Title: Miliha Ferluckaj v. Goldman Sachs & Co./Goldman Sachs & Co. v. American Building Maintenance Co.

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 45  
Miliha Ferluckaj,
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Goldman Sachs & Co., 
            Appellant, 
Henegan Construction Co., Inc.
            Defendant.
--------------------------------
Goldman Sachs & Co.,
        Third-Party Plaintiff, 
        v. 
American Building Maintenance 
Co.,
        Third-Party Defendant.
Christine Bernstock, for appellant.
Michael J. Gaffney, for respondent.
Defense Association of New York, amicus curiae.
SMITH, J.:
Plaintiff fell off a desk on which she was standing
while cleaning the inside of an office building window, in space
leased to defendant Goldman Sachs & Co.  We hold that, because
uncontroverted evidence shows that Goldman did not hire
plaintiff's employer to clean the window and that Goldman
exercised no control over plaintiff's work, Goldman is not liable
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No. 45
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to plaintiff under Labor Law § 240 (1).  Supreme Court and the
Appellate Division erred in denying Goldman's motion for summary
judgment.  
The building in question is at 32 Old Slip, in
Manhattan.  Goldman leased a number of floors from the building's
owner, Paramount Group, Inc.  Paramount hired third party
defendant, American Building Maintenance Co. (ABM), to provide
cleaning and janitorial services.  Among ABM's duties under its
contract with Paramount was to clean the building's windows every
three months.  Tenants, including Goldman, could and sometimes
did contract directly with ABM for "special services," but window
cleaning was not treated as a special service.  It was provided
by Paramount to Goldman in exchange for the rent.
Plaintiff, an ABM employee, fell while she was cleaning
a window on a floor that Goldman had not yet occupied.  Goldman
was scheduled to, and did, begin moving in on the day after the
accident.  Plaintiff claims, and we assume it to be true, that
the cleaning she was working on was not a regular quarterly
cleaning, but a special "preoccupancy" cleaning, to get the space
ready for Goldman's use.  Preoccupancy cleanings, however, were
also provided for in the Paramount-ABM contract, which requires
ABM to provide such cleanings without extra cost to Paramount:
"Prior to tenant occupancy, contractor shall provide the initial
cleaning or [sic] all interior windows for which there will be no
charge to Paramount Group, Inc. or tenant."  
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There is no evidence in the record that Goldman hired
ABM to perform either a regular quarterly cleaning or a
preoccupancy cleaning.  The contractor that Goldman used to do
renovation work on the space, defendant Henegan Construction Co.,
Inc., did not subcontract any work to ABM.  
In sum, the evidence points clearly and without
contradiction to the conclusion that it was Paramount, not
Goldman, that hired ABM to do the project on which plaintiff was
working when she fell.  Plaintiff does not claim that Goldman in
fact supervised her work.  Goldman therefore has no liability to
plaintiff under Labor Law § 240 (1).  The statute says:
"All contractors and owners and their agents,
except owners of one and two-family dwellings
who contract for but do not direct or control
the work, in the erection, demolition,
repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or
pointing of a building or structure shall
furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or
erected for the performance of such labor,
scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings,
hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons,
ropes, and other devices which shall be so
constructed, placed and operated as to give
proper protection to a person so employed."
This statute places a duty on "contractors and owners
and their agents."  It says nothing about lessees.  That does not
necessarily mean lessees can never be liable.  Appellate Division
cases have said that lessees who hire a contractor, and thus have
the right to control the work being done, are "owners" within the
meaning of the statute (Frierson v Concourse Plaza Assoc., 189
AD2d 609, 611 [1st Dept 1993]); Sweeting v Board of Coop. Educ.
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Servs., 83 AD2d 103, 114 [4th Dept 1981]; cf. Bart v Universal
Pictures, 277 AD2d 4, 6 [1st Dept 2000] [occupant of space with
power to control the work held "an agent of the fee owner"]).  We
assume, without deciding, that these cases are right, but they do
not apply here.  ABM was hired by the landlord, Paramount, not by
Goldman, so there is no basis for holding Goldman to be an owner
or owner's agent (see Guzman v L.M.P. Realty Corp., 262 AD2d 99
[1st Dept 1999]).  
