Title: Randy Schoenwetter v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-53 
____________ 
 
RANDY SCHOENWETTER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 27, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have on appeal the judgments and sentences of the trial court finding 
Randy Schoenwetter guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and imposing 
sentences of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For 
the reasons stated below, we affirm the convictions and sentences. 
Procedural and Factual History 
Randy Schoenwetter was indicted on August 29, 2000, for first-degree 
murder in the death of Virginia Friskey, first-degree murder in the death of Ronald 
Friskey, attempted first-degree murder of Haesun Friskey, and armed burglary of a 
dwelling.  Before trial, Schoenwetter filed several pretrial motions, which included 
 
 
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a motion to suppress statements and admissions, a motion to suppress evidence, 
and a motion to disqualify the trial judge.  These pretrial motions were all denied.  
Schoenwetter wrote a letter to the court dated February 17, 2003, confessing his 
guilt and indicating that he wished to change his plea from not guilty to guilty.  
The trial court held a status hearing on February 26, 2003, where the defendant, 
against the advice of his attorneys to remain silent and after the trial court’s 
cautionary instruction, advised the court that he did in fact write the letter and that 
he did wish to change his plea from not guilty to guilty. The defense attorneys 
advised the court that they intended to have the defendant evaluated later that week 
to determine his competency.  
Prior to the entry of his plea on March 5, 2003, the defense attorneys advised 
the court that a psychologist had met with the defendant and had determined the 
defendant was competent. The defense attorneys also announced to the court that, 
against their advice, the defendant wished to enter a plea to all of the charges.  The 
court conducted a plea colloquy, advising the defendant of the consequences of his 
pleas and the rights he would give up by entering the pleas.  After the State 
established a factual basis for the pleas, the court found that the defendant entered 
his pleas knowingly, freely, and voluntarily, and with a full understanding that he 
could receive two death sentences.  
 
 
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A penalty phase proceeding before a jury was held from September 15, 
2003, to September 25, 2003.  The State presented testimony from fourteen 
witnesses, including Theresa Lathrop (daughter and sister of the victims), Haesun 
Friskey, (the victim of the attempted murder), Dr. Qaiser (medical examiner), Dr. 
Imani (medical doctor), Ronald Larson and Denise Fitzgerald (two crime scene 
technicians), and Thomas House and David Butler (the investigating officers).  The 
defense presented testimony from nine witnesses including Dr. Riebsame (forensic 
psychologist), Dr. Currie Prichard (neuropsychologist and clinical psychologist), 
Dr. Joseph Wu (clinical director of Brain Imaging Center), Deborah Roberts 
(mother of defendant), and Peter Siegel (expert on prison conditions). 
The following facts were established during the penalty phase.  At the time 
of the crimes, the Friskey family consisted of five people: the father, Ronald; the 
mother, Haesun; and the three children, Chad (eighteen years old), Theresa 
(sixteen years old) and Virginia, (ten years old).  The defendant had known the 
Friskey family from childhood and attended the same karate school with the 
Friskey children.  He was friends with Chad until Chad left for the Air Force a few 
months before the crime.  Throughout his association with the family and before 
the crimes occurred, the defendant stayed overnight at the Friskey residence on a 
number of occasions.  
 
 
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On the night of August 11, 2000, Theresa Friskey had dinner with the family 
and went out until 11 p.m.  Ronald, Haesun, and Virginia stayed home and 
watched television until they all fell asleep on the couch.  By the time Theresa 
came home, they had all retired to their respective bedrooms.   
At approximately 3 a.m. on August 12, 2000, the defendant left his 
apartment, where he lived with his mother.  He rode his bicycle to the Krystal's 
Restaurant, where he was employed.  After staying at Krystal's for a short time, he 
left on his bicycle and rode to the Friskey residence.  According to the defendant’s 
letter to the court confessing guilt, he decided to go to the Friskey residence so that 
he could force one of the Friskey daughters, Theresa, age sixteen, or Virginia, age 
ten, to have sex with him.   
Schoenwetter arrived at the Friskey residence at approximately 5 a.m.  He 
parked his bicycle on the back driveway of the residence and walked up to the back 
porch.  He used a box cutter to cut open the screen and enter the porch.   He then 
managed to push open the sliding glass door from the porch into the house just 
enough to slip through.  There was a stick in the sliding door which only allowed 
the door to be opened twelve inches.  After entering the house, he walked directly 
into the kitchen and armed himself with a large serrated kitchen knife from one of 
the drawers.  He then walked down the hallway where the three bedrooms were 
located.   
 
 
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The first door he approached was to Theresa's bedroom; it was locked.  He 
then peeked inside the bedroom on the opposite side of the hall and saw the parents 
asleep in their bed.  He knew, based upon his previous overnight visits to the 
Friskey home, that the parents were heavy sleepers.  He then entered Virginia's 
bedroom, which was directly across the hall from the parents' bedroom and next to 
Theresa's bedroom.   
During his taped confession, Schoenwetter said he entered Virginia's room 
and began looking around.  He said he never touched her body.  While he was in 
her room, Virginia woke up and began to shriek.  He put his hand over her mouth, 
threatened her with a knife, and told her to be quiet.  She continued to shriek, she 
then recognized him, and said his name, Randy.  He started to leave the room, but 
the mother came into the room and grabbed him.  The father came into the room 
and tackled him.  After struggling with the parents for a short time, he managed to 
break loose.  Instead of leaving the house, he decided to go back to Virginia's bed 
and kill her because she had recognized him and could identify him.  He stabbed 
her on her bed.  After he stabbed her, the father tackled him.  He then struggled 
with both parents until he managed to break loose again.  The defendant then left 
the house the same way he came in, got on his bike, and rode home.  After he 
arrived home, he took a shower, placed his clothes, shoes, the box cutter, and the 
 
