Title: Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 41 
Docket: 
Fed-16-31 
Argued: 
October 25, 2016 
Decided: 
March 7, 2017 
Corrected:  
March 23, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
LORRAINE SCAMMAN et al. 
 
v. 
 
SHAW’S SUPERMARKETS, INC. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Pursuant to 4 M.R.S. § 57 (2016), the United States District Court 
for the District of Maine has certified to us the following question of state law: 
Is a claim for disparate impact age discrimination under the Maine 
Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A), evaluated under the 
“reasonable factor other than age” standard, see Smith v. City of 
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005); the “business necessity” standard, 
see Maine Human Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253 
(1979); or some other standard? 
 
We answer the certified question as follows: “A claim for disparate impact age 
discrimination pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. 
§ 4572(1)(A), is evaluated according to the ‘business necessity’ framework.” 
 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The facts and procedural history are undisputed.  Lorraine 
Scamman and others similarly situated (collectively, the plaintiffs) worked at 
various Shaw’s Supermarkets locations in Maine as full-time employees when 
their employment was terminated in 2012 as part of a reduction in force. 
Pursuant to a policy Shaw’s implemented to carry out the reduction in force, 
only full-time employees were terminated.  Because full-time employees were, 
on average, older than part-time employees, the reduction in force affected 
more older employees, including the plaintiffs, than younger employees.  
Shaw’s explained that “business imperatives made it necessary . . . to cut costs 
by at least $550,000 per week, company-wide, and the reduction in force 
allowed it to do so.” 
 
[¶3]  After the plaintiffs filed complaints with the Maine Human Rights 
Commission alleging age discrimination in violation of the Maine Human 
Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551-4634 (2012),1 a Commission investigator 
recommended that the Commission find reasonable grounds to believe that 
                                         
1  Portions of the MHRA not relevant to the question presented in this case have been amended 
since the plaintiffs filed their claim.  See P.L. 2015, ch. 457, §§ 1-4 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified 
at 5 M.R.S. §§ 4553(1-H), (9-E)(A), 4582-A(3), 4592(8) (2016)); P.L. 2015, ch. 102, § 9 (effective 
Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 5 M.R.S. § 4594-D(11) (2016)); P.L. 2013, ch. 576, §§ 1-3 (effective Aug. 1, 
2014) (codified at 5 M.R.S. § 4573(5), (6)(B), (7) (2016)). 
 
 
3 
Shaw’s had violated the MHRA by discriminating based on age pursuant to a 
disparate impact theory.2  The investigator applied the three-step, 
burden-shifting “business necessity” framework to analyze the plaintiffs’ 
allegations.  See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-35 (1971); Me. Human Rights 
Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1264-68 (Me. 1979).  The 
Commission voted unanimously to adopt the investigator’s analysis and 
recommendations.   
 
[¶4]  The plaintiffs then filed a complaint in the Superior Court 
(Androscoggin County), alleging unlawful employment discrimination based 
on age pursuant to the MHRA.3  See 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) (2016).  After 
Shaw’s removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of 
Maine, the court, upon a joint request by the parties, certified to us the 
question of what framework of proof applies to a claim of disparate impact 
                                         
2  The investigator recommended that the Commission find no reasonable grounds to believe 
that Shaw’s violated the MHRA based on a disparate treatment (i.e., “intentional discrimination”) 
theory.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015); Me. Human 
Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261-62 (Me. 1979). 
 
3  The MHRA prohibits recovery of attorney fees as well as compensatory and punitive damages 
under certain circumstances unless the plaintiff has filed a complaint with the Commission and one 
of several outcomes has resulted.  5 M.R.S. § 4622(1) (2016); see Gordan v. Cummings, 2000 ME 68, 
¶ 11, 756 A.2d 942.  Those outcomes include the Commission’s “[f]ail[ure], within 90 days after 
finding reasonable grounds to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred, to enter into a 
conciliation agreement to which the plaintiff was a party.”  5 M.R.S. § 4622(1)(B). 
 
