Title: Elliott v. Warden (order)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 2nd day of 
November, 2007. 
 
 
Larry Bill Elliott, 
 
 
 
       Petitioner, 
 
  
against  
Record No. 050573 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
 
       Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed April 5, 2005, the respondent's motion to dismiss, and the 
petitioner’s reply to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, the Court 
is of the opinion that the motion should be granted and the writ 
should not issue. 
Larry Bill Elliott was convicted in the Circuit Court of 
Prince William County of one count of capital murder of Dana 
Thrall, one count of first-degree murder of Robert Finch, and two 
counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  Finding 
that the Commonwealth had proven the aggravating factor of 
“vileness” beyond a reasonable doubt, see Code § 19.2-264.2, the 
jury fixed Elliott’s sentence at death on the capital murder 
conviction and at one life sentence plus eight years’ imprisonment 
for the non-capital convictions.  The trial court sentenced Elliott 
in accordance with the jury’s verdict.  This Court affirmed 
 
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Elliott’s convictions and sentence of death.  Elliott v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 431, 593 S.E.2d 270, 292 (2004), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005). 
Section (I) of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus does 
not contain any claims. 
Procedural Defaults 
In claim (II), petitioner raises several allegations that the 
Commonwealth failed to meet its obligations under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by withholding certain material and 
exculpatory evidence. 
In claim (II)(1), petitioner alleges the Commonwealth did not 
disclose statements “of the Thrall boy(s) likely containing 
exculpatory evidence about a black man leaving the house.”  
Petitioner relies on several affidavits containing hearsay 
information that at least one of the Thrall boys said he saw 
“either a black man or a man wearing black running from the rear of 
the townhouse.”  Petitioner, however, has proffered no evidence 
properly before this Court to demonstrate that the Commonwealth had 
exculpatory evidence that was not disclosed.  The record, including 
affidavits by the Commonwealth’s Attorneys involved in the case, 
demonstrates that neither the police nor these attorneys had any 
knowledge of any exculpatory statements made by the Thrall 
children. 
In claim (II)(6), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth did 
not provide reports on all of Rebecca Gragg’s polygraph tests.  
 
3
Petitioner contends that Gragg, who was Finch’s ex-girlfriend, was 
subjected to a third polygraph examination and argues that any 
inconsistent statements Gragg made during administration of the 
third test could have been used to impeach her trial testimony.  
Petitioner has proffered no evidence properly before this Court to 
support his claim that a third polygraph test was administered.  
The record, including affidavits of the Commonwealth’s Attorney and 
the polygrapher, demonstrates that there were only two polygraph 
tests administered by the Commonwealth in connection with the 
investigation. 
The Court holds that the alleged Brady violations contained in 
claims (II)(1) and (II)(6) are factually without merit.  Petitioner 
has proffered no evidence properly before the Court to support the 
allegations and, thus, has failed to establish that the 
Commonwealth withheld any exculpatory evidence in violation of 
Brady. 
In claim (II)(2), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth did 
not produce photographs, provided by Robert Finch’s parents, 
depicting Finch after he allegedly had been severely beaten by 
friends of Rebecca Gragg.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that petitioner was aware, at trial, of 
the alleged existence of these photographs and of the 
Commonwealth’s denial that the photographs existed. 
In claim (II)(3), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth did 
not provide a recording of a conversation between Gragg and 
 
4
Detective Charles Hoffman during a “smoke break” from the police 
interrogation of Gragg on May 10, 2001.  The record, including the 
trial transcripts and the issues raised on appeal, demonstrates 
that petitioner was aware of this conversation that took place on 
May 10 and questioned whether or not it was recorded.  Although 
petitioner raised a similar claim on direct appeal, this Court 
determined the argument to be waived because petitioner had not 
raised the same argument at trial. 
In claims (II)(4) and (II)(5), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth did not provide reports prepared by Detectives 
Masterson, Hoffman, and McClelland with regard to a request Gragg 
allegedly made for a copy of her written statement to police, which 
was allegedly prepared after a conversation Gragg had with officers 
during a “smoke break.”  Petitioner contends also that Gragg 
believed her written statement had been prepared on a computer and 
that the Commonwealth did not provide an electronic version of 
Gragg’s statement.  The record, including the trial transcripts, 
petitioner’s direct appeal brief, and this Court’s opinion on 
direct appeal, demonstrates that the issue of whether a written 
statement of the “smoke break” conversation existed was raised at 
trial and that the detectives involved denied that such a statement 
existed.  This Court rejected petitioner’s argument on direct 
appeal because the argument was different than the one petitioner 
raised at trial. 
 
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In claim (II)(7), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth 
intentionally ignored evidence implicating others present at the 
crime scene.  Petitioner argues that, although forensic testing 
confirmed that the blood and DNA found on the front and back doors 
of the house and on Finch’s jeans did not belong to petitioner, the 
Commonwealth did not attempt to learn the source of this DNA. 
In claim (II)(8), petitioner alleges that, taken together, his 
allegations of Brady violations show materiality because but for 
the violations, he could have impeached the testimony of Gragg and 
Hoffman. 
In claim (III)(A), petitioner claims that his rights under 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) were violated when Officer Thomas Leo 
falsely testified that he collected blood from the back gate on 
January 2, 2001, instead of on a different date, and when the 
Commonwealth then presented false evidence by submitting the blood 
sample marked with the January 2 date. 
In claim (III)(B), petitioner claims his rights under Napue 
and Giglio were violated when Detective Charles Hoffman testified 
falsely on three occasions.  Petitioner alleges that Hoffman lied 
when he testified that he never received any photographs showing 
Finch had been assaulted and when he explained why he used the word 
“polygrapher” during his testimony.  Petitioner further alleges 
that Hoffman appeared to commit perjury when his testimony about 
 
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the existence of a tape recording of a conversation that occurred 
during a “smoke break” differed from Gragg’s testimony. 
In claim (III)(C), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth 
improperly “sponsored” Gragg’s testimony despite questions 
concerning Gragg’s credibility before trial.  Petitioner contends 
that the Commonwealth “vouched” for Gragg as a principal witness 
and solicited false testimony from her. 
In claim (III)(D), petitioner alleges that the cumulative 
impact of the Giglio and Napue right violations proves a reasonable 
likelihood that the Commonwealth knowingly presented false 
testimony, which affected the jury’s judgment. 
The Court holds that claims (II)(2), (II)(3), (II)(4), 
(II)(5), (II)(7), (II)(8), (III)(A), (III)(B), (III)(C) and 
(III)(D) are procedurally defaulted because these non-
jurisdictional issues could have been raised at trial and on direct 
appeal and, thus, are not cognizable in a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 
680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
In claim (IV)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial 
because counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare for 
trial.  Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to obtain a complete 
transcript of the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, and 
failed to interview jurors from the first trial. 
 
