Title: Attorney Grievance v. Wills

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Talieb Nilaja Wills, Misc. Docket AG No. 99, 
September Term, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT — DISCIPLINE — DISBARMENT — Respondent, 
Talieb Nilaja Wills, violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 4.1(a); 
8.1; and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).  The violations stemmed from Respondent’s 
misappropriation of his client’s funds, and deceit about those funds and the work he did for 
that client.  The appropriate sanction for Respondent’s violations is disbarment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No. 29702M 
Argued: October 3, 2014 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 99 
 
September Term, 2013 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
TALIEB NILAJA WILLS 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Harrell 
 
Battaglia 
 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts,         
 
               JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  December 18, 2014 
 
 
 
On February 19, 2014, Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of 
Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or 
Remedial Action (the “Petition”) against Respondent, attorney Talieb Nilaja Wills.  The 
Petition alleged violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MLRPC”) in connection with Respondent’s misappropriation of funds belonging to his 
client, Mrs. Millicent Goode, and his deceitful responses to questions, from Bar Counsel 
and others, concerning both his use of those funds and his representation of Mrs. Goode.  
Specifically, the Petition alleged that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.5 (fees); MLRPC 
1.15(a) (safekeeping property); MLRPC 4.1(a) (truthfulness in statements to others); 
MLRPC 8.1 (a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); and MLRPC 8.4(a), 
(b), (c), and (d) (misconduct).  
 
On February 20, 2014, this Court designated the Honorable David A. Boynton of 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing and issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On March 20, 2014, 
Respondent was served with process, in compliance with Maryland Rule 16-753. 
Respondent did not file a response to the Petition, timely or otherwise.  On April 23, 2014, 
the hearing judge entered a default order against Respondent.  
 
Respondent did not move to vacate the order, although he appeared, unrepresented, 
at the subsequent hearing on the Petition, which occurred on July 16, 2014.  The hearing 
judge heard evidence from Petitioner and one complainant testifying for Petitioner—
Steven Weinberg, the personal representative of Mrs. Goode’s estate.  Respondent cross-
examined Mr. Weinberg but did not testify or present any witnesses.  On August 6, 2014, 
 
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the hearing judge issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which he 
concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent had violated MLRPC 4.1(a); 
MLRPC 8.1(a) and (b); and MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).  Neither party filed exceptions 
to either the hearing judge’s underlying factual findings or his legal conclusions.  
Respondent did not make a recommendation for sanction; Petitioner recommended 
disbarment. 
 
On October 3, 2014, we heard oral argument, at which only Petitioner appeared.  
The same day, we entered a per curiam order disbarring Respondent.  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Wills, 440 Md. 182 (2014).  We explain in this opinion the reasons for that 
action. 
I. 
As summarized, the hearing judge found the following facts. 
Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 19, 2002.  He 
maintained an office for the practice of law, Wills Law, PC, in Montgomery County, 
Maryland.  Sometime in 2009, Mrs. Millicent Goode, who was in her 80s, entered into an 
attorney-client relationship with Respondent.  No formal retainer agreement was ever 
executed.   During his representation, Mrs. Goode was residing in a retirement home.  Her 
health was poor, so she relied on Respondent to care for her finances.   
On or about April 8, 2010, Respondent prepared, and Mrs. Goode executed, a 
“Durable Power of Attorney for Financial and Business Matters of Millicent R. Goode” 
(“Power of Attorney”).  The Power of Attorney “appointed the Respondent as Mrs. 
 
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Goode’s agent to make financial and health care decisions[]” and provided that all of Mrs. 
Goode’s future tax returns were to be prepared, executed, and filed by Respondent. 
 
The same day Mrs. Goode signed the Power of Attorney, Respondent added his 
name as a joint owner of Mrs. Goode’s Bank of America bank account (“joint bank 
account” or “account”).  At that time, the account had a balance of $14,157.06.  According 
to bank records, for the most recent years immediately prior to 2009, Mrs. Goode received 
approximately $3,000 each month in retirement benefits and spent approximately that same 
amount each month on her personal finances.  There was no history of her making cash 
withdrawals or using a check card. 
Once Respondent had his name added to the joint bank account, he began 
withdrawing cash and making debit card purchases for his personal use.  By the end of 
June 2010 (less than three months after Respondent added his name to the account), the 
account balance was $2.92. 
On June 30, 2010, Mrs. Goode sold her home, located in Washington, D.C., for 
$245,971.71.1 That sum was deposited into the joint bank account.  Respondent began 
accessing those funds for his own use.  He wrote himself multiple checks from the account 
and withdrew tens of thousands of dollars in cash.  Respondent used account funds to pay 
his personal utility and cellular phone bills, to buy clothes, meals at restaurants, and 
                                                          
 
1  Respondent indicated in subsequent correspondence to an attorney who was retained by 
Mrs. Goode’s son after her death, that he, Respondent, was involved in the sale of the 
home. 
 