4 
age discrimination brought pursuant to the MHRA.  See Scamman v. Shaw’s 
Supermarkets, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00295-JDL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10271 (D. Me. 
Jan. 26, 2016). 
[¶5]  Shaw’s argues that a provision of the federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 621-634 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 
114-328), known as the “reasonable factor other than age” (RFOA) defense, 
should apply to MHRA claims of disparate impact age discrimination.  The 
parties agree that if the RFOA defense applies pursuant to Maine law, Shaw’s 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs’ age 
discrimination claim.  They also agree that if the Commission was correct to 
apply the “business necessity” framework instead, further discovery will be 
necessary to develop the issues of (1) whether the reduction in force was 
actually motivated by a business necessity and (2) if so, whether 
less-discriminatory alternatives would have served those business needs.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Acceptance of the Certified Question of State Law 
 
[¶6]  We must first decide whether to accept and answer the certified 
question.  See 4 M.R.S. § 57; Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 25.1 at 194 
 
5 
(4th ed. 2013) (“Consideration of the merits of a certified question is not 
automatic.”). 
[W]herever reasonably possible, the state court of last resort 
should be given opportunity to decide state law issues on which 
there are no state precedents which are controlling or clearly 
indicative of the developmental course of the state law because 
this approach (1) tend[s] to avoid the uncertainty and 
inconsistency in the exposition of state law caused when federal 
[c]ourts render decisions of [s]tate law which have an interim 
effectiveness until the issues are finally settled by the state court 
of last resort; and (2) minimize[s] the potential for state-federal 
tensions arising from actual, or fancied, federal [c]ourt efforts to 
influence the development of [s]tate law. 
 
Bankr. Estate of Everest v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2015 ME 19, ¶ 14, 111 A.3d 655 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶7]  “Title 4 M.R.S. § 57 authorizes, but does not require, us to consider 
a certified question of state law posed by a federal court in certain 
circumstances.”  Id. ¶ 13 (quotation marks omitted); see M.R. App. P. 25(a).  
We may consider the merits of a certified question when three criteria are 
met: “(1) there is no dispute as to the material facts at issue; (2) there is no 
clear controlling precedent; and (3) our answer, in at least one alternative, 
would be determinative of the case.”  Everest, 2015 ME 19, ¶ 13, 111 A.3d 655 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
6 
 
[¶8]  In this case, all three requirements are met.  First, the material 
facts are undisputed.  Second, there is no clear controlling precedent—
although we have made clear that the business necessity test applies in MHRA 
disparate impact cases based on sex discrimination, see City of Auburn, 
408 A.2d at 1261-68, we have not yet expressly articulated what framework 
applies in age-based disparate impact employment discrimination cases 
pursuant to the MHRA.4  Finally, the plaintiffs agree that if the ADEA’s RFOA 
defense does apply, Shaw’s is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  In one 
alternative, therefore, our answer to the certified question would be 
determinative of the case.  Because all three criteria are met, we elect to 
consider and answer the certified question. 
B. 
Legal Background 
 
1. 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Claims 
 
[¶9]  The law recognizes at least two theories of liability upon which a 
plaintiff may prove a claim of employment discrimination: “disparate 
treatment” and “disparate impact.”  See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 
                                         
4  In Maine Human Rights Commission v. Department of Corrections, we addressed a claim that an 
employer discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of age and sex in violation of the 
then-existing version of the MHRA.  474 A.2d 860, 863 (Me. 1984).  The plaintiff’s claim included 
both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories.  Id. at 863-64.  Analyzing the disparate 
impact allegations, we concluded at the first step that the plaintiff could not meet her initial burden 
to make a prima facie showing of a disparate impact.  Id. at 865-66.  We did not address what 
framework of proof should apply to age discrimination claims specifically, nor did we discuss the 
ADEA or the RFOA defense.  See id. 
 
7 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015); City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261-63.  In a 
disparate impact claim, such as the suit at issue in this case, the plaintiff 
alleges that he or she is a member of a protected group that is 
disproportionately affected by an employer’s practice.  E.g., City of Auburn, 
408 A.2d at 1264-68.  Statistical evidence is the “primary method” by which a 
plaintiff supports this type of claim.5  Id. at 1264. 
 
2. 
The Business Necessity Framework 
 
[¶10]  The business necessity framework, pursuant to which the 
Commission analyzed the disparate impact claim in this case, consists of a 
three-step burden-shifting scheme: 
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact by identifying a facially neutral practice that affects one 
group more harshly than another.  Second, if the plaintiff meets 
her burden in the first step, the defendant must present prima 
facie evidence that its practice is justified by a business necessity.  
Finally, if the defendant meets its burden in the second step, the 
plaintiff must present prima facie evidence that the defendant’s 
proffered justification is pretextual or that other practices would 
have a less discriminatory impact. 
 
Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 24, 86 A.3d 52 
(citations omitted). 
                                         
5  In a “disparate treatment” claim, also called an “intentional discrimination” claim, the plaintiff 
alleges that the employer engaged in an adverse employment action against him or her as an 
individual because of a characteristic that is protected by human rights legislation.  See Abercrombie 
& Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2031-32; City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1263. 
 
8 
 
[¶11]  The federal courts apply the business necessity framework to 
disparate impact claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-328), 
which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of various 
characteristics not including age.  See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a); Albemarle, 
422 U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-35.  In City of Auburn, we applied the 
business necessity framework to an MHRA claim of disparate impact sex 
discrimination.  408 A.2d at 1264-68. 
 
3. 
The RFOA Defense 
 
[¶12]  Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of various characteristics other than 
age, the ADEA is the federal statutory scheme that proscribes age 
discrimination in employment.  See 29 U.S.C.S. § 623(a).6  The ADEA also 
                                         
6  The ADEA provides, in relevant part: 
 
§ 623. Prohibition of age discrimination. 
 
(a) Employer practices.  It shall be unlawful for an employer— 
 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; 
 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s age; or 
 
9 
specifies, however, that “[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take 
any action otherwise prohibited under subsection[] (a) . . . where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.”  29 U.S.C.S. 
§ 623(f)(1).  This is the RFOA defense. 
 
[¶13]  In light of the RFOA defense, courts analyzing disparate impact 
age discrimination claims filed pursuant to the ADEA do not apply the 
business necessity framework.  Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 
84, 97-99 (2008).  Once the plaintiff has satisfied his or her burden to make 
out a prima facie case of disparate impact, there is no inquiry into whether the 
employer’s facially neutral practice constitutes a business necessity or 
whether the employer could have accomplished the same goal by 
less-discriminatory means.  See id. at 95-100; Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 
228, 240, 243 (2005).  Instead, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish 
that the challenged practice is based on a reasonable factor other than age.  
29 U.S.C.S. § 623(f)(1); see Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91-96; Smith, 544 U.S. at 243; 
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (2016).  The United States Supreme Court has made clear 
that the existence of the RFOA defense in the ADEA means that “the scope of 
                                                                                                                                   
 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this 
Act. 
 
29 U.S.C.S. § 623(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-328). 
 
10 
disparate-impact liability under [the] ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.”  
Smith, 544 U.S. at 240; see Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102. 
C. 
Analysis 
 
1. 
Standards of Review 
 
[¶14]  The question before us is whether the business necessity 
standard applies to disparate impact age discrimination claims filed pursuant 
to the MHRA, whether the ADEA’s RFOA defense applies, or whether some 
other framework of proof applies.  To answer this question, we examine the 
terms of the MHRA in light of the legal background we have described.  When 
interpreting a statute, “we give effect to the Legislature’s intent by considering 
the statute’s plain meaning and the entire statutory scheme of which the 
provision at issue forms a part.”  Samsara Mem’l Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & 
Zimmerman, 2014 ME 107, ¶ 42, 102 A.3d 757.  Only if the plain language of 
the statute is ambiguous will we look beyond that language to examine other 
indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history.  Zablotny v. State Bd. of 
Nursing, 2014 ME 46, ¶ 18, 89 A.3d 143.  “Statutory language is considered 
ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.”  Id. 
(alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  “When a statute 
administered by an agency is ambiguous, we review whether the agency’s 
 
11 
interpretation of the statute is reasonable and uphold its interpretation unless 
the statute plainly compels a contrary result.”  Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office 
Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 23, 58 A.3d 1083 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
2. 
Plain Language 
 
[¶15]  The MHRA provides: “The opportunity for an individual to secure 
employment without discrimination because of race, color, sex, sexual 
orientation, physical or mental disability, religion, age, ancestry or national 
origin is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.”  5 M.R.S. § 4571 
(2016).  More specifically, 
It is unlawful employment discrimination, in violation of this Act, 
except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification . . . 
[f]or any employer to fail or refuse to hire or otherwise 
discriminate against any applicant for employment because of 
race or color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, 
religion, age, ancestry or national origin . . . or, because of those 
reasons, to discharge an employee or discriminate with respect to 
hire, tenure, promotion, transfer, compensation, terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment or any other matter directly or 
indirectly related to employment . . . . 
 
