Title: Price v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

*Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV § 12. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
LOU G. PRICE, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 486, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. Nos. IN-01-07-1529 and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  IN-01-07-1530 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
)  I.D. No. 0106010693 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July 21, 2004 
Decided:  September 8, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, Justices and 
LAMB, Vice Chancellor.* 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Joseph M. Bernstein (argued) and Andrew J. Witherell, Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., (argued), Natalie S. Woloshin, and James V. 
Apostolico, Department of Justice, Wilmington for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
2
 
A Superior Court jury convicted Lou Price of First Degree Murder and 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  The trial judge 
sentenced him to life imprisonment without probation or parole on the murder 
conviction, plus an additional twenty years for the weapons offense.  In this appeal 
from his conviction, Price contends that the prosecutor in her closing argument 
argued that the evidence supported a conviction on a theory of accomplice liability 
despite the fact that the trial judge had ruled that the evidence did not support 
accomplice liability and had accordingly refused the State’s request for a jury 
instruction on the subject.   
After a review of the evidence and consideration of the applicable law, we 
affirm the conviction.  Despite her troubling tactics, the prosecutor’s inappropriate 
remarks did not, in light of substantial evidence of guilt and the trial court’s 
curative instruction, create reasonable doubt about the fairness of Price’s trial.  
Notwithstanding our conclusion that we must affirm the conviction, after careful 
review of the trial transcript and, after considering widely accepted standards of 
prosecutorial conduct, we find that the prosecutor’s actions here conflicted with 
her responsibilities under the ABA Standards of Conduct.  We, therefore, strongly 
suggest that the Attorney General take appropriate action to address this 
deficiency. 
 
3
 
I. 
 
Lou Price led a drug distribution ring operating between New York City and 
West Chester, Pennsylvania.  Jamel Daniels was one of Price’s principal cohorts.  
A Grand Jury indicted both Daniels and Price for the murder of Kensworth 
Griffith, a local drug dealer.1  For several weeks before his murder, Griffith 
avoided contact with Price because he owed him “serious money” for drugs he had 
sold on Price’s behalf.  On the day of the shooting, Griffith, Daniels and two other 
drug dealers, Jose Martinez and Jamik Mosley, met Price at a gas station.  All five 
drove around together for about an hour before Price stopped the car on the side of 
a rural road.  Price and Daniels got out and pretended to urinate and asked Griffith 
to get out of the car.  As soon as Griffith was out of the car, Price and Daniels both 
shot him, each firing at least two shots.  Price shot Griffith with a .25 caliber 
Derringer that was never recovered, and Daniels shot Griffith with a .45 caliber 
Glock that was recovered and matched by ballistic evidence. 
 
At trial, the medical examiner testified that Griffith died as a result of a 
combination of all of the shots.  Martinez, Mosley, Price’s girlfriend, and Griffith’s 
best friend each gave testimony supporting the above-recited facts.  There was 
evidence that Price paid certain individuals to supply him with a false alibi.  There 
                                                 
1 The Superior Court severed Price and Daniels’ cases for trial.  Daniel’s appeal, No. 506, 2003, 
is pending before this Court. 
 
4
was also evidence that Price and Daniels had an extremely close relationship 
(likened to “twins”) and that they often communicated without speaking.  There 
was no direct evidence, however, that Price directed Daniels to shoot Griffith.2 
II. 
 
At the prayer conference, the State repeatedly requested an instruction on 
accomplice liability.  Both of the prosecutors argued to the trial judge that the 
record evidence would support the requested jury instruction.3  It is evident that 
despite substantial evidence that Price shot Griffith, the prosecutors were not 
content to rely on that theory of the case alone.  They persistently insisted that the 
evidence also supported an accomplice liability theory as an alternative basis on 
which to convict Price of First Degree Murder.  The trial judge considered 
seriously the arguments of both parties made over the course of two consecutive 
days, but ultimately expressed his belief that there was no evidence to support an 
accomplice liability theory.  He, therefore, declined to give the State’s requested 
instruction.  We note the following instances, before his penultimate ruling, where 
the trial judge made it clear that he could find no evidence to support the requested 
instruction: 
                                                 
2 The trial judge repeatedly found that there was no direct evidence that Price told Daniels to 
shoot Griffith.  At one point, the trial judge said, “… there is no evidence that he [Price] directed 
him, not nary a witness that you can point to that Price directed Daniels.  I don’t know how you 
get around it.”  Trial Transcript at p. 88 (April 24, 2003). 
3 James V. Apostolico and Natalie S. Woloshin were the Deputy Attorneys General of record for 
the State. 
 
5
 
The Court: I don’t know how you get accomplice liability from there.  
Where is the factual basis to give it?4 
~ 
The Court:  …How did Price in any way aid – How is Daniels the 
principal?  There’s no evidence that Daniels was the Principal actor 
here.5 
~ 
Mr. Apostolico:  I understand You Honor’s view of the evidence here.  
And that is consistent with the State’s theory.  But it appears to the 
State that -- 
The Court:  If you can point me to evidence, then you got – I have a 
much different situation.  But the problem here is I don’t think you 
can.  Because what I recited was basically your opening statement. 
Mr. Apostolico:  That is correct.  State can’t argue with that. 
The Court:  I’m not opposed to giving it, but I’ve got to have, in light 
of their objection --- even before their objection I started off with that 
look.  Tell me where the evidence is.6 
~ 
Mr. Apostolico:  There’s no direct evidence in the – where you have 
Price telling Daniels, I want you to finish him off. 
The Court:  That’s the issue I have.7 
~ 
Ms. Woloshin:  That 18-page letter indicates that he orchestrated the 
drug deal and he told Mel, Jamel was to take Kenny so that Kenny 
would be the driver.  He gave Jamel the money and told them 
specifically where to go and where it was.  And I think he even writes 
in the letter, take Route 92, or whatever it is. 
The Court:  He also said, I didn’t do it, didn’t know anything about it.  
It was a beef between Mosley and – even from his statement I don’t 
have anything which in any way shows that he aided, abetted, or did 
anything other than do a drug deal that didn’t come off. 
Mr. Apostolico:  Right, I think that’s a fair statement.  (emphasis 
supplied) 
The Court: So I don’t have anything –8 
                                                 
4 Prayer Conference Tr. at p. 3  (April 23, 2003). 
5 Id. at p. 4. 
6 Id. at p. 10. 
7 Id. at p. 13. 
8 Prayer Conference Tr. at p. 14. 
 
6
~ 
Mr. Apostolico:  We think the evidence supports the principal 
accomplice relationship. 
The Court:  What are the facts to support it other than Daniels was 
Mr. Price’s alleged lieutenant?  Generally speaking, you have no other 
evidence from anything other than Daniels said, Yeah; why don’t you 
get out of the car; come on.9 
~ 
The Court: But I mean the language says the jury can be instructed – 
before the jury can be instructed as to accomplice liability, there must 
be evidence that someone other than the defendant was the principal 
whom the defendant aided and abetted.  And that is clearly not the 
case here…10  
~ 
Ms. Woloshin:  Consciousness of guilt.  This was an earlier draft. 
The Court:  What you have is what I have here.  And the 
consciousness of guilt I hadn’t – what’s your position on that? 
Mr. Bernstein: Putting that in? 
The Court:  I don’t know if they still want it. 
Ms. Woloshin:  We’d rather have accomplice liability. 
The Court:  I don’t think there’s a trade in the offing. 
Mr. Apostolico:  We don’t have strong feelings about it.  I think it is 
covered in the state of mind generally. 
The Court:  If you don’t have any strong feelings, I’m not going to 
mess with it.  Anything else you want to say on accomplice liability? 
Mr. Apostolico: No, Your Honor.  We made our position. 
Mr. Bernstein: You know our position. 
The Court:  Does it help if I give it in the next case? 
Ms. Woloshin:  You have to in that one.  (emphasis supplied) 
Mr. Apostolico:  We’ll definitely argue for it in the next one.11 
~ 
The Court: …All right.  I’m not going to, as you might have suspected 
– I just don’t see accomplice liability here.  I just don’t see it from the 
evidence.  Not that I see the legal theory.  And I do see the inference 
                                                 
9 The day after the Prayer Conference, and before the parties’ summations, final arguments were 
heard on the jury instructions.  Trial Tr. at p. 10. 
10 Trial Tr. at p. 16. 
11 Id. at p. 42-43. 
 
7
that could be drawn in some fashion.  But it’s just not the evidence to 
give in my estimation. 
… 
The Court:  All Right. So the State has the exception as to the failure 
to give accomplice liability.  Any other exception? 
Ms. Woloshin: No.12 
 
Immediately after the final conference on the instructions, Woloshin made the 
following statements during her summation: 
 
…And at this point it’s important for you to know that in Delaware, if 
you direct another person to commit a crime, you who directed them 
are just as responsible as the person you directed…. So it’s pretty 
clear that, because of their relationship, that Jamel Daniels knew what 
was going to happen and was directed by the defendant to help him 
kill Kenny [Griffith] because of the debt that Kenny owed the 
defendant.  Therefore the defendant is responsible for all of the 
injuries that Kenny suffered from the shots that Jamel Daniels fired.  
And those injuries were… (Pause.)  …And Dr. Pearlman testified that 
all of the injuries together caused Kenny’s death; multiple gunshot 
wounds caused Kenny’s death; although the most serious of those 
injuries are, first, the one to Kenny’s abdomen, one the defendant 
caused when he shot Kenny with his Derringer; and the other one was 
to the back and shoulder area, which caused damage to the lungs and 
heart, which was caused by the bullet that Jamel Daniels fired at the 
direction of the defendant.13   (emphasis added) 
 
After Woloshin finished her summation, defense counsel objected, explaining that 
he did not object during her summation because he did not want to highlight her 
comments any more than necessary. The following exchange took place: 
 
Mr. Bernstein:  …We talked, I’m going to say, ad nauseam, about 
accomplice liability and the State’s obvious desire to get an 
accomplice liability instruction, which the Court denied.  And we 
                                                 
12 Id. at p. 44, 47. 
13 Id. at p. 74-76 (emphasis added). 
 
8
agreed on causation, the language that the State proposed to the effect 
that more than one person can be responsible.  But what was argued 
here was accomplice liability.  He’s responsible for something that 
somebody else did.  I don’t know how to unring that bell, Your 
Honor.  I very strongly object.  I am asking for a mistrial.  It’s just 
improper.  They couldn’t have been more on notice that it was taboo.  
They did it anyway.  I just don’t know what to say. 
 
The Court:  Ms. Woloshin. 
 
Ms. Woloshin:  Your Honor, I discussed this issue with Mr. Bernstein 
outside before I did this.  And I told him exactly what I was going to 
say.  I said I was going to say to this jury that if they believed that the 
defendant directed either by word or deed Jamel Daniels, then he was 
responsible for what Daniels did.  And I did not imply that Daniels 
was the principal.  I simply said that, if the defendant directed, if they 
believed that the defendant directed Daniels to do this, then he’s just 
as responsible.  And this is directly in coming from – these are 
reasonable inferences from the evidence, in that the relationship 
between Jamel Daniels and Lou Price was so tight, it was an 
employee/employer relationship in some type of context other than 
say that if he believed – if he directed him, then he’s responsible. 
 
The Court:  But there is no evidence that he directed him, not nary a 
witness that you can point to that Price directed Daniels.  I don’t know 
how you get around it.  I looked up at the same breath ‘ cause I didn’t 
quite understand it…  And you also said it’s Delaware law.  And I’m 
not instructing them in that fashion.  The charge I gave you guys 
doesn’t say anything like that….So how can you say it’s Delaware 
law if I’m not going to instruct them on it?…14  (emphasis added) 
 
At this point Woloshin begins to reargue the appropriateness of an accomplice 
liability instruction.  In fact, she makes some of the same arguments that 
Apostolico had made unsuccessfully only hours earlier:  
 
                                                 
14 Trial Tr. at p. 85-88. 
 
9
Ms. Woloshin:  There was also – there was evidence about their 
relationship.  There was also testimony about the fact that Jamel 
Daniels was the one who opened the door and got Kenny out of the 
car.  There was also  -- or there’s a reasonable inference that if there 
was not – some type of understanding between the two of them, the 
reasonable inference is why did Jamel Daniels pull out his gun and 
start firing if there was no understanding between them?  Obviously, 
there had been some understanding – 
The Court:  But there must be some evidence to support that.  I mean, 
you can speculate on a lot of things that they may very well have said.  
Maybe I just misunderstood the point. 
Ms. Woloshin:  I think there was testimony about things that occurred.  
And the State can argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.  
And there’s a reasonable inference that if Jamel Daniels did nothing 
after the defendant fired his gun the reasonable inference is that they 
must have had some sort of understanding between them or else Jamel 
wouldn’t have fired. 
The Court:  I don’t know how you get to that point.  But I’ve heard 
that portion.  I really don’t.  But the question is, what do, if anything, 
we do?  I don’t think there is any evidence to support that.  But what 
do you respond to “that is Delaware law” where you have 
instructions and I have the instructions and there’s no instruction that 
Price is responsible for what Daniels does?  Don’t I have to instruct 
them as to the law? 
 
Ms. Woloshin:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
The Court:  How do we get past that?  Even if you can argue that what 
you did, you argued something – you’ve told them that Price is 
responsible for what Daniels does.  So now what do I do – there’s 
nothing in the instructions.  And the only exception the State took was 
on the accomplice liability issue, so that’s not the law.  Again, how do 
we get around that? 
 
Ms. Woloshin:  If I could have a moment Your Honor. 
(Pause.) 
 
Ms. Woloshin:  I think in that type of argument that I was making, as I 
was referring to the causation that we had instructed, that the Court 
had – that we had discussed earlier, under Delaware law, more than 
 
10
one person can be held responsible for causing the death of another.  
And if I misstated that, I apologize.  But I think that the Court can – in 
order to cure that the Court can reread the causation instruction that 
you gave.  And the Court can say I was wrong on how I phrased it.  I 
mean, this is not evidence, obviously. The Court is the ultimate 
definer of the law.  And  the Court can say that.  And the Court can 
say that I was wrong if I misstated the causation instruction. 
 
Mr. Bernstein:  . . .To try and argue that, well, I made a mistake. I 
really meant to say causation, all she had to say was that more than 
one person can be responsible, which is exactly what we agreed to.  
She didn’t begin to talk about causation then because that was at the 
tail end of the argument.  
~ 
The Court: (after reading back the disputed comments by the 
prosecutor) That’s just not an accurate statement of the evidence. It’s 
not close.  It really isn’t. I mean that part isn’t, where you say “it’s 
pretty clear that Jamel Daniels knew what was going to happen and 
was directed by the defendant to help kill Kenny because of the debt.”  
If you can point to me any witness that said that, that would take care 
of one situation, but I don’t think you can.  Interestingly enough, 
nobody even asked Mosley or Tito [Martinez]…was there any 
exchange between Daniels and Price relative to what happened after it 
happened?  I don’t think.  And there was no testimony in that regard.  
So how do we get that? 15 
 
Ms. Woloshin:  Do you want a response? 
 
The Court: Yeah.  I was being rhetorical. 
 
Ms. Woloshin:  …I argued what I thought were reasonable inferences 
from the evidence in that there must have been some understanding 
between them because the defendant got out of the car and Jamel went 
and opened the car door.  How would you know to let Kenny out of 
the car unless there was some understanding to get him out of the car? 
 
The Court:  The only testimony is they were going to Delaware to get 
the drugs from the defendant’s house.  That was the only testimony.  
                                                 
15 Trial Tr. at p. 88-91 (emphasis added). 
 
11
And that was a ruse, that there was no indication that Daniels knew 
otherwise.  There just isn’t anything. 
Ms. Woloshin:  And I think I said there must be some understanding 
between the two of them because Daniels got Kenny out of the car…16 
~ 
The Court: (after agreeing to a proposed curative instruction)  I will 
add for the purposes of the record, whatever it’s worth, I don’t think 
you intentionally intended to circumvent or do anything wrong.  I 
mean that.  That and ten cents may get you a cup of coffee.  I don’t 
think you intended to do anything improper or incorrect.  I guess that 
doesn’t change much, but still. 
 
Ms. Woloshin:  I think that’s a pretty accurate observation.  There was 
absolutely no intention on my part to circumvent the Court’s order or 
rules. 
 
The Court: I honestly don’t think there was.17  (emphasis added) 
 
III. 
 
 
We find the above related transcript excerpts astonishing.  While we hesitate 
to take issue with the trial judge’s gratuitous (and curious) comment that he did not 
think Woloshin intended to circumvent his clear ruling rejecting accomplice 
liability, we note his palpable frustration and believe that his comments were, as he 
said, mere additions “for the purposes of the record . . ., whatever it’s worth . . . .”  
It is important, we think, to focus on the long, tedious battle the State waged to 
convince the trial judge to give an instruction on accomplice liability that would 
tell a jury, in essence, that “in Delaware, if you direct another person to commit a 
                                                 
16 Id. at p. 96-98. 
17 Id. at p. 103-104. 
 
12
crime, you who directed them are just as responsible as the person you directed . . . 
.” 
 
The trial judge flatly, clearly and unambiguously rejected that requested 
instruction.  As the trial judge saw the evidence:  “ . . . – even from his statement I 
don’t have anything which in any way shows that he aided, abetted, or did 
anything other than do a drug deal that didn’t come off . . . there must be evidence 
that someone other than the defendant (Price) was the principal (Daniels) whom 
the defendant aided and abetted, and that is clearly not the case here.”  To say that 
the prosecutors were on notice that the trial judge saw no evidence to support an 
accomplice liability charge would be an understatement.  The trial judge expressly 
stated that he found “no evidence that he (Price) directed him (Daniels).”  
Nevertheless, Woloshin, present when those rulings were made on the record, 
stated in her closing that “in Delaware, if you direct another person to commit a 
crime, you who directed them are just as responsible as the person you directed . . . 
.  Therefore, the defendant (Price) is responsible . . . from (sic) the shots that Jamel 
Daniels fired.”   
 
We are mindful that the trial judge faced a dilemma.  He was at the end of a 
long First Degree Murder trial about to go off track because of the prosecutor’s 
conduct in her initial closing.  The trial judge believed a curative instruction might 
save the case from error sufficiently substantive to otherwise warrant a mistrial.  
 
13
He may also have believed that a for-the-record comment that the prosecutor did 
not intend to circumvent his rulings could reinforce his justification for opting for a 
curative instruction rather than a mistrial to resolve any unfair prejudice.  The trial 
judge may well have considered that in the future he would have to work with this 
prosecutorial team.  The prosecutor, nonetheless, not only characterized the 
evidence in a way that the trial judge had found to be unsupported by the record 
but also urged the jury to convict on a legal theory on which he had adamantly 
refused to charge.  However his efforts to salvage the trial may be viewed, we do 
not believe the record supports the trial judge’s professed conclusion that the 
prosecutor did not intend to violate his earlier ruling denying her requested 
instruction on accomplice liability. 
 
After thoroughly reviewing this record and carefully considering the 
prosecutor’s remarks about her summation and her arguments opposing the motion 
for a mistrial, we can only conclude that she intentionally ignored the trial judge’s 
clear finding that the evidence did not support a contention that Price “directed” 
Daniels to kill Griffith.  Even before her summation, the prosecutor made her 
disapproval of that ruling evident by a frustrated retort that the trial judge would 
“have to” give the accomplice liability instruction at Price’s co-defendant, Daniel’s 
 
14
trial.18  The trial judge had ruled that the evidence did not support a jury instruction 
that Price could be held responsible if he had done no more than to direct Daniels 
to shoot the victim.  Despite that ruling, Woloshin, nevertheless, informed the jury 
that “in Delaware” Price would be responsible if they determined that he 
“directed” Daniels to shoot Griffith.  The prosecutor knew that the trial judge’s 
instruction on the law of the case would present no such legal theory to the jury.  
Despite that, she unabashedly argued to the jury that the evidence supported such a 
finding.  The trial judge’s unequivocal ruling that the evidence did not support the 
theory and that his final instructions would not put the issue to the jury did not 
deter her from making certain that the jury would have an alternative theory on 
which to convict Price even if they did not believe that the evidence supported a 
finding that Price, himself, shot Griffith.   
Woloshin’s response to the defense’s objection and to the Motion for a 
Mistrial dispels any uncertainty about her intentions before the jury. 
First, she deflected responsibility for her actions by suggesting that 
Bernstein was also at fault because she “told him exactly what I [she] was going to 
say” and because Bernstein did not challenge her before she made her outlaw 
argument.  It is not defense counsel’s responsibility, however, to review a 
prosecutor’s summation for compliance with the trial judge’s rulings on proposed 
                                                 
18 A retort to which Apostolico, her co-counsel, promptly and tactfully responded:  “We’ll 
definitely argue for it in the next one.” 
 
15
instructions, nor is there any suggestion that if he had so cautioned her, that the 
caution would have caused her to rethink her position.   
Second, during her initial response to the objection, Woloshin attempted to 
reargue the State’s position on the sufficiency of the evidence to support her 
argument that Price directed Daniels to shoot Griffith, stating, “And this is directly 
in coming from – these are reasonable inferences from the evidence….”  To that 
the trial judge responded, “ But there is no evidence that he directed him, not nary 
a witness that you can point to that Price directed Daniels.  I don’t know how you 
get around it.” (emphasis added)  Undaunted and continuing to justify her blatant 
sidestep of the trial judge’s ruling, Woloshin responded: “There was also  -- or 
there’s a reasonable inference that if there was not – some type of understanding 
between the two of them.  Obviously, there had been some understanding.”   
Finally, after pausing to realize that reargument at this stage of the 
proceedings was both improper and futile, she took a different tack.  
Disingenuously, we believe, Woloshin insisted that her objectionable argument 
was simply “referring to the causation that we had instructed.”  Causation, 
however, only related to the fact that when two people shoot another at the same 
time and the multiple shots indistinguishably cause death, a jury can find both 
persons responsible.  “Causation” had absolutely nothing to do with whether Price 
“directed” Daniels to shoot Griffith and Woloshin knew that both at the time of her 
 
16
closing argument and at the time she argued against the defense’s Motion for a 
Mistrial.   
The record supports only one conclusion:  Woloshin’s refusal to accept the 
trial judge’s clear ruling on an issue that she remained determined to argue to the 
jury caused her to embark on an inappropriate legal frolic of her own.  Her actions 
reflect no concern about complying with an adverse ruling from the bench.   
The issue here is not whether the trial judge erred by refusing to give an 
accomplice liability charge where inferences from the evidence supported it.  The 
issue is whether the prosecutor’s refusal to abide by the ruling and her 
inappropriate remarks to the jury unfairly prejudiced Price in a way that 
jeopardized Price’s right to a fair trial. 
IV. 
We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct de novo to determine 
whether the conduct was improper or prejudicial.19  There can be no question that a 
prosecutor’s blatant refusal to abide by a critical ruling by a trial judge on the law 
constitutes misconduct.  Therefore, the issue becomes whether that misconduct 
warrants reversal of the conviction.20  In Hughes v. State, this Court adopted a 
three-part test to evaluate prosecutorial misconduct: "the closeness of the case, the 
centrality of the issue affected by the (alleged) error, and the steps taken to mitigate 
                                                 
19 Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002). 
20 Id. at 737. 
 
17
the effects of the error." 21  Hunter v. State22 also demands that we review the 
misconduct itself to determine if it is part of a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct; 
the repetition of which “adversely affects the integrity of the judicial process," and 
may warrant reversal.23  
The corroborative physical evidence and testimony of numerous witnesses 
convinces us that this is not a close case.  There were two eyewitnesses to the 
actual shooting, each of whom testified consistently with the other.  There was also 
evidence of an attempt by Price to “buy” an alibi defense, which demonstrated his 
awareness of guilt.  
The next factor is the centrality of the issue.  The medical examiner testified 
that Griffith died as a result of the combined effect of all of the gunshot wounds.  
Therefore, the jury would not have to find that Price directed Daniels to shoot 
Griffith in order to convict, even if the evidence supported such a theory.  The jury 
would only need to find that Price shot Griffith, since Griffith died as a result of 
the combined shots fired by Daniels and Price.   
Finally, the trial judge gave a clear curative instruction on the law and told 
the jury specifically that Price could not be held responsible for Daniels’ actions: 
                                                 
21 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981) (quoting Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C. 
1980)). 
22 Note 19, supra. 
23 Hunter, 815 A.2d at 737-738; Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 864 (Del. 1987). 
 
18
Further, I instruct you as a matter of law that you may not hold 
Mr. Price responsible for the actions of Mr. Daniels.  You may only 
consider the evidence in the record as to Mr. Price’s activities in 
determining whether he is guilty or not guilty as charged and may not 
impute anything done by Mr. Daniels to Mr. Price in that regard.  Do 
you understand?24    
 
This instruction sufficiently mitigated any unfair prejudice to Price because it took 
from the jury the issue unfairly put to it by Woloshin, and made it clear that the 
jurors were to focus on Price’s actions regardless of what Daniels may have done.  
A jury is presumed to follow the instructions given by the court notwithstanding a 
prosecutor’s outlaw argument.25  Accordingly, all three of the Hughes factors 
weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion that the prosecutor’s misconduct did not 
result in unfair prejudice that adversely affected the outcome of the case. 
 
We conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct, although inexcusable and 
regrettable, did not so compromise the integrity of the judicial process that Price 
did not receive a fair trial.  Accordingly, the conviction must be affirmed. 
V. 
In Hunter, we lamented that at least five instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct were found during 2002 that resulted in three reversals of 
                                                 
24 Trial Tr. at p. 105. 
25 Brown v. State, No. 528, 2000, 2001 Del. LEXIS 325, at *3 (Del. 2001) (juries are presumed 
to understand and follow instructions issued by the Superior Court); Pena v. State, No. 555, 2003 
(Decided August 12, 2004). 
 
19
convictions.26  We also cited a litany of cases that expressed “considerable 
concern” about a general failure to improve prosecutorial standards of trial 
conduct.27  Once again:  “For over twenty years, this Court has been admonishing 
prosecutors to follow ABA Standards of Conduct and refrain from making 
improper comments during summation that could prejudice the defendant.”28  A 
prosecutor "represents all the people, including the defendant"29 and must "seek 
justice, not merely convictions."30  Further, the American Bar Association's 
standards governing prosecution, condemn: (i) the expression of personal beliefs as 
to the credibility of witnesses;31 (ii) the misrepresentation of trial evidence;32  (iii) 
commenting on the fact that a defendant exercised his or her constitutional right to 
remain silent;33 (iv) denigrating the role of defense counsel;34 (v) misrepresenting 
the legal effect of defendant's statements;35 (vi) an appeal to the jury's sense of 
                                                 
26 815 A.2d at 731 citing Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214 (Del. 2002); Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 
653 (Del. 2002); Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281 (Del. 2002); Williams v. State, 803 A.2d 927 
(Del. 2002). 
27 Brokenbrough, 522 A.2d at 854. 
28 Williams, 803 A.2d at 928. 
29 Bennett v. State, 164 A.2d 442, 446 (Del. 1960). 
30 Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540, 544 (Del. 1979). See also State v. Torres, 744 A.2d 699, 
708 (N.J. 2000) “A prosecutor is not simply another lawyer who happens to represent the State. 
Because of the overwhelming power vested in his office, his obligation to play fair is every bit as 
compelling as his responsibility to protect the public.” 
31 Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940, 942 (Del. 2001). 
32 Morris, 795 A.2d at 659. 
33 Bowe v. State, 514 A.2d 408, 410 (Del. 1986). 
34 Walker, 790 A.2d at 1219. 
35 Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 255 (Del. 2001). 
 
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personal risk or the level of safety in the community;36 or (vii) an attempt to 
inflame the prejudices of the jury by name-calling or other pejorative language.37 
At first glance, and consistent with Hunter, this appears to be an issue that 
we would review on a “clean slate” because this Court has not seen this specific 
kind of prosecutorial misconduct in past decisions.38  However, while this 
particular instance of misconduct may enjoy “clean slate” status, this particular 
prosecutor does not.  We note for the purposes of this decision that the same 
prosecutor who committed misconduct here was also at the center of a recent 
appeal highlighting her serious failures to comply with the rules of discovery in a 
drug case.39  In an extraordinary, and likely telling, turn of events, the Attorney 
General, herself, reviewed, and then abandoned, the State’s argument on appeal 
defending this prosecutor’s conduct in that case.40  We are obligated to express our 
concern that prosecutorial misconduct leading to reversal of an otherwise error free 
conviction includes not only “repetition of the same type or category of errors,” but 
also a persistent pattern of misconduct by a single prosecutor whose actions cannot 
                                                 
36 Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 767 (Table), 1998 WL 138697 (Del. Supr.). 
37 Brokenbrough, 522 A.2d 860-61. 
38 815 A.2d at 738 citing Coyle v. State, 618 A.2d 90 (Table) (Del. 1992). 
39 See Padilla v. State, 852 A.2d 908, (Table) 2004 WL 368941 (Del. Supr.). 
40 The Attorney General, after personally reviewing the briefs and the transcript of the oral 
argument made by the offending prosecutor before this Court, determined that, in light of the 
particular errors made by the prosecutor, a nolle prosequi should have been entered after the first 
mistrial – and requested that we remand for that purpose. 
 
21
be fairly attributed to human error or honest mistake and compels equally strict 
scrutiny. 
Departure from these ethical and professional obligations should be 
remedied other than by reversing convictions as a means to punish “a blundering . . 
. prosecutor.”41  Where (as here) we can fairly conclude the unfair prejudice caused 
by such a prosecutor did not adversely affect the outcome of a trial and did not 
reflect a pattern of conduct that compromises the integrity of the judicial process, 
we must find other ways to address the prosecutor’s misconduct.   
A prosecutor is simultaneously both an officer of this Court and an officer of 
this State; the direct report of a duly elected Attorney General.  Besides performing 
the role of chief law enforcement officer of the State, the Attorney General also 
supervises prosecutors with a view to obtaining effective and uniform enforcement 
of the criminal laws.42  Thus, so as the public looks to the Attorney General when 
law enforcement runs amok, so do we when prosecutorial conduct does the same.  
The misconduct in this case was not a mere moment of incompetence, nor a matter 
of inexperience.  At best, it was outright indifference to a trial judge’s ruling.  At 
worst, the prosecutor acted with intent to prejudice the defendant's right to a fair 
                                                 
41 Torres, 744 A.2d at 708. “The purpose of our system of criminal justice is to protect the 
innocent and punish the guilty. When a criminal trial is barred without reference to the evidence 
and a potential criminal is set free, the pain of such preclusion is felt, not by the inanimate State, 
or by some penitent assistant prosecutor, but by the offender's next victim. In such a way, the 
innocent are denied the protection due them by our Constitution.” 
42 See generally 29 Del. C. § 2502 et seq. 
 
22
trial.  What is not arguable is that the prosecutor acted in a manner wholly at odds 
with her overriding duty as a prosecutor and as an officer of the court, to seek 
justice.  The Attorney General has an appropriate statutory mechanism at her 
disposal to address this situation.43  Accordingly, we refer this matter to the 
Attorney General to afford her an opportunity to take measures she deems 
appropriate. 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
                                                 
43 29 Del. C. § 2511. Tenure.  Any attorney or other employee regularly employed by the 
Department of Justice to render services shall be appointed by the Attorney General to serve 
at the Attorney General's pleasure. After 3 years full-time service the employee shall have 
attained tenure and shall continue to be regularly employed during efficient and good 
behavior and shall not be removed because of religious or political opinions or affiliations or 
except for due cause, after a hearing before a court consisting of 3 judges of the Superior 
Court of the State.