Title: Resper v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Wayne Resper v. State of Maryland, No. 154, September Term, 1998.
SENTENCING--SENTENCE REVIEW PANEL   When a person requests review of sentence
pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27 § 645JA, the sentence review
panel has the authority to review and revise the entire sentencing scheme, including a
recommendation for evaluation for Patuxent Institution. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. K-97-1354
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 154
September Term, 1998
                                                                           
   
WAYNE RESPER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                           
 
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Karwacki, Robert L.
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                           
Opinion by Raker, J.
                                                                           
Filed:   July 8, 1999
     
Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to these provisions shall be to
1
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, §§ 645JA - 645JG.  Subsequent to the
sentence review in this case, the General Assembly rewrote § 645JC and § 645JE.  1998
Maryland Laws ch. 367, §1, at 1914 (effective October 1, 1998) (codified at Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.) Article 27, § 645JC, § 645JE).
Resper was indicted by the Grand Jury for Anne Arundel County for violation of
2
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 26.  Throughout the record, that charge
is referred to as “intimidating or influencing a juror,” “intimidating or influencing a witness”
or “retaliation for testimony.”
The issue in this appeal is the propriety of the sentence imposed upon Appellant by
the sentence review panel which reviewed Appellant’s sentence pursuant to Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, §§ 645JA - 645JG.   The primary question we must
1
answer is whether a three-judge sentence review panel has the authority to review a
recommendation for Patuxent Institution.  We conclude that it does, and accordingly we shall
affirm.  
I.
On March 27, 1998, appellant, Wayne Resper, was convicted in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County after he pled guilty to attempted first degree murder, intimidating or
influencing a juror,  and reckless endangerment.  At the sentencing proceeding the trial judge
2
stated: 
[I]t is the judgment and sentence of this Court for the
crime of attempted first degree murder, I sentence you to life
imprisonment.
For the offense of intimidating or influencing a witness,
I sentence you to five years to run consecutive.
2
Article 27, § 645JA, Right to review of sentence, provides in pertinent part as
3
(continued...)
To the reckless endangerment, if that crime will merge,
I will merge it. 
The Court will, in light of Dr. Spodak’s recommendation,
recommend you to evaluation at Patuxent Institute for further
evaluation and commitment if you meet their criteria.
The court advised Appellant of his appeal rights and review of sentence.  The following
colloquy then occurred:
THE COURT:  You are excused.
[STATE’S ATT’Y]:  Your Honor, may I beg the Court’s
indulgence for a moment?
THE COURT:  Yes.
[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Your Honor, the Court?
THE COURT:  It doesn’t.  All right.  Correction. As to the
reckless endangerment, it is five years.  That sentence to run
concurrent.
[DEFENSE ATT’Y]:  Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.
[DEFENSE ATT’Y]:  Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT.  Yeah.
[DEFENSE ATT’Y]:  May we step down, Judge?
THE COURT:  Yes, sir.
Appellant exercised his right to review of sentence pursuant to Article 27, § 645JA.3
3
(...continued)
3
follows:
(a) In general. — Unless no different sentence could have been
imposed or unless the sentence was imposed by more than one
trial judge, every person convicted of a crime by any trial court
of this State and sentenced to serve, with or without suspension,
a total of more than two years imprisonment in any penal or
correctional institution in this State shall be entitled to have the
sentence reviewed by a panel of three or more trial judges of the
judicial circuit in which the sentencing court is located.
However, a person has no right to have any sentence reviewed
more than once pursuant to this section.  Notwithstanding any
rule of the Court of Appeals to the contrary, the judge who
sentenced the convicted person shall not be one of the members
of the panel, but if he so desires he may sit with the panel in an
advisory capacity only.
Before the three judge panel, (Rushworth, J., Heller, J., and Lerner, J.), Appellant argued
that, based on the guidelines, the sentence was “unduly harsh.”  In regard to Patuxent
Institution, defense counsel implored the panel to say “that a recommendation to Patuxent
is warranted and is made.”  The State’s Attorney took no position on the Patuxent referral.
The panel modified Appellant’s sentence, increasing the sentence imposed by the
sentencing judge for reckless endangerment so that the five year sentence runs consecutive
to the five year sentence imposed for retaliation for testimony.  The panel was divided as to
the Patuxent recommendation.  The panel Memorandum and Order stated: “This Panel will
not recommend Patuxent Institution but will leave that decision to the appropriate
authorities.”  Judge Heller concurred in all respects with the Order of the panel except that
he would not have changed that part of the sentencing court’s recommendation that
4
Appellant be considered for admission to Patuxent.  
Appellant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, raising two issues:
whether the sentence review panel had the authority to  review and modify the circuit court’s
