Title: In re Spencer

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 125,500 
 
In the Matter of MITCHELL J. SPENCER, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed February 10, 2023. Published censure.  
 
Matthew J. Vogelsberg, Chief Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and was on the 
formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
John E. Rapp, of Hinkle Law Firm LLC, of Wichita, and Mitchell J. Spencer, respondent, argued 
the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an attorney discipline proceeding against Mitchell J. 
Spencer, of Wichita, Kansas. Spencer received his license to practice law in Kansas in 
September 2017. Spencer also is a licensed attorney in Missouri, admitted in 2020.  
 
On April 19, 2022, the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator (ODA) filed a 
formal complaint against Spencer alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct. The complaint was filed after the ODA received a copy of a charging document 
filed by the Office of the Kansas Attorney General against the respondent in a 
misdemeanor traffic case. Spencer filed a timely answer to the formal complaint and 
participated in the investigation.  
 
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On July 7, 2022, the parties entered into a summary submission agreement under 
Supreme Court Rule 223 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 278) (summary submission is "[a]n 
agreement between the disciplinary administrator and the respondent," which includes "a 
statement by the parties that no exceptions to the findings of fact or conclusions of law 
will be taken"). In the summary submission agreement, the Disciplinary Administrator 
and Spencer stipulate and agree that Spencer violated the following Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct: 
 
• KRPC 8.4(c) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434) (engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 
• KRPC 8.4(g) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 435) (engaging in any other conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
 
Before us, the parties jointly recommend the respondent's license to practice law 
be suspended for a period of 90 days, that the suspension be stayed, and that the 
respondent be placed on probation for one year.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
We quote the relevant portions of the parties' summary submission below.  
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
. . . . 
 
"8. 
During the evening of October 7, 2019, respondent played golf with his mother at 
the golf club in Wellington, Kansas—the county seat of Sumner County. They 
rented a golf cart from the club. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"9. 
 
Around 7:00 p.m., after respondent and his mother were finished playing 
golf, respondent dropped his mother off at her car and drove the rented 
golf cart through the club's parking lot to return it to the golf cart shed. 
Respondent's mother followed from a distance in her car.  
 
 
"10. 
 
While driving the golf cart through the parking lot, respondent drove into 
the rear end of an unoccupied 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck that was 
parked in the lot. Respondent was looking at his cellular phone at the 
time of the collision.   
 
 
 "11. 
Surveillance video from the golf club shows that the golf cart collided 
into the back of the truck. The collision caused damage to [the] golf cart 
(cracked and scuffed the cart's body) and the truck (scuffed the rear 
bumper and broke off a piece of the bumper's plastic trim). 
 
 
"12. 
As a result of the collision, the cart became wedged onto the truck's rear 
bumper. Respondent attempted to dislodge the cart by putting the cart in 
reverse and backing it up. When that failed, respondent got out of the 
cart and lifted and pushed against the front of the cart for several 
seconds, eventually succeeding in dislodging the cart from the truck's 
rear bumper. 
 
 
"13.  
Once respondent dislodged the cart, he backed the cart away and then 
drove forward, stopping at the rear of the truck. In the video, the 
respondent appears to briefly inspect the back of the truck. He then gets 
out of the cart to pick up a piece of plastic from the ground. (The 
surveillance video shows that the piece of plastic broke off from the 
truck's rear bumper during the collision.) After picking up the plastic 
piece, the respondent returns to the cart and drives the cart forward to the 
golf cart shed, followed by respondent's mother in her car. 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"14. 
After parking the golf cart at the shed, respondent got into his mother's 
car and left the golf club. At the time, respondent was aware that the 
accident had caused damage to both the truck and the golf cart. 
 
 
"15. 
When respondent left the golf club, he was not aware that anyone was 
still working at the golf club. Regardless, prior to leaving, respondent did 
not attempt to notify anyone regarding the accident. 
 
 
"16. 
L.S., an employee at the golf club, was working in the golf cart shed at 
the time of the accident. He heard the collision and saw respondent 
dislodge the cart from the truck. L.S. watched respondent return the cart 
to the shed and then leave the club. 
 
 
"17. 
L.S. looked at the golf cart that respondent had left at the shed and 
noticed the damage to the cart. 
 
 
"18. 
That evening, L.S. told B.S., an employee of the club who owned the 
truck with his father, S.S., that respondent had collided into the truck 
with the golf cart. 
 
 
"19. 
Three days later, on October 10, 2019, B.S. saw respondent at the golf 
club. According to a statement B.S. provided to the Wellington Police 
Department (WPD), B.S. asked respondent whether he had hit his truck 
with the golf cart. Respondent said yes, explained that he was on his 
phone when he had hit the truck, and apologized.  
 
 
"20. 
During the conversation, B.S. may have indicated to respondent that the 
damage the truck sustained from the collision was not much and that 
'everything was fine.'  
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"21. 
On October 13, 2019, B.H., the director of the golf club, filed a police 
report about the incident with the WPD. 
 
 
"22. 
On October 16, 2019—nine days after the collision—respondent sent a 
Facebook message to B.H., stating: 'Hey man; did you have any damage 
on a golf cart the other day? I already talked to [B.S.] about it the other 
day and he had said everything was fine.' 
 
 
"23. 
B.H. did not respond to respondent's message. 
 
 
"24. 
As part of the WPD's investigation into the collision, S.S. provided the 
WPD with a repair estimate for the truck's rear bumper ($29.59 to 
replace the broken trim and $90 in labor). B.H. provided an estimate of 
$700 to repair the damage to the golf cart. 
 
 
"25. 
On October 23, 2019, WPD Police Chief Tracy Heath interviewed 
respondent about the collision. During the interview, respondent said that 
he was on his phone at the time he collided into the truck. Respondent 
told Heath that he did not report the accident because he did not see any 
damage caused by the collision. He also repeatedly said that he spoke to 
B.S. and that B.S. told him everything was fine. Respondent said that he 
took B.S.'s response as meaning there was no damage done to his truck. 
Respondent said that he had also messaged B.H. about the accident but 
did not get a response. 
 
 
"26. 
Chief Heath questioned respondent about his belief that the collision 
caused no damage when surveillance video clearly showed respondent 
picking up debris from the collision. After initially stating that he did not 
remember what he picked up, respondent said that it might have been a 
piece of plastic but claimed he did not know where the piece of plastic 
came from. Respondent reiterated that he did not report the accident 
because he did not see that the collision caused any damage. But, 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
respondent said that because he was now informed there was damage, he 
wanted to report the accident. 
 
 
"27. 
Heath issued a citation to respondent for violating K.S.A. 8-1605, duty of 
driver upon damaging unattended vehicle or other property, a class C 
misdemeanor. 
 
 
"28. 
Wellington city prosecutor Shawn DeJarnett dismissed the traffic citation 
and referred respondent's traffic case to the Kansas Attorney General's 
(AG's) Office for prosecution. In June 2020, the AG's Office instituted a 
traffic case against respondent in Sumner County District Court, Case 
No. 2020-TR-1251. 
 
 
"29. 
Prior to the AG's Office filing the traffic case, respondent paid S.S. and 
the golf club the estimates they obtained for repairing the damage to the 
truck and golf cart, respectfully. 
 
 
"30. 
In July 2020, attorney Michael Brown forwarded a copy of the complaint 
filed in Case No. 2020-TR-1251 to the Office of the Disciplinary 
Administrator (ODA). The ODA docketed the matter for investigation 
and asked the respondent to provide a response.  
 
