Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 107 Ohio St.3d 182, 2005-Ohio-6178.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WATSON. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 107 Ohio St.3d 182, 2005-Ohio-6178.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of 
justice — Engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice 
law — Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or 
misrepresentation – Failing to cooperate in disciplinary proceeding — 
Practicing law while under suspension — History of disciplinary 
infractions — Permanent disbarment. 
(No. 2005-0398 — Submitted June 28, 2005 — Decided December 7, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-038. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Michael Troy Watson of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0029023, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1983.  On May 22, 
2002, we suspended respondent from the practice of law in Ohio for one year for 
professional misconduct.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 95 Ohio St.3d 364, 
2002-Ohio-2222, 768 N.E.2d 617.  On December 26, 2002, we suspended 
respondent for another two years for additional misconduct.  The last year of the 
second suspension was stayed on conditions, and respondent was ordered to serve 
this suspension consecutively with the prior suspension.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Watson, 98 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-7088, 781 N.E.2d 212.  We 
have never readmitted respondent to practice law in this state. 
{¶ 2} On March 24, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent in an amended 13-count complaint with numerous additional 
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of the Board of 
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Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and made findings 
of misconduct and recommended respondent’s permanent disbarment.  The board 
adopted the panel’s report in full. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} The board agreed with the panel’s dismissal of some alleged 
Disciplinary Rule violations for insufficient evidence.  The board also accepted 
the panel’s dismissal of Count XII, which the panel did at relator’s request.  All 
the misconduct found by the panel and board arose from respondent’s 
representation of eight clients between 1999 and 2002. 
Count I 
{¶ 4} In January 2002, JoAnn M. Holsopple retained respondent to 
represent her in an employment-discrimination suit, accepting the case on a 40 
percent contingent-fee basis.  Respondent also requested a cash retainer, and 
Holsopple paid him a total of $2,000.  Respondent filed suit in February 2002. 
{¶ 5} Respondent did not inform Holsopple of his May 22, 2002 
suspension until July 23, 2002.  That day, respondent explained that he was 
turning over her file to another lawyer, but that he would still be Holsopple’s 
attorney, just not lead counsel.  He also asked Holsopple to write a letter to this 
court opposing his suspension, which she did.  In another letter dated July 23, 
2002, Holsopple expressed her gratitude that respondent had remained her 
attorney, albeit not as lead counsel. 
{¶ 6} Holsopple did not know the other lawyer who was supposed to be 
on her case and apparently did not agree to the referral.  In fact, respondent 
promised Holsopple that he would prepare her for depositions, answer all her 
questions, and instruct the second lawyer on what to say in court.  In August 
2002, respondent did prepare Holsopple for a deposition. 
{¶ 7} Respondent also asked Holsopple to pay $500 of his retainer to the 
second lawyer so that he could pass the money back to respondent.  Holsopple 
January Term, 2005 
3 
wrote a $500 check as requested, but she later stopped payment and called this 
court to inquire about the particulars of respondent’s suspension.  Thereafter, 
Holsopple repeatedly asked for her file, but neither respondent nor the second 
lawyer returned it.  She finally got her file in October 2002, after she retained yet 
another lawyer.  The new lawyer also asked for the return of Holsopple’s retainer, 
but that has not been repaid. 
{¶ 8} The board found that in representing Holsopple, respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (barring conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (barring conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (barring conduct adversely reflecting on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law), 2-103(A) (prohibiting one lawyer’s unsolicited 
recommendations of another lawyer’s employment, except as permitted by DR 2-
101), 2-110(A)(3) (requiring the refund of unearned fees upon a lawyer’s 
withdrawal from employment), 2-110(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer’s withdrawal 
from employment upon discharge), 3-101(B) (prohibiting practice in violation of 
professional regulations in that jurisdiction), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer 
to deliver funds and property a client is entitled to receive), and Gov.Bar R. 
V(8)(E) (requiring the performance of various duties upon suspension). 
Count II 
{¶ 9} In responding to relator’s inquiries about Holsopple’s case, 
respondent falsely denied in a letter and under oath that his client had asked for 
the return of her file and fee.  He also falsely denied that he had promised to 
represent Holsopple notwithstanding the suspension of his license to practice.  
Moreover, respondent did not comply with a request to produce his client-trust-
account records and an accounting of the fees Holsopple paid. The board found 
that respondent had thereby violated DR l-102(A)(4) and 1-102(A)(5) and 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring lawyers to cooperate in a disciplinary 
investigation). 
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Count III 
{¶ 10} Respondent represented Nadyne Turner in October 2001, 
defending her against a former employee’s lawsuit.  During that litigation, 
respondent failed to respond to an order for a more definite statement, did not 
timely answer interrogatories and requests for admissions, and failed to appear for 
a deposition.  He also failed to reply to the employee’s motion to compel 
discovery and to deem the unanswered requests for admissions admitted. 
