Title: Veile v. Board of County Com'rs of Washakie County

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Veile v. Board of County Com'rs of Washakie County1993 WY 133860 P.2d 1174Case Number: 93-43Decided: 10/14/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
David 
M. VEILE, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WASHAKIE COUNTY, Wyoming; Thomas K. Bosch; Edward 
Schmeltzer; and Marion Barngrover, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal 
from The District Court, Washakie County, Hunter Patrick, 
J.

James 
P. Castberg, Sheridan, for appellant.

Judith 
Studer of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, Casper, for 
appellees.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This innovative 
action involves a former elected official seeking recovery of damages pursuant 
to allegations that he was forced to resign his office of county coroner because 
he was denied sufficient budgetary funding for the expenses of his office and 
prevented from performing his required duties. The damages assigned were 
expenses of continuing education, compensation for failure to provide medical 
and hospitalization insurance and general damages for his "forced termination." 
The former coroner filed suit against the Board of County Commissioners of 
Washakie County, Wyoming and three present or former county officials. The 
district court dismissed the action against the Board of County Commissioners 
finding that sovereign immunity barred relief. After discovery had been 
completed, the district court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of 
the county officials.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, the 
former coroner, identifies the following issues:

I. 
Assuming the facts alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint are true and viewed in a 
light most favorable to the Appellant, the District Court erred in granting the 
Appellees' Motion To Dismiss as to the Appellee Board of County Commissioners of 
Washakie County, Wyoming.

II. 
Giving the Appellant the benefit of every favorable inference and reasonable 
doubt, based upon the pleadings and the discovery, there are genuine issues of 
material fact which preclude the granting of the Motion For Summary Judgment for 
the individual Appellees.

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      After being 
elected to four terms of office as a county coroner, David M. Veile (Veile) 
resigned effective June 30, 1989. Veile informed the Board of County 
Commissioners of Washakie County, Wyoming (Commissioners) that he was forced to 
resign because he would no longer be certified to perform his duties. Veile 
attributed his failure to comply with a continuing education requirement to the 
Commissioners' inadequate budget allocation for his 
office.

[¶5]      Veile filed a 
claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act with the Commissioners on 
January 7, 1991. Veile alleged that the Commissioners' budget allocations did 
not provide sufficient reimbursement for necessary expenses of continuing 
education. In addition, Veile sought compensation for the Commissioners' refusal 
to provide medical and hospitalization insurance benefits to him prior to 1987. 
Veile claimed $24,727.07 for expenses and insurance costs and $150,000.00 in 
damages resulting from his "forced termination." The Commissioners denied the 
claim.

[¶6]      Veile filed suit 
in district court on March 11, 1991. Veile alleged the Commissioners' inadequate 
budget allocations and refusal to provide insurance benefits constituted 
interference with the performance of his official duties. Veile also alleged 
causes of action against three present or former county officials. According to 
Veile, Thomas K. Bosch (Bosch) and Edward Schmeltzer (Schmeltzer), while serving 
as Commissioners, and Marion Barngrover (Barngrover), while serving as County 
Clerk and County Budget Officer, had individually committed intentional torts by 
interfering with the performance of Veile's duties as county coroner and 
discriminating against him. In addition to the general and special damages 
previously claimed against the Commissioners, Veile sought damages of 
$100,000.00 each from Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover.

[¶7]      The Commissioners 
filed a motion to dismiss contending the cause of action against them was barred 
by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The district court agreed. The district 
court ruled that Veile had failed to state a claim because, as a governmental 
entity, the Commissioners were entitled to immunity.

[¶8]      After extensive 
discovery proceedings, including lengthy depositions, Bosch, Schmeltzer and 
Barngrover filed a motion for summary judgment. Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover 
maintained that they were immune from suit because their actions were within the 
scope of their duties and the causes of action Veile brought were not among 
those specifically authorized by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bosch, Schmeltzer and 
Barngrover.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
Dismissal of the Board of County Commissioners

[¶9]      The accepted 
standard for appellate review of a district court order granting a motion to 
dismiss requires that the facts alleged in the complaint be accepted as true and 
viewed more favorably to the party opposing the dismissal. Park County v. 
Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349-50 (Wyo. 1992); W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is a drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly. Kautza 
v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 145 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶10]   The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
(hereinafter Governmental Claims Act) Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-120 (1988 
& Cum.Supp. 1993), creates statutory exceptions to sovereign 
immunity.

(a) 
A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of 
duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by 
W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-39-104(a). A board of county commissioners is a governmental entity 
for purposes of the Governmental Claims Act. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-103(a)(i) and 
(ii). Therefore, sovereign immunity bars recovery unless the well-pleaded 
allegations of the complaint demonstrate either that the tort on which Veile's 
cause of action was premised was one of those enumerated exceptions or that the 
Commissioners acted outside the scope of their duties in allocating the budget 
and determining compensation for the county coroner's 
office.

[¶11]   A claim not specifically authorized 
under the Governmental Claims Act is barred. Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wyo. 1991). The authorized exceptions to sovereign immunity permit 
actions premised on negligent operation of certain governmental vehicles, Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-39-105; negligent operation or maintenance of certain governmental 
facilities, Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106; negligent operation of airports, Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-107; negligent operation of public utilities and services, Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-108; negligent operation of public hospitals, Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-109; 
negligent performance of health care providers employed by governmental 
entities, Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-110; and tortious acts of peace officers, Wyo. Stat. 
§ 1-39-112.

[¶12]   The cause of action stated by Veile 
against the Commissioners was not one of those specifically enumerated by the 
Governmental Claims Act. Furthermore, the allegations of the complaint did not 
establish that the Commissioners were acting beyond the scope of their duties in 
allocating the budget and determining compensation for the county coroner's 
office. Commissioners are required by law to make such decisions on behalf of 
the people of the county. Wyo. Stat. § 18-3-504(a)(ii) (1977 & Cum.Supp. 
1993) (stating power and duty of board of county commissioners to examine and 
settle all accounts and expenses of county); Wyo. Stat. § 18-3-107 (1977 & 
Cum.Supp. 1993) (requiring board of county commissioners to establish salaries 
for officials which shall not be changed during the term of office of that 
official); Wyo. Stat. § 7-4-210 (1987) (stating that county coroner receives 
fees and mileage, if any, as determined by the board of county 
commissioners).

[¶13]   We affirm the district court's 
order dismissing the cause of action against the Commissioners. Veile failed to 
state a claim under the Governmental Claims Act upon which relief can be 
granted. W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

B. 
Summary Judgment In Favor Of Bosch, Schmeltzer and 
Barngrover

[¶14]   The district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover will be affirmed 
on appeal if there are no disputed material facts and this court determines that 
the county officials were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
Prudential Preferred Properties v. J And J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271, 
(Wyo. 1993); Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 403, 
406-07 (Wyo. 1992); W.R.C.P. 56(c).

[¶15]   The district court found that 
Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover, as county officials at the time of their 
challenged actions, acted within the scope of their duties as a matter of law. 
We agree. While the question whether a governmental employee is acting within 
the scope of duties is normally an issue of fact, it becomes one of law "when 
only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence." Jung-Leonczynska 
v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578, 582 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶16]   Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover 
were elected officials during the period when Veile claimed the tortious conduct 
occurred. The Governmental Claims Act defines a public employee as "any officer, 
employee or servant of a governmental entity, including elected or appointed 
officials * * *[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A) (emphasis added). 
(emphasis added). A public employee acts within the scope of duties by 
"performing any duties which a governmental entity requests, requires or 
authorizes a public employee to perform regardless of the time and place of 
performance * * *[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-103(a)(v) (emphasis added). Bosch, 
Schmeltzer and Barngrover were entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the 
only reasonable inference that could be drawn was that they acted within the 
scope of their requested, required or authorized duties.

[¶17]   Bosch and Schmeltzer served as 
members of the Board of County Commissioners of Washakie County during the 
period Veile alleged insufficient budget allocations were made and inadequate 
compensation levels were determined. Approving budgets and determining 
compensation for the county coroner's office are statutory functions expressly 
within the scope of duties required of a member of a board of county 
commissioners. Wyo. Stat. § 18-3-504(a) (budgets); Wyo. Stat. § 18-3-107 
(salaries); Wyo. Stat. § 7-4-210 (coroner's fees and mileage). Bosch and 
Schmeltzer were acting within the scope of their duties.

[¶18]   Barngrover formerly served as both 
the County Clerk and County Budget Officer of Washakie County. The Wyoming State 
Legislature has declared that service by a county clerk in such a dual capacity 
is "compatible." Wyo. Stat. § 18-4-103 (1977). The office of county clerk is a 
statutory creation. Wyo. Stat. §§ 18-3-401 to 18-3-402 (1977 & Cum.Supp. 
1993). County clerks are required to perform all duties and general accounting 
necessary to implement the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act, Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 16-4-101 to 16-4-124 (1990 & Cum.Supp. 1993), on behalf of the people of 
the county. Wyo. Stat. § 18-3-402(a)(xxiii). The Uniform Municipal Fiscal 
Procedures Act mandates that the budget officer must prepare a tentative budget 
for submission to the board of county commissioners. Wyo. Stat. § 16-4-104(a). 
As county clerk and budget officer, Barngrover was acting within the scope of 
her duties in preparing budgets during the time Veile alleged she committed 
tortious conduct.

[¶19]   Veile contends, in essence, that 
Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover could not have acted within the scope of their 
duties because their actions toward him constituted intentional torts. It is not 
necessary to the resolution of this case to determine whether Wyoming recognizes 
the tort of intentional interference with a right to vote or hold office, 
restatement (Second) Torts § 865 (1979), or whether that tort would be properly 
applied to these facts. We need only consider whether Veile has established, as 
a matter of law, that the acts which he complained of constituted intentional 
tortious conduct, i.e., acts or omissions of such a character as to subject the 
actor to liability under principles of the law of torts. Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 6 (1965).

[¶20]   Veile claims Bosch, Schmeltzer and 
Barngrover intentionally interfered with the performance of the county coroner's 
official duties by failing to budget for necessary expenses. As an example of a 
necessary expense, Veile maintains he should have been compensated for the 
expenses his private mortuary incurred in hiring a licensed embalmer to operate 
the business while Veile attended required continuing education courses. See 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-4-103(a)(ii) (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1993) (stating continuing 
education requirements of county coroners). Veile also finds intentional 
discrimination in the failure to provide medical and hospitalization insurance 
benefits to him prior to 1987 while other county officials received coverage. We 
hold these actions, and the others Veile alleged, do not constitute 
intentionally tortious conduct as a matter of law.

[¶21]   The official duties of a county 
coroner are statutory and specific. A county coroner is generally an elected 
officer of the county authorized to investigate the cause of death in certain 
enumerated cases. Wyo. Stat. § 7-4-104(a)(iii) (1987). By statute, the county 
must pay the "expense and costs" of conducting an investigation when one is 
required. Wyo. Stat. § 7-4-201(e) (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1993). However, the 
board of county commissioners is given discretionary authority to approve the 
claim for expense and costs submitted by a coroner. "If the board of county 
commissioners finds that the inquest was necessary and in accordance with law, 
and the accounts are correct and just, the accounts shall be paid in warrants 
properly drawn upon the order of the county commissioners." Id. The fees and 
mileage which a county coroner shall receive are determined by the board of 
county commissioners. Wyo. Stat. § 7-4-210. In addition, the board of county 
commissioners consents to the appointment of deputy coroners who receive the 
same compensation in fees and mileage provided for the county coroner. Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-4-102 (1987).

[¶22]   The budget and compensation 
requests which Veile claimed were denied with intentional tortious conduct were 
not required by law to perform the official duties of a county coroner, 
conducting investigations into the cause of death in certain specified 
situations. Certainly, the county could not be charged with the expenses of 
operating Veile's mortuary while Veile attended continuing education courses. 
The compensation for attending such training is limited by statute and includes 
only travel and "other necessary expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining the 
required training." Wyo. Stat. § 7-4-103(c). In the plain meaning of the 
statute, the phrase, "expenses reasonably incurred" does not anticipate the 
expenses of operating a private business. The statute is referring to expenses 
for lodging or meals necessitated by out-of-town travel that are not paid by 
other means, such as per diem. Id. Similarly, Veile's other claims of 
intentional tortious conduct, the failure to purchase body bags for emergency 
preparedness kits or radio systems for the coroner's office, did not interfere 
directly with official duties to investigate a cause of death. As county 
officials, Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover made or recommended budget choices 
within the scope of their duties.

[¶23]   The alleged discrimination in 
insurance coverage reflects a choice by the governing body of the county, the 
Commissioners, of which full or part-time employees would be eligible for such 
benefits. Any claim of discrimination in providing such coverage was untimely 
since it was not brought within two years of the date of the act, error or 
omission under the Governmental Claims Act and no statutory ground for the late 
discovery of the act, error or omission was alleged to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the court. Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993); 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113(a). It is undisputed that Veile was provided insurance 
coverage in 1987 and no claim was filed until January 7, 
1991.

[¶24]   From the evidence, the only 
reasonable inference that can be drawn is Bosch, Schmeltzer and Barngrover were 
acting within the scope of their duties at all relevant times. Therefore, they 
are entitled to immunity from liability for any tort except those enumerated 
within the Governmental Claims Act. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-104(a). The tort claims 
Veile makes, interference with official duties and discrimination, are not 
included in those enumerated in the Governmental Claims Act for which sovereign 
immunity is waived. Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-105 to 1-39-112. Therefore, Bosch, 
Schmeltzer and Barngrover are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 1990).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶25]   The nature of these contentious 
claims disguises a more fundamental problem. In a time of diminishing revenue 
and increasing demand, scarce government money must be allocated according to 
some accountable priorities. The choices made by a board of county commissioners 
or any other legislative body often reflect imperfect solutions to difficult 
problems. In this instance, the attempt to find a personal remedy 
failed.

[¶26]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed in all respects.