5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A). 
 
[¶16]  In a section describing what is “[n]ot unlawful employment 
discrimination,” the MHRA expressly allows discrimination on account of age 
effected in order to (1) comply with “laws relating to the employment of 
 
12 
minors” and (2) “[o]bserve the terms of any bona fide employee benefit plan” 
that, inter alia, complies with the ADEA.  5 M.R.S. § 4573(1-A) (2016).  
Although section 4573(1-A) specifically refers to the ADEA in describing what 
is “[n]ot unlawful employment discrimination,” that section contains no 
provision allowing an employer to take otherwise prohibited actions “where 
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.”7  
Cf. 29 U.S.C.S. § 623(a), (f)(1).  This suggests that the Legislature, while fully 
aware of the provisions of the ADEA, did not intend for the RFOA defense to 
be available pursuant to Maine law. 
 
[¶17]  On the other hand, the MHRA also does not affirmatively provide 
that the business necessity test applies to disparate impact age discrimination 
claims.  Moreover, although the phrase “business necessity” appears in an 
MHRA provision describing a defense to claims where the plaintiff alleges 
certain types of discrimination against an individual with a disability, that 
section does not refer to claims based on other protected characteristics, such 
as age.  See 5 M.R.S. § 4573-A (2016).8  This could suggest a legislative choice 
                                         
7  Nor did the Legislature include any reference to an RFOA defense in a section entitled 
“Defenses,” 5 M.R.S. § 4573-A (2016), or in any other portion of the MHRA. 
 
8  Title 5 M.R.S. § 4573-A provides, in relevant part: 
 
§ 4573-A.  Defenses 
 
 
13 
that the business necessity framework should apply only to disability-related 
MHRA claims.9  See Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me. 1994) (“[A] 
well-settled rule of statutory interpretation states that express mention of one 
concept implies the exclusion of others not listed.”).  Looking only at the 
statute’s plain language, we therefore conclude that the statute is “reasonably 
susceptible to different interpretations,” Zablotny, 2014 ME 46, ¶ 18, 89 A.3d 
143 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted), and is therefore 
ambiguous. 
 
3. 
Agency Deference 
 
[¶18]  As we noted above, we give deference to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers.  Fuhrmann, 
                                                                                                                                   
1.  General provisions.  It is a defense to a charge of discrimination under 
this subchapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests or 
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or 
benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, and such performance [cannot] be accomplished 
by reasonable accommodation, as required by this subchapter. 
 
(Emphases added.) 
 
9  This is merely one possible interpretation of 5 M.R.S. § 4573-A, which renders the MHRA 
ambiguous as to the question presented in this case.  We do not mean to suggest that it is 
necessarily the “correct” interpretation.  Indeed, the statute refers to “a defense to a charge of 
discrimination under this subchapter,” 5 M.R.S. § 4573-A(1) (emphasis added), which ostensibly 
includes non-disability-based discrimination claims, see 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) (2016).  And no 
indication exists in our case law to suggest that we have abandoned the business necessity 
framework for non-disability-based disparate impact claims since the enactment of section 4573-A 
in 1995.  See Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 24, 86 A.3d 52 (“We 
evaluate claims of disparate impact in the employment context using [the] . . . three-step, 
burden-shifting [business necessity] analysis.”); P.L. 1995, ch. 393, § 21 (effective Sept. 29, 1995); 
P.L. 1995, ch. 511, § 1 (effective Feb. 22, 1996). 
 
14 
2012 ME 135, ¶ 23, 58 A.3d 1083.  “We will not second-guess the agency on 
matters falling within its realm of expertise.”  Mulready v. Bd. of Real Estate 
Appraisers, 2009 ME 135, ¶ 13, 984 A.2d 1285 (quotation marks omitted); 
see also Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 383 A.2d 
369, 378 (Me. 1978). 
 
[¶19]  The Maine Human Rights Commission administers the MHRA; it 
is required to investigate human rights violations and “recommend measures 
calculated to promote the full enjoyment of human rights and personal dignity 
by all the inhabitants of” Maine.  5 M.R.S. § 4566 (2016).  To achieve those 
goals, it has the power to hold evidentiary hearings, adopt rules and 
regulations, publish results of investigations, report to the legislative and 
executive branches, and do “everything reasonably necessary to perform its 
duties under” the MHRA.  5 M.R.S. § 4566(4), (7), (10)-(12). 
 