 
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knife inside a blue plastic bag, placed the blue bag inside a trash bag containing 
trash from his apartment, and put the trash bag in the dumpster. 
According to Haesun Friskey, she awoke when she heard Virginia whining. 
She walked over to the doorway to her bedroom, where she could see directly into 
Virginia's room.  She saw Virginia lying in her bed with the defendant standing 
over her, touching her body.  The defendant turned and looked at Haesun and then 
made a stabbing motion toward Virginia.  Virginia made a sound like she was 
taking in air.  Haesun could remember her husband struggling with the defendant.  
However, as a result of the trauma she suffered, she could not remember anything 
else that happened. 
At some point during the struggle, Theresa Friskey, who was asleep in her 
locked bedroom, awoke and heard a commotion.  She came to her sister's room, 
where she saw a pile of people on the floor.  She heard a man, whom she believed 
to be her father, tell her to call 911.  She went back to her bedroom and called 911.  
While she was on the phone, she looked out of her bedroom window and saw a 
man leaving the house covered in blood.  She later learned that this man was her 
father.       
After the defendant fled the Friskey residence, Ronald Friskey managed to 
get up, leave the house, and walk next door to Terry and Julie Blythe’s home.  He 
knocked on the window near the front door and called out, “Terry, help me.”  Julie 
 
 
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Blythe called 911 and opened the door.  She found Ronald Friskey slumped on the 
ground covered in blood.  He told her that he had been stabbed, that his whole 
family was dead, and that a white male committed the crimes.  He died in her arms 
as they were waiting for the paramedics to arrive. 
When the police arrived at the scene, they observed a trail of blood leading 
away from the Friskey residence.  An officer followed the blood trail and found 
that it led to an apartment complex at 215 Knox McRae Drive.  Later that morning, 
Detectives House and Butler went to the apartment complex.  While there, they 
spoke with a woman and a young girl who were outside to learn more about the 
apartment complex.  The detectives explained to the woman their reason for being 
at the apartment complex.  The woman identified herself as Deborah Roberts, 
stated that she knew the Friskey family, and said that her son and daughter were 
friends with the Friskey children.  As they were talking, Schoenwetter left an 
apartment and walked towards them.  One officer indicated that Schoenwetter was 
walking stiffly, as if he had been in a fight or an accident, and that he had a 
bandage on his thumb.  Mrs. Roberts stated that he was her son, Randy 
Schoenwetter.   
When Schoenwetter learned that the men were detectives, he appeared 
extremely nervous.  The detectives asked Schoenwetter if he had a bicycle.  He 
said that he did and showed Detective Butler his bicycle.  After Schoenwetter left 
 
 
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to show Detective Butler the bicycle, Detective House received a telephone call 
from Sergeant Esposito stating that they had found a size eleven deck or boat shoe 
print at the scene.  Detective House asked Ms. Roberts if her son had any deck or 
boat shoes.  She said Randy had some deck shoes, and she had seen them the day 
before.  When Schoenwetter returned, Detective House asked him where the shoes 
were.  He said that he did not have them anymore because he had ruined them the 
other day and had thrown them out.  The detective asked him if he would come to 
the police station with them for an interview.  Schoenwetter agreed.   
During the videotaped interview at the police station, Schoenwetter initially 
denied any involvement in the crimes.  He then indicated how he would have 
committed the crimes had he been involved.  He finally confessed to committing 
the crimes and gave the detectives a detailed statement.   
The forensic evidence revealed Ronald Friskey died as a result of multiple 
stab wounds, including a stab wound to the eyebrow, forehead, left upper back, left 
middle back, middle back close to the spine, right lower back, right side of the 
neck, and three wounds to the right side of the chest.  Ronald Friskey also had 
wounds on his right hand, which were consistent with defensive wounds.  The 
wounds to the right side of the neck and the left middle back were life-threatening 
wounds, because they were very deep and caused extreme blood loss.  The wound 
to the left middle back penetrated Ronald Friskey's lung.   
 
 
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It was determined that Virginia Friskey also died as a result of multiple stab 
wounds.  One stab wound was inflicted to each side of her chest.  The stab wound 
on the left was four inches deep and the one on the right was three inches deep.  
She also had a wound on each hand which entered the back of the hand and came 
out to the front of the hand.  It appears that she was shielding her chest and that 
these wounds occurred at the same time as the chest wounds.  The wounds to her 
chest penetrated her heart and both lungs.  She also had wounds to her lip and to 
her lower jaw.   
Haesun Friskey was stabbed multiple times but survived.  She was in critical 
condition when she arrived at the hospital and had to undergo surgery to stop the 
bleeding in her liver and the bleeding on two parts of her arm.  She suffered from 
massive blood loss and received 100 units of blood during her hospital stay.  Dr. 
Emran Imani, the trauma surgeon who treated Haesun Friskey, testified that this 
was the equivalent of replacing her entire blood volume more than twenty times.  
He described her survival as miraculous, stating that she was expected to die when 
she arrived at the hospital.   
The blood trail from the Friskey house that ended at Schoenwetter's 
apartment complex was proven by DNA testing to be that of Schoenwetter.  His 
blood DNA was also found in Virginia Friskey’s bedroom and in other locations 
inside the Friskey residence.  The bags that Schoenwetter placed in the dumpster at 
 
 
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his apartment complex, containing the clothes and shoes he was wearing during the 
crimes, the box cutter he used to cut the screen to enter the porch, and the knife he 
used to commit the murders, were subsequently found by law enforcement officers.  
The trial court noted that the defendant, in order to destroy or hide this evidence, 
placed these items into one bag, then placed this bag into a second bag, prior to 
putting it into the apartment complex dumpster.  The defendant's shoes, socks, 
shirt, and shorts were tested for blood, and the blood found matched that of Ronald 
and Virginia Friskey.  The large kitchen knife also tested positive for the blood of 
Ronald and Virginia Friskey.  Schoenwetter’s blood DNA was found on the handle 
of the knife.  
On September 25, 2003, the jury recommended death for the murder of 
Virginia Friskey by a vote of ten to two.  The jury also recommended a sentence of 
death for the murder of Ronald Friskey by a vote of nine to three.  On November 7, 
2003, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 
(Fla. 1993).  At the hearing the trial court heard from Jean Dees, Schoenwetter’s 
grandmother, Pastor Dodzweit, and Deborah Rogers, Schoenwetter’s mother.  In 
addition, two victim impact statements were read into the record.  The trial court, 
on December 5, 2003, entered its judgments and sentences, noting that the 
imposition of death is to be reserved for the most aggravated and least mitigated of 
 
 
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crimes.1  After consideration of all evidence presented, argument of counsel, the 
advisory verdict of the jury, the applicable elements of aggravation and mitigation 
as provided for by statute,2 as well as the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 
presented by the defense,3 the court imposed sentences of death for the first-degree 
murders of Virginia Friskey and Ronald Friskey.  The trial court sentenced 
Schoenwetter to life in prison for the attempted murder of Haesun Friskey, to run 
concurrent with the sentences for the two murders.  A sentence of life in prison 
was imposed for the armed burglary of a dwelling, to run consecutive with the 
sentence for the attempted murder.  
In support of the death sentences, the trial court found four aggravators 
applicable to each of the murders.  Three aggravators, prior violent felony; murder 
committed during a burglary; and murder committed to avoid arrest, were found 
applicable to both murders.  As to the murder of Virginia Friskey, the trial court 
also found the aggravator that the victim of the murder was less than twelve years 
old.  The fourth aggravator applied to the murder of Ronald Friskey was heinous, 
atrocious or cruel.  In mitigation, the trial court found applicable to both murders 
four statutory mitigators: no prior criminal history; extreme mental or emotional 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial court cited to Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 31 (Fla. 2003), for 
this proposition. 
 
2.  Cited by the trial court as set forth in section 921.141 (5) & (6), Florida 
Statutes (2000). 
 
3.  See Ford v. State, 802 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2001). 
 
 
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disturbance; lack of capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law; and the defendant’s age (eighteen) at the time of the crime.  The trial court 
also considered and weighed eight of the nine nonstatutory mitigators argued by 
the defendant.4 
The trial court further found that as to the two murders, each of the four 
aggravating circumstances standing alone outweighed all of the mitigating 
circumstances combined.  This appeal followed.   Schoenwetter raises nine issues 
on appeal which we address below. 
Discussion of Issues 
 
 MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS CONFESSION AND EVIDENCE 
 
 
Schoenwetter contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to 
suppress his confession and the fruits thereof, and he contends the trial court 
                                          
 
4.  The nonstatutory mitigators considered, weighed or rejected are: (1) the 
defendant accepted responsibility by pleading guilty; (2) the defendant was bullied, 
picked on by his peers, from an early age; (3) the defendant was continually 
gainfully employed as a teenager and helped his mother financially; (4) the 
defendant will not pose a danger to the general prison population if given a life 
sentence without parole; (5) as a result of neurological disorders, specifically 
Asperger’s syndrome and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), the 
defendant’s ability to socially interact has been impaired; (6) the defendant has had 
a sexual preoccupation from the age of seven; (7) the defendant had a 
developmental and emotional age of twelve to thirteen at the time of the offense 
(the court found that this proposed mitigator was not proven by the greater weight 
of the evidence); (8) the defendant has a close loving relationship with his mother 
and his younger sister; (9) while in the tenth grade, the defendant and his mother 
lived with the mother’s boyfriend who physically and emotionally abused the 
defendant.   
 
 
 
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erroneously concluded that he waived any rights to suppression of those issues 
during the penalty phase since he pled guilty to the crimes.  We affirm the trial 
court’s denial of the motion to suppress.  “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness 
and the court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions 
derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”  
Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 291 (Fla. 1997) (citing McNamara v. State, 357 
So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1978)).  Appellate courts should accord a presumption of 
correctness to the trial court’s rulings on motions to suppress with regard to the 
trial court’s determination of historical facts, but appellate courts must 
independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine 
constitutional issues. See Conner v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001).   
Schoenwetter argued in his motion to suppress statements and admissions that his 
admissions should be suppressed because he was in custody during the interview 
and the detectives did not read him his Miranda5 rights.   
Custody/Arrest 
 
Schoenwetter basically argues his statements should have been suppressed 
as involuntary because he was essentially arrested without probable cause and 
because he was not given proper Miranda warnings.  In denying the motions to 
                                          
 
 
5.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
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suppress, the trial court relied on evidence from Detective Butler, Officer House, 
and the videotape of the interrogation.  The trial court found that Schoenwetter was 
not arrested but voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the police 
station and that Schoenwetter was given Miranda warnings once he made  
incriminating statements.  In addition, the trial court found that the defendant 
waived his rights in writing.  We find the trial court’s factual findings on these 
issues are supported by competent substantial evidence, and we affirm the trial 
court’s conclusion that Schoenwetter’s statements were voluntary.  Thus, the trial 
court did not err in denying Schoenwetter’s motion to suppress statements. 
 
The trial court relied on this Court’s opinion in Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 
568 (Fla. 1999), in reaching its determination that Schoenwetter was not in custody 
or otherwise arrested at the time he made his statements to the police.  In Ramirez, 
we said: 
A person is in custody if a reasonable person placed in the same position 
would believe that his or her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree 
associated with actual arrest.  “The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated 
plan of the police, but rather how a reasonable person in the suspect’s 
position would have perceived the situation.”   
 
Id. at 573 (citations omitted) (quoting David v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 
1997)).  We set out in Ramirez the following four factors for a trial court to 
consider in determining if a suspect is in custody:  (1) the manner in which the 
police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of 
 
 
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the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of 
his or her guilt; and (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to 
leave the place of questioning.  See id. at 574.  
 
The facts of this case illustrate that Schoenwetter was not in custody.  First, 
the detectives asked Schoenwetter if he would come to the police station to talk to 
them and he agreed, but stated he would have to be back by 4 p.m. to go to work.  
Moreover, Schoenwetter was not handcuffed and he was able to exit the car when 
they stopped for a snack.  Second, the purpose of the interrogation was clear from 
Detective Butler’s testimony that Schoenwetter appeared nervous, he had a cut on 
his hand, he was out and about on his bike the night before, and he knew the 
victims.  Third, Schoenwetter was confronted with some evidence which 
implicated him in the murders.  Detective Butler told Schoenwetter that there was a 
blood trail which led from the victim’s house to his house and he had a cut on his 
hand.  Also, Detective Butler stated that the person who committed the crime left 
on a bike.  Fourth, Schoenwetter was not told he was under arrest.  When he was 
asked during the interview if anyone ever told him he was under arrest, he 
responded, “No.” 
 
As did the defendant in Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2003), 
Schoenwetter argues that he was under de facto arrest when he was taken to the 
police station and, therefore, he argues his subsequent confession to the detective 
 
 
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about the burglary was the fruit of an illegal arrest.  However, in Taylor, we did not 
find the defendant was under de facto arrest, because Taylor voluntarily agreed to 
accompany the officers to the station, he was not handcuffed during the ride, he 
was only handcuffed after arrival for safety purposes, and the officer explained that 
he was not under arrest.  We said to find a defendant to be in custody, “it must be 
evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the 
suspect’s position would feel a restraint of his or her freedom of movement, fairly 
characterized, so that the suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the 
encounter with police.”  Id. at 17-18 (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 605 
(Fla. 2001)).  Similar to Taylor, Schoenwetter in this case voluntarily agreed to 
accompany the officers to the station when asked, rode in the back of the police car 
without handcuffs, and exited the car when officers stopped for a snack. 
 
Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel a restraint on 
his freedom or that he was not free to terminate the encounter.  The trial court did 
not err in denying the motion to suppress.  
Voluntariness 
 
We disagree with Schoenwetter’s arguments that his statements should have 
been suppressed because they were involuntary and obtained in violation of his 
constitutional rights.  We have said that to establish that a statement is involuntary, 
there must be a finding of coercive police conduct.  See Chavez v. State, 832 So. 
 
 
- 17 -
2d 730, 749 (Fla. 2002).  In Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1997), we said, 
“Where a defendant alleges that his statement was the product of coercion, the 
voluntariness of the confession must be ‘determined by an examination of the 
totality of the circumstances’ ”  Id. at 311 (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 
957, 964 (Fla. 1992)). 
 
The totality of the circumstances present in this case demonstrates the 
defendant’s statements to the police were voluntary.  The trial court found that, 
while at home and in the presence of his mother and sister, Schoenwetter told the 
police he would go with them to the police station for questioning but wanted to be 
back in time to go to work.  He was taken to the police station without handcuffs 
and allowed to get out of the police vehicle when the officers stopped for a snack.  
Schoenwetter was not promised anything in exchange for a confession, and he was 
not deprived of food or water.  He was not physically or verbally threatened or 
abused.  Moreover, the trial court viewed the videotaped statement and indicated 
the videotape shows a mature young man who did not hesitate in his response to 
questioning and who seemed confident in the answers given.    
 
Prior to the administration of the Miranda rights, the following dialogue 
occurred between Detective Butler and the defendant: 
Q.       Let, let, let me ask you this. Did, did you come to the station 
voluntarily? 
A. 
You mean- 
Q. 
Today? 
 
 
- 18 -
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Did anyone force you? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
Did anyone tell you you was under arrest? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
And you was willing to come down here and talk to me? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
At any time, did anyone force you to tell me what happened? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
You're doing this on your own free will? 
A. 
Yes, sir, I am. 
Q. 
Has anyone threatened you or anything like that? 
A. 
No, sir. 
Q. 
And you, and you just wanted to get this off your chest? Is that 
a yes or no? 
A. 
Yes. Yes, sir. 
 
We affirm the trial court’s determination that the defendant made his admissions 
freely and voluntarily; Schoenwetter has not shown that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress statements and admissions. 
Motion to Suppress Evidence 
 
Schoenwetter also argues that the trash bag, clothing, knife, shoes, box 
cutter, and the blood drawn from him should be suppressed because these items are 
the fruit of the unlawful interrogation.  Although the detectives first learned of the 
items in the dumpster during the defendant’s interrogation, this evidence cannot be 
the fruits of the poisonous tree because the interrogation was not unlawful.  As 
previously discussed, the trial court properly found the statements were made 
voluntarily and were not the product of unlawful police conduct.  The items 
recovered from the dumpster were properly admitted into evidence.  At both the 
 
 
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beginning and the end of the interview, Schoenwetter agreed to have his blood 
drawn.  His agreement was done during the same setting that his other statements 
were made.  Thus, the trial court did not err in denying these aspects of the 
defendant’s motion to suppress. 
 
The record corroborates the trial court’s detailed findings, and the motion to 
suppress confession and admissions as well as the motion to suppress evidence was 
properly denied by the trial court.  The record reveals the trial court considered the 
different factors involved in determining whether the interrogation of the defendant 
was lawful.  The trial court properly found that the defendant was never formally 
arrested or taken into custody by the police and, therefore, Miranda warnings were 
not necessary.  See Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 1988).  The trial 
court properly found that Schoenwetter was not arrested until after he made the 
initial incriminating statements.   
 
Additionally, Schoenwetter argues the trial court erred in holding that the 
issues raised in his motion to suppress were waived when he entered his guilty 
plea.  While this was error, the trial court nonetheless correctly denied the motion. 
In Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997), the State argued that the issues 
raised in the defendant’s motion to suppress were not properly raised on appeal 
because they did not survive the guilty plea.  See id. at 288 n.6.  However, this 
Court said that the suppression issue was preserved as to the penalty phase of the 
 
 
- 20 -
trial and was correctly before it on review since Rolling objected to the admission 
of these statements and repeated his objection each time the evidence was 
introduced.  Id.  This Court in Rolling found no merit to the motion to suppress and 
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.  
 
In this case, the defendant continued to object to the introduction of his 
statements and the evidence seized during the penalty phase, and the trial court 
overruled the objections.  We affirm because, as in Rolling, there is no merit to the 
defendant’s arguments that his statements were involuntary and that the evidence 
seized from the dumpster was the fruit of the poisonous tree.  
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE/MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
 
Schoenwetter next argues the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s 
motion to withdraw.  He further argues the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility 
of the victim impact evidence, based on arguments made by Schoenwetter and not 
his attorneys, resulted in a denial of effective assistance of counsel.  The trial court 
denied counsel’s motion to withdraw and found the victim impact evidence 
admissible.  The record supports these findings by the trial court; therefore the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. 
 
Prior to the penalty proceedings, the defense attorneys filed motions 
challenging the victim impact evidence.  During the penalty phase, the testimonies 
of three witnesses who would offer victim impact testimony were proffered to the 
 
 
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court.  During each proffered testimony, defense counsel objected but 
Schoenwetter interjected that the evidence should be allowed and that his attorneys 
should not object.  The attorneys argued that the decision on whether or not to 
make objections rests with the attorneys and that Schoenwetter’s comments should 
not be considered.  After hearing the arguments of counsel and the defendant, the 
trial court noted that all objections were a part of the record and found the 
proffered evidence conformed to the requirements of the statute. 
 
The standard applicable to a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence 
is whether there has been an abuse of discretion.  See Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 
1190 (Fla. 2005).  The trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
clear showing of abuse.  See Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2005).  It is clear 
from this record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Prior to the penalty 
phase, Schoenwetter pled guilty, over counsel’s advice, to all of the offenses 
charged, including the two charges of first-degree murder.  In an abundance of 
caution, the trial court allowed the defendant to address the court on the victim 
impact issue.  Despite the fact that the trial court allowed the defendant to speak, 
the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of this evidence was based on the trial 
court’s belief that the admitted evidence was admissible under section 921.141(7), 
Florida Statutes (2000).6   This is evident by the fact that after listening to the 
                                          
 
6.  Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes, specifically provides: 
 
 
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proffers, the trial court placed limitations on the testimonies of two of the victim 
impact witnesses. 
 
In addition to the provision for this type of testimony in section 921.141(7), 
this Court has held that victim impact evidence is relevant even though it does not 
address any aggravating circumstance or rebut any mitigating circumstance.  See 
Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 653 (Fla. 1997).  Based on the facts of this case and 
the proffered victim impact evidence, the trial court properly admitted the 
testimonies of the three victim impact witnesses.  See Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 
2d 41, 53 (Fla. 2003). 
 
Based in part on the trial court’s rulings on the victim impact evidence, 
defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Schoenwetter.7  Defense 
counsel stated they would not have the defense controlled by Schoenwetter.  The 
                                                                                                                                        
 
Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or more 
aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the prosecution may 
introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence.  Such evidence shall be 
designed to demonstrate the victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being and 
the resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death.  
Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate 
sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence. 
 
 
7.  Counsel also moved to have the defendant evaluated for competency.  
The trial court initially denied the motion because competency had been 
determined prior to entry of the pleas and he had not observed any conduct that 
would lead him to believe that Schoenwetter had become incompetent.  However, 
the defendant was examined by three mental health professionals, and the trial 
court found him competent. 
 
 
- 23 -
trial court denied the motion and in so doing noted that the rulings on the victim 
impact evidence were based on the fact that the evidence as limited was admissible 
under the statute.  Moreover, the trial court attempted to alleviate any concerns by 
having the defendant evaluated despite the trial court’s belief that no additional 
competency evaluation was necessary. 
 
The trial court properly denied the motion to withdraw.  This record does not 
demonstrate that the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated to the point where 
counsel could no longer give effective aid in the fair representation of the defense.  
See Wilson v. State, 753 So. 2d 683, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).  General loss of 
confidence or trust standing alone will not support withdrawal of counsel.  See 
Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla. 1986). 
 
WITNESS CONFRONTATION 
 
Schoenwetter argues that the trial court erred in allowing a medical examiner 
who did not perform the autopsies to testify regarding his opinion as to cause and 
manner of death.  He contends this testimony violated his right to confront the 
witness pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  Schoenwetter 
also contends that the trial court erred in relying on Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d 96 
(Fla. 1996), to allow the medical examiner to testify, because Dr. Qaiser admitted 
that he had only reviewed the records, photos, and other documents and talked to 
the medical examiner who actually performed the autopsy.  The trial court did not 
 
 
- 24 -
abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Qaiser to testify about the autopsies performed 
by Dr. Vasallo, where Dr. Vasallo was unavailable to testify, and Dr. Qaiser was a 
qualified expert who had reviewed the autopsy reports, photos, and notes and had 
spoken with Dr. Vasallo. 
 
This Court said in Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1989), that the 
determination of a witness’s qualifications to express an expert opinion is 
peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, and the trial judge’s decision will 
not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.  Section 90.704, Florida Statutes 
(2000), provides that an expert is permitted to express an opinion on matters in 
which the witness has expertise when the opinion is in response to facts disclosed 
to the expert at or before the trial.  See also Capehart v. State, 583 So. 2d 1009, 
1012-13 (Fla. 1991).  Additionally, in Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1996), 
this Court held it was proper to permit a medical expert to testify as to the cause of 
death, despite the fact that the expert did not perform the autopsy.  In this case, Dr. 
Qaiser reviewed the medical files, the autopsy reports, and the whole chart, and 
discussed the case with Dr. Vasallo, who conducted the autopsies.  Dr. Qaiser 
formed his opinion on the manner and cause of death on the basis of what he 
reviewed.  The defense did not object to Dr. Qaiser’s qualifications as an expert, 
and the court noted that Dr. Qaiser had testified as an expert in previous cases. 
 
 
- 25 -
This case is similar to the situation we addressed in Capehart v. State, 583 
So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1991).  In Capehart, the defendant objected to a medical 
examiner testifying at trial regarding the cause of death and the condition of the 
victim’s body.  However, this Court held that under section 90.704, a medical 
examiner may testify relying on facts or data not in evidence because such 
information was of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject.  This 
Court found the expert testimony was proper where the expert formed her opinion 
based upon the autopsy report, the toxicology report, the evidence receipts, the 
photographs of the body, and all other paperwork filed in the case.  Capehart, 583 
So. 2d at 1013. 
 
