Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Smithern

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Smithern, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-652.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-652 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. SMITHERN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Akron Bar Assn. v. Smithern,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-652.] 
Attorneys at law — Multiple disciplinary violations — Felony conviction — 
Indefinite license suspension. 
(No. 2009-1522 — Submitted November 17, 2009 — Decided March 3, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-036. 
_________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Michelle A. Smithern of Akron, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0032850, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1986.  
On February 17, 2009, we suspended respondent's license to practice law on an 
interim basis, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(4), upon receiving notice that she 
had been convicted of a felony.  In re Smithern, 120 Ohio St.3d 1520, 2009-Ohio-
686, 901 N.E.2d 240.  
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{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline now 
recommends that we indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to practice law 
based on the board’s findings that respondent was convicted of felony theft for 
stealing money from her law firm.  The board also recommends that we credit 
respondent for the time she served under the interim suspension.  We accept the 
board’s findings and conclusion and indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to 
practice law in Ohio, with credit for time served under the interim suspension. 
{¶ 3} On June 9, 2008, relator, the Akron Bar Association, charged 
respondent with 33 counts of misconduct, alleging in each count violations of DR 
1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects 
on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) , DR 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting intentional 
prejudice or damage to a client during the course of the professional relationship), 
and DR 9-102(A) and (B)(3) (requiring the preservation of the identity of client 
funds). 
{¶ 4} A three-member panel of the board heard the case.  At the hearing, 
the relator withdrew count 25 of the complaint.  The panel subsequently 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove that respondent had 
violated DR 7-101(A)(3) and consequently dismissed that violation in the 
remaining 32 counts.  However, the panel found that there was clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had committed the other charged violations 
in all remaining 32 counts and recommended an indefinite suspension with 
conditions that must be satisfied before respondent could apply for reinstatement.  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline adopted the panel’s 
findings of misconduct and the recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} Respondent began working for Buckingham, Doolittle & 
Burroughs, L.L.P. (“Buckingham”) in 1985 as a law clerk, and after passing the 
January Term, 2010 
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bar, as an associate.  In the mid 1990s, she became a partner.  From 2004 to 2006, 
respondent converted retainer fees from more than 30 clients by depositing them 
in her personal bank account rather than in Buckingham’s trust account.  In total, 
respondent stole approximately $108,000 from Buckingham. 
{¶ 6} Attorneys at Buckingham discovered the thefts only after one of 
respondent’s clients made complaints about her bill.  The firm’s records showed 
that the client had never paid a retainer, even though the client had a check 
showing that she had.  When confronted with this information, respondent 
admitted to the thefts. 
{¶ 7} In 2007, a grand jury indicted respondent for aggravated theft of at 
least $100,000.  Respondent pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of theft, a fourth-
degree felony.  The trial court imposed a 12-month prison sentence, which it 
suspended upon the condition that respondent successfully complete five years of 
community control. 
{¶ 8} Pursuant to respondent’s admitted thefts, the board found by clear 
and convincing evidence that respondent had violated DR1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(6), and 9-102(A) and (B)(3). We accept these findings of misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the duties violated by the lawyer and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final determination, we also 
weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of 
the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings 
Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD 
Proc.Reg.”). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-
5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  “Because each disciplinary case is unique, we are 
not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take into account ‘all 
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relevant factors’ in determining what sanction to impose. BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B).”  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Schram, 122 Ohio St.3d 8, 2009-Ohio-1931, 907 
N.E.2d 311, ¶ 8. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 
{¶ 10} In mitigation, the board recognized that respondent had no 
disciplinary record prior to her felony suspension and has cooperated throughout 
the disciplinary proceedings.  The board recognized that respondent’s 
psychologist testified that respondent’s gambling and drinking addictions were 
the cause of respondent’s stealing.  The board also found that respondent has 
acknowledged her addictions, is receiving treatment for these addictions, and can 
overcome these addictions with continued treatment.  The board also found that 
respondent has entered into a settlement with Buckingham’s insurer to pay full 
restitution for the money that she stole.  Finally, respondent submitted letters of 
support from two attorneys and a judge. 
{¶ 11} However, it is equally clear that respondent had a dishonest and 
selfish motive in stealing the money.  It is also notable that respondent’s conduct 
occurred over a two-year period and involved over 30 separate thefts that totaled 
over $100,000.  Moreover, it was not until she was faced with discrepancies in 
one of her client’s bills that respondent admitted to stealing her client’s retainer 
fees. 
Similar Cases 
{¶ 12} Respondent argues that a two-year suspension with 18 months 
stayed on satisfaction of certain conditions is a more appropriate sanction, citing 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006-Ohio-2423, 847 
N.E.2d 435.  In Washington, the attorney billed multiple insurance clients $91,000 
for work that he did not perform.  He also converted $4,000 from two clients for 
his own personal use.  The board found that Washington had had a cocaine and 
alcohol dependency that was the primary cause of his misconduct.  Washington 
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had signed a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) prior 
to his disciplinary hearing, and he had paid full restitution.  The court imposed a 
two-year suspension with 18 months stayed on the conditions that respondent (1) 
be supervised by a monitoring attorney, (2) comply with his OLAP contract, and 
(3) commit no more misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 13} In the instant case, respondent has yet to enter a contract with 
OLAP.  Further, although she has reached a settlement agreement with 
Buckingham’s insurer, she has yet to pay the balance on the restitution that she 
owes.  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, respondent misappropriated funds 
on more than 30 separate occasions over a two-year period.  Because of these 
differences, we hold that respondent’s case is distinguishable from Washington. 
{¶ 14} When an attorney undertakes a pattern involving numerous acts of 
misconduct in converting law-firm funds, we have held that an indefinite 
suspension is appropriate.  See Toledo Bar Assn. v. Crossmock, 111 Ohio St.3d 
278, 2006-Ohio-5706, 855 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 3, 11 (indefinite suspension for 
attorney's misappropriation of over $300,000 in law-firm funds over a ten-year 
period); Disciplinary Counsel v. Yajko (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 385-389,674 N.E.2d 
684 (indefinite suspension for misappropriating law-firm funds on 20 separate 
occasions from 20 clients over a seven-year period); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Crowley (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 554-556, 634 N.E.2d 1008 (indefinite suspension 
for misappropriation of approximately $200,000 of law-firm funds from as many 
as 17 clients); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Osipow (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 338, 340, 626 
N.E.2d 935 (indefinite suspension for failing to report fees to firm, 
misrepresenting expenses, and misappropriating client and law-firm funds). 
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we accept the board’s recommended sanction and 
therefore indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law in Ohio.  We 
also accept the board’s recommended conditions on respondent’s petitioning for 
reinstatement except for the condition that respondent be in compliance with the 
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terms of her probation.  Rather, we require that she must complete all court-
imposed probation prior to petitioning for reinstatement. 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(10), 
respondent must upon petitioning for reinstatement show that (1) she has entered 
into a contract with OLAP and is in compliance with its requirements, (2) she has 
completed all court-imposed probation, (3) she is in compliance with the 
settlement agreement between her and Federal Insurance Company and is current 
on her payment of restitution, and (4) she has received a prognosis from a 
qualified health-care professional or alcohol/substance-abuse counselor that 
respondent is able to return to the competent, ethical, professional practice of law.  
Finally, we grant respondent credit for time served under the February 17, 2009 
interim suspension. 
{¶ 17} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Nathan A. Ray and Vincent Alfera, for relator. 
 
Charles E. Grisi, for respondent. 
______________________