 
"31. 
In his response, respondent stated:  
 
 
'I did not do anything unethical regarding the golf cart. I was texting 
while I was driving a golf cart and ran into an old pickup around 8pm at 
night when I was leaving the golf course on October 7, 2019. That is 
almost a year ago. No one was at the golf course. The only damage to the 
truck was a broken plastic piece that cost $20 to fix. I was able to figure 
out whose vehicle it was by the next day and had a discussion with 
[B.S.], the owner of the truck, and he told me not to worry about it and 
that everything was fine. He also worked at the golf course at the time so 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
I thought that was also informing the golf course as well. Just to be safe, 
a few days later I sent a facebook [sic] message to [B.H.], the manager of 
the golf course, that said "Hey man; did you have any damage on a golf 
cart the other day? I already talked to [B.S.] about it the other day and he 
had said everything was fine." It was not until at least a week if not more 
time later that I was informed law enforcement was involved. I tried to 
take care of everything responsibly. [B.S.] and his father [S.S.] informed 
law enforcement that they did not want to have charges filed against me.' 
 
 
"32. 
In his response, respondent failed to acknowledge that the damage he 
caused to B.S.'s truck cost over $100 to repair. Furthermore, he failed to 
acknowledge that he had caused damage to the golf cart and that it cost 
$700 to repair. The complaint did not refer to the amount of damage to 
either vehicle. 
 
 
"33. 
Concluding his response, respondent stated: 
 
 
'In summary, I did not do anything unethical and I am no longer a 
prosecutor in Sumner County. The only damage to the truck was $20. 
Before I was aware law enforcement was involved, I was able to have an 
in-person conversation with [B.S.] about the damage to his truck, and he 
told me not to worry about it. I also contacted the manager of the golf 
course before I was aware law enforcement was involved. I also paid all 
restitution for both the truck and the golf cart before a case was ever filed 
by the attorney general.' 
 
 
"34. 
In 2020, respondent left the Sumner County Attorney's Office and 
entered private practice in Wichita. 
 
 
"35. 
On October 20, 2020, respondent entered into a diversion agreement in 
Case No. 2020-TR-1251 for violating K.S.A. 8-1605. In the diversion 
agreement, respondent stipulated to the following facts: 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'I was the driver of a vehicle on or about October 7, 2019, in Sumner 
County, Kansas which collided with another vehicle that resulted in 
damage to property that was not my own and that I failed to either 
immediately stop and locate and notify the property owner or attach 
securely in a conspicuous place on the other vehicle the notice required 
by K.S.A. 8-1605; and 
 
 
'I further stipulate to any police reports, witness statements, video and/or 
photographs, or any other evidence under Wellington Police Department 
Case Number 19-1985 and agree that they shall be admitted into 
evidence without further foundation in the event of revocation.' 
 
 
"36. 
Respondent successfully completed diversion, and Case No. 2020-TR-
1251 was dismissed with prejudice. 
 
 
"37. 
On September 25, 2021, respondent provided a supplemental response to 
the complaint. In his supplemental response, respondent stated: 
 
 
'First, I would like to apologize for my prior response. I was under the 
misunderstanding I was supposed to be defending myself and that simply 
accepting responsibility was not an option. Instead of taking 
responsibility for my actions, I mistakenly and wrongly took the 
opportunity to focus my response on small town politics and issues with 
Mr. Brown. I now wish I would have sought the advice of counsel at that 
time to help me understand that this can be a productive and interactive 
process to make sure the circumstances and situation does not recur. I 
take this process very seriously. I pride myself on my honesty and 
integrity and apologize for my misunderstanding and missteps. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'I admit that I drove the golf cart and wedged it underneath the bumper of 
[B.S.'s] truck while I was texting and driving the golf cart approximately 
two years ago. I take responsibility for those actions. At the time of the 
incident, I did not think anyone was at the Wellington Golf Course to 
speak with. Nonetheless, I should have addressed the situation at that 
time. I have learned from that mistake and I apologize. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
'Again, I apologize for any miscommunication and any missteps along 
the way, and I apologize for those whom I have made this process 
difficult. I now realize that I was wrong in multiple respects in handling 
the incident at issue. I should have immediately addressed the situation 
following the wreck, and I should have ensured that I spoke with all 
individuals affected by my actions and not made assumptions. [] I take 
full responsibility for all of my actions, and I am open for discussions 
and making a plan to make sure something like this does not happen in 
the future.'   
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
 
 
"38. 
Under Rule 223(b)(1), the respondent admits that he engaged in 
misconduct. Under Rule 2[2]3(b)(2)(C), the disciplinary administrator 
and the respondent stipulate that the findings of fact stated above 
constitute clear and convincing evidence of violations of the following 
rules: 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty) 
 
 
"39. 
KRPC 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty. The respondent violated KRPC 
8.4(c) during his interview with Police Chief Heath by falsely stating that 
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he was not aware that his accident at the golf club had caused any damage 
to either the truck or the golf cart.  
 
                 "KRPC 8.4(g) (engaging in any other conduct that adversely reflects  
                          on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) 
 
 
"40. 
KRPC 8.4(g) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness 
to practice law. The respondent violated KRPC 8.4(g) when he left the 
golf club without attempting to notify anyone of the accident, knowing 
that the accident had caused damage to the truck and the golf cart.  
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"41.  Under Rule 223(b)(2)(D), the disciplinary administrator and the 
respondent stipulate that the following aggravating and mitigating factors 
are applicable in this case: 
 
"Aggravating Factors 
 
 
"42. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive. Respondent had a dishonest motive when he 
left the golf club without attempting to report the accident to the golf 
club or the owner of the truck. Respondent left the golf club, knowing 
that he caused damage to the golf cart and the truck. Respondent 
nonetheless told Police Chief Heath that he was not aware that the 
accident had caused damage to either the golf cart or the truck.  
 
 
"43. 
Engaging in Deceptive Practices During the Disciplinary Process. 
Respondent engaged in deceptive practices when he submitted his initial 
response to the disciplinary complaint. Respondent's initial response 
failed to acknowledge the full extent of the damage the collision caused 
to the golf cart and truck. Furthermore, respondent gave the impression 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
in his response that he had timely notified B.S. and B.H. of the accident. 
The investigation disclosed that B.S. approached respondent at the golf 
club three days after the accident to ask him about his involvement. The 
investigation also disclosed that respondent waited nine days after the 
accident to send a Facebook message to B.H., asking about the damage 
to the golf cart. These communications did occur, however, prior to law 
enforcement contacting respondent regarding the accident.    
 
"Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"44. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. Respondent has no prior 
disciplinary record.  
 
 
"45. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes have Contributed 
to a [sic] Violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. As 
detailed in Dr. Parker's report . . . , respondent suffers from an anxiety 
disorder that contributed to respondent's 'maladaptive response' to the 
accident. As Dr. Parker states in his report:  
 
 
'Unfortunately, his response to ignore (denial) the matter started a 
snowball of stressful events that Mitch continued to reflexively respond 
to with additional denial defense mechanisms. He may have minimized 
and obfuscated matters to investigators out of his reflexive use of denial 
as a defense mechanism to protect himself from the guilt/shame for not 
living up to his own unreasonably high standards of himself—which 
served to make matters worse. 
 
'Based on the psychological testing results, it appears that Mitch holds 
himself to very high standards of performance and resorts to denial as a 
psychological defense mechanism. When someone holds themselves to 
very high standards and they fail to meet their own standards, anxiety 
and shame are generated. Under normal circumstances, this would have 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
led Mitch to have seen his actions of texting while driving a golf cart and 
hitting a pickup as significant failure to uphold the very high personal, 
performance and ethical standards of conduct he had set for himself. But, 
being the Assistant City Prosecutor who had filed ethics complaints on 
two other attorneys, this would have heightened his awareness of his 
failure and that personal shock of failing to meet his own standards led to 
the panicked deployment of denial out of which he parked the cart and 
went home—an uncharacteristic behavior. Even though he eventually 
calmed and attempted to resolve the matter with the pickup owner and 
golf course, the ongoing fallout from the incident created additional 
anxiety that Mitch responded to with further denial mechanisms which 
served to only overly complicate what should have been a very simple 
matter in the beginning.' 
 
