Title: Savini v. University of Hawaii.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘tee FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
ee
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'L

— 000 —-
Sees
SOSAIETE L, SAVINI and BETTE SAVINI, Plaintiffs-Appell

 

 

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I, Defendant-Appellant,
and

JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOB PARTNERSHIPS 1-10,
DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, DOE NON-PROFIT ENTITIES 1-10,
‘and DOE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.

—_—_— Sse

wo. 26747

if cane

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 01-1-1052-04)

  

MARCH 19, 2007
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBR, AND DUFFY, JJ.
INION couar By LEVINSON,
‘The defendant-appellant University of Hawai'i (UH)
appeals from the first circuit court’s July 12, 2004 order, the

Honorable Gary W.B. Chang presiding, denying UH's April 7, 2004
(1993) and

 

motion (citing Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 662
Hawai" Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 12(b)"), to dismiss

 

HRS § 662-4, entitled “Statute of Limitations,” provides: "A tort
claim agsinst the State’ shell be forever barred unless action is begun within
feo yeare after the claim accrues, ea

1 ee isis fin 1a ss
aD te eit coded. |The legislature added the emphasized text on June
HPibic. Sue 1976 aw, Ses. L. Act 219, $$ 16 anc 23 et 539, 541.

ECE Rule 12(b] permite certain defenses or objections to be raised by

notion rather than in ® responsive pleading, including "(1) lack of
(Continued. .

 

 

na
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER *#*

 

the June 5, 2001 first amended complaint of the plaintiffs-
appellees Sosaicte L. and Bette Savini (hereinafter, “the
Savinis"].

On appeal, UH asserts that the Savinis’ claim for
relief is barred by HRS § 662-4 inasmuch as more than two years
elapsed between the onset of the Savinis’ injuries -- which, UH
asserts, triggered the “accrual” of their claim -~ and the
Savinis’ initiation of their lawsuit more than three years later.

As we hold dniza in section III.B.5, the Savinis’ claim
did not accrue until the quantum of the medical care they
actually received exceeded the medical-rehabilitative limit set
forth in HRS § 431:10C-306(b) (2) (1993).* It follows that the

2(.,scontinued)
jurisdiction over the subject matter” and “(6) failure to state = claim upon
hich relief can be granted.”

HRS § 431:10C-306, entitled "Abolition of tort Liability,”
Provided in relevant part

 

(2) Except as provided in eubsecticn (bi, [the Hawai'i Motor
Vehicte insurance Lav, ilkS ch. 431, ert, 10G;] abolishes tort
Hability of the following persons with ‘respect to accidental harm,
arising from motor vehicle accidents oocureing An this Stats

{1) ‘Ouser, operator, Sr user of an insured motor vehicles of

(2) Operator or user of an uninsured motor vehicle uho operates of

uses such vehicle without reason to believe st to be an
Unineured motor vehicle.

(b) Tort Liability is not abolished as to the following

persons... in the following cireunstances:

 

i2) injury occurs to such person in a motor vehicle accident in
which the amount paid or accrued exceeds the medical
Fehabilitative Linit established in [HRS §] ¢31:10¢-308 for
expenses provided in [HRS §) 431:10C-103(10) {Al and
(B)[) (eongerning personal injury protection benefits) |

 

 

 

Effective January 1, 1998, the legislature repealed the floating medical-

rehabilitative Limit, fixed the threshold st $5000.00, and further. snended HRS
5°431:106-306 in respects. inmatersol to the present matter. Sex 198? hax.
L. Act 251, $843, 51, and 70 at 542, 551, 553. Effective July 20,

the legislature defined nore preciaely the amounts to be included in the

(continued...)

 
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
circuit court correctly denied UH’'s motion to dismiss and,

accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s July 12, 2004 order.

1. BACKGROUND

‘The Savinis allege that, on Novenber 13, 1997, UH
professor Thomas T. Bopp, while driving a vehicle owned by the
State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, “the State”) at Honolulu
International Airport, struck and physically injured Sosaiete
and, hence, inflicted emotional distress on Bette. ‘These facts
[hereinafter, “the accident”]* were alleged both in the Savinis’
April 3, 2001 complaint for damages against the State and Bopp
and in their June $, 2001 first amended complaint, which was
materially identical except that it changed the named defendants
by substituting UH for Bopp and the state.

on April 7, 2004, UH moved to dismiss the Savinis’
action pursuant to the State Tort Liability Act (STLA), HRS
ch. 662, in particular HRS § 662-4, and HRCP Rule 12(b), see
supra note 1. In particular, UH argued that the Savinis “were
required to file their claim within two years of the date of the
“ (Citing Waugh v. Univ, of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 128,

accident

(continued)
calculation of expenditures and, effective July 20, 1998 and January 1, 2002,
further anended HRS § €31/10c~s06 in innaterial respects.” Seg 2001 Haw. Se
L, Act 157, $6 31 and 39 at 401, 404; 1998 Haw. Sees. L. Act 275, §§ 22-23 and
33 at 934, "940.

 

» Nowhere do UH oF the Savinis discuss any specifica of the accident
alleged injuries, nor are they particularly relevant to this
appeal. Inasmuch as UH raised the statute of limitations ae a defense and the
Seviniz aio not produce any colorable evidence that their injuries were latent
for a period following the accident, of that UK's torticus conduct was
Continuing, we a#eune that the Savinis were injured and should have know they
were injured, if at all, mediately upon the cecurrence of the accident.

    

       

 

 

3
 

‘04 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

621 P.2d 957, 966 (1961); Bissen v, Fuiii, 51 Haw. 636, 638, 466
P.2d 428, 431 (2970); Rumball v. State, Civ. No. 04-1-0038K (Haw.
3d Cir. May 4, 2004); Brub v. Bedish, Civ. No. 03-1-0500-03 (Haw.
Ast Cir. Oct. 22, 2003); Wollman v, Gross, 637 F.2d S44, 547 (8th
Cir. 1980); Mendiola v. United States, 401 F.2d 695, 697 (Sth
Cir, 1968); United States v. Webb Trucking Co., 141 F. Supp. $73,
575 (D, Del. 1956).) In their memorandum in opposition, the
Savinis urged (1) that “accrue” and “occur” are distinct terns
and concepts, as construed by this court and by the Mississippi
Supreme Court, (2) that, regardless of the date of the accident,
their “claim” did not “accrue,” within the meaning of HRS

§ 662-4, until the medical-rehabilitative limit set forth in HRS
§ 431:10C-306(b) (2), see supra note 2, was exceeded, and (3) that
the medical-rehabilitative limit constitutes a threshold quantum
of resultant medical expenses beneath which motor vehicle
accidents are generally' characterized as “no-fault” such that,
as a matter of law, tort liability does not attach to personal
injuries. (Quoting Teller v, Teller, 99 Hawai'i 101, 110, 53
P.3d 240, 249 (2002) (quoting In re Akana, 42 Haw. 415, 444
(2958) (Stainback, J., dissenting) (“The dictionary gives the
following definition for the word ‘accrue’: ‘To come into
existence as an enforceable claim to vest as a right; as, a
cause of action has accrued when the right to sue has become

vested.’")); Stubbs v, Miss, Farm Bureau Cas, ins, Co., 625 So.

< None of the parties discuss the “verbal threshold,” ARS §
431:100~306(6) 11) to. (3), (Supp. 2001), whereby sufficiently serious and
Permanent injuries lof death) are deemed to trigger tore Liability without
Proof that the sonetary threshold has been exceeded. We proceed on the
Sscumption that the verbal ehreshols dese not apply to the present matter.

   

 

4
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

2d 8, 15 (Miss. 2002) ("*Occur’ and ‘accrue’ are not synonymous,
legally or otherwise . . . .”).) The Savinis noted that HRS

§ 431:10C-315* provides that the limitation period “runs from the
date of the accident or . . . of the last no-fault payment, (*]
whichever is later.” Further to the foregoing, the Savinis
asserted that, as of April 3, 1999, two years prior to the filing
of their original complaint, Sosaiete’s workers’ compensation
carrier had expended only $1244.06 on his behalf, i,e,, less than
the monetary threshold, which was $13,900.00 at the time of the
accident, see Hawai't Administrative Rules § 16-23-10(c) (1999).
The Savinis attached an “Exhibit A,” which appears to be a
statement of workers’ compensation benefits paid on Sosaiete’s
behalf, and 2 declaration of the Savinis’ counsel purporting to
authenticate the exhibit. In its reply, UH added that, inasmuch
as the legislature, in 1976, amended HRS § 662-4 expressly to
protract the STLA’s limitation period te six years in medical
malpractice cases involving a plaintiff's late discovery of the

injury, see supra note 1, but did not create “any exception for

 

RS § €31:100-315(b) (1993), amended py 1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act
251, $5 49 and 70 at 545, 853, provided in relevant part:
No suit arising out of a motor vehicle accident shall be
brought in tort more than the Later of:
(1l'two years after the date of the sotor vehicle accident upon
which the claim is bared; (or)

    

ia) two years after the date of the last payment of workers!
compensation benefits arising from the
moter vehicle accident:

 

Effective July 20, 1998, the legislature amended 2 different subsection in
immaterial respects. S26 1998 Haw, Sess. L. Act 275, $6 28 and 37 at 935-36,
540.

‘Presumably, the Savinis mean to include workers’ compensation
benefits," inasmuch aa their Exhibit A implies that they crossed the monetary.
threshold by virtue of the workers’ compensation payment of October 23,2000.

5
 

+ POR PUBLICATIGN IN WEST! S HAWAI'I REFORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER +4

   

+ automobile accidents,” the legislature did not contemplate
extending the Limitation peried beyond two years after the
occurrence of the accident itself.

At its June 1, 2004 hearing, the circuit court ruled in
relevant part as follows:

[tine cause of action does not accrue until... the

plaintiff reaches the thresh Jold and this record does not

Ingicate when the thresh [Jold was met.
T'think st indicates that (the Savinis] halve]

 

 

Ancurred at least $17,000... . of expenses, but 1t doesn’t
show when in tine the tort chresn(Jole amcust of

[#)13, (9100. - + was set... + Im interpreting that
word ‘acerued” to begin » | | Gpon that point in tine when

the plaintsff sneurs of ie pasa the thresh{Jolé amount of
posfeult [sic =~ presumably, "workers" compensation,” 536
SUBEA note 6,) benefits.

Accordingly, the circuit court's July 12, 2004 order denied UN's

 

motion to dismiss, concluding that “[a] claim against [UK]

arising out of a motor vehicle accident does not ‘accrue,’ and
“the two-year statute of limitations . . . does not begin to
run(,] . . + unt{l medical/rehabilitative expenses incurred by

the injured person exceed the applicable tort threshold.” on
August 5, 2004, the circuit court ordered that UM could pursue an
interlocutory eppeal from its July 12, 2004 order, see HRS

§ 641-1() (1993). On August 9, 2004, UH filed its timely notice
of appeal.
 

‘+4 FOR PURLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

TT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Denial Of Summary Judament?
ie review the circuit court’s grant or denial of

summary Jusgnent de nous.
inion. Kens, 94 Hawaii 213, 221, 11 F.3d 1, 8 (2000)
The standard for granting * motion for summary judgsent ie
settles:

 

(slummary judgment is appropriate if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
Unterrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affiaavits, 1f any, show that
there ig no genvine issve as to any materia

 

If, on motion to dismiss for failure of the
Pleading to state 2 Claim upen which relief can be
Srenteds matters outside the pleading are presented to
ane not excludes by the court, tne notion shall be
Treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in (MRCP) Rule 56 ss

WRCP Rule 12(b). HRCP Rule 96, entitled “Summary Judgment,” provides in
relevant port

(e) . . . The Sudgnent sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, ‘depositions, enewers to interrogatories, and
Sonisaions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genoine ‘sue as to any msterial fact and tht
the moving party is entitied to's Judgment as a matter of Lew.

 

 

 

ei | |. (oiefense required... . when 2 motion for
sunnary Judgment 2 made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adveree party nay not rest upen the mere allegations or denials
Of the adverse perty's pleading, but the adverse party" s respons
by afficarite or 2s otherwise provides in this role, must set
forth specific facte showing that there is a genuine issue for
tele +

 

In the present matter, the Savinis’ on mencrandun in opposition to U8's
notion £0 dianise drew the circust court's attention te facts beyond the scope
Of thets complaint, and the circuit court relies upon the allegation that the
Sovinis’ PIP benefits hed accrued pieceneal. Ch.

Bently 29 Hawalt 215, 321, 972 F.26 1081, 1087 (i993) (where “there [wa]s no
[nications . . that the cézcuit court... relied upon any facte that were
hot alleged if the » - + complaint,” holding thet mere “references to facts,
Soteide the plescings” in the defendant’s notion to dismiss did not
Stransfore” it inte a motion for sunmary Judoment); Buw. Au, 62 Haw. 210,
214, 626 F.2d 173, 177 (1981) (where “ehere [wals no indication in the record
Gf unether the trial court considered the interrogatories in making its
String." holding that “notion to dismiss was not transformed into one for
Sunnary judgment”). Accordingly, we apply the summary Judgnent standard of
feview rather than Limiting ourselves to the allegations set forth in the
complaint
04 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

fact and that the moving party is entitled to
Judgment as 2 matter of low. A fact is material
if proof of that fact would have the effect of
establishing or refuting one of the essential
Glenents of a cause of action or cefense
Seserted by the parties, The evidence must be
Slewes in the Light nest favorable to the.
ronvmoving party. In cther word#, we must view
Sil of the evidence and the inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.

 

 

 

Id, (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Qusrubin z Thronas, 107 Hawai'i 48, 56, 109 P.3d 689, 637
(200s) (quoting Durette x. Alcha Plastic Recycling, Inc,
108 Hawai't 490, B01, 100 P-3a 60, 71 (2008) (quoting

SAMRGHEe._Euu, 105 Hawai'i 112, 137-26, 94 P.3d 667, 672-73
(2004) (quoting Kahale v. Citys County of Honolulu,’ 104
Hawai'i 341, 344, 90 P30 233, 236 (2008) (quoting SCI Mant.
Sore, ve Sima, 101 Hawai'i 438, 445, 71 P.3d 389, 396 (2O0sT
(quoting Coon’. City ¢ County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai't 233,
244-45, 47 Pe3d 348, 359-60 (2002) TT)

Willis v. Swain, 112 Hawai'i 184, 188-89, 145 P.3d 727, 731-32

 

(2006) (brackets in original).
B. Statutory Interpretation

“the standard of review for statutory construction is
established. The interpretation of e statute is 3

 

wel
uertion ef law which this court reviews de now.” Liberty
Sit, Five Ine. co, -v, Dennison, 108 dawai'® 360, 304,120,
Posgaiis, iis (200s) tqucting

Geous, 103 Hana" 206, 211, 62 Pasa 386, 351 (2003))
internal quotation marks cmitted). In ‘so doing, this court
must adhere to the well-established rule of statutory
Senstruction that the “forenost obligation is to ascertain
Gnd give effect. to the intention cf the legislature, which
if to be cotained primarily fron the language contained in
the statute itself.” Gravy, Admin, Diz. of [the] court, 84

 

 

Houal't 138, 148, 931 P-2a 580, S90 T1e87) (eltations
oaitted)
Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 111 Hawai'i 401, 407, 142 P.3d

265, 271 (2006).

On appeal, UH begins with a disquisition on sovereign

immunity, implying that to hold that the Savinis’ claim did not

8
‘ee FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HANAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
accrue until they exceeded the medical-rehabilitative limit would
exceed the scope of the State’s (and, hence, UH’) consent to

suit get forth in the STLA, HRS ch. 662:

= The Language of the no-fault statutes at issue
here do not puspore to change the SILA's statute of
Visitations(, HRS § 662-4, gee supre note 1]

injhe two-year statate of Linstation { (iH
presumably’ means “the Savinie’ cleis”)) “accrue(d]” at the
Eine of the motor vehicle accident. Any attempt to
manipulate (HRS § E62-4] by changing the legal meaning of
Ngccrual” to accommodate one’s sense Of public policy

 

  

 

offends (1s) plain language - .  - (2]te protections
Should not be watered down Sy anyone other than the state
Legislature:

(Quoting Haw. Const. art. x, § 5 ("[UH] is . . . established as
the state university and constituted a body corporate.”); HRS

§§ 304-2 (1993) (same), 304-6(a) (Supp. 1999) (*[UH] shall be
subject to suit only in the manner provided for suits against the
State... . All defenses available to the State, as well as
all limitations on actions against the State, shall be applicable
to (uH].“):* Tavlor-Rice v, State, 105 Hawai'i 104, 120-12, 94
P.3d 659, 665-66 (2004); Fought & Co., inc, v, Stee] Ena’a &
Erection Co., 87 Hawai'i 37, $5, 951 P.2d 487, 505 (1998); Waugh,
63 Haw. at 125, 621 P.2d at 965; Oahu Ry, & Land Co, v, United

 

States, 73 F. Supp. 707, 708 (D. Haw. 1947).) (Citing Chun we
Bd_of Ts, of Emplovess’ Ret. Sys., 106 Hawai'i 416, 106 P.3d
339 (2005).) UK’s points of error reduce to @ single issue:

whether the Savinis’ claim accrued at the time of the accident or

when the amounts paid or accrued by virtue of Sosaiete’s injury

 

* on ouly 1, 2006, the legislature effectively moved the quoted
portions of HRS $§ 304-2 and -€{a) to the newly crested HRS $§ 304K-103 and
PfoR (als respectively. See 2006 Haw. Sese. 1. Act 75, $§ 2 and 23 at 146-47,
aie

 
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++
exceeded the $13,900.00 monetary threshold, see supra section Cc.’

UH argues:
"at the tine

 

[t]he two-year statute of Limitation “accrus
Of the moter vehicle sceident

fins § 662-4 does not provide for any delay of the
enget of the. . period. - by .. «the Hawai'i Motor
Venicie tasurance (Llaw(, sini Gh. 431, ave. 20c]

Adniteadly, if thie Court were to reverse the ruling
of the eizoust dourt |. . ana hold that the tuo year
Statute of Linitation is strictly interpreted, there would
bea "gap" for... persons who do not meet the dollar
level Ehreshoid prior to the expiration of the two years.
However, tne proper forum to address this gap is the
Legislature

UH contends “that it is obvious that the term ‘accrue’ in this

 

context means th[e] date of the . . . accident.” (Quoting Wauah,
63 Haw. at 128, 621 P.2d at 968; Wollman, 637 F.2d at 547.)
(Citing Bigsen: Mendiola, 401 F.2d at 697; Webb Trucking, 141 F.
Supp. at 575.) Quoting Whittington v, State, 72 Hawai'i 77, 79,
806 P.2d 957, 958 (1991), UH adds that we have previously
“refused to extend HRS § 662-4.”

In their answering brief, the Savinis counter that HRS
§ 662-4's use of the term “accrues” contemplates that the two-

year period began when they had a viable claim for relief over

 

* ory as the State of Hawai'i, as amicus curiae, expresses it,
Sidloes the tort threshold Lax, [HRS § 431:i0C-306(B) (2)y gee subKa note 2,] a
law of general applicability that does not expressly incluse the state,
iepiieaiy expand the waiver of sovereign innunsty snd spplicable statute of
Limitatigns in the STA?” (Citing, e.gcy Tavlor-Rice; Vail v.Eaplovees’ Ret
Sua 78 tow. 42, 58, 056 P28 1950, 1855 1299); Retecinatan Z-Seate, 7
Naw,’ 77, 78, 606 P.24 957, 958 (1991); Big teland Smaly Ranchers? Asera
State, 60 Haw. 228, 236, $88 P.2d 430, 436 (1876)7 A.C. chock s. Kaneshiro, $1
How, 82, 451 F.2¢ 809 (1969); Marks v._AN tiga, 48 aw, "92, 96, 395 F.2d 620,
622 (3368); SOME efi F.20 474,477 (23 Cir. 1968)?

442 Fe20- 1299, 1303 (eh Csr, 1971); Qahe By &
Leng ce, 73 f. Supp. at 108; Carter v. Cross, 373 So. ad E1, 82 (Fla. Dist.
cee App. 1979); Stephens v. Dixen, S36 N.n.2a 755, 759 (wicn. 1995); Jackson
eu pans. $30 NeEvza 1262, 2282 (NeY- 1986).)

 

 

 

10
 

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which the cireuit court had jurisdiction, ise., when the workers’
compensation insurer's outlays exceeded the sum of $13,900.00.
‘hey reiterate that HRS § 431:10C-315, see supra note 5, provides
that the applicable limitation period “runs from. . . the
accident or . . . the last no-fault payment, (sic, see supra
note 6,) whichever is later.” Furthermore, they urge that UH
misconstrues Waugh, which “recognized” “the date when harm
occurred and the date when a claim accrued . . . as being two
potentially different dates.” (Quoting 63 Haw. at 127, 621 P.2d
at 968.)
B. analysis
1. Intreduction

In general, “[a] cause of action for negligently
harming a person . . . is complete when the harm occurs.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 cmt. c¢ (1979 & Supp. 2006).
However, a harmful incident and the “accru[ai]” of a resulting
claim for relief may be temporally distinct under certain
circumstances, such as where the tortious conduct is of a

continuing character or the plaintiff's discovery of the cause of

action is justifiably forestalled. See, e.g, Blair vs Ing, 98
Hawai'i 247, 264, 21 P.3d 452, 469 (2001) (quoting Havs v. City &
County of Honolulu, 61 Hawai'i 391, 293, 917 P.2d 718, 720

(1996)). The question before us -~ whether the accrual of a tort

claim, particularly against a sovereign defendant, is delayed
until the accumulation of medical expenses exceeding the monetary

threshold -- is one of first impression in Hawai'i.

u
 

 

}+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § WAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
In other jurisdictions, “the statute of limitations may
- run even if the . . . certain sum of money that must be
exceeded before recovery may be had[] has not been attained.”
Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations
Commences to Run on Automobile N u
Claim, 36 A.L.R.dth 357, 362 (1985 & Supp. 2007); see also Lee R.
Russ in consultation with Thomas F. Segalia, Couch on Insurance
§ 12)

‘even though the monetary threshold has not been fully satisfied,

 

 

2 (3d ed. 2006) (“The injured person may maintain suit

provided it is clear that additional medical expense will be
incurred and that the plaintiff will then exceed the
threshold.”). Nevertheless, we conclude that, under Hawai"i lew,
a plaintiff who relies on the medical-expense threshold as
opposed to a verbal threshold, see supra note 4, has no claim at
all, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until
the plaintiff has actually received the requisite amount of
“reasonably necessary” medical-rehabilitative treatment, as
manifested through bills received or paid.

2. Fora viable tort claim to accrue under the monetary=

x collateral
source providing benefits to the plaintiff, must have
actually incurred expenses that exceed the statutory

Shreshold.

‘The plain language of HRS § 431:10C-306(a), see supra
note 2, indicates the legislature’s intent to “abolish{]” tort
liability derived from motor vehicle accidents except in cases of
serious injury, leaving motor-vehicle-tort plaintiffs “generally”
to “seek reparations from his [or her] own insurance company,”

the insurer “of the vehicle in which [#/Jhe was a passenger,” or,

12
 

FOR PUBLICATION TN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

in the case of an injured pedestrian, “an insurance company
covering any vehicle which caused injury to him” or her. See
Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 4, in 1973 Senate Journal at 636; Hse.
Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 13, in 1973 House Journal at 1219. In
carving out the exceptions in HRS § 431:10c-306(b), the
legislature created the monetary threshold so that, even without
satisfying the “verbal threshold,” see supra note 4, tort
Liability for a plaintiff's injuries would arise so long as the
plaintif£ could denonstrate that the injuries were sufficiently
costly.” See generally $-47 Damages in Tort Actions

§ 47.04(1] [a] (LexisNexis 2006) (“The theory is that, once an
injury requires a certain amount of treatment, it will be deemed
fa serious one even though it may not be specifically listed as a
‘serious injury’ under the verbal threshold.”). To that end, HRS
§ 431:10C-315(b), see supra note 5, which UH conspicuously omits
0c-306 (b)

  

from its arguments, operates in tandem with HRS $ 43
extending the plaintiff’s limitation period until unrealized
medical expenses have accumulated and the gravity of the
plaintiff's injury and, hence, the presence or absence of a claim
for which relief can be granted, is ascertainable. In other
words, HRS § 431:10C-306 enables, indeed requires, would-be
plaintifts to “wait and see” whether their expenses will be great
enough to shift responsibility to another party. ‘The claim

having “accrued” at such time after the accident as the monetary

 

We said as much in Ho vs Leftwich, #8 Mawas't 251, 258, 965 F.2d
793, 800 (1998). ("[T]he provisions of HRS $ 451:10C-306 . . . permit()
celculation of expenses for the purpose of satisfying the threshold
Feguirenent either on the basis of those already aid or those merely
acarusd.” (Eaphases acced.).

 

3
 

‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
threshold requirement is satisfied, HRS §§ 431:10C-315(b)

generally allows the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit for up to two

years after “(2) motor vehicle insurance(,] . . . optional
additional benefits[,] . . . (3) . . - workers’ compensation|,
and] public assistance benefits . . . have ceased.”

In sum, construing HRS $§ 431:10¢~306(b) (2) (2993) and
431:10¢-315(b) 80 as to postpone “accrual” of claims based upon
the medical-rehabilitative limit is necessary to effectuate the
legislature’s “aboli(tion]” of most motor vehicle tort lawsuits.
For a plaintiff to sue based on the mere expectation that
expenses might exceed the medical-rehabilitative threshold would
be to pursue a cleim that the legislature has expressly
abolished. Moreover, the possibility of an eventually ripe claim
does not justify a premature complaint: not even the best expert
witness can ensure that such an inchoate claim will accrue before
the plaintiff convalesces or dies due to causes unrelated to the
alleged tort.

3. UB =
crual date claim.

Furthermore, the “wait-and-see” rule applies regardless
of the sovereign status of the defendant. We agree with UM that,
when the legislature amended the STLA in 1976 so as to lengthen
the limitation period for medical malpractice claims, see supra
note 1, it similarly could have extended, but did not, the life
of motor vehicle tort claims. Nonetheless, this observation is
of no avail to UH inasmuch as, until they reached the medical~
rehabilitative limit, the Savinis’ claim had not “accrued.” To

construe the STLA’s usage of “accrue” any more narrowly would be

a
ses FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWA'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *¥4
to resuscitate a class of tort claims that the legislature
abolished.

Nevertheless, the defendant's sovereign status could be
relevant under circumstances not present in this case. Had the
Savinis waited more than two years after the monetary threshold

had been satisfied to file their lawsuit, UH could have relied on

 

HRS § 662-4 as a statute of repose, regardless of whether two
years had elapsed since “the last payment of workers’
compensation,” of, HRS § 431:10C-315(b) (3). In other words, HRS
§ 662-4 may accord a sovereign defendant some protection beyond
that of HRS § 431:10C-315(b), but it is of no consequence in the
present matter. Sosaiete having apparently exceeded the medical-
rehabilitative limit on October 23, 2000, see supra note 6, HRS

§ 662-4 afforded the Savinis two years from the accrual of their

 

claim

 

Lue., through October 23, 2002 =~ within which to file
their lawsuit. Accordingly, their April 3, 2001 complaint and
June 5, 2001 first amended complaint were timely filed.

4. Ui's discussion of case law is unpersuasive,

UH founders on extrajurisdictional interpretations of
statutes that are materially distinct from those under scrutiny
here. “Hollman stands on all fours with the instant case” is
quite an overstatement; neither it nor Mendiola nor Webb Trucking
involved a statutory tolling or delay provision, a medical
threshold, or any comparable statutory exception to a general

abolition of tort liability. In Wollman, the United States Court

a5
 

"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++*

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit" affirmed a federal district
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint on the grounds
that it “had not been presented within two years of . . . the
accrual of the claim as required by (28 U.S.C. 2401(b)).”

637 F.2d at 546. The plaintiff sought a judicial extension of
the limitation period on the grounds that, while he knew that the
defendant worked for the federal government, he did not know “of
the legal significance of this fact,” i.e., that the government
might have been liable. See id, at 547-49. Specifically, the
plaintiff relied upon the “blameless ignorance” doctrine and the
rule of United States v. LePatourel, $93 F.2d 827, 831-32 (8th
Cir. 1979), which effectively delayed the onset of @ limitation
period pending the resolution of a “novel question of law.” See
Ad at 547-48. ‘The defendant's arguable sovereign status was
irrelevant to the court's conclusion that the plaintiff's belated
development of his respondeat superior theory did not constitute
“blameless ignorance” or trigger the LePatourel rule. See id, at
548, 549 6 n.6. On the other hand, in the present matter, it is
uncontroverted that Sosaiete was receiving workers’ compensation
benefits through at least November 20, 2000, and would be
entitled to a full two-year extension from that date pursuant to

HRS § 431:10C~315(b) (3), see supra note 5, were UH's sovereign

 

immunity not at issue.!?

B Fedorel jurisdiction was predicated upon the defendants conduct
as an employes of the federal government. See 637 F.2a at S46.

 

Nor is Whittington pertinent to the present matter. In that case,
we rejected the plaintift’s argument that the statute of limitations was
teilea during his infancy, Lneamuch as the tolling provision linited itself te

(continsed...)

 

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[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +##

 

Waugh is similarly inapposite. UH urges that,
according to Waugh, because the Savinis “*knew or should have
known’” about their injuries as soon as Sosaiete was struck, the
claim “accrued” at that moment. (Quoting 63 Haw. at 128, 621
P.2d at 966.) Essentially, UH attacks a straw man by arguing
that the “discovery” rule, see supra E.2.a, does not toll the
Limitation period in the present matter. It is uncontested that
the Savinis possessed immediate knowledge of their injuries.
Their entitlement to a delayed onset of the limitation period did
not spring from any ignorance of fact but, rather, from the delay
between the onset of Sosaiete’s injuries and the accumulation of
sufficient medical expenses to create an exception to the no-
fault paradigm, thereby giving rise in the first instance to
potential tort liability on UH's part.

5. Conclusion

In the present matter, UH was not liable to the

Savinis, if at all, until Sosaiete’s injuries had provoked more
than $13,900.00 in actual, incurred expenses. According to
Exhibit A, Sosaiete exceeded the medical-rehabilitative limit
within the two-year period prior to the filing of the Savinis’
complaint. Consequently, the Savinis’ claim had accrued by the

time they filed their complaint but not more than two years

(continued)
action(s) specified in [HRS ch. 657, pt. I,” expressly excluding the STLA,
tnder which the Whistinaten pleinei#é Sued. ‘72 Haw. at 77-76, 606 P.2d at
Se7sse. In contrast, SRS § 431:10c-218(p) (3), does net facially exclude STA
aetiens.

 

 

vv
(++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#+
prior. That being the case, the complaint was timely in
accordance with HRS § 662-4, gee supra note 1.

We recognize that today’s holding might inconvenience
future parties who would prefer to litigate early under
circumstances where it is virtually certain’ that the
plaintiff's injuries will give rise to medical expenses over
$5,000.00 (the current threshold, see HRS § 431:10C-306(b) (4)
(2005)}, but will not do so until considerable time has elapsed.
Such a scenario would be exceptional and capable of amelioration
by the legislature." See generally 2-19 No-Fault & Uninsured
Motorist Auto Insurance § 19.60 (LexisNexis 2006); Stackhouse v
Schneider, 559 A.2d 306, 308 n.5 (D.C. 1989) ("*{I]f there is a
perceived need . . . to set ain] . . . outer time limit... ,
the proper way to do so is by a statute of repose.) (quoting
Bussineau v. President 6 Dirs, of Georgetown Coll., 518 A.2d 423,

436 (D.c. 1986).

Tv. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the
Savinis’ two-year limitation period under HRS § 662-4, see supra

note 1, began to run as soon as (1) the Savinis had incurred or

 

8 Again, sesuming neither tragedy nor cure intervenes.

A few states' statutes currently permit the plaintiff to satisfy
the monetary threshola based upon the expectation of future expences.
fg, S94) Pansase in Tort Actions, gupta section £.2-b, $47.04 (a}{a] teiting
Ky. Fev. Stat. Ann, § 304,39°060 (2) (b)7 Minn. Seat. § 668.51(3) (a) (1)); Montag
yp Beraan Blusatone Coy, 366 A.2d 1363, 1362-63 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
57) (wnere ehreshola required that “expense incurred or
equal or exceed $200.00, agreeing with plaintiff's position “that the cause of

Sctlon dig not accrue Uistil she actually inevrred or should have knows
She gould incor s 200 in ‘medical expenses” (emphases adced)); Correll v,

Gasrelie, 404 N..8,26 636, 637-86 (Sup. Ce. 1378)
18
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

paid actual expenses sufficient to exceed the medical-

rehabilitative limit and (2) Sosaiete’s workers’ compensation

benefits had ceased. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's

duly 12, 2004 order denying UH’s motion to dismiss.

on the briefs:

 

Francis 7. 0’Brien,
for the plaintiffs-appellees
Sosaiete L. Savini and
Bette Savini

Robert A. Nash, of the Office
of the General Counsel of the
University of Hawai'i, for the
defendant-appellant University
of Hawai'i

Deirdre Marie-Tha,
Deputy Attorney General,
for the amicus curiae
State of Hawai'i

ore
ML
Rasta Coruna Ores

Om

Yan < Dudiys