Title: RICHARD HEDGE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD HEDGE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 34696 P.2d 51Case Number: 84-143Decided: 02/27/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD HEDGE, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, Public Defender, and Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John W. Renneisen, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kevin G. Martin and Robert Nicholas, Legal Interns, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant pled guilty 
on January 5, 1983, to a charge of fraud by check, in violation of § 
6-3-124(b)(ii), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982,1 after being arrested for writing a 
series of checks during a two-month period. Appellant admitted that he knew 
there were insufficient funds in his account to cover the 
checks.

[¶2.]     The single issue on 
appeal is worded by appellant as follows:

"Whether the district 
court erred in failing to offset Appellant's pre-sentence detention against both 
his minimum and maximum sentence."

[¶3.]     Appellant was 
originally sentenced, on March 15, 1983, to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a 
term of imprisonment of not less than 2 years, 9 months nor more than 3 years. 
Originally, credit was not given for the 119 days that appellant spent in 
presentence confinement, but after a series of motions and orders, the court 
corrected the sentence to not less than 2 years, 8 months and not more than 3 
years minus 119 days, thus giving appellant credit for the presentence jail time 
against the maximum sentence. This appeal is taken from the order dated May 24, 
1984, so correcting the sentence.

[¶4.]     We 
affirm.

[¶5.]     Wyoming has no statute 
governing the granting or denial of credit for time served in presentence 
detention. The rule in Wyoming is that the trial judge has discretion 
to grant or deny credit for time served in presentence custody where such 
custody is not due to the defendant's indigency and the sum of such time spent 
plus the sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence. Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 381 
(1979). Jones was written in reliance on two United States Supreme Court cases, 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 
90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970) and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. Ct. 668, 28 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971).

[¶6.]     Williams v. Illinois, supra, involved an 
Illinois statute which provided that a person who was unable to pay a fine 
judicially imposed in addition to a term of imprisonment could "work it off" at 
the rate of $5.00 per day by remaining in jail after the expiration of the term 
of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that this statute worked an invidious 
discrimination based solely on ability to pay a fine, and thus violated the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, the Court held that a convicted indigent defendant 
could not be held in confinement beyond the statutory maximum term of 
imprisonment authorized.

[¶7.]     Tate v. Short, supra, then extended Williams v. Illinois, supra, to a "fines 
only" penalty scheme which required incarceration for a sufficient time to 
satisfy the fine at a per diem rate, in the event the defendant was unable to 
pay the fine outright. The Court there said that under the equal protection 
clause a statute cannot limit punishment to payment of a fine if one is able to 
pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent defendant unable 
to pay his fine. Tate v. Short, 
supra, 401 U.S.  at 399, 91 S. Ct.  at 
671.

[¶8.]     These holdings were 
recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983). There the question was whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a state from revoking an indigent defendant's probation for 
failure to pay a fine and restitution absent a showing that defendant was 
somehow responsible for the failure or that adequate alternative forms of 
punishment did not exist. 103 S. Ct.  at 2069. The Supreme Court held that this 
did violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and reiterated that said in Williams v. Illinois, supra, and Tate v. Short, supra. The Court there 
also said at 103 S.Ct. at 2071: 

"The State, of course, 
has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons - rich and poor - 
who violate its criminal laws. A defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him 
from punishment. Thus, when determining initially whether the State's 
penological interests require imposition of a term of imprisonment, the 
sentencing court can consider the entire background of the defendant, including 
his employment history and financial resources. See Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. [241] 247, 250, and n. 15 [69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083, 1084, and n. 15, 93 L. Ed. 1337] (1949)."

[¶9.]     Appellant does not 
dispute any of the foregoing, but states that a growing number of states are 
requiring that credit for jail time always be given. He states in his brief, 
"[a]ppellant would ask this Court to reconsider its rejection of this broader 
rule. Credit should always be given for any presentence 
detention."

[¶10.]  After studying the cases cited by 
appellant in support of his contention, we decline to accept his proposition, 
and reaffirm our holding in Jones v. 
State, supra. As we said there:

"* * * [A] trial judge 
has discretion to deny or grant credit for time served in pre-sentence custody 
where: (1) the presentence custody is not due to the defendant's indigency, and 
(2) the sum of the time spent in pre-sentence custody plus the sentence does not 
exceed the maximum allowable sentence." 602 P.2d  at 381.

Beyond that we 
are not prepared to go. There is no fundamental right to credit for presentence 
custody beyond that which will result in more jail time than that authorized by 
law. There is no indication in the record that the denial of credit had anything 
to do with appellant's indigency, and the sentence as it now stands, plus the 
presentence detention does not exceed the statutory 
maximum.

[¶11.]  In this case the district judge 
originally imposed an unlawful sentence, as the maximum imprisonment imposed 
plus the time spent in presentence detention exceeded the three-year maximum 
sentence allowed by statute. Section 6-3-124(b)(ii), supra. However, the 
sentence has been corrected. As the sentence is now within the statutory limits, 
we will review the sentence only for a clear abuse in discretion. Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090 (1983); Eaton v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803 (1983); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297 (1983); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 (1982); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981).

[¶12.]  In his brief, appellant 
said:

"* * * [T]he district 
judge's conduct now can only be read as an attempt to punish the defendant for 
his indigency, which caused him to be unable to post bond, and for his attempts 
to get his sentence corrected. * * *"

It is abundantly 
clear from the record what the district judge's motives were. At the sentencing 
hearing, the district judge had the benefit of a presentence 
investigation.

"THE COURT: According to 
the pre sentence investigation report this is your seventh felony; is that 
correct Mr. Hedge?

"RICHARD HEDGE: Yes, Your 
Honor. All related to bad checks."

[¶13.]  In originally denying credit for time 
served, the court noted:

"* * * [the] extensive, 
exhaustive and lengthy record Mr. Hedge has produced in the 
past.

"The Court does not feel 
it would be of any benefit to give him any credit for jail time served. You seem 
to have arrived at the point where you prefer to be institutionalized rather 
than to be out in society. That's the only conclusion the Court can come to in 
view of your record, which I have reviewed."

We cannot say 
that the sentence imposed in this case, as it now stands, is an abuse of 
discretion, or a denial of appellant's constitutional 
rights.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 6-3-124(b)(ii) 
provides:

"(b) Fraud by check 
is:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) A felony if the 
fraudulent check was for the sum of two hundred dollars ($200.00) or more, or if 
the offender is convicted of fraud by check involving two (2) or more checks 
within any sixty (60) day period in the state of Wyoming totaling two hundred 
dollars ($200.00) or more in the aggregate. If convicted under this paragraph, 
the defendant shall be fined not more than one thousand five hundred dollars 
($1,500.00) or imprisoned in the state penitentiary for a maximum of three (3) 
years, or both."

This statute has 
now been superseded by § 6-3-702(b), W.S. 1977, (June 1983 Replacement).