Title: IN THE INTEREST OF L.L., A.L., M.L., and N.C.: M.L. V. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF L.L., A.L., M.L., and N.C.: M.L. V. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2007 WY 92159 P.3d 499Case Number: C-06-8Decided: 05/05/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN THE 
INTEREST OF L.L., A.L., M.L., and N.C.:

 
 
M.L.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
LARAMIE 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).)

 
 
Appeal 
from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

John M. 
Burman, Faculty Supervisor, and Tina Popova, Student Director, UW Legal Services 
Program; and Scott A. Homar, Cheyenne, Wyoming.*  Argument by Ms. 
Popova.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jill E. Kucera, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Kucera.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ, and SULLINS, 
D.J.

 
 
*Order 
Granting Motion Allowing Scott A. Homar to Withdraw as Counsel entered November 
16, 2006.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court terminated Mother's parental rights to four of her children after a 
two-day hearing.  Mother now appeals 
the district court's ruling on two grounds.  First, she argues that the district 
court erred when it allowed the guardian ad litem (GAL) from prior adjudications 
involving her children to testify as a lay witness in the instant 
proceeding.  Second, Mother claims 
that the Laramie County Department of Family Services (DFS) did not prove that 
her parental rights should be terminated by clear and convincing evidence.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the district court erred 
when it permitted the GAL from previous neglect cases involving Mother and her 
children to testify at the termination of parental rights hearing, wherein the 
witness was not appointed as a GAL.

 
 
           
2.   Whether clear and 
convincing evidence existed to justify terminating Mother's parental 
rights.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The instant 
appeal involves Mother's parental rights to four of her children, LL, ML, AL, 
and NC, ages 11, 9, 5, and 1 at the time DFS filed the petition for 
termination.  ML was taken from 
Mother and placed in foster care in 2001 as a result of allegations that Mother 
and ML's father were not properly caring for ML and treating her diabetes.  Subsequently, in November 2002, LL, 
AL, and a 
fifth child, NL,1 were taken into protective custody 
because DFS had concerns about the children's safety and believed them to be 
neglected.  After the children were 
removed from the home, investigators discovered that the children's father had 
sexually abused his daughters and the father later pled guilty to those 
charges.

 
 
[¶4]      Initially after 
LL, ML, AL, 
and NL were removed from Mother's care, visitation was conducted with the 
children by Mother and the children's father jointly.  Joint visitation was subsequently 
discontinued apparently because the children's father "was trying to manipulate" 
Mother during those visits.  
Finally, in June 2003, the juvenile court terminated Mother's visitation 
with the children after a hearing.  
Mother has not seen LL, ML, or AL for over three years.

 
 
[¶5]      Mother gave birth 
to NC on October 22, 2004.  Police 
quickly took NC into protective custody because Mother wanted to remove NC from 
the hospital against medical advice and also because a drug screen indicated the 
presence of narcotics in Mother's blood.  
The drug screening was subsequently proven false; however, NC remained in 
police custody and Mother has never been allowed to parent the 
child.

 
 
[¶6]      Mother has been 
found neglectful of her children in three separate adjudications.  First, in 2001, she admitted to 
neglecting the medical needs of ML.  
In December 2002, she admitted to charges of abuse and neglect regarding 
LL, NL, and AL.  
Finally, the district court found Mother neglectful of NC on March 25, 
2005, apparently for attempting to remove the child from the hospital against 
medical advice.  In each of these 
adjudications John Frentheway acted as the GAL for the children 
involved.

 
 
[¶7]      The instant case 
began when DFS filed a petition for the termination of Mother's parental rights 
to ML, LL, AL, 
and NC.  The district court held a 
hearing on the petition on April 19 and 20, 2006.  At that hearing, DFS elicited testimony 
from Mr. Frentheway, over Mother's objection, about his involvement with Mother 
and the children.  On May 3, 2006, 
the district court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which 
it ordered that Mother's parental rights to LL, ML, AL, and NC be 
terminated.  Mother now appeals that 
order.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      We have said 
that

 
 
            
[d]ecisions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion, i.e., when the trial court acts outside the bounds of reason or 
commits an error of law.  Hayes v. State, 935 P.2d 700, 702 
(Wyo. 1997); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 933 P.2d 1098, 1107 (Wyo. 1997).  The burden is upon the appellant to 
demonstrate such abuse.  Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 
(Wyo. 1997); Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 956-57 
(Wyo. 
1996).

 

Clark v. 
Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 150 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶9]      In cases 
involving the sufficiency of the evidence to terminate a parent's rights, we 
have said:

 
 
Due to 
the tension between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the 
compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children, 
application of statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter 
for strict scrutiny. . . .  As 
part of this strict scrutiny standard, a case for termination of parental rights 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. . . .  Clear and convincing evidence is that 
kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable. . . .  
Rigorous though this standard may be, we apply our traditional principles 
of evidentiary review when a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting termination. . . .  Thus, 
we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 
below, assuming all favorable evidence to be true while discounting conflicting 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.

 
 

SD v. 
    
   Carbon    
   County Dep't of Family 
Servs. (In re SED), 2002 
WY 168, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1235, 1237-38 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting LDC v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re ZKP), 979 P.2d 953, 956 
(Wyo. 1999)) 
(internal citations omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Frentheway to 
testify.

 
 
[¶10]   Mother first argues that Mr. 
Frentheway acted as a GAL in this case, even though the district court did not 
appoint him to represent the children.  
Mother's argument in this regard largely consists of an uncited  but 
nearly verbatim  recitation of part of our discussion in DH v.     Wyo.  Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, 
¶¶ 27-33, 79 P.3d 997, 1004-07 (Wyo. 2003), wherein we discussed the 
evolution of our GAL jurisprudence.  
The fatal flaw with Mother's argument and reliance on our GAL rules lies 
in the fact that Mr. Frentheway was not appointed as a GAL in the termination 
proceeding and his role in the hearing was that of a witness, not an 
advocate.  Mother's argument that 
Mr. Frentheway's status as GAL in previous proceedings made him a de facto GAL in the instant case has no 
legal or logical foundation.  

 
 
[¶11]   We have previously described the 
role of a GAL as follows:

 
 
A 
guardian ad litem, counsel, and the court should work together at the beginning 
of a case to develop and articulate clearly the scope and nature of the guardian 
ad litem's responsibilities.  Full 
investigations of the facts relevant to custody should be completed by the 
guardian ad litem, including interviewing witnesses deemed appropriate by the 
guardian ad litem, custody evaluators, if any, counselors, teachers, relatives, 
and friends.  Based on the evidence, 
input from any experts, and their own best judgment, the guardians ad litem will 
develop their recommendations concerning custody.  They should communicate with the 
parents' counsel, preferably in writing, regarding the proposed recommendations 
sufficiently in advance of trial to allow them to prepare evidence in response 
to the recommendations.  If the 
parties agree, those recommendations should be provided to the court prior to 
trial.  To fulfill their obligations 
to the children they represent, guardians ad litem must take the necessary steps 
to assure sufficient evidence is presented at trial either by introducing the 
evidence themselves or assuring counsel for one or both parents are prepared to 
do so.  Finally, guardians ad litem 
should present their recommendations to the court in the form of closing 
argument and not through personal testimony.  We recognize fully that often guardians 
ad litem are not handsomely compensated for their work.  However, performing these outlined 
duties is required to fulfill their professional 
responsibility.

 
 

Pace v. 
Pace, 2001 
WY 43, ¶ 26, 22 P.3d 861, 870 (Wyo. 2001); see also U.R.D.C. 106(d).  In the instant case, Mr. Frentheway did 
not have any responsibility to the court other than to testify truthfully.  Similarly, he was not required to make a 
full investigation into the best interests of the children, to present an 
opinion regarding custody, or to examine witnesses to support any 
recommendations he may have wished to make to the court.  In short, Mr. Frentheway had no 
responsibility to the court, the children, or Mother greater than that of any 
other factual witness at a trial.  In these circumstances, Mr. Frentheway 
was neither appointed as GAL, nor are we willing to treat him as such.  Our traditional concerns regarding the 
rules of professional responsibility and the testimony of a GAL are not present 
in this case because Mr. Frentheway was not both testifying and acting as an 
advocate for the children.  See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d  at 
151-54 (discussing the "hybrid" nature of the attorney/GAL and the modifications 
to the rules of professional responsibility that come therewith).  We, therefore, find no per se error in allowing Mr. Frentheway 
to testify in the instant termination of parental rights action when he acted as 
GAL to the children in previous neglect actions.

 
 
[¶12]   Having determined that it was not 
error to allow Mr. Frentheway to testify, we now turn to the question of whether 
the district court erroneously allowed Mr. Frentheway to testify regarding 
inadmissible opinion evidence.  
Apart from simply reiterating her arguments regarding Mr. Frentheway's 
status as GAL, Mother further alleges that Mr. Frentheway offered expert 
opinions even though he was only admitted as a lay witness at the termination 
hearing.  As support for this 
argument, Mother identifies two portions of Mr. Frentheway's testimony as 
objectionable.  First, she claims 
that he inappropriately testified on direct examination that continued 
visitation with Mother constituted "abuse" for the children.  Next, Mother directs us to Mr. 
Frentheway's statement on cross-examination, wherein he stated that he had 
received certain information from "the foster parent and from the reports from 
DFS and from . . . the workers that have observed 
[Mother]."

 
 
[¶13]   W.R.E. 701 
states:

 
 
            
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form 
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue.

 
 
In 
contrast, W.R.E. 702 provides: 

 
 
            
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.

 
 
[¶14]   Mother's counsel objected to Mr. 
Frentheway's use of the term "abuse" on the grounds that it was an expert 
opinion on a legal issue.  The 
district court determined that 

 
 
[t]he 
word abuse' has a number of meanings, and one might be the legal meaning from 
the statutes.  I don't take it that 
Mr. Frentheway has offered a legal conclusion.  In some circumstances a lay opinion may 
be helpful to the court.  I will 
permit him to offer the opinion, and that's all.

 
 
We have 
recognized that lay witnesses may give opinion evidence regarding matters that 
are rationally based on their perceptions and helpful to the trier of fact.  Clark v. Gale, 966 P.2d 431, 437 
(Wyo. 
1998).  We also note that while 
"abuse" is a defined legal term in Wyoming's child protective services statutes, 
it also has a non-technical, colloquial meaning. Compare Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-202(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005) with Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
5 (10th ed. 1995).  We are satisfied 
from our review of the record that Mr. Frentheway did not testify that visits 
with Mother were abuse under § 14-3-202(a)(ii), but merely intended to convey 
his opinion that the intermittent nature of their visits with Mother was causing 
problems for the children in adjusting to their lives when Mother was not 
around.  It further appears that Mr. 
Frentheway had firsthand knowledge of this issue because he was part of the DFS 
team assigned to deal with Mother's ongoing neglect proceedings.2  Because a central issue in this case, as 
in all termination cases, was the well-being of the children involved, it is 
also clear that the emotional and psychological effects of visits with Mother 
was information that would be helpful to the district court.  We, therefore, find no error in the 
district court's determination that Mr. Frentheway could offer these opinions as 
a lay witness.

 
 
[¶15]   Mother next argues that Mr. 
Frentheway was precluded from testifying in the instant case "by the Single 
Matter Doctrine."  In our research, 
we have found no mention of a legal theory known as "the single matter 
doctrine"; however, without citation to authority, Mother argues that "courts 
have interpreted the so-called single matter' doctrine to mean that guardians 
ad litem have acted outside the scope 
of the authority granted by their appointments in dependency and neglect cases 
when they have attempted to act in cases closely tied to the 
original."

 
 
[¶16]   Mother does direct our attention to 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 334 (2004), which 
states that 

 
 
            
The rights and powers of a guardian ad litem or next friend usually are 
restricted to matters connected with the litigation at hand, and such a 
representative generally has authority, as a representative of the court, to act 
for the infant in matters such as engaging counsel, filing suit, and prosecuting 
the litigation.

 
 
As 
discussed hereinabove, Mr. Frentheway was simply testifying as a lay witness and 
did not participate in the termination proceeding in a representative capacity, 
nor did he attempt to exercise any authority over the matter.  Mother further directs us to Cabinet for Human Resources v. S.R.J., 
706 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Guffey v. Cann, 766 S.W.2d 55 
(Ky. 1989), 
which she argues is an "example" of the single matter doctrine.  In that case, the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky 
merely held that a GAL could not recover expenses incurred in preparation for a 
future negligence action under a statute providing for GAL payment.  Id. 
at 433-34.  That court expressly 
recognized, however, that the GAL could represent the child in the future in a 
negligence action; however, such representation would not be paid through public 
funds.  Id.  We think it clear that S.R.J. provides no support for Mother's 
contention that GALs act "outside of the scope of the authority granted by their 
appointments . . . when they have attempted to act in cases closely tied to the 
original."  If anything, we read S.R.J. as recognizing the ability of 
GALs to act in cases closely tied to the original, but they do so without the 
legal status of a GAL.  Therefore, 
we find that Mr. Frentheway was not prohibited from testifying in the instant 
case by any "single matter doctrine."

 
 
[¶17]   Mother's final argument regarding 
Mr. Frentheway's testimony is that unfair prejudice resulted from such 
testimony.  To the extent Mother 
argues that prejudice resulted from her previous claims of error, as discussed 
above, we have found that no error occurred in Mr. Frentheway's testimony, 
therefore there is no possibility that prejudice could result from non-existent 
errors.   Mother also argues 
that an attorney commits an ethical violation when he or she acts as a GAL and 
also as a factual witness in the same case.  See  
 Clark 
v. Alexander, 953 P.2d  at 154.  
Again, the district court did not appoint Mr. Frentheway to act as GAL in 
the termination proceedings and he, therefore, did not commit an ethical 
violation according to Clark v. 
Alexander by testifying as a fact witness in the instant case.  Mother further finds error in the fact 
that Mr. Frentheway based his testimony "on information he had learned outside 
the termination proceedings" which made such testimony "impossible for [Mother] 
to refute."  We fail to see how our 
system of justice could continue to operate if witnesses were not allowed to 
bring information from outside the proceedings to the attention of the finder of 
fact.  The mere fact that Mother was 
unable to refute Mr. Frentheway's testimony does not constitute error.  Finally, Mother has not couched her 
prejudice argument in terms of prejudicial effect versus probative value under 
W.R.E. 403, and we will not attempt to create such an argument for 
her.

 
 
Whether 
clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's decision to 
terminate Mother's parental rights.

 
 
[¶18]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309 
(LexisNexis 2005) governs a district court's ability to terminate a parent's 
legal relationship with his or her children.  In pertinent part, that statute 
states:

 
 
            
(a)     The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing 
evidence:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
(iii)    The child 
has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent;

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
(v)     The 
child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state of 
Wyoming for 
fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the 
parent is unfit to have custody and control of the 
child[.]

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309.

 
 
[¶19]   In its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the district court ultimately 
concluded:

 
 
            
17.    Clear and 
convincing evidence shows that the children were abused or neglected by 
[Mother], and that the children have been in foster care under the 
responsibility of the State for the last 15 consecutive 
months.

 
 
            
18.    Clear and 
convincing evidence shows that the State made reasonable efforts to reunite the 
family but those efforts were unsuccessful as a result of [Mother's] lack of 
cooperation, confrontational attitude, inability to focus, inability to properly 
care for the children even during visitation, personal instability, and 
dangerous relationships.

 
 
            
19.    Clear and 
convincing evidence shows that the health and safety of the children would be 
seriously jeopardized if they were returned to [Mother].

 
 
            
20.    Clear and 
convincing evidence shows that [Mother] is unfit to have custody of children 
because of her limited mental capacity, psychological problems, refusal to 
address psychological problems, transient lifestyle, dangerous relationships, 
lack of stability, refusal to cooperate with DFS, and inability to understand or 
focus on the needs of children.

 
 
            
21.    The 
circumstances listed in conclusion no. 20, above, clearly and convincingly 
indicate that there is little likelihood of State services resulting in 
reunification of [Mother] with these children.

 
 
Our 
task, then, is to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports these 
conclusions.  Based on our review of 
the record, such evidence does exist.

 
 
[¶20]   Two elements must be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) in order to 
divest parents of their rights to their children.  First, it must be shown that a "child 
has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) 
of the most recent twenty-two (22) months."  Id.  In the instant case, it is undisputed 
that all of the children involved in the instant appeal were in foster care 
provided by the state for the fifteen months preceding the termination 
hearing.  Therefore, the dispositive 
consideration on this issue is whether DFS proved the second element by clear 
and convincing evidence; namely, whether Mother is unfit to have custody of the 
children.3

 
 
[¶21]   In the instant case, the evidence 
that tended to show that Mother was unfit to parent the children was 
substantial.  DFS presented 
testimony from Robert Fleming, a clinical psychologist who conducted a 
psychological evaluation on Mother; Rhea Halstead, a DFS case worker who has 
worked with Mother and some of the children since 2001; Debra Hibbard, a former 
employee of DFS who was also involved in providing services to Mother and the 
children; John Frentheway, whose testimony was discussed hereinabove; Shelly 
Cunningham, the foster parent of NC; and Gwen Smith-Russell, a therapist who had 
worked with Mother for two and a half years prior to the termination 
hearing.  While we need not belabor 
the minutia of each witness' testimony, we are satisfied after a review of the 
record that clear and convincing evidence existed to justify the district 
court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights.  In accordance with our traditional 
principles of evidentiary review cited supra, we find the evidence tending to show Mother 
unfit as follows:

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

            

[¶22]   The district court could properly 
terminate Mother's parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) 
because the children were in DFS custody for more than 15 of 22 months preceding 
the termination hearing and Mother was shown to be unfit to parent.  Termination was justified under § 
14-2-309(a)(v), therefore we need not discuss whether § 14-2-309(a)(iii) also 
justified termination.  See BSC v.        
Natrona       
County Dep't of Family Servs. (In re 
CC), 2004 WY 167, ¶ 32, 102 P.3d 890, 899 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   The district court did not err in 
allowing Mr. Frentheway to testify in the instant case and clear and convincing 
evidence supported the termination of Mother's parental rights to LL, ML, AL, 
and NC.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Unfortunately, 
in August 2003, NL drowned in a bathtub while she was in foster 
care.

 
 

2Mother's 
contention that Mr. Frentheway did not have firsthand knowledge on which to base 
his opinion is inaccurate.  The 
portion of Mr. Frentheway's testimony upon which Mother relies, in which he 
testified that he had learned information from DFS, foster parents, and case 
workers, was offered by Mr. Frentheway in response to a specific line of 
questioning on cross-examination regarding Mother's "constant hostility" toward 
DFS after the death of NL and DFS' attempts to reunify her with NC.  That testimony was unrelated to his 
previous lay opinion that continued visitation with Mother was a form of "abuse" 
for the children.  While Mr. 
Frentheway admitted to relying on out of court statements during the questioning 
on cross-examination, we note that Mother's counsel clearly invited him to 
testify broadly regarding "reunification efforts . . . on the part of DFS" and, 
after Mr. Frentheway testified that he had collected information from third 
parties, Mother's counsel again asked "what has DFS done that you have seen in 
an effort to reunify [Mother] with [NC]?"    Mother clearly invited a 
broad answer, failed to object to its potentially hearsay aspects, and in the 
instant appeal has failed to provide this court with a cogent hearsay 
analysis.  Mr. Frentheway's 
testimony in this regard also tended to be largely duplicative of testimony 
already presented to the court through the children's case workers.  Therefore, we will not now consider Mr. 
Frentheway's testimony error.

 
 

3We 
recognized in C.L. v.     
   Wyo.  Dep't of Family 
Servs. (In re A.D.), 2007 WY 23, ¶ 12, 151 P.3d 1102, 1106 (Wyo. 2007), that 
evidence tending to show a parent unfit is also relevant to the consideration in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) regarding whether a child's health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to a 
parent.