Title: Hunt v. Chang

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

594 P.2d 118 (1979) Joan H. HUNT, Individually and as next friend of James Richard Hunt II, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Elaine CHANG, a/k/a Elaine Pepitone, Defendant-Appellee. No. 6197. Supreme Court of Hawaii. April 19, 1979. *119 Wayne D. Parsons (Hyman M. Greenstein, Honolulu, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants. Leland H. Spencer, Honolulu (Kelso, Spencer, Snyder & Stirling, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellee. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and KOBAYASHI, Retired Justice, assigned by reason of vacancy.[*] KOBAYASHI, Justice. This is an appeal from orders of the circuit court of the first circuit, granting Elaine Chang defendant-appellee's (appellee) motion for summary judgment against plaintiff-appellant Joan H. Hunt (appellant) and dismissing appellant's action as next friend of James Richard Hunt II, a minor. We affirm. I. Whether the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment against appellant. II. Whether the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to dismiss the action as to appellant, as next friend of James Richard Hunt II, a minor. The appellant, individually and as next friend of James Richard Hunt II, a minor, filed a complaint, alleging alienation of affection, deprivation of affection and support, and damages suffered, in circuit court against appellee (also known as Elaine Pepitone). Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment and/or dismissal and a memorandum in support of the motion. Appellee's memorandum states: An affidavit of James R. Hunt was filed. The appellant filed an affidavit of counsel in opposition to motion for summary judgment. Depositions of all of the parties were filed. After a hearing, the trial court granted appellee's motions. James R. Hunt is the husband of the appellant. After James Hunt's first wife left him, James Hunt and appellant "moved in together". James Hunt and his first wife were divorced in June, 1964. Thereafter, the appellant and James Hunt were married in June, 1964. Their son, Jimmy, was born on June 30, 1964, 29 days after their marriage. James Hunt has had eleven jobs in eleven years.[1] He has generally been employed as a restaurant manager. Evidence adduced showed that James Hunt was unable to serve for any length of time in any of his employments. The appellant and son, Jimmy, traveled with and/or followed James Hunt to his various new employments in several different states. In 1971 appellant filed a divorce complaint against James Hunt in Newport Beach, California, "because of his alcoholic and gambling." The appellant stated that James Hunt promised her that if she would "drop the divorce action he would stop drinking and gambling". Appellant stated, "He stopped gambling, and he temporarily at least stopped drinking." In August or September, 1974, James Hunt came to Honolulu to work as general manager of the Oceania Floating Restaurant. Appellant and Jimmy remained in Phoenix. James Hunt told appellant he would send for them "as soon as conditions warranted." The appellee has been married to Dean Pepitone since September 12, 1972. Dean Pepitone left appellee when James Hunt "came into the picture". James Hunt first met appellee in October, 1974. They were introduced at the Oceania Restaurant, located in Honolulu, by mutual friends. The appellee stated that when she met James Hunt she knew he was married. James Hunt stated as follows: Dean Pepitone stated that appellee would go to see James Hunt "every night." In March, 1975, James Hunt moved in with appellee. By then Dean Pepitone had already moved out. At the time of the hearing James Hunt was still living with appellee. Appellee stated: The appellee supported James Hunt while he was living with her. The appellee stated that she was in the "apartment rental, income rental business, and real estate." She further stated that a trust holds title to the apartments and real estate. James Hunt made three or four trips abroad with appellee. In May or June, 1975, James Hunt joined appellee in Las Vegas. The appellee paid for the tickets and gave James Hunt money to use at the tables. James Hunt stated: *121 On about June 6, 1975, James Hunt was terminated from his job at the Oceania Restaurant. On June 6, 1975, appellee and James Hunt left on a trip to Europe. The trip was paid for by appellee. They returned to Honolulu approximately July 16, 1975. The appellant stated that from August, 1974, when James Hunt left Phoenix, until June, 1975, he wrote her twice a week and called her every Sunday night. James Hunt stated that he wrote appellant "two, three times a month, on the average." James Hunt wrote letters to his wife while he was on the trip to Europe. He stated that he mailed appellant a letter, dated June 16, 1975, from Bucharest, Rumania, telling her not to come to Honolulu and that "things were through" between them. The appellant stated that it was when she received a letter from James Hunt from Rome,[2] dated June 16, 1975, that she first suspected that he did not want her to come and join him in Hawaii. Appellant stated as follows: The appellant stated that after she received "the letter from Rome," she phoned Mrs. Francis Siu, a friend. The appellant stated that "other than the facts which [allegedly] give rise to this complaint," she was sure that James Hunt never had an affair with another woman. On July 18, 1975, after James Hunt had returned from Europe, appellant called him at the home of appellee. James Hunt asked appellant not to come to Honolulu and said that things would work out better for everyone concerned if she and Jimmy stayed in Arizona. Appellant stated: The appellant stated that James Hunt then broke in and said he would call appellant back from another number in twenty minutes. James Hunt called appellant back the next morning. James Hunt stated that he had been sending appellant "a thousand dollars a month, on the average" for support. The appellant stated that she had not received any support money from James Hunt since "the middle of July." James Hunt made the following statements regarding his marriage to appellant: The appellant stated as follows regarding the marriage: As to his relationship with his son, Jimmy, James Hunt stated: The appellee stated as follows: Appellee stated as follows regarding her relationship with James Hunt: James Hunt's affidavit states as follows: The action for alienation of affections has not been abolished by statute in this jurisdiction.[3] The only reported case in this jurisdiction concerning interference with the marital relationship is Waki v. Yamada, 26 Haw. 52 (1921). In Waki v. Yamada, this court upheld the dismissal of an action for enticement. At common law, enticement and alienation of affections were treated as separate causes of action.[4] Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 874-77 (4th ed. 1971); Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference With the Marital Relationship, 48 Notre Dame Lawyer, 426, 427-28 (1972). The appellee refers this court to a recent Kansas decision, Long v. Fischer, 210 Kan. 21, 499 P.2d 1063 (1972), which sets forth the elements of an action for alienation of affections as follows: Id., 210 Kan. at 25-26, 499 P.2d at 1067. Appellee also relies on an earlier Kansas case, Curry v. Kline, 187 Kan. 109, 353 P.2d 508 (1960), which states: Id., 187 Kan. at 111-12, 353 P.2d at 510. The appellant in oral argument urged this court to accept the Curry test. The *124 appellee in oral argument argued in favor of the Long test. In both Long and Curry, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed previous alienation of affections cases in that jurisdiction. In Long, the court, in formulating the elements of the action, took the Curry test into consideration. 210 Kan. at 25, 499 P.2d at 1066-67. A careful comparison of the respective elements of the Long and Curry tests indicates little difference in substance. The only difference is that the Curry test's element, "[Plaintiff's spouse] did not voluntarily bestow her love and affection upon the stranger," was changed in Long into two, more specific elements: We adopt the more definitive standard enunciated in Long, as the criteria of proof required in an action for alienation of affection. Appellant contends (1) that the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous "in light of triable issues of fact revealed by the pleadings and oral argument"; (2) that appellee failed to meet the burden of removing all doubt as to the existence of triable issues of fact; and (3) that appellant "has sufficiently countered [appellee's] evidence to avoid a ruling against her." Under H.R.C.P. Rule 56(c) a summary judgment is sustained only if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bolte v. AITS, Inc., 60 Haw. 58, 64, 587 P.2d 810, 814-15 (1978); Fry v. Bennett, 59 Haw. 279, 280, 580 P.2d 844, 846, (1978). Inferences to be drawn from the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hokama v. Relinc Corp., 57 Haw. 470, 472, 559 P.2d 279, 281 (1977); Island-Gentry Joint Venture v. State, 57 Haw. 259, 266, 554 P.2d 761, 766 (1976). For purposes of ruling on a summary judgment a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Timmons v. Reed, 569 P.2d 112, 117 (Wyo. 1977); Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Wyo. 1975). See Richards v. Midkiff, 48 Haw. 32, 39, 396 P.2d 49, 54 (1964). In Johnson v. Soulis, supra, the court explained: Id. at 872. Upon review of the record, including the affidavits, depositions, and testimonies of the parties and others, we are of the opinion a genuine dispute does not exist as to any material fact. Based on the undisputed material facts of the instant case, we are of the further opinion that appellant has failed to establish all of the five elements of the test enumerated in Long v. Fischer, supra. The record shows clearly that appellant satisfied two of the five elements of the test: *125 1. that, the appellee has "exercised improper, willful, and malicious influence on [appellant's] spouse in derogation of [appellant's] marital rights"; and 2. that, appellant "was not at fault in causing [her] spouse's affections to stray". However, the appellant has failed to satisfy the other requirements of the Long test. The facts show: 1. that, the appellant's spouse "voluntarily accepted appellee's advances at the outset of the affair"; and, 2. that, the appellant's spouse did actively contribute to appellee's effort of procuring the "loss of the love and affection which [appellant's] spouse formerly held for the [appellant] by intentionally seeking the companionship and the affection of" the appellee. 3. The appellant further failed to prove that "the willful and malicious influence of the appellee" on appellant's spouse was "the procuring cause of the loss of the love and affection" which the appellant's spouse formerly held for the appellant. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that appellee was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The issue herein is whether in this jurisdiction a minor child has a cause of action for alienation of affections. In this jurisdiction such a cause of action is recognized by neither statute nor case law. Appellee contends: Appellant argues that at common law a minor child does have a cause of action for alienation of affections. Appellant relies upon Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir.1945); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949); and Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D.Mich. 1949). The great majority of jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue have held that a minor child does not have a cause of action for alienation of affections. Mode v. Barnett, 235 Ark. 641, 649, 361 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1962); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 457, 190 P.2d 984, 987 (1948); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 161-62, 56 A.2d 768, 770 (1947); Whitcomb v. Huffington, 180 Kan. 340, 344, 304 P.2d 465, 467-68 (1956); Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 488, 95 N.E.2d 545, 546 (1950); Miller v. Kretschmer, 374 Mich. 459, 461, 132 N.W.2d 141, 143 (1965); Kleinow v. Ameika, 19 N.J. Super. 165, 167-68, 88 A.2d 31, 33 (1952); Roth v. Parsons, 16 N.C. App. 646, 647, 192 S.E.2d 659 (1973); Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412, 413, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (1950); Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St.2d 1, 3, 203 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1964); Nash v. Baker, 522 P.2d 1335, 1339-40 (Okl.Ct.App. 1974); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948); Wallace v. Wallace, 155 W. Va. 569, 579, 184 S.E.2d 327, 332-33 (1971); Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 215, 58 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1953). The four cases relied upon by appellant are apparently the only reported cases which hold that a minor child has a cause of action for alienation of affection. These minority, cases focus on the importance of the family unit. The basis for their position is summarized as follows in Rieff, Relational Interests: A Minor Child's Action Against a Third Party Who Alienates the Affections of a Parent, 7 J.Fam.L. 14, 15 (1967): The majority has refused to recognize the cause of action for policy reasons involving changes in the family unit. In Nash v. Baker, supra, the court pointed to: Id. at 1339. In addition, the majority raises "numerous practical objections," as enumerated by the court in Nelson v. Richwagen, supra, quoting from a note in a law review:[5] Id., 326 Mass. at 487, 95 N.E.2d at 546. See Taylor v. Keefe, supra, 134 Conn. at 161, 56 A.2d at 770. The minority answers these objections as follows: Miller v. Monsen, supra, 228 Minn. at 404-05, 37 N.W.2d at 546. The majority, noting the absence of statutory and case law authority, has refused to create such a cause of action, on the ground that it would invade the province of the legislature. Mode v. Barnett, supra, 235 Ark. at 649, 361 S.W.2d at 529; Rudley v. Tobias, supra, 84 Cal. App. 2d at 457, 190 P.2d at 987; Whitcomb v. Huffington, supra, 180 Kan. at 344, 304 P.2d at 467-68; Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 176, 56 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1949); Garza v. Garza, supra, 209 S.W.2d at 1015-1016. The minority responds that "it is the province of the court to `fill in the gaps.'" Johnson v. Luhman, supra, 330 Ill. App. at *127 606, 71 N.E.2d at 814. The court in Miller v. Monsen, supra, stated: Id. 228 Minn. at 406, 37 N.W.2d at 547. In several of the majority jurisdictions, the courts' refusal to recognize a minor child's cause of action was influenced by the fact that a spouse's action for alienation of affections had been abolished by statute in those jurisdictions. Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d at 456-57, 190 P.2d at 987; Miller v. Kretschmer, supra, 374 Mich. at 461, 132 N.W.2d at 142-43; Kleinow v. Ameika, supra, 19 N.J. Super. at 167-68, 88 A.2d at 32-33; Katz v. Katz, supra, 197 Misc. at 413, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 865. Yet, in Russick v. Hicks, supra, the District Court of Michigan held that a minor child has a cause of action for alienation of affections, in spite of a Michigan statute, which read: Id. at 286. The court stated that the statute was intended to abolish only "the traditional alienation-of-affections suit" by a spouse. Id. The validity of Russick v. Hicks, supra, as precedent, however, is dubious in view of the holding of Miller v. Kretschmer, supra. In Miller v. Kretschmer, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a more resent statute.[6] Id. 374 Mich. at 461, 132 N.W.2d at 143. The court quoted a comment the Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision made regarding the statute: Id. The remaining three minority cases represent only two jurisdictions Minnesota and Illinois.[7] The most recent of these cases is thirty years old.[8] After consideration of the parties' respective arguments, we join the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a minor child does not have a cause of action for alienation of affections. We agree with the "practical objections" enumerated in Nelson v. Richwagen, supra. Additionally, for the policy reasons stated in Nash v. Baker, supra, we believe that it is inappropriate for this court to judicially recognize a claim for relief of the minor child as contended for by the appellant. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's dismissal of the action by appellant, as next friend of James Richard Hunt II, a minor. [*] Justice Kidwell, who heard oral argument in this case, retired from the court on February 28, 1979. HRS § 602-11 (1978 Supp.) provides: "After oral argument of a case, if a vacancy arises or if for any other reason a justice is unable to continue on the case, the case may be decided or disposed of upon the concurrence of any three members of the court without filling the vacancy or the place of such justice." [1] Appellant stated that James Hunt "had an alcoholic problem" and that this was "the major factor in him switching jobs." [2] James Hunt stated that he never was in Rome. [3] The action for alienation of affections has been abolished by statute in about one third of the states. Wyman v. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 396 n. 2, 549 P.2d 71, 72 n. 2 (1976); Notes & Comments, Torts: Alienation of Affections: A Child's Right to Seek Damages for Alienation of His Parent's Affection, 28 Okl.L.Rev. 198, 202 n. 25 (1975). In addition, the action has been abolished by judicial decision in one state, Wyman v. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976), and refused judicial recognition in another state, Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927). See Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 1978). [4] Recently, some courts have considered enticement and alienation of affections to be merely different forms of the tort of interference with the marital relationship. Skaggs v. Stanton, 532 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ky. 1975); Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, supra at 876-77. [5] Note, Torts Parent and Child Right of Child to Recover Damages from One Who Has Enticed His Mother, 83 U.Pa.L.Rev. 276, 277 (1934). [6] That statute reads: The following causes of action are abolished: "(1) alienation of the affections of any person, animal, or thing capable of feeling affection, whatsoever." Id. 374 Mich. at 461, 132 N.W.2d at 142. [7] Johnson v. Luhman, supra, and Daily v. Parker, supra, arose in Illinois state and federal courts, respectively. [8] Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).