Title: LEPAGE v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEPAGE v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH2001 WY 2618 P.3d 1177Case Number: 00-10Decided: 03/08/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                
              
       March 8, 2001 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE EXEMPTION

FROM 
IMMUNIZATION REQUESTED BY

SUSAN 
LePAGE, PARENT OF LISA

LePAGE, 
a minor:

SUSAN 
LePAGE,

Appellant

(Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF 
WYOMING, DEPARTMENT

OF 
HEALTH,

Appellee

(Respondent).

 
W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification  from the 
District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
J. Rissler of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming; Robert T. 
Moxley of Gage & Moxley, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Steven H. Aden of The 
Rutherford Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Marci M. Hoff, Assistant Attorney General  

 Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

  

            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      This case raises 
the fundamental question of whether the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-4-309(a) (LEXIS 1999) mandates the issuance of an exemption from immunization 
for schoolchildren upon a written religious objection or whether it permits an 
inquiry by the Department of Health into the sincerity of the religious beliefs 
of an applicant.  We hold that the 
Department of Health exceeded its statutory authority by applying the statute 
inconsistently with its clear and unambiguous language.  Our holding is based on the premise that 
the language of § 21-4-309(a) is mandatory.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant Susan 
LePage presents the following issue:

            
Did the Wyoming Department of Health act arbitrarily and capriciously or 
otherwise abuse its discretion and legal authority in denying the claimed 
religious exemption of Appellant?

Appellee 
State of Wyoming, Department of Health phrases the issues as 
follows:

            
I.  Was the Department of Health's final 
decision to deny the Appellant's request for a religious exemption in accordance 
with the law?

            
II.  Was the Department of 
Health's denial of Appellant's request for a religious exemption constitutional 
and supported by substantial evidence?

FACTS

[¶4]      On March 25, 
1999, Mrs. LePage requested a religious exemption from the hepatitis B 
vaccination pursuant to § 21-4-309(a) on behalf of her daughter.  Mrs. LePage outlined her concerns 
regarding the hepatitis B vaccination in a four-page letter.1  The State Health Officer for the 
Department of Health delayed a decision pending receipt of further information 
to assure that faith served as the basis for the request.  In particular, the State Health Officer 
asked Mrs. LePage to define her beliefs as being religious-based and to explain 
how she acted upon her faith in a consistent manner.  Mrs. LePage responded with a second 
letter, which restated her concerns.  
On June 10, 1999, Mrs. LePage's request for exemption was denied, and she 
was informed that, if her daughter was not immunized, she would be unable to 
attend school. 

[¶5]      Mrs. LePage 
requested a hearing, and the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH).  A hearing was held 
on August 5, 1999,  at which time 
Mrs. LePage stated she had recently concluded that all vaccines were not 
"[G]od[']s will for our lives."  The 
OAH rendered its decision and determined that Mrs. LePage had failed to provide 
evidence to justify the religious exemption.2  The Department of Health issued an 
amended final decision on September 28, 1999, which specifically found that Mrs. 
LePage's objection was based on personal, moral, or philosophical beliefs rather 
than on a principle of religion or a truly held religious conviction.  Mrs. LePage appealed from the decision, 
and the district court certified the case to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶6]      When a case is 
certified to this court, we examine the administrative agency's decision as if 
we were the reviewing court of the first instance.  Petroleum Inc. v. State ex rel. State 
Board of Equalization, 983 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Wyo. 1999).  The issue presented in this case 
requires us to interpret § 21-4-309(a).  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  Trefren v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 
325 (Wyo. 1993).  This court affirms 
an agency's conclusions of law when they are in accordance with the law.  Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996).  When an agency has not invoked and 
properly applied the correct rule of law, we correct the agency's errors.  Gneiting v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 
1995).

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      The United States 
Supreme Court held in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905), that a state has the authority to enact a 
mandatory immunization program through the exercise of its police power.  Moreover, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-4-101 
(LEXIS 1999) grants the Department of Health the power to prescribe rules and 
regulations for the management and control of communicable 
diseases.

[¶8]      The question 
presented in this case requires us to interpret the language of § 21-4-309(a), 
which provides for mandatory immunization of Wyoming schoolchildren.  That statute provides in pertinent 
part:

(a)  Any 
person attending, full or part time, any public or private school, kindergarten 
through twelfth grade, shall within thirty (30) days after the date of school 
entry, provide to the appropriate school official written documentary proof of 
immunization. . . . Waivers shall be authorized by the state or county 
health officer upon submission of written evidence of religious 
objection or medical contraindication to the administration of any 
vaccine.

Section 
21-4-309(a) (emphasis added).  Mrs. 
LePage asserts the clear language of the exemption statute confirms that the 
issuance of a religious exemption is not a discretionary function but is a 
ministerial duty on the part of the Department of Health.  Therefore, the Department of Health 
exceeded its authority by requiring more than an initial written objection which 
by statute appears to be sufficient to obtain a waiver.

  

[¶9]      Conversely, the 
Department of Health argues that Wyoming's immunization waiver allows only for 
religious objections as opposed to personal or philosophical 
objections.  Therefore, the 
Department of Health must review the asserted objection and determine whether it 
is based on sincerely held religious beliefs.  The Department of Health determined that 
Mrs. LePage's religious waiver request was based on concerns regarding the 
health and safety risks of the vaccination as well as the mode of transmission 
of the hepatitis B virus.  According 
to the Department of Health, Mrs. LePage failed to establish that the requested 
waiver was based on sincerely held religious beliefs which would entitle her to 
a waiver.

[¶10]   In interpreting statutes, we 
primarily determine the legislature's intent from the words used in the 
statute.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991).  "We have interpreted statutes on 
innumerable occasions, so our standard is well established."  Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994).  First, we must determine whether a 
statute is clear or ambiguous.  
Sue Davidson, P.C. v. Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 356 (Wyo. 1995).  "[W]e determine if the statute is 
ambiguous by looking at the plain and ordinary meaning of the words contained 
therein."  Olheiser, 866 P.2d  
at 770.  A "statute is unambiguous 
if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its 
meaning with consistency and predictability."  Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d  at 220.  "[W]hether an 
ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the 
court."  Id.  However, "[s]trict adherence to our 
Wyoming constitution demands that the judicial branch of government recognize 
that it is without discretion, nor does it have any latitude, to apply statutes 
contrary to legislative intent once that intent has been ascertained."  813 P.2d  at 219.

[¶11]   The principal language in the 
statute which delineates the requirement to obtain a waiver provides:  "Waivers shall be 
authorized."  Section 21-4-309(a) 
(emphasis added).  This court has 
observed that, when the word "shall" is employed, it is usually legally accepted 
as mandatory.  Long v. State, 
745 P.2d 547, 549 (Wyo. 1987).  
Where a statute uses the mandatory language "shall," a court must obey 
the statute as a court has no right to make the law contrary to what is 
prescribed by the legislature.  
Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 787 
(Wyo. 1982).

[¶12]   The choice of the word "shall" 
intimates an absence of discretion by the Department of Health and is 
sufficiently definitive of the mandatory rule intended by the legislature.  Similarly, the statutory language lacks 
any mention of an inquiry by the state into the sincerity of religious 
beliefs.  As a result, the 
Department of Health exceeded its legislative authority when it conducted a 
further inquiry into the sincerity of Mrs. LePage's religious 
beliefs.

[¶13]   When reviewing an administrative 
agency's decision, this court will consider whether the agency exceeded its 
statutory authority.  See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C) (LEXIS 1999).  As a creature of the legislature, an 
administrative agency has only the powers granted to it by statute, and the 
justification for the exercise of any authority by the agency must be found 
within the applicable statute.  
Montana Dakota Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission of 
Wyoming, 847 P.2d 978, 983 (Wyo. 1993).  A statute will be strictly construed 
when determining the authority granted to an agency.  Id.  "Any agency decision that falls 
outside the confines of the statutory guidelines articulated by the legislature 
is contrary to law and cannot stand."  
Tri County Telephone Association, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service 
Commission, 910 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo. 1996).  In other words, reasonable doubt of the 
existence of a power must be resolved against the exercise thereof.  A doubtful power does not exist.  French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1998).  The 
statute provides mandatory language, and the Department of Health may not 
circumvent the legislature's clear limitation of its powers or expand its power 
beyond its statutory authority.  
There is no justification found within the statute for the Department of 
Health to institute a religious inquiry.  
As a result, the decision to do so is not in accordance with the 
law.

[¶14]   Furthermore, construing the statute 
as the Department of Health suggests raises questions concerning the extent to 
which the government should be involved in the religious lives of its 
citizens.  Should an individual be 
forced to present evidence of his/her religious beliefs to be scrutinized by a 
governmental employee?  If parents 
have not consistently expressed those religious beliefs over time, should they 
be denied an exemption?  Can parents 
have beliefs that are both philosophical and religious without disqualifying 
their exemption request?  Should the 
government require a certain level of sincerity as a benchmark before an 
exemption can be granted?  If the 
legislature chose to address these types of questions with further legislation, 
such legislation would call into question the constitutional prohibition against 
governmental interference with the free exercise of religion under Article 1, 
Section 18 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
However, those issues need not be addressed in this case because the 
statute does not provide the authority for such inquiry. 

[¶15]   We do not believe that the 
legislature, through its adoption of § 21-4-309(a), anticipated or authorized a 
broad investigation into an individual's belief system in an effort to discern 
the merit of a request for exemption.  
Rather, we construe the statutory language as mandatory and the exemption 
as self-executing upon submission of a written objection.

[¶16]   In her request for exemption, Mrs. 
LePage fully complied with both the statutory and the regulatory 
requirements.  However, it should be 
noted that, in attempting to enforce the immunization for hepatitis B, the 
Department of Health failed to abide by its own regulations which do not include 
the hepatitis B vaccination.  
Department of Health Rules, Immunization Regulations, ch. 1, § 
7(b) (1-13-92).  "An administrative 
agency must follow its own rules and regulations."  Antelope Valley Improvement v. State 
Board of Equalization for State of Wyoming, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 1999), 
opinion clarified at 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo. 2000).  This could be an independent reason for 
reversing the State Health Officer's conclusion that a religious waiver was 
necessary for exemption from the hepatitis B vaccination.

[¶17]   We recognize the genuine concern 
that there could be increased requests for exemption and a potential for 
improper evasion of immunization.  
The state certainly has a valid interest in protecting public 
schoolchildren from unwarranted exposure to infectious diseases.  However, we have been presented with no 
evidence that the number of religious exemption waiver requests are excessive 
and are confident in our presumption that parents act in the best interest of 
their children's physical, as well as their spiritual, health.  Again, if problems regarding the health 
of Wyoming's schoolchildren develop because this self-executing statutory 
exemption is being abused, it is the legislature's responsibility to act within 
the constraints of the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions.

[¶18]   Our statutory interpretation is 
conclusive; therefore, upon proper application of the statute, there is no basis 
for further discussion of the constitutional issues raised in this case.  As is our practice, we will not address 
constitutional issues if we resolve a case on other grounds.  State Highway Commission of Wyoming 
v. Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Association, 784 P.2d 588, 591 n.4 
(Wyo. 1989).

[¶19]   Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

  1Mrs. LePage's initial letter 
began:

We, the parents of . . ., are petitioning 
for religious exemption of the Hepatitis B vaccine.  Because of the strong religious beliefs 
of our family, we do not believe our daughter will engage in behavior that 
involve[s] exposure to blood or body fluids.  We believe that the instituting of 
mandatory Hepatitis B vaccines is the direct result of our children growing up 
in a declining moral culture.

  2The OAH found in 
part:

15.  The evidence shows that LePage did have 
her children vaccinated against other diseases in the past.  It also shows that when LePage initially 
requested the religious exemption, it was based on her personal belief that the 
mandatory vaccination condoned immoral behavior which was contrary to how she 
raised her children.  Both of her 
letters and the attachments provide information which reflect that LePage's 
objection, while religiously based, was in fact philosophical. . . 
.

16.  The first time LePage expressed a truly 
religious based objection to the hepatitis B vaccine was at the hearing.  This Office does not question that 
LePage is a devoutly religious individual and that she spent extensive time 
praying, fasting and reading the Bible.  
This Office also does not question the fact that LePage now believes that 
all vaccinations are contrary to the word of her God and that she believes she 
sinned when having her children vaccinated in the past.  

17.  The change of position at hearing raises 
questions.  Is this change really 
the result of her recent religious revelation or is it just a change to justify 
granting the exemption?  To obtain a 
religious exemption, a person must present evidence that his/her objection to 
vaccination is grounded in religion and then evidence of conduct consistent with 
the belief must also be presented.