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alcohol, as well as to purchase plane tickets to Miami, Las Vegas, and Hawaii, and pay for 
hotels while on those trips.  
 
In or about March 2011, Mrs. Goode suffered a stroke and was admitted to Howard 
University Hospital.  After the stroke and until her death on June 10, 2012, Mrs. Goode 
lived in various rehabilitation and assisted living facilities.  During that time, she returned 
often to Howard University Hospital for ongoing care and treatment.  
 
By the time of Mrs. Goode’s death, there were no funds left in the joint bank 
account.  Respondent nevertheless wrote several checks from the account to cover Mrs. 
Goode’s funeral and burial expenses.  Those checks were returned for insufficient funds.  
Following Mrs. Goode’s death, the civil service annuity payments she had been 
receiving monthly in the amount of $3,000 continued to be deposited into her account.  
Respondent did not return the money to the government and instead spent the money.  
 
After the death of Mrs. Goode, her son, Clyde V. Goode, hired an attorney, Steven 
Weinberg, to assist him in closing the estate.  Mr. Weinberg, who later was appointed the 
personal representative of the estate, sent repeated requests to Respondent asking for 
information relating to Respondent’s work for Mrs. Goode.  Mr. Weinberg specifically 
requested the original retainer agreement, documentation of Mrs. Goode’s expenses, her 
original will, her tax returns for years 2009-2011, and all documents necessary for the 
probate of her estate.   
 
On August 26, 2012, Respondent provided Mr. Weinberg with a “Memorandum,” 
which Respondent intended to serve as his response to Mr. Weinberg’s request.  With the 
Memorandum, Respondent included an itemized account summary that explained some of 
 
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the work he had done on behalf of Mrs. Goode.  The Memorandum purported to summarize 
Respondent’s work on behalf of Mrs. Goode and included the monetary value of some of 
that work; the summary contained only some of the detailed financial information Mr. 
Weinberg had requested.  The Memorandum set forth several specific representations 
relating to Respondent’s time and work with Mrs. Goode.  Respondent represented that 
Mrs. Goode’s house was sold in 2010, because if she did not sell it, she was going to be 
fined $100 a day, by the Washington, D.C. government, retroactively to 2009.  Respondent 
stated that he had been involved in the sale of the home with the District of Columbia and 
had prepared and filed tax returns on behalf of Mrs. Goode.  He noted his attorney rate, 
which he said had been agreed upon with Mrs. Goode, was to be $300 per hour, and that 
he would be compensated for any administrative work at $85 an hour.  He stated that he 
visited Mrs. Goode in her retirement home three times a week, regularly spoke to the 
doctors and nurses at Howard University Hospital about Mrs. Goode’s medical care, and 
had talked to Mrs. Goode’s health insurance provider, Care First, on her behalf.  
Respondent noted, too, that there were three outstanding bills including a disputed bill with 
a rehabilitation facility, a disputed bill with an assisted living facility, and a bill for a 
separate rehabilitation center.  He added that Mrs. Goode also had an outstanding bill with 
Howard University Hospital for $78,000.   
 
After reviewing the Memorandum and itemized account summary, Mr. Weinberg 
repeatedly requested additional documentation.  Respondent did not reply to those requests.  
The hearing judge found that Respondent’s itemized “accounting” of the work he had 
performed for Mrs. Goode was “fabricated by the Respondent in an effort to knowingly 
 
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and intentionally mislead Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Goode and to cover up his 
misappropriation.”   
Attorney Grievance Commission Investigation 
 
On October 31, 2012, Mr. Goode filed a complaint with Petitioner.  Bar Counsel, 
on behalf of Petitioner, forwarded the complaint to Respondent on November 16, 2012, 
and requested a written response within fifteen days.  Bar Counsel did not receive a 
response from Respondent and therefore sent a second letter on December 13, 2012.  When 
Bar Counsel did not receive a response to that letter, she sent a third letter on January 22, 
2013.  In the third letter, Bar Counsel also requested an explanation for Respondent’s 
failure to respond to the first two letters.  Respondent again failed to reply to Bar Counsel’s 
letter. 
 
