Title: Williams v. Collins Communications, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Williams v. Collins Communications, Inc.1986 WY 129720 P.2d 880Case Number: 85-265Decided: 06/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Maurice WILLIAMS, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

COLLINS COMMUNICATIONS, 
INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

S. Thomas Throne 
and Thomas E. Campbell, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

David F. 
Palmerlee of Omohundro and Palmerlee, Buffalo, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The parties assiduously 
pleaded and comprehensively litigated a contractual relationship involving radio 
tower facilities. Appellee, Collins Communications, Inc. (Collins), original 
defendant and counterclaimant, enjoyed trial success by entry of a favorable 
specific-performance decree against appellant Maurice Williams, from which 
decision this appeal was taken. The parties have spared no effort in reaching 
this stage in a demonstration of contractual disaffinity.

[¶2.]     We will generally 
affirm, except to remand for an accounting under the contract for revenues 
received by each party between January, 1983, and the date of effectuation of 
the specific-performance decree.

[¶3.]     Some time prior to 
1976, by oral agreement, and then by written agreement dated July 1, 1976, 
Collins and Williams came to be jointly involved in the operation of radio 
communication towers on WarrenPeak in northeast Wyoming. The Peak, 
topographically dominant in the area, involved a parcel of land originally 
acquired from Williams by condemnation for a government radar installation, 
later transferred to the United States Forest Service upon discontinued 
installation use, with the surrounding land remaining in the ownership of 
Williams. In 1975, Collins had obtained a special use permit for the 
construction of a radio tower on the Forest Service 
parcel.

[¶4.]     By trial date, there 
were four towers on the Peak. The first, predating the written agreement, was 
the Forest Service tower; a second, designated the Materi tower, was located on 
the Williams property, and was expressly excluded from the agreement; the third, 
designated the middle tower, was located on Williams' property, apparently 
constructed by the parties before the 1976 written agreement, or at least 
operated jointly before that date. Construction of the fourth, the Williams 
tower, was completed by Williams in October, 1983.

[¶5.]     The 1976 agreement 
effectuated a joint use of the properties for radio-tower utilization, 
retroactive to September 1, 1975 and expiring December 31, 1992, and provided 
for equal division of revenue and expenses, and

"COLLINS will operate all 
of the communications sites on Exhibits `A' [Forest Service parcel] and `B' 
[surrounding Williams' land], collect and administer all income received 
therefrom, make all arrangements and contacts for new customers to be placed on 
said communications sites, and COLLINS will have complete control over the 
development and expansion of said sites and will use their best efforts to fully 
develop said sites in the proper manner so as not to create excessive 
communications interference."

"COLLINS will account 
monthly to WILLIAMS with regard to all rental income received, costs and other 
expenses expended and will forward to WILLIAMS his proportionate share of said 
rental income as provided for herein. COLLINS will also furnish to WILLIAMS the 
identical data sheets as supplied to the U.S. Forest Service and will furnish 
WILLIAMS, upon request, with copies of invoices for all site rentals. In the 
event WILLIAMS shall receive any income from said communications sites, he will 
also make such accounting to COLLINS.

"`It is understood and 
agreed that at such time as the communications equipment constructed or 
hereafter to be constructed upon said property has been paid for from the rental 
derived therefrom, that both COLLINS and WILLIAMS shall equally own said 
equipment as tenants in common.'"

"`Except as to the 
service to Materi Exploration Company and Belle Fourche Pipe Line company, 
heretofore mentioned, neither COLLINS nor WILLIAMS shall construct, operate or 
maintain any communications system in competition to the communications system 
contemplated herein within 10 miles of the real property described in Exhibit 
"A" and Exhibit "B" attached hereto.'"

[¶6.]     There was something 
less than total payment regularity for amounts due to Williams on the contract, 
although with the joint control of the market by a monopoly of locations on the 
Peak, the venture was mutually profitable.

[¶7.]     In 1981, Motorola 
Communications and Electronics Inc. (Motorola), a competitor of Collins in radio 
communications systems, inquired of Collins about placing a community repeater 
on the facility. Communication ensued, but no real negotiations 
occurred.

[¶8.]     In the Fall of 1982, 
Williams commenced construction of the Williams tower, and it was completed in 
the Fall of 1983, when he put Motorola and an associate, Crescent 
Communications, on the tower, acquired a few customers from Collins, and added 
some new business. The tower cost and expenses were $12,320, and revenues 
totaled $18,200. In January, 1983, Collins stopped paying Williams the pro-rata 
share under the contract, with a net revenue from that date to date of decree of 
$58,982, or $29,491, as the Williams distributable share.

[¶9.]     In November, 1984, the 
litigative campaign was started by Williams, claiming for an accounting, 
payments with interest, and partnership dissolution and distribution. As its 
pleadings, with numerous defenses, Collins pleaded Williams' breach of contract 
by construction of the Williams tower, with a counterclaim for damages, 
requesting specific performance, and alleging a cause of action in 
libel.

[¶10.]  Extended pretrial proceedings, including 
motions for summary judgment, led the case at trial commencement to accommodate 
two issues: claim of Williams for breach of contract by Collins, and 
counterclaim of Collins for breach by Williams.

[¶11.]  At the commencement of the trial, 
pursuant to a motion in limine, but generally as a ruling on the case, the court 
determined that the contract was clear and unambiguous, and ruled that 
interpretative evidence for the written contract would not be admitted at 
trial.

