Title: STEVEN R. BOWSER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEVEN R. BOWSER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 54205 P.3d 1018Case Number: S-08-0061Decided: 04/16/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
STEVEN R. 
BOWSER,

 
 
Appellant

 
 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

 
 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham Macdonald Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Steven Bowser appeals 
his convictions on two counts of immoral or indecent acts with a minor in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2005).1  Mr. Bowser challenges the district 
court's decision permitting the alleged victim, a minor child, to testify at 
trial by video deposition.  He also 
contends that the seating arrangement at the video deposition violated his 
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him because he was prevented 
from seeing the witness while she testified.  We conclude that the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support use of the video deposition at trial and 
the seating arrangement at the deposition.  
Consequently, we reverse.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. Bowser raises 
several issues in this appeal.  We, 
however, find that the following issue raised by the State is 
dispositive:

 
 
Was there a violation 
of Mr. Bowser's right to confront witnesses against him as a result of failure 
to follow the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
On February 6, 2007, 
the State charged Mr. Bowser with one count of incest, two counts of immoral or 
indecent acts with a minor, and two counts of third-degree sexual assault.  The indecent acts charges were based upon 
two incidents in which Mr. Bowser was accused of masturbating in DM's 
presence.  Mr. Bowser entered a plea 
of not guilty to all charges.  On 
July 24, 2007, Mr. Bowser moved for a hearing to determine DM's competence to 
testify.  Two weeks later, the State 
filed a Motion for Testimony by 
Videotaped Deposition.  The 
motion stated that DM was seven years old and "susceptible to feelings of 
intimidation by the accused offender," and that she was "receiving ongoing 
psychological counseling in regard to difficulties . . . experienced in coping 
with [her] victimization."  It also 
stated that, "[t]here is a concern among counsel for the State as well as [DM's] 
private counselor that a courtroom will be so intimidating to [DM] that [she] 
will be unable to testify against [her] father."

 
 

[¶4]           
The court held a 
hearing and considered both parties' motions.2  The State argued that DM would not be 
able to testify in a courtroom setting and that she would be intimidated by Mr. 
Bowser's presence.  The State 
introduced no testimony, affidavits, or other evidence to support its 
claims.  Mr. Bowser objected to DM's 
video deposition based on his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 
against him.  The court ruled that 
the video deposition was permissible, but that Mr. Bowser was entitled to 
be in the same room as DM during the questioning.  The court stated, however, that the State 
could "arrange the seating so that this little girl doesn't have her dad looking 
her square in the eyes."  The court 
also granted Mr. Bowser's request for a competency hearing.  

 
 

[¶5]           
The video deposition 
occurred on August 16, 2007.  Before 
questioning began, Mr. Bowser objected to the seating arrangement because he 
could not observe DM during her testimony.  Mr. Bowser and DM were seated on the same 
side of the conference table.  
Another person, apparently DM's therapist, was seated between Mr. Bowser 
and DM.  The seating arrangement 
resulted in an inability of Mr. Bowser and DM to see each other during her 
testimony.  On August 20, 2007, 
after the district court had viewed the video, it held a motion hearing in which 
it considered DM's competency and Mr. Bowser's confrontation 
objection.  The court found DM 
competent to testify and overruled the confrontation 
objection.

 
 

[¶6]           
The trial took place 
on August 21-22, 2007.  DM was the 
first witness for the State but did not testify in person.  Instead, her video testimony was played 
for the jury.3  At the trial's conclusion, Mr. Bowser 
was found guilty of two counts of indecent liberties and acquitted on all other 
charges.  The court sentenced Mr. 
Bowser to four to eight years of imprisonment on each count, to be served 
consecutively.  The sentence on the 
second count was suspended in favor of four years of probation.  Mr. Bowser 
appeals.

 
 
Standard of 
Review

 
 

[¶7]           
Mr. Bowser contends 
that his constitutional right to confront witnesses has been violated.  The question of whether a defendant's 
confrontation right has been violated is an issue of law that we review de novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 102, ¶ 5, 191 P.3d 963, 966 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
issue raised by the State is whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408 was complied 
with in the district court.  To the 
extent our review requires us to interpret the statute, we do so de novo.  RK v. State ex rel. NatronaCounty Child Support Enforcement 
Dep't, 2008 WY 1, ¶ 10, 174 P.3d 166, 169 (Wyo. 2008).  The statute requires certain findings of 
fact, which we will discuss.  We 
review findings of fact for clear error.  
Baker v. Speaks, 2008 WY 20, ¶ 
9, 177 P.3d 803, 806 (Wyo. 2008).  
Lastly, the current case implicates the admission of the video deposition 
as evidence in lieu of direct testimony.  
We review evidentiary rulings of a trial court for an abuse of 
discretion.  Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, ¶ 8, 169 P.3d 81, 84 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Discussion

 
 

[¶8]           
In this appeal, we 
must determine whether the district court erred in allowing the State to present 
the testimony at trial of the alleged victim, a minor child, by video 
deposition.  In making that 
determination, we must also address whether the court erred in requiring a 
seating arrangement at the deposition that blocked Mr. Bowser's view of the 
child during her testimony.  Mr. 
Bowser contends that the use of the video deposition at trial and the seating 
arrangement at the deposition violated his constitutional right to confront 
witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.4  The State does not respond to Mr. 
Bowser's constitutional claim.  
Instead, it contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408 governs introduction 
of video testimony of a child witness in cases of this nature.  The State asserts that the statute is 
constitutional and that it was complied with in this case.  Mr. Bowser makes it clear in his reply 
brief that he did not challenge the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-408 at the trial court level, and does not raise a constitutional challenge 
to the statute in this appeal.  He 
points out that the application of the statute was never raised before the 
district court.  Mr. Bowser contends 
that, if compliance with the statute is the dispositive issue, he should prevail 
because the statutory requirements were not met.  Based upon our review of the record, we 
have determined that the State failed to satisfy the requirements of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-11-408 because it failed to provide any evidentiary foundation for the 
restricted seating arrangement at the deposition or use of the video deposition 
at trial.

 
 

[¶9]           
As a general 
proposition, in criminal cases, witness testimony should be presented by oral 
testimony of the witness at trial.  
W.R.Cr.P. 26(a) provides: "In all trials, the testimony of witnesses 
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by statute, or by 
these rules, by the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, or by other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming."5  The particular statute at issue in this 
case is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408.  
It states in relevant part:

 
 
Videotape 
depositions.

 
 
(a)       In any case 
in which the defendant is charged with incest as defined in W.S. 6-4-402(a) or 
sexual assault as defined in W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-305 [6-2-304] and a child 
less than twelve (12) years of age is the victim, the judge may order the taking 
of a videotape deposition of the child. The videotaping shall be done under the 
supervision of the court.

 
 
(b)       Persons 
allowed to be present at the videotaping of the deposition are the child, the 
judge, prosecutor, defendant and defense counsel, a family member who was not a 
witness to the offense or a support person for the child and any technicians 
required to operate the equipment.

 
 
(c)        
Before ordering the deposition, the judge shall find 
that:

 
 
(i)         
The child's testimony would be relevant and 
material;

 
 
(ii)        The 
best interests of the child would be served by permitting the videotape 
deposition;

 
 
(iii)       A potential 
physical or psychological harm to the child is likely to occur if the child is 
required to testify which would effectively render the child incapable to 
testify at the trial; and

 
 
(iv)       The 
defendant or his legal counsel has the opportunity to be present and to 
cross-examine the child at the videotape deposition.

 
 
(d)       The judge 
may deny the defendant's face-to-face confrontation of the child at the 
videotape deposition if:

 
 
(i)         
The defendant is alleged to have inflicted physical harm or is alleged to 
have threatened to inflict physical harm upon the child, and physical or 
psychological harm to the child is likely to occur if there is a face-to-face 
confrontation of the child by defendant;

 
 
(ii)        The 
defendant's legal counsel will have reasonable opportunity to confer with his 
client before and at any time during the videotape deposition; 
and

 
 
(iii)       The 
defendant will have opportunity to view and hear the proceedings while being 
taken.

 
 
(e)       A videotape 
deposition may be admitted at trial in lieu of the direct testimony of the 
child, if the judge finds, after hearing, that:

 
 
(i)         
The visual and sound qualities of the videotape are 
satisfactory;

 
 
(ii)        The 
videotape is not misleading;

 
 
(iii)       All 
portions of the videotape that have been ruled inadmissible have been deleted; 
and

 
 

(iv)       A potential 
physical or psychological harm to the child is likely to occur if the child is 
required to testify which would effectively render the child incapable to 
testify at the trial.

 
 

[¶10]       
It is undisputed that, 
in this case, the alleged victim was a child under the age of twelve.  It is also undisputed that Mr. Bowser 
was charged with incest and sexual assault.  Pursuant to subsection (a), in these 
circumstances, the trial court "may order the taking of a videotape deposition 
of the child."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-408(a).  Before ordering that 
deposition, however, the court "shall find" that the testimony is "relevant and 
material," that the "best interests of the child" would be served by permitting 
the deposition, and that "[a] potential physical or psychological harm to the 
child is likely to occur . . . which would effectively render the child 
incapable to testify at the trial."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408(c).  The court 
made no specific findings and there was no evidence presented to the court by 
the State in support of its request to take the deposition.  The district court ordered the 
deposition over the objection of Mr. Bowser.  On appeal, however, Mr. Bowser limits 
his challenge to the seating arrangement at the deposition and use of the 
deposition at trial.

 
 

[¶11]       
It appears to be 
undisputed that the seating arrangement at the deposition resulted in Mr. Bowser 
having, at best, an obstructed view of the witness during her testimony.  Mr. Bowser and DM were positioned on the 
same side of a conference table with an individual, DM's therapist, seated 
between DM and Mr. Bowser.  The 
State characterized DM's therapist during oral argument before this Court as a 
"human screen," obstructing Mr. Bowser's view of the witness during the 
deposition.6  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-408(d)(i), denial of face-to-face confrontation is permitted only if two 
conditions are met.  The first is 
that the defendant must be "alleged to have inflicted physical harm or is 
alleged to have threatened to inflict physical harm upon the child."  Here, it is questionable whether this 
requirement was met.  There is no 
specific allegation of physical harm in the Information and the State did not 
allege that Mr. Bowser committed or threatened physical harm to DM in support of 
its motion to permit the videotape deposition.

 
 

[¶12]       
The second requirement 
of the statute that must be satisfied is that "physical or psychological harm to 
the child is likely to occur if there is a face-to-face confrontation of the 
child by defendant."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-408(d)(i).  That statutory 
requirement is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).  
In Craig, the Supreme Court 
held that face-to-face confrontation may only be denied where it is necessary to 
further an important public policy, and where the reliability of the testimony 
is otherwise assured.  Id. at 850, 110 S. Ct.  at 3166.  Accord, Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 49, 193 P.3d 203, 214-15 (Wyo. 2008).  When 
the important public policy is that of a child's welfare, the Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
Denial of face-to-face 
confrontation is not needed to further the state interest in protecting the 
child witness from trauma unless it is the presence of the defendant that causes 
the trauma. In other words, if the state interest were merely the interest in 
protecting child witnesses from courtroom trauma generally, denial of 
face-to-face confrontation would be unnecessary because the child could be 
permitted to testify in less intimidating surroundings, albeit with the 
defendant present. Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional 
distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more 
than de minimis, 
i.e., more than "mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to 
testify."

 
 

Craig, 497 U.S.  at 856, 110 S. Ct.  at 
3169 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 
530 A.2d 275, 286 (Md. 1987)).  The district court did not make any 
finding that this requirement had been satisfied.  More significantly, there was no 
evidence in the record that would support that finding.  The State did not present any evidence 
on the issue.  In the absence of 
such a finding, and evidence to support it, we are forced to conclude that Mr. 
Bowser was denied his right of face-to-face confrontation.

 
 

[¶13]       
Use of the deposition 
in lieu of trial testimony is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408(e).  Before the deposition may be introduced 
at trial the judge must find, after a hearing, that "[a] potential physical or 
psychological harm to the child is likely to occur if the child is required to 
testify which would effectively render the child incapable to testify at the 
trial."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-408(e)(iv).7  The court made no specific findings and 
there was no evidence presented by the State in support of its request to use 
the deposition in lieu of DM's testimony.  
The State apparently concedes that the district court did not make any 
specific findings as required by the various subsections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-408.  According to the State: 
"the district court has implicitly adopted the States [sic] uncontroverted 
showing that a videotape deposition was both in DM's best interest as well as 
that she would be effectively rendered incapable of testifying." Even if we were 
to agree that "implicit findings" were sufficient to satisfy the statutory 
mandate, there is no evidence in the record to support those findings.  In the absence of any evidence 
satisfying the requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408(e)(iv), we conclude 
that the district court erred in permitting DM's testimony to be presented by 
video deposition.

 
 

[¶14]       
Having found that 
there was a failure to comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408, we must determine 
whether the error was harmless.  The 
State bears the burden of establishing that an error violating a defendant's 
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶ 19, 98 P.3d 172, 179 (Wyo. 2004); Coy v.  Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 
2803, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988).  In 
conducting our analysis, we must disregard DM's testimony entirely. "An 
assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' 
testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had 
there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure 
speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the 
remaining evidence."  Id. at 1021-22, 108 S. Ct.  at 2803.  We agree.  Any attempt to determine the impact of 
DM's testimony had it occurred in open court or had Mr. Bowser been afforded 
face-to-face confrontation would "involve pure speculation," and we will not 
consider DM's testimony in determining whether the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

 
 

[¶15]       
Mr. Bowser was 
convicted of two counts of immoral or indecent acts against DM.  The evidentiary support for those 
convictions, according to the State, was testimony that Mr. Bowser masturbated 
in DM's presence.  DM was the only 
witness who testified that she was present.  Absent DM's testimony, Mr. Bowser's 
conviction cannot stand.  At most, 
the remaining evidence establishes that Mr. Bowser masturbated in his home, and 
that he viewed pornography, but it does not establish that DM was present during 
those incidents.  Neither activity 
is sufficient to sustain convictions for indecent acts with a minor if the minor 
is not present.  It is impossible 
for this Court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the violations of Mr. 
Bowser's Sixth Amendment rights were harmless.  In light of our resolution of the issues 
regarding the video deposition of DM, it is not necessary to address the 
remaining issues Mr. Bowser presents.

 
 

[¶16]       
Reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This 
provision was repealed in 2007.  
2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 159, § 
3.

 
 

2This 
hearing was not reported, but it was tape recorded and the audio tape appears in 
the record.  See infra n.Error! 
Bookmark not defined. for additional discussion of this 
issue.

 
 

3DM's 
testimony was not reported.  
Instead, the trial transcript simply notes that the video deposition was 
played in court, and copies of the video are included in the record.  We take this opportunity to remind 
counsel practicing before this Court that the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
require that all proceedings in criminal and juvenile matters be 
transcribed.  W.R.A.P. 3.02(a), (d); 
Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 652 
(Wyo. 
1986).  "It has been a long-standing 
policy of this [C]ourt that the record on appeal should include a proper 
transcript of the proceedings in the trial court, and in the absence of a 
properly certified transcript of those proceedings this [C]ourt will not 
consider them."  Id.

Although 
we are free to disregard both the hearing audiotape and video deposition, id., we instead choose to exercise our 
discretion and consider these materials.  
Neither party contends that they do not show what they purport to show 
and, in the interest of justice, we find it appropriate to rely upon them in 
this case.  Nevertheless, "[w]e do 
not intend to recede from our rule that a transcript rather than the electronic 
recordings should be provided in this [C]ourt if claims of error are asserted 
based upon matters in the record and no statement of the case has been 
prepared."  Id. at 
652-53.

4The 
Sixth Amendment states, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him."  Mr. Bowser does not 
raise the comparable Wyoming constitutional provision, Art. 1, § 
10.  That provision states: "In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him . . . ."

5The 
taking and use of depositions in criminal proceedings is addressed in W.R.Cr.P. 
15.  W.R.Cr.P. 15(a) first provides 
that a deposition may only be taken on court order "due to exceptional 
circumstances of the case . . . in the interest of justice."  This restriction is intended to limit 
criminal depositions to circumstances where it is necessary to preserve 
evidence.  Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 
3d § 241, at 8 (2000).  W.R.Cr.P. 
15(e) further provides that a deposition, "so far as otherwise admissible under 
the rules of evidence, may be used as substantive evidence if the witness is unavailable, as 
unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a), W.R.E."  (Emphasis added.)

6Decisions 
on the issue of what constitutes denial of face-to-face confrontation generally 
hold that significant obstruction of the defendant's view of the witness 
constitutes a violation.  In Coy v. Iowa, for example, "[t]he screen 
at issue was specifically designed to enable the complaining witnesses to avoid 
viewing appellant as they gave their testimony, and the record indicates that it 
was successful in this objective."  487 U.S. 1012, 1020, 
108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988).  This procedure was held to 
violate the appellant's right to face-to-face confrontation.  In Herbert 
v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, the defendant was denied view of the 
5-year-old witness when he "was seated in front of and to the side of the bench 
[while] the judge sat in the jury box and the child in the witness chair."  
117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 664 (1981).  As a result, the defendant's view of the 
child was blocked by the bench, but both could see the trial judge, and the 
judge could see both the witness and the defendant.  Id. at 665.  
The appellate court concluded that the defendant's right to confrontation had 
been denied.  Id. at 671.  In a more recent 
decision, State v. Hill, the prosecutor placed the courtroom podium 
between the witness and the defendant during examination.  247 S.W.3d 34, 
38-39 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 2008).  The appellate court determined that the placement of the 
podium in this manner abridged the defendant's right to confrontation and that, 
in the absence of the findings required by Maryland v. Craig, this 
violation was improper.  Id. at 41.  Romero v. State 
involved not a full physical barrier, but a "disguise" worn by the 
witness.  173 S.W.3d 502, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  This disguise 
consisted of "dark sunglasses, a baseball cap pulled down over his forehead, and 
a long-sleeved jacket with its collar turned up and fastened so as to obscure 
[the witness]'s mouth, jaw, and the lower half of his nose."  Id.  The 
court determined that the disguise was an unjustified violation of the 
defendant's right to confrontation.  Id. at 505-06.

7This 
requirement is identical to the factual finding that the court must make prior 
to ordering the video deposition.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408(c)(iii).