Title: Calvert Joint v. Snider

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

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grantee where the grantor sought to bind the grantee:
“to a servitude which he resists, and insists that he never bought subject to.  It
is a burdensome and very prejudicial servitude; and, to fasten it on the
appellee’s land in favor of the vendors, there should be clearer proof of its
unequivocal reservation than we can find in this case.
“The rule is laid down in numerous authorities that, where the servitude
is a burdensome one, only strict necessity will raise the implication of its
reservation.  ‘Great convenience is not enough.’  2 Wait’s Actions and
Defences, 668-9-70, and authorities there cited.  Mitchell vs. Seipel, 53 Md.
251. It would be very convenient, beyond a doubt, for the appellants to have
a perpetual right of way and outlet in what is called ‘Sutton avenue’ on the
plat; but it is manifestly not a way of necessity. . . . [T]o grant the prayer of
[appellant’s] of their bill would inflict great and lasting injury upon the
appellee and bind him to a condition and situation as respects to his lots which
he did not contemplate when he purchased. . . . [T]he appellee [grantee] holds
the lots he purchased discharged of the claim which the appellants [grantors]
have set up.”  
Id. at 579-80, 19 A. at 1043 (alterations added).  See also, Eliason v. Grove, 85 Md. 215, 225,
36 A. 844-45 (1897); Tong v. Feldman, 152 Md. 398, 402, 136 A. 822-23 (1927)  (“The
necessity must be imperative and absolute.  ‘It is only in cases of the strictest necessity, and
where it would not be reasonable to suppose that the parties intended the contrary, that the
principle of implied reservation can be invoked.’”) (quoting Burns v. Gallagher, supra);
Hansel v. Collins, 180 Md. 209, 216, 23 A. 686, 690 (1942); Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md.
18, 23-24, 54 A.2d 137, 139-40 (1947); Dalton v. Real Estate & Imp’v’t Co., 201 Md. 34,
47, 92 A.2d 585, 591 (1952) (“However, if a grantor intends to reserve any rights or uses in
or over the tenement granted, he must reserve them expressly, and the only exception is of
easements, including ways, of actual, strict necessity.  The reason for the last rule is said to
be that a grantor cannot derogate from his grant.”);  Mitchell v. Houstle, 217 Md. 259, 264,
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142 A. 556, 558 (1958) (“From a very early date, a distinction has been made between an
implied grant and an implied reservation, with the rule being much more strict when called
upon to create an easement by implied reservation than to create one by implied grant.”).
This Court set out the law of implied easements more recently and more completely
in Shpak, 280 Md. at 361, 373 A.2d at 1238, when, citing to some of the cases above, we
stated:
“‘Ways by necessity are a special class of implied grants and have been
recognized in this State for a good many years.’ [quoting Henderson, 236 Md.
at 102, 202 A.2d at 601.]  There are two types of ways of necessity, implied
reservation and implied grant.  If a reservation is not expressly made ‘in the
deed, it must be shown that there is a necessity for its use by the property
retained over the property conveyed.’  Hansel v. Collins, 180 Md. 209, 216, 23
A. 2d 686 (1942).  To similar effect relative to necessity, sometimes referred
to as necessary to be ‘imperative and absolute,’ see Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md.
317, 322, 41 A.2d 66 (1945); Tong v. Feldman, 152 Md. 398, 402, 136 A. 822
(1927); Jay v. Michael, supra, 92 Md. at 210; Burns v. Gallagher, 62 Md. 462,
472 (1884); and 2 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real
Property § 353 (J. Grimes ed. 1961). . . .  An easement by implied reservation
must arise at a time when there is unity of title.  Hansel v. Collins, supra, 180
Md. at 216 . . . .
“‘[G]rants of easements by implication are looked upon with jealousy
and are construed with strictness by the courts.’  Condry v. Laurie, supra, 184
Md. at 321.  ‘The rule with respect to implied reservations is much more
strict than that with respect to implied grants.’  Slear v. Jankiewicz, supra,
189 Md. at 22, quoting Hansel v. Collins, supra, 180 Md. at 215.” [Some
Citations omitted.][Some alterations added.][Emphasis added.]
In the case of Hansel v. Collins, supra, this Court found that there was no necessity
of circumstances for an implied easement to be created.  We said:
“‘For the principle is well settled, and it is founded in reason and good sense,
that no easement or quasi easement can be taken as reserved by implication,
unless it be de facto annexed and in use at the time of the grant, and it be
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shown moreover to be actually necessary to the enjoyment of the estate or
parcel retained by the grantor.  And such necessity cannot be deemed to exist
if a similar way or easement may be secured by reasonable trouble and
expense, and especially not if the necessary way or easement can be provided
through the grantor’s own property.  In order to give rise to the presumption
of a reservation of an existing easement or quasi easement, where the deed is
silent upon the subject, the necessity must be of such strict nature as to leave
no room for doubt of the intention of the parties that the adjoining properties
should continue to be used and enjoyed . . . .  If the grantor intends to reserve
any right or easement over the property granted, it should be done by express
terms . . . . It is only in cases of the strictest necessity, and where it would not
be reasonable to suppose that the parties intended the contrary, that the
principle of implied reservation can be invoked.’ [quoting Burns v.
Gallagher, 62 Md. 462, 471-72 (1884)] . . . 
“It will be observed that the reservation must be made at a time when
there is unity of title, and if not expressly reserved in the deed, it must be
shown that there is a necessity for its use by the property retained over the
property conveyed.  Several of these factors are missing in the present
instance. . . . The property retained . . . was not dependant upon appellants’
property . . . for its water.  There was no question of necessity, and it cannot
be presumed under the circumstances that, having given an absolute deed, the
grantors intended to reserve any rights over the property granted.”
Hansel, at 215-16, 23 A.2d at 689-90 (alteration added) (emphasis added).  See also Beck v.
Mangels, 100 Md. App. 144, 158, 640 A.2d 236, 243 (1994); Markey v. Wolfe, 92 Md. App.
137, 158, 607 A.2d 82, 93 (1992) (involving the reservation of the right to alter covenants).
2. Mineral Rights Doctrine
Before we apply the doctrine of implied easements to the case at bar, we shall discuss
this State’s law with respect to the relationship, generally, between the owners of mineral
rights and the owners of the property subject to a severance of mineral rights, and thus
explain the interplay of the doctrine of mineral rights law with that of the doctrine of implied
easements by reservation.  Because this Court has never specifically addressed many of the
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issues stemming from the separation of the mineral rights from an estate, we also look to the
law from our sister states, as well as our own case law regarding subjacent support rights, in
ascertaining the ultimate state of mineral rights law in Maryland.  In essence, we hold that
the type of conveyance utilized here gave the right to extract the subsurface minerals to
respondents and gave to petitioners the title to the entire property, subject, however, to the
rights of respondent to extract subsurface minerals from the property.  Two separate,
coexisting interests are created in the property.  In addition, we agree with a majority of our
sister states’ courts in holding that, where warranted by the circumstances, a reservation of
subsurface mineral rights may, under appropriate circumstances, carry with it an implied
easement to utilize the surface, where, at the time of the conveyance, a necessity for such an
easement under the circumstances of a particular case exists to utilize such surface of the
property to access those minerals and where, at the time of the conveyance, such a
reservation of an implied easement would not be in conflict with the known intended future
uses of the whole property being conveyed.  Lastly, while we reaffirm our long-held doctrine
of subjacent support, we do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it is determinative in
the case at bar.
We first discussed the rights of mineral owners nearly 100 years ago in the case of
Piedmont and George’s Creek Coal Company vs. Kearney, 114 Md. 496, 79 A. 1013 (1911).
In that case we opined:
“The general rule of law is that when the estate in minerals ‘in place,’ as they
are sometimes spoken of in their natural bed, is severed from the estate in the
18 It is possible that other interests can be severed as well, i.e., “air rights.”
Additionally, a modern trend in title law has begun to recognize such things as “development
rights,” and other non-traditional forms of ownership.
19 There may be elements beneath the surface of land that do not constitute minerals
under mineral rights laws, i.e., subterranean water, subterranean air (caverns and caves),
animal life, etc.  For this additional reason, we doubt that a “reservation” of “mineral rights”
alone carries with it an estate in the entire subsurface of property.  Accordingly, when
language such as that used in the present case establishes the rights of parties, it is more
proper to note that there is but one estate, subject to certain specific reservations.  However,
many of the mineral rights cases generally refer to mineral rights as estates.  Accordingly,
when such a term as an “estate” in the subsurface is used, it generally refers to a limited
(mineral right) right in the subsurface.  Accordingly, the terms “surface estate” and
“subsurface estate” may not be, in the cases, completely accurate unless the conveyances
(continued...)
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surface, the owner of the latter has an undoubted right of subjacent support for
the surface, and the owner of the estate in the minerals is entitled to remove
only so much of them as he can take without injury to the surface, unless
otherwise authorized by contract or statute.”  
Id. at 501, 79 A. at 1015.  While not affirmatively articulating it as a rule of law, this Court’s
use of language of “severed from the estate,” as opposed to “excepting” from the grant, in
reference to the minerals rights in that case recognizes that a reservation of mineral rights by
a grantor creates two independent, distinct and co-existing interests in one parcel of land; one
in the whole property subject to a reservation of mineral rights and one in the minerals
beneath the surface of the land.18  The former is often described as the surface estate,
although it is in reality the whole estate “subject to” the mineral rights.  The latter is often
referred to as the subsurface estate, although, as to the subsurface, it is only a limited right
when reservation, as opposed to “exception” language, such as that contained in the present
deed is used.19
19(...continued)
“except” from the grant all of the subsurface of a property.  However, we shall in this
opinion, sometimes, refer to the interests in reserved minerals as “estates” in order to be
consistent with the language of many of the cases.
20 The Court of Special Appeals relied on Spurlock v. Sante Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 143
Ariz. 469, 694 P.2d 299 (1984), in its opinion in this case.  While Spurlock is valid for many
of the propositions for which it was relied on by our lower court, it is not, contrary to the
contention of the lower court, determinative on the question of whether respondents have a
right to use the surface of petitioner’s residential subdivision.  In fact, the Spurlock court
specifically passed on answering a question such as the primary one in the case at bar when
it said:
“In the present case, only the issue of ownership rights under the
general mineral reservation is before us.  Issues relating to the effect of
extraction of the disputed substances upon the surface estate have not been
briefed or argued before this court.  Nor do the judgments below purport to
rule on these matters.  Accordingly, we do not believe it appropriate for this
court to speculate as to whether or not production of any minerals would
substantially interfere with the surface estate.”  
Id. at 480-81, 694 P.2d at 310-11 (footnote omitted).  In addition, the deed in Spurlock, is
entirely distinguishable from the one in the case sub judice as it “excepted” the minerals from
the conveyance, as well as expressly reserving broad rights to access and use the surface for
the benefit of the  mineral estate “excepted.”  The express language stated:
“‘Grantor expressly reserves and excepts all oil, gas, coal and minerals
whatsoever, already found or which may hereafter be found, upon or under
said lands, with the right to prospect for, mine and remove the same, and to
use so much of the surface of said lands as shall be necessary and convenient
for shafts, wells, tanks, pipe lines, rights of way, railroad tracks, storage
purposes, and other and different structures and purposes necessary and
convenient for the digging, drilling and working of any mines or wells which
may be operated on said lands.’”  
Id. at 474 n.2, 694 P.2d at 304 n.2. (emphasis added).  Thus, the Spurlock court’s own
language, coupled with the express language of the deed in that case, makes it inapplicable
(continued...)
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The separation of “estates” (or more accurate, “interests”) in this manner is recognized
in other jurisdictions, including the Arizona case law which the Court of Special Appeals
relied on in rendering its decision in this case.20  See, Spurlock v. Sante Fe Pacific R.R. Co.,
20(...continued)
to the ultimate issues of the case at bar.  The Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on Spurlock
as being determinative in this case, was, although informative, misplaced.
21 As we have noted, such language really creates a right to own and extract minerals,
as opposed to a creation of separate “estates.”  However we recognize that use of the term
“estates” in such circumstances has often been the term of choice.
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143 Ariz. 469, 478-79, 694 P.2d 299, 308-09 (1984); see also Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,
462 U.S. 36, 50-55, 103 S. Ct. 2218, 2226-29, 76 L. Ed. 2d 400, 411-15 (1983); Gill v.
Colton, 12 F.2d 531, (4 th Cir. 1926); Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13,
(1938); and Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Allegheny Nat’l Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 60 A. 924
(1905).  In Spurlock, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
“[W]e believe a reservation of ‘all minerals whatsoever’ reflects a general
intent of the parties to sever the surface estate from the underlying mineral
estate.  Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938).  It indicates
that the parties intended to create two distinct, coexisting, and individually
valuable estates.  Thus, the grantor retains ownership of all commercially
valuable substances separate from the soil, while the grantee assumes
ownership of a surface that has value in its use and enjoyment.”  
Spurlock, 143 Ariz. at 478, 674 P.2d at 308 (alteration added).  As can be seen in Spurlock,
the grantor “excepted” mineral rights from the conveyance.  Respondents in the case sub
judice, reserved “all oil, gas or other mineral rights in and to the aforesaid property.”  As
such, we hold that this reservation created an ownership interest in the minerals in
respondents, separate and apart from the whole “estate” in the property at issue which
belongs to petitioners.21
Generally, while this State has yet to speak to the issue, once the mineral rights have
22 The law of mineral rights is vast and complex.  We do not purport to cite every case,
in every jurisdiction, speaking to mineral rights law relevant to this case; we merely cite to
some of the more recent cases dealing with these issues.  For a more thorough discussion in
the cases of mineral rights law where the minerals rights are granted or reserved separate
from the superjacent land, see 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals §§ 158-90 (1998); or its
predecessor, 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals §§ 150-60 (1948).  See generally 54 Am. Jr. 2d
Mines and Minerals §§102-148.
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been reserved (or granted) and the whole estate has been encumbered by the instrument of
conveyance, some other states have found that the reservation, conveyance or leasing of
mineral rights includes an implied easement for the owner of those rights to ingress, egress,
occupy and use the surface of land, as reasonably necessary, for the purpose of extracting
those minerals in the absence of specific language granting those rights.22  See generally,
Norken Corp. v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 628, 628 n.6 (Alaska 1991) (not applying the
“universal recognition” of an owner of mineral rights to use the surface to obtain said
minerals where alternate access to the land was not at issue and when the substance
concerned is neither a mineral, nor was a substance intended to be removed in the lease);
Spurlock, 143 Ariz. at 479, 694 P.2d at 309 (stating, in a case concerning a deed with a
comprehensive mining reservation, including the right to enter, mine and use the surface, that
it is logical that a surface owner would agree to a reasonable burden or some surface
destruction on his estate by the mineral rights owners in order for the latter to access his
estate); Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 1997) (stating, in a
case concerning an oil lessee’s excessive and unreasonable use of the surface where the
lessee had no other access and in reference to access to the superjacent surface, “the right of
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access to the mineral estate is in the nature of an implied easement, since it entitles the holder
to a limited right to use the land in order to reach and extract the minerals”); Crawford v.
Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 447 (Kan. 2002) (which involved an oil lease that expressly granted use
of the surface property, the court noted:  the proposition that, while not determinative in that
case, an owner or lessor of mineral rights had an implied right to make a reasonable use of
the surface); Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1183 n.32 (Okla. 1993)
(noting although not at issue in that case, that for mineral rights owners, “the right of ingress
and egress for development is now implied in both grants and reservations”); Melton v.
Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1941) (although the facts are not clear as to alternate
access and the necessity to enter and use the surface property, stating that the right of entry
accompanies a grant of mineral rights); Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d
865, 867 (Tex. 1973) (stating an ownership in mineral rights “carries with it the right to use
the surface, including water, to the extent reasonably necessary to develop and produce the
minerals” in a case awarding damages to the surface owner for the mineral rights owner’s
unreasonable use of the surface where there was no proof of the necessity of that use); Flying
Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 625-26 (Utah 1989) (recognizing
that a mineral owner has an implied easement of ingress/egress over the surface of the land
if “reasonably necessary” in a case where the mineral rights owner contracted for broad
surface rights in order to facilitate exploration and production of the minerals); Flying
Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511, 511 n.1 (Utah 1976) (approving of, and citing
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to treatises on the general rule “approved by all jurisdictions that have considered the matter
. . . that the ownership (or rights of a lessee) of mineral rights in land is dominant over the
rights of the owner of the fee to the extent reasonably necessary to extract the minerals
therefrom” in a case where, pursuant to a broad oil and gas lease, the surface owner received
damages for the lessee’s placement of an access road that interfered with his crops when the
road could have been placed elsewhere on the land.  The court found that it wasn’t necessary
to build the road where it was built.); Phillips v. Fox, 193 W. Va. 657, 662-63, 458 S.E.2d
327, 332-33 (1995) (reiterating the well-settled West Virginia law that “ownership of a
mineral estate includes the right to enter upon and use the superjacent surface by such
manner and means as is fairly reasonable and necessary to reach and remove the minerals”
in a case concerning a deed silent as to surface use issues and whether strip mining was
allowable.  The court remanded to ascertain the necessity of this type of mining.); Howard
R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law 218 (1996) (stating that when provisions
such as ingress/egress are absent from the instrument conveying the mineral right, courts
have held that such surface easements are implied and then they will permit the lessee or
mineral owner to enjoy their interest).
A right to underground minerals might be valueless without the right to access the
minerals.  However, the creation of an implied easement is affected by other factors; an
implied easement exists only if, at the time of the separation of the mineral rights there exists
an actual necessity for the owner of said rights to enter the surface lands above those
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minerals in order to derive value from or make use of the interests in the minerals.  This
Court has consistently said: “‘It is only in cases of the strictest necessity, and where it would
not be reasonable to suppose that the parties intended the contrary, that the principle of
implied reservation can be invoked.’”  Hansel v. Collins, 180 Md. at 216, 23 A. 2d at 690
(quoting Burns v. Gallagher, 62 Md. 462, 471-72).  We hold that, generally, when the
ownership of minerals is severed by exception, reservation or grant, the mineral rights owner
may retain an implied easement to access the surface of the superjacent surface lands only
when there is a strict necessity for such an easement and it does not conflict with the known
intended use of the whole property at the time of the conveyance and/or severance.  This is
especially so when the right to the minerals is created by a reservation in a conveyance by
a grantor of the whole estate.  This implied easement by reservation, moreover, is far from
absolute.  We also hold consistent with our sister courts, that the use must be reasonable and
not in conflict with the intent of the parties as of the time of the conveyance.
As previously noted, our sister states mainly focus on whether the specific use of the
surface in question is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the minerals.  While the
implied easement to reasonably use the surface of the land to access its underlying minerals
is generally accepted, when making a determination of the scope of the implied right, courts
have looked into ascertaining the intent of the parties through an analysis of the
circumstances surrounding each case, including, but not limited to, the language in the deed,
the purpose for which the land conveyed was to be used, the purpose for which the right was
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reserved, the actual necessity for the implied easement and the knowledge of the parties.  See
Department of Forests and Parks v. George’s Creek Coal & Land Company, 250 Md. 125,
242 A.2d 165 (1968) (holding that extrinsic evidence revealed the parties’ intent to include
strip mining as an accepted method when the deed was ambiguous as to whether grantor’s
reservation included strip mining); see also Bibby v. Bunch, 176 Ala. 585, 58 So. 916 (1912)
(holding, that where no stipulation of mining methods exists and where the surface lands
have been shown to contain plentiful timber, grasses and herbs which make that land
valuable for agriculture or residential development that would be severely adversely affected
by mining operations, courts should first consider the surface interests “from which the
human family draws sustenance and on which it lives and moves, and declare, in the absence
of special covenant to a contrary effect, the absolute right to its use and enjoyment, subject
only to those rights in the owner of the underlying minerals which are necessarily implied”);
Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 (1974) (construing the
intent of the parties to a deed not to include strip mining of a surface because of the total
incompatibility of strip mining with enjoyment of the surface and that there is a heavy burden
on the party seeking to demonstrate the right to mine in that fashion); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953) (focusing on the nature and character of the land
as a farm in disallowing strip mining operations); Friedline v. Hoffman, 271 Pa. 530, 115 A.
845 (1922) (holding that, as defendants had “a practicable way over their own lands for the
removal of the coal in question; hence the law cannot allow them a right-of-way by necessity
23 See also cases cited supra.
24 Hereinafter, “George’s Creek.”
25 It was known to the grantees that “George’s Creek” was a mining company that
utilized strip mining procedures.
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over plaintiff’s land” where defendants purchased five acres of the land in which they had
mineral rights for the purpose of creating an opening into the surface to extract coal); Getty
Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971) (establishing the accommodation doctrine in
Texas, whereby if it is shown that a mineral owner has reasonable alternative ways to extract
minerals which will not interfere with the surface owner’s intended use, the mineral owner
must choose the use not precluding the use of the surface owner).23
In George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., this Court construed a deed excepting and
reserving broad mining rights to include strip mining methods although strip mining would
destroy the surface above the coal, which was rocky, unimproved and covered with timber
at the time of the reservation.  In doing so, this Court relied on the intent of the parties at time
of the conveyance.  At that time, George’s Creek Coal and Land Company24conveyed land
known as “Beattys’ Plains” to McMillen, who was in the timber and pulping business.25
George’s Creek excepted and reserved the following in the deed in that case, “‘Excepting,
however, from the operation of this deed, and reserving . . . all the coal, clay and other
minerals, and all the oil and gas underlying said land hereby conveyed, together with the
right to enter in, upon and under said land and to mine, excavate and remove all said coal,
clay and other minerals, and said oil and gas . . . .’” George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 250
26 As the deed in George’s Creek “excepted” and “reserved” from the conveyance, it
can be properly said that the grantor retained an “estate” as well as an interest in the minerals
“excepted” from the conveyance.  It would appear to be the better practice to both “except”
minerals from conveyances and “reserve” the right to mine, i.e., extract them.
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Md. at 127, 242 A.2d at 166.  As is evident, there was an express reservation of an access
easement.  The express reservation then went on to list several other easements reserved in
the property, such as the right to transport minerals, construct buildings, roads, tunnels and
other structures, and relieving the grantor of liability for “‘the breaking or subsidence of the
surface.’” Id.  In considering whether this type of deed allowed strip mining, this Court
focused on this broad exception and express reservation language coupled with the parties’
intent, when we said:
“However desirable it may be for contracting parties, in the future, to be more
specific, we think any reasonable appraisal of the circumstances . . . makes it
entirely clear that the [George’s Creek Coal and Land] Company and
McMillen had no notion whatever of excluding strip mining as a method of
removing the coal.  In their scale of values the land had two assets, coal and
timber, upon the removal of both of which, what remained would be worthless.
We find nothing admirable in their way of thinking but it has a significance
here which cannot be overlooked.   
Id. at 137-38, 242 A.2d at 172 (alteration added). 26
In the present case, as we have noted, the grantor failed to reserve express access
easements such as those existing in George’s Creek Coal & Land Co.  If respondents, who
owned land adjacent to the Calvert Property, had deemed such surface access necessary it
would have been easy for them to have included such rights in the land contract and
subsequently expressly reserved them  in the deed.
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The reasonableness of the mineral rights owner’s use of the land often depends on the
character or planned use of that land.   In Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Duricka, 374 Pa. at 265-66
97 A.2d at 826, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in its disallowance of strip mining
operations pursuant to the deed conveying extremely broad mining rights in that case, said:
“It is obvious, in view of the surface violence, destruction and
disfiguration which inevitably attend strip or open mining, that no land owner
would lightly or casually grant strip mining rights, nor would any purchaser of
land treat lightly any reservation of mining rights which would permit the
grantor or his assignee to come upon his land and turn it into a battleground
with strip mining.”
After analyzing the leading Pennsylvania cases in this area, the court went on to say:
“The surface of the ground involved here is farm land.  A farm, except
in a very restricted way, is not affected by underground mining.  The farmer
may plough, plant and prune while miners work underneath his growing crops.
But strip mining drives him from his fields as effectively as a tornado.  And
the damage done is not restricted to the year in which the mining occurs. . . .
[T]he top soil is so wounded and scarred by rock, shale, gravel and unusable
coal that it is rendered incapable of production for many years.  No farmer
would permit such a disablement of his land without specific consideration.
It is clear in this case that the rights reserved and later conveyed to the plaintiff
were not broad enough to include such disablement.”  
Id. at 269, 97 A.2d at 827-28. 
In  Friedline v. Hoffman, 271 Pa. 530, 115 A. 845, before buying all of the mineral
rights in a larger tract of property, the buyer also purchased outright five acres of the
superjacent land for the purpose of using its surface for coal mining operations to extract the
minerals.  The buyer then discovered that it would be cheaper to place the mine entrance on
a separate one-acre parcel of the superjacent land that he had not purchased outright, which
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was over 400 feet from the five-acre parcel the buyer had previously purchased.  The mineral
rights owner failed in his attempt to purchase outright this additional acre of land, but,
against the protestations of the surface owner, took possession of it, cut its timber, sunk a
mine shaft and prepared to commence full mining operations.  The Friedline court found:
“Where a vendor of the surface reserves the coal, with no stipulation as
to the mining thereof, he will be entitled to such use of the surface as is
necessary to make his reservation effective; but, if he owns adjoining property,
through or over which it is practically possibly to mine and remove the
reserved coal, he will not be entitled to use for that purpose the conveyed
surface.  A way of access to property, granted or reserved, will be implied only
when necessary to give effect to the grant or reservation but never merely as
a matter of convenience. Here, when defendants bought the coal, they owned
five acres of plaintiff’s surface, which the chancellor finds was a means of
access to the coal; he also finds, in effect, that while it is not the most
convenient avenue of approach to the coal the latter can thereby be mined at
a profit and that it is commercially feasible to do so. . . . 
“Where the parties agree as to the method of access to the coal, the law
will not imply a different way, although more convenient.  Here, however,
independently of such an agreement, defendants have a practicable way over
their owns lands for the removal of the coal in question; hence, the law cannot
allow them a right-of-way by necessity over plaintiff’s land.”  
Friedline v. Hoffman, 271 Pa. at 534-35, 115 A. at 846 (citations omitted).
This Court has also recognized the need for surface owners to have the right to enjoy
their land, free from unreasonable interference stemming from mining operations; this
includes the doctrine of subjacent support.  Kearney, 114 Md. at 500-03, 79 A. at 1015-16.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Special Appeals failed to apply  Kearney to the case at
bar and that the lower court’s holding was in “direct conflict” with Kearney.  In essence,
petitioner argues that Kearney stands for the proposition that the owner of the mineral rights
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cannot, under any circumstance, enter the surface of the property.  We disagree that such a
proposition, standing alone, supports the position of petitioner.
Petitioner references language in Kearney which, according to petitioner, directs that
“the owner of the surface has the right of subjacent support for the surface and the owner of
the minerals is entitled to remove only so much of them as he can take without injury to the
surface, unless otherwise authorized by contract or statute.”  In fact, the actual language in
Kearney stated: 
“The general rule of law is that when the estate in minerals ‘in place,’ as they
are sometimes spoken of in their natural bed, is severed from the estate in the
surface, the owner of the latter has an undoubted right of subjacent support for
the surface, and the owner of the estate in the minerals is entitled to remove
only so much of them as he can take without injury to the surface, unless
otherwise authorized by contract or statute.”
Id. at 501, 79 A. at 1015.  But cf. George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d
165 (holding, that when a deed is ambiguous as to whether grantor’s reservation included
strip mining, extrinsic evidence was to be used in ascertaining intent of the parties, thus, even
though strip mining would severally injure the surface, it was allowed because of the parties’
intent).  While the language of Kearney appears, as petitioner contends, to require no injury
to the surface, it is taken out of context.  The reservation in Kearney was comprehensive,
including an easement clause, and reserved the mineral rights along with “the right to mine
and remove the said coal or minerals at such place or places as may appear to them, the said
first parties, their heirs or assigns, most suitable and convenient.”  Id. at 500, 79 A. at 1015.
As such, the parties in Kearney, in the deed, expressly decided all issues relating to the
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mineral rights owner’s access to the minerals.  The parties decided that the mineral rights
came with a right to “mine and remove” the coal from a place deemed “suitable and
convenient” solely by the mineral rights owner.  
Our holding, in Kearney merely dealt with issues of supporting the surface after the
mineral rights owner had properly entered beneath the surface and commenced removing the
minerals.  There was no issue in Kearney relating to surface access to the minerals.  The rule
of law arising in that case was that, in Maryland, a mineral rights owner has a duty to support
the surface during mining activities, i.e., ensuring that the superjacent surface does not
collapse.  Kearney remains good law, but does not speak to whether, when the deed is silent
as to the issue, an implied reservation to use the superjacent surface for access exists.  The
Court of Special Appeals was correct in not relying on 
Kearney as determinative in the issues
in the case sub judice.
3. Respondents’ Use of Surface Lands
Given our holding that mineral rights owners may, under proper circumstances, have
an implied easement to use  the superjacent surface and that the language of the deed in the
case sub judice is silent in reference to the scope of the mining rights access reserved by
respondents, we now apply the facts of this case to our doctrine of implied easements to
ascertain whether the parties intended for respondents to reserve an easement over and/or
through the surface of the Calvert Property.
When a grantor conveys surface rights knowing that the purpose of the grantee is to
27 It is not unreasonable to assume that respondents knew or should have known that
the petitioner, a joint venture formed to develop and market land, intended to maximize the
lot yield of the subject property, rather than subdivide it for only a few lots.
28 In the opening statement at trial, respondents’ counsel stated:
“I believe the [petitioners] are going to offer testimony, for instance, as to
whether it is feasible for [respondents] to get to the minerals, whether it is
possible under the current law today for them, for instance, to put an oil well
(continued...)
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utilize the surface for a particular purpose such as a residential home subdivision,27 there is
no inference that can be reasonably drawn, merely from the reservation of mineral rights, that
the grantor reserves the right to an easement to disturb the surface to access the minerals in
a way that would disturb the intended surface use so as to make that use impracticable.  The
retention of such an unfettered and general implied easement would impermissibly conflict
with the uses for which the grantor conveyed the property.  It, in essence, would, if not
destroy, certainly severely affect, the marketability of the residential lots, and the subsequent
use of such lots for all of the purposes we have noted.  The conflict is avoidable when the
grantor, at the time of the conveyance, retains adjacent, or other property, from which access
to the minerals might be made.  
In this case, it is clear that surface access from the Calvert Property to the subsurface
minerals at issue here was not intended at the time of the land installment contract or at the
time of conveyance.  Such surface access, in these circumstances, would be clearly
incompatible with the surface use as a residential subdivision.  Additionally, there is no
evidence that, at the time of the conveyance, such access was even necessary.28  As we
28(...continued)
on this property.  I don’t think that is before the Court or there is going to be
an expert testimony as to what is feasible and what is not feasible.
“I would just say to the Court that even if it were true under today’s law
it would be difficult for my clients to exercise their rights.  My clients are not
here to say we are going to sink this well today.”
29 This point underscores an alternative basis for holding that no implied reservation
arose on the record of this case.  Respondents, as the proponents of the existence of an
implied reservation of surface access in this declaratory action, had the burden to adduce
competent evidence establishing each of the elements needed to give rise to the existence of
such an implied reservation.  This they failed to do.  In fact, they not only failed to discharge
their duty to put forth affirmative evidence in this regard, they resisted petitioner’s efforts to
adduce evidence tending to prove that no such reservation should be recognized.
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indicated earlier in this opinion, at trial petitioner’s witness claimed, on cross-examination,
that it was “not inconceivable” that the minerals could be accessed from respondent’s
adjoining property.  No contrary evidence was proffered by respondents.29  Accordingly, no
implication that surface access is necessary can be made and thus no implied easement exists.
We think that an analysis of our doctrine of implied easements illustrates that
reasonableness of the intrusion on the property to access the mineral rights is not the only
factor involved; necessity of that right is also an element.  It must be reasonable and
necessary.  In this case, based on the evidence actually presented, it was neither.  Many of
the cases cited herein have involved deeds with specific reservations granting the surface
access rights respondents claim are implied by a reservation of mineral rights in the deed in
the case at bar.  If respondents meant to reserve access to the surface of land they knew was
being purchased for a residential subdivision, they should have expressly included such a
conflicting right within the contract and deed.  As no such clause appeared in the deed and,
30 The parties have agreed that separate estates in property have been created, but only
differ on the character of the estates.  We shall address the issues as argued by the parties.
However, there remains the question of whether an estate in the subsurface, as opposed to
a right to extract minerals, is created by the language used here.
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further, at the time of conveyance respondents retained ownership of an adjacent parcel from
which access might be possible, we hold that respondents cannot access the surface of this
proposed residential subdivision for mining purposes.
B. Duration of the Mineral Rights Reservation
Petitioner’s final question to which we granted certiorari deals with the duration of
the mineral rights interests created by respondents’ express reservation in the special
warranty deed.  Petitioner claims, despite the clear language in Section 4-105 of the Real
Property Article of the Maryland Code stating that words of inheritance are not necessary to
create a fee simple estate, that respondents’ reservation is limited to a life estate in the
mineral rights because no words of inheritance are used.  This contention has no merit.30
The Maryland Legislature codified the principle that words of inheritance are not
necessary to create a perpetual estate when it enacted § 4-105 of the Real Property Article,
which states:
“No words of inheritance are necessary to create an estate in fee simple
or an easement by grant or by reservation.  Unless a contrary intention appears
by express terms or is necessarily implied, every grant of land passes a fee
simple estate, and every grant or reservation of an easement passes or reserves
an easement in perpetuity.”
Md. Code (1974, 1996 Repl. Vol) § 4-105 of the Real Property Article.  This principle pre-
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dates the case of Hawkins v. Chapman, 36 Md. 83, 94 (1872), when this Court said:
“The text writers and reports establish beyond doubt that words of
limitation or inheritance are not essential to create an estate in fee; nor is the
nature of the estate conveyed, whether a trust or use executed, determined so
much by the terms used, as the object to be effected.  In Hill on Trustees, 455,
it is said, ‘A trustee will take the fee without the word “heirs,” when necessary
for the trust.’  The same principle is announced in Spessard, et al., vs. Rohrer,
et al., 9 Gill 261, where the deed conveyed lands without the word ‘heirs’ to
a trustee, with power to sell to pay debts.”
See also Farquharson v. Eichelberger, 15 Md. 63 (1860).  This Court rearticulated this
principle in the case of Case v. Marshall, 159 Md. 588, 594, 152 A. 261, 264 (1930), when
we said:
“With the statutes now in force in this state, it is, we think, well settled
that, where a contrary intention is not clearly shown, both deeds and
assignments, as well as wills, though without words of limitation or perpetuity,
are presumed to carry such estate as the grantor, assignor, or testator has the
power to convey, assign, or dispose of by will, and not an estate limited to the
life of the grantee, assignee, devisee, or legatee, or an estate or interest less
than that over which such party has the power of disposition.”
Additionally, as to reserved easements, we reiterated the principle in Greenwalt v. McCardell
178 Md. 132, 136, 12 A.2d 522, 524 (1940), where we stated:
“It is well established that whenever it appears from a fair construction
of a deed that it was the purpose of the parties to create or reserve an easement
in the property conveyed for the benefit of other land owned by the grantor,
regardless of the form in which the purpose may have been expressed, such a
right is deemed to be appurtenant to the land of the grantor and binding on that
conveyed to the grantee; and the right thus created or reserved will pass to all
subsequent owners of the land to which it is appurtenant.”
As the evolution of this long standing principle culminating in the creation of § 4-105
suggests, there is no question that Maryland law has long favored estates in fee simple even
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in the absence of words of inheritance.
Given the unambiguous language of §4-105, the only way in which petitioner could
possibly prevail given the positions argued by the parties would be if respondents’
reservation “necessarily implied” that only an interest for life was reserved.  Although in its
argument petitioner points to several factors in the deed’s, and land installment contract’s,
language that, petitioner argues, necessarily implies a conveyance of a life estate, not one of
those factors, either reviewed in conjunction or isolation, rise to the level required to support
the desired implication sought by petitioner.  We do not believe, as petitioner does, that the
omission of words of inheritance in a reservation of the right to execute leases or other
documents relating to mineral rights, which “specifically and unequivocally identified” only
the names of respondents, necessarily implies that the duration of the interests was for only
the lives of those named people.  Nor do we believe that language stating “that any dispute
regarding the terms and conditions is to be resolved by the contract as written and not by any
prior documented agreements or understandings,” implies the same.  In fact, respondents
counter by arguing that the lease language signifies that the right to decision-making with
respect to the minerals is reserved, along with the actual mineral rights, to the respondents
and their heirs and that it instructs that the owner of the surface, i.e., petitioner, has no voice
in any issues arising from the leasing of respondents’ mineral rights.  Similarly, the dispute-
resolving language merely illustrates an intention by the parties to resolve any disputes with
respect to their intent at the time the document was conveyed.  The very existence of these
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reasonable alternative meanings to petitioner’s contention that the deed’s language
purportedly limits the interests reserved by respondents to a life estate, dispels any notion that
petitioner’s interpretation is “necessarily implied.”  
Additionally, language in the deed of October 1996 that specifically grants the
property “to the Grantee . . . its successors and assigns, in fee simple” without using parallel
language for the reservation clause, is not enough to overcome the substantial burden
imposed on petitioner by § 4-105.  Given Maryland’s long history of favoring the creation
of estates in fee simple and the fact that the deed contains no express terms expressing a
limitation of the duration of the “estate,” we affirm the lower court on this issue.
There is also another reason why a strong inference exists, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, that the parties intended no time limitations on the character of the
minerals rights’ interest created by the conveyance at issue.  A life estate in mineral rights
would be, basically, commercially unmarketable.  Life estates, of necessity reference a life
in esse.  When that life ceases, the right to mine minerals from the total estate would also
cease.  In other words, in the present case if the respondents had died the day after the subject
conveyance, their minerals rights’ interest would have ceased.  This very pertinent fact is
well known to investors, purchasers, lenders and anyone conversant with aspects of titles.
No bank would lend money to respondents to mount a mining venture using the mineral
rights as collateral, by mortgage or otherwise, because the mineral rights would have a
limited life, and could have a very limited life – days, minutes even.  Upon the death of the
31 In rare instances, generally involving family matters one would suppose, life estates
in mineral rights might be created; for instance a conveyance of a life estate to a family
member where the grantor retains the fee, and the family member is sufficiently affluent to
finance the mining out of his pocket.  If the life holder dies, the mineral rights would revert
to the granting family member, i.e., stay in the family.  There may be a rare investor that
would be willing to gamble on the life span of the life interests’ holder, but it would not
appear that such gamblers are to be found with sufficient frequency to make such interests
commercially marketable.  
In fact, one could imagine the following scenario when such a “gambler” on life
purchases mineral rights whose duration is limited to the life of another.  After the purchase,
the gambler would become a de facto guardian angel of the life interests’ holder, while the
remainderman would have no interest in preserving that same life.  For instance, if the life
interests’ holder suffered an injury causing him to be in a coma or on life support, the
gambler would do everything in his power to prolong the life interests’ holder’s life, while
the remainderman would advocate “pulling the plug,” which, inevitably, would spawn
litigation.
In any event, when speaking of marketability, we are not concerned with family
arrangements, or gamblers on lives, but we are addressing commercial marketability,
unfettered alienability of interests in land.
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holders of the life “estate,” paramount title in the minerals, in the circumstances of a grant
with a reservation of a life estate in the minerals, would pass to the owners of the whole
estate – in the present case, petitioner.  In other words, the collateral would vanish.
Likewise, no reasonable buyer would purchase the right to mine minerals when the right
would be extinguished if the holders of the life estate were killed in an automobile accident
on the way home from signing the documents that granted the mineral rights.31
In order to convey the mineral rights they have reserved, if they had only reserved a
life interest, respondents in this case would have to obtain the agreement of the owner of the
total “subject to” estate, petitioner, and have it sign over its rights as remainderman (or
remainder persons) in the minerals in order to market the mineral rights, by lease or
32 There is not even an inference that can be made under the circumstances here
present.
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otherwise.  The Land Installment Contract and the subsequent deed included the reservation
to respondents of the right to “execute leases and other documents relating to the production
of oil, gas, and other minerals upon such terms and conditions as are acceptable to sellers
[respondents].” (alteration added).  The language of the documents themselves are
inconsistent with the language that would, under the circumstances here present, need to be
used in order to create a “life interest.”  Generally, inferences would not suffice to create
such a severely limited interest.32  To create a “life interest” limitation that would so severely
affect the marketability of that interest, the language (whether exception, grant or
reservation) in the creating document must explicitly so provide.  The mineral rights
reservation in the case sub judice is not so limited.
III.  Conclusion
We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, respondents are precluded from
using the surface of the Calvert Property under the reservation clause in the October 1996
special warranty deed.  Had respondents desired to retain the right to prospect for and/or
mine minerals from the surface of the subject property in spite of its intended use for a
residential subdivision, they could have, at the time of the conveyance, easily expressly
reserved an easement to utilize the surface land.  They did not do so.  Although an owner of
mineral rights under a property may, under appropriate circumstances, be entitled to an
33 Claims of implied easements, if any, are  ordinarily examined based on the
circumstances in existence at the time of the conveyance at issue.
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implied reservation of an easement to access those minerals from the surface even where the
deed’s language makes no mention of such a right, that use must be both reasonable and
necessary at the time of the conveyance in which the minerals are excepted, reserved or
granted.  We hold that, under the special circumstances here present, any access to the
surface of the residential subdivision for mining would be unreasonable and in conflict with
the intended purpose of using the property as a residential subdivision.  This is especially true
where, as in this case, respondents were well aware of the fact that petitioner planned to use
the property for residential subdivision purposes.  Under these circumstances, we hold that
respondents failed to meet their burden of proof as to the elements required to establish the
implied reservation at issue. 
While we couch our conclusion in terms of the specific intended use of the surface in
this case, i.e., a residential subdivision, our holding extends to any surface use where, under
the circumstances of a particular case, utilization of the surface to prospect for, or to extract,
subsurface minerals, would unreasonably interfere with the known intended uses of the
surface.  
In addition, an implied easement to use the surface of the property was unnecessary
under these facts as, at the time of the conveyance, respondents in this case owned a tract of
land adjacent to the subject property.33  Thus, we reverse the Court of Special Appeals as to
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this issue.  Respondents have no right to use the surface of the Calvert Property in the
exercise of their mineral rights.
We further hold that, although the doctrine of subjacent support is still valid in this
State, it is not presented as an appropriate issue in the case sub judice.  Finally, pursuant to
well-established law, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals in that respondents’ reservation
of all oil, gas and other mineral rights in this case was a reservation of a perpetual interest,
pursuant to § 4-105 of the Real Estate Article of the Maryland Code.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN
PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
W ITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMER Y
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR  THE
E N T R Y  
O F  
J U D G M E N T S
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE DIVIDED EVENLY BETWEEN
PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.