Title: Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.1992 WY 168842 P.2d 1077Case Number: 92-81Decided: 12/08/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming

Carson R. 
AANENSON, Appellant (Petitioner Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE 
of Wyoming ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent 
Objector).

Appeal from District Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 Michael 
Schilling, Laramie, for appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., and J.C. DeMers, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Carson R. Aanenson 
seeks review of a district court order affirming the denial of worker's 
compensation benefits by a hearing officer. Mr. Aanenson was diagnosed with a 
ruptured disc in 1986 but neglected to file a report or claim for worker's 
compensation. In 1990, Aanenson filed an injury report and then a claim for 
coverage for an operation on the same ruptured disc. The benefits were denied 
because appellant missed the statutory deadline provided in W.S. 27-12-503 
(1977).

 [¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 [¶3.]     Mr. Aanenson presents 
the following issue:

I. 
Whether appellant's claims for a ruptured dis[c] injury are timely filed within 
one year from the date of the treating physician's determination that the 
condition requires surgical correction.

 [¶4.]     The State presents it 
this way:

I. Does 
substantial evidence exist to support the hearing examiner's finding that the 
statute of limitations began to run in May of 1986 and that the appellant's 
claim was barred pursuant to W.S. § 27-14-503.

FACTS

 [¶5.]     Mr. Aanenson was first 
employed by Roger and Jean Schlump, the sole proprietors of Ace Salvage, in 
1985. The Schlumps hired him to manage and operate their salvage yard, which 
required strenuous lifting. Throughout the first two to three years, Mr. 
Aanenson was sporadically paid small sums, despite working 300-400 hour months. 
However, in 1988, the Schlumps incorporated Ace Salvage, made Aanenson vice 
president, and issued him shares in the corporation.

 [¶6.]     While moving a number 
of car transmissions and car rear ends in the spring of 1986, Aanenson gradually 
developed severe pain in his left leg and buttocks. In early May, the pain 
became intolerable, forcing a visit to the emergency room. Based upon the 
hospital's examination and advice from his employer, Mr. Aanenson scheduled an 
appointment with Dr. Kieffer.

 [¶7.]     Dr. Kieffer examined 
Mr. Aanenson and ordered a CAT scan of Mr. Aanenson's lower back. Based upon the 
exam and CAT scan, Dr. Kieffer explained to Mr. Aanenson that he had ruptured a 
disc, pinched a nerve, and that he had a floating cracked vertebra. Mr. Aanenson 
did not file a worker's compensation claim or accident report. Mr. Aanenson and 
Dr. Kieffer agreed upon a conservative treatment approach, including bed rest, 
medication, stretching exercises, and time off from work. After about two 
months, Mr. Aanenson returned to work and gradually was able to perform his same 
duties.

 [¶8.]     Over the next three 
years, Mr. Aanenson continued to diligently perform his duties at the salvage 
yard and was able to endure whatever pain existed. In 1990, however, the salvage 
company began a new project which required more strenuous lifting and moving 
than had previously been needed. The severe pain returned. Mr. Aanenson 
consulted a second physician, Dr. Wirt. Dr. Wirt diagnosed a ruptured disc at 
L5-S1 and confirmed that it was the same disc injury as in 1986. Dr. Wirt 
recommended surgery.

 [¶9.]     On December 3, 1990, 
Mr. Aanenson filed a worker's compensation employee injury report, and an 
employer's report was also completed. Dr. Wirt and Mr. Aanenson set a date for 
surgery, and Dr. Wirt sent in a claim for worker's compensation coverage. The 
Division of Worker's Compensation denied coverage of the surgery because they 
viewed the 1990 injury as pre-dating to 1986, and thus the time for filing the 
1986 claim had passed. Mr. Aanenson then requested a hearing before the hearing 
officer, who also denied his claims. Aanenson appealed the decision to the 
district court, who then affirmed the hearing officer's denial. Mr. Aanenson now 
asks us to review the district court order.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 [¶10.]  The standard to which we must adhere in 
reviewing agency factual findings is as follows:

"We 
examine the entire record to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings. If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of 
the agency. It is more than a scintilla of evidence."

State 
ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1992), 
quoting Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 1989); 
see also Trout v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 
(Wyo. 1986). Agency conclusions of law, however, are not afforded the same 
deference. Thus, our standard of review for agency conclusions of law is as 
follows:

If the 
conclusion of law is in accordance with law, it is affirmed, [Department of 
Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyoming v.] Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 
766 [767] P.2d 608 [Wyo. 1989]; if it is not, it is to be 
corrected. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n [v. State Board of Equalization], 
749 P.2d 221 [Wyo. 1987].

Employment 
Security Comm'n v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 871, 86 A.L.R.4th 
295 (Wyo. 
1990).

 [¶11.]  When we review mixed questions of law and 
fact, our standard has been stated this way:

     When an agency's 
determinations contain elements of law and fact, we will not treat them as 
findings of fact. We extend deference only to agency findings of "basic fact." 
When reviewing a finding of "ultimate fact," we divide the factual and legal 
aspects of the finding to determine whether the correct rule of law has been 
properly applied to the facts. If the correct rule of law has not been properly 
applied, we do not defer to the agency's finding but correct the agency's error 
in either stating or applying the law.

Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 860-61 (Wyo. 
1990).

 [¶12.]  Before choosing the appropriate standard 
of review, we must determine whether we are being asked to review a finding of 
fact, a conclusion of law, or a mixed question of fact and law. Distinguishing 
between fact and law is a sometimes difficult, if not impossible, task because 
"[m]atters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach 
upward, without a break, into matters of law." Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in 
Judicial Review, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 899, 904 (1943), quoting Dickinson, Administrative 
Justice and the Supremacy of the Law 55 (1927).

 [¶13.]  In discussing distinctions between issues 
of fact and issues of law in the area of the worker's compensation statute of 
limitations, we said, in Claim of Grindle, 722 P.2d 166, 169 (Wyo. 
1986):

"It is 
the duty of the trial judge as finder of fact to determine and find by a 
preponderance of the evidence whether there was a compensable injury, and, if 
so, when it was actually suffered by an employee. . . ." In the Matter of 
Barnes, Wyo., 
587 P.2d 214 (1978); and Big Horn Coal Company v. Wartensleben, Wyo., 502 P.2d 187 
(1972).

In 
Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 299 (Wyo. 1991), we commented 
further:

     While it is true a 
claimant has the burden of proving the actual time of disability and its cause, 
for purposes of establishing the date of occurrence of an injury to ascertain 
the time from which the statute of limitations begins to run is a legal question 
and not one of fact. [citations omitted]

From 
these excerpts, it appears that our issue is a mixed question of law and 
fact.

 [¶14.]  A "mixed question of law and fact" is a 
conclusion reached or a finding made by an agency through application of legal 
precepts to the historical and narrative events of a particular case. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co., 802 P.2d  at 860. Professor Davis explained the concept using 
the most common of issues: Was the defendant negligent? He divided the issue 
into two questions: (1) What did the defendant do? (an issue of historical 
fact), and (2) Do defendant's actions constitute negligence? (an issue of law). 
5 Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 29:9 at 367 (2d ed. 1984).

 [¶15.]  The historical actions and inactions of 
Mr. Aanenson, as determined by the hearing officer, are historical or basic 
facts. However, whether or not W.S. 27-12-503 acts as a bar to Mr. Aanenson's 
claim when applied to the basic facts is an issue of law. Therefore, the 
findings made by the hearing officer concerning appellant's historical actions 
are given due deference, but the conclusion that W.S. 27-12-503 bars appellant's 
claim will be affirmed only if it is in accordance with 
law.

ANALYSIS

Findings of Fact

 [¶16.]  The hearing officer expressed his 
findings of basic fact as follows:

     This office is 
persuaded that Employee-Claimant [appellant] ruptured his L5-S1 disk in 1986. 
This medical condition was diagnosed in 1986, and the diagnosis was communicated 
to Employee-Claimant. Employee-Claimant has no doubts as to the fact that this 
diagnosed condition was caused by his Ace employment. Although able to delay 
surgical treatment through the date of this hearing, Employee-Claimant 
nevertheless was totally disabled for two (2) months in 1986, and since then has 
had intermittent periods where his medical condition prevented his engaging in 
unrestricted work effort with Ace. Despite this, Employee-Claimant did not file 
any worker's compensation accident report until approximately December 5, 1990, 
and did not file any worker's compensation claim until December 17, 
1990.

Each of 
these findings made by the hearing officer is supported by Mr. Aanenson's 
testimony and the record. Mr. Aanenson testified that he was informed of the 
ruptured disk by Dr. Kieffer in 1986; that he believed the injury happened at 
Ace Salvage; that he was able to postpone surgery; that he was unable to work 
for two months after the injury in 1986; that he experienced periods where he 
could not fully perform his normal duties during the period between 1986 and 
1990; and that he failed to file any worker's compensation form until December 
of 1990. Therefore we hold these findings, as to the basic facts, to be 
supported by substantial evidence and will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the hearing officer.

Conclusions of Law

 [¶17.]  Mr. Aanenson makes only one legal 
argument for our review: He argues that this court has adopted a "per claim" 
statute of limitations through three cases decided since 1986. He admits that 
without the intervention of these cases his claim would be barred under pre-1987 
law. In order to address Mr. Aanenson's argument, we feel it necessary to review 
the cases construing our worker's compensation statute of 
limitations.

 [¶18.]  When Mr. Aanenson was initially diagnosed 
with a ruptured disk, the statute of limitations in effect at the time of injury 
and which controls was W.S. 27-12-503 (1977). Seckman v. Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 166 (Wyo. 1989); Wyoming Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647, 648 
(Wyo. 1985). 
Wyoming 
Statute 27-12-503 (1977) provided:

(a) No 
order or award for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a 
single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, 
shall be made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or 
claim for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the 
injury occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred 
or for injuries not readily apparent, within 
one (1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The reports 
of an accident do not constitute a claim for compensation.

(b) The 
right of compensation for injury which occurs over a substantial period of time 
is barred unless a claim for benefits is filed with the clerk of the district 
court within one (1) year after a diagnosis of injury is first communicated to 
the employee, or within three (3) years from the date of last injurious exposure 
to the condition causing the injury, whichever occurs first. . . . [emphasis 
added]

(This 
provision was renumbered as W.S. 27-14-503 in 1986 and was amended again 
effective March 7, 1989. However, these amendments do not affect the outcome of 
this case.)

 [¶19.]  The worker's compensation statute of 
limitations has been consistently interpreted by this court. A cause of action 
under the Worker's Compensation Act does not arise until the claimant has 
suffered a "compensable injury." In the Matter of Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 218 
(Wyo. 1978); Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 
502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo. 1972); Baldwin v. 
Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 535, 108 A.L.R. 304 
(1936). Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations does not begin running 
until the claimant has suffered a "compensable injury." Barnes, 587 P.2d  at 219; 
Baldwin, 50 Wyo. at 530, 62 P.2d  at 539. In addition, a 
single employment accident may create more than one "compensable injury" which 
in turn results in more than one date for the start of the statute of 
limitations. Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d  at 299; State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604, 605 (Wyo. 1987); Pacific Power & Light 
Co. v. Rupe, 741 P.2d 609, 610 (Wyo. 1987); Barnes, 587 P.2d  at 
218.

 [¶20.]  A "compensable injury" occurs, starting 
the statutory period, when it becomes reasonably clear from the nature and 
seriousness of the injury that it is compensable. Big Horn Coal Co., 502 P.2d  at 
188; Barnes, 587 P.2d  at 219; 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 
78.40-.41(a) at 15-155 (1983). To further illuminate this general concept we 
examine several of the applicable cases.

 [¶21.]  Our approach first began to evolve in 
Baldwin. Mr. Scullion, the claimant, was 
injured at work when his hip was struck by a large metal pipe in July of 1934. 
He was diagnosed with arthritic rheumatism, given medicine and then permitted to 
return to work. Scullion consulted a second physician who diagnosed the hip 
injury as a fracture. In April 1935, after consulting a bone specialist, 
Scullion filed reports of the accident. After Scullion had received some 
benefits under worker's compensation, his employer objected because the claim 
was not timely filed. Baldwin, 50 Wyo. at 514-16, 62 P.2d  at 532-33. After 
reviewing the law in other jurisdictions, we held that Scullion had timely filed 
for the fracture because it was not diagnosed and thus not discovered until 
January of 1935. Id., 50 Wyo. at 531, 62 P.2d  at 
539.

 [¶22.]  In Big Horn Coal Co., the claimant 
(Wartensleben) suffered a back injury that was originally diagnosed as 
nervousness and treated with muscle relaxants. Later, however, after having his 
back x-rayed, Wartensleben was informed that he had a more serious injury. We 
held that Wartensleben had not suffered a "compensable injury" until he was 
informed of the more serious injury. In so holding we 
said:

[W]here 
an employee in the course of his employment sustains an apparent trivial injury which does not result in 
present disability and which would not reasonably be expected to cause future 
disability, but which injury in fact over a period of latency does cause future 
disability, the time for giving notice of the occurrence of the injury to the 
employer runs from the time when it becomes apparent that such injury has 
resulted in, or is likely to cause, compensable 
disability.

Big 
Horn Coal Co., 502 P.2d  at 188, citing Potter v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 248 
Minn. 380, 80 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1956).

 [¶23.]  In Barnes, the claimant was injured at 
work in 1967 and was diagnosed with a possible herniated disc. The claimant 
(Barnes) filed a worker's compensation injury report, and the cost of the 
necessary treatments were covered. Almost twenty years later, Barnes filed for 
further coverage because the injury required surgery. We concluded that the 
claimant could not reasonably be expected to comprehend that his injury was 
compensable until he was affirmatively told that he suffered from a herniated 
disc. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the claimant was 
originally diagnosed with only a possible herniated disc.

 [¶24.]  In Grindle, we framed our analysis, of 
when the statute of limitations begins to run, using language specifically found 
in W.S. 27-12-503(a). We said that the statute begins when the injury becomes 
"readily apparent." Despite the different phraseology, we applied the same basic 
test as described and used in Baldwin, Big Horn Coal Co. and Barnes. In fact, we 
cite the Barnes and Baldwin line of cases which established the "compensable 
injury" rule. Grindle, 722 P.2d  at 169. In reaching the conclusion that 
Grindle's injury was "readily apparent" when she was originally injured, we 
stressed that she was a licensed practical nurse when the injury occurred and 
that she had back surgery before she filed any claim.

 [¶25.]  As demonstrated by the foregoing cases, 
when determining the time a particular injury became compensable, it should be 
asked: When would a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have understood 
the full extent and nature of the injury and that the injury was related to his 
or her employment? The statute of limitations starts running when that date is 
fixed.

 [¶26.]  In light of the analysis elicited from 
our precedents and our ruling in Grindle, we find that the hearing officer 
properly concluded that Mr. Aanenson suffered a compensable injury in 1986 when 
he was informed by Dr. Kieffer that he had a ruptured disc, a pinched nerve, and 
a floating cracked vertebra and was unable to work for two to three months. For 
whatever reason, he chose not to file a worker's compensation claim. The statute 
of limitations, however, began running in 1986 when he was diagnosed and knew 
the nature and extent of his disabling injury, and he is barred by W.S. 
27-12-503 from any claim for coverage of his ruptured disc at 
L5-S1.

 [¶27.]  As the hearing officer concluded, the 
facts of Grindle closely mirror Mr. Aanenson's claim. Both Grindle and Mr. 
Aanenson suffered lower back injuries which caused severe initial pain but after 
a period of time diminished. Neither Grindle nor Aanenson filed an injury report 
or a worker's compensation claim when they were originally injured. In addition, 
they both were uniquely aware that they had a serious injury, Grindle because 
she was a licensed nurse and had surgery performed, and Aanenson because he was 
diagnosed with and informed of the exact nature and gravity of his injury. In 
his testimony concerning the discussion with Dr. Kieffer in 1986, appellant 
replied:

I went 
in, filled out the reports, Dr. Kieffer examined me and told me that I had a ruptured disc and [a] pinched nerve, a piece 
of floating bone in my back and a cracked vertebra. [emphasis 
added]

 [¶28.]  Even if the Grindle decision did not 
exist, application of the general analysis developed from Baldwin would require the same conclusion. A reasonable 
person would realize the serious nature of his or her injury when informed of a 
list of injuries like those expressed in Mr. Aanenson's testimony. These are not 
trivial injuries nor was there any doubt as to the occurrence of the injuries at 
Ace Salvage. Coupling this with the fact that Mr. Aanenson had to miss several 
months of work due to the pain, it is clear he should have understood the 
compensable nature of his injury.

 [¶29.]  Returning to Mr. Aanenson's argument that 
we have adopted a "statute of limitations per claim" doctrine since Grindle, we 
agree with the district court and affirm the hearing officer's conclusion 
against this proposition.

 [¶30.]  Mr. Aanenson claims that our decisions in 
Malkowski, Rupe and Nielsen have changed the law since Grindle. We have long 
held that an accident may result in two compensable injuries which manifest at 
separate times. Baldwin, 50 Wyo. at 531, 62 P.2d  at 539; Barnes, 587 P.2d  
at 218. As the hearing officer concluded, each of these cases is distinguishable 
because each involved a second compensable injury. In Malkowski the claimant's 
wrist injury deteriorated to a distinguishably worse condition; in Rupe the 
claimant's knee injury required additional surgery; and in Nielsen the claimant 
suffered pain in different parts of his back each time a second "compensable 
injury" occurred and his back deteriorated to the point where he was declared to 
have a 100 percent disability.

 [¶31.]  In Mr. Aanenson's case, there is no 
evidence that this is a second "compensable injury." Instead, Dr. Wirt's 
testimony states that his diagnosis in 1990 is the same as Dr. Kieffer's in 
1986. Perhaps if there was some evidence that this 1990 claim involved an 
increase in herniation of the disc, then there might arguably be a second 
compensable injury. However, that evidence does not exist in the 
record.

 [¶32.]  In addition, Mr. Rupe, Mr. Malkowski and 
Mr. Nielsen all filed timely reports and claims with the Worker's Compensation 
Division when they were first injured. Mr. Aanenson failed to file any report or 
claim with the Worker's Compensation Division until 1990, over four years after 
his initial injury was diagnosed.

 [¶33.]  As both the hearing officer and the 
district court recognized, our decision is harsh for Mr. Aanenson. We must, 
however, abide by our law and precedent, and we cannot say that the hearing 
officer erred in applying the law. Mr. Aanenson's argument that the worker's 
compensation statutes should be construed in favor of the worker, see generally 
Seckman, 783 P.2d  at 165, has not fallen upon deaf ears. However, we are not at 
liberty to create our own exceptions to language adopted by our legislature. 
Seckman, 783 P.2d  at 165. Additionally, we note the important role the statute 
plays in our worker's compensation scheme, by providing certainty and a ripe 
opportunity to investigate an injury. Holding for Mr. Aanenson would be to 
ignore these important policies. 

CONCLUSION

 [¶34.]  We hold that the hearing officer's 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and that his conclusions 
of law are in accordance with the law. Therefore, we must affirm the denial of 
benefits to Mr. Aanenson.