Title: Fowler v. MVA

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Zachary Shawn Fowler v. Motor Vehicle Administration, No. 111, Sept. Term, 2005.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE – DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION
HEARING – MOTION TO SUBPOENA THE ARRESTING POLICE OFFICER –
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT – DRIVER FULLY ADVISED OF RIGHTS
The Court of Appeals considered whether, during a driver license suspension hearing
conducted under §16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl.
Vol.), an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), faced with conflicting evidence in the form of
an arresting police officer’s written certification in a DR-15 Advice of Rights form and
testimony from the arrested driver, may deny the driver's motion to subpoena the officer
where the driver disputes that he was fully advised by the officer of the consequence for
refusing to take a chemical breath test.  Noting its decision in Forman v. Motor Vehicle
Administration, 332 Md. 201, 630 A.2d 752 (1993), the Court re-emphasized the three
options for an ALJ during a §16-205.1 hearing where the arrested driver files a motion for
a subpoena request and proffers evidence to support the request: accept the proffer and deny
the subpoena, reject the proffer and deny the subpoena, or issue the subpoena to receive
additional evidence.  The Court noted that an ALJ’s treatment of the proffer must be
indicated clearly.  Here, the record yielded no specific or explicit statement indicating
whether the ALJ accepted or rejected Fowler's proffered testimony.  While it recognized that
the ALJ might have attempted to comply with one of the options outlined in Forman, the
Court ultimately remanded the case because, while the ALJ clearly denied the subpoena
request, the basis for his decision was not apparent.  The Court emphasized that for it to
perform its reviewing function, an ALJ’s decision must contain “full, complete and detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 
Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery C ounty
Case # 256013
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 111
September Term, 2005
ZACHARY SHAWN FOWLER
v.
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed: August 30, 2006 
1 All statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are hereafter to the Transportation
Article of the Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.).
2 A chemical breath test is “[a] test of a person’s breath or of 1 specimen of a person’s
blood to determine alcohol concentration.”  §16-205.1(a)(1)(iv)(1).   While a person may not
be compelled to take a chemical breath test, refusal to take a test results in automatic
suspension of the person’s driver’s license.  See §16-205.1(b)(1). 
3 A preliminary breath test (“PBT”) may be requested by a police officer, without
making an arrest and prior to issuing a citation, in order to “guide [] the police officer in
deciding whether an arrest should be made.”  §16-205.2(a) and (c).  However, the State may
not use the results of a PBT in a court action.  §16-205.2(c). 
We consider here whether, during a driver license suspension hearing conducted 
under
§16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.),1 an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), faced with conflicting evidence in the form of an arresting
police officer’s written certification in a DR-15 Advice of Rights form and testimony from
the arrested driver, may deny the driver's motion to subpoena the officer where the driver
disputes that he was fully advised by the officer of the consequence for refusing to take a
chemical breath test.2  
I. 
On 12 June 2004, Zachary Shawn Fowler, Petitioner, was stopped by a Howard
County police officer for making an unsafe lane change.   The arresting officer, noticing a
strong odor of alcohol, asked Fowler to perform certain field sobriety tests.  Fowler
performed poorly on these tests.  The officer then asked Fowler to submit to a preliminary
breath test (“PBT”).3  Fowler refused.  Based on his performance on the field sobriety tests,
the officer arrested Fowler for drunk driving and transported him to the police station.  
4 Under §16-205.1(b)(2), an officer who believes that an individual has been driving
under the influence of alcohol is required to “(i) Detain the person; (ii) Request that the
person permit a test to be taken; [and] (iii) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions
that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test . . . .”  
2
At the police station, the officer provided Fowler with a DR-15 Advice of Rights
form.  The use of this form is intended, first, to advise the arrested driver of the consequences
of refusing or failing a chemical breath test and, second, to certify that the officer complied
with the statute’s advice of rights requirement.4  The form includes the following language
to ensure the driver’s receipt of the required advice of rights: 
Read Before Signing: 
I, the undersigned driver, acknowledge that I have been read or I have
read the above stated Advice of Rights as certified by the police officer.
I understand that this requested test is in addition to any preliminary
tests that were taken. 
Both Fowler and the arresting officer signed the DR-15 Advice of Rights form.  The officer
completed also a DR-15A form, which contained his sworn statement that he had reasonable
grounds to stop Fowler and that Fowler refused a chemical breath test at the station after
being fully advised of the applicable sanctions, as provided in the DR-15 Advice of Rights
form.  
Separate from the criminal charges for drunk driving, Fowler was charged also with
refusing to take a chemical alcohol concentration breath test in violation of §16-205.1.
Section 16-205.1 imposes a mandatory license suspension upon an individual, suspected of
driving under the influence of alcohol, who either refuses to take a chemical breath test or
5 Section 16-205.1(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: 
Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on
a highway or on any private property that is used by the public
in general in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take
a [chemical breath] test if the person should be detained on
suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the
influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol . . . . 
Section 16-205.1(b)(1)(i) describes the mandatory license suspension scheme: 
(i) In the case of a person licensed under this title: 
1. For a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of
0.08 or more at the time of testing: 
A. For a first offense, suspend the driver’s
license for 45 days; or 
B. For a second offense or subsequent
offense, suspend the driver’s license for 90
days; or
2. For a test refusal: 
A. For a first offense, suspend the driver’s
license for 120 days; or 
B. For a second offense or subsequent
offense, suspend the driver’s license for 1
year. 
3
submits to a test and registers a blood alcohol concentration result in excess of 0.08.5  In
accordance with §16-205.1(f)(1), Fowler requested a hearing before the Motor Vehicle
Administration (“MVA”) to contest his license suspension.  Fowler filed also a motion
requesting a subpoena for the arresting officer, in compliance with the Code of Maryland
Regulations (“COMAR”) 11.11.03.07, to question the officer in an effort to support his claim
that he was not advised fully of the administrative sanctions for refusing to take an alcohol
concentration chemical breath test.  The subpoena request proffered that the officer would
6  The following excerpt is from Fowler’s testimony at the suspension hearing: 
[Fowler’s Attorney]: Did he ever tell you that if you did
not take the test at the station that your license would be
suspended for 120 days? 
[Fowler]: Well, he told me that on the street. 
[Fowler’s Attorney]: What did he say on the street? 
[Fowler]: He told me that if I -- he actually told
me when I was actually -- on the street he told me
that if I didn’t take the test he would take me to
the station.  When I got to the station after waiting
there for an extensive period of time he brought
me into the room and gave me papers to actually
(continued...)
4
testify “that the officer did not fully advise [Fowler] of the administrative sanctions that shall
be imposed for submitting to or refusing a test” and “that legally improper and misleading
advice was given.”  Fowler deferred a decision on his subpoena request to the ALJ
conducting his suspension hearing.  See COMAR 11.11.03.07D.  
At his hearing before the ALJ, Fowler disputed that he was fully advised of his rights.
Specifically, he contended that while the officer advised him that his license would be
suspended for 120 days if he refused to take a breath test, the officer did so only at the scene
of the arrest, but not at the police station.  Moreover, Fowler argued that when he was
provided the DR-15 Advice of Rights form at the station the officer informed him that his
license was being suspended because Fowler already had refused to take the test, which
Fowler believed referred to the PBT.6  Fowler stated that he was never offered a second test,
6(...continued)
look at and read, and told me that because I didn’t
take the test my license was going to be
suspended and it was his prerogative whether to
detain me that night or not to, so he decided not
to. 
[Fowler’s Attorney]: Did he ever distinguish
between the test that you refused on the street, did
he ever explain to you that it was a separate test
that he wanted you to take at the station?
[Fowler]: No. . . . 
7 The ALJ entered both the DR-15 Advice of Rights form and the DR-15A form as
evidence for the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”). 
5
the chemical breath test, at the station.  He believed that by signing the DR-15 form he was
merely acknowledging his refusal of the PBT requested by the officer on the street and,
therefore, he did not knowingly refuse a chemical breath test at the station.  While Fowler
conceded that he was given the DR-15 form to read and sign, he stated that he merely
“skimmed over it” before signing it.  He testified as well that the officer did not read it to
him.  Fowler asserted that if the arresting officer were subpoenaed, the officer would testify
consistently with Fowler’s version.7 
After hearing Fowler’s proffer of what the arresting officer would testify to, the ALJ
denied Fowler’s subpoena request.  In his oral ruling, the ALJ stated: 
First off, I’m going to find that the licensee was fully advised.
I conclude primarily from the certification of the officer that he
was fully advised and it's bolstered by the testimony of the
licensee wh[o] was told to read it and he skimmed over it.  And
6
I don’t see the need to call the officer to cross examine him.
There’s no indication the PBT was relied on or not relied on in
this case. 
* * * 
My finding is he was fully advised, and the other finding is I
don’t see the need to call the officer to clarify anything . . . . 
The ALJ suspended Fowler’s license for 120 days, but modified the sentence to only five
days of suspension on the condition that he participate in the Ignition Interlock Program for
one year.  
Fowler sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision by the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, which affirmed relying upon this Court’s decision in Motor Vehicle
Administration v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d 511 (1995).  The Circuit Court
concluded that the ALJ properly exercised his discretion by resolving the conflicting
evidence of Fowler’s testimony and the officer’s certification on the DR-15 Advice of Rights
form.  Noting that Fowler had an opportunity to read the DR-15 form, the court found there
was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision that Fowler was informed of his
rights.  Specifically, the Circuit Court emphasized that under Karwacki, “[t]he ALJ was
under no obligation to believe Petitioner over the officer’s sworn statement.”  Thus, because
the ALJ found the police officer’s sworn statement credible, the Circuit Court determined
that the ALJ properly rejected Fowler's request to subpoena the arresting officer. 
  Fowler filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court.  We granted Fowler’s
petition to consider whether the ALJ, faced with the officer’s certification on the DR-15
8Fowler submitted the following question in his petition: 
Whether an ALJ in a driver license suspension hearing must
apply the rule of Forman v. MVA, [332 Md. 201, 630 A.2d 752
(1993),] rather than MVA v. Karwacki, [340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d
511 (1995),] where there is a dispute on a genuine issue of fact
and the licensee has properly requested a subpoena for the
witness? 
7
Advice of Rights form and Fowler’s conflicting testimony, properly denied Fowler’s request
to subpoena the arresting officer.8  Fowler v. MVA, 390 Md. 500, 889 A.2d 418 (2006).
II. 
Under §10-222(h)(3) of the State Government Article, Maryland Code (1984, 2004
Repl. Vol.), a reviewing court may reverse or modify an administrative decision of a state
agency if it: 
(i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by
competent, material and substantial evidence in light of the entire
record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
A final administrative decision or order shall contain “separate statements of: (i) the findings
of fact; (ii) the conclusions of law; and (iii) the order.”  Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl.
Vol.), State Government Article, §10-221(b)(1).  As this Court has noted, for a reviewing
court to perform properly its examination function, an administrative decision must contain
factual findings on all the material issues of a case and a clear, explicit statement of the
agency’s rationale.  Harford County v. Preston, 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778
9 In this case, the MVA is the relevant administrative agency. The MVA delegated
authority to conduct hearings and render final decisions in contested matters, such as
Fowler’s case, to the Office of Administrative Hearings. See Code of Maryland Regulations
(“COMAR”) 11.11.02.07. 
8
(1991).  A fully explained administrative decision also fulfills another purpose; it recognizes
the “fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before an administrative agency to be
apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision . . . .”  Id.  
When evaluating an administrative agency's decision,9 a reviewing court must not
substitute its judgment for that exercised properly by the agency, especially where the
expertise of the agency is employed in reaching its decision.  See Board of Physician v.
Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999).  “It is well-settled in this State that it is
the function of an administrative agency to make factual findings and to draw inferences
from the facts found.” Karwacki, 340 Md. at 280, 666 A.2d at 515.  As such, a court’s role
in reviewing an agency’s factual determinations is particularly narrow, limited to determining
whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision.  See
Banks, 354 Md. at 67-68, 729 A.2d at 380; United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569,
576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994).  In defining substantial evidence, we have stated that it
requires “relevant evidence [that a] reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”  Caucus v. Maryland Securities, 320 Md. 313, 324, 577 A.2d 783, 788 (1990);
see also Liberty Nursing v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 330 Md. 433, 443,
624 A.2d 941, 946 (1993) (stating that “if reasoning minds could reasonably reach the
9
conclusion reached by the agency from the facts in the record, then it is based upon
substantial evidence, and the court has no power to reject that conclusion”).  An agency
decision is presumed to be valid on its face.  Liberty Nursing, 330 Md. at 443, 624 A.2d at
946.  Thus, where the dispute concerns a factual matter and substantial evidence supports an
agency or administrative decision, we affirm.  Id. 
A reviewing court is not under similar restraint when evaluating administrative
decisions premised on erroneous conclusions of law.  See id. (clarifying that when an issue
before an agency is one of law, no deference is appropriate and the scope of review is much
broader than when reviewing factual determinations); People’s Counsel v. Maryland Marine,
316 Md. 491, 497, 560 A.2d 32, 34-35 (1989).  Despite this broader scope of review, we
have noted that "with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be
accorded the position of the administrative agency."  MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57, 821 A.2d
62, 73 (2003) (quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 69, 729 A.2d at 381).  Thus, a reviewing court may
give considerable weight to the agency’s interpretation of its own statutes.  Id. 
III. 
Section 16-205.1 imposes mandatory license suspension for an individual, suspected
of driving under the influence of alcohol, who either refuses to take a chemical breath test
or submits to a test and registers a result in excess of the legal maximum of 0.08 alcohol
10 This section has been referred to as “Maryland’s ‘implied consent’ and
‘administrative per se’ law against drunk driving” because it provides for “swift
administrative action” to suspend suspected drunk drivers’ licenses, in addition to criminal
penalties that may also be imposed.  Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 344 n.1,
643 A.2d 442, 442 n.1, (1994); see generally Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454,
460-62, 597 A.2d 939, 941-43 (1991) (recounting the history leading to the passage of §16-
205.1). 
11 Section16-205.1(f)(7)(i) sets forth the six issues that may be raised at a hearing
under §16-205.1(f).
10
concentration.10  To encourage drivers to submit to a chemical breath test, the statute imposes
harsher sanctions for refusing to submit to the test than for failing the test.  See §16-
205.1(b)(1)(i); Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 206, 630 A.2d 753, 756
(1993) (stating that the strict penalty for refusing to take a breath test “is designed to
encourage licensees to take, rather than to refuse” alcohol concentration breath tests).  The
statute, however, specifically requires officers to advise drivers of the sanctions to ensure that
arrested drivers may make fully informed decisions.  See §16-205.1(b)(1) and (2).  A driver
whose license has been suspended under §16-205.1 may request a hearing before the MVA
on certain limited issues, including whether the driver was “fully advised.” 11  See §16-
205.1(f)(1).  
In Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration, supra, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764,
this Court examined the options an ALJ considers when a driver, during a §16-205.1 hearing,
files a motion for a subpoena request.  Forman, charged with a violation of §16-205.1 for
refusing a chemical breath test, requested both an administrative hearing to contest her
suspension and a subpoena to compel the arresting officer to testify at her hearing.  Forman,
11
332 Md. at 208, 630 A.2d at 757.  The decision of the subpoena request was deferred to the
ALJ at the hearing.    Forman, 332 Md. at 209, 630 A.2d at 757.  During the hearing, Forman
asserted that, although she had read and signed the DR-15 Advice of Rights form, she was
confused and misled by the officer’s statements which suggested that suspension may not be
mandatory.  Foreman, 332 Md. at 208-11, 630 A.2d at 758-59.  She contended also that she
was induced by the officer to refuse the test, an action contrary to the language of the statute
and the intent of the Legislature.  Id.  Forman stated that the officer promised to return her
to a friend’s home if she refused the test, but told her he would take her to the police station
if she took and failed the test.    Forman, 332 Md. at 210, 630 A.2d at 758.  The ALJ denied
Forman’s motion for a subpoena request.  Forman, 332 Md. at 211, 630 A.2d at 759.  
Finding that the ALJ failed to resolve the critical issue raised by Forman concerning
her advice of rights, we reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the ALJ’s decision
denying the subpoena request.  Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764.  In doing so, we
set forth the following analytical framework for ALJs when considering subpoena requests:
[W]hen faced with a licensee’s proffer and subpoena request, an
ALJ has three distinct choices: (1) accept the proffer’s contents
as true, and indicate this acceptance; (2) reach no conclusion
regarding the truth of the proffer (essentially suspending
judgment) and issue the subpoena; or (3) reject the proffer and
subpoena request entirely, and provide a valid explanation of the
rejection.
Id. 
12
Additionally, in Forman, we emphasized the need for an individual to receive a full
and accurate advice of rights under the implied consent statute.  Forman, 332 Md. at 212-19,
630 A.2d at 759-63.  We stated that it is imperative that a “person detained for drunk driving
. . . be capable of making a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse the alcohol
concentration test.”  Foreman, 332 Md. at 218, 630 A.2d at 762.  This is because an
individual’s driver’s license is an important property interest that may be vital to his or her
ability to function in society on a daily basis.  See Forman, 322 Md. at 214, 630 A.2d at 760.
Importantly, we clarified that “‘[f]ully advised’ [under §16-205.1(f)(8)(i)(3)] means not only
advised initially, but the detaining officer must also take care not to subsequently confuse or
mislead the driver as to his or her rights under the statute.”  Forman, 332 Md. at 217, 630
A.2d at 762 (Emphasis in original).  Likewise, we cautioned that due process demands that
the State “not mislead the defendant or construct road blocks, thus unduly burdening [the
defendant’s] decision-making.”  Forman, 332 Md. at 215, 630 A.2d at 761 (quoting Hare v.
Motor Vehicle Admin., 326 Md. 296, 304, 604 A.2d 914, 918 (1992)).
Two years after Forman, in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Karwacki, supra, 340
Md. at 288-89, 666 A.2d at 519, we re-affirmed the three-option framework enunciated in
Forman.  Karwacki, charged under §16-205.1, argued, like Forman, that he was not fully
advised under the statute.  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 279, 666 A.2d at 515.  Specifically, as a
repeat offender, Karwacki contended that the arresting officer only advised him that his
license would be suspended for 120 days and did not inform him of the increased term of
12 In Karwacki, we noted, on numerous occasions, the absence of a subpoena request.
For instance, in identifying  the issue,  we described it as “whether, at a probable cause
hearing, held pursuant to [§16-205.1(f)(7)], an administrative law judge may give greater
credit to the sworn written statement of an absent police officer, who was not subpoenaed
by either party, than to the conflicting testimony of the motorist.”    Karwacki, 340 Md. at
273, 666 A.2d at 512 (Emphasis added).  Later, in distinguishing Forman, we noted it was
not controlling because in Karwacki’s case “[he] did not subpoena the arresting officer, and
consequently, did not proffer what the officer’s testimony would have been had he been
called to testify.”  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 287, 666 A.2d at 519 (Emphasis added).  Further,
in summarizing our holding, we stated that “by not subpoenaing the arresting officer and
offering only his sworn testimony, directly conflicting the arresting officer’s sworn statement
on a critical point, [Karwacki] presented the ALJ with an all or nothing choice.”  Karwacki,
340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520 (Emphasis added).  The ALJ was therefore entitled to, and
did, resolve the factual dispute in favor of the prima facie evidence of the DR-15
certification.  Id.  The ALJ was “under no obligation to believe the respondent.  Nor, in the
absence of a request to do so, was he obliged to even consider whether to subpoena the
arresting officer.”  Id. (Emphasis added). 
13
suspension for a second offense.  Id.  Faced with conflicting evidence from Karwacki’s
testimony and the officer’s certification on the DR-15 form, the ALJ concluded that the
certification was more credible than the driver’s drunken recollection and suspended his
license.  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 278, 666 A.2d at 514.  Affirming the decision, we noted that
“the ALJ was under no obligation to believe [Karwacki]” over the prima facie evidence of
the DR-15 form.  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520. 
In contrast to Forman, however, the petitioner in Karwacki did not file a motion for
a subpoena request for the charging officer.12  Id.  Consequently, the ALJ was left to consider
only the evidence in front of him: the DR-15 certification form and the petitioner’s
conflicting testimony.  Id.  As we noted, by not subpoenaing the arresting officer, Karwacki
"presented the ALJ with an all or nothing choice."  Id.  Because a signed DR-15 form serves
14
as prima facie evidence to demonstrate that the driver refused the chemical breath test, we
recognized that the ALJ exercised properly his discretion to resolve the conflicting evidence
against the driver.  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283, 289, 666 A.2d at 516, 520.  We ultimately
affirmed the ALJ’s determination that Karwacki’s contradictory statements were not
sufficient to rebut the documentary evidence.  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520.
IV. 
At his suspension hearing, Fowler filed a motion requesting a subpoena for the
arresting officer; therefore, we shall analyze his case according to the principles applied in
Forman.  As we noted, supra, where a motion for a subpoena request has been filed, an ALJ
is faced with three options.  Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764.  First, an ALJ may
accept explicitly the entire proffer, denying the subpoena request.  Id.  The ALJ then assesses
all the evidence before him or her, including the proffer.  Id.  Under this option, an ALJ
determines if the proffer, assumed to be true in its entirety, is sufficient to rebut any
conflicting evidence.  Second, an ALJ may reject the proffer as a whole, also denying the
subpoena request; however, the ALJ must provide additionally a valid explanation for the
rejection.  Id.  As we have noted, this option “enables the ALJ to dispose of frivolous or
otherwise improper subpoena requests.”  Id.; see also Maryland Code (1974, 1982 Repl.
Vol.), State Government Article, §10-213(d) (allowing agencies to exclude evidence that is
incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious at administrative hearings).
Finally, an ALJ, uncertain of the accuracy of the driver’s proffer, may grant the subpoena
15
request.  Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764.  This action effectively suspends
judgment on the merits of determining whether to suspend the driver’s license in order to
allow the ALJ to hear additional testimony.  Id. 
In the present case, while it is clear that the ALJ denied the subpoena request, the
rationale or basis for his decision are not apparent.  After hearing Fowler’s testimony and
proffer, the ALJ stated: 
First off, I’m going to find that the licensee was fully advised.
I conclude primarily from the certification of the officer that he
was fully advised and it’s bolstered by the testimony of the
licensee wh[o] was told to read it and he skimmed over it.  And
I don’t see the need to call the officer to cross examine him.
There’s no indication the PBT was relied on or not relied on in
this case.  
* * * 
My finding is he was fully advised, and the other finding is I
don’t see the need to call the officer to clarify anything . . . .
Under Forman, an ALJ’s decision either to deny or grant the subpoena request must be
clearly indicated.  Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764.  Specifically, we emphasized
that “the ALJ may only avoid issuing the subpoena when he or she explicitly accepts the
proffer or rejects the proffer and provides a basis for this rejection.”  Id.  The record in the
present case yields no specific or explicit statement indicating whether the ALJ accepted or
rejected Fowler’s proffered testimony.  Thus, as a reviewing court, we are unable to perform
our function because the ALJ did not state clearly his decision or enunciate fully his rationale
for denying Fowler’s subpoena request.
   
16
A. 
For example, one might infer from the ALJ’s language, see supra, that he attempted
to proceed under Forman by rejecting Fowler’s proffer along with his subpoena request.  The
crux of Fowler’s argument centers on  his assertion that he was not offered a second test at
the police station and his belief that the DR-15 form merely acknowledged his refusal of the
PBT.  The ALJ’s statement regarding the PBT may be read as a rejection of that proffered
testimony.  Yet, assuming that the ALJ intended to reject the proffer and deny the request,
he did not proceed correctly under Forman.  
First, the ALJ did not explain the reasons for his rejection.  He concluded only that
Fowler was fully advised and that there was no need for the subpoena.  Under the Forman
framework, however, an ALJ who rejects the proffer of a driver and denies a subpoena
request must also “provide a valid explanation of the rejection.”  Forman, 332 Md. at 222,
630 A.2d at 764.  A valid explanation should include making clear the ALJ’s decision to
reject the proffer; it should not require a reviewing court to draw inferences.  A valid
explanation also should provide a “basis for rejection” by explaining the reasons behind the
ALJ’s decision; it should not merely announce a conclusion. 
