Title: State v. Idaho Power Co.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed June 19, 1957.
Petition for rehearing denied September 11, 1957.
*285 E.G. Foxley, Deputy Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, Salem.
A.S. Grant, Baker, and R.P. Parry, Twin Falls, Idaho, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief was A.S. Grant.
Before PERRY, Chief Justice, and BRAND, McALLISTER and KESTER, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
PERRY, C.J.
This appeal by the State of Oregon arises from the trial court's sustaining of the defendant's demurrer to the indictment.
The indictment, which was returned by the grand jury for Baker county on July 6, 1956, against the defendant, reads as follows:
The parties agreed that in considering the demurrer the trial court should take judicial notice of the license issued the defendant by the Federal Power Commission for construction of the dam.
The Federal Power Commission on August 4, 1955, issued to the defendant Idaho Power Company a license for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a proposed Brownlee, Oxbow, and Hells Canyon development, which development for the purpose of a license was considered as a single project designated as No. 1971. The license and order issued provides in part as follows:
The defendant Idaho Power Company is required to "Commence construction of the Brownlee unit within one year of the effective date [i.e. August 1, 1955] of this license, and shall thereafter in good faith and with due diligence prosecute such construction; and shall complete that unit in 36 months."
ORS 543.010 to 543.620, in general, provides for the creation of a Hydroelectric Commission and, among other things, requires that anyone seeking appropriations of the waters within the state or waters over which the state has concurrent jurisdiction shall first obtain a permit from the Hydroelectric Commission, and, if the project is approved, shall then secure a license to construct and operate the project in accordance with the Act. The Act also provides that the right to use the water in the generation of electricity cannot be acquired except pursuant to its provisions, and that the Commission may deny an application if in its judgment the project is "unfeasible or the public interest requires the denial thereof." Penalties are provided for failure to comply with the provisions of the law.
Both counsel for the state and counsel for the defendant concede that the Snake river at the point in question is a navigable waterway of the United States and forms the boundary between the states of Idaho and Oregon.
*288 While the defendant has not been charged with using or appropriating water, both parties concede that the construction of the dam would be tantamount to the use and appropriation of such water notwithstanding the multipurpose aspects of the dam which include, in addition to the generation of electricity, flood control and navigation.
The state's contention is that the use and appropriation of water rights, including the waters of the Snake river, is within the control and authority vested in the state of Oregon and not within the authority of the licensing power of the Federal Power Commission. This contention is based upon the savings provisions of the Federal Water Power Act, 41 Stat 1063, § 9(b) and § 27, 16 USCA §§ 802 (b) and 821.
Section 9(b) provides as follows:
Section 27 reads as follows:
*289 Upon first impression it would appear that the language used in section 9(b) requires compliance with any state regulatory measure prior to the issuance of a federal license; but Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for the majority, in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 US 152, 168, 90 L ed 1143, 66 S Ct 906, dispelled any such impression with the following language:
In a footnote on page 169 of the opinion, Mr. Justice Burton, speaking of the Rules of Practice and Regulation of the Commission, said: "They cover the field so fully as to leave no purpose to be served by filing comparable information required in some alternative form under state laws as a basis for a state permit."
Greater emphasis is placed by the state upon the provisions of section 27 of the Federal Water Power Act. It contends that such section is crucial to the issues to be determined in the present appeal. There is no question that section 27 is a saving clause as to proprietary rights under state laws. Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 US 239, 98 L ed 666, 74 S Ct 487; Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 US 369, 74 L ed 483, 50 S Ct 140.
The Court in the Niagara Mohawk case, supra, p. 255, said:
1. Thus it may be stated that even though a state might claim that it has a proprietary right, as distinguished from a governmental power, in the waters of a navigable stream, section 27 would grant to the state only the same right to be compensated as is granted an individual with rights that have vested in accordance with the laws of the state, and not the right to prevent the federal government from exercising its powers as granted in the Constitution of the United States until compensation was made for the appropriation of the right. Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 US 435, 99 L ed 1215, 75 S Ct 832; Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra.
2. However, the question of compensation or right to compensation is not before the Court, and cannot be considered in a criminal proceeding. Our only concern is whether the state has the power to veto a license granted by the federal government to construct a dam across a navigable stream for purposes of generating electricity. The right to grant a hydroelectric permit includes the right to deny it. Neither section 9(b) nor section 27 grants to the states this right. Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, supra.
3. It is unnecessary to cite authority for the long-settled proposition that powers granted by the people of the United States to the federal government in the *292 constitution and laws passed pursuant thereto shall be the supreme law of the land. If there is any conflict between such laws and a law passed by a state, even in the exercise of its acknowledged powers, the state law must yield.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.