Plaintiff concedes that she cannot prevail if Goldman
had no right to control ABM's work, but she says that the facts
are not clear enough to justify granting Goldman summary
judgment.  She points out that, under the contract between
Paramount and ABM, preoccupancy cleaning was to be done "upon
request of Paramount," and notes that the record contains no
direct evidence of a "request."  Though it is clear that
Goldman's contractor, Henegan, did not hire ABM to do this work,
plaintiff speculates that, for some reason, Goldman might have
done so directly.  Plaintiff emphasizes that Goldman did not
submit an affidavit denying that such a transaction occurred.  
We find plaintiff's theorizing -- and the somewhat more
elaborate theories offered by the dissent -- insufficient to
defeat summary judgment.  The idea that Goldman chose to hire ABM
at its own expense, when ABM was already contractually obligated
to Paramount to do the work for free, is farfetched.  And if that
did happen, plaintiff had an ample opportunity to show it.  After
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taking discovery, she has unearthed no record of any payment for
this service from Goldman to ABM, or any relevant communication
between the two.
The burden of a party moving for summary judgment is to
"make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324
[1986]).  The moving party need not specifically disprove every
remotely possible state of facts on which its opponent might win
the case.  Goldman's showing here was adequate to shift the
burden to plaintiff "to produce evidentiary proof ... sufficient
to establish the existence of material issues of fact" (id.). 
Plaintiff has not carried that burden.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed with costs, summary judgment granted dismissing the
complaint as against Goldman Sachs & Co., and the certified
question answered in the negative.
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Miliha Ferluckaj v Goldman Sachs & Co., and Henegan Construction
Co., Inc.
No. 45
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting) :
We have held time and time again that summary judgment
should not be granted when there is "any doubt" (Sillman v
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957]) as to
the existence of a triable issue or when the issue is "arguable" 
(id.; Barrett v Jacobs, 255 NY 520, 522 [1931]).  "[I]f the issue
is fairly debatable a motion for summary judgment must be denied"
(Stone v Goodson, 8 NY2d 8, 12 [1960]).  In other words, if it is
reasonable to disagree about the material facts or about what may
be inferred from undisputed facts, summary judgment may not be
granted.  Moreover, in deciding whether there is a material
triable issue of fact, "the facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party" (Matter of Council of
City of N.Y. v Bloomberg, 6 NY3d 380, 401 [2006]), citing
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574,
587 [1986]).  It follows that a split decision, such as this one,
in which appellate judges disagree about what disputed facts may
be inferred from undisputed facts, should be extremely rare.
A summary judgment motion is governed by a well-
established shifting of the burden of proof.  The movant's
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failure to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law "requires a denial of the motion, regardless
of the sufficiency of the opposing papers" and it is only if the
movant succeeds in making this showing that the burden shifts to
the party opposing the motion (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d
320, 324 [1986]).  Here, Goldman Sachs failed to sustain its
initial burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to
summary judgment.  
Under New York case law that the majority does not
question, a lessee is liable pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) if
it has "the right to control the work being done" (maj opn at 3,
citing Sweeting v Board of Co-op Educational Services, 83 AD2d
103, 114 [4th Dept 1981], lv denied 56 NY2d 503 [1982]; Frierson
v Concourse Plaza Associates, 189 AD2d 609, 611 [1st Dept 1993]);
Bart v Universal Pictures, 277 AD2d 4, 5 [1st Dept 2000]).  The
key question is whether "defendant had the right to insist that
proper safety practices were followed . . . it is the right to
control the work that is significant, not the actual exercise or
nonexercise of control" (Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 567 [2d
Dept 1984], citing Sweeting, 83 AD2d at 114).  "[E]vidence that
the lessee actually hired the general contractor" is relevant to
establishing the right to control, as are "contractual or
statutory provisions granting such right" (Bart, 277 AD2d at 5). 
The question for this Court is whether Goldman tendered
sufficient evidence to eliminate any issue of fact concerning
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whether it had the right to control plaintiff's work.  In my
view, it did not.