{¶ 11} After respondent’s May 2002 suspension, he informed Turner that 
another lawyer, G. Michael Goins, would assist him with her case, but he forbade 
Turner to speak with Goins until respondent had introduced them. Turner met 
Goins for the first time on September 9, 2002, the day of a hearing on discovery 
disputes that developed before respondent’s suspension and the possibility of 
sanctions against Turner for respondent’s failure to comply. At that hearing, the 
court granted a default judgment and sanctions against Turner for over $200,000.  
This order was later reversed and remanded on appeal but only as to the amount 
of damages. 
{¶ 12} On June 17, 2002, nearly one month after his first suspension from 
practice, respondent met with Turner in an attempt to settle a legal-malpractice 
case against another lawyer on her behalf. Respondent arranged for Turner to sign 
the settlement agreement, and he witnessed her signature.  Later in September 
2002, respondent helped Turner prepare answers to interrogatories that were to be 
presented in response to discovery concerns at the September 9, 2002 show-cause 
hearing.  Moreover, in September 2002, respondent telephoned Edmund Lee 
Wagoner, the attorney who represented Turner’s former employee, to discuss the 
case against Turner. 
{¶ 13} The board found that in representing Turner, respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4), l-102(A)(5),  1-l02(A)(6), 2-103(A), 3-101(B), 6-
101(A)(3) (barring the neglect of an entrusted legal matter), 7-l0l(A)(2) (barring 
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the intentional failure to carry out a contract for professional employment), and 7-
101(A)(3) (barring a lawyer from intentionally causing a client prejudice or 
damage during representation), and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count IV 
{¶ 14} In responding to relator’s inquiries about Turner’s case, respondent 
falsely denied in a letter and under oath that he had continued to provide legal 
counsel to Turner after his suspension.  The board found that respondent had 
thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 1-102(A)(5) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
Count V 
{¶ 15} Edna Bray hired respondent in March 2001 to file a legal-
malpractice case and paid him a $1,000 fee.  Respondent filed the lawsuit; 
however, on the day of trial, he dismissed the case without his client’s knowledge 
or approval. 
{¶ 16} Respondent eventually refiled Bray’s case.  On May 30, 2002, 
after his suspension, respondent accepted Bray’s check for $500 in partial 
payment of his fee.  Although she had left blank the space for identifying the 
payee, Bray noticed after the check was negotiated that the name of another 
lawyer in respondent’s office, Yvonne Harris, had been written in as payee.  The 
check was later deposited in respondent’s personal account.  Bray had not hired 
Harris to represent her, nor did she know who Harris was.  After Bray wrote the 
check, respondent told Bray that he had been suspended.  Respondent has not 
refunded any of Bray’s money. 
{¶ 17} The board found that in representing Bray, respondent had violated 
DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 2-107(A) (allowing division of fees 
between attorneys who are not in the same firm only under limited conditions), 2-
110(A)(3), and 9-102(B)(4) and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count VI 
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{¶ 18} A letter of inquiry was sent to respondent on October 9, 2002, 
regarding the Bray case. After several extensions, respondent finally responded to 
the letter on January 13, 2003, the day before his deposition.  Under oath during 
his deposition, respondent falsely claimed that Bray gave him the $500 check 
because she intended to hire Harris to do some legal work and he denied having 
received the funds.  Respondent also failed to comply with relator’s request for 
accounting records concerning the Bray case. 
{¶ 19} The board found that respondent had thereby violated DR l-
102(A)(4) and 1-102(A)(5) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
Count VII 
{¶ 20} Angela Lockhart hired respondent in April 2000 to file a sex-
discrimination lawsuit against an employer.  Lockhart paid a $2,500 retainer fee 
and also entered into a contingent-fee agreement.  Respondent filed the case, but 
he failed to respond to the defense’s motion for summary judgment.  When the 
defense filed a motion for default, respondent voluntarily dismissed Lockhart’s 
case without her knowledge or approval.  Respondent later lied to Lockhart, 
telling her that the defendant had been able to get the case dismissed. 
{¶ 21} Respondent eventually refiled Lockhart’s case and learned at a 
February 6, 2002 hearing that the final pretrial hearing date would be May 14, 
2002.  On the day before the hearing, respondent told Lockhart that he had not 
received notice of pretrial and that there must not be one scheduled.  As a result, 
neither he nor Lockhart appeared for the hearing that took place on May 14, 2002. 
{¶ 22} On May 23, 2002, notwithstanding his suspension from practice, 
respondent discussed settlement with opposing counsel and offered lower terms 
than Lockhart had approved.  During June, July, and September 2002, respondent 
continued to represent Lockhart by reviewing court filings, correspondence, and 
depositions, and, at one point, coaching her for her trial testimony.  Respondent 
also participated in conference calls concerning the settlement between himself, 
January Term, 2005 
7 
Lockhart, and another attorney whom respondent had brought into the case 
without first consulting Lockhart. 
{¶ 23} The board found that in representing Lockhart, respondent violated 
DR l-102(A)(4), l-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 2-103(A), 3-101(B), 6-101(A)(3), 7-
101(A)(2), and 7-101(A)(3) and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count VIII 
{¶ 24} On October 10, 2002, relator sent a letter of inquiry to respondent 
regarding the Lockhart matter.  Respondent finally replied on January 13, 2003, 
the day before his deposition.  In his response and in his deposition, respondent 
falsely stated that he had consulted Lockhart prior to dismissing her case, that he 
did not make any settlement offers without consulting Lockhart, and that he did 
not continue to represent her after his suspension. 
{¶ 25} The board found that respondent had thereby violated DR 1-
102(A)(4) and 1-102(A)(5) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
Count IX 
{¶ 26} On June 25, 2002, over one month after respondent’s first 
suspension became effective, Kent Minshall, another attorney, received a 
telephone message stating that respondent had a very important message for him.  
When Minshall returned the call, respondent told him that he represented Mike 
Ibrahim, who was having trouble with a liquor-license transfer.  During the 
conversation, respondent specifically referred to Ibrahim as his client, and he said 
nothing about his suspension from practice. 
{¶ 27} Though respondent admitted that Ibrahim had been his client and 
that he had talked to Minshall in June 2002, respondent falsely represented under 
oath that he had not called Minshall about a client’s legal concern.  Respondent 
instead suggested that he had simply returned a call received on his cell phone to 
a number he did not recognize that turned out to be Minshall’s. 
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{¶ 28} The board found that respondent’s conduct in the Minshall incident 
and his explanation of it violated DR l-102(A)(4), l-102(A)(5), l-102(A)(6), and 
3-101(B) and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Count X 
{¶ 29} Respondent also represented Daniel Pipkins, a landlord, in 
December 1999, in connection with a series of claims or judgments that Pipkins 
had involving 20 different tenants.  Pipkins paid respondent a $200 retainer and 
also entered into a contingent-fee agreement. 
{¶ 30} After Pipkins had filed a case himself against one of the tenants, 
respondent mistakenly entered a notice of appearance on December 8, 1999, as 
the tenant’s attorney.  Respondent thereafter did not respond to a motion for 
summary judgment despite having received two extensions.  When the last 
extension expired, respondent instead dismissed the complaint without Pipkins’s 
knowledge or consent.  Respondent later refiled the case but then failed to appear 
for a pretrial hearing and at a later show-cause hearing.  The court consequently 
dismissed the case, and respondent never told Pipkins about the disposition. 
{¶ 31} At about the same time, Pipkins asked respondent to pursue a 
claim against a second tenant.  Respondent did nothing in the case.  He was also 
supposed to collect 18 judgments that had been awarded to Pipkins but did no 
work in those cases. 
{¶ 32} Pipkins asked several times for the return of his files.  Respondent 
did not comply, keeping the files until June 2002.  After his suspension, 
respondent asked Pipkins to allow one of his associates to continue as Pipkins’s 
counsel.  He promised Pipkins that he would look over the associate’s shoulder 
until the cases were resolved. 
{¶ 33} Respondent denied or could not recall these events during his 
deposition and falsely claimed at the panel hearing that he had informed Pipkins 
that his claim against the first tenant had been dismissed. 
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9 
{¶ 34} The board found that in representing Pipkins, respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4), l-102(A)(5), l-102(A)(6), 2-103(A), 6-101(A)(3), 7-
101(A)(2), 7-101(A)(3), and 9-102(B)(4). 
Count XI 
{¶ 35} Donna Baltz consulted respondent in early 2001 about 
representation in a medical-malpractice claim against the Cleveland Clinic. Baltz 
eventually paid respondent $1,500 so that he could obtain an expert medical 
opinion.  Respondent has not produced the opinion, nor has he refunded Baltz’s 
money. 
{¶ 36} In July 2001, respondent entered an appearance in the lawsuit that 
Baltz had already filed herself.  On February 13, 2002, Baltz appeared for the 
final pretrial.  Respondent did not appear, but had earlier filed an entry of 
voluntary dismissal in the case without Baltz’s consent or knowledge.  The court 
approved the dismissal entry, the cause was eventually dismissed in March 2002, 
and respondent never refiled it, nor did he return Baltz’s case file. 
{¶ 37} The board found that in representing Baltz, respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), and 7-101(A)(2). 
Count XIII 
{¶ 38} Respondent represented Nathaniel Jones beginning in October 
2001 for the purpose of adding him as a plaintiff to a lawsuit that respondent had 
filed on behalf of other clients against a board of elections. By January 2002, 
Jones had paid respondent $1,100, but respondent filed nothing on Jones’s behalf.  
Respondent has repeatedly promised to repay Jones, but he has not. 
{¶ 39} The board found that in representing Jones, respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), and 7-101(A)(2) and 
Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). 
Sanction 
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{¶ 40} In recommending a sanction, the board considered the mitigating 
and aggravating features of respondent’s case.  See Section 10 of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).   
{¶ 41}  In mitigation, the board found that respondent had expressed 
remorse for his misconduct during the panel hearing. The board found 
respondent’s expression of contrition, however, to be “carefully worded and 
contrived,” with his emphasis placed on how much he regretted the work he had 
lost during his suspension and not on the considerable harm his misconduct had 
caused clients. Rather than reflecting regret, respondent’s demeanor while 
apologizing was marked by defiance.  He did not, in fact, acknowledge that any of 
his actions constituted a violation of ethical standards.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(g). 
{¶ 42} Respondent has been sanctioned twice before for unethical conduct 
and chastised for his refusal to take responsibility for his transgressions.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a).  The board found that the prior cases, together with the 
numerous disciplinary violations proved here, established a pattern of misconduct, 
multiple offenses, and recidivism of a dimension rarely seen.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(c) and (d).  Respondent routinely failed to keep clients informed about 
their cases, to appear for court hearings, and to comply with discovery requests.  
Respondent also dismissed cases without the client’s knowledge, kept unearned 
fees, ignored client requests for the return of files, refused to cooperate in the 
disciplinary process, and continued or offered to continue in the practice of law 
despite the suspension of his license. 
{¶ 43} Last, the board found that respondent acted deceptively during the 
disciplinary process.  He attempted to delude relator, the panel, and, at times, his 
own supporters.  Respondent testified falsely at his deposition, and he provided 
false evidence and testimony throughout the investigation of his misconduct and 
January Term, 2005 
11 
at the panel hearing.  Although respondent submitted scores of letters and much 
testimony from people urging his reinstatement to practice, none acknowledged 
the extent of the new charges of misconduct against him, suggesting that 
respondent had not been forthcoming about the underlying complaint.  In fact, one 
witness testified to his impression that respondent’s third panel hearing was 
actually a hearing on his reinstatement, and respondent confirmed under oath that 
he also considered the hearing a reinstatement proceeding. 
{¶ 44} Relator advocated permanent disbarment.  Respondent urged 
dismissal of the complaint.  Anticipating a recommendation that the board would 
recommend yet another suspension, however, respondent argued in the alternative 
for an order that any suspension be served concurrently with his previous 
suspensions, that he be provided with credit for time served, and that he be 
permitted to reapply immediately for reinstatement to the practice of law.  
Adopting the panel’s recommendation, the board recommended, based on the 
extraordinary amount and nature of misconduct in this case, that respondent be 
permanently disbarred. 
Review 
{¶ 45} Respondent objects vigorously to the board’s report, attempting at 
great length to undermine the board’s reliance on the panel’s credibility 
determinations.  Upon review of this voluminous record, however, we find 
respondent’s testimony as to the underlying events completely untrustworthy.  
Respondent’s ability to tell the truth was described as “questionable” even by his 
own witness.  Moreover, we simply do not believe, as respondent persistently 
insisted, that each witness who contradicted his version of the facts was either “a 
liar” or had testified to “an outright lie.”  We thus accept the panel’s and the 
board’s evidentiary assessments and find that respondent committed the cited 
violations of the Disciplinary Rules and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) and V(8)(E).  
Moreover, we agree that respondent’s disbarment is warranted. 
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{¶ 46} The evidence in this case is overwhelmingly clear and convincing.  
Respondent repeatedly neglected his clients’ interests.  He repeatedly 
misrepresented events or lied to his clients and others, including relator and the 
board.  He repeatedly failed to do what his clients asked of him.  He repeatedly 
took his clients’ money, did nothing for it, and neither accounted for the funds nor 
returned the unearned portions.  He repeatedly failed to return his clients’ files on 
request.  Respondent furthermore did not cooperate in the disciplinary process and 
has not made restitution.  These ethical improprieties, respondent’s significant 
record of professional discipline, and repeated violations of the court-ordered 
suspension of his license are ample reason for the recommendation to disbar.  
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 726 N.E.2d 993. 
{¶ 47} Respondent is therefore permanently disbarred from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Michael Troy Watson, pro se. 
______________________