Schoenwetter’s reliance on Crawford in arguing that the medical examiner’s 
reports, notes, and statements were testimonial hearsay is misplaced.  The record 
does not reflect any specific objection by counsel based on Dr. Qaiser’s reliance on 
actual conversations with Dr. Vasallo (the medical examiner who did the autopsy) 
or based on Dr. Qaiser’s quoting or testifying to anything specific that Dr. Vasallo 
related to him.  There was no specific objection by defense counsel based on a 
confrontation violation; therefore, this issue has not been preserved for review.   
  
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
Schoenwetter contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
mistrial because the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury about appellant’s lack 
 
 
- 26 -
of significant criminal history.  Schoenwetter maintains that a mistrial was 
appropriate because a curative jury instruction was not sufficient to undo the 
damage.  He further argues that the error was compounded by the erroneous 
consideration by the jury of Schoenwetter’s possession of child pornography, of 
his conviction for retail theft, and of his contemporaneous convictions for 
attempted murder and armed burglary of a dwelling.  
The record reflects the prosecutor addressed the jury in closing argument 
concerning the weight to be given to the aggravators and the mitigators.  He told 
the jury they could consider the fact that the defendant had been previously or 
contemporaneously convicted for the other crimes charged in this case. After 
objection by the defense, the trial court found the statement could have been made 
in error and was not necessarily misleading to the jury.  Defense counsel’s motion 
for mistrial was denied and a curative instruction was given.  Schoenwetter agreed, 
without waiving his request for a mistrial, that the curative instruction could be 
read to the jury. 
 
A motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure 
that the defendant receives a fair trial.  See Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 547 
(Fla. 1999).  This Court has held that a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial 
is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.  Id. at 546.  In this case, the 
prosecutor admitted the mistake, and the trial judge gave a curative instruction.  
 
 
- 27 -
The jury indicated that it understood the curative instruction.  The giving of a 
curative instruction was sufficient to cure the error, and a mistrial in this instance 
was not required.  See Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 169, 186-87 (Fla. 2003). 
 
Further, to the extent Schoenwetter argues that erroneous consideration of 
his possession of child pornography may have compounded the error, it appears 
from the record that introduction of this issue was not attributable to the State but 
was raised instead by a defense witness, Dr. Riebsame.  The doctor spoke of 
Schoenwetter’s obsession with child pornography.  The defense attempted to rebut 
the testimony by introducing evidence from Commander Mutter from the police 
department.  Mutter testified that the images the child’s mother brought to the 
police, images that Schoenwetter had downloaded, were not underage women.  
Because the images were not of underage children, no charges were filed.   
 
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 
for mistrial and any error was harmless because a curative instruction was given.  
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE TRIAL JUDGE 
Schoenwetter next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
disqualify the trial judge.8  The motion to disqualify was based on the fact that the 
trial judge was a former prosecutor whose office had prosecuted another case 
involving a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan and that the office opposed 
                                          
 
 
8.  The motion to disqualify was not sworn to by the defendant as required 
under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(c)(3). 
 
 
- 28 -
the use of PET scan evidence.  The motion did not allege any other facts 
concerning this trial judge.  The trial court denied the motion as legally 
insufficient.  We find no error and affirm the denial of the motion. 
In  Mackenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 
1990), this Court explained that the standard for deciding if a motion to disqualify 
is legally sufficient is whether the facts as alleged would place a reasonably 
prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.  See also Correll v. 
State, 698 So. 2d 522, (Fla. 1997); Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 
1983).  The motion to disqualify filed in this case does not meet this standard.  The 
motion merely asserts that the trial judge was a former prosecutor and that his 
office aggressively opposed the use of PET scans.  The rest of the affidavit makes 
allegations concerning other prosecutors or the prosecutors’ office in general.  
Such generalizations fall short of the “specifically described prejudice or bias of 
the judge” required by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(d)(1).  Error 
on this issue has not been demonstrated.  
INFLAMMATORY PHOTOGRAPHS 
Schoenwetter asserts that the trial court erred in admitting photographs of 
the wounds inflicted on the attempted murder victim because they were not 
relevant to any contested issue.  He contends the photographs of the bloody but 
necessary work of the emergency room doctors impermissibly tipped the scales 
 
 
- 29 -
towards death in the jury’s mind.  Thus, he concludes, the photographs’ probative 
value was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect, and therefore, the 
trial court erred in admitting the photographs into evidence.  We disagree and 
affirm the trial court’s ruling. 
The admissibility of photographs of a victim is within the discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse of that 
discretion.  See Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).  We have repeatedly 
upheld the admission of photographs when they are necessary, as in the instant 
case, to explain medical testimony, the manner of death, or the location of the 
wounds.  See Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 477 (Fla. 2003)(finding photographs 
admissible where they were used to aid in explaining the examiner’s testimony); 
Floyd v. State, 808 So. 2d 175, 184 (Fla. 2002)(finding two autopsy photographs 
that showed the victim’s stab wounds admissible because they were relevant to 
show the circumstances of the crime and the nature and extent of the victim’s 
injuries); Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713-14 (Fla. 1996)(affirming the 
admission of autopsy photographs where they were relevant to illustrate the 
medical examiner’s testimony and the injuries he noted).  In this case, the trial 
court found the photographs were relevant because they showed the extent of the 
wounds inflicted on the victim by the defendant and depicted the medical 
intervention necessary to save the victim’s life.  These issues helped to put into 
 
 
- 30 -
context the actions of the defendant and his state of mind when both the fatal and 
nonfatal wounds were inflicted. 
 