Here, the majority relies exclusively on one document,
a "Services Agreement" between Paramount Group, Inc., the
building's owner, and American Building Maintenance Co. ("ABM"),
entered into as of June 1, 1997.  An appendix to the contract,
titled "Exhibit 'C' Specifications" -- describing the "base
building cleaning specifications" in regard to window cleaning --
provides that "[p]rior to tenant occupancy, [ABM] shall provide
the initial cleaning [of] all interior windows for which there
will be no charge to Paramount Group, Inc. or tenant.  Work to be
performed upon request of Paramount Group Inc."  The majority
infers from this single provision that Ferluckaj, who was
cleaning the interior side of an exterior window, just prior to
occupancy by Goldman, was doing so pursuant to Paramount's
orders.  This inferential leap cannot be reconciled with the
well-established standards of summary judgment outlined above.
The majority writes that "[t]he idea that Goldman chose
to hire ABM at its own expense, when ABM was already
contractually obligated to Paramount to do the work for free, is
farfetched" (maj opn at 4).  I cannot agree.  Far from answering
the dispositive question, of who ordered the cleaning, as a
matter of law, the Services Agreement raises several questions. 
Contrary to the majority's suggestion that window cleaning was
not treated as a special service that tenants could contract
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No. 45-dis
1 Similarly, ABM manager Al Hoti, who was deposed, had no
firsthand knowledge of preoccupancy events, because he began work
at ABM in September 2001.  Hoti testified that did not know
whether ABM provided additional services to Goldman in March
2001.
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directly with ABM for (maj opn at 2), the Services Agreement
expressly states, in a section titled "Special Services Required
by Tenants," that "[a]dditional window cleaning" is one of the
extra services that tenants may request and for which they will
be directly charged by ABM.  
At his deposition, Robert Barriero, a corporate
services vice-president at Goldman, testified that in his
understanding "[a]dditional window cleaning" referred to the
cleaning of "[i]nterior glass," such as might be found in an
interior doorway.  And he insisted that, while Goldman hired ABM
directly during occupancy to perform additional cleaning and
maintenance services such as carpet cleaning and pantry
maintenance, it did not hire ABM to do any window cleaning. 
Barriero's testimony is, however, of limited value with respect
to preoccupancy events.  His knowledge of the "base building
cleaning specifications" and the "special services" was confined
to their postoccupancy implementation.  In fact, Barriero
admitted he was unaware of the preoccupancy renovations.1  
Barriero's testimony was of limited use for another
reason -- Goldman outsourced its management services at the time
in question to a company, Hines Interests Limited, that entered
into and maintained all the contracts for services provided to
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Goldman at the building.  Hines, as Goldman's agent, entered into
contracts for services not provided by the base building cleaning
specifications contract, including the additional postoccupancy
cleaning and maintenance services.  Barriero testified that, if
there were records concerning the purchase of additional ABM
cleaning services by Goldman, they would not be in his
possession.  It remains undisputed that, under the Services
Agreement, special window cleaning by ABM could be separately
contracted for.
The Services Agreement is puzzling in another way.  As
the majority notes, ABM's postoccupancy duties included cleaning
the building's windows once every three months.  The pertinent
provision states that ABM shall "[w]ash and clean all interior
and exterior of windows and frames . . . on every floor every
three [3] months."  By contrast, the preoccupancy provision
specifies "all interior windows," omitting the possessive.  As
the majority reads it, the contract envisages three-monthly
cleaning of the interior and exterior sides of all windows, plus
an initial preoccupancy cleaning that would include the interior
sides of exterior windows.  This is a reasonable interpretation,
but it is by no means the only reasonable one.
