Title: Parker v. Gorczyk

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Parker v. Gorczyk (97-347); 170 Vt. 263; 744 A.2d 410

[Opinion Filed 29-Oct-1999]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 23-Dec-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the  Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609- 0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

 

                                 No. 97-347

Gordon Parker and Robert Bailey	                      Supreme Court

	                                              On Appeal from
     v.		                                      Windsor Superior Court

John Gorczyk, Commissioner	                      June Term, 1998
Vermont Department of Corrections

Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

                                   
       Jeffrey Dworkin, Montpelier, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

       William Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Joseph L. Winn,
  Assistant Attorney           General, Waterbury, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., Cashman, D.J., Specially Assigned

       SKOGLUND, J.  Plaintiffs, two inmates incarcerated at the Woodstock
  Regional  Correctional Facility, brought this class action seeking to
  enjoin defendant, the Commissioner of  the Department of Corrections, from
  implementing a policy that would make prisoners convicted  of violent
  felonies ineligible for furlough until the expiration of their minimum
  sentences.  Based  on its conclusion that the policy violated plaintiffs'
  right to due process guaranteed by Chapter I,  Article 10 of the Vermont
  Constitution, the Windsor Superior Court permanently enjoined  defendant
  from implementing the policy or adopting any other policy that would
  prevent the  Department from making individualized furlough assessments for
  each prisoner.  Because we  conclude that the challenged policy does not
  violate statutory law or contravene plaintiffs' right  to due process or
  equal protection of the law under the Vermont Constitution, we reverse the 
  superior court's decision.

       The material facts are not in dispute.  As of January 1995, the
  Department's Offender  Classification Manual provided as follows:

 

     Extended furlough should be granted as part of an offender's 
     reintegration plan and should occur during the 90 days prior to the 
     offender's minimum release date.  Extended furlough to a 
     residential treatment, educational, or vocational program may be 
     granted up to 6 months prior to an offender's minimum release 
     date.

  On January 24, 1995, the Commissioner amended this provision by adding the
  following  sentence:

     Exception: offenders incarcerated for felony violence are not 
     eligible for release on Furlough until they have reached their 
     minimum release date.

  (Emphasis in original.)  The Commissioner explained that the change was
  aimed at serving and  protecting the public, and at bringing the
  Department's policy in line with public expectations  concerning truth in
  sentencing and protection from violent offenders.

       In April 1995, inmates Gordon Parker and Robert Bailey filed suit on
  behalf of  themselves and similarly situated prisoners, asking the superior
  court to declare the new  regulation unconstitutional and to enjoin the
  Commissioner from enforcing it.  Plaintiffs alleged  that the regulation
  constituted an abuse of discretion, violated their rights to due process
  and  equal protection of the law under the federal and Vermont
  constitutions, and was not  promulgated in accordance with the Vermont
  Administrative Procedures Act (APA), in violation  of 3 V.S.A. §§
  801-849.(FN1)  At a hearing on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
  injunction,  the parties presented evidence on (1) the history and
  rationality of the new policy; (2) the impact  of the policy on prisoners'
  chances of being granted parole upon the expiration of their minimum 
  sentences; and (3) the specific impact of the policy on each plaintiff. 
  Following the hearing, the  superior court dismissed plaintiffs' due
  process claims, but granted preliminary injunctive relief  based on its
  conclusion that plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on
  their APA  claim.

 

       The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment after
  stipulating that they  would not be presenting any additional evidence and
  that the evidence submitted at the  preliminary hearing could be considered
  for a final ruling on the merits.  In their motion,  plaintiffs asked the
  court to reinstate their due process claim in light of the analysis
  contained in a  recent United States Supreme Court case, Sandin v. Conner,