Title: State v. John P. Greeley

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN P. GREELEY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 22, 2003 -- Decided On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 354 N.J. Super. 432 (2002). Joseph P. Connor, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Michael M. Rubbinaccio, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney). John P. Greeley argued the cause pro se. Justice ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns the right of a defendant, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(c), to an independent blood-alcohol test after being arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Specifically, we must decide whether the police violate that right by refusing to release, except to the care of a relative or friend, a defendant whose station-house test reveals a blood-alcohol level in excess of the legal limit. In vacating defendant s conviction, the Appellate Division determined that the police, in enforcing that policy, violated defendant s statutory right to an independent test. State v. Greeley, 354 N.J. Super. 432, 441 (2002). Because we find that neither the policy at issue here nor its administration in the circumstances of this case impermissibly encroached on that statutory right, and because the policy protects the safety of both defendants and the public, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate defendant s conviction. Beyond the need to inform an arrestee of the right to a copy of the test results and that he or she is permitted to have an independent test performed, the statute sets forth no other affirmative duties on the part of the police. Nevertheless, in a series of reported opinions, the Appellate Division has instructed that the police may not thwart the right to an independent test through arbitrary actions or policies that otherwise would render the statutory right meaningless. In State v. Ettore, 228 N.J. Super. 25, 30 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 473 (1989), the court considered a policy that provided that [u]ntil the blood alcohol level of the charged driver fell below the legal limit, he or she could be released only to a responsible escort. The defendant moved to suppress the test results on the ground that the police had deprived him of his statutory right to an independent test. Id. at 27. The court, however, concluded that [t]here is nothing unreasonable or arbitrary about such a policy considering the possible consequences of permitting an intoxicated defendant to proceed unattended by one responsible for his or her safety. Id. at 30. Accordingly, it refused to suppress the breathalyzer results because the policy afforded the defendant reasonable access to an independent test. Id. at 31. On another occasion, the Appellate Division elaborated on the notion of reasonable access. State v. Hicks, 228 N.J. Super. 541 (1988), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 324 (1990). In Hicks, the defendant alleged that the police had refused to allow him to use a telephone to arrange for a private test. Id. at 544. The court explained that the statutory right to have an independent examination . . . would be meaningless if there are no means to implement the statute. Id. at 549. Consequently, the denial of access to a telephone thwarts the exercise of that right. Id. at 550. However, because the record was not clear as to the purpose for which defendant sought to use the phone -- i.e., to call his wife, his lawyer, or his physician -- the court remanded without deciding whether suppression was warranted. Id. at 551. In State v. Jalkiewicz, 303 N.J. Super. 430, 432 (App. Div. 1997), the police informed the defendant of the right to an independent test, but had no specific procedures in place concerning a defendant s request for an independent blood test. Consequently, the police provided no further information as to how such a test could be obtained, although they summoned a taxi at the defendant s request. Ibid. After being released, the defendant simply asked the taxi driver to take him home and did not seek a test. Ibid. The defendant contended that the lack of procedures concerning an independent test warranted suppression of the breathalyzer results. Ibid. The court, however, determined that the absence of procedures, alone, does not require suppression. Id. at 434. Instead, it ruled that a challenge to BAC test results would be upheld only when the inadequacy of police procedures has interfered with or thwarted defendant s attempt to exercise the right to an independent examination. Ibid. That is, the police have no statutory duty to assist in procuring a test; rather, the question is whether the absence of a policy relating to independent BAC tests affirmatively interferes with a defendant s pursuit of such a test. Accordingly, the court found that in summoning a taxi at the defendant s request, the police fulfilled any duty they had. Id. at 435. From the above case law, then, the following principles emerge. A police policy of releasing a DWI arrestee only to a responsible relative or friend is reasonable in light of the risks posed by an intoxicated person to himself and the public. In the absence of such a policy, so long as a defendant is informed of the right to an independent test, police conduct will warrant suppression of BAC test results only if that conduct affirmatively interferes with or thwarts a defendant s good-faith attempt to obtain an independent test. It is illogical to conclude that the Legislature was sufficiently concerned with the release of intoxicated motorists to provide immunity from tort liability only when the police release such persons in positions of relative safety and refuge, but chose to preserve what would amount to an absolute right of an intoxicated DWI arrestee to be released, unescorted. Instead, reading these statutes in pari materia, we find that the Legislature has manifested an overarching concern regarding the release of intoxicated persons and has chosen to limit the circumstances in which police properly may release such persons. Although neither the Appellate Division nor defendant (who argued this appeal pro se) raised the issue, we are mindful of the Senate Judiciary Committee Statement that accompanies N.J.S.A. 59:5-6. We address its language because it may appear contrary to our analysis of the Legislature s intent. The Statement reads in relevant part: Police officers do not have the authority to detain defendants who are charged with driving under the influence, or their passengers, after the defendant has been processed. These people must be released upon request. This bill does not change the state of the law. It merely provides immunity from civil liability for injuries drivers or their passengers sustain following their release from custody. The committee amendments provide that there will be immunity from liability if the driver or occupant is released from police custody or detention after reasonable precautions have been taken so that they are released in a position of relative safety and refuge. Committee statements are useful in interpreting ambiguous language, but in all cases considered judgment as to the weight to be accorded them must be exercised. Howard Sav. Inst. v. Kielb, 38 N.J. 186, 195 (1962); State v. San Vito, 133 N.J. Super. 508, 511 (App. Div. 1975). The comment s explanation that, in order to enjoy full immunity, the police must release arrestees only after reasonable precautions have been taken is anchored in the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 59:5-6. However, the comment s observations that the police do not have the authority to detain defendants and that drivers and passengers must be released upon request are not rooted in the statute. Moreover, this language is inconsistent with that included elsewhere in the comment and in the statute that requires police officers to undertake reasonable precautions before releasing persons from custody. Further, the Statement refers to the then-existing state of the law. At the time this language was promulgated, the Appellate Division had decided Ettore, supra, 228 N.J. Super. at 25. Presuming, as we must, the Legislature s familiarity with judicial declarations relating to its laws, we conclude that the Senate Judiciary Committee understood that police had the authority to detain a still-intoxicated motorist until a responsible escort is procured. In view of its internal inconsistency and explicit reference to the prevailing state of the law, the Statement cannot be said to evince a legislative intent to contravene the authority of the police to release an intoxicated motorist only to a relative or friend. Understood in full context, the Statement does not detract from the plain language of N.J.S.A. 59:5-6, which manifests a clear intention that, to avoid potential liability, the police must release intoxicated motorists only after taking necessary precautions. We add only that N.J.S.A. 40:48-1.3 has recently been amended. L. 2003, c. 164, 1. This change empowers municipal governments to pass ordinances allowing the police to detain DWI arrestees until their BAC decreases to .05% or for eight hours, whichever occurs first. Ibid. In light of accepted canons of statutory construction, as noted above, it is clear that the Legislature does not intend to preserve the right to an independent BAC test without regard to the dangers posed by the release of still-intoxicated arrestees. Although this recent change does not address the question of legislative intent before its passage, the laws existing at the time of defendant s arrest, read in pari materia, compels our conclusion that a policy of releasing an intoxicated DWI arrestee only to persons responsible for the arrestee s conduct strikes a proper balance between the right to an independent BAC test and the continuing duty of the police to safeguard the public. In sum, we endorse the approach, originally announced in Ettore, that a policy of releasing an intoxicated DWI arrestee only to a responsible friend or relative provides a reasonable opportunity to secure an independent BAC test. Such a policy properly takes into account the dangers such an intoxicated person poses both to himself and to the public. Accordingly, the police need do no more than provide a defendant access to a telephone so that he may arrange for such an escort. If a defendant fails in that attempt, police do not violate a defendant s statutory right by detaining him until he becomes sober enough to no longer present a danger to himself or others. NO. A-48 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN P. GREELEY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED November 13, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY