Title: Crosby v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

97 So. 2d 181 (1957)
Charles Edward CROSBY, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 11, 1957.
Rehearing Denied December 9, 1957.
*182 C.J. Hardee, Sr., and Robert J. Fishkind, Tampa, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
KNOTT, Circuit Judge.
On March 2, 1955, the County Solicitor of Hillsborough County, Florida, filed a criminal information charging appellant Crosby and one Lee R. Baker with attempted robbery. Crosby entered a plea of guilty as charged in the information and was adjudged guilty by the Honorable L.A. Grayson, the Judge of the Criminal Court of Record. Sentence was deferred pending an investigation by the court's probation officer. Baker pleaded not guilty, a severance was granted and he was later placed on trial. Crosby, who as yet had not been sentenced was subpoenaed as a witness for both the State and the defense at Baker's trial. He was not called as a witness by the State but did testify as a witness for the defense at the trial on September 15, 1955, at which Judge Grayson presided. The following proceedings transpired while Crosby was on the witness stand:
After Baker's trial, Crosby (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) filed affidavit and application for disqualification of Judge Grayson, with supporting affidavits, pursuant to Sec. 38.10, F.S., F.S.A., citing the statements made by the latter concerning the defendant during Baker's trial, referred to above, as a basis for his fear that he would not receive a fair trial at the hands of Judge Grayson and his contention that Judge Grayson was prejudiced against defendant and disqualified to sit as a fair and impartial Judge in any future proceedings in the defendant's case. At the same time, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and for permission to plead not guilty, asserting that he had a meritorious defense. In support of that motion, defendant alleged that he had been reluctantly persuaded to enter the guilty plea by his attorney on assurance that he would be placed on probation, upon representations allegedly made to his attorney by the county solicitor's office, whereas if he went to trial he would probably be convicted and receive a penitentiary sentence, even if not guilty.
The court entered orders denying the defendant's application for disqualification and his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, and thereupon sentenced the defendant to three years' imprisonment.
We are called upon initially to determine whether the Judge of the lower court erred in refusing to disqualify himself. We think error was committed.
The statute, Sec. 38.10, supra, requires the affidavit to state such facts as cause the movant to "fear" that he will not receive a fair trial because of prejudice on the part of the judge. The facts set forth in the affidavit here under consideration are sufficient for that purpose under the interpretation of the statute given in State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695, 697, 115 A.L.R. 857, where we said, "the test of the sufficiency of the affidavit is whether or not its content shows that the party making it has a well-grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. It is not a question of how the judge feels; it is a question of *184 what feeling resides in the affiant's mind, and the basis for such feeling."
In applying the test, the function of the trial court is limited to a determination of the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, without reference to its truth and veracity. If the allegations are sufficient, the judge must retire from the case. Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459.
It is our conclusion that the affidavit suggesting the disqualification of the trial judge in the case before us shows plainly that he should have recused himself and not participated further in the case. The language of this court in State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615, is peculiarly apropos in the present instance. There we said:
We hold that the trial judge should have disqualified himself, and declined to proceed further in the case. It follows that he was without authority to act upon the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, and his ruling on that motion was erroneous for that reason. We are constrained to observe, however, that the grounds of the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty were sufficient in any event to justify the relief sought, under the principles followed by this court in the case of Rubenstein v. State, Fla., 50 So. 2d 708, and the cases therein cited.
The judgment and sentence below are reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in a manner consistent with the views set forth in this opinion.
ROBERTS, DREW and O'CONNELL, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, Acting C.J., and THORNAL, J., dissent.