Title: MARTA v SMITH

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-81 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA JACK A . MARTA, ROBERT D. MARTA and DAVID A. MARTA, Plaintiffs and Appellants, DOUGLAS L. SMITH and EFFIE L. SMITH, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, In and for the County of Madison. Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Morrow, Sedivy, Olson and Scully, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Jardine, McCarthy and Grauman, whitehall, Montana Submitted on briefs: September 25, 1980 Decided: :DM 1 2 1981 Filed: Jkl\; 1 - . $1 Clerk M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l from a judgment e n t e r e d i n District C o u r t , Madison County, i n f a v o r of d e f e n d a n t s on a l l i s s u e s . The p l a i n t i f f s were denied an e x c l u s i v e p r e s c r i p t i v e easement to a roadway, were found to be i n wrongful p o s s e s s i o n of t h e i r "yard s p a c e " , and were e n j o i n e d from u s i n g an i r r i g a t i o n system across d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d , u n t i l p l a i n t i f f s paid d e f e n d a n t s f o r damages t h e r e t o . W e af f i r m i n p a r t , v a c a t e i n p a r t , and remand to District Court f o r a h e a r i n g on a t t o r n e y f e e s and p l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o s t r i k e . T h i s d i s p u t e a r o s e between a d j a c e n t landowners n e a r S h e r i d a n , Montana, and i n v o l v e s s e v e r a l p i e c e s of p r o p e r t y . The Martas farm about 200 acres and t h e f a m i l y h a s been i n p o s s e s s i o n s i n c e 1904. The Smiths own a p p r o x i m a t e l y 45 acres l y i n g s o u t h of t h e Martas, and a d d i t i o n a l a c r e a g e l y i n g n o r t h and east of t h e Martas. They have been i n p o s s e s s i o n s i n c e 1977. The road to t h e Marta home r u n s p a r t l y o v e r t h e Smith p r o p e r t y , and h a s been used by t h e Martas and t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s , i n t h e same l o c a t i o n s i n c e anyone i n t h e neighborhood c a n recall. A f t e r Smiths moved i n , they and o t h e r p e r s o n s a u t h o r i z e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t s began u s i n g t h e road w i t h o u t Martas' p e r m i s s i o n . Martas r e q u e s t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t s q u i t using t h e roadway, which d e f e n d a n t s r e f used to do. I n May 1978, Martas brought a q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n , i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h an e x c l u s i v e p r e s c r i p t i v e easement i n themselves f o r t h e use of t h e roadway. They a l s o s o u g h t to e n j o i n d e f e n d a n t s from use of t h e r o a d , and r e q u e s t e d damages from d e f e n d a n t s to compensate p l a i n t i f f s f o r t h e p a s t use. Defendants counterclaimed a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f s , s e e k i n g to q u i e t t i t l e to t h e road i n themselves. Smiths f u r t h e r s o u g h t to have an area of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2/10 acre ( t h e "yard s p a c e " ) r e s t o r e d to them, and to e n j o i n p l a i n t i f f s from use of an i r r i g a - t i o n d i t c h o v e r d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d and to compensate f o r damage caused by n e g l i g e n t use of t h e d i t c h . Following t r i a l , t h e d i s t r i c t judge e n t e r e d h i s f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . H e found a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement i n Martas f o r t h e use of t h e roadway, b u t he determined t h a t it was a n easement common to t h e p a r t i e s . H e r e f u s e d to e n j o i n d e f e n d a n t s ' u s e . Although Martas were found to have a d v e r s e l y possessed t h e "yard s p a c e , " t h e d i s t r i c t judge r e f u s e d t o uphold t h e c l a i m because Martas could p r e s e n t no evidence of having paid t h e t a x e s . F i n a l l y , t h e judge found t h a t Martas' use of t h e i r r i g a t i o n system c r o s s i n g S m i t h s ' l a n d was n e g l i g e n t , and had caused c u t t i n g and e r o d i n g of Smiths' l a n d . H e ordered Martas to c e a s e using t h e i r r i g a t i o n system u n t i l it was r e p a i r e d , or u n t i l t h e y paid d e f e n d a n t f o r t h e damage caused by t h e use. The p l a i n t i f f s raise s e v e r a l i s s u e s on appeal: (1) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n determining t h a t p l a i n - t i f f s had acquired a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, b u t not an e x c l u s i v e easement, a c r o s s d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d ? ( 2 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n not e n j o i n i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' u s e of t h e roadway and i n not r e q u i r i n g d e f e n d a n t s t o compensate p l a i n t i f f s f o r damage caused t o t h e roadway? ( 3 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n denying p l a i n t i f f s ' a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e yard s p a c e , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t e v i - dence was introduced showing p l a i n t i f f s' p o s s e s s i o n s i n c e 1904? ( 4 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n denying p l a i n t i f f ' s con- t i n u e d use of t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h u n l e s s p l a i n t i f f s paid f o r damages done t o d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d ? ( 5 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n awarding $2500 i n a t t o r - ney f e e s ? ( 6 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge err i n awarding costs to d e f e n d a n t s ? Both p a r t i e s to t h i s l i t i g a t i o n concede t h a t t h e Martas e s t a b l i s h e d a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement i n t h e roadway where it c r o s s e s Smiths' l a n d . A t i s s u e is t h e e x t e n t of t h e r i g h t a c q u i r e d by Martas, t h a t is, whether both Smiths and Martas have a r i g h t t o use t h e road, or whether Martas acquired an easement w i t h e x c l u s i v e and p r i v a t e use i n themselves. Based on t h e testimony, t h e d i s t r i c t judge s t a t e d i n h i s f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s : " . . . s a i d r i g h t of way as h e r e i n b e f o r e d e s c r i b e d is a common r i g h t of way t h a t has been a c q u i r e d by t h e p a r t i e s by r i g h t of p r e s c r i p t i o n ( a s t o t h o s e p o r t i o n s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y owned by t h e p a r t i e s ) and t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s and defen- d a n t s are e n t i t l e d to t h e common use of t h e e x i s t i n g roadway f o r t h e purpose of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s . . ." Martas o b j e c t t o t h e "common use , I r and contend t h a t t h e l a w and t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t t h e i r p o s i t i o n t h a t they s h o u l d have a c q u i r e d an e x c l u s i v e easement. I t is s e t t l e d l a w i n Montana t h a t i n a c q u i r i n g a p r e s c r i p - t i v e easement, " t h e r i g h t of t h e owner of t h e dominant estate is governed by t h e c h a r a c t e r and e x t e n t of t h e use d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d r e q u i s i t e to a c q u i r e it." Ferguson v. S t a n d l e y ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 89 Mont. 489, 502, 300 P. 245, 250; 28 C.J.S. Easements $89. T h e r e f o r e , Martas' u s e of t h e roadway cannot exceed t h e use which t h e y made of it d u r i n g t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e p e r i o d . Hayden v. Snowden ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 169, 175, 576 P.2d 1115, 1119; S t a t e of Montana by and through t h e Montana F i s h & Game Commission e t a l . v . C r o n i n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587 P.2d 395, 401, 3 5 St.Rep. 1798, 1805. A t t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f s attempted t o show t h a t a l l p e r s o n s who had used t h e road had done s o o n l y w i t h t h e p e r m i s s i o n of Martas, t h u s e s t a b l i s h i n g an e x c l u s i v e and p r i v a t e use r i g h t i n Martas. Smiths countered w i t h w i t n e s s e s who t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r o a d had always been i n common usage, and t h a t Martas' p e r m i s s i o n had never been s o u g h t f o r t h e use. E f f i e Smith t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g a summer of i r r i g a t i n g , she had used t h e road s e v e r a l t i m e s a day w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n from Martas. A p r e d e c e s s o r of S m i t h s who had owned t h e p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e 1 9 6 0 ' s t e s t i f i e d to u s i n g t h e road a t l e a s t s e v e r a l times a week, and more o f t e n when he had cattle to tend o r hay to p u t up. H e moved cattle and f a r m equipment a c r o s s t h e road w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n . The f i n d i n g s of t h e judge i n d i c a t e t h a t he found d e f e n d a n t s ' t e s t i m o n y more p e r s u a s i v e . H e found t h a t t h e Martas' e s t a b l i s h e d use was n o t t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of a l l o t h e r s . Although Martas' use was " e x c l u s i v e " i n t h e s e n s e n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e use i n t h e Martas, S c o t t v. Weinheimer ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 140 Mont. 554, 561-62, 374 P.2d 91, 95-96, Martas cannot e s t a b l i s h a p r i v a t e or e x c l u s i v e easement where it is shown t h a t o t h e r per- s o n s have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e use. C r o n i n , s u p r a , Mont. a t , 587 P.2d a t 401, 35 St.Rep. a t 1805; 28 C. J.S. Easements S15. There was ample t e s t i m o n y as t o t h e p r i o r u s e s made of t h e roadway. W e f i n d t h a t t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e j u d g e ' s f i n d i n g s of a common easement, w i t h t h e e x t e n t of use d e f i n e d by t h e use made d u r i n g t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e p e r i o d . W e w i l l n o t o v e r t u r n t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s f i n d i n g s where t h e y are sup- p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . S c o t t , s u p r a , 140 Mont. a t 562, 374 P.2d a t 96. However, w e do f i n d t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge i n c o r r e c t l y concluded t h a t d e f e n d a n t s were e n t i t l e d to t h e use of a n i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h running p a r a l l e l to and e a s t e r l y of t h e road- way i n q u e s t i o n . D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t s d i d n o t a s k f o r t h i s r e l i e f , t h e d i s t r i c t judge determined t h a t d e f e n d a n t s had a c q u i r e d t h i s r i g h t by p r e s c r i p t i o n . T h i s i s s u e was not b e f o r e t h e c o u r t and is not a p a r t of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e w e v a c a t e t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e judgment. Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g , we f i n d a l s o t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge p r o p e r l y denied t h e p l a i n t i f f s' r e q u e s t f o r an i n j u n c t i o n , and t h e i r claim f o r damages f o r r u t t i n g and d i s r e p a i r of t h e roadway. Finding No. 8 i n d i c a t e s : "That t h e p l a i n t i f f s have maintained s a i d road- way throughout t h e y e a r s but have done s o v o l u n t a r i l y and w i t h o u t r e q u e s t f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n from t h e d e f e n d a n t s and t h a t no damages t o s a i d roadway were caused through t h e f a u l t or n e g l e c t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s and t h a t d e f e n d a n t s are not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r damages, i f any, s u s t a i n e d or claimed by t h e p l a i n t i f f s . " The t e s t i m o n y of d e f e n d a n t s shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t s and t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s used t h e roadway f o r c a r r y i n g on a farming o p e r a t i o n , d r i v i n g a n i m a l s and machinery o v e r it. I n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, p l a i n t i f f s have k e p t t h e roadway up d e s p i t e t h i s use by d e f e n d a n t s and t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s . Martas are n o t e n t i t l e d to damages f o r t h e p r o p e r u s e s t o which defen- d a n t s p u t t h e roadway. N e i t h e r a r e they e n t i t l e d to an injunc- t i o n t o p r e v e n t d e f e n d a n t s from p u t t i n g t h e roadway to t h e u s e s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h d e f e n d a n t s ' i n t e r e s t i n t h e l a n d . Smiths cannot p r e v e n t Martas' u s e of t h e roadway, j u s t as Marta cannot claim a n e x c l u s i v e p r i v a t e p r e s c r i p t i v e easement. See S c o t t , s u p r a ; 28 C . J.S. Easements 891. Martas n e x t contend t h a t t h e judge e r r e d i n denying t h e i r claim to t h e "yard space." The f i n d i n g s show t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s fenced i n and c u l t i v a t e d a p o r t i o n of d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d s and t h a t ". . . t h e p l a i n t i f f s claim t h a t t h e y are t h e owners of and i n p o s s e s s i o n of s a i d tract and t h a t t h e y have proved t h a t t h e y have occupied t e Sam open1 n o t o i s l y e x c u s i e l 8 a v e r s e f y , unlXterrupEe8Yy, ~ i s l b f ~ , XosXf.lely, a c t u a l l y , and under a claim of r i g h t , and t h a t p l a i n t i f f s , or t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s caused t h e same t o be p a r t i a l l y enclosed by a f e n c e , b u t t h a t p l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d to show by any e v i d e n c e whatsoever t h e payment of t a x e s upon s a i d l a n d s by them and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e i r claim of occupancy and ownership by a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n cannot be s u s t a i n e d by r e a s o n of S e c t i o n 70-19-411, MCA 1979 (Sec. 93-2513, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) , and, t h e r e f o r t h e i r 'claim of ownership by a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n f a i l s . . ." Martas admit to n o t paying any t a x e s , b u t contend t h a t t h e i r a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n claim should be s u s t a i n e d because t h e y have been i n p o s s e s s i o n s i n c e 1904. N o s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g payment o f t a x e s w a s i n e f f e c t u n t i l 1917, and claims made p r i o r to t h a t t i m e are deemed completed w i t h o u t any e v i d e n c e of t a x e s being p a i d . T h i b a u l t v. Flynn ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 3 Mont. 461, 466, 325 P.2d 914, 917. The d i s t r i c t judge found a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n , b u t d i s a l l o w e d t h e claim because of t h e nonpayment of t a x e s . H e made no f i n d i n g as t o t h e d a t e of t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e claim. T h a t no a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r to 1917 is n e c e s s a r i l y implied i n t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s and is sup- p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . W e n o t e t h a t t h e argument advanced i n T h i b a u l t , s u p r a , was b r i e f e d by c o u n s e l , and t h e f i n - d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e judge found it t o be i n a p p l i c a b l e . H i s judgment is presumed correct and w e w i l l draw e v e r y l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e to s u p p o r t t h a t presumption. Madison Fork Ranch v. L & B Lodge P o l e Timber Prod. ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 615 P.2d 900, 905-906, 37 St.Rep. 1468, 1473. W e uphold t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t s are e n t i t l e d to immediate p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e yard s p a c e , because a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d . The d i s t r i c t judge found t h a t f o r many y e a r s p l a i n t i f f s have d i v e r t e d i r r i g a t i o n water a t a p o i n t on d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d , and t h a t t h e y have e x e r c i s e d t h e i r d i t c h r i g h t s i n a "careless, n e g l i g e n t , i r r e s p o n s i b l e and wrongful manner," c a u s i n g damage t o d e f e n d a n t s 1 l a n d . H e concluded t h a t p l a i n t i f f s were n o t to irri- g a t e f u r t h e r u n t i l t h e damage was r e p a i r e d and t h e system reorga- n i z e d t o p r e v e n t f u r t h e r damage. H e found damages i n t h e amount o f $5500. P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e judge e r r e d i n f i n d i n g damage t o d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d s , because t h e t e s t i m o n y showed o n l y t h a t "washing" had t a k e n p l a c e . They argue t h a t Montana law d o e s n o t impose t h e d u t y of an i n s u r e r on t h e owner of a d i t c h , and mere washing does n o t show any f a u l t on t h e p a r t of t h e i r r i g a t o r . P l a i n t i f f s are correct i n s t a t i n g t h a t an owner of a d i t c h is n o t an a b s o l u t e i n s u r e r . C a l v e r t e t a l . v. Anderson e t a l . ( 1 9 2 5 ) , 73 Mont. 551, 555, 236 P. 847, 848; Fleming v. Lockwood ( 1 9 0 7 ) , 36 Mont. 384, 391-92, 92 P. 962, 964. But t h i s Court h a s n o t allowed any and e v e r y use of i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h e s , and h a s approved j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s which p r e s e n t t h e i s s u e of n e g l i g e n c e i n c o n s t r u c t i o n o r use t o t h e jury. Fleming, s u p r a , 36 Mont. a t 386-93, 92 P. a t 962-65. M r . Smith t e s t i f i e d t o e r o s i o n and c u t t i n g away of t h e s o i l on both s i d e s of t h e d i t c h . M r . Marsh, who t e s t i f i e d to i r r i g a t i n g f o r t h e Martas, i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e r e had been c u t t i n g a t t h e c o r n e r of t h e d i t c h and "bad washing" a t t h e p o i n t a t which t h e i r r i g a t i o n p i p e comes o u t . An a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s , John Simpson, who t e s t i f i e d t o being a c o n t r a c t o r and doing work f o r t h e S o i l C o n s e r v a t i o n S e r v i c e , i n d i c a t e d t h a t it would t a k e $5500 t o make t h e i r r i g a t i o n system s u i t a b l e , t o p r e v e n t f