Title: CODY NISH V. CHARLES SCHAEFER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CODY NISH V. CHARLES SCHAEFER2006 WY 85138 P.3d 1134Case Number: 05-221Decided: 07/18/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
CODY 
NISH,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHARLES 
SCHAEFER,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Robert E. Schroth of Schroth & Schroth, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
George Santini of Ross & Santini, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Cody Nish was 
injured when the bicycle he was riding collided with Charles Schaefer's van at 
an intersection in Jackson.  
Mr. Nish filed suit against Mr. Schaefer seeking damages for his 
injuries, and Mr. Schaefer counterclaimed for the damages to his van.  A jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Mr. Schaefer, finding Mr. Nish 100% at fault for the accident.  The district court entered a judgment on 
the jury's verdict and granted Mr. Schaefer's specific requests for costs.  On appeal, Mr. Nish claims the district 
court committed reversible error in instructing the jury and improperly ordering 
him to pay certain costs to Mr. Schaefer.  
We conclude the district court's jury instruction concerning the relative 
rights and responsibilities of the parties was erroneous.  However, Mr. Nish failed to present a 
proper instruction on the law to the district court and failed to designate an 
adequate record showing, under the plain error standard, he was prejudiced by 
the instruction.  Moreover, we 
refuse to consider Mr. Nish's allegation the district court erred by awarding 
certain costs to Mr. Schaefer because Mr. Nish's separate appeal of the district 
court's order awarding costs was dismissed for want of prosecution.  Affirmed.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Nish 
articulates the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Did the 
trial court [err] by incorrectly instructing the jury that the Appellant was 
[illegally] in the crosswalk[?]

 
 

2.                  
Was it 
error for the trial court to prohibit Plaintiff's counsel from telling the jury 
that Mr. Nish was legally within the crosswalk at the time of his accident, when 
he struck Defendant's vehicle[?]

 
 

3.                  
Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion by awarding costs for lodging and meals during 
trial, Defendant's airfare to attend a deposition he never attended, mileage to 
and from the trial, and enlarged exhibits[?]     

 
 
Mr. 
Schaefer rephrases the issues as:

 
 
1.         
Can this Court rule upon the correctness of a jury instruction where 
Appellant has failed to include a transcript of the evidence as part of the 
record on appeal?

 
 
2.         
Assuming that instruction No. 20 was erroneous, can Appellant establish 
prejudice?

 
 
3.         
Was the jury correctly instructed with regard to the use of crosswalks by 
bicyclists?

 
 
4. 
        
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in [its] award of 
costs?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellate 
record does not contain a transcript of the trial proceedings, other than the 
jury instruction conference and closing arguments.  Thus, we take the explanation of the 
events precipitating this action from Jury Instruction No.  11:

 
 
This 
case involves an accident which occurred on August 7, 2002, at the corner of 
Buffalo 
Way road and US 89 in Jackson, Wyoming.  Plaintiff, Cody Nish, alleges that he 
was crossing Buffalo Way Road on his mountain bike in the crosswalk when the 
Defendant's van suddenly appeared in front of him, blocking the crosswalk, 
forcing him to stop suddenly.  As a 
result, Nish was thrown over the handle bars of 
his mountain bike.  Both he and the 
mountain bike struck Defendant Schaefer's blue Ford panel van in the driver's 
side door area.  Nish contends that 
he has sustained injuries, including a fracture[d] left wrist, for which he 
seeks an award of damages including past and future medical expenses, past and 
future lost earning[s] and earning capacity, past and future pain and suffering, 
loss of enjoyment of life, disability and disfigurement.

 
 
Charles 
Schaefer contends that the accident occurred as a result of Cody Nish's erratic 
riding of his mountain bike and failing to maintain adequate control over his 
bike.  Schaefer specifically 
contends that the cross walk was intended for pedestrians and that the accident 
occurred when Nish strayed from the crosswalk 
into the regular driving lane prior to striking his van.  Schaefer stopped his van behind the 
crosswalk and was waiting for the light to turn before turning right onto US 
89.  The accident occurred because 
Nish was riding his mountain bike too fast for 
traffic conditions and failed to maintain an adequate lookout. Schaefer also 
contends that Nish was negligent in the manner in which he attempted to stop his 
mountain bike resulting in Nish being thrown 
over the handlebars into Schaefer's van.

 
 
Finally, 
Schaefer contends that Nish caused damages to 
his van having a reasonable value of $899.90.  Schaefer contends that Nish should pay for those damages.

 
 
These 
are just the contentions of the parties.  
Whether those contentions are correct are for you to determine based upon 
the evidence presented to you and the law upon which I will instruct you.  

 
 
[¶4]      Answering the 
special interrogatories in the verdict form, the jury found Mr. Schaefer was not 
negligent, Mr. Nish was negligent, Mr. Nish's negligence was the cause of the 
damages, Mr. Nish was 100% at fault in the accident, and Mr. Schaefer suffered 
damages in the amount of $899.90.  
The district court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and awarded 
costs to Mr. Schaefer.  Mr. Nish 
filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on the jury's verdict, and Mr. 
Schaefer submitted a certified statement of costs pursuant to Uniform Rule for 
District Courts 501, and a motion for costs pursuant to W.R.C.P. 68 because Mr. 
Nish had rejected a pre-trial offer of judgment.  Despite Mr. Nish's objection to Mr. 
Schaefer's request for costs, the district court entered an order awarding the 
costs.  Mr. Nish filed a second 
notice of appeal from the district court's award of costs.     

 
 
 STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      Our review of 
claimed error in jury instructions is controlled by W.R.C.P. 51(b), which 
provides as follows:

 
 
(b) Further instructions;  objections.  At the close of the 
evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in the requests.  
The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests 
prior to their arguments to the jury.  
Before the argument of the case to the jury has begun, the court shall 
give to the jury such instructions on the law as may be necessary. . . .  No party may assign as error the giving 
or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected 
to and the grounds of the objection.  

 
 

See Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2005 WY 154, ¶ 13, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo. 2005); Landsiedel v. Buffalo Properties, 
LLC, 2005 WY 61, ¶ 5, 112 P.3d 610, 612 (Wyo. 2005).  When a party does not submit a proper 
instruction to the trial court, he waives any error in the instructions given 
and is not entitled to reversal on appeal unless he can show plain error.  Triton Coal Co. v. Mobil Coal Prod., Inc., 
800 P.2d 505, 511 (Wyo. 1990); Landseidel ¶ 13, 112 P.3d  at 614. 

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court's award of costs is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 
1084 (Wyo. 
1999).  "A court abuses its 
discretion only when it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances.  The burden 
is placed upon the party who is attacking the trial court's ruling to establish 
an abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did."  Snyder, 992 P.2d  at 1084, quoting Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 
862 (Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
            
A.        Jury Instructions 

 
 
 [¶7]     Mr. Nish claims the 
district court erred in instructing the jury on the applicable law.  He also claims the instructional error 
was exacerbated by Mr. Schaefer's closing argument and the district court's 
rulings on the parties' objections during closing arguments.  Specifically, Mr. Nish argues 
Instruction No. 20 incorrectly inferred it was unlawful for him to ride his 
bicycle in the crosswalk and improperly omitted a statement, pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-403(a)(iii)(C) (LexisNexis 2005), telling the jury that a 
vehicle facing a red light must yield the right of way to a bicyclist in a 
crosswalk.  Instruction No. 20 
stated:

 
 
            
You are instructed that at the time of the event in question, the 
statutes of the State of Wyoming stated as 
follows:

 
 
Every 
person riding a bicycle has all the rights and all the duties applicable to the 
driver of any vehicle under the Wyoming Traffic Code except as to those 
provisions which by their nature can have no application.  (§31-5-702).

 
 
Pedestrians 
have the right of way in crosswalks and drivers of vehicles are required to 
yield the right of way to pedestrians by slowing down or stopping as needed to 
yield to any pedestrian within or entering a crosswalk at either edge of the 
roadway.  Bicyclists are not treated 
as pedestrians for purposes of Wyoming law and are instead treated as any 
other operators of vehicles.  
(§31-5-102(a)(iii) & (xxlviii) & (lviii); § 31-5-602; and § 
31-5-702 (sic)).

 
 
No 
person shall drive a vehicle on the highway at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing.  
Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and 
appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection and when special 
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reasons of 
weather or highway conditions.  
(§31-5-301(a))

 
 
Except 
when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with law or 
the directions of a police officer or traffic-control device, no person shall 
stop, stand or park a vehicle on a crosswalk.  (§31-5-504 
(a)(i)(D))

 
 
Vehicular 
traffic having a red light must stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, 
at a clearly marked crosswalk.  
(§31-5-403(a)(iii)(A))

 
 
[¶8]      In order to 
determine whether the instructions properly advised the jury of the law, we must 
interpret the relevant statutes dealing with the rights and obligations of 
bicyclists and drivers of motor vehicles.  
Our rules of statutory interpretation are well 
known:

 
 
We first 
decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  "A statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability."   A "statute is ambiguous only if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations."  

 
 

Powder 
River Coal Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 
WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, 426 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).  When interpreting statutes, we give 
effect to every word, clause and sentence, and construe them in pari materia.  Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 2004 WY 84, ¶ 27, 94 P.3d 412, 420 (Wyo. 2004).  When a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
we apply the plain language of the statute.  Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, ¶ 11, 109 P.3d 887, 889-90 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶9]      There are 
numerous statutes defining the relative duties of drivers and bicyclists which 
apply to this case.  The relevant 
statutes are found in the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 31-5-101 through 31-5-1601 (LexisNexis 2005).  To start with the basics, § 31-5-102(a) 
defines the following terms:

 
 
§ 
31-5-102. Definitions

 
 
            
(a) Except as otherwise provided, as used in this 
act:

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
(iii) "Bicycle" means every vehicle propelled solely by human power upon 
which any person may ride, having two (2) tandem wheels except scooters and 
similar devices;

 
 
            
* * *

            

            
(viii) "Crosswalk" means:

            
(A) That part of a roadway at an intersection included within the 
connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the 
highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of 
the traversable roadway, and in the absence of a sidewalk on one (1) side of the 
roadway, that part of a roadway included within the extension of the lateral 
lines of the existing sidewalk at right angles to the 
centerline;

            
(B) Any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly 
indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the 
surface.

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
(xxviii) "Pedestrian" means any person afoot;

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
(xxxix) "Right-of-way" means the right of one (1) vehicle or pedestrian 
to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian 
approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to 
give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the 
other;

 
 
            
* * *

            

            
(xliv) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street between curb lines, or 
the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines, intended for 
use of pedestrians; 

 
 
[¶10]   Bicyclists are subject to specific 
laws in Wyoming.  
Section 31-5-702 states:  
"Every person propelling a vehicle by human power or riding a bicycle has 
all of the rights and all of the duties applicable to the driver of any vehicle 
under this act, except as to special regulations in this act and except as to 
those provisions which by their nature can have no application."  Section 31-5-120 pertains to sidewalks 
and reads as follows:

 
 
No 
person shall drive any vehicle except motorized wheelchairs other than by human 
power upon a sidewalk or sidewalk area except upon a permanent or duly 
authorized temporary driveway.

 
 
[¶11]   When an intersection is controlled 
by traffic signal lights, the following law applies to vehicles facing a red 
light:

 
 
            
* * *

            
(iii) Steady red indication:

 
 
(A) 
Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular red signal alone shall stop at a 
clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near 
side of the intersection or, if none, then before entering the intersection and 
shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown except as provided 
in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph;

 
 
 * * *

(C) 
Except when a sign is in place prohibiting a turn, vehicular traffic facing any 
steady red signal may cautiously enter the intersection to turn right, or to 
turn left from a one-way street into a one-way street after stopping as required 
by subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph.  The vehicular traffic shall yield the 
right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other 
traffic lawfully using the intersection;

                        

Section 
31-5-403(a).  Section 31-5-504 
specifically governs crosswalks and states:

 
 
(a) 
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with 
law or the directions of a police officer or traffic-control device, no person 
shall:

            
(i) Stop, stand or park a vehicle:

            

            
* * *

 
 
                        
(D) On a crosswalk[.]

            

Section 
31-5-607 requires "every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid 
colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human powered 
vehicle."

 
 
[¶12]   Applying the plain language of the 
relevant statutes and construing the sections together, we conclude bicycles 
hold a special place in the law because they can be operated both on roadways 
and on sidewalks.  Sections 31-5-702 
and 31-5-120.  When a bicyclist is 
riding in the roadway, he must generally obey the laws governing vehicles.  Section 31-5-702.  Unlike motorized vehicles, bicycles may 
also be ridden upon sidewalks because they are human-powered.  Section 31-5-120.  The Kansas Supreme Court explained the 
wisdom of allowing bicyclists to ride on sidewalks in Schallenberger v. Rudd, 767 P.2d 841, 
844 (Kan. 1989): 

 
 
[W]e 
think it clear [the Kansas legislature] did not intend to prohibit 
bicycles and other devices moved by human power from being used on sidewalks. To 
do otherwise would produce an undesirable result.  It would prevent little children from 
riding their bicycles on the sidewalks in front of their homes.  Further, were we to accept Rudd's 
argument that sidewalks are solely for pedestrians, as defined by K.S.A. 
8-1446, by reason of K.S.A. 8-1465, then not only are bicycles 
prohibited on sidewalks, but tricycles, skateboards, baby carriages, toy wagons, 
and wheelchairs would be barred.  We 
hold that, in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition, bicycles, 
skateboards, tricycles, wheelchairs, baby carriages, toy wagons, and other 
human-powered conveyances may legally be used on the sidewalks with 
pedestrians.

 
 
Logically, 
the right of a bicyclist to ride upon sidewalks with pedestrians extends to the 
use of a crosswalk when crossing an intersection.   Id.   

 
 
[¶13]   Pursuant to §§ 31-5-403 and 
31-5-504, if a bicyclist is lawfully within the crosswalk, a vehicle facing a 
red light must stop behind the crosswalk, yield the right-of-way to the bicycle, 
and may not make a right turn until the way is clear.  The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted a 
Kansas statute 
comparable to § 31-5-403, as follows:

 
 

K.S.A. 
1987 Supp. 8-1508(c)(1) 
provides that vehicular traffic facing a steady red light shall stop and remain 
stopped until an indication to proceed is shown.  K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 8-1508(c)(2) 
provides for an exception to the effect that, unless specifically prohibited by 
sign, vehicular traffic may cautiously turn right on a steady red light after 
coming to a complete stop, but shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians on 
the crosswalk and other traffic lawfully  
using the intersection. We 
construe this section to mean users of bicycles, skateboards, tricycles, 
wheelchairs, baby carriages, toy wagons, and other human-powered conveyances 
using the sidewalk also may lawfully use the crosswalk with the same rights as 
pedestrians, to which a vehicle turning right on a red light after a complete 
stop must yield the right-of-way.

 
 

Schallenberger, 
767 P.2d  
at 844 (emphasis added).  Other 
states have reached similar conclusions about the right of bicyclists to use 
sidewalks and crosswalks.  See, e.g., Luellman v. Ambroz, 516 N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 
Ct. App. 1994); Pudmaroff v. Allen, 
977 P.2d 574 (Wash. 1999); Maxwell v. Gossett, 612 P.2d 1061 
(Ariz. 
1980).    

 
 
[¶14]   Returning to the case at bar, Mr. 
Nish argues Instruction No. 20 is erroneous and an incomplete statement of the 
relevant law because it implies a bicyclist may not use a crosswalk at an 
intersection and does not include the principles set forth in § 
31-5-403(a)(iii)(C).  Mr. Schaefer 
counters by pointing out the individual sections of the instruction are 
consistent with Wyoming law.  The district court instructed the jury 
that any person riding a bicycle has the rights and duties applicable to the 
driver of a vehicle.  This statement 
is consistent with § 31-5-702.  See also, Blakeman v. Gopp, 364 P.2d 986, 989 
(Wyo. 
1961).   The instruction 
continued by stating pedestrians have the right of way in crosswalks and drivers 
must yield to pedestrians.  Again, 
this is a correct statement of the law. Section 31-5-403.  The instruction also correctly recited 
the laws pertaining to Mr. Schaefer's duties to operate his vehicle in a safe 
manner, refrain from stopping or parking his vehicle on a crosswalk, and stop at 
the crosswalk for a red light.  
Sections 31-5-301(a), 31-5-504(a)(i)(D), and 31-5-403(a)(iii)(A).  

 
 
[¶15]   The district court, however, went 
awry when it stated that bicyclists are not treated as pedestrians under the 
law, suggesting bicyclists are always treated as other operators of 
vehicles.  This statement implied to 
the jury that, because bicyclists are subject to the rules which apply to 
vehicles and not treated as pedestrians, they may not use a crosswalk.  The district court's instruction 
suggested an overbroad interpretation of § 31-5-702's directive that bicycles 
are subject to the duties applicable to vehicles.  The district court's interpretation did 
not give effect to § 31-5-120, which specifically states bicycles are allowed to 
use sidewalks.  Construing §§ 
31-5-702 and 31-5-120 to give effect to each, a bicyclist must follow the rules 
applicable to vehicles when riding on the roadway; however, since a bicyclist 
may also use sidewalks, he has the same rights as pedestrians to use crosswalks 
at intersections.   Instruction 
No. 20 incorrectly implied Mr. Nish was not entitled to use the 
crosswalk.

 
 
[¶16]   Furthermore, the instruction 
improperly excluded the law set out in § 31-5-403(a)(iii)(C), directing that 
"vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within 
an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection."  This statement of the law was necessary 
to inform the jury which party had the right of way at the intersection.  The jury should have been instructed 
that Mr. Nish had the right of way while in the crosswalk and Mr. Schaefer was 
obligated to yield to him before making a right-hand turn on a red light.  As such, the district court did not 
properly instruct the jury on the law in this case.  This ruling does not, however, end our 
analysis. 

 
 
[¶17]   Although Mr. Nish objected to 
Instruction No. 20 because it implied he was not entitled to use the crosswalk 
and did not include the law set forth in § 31-5-403(a)(iii)(C),  the record on appeal does not include any 
specific instructions offered by Mr. Nish to correct the errors.1  In addition, the record does not include 
any indication Mr. Nish referred the district court to § 31-5-120 or the cases 
from other jurisdictions which support the principle that bicyclists may use 
sidewalks and crosswalks.2  

 
 
[¶18]   As we explained in Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson 
& Shotwell, P.C., 743 P.2d 880, 885 (Wyo. 1987):

 
 
An 
objection to an instruction is not complete without a correct typewritten form 
being handed to the court for its use.  
Parties have not only the right but the duty to offer instructions.  In the absence of submission of a proper 
written instruction, any claimed error is deemed to have been waived.  Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, 
Wyo., 511 P.2d 963 (1973).  It is insufficient 
merely to state that the instruction is not complete or an accurate statement of 
the law.  Runnion v. Kitts, Wyo., 
531 P.2d 1307 (1975).  See also 
Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Company, Wyo., 400 P.2d 488 
(1965), and  Rule 51, 
W.R.C.P.

 
 
In 
accordance with the holdings in Condict 
and Triton Coal, having failed to 
demonstrate he filed an appropriate instruction for the district court's 
consideration, Mr. Nish must show plain error in order for this Court to reverse 
the resulting judgment.  The 
well-known elements of plain error are:

 
 
"(1) the 
record reflects clear[ly] and unequivocally the fact complained of;  (2) the facts prove a transgression of a 
clear rule of law;  (3) the error 
affects a substantial right of [appellant];  and (4) [appellant] has been materially 
prejudiced by that violation."  

 
 

Landseidel, 
¶ 17, 
112 P.3d  at 615, quoting Goggins v. 
Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Wyo. 1985) (citation 
omitted).

 
 
[¶19]   Although the first two elements can 
be satisfied by the record extant, Mr. Nish must also show material prejudice 
resulting from the incorrect jury instruction.  Landseidel, ¶ 17, 112 P.3d  at 615.  For an instructional error to warrant 
reversal, there must be a reasonable probability that, in absence of the error, 
the verdict would have been more favorable to the appellant.  Triton Coal, 800 P.2d  at 512; Condict, 743 P.2d  at 885.  "To measure the degree of prejudice, jury 
instructions are viewed in light of the entire trial, including the allegations 
of the complaint, conflict in the evidence on critical issues and the arguments 
of counsel."  McGuire v. Solis, 2005 WY 129, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 1020, 1026 (Wyo. 2005), quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 
882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994).   In past decisions, we have applied 
a five-factor test to measure the prejudice resulting from an error.  Those factors are:

 
 
(1) the 
extent to which there is conflict in the evidence on critical 
issues;

 
 
(2) 
whether or not the . . . argument to the jury may have contributed to the 
instruction's misleading effect;

 
 
(3) 
whether or not the jury requested a re-reading of the erroneous instruction or 
of related evidence;

 
 
(4) the 
closeness of the jury's verdict;  
and

 
 
(5) the 
effect of other instructions in curing the error.  

 
 

Cathcart, 
¶ 49, 
123 P.3d  at 597 (Wyo. 2005), quoting Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶ 30, 30 
P.3d  547, 555 (Wyo.2001) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶20]   In an apparent effort to show 
prejudice from the instructional error, Mr. Nish argues the error was 
exacerbated by the closing arguments.  
In particular, he takes issue with a statement Mr. Schaefer's attorney 
made in his closing argument:

 
 
            
Now, let's talk about what we do know and I want to talk a little bit 
about this discussion about the crosswalk.  
Well, take a look at Instruction Number 20, ladies and gentlemen.  And Instruction Number 20 makes it clear 
that Mr. Nish is a vehicle, he has no more business using that crosswalk than a 
semi truck, no more business riding down the sidewalk than I would or you 
would.  He is supposed to be in the 
street.

 
 
Mr. Nish 
also claims the district court improperly sustained Mr. Schaefer's objection to 
his argument that it was lawful for him to ride in the crosswalk.    

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Nish's claim is germane to a 
determination of the second element of the Daley test  whether the parties' 
arguments contributed to the instruction's misleading effect.  It is not, however, sufficient to show 
the level of prejudice necessary for reversal.  The only portions of the trial 
transcript designated by Mr. Nish as the record on appeal were the jury 
instruction conference and the closing arguments.  The lack of a full trial transcript 
makes it impossible to analyze the first and third elements of the Daley test because we cannot determine 
the extent of conflict in the evidence on the key issues or whether the jury 
requested a re-reading of the erroneous instruction or related evidence.  Thus, it is impossible for Mr. Nish to 
show there is a reasonable probability that, in absence of the instructional 
error, the verdict would have been more favorable to him.  Mr. Nish had the responsibility to 
provide an adequate record to this Court to enable us to conduct our 
review.  The failure to do so is 
fatal to his claim on appeal.  See, e.g., Meyer v. Rodabaugh, 982 P.2d 1242, 1244, 
n. 1 (Wyo. 
1999).  

 
 
B.        Appeal of 
Costs

 
 
[¶22]   The district court entered a 
judgment on the jury's verdict, and ordered costs be awarded to Mr. 
Schaefer.  Mr. Nish filed a notice 
of appeal from the judgment on the jury's verdict, which is the case at 
bar.  Mr. Schaefer submitted a 
certified statement of costs, pursuant to Uniform Rule of District Court 501, 
and a Motion for Award of Costs, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 68, outlining the specific 
costs requested.  Mr. Nish objected 
to Mr. Schaefer's requests, but the district court apparently was not convinced 
by those objections and entered an order awarding all of the specific costs 
requested by Mr. Schaefer.  
Thereafter, Mr. Nish filed a second notice of appeal, challenging the 
district court's award of costs.  
That appeal was docketed as Supreme Court No. 05-238.  Mr. Nish did not file a brief in Case 
No. 05-238, and on November 22, 2005, this Court dismissed that case for want of 
prosecution.  Undaunted by the 
dismissal of the costs appeal, Mr. Nish included an issue in his brief in this 
case contesting the award of costs.  
Mr. Schaefer claims the costs issue is not properly before this Court 
because Mr. Nish's costs appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.    

 
 
[¶23]   Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 58(c), a 
district court retains jurisdiction to determine a request for costs after a 
final judgment has been entered on the merits of the case.  Anderson v. Hernandez, 2005 WY 142, ¶ 18, 122 P.3d 950, 954 (Wyo. 2005).  A 
pending motion for costs does not affect the finality of the judgment and does 
not stay the time for filing a notice of appeal from the judgment on the 
merits.  W.R.A.P. 2.01, 2.02; 
Anderson, ¶ 16, 122 P.3d  at 954-55.  W.R.A.P. 2.01 requires an appeal to be 
filed within thirty days from the entry of an appealable order, and W.R.A.P. 
2.07 directs the appellant to identify the order appealed and attach a copy of 
the order to the notice of appeal.  
The notice of appeal effects an appeal of the order identified in the 
notice.  See W.R.A.P. 2.01, 2.07. 

 
 
[¶24]   Our precedent reveals cases where 
we have considered, together, appeals from the judgment on the merits and a 
subsequent order on costs.  See, e.g., Winterholler v. Zolessi, 989 P.2d 621 
(Wyo. 1999); Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552 
(Wyo. 
1998).  However, those cases 
involved a consolidation, for consideration and decision, of the appeal on the 
merits with the appeal of the costs award.  
They did not involve a unilateral decision by the appellant to ignore the 
separate appeals.  In Centra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins. Co. Ltd, 
2000 
U.S.App. LEXIS 22609, pp. 34-36 (10th Cir. 
2000), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized the importance of a separate appeal of an order on costs entered 
after the judgment on the merits.  
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), which is similar to 
W.R.A.P. 2.01, 
the Tenth Circuit ruled that, even though the judgment on the merits referenced 
costs by directing the parties to file motions for "attorneys' fees and costs," 
a separate appeal from the district court's actual determination of the parties' 
requests for costs was required.  
The appellant's failure to file a separate notice of appeal from the 
trial court's order on costs deprived the court of appeals of jurisdiction over 
the matter.  Id.   Since Case No. 05-221 does not 
include an appeal from the district court's order on costs, issues pertaining to 
that order cannot be raised in this appeal. We, 
therefore, decline to consider Mr. Nish's claims of error regarding the award of 
costs.  

 
 
[¶25]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The record 
contains Mr. Nish's proposed jury instructions numbers 1 through 23.  Although the district court indicated, 
at the jury instruction conference, Mr. Nish had offered an instruction 
(plaintiff's proposed Instruction Number 33) which was a complete quotation of § 
31-5-403(a)(iii), it is not included in the record on appeal.   The only instruction addressing § 
31-5-403 offered by Mr. Nish and included in the record on appeal is plaintiff's 
proposed Instruction No. 17.  That 
instruction includes quotations of § 31-5-403(a)(iii)(A) and (B), but does not 
include the critical language of § 31-5-403(a)(iii)(C).  At the instruction conference, the 
district court directed Mr. Nish to tender to the court any additional 
instructions he proposed but were refused, including an instruction setting out 
the language of § 31-5-403(a)(iii)(C).  
The district court indicated it would mark the proposed instructions as 
"refused" and include them in the court record.  Despite the district court's express 
direction, the record on appeal does not include any additional instructions 
filed by Mr. Nish or marked "refused."    

 
 

2Interestingly, his argument on appeal indicates he still fails to realize 
the relevance of  § 31-5-120 and the 
authorities from other states to his position.