Title: Harris v. Harman

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARK BRIAN HARRIS  
 
v.   Record No. 961774 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                     April 18, 1997 
JULIAN DAVID HARMAN, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
 
B.A. Davis, III, Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises from an automobile accident involving 
two vehicles.  On August 1, 1992, Julian David Harman, Jr., was 
driving Tracy Lee Sweeney and two of his friends home from the 
Franklin County Speedway about 11:00 p.m. when a second 
vehicle, driven by Mark Brian Harris, approached Harman's 
vehicle from the rear.  For some distance, Harris "tailgated" 
the Harman vehicle; that is, the Harris vehicle "would get 
'real close'" to the rear of the Harman vehicle.  The two 
vehicles were traveling at speeds estimated at 40 to 60 m.p.h., 
well above the 30 m.p.h. speed which was safe for that stretch 
of road.  As the vehicles approached a sharp curve, Harman 
glanced in his rearview mirror to check Harris' position.  When 
Harman turned his eyes back to the road, his truck was almost 
in the curve.  He applied the brakes, but lost control of the 
vehicle.  The vehicle slid off the road and down into a creek 
embankment.  Harris' car followed Harman's vehicle off the road 
at approximately the same point.  There was no contact between 
the vehicles, but Harman and Sweeney, among others, were 
injured in the accident. 
 
Sweeney filed a motion for judgment against Harman and 
Harris seeking recovery for his injuries.  Harman sought 
recovery for his injuries in a motion for judgment he filed 
against Harris.  The two cases were consolidated.  The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Sweeney and against Harman and 
Harris jointly and severally for $25,000, and a verdict against 
Harris in favor of Harman for $50,000. 
 
Harris appealed both judgments maintaining that, as a 
matter of law, his actions were not a proximate cause of the 
accident and Harman was contributorially negligent.  Harris 
also challenged the verdicts as inconsistent.  Harman assigned 
cross-error to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury 
on Harris' willful and wanton negligence.  
 
I. 
 
Proximate Cause
 
Harris argues that he is entitled to final judgment in 
both actions because the evidence established, as a matter of 
law, that his actions were not a proximate cause of Harman's 
vehicle skidding off the road.  Harris does not challenge the 
jury's determination that his actions were negligent, but 
argues that the evidence shows that Harman's admitted excessive 
speed and inattention were the sole proximate cause of the 
accident as a matter of law.  We disagree. 
 
Harman testified that just before the accident, he was 
"[n]ot focusing on what [he] was doing" because he was paying 
attention to the Harris vehicle.  He also testified that 
Harris' actions frightened, scared, and distracted him.  The 
state trooper investigating the accident testified that when he 
interviewed Harman two months after the accident, Harman stated 
that he "didn't pay much attention to the vehicle being behind 
him."  The conflicting testimony in this record presents a 
classic jury issue of whether Harris' tailgating was a 
proximate cause of the accident, and the trial court was 
correct in submitting the issue to the jury for resolution. 
 
II.  
 
Contributory Negligence 
 
Harris argues that Harman's admissions that he was driving 
at an excessive speed and failed to maintain a proper lookout 
require a determination that Harman was contributorially 
negligent, as a matter of law, and, therefore, that Harris is 
entitled to final judgment in Harman's action against him.  
Harman replies that the issue was properly submitted to the 
jury because Harris' tailgating placed Harman in a position of 
sudden peril, and, thus, the jury could find that Harman's 
actions were reasonable under the circumstances.
*  Harman bases 
his position on our cases which have excused otherwise 
negligent acts, such as Perlin v. Chappell, 198 Va. 861, 96 
S.E.2d 805 (1957), in which we held 
 
[i]f the circumstances are such as would reasonably 
cause a normal person to become greatly excited or 
frightened, he is not required to exercise the 
coolness and sound judgment that he would be required 
to exercise under ordinary circumstances.  One who 
                     
     
* Harman also argues that his excessive speed and failure 
to keep a proper lookout were put into operation by Harris' 
tailgating and, therefore, the tailgating "entirely 
supersede[d] the operation" of Harman's negligence.  The jury 
instruction upon which Harman relies, however, refers to 
whether Harris' negligence was superseded by Harman's, not vice 
versa.  Harman did not offer a jury instruction on Harris' 
negligence as a superseding cause of the accident and we will 
not consider that argument here. 
negligently places another in a position of sudden 
peril may not complain that the other fails to react 
with wisdom and promptness. 
 
Id. at 866, 96 S.E.2d at 809. 
 
In Perlin, the plaintiff faced a runaway 1,100 pound 
heifer, and was "so frightened that 'he could not move.'"  Id. 
at 863-64, 96 S.E.2d at 808.  Under these circumstances, the 
plaintiff's failure to take reasonable steps to avoid injury 
was not negligent.  Like Perlin, all the cases relied on by 
Harman in which the sudden peril doctrine has been applied 
involved situations in which the actor engaged in some activity 
which could be considered negligent under normal circumstances, 
but was not because the actor was faced with immediate peril.  
Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co. v. Parker, 152 Va. 484, 
500-01, 147 S.E. 461, 466 (1929)(failing to draw arm in car 
before collision with train); Richmond Traction Co. v. 
Wilkinson, 101 Va. 394, 404-05, 43 S.E. 622, 626 (1903)(boy 
jumping off moving street car when ordered to do so by 
conductor); South West Improvement Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 85 Va. 
306, 319, 7 S.E. 365, 371 (1888)(young boy opening door of mine 
chamber when faced with run-away coal train). 
 
In this case, Harris' tailgating did not present Harman 
with immediate peril.  While the record is not precise, it does 
establish that Harman was aware of Harris' tailgating for four 
to five miles before the two vehicles approached the curve and 
that Harman's speed was consistent throughout that four to five 
mile stretch.  Harman was familiar with the road, knew he was 
approaching the curve, and knew he had to slow down to 
negotiate it.  Harman was not put in sudden peril by Harris' 
tailgating, but he had been aware of, and had reacted to, the 
situation for a period of time.  During that time, Harman, by 
his own admission, drove at an excessive speed and failed to 
keep a proper lookout.  Accordingly, Harman was 
contributorially negligent as a matter of law, and the trial 
court erred in submitting that issue to the jury. 
 
III. 
 
Willful and Wanton Negligence
 
Harman assigned cross-error asserting that the trial court 
should have instructed the jury on willful and wanton 
negligence and that Harman's contributory negligence would not 
bar his recovery from Harris if Harris was guilty of willful 
and wanton negligence. 
 
Willful and wanton negligence is one of three levels of 
negligence.  Simple negligence is the failure to use the degree 
of care an ordinary person would exercise to avoid injury to 
another.  The second level of negligence, gross negligence, is 
action which shows indifference to others, disregarding 
prudence to the level that the safety of others is completely 
neglected.  Gross negligence is negligence which shocks fair-
minded people, but is less than willful recklessness.  Griffin 
v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321, 315 S.E.2d 210, 212-13 (1984).  
Willful and wanton negligence, the third level, is "acting 
consciously in disregard of another person's rights or acting 
with reckless indifference to the consequences, with the 
defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances 
and conditions, that his conduct probably would cause injury to 
another."  Id. at 321, 315 S.E.2d at 213. 
 
Harman argues that the evidence showed that Harris 
intended to tailgate Harman, had prior knowledge of the road 
and curve, and knew that his speed was in excess of the speed 
required to safely negotiate the curve.  These facts, Harman 
contends, would support a finding by the jury that Harris' acts 
were conscious, intentional acts, in "disregard of another 
person's rights," and that Harris was aware, "from his 
knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his 
conduct probably would cause injury to others."  
 
Harman applies the phrases we have used to describe 
willful and wanton negligence in characterizing Harris' 
conduct.  But adopting his analysis would turn every 
intentional moving traffic violation into a case of willful and 
wanton negligence.  Traffic laws are established for the safety 
of those who are on the public roads.  Every time a driver 
intentionally violates a traffic law, by definition, the 
violator is on notice that other users of the road may be 
injured as a result of his violation.  Such conduct alone, 
however, does not have the characteristics of conduct generally 
classified as willful and wanton.  See Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 
905, 910, 114 S.E.2d 617, 621-22 (1960). 
 
While each case must be resolved on its own facts, willful 
and wanton negligence generally involves some type of egregious 
conduct - conduct going beyond that which shocks fair-minded 
people.  Such conduct has ranged from a driver with a 
significantly high blood alcohol content involved in an 
accident after a prior collision with another car, exceeding 
the speed limit, driving in the wrong lane, and leaving the 
scene of the accident, Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 313, 427 
S.E.2d 357, 359 (1993), to a driver intentionally chasing and 
running into a bicyclist in a dispute over money, Friedman v. 
Jordan, 166 Va. 65, 68, 184 S.E. 186, 187 (1936), but has not 
included the actions of a drunk driver who was speeding, took 
no evasive action to avoid a rear-end collision, and tried to 
leave the scene of the accident, Puent v. Dickens, 245 Va. 217, 
218-19, 427 S.E.2d 340, 341-42 (1993).  The conduct complained 
of in this case, Harris' speed and tailgating, falls far short 
of the egregious conduct we have previously found necessary to 
support a finding of willful and wanton negligence.  See 
Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 253, 462 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1995), 
and the cases discussed therein.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on 
willful and wanton negligence. 
 
IV. 
 
Summary
 
In summary, we conclude that the trial court properly 
submitted the issue of whether Harris' actions were a proximate 
cause of the accident to the jury and that the trial court did 
not err in refusing to instruct the jury on willful and wanton 
negligence.  Therefore, we will affirm that part of the 
judgment awarding Sweeney $25,000 for which Harris is jointly 
and severally liable with Harman.  Because we conclude that 
Harman was contributorially negligent, as a matter of law, we 
will reverse that part of the judgment awarding Harman $50,000 
damages, and enter final judgment in favor of Harris on that 
issue.  In light of this disposition, we need not address 
Harris' challenge that the verdicts were conflicting. 
                                            Affirmed in part,   
                                            reversed in part,   
 
and final judgment.