[¶12.]  A jury was empaneled, and at the close of 
Williams' evidence a directed verdict was granted against him and in favor of 
Collins, on the original complaint. Collins elected to proceed in specific 
performance rather than damages, and the parties then stipulated that the 
counterclaim would be tried by the court on that issue. Following trial, the 
court ruled for the defendant in granting specific performance on the written 
contract, but awarded no damages or accounting to either party for payments then 
accrued and unpaid under the contractual provisions.

[¶13.]  The issues have been variously stated, 
not only in appellant's brief, but in prior presentations to the trial court, 
but are best detailed in sequential relationship to the proceedings as claimed 
error by:

(A) denying summary 
judgment for Williams on his complaint;

(B) determination that 
the contract was not ambiguous and consequently rejecting interpretative 
evidence from Williams;

(C) admission of 
objectionable hearsay evidence;

(D) entry of directed 
verdict against Williams on his complaint; and

(E) limitation of the 
scope of the final judgment as denying an accounting for the contractual 
proceeds.

A

Denial of Williams' 
Motion for Summary Judgment

[¶14.]  The trial court accurately found 
evidentiary conflicts in its initial denial of summary judgment. More than a 
reasonable doubt existed as to the nonexistence of a factual issue otherwise 
required for summary judgment. Cordova v. Gosar, 
Wyo., 719 P.2d 625 (1986); Durdahl v. Bank of 
Casper, Wyo., 712 P.2d 23 
(1986).

[¶15.]  Additionally, the subsequent entry of a 
directed verdict against Williams, after his case in chief was concluded, is 
rationally dispositive of any question as to his earlier right to favorable 
summary judgment. Failure to withstand a directed verdict is logically 
persuasive of the existence of an unfavorable status for earlier summary 
judgment. Kuehne v. Samedan Oil Corp., Wyo., 626 P.2d 1035 
(1981).

B

Determination That the 
Contract Was Not Ambiguous

[¶16.]  This court has regularly and forcefully 
ruled that the determination whether a written agreement is ambiguous is a 
determination of law, to be made by the trial court. E & E Mining, Inc. v. 
Flying Group, Inc., 718 P.2d 58 (1986); Sannerud v. First National Bank of 
Sheridan, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1236, 1240 (1985) (construction of an unambiguous 
agreement is done by the court as a matter of law); Shepard v. Top Hat Land 
& Cattle Co., Wyo., 560 P.2d 730 (1977); Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, 
Inc., Wyo., 624 P.2d 1192 (1981); Madison v. Marlatt, Wyo., 619 P.2d 708 
(1980).

"If the language of a 
contract is plain and unequivocal, that language is controlling and the 
interpretation of its provisions is for the court to make as a matter of law. 
The meaning of the instrument is to be deduced only from its language if the 
terms are plain and unambiguous." Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, Wyo., 
604 P.2d 1359, 1361 (1980).

 

[¶17.]  Nothing in the discovery evidence 
presented before trial or the facts introduced at trial afford a basis for 
concluding that the trial court's decision was incorrect. We agree that the 
agreement was clear and understandable as to the undertaking by the parties as 
defined in the written instrument.

C

Inadmissible Hearsay 
Evidence

[¶18.]  In the course of Williams' case in chief, 
a representative of Collins was called as an adverse witness. The examination 
was extended, and on cross-examination by his own counsel the earlier subject of 
Motorola negotiations was addressed. At issue was the question of whether the 
response by Collins to Motorola for radio-tower rental services was of a nature 
to terminate further discussions, as contended by Williams, or whether it was a 
high opening bid to allow room for negotiations, as contended by Collins. In 
answer to the direct-examination inquiry as to the intent of Collins, tender was 
made, in cross-examination, of a letter written by a representative of the 
United States Forest Service to Motorola, found in the files of the Forest 
Service office in Sundance, 
Wyoming.1

[¶19.]  The evidentiary status addressed at trial 
was that the author of the letter, earlier listed as a witness, had been 
transferred to Idaho, and the representative at the Sundance office subpoenaed 
to testify as to foundation from the records was unavailable due to an 
automobile accident in traveling to the trial.

[¶20.]  Introduction of the exhibit was 
strenuously contested by Williams, since the exhibit was obviously intended by 
Collins to show fair dealings under the contract, but accepted by the trial 
court in its decision both on directed verdict and entry of the 
specific-performance decree:

"5. That with regard to 
the duty to develop, the evidence adduced was that there was space available on 
one of the two existing towers for further development, and that the only 
evidence of dealing with Motorola came from either Mr. Klinker, who said that 
the Defendant's dealings were reasonable, and the letter from the Forest Service 
(Exhibit G), which also indicated they were reasonable."

[¶21.]  Except that the exhibit (Exhibit G) was a 
letter written by a Forest Service employee, addressed to a third party, 
absolutely no basis for knowledge of the author on the subject of reasonable 
rates of tower rental was established by the letter or at trial, and, likewise, 
the trier of fact could not determine what relationship might have existed 
between the author and Collins, Williams or Motorola. These inquiries would have 
been normal areas to be explored in cross-examination had the author testified 
in person. Additionally, this court is not unaware of the general availability 
of government employees to testify as witnesses if appropriate expenses are 
afforded, and, conversely, that depositions can normally be scheduled 
conveniently without all of the formalities that might be required when an 
unwilling individual is the subject matter of an anticipated deposition. 
Litigants should not ignore the economics and efficiency accommodated by 
discovery rules, including specifically Rule 30(b)(7), W.R.C.P., Cum.Supp. 
1985:

"The parties may 
stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion order that a deposition be 
taken by telephone. For the purposes of this rule and Rules 28(a), 37(a)(1), 
37(b)(1) and 45(d), a deposition taken by telephone is taken in the district and 
at the place where the deponent is to answer questions propounded to 
him."

[¶22.]  This difficult subject will be first 
addressed by exploring the contentions of the parties provided by appellate 
brief, and then tracing the file history of the document, reflected by review of 
the record, in considering the extended and explicit objection to the 
introduction for lack of foundation and as inadmissible 
hearsay.

[¶23.]  In regard to foundation, argument was 
made by Williams in his brief that, without authentication or explanation, 
relevancy was not shown. Under the exigencies of the trial, where a witness from 
the Forest Service had been subpoenaed and then deterred from appearance by an 
automobile accident, it is appropriate to recognize the effort of the court in 
the interest of justice to be reasonable in consonance of the circumstances in 
ruling on the issue of foundation. Actually, no question existed about the 
document being a copy of a Forest Service letter taken from their files. The 
subject matter could be deduced from the text of the document. Relevancy 
afforded the obvious reason for the introduction objection by Williams, although 
validity and reliability of the opinion stated in the letter remained in 
question.

[¶24.]  Hearsay, the second aspect for claimed 
inadmissibility, requires substantially more attention.

[¶25.]  Neither party contended or discussed 
admissibility under either Rule 803(6), W.R.E., business records, or Rule 
803(8), W.R.E., public records and reports, and this court will not now attempt 
that construction in the absence of litigative contention and briefing. 
SeeVillage of Evanston v. 
Gunn, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 660, 25 L. Ed. 306 
(1878); Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co. v. Riverton, Fremont County, 70 Wyo. 119, 247 P.2d 660 (1952); and Paine, Admissibility of Factual Findings in an Official 
Investigative Report Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c), LIII Insurance 
Counsel Journal 244 (1986).

[¶26.]  When Collins contended for admission 
under Rule 804, Williams objected for the following 
reasons:

1. Under Rule 804(a)(5), 
W.R.E., there was an inadequate demonstration of 
unavailability.

2. The letter did not 
comply with Rule 804(b)(5), W.R.E., since it is an opinion and not a narration, 
description or explanation of "an event or condition recently 
perceived."

3. The letter is not 
within the admission exception of Rule 804(b)(6) (Rule 804(b)(5) in the federal 
rules), for three further reasons: (a) equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness are lacking; (b) the document is not more probative than 
evidence available through diligent effort; (c) it does not advance the general 
purposes of the rules of justice because it results in the admission of 
unreliable testimony without the corrective benefit of cross-examination 
available by deposition of the writer.

[¶27.]  Except by general objection not otherwise 
specified, Williams did not raise introduction noncompliance under the notice 
provisions of the last sentence of Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E.

[¶28.]  Briefing authority was cited in support 
of the probative/diligence requirement, Demars v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of United States, 610 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1979), and on the subject of 
nonavailability requirements of Rule 804(a)(5), as well as in discussion of 
general hearsay principles as rules of evidence.

[¶29.]  The response by Collins, without any case 
citation or review of the rules, quoted the trial court for support of the Rule 
804(b)(5) and (6) hearsay introduction exception ruling 
and:

"* * * [I]f the district 
court were wrong and Exhibit G should not have been admitted, admission of 
Exhibit G was not prejudicial. Assuming arguendo that the rental price was 
unreasonable, and that the court erred in admitting and relying on Exhibit G, 
the fact that the price was unreasonable does not constitute a material breach 
of the Agreement, either alone, or together with other facts in the 
record."

Collins further 
argued by brief that it had no obligation to deal with Motorola, that the high 
price was to open negotiations, that Motorola would not have rented tower space 
from Collins, and even if Motorola was excluded as a customer, the minimal loss 
of revenue was not material as a contract breach. No case citation or further 
evidence admission justification was afforded by appellee as a response to the 
general hearsay admission objection discussed by appellant.2

[¶30.]  Comprehensive record review is required 
to determine how Exhibit G was introduced under Rule 804. It was not listed as 
an exhibit by Collins in its pretrial memorandum and exhibit list filed 
September 19, 1985. In further pretrial submission on September 26, 1985, the 
author of the exhibit, William E. Lind, was included as a prospective witness. 
No reference to a proposed Exhibit G is found in any pretrial pleading, and the 
exhibit was not noticed for pretrial purposes as required by the order for 
pretrial conference or the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of 
Wyoming, or 
otherwise noticed in any other fashion. Noncompliance with the pretrial process 
was not raised in objection to introduction, and consequently this court will 
not contemplate error on that basis. The court is entitled to notice of specific 
basis for objection or the objection is waived. Rule 46, W.R.C.P.; Joly v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 502 P.2d 362 
(1972).

[¶31.]  This non-notice status does bear 
specifically, however, on admissibility, under the purview of the last sentence 
of Rule 804(b)(6):

"* * * However, a 
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it 
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing 
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his 
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant,"

as well as the 
unavailability determination of Rule 804(a).3

[¶32.]  Compliance with Rule 804(a) is required 
before the hearsay exceptions of Rule 804(b) can be applied. We will not 
determine if the substantive requirements of Rule 804(b)(5) and (6) were met, 
unless the threshold eligibility of the unavailability request is 
demonstrated.4 See the exhaustive analysis of the 
catch-all hearsay exception in Schmunk v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 
(1986).

[¶33.]  We limit this decision to the threshold 
question of the determination of unavailability of the witness since we find 
that there is insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the admissibility 
of Exhibit G, and we will not further pursue the other objections which were 
raised or could have been raised in opposition to introduction. By this 
disposition we in no way denigrate the importance of other requirements, and 
especially so as to pretrial notice requirements and the use notice of Rule 
804(b)(6). Fairness and justice are both at issue in notice compliance 
requirements. See United 
States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 36 
A.L.R.Fed. 734 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S. Ct. 739, 50 L. Ed. 2d 752, reh. denied 430 U.S. 911, 97 S. Ct. 1186, 51 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1976); Annot., 36 A.L.R.Fed. 742, 747.

[¶34.]  The Wyoming Rule 804 definition of 
unavailability is identical with the federal rule. At issue in this case is the 
criterion requirement of subsection (a)(5):

"Is absent from the 
hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his 
attendance by process or other reasonable 
means." (Emphasis added.)

[¶35.]  The actual principle in contest is whether a 
witness' nonresidence in Wyoming alone renders letters admissible. 
The significance of the question directs this court to resolve inadmissibility 
on that question.

[¶36.]  Factually, little documentary support for 
admissibility on the Rule 804(a)(5) requirement exists in this case. The 
contention for compliance was solely based on the transfer of the witness from 
Wyoming with 
no effort made to either secure voluntary appearance or to take a 
deposition.

[¶37.]  The number of cases is extensive, with 
perhaps four out of five arising in the criminal context. It must immediately be 
recognized that admissibility in criminal cases not only encompasses the 
criteria of Rule 804, but also the confrontation requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Consequently, in criminal cases, 
these criteria may be more strictly construed. See Schmunk v. State, 
supra.

[¶38.]  Also to be noted is that the type of the 
hearsay material tendered under the rule exception unquestionably affects the 
reasonableness considerations when comparing depositions, testimony in prior 
trials or preliminary hearing evidence, in cases where cross-examination was 
afforded, to be compared with material such as an ex parte letter as is at issue 
here.

[¶39.]  In this case, we have an opinion letter 
on a technical question, written to a third party.

[¶40.]  The range of standards elicited from the 
cases goes from due diligence and good faith as alternately and interchangeably 
used, to mere absence from the subpoena jurisdiction as sufficient. This latter 
construction essentially excises the "other reasonable means" provision from the 
evidentiary Rule 804(a)(5).

"* * * Assuming that the 
declarant cannot be subpoenaed to testify at trial, he still does not satisfy 
the unavailability criteria of Rule 804(a)(5) if his presence can be obtained by 
`other reasonable means.' In civil litigation, it should be necessary for a 
party invoking one of the exceptions in Rule 804(b) to represent to the court 
that it communicated with the declarant or tried to do so in an effort to secure 
his voluntary attendance at trial." 4 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 
486, pp. 1055-1056 (1980).

See Janich 
Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 859-860 (9th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied 439 U.S. 829, 99 S. Ct. 103, 58 L. Ed. 2d 122 
(1978).

[¶41.]  Any practical standard or requirement in 
order to afford fairness or justice mandates accommodation in Rule 804(b)(6) 
catch-all cases with the concurrent fair-opportunity-to-prepare corollary 
requirement of the last sentence. If a proponent seeks to rely only on 
"absence," then respondent surely must be afforded an opportunity to defend, and 
particularly so when hearsay opinion statements might be included in the 
tendered exhibit. This is the significance in this case of the noncompliance 
with notice requirements of both the pretrial rule and the catch-all 
exception.

[¶42.]  It is clear that no absolute rule can be 
created which will realistically afford justice in all the variegated 
circumstances occurring in trial activities. Reason and fairness within the 
sound discretion of the court should be determinative. This is the test of 
reasonableness.

"* * * [T]he `reasonable 
means' clause has the effect of restricting the situations in which the 
declarant is deemed unavailable by expanding the obligation of the proponent to 
attempt to secure his live testimony beyond merely exhausting the subpoena power 
of the court and attempting to depose the witness.

Fairly read, however, the 
same clause in Rule 804(a)(5) also has the effect of expanding the situations in 
which the declarant is deemed unavailable by limiting the obligation of the 
proponent to attempt to secure his live testimony where efforts of this sort are 
likely to be unproductive or too costly in the light of 
circumstances.

"That is to say, a fair 
reading of Rule 804(a)(5) suggests that all three of the factors which it cites 
as bearing upon the declarant's availability are subject to a reasonableness 
standard. This reasonableness standard implies that a party offering a statement 
under Rule 804(b) may satisfy the unavailability criteria of Rule 804(a)(5) 
[Rule 804(a)(6), W.R.E.] without even attempting to subpoena the declarant if it 
can be shown that the declarant simply cannot be found, which in turn suggests 
that the party should be excused from pursuing other means to secure the 
declarant's attendance and testimony, including efforts to depose the declarant. 
It implies too that if the party offering a statement under Rule 804(b) can show 
that his adversary is responsible for the disappearance of the declarant, or for 
the fact that he has proven difficult to find, less in the way of efforts by the 
offering party should be considered sufficient to discharge his obligation to 
try to produce the declarant.

"The reasonableness 
standard also suggests that the stakes in the litigation, the relative resources 
of the parties, the importance of the declarant's statement in the suit, the 
foreseeability of need for the statement, and the relative expense and 
difficulties which would be encountered in securing the declarant's trial or 
deposition testimony should all be considered in determining whether a party 
offering a statement under Rule 804(b) made an adequate effort to obtain 
declarant's trial or deposition testimony." 4 Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 
486, pp. 1066-1068.

[¶43.]  For application of the test of 
reasonableness as a standard, specific rules can be ascertained from the 
extensive authorities and case law.

[¶44.]  (1) A discretional factor for the trial 
court exists. United States 
v. Thomas, 705 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 890, 104 S. Ct. 232, 78 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1983); State v. Grable, Wyo., 
649 P.2d 663 (1982); People v. Masters, 134 Cal. App. 3d 509, 185 Cal. Rptr. 509 
(1982); People ex rel. Faulk v. District Court of Eleventh Judicial District of 
Colorado, Colo., 667 P.2d 1384 (1983); People v. Pullins, 145 Mich. App. 414, 
378 N.W.2d 502 (1985); Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rules: A 
Discretional Approach, 15 Wayne L.Rev. 1079 (1969).

[¶45.]  (2) The catch-all exceptions, Rules 
803(24) and 804(b)(6), W.R.E., are to be cautiously used and only in exceptional 
cases, in the interest of justice. Schmunk v. State, supra; Demars v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of United States, supra; 4 Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 
472, pp. 921, 923.

[¶46.]  (3) The burden of proving unvailability 
rests with the proponent of the evidence. People v. Masters, supra; Perricone v. 
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 630 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1983); Complaint of Bankers 
Trust Co. v. Chatterjee, 40 F.R.S.2d 1181, 752 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1984); Baylor 
v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 733 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1984); Dartez 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985); People ex rel. Faulk v. 
District Court, supra; Estate of Schoch v. Kail, 209 Neb. 812, 311 N.W.2d 903 
(1981); Compton v. WWV Enterprises, Tex. App., 679 S.W.2d 668 (1984); 4 Louisell 
and Mueller, supra, § 486, p. 1026; V. Wigmore, Evidence § 1414, p. 
237.

[¶47.]  (4) The availability quotient is 
intrinsically involved in the particular use intended and the type of material 
to be introduced as raising the other criteria for introduction under either 
Rule 803(24) or Rule 804(b)(6),5 with proper findings to be provided 
to establish that a factual basis for admission does exist. Janich Bros., Inc. 
v. American Distilling Co., supra; 4 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 804(b) (5) [02]. See 
4 Louisell and Mueller, supra, discussion of Rule of Reasonableness. See also 
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 431 U.S. 914, 
97 S. Ct. 2174, 53 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1977); Huff v. White Motors Corporation, 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1979); 
Castilleja v. Southern Pacific Co., 445 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. 
Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985).

[¶48.]  (5) Generally, the absence of the witness 
from the jurisdiction alone is not sufficient without further effort to obtain 
the evidentiary support or the direct testimony by "reasonable 
means."

"* * * In this case, 
counsel for Janich made conclusory allegations that Sherwin was outside the 
jurisdiction of the court. This is inadequate." Janich Brothers v. American 
Distilling Co., supra, 570 F.2d  at 859.

[¶49.]  Wyoming does not have any civil cases directly 
considering the catch-all hearsay exception involved in this decision. See 
general discussions, United 
States v. Thomas, supra; United States v. 
Carlson, supra. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983), a civil case, as well as Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982), and Schmunk v. 
State, supra, the witnesses were dead, so that the unavailability question was 
not invoked.

[¶50.]  In Grable v. State, supra, a criminal 
case, the availability question was considered in regard to a transcript of 
testimony from a prior trial. Adequate notice was given, with the witness 
claiming unavailability for medical reasons for travel from Texas to the Wyoming trial. Extended efforts to secure 
attendance were made, the absence having been occasioned by an earlier trial 
continuance. The court then said:

"The prosecution has the 
burden of establishing the unavailability of a witness to testify at trial 
despite good faith efforts to obtain his presence. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). Futile acts are not required, and the lengths 
to which the prosecution is required to proceed in order to produce a witness is 
a question of reasonableness. California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970). The determination of the unavailability of a witness is a matter 
which rests in the discretion of the trial court, and that determination will 
not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of the court's discretion. Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 (1980) * * *." 649 P.2d  at 
672.

Determinative 
under the confrontation question not existent in the civil case was the adequacy 
of cross-examination in the previous trial.

[¶51.]  The good-faith rule has comprehensive 
authority, especially where a criminal trial is involved. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). Due diligence is used interchangeably by some courts. People v. 
Masters, supra. It is apparent that the standard of reasonableness is to be 
broadly applied, including all the circumstances, the types of evidence, and the 
factors of fairness and justice. However, something more than simple absence 
from the state will inevitably be required, except in the most unusual 
circumstances, not demonstrated here under proponent's burden of proof of 
unavailability, where the only fact was the out-of-state 
transfer.

[¶52.]  This court determines that introduction 
of Exhibit G in this case was in error.

[¶53.]  Determining as we do that the 
introduction of the exhibit was in error, was the introduction of Exhibit G 
sufficiently prejudicial so that reversal is required? We answer this question 
in the negative. Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1035, 100 S. Ct. 710, 62 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1979); Janich Bros. v. American 
Distilling Co., supra; Demars v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United 
States, supra; United States v. Guevara, supra.

[¶54.]  Williams contended that the opening 
Motorola offer was so excessive as to demonstrate bad faith. Motorola, as a 
prospective customer, was not called to testify to prove the Collins breach of 
contract.

[¶55.]  Collins contended that it started high 
but was willing to negotiate. May it suffice to observe that if Williams gave 
particular priority to the Collins-Motorola negotiation, written demand and 
notice could have been furnished rather than relying on the assumption of a 
possible breach to be followed with the tower construction for competitive 
application to the Motorola business.

[¶56.]  Considering all of the evidence available 
to the court when ruling on the motion for directed verdict, we conclude that if 
the introduction of Exhibit G had been rejected the trial court would properly 
have ruled the same, and consequently introduction was not prejudicial. This 
determination devolves from the peculiar nature of the facts involved in this 
case, and could have been different if the document had been involved in a jury 
decision. The jury might have been more likely to believe that Lind did know 
what he was writing about than is likely to be implied from judicial 
sophistication as a professional ability to comprehend and evaluate the 
reliability of evidence. Colorado Serum Company v. Arp, Wyo., 504 P.2d 801 (1972). See dissenting 
comments in DeJulio v. Foster, Wyo. 715 P.2d 182 (1986).

D

Directed Verdict Against 
Williams

[¶57.]  The parties agree that the premise for 
recovery by either is whether the other party committed a material breach of the 
agreement.

[¶58.]  Williams contended as justification for 
his tower construction that Collins was earlier in performance default. Raised 
as default issues were contentions of late payments, failure to maintain the 
tower, failure to cooperate, and a breach of duty to develop. A fifth issue 
devolves from the cessation of payment by Collins in 1983 as justified by the 
tower construction by Williams.

[¶59.]  We find that the trial court clearly and 
with specificity related a justified basis for entry of the directed 
verdict:

"Rule 50(a) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a directed verdict may be granted 
only when the evidence is such that after viewing it in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff and giving to him all reasonable inferences reasonable minds 
could not disagree as to the verdict.

"Stated another way, if 
after giving the plaintiff all reasonable inferences the evidence leads to only 
one conclusion, a directed verdict should be granted.

* * * * * 
*

"First of all, a breach 
of contract is a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which 
forms a whole or a part of the contract. 

"A material breach is a 
breach that goes to the whole consideration of the 
contract.

"And, as the plaintiff 
pointed out in its submitted jury instructions, in determining whether a breach 
is a material or substantial breach you may consider these factors: First, the 
extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected; secondly, the likelihood that the breaching party will cure 
its breach taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances made; and, thirdly, the extent to which the behavior of the breaching 
party comports with standards of good faith and fair 
dealing.

"First, I think it's 
important to state that the law is, as I understand, at least, that the party 
first committing a substantial breach of contract cannot complain that the other 
party thereafter fails to perform, and where one party to a contract repudiates 
it or refuses to perform, the injured party is not obligated to perform its 
promises.

"With that in mind, and 
reiterating the court's earlier findings in this case, that the contract is 
clear and unambiguous, and that the terms of the contract are not in conflict, 
and the parties' intentions are clearly expressed in that contract, after giving 
the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, the court finds the 
evidence has established the following:

"First, the plaintiff was 
not deprived of his monthly payments until January of 1983, and he neither 
complained nor notified the defendants that he considered any late payments a 
breach [at an earlier date].

"Further, even if the 
payment up until that time - payments, rather, were late by definition, that 
does not constitute a material breach of the agreement.

"The court finds, 
secondly, if there was a failure to maintain, and the evidence is contradictory 
on that point, the plaintiff was not deprived of any benefit which he reasonably 
expected.

"The plaintiff's own 
expert testified there was no damage to the plaintiff because of any maintenance 
problems.

"Thirdly, the court finds 
that no testimony regarding failure to cooperate was adduced at the 
trial.

"* * * [U]ntil the 
problem with the new tower which was constructed, the plaintiff testified that 
he believed there was a good relationship between the 
parties.

"With regard to the duty 
to develop, the evidence adduced was that there was space available on one of 
the 2 existing towers for further development, and the only evidence of dealing 
with Motorola came from either Mr. Klinker, who said that the defendant's 
dealings were reasonable, and the letter from the Forest Service, which also 
indicated they were reasonable.

"The only reasonable 
conclusion that can be drawn is that Motorola, or Crescent, or whomever, took 
advantage of the plaintiff's unfounded belief that the defendants were not 
properly developing the site.

"However, there was no 
evidence adduced that they were not properly developing the 
site."

[¶60.]  The evidence supports the decision, and 
the legal rules involved justify the directed verdict entry by analysis and 
application of the trial court. Boswell v. First National Bank of Laramie, 16 Wyo. 161, 92 P. 624, reh. denied 93 P. 661 
(1907).

"In reviewing the grant 
of a directed verdict by a trial court, consideration must be given to all 
evidence favorable to party against whom the motion is directed, as well as to 
all reasonable and legitimate inferences which might be drawn therefrom. 
McCarthy v. Croker, Wyo. 1976, 549 P.2d 323; 
Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo. 1974, 526 P.2d 983; 
Brennan v. Laramie Newspapers, Inc., Wyo. 1972, 493 P.2d 1044. Whether or not the 
evidence so viewed is sufficient to create an issue for the jury is solely a 
question of law to be answered by the trial court. That court must determine 
whether or not the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of 
the witnesses, or otherwise, considering the weight of the evidence, there is 
but one conclusion as to verdict which men of reason could reach." Town of 
Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 
569 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1977).

See also Note, 
Evidence Court Considers on Motion to Direct Verdict, 10 Wyo.L.J. 164 
(1956).

E

Scope of the Summary 
Judgment Order

[¶61.]  By judgment, the trial court determined 
and ordered in regard to summary judgment:

"(6) That because of the 
material breach of the Agreement between the parties by Plaintiff as set forth 
in paragraph II.D. (4), and because of the refusal by the Plaintiff to perform 
the Agreement between the parties, or Plaintiff's repudiation of the contract, 
thereafter the Defendant was excused from performance of the terms of the 
Agreement between the parties.

* * * * * 
*

"(7) That the Defendant 
should be awarded the equitable remedy of specific performance of the Agreement 
between the parties, and that from this date forward the Agreement between the 
parties should be performed in accordance with the ruling of the 
Court.

"(8) That prior to the 
8th day of October, 1985, the parties shall be left as they are with each 
retaining the monies from tower rental which they presently have in their 
possession or which have accrued prior to this date."

[¶62.]  The issue raised by the decision is 
whether in granting a decree of specific performance prospectively the court 
could disregard payment rights devolving from the contract for the earlier 
period after controversy between the parties had 
developed.

[¶63.]  Otherwise stated, could Collins retain 
monies clearly due to Williams from the time when Williams commenced 
construction of the fourth tower, particularly since it was more than six months 
before any completion for service occurred? Since the performance of plaintiff 
in no way affected the contributory obligation of Collins, we answer this 
question in the negative, and consequently reverse for determination of the 
amounts properly due. To do otherwise would unjustly enrich Collins for his 
failure to comply with his own contract obligations and excuse rental and joint 
use nonpayment. See Schultz v. Campbell, 147 Mont. 439, 413 P.2d 879 (1966); Nugent v. 
Beckham, 37 N.C. App. 557, 246 S.E.2d 541 (1978).

[¶64.]  The rules on specific performance 
explained in McCoy Farms, Inc. v. J & M McKee, 263 Ark. 20, 563 S.W.2d 409, 
cert. denied 439 U.S. 862, 99 S. Ct. 184, 58 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1978), lend support to 
our conclusion:

"* * * Specific 
performance is an equitable remedy which compels the performance of a contract 
on the precise terms agreed upon or such a substantial performance as will do 
justice between the parties under the circumstances. It is a means of compelling 
a contracting party to do precisely what he should have done without being 
coerced by a court. 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 2, 701; 71 Am.Jur.2d 10, 
Specific Performance, § 1; Restatement of the Law, Contracts § 358, Comment a, § 
359(2), § 360(b), § 326(c). The object in such cases is to place the party 
without fault in as nearly the same position as he would have been had there 
been no default by the other party. Pillsbury v. J.B. Streeter, Jr. Co., 15 N.D. 
174, 107 N.W. 40 (1906). The guiding principle in such cases is to relate the 
contract back to the date set therein. Ellis v. Mihelis, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415, 384 P.2d 7 (1963); Meyer v. Benko, 55 Cal. App. 3d 937, 127 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1976)." (Emphasis added.) 563 S.W.2d  at 
415.

[¶65.]  As indicated in the above quotation, the 
object of specific performance is to place the party without fault in the 
position he would have been in had there been no default. Neither party is 
totally without fault in this case. Collins withheld rental income from Williams 
after Williams partially breached the contract by building a new 
tower.

[¶66.]  Regarding recovery by a party who has 
breached his contract, Williston on Contracts points out 
that:

"A satisfactory solution 
is not easy, for two fundamental legal policies seem here to come in conflict. 
On the one hand, it seems a violation of the terms of a contract to allow a 
plaintiff in default to recover - to allow a party to stop [performance] when he 
pleases * * *.

"On the other hand, to 
deny recovery often gives the defendant more than fair compensation for the 
injury he has sustained and imposes a forfeiture (which the law generally 
abhors) on the plaintiff. The mores of time and place will often determine which 
policy will be followed.

"But the second of these 
opposing policies has steadily increased in favor and probably represents the 
weight of authority. Except where the obliquity of the defective performance is 
of a sort that indicates moral obliquity, and where, therefore, the court feels 
that the one who is in default may properly be penalized, the tendency is to 
grant him restitution if a substantial net benefit has accrued to the defendant 
by partial performance." 12 Williston on Contracts, third edition § 1473, pp. 
221-224.

[¶67.]  The essence of specific performance is 
that the contract will be enforced, Otis Oil & Gas Corporation v. Maier, 74 
Wyo. 137, 284 P.2d 653 (1955), and the decision of this case is that the 
contractual relationship will continue as if no breach had occurred, McCoy 
Farms, Inc. v. J & M McKee, supra, and the accounting requirement to 
effectuate the contractual result is now properly before the trial 
court.

[¶68.]  An accounting was required in Duane 
Sales, Inc. v. Carmel, 57 A.D.2d 1003, 394 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1977), reversed on 
other grounds, 49 N.Y.2d 862, 427 N.Y.S.2d 930, 405 N.E.2d 175 (1980), after 
specific performance of a real property purchase option agreement had been 
granted. The New York Supreme Court modified the judgment, concluding 
that:

"* * * an accounting 
should be had which should take into consideration, among other things, the 
following: the rents received by 
defendants during the period from the date of the conveyance of the title to the 
premises; any profits resulting to the defendants in their operation of the 
property; any losses sustained by the plaintiff because of the delay in 
conveyance of title; necessary expenses incurred by the defendants in the 
operation of the property, such as payments of principal and interest on the 
mortgage, property taxes, insurance, and minor repairs; the benefits to the 
plaintiff in retaining the use of the purchase money during the pendency of the 
litigation." (Emphasis added.) 394 N.Y.S.2d  at 308, 405 N.E.2d  at 
175.

[¶69.]  Although Duane Sales was reversed on 
other grounds by the Court of Appeals of New York, the quoted language regarding 
the accounting was cited with approval in Bravo v. Buelow, 214 Cal. Rptr. 65, 
168 Cal. App. 3d 208 (1985), an action for specific performance of a real estate 
sales contract. The California Court of Appeal further 
said:

"`In California the 
compensation which may be awarded incident to a decree of specific performance 
is not for breach of contract and is not legal damages. The complainant affirms 
the contract and asks that it be performed. Since the time for performance has 
passed, the court relates that performance back to that date, by treating the 
parties as if [performance] * * * had taken place at that time. Thus the [real 
estate] buyer is entitled to the rents and profits from the time the contract 
should have been performed, and the [real estate] seller is entitled to an 
offset for the interest on the purchase money which he would have received had 
the contract been performed. The process is more like an accounting between the 
parties than an assessment of damages. [Citations].'" 214 Cal. Rptr.  at 69, 
quoting from Hutton v. Gliksberg, 128 Cal. App. 3d 240, 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 141 
(1982).