Dr. Parker recommended that respondent attend short-term counseling to 
(1) 'develop stress and anxiety management skills to give him additional 
psychological defense tools other than denial'; and (2) 'develop more 
reasonable standards and expectations of himself.'   
 
 
"46. 
Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify Consequences 
of Misconduct. Though there was some delay in notifying B.S. and B.H. 
regarding the accident, respondent paid for the damage his accident 
caused to the truck and golf cart prior to being charged in Sumner 
County District Court for violating K.S.A. 8-1605. 
 
 
"47. 
Full and Free Disclosure to Disciplinary Board or Cooperative Attitude 
Toward Proceedings. Once formal disciplinary proceedings were 
instituted against respondent, he fully cooperated in the process and 
willingly entered into this summary submission agreement, stipulating to 
facts and rule violations.  
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"48. 
Inexperience in the Practice of Law. At the time respondent engaged in 
the underlying conduct, he had been practicing law for approximately 
two years.  
 
 
"49. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
any Letters from Clients, Friends, and Lawyers in Support of the 
Character and General Reputation of the Attorney. Respondent has 
submitted numerous letters from colleagues in support of his character 
and reputation as a talented and hardworking attorney. Respondent 
received the Samuel E. Hooper Award from the University of Oklahoma 
College of Law on March 9, 2017. It is awarded to a law student with a 
reputation for candor and integrity. 
 
 
"50. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. As a result of failing to 
report the accident, respondent was charged with a violation of K.S.A. 8-
1605. He entered into a diversion agreement and successfully completed 
diversion, resulting in the charge being dismissed with prejudice.  
 
 
"51. 
Remorse. Respondent has expressed genuine remorse for engaging in the 
conduct that led to a disciplinary complaint being filed against him.  
 
"Recommendation for Discipline 
 
 
"52. 
Under Rule 223(b)(3), the disciplinary administrator and respondent 
jointly recommend that the Supreme Court suspend the respondent's 
license to practice law for a period of 90 days, that the suspension be 
stayed, and that respondent be placed on probation for one year.  
 
 
"53. 
The conditions of probation are outlined in Respondent's Proposed 
Probation Plan, found in Volume I of the record.  
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"54. 
Respondent will comply with Supreme Court Rule 227(f) (2022 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. at 283) prior to oral argument before the Supreme Court.   
 
 
 . . . . 
 
"Waiver of Hearing on the Formal Complaint 
 
 
"62. 
Under Rule 223(b)(4), the disciplinary administrator and the respondent 
hereby waive the hearing on the formal complaint.  
 
"Statement of No Exceptions 
 
 
"63. 
Under Rule 223(b)(5), the disciplinary administrator and the respondent 
agree that no exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
will be taken in this case.  
 
"Additional Acknowledgments 
 
 
"64. 
The disciplinary administrator and the respondent understand and agree 
that if the summary submission agreement is rejected by the Board chair, 
under Rule 223(e)(3), the hearing on the formal complaint will proceed 
under Rule 222 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 277).  
 
 
"65. 
The disciplinary administrator and the respondent understand and agree 
that if the summary submission agreement is approved by the Board 
chair, under Rule 223(e)(2), the hearing on the formal complaint will be 
canceled and the case will be docketed with the Supreme Court under 
Rule 228 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 287).  
 
 
"66. 
The disciplinary administrator and respondent further understand and 
agree that the summary submission agreement is advisory only and does 
not prevent the Supreme Court from making its own conclusions 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
regarding rule violations or imposing discipline greater or lesser than the 
parties' recommendation.  
 
 
"67. 
Finally, the disciplinary administrator and the respondent agree that the 
summary submission agreement may be exchanged and executed by 
electronic transmission and that electronic signatures will be deemed to 
be original signatures."  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court generally considers the evidence, the 
disciplinary panel's findings, and the parties' arguments to determine whether KRPC 
violations exist and, if they do, the appropriate discipline to impose. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see also Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 
281) (a misconduct finding must be established by clear and convincing evidence). "Clear 
and convincing evidence is 'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth 
of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009). 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator provided the respondent with adequate notice of 
the formal complaint. The Disciplinary Administrator also provided the respondent with 
adequate notice of the hearing before the panel, but he waived that hearing after entering 
into the summary submission agreement. Under Rule 223, a summary submission 
agreement   
 
"must be in writing and contain the following: 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)  an admission that the respondent engaged in the misconduct; 
 
(2)  a stipulation as to the following: 
 
(A)  the contents of the record; 
 
(B)  the findings of fact; 
 
(C)  the conclusions of law, including each violation of the Kansas Rules 
of Professional Conduct, the Rules Relating to Discipline of Attorneys, 
or the attorney's oath of office; and 
 
(D)  any applicable aggravating and mitigating factors; 
 
(3)  a recommendation for discipline; 
 
(4)  a waiver of the hearing on the formal complaint; and 
 
(5)  a statement by the parties that no exceptions to the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law will be taken." Supreme Court Rule 223(b) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. at 278).  
 
The Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys approved the summary submission 
and canceled a hearing under Rule 223(e)(2). As a result, the factual findings in the 
summary submission are admitted. See Supreme Court Rule 228(g)(1) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. at 288) ("If the respondent files a statement . . . that the respondent will not file an 
exception . . . , the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the final hearing report will 
be deemed admitted by the respondent."). 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
The summary submission and the parties' stipulations before us establish by clear 
and convincing evidence the charged conduct violated KRPC 8.4(c) and KRPC 8.4(g). 
We adopt the findings and conclusions set forth by the parties in the summary 
submission. 
 
The remaining issue is deciding the appropriate discipline. The parties jointly 
recommend a 90-day suspension of Spencer's law license with the suspension being 
stayed while the respondent is placed on probation for one year. An agreement to proceed 
by summary submission is advisory only and does not prevent us from imposing 
discipline greater or lesser than the parties' recommendation. Supreme Court Rule 223(f). 
After careful consideration, we find the lesser sanction of published censure is 
appropriate under the circumstances here. A minority of the court would impose the 
jointly agreed to recommended discipline of a 90-day suspension with the suspension 
being stayed while the respondent is placed on probation for one year.   
 
Although not in the summary submission, counsel for both parties presented 
information at oral argument about the negotiation process and the legal basis for their 
decision to jointly recommend stayed suspension with a one-year probation. ODA 
counsel provided a summary of the negotiation process in opening argument. The 
respondent's attorney initially approached ODA counsel about the possibility of a 
published censure. ODA counsel responded that the misconduct warranted more than a 
published censure because—at the time of the misconduct—the respondent was a 
prosecutor and should be held to a higher standard of ethical conduct than an attorney 
who is not a prosecutor. With that said, ODA counsel communicated to the respondent's 
counsel that he believed the respondent should be able to continue practicing law, which 
is how the parties ultimately came to agree on a suspended suspension with a plan of 
probation.  
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For his part, the respondent's counsel agreed it was appropriate to hold the 
respondent to a higher standard of professional conduct because the respondent was a 
prosecutor when the misconduct occurred. The court pushed back, asking respondent's 
counsel to cite authority for the legal proposition that prosecutors are held to a higher 
standard of professionalism than non-prosecutors under the rules of professional conduct. 
Respondent's counsel deferred the question. At that point, ODA counsel returned to the 
podium for rebuttal and advised the court that the higher standard of professionalism for 
prosecutors comes from this court's caselaw. ODA counsel cited In re Holste, 302 Kan. 
880, 889, 358 P.3d 850 (2015), and the cases cited therein to support this higher standard.  
 
We have reviewed the cases relied on by ODA counsel and find them factually 
distinguishable. Unlike the facts presented here, the prosecutors in those cases engaged in 
misconduct while acting in the scope of their official prosecutorial duties. And the cases 
cited appear to have some legal infirmities as well. In order to flush out those infirmities, 
we begin with the two Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct relied on in these cases—
KRPC 3.8 and KRPC 8.4—keeping in mind that "[i]nterpretation of the Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review." In 
re Bryan, 275 Kan. 202, 211, 61 P.3d 641 (2003).  
 
KRPC 3.8 
 
We begin with KRPC 3.8 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 401), which bears the title 
"Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor" and imposes the following enumerated 
responsibilities on prosecutors in criminal cases while they are acting in the scope of their 
official prosecutorial duties: 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
"The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
 
"(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported 
by probable cause; 
 
"(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the 
right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable 
opportunity to obtain counsel; 
 
"(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important 
pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;  
 
"(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known 
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, 
and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all 
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor 
is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and 
 
"(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present 
evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes: 
 
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by 
any applicable privilege; 
 
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion 
of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and 
 
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the 
information; 
 
"(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature 
and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of 
heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent 
investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or 
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement 
that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule." 
 
While prosecutors are also subject to the ethics rules governing all lawyers (such 
as the duty of candor to the court, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and so on), KRPC 
3.8 imposes "special" responsibilities on prosecutors since certain tasks are unique to the 
prosecutor's office. See KRPC 3.8, Comment [1] (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 401) ("A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant 
is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence."). Whether the special responsibilities imposed by KRPC 3.8 should be 
characterized as additional standards of ethical conduct unique to prosecutors or 
heightened standards of ethical conduct for prosecutors is an issue never addressed by 
this court. We find it unnecessary to decide the issue here because KRPC 3.8 is 
inapplicable under the facts presented. Specifically, the language of KRPC 3.8 and the 
comments appended to the rule make clear that the enumerated special responsibilities 
imposed on prosecutors in criminal cases apply only when the prosecutors are acting in 
the scope of their official prosecutorial duties. Although the respondent was employed as 
a prosecutor at the time of the misconduct here, there is no dispute between the parties 
that his misconduct occurred in his private life, outside the scope of his official 
prosecutorial duties.   
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
KRPC 8.4 
 
Many of the cases cited by ODA counsel relied on Comment [4] of KRPC 8.4 as 
the basis for the legal proposition that prosecutors—as lawyers holding public office—
are held to a higher duty of ethical conduct than a non-prosecutor. KRPC 8.4 bears the 
title "Misconduct" and governs an attorney's responsibility to maintain the integrity of the 
profession, whether the attorney is acting in a personal capacity or acting within the 
scope of official prosecutorial duties. Compare KRPC 3.8 (setting forth attorney's 
responsibilities in enumerated circumstances, all of which necessarily occur within the 
scope of official prosecutorial duties). Importantly, the cases do not cite to the substantive 
language of Rule 8.4, but instead rely on the language of Comment [4] (2022 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. at 435) to support imposing a heightened duty of ethical conduct for prosecutors:  
 
"[4] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond 
those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill 
the professional role of attorney. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust 
such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager 
of a corporation or other organization." 
 
As noted above, each case cited by ODA counsel that relied on Comment [4] to 
hold prosecutors to a heightened duty of ethical conduct involved prosecutors acting in 
the scope of their official prosecutorial duties. But Comment [4] is inapplicable to a 
prosecutor acting in the scope of official prosecutorial duties because non-lawyer citizens 
cannot hold the public office of prosecutor. See Comment [4] ("Lawyers holding public 
office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens.").  
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
Reading Comment [4] in its entirety persuades us that the comment was intended 
to apply to public office positions that (1) impose a duty of public trust and (2) can be 
held by both lawyers and non-lawyers. Examples of these positions include state senator, 
state board of education member, county commissioner, mayor, and sheriff. An attorney 
holding public office assumes legal responsibilities beyond those of non-attorney citizens 
holding public office because an attorney's "abuse of public office" suggests an inability 
to fulfill the professional role of an attorney. The comment goes on to compare an 
attorney's abuse of public trust to a private attorney's "abuse of positions of private trust 
such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager 
of a corporation or other organization."   
 
In this case, we already have found clear and convincing evidence that the 
respondent violated 
 
• KRPC 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty) during his interview 
with Police Chief Tracy Heath by falsely stating that he was not aware that his 
accident at the golf club had caused any damage to either the truck or the golf 
cart; and 
• KRPC 8.4(g) (engaging in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law) when he left the golf club without attempting 
to notify anyone of the accident, knowing that the accident had caused damage 
to the truck and the golf cart.  
 
The public office held by the respondent was assistant county prosecutor. But the 
respondent's misconduct did not occur in the scope of executing his official duties of 
public office, so he cannot be said to have abused his public office as specified in 
Comment [4]. And even if his misconduct had occurred in the scope of executing his 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
official duties of public office, Comment [4] would not apply because the legal 
responsibility for attorneys is enhanced as compared to non-attorney citizens, who cannot 
hold the public office of prosecutor in the first place. See KRPC 8.4, Comment [4] 
("Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other 
[non-lawyer] citizens.").  
 
 
In sum, and because the respondent's violations of KRPC 8.4(c) and (g) did not 
occur while he was acting within the scope of his official prosecutorial duties, we hold 
that neither KRPC 3.8 nor Comment [4] imposed a heightened duty of ethical conduct on 
the respondent for his misconduct. Our holding in this regard is critical to deciding the 
appropriate discipline here because, when asked by the court, ODA counsel expressly 
acknowledged that in deciding to reject a joint recommendation of published censure in 
favor of a stayed suspension with one year of probation, ODA counsel applied a higher 
standard of ethical conduct to the respondent because he was a prosecutor at the time of 
the misconduct as opposed to a non-prosecutor. We find ODA counsel's application of 
the higher standard of ethical conduct for prosecutors under the facts of this case to be 
legal error, without support in the law.    
 
 
In deciding the proper discipline without applying a higher standard of ethical 
conduct, we consider the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards"). We already have set forth the 
duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and 
the aggravating and mitigating factors to which the parties stipulated in the summary 
submission agreement. In addition to those factors, we consider the following Standards:  
 
"5.1  
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the 
factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally  
appropriate in cases involving commission of a criminal act that reflects  
24 
 
 
 
 
 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in  
other respects, or in cases with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,  
or misrepresentation: 
 
"5.11  Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
"(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of  
which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice,  
false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or  
theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the  
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of  
another to commit any of these offenses; or 
 
"(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the  
lawyer's fitness to practice. 
 
"5.12  Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard  
5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
 
"5.13  Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in  
any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or  
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to  
practice law. 
 
"5.14  Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other  
conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law."  
 
The parties agree, and clear and convincing evidence establishes, the respondent 
committed a misdemeanor that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law but did not seriously adversely 
reflect on his fitness to practice law. Thus, we hold published censure is an appropriate 
sanction. A minority of the court would impose the jointly agreed to recommended 
discipline of a 90-day suspension with the suspension being stayed while the respondent 
is placed on probation for one year.  
 
We assess the costs of these proceedings to the respondent and order this opinion 
be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mitchell J. Spencer is disciplined by published 
censure to be published in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(5) (2022 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. at 281) for violations of KRPC 8.4(c) and 8.4(g). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.