7
The Court holds that claim (IV)(A) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
The record, including the trial transcript of the second trial and 
William Moffitt’s affidavit, demonstrates that Moffitt, one of the 
attorneys who represented petitioner in his first trial, also 
represented petitioner in the second trial and obtained transcripts 
of portions of the first trial.  Petitioner does not articulate how 
obtaining transcripts of the remainder of the first trial would 
have been helpful and does not specify how the lack of transcripts 
affected counsel’s performance.  Petitioner does not proffer what 
questions counsel should have asked jurors from the first trial, 
how the jurors would have responded, or how such information would 
have aided counsel’s performance in the second trial.  Counsel was 
not required to interview any jurors following the grant of a 
mistrial in the first trial.  Lenz v. Warden, 267 Va. 318, 326, 593 
S.E.2d 292, 296-97 (2004).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the first portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(a), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during 
the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed to identify, 
interview, or call Todd Prach to testify to petitioner’s location, 
activities, and appearance on the morning of the murders.  
 
8
Petitioner alleges that Prach would have testified that, between 
5:00 and 5:30 a.m. on the morning of the murders, he spoke with 
petitioner at Ft. Meade and observed no blood on or anything 
unusual about petitioner.  Petitioner contends that Prach’s 
testimony would have refuted the Commonwealth’s suggested timeline 
for the morning of the murders because petitioner could not have 
committed the murders, cleaned himself and the crime scene, driven 
to the restaurant where he placed a call to Gragg, disposed of 
trash bags containing evidence, and then arrived at Fort Meade by 
5:30 a.m. 
The Court holds that the first portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(a) 
fails to satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that petitioner’s truck was seen in the 
neighborhood between 4:15 a.m. and 4:25 a.m. on the morning of the 
murders and petitioner repeatedly admitted that he was in the area 
of the murders at that time.  No evidence was presented at trial 
concerning how much time petitioner spent cleaning the crime scene; 
however, petitioner was no longer in the house when police 
responded at 4:25 a.m.  While petitioner contends that it would 
have been impossible for him to have cleaned himself up prior to 
seeing Prach, he fails to point to any evidence that the killer was 
bloody or where on the killer’s person the blood would have been. 
In addition, the evidence presented at trial did not specify the 
exact time petitioner disposed of the trash bags.  Thus, petitioner 
 
9
has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In the second portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(a), petitioner 
asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
interview Kathy Elliott, petitioner’s wife, who now claims she 
would have testified that, at 6:00 a.m. on the morning of the 
murders, petitioner returned home from a weekend away and did not 
appear unusual in appearance or demeanor and that petitioner had a 
reputation for being non-violent.  Petitioner contends his wife 
could also have testified that petitioner had no recent bleeding 
from the scabbed abrasions on the back of petitioner’s hand. 
The Court holds that the second portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(a) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
Kathy Elliott’s affidavit, demonstrates that petitioner came home 
and immediately began doing a load of laundry and took a shower; 
raising an inference that petitioner was attempting to remove 
evidence linking him to the murders.  Contrary to petitioner’s 
argument, Kathy Elliott’s affidavit does not reference the injury 
to petitioner’s hand.  Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that 
petitioner and Gragg had worked together to defraud Kathy Elliott 
of a large sum of money, and trial counsel cannot be faulted for 
failing to pursue a witness whom petitioner had defrauded.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
 
10
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In the third portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(a), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel failed to adequately interview Kaitlynn Elliott, 
petitioner’s daughter.  Petitioner alleges he drove Kaitlynn to 
school in his truck the morning of the murders and that Kaitlynn 
noticed nothing unusual about her father or the truck and did not 
see any bags in the truck. 
The Court holds that the third portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(a) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
the trial transcripts, demonstrates that the only evidence 
concerning the trash bags came from Gragg, who testified that 
petitioner called her from a restaurant and told her he had stopped 
to dispose of trash bags.  No evidence established that trash bags 
were actually ever in petitioner’s vehicle or specifically when 
petitioner disposed of the bags.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the first portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(b), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during 
the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed to identify, 
 
11
interview, or call key witnesses to testify about petitioner’s 
interest in silencers for weapons to use on target ranges.  
Petitioner contends that several witnesses would have testified 
that they had discussed the possibility of creating a target 
shooting range at Ft. Meade and that petitioner sought information 
concerning silenced weapons for use at the range. 
The Court holds that the first portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(b) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
the trial transcript and petitioner’s e-mail to Randy Jackson, 
demonstrates that the information petitioner contends counsel 
should have elicited would have been cumulative.  The jury was 
informed that petitioner sought information from Jackson on 
silencers purportedly as part of an investigation concerning the 
development of a shooting range in a building at Fort Meade.  The 
jury was also aware that petitioner had then sent Gragg an e-mail 
concerning this inquiry and his plan to seek more information from 
different sources.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In the second portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(b), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during 
the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed to identify, 
interview, or call Gail and Terry McGraw, who would have testified 
 
12
that Jackson, with whom petitioner had e-mailed about obtaining a 
silencer, had a romantic interest in Gail and was jealous of 
petitioner’s friendship with Gail.  Petitioner contends that 
Jackson’s jealously would explain Jackson’s motive to exaggerate 
his testimony to harm petitioner.   
The Court holds that the second portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(b) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner fails to 
articulate how such testimony would not have constituted 
inadmissible hearsay.  Furthermore, impeaching Jackson’s testimony 
in this manner would not have undermined the evidence of the e-mail 
containing petitioner’s inquiry into silencers immediately before 
the murders.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(A)(1)(c), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial 
because counsel failed to identify, interview, or call key 
witnesses to testify about petitioner’s habit of “compulsively 
cleaning” his vehicles.  Petitioner asserts that Chris McSpadden 
and Robert Barrow would have testified that beer was spilled in 
petitioner’s truck at a football game a few days before the 
murders, explaining any recent cleaning of the truck and rebutting 
 
13
the Commonwealth’s speculation of why the truck was so clean after 
the murders. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(A)(1)(c) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Evidence of petitioner’s cleaning habits 
would also have bolstered the Commonwealth’s case by reinforcing 
the expert witness testimony that a thorough, recent cleaning of 
the truck could have removed any evidence existing in it after the 
crimes.  The fact that petitioner may have cleaned his truck in the 
days immediately preceding the murders does not negate a conclusion 
that petitioner also cleaned his truck after the murders.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (IV)(A)(1)(d), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial 
because counsel failed to identify, interview, or call the victims’ 
family members.  Petitioner asserts that Robert Finch’s parents and 
Dana Thrall’s father would have testified about their various 
theories that Rebecca Gragg was responsible for the murders or that 
the murders were connected to Robert Finch’s alleged illegal drug 
connections.  These witnesses believed Gragg was responsible 
because she allegedly had previously arranged to have Robert Finch 
 
14
beaten in West Virginia and she was afraid Finch would gain 
permanent custody of her children. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(A)(1)(d) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The trial court and this Court held that 
evidence of third party involvement was not proven; therefore, 
testimony on alternative theories of who committed the murders 
would not have been admissible under Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 654, 681, 529 S.E.2d 769, 784, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981 
(2000).  Furthermore, evidence of Gragg’s alleged involvement in 
arranging the murders does not negate the evidence that petitioner 
actually committed the murders.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
In the first portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(e), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during 
the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed to call Larry 
Kent Smith to testify that Gragg’s relatives had previously beaten 
Finch and Finch had once told Smith that if Finch ever turned up 
dead, Gragg would have been responsible; Finch kept large amounts 
of money in the house; and Finch’s dog, a 150-pound Mastiff, would 
not let anyone it did not know through the back gate of Finch’s 
home. 
 
15
The Court holds that the first portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(e) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  Smith’s testimony 
about Gragg’s relatives beating Finch and about Finch keeping money 
in his home would have constituted inadmissible hearsay.  
Furthermore, no testimony about the dog could impeach the fact that 
petitioner’s DNA was found on the inside of the back gate of the 
home.  Officer Creamer testified that when he entered the backyard 
the dog was calm and friendly.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the second portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(e), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during 
the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed to call Dorothy 
Roberts, a secretary of the guardian ad litem appointed to 
represent the interests of the couple’s children during the custody 
dispute between Finch and Gragg.  Petitioner contends Roberts would 
have rebutted testimony that the couple’s relationship was still 
intimate and would have contradicted Gragg’s testimony that she 
kept Finch informed about his children’s whereabouts. 
The Court holds that the second portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(e) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  Any information 
provided by Roberts concerning the intimacy of Finch’s and Gragg’s 
 
16
relationship and whether Finch was informed about his children’s 
whereabouts would have constituted inadmissible hearsay.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In the third portion of (IV)(A)(1)(e), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt 
phase of his trial because counsel failed to call fifteen witnesses 
to testify to petitioner’s reputation for being peaceable and non-
violent.   
The Court holds that the third portion of claim (IV)(A)(1)(e) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  While these witnesses 
may have been able to testify to petitioner’s reputation for being 
non-violent, these witnesses would have been subject to cross-
examination as to their knowledge of petitioner’s relationship with 
Gragg and how petitioner and Gragg defrauded his wife of large 
amounts of money.  Furthermore, in light of the sufficient evidence 
of petitioner’s guilt, petitioner cannot demonstrate that testimony 
as to petitioner’s reputation in those limited areas of his life 
would have had any significant impact on the jury’s decision.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
 
17
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(A)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial 
because counsel failed to obtain key documents, identify key 
witnesses, and call crime scene reconstruction and blood spatter 
experts.  Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to obtain 
petitioner’s and Gragg’s complete cell phone records with detailed 
cell tower information, which might have confirmed that petitioner 
made the 5:23 a.m. phone call to Gragg from his office parking lot, 
not at a restaurant.  Petitioner also asserts that counsel should 
have obtained (1) Thrall’s and Finch’s financial records to 
discover whether they had a legitimate source of funds to purchase 
a $300,000 home, (2) medical records where Finch received treatment 
for his beating allegedly caused by Gragg’s friends, and (3) police 
reports about the beating.  Petitioner contends that this 
information would have bolstered the theory that Finch was involved 
in illegal activities and that others had a motive to kill Finch.  
Petitioner also asserts that counsel should have called a crime 
scene/blood spatter expert to challenge the Commonwealth’s version 
of how the murders transpired.  
The Court holds that claim (IV)(A)(2) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner does not provide a copy of 
the cell phone records provided to counsel or a copy of any 
 
18
unredacted records to establish what the records would have proven.  
As to evidence concerning a beating Finch received in West 
Virginia, the circuit court held that similarly suggestive evidence 
involving an altercation was inadmissible and that a theory of 
alternate killers was also inadmissible.  Finally, petitioner 
provides no blood spatter analysis different from that presented at 
trial but merely speculates that a defense expert would have 
provided favorable evidence.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(B)(1) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object when, during opening statement, the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney called petitioner a “liar” and a “thief” who was willing 
to steal from his own family and failed to move for a new trial at 
the end of the Commonwealth’s case, because the Commonwealth failed 
to prove what was asserted in the opening statement.  Petitioner 
also contends counsel should have objected, during opening 
statement, when the Commonwealth’s Attorney (1) read e-mails 
allegedly written by petitioner which were not marked as exhibits, 
authenticated, or admitted, (2) made inflammatory statements that 
petitioner was “flawed,” and (3) showed the jury a photograph of 
the victims and their children.   
 
19
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(1) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that the 
Commonwealth’s opening statement constituted a fair depiction of 
the evidence to be presented and a fair inference of what the 
evidence would prove and, thus, was not objectionable.  Evidence is 
not usually authenticated at the time of opening statements and the 
e-mails were later authenticated by Gragg and admitted as evidence.  
Photographs of the victims are admissible and may be used in 
opening statements.  Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 471, 374 
S.E.2d 303, 317, (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989).  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In the first portion of claim (IV)(B)(2) and a portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because 
counsel promised the jury in opening statements that he would play 
an audiotape of petitioner denying his guilt and ultimately did not 
play the tape. 
The Court holds that the first portion of claim (IV)(B)(2) and 
this portion of claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” 
nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
 
20
Strickland.  The record, including the trial transcripts, 
demonstrates that counsel told the jury that there was a tape of 
Gragg’s conversation with petitioner and that the jury could hear 
that during that conversation Gragg never mentioned the bloody bags 
or the phone call in which she mistook petitioner for Finch.  
Counsel may have intended to play the tape in order to impeach 
Gragg’s testimony at trial.  Nevertheless, upon cross-examining 
her, counsel obtained Gragg’s admission to these facts.  The 
transcript of the tape provided by petitioner demonstrates that 
counsel’s subsequent decision not to play the tape was reasonable 
because the tape was merely cumulative and contained evidence that 
would have been detrimental to petitioner’s defense.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In the second portion of claim (IV)(B)(2) and a portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because 
counsel portrayed Gragg as a possible murder suspect rather than as 
someone who enlisted others to commit the murders.  Petitioner 
suggests that this error allowed the Commonwealth to rebut such a 
theory by showing that Gragg was out of town at the time of the 
murders. 
 
21
The Court holds that the second portion of claim (IV)(B)(2) 
and this portion of claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel suggested only that Gragg had 
a motive for the killings, but did not imply that Gragg actually 
committed the murders.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the third portion of claim (IV)(B)(2) and a portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel during the guilt phase because counsel failed 
to address the issue concerning petitioner’s blood on the back 
gate, the only physical evidence placing petitioner near the scene, 
thereby conceding a crucial point in the Commonwealth’s case.  
Petitioner suggests that counsel could have argued that there was 
no way to determine when the blood got on the gate or how 
petitioner would have been able to go through the gate and past an 
aggressive dog. 
The Court holds that the third portion of claim (IV)(B)(2) and 
this portion of claim (IV)(B)(10) do not satisfy the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, 
including the trial transcript, demonstrates that there was no 
evidence that petitioner had been inside that back gate at any 
 
22
other time and no innocent explanation existed for why petitioner’s 
blood was found on the inside of the locked gate.  Petitioner has 
proffered no explanation for the presence of his blood on the gate.  
Furthermore, Officer Creamer testified at trial that when he 
entered the backyard from the house, the dog in the backyard was 
calm and friendly.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(B)(3)(a) and a portion of (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object to evidence offered by the Commonwealth that petitioner 
had committed other criminal or immoral acts.  Petitioner asserts 
that the Commonwealth introduced evidence of (1) petitioner’s 
alleged theft of money from his wife, (2) petitioner’s alleged rape 
of Gragg when she was sedated prior to surgery, (3) petitioner’s 
alleged illegal attempt to obtain a silencer, and (4) petitioner’s 
alleged attempt to flee from police and evade arrest. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(3)(a) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcripts, demonstrates that the 
Commonwealth’s theory of the case was that petitioner was enamored 
of Gragg and was motivated to kill Finch in order to please Gragg, 
 
23
who was going through a child custody dispute with Finch.  This 
evidence was relevant and admissible to prove petitioner’s motive 
to kill Finch, the acts he took in furtherance of his plan to kill 
Finch, and as evidence of his guilt.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(B)(3)(b) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object to the introduction of evidence of petitioner’s blood on 
the back gate.  Petitioner asserts that the chain of custody 
pertaining to this evidence was not established and thus the 
evidence should have been inadmissible. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(3)(b) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcripts, demonstrates that 
Officer Leo collected the bloodstain and submitted it to the 
Department of Forensic Science; therefore, no meritorious objection 
was available to challenge the chain of custody of the DNA 
evidence.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
 
24
In claim (IV)(B)(3)(c) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object to autopsy photographs and a crime scene videotape on the 
basis that the prejudicial impact outweighed any probative value 
and because the videotape was cumulative.  
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(3)(c) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
This Court has established the admissibility, at trial, of autopsy 
photographs and crime scene videotapes.  See, e.g., Gray v. 
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 342, 356 S.E.2d 157, 173, cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 873 (1987); Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 85, 452 
S.E.2d 862, 867, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995).  Therefore, 
counsel reasonably did not make groundless objections to the 
photographs or videotape.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(B)(4)(a) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object to prejudicial hearsay testimony.  Petitioner contends 
counsel should have objected to (1) Raymond Whalen’s hearsay 
testimony concerning Gragg’s trip to Florida; (2) Officer Daniel’s 
 
25
hearsay testimony about what a witness told him she saw on the 
night of the murders; (3) Laura Didion’s hearsay testimony that 
Gragg was upset because Finch abused Gragg’s children and that 
Gragg said she and Finch had an ongoing sexual relationship; (4) 
Suzanne Knowlinger’s hearsay testimony that Gragg told her she had 
car trouble on her trip home from Florida; and (5) Jennifer Finch’s 
hearsay testimony that Gragg told her that Finch and the Gragg 
children had been abused by Clayton Finch, Finch’s father.  
Petitioner asserts this testimony improperly focused the jury on 
irrelevant evidence. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(4)(a) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcripts, demonstrates that (1) 
counsel successfully objected to the portion of Whalen’s testimony 
which would have constituted hearsay; (2) Officer Daniel’s 
testimony was not objectionable because it was used to explain why 
the officer was in the neighborhood investigating petitioner’s 
truck; (3) Didion’s testimony about Finch’s abuse of his children 
did not contain hearsay testimony, and Didion’s testimony about 
Gragg and Finch’s relationship was not objectionable because it was 
not admitted for its truth but was used to show that petitioner 
believed Gragg and Finch were still sexually involved with each 
other; (4) Knowlinger’s testimony contained no hearsay; and (5) 
Jennifer Finch’s testimony was not objectionable because it was not 
 
26
offered to prove that her father had abused Finch and Gragg’s 
children, but as further evidence in support of petitioner’s motive 
to gain favor with Gragg by killing Finch.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In footnote 44, petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to 
the admission of several exhibits as hearsay.  Petitioner does not 
articulate a reason as to why any of the exhibits are inadmissible 
hearsay, what arguments counsel should have made, or that any 
objections would have been successful.  The Court holds that the 
allegations made in footnote 44 are conclusional and, therefore, 
will not support the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.  Penn v. 
Smyth, 188 Va. 367, 370-71, 49 S.E.2d 600, 601 (1948). 
In claim (IV)(B)(4)(b) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object to extrinsic testimony on collateral issues including 
testimony about Clayton Finch’s alleged sexual abuse of Jennifer 
Finch, a neighbor’s testimony concerning the manner in which Dana 
Thrall dealt with her children, information about a fire in Gragg’s 
home, and testimony concerning Gragg’s separation from her husband. 
 
27
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(4)(b) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that the 
evidence about which petitioner complains was relevant to establish 
petitioner’s relationship with Gragg and his motive for the 
killings on Gragg’s behalf.  Petitioner fails to allege how 
objections to this evidence would have affected the outcome of his 
trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(B)(5) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to elicit testimony that was admitted in the first trial.  
Petitioner asserts that counsel failed to ask questions challenging 
the competence of the crime scene investigation that were asked in 
petitioner’s first trial. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(5) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Petitioner fails to allege anything more than that the evidence 
came out slightly different in the second trial.  Petitioner does 
not articulate the testimony counsel would have elicited or how 
 
28
this testimony would have affected the jury’s decision.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (IV)(B)(6) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to properly move to strike the evidence by stating no grounds for 
the motion when many compelling grounds existed and failed to move 
for a mistrial on those same grounds.   
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(6) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcript and the exhibits, 
demonstrates that the evidence was sufficient to overcome a motion 
to strike and to support petitioner’s convictions.  Elliott, 267 
Va. at 425 n.8, 593 S.E.2d at 288 n.8.  Petitioner fails to allege 
how a more specific motion to strike would have affected his case 
and fails to allege any viable basis upon which counsel should have 
sought a mistrial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
 
29
In claim (IV)(B)(7) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to put on a defense, calling only one witness to the stand and 
asking only four questions of that witness. In support of claims 
(IV)(B)(7) and this portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), petitioner refers 
to his prior arguments concerning counsel’s performance but makes 
no additional proffers as to the witnesses counsel should have 
called or what information counsel should have elicited.  The Court 
holds that these claims constitute an allegation that the 
cumulative effect of counsel’s ineffective assistance in the 
presentation of a defense prejudiced petitioner and holds that this 
claim has no merit.  “Having rejected each of petitioner’s 
individual claims, there is no support for the proposition that 
such actions when considered collectively have deprived petitioner 
of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.”  
Lenz, 267 Va. at 340, 593 S.E.2d at 305. 
In claim (IV)(B)(8) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object to the Commonwealth’s improper statements in its closing 
arguments and failed to move for a mistrial.  Petitioner asserts 
that the Commonwealth maligned petitioner’s character by mentioning 
uncharged crimes of theft, use of a silencer, and flight to avoid 
prosecution.  Petitioner also asserts that the Commonwealth 
 
30
impermissibly vouched for the truthfulness of three of its 
witnesses. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(8) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including the trial transcripts, demonstrates that the 
prosecutor’s closing argument was properly based upon the evidence 
admitted at trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (IV)(B)(9) and a portion of claim (IV)(B)(10), 
petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed 
to object to the jury’s viewing, during deliberations, of the 
videotape of the crime scene and failed to ask for any cautionary 
instructions regarding the videotape.   Petitioner contends that 
the probative value of the videotape was outweighed by its 
prejudicial impact. 
The Court holds that claim (IV)(B)(9) and this portion of 
claim (IV)(B)(10) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Any objection concerning the prejudicial impact of the videotape 
should have been made prior to its admission into evidence.  Having 
been properly admitted into evidence, the videotape was available 
 
31
for the jury to view during deliberations.  Petitioner fails to 
articulate what type of objection counsel could have successfully 
made or what type of cautionary instruction counsel should have 
sought.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (V)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to reassert motions raised in the first trial 
concerning the penalty phase, thus denying petitioner an 
opportunity to appeal these issues. 
The record demonstrates that, after the mistrial, counsel 
informed the prosecutor that the motions previously argued and 
ruled upon by the trial court would not be re-litigated during the 
second trial, because the court’s rulings were unlikely to change.  
Nothing in the record demonstrates that the court adopted its 
previous rulings and this Court, on direct appeal, held that the 
issues raised in the motions filed prior to the mistrial were not 
preserved for appellate review.  Elliott, 267 Va. at 427-28, 593 
S.E.2d at 289-90. 
The Court holds that claim (V)(A) fails to satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Although petitioner identifies these motions in a footnote, he does 
not address the merits of the individual motions and does not 
 
32
articulate the basis upon which an appellate challenge to any of 
the circuit court’s previous rulings would have had merit or have 
been successful.  Thus, petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (V)(B)(1), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to object to improper and prejudicial victim impact 
testimony.  Petitioner asserts that Cyndia Johnson, Thrall’s 
mother, improperly testified to watching her fatally wounded 
daughter shed tears.  Petitioner also asserts that Cameron and 
Rebecca Thrall, Thrall’s brother and sister-in-law, improperly 
testified about the effect of the murders on Dana Thrall’s children 
and that counsel should have objected to the hearsay evidence of 
what the children were thinking and to the hearsay evidence of the 
children’s posttraumatic stress disorder.   
The Court holds that claim (V)(B)(1) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Code § 19.2-264.4(A1) specifically 
allows victim impact testimony; therefore, Cyndia Johnson’s 
testimony concerning what she observed during Dana’s last minutes 
of life was admissible evidence.  Furthermore, the testimony 
concerning the children’s thoughts and their diagnoses was not 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that 
petitioner was going to harm the children or that the children 
 
33
actually suffered particular disorders, but instead was offered to 
demonstrate how the murders affected the children.  Counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to raise an unreasonable objection.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (V)(B)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to object to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s emphasis, 
during closing arguments, on the testimony concerning the 
children’s counseling and nightmares.  Petitioner also asserts that 
counsel should have objected to the argument that the victim’s 
families would “get some solace” from the death sentence because 
Thrall’s father and Finch’s parents oppose petitioner being 
executed.   
The Court holds that claim (V)(B)(2) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The Commonwealth’s Attorney’s argument 
constituted a fair comment based upon the evidence, including the 
testimony of some members of Thrall’s family. Whether members of 
Finch’s family wanted petitioner sentenced to death would be 
irrelevant as petitioner was only subject to the death penalty for 
his killing of Thrall.  Counsel is not ineffective for failing to 
raise an unreasonable objection.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
 
34
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (V)(B)(3), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to object to eleven statements made by the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney that petitioner would be a future danger.  
Petitioner asserts that the issue of “future dangerousness” was not 
proven at the first trial; and that the trial court ruled it could 
not be reasserted in the second case due to double jeopardy 
concerns. 
The Court holds that claim (V)(B)(3) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts, demonstrates that counsel successfully moved to 
preclude the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty based upon 
future dangerousness.  Later, when the Commonwealth argued that 
imposing the death sentence would preclude petitioner from harming 
anybody else, counsel objected on the grounds that future 
dangerousness was not an issue.  The trial court, however, ruled 
that, despite its earlier ruling, the Commonwealth was entitled to 
make a general argument that imposition of the death sentence would 
prevent further harm. Petitioner has not articulated alternate 
grounds upon which he contends counsel should have objected and, 
having obtained an adverse ruling from the court, counsel is not 
 
35
required to reassert objections that are meritless.   Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (V)(B)(4), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to object during closing argument to the 
Commonwealth’s mention of petitioner’s having sex with Gragg while 
she was unconscious.  The Court holds that claim (V)(B)(4) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of 
the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
the trial transcript, demonstrates that the prosecutor’s argument 
was a proper comment based upon the evidence.  As addressed 
previously, petitioner’s statement to Gragg concerning a sexual 
encounter he allegedly had with her while she was sedated was 
admissible to prove his motive to kill Finch and as a 
“circumstance[] surrounding the offense.”  See Code § 19.2-264.4.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (V)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to adequately develop and present mitigation 
 
36
evidence.  Petitioner asserts that he provided counsel with twenty-
seven mitigation witnesses and that counsel erred in not calling 
these people as witnesses because they would have either testified 
about his good reputation or would have testified in favor of 
sparing petitioner’s life.   
The Court holds that claim (V)(C) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the sentencing 
transcripts, demonstrates that the evidence petitioner contends 
counsel should have presented would have merely been cumulative of 
that presented at trial.  Counsel called several witnesses during 
the penalty phase to testify to petitioner’s qualities of being 
“easygoing, reliable, kind, gentle, generous, and decent.”  
Additionally, the Commonwealth relied on this “reputation” evidence 
to argue that petitioner was an individual who solved problems, 
rather than getting angry, and that his act of killing Finch and 
Thrall was simply a selfish, calculated act designed to solve 
Gragg’s problem and gain her affection.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (V)(D), petitioner alleges that the cumulative effect 
of counsel’s ineffective assistance during the penalty phase 
prejudiced petitioner.  The Court holds this claim has no merit.  
 
37
“Having rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, there is 
no support for the proposition that such actions when considered 
collectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel.”  Lenz, 267 Va. at 340, 593 
S.E.2d at 305. 
In claim (V)(E), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to seek a continuance or other relief based on the 
pre-sentence report, which reflects Clayton Finch’s belief that 
Detective Hoffman had “sabotaged” the defense. 
The Court holds that claim (V)(E) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The pre-sentence report does not include 
the basis for Clayton Finch’s belief and petitioner provides 
nothing to substantiate an allegation that Detective Hoffman 
“sabotaged” petitioner’s defense.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VI)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because during the guilt phase 
counsel withdrew his proffered “mere presence” instruction when the 
trial court required the instruction to be given with a “principal 
in the second-degree” instruction, and because counsel failed to 
request a “triggerman” instruction.   
 
38
The Court holds that claim (VI)(A) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Counsel reasonably made a tactical 
decision to avoid liability as a principal in the second-degree and 
to proceed under the theory, based on petitioner’s statements, that 
petitioner committed no criminal act.  Counsel’s representation 
does not fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness” when 
counsel relies upon information supplied by his client.  Curo v. 
Becker, 254 Va. 486, 493, 493 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1997)(citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 691).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VI)(B)(1) and portions of (VI)(B)(2), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during 
the guilt phase because counsel failed to object to jury 
instructions and verdict forms.  Petitioner asserts that 
instruction number 4 and the capital murder verdict form were 
erroneous because they told the jury that if it did not find that 
the murders were part of the same transaction, it must find 
petitioner was guilty of first-degree murder rather than second-
degree murder.  Petitioner further asserts the instruction and form 
should have included the element of malice. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(B)(1) and these portions of 
claim (VI)(B)(2) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the 
 
39
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Instruction number 4 did not misstate the law of murder in 
Virginia.  This Court has previously held that where a jury is 
instructed to determine “whether the killing was willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated, ... a separate instruction on malice 
[is] unnecessary.”  Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 254, 372 
S.E.2d 759, 768 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).  As the 
jury found petitioner guilty of the capital murder of Dana Thrall, 
petitioner cannot demonstrate that an instruction providing the 
jury the option of finding second-degree murder, if it did not find 
capital murder, would have affected the jury’s decision.   Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In other portions of claim (VI)(B)(2) and in claims (VI)(B)(3) 
and (VI)(B)(4), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel during the guilt phase because counsel failed 
to object to language contained in the verdict forms.  Petitioner 
contends that by adding the language “as charged in the indictment” 
to the verdict forms, and because the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury as to the meaning of words such as “murder” and 
“felony,” the trial court rendered the forms confusing. 
The Court holds that these portions of claim (VI)(B)(2) and 
claims (VI)(B)(3) and (VI)(B)(4) satisfy neither the “performance” 
 
40
nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  The record, including the jury instructions and the 
verdict forms, demonstrates that the jury was adequately instructed 
and the verdict forms were not confusing.  Additionally, petitioner 
has not provided this Court with the definitions he contends 
counsel should have sought.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.   
In claim (VI)(C)(1), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to request, 
at the penalty phase, an instruction, which had been given during 
the first trial’s penalty phase, explaining how to evaluate victim 
impact testimony.  Petitioner contends that counsel’s failure to 
seek this instruction led the jurors to believe that the 
Commonwealth had met its burden of proving an aggravating 
circumstance merely by putting on victim impact testimony.   
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C)(1) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed 
that, before imposing a sentence of death, the jury must find that 
the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating 
circumstance that petitioner’s “conduct in committing the offense 
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it 
 
41
involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the 
victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of 
murder.”  There is no indication that the jury failed to follow the 
court’s instructions and nothing to rebut the presumption that the 
jury did follow the instructions.  See Emmett v. Commonwealth, 264 
Va. 364, 371, 569 S.E.2d 39, 44 (2002) (holding that a jury is 
presumed to follow the instructions of the court).  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (VI)(C)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object, 
at the penalty phase, to defects in the signed capital murder 
verdict form, which referred to (1) “capital murder” with no 
definition, (2) “the offense,” which petitioner contends is a vague 
and confusing term, and  (3) “torture” and “depravity of the mind” 
for which, petitioner contends, there was no evidence.   
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C)(2) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcripts and jury verdict forms, demonstrates that the jury was 
adequately instructed and  the forms were not confusing.  
Furthermore, the jury instructions and verdict forms properly 
placed before the jury the task of determining whether the 
 
42
Commonwealth had met its burden to prove that the murder of Dana 
Thrall involved torture, depravity of the mind, or aggravated 
battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish 
the act of murder.  The evidence presented at trial established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Dana Thrall’s murder involved 
aggravated battery beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the 
act of murder.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VI)(C)(3), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to provide 
the court, at the penalty phase, proper verdict forms for capital 
sentencing.  Petitioner asserts the forms used erroneously required 
jurors to find unanimously that the Commonwealth failed to prove an 
aggravating factor in order to sentence petitioner to life.  In 
claim (VI)(C)(4), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to request an 
instruction, at the penalty phase, on unanimity on “vileness” and 
counsel failed to object to instruction 1 on the basis that it 
improperly permitted the jury to find “vileness” without requiring 
specification of, and unanimous agreement about, that statutory 
element. 
The Court holds that claims (VI)(C)(3) and (VI)(C)(4) satisfy 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
 
43
test enunciated in Strickland.  Counsel is not unreasonable for 
failing to object to jury instructions and verdict forms that follow 
the statute and have previously been approved by this Court.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim (VI)(C)(5), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object, 
at the penalty phase, to inclusion of the term “torture” in the 
instructions or verdict form or, in the alternative, because 
counsel did not ask that “torture” be defined.   
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C)(5) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Counsel is not unreasonable for failing 
to object to jury instructions and verdict forms that follow the 
statute and have previously been approved by this Court.  
Furthermore, petitioner does not articulate the grounds upon which 
counsel could have reasonably objected to the use of the word 
“torture” in the instructions and on the verdict form.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
 
44
In claim (VI)(C)(6), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object, 
at the penalty phase, to the inclusion of the “depravity of mind” 
element in the vileness instruction when no evidence of ”depravity 
of mind” existed.   
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C)(6) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Counsel is not unreasonable for failing 
to object to jury instructions that follow the statute and have 
previously been approved by this Court.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (VI)(C)(7), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to propose 
and request that the instructions include a definition of the 
element of “aggravated battery beyond the minimum necessary to 
accomplish the act of murder.” Petitioner contends that failure to 
request such a definition invited the jury to speculate as to the 
definition of aggravated battery or to assume that the mere act of 
murder would be sufficient to satisfy this element. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C)(7) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including Instruction No. 1, 
 
45
demonstrates that the plain language of the instruction “aggravated 
battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish 
the act of murder” provided the definition petitioner contends 
counsel should have requested.  Furthermore, the instruction as 
given required the jury to find more than “the mere act of murder” 
to satisfy this element.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VI)(C)(8), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object 
that Instruction No. 6 contradicted Instruction No. 5.  Petitioner 
contends that the instructions are identical except that one 
instructs that the punishment is three years and the other 
instructs that the punishment is five years. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C)(8) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the jury 
instructions, demonstrates that the instructions numbered five and 
six concerned the punishments the jury was to impose for 
petitioner’s two convictions for use of a firearm in the commission 
of a murder, which were statutorily fixed at three years and at five 
years, respectively.  Counsel is not unreasonable for failing to 
object to jury instructions that follow the statute.  Furthermore, 
as the jury had no discretion concerning these sentences, petitioner 
 
46
cannot demonstrate how any alleged confusion impacted the sentence 
he received.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VI)(C)(9), petitioner alleges counsel failed to 
propose instructions for the penalty phase on the following five 
legal principles: “defendant is presumed innocent,” “he does not 
have to testify,” “he does not have to produce any evidence,” “the 
burden is on the Prosecution,” and the burden is “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Petitioner contends that the failure to 
instruct the jury on these principles at the penalty phase was 
confusing because they had been instructed on them during the guilt 
phase. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(C)(9) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed at 
the penalty phase as to the Commonwealth’s burden to prove the 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Upon the jury’s 
determination that petitioner was guilty of the offenses for which 
it would be sentencing him, petitioner was no longer presumed 
innocent and an instruction otherwise would have been erroneous. 
Petitioner presented evidence in mitigation and, thus, an 
instruction that petitioner was not required to present evidence 
 
47
would have been confusing. Finally, the jury was instructed during 
the guilt phase that petitioner was not required to testify.  
Petitioner fails to provide a legal basis for re-instructing the 
jury on this issue.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VI)(D), petitioner states that the Court should 
grant an evidentiary hearing on whether the jury had requested an 
instruction on reasonable doubt.  Petitioner contends that he was 
unaware of a note from the jury requesting such an instruction 
until the direct appeal proceeding.  On appeal, we declined to 
address the issue because it was based on pure speculation and held 
that petitioner’s requested relief in the form of an evidentiary 
hearing could not be afforded on direct appeal.  Elliott, 267 Va. 
at 414-15 & n.4, 593 S.E.2d at 282 & n.4.  Petitioner asks that his 
convictions and sentences be reversed for failure to answer the 
jury question or in the alternative “a new trial or hearing [be 
granted] to establish that the request was made and not 
communicated to the Defense.” 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(D) is not cognizable in a 
habeas corpus proceeding.  Petitioner raises no allegations that 
this issue is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel or 
misconduct and provides no evidence that “the jury actually 
intended to send the purported jury question at issue to the trial 
 
48
court for a response.” Id. at 414-15, 593 S.E.2d at 282.  "The 
function of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into 
jurisdictional defects amounting to want of legal authority for the 
detention of a person on whose behalf it is asked.  The court in 
which a writ is sought examines only the power and authority of the 
court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions, and the 
petition for a writ may not be used as a substitute for appeal or 
writ of error."  Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 321, 171 S.E.2d 
243, 246 (1969). 
 
In claim (VII)(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel failed to 
assign error to the trial court’s ruling which allowed the 
Commonwealth to make an argument on future dangerousness and on the 
Commonwealth’s improper argument regarding victim impact testimony. 
The Court holds that claim (VII)(A) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The selection of issues to address on 
appeal is left to the discretion of appellate counsel and counsel 
need not address every possible issue on appeal.  Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983).  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed that 
it could impose the death penalty only if it were to find that the 
Commonwealth had proven the vileness aggravating factor beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  A jury is presumed to follow its instructions 
and petitioner has provided no basis upon which his appellate 
 
49
counsel could have argued that either the trial court’s ruling was 
incorrect or that the jury did not follow the court’s instructions.  
Furthermore, petitioner concedes that no argument or objection was 
made concerning the victim impact evidence and, therefore, this 
argument was not preserved for appeal.  Rule 5:25.  Petitioner also 
does not articulate the substantive legal argument he contends 
counsel should have made on these issues or how such argument would 
have had merit.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VII)(B), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel requested 
the wrong relief when counsel requested an evidentiary hearing 
instead of asking the Court to reverse his conviction on the basis 
of an alleged unanswered jury question found in the record. 
The Court holds that claim (VII)(B) fails to satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record, including this Court’s opinion, demonstrates that this 
Court could not consider petitioner’s arguments on this issue 
because the record was incomplete and, therefore, any consideration 
would have required this Court to engage in improper speculation.  
Elliott, 267 Va. at 414-15, 593 S.E.2d at 282.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s failure to seek reversal rather than an 
 
50
evidentiary hearing, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim (VII)(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel failed to 
present argument for and, thereby, waived assignments of error 8, 
9, 10, 13, and 14.  Assignments of error 8, 9 and 10 each concerned 
the alleged “smoke break” statement Gragg made to police, which 
Gragg claimed was memorialized and signed by her.  Assignments of 
error 13 and 14 concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support petitioner’s convictions. 
The Court holds that claim (VII)(C) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the appellate brief, demonstrates that assignments 
of error 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 were without merit.  This Court 
determined on direct appeal that there was ample evidence to 
support petitioner’s convictions.  Furthermore, the arguments 
raised in assignments of error 8, 9 and 10 were not preserved at 
trial and would have been barred by Rule 5:25, as counsel had been 
given the opportunity to impeach Gragg’s testimony concerning the 
alleged statement and counsel had asked for no other relief.  The 
selection of issues to address on appeal is left to the discretion 
of appellate counsel, and counsel need not address every possible 
issue on appeal.  Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751-52.  Counsel is certainly 
not deficient for choosing to focus his arguments on issues that 
 
51
had been properly preserved at trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VII)(D), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel failed to 
cite authority requiring the adoption of a narrowing instruction 
regarding the vileness factors.   
The Court holds that claim (VII)(D) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  This Court does not require a trial 
court to define the statutory terms or for a jury to receive 
instructions beyond the statutory factors.  See Bunch v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 442, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282, cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 977 (1983).  Furthermore, the holding in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) does not require jury instructions on 
the definitions of the composite parts of Virginia’s vileness 
aggravator.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VII)(E), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because counsel 
failed to argue that, based on errors made during the trial, the 
perjured testimony, prosecutorial misconduct, and the fact that the 
 
52
evidence against petitioner was minimal, circumstantial, and 
conflicting, the jury’s verdict was not the product of a reasoned 
and dispassionate deliberation. 
The Court holds that claim (VII)(E) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  On direct appeal, this Court reviewed 
the record and considered, as required by Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), 
whether the jury imposed petitioner’s death sentence under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and 
determined that the sentence was appropriate.  Petitioner does not 
articulate how an affirmative argument by counsel would have 
affected this Court’s mandatory review, nor does petitioner 
articulate the specific arguments he contends counsel should have 
made.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In claim (VIII), petitioner claims that the cumulative effect 
of all the preceding claims demonstrates that the Court should 
grant petitioner relief.  The Court holds that claim (VIII) has no 
merit.  “Having rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, 
there is no support for the proposition that such actions when 
considered collectively have deprived petitioner of his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.”  Lenz, 
267 Va. at 340, 593 S.E.2d at 305.   
 
53
Upon consideration whereof, petitioner’s motions for leave to 
issue subpoenas duces tecum; for leave to depose petit jurors; for 
leave to propound interrogatories; for an order releasing physical 
evidence for examination and authorization to retain a DNA expert, 
a crime scene reconstruction expert, a blood spatter expert, and a 
fingerprint expert; for leave to conduct depositions of witnesses; 
for leave to amend his habeas corpus petition with a recently 
discovered due process claim and to conduct discovery; and for oral 
argument are denied.  Upon further consideration whereof, the 
respondent’s motion to strike petitioner’s exhibits containing 
hearsay testimony is denied and the exhibits are considered 
pursuant to the appropriate evidentiary rules; petitioner’s motion 
to strike a letter and an exhibit filed in support of the warden’s 
motion is denied.  
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.  
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
       Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk