Title: Felix v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CANDIDO A. FELIX, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 14, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0506010024 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 18, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 14, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 14th day of July 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In October 2005, the defendant-appellant, Candido A. Felix, 
pleaded guilty to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”), Driving 
Without Proof of Insurance, Driving an Unsafe Motor Vehicle, Displaying a 
Fictitious/Cancelled Registration Plate, Operating a Motor Vehicle Without 
Possessing a Registration Card, Driving While License Suspended or 
Revoked, and Driving After Judgment Prohibited.   In December 2005, the 
State dismissed the charge of Driving While License Suspended or Revoked.  
 
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Candido was sentenced on the remaining charges to a total of 8 years of 
Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 1 year and successful 
completion of the Greentree Program for decreasing levels of probation.      
 
(2) 
Candido’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that arguably could support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Felix’ counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Felix’ counsel informed Felix of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete trial transcript.  Felix also was informed of his right 
to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Felix responded with a brief that 
raises four issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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the position taken by Felix’ counsel as well as the issues raised by Felix and 
has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Felix raises four issues for this Court’s consideration.  He 
claims that: a) his guilty plea was coerced because his counsel was not 
prepared to go to trial; b) his bail was improperly revoked; c) he should have 
been charged with Failure to Reinstate License rather than Driving After 
Judgment Prohibited; and d) he was improperly sentenced for a fourth-
offense DUI.   
 
(5) 
Felix’ first claim is that his guilty plea was coerced because his 
counsel was not prepared to go to trial.  In order to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a 
defendant must show that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to 
trial.2  The defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.3 
 
(6) 
Felix has presented no factual support for his claim that, but for 
his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but 
would have insisted on proceeding to trial.  The transcript of Felix’ plea 
colloquy reflects that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and that he 
                                                 
2 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
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was satisfied with his counsel’s performance.  In the absence of clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary, Felix is bound by those 
representations.4  For all of these reasons, we find Felix’ first claim to be 
without merit. 
 
(7) 
Felix’ second claim is that his bail was improperly revoked.  
The transcript of the plea colloquy reflects that, after entering his guilty plea, 
Felix requested a two-day grace period before reporting to prison.  After 
accepting Felix’ guilty plea, however, the Superior Court denied his request 
for a two-day grace period and revoked his bail on the ground that the DUI 
conviction carried a minimum mandatory sentence.  The judge noted that it 
was standard practice in the Superior Court to revoke bail under such 
circumstances.  There is no constitutional right to bail in the post-conviction, 
pre-sentencing period5 and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of 
the Superior Court in revoking Felix’ bail.  We, therefore, find Felix’ second 
claim to be without merit.   
 
(8) 
Felix’ third claim is that he should have been charged with 
Failure to Reinstate License rather than Driving After Judgment Prohibited.  
Because Felix’ voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged 
                                                 
4 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631-32 (Del. 1997). 
5 State v. Flowers, 330 A.2d 146, 148-49 (Del. 1974). 
 
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defects or errors occurring prior to the entry of the plea,6 we find that this 
claim, too, is without merit. 
 
(9) 
Felix’ final claim is that he was improperly sentenced for a 
fourth-offense DUI under Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4177(d) (4).  He 
contends that only his DUI convictions after 1995, the year § 4177 was 
amended, should be counted as predicate offenses.  Felix’ argument is 
incorrect as a matter of law.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4177B(e) (2) 
expressly states:  “For sentencing pursuant to § 4177(d) (4) of this title there 
shall be no time limitation and all prior or previous [DUI] convictions or 
offenses . . . shall be considered for sentencing under § 4177(d) (4).”  We, 
therefore, find Felix’ final claim to be without merit. 
 
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Felix’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Felix’ counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Felix could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice