Title: CHARTER TWP OF NORTHVILLE V NORTHVILLE PUB SCHLS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 31, 2003 
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE, 
Plaintiff, 
and 
No. 120213 
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ;
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE,
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK,
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER
and SANDRA A. BULGER. 
Intervening-Plaintiffs,
Appellants, 
v 
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
___________________________________ 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
TAYLOR, J.  
We granted leave to appeal to determine whether local  
school districts, which are required to submit building plans  
to 
the 
state 
superintendent of public instruction for approval  
pursuant to MCL 380.1263(3), must also comply with township  
zoning 
and 
planning 
ordinances pursuant to the Township Zoning  
Act, MCL 125.271 et seq., and the township planning act, MCL  
125.321 et seq. 
We conclude that because the text of MCL  
380.1263(3) 
grants 
the 
state 
superintendent 
sole 
and 
exclusive  
jurisdiction over local school district construction and site  
plans, it immunizes school districts from local zoning  
ordinances affecting those functions.  However, a majority  
declines to address whether this is an impermissible  
delegation 
of 
legislative 
power 
because 
the 
state  
superintendent is not a party to this suit.  
Accordingly, a majority affirms in part and vacates in  
part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
I  
Before beginning construction of a new high school in  
Northville Township, the Northville Board of Education met  
with township officials to discuss the effect of local zoning  
ordinances on its site plan.  Although somewhat productive,  
conflicts remained and the township sought to enjoin  
2  
 
construction.1  The trial court denied a stay, but allowed  
nearby landowners to intervene as plaintiffs. 
After  
discovery, the township and intervening plaintiffs moved for  
summary disposition. The circuit court denied the motion on  
the basis of the text of MCL 380.1263(3), which grants sole  
and exclusive jurisdiction over school site plans to the state  
superintendent.  
The intervenors appealed, and the Court of Appeals  
affirmed, holding that the text of the revised school code,  
MCL 380.1263(3), conveys a clear intention to grant “sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction” over site plans to the state  
superintendent.  The Court also rejected intervenors’ claim  
that the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated legislative  
authority to the state superintendent, concluding that the  
statute 
provides 
sufficient 
construction 
and 
design  
standards.2  
We granted intervenors’ application for leave to appeal.3  
1After reviewing defendant’s site plans, the township 
provided 
over 
ninety 
zoning-related 
recommendations.  
Defendant school district addressed each concern and complied 
with all but a handful of recommendations.  
2Although the township also appealed separately, it then 
settled with the school district and that appeal was  
dismissed.  
3467 Mich 896 (2002).  
3  
  
II  
We review de novo decisions on summary-disposition  
motions. Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 614; 647 NW2d  
508 (2002).  Similarly, we review de novo questions of  
statutory interpretation. In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596  
NW2d 164 (1999).  
III  
To determine whether local school districts are subject  
to township zoning and planning ordinances, we must examine  
the authority of the school district to develop school  
construction and site plans, with the approval of the state  
superintendent, under MCL 380.1263(3).  
MCL 380.1263(3) states:  
The board of a school district shall not  
design or build a school building to be used for 
instructional or noninstructional school purposes 
or design and implement the design for a school 
site unless the design or construction is in 
compliance with [MCL 388.851 to 388.855a].  The  
superintendent of public instruction has sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval 
of plans and specifications for the construction, 
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings 
used for instructional or noninstructional school  
purposes and of site plans for those school  
buildings. [MCL 380.1263(3) (emphasis supplied).]  
Of importance is that this subsection vests design and  
construction oversight authority over the district’s decision  
in the state superintendent, who has “sole and exclusive  
jurisdiction . . . .”  
4  
 
 
 
 
 
The first step in construing a statute is to discern  
legislative intent.  To do this requires review of the  
statutory text adopted by the Legislature.  House Speaker v  
State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539  
(1993). If unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to  
have intended the meaning expressed, and the courts enforce  
that meaning without further judicial construction or  
interpretation. Grievance 
Administrator 
v 
Underwood, 
462 
Mich  
188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000).  These rules control the  
disposition of this matter.  
We determine that the statute here is unambiguous.  It  
grants sole and exclusive jurisdiction to the state  
superintendent to review and approve plans and specifications  
of school buildings and site plans for those buildings.  Thus,  
what the state superintendent approves is immune from the  
provisions of local zoning ordinances.  
In Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich 257, 264; 269 NW2d 139  
(1978), a case concerning the authority of the Department of  
Corrections to locate prisons without regard to local zoning,  
in which the department was given exclusive jurisdiction  
concerning 
location, 
we 
found 
the 
words 
“exclusive  
jurisdiction” indicative that the department had, not  
surprisingly, exclusive jurisdiction. 
In later cases,  
apprehensive that this may have suggested a need for  
5  
 
 
“talismanic words,” and that a court, not finding any, might  
conclude that the state agency was not immune from local  
zoning, we indicated in Burt Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources,  
459 Mich 659, 669; 593 NW2d 534 (1999), that even in the  
absence of talismanic words the state agency may be immune if  
the Legislature’s intent to immunize was otherwise clear. The  
thrust of this was that a court should look to the intent of  
the Legislature and not just do a word search.  We recently  
discussed this again in Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co,  
468 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2003). We now come full circle.  
The fact that the Legislature does not have to use talismanic  
words does not mean that, if it does, they are to be  
disregarded. That is, Burt Twp, et al., should correctly be  
understood as recognizing an enlarged target for the  
Legislature, but it should not be read to say a bull’s eye no  
longer counts.  With that in mind, as explained below, we  
conclude that “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” means, again  
we hope not surprisingly, sole and exclusive jurisdiction.  
We find the dictionary definitions dispositive. “Sole”  
means “[b]eing the only one; existing or functioning without  
another or others; only.” The American Heritage Dictionary of  
the English Language (1981). 
Similarly, “exclusive” is  
defined as “not divided or shared with others [or] single or  
independent; sole.” 
Id. 
The Legislature’s choice of  
6  
 
modifiers reflects its intention to unambiguously vest  
“jurisdiction,” 
i.e., 
“the 
general 
power 
to 
exercise  
authority,” in the state superintendent. 
Black’s Law  
Dictionary (7th ed). 
 This leaves to be determined the definition of “site  
plan.”
 The dictionary defines “site” as “The place where  
something was, is, or is to be located,” The American Heritage  
Dictionary of the English Language (1982), or similarly,  
“[T]he area or exact plot of ground on which anything is, has  
been, or is to be located . . . .”  Random House Webster’s  
College Dictionary (1997). “Plan” is defined as “A detailed  
scheme, program, or method worked out beforehand for the  
accomplishment of an object . . . . A proposed or tentative  
project or goal . . . .”  The American Heritage Dictionary of  
the English Language (1982). Thus, it is apparent that the  
meaning of “site plan,” with no qualifying modifiers, is the  
plan for everything on the property, i.e., the entire project.  
This definition is consistent not only with the common  
understanding of the phrase but also with the Legislature’s  
use of the term “site plan” in both the Township Zoning Act  
and the township planning act.  The Township Zoning Act states  
that the proposal for the individual “site plan” of a property  
owner or user must be “in compliance with local ordinances and  
state and federal statutes.”  MCL 125.286e(1). If it is, the  
7  
township zoning authorities have the duty to approve it.  
Similarly, in the township planning act, the site plan must  
“comply with the [township’s basic development] plan adopted  
under this section.” MCL 125.326(4). If the site plan does  
comply, it is to be approved by the planning authorities.  
Thus, in both these acts the site plan, i.e., what is to be  
undertaken on the site, is presented to the appropriate zoning  
and 
planning 
authorities and, if consistent with the ordinance  
and plan, it is to be approved.  
In a fashion similar to the procedure followed by  
individuals who wish to have their site plans approved by the  
zoning and planning authorities discussed above, the school  
district, under MCL 380.1263(3), must present its site plan to  
the state superintendent for approval. Just as the township  
zoning authorities have duties to accept or reject the  
individual homeowner’s site plan, so the state superintendent  
has similar duties to “review and approv[e]” the school  
district’s site plans.  
This understanding of MCL 380.1263(3) makes clear that  
the state superintendent’s power is unaffected by any zoning  
or planning rules or ordinances regarding what goes on within  
the site itself.  While this may appear to be an extensive  
grant of authority, it is, in our view, no more so than, and  
indeed of a piece with, the authority given to the ultimate  
8  
reviewing authorities by the Township Zoning Act and the  
township planning act.  
We also note that this interpretation is in harmony with  
the general structure of MCL 380.1263(3), in which the state  
superintendent is given distinct duties regarding both  
construction 
and 
site plans.  Because the state superintendent  
must approve construction plans and, as a separate matter,  
approve site plans, we are led to the conclusion that the  
Legislature considered these two types of plans as not being  
identical.  Thus, we conclude that it was the Legislature’s  
view that “site plans” would not be coterminous with  
“construction plans.”  Our interpretation of the statute is  
consistent with this.  
Further, 
it 
is 
important that neither the Township Zoning  
Act nor the township planning act by its terms requires school  
district compliance with zoning ordinances.  Intervening  
plaintiffs correctly note that MCL 125.273 and 125.327(2)(a)  
clarify that township zoning ordinances and plans should be  
drafted to accommodate a community’s educational needs.  
However, it does not necessarily follow that local school  
districts must comply with all township land-use controls  
prescribed by ordinance.4  
4Intervening 
plaintiffs 
also 
assert 
that 
the 
Legislature, 
by not expressly exempting school districts from zoning 
(continued...) 
9  
 
Intervenors 
further 
argue 
that 
“site 
plans” 
cannot 
extend  
beyond the construction of school buildings because the state  
superintendent’s 
agents testified in the matter that they have  
no published standards for site design and do not review site  
plans for land-use matters. This argument has no merit. The  
purported failure to act on the part of the state  
superintendent’s 
agents 
is 
not 
indicative 
of 
the 
Legislature’s  
intent and cannot control the meaning of the statutes at  
issue.  The intervenors’ claim in this regard would be better  
understood as precipitating challenges to the administration  
of the statute rather than its meaning.  
After considering all the above arguments and applying  
Dearden, it is our view that the Legislature clearly evidenced  
an intention to grant “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over  
school 
construction 
and 
site 
plans 
to 
the 
state  
superintendent, thereby immunizing local districts from  
township zoning ordinances as they affect the content of the  
site plan itself.  MCL 380.1263(3). Because nothing in either  
(...continued)
regulations, as it had regarding certain gas and oil  
operations and electric transmission lines, should be held to 
have not intended to exempt school districts from zoning.  MCL  
125.271(1).  However, as we noted in Pittsfield Charter Twp v  
Washtenaw Co, slip op at 13, this reads too much into these 
existing exceptions, which, by the nature and timing of their 
enactment, were the Legislature’s attempt to coordinate other 
statutes with the Township Zoning Act, not to identify the 
only possible exceptions to a township’s zoning authority.  
10  
the Township Zoning Act or the township planning act suggests  
an intent to usurp the state superintendent’s “sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction” over design, construction, and siting  
requirements, 
we 
must conclude that local school districts for  
their site plans must seek only the state superintendent’s  
approval and need not have the approval of township zoning and  
planning authorities.  
IV  
Intervening plaintiffs also argue that this act is  
unconstitutional because it is an impermissible delegation of  
legislative power to the state superintendent.  For us to  
address whether this statute effects an impermissible  
delegation of legislative authority, it would have been  
necessary for the state superintendent to have been joined as  
a party pursuant to MCR 2.205(A). Because this did not take  
place, the issue is not properly before us and we decline to  
address the matter further.  Similarly, the matter was not  
properly presented to the Court of Appeals and that Court’s  
opinion, to the extent that it considered this issue, must be  
vacated.  
V  
As we read Justice Cavanagh’s opinion, he agrees with us  
that MCL 380.1263(3) granted the state superintendent  
authority 
superseding 
township 
zoning 
ordinances 
for 
what 
goes  
11  
on within the site itself.  He would go further however,  
understanding the statute to mean that  
there 
is 
no 
reason 
to 
presume 
the 
state  
superintendent’s review power over local school 
districts is necessarily limited to activities 
contained within the site itself. (Post at 4).  
Thus, he concludes that  
it would be inappropriate to suggest that, even in 
some limited fashion local school districts should  
be subject to township zoning authorities.  (Post  
at 5).  
Justice 
Weaver 
concurs with our approach to the authority  
of the superintendent stating that  
the text of MCL 380.1263(3) evidences a legislative 
intent to subject local school districts to the 
authority 
of 
the 
superintendent 
of 
public 
instruction, 
thus 
immunizing 
districts 
from  
township zoning ordinances. (Post at 2).  
Thus a clear majority of the Court agrees that the  
authority of the state superintendent pursuant to MCL  
380.1263(3) is at least as broad as set forth in this opinion.  
Justice Markman disagrees with us. 
Under Justice  
Markman’s interpretation of MCL 380.1263(3) the words “sole  
and 
exclusive 
jurisdiction” 
do 
not 
convey 
that 
the  
jurisdiction is sole and exclusive.  His view, we believe, is  
inconsistent with the Legislature’s grant of “sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval” of the  
site plans as well as, were it the majority, an effective  
overruling of the line of cases commencing with Dearden and  
12  
 
