Title: State v. Daniel

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2692-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Roddee W. Daniel, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 51, 847 N.W.2d 855 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 46 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 29, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2015  
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur W. Warren III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Anthony J. Jurek, Middleton, and oral argument by Anthony J. 
Jurek.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson, 
state public defender, and Joseph N. Ehmann, first assistant 
state public defender, on behalf of the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender. Oral argument by Joseph N. Ehmann. 
 
 
 2015 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2012AP2692-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF1035) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Roddee W. Daniel, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 29, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Petitioner, Roddee W. Daniel, 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
that reversed an order of the circuit court.1  In a post-
conviction hearing, the circuit court concluded that Daniel's 
defense counsel failed to show by clear and convincing evidence 
                                                 
1 State v. Daniel, 2014 WI App 46, 354 Wis. 2d 51, 847 
N.W.2d 855 (reversing order of circuit court of Kenosha County, 
Wilbur W. Warren III, Judge). 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
2 
 
that Daniel was incompetent.  The court of appeals determined 
that the circuit court erred because it failed to apply the 
lower 
"preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence" 
burden 
of 
proof.  
Accordingly, it remanded for a new competency hearing.     
¶2 
Although 
neither 
party 
challenges 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' determination that the burden of proof here is a 
preponderance of the evidence, Daniel contends that the court of 
appeals' decision was erroneous because, upon remand, it permits 
the circuit court to place the burden to prove incompetency on 
defense counsel.  He asserts that despite the fact that Daniel 
and his defense counsel disagree about competency, once defense 
counsel has raised the issue of competency, the burden of proof 
should be on the State. 
¶3 
Considering the statute governing competency hearings, 
the potential conflict of interest in placing the burden of 
proof on defense counsel, and the relative interests and risks 
at stake, we determine that once a defense attorney raises the 
issue of competency at a postconviction hearing, the burden is 
on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant is competent to proceed.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to apply 
the correct standard if Daniel's competency is challenged upon 
remand. 
I 
¶4 
Daniel has a long history of mental illness.  He began 
treatment for mental illness in 2004 at Rogers Memorial 
Hospital-Milwaukee.  Multiple medications have been prescribed. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Daniel's 
treatment 
at 
Rogers 
Memorial 
ended 
in 
September 2008 around the time that he was arrested and charged 
with first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime and 
armed burglary as party to a crime.  According to the complaint, 
15-year old Daniel and a friend broke into a neighbor's home.  
Daniel told police that as they looked around for items to take, 
they noticed a woman asleep in her bed.  The woman woke up and 
started to run away.  Daniel stated that his friend ran after 
her and hit her multiple times with a baseball bat.2  Then, he 
and his friend grabbed various items and left.  The woman's 
boyfriend discovered her body the next morning.  Daniel was 
arrested and held at Kenosha County Detention Center (KCDC) 
pending trial. 
¶6 
The court granted defense counsel's request that 
Daniel undergo an evaluation to determine his competency to 
stand trial.  Dr. Collins conducted the evaluation which 
included an interview with Daniel.  Her report indicates that 
she had trouble engaging Daniel in a goal-directed, rational 
exchange.  However, he did acknowledge that he had been 
institutionalized at Rogers Memorial because he "was hearing 
voices" and that he had previously received mental health 
treatment in connection with panic attacks.   
¶7 
Dr. Collins' evaluation also included a review of 
Daniel's medical records from KCDC.  Her report indicates that 
                                                 
2 Daniel's friend claimed that it was Daniel who hit the 
woman. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
4 
 
she believed there were discrepancies between some of the mental 
health 
complaints 
Daniel 
made 
while 
at 
KCDC 
and 
staff 
observations of his behavior.  Dr. Collins further observed that 
while at KCDC a diagnosis of "probable malingering" had been 
offered.  She deermined that there was not enough evidence to 
support a conclusion that Daniel lacked substantial mental 
capacity to factually and rationally understand the pending 
proceeding and aid in his defense.  Based on Dr. Collins' 
report, the circuit court declared Daniel competent to stand 
trial. 
¶8 
After a jury trial, Daniel was convicted of the crimes 
charged.  He was sentenced to life in prison without extended 
supervision. 
 
During 
his 
subsequent 
incarceration, 
the 
Department of Corrections determined that Daniel suffered from a 
psychotic disorder and transferred him to the Wisconsin Resource 
Center for treatment.  Daniel's treating psychiatrist at the 
Resource Center, Dr. Alba, challenged his decisional competency 
and requested that Daniel be civilly committed pursuant to 
Chapter 51. 
¶9 
Following a hearing on the matter, the court ordered 
Daniel's civil commitment.  It determined that medication or 
treatment would have therapeutic value.  It further determined 
that due to mental illness, Daniel was not competent to refuse 
psychotropic medication or treatment.  Accordingly, the court 
ordered that medication and treatment could be administered 
without Daniel's consent during the period of commitment.  Dr. 
Alba later requested an extension of Daniel's civil commitment, 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
5 
 
which was granted.  The court also extended Daniel's deadline 
for filing a postconviction motion. 
¶10 While Daniel was still under civil commitment, defense 
counsel notified the court, pursuant to State v. Debra A.E., 188 
Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994), that he had good faith 
reason to doubt Daniel's competency to pursue postconviction 
relief.  He explained that he had spoken with Daniel multiple 
times and that during those conversations Daniel equivocated in 
regard to pursuing postconviction relief, oscillating between a 
desire to pursue relief and a desire not to pursue relief.  
Despite a variety of approaches, defense counsel was unable to 
get Daniel to express any reasoning behind his decisions to 
pursue or not pursue postconviction relief.   
¶11 Defense counsel further explained to the court that 
since 
Daniel's 
conviction, 
Daniel 
had 
been 
diagnosed 
as 
schizophrenic, and had been civilly committed pursuant to 
Chapter 51.  He informed the court that his privately obtained 
psychologist, Dr. Cumming, had evaluated Daniel and determined 
that Daniel was not competent to seek postconviction relief.  
Accordingly, defense counsel moved the court for a finding that 
there was reason to believe that Daniel was incompetent and 
asked the court to rule regarding Daniel's competency to seek 
postconviction relief. 
¶12 Attached to defense counsel's submission was a letter 
from Dr. Cummings.  His letter indicates that he met with Daniel 
after reviewing Daniel's records.  During their first meeting, 
it was clear that Daniel lacked the capacity to understand the 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
6 
 
purpose of the visit or that Dr. Cummings' findings would be 
used to aid Daniel's defense.  During the second meeting, Daniel 
told Dr. Cummings that he "didn't even know what an appeal was."  
Based on Daniel's records and these interviews, Dr. Cummings 
concluded to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that 
Daniel was not competent to understand the appeal process or 
make decisions about legal matters. 
¶13 The court appointed a psychologist, Dr. Rawski, to 
evaluate 
Daniel, 
but 
Daniel 
refused 
to 
meet 
with 
him.  
Therefore, Dr. Rawski was unable to offer an opinion to a 
reasonable degree of professional certainty as to Daniel's then 
current state of competency to participate in legal proceedings. 
He recommended that Daniel be transferred to a state psychiatric 
institute for an inpatient assessment. 
¶14 Following 
Dr. 
Rawski's 
recommendation, 
the 
court 
ordered the State to transfer Daniel to a state psychiatric 
institute for evaluation of his competency.  There, he was 
examined by Dr. Phelps, a forensic psychiatry fellow.  Dr. 
Phelps determined that Daniel's behaviors were not the product 
of mental illness, but rather the result of a characterological 
disorder.  Although he acknowledged the possibility that Daniel 
had a major mental illness, Dr. Phelps observed that Daniel had 
denied symptoms of mental illness and, with one exception, had 
not exhibited signs or symptoms of mental illness.   
¶15 Dr. Phelps further acknowledged the possibility that 
the medications Daniel took were effectively treating a mental 
illness. 
 
However, 
observing 
that 
Daniel 
had 
previously 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
7 
 
demonstrated the capacity to stand trial and that he did not 
demonstrate symptoms of a condition that would preclude his 
capacity, Dr. Phelps concluded that Daniel had substantial 
mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his 
own defense. 
¶16 After the evaluations were complete, the court held a 
competency hearing.  At the start of the hearing, the circuit 
court asked Daniel if he believed he was competent to proceed.  
Daniel replied "Yeah."  The court then asked Daniel if he 
believed he understood what was involved in making a decision 
about whether to appeal.  Daniel again responded "Yeah."  
Thereafter, defense counsel asked Daniel if he could explain 
what it means to appeal a conviction.  Daniel responded "No."  
Counsel then asked Daniel "what happens if you don't appeal?"  
Daniel replied "I can get charged with a crime." 
¶17 Based on Daniel's statement that he was competent, the 
court made an initial determination of competency.  It placed 
the 
burden 
on 
defense 
counsel 
to 
show 
that 
Daniel 
was 
incompetent.  To meet his burden, defense counsel presented the 
testimony of Dr. Alba, Dr. Phelps, Dr. Collins, Daniel's social 
worker at the Wisconsin Resource Center, and Dr. Cummings.  He 
also presented the reports from Dr. Alba, Dr. Phelps, and Dr. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
8 
 
Cummings, Daniel's medical records from Rogers Memorial, and 
Daniel's discharge summary from Rogers Memorial.3   
¶18 The circuit court opined that based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b) 
(2011-12)4, 
if 
the 
defendant 
claims 
to 
be 
competent, the defendant shall be found competent unless the 
State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
is not competent.  The court observed that in this case, the 
State agreed with Daniel that he was competent and so it was not 
in the position to disprove his assertion of competency.  
However, the court determined that the clear and convincing 
standard still should be applied: "the standard should be the 
same for establishing incompetence, notwithstanding the party is 
other than the State who is asserting it, and that's the basis 
which this decision will be framed."  It then concluded that 
defense counsel had failed to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that Daniel was incompetent. 
¶19 On appeal, the court of appeals observed that the 
circuit court could allocate the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant or defense counsel in a postconviction competency 
proceeding.  State v. Daniel, 2014 WI App 46, ¶2, 354 Wis. 2d 
                                                 
3 The court gave the parties time after the hearing to 
submit written closing arguments.  During that time, Daniel 
submitted a hand-written note, stating that he wanted to plead 
guilty.  It states: "this is Roddee DanieL i want to plead 
Guilty for the murder of [C.W.] I want to plead Guilty. Im 
admitting that I killed [C.W.]." 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
9 
 
51, 847 N.W.2d 855.  However, the court of appeals determined 
that a circuit court must utilize the lower "preponderance of 
the evidence" burden of proof when doing so.  Id.  Because the 
circuit court had applied an incorrect burden of proof, the 
court of appeals reversed and remanded.  Id.  It further 
declared that if Daniel's competency is questioned upon remand, 
the circuit court shall address the issue de novo.  Id. 
II 
¶20 At issue in this case is who bears the burden of proof 
at a postconviction competency hearing when defense counsel and 
the defendant disagree on competency.5  In this case of first 
impression in our state, we examine statutory authority and 
prior case law.  Ultimately, this issue presents a question of 
law which this court reviews independently of the decisions 
rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Acuity 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Olivas, 2007 WI 12, ¶31, 298 Wis. 2d 640, 726 
N.W.2d 258. 
III 
¶21 To provide context for our discussion, we begin with a 
brief overview of competency.  For purposes of criminal trials, 
competency refers to the defendant's "present mental capacity to 
                                                 
5 The petition for review presented this as two issues: who 
bears the burden of proof and what is the correct procedure to 
follow when a defendant and defense counsel disagree about a 
defendant's competency.  However, in the parties' arguments the 
second issue was subsumed into the first.  Accordingly, we 
address them as one issue. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
10 
 
understand the proceedings and assist in his or her defense."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(c); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 
U.S. 402, 402 (1960) ("the test [for competency] must be whether 
he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him."); State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, 
¶27, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 ("a defendant is 
incompetent if he or she lacks the capacity to understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings, to consult with counsel, 
and to assist in the preparation of his or her defense."). 
¶22 Courts have long followed the rule that incompetent 
defendants should not be forced to face criminal proceedings 
during their incompetency.  State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 
57 Wis. 2d 315, 321, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973).  Wisconsin codified 
this rule in 1878, and it currently appears in our statutes at 
Wis. Stat. § 971.13.6 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 4700 (1878) stated: 
When any person is indicted or informed against for 
any offense, if the court shall be informed, in any 
manner, that there is a probability that such accused 
person is, at the time of his trial, insane, and 
thereby incapacitated to act for himself, the court 
shall, in a summary manner, make inquisition thereof, 
by a jury or otherwise, as it deems most proper; and 
if it shall be thereby determined, that such accused 
person is insane, his trial for such offense shall be 
postponed indefinitely . . . . 
 
The current Wis. Stat. § 971.13(1) provides: "No person who 
lacks substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
11 
 
¶23 As 
Justice 
Kennedy 
has 
succinctly 
explained, 
competence to stand trial is integral to a number of other 
constitutional rights: 
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it 
depends the main part of those rights deemed essential 
to a fair trial, including the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to 
confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the 
right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain 
silent without penalty for doing so. 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that the 
prohibition on the prosecution of incompetent individuals is 
"fundamental to an adversary system of justice," Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975), and the conviction of an 
accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due 
process, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996).  See also 
State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 221, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997) 
(observing that the prohibition is an issue of "fundamental 
fairness").  
¶24 Consistent with those statements, the Supreme Court 
has further determined that "the failure to observe procedures 
adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or 
convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his 
due process right to a fair trial."  Drope, 420 U.S. at 172; see 
also State v. Wanta, 224 Wis. 2d 679, 692, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. 
                                                                                                                                                             
or assist in his or her own defense may be tried, convicted or 
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the 
incapacity endures." 
 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
12 
 
App. 1999) ("competence to stand trial in a criminal proceeding 
[is] a fundamental right requiring due process protections").   
¶25 Wisconsin's codified procedures to protect a defendant 
from being tried while incompetent can be traced back to 1878. 
Wis. Stat. § 4700 (1878).  The current procdures are found in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14.  Under the statute, if there is reason to 
doubt a defendant's competency, the court "shall appoint one or 
more examiners having the specialized knowledge determined by 
the court to be appropriate to examine and report upon the 
condition of the defendant."  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(a).  Copies 
of the report are delivered to the State, the defendant, and 
defense counsel.  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(a).  If each waives the 
opportunity to present evidence on the issue, "the court shall 
promptly determine the defendant's competency."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(4)(b).   
¶26 The statute directs that in the absence of waivers, 
the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
competency.  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b).  It describes the 
hearing as follows: 
At the commencement of the hearing, the judge shall 
ask the defendant whether he or she claims to be 
competent or incompetent. If the defendant stands mute 
or claims to be incompetent, the defendant shall be 
found incompetent unless the state proves by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence that the 
defendant is competent. If the defendant claims to be 
competent, the defendant shall be found competent 
unless the state proves by evidence that is clear and 
convincing that the defendant is incompetent. If the 
defendant is found incompetent and if the state proves 
by evidence that is clear and convincing that the 
defendant is not competent to refuse medication or 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
13 
 
treatment, under the standard specified in sub. (3) 
(dm), the court shall make a determination without a 
jury and issue an order that the defendant is not 
competent to refuse medication or treatment for the 
defendant's 
mental 
condition 
and 
that 
whoever 
administers 
the 
medication 
or 
treatment 
to 
the 
defendant shall observe appropriate medical standards. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b). 
¶27 To protect the right to these competency proceedings, 
in State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986), the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court placed a duty on defense counsel to 
raise the issue of defendant's competency whenever there is 
reason to doubt it.  In that case, despite strong indications of 
defendant's incompetency, defense counsel had made a "strategic 
decision" to not raise the issue prior to or during defendant's 
criminal trial.  Id. at 214.  The question before the court was 
whether counsel's failure to do so constituted representation 
which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Id. 
at 218.   
¶28 In its analysis, the Johnson court explained that the 
procedure for determining competency laid out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14 is "a critically important fail-safe device for the 
benefit of accused persons who may not be able to fully 
cooperate and assist in their defense."  Id. at 218-19 (quoting 
Matalik, 57 Wis. 2d at 322).  It further observed that the 
protection is illusory if, when there is a reason to doubt 
defendant's competency, neither the court nor counsel seek the 
procedures provided by the State for determining competency.  
Id. at 219.  The court held that "where defense counsel has a 
reason to doubt the competency of his client to stand trial, he 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
14 
 
must raise the issue with the trial court" and "[t]he failure to 
raise the issue of competency makes the counsel's representation 
'fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.'"  Id. at 
220.7   
¶29 The Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently recognized 
that the right to a competency determination extends to 
postconviction proceedings.  In Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 
defense counsel was unable to determine whether the defendant 
was willing to accept the risks of pursuing postconviction 
relief 
because 
the 
defendant 
would 
not 
speak 
to 
him.  
Accordingly, he requested a competency proceeding, which the 
circuit court denied.  Id. at 121-22.   
¶30 On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that 
the 
decisions 
to 
pursue 
postconviction 
relief 
and 
what 
objectives to pursue must be made by the defendant, not defense 
counsel.  Id. at 125.  Because those tasks were required of the 
defendant, the court determined that a defendant "is incompetent 
to pursue postconviction relief under sec. 809.30, Stats. 1991-
                                                 
7 In 1984 the ABA adopted a standard substantially similar 
to that announced in State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 
N.W.2d 176 (1986).  ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 
7-4.2(c) provides that:  
Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the 
defendant's competence to stand trial whenever the 
defense 
counsel 
has 
a 
good 
faith 
doubt 
as 
to 
defendant's competence.  If the client objects to such 
a 
motion 
being 
made, 
counsel 
may 
move 
for 
an 
evaluation over the client's objection. 
This standard remains in effect today. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
15 
 
92, when he or she is unable to assist counsel or to make 
decisions committed by law to the defendant with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding."  Id. at 126. 
¶31 The Debra A.E. court then proceeded to prescribe the 
process for postconviction competency proceedings.  Id. at 131.  
It stated that if the State or defense counsel has a good faith 
reason to doubt a defendant's competency, counsel should advise 
the court and move for a ruling on competency.  Id.  The circuit 
court may also raise the issue of reason to doubt a defendant's 
competency sua sponte.  Id.  If there is reason to doubt a 
defendant's competency, the circuit court may hold a hearing.  
Id. at 132.  "In conducting any hearing the circuit court should 
be guided by sec. 971.14(4), Stats. 1991-92, to the extent 
feasible."  Id.   
¶32 Having 
set 
forth 
the 
background 
on 
competency 
proceedings, we turn now to the issue of who bears the burden of 
proof at a postconviction competency hearing when the defendant 
and defense counsel disagree about competency.  We acknowledge 
that, as a general matter, the burden of proof is frequently 
assigned to the moving party.  See, e.g., State v. West, 2011 WI 
83, ¶65, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929;  Larry v. Harris, 2008 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
16 
 
WI 81, ¶50, 311 Wis. 2d 326, 752 N.W.2d 279.8  However, we are 
not convinced that the general rule applies to this case.  Here, 
defense counsel, as an officer of the court, was obligated to 
alert the court of his doubt about competency under Johnson, 133 
Wis. 2d 207.  Thus, we decline to view the fulfillment of this 
duty in the same manner as a typical motion. 
¶33 As the parties concede, there is currently no statute 
directly 
governing 
postconviction 
competency 
proceedings.9  
                                                 
8 There are several situations in which this rule does not 
apply.  See, e.g., State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, ¶73, 357 
Wis. 2d 41, 849 N.W.2d 748 (after defendant raised the issue, 
the burden was on State to show that exigent circumstances 
justified a warrantless search); State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 
105, ¶17, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (upon defendant's 
suppression motion, the burden was on the State to prove 
confession was voluntary); State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶23, 262 
Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798 (where the defendant moved to 
suppress various admissions, the burden was on the State to show 
that 
the 
defendant 
received 
and 
understood 
his 
Miranda 
warnings).  Indeed, under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b) when the 
defense counsel raises the issue of competency at defendant's 
request, the burden is explicitly on the State to prove 
competency. 
9 We have previously determined that Wis. Stat. § 971.14, by 
its terms, "govern[s] competency determinations only through the 
sentencing stage of a criminal trial."  State v. Debra A.E., 188 
Wis. 2d 111, 128 n.14, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994).  As Debra A.E. 
explained, "[t]his conclusion follows from reading sec. 971.14 
in its entirety and with sec. 971.13, as well as from the 
legislative history underlying these two sections."  Id.     
The legislative history reveals that the drafters of the 
proposed legislation were mindful that Wis. Stat. § 971.14 left 
unaddressed incompetency in postconviction proceedings:  
[T]he Committee had not devoted sufficient attention 
to how to handle the case of a defendant who is 
incompetent 
to 
assist 
counsel 
in 
post-conviction 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
17 
 
Following Debra A.E., we look to Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4) for 
guidance.   
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14(4)(b) defines the burden in 
terms of the defendant's position.  If the defendant asserts 
competency, the State must prove incompetency by clear and 
convincing evidence and if the defendant asserts incompetency, 
the State must prove competency by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence:  
At the commencement of the hearing, the judge shall 
ask the defendant whether he or she claims to be 
competent or incompetent. If the defendant stands mute 
or claims to be incompetent, the defendant shall be 
found incompetent unless the state proves by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence that the 
defendant is competent. If the defendant claims to be 
competent, the defendant shall be found competent 
unless the state proves by evidence that is clear and 
convincing that the defendant is incompetent.  
                                                                                                                                                             
proceedings.  To try to address this in a general 
competency statute was opening Pandora's box . . . the 
issue of competency ought to be the defendant's right 
to raise up to the point of the imposition of sentence 
but not afterwards. . . .  The competency statute 
should be limited to proceedings up to and including 
sentencing. 
Judicial 
Council 
Insanity 
Defense 
Committee 
Summary 
of 
Proceedings, April 24, 1981, at 4. 
 
Currently a bill is pending in the legislature that would 
address this hole in our statutes: Section 1149 of Assembly Bill 
90 (2015) proposes the creation of Wis. Stat. § 975.39, entitled 
"Competency to pursue postconviction relief," which delineates 
how 
questions 
of 
competency 
should 
be 
addressed 
during 
postconviction proceedings. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
18 
 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b) (emphasis added).10   
¶35 The statute does not appear to contemplate the 
scenario where the State takes the same position as the 
defendant and in contrast it is defense counsel who is 
questioning competency.  However, we find it informative that 
regardless of the scenario, the statute places the burden of 
proof on the State.  This reflects the legislature's policy 
choice and we see no reason to alter this statutory approach.  
Thus, the statute's framework suggests that when the issue of 
competency has arisen, and the State wants to proceed, the State 
will bear the burden of proving competency. 
¶36 This interpretation of the statute is consistent with 
our prior description of the statute's procedures.  In Byrge, 
237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶29, we stated that a court will follow the 
procedures of Wis. Stat. § 971.14 if there is reason to doubt a 
defendant's competency to proceed.   We explained that a reason 
to doubt competency can be raised by either party or by the 
court.  Id.  We observed that once a reason to doubt competency 
has been raised, the court will appoint an examiner to conduct a 
competency examination and, absent a waiver, will hold a 
competency proceeding.  Id., ¶30.  Then, without reference to 
                                                 
10 As the court of appeals observed, "[t]he differing 
burdens of proof at the trial stage serve the twin due process 
goals of protecting an incompetent defendant's right not to be 
tried while incompetent and the preconviction defendant's right 
to liberty by reducing the risk of committing a competent 
person." Daniel, 354 Wis. 2d 51, ¶8 n.4 (citing State v. Wanta, 
224 Wis. 2d 679, 695, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
19 
 
who raised the issue of competency, we stated that "[t]he court 
must find the defendant incompetent unless the State can prove, 
by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that the 
defendant is competent."  Id.11  
¶37 Admittedly, Wis. Stat. § 971.14 does not directly 
answer the question of who bears the burden of proof when a 
defendant disagrees with defense counsel regarding competency.  
Further, as stated above, the statute does not directly govern 
competency hearings during postconviction proceedings and is 
referred to solely as guidance.  Our prior interpretation of 
that statute, however, supports a conclusion that regardless of 
whether it is the defendant or defense counsel that raises 
competency, once the issue is raised, the burden is on the 
State. 
¶38 This conclusion is further supported by the untenable 
result of the alternative procedure.  Were we to place the 
burden of proving incompetency on defense counsel when defendant 
asserts competency it would create a conflict between an 
attorney's duty as an advocate and an attorney's duty as an 
officer of the court.   
¶39 Attorneys' obligations to their clients are set forth 
in the Supreme Court Rules.  One of the primary obligations is 
                                                 
11 The United States Supreme Court has likewise read Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14(4)(b) as "requir[ing] the prosecutor to prove the 
defendant's competence to stand trial once a question about 
competency has been credibly raised."  Cooper v. Okalahoma, 517 
U.S. 348, 361-62 and n.18 (1996).  
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
20 
 
that of confidentiality.  Supreme Court Rule 20:1.6(a) prohibits 
an 
attorney 
from 
disclosing 
information 
relating 
to 
representation without a client's consent: 
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, except for disclosures that are 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation,  and except as stated in pars. (b) and 
(c).12 
                                                 
12 SCR 20:1.6(b)-(c) are not relevant here.  They state: 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the 
client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act 
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to 
result in death or substantial bodily harm or in 
substantial 
injury 
to 
the 
financial 
interest 
or 
property of another. 
(c) A lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) 
to 
prevent 
reasonably 
likely 
death 
or 
substantial bodily harm; 
(2) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that is reasonably certain to result or has 
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or 
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used 
the lawyer's services; 
(3) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's 
conduct under these rules; 
(4) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of 
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and 
the client, to establish a defense to a criminal 
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon 
conduct in which the client was involved, or to 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
21 
 
SCR 20:1.6(a).   
¶40 The importance of this rule is stressed by the 
official 
comments 
to 
SCR 
20:1.6, 
which 
describe 
it 
as 
"fundamental" 
to 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship. 
S.C.R. 
20:1.6, ABA Comment 2; see also Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's 
Grove Condo. Ass'n, 2011 WI 36, ¶100, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 797 
N.W.2d 789 ("Maintaining confidentiality of information relating 
to representation is a fundamental principle in the attorney-
client 
relationship."). 
 
The 
obligation 
to 
keep 
client 
communications secret is further protected by Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.03(2) which grants a client the privilege to refuse 
disclosure of communications with the client's attorney. 
¶41 In State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 
N.W.2d 859, this court observed the potential conflict between 
an attorney's duty to a client to maintain confidentiality and 
an attorney's duties as an officer of the court under Johnson, 
133 Wis. 2d 207.  Meeks involved a competency hearing at which 
the State offered the testimony of the defendant's former 
attorney.  Id., ¶7.  Over defense counsel's objection, the 
former attorney testified about her opinions, perceptions, and 
impressions of the defendant's competency.  Id., ¶¶7-8. 
                                                                                                                                                             
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning 
the lawyer's representation of the client; or 
(5) to comply with other law or a court order. 
SCR 20:1.6(b)-(c). 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
22 
 
¶42 On review, this court determined that the former 
attorney's testimony revealed confidential information protected 
by SCR 20:1.6(a) and Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2).  Id., ¶40.  It 
stated that "it is difficult, or nearly impossible, for an 
attorney to testify regarding an opinion of the client's 
competency to proceed without violating the attorney-client 
privilege."  Id., ¶37.  It further explained that, "[a]n 
attorney's opinion of a client's mental competency is based 
largely upon private communications with the client."  Id., ¶40. 
¶43 Admittedly, the circumstances in Meeks differ from the 
facts presented in this case.  Meeks addressed a former 
attorney's testimony at a competency hearing as opposed to 
present counsel raising the issue of competency.  Nevertheless, 
Meeks provides guidance through its remarks on the interplay 
between an attorney's duty as an officer of the court and the 
attorney-client privilege.  In response to arguments about the 
duty under Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, the court held that "the 
former attorney's duty as an officer of the court does not, 
under the circumstances set forth herein, trump the attorney-
client privilege."  Id., ¶43.  The court then explained that 
Johnson's requirements were limited to merely raising the issue 
of competency:  
An attorney's duty under Johnson demands a very narrow 
and limited breach of the attorney-client privilege.  
The attorney is merely obligated to 'raise the issue 
[of competency] with the trial court.'  There is no 
requirement that the attorney testify about his or her 
reasons for raising the issue or the opinions, 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
23 
 
perceptions, or impressions that form the basis for 
his or her reason to doubt the client's competence. 
Id., ¶46. 
¶44 There is an obvious difference between raising an 
issue and having to prove it.  Meeks instructs that an 
attorney's duties under Johnson are limited to the former.  Were 
we to put the burden of proof on defense counsel, it would 
require more, upsetting the delicate balance that we laid out in 
Meeks.  The "limited breach" of attorney-client privilege 
necessary to fulfill the Johnson obligation would turn to an 
open 
door, 
requiring 
attorneys 
to 
divulge 
significant 
information gained through private communications with their 
clients.  Such a result is unpalatable and militates in favor of 
placing the burden on the State.  
¶45 A consideration of the relative interests at stake in 
postconviction competency hearings further suggests that the 
burden of proving competency should be on the State.  Burdens of 
proof "reflect and protect social values.  Courts must reduce 
the risk facing the party that has an interest of 'transcending 
value' by placing the burden of proof on the other party." 
Benjamin James Vernia, The Burden of Proving Competence to Stand 
Trial: Due Process at the Limits of Adversarial Justice, 45 
Vand. L. Rev. 199, 226 (1992) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513, 525 (1958)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 757 (1982) ("[s]tandards of proof . . . are shaped by the 
risk 
of 
error 
inherent 
in 
the 
truth-finding 
process");  
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) ("The standard 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
24 
 
serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and 
to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate 
decision.").   
¶46 An erroneous decision that a defendant is competent 
implicates weighty interests of the defendant in postconviction 
proceedings.  Such an error would substantially hinder a 
defendant's ability to pursue postconviction relief or an appeal 
because defense counsel's ability to act without direction from 
a client is limited.  Ultimate decisions regarding the objective 
of representation, and whether to undertake a postconviction 
proceeding or an appeal are left solely to the client.  Debra 
A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 125-26; see also SCR 20:1.2 ("a lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation and, as required by SCR 20:1.4, shall consult 
with the client as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued.").  Accordingly, in some circumstances, an erroneous 
decision that a defendant is competent could prevent a defendant 
from 
seeking 
postconviction 
relief 
or 
filing 
an 
appeal 
altogether, affecting the defendant's right to appeal a criminal 
conviction.     
¶47 In contrast, an erroneous decision that a defendant is 
incompetent will have little impact on the State.  As indicated 
by the procedures identified in Debra A.E., the only impact on 
the State of a defendant being declared incompetent is a delay 
of the postconviction proceedings.  188 Wis. 2d at 134 (stating 
"defense counsel may request a continuance or enlargement of 
time 
for 
filing 
the 
necessary 
notices 
or 
motions 
for 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
25 
 
postconviction relief" and permitting defendants who regain 
competency to raise issues that could not have been raised 
earlier due to incompetency).  Further, in many cases, no delay 
will even occur.  Id. at 133-34 (directing defense counsel to 
initiate or continue to seek relief on defendant's behalf where 
the defendant's assistance and decisionmaking are not necessary 
and there is no risk to the defendant).  Thus, an erroneous 
finding of incompetency will  place little burden on the State.   
¶48 Balancing the risk to a defendant of losing the 
ability to seek postconviction relief or file an appeal against 
the risk of the State having to face a delay in an appeal or 
postconviction 
proceeding, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
potential 
consequences of error additionally suggest that the burden in a 
postconviction competency hearing be placed on the State once 
the issue has been raised.   
¶49 We decline to adopt the State's suggestion that 
competency be presumed at a postconviction hearing when the 
defendant was previously determined to be competent to stand 
trial.  Competency is not static.  As we observed in Meeks, 
"[g]iven the nature of mental illness, a defendant may have been 
competent during a prior proceeding, but incompetent now, and 
vice versa."  263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶50.   
¶50 Further, 
competency 
has 
a 
different 
meaning 
in 
different circumstances.  Compare Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 126 
(At a postconviction proceeding a defendant is incompetent to 
pursue postconviction relief "when he or she is unable to assist 
counsel or to make decisions committed by law to the defendant 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
26 
 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.") with 
Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶27 ("a defendant is incompetent [to 
stand trial] if he or she lacks the capacity to understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings, to consult with counsel, 
and to assist in the preparation of his or her defense.").  
Thus, the fact that a defendant was deemed competent to stand 
trial should not create a presumption that the defendant is 
competent at a later date when the same defendant pursues 
postconviction relief. 
IV 
¶51 In this case, defense counsel raised reason to doubt 
defendant's competency.  In response, the State contended that 
the defendant was competent.  The burden should have been on the 
State to prove defendant's competency by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  The circuit court, however, placed the burden on 
defense counsel to prove incompetency by clear and convincing 
evidence and determined that defense counsel did not meet that 
burden.   
¶52 As we stated in Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶4, "[t]he 
findings of a circuit court in a competency to stand trial 
determination will not be upset unless they are clearly 
erroneous because a competency hearing presents a unique 
category of inquiry in which the circuit court is in the best 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
27 
 
position to apply the law to the facts."13  In this case, 
however, the circuit court applied the wrong law by incorrectly 
placing the burden on defense counsel to prove incompetency by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Because we agree with the court 
of appeals that it is unclear whether the circuit court would 
have reached the same result had it applied the correct burden, 
we remand with the instruction that if Daniel's competency 
remains at issue, a new competency hearing be conducted. 
V 
¶53 In sum, considering the statute governing competency 
hearings, the potential conflict of interest in placing the 
burden of proof on defense counsel, and the relative interests 
and risks at stake, we determine that once a defense attorney 
raises the issue of competency at a postconviction hearing, the 
burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence 
that 
the 
defendant 
is 
competent 
to 
proceed.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand the cause 
to the circuit court to apply the correct standard if Daniel's 
competency is still challenged. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
¶54 Justice DAVID T. PROSSER did not participate.  
 
                                                 
13 Although State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 
614 N.W.2d 477, addressed competency to stand trial we see no 
reason to apply a different standard to a decision regarding 
competency for a postconviction proceeding. 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2012AP2692-CR   
 
 
 
1