Title: STATE EX REL CASHMORE v ANDERSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

?l4 'i.'HE SUPKD.IE C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA THE S ' I A I J ~ 3P YONTAIa ex rel. WILLIAM F. CASHMOKE, M.D. , and STANLEY " C . BURGE3, Rela t o r , FOKKES'L H. ANDERSON, a s GOVERNOR O F THE STATE O F MONTANA, Respondent. j)r i g i ~ i d l Proceedings. "ourisel of Record: For Relators : Paul T . Keller argued, Helena, Montana, Paul T. Keller, Paul F. Reynolds, Charles E. Petaja and P. Keith Keller, Helena, Montana. Mcrrow, Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana, {dmund P. Sedivy argued, Bozeman, Montana. Duuglas Freeman argued, Hardin, Montana. ?. F. Hibbs argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana, For Pespondent : F o r r e s t H. Anderson, Governor, Helena, Montana. 'tobert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Relena , Montana. Charles C. Lovell, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Great F a l l s , Montana, arsued. William Jensen argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana. I ' ,;ugenc H , Mahoney argued, Thompson F a l l s , Montana. Randall Swanberg argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. James E. Murphy argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana. Amicus Curiae : John A . Layne III argued, Helena, Montana. Filed: AUG 1 8 I~ Submitted: July 1 7 , 1972 ~ e c i d e d : AUG 1 8 I Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court, This original proceeding seeks a judicial determination by this Court whether the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution was approved and adopted by the electors at the special election of June 6, 1972. The essential facts are undisputed. The 1969 Montana Legislature provided for a referendum election on the calling of a constitutional convention. Article XIX, Section 8, Montana Constitution; Chapter 65, Session Laws 1969. This election was held on November 3, 1970, at which time the electors approved the calling of a constitutional convention to revise, alter, or amend the present Montana Constitution. Thereafter, the 1971 Legislature enacted the necessary enabling act for such consti- tutional convention. Chapter 1, Extraordinary Session Laws 1971. The delegates to the constitutional convention were duly elected at the election held op November 2, 1971, The convention con- vened, held hearings, debated, and eventually agreed upon a proposed 1972 Constitution to be submitted to the electors for their approval or rejection at a special election to be held in conjunction with the primary election on June 6, 1972. The separate constitutional election ballot is herewith set forth: '' INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS: PLACE AN "X" I N THE BOXES WHICH EXPRESS YOUR PREFERENCES. THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION AND THE SEPARATE PROPOSITIONS IS AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION AT YOUR POLLING PLACE. IF THE PROPOSED CONSTITCP- TlON FAILS TO RECEIVE A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST, ALTER- NATE ISSUES ALSO FAIL. OFFICIAL BALLOT PROPOSED CONSTITUTION PLEASE VOTE O N ALL FOUR ISSUES 1. (Vote for One) FOR the proposed Constitution. 0 AGAINST the proposed Constitution. The proposed Constitution will include a bicameral ( 2 houses) legislature unless r mr- jority of those voting in this election vote for a unicameral ( 1 house) legislature in Issue 2. 2. (Vote for One) Z A FOR a unicameral ( 1 house) legislature. n 2B. FOR a bicameral ( 2 houses) legislature. 3. (Vote for One) n ] 3A FOR allowing the people or the legislature to authorize gambling. a 3 B AGAINST allowing the people or the legislature to authorize gambling. 4. (Vote for One) n ( 4A. FOR the death penalty. 48 AGAINST the death penalty. H u Following he election, the election returns were can- vassed by the s t a t e canvassing board and the r e s u l t s of t h a t canvass were contained i n a c e r t i f i c a t e of the abstract of the voces by the Secretary of S t a t e a s follows: "FOR the proposed Constitution. 116,415 "AGAINST the proposed Constitution. 113,883 "ZA, F O R a unicameral (1 house) Legislature 95,259 "2B. F O R a bicameral (2 houses) l e g i s l a t u r e 122,425 " 3 ~ , F O R allowing the people o r the l e g i s l a t u r e t o authorize gambling. 139,382 "35. AGAINST allowing the people o r the l e g i s l a t u r e t o authorize gambling. 88,743 " 4 ~ FOR the death penalty. "40 AGAINST the death penalty. " ~ o t a l number of electors voting. 237,600" Thereupon the Governor proclaimed the proposed 1972 Montana Gonstitution approved and adopted. Relators f i l e d the i n s t a n t action a s an o r i g i n a l proceeding i n t h i s Court seeking a declaratory judgment t h a t the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution was not r a t i f i e d and adopted because 11 i.t was not approved by a majority of the e l e c t o r s voting a t the election" as required by A r t i c l e X I X , Section 8 of the present Molrtana Constitution. Relators a l s o sought appropriate remedial writs a n c i l l a r y thereto, The Governor was named a s sole defendant in r e l a t o r s ' action. This Court accepted original jurisdiction, ordered the ;rparate actions f i l e d by the two r e l a t o r s consolidated, and s e t s h e consolidated action f o r adversary hearing. Prior t o the Ledring an answer was f i l e d by the Governor, a complaint i n inicervention was f i l e d by s i x individuals, the Attorney General intervened a s an additional respondent and f i l e d a separate ans- w e r , and answers were f i l e d t o intervenorsf complaint. In a l l , cwenty written b r i e f s were f i l e d by the p a r t i e s , intervenors, and amici curiae. Oral argument was heard on behalf of a l l interested parties, including amici curiae. This case was exhaustively briefed and argued, The ultimate issue f o r determination can be simply stated: Was the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution "approved by a majority of the e l e c t o r s voting a t the election" of June 6, 1972, a s required by A r t i c l e XIX, Section 8, of the present Montana Constitution? The principal contentions of r e l a t o r s and others who contend the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution did not receive the required majority approval can be summarized i n t h i s manner: They contend the phrase "approved by a majority of the e l e c t o r s voting a t the election" a s provided i n A r t i c l e X I X , Section 8, of the present Montana Constitution means a majority of the electors who c a s t a valid b a l l o t on any of the four questions on the b a l l o t ; t h a t the quoted language speaks f o r i t s e l f and there i s nothing f o r t h i s Court t o construe; t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e , t h e constitutional convention commission, and the constitutional ~ m v e n t i o n i t s e l f a l l understood what the constitutional language meant a s evidencedby t h e i r o f f i c i a l a c t s ; and t h e i r own i n t e r - pretation can not be changed now a f t e r the election has been held dnd the vote has become known. They a l s o point out t h a t the Secretary of s t a t e ' s c e r t i f i c a t i o n of 237,600 as the t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s voting i s presumptively correct by s t a t u t e and a s there i s nothing t o indicate such figure i s incorrect, the pre- suinption controls. They conclude t h a t because the provisions the present Constitution on determining approval. o r r e j e c t i o n -tL the proposed constitution are mandatory and exclusive, and 5rcause 237,600 e l e c t o r s voted a t the election and l e s s than half ~f t h a t number (116,415) voted f o r the proposed 1972 Constitution, it lacked the required majority approval t o take e f f e c t . O n the other hand, the basic thrust of respondents and those who contend the proposed 1972 Constitution received the required majority approval and became e f f e c t i v e according t o i t s provisions can be summarized i n these words: They take the position t h a t the phrase "approved by a majority of the e l e c t o r s voting a t the election" means a majority of e l e c t o r s voting on approval. 13r r e j e c t i o n of the proposed 1972 Constitution, and does not include the electors voting only on one o r more of the alterna- t i v e proposals. Respondents argue t h a t there i s no v a l i d basis f o r con- sidering nonvotes on approval or r e j e c t i o n of the proposed cmsti- tution a s votes against i t s approval, which would be the e f f e c t of including as p a r t of the required majority those b a l l o t s con- taining a vote on one o r more of the a l t e r n a t i v e questions which did not contain a vote "for" or "against" the proposed c ~ n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f . They contend the figure of 237,600 represented a s the t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s voting i n the Secretary of S t a t e ' s c e r t i f i c a t e i s incorrect; t h a t i n f a c t it represents the t o t a l number of b a l l o t s issued which includes blank b a l l o t s , t o t a l l y void b a l l o t s , p a r t i a l l y void b a l l o t s , and the l i k e ; t h a t such b a l l o t s cannot be counted i n determining the t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s voting a t the election i n computing the required majority vote, but only v a l i d b a l l o t s c a s t can be counted, The Attorney ~ e t l e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e l y argues t h a t i f the required majority means a gnajority of the e l e c t o r s voting on any of the four issues, then rhe evidence before t h i s Court i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o make t h a t deter- (nirlation; o r t h i s Court should use the issue receiving the l a r g e s t number of votes (the approval or r e j e c t i o n of the proposed consti- tution) a s a basis f o r determining the necessary majority; o r oiherwise those voting i n favor of the proposed constitution a r e denied "due process" and "equal protection of the laws" by d i l u t i o n of t h e i r vote by those not voting on t h a t question i n contraven- tion of the Fourteenth Amendment t o the United States Constitution. A t the outset we need not concern ourselves with any technical legal question concerning the p a r t i e s , procedure, the acceptance of o r i g i n a l jurisdiction by t h i s Court, and r e l a t e d matters. This Court has previously accepted j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s cause, no issues have been raised by the p a r t i e s on these subjects, and such matters a r e irrelevant t o our decision here. Instead, w e d i r e c t our exclusive a t t e n t i o n t o determination of the substan- t i v e issue here involved. Neither do we consider the pleading c o n f l i c t raised by the Attorney General concerning the meaning and e f f e c t of the Secretary of S t a t e ' s c e r t i f i c a t i o n of the " t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s voting" germane. The f a c t s speak f o r themselves and only l e g a l questions remain f o r our determination. Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o the substantive issue, we observe t h a t A r t i c l e XIX, Section 8, of the present Montana Constitution provides f o r a separate election where a constitutional convention submits a proposed new constitution t o the voters f o r t h e i r approval o r rejection. W e quote A r t i c l e XIX, Section 8 , i n f u l l , !:he underlined words being the portion thereof which we a r e called upon t o constrrie: 11 The l e g i s l a t i v e assembly may a t any time, by a vote of two-thirds of the members elected t o each house, submit t o the electors of the s t a t e the question whether there s h a l l be a convention t o revise, a l t e r , o r amend t h i s constitution; and i f a majority of those voting on the question shall k c l a r e i n favor of such convention, the l e g i s l a t i v e ~ssembly s h a l l a t i t s next session provide f o r the c a l l i n g thereof. The number of members of the con- vention s h a l l be the same a s t h a t of the house of representatives, and they s h a l l be elected i n the same 'uanner, a t the same places, and i n the same districts. rhe l e g i s l a t i v e assembly s h a l l i n the a c t c a l l i n g the -onvention designate the day, hour and place of i t s i~eeting, f i x the pay of i t s members and o f f i c e r s , and provide f o r the payment of the same, together with the ~lecessary expenses of the convention. Before proceeding, the members s h a l l take an oath ro stppowt t h e consti- tution of the United States and of the s t a t e of Montana, and t o f a i t h f u l l y discharge t h e i r duties as members 3f the convention. The qualifications of members s h a l l 3e the same a s of the members of the senate, and vacancies occurring s h a l l be f i l l e d i n the manner provided f o r ifilling vacancies i n the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly. Said convention s h a l l meet within three months a f t e r such dlection and prepare such revisions, a l t e r a t i o n s o r dmendments t o the constitution a s may be deemed neces- sary, which s h a l l be submitted t o the electors f o r t h e i r r a t i f i c a t i o n or r e j e c t i o n a t an election appointed by the convention f o r t h a t purpose. not l e s s than two nor illore than s i x months a f t k r the adjournment thereof; and unless so submitted and approved by a majority of t h 7 electors voting a t the election, no such revision, a l t e r a t i o n or amendment s h a l l take effect,"(Emphasis added). The crux of the issue i s whether the underlined quoted language requires a majority of e l e c t o r s voting on approval o r r e j e c t i o n of the proposed constitution o r whether i t requires some other majority. Relators and others espousing t h e i r vi.ew contend t h a t the quoted constitutional language i s c l e a r and ~7e must declare what it plainly says. They argue t h a t the use of d i f f e r e n t language in various election provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of A r t i c l e XIX indicates an i n t e n t by the framers of the Montana Constitution t o require something more than a simple majority t o approve a proposed constitution submitted by a constitutional convention. They con- clude t h a t a majority of the t o t a l number of electors voting on any of the four questions on the b a l l o t i s required t o approve the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution. W e note t h a t a l l p a r t i e s agree t h a t the a c t of voting consists of marking a v a l i d b a l l o t t h a t is deposited i n the b a l l o t box and counted i n the election. Goodell v. Judith Basin County, 70 Mont. 222, 224 P. 1110; Maddox v. Board of S t a t e Canvassers, 116 Mont, 217, 149 P. 2d 112, stand f o r the proposition t h a t voting is the affirmative a c t of marking the b a l l o t and depositing i t i n the b a l l o t box i n conformity with the election laws. Neither signing the r e g i s t r y of voters, nor being issued a b a l l o t , nor having one's name appear on the p o l l book i s enough, standing alone, t o constitute the a c t of voting. The issue before us i s a narrow one but its solution i s noc simple. W e recognize t h a t there a r e two d i s t i n c t and opposing Lines of authority i n other jurisdictions having the same or similar constitutional language. E a r l i e r cases a r e collected i n the Annotation appearing a t 131 A.L.R. 1382. For examples of l a t e r cases see: State ex r e l . W i t t v. S t a t e Canvassing Board, 78 N.M. 582, 437 P.2d 143; I n r e Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 193 N,E. 865; Stoliker v. Waite, 359 Mich. 65, 101 N.W.2d 299. These.cases are c i t e d merely t o indicate the two conflicting l i n e s of authority but a r e n o t r e l i e d upon o r determinative of our decision i n the i n s t a n t case, W e prefer t o look t o Montana s t a t u t e s and cases for guidance i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the meaning of our own constitutional. provisions. The r u l e s of statutory construction a r e equally applicable t o interpretation of the meaning of provisions i n the Montana Constitution. S t a t e ex r e l . Gleason v. Stewart, 57 Mont, 397, 188 P. 904; Vaughn & Ragsdale C0.v. S t a t e Board, 109 Mont. 52, 96 P.2d 420. In construing the meaning of a s t a t u t e , the i n t e n t of the framers, i.e., the l e g i s l a t u r e , i s paramount. Section 93-401-16, R.C.M. 1947, In determining l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , r e s o r t must f i r s t be made t o the plain meaning of the words used. Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151 Mont.76, 438 P.2d 660, and Montana cases c i t e d therein. I n construing a s t a t u t e , the function of the court is simply t o ascertain and declare what i s i n terms or substance contained therein, not t o i n s e r t what has been omitted nor t o omit what has been inserted. Section 93-401-15, R.C,M. 1947, A s t a t u t e must be read and considered i n i t s e n t i r e t y and the Legislative i n t e n t may not be determined from the wording of any particular section o r sentence, but only from a consideration of the whole, Home Bldg. & Loan v. Bd. of Equalization, 141 Mont. 113, 375 P.2d 312. Applying these r u l e s t o the quoted constitutional language, a Literal construction would seem t o support r e l a t o r s . The quoted I I language speaks of approval by a majority of e l e c t o r s voting a t the election". But voting on what? The constitutional language does not expressly answer t h i s . However, the substance of the language of the e n t i r e provision indicates t h a t it r e f e r s t o voting on approval o r r e j e c t i o n of the proposed constitution, and it i s t o t h a t question t h a t the quoted language is directed. There i s absolutely nothing t o indicate t h a t the framers had i n mind a multiple i s s u e b a l l o t wherein contingent a l t e r n a t i v e issues would be submitted t o the e l e c t o r s i n addition t o the primary question of approval o r r e j e c t i o n of the proposed constitution i t s e l f , The b e s t t h a t can be said f o r r e l a t o r s i s t h a t the quoted language i s ambiguous when read i n connection with the e n t i r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision r e l a t i n g t o submission of the proposed constitution t o the electors. W e a r e mindful of the principle t h a t when a s t a t u t e is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one i n favor of ndtural r i g h t and the other against it, the former i s t o be adopted. Section 93-401-23, R.C,M. 1947. Majority r u l e i-s a rratural r i g h t and fundamental tenet of government i n a democracy, and only the strongest evidence t h a t something more than a majority, i-.e., an extraordinary majority, i s required i n a given s i t u a t i o n w i l l suffice. Here no such evidence e x i s t s . Nor, i n our view, i s the difference i n language employed in d i f f e r e n t election provisions of A r t i c l e X I X controlling, o r indicative of an i n t e n t by the framers of our Constitution t o require approval of a proposed constitution by an extraordinary ,xajority. The f i r s t part of Section 8 r e l a t i n g t o c a l l i n g a 11 dc~nstitutional convention requires a referendum vote by a majority sf those voting on the question"; Section 9 dealing with submis- ;ion of individual constitutional amendments by the l e g i s l a t u r e requires referendum t o the qualified electors a~xd approval I I by a majority of those voting thereon", That part of Section 8 we a r e c a l l e d upon t o construe requires submission of the proposed 11 constitution t o the e l e c t o r s a t an election appointed by the convention for t h a t purpose, not l e s s than two nor more than s i x months a f t e r the adjournment thereof" and approval by "a majority of the e l e c t o r s voting a t the election". The reason f o r the difference i n language between these three provisions i s readi-ly apparent. The referendum t o the voters on the c a l l i n g of a constitutional convention i s normally held a t a general election as was done here; consequently, the phrase I I requiring a majority of those voting on the question" was employed t o distinguish the constitutional referendum question from other general election issues. The language of Section 9 m:el.ating t o submission t o the electors of individual constitu- t i o n a l amendments proposed by the l e g i s l a t u r e must be a t a general election where up t o three such amendments can be submitted a t the I I same election, thus the language approved by a majority of those voting thereon" i s used. The language of Section 8, t h a t we mst construe --- I I a majority of the e l e c t o r s voting a t the election" was used because a separate election i s required f o r dpproval o r rejection of a constitution proposed by a constitu- t i o n a l convention and there i s no need t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between approval or r e j e c t i o n of a proposed constitution a t such separate dlection and issues a t some other election held a t the same t i m e . Accordingly, these differences i n the language employed by the tramers of our Constitution i n the d i f f e r e n t election provisions qf Sections 8 and 9 of A r t i c l e X I X a r e no evidence of a d i f f e r i n g il~ilent on the part of the framers, but a r e the r e s u l t of inherent ct311stitutional differences i n the elections themselves, which L ~ L turn requires d i f f e r e n t language. Finally, iL the framers 0.2 Cunstitution had intei1Jec3 CL) require an extraordinary majority for approval of a proposed t:onstitution submitted by an elected constitutional convention, ':hey could e a s i l y have said so. Our Constitution contains severai provisions requiring extraordinary majorities, but wherever such requirement i s imposed the language i s loud, c l e a r and unaml~iguous. Examples of such provisions are: Changing the seat of government cequiring "a vote of two-thirds of a l l the qualified e l e c t o r s af the state", (Article X, Section 3 ) ; overriding the governor's veto of a l e g i s l a t i v e a c t which requires t h a t such a c t s h a l l "be repassed by two-thirds of both houses" i n order t o become 2Efective, (Article V , Section 40) and a specific detailed pro- zedure therefor (Article VII, Section 12); submission by the l e g i s l a t u r e t o the electors the question of c a l l i n g a constitutional I I convention which requires a vote of two-thirds of the members elected t o each house", (Article XIX, Section 8); submission by the Legislature t o the electors of individual l e g i s l a t i v e proposed constitutional amendments which require a vote of "two-thirds of rile members elected t o each house", (Article XIX, Section 9 ) . W e must a l s o consider the e f f e c t of requiring an extra- ~ r d i n a r y majority i n an election by counting the e l e c t o r s who ~ o t e on issues other than approval or r e j e c t i o n of the proposed ;onstitution. In 18 counties of t h i s s t a t e more e l e c t o r s voted  ~ i the proposed constitution i n determining the required majority :or i t s approval, we a r e i n e f f e c t holding t h a t the framers of our donstitution intended t o give such abstainers the s t a t u s of lectors voting against the proposed constitution. This we refuse t o do i n the absence of a c l e a r and unmistakable requirement of an extraordinary majority vote. Additionally, we must consider the policy and philosophy of government contained i n our Constitution a s enunciated i n numerous cases including Tinkel v. Griffin, 26 Mont, 426, 431, 68 P. 859. There the Court said: 11 The expression 'majority of the e l e c t o r s thereof voting a t an e l e c t i o n , ' etc., c l e a r l y means a majority of those who vote, of a l l of the e l e c t o r s of the county, o r of those who vote upon any other issue, a t the same or some other time." (Emphasis added). The philosophy of our Constitution was further explained i n t h i s language from Tinkel: "It i s the theory of our government t h a t those electors control public a f f a i r s who take a s u f f i - c i e n t i n t e r e s t therein t o give expression t o t h e i r views. Those who r e f r a i n from such expression a r e deemed t o yield acquiescence, "In a recent case the court of appeals of Kentucky, having under consideration a similar constitutional ;~rovision, said: '1t i s a fundamental principle i n ,>ur system of government t h a t i t s a f f a i r s a r e con- t r o l l e d by the consent of the governed, and, t o t h a t end, it i s regarded a s j u s t and wise t h a t a majority of those who a r e interested s u f f i c i e n t l y LO assemble a t places provided by law f o r the pur- pose s h a l l , by the expression of t h e i r opinion, d i r e c t he manner i n which i t s a f f a i r s s h a l l be conducted. When majorities a r e spoken o f , it i s meant a majority af those who f e e l an i n t e r e s t i n the government, and who have opinions and wishes a s t o how it s h a l l be conducted, and have the courage t o express them. L t has not been the policy of our government, i n order t o ascertain the wishes of the people, t o count those who do not take s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t i n i t s a f f a i r s t o vote upon questions submitted t o them, It i s a rilajority of those who are a l i v e and active, and ex- press t h e i r opinion, who d i r e c t the a f f a i r s of the government, not those who a r e s i l e n t and express no opinion i n the manner provided by law, i f they have any. Before reaching a conclusion t h a t those who framed our fundamental law intended t o change a well- s e t t l e d policy by allowing the voter who i s s i l e n t dnd expresses no opinion on a public question t o be counted, the same a s the one who takes an i n t e r e s t i n 3nd votes upon it, we should be s a t i s f i e d t h a t the Language used c l e a r l y indicates such a purpose, t (Montgomery County Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 47 SOW. !73, 42 L.R.A. 738.)" This Court reaffirmed the r u l e of Tinkel i n Morse v. Srasiitr Sounty, 44 Mont. 78, 119 P. 286. W e consider the constitutional philosophy expressed therein concerning the Montana Constitution a s v a l i d today a s i t was when *riginally expressed three generations ago. W e extend t h a t constitutional philosophy t o the i n s t a n t case involving A r t i c l e the i s sue X I X , Section 8 , and/multiple/election here involved. Here, we a r e simply not s a t i s f i e d t h a t the framers of our Constitution intended t o require more than a simple majority vote on approval of the proposed constitution. Accordingly, we hold t h a t "approval by a majority of e l e c t o r s voting a t the election'' a s used i n A r t i c l e XIX, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution means approval by a majority of the t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s casting valid b a l l o t s on the question of approval or r e j e c t i o n of the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution. W e hold t h a t i t does not r e f e r t o o r include those e l e c t o r s who f a i l e d t o express an opinion by a vote on t h a t issue. The Secretary of S t a t e ' s c e r t i f i c a t e shows 116,415 votes i n favor of the pro- posed constitution and 113,883 votes against the proposed con- s t i t u t i o n and no one contends these figures a r e incorrect, As these figures carry a presumption of correctness by s t a t u t e , section 93-1301-7(15), R.C,M, 1947, and a s there i s nothing t o indicate otherwise, we hold t h a t the proposed 1972 Montana Con- s t i t u t i o n was approved by the required majority and the over nor's proclamation thereof was correct. Even under r e l a t o r s ' interpretation of the constitutional requirement i n question which we expressly r e j e c t , r e l a t o r s s t i l l cannot prevail. Relators would require an extraordinary majority t o approve the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution, i . e . , a ri~ajority of the t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s voting a t the special constitutional election on any issue. The Secretary of S t a t e ' s c e r t i f i c a t e of the a b s t r a c t of votes a s determined by the s t a t e 1 1 canvassing board shows Total number of electors voting. 237,600" which r e l a t o r s contend must be accepted as correct by s t a t u t e . This figure i s c l e a r l y incorrect even under r e l a t o r s ' interpre- tdtion of A r t i c l e X I X , Section 8. The Secretary of S t a t e by l e t t e r dated June 2, 1972, i-ns~iucted the county c l e r k s and recorders of each county t o ''enter the t o t a l number of electors who a r e l i s t e d on the p o l l books f o r the separate election on the proposed c'onstitution on the front of the a b s t r a c t book f o r t h a t election". The a f f i d a v i t of the members of the s t a t e canvassing board indicates t h a t the phrase "'Total number of electors voting', as used i n said canvass and c e r t i f i c a t e , r e f e r s t o the t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s dppearing a t the p o l l s and receiving b a l l o t s , plus the number V J ~ e l e c t o r s receiving and r e turning absentee b a l l o t s . " The ~ 2 f i d a v i t of the Secretary of State i s t o the same e f f e c t , A n "elector" i s a person possessing the legal qualifica- 5 ~ ' ~ s t h a t e n t i t l e him t o vote. S t a t e ex r e l . Lang v. Furnish, $3 Mont. 28, 134 P, 297. The word "voting" means the affirmative ac; of marking one's b a l l o t properly and depositing i t i n the bdLlot box i n conformity with the election laws. Goodell v. ~ d i t h Basin County, 70 Mont. 222, 224 P. 1110; I4addox v. Board  a sb 7k. The Idaho Court made a great d i s t i n c t i o n between the meaning of the two provisions and made the following observation which i s important here because of the s i m i l a r i t y of the language cons trued t h a t t o be construed i n the i n s t a n t case: "If they were, a s counsel f o r defendants contend, intended t o mean the same thing, why was not the same language used? W e know of no r u l e of construc- tion, nor has our attention been c a l l e d t o any, t h a t would warrant us i n a r b i t r a r i l y saying t h a t the language used i n the two sections was intended t o mean the same thing. O n the contrary, the reason seems t o us t o be the other way. W e can understand why the makers of the constitution should apply a d i f f e r e n t and more stringent r u l e i n the adoption of a c a l l f o r a constitutional con- vention from what they would i n the matter of a mere amendment, It i s t r u e , the amendment under considera- t i o n i s one of v a s t importance, but so, likewise a r e the other amendments submitted a t he same time. With the character o r importance of the amendment we have nothing t o do i n t h i s consideration. Was the amendment adopted as required by the terms and provisions of the constitution? To hold t h a t i t was not i s v i r t u a l l y t o say t h a t no amendment of the constitution i s practicable. I n f a c t , counsel do not strenuously contend f o r a con- struction involving such a conclusion, but r a t h e r i n s i s t I t h a t the words 'majority of the e l e c t o r s , i n section 1, should be construed t o mean the same a s the words 'majority 1 of a l l the e l e c t o r s voting a t such election, i n section 3. Even the a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d by counsel do not go t o such an extent t o sustain such a conclusion." The reasoning and construction of the Idaho Court i s proper and logical. It i s a maxim of statutory construction, no l e s s applicable t o constitutional law, t h a t "where there a r e several provisions or particulars, such a construction i s , i f possible, t o be adopted as w i l l give e f f e c t t o a l l . " Section 93-401-15, R.C.M. 1947. Moreover, the i n t e n t of the framers must be deter- mined from the language used i n the document. The reasoning of the Idaho Court i s consistent with these principles f o r it gives effect t o two differently worded sections "majority of the electors" and "majority of a l l electors voting a t said election. l1 The ap- parent intent of the framers to impose a s t r i c t e r requirement i n convening a convention than i n ratifying an amendment i s also considered. I n Lee v. State of Utah, (1962), 13 Utah 2d 15, 367 P.2d 861, a constitutional amendment relating t o wartime and emergency powers of the legislature was submitted t o the voters and there- a f t e r was attacked on the grounds that a majority of the electors registered had not voted, The Supreme Court of Utah held that as the majority of electors voting thereon, as provided by their constitution, had voted i n favor, the amendment had been r a t i f i e d . In Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, (19581, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, i t was contended that a constitutional amendment was not properly adopted because it was not supported by a majority of the electors of the s t a t e although it got a majority of those voting on the proposition. However, it did have a majority also of those voting a t that particular election. The argument was that there were more franchised voters i n the s t a t e taking into consideration a l l the people who were registered, and as a conse- quence, it did not receive the support of a majority of the electors. The Court there held, c i t i n g Indiana, that a sensible construction had t o be applied, and the wording "all electors of the state" are the electors voting a t the particular election, Article XIX, Section 8, of the 14ontana Constitution relating t o the r a t i f i c a t i o n of constitutional revisions a f t e r a convention, I t provides i n part that such ratification must be by a majority of the electors voting a t the election." Section 9, relating t o the r a t i f i c a t i o n of amendments proposed by the legislature, provides 11 i n part that such amendments must be approved by a majority of those voting thereon." It i s t h i s difference in language which dictates that the proposed constitution may have failed. "[floting thereon" a s interpreted by the Idaho Court i n Green, may be ~ a k e n t o mean a count of ayes and nays. " [ ~ l o t i n g a t the election" must mean something d i f f e r e n t and more; t h a t i s , a l l those who c a s t b a l l o t s whether ayes, o r nays, on any one of the four issues submitted. I n f a c t , i n Stoliker v. White (1960), 359 Mich. 65, 101 N.W.2d 299, 300,304, the Court based i t s decision on such a distinc- tion: "The question before us i s t h i s : Does the Constitution require a d i f f e r e n t vote f o r the c a l l of a constitutional convention than it requires f o r the adoption of an amendment t o the Constitution? "What the Constitution actually says i s that the adoption of a constitutional amendment requires a majority of the electors 'voting thereon,' whereas a c a l l f o r a constitutional convention 1 requires a a majority of such e l e c t o r s voting a t such election.' I I I n short, we a r e now asked t o hold t h a t the people did not c l e a r l y understand what they were thus doing. W e a r e asked t o hold t h a t , despite the 1899 opinion of the Attorney General upon the very issue here presented, despite the unsuccessful l e g i s l a t i v e a t - tempt t o overcome it immediately t h e r e a f t e r , despite the ruling of the Board of S t a t e Canvassers t h a t the 1904 proposition had f a i l e d t o carry f o r lack of the necessary majority, and despite the re-enactment i n the new Constitution of the very language over which a l l of t h i s turmoil had raged, the people did not r e a l l y understand the c l e a r meaning of the words they were using, once again, i n t h e i r new Constitution. (Constitution of 1850, a r t i c l e 20,§2: + ; ? i n case a majority of the e l e c t o r s so qualified, voting a t such election, s h a l l decide i n favor of a convention . P a -*- - 1 - ' ,. , , ,, . Constitution of 1908, a r t i c l e 17, $ 4 : ' " " ,. ,, " ,. I n case a majority of such e l e c t o r s voting a t such election s h a l l decide i n favor of a convention ; k 2 ' ; ik. ') iqe a r e t o hold t h a t when they required t o pass a constitutional amendment a majority of the votes c a s t !:hereon, and when they required t o c a l l a constitutional zonvention a majority of the votes c a s t a t such election, they were actuall-y prescribing no difference between the two votes but were i n f a c t merely c a l l i n g f o r the same vote on each. A l l of t h i s we decline t o do. The understanding of our people i s not so meager. Their Aistinguished leaders who framed the Constitution were not so inept, so thoughtless, so blind t o the issues 35 the day. From the language used i t i s c l e a r t h a t they mean2 t o d i s t i n g u i s l ~ between the votes required f o r a simple amendment and those re- quired t o c a l l a constitutional convention, and our holding i s t h a t they did so distinguish, " W e have thus r e l i e d upon the contemporaneous ~nderstanding of the people. Their understanding i-s as relevant today a s it was a half-century ago 2nd it has a d i r e c t a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o the situation '3efore us. When the people went t o the polls i n !958 t o vote upon the question of a constitutional .zonvention, they went with the contemporaneous a d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t a f a i l u r e t o vote upon the con- s t i t u t i o n a l question would have the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t 3f a vote i n the negative thereon. Such i s not only she c l e a r phrasing of the Constitution but the highest court i n the State had unanimously so ruled with respect thereto. W e have no way of knowing how many ~f the 900,000 electors who f a i l e d t o vote on the Lssue would have ,voted i n the affirmative thereon, had they voted, o r how many who f a i l e d t o vote did so 3ecause of reliance upon the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of t h e i r f a i l u r e t o vote. Obviously we cannot say t h a t the r~roposition carried nor can we command the Board of S t a t e Canvassers, a s p l a i n t i f f wishes ' t o c e r t i f y chat the revision question carried. 1 11' There a r e two Montana cases construing the election pro- visions of the current Constitution concerning voting on bond elections. I n Tinkel v. Griffin, (1902), 26 Mont. 426,431, 68 P. 559, the Supreme Court had before i t a vote i n Flathead County Eor the building of a new county courthouse and j a i l . The county commissioners had regularly submitted t o the voters the matter af the loan. That election was held under Article X I I I , Section 5 , of the Constitution which contains the following language: "* ; ' ; ; ? No county s h a l l incur any indebtedness o r l i a b i l i t y f o r any single purpose t o an amount exceeding ten thousand d o l l a r s ($10,000) without the approval of a majority of the electors thereof voting a t an e l e c t i o n t o be provided by law. ?I T h i s language i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t than the language i n Sections 8 and 9, Article XIX, of the Constitution. The question arose a s to what constituted a majority of fhe e l e c t o r s of the county voting. The Court pointed out t h a t the election could have been held by i t s e l f o r a t any time. As a consequence, the majority of the electors voting a t the election t o be provided by law would be only those who voted on the bonds themselves. The Supreme Court treated the election on bonding the county a s a special election, although i t was held a t the same time a s the general election. Thus there were two elections the same day. The Court i n Tinkel said t h i s : " ~ t appears t h a t the highest number of votes c a s t f o r any o f f i c e voted upon a t the election was 2,400, t h a t 1,000 were c a s t i n favor of the issuance of the bonds, and t h a t 462 were c a s t against it. It thus c l e a r l y appears, counsel say, t h a t the proposition did not receive a majorlty of the electors voting, within the meaning of Section 5 , A r t i c l e X I I I , of the Constitution. "1t w i l l be observed t h a t the requirement i s t h a t the approval must be by a majority of the e l e c t o r s of the county voting, not a t a general election, but a t an election t o be provided by law, I1 As we have seen, such an election has been provided by law t o be held a t any time it may be deemed neces- sary by the board of commissioners, It happens, a l s o , t h a t the manner of holding it i s the same a s t h a t pre- scribed f o r general elections. Thus it nay, with perfect propriety, be held a t the same time a t which a general election i s held; but the f a c t t h a t t h i s i s the case does not require a d i f f e r e n t standard of estimating the maj o r i t y necessary from t h a t which would govern i f the election i s held on a d i f f e r e n t day. The evident meaning of the constitution i s t h a t the approval must be the r e s u l t of an expression of a majority of those voting, The expression 'majority 1 of the e l e c t o r s thereof voting a t an election, e t c . , c l e a r l y means a majority of those who vote, and not a majority of a l l the electors of the county, o r of those who vote upon any other issue a t the same o r some other time. I f the election on the issue of a loan had been upon another day, there would have been no question but t h a t it would have had a majority of the e l e c t o r s of the county who voted. It was none the l e s s a special election, within the meaning of the law, though i n t h i s particular instance it was held, f o r convenience, on the day fixed f o r a general election. I t The Court f e l t t h a t only those who voted on the bond i s s u e should have been counted i n determining whether a majority voted f o r o r against the bonds. W e have no argument with t h a t philosophy. The same argument i s applicable t o the case a t bar because the t o t a l number of votes f o r the proposed constitution may have been l e s s than a majority of those who voted on t h a t separate issue. Tinkel was followed by Morse v. Granite County, (1911), 44 Mont, 78, 95, 119 P, 286. There, the county commissioners c a l l e d an election t o submit t o the voters the matter of borrowing $50,000 t o build a courthouse. The d i s t r i c t court of Granite County ruled i n t e r a l i a t h a t not s u f f i c i e n t voters had voted i n favor of the bond and held the bond issue void and ordered an injunction t o issue. The Court c i t e d Tinkel with approval: 11 f The evident meaning of the Constitution i s t h a t the approval must be the r e s u l t of an expression of a majority of those voting. The expression 1 I majority of the e l e c t o r s thereof voting a t an 11 election, e t c . , c l e a r l y means a majority of those who vote, and not a majority of a l l the electors of the county, o r of those who vote upon any other i s s u e a t the same or some other time. 111 The Court then went on t o say t h a t the laws and the Constitution should be so interpreted a s t o become useful. A majority of the e l e c t o r s who voted a t the election on June 6, 1972, may not have voted - f o r the proposed constitution, the same a s the Court held i n the two Montana cases j u s t cited. W e would find then t h a t "positive assent" i s the same a s 1 I a majority of the e l e c t o r s voting a t the election". This positive assent i s referred t o by many writers and courts a s an extraordinary m a j o r i t y . The question i n the i n s t a n t case i s a majority of what group? Clearly, t h a t of "electors voting a t the election" i s required, What t h a t means under the f a c t s here i s the problem. As r e l a t e d heretofore, the r e l a t o r s ' position i s simply t h a t the Secretary of s t a t e ' s c e r t i f i e d number voting i s 237,600 and t h a t answers the question. But does i t ? 1 I The respondent says simply t h a t the group voting a t the election1' i s confined t o those voting on issue ?/ I, or a s he puts i t the "main issue" and t h a t answers the question. But does i t ? W e should then attempt t o analyze the figure c e r t i f i e d by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of S t a t e r e c i t e d t h a t he had --C . - - - . _ ------- ----- - - . ..__ . - - _ U r n ~ _- - __ I . - . - . . _TAW- -- - - - ed Constitrriion . I ELECTIO:.: I:3R THC CATIFICATION O R REJECTION OF TI4E PROPOSALS O F THE CONSiITUTIOMAL CON\'ENTION, JUNE 6, 1972 C Q - S C ~ C ~ ~ ~ For the Cc L)IIOY of- - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - -. -- - - - -- - -- ' I * ) ! ~ ullllprsigllr,r] Ilt,rc,by rc.r:if?- thn: ~ k t . ..( itl1i11 co~!atitt~frs $jT:\TI' 0 1 ' lIOS'I'.\SX I 3 ftI:i. true nllcl col~~l,lt't~ A h t ract < t i \'t :~.s ~ ' 1 s t in ........................................................................ Cc>utlt)- uf.. * Cc*u:t;y, at all vlcc.tio11 1"- ...................................................... . . . . .lu~lc. C , , 19i2, T o r : 1. County Clcrk J~;,~jficilti(tll r,.jt-ctittrl ttf tkic ] ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ t t h : : l * t t f ~ I I C ~ ' t l l l ~ t i t l l - a1111 1:s-Ofiicio C11.1.l; ( t i t l ~ c Uonrd of County Callvrssera of tit,!,:,! t ' ~ I I I V C I I ~ ~ ( B I I . said Coul!ty, l:y l!;o (hb ~ c ~ k - ~ f t . 1211,En Office Sccrct~ry of State 011 the. ........................ I of .......................-............... 1972. nt t!tl- lwur of 1. ......... ............ . ................................................... OFFICIAI~ ...................____ s a r r C'ounty Clrrl; nnd flcrl; of sq,?id 13onrd of ........_. ..._.........................._................-................. Scrrc,tnv of St ntc. Coul;ty Cnnvnsers of .................-....-......- ........................... C o u n t ~ , Ststc of Yontrrnn. Ily ........-.....................-...................... l)cp11t\. _ _. -_ - .--.- .-. ^-.-. --- - From the Secretary of s t a t e ' s c e r t i f i c a t e of canvass it i s ~ b v i o u s t h a t some electors did not vote f o r or against a l l 22 the issues on the b a l l o t . A t o t a l of 230,298 e l e c t o r s voted ~ i l the f i r s t issue, 217,684 electors voted on the second issue, 228,125 electors voted on the t h i r d issue, and 224,756 e l e c t o r s voted on the fourth issue. The t o t a l number of electors voting was ,2ertified a s 237,600. I n a compilation of votes by counties prepared by the Secretary of State from the a b s t r a c t s , on issue #3 there were 18 counties which had more votes than on issue #I, by a t o t a l of 290 votes. This fact,, standing alone, demonstrates conclusively t h a t e l e c t o r s voted on the b a l l o t (thus a t the election) but did not a l l vote on issue #1. But of the 7,302 votes difference between the number voting on issue /I1 and the t o t a l number c e r t i f i e d as voting a t the election, it i s impossible on the record before us t o determine how many of t h a t number a r e actual votes c a s t o r j u s t b a l l o t s issued. In other words, does 237,600 represent a nec voting figure or a gross figure of those receiving b a l l o t s ? Section 23-4002(4), R.Ce1f. 1947, provides: "A b a l l o t which i s not endorsed by the o f f i c i a l scamp i s void and s h a l l not be counted. A b a l l o t o r p a r t of a b a l l o t i s void and sh.all not be counted i f the e l e c t o r ' s choice cannot be determined. I f a p a r t of a b a l l o t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y plain t o determine the e l e c t o r ' s intention, the election judges s h a l l count t h a t part. 11 i t i s c l e a r t h a t the "number voting" should be the n e t figure. Further proof of t h i s statement can be found by examining the voting process under our s t a t u t e s . Since the general election laws a r e t o be followed, sections 23-3601 through 23-3618, R.C.M. 1947, s e t the procedure f o r voting. The voting on the proposed constitution was treated as a special election and special p o l l books were kept on the voting. Section 23-3610 provides t h a t the person's name must be recorded i n the p o l l book a s he voted; provides f o r che keeping of records f o r the list of a l l voters who voted, and a c e r t i f i c a t i o n by each precinct a s t o tirho voted; and provides t h a t the c l e r k of elections s h a l l keep a l i s t of persons voting. The name of each person who votes must be entered hereon and numbered i n the order voting. Such l i s t i s lcnown as and recorder the p o l l book. From these p o l l books each county clerk,/should know exactly how many persons voted on the constitution. I f the oEficials followed the law, section 23-3605 provides t h a t unmarked b a l l o t s should be returned t o the election judges. Section 23- 3606 provides that a voter s h a l l receive a new b a l l o t f o r a spoiled one. As t o the counting and canvassing of t h e count, sections 23-4001 through 23-4019, R.C.Pf, 1947, make the provisions. Section 23-4002 provides f o r a method of handling spoiled or voided b a l l o t s and for an actual t a l l y of the number of voters who c a s t b a l l o t s . If the provisions of the law were followed meticulously, the number of votes counted would be a l l good b a l l o t s and r e s u l t i n a n e t figure. O n the other hand, we have previously s e t f o r t h i n f u l l the Secretary of s t a t e ' s directive o r instructions dated June 2, 1 1 1972. There he s t a t e s : I n preparing ik ;k ik the a b s t r a c t s 9 : ;k 9 : ( I ) Check a l l t o t a l s against precinct e n t r i e s . f : 9 : i'i(4) It i s very important t h a t you enter the t o t a l number of electors who a r e l i s t e d on the p o l l books f o r the separate election on the proposed constitution on the front of he a b s t r a c t book f o r t h a t el-ection. n Please check t h i s figure carefully f o r accuracy. i \ 9 : "" Note the underlined instructions---- electors l i s t e d . I s t h a t consistent with the figure required by the s t a t u t e s , e l e c t o r s who voted a valid b a l l o t a f t e r the t a l l y of he p o l l books was adjusted? W e were assured when we assumed jurisdiction of t h i s iiiatter t h a t - no factual dispute existed. Yet, the overn nor's answer admits the allegation of the p e t i t i o n t h a t 237,600 e l e c t o r s voted a t the special election and then f i l e s with his brief, through the Attorney General, an affidavit of himself, the Secretary of State, and the State Treasurer, constituting the state canvassing board, whick asserts that the figure 237,600 was the t o t a l number receiving ballots plus absentees, thus a gross figure rather than a net figure as i s seemingly admitted i n the answer. This pre- sents a fact issue as disc~lssed before---in fact the c r i t i c a l , controlling fact figure. &mining the tabulation by counties of the two separate elections held on the same day and judged, counted, and canvassed by the same election officials, i t appears that in the primary election a t o t a l of 238,215 votes were cast, while i n the special constitutional election 237,600 votes were cast. Out of those t o t a l votes cast, 24 counties show differences between the primary and special election totals, while, significantly, 32 counties show identical totals! Using one example, i n Lewis and Clark County, the seat of the State Capitol, 13,867 votes were cast i n the primary and 13,867 votes were cast i n the special. Can these be possible net figures? W a s nat a' single ballot mutilated or voided for some reason i n one or the other election? O r taking another example from Beaverhead County, the f i r s t county listed alphabetically, the t o t a l votes cast i n the two separate elections i s recorded as 2,832, identical i n each. Yet i n the partisan races for nominations to the United States Senate where two men, including incumbent Senator Metcalf, vied for the Democratic nomination and four m e n vied for the Republican nomina- tion, a t o t a l of 2,392 votes was tallied. 441 voters either d i d not vote a t a l l on that important race or their ballots were not properly accounted for. In that same county with nine candidates running for the nomination for governor, a t o t a l of 2,686 votes cast was tallied. 146 votes reported as voting on that important office were not accounted for but significantly 295 more voters expressed a preference here than i n the senatorial race. This example demonstrates t h a t voters do not vote on a l l offices or a l l issues, but nevertheless do vote, and the t o t a l number of e l e c t o r s voting a t an election cannot be measured by a single i s s u e or o f f i c e i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r election. These questions pose other questions. Did the precinct and county election o f f i c i a l s follow the election laws by ad- justing o r balancing t h e i r p o l l books with the v a l i d b a l l o t s ? O r , did they follow the Secretary of S t a t e ' s instructions by i n s e r t i n g the number of e l e c t o r s l i s t e d i n t h e i r p o l l boolcs? It appears beyond a doubt t h a t some precincts and some counties did i t each tiray! TITUS the figure of 237,600 c e r t i f i e d by the Secretary of State l i k e l y r e f l e c t s a combination among counties of n e t and gross figures. It i s a c r i t i c a l f a c t question t h a t no analysj-s short of a recanvass by precinct can answer. It i s noted here t h a t no suggestion of fraud, bad f a i t h , i r r e g u l a r i t y or anything of t h a t nature has been reported o r urged i n any of the 981 precincts i n the e n t i r e s t a t e . That t h e election r e s u l t on the proposed constitution was close i s s e l f - apparent----a difference of only 2,532 votes, The proposed con- s t i t u t i o n was approved i n 12 counties and defeated i n 44 counties, Would a recanvass a f f e c t the r e s u l t ? W h o knows, without the correct figure i n the formula? The foregoing should pose a dilemma f o r t h i s Court. W e a r e aware t h a t the b r i e f s argue on burden of proof and presumptions of law. Each side applies these l e g a l arguments t o prove its position. But from our previous discussion it is c l e a r t h a t t o change such a basic document a s our Constitution, a c l e a r c u t w i l l of the people expressed within the r u l e s l a i d out i n A r t i c l e XIX, Section 8, i s mandatory and should not r e s t on the n i c e t i e s and s u b t l e t i e s of the r u l e s on burden of proof and presumptions of law. W e a r e here concerned with hard, cold, mathematical f a c t s which can be determined. This Court has the responsibility t o see t h a t the f a c t s a r e determined. We would find that the only solution to this problem is to grant a writ of mandamus to compel a recanvass by precinct of the votes cast in the June 2, 1972 election. A canvassing board cannot evade its duties by adjourning without taking the action required by law, and mandamus lies to compel its members to reassemble and perform their duty. A partial or incomplete canvass is viewed in the same manner as a total failure to make a canvass in the first instance, and a writ may issue to compel the board to reassemble and make a complete and accurate canvass of all the returns. This is supported by ample statutory and case law. In this analysis the first point that must be considered is the statutory law. Sections 23-4007 and 23-4008, R.C.M. 1947, state: "23-4007. Disposition of items by registrar. ( 1 ) When the registrar receives the packages or envelopes, he shall file those containing the ballots voted and detached stubs and the unused ballots and keep them unopened for twelve (12) months. After twelve (12) months, if there is no contest begun in a court or no recount, he shall burn the envelopes without opening them or examining their contents. "(2) The registrar shall file the envelopes or packages containing the precinct registers, certifi- cates of registration, pollbooks, tally sheets, and oaths of election officers. He shall keep them un- opened until the commissioners meet to canvass the returns. The commissioners shall open the envelopes or packages. "(3) Immediately after the returns are canvassed, the registrar shall file the pollbooks, election records, and the papers delivered to the commissioners. " "23-4008, Disposition of items in event of contest. If there is a contest within twelve ( 1 2 ) months, the registrar shall keep the envelopes or packages unopened until the contest is finally determined and then destroy them. I f the court hasmtody of the envelopes or pack- ages as evidence, they are in the custody of the court and the registrar shall not destroy them." There is no dispute that the issue before the Court is an election contest. Did the proposed constitution pass or fail? This contest was filed in this Court and the above cited statutes explicitly and implicitly grant the Court the authority to compel a reexamination o f the o r i g i n a l canvass i n . ~ r d e r co determine Zhe exact number of votes, both gross and n e t , t h a t were c a s t I t "for" o r against" the proposed constitution. W e recognize the argument t h a t the time f o r a recount ias 2xpired. However, the l e g i s l a t u r e has provided exact instruc- cions by which a recount may be held, and t h i s Court readily submits t o those instructions. The l e g i s l a t u r e has provided f o r the retention of b a l l o t s f o r a period of 12 months i n the event a dispute may a r i s e a s t o the exact outcome of a given election. This i s the case a t hand, therefore, the r e q u i s i t e power and means e x i s t f o r a recanvassing of the June 2, 1972, special election, i n order t o determine t h e I I nxact number of electors voting for" or "against" i n t h a t election. A recanvass i s not a new or unusual remedy. In State ex r e l . Lynch v. Batani, 103 Mont 353, 362, 62 P.2d 565, we stated: "we think what the court said i n the similar case of Capper v. Anderson, 88 Kan. 385, 128 Pac. 207, i s applicable here. 1 here it was recorded: A canvassing board, i n ascertaining and registering the e f f e c t of the returns, a c t s i n a purely ministerial capacity, and i s subject t o control by mandamus. * * The power t o compel a canvass implies the power t o compel a correct one. A ministerial duty wrongly performed i s not performed a t a l l . The correction of an erroneous computation can, of course, be compelled by a court. The mistakes here complained of a r e substantially of t h a t character. They con- s i s t of t r e a t i n g the face of the p o l l books and t a l l y sheets a s indicating a r e s u l t which a proper consideration of the e n t i r e document shows beyond a question t o be wrong. Whatever might be the r u l e i n a s i t u a t i o n admitting of a substantial difference o f opinion, when a court can determine with c e r t a i n t y t h a t the p o l l books and t a l l y sheets show a c e r t a i n number of votes t o have been c a s t and counted f o r a particular candidate, i t can require a board of canvassers t o give proper e f f e c t t o t h a t determina- cion. 11 Sase law from other jurisdictions supports the principle expressed i n Lynch. The following cases stand for the single proposition that a board of canvassers can be reconvened t o correctly, accurately, and t r u l y ascertain the r e s u l t of an election. State v. M i l l s , 132 W.Va.580, 53 S.E.2d 416; Eaton v. County Court of Cabell County, 140 W.Va. 498, 85 S.E.2d 648; Kane v. Registrars of Voters of F a l l River, 328 Mass. 511, 105 N.E.2d 212; Dotson v. Ritchie, 211 Ark. 789, 202 S.W.2d 603; Mahoney v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 205 Md. 325, 108 A.2d 143; State v. County Court of Logan County, 145 W.Va. 581, 116 S.E.2d 125; and State v. Mercer County Court, 129 W.Va. 584, 41 S.E.2d 855. The l i s t i s endless, but the simple proposition e x i s t s t h a t t h i s Court has the power through the s t a t u t e s hereto- fore c i t e d , and the means, through the granting of a w r i t , t o order a recanvass of the precincts of Montana t o determine the t o t a l number voting a t the special election on the proposed constitution. W e would order the Secretary of S t a t e t o immediately take action by issuing instructions t o the f i f t y - s i x county c l e r k and recorders i n Montana t o conduct a recanvass by precinct t o balance the p o l l books with the v a l i d b a l l o t s t o determine the t o t a l number of electors voting a t the special election. In f i l i n g the foregoing dissent, we recognize the f u t i l i t y of it. B y a three t o two vote t h i s Court i s declaring a new majority constitution t o have been adopted. W e believe thelapinion t o be wrong; and therefore dis.sent. W e a r e aware t h a t under our proposed solution a recanvass might reveal the same r e s u l t ; t h a t i s , t h a t i t would show a majority of those voting a t the e l e c t i o n did approve. I f t h a t were t o occur,