  
including Burt Twp, Byrne v Michigan, 463 Mich 652; 624 NW2d  
906 (2001), and most recently, Pittsfield Twp.5  
As for plaintiffs’ claim that MCL 380.1263(3) is  
unconstitutional because it is an inappropriate delegation of  
legislative power to the state superintendent, 
Justice  
Markman, while otherwise dissenting as we have mentioned,  
concurs with our position that to reach this issue the state  
superintendent should have been joined as a party.  Justice  
Cavanagh, in his concurrence, only briefly addresses this  
issue without stating a preference for its resolution.  
5Moreover, with respect to Justice Markman’s concern that 
unfortunate 
consequences 
may 
flow 
from 
the 
state  
superintendent having such power, we do not share his 
apprehensions.  Regarding the prospect of a school district 
recommending, and the state superintendent approving, plans 
that are in conflict with  a community’s interests, it is, of 
course, possible, but seems unlikely when one recalls that the 
local school district, the generator of the site plan, is 
controlled by a locally elected board.  We believe they, as 
other unnamed elected officials in whom Justice Markman seems  
to have more confidence, can be expected to be sensitive to 
the local community interests.  If they are not, there are the 
usual political remedies.  In any event, assuming this is 
insufficiently reassuring, we fail to see why, as a general 
matter, these elected officials would be inherently less 
sensitive to local concerns than would be an appointive (that 
is, unelected) zoning board or planning commission.  Further, 
reinforcing our conclusion in this regard is the fact that the 
state superintendent serves at the pleasure of yet another 
elected body, the State Board of Education.  Thus, we believe 
the statute, as we have construed it, will produce fewer 
discordant outcomes with local wishes than can be expected 
under Justice Markman’s approach. 
If, however, this is not 
the case, it is within the Legislature’s power to simply 
change the process to have ultimate authority rest with 
appointed zoning boards and planning authorities.  
13  
 
Justice Weaver, however, reaches the delegation question and  
finds no improper delegation. 
Accordingly, with others  
joining this plurality, a clear majority of the Court agrees  
that the failure to join the state superintendent as a party  
precludes us from resolving the claim that MCL 380.1263(3) is  
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.  
VI  
In the present case, the Legislature vested “sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction” over school construction and site  
plans in the state superintendent of public instruction, who  
has the approval authority for school construction and site  
plans submitted by the local school districts. 
This  
unambiguous language, when viewed in light of the zoning  
authority granted to townships in the township zoning and  
planning acts, indicates an intention to immunize school  
districts from local ordinances as they affect the content of  
a school site plan.  Further, the issue of delegation of  
legislative authority to the state superintendent is not  
properly before us, and a majority declines to consider it.  
For these reasons, with others joining this plurality, the  
Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing  
the intervening plaintiffs’ appeal after the denial of their  
motion for summary disposition and the Court vacates those  
portions of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that address  
14  
the issue of delegation of legislative authority to the state  
superintendent of public instruction.  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr  
15  
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,  
Plaintiff,  
and 
No. 120213  
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ; 
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC 
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK 
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID 
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN 
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM 
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH 
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE, 
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK 
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN 
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY 
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK, 
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER 
and SANDRA A. BULGER.  
Intervening-Plaintiffs, 
Appellants,  
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE  
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
I agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that an  
evaluation of MCL 380.1263(3)1 indicates a legislative intent  
to subject local school districts to the authority of the  
state superintendent, thereby immunizing districts from  
township zoning ordinances.  However, I must concur in the  
result only.  
Above all, I am troubled by the lead opinion’s suggestion  
that the state superintendent’s power to review a local school  
district’s site plan is limited to “what goes on within the  
site itself.”  Ante at 7. In drafting MCL 380.1263(3), the  
Legislature 
indicated 
no 
such 
restriction 
on 
the  
superintendent’s authority.  As the lead opinion clearly  
states, the statute provides the state superintendent with  
“sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over “site plans.” MCL  
380.1263(3).  
This 
interpretation accords with the events leading up to  
the statute’s revision.  In response to several Court of  
1 Portions of the school construction code, MCL 388.851  
et seq., have been revised by 2002 PA 628. Without amending 
the grant in MCL 380.1263(3) of “sole and exclusive  
jurisdiction over . . . site plans” to the superintendent of 
public 
instruction, 
the act transfers the authority to enforce 
construction codes from one state entity, the superintendent, 
to the Department of Consumer and Industry Services.  Because  
this case arose before 2002 PA 628 was enacted, we need not 
decide whether the revisions alter the scope of the  
superintendent’s authority.  
2  
 
Appeals cases mandating local school district compliance with  
township ordinances,2 the Legislature amended subsection  
1263(3) and extended state oversight authority to include  
“site plans for those school buildings.”  1990 PA 159.  
Interpreting the 1990 amendment in a manner that gives a  
distinct meaning to “site plans” requires an acknowledgment  
that “site plans” contain data other than that strictly  
necessary for “the construction of . . . school buildings  
. . . .”  
Further, although the term “site plans” is not defined in  
the revised school code, the Legislature’s practice of  
employing the term in zoning statutes suggests its utility as  
a tool to measure compliance with land-use regulations.3  
2 Lutheran High School Ass’n v Farmington Hills, 146 Mich  
App 641; 381 NW2d 417 (1985) (subjecting private school to 
local zoning ordinances); Cody Park Ass’n v Royal Oak School  
Dist, 116 Mich App 103; 321 NW2d 855 (1982) (holding that the 
power of a school district to acquire property did not exempt 
it from local zoning ordinances).  
3 MCL 125.286e(1) provides:  
As used in this section, "site plan" includes 
the documents and drawings required by the zoning 
ordinance to insure that a proposed land use or 
activity is in compliance with local ordinances and 
state and federal statutes.  
See also MCL 125.326.  
Unlike the lead opinion, I disagree that the American 
Heritage Dictionary should be used to define “site plan.”  As  
noted above, the phrase is a term of art in the fields of, 
inter alia, zoning, construction, and planning, i.e., a “site 
(continued...)  
3  
 
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the superintendent’s  
exclusive jurisdiction over site plans would include the  
authority to review and approve land-use controls for the  
promotion of community health, safety, and welfare.  See,  
e.g., MCL 125.271(1) (“the township board of an organized  
township in this state may provide by zoning ordinance . . .  
to promote public health, safety, and welfare.”).  Therefore,  
while we require no “talismanic words,” the legislative grant  
of “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” unambiguously indicates  
a legislative intent to vest comprehensive and undivided  
control over both school construction plans and site plans in  
the state superintendent, which includes land-use oversight  
authority.  From this broad grant of power, there is no reason  
to presume the state superintendent’s review power over local  
school districts is necessarily limited to activities  
contained within the site itself.  
In 
this 
case, 
for example, plaintiff requested a “traffic  
impact study to evaluate peak hour movement.”  Certainly, the  
relevant traffic patterns with which the township was  
3(...continued) 
plan” refers to the specifications required for the task 
assigned.  See MCL 8.3a (“technical words and phrases . . . 
shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar 
and appropriate meaning”). See also Production Credit Ass’n  
of Lansing v Dep’t of Treasury, 404 Mich 301, 312; 273 NW2d 10 
(1978) (“terms of art” should be interpreted “in accordance 
with the experience and understanding of those who would be 
expected to use and interpret the act”).  
4  
concerned 
included 
activities 
not 
contained 
exclusively 
within  
the site itself.  Although accommodations for such concerns  
would normally be (and were) included within the site plan, §  
1263(3) indicates no particular land-based limit to the state  
superintendent’s oversight authority, as the lead opinion  
suggests.  Rather, the state superintendent has “sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction” over “site plans,” which reasonably  
includes the authority to review land-use controls designed  
for zoning purposes. 
MCL 380.1263(3). 
Given that this  
textual indicator of legislative intent, it would be  
inappropriate to suggest that, even in some limited fashion,  
local school districts should be subject to township zoning  
authorities.  
Further, the lead opinion comments upon the “standards”  
to which the state superintendent must submit itself and the  
adequacy with which state agents are able to enforce those  
standards in part III, ante at 9, but continues by refusing to  
reach the merits of plaintiff’s delegation-of-power claim in  
part IV. 
Because of the lead opinion’s position regarding  
plaintiff’s failure to join the superintendent as a party and  
its refusal to rule on the adequacy of the standards delegated  
by the Legislature, I would, had I chosen to join the lead  
opinion’s 
position, 
refrain 
from 
all 
unnecessary 
commentary 
in  
part III.  
5  
 
In sum, while I agree that Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich  
257; 269 NW2d 139 (1978), requires the rejection of  
plaintiffs’ claim in light of the “sole and exclusive  
authority” granted to the state superintendent in MCL  
380.1263(3), I respectfully concur in the result only for the  
reasons noted above.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
6  
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,  
Plaintiff,  
and 
No. 120213  
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ; 
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC 
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK 
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID 
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN 
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM 
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH 
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE, 
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK 
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN 
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY 
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK, 
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER 
and SANDRA A. BULGER.  
Intervening-Plaintiffs, 
Appellants,  
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE  
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in result).  
I concur in the result of the lead opinion because the  
text of MCL 380.1263(3) evidences a legislative intent to  
subject local school districts to the authority of the state  
superintendent 
of 
public 
instruction, 
thus 
immunizing  
districts from township zoning ordinances.1  This conclusion  
is consistent with the general understanding of the term “site  
plan,” as that term is used in the Township Zoning Act, MCL  
125.271 et seq.,2 as well as the general understanding of the  
phrase “sole and exclusive jurisdiction.”  
I write separately because not persuasive is the lead  
opinion‘s position that it is “necessary” to join the state  
1 MCL 380.1263(3) provides:  
The board of a school district shall not  
design or build a school building to be used for 
instructional or noninstructional school purposes 
or design and implement the design for a school 
site unless the design or construction is in 
compliance with [MCL 388.851 to 388.855a].  The  
superintendent of public instruction has sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval  
of plans and specifications for the construction,  
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings  
used for instructional or noninstructional school  
purposes and of site plans for those school  
buildings. [Emphasis added.]  
2 The Township Zoning Act provides:  
As used in this section, “site plan” includes 
the documents and drawings required by the zoning 
ordinance to insure that a proposed land use or 
activity is in compliance with local ordinances and 
state and federal statutes. [MCL 125.286e(1).]  
2  
 
 
superintendent as a party before addressing the intervening  
plaintiffs’ argument concerning the improper delegation of  
legislative authority.3
 Rather, applying the guidelines  
articulated in Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich  
299; 240 NW2d 206 (1976),4 I would conclude that the act does  
3 MCR 2.205(A) states that “persons having such interests 
in the subject matter of an action that their presence in the 
action is essential to permit the court to render complete 
relief must be made parties . . . .”  The superintendent’s 
presence is not essential to permit the Court to render 
complete relief on the issue concerning the constitutionality 
of the statute, where the conclusion is that the statute is 
constitutional and the superintendent would not be arguing 
against the constitutionality of the statute. Additionally, 
I note that none of the parties moved to join the  
superintendent at any stage of the proceedings, and the 
Attorney General declined to file a brief amicus curiae on the 
superintendent’s 
behalf, 
despite 
this 
Court’s 
invitation 
to 
do 
so. This Court’s grant order stated:  
Leave to file briefs amici curiae is granted. 
The Attorney General is invited to file a brief 
amicus curiae on behalf of the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction. [467 Mich 896 (2002).]  
Moreover, were the superintendent a party whose presence 
was essential under MCR 2.205, MCR 2.207 authorizes the Court 
to add parties at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. 
2 Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice, p 97.  See  
also Henkel v Henkel, 282 Mich 473, 488; 276 NW 522 (1937) 
(“And, ordinarily, if the proper parties plaintiff are not 
joined, this court will direct the joinder of the proper 
parties plaintiff on appeal.” [Citations omitted.]).  
4 The rule concerning delegation states:  
“The legislature cannot delegate its power to 
make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a 
power to determine some fact or state of things 
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its 
own action depend.  To deny this would be to stop 
the wheels of government.” [Seaman, supra at 308, 
(continued...)  
3  
 
 
not constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative  
authority because the Revised School Code provides sufficient  
standards to guide the superintendent’s discretion.  
For these reasons, I concur in the result of the lead  
opinion.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
4(...continued) 
quoting Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa 491, 498-499 (1873).]  
Seaman offers the following criteria for determining 
whether  a statute provides sufficient standards: (1) the act 
in question must be read as a whole when determining whether 
the 
provision 
at 
issue provides sufficient standards, (2) “the 
standard should be ‘as reasonably precise as the subject 
matter requires or permits’”, (quoting Osius v St Clair  
Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25 [1956])and (3) when 
possible, the statute must be construed in a manner that 
renders it valid rather than invalid. Id. at 309.   
4  
 
 
                                          
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,  
Plaintiff,  
and 
No. 120213  
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ; 
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC 
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK 
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID 
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN 
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM 
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH 
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE, 
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK 
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN 
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY 
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK, 
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER 
and SANDRA A. BULGER,  
Intervening-Plaintiffs, 
Appellants,  
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE  
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
 
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  A majority of the Court affirms  
in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that  
MCL 380.1263(3) evidences a legislative intent to immunize  
school districts from local zoning ordinances that affect the  
content of school site plans.  I disagree with the majority’s  
conclusion that the language in this statute according the  
state superintendent of public instruction (superintendent)  
“sole and exclusive jurisdiction” to review and approve “site  
plans” for school buildings permits the superintendent to  
determine what may be placed on a site without regard to local  
zoning ordinances.  Because, in my judgment, there is no clear  
legislative intent in MCL 380.1263(3) to exempt school  
districts from local zoning ordinances, I would reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
I. THE DEARDEN TEST AND RELEVANT CASES  
As this Court indicated in Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich  
257, 264; 269 NW2d 139 (1978), “legislative intent, where it  
can be discerned, is the test for determining whether a  
governmental unit is immune from the provisions of local  
zoning ordinances.”  In Dearden, this Court considered a  
statute granting the Department of Corrections “exclusive  
jurisdiction” over penal institutions, MCL 791.204, and  
determined 
that 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
demonstrated 
a  
2  
legislative 
intent 
to grant the department immunity from local  
zoning ordinances in the establishment of state penal  
institutions. Dearden, supra at 265-267.  
Subsequently, in Burt Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources,  
459 Mich 659; 593 NW2d 534 (1999), this Court concluded that  
the Department of Natural Resources was required to comply  
with a local zoning ordinance when constructing a public boat  
launch.  Although the Legislature granted the department  
“power and jurisdiction over the management, control, and  
disposition of all land under the public domain, except for  
those lands . . . that are managed by other state agencies,”  
MCL 324.503(1), other statutes granted the township extensive  
regulatory authority over land use, including waterfront land  
use.  We noted that the burden was on the department to  
demonstrate a “clear legislative intent” to exempt the  
department from the township’s zoning ordinances.  Nothing in  
the statutes in that case indicated a “clear expression” of  
legislative 
intent to 
grant 
the 
department 
exclusive  
jurisdiction or to exempt the department from the township’s  
zoning ordinance. Burt Twp, supra at 668.  
More recently, in Byrne v Michigan, 463 Mich 652, 660-61;  
624 NW2d 906 (2001), this Court concluded that the Legislature  
clearly expressed its intent to grant the Michigan State  
Police exclusive authority, not subject to any local zoning  
3  
ordinances, 
over 
the 
siting 
and 
construction 
of 
a  
communications tower. 
The statute at issue there, MCL  
28.282(2), specifically required that the local zoning  
authority be notified of the site selected and set out a  
procedure to be followed in the event that the selected site  
failed to comply with local zoning, with the result that if  
any dispute could not be resolved, the department could  
proceed with construction.1  Thus, the statute amounted to a  
“clear expression” of the Legislature’s intent to invest the  
state police with full authority over the construction of the  
tower. Id. at 661.  
II. ANALYSIS  
For the following reasons, which will be discussed in  
more detail below, I do not believe that MCL 380.1263(3)  
1 MCL 28.282(2) provides:  
In 
siting 
the 
buildings 
and 
equipment 
necessary to implement the Michigan public safety 
communications 
system, 
the 
director 
of 
the  
department of state police shall locate the system, 
a local unit of government with zoning authority 
shall be notified of a site selected in their  
jurisdiction and the requirements necessary for a 
site. If the selected site does not comply with 
zoning, the local unit shall have 30 days from the 
date of notification to grant a special use permit 
or propose an equivalent site. If the local unit 
does not grant a special use permit within the 30 
day period, or a proposed alternate site does not 
meet the siting requirements, the department may 
proceed with construction.  
4  
 
 
evidences a legislative intent, much less a “clear”  
legislative intent, Burt, supra at 666, to equate the state  
superintendent’s authority over school site plans with the  
general power to act as a statewide zoning official. First,  
authority over site plans is wholly distinct from authority  
over zoning and land-use matters.  Second, MCL 380.1263(3)  
fails to reference zoning, an inexplicable failure if the  
purpose of this provision was to confer zoning authority upon  
a public official.  Third, the Township Zoning Act, MCL  
125.321 et seq., sets forth a contrary understanding of the  
zoning and land-use authority of local officials. 
As a  
result, under the test set out in Dearden, in which this Court  
declined to adopt a rule that state agencies have inherent  
immunity from local zoning ordinances, there is no evidence of  
a “clear legislative intent,” Burt, supra at 666, to provide  
the superintendent with zoning authority and thereby immunize  
school districts from township zoning ordinances.  
A. SITE PLAN AUTHORITY DISTINCT FROM ZONING AUTHORITY  
Determining whether the Legislature intended to exempt  
local school districts from township zoning affecting site  
plans for schools requires an examination of the relevant  
portion of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.1263(3), which  
provides:  
The board of a school district shall not  
design or build a school building to be used for  
5  
 
instructional or noninstructional school purposes 
or design and implement the design for a school 
site unless the design or construction is in 
compliance with [MCL 388.851 to 388.855a, the 
construction of school buildings act]. 
The  
superintendent of public instruction has sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval 
of plans and specifications for the construction, 
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings 
used for instructional or noninstructional school  
purposes and of site plans for those school  
buildings.  
As the lead opinion recognizes, this provision requires local  
school boards to comply with the construction of school  
buildings act and grants the state superintendent “sole and  
exclusive jurisdiction” to review and approve “plans and  
specifications for the construction, reconstruction, or  
remodeling of school buildings” and “site plans for those  
school buildings.”  
I agree with the lead opinion that the references in MCL  
380.1263(3) 
to 
both 
construction plans and site plans indicate  
that the Legislature viewed site plans as meaning something  
different from construction plans. Like the lead opinion, I  
believe that a site plan essentially comprises “the plan for  
everything on the property.”  Ante at 6. As the lead opinion  
acknowledges, a site plan reflects “what is to be undertaken  
on the site,” ante at 7, and amounts to a proposal. This is  
supported by the description of site plans given in MCL  
125.286e(1):  
As used in this section, “site plan” includes  
6  
  
 
the documents and drawings required by the zoning 
ordinance to insure that a proposed land use or  
activity is in compliance with local ordinances and 
state and federal statutes. [Emphasis added.2]  
Site plans thus can be reasonably understood as consisting of  
written 
and 
illustrative documents that set forth the proposed  
layout of a site and that are used to ensure compliance with  
local zoning regulations.  
Although I do not disagree with the lead opinion’s  
general characterization of site plans, I disagree with its  
conclusion 
that 
the 
superintendent’s 
authority 
over 
site 
plans  
is “unaffected by any zoning or planning rules or ordinances  
regarding what goes on within the site itself.” Ante at 10.  
As the lead opinion recognizes, a “plan” is a proposal that is  
tentative in nature and is not, by definition, a final  
decision. Ante at 6. Recognizing this meaning, it is clear,  
in 
my 
judgment, 
that 
the 
authority 
granted 
to 
the  
superintendent 
in 
MCL 380.1263(3) relates only to the approval  
of proposals for what might be built, or what the school  
district would like to have built, on the school site, and is  
not the equivalent of authority to undertake final zoning or  
2 See also the township planning act, MCL 125.326(4):  
After adoption of a plan under this section, a 
site plan for a property located in the plan area 
that is required to be submitted under section 16e 
of the township zoning act [MCL 125.286e] shall 
comply with the plan adopted under this act.  
7  
 
land-use decisions.  The lead opinion, however, construes MCL  
380.1263(3), as empowering the superintendent to effect final  
zoning and land-use decisions regarding the placement of  
buildings and facilities on school sites.  In contrast, I  
believe that the superintendent’s authority extends under the  
statute only to the final review and approval of the proposed  
layout—that is the “site plan”—for the school building. The  
statute authorizes the superintendent to finally review and  
approve the plan for the school site. 
However, local  
authorities, 
consistently 
with 
MCL 
125.286e(1), 
are 
authorized  
to utilize the site plan as a means for ensuring  that the  
proposed land use by the superintendent complies with local  
zoning ordinances.3  
The 
superintendent’s authority over site plans is not the  
equivalent of zoning or land-use authority, but it is an  
authority in support of, an authority that informs, the  
exercise of zoning authority by local officials.  A site plan  
is a tool that ensures compliance with zoning; it is not  
merely substitute nomenclature for describing the zoning and  
3 To illustrate this point, consider the situation of an 
individual planning to build a new house.  Although the 
individual 
might 
have “sole and exclusive” authority to review 
and approve a site plan for the house, as between the 
individual and the builder and neighbors, this does not mean 
that the site plan is exempt from applicable local zoning 
ordinances. Local zoning authorities are still empowered to 
examine the site plan in order to ensure that the proposed use 
complies with local zoning requirements.  
8  
 
  
 
land-use processes.4  
B. ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO ZONING  
It is noteworthy that MCL 380.1263(3) is not a zoning or  
land-use statute at all and nowhere does it refer to zoning or  
land-use authority.  Rather, this provision is located within  
Part 16 of the Revised School Code, which concerns the general  
powers and duties of boards of education.  As discussed in the  
preceding subsection, the statute grants the superintendent  
sole and exclusive jurisdiction to review and approve site  
plans for school buildings, but nowhere empowers the  
superintendent to make final zoning or land-use decisions,  
even as they relate to school site plans.  This omission is  
particularly significant in light of the level of specificity  
with 
which 
the 
provision 
otherwise 
describes 
the  
superintendent’s jurisdiction.  Under MCL 380.1263(3), the  
superintendent possesses jurisdiction over “plans” and  
“specifications” 
for 
the 
“construction,” 
the 
“reconstruction,”  
and the “remodeling” of schools, as well as for the “site  
4 The lead opinion’s assertion that I view the township’s 
authority 
under 
MCL 
380.1263(3), as “not only concurrent with, 
but also superior to” the superintendent’s authority, ante at  
11, misapprehends this dissent.  Rather, the respective 
authorities of these entities are simply different. That the  
President, for example, may veto legislation enacted by the 
Congress does not make his veto authority either “concurrent” 
with or “superior” to the legislative authority of the 
Congress. It is simply a different authority whose exercise 
may have an effect on the authority of the Congress.  
9  
 
 
plans,” of certain school buildings.  However, nowhere in this  
provision is there any mention of jurisdiction concerning  
zoning or land-use planning, both of which are subject to  
regulation under entirely separate statutes. This is hardly  
surprising, considering that subsection 1263(3) is part of a  
school code and not a part of a zoning or land-use statute.5  
Despite the lack of any statutory reference to zoning or  
land-use authority, the lead opinion construes subsection  
1263(3) as replacing the authority of local officials in this  
realm with that of the superintendent.  It reaches this  
conclusion with little substantive analysis, instead simply  
assuming that the Legislature, by granting the superintendent  
certain enumerated powers, intended to grant him unenumerated  
powers as well.6  Yet, in my judgment, it is difficult to  
conceive that the Legislature would have conferred zoning and  
land-use 
authority 
upon 
the 
superintendent 
by 
implication, 
and  
that it would have set forth with specificity an enumeration  
5 Given its placement in Michigan statutory law, it is 
quite likely that the legislative intention underlying MCL 
380.1263(3) was merely to recognize the superintendent as the 
final authority within the school system empowered to review 
and approve construction plans and site plans for school 
buildings.  
6 
 This is reflected in part by the lead opinion’s 
apparent conclusion that the state superintendent may preempt 
some local zoning and land-use regulations, but not others. 
Absent any reference to zoning or land-use authority in the 
statute, it is hard to understand how the lead opinion draws 
a distinction between zoning that is preempted and zoning that 
is not preempted.  
10  
 
 
 
of lesser authorities and yet intended to grant a greater  
authority despite failing to specify that greater authority.  
Further, it is difficult to conceive that the Legislature  
would have intended to deprive communities throughout the  
state of one of their most fundamental powers, the power to  
zone and regulate land use, through such indirection.7  In the  
absence of any indication in MCL 380.1263(3), clear or  
otherwise, that the superintendent is not required to comply  
with local zoning and land-use regulations, I believe that  
such compliance is required.  There is nothing in that statute  
that authorizes the superintendent to act in disregard of the  
zoning and land-use decisions made by local communities  
throughout this state.  
C. TOWNSHIP ZONING ACT  
The lead opinion’s interpretation of MCL 380.1263(3) is  
further refuted by the Township Zoning Act, pursuant to which  
township boards are authorized to regulate in a very broad  
7 The Legislature has hardly shown itself incapable of, 
or disinclined to, expressly use “zoning” when that was its 
intention.  A simple word check of the Michigan statutory law 
indicates that the Legislature has used the term on at least 
several hundred occasions when it wished to reference such  
authority.
 Yet, in the view of the lead opinion, the 
Legislature, 
through 
MCL 
380.1263(3), 
conferred 
authority 
over 
zoning upon an unelected state official, in derogation of the 
authority possessed by the people of communities throughout 
the state, in a realm (i.e., schooling) that likely would 
effect every one of these communities, without happening to 
mention “zoning.”  
11  
manner land uses and development within their boundaries,  
including regulation of the location and size of buildings.8  
Moreover, MCL 125.271 specifically allows townships “to  
facilitate adequate and efficient provision for . . .  
education . . . .” Similarly, MCL 125.273 provides:  
The zoning ordinance shall be based upon a 
plan designed to . . . facilitate adequate  
8 With regard to land-use regulation by townships, MCL 
125.271(1) states:  
The township board of an organized township in 
this state may provide by zoning ordinance for the 
regulation 
of 
land 
development 
and 
the  
establishment of districts . . . which regulate the 
use of land and structures; to meet the needs of 
the state's citizens for food, fiber, energy, and 
other natural resources, places of residence, 
recreation, industry, trade, service, and other 
uses of land; to insure that use of the land shall 
be 
situated 
in 
appropriate 
locations 
and  
relationships; 
to 
limit 
the 
inappropriate 
overcrowding of land and congestion of population, 
transportation 
systems, 
and 
other 
public 
facilities; to facilitate adequate and efficient 
provision 
for 
transportation 
systems, 
sewage 
disposal, water, energy, education, recreation, and 
other public service and facility requirements; and 
to promote public health, safety, and welfare 
. . . . The township board of an organized township 
may use this act to provide by ordinance for the 
regulation of land development . . . . Ordinances 
regulating land development may also be adopted 
designating or limiting the location, the height, 
number 
of 
stories, 
and 
size 
of 
dwellings, 
buildings, and structures that may be erected or 
altered . . . , and the specific uses for which 
dwellings, buildings, and structures . . . , may be 
erected or altered; the area of yards, courts, and 
other open spaces, and the sanitary, safety, and 
protective measures that shall be required for the 
dwellings, buildings, and structures . . . .  
12  
 
 
 
provision for a system of transportation, sewage 
disposal, 
safe 
and 
adequate 
water 
supply, 
education, 
recreation, 
and 
other 
public 
requirements . . . .  
These provisions generally recognize the zoning and land-use  
authority of townships, as well as the specific role of zoning  
and land-use authority in promoting a system of education.  
Because the Legislature has authorized township boards to  
comprehensively regulate land use, and has specifically  
authorized townships to enact zoning ordinances in order to  
provide for the area’s education requirements, I do not  
believe that the superintendent’s authority under MCL  
380.1263(3) can reasonably be construed to displace all local  
zoning and land-use ordinances that, in any way, “affect”  
school site plans.  The breadth of the Township Zoning Act is  
inconsistent with the notion that the Legislature would have  
compromised this authority through statutory silence and  
indirection.  
Given the integrated and coordinated nature of most  
zoning and land-use plans, in which the whole is affected by  
the part, the conferral of authority upon the superintendent  
to 
disregard 
local 
regulations 
concerning 
school 
sites 
carries  
with it a potential effect reaching far beyond these sites.  
In communities throughout the state, the most carefully  
considered and finely coordinated zoning and land-use plan  
will now potentially be subject to the disruptiveness of a  
13  
 
 
 
 
contrary 
zoning 
or 
land-use 
decision 
made 
by 
the  
superintendent.
 Moreover, such a decision will be one  
undertaken by an unelected official who, almost certainly,  
will 
possess 
less 
familiarity with the needs and circumstances  
of these communities, and who will be less responsive to the  
people of these communities, than their own local officials.  
III. APPLICATION OF THE DEARDEN TEST  
In Dearden, supra at 265, the statute at issue granted  
the Department of Corrections “exclusive jurisdiction” over  
penal institutions.  The statute indicated that it was  
intended to repeal other provisions of law that were  
inconsistent 
with 
the 
department’s 
administration 
of 
the 
penal  
system and indicated that the Michigan Corrections Commission  
was to address “‘all matters relating to the unified  
development of the penal institutions . . . of the state . .  
. .’”  Id. at 266 quoting MCL 791.202(1). The statute thus  
evidenced a legislative intent to immunize the department  
“from local zoning ordinances when establishing state penal  
institutions.” Id. at 267.  
In my judgment, the circumstances involved in Dearden  
materially differ from the circumstances in this case.  
Although, like the statute in Dearden, subsection 1263(3)  
contains “exclusive jurisdiction” language, the exclusive  
jurisdiction applies specifically to “the review and approval  
14  
 
 
  
of 
plans 
and 
specifications 
for 
the 
construction,  
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings” and “site  
plans for those school buildings.”  This language, in my view,  
reflects an intent to grant the state superintendent a more  
limited authority that relates specifically to the oversight  
of construction and site plans for particular school  
buildings.  Whereas the statutory scheme in Dearden reflected  
a legislative intent to provide the Department of Corrections  
with broad authority to oversee and develop a statewide system  
of penal institutions, the relevant statute here reflects an  
intent to empower the superintendent to oversee a much  
narrower area relating to construction and site plans for  
school buildings.  This is not surprising in view of the fact  
that principal authority over schools, unlike prisons, has  
traditionally reposed with local communities.9  
In regard to the application of the Dearden test, this  
Court indicated in Burt Twp, supra at 666, that the party  
claiming to be exempt must show “a clear legislative intent”  
to exempt the particular activities from local zoning.  The  
9 Compare, also, the specificity and concreteness of MCL 
46.11, considered in Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co, 
468 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2003), which states that a county 
board of commissioners may “[d]etermine the site of, remove,  
or designate a new site for a county building,” MCL 46.11(b), 
and “[e]rect the necessary buildings for jails, clerks' 
offices, and other county buildings, and prescribe the time 
and manner of erecting them,” MCL 46.11(d) (emphasis  
supplied).  
15  
 
 
 
lead 
opinion 
effectively inverts this test, asserting that the  
statutes pertaining to township zoning and planning do not  
expressly 
require 
school districts to comply with local zoning  
regulations.  Ante at 9-10. However, given the broad land-use  
authority that the Legislature has granted to townships, it  
would hardly be expected that these statutes would also  
affirmatively enumerate those entities obligated to comply  
with their zoning requirements.  To assume otherwise is to  
suggest that, unless express compliance is mandated, then  
compliance is not required. Following this reasoning to its  
logical conclusion, one would have to assume that no entity  
must comply with local zoning authority because no such  
entities are listed. The lead opinion’s analysis improperly  
shifts the burden to the township to demonstrate that its  
generally applicable zoning and land-use regulations are  
applicable to a particular entity.  
In my judgment, the school district, the party claiming  
exemption, has not met its burden. 
Rather, the relevant  
statutory provisions do not evidence a “clear legislative  
intent” to immunize local school districts from local zoning  
ordinances.  
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MAJORITY HOLDING  
The majority of the justices conclude that the  
superintendent’s authority over “what goes on within the site  
16  
  
itself” is unaffected by local zoning, ante at 7, and that  
local school districts are immune from township zoning  
ordinances “as they affect the content of the site plan  
itself.” 
Ante at 9. 
However, the lead opinion does not  
otherwise explain how broad or how limited it perceives the  
superintendent’s 
jurisdiction to be.  This prompts the obvious  
questions: precisely what, under the lead opinion, does the  
superintendent have the authority to do; and precisely what do  
local officials have the authority to do?  By not offering  
insight into how these questions should be answered, the  
public is left only to speculate, ensuring that new litigation  
will be the product.  Which types of zoning and land-use  
matters “affect” the content of the site plan itself?10  Do  
sewage and drainage pipes that extend beyond the “site itself”  
and into the surrounding community “affect” the site plan?  Do  
roads and paths, and means of ingress and egress that extend  
beyond the “site itself” and into the surrounding community  
“affect” the site plan?  Do environmental regulations that  
affect the community generally “affect” the site plan?  Do  
noise regulations that have a general effect on the community  
10 Some sense of the breadth of the answer to this  
question might be gleaned by reading the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111; 63 S Ct 82 
87 L Ed 122 (1942), and its considerable line of progeny, 
concerning what is meant by matters that “affect” interstate 
commerce.  
17  
 
 
    
 
“affect” the site plan?  Indeed, what generally applicable  
zoning and land-use regulations might not be perceived, at  
least 
under 
some 
circumstances, 
as 
“affecting” 
the 
site 
plan?11  
Apart from what “affects” the site plan, and is thereby  
within 
the 
exclusive 
determination 
of 
the 
superintendent, 
what  
“affects” the community surrounding the school is also within  
the exclusive determination of the superintendent.  Persons  
living within the surrounding neighborhood, and within the  
surrounding community, will, as a result, have diminished  
effective resort to their local representatives, none of whom  
will any longer possess authority over matters relating to  
school sites and the structures upon them.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that MCL  
380.1263(3), which grants the state superintendent “sole and  
11 The lead opinion is tentative even in addressing 
whether a community may determine the initial location of a 
school, for example, by restricting it from being placed in a 
recreationally, residentially, or commercially zoned area. 
The lead opinion, while indicating that school districts are 
exempt from zoning ordinances that “affect the content of a 
school site plan,” ante at 12, does not clearly address the 
question of who has the power to determine the location of the 
school site in the first instance, and whether a community has 
any involvement in this decision. Although the lead opinion 
appears at one point to limit the superintendent’s exemption 
to “the site plan itself,” ante at 9, it proceeds to suggest 
that the superintendent possesses exclusive authority “over 
design, construction, and siting requirements,” ante at 9  
(emphasis added).  Moreover, it is difficult to understand 
what could more directly “affect” a school site plan than 
where a school is sited in the first place.  
18  
 
 
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval of plans  
and specifications for the construction, reconstruction, or  
remodeling of school buildings . . . and of site plans for  
those school buildings,” indicates a “clear legislative  
intent” to exempt the state school superintendent from local  
zoning 
ordinances. 
 
First, 
the 
superintendent’s 
authority 
over  
“site plans” is not the equivalent of zoning or land-use  
authority, and such authority cannot reasonably be understood  
to displace local zoning and land-use authority.  Second,  
subsection 1263(3) does not even refer to zoning.  Its  
specific grants of authority to the superintendent cannot  
reasonably be construed to include the distinct, and greater,  
authority over zoning and land-use matters.  Third, the  
relevant provisions of the Township Zoning Act confer upon  
townships broad land-use authority and specifically recognize  
the role of such authority in providing for a system of  
education.  Such breadth of authority is inconsistent with the  
notion that the Legislature would have compromised this  
authority through statutory silence and indirection.  
I would therefore reverse the part of the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals finding such an exemption for the  
superintendent’s decisions, and remand for entry of summary  
19  
disposition on this issue in favor of the intervenors.12  
Stephen J. Markman  
12 I concur in part IV of the lead opinion, in which the 
justices decline to address intervenors’ argument regarding 
the improper delegation of authority.  
20