Title: P. v. Cash

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 7/25/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S029460
v.
)
)
Alameda County
RANDALL SCOTT CASH,
)
Super. Ct. No. H-8485
)
Defendant and Appellant.
)
__________________________________ )
A jury convicted Randall Scott Cash of the first degree murder of Bud
Smith (Pen. Code, § 187),1 and it found true a special circumstance that the murder
was committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)).  The jury
also convicted defendant of the attempted murder of Susan Balestri (§§ 664/187).
With respect to both the murder and the attempted murder, the jury found that
defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5).  It also found that in committing
the attempted murder, defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon
(§ 12022, subd. (b)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7).  At
the penalty phase the jury returned a verdict of death.  Defendant’s appeal to this
court is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)
We affirm the judgment as to guilt and the robbery special circumstance,
but, because of prejudicial error in death qualification of the jury we reverse the
judgment as to the penalty of death.
                                                
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2
I.  FACTS
A.  Guilt Phase—Prosecution’s Case
In June 1985, defendant sublet a room in a house occupied by Bud Smith, a
cocaine dealer, and by Susan Balestri, Smith’s girlfriend.  Over the course of the
summer, defendant began to exhibit mood changes, lost a job he had held for four
years, and experienced financial difficulties.
Todd Babbitt, a friend of defendant’s, testified that in mid-September 1985,
defendant jokingly said to him, “I ought to just tie [Smith] up and take [Smith and
Balestri’s] money and his dope.”  Defendant told Babbitt that Smith kept $3,000 to
$4,000 in cash in his bedroom.
By October 1985, defendant’s car had been repossessed, and he owed $330
in back rent to Smith, who set a payment deadline of Monday, October 28.  At a
party on the evening of October 26, defendant asked David Rogers to get drugs for
him from Smith.  When Rogers returned empty-handed, defendant remarked he
wished he knew a coke dealer to “knock off” for money or drugs.
Later that evening, defendant and three friends were at the Smith house.
They sat in the living room watching television, drinking alcohol, and using
“speed.”  Meanwhile, Smith and Balestri were in their bedroom.  Sometime after
4:00 a.m., Balestri walked through the living room, where she found defendant
and one friend asleep on separate couches.  She returned to the bedroom and
locked the door.
Around 9:30 the next morning, Balestri was still in bed when the bedroom
door burst open and defendant, armed with a rifle, started shooting at Smith’s
back.  When Balestri screamed, defendant told her:  “Shut up.  If you don’t do
what I say, I’m going to kill you too.  I have to.  I have to.”  When Balestri
covered her face, defendant shot her, injuring her finger.  He then grabbed her by
the hair, dragged her into the living room, and shot her in the chest.  Grabbing a
3
wooden baton from the coat rack, defendant beat Balestri on the head until the
baton broke.
Defendant dragged Balestri back into the bedroom, tied her legs together,
and repeatedly pounded her head with his rifle.  Using a set of handcuffs
belonging to Balestri, defendant handcuffed her right wrist to her left ankle and
gagged her.  She could hear defendant opening drawers and rummaging through
the closets and the jingling of keys attached to Smith’s wallet.  She also heard the
sound of a razor blade chopping on a mirror, followed by a sniffing sound, leading
her to believe defendant was snorting cocaine.
While Balestri was on the floor, defendant kicked her in the stomach and
asked where the money was kept.  She told him it was on a clipboard kept
underneath the nightstand.  She heard him go to that part of the room.  When she
next saw him, defendant was holding a thick wad of bills.  Before leaving the
bedroom, defendant tied Balestri up more tightly, lashing her to the bed and to
Smith’s body.  Defendant fired two more shots at Balestri and left the bedroom.
Shortly thereafter, defendant returned, pulled apart Balestri’s thighs, and looked at
her genitals.
Balestri eventually freed herself and summoned help from the neighbors,
who called the police.  The responding officers found a note on the front door of
Smith’s house.  It said:  “Do not disturb till 6:00 o’clock.”
On October 29, 1985, the police arrested defendant at a Fresno motel.  In the
room he had occupied, they found a rucksack containing a hunting knife, a pistol,
and a brown box containing $700 and several bindles of cocaine bearing Smith’s
distinctive label.
Smith died from multiple gunshot wounds, three of which had been fired at
close range.  Although Balestri sustained lacerations on her head and four gunshot
wounds, she survived and testified as a prosecution witness.
4
B.  Guilt Phase—Defense Case
Defendant did not testify.
William Bratten testified that on the day of the shooting he had spoken to his
friend Todd Babbitt, but Babbitt never mentioned an earlier conversation with
defendant during which defendant spoke of harming or stealing from Smith, the
murder victim.
A defense investigator testified that when he tried to interview David Rogers,
the latter refused to cooperate, saying that he had no interest in helping defendant,
and that his only interest would be to “bury” defendant.
Three witnesses testified about events shortly before the shooting.
Defendant’s employer characterized defendant as his “right-hand man” until
a month or six weeks before defendant failed to return from vacation in late
August 1985.  In those weeks preceding his vacation, defendant had become
belligerent and had begun wearing a hunting knife.
A friend of Smith’s testified that he overheard Smith tell defendant to move
out because he had not paid his rent.  Defendant was distraught and asked for more
time, but Smith gave him a one-week deadline.
Patrick Malone, a former resident of the house, testified that Smith had
exchanged cocaine for the use of defendant’s truck and that defendant had given
Smith all his vacation pay, some $700 to $800, to pay for drugs.
C.  Penalty Phase—Prosecution Case
The prosecution presented evidence of two prior murders:  in January 1977,
when he was 17 years old, defendant had killed his elderly grandparents, Daniel
and Verneva Kent.  Their bodies were found in easy chairs in the living room of
their home in the State of Kansas.  Each had been shot in the head.  The house was
in disarray, with pills scattered about and a woman’s purse lying open on the floor.
5
Mark Nelson, a friend of defendant’s, was present when defendant argued
with and shot the Kents.  Defendant and Nelson were arrested early the next
morning while driving the Kents’ car.  In the car, the officers found a stereo and
two shotguns.
Defendant was tried as a juvenile in Kansas.  He admitted killing his
grandparents and, in August 1977, was committed for treatment to a state facility.
After successfully completing probation, defendant was released in January 1979.
D.  Penalty Phase—Defense Case
The defense presented many witnesses who testified to the circumstances of
defendant’s early life.  His parents’ marriage broke up when he was 14 months
old.  His mother left defendant and his sister with her parents, the Kents.
Defendant was sickly as a child, suffering from asthma and extreme
nearsightedness.  Defendant stayed with the Kents until his freshman year in high
school, when he moved in with his mother and her third husband.
In the fall of his sophomore year in high school, defendant returned to his
grandparents’ home.  Daniel Kent had been diagnosed with prostate cancer, and
Verneva Kent needed defendant to drive her to medical appointments.  Verneva
Kent suffered from a variety of ailments that confined her to a wheelchair.
In 1979, after his release from the juvenile treatment facility in Kansas,
defendant came to Southern California, where he lived with his mother.  In 1981,
defendant and his mother moved to Fremont in Northern California.  Defendant
found work in a print shop, where he was considered a steady, dependable worker
during most of the four years of his employment.
Defendant testified on his own behalf.  In the summer of 1985, he sublet a
room from Smith, a cocaine dealer.  Smith often gave defendant cocaine in
payment for errands.  When defendant lost his job and his car was repossessed, he
began trading his personal possessions to Smith in exchange for drugs.  By mid-
6
October, defendant’s daily consumption of alcohol and drugs included two to three
six-packs of beer, a pint of hard liquor, marijuana, and up to half a gram of
cocaine or methamphetamine.
On the morning of October 27, 1985, Smith got up at about 8:00 a.m. and
defendant obtained some cocaine from him.  Smith again threatened to beat up
defendant if he did not pay his debts.  Shortly after that conversation, defendant
took the loaded rifle kept by the front door, went into the bedroom, and shot
Smith.  He left the house after tying Balestri to Smith’s body.  Realizing he had no
money, he returned, ungagged Balestri, and asked her where Smith kept his cash.
Two psychiatrists, Dr. Herbert Modlin and Dr. William Vicary, testified on
defendant’s behalf.  Dr. Modlin, of the Menninger Clinic, was appointed by the
Kansas court in 1977 to examine defendant in connection with the murders of
defendant’s grandparents.  He diagnosed defendant at that time as having
depressive neurosis.  Dr. Modlin did not consider defendant a sociopath.  In his
opinion the combination of drugs and alcohol defendant consumed on the day he
murdered his grandparents reduced defendant’s already weak ability to control his
emotions.  In 1977, Dr. Modlin had recommended that defendant receive
psychiatric treatment, but he never did.  In Dr. Modlin’s view psychiatric
treatment could have prevented defendant’s violent assaults on Smith and Balestri
in 1985.
Dr. William Vicary evaluated defendant in connection with the present
offenses.  In his opinion, defendant has since childhood suffered from severe
depression caused by rejection by his parents, an older sister’s death from drug
abuse, and his upbringing by grandparents with rigid personalities and poor health.
Defendant was feeling trapped and depressed at the time of the Kansas killings
and again when he attacked Smith and Balestri.  In each case, defendant had
expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for the crimes.
7
II.  JURY SELECTION ISSUES
A.  Denial of Voir Dire on Prior Murders
The trial court conducted death qualification voir dire of each prospective
juror individually and out of the presence of other prospective jurors (see People v.
Hovey (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80), followed immediately by general voir dire of that
juror.  Voir dire of each prospective juror proceeded in three steps:  The court
asked death-qualifying questions, attorneys for each side posed death-qualifying
questions, and finally each side posed questions on general voir dire.  After each
step, the court entertained challenges for cause.  All prospective jurors not excused
for cause during this process were directed to return at a later date.  When the
prospective jurors remaining after voir dire assembled on that date, they were
called into the jury box according to randomly assigned numbers, the court
entertained the parties’ peremptory challenges, and in this manner the final
selection of the jury and the alternates was concluded.
On the second day of voir dire, when defense counsel attempted to ask a
prospective juror whether there were “any particular crimes” or “any facts” that
would cause that juror “automatically to vote for the death penalty,” the trial court
ruled the questions improper because “we’re restricted to this case.”  Later, when
no prospective juror was present, defense counsel asked the court to reconsider the
restriction.  Counsel explained that the defense wanted to determine whether
prospective jurors could return a verdict of life without parole for a defendant who
had killed more than one person, without revealing that defendant had killed his
grandparents.  The trial court replied that because the prior murders were not
expressly alleged in the charging document, it would not permit any such
questions:  “You cannot ask anything about the facts that are not charged in the
Information, period.  You can’t raise one mitigating factor, nor can [the
8
prosecutor] raise one aggravating [factor] that is not charged in the
Information. . . .  You cannot go past the Information.”
The defense then prepared and filed a written motion seeking permission to
ask prospective jurors “whether there are any aggravating circumstances which
would cause a prospective juror to automatically vote for the death penalty,
without considering the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole.”  The trial court denied the motion with this comment:  “I am not
permitting you to ask them about any specific acts of mitigation or aggravation, as
that would in my opinion have them prejudge the evidence.”  The trial court
enforced this ruling during the remainder of the voir dire, prohibiting any defense
questioning about uncharged facts or circumstances that would cause a prospective
juror to vote automatically for the death penalty.
Defendant contends that by preventing all voir dire on the issue of prior
murders, the court denied him his rights under our federal and state Constitutions
to an impartial penalty jury.  We agree.
Prospective jurors may be excused for cause when their views on capital
punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties
as jurors.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  “The real question is
‘ “ ‘whether the juror’s views about capital punishment would prevent or impair
the juror’s ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 431, quoting People v. Bradford (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1229, 1318, quoting in turn People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1003.)
Because the qualification standard operates in the same manner whether a
prospective juror’s views are for or against the death penalty (Morgan v. Illinois
(1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728), it is equally true that the “real question” is whether
the juror’s views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the juror’s
ability to return a verdict of life without parole in the case before the juror.
9
A challenge for cause may be based on the juror’s response when informed
of facts or circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried.  (People v.
Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005.)  In Kirkpatrick, the defendant was
charged with the execution-style killings of a teenage employee and a former
supervisor against whom he bore a grudge.  (Id. at pp. 999-1000.)  The
prosecution’s case in aggravation included two uncharged assaults by the
defendant on teenage boys, and an incident in which the defendant had threatened
to harm the daughter and the pet dogs of a woman with whom he had a dispute
over a calculator.  (Id. at pp. 1001-1002.)  The trial court permitted the defendant
to ask jurors if they would automatically vote for or against death “in cases
involving any generalized facts, whether pleaded or not, that were likely to be
shown by the evidence” (id. at p. 1004, italics added).  But the court ruled that the
parties could use this voir dire only as a basis for peremptory challenges, not to
establish grounds to challenge a prospective juror for cause.
We concluded the trial court erred by not permitting such questions to
support a challenge for cause.  We held:  “A prospective juror who would
invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more
circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the
strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is therefore subject to
challenge for cause, whether or not the circumstance that would be determinative
for that juror has been alleged in the charging document.”  (People v. Kirkpatrick,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005, italics added; accord, People v. Ervin (2000) 22
Cal.4th 48, 70; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 853.)  Thus, we affirmed the
principle that either party is entitled to ask prospective jurors questions that are
specific enough to determine if those jurors harbor bias, as to some fact or
circumstance shown by the trial evidence, that would cause them not to follow an
10
instruction directing them to determine penalty after considering aggravating and
mitigating evidence.  (See CALJIC No. 8.85 (2000 rev.) (6th ed. 1996).)
We have endorsed such particularized death-qualifying voir dire in a variety
of situations.  A prosecutor may properly inquire whether a prospective juror
could impose the death penalty on a defendant in a felony-murder case (People v.
Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 916-917), on a defendant who did not personally
kill the victim (People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 431; People v. Ervin,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71), on a young defendant or one who lacked a prior
murder conviction (People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 772-773), or only in
particularly extreme cases unlike the case being tried (People v. Bradford, supra,
15 Cal.4th at p. 1320).
Here, the trial court’s ruling prohibited defendant’s trial attorney from
inquiring during voir dire whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for
the death penalty if the defendant had previously committed another murder.
Because in this case defendant’s guilt of a prior murder (specifically, the prior
murders of his grandparents) was a general fact or circumstance that was present
in the case and that could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death
penalty, regardless of the strength of the mitigating circumstances, the defense
should have been permitted to probe the prospective jurors’ attitudes as to that fact
or circumstance.  In prohibiting voir dire on prior murder, a fact likely to be of
great significance to prospective jurors, the trial court erred.  In fairness to the trial
court, we note that most of our decisions clarifying the law on this point were
announced after the trial in this case.
Arguing that the trial court did not err in restricting voir dire to facts and
circumstances alleged in the information, the Attorney General relies on language
in some of our prior decisions to the effect that death qualification voir dire
“ ‘seeks to determine only the views of the prospective jurors about capital
11
punishment in the abstract’ ” and “ ‘ “without regard to the evidence produced at
trial.” ’ ”  (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 746; People v. Clark (1990)
50 Cal.3d 583, 596-597.)  Our decisions have explained that death-qualification
voir dire must avoid two extremes.  On the one hand, it must not be so abstract
that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in the case being
tried.  On the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective
jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and
aggravating evidence likely to be presented.  (See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22
Cal.4th 900, 990-991 [not error to refuse to allow counsel to ask juror given
“detailed account of the facts” in the case if she “would impose” death penalty].)
In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have
considerable discretion.  (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908; People
v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 918.)  They may not, however, as the trial
court did here, strike the balance by precluding mention of any general fact or
circumstance not expressly pleaded in the information.  (People v. Ervin, supra, 22
Cal.4th at p. 70; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 853; People v. Kirkpatrick,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005; see also People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at
pp. 772-773.)
In Medina on which the Attorney General particularly relies, the trial court
initially declined to permit voir dire on whether prospective jurors could vote for
life imprisonment if the defendant had committed multiple murders, but later the
trial court changed its ruling and allowed such questioning.  Despite dictum
expressing doubt that the court’s initial ruling was incorrect, we held that the
initial ruling did not prejudice the defendant because “after the trial court clarified
its position with respect to the multiple murder question, defendant failed to ask to
reexamine any juror on this topic.”  (People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at
12
p. 746.)  Here, by contrast, the trial court never altered its erroneous ruling, and
defendant had no opportunity to reexamine any juror with respect to the prior
murder question.
Error in restricting death-qualification voir dire does not invariably require
reversal of a judgment of death.  (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
974.)  In particular, we have suggested that such error may be deemed harmless if
the defense was permitted “to use the general voir dire to explore further the
prospective jurors’ responses to the facts and circumstances of the case” or if the
record otherwise establishes that none of the jurors had a view about the
circumstances of the case that would disqualify that juror.  (Ibid.)  Here, however,
the general voir dire of each prospective juror immediately followed the death-
qualification voir dire, and it seems clear from the record that the trial court’s
ruling extended to both portions of the voir dire.  The Attorney General does not
contend otherwise.  As a result, defendant was unable to use the general voir dire
to cure the prejudice resulting from the trial court’s erroneous limitation on the
scope of voir dire.
A defendant who establishes that “any juror who eventually served was
biased against him” is entitled to reversal.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 975; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 413.)  Here, defendant
cannot identify a particular biased juror, but that is because he was denied an
adequate voir dire about prior murder, a possibly determinative fact for a juror.
By absolutely barring any voir dire beyond facts alleged on the face of the
charging document, the trial court created a risk that a juror who would
automatically vote to impose the death penalty on a defendant who had previously
committed murder was empanelled and acted on those views, thereby violating
defendant’s due process right to an impartial jury.  (See Morgan v. Illinois, supra,
504 U.S. at p. 739.)  The trial court’s restriction of voir dire “leads us to doubt”
13
that defendant “was sentenced to death by a jury empanelled in compliance with
the Fourteenth Amendment.”  (Ibid.)
Because the trial court’s error makes it impossible for us to determine from
the record whether any of the individuals who were ultimately seated as jurors
held the disqualifying view that the death penalty should be imposed invariably
and automatically on any defendant who had committed one or more murders
other than the murder charged in this case, it cannot be dismissed as harmless.
Thus, we must reverse defendant’s judgment of death.  (Morgan v. Illinois, supra,
504 U.S. at p. 739.)
B.  Peremptory Challenge Based on Religious Training
During jury selection, the defense accused the prosecution of exercising its
peremptory challenges to excuse seven of eight prospective African-American
jurors because of their race, in violation of the federal and state Constitutions.
(See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22
Cal.3d 258, 276-277.)
By asking the prosecutor to explain her peremptory challenges, the trial court
here implicitly found that defendant had made a prima facie showing of racial
bias.  The prosecutor then gave reasons for the challenges.  The trial court found
the reasons to be neutral and persuasive and concluded there had been no
exclusion based on race.
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s ruling as to the
prosecution’s exclusion of six of the seven African-American prospective jurors
challenged by the prosecution.  Defendant challenges the ruling only as to the
seventh African-American prospective juror, Eric S., claiming that the
prosecutor’s primary ground for challenging Eric S. was that he had been raised a
Jehovah’s Witness.
14
The prosecutor, believing that Jehovah’s Witnesses are “taught not to pass
judgment,” was concerned that Eric S.’s early religious training would render him
unwilling to vote for death.  In addition, the prosecutor said she had challenged
Eric S. because he gave abrupt answers suggesting he resented being questioned.
For example, when defense counsel asked him to explain his jury questionnaire
statement that he considered the death penalty appropriate for certain crimes, Eric
S. replied, “I feel that it’s fairly clear.”  Thereafter, when the prosecutor asked if
Eric S. could look defendant in the eye and vote for death, Eric S. replied, “Sure.”
The prosecutor asked again, and Eric S. replied, “I said yes.”
Without giving a specific reason, the prosecutor expressed doubt that Eric S.
“would get along with the other jurors.”  The prosecutor’s final objection to Eric
S. was that he seemed reluctant to serve as a juror.  “He was sitting on the edge of
his seat . . . holding his backpack ready to get out of here.”
The vice that Wheeler seeks to address is the exclusion of any juror based on
the “presumption that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members
of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar
grounds.”  (People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1215; People v. Wheeler,
supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276.)  Although this court has described the protections
against group exclusion as including religious affiliation, the United States
Supreme Court has only applied Batson to forbid group exclusion based on race or
gender.  (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127; see Davis v.
Minnesota (1994) 511 U.S. 1115 (dis. opn. of Thomas, J.) [peremptory challenge
to African-American juror because juror was a Jehovah’s Witness].)
The United States Supreme Court has set out a three-step process that is
required when a party claims that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the
exercise of peremptory challenges.  The first step is for the complaining party to
make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  If the complaining party
15
does so, in step two the burden of production shifts to the opponent to advance a
race-neutral explanation.  If a race-neutral reason is tendered, in step three the
court decides whether the complaining party has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.  (Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767; People v. Silva (2001)
25 Cal.4th 345, 384.)
The reasons advanced by the challenging party at step two need not be
tactically sound or even plausible; absent a discriminatory intent inherent in the
proffered reasons, those reasons will be deemed race neutral.  (Purkett v. Elem,
supra, 514 U.S. at p. 768.)  Only at step three is the persuasiveness of the reasons
relevant.  “At that stage implausible or fantastic justifications may . . . be found to
be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”  (Ibid.)
Here, at step one, the trial court implicitly found the defense made a prima
facie case of racial discrimination.  (People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 75.)
We assume substantial evidence supports that determination.  (People v. Silva,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 384.)
The prosecutor then came forward (step two) with various reasons for
excusing Eric S. that did not reveal any racial intent.  The prosecutor objected to
Eric S. because of his possible reluctance to vote for death, his attitude toward the
court and counsel, his possible inability to get along with other jurors, and his
seeming reluctance to serve.  The court properly deemed these reasons to be race-
neutral.  (Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 768.)
Defendant challenges only the third step in the process—namely, whether the
prosecutor’s reasons were persuasive and not merely a pretext for discrimination.
The defense did not object below that the prosecutor challenged Eric S. because
Eric S. was raised as a Jehovah’s Witness.  Defense counsel argued to the trial
court, in essence, that the prosecutor’s religious justification was merely a pretext
for race-based exclusion.  (See J.E.B. v. Alabama, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 145
16
[peremptory challenge must be based on a juror characteristic other than race or
gender and proffered explanation may not be pretextual].)
Excusing prospective jurors who have a religious bent or bias that would
make it difficult for them to impose the death penalty is a proper,
nondiscriminatory ground for a peremptory challenge.  (People v. Ervin, supra, 22
Cal.4th at p. 76; see People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 118-119.)  Here, the
prosecutor indicated her concern that Eric S. might harbor an anti-death bias based
on his early religious training.  (See United States v. Stafford (7th Cir. 1998) 136
F.3d 1109, 1114.)  The trial court found that concern to be a “valid position.”
Religion was not, however, the only reason the prosecutor gave.  Eric S.’s attitude
was also a concern.  The transcript before us does not reveal Eric S.’s tone or body
language.  In that respect the trial court was far more able than we are to evaluate
whether Eric S. was, as the prosecutor described him, “smart alecky” and anxious
to get out of the courtroom.
When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of
the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference
to its conclusion.  (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720; People v.
Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198.)  Here, the trial court rejected
defendant’s claim of pretext.  The prosecutor’s reasons for excusing Eric S. are not
inherently implausible and find support in the record.  Thus, the trial court did not
err in denying defendant’s Wheeler/Batson motion claiming prospective juror Eric
S. was excluded because of his race.
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES
A.  Evidentiary Rulings
1.  Exclusion of evidence of victim’s violence
At trial the defense sought to portray murder victim Bud Smith as a violent,
manipulative man who had threatened defendant with physical violence if he did
17
not pay Smith his drug debts and overdue rent.  The defense sought to introduce
evidence of Smith’s past violent reprisals for unpaid debts to establish provocation
sufficient to reduce defendant’s killing of Smith to second degree murder, and to
bolster the defense that defendant formed an intent to rob only after he completed
his attacks on Smith and Balestri, and thus did not kill Smith in the course of a
robbery.
Consistent with this theory, defense counsel in opening statement told the
jury the defense would elicit testimony from two witnesses that Smith had forcibly
evicted former housemate Pat Malone for not paying rent, and that Balestri and
defendant were present when Smith had done so.  On cross-examination, Balestri
testified that Smith had evicted Malone “with force.”  The trial court overruled the
prosecutor’s objection that the “character of the deceased is not relevant.”
Defense counsel then asked Balestri if she remembered Billy Mackey and a
dispute between Mackey and Smith over money Mackey owed Smith.  After the
trial court sustained the prosecutor’s relevance objection, defense counsel asked
Balestri:  “It’s true, isn’t it, that when people owed Bud money and they didn’t pay
physical violence often occurred.”  The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s
relevance objection.
Defendant argues that this last ruling was erroneous because the evidence he
sought to elicit was not character evidence of Smith’s prior bad acts (Evid. Code,
§ 1103, subd. (a)), but was evidence of Smith’s conduct that was part of the events
surrounding the crime.  The claim is unpersuasive.  Smith’s customary debt
collection practices were not relevant to show defendant’s state of mind at the time
he killed Smith unless defendant knew of those practices.  Defendant did present
evidence of Smith’s violence directed at Malone in defendant’s presence.  There
was no evidence, however, that defendant knew of violent acts by Smith against
Mackey.
18
Defendant contends the trial court should not have sustained the prosecutor’s
relevance objection when defense counsel asked Pat Malone about “the
circumstances in which [he] left the [Smith] house.”  We disagree.  Balestri had
already testified that Smith had forcibly evicted Malone.  The trial court could
reasonably have found that the broadly framed question might get an answer going
well beyond Smith’s violent behavior.  Only relevant evidence is admissible, and
the trial court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence.
(People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13-14.)
Defense counsel asked Paul Jorgensen, who visited Smith daily in the fall of
1985, if he had heard Smith make threats about what Smith would do if defendant
tried to leave the house without paying his debts.  The trial court sustained the
prosecutor’s hearsay objection.  Defense counsel responded, “I’m offering it for
the purpose of state of mind.”  An out-of-court statement is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule when offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind,
provided the declarant’s state of mind is at issue.  (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd.
(a)(1).)
Whether or not the statement was hearsay, any threat Smith may have made
was irrelevant.  Smith’s state of mind was not at issue, nor was it relevant to show
his conduct in conformity with that state of mind, because he was asleep when he
was shot.  (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(2); People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d
522, 530-531.)  Thus the court did not err in sustaining the prosecutor’s objection.
Defendant contends these isolated rulings had the effect of preventing him
from establishing a pattern of provocation created by Smith’s threats.  We
disagree.  The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a defense.  (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S.
683, 690.)  Evidence that falls short of exonerating a defendant may still be critical
to a defense.  (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 809.)  Here the
19
trial court’s rulings did not prevent defendant from presenting evidence from
which the jury might have concluded defendant’s killing of Smith was the result of
provocation.  Defendant introduced evidence that Smith was adamant about being
repaid and, in defendant’s presence, had forcibly evicted Malone for nonpayment
of rent.  In closing argument, defense counsel emphasized defendant’s
increasingly desperate plight as his debt to Smith grew day by day, and
characterized defendant’s attack as an outburst of rage rather than an act of
premeditated murder or murder for the purpose of robbery.  In these circumstances
we cannot conclude that the trial court’s rulings prevented defendant from
presenting those defenses.
2.  Limitation on impeachment of Balestri
At the preliminary hearing, Balestri testified that after defendant tied her up
in the bedroom she heard, but could not see, him go to a desk on the other side of
the room in which Smith kept cocaine.  Balestri then heard sounds of the cocaine
being cut and of sniffing.  Shortly thereafter defendant kicked Balestri in the
stomach and demanded to know where the money was kept.  She told him it was
“on a clipboard on a night table.”  She then testified that she did not see defendant
take either the cocaine or the money.  At trial, Balestri testified that she saw
defendant remove a wad of bills from the clipboard.
When defense counsel sought to impeach Balestri with this apparent
inconsistency, the trial court asked her whether she had seen defendant “take it
[the clipboard with the money]” from the nightstand, and she said no.  But she
testified she saw defendant in possession of the roll of bills from the clipboard.
When defense counsel tried to get Balestri to identify where in her preliminary
hearing testimony she described defendant removing money from the clipboard,
the court sustained the prosecution’s objection that there was no inconsistency.
The trial court characterized the question as “improper,” explaining that Balestri
20
had not been asked at the preliminary hearing if she saw defendant holding the
money, only if she saw defendant take the money from the nightstand.
Defendant contends this was an inconsistency that “would probably have
tipped the scale to a finding of untrue for the [robbery-murder] special
circumstance.”  Moreover, he argues that the trial court committed misconduct
both by suggesting defense counsel was asking an improper question and by then
stating there was no inconsistency.  We disagree.
Even assuming the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was erroneous, defendant
was not prejudiced.  Whether or not Balestri actually saw defendant with Smith’s
money, there was no inconsistency between her preliminary hearing testimony and
her trial testimony that after she heard sounds consistent with cocaine use,
defendant kicked her in the stomach and asked where the money was.  Moreover,
these events occurred after Smith was dead and after defendant had shot and
beaten Balestri.  Thus there is not a reasonable probability that the trial court’s
ruling affected the jury’s decision that defendant had formed the intent to rob
before or at the time he shot Smith.
3.  Admission of evidence that Balestri was pregnant
Defendant had moved in limine to exclude all mention of Balestri’s
pregnancy, on the ground it was more prejudicial than probative, but the trial court
reserved any ruling until the matter came up in trial.  At trial, when the prosecutor
asked Balestri if she was pregnant at the time of the attack, the defense objected
that the question was not relevant, but the trial court overruled the objection.
Balestri testified that she had been pregnant, though at the time she had merely
suspected the pregnancy because it was only four weeks advanced.  No further
evidence pertaining to her pregnancy or its outcome was introduced.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by overruling the relevance
objection and that the error requires reversal.  In his view the evidence was so
21
inflammatory that its erroneous admission denied defendant due process under
Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 131, footnote 6 and violated the
reliability standards imposed by the Eighth Amendment.  (Beck v. Alabama (1980)
447 U.S. 625, 638.)
Relevant evidence includes evidence “having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action.”  (Evid. Code, § 210.)  As the Attorney General concedes, Balestri’s
pregnancy was clearly irrelevant to any issue in the case.  Thus, the trial court
erred in admitting the evidence.
The impact of this evidence, however, pales in light of the other acts of
violence defendant committed against Balestri.  Before defendant kicked her in the
stomach he shot at her twice, beat her repeatedly about the head with the butt of
his rifle and then with a wooden rod until it broke, dragged her by her hair, and
gagged and bound her.  It strains credulity to infer that any jury, knowing that the
victim had suffered such abuse, would be swayed to convict by learning that the
victim was four weeks pregnant.
Accordingly, the error was harmless under the state standard of error set forth
in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.  Even assuming that the error
implicated defendant’s rights under the federal Constitution, the error was
harmless under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 23-24.
B.  Comments on Todd Babbitt’s Bench Warrant
Todd Babbitt, a friend of defendant’s, testified at trial as a prosecution
witness.  He stated that one day in mid-September, alluding to the $3,000 to
$4,000 in cash that Smith and Balestri kept in their room, defendant “jokingly”
said:  “I ought to just tie him [Smith] up and take their money and his dope.”
22
Babbitt mentioned this remark to the police some hours after they told him about
the attack on Smith and Balestri.
Seeking to defuse a defense attack on Babbitt’s motivation for testifying, the
prosecutor brought out on direct examination that in 1990 Babbitt had pled guilty
to driving under the influence, that the case was still pending, and that he had an
outstanding bench warrant for failure to appear.  When Babbitt explained that he
“just couldn’t make it to court because [he] was up in Washington,” the trial court
commented:  “You’re going to make a misdemeanor a federal offense if you don’t
take care of it.”  When Babbitt admitted that he had a fine of $1,200 outstanding,
the court interjected:  “That’s right.  You don’t pay, you go to jail.”  The defense
did not object to the court’s comments.
Defendant now contends that the trial court’s comments were “gratuitous and
inappropriate because they conveyed an argument favorable to the prosecution,”
and that the court’s comment undercut defendant’s effort to impeach Babbitt.
Defendant contends the error requires reversal because Babbitt’s testimony was
crucial to the prosecution’s theory that defendant committed his attacks on Smith
and Balestri to facilitate his planned robbery of them.
We determine the propriety of judicial comment on a case-by-case basis in
light of its content and the circumstances in which it occurs.  (People v. Sanders
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 531-532.)  To preserve the issue for review, a defendant
must make a timely objection.  (Id. at p. 531.)  Defendant here did not object at
trial, but he contends that any objection would have been futile or an admonition
ineffective to cure the error.  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 159.)  He
argues that an objection to the court’s facetious “federal case” comment would
have been counterproductive because the court might have ridiculed the defense
for objecting, or, if the court agreed to admonish the jury, an admonition might
23
have made the defense appear foolish in suggesting that a relatively trivial benefit
to Babbitt would tempt him to fabricate or exaggerate such damning evidence.
Defendant characterizes the trial court’s tone as one of “good-natured”
admonishment and “mock judicial severity.”  Whatever that tone may have been,
the court simply advised Babbitt to resolve the matter of the outstanding warrant
and to pay the $1,200 fine or face time in jail.  Neither comment was improper.
Assuming, however, that the court’s tone deprecated the seriousness of Babbitt’s
motive to exaggerate or fabricate, an admonition would have cured any error.
Defendant sought no such curative admonition, and therefore he has forfeited any
claim of error.
Defendant further argues that had the trial court not demeaned defense
counsel’s efforts to impeach Babbitt, the jury would likely have disbelieved
Babbitt’s testimony about defendant’s plan to rob Smith.  Not so.  It was
undisputed that during the afternoon interview with police, when Babbitt learned
of Smith’s murder, Babbitt did not mention defendant’s earlier statement about
tying up Smith.  Babbitt did, however, call the police to report that remark some
three hours later.  It was also undisputed that Babbitt’s outstanding warrant
stemmed from an offense committed some five years after the murder.
Accordingly, whatever motive Babbitt may have had at the time of trial to testify
in a manner favorable to the prosecution, his testimony at trial was apparently
consistent with his statement at the time of the murder.  In these circumstances, the
trial court’s comments cannot have been prejudicial to defendant under any test.
C.  Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument
David Rogers testified for the prosecution that on the night before the murder
he had tried unsuccessfully to obtain cocaine for defendant from Smith.  When
Rogers returned empty-handed, defendant said he wished he knew a coke dealer
he could “knock off” for money or drugs, and he asked if Rogers might know of a
24
victim.  Rogers did not report the conversation to the police until shortly before
trial.
Defense investigator Randy Schmidt approached Rogers before trial, but
Rogers refused to talk to him.  Schmidt testified he had learned about Rogers from
Rogers’s sister and sought to find out what Rogers could “add to the case,” though
Schmidt “had no information as to what” Rogers would tell him.  To Schmidt,
Rogers expressed no interest in helping defendant, only in “burying” him.
In closing argument the prosecutor told the jury that Rogers had no motive to
fabricate.  She noted that no leniency had been shown Rogers and then stated:
“They brought in Randy Schmidt, their investigator . . . to try to say that [Rogers]
was going to bury [defendant] and that’s why he came forward . . . .  [¶]  Well,
why not tell a good lie, and why not do it right away?  That’s what we’re here for.
[¶]  Now, what’s interesting about Mr. Rogers is the defense, how did they know
he existed?  How did they know he had something to say?  [¶]  They talked with
him in February before I even knew he existed. . . .  I didn’t even know who he
was until mid May.  [¶]  Only one person I can think of that would know that there
was an important conversation with him—”  At this juncture the defense objected
to the argument as improper.  The court told the jury, “[A]s I indicated to you, the
statements of the attorneys are not evidence.”  The prosecutor did not resume this
line of argument.
Defendant contends the prosecutor’s comment implied, without any basis in
the evidence, that defendant was the only person who knew of his conversation
with Rogers the night before the attack, and that either investigator Schmidt was
lying when he said he had no idea what information Rogers might have or that
defense counsel had withheld information from investigator Schmidt.  Defendant
claims the argument was prosecutorial misconduct that was not cured by the
25
court’s admonition that argument is not evidence, violating his Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel.
It is misconduct for the prosecutor in argument to impugn the integrity of
defense counsel or to suggest defense counsel has fabricated a defense.  (People v.
Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43,
59.)  Counsel may not state or assume facts in argument that are not in evidence.
(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 102.)  That said, we accord counsel
great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes can
properly be drawn from the evidence.  (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489,
526.)  Such latitude precludes opposing counsel from complaining on appeal that
the opponent’s “ ‘reasoning is faulty or the conclusions are illogical.’ ”  (Ibid.)
Here, the prosecutor was inferring that defendant was the most likely person
on the defense side to know he had talked to Rogers the evening before the
attacks.  That inference was not necessarily inconsistent with Schmidt’s testimony
that Rogers’s sister had suggested the investigator talk to Rogers because Rogers
knew Smith and might be able to say something about Smith’s character.  Nor was
it inconsistent with investigator Schmidt’s testimony that when he first contacted
Rogers, Schmidt “had no information as to what [Rogers] could tell me.”
The second claim, that the prosecutor was alleging defense dishonesty, is
more complex.  Defendant reasons thus:  The prosecutor was assuming defendant
both remembered the substance of his conversation with Rogers and recounted it
sometime before February to either or both his attorney and the investigator.
Therefore, the prosecutor was accusing investigator Schmidt of committing
perjury when Schmidt testified he approached Rogers without knowing what
Rogers could tell him.  Defense counsel colluded in this “dishonesty” if counsel
knew of the pre-attack conversation between defendant and Rogers, but failed to
26
tell the investigator about the conversation.  Alternatively, counsel conspired to
elicit perjurous testimony from the investigator.  This claim also fails.
When the prosecution denigrates defense counsel, there is a risk the jury will
shift its attention from the evidence to the alleged defense improprieties.  (People
v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-
978.)  “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of
fabricating a defense . . . .”  (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.)  For
defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in
an objectionable fashion.’ ”  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001;
People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072, overruled on another ground in
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)
Prosecutorial comment is reversible as misconduct under the federal
Constitution when it “ ‘so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ”  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477
U.S. 168, 181; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 969.)  Under state law,
however, prosecutorial comment that falls short of rendering the trial
fundamentally unfair is misconduct when it involves “ ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 858.)  Here, it is implausible that the
prosecutor’s brief comment would have reasonably caused the jury to follow such
a tenuous chain of inference to conclude that defense counsel had elicited perjury
from investigator Schmidt.
Defendant contends the prosecutor’s argument went beyond pointing out
deficiencies in the defense effort to discredit Rogers as biased.  We accord the
prosecutor wide latitude in describing the factual deficiencies of the defense case.
(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.)  Here, the prosecutor argued that
27
Rogers could have told a “good lie” and could have come forward much sooner
had he falsified his account of the conversation with defendant.  Rogers’s
testimony that he spoke to defendant on the night in question supported the
prosecutor’s inference that defendant as the other party to the conversation would
have known that Rogers might be an important witness and conveyed that
knowledge to his attorney.  Moreover the fact that the defense investigator
approached Rogers long before the prosecutor was aware that Rogers knew
something about the attack supported her inference that the defense knew Rogers
could provide damning testimony.
The prosecutor’s comment was brief, truncated by an objection, and not
resumed.  We conclude the prosecutor’s statement amounted to proper comment
on the evidence.  (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1057; People v.
Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 449.)  Even if we were to assume there was some
impropriety in the prosecutor’s argument, it was cured when the trial court
instructed the jury with the standard admonition that argument is not evidence.
D.  Trial Counsel’s Competence
In closing argument, the prosecutor suggested to the jury that it begin its
deliberations by focusing on robbery and looking at each element of that crime.
Accordingly, she described the facts supporting a robbery from Smith’s presence
and against his will.  “ ‘The taking was accomplished either by force, violence,
fear or intimidation.’  Now [Smith] is obviously dead, so he can’t fear anything.
The law covers that.  The law . . . has another instruction . . . which I’ll read to
you.  The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of
anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery . . . can
substitute [for] that fear if the victim’s dead.  Who is there?  Susan Balestri.  Was
she in fear?  Of course she was in fear.”
28
Defendant contends the prosecutor’s argument misstated the law because it
told the jury that Balestri’s fear would suffice to satisfy the force or fear element
of a robbery of Smith.  Defendant faults defense counsel for not objecting to the
prosecutor’s misstatement of the law and requesting an admonition.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both
that counsel’s performance was deficient—it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness—and that defendant was thereby prejudiced.  (People v. Lucero
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 728.)  Such prejudice exists only if the record shows that
but for counsel’s defective performance there is a reasonable probability the result
of the proceeding would have been different.  (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 694.)  To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance on appeal
“ ‘ “the record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose
for the challenged act or omission.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Majors (1998) 18
Cal.4th 385, 403.)
Defendant is correct that the prosecutor misstated the law when she argued
that Balestri’s fear could satisfy the force or fear element of a robbery of Smith.
In order “ ‘[t]o constitute robbery the property must be removed from the
possession and immediate presence of the victim . . . by force or fear.’ ”  (People
v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 761.)  Logically, the fear experienced by one
who is not a victim does not supply the force or fear element for robbery of
another person.
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s misstatement, and it is
difficult to perceive a tactical purpose for not objecting.  (People v. Pope (1979)
23 Cal.3d 412, 424.)  Assuming, without deciding, that defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object, we turn to whether defendant was
prejudiced by that omission.
29
Despite the prosecutor’s early misstatement, in the later portions of her
argument and in summation she urged the jury to find the existence of a robbery-
murder special circumstance because defendant formed an intent to rob before
bursting into Smith and Balestri’s bedroom.  The prosecutor pointed to evidence
that defendant armed himself, picked a time when Smith and Balestri were likely
sleeping, and shot Smith first, all facts indicating that defendant entered the room
with an intent to commit a robbery by first killing Smith to eliminate any
resistance.
Defense counsel, likewise, argued to the jury that it must find a robbery of
Smith, not of Balestri, in order to find the robbery-murder special circumstance.
In doing so, he specifically told the jury that in order to find the robbery-murder
special circumstance based on robbery of Smith it must find “that at the time that
[defendant] applied the force when he shot Bud Smith, that is when he had already
formed the intent to take property. . . .  You must find for that special circumstance
that for [defendant] Bud Smith’s death was merely a means to an end.”
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury for the robbery-murder special
circumstance it “must find the murder was committed in order to carry out or to
advance the commission of the crime of robbery . . . .  The special circumstance
referred to in my instruction is not established if the robbery was merely incidental
to the commission of the murder.  In other words, the special circumstance is not
present if the defendant’s intent is to kill and the related felony of robbery is
merely incidental to the murder.”
In light of this instruction, we reject defendant’s contention the jury could
have been misled into believing that it could find the robbery-murder special
circumstance true, even if it found defendant only formed an intent to rob after he
shot Smith.  Under these instructions, and in light of the prosecutor’s argument
regarding the robbery-murder special circumstance, we conclude that defense
30
counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the force or fear
element of robbery cannot have prejudiced defendant.
E.  Instructional Claims
1.  Pinpoint instruction on after-formed intent
Defendant asked the trial court to give this pinpoint instruction:  “If
defendant did not conceive his intent to steal either before committing the act of
force against Bud Smith, or during the commission of the act, then the taking
cannot form the basis for the special circumstance allegation, or a finding of first
degree felony murder.”  (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 54.)  This
instruction was consistent with the defense theory that defendant only decided to
steal Smith’s cash after he killed Smith, because he then needed money to escape.
The trial court refused to give the instruction, but it instructed the jury that “in the
crime of robbery, there must exist in the mind of the robber at the time the force is
applied the specific intent to commit such crime and to permanently deprive the
owner of his property.”  (Italics added.)  The trial court did not err by refusing to
give defendant’s special instruction, which redundantly instructed on when
defendant must form an intent to rob.
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s refusal to give his pinpoint
instruction when combined with the prosecutor’s erroneous description of the
force or fear element of robbery (see ante, pp. 28-29) permitted the jury to ignore
his defense of after-formed intent.  We disagree.  While the prosecutor’s argument
misstated the law, it was directed not to the issue of when defendant formed an
intent to rob Smith, but instead to the force or fear element of that robbery.
2.  Failure to instruct on theft
Defendant contends the evidence would have supported, and therefore the
trial court had a duty to give on its own initiative, an instruction on theft as a lesser
31
included offense of the robbery that formed the basis for the charge of felony
murder and the special circumstance allegation.
Defendants have a constitutional right to have the jury determine every
material issue presented by the evidence, and a trial court’s failure to instruct on
lesser included offenses denies them that right.  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th
610, 645.)  “Although a trial court on its own initiative must instruct the jury on
lesser included offenses of charged offenses, this duty does not extend to
uncharged offenses relevant only as predicate offenses under the felony-murder
doctrine.”  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371.)  Defendant here was not
charged with robbery, and the court therefore had no duty to instruct on theft as a
lesser included offense of robbery.
Defendant contends the trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense
of theft when, as here, the defendant is not charged independently with the greater
offense (robbery) but that greater offense is the predicate offense for a special
circumstance (murder in the commission of a robbery).  He relies on three
grounds, none of which is persuasive.
First, defendant relies on language in the special circumstance statute
requiring the predicate crime to be “charged and proved pursuant to the general
law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime.”  (§ 190.4, subd. (a), 2d par.)
We have previously held that this language does not “require the substantive
pleading or conviction of a special circumstance felony.”  (People v. Morris
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 16.)  We see no reason to revisit this issue.
Second, defendant argues the instruction should have been given as part of
the trial court’s duty to instruct on all applicable principles of law connected to the
law and facts of the case.  (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118.)
Defendant was not charged with robbery and therefore could not have been
32
convicted of robbery or of theft as a necessarily lesser included offense of robbery.
(Ibid.; People v. Miller (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 522, 526.)
Third, defendant analogizes to cases involving aiders and abettors.  He
argues, relying on People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 564, that the trial court
had a sua sponte duty to instruct on theft because it was an uncharged predicate
offense for felony murder.  In Failla, the court instructed the jury that the
defendant committed burglary if he entered the residences intending to commit
theft “ ‘or any felony.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 563-564.)  We held that the trial court should,
on its own initiative, have instructed the jury as to what conduct constitutes a
felony.  No such ambiguity was involved here.  The court instructed the jury on
the elements of robbery, the only theory of felony murder advanced at trial and the
felony supporting the special circumstance.
Defendant further contends the trial court’s failure to instruct on theft
violated his right to equal protection.  He points out that a hypothetical defendant
charged with robbery would be entitled to a lesser included offense instruction on
theft.  Defendant argues he is identically situated, because neither he nor his
hypothetical defendant could be punished both for the robbery-murder special
circumstance and for the robbery.  Defendant and his hypothetical counterpart are
not similarly situated because defendant, unlike his hypothetical counterpart, could
not be punished for robbery or for the lesser included offense of theft even if the
jury had made a “not true” finding as to the robbery-murder special circumstance.
Finally, defendant contends the absence of a lesser included offense
instruction violated his rights under the federal Constitution, namely his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense and his Eighth Amendment right not to be
subject to cruel and unusual punishment.  Defendant’s claim does not fall within
the limited situations in which such claims implicate rights under the federal
Constitution.  California requires a sua sponte instruction on lesser included
33
charged offenses regardless of whether the case is a capital, or a noncapital, one.