During the penalty phase, the State presented testimony from Dr. Eman 
Imani, one of the emergency room physicians who treated Mrs. Friskey upon her 
arrival at the hospital.  The photographs were used to aid the doctor in explaining 
the extent of Haesun’s injuries, and in explaining the steps taken to save her life, 
evidence relevant to the totality of aggravating circumstances.  Pursuant to Davis 
and Floyd, the trial court carefully considered the photos before making its 
findings.  The photographs were probative of and relevant to penalty phase issues, 
and were thus properly admitted.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the photographs. 
AGGRAVATORS AND MITIGATORS 
The defendant argues the death sentences imposed must be vacated because 
the trial court found improper aggravating circumstances, failed to consider (or 
gave little or no weight to) highly relevant and appropriate mitigating 
circumstances, and improperly found that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating factors.  We affirm the sentences imposed in this case. 
 
Witness Elimination/Avoid Arrest Aggravator 
 
First, Schoenwetter argues it was error for the trial court to consider and to 
instruct the jury that one of the aggravating circumstances it could consider 
 
 
- 31 -
relating to the murder of Ronald Friskey was that the murder was committed to 
avoid arrest.  He asserts that the evidence does not support this aggravator.  In 
Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1992), we held that in order to establish this 
aggravating factor, where the victim is not a law enforcement officer, the State 
must show that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of 
the witness.  Id. at 409.  We additionally said that this factor may be proven by 
circumstantial evidence from which the motive for the murder may be inferred.  Id. 
at 409 (citing Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 276 n.6 (Fla. 1988)).  In Walls v. 
State, 641 So. 2d 381, 390 (Fla. 1994), we further held that a confession is direct 
evidence of motive and that a confession that witness elimination was the reason 
for the murder satisfies this aggravating circumstance.   
 
In this case, the State presented evidence and the trial court found that the 
defendant confessed to the crimes, and in particular to stabbing and killing Virginia 
because she knew him.  In his confession, Schoenwetter indicated he knew 
Virginia recognized him because she said his name, “Randy.”  He also said 
Virginia continued to shriek after he said he would not hurt her.  Her shrieking 
brought the mother to the room.  Therefore, knowing that he needed to escape and 
knowing Virginia was the only one who knew he was the intruder, he stabbed 
Virginia to conceal his identity.  Thus, by his own words, Schoenwetter killed 
Virginia to eliminate her as a witness. 
 
 
- 32 -
 
Other statements made by Schoenwetter support the finding that the murder 
of the father, Ronald Friskey, was to avoid detection and arrest.  During his 
confession, Schoenwetter stated he was fighting with Ronald and swinging away 
with the knife, “trying to get Ronald off him.”  He said he was lashing out with the 
knife because he “didn’t want to get caught or anything like that.”  Once the 
defendant was discovered, his primary focus was to avoid capture and get away 
from the Friskey house. 
 
The trial court did not err in considering and allowing the jury to consider 
that the murder of Ronald Friskey was done to avoid arrest.  The evidence amply 
suggests application of this aggravating circumstance to both the murders of 
Virginia and Ronald Friskey. 
 
Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravator 
 
Schoenwetter next argues the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravating 
circumstance does not apply to the murder of Ronald Friskey.  We stated in Lynch 
v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003), that when we analyze the heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel aggravator, the focus is not on the intent of the assailant, but on 
the actual suffering caused to the victim.  In determining whether the HAC factor 
was present, the focus should be upon the victim’s perceptions of the 
circumstances as opposed to those of the perpetrator.  See Farina v. State, 801 So. 
2d 44, 53 (Fla. 2001). 
 
 
- 33 -
 
The record reflects and the trial court found that the HAC aggravator applied 
to Ronald Friskey.  Ronald Friskey died an extremely torturous death. The medical 
examiner’s testimony revealed Ronald was stabbed at least ten times. The wounds 
were on various parts of his body (including defensive wounds on his hands), he 
lost a lot of blood, and he had difficulty breathing.  Ronald Friskey was alive and 
conscious throughout the attack as evidenced by the defendant’s confession, and 
by the fact that Ronald lived long enough to drag himself next door to seek help 
and was able to state his belief that his entire family was killed.  In addition to the 
physical torture he endured, Ronald was emotionally tortured by witnessing the 
defendant’s attack on his ten-year old daughter and his wife. 
 
The heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance is 
applicable to the murder of Ronald Friskey. 
Weight Given to Mitigators 
 
Lastly, Schoenwetter contends the trial court erred in the weight it accorded 
to some of the mitigating circumstances.9  In Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 
(Fla. 1990), this Court indicated that a trial court must find as a mitigating factor 
any factor reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence and that is 
mitigating in nature.  In Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2000), we receded 
                                          
 
 
9.  In an amicus brief, More Advanced Persons with Autism and Asperger’s 
Syndrome (MAAP) also argued the trial court should have given greater weight to 
Schoenwetter’s diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome. 
 
 
- 34 -
from Campbell “to the extent it disallows trial courts from according no weight to 
a mitigating factor and recognize that there are circumstances where a mitigating 
circumstance may be found to be supported by the record, but given no weight.”  
Trease, 768 So. 2d at 1055.   This Court also held in Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 
1119, 1133 (Fla. 2000), that deciding the weight to be given a mitigating 
circumstance is within the trial court’s discretion, and that the trial court’s decision 
will not be reversed except for an abuse of discretion. See also Blanco v. State, 706 
So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1997).   
 
In this case, the trial court did not refuse to consider or weigh any mitigating 
evidence presented by Schoenwetter.  On the contrary, the record reflects that the 
trial court found four statutory mitigating circumstances and numerous 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  The trial court found as statutory 
mitigating circumstances the defendant’s age, lack of prior criminal history, 
impaired capacity, and extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  In addition, the 
trial court considered and found as mitigating such factors as acceptance of 
responsibility, sexual preoccupation from an early age, lack of a threat to the 
general prison population, gainful employment, and loving relationship with his 
family. 
 
The defendant, however, takes issue with the weight that was given to the 
four statutory mitigating circumstances, which were given little weight, and with 
 
 
- 35 -
the weight given to two of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.10  Although 
Schoenwetter maintains these mitigating factors were not accorded the proper 
weight, he has failed to even argue, much less demonstrate, why the weight given 
by the trial judge was not appropriate under the facts of this case.  The weight 
given to these mitigators lies within the discretion of the trial court, and there has 
been no showing that the trial court abused its discretion.  Therefore, we find no 
error in the trial court’s consideration of these mitigating factors.   
Proportionality 
 
In deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty, this Court considers the 
totality of the circumstances of the case and compares the case with other similar 
capital cases.  See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 417 (Fla. 1998).  However, this 
proportionality review "is not a comparison between the number of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances."  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)).  The murders of 
Virginia Friskey and Ronald Friskey are supported by four aggravating 
circumstances.  The trial judge found four statutory mitigating circumstances and 
several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  Our review of the circumstances of 
this case supports the imposition of death for both murders.    
                                          
 
 
10.  Gainful employment and loving relationship with his mother and sister 
were given no weight. 
 
 
- 36 -
This Court has upheld as proportional several cases with similar aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  For example, in Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 
(Fla. 2004), we held the death sentence was proportional where the trial court 
found five aggravators, including avoiding arrest and HAC, weighed against one 
statutory mitigator, that defendant was nineteen years old, and thirteen 
nonstatutory mitigators, including the defendant’s cooperation with law 
enforcement and the defendant’s abusive or deprived childhood.  Likewise in 
Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2003), the death penalty was affirmed 
where four aggravators were found, including avoiding arrest and HAC, and six 
mitigators were found, including no significant prior criminal history and extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.   
As with this case, the trial court in Caballero found the aggravators were 
proven and that each of them, standing alone, would be sufficient to outweigh the 
six mitigating circumstances.  See id. at 659 n.2; see also Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d 
629 (Fla. 2001) (holding death penalty proportional in a double homicide where 
seven aggravators were found for each victim including avoid arrest, HAC, and 
murders during the course of a burglary; two statutory mitigators were found 
including impaired capacity, defendant’s age of twenty, and several nonstatutory 
mitigators including lack of significant criminal history); Booker v. State, 773 So. 
2d 1079 (Fla. 2000) (finding the death penalty proportional where four aggravators 
 
 
- 37 -
were found, including prior convictions of a felony and HAC, and two statutory 
mitigators were found, namely extreme mental or emotional disturbance and lack 
of capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, as well as nine 
nonstatutory mitigators including abuse as a child and inconsistent family life). 
This Court has also upheld the death sentence in other double homicide 
cases with similar aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances.  See 
Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2001) (holding death sentences proportional 
where the aggravators included avoiding lawful arrest, HAC, and homicide during 
commission of a robbery or burglary, weighed against two statutory mitigators of 
the defendant’s age and lack of significant history of prior criminal activity, as well 
as several nonstatutory mitigators, including unstable home and social life and the  
defendant’s confession and cooperation with the police); Lynch v. State, 841 So. 
2d 362 (Fla. 2003) (finding death penalty proportionate where the aggravators 
found included murder during the commission of other felonies and HAC, and the 
mitigators included mental or emotional disturbance and lack of capacity to 
conform conduct to the requirements of the law). 
 
In sum, we find Schoenwetter’s death sentences were not impermissibly 
imposed.  The sentences of death in this case are proportional to sentences imposed 
in other capital cases with similar factual circumstances and where similar 
aggravating and mitigating factors were found.   
 
 
- 38 -
BURDEN OF PERSUASION 
Schoenwetter argues that placing a higher burden of persuasion on the 
defense to prove that life imprisonment should be imposed than is placed on the 
State to prove capital punishment should be imposed violates fundamental fairness 
and due process.  This claim is similar to claims that have been raised in numerous 
cases.  This Court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly found that 
the standard jury instructions, when taken as a whole, do not shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant.  See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1024 (Fla. 
1999); San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1350 (Fla. 1997).  We are not 
persuaded by Schoenwetter’s arguments that the standard jury instructions given 
have somehow changed this point of law.  We therefore find that the death 
sentences were not erroneously imposed.    
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 921.141, FLORIDA STATUTES 
Schoenwetter argues that section 921.141, Florida Statutes, allows the trial 
court to sentence him to death without a unanimous death recommendation, in 
contravention of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The 
issue of whether section 921.141 is unconstitutional, in whole or in part, has been 
addressed repeatedly by this Court.  We have found the statute comports with the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment.  See Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 119 (Fla. 
 
 
- 39 -
2003); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2003);  Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 
2d 693 (Fla. 2002).  
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons expressed above, we affirm the judgments and 
sentences, including the two sentences of death, imposed by the trial court in this 
case. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except for its continuing 
approval of jury instructions that place the burden upon the defendant to prove that 
the death penalty should not be imposed unless the defendant establishes the 
existence of sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances established by the State.  By continuing to approve these standard 
instructions relieving the State of its constitutionally mandated burden of proof, we 
are placing the entire Florida death penalty scheme at risk and in violation of the 
due process guaranteed by the United States and Florida Constitutions.  See 
 
 
- 40 -
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 312 (1985); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 
703-04 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).   
 
In fact, from the inception of Florida’s current death penalty scheme, we 
have consistently held that no defendant may be sentenced to death unless the State 
demonstrates that the aggravation outweighs the mitigation.  See, e.g., Alvord v. 
State, 322 So. 2d 533, 540 (Fla. 1975) (“No defendant can be sentenced to capital 
punishment unless the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.”).  
However, at the same time, we have refused to mandate that juries be instructed on 
this critical and fundamental principle or to disapprove the standard jury 
instructions, which place the burden on the defendant to establish sufficient 
mitigation to outweigh the aggravation.  We should wait no longer to correct this 
longstanding problem. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
John M. Griesbaum, Judge - Case No. 05-2000-CF-041829-AX 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
 
 
- 41 -
Roger W. Yoerges, C. Boyden Gray, Edward C. DuMont, and Edward n. Siskel of 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP, Washington, D.C., on behalf of 
MAAP Services for Autism and Asperger Spectrum, Dr. Fred Volkmar and 
Professor Anthony Bailey, 
 
 
for Amici Curiae