Title: Harris v. Price

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LILA HARRIS,1  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 59, 2016 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Family Court of  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
SCOTT A. PRICE, 
 
 
§  
File No. 13-03-11TN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Pet. No. 13-08599 
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 17, 2016 
Decided: 
July 7, 2016 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
   ORDER 
 
 
This 7th day of July 2016, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Lila Harris (“Mother”), has appealed the Family 
Court’s order dated January 27, 2016, terminating her parental rights in her 
daughters born in 2004 and 2008 (collectively, the “Children”).  The petition to 
terminate parental rights (“TPR”) was filed by the Children’s father, Scott A. Price 
(“Father”), and was based on Mother’s alleged abandonment of the Children.   
                                          
 
1 By Order dated February 8, 2016, the Court assigned pseudonyms to the parties.  Del. Supr. Ct. 
R. 7(d). 
2 
 
 
(2) 
Mother opposed the TPR petition and was granted counsel at State 
expense to represent her in the proceedings.  The Family Court also appointed a 
guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the Children.2 
 
(3) 
Mother’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a no-merit brief and 
a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c).3  Counsel states that after 
making a complete and careful review of the Family Court record, she could find 
no meritorious issues to raise on appeal.  The brief includes an arguably appealable 
issue for the Court’s consideration. 
 
(4) 
Counsel provided Mother with a copy of the no-merit brief and the 
motion to withdraw and informed Mother that she had a right to supplement the 
brief and to file a response to the motion.  Mother did not supplement the brief 
with additional issues for the Court’s consideration and did not respond to the 
motion to withdraw.  In response to Counsel’s submission, Father has moved to 
affirm the Family Court’s judgment. 
 
(5) 
When considering a TPR petition, the Family Court first must 
determine whether there is a statutory basis for termination.4  If the court finds a 
statutory basis for termination, the court then must determine whether termination 
                                          
 
2 The guardian ad litem participated in the proceedings but did not take a position on the TPR 
petition.  Also, the guardian ad litem did not participate in this appeal. 
3 Mother was represented by different counsel in the Family Court. 
4 See 13 Del. C. § 1103 (governing grounds for termination of parental rights).  Shepherd v. 
Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 537 (Del. 2000). 
3 
 
of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.5  Also, in this case, because 
Father was not remarried and was not seeking termination for the purpose of 
adoption, the court was required to determine whether continuing Mother’s 
parental rights would be harmful to the Children.6  The burden was on Father to 
prove all of the required elements by clear and convincing evidence.7 
 
(6) 
The record reflects that the parties entered into a written stipulation in 
March 2014 under which they agreed, first, that Mother’s abandonment of the 
Children provided a statutory basis for termination8 and second, that they would 
provide the Children with a therapist who would make a recommendation on 
whether future contact with Mother would be in the best interest of the Children or 
whether such contact would be harmful to the Children.  After some initial 
difficulties, which delayed the process, Father found a therapist who was willing to 
work with the Children and provide a recommendation.  The therapist had eighteen 
sessions with the Children, beginning in March 2015.  The therapist also met with 
Mother individually one time and with Mother and Father jointly one time. 
 
(7) 
The parties appeared at a hearing on the TPR petition on September 
23, 2015.  During the course of the hearing, the Family Court admitted 
                                          
 
5 Id.  See 13 Del. C. § 722(a)(1)-(8) (listing best interest factors). 
6 § 1103(b) (“Unless adoption is contemplated, the termination of 1 parent’s rights shall not be 
granted if the effect will be to leave only 1 parent holding parental rights, unless the Court shall 
find the continuation of the rights to be terminated will be harmful to the child.”).   
7 In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995). 
8 § 1103(a)(2)b. 
4 
 
documentary evidence and heard testimony from the parties, the therapist, and a 
social worker who conducted a home study and prepared a social report. 
 
(8) 
The therapist recounted her sessions with the Children as well as her 
individual session with Mother and joint session with Mother and Father.  The 
therapist testified that Mother did not ask any questions about the Children’s well-
being, which the therapist found concerning, and that Mother became defensive at 
times, which suggested to the therapist that Mother had unresolved issues possibly 
related to her ongoing recovery from drug addiction.  The therapist testified that 
she believed that any contact with Mother, even in a therapeutic setting, would not 
be good for the Children because the Children had effectively grieved the loss of 
their mother and were doing very well.  The therapist advised against the Children 
having contact with Mother for the foreseeable future, and she advised that it 
would be especially harmful for the Children if Mother was to reenter their lives 
and then leave them again.  
 
(9) 
Mother testified that she has “a very aggressive drug addiction”9 as 
well as issues with mental illness, but that she was in recovery and receiving 
effective mental health treatment.  Mother told the court that she currently was in a 
methadone program, and that she was being treated by a psychiatrist and was 
taking medications for bipolar disorder and PTSD.  Mother testified that she had a 
                                          
 
9 Hr’g Tr. at 185 (Sept. 23, 2015). 
5 
 
baby in 2012, and that she was living in a stable household with the child, the 
child’s father to whom she was engaged, and her fiancé’s mother.  Mother told the 
court that she was willing to work within the therapeutic setting to establish contact 
with the Children. 
 
(10) At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Family Court took 
the matter under advisement.  In a twenty-two page “amended order” dated 
January 27, 2016, the court granted the TPR petition and terminated Mother’s 
parental rights.10  The court found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that 
terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Children and 
that continuing parental rights would be harmful to the Children.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
(11) When reviewing a decision on a TPR petition, the Court is required to 
consider the facts and the law as well as the inferences and deductions made by the 
Family Court.11  To the extent rulings of law are implicated, our review is de 
novo.12  To the extent issues implicate rulings of fact, we conduct a limited review 
of the Family Court’s factual findings to assure they are sufficiently supported by 
                                          
 
10 The order, which originally issued on November 19, 2015, was reissued as an amended order 
on January 27, 2016 when it became apparent that Mother’s counsel did not receive the original 
order in a timely fashion.   
11 Wilson v. Div. of Family Serv., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010) (citing cases). 
12 Id. at 440. 
6 
 
the record and are not clearly wrong.13  This Court will not disturb inferences and 
deductions that are supported by the record and the product of an orderly and 
logical deductive process.14  If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our 
review is limited to abuse of discretion.15 
 
(12) The Court has considered the arguably appealable issue identified by 
Counsel—that the Family Court placed too much emphasis on the therapist’s 
testimony and not enough emphasis on Mother’s testimony when considering 
whether to terminate Mother’s parental rights.  The issue is without merit.  It was 
within the court’s discretion, when weighing the evidence, to give more weight to 
the therapist’s testimony than to Mother’s testimony. 
 
(13) After carefully considering the parties’ submissions on appeal and the 
Family Court record, including the transcript of the TPR hearing, the Court has 
concluded that the judgment of the Family Court should be affirmed.  There is 
clear and convincing evidence in the record supporting the court’s termination of 
Mother’s parental rights.  From the court’s thorough and thoughtful decision of 
January 27, 2016, it is apparent that the court carefully considered all of the 
evidence, made the required factual findings on the basis of clear and convincing 
evidence, and applied the correct legal standard when making the difficult decision 
                                          
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
7 
 
to terminate Mother’s parental rights.  This Court can discern no abuse of 
discretion in the factual findings and no error in the court’s application of the law 
to the facts.  We are satisfied that Counsel made a conscientious effort to examine 
the record and the law and properly determined that Mother could not raise a 
meritorious claim on appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
           Justice