Title: Welling v. Weinfeld

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451.] 
 
 
WELLING ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WEINFELD, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451.] 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts — False-light theory of the tort of invasion of 
privacy is recognized. 
(No. 2005-1964—Submitted October 4, 2006—Decided June 6, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2004CA00340, 2005-
Ohio-4721. 
—————————— 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other 
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of privacy if (a) the false light in which the other was placed 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) the actor had 
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the 
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. 
(Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1977), Section 652E, adopted.) 
—————————— 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 1} From neighborhood friction that spiraled into dueling litigation has 
emerged a significant question for this court: Does Ohio recognize the “false 
light” theory of the tort of invasion of privacy?  Today we recognize that theory of 
recovery. 
{¶ 2} The plaintiff-appellee, Lauri Weinfeld, and defendants-appellants, 
Robert and Katherine Welling, are neighbors in Perry Township in Stark County.  
Weinfeld owns and operates a party center next to her home, which hosts 
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banquets, parties, and outdoor weddings.  The Wellings live next to the party 
center.  Weinfeld and the Wellings each alleged on a number of theories that the 
activities of the other interfered with their legitimate use of their own property. 
{¶ 3} Weinfeld sued, alleging that the Wellings’ use of yard and farm 
equipment during party center events constituted nuisance, trespass, invasion of 
privacy, interference with business relations, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  It is one of the Wellings’ counterclaims, invasion of privacy, 
that is the focus of this case. 
{¶ 4} At trial, the Wellings alleged two sets of facts supporting their 
invasion-of-privacy claim.  First, they alleged that Weinfeld had focused 
floodlights on and had conducted videotape surveillance of their property. 
{¶ 5} The second set of facts forms the basis of the issue in this case.  
During the spring of 2000, someone threw a rock through a plate-glass window at 
Weinfeld’s party center.  Weinfeld suspected that the culprit was the Wellings’ 
son, Robert. Weinfeld created handbills, printed on 8½-by-11-inch paper, offering 
a reward for information regarding the perpetrator.  The handbill read:  
$500.00 
REWARD 
for any information which leads to the 
conviction of the person(s) responsible 
for throwing a rock through the window 
of Lakeside Center Banquet Hall 
(also known as the “Party Center”) 
in the Dee Mar Allotment, in Perry 
Township, on Monday, May 8th or 
Tuesday, May 9th, 2000. 
______________________________________ 
Any tips will be kept confidential. 
January Term, 2007 
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Call the Perry Township Police 
Department’s Detective Bureau at 
478-5121. 
Reward will be paid in cash. 
——————————————————— 
{¶ 6} Weinfeld admitted that she had no proof that the Wellings were 
responsible for the damage.  She further admitted that she distributed the 
handbills at two locations outside the neighborhood that were of special 
significance to the Wellings: at the Pepsi bottling plant where Robert Welling and 
his son worked and at the schools the Welling children attended. 
{¶ 7} The Wellings allege that Weinfeld’s distribution of the handbills 
spread wrongful publicity about them that unreasonably placed them in a false 
light before the public. 
{¶ 8} On November 22, 2002, a jury entered a defense verdict in favor of 
the Wellings on Weinfeld’s claims and further found that Weinfeld had invaded 
the Wellings’ privacy.  The jury interrogatory on the invasion-of-privacy claim 
did not delineate the facts upon which the jury based its verdict.  The jury 
awarded the Wellings $5,412.38 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in 
punitive damages.  Attorney fees were stipulated to be $10,000. 
{¶ 9} On December 6, 2002, Weinfeld moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial or remittitur.  On 
June 5, 2003, the trial court overruled the plaintiff’s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, but granted a remittitur of the punitive damages 
award to $35,000, subject to acceptance by the Wellings.  The Wellings did not 
accept the remittitur.  The trial court therefore granted a new trial on the Wellings’ 
invasion-of-privacy claim. 
{¶ 10} Weinfeld and the Wellings both appealed the trial court’s decision.  
Weinfeld argued that the trial court should have granted her motion for judgment 
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notwithstanding the verdict on the Wellings’ invasion-of-privacy claim.  The 
appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion, holding that an invasion-of-privacy action could lie based upon 
Weinfeld’s use of the video camera and floodlights.  However, as to false-light 
invasion of privacy based upon the distribution of the handbill, the appellate court 
made no determination, noting that this court had not yet adopted the false-light 
invasion-of-privacy theory of recovery.  The court wrote: 
{¶ 11} “[I]t remains an open question, rather than an absolute rejection 
whether such theory would be recognized.  We do not choose to decide what 
constitutes an appropriate case wherein the Ohio Supreme Court would finalize 
such issue as we are not required in this case to reach such a decision and would 
be reluctant, in any event, to do so without affirmative guidance from the 
Supreme Court.”  Weinfeld v. Welling, Stark App. No. 2004CA00340, 2005-Ohio-
4721, 2005 WL 2175141, ¶ 57. 
{¶ 12} The appellate court thus removed the issue of false-light invasion 
of privacy from this case, limiting the retrial to the issue of invasion of privacy 
based upon Weinfeld’s intrusion upon the Wellings’ seclusion.  The Wellings 
appealed, urging this court to recognize that a cause of action exists under Ohio 
law for false-light invasion of privacy. 
{¶ 13} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  108 Ohio St.3d 1435, 2006-Ohio-421, 842 N.E.2d 61. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 14} In Housh v. Peth (1956), 165 Ohio St. 35, 59 O.O. 60, 133 N.E.2d 
340, this court first recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy.  The 
court listed three instances in which the claim could be brought: 
{¶ 15} “An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is [1] the 
unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one’s personality, [2] the publicizing 
of one’s private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or [3] the 
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wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner as to outrage or 
cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 16} Noticeably absent from Housh is the recognition of a cause of 
action based upon publicity that places a person in a false light before the public.  
But Housh was decided before the 1960 publication of Dean William L. Prosser’s 
influential law review article, Privacy (1960), 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, wherein Prosser 
described four distinct types of invasion of privacy:  
{¶ 17} “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs. 
{¶ 18} “2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the 
plaintiff. 
{¶ 19} “3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public 
eye. 
{¶ 20} “4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness.”  Id. at 389. 
{¶ 21} The Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1977), Section 652A 
incorporated the false-light theory as one of the four causes of action included 
under the umbrella of invasion of privacy.  Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, 
Section 652E sets forth the elements of false-light invasion of privacy: 
{¶ 22} “One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that 
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy, if 
{¶ 23} “(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and 
{¶ 24} “(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to 
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be 
placed.” 
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{¶ 25} This court has not addressed head-on the viability of a cause of 
action in Ohio for false-light invasion of privacy, although it referred to the claim 
in a footnote in Sustin v. Fee (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 143, 23 O.O.3d 182, 431 
N.E.2d 992.  Sustin was an invasion-of-seclusion claim, not a false-light claim; 
the plaintiffs complained that a village zoning inspector was conducting 
surveillance of their property with binoculars.  The court wrote that Housh had 
established the tort of invasion of privacy in Ohio and quoted that case’s second 
syllabus paragraph, which set forth three actionable types of invasion of privacy.  
Id. at 145.  In a footnote, the court wrote that there were four separate recognized 
branches of invasion of privacy, including false light: 
{¶ 26} “Today the intrusion into a person’s seclusion is recognized as but 
one of four separate branches of tortious invasion of privacy. These are set out in 
Section 652A of the Restatement of Torts 2d, at page 376, as follows:  
{¶ 27} “ ‘(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to 
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. 
{¶ 28} “ ‘(2) The right of privacy is invaded by 
{¶ 29} “ ‘(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another * * * 
{¶ 30} “ ‘(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness * * * 
{¶ 31} “ ‘(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life * * * 
{¶ 32} “ ‘(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light 
before the public * * *.’  See, also, Prosser on Torts (4 Ed.), 802, Sec. 117.”  
(Ellipses sic.) Sustin, 69 Ohio St.2d at 145, 23 O.O.3d 182, 431 N.E.2d 992, fn. 4. 
{¶ 33} The court’s affirmative acknowledgement of false-light invasion of 
privacy indicated an inclination toward recognizing it as a separate cause of 
action.  However, in Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 6 OBR 421, 453 N.E. 
2d 666, this court made clear that whatever it had said in Sustin did not constitute 
a holding on the issue: 
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{¶ 34} “[T]his court has not recognized a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy under a ‘false light’ theory of recovery.  Under the facts of the instant 
case, we find no rationale which compels us to adopt the ‘false light’ theory of 
recovery in Ohio at this time.” Id. at 372, 6 OBR 421, 453 N.E.2d 666. 
{¶ 35} In M.J. DiCorpo, Inc. v. Sweeney (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 497, 634 
N.E.2d 203, an appellant again asked the court to recognize false-light invasion of 
privacy, but the court held that the statements at issue were made in an affidavit 
pursuant to a legal proceeding and were thus privileged and not actionable: 
“Given our determination that the statements contained in [the] affidavit cannot 
form the basis for civil liability, this case (like Yeager) is obviously not the 
appropriate case to consider adopting, or rejecting, the false light theory of 
recovery.”  Id. at 507, 634 N.E.2d 203. 
{¶ 36} A majority of jurisdictions in the United States have recognized 
false-light invasion of privacy as a distinct, actionable tort. See West v. Media 
Gen. Convergence, Inc. (Tenn.2001), 53 S.W.3d 640, 644; Elder, Privacy Torts 
(2006), Section 4:1.  However, the two most recent state supreme courts to 
address the issue, Tennessee and Colorado, have made divergent holdings.  In 
West, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized false-light invasion of privacy as 
a cause of action.  West at 645.  In Denver Publishing Co. v. Bueno (Colo.2002), 
54 P.3d 893, however, the Colorado Supreme Court, in “a deliberate exercise of 
caution,” ruled that false light “is too amorphous a tort for Colorado, and it risks 
inflicting an unacceptable chill on those in the media seeking to avoid liability.”  
Id. at 904.  Those two cases mark well the boundaries of the opposing viewpoints 
on the issue. 
{¶ 37} Bueno points to the central concern of the cases and commentary 
against false light — that there is an unacceptable overlap between false light and 
defamation. The four-to-three majority in Bueno writes, “Courts that recognize 
false light view one’s reputation in the community and one’s personal sense of 
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offense as separate interests. * * * But even those states that accept as important 
the difference between these two interests, reputation and personal feelings, 
recognize an ‘affinity’ between them.”   Id. at 901-902.  Bueno describes the 
interest protected in a false-light claim as the “individual's peace of mind, i.e., his 
or her interest ‘in not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable 
false light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he is,’ ” while the 
action for defamation is to protect a person's interest in a good reputation.  Id., 
quoting  Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 652E, Comment b. 
{¶ 38} While conceding the distinction of those interests, Bueno held that 
“recognition of the different interests protected rests primarily on parsing a too 
subtle distinction between an individual’s personal sensibilities and his or her 
reputation in the community.” Id. at 902.  But Bueno acknowledges that there are 
scenarios in which false light fits and defamation fails: 
{¶ 39} “The first involves cases where the defendant reveals intimate and 
personal, but false, details of plaintiff's private life, for example, portraying 
plaintiff as the victim of sexual harassment, Crump [v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 
173 W.Va. 699], 320 S.E.2d [70] 80 [(1984)], or as being poverty-stricken, 
Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 95 S.Ct. 465, 42 L.Ed.2d 419 
(1974), or as having a terminal illness or suffering from depression.  These 
depictions are not necessarily defamatory, but are potentially highly offensive.  
The second category encompasses portrayals of the plaintiff in a more positive 
light than he deserves. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 219, 
250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 538-40, 543 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1964), aff'd, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 23 
A.D.2d 216 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 221 N.E.2d 543 
(1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, 87 S.Ct. 1706, 18 L.Ed.2d 744 (1967) (trial court 
finding invasion of privacy where plaintiff was depicted in book as a war hero 
who earned Bronze Star and ‘raced out into the teeth of the enemy barrage’ — 
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two of a multitude of characterizations that were utterly false and embarrassing to 
plaintiff).” Bueno, 54 P.3d at 902-903. 
{¶ 40} Ultimately, Bueno characterized potential false-light claims as 
encompassing “a decidedly narrow band of cases” and held that such plaintiffs 
would be protected by the existing remedies of defamation, appropriation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 903. 
{¶ 41} Beyond Bueno’s reluctance to recognize new torts was its 
determination that a false-light tort would have negative implications on First 
Amendment principles.  The court reasoned that the theory of false-light invasion 
of privacy fails the test of providing a clear identification of wrongful conduct: 
{¶ 42} “The sole area in which it differs from defamation is an area 
fraught with ambiguity and subjectivity. Recognizing ‘highly offensive’ 
information, even framed within the context of what a reasonable person would 
find highly offensive, necessarily involves a subjective component. The 
publication of highly offensive material is more difficult to avoid than the 
publication of defamatory information that damages a person's reputation in the 
community. In order to prevent liability under a false light tort, the media would 
need to anticipate whether statements are ‘highly offensive’ to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities even though their publication does no harm to the 
individual's reputation. To the contrary, defamatory statements are more easily 
recognizable by an author or publisher because such statements are those that 
would damage someone's reputation in the community. In other words, 
defamation is measured by its results; whereas false light invasion of privacy is 
measured by perception. It is even possible that what would be highly offensive in 
one location would not be in another; or what would have been highly offensive 
in 1962 would not be highly offensive in 2002. In other words, the standard is 
difficult to quantify, and shifts based upon the subjective perceptions of a 
community.” Bueno, 54 P.3d at 903-904. 
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{¶ 43} Bueno concludes that the ambiguity and subjectivity surrounding 
false-light invasion of privacy would “invariably chill open and robust reporting.” 
Id.  Other states rejecting false light as a theory of recovery have also pointed to 
First Amendment implications in their reasoning. Cain v. Hearst Corp. 
(Tex.1994),  878 S.W.2d 577, 579-580; Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(Minn.1998), 582 N.W.2d 231, 235-236; Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing 
Co. (1984), 310 N.C. 312, 325-326,  312 S.E.2d 405. 
{¶ 44} In West, 53 S.W.3d 640, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a 
cause of action for false-light invasion of privacy protects an important individual 
right complementary to other privacy rights and that there are adequate 
protections guaranteeing the First Amendment rights of potential defendants.  We 
agree. 
{¶ 45} The court wrote in West: 
{¶ 46} “While the law of defamation and false light invasion of privacy 
conceivably overlap in some ways, we conclude that the differences between the 
two torts warrant their separate recognition. The Supreme Court of West Virginia 
noted the following differences in Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc.:  
{¶ 47} “ ‘“In defamation law only statements that are false are 
actionable[;] truth is, almost universally, a defense. In privacy law, other than in 
false light cases, the facts published are true; indeed it is the very truth of the facts 
that creates the claimed invasion of privacy.  Secondly, in defamation cases the 
interest sought to be protected is the objective one of reputation, either economic, 
political, or personal, in the outside world. In privacy cases the interest affected is 
the subjective one of injury to [the] inner person. Thirdly, where the issue is truth 
or falsity, the marketplace of ideas furnishes a forum in which the battle can be 
fought. In privacy cases, resort to the marketplace simply accentuates the injury.”’ 
173 W.Va. 699 [711], 320 S.E.2d 70, 83 (1984) (quoting Thomas Emerson, The 
January Term, 2007 
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Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 329, 333 
(1979)).”  West, 53 S.W.3d at 645-646. 
{¶ 48} We agree with West that the viability of a false-light claim 
maintains the integrity of the right to privacy, complementing the other right-to-
privacy torts.  In Ohio, we have already recognized that a claim for invasion of 
privacy can arise when true private details of a person’s life are publicized.  The 
right to privacy naturally extends to the ability to control false statements made 
about oneself. 
{¶ 49} Without false light, the right to privacy is not whole, as it is not 
fully protected by defamation laws: 
{¶ 50} “Certainly situations may exist in which persons have had 
attributed to them certain qualities, characteristics, or beliefs that, while not 
injurious to their reputation, place those persons in an undesirable false light.  
However, in situations such as these, victims of invasion of privacy would be 
without recourse under defamation law.  False light therefore provides a viable, 
and we believe necessary, action for relief apart from defamation.” West, 53 
S.W.3d at 646. 
{¶ 51} Will a recognition of false-light invasion of privacy result in a 
parade of persons with hurt feelings clogging our courthouses?  There is no 
indication that that scenario is the case in the states that already recognize false-
light claims.  The requirements imposed by the Restatement make a false-light 
claim difficult to prove. 
{¶ 52} First, the statement made must be untrue.  Second, the information 
must be “publicized,” which is different from “published”: 
{¶ 53} “ ‘Publicity,’ as it is used in this Section, differs from 
‘publication,’ as that term is used * * *in connection with liability for defamation. 
‘Publication,’ in that sense, is a word of art, which includes any communication 
by the defendant to a third person. ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means that the 
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matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many 
persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of 
public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of communication, 
which may be oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication 
that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.” Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, 
Section 652D, Comment a. 
{¶ 54} Another element of a successful false-light claim is that the 
misrepresentation made must be serious enough to be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person: 
{¶ 55} “The rule stated in this Section applies only when the publicity 
given to the plaintiff has placed him in a false light before the public, of a kind 
that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. In other words, it applies 
only when the defendant knows that the plaintiff, as a reasonable man, would be 
justified in the eyes of the community in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved 
by the publicity. * * * The plaintiff's privacy is not invaded when the unimportant 
false statements are made, even when they are made deliberately. It is only when 
there is such a major misrepresentation of his character, history, activities or 
beliefs that serious offense may reasonably be expected to be taken by a 
reasonable man in his position, that there is a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy.” Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 652E, Comment c. 
{¶ 56} The Restatement also accounts for multiple claims arising under 
the same set of facts. 
{¶ 57} “The interest protected by this Section is the interest of the 
individual in not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable false 
light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he is. In many cases to 
which the rule stated here applies, the publicity given to the plaintiff is 
defamatory, so that he would have an action for libel or slander * * *. In such a 
case the action for invasion of privacy will afford an alternative or additional 
January Term, 2007 
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remedy, and the plaintiff can proceed upon either theory, or both, although he can 
have but one recovery for a single instance of publicity.”  Restatement of the Law 
2d, Torts, Section 652E, Comment b. 
{¶ 58} Like the court in West, we believe that the First Amendment 
concerns that some courts have raised in regard to false-light claims are 
overblown.  False-light defendants enjoy protections at least as extensive as 
defamation defendants.  West makes the standard of fault identical for defamation 
and false-light claims: a negligence standard in regard to statements made about 
private citizens and an actual-malice standard for statements made about public 
figures.  We choose to follow the Restatement standard, requiring that the 
defendant “had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the 
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed,” in cases 
of both private and public figures.  Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 
652E(b).  In part, this heightened requirement is a recognition that a statement 
that is not defamatory is less apt to be a red flag for editors and checked for 
accuracy: 
{¶ 59} “It is undoubtedly true that misrepresentations putting plaintiffs in 
a false light but not amounting to libel or slander are more difficult for an editor to 
notice and prevent. The false-light actual-malice requirement, however, is meant 
to address this concern.  Negligent reporters and editors who merely fail to 
observe an error or to use reasonable care in averting misrepresentations will be 
protected.  There can only be liability if a plaintiff can show that the publication 
knew of the falsity or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.” Ray, Let There 
Be False Light: Resisting the Growing Trend Against an Important Tort (2000), 
84 Minn.L.Rev. 713, 731. 
{¶ 60} Adequate First Amendment protections are in place in regard to a 
cause of action for false-light invasion of privacy.  The world has changed since 
Renwick, one of the early decisions in which the court refused to recognize false-
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light claims due in part to First Amendment concerns.  In Renwick, 310 N.C. 312, 
312 S.E.2d 405, the court stated that the right to privacy had first been developed 
during the period of the excesses of yellow journalism and that formal training in 
journalism and ethics had ameliorated the concerns of the early leading legal 
lights as to the damage that could be done to individuals by the press.  Id. at 325, 
312 S.E.2d 405.  At the time of Renwick in 1984, Greener’s law – “Never argue 
with a man who buys ink by the barrel” — still applied.  Today, thanks to the 
accessibility of the Internet, the barriers to generating publicity are slight, and the 
ethical standards regarding the acceptability of certain discourse have been 
lowered.  As the ability to do harm has grown, so must the law’s ability to protect 
the innocent. 
{¶ 61} We therefore recognize the tort of false-light invasion of privacy 
and adopt Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 652E.  In Ohio, one who 
gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the 
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy 
if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the 
other would be placed. 
{¶ 62} Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the 
cause. 
Judgment reversed 
 and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., 
concur. 
O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would dismiss the cause as 
having been improvidently accepted. 
January Term, 2007 
15 
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, was assigned to sit 
for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
——————————- 
 
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews and Ralph F. Dublikar, for 
appellants. 
 
Brouse McDowell and Clair E. Dickinson, for appellee.