[¶20]  Here, guided by City of Auburn, the Commission investigator 
unequivocally applied the business necessity framework to the plaintiffs’ 
disparate impact age discrimination claims, and the Commission unanimously 
adopted the investigator’s report.  The Commission has also made clear, in its 
amicus brief, its interpretation that the ADEA’s RFOA defense does not apply 
to MHRA claims and that the business necessity framework does apply.  
 
15 
Contrary to what Shaw’s contends, therefore, the Commission’s interpretation 
is not indeterminate. 
 
[¶21]  Nor is the Commission’s interpretation unreasonable.  
See Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 23, 58 A.3d 1083.  On the contrary, its 
interpretation is supported by the MHRA’s legislative history and content and 
by our existing case law. 
 
[¶22]  The Legislature enacted the MHRA in 1971.  P.L. 1971, ch. 501, 
§ 1.  At that time, both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA 
were already in effect.  See City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261 & n.10.  Although 
the ADEA contained the RFOA defense, 29 U.S.C.S. § 623(f)(1), the Maine 
Legislature did not include an RFOA provision in the MHRA.  The Legislature 
revisited the section describing “[n]ot unlawful employment discrimination” 
based on age in 1977, 1979, and 1995.  P.L. 1977, ch. 580, § 14; P.L. 1979, 
ch. 350, §§ 2-3; P.L. 1995, ch. 393, § 15.  The 1979 amendment resulted in an 
express reference to the ADEA.  P.L. 1979, ch. 350, §§ 2-3.  The Legislature did 
not, however, enact an RFOA provision through any of these amendments.  
This history suggests that the Legislature has chosen—intentionally—not to 
limit the scope of its protections against age discrimination by providing for 
an RFOA defense. 
 
16 
 
[¶23]  The United States Supreme Court concluded in Smith that the 
legislative history of the ADEA demonstrates that Congress’s decisions to 
enact the ADEA separately from Title VII and to provide for the RFOA defense 
were based in part on the notion that “age, unlike race or other classifications 
protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s 
capacity to engage in certain types of employment.”10  544 U.S. at 240.  The 
legislative history of the MHRA does not suggest that the Maine Legislature 
agreed with that premise.  Instead, “against the background of prior federal 
antidiscrimination statutes,” City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261—namely, Title 
VII and the ADEA—the Legislature enacted a unitary antidiscrimination 
statute that is similar to Title VII but that includes age as a protected 
characteristic.  Unlike Congress, the Maine Legislature did not create a 
separate statutory scheme specific to age discrimination.  The MHRA’s situs 
on the historical timeline of anti-discrimination legislation, considered 
alongside the absence of statutory language creating an RFOA defense, 
suggests that the Legislature did not intend for the scope of protection from 
                                         
10  The Supreme Court noted that “[d]uring the deliberations that preceded the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered and rejected proposed amendments that would have 
included older workers among the classes protected from employment discrimination.”  Smith v. 
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). 
 
 
17 
age discrimination to be any different from the scope of protection from 
discrimination based on the other characteristics enumerated in the MHRA.11 
 
[¶24]  Shaw’s argues that we should not “reject the use of the RFOA test 
because it is not included in the statute,” where the MHRA also does not 
expressly codify the business necessity test for age-based discrimination 
claims.  This argument relies on an inapt comparison because the two 
standards differ in nature.  The RFOA defense is a creature of the ADEA 
statute; it is an affirmative defense, not a “test.”  Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91-95; 
29 U.S.C.S. § 623(f)(1).  It allows an employer that demonstrates certain facts 
to engage in “otherwise prohibited” conduct.  See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 95 
(“[A] defense to what is ‘otherwise prohibited’ is an affirmative defense, 
entirely the responsibility of the party raising it.”).  The business necessity 
test, conversely, is a judicially-created method of allocating the burdens 
involved in proving entitlement to relief on a claim that an employer’s facially 
neutral practice has the consequence of discriminating on the basis of a 
protected characteristic.  See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
431-32; City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261-62, 1264.  That the statutory RFOA 
                                         
11  This interpretation is consistent with the notion that Congress intended the ADEA to serve as 
a “floor” of protection from age discrimination.  Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. Kennebec Water Power 
Co., 468 A.2d 307, 310 (Me. 1983) (“It is clear that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to 
leave room for states to supply consistent legislation.”). 
 
