Title: Commonwealth v. Nuckles

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 022776  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   October 31, 2003 
RICHARD WAYNE NUCKLES 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth of Virginia challenges the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversing the trial 
court’s conviction of Richard Wayne Nuckles (“Nuckles”) for 
grand larceny.  The Court of Appeals held that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove that Breeden Mechanical, Inc. 
(“Breeden”), was a corporation, as alleged in the 
indictment.  Nuckles v. Commonwealth, No. 2570-01-4 (Va. 
Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2002).  Because we conclude that proof of 
Breeden’s corporate status was not necessary to identify 
Breeden as the victim of the larceny or to establish an 
element of the offense, and that the Commonwealth proved 
that Breeden owned the stolen property, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the 
defendant’s conviction. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The indictment charging Nuckles with grand larceny 
alleged that 
[o]n or about November 8, 1998, in the County of 
Warren, Richard Wayne Nuckles did unlawfully and 
feloniously take, steal, and carry away the goods and 
chattels of Breeden Mechanical Inc., in violation of 
Section 18.2-95 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as 
amended. 
 
Nuckles was convicted in the Circuit Court of Warren County 
of the charged offense and sentenced to four years of 
incarceration, with one year suspended. 
 
The evidence at trial showed that Nuckles worked for 
Breeden for approximately a month.  Breeden performed 
plumbing services and hired Nuckles to work as a plumbing 
foreman.  Breeden provided Nuckles with a “company truck,” 
equipped with all the supplies and tools needed to work on 
plumbing jobs, as Breeden does for anyone it hires as a 
plumbing foreman.  The truck, with “Breeden Mechanical all 
over both sides,” belonged to Breeden and was “given” to 
Nuckles “to use on the job and drive back and forwards from 
home.”  “Breeden Mechanical own[ed] the tools,” as well as 
the truck, according to the testimony of Nuckles’ 
supervisor. 
 
Nuckles advised his supervisor on a Friday that he had 
not been at work all week because of his mother’s illness.  
Although Nuckles indicated that he would be at work on the 
next Monday, he never returned to work at Breeden.  Soon 
thereafter, several Breeden employees, at the direction of 
Nuckles’ supervisor, went to Nuckles’ residence to retrieve 
 
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Breeden’s truck.  When the truck was recovered, the 
“Breeden Mechanical” sign on the side of the truck could no 
longer be seen because it had “duct tape over it.”  All the 
supplies and tools were missing from the truck.  Nuckles’ 
supervisor testified that Nuckles did not have any 
authority to dispose of the tools. 
 
Nuckles appealed his conviction to the Court of 
Appeals, contending that the evidence was not sufficient to 
prove that the owner of the stolen goods was a corporate 
entity as alleged in the indictment.  The Court of Appeals 
agreed and reversed the trial court’s judgment.  The Court 
of Appeals found that the term “Inc.” could not be 
dismissed as “surplusage” under Code § 19.2-226(9) “because 
it described, limited, and qualified that which was 
necessary to charge.”  Nuckles, slip op. at 4.  In 
conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that the Commonwealth 
failed “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 
stole property belonging to Breeden Mechanical Inc.”  Id.  
The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue in this case is whether the Commonwealth had 
to prove the corporate status of the victim in this 
prosecution for larceny.  The Commonwealth contends that 
 
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the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was required 
to establish that Breeden was actually incorporated at the 
time of the offense.  The Commonwealth argues that, once it 
proved that Breeden’s property was stolen, proof of 
Breeden’s corporate status was irrelevant. 
 
In response, Nuckles asserts that the burden was on 
the Commonwealth to prove that corporate property was 
stolen and that it failed to do so.  Because the entity 
alleged in the indictment was “Breeden Mechanical Inc.,” 
Nuckles argues that evidence of Breeden’s corporate status 
was required to sustain his conviction for larceny.  In 
Nuckles’ words, “the Commonwealth was well aware that the 
‘victim’ in this case [w]as a corporation as evidenced by 
the indictment and simply tried to take a shortcut by 
having the superintendent testify to ownership.” 
 
In Gardner v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 18, 25, 546 S.E.2d 
686, 690 (2001), this Court vacated a defendant’s 
conviction and dismissed an indictment because a “fatal 
variance” existed between the indictment and the evidence.  
The defendant in that case was charged with obtaining 
United States currency by false pretenses in violation of 
Code § 18.2-178.  Id. at 19, 546 S.E.2d at 686.  Because 
the indictment alleged that the property belonged to George 
Gardner, the issue centered on whether the owner of the 
 
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currency was the bank account depositor, Gardner, or the 
bank from which the money was obtained.  Id. at 19-20, 546 
S.E.2d at 687.  We held that “when the Commonwealth alleged 
in the indictment that the money obtained by the defendant 
was the property of George Gardner but the evidence showed 
the money was the property of the bank, it proved a 
different offense, resulting in a fatal variance.”  Id. at 
25, 546 S.E.2d at 690. 
 
In an earlier analogous case, we held that a fatal 
variance existed between the allegation in an indictment 
charging a defendant with shooting into the residence of 
Edna Harper and the evidence showing that the defendant 
actually shot into the residence of Alberta Riddick.  
Etheridge v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 328, 330, 171 S.E.2d 
190, 191-92 (1969).  We stated that, while it was necessary 
for the Commonwealth to allege in the indictment that the 
defendant shot into an occupied dwelling house, the 
additional allegation that the dwelling house was that of 
Edna Harper “described, limited, and qualified that which 
was necessary to be alleged, and the added language [could 
not], therefore, be treated as surplusage.”  Id., 171 
S.E.2d at 192; cf. Alston v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 661, 
666, 529 S.E.2d 851, 854 (2000) (holding that, in an 
indictment for maliciously burning a dwelling house, an 
 
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allegation regarding ownership of the house was immaterial 
to the offense). 
 
Our holding in both Gardner and Etheridge relied on 
the following principle: 
 
If the unnecessary word or words inserted in the 
indictment describe, limit or qualify the words which 
it was necessary to insert therein, then they are 
descriptive of the offense charged in the indictment 
and cannot be rejected as surplusage.  The offense as 
charged must be proved. 
 
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 560, 127 S.E. 368, 
374 (1925).  As noted by the Commonwealth on brief, the 
unnecessary language found in the indictment in Mitchell, 
that the defendant made “a false and fraudulent entry in 
the ledger account of the accused with the bank,” described 
the manner in which the defendant committed the crime.  Id. 
at 553, 127 S.E. at 372.  Thus, we held that, since “the 
Commonwealth elected to restrict the prosecution to a 
‘false and fraudulent’ entry,” it was “bound to sustain the 
allegation by proof.”  Id. at 560, 127 S.E. at 374.  
Similarly, the words at issue in Gardner and Etheridge were 
not surplusage because they were descriptive of the offense 
charged, namely the identity of the victim, but the 
evidence pointed to a different victim, thus creating a 
fatal variance. 
 
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Here, we agree with the observation of the Court of 
Appeals that the “term ‘Inc.’ has legal meaning and 
significance.”  Nuckles, slip op. at 4.  However, the 
significance of the term relates solely to the legal status 
of the victim and not to the identity of the victim or the 
manner in which the crime was committed as was the 
situation in Gardner and Etheridge, and in Mitchell, 
respectively.  Proof that Breeden was incorporated at the 
time of the offense was not necessary to identify Breeden 
as the victim of this larceny, nor was Breeden’s corporate 
status an element of the offense.  Inclusion of the term 
“Inc.” in Breeden’s name merely reflected the requirement 
found in Code § 13.1-630 that a corporate name shall 
include one of several listed words or abbreviations, the 
term “Inc.” being one of the options. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence at trial established the 
identity of the victim in this case.  Nuckles’ supervisor 
testified that Breeden owned the truck and the tools that 
had been supplied to Nuckles but were not returned by him.  
The identification of Breeden as the owner of the stolen 
property was not limited or qualified by its corporate 
status.  Thus, we hold that the term “Inc.” was surplusage 
in this case.  There was no fatal variance between the 
indictment and the proof at trial. 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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