Eventually an investigator working on behalf of Petitioner was able to reach 
Respondent by personally serving him with a subpoena at a courthouse where he was 
present for a hearing for another of his clients.  After receiving the subpoena for himself 
and for the Bank of America records of accounts held by Respondent, Respondent agreed 
to provide a statement under oath. 
Bar Counsel interviewed Respondent on April 30, 2013.  Although Respondent gave 
a statement under oath, he failed to bring any of the subpoenaed documents with him.    
Respondent informed Bar Counsel that the subpoenaed documents were in a storage 
facility in Bethesda, Maryland.  During the interview, Respondent refused to answer any 
substantive questions about the Goode matter or about Bar Counsel’s investigation.  He 
requested a continuance in order to obtain counsel, which he said he was in the process of 
 
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doing.  Bar Counsel granted Respondent the continuance and issued a new subpoena for 
him to appear on May 30, 2013, for the rescheduled interview.  It also was agreed that 
Respondent would meet Bar Counsel’s investigator at the storage facility on May 21, 2013. 
 
On May 17, 2013, Bar Counsel’s investigator attempted to contact Respondent to 
confirm the plans to retrieve the subpoenaed documents from the Bethesda storage facility.  
Respondent never returned the investigator’s phone call.  The documents were never 
recovered.  Respondent did not obtain counsel, even though he had requested the 
continuance on the premise that he was about to obtain counsel and did not want to proceed 
without counsel.  Respondent did not appear for the re-scheduled interview, for which he 
had been subpoenaed. 
 
Based upon these findings, the hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that Respondent violated MLRPC 4.1(a); MLRPC 8.1; and MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), 
(c), and (d). 
II. 
 
In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court “has original and complete jurisdiction 
and conducts an independent review of the record.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Page, 
430 Md. 602, 626 (2013).  We accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as correct unless 
shown to be clearly erroneous.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lara, 418 Md. 355, 364 
(2011).  Neither Respondent nor Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s 
findings of fact.  We therefore treat those findings as established.  See Md. Rule 16-
759(b)(2)(A). 
 
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We review de novo the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1); 
Page, 430 Md. at 626.  The ultimate decision as to whether an attorney has engaged in 
professional misconduct lies with this Court.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 
Md. 695, 717 (2014). 
III. 
 
Neither party filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Based 
upon our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 4.1(a); MLRPC 8.1; and MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d). 
Truthfulness in Statements to Others 
 
MLRPC 4.1(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n the course of representing a 
client a lawyer shall not knowingly [] make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person[.]”  This Court has held that a misrepresentation to another attorney violates 
MLRPC 4.1(a).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zhang, 440 Md. 128, 166 (2014); see 
also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 367 (2006) (holding a 
violation of MLRPC 4.1(a) when the attorney falsely stated to opposing counsel that his 
client refused to be deposed).  
 
The hearing judge found, and we have accepted as established, that in the 
Memorandum he sent to Mr. Weinberg Respondent “knowingly and intentionally made 
multiple misrepresentations about his representation of Mrs. Goode to Mr. Weinberg.”  The 
hearing judge further found that Respondent “fabricated an account of Mrs. Goode’s funds 
and provided it to Mr. Weinberg[,]” omitting from that accounting the many thousands of 
 
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dollars he had drawn from Mrs. Goode’s bank account, for his own use, during his three-
year representation of her.  These facts readily support a violation of MLRPC 4.1(a).  
Compliance with Disciplinary Matters 
 
MLRPC 8.1 reads: 
a lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter[] shall not: 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension 
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly 
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an 
admissions or disciplinary authority. . . .  
 
Section (a) of this rule is violated when an attorney intentionally misleads Bar Counsel 
about the attorney’s knowledge and ability to provide information to assist in the 
investigation.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 393 Md. 385 (2006) (violation of 
MLRPC 8.1(a) when an attorney falsely informed Bar Counsel that he was unable to obtain 
transcripts, which, if believed, could have caused the complaint against the attorney to be 
dismissed); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505 (2006) (violation of 
8.1(a) when an attorney told Bar Counsel that his client had never tendered a check when 
the client in fact had done so).   
 
Section (b) of MLRPC 8.1 is violated when an attorney fails to reply to Bar 
Counsel’s lawful requests for information.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 436 Md. 
513 (2014); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15 (2012); Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Nnaka, 428 Md. 87 (2012); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 
147 (2010).  Belated participation in a Bar Counsel investigation does not overcome a 
violation of failing to respond to Bar Counsel in the first instance.  See Attorney Grievance 
 
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Comm’n v. Queen, 407 Md. 556 (2009) (respondent’s eventual response to Bar Counsel 
after a four-month initial failure to respond was still a violation of MLRPC 8.1(b)).   
 
The hearing judge found, and we have accepted, that Respondent knowingly 
misrepresented to Bar Counsel that Mrs. Goode’s file was in a storage facility and that he 
would meet Bar Counsel’s investigator at the facility to retrieve the file.  He did not reply 
to or meet with the investigator after receiving a subpoena for the file and agreeing to the 
meeting.  Respondent never did produce the file to bar Counsel.  The hearing judge further 
found that Respondent thrice failed to reply to Bar Counsel’s initial requests for 
information, establishing that Respondent also violated MLRPC 8.1(b).  Those facts 
establish a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a).    
Misconduct 
 
MLRPC 8.4 provides: 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, 
or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice[.] 
 
The hearing judge found that Respondent had stolen and misappropriated funds 
from Mrs. Goode’s bank account when he was her attorney, in violation of Md. Code Ann., 
Crim. Law § 7-104(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), and Crim. Law § 7-113(a)(1) and (a)(2).  Those 
findings establish a violation of MLRPC 8.4(b).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
 
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Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 644 (2007) (holding that misappropriation of a client’s escrow 
funds for attorney’s own use violated MLRPC 8.4(b)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Carithers, 421 Md. 28, 39-40 (2011) (clear and convincing evidence that attorney violated 
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 7-104(a)(1), thereby establishing a violation of MLRPC 
8.4(b)). 
The hearing judge found that Respondent’s misrepresentations to Mr. Weinberg and 
Bar Counsel and his misappropriation of Mrs. Goode’s money was laden with deceit and 
dishonesty.  That finding establishes that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c).  See Zhang, 
440 Md. at 169 (violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) when the attorney made false representations 
to co-counsel); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landau, 437 Md. 641, 652 (2014) (finding 
that an attorney who neither administered nor accounted for client funds, and instead 
withdrew them for personal use, violated MLRPC 8.4(c)); see also Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Brown, 415 Md. 269, 279 (2010) (false statements to Bar Counsel violated 
MLRPC 8.4(c)). 
 
That same misconduct by Respondent also establishes a violation of MLRPC 8.4(d).  
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zimmerman, 428 Md. 119, 132 (2012) 
(misappropriation of client funds is “dishonest conduct” that also is “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice in violation of [MLRPC] 8.4(c) and (d)”); Brown, 415 Md. at 279 
(false statements to Bar Counsel violated MLRPC 8.4 (c) and (d)); see also Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Nussbaum, 401 Md. at 642 (the deceit and dishonesty underlying 
the violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) also constituted an act prejudicial to the administration of 
justice in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d)). 
 
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Respondent’s violation of the aforementioned provisions of the MLRPC constitute 
a violation of MLRPC 8.4(a).  
IV. 
 
We turn now to the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct.  Respondent 
did not submit a recommendation for sanction.  Bar Counsel contended that the 
misappropriation of entrusted funds is inherently deceitful and dishonest, and therefore 
Respondent should be disbarred.  
 
The severity of the sanction for an attorney’s misconduct “depends on the 
circumstances of each case, the intent with which the acts were committed, the gravity, 
nature and effect of the violations, and any mitigating factors.”  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 33 (2006) (citations omitted).  The purpose of a sanction is 
not to punish the attorney, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garcia, 410 Md. 507, 521 
(2009), but rather, “to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal 
profession[,]” Zimmerman, 428 Md. at 144.  “Sanctions accomplish these goals by 
deterring intolerable conduct and keeping those unfit to practice law from doing so.”  Id. 
 
We are consistent in holding that the “misappropriation of funds by an attorney is 
an act infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment in the 
absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction.” 
Zimmerman, 428 Md. at 144 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 
Md. 376, 410 (2001)).  That sanction is warranted because attorneys  
must remember that the entrustment to them of the money and property of 
others involves a responsibility of the highest order.  They must carefully 
administer and account for those funds.  Appropriating any part of those 
 
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funds to their own use and benefit without clear authority to do so cannot be 
tolerated. 
 
Landau, 437 Md. at 652 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 
334, 345 (1991)). 
  
 
The “misappropriation of client funds alone will result in disbarment in the absence 
of compelling extenuating circumstances.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Weiss, 389 Md. 
531, 566 (2005).  Respondent’s misconduct in misappropriating funds is exacerbated by 
multiple other violations, including the creation of the Memorandum with the intent to 
deceive Mr. Weinberg.  Further, the itemized bill that Respondent created to justify the 
balance in Mrs. Goode’s account following her death is a template of dishonesty.  
 
In addition, Respondent was evasive and dishonest with Bar Counsel throughout the 
investigative process. These combined violations create an even stronger case for 
disbarment.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Page, 430 Md. 602, 637 (2013) (holding 
disbarment appropriate after considering the aggravating factor that the respondent 
“committed multiple offenses[]”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 
229 (2001) (holding disbarment appropriate where the respondent’s misappropriation of 
funds was “compounded by other numerous rule violations”). 
 
In light of our precedent, Respondent’s misconduct clearly would warrant 
disbarment, absent compelling mitigating circumstances.  Respondent did not offer, nor 
did the hearing judge find, any mitigating circumstances, compelling or otherwise, that 
would justify a lesser sanction.  Accordingly, we entered the October 3, 2014, order 
disbarring Respondent and awarding costs against him.