Title: People v. Garcia

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

SEE CONCURRING OPINION. 
Filed 3/20/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S218197 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H039603 
IGNACIO GARCIA, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. C1243927 
 
____________________________________) 
According to the Center for Sex Offender Management (CSOM), one in 
every five girls and one in every seven boys is sexually abused by the time they 
reach adulthood.  Among adults, one in six women and one in 33 men suffer 
sexual assault.  (CSOM, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fact Sheet: What You Need to 
Know About Sex Offenders (2008) p. 1  [as of March 20, 2017].)  Yet only about 30 percent of sexual 
assaults are reported to law enforcement.  (Off. of Sex Offender Sentencing, 
Monitoring, Registering, and Tracking, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Facts and Statistics, 
 [as of March 20, 
2017].)    
Despite rising incarceration rates, the majority of known sex offenders at 
any given time are not in prison — and most sex offenders who are imprisoned 
will eventually be released.  (Nat. Governors Assn. Center for Best Practices, 
Managing Convicted Sex Offenders in the Community (Apr. 2008) pp. 1-2 
 
2 
[as of March 20, 2017].)  Like most jurisdictions, California requires convicted 
sex offenders to register as a means of enabling law enforcement to manage the 
serious risk to the public of recidivism.  (In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 279.)   
During the five-year period from 2006 to 2011, the number of registered 
sex offenders in the United States increased 23.2 percent.  (Nat. Center for 
Missing & Exploited Children, Number of Registered Sex Offenders in the U.S. 
Nears Three-quarters of a Million (Jan. 2012)  [as of March 20, 2017].)  Today, over 850,000 sex offenders are 
registered throughout the United States.  (Nat. Center for Missing & Exploited 
Children, Map of Registered Sex Offenders in the United States (Dec. 2016)  
 [as of 
March 20, 2017].)  California alone has 75,000 — more than any other state.  (Off. 
of Atty. Gen., Cal. Megan‘s Law Website  [as of March 20, 2017]; Cal. Sex Offenders Management Bd., An 
Assessment of Current Management Practices of Adult Sex Offenders in 
California (Jan. 2008) p. 55.)  How to manage and supervise these offenders is one 
of the most difficult challenges facing government policymakers today.   
In response to this challenge, the Legislature in 2006 created the California 
Sex Offender Management Board (CASOMB) to analyze current practices and 
recommend improvements.  (Pen. Code, § 9001.)1  One of CASOMB‘s 
foundational principles was that sex offender management strategies should be 
based on reliable information and empirical research concerning the efficacy and 
cost effectiveness of different approaches.  (CASOMB, Recommendations Rep. 
(Jan. 2010) p. 12; see § 9001, subd. (i).)  Following a series of public hearings and 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3 
meetings (§ 9002, subd. (b)), CASOMB issued a report recommending best 
practices in a variety of areas relating to the management of sex offenders, 
including their reentry into the community, supervision, housing, and treatment.  
(CASOMB, Recommendations Rep., supra, at pp. 5-6, 12.)  Some (but not all) of 
those recommendations were subsequently adopted by the Legislature in the 
Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 (Chelsea‘s Law).  (Stats. 
2010, ch. 219, § 1 et seq.) 
One of the CASOMB report‘s conclusions was that sex offender treatment 
differs in important respects from ordinary psychotherapy.  Sex offenders can be 
required to participate in treatment, are not free to determine the nature and course 
of their own therapy, may be examined with a polygraph to verify the information 
they provide to their therapists and probation officers, and may encounter greater 
intrusions on the confidentiality of their discussions with treatment providers, so 
that probation officers can keep abreast of the offenders‘ progress and compliance 
with probation.  (CASOMB, Recommendations Rep., supra, at pp. 30-31.)  
CASOMB concluded that the increased supervision mandated by Chelsea‘s Law 
can pay substantial dividends:  sex offender-specific treatment has been shown to 
reduce recidivism by up to 40 percent.  (CASOMB, Recommendations Rep., 
supra, at p. 35.)   
At issue in this appeal are two parts of Chelsea‘s Law, both relating to a sex 
offender‘s mandatory treatment.  Section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) requires a 
convicted sex offender, as a condition of probation, to waive ―any privilege 
against self-incrimination‖ and to participate ―in polygraph examinations, which 
shall be part of the sex offender management program.‖  Section 1203.067, 
subdivision (b)(4) requires, again as a condition of probation, a waiver by the 
convicted sex offender of the ―psychotherapist-patient privilege to enable 
4 
communication between the sex offender management professional and 
supervising probation officer, pursuant to Section 290.09.‖   
Defendant Ignacio Garcia contends that conditioning probation on the 
waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, as well as on his participation in 
polygraph examinations, violates his Fifth Amendment rights.  We conclude that 
the condition mandated by section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) directs defendant 
to answer fully and truthfully all questions posed to him as part of the sex offender 
management program.  But because we deem his responses compelled within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment, they cannot lawfully be used against him in a 
criminal proceeding. (Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 435, fn. 7 
(Murphy); accord, People v. Racklin (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 872, 880.)  Where, as 
here, the responses would therefore pose no risk of incrimination, neither the fact 
that he was compelled to respond nor the fact that his responses were being 
monitored by a polygraph offends the Fifth Amendment.   
We likewise reject defendant‘s claim that conditioning probation on the 
waiver of his psychotherapist-patient privilege violates his constitutional right to 
privacy and is overbroad under California law.  It is neither overbroad nor 
violative of defendant‘s right to privacy to require a limited waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege for the purpose of enabling the treatment 
professional to consult with the probation officer and the polygraph examiner.  We 
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Originally charged with six counts of forcible lewd conduct with a child 
(§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), defendant pleaded no contest in a negotiated disposition to 
two counts of nonforcible lewd conduct.  (§ 288, subd. (a).)  The trial court 
suspended imposition of the sentence and placed defendant on probation for three 
years, ordered him to serve one year in jail and register as a sex offender, and 
5 
mandated his participation in an approved sex offender management program.  
Over defense objection, the court also imposed the two probation conditions that 
are the subject of this appeal:  ―The defendant shall waive any privilege against 
self-incrimination and participate in polygraph examinations, which shall be part 
of the sex offender management program, pursuant to Section 1203.067(b)(3) of 
the Penal Code‖ (the subdivision (b)(3) condition); and ―The defendant shall 
waive any psychotherapist-patient privilege to enable communication between the 
sex offender management professional and the Probation Officer, pursuant to 
Section 1203.067(b)(4) and Section 290.09 of the Penal Code‖ (the subdivision 
(b)(4) condition).    
Defendant appealed.  He claimed that the coerced waiver of his privilege 
against self-incrimination and the required participation in polygraph examinations 
violated the Fifth Amendment and, like the mandated waiver of his 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, was unconstitutionally overbroad.  The Court of 
Appeal affirmed.  All three justices upheld the validity of the subdivision (b)(4) 
condition.  The panel was divided, however, as to the validity of the subdivision 
(b)(3) condition.  The majority reasoned that the choice defendant faced between 
forfeiting his privilege against self-incrimination (on the one hand) or asserting the 
privilege and having his probation revoked (on the other) would present ― ‗the 
classic penalty situation, [in which] the failure to assert the privilege would be 
excused, and the probationer‘s answers would be deemed compelled and 
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding.‘ ‖  Because ―the mere extraction of 
compelled statements does not violate the Fifth Amendment‖ and no statements so 
extracted could be used against defendant in any criminal proceeding, it 
necessarily followed (according to the majority) that the subdivision (b)(3) 
condition did not violate the Fifth Amendment.     
6 
The majority also rejected the claim that the conditions were 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  Addressing the required waiver of the privilege 
against self-incrimination and participation in polygraph examinations, the 
appellate court found these conditions closely tailored to the purpose of allowing 
―the state to discover the full extent of the risks created by the sex offender‘s 
freedom so that the state can respond with additional treatment, closer monitoring, 
and other measures necessary to protect the community.‖  For similar reasons, the 
majority found that the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege neither 
violated defendant‘s constitutional right to privacy nor was it overbroad.    
Justice Grover concurred in part and dissented in part.  In her view, ―[t]he 
denial of probation for refusal to accept the mandated condition attaches an 
impermissible penalty to the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege‖ and is 
itself unconstitutional.   
We granted review to consider the validity of the probation conditions 
mandated by section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) and (b)(4).  Prior to oral 
argument, the Attorney General informed us that defendant had completed his 
probationary term.  Although the question of these probation conditions‘ validity 
is now moot with respect to this defendant, we will exercise our inherent power to 
retain and decide the case so that we may settle an important issue that has divided 
the Court of Appeal.  (See People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 408, fn. 8.)      
II.  DISCUSSION 
At any given moment, a substantial majority of convicted sex offenders are 
under some form of conditional supervision in the community.  (CSOM, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, Recidivism of Sex Offenders (2001) p. 1  ] [as of March 20, 2017].)  Many jurisdictions have adopted a 
comprehensive approach to managing these sex offenders, under which treatment 
providers work together with supervising probation and parole agents to devise an 
7 
individualized supervision and treatment plan for each offender.  Although the 
available data provide only a partial basis for inference, the findings of relevant 
studies appear consistent with the conclusion that offenders who receive 
comprehensive treatment have a significantly lower rate of recidivism and rearrest 
than offenders who did not participate in such treatment.  (CSOM, U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, An Overview of Sex Offender Management (2002) pp. 1-2 
 [as of March 20, 2017].)        
When Chelsea‘s Law was enacted, California had been relying on a 
patchwork of management strategies that was crafted ― ‗piece by piece through 
separate and uncoordinated legislative and administrative actions.‘ ‖  (Sen. Com. 
on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1844 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 2, 2010, pp. 31-32.)  The new provisions adopted a unified strategy 
for sex offender management known as the ―Containment Model,‖ which was 
characterized by CASOMB as ― ‗the best practice for community supervision of 
sex offenders.‘ ‖  (Ibid., quoting CASOMB, Recommendations Rep., supra, at pp. 
32-33.)   
The Containment Model adopted by the Legislature depends on three 
interrelated elements: supervision and monitoring of the sex offender while on 
probation; sex offender-specific assessment and treatment; and the use of static, 
dynamic, and future assessments of the risk of reoffending, including the State 
Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex Offenders (SARATSO).  (CASOMB, 
Sex Offender Treatment Program Certification Requirements (2014 rev.) pp. 6, 8; 
Sen. Appropriations Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1844 (2009-2010 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Aug. 2, 2010, p. 5.)  A major premise of the model is that the 
mental health professional, probation officer, and polygraph examiner will work 
together closely to assess the offender‘s compliance with, and participation in, the 
treatment program as well as the offender‘s risk of reoffending.  (Sen. Com. on 
8 
Public Safety, Bill Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1844, supra, at p. 33.)  Indeed, the 
law specifies that the treatment professional must communicate with the offender‘s 
probation officer on a regular basis (or at least once a month) and share pertinent 
information with the certified polygraph examiner ―as required.‖  (§ 290.09, 
subd. (c).)    
In enacting a statutory framework to implement the Containment Model, 
the Legislature directed CASOMB to develop and maintain standards for 
certification of sex offender management programs, professionals, and polygraph 
examiners.  (§ 9003, subds. (a), (b), (d).)  The relevant standards require the 
containment team to obtain accurate information about the offender‘s prior 
victims, the offender‘s access to potential new victims, and the high-risk behavior 
unique to that sex offender — especially when that history includes categories of 
victims or types of behavior stretching beyond the crimes of conviction.  
Postconviction polygraph examinations are used to elicit and verify this 
information.  (CASOMB, Post-Conviction Sex Offender Polygraph Certification 
Standards (June 2011) pp. 10-23; see § 9003, subd. (b) [―programs shall include 
polygraph examinations‖].)  According to the theory of the model, a polygraph 
examination (or the threat of one) encourages the offender to be more complete 
and accurate when detailing his or her sexual history, provides a method of 
verifying whether the offender is currently engaging in or planning to engage in 
unlawful behavior, and helps disrupt the pattern of denial that ― ‗is generally 
regarded as a main impediment to successful therapy.‘ ‖  (McKune v. Lile (2002) 
536 U.S. 24, 33 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see English et al., Community 
Containment of Sex Offender Risk:  A Promising Approach in Protecting Society 
From Sexually Dangerous Offenders:  Law, Justice, and Therapy (Winick & 
LaFond edits., 2003) p. 266.)  The supervising probation or parole officer then 
uses information obtained through treatment and verified by the polygraph 
9 
examination to assess the risk posed by the offender and take appropriate remedial 
action.  (Ibid.)   
This approach depends on the cooperative efforts and expertise of each part 
of the containment team.  Accordingly, CASOMB concluded that adoption of the 
full model was necessary to reduce the risk associated with managing convicted 
sex offenders on probation.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 1844, supra, at pp. 30-31, quoting CASOMB letter to Assemblyman 
Fletcher.)  What CASOMB asserted, in particular, is that the absence of open and 
ongoing communication among the professionals and others involved in the 
offender‘s supervision ―compromises the purpose of the containment team 
approach and may jeopardize the safety of the community.‖  (CASOMB, Sex 
Offender Treatment Program Certification Requirements, supra, at p. 12.)   
Following this recommendation, the Legislature mandated certain 
conditions for any registered sex offender placed on probation.  Among these are 
participation and successful completion of an approved sex offender management 
program (§ 1203.067, subd. (b)(1), (2)); waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination and participation in polygraph examinations as part of the sex 
offender management program (id., subd. (b)(3)); and waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege to enable communication between the sex 
offender management professional and the supervising probation officer and 
polygraph examiner (id., subd. (b)(4)).  At issue in this appeal is the 
constitutionality, under both state and federal law, of the subdivision (b)(3) and 
(b)(4) conditions. 
A. 
The Validity of the Probation Condition Requiring Waiver of the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Participation in Polygraph Examinations 
(the Subdivision (b)(3) Condition)  
 
1.  Waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination 
10 
Defendant‘s argument that section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) imposes an 
invalid condition rests on two contentions:  (1) that the probation condition 
requires him to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege, and (2) that a coerced 
waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege is unconstitutional.  Although we agree 
that a coerced waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination would raise 
serious constitutional questions, our examination of the subdivision (b)(3) 
condition in its proper context, as well as the structure and purpose of Chelsea‘s 
Law, demonstrates that the Legislature has not actually required probationers to 
waive the protections of the Fifth Amendment.  The condition is properly read 
instead to require that probationers answer all questions posed by the containment 
team fully and truthfully, with the knowledge that these compelled responses 
could not be used against them in a subsequent criminal proceeding.  Because 
there is no Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled disclosure of information 
that cannot be used to incriminate the probationer (Fisher v. United States (1976) 
425 U.S. 391, 400-401; accord, Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
1112, 1134 (Maldonado)), it follows that the condition, properly understood, does 
not violate the Fifth Amendment.   
We begin with the construction proposed by defendant.  The subdivision 
(b)(3) condition, he asserts, should be interpreted in the broadest manner as 
requiring him to waive all of his Fifth Amendment protections, including the right 
to bar use of his compelled statements in a criminal trial.  But this construction, he 
concludes, is unconstitutional under well-established precedent.  In short, 
defendant argues that the Legislature enacted a patently unconstitutional statute, 
and that we have no choice but to strike it down.   
Defendant is correct that it would raise serious constitutional questions to 
require defendants to waive their privilege against self-incrimination as a 
condition of probation.  As the high court has explained, ― ‗a State may not impose 
11 
substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise [the] Fifth Amendment 
right not to give incriminating testimony . . . .‘ ‖  (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 
434.)  For example, the government cannot condition a benefit such as public 
employment on a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, even if the 
waiver is ultimately deemed ineffective.  (Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm’r 
(1968) 392 U.S. 280, 283-285; Gardner v. Broderick (1967) 392 U.S. 273, 279 
[―the mandate of the great privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the 
attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the 
immunity it confers on penalty of the loss of employment‖]; accord, Spielbauer v. 
County of Santa Clara (2009) 45 Cal.4th 704, 720 [―the Fifth Amendment forbids 
dismissal from public employment for refusal to surrender the privilege against 
self-incrimination‖].)  The high court has also found ―a substantial basis in our 
cases‖ to support the proposition that conditioning a grant of probation on 
surrender of the Fifth Amendment privilege would likewise ―create[] the classic 
penalty situation‖ and thus be unconstitutional.  (Murphy, at p. 435; see id. at p. 
436 [requiring a defendant ―to choose between making incriminating statements 
and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent‖ is ―the extra, 
impermissible step‖].)  As in the other ―penalty‖ cases, the statements of a 
probationer faced with such a choice would be inadmissible in a criminal 
prosecution.  (Id. at p. 435.)   
The People do not dispute defendant‘s characterization of Murphy or his 
contention that it would be unconstitutional to condition a grant of probation on 
surrender of his Fifth Amendment privilege.  What they claim instead is that we 
must reject defendant‘s broad construction of the subdivision (b)(3) condition and 
consider whether the condition can reasonably be construed in a manner that is 
consistent with the Constitution.  They rely on the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance.   
12 
Under the doctrine, a statute should not be construed to violate the 
Constitution ― ‗ ―if any other possible construction remains available.‖ ‘ ‖  (People 
v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 256; accord, DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf 
Coast Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568, 575 [―where an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court 
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress‖].)  The theory underlying the canon rests not 
only on a preference for avoiding the unnecessary resolution of constitutional 
questions, but also on the presumption that the Legislature (whose members have 
sworn to uphold the Constitution) did not ―intend[] to infringe constitutionally 
protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.‖  (DeBartolo 
Corp., at p. 575; see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 
509.)  The basis for that presumption is especially strong in this case.  Not only did 
the high court‘s Murphy decision predate the enactment of Chelsea‘s Law by over 
25 years, but that same decision also set out with some care how a state should go 
about establishing a valid way of obtaining the information necessary to monitor 
probationers released into the community.  As the high court explained, ―a State 
may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly 
administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers 
may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of 
incrimination.‖  (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 435, fn. 7.)   
Defendant nonetheless claims the avoidance canon is inapplicable here.  
The subdivision (b)(3) condition, he contends, is unambiguous and must be 
accorded its literal meaning:  that it requires the waiver of any privilege against 
self-incrimination.  The People, by contrast, argue that the condition is ambiguous, 
and conclude that ―the historical context, the plain language, and the positioning of 
the waiver all indicate that the Legislature intended to limit invocation of the 
13 
privilege against self-incrimination only in the narrow context of probation 
supervision and treatment,‖ without precluding probationers from objecting ―to the 
admission of compelled statements in later criminal proceedings.‖  Under this 
interpretation, the word ―any‖ in subdivision (b)(3) would not refer to all aspects 
of the self-incrimination privilege, but rather to ―any‖ right to remain silent that 
probationers might assert as a basis for refusing to answer questions posed by the 
containment team. What we find is that defendant‘s construction places too much 
reliance on one particular reading of the provision‘s text, and too little on the 
provision‘s purpose and context.   
Text may sometimes seem unambiguous in isolation, even as it harbors 
greater complexity when considered in the context of surrounding provisions and 
the overall statutory structure.  (Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 
Cal.4th 1378, 1391-1392 (conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.), citing Horwich v. Superior 
Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276, and Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 109, 114.)  Both the Penal Code (see § 7, subd. 16) and our case law 
(People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506) direct us to construe words and 
phrases according to their statutory context.  We consider the text in conjunction 
with the context and purpose of the statute even where, as here, the statutory 
language has a ―highly technical‖ meaning.  (Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. 
Department of Education (2007) 550 U.S. 81, 99.)   
Our primary task, after all, is to identify and effectuate the underlying 
purpose of the law we are construing.  (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 
1327, 1332.)  The statutory provision here describes the waiver term of probation 
as ―part of the sex offender management program.‖  (§ 1203.067, subd. (b)(3).)  
Other parts of the same subdivision provide that participation in a sex offender 
management program for at least a year is a requirement of probation, as is 
successful completion of the program, and that the program must follow the 
14 
standards developed by CASOMB.  (Id., subd. (b)(2), citing § 9003.)  Those 
standards emphasize the need for complete and accurate information about the 
probationer‘s prior victims, the probationer‘s access to potential new victims, and 
the high-risk behavior unique to that sex offender.  It is precisely such information 
that is meant to be elicited by the psychotherapist and probation officer, and 
verified by polygraph examinations.  (CASOMB, Post-Conviction Sex Offender 
Polygraph Certification Standards, supra, pp. 10-23.)   
So any reasonable understanding of statutory purpose here must 
acknowledge the Containment Model‘s dependence on the information shared by 
the probationer.  The People contend that the model‘s pillars are (1) measures 
designed to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by 
sex offenders to treatment professionals, and (2) collaboration and communication 
among the containment team members to enable development of an individualized 
treatment plan and to ensure the offender‘s compliance with it.  The model 
contemplates that the privilege against self-incrimination must not be used to 
impede treatment professionals from eliciting a full disclosure of the offender‘s 
sex offense history, which is verified for completeness and accuracy by the 
polygraph examination.  The containment team, in turn, uses the verified 
information to formulate an accurate risk profile and monitoring plan with the goal 
of preventing recidivism and promoting public safety.  Depriving the containment 
team of the ability to insist on answers to their questions would, according to the 
People, ―undercut[] this core pillar of the model.‖  (See State v. Fuller (Mont. 
1996) 915 P.2d 809, 816 [―a defendant who refuses to disclose his offense history 
cannot be successfully treated‖].) 
The purpose of the subdivision (b)(3) condition can thus be understood as a 
means of ensuring that the probationer fully, and accurately, answers questions 
pertinent to the sex offender management program.  Without that insight into the 
15 
probationer‘s history and current state of mind, the containment team would be 
seriously hampered in its vital task of monitoring the probationer in the 
community.  If the containment team is to fulfill its proper role in the offender 
management system, the flow of information to the team must not be subject to 
disruption by a probationer‘s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.   
Because it would frustrate the purpose of the subdivision (b)(3) condition 
for a probationer to engage in a valid assertion of the privilege that thwarts a core 
premise of the sex offender management program, it would make no sense to 
interpret the condition as compelling a waiver that the People concede would be 
unconstitutional.  The People acknowledge the need to read the text of the 
subdivision (b)(3) condition in the context of the statutory scheme and its purpose.  
(See generally In re Application of Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 612 [―To arrive at 
the legislative intent in the interpretation of statutes the original purpose and object 
of the legislation must be considered‖], disapproved on other grounds in In re 
Culver (1968) 69 Cal.2d 898, 904-905 & fn. 8.)  There is no indication in the 
structure of Chelsea‘s Law or in its legislative history that the Legislature expected 
(in defiance of the high court‘s Murphy decision) that the fruits of the 
probationer‘s statements would be admissible in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution.  In short, defendant‘s construction of the subdivision (b)(3) condition 
is inconsistent with the statutory purpose.  So we must reject it.  (People v. Leiva, 
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 506.)   
We conclude instead that the subdivision (b)(3) condition may reasonably 
be construed in a manner that is both constitutional and consistent with the  
purpose of Chelsea‘s Law.  (See People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 524.)  
The subdivision (b)(3) condition does no more than allow the containment team to 
overcome the probationer‘s Fifth Amendment objections when the team poses 
potentially incriminating questions.  Under this construction, a probationer is 
16 
required to answer the questions posed by the containment team, on pain of 
probation revocation should the probationer refuse.  In turn, the probationer‘s 
compelled responses may not be used against the probationer in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution.  (Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 435 & fn. 7.)   
This construction adequately safeguards a probationer‘s Fifth Amendment 
rights.  The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from using statements 
compelled under the subdivision (b)(3) condition against the probationer in a 
criminal trial, whether as direct evidence of guilt or as impeachment.  (New Jersey 
v. Portash (1979) 440 U.S. 450, 458-459.)  It also prevents the government from 
exploiting the information gleaned from those statements to discover other 
evidence of guilt.  (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488.)  
Once a defendant demonstrates that he or she was compelled to disclose evidence 
of criminal conduct as part of the sex offender management program — which 
could ordinarily be established by the defendant‘s uncontradicted declaration to 
that effect — the burden shifts to the prosecution in a criminal proceeding to 
demonstrate that its evidence was untainted by the defendant‘s prior statements.  
(See Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 460.)  That is, the government 
remains free to undertake a prosecution for those crimes, but it bears a ―heavy 
burden‖ to show that its evidence was derived from a legitimate source wholly 
independent of the compelled testimony.  (Id. at p. 461; accord, Maldonado, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1138-1139, fn. 17.)     
We therefore interpret the subdivision (b)(3) condition as directing the 
probationer, in the context of questioning by the containment team, to exchange 
the privilege against self-incrimination for an immunity against prosecutorial use 
of the compelled responses.  (See United States v. Balsys (1998) 524 U.S. 666, 
682.)  As this court has previously explained, the Fifth Amendment does not 
establish a privilege against the compelled disclosure of information; rather, it 
17 
―precludes the use of such evidence in a criminal prosecution against the person 
from whom it was compelled.‖  (Maldonado, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1134.)   
At the People‘s invitation — and to remove any doubt on this score — we 
explicitly declare that probationers have immunity against the direct and derivative 
use of any compelled statements elicited under the subdivision (b)(3) condition.  
(See United States v. Balsys, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 683, fn. 8 [―the prediction that a 
court in a future criminal prosecution would be obligated to protect against the 
evidentiary use of compelled testimony is not enough to satisfy the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination‖]; cf. Maldonado, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 
1129, fn. 10 [declaring judicial immunity against use in prosecution‘s case-in-
chief of an accused‘s compelled statement to a prosecution mental health expert]; 
accord, State v. Evans (Wis. 1977) 252 N.W.2d 664, 668 [declaring judicial 
immunity against use of incriminating information disclosed under compulsion by 
a probationer or parolee to a probation or parole agent ―[i]n order to guarantee the 
fifth amendment rights of a probationer or a parolee and at the same time to 
preserve the integrity of the probation system‖].)  We further agree with the 
People that the probationer must be made aware of the protection afforded 
statements compelled in the course of the sex offender management program.  In 
particular, a probationer must be advised, before treatment begins, that no 
compelled statement elicited under questioning in the course of the mandatory sex 
offender management program (or the fruits thereof) may be used against him or 
her in a subsequent criminal prosecution.  (Cf. Evans, supra, at pp. 668-669 
[declaring that a probationer or parolee should be made aware that potentially 
18 
incriminating answers compelled under questioning by a probation or parole 
officer cannot be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding].)2      
   
2.  Participation in polygraph examinations 
The trial court also conditioned defendant‘s probation on his participation 
in polygraph examinations connected to the sex offender management program. 
Defendant argues that mandating the use of polygraph examinations to ―elicit 
incriminating information‖ about ―uncharged offenses‖ violates the Fifth 
Amendment.  But as explained earlier, the information elicited under compulsion 
by the containment team in interviews and by polygraph examinations may not be 
used against the probationer in a criminal prosecution and therefore does not 
offend the Fifth Amendment.  (Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 
313, 320 [―if the questions put to the probationer [during the polygraph 
examination] are relevant to his probationary status and pose no realistic threat of 
incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding, the Fifth Amendment privilege 
would not be available and the probationer would be required to answer those 
questions truthfully‖]; accord, United States v. Locke (5th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3d 
764, 767 [―The fact that the questions were asked to Locke in the context of a 
polygraph test does not convert the question-and-answer session into a Fifth 
Amendment violation‖].)   
                                              
2 
If defendant had been successful in invalidating the subdivision (b)(3) 
condition, it might have had paradoxical consequences for him and for other sex 
offenders who are granted probation.  Without the assurance that the containment 
team would be able to uncover the extent of a probationer‘s vulnerabilities and 
monitor the probationer‘s progress, a trial court might well conclude that the sex 
offender was not a good candidate for probation and must instead be sentenced to 
prison.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1844, supra, at 
pp. 30-31.)    
19 
Defendant complains next that the scope of the mandated examinations 
under the subdivision (b)(3) condition is not limited to prior or potential sex 
offenses but would permit a polygraph examiner to ask ―anything at all, without 
limitation,‖ including questions about ―his medical history or personal financial 
matters having nothing to do with any criminal conduct.‖  He contends that 
requiring him to participate in polygraph examinations of unlimited scope would 
be overbroad and that the condition should be narrowed.   
We reject the claim of overbreadth here.  The scope of the polygraph 
examination is not unbounded, as defendant suggests.  Rather, it is limited to that 
which is reasonably necessary to promote the goals of probation.  As the Court of 
Appeal pointed out, the polygraph testing condition is expressly linked to the 
purposes and needs of the sex offender management program.  (See § 1203.067, 
subd. (b)(3) [requiring ―participation in polygraph examinations, which shall be 
part of the sex offender management program‖].)  That program requires 
disclosure of each prior sex offense so as to enable identification of the 
psychological and physiological factors associated with the probationer‘s crimes 
and development of a plan to reform and rehabilitate the probationer.  The 
polygraph is a reasonable means of verifying the accuracy and completeness of 
those disclosures and of ensuring the probationer‘s compliance with treatment and 
supervision, both of which allow the containment team to discover and monitor 
the risks posed by the probationer‘s release to the community.  (In re Jordan R. 
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 129, fn. 17.)  Because the scope of the polygraph 
examination is already focused by its terms on criminal conduct related to the sex 
offender management program, it is a valid condition of probation and does not 
require further limitation.  (See People v. Lent (1975) 13 Cal.3d 481, 486.)   
The polygraph examination, of course, may also include questions unrelated to the 
probationer‘s treatment and supervision but that are reasonably necessary to 
20 
establish a baseline physiological response.  Such questions do not render the 
condition overbroad. 
B. 
The Constitutionality of the Probation Condition Requiring Waiver 
of the Psychotherapist-patient Privilege (the Subdivision (b)(4) Condition)  
Defendant contends that the condition requiring him to waive his 
psychotherapist-patient privilege violates his right to privacy and is 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  As we recently did in People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 353, 385 (Gonzales), we will assume (without deciding) that the federal 
Constitution can in some circumstances protect convicted sex offenders from 
governmentally compelled disclosure of privileged communications with their 
psychotherapists.  We nonetheless conclude that the subdivision (b)(4) condition is 
not unconstitutional.3 
 To determine whether the sharing of confidential communications between 
defendant and his psychotherapist (see Evid. Code, § 1012) with certain members 
of the containment team would violate defendant‘s asserted federal constitutional 
right to privacy, we balance the particular intrusion on defendant‘s privacy against 
the justification for the probation condition.  (Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
p. 386.)  Defendant, as a probationer, has a diminished expectation of liberty and 
privacy as compared to an ordinary citizen.  (United States v. Knights (2001) 534 
U.S. 112, 119.)  In addition, the waiver required by the probation condition is 
quite narrow.  By its express terms, the waiver is limited to that which is necessary 
―to enable communication between the sex offender management professional and 
                                              
3  
Defendant purports to assert claims under both the federal and state rights 
to privacy, but provides no separate analysis of the protection afforded by the state 
Constitution.  We therefore restrict our discussion to the federal claim.  (See 
People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19.)     
21 
supervising probation officer, pursuant to Section 290.09.‖  (§ 1203.067, 
subd. (b)(4).)  Consequently, a probationer‘s confidential communications may be 
shared only with the probation officer and the certified polygraph examiner, who 
is likewise explicitly authorized to receive ―pertinent information . . . as required‖ 
from the sex offender management professional under subdivision (c) of section 
290.09.  (See § 9003, subd. (b) [sex offender management programs provided by 
sex offender management professionals ―shall include polygraph examinations by 
a certified polygraph examiner‖].)4  The waiver does not relieve the 
psychotherapist, probation officer, or polygraph examiner of their duty to 
otherwise maintain the confidentiality of this information (although the mandatory 
reporting laws may themselves require a probation officer, psychotherapist, or 
other classified individual to inform the appropriate agencies about suspected child 
abuse or neglect (see §§ 11165.7, subd. (a)(15), (18), (21), (34), 11165.9), nor 
does it divest defendant of the ability to assert the privilege to prevent further 
disclosure of the shared communications.  (CASOMB, Post-Conviction Sex 
Offender Polygraph Certification Standards, supra, at p. 5.)  We expect that the 
members of the containment team will act in accordance with their professional 
obligations and ensure the integrity of the process.  Section 11167.5, moreover, 
criminalizes unauthorized disclosure of confidential information elicited under the 
mandatory reporting law.       
Against that limited intrusion, we must weigh the state‘s strong and 
legitimate interest.  The core of that interest is allowing the psychotherapist, 
                                              
4  
The sex offender management professional must also provide the 
offender‘s SARATSO score to the probation officer, who in turn must provide the 
score to the Department of Justice.  The score is then made available on the 
California Sex and Arson Registry website.  (§ 290.09, subd. (b)(2).)      
22 
probation officer, and polygraph examiner to exchange relevant information about 
a probationer‘s reformation and rehabilitation, including information disclosed 
during the probationer‘s therapy.  (§ 290.03, subds. (a), (b).)  The Legislature has 
recognized that the effectiveness of the Containment Model depends on ― ‗open 
and ongoing communication‘ ‖ among the professionals involved in 
― ‗supervising, assessing, evaluating, treating, supporting, and monitoring sex 
offenders.‘ ‖  (Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 377.)  Unless these professionals 
can communicate freely about the probationer‘s situation, the purpose of the 
Containment Model may be compromised and the safety of the community may be 
placed in jeopardy.  (Ibid.)     
In Gonzales, we did not have occasion to consider the validity and effect of 
an analogous waiver condition for parolees.  Those provisions had not yet gone 
into effect at the time the defendant there was placed on parole and participated in 
parole-mandated therapy.  (Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 378, fn. 9.)  
Moreover, the intrusion on the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Gonzales was 
more substantial than in this case.  The confidential communications were shared, 
over the parolee‘s objection, with the government, and were introduced at trial on 
the petition to commit the parolee as a sexually violent predator.  (Id. at p. 357.)  
But applying a weighing process similar to what we apply here, Gonzales held that 
the involuntary disclosure and use of a parolee‘s confidential communications 
with his psychotherapist, while state law error, was not a violation of the parolee‘s 
federal constitutional right to privacy.  (Id. at p. 388.)  It follows that the more 
limited intrusion on the privilege in this case did not violate defendant‘s federal 
right to privacy, either.  (See In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 
695 [probation condition requiring disclosure to the probation officer and the court 
of all records concerning the juvenile‘s court-ordered medical and psychological 
23 
treatment did not violate the federal right to privacy], disapproved on other 
grounds in Gonzales, at p. 375, fn. 6.)   
Even without any waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the 
psychotherapist has a statutory duty to report suspected child abuse or neglect.  
(§ 11165.7, subd. (a)(21); see generally People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
505, 512.)  The possibility that a probation officer or polygraph examiner might 
also qualify as a mandatory reporter does not materially alter the intrusion on a 
defendant‘s privacy.          
We likewise reject defendant‘s claim that the subdivision (b)(4) condition is 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  The required waiver extends only so far as is 
reasonably necessary to enable the probation officer and polygraph examiner to 
understand the challenges defendant presents and to measure the effectiveness of 
the treatment and monitoring program.  (Cf. Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 377 
[noting that the analogous waiver of the privilege in § 3008, subd. (d) extends only 
to what ―is considered necessary to the effective functioning of the parole process 
with regard to the parolee in question‖].)  Defendant‘s assertion that these goals 
can be achieved without disclosure of any privileged information — i.e., by 
limiting disclosures to a record of his attendance at therapy sessions and a general 
opinion as to whether he was cooperating and progressing — is flatly inconsistent 
with the Containment Model the Legislature adopted, and is supported by no 
evidence or even an explanation.     
Defendant contends that his overbreadth argument finds support in In re 
Corona (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 315.  His reliance is misplaced.  Corona, a sex 
offender, was required as a condition of parole to execute a waiver of his patient-
therapist privilege to permit his parole officer to stay informed about information 
Corona disclosed during his state-reimbursed group therapy program.  (Id. at p. 
319.)  But Corona did not challenge that waiver.  Instead, he challenged the 
24 
validity of a waiver the state sought as to therapy he had voluntarily arranged with 
a private psychotherapist.  In striking down only the latter waiver, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the private therapy was something for which Corona should 
be credited, not penalized, and that the compelled waiver of the privilege 
concerning the private therapist would discourage Corona from obtaining needed 
treatment.  (Id. at p. 321.)  Because the waiver would therefore have a ―reverse 
effect‖ on his reformation and rehabilitation, the Court of Appeal deemed it to be 
―unreasonable and unnecessary.‖  (Ibid.)  Here, by contrast, the therapy is itself a 
condition of probation and is provided by a state-paid therapist.  (Gonzales, supra, 
56 Cal.4th at p. 386.)  And as the People indicate, the ongoing communication 
among members of the team remains essential to the Containment Model‘s 
success in reducing recidivism for convicted sex offenders.  So the Legislature 
was entitled to conclude that the Containment Model, and the limited sharing of 
information it requires, would be more effective in rehabilitating and reforming a 
convicted sex offender than a model that maintained the privilege to its fullest 
extent.  (Cf. People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1104 [―A sentencing 
determination predicated on the judicial repudiation of legislative policy 
constitutes an abuse of discretion‖].)     
Finally, we find that the limited scope of the subdivision (b)(4) condition is 
consistent with Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2008) 165 
Cal.App.4th 672 (Regents) –– a case on which defendant relies.  In the underlying 
action there, the Regents had brought an antitrust suit against a group of energy 
suppliers.  As part of discovery in the antitrust suit, the Regents requested 
materials protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges, which the 
defendants had previously disclosed to a federal corporate fraud task force.  (Id. at 
p. 676.)  The defendants had willingly disclosed these materials to demonstrate 
their ―cooperation with the government‖ consistent with federal enforcement 
25 
guidelines and on the condition that ―disclosure of information to the government 
was not a waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges.‖  (Id. at pp. 
676-677.)  The Regents contended that the disclosure constituted a waiver of the 
privilege for all purposes.  (Id. at p. 677.)   
In rejecting the claim that prior disclosure had effected a blanket waiver of 
privilege, the Court of Appeal accepted the uncontradicted allegations that each 
defendant believed it would have suffered severe regulatory or criminal 
consequences had it failed to share the requested information with the federal 
investigators.  (Regents, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 677-678.)  The Court of 
Appeal then concluded that disclosure under such circumstances was a product of 
―coercion‖ within the meaning of Evidence Code section 912, subdivision (a) and 
thus did not constitute a waiver of the privilege for all purposes.  (Regents, at pp. 
683-684.)  
In this case, defendant faced the choice between waiving his 
psychotherapist-patient privilege or going to prison.  Defendant is correct that the 
condition involves an element of coercion, but he is mistaken in concluding that 
the condition thereby is invalid.  Here, as in Regents, the disclosure does not cause 
the privilege to evaporate, because, as noted ante on page 16, the privileged 
information is disclosed under compulsion.  (See Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a).)  
The subdivision (b)(4) condition thus should be read to intrude on the privilege 
only to a limited extent:  the extent specified in the condition itself, which 
describes what is reasonably necessary to enable communications among the 
psychotherapist, probation officer, and polygraph examiner; facilitate their 
understanding of the challenges defendant presents; and allow those containment 
team members to measure the effectiveness of the sex offender treatment and 
monitoring program.  (Pen. Code, § 1203.067, subd. (b)(4).)  In all other respects, 
the privilege remains intact.  So construed, the condition is not overbroad.   
26 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
When the Legislature adopted the Containment Model for the management 
of sex offenders who are granted probation, it balanced the constitutional interests 
of those sex offenders released into the community under supervision with the 
compelling need to protect public safety.  The success of that carefully wrought 
model depends on an accurate and complete understanding of the sex offender‘s 
criminal proclivities and vulnerabilities.  Read in light of the relevant 
constitutional provisions and the purpose of Chelsea‘s Law, the probation 
conditions challenged here enable those charged with monitoring the probationer 
to obtain the information they need, while otherwise safeguarding the 
probationer‘s privacy and protecting the probationer from compelled self-
incrimination.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J.  
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KRUGER, J. 
 
 
Penal Code section 1203.067 requires criminal defendants who must 
register as sex offenders to participate in an approved sex offender management 
program as a condition of probation.  For purposes of the program, the defendant 
must, among other things, waive ―any privilege against self-incrimination‖ (Pen. 
Code, § 1203.067, subd. (b)(3)), participate in polygraph examinations, and waive 
―any psychotherapist-patient privilege to enable communication between the sex 
offender management professional and supervising probation officer‖ (id., subd. 
(b)(4)).  I join the majority in concluding that, properly construed, these conditions 
are not overbroad, do not violate the defendant‘s right to privacy, and do not 
violate the defendant‘s Fifth Amendment rights.  I write separately to elaborate on 
my views on the proper construction of the condition requiring a waiver of ―any 
privilege against self-incrimination.‖  (Id., subd. (b)(3).) 
Defendant contends this self-incrimination waiver provision ―preclude[s] 
any attempts by a probationer, present and future, to seek protection under the 
self-incrimination clause for compelled statements made during the sex offender 
management program.‖  So construed, defendant contends, the condition violates 
the self-incrimination clause of the federal Constitution‘s Fifth Amendment by 
requiring probationers not only to respond to potentially incriminating official 
questions, but also to anticipatorily waive any right to object if the state later uses 
their answers against them in criminal proceedings.  The Attorney General 
2 
disavows this interpretation.  He contends that the provision merely requires 
probationers to provide truthful answers to questions posed as part of the sex 
offender management program, and does not preclude probationers from objecting 
to the admission of compelled statements against them in later criminal 
proceedings.  On this narrower understanding of the required waiver, Penal Code 
section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) does no more than what the law clearly 
permits:  It has long been established that ―a State may validly insist on answers to 
even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, 
as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal 
proceeding . . . .‖  (Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 435, fn. 7 
(Murphy).) 
The Attorney General‘s argument relies on the canon of constitutional 
avoidance — that is, the principle that we will construe statutes to avoid serious 
constitutional problems if such a reading is fairly possible.  (See People v. 
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1373.)  Defendant contends that the Attorney 
General‘s narrow reading is not fairly possible, because the statutory requirement 
that probationers waive ―any privilege against self-incrimination‖ admits of only 
one interpretation.  If that were so, the canon would have no application here.  The 
canon of constitutional avoidance is a tool of statutory interpretation that permits 
us to select between competing plausible interpretations of statutory text.  It does 
not permit us to ― ‗ ―do[] violence to the reasonable meaning of the language 
used‖ ‘ ‖ (ibid.), nor does it provide ―a method of adjudicating constitutional 
questions by other means‖ (Clark v. Martinez (2005) 543 U.S. 371, 381 
(Martinez)). 
The primary question before us, then, is whether the language of Penal 
Code section 1203.067 is susceptible of the reading the Attorney General urges.  It 
is.   
3 
To be sure, the requirement that probationers waive ―any privilege against 
self-incrimination‖ is also susceptible to defendant‘s broader reading.  Both this 
court and a majority of the members of the United States Supreme Court have said 
that the core constitutional right protected by the Fifth Amendment‘s self-
incrimination clause is a privilege against the use of compelled statements in a 
criminal trial, not against the compulsion of those statements in the first instance.  
(See Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 U.S. 760, 767 (Chavez) (plur. opn. of 
Thomas, J.) [―Statements compelled by police interrogations of course may not be 
used against a defendant at trial, [citation], but it is not until their use in a criminal 
case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.‖]; see also id. at 
p. 772 [―the core constitutional right defined by the Self-Incrimination Clause [is] 
the right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against oneself‖ 
(fn. omitted)]; id. at p. 777 (conc. opn. of Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J.); 
Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1128 (Maldonado) 
[adopting Chavez‘s conclusion that ―a ‗core‘ Fifth Amendment violation is 
completed, not merely by official extraction of self-incriminatory answers from 
one who has not waived the privilege, but only if and when those answers are used 
in a criminal proceeding against the person who gave them‖].)  Understood 
against the backdrop of these decisions, the statutory requirement to waive the 
self-incrimination privilege is plausibly understood, as defendant argues, to mean 
waiving the right to object to the use of compelled statements in a criminal trial, 
not waiving any purported right to remain silent when asked incriminating 
questions as part of sex offender treatment. 
But defendant‘s interpretation is not the only plausible interpretation of 
Penal Code section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) — nor is it the most reasonable 
one.  While cases like Chavez and Maldonado have taken the view that the Fifth 
Amendment right is violated by the prosecution‘s use of compelled statements in 
4 
criminal proceedings, not the compulsion itself, the cases have also recognized a 
longstanding body of ― ‗prophylactic rules designed to safeguard the core 
constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.‘ ‖  (Maldonado, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1128, quoting Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 770-771 (plur. 
opn. of Thomas, J.).)  These rules permit an individual to assert the Fifth 
Amendment privilege if ― ‗ ―compelled to produce evidence which later may be 
used against him as an accused in a criminal action.‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.)   
Common usage does not always respect this distinction between core 
constitutional right and prophylactic safeguard.  It is certainly not unusual to hear 
the phrase ―privilege against self-incrimination‖ to refer to the assertion of the 
―right to remain silent‖ in the face of official questioning, as opposed to the 
assertion of the right to prevent the use of compelled statements in a later criminal 
proceeding.  Perhaps the most well-known example appears in Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) 384 U.S. 436:  ―Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure 
is clear.  If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during 
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.  At this 
point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any 
statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the 
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off 
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to 
overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once 
invoked.‖  (Id. at pp. 473-474, italics added, fn. omitted.)  Given that the United 
States Supreme Court itself has used the phrase ―Fifth Amendment privilege‖ to 
mean ―the right to remain silent,‖ it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that the 
Legislature might have used the phrase ―privilege against self-incrimination‖ to 
mean much the same thing. 
5 
Defendant‘s counterargument relies heavily on the Legislature‘s use of the 
word ―any‖ to modify the term ―privilege,‖ contending that it unambiguously 
demonstrates the Legislature‘s desire to prohibit probationers from asserting any 
version of the ―self-incrimination privilege‖ at any time and in any proceeding.  It 
is, however, at least as likely that the Legislature used the word ―any‖ because 
nothing about sex offender treatment necessarily implicates the privilege against 
self-incrimination; it is only if ―any‖ incriminating questions are asked that ―any 
privilege against self-incrimination‖ (Pen. Code, § 1203.067, subd. (b)(3)) might 
be invoked.  Moreover, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not the only potentially 
applicable self-incrimination privilege:  A criminal defendant might equally 
invoke article I, section 15 of the California Constitution (―Persons may not . . . be 
compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves‖), or Evidence 
Code section 940 (―To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution 
of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him‖).  The Legislature may have 
used the word ―any‖ as a shorthand reference to all three of these provisions, 
rather than, as defendant argues, as a reservation of the state‘s prerogative to use 
probationers‘ incriminating statements against them in later criminal proceedings. 
Nor does the remainder of Penal Code section 1203.067 suggest that the 
Legislature intended to require probationers to surrender any privilege against the 
use of their statements to prosecute them for criminal offenses.  The evident focus 
of the provision is the proper functioning of the sex offender management program 
as a mechanism for treatment of participating sex offenders.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1203.067, subd. (a)(3).)  The provision makes no mention of the use of 
information gathered in the course of treatment, except ―to enable communication 
between the sex offender management professional and supervising probation 
officer‖ (id., subd. (b)(4)), who are, collectively, responsible for determining how 
6 
long the probationer must remain in the program.  It contains no indication that the 
Legislature intended to require probationers to provide truthful answers not only 
for purposes of successful treatment, but also for purposes of facilitating criminal 
prosecution. 
The statutory language is, in short, entirely susceptible of the narrow 
construction the Attorney General urges.  That construction is consistent with the 
evident purpose of the sex offender management program — that is, to promote 
successful treatment of the participants.  It is also consistent with established law.  
(See Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 435, fn. 7.)  As between this construction and 
defendant‘s proffered construction, we presume the Legislature ―did not intend the 
alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.‖  (Martinez, supra, 543 U.S. 
at p. 381.) 
For all these reasons, in my view, the court is clearly correct to conclude 
that Penal Code section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3)‘s ambiguous language must 
be construed not as requiring probationers to waive the right to assert any self-
incrimination privilege in criminal proceedings, but merely as barring probationers 
from attempting to use any such privilege as a basis for refusing to candidly 
discuss matters pertinent to the sex offender management program.  So construed, 
the condition does not violate defendant‘s Fifth Amendment rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
I CONCUR: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Garcia 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 224 Cal.App.4th 1283 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S218197 
Date Filed: March 20, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Hector E. Ramon 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
David D. Martin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Daniel H. Willick and Daniel H. Willick for California Psychiatric Association, National 
Association of Social Workers and California Chapter of National Association of Social Workers as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and 
Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Seth K. Shalit, Lisa Ashley Ott, Laurence K. 
Sullivan, René A. Chacón and Leif M. Dautch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David D. Martin 
10 Sanderling Court 
Sacramento, CA  95833 
(916) 999-0200 
 
Leif M. Dautch 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5089