Title: State v. Carroll

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Carroll (99-472); 171 Vt. 395; 765 A.2d 500

[Filed 01-Dec-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-472

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Washington Superior Court

John and Adrienne Carroll	                 September Term, 2000

     v.

Mobil Oil Corp.; Mary Heaslip; Merrill 
Transport Co., d/b/a J.A. Carmen Trucking
Co., Inc.; Melru Corp.; and Vermont 
Railway, Inc.

David A. Jenkins, J.

David W. Gartenstein of Downs Rachlin & Martin PLLC, Brattleboro, for 
  Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Shannon A. Bertrand of Reiber, Kenlan, Schwiebert, Hall & Facey, P.C., Rutland,
  for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse and Skoglund, JJ., and Davenport, Supr. J., and 
          Gibson, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       MORSE, J.   John and Adrienne Carroll appeal the Washington Superior
  Court's dismissal  of their third-party complaint against Melru
  Corporation.  The court determined that the Carrolls'  third-party
  complaint against Melru for contribution and indemnification pursuant to 10
  V.S.A.  § 6615(i) for clean-up costs incurred by the State related to
  hazardous materials located on the  Carrolls' property was precluded by a
  judgment in a previous action between the parties.  The 

 

  Carrolls argue that res judicata should not apply in this case to bar their
  present claim against Melru.  We agree and, therefore, reverse.

       In August 1997, the State of Vermont brought an action against the
  Carrolls under 10 V.S.A.  § 6615 for clean-up costs it had incurred in its
  ongoing efforts to remedy petroleum contamination  located on a piece of
  property owned by the Carrolls.  A fuel storage and distribution facility
  had  been operated on the property under several different owners starting
  in the early 1900s.  Having  been alerted to the petroleum contamination of
  the site, the State engaged in investigatory and  remedial activities
  starting in 1990.  As of October 1998, the State had incurred roughly
  $355,000 in  costs. 

       Under 10 V.S.A. § 6615(i), the Carrolls filed a third-party complaint
  against several  potentially responsible parties as third-party defendants,
  seeking contribution and indemnification for  their share of the clean-up
  costs.  The parties were Mobil Oil Corp., Mary Heaslip, Merrill Transport 
  Co., Vermont Railway, Inc., and Melru.  Melru thereafter brought a motion
  to dismiss the claim  against it, arguing that a judgment in its favor on a
  counterclaim brought by the Carrolls in a prior  action foreclosed the
  present claim. 

       Melru, which owned a parcel of property neighboring the Carrolls'
  property, had brought suit  against the Carrolls in 1992 seeking damages
  for petroleum contamination of its land stemming from  activity on the
  Carrolls' property.  The Carrolls filed a counterclaim for damages and
  equitable relief  based on an allegation that leakage from a 275-gallon
  fuel tank on Melru's property had caused  contamination of their property. 
  In 1995, after a bench trial, the Bennington Superior Court entered 
  judgment in favor of Melru on the Carrolls' counterclaim, determining that,
  although there  was a  contamination plume extending from Melru's property
  onto that of the Carrolls, the evidence of 

 

  causation linking the plume and the contamination on the Carrolls' property
  was "slight" and that the  Carrolls had failed to prove damages resulting
  from the contamination plume.

       After reviewing the earlier judgment and following a hearing, the
  trial court in this case  determined that the Carrolls' present claim was
  barred by res judicata.  The court dismissed the claim  against Melru,
  entering a final judgment in the case with respect to Melru only.  The
  Carrolls appeal  to this Court.

       Res judicata, or claim preclusion, generally bars the litigation of a
  claim if there exists an  earlier final judgment in which "the parties,
  subject matter and causes of action are identical or  substantially
  identical."  Russell v. Atkins, 165 Vt. 176, 179,