Therefore, the unavailability of a lesser included offense instruction to an
uncharged crime does not operate to weight the outcome in favor of death for
defendants facing capital charges.  (Hopkins v. Reeves (1998) 524 U.S. 88, 96;
Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. at pp. 637-638; People v. Waidla (2000) 22
Cal.4th 690, 736, fn. 15.)
3.  Instruction on motive
The trial court instructed the jury:  “Motive . . . is not an element of the crime
charged and need not be shown.  However, you may consider motive or lack of
motive as a circumstance in this case.  Presence of motive may tend to establish
guilt.”  (See CALJIC No. 2.51 (6th ed. 1996).)  Defendant contends this
instruction relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he possessed the required intent to rob when he killed Smith.  He
advances this argument by assuming that the terms “motive” and “intent” are
commonly understood as synonymous and by making the further assumption that
the jury would have understood defendant’s motive to be a need for cash.
As we have recently explained, motive is the “reason a person chooses to
commit a crime,” but it is not equivalent to the “mental state such as intent”
required to commit the crime.  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 504.)
Defendant relies on People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, a case
involving the crime of child molestation.  (§ 647.6.)  To violate section 647.6, the
defendant must be “ ‘motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or
intent.’ ”  (Maurer, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127, italics omitted; People v. Lopez
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289.)  The trial court in Maurer instructed the jury that to
commit the crime the defendant must be both “motivated” by an impermissible
sexual interest and that “motive” need not be shown.  The Court of Appeal held
34
that the conflicting instructions removed the issue of intent from the jury’s
consideration.  (People v. Maurer, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127.)
Here, we cannot say the same.  The trial court instructed the jury that to find
the existence of the robbery-murder special circumstance, it “must find the murder
was committed in order to carry out or to advance the commission of the crime of
robbery,” and that “the special circumstance is not present if the defendant’s intent
is to kill and the related felony of robbery is merely incidental to the murder.”  In
sum, the instructions as a whole did not use the terms “motive” and “intent”
interchangeably, and therefore there is no reasonable likelihood the jury
understood those terms to be synonymous.  (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th
598, 687.)
4.  Instruction on sequence of deliberation
The trial court instructed the jury:  “[I]f you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree by reason of having
committed murder in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery
. . . the additional instructions which I’m now going to give you have no
application. . . .  [I]f you’re satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt he’s guilty of
murder in the first degree by reason of having committed murder in the attempt to
commit robbery, then it’s murder in the first degree.  If, on the other hand, you’re
not so satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt the killing occurred during a robbery,
then the instructions I’m now going to give you on murder will apply.”  The court
then instructed on premeditated first degree murder and on second degree murder.
Defendant contends this instruction impermissibly directed the jury to
consider the theories of murder in a particular sequence.  Although a court may
restrict a jury from returning a verdict on a lesser included offense before
acquitting on a greater one, it may not preclude the jury from considering lesser
35
offenses during deliberations.  (People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1073;
People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 324-325.)
We find no error.  Nothing in the trial court’s instruction required the jury to
consider felony murder or premeditated murder before it considered the lesser
included offense of second degree murder.  The court also instructed the jury that
there was no significance to the order of the instructions and that each instruction
should be considered in light of all the others.  We perceive no reasonable
likelihood the jury felt constrained to proceed in the sequential manner defendant
suggests.  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 537.)
5.  Consciousness of guilt
Balestri testified that at a 1998 hearing defendant made a gesture with his
hand formed like a gun pointed at her and mouthed “pow, pow.”  The trial court
gave this instruction pertaining to Balestri’s testimony:  “If you find that defendant
attempted to suppress evidence against him in any manner, such as by intimidation
of a witness, such attempt may be considered by you as a circumstance tending to
show a consciousness of guilt. . . .  The intimidation referred to is the defendant’s
alleged gesture of simulating a gun with his hand which was made at a court
proceeding.”  (See CALJIC No. 2.06 (6th ed. 1996).)
Defendant contends the trial court’s specific reference to defendant’s alleged
gesture made the instruction improperly argumentative.  In People v. Johnson
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, we upheld a similar reference by the trial court to the
conduct of the defendant in that case, noting that the court, as here, had instructed
the jury that the defendant’s conduct was “not sufficient in itself to prove guilt”
and the weight and significance of the evidence was for the jury to determine.  (Id.
at p. 1235.)  We have previously noted the cautionary language in the instruction
36
benefits the defendant by admonishing the jury of the limited use it may make of
such potentially inculpatory evidence.  (See People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th
at p. 1224.)  Nothing in this case requires a different result.
6.  Reasonable doubt instruction
The trial court instructed the jury on reasonable doubt with some language of
its own formulation:  “Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:  It is not a mere
possible doubt because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon
moral evidence, that is, evidence which comes to you from the mouths of people,
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the case which after
the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.  [¶]  The law does not require
demonstration or that degree of proof which, excluding all possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty, for such degree of proof is rarely possible.  Moral
certainty only is required, which is that degree of proof which produces an abiding
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.”  (Italics added.)
Defendant argues that the italicized phrase “all possibility of error” rendered
the instruction infirm because it precluded the jury from acquitting defendant if it
had a “possible” doubt of his guilt.  He contends the instruction reduced the
prosecution’s standard of proof below proof beyond a reasonable doubt by telling
the jurors the possibility of defendant’s innocence could not constitute reasonable
doubt.
Defendant argues that in the instruction’s first paragraph the word “possible”
is treated as a synonym for “imaginary” in the phrase “possible or imaginary
37
doubt,” but in the second paragraph the word “possibility” in the phase “all
possibility of error” is used less restrictively.  Indeed, the language in the two
paragraphs differs, but the language of the second paragraph is merely a
reformulation of the first paragraph’s “possible or imaginary doubt,” language that
United States Supreme Court has described as imparting “that absolute certainty is
unattainable in matters relating to human affairs.”  (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511
U.S. 1, 13.)  We find no reasonable likelihood that the instruction used here led the
jury to believe that it could not acquit defendant even if it had a possible doubt as
to his guilt.
F.  Cumulative Prejudice
Defendant contends that even if we find no individual error in the guilt phase
to have been prejudicial, the cumulative effect of the alleged errors requires
reversal.  (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 844-845.)  Having identified
only a single evidentiary error, which we found not prejudicial, there are no
additional errors to accumulate.
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
Defendant raises numerous claims of error relating to the penalty phase and
to the validity of his death sentence.  We need not reach these claims, however,
given our finding that we must reverse the penalty of death because there was
prejudicial error during death-qualification voir dire of the jury.  For the same
reason we need not reach defendant’s additional claim of cumulative penalty
phase error.
38
V.  DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed as to the guilt verdicts and the special circumstance
finding, but it is reversed as to the sentence of death.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
39
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Cash
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S029460
Date Filed: July 25, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Alameda
Judge: Stanley P. Golde
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Mark D. Greenberg, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass,
Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and and John H. Deist, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
40
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Mark D. Greenberg
484 Lake Park Avenue
Oakland, CA  94610
(510) 452-3126
John H. Deist
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA  94102-3664
(415) 703-5855