An alternative reading of the agreement is both literal
and plausible.  It is that there will be three-monthly cleaning
of the interior and exterior sides of all windows, plus an
initial preoccupancy cleaning of interior windows -- glass panels
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neither side of which is outside the building.  These would be
precisely the windows that Barriero testified would not be
included in "base building cleaning" and would normally be the
subject of a separate contract between tenant and ABM.  This
interpretation makes sense of the clause that provides that
"there will be no charge to Paramount Group, Inc. or tenant" for
this cleaning.  Since the context is a list of base building
cleaning services that are provided to tenants at the owner's
expense, the added language specifying that there will be no
charge in this one instance is odd.  It is explicable if it
refers to a service that would normally, postoccupancy, be
regarded as an additional service to be paid by the tenant.  I
conclude that it is reasonable to doubt whether the Services
Agreement provided for preoccupancy cleaning of the interior
sides of exterior windows. 
Moreover, under the Services Agreement, the only
preoccupancy cleaning of any kind that ABM contracted to do was
"the initial cleaning [of] all interior windows."  That seems a
peculiar choice of item to clean prior to a tenant moving in. 
One would expect an owner to require the cleaning service it
contracts with to carry out further services, such as carpet
shampooing, wall washing and dusting, before a tenant moves in. 
Moreover, Goldman retained defendant Henegan Construction Co.,
Inc., as construction manager, to supervise a "complete
renovation" of the floor on which Ferluckaj's accident occurred,
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prior to occupancy.  The accident occurred after the renovation
and immediately before occupancy.  In these circumstances, unless
Henegan and its subcontractors could be relied on to clean up the
dust and dirt that their work created (as opposed to the large
pieces of debris associated with construction work that laborers
would normally remove themselves), extensive cleaning would have
to be performed by ABM.  In short, there was a large amount of
preoccupancy cleaning that ABM was not contractually obliged to
do, under the Services Agreement, but which any corporate tenant
would surely have expected.  
Either the Services Agreement incompletely describes
the responsibilities of ABM or tenants contracted separately with
ABM for preoccupancy cleaning.  We do not know whether Goldman
had to hire ABM at its own expense to clean carpets, walls, doors
and ceilings, between the renovation and occupancy.  (Goldman was
required by its lease to use ABM for any additional cleaning
services.)  If it did, it likely contracted with ABM for
preoccupancy cleaning of the interior sides of exterior windows,
including those Ferluckaj was cleaning when she fell.  I note
that ABM was accustomed to doing additional window cleaning work,
over and above the base building specifications.  Al Hoti, an ABM
manager, testified that, although the postoccupancy cleaning of
the interior sides of exterior windows was part of base building
cleaning, nevertheless "it all depends how many cycles [of
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cleaning] the contract calls for . . . if a tenant requests . . .
more cleaning, then [ABM] can get more cleaning done."  
We simply do not know which contract governed
Ferluckaj's cleaning, because discovery did not answer that
question.  This would be a very different case if Goldman had
produced an affidavit stating that the cleaning was done pursuant
to the Services Agreement.  Then Ferluckaj, if she failed to
respond to that affidavit, might be deemed to admit it (Kuehne &
Nagel, Inc. v Baiden, 36 NY2d 539, 544 [1975]).  But Goldman
produced no such affidavit, and, as noted above, the relevant
deposition testimony mainly concerned postoccupancy events,
shedding no light on who ordered the preoccupancy cleaning.
Because, having read the Services Agreement, as well as
the deposition transcripts and affidavits submitted by the
parties in their summary judgment motions, I still have
considerable "doubt" (Sillman, 3 NY2d at 404) as to whether
Goldman had the right to control Ferluckaj's work, I would affirm
the order of the Appellate Division, deny so much of Goldman's
motion as sought summary judgment dismissing Ferluckaj's Labor
Law § 240 (1) claim, and answer the certified question in the
affirmative.  
I conclude by noting that I would expect the majority
opinion in this case to have fairly limited precedential value. 
This is a fact-specific area of law in which almost every case is
sui generis.
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order reversed, with costs, that part of defendant Goldman Sachs
& Co.'s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's
Labor Law § 240(1) claim granted, complaint against Goldman Sachs
& Co. dismissed in the entirety, and certified question answered
in the negative.  Opinion by Judge Smith.  Judges Graffeo, Read
and Jones concur.  Judge Pigott dissents and votes to affirm in
an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick 
concur.
Decided April 2, 2009