recommendation for evaluation at Patuxent Institution, and whether the panel had the
authority to impose a sentence on the reckless endangerment count based on an argument that
the circuit court merged that conviction for sentencing purposes.  We issued a writ of
certiorari on our own motion to consider these issues.  
II.
Appellant contends that the trial court merged the reckless endangerment conviction
for sentencing purposes, and therefore, there was no sentence to modify either upward or
downward.  We can dispose of this contention quickly, because the short answer is that there
was no merger of the reckless endangerment conviction.  The record reflects clearly that as
to that count, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five years, to run concurrent to the other
sentences imposed.  
Appellant counters with the argument that the trial judge was bound by his statement
that “if that crime will merge, I will merge it” and that the purported correction and
modification of the sentence was impermissible because Appellant had been excused from
the courtroom.  See Md. Rule 4-345(b) (stating in pertinent part that “[t]he court may not
increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evident
mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the
5
In Watson v. State, 286 Md.  291, 298, 407 A.2d 324, 328 (1979), Judge Orth,
4
writing for the Court, discussed the reasons for the dissatisfaction with Patuxent, noting that
the main complaint was with the possibility under the law for a person to remain confined
in the Institution long after the original sentence had expired. 
defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding”) (emphasis added).
Appellant’s argument is frivolous.  Not only does the record reflect that Resper was in the
courtroom when the judge imposed the sentence for reckless endangerment; it also reflects
that his attorney asked him whether he understood, and he responded in the affirmative.  The
sentencing phase of the proceeding had not been terminated.  Consequently, the court was
free to clarify the sentence.  See State v. Sayre, 314 Md. 559, 565, 552 A.2d 553, 556 (1989).
The sentence review panel acted within its power to modify the sentence.
III.
Appellant’s final argument relates to the Patuxent Institution evaluation
recommendation.  Patuxent Institution was established in 1951 as a result of the adoption of
the Defective Delinquents Law, codified as Maryland Code (1951) Article 31B.  Its purpose
was to confine and treat persons found to be Defective Delinquents until it was safe to
release them into society.  Id. at § 5.  As a result of severe criticism,  the law was repealed
4
by 1977 Maryland Laws ch. 678, effective July 1, 1977, and a new Article 31B was enacted,
entitled “Patuxent Institution.”  See Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1977 Supp.) Art.
6
All future statutory references to Patuxent Institution shall be to Maryland Code
5
1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 31B, the law in effect at the time of Appellant’s sentencing.
Effective October 1, 1999, the statutory provisions governing Patuxent Institution shall be
contained in Title 4 of the Correctional Services Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
See 1999 Maryland Laws ch. 54, at 446, 574-606 (repealing Article 31B and establishing a
new article to revise, restate, and recodify the laws relating to the State and local correctional
systems). 
31B.5
Referral for evaluation and examination for Patuxent Institution is governed by Article
31B, § 8(a), and under the statute, referral is within the sole discretion of the Commissioner
of Corrections.  That section provides as follows:    
(a) Persons who may be referred. — Any person who is serving
a sentence of imprisonment following conviction of a crime, has
more than three years remaining to serve on a sentence, has not
been evaluated by or confined at the Institution within the
preceding three years, is not disqualified from being an eligible
person under § 1 (f)(2) of this article, and meets the eligibility
criteria established by the Secretary under § 4A (c) of this
article may be referred by the Commissioner to the Institution
for evaluation as to whether the person is an eligible person
upon recommendation of the sentencing court, upon application
to the Commissioner by the State’s Attorney of the county in
which the person was last convicted, upon application by the
inmate, or upon recommendation of the Commissioner.
Appellant’s argument is that the review panel has authority only to review sentences.
A recommendation for evaluation is not a sentence.  Therefore, he concludes, the review
panel has no authority to review or eliminate the sentencing judges’s recommendation for
evaluation at Patuxent.  As such, the recommendation was not properly before the panel for
review. 
7
The State argues that at the sentence review hearing, Appellant agreed that the
sentence review panel had the authority to review the sentencing judge’s recommendation
to Patuxent.  He explicitly asked the panel to reconsider “the business of the referral to
Patuxent,” implicitly recognizing that the Patuxent recommendation constituted an aspect of
the sentence subject to panel review.  We agree with the State.  Appellant can hardly
complain that the review panel improperly considered the recommendation to Patuxent
Institution when he requested that it do so.  We nonetheless will consider his arguments on
the merits.  
In order to ascertain legislative intent, we begin by looking at the statutory language
itself, “as the words of the statute, given their ordinary and popularly understood meaning,
are the primary source of legislative intent.”  Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d
675, 678 (1994).  “If the language of the statute is plain and clear and expresses a meaning
consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, no further analysis is ordinarily required.”
Id.  If a statute contains an ambiguity, we must look to “not only the literal or usual meaning
of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose
of the enactment” in order to find a construction that best realizes the legislative intent.
Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986).  “[W]hen a
statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity the
court may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another and
adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is
inconsistent with common sense.”  Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539, 546 A.2d 465, 468
8
(1988) (quoting Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632
(1987)).
Article 27, § 645JC,  provides in pertinent part as follows:
The panel shall have the right to require the Department of
Parole and Probation to investigate, report, and make
recommendations with regard to any such application for
review. The panel shall consider each application for review and
shall have the power, with or without holding a hearing, to order
a different sentence to be imposed or served, including, by way
of illustration and not by way of limitation, an increased or
decreased sentence, or a suspended sentence to be served in
whole or in part, or a sentence to be suspended with or without
probation, upon such terms and conditions as the panel may
deem just and which could lawfully have been imposed by the
sentencing court at the time of the imposition of the sentence
under review, or the panel may decide that the sentence under
review should stand unchanged . . . .
The plain language of the statute makes clear that the review panel shall have the
power to review a sentence.  “Sentence” is defined in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6  ed.
th
1990) as “[t]he judgment formally pronounced by the court or judge upon the defendant after
his conviction in a criminal prosecution, imposing the punishment to be inflicted, usually in
the form of a fine, incarceration, or probation.”  Subject to modification upon review by the
sentence review panel, sentencing “is within the exclusive domain of the trial judge.”
Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 538, 336 A.2d 113, 114 (1975).  See also ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING (3d. ed.), Standard 18-1.4 (providing that the imposition
of sentence is a judicial function to be performed by sentencing courts).  
Judges, in sentencing convicted persons to imprisonment to be served at a State
9
The sentence review panel, upon revision of the sentence, becomes the sentencing
6
court.  See Rendelman v. State, 73 Md.App. 329, 533 A.2d. 1339 (1987).
correctional institution, shall sentence such persons to the jurisdiction of the Division of
Correction, and as such, cannot sentence persons to any particular institution.  State v.
Parker, 334 Md. 576, 592, 640 A.2d 1104, 1112 (1994); Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.)
Art. 27, § 690.  While a judge may recommend to the Commissioner that a person be referred
to Patuxent Institution for evaluation, the Commissioner makes the actual referral for
evaluation, and the evaluation team at the Institution makes the ultimate decision as to
whether a person is eligible for treatment.  See Art. 31B, § 8(c).  In the final analysis,
admission to Patuxent Institution is not a judicial function.
As we have noted, a sentencing court’s  activity with respect to Patuxent Institution
6
goes no further than a recommendation to the Commissioner of Correction that a person be
evaluated for treatment at the Institution.  Nonetheless, we have treated the recommendation
as part and parcel of a sentence, and as having had some potential impact on the structure of
the sentence.  See Watson v. State, 286 Md. 291, 300, 407 A.2d 324, 329 (1979).  In Watson,
the question before this Court was whether Petitioner’s sentence for second degree rape was
cruel and unusual punishment or otherwise improper.  Id. at 293, 407 A.2d at 325.  We
reversed and remanded the case for a new sentencing because the sentencing judge
mistakenly concluded that it had no authority to order evaluation at Patuxent unless the
Petitioner consented.  In fact, as Article 31B, § 8(a) reflects, the court may make a
recommendation to the Commissioner irrespective of whether the defendant consents or not.
10
We stated:
[W]e cannot be sure to what extent this mistaken belief actually
affected the court’s ultimate determination to impose the
maximum sentence permitted by law.  It may be that the
reasoning of the court was that if there was no possibility, in
light of Watson’s stand, that he would receive the treatment
offered by the institution, and by reason thereof be released
from confinement as no longer an unreasonable risk on society,
new Art.  31 B, § 11(b)(2), the public should be protected from
him for the longest period possible.  Therefore, . . . , in order to
be sure that Watson’s sentence is free of taint, we shall vacate
the sentence imposed and remand the case so as to afford the
court an opportunity to sentence Watson again, taking into
account that it may recommend to the Commissioner of
Correction that he be sent to Patuxent Institution for evaluation
to determine whether he is eligible for admittance so as to
receive the benefits of treatment and services available at the
institution.
 
Id. at 301-02, 407 A.2d at 330.  As the Watson Court concluded, a recommendation for
Patuxent may be a component of the sentence imposed.  Consequently, when a person
requests review of sentence, the panel has the authority to review and revise the entire
sentencing scheme. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 
ANNE 
ARUNDEL 
COUNTY
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.