Title: Dale v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough

State: alaska

Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court

Document:

439 P.2d 790 (1968) Marjorie C. DALE, Appellant, v. GREATER ANCHORAGE AREA BOROUGH, Appellee. No. 965. Supreme Court of Alaska. April 16, 1968. Marjorie C. Dale, in pro. per. Victor D. Carlson and Eaic E. Wohlforth, Anchorage, for appellee. *791 Before NESBETT, C.J., and DIMOND and RABINOWITZ, JJ. DIMOND, Justice. On October 3, 1967, the Appellee, Greater Anchorage Area Borough, held an election. One measure voted on was Proposition A which related to the approval or disapproval of the Borough incurring a $20,000,000 indebtedness for sewerage treatment facilities. The Borough assembly met on October 5, 1967, to canvass the election returns. The results of the election showed 4,041 votes in favor of Proposition A, and 3,986 votes, against. On November 27, 1967, Appellant commenced this action seeking a declaration that the election was invalid, and that any indebtedness incurred in reliance on the election was not binding or enforceable. In her complaint Appellant alleged that a quorum was not present at the October 5, 1967, meeting where the election returns were canvassed, that subsequent to that meeting she discovered that certain unqualified voters had been allowed to vote and that certain qualified voters had been denied the opportunity to vote, and that irregularities in the election were of such magnitude that the results of the election could have been different and Proposition A could have been defeated. The court below dismissed Appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and this appeal followed. In the case of Turkington v. City of Kachemak,[1] which involved an election contest growing out of an attempt to incorporate the community of Kachemak as a third class city, we stated as follows: The legislature still has not provided for preliminary administrative determination of local election contests before resort may be had to the courts. But the Greater Anchorage Area Borough has. Chapter 7 of the Borough's Code of Ordinances provides in part as follows: Sec. 7-26. CONTEST OF ELECTION. It is true that this ordinance does not specifically provide that the foregoing procedure must be followed prior to seeking relief in the courts. But such is implicit in the administrative requirements, for there would be no reason to follow the administrative procedure for contesting an election after one had brought a court action seeking to have the election declared invalid. And the ordinance is binding and effective even though it is not a law enacted by the state legislature for the regulation of local election contests. The legislature has given the borough broad power to prescribe general rules for the conduct of borough elections,[2] and this includes the power to make provisions for the contest of elections. It is generally held that election contests are purely statutory and dependent upon statutory provisions for their conduct,[3] and that the failure of a contestant to observe strict compliance with the statuory requirements is fatal to his right to have an election contested.[4] The reason for this, as expressed by one court, is that public policy demands that election results have stability and finality.[5] We apply the foregoing rule to this case. Appellant at no time delivered to *793 the borough assembly a written notice of contest of the election as required by borough ordinance. Compliance with this requirement of the ordinance was a condition precedent to Appellant's invoking the power of the court to have the election declared invalid. Since Appellant has not met that condition, her complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the court below correctly held. Appellant was required by ordinance to deliver her written notice of contest to the borough assembly at the meeting held to canvass the election returns, which was October 5, 1967. At that meeting a quorum of the assembly was not present there being only 5 out of 11 members in attendance. Appellant argues that since there was not a quorum of the assembly present, no official action could be taken by the assembly and she was thus relieved of her obligation to deliver her notice of contest to the assembly in these circumstances. Such an argument is untenable. The receipt by the assembly of a notice of contest of election is a purely ministerial act and the presence or absence of a quorum does not affect, one way or the other, the effectiveness of the delivery of such a notice.[6] The ordinance neither provides nor suggests that the obligation of one to deliver a notice of contest to the assembly at a particular time is contingent upon the presence of a quorum of the assembly at such time. Appellant's final point is that the court below committed reversible error in awarding the borough $700.00 in attorney's fees. We find no error. The matter of awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs of an action is committed by rule to the broad discretion of the trial court.[7] Considering the record in this case and the character of the litigation, we are not convinced that the trial court's award of attorney's fees in the amount of $700.00 was an abuse of discretion. The judgment is affirmed. [1] 380 P.2d 593, 596 (Alaska 1963). [2] AS 07.30.040 provides: The assembly shall prescribe the general rules for the conduct of the borough election. [3] Longshore v. City of Homewood, 277 Ala. 444, 171 So. 2d 453, 455 (1965); Fish v. Redeker, 2 Ariz. App. 602, 411 P.2d 40, 43 (1966); Alden v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 2d 764, 28 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1963); Lyon v. Holbrook, 316 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Ky. 1958); Lasseigne v. Martin, 250 La. 1073, 202 So. 2d 247, 248 (1967); State ex rel. Conaway v. Consolidated Sch. Dist. No. 4, 417 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Mo. 1967). [4] Graham v. Swift, 123 Colo. 309, 228 P.2d 969, 974 (1951); Doelling v. Board of Educ., 17 Ill. 2d 145, 160 N.E.2d 801 (1959); Hancock v. Lewis, 265 Minn. 519, 122 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1963); Sutton v. Anderson, 176 Neb. 543, 126 N.W.2d 836, 838-839 (1964); Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771, 774 (1961); McCall v. Board of Educ., 169 Ohio St. 50, 157 N.E.2d 351, 353 (1959). [5] Curry v. Dawson, 238 Ark. 310, 379 S.W.2d 287, 289 (1964). [6] See People ex rel. Woods v. Green, 265 Ill. 39, 106 N.E. 504, 506 (1914). [7] Civ.R. 82(a). McDonough v. Lee, 420 P.2d 459, 465 (Alaska 1966).