u r t h e r washing on Smiths ' l a n d , and to r e p a i r p a s t damage. W e f i n d t h i s e v i d e n c e to be s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t t h e j u d g e ' s f i n d i n g s of n e g l i g e n c e and c a r e l e s s n e s s i n p l a i n t i f f s ' i r r i g a t i o n p r a c t i c e s , and h i s f i n d i n g of damages of $5500. W e w i l l n o t o v e r t u r n t h e d i s t r i c t judge when t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t h i s f i n d i n g s . The d i s t r i c t judge I s c o n c l u s i o n No. 5 provided f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e i n j u n c t i o n which prevented S m i t h s from using t h e roadway. H e o r d e r e d p l a i n t i f f s to pay $2500 a t t o r n e y f e e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s e c t i o n 27-19-406, MCA. P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e s t a t u t e does n o t allow f o r f e e s o v e r $100, and i n a d d i t i o n t h a t no h e a r i n g was had to e s t a b l i s h t h e f e e s . S e c t i o n 27-19-406, MCA, does set a $100 l i m i t on t h e reco- v e r y of c o s t s . However, t h i s Court h a s determined t h a t a t t o r n e y f e e s and costs are r e c o v e r a b l e under s e c t i o n 27-19-306, MCA, as e l e m e n t s of t h e damages s u s t a i n e d by r e a s o n of t h e i n j u n c t i o n , and no such monetary l i m i t a p p e a r s i n t h a t s t a t u t e . Our p a s t d e c i s i o n s have s a n c t i o n e d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e f e e by u s i n g t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " s t a n d a r d . Boz-Lew B u i l d e r s v. Smith ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 448, 455, 571 P.2d 389, 393; Godfrey v. P i l o n ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. 439, 448-449, 529 P.2d 1372, 1377; S h e r i d a n County Electric Co-op v. Ferguson ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 124 Mont. 543, 551, 227 P.2d 597, 602. D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t s e c t i o n 27-19-306 p r o v i d e s f o r r e c o v e r y by an a c t i o n on an i n j u n c t i o n bond, w e a p p l y t h e same r e a s o n a b l e s t a n d a r d t o t h o s e a c t i o n s f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s i n which a bond is n o t involved. I n making a t t o r n e y f e e s an element of damages under s e c t i o n 27-19-306, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s u r e l y d i d n o t i n t e n d to make t h e r e c o v e r y depend on t h e j u d g e ' s d i s c r e t i o n i n demanding an i n j u n c t i o n bond. Thus we f i n d t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge s h o u l d have awarded r e a s o n a b l e f e e s as an element of damages, p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 27-19-306, MCA, and n o t as c o s t s of s u i t . I n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e District C o u r t a s t o what c o n s t i t u t e d a r e a s o n a b l e f e e . The d i s t r i c t judge cannot make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h o u t having such e v i d e n c e b e f o r e him. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank of Bozeman v. Tholkes ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 422, 429, 547 P.2d 1328, 1331-32; Crncevich v. Georgetown R e c . Corp. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 113, 120, 5 4 1 P.2d 56, 59. T h e r e f o r e we v a c a t e t h e award of a t t o r n e y f e e s and remand t h i s case t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r a h e a r i n g as to r e a s o n a b l e f e e s . Defendants s u b m i t t e d to t h e c o u r t a memorandum of costs of $1,073.87. P l a i n t i f f s t h e r e a f t e r moved t h e D i s t r i c t Court to s t r i k e t h e memorandum of c o s t s f o r f a i l u r e t o s e r v e it upon t h e p l a i n t i f f s o r t h e i r a t t o r n e y w i t h i n f i v e days af t e r n o t i c e of t h e d e c i s i o n , p u r s u a n t to s e c t i o n 25-10-501, MCA, o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t o t a x costs. The d i s t r i c t judge d i d n o t r u l e on t h e motion and allowed t h e costs as claimed by d e f e n d a n t s to s t a n d . On a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t s admit t h a t s e v e r a l items of c o s t were i n c o r r e c t l y l i s t e d . Because of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o c o n s i d e r t h i s t i m e l y motion of p l a i n t i f f s , w e v a c a t e t h e award of costs, and remand to t h e District Court f o r a h e a r i n g on t h e motion. W e remand t h i s case t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r pro- c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . Chief J u s t i c e