[¶70.]  We equate the remedy provided to the 
buyer and seller of real estate in Bravo v. Buelow, supra, to our conclusion 
that each party should receive a pro-rata share of the revenue due under the 
contract. See also Masholie v. River Edge Estates, 129 N.J.E. 228, 19 A.2d 27 
(1941), reh. denied 135 N.J.E. 193, 37 A.2d 861 (1944).6

[¶71.]  In regard to the funds due from Collins 
to Williams, the amount is in the undisputed total of $29,491. The remaining 
issue is, what should occur with regard to the Williams tower and the cost 
incurred in its construction? It is our conclusion that by enforcing the 
contract the option is vested in Collins to either accept the tower and its cost 
or accept the funds earned by Williams for credit on the balances remaining due 
on the agreement for division of profits. Reasonable time should be afforded by 
the trial court upon remand for Collins to make the election.7

[¶72.]  With a contract life remaining of six 
years, it surely would benefit both parties for the tower to be used if that use 
can accommodate an increased revenue to the venture. Likewise, then, at the 
termination of the period, the tower, as well as the other two towers (the 
Forest Service and the middle tower), will be joint-venture property in an 
undivided 50 percent interest rather than Williams owning one tower and a 50 
percent interest in two other towers.

[¶73.]  The decision of the trial court is 
affirmed except as remanded for entry of an order affording an accounting and 
option to Collins to acquire the newly constructed tower for the venture, as is 
herein provided.

FOOTNOTES

1 "Reference your letter 
concerning renting space at the WarrenPeak site for the installation of a 
community repeater.

"Collins 
Communications, Inc. was issued a 20 year Special Use Permit in 1972 after the 
Forest Service solicited bids from parties interested in developing and 
operating an electronic site on WarrenPeak. As permit holder, they make space 
available on a lease or rental basis to other individuals, companies or 
corporations for the operation of electronic equipment.

"The monthly rental fee quoted to you by 
Collins does appear to be in line with the rates charged to the other users on 
this site.

"Please continue 
to work with Collins and address any questions or problems of a technical nature 
directly to them.

"If I can be of 
any further assistance, please feel free to contact our office." (Emphasis 
added.)

2 This is dangerous 
briefing, and could result in summary appellate decision from the appearance 
that appellee did concede improper admission.

3 Although the existence 
of the letter (Exhibit G) was apparently known by Williams, nothing of record 
reflects its intended introduction before actual presentation. Except as 
included in the exhibit chart apparently maintained by the trial court, the 
existence of Exhibit G is nowhere found in the volume of the record constituting 
the pleadings, and first appeared at trial in the cross-examination inquiry and 
exchange. The only documented notice that might be found of the intended 
introduction was occasioned by the issuance of a subpoena on October 4, 1975, to 
an assistant forest ranger to secure "the entire file regarding the Special Use 
Permit for the Warren Peak Electronics Site issued to Collins Communications, 
Inc." Since the trial date followed on October 7, this could hardly be 
considered as notice of use of the exhibit rather than of the witness who had 
been listed in pretrial memoranda.

4 Admissibility of Exhibit 
G, under Rules 804(b)(5) and (6) could be resisted (successfully or otherwise) 
for the following reasons:

(a) noncompliance with 
pretrial requirements;

(b) not covered by Rule 
804(b)(5) in the terms of the rule;

(c) under Rule 804(b)(6): 
(1) equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are lacking; (2) the 
document is not more probative than evidence available through diligent effort; 
and (3) the exhibit does not advance the interest of justice when resulting in 
the admission of unreliable testimony without the corrective benefit of 
cross-examination;

(d) no compliance with 
the mandatory notice requirements of the last sentence;

(e) questionable opinion 
evidence under Rules 701, 702, 703, and 705, W.R.E.; and

(f) unavailability 
demonstration of the witness as required by Rule 804(a) is not 
shown.

5 Rules 803(24) and 
804(b)(6), W.R.E., are identical in phrase and function except that 804(b)(6) 
implies the witness unavailability requirements of 804(a).

6 In Masholie, a corporate 
director self-dealing case in which specific performance was granted, equitable 
title to certain shares of stock was placed in the complainant from the date the 
contract was made,

"* * * 
notwithstanding the fact that the judgment, or decree, awarding title to the 
stock to this complainant was entered approximately five years later." 19 A.2d  
at 29.

7 The financial facts are 
clearly established in the record. The revenue accrued but not paid to Williams 
totals $29,491, the tower costs and expenses of operation total $12,320, with 
income of $18,200, or a net revenue of $5,280. Collins is obligated to pay the 
sum of $29,491, the amount accrued and due to Williams. It is entitled to a 
credit in this computation of one-half the total revenues received by Williams 
of $9,100, with a net amount to be paid of $20,391. Alternatively, should 
Collins elect to accept the Williams tower as an asset of the venture, in accord 
with the agreement for joint operation and control, then payment is due of 
one-half the costs of the tower of $12,320, or a total additional of $6,160. 
Consequently, upon the exercise of this election, the amount to be paid would be 
$26,551, with the Williams tower then constituting a venture asset within the 
control of Collins pursuant to the terms of the original agreement. By this 
computation, Williams is chargeable with all income and Collins has the right to 
elect whether the tower will constitute a venture asset by a payment of 50 
percent of the cost incurred. The record before us does not demonstrate any 
appeal supersedeas bond. If delay by order or non-court arrangement occurred 
past the decree date in the enforcement of the decree, any accounting should 
accommodate the additional period involved.