The Maryland Administrative Procedure 
Act, Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol),
State Government Article, and COM AR set forth reasons for denying a subpoena request.
Section 10-213 of the Administrative Procedure Act governs the admission and exclusion of
evidence at administrative hearings and allows agencies to exclude evidence that is
17
incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.  Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl.
Vol.), State Government Article, §10-213(d).  This language is mimicked in the MVA’s
regulation pertaining to §16-205.1 proceedings and subpoena requests.  See COMAR
11.11.03.07.  While the decision of whether to issue a subpoena is within the ALJ’s
discretion, COMAR 11.11.03.07C provides circumstances that warrant the denial of a
subpoena request:  “[a] request may be refused if the testimony or evidence to be offered: (1)
is immaterial, irrelevant or unduly repetitious; or (2) does not pertain to a genuine issue in
the contested case.”  Here, the ALJ stated that he did not “see the need to call the police
officer to cross-examine him,” but failed to detail the circumstances purportedly justifying
this rejection. 
Moreover, the option of rejecting the proffer and denying the subpoena request is
inappropriate given the factual circumstances in the present case.  In Forman, we observed
that this option “enables the ALJ to dispose of frivolous or otherwise improper subpoena
requests.”  Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764.  In the present case, Fowler proffered
that the police officer did not fully advise him of the consequences of refusing a breath test,
as required under §16-205.1; also, he claimed he was misled by the officer’s statements and
the previous administration of a PBT.  This proffer presents a genuine factual dispute for the
ALJ to resolve.  As we noted in Forman, “evidence pertaining to negation of the advice of
rights or inducement to refuse the alcohol concentration test is neither incompetent,
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.”  Forman, 332 Md. at 224, 630 A.2d at 765; see
13 Section16-205.2 governs the administration of a preliminary breath test (“PBT”).
While the results of a preliminary breath test serve as a guide for the officer to determine if
arrest is necessary, there is no mandatory license suspension for a test failure or refusal to
take a PBT.  See §16-205.2(c). 
18
also §16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(3) (listing “[w]hether the police officer requested a test after the
person was fully advised” as one of the issues that may be raised in the hearing); Forman,
332 Md. at 223-24, 630 A.2d at 765 (concluding that proffered evidence as to “whether
Forman was properly and fully advised of the administrative sanctions” directly pertained to
a genuine issue).  It is important also that Fowler’s claim be resolved clearly, in light of the
different statutory consequences of refusing a chemical breath test versus a PBT,13
particularly because  “[r]efusal to submit to a preliminary breath test [does] not constitute a
violation of §16-205.1.”  §16-205.2(d).  If the ALJ decides Fowler was not offered a breath
test other than the PBT requested on the street prior to his arrest, Fowler cannot be convicted
of a violation of §16-205.1.
Finally, the ALJ appears to have engaged in a credibility assessment in forming his
opinion about Fowler's contentions regarding the PBT.  Under Forman, however, none of
the options provide for an ALJ to make a credibility determination when ruling on a
subpoena request.  Rather, the ALJ must either accept explicitly the proffer in its entirety or
reject the stated proffer in whole, without assessing its validity in either case; otherwise, the
ALJ must issue the subpoena to hear additional testimony.   
19
In Karwacki, this Court highlighted the ability generally of an ALJ to make credibility
assessments.  See Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283-84, 666 A.2d at 517.  We noted that frequently
“the resolution of conflicting evidence and inconsistent inferences involves making
credibility determinations.”  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 284, 666 A.2d at 517.  The ALJ in
Karwacki, however, was faced with a confined set of conflicting evidence – that of the DR-
15 form and the driver’s contrary testimony – due to the petitioner having not filed a motion
for a subpoena request.  Consequently, we concluded the ALJ  properly engaged in a
credibility determination finding that the officer’s sworn certification in the DR-15 form was
more credible.  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 514.  Where an ALJ is forced to
consider only the factual evidence before him, as in Karwacki, this assessment is within the
ALJ’s province to resolve.  In the present case, however, the ALJ, who concluded that
Fowler did not rely as he claimed on the circumstances surrounding the advisement regarding
the PBT, in fact seemed to reject Fowler’s proffer by making a credibility assessment that
Fowler did not rely on his refusal of the PBT in signing the DR-15 form.  This credibility
assessment is not permitted under Forman. 
B. 
Under yet another scenario, one might infer that the ALJ proceeded under the Forman
framework by accepting Fowler’s proffer, but still denied his subpoena request.  When
accepting an individual’s proffer, the ALJ treats it as a proven fact and, consequently, there
is no need to summon the officer to corroborate or clarify the information.  See Forman, 332
20
Md. at 224, 630 A.2d at 765.  Therefore, the ALJ’s statement that there was no need to
summon the officer could be viewed as an implicit acceptance of Fowler’s proffer and an
implicit weighing of the evidence of the proffer against the officer's certification.  This
requires a substantial inferential leap, however, one that we are not prepared to take on this
record.  Even if we were prepared to do so, under this Forman option, an ALJ is required to
“explicitly accept[] the proffer.”  Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764.  The record does
not indicate that this was done. 
Because we are remanding the present case for further proceedings, we pause to
highlight how an ALJ might proceed under this option.  Accepting the proffer of the driver
as to what the certifying officer’s testimony would be does not imply automatically that the
driver’s proffer will be sufficient to exonerate him, or to overcome the prima facie evidence
of the DR-15 form.  Instead, the ALJ first accepts the proffer as if it were proven true.  By
accepting the proffer of the certifying officer’s testimony as truth there is no need to
subpoena the officer to reiterate these facts.  Forman, 332 Md. at 224, 360 A.2d at 765.
After accepting explicitly the proffer, the ALJ next assesses the proffer against other
competing evidence to determine if the evidence is sufficient to overcome other conflicting
evidence.  The DR-15 Advice of Rights form constitutes prima facie evidence of a test
refusal.  Prima facie evidence is “good and sufficient on its face . . . to establish a given fact,"
unless contradicted.  Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283, 666 A.2d at 516-17 (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1190 (6th Ed. 1990)).  Thus, the ALJ must exercise his or her discretion and
21
determine if a driver’s proffer as to what the certifying officer would testify overcomes
sufficiently the prima facie evidence of the form. 
V. 
The importance of clear, explicit administrative agency decisions cannot be over-
emphasized.  “[I]t is appropriate to point out, as we have in previous opinions, not only the
importance but the necessity that administrative agencies resolve all significant conflicts in
the evidence and then chronicle, in the record, full, complete and detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.” State Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Malakoff, 273 Md. 214, 229, 329 A.2d
8,17 (1974).  Administrative law judges must fully explain their decisions so that this Court
and others may perform the function of review accurately and effectively.  Harford County,
322 Md. at 505, 588 A.2d at 778. Such explanation is not only for the sake of judicial
economy, but also ensures that the parties understand fully an agency’s decisions. See id.
Upon remand, the option to reject both the proffer and the subpoena request is not
viable, given the need to resolve the material factual issue raised by Fowler’s proffer.  Two
options remain.  The ALJ may accept explicitly the proffer, denying the subpoena request,
and proceed as described, supra.  Otherwise, the ALJ may choose to issue the subpoena. This
option should be executed if the ALJ harbors reservations as to the accuracy or credibility
of Fowler’s proffer.  See Forman, 332 Md. at 224, 360 A.2d at 765.  While we recognize that
the General Assembly elected specifically to make the DR-15 form prima facie evidence to
14 See §16-205.1(f)(7)(ii); see also MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 51, 821 A.2d 62, 70
(2003) (recounting the legislative history behind §16-205.1 and concluding that the
“Legislature refused to adopt [statutory] amendments which would have allowed a driver to
compel attendance of the police officer . . . at the hearings and, instead, retained the nature
of an administrative per se hearing as one where 'a sworn statement is prima facie evidence
of a violation of § 16-205.1'”).
22
avoid an unnecessary burden on the police force,14 we do not think the Legislature intended
to preclude an officer from being called to testify at a suspension hearing when a key factual
issue is in dispute, particularly where the issue involves an individual’s advice of his or her
rights under the law.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY REVERSED, AND
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF
THE MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION AND
REMAND THE CASE TO THE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY  THE MOTOR
VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.