Title: Rowe v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JEFFREY WAYNE ROWE 
 
v.  Record No. 081173 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
April 17, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the conviction of Jeffrey Wayne Rowe 
(“Rowe”) for the crime of assault and battery1 of a law 
enforcement officer. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Officer Brian J. Fair (“Officer Fair”) of the Virginia 
Beach Police Department was driving on Interstate 64 from work 
to his home in Chesapeake at approximately 1:30 a.m. on July 
9, 2005.  Although he was driving his personal vehicle, 
Officer Fair was in uniform.  His uniform was dark blue, “with 
a patch on both shoulders, [and] the badge clearly displayed 
above his left breast pocket.”  During his commute home, 
Officer Fair noticed a truck being driven in a very erratic 
                     
 
1  From the bench, the trial court found Rowe guilty of 
“assaulting a police officer in the exercise of his duties.”  
In its sentencing order, the trial court found Rowe guilty of 
“A&B of Police Officer.”  Code § 18.2-57(C) makes it a Class 6 
felony to commit “an assault or an assault and battery against 
another knowing or having reason to know that such other 
person is a . . . law-enforcement officer.”  The distinction 
between the trial court’s language from the bench and in the 
sentencing order is not germane to any contested issue on 
appeal, but does account for periodic use of both terms by the 
trial court and counsel. 
manner, “cutting across” multiple lanes and at one point 
spinning out of control.  Officer Fair contacted the Virginia 
Beach Police dispatcher and stated that he believed he was 
encountering a drunk driver and requested that the Virginia 
State Police be notified.  The driver was later identified as 
Rowe. 
 
Officer Fair was informed that no State police officers 
were available to assist, so he continued to follow Rowe at a 
distance.  Officer Fair followed Rowe, who continued to drive 
erratically, for some time, losing and regaining contact with 
Rowe at least twice.  At one point, Rowe left the highway and 
stopped his truck, and Officer Fair, seeing that Rowe’s 
driver’s-side window was open, exited his vehicle and shouted 
that he was a police officer.  Rowe drove away again and 
Officer Fair resumed pursuit; he later observed Rowe losing 
control of his truck and driving on the wrong side of the 
roadway. 
 
Eventually, Officer Fair saw Rowe drive his truck into a 
“ravine” between the northbound and southbound lanes of the 
interstate.  Officer Fair informed the dispatcher that he 
believed Rowe had “wrecked bad and the vehicle had possibly 
flipped.”  Officer Fair did not follow Rowe into the ravine, 
but instead drove to the guardrail overlooking the ravine, 
approximately 25 feet above Rowe’s position.  Although the 
 
2
interstate was illuminated, lighting in the ravine area was 
“very faint.”  Officer Fair observed Rowe’s truck, stopped but 
with its headlights still on, facing the embankment where 
Officer Fair was positioned.  He heard the gears of Rowe’s 
truck grinding, and surmised that Rowe was trying to put the 
vehicle back into gear. 
 
Hoping to prevent Rowe from driving away, Officer Fair 
exited his vehicle, drew his service weapon, identified 
himself as a police officer, and ordered Rowe to shut off the 
engine.  Rowe’s driver’s-side window was open.  Officer Fair 
saw Rowe bend down as if to look under the sun visor up the 
hill, and Rowe turned the engine off.  With his firearm at the 
“low ready position,” Officer Fair commanded Rowe to put his 
hands in plain view.  Rowe complied, extending his hands out 
his window, and Officer Fair continued to walk carefully down 
the embankment toward Rowe’s truck.  When he reached the 
bottom of the embankment, he was approximately 10 yards in 
front of Rowe’s truck, and was standing directly in his 
headlights for several seconds.  Officer Fair then ordered 
Rowe to get out of the truck and lie “facedown” on the grass. 
 
Almost immediately, Rowe pulled his hands into his truck, 
put the truck in drive, and accelerated rapidly, spinning the 
wheels on the wet grass in the ravine.  Officer Fair was 
moving toward his right, away from the entrance to the ravine, 
 
3
which was also the only exit.  As Rowe moved forward, Officer 
Fair was shouting at him to stop, and threatening to shoot if 
he did not do so.  Rowe turned his truck toward Officer Fair, 
away from the exit to the ravine, as he accelerated, and 
Officer Fair responded by firing several shots at the front of 
the truck.  Officer Fair believed he had hit the engine 
because steam began to escape from the front, and the truck 
stopped between 5 and 10 feet from Officer Fair. 
 
However, the truck was not disabled, and Rowe began 
spinning his tires in reverse.  Officer Fair tried to return 
to his vehicle, which was his “safety point,” but fell on the 
wet grass.  When he looked up, Rowe was again driving directly 
at him, and he was fully illuminated by Rowe’s headlights.  
Officer Fair fired several more shots at the truck, but 
stopped when he saw Rowe turn away from him.  At that point, 
Rowe drove out of the ravine and left the area.  Officer Fair 
called the dispatcher and returned to his vehicle, where he 
was joined by Chesapeake and State police.  Chesapeake police 
officers apprehended Rowe several hours later.  When they did, 
Rowe was disheveled and smelled of alcohol, but made several 
spontaneous statements that he had “heard someone come up to 
me and say he was a police officer” and asked whether the 
arresting officer “was the police officer that shot at him.” 
 
4
 
Rowe was indicted for attempted capital murder of a law 
enforcement officer, and was found guilty of that offense in a 
bench trial.  Subsequently, he filed a motion to reconsider, 
which the trial court granted.  After accepting memoranda of 
law from both parties and viewing the scene of the encounter 
between Officer Fair and Rowe at the ravine, the trial court 
held a hearing on the motion to reconsider, at which a Law 
Enforcement Mutual Aid Agreement (“the Agreement”) signed in 
2003 by Chesapeake, Virginia Beach, and other municipalities 
was received as evidence.  The Agreement purported to give 
officers of each signatory jurisdiction “authority to enforce 
the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia and to perform the 
other duties of a law enforcement officer” when present in any 
other signatory jurisdiction “in such instances wherein an 
apparent, immediate threat to public safety precludes the 
option of deferring action to the local law enforcement 
agency.”  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 
vacated its finding of guilt on the charge of attempted 
capital murder of a law enforcement officer, and instead 
convicted Rowe of the Class 6 felony of assault and battery of 
a police officer pursuant to Code § 18.2-57(C). 
 
The Court of Appeals granted an appeal on only one of the 
two arguments Rowe asserted.  The Court held that Rowe had 
waived his argument that the assault and battery charge was 
 
5
not a lesser included offense of the attempted capital murder 
charge, and therefore denied his petition as to that question.  
Rowe v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3196-06-1 (Aug. 14, 2007).  
According to the Court of Appeals, Rowe violated Rule 5A:18, 
which limits questions on appeal to those raised in the trial 
court and incorporates the requirements of other rules, 
including Rule 5A:20, to delineate what arguments are 
preserved.  Id., slip op. at 2-3.  The Court of Appeals twice 
required Rowe to amend his Petition for Appeal so that it 
complied with the requirements of Rule 5A:20(c).  This rule 
requires that petitions for appeal include “[a] statement of 
the questions presented with a clear and exact reference to 
the page(s) of the transcript, written statement, record, or 
appendix where each question was preserved in the trial 
court.”  Rule 5A:20(c).  The Court of Appeals held that 
because the pages referenced by Rowe did not show he preserved 
the lesser-included-offense argument, Rowe “never raised this 
issue at trial,” and therefore it denied Rowe’s appeal of that 
question.  Rowe v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3196-06-1, slip 
op. at 3 (May 20, 2008). 
 
As to the sufficiency of the evidence to support Rowe’s 
assault and battery conviction, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court by unpublished opinion, 
concluding that the Agreement “gave Officer Fair authority to 
 
6
engage in the public duties of a police officer in the City of 
Chesapeake,” even though he was a Virginia Beach police 
officer.  Id., slip op. at 3.  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals held that under the circumstances of the encounter 
with Rowe, Officer Fair was “engaged in the performance of his 
public duties” within the meaning of Code § 18.2-57(C).  Id., 
slip op. at 4. 
 
We awarded Rowe an appeal on the following assignments of 
error: 
1. 
The Court of Appeals erred when it found Petitioner 
had waived the issue of whether assault of a law 
enforcement officer under Va. Code § 18.2-57 is a 
lesser-included offense to the charge of attempted 
capital murder of a police officer under Va. Code 
§ 18.2-31. 
 
2. 
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the 
trial court’s finding that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict Petitioner of assault of a 
police officer in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-
57(C). 
 
II.  Analysis 
 
A. 
Assault and Battery as a Lesser Included Offense 
 
 
Rowe first contends that assault and battery of a law 
enforcement officer under Code § 18.2-57(C) is not a lesser 
included offense of attempted capital murder of a law 
enforcement officer under Code § 18.2-31(6), and that because 
he was never indicted for the assault and battery charge, his 
conviction must be reversed.  The Court of Appeals did not 
reach the merits of this argument, holding instead that Rowe 
 
7
had waived it by failing to comply with the rules governing 
appeals to the Court of Appeals.  It is not necessary to 
specifically address the question of Rowe’s compliance with 
Rules 5A:20(c) and 5A:18 because Rowe invited the very error 
of which he now complains.  His approbation and reprobation is 
necessarily fatal to his lesser-included-offense argument. 
We have previously made clear that “[a] party may not 
approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the 
course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each 
other or mutually contradictory.  Nor may a party invite error 
and then attempt to take advantage of the situation created by 
his own wrong.”  Cangiano v. LSH Bldg. Co., 271 Va. 171, 181, 
623 S.E.2d 889, 895 (2006).  Cangiano had conceded at trial 
that language in a purchase agreement was contractual in 
nature, but then argued on appeal that the trial court erred 
when it held that he was contractually bound by it.  271 Va. 
at 180-81, 623 S.E.2d at 895.  And in Powell v. Commonwealth, 
267 Va. 107, 590 S.E.2d 537 (2004), we held that a defendant 
could not complain on appeal of the trial court’s decision not 
to disqualify jurors due to bias, when the potential bias 
complained of arose from questions asked by the defendant’s 
attorney during voir dire.  Id. at 144, 590 S.E.2d at 560. 
 
Here, the error asserted by Rowe is even more obviously 
the result of his own strategy and actions at trial.  At 
 
8
trial, Rowe advanced the assault charge – the charge of which 
he was never indicted but eventually convicted – as a more 
lenient alternative to the attempted murder charge he was then 
facing and maintained that it was a lesser included offense. 
 
On numerous occasions during trial, counsel for Rowe 
sought to rebut the attempted-capital-murder charge, asserting 
that Rowe lacked the requisite specific intent for that crime.  
Counsel for Rowe described for the trial court the possible 
consequences if it agreed with these arguments, asserting that 
“the Court clearly has options” for imposing reduced penalties 
based on lesser included offenses.  In support of his 
argument, Rowe cited and repeatedly referenced a Court of 
Appeals opinion, Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 362 
S.E.2d 193 (1987), which he claimed supported his position 
that assault and battery of a law enforcement officer is a 
lesser included offense of attempted capital murder of a law 
enforcement officer. 
 
The clearest example of this occurred on the final day of 
the original trial, when counsel for Rowe, in response to a 
specific request from the trial court, stated his belief that 
“felony assault and battery of a law enforcement officer . . . 
would be the lesser-included offense” for attempted capital 
murder.  The record of the proceedings demonstrates that Rowe 
acquiesced without objection when the trial court accepted his 
 
9
theory.  Rowe cannot now complain of the trial court’s 
adoption of the legal theory he introduced and repeatedly 
urged the trial court to adopt.  Because we hold that Rowe may 
not approbate and reprobate by inviting error and then seeking 
reversal of his conviction based upon it, it is not necessary 
to address Rowe’s claim that the Court of Appeals erred in its 
application of Rules 5A:18 and 5A:20(c). 
 
Nonetheless, Rowe argues that the Court of Appeals erred 
in failing to apply the “ends of justice” exception of Rule 
5A:18 to reach the argument.  We have held that “[a]pplication 
of the ends of justice exception is appropriate when the 
judgment of the trial court was error and application of the 
exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice or the 
denial of essential rights.”  Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 
14, 17, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 (2005). Because Rowe invited the 
error of which he complained before the Court of Appeals, the 
Court of Appeals’ refusal to consider this argument under the 
“ends of justice” exception did not sanction a “a grave 
injustice or the denial of essential rights,” and was 
therefore correct. 
B. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Rowe next argues that even if we reject his lesser-
included-offense argument, the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to support his conviction for assault and battery 
 
10
of a law enforcement officer.  This argument is reviewed under 
established principles of appellate review. 
When analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence, this Court reviews the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party at trial and considers any 
reasonable inferences from the facts proved.  
The judgment of the trial court will only be 
reversed upon a showing that it “is plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support it.” 
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 
(2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680) (citation omitted). 
 
Rowe was convicted under Code § 18.2-57(C), a subsection 
of Virginia’s statute criminalizing assault and battery.  
Under this subsection,  
if any person commits an assault . . . against 
another knowing or having reason to know that 
such other person is . . . a law-enforcement 
officer . . . engaged in the performance of his 
public duties, such person is guilty of a Class 
6 felony . . . .” 
Rowe’s essential arguments on appeal are as follows:  Rowe 
asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove at trial that 
Officer Fair was “engaged in the performance of his public 
duties” such that § 18.2-57(C) applies.  Consequently, Rowe 
contends, Officer Fair only had authority to make a citizen’s 
arrest. 
 
At trial and on appeal, Rowe has maintained that the 
Agreement has no relevance to this issue.  At trial, following 
the grant of his motion to reconsider, Rowe challenged the 
 
11
admissibility of the Agreement on grounds of relevance.  Rowe 
claimed that Code § 19.2-250(A) confines the arrest authority 
of police “to the officer’s own city or within one mile of 
that city’s corporate limits,” and that “nothing in the 
Virginia Code authorizes individual municipalities to grant 
law enforcement officers greater powers than ordinary citizens 
when those officers are outside their territorial boundaries.”  
Based on these assertions, Rowe objected to the admissibility 
of the Agreement as “immaterial and irrelevant.”  Rowe makes 
the same arguments here, asserting that because the encounter 
between Officer Fair and Rowe took place entirely outside of 
the City of Virginia Beach or the statutory extension of one 
mile, the Commonwealth failed to prove that Officer Fair was 
engaged in the performance of his duties, as required to 
support Rowe’s conviction. 
 
We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Rowe’s 
conviction for assault of a law-enforcement officer.  Although 
Code § 19.2-250 does limit the geographic boundaries of 
localities to one mile beyond their respective corporate 
limits, as Rowe contends, the Agreement, signed by both 
Virginia Beach (which employed Officer Fair) and Chesapeake 
(where the encounter took place), gives officers from one 
jurisdiction “authority to enforce the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia and to perform the other duties of a 
 
12
law enforcement officer” when present in any other signatory 
jurisdiction “in such instances wherein an apparent, immediate 
threat to public safety precludes the option of deferring 
action to the local law enforcement agency.” 
 
Rowe asserted at trial and on appeal that nothing in the 
Virginia Code authorized the provisions of the Agreement. 
However, Code § 15.2-1726 provides in relevant part that 
[a]ny locality may, in its discretion, enter 
into a reciprocal agreement with any other 
locality . . . for such periods and under such 
conditions as the contracting parties deem 
advisable, for cooperation in the furnishing of 
police services. . . .  Subject to the 
conditions of the agreement, all police 
officers, officers, agents and other employees 
of such consolidated or cooperating police 
departments shall have the same powers, rights, 
benefits, privileges and immunities in every 
jurisdiction subscribing to such agreement, 
including the authority to make arrests in 
every such jurisdiction subscribing to the 
agreement. 
Rowe does not challenge the validity of this statute, which 
authorizes the Agreement.  Whether this statutory provision 
violates the Dillon Rule2 and consequently is invalid was not 
raised by Rowe at trial or on appeal.  Accordingly, we express 
no opinion as to this issue. 
                     
 
2  “Dillon’s Rule provides that municipal corporations 
have only those powers that are expressly granted, those 
necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, 
and those that are essential and indispensable.”  Board of 
Zoning Appeals v. Board of Supervisors, 276 Va. 550, 553-54, 
666 S.E.2d 315, 317 (2008). 
 
13
 
When he encountered Rowe, who was driving recklessly and 
dangerously on a public highway, Officer Fair was faced with 
“an apparent, immediate threat to public safety.”  He reported 
the situation in an effort to have Chesapeake officers or 
State police officers handle the matter, but was informed that 
they were unavailable to do so.  This is precisely the sort of 
situation envisioned by the Agreement.  The Agreement was 
introduced as evidence before the trial court.  The statute 
that authorized it was not challenged.  The evidence presented 
was sufficient to hold that Officer Fair was “engaged in the 
performance of his public duties” at all relevant times during 
his encounter with Rowe.  
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
did not err in affirming Rowe’s conviction for assault and 
battery of a law enforcement officer.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 
KEENAN join, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the majority’s 
application of the “invited error” doctrine in this case 
sweeps too broadly and thereby implicitly permits defense 
counsel to confer upon the trial court authority to convict 
 
14
Jeffrey Wayne Rowe of an offense which is not, as a matter of 
law, a lesser-included offense of the statutory crime for 
which he was indicted. 
Rowe was indicted for attempted capital murder of a law 
enforcement officer in violation of Code § 18.2-31(6).  
Following a lengthy bench trial, Rowe was found not guilty of 
that charge.  While the indictment was not amended, Rowe was 
found guilty of felony assault and battery of a law 
enforcement officer in violation of Code § 18.2-57(C).  The 
Commonwealth has previously conceded in another case that, as 
a matter of law, a violation of Code § 18.2-57(C) is not a 
lesser-included offense under Code § 18.2-31(6) because the 
two statutes contain different definitions of the term “law 
enforcement officer.”  See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. 
App. 752, 759, 589 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc).  
Moreover, during oral argument in the present case, the 
Commonwealth properly adhered to its prior concession.  See 
also Coleman v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 196, 201, 539 S.E.2d 
732, 735 (2001) (“[s]ince assault and battery requires proof 
of a battery, it is not a lesser-included offense of attempted 
murder”). 
Basic principles frame my disagreement with the 
majority’s application of invited error under the 
circumstances of this case.  An indictment is a written 
 
15
accusation of a crime issued by a legally impaneled grand 
jury.  Code § 19.2-216.  And “no person shall be put upon 
trial for any felony, unless an indictment . . . shall have 
first been [issued] by a grand jury . . . or unless such 
person” waives the indictment and then may be tried on a 
warrant or information.  Code § 19.2-217.  In this context, we 
have recognized that the Due Process Clauses of both the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
and Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia 
require that an accused be given proper notification of the 
criminal charges against him.  Thus, we have stated that “an 
accused cannot be convicted of a crime that has not been 
charged, unless the crime is a lesser-included offense of the 
crime charged [in the indictment].”  Commonwealth v. Dalton, 
259 Va. 249, 253, 524 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2000). 
Of course, there is a permissible procedure by which the 
indictment can be amended to conform to the evidence under 
Code § 19.2-231, and it is well-established that the accused 
can waive an objection to the amendment of the indictment.  
Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 722, 667 S.E.2d 751, 761 
(2008).  Similarly, a criminal defendant charged with a felony 
offense may plead guilty to a different, reduced charge as 
part of a plea agreement.  See Palmer v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
203, 207, 609 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2005). 
 
16
In the present case, the Commonwealth did not seek to 
amend the indictment which charged Rowe with attempted capital 
murder of a law enforcement officer, nor does the record show 
that the assertions of Rowe’s defense counsel constituted an 
offer to have Rowe plead guilty to a different, reduced 
charge.  In contrast, the record is replete with numerous 
discussions between the trial court and defense counsel 
concerning whether a finding of not guilty of the attempted 
murder charge necessarily would require a dismissal of the 
case or whether the evidence would support a finding of guilt 
for a lesser-included offense.  Clearly, the trial court was 
fully aware of the limitations of its authority in that regard 
as we explained in Dalton. 
Under those circumstances, any seasoned defense attorney 
can be expected to employ a trial strategy designed to obtain, 
in the absence of a dismissal, a conviction of a lesser-
included offense and a corresponding lesser punishment than 
might have been imposed for the offense charged in the 
indictment.  Here, Rowe’s counsel unquestionably employed such 
a trial strategy in asserting that assault and battery of a 
law enforcement officer is a lesser-included offense of the 
crime of attempted capital murder of a law enforcement 
officer.  While this assertion was erroneous as a matter of 
law, the record is clear that defense counsel relied upon Wynn 
 
17
v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 362 S.E.2d 193 (1987), to 
support that assertion.  Defense counsel may have made the 
assertion in good faith, but he was simply wrong.  
Nevertheless, the trial court was also in error in adopting 
the erroneous assertion because the trial court had no 
authority to convict Rowe of a crime that was not a lesser-
included offense of the crime charged in the indictment and 
upon which Rowe was on trial. 
Certainly, the “invited error” doctrine can and should, 
in an appropriate case, be employed to bar a criminal 
defendant from “approbating and reprobating” by seeking to 
challenge on appeal an action of the trial court brought about 
through his counsel’s own purposeful conduct.  See, e.g., 
Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 143-44, 590 S.E.2d 537, 
559-60 (2004) (no error in trial court’s failure to strike for 
cause jurors made aware of defendant’s prior conviction 
through strategic decision of defense counsel to raise the 
issue during voir dire); Moore v. Hinkle, 259 Va. 479, 491, 
527 S.E.2d 419, 426 (2000) (defendant could not claim 
prejudice arising from his decision not to wear available 
street clothes and instead to appear before the jury in jail 
clothing).  The essence of invited error is the concept of 
waiver.  Conferring authority upon the trial court that is not 
authorized by statute and, indeed is prohibited, applies the 
 
18
concept of waiver too broadly.  The majority’s decision today 
will devolve upon a trial court the ability to determine not 
merely the guilt of an accused but also the crime for which he 
may be convicted though never charged, simply because a 
defense counsel has made an erroneous statement of law. 
For these reasons, I am of opinion that the Court of 
Appeals erred in failing to apply the “ends of justice” 
exception of Rule 5A:18 and grant Rowe’s petition in order to 
reach the merits of the issue as Rowe argues in support of his 
first assignment of error in this appeal.  The judgment of the 
trial court was plainly wrong because it had no authority to 
convict Rowe of a crime that is not, as a matter of law, a 
lesser-included offense of the crime for which he was charged 
in the indictment and the indictment was never amended.  
Accordingly, I would invoke the ends of justice exception of 
our Rule 5:25 and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
under the first assignment of error in this appeal and reverse 
Rowe’s conviction for a violation of Code § 18.2-57(C) as 
having been rendered by the trial court without authority to 
do so. 
 
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