Title: Ulrich v. United Services Auto. Ass'n

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ulrich v. United Services Auto. Ass'n1992 WY 128839 P.2d 942Case Number: 92-6Decided: 10/08/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming

Lawrence M. ULRICH, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

UNITED 
SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District Court, SubletteCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 William R. 
Fix of Fix & Mulligan, Jackson, for 
appellant.

Richard 
P. Boley and Peter K. Michael of Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Lawrence B. Ulrich 
(Ulrich) filed a complaint against his automobile insurance carrier, United 
Services Automobile Association (USAA), seeking a declaration that the uninsured 
motorist (UM) provision of his liability policy provided coverage for injuries 
he sustained in a parking lot shootout. After a hearing on cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the district court determined that Ulrich's injuries did not 
"arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle," 
as required by Ulrich's USAA policy. The district court accordingly issued an 
order which granted to USAA its motion for summary judgment. Ulrich appeals from 
the district court's order. We will affirm.

ISSUES

 [¶2.]     Ulrich presents the 
following issue for our review:

I. Do 
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether appellant's injuries arose 
out of the "ownership, maintenance or use" of the uninsured motor vehicle 
precluding the entry of summary judgment?

USAA 
restates the issue in this manner: Whether the intentional shooting of an 
insured by an uninsured motorist in a parking lot can be said to arise out of 
the assailant's use of his uninsured motor vehicle.

FACTS

 [¶3.]     The facts of this case, 
drafted in the light most favorable to Ulrich, are as follows: On July 29, 1989, 
Ulrich and an acquaintance, Glenn Hildebrant, were drinking at the Cowboy Bar in 
Pinedale, Wyoming. While at the bar, Ulrich became upset 
with the unlady-like conduct of a bar patron, Kemo. Ulrich reproved Kemo for her 
conduct and a verbal confrontation ensued.

 [¶4.]     Kemo and her companion, 
Gus Stallings, left the bar shortly after the verbal confrontation. Ulrich 
dismissed the whole situation as mere "bar talk" and did not expect anything 
further to develop. However, when Ulrich and Hildebrant left the bar, Kemo 
approached shouting obscenities and began "putting a hurt on" Ulrich. Ulrich 
attempted to repel the attack by pushing Kemo aside, but was unsuccessful. The 
altercation continued, both combatants being egged-on by their sidekicks. 
Stallings then joined the assault by "sucker-punching" Ulrich a couple times 
from behind. Stallings' conduct so enraged Hildebrant that he intervened and 
proceeded to put "a whipp'n" on Stallings. At approximately this point in the 
melee, a bystander yelled "Hey, the cops are coming." The members of the crowd 
that had gathered "scattered like rats," and the fight came to an abrupt end. 
All parties to the fracas apparently walked away without 
incident.

 [¶5.]     Two weeks later, on 
August 12, 1989, Ulrich again found himself in the Cowboy Bar, this time 
accompanied by Darrin Hill. Ulrich and Hill had just attended a Little Britches' 
Rodeo and had stopped for a few beers before returning home. While at the bar, 
two fellows dressed in white and wearing fruit baskets on their heads invited 
Ulrich and Hill to a private toga party. Ulrich and Hill subsequently left the 
bar in Ulrich's Bronco. Hill was driving as he knew where the toga party was 
being held. While on the way, Hill decided to stop at the Trailside Convenience 
Store to purchase some cigarettes. He parked Ulrich's Bronco between the front 
entrance of the store and the gas pumps. Hill then went into the store for his 
cigarettes, and Ulrich exited the Bronco to put some air in the right front 
tire.

 [¶6.]     As Ulrich was putting 
air in his tire, a Toyota pickup with a camper shell pulled 
directly in front of and perpendicular to Ulrich's Bronco. The Toyota was positioned so 
as to block the Bronco's means of forward egress. Ulrich glanced upward and 
instantly recognized the occupants of the Toyota as Stallings and Kemo. Stallings 
immediately began yelling at Ulrich about the Cowboy Bar incident, stating he 
intended to get even. Ulrich countered by informing Stallings that he had no 
"beef" with him and, nicely put, by directing him to move his truck. Hill exited 
the Trailside as this exchange was in progress. Believing that the controversy 
was over the parking location of Stallings' truck, Hill also chimed in with his 
two cents worth. Stalling became enraged upon seeing Hill, who he mistakenly 
believed to be Hildebrant, and continued his threats to get 
even.

 [¶7.]     Ulrich and Hill then 
jumped into the Bronco. Somewhat confused, Hill excitedly asked "What's going 
on?" Ulrich explained, "He [Stallings] thinks you are Glenn [Hildebrant], the 
guy that beat him up a couple weeks ago at the fight." As Hill looked up after 
starting the Bronco, he noticed that Stallings' truck was no longer blocking the 
way. In an attempt to get a better angle, Stallings had backed up and pulled 
parallel to the Bronco. Only the gas pumps separated the vehicles which, 
although parallel, were facing opposite directions. Stallings was leaning over 
his passenger, Kemo, and was pointing the business end of a chrome plated 
handgun at Hill and Ulrich. Stricken with fear, Ulrich shouted, "We don't want 
no trouble. Don't be a fool." Ulrich also tried to explain that Hill was not 
Hildebrant. Stallings would not listen and informed Ulrich to shut up or he, 
Stallings, would take care of him too.

 [¶8.]     Stallings next got out 
of his truck with the handgun. It simultaneously occurred to Hill that Ulrich 
had a .44 caliber pistol and ammunition in the Bronco. As Hill and Ulrich were 
securing the pistol and ammunition, Stallings scurried around the back of his 
truck to a position approximately twelve to fifteen feet in front of the Bronco. 
Stallings then fired at least one shot at Hill and Ulrich, but did not hit 
either one of them. In response, Hill handed to Ulrich his loaded .44 caliber 
pistol. Stallings took cover on the driver's side of his truck and, unbeknown to 
Hill and Ulrich, switched his handgun for a shotgun. Hill, in the meantime, 
engaged the Bronco's transmission and began to speedily leave the parking lot. 
Just as the cab portion of the Bronco cleared the driver's side of Stallings' 
truck, Stallings, who was leaning against his truck, fired several shotgun 
blasts at the Bronco's tires and, after allegedly being shot in the leg by 
Ulrich, "shot one more time at the guy, or the passenger of the vehicle . . . 
[hitting] him in the face with the shotgun."1

 [¶9.]     Hill and Ulrich 
proceeded out of the parking lot and headed south of town, apparently fearing 
that Stallings would give chase. Stallings, however, did not follow. 
Consequently, Hill pulled into a gas station just outside of the Pinedale city 
limits to evaluate the extent of Ulrich's injuries. After determining that they 
were serious, Hill returned to Pinedale to seek medical attention. A local 
doctor was initially consulted and recommended that Ulrich be transported to 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for further treatment. Ulrich's right 
eye was surgically removed at the Utah hospital, as were the pellets that were 
lodged in his face and right hand.

 [¶10.]  After discovering that Stallings was an 
uninsured motorist, Ulrich submitted a first party claim to his insurance 
carrier, USAA, for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. USAA denied Ulrich's claim 
on the ground that his injuries did not "arise out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of the uninsured motor vehicle," as required under the policy. Ulrich 
then filed a declaratory judgment action against USAA in district court to 
resolve the coverage dispute. After a hearing on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court also determined that UM coverage did not exist. 
Specifically, the district court concluded that Ulrich's injuries did not arise 
out of Stallings' use of his vehicle, as the vehicle was merely the "situs" of 
the shooting. The district court accordingly granted summary judgment to USAA. 
This appeal followed.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 [¶11.]  When reviewing the propriety of a summary 
judgment, this court examines the record from the vantage point most favorable 
to the party opposing summary judgment to determine whether there exists a 
genuine issue of material fact to preclude disposition of the case as a matter 
of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proved, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element to the 
cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. If upon such review no 
genuine issue of material fact is found to exist, we will uphold a summary 
judgment under any legal theory properly supported by the 
record.

Evansville v. Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 328 (Wyo. 1992) (citation 
omitted). 

DISCUSSION

 [¶12.]  A review of the record from a vantage 
point most favorable to Ulrich fails to disclose a genuine issue of material 
fact which would preclude the disposition of this case as a matter of law. The 
record reflects that Ulrich was the only person deposed in connection with this 
case. Ulrich and USAA subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment on 
the UM coverage issue. Ulrich's motion was supported by his deposition 
testimony, by his affidavit, and by the affidavit of Darrin Hill. Ulrich's 
motion was later supplemented by a portion of Gus Stallings' testimony as 
transcribed at his criminal arraignment. USAA did not submit any documentation 
with its motion to controvert Ulrich's factual assertions. Rather, USAA's 
position throughout has been that the facts, viewed in Ulrich's favor, fail to 
give rise to a claim of UM coverage as a matter of law. Given USAA's position, 
we perceive no factual dispute to be resolved by a jury and proceed to resolve 
this case as a matter of law. See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764, 766 (Wyo. 1988).

 [¶13.]  Resolution of this case requires that we 
confront two interrelated legal issues. We must first determine if Wyoming's Uninsured 
Motorist Act (WUMA), Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-10-101 to -104 (1989), requires insurance 
carriers to offer UM coverage which would extend to the circumstances of this 
case. This line of inquiry is dictated by recognition that insurance may not be 
offered in contravention of the minimum statutory requirements. 8C John A. 
Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5069.35 (1981). If 
the first issue is not resolved affirmatively, we must direct our attention to 
the UM provision of the parties' insurance contract. Our objective then becomes 
to determine the scope of UM coverage intended by the parties and to give effect 
to such intent. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Stamper, 732 P.2d 534, 539 
(Wyo. 
1987).

1. 
Wyoming Uninsured Motorist 
Act.

 [¶14.]  An accurate understanding of the scope 
and intent of Wyoming's Uninsured Motorist Act (WUMA) is best garnered by 
briefly reviewing its relationship to Wyoming's Motor Vehicle 
Safety-Responsibility Act (WMVSRA), Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-9-101 to -414 (1989). 
WMVSRA, in a nutshell, provides that each person involved in a "motor vehicle 
accident" must submit proof of financial responsibility2 to the Department of Transportation 
within thirty days of the Department's receipt of the accident report. 
Wyo. Stat. § 31-9-103 (Supp. 1992) and 
Wyo. Stat. § 
31-9-202 (1989). Failure to submit proof of financial responsibility within the 
requisite time period results in suspension of both driving privileges and 
vehicle registration. Wyo. Stat. § 31-9-202 (1989). While proof of 
financial responsibility may be demonstrated in various ways, the thrust of 
WMVSRA is to encourage motorists to procure and maintain automobile liability 
insurance so that victims of "motor vehicle accidents" will have a reliable 
source from which to seek compensation for their injuries. See generally, Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 31-9-101 to -414 (1989 & Supp. 1992).

 [¶15.]  The legislature, cognizant of the fact 
that not all motorists would carry liability insurance, passed WUMA as a 
necessary companion to WMVSRA. WUMA § 31-10-101 furthers the legislature's 
compensatory objective by requiring insurance carriers to offer UM coverage with 
every liability policy issued in Wyoming, unless such coverage is specifically 
rejected by the insured.3 If UM coverage is purchased, the 
net effect is to place a person injured by an uninsured motor vehicle in 
essentially the same position that he would have been in had the uninsured 
motorist carried liability insurance as prescribed by WMVSRA. Glenn E. Smith, 
The Wyoming 
Uninsured Motorist Act: A Regulatory Reconciliation of Mandated Coverages with 
the Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 11 Land & Water L.Rev. 213, 215 
(1976).

 [¶16.]  Specifically addressing § 31-10-101, this 
court has stated:

[T]he 
purpose of uninsured-motorists insurance coverage is to provide to innocent 
automobile accident victims an opportunity to procure a means of insulating 
themselves from damages incurred as a result of unfortunate and far too 
frequently occurring automobile collisions with uninsured 
motorists.

Stamper, 
732 P.2d  at 537 (emphasis in original).

 [¶17.]  Applying the plain and ordinary meaning 
to the terms "motor vehicle accident," "automobile accident," and "automobile 
collisions," we perceive no legislative intent which would require insurance 
carriers to be answerable under the UM coverage mandated by statute for injuries 
sustained from instrumentalities other than motorized vehicles, i.e., for 
injuries inflicted by gun, knife, club, fist, etc. during an intentional 
criminal assault. See Cerullo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 372, 565 A.2d 1125, 1127-28 (1989) (interpreting legislative intent underlying New Jersey 
UM statute). Consequently, we proceed to the second stage of our 
analysis.

2. 
Insurance Contract.

 [¶18.]  Parties to an insurance contract are free 
to bargain for coverage greater than that mandated by statute, unless contrary 
to public policy. See Stamper, 732 P.2d  at 536. The public policy prohibition 
against procuring liability insurance for intentional misconduct is not 
applicable in this context. UM insurance is a form of casualty, rather than 
liability insurance. 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance § 24.02 
(1991). Accordingly, we look to the USAA policy to determine whether the 
"casualty" which befell Ulrich is among the risks which the parties reasonably 
intended to be covered by the UM provision of their contract. 6B Appleman, supra 
§ 4317.

 [¶19.]  The UM provision of the USAA policy 
provides:

We will 
pay compensatory damages which a covered 
person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of BI [bodily injury] sustained by a covered person and caused by an 
accident.

The 
owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor 
vehicle.

 [¶20.]  The parties do not dispute that Ulrich 
was a covered person within the meaning of the policy; that he would legally be 
entitled to recover from Stallings for his injuries; that Stallings' vehicle was 
uninsured; or that Ulrich's injuries, when viewed from his perspective, were 
accidentally incurred. The sole matter at issue is whether Ulrich's injuries 
"ar[o]se out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of Stallings' uninsured motor 
vehicle.

 [¶21.]  In Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796 
(Wyo. 1979), this court set forth an analysis for construing an "arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use" clause in a liability insurance policy which 
we believe is equally applicable to the same or similar clause of an UM 
insurance provision. The Worthington case originated from an automobile 
accident which occurred on a state highway that had been recently resurfaced. 
Mark Scott had been traveling eastbound on the highway when his vehicle broke 
down, forcing him to pull off onto the highway's shoulder. Kelly Worthington, 
noticing Scott's predicament, pulled nose-to-nose with the Scott vehicle to 
illuminate the area while Scott tried to fix his vehicle. As Scott was standing 
between the two vehicles and Worthington was seated in her vehicle, the 
Scott vehicle was hit from behind by Edward Malar, a partially blind motorist. 
The impact propelled the Scott vehicle into the Worthington vehicle. Scott lost both legs as a 
result of being pinched between the vehicles; Worthington sustained a severe neck injury 
which led to total paralysis. Malar explained that a dust storm, coupled with 
the lack of road lines, caused him to wander off the road and collide with the 
Scott vehicle.

 [¶22.]  Scott and Worthington, the plaintiffs, filed separate lawsuits 
against the state of Wyoming to recover damages for their injuries. 
They asserted that the state had waived immunity from suit to the extent that it 
held liability insurance and that their injuries fell within the purview of such 
insurance. The state's insurance policy obligated the 
carrier:

To pay 
on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of

(A) bodily injury sustained by other 
persons, and

(B) 
property damage,

caused 
by accident arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use, including loading or unloading, of the owned 
motor vehicle.

Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 
805-06 (emphasis in original).

 [¶23.]  The plaintiffs argued that, because state 
owned vehicles were used to obliterate the road lines and because the 
nonexistence of road lines was a contributing cause of the accident, their 
injuries "ar[ose] out of" the use of the state owned vehicles. The court, 
rejecting the plaintiffs' reasoning, set forth the following 
analysis:

The 
primary objective of interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain what the 
parties reasonably intended as its object and to ascribe to the terms used their 
plain, ordinary and customary meaning in order to effectuate the intent of the 
parties. When there are any ambiguities or uncertainties in the meaning of the 
language used in a policy, they must be strictly construed against the insured 
who drafted the contract. However, if the language is clear and unambiguous, 
there is no room for the court to resort to a strict construction against the 
insurer, and the insurance policy must be interpreted according to the ordinary 
and the usual meaning of its terms.

Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 
806 (citations omitted).

 [¶24.]  Applying the foregoing rules of contract 
construction, the court determined that the "arising out of" clause 
unambiguously expressed the parties' intent that liability coverage existed for 
injuries which resulted as a natural consequence from the use of an insured 
vehicle. The court then expounded upon what has been coined the "natural 
consequences" test as follows:

     In determining whether 
an injury arose out of use, the evidence must demonstrate that it was the 
natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of an insured vehicle, 
the causal connection being reasonably apparent. If the injury was directly 
caused by some independent or intervening cause wholly disassociated from, 
independent of or remote from the use of the automobile, the injury cannot be 
held to arise out of its use. The resolution of the question necessarily depends 
to a great degree upon the particular facts presented by each individual 
case.

Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 
807 (citations omitted).

 [¶25.]  The Worthington court applied the "natural 
consequences" test to the facts of the case to conclude that the plaintiffs' 
injuries did not fall within the risks reasonably covered by the state's 
liability insurance contract. The court noted that intervening acts of 
negligence rendered any causal connection between the state-owned vehicles and 
the plaintiff's injuries legally remote. Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 
809.

 [¶26.]  Before we apply the "natural 
consequences" test to the instant case, it is necessary that we address Ulrich's 
contention that the "some nexus" analysis applied in General Acc. Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Olivier, 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990), best reflects the parties' intent 
regarding the scope of coverage provided by UM insurance. The "some nexus" test 
basically provides that, absent an express provision to the contrary, UM 
coverage will be found when there exists "some nexus" between the operation, 
maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle and the injury to the insured. 
In Olivier, an uninsured motorist was involved in a fender-bender with a vehicle 
in which Olivier was a passenger. As the police were conducting a post-accident 
investigation, the enraged uninsured motorist intentionally shot and killed 
Olivier as she stood along the roadside. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, relying 
almost exclusively upon the "some nexus" case of Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. 
Novak, 453 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1984), held that there existed a sufficient nexus 
between the accident and the shooting to find that Olivier's death "arose out of 
the use" of an uninsured motor vehicle. Olivier, 574 A.2d  at 
1243.

 [¶27.]  We find the minority approach of Olivier 
to be unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Olivier is factually 
distinguishable in that the accident was the sole cause of the assailant's 
fervor. In the case at hand, Stallings was primarily, if not exclusively, upset 
about the physical altercation that had taken place at the Cowboy Bar. Second, 
the Novak case relied upon by the Olivier court was not a UM coverage case, but 
rather was a personal injury protection (PIP) insurance case. In Race v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 542 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1989), the Florida Supreme Court 
identified the differences between UM and PIP insurance and specifically 
rejected an invitation to interject the Novak "some nexus" analysis into the UM 
context. Third, and most importantly, because the use of an automobile has "some 
nexus" to almost any action undertaken in society, it is our persuasion that the 
test does not accurately reflect the intent of the parties regarding the scope 
of UM coverage. See Gilbertson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 845 F.2d 245, 248 
(10th Cir. 1988).

 [¶28.]  Ulrich also urges this court to follow 
the analysis in Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Insur. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 990 (10th 
Cir. 1972). The Farm Bureau court applied essentially a "but for" test to an 
"arising out of" clause of a liability insurance contract to find that coverage 
existed for a pedestrian who was injured by shattering glass from a bottle which 
was thrown from a passing vehicle. We believe that the "but for" test suffers 
from the same deficiency as the "some nexus" test, i.e., it is overly broad. 
Consequently, we adhere to the analysis set forth in Worthington, as it, and not Farm Bureau, is the definitive 
expression of Wyoming law in this 
area.

 [¶29.]  Consistent with Worthington, we hold that 
the "aris[ing] out of" clause of the parties' UM insurance provision 
unambiguously expresses their intent that coverage extend for those injuries 
which occur as a natural consequence of the use of an uninsured motor vehicle.4 Applying the "natural consequences" 
test to this case, we conclude the obvious: Ulrich's injuries did not occur as a 
natural consequence of the use of Stallings' uninsured motor vehicle, but rather 
occurred as a natural consequence of Stallings' intentional use of a loaded 
firearm. Stallings' intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening 
cause of Ulrich's injuries which rendered Stallings' use of his uninsured motor 
vehicle legally insignificant.5 Consequently, we hold that Ulrich's 
injuries did not "arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured 
motor vehicle" as required by the UM provision of his USAA liability insurance 
policy.6 As we ended our analysis in 
Worthington, we 
end our analysis here: "The scope of coverage afforded by the type of insuring 
clause in question must end at some point, and this case represents a point 
well-beyond the line that must reasonably be drawn." Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 
809 (citing Asso. Independent Dealers, Inc. v. Mutual Serv. Ins. Cos., 304 
Minn. 179, 229 N.W.2d 516, 519 (1975)).

DISPOSITION

 [¶30.]  The district court's judgment and order 
which granted to USAA its motion for summary judgment is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Gus 
Stallings pled guilty to the crime of attempted manslaughter and was sentenced 
to a term of confinement in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

2 Wyo. Stat. § 31-9-102(a)(xi) (1989) 
provides:

     "Proof of financial 
responsibility" means evidence of ability to respond in damages from liability, 
resulting from accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of the 
proof, arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, in 
the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) because of bodily injury 
to or death of one (1) person in any one (1) accident, and subject to the limit 
for one (1) person, in the amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) because 
of bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons in any one (1) accident 
* * *.

3 Wyo. Stat. § 31-10-101 (1989) 
provides:

     No policy insuring 
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death 
suffered by any natural person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with 
respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state 
unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for 
bodily injury or death as provided by W.S. 31-9-102(a)(xi), under provisions 
approved by the insurance commissioner for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder or legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom. Unless the named insured requests the 
coverage in writing, the coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a 
renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection 
with the policy previously issued to him by the same 
insurer.

4 The essence of the "natural 
consequences" test is perhaps best captured by Appleman: "The accident [the 
event giving rise to injury] must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the 
automobile, as such." 6B Appleman supra § 4317 at 367-68.

5 Long comments in his treatise on 
insurance law:

     Clearly, there can be 
no coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions where the injuries do not 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance and use of a vehicle; therefore, no 
recovery can be had where the injuries are the result of an assault or similar 
intentional act where the instrumentality is not the automobile but rather is a 
gun, baseball bat, fist or similar instrument since the injuries can be found to 
have been caused by an intervening cause.

3 Long 
supra § 24.15.

6 For intentional shooting cases in 
which the courts have denied UM coverage, see, e.g., Wausau Underwriters Ins. 
Co. v. Howser, 727 F. Supp. 999 (D.S.C. 1990); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Nichols, 710 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D.Ga. 1989); Fowler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 548 So. 2d 830 (Fla.App. 1989); Curtis v. Birch, 114 Ill. App.3d 127, 69 
Ill.Dec. 873, 448 N.E.2d 591 (1983); Hamidian v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 251 Kan. 
254, 833 P.2d 1007 (1992); Kessler v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 476 
(La. 1991); 
McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.App. 1991); 
Coleman v. Sanford, 521 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1988); Roberts v. Grisham, 487 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1986); Ford v. Monroe, 559 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. App. 1977); Sciascia v. American Ins. Co., 
183 N.J. Super. 352, 443 A.2d 1118 (1982); Kish 
v. Central Nat. Ins. Group of Omaha, 67 
Ohio St.2d 41, 
21 O.O.3d 26, 424 N.E.2d 288 (1981).

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, with whom 
URBIGKIT, Justice, 
joins.

 [¶31.]  I believe the law cited in the opinion of 
the court supports a finding for appellant, and for that reason I would reverse 
the summary judgment. The second altercation that resulted in Ulrich's injury 
began with Stallings using his pickup to block Ulrich and Hill to prevent their 
driving away from the service station. Stallings then moved his vehicle to 
parallel with Ulrich. A reasonable inference a jury might draw from these facts 
is that once having blocked Ulrich from leaving, Stallings moved his vehicle to 
get a better shot at the Ulrich vehicle and to conceal himself from return 
fire.

 [¶32.]  For Ulrich to be covered under the 
uninsured motorist provision of his policy, his injury must "arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of" the uninsured vehicle. The injury is held to 
arise out of the use of the vehicle if

it was 
the natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of an insured 
vehicle, the causal connection being reasonably apparent.

Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 807 (Wyo. 1979). What is meant 
by the quoted language in unclear. It could be held to mean that the natural and 
reasonable consequence of the use of an insured vehicle is an accident involving 
the vehicle. Or it could mean the incident which follows be reasonably expected 
from the use being made of the vehicle, whatever that might be. I would hold the 
latter.

Continuing,

If the 
injury was directly caused by some independent or intervening cause wholly 
disassociated from, independent of or remote from the use of the automobile, the 
injury cannot be held to arise out of its use.

Id. In the fact scenario 
of this case, it would be impossible to say that the cause of the injury was "wholly disassociated from, independent of or remote from the use of 
the automobile." (emphasis added)

Finally, 
it is said:

The 
resolution of the question necessarily depends to a great degree upon the 
particular facts presented by each individual case.

Id.

 [¶33.]  Nor do I conclude that Wyoming Farm 
Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1972) states a "but for" rule. In this case a bottle was thrown 
from an auto as the driver swerved the car. The bottle broke, causing an eye 
injury to a bystander. The court stated:

[T]he 
sole issue is whether as a matter of law the injury was an accident arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle within the meaning of 
the State Farm policy.

Id. at 993. The court 
then stated:

     The numerous cases 
which have construed the clause that we have before us hold in effect, if not 
directly, that the relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury 
complained of need not be a direct one. * * * The courts do scrutinize the facts 
and require that the negligent act and the injury be fairly proximate. * * 
*

* * * 
In our case there is a "but for" connection and more. The evidence here is amply 
sufficient to support a conclusion that the use of the automobile was a 
substantial factor in the production of the injury.

* * * * 
* *

* * * 
[T]he causal relationship need not be a direct one; that it is sufficiently 
connected if the act which causes the injury is incident to the use of the 
vehicle. * * * We hold, therefore, that the breaking of the bottle and the 
injury to Harvey 
were not legally remote in relationship to the use of the 
vehicle.

Id. at 993-95 (emphasis 
added). The ownership/maintenance language has been used in these policies for a 
long period of time without change. If the insurer wished to confine "use" to 
incidents in which the insured automobile actually strikes a person or object 
directly causing injury, it could do so easily. A failure to restrict "use" in 
the policy demonstrates, for me, an intention to provide broad coverage beyond 
that defined by the court in this opinion.

 [¶34.]  In this case, a jury could find that the 
shooting was not "wholly disassociated from * * * the use of the automobile," 
was not "remote from the use," was a substantial contributing factor to the 
injury, and, as then being used, the incident was reasonably to be expected. As 
the Worthington 
court said, "The resolution of the question necessarily depends to a great 
degree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case." 598 P.2d  at 
807. Accordingly, I would reverse the summary judgment entered in this 
case.