Title: Winn v. Martel

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 4 
Docket: 
And-19-141 
Argued: 
November 5, 2019 
Decided: 
January 7, 2020 
Revised: 
March 31, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.* 
 
 
VALERIE R. (BISHOP-MARTEL) WINN 
 
v. 
 
JEAN MARTEL 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
[¶1]  Valerie R. Winn,1 the mother of a child whose father is Jean Martel, 
appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Lewiston, Lawrence, J.) awarding 
child support to Martel’s sister—the child’s paternal aunt—who had been 
providing ongoing residence and care for the child.  The mother argues that the 
court erred in awarding child support, including past support, to the aunt and 
in its determination of the amount of the mother’s gross income.  We affirm the 
judgment, except for its provision that the mother’s child support obligation to 
the aunt is retroactive to a date before the divorce complaint was filed.   
                                         
*  Although Justice Hjelm participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified. 
1  Winn’s name was formerly Valerie R. Bishop-Martel, but upon entry of the divorce judgment, 
her name was changed to Valerie R. Winn.   
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The facts are drawn from the court’s supported findings and from 
the procedural record.  The mother and father were married in November 
2010, when their child was five years old.  Several years later, beginning in July 
2014, the father’s sister began providing primary care for their child.2   
 
[¶3]  On October 19, 2016, the paternal aunt filed a petition in the 
Androscoggin County Probate Court to be appointed as the guardian of the 
child.  Notice of the petition was served on the mother in November 2016.   
 
[¶4]  The mother then commenced a divorce proceeding by serving a 
complaint on the father on February 8, 2017, and filing the complaint with the 
District Court within twenty days.  See M.R. Civ. P. 3.  The complaint alleged that 
the child had been residing with his paternal aunt since July 2014 and 
requested that the District Court determine parental rights and responsibilities 
for the minor child, including child support.   
 
[¶5]  On March 7, 2017, the District Court (Carlson, J.) held a case 
management conference.  In addition to the parties, the aunt was present at the 
conference and indicated that she had filed a petition for guardianship of the 
                                         
2  The mother testified that the child began to reside with his aunt in July 2014 so that the child 
could remain in the same school after his mother moved away.  The father is disabled.   
 
 
3 
minor child in the District Court.  See 18-A M.R.S. §§ 5-201 to 5-213 (2018).3  
The probate matter was then dismissed as duplicative.   
[¶6]  In early August 2017, after a first mediation did not fully resolve the 
family matter, the aunt—identifying herself as “the De Facto Guardian”—filed 
a motion seeking, among other things, ongoing child support from the mother.  
The parties did not resolve the matter at a second mediation, and the court 
(Martin, M.) consolidated the aunt’s guardianship petition with the divorce 
matter.   
 
[¶7]  The parties participated in a judicial settlement conference in 
October 2017.  They reached an agreement on the record, and the court 
(Ham-Thompson, M.) directed the mother’s counsel to draft the order, confirm 
the terms of the agreement with all parties, and present it to the court for 
signature.  Because the parties could not agree to the contents of the order, the 
court (Lawrence, J.) ordered all counsel to listen to the recording of the 
agreement as stated then by the parties and submit a final order for signature 
by December 15, 2017, with the magistrate (Ham-Thompson, M.) to resolve any 
remaining differences. 
                                         
3  Title 18-A was replaced with Title 18-C, but not until September 1, 2019, after the probate matter 
in this case had been concluded.  See P.L. 2019, ch. 417; P.L. 2017, ch. 402.   
 
 
4 
 
[¶8]  The magistrate entered the divorce judgment in January 2018.  For 
reasons that are not clear on the record, the magistrate accepted the parties’ 
agreement to dismiss the aunt’s petition for guardianship upon an agreement  
that “[the aunt] is the de facto guardian of [the child].”  The judgment ordered 
that the child would “continue to reside” with the aunt, and it included a 
provision that a final two-hour hearing regarding child support would be 
scheduled before a magistrate at the court’s earliest convenience.4   
 
[¶9]  After a hearing held by a different magistrate, the court (Martin, M.) 
entered an order in June 2018 determining that, because the aunt was not a 
guardian, and there is no legal significance to “de facto guardian” status for 
purposes of awarding child support in a family matter,5 the aunt lacked the legal 
standing to seek or receive child support.  The father objected to the 
magistrate’s decision, and the court (Lawrence, J.) entered an order in 
December 2018 determining that, although the magistrate correctly held that 
                                         
4  The mother objected to the judgment, but the court (Lawrence, J.) overruled the objection and 
scheduled the child support hearing.   
5  As the magistrate noted, the term “de facto guardian” as it then appeared in the guardianship 
statutes did not confer any legal status but instead was defined to establish a basis to seek 
guardianship for an individual with whom the child resided during a defined period in which there 
was “a demonstrated lack of consistent participation by the parent or legal custodian.”  18-A M.R.S. 
§ 5-101(1-B) (2018); see 18-A M.R.S. § 5-204 (2018).  The term does not appear in the current 
statutes, codified at Title 18-C.  See P.L. 2019, ch. 417; P.L. 2017, ch. 402. 
 
 
5 
the term “de facto guardian” is a term without legal significance in this context, 
the aunt could receive child support as a “caretaker relative” pursuant to 
19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4) (2018).  In addition to provisions requiring the father to 
pay the aunt child support, the court ordered the mother to pay the aunt as 
follows: 
• $183 per week from November 1, 2016, to January 3, 2018; and  
• $170.70 per week beginning on January 3, 2018. 
 
