Title: State v. Muscari

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Muscari  (2000-562); 174 Vt. 101; 807 A.2d 407

[Filed 05-Jul-2002]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                No. 2000-562


State of Vermont	                           Supreme Court

                                                   On Appeal from
   v.                                              District Court of Vermont,
                                                   Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Vincent Muscari	                                   November Term, 2001 

  David Suntag, J.

  Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and Christopher C. Moll
  and Tracy Kelly Shriver, Deputy State's Attorneys, Brattleboro, for
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

  William E. Kraham, Brattleboro, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


        
       JOHNSON, J.   Defendant appeals his convictions for unlawful trespass,
  first degree aggravated domestic assault, simple assault by mutual combat,
  and unlawful mischief.  Defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1)
  permitting a charge of aggravated domestic assault; (2) admitting the tape
  of the victim's 911 call in evidence; (3) erroneously instructing the jury
  on serious bodily injury and the relevance of expert medical testimony; (4)
  considering defendant's silence to the pre-sentence investigator at
  sentencing; (5) denying him equal access to the crime scene; (6) engaging
  in experimental trial procedures; (7) denying him the right of
  confrontation by limiting the 

  

  scope of cross-examination of the victim; and (8) improperly admitting
  evidence of prior bad acts.  We affirm.

       On the evening of February 5, 1999 defendant let himself into the
  Westminister, Vermont home of his former girlfriend, Ellyn Benson, and went
  up the stairs to her bedroom where he discovered Ms. Benson with her
  boyfriend, Chad Simpson.  Defendant claimed that he and Ms. Benson had
  scheduled a date to have dinner at her residence that night.  Defendant and
  Ms. Benson came face to face at Ms. Benson's bedroom door and began to
  argue.  When defendant pushed Ms. Benson down to the floor, Mr. Simpson
  intervened, and the two men fought.  After Mr. Simpson and defendant
  temporarily stopped fighting, all three individuals went downstairs to the
  living room and kitchen.  While it is disputed whether defendant
  accompanied or dragged Ms. Benson down the stairs, the evidence at trial
  indicated that shortly after Ms. Benson arrived downstairs, defendant
  punched her in the face.  After being hit, Ms. Benson tried to defuse the
  situation by urging Mr. Simpson to leave.  With Mr. Simpson's departure,
  however, defendant's violent behavior escalated; he smashed Ms. Benson's
  plates and other breakables, threw them into the air, and hit Ms. Benson in
  the face with at least one broken piece of dishware.  Defendant then
  punched Ms. Benson in the face again.

       Ms. Benson ran outside to escape.  Mr. Simpson, who was in the process
  of leaving, saw that Ms. Benson was bleeding from her cheek and returned to
  the scene to physically engage defendant.  As the two men fought, Ms.
  Benson called 911.  She spoke with the 911 operator, left the telephone
  line open, and went back outside.  Defendant fled the scene before the
  police arrived.  Several hours later, from the house of his attorney,
  defendant surrendered himself to the police.	

  

       The 911 response team administered first-aid and photographed Ms.
  Benson's injuries before taking her to the hospital for further treatment. 
  The police took photographs of the crime scene and interviewed Ms. Benson
  the night of February 5th, and again the following day.  Although the
  defense wanted to take its own photographs, Ms. Benson would not allow them
  into her home.  Ms. Benson's injuries as documented by the police
  photographs and affidavit, and by Ms. Benson's testimony at trial,
  consisted of a black eye, a three-centimeter long and one-centimeter deep
  laceration on her face that required stitches, an additional small
  laceration to the forehead, numerous small bruises and superficial
  abrasions, and back pain.  The larger laceration has developed into a
  permanent scar and the back pain continues.

       Defendant was charged with unlawful trespass, first degree aggravated
  domestic assault, simple assault by mutual combat, and unlawful mischief. 
  After a three-day trial, on June 30, 2000, a jury convicted defendant of
  all counts.  Defendant appeals, alleging several different errors at trial.

       Defendant's first claim of error is that there was insufficient
  evidence to support a finding of serious bodily injury, and thus the charge
  of aggravated assault.  Defendant brought motions for judgment of acquittal
  under V.R.Cr.P. 29 at the close of the State's case and after trial.  The
  court denied both motions.  On review of a court's denial of a motion for
  judgment of acquittal we must consider "whether the evidence, when viewed
  in the light most favorable to the State and excluding any modifying
  evidence, fairly and reasonably tends to convince a reasonable trier of
  fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v.
  Couture, 169 Vt. 222, 226,