18 
language—which already existed in the ADEA when the MHRA was enacted—
is absent from the MHRA therefore sheds significantly more light on the 
Legislature’s intent than does the absence of a codification of the business 
necessity framework, which evolved in the courts after the MHRA was 
enacted. 
 
[¶25]  Our case law interpreting the MHRA also supports the 
Commission’s interpretation.  Shaw’s argues that because the MHRA is “silent” 
on the test to be applied to the claim at issue, we should “look to the ADEA for 
interpretation.”  We have indeed looked to federal human rights legislation, 
and the cases interpreting it, for aid in interpreting the MHRA.  See, e.g., City of 
Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261 (“[T]he Maine legislature—by adopting provisions 
that generally track the federal antidiscrimination statutes—intended the 
courts to look to the federal case law to provide significant guidance in the 
construction of our statute.” (quotation marks omitted)); Wells v. Franklin 
Broad. Corp., 403 A.2d 771, 773 n.4 (Me. 1979) (“[F]ederal cases construing 
the ADEA may aid our interpretation of the provision of the [MHRA] banning 
age discrimination in employment.”). 
 
[¶26]  We have been careful, however, to specify that we will consider 
the construction of a federal counterpart to the MHRA only “when the federal 
 
19 
and state laws are substantially identical.”  Percy v. Allen, 449 A.2d 337, 342 
(Me. 1982); see Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. Kennebec Water Power Co., 
468 A.2d 307, 310 (Me. 1983) (“[W]here the provisions of the Maine statute 
differ substantively from their federal counterparts, . . . deference to 
construction of the federal version is unwarranted.”).  In Kennebec Water 
Power Co., the plaintiff, who was in his thirties, alleged that an employer 
discriminated against him on the basis of age when it hired older workers 
instead of him.  468 A.2d at 308.  The trial court concluded that the ADEA’s 
provision limiting its protection to individuals forty or older, which the MHRA 
does not contain, applied to MHRA claimants.  Id.  We disagreed, concluding 
that “in enacting the age discrimination prohibitions, the Legislature intended 
to supplement the federal ADEA.”  Id. at 310 (emphasis added).  We “decline[d] 
to superimpose a limitation which does not appear on the face of the 
statute.”12  Id. 
 
[¶27]  Unlike the ADEA, the MHRA does not contain an RFOA affirmative 
defense.  This is a substantive difference; the laws are not “substantially 
                                         
12  We held similarly in Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, ¶¶ 24-31, 895 A.2d 309, 
superseded by statute as stated in Rooney v. Sprague Energy Corp., No. CV-06-20-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78147, at *6-8 (D. Me. Oct. 19, 2007).  In that case, we rejected an employer’s argument that 
the MHRA’s definition of “physical or mental disability” should be read to include the requirement 
of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of a showing of a substantial limitation on a major life 
activity.  Id.  We declined to “in effect, amend the MHRA to include the limitation present in federal 
law but not in the Maine Legislature’s enacted definition of ‘disability.’”  Id. ¶ 27. 
 
20 
identical,” Percy, 449 A.2d at 342.  Thus, neither the text of the RFOA 
affirmative defense nor the federal cases applying that text provides helpful 
guidance for interpreting our statute.  We therefore uphold the Commission’s 
reasonable determination that the business necessity test applies to disparate 
impact age discrimination claims brought pursuant to the MHRA.  
See Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 23, 58 A.3d 1083. 
The entry is: 
We answer the certified question as follows: “A 
claim for disparate impact age discrimination 
pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, 
5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A), is evaluated according to 
the ‘business necessity’ framework.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey Neil Young, Esq., Carol J. Garvan, Esq., and Max I. Brooks, Esq. (orally), 
Johnson, Webbert & Young, LLP, Augusta, for appellant Lorraine Scamman et 
al. 
 
K. Joshua Scott, Esq. (orally), Jackson Lewis P.C., Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 
for appellee Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. 
 
Barbara Archer Hirsch, Esq., Maine Human Rights Commission, Augusta, for 
amicus curiae Maine Human Rights Commission 
 
Richard L. O’Meara, Esq., Murray Plumb & Murray, Portland, for amicus curiae 
AARP 
 
 
United States District Court for the District of Maine docket number 2:15-cv-00295-JDL 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY