Title: David L. Moshenek v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Teresa D. Harper  
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Bloomington, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kelly A. Miklos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 42S04-0706-PC-244 
 
DAVID L. MOSHENEK,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Knox Superior Court, No. 42D01-8808-CF-026  
The Honorable Timothy Crowley, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 42A04-0511-PC-686  
_________________________________ 
 
June 20, 2007 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
 
We hold that a trial court’s ruling on a petition for permission to seek relief under Post-
Conviction Rule 2 should be affirmed unless it was based on an error of law or a clearly errone-
ous factual determination.  Moreover, if the trial court did not advise a defendant of the right to 
appeal the sentence in an “open plea,” that may well suffice to meet the lack of fault requirement 
under Post-Conviction Rule 2 depending on other evidence, but the defendant must make some 
additional showing to establish diligence. 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
On August 28, 1988, twenty-one year old David Moshenek followed Anthony Barrix as 
Barrix drove from the house of Heidi Sutton, whom Moshenek had dated for over two years.  
Moshenek forced Barrix’s car off the road, and the two started to fight.  Ultimately Moshenek 
stabbed Barrix repeatedly with a knife, and Barrix, who was unarmed, died at the scene.  Mosh-
enek then put Barrix’s body in Barrix’s car and drove to a shed behind Moshenek’s home, where 
he buried the body the next morning.    
 
Two days later the State charged Moshenek with murder, and the next week Moshenek 
filed a notice of his intent to pursue an insanity defense.  The State requested the death penalty 
several months later.  On January 10, 1989, Moshenek orally moved to enter a plea of guilty of 
murder.  At the plea hearing, the trial court advised Moshenek that he would give up his right to 
appeal his conviction by pleading guilty, but there was no reference to the right to appeal his sen-
tence.  Moshenek then admitted to stabbing Barrix “repeatedly” in an encounter over the woman 
Moshenek had once dated.  The trial court accepted Moshenek’s plea, found him guilty of mur-
der, and entered a judgment of conviction.   
 
On January 31, 1989, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and found that the State 
had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either of the two aggravating circumstances al-
leged in support of the death sentence.  The trial court found two non-eligibility aggravating cir-
cumstances:  (1) the victim’s 101 stab wounds indicated that the defendant was capable of “ex-
treme and heinous violence” and (2) the defendant’s capacity for extreme and deadly violence 
from a “seemingly quite [sic], serious, hardworking, studious, and polite individual” indicated 
that the public needed protection from him for as long as possible.  The trial court found two 
mitigating circumstances—the defendant’s lack of criminal history and the emotional strain that 
could have weakened the defendant’s ability to control his behavior.  The trial court found that 
the aggravating circumstances significantly outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Moshenek 
to the maximum term of sixty years.       
In the year following his sentencing, Moshenek filed two pro se motions requesting tran-
scripts of the proceedings from the trial court and stating his intent to seek post-conviction relief.   
The transcripts were supplied in February of 1991.  On January 14, 1994, Moshenek filed a pro 
 
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se petition for post-conviction relief under Post-Conviction Rule 1.  He asserted four grounds for 
relief, including a claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate sen-
tencing matters.  The petition did not, however, directly challenge his sentence.  Moshenek re-
quested that a public defender represent him, and over the next three years, four deputy public 
defenders filed appearances for Moshenek in the post-conviction proceedings.  On November 23, 
1998, Moshenek’s counsel in this appeal became the fifth.      
On February 3, 2005, with the post-conviction proceeding still pending, Moshenek filed a 
petition for permission to file a belated motion to correct error under Post-Conviction Rule 2.  
We assume this represented an effort to invoke the limits on aggravated sentences imposed by 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  As we hold in Gutermuth v. State, No. 10S01-
0608-CR-306, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. June 20, 2007), also decided today, Blakely is not applica-
ble to Moshenek’s 1991 conviction and sentence.  But for our purposes today, the issue is only 
whether Moshenek met the requirements of diligence and lack of fault in presenting this claim 
under Post-Conviction Rule 2.  
Moshenek’s petition for leave to file a belated motion to correct error addressed the dili-
gence and fault issues by alleging, among other things, that (1) the trial court did not advise him 
of the right to appeal his sentence; (2) he had always desired to challenge his conviction and sen-
tence; (3) he had filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in 1994; (4) he had been diligent 
in the pursuit of relief of any errors in his sentence; (5) any delay was “occasioned by counsel’s 
other responsibilities”; and (6) Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 2004) recently made clear 
that the proper vehicle for raising a sentencing issue was a direct appeal and not a post-
conviction proceeding.     
At the hearing on the petition, Moshenek testified that he had obtained the transcripts 
with the intent to attack both his conviction and his sentence in post-conviction relief.  He also 
testified that he had never filed any document challenging his sentence because he relied on his 
various lawyers, to whom he had “always” expressed a desire to challenge his sentence.  The 
trial court denied the petition, finding that Moshenek had not been diligent in requesting permis-
sion to file a belated motion to correct error as required by Post-Conviction Rule 2.   
 
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The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in deny-
ing Moshenek permission to seek relief under Post-Conviction Rule 2.1  Moshenek v. State, 851 
N.E.2d 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  The State seeks transfer, which is granted by order concurrent 
with this opinion. 
Post-Conviction Rule 2 
 
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2(1) provides a defendant an opportunity to petition the 
trial court for permission to file a belated notice of appeal.  It provides 
Where an eligible defendant2 convicted after a trial or plea of guilty fails to file a 
timely notice of appeal, a petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal 
for appeal of the conviction may be filed with the trial court where: 
(a) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not due to the fault of the de-
fendant; and 
(b) the defendant has been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated no-
tice of appeal under this rule 
It includes the same requirements of diligence and lack of fault for a belated motion to correct 
error.  P-C.R. 2(2).  Post-Conviction Rule 2 also gives a defendant the right to appeal a trial 
court’s denial of permission to file a belated notice of appeal or motion to correct error.  Davis v. 
State, 771 N.E.2d 647, 649 (Ind. 2002).   
In Collins v. State, we held that the proper procedure for contesting a trial court’s sen-
tencing decision where the trial court has exercised sentencing discretion was a direct appeal and 
not a proceeding under Post-Conviction Rule 1.  817 N.E.2d at 231-32.  We also noted that an 
individual who failed to file a timely notice of appeal could petition for permission to file an ap-
                                                 
1 The Court of Appeals refers to Moshenek’s petition as a petition for leave to file a belated notice of ap-
peal.  Moshenek’s petition was a petition to file a belated motion to correct error.  For our purposes, there 
is no difference between the two.  Both types of petitions arise under Post-Conviction Rule 2, and both 
impose the same standards of diligence and lack of fault on the part of the defendant.  See P-C.R. 2(1), 
(2).   
2 An “eligible defendant” is defined under the rule as “a defendant who, but for the defendant’s failure to 
do so timely, would have the right to challenge on direct appeal a conviction or sentence after a trial or 
plea of guilty by filing a notice of appeal, filing a motion to correct error, or pursuing an appeal.”  P-C.R. 
2. 
 
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peal under Post-Conviction Rule 2 if the individual met the standards set forth in the Rule.  Id. at 
233.        
The decision whether to grant permission to file a belated notice of appeal or belated mo-
tion to correct error is within the sound discretion of the trial court.  George v. State, 862 N.E.2d 
260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also Whitmire v. State, 498 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Ind. 1986).  The 
defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was without 
fault in the delay of filing and was diligent in pursuing permission to file a belated motion to ap-
peal.  Witt v. State, No. 45S00-0608-CR-283, 2007 WL 1684697, at *2 (Ind. June 12, 2007); 
Dobeski v. State, 275 Ind. 662, 665, 419 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1981) (citing Zellers v. State, 271 Ind. 
22, 389 N.E.2d 299 (1979)).  There are no set standards of fault or diligence, and each case turns 
on its own facts.  Land v. State, 640 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).  Several factors are 
relevant to the defendant’s diligence and lack of fault in the delay of filing.  These include “the 
defendant’s level of awareness of his procedural remedy, age, education, familiarity with the le-
gal system, whether the defendant was informed of his appellate rights, and whether he commit-
ted an act or omission which contributed to the delay.”  Id. (citing Tredway v. State, 579 N.E.2d 
88, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).  
Because diligence and relative fault are fact sensitive, we give substantial deference to 
the trial court’s ruling.  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that deference but concluded that 
Moshenek had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had been diligent in his 
effort to challenge the sentence.  It was therefore an abuse of discretion to deny Moshenek per-
mission to file a belated motion to appeal.  Moshenek, 851 N.E.2d at 342, 344.  Sixteen years 
elapsed between Moshenek’s conviction and his filing for relief under Post-Conviction Rule 2.  
In evaluating whether or not Moshenek was diligent and without fault in this delay, the Court of 
Appeals noted Moshenek’s testimony that he had consistently informed his counsel of his desire 
to challenge his sentence and that prior to Collins he had believed that any challenge to his sen-
tence must be raised in his pending post-conviction proceeding, which was in the hands of his 
counsel.  Moshenek, 851 N.E.2d at 343.  The court also pointed out that Moshenek was advised 
by the trial court that by pleading guilty he was giving up his right to appeal his conviction but 
he was never advised by the trial court of his right to appeal his sentence.  Id. at 343.   
 
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The State argued that Moshenek had not addressed his sentence in any of his pleadings 
over the sixteen-year period.  The State also pointed to a period of seven years in which Mosh-
enek did nothing to seek permission to file a belated appeal.  Id.  The Court of Appeals found 
that language from our decision in Kling v. State, 837 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 2005) addressed those 
arguments.  In Kling, we held that a challenge to a sentence that had been presented in a Post-
Conviction Rule 1 proceeding before Collins was sufficient to establish that the petitioner was 
diligent.  We also held that “the time spent by the State Public Defender investigating a claim” 
was not the fault of the defendant.  Id. at 508.  The Court of Appeals finally pointed to its recent 
decision in Baysinger v. State, 835 N.E.2d 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), where the court found that a 
defendant was entitled to file a belated notice of appeal even though the defendant had made no 
effort to challenge his sentence for four years.  Moshenek, 851 N.E.2d at 344.  In Baysinger, the 
trial court had told the defendant that he was giving up “most” of his grounds for appeal but did 
not inform him of his right to appeal his sentence.  835 N.E.2d at 226.  The defendant also as-
serted that his trial counsel had not informed him of his right to appeal his sentence.  Id.  The 
court found that these two facts established that the defendant was without fault in failing to file 
a timely notice of appeal.  Id.  It also determined that the defendant was diligent in seeking per-
mission to file a belated appeal because he had filed for permission shortly after we handed down 
the Collins decision.  Id.   
A trial court’s ruling on a petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal under 
Post-Conviction Rule 2 will be affirmed unless it was based on an error of law or a clearly erro-
neous factual determination (often described in shorthand as “abuse of discretion”).  See Town-
send v. State, 843 N.E.2d 972, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  The trial court is in a better position to 
weigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and draw inferences.  Fisher v. State, 810 
N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).  In Baysinger, the trial court did not hold a hearing before denying 
the defendant’s petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal.  835 N.E.2d at 224.  The 
Court of Appeals owed no deference to the trial court’s factual determinations because they were 
based on a paper record.  See Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 1997).  In the present 
case, however, the trial court did hold a hearing on Moshenek’s petition for permission to file a 
belated motion to correct error.     
 
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There is substantial room for debate as to what constitutes diligence and lack of fault on 
the part of the defendant as those terms appear in Post-Conviction Rule 2.  Several points may be 
made, however.  In order to meet the requirements of Post-Conviction Rule 2, it is not sufficient 
to point only to the fact that the trial court did not advise the defendant of the right to appeal a 
sentence after an “open plea.”  The right to appeal a sentence is not among those rights of which 
a trial court is required to inform a defendant before accepting a guilty plea.  Ind. Code § 35-35-
1-2 (2004); see also Garcia v. State, 466 N.E.2d 33, 34 (Ind. 1984).  The fact that a trial court did 
not advise a defendant about this right can establish that the defendant was without fault in the 
delay of filing a timely appeal.  However, a defendant still must establish diligence.  Several fac-
tors are relevant to this inquiry.  Among them are the overall passage of time; the extent to which 
the defendant was aware of relevant facts; and the degree to which delays are attributable to 
other parties, as, in Moshenek’s case, the preparation of transcripts.  When the overall time 
stretches into decades, a belated appeal becomes particularly problematic because of the risk that 
significant problems will be encountered in any retrial due to unavailable evidence or witnesses 
or failing memories.  
As Kling held, a pre-Collins Post-Conviction Rule 1 challenge to a sentence can serve to 
establish diligence, but Moshenek’s Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition did not attack his sentence.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Moshenek had not been diligent.  
Moshenek waited three years from the receipt of his transcripts before filing his initial petition 
for post-conviction relief.  When he did file, his petition did not challenge his sentence.  Mosh-
enek testified that he had constantly informed his lawyers of his desire to challenge his sentence 
and had relied on his counsel to make that claim.  But he raised no challenge to his sentence in 
the three years before he requested a public defender.  It was not clearly erroneous for the trial 
court to determine that an eleven-year span without any effort to raise a sentencing claim showed 
lack of diligence in pursuing a belated appeal. 
 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
The trial court’s denial of permission to file a belated motion to correct error is affirmed. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
  
 
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