petition.  In light of the fact an amended petition is proposed that is not 
before this Court, this Court directs the trial court to vacate its order overruling the motion 
to dismiss, without prejudice, and to consider whether to permit Plaintiffs to file the 
proposed amended petition and whether a protective order is appropriate as to some or all 
of the proposed discovery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
 
All concur.