Title: FLOYD CRAWFORD v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FLOYD CRAWFORD v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 76701 P.2d 1150Case Number: 84-199Decided: 06/25/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
FLOYD CRAWFORD, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Martin J. 
McClain, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, and 
Victoria G. Huntoon, Laramie, for appellant 
(defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John Renneisen, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.     

[¶1.]     Appellant Floyd 
Crawford appeals his conviction, which was based on a plea of guilty, and 
alleges error as follows:

"1. Did the Trial Court 
err in change of plea and sentencing hearing because it did not comply with 
W.R.Cr.P. 15 which requires the guilty plea be set aside?

"2. Did the Trial Court 
correctly determine that Appellant's guilty plea which it accepted was 
voluntarily given?"

[¶2.]     We will reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     We need not address the 
voluntariness issue because of our determination of the first 
issue.

[¶4.]     Appellant was convicted 
of first-degree sexual assault in violation of § 6-2-301(a)(i), W.S. 1977. 
Appellant's arraignment commenced January 10, 1984, and was continued until 
January 13, 1984, so that the State could amend the information.1 Appellant pled not guilty on 
January 13, 1984. On March 14, 1984, appellant changed his plea to not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of mental deficiency or mental 
illness.

[¶5.]     Appellant was admitted 
to the StateHospital pursuant to § 
7-11-301 et seq., W.S. 1977. It was determined by hospital personnel that 
appellant was "not mentally ill or deficient," and also that he was "not 
mentally ill or deficient at the time of the alleged criminal 
action."

[¶6.]     Later a plea bargain 
was agreed upon and on the 13th day of July, 1984, appellant withdrew his plea 
of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental deficiency or mental illness 
and entered a plea of guilty.2 

Appellant waived 
the presentence investigation report and the court proceeded to impose 
sentence.

[¶7.]     Rule 15(c), Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:

"(c) Advice to defendant. 
- Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address 
the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he 
understands, the following:

"(1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; 
and

"(2) If the defendant is 
not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an 
attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one 
will be appointed to represent him; and

"(3) That he has the 
right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been 
made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the 
right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; 
and

"(4) That if he pleads 
guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that 
by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; 
and

"(5) That if he pleads 
guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to 
which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the 
record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against 
him in the prosecution for perjury or false statement."

[¶8.]     The trial court failed 
to comply with Rule 15(c) at the change-of-plea hearing; that is, the record of 
the July 13, 1984, hearing does not contain the advice required to be given 
according to Rule 15(c) before a defendant's guilty plea is 
accepted.

[¶9.]     The requirements of 
Rule 15(e), W.R. Cr.P., were not met; that is, the plea agreement was not 
disclosed on the record nor was it accepted on the record and appellant so 
advised.3 If the advice given by the trial 
court at the January 10, January 13, March 14, and July 13 proceedings were 
joined, it is possible Rule 15(c), W.R.Cr.P., may have been substantially 
complied with. The state does not contend, however, that the court complied with 
Rule 15(c) at the time the guilty plea was accepted or even that the trial court 
advised appellant of his rights in installments. The state contends, however, 
that the deficiencies in the advice required by Rules 15(c) and 15(e) do not 
require reversal. We disagree.

[¶10.]  The effect of noncompliance with Rule 
15(c) was discussed in Hoggatt v. 
State, Wyo., 606 P.2d 718, 724-725 
(1980):

"A condition precedent to 
our acceptance of the proposition that an accused has effectively changed his 
plea from not guilty to guilty, and thus made up an issue upon which judgment 
could be entered and sentence pronounced, is a showing on the record that Rule 
15, W.R. Cr.P., has been complied with. The reason for this is that the 
informing process which furnishes a basis for a change of plea goes to the 
guarantee of the accused's constitutional rights of due process. Until those 
rights have been protected by the Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., mandatory ritual, there is 
nothing which will permit the judge on the record to reach a rational and 
informed conclusion that the defendant exercised his prerogatives voluntarily 
and with an understanding of what his decision would bring. * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"To fail to comply with 
the strictures of this rule is to deny the defendant his constitutional right of 
due process of law. This rule is mandatory. Failure to strictly adhere to Rule 
15, W.R.Cr.P., will inevitably result in reversal, as it must 
here."

[¶11.]  In Cardenas v. Meacham, Wyo., 
545 P.2d 632, 639-640 (1976), we said:

"* * * In order to comply 
with Rule 15 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court, before the 
plea is entered, must determine if there has been a bargain made with respect to 
the plea. If there has, it must be made a part of the record. The court must 
then inquire of the defendant if the purported bargain is as he understood it to 
be when making his plea decision. The court must explain the bargain's effect 
with respect to maximum sentence and its effect on concurrent or consecutive 
sentencing, if that be a part of the bargain, and all other aspects of the 
agreement must be reviewed by the court with the defendant. The court must make 
known to the defendant whether there is anything about the bargain which is 
abhorrent to the court or which violates any aspect of the sentence which the 
court intends to impose. If the bargain purports to improperly bind the court, 
the defendant should know this and should be told that the court will not be 
bound by any such impropriety.

"In other words, every 
aspect of the bargain and the court's reaction to it should be reviewed at the 
Bar on the record before the plea is received so that the record will forever 
reflect that it was made voluntarily by the defendant and with a full 
understanding of its consequences."

We reluctantly 
reverse this case because of the court's failure to comply with Rules 15(c) and 
15(e), W.R.Cr.P.4 Our reversal is based principally 
on the authority of the Hoggatt and Cardenas cases. Furthermore, we hold that 
attempted compliance with Rule 15(c) by advising appellant of his rights by 
installments is insufficient. The advice required by Rule 15(c) must be given at 
the time a plea of guilty is accepted. The State, while not contending that 
there was no error, urges that we adopt a harmless error rule similar to that 
recognized by some federal circuit courts. We decline to address a harmless 
error rule at this time, noting that the state has not demonstrated that this 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we will wait until a proper 
case is before us to discuss such a rule.

[¶12.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 The amended information 
added a paragraph alleging a previous conviction of a crime similar to the crime 
charged in the original information, thus subjecting appellant to an enhanced 
punishment. Section 6-2-306(b)(ii), W.S. 1977.

2 At the change-of-plea 
hearing on July 13, 1984, a plea bargain was mentioned but its terms were not 
disclosed. However, the court signed an order reciting a plea agreement and 
dismissed the second paragraph of the information which pertained to enhanced 
punishment provided for by § 6-2-306(b)(ii).

3 Rule 15(e)(2) and (3), 
W.R.Cr.P.:

"(2) Notice of Such 
Agreement. - If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court 
shall, on the record, require the 
disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause in camera, at the time the plea is 
offered. Thereupon the court may accept 
or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or 
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence 
report.

"(3) Acceptance of a Plea 
Agreement. - If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the 
defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition 
provided for in the plea agreement."

4 We say we are reluctant 
to reverse because in appellant's folksy account of the factual basis for his 
plea of guilty, it is clear that he committed the crime charged. Appellant has 
never claimed he was not guilty except a perfunctory plea to that 
effect.