Title: Penney v. Carden

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

356 So. 2d 1188 (1978)
W. E. PENNEY
v.
O. D. CARDEN and Rachel Carden.
SC 2817.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 24, 1978.
James S. McGinty, of Dawson & McGinty, Scottsboro, for appellant.
Ronald A. Drummond, of Livingston & Drummond, Scottsboro, for appellees.
*1189 MADDOX, Justice.
The gist of this action involved a dispute between individuals over the ownership of a twenty acre tract of land.
The trial court saw and heard the witnesses, and decreed that the Cardens (plaintiffs) had adversely possessed the tract. Appellant, Penney (defendant below) argues that Carden alleged, but did not prove, that he was in peaceable possession; therefore, says Penney, the court was ousted of jurisdiction because the statutory proceeding in rem to quiet title (now § 6-6-560, Code, 1975) requires allegation and proof that the claimant "is in the actual, peaceable possession of the land." We disagree. A quiet title action will lie in two fundamental situations, one is where the complainant is in the actual peaceable possession of the property, and the other is whether no one is in the actual possession of the property. Dennison v. Claiborne, 289 Ala. 69, 265 So. 2d 853 (1972), which quotes from Fitts v. Alexander, 277 Ala. 372, 170 So. 2d 808 (1965).
The pre-trial order, "which control[s] the subsequent course of the action," stated that the issue involved was the ownership of the disputed tract. The evidence introduced on the issues set out in the pre-trial order was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to enter the decree in this cause. Cf. Chestang v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., 273 Ala. 8, 134 So. 2d 159 (1961).
Appellant claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because "the evidence is without dispute that W. E. Penney had been in the actual possession of the property since immediately after he purchased it in 1969, and continuing up until the trial (1977)." If the evidence were uncontradicted that Penney was in actual possession as he claims, it is true that title to land cannot be quieted in one out of possession when another is in possession. Dennison v. Claiborne, supra. Here, however, the evidence of actual possession was disputed.
Assuming, however, that the evidence was undisputed that Penney did have actual possession of the tract, should the decree of the trial court be reversed? No. One of the issues set out in the pre-trial order, which controlled the subsequent course of the proceeding, concerned the ownership of the disputed tract. The spirit of the new Rules of Procedure is that they should be construed to assure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. Furthermore, as we will discuss in part II *1190 of this opinion, Rule 54(c) provides that in non-default judgments, the trial court should grant the relief to which a party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in his pleadings. In this case, the court, acting pursuant to the pre-trial order, could fashion a decree as if the suit had been begun as an action to quiet title, but was tried as an action in ejectment.
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court which determines the ownership of the land is due to be affirmed.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to make an award of compensation to him for improvements made on the subject property. He admits that the pleadings do not claim this compensation, but he insists that he is entitled to recover it under his prayer for general relief in his cross-complaint. He also claims that the testimony of Carden that the land was substantially enhanced in value by reason of the improvements, is sufficient in and of itself to entitle him to compensation. It is undisputed that the trial of the case was well under way before the issue of compensation to Penney arose. The following transpired during cross-examination of appellee Carden:
"* * * Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
The quoted portion of Rule 54(c) applies not only to claimants, but to defending parties as well. 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 154.62, p. 1271.
The Cardens primarily attack Penney's claim for damages here on appeal as coming too late. They say that Penney should have insisted on the claim as an issue in the pre-trial order, or should have moved to amend his pleadings, and, at least, should have given the trial court, in a post-judgment motion, an opportunity to rule on the matter. Admittedly, the Cardens state what constitutes the better practice, but the question remains whether Penney, having failed to take these steps, is now precluded from attacking the judgment. Construing Rule 54(c) liberally, we hold that he is not. At the time the evidence was presented, Penney's counsel advised the trial court of the purpose of the testimony on improvements, and that the relief requested could be given under Penney's general prayer for relief.
The situation here is somewhat similar, factually, to a set of circumstances in Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172 (1975).
There, Sapp's complaint did not contain a demand for money damages, except for such "further relief as is just and proper." Sapp, however, in response to a Board of Education's motion to dismiss the appeal, asserted in the appellate court that he was entitled to money damages. The Fifth Circuit, in a footnote, stated that Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been construed liberally and under it a demand for relief in the pleadings did not limit, except in cases of default, the relief a court could grant when entering judgment.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody , 422 U.S. 405, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975), in a class suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the claimant's request for backpay was filed nearly five years after the institution of the action. The backpay claim was not prayed for in the pleadings. A Federal District Court denied the backpay claim, using the tardiness of the filing and the lack of a prayer for relief in the pleadings as grounds for its denial. The Supreme Court of the United States held:
In Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation, 444 F.2d 791 (1971), the court applied Rule 54(c), as follows:
We do not interpret the trial court's decree as making a determination on Penney's claim for compensation. Therefore, we reverse the judgment insofar as it relates to this claim for compensation, and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to make a determination whether Penney is "entitled" to a judgment, under the particular facts already proved. In determining whether Penney is "entitled" to a judgment on his claim for compensation, the court may consider whether the failure by Penney to ask for the compensation by pleading and prayer substantially prejudiced the Cardens. Albemarle, supra.
The trial court is directed to make specific findings to support its determination whether Penney is or is not "entitled" to a judgment under Rule 54(c), in order that either party, if aggrieved, may appeal the determination. The standard of review on any appeal would be the familiar one, whether the findings made by the trial court were clearly and palpably wrong. See Albemarle, supra.
AFFIRMED, IN PART; REVERSED, IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.