Title: Avent v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CARDELL LAMONT AVENT 
 
v.  Record No. 090537   OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
January 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Cardell Lamont Avent (“Avent”) was convicted by a jury on 
charges of first-degree murder in violation of Code § 18.2-32 
and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in 
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  In this appeal, we consider 
multiple assignments of error arising from these convictions. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW1 
 
On August 17, 2005, police officers in Brunswick County, 
Virginia, responded to a call for a “welfare check” on William 
David Thomas, Jr. (“William”), whom the caller had not seen in 
several days.  Upon arriving on William’s property, Major Brian 
Roberts (“Major Roberts”) testified at trial that he detected a 
“very strong odor, like a dead carcass.”  Once inside William’s 
residence, Major Roberts saw blood stains throughout the house:  
“in the bathtub,” “in . . . the victim’s bedroom upstairs,” and 
“on the steps.”  When William’s body was not located inside his 
                     
 
1 Avent was tried separately from Meloni Thomas 
(“Thomas”), who was also charged and convicted for her 
participation in the crimes.  See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 279 
Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2010) (this day decided).  Neither 
Avent nor Thomas testified at the other’s trial.  As a result, 
the evidentiary records in the two trials are inconsistent. 
residence, the deputies searched the curtilage of his property.  
The search led the officers to a “chicken coop” that had a 
“wood door” with “a cinderblock on the ground against it.”  
Once deputies removed the cinderblock and opened the door, 
there was a “completely overwhelming,” “unbelievable odor.” 
 
Immediately inside the chicken coop, officers encountered 
“a black fender well” and “blue plastic foam insulation.”  Upon 
removing those items, “a head of a human being was exposed, and 
flies just swarmed.”  Major Roberts testified to finding a 
“very, very badly decomposed body.”  He described the head, 
later identified through dental records as William’s, as having 
“[p]art of the face almost looked like it melted off or rotted 
off.” 
 
Captain Kent Washburn2 (“Captain Washburn”) also testified 
to the presence of blood throughout the house, on walls, the 
bathtub, and floors.  In the bucket for the well outside 
William’s home, Captain Washburn discovered a “soiled shirt 
that appeared to have stained blood on it, and there was a hole 
in the chest area.”  Officers also recovered a comforter, a 
sheet to a bed, and gun parts from the well.  The bed in 
                     
2 Captain Kent Washburn was referred to in the Thomas and 
Avent records as both “Captain Washburn” and “Lieutenant 
Washburn.”  For the purpose of consistency, we will refer to 
him as “Captain Washburn” in both this opinion and in Thomas 
v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2010) (this day 
decided). 
 
2
William’s bedroom had no sheets on it, and there were “ammonia 
and bleach bottles” in his bedroom.  A piece of the gun had 
“gr[a]y duct tape” on it and the name “Winchester.” 
 
After receiving a “Crime Solver’s tip,” Major Roberts and 
Captain Washburn traveled to the Navajo County Jail in 
Kayenta, Arizona, where they encountered Avent and Thomas, 
daughter of decedent William; both Avent and Thomas were 
“people of interest in this murder case.”  During their time 
together, Major Roberts observed no injuries on Avent.  
Captain Washburn interviewed Avent and testified that Avent’s 
demeanor during the interviews was “[v]ery calm; no signs of 
being nervous or upset; showed no emotion; no signs of crying; 
and basically, did not ask anything about the Thomas family.” 
 
Over two days of interviews, Captain Washburn advised 
Avent of his Miranda rights and had Avent sign a written 
Miranda waiver.  Captain Washburn obtained “three written 
statements” from Avent, one in Avent’s own handwriting, the 
other two in question-and-answer format transcribed by Captain 
Washburn, which detailed Avent’s involvement in William’s 
death.  Avent signed each page of his statements.  Captain 
Washburn made an audio recording of the last statement Avent 
 
3
gave on the first day of interrogation in Arizona.  During the 
trial the audio recording was played for the jury.3 
Prior to trial, Avent made a motion to suppress the 
statements he gave in Arizona to Captain Washburn and Major 
Roberts on the grounds that the statements were made 
involuntarily.  Major Roberts, Captain Washburn, and Avent 
each testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. 
 
Major Roberts testified that Avent was neither threatened 
nor offered leniency in exchange for his cooperation.  Captain 
Washburn testified that the interrogation lasted “roughly 
three and a half hours, four hours.  It was on and off, after 
[Avent] had been given breaks” to use the restroom and to have 
something to drink.  Avent was fed dinner and never complained 
of discomfort. 
Major Roberts was only present for the “initial meeting,” 
in which Avent was given Miranda warnings and made his first 
verbal statement.  Major Roberts “got disgusted” with the 
“lies” Avent told the officers during the first interview and 
so Major Roberts “got up and walked out and went back to 
interview” Thomas. 
Avent described himself during the interrogation as 
“calm” and “comfortable.”  Avent further testified that he had 
                     
3 Neither the transcript of the audio recording nor the 
recording itself were made a part of the record in this 
 
4
been given food and an opportunity to sleep, and he was given 
his Miranda rights.  He testified that while he understood the 
rights, he did not waive those rights until after his 
interrogation.  Avent said he was “scared” after Major Roberts 
“got so mad that he slammed his hand down on the table and 
told  me . . . if I didn’t cooperate with him . . . that they 
were going to charge my ass with capital murder and that’s a 
life or death sentence.” 
Avent testified that the officers never touched him, and 
he did not feel threatened or scared by Captain Washburn.  On 
a number of occasions during the hearing, Avent responded that 
he understood what was occurring during the interrogation.  At 
the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court denied the 
motion to suppress, finding that there was “no threat of a 
murder charge, no threat of physical harm, [and] no promises 
of leniency.”  Further, the trial court found that Avent was 
“a man of at least average intelligence,” Avent himself said 
“he was comfortable [during the interrogation],” and Avent 
“never complained about his comfort or any physical 
discomforts.” 
Avent also made a Batson motion, arguing that the 
Commonwealth’s exercise of all five of its peremptory strikes 
on African-American potential jurors was racially motivated in 
                                                                
appeal. 
 
5
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).  
Avent is African-American.  In particular, Avent challenged 
two of the strikes exercised by the Commonwealth:  Frema 
Draughn (“Draughn”) and Chiquita Easter (“Easter”). 
The Commonwealth gave two reasons for the strike of 
Draughn.  The first was that her son was “recently stopped in 
a traffic stop and had marijuana,” but he was not charged.  
The second was that both Draughn and her father had an 
affiliation with Saint Paul’s College, and the Commonwealth 
noted that there was “friction” between the Commonwealth and 
the college because the Commonwealth “tr[ies] to prosecute 
some of [its] students” and its “chief of security was 
recently arrested for sex crimes.”  However, during voir dire, 
Draughn indicated that while her father had worked with “Saint 
Paul’s security,” he was “currently deceased.”  Avent argued 
that Draughn’s son’s alleged marijuana possession had nothing 
to do with her, and he noted that the affiliation with the 
college was a “positive rather than negative.” 
The Commonwealth also cited two reasons for its strike of 
Easter.  First, during voir dire “she appeared to be 
sleeping.”  Second, she “has been sued multiple times in civil 
matters, owes money,” and she indicated on her intake form 
that she had a disability, but the Commonwealth was unclear of 
what that disability was. 
 
6
The trial court denied Avent’s Batson motion, holding 
that all five strikes were made for “facially valid race-
neutral reasons” and Avent failed to demonstrate that the 
Commonwealth’s race-neutral reasons were “mere [pretext] and 
not supported by the evidence.”  The trial court then 
impaneled the jury, and began the trial. 
At trial, Captain Washburn read Avent’s written 
statements into evidence.  In Avent’s hand-written statement, 
Avent stated that he, Thomas and her three children went to 
William’s house so Thomas could “get her checks.”  Thomas 
entered William’s house “[t]hrough a window on the porch.  She 
moved the storm door and went inside through a window.”  His 
narrative continued: 
[Thomas] went in the house to get her 
checks.  I heard arguing, so I went in the 
house.  Next thing I know, I was hit.  I falled 
[sic] down on the floor while still being hit.  
I, Cardell, looked up and it was her father.  
He then put his hands around my neck and 
started choking me.  I was afraid for my life.  
I started wiggling trying to get away. 
 
He stopped and went upstairs.  I followed 
behind him slow to see what he was doing.  When 
I got upstairs, I was hit with a board a few 
times.  Once again, I was afraid for my life, 
so I turned my head away, at the same time, 
pulled out the gun and shot it one time; not 
noticing where I was shooting at, I just wanted 
him to stop hitting me.  I turned back around, 
and he was running towards me still, so I took 
the gun and only hit once.  He was still 
fighting me, so I kept on hitting him until he 
stopped.  [Thomas] then came upstairs. 
 
7
 
I was scared, so we dragged him outside to 
the shed.  I then went to the car to check on 
the kids.  After I checked on the kids, I went 
to see what [Thomas] was doing.  She was 
cleaning up.  I wiped off a few things, I can’t 
remember what they are, and then we left. Got 
to North Carolina, she gave her checks to John, 
and we came to Arizona. 
 
 
In response to Captain Washburn’s questions, Avent 
estimated that the altercation with William occurred “between 
August 7th and the 11th of 2005” at “around 1:00 P.M. or 2:00 
P.M.”  Avent said that he followed William upstairs because he 
“was mad, because [William] had choked [him].”  Avent “wanted 
to tell [William] that [William] was wrong for hitting [Avent] 
and tell him why [Avent] was down the[re], but [William] kept 
hitting [Avent].”  When Avent got upstairs, William “swung a 
board at [Avent] and kept on swinging.”  Avent told Captain 
Washburn that he was “bleeding somewhere on [his] head” as a 
result of the fighting with William. 
Avent stated that he hit William in the face three to 
five times with the barrel of a sawed-off shotgun.  After he 
stopped hitting William, Avent “was leaning up against the 
wall and [his] head was hurting.”  Avent acknowledged that he 
assisted Thomas in removing William’s body from the house, 
stating that he “was tired and help[ed] her drag the best I 
could, but [Thomas] did most of the dragging.” 
 
8
Avent described the shotgun as an old, two-foot long, 
single-barrel Winchester with gray duct tape on it.  When 
asked about the gun’s whereabouts, Avent answered that he 
“threw some pieces in the wood[]s while we were riding down 
the road.  I threw them out of the car window, somewhere in 
North Carolina.”  Avent also threw away a black hooded-type 
jacket that he was wearing during the assault. 
 
In the statements recorded by Captain Washburn, Avent 
asserted that Thomas had placed the gun parts, bed sheet, 
comforter, and towels in the well, Thomas put William’s body 
in the shed and covered him up with the black fender well, and 
Thomas closed the shed door and put a brick behind the door.  
Avent stated that he had “never shot [the gun] until that day 
at [William’s] house.” 
During the interviews, which took place approximately two 
weeks after William’s body was recovered, Captain Washburn 
photographed portions of Avent’s body that Avent identified as 
being injured.  Captain Washburn was not able to “see any 
visible injury” either on Avent’s head where he contended he 
bled after being hit by a board, or on his neck where he 
claimed William had choked him.  Captain Washburn did observe 
a “bruise on [Avent’s] left arm and also a mark on his left 
leg,” both of which were the size of a dime or smaller.  Avent 
said the injuries to his arm and leg came from “the struggle.”  
 
9
Captain Washburn recovered various pieces of wood around the 
crime scene, including one in the well, which were “only . . . 
small pieces of wood,” about “the size of two fingers put 
together.” 
Other people saw Avent shortly after the incident.  John 
Bass (“Bass”) testified that he met Avent and Thomas at a fast 
food restaurant in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina on the day 
in question in response to Thomas’ request that he cash a 
check for her.  Bass got within “15, 20” feet of Avent and he 
did not notice any visible signs of injury or anything that 
suggested that he was injured.  Tami Rose saw Avent in Arizona 
on approximately August 14th.  She did not notice any injury 
to Avent. 
Lieutenant Reeder Nez (“Lt. Nez”) of the Department of 
Criminal Investigation for the Navajo Nation, in Kayenta, 
Arizona, testified that Kayenta, Arizona, is “really a remote 
area” located on the Navajo reservation.  On September 1, Lt. 
Nez went to a residence in Arizona where he found Avent.  Lt. 
Nez testified that Avent neither seemed injured nor emotional 
in any way. 
Crime scene investigators testified about the state of 
William’s house.  Special Agent Thomas Embry was responsible 
for the exterior crime scene.  He testified that the distance 
from William’s house to where the body was discovered was 123 
 
10
feet.  Forensic scientist James Bullock testified that the 
wood and metal pieces recovered from the scene of the crime 
came from the shotgun admitted into evidence. 
A forensic expert, Marjorie E. Harris, testified that “a 
blood source [underwent forcible] events in the threshold of 
[William’s] bedroom, and [blood flew] out into the hallway.”  
She observed “so much [blood] that it actually drained through 
the holes in the floor.”  There was blood spatter indicating 
trauma both while the victim was upright, and while he was 
supine.  She concluded that the blood patterns in William’s 
room were consistent “with one sequence of events where the 
injury begins in the northeast corner with the blood source 
high.  The blood source is mobile, travels, ends up in the 
threshold of the door, is now low, and then is consequently 
moved out of the bedroom . . . across the hallway, down the 
steps.” 
Dr. Bill Gormley (“Dr. Gormley”), Assistant Chief Medical 
Examiner, testified that the cause of William’s death “was 
certified as blunt force injury to the head.”  William’s skull 
had “comminuted fractures of the . . . facial skeleton [and] 
rare small metallic foreign bodies.”  William had sustained a 
fracture of the right radius, and his chest contained multiple 
small fragments of metal.  Dr. Gormley testified that William 
was missing portions of his skull due to the extensive 
 
11
fractures and decomposition, and William’s lower mandible was 
dramatically displaced.  Dr. Gormley concluded that the 
shotgun wound or wounds were not necessarily lethal, but 
rather William died from the blunt force trauma to his skull. 
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Avent made a 
motion to strike on three separate grounds: (i) Avent acted in 
self-defense as a matter of law, (ii) the Commonwealth failed 
to prove sufficient evidence of premeditation, and (iii) the 
Commonwealth failed to prove murder and therefore the trial 
court should reduce the homicide charge to voluntary 
manslaughter and strike the use of a firearm charge.  The 
trial court denied the motion to strike on all three grounds. 
Regarding Avent’s claim of self-defense, the trial court 
stated that “[o]nce the defendant pursued the decedent up the 
stairs, he lost the defense of justifiable homicide.”  
Likewise, the trial court ruled the defense of excusable 
homicide unavailable because of Avent’s failure to retreat 
from the place of the attack.  The trial court noted “[i]t was 
at the very door where the defendant had the opportunity to 
extricate himself from the difficulty where the deadly force 
used by the defendant took place.”  Accordingly, the trial 
court denied Avent’s motion to strike on the basis of self-
defense. 
 
12
With regard to Avent’s contention that the Commonwealth 
failed to prove premeditation, the trial court noted that in 
this case, Avent inflicted a nonfatal wound on William, and 
“thereafter inflicted multiple blunt force trauma sufficient 
to . . . cause [William’s] death.”  Accordingly, the trial 
court concluded that the Commonwealth established a prima 
facie case of premeditation. 
Finally, the trial court found Avent’s motion to strike 
the charges of first- and second-degree murder unavailing.  
The trial court noted that malice may be presumed by the use 
of a deadly weapon, and in this case Avent had used the 
shotgun both as a firearm and a bludgeon.  Accordingly, the 
trial court denied Avent’s motion to strike. 
 
Prior to the presentation of defendant’s case-in-chief, 
Avent proffered testimony regarding his state of mind during 
the altercation that led to William’s death.  Avent sought to 
testify about the effect that statements made by William to 
Thomas had on Avent’s state of mind at the time of the 
incident.  Avent contended that prior to the altercation, 
Thomas told him that William “didn’t like black people, that he 
didn’t approve of her dating black men, and he didn’t approve 
of her kids being . . . of mixed races.”  Avent asserted that 
he was present when William told Thomas that Avent was not 
 
13
allowed on his property because William “didn’t like [Avent or] 
the color of [his] skin.” 
 
The trial court found Avent’s proffered testimony 
inadmissible for several reasons.  First, the court determined 
it was hearsay because it was being offered to prove William’s 
alleged racism.  Second, it was inadmissible because it was 
irrelevant:  William’s “views on race relations [we]re not an 
issue” in the case and were therefore collateral.  Finally, 
there would be no opportunity to cross-examine William — and 
likely no opportunity to cross-examine Thomas — regarding the 
statements.  Additional argument followed the trial court’s 
ruling, after which the trial court commented that William’s 
statements were “so removed in time and so irrelevant to this 
case that the Court believes they have no probative value.” 
 
Avent then testified on his own behalf.  Avent testified 
that he had smoked an entire six-inch “blunt” of marijuana and 
consumed a 32-ounce bottle of Colt 45 beer approximately “30, 
35 minutes before” he arrived at William’s house.  Avent stated 
that he was “pretty much high” when he arrived at William’s 
house, and he was intoxicated during the assault. 
 
Avent testified that he and Thomas, along with Thomas’ 
three sons, had gone to William’s house to get Thomas’ checks.  
Thomas entered the house and was inside for “10 or 15 minutes” 
when Avent heard “arguing” and a “loud bang noise.”  Avent 
 
14
claimed that he retrieved the shotgun from the trunk of the car 
and brought the gun into the house concealed in his pants in 
response to the “loud banging noise,” and because he was 
“paranoid” and “scared” as a result of “smoking [marijuana] and 
drinking [alcohol]” Avent testified that he went into “the 
house to get [Thomas] out of the house before she get herself 
into any trouble or whatever.”  Avent stated that he did not 
plan on killing, assaulting, or injuring William when he 
entered the house. 
 
According to Avent, William attacked him and struck him 
multiple times in the face with “his fist and his hand” once 
Avent entered from the outside into the kitchen.  Avent also 
asserted that William said, “Nigger, what are you doing in my 
house?” while he was striking Avent.  Avent claimed that 
William hit Avent three times “at the most” and choked him as 
well.  Avent stated that William’s attack “put fear in [him].  
[He] was scared and [he] was mad” because he felt William was 
“really going to hurt” him, and because he thought William was 
attacking him “just because of the color of [his] skin.” 
 
When the choking ceased, William “got up and he said, ‘I 
got something for you.’ ”  William then “turned around . . . 
and started going towards the stairs and up the stairs.”  Avent 
testified that he “had a good idea that [William] was going to 
get a gun.”  Avent followed William “upstairs behind him to 
 
15
stop him and tell him I wasn’t there to fight him” because he 
was aware that Thomas’ sons were in the car and Avent “wasn’t 
going to go out to the car and put the kids’ life on the line.” 
 
Avent claimed that once Avent got upstairs, William “hit 
[him] in the back of [his] head . . . [w]ith a board” which 
caused bleeding from “the back left of [his] head.”  Avent 
testified that he “got madder and madder” because he “was 
telling [William] the whole time” William was hitting him that 
Avent “wasn’t there to fight him.”  In addition to the injury 
to his head, Avent stated that he suffered injuries “on both of 
[his] arms . . . as far as knots and swelling” and “knots and 
swelling and a bruise on [his] left leg, too.” 
 
Avent testified that he was “holding up [his] arms” to 
protect himself from William, and finally drew the shotgun 
because he “just got so mad that [William] kept on hitting” him 
and because he “was scared of [William] possibly taking [his] 
life and hurting” him.  Avent stated that when he fired the 
shotgun at William, William was “30 feet” away from Avent.  
Avent was unable to answer whether William was “moving towards” 
him or away from him when Avent shot him.  Avent asserted that 
he “just pulled out the gun, turned [his] head away and shot” 
the gun. 
 
After Avent shot William, a fight ensued.  Avent testified 
that William “still came towards” Avent and William “was 
 
16
swinging.”  Avent testified that he “got madder and madder, so 
I hit him back hard one time.  He fell down on the floor, and I 
just continued to hit him” with the barrel of the gun.  William 
fell after Avent hit him one time, and Avent stated “I think he 
lost or he dropped the board as soon as he fell and hit the 
floor” and he never regained possession of the board.  Avent 
testified that while William was on the ground, Avent “was 
bending over,” striking him with the shotgun.  Avent stated 
that after he stopped hitting William, Avent “had got 
overheated and blacked out, and [he] fell to the floor.” 
 
Avent asserted that he was dazed for a “split-second,” and 
when he regained consciousness, he helped Thomas remove 
William’s body from the house because he was scared.  He also 
took the board William used to hit him because he was scared 
and “wanted to get rid of the evidence that was there.”  Avent 
and Thomas were cleaning up the scene for approximately “30 
minutes” and they then left together, first for North Carolina 
and then Arizona. 
 
Avent conceded that he had not been truthful when he told 
investigators that he had never fired the shotgun prior to that 
time, stating that he “simply forgot.”  Avent added that during 
his interrogation, Major Roberts had threatened him with a 
capital murder charge if he did not cooperate and as a result 
Avent was scared and “in like a shock state or zone.”  Avent 
 
17
also contended that most of his injuries had healed by the time 
the officers interviewed him in Arizona. 
 
On cross-examination, Avent conceded that on the audio 
recording, the final question asked was whether Avent “had 
anything else at all to say about what had happened.”  Despite 
that opportunity, Avent admitted that during the interrogation 
he made no mention of the loud banging noise, his use of drugs 
or alcohol, William’s use of a racial slur, the threat Major 
Roberts allegedly made to him, or Avent’s disposal of the board 
he alleged William had used to attack him.  On several 
occasions in his testimony, Avent responded that there were a 
number of things he and Captain Washburn had discussed that 
were not in his written statements. 
 
At the close of all the evidence, Avent renewed his motion 
to strike on the following grounds:  (i) the Commonwealth’s 
case should be struck on the grounds of self-defense, (ii) his 
intoxication negated the element of premeditation and therefore 
the charge of first-degree murder should be struck, and (iii) 
the Commonwealth’s evidence only supported a conviction of 
voluntary manslaughter and therefore the use of a firearm in 
the commission of a felony should be struck.  The trial court 
denied Avent’s renewed motion to strike. 
 
The trial court held that Avent was not entitled to a 
defense based on justifiable self-defense because Avent 
 
18
followed William upstairs after the initial altercation had 
ended.  Nor was Avent entitled to a defense based on excusable 
self-defense because he failed to “retreat as far as he safely 
could under the circumstances,” he did not make a “good-faith 
attempt to abandon the fight,” and he “used more force than was 
reasonably necessary to protect himself from the threat of 
harm.” 
 
The trial court found that Avent’s voluntary intoxication 
was not sufficient “to render him incapable of premeditation” 
and accordingly denied Avent’s motion to strike on that basis.  
The trial court further noted that “the facts taken in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth have not changed 
significantly” from the time of Avent’s previous motion to 
strike the charges of first- and second-degree murder, 
therefore “they are still proper charges for the trier of fact 
to consider.”  Accordingly, the trial court denied Avent’s 
motion to strike on that basis. 
 
Avent proffered the following jury instruction on 
justifiable self-defense: 
If you believe that the defendant was without 
fault in provoking or bringing on the 
difficulty, and if you further believe that the 
defendant reasonably feared, under the 
circumstances as they appeared to him, that he 
was in danger of being killed or that he was in 
danger of great bodily harm, then the killing 
was in self defense, and you shall find the 
defendant not guilty. 
 
19
 
The trial court refused to give this instruction, holding that 
the “evidence does not exist to grant the instruction as a 
matter of law” because “the defendant used more force than was 
reasonably necessary to protect himself from threat and harm.”  
The trial court also noted that Avent’s statements about being 
angry “lead[] into manslaughter, but also to a great extent, 
vitiate[] self-defense.” 
 
Among other instructions, the trial court gave the jury 
instructions on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and 
voluntary manslaughter.  The jury was also given an 
instruction on voluntary intoxication:  if Avent was “so 
greatly intoxicated by the voluntary use of alcohol and drugs 
that he was incapable of deliberating or premeditating, then 
you cannot find him guilty of murder in the first degree.”  
The jury found Avent guilty of first-degree murder and use of 
a firearm in the commission of murder. 
 
During the penalty phase, Avent objected to the following 
argument made by the prosecutor:  
The cruelty and the brutality of that murder 
has to be punished, and what does he deserve as 
punishment for that?  He deserves to spend 
every day of the rest of his natural life in 
prison. 
 
Now, the second thing that I’d ask that 
you consider, not only as punishment for him, 
but the second thing is to look at the danger 
he would pose if he wasn’t in prison because if 
 
20
you do anything else less than life, anything 
less, then one day he’s going to walk out of 
that prison cell, and he’s going to come back 
in this society. 
 
Avent moved for a mistrial based on “improper and 
inappropriate” argument.  The trial court denied Avent’s motion 
for a mistrial, and overruled his objection on the ground that 
“the Commonwealth ought to be able to argue restraint.”  The 
jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment plus three 
years. 
Following his conviction, Avent made a motion for a new 
trial based on after-discovered evidence.  At a hearing on the 
motion, Deborah Burkett (“Burkett”), a social work supervisor 
with the Brunswick County Department of Social Services, 
testified that “10, 12 years ago” a “child protective service 
complaint” was received regarding the victim, William.  The 
complaint was initially filed by “somebody within the community 
who [William’s wife] had gone to.” 
Burkett testified that there was a letter indicating that 
William “had abused his wife and that social services assisted 
her in moving to federal housing.”  There was also “a complaint 
being made of [William] being accused of beating his toddler 
boys with switches.”  Record of this complaint had been 
“expunged from [the] agency” having “surpassed the timeframe to 
be retained.”  Apart from that complaint, William’s wife on 
 
21
“numerous later occasions [] presented [William] as being a 
very loving, caring, father/husband.”  Burkett testified that 
she had not heard of any reputation in the community for 
violence on the part of William. 
 
The Commonwealth conceded at the hearing that it had not 
discovered this information until after the trial and after it 
had exercised due diligence.  Additionally, the Commonwealth 
admitted that the evidence was not cumulative or collateral 
because “there was no other evidence of any reputation of 
violence or prior acts of violence.” 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 
determined that the proffered after-discovered evidence “almost 
certainly would not have produced an opposite result at trial.”  
The trial court reached this result in part because it had 
decided that “the defendant could not avail himself of a self-
defense instruction.”  Additionally, the trial court expressed 
doubt that the evidence would be admissible. 
 
Avent timely filed his notice of appeal, and the Court of 
Appeals, per curiam, denied by unpublished order his petition 
for appeal.  Avent v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2941-07-2 
(October 21, 2008).  A three-judge panel affirmed the denial of 
Avent’s appeal.  Avent v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2941-07-2 
(February 26, 2009).  Avent timely filed his notice of appeal 
 
22
and we awarded an appeal on the following ten assignments of 
error: 
1. 
The Court erred in refusing to grant the defense 
counsel’s Motion to Suppress his statements on the 
grounds that they were not voluntary. 
2. 
The Court erred when it denied defense counsel’s 
Baston [sic] motion. 
3. 
The Court erred by refusing to allow in evidence of 
the defendant’s state of mind as it pertained to the 
defenses of voluntary manslaughter and self-defense. 
4. 
The Court erred in refusing to grant the defense 
counsel’s Motion to Strike on the basis that the 
defendant acted in self-defense. 
5. 
The Court erred in refusing to grant the defense 
counsel’s self-defense jury instruction. 
6. 
The Court erred in failing to find the defendant 
guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and in failing to 
thus, acquit him of use of a firearm.  
7. 
The Court erred in failing to grant defense 
counsel’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of 
improper argument at the penalty phase by the 
Commonwealth.   
8. 
The Court erred by denying the defense counsel’s 
motion for a new trial based on after-discovered 
evidence. 
9. 
The defendant should have been acquitted of first 
degree murder as the element of premeditation was 
negated by intoxication. 
10. The Court erred when it found that there was 
sufficient evidence to find that the defendant 
premeditated, as to support a conviction for first 
degree murder. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  PRE-TRIAL ISSUES 
1.  Motion to Suppress 
 
Avent argues that it was error for the trial court to 
deny his motion to suppress the statements he made to the 
officers in Arizona because the statements were obtained in a 
 
23
manner that “arguably falls under coercive police activity due 
to the duration of time that [Avent] was held and questioned, 
and the threatening remarks that were made to him.” 
a.  Standard of Review 
 
“The standard of review for determining whether a 
defendant’s confession was voluntary is well-established . . . 
Voluntariness is a question of law, subject to independent 
appellate review.”  Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 262, 268-
69, 462 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1995.)  “Subsidiary factual 
questions, however, are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness.”  Id. at 268, 462 S.E.2d at 116 (citations 
omitted). 
b.  Analysis 
 
“If the suspect’s will has been overborne and his capacity 
for self-determination critically impaired, the confession is 
considered involuntary and its use is unconstitutional.”  Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
The test to be applied in determining 
voluntariness is whether the statement is 
the ‘product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker,’ or 
whether the maker’s will ‘has been overborne 
and his capacity for self-determination 
critically impaired.’  Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).  In 
determining whether a defendant’s will has 
been overborne, courts look to ‘the totality 
of all the surrounding circumstances,’ id. 
at 226, including the defendant’s background 
and experience and the conduct of the 
 
24
police, Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 
454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987). 
 
Midkiff, 250 Va. at 268, 462 S.E.2d at 116 (quoting Burket v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 611, 450 S.E.2d 124, 132 (1994)). 
 
The record in this case, which includes Avent’s own 
testimony, indicates that his will was not overborne and his 
capacity for self-determination was not impaired.  Avent was 
apprised of his Miranda rights by the interrogating officer, he 
was given food and an opportunity to sleep, and he described 
himself as “calm” and “comfortable” throughout the questioning. 
 
The trial court, acting as the fact-finder, found that 
there was “no threat of a murder charge, no threat of physical 
harm, [and] no promises of leniency.”  Further, the trial court 
found Avent to be “a man of at least average intelligence,” 
thereby capable of understanding the nature of his 
interrogation, a fact to which Avent agreed in his testimony. 
 
Recognizing as we did in Midkiff that “[a]ll police 
interviews of suspects have coercive aspects to them by virtue 
of the fact that the interrogating officer is part of a system 
which may ultimately charge the suspect with a crime,”  250 Va. 
at 269, 462 S.E.2d at 117, nothing in the record before us 
requires a reversal of the trial court’s denial of Avent’s 
motion to suppress.  The trial court properly assessed whether 
Avent’s will was overborne under the circumstances, and 
 
25
credited the officers’ testimony — a factual determination to 
which we accord deference.  Accordingly, the trial court did 
not err when it denied Avent’s motion to suppress. 
2.  Batson Motion 
 
Avent contends the trial court erred when it denied his 
Batson motion. 
a.  Standard of Review 
 
“On appellate review, the trial court’s conclusion 
regarding whether reasons given for the strikes are race-
neutral is entitled to great deference, and that determination 
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly 
erroneous.”  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 437, 587 
S.E.2d 532, 543 (2003). 
b.  Analysis 
When a defendant raises a challenge based on 
Batson, he must make a prima facie showing that 
the peremptory strike was made on racial 
grounds. At that point, the burden shifts to 
the prosecution to produce race-neutral 
explanations for striking the juror. The 
defendant may then provide reasons why the 
prosecution's explanations were pretextual and 
the strikes were discriminatory regardless of 
the prosecution's stated explanations. Whether 
the defendant has carried his burden of proving 
purposeful discrimination in the selection of 
the jury is then a matter to be decided by the 
trial court. 
 
Id. at 436, 587 S.E.2d at 542. 
 
26
 
In this case, it was incumbent upon Avent to demonstrate 
that the reasons advanced by the Commonwealth for striking 
these potential jurors “were purely a pretext for 
unconstitutional discrimination,” Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 
Va. 362, 407, 626 S.E.2d 383, 412 (2006).  On appeal, Avent 
only focuses upon two jurors. 
 
The trial court found that the Commonwealth offered 
“facially valid race-neutral reasons” for the exercise of its 
strikes, and at that point the burden shifted back to Avent.  
Avent did not offer any evidence or argument that the 
Commonwealth’s proffered rationale behind the two strikes 
challenged in this appeal were pretextual.  Accordingly, the 
trial court was not clearly erroneous in denying Avent’s Batson 
motion.  
B.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
1.  Evidence of Avent’s State of Mind 
 
Avent argues that the trial court erred when it ruled 
that certain statements made by William to Thomas, later 
relayed to Avent, were inadmissible.  
a.  Standard of Review 
Generally, we review a trial court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence using an 
abuse of discretion standard and, on appeal, 
will not disturb a trial court's decision to 
admit evidence absent a finding of abuse of 
that discretion. 
 
 
27
John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 274 Va. 581, 590, 650 S.E.2d 851, 
855 (2007). 
b.  Analysis 
 
Avent asserts that his proffered testimony regarding 
William’s disapproval of African Americans was “relevant and a 
material issue” to his case, namely the impact this 
information had on Avent’s “mental state, as to reasonable 
provocation, heat of passion, and self-defense claims.”  We 
disagree with Avent and hold that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it excluded Avent’s proffered 
testimony.  The trial court found that the statements William 
made to Thomas were “so removed in time and so irrelevant to 
this case that the Court believes they have no probative 
value.”  “[A] great deal must necessarily be left to the 
discretion of the [trial court], in determining whether 
evidence is relevant to the issue or not.  Evidence is 
relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove an issue in a 
case.”  Id.  (Citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Regarding Avent’s claim of reasonable provocation, we 
have held that “provocation cannot be relied upon to reduce 
murder in the second degree to manslaughter, unless the 
provocation has so aroused the anger of the assailant as to 
temporarily affect his reason and self-control.”  Jacobs v. 
Commonwealth, 132 Va. 681, 685, 111 S.E. 90, 92 (1922). 
 
28
In this case, the trial court found William’s alleged 
statements “so removed in time” as to be irrelevant to the 
issue of reasonable provocation.  We agree.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
excluded Avent’s proffered testimony as irrelevant. 
2.  Motions to Strike 
 
At the conclusion of the presentation of all the 
evidence, Avent made several motions to strike.  Avent 
contends that it was error for the trial court to deny his 
motion to strike the Commonwealth’s case on the basis of self-
defense.  In the alternative, Avent argues that the trial 
court erred when it denied his motion to strike the charge of 
first-degree murder on the grounds that his voluntary 
intoxication negated the element of premeditation, and his 
motion to strike the charges of first- and second-degree 
murder on the basis that the evidence only supported a charge 
of voluntary manslaughter.  Avent further contends that if the 
charges of first- and second-degree murder were struck, the 
trial court was required to strike the charge of use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony. 
a.  Standard of Review 
 
We review the trial court’s ruling denying 
the motion to strike in accordance with well-
settled principles: 
 
 
29
When the sufficiency of [the 
Commonwealth’s] evidence is challenged 
by a motion to strike, the trial court 
should resolve any reasonable doubt as 
to the sufficiency of the evidence in 
the [Commonwealth’s] favor and should 
grant the motion only when it is 
conclusively apparent that [the 
Commonwealth] has proven no cause of 
action against defendant, or when it 
plainly appears that the trial court 
would be compelled to set aside any 
verdict found for the [Commonwealth] as 
being without evidence to support it. 
 
Banks v. Mario Indus., 274 Va. 438, 454-55, 650 S.E.2d 687, 696 
(2007) (quoting Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 272 Va. 
177, 188, 630 S.E.2d 304, 311 (2006)). 
b.  Analysis 
i.  Self-defense 
 
Avent asserts that it was error to deny his motion to 
strike the Commonwealth’s evidence on the grounds that he 
acted in self-defense as a matter of law.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
party opposing the motion to strike at trial, we hold that the 
trial court did not err when it denied Avent’s motion to 
strike based upon self-defense. 
 
“Killing in self-defense may be either justifiable or 
excusable homicide.  Justifiable homicide in self-defense 
occurs where a person, without any fault on his part in 
provoking or bringing on the difficulty, kills another under 
 
30
reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm to 
himself.”  Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 975, 234 
S.E.2d 286, 290 (1977) (emphasis added) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
The trial court correctly held that Avent’s own 
statements to the police prohibit him from the benefit of 
self-defense as a matter of law.  In Avent’s handwritten 
account of the events, he stated that William “stopped 
[hitting Avent] and went upstairs.  [Avent] followed behind 
him slow to see what he was doing.”  In response to Captain 
Washburn’s question, Avent said that he followed William 
upstairs because he “was mad, because [William] had choked” 
him. 
 
By Avent’s own account, an angry Avent followed William 
upstairs in William’s home, following an altercation, and 
carrying a sawed-off shotgun.  Based on the evidence, Avent 
was not “without any fault on his part in provoking or 
bringing on the difficulty.”  Id.  Accordingly, the trial 
court did not err when it denied Avent’s motion to strike 
based on justifiable self-defense. 
 
The trial court denied Avent’s motion to strike based on 
excusable homicide due to Avent’s failure to retreat from the 
scene of the altercation and his use of excessive force. 
 
31
Excusable homicide in self-defense occurs where 
the accused, although in some fault in the 
first instance in provoking or bringing on the 
difficulty, when attacked retreats as far as 
possible, announces his desire for peace, and 
kills his adversary from a reasonably apparent 
necessity to preserve his own life or save 
himself from great bodily harm. 
 
Id. 
 
As recounted above, rather than exit from the first-floor 
of the house to his parked vehicle, Avent followed William 
upstairs.  Once upstairs, William allegedly hit Avent in the 
back of the head with a board.  Avent then shot William from a 
distance of “30 feet.”  Avent testified that William “still 
came towards” him and so Avent hit him one time, a blow that 
caused William to fall to the floor and lose control of the 
board.  It was at that point that Avent, on his feet, beat a 
prone and unarmed William to the point that William’s skull 
was dramatically disfigured, the shotgun was broken into 
pieces, and Avent himself was exhausted from the violence of 
the attack. 
 
Avent’s own testimony reveals that he did not “retreat[] 
as far as possible.”  Id.  Additionally, when William — 
without a weapon and wounded by a shotgun — was on the ground 
after a blow from Avent, Avent was not acting out of a 
“reasonably apparent necessity to preserve his own life.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied 
 
32
Avent’s motion to strike on the basis of excusable homicide in 
self-defense. 
ii.  Voluntary Intoxication 
 
The trial court denied Avent’s motion to strike the 
charge of first-degree murder on the basis of his voluntary 
intoxication.  We hold that the trial court did not err when 
it submitted the question of voluntary intoxication to the 
jury. 
 
Jury instruction number 12A read: 
If you find that the defendant was so 
greatly intoxicated by the voluntary use of 
alcohol and drugs that he was incapable of 
deliberating or premeditating, then you cannot 
find him guilty of murder in the first degree. 
 
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to 
murder in the second degree or voluntary 
manslaughter. 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to support the 
finding that Avent was not “so greatly intoxicated . . . that 
he was incapable of deliberating or premeditating.”  See 
Wright v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 627, 629, 363 S.E.2d 711, 712 
(1988) (“Mere intoxication will not negate premeditation.”) 
The facts adduced at trial indicate that Avent provided a 
detailed recollection of the chronology of events to the 
investigating officers, and again in his trial testimony.  
Avent testified to entering Thomas’ house carrying a shotgun 
 
33
“to protect” himself after he “heard a loud banging noise.”  
Avent followed Thomas upstairs “telling him the whole time 
that I wasn’t there to fight him, I just wanted to get his 
daughter and go,” rather than flee from the house because he 
“wasn’t going to go out to the car and put the kids’ life on 
the line.”  Avent also testified that when Thomas assaulted 
him, he “was afraid he was really going to hurt me, and 
[Avent] was mad at the same time because [Thomas] was 
attacking [Avent] because of the color of [Avent’s] skin.”  
Following William’s death, a “scared” Avent worked with Thomas 
to move the body and clean the house. 
 
From Avent’s own testimony, it is clear that on the day 
in question Avent comprehended what was occurring, he recalled 
the chain of events, and he articulated reasons for his 
reaction to the developing situation in a way that supports a 
finding that he was capable of deliberation despite his 
consumption of intoxicants.  Accordingly, the trial court did 
not err when it denied Avent’s motion to strike the charge of 
first-degree murder on the grounds that he was voluntarily 
intoxicated. 
iii.  Voluntary Manslaughter 
 
The trial court denied Avent’s motion to strike the 
charges of first- and second-degree murder, holding that 
Avent’s use of the shotgun as a deadly weapon made the charges 
 
34
of first- and second-degree murder appropriate.  Avent 
contends the trial court erred when it determined that the 
evidence supported the greater charges. 
 
“Generally, whether a killing was done in the heat of 
passion upon reasonable provocation is a jury question.”  
Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 106, 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 
(1986).  “Manslaughter . . . is the unlawful killing of 
another without malice.”  Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 
445, 457, 423 S.E.2d 360, 368 (1992).  Malice may be inferred 
“from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless, from all 
the evidence,” there is reasonable doubt as to whether malice 
existed.  Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 263, 389 S.E.2d 
871, 882 (1990).  A “common theme running through [the 
definitions of malice] is a requirement that a wrongful act be 
done wilfully or purposefully.”  Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 
Va. 273, 280, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1984) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
In this case, Avent admitted to purposefully using a 
sawed-off shotgun both to shoot and bludgeon William.  
Therefore, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could infer malice, and the charges of first- and second-
degree murder were properly before the jury.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the trial court did not err when it denied Avent’s 
motion to strike those charges.  For the same reasons, the 
 
35
trial court did not err when it failed to strike the charge of 
use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. 
3.  Self-Defense Jury Instruction 
 
Avent argues that the trial court erred when it refused 
to instruct the jury on his proffered self-defense jury 
instruction. 
a.  Standard of Review 
Because the trial court refused to grant the 
instruction proffered by the accused, we view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the 
defendant.  However, an instruction is proper 
only if supported by more than a scintilla of 
evidence.  If the instruction is not applicable 
to the facts and circumstances of the case, it 
should not be given.  Thus, it is not error to 
refuse an instruction when there is no evidence 
to support it. 
 
Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729, 553 S.E.2d 733, 736 
(2001) (citations omitted). 
b.  Analysis 
 
The trial court refused Avent’s proffered instruction, 
ruling “as a matter of law, . . . the defendant used more 
force than was reasonably necessary to protect himself from 
threat and harm.”  Additionally, the trial court found that 
“[o]nce the defendant pursued the decedent up the stairs, he 
lost the defense of justifiable homicide.” 
 
Under either account of the events given by Avent – his 
trial testimony or his statements made to investigators – he 
 
36
forfeited his right to a self-defense jury instruction because 
he was not without fault in bringing on the difficulty that 
resulted in William’s death, and he was not in reasonable fear 
of death or great bodily harm when he killed William.  
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the accused, we hold that the trial court did not err when 
it refused Avent’s proffered jury instruction on justifiable 
homicide. 
 
“If a defendant is even slightly at fault, the killing is 
not justifiable homicide.”  Perricllia v. Commonwealth, 229 
Va. 85, 94, 326 S.E.2d 679, 685 (1985).  While there are 
inconsistencies in Avent’s account of the events, he 
consistently stated that the alleged altercation between 
himself and William ended when William went upstairs.  Avent 
stated that during William’s alleged assault, William used a 
racial epithet, and that when William ascended the stairs, 
Avent believed he was going to retrieve a gun.  Despite this 
obvious hostility toward Avent and despite the fact that his 
vehicle was available outside, mere steps from where he 
entered William’s house, Avent pursued William upstairs 
carrying a shotgun.  We hold that the trial court did not err 
in ruling that Avent was not entitled to a justifiable 
homicide jury instruction due to his fault in bringing on the 
difficulty by pursuing William upstairs. 
 
37
 
Assuming arguendo that Avent was not at fault when he 
followed William upstairs, or when he discharged the shotgun, 
we agree with the trial court that at the instant Avent 
applied lethal force he was not “under reasonable apprehension 
of death or great bodily harm to himself.”  Yarborough, 217 
Va. at 975, 234 S.E.2d at 290.  Avent’s own account of the 
events reveals the following chronology:  William attacked 
Avent with a board, Avent shot William one time, William 
continued his attack, and then Avent “hit him back hard one 
time” with a blow strong enough to knock William to the floor 
and the board from his hand. 
 
At that moment, Avent stood astride William who was 
wounded from a gunshot and on the floor without a weapon — 
hardly a position that evokes “reasonable apprehension of 
death or great bodily harm to himself.”  Id.  Despite 
William’s prone and wounded position, Avent proceeded to 
bludgeon him repeatedly with the barrel of the gun, conduct to 
which the medical examiner ascribed William’s cause of death.  
Consequently, we hold that under the circumstances, Avent’s 
use of force was not reasonable to justify killing William.  
The trial court did not err when it refused to grant Avent’s 
proffered self-defense jury instruction. 
4.  Motion for New Trial 
 
38
 
Avent contends that it was error for the trial court to 
deny his motion for a new trial on the basis of improper 
argument at the penalty phase of the trial.  Avent asserts 
that the argument “appealed to the jury’s passion, and that 
the case should be remanded for new trial as to punishment.” 
a.  Standard of Review 
We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to the 
trial court’s determination of whether the Commonwealth’s 
argument was objectionable. 
Sometimes it is difficult to draw the line 
between proper and improper comments, hence the 
general rule is to leave such distinction 
largely to the discretion of the trial court, 
whose ruling will be allowed to stand unless it 
is made to appear probable that the party 
complaining has been substantially prejudiced 
by the objectionable remarks or argument. 
 
McLean v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 398, 401, 43 S.E.2d 45, 47 
(1947). 
b.  Analysis 
 
Avent is correct that a “prosecutor’s request . . . must 
not appeal . . . to the jurors’ passions by exciting their 
personal interests in protecting the safety and security of 
their own lives and property.”  Hutchins v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 17, 19, 255 S.E.2d 459, 460-61 (1979).  However, the 
language of which Avent complains does not violate that 
standard. 
 
39
 
During the penalty phase, the prosecutor said:  
 
Now, the second thing that I’d ask that 
you consider, not only as punishment for him, 
but the second thing is to look at the danger 
he would pose if he wasn’t in prison because if 
you do anything else less than life, anything 
less, then one day he’s going to walk out of 
that prison cell, and he’s going to come back 
in this society. 
 
 
This case is distinguishable from Hutchins.  In Hutchins, 
during a trial held in Franklin County, the prosecutor made 
specific, repeated reference to the safety and security of the 
jurors during closing argument.  Id. at 18, 235 S.E.2d at 460.  
At one point, the prosecutor stated, “[t]his case is about the 
security of Franklin County property owners.”  Id.  Later, the 
prosecutor asked,  
What message are you going to send out to the 
people of Franklin County?  Are you going to 
send out, ‘Come on down.  It’s down there.  
It’s yours for the picking.  We don’t care.  We 
don’t think it’s serious.  We’re going to slap 
him on the wrist and turn him loose.’ 
 
Id. at 19, 235 S.E.2d at 460-61.  We assessed the prejudice of 
such an argument by noting: 
What this argument does is create an atmosphere 
wherein a defendant may be convicted and 
punished, not just for the offense on trial, 
but to set an example to deter some unknown 
future criminal activity by some as yet 
unidentified outside criminal actor. The 
potential harm in such an argument is that it 
tends both to inflame a juror's natural 
prejudice against an outsider entering his 
jurisdiction for criminal purposes and to 
divert the juror's attention from the evidence 
 
40
produced at trial and focus it upon extraneous 
and inadmissible matters. 
 
Id. at 20, 255 S.E. 2d at 461. 
 
In this case, there was no reference to potential 
criminal offenses by others. Based upon our review of the 
record, we cannot say that Avent was “substantially 
prejudiced” by the prosecutor’s statement during the 
sentencing phase of his trial.  See McLean, 186 Va. at 401, 43 
S.E.2d at 47.  Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it denied Avent’s motion for 
a new trial based on improper argument. 
C.  POST-TRIAL ISSUES 
1.  After-Discovered Evidence 
 
Avent argues that the trial court erred when it denied 
his motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. 
a.  Standard of Review 
 
A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered 
evidence “is a matter submitted to the sound discretion of the 
circuit court and will be granted only under unusual 
circumstances after particular care and caution has been given 
to the evidence presented.”  Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 
486, 501, 628 S.E.2d 344, 352 (2006). 
b.  Analysis 
 
41
 
“Motions for new trials based on after-discovered 
evidence are . . . not looked upon with favor, are considered 
with special care and caution, and are awarded with great 
reluctance.”  Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 
S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983).  See Garnett v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 
397, 416-17, 657 S.E.2d 100, 112 (2008); Commonwealth v. 
Tweed, 264 Va. 524, 528-29, 570 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2002).  The 
moving party  
bears the burden to establish that the evidence 
(1) appears to have been discovered subsequent 
to the trial; (2) could not have been secured 
for use at the trial in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence by the movant; (3) is not 
merely cumulative, corroborative or collateral; 
and (4) is material, and such as should produce 
opposite results on the merits at another 
trial. 
 
Id.  The moving party “must establish each of these mandatory 
criteria.”  Garnett, 275 Va. at 417, 657 S.E.2d at 112. 
 
In this case, the Commonwealth conceded that the first 
three criteria have been satisfied.  The trial court, without 
deciding whether the first three criteria were satisfied, 
ruled that if this after-discovered evidence had been 
available at trial, “there is virtually no likelihood that it 
would have produced the opposite result.”  We agree with the 
trial court and hold that it did not abuse its discretion in 
reaching this conclusion. 
 
42
 
As the trial court correctly noted, there is doubt 
whether the after-discovered evidence would be admissible at 
trial.  “[W]here an accused adduces evidence that he acted in 
self-defense, evidence of specific acts is admissible to show 
the character of the decedent for turbulence and violence, 
even if the accused is unaware of such character.”  Barnes v. 
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25, 197 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1973).  
However, this statement of the law has been qualified.  “[T]he 
ultimate issue becomes whether such evidence of prior conduct 
was sufficiently connected in time and circumstances with the 
homicide as to be likely to characterize the victim’s conduct 
toward the defendant.”  Id. at 26, 197 S.E.2d at 190.  “A 
single act of bad conduct does not establish one’s unfavorable 
character.  While evidence of a series of bad acts may 
collectively be admissible to establish poor character, the 
conduct in a single incident is insufficient.”  McMinn v. 
Rounds, 267 Va. 277, 282, 591 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2004). 
 
The after-discovered evidence in this case was not 
connected in time or circumstances with the homicide.  The 
accusations introduced at the hearing are between 10 and 12 
years before the killing, and they involve domestic conduct, 
not a confrontation of the type Avent alleges occurred on the 
day in question. 
 
43
 
Assuming arguendo that the evidence would be admissible 
at a new trial, it would not be likely to alter the outcome.  
Even armed with the new evidence, Avent’s statements to the 
police and his trial testimony precluded him, as a matter of 
law, from the benefit of a jury instruction on self-defense.  
Additionally, the jury had before it Avent’s account of the 
events that included William’s alleged use of provocative 
language and physical assault.  The jury rejected Avent’s 
account and the addition of a decade-old allegation would not 
likely “produce opposite results on the merits at another 
trial.” 
Garnett, 275 Va. at 417, 657 S.E.2d at 112.  We hold 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Avent’s motion for a new trial based on after-
discovered evidence. 
2.  Motion to Set Aside the Verdict 
 
Avent assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his 
motion to set aside the jury’s verdict and the sentencing 
order on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of 
premeditation to support a finding of first-degree murder. 
a.  Standard of Review 
 
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction, the Court will affirm the judgment 
unless the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
 
44
support it.”  Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 
S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). 
b.  Analysis 
[T]he question whether a defendant is guilty of 
a premeditated killing of the victim is usually 
a jury question.  The intention to kill need 
not exist for any specified length of time 
prior to the actual killing; the design to kill 
may be formed only a moment before the fatal 
act is committed provided the accused had time 
to think and did intend to kill. 
 
. . . . 
 
To premeditate means to adopt a specific intent 
to kill, and that is what distinguishes first 
and second degree murder.  The intent to kill 
must come into existence at some time before 
the killing; it need not exist for any 
particular length of time. 
 
Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 352, 551 S.E.2d 620, 
632 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
In deciding [whether premeditation and 
deliberation exist], the jury may properly 
consider the brutality of the attack, and 
whether more than one blow was struck, the 
disparity in size and strength between the 
defendant and the victim, the concealment of 
the victim’s body, and the defendant’s lack of 
remorse and efforts to avoid detection. 
 
Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 232, 294 S.E.2d 882, 892 
(1982) (citations omitted).  Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find that Avent committed 
premeditated, first-degree murder. 
 
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Avent entered William’s house only after Thomas had 
entered through a window, and he did so carrying a concealed, 
sawed-off shotgun.  Following a skirmish on the first floor, 
Avent gave several different reasons for following William 
upstairs, among them Avent’s anger towards William.  Once 
upstairs, Avent shot and then brutally bludgeoned an unarmed 
William to the point that William’s skull collapsed.  Avent 
used such violent force that afterward he was “leaning up 
against the wall and [his] head was hurting” and the gun was 
broken into pieces. 
Following the assault, Avent and Thomas tried to conceal 
William’s death by cleaning up blood, hiding or discarding 
evidence, dragging William’s body to an out-building and 
covering it, then fleeing to a remote settlement on the Navajo 
Reservation in Arizona.  When he was interviewed in Arizona, 
Avent “showed no emotion” and “did not ask anything about the 
Thomas family.”  Despite Avent’s claims that William attacked 
him, no witness that saw Avent following the alleged attack 
was able to identify any injuries to him. 
The record reveals a brutal attack where, after the 
victim was shot, more than one blow was struck, and the 
defendant attempted to conceal the crime and avoid detection, 
and expressed no remorse for the killing.  Accordingly, there 
was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding of 
 
46
premeditated killing in the first degree.  Therefore, the 
trial court did not err when it denied Avent’s motion to set 
aside the verdict on the grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of premeditation. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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