[¶10]  The mother moved to alter or amend the judgment in December 
2018, arguing, among other things, that the court had erred in determining the 
amount of her gross income because a portion of the compensation she 
received through her contract to provide services to the United States Postal 
Service constituted reimbursement for the ordinary and necessary expenses of 
her self-employment and could not properly be treated as income for child 
support purposes.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(C) (2018); M.R. Civ. P. 59(e).  The 
court reconfirmed its income determination, finding that the reimbursement 
payments received by the mother reduced her personal living expenses.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(B) (2018).  The court entered a judgment correcting 
some clerical errors, but the child support was otherwise unchanged.   
 
 
6 
 
[¶11]  The mother timely appealed from the judgment.  See 14 M.R.S. 
§ 1901 (2018); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12]  The mother argues that the court erred in awarding past and 
ongoing child support to the aunt and in its calculation of the mother’s income 
for purposes of child support.  We discern no error in the court’s determination 
that the mother’s income included a substantial expense reimbursement from 
the Postal Service that reduced her personal living costs.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2001(5)(A), (B) (2018); Dostanko v. Dostanko, 2013 ME 47, ¶ 14, 65 A.3d 
1271; Knowles v. Knowles, 588 A.2d 315, 318 (Me. 1991).  Thus, we focus our 
discussion on the propriety of the court’s award of child support to the aunt. 
 
[¶13]  The mother contends that child support should not have been 
ordered to begin before October 2017 because the aunt had no legal status in 
relation to the child until the entry of the October 2017 order.6   
                                         
6  The mother also argues that the parties had agreed to a complete judgment that did not contain 
an order of child support.  The court was required, however, to review the parties’ proposed 
judgment to determine whether child support had been addressed adequately pursuant to the child 
support guidelines, and the court acted within its discretion in holding a hearing on child support 
before finalizing the judgment.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2008 (2018).  Because there was no final child 
support judgment until after that hearing, the aunt was not required—contrary to the mother’s 
suggestion—to file a motion to modify asserting a substantial change in circumstances to obtain child 
support.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(2) (2018); McCarthy v. Goroshin, 2016 ME 98, ¶ 15, 143 A.3d 138.   
 
 
7 
 
[¶14]  When a caretaker relative provides primary residence for a child, 
“[b]oth parents are responsible for child support.”  19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4).  “In 
an action filed under section 1654 [‘Parenting and support when parents live 
apart’], the court may require the child’s nonprimary care provider to pay past 
support.”  19-A M.R.S. § 1653(8)(A) (2018).  By statute, the child support 
guidelines apply to an award of past support.  See id.; see also 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2006(2) (2018).  Past support “is calculated by applying the current support 
guidelines to the period for which past support is owed.”  Id. § 2006(2).   
 
[¶15]  Here, the magistrate who initially considered whether the aunt 
was entitled to child support (Martin, M.) correctly concluded that the aunt’s 
agreed-to status as a “de facto guardian” did not entitle the aunt to receive child 
support based on Maine law.  See supra n.5.  The aunt had filed guardianship 
petitions in two separate courts, and she was therefore aware of what was 
necessary to be treated as a legal guardian and receive child support in that 
capacity.  See 18-A M.R.S. § 5-204.  Her agreement to dismiss the guardianship 
petition and accept a judgment stating that she was a “de facto guardian” left 
her without the legal status of a guardian.   
 
[¶16]  The District Court (Lawrence, J.) was also correct, however, in 
determining that 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4) authorizes the aunt to receive child 
 
 
8 
support as a caretaker relative.  Because there has never been any dispute that 
the aunt began to provide primary care for the child in July 2014, the court 
properly recognized the aunt as a caretaker relative who was entitled to receive 
child support.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4).   
 
[¶17]  In determining the amount of support to be paid by the mother 
and father to the aunt as the caretaker relative, the benefits received by the 
child through Social Security were not attributable to the mother but rather to 
the disabled father.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2107 (2018).  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the court found that the mother had stopped paying the aunt any child 
support after the aunt became the child’s representative payee for the Social 
Security benefits arising from the father’s disability.  Given that supported 
finding and the aunt’s ongoing responsibility for the child pursuant to the 
divorce judgment, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining 
that it would be in the child’s best interest to order the mother to pay child 
support, including past support, to the aunt.   
 
[¶18]  The court established the start date for past support as 
November 1, 2016—the approximate date when the aunt petitioned for 
guardianship in the Probate Court.  The aunt did not, however, ever become a 
legally recognized guardian for the child, either in the Probate Court or the 
 
 
9 
District Court.  As a caretaker relative, it was only on February 8, 2017, when 
the mother commenced the divorce proceeding by service of process, that the 
aunt became eligible to receive child support.  See M.R. Civ. P. 3; cf. Wood v. 
Wood, 407 A.2d 282, 287-88 (Me. 1979) (holding, before the enactment of 
19-A M.R.S. § 2009(2), that a modification of support may be retroactive only 
to the initiation of the motion to modify).   
 
[¶19]  Accordingly, we must vacate that portion of the judgment that 
establishes a November 1, 2016, start date for the mother’s past support 
obligation to the aunt and remand the matter for the court to enter an order 
establishing February 8, 2017, as the start date for that past support. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed, except that the child support 
order is vacated to the extent that it establishes 
November 1, 2016, as the start date for the 
award of past support from the mother to the 
aunt.  Remanded for the court to establish 
February 8, 2017, as that start date.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thaddeus V. Day, Esq. (orally), Law Offices of Thaddeus V. Day, P.L.L.C., 
Cumberland Center, for appellant Valerie R. Winn 
 
Joan Egdall, Esq. (orally), Gosselin & Dubord, P.A., Lewiston, for appellee Jean 
Martel 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number FM-2017-92 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY